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31 AUG 1987


SECRET (unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:mtm 5750
Ser: 00236-67 of 4 July 1967

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: Command Chronology for May 1967

1. Forwarded.


J. B. SOPER
By direction

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST;mtm 5750
Ser: 00236-67 of 4 Jul 1967

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for
1-31 May 1967

1. Forwarded.

2. This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED when
removed from the basic correspondence.

R. B. Neville
R. B. NEVILLE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

3:HIST:mtm
5750
Ser: 00236-67
4 JUL 1967

SECRET -- Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31 May 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31 May 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.


DONAL D. ROBERTSON

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 May to 31 May 1967

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATION

1st Marine Division (Rein)

MajGen H. WICKERSON, Jr.

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Chu Lai Installation Coordinator

Headquarters Bn

1st Marines (Rein)

5th Marines (-)

7th Marines (Rein)\$

11th Marines (-) (Rein)

2dBn, 5th Marines

1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)

1st Engr Bn (-)

7th Engr Bn#

9th Engr Bn#

1st SP Bn (-)

1st MT Bn

7th MT Bn (-) (Rein)

11th MT Bn

1st AmTrac Bn (-)*%

3rd AmTrac Bn (-)

7th Comm Bn (-)

1st AT Bn (-)

1st Tank Bn (-)

1st Med Bn

1st Hosp Co

1st Dental Co (-)

3rd Dental Co (-)*

* OPCON ONLY

ADCON ONLY

\$ 1st Bn, 26th Mar OPCON to 7th Mar

% 24Apr67 OPCON returned to 3rdMarDiv

BGen F. C. LAHUE

Col W. A. LEITNER

Col E. J. RADICS

Col K. J. HOUGHTON

Col G. C. CROSSFIELD II

Col G. E. NORRIS

LtCol M. C. JACKSON

LtCol D. N. MCKEON (To 20May67)

Maj B. G. LOWERY (Fr 21May67)

Maj C. O. NEWTON (To 24May67)

Maj J. M. MCKENZIE (Fr 25May67)

LtCol F. W. HARRIS III

LtCol G. A. BABE

LtCol E. H. JONES

Maj K. H. REAGAN

Maj S. H. BATCHELDER, JR.

Maj R. C. TASHJIAN

LtCol A. R. BOWMAN II

Maj F. N. VANSANT

LtCol W. M. CLELLAND

LtCol J. J. KEEFE

LtCol R. M. TAYLOR

Cdr P. D. COOPER, MC, USN

LCdr R. M. OBRIEN, MC, USN (To 3May67)

Cdr C. H. LOWERY, MC, USN (Fr 4May67)

Capt P. C. CONGLIS, DC, USN (To 24May67)

Capt T. J. PAPE, DC, USN (Fr 25 May 67)

Capt L. H. GORDONIER, DC, USN

2. LOCATION

1-31 May 1967: Danang, RVN

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3. Staff Officers

Chief of Staff
 Staff Secretary
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Compt
 Adjutant
 Air Officer
 Artillery Officer
 Band Officer
 Chaplain
 Comm-Electronics Officer
 Dental Officer

 Disbursing Officer
 Division Clubs Officer
 Division Exchange Officer
 Embarkation Officer
 Engineer Officer
 Field Historian
 Food Services Officer
 Information Services Officer
 Inspector
 Legal Officer
 Motor Transport Officer
 Naval Gunfire Officer
 Ordnance Officer
 Photographic Officer
 Postal Officer
 Provost Marshal
 Reproduction Officer
 Special Services Officer
 Supply Officer
 Surgeon
 Tank Officer

Col S. J. ALTMAN
 1stLt F. A. WATERS
 Col A. L. EMILS (To 10May67)
 Col W. R. EARNEY (Fr 11May67)
 Col S. DAVIS
 Col H. POGGEMEYER, JR.
 Col E. L. BALE, JR.
 Col D. L. MALLORY
 Col R. S. ROBERTSON
 LtCol E. R. SCHIFFMAN
 Col F. C. LANG
 Col G. E. NORRIS
 WO E. W. ELVES
 Capt D. J. CASAZZA, CHC, USN
 Col E. P. CLAUDE
 Capt P. C. CONGLIS, DC, USN (To 24May67)
 Capt T. J. PAPE (Fr 25May67)
 Maj G. W. COLBURN
 Capt R. J. PLACHY
 Capt C. E. LAND
 Maj R. PETROFF
 LtCol G. A. MERRILL
 Maj H. T. KENNEDY
 WO J. J. LAGGIS
 Capt D. R. HUDSON
 Col W. W. CURTIS
 LtCol W. T. WESTMORELAND
 Maj L. V. BARKLEY
 LCdr R. A. WHITCOMB, USN
 Maj H. SOBOL
 2dLt J. E. MCKAY
 2dLt W. NEW
 Maj D. L. DIAMOND
 2dLt J. M. WHEATLEY
 Maj J. E. FORDE
 Col P. J. DUPRE
 Capt J. J. MCGREEVY, MC, USN
 LtCol R. M. TAYLOR

4. Average Monthly Strength

	<u>USMC</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1087	23759

	<u>USN</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
139	1052

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARYPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. Replacement and Rotation of Personnel

a. Total of Marine replacements received and Marines rotated during May 1967 were:

Replacements:

Officer	80
Enlisted	2137

Rotation:

Officer	89
Enlisted	806

b. There were 6 officers and 354 enlisted personnel medically evacuated. 2 officers and 43 enlisted personnel who were previously evacuated were returned to duty. 98 personnel departed on emergency leave/permanent change of station orders.

c. A total of 2 officers and 222 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour in RVN in conjunction with the 30 day free leave policy. 5 officers and 257 enlisted personnel departed on 30 day free leave during May 1967.

2. Casualty and Graves Registration. The below casualties were sustained by units ADCON to the 1st Marine Division during May 1967.

	KIA	WIA	**DOW	MIA	CPTR	OTHER	*NON-BATTLE DEATH INJURED		**TOTAL
USMC									
OFF	5	44						1	50
ENL	164	1109	12	2		1	8	44	1328
USN									
OFF		2							2
ENL	10	41							51
TOTAL	179	1196	12	2		1	8	45	1431

* Injuries which result in absence from duty for more than 24 hours.

** DOW figures included in WIA totals and not in horizontal total.

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3. Awards. During the period 1-31 May 1967, 215 award recommendations were processed and forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. In addition, 1395 Purple Heart Medals were awarded. No Commanding General Certificates of Commendation were awarded during the period.

4. Discipline, Law and Order. The following criminal investigations were reported. Eighteen cases are presently under investigation:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Voluntary Manslaughter	1
Rape	2
Aggravated Assault	2
Larceny of Government Property	2
Larceny of Private Property	3
Vehicle Theft	2
Total	12

One hundred and twenty traffic violations were reported for the month of May 1967.

Forty-six offense reports were issued to violators as follows:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Wrongful Appropriation & Disposition of U. S. Property	3
Illegal possession of Alcohol	3
Weapons Violation	3
Failure to obey a Lawful Order	1
Curfew Violations	8
Off Limits	16
Other	12
Total	46

5. Industrial Relations

a. Current utilization totals:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>
Headquarters Battalion	70	70
Headquarters, 1st Marines	16	5
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines	10	0
Headquarters, 5th Marines	10	0
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	0
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	0
Headquarters, 7th Marines	20	20
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	10	4
Headquarters, 11th Marines	60	65

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>
3rd 8" Howitzer Battery	10	10
1st Antitank Battalion	24	21
1st Tank Battalion	18	11
3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion	18	10
7th Communication Battalion	25	24
1st Engineer Battalion	60	59
7th Engineer Battalion	88	89
9th Engineer Battalion	62	69
1st Hospital Company	14	15
1st Medical Battalion	32	28
1st Motor Transport Battalion	26	24
11th Motor Transport Battalion	33	34
1st Reconnaissance Battalion	11	11
1st Shore Party Battalion	<u>22</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL	659	589

b. Change 3 to Division Order 12000.1 has been published. It establishes new authorized ceilings for appropriated fund employees.

c. Elements of the 11th Marines are receiving employee support from Headquarters, 11th Marines.

d. A survey of all battalions as to desired ceilings indicated that the Division ceiling for appropriated fund employees should be increased to 1000.

e. Five employees attended the May Basic English Class at the Industrial Relations Training Department, Danang.

6. Personal and Morale Services

a. Chaplain. At the end of May the on-board strength of Chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division was as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Denomination</u>
17	Protestant
7	Catholic
<u>1</u>	Eastern Orthodox
TOTAL	25

The following services were conducted during the month:

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<u>Service</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number Attending</u>
Catholic Sunday Divine Services	102	4,091
Catholic Weekday Services	170	1,860
Protestant Sunday Divine Services	194	4,646
Protestant Weekday Services	87	1,282
Protestant Lay Leader	5	75
Protestant Bible Study	16	112
Lectures/Vietnamese People and Their Religion	27	1,005
Memorial Services	27	2,963

b. Division Clubs. The gross income during April was \$327,394.66. 4 officers, 6 SNCO's and 7 enlisted personnel operated the 64 clubs and 8 battalion accounts. No additional clubs are planned.

c. Exchange System. Gross sales during the month of May were \$271,875.70. 2 officers and 63 enlisted personnel operated 11 stores and 3 mobile units within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's.

d. Division Band. The Division Band performed at 4 Marine military formations and 5 other military formations. During the month of May the Division Band was furnishing twenty-eight sergeants and below for interior guard and perimeter outposts daily.

e. Informational Services. During May the Informational Services Office produced 176 news releases and 3,966 Fleet Home Town News Releases. The ISO Radio-TV section produced 300 Fleet Home Town radio tapes and 16 feature interviews for release to major radio networks in the United States.

Writer-Photographer teams covered the following named operations:

Webster
Duval

Union
Union II

The ISO representatives assigned to the Chu Lai Installation Co-ordinator staff was reassigned to Division ISO 20 May 1967. Coverage of Marine units remaining in the Chu Lai area, which were previously covered by the Task Force X-Ray ISO, are now covered by the MAC-12 ISO. Copy concerning these units is submitted through the 1st Division ISO.

f. Postal

(1) The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this command has received and dispatched during May 1967:

<u>Total Received</u>	<u>Total Dispatched</u>	<u>Total Handled</u>
1,234,613	239,650	1,474,263

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(2) The following figures represent financial business transacted during May 1967:

U. S. Money Orders and Fees	\$950,851.10
Stamps, postage and insurance sales	\$47,000.00

(3) During the month of May, 16 mail rooms were inspected with only 1 being found unsatisfactory. 12 unit post offices were inspected and audited during this period, as well as the audit of the main stamp stock retained by the Division Postal Chief.

g. Career Advisory. The following statistics represent reenlistment and extension of enlistment percentages for the month of May 1967:

(1) Reenlistment Percentages

a. First term	20.0%
b. Career	95.2%
c. Total	43.5%

(2) Extensions of enlistment executed

a. Career	6
b. Short term	45
c. Total	51

The FMFPac (Fwd) Career Advisory Team concluded their visit on 31 May 1967. They were aboard from 25 April - 31 May 1967 for the purpose of evaluating the Division's Career Advisory Program. The Career Advisory Achievement Award was presented to the Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF by the Commanding General for having the highest reenlistment percentage for the first quarter, calendar year 1967.

h. Special Services. Personnel of the 1st Marine Division were entertained during the month of May 1967 by the appearance of the following shows and/or well known personalities:

13May67 - Ink Spots
 26May67 - Carol Connors Musical Variety Show
 30May67 - Woody Hayes, Ohio State Football Coach

i. Distinguished Visitors. Distinguished persons who visited the command during May and the purpose of their visit are listed in Part III.

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION ACTIVITY1. ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

a. Services and Support. During this period the unit provided general administrative services for the G-2 Section. Primary emphasis was placed on continued improvement of the system for staffing intelligence reports and staff procedures.

b. Personnel. During the period the G-2 Section received a new manning level of 29 officers and 44 enlisted personnel. The previously authorized manning level was 25 officers and 52 enlisted personnel. Thus, the new manning level increases the overall officer strength by 4 while decreasing the enlisted strength by 8, resulting in an overall loss of 4 personnel. The Section operated at an average 130 percent of its newly assigned manning level. Incoming personnel and the attempt to reduce personnel strength to conform with the new manning level resulted in additional assignments of qualified intelligence personnel to subordinate unit S-2's. There remains a critical need for trained career intelligence specialists.

c. Logistics and Allowances. During this period approximately 60 percent of materials and supplies necessary for the operation of the Section and its attached teams were received as ordered. There remains a critical need for an increase in Garrison allowances for office furniture, most noticeably typist's desks and chairs. Motor transport assets assigned to the section, while adequate for minimum operational needs, experienced a high rate of maintenance problems mainly due to high usage and climate.

d. Training. Maximum effort was made to train personnel in intelligence functions as well as participation in general military subjects training at the Headquarters Company level.

e. Military Interpreters. This Command continues to be plagued by shortages of ARVN Military Interpreters. Particularly noticeable were recurring cases of disciplinary nature resulting in frequent reassignments of interpreters as well as frequent cases of unauthorized absence.

2. ACQUISITION SECTION. During this period the program of establishing District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers progressed. Construction of the Center at Hieu Duc was completed and has since become operational. The ground work has been layed at Duc Duc. No date can be set for beginning of construction.

a. Photo Imagery/Interpretation Unit. During this period 6 Red Haze

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Hot reports were received by the command. During this period 14 photo missions were requested, 23 were received and 2 are still pending.

b. Air Observation Unit. During this period, Air Observers flew 214 sorties for 449.7 hours of visual reconnaissance in the Division's zone of responsibility. In conjunction with normal VR flights, the following missions were performed: 10 Photo, 22 artillery, 246 Air Strike TAC(A). The AO Unit also provided support for Operation Union Phase I, II, and III.

c. Interrogation-Translation Teams (3d ITT and 9th ITT). A total of 332 detainees were interrogated at the III MAF Collection Point of which 318 had Viet Cong association. In addition, several hundred detainees were interrogated by 3d and 9th ITT sub-teams at the battalion level. During this period the 9th ITT has come under the supervision of the Team Commander of 3d ITT due to lack of officer personnel in the 9th ITT.

d. Command Operations Center (G-2 portion). COC-2 continued to serve as a focal point for the receipt of spot reports from the ITTs, tactical units, adjacent units and higher headquarters. Immediate intelligence requirements generated or suggested by reports were disseminated to collectors. Current intelligence was spotted to users.


3. PRODUCTION UNIT. In addition to the two daily Intelligence Summaries, PERINTREP 9-67 was published. A study of the Independence Area was prepared and a study of the Operation Union I and II areas was prepared and sent to the 5th Marines. Routine issue of maps continued and a chart was developed for the recording of VC casualties and detainees. Recording and precessing of captured weapons and materials continued.

4. STAFF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT. During this period the unit provided routine administrative counterintelligence services to the Division Staff. The unit was supported by the 3d CIT. The unit processed 16 requests for personnel security investigations and received 35 completed investigations, presented security orientation lectures to incoming personnel, administered the Division's Reward Fund Program and the Kit Carson Scout Program. In addition, the unit routinely precessed administrative correspondence dealing with passwords, security violations, termination of security clearances and other miscellaneous correspondence of counterintelligence interest. The unit maintained liaison with other counterintelligence agencies and with the subordinate unit G-2's through the Quarterly G-2 Technical Inspections.

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5. 1ST INTERPRETER TEAM. During this period the team translated 124 documents, including awards, legal matters and claims. The team totaled 515 hours of interpreter usage in addition to translation of documents. During most of the reporting period the team operated without USMC personnel due to their loss through normal rotation. During the latter part of the month the team was assigned one junior (USMC) non-commissioned officer.

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ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN1. ENEMY

a. Main Force. Two distinct trends characterized the enemy Main Force activity during the month of May. Early in the month in Que Son the enemy displayed great aggressiveness. On 16 May FVMAF operations in the Que Son Valley terminated, and VC/NVA activity decreased correspondingly. When FVMAF operations again commenced in the same area on the 26th, the enemy was neither as eager nor as willing to engage friendly forces, as he was earlier in the month. During Operation Union I both the 3rd and 21st NVA Regiments were identified as having been engaged with friendly forces. Order of Battle holdings at this Headquarters presently carry the effective strength of the 3rd NVA Regiment at 1100 men which is a reduction of 700 men, and has reduced the effective strength of the 21st NVA Regiment from 2000 to 1000 men.

b. Local and Irregular Forces. Local Force activity was again confined to small scale harassing attacks characteristic of these forces. The only Local Force unit identified during the period was the V-4 Company of the T-89th Battalion. This unit is credited with the attack on the 1st LAAM Battalion on the 14th. Interdiction activities of a counterintelligence nature remained at a low. Do Xuan Thiet, a returnee, Junior Captain assigned to the Quang Da Military Committee revealed that the V.25 Battalion is preparing to become a sapper battalion. The battalion's strength is reported at 521 men, 209 of which are combat effective. He also indicated that the R.20 Local Force Battalion had a strength of 450, of which 250 were combat effective.

2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a. General. The skies were clear with the exception of a few overcast days. The temperature has continued to rise and as expected heat casualties increased. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 98 and 78 degrees respectively. The average humidity decreased 16 points to 67 percent, and the cumulative rainfall was .66 inches.

b. Effects of the Weather. The weather had little or no effect on operations. Clear skies and dry terrain presented favorable conditions for maximum use of supporting arms and enabled troops and vehicles to move freely.

c. Effects of the Weather on Terrain. The terrain was unaffected by the continued dry spell. The rice lands remained in stubble or dry crop after the spring harvest.

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

1. With the shift of the 1st Bn 26th Marines to Northern I CTZ early in May the deployment of major units was completed and the Division was intact with all units except several small detachments operating from one Division headquarters. Operation UNION/BEAVER CAGE continued with the SLF, 1st Bn, 3rd Marines, completing their backload aboard ships of the Amphibious Ready Group on 13 May. Operation UNION continued until 17 May when the 5th Marines returned to Que San and Nui Lac Son and began preparations for Operation UNION II. Initial contact when Operation UNION II commenced on 26 May was heavy with the helilifted elements conducting a vertical envelopment into an enemy area. The operation continued into June with alternate sporadic and heavy contact with NVA units. Operation DUVAL, a reconnaissance in force into the Elephant Valley, kept the Viet Cong off-balance and provided continued surveillance of this likely infiltration route. Major operations and controlling headquarters were as follows;

OperationHeadquarters

UNION/BEAVER CAGE
WEBSTER
DUVAL
UNION II

5th Marines/SLF, 1st Bn 3rd Marines
3rd Bn, 7th Marines
1st Bn, 7th Marines
5th Marines

2. Small unit contacts and activities throughout the TAOR continued to be the major unit activity with only a pause for the truce over Buddha's Birthday on 23 May. All operations by the division in May accounted for 1218 enemy KIA, 1522 enemy KIA (Probable), 223 PWS, 464 Detainees, 151 Weapons captured.

3. Four County Fair operations were conducted during May and were part of the continuing effort to extend GVN control into previously enemy controlled areas. All units continued their support of the Revolutionary Development effort through daily small units activities, specific sweep operations and daily presence in areas once controlled by the Viet Cong. These operations continued to demonstrate to the people the goal of Marine Corps forces in their country.

4. During the month four ships provided naval gunfire support for the division. A total of 79 missions were fired in support of normal division operations and Operation UNION.

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PLANS

1. Operation Plan 3-67 (Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan) was staffed and published this month.
2. The Division basic operations plan (301-67) is presently being updated.
3. A study of the methods for controlling waterways has been initiated and will be a continuing project that will receive added emphasis in the future.

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TRAINING

1. During May, thirty-one officers and 197 enlisted Marines attended formal schools. Additionally thirty-five Marines attended a four day MUMMS school at III MAF.
2. A special Airborne School was conducted on Okinawa and graduated 24 Marines from Division reconnaissance units.
3. The FMFPAC M-16 Contact Team presented instruction and familiarization firing to 539 Marines from ~~combat~~ support and service support units.

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COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

1. The formation of CAC platoon D-8 in the 1st Marines sector of the TAOR brings the total to 23 CAC platoons under 1st Division operation control. The platoons in the DANANG TAOR have an effective strength of 316 Marines and 646 PF's and RF's.
2. There were 45 contacts by the 23 platoons which resulted enemy casualties of 14 KIA, 36 KIA (PROB), 19 WIA, 26 PW and 106 detainees. Weapons captured included one M-14 rifle, one M-1 rifle, one M-1 Carbine, one K-44 rifle with scope and two AK-47 rifles.

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

1. The major logistic activity during this reporting period was directed toward the support of combat operations.
2. During the reporting period, the Division Supply Officer conducted (8) eight Supply Inspections/Instruction visits; the Division Embarkation Officer conducted (14) fourteen Embarkation Readiness Inspections; and the Division Ordnance Officer conducted Ordnance Inspections on (2) two units. Additionally, the Division Engineer Officer, Motor Transport Officer, Food Service Officer, and Surgeon conducted informal staff visits and inspections.
3. The available vehicle assets of both the 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalion's were generally committed to the maximum during the month in the support of this Division, III MAF, and FLC requirements. 590 tons of building material, 15 tons of rice, 48 tons of fertilizer and 10,000 gallons of diesel fuel were transported to An Hoa and 272 tons of coal were transported from An Hoa to Danang during the month. Two Marines were WIA from the 11th Motor Transport Battalion and two Marines were KIA and two were WIA from the engineer sweep teams as a result of enemy action during the conduct of these convoys.
4. Division Embarkation coordinated the total airlift of 1732 personnel, 26 vehicles, 469,958S/T and 10,579 cubic feet during the reporting period and the total sealift of 790 personnel, 256 vehicles and 3672.86S/T.
5. The 1st Marine Division Food Service Office in Chu Lai was closed.
6. Reports have been received relative to the malfunctioning of M16E1 rifles. Specifically, reports cite failure to extract as the primary problem. Further, inoperative selector levers and failure to feed have also been reported. These problems are being investigated. It would appear that the extractor and spring are inadequate to remove a cartridge case from the chamber of a weapon that is dirty from firing or from dirt deposited by cartridges. Unsatisfactory Equipment Reports have been submitted on the extractor and spring.
7. The Army Civilian Technical Team completed their inquiry into the problem of unintentional firings of the M50A1 (Ontos). The team intends to return to CONUS and evaluate data collected in order to determine action required to resolve the unintentional firing problem.
8. Adequate Track Kits have been received to remove from deadline all LVTP5A1's currently deadlined for track.
9. As of 31 May 1967, the following FY 67 R & E equipment has been received by this Division:

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Forty Eight LVTP5A1
Two LVTR1A1
Three LVTP5 (CMD)
Two LVTE1
One M-51 Tank Retrigger
Thirteen M50A1 Ontos
Three M-55 8" How
Two M-109 155mm How
Eighteen M48A3 Tanks
One M67A2 Flame Tank
One M-53 155 mm Gun
Two Rawin Sets

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

1. Narrative summary for the period of 1-31 May 1967.

On 6 May 1967, the construction of the Ha Thanh Dam was approved by the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. It is estimated that this dam will be instrumental in the production of an additional rice yield in the Hoa Vang District sufficient to feed 18,000 Vietnamese people.

Civic Action projects underway during the month of May includes construction initiated on 4 new schools and 4 new dispensaries. There were three schools reconstructed and three schools enlarged. Other projects included: fence building, sanitation improvement, communal head construction, fertilizer sales, digging of irrigation canals, generator repairs, market place construction, road drainage, land clearing, water well platforms built, well repairs, flag poles constructed and community baths set up. Also, an additional pig sty was built at the Phong Bac pig farm.

Items hauled by 1st Marine Division vehicles in support of the An Hoa Industrial Complex during May included 589 1/2 tons of building materials, 1000 gallons of fuel oil, 48 tons of fertilizer, 15 1/2 tons of rice and 2 tons of steel hauled from Danang to An Hoa. 272 tons of coal were hauled back from An Hoa to Danang. On the 24th of May in the village of Phuoc Tuong 12 houses burned to the ground. All adjacent Marine units immediately rendered support and the fire was extinguished. The houses are presently being re-built through the efforts of the 1st Medical Battalion.

Distinguished guests during the month of May included: Lieutenant General Victor KRULAK, CG, FMFPAC, Dr. HARRON and Dr. HOPPER of the Human Science Research Center, Governor John LOVE of Colorado, Mr. Lesley E. FRY, VFW National Commander, Representative Olin TEAGUE (Demo), Texas, Mr. Bill DRIVER and Mr. Bill STINSON of the Veterans Administration, Mr. Henry C. MC PHEARSON and Mr. William J. JORDAN, Special Counsels to the President and Major Ted CONNELL, USAR, past National Commander of VFW.

Assistance rendered in the Danang Area during the month of May was as follows:

MEDICAL TREATMENTS	30,133
Medical Evac	53
Dental Treatments	500
English Language Trng	75 hours

COMMODITIES:

Rice (lbs)	15,900
Dry milk (lbs)	8,047
Kool Aid (boxes)	77

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Candy (cases)	17
Bulgar wheat (bags)	621
Corn (lbs)	400
Cooking Oil (cases)	7
Salt (lbs)	500
Salad oil (cases)	5
Soybean oil (gal)	5
Listerine (cases)	5
Animal feed (lbs)	30,000
Animal salt (block)	20
pigs	9
Clothing (lbs)	2,229
Soap (bars)	5,452
Toothbrushes	10
Toothpaste (tubes)	10
Cement (bags)	1,824
Tin (sheets)	1,023
Mason kits	44
Carpenter kits	47
Bricks	6,000
Lumber (truck loads)	46
Paint (gal)	208
Sand (truck loads)	26
Nails (boxes)	114
Reinforcing bar (ft)	50
Reinforcing wire (rolls)	7
Gravel (truck loads)	14
Whitewash (lbs)	150
Sewing kits	463
Dye (lbs)	16
Garden kits	5
School kits	783
Toys	800
Rice bags	3,010

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Narrative summary for the period 1-31 May 1967.

Hand Distribution of PSYOP Leaflets. Increased emphasis throughout the TAOR was placed on hand distribution of leaflets and organic aerial leaflet drops. Themes especially emphasized were the rewards and Chieu Hoi programs. A total of 140,269 leaflets were distributed in this manner.

Rewards Program. Four instances of specific response to the PSYOP rewards program were reported to this Headquarters during the month.

On 8 May 67, three villagers reported to Duc Duc District Headquarters that they knew of a bunker in which the VC had stored mines and agreed to point out the position. An examination of the bunker revealed eight anti-personnel mines. C-4 was used to destroy the bunker and mines. The hamlet chief explained that the people had found our reward leaflets which were dropped during the week of 1 May 1967.

On 11 May 67, a Vietnamese woman reported to 3/1 personnel that she had heard of the rewards program and knew of the location of a VC mine. She directed a Marine patrol to a press type mine with 30-35 pounds of TNT.

On 15 May 67, in the 2/5 area, a Vietnamese man turned in a .45 caliber pistol after a reward leaflet drop was made in that vicinity.

On 18 May 67, 2/5 personnel received information from residents of Phu Da Hamlet regarding the location of mines and booby traps. Demolitions personnel destroyed two mines, two booby traps and two punji pits. This information was gained as a result of reward leaflet drops.

Special Leaflets. Operation UNION I was supported by air drops and broadcasts. A special leaflet was made exploiting one of two Hoi Chanh who had returned during the operation.

County Fair. A particularly successful County Fair (#7-11) was conducted this month. Vietnamese officials willingly participated in all phases of the operation and appeared gratified by the results achieved. A total of 254 persons were screened and several caves were destroyed. Three VC were apprehended by the National Police; this was considered to be an important loss to the VC infrastructure.

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COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. During the month of May, staff visits were made to selected units as a follow up to the Communication-Electronics Technical Inspections conducted during the months of March and April.
2. On 10 May 1967, a sole user telephone circuit was established between the 1st Medical Battalion located in Danang, and the 1st Hospital Company located in Chu Lai. The primary transmission path is provided by DCA equipment with tactical equipment programmed for back-up. The primary purpose of this circuit is to provide a coordination means in the evacuation of casualties and to ensure full utilization of hospital facilities.
3. On 12 May 1967, the Division Communication-Electronics Officer, Colonel E. P. CLAUDE attended a telephone cable conference hosted by III MAF which resulted in the establishment of an area cable coordination committee. The future actions of the committee should result in an economical and effective use of cable and associated assets, reduce duplication in man hours and provide for an integrated cable system.
4. On 13 May 1967, request number FMD 41 was submitted to NSA, Danang for the construction of a Telephone Central Office building to house the AN/TTC-7 switchboards of which the First Marine Division is presently scheduled to receive two. The AN/TTC-7 is a non-shelterized AN/MTC-1 with a 200 drop capability and three operator positions. With two AN/TTC-7's and parallel wiring a six operator position, 400 drop capability can be realized.
5. Construction of the new Communication Center continued during the month. Construction of the building was completed on 21 May and work commenced in the installation of multiplexing equipment, AN/FCC-19, Patch Panel, and Crypto Racks. All circuits have been pre-wired in parallel to provide minimum, if any, outage time during the cut-over process. Red/Black wiring is now being accomplished jointly by Communication Company, Headquarters Battalion and electricians from MCB-74. Latest estimate of occupation and operation is 14 June 1967.
6. On 22 May 1967, RAdm Joseph E. RICE, USN, COMNAVELECSYSCOM, accompanied by Capt. E. L. HURD, USN, COMNAVSEAPAC and Cmdr W. B. FISHER, USN, FTAE SEASIA, toured 1st Marine Division Communication facilities.
7. On 23 May 1967, CG III MAF assigned to 7th Communication Battalion the management and operational responsibility for the Chu Lai area Communication Center and concurrently designated that Center as a tributary with the routing indicator of RUMHIA.
8. On 27 May 1967, CG III MAF activated an HF SSB voice coordination net for casualty evacuation. All USN Hospital facilities, including Hospital Ships in the I Corps Tactical Zone, guard this net. The activation of this net should serve not only to expedite casualty evacuation, but to

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evacuate casualties to the facility which has the skills required for the type casualty concerned. It is noted that the function of this net is similar to that of the casualty evacuation control net utilized in amphibious operations.

9. On 29 May 1967, the Division Assistant Communication-Electronics Officer attended a conference concerning the realignment of III MAF Communication assets within the I Corps Tactical Zone. An analysis of present employment of communication personnel and equipment assets compared to existing communication requirements resulted in: a change of Operational Control of Communication Support Company, 7th Communication Battalion from Fifth Communication Battalion to CG, Third Marine Division; return to parent units of organic equipment; and, a readjustment of communication detachments provided from the 5th and 7th Communication Battalions.

10. The First Marine Division Communication Center, RUMHLA, was designated the "Honor Tributary Station" of RUMH for the month of April. This is the second consecutive month in which the Division Communication Center has been so designated.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The following distinguished visitors visited/toured the command during May 1967:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
1May	Dr. M. Dean HAVRON Dr. Janice HOPPER	President, Human Sciences Research, Inc. Research Associate, Simulmatics Corporation
6-7May	LtGen Victor H. KRULAK	CG, FMFPac
17May	Mr. Leslie M. FRY BGen James D. HITTLE Senator Clifford CASE	National Commander of VFW USMC (Retired) Republican, New Jersey
19May	Honorable John A. LOVE	Governor of Colorado
20May	RAdm Joseph E. RICE	Commander, Naval Electronics Systems Command
27May	Mr. Harry C. McPHERSON, JR. Mr. William J. JORDEN Mr. Ellsworth BUNKER	Special Counsel to the President Assistant to the Special Assistant to the President Ambassador to South Vietnam
28May	Congressman Olin E. TEAGUE Mr. Bill DRIVER Mr. Bill STINSON Maj Ted CONNELL, USAR	Democrat, Texas VA Administrator Special Assistant to Mr. DRIVER Special Assistant to Mr. DRIVER & Post National Commander of VFW

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ENEMY ACTIVITY

During the early part of the month, VC activity was characterized by aggressiveness and a desire to engage FWMAF. With the termination of Operation Union I on the 16th enemy activity decreased until commencement of Operation Union II on the 26th.

- 4 May: At 1112H, Company "I", 3dBn, 5thMar the perimeter defense at (BT 038343) received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from what appeared to be two separate groups of VC. Artillery was fired on suspected enemy positions at (BT 012331) silencing the enemy fire. (TAB A)
- 8 May: At 1035H, Company "C", 1stBn, 3dMar on a search and destroy mission in the vicinity of (BT 024398) received 20 rounds of mortar fire from vicinity of (BT 034394) and another unlocated position. Air strikes were directed on the position at (BT 034394) resulting in 1 enemy mortar destroyed and 5 VC KBA(C). The other (unlocated) enemy mortar position ceased fire. (TAB A)
- 12 May: At 1830H, elements of Company "D", 1stBn, 5thMar and Company "I", 3dBn, 5thMar (BT 085365) reported contact with an enemy force of unknown size. Air strikes were called in and Company "I" moved east. "D" Company pressed the attack and maneuvered toward the enemy, but was temporarily halted by intense automatic weapons and small arms enemy fire. The enemy was firing from a treeline which appeared to be heavily fortified. Artillery and air supported throughout the engagement, pounding relentlessly at the enemy's fortified emplacements. Two maneuvering platoons were separated by small arms and automatic weapons fire and one squad was severed from the company. Company "I" moved to the enemy's south flank where the enemy took them under heavy small arms and mortar fire, Company "K", 1stBn, 5thMar reinforced and maneuvered until they were directly north of Company "D". A link up was completed by 1900, however the action did not decrease until 2100H. Sporadic firing occurred throughout the night. Casualties were 15 USMC KIA, 39 USMC WIA and 7 USMC MIA, 5 of which were later found. The enemy lost 10 KIA (C) and 10 KIA (P). (TAB A)
- 13 May: At 0845H, Company "I", 3dBn, 5thMar search and destroy sweep force at vicinity of (BT 092360) came under small arms and mortar attack. Air strikes and mortar fire suppressed the enemy fire. At 1300, Company "I", 3dBn,

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5thMar at vicinity of (BT 093358) again encountered the enemy in close combat. The enemy employed mortar and small arms fire in both encounters. Enemy losses were reported as 44 KIA (C) and 22 KIA (P).

- 13 May: At 1500H, Company "K", 3dBn, 5thMar received intense small arms and mortar fire (BT 088350). Friendly artillery and air strikes accounted for 15 NVA KIA and 20 NVA KIA (P). Later the same day, the enemy again attacked Company "K", 3dBn, 5thMar using small arms and mortar fire. Artillery, air strikes and mortars brought the total enemy losses for the two engagements up to 25 NVA KIA (C) and 30 NVA KIA (P). (TAB A)
- 13 May: At 2340H, the enemy fired approximately 115 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortars into "A", "I", and "M" Companies, 5thMar in the vicinity of (BT 086354). The enemy then assaulted with small arms and hand grenades. With artillery in support and a flareship providing illumination the enemy was repulsed, leaving 32 KIA (C) on the field. Two ChiCom light machineguns and 3 ChiCom automatic rifles were captured. (TAB A)
- 14 May: At 0155H Combined Action Platoon B2-2 located at (AT 865573), reinforced by an additional USMC squad as a result of local intelligence was attacked by an estimated 100 VC/NVA. The enemy were well armed and wearing some sort of helmet. The attack commenced under cover of mortar and 57mm RR fire with the enemy attacking in platoon size strength simultaneously from the north, northeast, and south. They breached the wire by propping it up approximately 18" off the ground with forked sticks, and continued the attack with grenades, heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire and satchel charges. One group of approximately six enemy was driven from the bridge at (AT 865573) after an apparent attempt to destroy it. Simultaneously the refugee hamlet 100 yards west of Combined Action Platoon B2-2 was also hit resulting in 2 civilians KIA, 10 WIA and 2 houses destroyed. Prior to attacking the enemy yelled, "Move out or you'll all be killed. Tin is American and we consider you American." A 17 man reaction force from Company "I", 3dBn, 7thMar was dispatched with tanks, and pre-planned concentrations were fired on routes of enemy withdrawal. A search of the area indicated 20 VC KIA (P). A debriefing after the attack revealed that one USMC ambush 250 meters to the north-east,

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one RF ambush in the hamlet and a listening post south-west of the stream had not observed any movement prior to the attack. Friendly casualties were 2 USMC KIA and 4 PF KIA, 3 USMC and 1 PF WIA, and 4 PF's MIA. (TAB A)

- 14 May: At 0015H, the 1st LAAM Battalion (AT 972736) perimeter was penetrated by an estimated 12 to 15 enemy who used hand grenades, satchel charges and RPG-2 rocket rounds. The perimeter defense returned small arms fire which they believed wounded an unknown number of enemy. Three missile launchers were damaged, one fuel bladder destroyed, and wire leading into the position was cut. One pair of wire cutters, two camouflage head bands, several hand grenades, propaganda leaflets (English and VN language) and personal letters, three pieces of oil paper, two wooden plugs, one bottle of unknown substance, one knotted green cloth (used to tie defensive wire) were found. (TAB A)
- 15 May: At 0305, Combined Action Platoon D-4 located at (BT 084569) was attacked by 30 to 40 enemy dressed in black shorts. The enemy used rifle grenades, 57mm RR, and B-40 rockets. CAP D-4 attempted to fire claymore mines positioned in the defense wire, but the wire leading to the mines had been cut. Illumination, artillery, and reinforcements were requested over the land line to 1stBn, 1stMar Command Post. The land lines were cut shortly thereafter. Protective wire was breached in the northwest corner of the perimeter with bangalore torpedoes. An estimated 20 to 30 enemy penetrated the protective wire and attacked the bunkers and installations within the perimeter using shaped charges and grenades. CAP D-4 returned small arms fire and grenades and engaged the enemy in hand to hand fighting. The enemy fled to the south and southwest carrying many dead and wounded. Artillery fired in support of CAP D-4 on possible routes of escape. A reaction force from 1stBn, 1stMar arrived but made no contact with the enemy. A search of the area found 2 AK-47 rifles, 1 B-40 rocket, two 20 pound shaped charges, including assorted grenades and equipment.
- 16 May: At 0100H, Company "H", 2dBn, 11thMar Perimeter received 13 rounds of 140mm rocket fire. Counterbattery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. Company "G", 2dBn, 7thMar platoon combat patrol was dispatched to the area on the following day. The patrol located 47 rocket firing positions, 31 rocket tubes, and 19 rockets at (AT 868865). (TAB B)

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- 17 May: At 0155H, the 1stBn, 5thMar perimeter at (BT 044344) and Company "D", 2dBn, 11thMar perimeter at (BT 127341) received 30 to 35 rounds of 120mm mortar fire from two enemy positions. Thirty rounds of 81mm mortar and 170 rounds of 105mm HE were returned, silencing the enemy mortars.
- 19 May: At 1930H, Battery "D", 2dBn, 11thMar at (BT 027341) and 1stBn, 5th Marines's perimeter at (BT 044344) were hit again. This time the enemy fired 30 to 40 rounds of 60mm mortars from several locations. Artillery and countermortar fire were returned silencing the enemy mortars. Local villagers indicated the attack was conducted by 20 Main Force VC who used four 60mm mortars. (TAB B)
- 21 May: At 1715H, Company "B", 1stBn, 5thMar received an estimated 4,000 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated 50 to 60 enemy located at (BT 002345) (AT 999350, 999348), resulting in 8 USMC WIA (Evac). Company "B", 1stBn, 5thMar returned 2,500 rounds of small arms fire, 10 rounds of 3.5 WP, 50 rounds of M-79. Artillery and air strikes were called. Company "B" maneuvered, assisted by Company "C". The enemy broke contact at dusk. There was excellent coverage by the artillery and air strikes. There were 20 VC KIA (P) attributed to this action. (TAB B)
- 26 May: At 1830H, elements of 3dBn, 5thMar engaged heavily with the enemy, receiving automatic weapons and 60mm/82mm mortar fire, (BT 075304, 078306). The enemy force was estimated to be a battalion (-). Company "M" moved to the west shoulder of the enemy position to relieve pressure on Company "L", 3dBn, 5thMar. Countermortar fire included 60mm, 81mm, artillery, and fixed wing air strikes. Spooky aircraft also fired suppressive fires. Enemy casualties from this action totaled 118 NVA KIA (C), 162 NVA KIA (P). (TAB B).

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- 1 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 59-67 (Operation UNION/BEAVER CAGE).
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 010233Z May 67
Tab C
- 1 May - CG 1st MarDiv cautioned division units to insure appropriate security measures are taken during the Communist holidays of May Day and Ho Chi Minh's birthday.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 010553Z May 67
- 1 May - CG 1st MarDiv directed major subordinate commanders to determine effectiveness of security provided by RVNAF/US/FWNAF in GVN controlled areas and areas where Revolutionary Development activities are in progress.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 011353Z May 67
Tab C
- 2 May - CG 1st MarDiv assumed opcon TG 79.4 effective 010242H May 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 020051Z May 67.
- 2 May - CG 1st MarDiv directed commanders to review certain basic combat principles.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 020609Z May 67
Tab C
- 3 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 61-67 directing deployment of 1st Bn, 26th Marines to Northern I CTZ.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030129Z May 67
Tab C
- 3 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 55-67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030541Z May 67
Tab C
- 3 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 62-67 directing repositioning of forces within the Danang TAOR.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030553Z May 67
- 4 May - CG 1st MarDiv published schedules for training of cadres on M16E1 rifle in combat support and combat service support units.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 040601Z May 67
- 4 May - CG 1st MarDiv directed change in internal TAOR boundaries due to availability of forces and changing situations within the TAOR.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 041305Z May 67
Tab C

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4 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 62-67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 041509Z May 67
Tab C

5 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 57-67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 050905Z May 67
Tab C

5 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 61-67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 051357Z May 67
Tab C

6 May - Opcon of 1st Bn, 26th Marines passed to CG 3rd MarDiv effective 060800H.
Ref: CG 3rd MarDiv 070147Z May 67

6 May - CG 1st MarDiv submitted to CG III MAF security measures presently employed around bridges in First MarDiv TACR.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 060549Z May 67
Tab C

6 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 63-67 directing Rough Rider convoy to Phu Bai on 8 May 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 060551Z May 67

6 May - CG 1st MarDiv directed responsibility for relief/reinforcement of certain CLDG camps.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 061504Z May 67
Tab C

9 May - CG III MAF notified major commands of indications that the enemy may employ, in the near future in SVN, surface-to-surface missiles or rockets larger than those previously reported.
Ref: CG III MAF 090822Z May 67

9 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 64-67 directing repositioning of forces on Operation UNION.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 090945Z May 67
Tab C

9 May - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of his satisfactory appraisal of the mounted Xenon searchlight.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 091249Z May 67

10 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 65-67 directing contingency forces for Operation MALHEUR.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 101445Z May 67
Tab C

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11 May - CG III MAF directed that command emphasis be placed on seeking ways to use available forces, firepower, and mobility to maintain pressure on the enemy in an ever increasing tempo.
Ref: CG III MAF 101546Z May 67

12 May - CG 1st MarDiv passed opcon of CTG 79.4 to CG III MAF effective 121800H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 121019Z May 67
Tab C

12 May - CG 1st MarDiv directed restriction of Ontos movement and usage due to weapon malfunctions.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 121021Z May 67

12 May - CG III MAF published his planning guidance for June 1967.
Ref: CG III MAF 121526Z May 67

12 May - CG 1st MarDiv directed augmentation of Operation UNION.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 171721Z May 67
Tab C

12 May - Termination Operation BEAVER CAGE effective 131400H.
Ref: COM 7th Fleet 122300Z May 67

13 May - CG 1st MarDiv published planning guidance to division units for June 1967.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 130851Z May 67
Tab C

14 May - CG 1st MarDiv directed units to prepare for the FMFPac Assistance Team review of training.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 140921Z May 67

15 May - CG 1st MarDiv issued instruction to division units regarding the employment of tactical troop units for installation security.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 150255Z May 67

15 May - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for Operation WEBSTER.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 150635Z May 67

16 May - CG III MAF directed CG 1st MarDiv to conduct increased reconnaissance and surveillance along the Quang Nam-Thua Thien province boundary.
Ref: CG III MAF 160220Z May 67
Tab C

16 May - Operation WEBSTER commenced 160715H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 161011Z May 67
Tab D

17 May - Termination Operation UNICF effective 170600H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 170141Z May 67

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17 May - CG 1st MarDiv submitted to CG III MAF evaluation of security provided by RVNAF/US/FWMAF in areas within 1st MarDiv TAOR where programmed RD activities are in progress.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 170317Z May 67

17 May - CG III MAF directed immediate extensive reconnaissance operations along the axis of Elephant Valley.
Ref: CG III MAF 171204Z May 67

18 May - CG 1st MarDiv issued Frag Order 66-67 directing Rough Rider convoys to Phu Bai on 19 and 20 May.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180137Z May 67
Tab C

18 May - Termination Operation WEBSTER effective 181200Z May 67
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180303Z May 67
Tab C

18 May - CG III MAF expressed his gratitude and appreciation to personnel of the 1st MarDiv who participated in Operation UNION.
Ref: CG III MAF 180505Z May 67

18 May - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of planned operations for June 1967.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 181325Z May 67

19 May - CG 1st MarDiv requested CG III MAF consider possibility and feasibility of establishing a CIDG Camp in the vicinity of Hiep Duc (AT 9024). A CIDG Camp in this area would be astride major lines of communications and infiltration routes.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 190146Z May 67

19 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 67-67 directing execution of Operation DUVAL.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 190705Z May 67

19 May - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for Operation DUVAL.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 190841Z May 67

19 May - Operation DUVAL commenced 191700H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 191559Z May 67
Tab D

21 May - CG 1st MarDiv advised all units of the U. S. policy for Buddha's Birthday and the curtailment of military operations in RVN during the period 230001H May to 232400H May.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 210031Z May 67

24 May - CG 1st MarDiv directed 1st Marines, 7th Marines, 11th Marines and 1st Tank Bn to conduct a seminar on base defense with the Ass't G-3 (Plans).
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240151Z May 67

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- 24 May - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of concept for Operation UNION II.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250233Z May 67.
- 25 May - Termination Operation DUVAL effective 251200H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 252001Z May 67.
- 25 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 68-67 directing execution of Operation UNION II.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250245Z May 67
- 26 May - Operation UNION II commenced 260600H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 261217Z May 67
Tab D
- 27 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Change Two to Frag Order 30-67 directing realignment of responsibilities for Revolutionary Development protection.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 271303Z May 67
Tab C
- 29 May - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 69-67 directing Rough Rider convoy from Danang to Phu Bai on 30 May.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 290025Z May 67
- 29 May - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of concept and task organization for Operation UNION II.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 291347Z May 67
- 31 May - CG 1st MarDiv instructed units to insure that all personnel operating vehicles are familiar with instructions applicable to Vietnamese bridge guards.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 310349Z May 67

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COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

- 6 May A Vietnamese boy came to CAP D-1 command post saying that he knew the location of a mine. Two PF's from the CP went with the boy and found one claymore mine with 300 feet of wire leading to a building. A search of the building revealed two BA 30 batteries, one 55 gallon drum of rice and 20 five gallon cans of molasses. One female detainee was apprehended in building. (SITREP 403 TAB D)
- 7 May A squad combat patrol from CAP D-2 observed one enemy fleeing from patrol. The patrol fired warning shots but the enemy continued to run. The patrol fired five rounds of small arms resulting in one VC KIA. (SITREP 404 TAB D)
- 9 May A squad ambush from CAP B-3-4 observed six enemy. The ambush received 50 rounds small arms from the enemy and returned 300 rounds small arms and three rifle grenades. The enemy broke contact with total casualties for the contact of one USMC KIA, two USMC WIA, and three VC KIA (probable). (SITREP 407 TAB D)
- 14 May CAP B-2-2 was assaulted by an estimated enemy platoon using 60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, grenades and small arms. The assault lasted ten minutes before enemy broke contact. The CAC platoon returned small arms and called artillery and 81mm mortar missions. The action resulted in two USMC KIA, four USMC WIA, four PF KIA and two PF WIA. A search of area disclosed blood trails indicating twenty VC KIA (probable). (SITREP 411 TAB D)
- 15 May A squad combat patrol from CAP D-6 received ten rounds small arms from an unknown number of enemy. The patrol returned 200 rounds of small arms fire and during a search of the area, found one VC KIA, one M-26 grenade, two carbine magazines and a cartridge belt. (SITREP 412 TAB D)
- 15 May CAP D-4 was assaulted by an estimated 30 to 40 enemy using 57mm recoilless rifles, B-40 rockets, rifle grenades and small arms. Marines attempted to detonate claymore mines, but the wires had been cut. An estimated 20 to 30 enemy penetrated the wire and attacked bunkers within the perimeter with shaped charges and grenades. The CAC platoon returned small arms and grenades, and requested artillery support. Results of the action were four USMC KIA, twelve USMC WIA, one PF KIA, nine PF WIA, one VC KIA, fifteen VC KIA (probable) and two AK-47 rifles captured. (SITREP 412 TAB D)
- 16 May A squad combat patrol from CAP D-2 observed and took under fire

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fifteen enemy. The patrol fired 440 rounds small arms and 12 rounds M-79. The enemy was observed to carry off one body, and a search of the area revealed four VC KIA, one M-14 rifle, and one M-1 rifle. (SITREP 413 TAB D)

26 May A squad combat patrol from CAP D-7 observed and took under fire two enemy weapons. The patrol fired 400 rounds small arms which resulted in two VC KIA. Search of the area revealed one K-44 rifle with scope and one M-1 carbine. (SITREP 423 TAB D)

30 May CAP D-8 was formed under operational control of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLY

1 May 1967 The 11th Motor Transport Battalion conducted a Rough Rider Convoy to Hue and Phu Bai. The convoy returned to Danang the next day without incident. The convoy transported 462 tons of rice for OCO.

5 May 1967 The 1st Motor Transport Battalion conducted a Rough Rider Convoy from Danang to Hue transporting 290 tons of rice for OCO and returned the next day.

5 May 1967 Division Embarkation coordinated the sealift of "A" Btry, 13th Marines from Danang to Phu Bai by LCU.

6 May 1967 Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift of 1st Battalion, 26th Marines from Danang to Phu Bai.


7 May 1967 Division Embarkation coordinated the sealift of "B" Co. (-) 3rd AT Battalion from Danang to Phu Bai by LCU.

9 May 1967 The 1st Motor Transport Battalion with 11th Motor Transport Battalion vehicles attached conducted a Rough Rider Convoy from Danang to Phu Bai transporting elements of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. The convoy returned the next day without incident.

15 May 1967 The operational control of the 7th Motor Transport Battalion passed from the 1st Marine Division to FLC.

19 May 1967 The 11th Motor Transport Battalion conducted a Rough Rider Convoy from Danang to Phu Bai transporting an advance element of MCB-3. The convoy returned the same day without incident.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-31 May 1967.

1 May 67 6 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 875,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "VC Force People to Dig Tunnels," "Don't Harbor VC," "Why USMC is in Vietnam" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Marine patrols distributed 12,950 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Don't Harbor VC," "Don't Run from Marines" and "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps."

2 May 67 7 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,194,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Why the Marines are in Vietnam," "Comparison of ARVN and VC Methods of Evacuation," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi," "Curfew," "Don't Harbor VC," "VC Mines," "VC Force Labor," "Radio Reward Leaflet" and "Appeals to VC Wives and Mothers."

Marine patrols distributed 4,900 leaflets. Themes used were: "Personal Hygiene," "Mines Rewards," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were made.

3 May 67 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 300,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Medical Treatment at GVN Dispensaries," "Exchange of Thoughts Between Mother and Son" and "Don't Harbor VC."

3 hours and 50 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

1st Marines made a ground broadcast for 3 hours on general information and "Rewards for Mines."

Marine patrols distributed 8,750 leaflets. Themes used were: "Marines are Friends," "GVN Provides a Better Life" and "Health and Sanitation."

4 May 67 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,100,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," "Chieu Hoi," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Good Treatment at GVN Dispensaries" and "Radio Reward Leaflet."

1 hour and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 9,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Rewards for Mines" and "Marines are Friends of the Vietnamese." 4,000 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

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- 5 May 67 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 450,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," "VC Take People's Rice" "Overwhelming Power Against the VC" and "Keep the VC Out of Your Homes."
- 3 hours and 45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.
- Marine patrols distributed 750 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Hygiene" leaflets.
- 550 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed by Marine patrols.
- 6 May 67 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 550,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Don't Harbor VC," "Rally Now," "Appeal for VC to Rally with Weapons" and "Weapons Rewards."
- 3 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.
- Marine patrols distributed 4,923 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Mines Kill Innocent Civilians," "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Mines Reward."
- 7 May 67 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 515,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Don't Harbor VC," "Rally Now," "Weapons Reward" and "Appeal to VC to Rally With Their Weapons."
- 2 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.
- Marine patrols distributed 4,577 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi," and "VC Mines Kill Innocent Civilians."
- Marine patrols also distributed 1,000 "Free South" newspapers.
- 8 May 67 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,475,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," "ARVN and Allied Overwhelming Power," "VC Force Labor," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Chieu Hoi."
- 5 hours and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.
- Marine patrols distributed 7,700 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Rewards for Mines" and "Safe Conduct Passes."
- Out of total leaflets dropped, 500,000 were in support of Operation UNION.

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A Recon patrol distributed 40 leaflets. Themes used were: "Marines are Watching You," "B-52's," "Where is your Rice?" and an "Ace of Spades" poster.

9 May 67 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 2,100,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," "Aspects of Peoples Lives in South Vietnam," "Where are Your Comrades?" "Chieu Hoi" and "Mine Rewards."

Out of the total leaflets dropped, 1,500,000 were in support of Operation UNION.

2 hours and 50 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "VC Kill Innocent Civilians" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 5,375 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards," "Report VC Activity," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

10 May 67 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 425,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Show of Strength," "Don't Harbor VC," "Chieu Hoi" and "Blood on the Hands of the VC."

1 hour and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Defect or Die" and "The Enemy is Surrounded and Should Surrender" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 4,500 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "VC Steal From the People," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People" and "Warning to Villagers Not to Run From Marines."

11 May 67 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,100,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Surrender Instructions," "ARVN and Allied Overwhelming Power," "Exploitation of VC Destruction," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians" and "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps."

1st Marines air dropped 200,000 leaflets by helicopter. This amount is included in the above figure of 1,100,000.

Marine patrols distributed 3,400 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards," "Letter to the VC to Rally" and "Chieu Hoi."

1 hour and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

12 May 67 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 500,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Mines Reward" and "Appeal to the VC to Rally."

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2 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were made.

Marine patrols distributed 4,400 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

A POET Team departed for Hill 29 to exploit a Chieu Hoi who returned to 1/5.

13 May 67 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 900,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "ARVN and Allied Overwhelming Power," "Chieu Hoi" and "Don't Harbor VC."

2 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

1st Marines made a special 35 minute aerial broadcast warning the people to flee the area because artillery was to be used.

Marine patrols distributed 3,400 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards" and "Report VC Activity."

A Recon patrol pinned "Chieu Hoi" leaflets to trees on trails. Another Recon patrol posted an "Ace of Spades" poster on a well used trail.

14 May 67 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 400,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Letter From a VC Who Rallied From the Que Son Area" and a leaflet addressed to the NVA, reminding them of the heavy casualties they have received.

2 hours and 45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,930 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes."

"Free South" newspapers and "Rural Spirit" magazines were also distributed.

15 May 67 3 hours and 45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "VC Kidnapping Incident" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 5,500 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps" and "Health and Sanitation."

16 May 67 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 650,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Letters to the Men in the VC Ranks," "Free Market," "Mines Rewards," "Weapons Rewards" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

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2 hours and 50 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Rally or Die" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 4,160 leaflets. Themes used were: "Report VC Activity," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Letter to the Soldiers in the VC R-20 Battalion" and "Leaflet to the NVA."

17 May 67 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 100,000 leaflets advertising 2/5's "Free Market" operation.

4 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were made.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 1,350 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Report VC Activity" and "GVN Helps the Vietnamese People." 200 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

18 May 67 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 360,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation" and "Die for HO CHI MINH or Chieu Hoi for GVN."

4 hours and 5 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Recent Allied Victories" were conducted.

Marine patrols and MEDCAPs distributed 10,360 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Rewards for Mines and Weapons" and "Chieu Hoi Letters to the VC R-20 Battalion." 3,400 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

1st Marines made a 2 hour and 20 minute broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

19 May 67 Marine patrols distributed 2,150 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals." 400 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

1 hour and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

1st Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast in their TAOR.

20 May 67 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 200,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Rewards for Weapons."

2 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were made.

Marine patrols distributed 3,083 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Chieu Hoi," "MEDCAP Schedules" and "Safe Conduct Passes." 1,150 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

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1st Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast on "Chieu Appeals."

- 21 May 67 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 400,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps" and "Rewards for Weapons."

1 hour and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 350 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Marines are Friends of the Vietnamese" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1st Marines made a 1 hour and 30 minute ground broadcast. Theme used: "An explanation of GVN/USMC intentions to repair a dam."

- 22 May 67 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 318,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Marine patrols distributed 3150 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Chieu Hoi" and "Letters to the Men in the VC R-20 Battalion. 650 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

- 23 May 67 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 300,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

40 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "VC Harassment."

Marine patrols distributed 3,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes." 300 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

- 24 May 67 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 340,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 3,113 leaflets and posters. Themes used were: "Buddha Birthday Posters," "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "GVN Helps the Vietnamese People."

- 25 May 67 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 189,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

Marine patrols distributed 2,270 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

- 26 May 67 Marine patrols distributed 4,755 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "How to Rally to the GVN" and the "GVN Helps the Vietnamese People."

25 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was made.

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1st Marines made a 24 hour ground broadcast during their two day operation. Themes used were: "Government News," "Chieu Hoi" and music.

At 2/5's County Fair (#5-16) 4 films were shown for 1½ hours and a 2½ hour broadcasts was made by 244th PSYOP Company.

27 May 67 Marine patrols distributed 2,513 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1st Marines conducted 3 hours of ground broadcasts. Themes used were: "Warning the People that Tan Mui (1) (BT085588) Is to be Leveled," "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Rewards Program."

In support of 2/7 County Fair (#7-12) a Cultural Drama Team performed for 2 hours and 30 minutes, and an Audio/Visual Team broadcasted for 12 hours and showed 3 movies for 2 hours.

28 May 67 45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,250 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1st Marines made 4 hours and 30 minutes of broadcasts. 30 minutes were by air, telling villagers that Tan Mui was going to be leveled. 4 hours of ground broadcasts were made with following themes: "Chieu Hoi," "Help the Marines," "VC Atrocities" and "MEDCAP Schedules."

29 May 67 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 400,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Exploitation of VC Lack of Food and Medical Supplies" and "Instruction to Citizens to Inform Soldiers of VC Mines."

A special leaflet drop, consisting of 150,000 leaflets, was made for 5th Marines. Theme was: A reminder to the NVA of how their leaders had lied to them about the situation in South Vietnam and of their losses on Operations UNION I and UNION II.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 2,245 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Chieu Hoi," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People" and "Rewards for Mines."

2 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

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30 May 67 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 548,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Rewards," and a special leaflet in support of the 5th Marines, telling the NVA how their leaders have lied.

3 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,750 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Health and Sanitation," "Rewards" and "Pledge of Allegiance Cards."

7th Marines made a 2 hour ground broadcast.

1st Recon Battalion distributed 20 leaflets near a VC shelter. Themes used were: "Marines are Watching You," "Hardships of VC Life," "Chieu Hoi," "Ace of Spades" and "Rally Route."

31 May 67 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 350,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi" and "A Warning to Villagers Who Travel this Road."

45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,675 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Report VC Activity," "Health and Sanitation" and "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians."

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COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 May 1967

Div CEO Rep, Maj F. L. BIROU made liaison visit to 7th Comm Bn in connection with transfer of equipment to new Communication Center (Danang).

Ref: CEO ltr 10/JRL/tre over 5510 of 1 May 67

10 May 1967

Sole user telephone circuit established between 1st Med Bn in Danang and 1st Hosp Co in Chu Lai.

12 May 1967

Div CEO, Col. E. P. CLAUDE, attended conference on Cable Coordination at III MAF.

Ref: CG III MAF 090554Z May 67

13 May 1967

Work Request FMD 41 submitted to NSA, Danang for construction of Telephone Central Office bldg.

15 May 1967

Div CEO Rep, Maj. F. L. BIROU, made staff visit and follow up on Technical Inspection of 3d Bn, 11th Marines.

16 May 1967

Div Ass't CEO, Maj. J. H. BIRD Jr. made staff visit to 2d Bn, 7th Marines, 1st Engr Bn, 7th Engr Bn, and 11th MT Bn.

17 May 1967

Div CEO, Col. E. P. CLAUDE, attended conference at III MAF in connection with I Corps Cable Coordination and Control.

18 May 1967

Div CEO, Col. E. P. CLAUDE, attended conference at III MAF pertaining to future employment of Communication Support Company, 7th Communication Battalion.

21 May 1967

Construction completed on 1st MarDiv Comm Center.

22 May 1967

RAcm RICE, USN, Capt. HURD, USN and Cmdr FISHER toured 1st MarDiv Comm Facilities.

Ref: ICC NOTICE 5050 over 6P:rrw of 16 May 67

Div CEO Rep, Maj. F. L. BIROU made staff visit to 3d Bn, 7th Marines.

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23 May 1967

7th Comm Bn assigned responsibility for management and operation Chu Lai Comm Center, RUMHIA.

Ref: OG III MAF 231238Z May 1967

Div CEO Rep, Maj. F. L. BIROU made a staff visit and follow up on Technical Inspection of 3rd Bn, 11th Marines.

27 May 1967

Activated HF SSB voice casualty evacuation control and coordination net.

Ref: OG III MAF 240752Z May 67

29 May 1967

Div Ass't CEO, Maj. J. H. BIRD Jr., attended conference on realignment of Communication assets within III MAF.

Div CEO Rep, Maj. F. L. BIROU made staff visit to 11th Marines.

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COTLAND CHRONOLOGY

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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PART IVSUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

✓ Tab A First MarDiv PERINTREP 9-67
 ✓ Tab B First MarDiv PERINTREP 10-67
 ✓ Tab C Operational Documents
 ✓ Tab D Situation Reports
 ✓ Tab E Photographs and News Releases
 ✓ Tab F G-3 Journal for May 67
 ✓ Tab G Command Directory
 ✓ Tab H Hq Bn Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab I First Marines Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab J Fifth Marines Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab K Seventh Marines Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab L Eleventh Marines Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab M First Recon Bn Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab N First Antitank Bn Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab O First Tank Bn Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab P Third Amtrac Bn Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab Q First Engr Bn Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab R First Motor Transport Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab S Eleventh Motor Transport Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab T First Shore Party Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab U First Medical Bn Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab V Seventh Comm Bn Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab W Seventh Engr Bn Command Chronology
 ✓ Tab X Ninth Engr Bn Command Chronology

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FIRST MARINE DIVISION
OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR AND DTG</u>
1 ✓Frag Order 59-67	CG 1st MarDiv 010233Z May 67
2 ✓Security Survey	CG 1st MarDiv 011353Z May 67
3 ✓Opcon SLF	CG 1st MarDiv 020051Z May 67
4 ✓Combat Opns in RVN	CG 1st MarDiv 020609Z May 67
5 ✓Frag Order 61-67	CG 1st MarDiv 030129Z May 67
6 ✓Ch One to Frag Order 55-67	CG 1st MarDiv 030541Z May 67
7 ✓Boundary Changes	CG 1st MarDiv 041305Z May 67
8 ✓Ch One to Frag Order 62-67	CG 1st MarDiv 041509Z May 67
9 ✓Frag Order 62-67	CG 1st MarDiv 041511Z May 67
10 ✓Ch One to Frag Order 57-67	CG 1st MarDiv 050905Z May 67
11 ✓Ch One to Frag Order 61-67	CG 1st MarDiv 051357Z May 67
12 ✓Security of Major Bridges	CG 1st MarDiv 060549Z May 67
13 ✓Frag Order 63-67	CG 1st MarDiv 060551Z May 67
14 ✓Relief/Reinf of CIDG Camps	CG III MAF 061504Z May 67
15 ✓Frag Order 64-67	CG 1st MarDiv 090945Z May 67
16 ✓Frag Order 65-67	CG 1st MarDiv 101445Z May 67
17 ✓Contingency Spt of Opn OREGON	CG 1st MarDiv 111411Z May 67
18 ✓Opcon SLF	CG 1st MarDiv 121019Z May 67
19 ✓Operation UNION	CG 1st MarDiv 121721Z May 67
20 ✓Planning Guidance June 67	CG 1st MarDiv 130851Z May 67
21 ✓Recon Along Prov Boundaries	CG III MAF 160220Z May 67
22 ✓Operation WEBSTER	CG III MAF 180057Z May 67
23 ✓Frag Order 66-67	CG 1st MarDiv 180137Z May 67
24 ✓Ch Two to Frag Order 30-67	CG 1st MarDiv 271303Z May 67

NOTE: Annex 7000-001-67 issued in May 67 f/u Basic, (12 Mar 67)

1st MAR DIV - Opnl Docs

MAY 1967

Tab C

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMMF



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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PERINTREP NO. 9-67

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF
AND RVNAF

Tab A

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)
DANANG, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
181200H MAY 1967

FERINTREF NO. 9-67

Period Covered: 011200H to 161200H May 1967

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. General Analysis

The number of enemy initiated incidents occurring in the first two weeks of May showed a slight decline from that of the previous two weeks. The attacks did, however, increase in intensity. On the 14th and 15th there were two physical assaults, characteristic of sapper-type attacks, upon CAC units. The attack on the 14th against CAC B2-2 (AT 865 874) was unique in so far as the enemy lifted the defensive wire instead of destroying it. (See paragraph #2.D.1). Also on the 14th the LAAM Battalion at (AT 972 736) was attacked by an enemy force which used small arms, RPG-2RKTS, and satchel charges.

Propaganda leaflets (written in both English and Vietnamese) and personal letters discovered immediately after the assault contained the letter box number of the V-4 Co of the 402nd Bn (AKA T/89 Bn).

The remaining incidents, with the exception of the 140mm rocket attack against H/2/11 (AT 9214 7951) on the 16th, consisted mainly of attacks by fire with mortars being used extensively. The rocket attack was accompanied by intermittent sniper fire indicating that the target area was under observation. Counter-battery fire was initiated and the enemy fire ceased shortly thereafter. A G/2/7 patrol dispatched to the area the following day discovered evidence that the enemy departed the area rather hurriedly (refer to paragraph #2.D.2).

Enemy Main and Local Force units continued to battle for control of the Que Son valley. A notebook taken from a recent captive reveals that the enemy waited twelve days to initiate the ambush against U.S. Marine forces at Nui Lac Son. This, and other significant attacks plus the apparently unrestricted use of mortars indicates the enemy's willingness to fight for this LOC to the west.

Elements of the 3rd NVA Regiment and the 21st NVA Regiment, together with supporting units of the 2nd NVA Division, have been identified as the enemy engaged with U.S. Marine Forces in Operation Union. One of the supporting units identified in the Union

DOWNGRADES AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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area is the 82nd Mortar Company of the 21st Regiment. A squad leader of the 82nd Company rallied to an RF unit near Tam Ky on 3 May. He stated that his unit mortared Tam Ky city (BT 291231) in the early morning hours of 3 May. After the attack the unit moved to the vicinity of (BT 240260). He further revealed that the 21st Regiment moved from Quang Ngai to Quang Tin about one month prior to his rallying.

The C-20th Medical Company of the 3rd NVA Regiment was also identified as being within the 1st Marine Division's area of responsibility. On 7 May Vietnamese Rangers captured two identification cards with the unit designation C-20 southwest of Hoi An in the vicinity of (BT 080515). The identification cards were dated 1 and 2 May 1967.

Enemy Main Forces remained in relatively the same locale as they were the latter part of April with the exception of the 21st Regiment which has been evidenced as far north as Tam Ky City. The 1st Regiment of the 2nd Division is still operating in Central Quang Ngai Province. The 2nd VC Regiment remained in southern Quang Ngai Province, and the 22nd Regiment straddled the Quang Ngai/Binh Dinh Province border.

B. 1st Marine Division's Zone of Responsibility

Once again the enemy concentrated his efforts against the Revolutionary Development program and ARVN outposts. Enemy activity in the northwestern part of the TAOR increased appreciably the latter part of the month. Three physical assaults were initiated. Before the attack on the 14th against a CAC unit located at (AT 865574), the VC took the position under fire with mortars and SA to allow their forces to crawl under the defensive wires. However, the CAC unit was prepared for the attack, and from all indications the enemy suffered at least 20 casualties. Also on the 14th the LAAM Battalion (AT 972795) was attacked by an enemy who employed SA fire and satchel charges. H/2/11 (AT 921795) received 13 rounds of 140mm rocket fire in the early morning hours of the 16th. The area east and southeast of Hieu Duc experienced more attacks by mortar fire than is normal for the area. The attacks were centered around the area where the 140mm rockets were fired against the Danang Air Base in February and March. All attacks consisted of a few rounds of 60mm mortar fire indicating they were probably initiated by local or irregular forces. The 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment was attacked by 60mm mortar fire on the 15th at (AT 966696). Quang Da Special Zone reported that 5-6 rounds of unknown type mortar fire landed indiscriminately in grid square (BT 0368) on the 12th. In the vicinity of Hoi An, enemy initiated incidents rose appreciably. The Cam Kim outpost (BT 132561) was attacked by 5-6 rounds of VC 60mm mortar fire. On the 9th the VC again delivered 5 rounds of mortar fire into the outpost. The VC fired three rounds of 60mm mortars at the Cau Lau bridge (BT 091552) on 5 May. On 6 May the 467th RF Company at (BT 135547) was harassed by the VC firing 4-6 rounds of 60mm mortars in the vicinity of their position. The 706th RF Company in the vicinity of (BT 132561)

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received 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the 9th. Friendly artillery countered killing two VC. Also on the 9th a platoon from F/2/1 received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire in their blocking position at (AT 996 605). CAC D-4, OPCON 1/1, was attacked on the 15th in their defensive position (BT 084 569) by 30-40 enemy dressed in black shorts. The enemy was supported by rifle grenades, 57mm RR, bangalore torpedos, and B-40 rockets. However, the attack cost the VC two AK-47 rifles, assorted grenades and equipment, a B-40 rocket, two 20 pound shaped charges, one KIA and 15 more probably killed. To the south of the 1st Marines TAOR, three apparently unrelated attacks occurred. The Duy Xuyen Headquarters received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on 4 May. The 325th RF Company manning the Hon Bang OP (BT 032 510) received 30 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the 7th. On the 11th the Moc Bai OP was attacked by fire. The enemy fired 3 rounds of 60mm mortars and several B-40 rounds.

The VC fired 3 rounds of 81mm mortar into the Que Son District Headquarters on the 3rd of May, and 4 more rounds on the 13th.

In the Operation Union area the enemy was active throughout the period, engaging friendly units when the situation presented itself. Often the enemy engaged Marine forces during daylight hours in open combat, however, he still relied heavily on mortar attacks at night unaccompanied by ground assault to inflict casualties upon friendly units.

C/1/3 received 5 rounds of 82mm mortar and 10 rounds of 60mm mortar, and an unknown number of 57mm RR rounds in their night defensive position (BT 115 398) at twilight on 2 May. On the 4th, I/3/5 perimeter defense (BT 038 343) received approx 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from a possible two enemy positions. Two rounds of mortar fire and 50cal fire were directed at D/1/3 (BT 098 404) on the 4th. Also on the 4th, D/3/1 in a night defensive position (BT 107 405) received mortar, SA, and AW fire. On the night of 7 May, companies C & D/1/3 were attacked by VC 81mm mortar fire. C & D were in defensive position at (BT 023 399) and (BT 030 385) respectively. C/1/3 on a S&D mission (BT 024 398) on 8 May received 20 rounds of mortar fire from an estimated 2 enemy positions. Airstrikes destroyed one enemy position. The VC fired 5 rounds of unknown type mortar at W/1/11 (BT 021 287) on the 8th. Counter-mortar fire resulted in two secondary explosions. On the 9th, C & D/1/3 received 8-10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire while on a S&D mission in the vicinity of (BT 015 375). The enemy mortared elements of B & C/1/3 on 10 May and all attempts to reinforce their position (BT 034 387) were met with heavy SA/AW and mortar fire. Finally after three hours, at 1300, the first reinforcements landed at (BT 034 395). Enemy small arms and mortar fire continued in heavy volume. While maneuvering toward Phu Que Doc, on the 14th, B/1/1 (BT 096335) was hit by an estimated 50 enemy who employed mortars and automatic weapons fire. Company D/1/3, which moved to assist, was also taken under enemy mortar fire. On the 15th A, I, and M Companies 5th Marines engaged an estimated NVA Company who used automatic weapons, small arms, and 82mm mortars. Contact with the enemy was maintained throughout the night.

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On 3 May the 5th Marines CP at Tam Ky was hit by 25 rounds of 81 or 82mm mortar fire. A coordinated attack was conducted on the 9th against the 5th Marines (BT 228 320) and the Tam Ky Provincial Headquarters.

C. Adjacent Areas

Quang Tri Province continued to be the scene of heavy fighting. Khe Sanh received mortar and heavy small arms fire on 11 May. Gio Linh and Con Thien were the hardest hit with both areas receiving artillery and mortar fire. Gio Linh received 11 rounds of mortar followed by small arms fire during the evening of the 2nd, 6 rounds of mortar on the 3rd, 105 rounds of 82mm mortar on the 7th and 59 rounds of artillery fire on the 12th of May. Con Thien received heavy mortar fire and a light ground attack on the 7th, mortar fire on the 11th, and 1/4's CP at Con Thien received 10-15 rounds of mortar fire about noon on the 12th, 15-20 rounds from 1530 to 1605, and 40-50 rounds of unknown caliber artillery fire between 1645 - 1655. Camp Carroll was mortared on the 7th.

Working on down the coast, Dong Ha received 10-15 rounds of mortar and 30 rounds of 140mm rocket fire on 7 May. MACV compound at Hue received 60 rounds of 82mm mortar with the Thua Thien subsector across the street receiving an additional 10-15 rounds. Operation Shawnee continued with light contact. Arriving at the Quang Nam border a convoy received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar fire just north of the Hai Van Pass.

To the south the NSA at Chu Lai received 32-40 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire and 2/35 CP (BS 754 434) received 35-40 rounds of 81mm mortar fire on the 12th.

2. Enemy Operations During the Period.A. Strength and Disposition

(1) Refer to OOB Annex this PERINTREP

B. Order of Battle

(2) Refer to OOB Annex this PERINTREP

C. Reserves and Reinforcements

(3) Refer to 1st MarDiv PERINTREP 8-67, Paragraph #5 (Capabilities and Vulnerabilities)

D. New Enemy Tactics

(1) At 0155H on 14 April approximately one hundred VC attacked CAC B2-2 in the vicinity of (AT 865 574). The enemy breached the defensive wires using forked sticks to hold the individual strands of wire about 18" off the deck. [REDACTED] This new tactic is a demonstration of the

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of the careful planning used by the VC before attacking a fixed installation.

(2) AT 0100H on 16 April, Battery H/2/11 (AT 921 795) received 140mm rockets rounds. G/2/7 platoon combat patrol located 47 rocket firing positions, 31 rocket tubes and 19 rockets at (AT 858 854). The enemy had fired the rockets from tubes which were fastened together. This duplex arrangement is a deviation from previous tactics. Also at least three mines have been discovered by EOD teams within the firing site. (See Enclosure # 2)

E. Administrative and Political Units

(1) An enemy base camp or training facility was found by a reconnaissance patrol. K/3/7 was dispatched to conduct a more detailed search. The area consisted of twenty structures and a fifteen foot cave. Assorted clothing including camouflaged utilities, fifty pigs and one hundred chickens were found.

(2) D/1/5 found what was believed to be a supply point for a battalion or larger unit. (AT 956 273) Captured gear included: 8,000 uniforms, four civilian AM/FM radios, four rice racks, 18 gallons of salad oil, 53 five gallon drums containing firstaid supplies, 40 bundles of plastic material, 200 maps, 8 field glass cases, 5 complete surgical kits, 1 medical sterilizer, two man-packed insecticide units, 39 pair of VC field shoes, 2 boxes of shotgun shells, 7 canteens, 16 field packs, 13 candles, 3 knives, 3 cheese cloth rolls, and 3 bundles of gauze.

F. Anti-Air Activity

(1) A helicopter on a med evac mission was forced to land on 5 May at (BT 052 698) when it caught fire from heavy automatic weapons fire directed at it.

(2) On 5 May a CH-46 in support of Operation Union caught fire after receiving ground fire. The pilot put the aircraft down in a river (AT 904 238) to extinguish the flames.

(3) A med evac helo received small arms fire on the 10th, forcing it to make an emergency landing in the 1st Bn, 7th Marines area.

G. Anti-Personnel/Anti-Tank Mine Activity. There were fifty-three mine/booby trap incidents within the Danang TAOR during this reporting period. This is a slight decrease from the last reporting period. These incidents are classified as follows: Thirty-nine antipersonnel mine/booby trap incidents and 14 anti-vehicular mine/booby trap incidents.

H. Artillery/Mortar/RR/Rocket Activity. Mortar attacks have increased both in duration and intensity, and in contrast to the last reporting period appear to have been coordinated. A possible reason for increased attacks by mortar fire by the VC within the TAOR was to induce caution in redeployment of Marine forces to the Operation Union area. ARVN

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outposts appear to have been the focal point for these attacks.

Mortar Incidents In Quang Nam Province

(1) 012125H Cam Kim OP, manned by the 467th RF Company (BT 132561) received 5-6 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

(2) 030130H, The VC fired 3 rounds of 81mm mortar into Que Son District Headquarters (BT 042 347).

(3) On 4 May Duy Xuyen District Headquarters (BT 064 515) received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

(4) 052230H, The Cau Lau Bridge (BT 091 552) received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

(5) 060030H, 2nd Bn, 51st Regiment CP received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire (AT 989 655).

(6) 062005H, 2nd Bn, 51st Regiment (AT 982 658) received 4-6 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

(7) 060155H, 467th RF Company (BT 135 547) received 4-6 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

(8) 080330H, Hon Bang OP (BT 032 510) received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

(9) 080730H, 1st Co, 1st Bn, 51st Regiment (AT 995 645) received mortar, small arm and automatic weapons fire.

(10) 090130H, 706th RF Company (BT 132 561) received 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Artillery returned fire and killed two VC.

(11) 092050H, F/2/1 Platoon blocking position (AT 996 605) received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

(12) 112105H, Moc Bai OP (BT 127 480) received 3 rounds of 60mm Mortar fire and several B-40 rounds.

(13) 122109H, Quang Da Special Zone reported 5-6 rounds of unknown caliber mortar fire land indiscriminately in grid square (BT 0368).

(14) 130030H, Que Son District Headquarters (BT 043 347) received 4 rounds of 81mm Mortar fire.

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(15) 140155H, 3/7's CAC B2-2 received mortar fire, small arms fire, and a physical assault (AT 865574). In breaching the wire the enemy used forked sticks to hold the wire off the deck, permitting troops to crawl under it.

(16) 152204H, M/3/7 (AT 966696) received 8 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

(17) 160100H, H/2/11 (AT 921795) received 13 rounds of 140mm rocket fire. Counter-battery fire was exercised on suspected enemy positions.

Mortar Incidents in the Operation Union Area.

(1) 021935H, C/1/3 (BT 115398) received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 5 rounds 82mm mortar fire.

(2) 040112H, I/3/5 perimeter defense (BT 038343) received approximately 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from what appeared to be two separate groups of VC.

(3) 04 May, D/1/3 on line (BT 098404) received two rounds of mortar and .50 caliber machine gun fire.

(4) 041040H, D/3/1 (BT 107405) received small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire.

(5) 051900H, H&S 1/3 while being helo-lifted received 12 rounds of mortar fire (size unknown) and small arms fire on the LZ (BT 128387).

(6) 072035H, D/1/3 (BT 030385) received 14 rounds of 81mm mortar fire.

(7) 081035H, C/1/3 on a search and destroy mission (BT 024398) received 20 rounds of mortar fire from two enemy positions. Air strikes destroyed one enemy position.

(8) 082010H, W/1/11 (BT 021287) received 5 rounds of mortar fire. They returned 4.2 mortars and observed one secondary explosion.

(9) 090640H, C & D/1/3 search and destroy mission (BT 015375) received 8-10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and small arms fire.

(10) 10 May, C & B/1/3 (BT 024387) received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire, and an unknown number of 82mm and 60mm mortar fire.

(11) 121830H, D Company 5th Marines while maneuvering into position was attacked by enemy using small arms and mortar fire. (BT 085356) I Company 5th Marines received heavy small arms and mortar fire when they attempted to move on line with D Company. The enemy was well dug in and firing from prepared emplacements.

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(12) 130010H, D/1/11 (BT 043343) perimeter defense received 30 rounds of mortar fire. Counter mortar fire resulted in one secondary explosion. Five minutes later 1/5 perimeter received 15 rounds of mortar fire, this time counter battery fire resulted in two secondary explosions.

(13) 130015H, I/3/5 (BT 055365) perimeter defense received approximately 15 rounds of mortar fire.

(14) 130030H, three RF companies coordinating with USMC elements in Operation Union received 4 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.

(15) 130845H, I/3/5 search and destroy sweep force (BT 092360) came under small arms and mortar attack. Air strikes and mortar fire suppressed the enemy fire. At 1300 the same day I/3/5 again encountered an enemy in close combat. The enemy employed mortar and small arms fire in both encounters.

(16) 131500H, K/3/5 received intense small arms and mortar fire (BT 088350). Friendly artillery and airstrikes, accounted for 15 NVA killed and 20 NVA probably killed. Later the same day, the enemy again attacked, using small arms and mortar fire. Artillery, air strikes, and mortars brought the total enemy losses for the two engagements up to 25 NVA KIA (C), and 30 NVA KIA (P).

(17) 14 May, while maneuvering toward Phu Que Doc, B/1/1 (BT 096335) was hit by an estimated 30 enemy who employed mortar and automatic weapons fire. Company D, who moved to assist B Company, also received small arms and mortar fire.


(18) On 15 May, A, I, and M Companies, 5th Marines engaged an estimated NVA company who used automatic weapons, small arms, and 82mm mortar fire (BT 0938, and (BT 1038). Contact with the enemy was maintained throughout the night.

Mortar Incidents In Quang Tin Province

(1) 030400H, 5th Marines CP at Tam Ky (BT 291228) received 20-25 rounds of 81 or 82mm mortar fire. PF's engaged the enemy, killing five and capturing one.

(2) 082010H, 1/11 received 5 rounds of mortar fire (BT 021287). They countered with a 4.2" mortar attack and observed one secondary explosion.

(3) 090105H, 5th Marines CP at Hill #29 received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. (BT 228320) 3 rounds hit in the 51st ARVN Regiment's area.



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090110H, 5th Marines at Tam Ky received 40-50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire (BT 291 228).

I. Interdiction.

Interdiction activity in the 1st MarDiv's area of responsibility increased slightly during this reporting period. There were five incidents reported.

On 7 May the VC destroyed a section of a bridge at (BT 062 511). The damage was estimated at 70%. Again on the 10th the VC destroyed a bridge at (AT 926 866). A culvert was destroyed, (BT 120 488) making the road impassable for a short time on the 11th. Again on the 11th the VC rendered the road impassable about 9 km southeast of Dien Ban (BT 113 497) by placing rocks and trees on the road. On the 12th a foot bridge (AT 986 2) constructed for VN use was damaged by ripping up 20 foot sections. There was no indication explosives were used on the foot span.

J. Guerrilla Activity. VC guerrilla activity increased moderately this reporting period. The total incidents within the Danang TAOR numbered 187 broken down as follows: 79 harassing small arms fire, 6 mortar attacks, 1 M-79 small arms fire, 1 small arms/grenade/B-40 rocket attack, 14 anti-vehicular mines, 39 anti-personnel mines, 1 grenade/small arms fire, 5 small arms/automatic weapons fire, 5 punji pits, 1 small arms fire/grenades, 18 grenades, 2 sabotage, 2 small arms/automatic weapons attack, 5 automatic weapon fire, 1 automatic weapon/M-79, 1 automatic weapon fire/grenade, 1 automatic weapon attack, 1 punji pit/mine, 1 satchel charge, and 1 rocket/small arms fire.

L. Infantry.

Infantry contacts have increased in intensity and duration during this reporting period. The most significant incidents are:

1). On the 6th of May, immediately after recon patrol CLASSMATE's insertion at (YC 998858), the patrol came under automatic weapons fire from 6-8 VC to their north and southwest. Aircraft delivered suppressive fire, fixed wing aircraft ran air strikes, and the patrol was extracted and reinserted in their alternate LZ at (ZC 0586). Again they received automatic weapons fire from the northwest and small arms fire from the north and west. As the weather closed in, airstrikes were run on the enemy positions but the patrol continued to receive fire. They were extracted for the second time two hours later. TPQ-10's were scheduled for both areas of contact.

2). On 7 May at 0540H, an unknown size enemy force destroyed the bridge and attacked the 759th RF Company at (BT 062511) forcing them to withdraw from the hamlet. Reaction forces consisting of the 37th and 39th Ranger Battalion and 2/4 APC's were in contact with the enemy force (BT 087 525, 094518) from late morning until early evening resulting in 29 VC KIA (C), 50 VC KIA (P), and 9 individual weapons captured.

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3). On 7 May at 0300H a 51st ARVN ambush was attacked by a possible VC platoon (AT 995642). Contact lasted approximately one hour. Marine artillery supported, and the 1st Marines maneuvered forces in an attempt to trap the enemy unit. Spooky was also employed. Two ARVN were slightly wounded.

4). On 13 May recon patrol, COMMANCHE, was taken under small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated thirty VC in a coordinated attack from the north, northeast, and east, 30 to 100 meters from the patrol's position (AT 951328). The patrol returned small arms/machine gun fire, grenades, M-79, and claymore mines. An airstrike and a fire mission were called. When the patrol ignited a smoke grenade to mark their position, the VC also ignited one. UH1E's arrived on station and delivered suppressive fires during the patrol's extraction. Artillery fired a complete saturation of the area after the patrol was extracted.

5). At 0155H on 14 May CAC B2-2 (AT 065573), which as a result of local intelligence had been reinforced by an additional USMC squad, was attacked by an estimated 100 VC/NVA. The enemy were well armed and wearing some sort of helmet. The attack commenced under cover of mortar and 57mm RR fire with the enemy attacking in platoon size strength simultaneously from the north, northeast and south. They breached the wire by propping it up approximately 18" off the deck with forked sticks, and continued the attack with grenades, heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire and satchel charges. One group of approximately 6 men was driven from the bridge at (AT 865573) after an apparent attempt to destroy it.

The refugee hamlet west of CAC B2-2 was also hit resulting in two civilians killed, ten wounded and two houses destroyed. Prior to attacking the enemy yelled, "Move out or you'll be killed. Tin is American and we consider you American." A seventeen man reaction force from Company I/3/7 was dispatched with tanks, and preplanned concentrations were fired on routes of withdrawal. A search of the area indicated 20 VC KIA (P). A debriefing after the attack revealed that one USMC ambush 250 meters to the north-east, one RF ambush in the hamlet and a listening post south-west of the stream had not observed any movement prior to the attack.

6.) On the 15th of May at 0305 CAC D-4 OPCON 1/1 (BT 084569) was attacked by thirty to forty enemy dressed in black shorts. They were supported by rifle grenades, 57mm RR, and B-40 rockets. CAC D-4 attempted to fire claymore mines positioned in the defensive wire but the wire leading to the mines had been cut. Illumination, artillery and reinforcements were requested over the land line to 1/1 CP. The land lines were cut shortly thereafter. Protective wire was breached in the north-west corner of the perimeter with bangalore torpedoes. An estimated twenty to thirty enemy penetrated the protective wire and attacked the bunkers and installations within the perimeter with shape charges and grenades. CAC D-4 returned small arms fire and grenades and engaged the enemy in hand to hand fighting. The enemy fled to the south and southwest carrying many dead and wounded. Artillery fired in support

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of CAC D-4 on possible routes of escape. A reaction force from 1/1 arrived but made no contact with the enemy. They searched the area and found two K-47 rifles, one B-40 rocket, two 20 pound shaped charges, assorted grenades and equipment. There was one VC KIA (C), and 15 VC KIA (F).

7.) 140015 May, the 1st LAAM Battalion (BT 972736) perimeter was penetrated by an estimated 12 - 15 enemy who used hand grenades, satchel charges, and RPG-2 rocket rounds. They returned small arms fire which they believed wounded an unknown number of enemy. Three missile launchers were damaged, one fuel bladder destroyed, and wire leading into the position was cut. One pair of wire cutters, two camouflage head bands, several hand grenades, propaganda leaflets (English and VN language) and personal letters, three pieces of oil paper, two wooden plugs, one bottle of unknown substance, one knotted green cloth (used to tie defensive wire) were found.

1. Intelligence Activity - Negative

2. Infiltration

Continued sightings of increased enemy activity in the A Shau Valley are being reported.

3. Other Elements - Negative

3. Other Intelligence Factors

A. Enemy Organization And Combat Efficiency - Refer to PARA # 1.A

B. New Unit Identification - Negative

C. New Weapons And Equipment - Negative

D. Personalities - Negative

E. Enemy Losses

1.) Danang TAOR: From 011200 May to 161200 May, the enemy suffered the following losses:

a.) Personnel

KIA (C) - 82

KIA (P) - 341

Lebainees - 180

FW (VC) - 19

Returnee - 1

Individual Weapons - 11

Rocket Launchers - 35

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2.) Operations

a.) Operation Union which has been engaged with Main Force units since 21 April in the Que Son Valley has accounted for 468 NVA KIA (C), 222 NVA (P), 397 VC KIA (C), and 553 VC KIA (F) as of 161200H May. One-hundred seventy-three (173) VC were classified as PW's. There were two returnees and 14 detainees who have not been further classified as of 16 May. Weapons captured consist of 63 individual weapons and 7 crew served.

b.) Operation Beaver Cage, which supported Operation Union from 280630H April through the 12th of May is credited with 181 VC KIA (C), 136 VC KIA (F), 11 VC PW. Ten (10) individual weapons were also claimed. There were 66 detainees.

F. Morale - No Change

G. Administrative Installations And Support

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type Installations</u>	<u>Source</u>
28 April	BT 088214	Two rice depots	Agent report F/3
2 May	BT 130219	Machine shop	Agent report F/4
3 May	BT 193149	Four rice caches	Agent report F/3
3 May	ZC 005503	Food depot	Agent report F/3
4 May	BT 195146	Rice depot	Agent report F/3
7 May	AT 866556	Tunnel	Agent report F/3
May	AT 995439	Paddy storage	Agent report F/3

H. Terrain - negative

I. Weather

Clear skies and a gradual warming trend characterized the weather for this reporting period. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 92 and 76 with an average humidity of 76%. Winds were from the southeast at 8-10 knots.

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Visibility, marred only by occasional early ground fog and late afternoon showers, averaged 7 miles. The cumulative rainfall was .22 inches. (See PERINTREF 8-67 for May forecast)

Increasing temperatures will continue to have an adverse affect on helicopter lift capabilities. This will be particularly apparent at higher altitudes.

J. Intelligence Operations

1.) Captured Document Translation Report

a.) Captured by 1/26, (AT 9659), on 251105 April 1967

To all Headquarters of all village units and other units.

Execute the above mentioned directive in order to accomplish the order of the B-55 Current Affairs Committee.

Based on the Province units order of action, unit 75's (Q.15 Dien Ban District Company) headquarters directs all villages and other units that they meet immediately and prepare a combat plan that is practical, specific and correct. You must obtain cadre to inspect and check the terrain before the enemy comes, so that we can avoid embarrassing situations during times of action.

The Viet Cong's purpose of preparing is to aim at the main areas where the U.S. and their servants are quartered. The U.S. tries to pacify, ambush and raid us sporadically in our various local areas. It is essential to attack the pacification groups and the 51st ARVN Regiment, as well as the homes of those tyrants who are leaders of the RVN.

Our manner of action will be both to fight and prepare for operations. Our constant observing of the enemy's daily operating procedures, such as sleeping and eating will be included in our daily preparations and reconnaissance.

Our tactics will be ambushes and raids and sapper fighting, and we will prepare the guerrillas to attack secretly deep into the enemy hideouts (especially their bases, cities, towns, etc...)

Every village should prepare a plan to destroy the convoys by planting mines to destroy their vehicles and should prepare the battle area for ambushes by means of mines at all intersections.

If conditions are favorable for us, we should deploy fireteams as a strong penetrating element so that when the mines explode, we can assault, get their weapons and quickly withdraw.

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All liberated areas such as Go Noi, be prepared to bring up our other friendly areas.

Specifically, all villages in the "K" area, bring to each village one element to coordinate with Dien Van, Thai, Tho Xuan and Phuoc in order to operate at the crossroads of road # 100 (will issue a specific directive and disseminate it to each village concerning the exact methods) which should be prepared already.

All the villages of Dien Son, Tien, Tho and Van need to bring their forces permanently, both day and night, to snipe at Bo Bo (Hill #55) and Trum Giao in order to create an encirclement of the enemy, not all owing them to develop and opportunities to raid us at night.

Dien Thai, Phuoc, Tho, Van and Xuan need to have guerrillas active south and north of road #100, along with maintaining contact with other friendly units of the "K" region so they can completely destroy the #100 crossroads. Do research into this, and create a fighting power on the battlefield using mines on road #100 like Kien Tho who gained success doing this before.

Dien Hoa, An and Thang should move their forces direction to encircle the Trang Nhut post in order to snipe at and attack the entire force of the enemy who usually operates in small separate groups. One half of Dien Hoa is to go north and operate strongly out of the new main crossroads. As for the other half of the forces, they are to link up with Dien An to attack the Tranh Nhut post.

All the villages of Dien Thang, An, Nam, and Trung are to positively attack in a strong manner, the crossroads of Route #1, in order to cut it in half, it being an important communications artery for the enemy.

Also, at night, bring the guerrillas to stick close to Route #1 to attack all the enemy patrols in order to protect the road. (All villages should continuously maintain contact with each other to make operating easier.)

Disputed areas must positively surround the U.S. bases along with attacking the convoys that usually run by with mines and booby traps. Determine to destroy the plot of the vehicles raiding our villages in an unexpected manner.

All of the village headquarters should, to their utmost, prepare for battle in a specific and correct manner. After developing this plan, all the villages should set up a detailed reporting system, together with maps of objectives that all villages will send to Unit 75 in order to study and advise, so that the participating units can obtain success as well as reinforcing each other if needed.

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Upon receiving this directive, all village units and other units must meet with this headquarters and quickly determine a plan that follows closely the spirit of the directive. The results are then to be reported to us (Unit 75). But, by 2 May 1967, all villagers must send their maps and objectives to Unit 75 as well as their plans of operations. G-2 Comment: This document could possibly have been promulgated by the Dien Ban Current Affairs Committee to coordinate the activities of the individual villages and the local district company. The B-55 has been reported as a designator for the Dien Ban Current Affairs Committee and a document captured on 4 April, listed Unit 75 as an AKA for the Q-15 district company.

A study of past incidents occurring within this area (see Perintreps 5-67 through 8-67) would reveal that the plan presented in this document represents "more of the same" for Dien Ban District. Apparently the VC recognized this area as a focal point for water and land LOC's and are attempting to deny free use of it to FWMF.

b.) Document captured during Operation Binh Quang-4 on 9 May by the 1st Ranger group in the vicinity of (BT 0747).

The document was dated 3 May and was originated by B-48 a unit of the Quang Da Provincial Committee, and appears to be a directive to district and village level cadre. It outlined propaganda action to be taken during the forthcoming 22-24 May stand down (Buddha's Birthday).

In essence the document stated:

District and village cadre will select assembly areas in which to carry out VC propaganda activities. Suggested areas are District headquarters, Buddhist Pagodas, and villages near ARVN outposts. Specific locations cited were the Lan Huong Pagoda in Nam Phuoc, Duy Xuyen District and the Long Tuyen and Phuc Thanh Pagodas near Hoi An. The theme of the propaganda activity during this period will be the oppression of the Buddhists by the GVN. In order to broadcast this theme, VC cadre will distribute leaflets, use loud speakers and send letters to ARVN personnel. In addition each village is to recruit five to ten families of ARVN soldiers or allegedly families of soldiers to go to outposts and District headquarters asking that their relatives in the GVN military be allowed to attend Buddhist celebrations. At district level thirty (30) families are to be assembled for the same purpose.

The document also states that agents will enter the outposts, District headquarters, and cities in order to contact soldiers and to spread propaganda about the many VC victories.

The document also indicated that the VC intend to use Buddhist cadre as mediators between the VC and GVN soldiers in terms of military proselyting.

4. Counterintelligence

A. General

During the reporting period enemy activity of a counterintelligence nature continued at a low level. Terrorism which had been higher than normal for this area has declined with the elections coming to an end.

B. Sabotage

The 5th Counterintelligence Team reported that the Hoa Hiep Village headquarters located in Nam O Hamlet (AT 923827) was totally destroyed by a satchel charge on the evening of 6 May.

C. Terrorism

1.) A usually reliable source reported three VC, disguised as civilians, carrying their weapons in a hemp bag, entered Cau Lau Hamlet, Xuyen Quang Village (BT 093545), on the night of 26 April. Once inside the hamlet, they assassinated Mr. Nguyen Can, My Duan Hamlet leader.

2.) Hieu Nhon DIOCC reports that on 4 May three VC entered Cam Chau Village (BT 165580) and fired a submachinegun into Long Thi Hung's Inn, killing one civilian and wounding two PF's and a school girl.

D. Other

1.) On 28 April an estimated VC platoon abducted 27 registered voters from Xuyen Chau Village in the vicinity of (BT 0950); but released the people, apparently unharmed, on 2 May. This was reported by a usually reliable source.

2.) Recent reports received by this Headquarters from various American and Vietnamese intelligence agencies indicate that the Viet Cong are seeking military information by having their agents gain employment within the American compounds. Recent reports also indicate that military information is being sought through the use of prostitutes. These women are found around the areas of military compounds, along routes that Marines travel and the civilian establishments that Marines visit. It is quite easy for a trained agent to gain information from a military man by the use of seemingly innocent questions and "small talk".


Units that employ Vietnamese nationals should stress security in the discussion of classified matters. Clubs, mess halls, military exchanges and Vietnamese concessions located within the compounds offer an excellent opportunity for the enemy to gain needed military information. "Loose talk" in such an establishment could mean failure to a units' combat mission, resulting in the loss of Marines' lives and equipment, to say nothing of the grief it would cause to the families, relatives and friends at home.

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The employees have been cleared by the Military Security Service, however this clearance is granted only to allow the employee access to the compound, so that he may perform his task. This clearance should not be construed to mean that he has been cleared for classified information.

Everyday security, like camouflage, is a continuing thing. Unit commanders and section leaders should remind their personnel that the practice of good security habits is a must in all facets of military operations.

5. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities - No change, refer to 1st Marine Division PERINTREF # 8-67.



S. DAVIS
COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. Order of Battle
- B. Significant Agent, VC PW/Returnee, and Document Reports
- C. Paragraph 13 Entries
- D. Astronomical Data (Refer to 1st Marine Division PERINTREF # 8-67)

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 "C" less 72, 76, 84, 98, 100, 191; plus 80 (15)

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SA, 2nd ARVN Div	(1)
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SA, Quang Ngai Sector	(1)
SA, QNSS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
FLC	(1)
MCB 1	(1)
MCB 4	(1)
MCB 58	(1)
MCB 133	(1)
CICV	(1)
1st AIRCAV Div	(1)
3rd MAW	(2)
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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO 1ST MARDIV FERINTREP NO. 9-67

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	ACCEPTED LOCATION	REPORTED LOCATION/DATE	SUBORDINATION
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>						
3RD NVA REGT	NVA	C	1800	BT 205 161	BT 08 38 17 MAY 67	2D NVA DIV
HQ & SPT UNIT	NVA	C	600	BT 205 161	BT 08 38 17 MAY 67	3RD NVA REGT
1ST BN	NVA	C	500	BT 255 158	BT 085 370 17 MAY 67	3RD NVA REGT
2ND BN	NVA	C	300	BT 205 161	BT 085 360 17 MAY 67	3RD NVA REGT
3RD BN	NVA	C	400	BT 118 266	BT 085 350 17 MAY 67	3RD NVA REGT
R-20 BN	LF	C	390	AT 985 535	BT 040 540 12 MAY 67	PROVINCE
V-25 BN	LF	C	500	AT 829 483	BT 000 600 12 MAY 67	PROVINCE
402ND SAPPER BN	LF	C	600	ZC 135 250	BT 845 760 10 MAY 67	DANANG CITY
Q-12 CO	LF	PR	80	BT 165 544	BT 185 565 12 MAY 67	HIEU NHON (D)
Q-13 CO	LF	C	60	BT 009 500	BT 020 510 11 MAY 67	DUY XUYEN (D)
Q-14 CO	LF	C	70	AT 790 550	AT 810 570 12 MAY 67	DAI LOC (D)
Q-15 CO	LF	C	80	BT 023 635	BT 075 600 12 MAY 67	DIEN BAN (D)
Q-16 CO	LF	C	80	AT 953 650	AT 960 690 12 MAY 67	HOA VANG (D)
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>						
2ND NVA DIV (FWD)	NVA	C	7460	BT 009 224	AT 970 250 17 MAY 67	MR V
21ST NVA REGT	NVA	C	2000	BS 350 830	BT 150 280 17 MAY 67	2ND NVA DIV
HQ & SPT UNIT	NVA	C	200	BS 350 830	BT 150 280 17 MAY 67	21ST REGT
1ST BN	NVA	C	600	BS 420 760	BT 155 270 17 MAY 67	21ST REGT
2ND BN	NVA	C	600	BS 420 760	BT 155 260 17 MAY 67	21ST REGT
3RD BN	NVA	C	600	BS 370 810	BT 155 250 17 MAY 67	21ST REGT

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	ACCEPTED LOCATION	REPORTED LOCATION/DATE	SUBORDINATION
RQ-20 SIG BN	NVA	C	300	AT 990 200	AT 995 258 17 JAN 67	2ND NVA DIV
RQ-24 LNCR BN	NVA	C	150	AT 790 230	BT 024 198 17 NOV 66	2ND NVA DIV
72ND BN	LF	C	300	BT 380 170	BT 140 230 17 MAY 67	PROVINCE
K-50 CO	LF	C	70	BT 227 446	BT 227 446 23 DEC 67	QUE SON (D)
K-51 CO	LF	C	70	BT 240 390	BT 230 390 4 APR 67	THANG BINH (D)
K-52 CO	LF	C	80	BT 090 310	BT 160 110 4 APR 67	TIEN PHUOC (D)
K-54 CO	LF	C	80	BT 230 220	BT 230 220 4 APR 67	TAM KY (D)
K-55 CO	LF	C	60	BT 330 150	BT 330 150 1 JUN 66	TAM KY CITY
706TH CO	LF	C	100	BT 370 100	BT 368 146 4 MAY 67	PROVINCE
74TH CO	LF	C	60	BT 280 100	BT 280 100 4 APR 67	PROVINCE
14TH CO	LF	C	70	BT 810 119	BT 340 160 24 APR 67	LY TIN (D)

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>				
3RD NVA REGT	64TH REGT; BAC HA; WORKSITE-3; FACTORY 10; 31ST REGT; 46TH REGT; 51ST REGT; 323RD REGT (?)			CO - LTCOL VIET SON XO - MAJ TRANH ANH KIEN PO - TRUNG THANH
1ST BN	X1; CT3; BINH MINH	20825		CO - CAPT THAO
2ND BN	BINH DA; X2			CO - CAPT THAU
3RD BN	BINH THIEN; MAO CHU; NGUYEN TRAI		5-82MM MORT 6-60MM MORT	CO - NGUYEN TIEP
R-20 BN	QUANG NAM INDP BN; DOC LAP BN; HAI CANG 20		1-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG 54-AR	CO - NGUYEN VAN LAM
V-25 BN	LAM BN; 5TH BN		2-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-57MM RR	CO - QUANG LAM (AKA LUC) XO - THEU PO - TOAN
402ND SAPPER BN	T-89TH SPECIAL ENGR BN	21395 GN DONG HAI	3-81MM MORT 1-120MM MORT	CO - NGUYEN VAN TRAN XO - SR LT THANH
Q-12 CO	X-62 CO; HOI AN CO	2102	1-60MM MORT 9-SMG	CO - LE HIEN XO - NGUYEN NGOC
Q-13 CO	DUY XUYEN CO; H-52; TAN LAP CO; 103RD CO		1-60MM MORT 1-30CAL MG 9-AR	CO - TRAN VAN CAM XO - NGUYEN CHI THIEN PO - VO CA SON
Q-14 CO	DAI LOC CO; H-42 CO		1-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-30CAL MG 4-M-79	CO - LE THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Q-15 CO	DIEN BAN CO; H-40; H-35; H-55; 105TH; Q-15B; X-65	2105	2-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-57MM RR 3-LMG	CO - NGUYEN HY XO - THAN TU PO - NGUYEN RA
Q-16 CO	HOA VANG CO; H-41 HOA HIEU CO; H-56 100 CO; Q-16B	2106	2-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 6-AR	CO - NGUYEN DOA XO - NGUYEN NHUONG

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2ND DIV (HQ)	HAM TU 2; 620TH DIV; AGRICULTURAL SITE #2; CHI LANG	20,601GM 20,925GM TAY AN		CG - BG VIET XO - BG DAO PO - BG DO
21ST REGT (HQ)	BACH MA; WORKSITE 21; 36TH; A-21; CONG TRUONG 21; 2ND REGT; 36TH REGT; CONG TRUONG 7 (?)		17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT	CO - PHAM KIET XO - DANG CONG KIET PO - TIEN
1ST BN	11TH WORKSHOP; 11TH BN; AN CHAU		6-60MM MORT 6-81MM MORT 3-MG	CO - TINH XO - NA PO - KHOI
2ND BN	135TH BN; 22ND; LONG THANH		3-60MM MORT 2-81MM MORT 1-75MM RR 3-57MM RR	CO - LA XO - OAN PO - THA
3RD BN	33RD BN; 75TH BN (?) LONG THANH		3-60MM MORT 5-81MM MORT 4-57MM RR 4-30CAL MG	CO - DANG HUNG PO - NGUYEN CO
RQ-20 BN (SIG)	RQ-20/A BN; GK-30; RQ-20/B BN; HAM TU 2/C	1803/CH		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ-24 BN (ENGR)	GK-40			CO - NGUYEN NGOC DONG
72ND BN	H-65; H-68	21,443GM BA HANH	4-60MM MORT 2-81MM MORT 3-57MM RR 6-LMG	CO - THANH CAN CAO XO - DANH PO - THANH
K-50 CO	QUE SON CO; 105 UNIT; A-7		1-60MM MORT 1-AA MG 1-57MM RR 2-30CAL MG	CO - NGUYEN THANH TUNG
K-51 CO	A-10; 107; F-14; D-21; THANG BINH		2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-MG	CO - KHOA XO - NGUYEN THAN PO - ANH VU
K-52 CO	A-13 CO; D-22; V-13		1-60MM MORT 2-57MM MORT 2-SMG	CO - NGO XO - KHANH PO - VAN
K-54 CO	A-16; C-73; V-12 N. TAM KY		1-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-MG	CO - CONG XO - TOAN PO - TICH
K-55 CO	A-21; CO75; V-15 PHI FO A-21 BN; FLYING TIGER A-21		1-60MM MORT 1-AA MG 1-LMG	CO - NGUYEN LIEN
706TH CO	106TH;	2440GM BA HANH	1-60MM MORT 1-AA MG 2-30 CAL MG	CO - NGUYEN DUY NGHIA XO - HOANH PO - PHUONG
74TH CO	V-74; V-20; 74TH DIST FORCE CO		1-60MM MORT 1-30 CAL MG 1-57MM RR (?)	CO - THANH XO - TRAN TIEN PO - PHUONG
14TH CO	K-53; A-19; V-14		1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-HMG	CO - PHAM CONG XO - HA DONG PO - KHANH

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENTS, VC-FW/RETURNEES, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO
1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 9-67

1. Interrogation Report Of Rallier Nguyen Luc, Village Guerrilla Squad Leader:

Luc rallied to 1/7 on 3 May 1967. When he surrendered he turned in his weapon, a MAT 49, and in addition he gave information which subsequently led to the capture of two other VC and their weapons.

Luc stated that in January 1967 he joined the Loc Chanh Village (AT955628) platoon. However, before he became a regular guerrilla he was required to undergo 48 hours of political and marksmanship training. His first weapon was a K-44 but later when he became a squad leader he was given a MAT-49. His squad consisted of village guerrillas and cadre. The squad would remain dispersed until called together by a runner. Their mission was to induce the people to support the NLF and to snipe at U.S. and GVN forces. Their tactics were to fire one round from a concealed position and then run.

Luc stated that the village guerrilla platoon leader told him that civilians were being used as reconnaissance elements by an unknown sapper unit. They were to recon District Headquarters and small U.S. and ARVN positions in Dai Loc. This same platoon leader also told him that on or about 28 April 1967, two hundred 140mm rockets were going to be fired at Hill 41 (vic AT 935663). Luc does not know any intended dates or where the weapons may be stored.

According to the rallier, the area around (AT 952622) was heavily mined and booby trapped. The mines were planted a few at a time by the village guerrillas and after each one was planted a young female guide was shown its location. Luc stated that the reason for this is that in case a guerrilla is captured he will know the location of only one or two mines; only the female guides will know the location of them all.

2. Preliminary Interrogation Report Of Returnee Sergeant Le Thu, a squad leader in an 82mm Mortar Company subordinate to the 21st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division.

Sergeant Thu returned to a RF unit near Tam Ky on 3 May 1967. He stated that at the termination of Lien Ket 102 (291600 April), the 21st Regiment moved from (BT 2408) to (BT 1824 and BT 1724). His mortar unit was then dispatched to (BT 278247). From this position they mortared Tam Ky (BT 291231).

According to Sergeant Thu the 21st Regiment moved from Quang Ngai to Quang Tin in early April. In addition he indicated that the 21st regiment would possibly move to Ky Tinh Village and Phuoc Tin Village, Tam Ky District in the vicinity of (BT 2113).

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ANNEX C (PARAGRAPH 13 ENTRIES) TO 1ST MAHDIV PERINTREF NO 9-67

1. Total cases of Vietnamese Nationals volunteering information to U.S. Forces are as follows:

1st Marines.....4

3/1.....4

5th Marines.....1

7th Marines.....1

2/7.....1

FLC.....1

NSDC.....1

TOTAL: 8

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
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ENCLOSURE 2

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



PERINTREP #10-67

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
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TAB B

Tab B



1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)
DANANG, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
041200H JUNE 1967

Period Covered: 161200H MAY TO 011200H JUNE 1967

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014


1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. General Analysis

With the cessation of Operation Union I the enemy averted any heavy contact with FWMAF. He did, however, continue his harassing attacks by fire against isolated outposts.

Despite the fact that Operation Union I terminated, U.S. Marine units who remained in the Que Son Valley continued to be harassed by enemy mortar attacks. On 17 May D/2/11 and the 1/5 perimeter defense (BT 043343) received an estimated thirty-five rounds of 120mm mortar fire from two enemy positions. Counter battery fire was brought to bear upon the suspected enemy position at (BT 047363). Within twenty minutes of this attack the Que Son District Headquarters received thirty rounds of 82mm and three rounds of 120mm mortar fire. All three 120mm rounds were duds. Battery D and the 1/5 perimeter received a mortar attack again on the 19th. This time the enemy used 60mm mortars and fired from several locations. Conversation later with the local villagers revealed that the attack was conducted by twenty VC who had four 60mm mortars. D/1/5, attacked on 24 May by an enemy who utilized mortars and automatic weapons, reacted with counter-mortar fire which silenced the enemy. When Operation Union II commenced on the 26th, contact with the enemy still continued to be light. Elements of 3/5 on 26 May engaged an enemy at (BT 072299) who employed 60mm and 82mm mortars. Contact with the enemy could not be maintained. On the 27th, D Battery and the 1/5 perimeter were again attacked by VC who fired mortars. On 30 May tear gas was employed against elements of 1/5 during an attack in the vicinity of (BT 105214). Friendly units reported that the gas was used in light concentrations and caused a slight watering of the eyes.

The southeastern portion of the TAOR around Hoi An was the subject of the only concentrated attacks of the period, and for five successive nights beginning on the 17th the VC fired at FWMAF in the vicinity. A/1/11 (BT 106582) received ten to twenty rounds of mortar fire on the 17th over a ten minute period. Artillery returned fire. Hoi An District Headquarters received 6 to 8 rounds of 120mm mortar fire on



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the 17th and another eight rounds on the 21st, killing two civilians and wounding nine. Five rounds of 82mm mortar landed in the vicinity of Cam Nui village (BT 154563) on the nineteenth, killing one civilian and wounding two. The 51st ARVN Regimental CI (rear) received six rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 20 May.

Elsewhere, the 607th RF Company at Thang Binh (BT 165415) received a light mortar attack on the 17th and two platoons of PF's on patrol in the vicinity of (BT 0751) came under a small arms/automatic weapons and mortar attack on the 25th from an estimated two companies of VC. Friendly artillery supported the PF's, and the enemy broke contact.

Enemy Main Force units remained in relatively the same locale as the previous reporting period. The 3rd Regiment which is believed to have suffered heavy casualties on Operation Union I remained in the foothills in the Que Son area, while the 21st remained in Quang Tin (F). A recent captive disclosed that one of the reasons the 21st Regiment displaced to Quang Tin was to find a solution to the critical food shortage and to commence the Spring-Summer campaign. The 1st Regiment of the 2nd Division remained in Quang Ngai. At Duc Pho an NVA soldier, captured by 2/35 infantry units during an encounter with an estimated enemy battalion, stated that he was a member of the heavy weapons company 7th Battalion, 22nd Regiment.

B. Adjacent Areas

Quang Tri Province, notably, the border units were targets of the enemy's large scale attacks. USMC and ARVN offensives into the DMZ reduced the effectiveness of these attacks; nevertheless, the enemy continued with numerous harassing attacks by fire. The enemy's largest display of power occurred on the 17th when artillery, rockets, and mortars were directed at FVMAF installations relentlessly throughout the day. Con Thien received twenty-five mortar and artillery rounds while Camp Carroll and Dong Ha received twenty-seven and one-hundred rounds of rocket fire respectively. Cam Lo (YD 125592) was subjected to attack by 140mm rockets. Gio Linh received twelve rounds of 102mm artillery fire and sixty rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Gas, along with mortars and small arms were employed against Company G 2/26; the 2/26 CP also received thirty to thirty-five rounds of artillery fire. 1/4 received forty to forty-five rounds of mortar fire. The Viet Cong attacked the composite artillery battalion located in the vicinity of (YD 204745) by fire on several occasions.

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However, the attack on the 17th was unprecedented as to severity. The enemy fired two hundred rounds of 82mm mortars, thirty rounds of 120mm mortars, and fifty-eight rounds of unknown caliber artillery. On the 18th, elements of 2/26 received fifty to fifty-five rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The Lang Vei CIDG Camp was attacked by an estimated two enemy companies who utilized mortars on the 20th. Again on the 21st Lang Vei received twenty to thirty rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The artillery unit at Khe Sanh answered the call and shelled the suspected enemy position. Aircraft on station also aided in suppressing the enemy fire. Gio Linh received forty rounds of 122mm artillery fire on the 21st, an unknown number of mortar rounds on the 22nd and thirty-three rounds of 105mm artillery fire on the 24th. On the 21st, the Trung Luong PF Platoon (YD 204769) received one hundred rounds of 82mm mortar fire, and Dong Ha, about thirteen kilometers to the south, received thirty rounds of 140mm rocket fire. Approximately thirty rounds of artillery impacted in Quang Tri City on the 22nd while, simultaneously, the La Van Combat Base received a light probing attack. Friendly forces retaliated with air strikes on the suspected enemy position, and a reconnaissance patrol which was dispatched to the area the following morning discovered two 82mm mortar base plates. On 28 May the VC fired two mortar barrages at Hue. Immediately following the second barrage, an estimated fifteen VC attacked the Huong Giang Hotel and The ARVN Officer's club using satchel charges and B-40 rockets.

C/1/327 on Operation Malheur found what was termed a bullet proof vest on 19 May at (BS 647367). The vest was very flexible and at outward appearances was not U.S. made. In the same vicinity a document which listed FM/UHF frequencies of all FWMAF airfields in Vietnam was discovered. On the 21st C/2/34 Cavalry received ten rounds of 57mm RR fire at (BS 823455). A/1/35 engaged an estimated NVA Battalion on 22 May. The enemy was fighting from well-prepared positions in a heavily fortified village (BS 888283). Elements of 2/35 infantry and B/1/9 Cavalry reinforced the friendly units. Artillery and airstrikes were called in. An NVA soldier captured during the encounter stated that he was a member of the heavy weapons company 7th Battalion, 22nd Regiment. At Duc Pho C/2/8 received eight rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Two platoons from the 3rd Battalion, 21st ARVN Regiment returning to their CP were ambushed (BS 750620) by an estimated VC company. The VC were supported by mortars. A reinforcing unit was dispatched to the scene but the enemy broke contact leaving twenty bodies behind.

In the vicinity of (BS 719820) Korean Marine units on 22 May engaged an estimated enemy battalion, killing seventy-one VC and probably killing forty. Three days later in the same area, the Korean Marines killed thirty-eight more VC.

2. Enemy Operations

A.) Strength and Composition

- 1.) Refer to ANNEX A (Order of Battle) this Perintrep

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B.) Order of Battle

- 1.) Refer to ANNEX A (Order of Battle) this Perintrep

C.) Reserves and Reinforcements

- 1.) Refer to ANNEX A (Order of Battle) this Perintrep

D.) New Enemy Tactics - NegativeE.) Administrative and Political Units

An agent report dated 16 May stated that a prison camp was located in the vicinity of the Tra Ly stream. The camp was composed of two separate sections, one on either side of the stream. The first section located at (ZC 199249), consisted of two long thatched houses, a shelter for VC cadre and soldiers, a cemetery, and a house for food and documents. There were approximately 120 prisoners and 30 VC monitors in this section. The prisoners were fed a handful of rice and some salt twice a day. Most of them had fevers and tympanites. The prisoners taken out for interrogation seldom returned, but new prisoners would fill the vacancy.

Prisoners from the first section were not allowed access to the second section. Since the source was confined to the first section he could not provide much detailed information about the second section. He was told that it was located at (ZC 200248), and contained approximately 100 prisoners. These prisoners were classified as heavy criminals. No information could be obtained about the possibility of Allied soldiers being held in this section.

The entire camp was covered by a dense canopy. The agent reports that he could not see the sun through the canopy over section one. Possibly this remote location and heavy canopy explain the camp's long period of undetected existence as the source states the camp has been in use since June 1965.

F.) Anti-Air Activity

- 1.) An A-4 in support of Operation Union II crashed on 30 May in the vicinity of (BT 125244), as a result of ground fire.
- 2.) One CH-46 was downed by enemy fire on the 26th at (BT 076295).

G.) Anti-Personnel/Anti-Tank Mine Activity. There were fifty-one mine/booby trap incidents in the Danang TAOR during this reporting period. This is a slight decrease from the last reporting period. These incidents are classified as follows: thirty-two anti-personnel mine/booby trap incidents and nineteen anti-vehicular mine/booby trap incidents.



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Enemy/Mortar/AR/Rocket Activity

Attacks by mortar fire decreased appreciably from the last reporting period. These attacks were limited in scope in so far as they appeared to be more of a harassing tactic as compared to the concentrated effort of the last reporting period.

- 1.) 170208H, Hoi An received six to eight rounds of 120mm mortar fire.
- 2.) 170155H, The 1/5 Perimeter Defense and D/2/11 received thirty to thirty-five rounds of 120mm mortar fire from two enemy positions. Thirty rounds of 81mm mortar and 170 rounds of 105mm HE were returned (BT 043 343).
- 3.) 170220H, (BT 042347) Que Son District Headquarters received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 3 rounds of 120mm mortar fire. The three 120mm mortar rounds were duds. Several civilians were killed and wounded.
- 4.) 170330H, Company I 607th RF unit at Thang Binh received a mortar attack on their night defense position (BT 165415).
- 5.) 170400, A/1/11 (BT 106582) received 10-20 rounds of incoming mortars. The attack lasted ten minutes. An ARVN unit located at (BT 106582) replied with 155mm fire.
- 6.) 191930H, Battery D and 1/5's perimeter was hit again. This time the enemy fired 30-40 rounds of 60mm mortars from several locations. Artillery and countermortar fire were returned. Local villagers indicated the attack was conducted by twenty Main Force VC with four 60mm mortars.
- 7.) 192225H, An unknown number of VC fired four rounds of 60mm mortars and automatic weapons into the Moc Bai OP.
- 8.) 201000H, Five rounds of 82mm mortar fire fell in the vicinity of Cam Nam village (BT 154563) killing one civilian and wounding two.
- 9.) 202220H, Outpost # 10 observed ten mortar muzzle flashes (AT 970697). They contacted 1st Mar COC and FDC who reported receiving an unknown number of incoming mortar rounds.
- 10.) 202315H, The 51st ARVN Regiment CP (Rear) received six rounds of 82mm mortar fire.
- 11.) On the 21st Hoi An received eight rounds of mortar fire which landed outside their perimeter, killing two civilians and wounding nine.
- 12.) 242215H, D/1/5 Search and Destroy mission (AT 983352) received four rounds of 60mm mortar and automatic weapons fire. They returned 60mm mortar and small arms fire silencing the enemy position.

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13.) 251250H, (BT 073518) an estimated two VC companies fired 81mm and 60mm mortars, then assaulted two PF platoons (BT 073518). Friendly artillery supported and a reaction force was sent to reinforce the two platoons. The enemy broke contact and further contact could not be regained.

14.) 261830-262015H, (BT 072299) elements of 3/5 engaged an estimated enemy battalion (-) who employed 60mm and 82mm mortars.

15.) 270045H, (BT 025342) D/2/11 and the 1/5 CP received an estimated ten to fifteen rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Countermortar fire was returned.

I. Interdiction

VC interdiction activity in the 1st MARDIV's area of responsibility has increased slightly over the last reporting period. It is significant to note that activity of this nature has been increasing steadily.

An explosion on 17 May created a hole eight feet by eight feet by four feet deep on Highway #1 at (BT 113496). Again on the 17th the road was rendered impassable when a VC blew himself up while setting in a mine. Pieces of a body and an AK-47 rifle were found at the scene. On the 22nd a mine detonated at (BT 111499), causing a hole the width of the road rendering the road impassable. Also at (BT 130476) another hole two feet deep and half the width of the road restricted traffic. A culvert was blown at (BT 098524) on the 21st. On the 25th a civilian bus hit a mine in grid square (BT 1445). On the 29th the advisor to the 6th ARVN Regiment reported that the bridge at (BT 196391) had been destroyed.

J. Guerrilla Activity. VC guerrilla activity increased slightly this reporting period. The total incidents within the Damang TAOR numbered 189 broken down as follows: 103 harassing small arms fire, 32 anti-personnel mines, 19 anti-vehicular mines, 4 punji pits, 4 automatic weapons/small arms fire, 5 grenade/small arms fire, 9 automatic weapons fire, 10 grenades, 2 small arms/M-79 fire, and 1 small arms/rifle grenade fire.

L. Infantry

There has been a decrease in intensity and duration of infantry contacts during this reporting period.

1.) F/2/5 on the 18th at 1800H had two sightings, one of three and one of fifteen to twenty-five enemy with weapons at (AT 980175). The Marines assaulted using artillery, mortars and 1000 rounds of small arms fire resulting in ten (10) VC KIA (C), five (5) VC KIA (P) and two (2) VC PW's. Captured equipment included fifteen grenades, 782 gear, grey uniforms, and documents. Thirty-eight Vietnamese were detained and evacuated with the PW's.

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2.) 211715-211200H B/1/5 S&D received an estimated 4,000 rounds of small arms fire/automatic weapons fire from an estimated fifty to sixty enemy located at (BT 002345) (AT 999350, 999348), resulting in eight USMC WIA (EVAC). B/1/5 returned 2500 rounds of small arms fire, ten rounds of 3.5 WP, fifty rounds of M-79. Artillery and air strikes were called. Company B continued to maneuver, assisted by Company C, and close with the enemy. The enemy broke contact at dusk. There was excellent coverage by the artillery and air strikes. Twenty (20) VC KIA (P) were attributed to this action.

M. Reconnaissance

In many cases the VC use irregulars indigenous to the proposed area of operation to gain their intelligence material. However, this is not their sole source as organized reconnaissance teams have been reported several times. The following reports of enemy reconnaissance activity were received during this reporting period:

- 1.) On 8 May an agent report revealed that a VC recon group moved from an unknown location to Hom Chong Mountain (BT 199105). Their mission was to observe the New Life Hamlets in Phuoc My and Phuoc Hoa Villages and Hill #211.
- 2.) On 11 May a VC Recon company moved to the vicinity of (BT 346270).
- 3.) On 16 May the Quang Nam Province Headquarters reported that the VC were organizing a recon team at (BT 190540).
- 4.) On 18 May the Hieu Duc District Headquarters reported that a recon team in northwestern Hieu Duc District (AT 895693) had the task of studying artillery positions, and of drawing a sketch of military strongholds at District Headquarters and the adjacent areas.
- 5.) On 23 May 3rd CIT reported a Main Force recon Platoon arrived at Boa Ban #1 (H) and Cam He #3 (H) (AT 959684, 959680).

N. Infiltration

The enemy activity in the A Shau Valley continues. III MAF reports that enemy units are stationed along roads to immediately repair damage caused by air strikes. Aerial photography showed that bridges along the truck route through the A Shau Valley, bombed on 17 May, had been repaired by 1200 on 18 May.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

A. Enemy Organization and Combat Efficiency

The combat efficiency of Local Force units is impaired by a lack of low level cadres. Captured documents show a growing concern for the

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abilities of the new VC cadre. A recent captive stated that NVA personnel have been placed among the Local Forces because the local people do not have the fortitude and character of the North Vietnamese.

The activities of the 3rd and 21st NVA Regiments on Operation Union I and II presented a different picture. These Main Force units were aggressive and when the situation presented itself, willing to fight sustained engagements with FVMAF. A further indication of their efficiency was the small number of NVA ralliers and captives.

B. New Unit Identification - Negative

C. New Weapons and Equipment

1.) MAC V reports that a Special Forces element in III CUEZ was ambushed by VC forces using canister rounds fired from 57mm RH.

2.) In the latter part of May Camp Carroll, to our north, and Bien Hoa, to our south, reported the use of 122mm rockets by the VC.

The 122mm rocket is fin and spin stabilized. The fins are spring loaded and folded back allowing the rocket to be fired through a 122.4mm tube. Reportedly it is an indirect fire weapon with a maximum range of 11,000 meters (10,000 for the 140mm rocket) and a minimum range of 2,000 meters. A captured document lists as its strong points simplicity of functioning, light weight, and a casualty radius of 170 meters.

The rocket is 122mm in diameter, 193cm long and weighs 100 pounds. It is fired from a tube mounted on a tripod. The combined weight of the mount and tube is 120 pounds. It takes 2½ minutes to set up the system. The range and deflection are determined with an optical sight. Two minutes are required for disassembly into major components to facilitate transporting the system.

3.) On 19 May C/1/327 found a flak jacket in the vicinity of (BS 6537). The vest was very flexible and from all outward appearances was not manufactured in the U.S.

The ARVN forces participating in Operation Lam Son 142 (Quang Tri) reported receiving two 105mm tear gas rounds on 19 May. On 30 May elements of the 1st Battalion 5th Marines experienced a watering of the eyes and other effects associated with the use of tear gas. These are the second and third recent reports of the use of tear gas in I Corp.

D. Personalities - Negative

E. Enemy Losses

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1.) Danang TAOR: From 161200 May to 011200 June, the enemy suffered the following losses:

a.) Personnel and Weapons

KIA (C) - 214
 KIA (P) - 399
 PW (VC) - 29
 Individual weapons - 26

2.) Operations

a.) Operation Union I which engaged elements of the 3rd and 21st NVA Regiments in the Que Son Valley from 21 April to 17 May accounted for 468 NVA KIA (C), 222 NVA KIA (P), 397 VC KIA (C), 555 VC KIA (P). One hundred-eighty-eight (188) VC were classified as PW's. There were two returnees. Sixty-three (63) individual weapons and eight (8) crew-served weapons were captured.

b.) Operation Union II which began 260600H May contacted light to medium enemy resistance. U.S. Marines committed to the operation are, to date, accredited with 193 NVA KIA (C), 21 VC KIA (C), and 300 NVA KIA (P), 91 VC KIA (P). There were twelve (12) detainees not further classified as of 01 May. Four (4) individual weapons were captured.

c.) Operation Webster began at 161200H and lasted until 181200H May. This operation accounted for 2 KIA (C) and 2 KIA (P). There were five detainees.

d.) Operation Duval ran from 191700H to 251200 May. Elements of the 1st and 7th Marines swept Elephant Valley with no contact. Reconnaissance supporting the operation accounted for two VC KIA (P).

F. Morale

Morale continues to be a problem for VC/NVA units within SVN. Air and artillery strikes are a major cause of poor morale. Nearly every rallier and PW expresses a fear of these two supporting arms.

Recent reports indicate a growing food shortage problem. Senior Sergeant Le Cong Thu, 21st NVA Regiment, disclosed that one of the reasons the 21st Regiment displaced to Quang Tin was to find a solution to the critical food shortage problem. Local Forces also appear to be hard pressed. They have been threatening villagers and merchants to effect support for the troops' mess funds. Some ralliers have said that the only place they can be assured of enough food is at home.

G. Details of Administrative Installations and Support

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE INSTALLATION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
5 May	AT 898244	Rice cache	Interr Report
6 May	ZC 199249	VC prison camp	Agent Report
7 May	BT 183249	Food caches	Agent Report
7 May	AT 855275	VC hospital	Interr Report
9 May	BT 125276	Rice cache	Agent Report
10 May	BT 206139	Machine Shop	Agent Report
11 May	BT 025897	Rice Caches	Interr Report
12 May	BT 190125	10 ton rice storage	Agent Report
12 May	BT 263157	2½ ton temp rice storage	Agent Report
12 May	BT 179261	2½ ton rice storage area	Agent Report
16 May	BT 245148	Rice caches	Agent Report
17 May	BT 366057	Hospital	Agent Report
21 May	BT 338056	Salt/Rice cache	Agent Report
22 May	BT 362088	2 Salt caches	Agent Report
22 May	RT 366126	Salt caches	Agent Report
25 May	BT 245149	Rice cache	Agent Report
25 May	BT 143272	Paddy and rice depot	Agent Report
26 May	BT 217118	Rice depot	Interr Report

I. Weather

Clear skies and warm temperatures characterized the weather for this reporting period. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 98 and 78 respectively with an average humidity of 67%. The winds were variable at 5-10 knots. The cumulative rainfall was .66 inches.

For the month of June we can expect a mean maximum temperature of 92 and a mean minimum temperature of 77 with a mean of 83. June is a dry season month in the 1st Mar Div area of responsibility. Five days with precipitation are forecasted with an average humidity of 83%. Visibility should average 7 miles.

As expected the increasing temperature brought on an influx of heat casualties.

J. Intelligence Operation1.) Photographic Exploitation

a.) A tracked artillery vehicle was photographed twelve kilometers north of Con Thien on 19 May. The vehicle has a 7.62mm machine gun mounted on the front and is probably used to tow artillery pieces up to 100mm in size. The vehicle has an estimated cruising range of 200 miles.

b.) A 24 May photography mission disclosed a possible commun-

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ications or electronics site eighteen kilometers southwest of Hue. The site is situated on top of a hill and consists of one tower, three structures, and three revetted positions.

2.) Document Exploitation

a.) An enemy document, captured in Hau Nghia Province on 17 May, dated 5 May 1967, addressed to four battalions in that province, states "The Military Party Committee and Headquarters (SVN Liberation Army) has reconfirmed the opening day for the summer campaign as 29 May 1967. All units must urgently complete their preparations so that fire for the opening phase will be well coordinated, spectacular and continuous. Care should be taken to insure that training is conducted simultaneously with the planning for combat objectives. We must win the first and second battles."

Major Cu stated that orders for attacks in one military region in Central RVN being coordinated with attacks in another military region are common practice.

MAC V J-2 comment: Reference to "The Military Party Committee and Headquarters" and "Summer Campaign" indicates possible country wide applicability of the 29 May opening day.

b.) A captured document, dated 14 April, appears to be a directive for the current affairs section of an unidentified province. The directive outlines the VC determination to establish and maintain intelligence nets within RD areas. It also suggests that more VC agents are needed to successfully counter the RD plan.

4. Counterintelligence

A. General

Although this reporting period included such dates as Ho Chi Minh's and Buddha's birthdays there was no significant increase in the number of events of a counterintelligence nature.

B. Sabotage

- (1) On the 19th a civilian bus struck a mine at (AT 824008).
- (2) A civilian bus was demolished on 26 May in the vicinity of (AT 870990). Seven civilians were killed and twelve were wounded.

C. Espionage

1.) Dien Ban BLOCC reports that the VC Front Committee of Quang Da Province ordered district and village cadre to use many attractive 18 year old youngsters to work as intelligence agents. After training these

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agents are to go to USMC base camps, selling commodities.

2.) Dai Lac DIOCC reports that during the week 20-27 May a meeting was held for the VC autonomous committees of the Lac Hiep village area (AT 853344-872518). The main topic of discussion was the use of children to collect information of a tactical nature. This program is to be expanded.

3.) On 22 May MP's apprehended a female VC suspect in the vicinity of (AT 872518). Later it was confirmed that she worked for Mr. Hung of MR V. She stated that her job was to observe vehicular traffic on roads around Hoa Phat (V) and to report to Mr. Hung the number, type and direction of these vehicles.

5. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

A. Capabilities

1.) Utilizing his Main Force units, the enemy can:

a.) Attack the An Hoa, Nong Sen, or Nui Lac Sen areas with up to two regiments reinforced by local force units to include battalions.

b.) Attack small outposts, convoys, and other installations which have limited defense capabilities, utilizing forces up to and including regimental strength with the short range objectives of annihilating friendly forces in this capacity, and ambushing friendly reinforcing units.

c.) Attack one or more of the CIDG camps in force of one or more regiments.

d.) Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 120mm mortars and /or 140mm rockets.

e.) Conduct combinations of the above.

f.) Employ his Main Forces in an essentially non-aggressive role. Engaged primarily in political indoctrination, retraining, re-equipping, and conducting small attacks against isolated outposts utilizing no more than battalion sized units, but positioned as to always pose a threat to certain vital points thus forcing a note of more than usual caution into the conduct of friendly operations.

g.) Reinforce his position in the Central I Corps area by the infiltration of additional forces from NVN, or by the introduction of the 1st VC Regiment from Quang Ngai Province within one day after movement commences, and elements of the 6th NVA Regiment, from Thua Thien

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Province within five to six days after movement commences.

h.) Reinforce and strengthen his position in the Que Son Valley.

2.) Utilizing his Local and Guerrilla Forces, the enemy can:

a.) Harass friendly forces and installations with small arms, grenades, mortars, booby traps, and small ambushes at a time and place of the enemy's choosing.

b.) Interdict LOC's, particularly National Route #1, Routes 1C, 1D, 14 and 5; and the railroads in the Hai Van Pass area at a time and place of the enemy's choosing, often using trained demolitions personnel working in conjunction with guerrilla and local forces.

c.) Conduct political agitation and propaganda, combined with a selective use of politically inspired violence, including assassination, terrorism, and sabotage in an effort to thwart the Revolutionary Development Program.

d.) Attack, preferably by fire, ambush, or sapper raid, friendly forces and positions in up to reinforced battalion strength at a time and place of the enemy's choosing.

B. Probable Enemy Courses of Action:

1.) For the Main Force Units:

a.) Continue political indoctrination, re-equipping and replenishing ranks; and conduct small-scale attacks on isolated outposts for the primary purpose of gaining combat experience, while also, by these attacks and the real or potential threat to friendly forces in the vicinity of these main forces, hoping to inhibit our freedom of action.

b.) Conduct coordinated attacks against any of the three CIDG camps in the 1st Marine Division's area of responsibility at a time of the enemy's choosing with the visible objective of ambushing reinforcements, utilizing a strength of one or more reinforced regiments.

c.) Infiltrate additional forces from NVN into the central I Corps area and/or introduce enemy forces from the Central Highlands, or northern or southern I Corps.

d.) Attack the An Hoa, Nong Son, or Nui Lac Son complexes at a time and place of the enemy's choosing with one reinforced regiment.

e.) Attack by fire and/or physical assault relatively close-in friendly positions and installations within any of the combat bases in up to battalion strength.

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f.) Reinforce and strengthen his forces presently engaged in the Nui Lac Son area.

2.) For the Local and Guerrilla Forces: Continue to exercise the related capabilities listed in paragraph 5.A.2. above

C. Vulnerabilities

1.) The enemy is vulnerable to attack by massed fires from air, artillery and naval gunfire. Even his deepest base areas and lines of communications are vulnerable to attack by air. When closer to the coast or to friendly positions, any massed formation is subject to detection and subsequent attack by artillery and naval gunfire in addition to air. Being unable to effectively counter this fire power, the enemy must rely heavily on camouflage and circumspection in his activities in order to minimize this vulnerability.

2.) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations. Life for the Viet Cong is hard at best and filled with deprivation and deprivation and danger. This constant difficulty and peril, the lack of dedication on the part of the rank and file, as well as some of the cadre, plus the proffered leniency of the Chieu Hoi program, combine to make the enemy unusually susceptible to exploitation by psychological warfare techniques.

3.) The enemy vulnerable to rapid, bold and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operation precludes a quick and flexible reaction to friendly maneuvers, unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.

4.) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations. The enemy's rigidity of tactical doctrine induces him to avoid and/or quickly disengage from contact whenever the tactical situation does not develop according to plan.



S. DAVIS
COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A. Order of Battle
- B. Significant Agent, VC PW/Returnee, and Document re- --
- C. Vietnamese Nationals Volunteering Information To U.S. Forces
- D. Astronomical Data

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 10-67

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	ACCEPTED LOCATION	REPORTED LOCATION/DATE			SUBORDINATION
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>								
3RD NVA REGT	NVA	C	1073	BT 205 161	BT 050 300	30 MAY 67	2D NVA DIV	
HQ & SPT UNIT	NVA	C	300	BT 205 161	BT 050 300	30 MAY 67	3RD NVA REGT	
1ST BN	NVA	C	300	BT 255 158	BT 055 290	30 MAY 67	3RD NVA REGT	
2ND BN	NVA	C	223	BT 205 161	BT 055 280	30 MAY 67	3RD NVA REGT	
3RD BN	NVA	C	250	BT 118 266	BT 055 270	30 MAY 67	3RD NVA REGT	
R-20 BN	LF	C	250	AT 985 535	BT 055 545	30 MAY 67	PROVINCE	
V-25 BN	LF	C	520	AT 829 483	BT 120 530	22 MAY 67	PROVINCE	
402ND SAFFER BN	LF	C	342	ZC 135 250	AT 857 740	31 MAY 67	DANANG CITY	
Q-12 CO	LF	PR	80	BT 165 544	BT 185 565	30 MAY 67	HIEU NHON (D)	
Q-13 CO	LF	C	120	BT 009 500	BT 040 530	24 MAY 67	DUY XUYEN (D)	
Q-14 CO	LF	C	70	AT 790 550	AT 810 570	30 MAY 67	DAI LOC (D)	
Q-15 CO	LF	C	80	BT 023 635	AT 995 568	30 MAY 67	DIEN BAN (D)	
Q-16 CO	LF	C	120	AT 953 650	AT 960 690	30 MAY 67	HOA VANG (D)	
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>								
2ND NVA DIV	NVA	C	7460	BT 009 224	AT 910 240	2 JUN 67	MR V	
21ST NVA REGT	NVA	C	1000	BS 350 830	BT 130 330	30 MAY 67	2ND NVA DIV	
HQ & SPT UNIT	NVA	C	200	BS 350 830	BT 130 330	30 MAY 67	21ST REGT	
1ST BN	NVA	C	200	BS 420 760	BT 135 320	30 MAY 67	21ST REGT	
2ND BN	NVA	C	200	BS 420 760	BT 135 310	30 MAY 67	21ST REGT	
3RD BN	NVA	C	400	BS 370 810	BT 135 300	30 MAY 67	21ST REGT	

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	ACCEPTED LOCATION	REPORTED LOCATION/DATE	SUBORDINATION
RQ-20 SIG BN	NVA	C	220	AT 990 200	AT 995 258 17 JAN 67	2ND NVA DIV
RQ-24 ENGR BN	NVA	C	120	AT 790 230	BT 176 236 21 APR 67	2ND NVA DIV
72ND BN	LF	C	300	BT 380 170	BT 200 240 26 MAY 67	PROVINCE
K-50 CO	LF	C	70	BT 227 446	BT 227 446 23 DEC 66	QUE SON (D)
K-51 CO	LF	C	70	BT 240 390	BT 230 390 4 APR 67	THANG BINH (D)
K-52 CO	LF	C	150	BT 090 310	BT 160 110 4 APR 67	TIEN PHUOC (D)
K-54 CO	LF	C	130	BT 230 220	BT 200 220 5 MAY 67	TAM KY (D)
K-55 CO	LF	C	100	BT 330 150	UNLOCATED	TAM KY CITY
706TH CO	LF	C	80	BT 370 100	BT 397 087 7 MAY 67	PROVINCE
74TH CO	LF	C	50	BT 280 100	BT 360 110 9 MAY 67	PROVINCE
14TH CO	LF	C	90	BT 310 119	BT 340 160 24 APR 67	LY TIN (D)

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>				
3RD NVA REGT	64TH REGT; BAC HA; WORKSITE-3; FACTORY 10; 31ST REGT; 46TH REGT; 51ST REGT; 323RD REGT (?)			CO - LTCOL VIET SON XO - MAJ TRANH ANH KIEN PO - TRUNG THANH
1ST BN	X1; CT3; BINH MINH	20825		CO - CAPT THAO
2ND BN	BINH DA; X2			CO - CAPT THAU
3RD BN	BINH THIEN; MAO CHU; NGUYEN TRAI		5-82MM MORT 6-60MM MORT	CO - NGUYEN TIEP
R-20 BN	QUANG NAM INDP BN; DOC LAP BN; HAI CANG 20		1-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-57MM RR 2-MG 54-AR	CO - NGUYEN VAN LAM
V-25 BN	LAM BN; 5TH BN		2-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-57MM RR	CO - CAPT THANH XO - TUNG PO - KHOA
402ND SAPPER BN	T-89TH SPECIAL ENGR BN	21395 GN	3-81MM MORT DONG HAI 1-120MM MORT	CO - NGUYEN VAN TRAN XO - SR LT THANH
Q-12 CO	X-62 CO; HOI AN CO	2102	1-60MM MORT 9-SMG	CO - LE HIEN XO - NGUYEN NGOC
Q-13 CO	DUY XUYEN CO; H-52; TAN LAP CO; 103RD CO		1-60MM MORT 1-30CAL MG 9-AR	CO - TRAN VAN CAM XO - NGUYEN CHI THIEN PO - VO CA SON
Q-14 CO	DAI LOC CO; H-42 CO		1-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-30CAL MG 4-M-79	CO - LE THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Q-15 CO	DIEN BAN CO; H-40; H-35; H-55; 105TH; Q-15B; X-65	2105	2-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-57MM RR 3-IMG	CO - NGUYEN HY XO - THAN TU PO - NGUYEN RA
Q-16 CO	HOA VANG CO; H-41 HOA HIEU CO; H-56 100 CO; Q-16B	2106	2-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 6-AR	CO - NGUYEN DOA XO - NGUYEN NHUONG

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2ND DIV (HQ)	HAM TU 2; 620TH DIV; AGRICULTURAL SITE #2; CHI LANG	20,601GM 20,925GM TAY AN	CG - BG VIET XO - BG DAO PO - BG DO
21ST REGT (HQ)	BACH MA; WORKSITE 21; 36TH; A-21; CONG TRUONG 21; 2ND REGT; 36TH REGT; CONG TRUONG 7 (?)	17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT	CO - PHAM KIET XO - DANG CONG KIET PO - TIEN
1ST BN	11TH WORKSHOP; 11TH BN; AN CHAU	6-60MM MORT 6-81MM MORT 3-MG	CO - TINH XO - NA PO - KHOI
2ND BN	135TH BN; 22ND; LONG THANH	3-60MM MORT 2-81MM MORT 1-75MM RR 3-57MM RR	CO - LA XO - OAN PO - THA
3RD BN	33RD BN; 75TH BN (?) LONG THANH	3-60MM MORT 5-81MM MORT 4-57MM RR 4-30CAL MG	CO - DANG HUNG PO - NGUYEN CO
RQ-20 BN (SIG)	RQ-20/A BN; GK-30; RQ-20/B BN; HAM TU 2/C	1803/CH	

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
RQ-24 BN (ENGR)	GK-40			CO - NGUYEN NGOC DONG
72ND BN	H-65; H-68	21,443CM BA HANH	4-60MM MORT 2-81MM MORT 3-57MM RR 6-IMG	CO - THANH CAN CAO XO - DANH PO - THANH
K-50 CO	QUE SON CO; 105 UNIT; A-7		1-60MM MORT 1-AA MG 1-57MM RR 2-30CAL MG	CO - NGUYEN THANH TUNG
K-51 CO	A-10; 107; F-14; D-21; THANG BINH		2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 5-MG	CO - KHOA XO - NGUYEN THAN PO - ANH VU
K-52 CO	A-13 CO; D-22; V-13		1-60MM MORT 2-57MM MORT 2-SMG	CO - NGO XO - KHANH PO - VAN
K-54 CO	A-16; C-73; V-12 N. TAM KY		1-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-MG	CO - CONG XO - TOAN PO - TICH
K-55 CO	A-21; CO75; V-15 PHI PO A-21 BN; FLYING TIGER A-21		1-60MM MORT 1-AA MG 1-IMG	CO - NGUYEN LIEN
706TH CO	106TH;	2440GM BA HANH	1-60MM MORT 1-AA MG 2-30CAL MG	CO - NGUYEN DUY NGHIA XO - HOANH PO - PHUONG
74TH CO	V-74; V-20; 74TH DIST FORCE CO		1-60MM MORT 1-30 CAL MG 1-57MM RR (?)	CO - THANH XO - TRAN TIEN PO - PHUONG
14TH CO	K-53; A-19; V-14		1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-HMG	CO - PHAM CONG XO - HA DONG PO - KHANH

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGEN, VC FW/RETURNEE AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO 1ST MARDIV
PERINTREP # 10-67

1. Individual Interrogation Report of Bui Xuan

Xuan stated that he was a private in the 3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 25th Division, Army of RVN from November 1963 to November 1965. The unit was stationed in Duy Xuyen (D), Quang Nam (P) during this time. After his discharge in January 1967 he returned home and joined the Duy Xuyen District Forces, the Q-13 Company.

Xuan claimed that the Q-13 Company is composed of two 30 man platoons and a ten man Headquarters group. There are three squads per platoon. According to Xuan the company was armed with the following weapons: One 60mm mortar, two Browning Automatic Rifles, one B-40 rocket launcher, six K-50 sub-machine guns (1 per squad), K-44's (captive was armed with a K-44), Garand M-1's, Carbines, M-26 and Chicom stick grenades.

The detainee claimed that the men in the company are from Duy Xuyen District. When he left the company it was located in Phu Dien (V), Que Son (D), Quang Nam (P) with a mission of sniping at U.S. forces and setting booby traps. He also states that during the second week in April 1967 at the vicinity of (BT 0352) he saw two NVA snipers with scopes mounted on their weapons.

G-2 Comment: This is the first interrogation report received on the Q-13 Company. Reported locations and missions are consistent with current intelligence holdings. The company strength was somewhat less than that previously reported; however, several agent reports indicate a stock of weapons similar to Xuan's report.

Xuan's statement about the weapon with a scope mounted on it is reinforced by a growing number of sightings and low level agent reports.

2. Individual Interrogation Report of Ly Cong, Soldier in the Q-15 Company.

A.) Introduction

Ly Cong joined the Q-15, Dien Ban District Force Company, in October 1965. In January 1966 he was elected to the position of Rear Cadre/Liaison Communication Agent for the Q-15 Company.

B.) Organization

The Q-15 Company is composed of Company Headquarters and Rear

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Service Section. It consists of three platoons (each platoon has one corpsman and three first aid men) which are made up of three squads further subdivided into cells.

C.) Strength

Prior to Ly Cong's capture, the Q-15 Company which normally consists of 124 men was reduced to about 65 men due to sickness and casualties.

D.) Tactics

The main tactics of the Q-15 Company are to employ guerrilla warfare and to cooperate with local guerrillas at platoon, squad, and cell level. They also operate on platoon level with each platoon operating independently for periods not longer than six days.

E.) Uniforms

The Q-15 wears various uniforms consisting of khaki and black, or green pajamas. No insignia nor rank is worn. Officers are identified by personal recognition.

F.) Civic Action

The Q-15 Company helps the local populace with farming, and "accepts" half the food ration. Combat or fortified villages are built with the assistance of the villagers.

G.) Additional Information

Two duties were assigned to the captive: tax collection and communication liaison.

As a tax collector he had to travel throughout Dien Ban District and collect the unit's portion of the "miscellaneous tax" which is composed of a sales tax on products bought or sold by the local populace. The amount varies on different products and is computed by a percentage. One procedure used to collect the tax is to position a man at the market gate who collects the money as the transaction occurs. The Village Chief or Economic Cadre is responsible for collection at this level. When Ly Cong would enter a village he would contact one of these two men. This tax was collected every three months. After collection, the total amount was divided into fifths: three fifths was used to support Village Level Cadre/Guerrillas; two fifths was used to support the District Force. Cong claims that he averaged approximately \$50,000 VN every three months. If more money was needed to support the unit, the commanding officer would request the needed amount from the Dien Ban Economic Cadre.

The captive's other duty was to perform in a liaison capacity

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between the Q-15 Company and the villages. He would enter approximately two days in advance the village which the unit was planning to occupy and inform the Economic Cadre of the size unit and of its approximate duration of stay. It was then the responsibility of the Economic Cadre to make available the necessary amount of rice to support the unit. This task was accomplished by means of a "liberation tax" which was reserved for the District Force; however, Provincial units received a large percentage of this tax.

3. Rallier Interview Report of Nguyen Van Coi, a private in the GK-40 Engineer Company.

A.) Introduction

The GK-40 Engineer Company is subordinate to the 2nd Division.

B.) Organization

There are four platoons:

(1) 1st Platoon - Composed of 35 men in three squads. It has the mission of destroying bridges and attacking vehicles.

(2) 2nd Platoon - Consists of 35 men in three squads, and it has the same mission as the 1st Platoon.

(3) 3rd Platoon - Has a strength of 37 men broken down into three squads, and it performs routine engineering tasks.

(4) 4th Platoon - Has a strength of 35 men broken down into three squads. It has the mission of constructing bridges.

C.) Weapons

Each soldier carries either a rifle or a submachine gun. TNT and unexploded bombs are utilized.

G-2 Comment: This Headquarters carries the GK-40 as an AKA for the RQ-24 Engineer Battalion subordinate to the 2nd Division. The rallier is possibly a member of one of the companies subordinate to the RQ-24 Battalion.

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ANNEX C (VIETNAMESE NATIONALS VOLUNTEERING INFORMATION TO U.S. FORCES) TO 1ST
MARDIV PERINTREP NO 10-67

1. Total cases of Vietnamese Nationals volunteering information to U.S. Forces are as follows:

7th Marines.....8

1/7.....4

2/7.....3

3/7.....1

5th Marines.....1

1/5.....1

TOTAL: 9

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND
RVNAF

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

ANNEX D (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 10-67

DATE	EMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	MOON PHASE	% ILLUM
JUNE 10	0552	0641	1918	1941	0745	2124		3%
11	0552	0614	1919	1942	0843	2217		8%
12	0553	0615	1919	1942	0943	2306		15%
13	0553	0615	1919	1942	1042	2351		24%
14	0553	0615	1919	1942	1140	0000		34%
15	0553	0615	1919	1942	1236	033	1ST QTR	45%
16	0553	0615	1920	1943	1333	0113		56%
17	0553	0615	1920	1943	1430	0153		67%
18	0554	0616	1920	1943	1528	0234		78%
19	0554	0616	1920	1943	1629	0318		87%
20	0554	0616	1921	1944	1733	0406		94%
21	0554	0616	1921	1944	1838	0459		98%
22	0554	0616	1921	1944	1941	0557	FULL	100%
23	0555	0617	1921	1944	2040	0658		99%
24	0555	0617	1921	1944	2134	0759		96%
25	0555	0617	1922	1945	2220	0858		91%
26	0555	0617	1922	1945	2304	0954		84%
27	0556	0618	1922	1945	2339	1047		76%
28	0556	0618	1922	1945		1136		67%
29	0556	0618	1922	1945	0013	1223		57%
30	0556	0618	1923	1946	0046	1309	LAST QTR	46%
JULY 1	0557	0619	1923	1946	0119	1356		39%
2	0557	0619	1923	1946	0152	1444		30%
3	0557	0619	1923	1946	0228	1533		21%
4	0558	0620	1923	1946	0308	1626		14%
5	0558	0620	1923	1946	0352	1721		8%
6	0558	0620	1923	1946	0441	1818		3%
7	0558	0620	1923	1946	0536	1915		1%
8	0558	0620	1923	1946	0634	2010	NEW	0%
9	0559	0621	1923	1946	0734	2101		2%
10	0559	0621	1923	1946	0835	2148		6%

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF
AND RVNAF

D-1

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

0 510233Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIRST MAR
FIFTH MAR
RUMQUAM/CTG 79.4
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
ELEVENTH MAR
INFO CG III MAF
CG FRAM
RUMHFL/CG FLC/FIRST PSE
BT

S E C R E T

FRAG 0 59-01 (OPN UNION/BEAVER CAGE)

1. SITUATION. FRIENDLY FORCES CONTINUE OPNS VIC OF HIEP DUC-THANG BINH BASIN TO LOCATE AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND SUPPLIES/EQUIPMENT.

2. EXECUTION

A. FIRST MAR

(1) ON ORDER CHOP F/2/1 REIN TO FIFTH MAR.

(2) BE PREPARED TO TAKE OPCON FIRST BN MINUS REIN FIRST

INCLUDES

PAGE TWO RUMHFL 5846 S E C R E T

MAR ON ORDER.

(3) ON ORDER CHOP TWO AUGMENTATION RIFLE COS TO SEVENTH MAR B. FIFTH MAR

(1) WITH FORCES AVAILABLE CONTINUE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN WESTWARD TO VIC HIEP DUC (AT 9024), THENCE NORTHEASTWARD IN HIEP DUC-QUE SON-THANG BINH BASIN AND ADJACENT HIGH GROUND TO LOCATE AND DESTROY EN FORCES IN AREA, CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, DISRUPT EN OPNL AND LOG INTENTIONS, AND EVACUATE REFUGEES.

(2) ON ORDER ASSUME OPCON F/2/1 REIN.

(3) BE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN ONE BN VIC QUE SON/NUI LAC SON ONLONG TRM BASIS TO CONDUCT OPNS AGAINST EN FORCES EXTEND GVN INFLUENCE AND PROTECT FRIENDLY INHABITANTS/INSTALLATIONS IN AREA.

(4) BE PREPARED TO EXTEND OPNS INTO VIC BASE AREA 116.

(5) ON ORDER CHOP FIRST BN MINUS REIN FIRST MAR TO FIRST MAR.

(6) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON AND EMPLOY SECOND BN, REIN FIFTH MAR INSPT OPN UNION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3646E S E C R E T
 (7) BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH REGT CP

NO 30 BN VIC

THANG WITH ONLONG TERM BASIS TO CONDUCT OPNS AGAINST EN FORCES,
 EXTEND OUR INFLUENCE AND PROTECT FRIENDLY INHABITANTS/INSTALLATIONS
 IN AREA.

(8) BE PREPARED TO CLOSE LSA TAM KY AND TRD REOPEN VIC THANG
 WHEN UPON ESTABLISH REGT CP.

C. 75.4

(1) UPON CHOP TO FIRST MARDIV COMPLETE MOVEMENT OF FORCES
 TO VIC BT 2839 ON 1 MAY AND CONDUCT THROUGH SEARCH AND DESTROY
 OPNS IN AREA SWM 24100 FM THIN PT TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES
 AND SUPPLIES IN AREA.

(2) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT UNILATERAL/COORDINATED OFFEN-
 SIVE OPN IN VALLEY SOUTH OF ONE SON CENTERED ON E-W GL 39.

(3) BE PREPARED ESTABLISH BLOCKING PSN VIC BT 2839 ON
 ORDER.

D. SECOND E N FIFTH MAR

(1) ESTABLISH BLOCKING PSN VIC GS AT 8237, AT 8236, AND
 AT 8336 TO PREVENT EN N-S MOVEMENT IN AREA.

(2) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN ANTENNA VALLEY
 SOUTHEAST FM VIC AT 8640 TO PREVENT EN INGRESS/ENGRESS FM OPN
 UNION AREA.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 3646E S E C R E T

(3) BE PREPARED FOR CHOP TO FIFTH MAR.

(4) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT OPNS WITHIN OR WITHOUT TAOR
 IN SPT/AS PART OF OPN UNION.

E. ELEVENTH MAR. CONTINUED TO PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED
 FOR FORCES ENGAGED OPN UNION.

F. COORD INSTINS

(1) CONTROL HQ OPN UNION/BEAVER CAGE. FIRST MARDIV.

(2) DEST DURATION. SIX TO TEN DAYS FM 01 MAY.

(3) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

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P 010353Z
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIRST MAF
FIFTH MAR
SEVENTH MAR
CMR, NSC, DIV AREA
CMR, SEC, DIV AREA
BT



CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY SURVEY (S)

A. COMUSMACV 240000Z APR 67 (S)

B. CG III MAF 290600Z APR 67 (S)

1. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASING NUMBER OF UNINITIATED INCIDENTS DIRECTED TOWARD POPULATION IN GVN CONTROLLED AREAS, PARTICULARLY TOWARD RD TEAMS AND LOCAL POPULATION IN AREAS WHERE PROGRAMMED RD ACTIVITIES ARE UNDER WAY. IN VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF RD PROGRAM, COMUSMACV AND CG III MAF, BY REFS A AND B RESPECTIVELY, HAVE DIRECTED COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SECURITY PLANS AT ALL LEVELS.

PAGE TWO RUMHIA 047000 **CONFIDENTIAL**

2. ACCORDINGLY CORRESPONDING SURVEY TO DETERMINE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY PROVIDED BY RVNA/US/PMAR IN GVN CONTROLLED AREAS AND IN AREAS WHERE PROGRAMMED RD ACTIVITIES ARE IN PROGRESS. SURVEY MUST RESPOND TO FOL REQUIREMENTS:

A. DISCUSS AND EVALUATE, AS APPLICABLE, EFFECTIVENESS OF FORCES THAT HAVE MISSION OF PROVIDING CLOSE IN AND PERIPHERAL SECURITY FOR AREAS ALREADY UNDER OWN CONTROL AND FOR AREAS WHERE PROGRAMMED RD ACTIVITIES ARE IN PROGRESS.

B. DISCUSS AND EVALUATE, AS APPLICABLE, EFFECTIVENESS AND ADEQUACY OF ALL TYPES RADIO AND WIRE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN RD TEAMS, LOCAL HAMLET, AND VILLAGE OFFICIALS AND MILITARY FORCES CHARGED WITH SECURITY MISSION.

C. DISCUSS AND EVALUATE, AS APPLICABLE, EFFECTIVENESS OF RESERVE/REACTION FORCES AND CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT, TO INCLUDE ADEQUACY OF LOCAL PROCEDURES FOR QUICK REACTION TO INTELLIGENCE

D. DISCUSS AND EVALUATE, AS APPLICABLE, ADEQUACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL WARNING DEVICES AND PROCEDURES FOR ALERTING LOCAL SECURITY FORCES AND POPULATION OF IMMINENT ENEMY ACTIONS. INVESTIGATE DISCUSS USE OF KLAXONS, HORNS,

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
X	BRIEF
	POST


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PAGE THREE RUMBLE CODE CONFIDENTIAL
 SIRENS, IRON FLARES, AND OTHER AUDIBLE AND VISUAL WARNING
 DEVICES BY LOCAL SECURITY FORCES AND VRD TEAMS.
 E. DISCUSS AND EVALUATE, AS APPLICABLE, ADEQUACY OF LOG-
 ISTIC SPT TO PROVIDE NECESSARY MATERIAL FOR DEFENSE OF UNITS
 SUPPORTING RD AND OF HAMLETS PROGRAMMED FOR DEVELOPMENT DURING
 CY 1967.
 F. DISCUSS AND EVALUATE, AS APPLICABLE, EFFECTIVENESS OF
 AVAILABLE MILITARY FORCES TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPNS TO BREAK UP
 CONCENTRATIONS OF EN UNITS WHICH THREATEN RD AREAS, DISTRICT
 HQ, AND PROVINCIAL CAPITALS, AND STATUS OF CONTINGENCY PLANS
 FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT.
 G. DISCUSS AND EVALUATE, AS APPLICABLE, EXISTENCE AND
 ADEQUACY OF INTERNAL HAMLET PLANS TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST
 ATTACKS.
 3. IN THOSE AREAS WHERE DEFICIENCIES ARE EVIDENT, SPECIFIC
 CORRECTIVE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN, INCLUDING MAXIMUM EFFORT
 TOWARD INFLUENCING THE COUNTERPARTS TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION
 IN IN THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
 4. SUBMIT RESULTS OF THIS SURVEY THIS HQ (ATTN: G-3)
 NLT 13 MAY 67. REPORT SHOULD INCLUDE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS IN
 THOSE AREAS WHERE ASSISTANCE FROM HIGHYR HQ IS REQUIRED.
 GP-4
 BT

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SECRET

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POST

0 020001Z MAY 67 G-3
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON
 RUMQUAM/CT 1 SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET

OPCON SLF

A. CG III MAF DAB050Z MAY 67
 B. CG FIRST MARDIV 010230Z MAY 67
 1. IAW REF A CG FIRST MARDIV ASSUMED OPCON TO 79.4 AS OF
 010242H MAY 67.
 2. CTG 79.4: REF B APPLIES.
 GP-4
 BT

1/3 SLF

SECRET


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Encl (3) 9

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

CC/K



	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
X	BRIEF
	POST

LOC

P 020609Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON
INFO CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

COMBAT OPERATIONS IN VIET NAM.

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 121003Z NOV 66

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 241417Z NOV 66

C. CG FIRST MARDIV 280719Z NOV 66

1. IN VIEW OF RECENT EXPERIENCES IT IS AGAIN NECESSARY TO REVIEW CERTAIN BASIC COMBAT PRINCIPLES. REF A PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS AT ALL ECHELONS CONCERNING DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY ATTACKS. REFS B AND C VOICE MY CONCERN RELATIVE TO ADEQUACY OF PATROLS, AMBUSHES, AND LISTENING POSTS.

2. MARINES MUST BE THOROUGHLY INDOCTRINATED WITH THE NECESSITY FOR CONTINUING ALERTNESS EVEN WHEN THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE OR NO CONTACT IN AN AREA. COMPLACENCY LEADS TO CARELESSNESS AND NEEDLESS CASUALTIES.

3. OBVIOUSLY DANGER OF ENEMY ATTACK VARIES ACCORDING TO UNIT LOCATION AND TACTICAL SITUATION; HOWEVER, COMMANDERS MUST

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0131E SECRET

MAINTAIN FIFTY PERCENT OF ASSIGNED SECURITY FORCES ON AN ALERT STATUS, INCLUDING REACTION FORCES, AS A MINIMUM REQUIREMENT ON A NIGHTLY BASIS.

4. IN A RECENT INFANTRY ASSAULT OF FORTIFIED POSITION FULL EXPLOITATION OF SUPPORTING ARMS WAS NOT POSSIBLE AND RESULTED IN DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH MARINE CASUALTIES. WHEN THE ENEMY IS LOCATED, SUPPORTING ARMS MUST BE USED TO MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EFFECT. ONCE CONTACT IS ESTABLISHED, THAT CONTACT MUST BE AGGRESSIVELY MAINTAINED. THE ENEMY MUST BE FOUND, FIXED, THEN DELIBERATELY CAPTURED OR DESTROYED.

MGJEN NICHESON SENDS.

BT

SECRET


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Encl (4)

6

SECRET

C.G.



K

0 032128Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHFL/CG FLO/FIRST FOR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST TK BN
INFO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)
BT

SECRET

FRAG 0 61-57 (ON DEPLOYMENT) (U)

A. CG III MAF 021350Z MAY 67

B. FIRST MARDIV ADMIN 0 301-66

C. DIVO P4608.10

D. FIRST MARDIV 0 P08000.30 (DIV CEO)

E. THIRD MARDIV 0 P08000.25 (DIV COI)

1. ENEMY SITUATION NORTHERN ICTZ REQUIRES REINFORCEMENT IAW REF A
2. EXECUTION.

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	NO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
X	BRIEF
	POST

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0234E **SECRET**

A. FOL UNITS PREPARE ON ORDER DEPLOY UNITS AS INDICATED TO
NORTHERN ICTZ TO CLOSE BY 8 MAY. UPON ARRIVAL NORTHERN ICTZ
UNITS DROP CG THIRD MARDIV. IMPLEMENTING INSTRNS PASEP.

(1) SEVENTH MAR: FIRST BN TWO SIX MAR

(2) ELEVENTH MAR: ALPHA BTRY FIRST BN THIRTEENTH MAR.

(3) FIRST TK BN: FLAT BRAVO CO THIRD TK BN.

B. SEVENTH MAR MISSION REMAINS SAME.

3. ADMIN AND LOG

A. ADMIN IAW REF B.

B. LOG

(1) PRESCRIBED LOADS FOR DEPL: AS DIR BY SEVENTH MAR,
ELEVENTH MAR, OR FIRST TK BN, AS APPROPRIATE.

(2) SUPPLY AFTER DEPL: AS DIR BY THIRD MARDIV

(3) TRANSPORTATION: PROVIDED BY THIS HQ (G-4 ON REQ)

(4) EMBARK: SEVENTH MAR PROVIDE FOLLOWING DATA TO THIS
HQ ASAP IAW REF COM

(A) COMPLY WITH PAR 104.11

(B) REF LIST IAW PAR 105.1

(C) DATA IAW PAR 312.

(5) DEBARKATION: TRANS TO BE PROVIDE BY THIRD MARDIV.

SECRET

Enell 65/3

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMMLA 0234H S E C R E T

C. MISCELLANEOUS

(1) ALL CANTONMENT FACILITIES WILL BE LEFT IN PLACE. FACILITIES WILL NOT BE STRIPPED OF WIRING NOR CANIBALIZED IN ANY WAY. NOTIFY THIS HQ (G-4) PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT IN ORDER THAT INSPECTION OF FACILITIES CAN BE MADE.

(2) FIELD FORTIFICATIONS WILL BE LEFT INTACT.

(3) ALL SPECIAL ALLOWANCE ITEMS OBTAINED FROM FIRST DIVISION WILL BE RETURNED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE THIS TAOR.

(4) ALL PERSONAL AND ORGANIC EQUIP WILL BE TAKEN.

D. REQ TO SUPPORTING COMMANDS

(1) CG III MAF: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE TRANS AS RQRD.

(2) CG FIRST MAW: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE FIXED WING/HELO RANS FOR UNIT MOVEMENT AS REQUIRED.

(3) CG FLC: REQUEST YOU EXPEDITE RETURN OF T/E ITEMS UNDERGOING REPAIR PRIOR TO UNITS DEP DANANG TAOR.

4. COMM-ELEC

A. COMM LAW REF D.

B. THIRD MARDIV

(1) REQUEST PROVIDE FREQ ASSIGNMENT ASAP.

(2) REQUEST ADVISE AN/TRC-27 CAPABILITY.

PAGE FOUR RUMMLA 0234H S E C R E T

(3) REQ PROVIDE ADDNL COMM INSTR AS REQUIRED.

C. SEVENTH MAR: BE PREPARED PROVIDE RADREL DET CONSISTING OF AN/TRC-27 AND PERS.

D. COORD INSTNS.

(1) UPON CHOP CALL, SIGNS LAW REF E.

(2) COMM SECURITY AIDS LAW REF D AND E.

GPBAR

BT

SECRET

Col. H. E. Jemeyer Sr.

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

31 OP:dwm
HARPER

CG III MAF
CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAF
CG FORLOGCHD/FIRST PSR
DANANG SUB AREA CMD
FIFTH COMM BN
CMD I CORPS ADV GP DNG
HQ BN FIRST MARDIV
SEVENTH MAR
ELEVENTH MAR
1ST MT BN
11TH MT BN
FIRST ENG BN

PPP
PPP

SECRET

CG I CORPS
COMNAV SUPPORT DNG
SEVENTH ENGR BN

SECRET

CHANGE ONE TO FRAG O 55-67 (ROUGH RIDER)

A. III MAF 011210Z MAY67 (NOTAL)

B. III MAF 221108Z APRIL67 (NOTAL)

C. FIRST MARDIV 240547Z APR67

1. REF A EXTENDED THE REQUIREMENTS OF REF B. ACCORDINGLY,
THE REQUIREMENTS OF REF C ARE EXTENDED, EXCEPT MODIFY REF C AS
FOL:

A. PARA 1: AFTER 30 APRIL INSERT 5 MAY AND 6 MAY.

B. PARA 3: AFTER LAST SENTENCE ADD WORDS CONVOY TO LOAD
DNG 4 MAY 67, DEPART DNG 5 MAY FOR HUE. THIRD MARDIV TRKS RE-
LEASED UPON UNLOADING AND RETURN TO PHU BAI. REMAINDER OF CON-
VOY RETURN DNG 6 MAY.

C. 5TH LINE PARA 5: DELETE ALL AFTER WORD "ARRIVE" AND ADD
WORDS FIRST MT BN CP (AT982718) NLT 041300.

D. PARA 5.C: DELETE WORD ELEVENTH AND INSERT WORD "FIRST".

PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES

0505417

02118

C-2118


E. PARA 5.E.3.(F): AFTER PARA (F) ADD PARA (G) TO READ
DANANG TO HUE 050900 MAY. ~~XXXXXX~~ AFTER PARA (G) ADD PARA (H) TO
READ HUE TO DANANG 060900 MAY.

GP-4

PAGE TWO OF TWO PAGES

SECRET

C-C-200



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

0 041500Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG ILL MAP
RUMV/P/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG PHAV
RUMFL/CG FLC/FIRST PER
ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OFCON
BT

SECRET**BOUNDARY CHANGES (C)**

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 030553Z MAY 67 (BRAG 0 62-67) NOTAL
1. AVAILABILITY OF FORCES AND CHANGING EN SITUATION DICTATE
FOLLOWING REVISION OF INTERNAL BOUNDARIES:
A. IAW REF A, BOUNDARY BTWN FIRST AND SEVENTH MAR BTWN PTS
AT 984704 AND AT 989633 SHIFTED WESTWARD TO EAST BANK SONG YEN
RIVER PTS AT 969626 AND AT 927633. THENCE EAST ALONG E-W
CL 65 TO PRESENT BOUNDARY AT AT 989633. EFF 061200H MAY.
B. EFF 061200H FIRST BN SEVENTH MAR ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY
PRESENT FIRST BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR SECTOR. RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PRESENT FIRST BN SEVENTH MAR SECTOR IS DIVIDED BTWN SECOND AND

PAGE TWO RUMFL 041500Z **SECRET**

THIRD AND SEVENTH MAR WITH BOUNDARY PASSING THROUGH FOL PTS:
FM AT 984704 THROUGH AT 982707, AT 987633, AT 986633, AT 986678 TO
WESTERN BOUNDARY VIC XC 194640.

C. BOUNDARY BTWN SECOND BN FIFTH MAR AND FIRST BN SEVENTH
MAR CHANGED TO FOLLOWERS: FM AT 966493 TO AT 967493; EAST ALONG
E-W CL 49 TO RR; EAST ALONG SOUTH SIDE OF RR TO BT 008616.

D. BOUNDARY BTWN FIRST AND SECOND BN FIRST MAR MODIFIED
AS FOL: FM PRESENT REGD BOUNDARY AT AT 986651 EAST ALONG
STREAM TO AT 986995, THENCE EAST ALONG TRAIL THROUGH

FM 012500 TO VIC PT BT 017506, AND EAST ALONG NORTH BANK SUCI
CO VA TO PRESENT BOUNDARY BT 025500.

E. BOUNDARY BTWN FIRST AND THIRD BNS FIRST MAR MODIFIED
TO RUN AS FOL: FM PRESENT BOUNDARY VIC BT 097643 TO PRESENT
BOUNDARY VIC BT 038632.

2. ALL CHANGES EFFECTIVE 051600H MAY 67 EXCEPT AS NOTED.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

37

FIRST MAR
 FIFTH MAR
 SEVENTH MAR
 GTS 79-4

00 XII MAY
 00 XIII
 00 PIC/PWR

300120Z
 0000

000
 000

SECRET

SECRET

CHANGE ONE TO FRAC 0 62-67

A. 00 FIRST HANDIV REIN 030555Z MAY67

1. MAKE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO REF A:

A. PARA 2.A.(1): DELETE ALL AFTER "POL SCHED" AND INSERT
 "W/2/1 RE 041600H MAY, REMAINING THREE COO 1/1 RE 051600H
 REY, AND W/2/1 RE 061600H MAY."

B. PARA 2.B.: AND PARA 2.B.(3) AS FOL: "ON RELIEF OF REIN
 1/3/5 VIE QUE SON BY SLF 5 MAY, CO AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER EMPLOYMENT."

C. RENOMINATE PARA 2.D. AS PARA 2.E.

D. INSERT NEW PARA 2.D. AS FOL:

"D. SLF

(1) MOVE ONE RIFLE CO AND SLF SUPPORTING ARTY TO VIC
 QUE SON 5 MAY RELIEVE REIN 1/3/5 IN PLACE AND ASSUME RESPONSIBIL-
 ITY FOR DEFENSE OF POSITION."


GP-4

041509Z

encl (8)

SECRET

K



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
K	BRIEF
	POST

0041511Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
INFO CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
O P 030553Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG FMAV
RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSR
BT

S E C R E T

FRAG 0 62-67 (REPOSITIONING OF FORCES) (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 010233Z MAY67 (FRAG 0 59-67)

B. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 030129Z MAY67 (FRAG 0 61-67)

1. SITUATION. REQUIREMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES TO NORTHERN
CITZ DICTATES REALIGNMENT OF BOUNDARIES AND FORCES WITHIN DA NANG
AOR.

2. EXECUTION

A. FIRST MAR

(1) ASSUME OPCON F/2/1 AND FIRST BN FIRST MAR FROM FIFTH
MAR IAW FOL SCHED: E/2/1 NLT 041600H MAY AND REMAINDER NLT

PAGE TWO RUMHFLA 0277E S E C R E T

051620H MAY.

(2) CHOP FORCES TO SEVENTH MAR IAW FOL SCHED: D/1/26
NLT 041600H MAY; D/1/7 NLT 051600H MAY AND ONE RIFLE CO FIRST
MAR NLT 051600H MAY.

B. FIFTH MAR

(1) CHOP F/2/1 AND FIRST BN FIRST MAR TO FIRST MAR IAW
SCHED CONTAINED PARA 2.A. (1) ABOVE.

(2) PROVIDED CO REIN AS RELIEF FOR F/2/1 NUI LAC SON/
VIET AML ON TERMINATION OPN UNION EXECUTE PARA 2.B.(3) OF REF A.

C. SEVENTH MAR

(1) RECEIVE D/1/26, D/1/7 AND ONE AUGMENTATION CO FM FIRST
MAR IAW SCHED CONTAINED PARA 2.A. (2) ABOVE.

(2) DEPLOY FIRST BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR WITH NORTHERN ICTZ
IAW REF B.

(3) RELIEVE FIRST BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR WITH FIRST BN
SEVENTH MAR.

(4) EFF 061200H MAY BOUNDARY BTWN FIRST AND SEVENTH MAR BTWN PTS
AT 994704 AND AT 989630 SHIFTED WESTWARD TO EAST BANK SONG YEN BTWN
PTS AT 963698 AND AT 957630, THENCE EAST ALONG E-W GL 63 TO PRESENT
BOUNDARY AT AT 989630.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 0277E S E C R E T

(3) ASSIGN SECOND AND THIRD BNS SEVENTH MAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESENT FIRST BN SEVENTH MAR SECTOR AS MODIFIED BY PARA 2.E.

(4) ABOVE, PROVIDE THIS HQ OVERLAY OF NEW BOUNDARY BTWN SECOND AND THIRD BNS.

D. COORD INSTRNS

(1) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(2) ALL CHOPS EFF AT TIME OF ARRIVAL IN RECEIVING UNIT'S SECTOR, REPORT EFF TIME CHOP BY MSG TO THIS HQ.

(3) ASSIGNED MISSIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

(4) SUBMIT TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS TO THIS HQ

(ATTN MEO OR AIRO AS APPROPRIATE) ASAP.

GF-4

BT


SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CBF
	BRIEF
	POST

COC



CC

~~AT~~

P 050905Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARINE DIV REIN
TO FIFTH MARINES
INFO THIRD AIRBORNE BN
BT

63

SECRET
CH 1 TO HQ REAG 0 17-51
A. CG 1ST MARINE DIV 210000Z APR 67
1. PARAGRAPH 3.0. BUT A. CHANGE "ONE LVS PLAT (10 LVIP5)" TO
READ "TWO LVS PLAT (20 LVIP5)".
GP-4
BT

5


Encl(10)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

CC



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

O 05135Z MAY 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHFL/CG FLC/FIRST PER
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST AT BN
 ZEN/FIRST TK BN
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 INFO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)
 XMT: SEVENTH MAR
 ELEVENTH MAR
 FIRST AT BN
 FIRST TK BN
 FIRST ENGR BN
 BT
 SECRET

OPNS 6
 6-3

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0589Z SECRET
 CHANGE ONE TO FRAG 0 61-67

- A. CG III MAF 050154Z MAY 67
 - B. CG FIRST MARDIV 030129Z MAY 67
 1. REF A APPLIES. CHANGE REF B AS FOL:
 - A. ADD NEW SUB-PARA 2.A(4) AS FOL:
FIRST AT BN: THIRD PLAT CO C THIRD AT BN.
 - B. ADD NEW SUB-PARA 2.A(5) AS FOL:
FIRST ENGR BN: FIRST PLAT (REIN) CO C THIRD ENGR BN.
 2. FIRST AT BN AND FIRST ENGR BN: COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE PORTIONS REF B. PRESCRIBE LOADS FOR UNITS FOR DEPLOYMENT, AS APPROPRIATE.
- GP-4
 BT

SECRET

Encl(11)

M

SECRET

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

CC
1-2
6-3
P 060540Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MAR DIV
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
BT

**SECRET**

SECURITY OF MAJOR BRIDGES (U)

A. CG III MAF 291012Z APR 67

B. FIRST MAR 040705Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)

C. SEVENTH MAR 050001Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)

1. IAW REF A, BASED ON INFO CONTAINED REFS B AND C, FOL IS
SUBMITTED CONCERNING MAJOR BRIDGES FOR WHICH FIRST MAR DIV HAS
SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY.

2. SONG CAN DO BRIDGE (AT 998706).

A. SPECIFIC SECURITY MEASURES.

(1) LIGHTING SYSTEM IN EFFECT WHICH ILLUMINATES
PILINGS AND ABUTMENTS UNDER BRIDGE.

(2) SECTION OF SEARCHLIGHTS WITH INFRARED AND WHITE
LIGHT CAPABILITIES POSITIONED TO ILLUMINATE APPROACHES

PAGE TWO PUMLA 0639E **SECRET**

TO BRIDGE.

(3) PLATOON SECURITY FORCE CANTONMENT LOCATED IMMEDIATELY
ADJACENT TO BRIDGE ALLOWING FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF
REACTION FORCES.

(4) PONTON CATWALK HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED AT RIVER
LEVEL BETWEEN PILINGS AND ABUTMENTS WHICH IS PATROLLED
24 HOURS A DAY. DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS, GRENADES
AND TNT CHARGES ARE DROPPED INTO WATER BY SENTRIES.

(5) REGULAR AND NONSCHEDULED CHECKS ARE MADE FROM
WATER CRAFT. BOATS AND PATROL WATER APPROACHES,
DROPPING GRENADES AND TNT CHARGES INTO WATER.

(6) ACTIVE PATROLS AND AMBUSHES ARE CONDUCTED WITHIN
200 METER RADIUS OF BRIDGE UNDER SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT
WITH FIRST TANK BN AND FIRST MP BN. ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE
200 METER CIRCLE AND COORDINATED WITH PARENT AND
ADJACENT UNITS.

(7) PREPLANNED DEFENSIVE ARTILLERY AND MORTAR CONCENTRATIONS
ARE PLOTTED.

(8) FLAESHIPS ARE VECTORED OVER AREA AT NONSCHEDULED
INTERVALS WHEN AVAILABLE.

SECRET

Encl (12)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 0639E S E C R E T

(9) ALERT DRILL ARE CONDUCTED AT VARYING TIMES THROUGHOUT DAY AND NIGHT TO INSURE TROOPS ARE FAMILIAR WITH ANY DIRECTION OR TYPE OF ATTACK, AT ANY TIME OF DAY, AND DURING ANY WEATHER CONDITION.

(10) TROOPS AND SMALL UNIT LEADERS ARE CONTINUALLY BRIEFED AND MOTIVATED CONCERNING URGENCY OF PROTECTING BRIDGE.

(11) NAVY EOD UNDERWATER SWIMMERS MAKE SCHEDULED AND ON CALL INSPECTIONS OF PILES AND ABUTMENTS.

(12) BARBED WIRE CAGES ENCIRCLE EACH PILE.

B. THERE ARE NO ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS OUTSIDE ORGANIC RESOURCES AT THIS TIME.

C. LESSONS LEARNED

(1) RECOMMEND ALL UNITS WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SIMILAR BRIDGES ACQUIRE DIVING MASKS, SNORKLES, AND SWIM FINS FROM SPECIAL FORCES OR OTHER SOURCES FOR PERSONAL DAILY INSPECTION OF PILES.

(2) BARBED WIRE CAGES SURROUNDING PILES MAY BE MORE OF DETRIMENT THAN ASSISTANCE. PERSONNEL INSPECTING PILING ARE SUBJECT TO ENSNAREMENT BY WIRE DUE TO

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 0639E S E C R E T

THE STRONG CURRENT. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE FOR EXPLOSIVE CHARGES TO BE FLOATED DOWNSTREAM TO CATCH ON BARBED WIRE.

(3) NAVY UD TEAMS HAVE PROVEN EFFECTIVE AND PARTICULARLY COOPERATIVE IN RESPONDING TO EVERY REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE.

3. SONG BOU DE BRIDGE (AT 927842)

A. SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES

(1) 24 HOUR SECURITY PROVIDED BY USMC PLATOON CONDUCTING PATROLS AND AMBUSHES IN ADDITION TO MANNING OF PERMANENT POSITIONS.

(2) LOCAL CAC UNIT OPERATES 1000 METERS SOUTH OF BRIDGE.

(3) AN/PSR-1 (SID) UNITS INSTALLED BOTH LAND AND WATER.

(4) TWO VEHICLE MOUNTED XENON SEARCHLIGHTS ARE IN SERVICE.

(5) CONCERTINA WIRE BARRIER IN PLACE.

(6) ON 3 MAY FIRST RECON BN DIVERS INSTALLED NEW UNDERWATER DEVICE OF SENSITIVE ELECTRIC WIRES DESIGNED TO LIGHT CONTROL PANEL WHEN CONTACT IS MADE.

B. ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES PLANNED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 0639E S E C R E T

- (1) SUBMARINE NETS.
- (2) UNDERWATER LIGHTS.
- (3) AN/MSS-3 XENON SEARCHLIGHTS.
- (4) ACOUSTICAL DEVICES.
- (5) BOATS.
- (6) STARLIGHT SCOPES COMING AVAILABLE ARE INTENDED FOR USE THIS BRIDGE.
- (7) REQUESTED EQUIPMENT EST IN SERVICE WITHIN 1-3 DAYS RECEIPT.

C. RESOURCES BEYOND ORGANIC CAPABILITIES INCLUDE REQUESTED MPS FOR TRAFFIC DIRECTION AND CONTROL; ALSO UDT FOR BI-WEEKLY UNDERWATER INSPECTION OF PILINGS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES.

C. LESSON LEARNED: USE OF GRENADES AT IRREGULAR INTERVALS APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL. ON 29 APRIL VC BODY RECOVERED NEAR BRIDGE BELIEVED POSSIBLE SWIMMER KIA BY GRENADE FRAGMENTS.

4. HILL 55 BRIDGE (AT 968606).

A. SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES.

- (1) 24 HOUR SECURITY PROVIDED BY USMC PLATOON.

PAGE SIX RUMHLA 0639E S E C R E T

(2) DEADMAN FLOAT STEEL CABLE WITH 55 GAL DRUMS HAS BEEN INSTALLED.

(3) TWO AN/PSR-1 (SID) UNITS IN SERVICE.

(4) DEFENSIVE WIRE CONSISTS OF BOTH CONCERTINA AND DOUBLE APRON TACTICAL WIRE.

(5) BUNKERS UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

(6) NEARBY HILL 5 (AT 963607) HAS TANK WITH XENON LIGHT AND REACTION SQUAD FOR BRIDGE.

B. ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES PLANNED:

(1) SEARCHLIGHT, ALREADY REQUESTED.

(2) BULLDOZER TO LEVEL SURROUNDING TRENCHES FOR BETTER FIELDS OF FIRE.

C. NEW UNIT TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRIDGE WILL RE-EVALUATE EXISTING SECURITY AND SUBMIT BY PRIORITY ANY EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL RESOURCES REQUIRED BEYOND ORGANIC CAPABILITY.

D. LESSON LEARNED: SECURITY FOR HILL 55 BRIDGE FORMERLY PROVIDED TANK AT BRIDGE BUT FOUND BETTER TACTICAL DISPOSITION ACHIEVED BY TANK POSITION ON NEARBY HILL 5.

BT

SECRET

SECRET

P 060548Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR

BT

SECRET

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

5. DAI LAC BRIDGE (AT913577)

A. SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES.

(1) 24 HOUR SECURITY PROVIDED BY USMC PLATOON AND LOCAL PFS CONDUCTING PATROLS AND AMBUSHES TO 1500 METERS RADII.

(2) TEMPORARY 3/4 INCH ROPE HAS BEEN RIGGED ON WATER PRIOR TO INSTALLATION OF REQUESTED PERMANENT BARRIER.

(3) OPS AND SENTRY POSITIONS MANNED BOTH ENDS OF BRIDGE ABOVE AND BELOW BRIDGE.

(4) ADDITIONAL CENTER POSITIONS MANNED DURING DARK.

(5) VEHICLE MOUNTED SEARCHLIGHTS WITH INFRARED SYSTEM ARE EMPLOYED.

B. ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES PLANNED:

(1) AN-POR-1 (SID) UNITS.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 06405 SECRET

(2) METASCOPES WHEN RELEASED.

(3) PERMANENT TWO LINE 55 GAL DRUM STEEL CABLE SPLIT BARRIER FLOAT WITH WEIGHTED CONCERTINA FOR ZIG ZAG BOAT TRAFFIC.

(4) FERRY TO BE CONSTRUCTED (AT911586).

(5) NEW REPLACEMENT BRIDGE (AT913588) EST COMPLETION

20 MAY WILL REQUIRE RE-EVALUATION OF SECURITY MEASURES.

D. LESSON LEARNED: NO UNDERWATER SWIMMERS ENCOUNTERED. HAND GRENADES NOT USED BECAUSE OF NEARBY FRIENDLY POPULACE AND TROOPS. RECON BY FIRE HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY CONDUCTED ON SUSPICIOUS FLOATING OBJECTS WITHOUT INCIDENT.

6. SONG THU BON BRIDGE (AT923533).

A. THERE IS NOW A FERRY AT THIS LOCATION AND A CONSTRUCTION SITE FOR THE PLANNED BRIDGE. NO PILINGS OR SPANS NOW EXIST.


B. REIN PLAT NOW GUARDING FERRY AND CONSTRUCTION SITE. OBSERVATION TOWER FIFTY FEET HIGH, ONE HUNDRED METERS FROM CONSTRUCTION SITE.

C. SECURITY WILL BE CONSTANTLY REEVALUATED AS BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION PROGRESSES.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	2
	INO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 060551Z MAY 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAF
 RUMHFL/ CG FORLOGCMD/FIRST FSR
 RUMHMF/DANANG SUB AREA CMD
 ZEN/FIFTH COMM BN
 RUMNVH/CMD I CORPS ADV G DNG
 ZEN/HQ BN FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST BN
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 INFO RUMHV/CG I CORPS
 RUMNNA/COMDAVSUPPORT DNG
 ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
 BT
 S E C R E T
 FRAG O 68-47 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)

W O
 Then
 C C

PAGE TWO RUMHFLA 0641E S E C R E T

A. CG III MAF 042340Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)

B. CG III MAF 221608Z APR 67 (NOTAL)

C. ANNEX B TO 1ST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)

D. THIRD MARDIV OPO 416-86 (NOTAL)

E. FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)

F. FIRST MARDIV ORDER P 22000.2C (COI) (NOTAL)

G. THIRD MARDIV P 22000.2C (COI) (NOTAL)

1. REF A AUTHORIZES CONTINUATION OF TASK VEH AND ORGANIZATION PRESCRIBED BY REF B FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF REAR ELEMENTS FIRST BATTALION MINUS REIN TWENTY SIXTH MAR FROM DA NANG TO PHU BAI BY ROUGH RIDER.

2. TASK VEH AND ORG OF ROUGH RIDER DEPARTING PHU BAI FOR DANANG ON 5 MAY WILL LOAD ELMS FIRST BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR NIGHT OF 6-7 MAY; DEPART DANANG FOR PHU BAI ON 7 MAY, AND DEPART PHU BAI FOR DANANG ON 8 MAY.

3. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV

A. REQUEST CONTINUE REQUIREMENTS LISTED PARA FOUR, REF B.

B. THIS DIV WILL ARRANGE FOR RETURN OF SECURITY FORCES BY AIR ON 8 MAY.

C. CHOP POINT IS BOUNDARY BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV.

14
SECRET

Emel (13)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 0641E S E C R E T

4. EXECUTION

A. SEVENTH MAR

(1) PROVIDE RESERVE FOR EACH CONVOY IAW PARA 3.D(1)(B) REF C.

(2) DEPLOY REAR ELEMENTS FIRST BN, TWENTY SIXTH MAR MINUS REIN TO PHU BAI.

B. ELEVENTH MAR: REF C AS APPLICABLE.

C. FIRST MT BN:

(1) REF C AS APPLICABLE

(2) DETACH THIRD MARDIV TASK VEHICLES AT PHU BAI.

D. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3.G. REF C.

5. COORD INST

A. REF C. AS APPLICABLE FOR CONVOYS BETWEEN DANANG AND PHU BAI.

B. CHECK POINTS: REF D AND E.

C. D DAY H HOUR:

(1) DANANG TO PHU BAI 071030H MAY

(2) PHU BAI TO DANANG 080900H MAY OR AS DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.

D. IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD, OR OTHER CONDITIONS REQUIRE

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 0641E S E C R E T

POSTPONEMENT. CONVOY TO BE RESCHEDULED FOLLOWING DAY.

6. COMM ELECT

A. REFS F AND G.


B. HQ BN AND SEVENTH MAR: MONITOR THIRD MARDIV TAC NR ONE (M-15, 2244 KC) COMMENCING THIRTY MINUTES PRIOR TO H-HOUR UNTIL CONVOY ARRIVES DESTINATION EACH DAY OF SCHED.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET



COC

(2)

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CLR
	BRIEF
	POST

O R 061504Z MAY 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMHVVH/CG TASK FORCE OREGON
 INFO RUMHVVH/DSA I CORPS
 RUMNAB/FIFTH SFG (ABN) NHA TRANG
 RUMHVVH/CO C FIFTH SFG (ABN)
 BT

G-3

C C

S E C R E T

RELIEF/REINFORCEMENT OF CIDG CAMPS

A. CG III MAF LOI 2-67 11MAR67

B. CG III MAF LOI 4-67 14MAR67

1. PENDING PUBLISHED CHANGES TO REFERENCES (A) AND (B) RES-
 PONSIBILITY FOR RELIEF/REINFORCEMENT OF CIDG CAMPS IS ASSIGNED
 AS FOLLOWS:

A. 1ST MARDIV ✓

(1) TIEN PHUOC

(2) KHAM DUC

(3) THUONG DUC

B. TASK FORCE OREGON

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 402 S E C R E T

(1) TRA BONG

(2) KA TANH

(3) MINH LONG

(4) BA TO

(5) GIA VUC

GP-4

BT

8

SECRET

Encl (14)

06 FIRST MANDIV REIN
 SMOOD IN FIFTH MAR

3:00 PM
 SOUTH

Brid

REK
 OOO

FIFTH MAR

SECRET

SECRET

REAS 0 44-67 (POSITIONING OF FORCES)(U)

2. SITUATION. OUR UNIC CONTINUES WITH FRIENDLY FORCES DRIVING
 EASTWARD IN NIENT DUC - THANH BINH VALLEY FM NORTHWEST OF QUE SON.

3. MISSION. SMOOD IN FIFTH MAR TERMINATES PRESENT BLOCKING ROLE
 EAST END ANTENNA VALLEY AND RESUMES MISSION IN DEFENSE NONG SON
 INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

3. SMOOD IN FIFTH MAR.

A. NOT EDGED COMMENCE MOVEMENT TOWARD NONG SON WITH OGS 2 AND

B. ASSUME DEF POS FOR NIGHT 9-10 MAY AND CONTINUE MOVE 10 MAY.

C. FOR OGS 2 AND 1 IN WESTERN END ANTENNA VALLEY AS REACTION
 FORCE TO COUNTER IN THREATS TO FRIENDLY POPULATION OR FACILITIES.
 UNHINDERED IN MOVEMENT TO AND THROUGH AREA. SEEK OUT AND CAPTURE
 OR DESTROY IN SUPPLIES AND FORCES IN AREA.

██████████ C. CONTINUE MAINTAIN ONE CO BLOCKING PSN SOUTH OF NONG SON.

GP-4.


090945Z

MAY 67

1876E

(incl 15)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

COC

(4)

K

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	NO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	RPINT

X

O 101445Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG FMAW
RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSH
RUMHVH/CG IF OREGON
RUMHFL/FLSG-BRAVO
BT

B-3

SECRET

FRAG O 65-67 (CONTINGENCY FORCE OPN MALHEUR)

A. CG III MAF 100130Z MAY 67

B. CG IF OREGON OPORD 4-67 (NOTAL)

C. FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66

D. FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C (DIV CEOI)

1. SITUATION. REF A DIRECTS CG FIRST MARDIV TO PREPARE TO
PROVIDE CONTINGENCY FORCE IN SPT OF IF OREGON IN SECURITY ROLE IN

PAGE TWO RUMHFL 1209Z SECRET

DUC PRO AREA DURING OPN MALHEUR. REF B APPLIES.

2. EXECUTION.

A. FIRST MAR. PREPARE ONE BN COMPOSED OF CMD GRP AND THREE COMPANIES FOR DEPLOYMENT TO IF OREGON ON SIX HOUR NOTICE.

B. SEVENTH MAR. PREPARE REGIL CMD GRP AND ONE BN COMPOSED OF CMD GRP AND THREE COMPANIES FOR DEPLOYMENT TO IF OREGON ON EIGHT HOUR NOTICE.

C. FIFTH MAR. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE FORCES FOR EMPLOYMENT WITHIN DANANG TAOR.

D. COORD INSTRNS.

(1) AIRLIFT WILL BE BY C-130 FM DANANG AIRFIELD TO QUANG NGAI FOR FURTHER DEPLOYMENT

(2) REPORT THIS HQ UNIT DESIGNATED FOR ALERT STATUS AND TIME STATUS ATTAINED.

(3) CHOP TO CG IF OREGON EFF ON ARRIVAL QUANG NGAI.

(4) MISSION REMAINS SAME.

(5) DYLATH ALCON.

3. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS.

A. ADMIN. IAW REF C.

B. LOGISTICS.

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6
Encl (6)

SECRET

PAGE THREE KUMH.A 1200E S E C R E T

(1) PRESCRIBED LOADS.

(A) CLASS I - MCI W/FUEL TRIOXANE - 1 DAY.

(B) CLASS II - ESSENTIAL I/E AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE ITEMS, AS PRESCRIBED BY BN CMDR.

(C) CLASS III - VEHICLE TANKS THREE QUARTERS FULL.

(D) CLASS V - BASIC ALLOWANCE.

(E) WATER - TWO FULL CANTEENS PLUS FIVE DAYS HALIZONE AND THREE DAYS SALT TABLETS.

(2) RESUPPLY. AS DIR BY CG TF OREGON. MARINE CORPS PECULIAR, SOURCE OF SUPPLY FL SG-B.

(3) TRANSPORTATION. SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS TO THIS HQ (ATTN EMBARKO).

C. REQUEST FMAW PROVIDE A/C AS REQUIRED.

D. ELEVENTH MT BN, BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION.

4. COMM-ELEC.

A. CG TF OREGON.

(1) REQ PROVIDE ASAP SEVEN VHF (FM) FREQS (30-75.0 MCS) PER BN. TWO FREQS EACH BN TO BE WHOLE 100 KCS INCREMENT.

(2) REQ ADVISE EFFECTIVE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CODES FOR AUTHENTICATION, NUMERAL CODE AND BREVITY CODE.

(3) REQ PROVIDE ADDNL COMM INSTRNS AS REQUIRED.

PAGE FOUR KUMH.A 1200E S E C R E T

E. COORD INSTRNS.

(1) CALL SIGNS IAW REF D.

(2) BN TAG NR ONE IAW REF D.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

K

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 111411Z MAY 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV MARIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAF
 RUMHFL/CG FLC/AS
 RUMHVN/CG IF OREGON
 RUMHFL/FLSG BRAVO
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/EIGHTH MAR
 ZEN/NINTH MAR
 BT

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CONTINGENCY SPEC OPN OREGON

A. CG III MAF 190130Z MAY 67

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 121405Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)

1. REF A DIRECTS CG FIRST MARDIV MARIN TO PREPARE TO PROVIDE CONTINGENCY FORCES IN SPT IF OREGON IN DUC PHO AREA DURING OPN MALHEUR. REF B TASKS SPECIFIC ELMS FIRST MAR DIV TO PREPARE TO PROVIDE SUCH FORCES.

2. IAW REF A, FC MARIN BEEN DESIGNATED AS ALERT UNITS. ALERT

PAGE 2 RUMHFL 1341E 100200Z MAY 67

STATUS ATTAINED 110000Z MAY 67.

A. FIRST BN FIRST MAR (EIGHT HOUR ALERT)

(1) CO B FIRST BN FIRST MAR

(2) CO C FIRST BN FIRST MAR

(3) CO E SECOND BN FIRST MAR

B. SECOND BN SEVENTH MAR (EIGHT HOUR ALERT)

(1) CO E SECOND BN SEVENTH MAR

(2) CO H SEVENTH BN SEVENTH MAR

(3) CO A FIRST BN SEVENTH MAR

ALL UNITS REPORTED AS NOTED AS POINT OF ORIGIN FOR C-130

BT

SECRET

Encl (17)

14


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	G-2
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	PER SUM
	WK SUM
X	CMD CHR
X	BRIEF
	POST

00



0 121019Z MAY 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/CG FMAW
 RUMFCR/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUMEUAM/CTG SEVEN NINE FT FOUR
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON

BT

S E C R E T

OPCON SLF

1. OPCON CTG 79.4 PASSED TO CG III MAF EFF 121800H MAY67.

GP-4

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31
 Encl(1)


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<i>2</i>	CMD CHR
<i>2</i>	BRIEF
<i>67</i>	POST



0000ZZ 121701Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST SP BN
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG FMAV
RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSR
BT

S E C R E T
OPN UNION

1. SITUATION. TACTICAL SITUATION THANG BINH - QUE SON BASIN
DICTATES AUGMENTATION FIRST MARDIV FORCES IN AREA.

2. EXECUTION.

A. FIRST MAR. MOVE ONE BN OF THREE COMPANIES BY HELICOPTER
TO VIC THANG BINH ASAP. CHOP TO FIFTH MAR ON ARRIVAL THANG
BINH.

B. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR.

PAGE TWO RUMHFL 1506Z **S E C R E T**

(1) PREPARE ON ORDER TO DEPLOY ONE COMPANY FM AN HOA
TO VIC QUE SON ON THREE HOUR NOTICE.

(2) PREPARE ON ORDER DEPLOY ADDNL COMPANY FM NONG SON
TO VIC QUE SON ON THREE HOUR NOTICE COMMENCING 130900H MAY 67.

(3) CHOP TO FIFTH MAR ON ARRIVAL VIC QUE SON.

C. FIFTH MAR: ASSUME OPCON ABOVE FORCES ON ARRIVAL THANG
BINH/VIC QUE SON FOR CONDUCT OF OPNS THANG BINH - QUE SON BASIN.

D. SEVENTH MAR. PREPARE TO PROVIDE FORCES UP TO ONE BN
OF THREE COMPANIES FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THANG BINH- QUE SON
BASIN OR WITHIN TAOR AS REQUIRED.

E. FIRST ENGR BN: PROVIDE ENGR SPT AS REQUIRED.

F. FIRST SP BN: PROVIDE HST SPT AS REQUIRED.

G. COORD INSTRNS. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

GP-4
BT

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Encl (17) 8

SECRET

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	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	REF
	POST

P 130851Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO FIRST MAR
FIFTH MAR
SEVENTH MAR
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
INFO FIRST RECON BN
BT

S E C R E T

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR JUNE 67 (U)

- A. III MAF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 16-66 (ICTZ)
 - B. CG FIRST MARDIV 260645Z JAN 67 (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT).
 - C. I CORPS COORD INSTR 05530.1 OF 4 JAN 67 (CONTROL, DISPOSITION, AND SAFEGUARDING OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND FOOD SUPPLIES).
 - D. MACV DIRECTIVE 525-3 OF 7 SEP 67 (COMBAT OPERATIONS, MINIMIZING NON-COMBATANT CASUALTIES).
 - E. FORCE/SA I CORPS ORDER 3040.3
1. PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH PLANNED BN MINUS OR LARGER OPNS AND COUNTY FAIRS FOR JUNE 67 TO ARRIVE THIS HQ NLT 171000H MAY 67. FORMAT FOR EACH BN MINUS OR LARGER OPN:

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1588E S E C R E T

- A. COMMAND GROUP
 - B. SIZE OF UNIT(S) PARTICIPATING
 - C. TYPE OPERATION
 - D. AREA OF OPN (OUTLINE GENERAL AREA BY GRIDLINES, GIVING NORTHERN BOUNDARY FIRST, THEN EASTERN, SOUTHERN, WESTERN IN THAT ORDER)
 - E. TIME DURING WHICH OPN TO BE CONDUCTED (FIRST OR LAST HALF OF MONTH).
2. INTELLIGENCE. REF A AND CURRENT FIRST MARDIV ISUMS AND PERINTREPS.
 3. REF B PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR FIRST MARDIV SPT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
 4. REFS C THROUGH E ESTAB POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR CONTROL, DISPOSITION, AND SAFEGUARDING OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND FOOD SUPPLIES AND FOR MINIMIZING NON-COMBATANT CASUALTIES. THESE REFS ARE TO BE REVIEWED AND RE-EMPHASIZED TO ALL PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH RE-TESTING, ADJUSTING, AND APPROVING SUPPORTING ARMS FIRE.
 5. GENERAL GUIDANCE.
 - A. EXPAND AND INCREASE TEMPO OF GENERAL OFFENSIVE WITH

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Encl (26) 6

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1588E S E C R E T
 CONCURRENT MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO AREA AND POPULATION
 SECURITY IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (PD)
 PROGRAM IAW REF B.

B. CONTINUE FREQUENT USE OF LOC'S, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS
 ON THOSE THAT CONTRIBUTE TO EXPANSION OF AREAS UNDERGOING RD.

C. HARASS ENEMY LOC'S BY RAIDS AND AMBUSHES TO PREVENT
 HIM FROM REPOSITIONING FORCES AND TO DENY HIM FOOD AND SUPPLIES.

D. RETAIN INITIATIVE AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES BY INTERDICTION
 AND INVADING HIS BASE AREAS AND ATTACKING HIS MAIN FORCES. CON-
 CURRENTLY, PREVENT ENEMY ACCESS TO POPULATION CENTERS.

E. EXPLOIT GROWING DISSATISFACTION OF NVA, VC, AND VC
 ORIENTED CIVILIANS BY INCREASED PSYWAR.

F. CONTINUE EMPHASIS ON COUNTY FAIR OPNS TO EXPAND CONTROL
 AND INFLUENCE OF LOCAL GOVT OFFICIALS AND ASSIST IN IDENTIFI-
 CATION AND DISRUPTION OF VC INFRASTRUCTURE.

G. CONTINUE EMPHASIS ON CAC PROGRAM TO IMPROVE UNIT LEADER-
 SHIP, TRAINING, AND CAPABILITIES.

H. CONTINUE EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT PATROLS, AM-
 BUSHES, AND LISTENING POSTS.

I. ENSURE MAXIMUM SECURITY FOR HELICOPTERS WITH PARTICULAR

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1588E S E C R E T
 ATTENTION TO SECURE LZ'S AND/OR ENSURING ADEQUATE SUPPORT AND
 SUPPRESSION FIRES IF ZONES ARE NOT SECURE.

J. ASSURE THAT LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
 ARE KNOWN TO EACH ORGN AND INDIVIDUAL.

K. CONTINUE USE OF SPARROWHAWK AND BALD EAGLE FOR RAPID
 EXPLOITATION OF SURPRISE CONTACT, INTELLIGENCE, AND TACTICAL
 SITUATION AS REQUIRED.

L. EMPHASIZE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION, MEAN-
 WHILE MAINTAINING QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY IN RESPONSE TO CUR-
 RENT INTELLIGENCE.

M. CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT DETAINEES TO UNCOVER ENEMY WEAPONS,
 EQUIPMENT, COMBATANTS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE.

N. CONTINUE RECON OPNS WITH EMPHASIS FOL AREAS:

(1) HIEP DUC/TIEN PHUOC/QUE SON / NUI LAC SON AREAS.

(2) WESTERN APPROACHES TO DA NANG TAOR

(3) WEST AND SOUTH OF AN HOA/NONG SON INDUSTRIAL COM-
 PLEX.

O. TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FAVORABLE WEATHER FOR COMBAT OPNS
 INVOLVING HELOS AND CLOSE AIR SPT AND TO IMPROVE AND EXTEND

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PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 1588E S E C R E T
RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE OPNS.

P. CONTINUE TO BE PERPARED TO PROVIDE REACTION FORCES IN
EVENT OF ATTACK ON DISTRICT/SUB-SECTOR HQ.

Q. EMPHASIZE COMPANY-SIZED AND SMALLER OPNS, PARTICULARLY
DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.

R. CONTINUE COORDINATION WITH ARVN UNITS AND LOCAL
CIVILIAN OFFICIALS RELATIVE TO ASSISTANCE, PROVISION OF RE-
ACTION FORCES, AND IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY FOR REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT CADRES AND DISTRICT/SUB-SECTOR HQ.

S. CONTINUE CLEAR AND HOLD OPNS IN DANANG TAOR.

6. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE.

A. FIRST MAR.

(1) RENDER MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO FIFTY FIRST
ARVN REGT IN CONDUCT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IAW
REF B.

(2) EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE BY RAPID REACTION OPNS IN AREA
SOUTH OF TAOR.

B. FIFTH MAR.

(1) CONTINUE OPNS WITH OBJECTIVE TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES
AND RESOURCES IN VICINITY OF AND WITHIN ENEMY BASE AREA 116

PAGE SIX RUMHLA 1588E S E C R E T
AND TO NEUTRALIZE THAT BASE AREA.

(2) CONTINUE CLEARING OPNS AGAINST GUERILLA AND MAIN
FORCE ELMS IN HIEP DUC VALLEY.

C. SEVENTH MAR.

(1) RENDER MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO FIFTY FIRST
ARVN REGT CONDUCT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IAW
REF B.

(2) CONDUCT APPROPRIATE OPNS TO INCREASE INFLUENCE
SOUTHWEST PORTION DAI LAC DISTRICT SEVENTH MAR SECTOR OF TAOR.

(3) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN ELEPHANT VALLEY
AREA (WEST OF TAOR GENERALLY ALONG E-W GL 85).

(4) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN HAPPY VALLEY
AREA (WEST OF TAOR GENERALLY ALONG E-W GL 66).

(5) CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF AREA SOUTH OF SONG THU
BON, INCLUDING LIKELY INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM WEST.

D. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR.

(1) CONTINUE TO INCREASE AREA OF INFLUENCE IN NONG SON
AND ANTENNA VALLEY AREAS BY ACCELERATING PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE
ACTIVITIES THAT AREA.


(2) CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF LIKELY INFILTRATION ROUTES
FROM SOUTH AND WEST.

GP-4

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<i>X</i>	<i>O/A</i>
<i>X</i>	<i>ADIC</i>
	<i>WATCH</i>
	PER SEC
	WK SEC
	CMD CLK
	BRIEF
	POST

P 160220Z MAY 67
 W/CG III MAF
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAF
 RUMH/CO, CO C, FIFTH SFGA
 RUMH/CO, DET B-FIVE TWO, FIFTH SFGA
 INFO RUMH/DSA I CORPS

SECRET

RECONNAISSANCE ALONG QUANG NAM - THUA THIEN BOUNDARY
 1. INCREASED RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE IS DESIRED
 IN SUBJ AREA. THE FOLLOWING IS DIRECTED:

- A. CG 1ST MARDIV - IMMEDIATELY CONDUCT RECON PATROLS IN THE
 AI VAN PASS - ELEPHANT VALLEY AREA NORTH OF THE LIMIT OF THE TAOR K
 AND WEST TO N-S GL ZC 00.
 B. CG 3D MARDIV - INCREASE RECON PATROLS IN RZ V AND EASTWARD INTO
 PHU LOC AREA.
 C. CG 15 -2 - INSURE ALL PERSONNEL ARE MADE AWARE OF AREA OF IN-
 TEREST AND REPORT ALL SIGNIFICANT SIGHTINGS IN SUBJECT AREA.

PAGE TWO RUMH/KE 1095 SECRET

D. CO, CG "C", 5TH SFGA - PREPARE PLANS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MGF IN
 AN AREA BOUNDED ON N BY E-W GL YD 00, ON EAST BY N-S GL ZC 00,
 ON S BY E-W GL YD 70 AND ON WEST BY A N-S LINE ALONG THE RIDGE LINE
 FROM YD 7400 TO

YD 7770
 E. CO, DET B-52, 5TH SFGA - PROJECT DELTA AREA OF OPNS ENTERED
 TO INCLUDE AREA BOUNDED ON N BY E-W GL YD 00, EAST TO N-S LINE ALONG
 RIDGE FROM YD 7400 TO YD 7770, EAST TO YD 8070, SOUTH TO YD 8060
 AND WEST TO THE LAOS B

DEER
 2. CRLAUGH ALCOH

CP-4
 BT

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
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ADU

	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
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	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

○ ZCZC MFE 515
FIRST MAFDIV -T- FIRST MARDIV COC


ZNY SSSSS
O 180057Z MAY 67
FM III MAF COC
TO FIRST MARDIV COC
BT
S E C R E T
OP WEBSTER
A. FIRST MARDIV 170319Z MAY67
1. CONCUR REF A. TERMINATE OP WEBSTER 181200H MAY67.
GP-4
BT

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	G-2
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	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

Q 180137Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMHFL/THIRTIETH NCR
ZEN/HQ BN FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHFL/CG FLC
ZEN/DANANG SUB AREA
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
BT

G-3

CC

SECRET

SUBJ: FRAG O 66-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)
A. CG III MAF 160252Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)
B. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)
C. THIRD MARDIV OP O 416-66 (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2179E **SECRET**

D. FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)
E. FIRST MARDIV P02000.20 (COI)
F. THIRD MARDIV P2000.2E (COI)

1. IN COMPLIANCE WITH REQUEST REF A ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS
SCHEDULED 19 AND 20 MAY TO MOVE ELMS MCB-THREE TO PHU
BAI.

2. FOR CG III MAF: REQUEST PROVIDE THREE M-36 TRUCKS
AND SUITABLE BRIDGING FOR CONVOYS.

3. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV

A. REQUEST PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH RIDER
CONVOY APPROX SEVENTY VEHICLES ARRIVING PHU BAI 19 MAY
AND BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES FOR CONVOY PERSONNEL.

B. REQUEST ORGANIZE CONVOY 20 MAY AND PROVIDE SPT
LESS INF SCTY AND ENGR SPT.

C. THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CONVOY SCTY OF RIGLE PLAT
(REIN) W/ARTY FO, FAC, ENGR SPT, COMM VEH AND WRECKERS.

D. REQUEST PROVIDE RIFLE CC(-) REIN AS CONVOY
RESERVE WHILE ROUGH RIDER IN THIRD MARDIV AREA OF RE-
SPONSIBILITY.

E. CHOP POINT BOUNDARY BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2179E S E C R E T
MARDIV.

4. EXECUTION:

A. SEVENTH MAR: REF B

B. ELEVENTH MAR: REF B AS APPLICABLE.

C. ELEVENTH MT BN: REF B AS APPLICABLE.

D. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA

3. G. REF B FOR CONVOYS.

E. COORD INSTR:

(1) REFS B&C AS APPLICABLE FOR CONVOYS
DANANG TO PHU BAI, ADMIN MOVEMENT.

(2) CHECK POINTS: REFS C AND D.

(3) D DAY H HOUR:

(A) DANANG TO PHU BAI: 190900H MAY 67

(B) PHU BAI TO DANANG: 200900H MAY 67 OR AS
DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.

(4) IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS
REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.

(5) DIR LAUTH ALCON.

5. COMM ELEC

A. REFS E AND F.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2179E S E C R E T

B. SEVENTH MAR: MONITOR THIRD MARDIV TAC 1, M-15,

REQ 2244 COMMENCING 0830H UNTIL CONVOY ARRIVES DESTINATION
EACH DAY OF SCHED.

GP-4

E

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P 271303Z MAY 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHPL/CG FLC/FIRST FSR
RUMHVN/DSA I CORPS
BT

CC

63

COE

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Am	Adk

SECRET

CHANGE TWO TO FRAG O 30-67

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 13000Z MAR 67

1. REDISTRIBUTION OF FORCES DANANG TAOR REQUIRES REALIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES REACTION PLANS FOR RD PROTECTION. ACCORD-
INGLY, CHANGE REF AT AS FOL:

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 3330E SECRET

A. DELETE SUB-PARAS 3.3, C, D AND E.

B. INSERT NEW SUB-PARA 3.3 AS FOL:

FIRST MAR

FIFTH MAR

SEVENTH MAR:

ESTABLISH NECESSARY LN AND PREPARE PLANS FOR SPT/
RELIEF OF FOL PROVINCE/DISTRICT HQS AS INDICATED:

HOI AN (BT152581)

FIRST MAR

DIEN BAN (BT 065532)

FIRST MAR

DUY KUYEN (BT064515)

FIRST MAR

HIEU NHON (BT 165576)

FIRST MAR

HOA VANG (BT012723)

FIRST MAR (ALTERNATE:

FIRST NP BN HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY)

TAM LY (BT309227)

FIFTH MAR

TIEN PHUOC (BT116135)

FIFTH MAR

HAU DUC (BS023977)

FIFTH MAR

QUE SON (BT042347)

FIFTH MAR

DUC DUC (AT364475)


SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

THANG BINH (BT169410)

FIFTH MAR

DAI LOC (AT916579)

SEVENTH MAR



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PAGE 3 RUMHLA 3330E SECRET

HIEU DUC (AT934688)

SEVENTH MAR

THUONG DUC (ZC143531)

SEVENTH MAR

C. CHANGE DESIGNATION SUB-PARAS 3. F AND G TO 3. C AND D.
RESPECTIVELY.

D. INSERT NEW SUB-PARA 3.D. (9) AS FOL: PLANS WILL BE
DISTRIBUTED TO ACTION ADDRESSES THIS MSG AND THIS HQ (ATTN:
G-3) AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AND IN ANY EVENT NOT LATER 15 JUNE 67.

GP-1

BT

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Encl (24) 15

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMAND DIRECTORY

HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION (RMV)
FIRST MARINE FORCE
DANANG, VIETNAM
1 JUNE 1967

	NAME	RTD	OFFICE PHONE	QTR
DIVISION COMMANDER	MajGen D. J. ROBERTSON	Jun68		
Aide-de-Camp			Isharwood 13	113
Sergeant Major	SgtMaj J. H. JOHNSON	Nov67	Isharwood 406	
CHIEF OF STAFF			Isharwood 5	905
Dep C/S			Isharwood 105	
Staff Secretary	1stLt F. A. WATERS	Nov67	Isharwood 38	113
ASST Cofs, G-1	Col W. R. RABNEY	May68	Isharwood 1	935
Asst G-1	LtCol F. A. LORENTZEN	Sep67	Isharwood 1	
Asst G-1	Maj M. F. MANNING	Aug67	Isharwood 201	
Asst G-1	Maj J. A. POLAND	Nov67	Isharwood 201	
Asst G-1	2dLt R. A. CORNELL	Dec67	Isharwood 101	
Special ProjectsO	2dLt M. B. JOHNSON	Feb68	Isharwood 201	
ASST Cofs, G-2	Col S. DAVIS	Nov67	Isharwood 2	938
Asst G-2	LtCol E. B. SIGMON	Oct67	Isharwood 2	
Chief Air Observer	Maj R. A. MONFORT	Jul67	Isharwood Bailey	
TaOmr SSCB-2	2dLt J. H. CONGOREN	Sep67	Isharwood Auditor 98	
SIO	2dLt D. A. BROWN	Dec67	Isharwood 602	
TaOmr 1ST IIT			Ironhand	
TaOmr 3RD IIT	Capt J. T. IRONS	Jun68	Isharwood 502	
CI Officer	Capt C. M. ISHELL	Sep67	Isharwood 502	
ASST Cofs, G-3	Col H. B. ING JR.	Jun68	Isharwood 3	909
Asst G-3	LtCol I. L. CARYER	Aug67	Isharwood 103	
OpnsO	LtCol R. W. SMITH	Oct67	Isharwood 203	
Asst OpnsO	Maj P. R. HARPER	Jul67	Isharwood 203	
OIC OOC	Maj E. T. KENNEDY	Aug67	Isharwood 000	
Asst Opns/Pyts/CAO	Maj R. J. HENLEY	Aug67	Isharwood 403	
PlansO	LtCol E. R. WATSON	Oct67	Isharwood 503	
TrngO	Maj D. E. WIGHT	Aug67	Isharwood 303	
LNO to QUANG DA Spec Z	Capt R. B. WILSON	Nov67	BNL AN 103	
LNO to DANANG Spec Z	1stLt W. C. SKIFFLE	Oct67	PUMA 126	
ASST Cofs, G-4	Col E. L. BALE	Oct67	Isharwood 4	909
Asst, G-4	LtCol E. M. BUSS	Nov67	Isharwood 104	
OpnsO	Maj C. P. GRESSWELL	Feb68	Isharwood 304	
Asst OpnsO	Capt T. E. FULLILOVE	Sep67	Isharwood 304	
PlansO	Maj B. JORDAN	Aug67	Isharwood 204	
Asst PlansO	Capt J. R. KIRKBS	Jun67	Isharwood 204	
ASST Cofs, G-5	LtCol R. F. PETERSON	Nov67	Isharwood 46	935
CAO	Maj J. P. MCGILL	Jul67	Isharwood 46	
Asst CAO	1stLt R. BUNGH	Apr68	Isharwood 146	
PayOpsO	Maj W. R. HUTCHINSON	Aug67	Isharwood 146	
AsstPayOpsO	1stLt L. D. CLARK	Oct67	Isharwood 146	
ASST Cofs, COMPTROLLER	Col R. S. ROBERTSON	Oct67	Isharwood 50	936
Asst Comptroller	Capt R. S. BANCHE	Apr68	Isharwood 50	
ANMA AUDITOR	Capt F. BERGANT	Feb68	Auditor 150	

CMD DIR

MAY 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADJUTANT	LtCol E. R. SCHIFFMAN	May67	Isherwood 7	
Asst Adjutant	Capt G. F. KUENTNER JR.	Dec67	Isherwood 207	
PersO	CWO F. L. HOLL	Dec67	Isherwood 47	
OffPersO/TADO	2dLt J. E. TYLER	Aug67	Isherwood 147	
CasualtyO	1stLt D. G. CAPPS	Jul67	Isherwood 107	
RPS Custodian	2dLt W. J. KANE	Oct67	Isherwood 507	
AwardsO	Maj J. C. BERGERT	Aug67	Isherwood 607	
S&C Files	CWO N. A. ZIMMERMAN	Nov67	Isherwood 507	
AIR OFFICER	Col F. C. LANG	Aug67	Isherwood 14	934
Asst AirO	Maj S. P. BURTCHER	Oct67	Isherwood 14	
AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR OFFICER	Maj F. N. VANSANT	Jun67	Sleek 6	
ARTILLERY OFFICER	Col G. E. NORRIS	Sep67	Amigo 6	
BAND OFFICER	WO E. W. ELVES	Sep67	Auditor 55	
CAREER ADVISOR	Capt T. R. DOVE	Nov67	Auditor #01	
CHAPLAIN	Capt D. J. CASAZZA, USN	Aug67	Isherwood 19	938
Asst Chaplain	Cdr E. H. KICKLIGHTER	Mar68	Isherwood 19	
CLUBS OFFICER	Capt R. J. PLACHY	Aug67	Auditor 60	
COMM ELBO OFFICER	Col E. P. CLAUDE	Oct67	Isherwood 10	932
Asst CEO/Elec/Opns	Maj F. L. BIROU	Aug67	Isherwood 210	
Asst CEO/Plans	Maj J. H. BIRD JR.	Jul67	Isherwood 110	
Div Comm Center Off	Capt T. R. O'DONNELL	Sep67	Isherwood 111	
DivSysContO	2dLt S. E. VIGNERE	Nov67	Isherwood 69	
DENTAL OFFICER	Capt T. J. PAPP, USN	May68	Isherwood 40	931
Admin Officer	Lt (JG) R. H. REYSEN, USN	Jan68	Isherwood 40	
DISBURSING OFFICER	Maj G. W. COLBURN	Mar68	Isherwood 18	
Asst Disbursing Off	2dLt J. HOFSTRA	Sep67	Isherwood 18	
EDUCATION OFFICER	1stLt D. G. SCHAAF	Feb68	Isherwood 37	
EMBARKATION OFFICER	Maj R. PETROFF	Aug67	Isherwood 39	
ENGINEER OFFICER	LtCol G. A. MERRILL	Aug67	Isherwood 15	939
Asst EngrO	Maj C. O. NEWTON	Aug67	Isherwood 115	
Base DevelopmentO	Capt W. C. WESSEL	Jun68	Isherwood 15	
Engr EquipmentO			Isherwood 115	
EXCHANGE OFFICER	Capt C. E. LAND	Mar68	Isherwood 44	
FOOD SERVICES OFFICER	WO J. J. LAGGIS	Jul67	Isherwood 56	
INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER	Capt D. R. HUDSON	Sep67	Isherwood 141	
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICER	Capt R. A. PATTERSON	Oct67	Isherwood 446	
INSPECTOR	Col W. W. CURTIS	Aug67	Isherwood 32	932
LEGAL OFFICER	LtCol W. T. WESTMORELAND	Feb68	Isherwood 17	
Chief Trial Counsel	Maj W. M. THURMAN	Oct67	Isherwood 117	
Chief Defense Counsel	Maj W. B. DRAPER	Oct67	Isherwood 317	
Law Specialist	Lt W. J. LANDEN, USN	Jul67	Isherwood 217	
Claims/Legal Asst	Capt D. M. GOSANTINO	Sep67	Isherwood 317	
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	Maj L. V. BARKLEY	Jan68	Isherwood 35	
NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER	LCdr R. A. WHITCOMB, USN	Jan68	Isherwood 26	
ORDNANCE OFFICER	Maj H. SCHOL	Feb68	Isherwood 8	

PHOTO OFFICER	2dLt J. E. MEXAY	Aug67	Isharwood 341	
POSTAL OFFICER	2dLt W. NEW	Aug67	Moment 120	
PROTOCOL OFFICER	Maj E. A. HENRY	Jul67	Isharwood 138	
PROVOST MARSHAL	Maj D. L. DIAMOND	Jul67	Weave 6	
REPRODUCTION OFFICER	2dLt J. M. WHEATLEY	Feb68	Isharwood 307	
SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER	Maj J. E. PORCH	Oct67	Isharwood 37	
Custodian Recreation Fund	2dLt W. E. MERR	Oct67	Isharwood 37	
SUPPLY OFFICER	Col P. J. DUPRE	Oct67	Isharwood 21	939
SURGEON	Capt J. J. MCGHEE, USN	Jun67	Isharwood 16	939
Admin Officer	1stLt A. E. EMMERSON	May68	Isharwood 16	
TANK OFFICER	1stLt R. M. TAYLOR	Nov67	Happy Age 6	
HEADQUARTERS BATTALION (REIN)				
Commanding Officer	Col W. A. LEITCHER	Aug67	Auditor 6	934
Executive Officer	1stLt J. W. CLAYBORNE	Aug67	Auditor 5	
OIC, Sub Unit #1	Maj R. C. HALL	Sep67	Auditor Balu	
Executive Officer	1stLt J. O. KING III	Aug67	Auditor Balu	
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MARINES				
Commanding Officer	Col E. J. RADIOS	Oct67	Blade 6	6
Executive Officer	1stLt V. D. DELL JR.	Aug67	Blade 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt E. P. HAGAN	Oct67	Blade 1	
1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES				
Commanding Officer	1stLt G. E. PETERO	Jan68	Bound 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj J. A. SCOTT	Jul67	Bound 5	5
Adjutant	1stLt B. R. FREEMAN	Oct67	Bound 1	
2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES				
Commanding Officer	1stLt M. M. HEMLETT	Aug67	Cedar Bird 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj G. P. FITCHFORD	Aug67	Cedar Bird 5	5
Adjutant	WO J. L. THOMPSON	Sep67	Cedar Bird 1	
3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES				
Commanding Officer	Maj R. C. RICE	Oct67	Chuck 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj A. S. LOUGHERY	Oct67	Chuck 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt W. B. BUNCKEL	Oct67	Chuck 1	
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES (CHU LAI)				
Commanding Officer	Col E. H. HOUGHTON	Mar68	Select 6	6
Executive Officer	1stLt W. E. BRADY	Oct67	Select 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt J. W. HORTON	Dec67	Select 1	
1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES				
Commanding Officer	1stLt P. L. HILGARTNER	Oct67	Chime 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj J. P. WHITE	Aug67	Chime 5	5
Adjutant	WO J. E. PERRY	Nov67	Chime 1	
2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES				
Commanding Officer	1stLt M. C. JACKSON	Aug67	Grasshopper 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj A. T. FISHER	Oct67	Grasshopper 5	5
Adjutant	Capt P. A. CHALLEY	Jul67	Grasshopper 1	
3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINES				
Commanding Officer	1stLt C. B. WEBSTER	May68	Glove 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj B. R. CUMMINS	Oct67	Glove 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt W. M. GORTZ	Dec67	Glove 1	

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH MARINES

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

Col C. C. CROSSFIELD
LtCol R. E. JOHNSON
Capt D. R. MUNGIE

Feb67 Bonnie Hero 6
Sep67 Bonnie Hero 5
Dec67 Bonnie Hero 1

6
5

1ST BATTALION, 7TH MARINES

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

LtCol J. D. ROWLEY
Maj W. J. KRAUSS
2dLt J. P. CURRAN

Oct67 Booth 6
Oct67 Booth 5
Aug68 Booth 1

6
5

2D BATTALION, 7TH MARINES

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

LtCol W. P. KITTERMAN
Maj M. E. WARHOLAK JR.
2dLt J. C. ALVAREZ

Aug67 Dixie Dinner 6
Sep67 Dixie Dinner 5
Jul67 Dixie Dinner 1

6
5

3RD BATTALION, 7TH MARINES

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

LtCol J. D. COUNSELMAN
2dLt W. E. KELLER JR.

Mar68 False 6
False 5
Jul67 False 1

6
5

1ST FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

LtCol R. B. METCALFE
Maj R. P. PALMER
2dLt M. E. RAFFERTY

Jan68 Ironside 6
Oct67 Ironside 5
Aug67 Ironside 1

6
5

HEADQUARTERS, 11TH MARINES

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

Col G. E. NORRIS
LtCol W. PLASKETT
2dLt J. A. GRIFFITH

Sep67 Amigo 6
Sep67 Amigo 5
Aug67 Amigo 1

6
5

1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

Maj J. J. MARRON
2dLt R. A. HARDLE

Oct67 Month 6
Month 5
Oct67 Month 1

6
5

2ND BATTALION, 11TH MARINES

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

LtCol R. E. HUNTER
Maj J. CLATWORTHY
2dLt A. A. BROWICKI

Oct67 Frowl 6
Sep67 Frowl 5
Oct67 Frowl 1

6
5

3RD BATTALION, 11TH MARINES

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

LtCol A. S. RUGGIERO
Maj O. K. JOHNSON
WO J. P. GURLEE

Jul67 Laugh 6
Jun68 Laugh 5
Oct67 Laugh 1

6
5

4TH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

LtCol G. M. LIVINGSTON
Maj P. F. BURAN
2dLt J. W. WELLS

Aug67 Plaid 6
Jul67 Plaid 5
Nov67 Plaid 1

6
5

1ST ANTI TANK BATTALION

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

Maj P. S. GALLIGAN
2dLt M. L. ELL

May68 Dance Card 6
Dance Card 5
Aug67 Dance Card 1

6
5

1ST DENTAL COMPANY

Commanding Officer
Admin Asst

Capt T. J. PAPE
Lt (JG) R. H. REYSEN, USN

May68 Isaherwood 40
Jan68 Isaherwood 40

931

1ST ENGINEER BATTALION

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant

Maj J. M. MCKENZIE
Maj E. J. TOWNSEND
2dLt J. MOUTON

Nov67 Big Buddy 6
Feb68 Big Buddy 5
Dec67 Big Buddy 1

6
5

1ST HOSPITAL COMPANY

Commanding Officer
Admin Asst

Odr G. H. LOWERY, MC, USN
Lt G. L. HENSLEY MCS/USN

Feb68 Chu Lai 251
Jan68 Chu Lai 251

1ST MEDICAL BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	Cdr P. D. COOPER	Sep67 Calhoun 6	6
Executive Officer	1Cdr G. R. FORD	Apr68 Calhoun 5	5
Adjutant	1Lt R. C. GRICE	Jan68 Calhoun 1	
1ST MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	Maj K. E. KRAGAN	Oct67 Quonoh 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj H. D. JACKSON	Nov67 Quonoh 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt B. V. KRANSON	Sep67 Quonoh 1	
1ST RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	Maj B. G. LOWERY	Aug67 Ironhand 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj G. R. JOHNSTON	Sep67 Ironhand 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt D. J. COLLINS	Aug67 Ironhand 1	
1st Force Reconnaissance Company			
Commanding Officer	Capt J. P. DANNO	Aug67 Ironhand	
1ST SECRE PARTY BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	1stCol E. H. JONES	Sep67 Consequence 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj T. H. GILSON JR.	Sep67 Consequence 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt J. J. KOLINA	Sep67 Consequence 1	
1ST TANK BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	1stCol R. M. TAYLOR	Nov67 Happy Age 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj E. P. TRADNER	Aug67 Happy Age 5	5
Adjutant	WO C. C. CARL JR.	Jul67 Happy Age 1	
3RD AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	Maj F. H. VANSANT	Jun67 Sleek 6	6
Executive Officer		Sleek 5	5
Adjutant	1stLt F. A. LAMBERT	Oct67 Sleek 1	
7TH COMMUNICATION BATTALION (CHU LAI)			
Commanding Officer	1stCol W. M. CLEVELAND	Dec67 Mouth 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj E. A. HUGELIMANN	Jul67 Mouth 5	5
Adjutant	1stLt R. L. DANIELS	Jul67 Mouth 1	
7TH ENGINEER BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	1stCol F. W. HARRIS III	Aug67 Brogue 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj J. M. MACKENZIE	Nov67 Brogue 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt J. R. MANNING	Sep67 Brogue 1	
7TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION (CHU LAI)			
Commanding Officer	Maj S. M. BATCHELDER	Sep67 Easter 6	6
Executive Officer		Easter 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt J. SOMMERHAUSER	Jul67 Easter 1	
9TH ENGINEER BATTALION (CHU LAI)			
Commanding Officer	1stCol G. RABE	Aug67 Earthworm 6	6
Executive Officer		Earthworm 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt J. R. HUDSON	Jan68 Earthworm 1	
11TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	Maj R. C. TASHJIAN	Oct67 Chester White 6	6
Executive Officer	Capt K. M. WILSON	Jan68 Chester White 5	5
Adjutant	2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Jan68 Chester White 1	
AMERICAN RED CROSS			
Field Director	V. F. BOYER	Oct67 Isherwood 162	

PLEASE REPORT PRIOR TO 24 JUNE 1967, ANY ERRORS, CHANGES AND/OR OMISSIONS, TO THE DIVISION ADJUTANT SECTION, ISHERWOOD 147.

E. Schiffman
 E. H. SCHIFFMAN
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
 Division Adjutant

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COMMAND DIRECTORY
 CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 1 JUNE 1967

RTD OFFICE PHONE

CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR	BGen F. C. LAHUE	Apr68 Chu Lai 006
Aide-de-Camp	1stLt J. H. KEAN	Oct67 Chu Lai 013
CHIEF OF STAFF	LtCol J. L. ZORACK	Aug67 Chu Lai 005
Staff Secretary	1stLt G. E. CROWELL	Jul67 Chu Lai 038
ASST Cofs, G-1	Maj R. N. FETTY	Nov67 Chu Lai 001
ASST Cofs, G-2	Maj D. Z. BOYD	Jul67 Chu Lai 002
ASST Cofs, G-3	LtCol B. D. ANDERSON	Aug67 Chu Lai 003
ASST Cofs, G-4	LtCol B. LUBKA	Aug67 Chu Lai 004
ASST Cofs, G-5	Maj J. T. SMITH	Nov67 Chu Lai 005

E. R. Schiffman
 E. R. SCHIFFMAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
 Division Adjutant