

001062-67

SECRET (NOFORN) (unclassified upon removal of basic material)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:pmm over 5750 Ser: 00275-67 of 28Jul67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-30

June 1967

1. Forwarded.

M. C. DALBY

By direction

Copy to:

CG, lstMarDiv

NOFORN SECRET (NOFORN)

UNCLASSIFIED

317 174

3/SBC/sheadQuarters II MAF 4 AUG 1967

ROFORN

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:pmm 5750 Ser: 00275-67 of 28Jul67

Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D) From:

To:

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Via:

1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for Subj:

1-30 June 1967

Forwarded.

This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED when removed from the basic correspondence.

BY DIRECTION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET-NOFORN



SECRET

HEAD WHATERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FIF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

3: KIST:pmm 5750 Ser: 00275-67

JUL 28 1967

From: Commending General

To; Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AC3D)

Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-30 June 1967

Ref: (a) ECO 5750.2 (b) FAFFPecO 5750.8

1 . 5

Encl: (1) 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-30 June 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),

enclosure (1) is submitted.


S & C MLES
HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

67 3022

DO MORADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

MUEUDM



### **DECLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

UNCLASSIFIED .

2

#### **DECLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FFO, San Francisco, California, 96602

COMMAND CHROLCLOGY
1 June to 30 June 1967

INDEX

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II - MARRATIVE SUITIARY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV - SUPPERFIER DOCUMENTS

UNCLASS IF TED

UNCLASSIFIED

#### PART I

#### ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

#### 1. (U) DESIGNATION

1st Marine Division (Rein)

MajGen Donn J. ROBERTSON

#### SUBORDINATE UNITS

Chu Lai Installation Coordinator Headquarters Bn 1st Marines (Rein) 5th Marines (-) 7th Marines (Rein) 1lth Marines (-) (Rein)

2nd Bn, 5th Marines
1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)
1st Engr Bn (-)
7th Engr Bn#
9th Engr Bn#
1st SP Bn (-)

11th MT Bn 3rd Amtrac Bn (-)

lst MT Bn

7th Comm Bn (-) lst AT Bn (-)

lst Tank Bn (-)
lst Med Bn
lst Hospital Co
lst Dental Co (-)
3rd Dental Co (-)\*

\* OPCON ONLY # ADCON ONLY

#### 2. (U) LOCATION

1-30 June 1967: Danang, RVN

#### 3. (U) STAFF OFFICERS

Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff Staff Secretary Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

BGen F. C. LAHUE Col W. A. LEITNER Col E. J. RADICS Col K. J. HOUGHTON Col C. C. CROSSFIELD II Col G. E. NORRIS (To 28Jun67) LtCol C. HENDRICKS (Fr 29Jun67) LtCol M. C. JACKSON Maj B. G. LOWERY Maj J. M. MCKENZIE LtCol F. W. HARRIS III LtCol G. A. BABE LtCol E. H. JONES Maj K. H. REAGAN (To 18Jun67) LtCol K. M. BUSS (Fr 19Jun67) Maj R. C. TASHJIAN Maj F. N. VANSANT (To 25Jun67) LtCol R. L. SHUFORD (Fr 26Jun67) LtCol W. M. CLELLAND LtCol J. J. KEEFE (To 4Jun67) Maj P. S. GALLIGAN (Fr 5Jun67) LtCol R. M. TAYLOR Cdr P. D. COOPER, MC, USN Cdr C. H. LOWERY, MC, USN Capt T. J. PAPE, DC, USN Capt L. H. CORDONIER, DC, USN

Col E. L. BALE, JR (To 12Jun67)
Col H. J. WOESSNER II (Fr 13Jun67)
Col E. L. BALE, JR (Fr 28Jun67)
Capt F. A. WATERS
Col W. R. EARNEY

Col S. DAVIS

#### UNCLASSIFIED

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff, Compt
Adjutant
Air Officer
Artillery Officer

Band Officer Chaplain Comm-Electronics Officer Dental Officer Disbursing Officer Division Clubs Officer Division Exchange Officer Embarkation Officer Engineer Officer Field Historian Food Services Officer Information Services Officer Inspector Legal Officer Motor Transport Officer Naval Gunfire Officer Ordnance Officer Photographic Officer Postal Officer Provost Marshal Reproduction Officer Special Services Officer Supply Officer Surgeon Tank Officer

#### 4. (U) Average Monthly Strength

<u>USMC</u> <u>OFF</u> <u>ENL</u> 1047 2378 Col H. E. ING, JR. Col E. L. BALE, JR. (To 27Jun67) LtCol E. K. VICKERS (Fr 28Jun67) LtCol R. F. PETERSON Col R. S. ROBERTSON LtCol E. R. SCHIFFMAN Col F. C. LANG Col G. E. NORRIS (To 28Jun67) LtCol C. HENDRICKS (Fr 29Jun67) WO E. W. ELFES Capt D. J. CASAZZA, CHC, USN Col E. P. CLAUDE Capt T. J. PAPE Maj G. W. COLBURN Capt R. J. PLACHY Capt C. E. LAND Maj R. PETROFF LtCol G. A. MERRILL Maj H. T. KENNEDY WO J. J. LAGGIS Capt D. R. HUDSON Col W. W. CURTIS LtCol W. T. WESTMORELAND Maj L. V. BARKLEY LCdr R. A. WHITCOMB. USN Maj H. SOBOL 2ndLt J. E. MCKAY 2ndLt W. NEW Maj D. L. DIAMOND 2ndLt J. M. WHEATLEY Maj J. E. FORDE Col P. J. DUPRE Capt R. W. JONES LtCol R. M. TAYLOR

1136

USN

### **DECLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

CONFIDERTIAL

# NOFORN

#### PART II

#### NARRATIVE SUMMARY

#### PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

### 1. (C) Replacement and Rotation of Personnel

a. Total of Marine replacements received and Marines rotated during June 1967 were:

Replacements:
Officer 186
Enlisted 1504
Rotation:
Officer 157
Enlisted 1553

- b. There were 11 officers and 512 enlisted personnel medically evacuated. 2 officers and 68 enlisted personnel who were previously evacuated were returned to duty. 35 personnel departed on emergency leave/permanent change of station orders.
- c. A total of 12 officers and 213 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour in RVN in conjunction with the 30 day free leave policy. 5 officers and 326 enlisted personnel departed on 30 day free leave during June 1967.
- 2. (C) Casualty and Graves Registration. The below casualties were sustained by units ADCON to the 1st Marine Division during June 1967.

KIA	AIW	**DOW	MTA	CPTR	OTHER				**TOTAL
10	20								30
124	949	19	1		·	1		11	1086
			·	<del> </del>					
3	18	1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						21
137	987	20	1			1	]	11	1137
	10 124	10 20 124 949 3 18	10 20 124 949 19 3 18 1	10 20 124 949 19 1 3 18 1	10 20 124 949 19 1 3 18 1	10 20 124 949 19 1 3 18 1	DEATH  10 20  124 949 19 1 1  3 18 1	DEATH INJUR	DEATH INJURED  10 20  124 949 19 1 1 11  3 18 1

- \* Injuries which result in absence from duty for more than 24 hours.
- ## DOW figures included in WIA totals and not in horizontal total.

7

CONFIDENTIAL

# NOFORN

#### CONFIDERIAL

- 3. (C) Avards. During the period 1-30 June 1967, 254 award recommendations were processed and forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. In addition, 1153 Purple Heart Medals were awarded. 82 Commanding General Certificates of Commendation were awarded during the period.
- 4. (C) <u>Discipline</u>, <u>Iaw and Order</u>. The following criminal investigations were reported. Fifteen cases are presently under investigation:

Offense	Number
Larceny of Government Property	1
Total	1

Nine ty-one traffic violations were reported for the month of June 1967.

Sixty offense reports were issued to violators as follows:

Offense	Number
Weapons Violation Disorderly Conduct	2 .
Failure to obey a Lawful Order	1
Curfew Violations Off Limits	15 35
Missing Persons Other	2 2
Total	60

### 5. (C) Industrial Relations

a. Current utilization totals:

Unit	Number Authorized	On Board
Headquarters Battalion	70	70
Headquarters, 1st Marines	16	15
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines	10	Ō
Headquarters, 5th Marines	10	. 0
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	0
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	0
Headquarters, 7th Marines	20	19
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	10	4
Headquarters, 11th Marines	. 60	5 <b>7</b>
3rd 8" Howitzer Battery	10	10
1st Antitank Battalion	24	24
1st Tank Battalion	18	ii
3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion	18	10

CONFIDENTIAL



# NOFORN

<u>Unit</u>	ara ir	٠.	Service Control	Number A	Authorized	On Board
7th Co	mmu <b>nic</b> ation E	attalion	gr w m · ·	,	25	27
İst En	gineer Battal	.i.on	1		60	<b>57</b>
					88	84
9th En	gineer Battal gineer Battal	ion	2		62	73
	spital Compar				14	11
	dical Battali				32	32
	tor Transport				26	26
	o tor Transpor				33	32
	connaissance				11	11
	ore Party Bat		. "		22	22
TOTAL		• •	maga ji ya ka ili ili sana sana sana sana sana sana sana san		659	595

- b. A total of 108 security clearance applications and 12 family allowance applications were submitted for the month of June 1967.
- c. Seventy people were given physicals at 1st Medical Battalion and Camp Tien Sha (Chest X-Ray, Urinalysis, VDLR).
- d. Twelve employees attended the June Basic English Class at the Industrial Relations Training Department, Danang.

#### 6. (U) Personal and Morale Services


a. Chaplain. At the end of June the on-board strength of Chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division was as follows:

	Number	<u>Denomination</u>
17		Protestant
	7	Catholic
	<u>1</u>	Eastern Orthodox
TOTAL	25	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

The following services were conducted during the month:

Service	the exp	Number	Number Attending
Catholic Sunday Divine Service	<b>95</b> ,	89	3,078
Catholic Weekday Services	41	132	1,554
Protestant Sunday Divine Servi	ces	181	4,041
Protestant Weekday Services	**************************************	76	1,095
	The state of the s	7	80
Protestant Bible Study	L. W.	14	.81
Lectures/Vietnamese People and	Their Religion	<b>35</b> .	1,538
Memorial Services		26	2,436
	Y		





#### **DECLASSIFIED**

Control of the Contro

#### UNCLASSIFIED

- b. <u>Division Clubs</u>. The gross income during June was \$375,781.91.

  3 officers, 5 SMCO's and 7 enlisted personnel operated the 62 clubs and 8 battalion accounts. No additional clubs are planned.
- c. Exchange System. Gross sales during the month of June were 3356,512.48. 2 officers and 58 enlisted personnel operated 11 stores and 5 mobile units within the Danang and Chu Lei TAOR's.
- d. <u>Division Band</u>. The Division Band performed at 7 Marine military formations, 2 military concerts, and 1 civic action function.
- e. <u>Informational Services</u>. <u>During June the Informational Services</u>
  Office produced 225 news releases and 4,035 Fleet Home Town News Releases.
  The ISO Radio-TV section produced 210 Fleet Home Town radio tapes and 18 feature interviews for release to major radio networks in the United States.

Adair

Writer-Photographer teams covered the following named operations:

Union II Butler Arizona

#### f. Postal

(1) The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this command has received and dispatched during June 1967:

Total Received	Total Dispatched	Total Handled
1.234.613	239,650	1,474,263
- Table 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.	The state of the s	the second of th

Brown Calhoun

- (2) The following figures represent financial business transacted during June 1967:
  - U. S. Money Orders and Fees \$794,010.55 Stamps, postage and insurance sales \$30,098.45
- (3) During the month of June, 21 mail rooms were inspected with none being found unsatisfactory. 12 unit post offices were inspected and audited during this period, as well as the audit of the main stamp stock retained by the Division Postal Chief.
- g. Career Advisory. The following statistics represent reenlistment and extension of enlistment percentages for the month of June 1967:
  - (1) Reenlistment Percentages

a. First term 17.1%

b. Career 90.9%

c. Total 42.2%

10

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Extensions of enlistment executed

Career

b. Short term 17

Total 19

Eleven staff and career advisory visits were conducted during the month of June 1967.

h. Special Services. Personnel of the lat Marine Division were entertained during the month of June 1967 by the appearance of the following shows and/or well known personalities:

9Jun67 - Lana Turner (Handshake Tour) - 1st Med En

15Jun67 - Hugh O'Brian's Guys & Dolls Show - Hill 327 Amphitheater

26Jun67 - Floyd Patterson (Handshake Tour) - 1st Med Bn



# NOFORN

#### ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN

#### 1. ENEMY

- a.(C) Main Force. Enemy Main Force units, after suffering heavy losses in an effort to maintain control of the Que Son Valley early in this month, avoided contact throughout the remainder of the period. Both the 3rd and 21st Regiments withdrew to the mountains south of Que Son to possibly regroup and train replacements. Most of the replacements were probably received within two weeks of the engagement. These units can be expected to operate in small units, conducting extensive reconnaissance and security patrols, while training these new troops. There is substantial information that the 70th Battalion has been detached from the 1st Regiment and has displaced to Quang Tin Province. The mission of this unit is not known at this time.
- b.(C) Local Force. Iocal Forces continued to direct their attentions to harassment of RD units, ARVN outposts, and CAC units. Operations launched against these units yielded only moderate enemy personnel losses, but supply bases, training camps, and base areas were penetrated and destroyed. These forces will continue to operate in company and smaller size units, conducting political agitation and attacks by fire. A recent rallier indicated that a new mission has been given to the local forces. The V.25th Battalion has been assigned the mission of a sapper unit, the R.20th will conduct ambushes, and district companies will attack ARVN outposts and RD units.

#### 2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

- a.(U) General. Hot and humid weather characterized the reporting period. Maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 99 degrees and 79 degrees respectively. The average humidity was 82%. The winds were variable at 5-10 knots and visibility averaged 7 miles. The cumulative precipitation for June was 1.89 inches.
- b.(U) Effects of the Weather. The weather had little or no effect on air operations. Air support was unhindered during the month since clouds were of the cumulus type and broken. Ground units continued to experience some heat casualties.
- c.(U) <u>Effect of the Weather on Terrain</u>. No change in the condition of the terrain was in evidence during June, as it remained in the same dry state as May.



NOFORM

CONFIDENTIAL

#### INTELLIGENCE SECTION ACTIVITY

#### 1. ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

- a.(U) <u>Services and Support</u>. During the period the unit provided general administrative services for the G-2 Section. Primary emphasis was placed on continued improvement of the system for staffing intelligence reports and staff procedures.
- b.(C) <u>Fersonnel</u>. During the period the G-2 Section operated with an average of 98 percent of its assigned manning level of 29 officers and 53 enlisted personnel.
- c.(U) <u>Logistics and Allowances</u>. During the period approximately 60 percent of materials and supplies necessary for the operation of the Section and its attached teams were received as ordered. There still is a need for parrison items most noticeable chairs and filing cabinets.
- d.(U) <u>Training</u>. Maximum effort was made to train personnel in their MOS as well as participation in general military subjects training at the Headquarters Company level. M-16 training has been received by all members of the G-2 Section.
- 2.(U) ACQUISITION SECTION. During the period cognizance of the DIOCC program was transferred to the Division Staff Counterintelligence Officer. The Acquisition Unit now is cognizant of the following subsections; OPCON Units, COC, PIIU, Recon, FI, ITT, and AO's.
- a.(U) <u>Photo Imagery Interpretation Unit</u>. The PIIU continued to support the First Marine Division with vertical aerial photography, high and low altitude panaramic photography, photo mosaics, and various overlays associated with photo intelligence. During the period 28 missions were requested, 22 were received and eight are still pending.
- b.(C) Air Observation Unit. During the month of June, Air Observers flew 302 sorties for 666.6 hours of Visual Reconnaissance in the Danang Area. In conjunction with normal VR flights, the following missions were performed: 4 photo, 62 artillery, 313 air strike TAC(A) and 6 Naval gunfire. The AO Unit also provided support for Operations Union II, Arizona, Brown, Beacon Torch, Adair and Calhoun.
- c.(U) Interrogation-Translation Team (3rd ITT and 9th ITT). A total of 244 detainees were interrogated at the III MAF Collection Point of which 216 had Viet Cong association. Number of documents translated during the month of June totals 18. In addition, 416 detainees were screened at Battalion level.
- d.(U) <u>Combat Operations Center</u>. COC-2 continues to serve as a focal point for the receipt of Spot Reports from subordinate units, and higher headquarters and for the dissemination of current intelligence and indications to consumers.

MOFCILI

CONFIDENTIAL



# NOFORM

#### CONFIDENTIAL

- 3.(C) PRODUCTION. The Basic Intelligence Section continued routine issue of maps, made charts, recorded and processed captured weapons and materials, started reorganizing the filing system, and effected liaison with Special Forces concerning a Happy Valley study. The Current Intelligence/Indications Section continued to put out daily briefs, supplementary intelligence summaries, maintained estimates of the current enemy situation initiated a new and improved targeting system and started a new intelligence evaluation program in accordance with MACV Directive No. 381-38. The Estimative Intelligence Section continued to produce two daily intelligence summaries, published PERINTREP 10-67, prepared and disseminated to all subordinate units a study of MY SON and vicinity (Base Area 116).
- 4.(C) STAFF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT. During the period the unit provided routine administrative counterintelligence services to the Division Staff. The unit was supported by the 3d CIT. The unit processed 4 requests for Top Secret clearences, 16 request for Top Secret access, 6 requests for Personnel Security Clearance (NAC/BI), 4 requests for ONI/HQMC Files check, 7 request for COFRAM Access, and forwarded 19 completed Personnel Security Investigations. In addition, the unit presented 3 security lectures to incoming personnel, administered the Divisions Reward Fund Program and the Kit Carson Scout Program. The unit maintained liaison with other counterintelligence agencies and with subordinate units.

CONFIDENTIAL





# NOFORN

#### ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

- 1. (C) During June the Division conducted six major operations and completed Operation UNION II which began in May. A major division operation, CALHOUN began on 25 June after extensive operations around the periphery of NVA/VC Base Area 116. The operation was designed to penetrate the base area and first and destroy the enemy facilities and equipment in the area.
- 2. (C) Reacting to solid contact encountered by Company K, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines the 5th Marines rapidly committed two battalions and exploited the contact. This action began Operation ADAIR which was completed after nine days of search and destroy. Other major operations and controlling headquarters were as follows:

#### **OPERATION**

UNION II
BUILER
AR MONA
ADJER
BROWN
BEACON TORCH
CALHOUN

#### CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS

Fifth Marines
Third Bn, Seventh Marines
Seventh Marines
Pifth Marines
Second Bn, First Marines
SLF Bravo (Second Bn, Third Marines)
First Marine Division

- 3. (C) Normal operations consisting of patrols, ambushes, listening posts and sweeps by companies within their TACRs maintained relentless pressure on the enemy and combined with the major operations accounted for 1129 VC KIA, 1511 VC KIA(Probable) 58 PWs, 3 Returnees, 339 Detainees, and 100 weapons captured.
- 4. (C) Five different ships fired a total of 144 naval gunfire missions in support of division units.
- 5. (U) The Vietnamese Governments Revolutionary Development program was characted by the narmal patrolling, company sweeps, and County Fair 7-14 which was conducted by the Seventh Marines.





# CONFIDENTIAL



#### PLANS

- 1. (C) During the month studies were prepared on the employment and optimum combat use of LVTs, LVTH-6s, Tanks and Ontos.
- 2. (C) G3 representatives attended a planning conference and a conference on the control of inland waterways during the month.

MUEUDU

CONFIDENTIAL

#### UNCLASSIFIED

#### TRAINING

- 1. (U) During June, thirteen officers and 132 enlisted attended formal, schools.
- 2. (U) Division instructors conducted M16 Training for 156 Combined Matien Platoon personnel and 290 personnel from Second Bn, Eleventh Marines.
- 3. (U) A four day MUNES ashool was conducted for 67 supply men from the division.
- 4. (U) A two day familiarization course on outboard motors, and boats was conducted by instructors from 1st FSR personnel who utilize this type equipment for guarding bridges in the division TAOR.
- 5. (U) An M16A1 contact team visited all division units equipped with the M16A1 for the purpose of providing instruction on proper care and cleaning of the rifle.

NOFORN

#### COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

- 1. (U) A review of the CAC Program in the 1st Marine Division was conducted under the cognizance of the Division Inspector in an effort to improve the program. Each functional area was reviewed, problems were identified and discussed, and recommendations were set forth. Guidance based on these recommendations will be included in the Division CAC SOP which is now being staffed.
- 2. (U) Four Combined Action platoons in the DANANG TAOR were redesignated from "B" platoons to "Q" platoons and a Combined Action Company Headquarters "Q" was activated. The company headquarters will supervise the "Q" platoons and is under the operational control of the 7th Marines.
- 3. (C) The 23 CAP's in the DANANG Area conducted 1232 patrols and 587 ambushes. There were 29 contacts which resulted in enemy casualties of 14 KIA, 2 WIA, 9 PW and 32 detainees.



MOFORM.

#### LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

- 1. (U) The major logistical activity during this reporting period was directed toward the support of combat operations.
- 2. (U) During the reporting period, the Division Supply Officer conducted seven (7) Supply Inspection/Instruction visits and twenty-four (24) Supply Staff visits. Additionally, the Division Embarkation Officer, Engineer Officer, Motor Transport Officer, Food Services Officer and Surgeon conducted informal staff visits and inspections.
- 3. (U) On the 4th and 6th of June a special congressional subcommittee visited this Command to inquire into the problems associated with the M16Al rifle. The Subcommittee was composed of Representatives Richard ICHORD (D-Mo.), William G. BRAY (R-Ind.) and Speedy O. LONG (D-La.) accompanied by Mr. Earl J. MORGAN, Colonel Edward B. CROSSMAN, USA (Ret), Major James M. FLETCHER, N.C. National Guard, and Colonel Paul X. HENLEY, USMC.
- 4. (U) M16Al Instruction Program. This program has been established within the Command to standardize cleaning, lubrication, maintenance procedures, conduct of limited technical inspections and prevention/correction of stoppages. Ordnance officers and Armorers from Division units have been schooled in the aforementioned areas. Phase two of this program consists of instructing all officers and non-commissioned officers. Phase two is scheduled to commence on 1 July 1967.
- 5. (c) 182 cartridges 106mm APERS (Beehive) XM581 were allocated to this Command. Distribution was made to Infantry/Reconnaissance Battalions.
- 6. (C) Ammunition Controlled by Available Supply Rates. The following ammunition items are controlled by an available supply rate:

## DODAC NOMENCLATURE

1315-0222	Cartridge 81mm High-Explosive
1330-G895	Grenade Hand Illuminating
1370-L312	Signal Illuminating Ground WSP
1370-L314	Signal Illuminating Ground GSC

- 7. (c) Howitzer 8" SP M110. Information received from the Commandant of the Marine Corps indicates that WestPac in-service date for the 8" Howitzer M110 is now scheduled for 31 August 1967.
- 8. (U) Administrative control of 7th Motor Transport Battalion passed from the 1st Marine Division to Force Logistic Command ending 17 years of attachment to and in general support of this Division.
- 9. (U) During the reporting period 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions traveled 306,291 miles and transported 23,211 tons of cargo and 131,533 personnel.

NOFORN

#### **DECLASSIFIED**

± ,4<u>€</u> n **₹** --

معالية .

#### UN CLASSIFIED

10. (U) Total airlifts for the month of June of 1st Marine Division units was 193 personnel, 11 vehicles, 49.9 S/T and 6103 cubic feet.

11. (U) Total sealifts for the month of June of 1st Marine Division units was 330 personnel, 180 vehicles, and 1774.8 S/T.

#### UNCLASSIFIED

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

- 1.(U) On 21 June, Vietnamese leading citizens and GVN officers in Danang and Hoi An celebrated an "International Day" showing appreciation to the free world units stationed in the Danang area. Visits were made to the 1st Marine Division CP, Quang Nam, CORDS, and MACV Headquarters and the knights of Malta Team in Hoi An.
- 2.(U) Dedication of the re-built Hieu Nhon District Headquarters was held on 20 June. Principle guests were MajGen Nickerson, Deputy CG, III MAF, MajGen Robertson, CG 1st MarDiv, Col Nguyen Duy Hinh, CO Quang Da Special Zone, LtCol Tri Tin, Quang Nam Province Chief, LtCol R. F. Peterson, 1st MarDiv Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, and Mr. Al Francis, Senior CORDS Representative, Quang Nam District. The former Hieu Nhon District Headquarters was destroyed 13 March during a VC raid. There was a wreath laying ceremony and presentation of gifts to the families of those killed in the raid.
- 3.(U) The 1st Marine Division CA Conference was also held on the 20th of June. Thirty-nine people attended and heard lectures by the Commanding General; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5; Civil Affairs Officer; Psychological Operations Officer and the Commanding Officer, 29th Civil Affairs Company. Speakers covered a variety of subjects and audience response was very good.
- 4.(U) On the 28th of June, the Hoa Vinh Dam was dedicated. The building of this dam was a joint effort between local villagers and the 7th Engineer Battalion. The dam will insure two rice crops a year and benefit 1200 people. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, III MAF, and District representatives were present along with the Commanding Officer, 7th Engineer Battalion.
- 5.(U) On the 19th of June, a fire in Hoa An Hamlet, Hoa Phat Village burned 28 homes. A total of 32 families were left homeless. There were no injuries and MCB-4 immediately set about to rebuild the homes. At this time, six houses have been rebuilt and four more are being constructed.
- 6.(U) During the month of June, Operations ARIZONA, BROWN, BEACON TORCH, ADAIR and CALHOUN were conducted in the 1st Marine Division TAOR. Operation ARIZONA, which occurred in 3rdBn, 7thMar area, generated 1775 refugees. In addition, 35 head of cattle, 70 water buffalo, and an unknown number of chickens and 100 pigs were brought out of the operational area. Operation BROWN generated 11 refugees, BEACON TORCH 60 and ADAIR 70. Operation CALHOUN, conducted throughout a suspected base area, in Duy Xuyen and Duc Duc Districts, produced 64,000 pounds of rice, 14 head of cattle and 54 water buffalo, 100 pounds of dried potatoes and 290 pounds of sugar. The majority of refugees generated by CALHOUN were handled by ARVN forces in the area. Eleven refugees, however, were evacuated to Dien Ban by Marine Helicopters. The captured commodities were distributed by Province and District officials.

#### UNCLASSIFIED

- 7.(U) In support of the Vietnamese Industrial Complex at An Hoa, 1,173 tons of building materials, 30,000 gallons of diesel fuel and 47 tons of general cargo was hauled by Division vehicles from Danang to An Hoa during June. Thirty tons of coal was hauled to Danang during the month.
- 8.(U) Distinguished guests during the month of June included Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, Commanding General, FMFPac, Major General Frank C. Tharin, Deputy Commanding General, FMFPac, and Ambassador Blair, U. S. Ambassador to the Phillipines. General Krulak visited projects of 1st Tank Battalion on 28 June. General Tharin visited the 7th Engineer Battalion Civil Affairs function and Ambassador Blair visited the An Hoa Industrial Complex.
- 9.(U) Projects underway in June consisted of 6 schools and 4 dispensaries. Construction of the Ha Thanh Dam continues and the Hoa Vinh Dam was completed on the 21st. Other projects included 3 schools being painted, an introduction of goat herds in the 7th Marines area, 7 wells dug, 2 market places constructed, 2 irrigation projects underway, 4 houses rebuilt, 1 road improved and 1 bridge reconstructed.
- 10.(U) The 7th Engineer Battalion established a brick factory utilizing Vietnamese labor and 40,061 bricks were produced during the month of June. These bricks are used for civilian construction purposes.

---

11.(U) Assistance rendered in the Danang and Chu Lai areas during the month of June was as follows:

#### Services:

Vàdi cál thaothanta

2 <b>8,</b> 498 123 323	
	(hours)
27,200	
35,292	
843	
3,248	
490	
420	
•	
200	
	123 323 190 27,200 35,292 843 3,248 490 420 16 69 40,061

# DECLASSIFIED

### UNCLASSIFIED

Nails (lbs)	100
Steel Matting (roll)	1
Plywood (sheets)	25
Salad oil (cases)	2
Soybean oil (gal)	60
Sewing kits	200
Paint (gal)	22
Whitewash (lbs)	1,050
School kits	600
Carpenter kits	10
Mason kits	10

UNCLASSIFIED

#### CIVIL ARFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Narrative summary for the period 1-30 June 1967.

- 1. (U) On both Operations ARIZONA and CALHOUN a special refugee leaflet was printed with instructions on one side and a map on the other side which directed all refugees to the collection points.
- 2. (U) During the month, III MAF assigned Detachment A, 244th Psychological Operations Company (USA) to the 1st Marine Division. Detachment A consists of one HE Team. The 1st Marine Division further assigned one HB Team to each infantry regiment. The HE Team was retained at Division.
- 3. (U) A new standard leaflet, 523-67, was originated by 1st Marine Division which encourages people to write their friends and relatives in the VC/NVA and explain the Chieu Hoi Program to them.

# MOFORN

#### COMMUNICATION\_ELECTRONICS NARRATIVE SUMMARY

#### CONFIDENTIAL

- 1. (C) Receipt of cable assets permitted resumption of the rehabilitation, up grading, and expansion of the Division Wire System. A twenty-five pair WD-1/TT cable extending from the Division Main Frame (BT953748) to the Force Logistics Command at Red Beach (BT943795) was replaced by a twenty-five pair polyethelene cable. Cable expansion consisted of installing a twenty-five pair polyethelene cable from the Division Main Frame to the 7th Marines (BT963623). Near future plans envision an extension of wire communications to the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines at AN HOA (AT873473).
- 2. (C) During the period 1-6 June 1967, the Division Communication Company was tasked to provide two retransmission teams to the 5th Marines in support of UNION II. The retransmission teams were positioned at NUI LAC SON (MTO20290) and utilized AN/PRC-25's with RC-292's. Although manual retransmission was required, reports from the field indicated that communication were reliable and responsive.
- 3. (U) During the period 1-15 June 1967, a total of 28 technicians received instructions from a 1st FSR team on the installation of the new VHF (FK) Communication equipment in combat vehicles. Subsequently, installation commenced in most units concerned; however, the program has been delayed due to a lack of modification kits.
- 4. (C) As a result of the conference on realignment of communications support conducted on 29 May 1967, a realignment of communication personnel and equipment assets was accomplished. Communication support requirements have been consolidated and units tasked to accomplish such support in conformance with their capability. The 7th Communication Battalion has been tasked to support the 1st Marine Division, Force Logistics Command, and the 1st Military Police Battalion and to provide the Communication Support Company (-) (Rein) in support of the 3rd Marine Division in the Northern portion of the I Corps Tactical Zone.
- 5. (U) On 12 June 1967, the Division CEO, Col E. P. CLAUDE, presented a detailed briefing to the Commanding General, Major General Donn J. ROEERTSON, on present and projected communication systems supporting the Division in operations and its Combat Base environment.
- 6. (C) On 12 June 1967, The Division Assistant CEO, Major James H. BIRD, Jr., and the Sperations Chief MSgt Iran R. COURTNEY, attended a frequency coordination conference conducted at and hosted by III MAF. The immediate concern of the conferees was the recent loss of 100 VHF (FM) frequencies in the 30 75 MC band and the requirement to redistribute remaining frequency assets without detriment to communications. Considering the congestion in the 30 75 MC range, the heavy reliance placed upon equipment operating in this range, and the limited resources, duplication of frequency assignments was the only acceptable solution. The situation is not untenable, however, it will pose some problems should the occasion arise to rapidly deploy reinforcements from one TAOR to another.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORM



#### CONFIDENTIAL

- 7. (U) During the period 12-14 June 1967, a total of 138 lst Marine Division personnel received a one hour lecture/demonstration on transmission security presented by members of the Sub Unit of the 1st Radio Battalion, FMF. This series of lectures completes the cycle for this quarter. The benefits of this instruction can only be realized by a continuing program and it is intended to have this instruction presented quarterly contingent upon operations.
- 8. (U) On 13 June 1967, the Division CEO, Col E. P. CLAUDE, briefed the new Chief of Staff, Col H. J. WOESSNER, on the present and projected communications systems supporting the Division.
- 9. (U) On 13 June 1967, the SLF (CTG 79.5) Communication Officer, Captain HUERING USMC, and the ARG (CTG 76.5) Communication Officer, Lt. THOMAS, USN, called on the Division CEO staff to coordinate communication matters with respect to Operation BEACON TORGH.
- 10. (C) Communication difficulties during Operation BEACON TORCH necessitated a minor revision in the Communication Plan and the assignment of a Liaison Officer from the Division CEO office to the SLF (CTG 79.5) aboard the USS TRIPOLI. On 18 June 1967, Capt ZEROWSKI accompanied by one radio/KY-8 technician and two radio relay technicians reported to the SLF. Concurrently the 7th Communication Battalion was tasked to position a radio religious interiment of one AN/MRC-63 with team in the area of THANG BINH (BF175418) and one AN/MRC-62 with team at the 5th Marines CP (ET228308) in a stand-by status. To support helicopter operations, the USS TRIPOLI was required to be contimually under way and it was determined that a relay station for the radio relay link from the Division to the SLF was necessary. The AN/MRC-63 was installed using horizontally polarised Tagi for the link to the Division CP and a ground plane antenna for the link to the SLF aboard the USS TRIPOLI. Radio Relay Communications were intermittent, but when working were excellent. It was later determined that the ground plane antennas aboard ship were improperly positioned in a fixed location and were occasionally masked due to the maneuvering of the ship. Despite the intermittent quality of the radio relay link, it did provide a direct means of coordination between the Division FSCC. the 1st MAW DASC and SACC aboard the USS TRIPOLI and a sole user circuit between the Division Combat Operations Center and the SLF operations center aboard ship.
- II. (C) On 19 June 1967, the Division Assistant CEO, Major James H. BIRD Jr., made a liaison trip to the SLF (CTG 79.5) aboard the USS TRIPOLI to coordinate establishment of vital circuits between the Division and the SLF (CTG 79.5) and the establishment of a radio relay link between the Division and BLT 2/3 ashore in support of Operation BEACON TORCH. It was determined that the Modem unit, AN/TCC-3, and the multiplex unit TA 219, required technical alignment and that mutual interference was caused by the ship's NAVCOMOPNET circuit. Consultation with the ship's communication officer resulted in a shift to another long wire antenna and a subsequent reduction of interference. Lack of reliable and continuous VHF (FM) communications was primarily caused by poorly located antennas which were in the majority of cases masked by the ship and an inability to patch the antenna system. The

CONFIDENTIAL

26

MOFORN

#### CONFIDENTIAL

SLF communications officer had decked mounted two AN/MRC 110's and reliable continuous communications were realized. Subsequently a trip was made to ELT 2/3 ashore to coordinate the establishment of a radio relay link to Division. A cursory inspection revealed the equipment was set up on improper frequencies and was utilizing ground plane antennas. Upon installing Yagi antennas and shifting frequencies reliable communications were established.

- 12. (U) On 21 June 1967, the Division Assistant CEO (Electronics), Major Frank L. BIROU, made a liaison visit to the USS TRIPOLI for the purpose of evaluating all facets of the communications equipment installed for the Landing Force. It was determined that the ship's propagation characteristics were such as to cause mutual circuit interference in certain frequency bands.
- 13. (U) The lack of signal/circuit power wiring delayed the shift of the Division Communication Center to its new location on the scheduled date. Preparation for the cut-over commenced on the evening of 21 June 1967. Actual circuit cut-over commenced at 230605H June 1967 and the Communication Center was completely operational in its new location by 240425H June 1967. The cut-over was accomplished without loss of communications into the World Wide Network or with the Senior Command, III MAF, a minimum outage time with subordinate units and no disruption of message center service. Expansion and upgrading of the communication center teletype facilities has been planned and programmed and will be initiated upon receipt of requisitioned equipment.
- 14. (U) On 23 June 1967, the Division received two AN/TTC-7's, each of which is a three operator position 200 line capacity common battery switchboard. Planning provides for parallel wiring which will result in a six operator position 400 line capacity switchboard. Upon installation an upgrade in subscriber service should be realized.
- 15. (C) On 24 June 1967, the AN/TRC-97 Tropo link from Danang to Chu Lai was deactivated and the equipment was deployed from Chu Lai to the 5th Marines CP (ET228308). A link was activated between the Division and the 5th Marines replacing two AN/MRC-62 radio relay links which have been placed in a standby status.
- 16. (U) On 26 June 1967, one of the two AN/TRC-97 Tropo radio relay sets authorized the Division was received. This equipment is presently being inventoried and operationally checked.

27

CONFIDENTIAL

### **DECLASSIFIED**

UMCLASSIFIED

COMMAND CHRONCLOGY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICARN EVENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

### PART III

### SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. (U) The following distinguished visitors visited/toured the command during June 1967:

DATE	NAME	BILLET
3Jun67	MajGen Frank C. THARIN	Deputy CG, FMFPac
4Jun67	Congressman Richard H. ICHORD Congressman Speedy O. LONG	Democrat, Missouri Democrat, Louisiana
6Jun67	Congressman Richard H. ICHORD	Democrat, Missouri
8Jun67	Congressman Speedy O. LONG Mr. Earl MORGAN	Democrat, Louisiana Member Special Staff Armed Forces Committee
•	General WESTMORELAND	COMUSMACY
10 <b>Ju</b> n67	Minister WILSON	Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Manila
17Jun67	Ambassador William C. BLATR	American Ambassador to the Philippines
20Jun67	Honorable Charles F. BAIRD	Undersecretary of the Navy, Designate
21Jun67	BrigGen G. E. DOOLEY	номс
26 <b>-</b> 27Ju <b>n67</b>	LtGen Victor H. KRULAK	CG, FMFPac
29 <b>Jun67</b>	Mr. Peter WILKINSON Mr. William T. ROGERS	Her Majesty's Ambassador Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
	Brigadier D. J. WILLISON	

MOFORM



#### ENERY ACTIVITY

Heavy contact with lain Force units occurred early in the month, however, the latter part of June saw only sporadic, harassing enemy activities.

- 2 June: (C) Two battalions of the 5th Marines engaged in a day long battle with the enemy. An initial contact was made by D/1/5 at 0610K in the vicinity of (BT 139310). Contact increased throughout the morning and close air support was used extensively. By 1130H all elements of 3/5 were engaged with the enemy. At 1250H, a hovering med-evac helo was hit by an unknown caliber recoilless rifle round. The helicopter, at (BT 125299), caught fire and crashed killing 1 Marine and wounding 7 others, most of whom had been previously wounded and were being med-evacuated. Contact continued into the night, but by 0130H on the 3rd, the battlefield was quiet. This action cost the enemy 56 KIA and 96 KIA probable.
- 6June: (C) CAP B-4, located at (AT 945665) was attacked by an estimated 100 enemy at 0155H. The enemy force used small arms, automatic weapons, grenades, and satchel charges. 1 ammo bunker was destroyed as were two defensive positions. Small arms, LAAM's and grenades were returned by the CAP unit and 8 VC were observed to fall. Their bedies were dragged away. An I/3/1 reaction force with one tank arrived and the enemy fled. An artillery mission was fired on suspected enemy routes of egress and the area was searched disclosing shrapnel fragments from RPG-2 rockets, pieces of satchel charges and CS grenades, and one .45 caliber pistol.
- 7June: (C) at 0230H, in the vicinity of (AT 925856), a CAP in 2/7's area received 10 rounds of 57mm RE, 3 grenades and six to seven hundred rounds of small arms fired, from an estimated enemy company. Small arms fire along with claymores and 3.5 rockets were returned by the unit. Seven VC were probably killed during this action.
- 17June:(C)At 1155H, E/2/7 received small arms fire from three enemy at (AT 864514). The three were probably decoys, because the Marines, after returning small arms fire, 3.5 and artillery, encountered 35 enemy in an "L" shaped ambush at 1300H. The VC employed 5 automatic weapons in this action. The Marines returned fire, an LVTH fired .50 caliber and 105mm direct fire, and artillery missions and air strikes were conducted. There was some further action, and air support as well as artillery was utilized; however the main action for the day was over. In the action 35 enemy were killed with 15 additional probably killed.










- 17 June: (C) At 0200H, in the vicinity of (BT 112302), 3/5's perimeter defense received an estimated 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Counter-battery fire was returned and 39 rounds of 155mm were expended.
- 18June: (C)At 0530H, F and H 2/7 received 12 rounds of 81mm mortar fire at (AT 858452).
- 18June: (C) At 0850H, I/3/7, in the vicinity of (AT 873520) made contact with approximately 60 armed enemy who fired 60mm mortar, RPG rockets and an accurate volley of heavy automatic weapons fire. A quick reaction by I/3/7 forced the enemy to break contact and flee. Documents were captured which identified the aggressors as being part of the R.20th Battalion.
- 18June: (C) At 1400H, in the vicinity of (AT 817468) 11 secondary explosions resulted from an air strike prescribed by G-2.
- 19 June: (C) At 2215H, the 3/7 CP located at (AT 869528), received 20-25 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. Counterbattery fire was returned but no accounting of enemy casualties could be made.
- 19June: (C) At 2110H, 2/5 was advised by Duc Duc senior advisor that 2 companies of NVA troops were in the vicinity of (AT 8347). A fire mission was called, resulting in 54 secondary explosions. A search of the area and questioning of local civilians revealed the source of these explosions to be a VC mine factory.
- 20 June: (C) At 2000H, the 2/1 Command Group, in the vicinity of (BT 025 525) received 10-12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and some small arms fire. Two secondary explosions were observed when a counter-battery mission was fired.

31





# MOFORN

#### ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

- 1 June (U) Major General Donn J. RCBERTSON assumed command of the 1st Marine Division effective 0900H. Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 010343Z Jun 67.
- June (C) CG 1st MarDiv submitted to CG III MAF recommendations concerning the use of steel antenna type observation towers. Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030315Z Jun 67. Tab F
- 4 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept for employment of ARG/SLF during the last half of June. Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 040830Z Jun 67.

  Tab F
- 5 June (S) Termination Operation UNION II effective 051800H.
  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 050847Z Jun 67.
  Tab D
- 6 June (C) CG 1st MarDiv requested to CG III MAF that this division be relieved from the requirement of providing security for ASP #1.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 061007Z Jun 67.

  Tab F
- 7 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 70-67 directing
  Rough Rider convoys on 11 and 12 between Danang and Phu Bai.
  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 070901Z Jun 67.
  Tab F, Tab C
- 9 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept of Operation BUTLER.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 0901112 Jun 67.

  Tab F
- 9 June (C) CG 1st MarDiv assumed opcon of 1st Platoon, 1st Armored Amphibian Company and passed opcon to CO 11th Marines effective 072250H.


  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 090257Z Jun 67
- 10 June (C) Operation BUTLER commenced 0700H.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 100545Z Jun 67

  Teb D
- 10 June (C) CG 1st MarDiv directed that reemphasis be placed on M-16 training.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 100231Z Jun 67.





To the particular of the particular of the control of the particular of the particul





- 11 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv requested CG III MAF to provide engineer support on National Route 1.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 190445Z June 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 12 June (S) CG ist MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept of Operation ARIZONA.

  Ref: CG ist MarDiv 161237Z Jun 67
  Tab C, Tab F
- 12 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 71-67 directing the concept of operations related to Operation BEACON TORCH.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 120149Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 12 June (S) GG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 72-67 (Operation ARIZONA).

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 120239Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 12 June (S) Termination Operation BUTLER effective 121600H.

  Ref: CG 1st MarBiv 120825 Jun 67.
- 12 June (S) CG 1st MerDiv directed certain restrictions on ONTOS employment.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 121455Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 13 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 72-67 (Operation ARIZONA).

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 130805Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 14 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published his planning guidance for July 1967.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 140703 Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 14 June (C) Operation ARIZONA commenced 0600H.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 140737Z Jun 67.

  Tab D
- 15 June (C) Operation ADAMS/ADATR commenced 1215H.


  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 151705Z Jun 67.

  Tab D
- 16 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept of Operation ADAIR.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 160145Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 16 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept of Operation BROWN.

NOFORN



NOFORN

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 160147Z Jun 67. Tab C, Tab F

- 16 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of additional measures taken for security of major bridges.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 161237Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 17 June (S) CG III MAF requested comments concerning the fessibility of opening Highway One from TAY NINH to DONG HA.

  Ref: CG III MAF 170120Z Jun 67.
- 18 June (C) CG 1st MarDiv commended 1st Recon Bn on the outstanding skill and competency displayed on the night of 15-16

  June by two patrols in Elephant Valley.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180131Z Jun 67.
- 18 June (S) CG III MAF directed 1st MarDiv to conduct continuous deep reconnaissance in the THUONG DUC/HAPPY VALLEY areas west to North-South Grid Line YC 35.
- 18 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 73-67 directing Rough
  Rider convoys on 21 and 22 June between Damang and Phu Bai.
  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180933Z Jun 67.
  Tab C, Tab F
- 18 June (C) CG III MAF cautioned all major commands to insure the enemy does not gain victories because of any lack of alertness on our part.

  Ref: CG III MAF 181102Z Jun 67.
- 18 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 73-67 directing Rough Rider convoys on 21 and 22 June between Danang and Phu Bai.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 18 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of planned operations for July.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 181347 Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 21 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv assumed opcon SIF BRAVO effective 0600H.

  Ref: CG III MAF 210146Z Jun 67.
- 21 June (S) Termination Operation BROWN effective 221400H.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 211641Z Jun 67.
- 21 June (C) Operation BEACON TORCH commenced 0600H.


  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 211837Z Jun 67.

  Tab D

34

MOFORM





## NO ORN

- 21 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 74-67 (Opcon SIF Bravo).

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 211849Z Jun 67.
- 21 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the consept of Operation CAIHOUN.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 211851Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 22 June (C) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the adequacy of M-16 E1 rifle pre-deployment training of replacements.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 220327Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 22 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF on the divisions amphibious tractor assets.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 221009Z Jun 67
  Tab C
- 22 June (S) Termination Operation ARIZONA effective 221800H.
  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 221045Z June 67.
- 23 June (8) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 75-67 (Operation CALHOUN).

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 231559Z Jun 67.

  Tab C
- 24 June (C) CG III MAF directed major commands to reemphasize techniques of assault on fortified positions.

  Ref: CG III MAF 240514Z Jun 67.
- 24 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 75-67 (operation Calboun).

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240647A Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 24 June (C) CG 1st MarDiv directed all units to take necessary precautions in order to reduce effectiveness of enemy employment of chemical munition.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240649Z Jun 67.

  Tab C
- 24 June (S) CG ist MarDiv requested major units participating in Operation CAIHOUN to conduct ground battle damage assessment on Arc Light Strikes within unit boundaries.

  Ref: CG ist MarDiv 2408572 Jun 67.
- 24 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Change Two to Frag Order 75-67 (Operation CALHOUN).

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240929Z Jun 67.

  Tab C. Tab F

NOFORN

Ħ,





- 24 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv directed change of opcom of reconnaissance elements in support of Operation CALHOUN.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 242347Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 25 June (C) CG FMFPAC cautioned major commands to insure adequate command emphasis is placed on the prevention of needless accidents and loss of life.

  Ref: CG MPPAC 250331Z Jun 67.
- 25 June (S) Termination Operation ADAIR effective 252400H.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250349Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab P
- 25 June (C) CG 1st MarDiv directed units to arrange installation lambuts to minimize possibility of extensive damage due to first or enemy activity.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250831Z Jun 67.

  Tab C
- 25 June (C) Operation CALHOUN commenced 0600H.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 251145Z Jun 67.

  Tab D
- 26 June (U) CG 1st MarDiv recommended to CG III MAF that a message is sent to CG ICTZ expressing the CG 1st MarDiv's appreciation for the excellent conduct of Operation PHI PHUNG 27.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260655Z Jun 67.

  Tab F
- 27 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv requested from CG III MAF a special operating area for division operations along National Route 1 and in the Que Son Theng Binh Nui Lac Son Basin.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 270337Z Jun 67.

  Tab C
- 27 June (C) CG 1st MarDiv informed CO, Co C Fifth SFGA that present commitment to Operation CALHOUN limited large scale reaction expability for operations by Thmong Duc CIDG.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 270341Z Jun 67.

  Tab F
- 27 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv requested from CG III MAF the approximate socations of all past duds or anti-disturbance fuzed aircraft ordance.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 270801Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F



NOFORN







- 28 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv advised all subordinate commands of the importance of destroying known dum ordnance.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 280521Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 28 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 76-67 directing continuation of Operation CALHOUN.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 280719Z Jun 67.

  Tab C
- 30 June(S) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF on the optimum use of tanks and the combat value of ONTOS.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 300705Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 29 June (S) -CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 77-67 directing Rough Rider convoys to Tam Ky on 3 July.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 290803Z Jun 67.

  Tab C
- 30 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to Frag Order 77-67 (Rough Rider).

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 300951Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 30 June (S) CG 1st MarDiv directed the establishment of a 5th Marines Regimental base camp at Hill 63 and operations thereafter.


  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 300955Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F
- 30 June (C) CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of LVTH-6 utilization by the division.

  Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 301213Z Jun 67.

  Tab C, Tab F







#### COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

- 2 June (C). A squad combat patrol from CAP D-2 observed two enemy. Then the patrol challenged, the enemy fled. The patrol fired six rounds of small arms at the enemy and on search of the area, found one VC KIA. (SITREP 430 TAB D)
- 6 June (C). The plateon position of CAP B-4 was assualted by an estimated 100 enemy using satchel charges, grenades, automatic weapons and small arms. The enemy penetrated the position, destroyed three bunkers, captured seven M-16 rifles, one M-79 launcher and seven LAAWS, and inflicted capualties of five Marines KIA, four Marines WIA and five PF's WIA. The CAP plateon responded with small arms, M-79's, grenades and called artillery fire an likely withdrawal routes. The enemy casualties were eight VC KIA. (SITREP 434 TAB D)
- 6 June (C). A squad combat patrol from CAP D-7 observed two enemy. patrol took the enemy under fire with small arms. A search of the arm disclosed two VC KIA, six M-26 grenades and two M-14 magazines. (SITREP 434 TAB D)
- 7 June (C). A squad combat patrol from CAP D-2 observed two enemy rurning from the patrol. The enemy were challenged but did not halt. The patrol fired five rounds small arms resulting in one VC KIA. (SITREP 435 TAPED)
- 13 June (C). CAP's Bl-1, Bl-4, Bl-5 and B3-2 were redesignated as CAP's Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 respectively. (1st MarDiv msg 1308572 Jun67)
- 14 June (C). A village chief reported to CAP B3-2 the location of six enemy. The platoon dispatched two squads to the reported location where they observed the enemy. The squads opened fire with small arms and the enemy returned fire and broke off the engagement. A search of the area revealed no evidence of enemy casualties. (SITREP 442 TAB D)
- 16 June (C). A squad ambush from CAP D-2 observed two enemy fleeing from the ambush. The squad pursued the enemy and observed that the two well joined by five more VN males. The squad fired 20 rounds of small arm which resulted in one VC KIA, one VC WIA captured and five VN males is area apprehended. (SITREP 444 TAB D)
- 18 June (C). Local children advised the personnel of CAP B2-2 of the location of an assualt rocket. The platoon informed the engineers, we found and destroyed the rocket. A picture of the children was taken and the children were rewarded. (SITREP 446 TAB D)

### NOFORN

- 23 June (C). Two Vietnamese boys brought a mine to CAP B2-2. The boys had found it rigged with a trip wire. The mine was destroyed and the boys were rewarded 150 piasters. (SITREP 451 TAB D)
- 27 June (C). A Vietnamese male reported the location of two 81mm mortar rounds to a squad patrol from CAP Q-3. The patrol located the rounds and destroyed them in place. The Vietnamese was rewarded 600 plasters for locating the rounds and informing the patrol. (SITREP 455 TAB D)
- 29 June (U). A Company headquarters, CAC Q Hq, was activated under the OPCON of the Seventh Marines. (CG lstMarDiv msg 302335Z Jun67)

NOFORN





#### LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

#### SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

4-6 June 1967 (U)

A special congressional subcommittee visited this command to inquire into the problems associated with the M16Al Rifle.

11 June 1967 (U)

lst Motor Transport Battalion conducted a Rough Rider from Danang to Phu Bai returning to Danang on 12 June. One vehicle was disabled by a mine on the return trip. Elements of Headquarters, 1st FAG were transported.

21 June 1967 (U)

11th Motor Transport Battalion conducted a Rough Rider from Danang to Phu Bai, returning to Danang on 22 June without incident.
Materials of the rear elements of 3rd Marine Division units were transported.



#### **DECLASSIFIED**

#### CIVIC ACPICE

THOUGHTETTED

- 20 June 1967 -(U) Rededication of the new Hieu Whom District Herdquarters.
- 21 June 1967 -(U) 1st Herine Division CA Conference.
- 22 June 1907 -(U) Vietnamese International Day showing appreciation to the free would units stationed in the Danang area.
- 25 June 1967 -(U) Dedication of He Winh Dem.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

- 1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-30 June 1967.
- 1 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 450,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

Marine patrols distributed 1,670 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Mines Kill Innocent People" and "Report VC Activity."

2/5, 3/1 and 3/7 made 5 hours of ground broadcasts.

2 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 310,000 leaflets.
Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Surrender Instructions," "VC
Mines Kill Innocent People" and "Rewards for Mines and Booby
Traps."

2 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 1,534 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation" and "Chieu Hoi."

2/5 reported that 7 Chieu Hoi's had turned themselves in to Duc Duc District Headquarters.

3 Jun (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,190,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Health and Sanitation" and "GVN Provides a Better Life."

2 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,590 leaflets. Themes used were: "Marines are Friends," "VC Steal Rice," "Report VC Activity" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Marines made 7 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcasts on "Rewards for Mines" and "Chieu Hoi."

4 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 650,000 leaflets.

Themes used were: "Surrender or Die" and "Chieu Hoi."

2 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted. Themes were: "Surrender," "Don't Harbor VC" and a tape directed to the NVA about casualties on Operation UNION.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 1,220 leaflets. Themes were: "Health and Sanitation," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Rewards."

#### **DECLASSIFIED**

#### UNCLASSIFIED

3/7 made a 4 hour ground broadcast on "Chieu Hoi" and "Rules of the River."

5 Jun (U) 3 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted.

Theme was: "Exploitation of the Victory on Operation UNION II."

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 1,110 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Health and Sanitation" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

7th Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast at a MEDCAP on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

6 Jun (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 282,500 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Rally or Die for HO CHI MINH" and "Don't Harbor VC/NVA."

3 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and a special tape exploiting the allied victories on Operation UNION were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 2,500 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians" and "Health and Sanitation."

100 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

7 Jun (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 150,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Atrocities," "Don't Harbor VC" and "Chieu Hoi" directed at the 21st and 31st NVA Regiments.

2 hours and 50 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi" were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 3,900 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Health and Sanitation," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Report VC Activity."

1st Marines made a 30 minute ground broadcast on "US/GVN Co-operation."

8 Jun (U) 6 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,500,000 leaflets.

Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Don't
Harbor VC/NVA" and "Chieu Hoi" directed at the 21st and 31st
NVA Regiments.

3 hours and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi" were conducted.

1st Marines air dropped 114,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Steal Rice" and "Keep VC Out of Your Homes."

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 1,700 leaflets. Themes used were: "Pledge of Allegiance Cards," "GVN Helps the Vietnamese People" and "Chieu Hoi."

1st Marines made a 1 hour and 30 minute ground broadcast.

A 1st Recon patrol dropped "B-52" leaflets. Subsequent to this, VC were seen reading them.

9 Jun (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 850,000 leaflets.
Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Chieu
Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

2 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,050 leaflets. Theme used was: "Health and Sanitation."

"Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

3 movies were shown for 2 hours, and 6 hours of ground broadcasts were conducted at County Fair #7-14.

10 Jun (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 500,000 leaflets.

The theme was: "NVA Chieu Hoi."

1 hour and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,588 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Chieu Hoi," "Where is Your Rice?" and "Mines Reward."

1,000 "Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

11 Jun (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 50,000 leaflets.

Theme used was: "VC Atrocity."

5 hours and 45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" and "Harassment" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,450 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "VC Mines Kill Immocent People" and "Pledge of Allegiance Cards."

5 movies were shown for 2 hours and 30 minutes by the 1st Marines.

UNCIA SSIFIED

12 Jun (U) 2 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Reward for Mines and Booby Traps," "Report Mined Roads" and "Health and Sanitation."

1st Marines conducted a 1 hour ground broadcast exploiting the VC attack on a VIS Team.

13 Jun (U) Marine patrols distributed 2,200 leaflets. Themes used were:
"Health and Sanitation" and "Report Mines on Roads."

1st Marines made a 35 minute aerial broadcast directed at the people at their collection point.

14 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 200,150 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes" and a special leaflet in support of Operation ARIZONA, instructing people to move to the refugee collection points.

1 hour and 45 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and a special tape, in support of operation ARIZONA, instructing the people to move to the collection points were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 8,625 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps" and "Health and Sanitation."

1st Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast and a 35 minute aerial broadcast warning the people to move out of a free-fire zone.

15 Jun (U) 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols and CAC units distributed 5,300 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1st Marines made a 30 minute ground broadcast of news and music directed to the people of Nui Kim Son market.

16 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 109,000 leaflets.
Themes used were: "NVA Leaders Lied" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

7th Marines air dropped 50,000 leaflets in support of Operation ARIZONA. Theme used was: "Instructions to Refugees."

Marine patrols distributed 3,150 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Report Mines on Roads" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

"Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

7th Marines made 11 hours of ground broadcasts in support of Operation ARIZONA. Themes used were: "Instructions to Refugees" and "Chieu Hoi."

1st Marines made 3 hours of ground broadcasts on "VC Taxation," "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and a recorded Cultural Drama Team performance.

17 Jun (U) 11 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 450,000 leaflets.

Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Chieu Hoi" and

"Letter to the Men in the Ranks of NLF."

40 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

1st Marines conducted 29 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcasts. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "VC Taxation," news and music.

A Cultural Drama Team gave 4 performances for the 1st Marines.

Marine patrols distributed 1,400 leaflets. Themes used were:
"VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Mines Rewards," "Report
VC Activity," "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "Health
and Sanitation."

18 Jun (U) 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 223,000 leaflets.
184,000 of these leaflets were dropped in support of Operation
EEACON TORCH. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Notice of Clear and
Destroy Operation" and "VC Destroy While GVN Builds."

3 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "VC Destroy While GVN Builds" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,025 leaflets. Themes used were:
"VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Mine Rewards," "Report
VC Activity," "Health and Sanitation" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1st Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast on the opening of a new market place at Nui Kim Son.

1st Marines conducted 4 hours of ground broadcasts in support of Operation ARIZONA. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Instructions to Refugees."

19 Jun (U) 11 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,000,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians," "Mines Rewards," "Truth vs Lies" and "Chieu Hoi."

Marine patrols distributed 1,300 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Report VC Activity" and "Health and Sanitation."

7th Marines made 4 hours of ground broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

A 1 hour aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

20 Jun (U) 7 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 825,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Your Leaders Lied," "NVA Chieu Hoi," "Health and Sanitation," "Warning to Villagers Who Travel This Road" and "Mines Reward."

2 hours and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,350 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Safe Conduct Passes," "GVN Helps Vietnamese People" and "Health and Sanitation."

1st Tk Bn showed 1 movie for 2 hours.

21 Jun (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 933,000 leaflets.

Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Safe Conduct Passes,"

"Chieu Hoi" and "Where Are Your Comrades?"

6 hours and 5 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,300 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Safe Conduct Passes" and "GVN Helps Vietnamese People."

7th Marines made a 1 hour "Chieu Hoi" ground broadcast.

22 Jun (U) 3 hours of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 15,400 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps," "Health and Sanitation" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1st Marines conducted 2 hours and 40 minutes of ground broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

23 Jun (U) 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 674,000 leaflets.

Themes were: "Chieu Hoi" and "Health and Sanitation."

4 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,600 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation," "Report VC Activity," "Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps" and "Chieu Hoi."

7th Marines made a 1 hour ground broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

4 movies were shown for 4 hours by the Northern Defense Command.

24 Jun (U) 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 536,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Warming to Villagers Who Travel Roads Mined by VC," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1 hour and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 1,500 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Health and Sanitation" and "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians."

7th Marines conducted a 1 hour ground broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

25 Jun (U) 6 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 622,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Don't Harbor VC," "Notice of Clear and Destroy Operations," "Show of Strength" and "VC Endanger Lives by Firing on Helicopters." Also dropped was a special leaflet map showing the safe area for refugees on Operation CALHOUN.

3 hours and 30 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

7th Marines distributed 700 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Report VC Activity," "Health and Sanitation," "VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians" and "Chieu Hoi."

26 Jun (U) 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 682,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Don't Harbor VC" and "VC Destroy While GVN Builds."

6 hours and 25 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Don't Harbor VC" and "Harassment" were conducted in support of Operation CALHOUN.

Marine patrols distributed 1,975 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines," "Free South" newspapers and "Chieu Hoi."

1st Marines made a 1 hour and 30 minute ground broadcast at a collection point.

27 Jun (U) 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 37,000 leaflets. Theme used was: "Chieu Hoi Appeal."

50 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 2,650 leaflets. Themes used were: "Safe Conduct Passes," "Health and Sanitation" and "Report VC Activity."

7th Marines conducted 30 minutes ground broadcast promoting cooperation between villagers and Marines.

1st Tk Bn showed 1 movie for 2 hours to 700 people.

28 Jun (U) 6 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 968,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Support the GVN," "Chieu Hoi" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

7 hours and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Don't Harbor VC" were conducted.

Marine patrols distributed 3,125 leaflets. Themes used were: "Mine Rewards," "Report VC Activity," "Health and Sanitation" and "Chieu Hoi."

1st Marines made a 2 hour ground broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and Vietnamese music.

29 Jun (U) 3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 150,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines," "Chieu Hoi" and "Mines Kill Civilians."

5 hours and 10 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi," "Don't Harbor VC" and "Rewards."

Marine patrols distributed 3,265 leaflets. Themes used were: "Health and Sanitation" and "Report VC Activity."

"Free South" newspapers were also distributed.

2 hours and 15 minutes of ground broadcasts were conducted using themes of "Chieu Hoi" and "Support GVN and Its Programs."

30 Jun (U) 2 hours and 55 minutes of aerial broadcasts were conducted on "Don't Harbor VC," "National Reconciliation," "VC Mines Kill Civilians" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

2,860 leaflets were distributed. Themes were: "Pledge of Allegiance Cards," "Don't Harbor VC" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

4 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcasts were conducted using the theme of "Support the GVN."

1st Marines showed movies for 2 hours and 30 minutes to the people of Nui Kim Son.

#### OCIUMICATIONS-DEDORRENTOS SEQUENTIAL LISTIM OF SIGNIFICARE EVENES

MOTORN

OUL TOTAL TELE

l June 1977 (U) Div About CTO, Rajor Junea W. DIAD, Jr., attended the I Corne Count Count Conference hosted by III 174F.

Ref: 050 III INF ltm 120/ped over 2000 of 22 Inv 1967

1-15 July 1967 (U) Instructions presented on the just allering one installation commenced on the new NUF (FI) equipment in combet vehicles.

Ref: 39 FLC 2514184 Nay 67

4 June 1557 (U) Reglignment of Comm assets directed.

Ref: III MAE 2913162 Loy 67 CG 1st HorDiv \$4\$7\$12 Jun 67

4 January (U) Div SMC, Col H. F. CLAUDE, made toff visit to 11th Larines.

7 Jan. 1867 (U) III MAY CTC made steff visit to 1st Markiv CTC.

12 June 1967 (U) ROBERTSCN, OG 1st MarDiv, was briefed on Communication Systems.

12 June 1967 (3) CTG 79.5 (TIF) and CTG 76.5 (ARC) Comm Reps ligison visit to Div CEC in conjunction with Operation PEACOL TORGH.

12 Jule 1967 (U) Div CRU Rejoint tended From Conference conducted by III NF.

Ref: III FAF \$7\$2362 Jun 67

12-14 June 1967 (') Then and maior Decurity Instructions presented to 2ndBn, 5thlier; 7thliegrBn; 3rdDn, 1st Mar.

Ref: 091st LerDiv \$4\$3274 Jun 67

13 Jane 1,67 (U) Col V. J. \*\*CHSBATE, 1st Name Chief of Staff, was briefed on Communication Systems.

14 June 1977 (U) Div CEC attended conference at III MAF concerning reallocation of supporting communication assets.

COLFIDERINIAL

#### **DECLASSIFIED**

UL ILEGALICAD		
15 June 1967 (	Div CEO Rep attended I Corps Comm Coord Confer	ence.
19 June 1967 (	Div CEO Reps conducted courtesy Electronics Management and Operational Communications Inspections Institutions Engineer Battalion.	
23 June 1967 (1	Received two AN/TTC-7 Switchboards.	
24 June 1967 (1	Div Comm Center relocated.	
26 June 1967 (1	Div CEO Rep attended the I Corps Cable Coordina Conference.	ation
	Ref: III MAF 22\$228\$ Jun 67	
26 June 1967 (1	Received one of the two authorized AN/TRC-97 Tradio Relay Sets.	ro <b>po</b>
27 June 1967 (1	Provided Comm Spt during LtGen KRULAK, OG FMFP. visit to lstMarDiv.	AC,
	Ref: CG is tMarDiv 2513492 Jun 67	
28 June 1967 (1	Div CEO Staff Visit to 2ndBn, 5th Marines.	

COMMIND CHROHOLOGY


PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

#### PART IV

#### SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Trible Town Day Command Change of Command	Tab B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Tab W Tab Y Tab	First MarDiv PERINTREP 11-67 First MarDiv PERINTREP 12-67 Operational Documents, */-37 Situation Reports Photographs and News Releases G-3 Journal for June 1967 Command Directory Field wy Cond Characterist Marines Command Chronology First Marines Command Chronology Beventh Marines Command Chronology First Recon Bn Command Chronology First Recon Bn Command Chronology First AntiTank Bn Command Chronology First Tank Bn Command Chronology First Engr Bn Command Chronology First Motor Transport Command Chronology First Shore Party Command Chronology First Medical Bn Command Chronology First Medical Bn Command Chronology Seventh Comm Bn Command Chronology Seventh Engr Bn Command Chronology Seventh Engr Bn Command Chronology
√ab X Ninth Engr Bn Command Chronology	· .	

### SECRET



## WOFORN


#### OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS

SUBJECT	ORIGINATOR & DTG
1 Change of Command, 1st marisis	CG First MarDiv 010343Z Jun 67 (U)
2 VFrag 0 70-67	CG First MarDiv 070901Z Jun 67 (S)
3 /Change of Opcon	CG First MarDiv 090257Z Jun 67 (C)
4 Rngr Support	CG First MarDiv 110445Z Jun 67 (S)
5 √Frag 0 71-67	CG First MarDiv 120149Z Jun 67 (S)
6 Frag 0 72-67	CG First MarDiv 120239Z Jun 67 (S)
7 Termination Op Butler	CG First MarDiv 120825Z Jun 67 (S)
Ontos Restrictions	CG First MarDiv 121455Z Jun 67 (S)
9 Change One to Frag 0 72-67	CG First MarDiv 130805Z Jun 67 (S)
/o √July Planning Guidance	CG First MarDiv 140703Z Jun 67 (S)
11 Concept Op Adair	CG First MarDiv 1601452 Jun 67 (S)
/2 Concept Op Brown	CG First MarDiv 160147Z Jun 67 (S)
13 Security Major Bridges	CG First MarDiv 161237Z Jun 67 (S)
14 Outstanding Performance of Duty	CG First MarDiv 180131Z Jun 67 (C)
15 Deep Reconnaissance	CG III MAF 180644Z Jun 67 (S)
/6 √Frag 0 73-67	CG First MarDiv 180933Z Jun 67 (S)
17√Ops for July 67	CG First MarDiv 181347Z Jun 67 (S)
18 /Concept Op Calhoun	CG First MarDiv 211851Z Jun 67 (S)
19 16 Training	CG First MarDiv 220327Z Jun 67 (C)
20 Amtrac Assets	CG First MarDiv 221009Z Jun 67 (S)
21 VFrag 0 75-67	CG First MarDiv 231559Z Jun 67 (S)
Anange One to Frag 0 75-67	CG First MarDiv 240647Z Jun 67 (S)
23 Enemy Employment of Chemical Munitions	CG First MarDiv 240649Z Jun 67 (C)
24 √ Change Two to Frag 0 75-67	CG First MarDiv 240929Z Jun 67 (S)
25 √Recon Elements Op Calhoun	OG First MarDiv 2413472 Jun 67 (S)
26 Termination Op Adair	CG First MarDiv 250349Z Jun 67 (S)
27 √Installation Security	CG First MarDiv 250831Z Jun 67 (C)
28 Special Operating Area	CG First MarDiv 270337Z Jun 67 (8)
29 Supporting Arms	CG First MerDiv 271003Z Jun 67 (C)
30 Vluds	CG First MarDiv 280521Z Jun 67 (8)
31 <b>√Frag</b> 0 76-77	CG First MarDiv 280719Z Jun 67 (S)
32 Duds and Ordnance	CG First MarDiv 280801Z Jun 67 (S)
33 Frag 0 77-67	CG First MarDiv 290803Z Jun 67 (S)
34√fanks and Ontos	CG First MarDiv 300705Z Jun 67 (S)
55 Change One to Frag 0 77-67	CG First MarDiv 3009512 Jun 67 (S)
36 VRegimental Combat Base Camp, Establish of	CG First MarDiv 300955Z Jun 67 (8)
JV INTH-6 Utilization	CG First MarDiv 301213Z Jun 67 (C)





### Ist MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF




DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DEGLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

PERINTREP NO. 11-6

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF

CONFIDENTIAL

**DECLASSIFIED** 



First Marine Division
Danang, Republic of Vietnam
271800 June 1967

Ferintrep No. 11-67

Period covered: Oll200H to 260600H June 1967

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. The First Marine Division has the responsibility to conduct offensive operations in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province areas.

#### 2. Enemy Situation

#### a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation

- (1) Military Geography
- (a) Climate and Weather. Clear skies and warming temperatures dominated the reporting period, and a late afternoon cloud cover appeared frequently. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 99 and 79 respectively with an average humidity of 68%. The winds were variable at 5 to 10 knots, and the cumulative rainfall was 1.89 inches. (Refer to Ferintrep No. 10-67 for Astronomical Data.)

#### b. Enemy Military Situation

- (1) Strength, Location, Composition. Refer to ANNEX A, this perintrep.
- (2) Availibility of Reinforcements. The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in Central I Corps with the infiltration of additional forces from North Vietnam. A rallier to ARVN forces in Southern Quang Ngai stated that he recently infiltrated with a regiment, half of which remained in Quang Nam Province. According to Pfc Nguyen Van Chet, captured by elements of the 3rd Marine Division, the 325C division has just received orders from NVN to gather supplies for a relocation to the Danang area in the early part of July.

#### (2) Movements and Activities

(a) Enemy activity in the 1st Marine Division's area of responsibility has been generalized. He has displayed a growing interest for the northern sector of the TAOR while at the same time he has continued efforts to maintain control of the Que Son Valley. These efforts have been demonstrated by his attacks by fire on U.S. Marines in the area and by his larger scale, well-prepared ambushes. Characteristically, the enemy would strike and withdraw; however, this has not been the case in the Que Son Valley. A determination to control the area has been demonstrated.





(b) On the 1st the enemy fired 30-40 rounds of mortars into the 1/5 periacter defense. Sattery "D" returned fire and two secondary emplosions were observed. Barly morning on the End, clements of the 5th Marines in the vicinity of (BT 145299) had only speradic contact with an estimated reinforced enemy company. Enemy resistance stiffeness in all sectors throughout the morning and by noon the enemy strength was estimated to be two companies reinforced. Despite the fact that arounder, and air support pounded the enemy positions throughout the day, heavy resistance persisted into the night. When it was all over, Karines counted 147 chary sodies, and they estimated killing another 216 VC. The 3/5 Ch mush have been hargeted because on three separate occasions (the 3rd, 17th, and 21st) the energy fired portars and RR at the position in the vicinity of (BT 120302). The Regionntal CF (BT 228318) received 7 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on the 8th. Also on the 8th the 928th RF Company in the vicinity of (Bf 218273) received a high volume of automatic measures, 57rm RR, and 60mm mortar fire. Thirty civillian houses were destroyed as a result of the enemy fire. About noon on the 15th 1/3/5 again contacted an estimated two enemy companies in the vicinity of (Er 162329). The entrenched energy fired mortars and automatic weapons; the Marines countered with small arms fire, artillery and close air support missions. Light to resedue compact continued throughout the day and into the night. On the 25th, Recon patrol, Etheline, called an artillery mission on 4 VC carrying . body into a house (AP 967304). Small arms ammunition explosions were observed along with larger explosions which were believed to be granades.

(c) In the south-western sector, an estimated two energy plateons attacked an AD Team in the vicinity of (AT 899570) on 4 June. A reaction force from I/3/7 was dispatched to the orea, illumination was provided, and artillery was fired in support. The energy dispersed, and contact could not be regained. On the 11th a company from the 2nd Battalion 51st ARVN Regiment in the vicinity of (AT 972667) received automatic compons and corter fire from an unknown enemy position. In the vicinity of (11 851481) the 2/5 Cl received 8 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 11 June. Counterportar fire was returned, and Spooky arrived on station. At the same time a Syarrow-Newk was deployed to assist a CAC unit which reported unusual movement in front of their position (AT 864514). We further energy activity was observed. The following night the Refugee camp near Thuong Duc received 5 rounds of worker fire. Two Vicinateso were killed and four wore wounded. On the 15th in the vicinity of Go Mei Boland, closents of the 7th Marines encountered about 35 energy (AT 864514) who were set in a "L" shaped ambush. The energy fired automable weet one and comployed several large caliber weapons; the Marines were supported by IVI-His which fired .50 caliber and 105mm direct fire. A few kilometers to the northwest a C/1/7 equal received automatic weapons, mortar, and MR fire from an unknown busher of energ in a trasline (aT 948543). A reaction force with four tanks moved to the error, but the energy thought it prudent to disperse, and the action decreased rapidly. 1/3/7 (4% 873524) hade contact on the 18th with a well-armed one w who explored 60% northers and 120 rockets with a high degree of accuracy.





When a 1/7 LVT was sent to the scene, twenty VC fired small arms and automatic weapons in an effort to keep it from reinforcing. L/3/7 deployed a platoon to support the vehicle, and the enemy fled. Documents captured during the encounter indicated the enemy was from the R-20th Battalion. The enemy fired 12 rounds of 81mm mortar at F and H/2/7 (AT 858542) on the 18th, and on the 19th they fired 20-25 rounds at the 2/7 CF. Both times counterpattery missions were executed, but enemy casualties could not be determined. Again on the 21st the 2/7 CF in the vicinity of (AT 866512) received 12-15 rounds of mortar fire. According to local villagers the numerous secondary explosions in grid square (AT 8247) were caused by a VC mine factory located in the area. When H/2/5 conducted a reconnaissance of the area, they reported that the shrapnel pieces discovered varied greatly in size and appeared to come from a variety of ordnance. Two CAC units within 8 kilometers of each other were probed on the 24th. In the vicinity of (AT 865 574) CAC B2-2 received small arms fire from an estimated 15-20 enemy. Illumination was provided, small arms and M-79 rounds were returned. To the south at (AT 888472) CAC N-2 observed two enemy probing their position. A fire fight which lasted for 15 minutes ensued.

- (d) The vicinity of Hoi An continued to be targeted for VC harassing action. ARVN outposts and RD teams were priority targets. The 467th RF Company in the vicinity of (BT 132561) received 5 rounds of mortar fire on the 1st. Friendly air and artillery supported, and the enemy withdrew. The Moc Bai OF (BT 127480) received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the 4th; three days later the enemy fired 57mm RR into the CF. On 5 June the enemy fired 60mm mortars into the night defensive positions of the 579th RF Company. The Fhu Phong OP (BT 112497) received 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the 6th and 3 more on the 7th. On the 16th the enemy fired 60mm mortars in the vicinity of the Ba Ren Bridge (BT 120510). In the same vicinity an ARVN unit made contact with an estimated enemy battalion on the night of the 20th. The V.25th Battalion was reportedly operating in that area. Small arms, automatic weapons, 57mum RR, and mortars were fired at the ARVN unit. ARVN Rangers reinforced, and Spooky provided illumination. The SLF assumed a blocking position to the south of the river. Thirty-four VC were killed and 75-80 more were probably killed as a result of this action. On Operation Calhoun 1/3/5 in the vicinity of (BT 067407) found a VC hospital. Beds and medicine were discovered. In the same vicinity a squad patrol found what appeared to be a training center. The area was clean and well kept.
- (e) The enemy's continuing interest in the northern sector of the TAOR was displayed throughout the period. An estimated 100 enemy attacked 3/7's CAC B-4 at 0155 on 6 June, the enemy force used small arms, automatic weapons, grenades, and satchel charges; the CAC unit returned small arms, grenades and LAAW's. Eight VC fell and their bodies were dragged away. An I/3/1 reaction force arrived, and the enemy fled. Artillery and air fired on suspected enemy routes of egress. One ammo bunker and two defensive positions were destroyed by the attackers. Pieces of satchel charges, CS grenades, and one .45 caliber pistol were captured. A CAC unit just north of the Namo bridge was attacked by an estimated company on the 7th.





Ten rounds of 57mm RR, numerous grenades, and 600-700 rounds of small arms were fired at the position. Small arms, 3.5 rocket rounds and claymores were fired at the attacking enemy force. Artillery fired illumination and HE. Elements of the enemy force penetrated the friendly position, and one enemy who was trying to take an M-16 was killed. Fourteen VC were probably killed and one wounded enemy was captured. In the vicinity of (AT 852851) on 15 June, an estimated enemy company was observed by recon patrol Consulate. Spooky was called and remained on station all night. The patrol observed 48 bodies, but they had been dragged away by morning.

- (f) Nguyen Thien Fhang, captured by 2/7 after the attack on the CAC unit at (AT 925856) on 7 June claimed to be from the 30th Montagnard Battalion, 301st Regiment, 305th Division whose CF is 12 kilometers west of the A Shau Valley. He was with a group of approximately 190 people whose mission was to attack the ESSO storage plant north of the Namo Bridge. He also claimed that transport companies attached to the 305th Division supply all the units in Quang Nam Frovince. He said the mission of the M-59 Sapper Company which has been unreported since January is to recon Highway #1 near the Hai Van Fass, and ambush convoys if the opportunity arises.
- (g) A document captured by the National Folice reveals that the 70th Battalion was detached from the 1st VC Regiment in January, 1967. There are indications that this battalion has moved into Central Quang Tin Province.
- (h) A captured document translation report discloses that the enemy is placing added emphasis on Sapper units; Do Xuan Thiet, a recent rallier from the Quang Da Provincial Committee, indicated that the V.25 Pattalion is making preparations to become a Sapper unit.

#### (4) AO and Recon Sightings

Date	Sighting	Movement	Location
010945-1730 041255	22 VC 59 VC	Mvg Y & NE	AT 872376
051255	71 VC	Mvg S	BT 1139 ZC <b>11</b> 39
5 June	40 VC	Engaged	ZC 2065
060925 0 <b>81012</b>	75-100 Wood Cutters 20 VC	Mvg SE	AT 8961-9061 AT 8128
121745	20 VC	Following patrol	AT 8084
131530	4C VC	Mvg E	AT 8566
151625	20 NVA		AT 871522
151420	60 VC	Engaged	BT 158329
15 June	100 VC	On river, road	AT 852851
15 June	28 VC	In boats	AT 8685
181135	100 VC/NVA	In trench	AT 867517
191900	42 VC	Mvg SW	BT 044398
191205	20 VC	Mvg W	BT 034395
200900	18 VC	Mvg E & W	AT 915244



L

	_		
Unc	BLASSIFIED		e p
<u>Date</u>	Sighting	Movement	<u>Location</u>
201745	15-20 VC	Engaged	BT 031399
201030	16 VC	Mvg E	BT 062413
210730	15 VC	Mvg E	AT 836266
211055	22 VC	Mvg E (grps of 3,5)	AT 798255
211500	18 VC	Mvg SW	AT 810263
210730	15 VC	Mvg E	AT 836266
211500	18 VC	Mvg SW	AT 810263
231535	40 VC	St <b>a</b> tionary	AT 028548
231830	40 VC	Mvg S	AT 828 <i>5</i> 48
251400	19 VC	On trail	AT 967364
251900	80 AC	Mvg S	AT 828548

#### b. Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

#### (1) Espionage

12 VC

261940

- (a) Enemy espionage activities during the reporting period centered mainly around the recruitment of children to work for the VC.
- (b) Dai Loc DIOCC reported on June 1 that the VC have organized some "Buffalo" girls and boys (Children's Group), at Hoa Fhu (V), Hieu Duc (D), to stand and watch Marines for the purpose of gaining information and begging for food. The food is to be given to the VC.

Mvg E

(c) Also on 1 June, DIOCC reported that the Viet Cong had organized a group of youths in the Loc Hier area to act as an intelligence gathering group. The youths, who range in age from 10 to 15, will be sent for training to (AT 946605), (AT 942610), (AT 9486C7).

#### (2) · Isychological

- (a) On 13 June, at 0900, approximately 300 people conducted a demonstration in the vicinity of (BT 105534). The purpose of the demonstration was to protest artillery firing and bombings. Later the same day, at (AT 070560) a second demonstration occurred. National Police reported the demonstrations "not serious".
- (b) These demonstrations appear to have been VC initiated, inasmuch as one well-equipped VC unit appeared in a village at (BT 080597) on the evening of the 12th. They forced the people to assemble for attendance at a meeting during which the people were ordered to go to Dien Ban bistrict to participate in a demonstration early the next morning. The demonstration's purpose was to urge authorities to request the cessation of bombardment and artillery firing near the village.

#### 3. Enemy\_Capabilities

#### a. Attack Carabilities

(1) Attack Tien Fhuoc CIDG camp or isolated outposts outside our TAOR



BT 063447



in strength up to and including a regiment with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.

- (2) Attack CAC units in company (rein) strength.
- (3) Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81 or 120mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.

#### b. Defense Capability

(1) Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd NVA Regiment, plus additional battalions subordinate to the 2nd NT Division and VC Quang Nam Province.

#### c. Delay Capability

(1) Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops into the mountainous area.

#### d. Reinforcement Capability


(1) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in the 1st MarDiv's area of responsibility with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.


#### e. Unconventional and Esychological Warfare Capability

(1) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of ICC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

#### 4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

- a. Attack Tien Phuoc CIDG camp and isolated ARVN outposts in up to and including regimental strength with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.
  - (1) The following factors favor the adoption of this capability:
- (a) Isolated units and outposts offer the best targets for a quick thrust and rapid withdrawal, even for large scale attacks.
  - (b) The enemy has had past successes using this method of attack.
  - (c) The enemy's desires to achieve a tactical success.
  - (d) The terrain provides many access routes from the mountains.
  - (2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:






(a) The demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy troop concentrations, and ability to react rapidly to destroy them by the use of supporting arms and/or by ground attacks

- b. Attack CAC units in company (rein) strength.
  - (1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:
    - (a) The enemy's past successes against this type of target.
- (b) Enemy Sapper units are organized and equipped to implement this capability.
  - (2) The following factors militate against this capability:
- (a) The ability of friendly units to react rapidly, and to destroy the enemy and his equipment by supporting arms and/or ground attack.
- c. Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81 or 120mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.
  - (1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:
- (a) The base can be attacked from a greater distance with less risk of loss.
  - (b) Enemy knowledge of the terrain and local populace.
  - (2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:
- (a) The ability of friendly units to react rapidly, and to destroy the enemy and his equipment by supporting arms and/or ground attack.
- d. Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd Regiment and forces locally available.
  - (1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:
    - (a) His displayed unwillingness to relinquish control of the populace.
  - (2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:
    - (a) The severe defeats he has previously suffered in this area.
    - (b) His unwillingness to engage FWMAF in conventional warfare.
- e. Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available, while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops to the mountainous area.










- (1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:
- (a) Numerous supplies believed to be located within this area would justify delaying actions.
  - (2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:
    - (a) He would not want to relinquish control of the population.
    - (b) It is a major source of supply and an important LOC.
- f. Reinforce his present resition in the lat Marbiv's area of responsibility with the infiltration of additional troops from NVN or Central Laos.
  - (1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:
    - (a) Recent severe attrition of enemy forces in Central I Corps.
  - (2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:
- (a) Food is in such short supply presently that it is doubtful the enemy could logistically support another sizable unit in Central I Corps.
- g. Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LCC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.
  - (1) The following factors favor adoption of this expability:
- (a) It provides the enemy an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms capabilities.
  - (b) VC knowledge of the terrain and populace.
- (c) The enemy's belief that application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage continued U.S./FimaF participation in RVN.
- (d) Guerrilla and Local Force units can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while Main Force units conduct larger operations.
  - (2) Factors which militate against adoption of this capability:
- (a) The loss of small unit leaders to supervise conducting this type warfare.
- (b) The successes of the RD program will help retard their progressiveness in this area.





#### 5. Conclusions

- a. Enemy capabilities in relative probability of adoption:
  - (1) Capability 3.e.
- (a) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.
  - (2) Capability 3.a.(2)
    - (a) Attack CAC units in up to company reinforced strength.
  - (3) Capability 3.b.
- (a) Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd NVA Regiment, and forces locally available. In carrying out this capability, he would attack by ambush and fire.
  - (4) Capability 3.a.(3)
- (a) Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81 or 120mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.
  - (5) Capability 3.a.(1)
- (a) Attack Tien Phuoc CLIC camp and/or isolated ARVN outposts in up to and including regimental strength with the objective of ambushing friendly: reinforcing units.
  - (6) Carability 3.d.
- (a) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in the 1st MarDiv's area of responsibility with the infiltration of additional troops from NVN or Central Laos.
  - (7) Gapability 3.d.
- (a) Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops into the mountainous area.

#### b. Vulnerabilities

(1) The enemy is vulnerable to massed fires from air, artillery, and naval gunfire. Even his deepest base areas and lines of communications are vulnerable to attack by air. When closer to the coast or to friendly positions, any massed formation is subject to the coast or attack by artillery and naval gunfire in





addition to air. Being unable to effectively counter this fire power, the enemy must rely heavily on camouflage and circumspection in his activities in order to minimize this vulnerability.

- (2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations.
- (3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold, and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations limits his ability to react to friendly maneuvers unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.
- (4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained operations and agressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air, deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations.

E. B. SIGAGN, JA.

LIEUTANANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

#### ANNEX:

A. STRENGTH, LOCATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE ENTERY

DISTRIBUTION: "A" less 7, 12, 17-21, 37-67

"B" less 72, 76, 84, 98, 100, 191; plus 80 (15)

Copy t	3rd 1st 2nd SA, SA, FIC MCB MCB MCB CICV 1st 3rd 7th 9th 2nd	4 58 133  AIRCAV MAN Marines MAB Bn, 5th Marines	(5) (2) (8) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (4) (2)
		MarDiv	(2) (2)

11

- CONFIDENTIAL

USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.
Task Force Oregon
3rd CIT
CLIC

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS LOD DIR 5200.10

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF

(2) (15)

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A (STRENGTH, LOCATION, COMPOSITION) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREF PERINTREF NO. 11-67

#### Main Force

Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
2nd NVA Div	7460	AT 9421/ 26 June	AT 9421		c $\blacksquare$
RQ-20 Sig Bn	220	AT 9925/ 11 Jan	,,,,,,,		č
RQ-24 Engr Bn	120	BT 1733/ 21 Apr			Ċ
3rd NVA Regt	1073	BT 0255/ 21 Jun	BT 0422		C C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300		BT 0422		Ċ
lst Bn	300	BT 1349/ 14 May			Ċ
2nd Bn	223	BT 1336/ 13 May			Ċ
3rd Bn	250	AT 8651/ 9 Jun		5-82mm, 6-60mm mtr	Ċ
21st NVA Regt	1000	BT 2004/ 26 Jun	BT 2004	,,	Ċ
Hqs & Spt Unit	200	BT 2004/ 26 Jun	BT 2004	17-81mm mtr	C C C C C
		•	<b>-</b>	unk no 60mm mtr	J
				unk no 75mm RR	
lst Bn	200	BT 1527/ 17 May		6-60mm mtr	C
		• • • •		6-81mm mtr	J
				3-mg	
2nd Bn	200	BT 1526/ 17 May		3-60mm mtr	C
				2-81mm mtr	
	•			4-35mm mtr	
			•	3-57mm RR	
3rd Bn	400	BT 1525/ 17 May		3-60mm mtr	C
	·			5-81mm mtr	v
				4-57mm RR	
				4-30 cal mg	
				4 70 00T MB	

Local Force

DECLASSIFIED

Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
402nd Sapper Bn	342	BT 0664/24 Jun	AT 8060	3-81mm mtr 1-120mm mtr	C
2-20 Bn	450	BT 1153/26 Jun	AT 8458	1-20mm mtr 1-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR 2-mg 5-BAR	С
V.25 Bn	521	BT 0465/26 Jun	BT 1052	2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR	C
72nd Bn	300	BT 1709/14 Jun	B <b>T 2224</b>	4-60mm mtr 2-81mm mtr 3-57mm mtr 6-1mg	С
Q.12 Co	80	BT 1956/23 Jun	BT 1756	1-60mm mtr 9 smg	PROB
Q.13 Co	120	AT 9449/25 Jun		1-60mm mtr 1-30 Cal mg 9-AR	С
Q.14 Co	70	AT 8456/23 Jun		1-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 4-M-79	С
Q.15 Co	80	AT 9857/23 Jun		2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR	С
Q.16 CO	120	AT 9564/23 Jun		3-lmg 2-60mm mtr 1-81mm mtr 6-BAR	С

A-2

CONFIDENTIAL

Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
K-50 <b>Co</b>	70	BT 2224/9 Dec	BT <b>07</b> 40	1-57mm RR 1-60mm mtr	C
K-51 Co	70	BT 1747/7 Jun	BT 1536	3-30 Cal mg 2-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR	c •
K-52 Co	150	BT 2220/8 Jun	BT 1017	5-mg 1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR	C
K-54 Co	130	BT 2220/14 Jun	BT 1561	2-sng 1-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR	С
K-55 Co	100	BT 3329/5 Jun		2-mg 1-60mm mtr	С
706th Co	80	BT 3707/12 Jun		1-AA mg 2-30 Cal mg 1-AA mg	С
74th Co	50	BT 3611/9 May		1-60mm mtr 1-60mm mtr 1-30 Cal mg	С
14th Co	90	BT 2612/14Jun		1-57mm RR 1-hmg 1-60mm mtr 1-57mm RR	c 🌘

DECLASSIFIED

Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
2nd NVA Div	MR V	Agricultural Site #2, 620th Div, Nam	CG-BG Viet XO-BG Dao	20,601GM 2091 <i>5</i> GM
3rd NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Tu, Chi Lang Worksite #3, 64th Regt, 51st Regt, 31st Regt, 46th	PO-BG Do CO-LtCol Viet XO-Maj Tranh Anh Kien PO-Trong Thanh	Tay An
lst Bn 2nd Bn 3rd Bn	3rd NVA Regt 3rd NVA Regt 3rd NVA Regt	Regt, Factory #10 X1, CT3, Binh Minh X2, Binh Da Binh Thien, Mao Chu,	CO-Capt Thao CO-Ngu <b>y</b> en Tiep	20825
21st NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Nguyen Trai Worksite 21, 2nd, Regt, 36th Regt,	CO-Capt Thau CO-Pham Kiet XO-Dang Cong Kiet	
lst Bn	21st NVA Regt	Cong Truong 21, A-21 Bach Ma 11th Bn, 11th Workshop, An Chau	FO-Tien CO-Tinh XO-Na	
2nd Bn	21st NVA Regt	22nd Bn, 135th Bn, Cong Thanh	FO-Khoi CO-La XO-Can FO-Tha	
3rd Bn	21st NVA Regt	33rd Bn, 75th Bn (?) Long <sup>T</sup> hanh	CO-Dang Hung FO-Nguyen Co	
RQ-20 Bn	2nd NVA Div	RQ.20/B Bn, GK 30, RQ.20/A Bn, Ham Tu 2/c.	10-Mguyen 00	1803/CH
RQ-24 Bn	2nd Nva Div	GK-40	CO-Nguyen Ngoc Dong	

DECLASSIFIED

A-4

CONFIDENTIAL

Unit	Subordination	AKA	Fersonalities	LBN
402nd Sapper Bn	Danang City	т.89	CO-Nguyen Van Tran	21395GN
R-20 Bn	Quang Nam (P)	Q.N. Independence Bn, Doc Lap Bn, Hai Cang 20	XO-Sr. Lt. Thanh CO-Nguyen Van Lam	Dong Hai
V-25 Bn	Quang Nam (P)	Lam Br, 5th Bn	CO-Capt Thang XO-Tung PO-Khoa	
72nd Bn	Quang Tin (P)	н-65, н-68	CO-Thang Can Cao XO-Danh FO-Thanh	21,443GM
Q.12 Co	Hoi An City	Hoi An Co, X-62 Co	CO-Le Hien XO-Nguyen Ngoc	2102
Q.13 Co	Duy Xuyen (D)	Duy Xuyen Co, H-52, 103rd Co, Than Lap Co	CO-Tran Van Cam XO-Nguyen Chi Thien PO-Vo Ca Son	
Q.14 Co Q.15 Co	Dai Loc (D) Dien Ban (D)	Dai Loc Co, H-42 Co, Dien Ban Co, H-40 Co, H-55, 105th Bn, X-65	CO-Te Thanh CO-Nguyen Hy XO-Than Tu PO-Nguyen Ra	2105
Q.16 Co	Hoa Vang (D)	Hoa Vang Co, H-41, H-56, Q.16.B, 100 Co, Hoa Hieu Co	CO-Nguyen Doa XO-Nguyen Nhuong	2106
K.50 Co	Que Son (D)	Que Son Co, 105 Unit,	CO-Nguyen Thang Tung	

A-5

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

## CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
K. 51 Co	Thang Binh(D)	Thang Binh Co, A-10 F-14, D-21 107	CO-Khoa XO-Nguyen Than	
K.52 Co	Tien Phuoc (D)	A-13 Co, D-22, V-13	PO-Anh Vu CO-Ngo XO-Khanh	
K. 54 Co	Tam Ky (D)	A-16, C-73, V-12, N. Tam Ky	PO-Van CO-Cong XO-Toan	
K.55 Co	Tam Ky City	A-21, Co 75, V-15, Phi Po A-21 Pn, Flying	PO-Tich CO-Nguyen Lien	
706th Co	Quang Tin (P)	Tig <b>er,</b> 106th	CO-Nguyen Duy Nghia XO-Hoanh	2442GM
74th Co	Quang Tin (P)	V-74, V-20, 74th District Force Co	PO-Phuong CO-Thanh XO-Tran Tien	
L4th Co	⇔ Ly Tin (D)	K-53, A-19, V-14	PO—Phuong CO—Pham XO—Ha Dong PO—Khanh	

A-6

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

## CONFIDENTIA

# Ist MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

PERINTREP NO. 12-67

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF
AND RVNAF

CONFIDENTIAL

**DECLASSIFIED** 



First Marine Division (Rein)
Denang, Republic of Marine C41800H July 1967

Perintrep No. 12-67

Period covered: 260600H June to 030600H July 1967

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. The First Marine Division has the responsibility to conduct offensive operations in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Frovince areas.

### 2. Enemy Situation

### a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

### (1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. The weather for the reporting period was clear, permitting maximum use of air support throughout the period. Temperatures continued to be in the 90's, reaching 100 degrees on occasion. The winds were variable, and visibility increased to 10 miles. The moon was in the last quarter. During the next 7 days the moon will be in the new phase and illumination will not exceed 14%. (Refer to Annex B for Astronomical Data)

### b. Enemy Military Situation

- (1) Strength, Location and Disposition
  - (a) Refer to Annex A. First MarDiv Ferintrep 11-67
- (2) Availability of Reinforcements.
- (a) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in the 1st MarDiv's AOR with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.

### (3) Movements and Activities

- (a) Although incidents continued at the same level, no large scale contacts occurred. Earlier in the month contact with Main Torce NVarunits accounted for the high number of larger contacts. Only two significant incidents occurred during the week. At (AT 974717) on the 30th the Hoa Contraining Center received 25-30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. On the 2nd streeon patrol, Chargesheet, at (ZC 202491) received automatic weapons fire from an estimated 50 enemy. CS was used to break contact, and the patrol continued its mission without further incident.
- (b) Since the 26th recon has had only one significant sighting in the Que Son area. At (AT 955307) on 30 June 40 VC with weapons and helmets were seen moving to the southeast. Thirty six (36) enemy casualties resulted from the



fire mission called down ... ... con patrol Commanche. The mission was 100% on target.

- (c) In the Operation Calhoun/Beacon Torch area, local and guerrilla forces avoided contact. This is the first real pressure applied to these units since February and March, during Operations Canyon and Stone, when heavy enemy personnel losses were incurred. Operation Calhoun dealt the enemy severe setback, specifically, with the capture of 32 tons of rice. Thirty two tons of rice will feed an enemy company for three months. Recent ralliers and captives indicate that the food problem is not improving. In fact some say the only place they can be assured of a meal is at home. Documents captured during the operation mentioned the 620 unit and the GK-32 Bn. The 620 unit is an AKA for the Second NVA Division. The GK-32 Bn is an AKA for the RQ-22 Bn which is a support unit for the Second NVA Division and is reportedly equipped with 12-75 millimeter recoilless rifles.
- (d) Recently a female was apprehended carrying what appeared to be peach cans and beer cans. Upon closer examination it was discovered the cans contained an acid and an explosive material. By breaking the seal on the acid tube the liquid would flow into a metal arm which obstructs the firing pin, causing a delay of 20-25 minutes.

## c. Enemy Unconventional Warfare and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) Enemy activity of an unconventional and psychological nature continued at the same low level. . The most numerous were incidents involving mines, booby traps, and harassment against CAC units and RD teams. This type action can be expected to continue, and most probably will increase. Operations Arizona, Brown, Beacon Torch, and Calhoun have undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of these local forces and their desire to operate on battalion level. We can expect them to operate in no larger than company size units. However, the enemy is in want of a victory and we can expect that he will increase his actions involving small forces in an effort to gain local successes which will have a favorable effect upon the local populace.

## 3. Enemy Carabilities

#### a. Attack Capabilities

- (1) Attack Tien Phuoc CIDG camp or isolated outposts outside our TAOR in strength up to and including a regiment with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.
  - (2) Attack CAC units in company (rein) strength.
- (3) Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81 or 120mm mortar and/or 140mm rockets.





### b. Defense Capability

(1) Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd NVA Regiment, plus additional battalions subordimate to the 2nd NVA Division and VC Quang Nam Frovince.

### c. Delay Capability

(1) Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops into the mountainous area.

### d. Reinforcement Capability

(1) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in the lst Marine Division's area of responsibility with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.

#### e. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Capability

(1) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.

#### 4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

- a. Attack Tien Phuoc CIDG camp and isolated ARVN outposts in up to and including regimental strength with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.
  - (1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:
- (a) Isolated units and outposts offer the best targets for a quick thrust and rapid withdrawal, even for large scale attacks.
  - (b) The enemy has had past successes using this method of attack.
  - (c) The enemy's desires to achieve a tactical success.
  - (d) The terrain provides many access routes from the mountains.
  - (2) The following factor militates against adoption of this capability:
- (a) The demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy troop concentrations, and ability to react rapidly to destroy them by the use of supporting arms and/or by ground attacks.




#### DECLASSIFIED



- b. Attack CAC units in company (rein) strength.
  - (1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:
    - (a) The enemy's past successes against this type of target.
- (b) Enemy sapper units are organized and equipped to implement this capability.
  - (2) The following factor militates against adoption of this capability:
- (a) The ability of friendly units to react rapidly, and to destroy the enemy and his equipment by supporting arms and/or ground attack.
- c. Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 120mm mortars/81mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.
  - (1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:
- (a) The base can be attacked from a greater distance with less risk of detection and less risk of loss.
  - (b) Enemy knowledge of the terrain and local populace.
  - (2) The following factor militates against adoption of this capability:
- (a) The ability of friendly units to react rapidly, and to destroy the enemy and his equipment by supporting arms and/or ground attacks.
- d. Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd Regiment and forces locally available.
  - (1) The following factor favors adoption of this capability:
- (a) His displayed unwillingness to relinquish control of the populace in this area.
  - (2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:
    - (a) The severe defeats he has previously suffered in this area.
    - (b) His unwillingness to engage FWMAF in conventional warfare.
- e. Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available while withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops to the mountainous area.





- (1) The following factor favors adoption of this capability:
- (a) The desire to save numerous supplies and equipment believed to be located within this area.
  - (2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:
    - (a) His reluctance to relinquish control of the population.
    - (b) It is a major source of supply and an important LOC.
- f. Reinforce his present position in Central I Corps with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.
  - (1) The following factor favors adoption of this capability:
    - (a) Recent severe attrition of enemy forces in Central I Corps.
  - (2) The following factor militates against adoption of this capability:
- (a) Food is in such short supply presently that it is doubtful the enemy could logistically support another sizeable unit in Central I Corps.
- g. Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.
  - (1) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:
- (a) It provides the enemy an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms capabilities.
  - (b) VC knowledge of the terrain and populace.
- (c) The enemy's belief that application of this capability steadily wears down friendly forces and offers his best long range opportunity to discourage U.S./FWMAF participation in RVN.
- (d) Guerrana and local forces can hope to tie down friendly forces to static defense and reaction missions while Main lorce units conduct larger operations.
  - (2) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:
- (a) The loss of small unit leaders to supervise conducting this type warfare.
- (b) The success of the RD program will help retard their progressiveness in this area.







## 5. Conclusions

- a. Enemy capabilities in relative probability of adoption:
- (1) Capability 3.e. Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LCC's, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities and the use of mines and booby traps.
- (2) Capability 3.a.(2) Attack CAC units in up to company (rein) \*\* strength.
- (3) Capability 3.b. Defend in the Que Son Valley with the 3rd NVA Regiment, and forces locally available. In carrying out this capability he will attack by ambush and fire.
- (4) Capabilities 3.8.(3) Attack by fire, facilities within the Danang combat base utilizing 81mm mortars/120mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.
- (5) Capability 3.a.(1) Attack Tien Phuoc CIDC camp and/or isolated ARVN outposts in up to and including regimental strength with the objective of ambushing friendly reinforcing units.
- (6) Capability find. The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present position in I Corps with the infiltration of additional forces from NVN or Central Laos.
- (7) Capability (.e. Delay in the vicinity of the Que Son Valley with forces locally available whole withdrawing supplies, communications equipment, command elements, and troops into the mountainous area.

#### b. Vulnerabilities

- (1) The enemy is valuerable to masked fire from air, artillery, and naval guns. Even his deepest base areas and lines of communications are vulnerable to attack by air. When closer to the coast or to friendly positions, any massed formation is subject to detection and subsequent attack by artillery and naval gunfire in addition to air. Being unable to effectively counter this fire power, the enemy must rely heavily on camouflage and circumspection in order to minimize this volumerability.
  - (2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations.
- (3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold, and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations limits his ability to react to friendly maneuvers, unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.



(4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air, deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations.

8.3. - Jan - 7

LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE COMPS ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEX: A. ASTRONOMICAL DATA

Distribution: "A" less 7,12,17-21,37-67
"B" less 72,76,84,98,100,191; plus 80 (15)

Copy to:	TIT MAF	(5)
	3rd Mardiv	(5)
	1st AAW	(2)
	2nd NOKAC Bde	(8)
	SA, Quang Tin Sector	(1)
	SA, Quang Ngai Sector	(1)
	SA, UNSS Adv Orp, Hoi An	(1)
	FLC	(1)
	MCB 1	(1)
	MCB 4	(1)
	₩CB 58	(1)
	CICV	(1)
	1st AIRCAV	(1)
	3rd MAW	(1)
	7th Marines	(2)
	9th MAB	(15)
	2nd Bn, 5th Harines	(4)
	5th MarDiv	(2)
	USAC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning Ga.	(2)
	Task Force Oregon	(2)
	31d CIT	(2)
	CLIC	(9)
		(3)


DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10


RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF

UNCLASSIFIED


## **DECLASSIFIED**

ANNE	A X	ASTRO	NCMICAL D	ATA) TO 18	ST MARDIV	FERINTREP	NO 12-67		
DATE	;	BMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EdCT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	MCON HASE	% ILLUM
JULX	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	0588 0588 0559 0559 0559 0600 0600 0601 0601	0621 0621 0622 0622 0622 0623 0623 0624 0624	1923 1923 1923 1923 1923 1923 1923 1922	1946 1946 1946 1946 1946 1946 1945	0835 0934 1032 1128 1224 1322 1420 1522 1645	2148 2232 2313 2353  0033 0115 0200 0250	1ST QTR	06 13 21 31 42 54 65 76 85
	19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	0601 0601 0602 0602 0602 0603 0603 0603	0624 0624 0625 0625 0625 0625 0626 0626 0626	1922 1922 1922 1922 1922 1921 1921 1921	1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1944 1944 1943	1728 1828 1923 2012 2056 2135 2211 2244 2317 2350	0345 0444 0545 0645 0742 0837 0927 1016 1103 1149	FULL	92 97 99 100 98 94 88 81 73
AUG	29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0604 0605 0605 0605 0606 0606 0606 0606	0627 0628 0628 0628 0629 0629 0629 0629 0630 0630 0630	1920 1919 1918 1918 1917 1917 1916 1916 1915 1915	1943 1942 1942 1941 1941 1940 1940 1939 1939 1938 1938	0025 0144 0231 0323 0420 0622 0622 0622 0724 0823 0922 1919	1236 1324 1509 1606 1703 1759 1942 1942 1942 2028 2111 2151 2232	1ST QTR NEW	55 45 36 27 19 11 02 02 00 01 05 11





R 010343Z JUN 67 5/5 FM CF FIRST MARDIV REIN TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC (KOO5) INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV ZEN/CG III MAF ZEN/CG FIRST MAW RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARD IV RUMHIA/CG TASK FORCE OREGON RUMHFL/CG FORLOGOND ZENCLIC ZEN/FIRST MARDIV ADCON BĪ UNCLASE FT 0 EFFECTIVE 010900H JUN 67 I ASSUMED COMMAND OF FIRST MARDIV REIN FMF. MOEN FORM J. ROBERTSON




PAGE TWO RUMBLA GROTE S F C R F T E. FIRST MARDIV PO) SEC. 2C (CSCI) F. THIRD MARDIN PRESS. 2E (CCI) LETE SOMPLAINCE WITH REF A ROUGH RIDER COVOYS SCHEDULED 11 AND 12 JUNE TO MOVE FLMS FIRST FAG TO PHU BAI. 2. FOR CG III MAF A. REQUEST PROVIDE THREE M-36 TRUCKS AND SUITABLE PRIDERING FOR CONVEYS. B. REGUEST ESTABLISH PRIDRITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USF OF 1.00 S. 3. FOR CG THIRD MARD IV A. REQUEST PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOY APPRICK EIGHTY VEH ARRIVING PHU BAI 11JUN AND BILLFTING AND MESSING FACILITIES FOR CONVOY PERSONNEL. TO REQUEST OPGARIZE CONVOY 12 JUNE AND PROVIDE SPT LESS INF SOTY AND ENGR SPI. COTHIS HO TO PROVIDE CONVOY SCTY OF PIFLE PLAT REIN W/ MATY FO, FAC, ENGR SPT, COM VEH AND WEECKERS. Do RECUEST P ROVIDE RIFLE CO(-) REIM AS CONVO Y RESERVE WHILE POUGH RIDER IN THIRD MARDIN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. IN CHOP POINT ECUMDARY BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD MARD IV.

PAGE THREE RUMBLA 0807E S E C R E T 4. FXECUTION: A. SEVENTH MAR: REF B DE ELEVENTH MAR & PEF B AS APPLICABLE C. FIRST MT BN: REF B AS APPLICABLE D. FIRST ENGR DN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3. C. REF 3 E. COORD INST: (1) REFS B&C AS APPLICABLE FOR CONVOYS DANAMG TO PHU BAI, ADMIN MOVEMENT. (2) CHECK POINTS: REFS C AND D. (3) D DAY H HOUP. (A) DANANG TO PHU BAI: 119900H JUN 67 (B) PHU BAI TO DANANG: 120900H JUNE 67 OR AS ARD IV. DIRECTED BY CG THIRD (4) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR CTHER CONDITIONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY. (5) DIR LAUTH ALCON 5. COMM ELFCT A. REFS E AND F. E. SEVENTH MAR: MCNITOR THIRD MARDIV TAC 1, M-15, FRE 0 2244 COMMENCING 0830H UNTIL CONVOY ARRIVES DESTRINATION EACH DAY OF SCHED. GP-4 ET

SECRET

CONFIDENT



Chen


G-3

P 090257Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ELEVENTH MAR
INFO CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
CHANGE OF OPCON (U)
A. CG III MAF 2423221 MAY 67
1. IAW REF A ASSUMED OPCON 1ST PLAT 1ST ARMD AMPH CO 072250H
JUN 67. OPCON FURTHER ASSIGNED 11TH MARINES 072250H JUN 67.
BT

CONFIDENTIAL



CC



P 110445Z JUN 67

PM CG FIRST MARDIV RIIN 6,5

TO ZENZCG III MAF

INFO ZENZFIFTH MAR

ZENZFIRST ENGR BN

ZENZSFYENTH ENGR 8H

ZENZMINTH ENGR BN

BI

SECRET FNGR SUPPORT (U)

A CG III MAF 0805482 JUN 67

1. IN SPT TASKS ASSIGNED BY REF A, UNODIR INTEND CONSOLIDATE HPESENT PSNS FIRST BN FIFTH MAR AT NUT LAC SOM/VIST AND AND VIC QUE SON, AND ESTAB COMBAT BASE FOR FIFTH MAR HO AND THIRD BN FIFTH MAR VIC THANG SINH. MISSIOM INCLUDES ACTIVE DEFENSE OF LOC'S AND RD PRICRITY AREAS, DESIRUCTION OF EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES IN THANG SINH - TAM KY - GUF SON AREA-AND BASE AREA ALG, AND EXTENSION OF GVN INFLUENCE THEREIN. INTEND TO REQUEST AREA OF OPERATION VICE TYTENSION OF TACR FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION.

PAGE TWO RUMBLA 1277E S E C R E T

2. LSA WILL BE REPOSITIONED PM TAM MY TO THANG BINH TO SPT
ABOUT 1 JULY.

3. BASAD ON ABOVE, PROUTST ENGA SPT ON NATIONAL PTE ONE BIWN
MOI AM AND TAM MY VITH FOL PRIORITY: PPI AN TO THANG BINH.
FIRST PRECRITY, TAM MY TO THANG BINH. SFCOND PRIORITY.

SPT FOR EVER FORCES ON FIFTH MAR.

J. TO DEBMIS FIRST EVER BUT OF TOURISH POUR NATE RIE
OFF TO MEENING FIRST EVER BUT OF TOUR BUT UPGRADING
HIL IA WYOT FIRST EVER BUT, FIRST ENGE PM WILL COMMENCE WORK
OF OUR SON ROAD WHEN MAIL RIS ONE OPEN TO PERMIT MOVEMENT OF
HEASAN WILL AND ROULD.







C 120149Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIPST MAR
FIFTH MAR
SEVENTH MAR
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
FIRST RECON BN — COMP
INFO CG III MAF
CG FMAW

SECRET

H

AG O 71-67 (CPNS RELATED TO CPN BEACON TOPCH)

SITUATION. COMMENCING OVA 18JUN67 SLF BRAVO EXECUTES CPN

BEACON TORCH, LANDING ON LITTORAL SOUTH OF HOL AN BY HELICOPTER

AND LANDING CRAFT AND SWEEPING WESTWARD TO CARRY OUT DETAILED

S&D BTWN NATL PTE ONE AND EASTERN EDGE OF BASE AREA 116.

MISSION. FIRST MARDIV CONDUCTS OPNS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE TAOR

TO ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM DESITY OF EN FORCES WITHIN SLF TARGET

AREA AND TO PROFIT FM EN MOVEMENTS ADJACENT TO THIS APEA.

3. EXECUTION.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1348F S E C R E T

A. FIRST MAR.

(1) COMMENCING 18 JUN 67 CONDUCT OPN BROWN, BN MINUS SAD OPN ON GO NOI ISLAND AND ENVIRONS TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, JPPLIES AND FACILITIES IN AREA.

CONDUCT LIAISON WITH GUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE IN FFFORT
TO OBTAIN ARVN PARTICIPATION TO EXPAND OPN TO INCLUDE ENTIRE
AREA VIC DUY XUYEN, I.F. SCUTH OF TACK AND BOUNDED ON SOUTH BY
SONG THU BON, SONG BA REN AND ROAD BYWN BY 061510 AND BY 073519.
(3) COORDINATE WITH SEVENTH MAP AND SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
FOR DESIRED OPNS WITH THEIR SECTORS OF PESPONSIBILITY.
B. FIFTH MAR

(1) COMMENCING NLT 18JUN67 CONDUCT OPN ADAMS, REGT MINUS CPNS IN THANG BINH - QUE SON AREA WEST OF NATL RTF THE AND SOUTH OF AREA BOUNDED BY LIME FM BT 175419 TO BRIDGE AT BT 138408 WESTWARD ALONG SUCI CHO DUN TO INTERSECTION WITH TAOR AT AT 994410.

©) CONDUCT LIAISON WITH SIXTH REGT SECOND ARVN DIV TO ARRANGE FOR COINCIDENTAL ARVN CLEARING OPN FAST OF HIGHWAY SOUTH OF LINE FM BT 253460 TO BT 214432 ALONG ROAD TO INTERSTCTION



JLUNLI DECLASSIFIED








PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1348E S E C R E T WITH NATL RTE ONE. C. SEVENTH MAR. CONDUCT OPN ARIZONA COMMENCING 14JUN67 IN NEW CASTLE AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG VU GIA. ON EAST BY SONG THU ROW-SONG TINH YEN, ON SOUTH BY E-W GLAS AND ON WEST BY TACK. CONCEPT PASEP. D. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR. (1) IAW SEP INSTRUS PROVIDE FORCES TO SEVENTH MAR FOR CPN ARIZONA. (2) UPON CONCLUSION OPN ARIZONA COMPUCT ACTIVE PATROLLING AND AMBUSHING IN CO STRENGHT VIC 65 AT 9545. AT 9646 AND AT 9747. E. FIRST RECON BN IAW INSTRUS PASE PROVIDE RECCU SPT FOR OPH REACON TORCH AND RELATED OPNS. F. COORD INSTRUS (I) DIRLAUTH ALCON. (2) AO OF OPN BEACON TORCH FOLLOWING CHOP TO FIRST MARDIV BOUNDED ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON SOUTH BY LINE FM BT 253460 TO BT 214438 ALONG SOUTH SIDE ROAD TO INTERSECTION WITH NATL PTY ONE TO BRIDGE AT BY 138408 WESTWARD ALONG SUCI CHO DUN TO INTER-

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1348E S E C R E T SECTION WITH TAOR AT AT 9944IN, ON WEST BY TACK, AND ON MORTH BY ROAD FM BT 003519 TO BT 061510, THEMOS ALONG SONG BA REN TO SONG THU BON TO SOUTH CHINA SEA. (3) INF UNITS (A) PROVIDE CONCEPT SUBJ OPNS TO THIS HO MIT 14 1200H JUN67. (B) BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT CONTACTS IN AC'S AND TO ASSUME OPCON ADDL FORCES FOR THIS PURPOSE. (C) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO TERMINATE SUPJ OPN AND PROVIDE ADDL FORCES TO EXPLOIT COMPACTS ELSEWHERE WITHIN OR OUTSIDE TAOR. (4) EST DURATION OPN BEACON TORCH: 9-12 DAYS. 6) DESIRED DURATION RELATED OPNS: MINIMUM 5 DAYS, NOTIFY THIS HO 24 HRS PRICE DESIRED TERMINATION. **P-4** 

**SECRET** 

DECLASSIFIED



N. SERINW 一个生产,增生的50 ZENZELHUZ-T - HODE ZENZETEST PECON BN ZENZ PERST OF BN RUMHFL/CG FLC

SECRET

FRAG 0 72-67 (OPN ARIZONA) (U)

AL CO FIRST MAR LTP 3/LAP/FUG OF PJUNG" (NOTAL)

B. FIRST MEPO IV 100 12014 PZ JUN67 (MOTEL)

1. COMPENSION REJUNET SEVENCE MA MINUS BEIN CONDUCTS THREE TO FIVE DAY SED OPN IN NEW CASILY APPA BOUNDED ON MORTH BY SONG ON EAST BY SONG THE BON-SONG THENH YEN, ON SOUTH BY ON MEST BY TAMP JAW CONCEPT CONTAINED REFS A E-W GL 45 AND AND S.

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1354F S E C P S T

2. EXECUTION

A . FIFTH MAP : CHOP ONE RIFLY OF REIN WITH ONE SECT RIMM MORIARS TO STUPNIH MAR TO APPILE SEVENEH MAR SPOTOR NET 1314 MAR JUNE7.

B. SEVENTH MAD

(I) CONCEPT OF TAINED REF A APPROVED. EXPORTE OPN

ARIZONA.

(2) PECEIVE AND EMPLOY ONE PIFLY OF RESMITM FIFTH MAR

FOR PERIOD 13-17 JUNES RETURN OF TO POINT DESIGNY FIFTH MAR

NLT 171200H JUN67.

(3) RECEIVE OF CMD GRP AND THE RIFLE COS PPIN FM

SECOND BY FIRTH MAR FOR EMPLOYMENT OF OPE OR IZONA, TRANSFERS

CPCOV AT YETHALLY AGREEABLE TIME ARE PLACE.

SECOND BY TIFTH MAR'S CHOP BE OND GRP AND TWO RIFLE CO'S REIN TO

SEVENTH MAR AS INDICATED AROUT FOR EMPROYMENT OPR ARIZONA

D, ELEVENTH MAR

(1) FROWIDE APTY SPI AS HEROLIPPE.

(E) PROVINE ARMO AMPH SPI AS DECUTEED.

E. FIRST RELCH AN: PROVIDE PENCY SPT AS EVOCURED.

F. FIRST SP BOX PROVIOR MS 1 421 AS PERMAND.

P: GS 3 RUSH 14 (354F S F C R F )

EL COORD INSTANS.

(:) DIRLAUT - ALCON.

W) EST DURATION, THREE TO TIVE DAYS.

CO ALL DETACHMENTS ABOVE APPEAR PARAMETERS OF TERMINA

ALION OF NEEDS OFFFEREE SECTIFIED.

3. PEOUSS CO FMAN PROVIDE FYLD SPECION CRITICAL TWO CO ING SOFT DEDAYS GOD MYD EVAC GND LOG SOE DERING OFN, AS DESCUSSED


RIF PROM 2-23 AT COURS COME SERVETH U.M.






**DECLASSIFIED** 











P 120825Z JUN 67
RM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO SEVENTH MAR
INFO CG FMAW


S E C R E T
TERMINATION OPN PUTLER (U)
A. III MAF COC 120511Z JUN 67
1. IAW REF A TERMINATE OPN BUTLER AS CF 121600H JUN 67.
CP-4
ET

SECRET DECLASSIFIED





and down



R DIC Anc

P 121455Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN G
TP ZEN/FIRST AT BN
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

BT SECRET

RESTRICTION ON ONTOS EMPLOYMENT

A. CG III MAF 371118Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 121021Z MAY 67

1. REF A EFFECTS STANDOWN ON USE OF 10SMM RR OF ONTOS WHILE MALFUNCTIONS THAT WPN BEING INVESTIGATED AND REMEDIED.

2. REF B CURTAILED USE OF ONTOS TO STATIC DEFENSIVE PSNS ONLY, WITH MOVEMENT RESTRICTED TO THAT NECESSARY FOR MAINTENANCE.

3. REF B CANCELLED. EMPLOYMENT OF ONTOS ARMOR. MACHINE

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1430E SECRET
GUN AND CROSS COUNTRY MOBILITY AUTHORIZED IN SPT OF INFANTRY IN FIELD, FOR ROAD SECURITY PATROLS, AND AS ESCORT
FOR CONVOYS AND REACTION FORCES.
4. 126MM RR WILL NOT BE USED EXCEPT IAW REF 4, I.E.
MAY BE LOADED AND FIRED ONLY IN CASE OF EMERGENCY.

EXAMPLE PROVIDED BY REF A: FIXED PSN BEING OVERRUN BY EN FORCES AND ALL AVAILABLE FIRE POWER NEEDED TO DESTROY ATTACKING FORCE. NO ONTOS 105MM RR WILL BE LOADED EXCEPT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS.

5. MOUNTING OF TWO .50 CAL MACHINE GUNS EACH ON NO MORE THAN TEN ONTOS IS AUTHORIZED IF ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT MODIFICATION OF VEHICLE.


GP-4
BT











OP 130805Z JUN 67 PM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN IU ZENT PMAW 6-3 ZEN/FIFTH MAR ZEN/SEVENTH MAP N/ELEVENTH MAR MINIFIRST RECON BN ZEN/FIRST AT BN ZEN/FIRST SP BN INFO RUMHFL/CG FLC H SECRET CHANGE ONE TO FRAG O 72-67 (OPN ARIZONA) (U) A. CG FIRST MARDIV 120239Z JUNE7 1. MODIFY REF A AS FOL: A. CHANGE PARAS 2. F. AND 2. G. TO 2. G. AND 2. H. RESPECT IVELY. B. INSERT NEW PAPA 2.F. AS FOL: FIRST AT BN: PROVIDE CO REIN IN SUPPOPT. GP-4 Ħ





DE R MMLA 1625E 1855103 ZNA 98888 P 740703Z JUN 67 EM OG FIRST MARDIV REJN TO FIRST HAR FIF14 MAR SZVENTH MAR SECOND BN FIFTH MAR INFO FIRST RECGN BN



SECTION ONE OF TWO
SECTION ONE OF TWO
FLANNING SCIDANCE FOR JULY 67 (U)
A: III MAF INTERLIGE NOE ESTIMATE 16-66 (I CTZ).
B: CO FIRST MARDIV 260545% JAN67 (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT).
C: I CORPS COORD INSTR 05539.1 OF 4 JAN 67 (CONTROL, DISPOSITION, AM SAFEGUARDING OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND 1000 SUPPLIES).
D: JACV DIRECTIVE 525-3 OF 7 SEP 67 (COMBAT OPERATIONS, MINSTIZING VON-COMBATANT CASUALTIES).

PAGE 2 RUMBLA 1:25E S & C R E T AND COURT FAIRS FOR BULY ST TO ARRIVE THIS HO NLT 1718ECH JUNST. FOREST FIR EACH EN OR LARGER OPM:

IL PROVIDE THIS HE WITH PLANNED BY OR LARGER CANS

AL CORTAIN GROUP

B. SIZE OF UNIT(S) PARTICIPATING

E. FORCE/S4 I CORPS OFDER 3342, 3

G. TYPE OPEN FION

T. AREA OF CHECKETAIN GERERAL AREA BY GRIDLINES, GIVING NORTHERY BOUNDARY FROST, THEN BASTERN, SOUTHERN, AND WESTIGES BY TRAT ORDER.

IN TIME OUR OFFICH COME TO BE CONDUCTED (FIRST OR LAST BALLE OF THE FY).

2. FRIEDLAGRIMOR REF A AND MERRENT FIRST MARDIV ISUMS ONA PER LARRAGE SERVICES.

3. HEF B TRUMINES CUIDANCE FOR FIRST MARDIN SPT OF

REVOLUTIONARY Divelopment program.

A. REFS C THROUGH E ESTAB POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR CONTROL. DISPOSITION, AND SAFEGUARDING OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND FOCO SUPPLIES AND FOR MINIMIZING NO N-COMBATANT CASUALTIZE. THESE REFS ARE TO BE REVIEWED AND REFM-PRASIZED TO ALL PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH REQUESTING AD MEETING.

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMBUA 1825E S E C R E T 5. CONCEPT.

- A. CONTINUE LEGENSE OF BASE AREAS, AIRFIELDS, AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES IN ASSIGNED AREÂS.
- B. EXPLOID SUPERIOR POSILITY AND FIRE POWER, EM-PHASIZING PRINCIPLES OF MASS, SURPRISE AND ECONOMY OF
- THE ACCELERATE TEMPO OF OFFENSIVE OPNS UTILIZING MAXIMUM FLEXIBLEITY IN THE SHIFTING OF FORCES.
- U. MAINTAIN PELENTLESS PRESSURE ON EN BASE AREAS AND LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS AND SYSTEMS, TO INCLUDE SUR-VEILLANCE, RECOGNAISSANCE, AND OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS,
- E. RETAIN INDICATIVE AGAINST COMMUNIST MAIN FORCES; CONGURRENCE! PREVENT GUERRILLA AND VC LOCAL FORCES FROM GAINING ACCESS TO POPULATION CENTERS.

  X P. EIPHOSIZE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION
- WHILE MAINIAINING QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY TO RESPOND
- TO SURRENT INTERLIGENCE.

  9. INTERNITY THAN INATIVE REVCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPNS TO DEPLOTE TOTAL OR FOREITIAL FRICTIONS AMONG DIVERSE
- FR FURTER AND BETWEEN EN FORCES AND FORMATION OF MAKE
  - F. PROVIDE VEGOROUS SUPPORT TO CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN FIRTHERS WE OF REVOLUTED HARRY DEVELORMENT.
- I. US MENT OF ARACTERIST DAKEN VERY GOOD WEATHER CONDITIONS AND AREA OF CORRECTED AND TO IMPROVE AND EX-TEND RECOMMENSE NCEZSURVE BLANCE OPMS, S. WESTERGLE OFFE FOR JULY 187 WILL BE PLANNED TO IN-OLUBES
- A. EMPADIME O DE AROYSEOS, SUFES WILL BE AVAILABLE. MARO DE DURANCE JULY RECOGNIZADO THAT THIS FORCE IS UNIQUELY ORGANIZED FOR A AFID EMPLOYMENT IN SUPPORTING CURRENT CANS OR IS CAPABLE OF SERVING AS A RESERVE ELEMENT, COMMANDERS ARE REQUESTED TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE SLF, PRIMARILY IN THE ROLE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPNS.
- B. MEUTRALIZATION EN BASE AREAS IN PROXIMITY TO NATIONAL PRODRITY AREAS, KIY POPULATION CENTERS, AND VITAL SECRET

PAGE D RUBBE A 1525E S E C R D T

C. PROVISION OF AREA SECURITY FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRES AND THE PREVENTION OF EN EXCURSIONS INTO AREAS UNDERGOING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, IN THIS CONNECTION, SUPPORT TO THE MAXIMUM FEASIBLE EXTENT ALL PHASES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

D. PROVISION FOR RECCTION FORCES TO BE EMPLOYED IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK ON CAPS, DISTRICT/SUB SECTOR HQ, AND RD THS.

E. OPEMING, SECURING, UPGRADING/MAINTAINING AND USING SURFACE LCC'S WHICH WILL FACILITATE CURRENT AND PLANNED OPNS AND WHICH WILL SUBSECUENTLY IMPROVE ECONOMIC POSTURE OF RVN.

F. PROVISION OF SECURITY FOR ENGINEER, CONSTRUCTION, AND OTHER FORCES TASKED WITH SURVEYS AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN ASSIGNED AREAS.

G. COMPLICE OF GOLDEN PLEECE AND COUNTY FAIR OPNS AS APPROPRIATE.

H. PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE AND INDIRECT SUPPORT TO GVM DURING ELECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PUBLISHED POLICY. 1. ENPHREIS OF AGGRESSIVE SHALL UNIT TACTICS

PAGE 6 RUMBLA 1625E S E C A E 1 EN PHASIZING TACTICAL SURPRISE. EXPAND SCOPE AND INCREASE NUMBER OF NIGHT OPERATIONS. CONTACT, ONCE MADE WITH THE )EN, IS TO BE MAINMAINED BY AGGRESSIVE AND RELENTLESS PUR-SUIT.

J. SUFFORT OF THE CAC PROGRAM TO EXPAND
AND IMPROVE LEADERSHIP AND CAPABILITIES OF EACH CAC UNIT
AND TO ENSURE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.

K. INCREASED USE OF LONG RANGE PATROLS AND LONG RANGE COMBAT PATROLS.

L. EMPHASIS ON COORDINGTION BETWEEN USING UNITS AND FIRST MAW TO ENSURE EFFICIENT USE OF CH-SS MELICOPTERS. 7. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE.

A. FIRST MAS

CID RENDER MAKINUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO FIFTY-FIRST ARVNEEDT IN CONDUCT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IAW REF 3.

(2) EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE BY RAPID REACTION OPNS IN AREA SOUTH OF TAGR.

(3) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN COASTAL BT

SECRET

SECRET SESSION TO THE SESSION OF THE

FM CS FIRST MARDIV REIN TO FIRST MAR FIFTH HAR SEVENER HAR SECOND BY MATH MAR INFO FIRST RECON BN BT

6-3

SECRET - Final Spotion of two AREA SOUTH OF FOI AN.

(4) CONTINUE CLEARING / SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN TAOR,

B. FIFTH LAP

(1) COMPLETE OPNS WITH CEDECTIVE TO DESTROY EN FORCES AND RESOURCES IN VICINITY OF AND WITHIN EN BASE AREA 116 AND TO NEUTRALIZE THAT BASE AREA, WITH A MAJOR OPN PLANNED THAT AREA IN CONJUNCTION WITH SECOND BN, FIFTH MAR DURING FIRST HALF JULY.

(2) CONTINUE CLEARING OPMS AGAINST GUERILLAA AND MAIN FORCE ELMS IN HIEP DUC VALLEY.

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1525E SECRET

- (3) CONTINUE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN OPERATING AREA. C. SEVENTH HAR
- (1) RENDER MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO FIFTY. FIRST ARVIN REGT COMPUCT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVILOPMENT PROGRAM IAW REF B.
- (2) CONDUCT APPROPRIATE OPNS TO INCREASE INFLUENCE SOUTHWEST PORTION DAI LOC DISTRICT SEVENTH MAR SECTOR OF TAOR
- (3) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OFN IN HAPPY VALLEY AREA (WEST OF TAOR GENERALLY ALONG E-W GL 66) DURING LATTER HALF OF JULY.
- (4) COWING SURVEILLANCE OF AREA SOUTH OF SONG THU BON, INCLUDING LIKELY INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM WEST.
- (5) COMTINUE CLEARING/ SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN TAOR.

D. SECOND BN. FIFTH MAR

- (1) CMTINÚE TO INCREASE AREA OF INFLUENCE IN NOING SON AND ANTENNA VALLEY AREAS BY MACCELERATING PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES THAT AREA.
- (2) CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF LIKELY INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM SOUTH AND SOUTH WEST

PAGE 3 RUMPLA 1826E SE CRET

- (3) CONDUCT SED OPN OF APPROPRIATE SIZE IN SOME THU BON VALLEY SOUTH OF HONG SON.
- (4) CONTINUE CLEARING/SEARCH AND DESTROY OPMS IN TAOR, INCLUDING OPN IN CONJUNCTION WITH FIFTH MAR IN EN BASE AREA 116 IN LATTER HALF JULY. GP-4

37

**SECRET** 



PP RUALBUG RUMHAL RUMWWW DE RUVALA 1785E 1670148 ZNY SSSSS OP 160145Z JUN 57 FM CG FIRST MARDIN REIN TO ZEW CO III MAP INFO ZENZCG FRAW RUMHFL/CG FLC RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE RUM NV H/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE RUMNVH/SA SE COND ARVIN DIV ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON) BT SEC RET CONEPT OF OPN ADAIR (U) 1. MISSION, COMMENCING 15 JUNEY FIFTH MAR MINUS ROIN CONDUCTS S&D OPN IN THANG BINH-QUE SON AREA BOUNDED ON EAST BY NATL RIE ONE, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 28, ON WEST BY N-S GL 96 AND TAOR. AND ON MORTH BY SUOI CHO DUN FM VIC AT 994410 THROUGH BT010391 EASTWARD TO BRIDGE AT BT138408), THENCE TO BT175419, TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES OR FACILITIES THEREIN. 2. CONCEPT. AT H-S THIRD BN MINUS FIFTH MAR MOVES OVERLAND FM VIC HILL 29 TO AO. COMMENCING H-HOUR FIFTH MAR MINUS REIN

PAGE TWO RUMPLA 1785E S E C R E T CONDUCTS SAD EAST OF THE SON IN AREA OF HVY CONTACT OF OPNS UNION I AND UNION II. OPN MARKS INITIAL EMPLOYMENT ARMOR IN QUE SON AREA. 3. TASK ORGANIZATION FIFTH MAR (-) ( REIN) CMD GRP FIRST BN CMD GRP TWO COMPANIES THIRD BN CMD GRP THREE COMPANIES CO A(-), FIRST TK EN DET FIRST ENGR BN DET FIRST SP BN DET 4. D-I AY, 15JUN67 5. HoHOUR. TO BE DETERMINED. S. EST DURATION. FIVE TO TEN DAYS. GF-4 BT

FF BLAUBJG RUMKEL RUMNVH DE RUMHLA 1786E 1675147 TMY SSSES

153147Z JUN 57 FIRST MARRIN REIN

TO ZEN/CG III MAP INFO ZEN/CG FMAW RUMHFL/CG FLC

RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE RUM NVH/SA GUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)

PT

SECRET

照明CEPT OPN BROWN (U)

😘 MISSION. COMMENCING ON OR ABOUT 13 JUN 67 FIRST MAR CONDUCTS BM WORTH BY SONG KY LAM, SONG DIEN BINH, SONG CAU LAU AND SONG HOI AN BIWN COORDS AT945544 AND BT196569, AND SOUTH BY SONG THU BON, SONG BA REN, ROAD BIWN BIGG1510 AND BI003519, AND SONG BA REN TO AT945544, TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCÉS. SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES THEREIN. OR IN ADJACENT AREAS IN COORDINIEION WITH UNIT CONCERNED.

CONCEPT AT H-HOUR D-DAY SECOND EN MINUS REIN ENTERS GO HOI ISLAND FROM VIC AT9554 AND ATTACKS EASTWARD. SEMULTANEOUSLY ARVN FORCES CONDUCT DETAILED S&D OPN IN

PAGE TWO RUNHLA LTSSE S E C R E T = EASTERN PORTION OF AREA. A, TASK GREANIZATION

SECOND BN FIRST MAR (-) (REIN) GID GRP

CO G

CO C: FIRST BN FIRST MAR DET. FIRST SP BN

DET, FIRST ENGR BN

1 PLT AT

AHVN FORCES

FOURTH BN FIFTY-FIRST REGIMEN RANGER BN

2-4 APC TRP

- D-DAY, H-HOUR. ISU600H JUN67. TENTATIVE

BU EST DURATION. FIVE DAYS.

- P- A

bΤ



SECRET •





DE RUMBLA (886E 161)237 ZNY 88884 O 161237/ UUN 67

PM PG PIRST MERDIV FUIR

TO CO THE MAS INFO ELEVENTH MAS

BI

SECRET

SECURITY OF MAJOR BRIDGES (U): A. CG III MAF 051234Z JUN 67

1. 1AW REF A FOL ADDITIONAL INFO SUBMITTED CONCERNING SECURITY OF MAJOR BRIDGES:

A. SONG CU DE (NAMO) BRIDGE

ONE TANK MOUNTED XE NON SEARCHLIGHTS AND SEARCHLIGHT IN SUE.

(2) FOR ANYPRS-1 (SID) INSTALLED ON LAND AND

WATER

(3) MP PERSONNEL NOW STATIONED AT BRIDGE FOR TRAFFIC CONTROL.

(4) BOAT REQUESTED. SHOULD BE AVAIL WITHIN SEVEN DAYS.

(5) STARLIGHT SCOPES NOT AVAILABLE.

PAGE TWO RUNHLA 1886E S E C R E T . . . .

(6) LOT PERSONNEL NOW CONDUCTING REGULAR UN-SCHEDULED UNDERWATER INSPECTIONS.

B. HILL 55 BRIDGE: SOME FIELDS OF FIRE HAVE BEEN CLEARED: ADDITIONAL

BULLDOZER WORK HAS BEEN SCHEDULED.

C. OLD DAI LOC BRIDGE. NEW DAI LOC BRIDGE COMPLETED EARLY JUNE. ALTHOUGH APPROPRIATE SECURITY BEING MAINTAINED OLD DAI LOC BRIDGE, PRIORITY OF SECURITY EFFORT NOW DIRECTED TO NEW DAI LOC BRIDGE AS STATED PARA: 1.D. BELOW.

D. NEW DAI LOG BRIDGE. CURRENT SECURITY MESAURES NOW

BEING INTENSIFIED INCLUDE:

(1) ONE USYC SOD REIN OCCUPYING PSNS ON AND IN

IMMEDIATE VIC OF BRIDGE DURING DAYLIGHT.

(2) TWO USEC SODS REIN OCCUPYING PSNS ON AND IN

IMMEDIATE VIC OF BRIDGE DURING NIGHT TIME.

(3) SIX HIGH INTENSITY LIGHTS POSITIONED UNDER BRIDGE AND THRES HIGH INTENSITY LIGHTS ON NORTH SIDE OF BRIDGE ARE USED FOR PERIODIC CHECKS OF AREA.

(4) SIMM MORTAR SUPPORT IS AVAILABLE FROM HILL 37 VIC COORD AT 518584 MITH ONE TUBE CONTINUOUSLY TRAINED ON BRIDGE

**SECRET** DECLASSIFIED



GF-4 BT


```
PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1885E S E O R E T
POSITION.
      (5) CLAYMORE MINES AND TRIP FLARES ARE POSITIONED
STRATEGICALLY AROUND PRIDGE POSITION,
      CEN DOUBLE AFROM FENCE ENCOMPASSES NORTH SIDE OF
BRIDGE.
      (7) ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES PLANNED INCLUDE:
         (A) ANZESTO LENTIS
         KB) METASCOFES
         (C) 50 FOOT TOWER TO BE CONSTRUCTED.
  E. SONG THE PON SPENCE
      (1) CURRENT SECURITY MUSSURES
         CAD ONE REIN USYG PLAT OCCUPIES AND DEFENDS CON-
STRUCTION SITE, CONDUCTS PATROLS AND AMBUSHER IN VICINITY.
         (B) ONE FIFTH FOOT OBSERVATION TOWER 100 METERS
FROM SITE.
      (2) SECURITY MEASURES PLANNED FOR WHICH FFASIBILITY IS
BEING INVESTIGATED.
         (A) APPLOPRIATE FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT.
         (B) SUBMARINE NET.
         TO CLETRING OF FIELDS OF FIRE.
         (D) BIX FOOT CYCLONE FENCE, AROUND INNER PERIMETER.
PAGE FOUR RUMMLA PERSE S E C 4 E T
         ALL) PRESURET UNDERWATER INSPECTIONS.
         (F) CONCINECTION OF SECOND 5,8 FOOT TOWER.
            KE NOTE STATISTI
            FLOUDING FOR DILING ILLUMINATION.
            TIOH SAME PLOMING PLATFORMS FOR SENTRIES.
            HNOUSE ATTA LIGHTING.
USE OF AVERSALISIOSE ON LAND AND WATER.
```

**SECRET** 

FORTS FOR PAUROL AND INSPECTION.

PASSED JUST IS EPPROPRIATE.

CONFIDENTAL





DE RUMHLA 2044E 1590131 ZNY CCCCC P 180 13 1Z JUN 67 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN TO FIRST RECON BN. INFO FIRST MARDIV (OPCON) BT CONFIDENTIAL SUBJ OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF DUTY 1. ON 15 JUNE AND EXTENDING INTO THE MORNING OF IS JUNE TWO OF YOUR PATROLS OPERATING IN THE ELEPHANT VALLEY AREA EXHIBITED THE ULTIMATE IN TEAMWORK, PROMPT REPORTING AND EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS. THROUGH THEIR OUTSTANDING SKILL AND DEDICATION THEY ACCOUNTED FOR 63 CONFIRMED VC KILLS, 8 PROBABLE KILLS AND PINPOINTED VC MOVEMENT ROUTES. THESE PATROLS. AND THE MAXIMUM EFFORT IN SUPPORT OPERATION ARIZONA AND ADAIR IN ADDITION TO EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF APPROACHES TO THE TOOR. REFLECT THE COMPETENCY OF YOUR ORGANIZATION AND ARE PARTICULARLY COMMENDABLE. WELL DONE TO ALL MGEN ROBERTSON SENDS. GP-4 BT

CONFIDENTIAL







TUR 180801

K

6369

ZCZC MFE 165 DE RUMHMF 1324 1690544 ZNY SSSSS

70 NUL S446CE1 9 FM CG III MAR Ti-Co Final Manu IV I HIRD MARD IV

INFO CG FIRST MAW

SECRET

DEEP RECONNAISSANCE

1. WITH THE DEPARTURE OF PROJECT DELTA ON 14JUN THE AVENUES OF APPROACH FROM A SHAU VALLEY INTO THE DIVISION TADES REMAIN UNCOVERED. UNTIL PROJECT DELTA RETURNS TO I CORPS IN MID-JULY IT IS DIRECTED THAT IST MARDIV CONDUCT CONTINUOUS DEEP RECON-NAISSANCE IN THE THUONG DUCTHAPPY VALLEY AREAS WEST TO N-S GL. YC 35.

G0 - 4


БŢ

CG III MAF P 180644Z JUN 67





#### DECLASSIFIED



119

91

76

91

16

Posted to

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2982% SECRET D. FIRST MARD IV O PREMARA 20 (CEOI) (NOTAL) E. FIRST MARDIV O PREMOREZ (COI) (NOTAL) 1. ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SCHEDULED 21 AND 22 JUNE TO MOVE REAR CH EQUIP THIRD MAR TO PHU BAI AND RETURN. FOR OG III MAF A. REQUEST PROVIDE THREE MAR TRUCKS AND SUITABLE BRIDGING FOR CONVOYS. B. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOC'S 3. FOR OG THIRD MARDIV. A. REQUEST PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOY APPROX FORTY VEH ARRIVING PHU BAI 21 JUN AND BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES FOR CONVOY PERSONNEL B. REQUEST ORGANIZE CONVOY 22 JUNE AND PROVIDE SPT LESS INF SCTY AND ENGR SPT. C. THIS HO TO PROVIDE CONVOY SCTY OF RIFLE PLAT REIN W/ARTY FO, FAC, ENGR SPT, COMM VEH AND WRECKERS. D. REQUEST PROVIDE RIFLE CO MINUS REIN AS CONVOY RE-SERVE WHILE ROUGH RIDER IN THIRD MORDIV AREA OF RESPONSI-BIL IT Y.

SUBJ: FRAG O 73-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U) .

B. THIRD MARDIV ADMINO 415-65 (NOTAL)
C. FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)

A. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)






PAGE THREE RUMMLA 2082E S E C R E T E. CHOP POINT BOUND ARY BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV. 4. EXECUTION: A. SEVENTY MAR: REF A B. ELEVENTH MAR: REF A AS APPLICABLE C. ELEVENTH MT BN: REF A AS APPLICABLE D. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA B.G REF A. E. COORD INST: (1) REFS A AND B AS APPLICABLE FOR CONVOYS DAMANG TO PHU BAI ADMIN MOVEMENT. (2) CHECK POINTS: REFF B AND C (3) D DAY H HOUR (A) DANANG TO PHU PAI: 2109004 JUN 67. (B) PHU BAI TO DANAMS: 2209804 JUN 67 OR AS TRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV. 4) IN EVENT HEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS RE-QUIRE POSTPONEMENT, CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY. (5) DIRLAMIN ALCON 5. COMM ELECT A. REFS D AND E.


PAGE FOUR RUMYLA 2032E S E C R ET

B. SEVENTH MAR: MONITOR THIRD MARDIV TAC 1, M-15,
FREQ 2244 COMMENCING 0836 UNTIL CONVOY ARRIVES DESTINATION
EACH DAY CONVOY SCHEDULLD.
GP-4
81


UNCLASSIFIED







CC



DE RUMHLA 21212 1491347
ZNY SSSS S
P 181347Z JUN 67
FM CO FIRST MARDIV REIN G Z
TO ZEN/CG III MAR
INFO ZEN/CG FMAM
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/SEVENTY MAR
ZEN/SECOND 2N FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIRST RECON PN
ZEN/FIRST RECON PN
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR

)SECRET

REPORT OF PLANMED OPNS FOR JULY 67 (U)

A. CG III MAF 137142Z JUN 67

1. BASED ON PLANNING GUIDANCE FURNISHED BY REF A THE FOL REPORT OF PLANNED MAJOR OPMS FOR JULY IS SUBMITTED:

A. (1) CALHOUN

(2) FIRST MARDIV

(3) TWO RECIMENTS COORDINATED WITH GUN FORCES.

(4) S & D

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2121E S E C R E T

(5) BASE AREA 116 BOUNDED BY AT 994515 TO BT 119426 TO BT 912395 TO AT968350 TO AT980400 TO AT877453 TO AT933500 TO AT994515.

(6) FIRST HALF JULY.


- B. (1) BOULDER
  - (2) SEVENTY MAR
  - (3) REGIMENT MINUS COORDINATED WITH ARVINCIDE
  - (4) S & D
- (5) HAPPY VALLEY AREA BOUNDED ON MORTY BY E-M GL 72, ON EAST BY N=S GL Z C19, ON SOUTH BY TRACE OF SONG VU GIA-SONG CON, AND ON WEST BY N=S GL Z C07.
  - (6) LAST HALF JULY
- C. (1) ALLEN
  - (2) FIRST MAR
  - (3) BN MINUS
  - (4) S & D
- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY U-M GL 57, ON EAST BY N-S GL BT 13, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 51, AND ON EST BY N-S GL BT 12.
  - (5) FIRST HALF JULY

**SECRET** 

DECLASSIFIED



## SECRET •



BN N-S GL BTG3 ON SOUTH BY C-W GL 52, AND ON WEST BY N-S GL AISS.

(6) FIRST HALF JULY

F. (1) CAVALIER

(2) SEVENTY MAS

(3) BN MINUS

(4) 5 & D

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2121E SECRET (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 57, ON EAST BY N-S GL PT 92, ON SOUTH PY E-W GL 48, AND ON WEST BY N-S GL AT92. (6) FIRST HALF JULY G. (1) EMERY (2) SEVENTH MAR (3) BY MINUS (4) S & D (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 91, ON EAST BY N-S GL AT 92, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL AT 83, AND ON WEST BY N-S GL AT 87. (6) FIRST HALF JULY H. (1) GEM (2) SEVE ITH MAR (3) BN MINUS (4) S & D (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 57, ON EAST BY N-S GL AT91, ON SOUTH BY E-M GL 51, AND ON WEST BY N-S GL 4T84. (6) FIRST HALF JULY.







#### SECRET •

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 2121E S E C R E T

I. (1) BOYD

(2) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

(3) BN MINU'S REIN

(4) S & D

(5) THAT PORTION OF NONG SON VALLEY BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL 39, ON EAST BY N-S GL ATSS, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 29, AND ON WEST BY N-S GL Z C20.

(6) LAST MALF JULY.

2. PRIORITY OF EFFORT WILL BE GIVEN TO EXECUTION OF OPNS CALMOUN AND BUTLER. RIMAINDER OF OPNS WILL BE EXECUTED BASED ON CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND TACTICAL SITUATION.

BT


**SECRET** 

**DECLASSIFIED** 



#### SECRET

OO RUMHFL DE RUMHLA 2519E 1721851 ZNY SSSSS 0 211851Z JUN67 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN G 3 TO ZEN/CG III MAF INFO ZEN/CG FMAW RUMHFL/CG FLC ZEN/ CTG SEVEN SIX POINT FIVE ZEN/ CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE ZEN/ FIRST MAR ZEN/FIFTH MAR ZEN/SEVENTH MAR ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR ZRN/ELEVENTH MAR ZEN/FIRST RECON BN



D. FIRST MARDIV OVERLAY (OPN CALHOUN) (PASEP)

PAGE TWO RUMYLA 2519E SECRET

TASK ORGANIZATION FIRST MARDIV REIN - CONTROLLING HO

PARTICIPATION UNITS: FIRST MAR

(NOTAL)

2 BNS (-) (REIN)

FIFTH MAR -

2 BNS (-) (REIN)


SPEC LANDING FORCE (CTG 79.5) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN)

FIRST RECON BN (REIN)

ELEVENTH MAR (-) (REIN)

DIV RESCI CO EACH FM FIFTH AND SEWENTH MAR AND SLF) 1. MISSION. IAW PARA 5. B REF A AND PARA 7.A (10) REF B. COMMENCING 0/4 25 JUNE FIRST MARDIV CONDUCTS DIVISION MINUS REIN SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION INTO BASE AREA 116 AS DELINEATED BY ANNEX A TO REF 10, TO DESTROY EN FORCES THEREIN AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN LOGISTIC SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS IN AREA. 2. CONCEPT.

**DECLASSIFIED** 









PAGE THREE RUMBLA 2519E S E C R E T.


A. FIRST RECON BN INSERTS RECON PATROLS INTO BASE
AREA 115 ON D-1 FOLLOWING ARC LIGHT STRIKES. ON D-DAY
MAIN INFANTRY FORCES COMMENCE DETAILED SEARCH AND DESTROY
EFFORT FM LOW GROUND INTO BASE AREA 116, FINDING AND INVESTIGATING TRAILS, DRAWS AND RIGDELINES IN AREA TO
DISCOVER EN FORCES, FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES. WITHIN
CAPABILITY COMMANDERS WILL BE PREPARED TO INSERT INFANTRY
ELMS TO CONDUCT S & D EFFORT DOWNWARD DEPENDENT ON TERRAIN AND
TN SITUATION.


B. DIV COORDINATES FORCES INMOLVED. BOUNDARIES
AND DIV OBJ AREAS IAW REF D. ZOA'S GENERALLY AS FOLLOWS;
FIRST MAR TO NORTH OF THROUGH POINTS, AT957500, BT 0044
AND BT070496; SLF TO EAST OF LINE THROUGH POINTS
BT070496, BT0044 AND BT136408; FIFTH MAR TO SOUTH OF LINE
THROUGH POINTS BI 136408, BT 2044 AND AT9236; AND SECOND
BN FIFTH MAR TO WEST OF LINE THROUGH POINTS AT9236, 910044
AND AT957500. SLF WILL CONDUCT S&D OF PAGODA VALLEY
(VIC GRID SQUARES BT 2444, BT 2545
AND BT0646) AND SURROUNDING HIGH GROUND, AND SWEEP OF LARGE
HILL MASS TO SOUTH AND EAST OF PAGODA VALLEY.
3. D-DAY H-HOUR. 252600H JUN 67.
4. EST DURATION. FIVE TO EIGHT DAYS.
GP-4
BT





#### CONFIDENTIAL





DE RUMHLA 2548E 1730327 ZNY CCCCC P 220327Z JUN 67 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN ZEN/CG III MAF

6-3

CONFIDENTIAL
ADEQUACY OF PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRNG OF REPLACEMENTS IN M-16 RIFLES.
A. CG III MAF 182314Z JUN67

1. REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON SUBJ ADEQUACY.

2. INDIVID REPLACEMENT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE ADEQUATELY TRAINED IN FUNDAMENTALS OF M-16. REPLACEMENTS EXPRESS CONFIDENCE IN RIFLE.

3. SUGGESTED TRNG IMPROVEMENTS.

A. MORE L. D. A IN CARE & CLEANING


B. KNOWN DISTANCE FIRING PRIOR TO FIRING AT POP-UP TARGETS

C. EACH MAN SHOULD BE ISSUED M-16 UPON REPORTING TO REPLACEMENT TRING AND RETAIN SAME WPN DURING ALL TRING. GP-4

1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

CONFIDENTIAL





PP RUMYVP DE RYNHLA 2597E 1751005 ZNY SSSSS P 221009Z JUN 67 W CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 10 ZEN/OG III MAF INFO RUMHVP/CG THIND MERBY ZENAFIRST ANTRAC BN 37 SECRET AMTRAC ASSETS A. CG III WAF 1515262 JUNET B. CG THIRD MARDIN 13174 TE STENST 1. FOL COMMENTS RESPOND TO REPUEST OF REF A CONCERNING IMPACT ON FIRST MARD IV OPMS IF REQUEST CONTAINED REF B APPROVED. 2. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT FIRST MARDIN RETAIN PRESENT AMTRAC ASSETS. DANANG TAOR REPLETE WITH MAJOR WATER BARRIERS USED BY VC AS INFLILTRATION AND SUPPLY ROUTES, WATERWAYS SOUTHERN PORTION TAOR MAKE MOBILITY PARTICULARLY ARDUOUS, CONTINUING PERIODIC, AND SPECIAL COMMITMENTS OF AMTRACS, INCLUDING ONE FULL PLAT COMMITTED ON FULL TIME BASIS TO TF QREGON. TOGETHER WITH ECESSARY EXTENSIVE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM HAS THINNED AMTRAC DENSITY TO CRITICAL LEVEL, LOSS OF ADDITIONAL PLATOON

PAGE TWO RUMBLA 2597E S E C R E T
WOULD AGGRAVATE SITUATION. FLOODING OF LARGE PORTIONS OF
TAOR FOR THREE TO FIVE MONTHS DURING RAINY SEASON WILL NECESSITATE
ADDITIONAL USE OF VEHICLES, FURTHER STRETCHIM ASSETS.
3. CONSIDER PRESENT AMTRAC ACCETS AS MINIMUM AMMOUNT REPUIRED TO
CONTROL MATERNAMS AND SUPPORT CONDUCT, OF OPERATIONS, INCLUDING
THOSE INVOLVING ALL BASE GENERSE.

**SECRET** 


DECLASSIFIED



# **SECRE1**



OD RUMURUS RIMMEN COMPANY DE RIMBLA 2745E 1941 250 297 SSSSS 0 23 15597 JUN 47 M CG FIRST MARDET STORY TO ZENZOG FYAM TUANBUGACTO SESSES -FIVE ZENIF IRST MAR ZEN/FIFTH MAR ZENISEVENTH MAR ZEN/ SECOND PN FIFTY THE ZEN/ELEVENT A MAR ZEN/FIRST RECENDED AN ZEN/FIRST ENGREEN ZENV FIRST OF AN INFO ZEN/CG III MA-REMHPLICE PLC RUMHFLISUP BN FLC RIMHPL/FLSG BRAVO RIMHVH/DSA I CORPS RIM HV W SA GUANO DA SPICIAL ZONE RUANBUG/CTG STUEN SIN FIVE ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPEON)



PAGE TWO RIMMLA 2745E O E O R E T SECRET SECTION FOR II FRAG O 75-67 (OPN CALHOUN) (U) A. MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS SERIES 7914 B. FIRST MARDIN OVERLAY (OPN CALHOUN) (PASEP) C. III MAF INTEL EST 19887 (BASE AREA 116) (UPDATE) (NOTAL) D. DIV 0 3497. (NOTAL) E. DIV ADMIN O 301-65 (MOTAL) F. DIV O PM2MM3. RO(CESI) (NOTAL) G. CTG 79.5 COI (REACON TORCH) (MOTAL) TASK ORGANIZATION FIRST MARDIN (-) (REIN) FIRST MAR (-) (REIN) ---BN (3 CO°S) FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN) FIRST BN (2 00'S) THIRD PN (3 CO°S) SPEC LANDING FORCE (CIG 79.5) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN) 2 00°S







#### SECRET (



PAGE THREE RIMMLS SOLDE SIG SIG SIT !" FIRST RECON BN (+) (RECOND ELEVENTH MAR (-) (RE 18) FIRST BY, SEVENTH MAR (+) 1. SITUATION AS EN FORCES (1) CURRENT INTSUAS AND PERINTREPS. (2) SPECIAL INTEL STEDY, MY SOR (BASE AREA 114) AND VIC (TO BE ISSUED). B. FRIENDLY FORCES (1) CG FMAN PROVIDER AND SPT AS DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE 2313094 JUN 67. (2) CTG 76.5 CONTINUES TO SUPPORT SUF (CTG 79.5). (3) CTU 70.8.9 CONTINUES TO PROVIDE NGF SPT. (4) QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE COMBUCTS S & D CPNS IN ANTENNA VALLEY AND SOUTHMESTERK PORTION BASE AREA 116 IN AREA POUNDED BY LINE THROUGH COORDS AT 8541, AT 9541, AT 970405, AT 9732 AND AT 8632. 2. MISSION. COMMENCERS HEHOUR DEDAY FIRST MARDIN MINUS REIN CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPE INTO BASE AREA 115 AS DELINEATED BY ANMEX A TO RES OF TO DESTROY EN FORCES IMERIM AND CAPTURE

PAGE FOUR RUMALA 27495 SECRET 11 OR DESTROY EM LOGIS'SO SOT INSTALLATIONS IN AREA. 3. EXECUTION. AS CONCEPT. FIRST RECOM BY INMEDIA PRECOM PATROLS INTO BASE AREA 116 AT M-1 1/2 FOLLOWING ARE LIGHT STRIKES. AT M-MCUR D-DAY MAIN INFANTRY FORCES COMMENCE DETAILED SEARCH AND DESTROY EFFORT FM LOW GROUND INTO DIV OBJECTIVES IN BASE AREA 116. INVESTIGATING TRAILS, DRAWS AND RIDGELINES IN AREA TO FIND EN FORCES, FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES. WITHIN CAPABILITY COMMANDERS WILL BE PREPARED TO INSERT INFANTRY ELMS ON HIGH GROUND IN DIV ORG AGENCY TO COMBUCE SAD EFFORT DOWNWARD DEPENDENT ON TERRALD FOR SITUATION. B. SLF (1) ZOA BOUNDED BY FORC BA REM WEST FY BT 102510 TO BI 070496 TO BI 0044 IP BI 136468 TO BI 175418. LOD IS RAILROAD, (2) AT H-HOUR DECAY CROSS LOD (PAILPOAD STWN PTS ST 055483 AND BY 1944) TO WESE INC. CONDITOR SEDEDPN IN VICIPAGODA VALLEY CVIC GRID SQUARES BY 0845, BT 3545 AND BT 2444). SEARCH HIGH SROUND TO NORTH, MEST SHE SQUITH OF PAGODA VALLEY FOR EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUEPTER) AND ON URBER SWEEP LARGE HILL MASS SOUTH AND EAST OF PERSONA VALLEY WITHIN ZOA. (3) BE PREPARED OF REPORT TO ASSETT OPCON RECON ELMS IN ZOA ON ORDER.



SECRET

DECLASSIFIED





#### SECRET •



PAGE FIVE RIMMLA ETAGE WE CAN TO PROVIDE ONE RIPLE CO TO DIV RESERVE, C. FIRST MAR

(1) ZOA BOUNDED BY RABLES AND RACHE OF WAY FM AT 997548

TO AT 958507, SOTEM ALD WE CAY SEV VINH TRINH TO AT 966490, THE VCE THROUGH RE 6044 TO BT 970496 AND EAST ALONG SCNG BARRY TO BT 102510.

(2) COMMENCING HAMOUR DADAY CONDUCT SED OPN INTO PORTION OF OBJ 1 IN ZOA TO FIND AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT THERING RATLROAD BINN RT 703517 AND BT 055483 IS LOD. FOR CES REMAIN EAST OF LOD UNTIL HAMOUR DADAY.

(3) ASSUME OPCON THO RIPLE COS FM SEVENTH MAR ON DATE FOR EMPLOYMENT WITHIN TAGR.

(4) BE PREPARED AT MAROUR TO ASSUME OPCON OF RECON FLMS IN ZOA

(4) BE PREPARED AT ASSUME OPON OF RECONFEMS IN ZOA ON ORDER. D. FIFTH MAR

(1) ZOA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY LINE BINN BI 175418, PI 136408, BI 0044, AI 970405 AND AI 9732. LOD EXTENDS FY AI 9835 IO PI 0039 TO BI 082390, NORTH ALONG ROAD TO BI 102416. FOR CES REMAIN SOUTH OF LOD PRIOR TO MUMOUR DUDAY.

(2) COMMENCING HONOUR DADAY CONDUCT SED OPN INTO VIC DIV

PAGE SIX RUMHLA 2745E S C R E T : OBJ 2 TO DISCOVER AND COPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIP THERIN,

(3) BE PREPARED AT HAMBUR TO ASSUME OPOON RECON ELMS IN ZOA ON ORDER.

(4) MAINTAIN ONE RIPLE SO IN RESTURESPVE, TO BE COMMITTED ONLY ON AUTHORITY THIS HG.

(1) DESIGNATE BY OND ONE PIFLE CO FY FIRST BY AS DIV RESERVE.

(2) CHOP TWO RIFLE COS TO FIRST MAR FOR TMPLOYMENT WITHIN TACR, TO ARRIVE ARE DESTE BY FIRST MAR LAT 19994 D-1.
F. SECOND BN FIRTH MAR

(1) ZOA BOUNDED ON EAST RY LINE THROUGH PTS AT 3541, AT 9541, AT 97445, BT 3644 ARE AT 965499, THENCE NORTH ALOUG CAY KHE VINH TRING TO AT 90 DOC, AND WEST ALONG NORMAL POUNDARY, LOO EXTENDS FM AT 9748 REDAME HIGH AROUND TO AT 935425. FORCES REMAIN WEST OF LOD PRIOR TO MARKET OF DABAM.

(2) COMMENCING HARDLE OF SORY OF VIRT SAD OPM INTO VIC DIV OBJ 3 TO CAPTURE OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIP THEREIN, ET

**SECRET** 





#### SECRET •



OO RUAUBJG RUMHFL RUMHVH DE RIMHLA 2745E 1741539 ZNY SSSSS 0 231559Z JUN 57 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN TO ZENICG FIAN RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE ZENJFIRST MAR ZEN/FIFTH MAR ZEN/SEVENTH MAR ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR ZEN/FIRST RECON RN ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN ZEN/FIRST SP PN INFO ZEN/CG III MAF RUMMFL/CG FLC RUMHFL/SUP BN FLC RUMHFL/FLSS BRAVO RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE RUAUBUG/CTG SEVEN SIX FIVE ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)

PAGE TWO RUMMLA 2746E SECRET PT SECRET SECTION 11 OF II BE PREPARED AT 4-4019 TO ASSIME OPOCN RECON ELMS IN ZOA ON ORDER. G. FIRST RECON BN (1) AT H-1 1/2 INSERT PATROLS IN DIV OR 1 1 VIC 65 AT 9946 AND BT 0146. BE PREPARED AT HE HOUR TO CHOP TO FIRST MAR ON ORDER. (2) AT H-1 1/2 INSERT PATROL IN DIV CPJ 1 VIC GS 3T 3144. BE PREPARED AT HEHOUR TO CHOP TO SLE ON ORDER. (3) AT H-1 1/2 INSERT PATROLS IN DIV OBJ 2 VIC GS RT 2144 AND AT 9841. BE PREPARED AT M-HOUR TO CHOP TO FIFTH MAR ON OPDER. (4) AT H-1 1/2 INSERT PATROL IN DIV COJ 3 GS AT 9841. BE PREPADED AT H-HOUR TO CHOP TO SECOND BY FIFTH MAR ON ORDER. (5) NLT D-1 PROVIDE LN THE TO FIRST MAR. FIFTH MAR SLF AND SECOND BY FIFTH MAR. H. ELEVENTH MAR (1) PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED. (2) PROVIDE FC TMS TO GUANG DA SPEC ZONE FORCES CONDUCTING OPNS COORDINATED WITH OPN CALHOUN. I. FIRST ENGR BN. PROVIDE ENGR SPT WAS REQUIRED. J. FIRST SP BN. PROVIDE HST SPT AS REQUIRED. K. COORD INSTRAS.







PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2746E S E C R E T (1) DIRLAUTH ALCON. (2) ALL ELMS CHOPPED IAM WITH ABOVE RETIR N OPCON PARENT OMD UPON TERMINATION OFN UMLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED. (3) D-DAY H-MOUR. 25 38 0 8 4 JUN 67. (4) EST DIRATION. 5-8 DAYS. (5) S''BM IT REPTS IAM REF D. (5) SUBMIT PSYOP REQUIREMENTS TO G-5 (ISH 45/146) ASAP (7) REFUGEE CONTROL COORDINATED BY G=5 (ISH 46/145). REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE TO THIS OFFICE ASAP. (8) EEI'S PASEP, ADMIN AND LOGISTICS FOR DIV UNITS. REF E. (2) INSTRUCTIONS FOR SLE (A) REPLACEMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED THROUGH SLF NORMAL ADMIN CHAINBM (B) CASUALTY EVACUATION AND REPORTING WILL BE THROUGH SLF NORMAL ADMIN CHAIN. PROVIDE INFO COPY OF ALL CASUALTY REPORTS TO OF FIRST MARDIN FOR COORDINATION. B. LOGISTICS.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2745E S E C R E T (1) CLASS I, III, IV, AND V. (A) FIFTH MAR (-) SUPPLIED FROM LSA THAM KY (BT-<u>33</u>0216). SECOND BY FIFTY MAR SUPPLIED FROM LSA AN MOA 844455). (C) FIRST MAR SUPPLIED FROM LSA MHOSE LOCATION WILL BE DETERMINED BY CO FIRST MAR WITH CONCURRENCE CO SUP BN FLC. (D) SPECAIL LANDING FORCE SUPPLIED FROM FIRST MAR LSA. (E) ELEVENTH MAR SUPPLIED AS DIRECTED BY CO FLEVENTH MAR IN COORD WITH CO SUP BY. (2) CLASS II. (A) TROPICAL CLOTHING, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, BATTERIES AND SELECTED ITEMS FROM LSA. (B) THE ITE'S BY MILSTRIP FROM NORMAL SOUPCES. (3) STOCK LEVELS. (A) LSA IN SUPPORT FIRST MAR WILL BE LIMITED TO 3 DAYS CLASS I, III. AND V EXCEPT FOR SELECTED CLASS V ITEMS HAVING A LOW DAY/RATE IN MHICH CASE A 5 DAY LEVEL IS AUTHORIZED. (B) LSA TAM KY AND AN 40% AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO.







#### SECRET •




PAGE FIVE RIMHLA 274SE S E C R E T (A) SALVAGE AND EVACUATION. REPORT TRACKED VEHICLE CASUALTIES THIS HO ASAP. EVACUATE ASAP. (B) MAINTENANCE. THIRD ECHTLON TUROUGH APPROPRIATE LSA. (5) FLC REQUESTED TO PROVIDE ALL LEASS SECOND ECHELON SPARE PARTS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS AND MOTOR VEHICLES. (6) SUBMIT TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS TO THIS 40 (ATTN: MTO OR AIR O AS APPROPRIATE) ASAP. 5. CMD AND COMM A. COMM-ELEC (1) COMM TAN REFS F AND G. (2) DIV TAC NR 2, UNCOVERED, M-838 WILL BE ACTIVATED AT H-3 AS OVERLOAD AND ALTERNATE TO DIV TAC NR 1. UNITS SUARD AS REQUIRED. (3) AUTOMATIC RETRANSMISSION (AUTOCAT) AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. (A) SUBORDINATE UNITS GUARD ASSIGNED FREE. UNIT RER AUTOCAT SHIFT TO M-63, 33,1 HCS TO CONDUCT RETRANSMISSION. 7 CALL SIGN OF AUTOCAT AIRCRAFT TO BE PROMULEATED. ( ) MANOCAT (A) UNITS GUARD ASSIGNED FRED.

PAGE SIX RUMMLA 2746E S E C R E T
(B) MANOCAT AIRCRAFT CALL SIGN TO BE PROMULGATED.
B. COMMAND POSTS.
(1) REPORT CMD POST LOCATIONS WHEN ENTABLISHED.
(2) DIV CMD POST OPENS AT AT 955735 2412004 JUN 67.
REQUEST ACTION ADDEES ACRUSHLED AE.
GP-4
BT










#### CONFIDENTIAL






PP RUAUBUG
DE RUMHLA 289/7E 175/3649
ZNY CCCCC

P 249649Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV REIN AD CON/OPCON
P 230159Z JUN 67

FM CG III MAF
TO ZEN/III MAF
INFO ZEN/CG SECOND PDE ROKMO
RUM HV H/DSA I CORPS
RUM HV H/CO "C" FIFTH SEGP
ST



DRAFTER G-3 RELEASER G-3

C O N F I D E N I I A L READINESS TO REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS OF POSSIBLE ENEMY EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS

I. SINCE MARCH 1967, IMERE MAVE BEEN THREE REPORTED INCIDENTS OF THE ENEMY'S USE OF AN IRRITANT GAS AGENT WITHIN I CTZ. THE AGENT HAS BEEN DELIVERED BY HAND GRENADE WHICH PRODUCES AN AEROSOL CLOUD COVERING APPROX 20 METERS AND IN ONE MINSTANCE WAS ORANGE IN COLOR THIS MIST IRRITATES THE EYES AND MASAL PASSAGES, ALTHOUGH IT DISSIPATES RAPIDLY IN THE OPEN. SEVERAL SMALL CACHES CAPTURED RECENTLY CONTAINED CHICOM CHEMICAL GRENADES OF CS OR CN MIXTURE.

2. INCIDENTS OF THE ENEMY'S USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS HAVE BEEN ISOLATED TO DATE. HOWEVER, THE POSSIBLITY THAT THE ENEMY WILL EMPLOY IRRITANT GAS MORE FREQUENTLY AND IN GREATER QUANTITIES

PAGE TWO RUMMER 1698 COME IDENTIAL
IN THE FUTURE CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED. THE MOST LIKELY ENEMY TACTIC
WOULD BE TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH GROUND
ATTACK OF STATIC AND RELATIVELY ISOLATED FORWARD POSITIONS.
3. THEREFORE, ALL MECESSARY PROTECTIVE MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN IN
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

GP-4
BT

G FIRST MAR DIV REIN P 230158Z JUN 67



1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

CONFIDENTIAL






CG FIRST MARELY REING

RUMENTO CONTROL STATES RUMENTO CONTROL STATES RUMENTO CONTROL SANDO RUMENTO CONTROL SANDO

0 2409292 JUNE 67

SECRET





OC RUA"BJG
DE RUMHLA 2893E 175134;
ZNY SSSSS
O 241347Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARD IV REIN
TO RUAUBJG/CTG 79,5
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST RECON 6N
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
BT
S E C R E T

DRAFTER 0-3 RELEASER G-3 CONCUR G-3 A G-2

CHOP OF RECON ELMS OPN CALROTT (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 231059% JUNE?

1. REF A APPLIES, RECON ELMS HOW SCHEDULED TO LAWD DESIGNATED

ZONES WITHIN DIV OBJECTIVES 1,2, AVD 3 AT FIRST LIGHT D-DAY

2.A. CTG 79.5

FIRST MAR

SECOND BN FIFTH MARY ASSUME OPCON RECON ELMS UPON THEIR LANDING YOUR ZONES OF ACTION.

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2893E S E C N E T

B. FIRST RECON BN: CHOP RECON ELMS UPON LANDING IN ZONES

OF ACTION TO CTG 79.5, FIRST MAR, FIFTH MAR, AND SECOND BN FIFTH

MAR, AS APPROPRIATE.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIY REIN 261347Z JUN 57

**SECRET** 

**DECLASSIFIED** 




**DECLASSIFIED** 

### SECRET •







OO PHAUBUG RUMHFL RUMHVY DE RUMMLA 2939E 1760349 ZNY SSSSS RUAUBJG-T-SEVENTY-NINE PT FIVE 0 259349Z J'N 67 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR INFO ZENZCO III MAF ZEN/CG FIRST MAM PUMHFL/CG FLC RUAUBJG/CTG 79.5 RUMHNIKISA CHANG DA SPEC ZONE RUMHVHYSA SECOND ARVN DIV ZEN/FIRST MARDIV CPCON श SECRET OPN ADAIR

CG F1:ST M. RDIV REIN 253349Z JUN 67

GP-4 BT

1. OPN ADAIR TERMINATED 242498H JUN 167.


DRAFTER G-3 RELEASER G-3

**SECRET** 

DECLASSIFIED

. . . .





PAGE TWO FUNSMA 1877E C O N F I D E N T I A L PORENTIAL SABOTEUP OR WAPONS WHICH COULD BE FIRED INTO THE IN-ST ALL/ 108 B. DERVISO THE ENEMY OBSERVATION OF ACTIVITIES AT THE SUSTALL A LEGAL. - FRENEROS OF MAN-MADE FEATURES WHICH COULD SERVE AS A CONVER INVE AIMING POINT FOR HOSTILE FIRE. D. COMPERSION OF DESERVATIONTOWERS FROM WHICH ENEMY ACTIVITY DAW BE DETECTED. E. MURDING OF EXCESSIVE STOCKAGE INFORWARD SUPPORT AREAS. F. FORLARD SUPPORT AREAS SHOULD BE UTILIZED FOR ESSENTIAL SUPPLY SEPREDRY ONLY, LIMITING THE CONGESTION BY OTHER ACTIVITIES. G. STOREGE OR PARKING OF OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT IN VICINITY OF POL AND AMMUNITION STORAGE OR SUPPLY POINTS WILL BE AVOIDED. 4. (U) IT IS REALIZED THAT THE PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF SUPPLY ACTIVITY OR INSTALLATIONIS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE ENEMY THREAT and corresponding defense plans. Defense plans and availability OF SECHBETY PERSONNEL MAY PRECLUDE NAXIMUM DISPRESSION, HOWEVER,

CG F RST MARDIN P 250831Z JUN 67

PAGE 1 OF 2 CONFIDENTIAL

1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

#### CONFIDENTIAL

AGE 3 RUMSMA 1877E C O N F I D E N T I A L
A CAREFULLY DEVELOPED PHYSICAL LAYOUT WILL PREVENT OR MINIMIZE
LOSS IN THE EVENT THAT FIRE DOES RESULT, WHETHER FROM ENEMY
ACTION OR OTHER CAUSES.
5. (U) FLARE DROP ACTIVITY FOR ILLUMINATION AT NIGHT MUST
BE CONDUCTED WITH CARE AND MONITORED BY PERSONNEL AT LOGISTICS
INSTALLATIONS TO GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE FIRE HAZARD.
6. (U) RESULT OF THE SEMINAP ON BASE DEFENSE CONDUCTED
AT MACY ON 12 JUNE 1967 WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FOR CONSIDERATION BY ALL CONCERNED.
BT


PAGE 2 OF 2

1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

CONFIDENTIAL







DE ROMMA 3181E 1783 57 ZNY SESSE P 2700070 31W 67 FM CG FIRST MARDIV HE SH (2,-3 TO GE TRE SAF INFO FIRST NAR BT SEORIS

DRAFTER G-3 RELEASER G-3 CONCURRENCE: G-2, G-3,

ENGRO. & G-4

SPECIAL APERATING ANDA (U)

1. READER SPECIAL DECEMBER OF AREA FOR FIRST MARDIN UNTIL 30 SEPT 57 AS File of

TOUNDED OF FORTH BY TAOR, ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA TO GL A DA A TAOR .

AN IS APPROVED. 2. I AN A PPR CVE ANGUEST THAT GVN FORCES NOT FIRE SUPPORTING ARMS WITHOUT AND COORDINATING WITH FIRST MARDIV. QUANG


DA SERVE AND READ ARVN DIVISION WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF MAJOR OF AREA.

3. AD WE WE NECESSER! FOR DIVISION OPERATIONS ALONG NATIONAL RTE GAR LO AN QUE GARD - THANG BINH - NUI LAC SON BASIN. GP=

BI.

CG FIRE ANDIV PREASSES JUN 67

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)



THEIDENTIAL TAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES IN EM-STING SUPPORTING ARMS HAVE BECOME COMMON PLACE THROUGHOUT THE DIVI-1984 AND HAVE RESULTED IN UNACCEPTABLE DELAYS IN ATTACKING TARGETS. INC HIDENTS OF THIS SORT OCCURRED DURING RECENT OPERATIONS. FIMMENCING AT 8915H ON D-DAY ALL ARTY FIRES THROUGHOUT THE OBJECT-AREA WERE WITHHELD FOR OVER 35 MINUTES TO ALLOW AND AIRSTRIKE TO BE IN ON VC WITH WEAPONS: IWENTY MINUTES DELAY WAS ENCOUNTERED TO ALL ON ITS TO MARK FRONT LINES AND FOR AIRCRAFT TO IDENTIFY THE TARGET. A D 15 MINUTES TO RUN THE STRIKE. NO UNIT RECEIVED ANY ARTY SUPPORT DURIN 45 PERIOD ALTHOUGH THREE MISSIONS WERE REQUESTED. AGAIN ON D-DAY. AO'S CALLED FOR FIRE, WITH INTENTION OF ATTACKING E TARGET WITH ARTY UNTIL AIR WAS AVAILABLE. PREMATURE CHECK FIRES WIRE GIVEN TO THE ARTY TERMINATING FIRES 22 MINUTES PRICE TO THE A THAL AIR STRIKE. THIS DENIED THE GROUND UNIT INVOLVED ANY ARTY SUPPORT

键 TWO RUMHLA 3238E C O N F 1 D E N T I DARING THIS PERIOD.

TO PRECLUDE RECURRENCE OF SUCH INCIDENTS, THE FOLLOWING BASIC

GAIDELINES ARE REITERATED:

TARGETS MUST BE ANALYZED TO DETERMINE THE BEST MEANS OF ATTACK. AMEVER, ATTACKING TARGETS OF A FLEETING NATURE. SUCH AS A TROOP CON-CHATRATION MUST NEVER BE DELAYED TO AWAIT A PARTICULAR SUPPORTING ARM. FORTATNH FLEETING TARGETS MUST BE ENGAGED WITH THE FIRST AVAILABLE PRORTING ARM WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY CALLING FOR THE PRIMARY CHOICE. ig. In most instances arty is immediatedly available. If air is REQUESTED, ENGAGE THE TARGET WITH ARTY AND COORDINATE THE AIR WITH ARTY THEN THE AIRCRAFT ARE ACTUALLY ON STATION. DO NOT CHECK FIRE ON TARGETS PRIOR TO THE TIME THE AIRCRAFT ARE ORIENTED AND READY TO MAKE THEIR BUN N. AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE ORBITED

ABOVE THE TARGET AT A SAFE ALTITUDE OR OQTSIDE THE SAV-A-PLANE AREAS THAT IL ARTILLERY OR NAVAL GUNFIRE HAVE COMPLETED THEIR MISSIONS DURING RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT AFTER COMPLETING A TARGET RUN. PROPERLY COORDINA-TED ARTY/NAVAL GUNFIRE CAN AGAIN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE TARGET UNTIL


ATRORAFT ARE POSITIONED TO


MAKE ANOTHER RUN. BY DIRECTING AIRCRAFT TO ORBIT ABOVE THE MAXIMUM GREATE OX THE ARTY OR NAVAL GHAFIRE, OR JOUTSIDE THE SAV-A-PLANE AREA. HAR THUM USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS CAN BELOSTAINED, THEREBY AVOIDING FIGURATIONS AS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED IN PAR HE TOO OFTEN THE SITUATION IN MIVERSED, CHECK FIRES ARE GIVEN PREMATURILY, ARTY AND NAVAL SURFIRE

SST WARDIV

R 27108 - UN 67 PAGE TOF ZE







LIFTED AFTER / TR IS O STATION BUT NOT ORIENTED OF READY TO ATTACK FIZ TARGET, TILS LOSING VALUABLE 'TIE AND ALLOWIN TVER OR DISPE SE BEFORE THE AIRCHAFT CAN STRIKE. 🐚 ANOTHER COSILY EXAMPLE OF POOR COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT CAN SEEN DAILY. THAT IS THE "ELANKE"" CHEC: FIRE SIVEN ARTY WHICH IN FACT IS NOT FIRING NEAR THE SITE OR ROUTE OF HELD RESUPPLY OR MED-EVAC MISSION. UN MAXNY OCCASIONS UNIT FSCC'S HAVE INNECESSARILY UPECKED ARTY OR NAVAL GUNFIRE IN THE MIDDLE OF MISSIONS, EVEN #:SSIONS SUPPORTING TROOPS IN CONTACT, DENYING THE USE OF SUPPORTING AREAS ALTHOUGH NOT IMMEDIATELY EFFECTING THE SAFETY OF HELO OPERATIONS. THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR AS THE COMMANDER'S REP MUST CONTRIL I COORDINATE THE USE OF ALL SUPPORTING ARMS. ACTIONS TAKEN MUST BE LECTION OF THE COMMANDER'S PRIORITIES: E.G., RESUPPLY OF MEDEVIOR SES OF ARTY/NGF SUPPORT. THE ESC SHOULD COORDINATE MEL O ANTONOCH RETIREMENT ROUTES SO AS TO AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH FIRE SUPPLIES FOR LEVEL HELD TILOTS EITHER MISUNDERSTAND 🕾 DO NOT CONSIDER DIRECTIONS GIVEN BY THE BN FSCC AS TO APPRICACH RETUTES AND REFUSE TO LAND UNLESS ALL ARTY FIRE IS LIFTED. INSTANCE SECH AS THIS SHOULD BE REPORTED ASAP TO THE UNIT COMMANDER. THE TSCC AT ALL LEVELS MUST FUNCTION AS A COORDINTATING CENTER TO

TAGE FOUR RUMMLA 3238E C O N F I D E N T I A L

PEGE THREE RUIM, A 3238E C DNF 1 NENT I AL


HE COMMANDERS WILL TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO ENSURE THE PROPER USE OF FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES AND WILL EMSURE CONSTWAT SUPERVISION OF THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATIO CENTER.

THE OW MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE SUPPORT. ARTY, AIR, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE REPS THE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY/CONTACT/COCRDINATION WITH ONE AND HER AND THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE TECHNIQUES OF ATTACK USED BY THE CTHER

FAGE 2 OF 2







PP RUAUBJG DE RUNHLA 329 E 1793521 ZNY SSSSS P 280521Z JUN 67 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN TO FIRST MARDIN OPCON INFO CG III MAF CG FMAW BI SECRET

DRARTER G-3 RELEASER G-3 CONCUR OPNS O G-3 A ORD O 13-4 GCN 3294


DUDS(U) DIV EULLETIN 8025 OF 8JUN 67 (NOTAL) 1. RECENT FREQUENT INCIDENTS INVOLVING VC USE OF DUD ORD-NACE AS MINES HAVE CAUSED DEATH AND SERIOUS INJURY TO MARINES AND HEAVY DAMAGE TO VALUABLE EQUIPMENT. VC RETURN OUR AMMUNITION TO US AS MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS FORMED FROM ALL SIXES AND SHAPES OF ORNANCE, FROM HAND GRENADES TO LARGE CALIBER ARTILLERY SHELLS. 2. REF A OUTLINES PROPER PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING DUDS!

MALFUNCTIONS, COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH REF A. INCL UDING CONSCIENTIOUS REPORTING OF SUSPECTED LOCATIONS OF DUDS. APPROPRIATE ACTION WILL BE INITIATED TO DESTROY ALL KNOWN BUDS, WHN POSSIBLE.

GPa4

BT

OG FIRST MARDIY REIN 280521Z JUN 167







° °°°°ZZ RUAUBJG RUMHFL RUMNVH RUMN DE RUNKLA 3318E 1790719 ZNY SSSSS RUAUBJG-T-CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE Z 280719Z JUN 67 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN TO RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE ZEN/FIRST MAR ZEN/FIFTH MAR ZEN/SEC OND BN FIFTH MAR

DRAFTER RELEASER C/S CONCUR G-3A CCN 3318

00

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF ZEN/CG FIRST MAW RUMHFL/CG FLC ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE RUMHFL/FLSG BRAVO RUMHFL/SUP BN FLC RUMNVH/DSA I CORPS RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPEC ZONE

ZENZFIRST RECON BN

ZEN/FIRST MARDIV/OPCON BT SECRET

FRAG C 76-67 (CONTINUATION OPN CALHOUN) A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 231559Z JUN67 (FRAG 0 75-67)

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 3318E S E C R E T 1. SITUATION. THOROUGH SEARCH OF DIVISION OBJECTIVES AND LOWER SLOPES BASE AREA 116 PROCEEDING AS SCHEDULED REF A. ESTIMATE COMPLETION OF BASIC MISSION O/A D PLUS 4. 2. MISSION. UPON COMPLETION OF MISSION ASSIGNED REF A. ELMS INVOLVED OPN CALHOUN WITHDRAW FM OBJ AREA CONDUCTING OPNS TO OBTAIN MAX BENEFIT FM PRESENT PSNS AND EN SITUATION. 3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. O/A D FLUS 4 INF ELMS COMPLETE SEARCH AND DESTRICT IN BASE AREA 116 AND CONDUCT TACTICAL MOVEMENT/SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS TO BASE CAMPS/ARG/AREAS AS DIRECTED HEREIN. B. FIRST MAR. ON D PLUS 3 COMMENCE WITHDRAWAL FM PORTION DIV OBJ ONE IN ZOA, SEARCHING LOWER SLOPES AND OCCUPYING ASSEMBLY AREAS WEST OF RAILROAD. O/A D FLUS 4 COMMENCE S&D TO NORTHEAST ALONG AXIS OF RIE 537 TO NATL RIE ONE. BE PREFARED ON ORDER TO CONTINUE S&D EAST OF RTE ONE. EITHER UNILATERALLY OR IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES AND SLF. C. FIFTH MAR. CONTINUE S&D IN Z OA CONCENTRATING ONCCN 3 LOWER SLOPES. ON ORDER O/A D/ PLUS 4 COMMENCE SWEEP FM REF A AREA TO COMBAT BASE.

D. SPEC LANDING FORCE. ON ORDER O/A D PLUS 4 COMMENCE SAD OF

CG FIRST MARDIY REIN 2807192 JUN 67 PAGE 1 OF 2

280719 Z JUN





#### SECRET \_



PAGE 3 RUMHLA 3318E S E C R E T THROUGH HILL MASS CENTERED ON E-W GL 43. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO CROSS NATE RIE ONE AND CONDUCT S&D OPN TO COAST NORTH OF LINE FM BT253460 TO BT214438, THEN ALONG SOUTHSIDE OF ROAD TO INTERSECTION WITH NATL RIE ONE. OPN EAST OF NATL RIE ONE EITHER UNILATERAL OR IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES AND FIRST MAR. NORTHERN BOUNDARY TO BE PROMULGATED. E. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR. UPON COMPLETION REF A MISSION IN ZOA, ON ORDER O/A D PLUS 4 COMMENCE WITHDRAWAL FM Z OA AND RETURN TO COMBAT BASE BY MOST APPROPRIATE MEANS. F. FIRST RECON BN. ASSUME OPCON OF RECON ELMS IN AO AT TIME MUTUALLY AGREED UPON WITH FIRST MAR, FIFTH MAR, SLF AND SECOND BN FIFTH MAR, RESPECTIVELY AND RETURN TO NORMAL RECON EFFORT IN AREA. WITHDRAWING ELMS AS REQUIRED. G. ELEVENTH MAR. DIV RESERVE FIRST ENGR BN FIRST SP BN

PAGE 4 RUMHLA 3318E S E C R E F
RECON BN AT MUTUALLY A GREEA HE TIME.

(2) ALL DATES SUBJ TO CHANGE BASED ON DEVEL OPING
EN SITUATION.

(3) INSTRUNS ON COORD BETWEEN SLF, FIRST MAR AND ARVN FORCES
EAST OF RTE ONE TO BE PASEP, AS REQUIRED.

(4) SUBMIT SPT REQUIREMENTS THIS HQ. ACTION ADDRES ACKNOWLEDGE
GP-4

(1) UNITS HOLDING OPCON RECON ELMS CHOP TO FIRST

PAGE 2 OF 2



ы


NO CHANGE FM REF A. H. COORD INSTRNS

**SECRET** 





DE RUMHLA 333SE 1702821
ZNY SSSSS
P 282821Z JUN 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG III MAF
INFO CG FIRST MAW
BT
S E C R E T



G-4 G-2 A1RO G+3

DUD AND ANTI-DISTURBANCE-FUSED BROWA!!CE

1. RECENT FREQUENT INCIDENTS INVOLVING VC USE OF DUD CRD NACE AS MINES HAVE CAUSED DEATH AND SERIOUS INJURY TO MARINES AND HEAVY DAMAGE TO VALUABLE EQUIPMENT.

HECETYEL

2<u>9</u> Jun

2. FOR EXAMPLE, ON 12 JUNE AN AIRSTRIKE RESULTED IN ONE TWO THOUSAND POUND BOMB REPORTED AS DUD IN VICINITY AT 852516. IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETONATE THIS DUD ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER, ADDITIONAL AIR STRIKES RESULTED IN EIGHT ADDITIONAL 250 POUND DUDS IN SAME AREA. ON 25 JUNE AN LVT WAS HEAVILY DAMAGED AT AT820550 BY WHAT WAS REPORTEDLY A 250 POUND BOMB RIGGED AS

MINE.
3. OTHER SIMILAR INCIDENTS CAN BE ASSOCIATED WITH VC RETURNING OUR AMMUNITION TO US AS MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS FORMED FROM ALL SIZES AND SHAPES OF ORDNANCE. FROM HAND GRENADES TO LARGE

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 3335E S E C R E T CALIBER ARTILLERY SHELLS.

4. ADDITIONALLY, RECENT DISCOVERY OF ANTI-DISTURBANCE-FUZED ORDNANCE M83 "BUTTERFLY" BUMBLETS) IN TWO LOCATIONS WIT "IN OPERATION CALHOUN OPERATING AREA IS A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN.
5. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT UNEMEVER POSSIBLE THIS COMMAND BE INFORMED OF AIR MISSIONS RESULTING IN DUDS AND / OR THE DELIVERY OF ANTI-DISTURBANCE-FUZED ORDNANCE.
6. ACCORDINGLY, FOR AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY QUANG DASPECIAL ZONE BOUNDARY, ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON SOUTH BY QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI PROVINCE BOUNDARY AND ON WEST BY N-S QLYC/YB70, REQUEST APPROX LOCATION OF ALL PAST DUDS OR ANTI-DISTURBANCE-FUZED AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE (SUCH AS MS3 BOMBLETS) BY COORDINATES WITH FOLLOWING:

(1) TYPE OF ORDNANCE

(2) HOW FUZED

(3) DELIVERING AGENCY (USNC/RVNAF/USAF/USN)

(4) WHEN DELIVERED

7. REQUEST SIMILAR INFORMATION FOR FUTURE DELIVERIES AS THEY CCCUR.

GP-4


BI

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 280801Z JUN 67



DECLASSIFIED





PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3435E S E C R E T

- B. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)
- C. FIRST MARDIV 272531Z MAR 67 (NOTAL)
- D. FIRST MARDIV P02039.2C (CEOI)
- 1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A ROUGH RICER CONVOYS SCHEDULED 3 JUL 67
- TO MOVE I CORPS CARGO FROM DANANG TO TAM KY AND RETURN.
- 2. FOR CG III MAF: REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT
- OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOC'S.
- 3. FOR CG I CORPS:
- A. VEH AVAILABLE FOR LOADING 321389H JUL 67.
- B. REQUEST ARRANGE FOR EXPEDITIOUS OFF-LOADING TAM
- KY TO PERMIT CONVOY TURN AROUND BY 231323H.
- 4. FOR CG FIRST MAW: REQUEST THREE M36 VEH REPORT SEVENTH ENGR BN 221302H JUL THENCE TO 1ST MT BN FOR STAGING AFTER COMPLETION LOADING.
- 5. EXECUTION:
- A. FIFTH MAR :
- (I) ASSUME OPCON CONVOY WHILE CONVOY SOUTH
- OF DANANG TAOR.
- (2) PROVIDE RIFLE CO(-) REIN AS CONVOY RESERVE WHILE CONVOY SOUTH OF DANANG TAOR.

CG FIRST MARDIV

290803 JUN 67

PAGE 1 OF 2









PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3435E S E C R E T (3) PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOY APPROX 30 VEH, BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES IN EVENT CONVOY RUN TAM KY AREA. B. FIRST MAR PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY REINFORCED WITH FAC'S AND FO'S AS REQUIRED. C. ELEVENTH MAR: REF B. D. FIRST MT BN; REF B. E. FIRST ENGR BN: REF B. F. COORD INST: (1) REF B AS APPLICABLE, ADMIN MOVEMENT. (2) CHECK POINTS: REF C. (3) D-DAY H-HOUR (A) DANANG TO TAM KY 330800H JUL 67. (B) TAM KY TO DANANG 231320H JUN67, OR AS OTHER-WISE DIRECTED BY THIS HQ. (4) IN EVENT WEATHER, ROAD OR OTHER CONDITIONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT, CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY. (5) DIRLAUTH ALCON 6 COMM-ELECT A. IAW REF D EXCEPT AS MODIFIED.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 3435E S E C R E T

B. FIFTH MAR.

(1) GUARD M 714. 50.95 AND M 109 4424 KCS COMMENCING 03 0700H UNTIL CONVOY TERMINATES DANANG.

(2) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME NCS DUTIES M 714 AND M 109 AS DICTATED BY ENEMY SITUATION.

C. AIR COMM

(1) TACTICAL AIR REQUEST NET 1(HF).M-11 2197.5 (2196) KCS.

(2) TACTICAL AIR REQUEST NET 4 (FM). (YELLOW) M-599 43.5 MCs.

(3) TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION NET 1 (UHF) (BLUE) M1223 283.3 MCS.

(4) TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION NET 2 (UHF). (ORANGE) M1208 252.7 MCS.

GP-4 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2






DECLASSIFIED



DE RUMHLA 3546L 1810705 ZNY SSSSS P 300705Z JUN 67 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN TO ZEN/CG III MAF



SECRET OPTIMUM USE OF TANKS AND COMBAT VALUE OF ONTOS A. CG III MAF 111341Z JUN 57

1. IAW REF A FOL COMMENTS TANKS AND ONTOS ARE SUBMITTED.

2. TANK

A. USE IN STATIC DEFENSE: EITHER FLAME OR GUN TANK EFFECTIVE IN ROLE OF STATIC DEFENSE, BUT USED IN SUCH ALL ONLY WHEN TERRAIN, WEATHER, AND TACTICAL SITUATION PRECLEDIT

E OF IT'S MOBILITY. FLEXIS-ILITY. AND FIREPOWER, TANKS IN STATIC DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE MAXIMUM FIELDS OF FIRE, LIMITED AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE BY OBSTRUCTIONS LOCAL LISTENING POSTS, AND OTHER KNOWN FRIENDLY POSITIONS. TANKS MAY BE SPOTTED IN PERIMETER OR USED AS ELM OF REACTION MORCE. SEARCHLIGHT USED EFFECTIVELY IN VARILITY OF WAYS.

B. USE AS ELM OF TANK-INFANTRY REACTION FOR CE: TANK MOVIDES RAPID MEANS OF CLOSING WITH ANY TREATENED AREA, HAS EXCELLENT COMM FACILITIES, AND SHOCK EFFECT WHICH HAS IN-EVITABLY CAUSED EN TO WITHDRAW, MOBILE LIGHT CAPABILITY HAS


PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3546E SECRET 爾OVED INVALUABLE IN THIS REGARD.

C. USE AS OFFENSIVE WPN WITH INFANTRY: THIS IS PRIMARY WE OF TANKS. AS ELM OF SWEEPING OR BLOCKING FORCE. LILE CONDUCTING COUNTRY FAIR OR SURPRISE SWEEP, TANKS MAVE PROVIDED MEANS OF DEPLOYING SWEEPING AND BLOCKING ELMS STMULIANEOUSLY. DURING MONSOONS, TRAFFICABILITY LIMITED MAINLY TO ROADS, BUT TANKS USED THEN FOR ROAD SWEEPS, CONVOY ESCORI, AND DIRECT FIRE SPT OF PATROLS THROUGHT PADDIES.

D. USE AS FIRE BASE: USE AS SUCH IN FIRST MARDIV AO LIMITED, HOWEVER TANK HAS PROVEN EXCEPTIONALLY EFFECTIVE BY SETTING UP FIRE BASE TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF INFANTRY ACROSS NATURAL OBSTACLES AND EXTENSIVE OPEN PADDY AREAS.

E. THE MINE THREAT: FIFTY SEVEN MINES DETONATED BY TANKS SINCE 1 JAN 67; OF THESE, SEVENTEEN TANKS CONDITION CODED AND EVACUATED. INJURIES TO TANK CREWMEN LIGHT. INJURIES TO INFANTRY RIDING ON REAR ARMOR PLATE AND TURRET RELATIVELY MINOR. INFANTRY RIDING ON FRONT AND MINDERS INVARIABLY SUFFER MAJOR INJURIES. TWO FIRETEAMS CAN RIDE SAFELY ON REAR ARMOR PLATE AND TURRET, MINES USUALLY THI BOX TYPE 15-60 POUNDS. DAMAGE

CG FIRST MARDIN REIN P 3007052 JUN 67



COP V# PAGE 1 OF 2



PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3546L S.E.C.R.E.T.
USUALLY TO ROAD WHEELS, ARMS, HOUSING, AND TRACK BLOCKS,
MAJORITY OF MINE INCIDENTS IN AREAS WHERE TRAFFIC CHANNEL EXER
BY NATURAL OBSTACLES, BUT MANY MINES HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN
HLACED AT RANDOM IN AREAS OF HEAVY TRACKED VEHICLE ACTIVITY.

F. USE W/IPS - 21 AND XENON LIGHT: BECAUSE OF NECESSITY TO PLACE IN STATIC POSITION FOR SUCH EMPLOYMENT, TANKS FIRED INFREQUENTLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH TPS-21 AND XENON LIGHT; BUT WHEN USED HAVE PROVEN EFFECTIVE WITH TPS-21 PICKING UF TARGET, XENON LIGHT BEING BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO BEAR FOR TARGET IDENTIFICATION, AND TANK PROVIDING TIMELY FIRE ON TARGET.

G. EMPLOYMENT IN WET VS DRY SHASON:

(1) FROM FEB TO SEPT TRAFFICABILITY THROUGHOUT FIRST MARDIV AO FAIR TO VERY GOOD. DURING MONSOON SEASON, OCT THROUGH JAN, TRAFFICABILITY REDUCED TO ABOUT 12 PCT OF AO, EXOUSIVE OF EXISTING ROAD NETWORK. TANKS WHEN CONFINED INLY TO STATIC POSITIONS AND LIMITED MOVEMENT, EXCEPT IN SANDY AREA GENERALLY PARALLELING COAST LINE WHICH WILL SUPPORT YEAR ROUND TRACK VEHICLE OPERATIONS. TANKS EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM EXTENT IN DRY SEASON WITH MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AGGRA-

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 3546E S E C R E T
VATED BY DUSTY AND DIRTY ENVIRONMENT.

(2) SEASONAL TANK-EMPLOYMENT OVERLAY PASEP.

(NOTAL).

3. ONTOS.

A. ONTOS BY VIRTUE OF LIGHT ARMOR, MOBILITY, AND FIRE FOWER IS FAR SUPERIOR TO GROUND AND MULE MOUNTED 105MM REQUILLESS RIFLES AS A DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE WEAPON. IN FACT, ONTOS DURING MONSOON SEASON HAS SOME CHARACTER TICS SUPERIOR TO TANKS SINCE IT IS ABLE TO TRAVERSE MORE ROODS PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT TO THE INFANTRY.

B. PRICE OF KELPING ONTOS IN VIEW OF ITS POTENTIAL AS AN OFFENSIVE WEAPON COMPARED WITH TANKS IS SMALL BY COMPARISON IN EOTH "HARD SKILL" PERSONNEL, MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS. ADDED SIRE POWER TO THE INFANTRY UNITS IN FIELD IS WORTH PRICE.

C. DEADLINING THE ONTOS WOULD WASTE VALUABLE ASSET AND GREATLY REDUCE FIRE POWER OF INFANTRY DURING OFFENSIVE OPER ATIONS. WE ARE PRESCUTLY TESTING ADVANTAGES OF .50 CAL MOUNT ON ONTOS.

D. MINES HAVE NOT HAMPERED ONTOS

OFERATIONS TO ANY GREAT EXTENT. FIRST AT BATTALION HAS LOST

ELEVEN ONTOS OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN MONTHS, DURING TRAVEL OVER
26, 116 MILES OF TERRAIN.


GP-4


SI

PAGE 2 OF 2









PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3579E SE CRET

B. FRIENDLY. III MAF, QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE AND SECOND ARVN DIV CONTINUE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPNS IN QUANG NAM AND SUANG TIN PROVINCES.

MISSION. COMMENCING EARLY JULY FIRST MARDIV ESTABLISHES COMBAT BASE VIC HILL 63 (COORD BT 132453) IN ORDER TO SUPPORT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPNS SOUTHEASTERN QUANG NAM AND EASTERN QUANG TIN PROVINCES.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPN. OPN TO BE CONDUCTED TO PROVIDE FIFTH MAR (-) REIN) ADEQUATE COMBAT BASE FM WHICH TO CONTINUE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPNS PRIOR TO AND DURING FORTHCOMING MONSOON SEASON.

B. FIFTH MAR

- (1) COMMENCING EARLY JULY DEPLOY FORCES TO VIC HILL 63 TO ESTABLISH REGIL CP AND COMBAT BASE FOR ELMS FIFTH MAR AND SPIG BLMS.
- (2) ESTABLISH SUBSIDIARY COMBAT BASE VIC QUE SON IN ADDITION TO BASE CITED ABOVE, AND MAINTAIN COMBAT BASE NUT HAD SON.
  - (3) DURING AND AFTER ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES CONTENUE

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 3009552 JUN 67 PAGE 1 OF 2







## SECRET.



PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3579E S E C R E T
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPNS WITHIN AREA OF OPNS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE
SECURITY FOR COMBAT BASE DEVELOPMENT OPN AND TO OPEN LOC'S,
FOR PLANNING PURPOSES AO IS AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY ROAD
BY 003519 EAST TO SONG BA REN, ALONG SONG BA REN TO SONG
THU BON TO SONG CUA DAI; ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA TO BY 260445
TO BY 080250; ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 25; AND ON WEST BY N-S GL
AY 96 AND TAOR TO BY 203519. FIRM AO WILL BE PROMULGATED WHEN
APPROVED BY HIGHER HQ.

- (4) PROVIDE SECURITY REQUIRED FOR DISPLACEMENT OF USA AT TAM KY AND VIC HILL 63 O/A 5 JULY. REF A APPLIES.
  - (5) SUBMIT OPERATIONAL SPT REQUIREMENTS THIS HG.
  - C. ELEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED.
- D. COORD INSTRUS. DIRLAUTH AS REQUIRED WITH FIRST MARDIV LETTS, FLSG BRAVO, QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE AND SECOND ARVEDIV. 4. LOGISTICS
- A. TO FLC. REQUEST DEPLOY LSA FM TAM KY TO VIC HILL 63  $_{\mbox{\scriptsize CN}}$  5 JULY 67. SECURITY AT TAM KY AND VIC HILL 63 PROVIDED BY FIFTH MAR.
  - B. FIFTH MAR
    - (1) IN COORD WITH FLC DETERMINE LSA SITE VIC HILL 63.

FAGE FOUR RUMHLA 3579E S E C R E T

(2) SUBMIT LOG SPT REQUIREMENTS THIS HG FOR COORDINATION.

C. FIRST MT BN. REF A APPLIES. WHEN I CORPS CARGO OFF
LOADED TAM KY REPORT OIC LSA TAM KY BY Ø413ØØH JULY 67 AND MAKE
AVAILABLE 25 TRUCKS AND 12 TRAILERS FOR ON LOADING SUPPLIES
FIFTH MAR ALSA ADMINISTRATIVE MOVE TO VIC HILL 63, CONVOY DE PARTS TAM KY MORNING 5 JUL 67. WHEN OFF LOADING COMPLETED VIC
HELL 63, RETURN TO DANANG.
5. COMM. REF B.
GP-4

GP = 4


**IINCLASSIFIED** 

PAGE 2 OF 2









TE RIMHLA 3602E

P selection

JUN 57

FM CO FORT MARDIN REIN

TO CG ITS MAR

ESCEN - MARINES

COSTSSENTIAL

LVTH-S OF ELTZATION A. CS TIT WAF 101522 JUN 67

1. INFORMATION REQ REF A FOLLOWS, FORMAT PARA & (S FOLL Medical) A. POSSIBLE USES.

(1) DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT WHILE WATERBORNE.

(2) DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT OF INFARITY, ESPECIALLY IN ALEAS INACCESSIBLE TO WHEELED AND NONAMPHIBIOUS TRACKED STRE SUPPORT VEHICLES, BEEHIVE AMMUNITION HAS ENLARGED THE SCOTE OF LINE SUPPORT PHASE .

K33 INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT REINFORCING FIRE OF COMPANY 10 LAE ARTILLERY.

RAD INTERDICTION OF WATERWAYS. PROVIDES BOTH FIRST DOWER AND MANLEY-ERABILITY.

THE A PIVER PATROL ASSAULT UNIT IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOW-8.

PAGE THE EDWALA 3602E CONFIDENTIAL

BUILDINATION.

DATE	NO. OF DAYS	WO. LVTF6	OPH (NAMED)	SUPPORT D
MADS FREE GRAD	38	6	DECK HOUSE V	FH 6 3
19-22-43	46 45	2	(UNNAMED)	j
4-7 55357	£	2	(UNNAMED)	3.
4- FASC:	Ą		(UNNAMED)	7
21-2000	€	2	NEW CASTLE	S. 17
25-174,19 37	5	2	DIXIE	
234 2 34 25 57	$\epsilon$	4,	GRAM)	为"多"。4.6 <b>頁</b>
28-44-67	4	2	(UN NAMED)	\$
23-23-4-17	G.		DUVAL	giri i
14 = 4 haar 17	É	ž	ARTZCNA	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

CHE SUPPORTED UNITS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH RESULTS AND WASHIE TO EMPLOY LVIN-6 IN FUTURE OPERATIONS

19) DURING DECKHOUSE V, LVING WAS USED IN MED INCH LASTO

FIRE SUPPORT ROLES.

(6) DURING NEW CASTLE, VEHICLE PERFORMANCE WAS 104 105 FACTURE IN SUCCESS OF OPN. TWO VEHICLES CREDITED WITH HE ENEMY KIA COMPLAMED. OVER =ALL RESULT WAS III KIA.

(4) INITIAL REPORTS FROM ARIZONA INDICATE HIGHLY E

VINGAM TOGILL OO

3712137 JIIN 67

PAGE 1 OF 2



RILLERSED CON

## EUNFIDEN AL

MOR RECEPTIONS A 36928 CONFIDENTIAL.

THE AMAGE HELLIZATION.

CAR THE LYTHS WILL PROVIDE INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE OF THE OPERATIONS IN THE WATERWAY COMPLEX ALONG THE SOUTHERN EACH OF THE REFORM THE RESIDENCE.


TENDER WATERWAY CONTROL OPERATIONS THE LVIES WITE AF MADE REFER DESIGN OF RIVER BLOCKADES AND WATER DENIAL ROLLS, SERRIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS.

O L BERGENT

E DRY OR SAND AREAS ARE MOST DESTRABLE FOR MADEUVERING DESTRABLE FOR MADEUVERING DESTRICT HOUSE IT Y 10 MUDDY TERRAIN IS MORE LIMITED. THE LVIE 5 OF LOADS FOR STANDING THE DRY SEASONS FROM VERY DURING THE MADEUVER OF THE BUSE BECAUSE WELL OF SEASON A GREATER DEMAND IS CREATED FOR THEIR USE BECAUSE WELLED.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 2 OF 2



# DECLASSIFIED

#### PER OFFICIAL USE ONLY

#### COMMAND DIRECTORY

Headquarters

187 Marine Division (rede)

Fleet Marine Perce

Danang, viewam

1 July 1967

	1 0 000 200 1	RTD	OFFICE PHONE	QTRS
DIVISION COMMANDER	MajGon D. J. ROBERTSON	Jun 68		
Alde-de-Cemp	1stLt G. W. MCDOWELL		Isherwood 13	115
Sargeant Major	SgtMaj J. H. JOHNSON		Isherwood 406	
CHIEF OF STAFF	Col H. J. WOESSMER II	<b>Ju16</b> 8	Isherwood 5	905
Dep C/S	Col E. L. BALE	0ct67	Isherwood 105	909
Staff Secretary	Capt P. A. WATERS	Nov67	Isherwood 38	113
ASST Cofs, G-1	Col W. R. EARNEY		Isherwood 1	933
Asst G-1	LtCol P. A. LORENTZEN	3e p67	Isherwood 1	
Asst G-1	Maj M. F. MANNING	∆ug67	Isherwood 201	
Asst G-1	2dLt R. A. CORDELL	Deo67	Isherwood 101	
Special Fraget #9	2dLt M. B. JOHNSON	<b>Feb</b> 68	Isherwood 201	
ASST CofS, G-2			Isherwood 2	938
Asst G-2	LtCol E. B. SIGMON	0ct67	Isherwood 2	
ChiefAirObserver	Capt P. H. CATHELL	Dec 67	Isherwood Bailey Isherwood Auditor Isherwood 602	
TmCmdr 880T-2	24IA J. W. CORCORAN	Sep67	Isherwood Auditor	98
STO	2dLt D. A. BROWN	Dec67	Isherwood 602	
Preduction Officer	Incol R. D. ROSECRANS	Jul68	Isherwood 202 Isherwood 502	
Technic JRD ITT	Capt J. T. IROHS	Jun68	Isherwood 502	
TenComir 9TH ITT	Maj D. D. MIKKELSON		Isherwood 502	
CI Officer	Campt C. M. ISBELL	Sep67	Isherwood 502	,
ASST Cofs, G-3	Col H. E. ING JR.		Isherwood 3	933
Acets. G-3	LtCol E. R. WATSON	0ct67	Isherwood 103	
Opena 0	LtCol R.W. SMITH	0ct67	Isherwood 203 Isherwood 203	
Asst OpnsO	Maj F. R. HARPER	Ju167	Isherwood 203	
OIC COC	Maj H. T. KENNEDY		Isherwood COC	
Agest Opne/Ryte/CACOff Plans/TemgO	Maj R. J. Hendley	Augby	Isherwood 403 Isherwood 303	
Asst Plans/TrngO	Maj D. E. WIGHT	Ju167	Isharwood 303	
LINO CHANGE ES Seco 2	Capt R. B. WILSON	Nov67	Hoi An 103	
LHO Danang Spec 2	2dLt R. C. OGG	Pe 568	Puma 126	
ASST COES, G-4	LtCol E. K. VICKERS	Ju168	Isherwood 4	
Asst, G-4	LtCol W. H. DRAFER	0c t67	Isherwood 104 Isherwood 204	
PlansO	LtCol W. E. KIRACOPE	Jul68	Isherwood 204	
Agest PlaneO	Maj B. JORDAN	Aug67	Isherwood 204	
Opena@	Maj C. F. CRESSMELL		Isherwood 304	
Aset OgneO	lstLt L. BAXLEY	Jam68	Isherwood 304	
ASST Coff, G-5	LtCol R. F. PETERSON		Isherwood 46	
CAO	Maj J. R. LAWS	Mar68	Isherwood 46	
Asst CAO	letic R. Buren	<b>≜pr6</b> 8	Isherwood 146	
PsyOpsO	Maj w. R. HUTCHISSON	Aug67	Isherwood 146	
Asat PayOpeO	letLt L. D. CLARK	00 t67	Isherwood 146	
ASST Cofs, COMPTROLLER	Col R. S. ROBERTSON		Isherwood 50	936
Asst Comptroller	Capt R. C. RAUSCH	<b>Држ</b> 68	Isherwood 50	
AREA ANDITOR	Capt P. PERANTS	<b>№16</b> 8	Auditor 150	
*				



	<b>4</b> 6					<b>8</b>		×	186				939									
Inhervool 7 Inhervool 207 Inhervool 47 Inhervool 147 Inhervool 107 Inhervool 507 Inhervool 607	Isberwood 14 Isberwood 14	Slank 6	Amige 6	Auditor 55	Auditor 401	Isherwood 19	Isherweed 60	Ishervood 10 Ishervood 10 Ishervood 210 Ishervood 110 Ishervood 111 Ishervood 111	Isherwood 40 Isherwood 40	Isharwood 18 Isharwood 18	Isharwood 57	Labaracood 39	Isharwood 15 Isharwood 115 Isharwood 15 Isharwood 115	Inharmon 44	Labarrood 56	Ishervood 141	Inharwood 446	Labarwood 32	Ishervood 17 Ishervood 117 Ishervood 117 Ishervood 317 Ishervood 217 Ishervood 217	Isharwood 35	Laberrood 26	Inherwood 8
99767 19667 19667 19667 19667 19667 19667 19667	Aug67 0ot67	377	Ju168	38 Ib7	Now67	Aug 7	Lydny 1	Oct67 Juli68 Juli67 Juli67 Bry67	May 68	Mar68	<b>39</b> 100	Aug67	Augo 7 Augo 7 June 8	Mars	Jule 7	Sep67	Cot67	Lynn 1	1868 00467 00467 Jumbs 18967	Jamb	Š	<b>3</b> eb68
LACOL E. R. SCHLFFAM Capt G. F. KUETCHE UR. CHO F. L. BUCK. ZALT J. E. TYLER ZALT V. A. DUESS RALT W. J. KANE MAJ J. G. HENGER OVD K. A. ZIDBERMAN	Col P. C. LANG Maj S. P. BRUNDER	Itol A. L. Harrow	Lecol G. Henricks	WO E. W. ELEES	Capt T. E. DOVE	Capt D. J. CASAZZA, USB Odr E. H. KICKLICHERE	Capt R. J. PLACET	601 E. P. CLAUDE LAGOI E. O. CONING Maj F. L. BIRGU Maj J. H. BIRD JR. Gapt T. N. CP DOMMELL ZALE S. E. VIONINE	Capt T. J. PAPE, USF Lt(JG) R. E. REYSHE, USF	Maj G. W. COLOUEDE 2dle J. Borsera	latht D. G. SCHAAF	Mag R. PRESOFF	Med 0. A. Merrill Med 0. O. Newton Cart V. C. Wessel	Capt C. M. LAND	WO J. J. IABGIS	Capt D. H. MIDSON	Capt R. A. PATTERSON	Col W. M. OTRETS	Lect W. T. WESTREAMD Maj W. M. SETRIMI Maj W. D. P. BEARDH Maj W. D. TRAYER Lt J. J. MARTERS, USK Capt D. M. OGERARTHO	Maj L. V. BARKLE	10te B. A. HELTOOMS, USE	Med in school
ADSUTABLE Asst Adjutent Persol Orithmial tyo Granal tyo RES Outcoldan Amedially SMO Files	AIR OFFICIR Aset Airo	APPHIBIAN TRACTOR OFFICER	ARTILIEN CETICIE	BAND OFFICER	DARTHE ADVISOR	CHAPIAIN Asst Chaplain	CLUBS COVICIE	COMM. MAND COPTICAR. Asst Comm. Mac Off. Asst COMM. Mac Off. Asst CHAPTON. Asst CHAPTON. Day Comm. Gaster: Off. Day Comm. Gaster: Off. Day Speciation	DESTAL OFFICER Adula Officer	menance extract.	MONOGATION OFFICER	MARATICA CONTORS	Motorian Opyrcian Asst Bagro Rase Daveloymento Bage Equi, pmento	ESTEANCE OFFICER	FOCO SERVICIES COPTORE	DIFTORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER	DECEMBERAL RELATIONS OFFICER		Lindal OFFICE. Asst Lagal Office: Other Factal Comman. Glack Daftense Comman. Less Specialists Claims/Lagal Asst	MOTOR TRANSPIRE CETTORE	NAVAL GURFTRE OFFICER	General Officer

#### FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

#### COMMAND DIRECTORY CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR CHU LAI, VIETNAM 1 JULY 1967

		RTD	OFFICE PHONE
CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR Aida-da-Comp	BGen F. C. LAHUE 1stLt J. H. KEAN		Chu Lai 006 Chu Lai 013
CHIEF OF STAFF Staff Secretary	ItCol J. L. ZORACK latit G. E. CROWELL		Chu Lei 005 Chu Lei 058
ASST CofS, G-1	Maj R. H. PERTY	Nov67	Chu Lai 001
ASST CofS, G-2	Maj D. Z. BOYD	Jul67	Chu Lai 002
ASST CofS, G-3	LtCol E. B. ANDERSON	∆ug67	Chu Lai 003
ASST CofS, G-4	Haj C. P. WILLIAMS	Nov67	Chm Lai 004
ASST CofS. G-5	Maj J. T. SMITH	Nov67	Chu Lai 005

E. R. SCHLIMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corpe Reserve
Division Adjutant

	ALL T M MATTER	467	Isherwood 341	
PHOTO OFFICER	2dLt J. E. MCKAY		Moment 120	
POSTAL OFFICER	2dLt V. INW			
PROTOCOL OFFICER	Maj T. W. HANCOCK		Isherwood 138	
PROVOST MARSHAL	Maj D. L. DIAMOND	Jul67	Weave 6	
REPRODUCTION OFFICER	2dLt J. M. WHEATLEY	Jeb68	Isherwood 507	
SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER Custodian Recreation Fund	Maj J. E. FORDE 2dLt W. E. MUHH	00 t67 00 t67	Isherwood 37 Isherwood 37	
SUPPLY OFFICER	Col P. J. DUPRE	•	Isherwood 21	939
SURGEON Admin Officer	Capt R. W. JONES, USN LCdr A. N. KENDRICK, USN	Jul68 <b>May6</b> 8	Isherwood 16 Isherwood 16	939
TANK OFFICER	LtCol R. M. TAYLOR	Nov67	Наруу Аде б	
HEADQUARTERS BATTALION (REIN) Commending Officer Brocutive Officer Adjutant: CUC Sub Boat #1	Col W. A. LEITHER LtCol J. W. CLAYBORNE Maj W. F. FLARO Maj R. C. HALL	Aug67	luditor 6 Auditor 5 Auditor 1 Auditor Zulu	9 <b>34</b>
HEADQUARTERS, 1.57 MARTHES Commanding Officer Emoutive Officer Adjutant	Col E. J. RADICS LtCol V. D. BELL JB 2dLt H. P. HAGAN	00 t 67 Aug 67 00 t 67	Blade 5	6 5
1st Battalion, 1st Marines Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol G. E. PETRO Maj J. A. SCOTT latit B. R. FREEMAN	Jané8 Julé7 <b>Coné7</b>	Bound 5	6 5
2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	ItCol M. M. HEWLETT Maj G. F. PITCHFORD WO J. L. THOMPSON	Aug67 Aug67 Sep67		6 5
RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES Sommanding Officer Adjutant	LtCol R. C. RICE Maj A. S. LOUGHEY 2dLt V. B. BUNNELL	0ot67	Chuck 6 Chuck 5 Chuck 1	6 5
Headquarters, 5TH MARINES Commanding Officer Emocutive Officer Adjutant	Col M. DAVIS Maj R. J. ALGER 2dlt J. W. BORTON	Sany67	7 Select 6 Select 5 Select 1	6 5
1st RATTALICE, 5TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol P. L. HILGARTNER M.J J. P. WHITE WO J. E. PERNY	0c t67 Aug67 Nov67	Chime 6 Chime 5 Chime 1	6 5
2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol M. C. JACKSCH Maj A. T. FISHER 2alt J. J. HORNACK	Oot67	Grasshopper 6 Grasshopper 5 Grasshopper 1	6 5
DED BATTALIAM, 5TH MARINES Commending Officer Emoutive Officer Adjutant	Licol C. B. WEBSTER Maj B. R. CUMCUIS 2dlt W. M. GORTZ	May66 Oct6 Dec6	7 Glove 5	6 5

DECLASSIFIED

3

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH MARINES				
Commanding Officer	Col C. C. CROSSFIELD	<b>∆ug</b> 67	Bonnie Hero 6	6
Executive Officer	LtCol R. E. JOHNSON		Bonnie Hero 5	5
and means	Capt D. R. MUNCIE	Dec 7	Bonnie Hero 1	
1ST BATTALION, 7TH MARINES				
Commanding Officer	LtCol J. D. ROWLEY	0ct67	Booth 6	6
Executive Officer	Maj D. A. WAGNER	Jun 8		5
Adjutant	2dlt J. P. Curan	<b>Aug</b> 68	Booth 1	-
2D BATTALION, 7TH MARINES				
Commending Officer	LtCol W. P. KITTERMAN	luck 7	Died - Di	,
Executive Officer	Maj M. E. WARHOLAK JR.		Dixie Dinner 6 Dixie Dinner 5	6
Adjutant	2dLt D. A. MOEN	Dec67	Dixie Dinner 1	5
3RD BATTALION, 7TH MARINES				
Commanding Officer Executive Officer	LtCol J. D. COUNSELMAN		False 6	6
Adjutant	Maj C. H. TURLEY		False 5	5
adjetant	2dLt K. J. WILKERSON	Novo 7	False 1	
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH MARINES				
Commanding Officer	LtCol C. HENDRICKS	Ju168	Amigo 6	6
Executive Officer	LtCol W. PLASKETT	Sep67		5
Adjutant	2dLt J. A. GRIFFITH		Amigo 1	
1 mm m + mm + 7 mm - + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +			•	
1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES				_
Commanding Officer Executive Officer	Maj J. J. MARRON	Oct67		6
Adjutant	Maj D. H. JONES letLt R. A. HARDIE		Month 5	5
	ISTUT R. A. HARDIE	UOTO 7	Month 1	
2D BATTALION, 11TH MARINES				
Commanding Officer	LtCol R. E. HUNTER	0ot67	Provd 6	6
Resoutive Officer	Maj J. CLATWORTHY		Prowl 5	5
Adjutant	2dlt A. A. BORCWICKI	0ot67	Prowl 1	•
EPD DAMENT TOWN 1200 MAD THE				
ORD BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer	Maj O. K. JOHNSON	T(0	1	
Resoutive Officer	ALJ U. L. JUHRSUN	Jum68	Laugh 6 Lauch 5	8
Adjutant	WO J. P. CURLER	00467	Laugh 1	5
•				
ATH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES				
Commanding Officer	LACOL G. M. LIVINGSTON	Au <sub>⊲</sub> 67		6
Resoutive Officer	Maj P. P. BURAN	Jul67		5
Adjutant	2dLt J. W. WELLS	Nov67	Plaid 1	
1ST ANTI TANK BATTALION				
Commanding Officer	Maj P. S. GALLIGAN	<b>Мау</b> 68	Dance Card 6	6
Executive Officer			Dence Card 5	5
Adjutant	2flt M. L. ELL	∆ug67	Dance Card 1	-
1SP DENTAL COMPANY				
Commanding Officer	C M 7 DANE WAY	w -/o	*	
Admin Asst	Capt T. J. PAPE, USM Lt (JG) R. H. REYSEN, USM	May68 Jan68		931
	De (ou) n. m. maxima, cam	Jamos	TRUST GOOD AD	
1ST ENGINEER BATTALION				
Commanding Officer	Maj J. H. MCKENZIE	Nov67	Big Buddy 6	6
Resoutive Officer	Maj E. J. TOWNSMIND		Big Buddy 5	.5
Adjutant	24I4 J. MOUTON		Big Buddy 1	
1ST HOSPITAL COMPANY				
Commanding Officer	CALL O II I CARROY MY TOW	18-1-60	On Ted 257	
Admin Asst	Cont C. H. LOWERY, MC, USN Lat C. L. Henseley MCS/USN	Jané8	Ohu Lei 251 Chu Lei 251	
	as mariner may con	- Emmo	Annu mert CAT	

DECLASSIFIED

1ST MEDICAL BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Cdr P. D. COOPER, USE LCdr G. R. FORD, USE Lt R. C. GRICE, USE	30 p6 7 Apr 68 Jan 68	Calhoum 5	6 5
1ST MOROR TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol K. M. BUSS Maj K. H. REAGAN 2dLt B. V. BRANSON	Nov67 Oct67 Sep67	Quench 5 Quench 1	6 5
1ST RECONVAISSANCE BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant 1st Force Recommandance Company Commanding Officer	No.j B. G. LOWERY No.j G. R. JOHNSTON 2dLt D. J. GOLLINS Capt A. K. DIXON III	Aug67 Sep67 Aug67 Nov67		6 5
LST SHORE PARTY BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol E. H. JONES Maj P. L. STOFFELEN. 2dLt J. J. KOLIHA	Sep67 Jul68 Sep67	Consequence 6 Consequence 5 Consequence 1	6 5
1ST TANK BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	ItCol R. M. TAYLOR Maj E. P. TRADER WO W. A. AKAHOSET	Nov67 Aug67 Nov67	Happy Age 6 Happy Age 5 Happy Age 1	6 <b>5</b>
3RD AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Level R. L. SHUFORD Maj J. E. SHAD latit F. A. LAMBERT	Jul68 Hev67 Opt67	Sleek 6 Sleek 5 Sleek 1	6 5
7TH COMMUNICATION BATTALION (CHU: Commanding Officer Emoutive Officer Adjutant	LAI) LtCol W. M. CLELLAND Maj E. A. HUERLIMANN 2016 S. G. LAIDA	Dec67 Jul.67 Dec67	Chu Lai 226 Chu Lai 206 Chu Lai 206	
7TH ENGINEER BATTALION Commending Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol F. W. HARRIS III Maj L. E. RAMSEY 2015 J. R. MANNING	Deo67	Erogus 6 Erogus 5 Erogus 1	6 5
9TH MGINSOR BATTALION (CHU LAI) Commanding Officer Amoutive Officer Adjutant	LtCol G. BARE Maj P. C. PAIGE 2dLt J. R. HUDSON	Nov67	EgrthWorm 6 EgrthWorm 5 EgrthWorm 1	6 5
lith MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Amountive Officer Adjutant	Maj R. C. Tashjian Capt K. M. Wilson 24Lt R. O. Blanchette	Jam68	Chester White 6 Chester White 5 Chester White 1	6 5
AMERICAN RED GROSS Field Director	W. F. HOYER	0c167	Isherwood 162	

PLEASE REPORT PRICE TO 24 JULY 1967, ANY ERRORS, CHANGES AND/OR OMISSIONS, TO THE DIVISION ADJUTANT SECTION, ISBERWOOD 147.

Lieutenant Colombi, U. S. Harine Corps Reserve Division Mjutant

.

5