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JAN 29 1968

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:lrs over 5750
Ser: 00484-67 of 24Nov67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31
October 1967

1. Forwarded.

W. E. Deeds
W. E. DEEDS
By direction

Copy to:
CG, 1stMarDiv

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6 DEC 1967

 (Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:lrs 5750 Ser:
00484-67 of 24Nov67

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for
1-31 October 1967

1. Forwarded.



Thomas L. RANDALL
By direction

Copy 1 of 

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3:HIST:lrs
5750
Ser: 00484-67
24 NOV 1967

~~SECRET~~ -- Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31 October 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPaCO 5750.8

Encl: ✓ (1) 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31 October 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

Foster C. LaRue
FOSTER C. LARUE
Acting

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 OCTOBER to 31 OCTOBER 1967

INDEX

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. (U) DESIGNATION

Commanding General
Assistant Division Commander

MajGen Donn J. ROBERTSON
BGen F. C. LAHUE#

SUBORDINATE UNITSUNITCOMMANDING OFFICER

Headquarters Bn (Rein)
1st Marines (Rein) (-)*
3rd Bn, 1st Marines
5th Marines (-)

Col J. F. DONAHOE, JR.
Col H. E. ING, JR.
LtCol M. MCQUOWN
Col S. DAVIS (To 16Oct67)
Col R. D. BOHN (Fr 17Oct67)
Col R. R. MINER
Col E. W. PAYNE
LtCol R. C. MCNAUGHTON
LtCol B. C. STINEMETZ
Maj J. M. MACKENZIE (To 10Oct67)
LtCol L. CASSEY (Fr 20Oct67)
LtCol R. FUNDERBURK
LtCol H. E. PEREA
LtCol N. KAVAKICH
LtCol K. M. BUSS
LtCol J. B. BROWN, JR.
LtCol R. L. SHUFORD
LtCol W. M. CLELLAND
LtCol P. D. REISSNER
LtCol R. M. TAYLOR
Cdr C. H. LOWERY, MC, USN
LCDR J. S. MAUGHON, MC, USN
Capt T. J. PAPE, DC, USN

7th Marines (Rein)
11th Marines (-) (Rein)
2nd Bn, 5th Marines
1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)
1st Engr Bn (-)

7th Engr Bn*
9th Engr Bn*
1st SP Bn (-)
1st MT Bn
11th MT Bn
3rd Amtrac Bn (-)
7th Comm Bn (-)
1st AT Bn
1st Tank Bn (-)
1st Med Bn
1st Hospital Co
1st Dental Co (-)

* ADCON ONLY

Assumed duties as Acting Commanding General on 27 Oct 1967

2. (U) LOCATION

1-31 October 1967; Danang, RVN

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3. (U) STAFF OFFICERS

Chief of Staff
 Staff Secretary
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

 Assistant Chief of Staff, Compt

 Adjutant
 Air Officer
 Artillery Officer
 Band Officer
 Career Advisory Officer
 Chaplain
 Comm-Electronics Officer
 Dental Officer
 Disbursing Officer
 Division Clubs Officer
 Division Exchange Officer
 Embarkation Officer
 Engineer Officer
 Field Historian

 Food Services Officer

 Industrial Relations Officer
 Information Services Officer
 Inspector
 Legal Officer
 Motor Transport Officer
 Naval Gunfire Officer
 Ordnance Officer
 Photographic Officer
 Postal Officer
 Provost Marshal
 Reproduction Officer
 Special Services Officer
 Supply Officer

 Surgeon
 Tank Officer

Col H. J. WOESSNER II
 Capt F. A. WATERS
 Col W. R. EARNEY
 Col R. E. COREY
 Col J. C. SHORT
 Col E. K. VICKERS JR.
 LtCol R. F. PETERSON (To 40Oct67)
 Col H. BECKINGTON (Fr 50Oct67)
 Col R. S. ROBERTSON (To 10Oct67)
 LtCol R. L. BARNETT (Fr 20Oct67)
 LtCol J. POLIDORI
 Col H. J. FINN
 Col E. W. PAYNE
 WO T. J. COOK
 Capt R. W. TOPPING
 Capt J. A. KEELEY, CHC, USN
 Col A. CORDES
 Capt T. J. PAPE, USN
 Maj G. W. COLBURN
 Capt J. J. BOWE
 Capt C. E. LAND
 LtCol C. B. WEBSTER
 LtCol J. W. WILSON
 Capt M. N. CARTER (To 30Oct67)
 Capt L. D. HUFF (Fr 40Oct67)
 CWO J. T. WILLIAMS (To 90Oct67)
 Capt N. J. ANGELO (Fr 100Oct67)
 Capt J. D. KINDER
 Maj J. M. GRATTO
 Col S. S. HUGHES
 Col J. L. OSTBY
 Maj L. V. BARKLEY
 LCdr R. A. WHITCOMB, USN
 LtCol H. SOBOL
 CWO H. L. HUNTLEY
 WO E. GARCIA
 Maj R. B. OBRIEN
 2ndLt J. N. WHEATLEY
 Maj M. V. YOUNG
 Col P. J. DUPRE (To 20Oct67)
 Col G. EDELMANN (Fr 30Oct67)
 Capt R. W. JONES, USN
 LtCol R. M. TAYLOR

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4. (U) AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1209	21312	154	1126

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARYPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. (C) Replacement and Rotation of Personnel

a. Total of Marine replacements received and Marines rotated during October 1967 were:

Replacements:
 Officer 118
 Enlisted 2106

Rotation:
 Officer 139
 Enlisted 2996

b. There were 7 officers and 290 enlisted personnel medically evacuated. 1 officer and 35 enlisted personnel who were previously evacuated were returned to duty. 32 personnel departed on emergency leave/permanent change of station orders.

c. A total of 1 officer and 235 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour in RVN in conjunction with the 30 day free leave policy. 1 officer and 130 enlisted personnel departed on 30 days free leave during October 1967.

2. (C) Casualty and Graves Registration. The below casualties were sustained by units ADCON to the 1st Marine Division during October 1967.

	KIA	WIA	**DOW	MIA	CPT	OTHER	*NON-BATTLE DEATH INJURED	**TOTAL
USMC								
OFF	2	5					1	8
ENL	75	547	7				16	645
USN								
OFF								
ENL		16					1	17
TOTAL	77	568	7				17	670

* Injuries which result in absence from duty for more than 24 hours.

** DOW figures included in WIA totals and not in horizontal total.

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3. (C) Awards. During the period 1-31 October 1967, 303 award recommendations were processed and forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. In addition, 587 Purple Heart Medals were awarded. 39 Commanding General Certificates of Commendation were also awarded during the period.

4. (C) Discipline, Law and Order. The following criminal investigations were reported for the month of October 1967:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Murder	2
Rape	1
Narcotics/Marijuana	25
Blackmarket	4
Larceny of Government Property	5
Larceny of Private Property	4
Vehicle Theft	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	47

Fourteen traffic violations were reported for the month of October 1967.

One hundred and eighty-one offense reports were issued to violators as follows:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Wrongful Appropriation & Disposition of U.S. Property	14
False Statements	1
Disrespect	2
Violation of Time Limits on Pass	1
Assaults	2
Weapons Violation	35
Disorderly Conduct	4
Under the Influence of Alcohol	1
Curfew Violations	20
Fraternalizing with VN	1
Off Limits	60
Unauthorized Personal Weapon	1
Missing Persons	10
Resisting Apprehension	6
Out of Uniform	<u>23</u>
TOTAL	181

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5. (C) Industrial Relations

a. Current utilization totals:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>	<u>Pending</u>
Headquarters Battalion	70	72	
Headquarters, 1st Marines	16		
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines	10	5	
Headquarters, 5th Marines	10	16	
1st Battalion, 5th Marines			+8
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	8	
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	10	1	+9
Headquarters, 7th Marines	20	20	
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines	0	14	
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	10	11	
Headquarters, 11th Marines	60	60	
3rd 8" Howitzer Battery	10	10	
1st Antitank Battalion	24	21	
1st Tank Battalion	18	17	
3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion	18	15	+3
7th Communication Battalion	25	15	+10
1st Engineer Battalion	60	60	
7th Engineer Battalion	88	88	
9th Engineer Battalion	62	59	
1st Hospital Company	14	9	
1st Medical Battalion	32	32	
1st Motor Transport Battalion	26	24	
11th Motor Transport Battalion	33	33	
1st Reconnaissance Battalion	11	12	
1st Shore Party Battalion	22	21	
	*2		
TOTAL	661	623	+30

* Reflects recent increase authorized by III Marine Amphibious Force

During October 1967, Headquarters, 1st Marines, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion and 7th Communication Battalion moved to new areas and therefore were not able to reach their ceilings in Vietnamese employees.

6. (U) Personal and Morale Services

a. Chaplain. At the end of October the on-board strength of Chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division was as follows:

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Denomination</u>
23	Protestant
8	Catholic
<u>1</u>	Eastern Orthodox
TOTAL 32	

The following services were conducted during the month:

<u>Services</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number Attending</u>
Catholic Sunday Divine Services	101	3,476
Catholic Weekday Services	123	881
Latter Day Saints Lay Leader Services	14	144
Protestant Sunday Divine Services	181	4,618
Protestant Weekday Services	37	813
Protestant Bible Study	28	136
Memorial Services	24	2,015
Personal Response Program	36	899

b. Division Clubs. The gross income during October was \$220,664.25. 3 officers, 8 SNCO's and 8 enlisted personnel operated the 63 clubs and 10 battalion accounts. 2 additional clubs are planned.

c. Exchange System. Gross sales during the month of October were \$412,907.57. 2 officers and 35 enlisted personnel operated 14 stores and 3 mobile units in direct support of 1st Marine Division units.

d. Division Band. The Division Band performed at 7 Marine military formations and 5 military concerts.

e. Informational Services. During October the Informational Services Office produced 196 news releases and 3,240 Fleet Home Town News Releases. The ISO Radio-TV section produced 40 feature interviews for release to major radio networks in the United States. In addition, the radio/TV section produced 60 minutes of live TV news coverage on AFTV Danang.

Writer-Photographer teams covered the following named operations:

ONSLow

KNOX

f. Postal

(1) The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this Command has received and dispatched during October 1967:

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<u>Total Received</u>	<u>Total Dispatched</u>	<u>Total Handled</u>
658,858	358,453	1,017,311

(2) The following figures represent financial business transacted during October 1967:

U. S. Money Orders and Fees	\$917,299.78
Stamps, postage and insurance sales	\$41,878.00

(3) Twelve unit post offices were inspected and audited this period, as well as the audit of the main stamp stock retained by the Division Postal Chief.

g. Career Advisory. The following statistics represent reenlistment and extension of enlistment percentages for the month of October 1967:

(1) Reenlistment Percentages

a. First term	10.1%
b. Career	88.2%
c. Total	18.2%

(2) Extensions of enlistment executed

a. Career	4
b. Short term	17
c. Total	21

h. Special Services. Personnel of the 1st Marine Division were entertained during the month of October 1967 by the appearance of the following shows and/or well known personalities:

10-13 Oct 1967 - Martha Raye and the Hello Dolly Cast - Freedom Hill,
1st Med Bn, Hq Bn

27 Oct 1967 - Wagon Wheel Show - 11th MT Bn, 1st Recon Bn

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ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN1. ENEMY

a. (C) Main Force. Due to the change in boundary of the 1st Marine Division in October, the following Main Force enemy units are presently located within the 1st Marine Division's AOR: The 368B NVA Artillery Regiment at (ZC 0968), the K-4B Battalion at (ZC 2199) and a Battalion of the 3rd NVA Regiment at (AT 9340).

Contacts were made by reconnaissance team Warcloud on the 14th of October and reconnaissance team Petrify on 16 October in the vicinity of (ZC 1798). The number and type of weapons employed by the enemy indicated that the patrols engaged elements of a battalion, possibly the K-4B.

During the week of 16 to 22 October, there were several sightings and contacts by reconnaissance patrols in Antenna Valley, possibly indicating that there is an enemy force of at least battalion size in the area.

On 24 October elements of Delta Force swept through an enemy battalion or regimental CP area at (ZC 0869). Captured gear and assorted documents indicated that the enemy forces were possibly elements of the 368B NVA Artillery Regiment.

b. (C) Local Force. The Local Forces were somewhat less active than in September. However, they were responsible for several small contacts in the southern portion of the TACR.

c. (C) Irregulars. Irregular activity continued to inflict a significant portion of USMC casualties. Several Cap units within the area came under fire from irregular forces. The irregulars also continue to employ command detonated mines throughout the TACR.

2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a. (U) General. The weekly maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 84 and 73 degrees respectively for the month of October. The average humidity was 81% and approximately 16 inches of rain fell on the Danang area. The skies were partly cloudy with intermittent rain showers throughout the month.

b. (C) Effects of the Weather. Periods of heavy rain and low ceiling caused interruptions in air support; including Infrared Coverage, Airborne Personnel Detector Coverage, reconnaissance insertion and extraction and Aerial Observation.

c. (C) Effects of the Weather on Terrain. Periods of heavy rain, especially on 8 and 9 October caused heavy flooding, restricting vehicular movement to improved areas. Also, there are indications that the enemy's supply activity was adversely affected due to the flooding as evidenced by enemy supplies and ordnance floating down the rivers in the area.

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION ACTIVITY1. ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

a.(U) Services and Support. During the period the unit provided general administrative services for the G-2 Section.

b.(C) Personnel. During the period the G-2 Section operated with an average of 87% of its assigned manning level of 29 Officers and 53 enlisted.

c.(U) Logistics and Allowances. During the period approximately 50 percent of materials and supplies necessary for the operation of the Section and its attached teams were received as ordered. There is a need for typing chairs and filing cabinets.

d.(U) Training. Maximum effort was made to train personnel in their MOS.

2.(C) ACQUISITION UNIT: Acquisition section collected intelligence information from all areas of interest within the Division AO throughout the reporting period. The one Airborne Personnel Detector, when available, proved to be extremely reliable and valuable in locating enemy positions and providing intelligence relative to enemy movement patterns. APD has proved to be extremely reliable in locating small groups, individuals, large groups, and recently used harbor sites. IR reconnaissance flights continued to produce valuable intelligence on the enemy's presence and movement patterns, although it was limited during the early weeks of this month due to ground haze and moisture content in the air. During this reporting period the 245th Aviation Company (USA) has allotted its Mohawk aircraft to use within the Division area. Six of these aircraft are equipped with SLAR, six are equipped with IR, and all aircraft are equipped with photographic capability through the KB30 cameras. The SLAR capability was used during the last two days of the month and the results have exceeded our high expectations. This increased capability will greatly enhance the acquisition of enemy movement and boat traffic within the Division's area. There are presently 4 Data Link systems in Vietnam. One Data Link van is now positioned in the proximity of the VIP LZ at Division. Data Link will make available immediate readout of SLAR coverage. SLAR identified targets will be recorded by G-2 and forwarded to the unit concerned via COC net info Division FSCC.

a.(C) Photo Imagery Interpretation Unit: The PIIU continues to support the First Marine Division with vertical aerial photography, high and low altitude panoramic photography, photo mosaics, and various overlays associated with photo intelligence. During the period 11 missions were requested, 4 were received, none were cancelled and 7 are still pending. The intensified Infra-red program continued during October with a total of ninety-two hot reports being received during the month.

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b.(C) Air Observation Unit: During the month of October, Air Observers flew 353 sorties for 721.8 hours of visual surveillance in the Danang area. In conjunction with normal VR flights, the following missions were performed: 3 photo, 95 artillery, 140 air strikes TAC(A) and 4 naval gunfire. During the month October, the AO Unit provided support for Operations Onslow and Knox.

c.(C) Interrogation-Translation Team (3rd, 9th and 13th ITT). Interpretation Team (1st and 7th IT): A total of 137 detainees were interrogated at the III MAF Collection Point of which 108 had VC association. Number of documents translated during the month of October totals 44. In addition, 182 detainees were screened at Battalion level.

d.(C) Combat Operations Center: COC-2 continues to serve as a focal point for the receipt of spot reports from ITT, CIT, tactical units, adjacent units and higher headquarters. Immediate intelligence requirements generated or suggested by reports, verbal and written, are disseminated to collectors.

3.(C) PRODUCTION UNIT: The Basic Intelligence Section continues to maintain background and technical studies, briefings, files on intelligence estimates, enemy units, spot reports, situation reports, climate, population, etc. This information is constantly being updated. Basic Intelligence also continues to receive, evaluate and process captured enemy ordnance and material. The following are among the accomplishment during October:

- a. Completed Study on the VC 105th Bn.
- b. Screened, processed and forwarded 39 captured weapons, plus assorted equipment.
- c. Issued permits for the retention of War Trophies.
- d. Disseminated tidal and related data.
- e. Conducted intelligence inspections at subordinate units.
- f. Completed special projects for CG's use.

4.(C) STAFF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT: During the period the unit processed 1 denial of security clearance, 12 requests for COFRAM access, 18 Top Secret access. The unit granted 7 Top Secret clearances, initiated 11 requests for security investigations, forwarded to regiments and battalions 14 completed investigations. The unit submitted the monthly rewards fund to III MAF, submitted the KCS bi-monthly report and hired 7 new Kit Carson Scouts.

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

1. (S) During the month of October two major search and destroy operations were conducted by division units. The 5th Marines on 15 Oct, shortly after relieving the 1st Marines of their TAOR, began a search and destroy operation, Operation ONSLOW, in the area south of Hoi An in support of the 22 Oct election. Operation ONSLOW was terminated on 17 October 1967 after a two day sweep that resulted in very light to negative enemy contact. Due to intelligence reports of enemy activity and strong enemy contacts in the Dong Top/Hai Van Pass Area, the 7th Marines with 2d Bn 7th Marines and BLT 2/3 (SLF B) conducted a multi-battalion search and destroy operation in the area commencing on 24 Oct 1967 and continuing through the end of the month with light contact.

2. (C) Major operations and the controlling headquarters were as follows:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
ONSLOW	5th Marines
KNOX	7th Marines

3. (C) Extensive patrolling, security operations and other small unit activities as well as the major search and destroy operations accounted for enemy casualties of 164 VC KIA (Conf), 323 VC KIA (Prob), 245 Detainees and 32 weapons captured.

4. (C) Normal fixed wing and helicopter support was utilized by the division with large troop lifts being accomplished during Operation KNOX. Four naval gunfire ships fired in support of the division during this month. The supporting ships and missions were as follows: USS Providence (CLG-6) supported the division for nine days firing 2138 rounds of 6" and 2293 rounds of 5"; USS New (DD 818) supported for 17 days firing 3495 rounds of 5"; USS McCormick (DDG-8) supported for four days firing 554 rounds of 5"; USS Carronade (IFS-1) supported for three days firing 754 5" rockets; and USS Hopewell (DD 681) provided support for one day firing 20 rounds of 5". The 1,647 missions and 9,254 rounds fired for October were the highest totals for any month this year.

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PLANS

1. (S) Planning commenced on revision of OperO 90-67 (Counter-Rocket). Changes will reflect transfers of tasked units and responsibilities for TAOR's and in the organization and reporting procedures for observation posts and control centers. It will be published as Operation Order 90-68 during November.
2. (S) Revision of Operation Order 91-67 (Waterway Control) was begun. The changed locations of organizations and changes of responsibilities for certain waterways are being included to make this order current and reflect certain additional waterway controls implemented by GVN Authorities. This will be published as Operation Order 91-68 during November.
3. (S) A rewrite of Operation Plan 303-67 (Relief of CIDG Camps) will provide for changes in certain unit responsibilities occasioned by the relocations of those units. It will be published as Operation Plan 303-68 in early November.
4. (S) Change #1 to Operation Plan 126-67 (TATTOO) was issued 6 October. Principal changes were in a contact for air support of the plan and the designation of the 5th Marines to coordinate execution vice 1st Marines.
5. (S) Frag Order 136-67 was published on 10 October. This provides for a reinforced company to patrol National Route #1 in the PHU GIA - PHU LOC area to ensure security for that section of the MSR on a continuing basis during the monsoon season.
6. (S) On 13 October an "Outline Plan for a Prospective Shift North" of the 1st Marine Division AOR was published as an enclosure to a Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 memorandum. The plan provides preliminary guidance for staff planning for a proposed relocation of certain units.
7. (S) Operation Order 301-68 (General Operations) was published on 16 October.
8. (C) Operation Plan 305-68 (Provisional Infantry Units) was published 21 October. Changes in responsibilities caused by relocations of units are reflected.
9. (S) Change #1 to Operation Order 301-68 (General Operations) was published 24 October. This change provides an effective date for attachments reflected in the task organization.

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TRAINING

1. During October 40 officers and 223 enlisted men attended formal schools both in and out of country.
2. A two-day Personal Response course was conducted by the Division G-5 section and was attended by 30 officers and 30 staff noncommissioned officers.
3. A three-day school was conducted by the Division Embarkation section and was attended by 21 enlisted Marines from various units throughout the Division.
4. The 1st Engineer Battalion conducted several three day Demolitions, Landmine Warfare and VC Boobytrap courses. 279 enlisted Marines attended.
5. Nine officers attended a 2 week Military Justice Course on Okinawa.
6. The 11th Marine Regiment conducted a one-day course for non-artillerymen in the adjustment of artillery fire. The course was attended by 32 Marines.

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLY NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. (U) The major logistical activity during this reporting period was directed towards the support of combat operations.
2. (U) During the reporting period, the Division Supply Officer conducted seven (7) supply inspection-instruction visits. The Embarkation Officer conducted material readiness assistance inspections of two (2) units and the G-4 Plans and Operations Officers conducted material readiness inspections of seven (7) units. All other special staff officers conducted numerous informal staff visits and inspections.
3. (U) During the month nine (9) Rough Rider convoys were conducted between Danang and Hill 63, three (3) to Quang Tri in support of the 1st Marines, two (2) to the combat base for "G" 2/7, and two (2) to the temporary LSA established in support of Operation Knox.
4. (U) During the month the 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions traveled 200,906 miles, transported 17,930 tons of cargo and 57,739 personnel. All available vehicles of these two battalions were committed to the maximum during the month in support of the Division, III MAF, and FLC requirements. In addition, vehicles were employed in the relocation of the 5th Marines from the Hill 63-Que Son area to the TAOR vacated by the 1st Marines (-) and the deployment of the 1st Marines (-) from Danang to Quang Tri. No significant direct enemy action was encountered during the conduct of these aforementioned Rough Rider convoys.
5. (U) On 8 October, a large tropical storm inundated a considerable portion of the Danang TAOR causing considerable damage to LOC's and restricting vehicular traffic for several days. As a result of the storm Route #1 south of the new Song Cau Lau bridge and Route #5 was impassable until 25 October. Three floating, six fixed bridges, and the approaches to nine additional bridges were washed out. The floating bridges have been reinstalled or replaced by ferries. The Liberty bridge was replaced by a ferry. Portions of Routes #1, #5, #12E, #14 and the Anderson Trail were washed out. Repairs have been completed and these portions of the Division LOC are usable.
6. (U) During the month the new buffer was installed in all M16A1 rifles currently assembled with buffers of the old configuration. This redesigned buffer should improve feeding/locking operations.
7. (U) Six 8" Howitzers SP M110 were placed in-service during October. These new Howitzers are replacements for the M55's which are in process of being retrograded by Force Logistic Command.
8. (u) During the month the Force Logistics Command procured bore and chamber brushes for the M16 rifle from sources in Japan. Five hundred (500) of each were furnished to the 1st and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines for a 20 day adequacy/durability comparison test with standard issue

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(USA procurement source).

9. (U) The following ammunition items are controlled by an available supply rate:

DODAC

C704
D544
G895
L312
L314

NOMENCLATURE

Ctg, 4.2" HE
Proj 155mm (HOW) HE
Grenade Hand Illum
Signal Illum WSP
Signal Illum GSC

10. (U) During the month the Division Embarkation Officer coordinated the sealift of 710 personnel, 202 vehicles and 1943.33 short tons of cargo. And, during the month coordinated the airlift of 2388 personnel, 220 vehicles and 914.18 short tons of cargo.

11. (U) Engineers conducted daily mine sweeping operations over roads in the 1st Marine Division TAOR. These sweeps covered an average of 152, 860 meters each day. Forty (40) items of enemy ordnance were located and destroyed. There were a total of sixty six (66) reported mine incidents within the Division TAOR during the month. Of this number 34 involved detonations. The detonations resulted in three (3) USMC KIA's, one (1) USN KIA, 23 Vietnamese civilian KIA's, 45 USMC WIA's, nine (9) ARVN WIA's, and 11 Vietnamese civilians WIA.

12. (U) Thirty eight (38) Work Requests were issued to the 1st Engineer and 1st Shore Party Battalions during the month. These battalions hold seventy-one (71) Work Requests. Forty-seven (47) work orders were completed during the month. Five (5) work orders for work beyond the capability of the Division Engineer units were forwarded to III MAF for allocation to other sources. In addition, four work orders were forwarded to Public Works, Naval Support Activity, Danang.

13. (U) The new 800 man cantonment for the 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion is 90% complete. The relocation of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines is 95% completed. The new 500 man messhall and the Landing Zone (LZ) still are under construction. These are 50% and 80% completed. It is estimated that the LZ will be completed 13 November 1967.

14. (U) The 1st Engineer Battalion produced 1,697,000 gallons of potable water and 257,400 gallons of raw water per week during the month.

15. (U) Engineer support was provided for all Rough Rider Convoys. Support consisted of one dump truck and a four man sweep team for each convoy. In addition, bridging to gap areas destroyed by the enemy was transported.

16. (U) Close combat engineer support was provided for the following regimental sized search and destroy operations: Granite, Knox, Osceola, Medina

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and Onslow. In addition, close combat engineer support was provided for four company sized search and destroy operations.

17. (U) Thirty-four (34) culvert type and one standard 18'x27'x8' bunkers were completed during the month.

18. (U) The upgrading of Routes #1 and #5 continued during the month. Work was centered around repairing the storm damage and preparing the major LOC's for the effects of the monsoons.

19. (U) Colonel Earl K. VICKERS, JR. (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4) and Colonel G. EDELMANN (Division Supply Officer) attended the 10th Periodic Logistic Conference in Okinawa.

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UNCLASSIFIEDCIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

- 1.(U) On 1 October, the G-5 Section received approximately 200 pounds of used clothing which was donated by the people of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and sent on to Vietnam by the Marine recruiters there. About 60 pounds of this clothing was distributed in the 7th Marines CAAOR. The remaining 140 pounds was given to the refugees in 2d Battalion, 5th Marines CAAOR.
- 2.(U) The self-help dispensary sponsored by the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion at Phuoc En Hamlet (AT968758) was completed. No dedication is planned.
- 3.(U) On 4 October, Ambassador H. L. T. Koren, DEPCORDS, III Marine Amphibious Force, visited the G-5 Section. Ambassador Koren was briefed by Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Peterson, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, after which the Ambassador visited the 7th Engineer Battalion Brick Factory, the Hoa Thanh Market Place (AT907790), Hoa Ninh Refugee Hamlet and pig project (AT899773), Hoa Loc Dispensary (AT906760), and the Hieu Duc District Headquarters where a brief was given by the sub-sector advisor. After lunch, with the Commanding Officer of the 7th Marines, the Ambassador returned to Danang.
- 4.(U) On 9 October, 115 flood refugees were evacuated to the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines Command Post. Tents were put up, blankets were given out, and the refugees were also given two hot meals. The flood waters receded on the morning of 10 October, and the people were assisted back to their homes.
- 5.(U) A children's head was completed at the Hoa Phu Hamlet School (AT923723) by the 1st Engineer Battalion on 7 October. The head is a permanent structure made from cinder-cement blocks.
- 6.(U) On 23 October, the last of 10 wells was completed at Phuoc Hung Hamlet (AT917727) by the 1st Engineer Battalion. All ten wells were constructed in a period of 8 days.
- 7.(U) The first monthly Division Personal Response School was held 23-24 October. There were 60 students in attendance and a total of 14 hours of classes were given during the two-day course.
- 8.(U) A self-help foot bridge, sponsored by the 1st Engineer Battalion, was completed on 24 October in Hoa Phu Village at coordinates AT923723. Labor for the project was provided by the men of the village, while materials and technical assistance was given by 1st Engineer Battalion. The bridge will allow school children to travel safely during the monsoons and will maintain communications between the various hamlets in the village.

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9.(U) On 24 October, The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, briefed the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Lieutenant General Krulak was updated on the Hung Quang I, Phase II, Revolutionary Development Campaign; significant Civic Action Projects, Psychological Operations in support of the Chieu Hoi Program, and the Division Personal Response Program.

10.(U) The 7th Marines are sponsoring a new pig farm at Tam Hoa Refugee Camp (AT867575). On 28 October, 10 piglets were given to the camp to start the project off.

11.(U) Brigadier General Foster C. Lahue, Assistant Division Commander, and Colonel Beckington, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, were the Division representatives at the 31 October dedication of the 3 classroom Phong Bac Hamlet School (AT998720). Also in attendance were the Hoa Vang District Advisor, the Hoa Vang District Chief, the Hoa Tho Village Chief, and the Phong Bac Hamlet Chief. Appropriate speeches were made and refreshments were served.

12.(U) In support of CORDS operations, Division vehicles carried 15 tons of foodstuffs during the month of October.

13.(U) Projects underway in the 1st Marine Division CAAOR include: 3 schools, 4 breeding farms, 4 dispensaries, a maternity hospital, and the Ha Thanh Dam.

14.(U) Assistance rendered within the CAAOR was as follows:

Services

MedCaps	28,125
DentCaps	2,895
English Classes	112 hours
Evacuation Assistance	102

Commodities

Animal feed (garbage)	52,550 lbs.
Lumber (truckloads)	39
Tin (sheets)	80
Cement (bags)	45
Soap (bars)	3,252
Milk (pints)	314
Foodstuffs	4,700 lbs.
Laundry soap (boxes)	15
School kits	575
Toys	300
Clothing	480 lbs.
Contribution (individual Marines)	26,000\$VN

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Summary for the period 1-31 October 1967.

1. (U) Leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts were made in support of operation Onslow, Baxter, and Knox.
2. (U) The Division supported project DELTA.
3. (U) The Division supported an extensive Chieu Hoi campaign in preparation for Independence Day.

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COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

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1. (C) On 10 October 1967 Col CORDES briefed the Commanding General relative to the status of the 7th Communication Battalion. The mission and capabilities of the battalion were discussed with emphasis on the effect of an ADCON/OPCON change on the capabilities of the 1st Marine Division.
2. (C) On 17 October 1967 Col LEMAY, HQMC (AO4C), and Col HORNER, FMFPac GEO, visited the CEO. A meeting was conducted in which all members of the CEO Staff participated. Informal minutes of this meeting were taken and are on file in this office (LtCol HOUCK).
3. (U) On 19 October 1967 Col CORDES attended Area Coordinator Communication Conference held at III MAF. The conference was headed by Col HUNT, III MAF GEO. All major communication commands in the I Corps area were represented. Details of this conference are cited in the minutes of the Area Coordinator Communication Conference. (III MAF ltr 10A/jjj over 2000 SerNo 00348667 of 22Oct67).
4. (C) On 20 October 1967 Col CORDES attended the Commander's Monthly Conference held in the Division Conference Room. All Division General and Special Staff Officers, as well as regimental and separate organizational Commanders were in attendance.

Ref: CG FIRST MARDIV 080947Z OCT67
5. (C) On 20 October 1967, LtCol HOUCK, Assistant CEO, attended Operation KNOX planning conference. LtCol HOUCK coordinated communication requirements for Operation KNOX with the 7th Marines and the SLF. In addition, the Commanding Officer of Division Communication Company was briefed and given the mission to support 7th Marines during this operation.
6. (C) On 21 October 1967 Captain MCKNIGHT, Lt GIRARDOT, and GySgt LACROSS, all of Division Communication Company, and Major LIGHT, Communication Officer 7th Marines, met with LtCol HOUCK to coordinate radio retransmission plan for Operation KNOX.
7. (U) On 23 October 1967 LtCol COWING visited III MAF and requested return of those personnel to 7th Communication Battalion who are TAD to 5th Communication Battalion. Action was taken requesting FMFPac authorization to transfer subject personnel (CG III MAF 241008Z OCT67).
8. (U) On 24 October 1967 Major SCHNEIDER attended an equipment meeting with personnel from Division Communication Company and 7th Communication Battalion. The purpose of the meeting was to examine temporary equipment loans made by these units with a view toward returning this equipment.

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9. (U) On 25 October 1967 Major SCHNEIDER, Major VERDON and CWO PETERS attended a Communication Equipment meeting at III MAF. The purpose of the meeting was to determine the extent of temporary loan of equipment between major commands and to devise a means of returning this equipment to its owners.

10. (U) On 26-27 October 1967 LtCol HOUCK visited the 3dMarDiv CP and discussed communication problems with Col WOOD, CEO 3dMarDiv. LtCol HOUCK also visited Quang Tri Airfield and made a Staff Visit to 1st Marine Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

11. (U) During the month of October 1967 LtCol HOUCK, newly assigned Assistant Communications-Electronics Officer, also visited the following activities for liaison purposes:

- a. III MAF
- b. 1st MAW
- c. Force Logistics Command
- d. 37th Signal Battalion
- e. Danang Control
- f. 7th Communication Battalion
- g. FSR Electronic Repair Facility

12. (U) During the month of October 1967 a Lightning Protection Program was begun in the 1st Marine Division. This program was based on recommendations from the Communications-Electronics Section and was promulgated by Division Order 5110.1.

13. (U) During the month of October 1967 Major VERDON, CEO Plans, began work on revising the Communications-Electronics SOP. This revised SOP will be completed during November 1967.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. (U) The following distinguished visitors visited/toured the command during October 1967:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
9Oct67	VAdm J. J. HYLAND	COMSEVENTHFLT
17Oct67	Gen C. W. ABRAMS	DEPCOMUSMACV
24Oct67	LtGen V. H. KRULAK	CG FMFPac

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ENEMY ACTIVITY

- 16 October (C) At 1715H, reconnaissance team Texas Pete at (AT 863888) came under attack from an estimated 20 NVA. Air strikes were called with unknown results. Two of the enemy were KIA (C) due to small arms fire.
- 17 October (C) At 0800H, reconnaissance team Texas Pete again received intense machine gun and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 40 to 60 NVA in the vicinity of (AT 872882). The patrol defended this area until a reaction force relieved them at 1530H on the 17th. A search of the area revealed six NVA KIA (C).
- At 1658H on the 17th, reconnaissance team Petrify received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated VC squad from 360 degrees around the patrol's position at (ZC 178978). Casualties were taken and a request was made for med evacs and a reaction force. A med evac helicopter arrived at 1800H but heavy ground fire forced them to abort the mission. Another CH-46 sent to the area was damaged and forced down at 0730H on the 18th. Later this helicopter took ten rounds of 81 or 82mm mortar at (ZD 1701). At 1135H on the 18th, the reaction force (G/2/7) linked up with reconnaissance team Petrify and at 1445H on the 19th, Petrify's extraction was completed.
- 24 October (C) On the afternoon of the 24th, a Delta Force Roadrunner Team came upon an abandoned enemy battalion or regimental CP area in the vicinity of (ZC 0869). A company size reaction force was inserted and conducted a sweep. During the advance, several enemy packs and assorted gear including plotting boards and documents were captured indicating that the enemy force could be elements of the 368B Artillery Regiment.
- 26 October (C) Operation KNOX. At 0250H, ISA perimeter defense at (ZD 183-013) received 61 rounds of 82mm mortar. Counter battery fire was conducted and the enemy mortars ceased. There was minor damage to a 155 Howitzer, a Mighty Mite, and a 6,000 gallon water tank. There were no friendly casualties.
- 31 October (C) Operation KNOX. 2/3's CP at (ZD 183013) received 43 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at 0800H. Six Marines were seriously wounded. An airstrike was run on the suspected mortar position.

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

- 2 Oct (U) - CG 1st MarDiv added Sub-Team (-) 3d CIT to task organization of 1st Mar (-) (REIN)
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 021605Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 3 Oct (S) - 1st Mar (-) (REIN) began move to Quang Tri in the 3d MarDiv TAOR
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 300037Z Sep 67
- 3 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag O 134-67 directing Rough Rider convoy from Da Nang to Quang Tri on 4-5 Oct 67 and return the next day.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030549Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 3 Oct (C) - CG 1st MarDiv sent instructions to CO 1st Marines in the proper use of tanks.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030945Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 4 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv established boundary between 1st MarDiv and Americal Div effective 041200H Oct 67
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 040340Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 4 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv passed operational control of eight 155 Howitzers (towed) to CG Americal Div effective 041200H Oct 67
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 040415Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 4 Oct (U) - CG 1st MarDiv rescheduled convoy Frag Order 134-67 to 060830H Oct 67 or following day.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 041339Z Oct 67
- 4 Oct (S) - Americal Division USA relieved 5th Mar (-) (REIN) of present bases and installations at 041200H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 011251Z Oct 67
Tab B
- 5 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv changed operational control of units shown in paragraph 3c, Frag Order 133-67 to their parent units.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 050030Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 5 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv changed operational control of 1st Marines (-) (REIN) to 3d MarDiv effective 051400H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 050540Z Oct 67
Tab F

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- 5 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv changed operational control of 3d Bn 1st Mar to the 5th Mar (-) (Rein) at 051200Z Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 011251Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 7 Oct (C) - 1st Bn 11th Mar (-) changed operational control to 3d MarDiv at 071500H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 070725Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 9 Oct (S) - Operation TATTOO commenced at 091200H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 080815Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 11 Oct (S) - Due to severe flood conditions requiring indefinite delay of Operation NAVAJO, the CG 1st MarDiv issued the concept of Operation ONSLOW to be conducted by the 5th Marines in their AO to disrupt anti-election activities.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 110250Z Oct 67
Tab B
- 11 Oct (C) - CG 1st MarDiv assigned responsibility for Liberty Bridge to 7th Marines and 2d Bn 5th Marines.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 110255Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 12 Oct (S) - 1st MarDiv assumed a temporary area of operation in the 3d MarDiv TAOR effective 121200H Oct 67 to provide security for Rough Rider convoys from Da Nang to Quang Tri due to the heavy commitment of elements of the 3d MarDiv.
Ref: CG III MAF 091336Z Oct 67
Tab B
- 12 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 136-67 ordering elements of 7th Marines and 2d Bn, 5th Marines with supporting units to provide security for Route #1 from NamO bridge to Phu Loc commencing 121200H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 110300Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 13 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 134-67 assigning support for the Rough Rider Convoy from Quang Tri to Da Nang on 13 Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 121550Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 13 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 138-67, Operation BAXTER, directing stepped-up 1st MarDiv operations prior to Vietnamese Lower House elections day 22 Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 131006Z Oct 67
Tab F

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- 14 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv directed that Rough Rider convoy move from Da Nang to Quang Tri commencing 140400H Oct 67
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 051510Z Oct 67
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 130743Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 15 Oct (S) - 5th Marines commenced Operation ONSLOW in the area south of Hoi An.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 110250Z Oct 67
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 130235Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 16 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published change #2 to Frag Order 136-67 modifying the western boundary of temporary operation area effective 151200H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 160412Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 16 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv issued administrative instructions to all units of 1st MarDiv relating to modified activity from 211800H Oct 67 to normal working hours 23 Oct 67 due to Vietnamese House of Representative Elections.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 160551Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 16 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 139-67(Project Delta) directing 5th Marines and 7th Marines support to Project Delta.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 160953Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 16 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published change #3 to Frag Order 136-67 changing the boundary of the temporary area of operation effective 171200H Oct.67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 161417Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 17 Oct (S)- 5th Marines terminated Operation ONSLOW 171400H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 170640Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 19 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv issued concept for Operation KNOX a multi-battalion operation in the general area north of Elephant Valley employing SIF Bravo with 7th Marines providing command and control. D-Day scheduled for 23 Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 191539Z Oct 67
Tab B

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- 19 Oct (C) - CG III MAF required CG 1st MarDiv to furnish personnel to operate one platoon LVTP-5 and one platoon LVTP-5 (Command). The LVTP-5's will be furnished by the 3d MarDiv and will change operational control to 2d ROK Brigade not later than 1 Nov 67.
Ref: CG III MAF 190356Z Oct 67
CG 1st MarDiv 280155Z Oct 67
Tab B
- 21 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 142-67 for combined search and destroy operation on Barrier Islands employing elements of the 5th Marines and two ARVN Ranger Battalions. D-Day 25 Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 210657Z Oct 67
Tab B
- 21 Oct (S) - Rough Rider convoy departed Da Nang for Phu Bai at 211000H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 201430Z Oct 67.
Tab B
- 21 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 143-67 (Operation KNOX) to be conducted by 7th Marines in the Phu Loc/Hai Van Pass area commencing on 24 Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 211328Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 22 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 117-67 directing Rough Rider convoy to move FLSG-A retrograde cargo from Phu Bai to Da Nang and 3d MarDiv supplies and equipment from Da Nang to Phu Bai. Departed Phu Bai 230715H Oct 67 and returned Phu Bai 240730H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 220851Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 24 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv assumed operational control BLT 2/3 (-) 240800H Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240723Z Oct 67.
Tab F
- 24 Oct (S) - 7th Marines (-) (Rein) commenced a multi-battalion search and destroy operation, Operation KNOX, in the Phu Loc/Hai Van Pass area at 240800H Oct 67.
- 25 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 146-67 directing Rough Rider convoy from Da Nang to Quang Tri on 26-27 Oct 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250802Z Oct 67
Tab B

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- 25 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv issued concept of operations NAVAJO and BALLARD tentatively to commence on 20 Nov 67 and 7 Nov 67 respectively.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250345Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 26 Oct (C) - Americal Division granted approval by CG 1st MarDiv to fire and maneuver in area bounded on north by Song Cua Dai, on east by South China Sea, on south by present 1st MarDiv/Americal Div boundry and on west by Trung Giang River in 1st MarDiv TACR from 270001H Oct 67 to 012400H Nov 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260301Z Oct 67
Tab B
- 26 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv issued warning order for activation of BLT 3/1 on or about 1 Nov 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260940Z Oct 67
Tab B
- 27 Oct (C) - CG 1st MarDiv assumed operational control at 271200H Oct 67 of 11 LVTP-5 and one LVTP-5 (Command) with one officer and 12 enlisted.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 290530Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 28 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv sent CG III MAF the task organization of BLT 3/1 which will be activated 1 Nov 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 280159Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 29 Oct (C) - CG 1st MarDiv published list of all units under operational and/or administrative control of the 1st MarDiv.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 290659Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 29 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv published Frag Order 148-67 which reduced forces committed to Operation KNOX to BLT 2/3 and set intended termination date about 041000H Nov 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 290859Z Oct 67
Tab F
- 29 Oct (U) - CG 1st MarDiv sent a "well done" to all 1st MarDiv units for their part in aiding the national elections during the month of October.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 292345Z Oct 67
Tab B

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31 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv sent instructions to all 1st MarDiv units to continue contact with enemy after casualties are taken.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 310216Z Oct 67

Tab F

31 Oct (S) - CG 1st MarDiv issued concept of operation for operation ESSEX, to be conducted in southwestern Antenna Valley by 2/5 beginning 5 Nov 67.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 310217Z Oct 67

Tab F

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLY

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1-6 October - Nine Rough Rider Convoys were conducted by 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions from Danang to Hill 63.

2-5 October - Elements of 1st Marines totaling 2119 personnel, 166 vehicles, and 588.76 short tons were airlifted by C130 from Danang to Dong Ha.

3 October - Elements of 1st Recon totaling 232 personnel, 27 vehicles, and 89.10 short tons were sealifted by LCU from Chu Lai to Danang.

4 October - Elements of 5th Marines totaling 50 personnel, 14 vehicles, and 624 short tons were sealifted by LCU from Chu Lai to Danang.

4-5 October - Elements of 1st Marines totaling 33 personnel, 34 vehicles, and 243 short tons were sealifted by LCU from Danang to Dong Ha.

7-8 October - Elements of 11th Marines totaling 127 personnel, 53 vehicles, and 275.43 short tons were airlifted by C130 from Danang to Dong Ha.

8-13 October - Three Rough Rider Convoys were conducted by 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions from Danang to Quang Tri.

8 October - A large tropical storm inundated a large portion of the Danang TAOR interrupting LOC's for a period of 17 days.

11-15 October - Remaining elements of 1st Marines totaling 142 personnel, and 37.59 short tons were airlifted by C130 from Danang to Dong Ha.

24-25 October - Two Rough Rider Convoys were conducted by 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions from Danang to SLF.

25-27 October - Three Rough Rider Convoys were conducted by 1st Motor Transport Battalion to Hill 63.

26-29 October - One Rough Rider Convoy was conducted by 11th Motor Transport Battalion from Danang to Quang Tri.

30 October - One Rough Rider Convoy was conducted by 1st Motor Transport Battalion from Danang to SLF.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

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Chronological Listing of Events:

10Oct67 200 pounds clothing from Milwaukee received. Self-help dispensary sponsored by 1st Reconnaissance Battalion completed at Phuoc En Hamlet.

40Oct67 Ambassador Koren's visit.

90Oct67 115 flood refugees assisted by 3d Battalion, 7th Marines.

170Oct67 Children's head completed at Phuoc Hung Hamlet School by 1st Engineer Battalion

230Oct67 10 wells completed at Phuoc Hung Hamlet by 1st Engineer Battalion.

23-240Oct67 First Monthly Division Personal Response School conducted.

240Oct67 Foot bridge at Hoa Phu Village completed by 1st Engineer Battalion.

240Oct67 General Krulak's visit.

290Oct67 Pig project started at Tam Hoa Refugee Center by 7th Marines.

310Oct67 Phong Bac Hamlet School dedicated.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Sequential listing of Psychological Operations in support of 1st Marine Division units for the period 1 - 31 October 1967.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Leaflets Air Dropped</u>	<u>Leaflets Hand Distributed</u>	<u>Aerial Broad- casts (hours)</u>	<u>Ground Broad- casts (hours)</u>
10 Oct 67	755,000	1,475	3:15	----
2	2,725,000	1,450	2:45	2:30
3	-----	2,050	11:00	4:30
4	-----	1,075	2:00	5:30
5	1,155,000	1,250	2:50	----
6	1,140,000	700	2:00	----
7	1,180,000	950	8:00	7:00
8	770,000	2,100	----	2:30
9	350,000	8,705	1:10	----
10	755,000	4,350	3:20	7:00
11	525,000	885	2:45	2:00
12	1,245,000	1,250	3:20	2:20
13	970,000	1,125	1:55	2:30
14	-----	4,840	2:30	5:00
15	-----	2,050	1:20	7:00
16	-----	1,950	3:05	8:00
17	1,110,000	2,800	----	6:30
18	350,000	5,195	2:40	2:00
19	1,250,000	11,180	1:40	12:00
20	-----	4,450	4:05	5:45
21	620,000	2,250	3:00	8:00
22	-----	-----	----	----
23	1,875,000	2,400	5:30	9:30
24	1,325,000	2,745	3:10	7:00
25	950,000	3,760	3:55	11:00
26	825,000	4,625	2:50	22:00
27	1,150,000	4,250	3:55	12:30
28	900,000	1,750	2:00	2:48
29	250,000	2,400	2:50	2:00
30	2,550,000	3,950	7:30	1:00
31	1,900,000	2,400	6:00	----

Themes employed were:

- | | |
|---|----------------------------------|
| 1. "GVN Provides a Better Life" | 7. "VC Unjustly Tax/Force Labor" |
| 2. "USMC Comes in Peace" | 8. "VC/NVA Face Defeat" |
| 3. "Rewards for Mines, Booby Traps and Information" | 9. "VC/NVA Hardships" |
| 4. "Don't Harbor VC" | 10. "VC Not Welcome by People" |
| 5. "VC Use Force/Terrorism" | 11. "GVN/US/FWMAF Offer Peace" |
| 6. "VC Destroy the Youth" | 12. "Chieu Hoi" |
| | 13. "Rocket Rewards" |

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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2 October 1967 (C)	Major RITTS, Communication Officer of the 1st Marines, visited the CEO to coordinate plans for 1st Marines move to Quang Tri.
2 October 1967 (U)	Major SCHNEIDER distributed several items of equipment to Major LIGHT, Communication Officer of the 7th Marines.
3 October 1967 (U)	Lt NEEDLES, Wire Platoon Commander of Division Communication Company, represented the CEO at the I Corps Cable Coordinating Committee meeting held at III MAF.
4 October 1967 (U)	LtCol CLELLAND, Commanding Officer 7th Communication Battalion, made a Staff Visit to the CEO.
5 October 1967 (U)	Col CORDES and LtCol COWING made a staff visit to III MAF CEO.
7 October 1967 (U)	Major SCHNEIDER made a staff visit to the Radio Relay and Construction Company of the 7th Communication Battalion.
8 October 1967 (U)	Col CORDES made a staff visit to the 37th Signal Battalion.
9 October 1967 (U)	LtCol CLELLAND and Major BOMGARDNER visited the CEO to discuss the personnel and equipment needs of the 7th Communication Battalion.
10 October 1967 (C)	Col CORDES briefed the Commanding General relative to the status of the 7th Communication Battalion.
13 October 1967 (U)	LtCol COWING, LtCol HOUCK, and Major SCHNEIDER made a staff visit to Force Logistics Command.
14 October 1967 (U)	LtCol HOUCK made a staff visit to CEO 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
16 October 1967 (U)	Major BOMGARDNER, S-3 7th Communication Battalion, visited the CEO.
17 October 1967 (U)	Col LEMAY, HQMC (AO4C) and Col HORNER, CEO FMFPac, visited the CEO.

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17 October 1967 (U) LtCol MITCHELL, Commanding Officer Division Communication Company escorted Col LEMAY and Col HORNER on a tour of the Division Communication Center.

19 October 1967 (C) LtCol CLELLAND, LtCol MITCHELL, and Major BOMGARDNER, all of 7th Communication Battalion, visited the CEO to discuss pending operations.

20 October 1967 (C) Major LIGHT, Communication Officer 7th Marines, visited the CEO to coordinate plans for a pending operation.

20 October 1967 (C) Lt WGT, Communication Officer 1st Reconnaissance Battalion visited the CEO to discuss Radio retransmission plan for a pending operation.

20 October 1967 (U) Col CORDES attended monthly Commanders Conference in the Division Conference Room.

Ref: OG FIRST MARDIV 080947Z OCT67

20 October 1967 (C) LtCol HOUCK attended planning conference relative to Operation KNOX.

21 October 1967 (C) Staff of Division Communication Company visited CEO to coordinate radio retransmission plan for Operation KNOX.

22 October 1967 (C) Meeting held by LtCol HOUCK with Communication units included in Operation KNOX.

22 October 1967 (U) Captain ENTWISTEL, SLF Communication Officer and Lt LOVE, ELT Communication Officer, visited CEO.

22 October 1967 (C) LtCol HOUCK furnished G-3 a draft of Annex F (Comm-Elect) in support of 1stMarDiv OPLAN 67-68.

23 October 1967 (U) LtCol COWING made a staff visit to III MAF CEO.

24 October 1967 (C) Col CORDES attended briefing for OG FMFPac in Division Conference Room.

24 October 1967 (U) LtCol CLELLAND and Major BOMGARDNER made a staff visit to the CEO.

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24 October 1967 (U)

Major SCHNEIDER attended an equipment conference with representatives of Division Communication Company and 7th Communication Battalion

25 October 1967 (U)

Major SCHNEIDER, Major VARDON and CWO PETERS attended III MAF Communication Equipment Meeting.

Ref: CG III MAF 131242Z OCT67

26 October 1967 (U)

Materiel Management Inspection of 7th Engineers conducted by CWO PETERS.

Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11Jun67

27 October 1967 (U)

Courtest inspection of 1st Battalion 5th Marines conducted by CWO PETERS.

26-27 October 1967 (U)

LtCol HOUCK visited 3d Marine Division Command Post, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and 1st Marines Command Posts.

30 October 1967 (U)

LtCol MITCHELL, Commanding Officer Division Communication Company and Captain ZUMBADO, Officer in Charge Division Communication Center, visited the CEO.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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PART IVSUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

✓Tab A	- First MarDiv Perintreps, 26, 27, 28, 29-67
✓Tab B	- Operational Documents, #1-128
✓Tab C	- Situation Reports <i>Filed & Sep</i>
✓Tab D	- Photographs and News Releases <i>Filed Sep</i>
✓Tab E	- Command Directory <i>Filed w/ Cmd Chron</i>
✓Tab F	- G-3 Journal <i>Filed Sep</i>
✓Tab G	- Hq Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab H	- First Marines Command Chronology
✓Tab I	- Fifth Marines Command Chronology
✓Tab J	- Seventh Marines Command Chronology
✓Tab K	- Eleventh Marines Command Chronology
✓Tab L	- First Recon Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab M	- First Anti-Tank Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab N	- First Tank Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab O	- First Engr Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab P	- First Motor Transport Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab Q	- First Shore Party Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab R	- First Medical Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab S	- First Hospital Co Command Chronology
✓Tab T	- Third Amtrac Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab U	- Seventh Comm Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab V	- Seventh Engr Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab W	- Ninth Engr Bn Command Chronology
✓Tab X	- Eleventh Motor Transport Bn Command Chronology

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OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTSSUBJECT

- 1 ✓ CHANGE ONE TO FRAG ORDER 133-67
- 2 ✓ STARLIGHT SCOPE EVALUATION
- 3 ✓ CHANGE TWO TO FRAG ORDER 133-67
- 4 ✓ TASK ORGANIZATION
- 5 ✓ FRAG O 134-67
- 6 ✓ ESTAB OF BOUNDARY
- 7 ✓ RECON OPS
- 8 ✓ TANK EMPLOYMENT
- 9 ✓ ARTY SUPPORT
- 10 ✓ ESTAB OF BOUNDARY
- 11 ✓ ARTY SUPPORT
- 12 ✓ ADCON THIRD BN FIRST MAR
- 13 ✓ RELOCATION OF ARTY
- 14 ✓ FRAG O 134-67
- 15 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
- 16 ✓ RIVER ASSAULT
- 17 ✓ OPCON MARINE ARTY
- 18 ✓ FRAG O 131-67
- 19 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON
- 20 ✓ HERBICIDE PROGRAM
- 21 ✓ ASSIGNED TASK
- 22 ✓ FRAG O 135-67
- 23 ✓ BOUNDARY CHANGE
- 24 ✓ ARTY TIEN PHUOC
- 25 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
- 26 ✓ OPN NAVAJO
- 27 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
- 28 ✓ ENEMY BODY COUNT SURVEY
- 29 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON
- 30 ✓ STATUS REPORT
- 31 ✓ FRAG O 134-67
- 32 ✓ FRAG O 134-67
- 33 ✓ OPN TATTOO
- 34 ✓ OPLAN 126-67
- 35 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
- 36 ✓ 8 INCH HOWITZER
- 37 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
- 38 ✓ COUNTER MORTAR RADARS
- 39 ✓ SMALL SCALE OPS
- 40 ✓ SECURITY OF ROUTE ONE
- 41 ✓ REPORT OF STORM/FLOOD DAMAGE
- 42 ✓ SECURITY OF ROUTE ONE
- 43 ✓ SUPPORT FOR DRAGON FIRE
- 44 ✓ STARLIGHT SCOPE EVALUATION
- 45 ✓ OPN ONSLOW
- 46 ✓ LIBERTY BRIDGE

ORIGINATOR & DTG

CG 1ST MARDIV 011251Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARINES 020720Z OCT 67 (G)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 021605Z OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 021609Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 030549Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG III MAF/SA I CORPS 030646Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 030850Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 030945Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG III MAF 032340Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 040340Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 040415Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 040915Z OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 041307Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 041339Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 041515Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 042245Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG AMERICAL DIV 050030Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 050115Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 5TH MARINES 050955Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 051105Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 051130Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 051510Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 051513Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 060325Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 061505Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 061507Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 061311Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 070257Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 070725Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARINES 070800Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 071151Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 071521Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG III MAF/SA I CORPS 080344Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 080815Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 3D MARDIV 080833Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG III MAF 081104Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 081445Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 090435Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 090953Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG III MAF/SA I CORPS 091336Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 100820Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 101016Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG III MAF 101604Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 102315Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 110240Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 110255Z OCT 67 (C)

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47 ✓ FRAG O 136-67
 48 ✓ RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS
 49 ✓ WATERWAY CONTROL
 50 ✓ FRAG O 134-67
 51 ✓ FRAG O 137-67
 52 ✓ SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
 53 ✓ SECURITY OF CAU DO BRIDGE
 54 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
 55 ✓ RECON OPS
 56 ✓ BRIDGE SECURITY
 57 ✓ FRAG O 138-67
 58 ✓ ARG/SLF BRAVO
 59 ✓ FRAG O 140-67
 60 ✓ CHANGE ONE TO FRAG O 137-67
 61 ✓ M16A1 RIFLE TRAINING
 62 ✓ CHANGE ONE TO FRAG O 136-67
 63 ✓ CHANGE TWO TO FRAG O 136-67
 64 ✓ BALD EAGLE AND SPARROW HAWK
 65 ✓ COMPANY I
 66 ✓ FRAG O 139-67
 67 ✓ CHANGE THREE TO FRAG O 136-67
 68 ✓ CIDG CAMPS
 69 ✓ OPLAN 319-67
 70 ✓ OPN ONSLOW
 71 ✓ OPN ONSLOW
 72 ✓ AIRBORNE PERSONNEL DETECTOR
 73 ✓ FRAG O 141-67
 74 ✓ ARTY DET QUE SON
 75 ✓ LVTP-5
 76 ✓ A/O EXTENSION
 77 ✓ OPN KNOX
 78 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
 79 ✓ FRAG O 142-67
 80 ✓ FRAG O 143-67
 81 ✓ M-109 LIFT
 82 ✓ OPN KNOX
 83 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
 84 ✓ FRAG O 143-67
 85 ✓ OPN KNOX
 86 ✓ 155MM HOW HE AMMO
 87 ✓ FRAG O 144-67
 88 ✓ A/O EXTENSION
 89 ✓ AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
 90 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON
 91 ✓ FRAG O 145-67
 92 ✓ BRIDGE INSPECTION CONFERENCE

CG 1ST MARDIV 110300Z OCT 67 (S)
 III MAF/SA I CORPS 110856Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 111351Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 121550Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 130235Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 130345Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 130346Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 130743Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 130840Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 130900Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 131000Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 131251Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 140745Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 140815Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 141130Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 150213Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 160412Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 160630Z OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 160631Z OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 160953Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 161417Z OCT 67 (S)
 III MAF/SA I CORPS 161508Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 162325Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 170638Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 170640Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 171118Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 180307Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 190050Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG III MAF 190356Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 190710Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 191539Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 201430Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 210657Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 211328Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 220524Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 220835Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 220851Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 221015Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG III MAF 230717Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 231000Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 231245Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 232053Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 240721Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 240723Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 240933Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 250115Z OCT 67 (C)

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92 ✓ AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
 94 ✓ COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
 95 ✓ FRAG O 146-67
 96 ✓ BRIDGE SECURITY
 97 ✓ AMERICAL OPN
 98 ✓ REQUEST FOR AO
 99 ✓ BLT ROTATION
 100 ✓ HDT REPORTS
 101 ✓ RECON OPNS
 102 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
 103 ✓ LVTP-5
 104 ✓ BLT ROTATION
 105 ✓ BLT ROTATION
 106 ✓ ARG/SLF BRAVO
 107 ✓ RECON OPNS
 108 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON
 109 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON
 110 ✓ BLT ROTATION
 111 ✓ FRAG O 148-67
 112 ✓ ROUGH RIDER
 113 ✓ CONGRADULATIONS
 114 ✓ OPN TATTOO
 115 ✓ RECON OPNS
 116 ✓ FRAG O 147-67
 117 ✓ BLT ROTATION
 118 ✓ SECURITY FOR CASUALTIES
 119 ✓ OPN ESSEX
 120 ✓ TANK REQUEST
 121 ✓ CHANGE TWO OP ORDER 91-67 *file Aug 67*
 122 ✓ SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTS
 123 ✓ OP ORDER 301-68
 124 ✓ ANNEX B OO ORDER 301-68
 125 ✓ CANCELLATION OF CERTAIN OP ORDERS
 126 ✓ CHANGE ONE TO ADMIN ORDER 301/67
 127 ✓ OPPLAN 305-68
 128 ✓ CHANGE ONE TO OP ORDER 301-68
 129 ✓ LETTER OF APPRECIATION
 129 ✓ OPN KNOX CONCEPTS
 130 ✓ OPN KNOX

CO FIFTH MARINES 250300Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 250655Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 250802Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 260259Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 260301Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 260315Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 260940Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 261400Z OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 270015Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 270645Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 280155Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 280157Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 280159Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG III MAF 281536Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 290320Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 290530Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 290655Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 290858Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 290859Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 291245Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 292345Z OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 300344Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 300601Z OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 300801Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 310158Z OCT 67 (C)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 310216Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 310217Z OCT 67 (S)
 CO FIRST MARINES 311310Z OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV 030800H OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV OCT 67 (U)
 CG 1ST MARDIV OCT 67 (S)
 CG 1ST MARDIV OCT 67 (S)
 CHIEF OF JOINT GENERAL STAFF RVNAF OCT 67 (U)
 III MAF 210557Z Oct 67 (S) *Filed*
 III MAF 220645Z Oct 67 (S) *date order of message*

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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PERINTREP NO. 26-67

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1st Marine Division (Rein)
Danang, Republic of Vietnam
090900H October 1967

PERINTREP No. 26-67

Period Covered: 011200H - 081200H October

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. There has been no change in the 1st Marine Division's mission.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 84 and 75 degrees respectively with an average humidity of 78%. Approximately eight inches of rain fell causing problems with trafficability, air support and infrared coverage.

Rain is predicted for the first three days of the forthcoming week with a general clearing on the last few days of the week. The lunar illumination will range from 34% on the 9th to 95% on the 16th.

(b) Astronomical Data. See Annex B.

b. Enemy Military Situation.

(1) Strength, Composition, Disposition. See Annex A, PERINTREP 25-67 with the following new locations:

2nd NVA Division	AT 9823
RQ.20 Signal Battalion	AT 9622
1st VC Regiment	AT 8827
3rd NVA Regiment	BT 1634
21st NVA Regiment	AT 8528
70th Battalion	AT 9327

(2) Availability of Reinforcements and Replacements. Replacements may be obtained from infiltration groups and by in-country recruiting. Reinforcements may come from elements of the 2nd NVA Division which have the capability to move north from Quang Tin.

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(3) Aggregate Strengths. The estimated strengths of the enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's AOR: Main Force 1,750, Local Force 1,720, and approximately 20,000 Irregulars.

(4) Movements and Activities

(a) Although the total number of activities occurring within the AOR this week was only slightly below average (101 incidents occurred) very few of these were of significance. Mines continued to produce a large portion of the U.S. Marine Corps casualties.

(b) 5th Marines. The 5th Marines had three CAP's and a Peace Hamlet attacked in addition to several small arms fire and mining incidents. CAP D-1 (BT 0770) received heavy small arms fire on the night of 2 October. At 030110H CAP D-2 (BT 0668) received heavy small arms fire and six to eight rounds of B-40 rocket fire. This CAP was also attacked last week. At 2200H on the 4th, the perimeter defense at CAP D-6 (BT 0560) noted movement. The area was illuminated and 40 VC were driven off with small arms fire. The Peace Hamlet located in the vicinity of (AT 9866) was destroyed by the VC on the 8th. Reportedly several people were kidnapped.

Other activity in this area occurred when Blackcoat 7 ran artillery on 10 VC trying to conceal two 35 foot sampans at (BT 0455) and when Hoi An received three rounds of mortar fire on the 5th.

(c) 2nd Battalion 5th Marines. 2/5's TAOR was relatively quiet with the only significant activity occurring in the vicinity of Nong Son and south of the TAOR. On the 4th, F/2/5 fired on an area reported to be sheltering 45 NVA. Later the Nong Son Police Chief brought three B-40 rounds from this area. The Americal Division reported firing on 40-50 sampans at (AT 7932) on the 6th and on several more at (AT 8126) on the 7th.

(d) 7th Marines. The 7th Marines TAOR was relatively active with nearly half of all the mines reported within the 1st Division's TAOR occurring in either 1/7 or 2/7's TAOR.

Reconnaissance team Bullrush operating in the vicinity of (AT 8045) called artillery on 13 VC on the 4th and 6 VC on the 5th. The airborne personnel detector picked up human emissions from this same area and air strikes and artillery run on (AT 8047) caused a secondary explosion on the 7th.

Elements of M/3/7 called artillery on two groups for a total of 10 enemy at (AT 8256) on the 3rd and on 15 enemy at (AT 8154) on the 4th.

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Further up the river AO's spotted several boats and a raft at (ZC 0658), nine large boats at (ZC 0451) and a boat at (ZC 9750). All the boats were camouflaged.

Throughout the week the airborne personnel detector reported human scent emissions in the vicinity of Charlie Ridge at (AT 8962, 8662). Two secondary explosions occurred at (AT 8157) on the 6th when artillery was first called as the result of an intelligence report and then on a sighting of five enemy.

Moving to 1/7's area; on the 4th a PW led Marines to a number of caves at (AT 9568) and in addition pointed out three anti-personnel mines. Two individual weapons and assorted equipment were found in the caves. Several costly mining incidents also occurred in this TAOR. At 0830H on the 2nd a command detonated mine destroyed an ARVN dump truck at (AT 9467) and seriously wounded six ARVN; as the truck was being towed away another command detonated mine wounded four more ARVN. Civilian vehicles detonated mines at (AT 9378) and (AT 9464). A Marine vehicle also detonated a mine at (AT 9464).

Evidence of enemy presence in Happy Valley was found when reconnaissance patrol Killekene had several contacts in the vicinity of (ZC 1365). On the 4th they came under fire from a multi platoon size force which employed B-40's, machine gun, and small arms fire. The next day the patrol initiated fire fights against three small groups of VC killing two of them and capturing an AK-47. They took two more small groups of VC under fire at (ZC 1065) on the 6th before being surrounded and forced to be extracted. A trail in the vicinity of (ZC 1065) running N-S was reported to have very deep human foot prints on it indicating that the users carried heavy loads. **These footprints indicated movement to the south.**

2/7 also had problems with mines. An H/2/7 fire team patrol at (AT 8878) detonated an unknown type of explosive device and then received heavy automatic weapons fire and grenades from an estimated six enemy on the 1st. On the 5th, an E/2/7 vehicle was ambushed at (AT 9289) by an enemy force which used a command detonated 250 pound bomb to destroy the vehicle and B-40 rounds, grenades and small arms fire to inflict several casualties. Recon patrol Eyelet reported that there were several recently used trails and harbor sites in the vicinity of (AT 8288). On the 7th, Basketball located at (AT 8987) reported that the enemy were moving around its position. On the 4th, a squad combat patrol from FLC observed and fired on an estimated 20 VC at (AT 9281).

(f) The Americal Division reported receiving considerable anti-aircraft fire from the Que Son Valley. Marines experienced similar activity on Operation Swift. Other reports from the Division include:

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A/1/327 at (AT 9426) receiving 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the 3rd and an unknown number on the 4th; on the 5th the CP of 2/327 (AT 9421) received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar. These incidents are in addition to the reports of sampans south of 2/5's area.

(5) Logistics. There have been several agent reports of VC taxation and other attempts to obtain rice. These reports are consistent with the fact that Marine operations disrupted rice harvests in the spring. During the summer months Operation Calhoun and Cochise resulted in the capture of 47 tons of rice. Numerous other small caches have been captured throughout the year.

(6) There has been no change in the enemy's operational capability to launch rockets.

3. Capabilities

a. To conduct acts of terrorism and harassment with emphasis on countering the Revolutionary Development Program, and to continue interdiction of LOC's with the objective of increasing VC control over population and denying the GVN/US/FMAF use of water, rail, and highways.

b. To conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields and logistics installations.

c. To conduct less than regimental size attacks and harassment against isolated friendly forces and installations.

d. To attack selected targets in up to regimental strength.

e. To continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

4. Analysis of enemy capabilities

a. The enemy has the capability to conduct unconventional warfare throughout the TAOR. Past activities indicate that the enemy places a high priority on lines of communication and the RD and CAP Programs. Restricted avenues of movement due to poor trafficability make vehicles vulnerable to mining activities. Recently there has been an increase in the use of command detonated mines. There are 20,000 Irregular and 1,720 Local Force personnel to carry out this mission at any time.

b. The enemy can attack by fire utilizing rockets or mortars. The 368B Artillery Regiment continues to have the capability to launch 122 or 140mm rockets against the DANANG Airfield or other vital installations.

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It is believed that a large scale attack would come from several dispersed rocket sites. There continue to be indications that local forces have a rocket support capability. To date all of the attacks involving rockets have occurred during the hours of darkness. The major threat of large scale attack by fire on the vital areas in and around DANANG comes from the western sector of the rocket belt. The 140mm rocket attacks associated with local forces may occur from any location.

c. Less than regimental size attacks may be conducted within the 1st Marine Division AOR. The recent attacks on the District Headquarters and key bridges may be an indication of the type of target to be hit in the future. Activity to the south of Hoi An and An Hoa may indicate these areas as future targets but generally any isolated unit or installation may expect an attack. The reliance on sapper tactics and the fear of supporting arms causes most of these attacks to occur at night.

d. The present location of the major elements of the 2nd NVA Division in Quang Tin reduces the threat of a regimental size attack in the 1st Marine Division AOR. A regimental size attack, should it occur, would probably come from the south in the vicinity of Hoi An or An Hoa.

e. The enemy has the capability to infiltrate additional personnel and units into Quang Nam from Central Laos or North Vietnam. There are indications that the VC are continuing with efforts to collect rice from the fall harvest.


5. Conclusions

a. Mining incidents, acts of terrorism, harassment and other forms of guerrilla warfare will continue throughout the TAOR.

b. There are no indications of a decreased rocket threat. It is probable that the enemy will continue to make attempts to attack vital installations by fire utilizing the 140 and 122mm rocket.

c. The continued activity in Antenna Valley and the presence of Main Force units south of Hoi An indicates a threat to these areas.

d. Due to the change in the AOR the possibility of a regimental size attack within the AOR is at present remote.


R. E. COREY
COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

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ANNEX: [REDACTED]
B. Astronomical Data

DISTRIBUTION: "E"

Copy to: 2nd ROKMC Bde	(1)
SA, Quang Tin	(1)
SA, Quang Ngai	(1)
SA, QNSS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
FLC	(1)
MCB 1	(1)
MCB 9	(1)
MCB 128	(1)
CICV	(1)
1st Air Cav Div - (3rd Bde)	(2)
3rd MAW	(2)
1st Marines	(15)
5th Marines	(9)
2nd Bn, 5th Marines	(6)
7th Marines	(15)
9th MAB	(4)
5th MarDiv	(2)
USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.	(2)
Americal Division	(15)
III MAF	(5)
1st MAW	(2)
1st Recon Bn	(2)
3rd ITT	(5)
11th Marines	(15)
9th ITT	(20)
13th ITT	(5)
3rd CIT	(9)
7th CIT	(5)
CTG 79.4	(2)
NSDC	(2)
SSDC	(2)
7th Comm Bn	(2)
MCB 7	(1)
1st AMTRAC	(2)
1st Tanks	(2)
6-3	(2)

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ANNEX B (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST NARDIV PERINTREP NO. 26-67

DATE	RMC	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	MOON PHASE	% ILLUM
8 OCT	0550	0636	1830	1916	1101	2220		23
9	0550	0636	1830	1915	1205	2320		34
10	0550	0636	1829	1915	1305	----		45
11	0550	0636	1828	1914	1359	0020		55
12	0551	0636	1827	1913	1447	0120		65
13	0551	0636	1826	1913	1529	0216		75
14	0551	0636	1826	1912	1608	0309		83
15	0551	0636	1825	1912	1643	0358		90
16	0552	0637	1825	1911	1716	0446		95
17	0552	0637	1824	1911	1748	0533		98
18	0552	0637	1823	1910	1821	0619		100
19	0552	0637	1823	1910	1855	0706		100
20	0552	0637	1822	1910	1932	0755		98
21	0552	0638	1822	1909	2013	0845		94
22	0552	0638	1821	1909	2057	0937		89

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

PERINTREP NO. 27-67

RELEASABLE TO FVNAF
AND RVNAF

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1st Marine Division (Rein)
Danang, Republic of Vietnam
160900H October 1967

PERINTREP No. 27-67

Period Covered: 081200H - 151200H October

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014.

1. Mission. There has been no change in the 1st Marine Division's mission.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 84 and 74 degrees respectively with an average humidity of 85%. Approximately $7\frac{1}{2}$ inches of rain fell, $5\frac{1}{2}$ of which fell on the 8th and morning of the 9th. As a result of the heavy downpour and high winds, several bridges were damaged. The roads are still in various states of repair and even though the rivers and streams have receded to their normal channels trafficability remains poor.

Air support including the use of infrared equipment was hampered by the weather conditions.

For the coming week light showers are predicted both during the day and night. Lunar illumination will range from 95% on the 16th to 89% on the 22nd.

(b) Astronomical Data. See Annex A

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength and Composition. See Annex A, PERINTREP No. 25-67.

(2) Locations

MAIN FORCE

2nd NVA Div (AT 9135)
RC-20 Sig Bn (AT 9333)
RC-24 Engr Bn (BT 1626)
3rd NVA Regt (BT 0833)
1st Bn (HT 0831)

2nd Bn (BT 2049)
3rd Bn (AT 9340)
21st Regt (BT 1426)
1st Bn (BT 1529)
2nd Bn (BT 1622)

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3rd Bn (BT 0925)	40th Bn (AT 8527)
368B Arty Regt (ZC 0867)	60th Bn (AT 9730)
1st Bn (AT 8065)	70th Indep Bn (BT 2243)
2nd Bn (ZC 1667)	90th Bn (AT 8850)
3rd Bn (ZC 2068)	804th Bn (ZC 0696)
1st VC Regt (AT 9729)	K-4B Bn (ZC 2099)

LOCAL FORCE

Quang Da P.U. (ZC 2144)	Q-14 Co (AT 8454)
V-25th Bn (BT 1455)	Q-15 Co (AT 9654)
R-20th Bn (AT 9053)	Q-16 Co (AT 9568)
Danang City Committee (BT 0253)	Quang Nam P.U. (BT 1616)
402nd Sapper Bn (ZC 1862)	72nd Bn (BT 1818)
Q-12 Co (BT 1856)	105th Bn (Probable) (BT 0945)
Q-13 Co (BT 0647)	C-118 Co (ZD 1302)

(3) Availability of Reinforcements and Replacements. Replacements may be obtained from infiltration groups and by in-country recruiting. Reinforcements may come from elements of the 2nd NVA Division which have the capability to move north from Quang Tin. There are indications that a Main Force Battalion may be moving to the vicinity of Go Noi Island to reinforce Local Forces in that area.

(4) Aggregate Strengths. The estimated strength of the enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's newly defined AOR are: Main Forces 2,450, Local 1,780, and approximately 22,000 Irregulars.

(5) Movements and Activities.

(a) Eighty five VC initiated incidents occurred within the TAOR this week. There were 11 small arms fire incidents and 18 were mine incidents; the remaining 10 incidents involved the use of explosives and grenades. There are no figures on the number of incidents occurring within this TAOR for a similar period last year, however for the past two weeks there has been a drop in both the severity and number of incidents involving 1st Marine Division Forces.

(b) 5th Marines. For the second week the activity in the 5th Marines area consisted mainly of small arms fire and mining incidents with many of the small arms incidents involving CAP units. CAP D-1 located at (BT 0770) received small arms fire during the evenings of the 9th and 15th. CAP D-2 located at (BT 0668) took small arms fire and eight grenades from an estimated enemy squad at 1955H on the 12th. Also on the 12th two VC squads attempted to enter the Peace Hamlet at (AT 9865) for the second time in two weeks. ARVN forces discovered them and the enemy was driven

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off by 0330H.

along the roads at 2140H on the 9th an LVT was damaged by a command detonated mine at (BT 0864) and at (BT 0365) an explosive charge slightly damaged the Tu Cau Bridge.

The small arms fire and mining incidents were scattered throughout the TACR.

Just south of Hoi An. Fireflies in support of Operation Tattoo sank four boats at (BT 1752) on the 14th.

(c) 2nd Battalion 5th Marines. In 2/5's area, CAPS N-2 and N-3 at (AT 8847, 8749) received small arms fire on the 11th and 12th. On the 10th on 2/2/5 patrol initiated a fire fight with a squad sized unit at (AT 9049).

To the south elements of 2/5 fired on lights at (AT 8739) on the 9th. On the 12th Clubcar received an intelligence report from CAP N-1. Artillery was fired on coordinates (AT 8435) and two secondary explosions resulted. In Antenna Valley recon patrols Bennington and Duckbill had sightings and contacts. On the 11th Bennington called artillery on two groups for a total of 15 VC at (AT 8834). Duckbill came under automatic weapons and small arms fire from an estimated 40 enemy at (AT 9437) on the 11th, and on the 12th they were ambushed by an estimated 70 VC at (AT 9537). The patrol reported that the enemy wore black pajamas and tiger striped utilities. Along the river F/2/5 called artillery on boats at (ZC 2133) on the 9th. Blackcat-4 reported seeing a total of 120 sampans which appeared to be loaded with rice in this same area on the 10th. Artillery was called damaging six of the boats but the canopy and an approaching storm prohibited further damage assessment. This is the same general area where 40-50 sampans were spotted on the 6th of last week.

(d) 7th Marines. The 7th Marines, particularly 3/7, continued to have several incidents of Vietnamese nationals turning in equipment and ordnance. They have been having success with this program for the past couple of months.

The majority of the activity in the 7th Marines area this week occurred in 3/7 and 2/7's TACR'S. At 1245H on the 9th an M/3/7 patrol called artillery on 11 VC at (AT 8457). Four of the enemy were armed while the other seven appeared to be carrying rice. K and I/3/7 observed enemy in boats at (AT 9761) and (AT 9053); in both cases the boats were taken under fire. At 0630H on the 12th I/3/7 observed 15 enemy crossing a rice paddy at (AT 8450). They fired on the enemy and a sweep of the area revealed four blood trails. An hour later "I" Company received eight 60mm mortar rounds and 100 rounds of small

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arms fire at (AT 8449). At 1400H a fire mission was called on 14 more VC moving north on a trail at (AT 8152). On the 13th M/3/7 observed 27 enemy in two groups at (AT 7855). Artillery was called in both cases. An AO spotted ten tunnel entrances and automatic weapons positions in the vicinity of (ZC 1756).

In 1/7's area a D/1/7 squad combat patrol found 15 box mines at (AT 9571) on the 12th.

2/7 had several isolated contacts and sightings. On the 10th F/2/7 observed ten lights in the vicinity of (AT 9591) and called 155mm VP rounds on them. On the 14th reconnaissance patrol War Cloud engaged an estimated 20 VC manning prepared positions at (ZC 1798). The enemy employed a large number of automatic weapons and machine guns including .50 calibers. Attempts to reinforce the patrol were stopped by a heavy volume of machine gun fire. Finally, a Bald Eagle was dropped north of the contact area in the low ground. The number and type of weapons employed by the ~~enemy~~ indicated that the patrol engaged elements of a battalion, possibly the K4B. Elsewhere, at 2300H on the 14th F/2/7 observed and fired upon an estimated 60 VC at (AT 8980).

(c) Outside the TAOB. On the 8th the 2nd Battalion 327th Infantry located at (AT 9427) received a heavy ground and mortar attack from a unit later identified as the 70th Battalion of the 1st VC Regiment. The enemy had 60 KIA. In addition elements of the 327th Infantry received several mortar rounds throughout the week.

Units on Operation Samurai II reported finding a concrete bridge at (ZC 0035). The bridge, about 75 feet long, was partially camouflaged. Reportedly this area has been targeted for future air strikes. Aircraft in support of the operation reported receiving heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire from the vicinity of (YC 7640).

(6) Logistics. A directive classified VC secret with the signature block of Unit 75 - Dien Ban District Unit - informs addressees that higher authorities will not issue any more weapons due to shortages. It directs hamlet and village guerrillas to conserve ammo, to operate together so that they may destroy squad sized U.S. forces, and to place more emphasis on spike pits, punji pits and rudimentary weapons. Finally the document cites Que Son, Duy Xuyen, Dai Loc and Thang Binh as places to look for duds to make mines and booby traps.

(7) Operational Capability to Launch Rockets. Certain areas which may have been acceptable as launching sites are presently unsatisfactory due to the rains, however there is no known change in the enemy's rocket capability.

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(8) Other. This week the 2nd Battalion/502 Infantry captured an M16-50 flame thrower at (BT 0324). This weapon has a range of 70 meters with thickened fuel and 20 meters with unthickened fuel.

3. Capabilities

a. To conduct acts of terrorism and harassment with emphasis on countering the Revolutionary Development Program, and to continue interdiction of LOC's with the objective of increasing VC control over population and denying the GVN/US/PVNAF use of water and highways.

b. To conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields and logistics installations.

c. To conduct less than regimental size attacks and harassment against isolated friendly forces and installations.

d. To continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. The enemy has the capability to conduct unconventional warfare throughout the TAOR. Past activities indicate that the enemy places a high priority on lines of communication and the RD and CAP Programs. The increased requirements for the use of Route #1 will make it an even more likely target, particularly in the Mai Van Pass/Phu Loc areas.

Restricted avenues of movement due to poor trafficability make vehicles vulnerable to mining activities. There are 22,000 Irregular and 1,780 Local Force personnel to carry out this mission at any time.

b. The enemy can attack by fire utilizing rockets or mortars. Although various potential rocket sites have been eliminated due to flooding and weather conditions, the 368B Artillery regiment continues to have the capability to launch 122 or 140mm rockets against the DANANG airfield or other vital installations. It is believed that a large scale attack would come from several dispersed rocket sites. There continue to be indications that local forces have a rocket support capability. To date, all of the attacks involving rockets have occurred during the hours of darkness. The major threat of large scale attack by fire on the vital areas in and around DANANG comes from the western sector of the rocket belt. The 140mm rocket attacks associated with local forces may occur from any location.

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c. Less than regimental size attacks may be conducted within the 1st Marine Division AOR. The past attacks on the District Headquarters and key bridges may be an indication of the type of target to be hit in the future, however, any isolated unit or installation may expect an attack. The reliance on seapper tactics and the fear of supporting arms cause the enemy to conduct attacks at night.

d. The enemy has the capability to infiltrate additional personnel and units into Quang Nam from Central Laos or North Vietnam.

There are indications that the VC are continuing with efforts to obtain and store supplies for the remainder of the monsoon season.

5 Conclusions

a. Mining incidents, acts of terrorism, harassment and other forms of guerrilla warfare will continue throughout the TAOR.

b. There are no indications of a decreased rocket threat. It is probable that the enemy will continue to make attempts to attack vital installations by fire utilizing the 140 and 122mm rocket.

c. There are indications that a Main Force battalion may be moving to the vicinity of Gc Noi Island to reinforce Local Forces in that area. There is a possibility of increased activity in this area in the near future.

d. Various sightings and certain captured documents indicate that the VC are giving a considerable amount of attention to the supply problems. The rain and accompanying floods are having an adverse effect on enemy as well as U.S. forces.


R. E. COREY

COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEX: A. Astronomical Data

DISTRIBUTION: "E"

Copy to:	2nd ROKMC Bde	(1)
	SA, Quang Tin	(1)
	SA, Quang Ngai	(1)
	SA, QNSS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)

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FLC	(1)
MCB 1	(1)
MCB 9	(1)
MCB 128	(1)
CICV	(1)
1st Air Cav Div (3rd Bde)	(2)
3rd LAW	(2)
1st Marines	(5)
5th Marines	(15)
2nd Bn, 5th Marines	(6)
7th Marines	(15)
9th MAB	(4)
5th MarDiv	(2)
USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning Ga.	(2)
Americal Division	(15)
III MAF	(5)
1st Recon Bn	(2)
3rd ITT	(2)
11th Marines	(5)
9th ITT	20
1st AT Bn	(1)
5th CIT	(5)
7th CIT	(9)
CTC 79-5	(5)
NSDC	(2)
SSDC	(2)
7th Comm Bn	(2)
MCB 7	(2)
3rd Amtrac	(2)
1st Tanks	(2)
G-3	(2)

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ANNEX A (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST HARIV PERINTREP NO. 27-67

DATE	BNCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	% ILLUM
15	0551	0636	1825	1912	1643	0358	90
16	0552	0637	1825	1911	1716	0446	95
17	0552	0637	1824	1911	1748	0533	98
18	0552	0637	1823	1910	1821	0619	100
19	0552	0637	1823	1910	1855	0706	100
20	0552	0637	1822	1910	1932	0755	98
21	0552	0638	1822	1909	2013	0845	94
22	0552	0638	1821	1909	2057	0937	89
23	0552	0638	1820	1908	2146	1030	82
24	0553	0639	1820	1907	2239	1124	74
25	0553	0639	1819	1907	2335	1218	65
26	0553	0639	1819	1906	----	1309	55
27	0553	0639	1818	1906	0033	1356	45
28	0553	0639	1818	1906	0131	1442	34
29	0553	0639	1818	1905	0230	1524	24

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

PERINTREP NO. 28-67

RELEASABLE TO FWMF
AND RVNAF

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1st Marine Division (Rein)
Danang, Republic of Vietnam
230800H October 1967

PERINTREP NO 28-67

Period Covered: 161200H - 221200H October 1967

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. There has been no change in the 1st Marine Division's mission.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation

(1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 83 and 73 degrees respectively with an average humidity of 81%. Approximately five inches of rain fell throughout the week. Once again, cloud cover hindered air support, particularly in the vicinity of Hai Van Pass.

The seven day forecast calls for partly cloudy skies on the 23rd and 24th with cloudy skies and showers predicted for the remainder of the week. The temperature and humidity will be about the same as last week with about four inches of rainfall predicted. Lunar illumination will decrease from 89% on the 22nd to 24% on the 29th.

(b) Astronomical Data. See Annex A.

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength and Composition. See Annex A, PERINTREP No. 25-67

(2) Locations

MAIN FORCE

2nd NVA Div (AT 9034)
RQ-20 Sig Bn (AT 9333)
RQ-24 Engr Bn (BT 1728)
3rd NVA Regt (BT 1533)
1st Bn (BT 1734)

2nd Bn (BT 2049)
3rd Bn (AT 9340)
21st Regt (BT 1921)
1st Bn (BT 2222)
2nd Bn (BT 1622)

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3rd Bn (BT 0925)
368B Arty Regt (ZC 0867)
1st Bn (AT 8065)
2nd Bn (ZC 1667)
3rd Bn (ZC 2068)
1st VC Regt (AT 9229)

40th Bn (AT 8527)
60th Bn (AT 9631)
90th Bn (AT 8827)
804th Bn (ZC 0696)
K-4B Bn (ZC 2099)
70th Indep Bn (BT 2243)

LOCAL FORCE

Quang Da P.U. (ZC 2044)
V-25th Bn (BT 1455)
R-20th Bn (AT 9053)
Danang City Committee (BT 0253)
402nd Sapper Bn (ZC 1862)
Q-12 Co (BT 1856)
Q-13 Co (BT 0648)

Q-14 Co (AT 8454)
Q-15 Co (AT 9654)
Q-16 Co (AT 8869)
Quang Nam P.U. (BT 1616)
72nd Bn (BT 2121)
105th Bn (Probable) (BT 0035)
C-118 Co (ZD 1302)

(3) Availability of Reinforcements and Replacements.

Replacements may be obtained from infiltration groups or by in-country recruiting. Reinforcements may come from elements of the 2nd NVA Division which have the capability of moving north from Quang Tin. There continue to be sightings and contacts in the Antenna Valley indicating that elements of the 2nd NVA Division are probably located in this area.

(4) Aggregate Strengths. The estimated strength of the enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's newly defined AOR are: Main Forces 2,450, Local Forces 1,780, and approximately 22,000 Irregulars. In addition, there are some indications of additional forces in the Phu Loc area.

(5) Movements and Activities. There were 68 (46 small arms fire, 14 mines, 8 miscellaneous) enemy initiated incidents this week and although this number is below the weekly average, many of the incidents were relatively significant.

(a) 5th Marines. In the 5th Marines area two large rice caches totaling 41,000 pounds were captured and several CAP's received small arms fire. Possibly the harassment of the CAP's was related to the elections.

D/1/5 OPCON to 3/5 found an estimated 40,000 pounds of rice at 0630H on the 19th. The rice was hidden in several huts in the vicinity of (BT 0460). At 1640H 3/5's S-2 discovered 1000 pounds of rice, a large threshing machine, some medicine, a VC rice receipt and a khaki uniform at (BT 0360). The 41,000 pounds of rice, enough to feed 1,000 men for a month, was turned over to Vietnamese officials for redistribution.

CAP D-5 at (BT 1858) was involved in four incidents this week. At 2105H on the 19th they received heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire

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and Spooky was called to drive the enemy away. At about the same time the next night they observed 30-40 VC moving into the nearby refugee village. The enemy was driven off with small arms fire and a search of the area revealed ten blood trails. Harassing small arms fire was directed at the D-5 at 0910H and 1150H on the 22nd. CAPS D-1 and D-3 at (BT 0770) and (BT 0457) received small arms fire on the 21st.

Along the rivers, one boat was spotted at (BT 1451), six boats at (BT 1560) and a total of nine boats at (BT 1360). All of the boats were taken under fire.

On the 18th and 19/1 patrol found seven Chi Com grenades rigged as AP mines at (BT 0564). The mines were in a small area.

At 1215H on the 19th an A/1/5 squad observed 20 enemy moving south at (BT 1164). An AO spotted 50 VC at (BT 0354) at 1200H on the 21st and air and artillery were called resulting in one secondary explosion. At 1645H airstrikes were called on suspected enemy positions within this area and another secondary explosion resulted. A column of smoke 100 feet high and 75 feet in diameter rose from this explosion.

(b) 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. In 2/5's TAOR recon patrols had several sightings and contacts. In Antenna Valley, recon patrol Lunga Point observed 17 VC and 12 lights in the vicinity of (AT 9039). Most of the VC were wearing gray or khaki uniforms and carrying packs. It appeared that some of the lights were used as signaling devices. The AO's reported several sightings in the vicinity of (AT 9037) again the enemy was reported to be wearing khaki and grey uniforms. At 1200H on the 22nd, recon patrol Ramage contacted 25 VC in the vicinity of (AT 9539). The VC were wearing black pajamas and carrying rice sacks. At 0700H on the 17th an F/2/5 patrol received heavy small arms fire/automatic weapons fire at (AT 8849). At (AT 9350) on the 18th, F/2/5 observed eight enemy with weapons. A fire mission was called with unknown results.

(c) 7th Marines. The 7th Marines had several contacts in the vicinity of Hill 55 and in the Phu Loc area.

In 3/7's TAOR on the 15th an AO ran an artillery mission on a tunnel complex at (AT 8248). On the 20th boats were taken under fire at (AT 8753). In the vicinity of (AT 9254) two VC were observed unloading a boat and at (AT 8753) Fire Flies destroyed 12 sampans. Also on the 20th, medical supplies were captured at (AT 7957) by an M/3/7 squad patrol. Throughout the week approximately 30 B-40 rounds were turned in to 3/7 by villagers. Reportedly they were found in the vicinity of (AT 9157) washed up by the floods last week. Contacts

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occurred on the 19th when a K/3/7 patrol received small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad at (AT 9660). At (AT 9861) on the 20th a K/3/7 fire team recon patrol observed 31 VC and called fixed wing and artillery in on the enemy. A search of the area revealed three VC KIA (C), two weapons and other equipment captured; also on the 20th at (AT 9560) K/3/7's security received fire from an estimated 15 C. On the 21st L/3/7 captured Nguyen Nginh, believed to be the commanding officer or executive officer of the R-24 Company, R-20th Battalion. During interrogation, the PW stated that he was used only for liason purposes within the R-20th Battalion.

1/7's TAOR was quiet. To the west Operation Samurai III commenced on 19 October, and several sightings and contacts occurred on the 20th. At 0650H Road Runner teams 106 and 107 received fire from an estimated 20 to 30 enemy in the vicinity of (ZC 0569). The enemy was armed with AK-47's. An hour later Road Runner Team 106 and 107 contacted another 30 to 40 enemy at (ZC 0570). An air strike was called and the teams reported they could hear people speaking with a North Vietnamese accent. Finally at (ZC 1371) elements of the Delta Force spotted five enemy running southeast into a woodline.

The northern portion of 2/7's TAOR was active all week. Recon team Petrify was inserted on the 15th in the vicinity of (ZC 1898) where recon team War Cloud was last week. At 1645H on the 16th they observed five VC moving northwest on a trail. The patrol killed one of the VC with small arms fire. At 1700H the next day they came under heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire from an estimated squad. Casualties were taken and a request was made for med evacs and a reaction force. A med evac helicopter arrived at 1800H but heavy ground fire forced them to abort the mission. Another CH-46 sent to the area was damaged and forced down at 0730H on the 18th. Later this helicopter took ten rounds of 81 or 82mm mortar at (ZD 1701). At 1135H on the 18th the reaction force G/2/7 linked up with recon and at 1445H on the 19th Petrify's extraction was complete. On the 22nd the Airborne Personnel Detector reported positive returns from this same area.

To the south recon team Texas Pete also had contact. On the 16th their harbor site at (AT 8689) came under attack from an estimated 20 NVA. Air strikes were called with unknown results. Two of the enemy were KIA (C) due to small arms fire. At 0800H on the next day the patrol received intense machine gun and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 40-60 NVA in the vicinity of (AT 8788). The enemy wore mixed uniforms, mostly greyish khaki. The patrol defended this area until a reaction force relieved them at 1530H on the 17th. A search of the area revealed six NVA KIA (C), magazines for Czech assault rifles and other equipment. Elsewhere in 2/7's TAOR CAP Q-3 squad

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ambush observed 15 enemy in the vicinity of (AT 9081). They initiated fire and reported three VC KIA (P). At 2305H on the 19th an E/2/7 squad ambush at (AT 9390) was attacked by an estimated enemy squad. The enemy employed grenades, rifle grenades, and a heavy volume of small arms/automatic weapons fire. About this same time on the next night an F/2/7 squad patrol at (AT 9183) received grenades and small arms fire from an estimated 20-25 enemy. A reaction force found an AK-47, a French rifle and 100 pounds of rice in the area.

On the 22nd E/2/7 fired artillery on VC unloading five sampans at (AT 9486). One boat was sunk and three VC KIA.

(d) In the Que Son Valley the Americal Division reported capturing about 17 tons of rice and other assorted equipment throughout the week. Their major contact occurred at (AT 9731) on the 20th, when several personnel were killed, three helicopters were shot down, and 14 others received fire. Enemy casualties were unknown.

(e) Operation Medina concluded at 1800H on the 20th. The 1st Marines reported 32 enemy KIA (C), 74 KIA (P), 3 NVA PW'S, 23 individual and 3 crew served weapons captured. On the nine day operation the 1st Marines received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar, six rounds of 60mm mortar, and were assaulted twice by small groups of the enemy.

(3) The enemy's operational capability to launch rockets remains unchanged. PW Nguyen Van Hoc, captured in the vicinity of (AT 9025) on the 29th of September claims he was from the 68th Artillery Regiment which is armed with 122mm rockets. The PW stated that his unit was assigned to Quang Ngai (P). The PW's description of his unit's organization and training indicates that it is set up very similar to the 368B Artillery Regiment except that it has no 140mm rockets. Possibly such a unit is passing through the western portion of Quang Nam/Quang Tin on its way south.

5. Capabilities

a. To conduct acts of terrorism and harassment with emphasis on countering the Revolutionary Development Program, and to continue interdiction of LOC's with the objective of increasing VC control over population and denying the GVN/US/PWMAF use of water and highways.

b. To conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields and logistics installations.

c. To conduct less than regimental size attacks and harassment against isolated friendly forces and installations.

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d. To continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. The enemy has the capability to conduct unconventional warfare throughout the TAOR. Past activities indicate that the enemy places a high priority on lines of communication and the RD and CAP Programs. The increased requirements for the use of Route #1 will make it an even more likely target.

The floods destroyed several punji pits and booby traps, however, these can be expected to be replaced in the near future. Restricted avenues of movement due to poor trafficability make vehicles vulnerable to command detonated mines. There are 22,000 Irregular and 1,780 Local Force personnel to carry out this mission at any time.

b. The enemy can attack by fire utilizing rockets or mortars. Although various potential rocket sites have been eliminated due to flooding and weather conditions, the 368B Artillery Regiment continues to have the capability to launch 122 or 140mm rockets against the DANANG Airfield or other vital installations. It is believed that a large scale attack would come from several dispersed rocket sites. To date, all of the attacks involving rockets have occurred during the hours of darkness. The major threat of large scale attack by fire on the vital areas in and around DANANG comes from the western sector of the rocket belt. The 140mm rocket attacks associated with Local Forces may occur from any location.

c. Less than regimental size attacks may be conducted within the 1st Marine Division AOR. The past attacks on the District Headquarters and key bridges may be an indication of the type of target to be hit in the future, however any isolated unit or installation may expect an attack. The reliance on sapper tactics and the fear of supporting arms causes the enemy to conduct attacks at night.

d. The enemy has the capability to infiltrate additional personnel and units into Quang Nam from Central Laos, North Vietnam, or adjoining provinces.

There are indications that the flooding, particularly in 3/7's area has destroyed some storage areas. The VC are expected to continue their efforts to obtain and store supplies for the remainder of the moonsoon season.

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5. Conclusions

a. Mining incidents, acts of terrorism, harassment and other forms of guerrilla warfare will continue throughout the TAOR.

b. There are no indications of a decreased rocket threat. It is probable that the enemy will continue to make attempts to attack vital installations by fire utilizing the 140 and 122mm rocket.

c. There is a sizeable enemy force in the Phu Loc area. Sightings and contacts made this week indicate that the enemy is dug in on the high ground along the ridge lines.

The continued presence of a battalion of the 3rd NVA Regiment and the 70th Independent Battalion south of Hoi An continues to indicate a threat to this area.

d. Various sightings and certain captured documents indicate that the VC are giving a considerable amount of attention to the supply problems. The rain and accompanying floods are having their effect on enemy as well as U.S. Forces.



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ANNEX: A. Astronomical Data

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MCB 9	(1)
MCB 128	(1)
CICV	(1)
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3rd CIT	(5)
7th CIT	(9)
CTG 79.5	(5)
NSDC	(2)
SSDC	(2)
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MCB 7	(2)
3rd Amtrac	(2)
1st Tanks	(2)
G-3	(2)
3rd MP Bn	(2)

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ANNEX A (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MAR DIV PERINTREP NO. 28-67

DATE	BMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	% ILLUM
23 OCT	0552	0638	1820	1908	2146	1030	82
24	0553	0639	1820	1907	2239	1124	74
25	0553	0639	1819	1907	2335	1218	65
26	0553	0639	1819	1906	----	1309	55
27	0553	0639	1818	1906	0033	1356	45
28	0553	0639	1818	1906	0131	1442	34
29	0553	0639	1818	1905	0230	1524	24
30	0553	0639	1818	1905	0328	1606	15
31	0553	0640	1817	1905	0426	1647	07
1 NOV	0554	0640	1817	1904	0526	1731	02
2	0554	0640	1817	1904	0619	1818	00
3	0554	0641	1817	1904	0733	1909	01
4	0555	0642	1816	1903	0841	2005	05
5	0555	0642	1815	1903	0949	2106	11
6	0556	0642	1815	1903	1053	2208	19

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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PERINTREP NO. 29-67

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1st Marine Division (Rein)
Danang, Republic of Vietnam
300800H October 1967

PERINTREP No. 29-67

Period covered: 221200H - 291200H October 1967

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. There has been no change in the 1st Marine Division's mission.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area Of Operation

(1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 84 and 70 degrees respectively with an average humidity of 81%. Approximately .36 on an inch of rain fell throughout the week.

The seven day forecast calls for partly cloudy skies with intermittent rain showers throughout the week. Temperatures will average 85 degrees for the high and 70 degrees for the low. The humidity will continue to average around 80%. Lunar illumination will decrease from 24% on the 29th to 5% on 4 November.

(b) Astronomical Data. See Annex B.

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength, Composition and Location. See Annex A.

(2) Availability of Reinforcements and Replacements.

Replacements may be obtained from infiltration groups or by in-country recruiting. Reinforcements may come from elements of the 2nd NVA Division which have the capability of moving north from Quang Tin. There continue to be sightings and contacts in the Antenna Valley indicating that elements of the 2nd NVA Division are probably located in this area.

(3) Aggregate Strengths. The estimated strengths of the enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's newly defined AOR are: Main Forces 2,150, Local Forces 1,780, and approximately 22,000 Irregulars.

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(4) Movements and Activities. There were 83 enemy initiated incidents last week of which 44 were the result of enemy small arms fire, 26 were attributed to mines and booby traps and 13 were due to enemy grenades and punji traps.

(a) The 5th Marines area was the scene of several small arms and mine incidents during the past week. CAP units throughout the area were also hit on several occasions.

In 3/1's area on the 22nd at 0800H, a Navy vehicle detonated a box type mine with an estimated 40 pound charge at (BT 0771). A half hour later on the same day, a Marine vehicle also detonated a 40 pound charge, box type mine at (BT 0772). On two separate occasions on the 23rd CAP D-1 located at (BT 0770) received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. At 2000H they received approximately 500-700 rounds of small arms fire. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 2255H CAP D-1 again received 200 rounds of small arms fire. At 2045H on the 26th CAP D-2 located at (BT 0669) received three rifle grenades and 450 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad.

On the 28th AC Breachmark-7 received small arms fire from a village at (BT 1063). The AC conducted an artillery fire mission and five airstrikes resulting in 20 structures destroyed and 18 damaged; in addition there were two small secondary explosions and one large secondary explosion. On the 22nd in 1/5's area CAP D-5 at (BT 1858) received 330 rounds of small arms fire.

On the 24th, a VNAF airstrike was conducted at (BT 1855) and at (BT 1755) resulting in 18 VC boats destroyed. Also on the 24th, a PF platoon at (BT 0550) came under attack from an estimated enemy company. The contact lasted from 0755H to 1230H. Enemy losses were reported as 17 VC KIA (C) and 21 KIA (P).

At 1520H on the 25th C/1/5 while on a search and destroy mission received five rounds of small arms fire at (BT 0860). Nine rounds of 105 HE were returned and five secondary explosions were observed near the enemy position at (BT 0760). On the 28th at 2040H, a B/1/5 combat patrol at (BT 1260) received small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact. Enemy casualties were reported as 10 VC KIA (P).

3/5's area was relatively quiet during the past week. However, on the 23rd CAP D-3 observed 25 enemy at (BT 0458) and another 15 enemy at (BT 0459). The CAP unit fired a total of 500 rounds of small arms and 20 rounds of 60mm mortar at the two enemy groups with unknown results. On the 28th at 2100H a 1/3/5 squad combat patrol at (AT 9861) received 300 rounds of automatic weapons and small arms fire from an estimated six enemy. Small arms fire was returned killing two VC.

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(b) In 2/5's area on the 22nd, AO Benchmark-4 observed 15 enemy at (AT 902378) in a fortified position. The AO conducted fixed wing airstrikes. One VC was killed, 14 structures were destroyed and there was one secondary explosion.

On the 22nd, reconnaissance team Rummage found a VC battalion size hospital at (AT 9539). Bandages and a bag of narcotics were found at the scene.

CAP N-2 located at (AT 8847) received enemy small arms fire on the 25th and 26th. On the 26th at 1945H, E/2/5 perimeter defense at (AT 8950) received 15 rounds of small arms fire and three 82mm mortar rounds.

(c) 7th Marines. The 7th Marines had several secondary explosions in their area as a result of AO sightings and contacts.

In 3/7's TAOR on the 22nd, AO Benchmark-1 ran three airstrikes on a village with an extensive bunker complex at (AT 8147), eight structures were destroyed and one secondary explosion was observed.

On the 24th at 1700H an I/3/11 convoy was ambushed at (AT 9658) by an estimated 11 enemy firing automatic weapons and machine guns. A reaction force was sent to the area and they also received fire.

At 1830H on the 27th, AO Benchmark-4 observed 20-25 VC in a fortified position at (AT 8048). The AO ran two airstrikes and six structures were destroyed. No enemy casualties were observed. On the 27th, AO Benchmark-7 observed a bunker complex at (AT 8955). Two airstrikes were run destroying 35 structures. There was also one large secondary explosion. Benchmark-7 ran two other airstrikes at (AT 8449) destroying 20 structures. Another large secondary explosion was also observed.

In 1/7's area, a B/1/7 Marine detonated an M-26 grenade rigged as a mine at (AT 8972). Later, two similar mines were detonated as his patrol searched the area. Also, an additional two mines were detonated as the Marines were establishing an LZ for a med evac chopper. Another six grenade type mines were found and destroyed in the same area.

On the morning of the 22nd in 2/7's TAOR an E/2/7 patrol observed eight boats at (AT 9689). Five of the boats appeared to be unloading supplies. An artillery mission was called damaging three boats and killing three VC.

At 1425H on the 24th, Harbor Entrance Control at (AT 920825) received three rounds of unknown type mortar.

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At 0130H on the 27th, two secondary explosions were observed during a TPQ-10 run at (AT 8584).

On the 27th at 0215H, reconnaissance team Texas Pete observed an estimated 50 lights at (AT 8583). Artillery was called and the lights went out. At 0350H a Spookey came on station in the same area. One large secondary explosion resulted from Spookey's fire.

On the 27th at 2330H, a F/2/7 ambush initiated a fire fight with ten VC at (AT 9284). Enemy casualties were unknown. 200 pounds of rice and assorted documents were found near the enemy position.

At 2045H on the 28th, at (AT 9184) a F/2/7 patrol was hit by an estimated 50 enemy. A reaction force from Fox Company was dispatched to the scene and artillery and mortar was utilized resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 10 VC KIA (P).

(d) Operation Knox. On the 24th a H/2/7 patrol at (ZC 1798) received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions. Small arms and mortar fire were returned, enemy casualties were unknown.

At 0250H on the 26th, LSA perimeter defense at (ZD 1801) received 61 rounds of 82mm mortar. Counter battery fire was conducted and the enemy mortars ceased.

(e) Americal Division. Elements of the Americal Division made two significant contacts south of the 5th Marines area.

On the 23rd and 24th "A" Company 5th Battalion of the 7th Infantry made contact with an enemy force suspected to be a battalion of the 3rd NVA Regiment at (BT 2239). Enemy losses were 50 KIA, 3 individual weapons and 3 crew served weapons captured.

From 0919H to 1900H on the 27th, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry once again engaged an NVA force estimated to be of battalion size at (BT 2348). Enemy losses were 45 NVA KIA, 13 individual weapons and 4 crew served weapons captured.

(f) Operation Samurai. On the 22nd, Delta Force Recon Team #2 participating in Operation Samurai III made several contacts in the vicinity of (ZC 1065) with small groups of enemy. Two VC were killed.

On the afternoon of the 24th a Delta Force Roadrunner Team came upon an abandoned enemy battalion or regimental CP area at (ZC 0869). A company size reaction force was inserted and conducted a sweep. During

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the advance, several enemy packs and assorted gear including plotting boards and documents were captured indicating that the enemy force could be elements of the 368B Artillery Regiment.

(g) IR and APD Emissions. IR coverage flown on the 22nd at (AT 8684) revealed six emissions or moderate activity. In the vicinity of (AT 8689) there were four emissions. APD surveillance on the 22nd at (ZC 1997) indicated moderate enemy activity.

On the 24th, IR coverage revealed five emissions or moderate activity at (ZC 1783). IR missions flown on the 28th in the Operation Knox area revealed 18 emissions at (ZC 0897) and ten emissions at (AT 8194). There were 13 emissions at (AT 8187).

Additional emissions were recorded in Elephant Valley at (ZC 2087) and Antenna Valley at (AT 8139) and at (AT 8335).

(5) Logistics. There have been reports of the possibility of an attempt by the enemy to infiltrate ammunition and supplies to forces in southern I Corps by sea. Possible areas for attempted infiltration are considered to be the Cau Dai river (BT 2056), the central Quang Tin coast, and the Batangan peninsula area. The infiltration attempt will probably be made in conjunction with diversionary attacks to cover the attempt. The most favorable time for an infiltration attempt is considered to be the period from 3 through 8 November, as this is the dark of the moon and high tides will occur between 2237H and 0124H.

(6) Operational Capability to Launch Rockets. The enemy's operational capability to launch rockets remains unchanged. The interrogation of PW DANG UNG strengthens our suspicion that the local enemy forces have a rocket support capability. UNG stated that he provided security for a provincial unit which fired rockets at the Danang Airfield on 9 September. UNG's description of events conforms with our records.

3. Capabilities

a. To conduct acts of terrorism and harassment with emphasis on countering the Revolutionary Development Program, and to continue interdiction of LOC's with the objective of increasing VC control over population and denying the GVN/US/FWMAF use of water and highways.

b. To conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields and logistics installations.

c. To conduct less than regimental size attacks and harassment against isolated friendly forces and installations.

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d. To continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. The enemy has the capability to conduct unconventional warfare throughout the TAOR. Past activities indicates that the enemy places a high priority on lines of communication and the RD and CAP Programs. The increased requirements for the use of Route #1 will make it an even likely target.

b. The enemy can attack by fire utilizing rockets or mortars. The 368B Artillery Regiment continues to have the capability to launch 122mm or 140mm rockets against the Danang Airfield or other vital installations. However, it is possible that the 368B Artillery Regiment's capability to launch an attack by fire on the vital areas has been hindered due to the recent activities of the Project Delta Forces and Arc-Light strikes in the vicinity of (ZC 0869). See page 4 (paragraph f) this Perintrep.

It is believed that a large scale attack could come from several dispersed rocket sites. To date, all of the attacks involving rockets have occurred during the hours of darkness. The major threat of a large scale attack by fire on the vital areas in and around Danang comes from the western sector of the rocket belt. The 140mm rocket attacks associated with Local Forces may occur from any location.

c. Less than regimental size attacks may be conducted within the 1st Marine Division AOR. The past attacks on the District Headquarters and key bridges may be an indication of the type of target to be hit in the future, however any isolated unit or installation may expect an attack. The reliance on sapper tactics and the fear of supporting arms causes the enemy to conduct attacks at night.

d. The enemy has the capability to infiltrate additional personnel and units into Quang Nam from Central Laos, North Vietnam, or adjoining provinces.

There are indications that the flooding, particularly in 3/7's area has destroyed some storage areas. The VC are expected to continue their efforts to obtain and store supplies for the remainder of the monsoon season.

5. Conclusions

a. Mining incidents, acts of terrorism, and other forms of guerrilla warfare will continue throughout the TAOR.

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b. It is probable that the enemy will continue to make attempts to attack vital installations by fire utilizing the 140mm and 122mm rockets.

c. Sizeable enemy forces remain in the mountains to the west of the Hai Van Pass and near the Phu Loc area. Due to their continued presence, moderate contact can be expected in the area.

d. Significant contacts made by Americal Forces with enemy forces south of Hoi An indicates that a Battalion of the 3rd NVA Regiment, the 3rd NVA Regimental Headquarters, and the 70th Independent Battalion are probably located in the area.

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ANNEX: A. Strength, Location, Composition
B. Astronomical Data

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MCB 9	(1)
MCB 128	(1)
CICV	(1)
1st Air Cav Div (3rd Bde)	(2)
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5th Marines	(15)
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11th Marines	(5)
9th ITC	(20)
1st AT Bn	(2)
3rd CIT	(5)
7th CIT	(9)
CTG 79.5	(5)
NSDC	(2)
SSDC	(2)
7th Comm Bn	(2)
MCB 7	(2)
3rd Amtrac	(2)
1st Tanks	(2)
G-3	(2)
3rd MP Bn	(2)

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ANNEX A (STRENGTH, LOCATION, COMPOSITION) 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 29-67

MAIN FORCE

Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
2nd NVA Div Hqs	200 ✓	AT 9232 / 30 Oct	BT 0121		C
RQ-20 Sig Bn	200 ✓	AT 9333 / 22 Oct		Indiv SA & SMG'S	C
RQ-24 Engr Bn	110 ✓	BT 1728 / 26 Sep		Indiv SA & SMG'S	C
3rd NVA Regt (Rein)	1500 ✓	BT 2151 / 30 Oct	BT 1036	10-81, 6-82, 14-60mm mtrs; unk #RR; 21-HMG	C
Hqs & Spt Unit	350 ✓	BT 2151 / 30 Oct	BT 1036		C
1st Bn	400 ✓	BT 1934 / 30 Oct			C
2nd Bn	400 ✓	BT 2049 / 30 Oct			C
3rd Bn	350 ✓	AT 9340 / 30 Oct		5-82mm, 6-60mm mtr	C
21st NVA Regt (Rein)	2000 ✓	BT 0629 / 30 Oct	BT 1204	10-81, 6-82, 12-60mm mtr, unk #RR, unk HMG, unk #B-40, 4-12.7AA MG'S	C
Hqs & Spt Unit	800 ✓	BT 0629 / 30 Oct	BT 1204		C
1st Bn	400 ✓	BT 2222 / 30 Oct		2-81, 2-82, 4-60mm mtr, 3-HMG, 9-B-40	C
2nd Bn	400 ✓	BT 1622 / 30 Oct		3-57mm RR	C
3rd Bn	400 ✓	BT 1420 / 30 Oct		2-81, 3-60mm mtr, 3-57mm RR, 4-MG	C
1st VC Regt	1200 ✓	AT 9827 / 30 Oct	BT 0825	2-81, 2-82, 3-60mm mtr, 2-57mm RR, 4-30cal MG	C
Hqs & Spt Unit	300 ✓	AT 9827 / 30 Oct	BT 0825		C

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Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
40th Bn	250	AT 8527 / 30 Oct			C
60th Bn	400	AT 9631 / 30 Oct			C
90th Bn	250	AT 8827 / 30 Oct		4-82, 6-60, 3-81mm mtr, 1-57mm RR, 3-SMG	C
368B NVA Regt (Hq80)	1400	ZC 0968 / 30 Oct			C
1st Bn	400	ZC 2064 / 30 Oct		unk # 140mm Rkt Launcher	C
2nd Bn	400	ZC 1367 / 30 Oct		18-122mm Rkt Launchers	C
3rd Bn	400	ZC 1069 / 30 Oct		18-122mm Rkt Launchers	C
C14 Recon Co	60				C
Trans Unit	30				C
Med Unit	30				C
70th Indep Bn	350	BT 2939 / 30 Oct	BT 2707	3-81, 4-60mm mtr, 5-MG 4-57mm RR, 4-B-40	C
804th Bn	350	ZC 0697 / 30 Oct		4-81, 8-60mm mtr, 4-AA MG	C
K-4B Bn	350	ZC 2099 / 30 Oct		4-RR, 8-B-40, 1-B-90 4-81, 12-60mm mtr, 6-AA MG 2-57mm RR, 10-B-40, 6-B-90	C
<u>Local Force</u>					
402nd Sapper Bn	400	ZC 1860 / 30 Oct	Hieu Duc (D)	3-81, 1-120mm mtr	C
R-20 Bn	400	AT 8755 / 14 Oct	Dai Loc (D)	3-81mm mtr, 1-57mm RR, 3-60mm mtr, 2-MG, 5-BAR	C
V-25 Bn	400	BT 0055 / 26 Oct	Dien Ban/Dai Loc (D)	3-81, 3-60mm mtr, 1-57mm RR, 4-B-40, 3-MG	C
72nd Bn	350	BT 2121 / 13 Oct	Tien Phouc/Tam Ky (D)	2-81, 1-82, 4-60mm mtr 4-B-40, 3-MG, 3-57 RR	C

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Unit	Estimated Str	Reported Loc/Date	Accepted Loc	Arms & Equipment	Category
105th Bn	350	BT 1242 / 25 Oct	Que Son (D)	2-81, 4-60mm mtr 2-57mm RR, 2-MG	C
Q-12 Co	100	BT 1856 / 26 Oct	Hieu Nhon (D)	1-60mm mtr, 9-smg	C
Q-13 Co	80	BT 0753 / 25 Oct	Duy Xuyen (D)	1-60mm mtr, 1-MG 9-AR	C
Q-14 Co	100	AT 9354 / 26 Oct	Dai Loc (D)	1-60, 1-81mm mtr, 4-M-79, 9-AR	C
Q-15 Co	120	BT 0058 / 21 Oct	Dien Ban (D)	2-60, 1-81mm mtr 1-57mm RR, 3-lmg	C
Q-16 Co	120	AT 8865 / 12 Oct	Hoa Vang (D)	2-60, 1-81mm mtr, 6-AR	C
K-50 Co	80	BT 0745 / 17 Sep	Que Son (D)	1-60mm mtr, 1-57 RR 2-30cal MG	C
K-51 Co	80	BT 1747 / 7 Jun	Thang Binh (D)	2-60mm mtr, 1-57mm RR	C
C-118 Co	60	ZD 1302 / 30 Oct	Phu Loc (D)	Indiv SA	C

A-3

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Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
2nd NVA Div	MR V	Ham Tu 2; Nam Hai; Thon An 520; Nong Truong 2; Su Doan 2; 620th Div; Chi Lang; Agricultural Site 2; Tay An Div	CO-Col. THACH XO-DAO PO-VIET	20.601GM- 20.925GM Tay An; Nam Hai 20.800GM
RQ-20 Sig Bn	2nd NVA Div	RQ-20A; GK-30; RQ-20B; Ham Tu 2/c	CO-TUNG APO- <u>Nguyen Ba CHU</u> CO-Le Hung MANH IO-THO	1803/CH Hai Cang20; HT20.605GM Tay An GM20.039 Tay An Nam Hai; HT26.309GM Tay An
RQ-24 Engr Bn	2nd NVA Div	GK-10		
3rd NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite #3; 64th Regt; 51st Regt; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; Factory #10; Quyet Thang Regt	CO-LtCol Viet SON XO-Maj Tranh Anh KIEN FO-Trung THANH	HT20.801GM An Binh; HT20.802GM An Binh; HT20.803GM An Binh
1st Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K1; Factory #1; 64th Bn	CO-Capt THAO	20.825-20.828GM An Binh
2nd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X2; K2; Binh Da; 74th Bn; Factory #2	CO-SrCapt THANH	20.837 GM An Binh
3rd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X3; K3; Binh Thien; Nguyen Trai; Q-56; Mao Chu; Factory #3; 84th Bn	CO-SrCapt Nguyen TIEP	20848 GM An Binh
21st NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; Cong Truong 21; A-21; An Long; Cong Truong7(?)	CO-LtCol MINH XO-Maj TU PO-LtCol TIEN	20756CN An Long; 20769GN Nam Dong; 43910 An Long; 20757 Bach Dang; 5201 Ap Nam 2

A-4

CONFIDENTIAL
(MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED)

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DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL (MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED)

Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
1st Bn	21st NVA Regt	11th Bn; 11th Worksite; An Chau; Factory 11; Long Chau; Dong Mai; 60th Bn	CO-LA XO-NA PO-KHOI	2007HG Bach Dong; 2678GM An Long; 5260- 5264 Ap Nam 2; 6604 Long Thanh
2nd Bn	21st NVA Regt	22nd Bn; 135th Bn; Long Thanh; Dong Hai; 72nd Bn 70th Bn	CO-SrCapt TIEP XO-OAN FO-TA	2019 Bach Dang; 5270-5274 Ap Nam 2010-2014 Bach Dang (?)
3rd Bn	21st NVA Regt	33rd Bn; Long Thang; Dong Bien; Xuong 72; 75th Bn; Phi Truong Long Chau; 80th Bn	CO-Dinh CANH	3039HC Bach Dang; 5280-5284 Ap Nam 2
1st VC Regt	2nd NVA Div	Cong Truong 1; PS/40; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Truong Giang; Steel Regt	CO-LtCol Chan Khoi DICH XO-Lt Col Chu An TAN	6000-6199
40th Bn	1st VC Regt	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007-2009; 80th Bn; Nam Hai; Bau Bang; Phong Mai	CO-LUAN XO-Pham THANH PO-Dui Duo TUNG	2010HQ Bach Dang; 5645 Quang Trung St
60th Bn	1st VC Regt	Thanh Ha; T-112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Binh Gia; Bong Trang (?)	CO-Maj PHONG XO-BAC PO-LICH	20735 An Giang
90th Bn	1st VC Regt	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Song Hong; Thuan Binh; Phong Bien	CO-XANG XO-PHONG FO-Ngo Danh TAN	6034HD Truong Giang
368E NVA Regt	MR V	Binh Minh Worksite; 575 Infiltration Group	CO-Maj Nguyen Huu CHAU XO-Maj Nguyen Xuan TU FO-Maj Do Xuan KHOAT	6503 Ap Binh

CONFIDENTIAL (MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED)

Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	IBN
1st Bn	368B NVA Regt	D-99; D.1 (?)	CO-Le Ngoc TOAN PO-CUNG	
2nd Bn	368B NVA Regt	D.2(?)	CO-MINH XO-TIEN PO-DANG	
3rd Bn	368B NVA Regt	D.3(?)	CO-Phan CAN XO-LONG PO-LIEN	
C-14 Recon & Sig Co Trans Unit Med Unit			CO-Tran Trung NGHIEN CO-Lt BE CO-Dr. HANH	
70th Indep Bn	2nd NVA Div	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; 103; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; Bong Trang	CO-NAM XO-LY PO-HONG	1784HC 20
804th Bn		K-4; VQ-74	CO-CHIEN XO-LANG PO-HAY	1504BK Di Hai; 1506BK Di Hai; 41,435 FT
K-4B Bn		2/6(?); 804th Bn(?); 802nd Bn; K-2; Van Troi Bn; 2nd Bn	CO-KHANH	Q52,700 Bac Do; 1522BK Di Hai
<u>Local Forces</u>				
402nd Sapper Bn	Danang City	T.89 Special Engr Bn; YH-9; Ten Lua (Flaming Arrow); 5th Engr Bn	CO-Nguyen Van TRAN XO-SrLt THANH	21,391-21,396GM Dong Hai

CONFIDENTIAL (MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED)

Unit	Subordination	AKA	Personalities	LBN
B-20 Bn	Quang Nam (P)	Q.N. Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; Viet Dung; Hung-Gia-Ray; B-20; 1st Bn	CO-Nguyen Van LAM	21.342 21.341GM Ba Ha
V-25 Bn	Quang Nam (P)	Lam Bn; 5th Bn; Q-92 Bn; 2nd Bn	CO-Nguyen Van THANH	A-4192 Anh Dung
72nd Bn	Quang Tin (P)	H-65; H-68; X-72; 305 Gp; Hai Cang 50; Truong Son	CO-TUC XO-MINH PO-LICH	21.443GM Ba Hanh; 21.993 Mrs Hanh; 25010; 21.446GM Ba Hanh; 21.445 GM
105th Bn	Que Son (D)	3rd Bn; 5th Regt; Que Son Bn	CO-KY XO-THANH PO-UT	2184
Q-12 Co	Hoi An City	X-62 Co; Hoi An Co; Unit 72; Q-12B	CO-Le HIEU	2102
Q-13 Co	Duy Xuyen (D)	H-52; Duy Xuyen Co; X-63 Co; 103rd Co; Q-13B; Unit 73	CO-Tran Van CAM	2103
Q-14 Co	Dai Loc (D)	Dai Loc Co; H-42 Co; X-64 Co; Unit 74; Q-14B	CO-MOI	2104
Q-15 Co	Dien Ban (D)	Dien Ban Co; H-40 Co; H-55; X-65; H-35; Q-15B; Unit 75	CO-Le HY	2105; 21.335GM Ba Ha
Q-16 Co	Hoa Vang (D)	Hoa Vang Co; H-41; H-56; 100 Co; Hoa Hieu Co; Q-16B; X-66; X-17(?); Unit 76	CO-Nguyen DOA	2106; 21.336GM BA Ha
K-50 Co	Que Son (D)	Que Son Co; 105th Unit; A-7	CO-TUNG	
K-51 Co	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh Co; A-10; F-14; D-21; 107	CO-KHOA	
C-118 CO	Phu Loc (D)	Phu Loc (D) Co; P.19	CO-SON	

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

A-7

CONFIDENTIAL
(MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED)
RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ANNEX B (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO 29-67


DATE	BMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	% ILLUM
30 OCT	0553	0639	1818	1905	0328	1606	15
31	0553	0640	1817	1905	0426	1647	07
1 NOV	0554	0640	1817	1904	0526	1731	02
2	0554	0640	1817	1904	0619	1818	00
3	0554	0641	1817	1904	0733	1909	01
4	0555	0642	1816	1903	0841	2005	05
5	0555	0642	1815	1903	0949	2106	11
6	0556	0642	1815	1903	1053	2208	19
7	0556	0643	1815	1903	1151	2310	29
8	0557	0643	1815	1903	1243	----	39
9	0557	0644	1814	1903	1328	0009	50
10	0557	0645	1813	1903	1408	0104	60
11	0558	0645	1813	1902	1444	0155	69
12	0558	0645	1813	1902	1518	0244	78
13	0558	0646	1813	1902	1550	0330	85

SECRET

SEVENTH BN
SEVENTH CT
FIRST HOSP CO

12512 OCT 67
FIRST MARDIV REIN
FIRST MARDIV OPCON
ZEN/CG III MAF
KIN/CG THIRD MARDIV
H/CG I FORCEV
D/CG AMERICAL DIV
B/CG FIRST CAV DIV
F/CG FMAN
R/CG FLC
SEVENTH ENGR BN

DRA FTER 10/3
RELEASE 10/3
CONCUR 10/3



SECRET

ONE TO FRAG ORDER 133-67 (U)

A. III MAF 251024Z SEP67 (NOTAL)

B. FIRST MARDIV 300037Z SEP67

C. PAC O 030025B, PARA 109.1

D. FOLLOWING CHANGES TO REF B.

1. AFTER REF A, ADD (NOTAL)

2. PAR 2B. CHANGE FIRST SENTENCE TO READ: BY PRIOR ARRANGE-

SECRET

AMERICAL DIV RELIEVES FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN) OF BASES AND
INSTALLATIONS AND ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY PRESENT FIFTH MAR

1200H OCT67.

PAR 4A. CHANGE PHU BAI TO READ QUANG TRI.

PAR 4B. CHANGE TASK ORG TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST MAR (-) (REIN)

FIRST BN, FIRST MAR

SECOND BN, FIRST MAR

COMPANY A (-) (REIN), FIRST AT BN

SET RAD RELIN AND CONSTR CO, SEVENTH COMM BN

COMPANY A (-) (REIN) FIRST ENGR BN

1ST, FIRST BN

COMPANY C, FIRST MT BN

COMPANY B, FIRST MED BN

PAR 4B (1). FIRST SENTENCE, CHANGE PHU BAI TAOR TO READ

2. CHANGE SECOND SENTENCE TO READ O/A 7 OCT 67 AND WHEN

CHOP 4000Z THIRD MARDIV FOR FUTHER OPS AS MAY BE DIRECTED.

3. CHANGE THIRD SENTENCE: CHOP THIRD BN, FIRST MAR TO FIFTH MAR (-)

1200Z OCT67.

PAR 4C(1). CHANGE SECOND SENTENCE TO READ: ASSUME OPCON

CG FIRST MARDIV

PAGE 1 OF 3 012512 OCT 67 COPY NR 4

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 0056 S E C R E T
THIRD BN, FIRST MAR AT 07200H OCT67.

G. AFTER PARA 4C(1) ADD NEW PARA 4C(2). TASKS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) DEPLOY FORCES THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED TAOR TO PROVIDE DEFENSE OF DANANG COMPLEX; EMPHASIS ON ROUTES OF APPROACH TO FRAGILE ROCKET/MORTAR LAUNCH POSITIONS, TO INCLUDE WATERWAYS.
(B) CONDUCT UNILATERAL AND JOINT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITHIN ASSIGNED TAOR.

(C) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS WITHIN RZ ON ORDER.

(D) SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITHIN ASSIGNED TAOR. PREPARE SPECIFIC REACTION PLANS FOR EACH DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS IN ASSIGNED TAOR. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE REACTION FORCE FOR RELIEF OF HOA VANG DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS (BT012723). COORDINATE WITH ARVN FORCES AS APPLICABLE.

(E) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS EXTERIOR TO ASSIGNED TAOR AND RZ ON ORDER.

(F) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SONG CAU DO BRIDGE (AT998706), SONG CAM LE BRIDGE (AT015717), NEW SONG CAU LAU (BT079550), AND THE SONG CAU LAU (BT092553) BRIDGES.

(G) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE COMPANY SIZE REACTION FORCE

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 0056 S E C R E T
FOR DEFENSE OF SEA ANCHOR (BT 092690).

(H) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE COMPANY SIZE REACTION FORCE TO CO, AIR BASE DEFENSE BATTALION (1ST MP BN) FOR PURPOSE OF BLOCKING ESCAPE OF PRISONERS OF WAR FROM COMPOUND AT BT075715.

(I) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ONE REINFORCED BATTALION FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN SVN ON 12 HOURS NOTICE.

(J) UPON COMMITMENT OF REINFORCED BATTALION IN PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY REMAINDER OF REGIMENT WITHIN ADDITIONAL 12 HOURS.

(K) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE RIFLE COMPANY (-) (REIN) TO CO, AIR BASE DEFENSE BATTALION (1ST MP BN) FOR EMPLOYMENT IN DANANG AREA IN CONNECTION WITH EVACUATION OF NONCOMBATANTS.

(L) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ENGINEER PROJECTS AND UPGRADING OF ROUTES 1 AND 14, AND OTHER CRITICAL ROADS WITHIN TAOR AND SUPPLEMENTAL AREA OF OPERATIONS.

H. TO PARA 4F ADD FOLLOWING SENTENCE. INCLUDE THREE AN/MRC62 TERMINALS TO SUPPORT THIRD MARDIV COMM REQ AND ONE AN/TRC 97 TERMINAL TO SUPPORT FIRST MARDIV COMM REQ. AN/MRC 62 FREQS PROVIDED BY THIRD MARDIV.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 0055 S E C R E T

1. DELETE PAR 4K(G) AND SUBSTITUTE AS FOLLOWS (9) BOUNDARY CHANGES.

(A) SOUTHERN BOUNDARY FIRST MARDIV AOR AS FOLLOWS: FM BT 229923 ALONG QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN BDRY TO BA REN RIVER AT BT 135525, THENCE ALONG RIVER TO BT077497, THEN SW ALONG QUAN DUY XUYEN/QUAN QUE SON BDRY TO AT910310 THEN TO AT894290, THEN ALONG QUAN QUE SON/QUAN HIEP DUC BDRY TO AT871278, THEN TO 818267, THEN ALONG QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN BDRY TO NS GL ZC16.

(B) FIRST MAR TAOR BECOMES FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN) TAOR 051200H OCT67. CO FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN) RECOMMEND CHANGES INTERNAL BOUNDARIES SUBSEQUENTLY.



(C) AREA SOUTH OF PRESENT DIV TAOR AND NORTH OF NEW DIV BDRY BETWEEN BT014442 AND COAST IS FIRST MARDIV SUPPLEMENTARY AO. J. 22 PAR 4K ADD FOLLOWING SUB PAR. (11) CO'S HAVING ELEMENTS PRESENTLY DS FIRST MAR REPORT CHANGE OF STATUS TO ATTACHMENT FIRST MAR (-) (REIN) OR TO DS FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN) AS APPROPRIATE AND TIME OF CHANGE. (12) CO'S ATTACHING ELEMENTS TO FIRST MAR (-) (REIN) PROVIDE DATA BASE TO FIRST MAR, INFO THIS HQ, ASAP IAW REF C.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

IN ARVN
 100-100-010-0750720
 100-100-010-0750720
 100-100-010-0750720
 100-100-010-0750720
 100-100-010-0750720
 100-100-010-0750720

G-3

TOR 021605
 0590 A

CONFIDENTIAL
 SCOPE EVALUATION
 221416Z SEP
 REQUEST BY PEF (A) FOLLOWS:
 PROBLEM - THREE

UTILIZED TO SCREEN OPEN AREAS; SELECT AMBUSH SITES;
 MINING ATTEMPTS ON TRAILS & ROADS; SURVEILLANCE OF

WERE, AVENUES OF APPROACH INTO DEFENSIVE POSITIONS;
 TOWERS, AND NATURAL ILLUMINATION NORMALLY SATISFAC-

ACCEPTABILITY IS HIGH DUE TO INCREASED CONFIDENCE DEVELOPED
 DUE TO DECREASE.

PROBLEMS

RECOMMEND ADDITIONAL ISSUES OF SCOPE. RECOMMEND EACH
 BE ISSUED 40 SCOPES AND REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

100-100-010-0750720 R 020720Z OCT 67

1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

CP 2000 F 1000
 DE 1000 F 1000
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 FROM 1000 F 1000
 INFO 1000 F 1000
 RE 1000 F 1000
 CH 1000 F 1000
 IN 1000 F 1000
 RU 1000 F 1000
 ST 1000 F 1000
 UN 1000 F 1000
 CH 1000 F 1000
 A. 03 1000 F 1000
 I. 03 1000 F 1000
 ST 1000 F 1000

DRAFTER;G-5
 RELEASER;G-5

03 FIRST 1000 F 1000 P 021605Z OCT 67

(3)

DE RUMLA 0193 2751629

NY SSSSS

FM 021609Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO CG III

INFO FIRST MARDIV OPCON/GUARD MAIL

BT

SECRET SECT 1 OF 17

TASK ORGANIZATION (U)

A. FOR 05213.2

1. IAW REF A TASK ORGANIZATION AS OF 30 SEP 67

A. 1ST MARDIV (REIN)

(1) HQ BN (REIN)

(A) HQ BN

1 HQ CO

2 COMM CO (-)

3 SERV CO

4 MP CO

(B) 1ST DENTAL CO

(C) 2D SSC TN, FMP

(D) 3D CIT, FMP

(E) 7TH CIT, FMP

(1) 1ST MED BN (-)

DAMAGE

DO

DO

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TAM KY

DARKING

PAGE TWO RUMLA 0193 SECRET

(A) HAS CO

(B) CO A

(C) CO C

(D) CO D

(3) 7TH COMM BN, FMP

(A) HQ CO (-)

(B) COMM CO (-)

(C) RAD REL & CONST CO (-)

(4) 9TH ITT (REIN), FMP

(A) 9TH ITT FMP

(B) 1ST IT, FMP

(C) 7TH IT, FMP

(D) 3D ITT, FMP

(E) 13TH ITT, FMP

(5) 1ST MAR (REIN)

(A) 1ST MAR

(B) 2D PLAT. 2D BN CO US

(C) DET. RAD REL & CONST CO

7TH COMM BN, FMP

(6) 5TH MAR (-) (REIN)

DO

DO

DO

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DO

CHALAI

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DAMAGE

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HILL 65

CG FIRST MARDIV

021609Z

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMMA 2195 S E C R E T

- (A) HQ CO
- (B) 1ST BN
- (C) 3D BN
- (D) CO A (-), 1ST TK BN (7 M48) (5 M48 1 M51)
- (E) CO B (-), 1ST AT BN (4 M52A1) (2 M52A1)
- (F) CO B (-) (REIN) 1ST ENGR BN
- (G) CO B (-) (REIN) 1ST SF BN
- (H) DET, RAD REL & CONST CO, 7TH COMM BN, PMP
- (7) 7TH MAR (REIN)
 - (A) 7TH MAR
 - (B) 3D PLAT, 29TH CA CO, USA
 - (C) DET, RAD REL & CONST CO, 7TH COMM BN, PMP
- (8) 2D BN 5TH MAR (REIN)
 - (A) 2D BN
 - (B) 2D PLAT, CO A, 1ST TK BN (5 M48)
 - (C) 2D PLAT, CO B, 1ST AT BN (4 M52A1)

DO
 QUE CON
 HILL 63
 HILL 65
 QUE CON
 HILL 63
 QUE CON
 HILL 63
 DO
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PAGE FOUR RUMMA 2195 S E C R E T

- (C) 2D PLAT CO B, 1ST ENGR BN
- (D) 4TH PLAT CO A, 3D AMIRAC BN, PMP
- (7) DET, COMM CO, HQ BN
- (8) DET, RAD REL & CONST CO, 7TH COMM BN PMP
- (9) 5TH PLAT, 29TH CA CO USA
- (S) 11TH MAR (REIN)
 - (A) HQ BTRY (REIN)
 - 1 HQ BTRY
 - 2 BTRY A, CO A (4 M52A1)
 - 3 BTRY B, CO B (4 M52A1)
 - (B) 1ST BN
 - 1 HQ BTRY
 - 2 BTRY A (4 M52A1)
 - 3 BTRY B (4 M52A1)
 - 4 BTRY C (4 M52A1)
 - 5 BTRY D (4 M52A1)
 - (C) 2D BN (-)
 - 1 HQ BTRY (4 M52A1)
 - 2 BTRY A (4 M52A1)
 - 3 BTRY B (4 M52A1)

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PAGE 3

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMMLA 0193 S E C R E T

3 BTRY F (-) (REIN) (4 105MM TD)
 4 DET, B1 F (4 105MM TD)
 5 MORT BTRY (4 155MM TD)
 (D) 3D BN
 1 HQ BTRY
 2 BTRY G (6 105MM TD)
 3 BTRY H (6 105MM TD)
 4 BTRY I (6 105MM TD)
 5 MORT BTRY (-) (2 4.2" MORT,
 2 HOWTAR)
 6 DET, MORT BTRY (2 4.2" MORT)
 (E) 4TH BN
 1 HQ BTRY (REIN)
 4 HQ BTRY
 B METRO SEC, 1ST FAS
 2 BTRY K (6 105MM SP)
 3 BTRY L (6 105MM SP)
 4 BTRY M (6 105MM SP)
 (F) 1ST ARMD AMPH CO (-) FMF
 1 CO HQ (-)

PHU 63
 TIEA PHUOC
 HILL 63
 DANANG
 DO
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 NONG SON
 DANANG
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 DANANG
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PAGE SIX RUMMLA 0193 S E C R E T

2 SERV PLAT (2)
 3 1ST PLAT (6 105MM-6)
 4 3D PLAT (6 105MM-6)
 (G) 3D 155 GUN BTRY SP FMF (3 155GMM SP)
 (2 155 GUN SP)
 (H) 2D PLAT 5TH 155 GUN SPX
 (2 155 GUN SP)
 (I) 3D 8" HOW BTRY SP
 (6 8" HOW SP)
 (J) BTRY G (-), 29TH ARTY, USA
 (K) BTRY E 29TH SM 4TH ARTY USA SP
 (4 155 GUN SP)
 (L) 1ST RECON BN (REIN)
 (M) 1ST CO
 (N) 2ND CO
 (O) 3RD CO
 (P) 4TH CO
 (Q) 5TH CO
 (R) 1ST RECON RECON CO
 (S) 1ST AT BN (-) (25 155MM)

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21

PAGE 7

SECRET

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF II SECTIONS

(A) H&S CO	DO
(B) CO A	DO
(C) CO C	DO
(12) 1ST TK BN (-) (25 M48, 9 M67, 3 M51 TVR)	DANANG
(A) H&S CO	DO
(B) CO B (REIN)	DO
(C) CO C (REIN)	DO
(13) 3DAMTRAC BN (56 LVTP-5 5 LVTR; 7 LVTP-5 CMD 3 LVTR)	DANANG
(A) H&S CO	DANANG
(B) CO A (-)	DO
(C) CO B (-)	DO
(14) 1ST ENGR BN	DO
(A) H&S CO (-)	DO

PAGE TWO RUMBLE 0194 SECRET

(B) CO A	DO
(C) CO C	DANANG
(D) SUPPORT CO (-)	DO
(15) 1ST MT BN	DO
(16) 11TH MT BN	DO
(17) 1ST SP BN (-)	DO
(A) H&S CO (-)	DO
(B) CO A	DO
(C) CO C	DO
(18) 1ST HOSPITAL CO (REIN)	CHU LAI
(A) 1ST HOSPITAL CO	DO
(B) CO B, 1ST MED BN	DO

SP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

00 RUMXVH RUMHVP
DE RUMLA 0223 2760549
ZNY SSSSS

O P 030549Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/HQ BN
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN

INFO RUMHVP/DISA I CORPS
RUMHVP/SECOR ADVISOR DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR
ZEN/FIRST LAAM BN

BT

SECRET

FRAG 0 134-67 ROUGH RIDER CONVOY(U)

A. CG III MAF 291604Z SEP67 (NOTAL)

B. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN 0 301-66 (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMLA 0223 SECRET

C. THIRD MARDIV ADMIN 0 416-66 (NOTAL)

D. CG FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN67 (NOTAL)

E. FIRST MARDIV 0 P02000.2C (COI) (NOTAL)

F. THIRD MARDIV P 02000.2E (COI) (NOTAL)

1. IN SUPPORT OF REF A SUBJ CONVOY SKED MOVE ELEMS FIRST MAR FM
DANANG TO QUANG TRI ON 4-5 OCT67. PLAN CONVOY MOVE PHU BAI RON,
DEPART NEXT DAY QUANG TRI RON AND RETURN DANANG FOL DAY.

2. FOR CG III MAF


A. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE
OF LOC'S.B. REQUEST CONDUCT LIAISON AND COORDINATE WITH RVN FORCES
ALONG ROUTE AS REQ FOR CONVOY PASSAGE, TRAFFIC CONTROL, SECURITY
AND SUPPORTING ARMS.

3. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV

A. REQUEST ASSUME OPCON AND PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE WHILE
CONVOY IN THIRD MARDIV TACR.B. THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY OF RIFLE PLAT REIN
W/ARTY FO, FAC, ENGR SPT AND CONTROL AND SERVICE VEHs.C. REQUEST PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR CONVOY APPROX 150 VEHs
ARRIVING PHU BAI 4 OCT67, ALSO BILLETING AND MESSING FOR 325 CONVOY

W	01C
W	01C
H	
	CC

COC

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASES G-3

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

PAGE 1 OF 2

030549Z OCT 67

SECRET (S)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMMLA 0223 S E C R E T

PERMANENT ADCT.

1. REQUEST COORDINATE CONVOY MOVEMENT PHU BAI TO QUANG TRI AND RETURN DANANG.

2. CHOP POINT: FIRST/THIRD MARDIV BOUNDARY. OK PT 30.

3. FOR CG FMAW; REQUEST THREE M-36 VEHs TO SUPPORT MOVE.

4. SEVENTH ENGR BN; REQUEST PROVIDE BRIDGING AS REQUIRED.

5. EXECUTION

A. FIRST MAR. STAGE PERSON AND EQUIP FOR CONVOY MOVEMENT TO QUANG TRI.

B. SEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE FORCES IAW PARA 3.D. OF REF B.

C. ELEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PARA 3.E. REF B.

D. FIRST ENGR BN. PROVIDE SPT IAW PARA 3.G. REF B LESS BRIDGING SPT.

E. ELEVENTH MT BN. PROVIDE MT SPT IAW PARA 3.F. REF B.

F. COORD INST

(1) REFS B AND C AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS DANANG TO HUE.

(2) CHECK POINTS. REFS C AND D.

(3) D-DAY H-HOUR

(4) DA NANG TO PHU BAI 040830H OCT 67.

(5) PHU BAI TO QUANG TRI. AS DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.

PAGE FOUR RUMMLA 0223 S E C R E T

1. CONVOY QUANG TRI TO DA NANG. 060800H OCT 67 OR AS DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.

(2) IF CONVOY POSTPONED RESKED FOL DAY.

(3) AIR SPT DA NANG TO PHU BAI ARRANGED BY THIS HQS FOR JOINT CONVOY.

(4) DIRLAUTH ALCON

2. COM-ELECT


A. REFS E AND F.

B. SEVENTH MAR. MONITOR THIRD MARDIV TAC 1, M756 (NEW) REF 0244NC COMMENCING 040700H OCT 67 EACH DAY CONVOY SKED.

END

PAGE 2 OF 2

SECRET

SECRET

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

PP RUMSMA RUMSBB RUMSBJ
DE RUMHMF 0213 2760646
ZNY SSSSS

P 030646Z OCT 67
FM CG III MAF/SAI CORPS
TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMNVG/CG FIRST CAV DIV
RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV

TOR: 031630Z
CON: 0917
ADV-RT G-5

8

578

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMHVVH/CG I CORPS
RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AF
RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FMAW
RUMHIB/CG SECOND BDE ROKMC
ZEN/CG FLC
RUMHVVH/DSA I CORPS
RUMSBB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

BT

SECRET

ESTAB OF BOUNDARY

1. FOL BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT BETWEEN FIRST MARDIV AND
AMERICAL DIV AND ON ORDER UPON III MAF ASSUMPTION CPCON FIRST

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 0213 **SECRET**

CAV DIV BETWEEN FIRST MARDIV AND FIRST CAV DIV: FM COCRD (BT 229523)
ALONG QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN BDRY TO (BT 165498) THENCE WEST ALONG DUY
XUYEN/QUE SON BDRY TO DUY XUYEN/QUE SON BDRY AT (AT 981431) THENCE
SOUTHWEST ALONG QUE SON/QUE SON BDRY TO (AT 910310) THENCE SOUTHWEST
TO QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN BDRY AT (AT 897290) THEN SOUTHWEST ALONG
QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN BOUNDARY TO (AT 871278) THENCE SOUTHWEST TO
(AT 818267) THEN SOUTHWEST ALONG QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN BDRY TO (YC 900
200) AND THEN WEST ALONG EW GRIDLINE 20 TO LAOS BORDER.

2. ACTION ADDEES ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

GP-4

BT

III MAF

030646Z OCT 67


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W	OIL
H	AOIC



S 97 CC

HAS BEEN SENT

COL

HAS BEEN SENT

DE 1000LA 0248 2760850

ZIA SSSSS

P 050830Z OCT 67

FM FIRST MARDIV COC

TO AMBASSADOR DIV TOC

INFO III MAF COC

CG FIRST MAW

BT

SECRET

REC'D OPS

1. OPN OVERLAY PASSED TO MAJ SMITH SEP

2. REF A PROPOSES RECON INSERT VIC MUTUAL BOUNDARY. REQUEST CONCURRENCE CONDUCT RECON INSERT 050830H OCT67 WITH EXTRACTION

051000H OCT67. AREA OF OPNS FROM AT9636 SOUTH TO AT9633, WEST

TO AT9236, NORTH TO AT9236, EAST TO START PT. REQUEST AREA OF

OPNS BE NFZ FOR RECON TM AND NFZ ALL OTHERS.

3. FURTHER REQUEST RETENTION FOR INDEF PERIOD RADIO TM (3-4 PERSON)

AT AT LAC SON. TM REQUIRED TO FACILITATE INTEL PASSAGE.

4. BELIEVE RECON INSERTS IN THIS EN ACTIVE AREA OF MUTUAL BENEFIT.

5. INTEL GENERATED AS A RESULT OF THIS OPN WILL BE PROVIDED YOUR

INFO

BT

BT

BT

1 0508 MARDIV COC

COPY NR#

2

030850Z OCT 67

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

ZNY 00000

R 030945Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIF
TO FIRST MARINES
INFO FIRST TANK BN
BT

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASER: COMMANDING GENERAL
CONCUR: G-3

CONFIDENTIAL
TANK EMPLOYMENT

A. CG FIRST MAR 210910Z SEP67

B. CG FIRST MAR 250120Z SEP 67

C. CG FIRST MARDIV 260803Z JUL 67

1. REF A AMPLIFIED BY REF B REQUESTS A REVIEW OF REF C AS IT PERTAINS TO THE USE OF TANKS AS A POINT OF A PATROL OR CONVOY.
2. NON-EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS AS PRIMARY MEANS OF DETONATING MINES AT POINT OF PATROL OR CONVOY IS INTENT OF PAR 3.E. OF REF (C). TO EMPLOY TANKS AS MINE CLEARING VEHICLES WOULD BE TO SOON DENY USE OF TANKS IN ANY CAPACITY. WHEN ALL TANKS HAVE BECOME CASUALTIES THE DIVISION IS LEFT WITH NEITHER A MINE CLEARING VEHICLE NOR A TANK CAPABILITY.
3. CONCUR WITH VIEW THAT TANK MAYBE BEST VEHICLE TO FIRST TRAVEL ROAD AFTER COMPLETION OF MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS. IF TACTICAL

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0041 CONFIDENTIAL

COMMANDER HAS CONDUCTED MINE SWEEP WITH STANDARD, SOUND, MINE SWEEPING PROCEDURES, AND ALL IMAGINATION AND RESOURCES HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED IN DETECTING AND REMOVING MINES. EMPLOYMENT OF TANK IS ONLY A MATTER FOR THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER TO RESOLVE. WHEN TACTICAL REASONS OTHER THAN MINE CLEARANCE DICTATE USE OF TANK AS POINT VEHICLE, SUCH EMPLOYMENT IS NOT ONLY PERMISSIBLE, BUT SOUND.

GP-4
BT


CG FIRST MA RDIV

030945Z OCT 67

1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

CONFIDENTIAL

(8)

SECRET

PP 600NVG
DE RUNHMF 0256 2772340
ZNY 55885

P 025640Z OCT 67
FM CG 111 MAF
TO 2FN/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMHMA/CG AMERICAL DIV
INFO RUNNVG/CG FIRST CAV DIV (AM)

G-3

TCR: 010120Z
CCN: 1086

S E C R E T

INITIAL ARTY SUPPORT FIRST CAVDIV (AM)

1. FOR CG FIRST MARDIV:

A. PENDING DECISION COMUSMACV ON MEDIUM/HEAVY ARTY SUPPORT OF FIRST CAVDIV (AM) YOU ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE FOLLOWING MEDIUM ARTY SUPPORT TO CG AMERICAL DIV (3D BDE FIRST CAV DIV)

4 150MM HOW TOWED AT HILL 63

4 150MM HOW TOWED AT QUE SON

9. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE FIRING BATTERY PERSONNEL TO MAN THESE PROVISIONAL BATTERIES.

C. REQUEST YOU PASS OPCON ABOVE BATTERIES TO CG AMERICAL DIV AT TIME MUTUALLY AGREEABLE WITH CG AMERICAL DIV.

D. FOR CG AMERICAL DIV:

A. FIRST MARDIV ARTY (11TH MARINES) HAS BEEN MANNING AND PROVIDING

PAGE TWO RUNHMF 0256 S E C R E T

FDC/COMM CAPABILITY FROM DS BATTERIES AT HILL 63 AND QUE SON.

REQUEST YOUR DS BATTERIES PROVIDE SAME.

B. ASSUME OPCON PROVISIONAL BATTERIES AT TIME MUTUALLY AGREEABLE WITH CG FIRST MARDIV.

3. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

BT

BT


CG 111 MAF

052300Z OCT 67

16

SECRET

SECRET



RMHFL RUMHI UMHIE RUMVFA
 0301 2770340
 285555
 SEVENTH CONM
 SEVENTH CIT
 FIRST HOSP

P 00442Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO 285555 FIRST MARDIV OPCON
 INFO 285555 III MAF
 RUMHFL CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHFL CG FLC
 RUMHFL CG AMERICAL DIV
 RUMHFL CG FIRST CAV DIV
 BT

DRAFTER: 0-3
 RELEASER: 0-3

SECRET
 00442Z OCT 67

FM CG III MAF 00442Z OCT 67

TO 285555 HOSP BY REF A EFFECTIVE 041200H OCT 67 BETWEEN FIRM
 RUMHFL AND AMERICAL DIV: FM CGO (BT229523) ALONG QUANG NAM
 QUANG NAM BDRY AT (BT65498) THENCE WEST ALONG DUY KUYEN/ONE
 DUY KUYEN/ONE BDRY AT (AT981431) THENCE SOUTHWEST
 TO QUANG NAM/ONE BDRY TO (AT871278) THENCE SOUTHWEST
 TO (BT65498) THENCE SOUTHWEST ALONG QUANG NAM/ QUANG NAM BDRY TO
 LAOS BORDER AND THEN WEST ALONG EW GRIDLINE 20 TO LAOS BORDER.

BT

040340Z OCT 67

4A
SECRET

SECRET

	OIL
FROM	ADIC
H	
	CC

00 RUMHIA RUMNVFA
DE RUMHLA 0302 2770415
ZNY SSSSS

0 040415Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMNVFA/CG FIRST CAV DIV
BT

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASER: G-3

S E C R E T

ARTY SPT FIRST CAV

A. CG III MAF 032340Z OCT67 (PASEP)

B. G-3 FIRST MARDIV TELECON G-3 AMERICAL DIV 041115H OCT67

1. AS DIRECTED BY REF A CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN) PASSES OPCON OF NIGHT 155 HOW (TOWED) WITH PRESENT LIMITED FIRING BATTERY PERSONNEL TO CG AMERICAL DIV EFFECTIVE 041200H OCT67. COMMAND LESS OPCON REMAINS ELEVENTH MAR.

2. ARTILLERY ASSETS CONSIST OF 4 HOWS, 1 OFF, AND 30 ENL LOCATED AT QUE SON, AND OF 4 HOWS, ONE OF WHICH IS DOWN FOR WORN INNER AND REAR SPLIT RINGS, AND ONE OFF AND 30 ENL LOCATED HILL 63.

3. FOR CG AMERICAL DIV. AS AGREED REF B REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF OPCON IAW PAR 1 ABOVE. FURTHER REQUEST ADVISE

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0302 **S E C R E T**
ANY FUTURE CHANGE IN OPCON THESE ASSETS.


G-3 FIRST MARDIV REIN

040415Z OCT 67

COPY

23

SECRET (1)



N	OIC
H	AOIC
	AC

COL

PP RUMHIE RUMHVP
DE RUMHIA 0342 2770915
ZNY ZEEEEE
RUMHIE-T-SEVENTH COMM
NINTH ENGR
SEVENTH CIT
FIRST HOSP

P 040915Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIRST MAR

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR G-1

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON/ADCON
BT

UNCLAS E F T O

ADCON THIRD BN FIRST MAR

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 011251Z OCT 67


1. REF A ASSIGNS OPCON THIRD BN FIRST MAR TO FIFTH MAR (-)
(REIN) EFFECTIVE 051200H OCT 67.

2. FIRST MAR TRANSFER ADCON THIRD BN, FIRST MAR TO CG FIRST
MARDIV (REIN) EFFECTIVE 051200H OCT 67.

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 040915Z OCT 67

SECRET



OO RUMHFL RUMGR
DE RUMHFLA 0333 2771537
ZY SS333

041307Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHFL/CG FLC
RUMGR/FIFTH SF3A
BT

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASES G-3

SECRET

RELOCATION OF ARTY TIEN PHUOC

A. CG III MAF 031722Z OCT 67 (PASEP)

1. REF A YOURS FOR ACTION.

2. HOWTARS LOCATED AT PL3G B (CHULAI) CONTACT: MAJ CRUDEP-
PITCHOLEND 122.3. PROVIDE TNG CADRE MINIMUM OF 1 OFF AND 3 ENL. CONTACT FOR
CIDS CAMP TIE I PHUOC: LT COL SCHUNGLE-FLAMINGO 216.4. ON COMPLETION OF HOWTAR TNG AND AS MUTUALLY AGREED WITH CG
5TH SF3A, RELOCATE 4 105MM HOWITZER FROM TIEN PHUOC TO DA NANG
TAOR.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN



041307Z OCT 67

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(13)

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SECRET (14)

SECRET

CO CC

OO RUMHIA
DE RUMHIA 0388 2771515
ZNY SSSSS

0 041515Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

DRA FTER G-3
RELEASER G-3

SECRET

ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS (U)

1. CONTINUING REQUIREMENT EXISTS TO CONDUCT SUBJECT CONVOYS DANANG SOUTH TO HILL 63 AND CHU LAI. EXECUTION OF CONVOY REQUIRES COORDINATION AND SUPPORT FROM AMERICAL DIVISION.

2. REQUEST ESTAB SYSTEM AS FOL FOR CONVOYS DANANG SOUTH.

A. CONVOY MOVING SOUTH ENTERS AMERICAL DIV AOR AT CHECK PT 28 (BA REN BRIDGE).

B. REQUEST AMERICAL DIV PROVIDE FOL:

(1) CONVOY RESERVE (REIN RIFLE CO) WHILE CONVOY IN AMERICAL AOR.

(2) ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED WHILE CONVOY IN AMERICAL AOR.

C. CONVOY DEPARTURE, NETS AND NET ACTIVATION TIMES WILL BE CONTAINED IN ACTIVATION MSGS.

3. FIRST MARDIV PROVIDES CONVOY SECURITY WITH EACH CONVOY

PAGE TWO RUMHIA 0388 **SECRET**

CONSISTING OF RIFLE PLAT REIN W/ARTY FO, FAC, ENGR SPT AND CONTROL AND SERVICE VEHs.

4. FIRST MARDIV PROVIDES AO AND CAS AS REQUIRED, AIR OPNS COORDINATED WITH AMERICAL DIV.

5. FIRST CONVOY ARRIVES CHECKPOINT 28 (BA REN BRIDGE) 051300H OCT 67.

6. REQUEST NECESSARY AMERICAL DIV COMM INFO REQUIRED TO SUPPORT ABOVE REQUEST.

GP-4

BT


CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

041515Z OCT 67

13

SECRET(15)

SECRET



Col

RR RUMHVH
DE RUMHLA 0398 2772245
ZNY SSSSS
R 042245Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
INFO RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPL ZONE
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
BT

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASED: CG
CONCURRENCE: C/S

SECRET

EMPLOYMENT OF RIVER ASSAULT GROUP (RAG)

1. RECENT EXPERIENCE OF CTE 117.1.3 IN OPNS VIC HOI AN INDICATES PRESENCE OF LUCRATIVE TARGETS ADJACENT TO WATERWAYS. AND REPORTS OF ACTIVITIES REVEAL THAT PER'S DO NOT HAVE EITHER THE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY TO COPE WITH ENEMY SITUATION. RECOMMEND INVESTIGATION OF CAPABILITY AND AVAILABILITY OF RAG FOR EMPLOYMENT ON PAIRO/ATTACK MISSIONS THEREIN.
2. RECOGNIZE DRAFT OF RAG CRAFT IS LIMITING FACTOR, BUT POTENTIAL AS WATERWAY CONTROL FORCE AND SUPPORTING FIRES OBSERVER IS GREAT. ARMOR OF RAG CRAFT SHOULD MINIMIZE THREAT FROM SHORE BASED HOSTILE FIRE. ARMAMENT IS CAPABLE OF DELIVERING SUPPRESSING OR DESTRUCTIVE FIRE. CAPABILITIES APPEAR TO BE WELL SUITED FOR TYPE OPERATIONS REQUIRED VIC HOI AN.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIVREIN


042245Z OCT 67

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
SECRET (16)

SECRET

COC



CC



01 000000
DE RUEHIC 6147 2780045

END BESSS

0 050050Z OCT 67 ZEL
FM CG AMERICAL DIVISION CHU LAI RVN
TO RUEHIC/CG 1ST MAR DIV DNG RVN
INFO RUEHIC/CG III MAF DNG RVN
RUEHIC/CG 1ST CWQ DIV AN KHE RVN
RUEHIC/CG 3D PDE 1ST ACD CHU LAI RVN
BT

TCR 050315Z

CLN 1468
G-3

RE CH E T AVDF-AT 593
SUBJECT, OPCON OF MARINE ARTILLERY (U)

1. REFERENCES:

A. CG, VCCC MAFMSG 032340Z OCT 67

B. CG, 1ST MAR DIV 040415Z OCT 67

C. WM (K) OPCON OF TWO PROVISIONAL MARINE 155MM HOWITZER BATTERIES
AT QUE SON AND HILL 63 BY CG, AMERICAL DIV EFFECTIVE 041200 OCT 67
ACKNOWLEDGED. OPCON HAS BEEN PASSED SUCCESSIVELY TO CO, 3D PDE, 1ST
ACD DIV AND THEN TO CO, 1ST BN, 21ST ARTY. THIS ARTILLERY BATTALION
WILL PROVIDE REQUIRED FDC AND COMMUNICATIONS.

2. CSA REQUEST

INFORMATION OF STATUS AND DURATION OF STAY OF
PROVISIONAL MARINE 155MM HOWITZER BATTERY LOCATED AT TIEN PHUOC

BT+4

BT

FM CG AMERICAL DIVISION CHU LAI RVN

050030Z OCT 67

20

SECRET (17)

SECRET

00 RUMHIA RUMHVH
DE RUMHLA 0405 2780115
ZNY SSSSS

OP 050115Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST AT BN
ZEN/HQ BN

INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAF
RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS
ZEN/FIRST MT BN
BT

SECRET

FRAG 0 131-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV 201435Z JUL 67 (NOTAL)
- B. CG FIRST MARDIV 251055Z SEP 67 (NOTAL)
- C. CG FIRST MARDIV 041515Z OCT 67

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0405 **SECRET**

D. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66 (NOTAL)

E. FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C (CEOI) (NOTAL)

1. REFS A AND B ARE CANCELLED.
2. THIS ORDER FOR ALL ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SKED TO SUPPORT FUTURE MOVEMENT FIFTH MAR MATERIAL HILL 63 TO DANANG.
3. FOR CG III MAF
 - VA. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOC'S
 - B. REQUEST CONDUCT LIAISON AND COORDINATION AS REQUIRED FOR CONVOY PASSAGE AND TRAFFIC CONTROL ALONG ROUTE OF CONVOY.
4. FOR CG AMERICAL DIV. REQUEST PROVIDE SPT REQUESTED BY REF C.
5. FOR SEVENTH ENGR BN
 - A. REQUEST PROVIDE ROAD SWEEP TEAM TO SWEEP ROUTE ONE BETWEEN SONG CAU LAU SOUTH TO MEET WITH FIRST ENGR SWEEP TM FROM HILL 63.
 - B. REQUEST PROVIDE ENGR SPT AS REQ TO KEEP ROAD SOUTH OF SONG CAU LAU OPERATIONAL AND AID CONVOY PASSAGE.
6. EXECUTION
 - A. FIFTH MAR.

1ST MARDIV

1 OF 2

050115Z OCT 67

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 0405 S E C R E T

(1) PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY IAW PAR 3D OF REF D. CONSISTING OF ONE PLAT REIN WITH MED PERS, FAC AND FJ.

(2) CONDUCT ROAD SWEEP ROUTE ONE FROM HILL 63 NORTH TO MEET WITH SEVENTH ENGR SWEEP TM.

(3) COORDINATE AND EXPEDITE VEH OFFLOAD AND BACKLOADING.

(4) GIVE MINIMUM ONE HOUR NOTICE THIS HQ ETD CONVOY RETURN TRIP OVER SP NET M 276 (FM).

B. ELEVENTH MAR: PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW REF 3E REF D.

C. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3G REF D.

D. FIRST AT: PROVIDE THREE M-50 UNTOS.

E. ELEVENTH MT BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PAR 3F REF D. INSURE ALL PERS W/CONVOY CARRY FIELD PROTECTIVE MASK (M17).

7. COORD INSTRNS

A. CONVOYS SKED AS FOL:

(1) 050930H OCT67 DPT CHPT 22 TO HILL 63 RON.

(2) 6-11 OCT67 CONVOY DPTS DAILY HILL 63 UPON COMPLETION OF ROAD SWEEP FOR 5TH MAR ATEA OFFLOADS, RETURNS HILL 63 AND RON'S.

B. REF D. AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS.

C. OPCON OF ALL CONVOYS TO REMAIN WITH THIS HQ.

D. AIR SPT ARRANGED BY THIS HQ.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 0405 S E C R E T

E. CHECK POINTS: REF D.

F. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

G. IN EVENT OF CANCELLATION OF CONVOY IT WILL BE RESKED FOL DAY.

8. COMM-ELECT

A. REF AS APPLICABLE DANANG TO CHU LAI.

B. AMERICAL DIV, FIFTH MAR AND COMM CO MONITOR DIV CONVOY CONTRL NET M 65 (FM) AND GUARD M276 (FM).

C. CONVOY CMDR REQUEST ENGR SPT WHEN REQUIRED WHILE OPERATING SOUTH OF SONG CAU LAU FM SCUPPER ALPHA M 164 (FM).

D. ACTIVATE NETS ON ORDER THIS HQ.

GP-4


BT

2 OF 2

SECRET

SECRET

W	OIC
10K	AOIC
H	
	CC



PP DXIU
DE K167 006 (780955
ZNY SSSSS

P 050955Z OCT 67
FM FIFTH MARINES
TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

C-3

TOM 051322
1610

INFO: FIRST AT BN
FIRST TK BN
FIRST ENGR BN -----COUR
FIRST SP BN -----COUR
SEVENTH COMM BN
BT

S E C R E T

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 050030Z OCT 67

1. IAW REFA FIFTH MARINES CHOP OPCON FOLLOWING ATACHMENTS TO PARENT
UNITS EFFECTIVE 051200H OCT 67

CO B (-) FIRST AT BN
CO A (-) FIRST TK BN
CO B (-) FIRST ENGR BN
CO B (-) FIRST SP BN

DET, RADIO RELAY AND CONSTRUCTION CO, SEVENTH COMM BN

GP-4

BT

FIFTH MARINES P 050955Z OCT 67

COPY#


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UNCLASSIFIED



DE RUHHLA 0517 2781165
ZNY SSSSS

P 051105Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG III MAF
INFO SEVENTH MAP

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR G-5

BT

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HERBICIDE PROGRAM

A. ON III MAF LTR 88/LKA OVER 3403/1 OF 2 AUG 67
1. JAW REF A REQUEST HERBICIDES BE EMPLOYED IN THE 1
THREE CROP DESTRUCTION ZONE.

B. COORDINATES: TARGET CENTER 20176645 - 500 M210
C. TYPE CROPS: RICE, MANIOC, IAPIOCA, BANANNA TREES,
PEPPERS.

D. EST HARVEST DATE: CROPS IN THIS AREA PLANTED
BEING SO AS TO PROVIDE CONSTANT SOURCE OF FOOD FOR
MILITARY FORCES. ALL STAGES OF CROP MATURITY WILL BE

BT
BT


ON FIRST MARDIV REIN P 051105Z OCT 67

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<i>[initials]</i>	AOIC
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DE RUNN A 0518 2711130
ZNY 88888

P 051130Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG III MAF

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER C/S

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CLARIFICATION OF ASSIGNED TASK

A. CG III MAF 291604Z SEP67

1. IN VIEW OF REDISPOSITION OF DIV ASSETS DIR BY REF A, REE
CLARIFICATION OF FOL TASK: 1ST MARDIV HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE
REACTION FORCE FOR CIDG CAMPS AT KHAM DUC, TIEN PHOUIC AND THUONG
DUC. KHAM DUC AND TIEN PHOUIC LIE WELL OUTSIDE DIV AOR AS DEFINED
REF A. RECOMMEND DIV BE RELIEVED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING
REACTION FORCE FOR KHAM DUC AND TIEN PHOUIC, BUT RETAIN THAT
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THUONG DUC.

GP-4

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

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 051130Z OCT 67

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00 RUMVVP RUMHVH
DE RUMHLA 2551 2782510
ZNY SSSSS

0 051510Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMVVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR MTO, G-4

COMM NOTE: CORRECTED COPY, UNDERLINED
PORTION OF TEXT CORRECTED BY ORIG...

ZEN/CG FIRST MAF
ZEN/HQ BN
RUMVVP/FIRST MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST MT BN
RUMVVP/DSA I CORPS
RUMVVP/SENIOR ADVISOR DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR
ZEN/FIRST LAAM BN

BT
S E C R E T
PRAG 0 135-67 ROUGH RIDER CONVOY (U)
FM CG III MAF 291604Z SEP67
SUBJ ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN 0 301-66 (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0551 S E C R E T

C. THIRD MARDIV ADMIN 0 416-66 (NOTAL)

D. CG FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)

E. FIRST MARDIV 0 P02000.2C (COI) (NOTAL)

F. THIRD MARDIV P 02000.2E (COI) (NOTAL)

1. IN SUPPORT OF REF A SUBJ CONVOY SKED MOVE ELEMS FIRST MAR FM
DANANG TO QUANG TRI ON 7-8 OCT67. PLAN CONVOY MOVE PHU BAI RON,
DEPART NEXT DAY QUANG TRI RON AND RETURN DANANG FOL DAY.

2. FOR CG III MAF

A. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE
OF LOC'S.

B. REQUEST CONDUCT LIAISON AND COORDINATE WITH RVN FORCES
ALONG ROUTE AS REQ FOR CONVOY PASSAGE, TRAFFIC CONTROL, SECURITY
AND SUPPORTING ARMS.

3. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV

A. REQUEST ASSUME OPCON AND PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE WHILE
CONVOY IN THIRD MARDIV TAGR.

B. THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY OF RIFLE PLAT REIN
ARTY FO, FAC, ENGR SPT AND CONTROL AND SERVICE VEHs.

C. REQUEST PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR CONVOY APPROX 70 VEH
ARRIVING PHU BAI 7 OCT67, ALSO BILLETING AND MESSING FOR 325 CONVOY

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

0 P 051510Z OCT 67 PAGE 1 OF 2 COPY# 1

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 0551 S E C R E T

PERSN RON 7 OCT.

J. REQUEST COORDINATE CONVOY MOVEMENT PHU BAI TO QUANG TRI AND RETURN DANANG.

E. CHOP POINT: FIRST/THIRD MARDIV BOUNDARY. CK PT 30.

A. FOR CG FMAW: REQUEST THREE M-36 VEHs TO SUPPORT MOVE.

B. SEVENTH ENGR BN: REQUEST PROVIDE BRIDGING AS REQUIRED.

3. EXECUTION

A. FIRST MAR REAR. STAGE PERSN AND EQUIP FOR CONVOY MOVEMENT TO QUANG TRI.

B. SEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE FORCES IAW PARA 3.D. OF REF B.

C. ELEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PARA 3.E. REF B.

D. FIRST ENGR BN. PROVIDE SPT IAW PARA 3.G. REF B LESS BRIDGING SPT.

E. FIRST MT BN. PROVIDE MT SPT IAW PARA 3.F. REF B.

F. COORD INST

(1) REFS B AND C AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS DANANG TO RUE.

(2) CHECK POINTS. REFS C AND D.

(3) D-DAY H-HOUR

(4) DANANG TO PHU BAI 070930H OCT67.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 0551 S E C R E T

(3) PHU BAI TO QUANG TRI. AS DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.

(4) QUANG TRI TO DANANG. 090800H OCT67 OR AS DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.

(5) IF CONVOY POSTPONED RESKED FOL DAY.

(6) AIR SPT DANANG TO PHU BAI ARRANGED BY THIS HQS FOR 7 OCT67 CONVOY.

(7) DIRLAUTH ALCON

7. COMM-ELCT

A. REFS E AND F.

B. SEVENTH MAR. MONITOR THIRD MARDIV TAC 1, MK 187 COMMENDING 040700H OCT 67 EACH DAY CONVOY SKED.

GFM


PAGE 2 OF 2

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TOP:

1. Brief to Brief this tomorrow ^{Foot}
 2. McBride to Change all maps tonight.
 Maj. Wilson



HAS BEEN BRIEFED

PP BURRIS
 RE BURRIS 2554 2781513
 MAY 00001
 BURRIS-SEVENTH COM
 SEVENTH DIV
 AUBURN, WA

IF 51513Z OCT 67
 TO: G FIRST BARDIV REIN
 TO: G FIRST BARDIV OPCON
 (W) 000 111 GAF

DRAFTER: G-3
 RELEASER: G-2


CONFIDENTIAL
 BOUNDARY CHANGE

RE EFFECTIVE 070000H OCT 67 MODIFY BOUNDARY EAST OF SONG YEN
 BETWEEN FIRST BN SEVENTH MAR AND THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR AS FOLLOWS.
 FROM POINT AT COORD AT955632 TO AT967636 TO AT973634 TO EAST
 BANK SONG AI NGHIA AT989637.

OP-1
 11

TO: G FIRST BARDIV P 51513Z OCT 67

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COC

W	OIC
H	AOIC
	CC

00 RUMFL RUMHIA RUMNGR
DE RUMHIA 0587 2790325
ZNY SSSSS

0 P 060325Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSR
RUMNGR/CO FIFTH SFGA
ZEN/EL EVENTH MAR
BT

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASES G-3
CONCURRENCE FSCG
G-4
AIRO

SECRET

RTY TIEIN PHUOC

A. CG AMERICAL DIV 050030Z OCT67 (NOTAL)

B. CG III MAF/SA I CORPS 031722Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

1. PARA 3 REF A PERTAINS. PRESENT SKED HOWTARS TO ARRIVE TIEN
PHUOC O/A 6 OCT 67. TRNG WILL COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY FOR PERSON
LOCATED TIEN PHUOC. ESTIMATED TRNG WILL BE COMPLETED IN 5-8 DAYS.
2. UPON COMPLETION OF TRNG FOUR MARINE 105MM HOW AND PERSON WILL BE
AIRLIFTED DA NANG AS AUTHORIZED BY REF B.



GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV RE III

060325Z OCT 67

SECRET



COL

RUM HVP-T-F IR ST MARINES

TO 061505Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARD IV REIN

TO ZEN/CG III MAF

FROM HVP/CG THIRD MARD IV

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

ZEN/HQ BN

IR UNHVP/F IR ST MAR

ZEN SEVENTH MAR

ZEN ELEVENTH MAR

ZEN/ FIRST ENGR EN

ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN

ZEN/7 IR ST MT BN

INFO RUM HV H/DSA I CORPS

RUH/KV/H/SENIOR ADVISOR DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR

ZEN/FIRST LAAM BN

13

C O N F I D E N T I A L

R OUGH R IDER C ONV OYS (U)

ACG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 03 05 4 9Z

B. CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 051510Z

DRAFTER; G; 3
RELEASER; G; 3
CONCUR; G; 4
MTO

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0678 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. CG FIRST MARD IV REIN 04 1339Z

SUSPEND EXECUTION OF REFERENCES A AND 3 UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

2. CANCEL REF C.

6-4

7

1ST MAR DIV

061545Z OCT 67

1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

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SECRET

PD RUMFL RUMIN
 DE RUMFLA 0679 2791507
 ZEN/SSSS
 P 001-01Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAR
 INFO ZEN/CG FMAW
 RUMFL/CG FLC
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST REG BN
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 ZEN/FIRST SP BN
 ZEN/FIRST TK BN
 ZEN/THIRD AMTRAC BN
 RUMFL/SA QUANG DA SPL ZONE
 RUMFL/1 CORPS ADV GR OUP
 FC

DRAFTER: G-3
 RELEASER: CG
 CONCUR: G-2

G-4
 C/S
 ADG
 FSBC
 AIRC



SECRET

CONCEPT OPN NAVAJO

1. MISSION. ON D-DAY SEVENTH MAR (-) (REIN) CONDUCTS A COORDINATED SA D OPN WITH DESIGNATED ARVN FORCES IN AREA EAST OF N-S GL 80 BETWEEN SONG VU GIA AND SONG THU BON; DESTROYS EN FORCES AND SUP-

PAGE TWO RUMFLA 0679 **SECRET**

PLACES; CAPTURES DETAINEES FOR INTERROGATION; AND FERRETS OUT EN CACHES AND UNDERGROUND FACILITIES.

2. AREA OF OPERATION. BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG VU GIA RIGHT (SOUTH BANK) ON N-S GL 91; ON EAST BY N-S GL 91 TO SONG THU BON; ON SOUTH EAST BY RIGHT (EAST) BANK OF SONG THU BON TO E-W GL 45; ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 45; ON WEST BY DIV TAOR.

3. CONCEPT. PRIOR TO D-DAY, RECON PATROLS DEPLOY INTO HIGH GROUND WEST AND SOUTHWEST OF OBJECTIVE AREA. ON D-DAY, 3/7 ATKS ACROSS SONG THU BON, WITH THREE CO'S INITIALLY BLOCKING ON SOUTHWEST, AND TWO CO'S ATKING IN COORDINATION WITH TWO REG BNS. AXIS OF ADVANCE IS TO THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST. 1/51 ARVN ATKS TO THE EAST ON ORDER FROM PSN IN VIC SONG VU GIA.

IN WESTERN PORTION OF AO, ATTACKING UNITS EMPLOY S&D TECHNIQUES. COMBAT SUPPORT ELM ARE IN DIRECT SUPPORT. LVT'S AND APC (ARVN) SPT RIVER CROSSINGS. ON CONCLUSION OF S & D MISSION AND ON Q, 3/7 (3 CO'S) CONDUCTS DELIBERATE SEARCH FOR EN SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES IN SELECTED AREAS WITHIN AO.

4. FORCES INVOLVED

A. USMC

(1) CONTROLLING HQ- SEVENTH MAR

1ST MAR DIV

1 OF 2

061507 **SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 0679 S E C R E T

(1) THIRD BN, SEVENTH MAR (5 CO'S)

(2) THIRD BN, ELEVENTH MAR

(3) RECON CO

(4) ENGR PLAT

(5) SP PLAT

(6) TK PLAT

(7) COLVT'S

E. ARVN

(1) TWO OR BN'S

(2) 2/4 APC TRP

(3) 1ST BN, 51ST ARVN (3 CO'S)

5. HORN HELICOPTER LOAD. D-DAY: LIFT FOR 500 TROOPS DISTANCE 200 KM.

6. COORDINATION. LIAISON HAS BEEN ESTAB WITH CMDR QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE. LIAISON WILL BE MADE BETWEEN ARVN FORCE COMMANDER

7. SCHEDULE

A. D-DAY: 0700 (CT).

B. L-HOUR: TO BE ANNOUNCED.


C. DURATION: 5-7 DAYS.

GP-4

BT

2 OF 2

SECRET



GRANTER: CBJ
RELEASED: CBJ
ORIGIN: CEC
REPO:

COMM NOTE: (BARRELED IN)
UNDERLINED PORTION - ADDED
BY ORIGINATOR.

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FROM BT176418 TO BT176406 CONTACT RASH 98
BT176406 TO BT176405 CONTACT LASHING ON

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CONFIDENTIAL

DE RUMMLA 0703 280025 Z

ZNY CCCCC

P 070257Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO FIFTH MARINES (REIN)

SEVENTH MARINES (REIN)

SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES (REIN)

INFO CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L


ENEMY BODY COUNT SURVEY (U)

A. COMUSMACV 030257Z OCT 67 (PASEP)

B. CG III MAF 061614Z OCT 67 (PASEP)

1. REFS A AND B PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR AN ENEMY BODY COUNT SURVEY TO BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD 10 OCT-1 NOV, OR LONGER IF NECESSARY.

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO APPOINT ONE COMPANY GRADE OFFICER FROM EACH INF REGT AND INF BN HQ TO ACT AS SURVEY TEAM MEMBERS. REPORT THE NAMES OF THE TEAM MEMBERS ASSIGNED AND THEIR UNIT TO THIS HQ (ATTN: G-3) BY 9 OCT. COMMENCING 10 OCT, TAM MEMBERS WILL CONDUCT THE ENEMY BODY COUNT SURVEYS, WHERE FEASIBLE, FOR THOSE



DRAFTER: G-3

RELEASER: G-3

W
OIC
H
H
OC
COL

PAGE TWO RUMMLA 0703 C O N F I D E N T I A L

INCIDENTS TO BE REPORTED WHICH OCCUR WITHIN THEIR PARENT UNIT'S AOR. FIRST MARDIV REP IS LTCOL R W STEPHENS, G-3 TRAINING OFFICER, ISHERWOOD 303.

3. FORMAT FOR ENEMY BODY COUNT SURVEY REPORTS IS PROVIDED IN PARA G, REF A, AS AMPLIFIED BY THIS MSG. FIRST ITEM REPORTED WILL BE DTG INCIDENT INITIATED, FOLLOWED BY LINES ALFA THROUGH LIMA. LAST ITEM WILL BE NAME OF TEAM MEMBER OR UNIT COMMANDER WHO CONDUCTED THE SURVEY.

4. ENEMY BODY COUNT SURVEYS WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED IN AREAS OR SITUATIONS WHERE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WOULD BE REQUIRED SOLELY TO CONDUCT THE BODY COUNT. NO ADDITIONAL RISKS BEYOND THOSE PREVAILING IN THE OPERATING AREA WILL BE INCURRED SOLELY TO CONDUCT THE BODY COUNTS. SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS WILL NOT BE DELAYED SOLELY TO MAKE THE BODY COUNT SURVEY AND REPORT REQUIRED BY THIS MSG.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

070257Z OCT 67

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OO 1000P RUMHRL RICHIE RUMHMA
DE 1000P 0744 0800ZS

ANY 0744
RUMHMA - SEVENTH MARY B
SEVENTH CYI

EXHST 000P

O 2100P OCT 67
FM CO FIRST MARDIV REYN
TO RUMHMA CO THIRD MARDIV
INFO: CO VII MAF

DRAFTER: C-3
RELEASER: C-3

REYNOLDS

RUMHMA CO RLC

2100P FIRST MAR

2100P MARDIV OP CON

RUMHMA CO RUMHMA (RUMHMA)

BT

CO 1000P DE NY 141

2100P MARDIV OP CON

IN 1000P MARDIV, ELEVENTH MAR (-) CHOPS TO THIRD MARDIV

2100P 0744 OCT 67

2100P ORG AS FOLLOWS:

2100P: ELEVENTH MAR (-)

2100P (-)

BT

BT

2100P MARDIV

BT

BT

CO FIRST MARDIV


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OCT 67

1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

CONFIDENTIAL

(29)

SECRET

COC

TO RUMHLA
 DE RUMHVP 1873D 2800800
 ZNY SSSSS

OR 070800Z OCT 67
 FM FIRST MARINES
 TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

C-3

TOR 071415Z
 CCM 2388

INFO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

BT

SECRET

STATUS REPORT AS OF 071200H

FORCES IN QUANG TRI AREA

1ST MARINES

HQ CO (-) REAR ECHELON IN DANANG

1ST BN

2ND BN

CO A (-) 1ST AT BN

DET RAD RELAY & CONSTR CO, 7TH COMM

CO A (-) 1ST ENGT BN

DET, 1ST SP BN

DET, 3RD CIT

1ST BN 11TH MARINES

BTRY A, (105)

BTRY W, (4.2)

W	OIL
700	AOIC
H	
	CC

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 1873D SECRET

ROUTE TO DONG HA (BY AIR 70CT)

BTRY B, 1ST BN 11TH MAR; DET HQ BTRY, 1ST BN 11TH MAR

FORCES REMAINING IN DANANG AREA (ETA BY CONVOY 10 OCT)

CO B, 1ST NY BN

CO B, 1ST MED BN

REMAINING ORGANIC 1ST MARINES VEHICLES

REMAINING ENGR, SP Hvy EQUIP.

P-4

TO FIRST MARINES

070800Z OCT 67

15

SECRET (30)

CONFIDENTIAL

OO RUMHVP RUMHVP
DE RUEHQA 0792 28012 J
ZNY 00000

0 071151Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZENWOG III MAF
RUMHVP CG THIRD MARDIV
ZENWOG FIRST MAW
ZENWOG BN
ZENWOG FIFTH MAR
ZENWOG ELEVENTH MAR
ZENWOG FIRST ENGR BN
ZENWOG SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZENWOG ELEVENTH MT BN

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCURRENCE MTC
G-4

INFO RUMHVP/DSA I CORPS
RUMHVP SECTOR ADVISOR DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR
ZENWOG FIRST LAAM BN
BT

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PRAG 0 134-67 ROUGH RIDER CONVOY (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 030549Z OCT 67

1. PRAG TO EXECUTE REF A COMMENCING 080830H OCT 67. TIME SEQUENCE FOR
CONVOY MOVEMENT OUTLINED PARA 1 REF A WILL BE FOLLOWED.

GP-A

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN



071151Z OCT 67

1 DIV 2100/4 (6-67)

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(3)

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OO RUMH H RUMHVP
 DE RUMH LA 0806 2801521
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O 071521Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/CG BN
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN

DRAFWR

DRAFTER G-3
 RELEASED G-3
 CONCURRENCE G-4
 MTO

INFO RUMHVP/DSA I CORPS
 RUMHVP/SECTOR ADVISOR DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR
 ZEN/FIRST LAAM BN
 BT

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FRAG O 134-67 ROUGH RIDER CONVOY (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 030549Z OCT 67

B. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 071151Z OCT 67

1. EXECUTE MY FRAG O 134-67 IAW REF A AND B.

GP-4

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CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

071151Z OCT 67

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00 RUMHVN RUMFKB RUMNVHE
DE RUMHMF 2658 2810344

REF 58866

0780344Z OCT 67

FM CG III MAF/SA I CORPS

TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV

INFO RUMHVN/CG I CORPS

ZEN/CG FIRST MAF

RUMHVN/I CORPS ADV GRP

RUMSBB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

RUMFKB/DEP DIR ICORPS DASC

RUMHVN/QUANG DA SPL ZONE

RUMNVHE/SA COASTAL GROUP FOURTEEN

BT

SECRET

OPERATION TATTOO

FM CG III MAF 174522Z SEP 67

FM CG IBI MARDIV 212901Z SEP 67

EXECUTIVE REF A LAW REF B COMMENCING 9 OCT 67

00-00

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SECRET

DE RUMHVP 2105D 2810333
 ZNY 88888

0 280533Z OCT 67
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO ZEN/SECOND BN TWENTY SIX MAR
 ZEN/THIRD MT BN
 ZEN/FOURTH MAR
 ZEN/TWELFTH MAR

INFO ZEN/ADC THIRD MARDIV DHC
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/SA FIRST ARVN DIV
 ZEN/FIRST MAR
 ZEN/SECOND BN TWELFTH MAR
 ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR
 ZEN/FOURTH BN TWELFTH MAR
 ZEN/QUANG TRI SECTOR HQ

BT

SECRET

FIRST MARDIV ROUGH RIDER 134-67
 A. 3D MARDIV OP O 416-66 (NOTAL)

1. REF A APPLIES.
2. A ROUGH RIDER CONVOY IS SCHED TO MOVE THE FIRST MAR REGT

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 2105D **SECRET**
 ELEMENTS FROM DANANG TO QUANG TRI. CONVOY ARRIVES PHU BAI
 8 OCT 67, RON, DEPART 9 OCT 67 FOR QUANG TRI. RON, AND RETURN
 DANANG 12 OCT 67. THIS HQ CONTROLS MOVEMENT IN 3D MARDIV AOR.

3. SCHED:

DATE/TIME	FROM	TO
092730H OCT 67	PHU BAI	QUANG TRI.
102715H OCT 67	QUANG TRI	PHU BAI

4. SECURITY COND II IN EFFECT

5. THIS HQTRS: FRAGS AIR FOR CONVOY TO BE AT CAMP EVANS
 092922H OCT 67. ON 102715H OCT 67 REQUEST AIR ON STATION
 AT QUANG TRI FOR RETURN TRIP.

6. 2/26 MAR:

- A. PROVIDE ONE RIFLE PLT TO REIN FIRST MARDIV
 CONVOY SECURITY.
- B. PROVIDE CONVOY REACTION FORCE ON 30 MIN ALERT
 WHILE CONVOY IN YOUR AOR.

7. 4TH MAR:

- A. CONTROL CONVOY AND REPORT MOVEMENT TO THIS HQTRS
 WHILE CONVOY IN YOUR AOR.
- B. PROVIDE REACTION FORCE ON 30 MIN ALERT WHILE

CG THIRD MARDIV

080833Z OCT 67

PAGE 1 OF 2 COPY NR

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PAGE THREE RUMHVP 2105D S E C R E T
CONVOY IN YOUR AOR.


- C. INTENSIFY PATROL EFFORT IN YOUR AOR ALONG RT 1.
- 8. 12TH MAR: PROVIDE ARTY SUPPORT ENTIRE ROUTE IAW REF A.
- 9. 3D MT BN:
 - A. PROVIDE COORDINATOR TO ASSIST IN STAGING, MESSING AND BILLETING CONVOY WHILE IN PHU BAI.
 - B. COORDINATOR REPORT THIS HQTRS FOR INSTRUCTIONS.
 - C. PROVIDE ONE OFFICER GUIDE TO ACCOMPANY CONVOY TO AND FROM DESTINATION.
- 10. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
 - A. FIRST MARDIV PROVIDES CONVOY SECURITY OF RIFLE PLT REIN, W/ARTY FC, PAC, ENGR SPT AND CONTROL SERVICE VEHICLES.
 - B. WHILE CONVOY IS IN 3RD MARDIV AOR CONVOY CONTROL FREQ 43.6 WILL BE UTILIZED.
 - C. PRIOR TO DEPARTURE CONVOY CMDR WILL CHECK AND DETERMINE ALL NETS WORKING.
 - D. CONVOY CMDR WILL NOTIFY QUANG TRI SECTOR HQ WHEN CONVOY ARRIVES GRID COORD YD 441430 NORTHBD AND SOUTHBD YD 441430. SECTOR HQ WILL ACTIVATE CONVOY

PAGE FOUR RUMHVP 2105D S E C R E T
CONDUCT OF FIRE NET. QUANG TRI SECTOR HQTRS CALL SIGN IS EXCISE FIRES ON FREQ 41.4

- 11. FOR ALL:
 - A. DIRLAUTH ALCON
 - B. THIS MSG EFF FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND FOR MOVE-
MENT DATE INDICATED SCHED PARA 3 THIS ORDER.
- GP-4
- BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

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CONFIDENTIAL

DE RUMMF 0703 281104

ZNY CCCCC

P R 081104Z OCT 67

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FORLOGCMD

ORDO

TOR 081453

2660

A

INFO CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

M110 SP 8 INCH HOWITZER

A. CMC 062116Z SEP 67 (NOTAL)

B. CG FMFPAC 080458Z SEP 67 (NOTAL)

1. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO PLACE 6 SUBJ HOWITZERS IN OPERATION.

2. ISSA FOR 20 PERCENT PARTS PROVISIONING REQUIRED BY REF A AND B HAS NOT BEEN FINALLY APPROVED BY USARV. ABOVE AUTHORIZATION BASED ON NOTIFICATION OF EXPECTED APPROVAL OF PROPOSED ISSA BY U.S. ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON, AND APPROVAL OF DANANG SUB AREA COMMAND TO REQN PARTS PENDING FINAL APPROVAL.

3. RETROGRADE M55 HOW SP AT EARLIEST DATE.

GP-4

BT



CG III MAF

P R 081104Z OCT 67

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00 RUMHVP RUMHVH
DE RUMHLA 0892 2811445
ZNY SSSSS

O P 081445Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
N/HQ BN
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST MT BN

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR MTO, G-4

COC

INFO RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS
RUMHVH/SENIOR ADVISOR DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR
ZEN/FIRST LAAM BN
BT

SECRET

ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 051510Z OCT 67 (PASEP)

1. REF A TO BE EXECUTED 100930H OCT 67. SUPPORT REQUESTED AND

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0892 SECRET

MISSIONS ASSIGNED REMAIN SAME EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS:

A. FIFTH MAR VICE SEVENTH MAR PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY.
SEVENTH MAR PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE.

2. TIME SEQUENCE FOR CONVOY MOVEMENT OUTLINED PAR 1 WILL BE FOLLOWED.

3. MODIFY PARA 3. C. TO READ APPROX 81 VEHs AND 260 CONVOY PERSON.

4. FOR FIFTH MAR. PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY CONSISTING OF RIFLE PLAT REIN W/ARTY FO, FAC AND MED PERSON TO ACCOMPANY REF A CONVOY.


GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN O P 081445Z OCT 67

SECRET

(37)



DRAFTED 6-3
RELEASED 1-7
CONCURRENT PLANS

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

090435Z OCT 67

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• COMMENCING MORNING OF 13 OCT CONDUCT SERIES

ADG

5. **DEVELOPMENT OF THE**

090953Z OCT 67

SECRET

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SECRET

Plot 5

BRIEF

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BOXb
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PP RUMHVH
DE RUMHMF 0791 2821336
ZNY SSSSS

P 091336Z OCT 67
FM CG III MAF/SA I CORPS
TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
INFO RUMHVH/CG I CORPS

TOR:091425Z

CCN:2926

G-3

ZEN/CG FMAW
ZEN/CG FORLOGCMD
RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS
BT

S E C R E T

SECURITY OF ROUTE ONE

1. THE MONSOON HAS EFFECTED OUR CAPABILITY TO LOGISTICALLY SPT LARGE FORCE/CONSTRUCTION COMMITMENTS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE BY SEA AND AIR.

2. USE OF ROUTE ONE IN THIS LOGISTIC EFFORT IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE. TIME IS APPROACHING WHEN RELIANCE WILL OF NECESSITY BE PLACED ON OUR ABILITY TO ROUGH RIDE SUPPLIES NORTH FROM DNG TO QUANG TRI/DONG HA. THE MAINT OF BRIDGE AND ROAD SECURITY TO INSURE THE ACCESSIBILITY OF ROUTE ONE IS, THEREFORE, ESSENTIAL.

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 0791 S E C R E T

3. RECOGNIZING THE HEAVY COMMITMENT OF 3D MARDIV FORCES TO THE NORTH, TO ASSIST IN PROVIDING THIS SECURITY, EFFECTIVE 121200H OCT - 67 A TEMPORARY AO FOR FIRST MARDIV IS ESTAB AS FOLLOWS IN CURRENT THIRD MARDIV AO: FROM PRESENT FIRST MARDIV BDRY AT ZC 102938 ALONG INTERMITTENT STREAM BED NW TO ZC 091954, NORTH TO ZC 091960, NW TO ZC 074990, NORTH TO ZD 074203, NW TO ZD 069014.

4. ACTION ADDEES ARE REQUESTED ON A PRIORITY BASIS TO COMMIT NECESSARY FORCES WITHIN ASSIGNED AO'S TO MAINTAIN BRIDGE AND ROAD SECURITY OF ROUTE ONE FROM DNG TO DONG HA UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

5. YOU SHOULD STRONGLY URGE YOUR CONTER-PARTS TO INCREASE THEIR EFFORTS. INFO ADDEES ARE REQUESTED TO ASSIST IN THIS EFFORT AS REQUIRED.

6. DIRLAUTH.

GP-4

BT

001 MAF


091336Z OCT 67

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 DE RUMHLA 1022 2830820
 INY CCCCC
 RUMHIE T SEVENTH COMM BN
 NINTH ENGR BN
 SEVENTH CIT
 FIRST HOSP CO

0 100820Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO FIRST MARDIV ADCON/OPCON
 FM HQ FIRST MAR

DRAFTER G-4
 RELEASER C/S
 CONCUR G-3

FIRST BN FIRST MAR
 SECOND BN FIRST MAR
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF STORM/FLOOD DAMAGE

1. TROPICAL STORM 8-9 OCT CAUSED FLOODING CONDITIONS BEYOND THAT REPORTED IN PREVIOUS YEARS.

2. REPORT THE FOLLOWING OR RELATED INFO BY 2200 10 OCT:

A. EFFECT OF FLOODING ON OPERATIONL CAPABILITY. COMMENT AS APPROPRIATE ON SUCH AREAS AS:

- (1) PATROL ACTIVITIES.
- (2) EFFECT ON DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS.
- (3) EFFECT ON OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS.

(4) POSSIBLE REEVALUATION OF RETENTION FIXED PSNS WHICH HAVE NOW BECOME TENUOUS.

B. STUDY SHOULD REPORT TOTAL REEVALUATION OPERATIONAL

COC

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1022 **CONFIDENTIAL**

CAPABILITY IN VIEW RECENT FLOODING AND SUBSEQUENT DAMAGE.

C. BRIDGES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED.

D. BUNKER DAMAGE. INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO CORRECT DEFICIENCY IN DESIGN.

E. EQUIPMENT LOSS OR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM FLOODING.

F. EFFECTS ON RESUPPLY. INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO CORRECT.

G. PROVIDE OVERLAY OF FLOODED AREA BY 140920H OCT 67.

FM-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

0 100820Z OCT 67

CONFIDENTIAL

(41)

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DE RUMHLA 1052 283 1016
ZNY SSSSS

P 101016Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG III MAF

INFO FIFTH MAR
SEVENTH MAR

BT

SECRET

SECURITY OF RTE 1 AND OTHER SECURITY TASKS

A. CG III MAF 091336Z OCT 67

B. CG III MAF 032340Z OCT 67

1. EXECUTION OF REF A REQUIRES AS MINIMUM, EMPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL RIFLE CO REIN IN PHU LOC AREA NORTH OF HIA VAN PASS. PRESENT INTENTION TO DISPLACE ONE-ONE FIVE FIVE HOW BTRY INTO AO ASSIGNED BY REF A TO SPT OPNS THERE.
2. TO PROVIDE THIS ADDITIONAL FORCE REQUIRES READJUSTMENT OF DIV MANEUVER ELEMS NOW FULLY EMPLOYED IN ACCOMPLISHING OTHER ASSIGNED TASKS.
3. AS PART OF PRE-ELECTION SECURITY, FIRST MARDIV WAS TASKED WITH SUPPLEMENTING ARVN SECURITY ON THE CAM LE (ATO15717) AND OLD SONG CAU LO (BT092553) BRIDGES. LIAISON WITH GVN OFFICIALS INDICATES

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1052 SECRET

THAT THEY HAVE CAPABILITY TO CONTINUE PROVISION OF SECURITY FOR THESE BRIDGES. ACCORDINGLY REQUEST PERMISSION TO REMOVE MARINE SECURITY ELEMS PRESENTLY LOC THEREON.

4. THIS DIVISION ALSO PROVIDES SECURITY FOR OLD DAI LOC (AT 914587) AND NEW DAI LOC (AT 914587) BRIDGES. PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF NEW DAI LOC BRIDGE, CG III MAF TASKED FIRST MARDIV WITH SECURITY FOR OLD DAI LOC BRIDGE. WHILE NOT TASKED WITH SECURING THE NEW BRIDGE, THIS IS NOW THE CRITICAL BRIDGE FOR MILITARY TRAFFIC AND SECURITY THEREON IS ESSENTIAL. OLD DAI LOC IS NOW USED PRIMARILY FOR CIVILIAN TRAFFIC AND IF SECURITY IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY CAN BE PROVIDED BY LOCAL DISTRICT FORCES. ACCORDINGLY REQUEST THAT DIVISION RESPONSIBILITY BE SHIFTED FROM OLD TO NEW DAI LOC BRIDGE.

5. TO SPT DISPLACEMENT OF ARTY IAW PARA 1 ABOVE FURTHER REQUEST THAT MINIMUM OF FOUR OR EIGHT 155MM HOW AND CREWS PRESENTLY OPCON AMERICAL DIV AS DIRECTED REF B BE RETURNED 1ST MARDIV ASAP.

6. FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF ABOVE REQUESTS WILL PERMIT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PHU LOC AREA TASK WITHOUT UNDUE RISK TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OTHER DIVISION MISSIONS.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV

COPY NR 16 101016Z OCT 67

SECRET

SECRET

W/OIC
~~W/OIC~~
 H CC

PP RUMHIA RUMHIB RUMHIE
 DE RUMHMF 0896 2831624
 ZNY SSSSS

P 101624Z OCT 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
 RUMHIB/CG SECOND BDE ROKMC
 INFO ZEN/COMNAVSUPPACT
 RUMHIE/NINTH ENGR BN
 BT

ADV RT G-3
 G-3

TOR:101830
 GCN:3391

SECRET
 SUPPORT FOR 2D BDE ROKMC CP DRAGON FIRE
 A. CG III MAF 311624Z AUG 67 (NOTAL)
 B. III MAF COC 260305Z SEP 67 (NOTAL)
 C. CG III MAF 281427Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

1. REF A PROVIDED CERTAIN SUPPORT FORCES FOR SUBJECT OPERATION FOR PRD 22-25 DAYS COMMENCING 5 SEP. REF B EXTENDED LVT SUPPORT UNTIL 7 OCT.

2. LVT SUPPORT IS FURTHER EXTENDED UNTIL COMPLETION OF ENGINEER TASKS DIRECTED BY REFERENCE (C), (PRD ABT 2 WKS) AT WHICH TIME LVT PLAT(-) WILL BE REDEPLOYED TO 1ST MARDIV AND AMERICAL DIV SIMULTANEOUS WITH REDEPLOYMENT OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT FROM

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 0896 SECRET
 BATANGAN PENINSULA.
 GP-4

BT

CG III MAF

COPY NR*

101604Z OCT 67

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DE RUMHLA 1091 2832315

ZNY CCCCC

P 102315Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

STARLIGHT SCOPE EVALUATION (U)

A. CG III MAF 221416Z SEP67

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, BASED ON LIMITED EXPERIENCE TO DATE WITH THE SMALL STARLIGHT SCOPES, IS PROVIDED AS REQUESTED BY REF A. SUBPARAS ARE KEYED TO THE CORRESPONDING SUBPARAS OF PARA 2, REF A.

A. 14 KIA (C), 4 KIA (P), 15 WIA. IN ADDITION, 1 KIA (C) AND 3 KIA (P) RESULTED FROM USE OF STARLIGHT SCOPE IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER DETECTION DEVICES.

B. RESULTS OF USE.

(1) STARLIGHT SCOPES HAVE BEEN USED EFFECTIVELY TO COORDINATE FRIENDLY PATROL ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF THE COMBAT BASE PERIMETER. IN AT LEAST ONE INSTANCE, A POSSIBLE CONTACT BETWEEN TWO CONVERGING FRIENDLY UNITS WAS AVERTED BY ALERTING EACH TO THE OTHER'S PRESENCE. THE SCOPES HAVE BEEN USED WITHIN THE COMBAT BASE PERIMETER TO CONTROL THE MOVEMENT OF THE REACTION FORCE, TO ENSURE THE PROPER MANNING AND SITING OF CREW-SERVE WEAPONS, AND TO MAIN-

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1091 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**
TAIN SURVEILLANCE OF CLAYMORES, TRIP FLARES, OBSTACLES, AND SID'S TO ENSURE PLANNED EMPLACEMENT AND TO DETECT ANY TAMPERING WITH THE DEVICE. SCOPES FACILITATE MAINTENANCE OF STRICT FIRE DISCIPLINE.

(2) STARLIGHT SCOPES HAVE BEEN USED TO SELECT AMBUSH SITES AND HAVE ENABLED RELATIVELY SMALLER UNITS TO COVER A LARGER AREA. AMBUSH AND OUTPOST PERSONNEL CAN SEE FARTHER, HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE, ARE NOT OVERLY REACTIVE TO NIGHT NOISES, AND ARE LESS LIKELY TO TRIGGER THE AMBUSH PREMATURELY. MOST OF THE CASUALTIES REPORTED IN PARA 1A RESULTED FROM SSS USED BY RECON OUTPOSTS.

(3) ROAD SURVEILLANCE TO PREVENT MINING HAS BEEN ENHANCED. ONE UNIT REPORTS THAT ROAD AREAS COVERED BY PATROLS WITH SSS HAVE HAD NEGATIVE MINE INCIDENTS THE NEXT DAY. SCOPES HAVE ALSO BEEN USED TO CONTROL/PREVENT WATERWAY TRAFFIC AT NIGHT AND TO ASSIST IN PROVIDING SECURITY OF VITAL BRIDGES.

(4) COORDINATION OF MANEUVER OF FRIENDLY UNITS. SEE PARA B (1) ABOVE.

(5) MONITORING NIGHT ACTIVITY IN FRIENDLY POSITIONS. SEE PARA B (1) ABOVE.

(6) MANY OF THE USES DISCUSSED ABOVE HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED
CG 1ST MAR DIV

PAGE 1 OF 8

102315Z OCT 67

CONFIDENTIAL

(48)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RUMLA 1891 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 WITH GREAT EFFECTIVENESS FROM TOWERS AND OP'S. IN MANY CASES, THE
 ENTIRE DEFENSIVE PERIMETER, AS WELL AS APPROACHES INTO THE POSITION
 CAN BE KEPT UNDER SURVEILLANCE. UNITS REPORT GOOD CLARITY OF IMAGE
 UP TO 450 METERS AND ABILITY TO DETECT MOVEMENT OUT TO 1500 METERS.

(7) SCOPES HAVE BEEN USED WITH ARTILLERY AND MORTAR
 ILLUMINATION FLARES, INFRA-RED AND VISIBLE SEARCHLIGHTS. FOUR-
 POINT ARTILLERY AND VISIBLE SEARCHLIGHT ILLUMINATION PROVIDE THE BEST

VISIBILITY. SMALLER ILLUMINATION DEVICES OF THE TYPE CARRIED BY
 PATROLS ARE NOT TOO EFFECTIVE. CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO POINT
 THE SCOPE AT AN ILLUMINATION SOURCE TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE TO THE SCOPE.
 THIS PREVENTS USE OF THE SCOPE WHEN A FLARE IS BURNING ON THE GROUND
 NEXT TO THE TARGET. USE OF ILLUMINATION ALSO ALERTS THE ENEMY THAT
 HE IS BEING OBSERVED AND HE BECOMES MORE CAREFUL TO AVOID DETECTION.
 ONE METHOD OF COUNTERING THIS IS TO FIRE THE ILLUMINATION BEHIND
 THE OBSERVER, THAT IS, ON THE SIDE AWAY FROM THE SUSPECTED ENEMY
 ACTIVITY. THE LIGHT SOURCE BEHIND THE OBSERVER PROVIDES EXCELLENT
 ILLUMINATION AND DECEIVES THE ENEMY INTO THINKING THAT ATTENTION IS
 FOCUSED IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. EVEN THOUGH ILLUMINATION EN-
 HANCES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SSS, ITS PRINCIPAL ADVANTAGE IS
 REALIZED WHEN IT CAN BE USED WITH NATURAL LIGHT ONLY. THIS CON-

PAGE FOUR RUMLA 1891 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 SERVES ILLUMINATION AMMUNITION, DOES NOT DESTROY THE NIGHT VISION
 OF OTHER OBSERVERS IN THE AREA, AND DOES NOT ALERT THE ENEMY TO THE
 FACT THAT HE IS SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION.

C. STARLIGHT SCOPES HAVE INCREASED THE CONFIDENCE OF PERSONNEL
 ON PATROLS, AMBUSHES, AND OUTPOSTS. THE EXTRA CONFIDENCE REDUCES
 THE LIKELIHOOD OF TRIGGER-HAPPY INCIDENTS. DUE TO THE LIMITED PERIOD
 OF EMPLOYMENT OF SSS, THERE ARE NO STATISTICS TO SUPPORT A REDUCTION
 IN FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. SOME DECREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AREAS
 WHERE SSS HAD BEEN USED WAS NOTED BY ONE UNIT.

C. SHORTCOMINGS OR PROBLEM AREAS.

(1) EXTREME CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO AVOID POINTING THE SCOPE
 AT A BRIGHT ILLUMINATION SOURCE.

(2) THE DIALS SHOULD BE LABELLED TO FACILITATE USE IN THE
 DARK, AND IF POSSIBLE, THE NUMBER OF ADJUSTMENT KNOBS SHOULD BE
 REDUCED.

(3) THE ACTIVATION SWITCH SHOULD BE LABELLED ON-OFF
 AND CONSTRUCTED OF STRONGER MATERIAL.

(5) THE RUBBER EYESHIELD IS NOT FIRMLY ATTACHED TO THE EYE-

PAGE 2 OF 3

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PAGE FIVE, RUMHLA 1891 CONFIDENTIAL
PIECE ASSEMBLY AND FALLS OFF EASILY.

(6) A CARRYING HANDLE SHOULD BE DESIGNED FOR THE SCOPE, IN ADDITION TO THE PRESENT CARRYING STRAP. THIS WOULD FACILITATE CARRYING AND STEADYING THE SCOPE WHEN EMPLOYED FOR LONG PERIODS, AND WOULD BE VALUABLE WHEN THE SCOPE IS HAND HELD. A SMALL TRIPOD OR MOUNTING BRACKET COULD BE DESIGNED FOR USE IN SEMI-FIXED POSITIONS.

(7) THE CASES IN WHICH SCOPES WERE RECEIVED CONTAINED STARLIGHT SCOPE, SMALL, HAND-HELD OR INDIVIDUAL MOUNTED (FSN 1090-688-9954). THE MANUAL IN THE CASE WAS TM 11-583-203-13 OF APRIL 1967 FOR THE NIGHT VISION SIGHT, INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS MOUNTED, AN/PVS-2 (FSN 5855-832-9223). THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE IN THE TWO SCOPES. THE CORRECT MANUAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN TM 11-1090-268-13 OF APRIL 1966.

(8) REPORTS ON BATTERY LIFE VARY FROM 30 TO 60 VICE THE DESIGN 100 HOURS.

(9) ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL REPORTS ARE GENERALLY VERY FAVORABLE, AN INCREASE IN THE RANGE OF THE SCOPES, A DECREASE IN THE SIZE AND WEIGHT, AND A LONGER BATTERY LIFE WOULD ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SSG.

(10) ONE BN REPORTS 19 PRI 02 REQUISITIONS FOR BATTERIES

PAGE SIX RUMHLA 1891 CONFIDENTIAL
UNFILED.

E. OTHER COMMENTS.

(1) BATTERY LIFE CAN BE INCREASED BY REMOVING THE BATTERY WHEN THE SCOPE IS NOT IN USE.

(2) TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE EMPHASIS HAVE REDUCED MANY OF THE INITIAL PROBLEM AREAS, SUCH AS STRIPPING THE FLANGES ON THE FOCUSING MECHANISM.

(3) RECOMMEND THAT A CONTACT TEAM BE ESTABLISHED TO SUPPLEMENT PERIODICALLY THE MAINTENANCE PERFORMED BY THE OPERATOR.

(4) RECOMMEND PROMULGATION OF AN INSTRUCTIONAL MANUAL ON CARE AND USE OF THE STARLIGHT SCOPES.

(5) RECOMMEND ADDITIONAL ISSUE OF STARLIGHT SCOPES ON THE BASIS OF 40 PER INF & RECON BN, 8 PER INF AND ARTY REGT HQ, AND 15 PER DIV SEPARATE BN.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3.


CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

DE RUMHIA 1101 200000 G
Z NY SSSSS
RUMHIA - SEVENTH BN
SEVENTH BN
FIRST HOSP CO

O 110250Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAF
RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
ZEN/FIRST MARDIV/OPCON
RUMH/H/SA QUANG DA SFL ZONE
RUMH/H/I CORPS ADV GROUP
BT

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASES: CG
CONCUR: G-4
G-2
C/S
ADC



SECRET

CONCEPT OPN ONSLOW

1. SEVERE FLOODING CONDITIONS REQUIRE INDEFINITE DELAY OF OPN NAVAJO. COMPANY SIZE S & D OPNS HIGH GROUND NAVAJO AREA COMMENCED 10 OCT. PROPOSE EMPLOY AVAIL FORCES TO CONDUCT OPN ONSLOW PERIOD 15-19 OCT.

2. SITUATION. ENEMY UNITS OPERATING SOUTH OF HOI AN POSE THREAT TO ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR 22 OCT. HIGHLY DESIRABLE CONDUCT OPN ONSLOW TO HELP DETER ENEMY ATK AGAINST HOI AN DURING PRE-ELECTION PERIOD.

3. AREA OF OPNS. BOUNDED ON WEST BY RTE 1. ON NORTH AND EAST BY PAGE 2 RUMHIA 1101 SECRET

SONG CAU LAU, ON SOUTH BY SONG BA REN.

4. MISSION. COMMENCING O/A 15 OCT, FIFTH MARINES CONDUCTS, WITHIN DESIGNATED AO, A COMBINED S & D OPN, WITH SPECIFIED ARVN FORCES, TO DISRUPT/VC ANTI-ELECTION ACTIVITIES, CAPTURE OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES.

5. CONCEPT. DELIBERATE S&D OPNS BY FIFTH MARINES IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES, BASED ON LATE INTELLIGENCE AND PREVAILING FLOOD CONDITIONS.

6. FORCES INVOLVED

A. USMC

- (1) CONTROLLING HQ - FIFTH MARINES
- (2) 1ST BN FIFTH MAR (2 CO'S & 1 CO 2/3)
- (3) SECOND BN ELEVENTH MARINES
- (4) PLAT RECON CO
- (5) ENGR PLAT
- (6) SP PLAT
- (7) CO LVT'S

B. ARVN TENTATIVE

- (1) TWO RANGER BNS
- (2) 24 APC TROOP

PAGE 3 RUMHIA 1101 SECRET

(3) ONE CO, 1ST BN, 51ST REGT.

7. NO INITIAL LARGE HELICOPTER LIFT ANTICIPATED.

8. COORDINATION: LIAISON HAS BEEN ESTAB WITH CMDR QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE.

GP-4

BT

1ST MAR DIV


W

110250Z OCT 67

44
SECRET

45

CONFIDENTIAL



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| ✓ | ADIC |
| ✓ | ADIC |
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| ✓ | CC |

PP RUMHIF

DE RUMH. 1 12 PM 255

ZNY CCCCC

RUMHIE-1-SEVENTH DIVISION BY SEVENTH DIVISION HQSP CO

P 110255Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN

TO SEVENTH MAR

ZEN/SEVENTH MAR

INFO SEVENTH MAR

ZEN/SEVENTH MAR

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIBERTY BRIDGE

A. CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 171309Z JUL 67

1. RECENT DAMAGE TO LIBERTY BRIDGE PRECLUDED ACCESS TO SOUTH BANK OF SONG THU BON BY SEVENTH MARINERS AND NECESSITATES MODIFICATION OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF HQSP CO

2. SEVENTH MAR RESPONSIBLE FOR RIVER AND SOUTHERN PORTION OF BRIDGE.

3. SECOND AND FIFTH MAR RESPONSIBLE FOR SOUTHERN PORTION OF BRIDGE AND SOUTHERN LAND APPROACHES TO BRIDGE.

4. THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE 111202HOUT 67 AND REMAINS IN EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MAR DIV

110255Z OCT 67

CONFIDENTIAL

(46)

SECRET

00 RUMHFL RUMHIE RUMWH RUMHVP
DE RUMHLA 1104 2840300
ZNY SSSSS
RUMHIE-T-SEVENTH COMM BN
NINTH ENGR BN
FIRST HOSP CO

0 110300Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMWH/CG I CORPS
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCOMD
RUMWH/DSA I CORPS
RUMWH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

BT
SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO.

FOG 0 136- 67

A. CG III MAF 091336Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

1. SITUATION

A. EN SIT. ENEMY STRENGTH WITHIN AO EST AT 1,000 COMBINED
LOCAL AND MAIN FORCES. PRINCIPAL IDENTIFIED UNITS AND OPERATING
AREAS ARE:

- 1) K-4B MF BN (AT 2099)
- (2) 804 MF BN (ZC0696)
- (3) C-118 LF CO (ZD1302)

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1104 **SECRET**

ATTITUDE OF LOCAL POPULATION NEUTRAL TO HOSTILE. TERRAIN IS STEEP
AND RUGGED WITH HIGH CANOPY RAIN FORESTS. RTE NR 1 IS ONLY LOC IN
AO AND TRAVERSES OVER 20 MILES AND 46 BRIDGES. WEATHER FOR OPER-
ATING PERIOD WILL BE MOSTLY CLOUDY WITH HEAVY RAINFALL. MOST
POSSIBLE EN COURSES OF ACTION WILL BE TO DESTROY BRIDGES, MINE,
AND AMBUSH LOC TRAFFIC IN AN EFFORT TO DENY VEHICULAR MOVEMENT.
IT IS IMPROBABLE EN WILL STAND AND FIGHT. DETAILED AREA STUDY
AVAILABLE FROM G-2.


B. FRIENDLY SITUATION

(1) MONSOON WEATHER HAS AFFECTED III MAF CAPABILITY TO
PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT BY AIR AND SEA TO OPERATIONS IN QUANG TRI
PROVINCE. INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF RTE NR 1 DICTATES NEED FOR
GREATER ROAD AND BRIDGE SECURITY. HEAVY COMMITMENT OF 3D MARDIV
FORCES TO THE NORTH NECESSITATES ESTAB OF A TEMPORARY AO FOR FIRST
MARDIV IN CURRENT 3D MARDIV AOR AS FOL: START AT POINT AT 890953,
FOL TAOR AND RZ BOUNDARY TO ZC080838, NORTH ALONG PROVINCE BOUNDARY
TO ZC102938, NW ALONG INTERMITTENT STREAM BED TO
ZC091954, NORTH TO ZC091960, NW TO ZC074990, NORTH TO ZD074003,
NW TO ZD 069014, THENCE EAST ALONG COASTLINE TO STARTING POINT.


(2) FORCES AVAILABLE
1ST MAR DIV

1 OF 3

110300Z OCT 67



DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASER: CG
CONCUR: G-2
G-4
C/S
ABC

**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMHLA 1104 S E C R E T

(A) FORCES NORMALLY AVAL TO FIRST MARDIV ARE AVAL FOR OPNS IN AO.

(B) DA NANG SPL SECTOR (GVN) FORCES ARE AVAL FOR SECURITY MISSIONS ALONG RTE NR 1 SOUTH OF HAI VAN PASS. COORD WITH CMDR, DANANG SPL SECTOR, TELE NR PUMA 126 (U.S. ADVISOR, CAPT CHRISTIAN).

(C) ARVN/GVN FORCES ARE AVAL FOR COORD OF SECURITY ALONG RTE NR 1 IN PHU LOC DISTRICT (NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS). COORD WITH PHU LOC DISTRICT CHIEF, PHU LOC (U.S. ADVISOR, CAPT VOPATEK).

2. MISSION. FIRST MARDIV, IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN/GVN FORCES, CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN AO TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY EN FORCES THEREIN; PROVIDES SECURITY FOR RTE NR 1 FROM NAM O BRIDGE TO PHU LOC; AND PROTECTS CRITICAL BRIDGES ALONG RTE NR 1.

3. EXECUTION

(A) CONCEPT

(1) FIRST MARDIV PROVIDES SECURITY ON RTE NR 1 BY CONTINUING SECURITY OPERATIONS IN TAOR, AND BY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN AO WITH AN ADDITIONAL RIFLE COMPANY. ARTY IS LOCATED TO PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT IN AO. ENGR SUPPORT INCLUDES NINE SWEEP TEAMS, TRUCKS

PAGE 4 RUMHLA 1104 S E C R E T

PROVIDE MOBILITY FOR REACTION FORCE.

(2) EST DURATION OF OPERATIONS IN AO IS LENGTH OF MONSOON SEASON.

(3) ROTATION OF PARTICIPATING UNITS IS ANTICIPATED. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS REMAINS SAME.

(4) TOTAL ADDITIONAL INFANTRY SECURITY REQUIREMENT FOR OPERATIONS IN AO IS ONE RIFLE COMPANY. FORCES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED IN TAOR VIC HAI VAN PASS REMAIN SAME.

B. 7 THE MAR

(1) CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN TAOR AND DIV TEMPORARY AO IN VIC RTE NR 1 TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY EN FORCES LOCATED THEREIN;

(2) CONTINUE CURRENT OPERATIONS ALONG RTE NR 1 VIC HAI VAN PASS AND WITHIN TAOR TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR NINE SWEEP TEAMS AND BRIDGES.

(3) ESTABLISH COMBAT BASE IN AO TO SUPPORT OFFENSIVE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS. LIMIT CONSTRUCTION TO THAT WHICH IS NEEDED FOR DEFENSE, COMMAND AND CONTROL. FIELD CONDITIONS APPLY. TENANT UNITS INCLUDE:

(A) RIFLE COMPANY

(B) ONE BTRY (-), ELEVENTH MAR

2 OF 3

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMHLA 1104 S E C R E T

(C) MINE SWEEP TEAMS

(D) DET, MT BN

(4) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP TEAMS IN AO.

(5) ESTABLISH WITH CMDR, DANANG SPL SECTOR AND PHU LOC DISTRICT CHIEF FOR COORDINATION ARVN/GVN FORCES.

(6) COORDINATE WITH GVN/ARVN FORCES IN IMPLEMENTING ROAD AND BRIDGE SECURITY. ENSURE, WITHIN CAPABILITY, APPROPRIATE SECURITY IS PROVIDED FOR THE FOLLOWING CRITICAL BRIDGES:

| NO. | COORD |
|-----|----------|
| 1 | AT926866 |
| 15 | AT936917 |
| 17 | AT929921 |
| 18 | AT927922 |
| 19 | AT916934 |
| 20 | AT915935 |
| 21 | AT915935 |
| 22 | AT912943 |
| 23 | AT912944 |
| 30 | AT887956 |
| 41 | ZD152011 |

PAGE 6 RUMHLA 1104 S E C R E T

46

ZD099006

(7) PROVIDE RIFLE COMPANY FOR OPERATIONS IN AO FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT ONE WEEK COMMENCING 12 OCT 67.
 C. FIFTH MAR/2D BN FIFTH MAR. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY TO SEVENTH MAR ON ORDER FOR PERIOD OF ABT ONE WEEK
 D. ELEVENTH MAR

(1) ONE BTRY (-) - DS SEVENTH MAR

(2) PROVIDE FIRE SPT FOR BRIDGE SECURITY FORCES, MINE SWEEP TEAMS AND CONVOYS NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS AND THROUGHOUT THE AO.

E. FIRST RECON BN

(1) PROVIDE RECON SPT AS REQUIRED BY SEVENTH MAR

(2) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT RECON PATROLS BY FOOT OR HELICOPTER. RECONNOITER TRAILS AND ROADS FEEDING INTO RTE NR 1. LOCATE AND RECONNOITER ENLOC'S. HARBOR SITES, ASSEMBLY AREAS AND CACHES. EMPHASIS IN WESTERN PART OF AO.

F. FIRST ENGR BN

(1) PROVIDE MINE SWEEP TEAMS AS REQUIRED BY 7TH MARINES. CONTINUE DAILY ROAD SWEEP OPERATIONS VIC HAI VAN PASS AREA IN TAOR. CONDUCT DAILY MINE SWEEP OPERATIONS ALONG RTE NR 1
 BT

3 OF 3

SECRET

SECRET

00 RUMHFL RUMHIE RUMHWH RUMHWP
DE RUMHLA 1105 2840300

ZNY SSSSS

RUMHIE-T-SEVENTH COMM BN
NINTH ENGR BN
FIRST HOSP CO

O 110300Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

RUMHWP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHWH/CG I CORPS

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCOMD

RUMHWH/DSA I CORPS

RUMHWH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

BT

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO
THROUGHOUT AOR.

(2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ENGINEER SUPPORT IN AO AS
REQUIRED BY 7TH MARINES.

G. 1ST MT BN PROVIDE MOBILITY TO SUPPORT MINE

SWEEPING OPERATIONS AND REACTION FORCES AS REQUIRED BY 7TH MARINES.

H. COORD INSTR

(1) TIME OF EXECUTION: 121200H OCT 67

(2) DESIGNATED RIFLE COMPANY RELIEFS: CHOP TO SEVENTH MAR,
ON ORDER, FOR EMPLOYMENT IN AO. SCHEDULE PROMULGATED SEPARATELY.

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1105 SECRET

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUMHIA RUMHIB
DE RUMHMF 0953 2840856
ZNY SSSSS

P 110856Z OCT 67
FM CG III MAF/SA I CORPS
TO RUMHVA/CG I CORPS
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
RUMHIS/CG SECOND BDE ROKMC
ZEN/CG FLC

INFO RUMHVA/DSA I CORPS
BT

S E C R E T

RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS

A. CG III MAF 090628Z SEP67 (NOTAL)

B. CG III MAF 030048Z OCT67 (NOTAL)

1. REFERENCE A PROMULGATED III MAF CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR 4TH QUARTER, 1967. REFERENCE B PROMULGATED THE RICE HARVEST SCHEDULE WITHIN ICTZ AND PROVIDED FOR SURVEILLANCE/PROTECTION OF FRIENDLY RICE HARVESTS IN AREAS OF OPERATIONS.
2. THE MISSION OF US/FWF IN ICTZ REMAINS TO DESTROY LOCAL GUERRILLAS

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 0953 **S E C R E T**

AND NVA/MF UNITS LOCATED IN ICTZ, TO DESTROY VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND TO RESTORE GVN CONTROL. TO THIS END, THE CURRENT MONSOON SEASON, COMPLICATING THE ENEMY'S ALREADY MONUMENTAL RESUPPLY PROBLEMS, CAN BE MADE TO WORK TO OUR ADVANTAGE IF THE ENEMY IS EFFECTIVELY DENIED ACCESS TO LOCAL FOOD RESUPPLY. THE CURRENT RICE HARVEST SEASON COULD WELL BE THE MOST CRITICAL PERIOD OF THE WAR FOR THOSE ENEMY FORCES LOCATED IN ICTZ SINCE THEY MUST DEPEND ON PROCUREMENT OF LOCAL RICE FOR SURVIVAL.

3. IN CONJUNCTION WITH OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY BASE AREAS AND KNOWN/SUSPECTED ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS, III MAF FORCES CONDUCT MAXIMUM RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS TAILORED TO FIT THE SITUATION IN RESPECTIVE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. DENIAL OPERATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE, IN ADDITION TO MAJOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, INTERDICTION OF ENEMY RESUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE COASTAL PLAINS TO THE HIGHLANDS.

4. CG, SECOND BRIGADE ROKMC, IS REQUESTED TO CONDUCT RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS WITHIN TAOR WITHIN GUIDE LINES ESTABLISHED BY COMROKFM.

5. CG, I CORPS IS REQUESTED TO SUPPORT THESE OPERATIONS WITH VIGOROUS RVNAF RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT ICTA DURING THE CURRENT HARVEST SEASON.

PAGE THREE RUMHMF 0953 **S E C R E T**

6. COMMANDERS, III MAF FORCES COORDINATE OPERATIONS WITH LOCAL RVNAF COMMANDERS.

GP-4

BT


CG III MAF/SA I CORPS

P 110856Z OCT 67

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DE RUMHLA 1195 284135 1
ZNY SSSSS

R 111351Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIFTH MAR
SEVENTH MAR
FIRST TANK BN

DRAFTER
RELEASER

BT

SECRET

FIRST MARDIV OPERO 91-67 W/CH 2 (WATERWAY CONTROL)

1. CO FIFTH MAR 090052Z OCT 67 (S) (MOTAL)

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 270119Z SEP 67 (S)

1. REF A REQUESTED CLARIFICATION SUBJ ORDER.

2. CH NO 3 TO SUBJ ORDER WILL BE PUBLISHED WITHIN FEW DAYS.
CHANGE WILL REFLECT RECENT SHIFT OF DIV ASSETS.3. FOR FIFTH MAR: NECESSARY COORD WITH AMERICAL DIVISION WILL
EFFECTED BY THIS HGS.4. FOR SEVENTH MAR AND SOUTHERN SECTOR DEF COMD: ATTN DIRECTOR
TO PARA 3D(4) AND 3G(1) OF SUBJ ORDER. BOUNDARY CHANGE
BY REF B CHANGES COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITY ACCORDINGLY.

GP-4

BT


CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

R 111351Z OCT 67

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| 1814 | AOIC |
| H | |
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| | AC |

OO RUMFCR RUMHVP
DE RUMHLA 1299 285 1550
ZNY SSSSS

O 121550Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/HQ BN
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASER: G-3

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMFCR/USS NEW (DD318)
BT

S E C R E T

FRAG O 134-67 ROUGH RIDER CONVOY TO DANANG

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 030549Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

B. CG THIRD MARDIV 120755Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

1. REF A SKED SUBJ CONVOY TO QUANG TRI ON 7 OCT 67. REF B SKED
RETURN CONVOY DANANG 130800H OCT 67 FROM PHU BAI.

2. EXECUTION:

A. SEVENTH MAR

(1) PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE WHILE CONVOY IN YOUR AREA OF
RESPONSIBILITY.

(2) COORDINATE SPT FIRE OF USS NEW FROM CK PT 14 - 30

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1299 **S E C R E T**
AS REQUIRED.

B. ELEVENTH MAR

(1) PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED CK PT 30 UNTIL CONVOY
SECURES DANANG.

2. SPT ARMS FROM CK PT 14-30 FOR CONVOY PROVIDED BY USS NEW
ASSIGNED FIRST MARDIV. CONVOY CHOPS TO FIRST MARDIV CK PT 14.

CP-4

BT

CG 1ST MAR DIV

121550Z OCT 67

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUMHIA RUMHFL RUMHVH
DE RUMHIA 1310 2860235
ZNY SSSSS

0130235Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
RUMHFL/CG FLC
RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS ADV GROUP
RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
BT

RECEIVED
13 OCT 1967
DRAFTED: G-3
RELEASED: G-3
CONCUR: G-2

G-4
G-5
C/S
ADC

| | |
|-----|------|
| | OIC |
| WAB | ADIC |
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SECRET

PRAG 0 137-67 (OPERATION ONSLOW) (U)

FM CG FIRST MARDIV 110250Z OCT 67

1. SITUATION. SEE REF A.

2. COMMENCING 15 OCT 67 FIFTH MAR MINUS REIN CONDUCT S & D OPN
IN AREA BOUNDED ON WEST BY RTE ONE, ON NORTH AND EAST BY SONG
CAB LAU. ON SOUTH BY SONG BA REN.

PAGE TWO RUMHIA 1310 **SECRET**

3. EXECUTION:

A. TASK ORGANIZATION

FIFTH MAR (-) (REIN)

FIRST BN (-) (3 CO'S)

B. FIFTH MARINES

(1) CONDUCT S & D OPN IN DESIGNATED AO COMMENCING 150700H
OCT 67.

(2) ASSUME OPCON OF CO 2/5 141200 OCT 67

(3) COORDINATE WITH CO QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE REGARDING
PARTICIPATION OF ARVN FORCES IN COMPANION OPERATIONS.

C. ELEVENTH MARINES: PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED.

D. 2D BN 5TH MAR: IAW PARA 39(2) ABOVE, CHOP CO 10 FIFTH
MAR.

E. COORD INSTRNS

(1) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(2) D-DAY-15 OCT 67.

(3) ESTIMATED DURATION 4 DAYS.

(4) CHOPPED UNITS REVERT PARENT CONROL UPON TERMINATION
OPN ONSLOW.

(5) UTILIZE PSYOPS MAX EXTENT POSSIBLE.

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 0 130235Z OCT 67

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(51)

22

SECRET

PP RUMNH
DE RUMNH 1321 2860345
ZNY 58555
RUMNH-1 SEVENTH COMM
SEVENTH CIV
FIRST HOSE

P 135548Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO SEVENTH MAR
FIRST TANK BN
FIRST RECON BN
INFO FIRST MARDIV DECON

DRAFTER C-3
RELEASER CG
CONCURRE C-4, C-5, C/S, ADD

SECRET

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

1. CO SEVENTH MAR LTR 26SEP67, SECURITY REQ
2. REF A REQUESTED ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN SEVENTH MAR COMBAT BASES.
3. FOR SEVENTH MARINES, AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO REMOVE SECURITY AT FOLLOWING BASES.
 - A. COM BASE (AT892771). ENSURE COMPLETE EVACUATION SO THAT NO EQUIPMENT OR MATERIAL OF VALUE CAN BE ACQUIRED BY EN AFTER DEPARTURE OF FRIENDLY FORCES. LEAVE FIGHTING HOLES AND WIRE FORTIFICATIONS IN PLACE.
 - B. PLAT CO P BASE (AT945725). COORD TRANSFER OF SECURITY FOR BRIG LOCATED AT 945725 WITH CO 1ST TANK BN EFF 20OCT67.

PAGE 1321 1321 SECRET

SEVENTH MAR RETAINS RESPONSIBILITY FOR REACTION FORCE FOR CAP

1. PLAT CO A (ZC275735) COORD TRANSFER OF SECURITY FOR RECON BATTAL INSTALLATION AT THIS LOC WITH CO 1ST RECON BN.
2. ELIMINATION OF FOL BASES CANNOT BE AUTHORIZED AT THIS TIME FOR REASONS LISTED BELOW.
3. PLAT CO B BASE (NAM O BRIDGE). SECURITY OF NAM O BRIDGE IS A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT DIRECTED BY CG III MAF. UNLESS BRIDGE YARD IV IS RELIEVED OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY, REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR THIS BASE.
4. PLAT CO K (AT883585). NO CAP HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR THIS LOCATION. IN EVENT SEVENTH MAR CAN PROVIDE ADEQUATE REACTION CAPABILITY FOR CAP C-2 WITHOUT MANNING THIS BASE, RESUBMIT FOR CONSIDERATION.
5. REQUEST TO TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY FOR OLD DAI LOC SUBJECT TO GVN FORCES IS UNDER CONSIDERATION AND WILL REQUIRE RECOMMENDATION BY CG III MAF.
6. FOR CO 1ST TANK BN, RELIEVE SEVENTH MARINES OF SECURITY FOR BRIG LOCATED AT 945725. IAW PARA 23 ABOVE.
7. FOR CO 1ST RECON BN, RELIEVE SEVENTH MAR OF SECURITY FOR

1321 1321 V REIN P 135548Z OCT 67 PAGE 1 OF 2 GCPV

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMMLA 1321 SECRET
RECON RADIO INSTALLATION AT ZC205705. TIME OF RELIEF AS
ARRANGED WITH CO SEVEN. MAY
BT FOR ALL. DIRLAUTH, NOTIFY THIS HQS TIME OF CLOSURE OF BASE
AND TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY.
GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

SECRET

100

WARD IV REYN

7 F N/ F 1800 TANK BN

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

19 APR 1968 0000Z

2000-2001 2001-2002

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

Journal of Management Education 30(6)p. 789-804
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ANGLICAN CAN DO BRIDGE CD

1. RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF SUBS BRIDGE (AT 990706) IS TRANSFERRED TO 213200N 00107 EN FIFTH MAR TO SSDC.

2. FOR FIRST TERM ON RELIEVE FIFTH MAR FM SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY SEP 68/69, TWO STARLIGHT SCOPES ARE AUTHORIZED YOUR UNIT FOR 1969. 10 YEAR FIDURE. INSURE INDOCTRINATION OF USING PERSONNEL PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT.

3. FOR EACH ROW, COORD RELEASE OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY
AND COMPLETION WITH SSGC.

BOUNDARY CHANGE AS FOLLOWS: FROM PRESENT
BORDER OF WATERS, RIVER BANK SONG CAU DO (AT 999700) TO WATER'S

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

ON 07-10-2020 AT 10:00H IN A 280N ARC TOUCHING APPROX 700 TO 800 FT. OFF THE COAST WHERE IT BECAME DISSENT DRY.

Figure 1

100



DOI: 10.1002/for

1 39346Z OCT 67

COPY:

SECRET (53)

SECRET



00 RUMHVH RUMHVP
DE RUMHLA 1356 2860743
Z NY SSSSS

O 130743Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/HQ BN FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST MT BN

DRAFETR G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR G-4, MTO

COE

INFO RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS
RUMHVH/SENIOR ADVISOR DAMANG SPECIAL SECTOR
ZEN/FIRST LAAM BN
BT

SECRET

ROUGH RIDER CONVOY (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN MSG 051510Z OCT 67

1. REF A TO BE EXECUTED 140400H OCT 67. SUPPORT REQUESTED AND

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1356 SECRET
MISSIONS ASSIGNED REMAIN SAME.

2. TIME SEQUENCE FOR CONVOY MOVEMENT OUTLINED IN PARA 1 WILL BE FOLLOWED.

3. MODIFY PARA 3C TO READ APPROX 82 VEHICLES AND 180 PERSONNEL.

4. MODIFY PARA 3E TO READ CK PT 14.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

O 130743Z OCT 67

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17

SECRET

(54)

FIRST MARDIV COC
AMERICAL DIV TOC

3:AIW:kgb
MARCZAKOWSKI

III MAP COC
CG FIRST MAW

000
000

Boing

SECRET

SECRET

RECON OPNS

1. A RECON INSERT IS PROPOSED IN VIC MUTUAL BOUNDARY. REQUEST CONCURRENCE CONDUCT RECON INSERT 140830H OCT67 WITH EXTRACTION 180900H OCT67.

2. AREA OF OPNS BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GL ³⁹40, ON EAST BY E-S GL 48, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 35, AND ON WEST BY E-S GL 94. REQUEST AREA OF OPNS BE PFZ FOR RECON TEAM AND NFZ FOR ALL OTHERS.


~~3. BELIEVE RECON INSERTS IN THIS EN ACTIVE AREA OF MUTUAL BENEFIT. ALL INTELL GENERATED AS A RESULT OF THIS OPN WILL BE PROVIDED YOUR HQ.~~

GP-4

13 08402 OCT 67

(55)

SECRET



COC CC

DE RUMHLA 1365 2860920
 ZNY SSSSS
 RUMHIE-T-SEVENTH COMM BN
 SEVENTH CIT
 FIRST HOSP CO

P 130900Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR

DRAFTER: 3/REH/IDH
 RELEASER: G-3

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON
 RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS
 RUMHAW/FIRST MP BN
 RUMHVH/QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
 BT

SECRET

BRIDGE SECURITY

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV 011251Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
- B. CG III MAF 121350Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
- C. CG FIRST MARDIV 130346Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
1. PARA 1G(F) REF A TASKS FIFTH MAR PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SONG CAU DO BRIDGE (AT998706) SONG CAM LE BRIDGE (BT015717), NEW SONG CAU LAU BRIDGE (BT079550)
2. REF B RELIEVES FIRST MARDIV OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRIDGES AT BT015717 AND BT079550.
3. REF C TRANSFERRED RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRIDGE AT COORD AT998706

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1365 SECRET
 FROM FIFTH MAR TO SSDC. FIFTH MAR RELIEVED SECURITY ASSIGNMENT BRIDGES PARA 2 ABOVE.

4. COORD WITH ARVN UNITS AND ENSURE THAT CONTINUOUS AND ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL FIFTH MAR ELEMENTS. REPORT TIME SECURITY DEPARTS EACH BRIDGE.
 GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV

130900Z OCT 67 COPY NR*

13

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(56)

SECRET

PP RUMHIE
DE RUMHLA 1378 2861006
ZNY SSSSS
RUMHIE-T- SEVENTH COMM BN
SEVENTH CIT
FIRST HOSP CO



P 131026Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG FIRST MAF

DRAFTER: 3/REH/TRL
RELEASER: C/S
CONCUR: A/JRO, G-2, G-4, G-5

BT
SECRET

FRAG O 1038-67 OPERATION BAXTER-VIETNAMESE LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS
(U)

1. SITUATION

- A. ENEMY FORCES. FUCURRECT INTSUMS AND PERINTREPS
B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) FIRST MAF PROVIDES AIR SPT AS AUTHORIZED.
(2) ARVN FORCES CONDUCT UNILATERAL, JOINT, OR COMBINED S AND D OPERATIONS; PROVIDE LOCAL SECURITY; AND CONDUCT ACTIVE DEFENSE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CENTERS, CAPITALS AND DISTRICT HQ AS APPROPRIATE.

2. MISSION

FIRST MARINE DIVISION CONDUCTS ACCELERATED MILITARY OPNS PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY 22 OCT 67 TO KEEP ENEMY OFF BALANCE AND MINIMIZE HIS CAPABILITY FOR DISRUPTING THE GENERAL BALLOTING, AND

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1378 SECRET
PROVIDES DISTANT SECURITY FOR POLLING PLACES AND VOTERS ON ELECTION DAY.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPS

(1) PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY FIRST MARDIV CONDUCTS ACCELERATED S AND D OPERATIONS WITH EFFORT TO CHANNEL FULL CREDIT FOR THESE OPERATIONS TO GVN WHILE PRECLUDING ANY INFERENCES OF MARINE INFLUENCE IN ELECTION PROCEEDINGS.

(2) ON ELECTION DAY IN COORDINATION WITH RVNAF AT ALL LEVELS FIRST MARDIV CONDUCTS DISTANT SECURITY.

(3) INFANTRY REGTS ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE REACTION FORCES (SPARROW HAWK-BALK EAGLE) ON ELECTION DAY IN AREAS UNCOVERED BY DIVERSION OF RVNAF ELECTION SECURITY FORCES.

(4) SUPPORTING FIRES ARE PLANNED IN SPT OF ELECTION DAY WITH INCREASE IN AREAS WHICH WILL FACILITATE RVNAF CONCENTRATION ON ELECTION SECURITY MEASURES, AND RESTRICTED IN AREAS WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH VOTING.

B. FIFTH MAR

(1) CONDUCT INTENSIVE S AND D OPERATIONS WITHIN TAOR PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY. CONCENTRATE ACTIVITY IN AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH
CG FIRST MARDIV

PAGE 1 OF 12 COPY NR*

131006Z OCT 67

SECRET

(57)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1378 S E C R E T
 ALONG E-W GL 66, ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON SOUTH BY E-W GL 60 AND ON WEST BY SONG VINH DIEN.

(2) CONDUCT DISTANT SECURITY FOR POLLING PLACES IN TAOR ON ELECTION DAY. (SEE OPN OVERLAY).

(3) CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN THE GO NOI ISLAND AREA NORTH OF DUY XUYEN 21-22 OCT 67.

C. SEVENTH MAR

(1) CONDUCT INTENSIVE S AND D OPERATIONS WITHIN TAOR PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY. CONCENTRATE ACTIVITY IN AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH ALONG SONG TUY LOAN, ON EAST BY SON YEN, ON SOUTH ALONG PRESENT 1/7-3/7 BOUNDARY AND ON WEST ALONG N-S GL 88.

(2) CONDUCT DISTANT SECURITY FOR POLLING PLACES IN TAOR ON ELECTION DAY. (SEE OPN OVERLAY)

D. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

(1) CONDUCT INTENSIVE S AND D OPERATIONS WITHIN TAOR PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY.

(2) CONDUCT DISTANT SECURITY FOR POLLING PLACES IN TAOR ON ELECTION DAY. (SEE OPN OVERLAY)

E. ELEVENTH MAR

(1) PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQ.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1378 S E C R E T

(2) RESTRICT ARTY MISSIONS WHICH WOULD INTERFIRE WITH VOTING.

(3) INCREASE ARTY MISSIONS IN OTHER AREAS ON ELECTION DAY TO PERMIT RVNAF TO CONCENTRATE ON ELECTION SECURITY MEASURES.

F. ALL OTHER FIRST MARDIV OPCON UNIT PROVIDE SPT AS REQUIRED.

G. COORD INSTRNS

(1) INFANTRY UNITS BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE REACTION FORCES AS DIRECTED ON ELECTION DAY.

(2) COORDINATE WITH RVNAF COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS TO PREPARE PLANS FOR DISTANT SECURITY ON ELECTION DAY.

(3) OPERATION OVERLAY (TO BE ISSUED) INDICATES AREAS WHERE DISTANT SECURITY IS REQUIRED AND LOCATION OF POLLING PLACES.

(4) DIRLAUTH

(5) PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN VIC OF POLLING PLACES WILL BE AVOIDED. DISTANT SECURITY WILL NOT BE DEPLOYED CLOSER THAN 1000 METERS TO POLLING PLACES.

(6) "BAXTER" WILL BE CODE NAME FOR ALL OPS IN SPT OF ELECTION. RADIO TRANSMISSIONS WILL USE "BAXTER" AS APPROPRIATE TO IDENTIFY ELECTION SPT OPS.

(7) ELECTION DAY: 22 OCT 67.


GP-4

PAGE 2 OF 2

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COC

DE RUMHLA 1390 2861251

ZNY SSSSS

O 131251Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO CG III MAF

BT

DRAFTER: 3:PGG:KGB

RELEASER: G-3

CONCUR: G-2, G-4

SECRET

ARG/SLF BRAVO (CTG 76.5/79.5) EMPLOYMENT

A. CG III MAF 091336Z OCT 67 (S)

B. CG III MAF 121550Z OCT 67 (S)

1. THIS DIVISION HAS TAKEN ACTION TO PROVIDE SECURITY WITHIN THE TEMPORARY AO ESTABLISHED BY REF (A).

2. THE PHU LOC DISTRICT, HOWEVER, HAS LONG BEEN AN AREA OF TRANSITORY FRIENDLY ACTIVITY. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY COULD EASILY CONDUCT A MORE VIGOROUS CAMPAIGN ONCE HE APPRECIATES THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF RTE 1. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO CONDUCT A LARGE SCALE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION IN THE AREA AT AN EARLY DATE.

3. PRESENT MISSIONS AND FORCES AVAILABLE WILL NOT PERMIT SUGGESTED OPERATION BY THIS DIVISION.

4. IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT SLF BRAVO CONDUCT AMPHIB OPNS WITHIN THE TEMPORARY AO ASSIGNED DIVISION BY REFERENCE (A)

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1390 SECRET

DURING THE PERIOD 18-30 OCTOBER AS INDICATED REF (B).

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV

COPY NR#

131251Z OCT 67

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SECRET

00 RUMHFL RUMHIA RUMHVH
 DE RUMHLA 1463 2870745
 Z NY SSSSS

0 140745Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
 ZEN/HQ BN
 ZEN/FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
 ZEN/FIRST AT BN

INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS
 ZEN/FIRST MT BN
 BT

S E C R E T

FRAG O 140-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 050115Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 241515Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1463 S E C R E T

C. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN O 301-66 (NOTAL)

D. CG FIRST MARDIV 261311Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

E. FIRST MARDIV O P02200.2C (CEOD) (NOTAL)

1. REF A IS CANCELLED.

2. THIS ORDER FOR ALL ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SKED TO SUPPORT FUTURE MOVEMENT FIFTH MAR AND 2/11, HILL 63 TO DA NANG.

3. FOR CG III MAF

A. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IS USE OF LOC'S.

B. REQUEST CONDUCT LIAISON AND COORDINATION AS REQUIRED FOR CONVOY PASSAGE AND TRAFFIC CONTROL ALONG ROUTE OF CONVOY.

4. FOR CG AMERICAL DIV. REQUEST PROVIDE SPT REQUESTED BY REF B.

5. FOR SEVENTH ENGR BN. REQUEST PROVIDE ENGR SPT AS REQ TO KEEP ROAD SOUTH OF SONG CAU LAU OPERATIONAL AND AID CONVOY PASSAGE.

6. EXECUTION

A. FIFTH MAR:

(1) PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY IAW PAR 3D OF REF C CONSISTING OF ONE PLAT REIN WITH MED PERS, FAC, AND FO.

(2) GIVE MINIMUM ONE HOUR NOTICE THIS HQ ETD CONVOY RETURN TRIP OVER SP NET M276 (FM).

18T MAR IDV

1 OF 2

140745Z OCT 67

SECRET

(59)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1463 S E C R E T

- B. ELEVENTH MAR: PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PAR 3E OF REF C.
 - C. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PAR 3G OF REF C.
 - D. FIRST AT BN: PROVIDE THREE M-50 OMOS.
 - E. ELEVENTH MT BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PAR 3F OF REF C.
- INSURE ALL PERS W/CONVOY CARRY FIELD PROTECTIVE MASK (M 17).

7. COORD INSTNS

A. CONVOYS SKED AS FOL:

(1) DEPART CH PT 22 FOR HILL 63 AT 151000H OCT 67, RON HILL 63, DEPART HILL 63 FOR DA NANG 161100H OCT 67.

(2) DEPART CH PT 22 FOR HILL 63 AT 171000H OCT 67, RON HILL 63, DEPART HILL 63 FOR DA NANG 181100H OCT 67.

B. REF C AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS.

C. REF D ESTABLISHED SYSTEM FOR CONVOYS IN AMERICAL DIV AOR.

D. OPCON OF ALL CONVOYS TO REMAIN WITH THIS HQ.

E. AIR SPT ARRANGED BY THIS HQ.

F. CHECK POINTS: REF C.

G. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

H. IN EVENT OF CONVOY CANCELLATION IT WILL BE RESKED FOR DAY.

8. COMM-ELECT

A. REF E AS APPLICABLE.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1463 S E C R E T

B. FIFTH MAR, AND COMM CO MONITOR DIV CONVOY CONTROL NET M65 (FM) AND GUARD M276 (FM). ALSO REQUEST AMERICAL DIV MONITOR THIS NET.


GP-4

BT

2 OF 2

SECRET

SECRET



COC

OO RUMHFL RUMHIA RUMHVH
 DE RUMHIA 1467 2870815
 ZNY SSSSS

O 140815Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR

DRAFTER: G-3
 RELEASER: G-3

INFO ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 ZEN/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG FMAW
 RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS ADV GROUP
 RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
 BT

SECRET

CHANGE ONE TO FRAG O 137-67 (OPERATION ONSLOW)

REF: CG 1ST MARDIV 130235Z OCT 67

1. PARA 3A OF THE REFERENCE. CHANGE FIRST BN (-) (3 CO'S) TO
 READ FIRST BN (-) (4 CO'S).

2. ADDITIONAL COMPANY WILL BE EMPLOYED IN BLOCKING FORCE ROLE
 AND IN AN AREA TO ENABLE QUICK EXTRACTION IF REQUIRED.

GP-4

BT

CG 1ST MAR DIV

140815Z OCT 67

12
SECRET

(60)

SECRET



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DE RUMHLA 1515 2871130

ZNY SSSSS

P 141130Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

M16A1 RIFLE TRAINING INFO (U)

- A. CG III MAF 121312Z OCT 67 (C)
- B. CG FIRST MARDIV 150330Z MAY 66
- C. CG FMFPAC LTR 3T/SJJ/HSS OVER 1500 OF 21 OCT 66
- D. CMC LTR A03C21-9AD OF 23 SEP 66
- E. CG FIRST MARDIV 100849Z NOV 66
- F. CG FMFPAC 180132Z NOV 66
- G. FORBUL 08370 OF 4 JUN 67
- H. FORBUL 8370 OF 16 JUN 67
- I. CG FIRST MARDIV 120721Z JUN 67
- J. CG III MAF 302330Z MAY 67
- K. CG FIRST MARDIV LTR 3:TR: NLB OVER 800 OF 24 JUN 67
- L. 1ST MARDIV 03591.18 DTD 6 FEB 67
- I. THIS MSG PROVIDES RATIONALE FOR FAM/ZERO FIRING AMMO EXPENDITURE RATES AS REQUESTED BY REF A.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1515 SECRET

2. THE FAM/ZERO FIRING PROGRAMS FOR THE M-16A1 RIFLE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY HIGHER HEAD-QUARTERS, AND COMMAND JUDGEMENT WITHIN THE LATITUDE AFFORDED BY SUCH GUIDANCE. A BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF PAST INSTRUCTIONS AND ACTIONS IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY FROM CG III MAF, IN REF B CG FIRST MARDIV ADVISED THAT 24 M-16 RIFLES WERE ON HAND IN THE DIVISION, THAT 96 ADDITIONAL RIFLES WERE REQUIRED FOR THE INTERIM TRAINING PROGRAM, THAT THE DIV PLANNED TO ASSIGN 20 RIFLES PER INF BN, AND THAT ALL RIFLE CO PERSONNEL WOULD FAM FIRE THE M-16, 25 RDS PER INDIVIDUAL. THIS INITIAL ALLOWANCE OF 25 RDS WAS BASED ON THE LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF AMMO AT THAT TIME.

B. IN REF C, CG FMFPAC FORWARDED REF D, WHICH GAVE CMC GUIDANCE FOR THE CONDUCT OF FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING WITH THE RIFLE 5.56MM XM16E1. THE SUGGESTED SYLLABUS INCLUDES A PERIOD FOR KNOWN DISTANCE FIRING AND BATTLESIGHT ZERO. THE NUMBER OF HOURS RECOMMENDED IS GIVEN: "AS REQUIRED". THE ONLY REFERENCE TO AMMUNITION ALLOWANCE IS IN THE STATEMENT OF THE SCOPE OF THE PERIOD, WHICH STATES IN PART: "THIS SUBCOURSE WOULD BE BEST CONDUCTED ON A STANDARD RIFLE RANGE AT RANGES OF 200 AND 300 YARDS,

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 141130Z OCT 67 PAGE 1 OF 3 CORY#

SECRET

SECRETPAGE THREE RUMHLA 1515 **SECRET**

EMPLOYING ANY SEQUENCE OF SHOTS WITHIN THE AUTHORIZED ALLOWANCE THAT ENABLES THE SHOOTER TO ACQUIRE A KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAPABILITIES, FUNCTIONING, SAFETY FEATURES OF THE WEAPON, SIGHTING AND AIMING, POSITIONS, TRIGGER SQUEEZE, AND ZERO. THE AUTHORIZED ALLOWANCE MENTIONED PRESUMABLY REFERS TO THAT LISTED IN MCO 3574.2C, WHICH IS LISTED AS A REFERENCE FOR THE KD FIRING AND BATTLESIGHT ZERO COURSE. WHILE NO ALLOWANCE FOR THE M-16 IS GIVEN IN THIS ORDER, THE ALLOWANCE FOR FAM FIRING THE M-14 IS 30 RDS PER MAN. FURTHER, A FAM FIRING SYLLABUS IS LISTED FOR THE PISTOL AND REVOLVER BUT FOR OTHER WEAPONS: "ALL OTHER FAMILIARIZATION (FAM) FIRING WILL BE AS PRESCRIBED BY COGNIZANT AUTHORITY."

. IN REF E, CG FIRST MARDIV ADVISED CG III MAF OF THE SYLLABUS FOR M-16 RIFLE TRANSITION TRAINING, PHASE TWO, WHICH INCLUDED: 5 RDS PRONE, ZEROING; 10 RDS STANDING TO PRONE, 1 MINUTE; AND 10 RDS STANDING, 2-4 RD AUTO BURSTS.

D. IN REF F, CG FMFPAC INFORMED CMC: "AN ALLOWANCE OF 100 RDS /MAN, FOR III MAF AND 9TH MAB TRANSITIONAL FIRING AND THREE MONTHS TRNG ALLOWANCE FOR OKINAWA BASED UNITS, IS INCLUDED IN ALLOCATIONS LISTED IN PARA 5 ABOVE."

E. IN REF G, CG III MAF STATED: "AN ALLOWANCE OF 100 RDS OF

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1515 **SECRET**

5.56 AMMUNITION PER MAN ARMED WITH THE RIFLE IS AUTHORIZED FOR TRANSITIONAL FIRING OF THE M16A1." THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE IN REF H THAT FAM FIRING WOULD BE CONDUCTED ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

F. IN REF I, CG FIRST MARDIV ADVISED SUBORDINATE UNITS NOT TO REQUISITION IN EXCESS OF PRESCRIBED BASIC ALLOWANCE PLUS 3 DOA PLUS 100 RDS PER MAN TRANSITION TRAINING ALLOWANCE. THE REFERENCE FURTHER STATED THAT UNIT TRAINING WOULD CONSIST OF AT LEAST THE FOLLOWING FAM FIRING: 75 RDS PLUS 25 RDS FOR ZEROING.

G. CG III MAF ASKED IN REF J, FOR A REPORT ON HOW MANY MEN WHO HAVE BEEN ISSUED M16 RIFLED DID NOT FIRE 125 ROUNDS DURING THEIR INITIAL TRAINING PERIOD. THIS WAS CONSTRUED AS GUIDANCE THAT 125 RDS, VICE THE FORMER 100 RDS, WAS CONSIDERED THE MINIMUM FOR SATISFACTORY FAM FIRING.

H. REF K WAS THEN PUBLISHED TO ALL FIRST MARDIV REGT AND BN CO'S AND INCLUDED A STATEMENT OF THE CG'S POLICIES CONCERNING THE M-16A1 RIFLE AND 5 ENCLS ON POLICY, TRAINING, SUPPLY AND ORDNANCE, COMMANDERS ACTION, AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PAMPHLET. INCLUDED THEREIN IS A TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR THE M16A1 RIFLE WHICH LISTS MINIMUMS OF 100 RDS FAMILIARIZATION FIRING AND 25 ROUNDS FOR ZEROING

PAGE 2 OF 3

SECRET

SECRETPAGE FIVE RUMHLA 1515 **SECRET**

THE WEAPON. THIS LETTER SUPPLEMENTED DIV POLICY ALREADY IN EFFECT, REF L, THAT FAM FIRING OF INDIVIDUAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS WILL BE CONDUCTED AT LEAST ONCE PER QUARTER AND TEST FIRING OF WEAPONS WILL BE DONE AT LEAST EVERY TWO WEEKS.

3. IT IS THE OPINION OF THIS DIVISION THAT THE FREQUENCY OF FAM FIRING IS EQUALLY, IF NOT MORE, BENEFICIAL THAN THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED. THERE IS A LIMIT TO THE AMOUNT OF TRAINING DERIVED FROM ANY ONE PERIOD. STUDENT ATTENTION AND MOTIVATION MAY LAG AND THE LAW OF DIMINISHING RETURNS CAN SET IN. FREQUENT FIRING, ON THE OTHER HAND, PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO FIRE UNDER VARYING WEATHER AND LIGHTING CONDITIONS AND PERHAPS ON DIFFERENT RANGES, DIFFERENT TERRAIN, DIFFERENT TARGETS AT DIFFERENT DISTANCES. THIS CONCEPT ALSO REDUCES THE INTERVAL BETWEEN FIRINGS.

4. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE 125 RDS ESTABLISHED IN REF K IS A REQUIRED MINIMUM. AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS DIFFICULTY WITH ANY PHASE OF THE INSTRUCTION IS REQUIRED TO REPEAT THE FAM FIRING COURSE UNTIL HE IS CONSIDERED QUALIFIED BY HIS IMMEDIATE COMMISSIONED SENIOR. A NOTATION ATTESTING TO THIS QUALIFICATION IS ENTERED ON PAGE 11 OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S SRB.

PAGE SIX RUMHLA 1515 **SECRET**

5. THE FOREGOING PROVIDES THE RATIONALE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 125 RD MINIMUM FAM FIRING COURSE WITHIN THIS DIVISION.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3


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SEVENTH CIT
FIRST HQSP CO

P 150213Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV RE IN
TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON

DRAFTER GR3
RELASER G-3

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMHVH/CG I CORPS
ZEN/CG FMAW
RUMHFL/CG FLC
RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS
RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
BT

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CHANGE NR 1 TO FRAG 0 136-67

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 110300Z OCT 67

1. MODIFY REF A AS FOLLOWS:

A. DELETE PARAS 3A(3), 3C, AND 3H(2).

B. MODIFY PARA 3B(7) TO READ: PROVIDE RIFLE COMPANY FOR
OPERATIONS IN AO UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE COMMENCING 12 OCT 67.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV RE IN


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150213Z OCT 67

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WATER G-3
LEASER G-3


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CHANGE NO TO FRAG 0 136-67
10 OCT 67 00 150403Z 67 (NOTAL)
3. 00 FI HARDIV 110300Z OCT 67
4. 10V R MODIFY WESTERN BOUNDARY OF FRAG 1.B(1) REF B
100403Z 15 1 GLOMS
5. 00G 2022 TO 201109 AND THENCE SOUTH ALONG N-S
FRID 11 0104, SOUTHWEST TO 20113902
10 1105 1. EFFECTIVE 151200H OCT 67
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OCT 1967

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ML

DE RUMHLA 1700 2890630
ZNY EEEEE

P 160630Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG FMAW

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER CG
CONCUR AIRO, G/S

INFO CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR MAJGEN ANDERSON FROM MAJGEN ROBERTSON
RECOGNITION OF PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE OF FMAW PERS ASSIGNED
BALD EAGLE AND SPARROW HAWK ON 14 OCT 67.

1. THE HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL MANNER IN WHICH MEMBERS OF YOUR
COMMAND RESPONDED TO THE EMERGENCY NEEDS OF THIS DIVISION ON
14 OCT HAVE AGAIN REFLECTED GREAT CREDIT ON THE FMAW. THE RAPID
RESPONSE, SKILLFUL COMPETENCE AND DETERMINATION OF THE CLOSE
AIR SUPPORT PILOTS AND THE PILOTS AND CREWS OF THE HELICOPTERS
INVOLVED IN THE SPARROW HAWK AND BALD EAGLE RELIEF OF PATROL
WAR CLOUD WERE IN THE BEST TRADITIONS OF OUR CORPS. MY CONGRAT-
ULATIONS TO THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A
DIFFICULT AND HAZARDOUS ASSIGNMENT WITH COURAGE AND EXCELLENCE.
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 160630Z OCT 67

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3645 2-10

REPRODUCTION OF COMPANY BY 1990/67 (03)

OF EACH PAGE BY MAIL, DONE TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF CO 1, 3RD INF DIVISION AND THE GTS AND MEN OF CO'S 2 AND 3 FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMANDS. EMPLOYMENT OF THE AFTERNOON OF 1900ET, THEIR RAPID RESPONSE TO THE EMERGENCY SITUATION REQUIRING THE COMBINATION OF A BOLD STRIKE, AND, IN ADDITION, THEIR SHARPLY EXERCISED TACTICAL ABILITY TO REACT IMMEDIATELY ON A SITUATION INVOLVED.



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160953Z OCT 67

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
PAGE THREE HMM116 1737 S E C R E T
 APPROX. 1000 CODET. EMBARK REACTION FORCE IN FNAW HELOS AT
 1000 HRS. AND PROCEED TO DELTA FOR AN MOA FOR RECEIPT OF
 FRAG 1.
 (3) SECOND CREWMENT (S) NOT LAUNCH WITHIN TIME SPECIFIED
 SUBMARINE FORCE WILL CONTINUE READY STANDBY UNTIL RECEIPT ORDER,
 "SECOND CREW DELTA ALERT".
 (4) AREA OF OPN. BOUNDED BY LINE THROUGH (ZC1578), (ZC
 1578), (ZC2873), (ZC1362), (ZC0052), (ZC0073), (ZC2773), (ZC0778) AND
 (ZC1278).
 (5) NO OPN. EXCLUSIVE TO PROJECT DELTA (DET 9-52). NO VR,
 AIRS, ARTY. OR OTHER SPT ARMS FIRES NOR OFFENSIVE OPN TO BE
 CONDUCTED THEREIN WITHOUT CLEARANCE THIS HQS.
 (6) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT. TERMINATION
 PROJECT DELTA OPN EMT 1 NOV 67.
 (7) END MAIL
 OP-4
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PAGE 2 OF 2

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DE RUMILA 1760 2891417
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RUMHIE-T SEVENTH COMM BN
FIRST HOSP CO

O P 161417Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV OPCON
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

DRAFTER:G-3
RELEASER:G-3

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMHVP/CG I CORPS
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHPL/CG FLC
RUMHVP/CG I CORPS
RUMHVP/CG QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
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CHANGE 3 TO FRAG 0 136-57

A. III MAF CGC 160947Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 160412Z OCT 67

1. JAW REF A TEMPORARY MODIFICATION WESTERN BOUNDARY OF PARA
1. REF B AS FOLLOWS:

FM ZD184262 SOUTHWEST ALONG THE WESTERN BANK OF SONG BU LU
RIVER TO ZC150990 THEN SOUTH ALONG NS GL 15 TO ZC150925 THEN
WEST ALONG THUA TIEN QUANG NAM PROVINCE BOUNDARY TO ZC102938.

PAGE TWO RUMILA 1760 SECRET

2. THIS CHANGE EFFECTIVE 171200H OCT 67.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV


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161417Z OCT 67

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DE RUMHMF 1513 2891508
ZNY SSSSS

P 161508Z OCT 67
FM CG III MAF/SA 1 CORPS
TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
RUMHVVH/CO C FIFTH SFGA DNG

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMSBJ/CMDR SEVENTH AF
ZEN/CG FORLOGCMD
RUMHVVH/CG 1 CORPS
RUMHVVH/DSA 1 CORPS
RUMNGR/FIFTH SFGA NHA
BT

SECRET

KHAM DUC/TIEN PHUOC CIDG CAMPS

A. CG III MAF 291604Z SEP67 (NOTAL)

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 051130Z OCT67 (NOTAL)

C. CG III MAF LTR SER: 0010566 OF 17 AUG66 (LOI 3-66) (NOTAL)

1. CG FIRST MARDIV HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE CONTINGENCY SUPPORT FOR SUBJ CIDG CAMPS.

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 1513 **SECRET**

2. REF A DIRECTED REDISPOSITION OF CERTAIN III MAF ASSETS, AND RELOCATED BDRY BETWEEN FIRST MARDIV AND AMERICAL DIV. AS A RESULT, SUBJ CIDG CAMPS NOW LOCATED WITHIN AMERICAL DIV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

REF C PROVIDES FOR CONTINGENCY RELIEF OR REINFORCEMENT FOR SUBJ CIDG CAMPS.

3. IN VIEW ABOVE, FOLLOWING ACTION IS DIRECTED BY 201200H OCT:

A. FOR CG FIRST MARDIV

(1) STAND RELIEVED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTINGENCY RELIEF OR REINFORCEMENT OF TIEN PHUOC AND KHAM DUC CIDG CAMPS.

B. FOR CG AMERICAL DIV

(1) ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELIEF OR REINFORCEMENT OF TIEN PHUOC AND KHAM DUC CIDG CAMPS.

(2) COORDINATE WITH CO LLDB C DET 1012/CO CO C 5TH SFGA IN PREPARATION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR SUBJ CIDG CAMPS.

C. FOR CO CO C 5TH SFGA

(1) ASSIST CG AMERICAL DIV IN PREPARATION OF PLANS FOR CONTINGENCY SUPPORT OF SUBJ CIDG CAMPS AS REQUIRED.

4. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

5. ACK RECEIPT. GP-4

BT

CG III MAF

161508Z OCT 67


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DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASER: G-3

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
162325Z OCT 67

162325Z OCT 67

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TOP 170638Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG III MAF

INFO FIFTH MAR
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
BT

SECRET

TERMINATION OPN ONSLOW

1. SUBJ YR CONCURRENCE INTEND TO TERMINATE OPN ONSLOW 171400H
OCT 67.

GP-4

BT

DRAWNTER;G-3
RELEASER;G-3

1ST MAR DIV

170638Z OCT 67

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DE RUMLA 1809 2900640
ZNY SSSSS

O 170640Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV RE IN
TO FIFTH MAR
INFO SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

BT

SECRET

OPN ONSLOW

1. TERMINATE OPN ONSLOW 171400H OCT 67.

GP-4

BT

1ST MAR DIV


170640Z OCT 67

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15

CONFIDENTIAL



DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3

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P R 171118Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIFTH MAR
SEVENTH MAR
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

INFO FIRST RECON BN
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

AIRBORNE PERSONNEL DETECTOR (APD)

A. CG III MAF 160220Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

1. FOUR AIRBORNE PERSONNEL DETECTORS (APD), COMMONLY CALLED "PEOPLE SNIFFERS" HAVE BEEN RECEIVED. TWO APD'S WILL NORMALLY BE MOUNTED IN UMO-2 UHIE HELICOPTERS, AND TWO WILL REMAIN IN A BACK-UP STATUS.

A. THE SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO DETECT PERSONNEL BY GATHERING AIR SAMPLES AND MEASURING THE AMMONIA CONTENT (GENERATED BY HUMAN METABOLISM) CONTAINED THEREIN.

B. CONDENSATION NUCLEI, A DIRECT RESULT OF COMBUSTION, CAN ALSO BE DETECTED AND MEASURED BY THE APD, AGAIN PERMITTING DETECTION OF PERSONNEL.

ec

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1844 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. TWO UH-1E GUNSHIPS WILL ALWAYS PROVIDE ESCORT BY FLYING 1500 FEET ABOVE AND BEHIND THE HELIBORNE APD WHICH NORMALLY FLIES 50 FEET ABOVE THE TERRAIN OR TREE TOP LEVEL. IN KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ENEMY CONCENTRATION ADDITIONAL ESCORT BY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT IS REQUIRED.

2. TO INSURE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES SHOULD BE OBSERVED:

A. AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS IN THE REQUIRED OPERATING ENVELOPE PRECLUDE USE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS AND DURING OTHER PERIODS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY.

B. BECAUSE OF AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY ATTENDANT TO LOW ALTITUDE FLYING, A DEFINITIVE REQUIREMENT FOR APD EMPLOYMENT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED THUS PRECLUDING EXTENSIVE AND INDISCRIMINATE AREA SEARCH.

C. COMBUSTION CAUSED BY AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES ACTIVATES THE SYSTEM AND RESULTS IN FALSE RETURNS. NORMALLY, A TWO DAY INTERVAL SHOULD BE OBSERVED BEFORE EMPLOYING APD SEARCH IN AREAS THUS AFFECTED. IF A HEAVY RAINFALL HAS OCCURRED, THE TIME INTERVAL CAN NORMALLY BE REDUCTED TO FOUR TO SIX HOURS.

3. EMPLOYMENT REQUEST TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN. REQUEST SHOULD

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P R 171118Z OCT 67 PAGE 1 OF 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1844 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ALLOW MINIMUM 48 HOURS LEAD TIME WHEN POSSIBLE AND INCLUDE:

- A. MAP SERIES: SHEET NO AND SCALE.
- B. AREA - GRID COORDINATES.
- C. CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT.
- D. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES SUBSTANTIATING REQUEST (FOR PILOT BRIEFING).
- E. TIME AND DATE OVER TARGET.
- F. REACTION FORCES FOR ANY DETECTION REPORTED.
- G. FREQUENCY AND UNIT CALL SIGNS FOR PILOT USE IN CONTACTING SUPPORTING UNIT.

4. PILOT MISSION BRIEFING/DEBRIEFING BY REQUESTING UNIT IS REQUIRED. THIS COMMAND WILL APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE EACH MISSION REQUEST FOR APD SUPPORT.

5. COMMANDS UTILIZING THE APD SUBMIT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS A REPORT OF ALL CONTACTS AND REACTIONS TAKEN.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2


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1898 29 OCT 67
 189307Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/HQ BN
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN

DRAFTER
 RELEASER
 CONCUR

G-3
 G-3
 OPS-0
 MTO
 G-4



INFO RUMH/VH/0 SA I CORPS
 RUMH/VH/SENIOR ADVISOR DA NANG SPECIAL SECTOR
 RUMH/VH/FIRST LAAM BN

COL

SECRET

1. 141-67 ROUGH RIDER CONVOY (U)
 2. ANNEX F TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 381-67 (NOTAL)
 3. FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C (CEOI) (NOTAL)
 4. SUBJ CONVOY SKED MOVE MATERIAL AND ARTY AMMO FROM DA NANG TO
 PHU GIA AND RETURN. CONVOY WILL DEPART CK PT 33 AT 190730H

PAGE TWO RUMH/A 1898 **SECRET**

0147 AND DEPART CK PT 5 AT 191400H OCT 67. IF CONVOY POSTPONED
 RESCHED FOR DAY.

2. FOR CG III MAF.

A. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF
 LOG'S.

B. REQUEST CONDUCT LIAISON AND COORDINATE WITH RVN FORCES A-
 LONG ROUTE AS REQ FOR CONVOY PASSAGE, TRAFFIC CONTROL, SECURITY
 AND SUPPORTING ARMS.

C. FOR CG FIRST MAW: REQUEST THREE M-36 VEHs TO SUPPORT MOVE.

D. SEVENTH ENGR BN. REQUEST PROVIDE BRIDGING AS REQUIRED.

E. EXECUTION

1. SEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE FORCES IAW PARA 3.D OF REF A.

2. ELEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PARA 3.E OF REF A.

3. FIRST ENGR BN. PROVIDE SPT IAW PARA 3.G OF REF A LESS
 BRIDGING SPT.

4. ELEVENTH MT BN. PROVIDE MT SPT IAW PARA 3.F OF REF A

5. COORD INSTNS

(1) REF A AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS DANANG TO HUE.

(2) CHECK POINTS. REF A.

(3) AIR SPT ARRANGED BY THIS HQ.

PAGE THREE RUMH/A 1898 **SECRET**

(4) DIR AUTH ALCON

COMM-ELECT

REF B.

CONVOY CONTROL NET ACTIVATED 190630H OCT 67

COPY NR.

SECRET

(73)

CONFIDENTIAL

FSR 2100/1 (5/67)

1. DOWNS

2. 67

3. REIN P-14

4. 443

DRAFTER: G-3

RELEASER: G-2

5. 100 U.S.

6. 100 (U)

7. INTERDET OCT 67 (PASEP)

8. 100 TO ASSIST IN COORD OF MOVEMENT REF A.

9. 100 OF ARTY DET ON ARRIVAL HILL 63.

10. 100 AMERICAN DIV ARTY.

11. 100 DIV GEN

12. 190050Z OCT 67

CONFIDENTIAL

(74)

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

W/OIC
FMA/OIC
H/

COC

DE RUMHMF 1742 2920356

ZNY CCCCC

P 190356Z OCT 67

FM CG III MAF

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FIRST MARDIV

INFO CG MACV

CG FLC

BT

G-3

TOR 190547

CCN; 6727

CONFIDENTIAL

LVP-5 AUGMENTATION FOR 3D AMTRAC BN

1. INCREASED OPERATIONAL RQMTS CAUSED BY INCREASED SPT OF
2ND ROK BDE NECESSITATES AUGMENTATION 3RD AMTRAC BN
ASSETS.

2. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV: DEPLOY AND PASS OPCON ONE PLT
LVP-5 AND ONE LVP-5 (CMD) WITH MINIMUM PERSONNEL AS SOON
AS PRACTICABLE BUT NLT 1 NOV67.

3. FOR CG FIRST MARDIV: RECEIVE, ASSUME OPCON, AND PROVIDE
RQR PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION FOR ABOVE MENTIONED UNIT.
RPT DTG ASSUMPTION.

4. DURLAUF ALCON.

BT-4

BT

CG III MAF 190356Z OCT 67

(75)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

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| <i>W</i> | <i>OIC</i> |
| <i>AKK</i> | <i>AOIC</i> |
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| <i>18</i> | <i>cc</i> |

*cc*
OC

PP RUMHIA RUMHVH
DE RUMHIA 2058 2920710
ZNY SSSSS

P 190710Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR OPS

ZEN/CG FIRST MAF

RUMHPL/CG FLC

ZEN/FIFTH MAR

RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP

RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPEC ZONE

BT

SECRET

TEMPORARY AREA OF OPERATIONS EXTENSION

1. REQUEST TEMP AREA OF OPERATIONS EXTENSION

BE APPROVED FOR A COMBINED OPERATION COMMENCING 250400H PERIOD
OF ABOUT 3 DAYS.

2. REQUESTED AREA EXTENDS FROM 9T135507 IN SE DIR TO 9T132465
THENCE IN NE DIR TO 9T135502.

CP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 190710Z OCT 67

COPY#

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(76)

SECRET

DE RUMHIA 2316 294 0655

ZNY SSSSS

O 210655Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

INFO RUMHIA/SA I CORPS

O 191539Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO ZEN/CG III MAF

RUMHIA/CG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV REIN

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

RUMFTJG/CG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

ZEN/ELEVENTH MARINES

ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES

ZEN/FIRST RECON BN

ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN

ZEN/FIRST SP BN

ZEN/FIRST MED BN

RUMFTJG/BLI TWO SLT THREE

BT

SECRET

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (OPERATION KNOX)


A. CG III MAF 190114Z OCT 67

1. REF A DIRECTS MULTI BN S & D OPN IN GENERAL AREA NORTH OF ELEPHANT VALLEY AND CHOPS SLF BRAVO TO OPCON CG FIRST MARDIV ON 23

DRAFTER: G-3

RELEASER: G-3

| | |
|----|------|
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| MA | AOIC |
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| H | |
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PAGE TWO RUMHIA 2316 **SECRET**

OCT TO CONDUCT SPECOPS.

2. SITUATION. RECENT INTELLIGENCE AND STRONG ENEMY CONTACTS IN THE DONG TOP/HAI VAN PASS AREA INDICATE THAT A MINIMUM OF ONE MAIN FORCE BATTALION IS OPERATING IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF THE PHU LOC DISTRICT POSING A SERIOUS THREAT TO LOC IN THAT GENERAL AREA.

3. MISSION. COMMENCING O/A 23 OCT SEVENTH MARINES (-) REINF IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES CONDUCTS A MULTI-BATTALION S & D OPN IN THE PHU LOC-HAI VAN PASS AREA TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES LOCATED THEREIN.

4. CONCEPT.

A. ONE USMC BN WILL CONDUCT A DAYLIGHT HELIBORNE ASSAULT FOLLOWED BY S & D OPNS AGAINST EN FORCES LOCATED IN CENTRAL SECTOR OF A.O.

B. ONE USMC BN WILL REMAIN OUTSIDE AO UNTIL AFTER DARKNESS ON D-DAY THEN COMMENCE A NIGHT MOVEMENT INTO THE EASTERN (VIC HAM PHU GIA) SECTOR OF THE AO INTO ATTACK POSITIONS FOLLOWED BY S&D OPNS FIRST LIGHT.

C. ARVN BN AS AVAILABLE AND DESIGNATED REQUESTED TO ENTER AO AFTER DARKNESS ON D-DAY THEN COMMENCE NIGHT MOVEMENT INTO WESTERN SECTOR OF THE AO INTO ATTACK POSITIONS FOLLOWED BY S & D OPERATIONS FIRST LIGHT.

D. RECON CO WILL CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE OF AO FROM NORTH OF RTE 1 TO THE COAST.

CG FIRST MARDIV

PAGE 1 OF 2

191539Z OCT 67 COPY NR 4

SECRET (77)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2316 S E C R E T

B. BN'S WILL CONDUCT OPNS WITHIN ASSIGNED ZONES BUT WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST ONE ANOTHER SHOULD THE TACTICAL SITUATION REQUIRE.

AREA OF OPERATIONS: BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY RTE ONE ON WEST BY H-S GL 3010 TO ZC100995 THENCE S-W ON A LINE TO ZC070970 THENCE S-E ON A LINE TO ZC140880 THENCE N-E TO ZC850930 THENCE NORTH TO ZC850960 FOLLOWING WEST SHORE LINE OF DAM LAPAN TO ZC840980 TO INTERSECTION RTE 1.

6. FORCES INVOLVED:

CONTROLLING HQ-7TH MAR

ONE BN (-) (3 CO'S) 7TH MAR

ONE BN ARVN

BUT 2/3 (SELECTED UNITS)

COMPANY FIRST RECON BN

COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AUGMENTATION AS REQUIRED.

7. PEAK HELICOPTER LOAD D-DAY: LIFT FOR 600 TROOPS DISTANCE OF APPROX 30 KMS.

8. COORDINATION. TO BE ESTABLISHED WITH SLF BRAVO AND ARVN BN ASSIGNED

9. SCHEDULE.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2316 S E C R E T

A. D-DAY 230CT67

B. L-HOUR TO BE ANNOUNCED

C. DURATION-7 DAYS

10. REQUEST CG III MAF:

A. PROVIDE CLEARANCE FOR THAT PORTION OF A/O EXTENDING INTO THIRD MARDIV AREA.

B. ARRANGE MINIMUM ONE BN ARVN FORCES TO PARTICIPATE IN CO-ORDINATED OPERATION. FURTHER REQUEST EARLY DESIGNATION PLANNING/ LIAISON ARVN HQ.

11. FOR CTS 79.5: REQUEST VISIT PLANNING GROUP THIS HQS.

ASAP.

PAGE 2 OF 2

BT-4

BT

SECRET

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR G-4, MFG

PAGE TWO
REF ID: A67098
US NAVY SPT REQUESTED TO DEPART CK FT SAN JOSE FOR PHU
THIEN HANGIN. G-NAVY SPT REQUESTED IN PARA 1A OF REF IS
PROVIDED.
G-NAVY RESERVE LAW PARA 3D OF REF IS

REF: HQDA 1235 S S C B S T
W/AL-VENTH MAP. PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PARA 3E OF REG 6
AND UNDERSTAND.
W/AL-UN 13 OF PI 14.
W/AL-UN 13 OF PI 14.


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REYE
DE MAF NR 309 309 309
M
PP UUMSE
DE UUMSEA 1280 2940557
ZNY SSSSS
P 210557Z OCT 67
FM III MAF COC
TO UUMSE/MACV COC
INFO THIRD MARDIV COC
RYAM OPS
FIRST MARDIV COC
BT



S E C R E T

CONCEPT OPN KNOX

1. CONCEPT: SEVENTH MARINES CONDUCTS MULTI-BN S&D OPN IN THE PHU LOC/HAI VAN PASS AREA. ONE MARINE BN CONDUCTS DAYLIGHT HELIBORNE ASSAULT AT L HOUR ON D DAY FOLLOWED BY S&D OPN IN CENTRAL SECTION OF AO. ONE MARINE BN ENTERS EASTERN SECTION OF AO (VIC HAM PHU GIA) ON D DAY UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS FOLLOWED BY S&D OPNS FIRST LIGHT D PLUS 1. ONE ARVN BN CONDUCTS CONCURRENT OPN BY ENTERING WESTERN SECTION OF AO UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS ON D-DAY FOLLOWED BY S&D OPNS FIRST LIGHT D PLUS 1. RECON COMPANY CONDUCTS RECON IN FIRST MAR DIV AO N OF RTE ONE TO COAST.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 1281 S E C R E T

7TH MAR -) REIN)

2BN, SEVENTH MAR

BLT 2/3

CO, FIRST RECON BN

ARVN BN TO BE DESIGNATED

3. CONTROL PC: 7TH MARINES

4. AREA OF OPNS: BOUNDED N BY RTE ONE, ON W BY N-S GL ZC 10 TO ZC 100995 THEN S-W ON A LINE TO ZC 070970 THEN S-S ON A LINE TO ZC 140980 THEN TO AT 50930 THEN N TO AT 50960 N ON W SHORE LINE OF DAY LAPAN TO AT 840998 INTERSECTION WITH RTE ONE.

5. L-HOUR: TBA D-DAY: 23OCT67

6. EST DURATION: 7 DAYS

GP-4

BT

101

*TOR: 21/1610H
Hd Coe*

5

SECRET

SECRET

ZNY SSSSS

RUMHIE-I-SEVENTH COMM BN

FIRST HOSP CO

P 210657Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

RUMHVN/CG I CORPS

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV

ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON

RUMHVN/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

BT

SECRET

FRAG O 142-67 COMBINED OPN BARRIER ISLAND

TASK ORGANIZATION

TWO ARVN RANGER BNS

ONE INF CO 51ST ARVN REGT MOUNTED IN APC

TWO COMPANIES FIFTH MARINES

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES

(1) ENEMY UNIT OPERATING IN THE BARRIER ISLAND AREA POSES A THREAT TO ARVN AND GVN OPERATIONS OF ALL TYPES.
PAGE TWO RUMHIA 2317 **SECRET**

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) TWO ARVN RANGER BNS WILL BE HELOLIFTED TO LZ'S IN VIC OF BT 20490 AND BT 225501.

(2) TWO COMPANIES OF 5TH MARINES AND 51ST ARVN CO IN APC ESTABLISH BLOCKS TO WEST OF TRUONG GIANG RIVER.

2. MISSION. COMMENCING H-HOUR ON D-DAY 5TH MAR, IN COORDINATION WITH TWO ARVN RANGER BNS, WILL PARTICIPATE IN A COMBINED OPERATION AGAINST THE BARRIER ISLAND BY ESTABLISHING BLOCKING POSITIONS WEST OF TRUONG GIANG RIVER, AND WILL BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO CROSS TRUONG GIANG RIVER TO CONDUCT S&D OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. COMMENCING L-HOUR D-DAY TWO ARVN RANGER BNS WILL LAND IN DESIGNATED LZ'S AND COMMENCE S&D OPERATIONS IN NORTHERLY DIRECTION TO VIC OF SONG THU BON. ON H-HOUR D-DAY TWO COMPANIES OF 5TH MARINES AND ONE COMPANY OF 51ST ARVN SUPPORTED BY APC'S WILL ESTABLISH BLOCKS TO WEST OF TRUONG GIANG RIVER AND WILL BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO CROSS TRUONG GIANG RIVER.

B. COORDINATING INSTRUCTION

(1) AREA OF OPERATIONS: BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY SONG THU

PAGE THREE RUMHIA 2317 **SECRET**

BON AND SONG CUA DAI, ON WEST BY SONG LY LY TO BT 150465, THENCE IN AN EASTERLY DIRECTION TO BT 234503 AND NORTH ALONG THE COASTLINE TO THE SONG CUA DAI.

(2) COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT AUGMENTATION FURNISHED AS REQUESTED.

(3) AIR SUPPORT AS REQUESTED.

(4) RIOT CONTROL AGENTS ARE AUTHORIZED.

(5) D-DAY: 25 OCT 67


(6) H-HOUR: AS DESIGNATED BY CO 5TH MARINES.

4. COORDINATION HAS BEEN EFFECTED WITH AMERICAL DIVISION FOR THAT PORTION OF AO EXTENDING INTO THEIR AREA.

DRAFTER: 3JDC/TRL

RELEASER: C/S

CONCUR: DPNS, G-3, C/S, G-2, G-4



BRIEF Hold

ADIC IN WO BOX

C

SECRET

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00 RUMHBJN RUMFTJG RUMHFL RUMHVH RUMHVP
DE RUMHLA 2394 294 1328

ZNY SSLSL

021132Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHFL/CG FLC

RUAUBJN/CG SEVEN NINE PT

RUMFTJG/CG SEVEN SIX PT

ZEN/ELEVENTH MARINES

ZEN/FIRST RECON BN

ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN

ZEN/FIRST SP BN

ZEN/FIRST MED BN

RUMHND/SA I CORPS ADV GROUP

RUMHND/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

BT

SECRET

FRAG ORDR 143-67 (OPERATION KNOX)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 191539Z OCT 67

1. SITUATION. SEE REF A.

| | |
|-----|----------------|
| W | OIC |
| ADJ | ADIC |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| A | DRAFTER: C-3 |
| | RELEASER: C-3 |
| | CONCURREN: C-2 |
| | G-3 |
| | G-4 |



CaC

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2394 SECRET

2. COMMENCING 24 OCT 67 SEVENTH MAR MINUS REIN CONDUCTS A COMBINED MULTI-BATTALION S&D OPN IN COORDINATION WITH DESIGNATED RVN RANGER BN IN THE PHU LOC - HAI VAN PASS AREA, TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES LOCATED THEREIN. CONCEPT CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A HAS BEEN APPROVED AND WILL BE EXECUTED. AREA OF OPERATIONS WILL BE BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY RTE ONE ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE ZD 10 TO ZC100995 THENCE S-W ON A LINE TO ZC070970 THENCE S-E ON A LINE TO ZC140880 THENCE N-E TO AT850930 THENCE NORTH TO AT850960 FOLLOWING WEST SHORE LINE OF DAN LAP AN TO AT840993 TO INTERSECTION RTE ONE.

3. EXECUTION

A. TASK ORGANIZATION SEVENTH MARINES (-) (REIN)

2ND BN (-) (3 CO'S)

ELR 2/300

(1) (-) RECON BN

B. SEVENTH MARINES

(1) CONDUCT S&D OPN IN DESIGNATED AO COMMENCING 240800H 0016Z.

(2) LIAISON WITH DISTRICT CHIEF PHU LOC DISTRICT FOR COORD OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WITHIN AO.

CG 1ST MAR DIV

PAGE 1 OF 2

211328Z OCT 67

SECRET (80)

SECRET

PAGE THREE HUMELA 2094 S E C R E T

(C) COORDINATE WITH DESIGNATED ARVN RANGER BN REGARDING
 PARTICIPATION OF ARVN FORCES.

(4) ASSUME OPCON BLT 2/3 (-) UPON ARRIVAL IN AREA OF OPERA-
 TIONS. EST TIME OF ASSUMPTION. CHOP OPCON BLT 2/3 THIS HQ UPON
 TERMINATION OPN ANOX.

(5) ASSUME OPCON CO (-) RECON BN 230900H OCT 67.

(6) ELEMENTS MAINTAIN. PROVIDE ARTILLERY SPT AS REQUIRED.

(7) FIRST BATT BN. PROVIDE EMGR SPT AS REQUIRED.

(8) FIRST SF BN. PROVIDE HST AUGMENTATION AS REQUIRED.

(9) FIRST RECON BN. CHOP RECON CO (-) TO 7TH MAR 230900H OCT 67.

(10) FIRST MED BATT. PROVIDE MED SPT AS REQUIRED.

(11) COORD INSTRUCTIONS:

(12) DEB LAUGH ALCON.

(13) 1-DAY 24 OCT 67 - H/L HOURS TO BE DETERMINED BY CO
 (TH 100).

(14) ESTIMATED DURATION: 7 DAYS.

(15) CO (-) RECON BN REVERT PARENT CONTROL UPON TERMINATION
 OPN ANOX.


(16) UTILIZE PSTOPS MAX.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

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03 RUMFTJG
 DE RUMHLA 2437 295 0524
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 0 220524Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 INFO ZEN/CG 111 MAF
 RUMFTJG/CIG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR

DRAFTER: G-3
 RELEASER: G-3
 CONCUR: G-4

COC

SECRET
 M-109 LIFT

1. CG 111 MAF 210834Z OCT 67 (PASEP)
1. REF A SMD LIFT SIX 155 HOW (SP) (M109) FROM TIEN SHA RAMP TO BEACH AT COORD AT875993.
2. PROVIDE FORCES AS REQUIRED TO ENSURE LANDING SITE SECURE PRIOR TO AND DURING LANDING. UPON LANDING M-109 ESCORT EQUIP TO, FIRING PSN.
3. DIRLAUTH WITH ELEVENTH MAR TO DETERMINE ETA M109 AT LANDING BEACH.

OP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

220524Z OCT 67


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ZNY SSSSS
 P 220645Z OCT 67
 FM III MAF COC
 TO FIRST MARDIV COC
 INFO THIRD MARDIV COC
 FIRST MAW OPS
 BT

S E C R E T

OP KNOX

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 191539Z OCT67

1. IN RESPONSE TO REQ MADE TO CG I CORPS FOR ARVN PARTICIPATION OP
 KNOX AS REQ REF A, CG I CORPS REPORTS NO ARVN FORCES AVAIL.

GP-4

BT

#176



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DE RUMHLA 24 67 2 95 0835
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P 22 0835Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF

DRAFTER 3-
RELEASES 0

INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHHL/CG FLC
ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST SP BN
ZEN/FIRST MED BN
RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE
RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN SIX POINT FIVE
RUMHVN/SA I CORPS ADV GROUP
RUMHVN/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
RUMH/H/SA FIRST ARVN DIV

COC

FE
S E C R E T
OPERATION KNOX

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 24 67 S E C R E T

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV 191539Z OCT 67
- B. CG FIRST MARDIV 211328Z OCT 67
- C. III MAF COC 210555Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
- D. CG THIRD MARDIV 150429Z OCT 67
- E. CG III MAF 190114Z OCT 67

1. IN VIEW OF THE NON-PARTICIPATION OF ARVN FORCES IN OPERATION KNOX THAT PORTION OF THE AO EXTENDING INTO THE THIRD MARDIV IS NO LONGER REQUIRED. ACCORDINGLY REQUEST THE WESTERN BOUNDARY FOR OPERATION KNOX BE MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS: FROM ZD110018 SOUTH ALONG THE N-S GL ONE ONE TO ZC110942 THENCE IN A SOUTH WESTERLY DIRECTION ALONG THE DISTRICT BOUNDARY TO ZC097934. REF A, B AND C APPLY.
2. REQUEST SLF BRAVO'S PRESENT AO EXTENDING INTO FIRST MARDIV AREA BE DISSOLVED UPON CHOP OF SLF BRAVO TO THIS DIVISION FOR OPERATION KNOX. REF D APPLIES.
3. FURTHER REQUEST SLF BRAVO CHOP TO CG FIRST MARDIV 24 0800H OCT 67
VICE 23 0800H OCT.

GP-4

BT


CG FIRST MARDIV

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Brief

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CG RUMHFL RUMHVP
 DE RUMHFLA 2472 295 085 1
 ZNY SSSSS

OP 22 035 12 OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOG CMD
 BT

SECRET

ROUGH RIDER CONVOY 117-67

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 211007Z OCT 67 (PASEP)

B. ANNEX F TO FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 201-67, NOTAL

1. REF A SSED 3D MARDIV ROUGH RIDER CONVOY TO MOVE FL SG-A
 RETROGRADE CARGO FROM PHU BAI TO DA NANG AND 3D MARDIV SUPPLIES
 AND EQUIP DA NANG TO PHU BAI. CONVOY SKED DPT PHU BAI 23 0715H
 OCT 67 AND RETURN PHU BAI FOM DA NANG 24 0730H OCT 67.

2. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV. WILL PROVIDE CONVOY SPT REQUESTED IN
 PARA 14 REF A.

3. FOR SEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE IAW PARA 3D OF REF B.

4. FOR ELEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PARA 3E OF REF B.

PAGE TWO RUMHFLA 2472 SECRET

5. COORD INSTRNS

A. CHOP POINT CH PT 14.

B. PROVIDE SPT FOR CONVOYS 23 OCT TO DA NANG AND 24 OCT
 TO PHU BAI.

C. DIRL SUTH.

CF-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV


220851Z OCT 67

15
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(83)

SECRET

ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN -----COUR
 ZEN/HQB, FIRST MARDIV -----COUR
 ZEN/THIRD BN, ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/FOURTH BN, ELEVENTH MAR
 ZEN/SEVENTH COMM BN
 RUMHFL/FIRST FSR
 ZEN/FIRST BN SEVENTH MARINES
 ZEN/SECOND BN, SEVENTH MARINE
 ZEN/THIRD BN, SEVENTH MARINES
 ZNY SSSSS



P 221015Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/SEVENTH MAR

G-3

TOR 231015
 8184 G

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
 RUABSR/SUP BN FIRST FSR
 ZEN/FIRST SP BN
 ZEN/FIRST MED BN
 ZEN/FIRST MT BN
 ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
 ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
 RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE
 RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS ADV GROUP

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SECRET

SECTION ONE OF TWO

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 8184 **SECRET**
 ADMIN O 143-67 TO FRAG O 143-67
 A. CG 1ST MARDIV 211328Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
 B. ADMIN O 301-67
 C. SUPPLY

A. GENERAL. FLC IS SOURCE OF SUP FOR ALL CLASSES OF SUP, SERVICE SPT AND THIRD ECHELON MAINT

(1) SUPPLY SOURCES

(A) TEMPORARY LSA ESTABLISHED AT LOCATION SELECTED BY SEVENTH MAR.

(B) CLASS III A FROM MARBLE MOUNTAIN AND LPH.

(2) PRESCRIBED LOADS

(A) AS PRESCRIBED IN REF B EXCEPT:

CL I TWO DAYS MCI W/FUEL BAR TRIOXANE

CL V BA PLUS TWO DOA

B. SUPPLIES AND EQUIP AVAILABLE IN THE LSA

CL-I THREE DAYS MCI W/FUEL BAR

CL-II CRITICAL HIGH USAGE ITEMS AS REQ/RQD

CL-III THREE DAYS

CL-IV MINIMUM ESSENTIAL AS RQD

CL-V THREE DOA

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

P 221015Z OCT 67 PAGE 1 OF 4 COPY

SECRET (34)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 8184 S E C R E T

MED SUP THREE DAYS

WATER POINTS

ONE IN LSA

ONE AT COORD ZC 886954

C. CONTROL AND DISTRIBUTION

(1) UNIT DISTRIBUTION IN EFFECT. SUPPLY POINT
DISTRIBUTION AS RQRD.(2) CONVOY CONTROL IAW REF B. SPECIFIC CONVOY REQ
TO THIS HQ (ATTN: G-3) ONE DAY IN ADVANCE OF DATE DESIRED.

D. RESUPPLY

(1) RESUPPLY FOR LSA AS RQRD FROM FL SG-A PHU BAI

(2) FIRST RESUPPLY OF LSA ASSETS ANTICIPATED ON D
PLUS 2 FROM FL SG-A

(3) UNIT RESUPPLY AS RQRD FROM LSA

(4) AIR RESUPPLY BY HELO AERIAL DELIVERY

(5) SIX M-76 OTTERS, AS ALTERNATE MEANS TO EFFECT
RESUPPLY

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

A. PRIMARY EVACUATION PLAN

(1) FOR FIRST MARDIV UNITS IN ACCORD WITH REF B

(2) FOR BLT TWO SLANT THREE TO LPH

(3) ALL CASUALTIES TO BE SCREENED THROUGH THE CLEARING
PLATOON (-) (REIN) FACILITY.

B. ALTERNATE PLAN (INCLEMENT WEATHER)

(1) FOR FIRST MARDIV UNITS: TO HOLDING FACILITY AS
ESTABLISHED BY SEVENTH MAR, THEN IAW WITH REF B.(2) FOR BLT TWO SLANT THREE: ENTER FIRST MARDIV CHAIN
OF EVACUATIONC. BAS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN THE FIELD. BLT TWO SLANT
THREE LAND ONE ECHELON BN AID STATION.D. CLEARING PLT (-) (REIN) LOCATED IN VICINITY OF LSA AND
AS APPROVED BY SEVENTH MAR.

E. ENSURE ALL PERSONNEL IMMUNIZED IAW BUMED INST 6230.1D

F. ALL UNITS BE PREPARED TO EVACUATE CASUALTIES BY ROPE
HOIST ON LITTERS.

G. ALL TROOPS CARRY SALT TABLETS AND IODINE TABLETS

3. TRANSPORTATION

(1) TROOP TRANSPORTATION AS DIRECTED. MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES
TO LSA ON D-DAY. LOAD ON D-1, STAGE AT CH PT 33 NORTH ON D-1.

(2) BLT 2/3 WILL POSITION 14 TRUCKS FOR RESUPPLY USE AT

PAGE 2 OF 4

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 8184 S E C R E T
PHU BAI.

(3) THE M76 OTTERS WILL BE USED TO TRANSPORT GENERAL CARGO AND PERSONNEL OVER MARGINAL TERRAIN ON LAND AND WATER. IT IS NOT AN ARMORED VEH AND IS NOT TO BE EMPLOYED AS AN ASSAULT VEH OR IN ASSAULT MANEUVERS. USE OF THE M76 VEH WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THE MOVEMENT OF CARGO, AND FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS WHEN OTHER MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION ARE NOT AVAILABLE.

4. SERVICE

A. MAINT AND SALVAGE IAW REF B.

B. MAINT FLOAT, BASED ON EQUIP AND WPNS DENSITY.

C. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) FIRST SP BN

(A) ESTABLISH AND OPERATE LSA

(B) FURNISH ONE 6000 LB FORKLIFT TO LSA

(C) FURNISH AERIAL DELIVERY NETS AS REQD

(D) PROVIDE ONE BULLDOZER

(2) FLC IS REQUESTED TO.

(A) FURNISH REQ SUPPLIES TO STOCK LSA

(B) AUGMENT SP PERS TO ASSIST IN OPN OF LSA

PAGE SIX RUMHLA 8184 S E C R E T

(C) PROVIDE DETACHMENT AERIAL DELIVERY PLATOON TO LSA

(D) FURN SMALL ARMS REPAIR, COMM-ELECT, AND ORD MAINT CONTACT TEAMS TO LSA

(E) ESTAB MAINT FLOAT AS REQ BY SEVENTH MAR BASED ON WPNS AND EQUIP DENSITY.

(3) FIRST MT BN

(A) FURNISH FOUR M-76 OTTERS TO SEVENTH MAR FOR RESUPPLY. TIME AND LOCATION AS SPECIFIED BY SEVENTH MAR.

(4) FIRST MED BN

(A) FURNISH ONE CLEARING PLATOON (-) (REIN)

(5) BLT TWO SLANT THREE

(A) FURNISH LSU TO LSA

(B) FURNISH 14 TRUCKS FOR RESUPPLY USE, POSITION

AT PHU BAI

(6) SEVENTH MAR

(A) FURNISH TWO M-76 OTTERS FROM SECOND BN SEVENTH MAR FOR RESUPPLY OF OPERATION.

(7) 1ST ENGR BN

(A) PROVIDE ENGR SPT AS REQ

(B) ESTABLISH WATER POINT IN LSA

BT

PAGE 3 OF 4

SECRET

SECRET

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TWO RUMHLA 8188 S E C R E T
PERSONNEL

1. STRAIGHT ON BOARD

2. REPLACEMENTS

(1) FOR DIV UNITS: PROVIDED BY THIS HQ

(2) FOR BLT TWO SLANT THREE: AS PROVIDED BY NINTH MAB

3. POW IAW DIV O 34 61.2. POW COLLECTION POINT IN LSA.

4. GRAVES REGISTRATION, DIV O P 3040.12 APPLIES.

5. MORALE, COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONTINUE NORMAL
AT THEIR DISCRETION.

6. PERSONNEL PROCEDURES

(1) NORMAL ROTATION PROCEDURES IN EFFECT

(2) NORMAL PERSONNEL REPORTS CONTINUE IN EFFECT

(3) CASUALTY REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIV O P 3040.12

(4) BLT TWO SLANT THREE CASUALTIES REPORTED THROUGH

NORMAL CHAIN OF COMMAND. IF ARG DEPARTS ARE, CASUALTY REPORTS
SUBMITTED TO 1ST MARDIV.

7. MISCELLANEOUS

A. REPORTS IN ACCORD WITH DIV O 3480.1

B. REFUGEE CONTROL. REFUGEES GENERATED BY THE OPN IN
THAT THEN PROVIDE WILL BE EVACUATED TO THE DISTRICT INTHREE RUMHLA 8188 S E C R E T
RICH THEY ARE FOUND

1. EVACUATION OF CAPTURED FOOD COMMODITIES.

(1) IAW ANNEX J (CONTROLLED ITEMS) TO OPN O 301-67

(2) RICE CACHES OR OTHER FOOD COMMODITIES CAPTURED

DURING TACTICAL OPNS WILL BE RPT TO THIS HQ FOR DISPOSITION
RISER.

(3) HQ FOR RICE SACKS WILL BE MADE TO THIS HQ.

(4) FORM FOR VIETNAMESE LABOR FORCE TO BAG AND ASSIST
IN EVACUATION WILL BE MADE TO THIS HQ.

2. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(1) CONDUCTED IAW ANNEX K (PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE) TO
OPN O 301-67.(2) REQ FOR LEAFLET DROPS AND AERIAL BROADCASTS TO BE
SUB TO THIS HQ(3) REQ FOR SPECIAL LEAFLETS REQ THIRTY SIX HOURS LEAD
TIME AFTER RECEIPT BY THIS HQ PRIOR TO ANTICIPATED AERIAL DROPS.(4) MAXIMUM UTILIZATION TO BE MADE OF ORGANIC GROUND
BROADCAST TEAM TO EXPLOIT THE TACTICAL SITUATION. ONE AUDIO-
VISUAL TEAM AVAILABLE ON REQ.3. WPNS AND PERSONNEL DENSITIES TO BE SUB TO
THIS HQFOUR RUMHLA 8188 S E C R E T
ATTITUDE ACOPS, G-4).

PAGE 4 OF 4

SECRET

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CD RUM LA
 DE RUM CR 023E 2970131
 ZNY SS SS
 02400 17 OCT 67

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 SE C I E T SVC
 RUM LA 045S 2962630. ZDK RUMFCR 108C 2961250 230717Z OCT.
 DE RUM CR 103C 2961250
 ZNY SS SS

02321 17 OCT 67
 FM 111 AAF COC
 TO RUM LA/FIRST MARDIV COC
 RUMHVP/THIRD MARDIV COC
 INFO RUMSMA/MACV COC
 RUMHAW/NAW OPS

ADV RT COC

G-3

TOR:240220

CCN:8487

ZEN/ITC
 ZEN/PL LOC
 RUMFTJ CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMFTJ CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

R
 SE C I E T
 OPERATION KNOX, FIRST MARDIV/THIRD MARDIV BDY
 A. CR, 1ST MARDIV 220335Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
 B. 111 AAF COC 221523Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
 I. IS TO REF A AND EFFECTIVE UPON CHOP SLF BRAVO TO 1ST MARDIV
 240300Z OCT 67 IAW REF B, WESTERN BDY OPN KNOX AND FIRST MARDIV/
 THIRD MARDIV TEMP BDY MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS: FM ZD 110022 S ALONG N-S
 Q. ONE ONE TO ZC 110942, THENCE IN A SW DIRECTION ONG QUANG
 NAM THIN THIEN BDY TO ZC 097834.

CP-4

ET

CP-4

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111 AAF COC


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DE RUMHLA 25 79 2961000
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P 231000Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
INFO RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD

DRAFTER: G-4
RELEASER: G-4

BT

SECRET

155MM HOW HE AMMO

1. SUPPLY BN FLC (S-3) REPORTS 7000 RDS 155MM HOW HE AT DUMP
IN PHU BAI. REQ 1200 RDS BE HELD FOR SUPPORT OF FIRST MARDIV
OPN KNOX UNTIL ADEQUATE STOCK LEVELS OF 155MM HOW HE AMMO IS
ACHIEVED AT ASP NR ONE.

GP-4

BT

CG 1ST MARDIV 231000Z OCT 67

NNNN

COC


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SECRET

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DRAFTER ADG-5

DRAFTER ~~OG-3~~
 RELEASER ~~G-3~~
 CONCUR ~~G-4, MTO~~




2. FOR THE FYI MAP
A. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE OF LOGS.
B. REQUEST CONDUCT LIAISON AND COORDINATE WITH RVN FORCES AND SUPPORTING ARMS.
3. FOR CC FIRST MAW: REQUEST THREE M-36 VEHs TO SUPPORT MOVE.
4. SEVENTH ENGR BN. REQUEST PROVIDE BRIDGING AS REQUIRED.
5. EXERCUTION
A. SEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE FORCES IAW PARA 3.D OF REF A.
B. SEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PARA 3.E OF REF A.
C. FIRST ENGR BN. PROVIDE SPT IAW PARA 3.G OF REF A LESS BRIDGING SPT.
D. SEVENTH MT BN. PROVIDE MT SPT IAW PARA 3.F OF REF A.
E. TOWED ENGINE
REF A AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS DA NANG TO HU
CHON POINTS. REFA.
FOR SPT ARRANGED BY THIS HQ.
FOR TRAILHEAD ALONG

00 3 1 157 HARDY REIN 0 231245Z OCT 67

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DE RUMHLA 2635 2962053
ZNY SSSSS

TO 232053Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO RUMHIC/AMERICAL DIV TOC
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

DRAFTER; G-3
RELEASER; G-3
CONCUR; G-2
G-4

BT

SECRET

TEMPORARY AREA OF OPERATIONS EXTENSION

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 190710Z OCT 67

1. AREA OF OPERATIONS REQ BY REF A NOT REQUIRED DUE
TO CANCELLATION SCHEDULED OPERATION.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV 232053Z OCT 67

COPY# 5

SECRET (gr)

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BY GSSS

240721Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARINE REIN

TO FIFTH MARINES

THIRD AMTRAC BN

DRAFTER: 3: PGG: RJV

RELEASER: G-3

SECRET

1. THIRD AMTRAC BN WILL ASSUME AN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN TAOR OF THIRD BN FIRST MARINES.

2. MUTUALLY AGREED BETWEEN ADDRESSEES.

3. FIFTH MARINES REPORT DETAILS OF ARRANGEMENTS TO INCLUDE BORDERS OF AOR AND EFFECTIVE DATE OF TAKEOVER BY THIRD AMTRAC BN.

CP-4

FM

CG FIRST MARINE

COPY MR#

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240721Z OCT 67

SECRET (89)

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DE RUMHLA 2 668 2970723

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P 240723Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

DRAFTER: 3:PGG:KGB

RELEASER: G-3

INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMFUV/CTG SEVEN SIX
 RUABOL/CTG SEVEN NINE
 RUMHFL/CG FLC
 ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
 RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 BT

SECRET

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 231331Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

1. ASSUMED OPOON BLT 2/3 (-) EFFECTIVE 240800H OCT 67. REF A APPLIES.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV

COPY NR# 13 240723Z OCT 67**SECRET (90)**

SECRET

COC

OO RUMHLC RUMHVN
DE RUMHLC 2680 2970933
ZNY ASSOS

0 240000Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHLC/CG AMERICAL DIV
ZEN/HQ BN
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST MT BN
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST AT BN

INFO 220700Z FIRST MAW
RUMHLC/SA I CORPS
BT

SECRET

FRAG 1 001-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV 140745Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
- B. CG FIRST MARDIV 041515Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
- C. ADVISE TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN 0301-68 (NOTAL)
- D. CG FIRST MARDIV 061311Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASER: G-3
CONCUR: G-4, MTON

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PAGE TWO RUMHLC 2680 SECRET

E. FIRST MARDIV 0 P02000.2C (CEOI) (NOTAL)

1. REF A IS CANCELLED.
2. THIS ORDER FOR ALL ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS SKED TO SUPPORT FUTURE MOVEMENT FIFTH MAR AND 2/11, HILL 63 TO DANANG.
3. FOR CG III MAF
 - A. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IS USE OF LOG S.
 - B. REQUEST CONDUCT LIAISON AND COORDINATION AS REQUIRED FOR CONVOY PASSAGE AND TRAFFIC CONTROL ALONG ROUTE OF CONVOY.
4. FOR CG AMERICAL DIV. REQUEST PROVIDE SPT REQUESTED BY REF B.
5. FOR SEVENTH ENGR BN. REQUEST PROVIDE ENGR SPT AS REQ TO KEEP ROAD SOUTH OF SONG CAU LAU OPERATIONAL AND AID CONVOY PASSAGE.
6. EXECUTION

A. FIFTH MAR:

1. PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY IAW PAR 3D OF REF C
CONSIDERING OF ONE PLATOON REIN WITH MED PERS, FAC, AND FO.
2. GIVE MINIMUM ONE HOUR NOTICE THIS HQ ETD CONVOY RETURN TRIP OVER SP NET M276 (FM).

B. SEVENTH MAR: PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PAR 3E OF REF C.

C. FIRST ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PAR 3F OF REF C.

CG FIRST MARDIV

PAGE 1 OF 2 COPY NR# 240933Z OCT 67

SECRET(91)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMKLA 2680 S E C R E T

D. FIRST AT 3N: PROVIDE THREE M-50 ONTOS.

E. FIRST MT 3N: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PAR 3F OF REF C.
INSURE ALL PERS W/CONVOY CARRY FIELD PROTECTIVE MASK (M 17).

7. COORD INSTRNS

A. CONVOYS SKED AS FOL:

(1) DEPART CH PT 22 FOR HILL 63 AS SKED BELOW OR ON
COMPLETION ROAD SWEEP. RETURN FIFTH MAR AREA SAME DAY UPON
COMPLETION ROAD SWEEP. RETURN FIFTH MAR AREA SAME DAY UPON
COMPLETION LOADING.

(2) SKED

DPT CH PT 22: 251000H OCT 67

260930H OCT 67

271030H OCT 67

281000H OCT 67

B. REF C AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS.

C. REF D ESTABLISHED SYSTEM FOR CONVOYS IN AMERICAL DIV AOR.

D. OPTION OF ALL CONVOYS TO REMAIN WITH THIS HQ.

E. AIR SPT ARRANGED BY THIS HQ.

F. CHECK POINTS: REF C.

G. DISLAUTH ALCON.

H. IN EVENT OF CONVOY CANCELLATION IT WILL BE RESKED FOR DAY.

PAGE FOUR RUMKLA 2680 S E C R E T

8. COMM-ELECT

A. REF E AS APPLICABLE.

B. FIFTH MAR, AND COMM CO MONITOR DIV CONVOY CONTROL NET
(MS: 100) AND GUARD M276 (FM). ALSO REQUEST AMERICAL DIV MONITOR
THIS NET.


02-4

PAGE 2 OF 2

BT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



PP RUMHFL RUMHNA
DE RUMHLA 2761 2980115
ZNY CCCC

P 250115Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
ZEN/SEC0D BN FIFTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
ZEN/NORTHERN SECTOR DEF CMD
ZEN/SOUTHERN SECTOR DEF CMD
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

RUMHFL/CG FLC
RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT

BT
Q O N F I D E N T I A L
BRIDGE INSPECTION CONF 310CT67
A. 261351Z SEP67 (NOTAL)

1. REF A ESTAB RECON / INSPECTION OF KEY BRIDGES AND CULVERTS
IN TAOR. RECENT CHANGES OF BRIDGE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES
REQUIRES MODIFICATION REF A.

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASE: G-3
CONCUR: G-2

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COZ

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2761 C O N F I D E N T I A L
2. CONFERENCE SKED DIVISION CONF ROOM 311000H OCT67 TO DISCUSS
REQUIRED CHANGES REF A. PLANS FOR FUTURE BRIDGE INSPECTIONS AND
PRIORITY CATEGORIES WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED.

3. ADDEES WILL SEND REP TO SUBJ CONF. REP SHOULD BE PREPARED
TO DISCUSS FOL.

- A. LISTING OF BRIDGES BY PRIORITY AND COORDINATES IN
ASSIGNED AREA.
- B. SECURITY PROVIDED EACH BRIDGE.
- C. RECOMMENDED INSP SKED EACH BRIDGE.
- D. LISTING OF SPECIAL EQUIP ON HAND EACH BRIDGE SITE
AS APPROPRIATE.
- E. ANY RECOMMENDATION / REQUIREMENTS EACH
BRIDGE SITE.

4. FIRST RECON BN. BE PREPARED DISCUSS
RESULTS BRIDGE INSPECTIONS ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE.
5. INFO ADDEES INVITED SEND REPS.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV 250115Z OCT 67

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET

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CO C

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S THIRD AMTRAC BN

P 250300Z OCT 67

FM FIFTH MARINES

TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

THIRD AMTRAC BN

Z W/THIRD BN FIRST MARINES

G-3

TOR 2 50326
8912 A

-COUR

SECRET

1. CG FIRST MARDIV 240721Z

2. AS MUTUALLY AGREED THIRD AMTRAC BN WILL ASSUME AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN TAOR OF THIRD BN FIRST MARINES.

3. OR BOUNDED BY FOLLOWING COORD: BT080714, BT096680, BT082677, AND BT073700.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF TAKEOVER 251200H OCT 67


GP-4

BT

FIFTH MARINE S P 250300Z OCT 67

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SECRET

RRC
P.113

CG RUMHVP RUMHVP RUMHVP
DE RUMHVA 2795 250802
ZNY SSSSS


0250802Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAR
ZEN/HQ BN FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/ELEVENTH MI BN

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR G-4, MTU

INFO RUMHVP/SA 7 CORPS
RUMHVP/SENIOR ADVISOR DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIRST LAM BN
BT

SECRET

INFO 0 146-67 ROUGH RIDER CONVOY (U)
CG III MAF 291624Z SEP67 (NOTAL)
ANEX 7 TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN O 301-68 (NOTAL)



COV

INFO TWO RUMHVA 2795 SECRET

CG THIRD MARDIV ADMIN O 416-66 (NOTAL)
CG FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C (COI) (NOTAL)
CG THIRD MARDIV O 02000.2E (COI) (NOTAL)

1. IN SUPPORT OF REF A SUBJ CONVOY SKED MOVE FIRST MAR SUPPLIES
DANANG TO QUANG TRI ON 26-27 OCT67. PLAN CONVOY MOVE PHU BAI
AGN, DEPART NEXT DAY QUANG TRI RETURN AS ARRANGED BY THIRD MARDIV.
2. FOR CG III MAF.

A. REQUEST ESTABLISH PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE
OF LOC'S.

B. REQUEST CONDUCT LIAISON AND COORDINATE WITH RVN FORCES
MOVING ROUTE AS REQ FOR CONVOY PASSAGE, TRAFFIC CONTROL, SECURITY
AND SUPPORTIVE ARMS.

C. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV

A. REQUEST ASSUME OPCON AND PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE WHILE
CONVOY IN THIRD MARDIV TAGR.

B. THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY OF RIFLE PLAT REIN
PARTY FC, FAC, ENGR SPT AND CONTROL AND SERVICE VEH.

C. REQUEST PROVIDE STAGING AREA FOR CONVOY APPROX 49 VEH.
ARRIVING PHU BAI 2 OCT67, ALSO BILLETING AND MESSING FOR 140
CONVOY PERSONNEL 26 OCT.

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN O 250802Z OCT 67 PAGE 1 OF 2 COPY#

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PAGE THREE RUHQA 2795 S E C R E T

1. REQUEST COORDINATE CONVOY MOVEMENT PHU BAI TO QUANG TRI
AND RETURN DANANG.

2. CHIEF POINT: FIRST/THIRD MARDIV BOUNDARY. CK PT 14.

3. FOR CG 3RD: REQUEST THREE M-36 VEHs TO SUPPORT MOVE.

4. SEVENTH LMR BN: REQUEST PROVIDE BRIDGING AS REQUIRED.

5. EXECUTION

A. FIFTH AFR. PROVIDE FORCES IAW PARA 3.D. OF REF B.

B. ELEVENTH AFR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PARA 3.E. REF B.

C. FIRST EIGHT BN. PROVIDE SPT IAW PARA 3.G. REF B LESS

MODELING SPT.

D. ELEVENTH BN. PROVIDE MT SPT IAW PARA 3.F. REF B.

E. COORDINATE

1. REF B AND C AS APPLICABLE FOR ADMIN CONVOYS DANANG
TO HUE.

2. CHECK POINTS. REFS B AND C.

3. 24-HOUR H-HOUR

4A. DANANG TO PHU BAI 260700H OCT 67

4B. PHU BAI TO QUANG TRI. AS DIRECTED BY CG THIRD

4C. RETURN

4D. QUANG TRI TO DANANG. AS DIRECTED BY CG THIRD

PAGE FOUR RUHQA 2795 S E C R E T

4C. RETURN

5A. IF CONVOY POSTPONED RESKED FOR FOL DAY.

5B. AIR SPT DANANG TO PHU BAI ARRANGED BY THIS HQS FOR
260700H CONVOY.

6. DISPATCH ALCON

7. COMMENTS

A. REFS B AND C.

8. FIRST AFR. MONITOR THIRD MARDIV ROUGH RIDGE CONVOY
CONTROL DET. ON 1ST COMMENCING 260700H OCT 67.

9. 10. 11.


PAGE 2 OF 2

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DE RUMHLA 2894 2990259

ZNY SSSSS

P 260259Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES

INFO ZEN/THIRD BN SEVENTH MARINES

BT

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BRIDGE SECURITY

A. CG III MAF/CG I CORPS CONFERENCE OF 21 OCT 67

B. CG III MAF/SA I CORPS MSG 250822Z OCT 67

1. IAW AGREEMENT REACHED AT REF A, AND AS DIRECTED BY REF B,
EFFECTIVE 311200H OCT 67 SEVENTH MARINES IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
SECURITY ON NEW DAI LOC BRIDGE (AT913587) ONLY AND STANDS RELIEVED
OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF OLD DAI LOC (CIVILIAN) BRIDGE.

GP-4

BT



CG FIRST MARDIV

260259ZUCT 67

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PP RUMHIE
 DE RUMHLA 2895 2990301
 ZNY CCCC
 RUMHIE-T-FIRST HOSP CO
 P 260301Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON

DRAFTER: 3 REH:KGB
 RELEASER: G-3
 CONCURRENCE: G-4
 G-2

BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 AMERICAL OPN

1. FOLLOWING AREA OF OPNS APPROVED FOR FIRE AND MANEUVER BY
 AMERICAL DIVISION (3D BDE, 1ST ACD) DURING PERIOD 270001H OCT 67
 TO 012400H NOV 67:

AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG CUA DAI (QUANG HIEU NHON/QUANG
 DUY XUYEN BDRY), ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON SOUTH BY PRESENT
 FIRST/AMERICAL DIV BDRY AND ON WEST BY TRUNG GIANG RIVER.

GP-4
 BT

CG FIRST MARDIV


260301Z OCT 67

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FIRST MARDIV COC

AMERICAL DIV TOC

3:25 PM
HAEH



III MAF COC

PPP
PPP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR AO

A. AMERICAL DIV TOC 251425Z OCT67

1. REF A REQUEST FOR AO FOR FIRE AND MANEUVER DURING PERIOD
270001H OCT67 TO 012400H NOV67 APPROVED.

GP-4

21
56
9252/4
TSD
4.8.1
5.1
2062

5.1
92
20

26 0315 OCT 67

(98)

BE RUMBLA 2996 2991420

NY SEERE

P 261400Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO FIFTH MAR

SEVENTH MAR

ELEVENTH MAR

SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

FIRST TANK BN

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR G-2

UNCLAS E F T O

NY REPORTS

FM CG FIRST MARDIV 201455Z SEP 67

1. REF ESTABLISHED A SYSTEM WHICH REQUIRES SUBORDINATE UNITS TO REPORT ACTION TAKEN WHEN A HOT REPORT IS RECEIVED. REACTION MAY BE A RAPIDLY EXECUTED SEARCH MISSION OR RESPONSE BY FIRE ON THE LOCATION IDENTIFIED IN THE HOT REPORT.

2. IN THE CASE OF A SEARCH MISSION, PERSONNEL INVOLVED SHOULD BE BRIEFED THAT THEY MAY BE SEARCHING FOR AS FEW AS A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL, A RECONNAISSANCE SCOUT. BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF HIS MISSION HE WILL CAREFULLY CONCEAL ANY EVIDENCE OF BEING ASSOCIATED WITH THE MILITARY. A CAREFUL SEARCH MUST BE CONDUCTED OF THE

PAGE TWO RUMBLA 2996 UNCLAS E F T O

AREA IN WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL IS DISCOVERED. CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO INSURE THAT LITERALLY NO STONE IS LEFT UNTURNED TO LOCATE CONCEALED EQUIPMENT. SUCH EQUIPMENT MAY BE SMALL ENOUGH FOR EASY CONCEALMENT AND MAY BE CAPABLE OF BEING SEPARATED INTO COMPONENTS EASILY CONCEALED. SIGNS OF RECENT DIGGING SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED. POSSIBLE HIDING PLACES IN CLUMPS OF BUSHES, UNDER LOGS, PILES AND ROCKS MUST BE EXAMINED. HUTS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY SEARCHED FOR HIDING PLACES IN THE FLOOR, WALLS, ROOF AND FURNITURE. RECENTLY A DETAINEE WAS FOUND HIDDEN IN A COMPARTMENT CONCEALED IN THE BACK OF A BED HEADBOARD. THESE RECONNAISSANCE PERSONNEL ARE EXPERTS IN DECEPTION.

3. THIS GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED IN ORDER THAT UNITS CONDUCTING SEARCH MISSIONS IN RESPONSE TO HOT REPORTS MAY BETTER UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR THOROUGHNESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THEIR ASSIGNMENT.

BT

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

P 261400Z OCT 67

NNNN

FIRST MARDIV COC
AMERICAL TOC

3:KMH:kgh
HABDEL

R/

Bay

III MAF COC

PPP
PPP

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RECON OPNS

1. REQUEST CONCURRENCE CONDUCT RECON INSERT 280730H OCT67 WITH EXTRACTION 311330H OCT67. AREA OF OPNS FROM AT9636 SOUTH TO AT9633 WEST TO AT9233 NORTH TO AT9236 EAST TO START PT.
2. REQUEST AREA BE FPE FOR RECON INSERT AND NPZ ALL OTHERS.
3. ALL INTEL GENERATED AS A RESULT OF THIS OPN WILL BE PROVIDED YOUR HQS.

GP-4

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270015 OCT 67

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BT RUMHVP
DE RUMHVA 3037 3000645

ZNY 55555

P 270645Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO ZEN/SEVENTH MAR

THIRD MARDIV

THIRD ZEN/CG III MAF

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

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ROCKY RIDER CONVOY

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 250802Z OCT 67 (PASEP)

FM CG THIRD MARDIV 260931Z OCT 67 (PASEP)

C. ANNEX F TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN O 301-68

1. REF A SKED CONVOY MOVE FIRST MAR SUPPLIES FM DANANG TO

QUANG TRI. REF B SKED RETURN CONVOY TO DANANG.

2. SEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE IAW PARA 3D IF REF C.

4. COORD INSTRUCTIONS

A. PROVIDE SPT WHILE CONVOY IN FIRST MARDIV AO.

B. CHOP POINT CH PT 14.

C. CONVOY SKED DPT PHU BAI FOR DANANG 280730H OCT 67.

PAGE TWO RUMHVA 3037 **SECRET**

D. DISTRIBUTE

BT-4



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CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

270645Z OCT 67

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FM RUMHVP RUMHNA
DE RUMHNA 3136 3510155
ZNY SS335

P 230155Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
INFO RUMHNA/COMNAVSOFACT DANANG
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/FIRST ANTRAC BN
ZEN/THIRD ANTRAC BN
BT

DRAFTER EMBARKO
RELEASER C/S
CONCUR G-3, G-2, G-4

SECRET

LVTF-5 AUGMENTATION FOR THIRD ANTRAC BN

AL CG III MAF 190350Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

BS CG THIRD MARDIV 250155Z OCT 67

1. REF A DIRECTED CHOP ONE FLY (ELEVEN) LVTF-5'S AND ONE LVT
TRACTOR TO FIRST MARDIV BLT 1 NOV 67.

2. REF B DIRECTED MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES DESIGNATED BY REF B TO
BE COMPLETED BY 28 OCT 67.

3. REQUEST LVTF-5'S AND LVTG DESIGNATED IN REFS A AND B BE
OFFLOADED BEACH VICINITY COORDINATES BT 033700 (THIRD ANTRAC

CG) VICE DANANG PORT FACILITIES. BEACH IS SUITABLE AND
SECURE. THIRD ANTRAC PREPARED TO RECEIVE TRACTORS.

BT-4

PAGE TWO RUMHNA 3136 SECRET

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 260155Z OCT 67

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(1.3)

PP RUMFTJG RUMFTJM RUAE SR RUAE GL
DE RUMLA 3137 3010 7

SECRET

200157Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/THIRD EN, FIRST MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/HQ LN
ZEN/FIRST RECON EN
ZEN/FIRST AT EN
ZEN/THIRD AMTRAC EN
ZEN/FIRST TK EN
ZEN/FIRST ENGR EN
ZEN/FIRST SP EN
ZEN/FIRST MT EN
ZEN/FIRST MED EN

DRAFTER G-3

RELEASER C/S

CONCUR G-2, G-4



INFO ZEN/CG III MAR
RUAE GL/CG NINTH MAB
RUAE SR/CG FLC/FSR
RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
PAGE TWO RUMLA 3137 S E C R E T
RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR
RUAE SR/THIRD FSR

SECRET
ELT ROTATION (U)

1. CG FIRST MARDIV 260940Z OCT 67 (NOTAL).
2. DIV 0 001300.7A WITH CHS 1 AND 2.
1. REF A REQUESTED NOMINATION OF UNITS FOR ELT.
2. INW REF B ELT 3/1 TASK ORG AS FOLLOWS:

ELT 3/1

THIRD EN, FIRST MAR

DET HQCO, FIRST MAR (RADIO RELAY)

DET HQ EN (POSTAL, DISBURSING, PHOTO)

BTRY C, FIRST BN ELEVENTH MAR

MORTAR BTRY, SECOND BN, ELEVENTH MAR

FIRST PLAT (REIN), CO D, FIRST RECON EN

FIRST PLAT, FIRST FORCE RECON CO FMP

THIRD PLAT (REIN), CO C, FIRST AT LA

PAGE THREE RUMLA 3137 S E C R E T

FOURTH PLAT (REIN), CO E, THIRD AMTRAC EN

THIRD PLAT (REIN), CO C, FIRST TK EN

THIRD PLAT (REIN), CO A, FIRST ENGR EN

DET CO A FIRST SP EN

FIRST PLAT (REIN), CO A, FIRST PT PL

SECOND PLAT (REIN), CO C, FIRST MED EN

DET, DENTAL CO, NINTH MAB

LSU, FLC

DET, IMU, NEG.

3. ELT 3/1 ACTIVATED INW PAR 3 REF E FOR PLANNING EFFECTIVE 211200H NOV 67, AND FOR OPERATIONS ON ORDER 07/11 NOV 67.

SP-4

FT


CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 200157Z OCT 67

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PP RUMFTJG RUMFTJM RUMHFL RUABQL RUABSR
DE RUMHLA 3138 3010159
ZNY SSSSS

P 280159Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER C/S
CONCUR G-2, G-4

INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSR
RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB
RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
RUABSR/THIRD FSR
ZEN/THIRD BN FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
N/FIRST SP BN

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DLT ROTATION (U)

A. III MAF COC 260215Z OCT 67

E. FMFPAC O 001300.13A AS MODIFIED BY ADMIN O FMFPAC MSG
070627Z MAR 67.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3138 SECRET

1. IAW REF A, FOLLOWING INFO IS SUBMITTED, REF B/ APPLIES.

2. DLT 3/1

THIRD BN REIN, FIRST MAR

DET HQ CO, FIRST MAR (RADIO RELAY)

DET HQ BN (POSTAL, DISEURSING, PHOTO)

TRY C, FIRST BN, ELEVENTH MAR

ARTAR BTRY, SECOND BN, ELEVENTH MAR

FIRST PLAT (REIN), CO O, FIRST RECON BN

FIRST PLAT, FIRST FORCE RECON CO

THIRD PLAT (REIN), CO C, FIRST TK BN

THIRD PLAT (REIN), CO C, FIRST AT BN

FOURTH PLAT (REIN), CO B, THIRD AMTRAC BN

THIRD PLAT (REIN), CO A, FIRST ENGR BN

DET CO A FIRST SP BN

FIRST PLAT (REIN), CO A FIRST MT BN

SECOND PLAT (REIN), CO C, FIRST MED BN

DET, DENTAL CO, NINTH MAB

LSU, FLC

DET, BMU, NRG

3. IT IS REQUESTED THAT ENL M/L FOR SP DET BE MODIFIED AS

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 280159Z OCT 67 PAGE 1 OF 2

COPY# 13

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PAGE THREE RUMMLA 3138 S E C R E T
FOLLOWS:

- A. DELETE ONE 1316. SP TM HAS NO WELDING CAPABILITY.
- B. DELETE CPL, LCPL AND TWO PVT 1341, ADD ONE SGT 1341. ADDED EXPERIENCE OF SGT NEEDED TO MAINTAIN EQUIP ON LENGTHY DEPLOYMENT. ONE EXPERIENCED MECH IS SUFFICIENT. THIRD AND FOURTH ECH MECHS AVAILABLE LSU.
- C. ADD ONE SGT 2531. AMOUNT OF COMM EQUIP RECOMMENDS SGT COMM CHIEF.
- 4. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO DELETION FROM THE BLT TASK ORG, THE PLAT OF FORCE RECON CO, BASED ON HEAVY UTILIZATION OF RECON ASSETS BY THIS DIV AND RELATIVELY LIMITED REQUIREMENT FOR USE BY SLF. SHOULD SLF MISSIONS REQ USE OF FORCE RECON PLAT, SUCH CAN BE TRANSFERRED ABOARD EXPEDITIOUSLY.
- 5. IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER DIRECTIVE, INTEND TO ACTIVATE BLT 3/1 FOR PLANNING 1 NOV67.

GP-4

ET

PAGE 2 OF 2

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RUABQJ RUABJN RUHGU RUHBRA RUHHQA RUHFC RUHFM RUHFO
 DE RUMMF 2726 3011536
 ZNY CCCCC

OP 281536Z OCT 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHGU/COMSEVENTHFLT
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 RUHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC
 RUHBRA/COMPHIBPAC
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/CG FORL OGCMO
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABQJ/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUABJN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT F
 RUABJN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 BT

ADV RT G-3
 G-3 TUR 281710Z
 CCN 12336



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PAGE TWO RUMMF 2726 S E C R E T
 S E C R E T

ARG/SLF BRAVO (CTG 76.5/79.5) EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

A. CG III MAF 251422Z OCT 67 (S)

B. ADMI O CINCPACFLT 270124Z OCT 67 (S) NOTAL

C. CINCPAC 262131Z OCT 67 (S) NOTAL

1. FOR ALL: REF A AS APPROVED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES BY REF B
 REFERS.

2. FOR CONSEVENTH FLT:

A. DUE TO TRIPOLI AVAIL AND EXCHANGE OF TG 76.5 SHIPPING, REQUEST
 SCHEDULE CONTAINED PARA 2B REF A BE MODIFIED AS F
 DELETE:

1-6 NOV BACKLOAD, REHAB DNG

7-28 NOV AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT

ADD:

1-7 NOV AVAIL SPECOPS FIRST MARDIV, ARG IN SUPP

5-10 NOV BACKLOAD, REHAB DNG

11-28 NOV AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT

B. REQUEST CONTINUATION DIRLAUTH CTF 76/CTF 79 WITH THIS HQ FOR
 PD 1 NOV 67 TO 1 FEB 67 IAW REF C.

3. FOR THIRD MARDIV: PRESENT PLAN IS TO MAKE BOTH ARG/SLF AVAIL

PAGE THREE RUMMF 2726 S E C R E T

YOUR USE IAW SCHEDULE REF A AS MODIFIED BY THIS MSG. SUBMIT CON-
 CEPTS TO THIS HQ AS NECESSARY, TO INCLUDE AO AND DATES ARG/SLF
 REQD.

GP-4

BT

CG III MAF

281536Z

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PP RUMHIC
DE RUMH.A 3276 3020320
ZNY 65555

P 290320Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARCIV REIN
TO RUMHIC/AMERICAN TOC
INFO ZEN/III MAP CGC

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASER: G-3

SECRET
RECON OPNS

1. REQUEST CONCURRENCE CONDUCT RECON INSERT 300930H OCT WITH EXTRACTION 021030H NOV 67. AREA OF OPNS FROM AT 8429 SOUTH TO. AT 8426 WEST TO AT 8026 NORTH TO AT 8029 EAST TO START PT.
2. REQUEST AREA BE FFZ FOR RECON INSERT AND NFZ ALL OTHERS.

GP-4
BT

CG 1ST MAR DIV

290320Z OCT 67


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RR RUMHVP
DE RUMHLA 3285 3020530
ZNY CCCCC

R 290530Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO ZEN/THIRD AMTRAC BN

DRAFTER:T-3
RELEASER:G-3

col

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. CG THIRD MARDIV 280435Z OCT 67
1. ASSUMED OPCOM 271200H OCT ELEVEN LVTP-5, ONE LVTP-5 CMD;
ONE OFFICER, TWELVE ENLISTED. REF A APPLIES.
GP-4
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV


290530Z OCT 67

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DE RUMLA 3295 3020655
ZNY CCCCC

P 290655Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/THIRD AMTRAC BN

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASER: G-3

BT
CONFIDENTIAL
CHANGE OF OPCON (U)

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 280435Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

1. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV: ASSUMED OPCON DET, CO B, 1ST AMTRAC BN
EFF 271200H OCT 67. REF A APPLIES.

2. FOR THIRD AMTRAC: PASSED OPCON DET, CO B, 1ST AMTRAC BN, K
ELEVEN LVTP-5, ONE LVTP-5 CDM; ONE OFFICER, TWELVE ENLISTED K
EFF 271200H OCT 67.

GP-4
BT

CG 1ST MARDIV 290655Z OCT 67


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FM BUNHUA
 DE BUNHUA 3522 302035 8
 ZNY 08005

P 290858Z OCT 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO BUNHUA/CG FMFPAC (K023)
 INFO ZEN/CG IYI MAP
 ZEN/THIRD BN FIRST MARINES

DRAFTER G-2
 RELEASER G-1
 CONCUR G-3

COC

SECRET
 AT NOTATION

1. CG FIRST MARDIV LTR 1/WHH/MLB OVER 5300 OF 14 SEP 67 (NOTAL)
 2. FMFPAC G 601300.13A
 3. IN ABSENCE OF OTHER DIRECTIVE THE M/L FOR THE INF BN
 SCHEDULED FOR ACTIVATION AS BLT 3/1 WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
 BAH AND W/S SUMMARIES SUBMITTED BY REF A IN LIEU OF M/L AUTH-
 ORIZATIONS PROMULGATED BY APPENDIX B AND D OF ENCL (3) TO REF B.

4-4
 10.

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 290858Z OCT 67

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DE RUMHLA 335 6 3 02 1245
ZNY CCC CC

P 291245Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV REIN
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

DRAFTER G-3
RELEASER G-3
CONCUR AIRO, G-4


BT
CONFIDENTIAL
ROUGH RIDER AIR SPT
A. CG THIRD MARDIV 280135Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
1. IAW REF A AIR COVER WILL BE PROVIDED FOR ALL ROUGH RIDERS
RETURNING TO THIRD MARDIV (PHU BAI).
G-4
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN P 291245Z OCT 67

(112)

CONFIDENTIAL

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RR RUMHIE
DE RUMHIA 3369 312 345
ZNY THREE
RUMHIE-7-NINTH E 01
FIRST E 01

0292345Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIRST MARDIV APOON OPCON
BT

DRAFTER: S/S
RELEASER: COMMANDING GENERAL
CONCUR: C/S

UNCLAS E F T O

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM CG III MAF/ SA I CORPS
QUOTE PLEASE CONVEY MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION TO THE OFFICERS AND
MEN OF YOUR COMMANDS FOR THEIR FINE PERFORMANCE IN THE EXECUTION
OF OPERATIONS DURING THE TWO RECENT ELECTION PERIODS. ALL CAN TAKE
PRIDE IN THE FACT THAT 84 PER CENT OF THE ELIGIBLE VOTERS IN THE I
CORPS AREA CAST THEIR BALLOTS DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND
78 PER CENT VOTED DURING THE LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS. THIS IS A
TRIBUTE TO THE ACTION OF THE ARVN FORCES, U.S. MILITARY FORCES AND
FREE WORLD FORCES DESPITE INCREASED AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY THE ENEMY.
MY HEARTY THANKS FOR ANOTHER JOB WELL DONE. UNQUOTE.

2. IN ADDITION, I WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION
TO YOU FOR MAINTAINING YOUR HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE IN THIS
ARDUOUS TASK.



YOUR LAHUE SENDS

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV

292345Z OCT 67

CONFIDENTIAL



OO RUMHVN RUMSEP
DE RUMHLA 3379 3930344
ZNY CCCCC

0300344Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/FIFTH MARINES
ZEN/ELEVENTH MARINES

DRAFTER: 3:JDC:KGB

RELEASED 0-3

CONCUR: OPNS, G-2

INFO RUMHVN/CG I CORPS
ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMHVN/ I CORPS ADV GRP
RUMHVN/DIR/DEP DIR I CORPS DASC
RUMHVN/SA CUANG DA SPEC ZONE
RUMSEP/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
RUMSEP/SA COASTAL GROUP FOURTEEN
ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES
ZEN/THIRD AMPH TRAC BN
ZEN/FIRST TK BN
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPOT INTEL REPORT/OPN TATTOO

1. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES REPORT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN
ATTEMPT BY THE ENEMY TO INFILTRATE AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES TO
FORCES IN SOUTHERN I CORPS BY SEA. POSSIBLE AREAS FOR ATTEMPTED

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3379 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INFILTRATION ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE CAU DAI RIVER (BT2056), THE
CENTRAL QUANG TIN COAST, AND THE BATANGAN PENINSULA AREA. THE
INFILTRATION ATTEMPT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS TO COVER THE ATTEMPT. THE MOST FAVORABLE
TIME FOR AN INFILTRATION ATTEMPT IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE PERIOD
FROM 3 THROUGH 7 NOVEMBER, AS THIS IS THE DARK OF THE MOON AND
HIGH TIDES WILL OCCUR BETWEEN 2237H AND 0124H.
2. ALL COMMANDS CONCERNED WILL EXERT MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO ASSURE
THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED INFILTRATION DOES NOT OCCUR.

SP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV

300344Z OCT 67

(114)

CONFIDENTIAL

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FIRST MARDIV COC

AMERICAL TOC

3:22H:7Jv
NABREL

III MAP COC

PPP
PPP

~~RECON OPMS~~

UNCLAS

UNCLAS

A. FIRST MARDIV COC 270015Z OCT 67

3 PLEASE CANCEL REF A REQUEST.


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0 P 302701Z OCT 47
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUMH/CG THIRD MARDIV

ZEN/00 FIRST MAW
ZEN/NO EN
ZEN/SEVENTH MAW
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAW
ZEN/FIRST ENGR EN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR EN
ZEN/FIRST MI EN

INFO RUMHVN/SA 1 CORPS
RUMHVN SENIOR ADVISOR DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR
TEN/FIRST LAMP DE
BT

2027 T

PAGE 3 167-67 RG 101 RIDER CONVOY CU

4. CG III MAP/SA 1 CORPS 270745Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

3. OF III MAR 28 1937 OCT 67 (TOTAL)

C. ANNEX F TO FIRST HARDIV ADMIN 0301-60 (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3406 S E C R E T

6. THREE MARDIV AD IN 0 415-67 (NOTAL)

10 EAST MARDIV 0 02000.20 (CEGD) (NOTAL)

THIRD MAR DIV 20 DEC. 21 (CONTINUED)

1. HELPS A AND P 30 AF SKED FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS TO NORTHERN
ICHT, ASSIGNS BUSH NSILITIES AND PROVIDES FOR COORDINATION OF
OPNS THROUGH 22 NO 47. FIRST HADIV CONDUCTS CONVOY SKED DPT
DANAN 31 OCT 67 FOR PHU BAI.

2. POL CG III M/F

1025 REQUEST 1027 PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLICT IN USE ON

3. REQUEST CIVIL CT LIAISON AND COORDINATE WITH RVN FORCES
IN ORDER TO GET THE BEST FOR CONVOY PASSAGE, TRAFFIC CONTROL SECURITY
AND THE AREA.

SECRET

REQUEST AND PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE WHILE
DIV TAOR.

THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY OF RIFLE PLAT REIN
WARTY HQ FAC, SPT SPT AND CONTROL AND SERVICE VEH.

C. REQUEST FOR DE BILLETING AND MESSING FOR APPROX 475 PERSONNEL FOR BLOC 57. REQUEST STAGING AREA APPROX 140 VEH.

02 FIRST RELEASE

1074 3120

PAGE 1 OF 2

475-23117

SECRET

(116)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMBLE 3406 S E C R E T

1. CHOP POINT. FIRST/THIRD MANDIV BOUNDARY. CHPT 14.

2. FOR CG FIRST MAND. REQUEST PROVIDE VEH AUGMENTATION IAW REF A.

3. SEVENTH MAND. REQUEST PROVIDE BRIDGING AS REQUIRED.

4. EXECUTION

A. SEVENTH MAND. PROVIDE FORCES IAW PARA 3D OF REF C.

B. ELEVENTH MAND. PROVIDE APTY GTH IAW PARA 3E OF REF C.

C. FIRST ENR. NO. PROVIDE SPT IAW PARA 3G REF C LESS

BRIDGING SUPPORT.

D. FIRST NY EN. PROVIDE MT SPT IAW PARA 3F REF C.

E. HQ BN. INSURE POSITIVE TRAFFIC CONTROL APPROACHES NAMO
BRIDGE/FERRY SITE.

F. COORD INSTLS

(1) REFS C AND D AS APPLICABLE.

(2) D-DAY HOUR

(A) DANANG TO PHU BAI 210000H OCT 67.

(B) PHU BAI TO DANANG 010700H NOV 67 OR AS DIRECTED

BY CG THIRD MAND.

(3) AIR SPT DANANG TO PHU BAI ARRANGED BY THIS HQS.

(4) ALL RADIO NETS WILL BE CHECKED OUT PRIOR TO CONVOY DPT.

(5) ALL CONVOY PERSON WILL HAVE GAS MASKS IN THEIR

POSSESSION.

PAGE FOUR RUMBLE 3406 S E C R E T

(6) ALL VEH. WILL HAVE AT LEAST TWO PERS ABOARD.

(7) DIRLATTI ALCON.

7. COMM-ELECT

A. REF D AND E.

B. SEVENTH MAND. MONITOR THIRD MANDIV CONVOY CONTROL NET 1MK

0700Z OCT 67.

2-1



PAGE 7 OF 2

BT

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PP RUMFTJM RUABSR RUABQL RUAUB
DE RUMHLA 3471 3040158
ZNY CCCCC

P 310158Z OCT 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/THIRD BN FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN

DRAFTER: G-3
RELEASER: G-3

INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAR
RUABSR/CG FLC/FSR
RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB
RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
RUABSR/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIFTH MAR
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/HQBN FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/FIRST AT BN
ZEN/THIRD AMTRAC BN
ZEN/FIRST TK BN
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN

COL

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3471 C O N F I D E N T I A L

ZEN/FIRST SP BN
ZEN/FIRST MED BN
ZEN/FIRST MT BN
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

BLT ROTATION (U)

A. CG III MAF 300638Z OCT 67

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 230157Z OCT 67

C. CG FIRST MARDIV 280159Z OCT 67

1. IAW REF A DELETE FIRST PLAT FIRST FORCE RECON CO FM REFS B AND C.

2. IN REFS B AND C CH DET FIRST SP BN TO READ DET CO A, FIRST SP BN.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 310158Z OCT 67

(117)


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DRAFTER: G-3
 RELEASER: ADC
 CONCUR: AIRO
 G-3
 C/S



5115

COC

DE RUMHLA 3474 3040215

ZNY SSSSS

R 310216Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

O FIFTH MAR

SEVENTH MAR

SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

FIRST RECON BN

INFO CG III MAF

CG FIRST MAF

BT

SECRET

SECURITY FOR CASUALTIES

1. THE EVIDENT TENDENCY ON THE PART OF COMBAT UNITS TO SLOW DOWN OR TEMPORARILY HALT PURSUIT OF THE ENEMY AFTER RECEIVING CASUALTIES IS A MATTER OF CONCERN. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS INCIDENTS WHERE THE ENEMY HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF SUCH INSTANCES TO REORGANIZE AND CONCENTRATE HIS FIRE AGAINST THE STATIONARY FRIENDLY FORCE, THEREBY ALMOST INVARIABLY INCREASING THE CASUALTIES. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENSIVE POSTURE UNTIL THE CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN EVACUATED IS ONLY JUSTIFIED IN EXTREME SITUATIONS.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3474 **SECRET**

2. IN ADDITION THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT THE ENEMY IS UTILIZING THE TECHNIQUE OF ENGAGING A FRIENDLY FORCE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF INFLECTING CASUALTIES IN HOPES OF SETTING A HELO TRAP. HE IS ASSURED BY OUR PAST PERFORMANCE OF CONTINUED HELICOPTER ACTIVITY IN THE AREA IN AN EFFORT TO EXTRACT CASUALTIES.

3. THE BEST REMEDIAL ACTION TO REDUCE THE ENEMY'S EFFECTIVENESS IN THESE SITUATIONS IS TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT AND RELENTLESS PRESSURE ON HIM. CONTACT MUST NOT BE BROKEN. THE ENEMY MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO MAINTAIN POSITIONS WHICH WILL PROVIDE TIME FOR HIM TO MASS FIRES. UNIT MOVEMENT MUST BE CONTINUOUS, AND ALTHOUGH IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT CASUALTIES BE PROVIDED PROPER SECURITY IT DOES NOT USUALLY REQUIRE THE EFFORTS OF THE ENTIRE UNIT.

4. UNIT LEADERS MUST BE MADE AWARE OF THE PITFALLS OF REDUCING PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY AND BE REORIENTED TOWARD TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES WHICH EMPHASIZE THE OBJECTIVES OUTLINED IN PAR 3 ABOVE.

3P-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 310216Z OCT 67

18

82

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SECRET

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PP RUMHFL RUMHVH RUMHIC RUMHIE
DE RUMHLA 3475 3040217
ZNY SSSSS

RUMHIE I FIRST MOSP CO

P 310217Z OCT 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO ZEN/CG III MAF

INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV

RUMHFL/CG FLC

ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV OPCON

RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS ADV GROUP

RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

BT

S E C R E T

CONCEPT FOR OPERATION ESSEX

1. CONSISTENT INTELL REPORTS OF 2D MVA DIV. HQ ELEMENTS AND EN TROOP ACTIVITY VIC SOUTHEASTERN PORTION ANTENNA VALLEY INDICATE NECESSITY FOR OPERATIONS THAT AREA. PROPOSED SIZE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN AS OUTLINED IN FOLLOWING PARA'S.
2. MISSION. COMMENCING 5 NOV, SECOND BN (-) REIN FIFTH MAR CONDUCTS ASLT FOLLOWED BY S&D OPNS IN ORDER TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY ENEMY CACHES, INSTALLATIONS AND MATERIAL, DISRUPT COMMAND HQ FUNCTIONS, OBTAIN INTELL AND TO KILL OR CAPTURE EN FORCES.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3475 **S E C R E T**

3. AREA OF OPNS. EXTENDING FROM AT8643 TO AT9443 TO AT9336 TO AT8430 TO AT8630 TO AT8643.
4. CONCEPT. HELIBORNE ASLT FOLLOWED BY S&D OPN. RECON INSERTS INTO AO TO FIND EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES. BALD EAGLE RESERVE.
5. FORCES INVOLVED
SECOND BN (-) REIN FIFTH MAR (4 CO'S)
BT FIRST RECON BN
ARTY, ENG AND SP AUGMENTATION AS REQ.
6. PEAK HELICOPTER LOAD D-DAY: LIFT FOR 500 TROOPS DISTANCE OF APPROX 30 KM.
7. COORDINATION. TO BE ESTABLISHED WITH CG AMERICAL DIV.
8. SCHEDULE
 - A. D-DAY 5 NOV 67
 - B. L-HOUR TO BE ANNOUNCED
 - C. DURATION 8-10 DAYS

SP-4


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CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

310217Z

OCT 67

COPY#



DRAFTER: G
RELEASE: ADG
CONCUR: 2-2
3-4
TIRU
C/S

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VV MFL431KMAF-T-FIRST ARDIV
 VV VPF118ZNY SSSSS

P 311310Z OCT 67
 FM FIRST MARINES
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

ADV RT G-3
 G-3

TOR:012144
 CEN:375

BT

SECRET

TANK REQUEST

1. FIRST MAR 271447Z OCT 67

1. REF A REQUESTED ASSIGNMENT OF TANK COMPANY TO 1ST MAR. FOLLOWING AMPLIFIES ON THAT REQUEST.

2. SURVEY OF TRAFFICABILITY FOR TANKS/CARRIERS FROM DONG HA TO 1ST MAR COMBAT BASE INDICATES VEHICLES CAN TRAVEL ENTIRE DISTANCE ON ROUTE 1.

3. TWO BRIDGES WILL REQUIRE TANKS TO DISMOUNT FROM CARRIERS AND CROSS INDEPENDENTLY. BRIDGE AT YD 329534 TOO NARROW TO PERMIT PASSAGE, HOWEVER STREAM CAN BE FORDED AT PRESENT. QUANG TRI BRIDGE (YD 329519) HAS 6 INCH CURB ON ROADWAY RENDERING IT TOO NARROW FOR TANKS. PLANKING CAN BE USED TO INCREASE CURB WIDTH ON WHICH TANKS COULD THEN TRAVEL WITH REQUISITE CLEARANCE TO PERMIT PASSAGE.

GP-4

BT FIRST MARINES

COPY NR#

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311310Z OCT 67

(120)

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

DivO 5720.4A
5/HJW/jec
5 Oct 1967

DIVISION ORDER 5720.4A

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Operational/Serious Incident Reports

Ref: (a) MCO 05740.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5740.1
(c) ICCI 5830.1A
(d) FMFPacO P5700.1A
(e) DivO P3040.1
(f) DivO 3480.1
(g) DivO 5101.1A

Encl: ✓(1) Format for Operational Incident Report (Spot)
✓(2) Format for Serious Incident Report (SIR)

Reports Required: I. Operational Incident Report (Spot), Par 5a
II. Serious Incident Report (SIR), Par 5b

1. Purpose. To prescribe policies and procedures for the timely and accurate reporting of significant information/incidents which may be of concern to U.S. National authorities.

2. Cancellation. DivO 5720.4.

3. Background

a. References (a), (b), (c), and (d) require immediate reports to higher headquarters of any incident that results in death or serious injury to friendly forces or noncombatants, any incident that may reflect adversely upon U.S. Forces and their mission in Vietnam, and any incident which may receive widespread adverse publicity. The requirement to report all types of serious incidents serves many purposes:

(1) It permits sound command supervision of all related matters, so that appropriate corrective action may be applied.

(2) The appropriateness of existing procedures, orders, and instructions is tested by every incident.

(3) Reports may indicate inadequate efforts to assist innocent victims of operational or administrative mishaps in every way possible.

(121)

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DivO 5720.4A

5 Oct 1967

b. The Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF, is charged with reporting such incidents to the Commanding General, III MAF, who in turn is responsible for reporting to higher authority. The Commanding General, III MAF, coordinates release to the press of information concerning serious incidents.

c. All units will continue to report U.S. casualties resulting from these incidents in accordance with reference (e).

d. This order is not intended to alter or supersede the requirement for submission of Spot Reports as outlined in enclosure (2), Annex E to reference (f). Rather, its intent is to clarify the reporting on certain of the elements outlined therein.

e. Accidental discharges will be reported in accordance with instructions contained in reference (g). Accidental discharges will not be reported as serious incidents unless they result in the injury or death of a Vietnamese National.

4. Reportable Incidents

a. Operational incidents to be reported utilizing the Spot Report format (enclosure (1)) include but are not limited to the following:

- (1) Initiation and results of U.S. or friendly tactical operations.
- (2) U.S. casualties, regardless of cause.
- (3) Downed or missing friendly aircraft.
- (4) Relocation of major friendly combat/combat support units (company or larger).
- (5) Enemy initiated attacks on U.S. or friendly forces and facilities.
- (6) Terrorist attacks on friendly localities or personnel.
- (7) Discovery of significant arms or supply caches and detection of infiltration operations.
- (8) VC atrocities or war crimes.
- (9) Evidence of VC use of new type of military equipment or VC adoption of new tactics.
- (10) Capture of senior enemy officers or VC cadre.
- (11) The launching, retrieving and results of Sparrow Hawk/Bald Eagle.

DivO 5720.4A

5 Oct 1967

- (12) Other reaction forces; when and why launched and results.
- (13) Launch of significant helilift; completion of lift.
- (14) Significant visual reconnaissance sightings.
- (15) Air to air contact, ground to air AA sightings.
- (16) Motor vehicle convoys departing and arriving in TAOR's; delays.
- (17) Change in status of main LOC.
- (18) Change in alert forces (units, times).
- (19) Company or larger troops lifts.
- (20) Suspected or alleged border violations of RVN or contiguous nations.
- (21) Incidents involving prisoners of war for whom the U.S. has responsibility under the Geneva Conventions, including death, serious injury, riots and successful escapes.
- (22) Injury or death of friendly forces or noncombatants during tactical operations due to U.S. ordnance.
- (23) Incidents, attacks and civil disturbances which physically or psychologically affect the people of Vietnam or the image of the central government. Of particular interest are incidents which have a direct impact on the Revolutionary Development program or the ability of the government to carry out the program.

b. Serious non-operational/administrative incidents involving moral turpitude which may result in damaging public confidence in the U.S. Armed Forces and which, because of the nature of personnel involved, may be reasonably expected to arouse public interest and cause continuous or widespread publicity, will be reported utilizing the Serious Incident format (enclosure (2)). The following are illustrative of reportable incidents in this category:

- (1) Mistreatment of noncombatants.
- (2) Death from other than natural causes.
- (3) Rape or an assault with intent to commit rape or other serious sex offenses.
- (4) Significant damage to Vietnamese property brought about by actions of U.S. Nationals.

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DivO 5720.4A
5 Oct 1967

(5) Burglary, robbery, arson, misappropriation, fraud or extortion of major significance.

(6) Riots or other disorders resulting from an incident caused by U.S. Nationals.

(7) Blackmarketing, smuggling, and currency manipulations.

(8) Involvement of U.S. Nationals with military or civilian personnel of a foreign power in a criminal incident of immediate or potentially serious significance from a political, military or public relations standpoint.

c. In all instances which occur, command judgement must be applied and a determination made as to the impact that the incident will have on the populace, on our efforts in the conduct of military operations, and on pacification progress. The publicity potential of the incident must also be considered. Therefore, care must be exercised in assessing the effect of the incident and its categorization as a serious incident. This categorization process will have a definite bearing on the detail required in initial report preparation and the need for subsequent or follow-up reporting.

5. Reporting Procedures

a. Operational Incidents. Initial Spot Reports on operational incidents will be made to the 1st Marine Division COC by the most rapid available means, subject to security requirements, at the earliest time that the significant facts can be determined. Operational incidents except those involving noncombatants are to be reported utilizing the Spot Report Format (enclosure (1)). Incidents which involve noncombatants will utilize the Serious Incident Report Format (enclosure (2)). Each report must indicate whether the report is an initial, interim, or final report. Examples:

(1) If, at the time of reporting it is determined that an additional report may be required, so indicate by stating "Initial Report. Interim/Final Report follows".

(2) If, at the time of reporting it is determined that the report is complete and no follow-up is required, so indicate by stating "Initial/Final Report".

(3) The submission of a follow-up report must state whether the report is an interim or final report.

b. Serious (Non-Operational/Administrative). To be meaningful, Serious Incident Reports may require detailed information and this information should be included in the report, even at the cost of some delay. Initial reports should be made not more than 24 hours from the time the incident was known to military authorities. Such reports will be made to the 1st Marine Division COC by the most rapid available means, consistent with security requirements, utilizing the Serious Incident Report format (enclosure (2)).

DivO 5720.4A

5 Oct 1967

(1) Interim reports on serious incidents will be made to the 1st Marine Division COC as soon as information is available, but not later than 72 hours after the incident was known to military authorities. Additional interim reports should be made when it becomes apparent that undue delay in submission of a final report will be encountered as the result of continued investigation.

(2) A final written report to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, will be submitted (original and two copies) consolidating the initial and interim reports, together with any additional information obtained. The final entry shall state, "No further report will be submitted unless investigation or developments warrant". An initial Serious Incident Report can be a Final Report provided all essential information is included and the report is complete. In this case, the above entry statement will be included.

6. Action

a. Commanding Officers under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division are responsible for reporting all incidents arising out of operations conducted by their commands, or otherwise related to personnel and units under their operational control, and will take such action as is deemed necessary to implement these instructions.

b. The 1st Marine Division COC will receive and record operational and serious incident reports at this Headquarters and report them in accordance with the instructions promulgated by this Headquarters.


H. J. WOESSNER
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "A" and "B"

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DivO 5720.4A
5 Oct 1967

Format for Operational Incident Report

SPOT REPORT

(Initial) (Follow on) (Final)

Alpha - (UNIT SENDING REPORT)
Bravo - (DTG OF ACTIVITY/INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED)
Charlie - (LOCATION BY COORDINATES)
Delta - (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW)
Echo - (RESULTS OR ACTION TAKEN)
Foxtrot - (FRIENDLY KIA)
Golf - (FRIENDLY WIA)
Hotel - (FRIENDLY MIA)
India - (ENEMY KIA (CONFIRMED))
Juliet - (ENEMY KIA (PROBABLE))
Kilo - (DETAINEES)
Lima - (ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED)
Mike - (WEAPONS CAPTURED)
November - (EQUIPMENT/DOCUMENTS CAPTURED)

ENCLOSURE (1)

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DivO 5720.4A
5 Oct 1967

Format for Serious Incident Report (SIR)

SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT (SIR)

1. Type of incident.
2. Time and date of incident.
3. Location of incident. Report the exact location, using identifiable landmarks, miles to the nearest town, city or village. Map grid coordinates will be used only when other means of identifying the location are impracticable, and then only when the map is completely identified.
4. Name, grade, and organization of individual rendering report.
5. Name of person(s) involved, to include victim(s), alleged offender(s) and witness(es), including information as to his/her/their:
 - a. Grade or title.
 - b. First name, middle initial, last name.
 - c. Service number.
 - d. Organization or address.
 - e. Sex and date of birth.
 - f. If civilian, indicate status; i.e., DAC, dependent, etc., in place of service number.
6. A complete narrative summary of factual information concerning the incident. When indicated because of the nature of the incident, the extent of injuries to personnel and estimated dollar value of damages or loss will be included.
7. Status and location of personnel involved.
8. Designation of the organization or offices, military and civilian, conducting the investigation.
9. Statement as to actual or anticipated reaction, by the civil populace, to the incident and news items relative to the incident.
10. Include a statement that the local S-2 or Intelligence Officer (has) (has not) been notified of this incident.
11. Additional information, if applicable.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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DivO 5720.4A

5 Oct 1967

12. State further command action contemplated: preventive, disciplinary, claims, Civic Action/Civil Affairs, condolence/solatum, etc.

13. Terminal Report: (This is final report; no further report will be submitted unless subsequent investigation or developments warrant).

ENCLOSURE (2)

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
 160800H October 1967

Operation Order 301-68

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6540 I, II; 6541 II; 6640 I, II, III, IV; 6641 II, III
 (b) CG III MAF LOI 4-67
 (c) CG 1stMarDiv 130003Z Mar67 (S) (Frag O 30-67 w/ch 1, 2)
 (d) 1stMarDiv Oplan 319-67 (PW Breakout Plan)
 (e) 1stMarDiv Oplan 303-67 (Relief/Rein of CIDG Camps)
 (f) 1stMarDiv Oplan 3-67 (Non-combatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan)
 (g) Air Base Defense Bn OperO 101-67 (Air Base Defense)
 (h) III MAF OperO 308-66 (Base Defense)
 (i) 1st MarDiv Administrative Order 301-67
 (j) 1stMarDiv OperO 304-67 (Revised) (Alert Forces)
 (k) 1stMarDiv Oplan 305-67 (Provisional Infantry Companies)
 (l) III MAF Campaign Plan 1-67
 (m) Div Order P3410.1 (Psychological Operations SOP)
 (n) Div Order 3480.1 (Operational Reports)
 (o) 1stMarDiv CEOI P02000.2

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization) and current monthly Task Organization Report.

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence), current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) CG III MAF conducts military operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) in support of and in coordination with CG I ARVN Corps and in other areas of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) as directed by COMUSMACV to destroy VC/NVA main and guerrilla forces; conducts operations to support the Revolutionary Development Program in established TAOR's and other areas; and conducts other operations as directed by COMUSMACV.
- (2) Commander, U. S. 7th Fleet provides shore bombardment and gunfire support to forces operating ashore in South Vietnam.

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- (3) Commander, U. S. 7th Air Force conducts offensive and defensive tactical air operations.
- (4) Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, in coordination with Commander, Vietnamese Navy (VNN), detects and restricts enemy seaborne infiltration traffic into I CTZ.
- (5) CG I ARVN Corps, in coordination with CG III MAF, supports the Revolutionary Development Program; conducts operations in I CTZ to protect and control natural resources, open and secure LOC's and eliminate the VC infrastructure; and actively defends principal capitals and district towns.
- (6) CG 3d Marine Division conducts operations within the assigned area of responsibility. (QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces).
- (7) CG Americal Division conducts operations in the assigned area of responsibility (QUANG NGAI Province, QUANG TIN Province, and a portion of QUANG NAM Province).
- (8) CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing conducts aerial counter-insurgency operations against the enemies of GVN within I CTZ, and such other places as directed by higher authority; provides fixed and rotary wing aircraft for all-weather support of III MAF ground forces, RVNAF, and other FWMAF; and, participates in the air defense effort of Mainland Southeast Asia Air Defense Region from assigned bases and such other locations as may be directed by higher authority.
- (9) MACV Advisory Groups provide advice to RVNAF and perform liaison functions between RVNAF and U. S. and other FWMAF.
- (10) CG 1st ARVN Division, conducts operations and supports the Revolutionary Development Program in the 11th DTA (QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces).
- (11) CG 2d ARVN Division, conducts operations and supports the Revolutionary Development Program in the 12th DTA (QUANG NGAI and QUANG TIN Provinces).
- (12) Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone, conducts operations and supports the Revolutionary Development Program in QUANG NAM Province.
- (13) CO, 10th Political Warfare Battalion, ARVN, conducts Psychological Operations in I CTZ.

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- (14) CO, 244th Psychological Operations Company, U.S. Army advises the CO, 10th Political Warfare Battalion and supports psychological operations conducted by the CO, 10th Political Warfare Battalion and the CG III MAF.
- (15) CO, Company C, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), and subordinate detachments, advises, assists and supports Vietnamese Special Forces and selected District Chiefs at Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps throughout the I CTZ.

2. MISSION

1st Marine Division participates in the defense of DA NANG; defends or participates in the defense of other U.S. or GVN vital installations; conducts unilateral and joint offensive operations within assigned TAOR at DA NANG; conducts offensive and reconnaissance operations within assigned reconnaissance zone (RZ) after coordination with Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone; supports Revolutionary Development Program within assigned area of responsibility; and conducts offensive operations exterior to assigned TAOR and RZ upon approval of CG III MAF and in coordination with the Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. Annex C (Concept of Operations).
- b. 5th Marines (Rein)
 - (1) Deploy forces throughout assigned TAOR to provide defense of the DA NANG complex; emphasis on routes of approach to probable rocket/mortar launch positions, to include waterways.
 - (2) Conduct unilateral and joint offensive operations within assigned TAOR.
 - (3) Be prepared to conduct offensive and reconnaissance operations within the RZ on order.
 - (4) Support the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned TAOR. Prepare specific reaction plans for each District Headquarters in assigned TAOR. Be prepared to provide a reaction force for relief of HOA VANG District Headquarters (BT 012723). Coordinate with ARVN forces as applicable. Reference (c).
 - (5) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations exterior to assigned TAOR and RZ on order.

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- (6) Be prepared to provide a company-size reaction force for the defense of SEA ANCHOR (BT 092690).
- (7) Be prepared to provide a company-size reaction force to the CO, Air Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Bn) for the purpose of blocking the escape of prisoners of war from the compound at BT 075715. Reference (d).
- (8) Be prepared to provide a relief force for the CIDG camp at THUONG DUC (ZC 142533) (secondary responsibility). 7th Marines have primary responsibility. Reference (e) (to be modified).
- (9) Be prepared to provide one reinforced battalion for employment anywhere in SVN on a 12-hour notice.
- (10) Upon commitment of the reinforced battalion in the preceding paragraph, be prepared to deploy the remainder of the regiment within an additional 12 hours.
- (11) Be prepared to provide a rifle company (-) (Rein) to the CO, Air Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Bn) for employment in the DA NANG area in connection with evacuation of noncombatants. Reference (f).
- (12) Provide security for engineer projects and the upgrading of Routes #1 and #14, and other critical roads within the TAOR and supplemental area of operations.

c. 7th Marines (Rein)

- (1) Deploy forces throughout assigned TAOR to provide defense of the DA NANG complex; emphasis on routes of approach to probable rocket/mortar launch positions, to include waterways.
- (2) Conduct unilateral and joint offensive operations within assigned TAOR.

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- (3) Be prepared to conduct offensive and reconnaissance operations within the RZ on order.
- (4) Support the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned TAOR. Prepare specific reaction plans for each District Headquarters in assigned TAOR. Coordinate with ARVN forces as applicable. Reference (c).
- (5) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations exterior to assigned TAOR and RZ on order.
- (6) Provide security for the following bridges:
 - (a) Hill 55 Bridge (AT 968606).
 - (b) DAI LOC Bridge (AT 913577).
 - (c) SONG THU BON Bridge (AT 923533).
 - (d) NAM O Bridge (AT 928841).
- (7) Provide security for the ESSO Plant (AT 935865).
- (8) Be prepared to provide a company-size reaction force to defend the LAAM Battery at HAI VAN Pass.
- (9) Be prepared to provide a relief force for the CIDG camp at THUONG DUC (ZC 142533) (primary responsibility). 5th Marines have secondary responsibility. Reference (e) (to be modified).
- (10) Be prepared to provide one reinforced battalion for employment anywhere in SVN on a 12-hour notice.
- (11) Upon commitment of the reinforced battalion in the preceding paragraph above, be prepared to deploy the remainder of the regiment within an additional 12 hours.
- (12) Be prepared to provide a rifle company (-) (Rein) to CO, Air Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Bn) for employment in the DA NANG area in connection with evacuation of noncombatants. Reference (f).
- (13) Provide security for engineer projects and upgrading Routes #14 and #5, and other critical roads within the TAOR.

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d. 2d Bn (Rein), 5th Marines

- (1) Deploy forces throughout assigned TAOR to provide security for AN HOA industrial complex vic AT 8747, to include coal mine vic NONG SON (AT 8139).
- (2) Conduct unilateral and joint offensive operations within assigned TAOR.
- (3) Be prepared to conduct offensive and reconnaissance operations within the RZ on order.
- (4) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations exterior to assigned TAOR and RZ on order.
- (5) Provide security for the southern approach to the SONG THU BON Bridge (AT 923533).
- (6) Provide security for engineer projects and upgrading Route #5 and other critical roads within the TAOR.

e. 11th Marines (-) (Rein)

- (1) Organization for combat. Annex F (Artillery).
- (2) Provide artillery support in defense of the DA NANG base area, airfield and ancillary facilities.
- (3) Provide fires in support of offensive operations within and beyond the TAOR and RZ.
- (4) Be prepared to provide fires in support of ARVN operations as directed.
- (5) Be prepared to provide fire support to the Air Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Bn), on order, in defense of East and West DA NANG. References (d), (g) and (h).
- (6) Assume command of the Northern Sector Defense Command. Establish control and coordination facilities necessary to coordinate defense of assigned sector.
- (7) Be prepared to provide fire support to the infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

f. 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein)

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) General Support.

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- (3) Conduct unilateral reconnaissance operations in the division TAOR, RZ and AOR.

g. 1st Antitank Battalion (-)

- (1) Organization for combat:
 - (a) Co B (-): DS 5th Marines
 - (b) Co C: DS 7th Marines
 - (c) Plat, Co B: DS 2d Bn, 5th Mar
- (2) Provide platoon (-) (three M-50's) for convoy security as directed.
- (3) Be prepared to support infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

h. 1st Tank Battalion, FMF

- (1) Organization for combat:
 - (a) Co A (-): GS
 - (b) Co B (Rein): DS 7th Marines
 - (c) Co C (Rein): DS 5th Marines
 - (d) Plat, Co A: DS 2d Bn, 5th Marines
- (2) Assume command of the Southern Sector Defense Command. Establish control and communication facilities necessary to coordinate defense of assigned sector and provide security for SONG CAU DO bridge (AT998706).
- (3) Be prepared to support infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

i. 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF

- (1) Organization for combat:
 - (a) Co A (-): DS 7th Marines
 - (b) Co B (-): DS 5th Marines
 - (c) Plat, Co A: DS 2d Bn, 5th Marines

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- (2) Be prepared to support infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

j. 1st Engineer Battalion (-)

- (1) Organization for combat:
 - (a) Co B (-) (Rein): DS 5th Marines
 - (b) Co C: DS 7th Marines
 - (c) Plat, Co B: DS 2d Bn, 5th Marines
 - (d) Engr Spt Co (-): GS 1st Marine Division
- (2) Conduct road sweep operations daily, as required, to open the critical roads throughout the TAOR/AO.
- (3) Be prepared to provide engineer support to infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

k. 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-)11th Motor Transport Battalion

- (1) General Support.
- (2) Be prepared to provide direct support on order.
- (3) Be prepared to provide motor transport support to infantry units assigned contingency tasks.
- (4) Reference (i).

l. 1st Shore Party Battalion

- (1) General support.
- (2) Be prepared to support infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

m. 1st Medical Battalion (-)1st Hospital Company

- (1) General support.
- (2) Be prepared to provide direct support as required.

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(3) Reference (i).

n. 7th Communication Battalion, FMF

(1) General support.

(2) Be prepared to provide direct support on order.

(3) Be prepared to provide communication support to task organized headquarters as directed.

o. 9th IT Team (Rein), FMF. Provide interrogation and translation support as required.

p. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Be prepared to provide local defense, or participate in the defense of other US or GVN installations within the TAOR.

(2) Be prepared to provide alert forces as required. Reference (j).

(3) Conduct all operations so that noncombatant casualties and damage to civilian property are minimized. Annex J (Rules of Engagement).

(4) Establish control measures to limit enemy access to food stuffs, weapons, medicine and money. Annex K (Controlled Items).

(5) Defense Readiness Conditions and MACV Security Conditions. Annex I (Alert Postures/Defenses).

(6) Make maximum use of VN liaison personnel during the conduct of operations for identification of friendly forces and as a means of contact with VN civilians.

(7) Establish liaison with GVN officials at province, sector, district and village level, as appropriate, to facilitate the coordination of intelligence and operational activities.

(8) Infantry regimental and battalion commanders be prepared to field a primary and a secondary command group, each capable of exercising tactical control of two or more maneuver elements.

(9) Supplement and assist the Revolutionary Development Program whenever and wherever possible. Annex M (Revolutionary Development).

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- (10) Psychological operations (PSYOPS) are conducted in accordance with references (l) and (m).
- (11) Reports. Reference (n).
- (12) Oplan 120-67 (Air Reinforcement of KHE SANH).
- (13) OperO 302-67 (GOLDEN FLEECE).
- (14) Oplan 305-67 (Provisional Infantry Companies).
- (15) OperO 307-67 (COUNTY FAIR).
- (16) OperO 90-67 (Counter-Rocket).
- (17) OperO 91-67 (Waterway Control).
- (18) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (19) Annex F (Artillery).
- (20) Annex G (Naval Gunfire).
- (21) Annex H (Air Support).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Reference (i).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION—~~ELECTRONICS~~

a. Annex L (Communication—Electronics) and reference (o) (Div CEOI).

b. Command Relations

- (1) Marine forces command relations.
 - (a) 1st Marine Division is under the command, less OPCON, of CG FMFPac and under the OPCON of CG III MAF.
 - (b) The relationship between the supported unit commander and the supporting unit commander is normally that of direct support. For special tasks or operations, attachments for operational control (OPCON) only are made.

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(2) Marine and ARVN command relations.

(a) The basic concept underlying command relations between the 1st Marine Division and ARVN forces is one of cooperation and coordination in the mutual endeavors of both. As a matter of U. S. policy, U. S. forces are not placed under command or OPCON of allied commanders. However, this restriction does not preclude temporary tactical direction of U. S. forces by ARVN commanders under exceptional circumstances and by mutual agreement, or temporary direction of ARVN forces by U. S. commanders under certain circumstances. Matters of this nature will be referred to this Headquarters.

(b) The 1st Marine Division exercises coordination/cooperation/liaison with the Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone and with the Senior Advisor, QUANG DA Special Zone.

(3) In regard to the defense of the DA NANG vital area CG 1st Marine Division establishes necessary command, control and coordination facilities within the Division TAOR in order to direct and supervise the execution of assigned tasks.

c. Command posts. Annex D (Operations Overlay).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- ✓A - Task Organization
- ✓B - Intelligence
- ✓C - Concept of Operations
- ✓D - Operations Overlay
- ✓E - Fire Support Coordination
- ✓F - Artillery
- ✓G - Naval Gunfire
- ✓H - Air Support
- ✓I - Alert/Defense Postures
- ✓J - Rules of Engagement
- ✓K - Controlled Items
- ✓L - Communication—Electronics
- ✓M - Revolutionary Development
- ✓N - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex N (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
 160800H October 1967

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

(All attachments effective as of

1st Marine Division (Rein)

MajGen ROBERTSON

Headquarters Battalion (Rein)

(Subordinate commanders
 not shown due to number of
 changes anticipated while
 this order is in effect).

Headquarters Battalion

1st Dental Co, FMF

2d SCCT, FMF

3d CIT, FMF

7th CIT, FMF

5th Marines (Rein)

5th Marines

Headquarters Company

1st Battalion

3d Battalion

3d Battalion, 1st Marines

2d Plat, 29 CA Co, USA

7th Marines (Rein)

7th Marines

3d Plat, 29 CA Co, USA

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2d Battalion (Rein), 5th Marines

2d Battalion, 5th Marines

5th Plat, 29th CA Co, USA

11th Marines (-) (Rein)

11th Marines (-)

Headquarters Battery

2d Battalion, 11th Marines (Rein) (C/1/11 attached)

3d Battalion, 11th Marines

4th Battalion, 11th Marines

1st Armored Amphibian Company (-), FMF

3d 155mm Gun Battery (SP), (Rein), FMF (2 Plat, 5th 155 Gun Battery (SP), FMF attached)

Battery B, 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery, USA (175 Gun, (SP))

Battery G (-), 29th Artillery, USA (Searchlights)

1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein)

1st Reconnaissance Battalion

1st Force Reconnaissance Company, FMF

1st Antitank Battalion (-)1st Tank Battalion, FMF3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF1st Engineer Battalion (-)1st Motor Transport Battalion (-)11th Motor Transport Battalion, FMF1st Shore Party Battalion1st Medical Battalion (-)

A-2

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1st Hospital Company, FMF

7th Communication Battalion, FMF

9th IT Team (-) (Rein), FMF

9th ITT (-), FMF


3d ITT, FMF

13th ITT, FMF

1st IT, FMF

7th IT, FMF

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON


H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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DaNang, Vietnam
October 1967

ANNEX B TO OPERATION ORDER 301-t8
INTELLIGENCE

References: (a) Maps 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6641 II, III, IV;
6640 I, II, III, IV; 6541 II; 6540 I, II.

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

- a. See current Intelligence Estimate.
- b. See Intelligence Summaries and Periodic and Special Intelligence Reports as issued.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Essential Elements of Information

- (1) Determine if the VC/NVA will attack Marine positions in the DaNang TAOH. If so, where, when, in what strength, with what forces, and from what direction?
- (2) Determine if the VC/NVA will defend VC/NVA - held or controlled areas against Marine operation. If so, when, where, in what strength, and with what forces?
- (3) Determine if the VC/NVA will reinforce units presently in or near the 1st Marine Division TAOH. If so, when, where, how and with what forces?
- (4) Determine if the VC/NVA will withdraw his forces from the 1st Marine Division TAOH. If so, when, to where, and for what reason?

b. Other Intelligence Requirements

- (1) What defenses do the VC/NVA employ in and around their combat positions? Give special attention to the employment of automatic weapons and supporting arms, weak/strong points in the defensive system, secret exits, hiding places for personnel/material, and tunnel patterns.

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- (2) Determine if the VC/NVA will use artillery, heavy mortars or rockets to shell or support an attack upon targets in the vital airfield area and 1st Marine Division positions/installations. If so, by whom, from what position, when, and on which targets?
- (3) Determine the locations of VC/NVA headquarters, camps, rest areas, training areas, special cultivation areas, supply points, and weapon/ammunition storage areas.
- (4) Determine the VC/NVA defenses and counter-measures against reconnaissance, surveillance, and detection techniques/devices. Give special attention to methods of avoiding detection and contact.
- (5) Determine VC/NVA land and water routes for the infiltration of personnel and material in RVN. Give special attention to routes leading into and through the Division's area of operations.
- (6) Determine suitable LZ's in projected areas of operation in the TAOR.
- (7) Determine the methods and techniques employed by the VC/NVA to gain access to friendly positions/installations. Give special attention to infiltration of individuals or units by deceptive or clandestine means to include tunnelling.
- (8) Determine the VC/NVA methods/techniques of communication. Give special attention to the types of radios and telephones utilized and methods of employment; also note signs and signals used for warning; breaking contact; opening fire; and marking minefields, stake traps, and booby traps.
- (9) Determine the attitude of the local population toward the Marines and VC/NVA forces in areas defined as pacified, under pacification, cleared, neither GVN nor VC/NVA controlled, and VC controlled. What factors affect these attitudes?
- (10) Determine methods employed by the VC/NVA to control the population and to install and maintain a hostile attitude toward Americans in the minds of the local population. What is the relative effectiveness of these different methods?
- (11) What is the effect of aircraft bombing, artillery, naval gunfire and tank fire on enemy emplacements with regard to material damage, casualties, and the morale of both VC and civilian population?

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- (12) What actions or attitudes on the part of the local population are indicative of the presence of the VC/NVA in the immediate and/or general area?
- (13) What is the enemy's rocket capability; where are rockets stored, how are they stored and over what routes are they brought for resupply?
- (14) What effect does friendly aerial broadcasting and leaflet dropping have upon enemy morale? What is enemy morale and why?
- (15) What is the enemy's capability of employing and/or defending against NBC warfare?
- (16) What GVN controlled, main routes and bridges are of interest to the enemy?
- (17) What are the enemy's intentions on Revolutionary Development Teams, CAF units and populated centers including District Headquarters?
- (18) What agricultural areas are controlled by the enemy? What areas are actually cultivated by the enemy?
- (19) What is the enemy's anti-vehicular; anti-mechanized capability?
- (20) What is the enemy's capability to employ anti-personnel and antitank mines? Where are these mines manufactured and by whom?
- (21) What is the enemy's capability to defend against an amphibious assault? What counters will the enemy use against amphibious assault vehicles, Swift boats, etc.?

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS

a. Area of Collection Responsibility

- (1) 1st Marine Division is responsible for the overall collection effort in Quang Nam Province.
- (2) All units are responsible for the collection effort within their areas of responsibility.

b. Support for Subordinate Commands

1. Amphibious (-) (main)

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- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations in TAOR with emphasis on daylight and night patrolling, especially in those areas considered the rocket belt, main and subsidiary avenues of approach, waterways and coastal area.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations in any area thus assigned throughout SVN.
- (c) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations at company level when assigned to support Air Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Bn) in the DaNang area.

(2) 7th Marines (Rein)

- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations in TAOR with emphasis on daylight surveillance and night patrolling of the eastern end of Happy Valley, Elephant Valley, Thuong Duc Valley, main and subsidiary avenues of approach and waterways.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations in any area thus assigned throughout SVN.

(3) 2nd Bn 5th Marines (Rein)

- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations in TAOR with emphasis on daylight surveillance and night patrolling.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations exterior to assigned TAOR and RZ.

(4) 11th Marines (-) (Rein)

- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations within Sector and conduct AO/VR daily coverage of the rocket belt.
- (b) Conduct VR from established OP's.
- (c) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations exterior to the Division TAOR/RZ in support of tactical units.

(5) 1st Reconnaissance Bn (Rein)

- (a) Conduct area, route and point reconnaissance throughout the RZ.

B-4

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- (b) Conduct reconnaissance screen for Company, Battalion, and Regimental operations as directed.
 - (c) Conduct reconnaissance operations to cover all likely avenues of approach and egress the enemy could use to launch or withdraw from an attack on the vital area.
 - (d) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations with swimmers in checking key bridges to ascertain threat against same.
- (6) 1st Anti-Tank Bn (-)
- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations with emphasis on acquiring information relative to enemy mechanized and/or anti-mechanized capability.
 - (b) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations in support of infantry units assigned contingency tasks.
- (7) 1st Tank Bn, FMF
- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations within Sector.
 - (b) Conduct VR from established OP's.
 - (c) Conduct Special Intelligence Operations with emphasis on acquiring information relative to enemy mechanized and/or anti-mechanized capability.
 - (d) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations in support of infantry units assigned contingency tasks.
- (8) 3rd Amphibious Tractor Bn (-), FMF
- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations with emphasis on acquiring information relative to enemy amphibious and/or anti-mechanized capability.
 - (b) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations in support of infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

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(9) 1st Engineer Battalion (-)

- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations with emphasis on acquiring information relative to enemy capability to disrupt travel over major roads and key bridges in AOR.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations in support of infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

(10) 1st Motor Transport Bn (-)
11th Motor Transport Bn, FMF

- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations with emphasis on road and bridge surveillance over main routes in AOR.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence in support of infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

(11) 1st Shore Party Bn

- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations in support of infantry units within AOR.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct Special Intelligence Operations in support of infantry units assigned contingency tasks.

(12) 1st Medical Bn (-)/1st Hospital Company (Rein), FMF

- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations with emphasis on acquiring information relative to new or unusual VC/NVA medical practices and/or use of medical supplies and their origin of manufacture.

(13) 7th Communication Bn, FMF

- (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations with emphasis on acquiring information relative to new or unusual VC/NVA communication procedures and/or use of communication equipment.

(14) Aerial Observation Unit

- (a) Conduct aerial reconnaissance flights as directed.
- (b) Report all indications of VC/NVA construction of fixed fortifications.

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- (c) Report all VC/NVA early warning devices and measures.
- (d) Report all sightings of VC/NVA.
- (15) 3rd, 9th and 13th Interrogation-Translation Teams and 1st and 7th Interpreter Teams. Report all significant information obtained from detainee(s) through interrogation; report significant information obtained from captured documents that have been translated.
- (16) All Units Report Immediately
 - (a) All VC/NVA sightings and contacts.
 - (b) The size, direction, and location of all VC/NVA movements.
 - (c) All fighting holes, tunnels, bunkers, caves and other fortifications discovered.
 - (d) Any sudden increase/decrease in attendance at unit market-places.
 - (e) Any sudden increase/decrease in attendance at unit MEDCAP.
 - (f) The location and type of all mines and booby traps found.
 - (g) Any trails, paths, or areas which VN civilians avoid using.
 - (h) All supply and arms caches found.
 - (i) All secondary explosions noted.
 - (j) All suspicious, or unusual river or road traffic.
 - (k) All instances of VC/NVA warning measures and devices.
 - (l) Any other information obtained to satisfy the intelligence requirements.

c. Requests to Higher and Adjacent Commands

(1) CG, III MAF

- (a) Provide, as obtained, any information to satisfy the intelligence requirements.

B-7

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(b) In addition, provide information as obtained on:

1. Hostile ground forces located in areas contiguous to the 1st MarDiv AO.
2. Nature and extent of enemy or potential enemy air threat against 1st MarDiv AO.
3. Movement of additional enemy forces into 1st MarDiv AO.
4. Enemy supply and infiltration routes into and within 1st MarDiv AO.
5. Degree of VC/NVA control of population and resources in areas of projected operations.
6. Beach and surf conditions in objective areas of any projected amphibious operations.
7. Suitable helicopter LZ's or projected operations outside 1st MarDiv AO.

(c) Provide requested aerial photography in support of current or projected operations as required.

(d) Provide assistance in special photo intelligence studies and provide targeting information material as acquired.

(e) Provide additional intelligence specialist support as required.

(f) Provide on call IR, night/day photography and SLAR as requested.

(2) CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Provide observation aircraft for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance.

(3) CO, Unilat Opns Bn., 149th MI Gp. Provide unilateral intelligence coverage.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL

- a. Captured Personnel and Documents. Detainees and captured documents will be processed in accordance with existing directives.

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b. Commanders are referred to the following directives for guidance:

- (1) Division Order 3461.2A.
- (2) Force Order 3461.2A.
- (3) CG, 1st MarDiv msg 280251Z Apr 67

c. Captured Material. Routine processing of captured material will be effected through normal channels. Special emphasis, however, will be placed on rapid evacuation of captured material having significant intelligence value. Items of specific intelligence interest are as follows and will be forwarded to higher echelons as the tactical situation permits.

- (1) All captured material (weapons, ammunition, foodstuffs, and medical supplies) that have not heretofore been encountered.
- (2) All communications equipment to include telephones, radios, and electronics.
- (3) All chemical warfare material (protective masks, decontamination kits, and chemical munitions).
- (4) VC/NVA uniforms, all types including head gear and accouterments.
- (5) Miscellaneous items such as flags, banners, political propaganda, pictures, etc.

5. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

a. Maps and Charts

- (1) The standard tactical map for operations in Vietnam is: Map Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. The following sheets are required for the DANANG TAOR.

6640 I, II, III, IV
 6641 II, III, IV
 6540 I, II
 6541 II

- (2) Map sheets providing coverage of QUANG NAM, QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces with overlap on North, South, and West L7014 Series 1:50,000 scale are as follows:

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6738 I, II, III, IV
 6739 I, II, III, IV
 6740 III
 6638 I, IV
 6639 I, II, III, IV
 6640 I, II, III, IV
 6641 II, III, IV
 6539 I, II, III, IV
 6540 I, II, III, IV
 6541 II, III
 6440 I, II, III, IV

- (3) Map sheets not shown above are available for other areas of SVN in limited quantities upon request. Map requests in large volume should be requested in advance.

b. Requisition and Distribution. Requisition and distribution will be made on an as required basis.

c. Aerial Photographs

- (1) A limited amount of "on hand" aerial photography is maintained at the P/IIU film library for the DaNang TAOR/RZ. Also, a larger film library is maintained and is available at the III MAF P/IIC. This photo coverage is readily available to subordinate units on request through the chain of command, to be signed out on a temporary loan basis.
- (2) Photography can be obtained by submitting a photo request (in writing) to ACoS, G-2 (Attn: P/IIU) in accordance with Division Intelligence SOP.
- (3) Requests for high-performance aerial photography should be submitted at least ten days prior to desired delivery date. Additional delay may be anticipated during periods of inclement weather, particularly during the monsoon season. This factor should be acknowledged, permitting sufficient lead time for processing.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

- a. Counterintelligence personnel are available upon request. Assistance should be requested from the Commanding General (Attn: G-2).
- b. Counterintelligence personnel are authorized direct liaison for dissemination of counterintelligence information to using units.

B-10

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- c. Area counterintelligence studies for special operations are available upon request. Requests should be submitted to the Commanding General, (Attn: G-2).
- d. Blacklists will be disseminated to 1st Marine Division Units as published.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a. Reports

- (1) Spot Reports. All contacts, sightings, and other intelligence information of an urgent nature will be immediately reported to this Headquarters by spot reports. The spot report will be in the format specified in current directives and will answer the questions who, what, where, when and how.
- (2) Shell Report/Mortar Report (SHELREP/MORTREP)
 - (a) See Division Order P3800.1F.
 - (b) VC/NVA use of mortars/artillery/rockets will be reported immediately.
 - (c) Crater analysis will be performed as soon as practicable and the results reported to this Headquarters and to the 11th Marines.
- (3) Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). Regiments and separate battalions will submit daily INTSUM's covering the period 0800-0800 to reach this Headquarters by 1200 daily. The INTSUM will be in the format as specified in DivO P3800.1F.

h. Distribution of Intelligence Reports

- (1) INTSUM's. 1st Marine Division INTSUM will be distributed to higher/adjacent headquarters, regiments and separate battalions.
- (2) Interrogation-Translation Reports. Information of immediate tactical value will be passed to the units concerned by the most rapid means available. Distribution of final reports will be as follows:

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(a) Distribution:

| | | | |
|-------------------|----|-------------------|-----------|
| G-2 III MAF | 25 | DOICC, Hieu Duc | 1 |
| G-2 1st MarDiv | 5 | DOICC, Thang Binh | 1 |
| G-5 1st MarDiv | 1 | S-2 2/5 | 2 |
| SCI 1st MarDiv | 1 | S-2 5th Marines | 5 |
| SIO, QN SS Hoi An | 1 | S-2 7th Marines | 5 |
| DSA I Corps | 1 | 3rd ITT | 1 |
| Cdr, 3rd CIT | 1 | 9th ITT | 1 |
| Cdr, 5th CIT | 1 | 13th ITT | 1 |
| Cdr, 7th CIT | 1 | AFIC, DaNang | 1 |
| DOICC, Hoa Vang | 1 | NSDC | 4 |
| DIOCC, Duc Duc | 1 | SSDC | 4 |
| DOICC, Dia Loc | 1 | G-2 1st MAW | 1 |
| DOICC, Dien Ban | 1 | G-2 FLC | 1 |
| DOICC, Hieu Nhon | 1 | | <u>70</u> |

(3) Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP). This Headquarters will publish a weekly PERINTREP which will receive the same distribution as the INTSUM.

(4) Special Intelligence Reports. When intelligence of special significance or timeliness is available, it will be disseminated by a Special Intelligence Report which will receive appropriate distribution.

8. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. Normal reconnaissance and observation will be carried out by all units in their assigned areas of operations.
- b. Units in contact make maximum effort to take prisoners daily.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

H. J. Woessner
 H. J. WOESSNER
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Chief of Staff

Appendices

None

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
160800H October 1967

Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6540 I, II;
6541 II; 6640 I, II, III, IV; 6641 II, III

1. MISSION

1st Marine Division participates in the defense of DA NANG; defends or participates in the defense of other U.S. or GVN vital installations; conducts unilateral offensive operations within assigned TAOR at DA NANG; conducts offensive and reconnaissance operations within assigned reconnaissance zone after coordination with Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone; supports Revolutionary Development Program within assigned area of responsibility; and conducts offensive operations exterior to assigned TAOR and RZ upon approval of CG III MAF and in coordination with the Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone.

2. DEFINITIONS

- a. Division Tactical Area of Responsibility. The area assigned to the 1st Marine Division in which the responsibility and authority for the development and maintenance of installations, control of movement and the conduct of tactical operations involving troops under division control, is vested in the CG, 1st Marine Division. All fire and maneuver conducted within the TAOR, or whose effects impinge upon it, must be coordinated with the CG, 1st Marine Division.
- b. Division Reconnaissance Zone. The area adjacent to the Division TAOR on the west, and within the AOR, in which offensive operations and extensive reconnaissance of main avenues of approach and critical terrain features are conducted, after coordination with the Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone.
- c. Division Area of Responsibility. The area assigned to the 1st Marine Division, to include the TAOR, over which the CG, 1st Marine Division, has cognizance, but in which he conducts operations outside the TAOR after coordinating with the appropriate GVN authority. The Division AOR consists of QUANG NAM Province

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except for that portion south of the southern boundary of the division AOR.

d. Annex C (Operations Overlay) to Operation Order 301-67 (Revised)

3. TASKS

a. Tasks assigned and/or deduced are listed in order of priority.

b. 1st Marine Division.

- (1) Participates in the defense of the DA NANG base area, airfields and ancillary facilities with emphasis on routes of approach to probable rocket launch sites, to include waterways; and provides combat support to the CO, Air Base Defense Battalion as required.
- (2) Provides local defense, or participates in defense of, other US or GVN installations within the AOR.
- (3) Conducts unilateral and joint offensive and defensive operations within assigned TAOR.
- (4) Conducts offensive and reconnaissance operations within reconnaissance zone, after coordination with the Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone.
- (5) Supports Revolutionary Development Program within assigned area of responsibility.
- (6) Conducts offensive operations exterior to assigned TAOR and RZ on approval CG III MAF in coordination with the Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone.
- (7) Provides alert forces as required.
- (8) Provides security for upgrading of Route #1 in AOR and other critical roads and engineer projects within TAOR.

4. CONCEPT

- a. General. 1st Marine Division deploys its forces throughout the assigned area of responsibility, and establishes necessary control and coordination facilities in order to direct, control, coordinate and supervise the execution of assigned tasks.

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- b. Maneuver elements are disposed to provide maximum security for the DA NANG base areas, airfield and ancillary facilities. Emphasis is placed on the rocket belt and routes of ingress and egress thereto. High density patrolling is established within the rocket belt. Positive control is maintained over waterways. Check points and interdiction of waterways are established to deny the enemy the use thereof. All available mechanical/electrical devices are used to assist with surveillance. Artillery and aerial observers provide aerial surveillance. Artillery and infantry units operate OP's along enemy routes of access.
- c. The division provides combat support for the defense of the DA NANG Air Base. Ground support and artillery fire support are provided, on order, to the CO, Air Base Defense Battalion, for employment as required.
- d. Offensive operations are conducted within the TAOR to disrupt enemy forces, seek, destroy and/or capture enemy personnel, weapons, equipment and materiel. Operations are conducted with division forces, plus supporting forces from FMAW, ARVN, USA and USN, as available or as required. Battalion and larger size operations are conducted only with approval of CG III MAF. Less than battalion size operations are planned and conducted by the participating unit, which keeps higher headquarters informed.
- e. Offensive and reconnaissance operations are conducted within the reconnaissance zone as required. These operations serve the purpose of denying the enemy the opportunity of launching an organized attack against, or within, the TAOR. Enemy lines of communication are disrupted, either through ground action or as the result of observed fire controlled by ground or aerial reconnaissance forces. Division reconnaissance teams conduct reconnaissance operations for periods of four to five days as required. Ground offensive operations are conducted as determined necessary by reconnaissance and/or other intelligence sources.
- f. The Revolutionary Development Program receives continuing support from the Division in the conduct of all operations. Directly, such operations as GOLDEN FLEECE or ELECTION operations have an immediate and beneficial effect. Indirectly, the presence of Marine forces contributes to the program by providing area security. Often, lines of communication are open to indigenous travel only through the efforts of Marine engineer and security forces. All operations conducted by the division within and without the TAOR are planned and conducted with consideration given to the influence on the RD program.

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- (1) Support of Regional Forces and Popular Forces is rendered as required and commensurate with division operations.
- (2) Administrative and operational assistance is provided, as required, to III MAF Combined Action Units located in the division TAOR.
- (3) Civil Affairs Operations.
 - (a) 1st Marine Division conducts military civil affairs operations based on guidance from higher authority in support of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. The term "Revolutionary Development" describes the total counter-insurgency effort. It includes military suppression of the insurgent Viet Cong and behind the protective screen of military force, the exercise of government, political, economic and social measures designed to demonstrate to the populace that life under the GVN is practicable and desirable.
 - (b) Military civil affairs operations of a long term impact nature are conducted in coordination with appropriate GVN Officials and CORDS/MACV Advisors. Projects and programs initiated are compatible with the needs of the civil populace, and are in consonance with the government's overall Revolutionary Development Program.
 - (c) Military civil affairs operations in support of unilateral tactical operations are of short term, immediate impact type, designed to favorably establish the image of U.S. forces in support of the GVN, and to render immediate assistance to the populace. These include rendering medical assistance, the provision of emergency food needs and possibly temporary shelter.
 - (d) Military civil affairs operations in support of combined GVN/U.S. force tactical operations are similar to those conducted in unilateral operations. Such operations are closely coordinated with the participating GVN force(s) and emphasize and foster the image of the GVN.
- g. Offensive operations exterior to the assigned TAOR and RZ are conducted, as required, to disrupt enemy forces and reduce enemy harassing and offensive capabilities. Division maneuver elements and combat support units, supported by friendly forces units, as available and required, conduct these operations with the approval of CG III MAF and in coordination with the Commander, QUANG DA Special Zone.

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- h. The division is prepared to provide local defense, or participate in the defense of other U.S. or GVN installations within the TAOR.
- i. Alert forces are provided, as required, to provide immediate security, reinforce an engaged unit, or to relieve a unit in contact. The alert force is prepared for employment anywhere in SVN. A battalion is prepared to deploy on a 12-hour notice. When this battalion is committed, the remainder of a regimental size force is prepared for deployment on an additional 12-hour notice.
 - (1) The division is prepared to provide relief forces to the CIDG Camp located at THUONG DUC.
- j. Security is provided to engineer units in connection with improvement and maintenance of critical roads within the division AOR. Highway #1 throughout the AOR, Highway #5 from DA NANG to AN HOA, and Highway #14 from HOI AN to DAI LOC and Hill 52 (AT 787552) are upgraded as operational commitments permit.
- k. The First MAW provides fire support with tactical aircraft, helicopter support for tactical lift of troops, resupply and medical evacuation, and other aircraft wing services in support of division operations.
- l. Naval Gunfire Support is provided by Seventh Fleet as available, and as required.
- m. The artillery regiment, reinforced, provides GS and DS in support of division operations.
- n. The division reserve is constituted through alert forces from the maneuver elements and supported by supporting arms as required.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

H. J. Woessner
 H. J. WOESSNER
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Chief of Staff

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
160800H October 1967

Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 301-68

- Ref: (a) Maps: Ref (a) to basic order
(b) DivO P3000.1D (SOP for Operations)
(c) FMFM 7-1 (Fire Support Coordination)
(d) MACV Directive 525-18 (Conduct of Artillery, Mortar, and Naval Gunfire)
(e) OperO 90-67 (Counter-Rocket)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence), current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Annex F (Artillery).
(2) Annex G (Naval Gunfire).
(3) Annex H (Air Support).

2. MISSION

The Division Fire Support Coordination Center exercises overall responsibility for the coordination of all supporting arms in the area of responsibility to insure maximum effective fire support and troop safety to all units.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept. Fire Support Coordination is in accordance with references (a) through (d) except as modified below.
- b. 5th Marines (Rein)
7th Marines (Rein)

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2d Bn. (Rein), 5th Marines

- (1) Coordinate fires within TAOR.
- (2) Be prepared to operate a forward FSCC to coordinate supporting arms in operations outside the TAOR/RZ when directed.

c. Northern Sector Defense CommandSouthern Sector Defense Command

Coordinate fires within assigned sector.

d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Rules of engagement: Annex J (Rules of Engagement).
- (2) Commanders ensure that communication/liason is established and maintained with GVN District Headquarters as required.
- (3) Commanders are authorized to establish precleared zones in coordination with local GVN District Headquarters. Forward overlays of all precleared zones, dated and properly authenticated, to Division FSCC.
- (4) Do not attack targets by Air or Naval Gunfire without positive approval by appropriate FSCC. This procedure is a departure from the objective set forth in paragraph 2104 of reference (c).
- (5) Targets are not attacked by artillery without positive approval by the appropriate FSCC, except as modified by the provisions of reference (e).
- (6) Include canister impact coordinates in requests for clearance to fire illumination missions.
- (7) Fire Support Coordination for Rough Rider. Annex F (Military Convoy Movement) to Administrative Order 301-67.

4. TARGET INFORMATION

a. Target List

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) As maintained by the Target Information Officer and G-2 Section.

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- (3) Units ensure timely flow of target information to higher headquarters.
- (4) Appropriate target information is disseminated to all units as required for specific operations. Targets of opportunity are passed immediately to the unit in whose TAOR/Sector the target appears.

b. Restricted Targets

- (1) Every effort is made to preserve religious, cultural, medical and public utility installations.
- (2) Other restricted targets are specified by the local GVN representative.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

- a. Sav-A-Plane. The sav-a-plane system described in reference (b) is implemented to ensure aircraft safety with respect to surface to surface firing.

b. Air Sentries and Lookouts

- (1) Position air sentries at artillery firing positions to command "Check Fire" when friendly aircraft are observed approaching or in danger area.
- (2) Artillery forward observers and naval gunfire spotters check fire when it appears that the projectile trajectories will endanger friendly aircraft.

c. Restrictive Fire Plan

- (1) When massed artillery and/or naval gunfire could endanger a simultaneous air support mission, a restrictive fire plan is employed. The appropriate FSCC promulgates the restrictive fire plan in accordance with reference (b).
- (2) The unit requesting an air support mission recommends restrictive fire plan if deemed appropriate. Higher echelons do not impose restrictive fire plans contrary to recommendations of requesting units unless the need is clearly indicated.
- (3) The ground commander exercises prudent judgement in use of restrictive fire plans to permit maximum use of all supporting arms available in the accomplishment of the ground force mission

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- d. Landing Zone Preparation. Helicopter landing zones are prepared by supporting arms, as required, prior to their use by helicopters executing a tactical lift.

6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

- a. Fire Coordination Line (FCL). The FCL is a line between two forces beyond which fires may not be delivered without coordinating with the affected force. It is normally established to coordinate fires between two converging forces, such as airborne forces and linkup forces. Fires with effects extending across the line must be cleared with the headquarters of the force on the other side of the line before firing. The FCL is established by the headquarters which controls both forces and follows easily identifiable terrain features.
- b. Units operating independently outside the division TAOR are enclosed by an FCL to ensure safety from friendly fires. The Division FSCC places the FCL into effect upon notification by the unit involved. Division FSCC notifies appropriate agencies of the location and duration of the FCL.

7. COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

- a. Annex L (Communication-Electronics).
- b. In the event land line communications are lost with the Division FSCC, subordinate FSCC's activate the artillery regimental FDC (P) net.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex N (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68 (revised)

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - ARCLIGHT
- 2 - AN/TPQ-10 Targeting and Operations Procedures

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
160800H October 1967

Appendix 1 (ARCLIGHT) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) For/I Corps O 003120.1_

1. GENERAL

- a. ARCLIGHT is the unclassified code word for Strategic Air Command B-52 strikes. ARCLIGHT strike flights are flown in the Republic of Vietnam on a continuing basis to destroy areas and forces associated therewith. This program emphasizes the integration of planned strikes with ground operations. Targets nominated for this purpose receive high priority. Flights may consist of three to thirty aircraft. Six to nine aircraft is an average flight. Each aircraft normally carries twenty-four 500-pound demolition and twenty-four 1000-pound general purpose bombs.
- b. The ARCLIGHT program has the following objectives:
 - (1) Destroy enemy defensive, logistic and training installations.
 - (2) Deter the enemy by taking full advantage of the psychological effects of heavy aerial bombardment.
 - (3) Soften the enemy defenses in specific areas in preparation for planned offensive combat operations.
 - (4) Harass the enemy and degrade his ability to take offensive action.
 - (5) Interdict enemy lines of communication.

2. CRITERIA AND CATEGORIES

- a. In order to be selected for an ARCLIGHT, a proposed target must fulfill at least one of the objectives listed above, and must be:
 - (1) Expected to persist as a target through the period of time required for development, approval and strike. Examples of such targets are heavily prepared defensive areas, bivouac areas, and marshalling and base areas under long time VC control.
 - (2) Of adequate size to warrant using the saturation bombing capability of the B-52 aircraft.

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- (3) Square or rectangular in shape, one to five square kilometers in size and at least one kilometer in width. A target size of one by three kilometers is considered to be of standard size.
 - (4) No closer than three kilometers to friendly troops (U.S., ARVN, FWMAF).
 - (5) No closer than one kilometer to religious shrines, national monuments, places of worship, and/or non-combatants.
- b. Aside from the basic distinction imparted by primarily strategic application and mass of ordnance delivered, ARCLIGHT differs essentially from tactical air strikes in terms of lead time required. Current categories of ARCLIGHT, together with their anticipated reaction times (after final in-country approval) are as follows:
- (1) Planned Strike. A target request that provides MACV a minimum of 48 hours for planning purposes. The great majority of ARCLIGHT requests fall into this category.
 - (2) Immediate Strike. A target request that provides MACV with less than 48 hours but not less than 24 hours for planning purposes. This category provides for exploitation of late intelligence.
 - (3) Quick Reaction Strike (QR). A strike of sufficient priority and time sensitivity to utilize the force of six aircraft on ground alert. A minimum of nine hours from first notification of B-52 unit to Time over Target (TOT) is required.
 - (4) In Flight Diversion Force (IDF). Diversion of a force by MACV after take off to a newly acquired high priority target. Only three aircraft are currently diverted from the main force.
 - (5) Ground Diversion Force (GDF). Diversion of a planned strike by MACV to a new target with no change to the previously planned take-off time. MACV must receive notification of the new target in time to plan, obtain approval, and notify B-52 units of the change a minimum of three hours prior to the scheduled launch time.

3. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

- a. Subordinate commands are encouraged to submit ARCLIGHT requests, with supporting intelligence, to Assistant CofS, G-2. The Assistant CofS, G-2 evaluates the request and is responsible for the preparation of the request for forwarding to III MAF.

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b. ARCLIGHT requests must reach III MAF as indicated:

- (1) Planned strikes: Not later than 12 days prior to the date recommended for the strike. If possible, the same lead time must be provided for targets that are to be integrated with tactical operations.
- (2) Immediate strikes: A minimum of 48 hours prior to the date recommended for the strike.
- (3) Quick reaction strikes: As soon as the target becomes known and when 48 hours is considered to be an unacceptable delay.
- (4) As a general guideline, any target that may dissipate in less than 24 hours should be programmed for strike by organic supporting arms.

c. Targets nominated are submitted by message to CG, III MAF, in the following detail and format:

- (1) Subject: ARCLIGHT request by type, (planned - immediate - quick reaction).
- (2) Par 1: Six digit UTM coordinates of the four corners of the proposed target area.
- (3) Par 2: Map sheet number and series (1:50,000).
- (4) Par 3: Intelligence justification, to include:
 - (a) Nature (description/composition) of target.
 - (b) Text, date, source and evaluation (rating) of supporting intelligence.
 - (c) Though not required, a supplemental narrative discussion and analysis of target is frequently helpful.
- (5) Par 4: Clearance statement to include:
 - (a) A positive statement that there are no friendly troops within a minimum of three kilometers of the target area.
 - (b) A statement that there are no non-combatants, huts, religious shrines, or national monuments in, or within one kilometer of, the target box. If there are structures (not to include religious shrines or national monuments) the statement should indicate that there are no non-combatants, religious shrines or national monuments in, or within one kilometer of, the target box, and that all other structures have been abandoned, destroyed or converted to NVA/VC use.

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- (6) Par 5: Intention of post strike ground exploitation and unit conducting operation. Maximum effort to accomplish ground exploitation is made where location, terrain and tactical situation permit.
 - (7) Par 6: Recommended date and TOT (especially applicable to targets planned for integration with ground operations, and for immediate or quick reaction strikes).
 - (8) Par 7: Date target will no longer be valid.
 - (9) Par 8: Remarks. Normally the message includes I Corps TOC and Company C, 5th Special Forces Group A as information addressees. In such instances paragraph 8 is used to request information addressees to send clearance (concurrence) to Assistant CoFS, G-3, III MAF as soon as possible.
- d. The ARCLIGHT message is routed (concurrence) through the FSCC and Assistant CoFS, G-3 (Operations Officer). The Chief of Staff is the releasing officer.
- (1) The FSCC clears the target with all 1st Marine Division ground commanders concerned. All non-1st Marine Division units concerned are listed as information addressees to the request message and are requested to send clearance to III MAF COC without delay. The Division FSCC clears for Division units only.
 - (2) The Assistant CoFS, G-3 (Operations Officer) considers the request in regard to overall operations.
4. Periodically, this Headquarters will be requested or may request subordinate headquarters, to validate or revalidate an ARCLIGHT target or series of targets. This action involves authentication or reauthentication of the accuracy and currency of intelligence pertaining to the target(s). In general terms, revalidation occurs concurrently with the request to extend the clearance date of a target, and monthly in the case of targets with indefinite clearance.
5. ARCLIGHT TOT's are announced. If at any time, prior to a drop on a specified target, there is reason to believe the target no longer meets the clearance criteria (e.g. friendly forces or non-combatants in the target area), this Headquarters (FSCC) is provided all available detail by the most expeditious means available. This Headquarters, in turn, notifies III MAF COC via telephone or flash message in order to affect diversion of the strike force.
6. Although the code phase ARCLIGHT is unclassified, there are many examples where targets may have been compromised through attempts to paraphrase

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over unsecure circuits. Therefore, all ground communications concerning ARCLIGHTS are encrypted or encoded. Information concerning proposed ARCLIGHTS, targets areas, TOT's, etc. will be disseminated on a "need to know" basis.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
160800H October 1967

Appendix 2 (AN/TPQ-10 Targeting and Operations Procedures) to Annex E
(Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

In order to maintain a 24-hour-per-day capability to provide air support to III MAF, Air Support Radar Teams (ASRT) are deployed at DA NANG and CHU LAI.

2. GENERAL

- a. Marine ASRTS, utilizing AN/TPQ-10 Radar Course Directing Centrals, are capable of providing coverage to a range of 80 kilometers (50 statute miles) from AN/TPQ-10 sites when aircraft are equipped with transponder beacons. The range is limited to 40 kilometers (25 statute miles) when aircraft are not equipped with beacons. AN/TPQ-10 radar is line of sight and is limited by earth curvature and obstructions between the radar and the aircraft.
- b. Within the ranges indicated above, ASRTS are capable of:
 - (1) Positioning aircraft for level bombing.
 - (2) Positioning aircraft for flare drops, and paratroops of personnel and supplies.
 - (3) Positioning aircraft for aerial photography or reconnaissance.
 - (4) Positioning aircraft over any geographical location within range.
 - (5) Limited helicopter guidance (range dependent on altitude due to line of sight limitation).
- c. Accuracy of AN/TPQ-10 varies with range, type of ordnance, wind, pilot/controller proficiency and many other factors. The maximum error is normally in range and it is desirable to make AN/TPQ-10 bomb runs parallel to friendly forces. A troop safety consideration of 1500 meters on initial runs is required. If visual

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observation permits adjustment, subsequent bomb runs can be "walked in" as close as the ground commander desires.

3. TARGETING

- a. Within the 1st Marine Division, AN/TPQ-10 strikes may be requested by the Division G-2 section or regimental FSCCs through the Division FSCC. The information required by the Division FSCC for AN/TPQ-10 scheduling is indicated in Tab A (AN/TPQ-10 Target List). When target clearance is obtained, the target list and copies thereto are distributed as follows:
 - (1) The original and one copy to the Direct Air Support Center (DASC); the original for relay to the ASRT and the copy for DASC files.
 - (2) One copy to the 11th Marines FDC.
 - (3) One copy to the Division G-2.
 - (4) One copy to the FSCC files.
- b. Units not OPCON to the 1st Marine Division (i.e., 1st Marine Aircraft Wing or ARVN Units) may request targets by using the same procedure.

4. TARGET CLEARANCE AND PROCEDURES

- a. All targets requested for AN/TPQ-10 strikes are cleared by the FSCC in the following manner:
 - (1) The proposed target is plotted on an overlay of the 1st Marine Division TAOR depicting each regimental and battalion TAOR, the division rear area, current reconnaissance patrol activity, current operations, and Revolutionary Development areas.
 - (2) The FSC determines, from the proposed target plot, the units whose concurrence will be required to clear the target for an AN/TPQ-10 strike. Each unit having cognizance of an area proposed for an AN/TPQ-10 mission is contacted for clearance for the strike.
 - (3) Proposed strikes affecting ARVN, Revolutionary Development efforts or other Free World Military Assistance Forces are cleared with I Corps Tactical Operations Center (ITOC).

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- (4) All proposed strikes outside the 1st Marine Division TAOR are cleared with I Corps Tactical Operations Center (ITOC).
- (5) Standard rules of engagement for operations in South Vietnam are given careful consideration when targeting and clearing AN/TPQ-10 strikes.
- (6) The FSC signs the appropriate space on the Target List indicating that the proposed targets have been verified and approved for strikes. The air watch officer also signs in the space provided, certifying that the requested targets have been plotted correctly.

5. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

AN/TPQ-10 strikes are unique in that the ordnance dropped is released without communication with the supported troop unit(s) and without pilot visibility of the target. In view of this, special care must be exercised in the selection and clearance of targets to ensure the security of friendly forces and installations. To provide a low risk factor, a safety consideration of 1500 meters on initial drops is required. If visual observation permits adjustment, subsequent bomb drops may be "walked in" as close as the ground commander desires.

6. POST STRIKE INFORMATION

- a. Information concerning AN/TPQ-10 strikes that have been flown is obtained from the DASC by the FSCC and recorded in the format indicated in Tab B (AN/TPQ-10 Target Hits). This form is distributed as follows:
 - (1) Original to FSCC files.
 - (2) One copy to G-2.
- b. The Division Air Officer distributes to subordinate Division units by message, daily, a list of the AN/TPQ-10 targets struck the previous day.

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 H. J. WOESSNER
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Chief of Staff

TABS:

- ✓ A - 1 Div 3320/7 (Rev 4-22-66) AN/TPQ-10 Target List
- ✓ B - 1 Div 3320/9 (5-66) AN/TPQ-10 Target Hits

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E-2-3

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TAB A (AN/TPQ-10 Target List) to Appendix 2 (AN/TPQ-10 Targeting and Operations Procedures) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 301-68

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DATE _____ TIME _____

[illegible]

TARGETS CLEARED FROM _____ UNTIL _____

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TAB B (AN/TPQ-10 Target Hits) to Appendix 2 (AN/TPQ-10 Targeting and Operations Procedures) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 301-68

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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Date:

Time:

TPQ-10 TARGET HITS

| TGT # | LOCATION | DESCRIPTION | ORDNANCE USED | SOURCE OF TGT INFO. |
|-------|----------|-------------|---------------|---------------------|
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1 Div 3320/9 (5-66)

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
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Annex F (Artillery) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Maps: Ref (a) to basic order
(b) Firing Chart: Grid Sheet, Scale 1:25,000
(c) 11th MarO 3000.3_ (SOP for Operations and Gunnery)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. Basic Order.

2. MISSION

Division artillery supports the 1st Marine Division (Rein) in the defense of the DA NANG base area, airfield and ancillary facilities; provides fires in support of offensive operations within and beyond the TAOR and RZ; and supports ARVN operations as directed.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Artillery Employment

(1) 11th Marines (-) (Rein) is positioned in the Division TAOR in a composition of types and calibers to provide fire support for division and ARVN operations as directed.

b. 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) (Rein)

- (1) Direct support - 5th Marines.
- (2) Zone of fire - 5th Marines area of operations.
- (3) Be prepared to provide reinforcing fires as required.

c. 3d Battalion, 11th Marines

- (1) Direct support - 7th Marines.
- (2) Zone of fire - 7th Marines TAOR.
- (3) Be prepared to provide reinforcing fires as required.

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d. 4th Battalion, 11th Marines

- (1) General support - 1st Marine Division.
- (2) Btry K - GS/Rein 3d Battalion, 11th Marines.
- (3) Btry L - GS/Rein 2d Battalion, 11th Marines.
- (4) Btry M - GS/Rein 3d Battalion, 11th Marines.

e. Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines

- (1) Direct support - 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.
- (2) Zone of fire - 2d Battalion, 5th Marines TAOR.

f. 1st Armored Amphibian Co (-) FMF

- (1) General support - 1st Marine Division.
- (2) 1st Plat (-) GS
- (3) Det, 1st Plat - GS/Rein 2d Battalion, 11th Marines.
- (4) 3d Plat - GS/Rein 3d Battalion, 11th Marines

g. 3d 155 Gun Battery (SP), (Rein), FMF

- (1) General support - 1st Marine Division.
- (2) 1st Plat - GS/Rein Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines
- (3) 2d and 3d Plats - GS/Rein 3d Battalion, 11th Marines.
- (4) 2d Plat, 5th 155 Gun Battery (SP) - GS/Rein Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines.

h. 3d 8" Howitzer Battery (SP), FMF

- (1) General support - 1st Marine Division.
- (2) 1st Plat - GS/Rein Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines.
- (3) 2d Plat - GS/Rein 2d Battalion, 11th Marines.
- (4) 3d Plat - GS/Rein 3d Battalion, 11th Marines.

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- i. Battery B, 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery, USA. General support.
- j. Battery G (-), 29th Artillery, USA. General support.
- k. Coordinating Instructions
 - (1) Firing chart. Reference (b).
 - (2) SOP for Operations and Gunnery. Reference (c).
 - (3) Registration. As directed by 11th Marines FDC.
 - (4) Position areas and fire capabilities. Report to Division FSCC when changes occur.
 - (5) Survey. Trigonometric lists available at 11th Marines survey information center.
 - (6) Counterbattery Policy. Active.
 - (7) Meteorological Data. Electronic data furnished every six (6) hours when available. Visual data will be furnished when electronic data is not available.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Administrative Order 301-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION--ELECTRONICS

- a. Annex L (Communication--Electronics).
- b. Command Posts. Report when established.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON


H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
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Annex G (Naval Gunfire) to Operation Order 301-68 ()

Ref: (a) COMCRUDESGRU SEVENTHFLT (CTG 70.8) OperO 320A-67 (Gun 12)
(b) 1stMarDivO PO2000.2 (CEOI)
(c) NWIP 22-2 (A)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

TG 70.8 (CruDesGru, SEVENTH Fleet)

| | |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| TU 70.8.9 Naval Gunfire Support Unit
(Cruiser/DD/DE/LSMR/IFS assigned) | DESRON or Senior
DESDIV Commander |
|---|--------------------------------------|

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS
- b. Friendly Forces. Commander, U.S. SEVENTH FLEET, provides Naval Gunfire Support to forces operating ashore in I CTZ.

2. MISSION

Naval Gunfire Support Unit (TU 70.8.9) provides naval gunfire support against enemy targets in RVN in support of COMUSMACV/RVNAF operations ashore.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. Naval Gunfire Support is provided by TG 70.8 as requested and coordinated by COMUSMACV and his designated representatives.
- b. TU 70.8.9
 - (1) Respond to COMUSMACV requirements and provide NGFS as requested.
 - (2) If directed, provide NGFS for specified amphibious operations in accordance with instructions provided by Commander, Amphibious Task Force.

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- (3) Promulgate NGFS ship availability (ships, CTZ, dates) as known.

c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) CG III MAF promulgates a planned utilization of available NGFS ships, designating the unit to be supported, dates the NGFS is received, and the FSA(s).
- (2) The Division Naval Gunfire Officer establishes personal liaison with NGFS ships assigned to support the 1st Marine Division on ships arrival.
- (3) Forward requests for NGFS in direct support of ground operations to the Division FSCC using the established chain of command. Requests approved by Division are forwarded to III MAF/SA I Corps.
- (4) Submit requests for NGFS in the format shown in Appendix 1. Requests are placed in one of the three following categories:
 - (a) Preplanned Missions. A preplanned mission includes naval gunfire support for a scheduled ground operation or preplanned targets known at least forty-eight hours in advance.
 - (b) Nonscheduled Missions. A nonscheduled mission is one requiring quick reaction (less than forty-eight hours notice) by a naval gunfire support ship already assigned in general support of I CTZ.
 - (c) Emergency Missions. An emergency mission is one in which a unit is under attack and for which sufficient artillery support is not available. Such requests are submitted directly to a NGFS Ship known to be in the fire support area and in general support of the Division. In other cases emergency mission requests are submitted to Division FSCC by the most expeditious means available.
- (5) Rules of Engagement. Annex J (Rules of Engagement).
- (6) Reports. The following report is submitted by units supported by naval gunfire to Division FSCC not later than 0630 daily and when changes occur:

CODEINFORMATION

- | | |
|---|---|
| A | Call sign and position of NGFS ship as of 0600. |
| B | Call sign of supported unit. |

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- C
 - 1. Number of missions/type/and number of rounds fired during previous twenty-four hour period as of 0600.
 - 2. Target description and surveillance.
- D
 - Time NGFS ship shifted to another spotter or unit for support and call sign of new spotter or unit.
- E
 - 1. Time ship reports on station
 - 2. Time ship departs station, reason and estimated time of return if applicable.

Nonapplicable codes are omitted. Reports are made by telephone using KAK 138 in reporting ships position.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. As provided by TU 70.8.9

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION--ELECTRONICS

- a. In addition to normal naval gunfire nets, ships assigned to naval gunfire support missions guard the Coastal Surveillance Center (CSC) Coordination and Reporting Net of the operating area to which assigned. This net may be used in an emergency for liaison and coordination with NGFS ships when communications cannot be established or contact is lost on assigned naval gunfire nets.

(1) CSC Northern Coordination and Reporting Net

(a) Frequencies

S-3 4085 KCS (P) 3A3J

S-4 8500 KCS (S) 3A3J

(b) Voice Radio Call Sign

CSC DA NANG (NCS) - ARTICLE

- b. Voice Communication Security Aids used by III MAF forces are not held by naval gunfire support ships. The following communication security aids are used in radio communications with naval gunfire support ships.

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- (1) AUTHENTICATION - KAA 60
- (2) NUMERAL CODE - KAC 138
- (3) OPERATIONS CODE - KAC 132/KAC 183
- c. Voice radio call signs of naval gunfire support ships are promulgated concurrently with individual ship assignments.
- d. Coordinating Instructions
 - (1) Annex L (Communication-Electronics).
 - (2) References (b) and (c).
 - (3) Appendix 2 for CTG 70.8 designators for naval gunfire nets and frequencies.
 - (4) Strict adherence to authentication procedures is mandatory. All suspect transmissions are challenged.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

H. J. Woessner
H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Naval Gunfire Support Mission Request Format
- 2 - Naval Gunfire Frequencies and Designators

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Appendix 1 (NGFS Mission Request Format) to Annex G (Naval Gunfire) to
 Operation Order 301-68

1. The following format is used in submitting Preplanned and Non-scheduled mission requests:

Fm: (Requesting unit)
 To: CG 1st MarDiv (Rein)
 Classification
 NGFS Mission Request (U)
 Type of Mission (Preplanned or Nonscheduled)

- a. Type of operation and brief concept of operations.
- b. Number and type of ships required.
- c. Coordinates of FSA.
- d. Coordinates of target or target area.
- e. Time to be on station by local DTG.
- f. Expected duration of mission.
- g. Type of target.
- h. U.S. Force.
- i. Frequencies by circuit designator and call sign of spotter.
- j. Unit to be supported/operation nickname.

2. The following format is used in submitting emergency mission requests:

Precedence: Immediate or Flash
 Fm: (Requesting Unit)
 To: (NGFS Ship in G S of 1st MarDiv or to Division FSCC)
 Info: CG 1st MarDiv (Rein)
 Classification
 NGFS Mission Request
 Type of Mission (Emergency)

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- a. Unit to be supported/operation nickname.
- b. Number of ships required/name of intended firing ship(s).
- c. Coordinates of FSA.
- d. Coordinates of target or target area.
- e. U.S. Force FSCC requesting mission.
- f. Call sign of spotter or observer.
- g. Non-U.S. Spotter is (is not) authorized.

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 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
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Appendix 2 (NGF Frequencies and Designators) to Annex G (Naval Gunfire)
 to Operation Order 301-68

1. The following frequencies, frequency designators, and corresponding CTG 70.8 frequency designators are assigned to Naval Gunfire Nets. A frequency designator corresponds to the frequency in all cases and not to the net. When coordinating frequencies cover nonsecure communications channel, only frequency designators are to be used.

| <u>FREQUENCY</u>
<u>DESIGNATOR NET</u> | <u>CTG 70.8 FREQ</u>
<u>DESIGNATOR</u> | <u>FREQUENCY</u> | <u>MISSION</u> |
|---|---|------------------|----------------|
| M-811 Division NGF Support | C-21 | 3271 KC | 3A3J |
| M-226 Division SFCP Local | C-22A | 46.25 MC | 36F3 |
| M-619 NGF Air Spot #1 | C-26 | 239.9 MC | 6A3 |
| M-641 NGF Air Spot #2 | C-27 | 265.3 MC | 6A3 |
| M-744 SFCP Spot #1 | C-23 | 2075 KC | 3A3J |
| M-758 SFCP Spot #2 | C-24 | 2300 KC | 3A3J |
| M-900 SFCP Spot #3 | C-25 | 6229 KC | 3A3J |
| M-239 Division FM SFCP Spot | C-22 | 47.4 MC | 36F3 |
| M-280 Division Radar Beacon | - - | 5505 MC | 36F3 |

2. The Division FM SFCP spot net is an alternate means of controlling naval gunfire missions and is only used when the assigned primary SFCP spot net is unusable and only when reliable communications can be established and maintained.

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
160800H October 1967

Annex H (Air Support) to Operation Order 301-68 (REVISED)

Ref: (a) Annex E (Tactical Air Operations) to III MAF LOI 1-66
(b) FMFM 7-1 (Fire Support Coordination)
(c) FMFM 7-3 (Air Support)
(d) FMFM 3-3 (Helicopterborne Operations)
(e) MACV Directive 95-4
(f) Division Order 003100.2
(g) Division Order 03400.9

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence), current INTSUMS and PIR's.
- b. Friendly Forces
 - (1) III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). Conducts tactical air support operations in RVN in accordance with the doctrine procedures and responsibilities outlined in references, (a) through (f).
 - (2) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW). Conducts offensive and defensive tactical air operations in support of III MAF ground forces, other US and ARVN forces as directed.
 - (3) 7th Air Force, USAF. Conducts offensive and defensive tactical air operations in RVN and supports US and GVN ground forces as directed.
 - (4) US SEVENTH FLEET. Conducts air operations in support of the GVN military campaign against the NVA/Viet Cong in RVN.
 - (5) Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). Conducts air operations in support of ARVN Forces.

2. PROCEDURES

a. General

- (1) Tactical air operations coordination responsibilities and

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procedures conform to existing doctrine as contained in references (a) through (d).

- (2) General procedures and operational restrictions governing the use of U.S. military air delivered fire power in RVN are contained in reference (e).
- (3) Air strikes within TAOR/RZ must be under the positive control of a TACP, TAC (A) or ASRT. Air activities outside the 1st Marine Division TAOR/RZ are in accordance with Annex G (Rules of Engagement).

b. Execution

- (1) Air requests are submitted via normal air channels. Routine requests are submitted to the Division Air Officer by 1000 and priority by 1700 on the day prior to the day desired. The Division Air Officer consolidates all requests from Division units in the DA NANG area and submits routine and priority requests to CG FMAW info CG III MAF by 1100 and 1800 respectively. Emergency requests are submitted at any time. Complete justification for the emergency classification is included in each request. All requests for air support are submitted in the formats set forth in Appendixes 1 and 2. Routine and priority requirements submitted subsequent to the above time frames will either be delayed or supported only at the expense of earlier acknowledged requirements of a lower priority.
- (2) Air-ground planning and liaison is established for all company strength and larger unit operations involving air support. This planning liaison is initiated by the Division Air Officer at the request of the ground unit. To ensure adequate and timely support, planning and liaison is established a minimum of 48 hours prior to the operation. Air requirements derived from these planning conferences are submitted to the Division Air Officer by 1000 of the day prior to the operation in accordance with Appendix 9.
- (3) On-call missions (par 3a(3) below) may be scheduled in support of a particular operation. Aircraft scheduled for this purpose, are not normally available for missions other than those for which specifically scheduled.
- (4) In keeping with the doctrine outlined in reference (c) maximum utilization of the forward air controller with assault units is essential for effective air support.

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3. RESOURCES AND CONSIDERATIONS

a. Resources

- (1) Fixed wing tactical air support may be provided from either the DA NANG (MAG-11) or CHU LAI (MAG-12 and MAG 13) based air groups depending on the missions to be accomplished and the availability of aircraft. When 1st MAF aircraft are providing close and deep support for 1st Marine Division forces actively engaged in combat, standard Marine Corps close air support doctrine applies as outlined in reference (c).
- (2) Helicopter support for 1st Marine Division (Rein) is normally provided by MAG-16 (Marble Mountain). Helicopter support doctrine is outlined in reference (d). Overall coordination for the employment of helicopter resources rests with CG, III MAF.
- (3) On Call Support
 - (a) MED EVAC. UH-34 and UH-1E escort helicopters are available on Condition III alert at MMAF day and night. MED EVAC aircraft are requested through the DASC by use of the TAR net using the format shown in Appendix 3. Units without entry into the TAR net may obtain this service through adjacent units or by landline. Appendix 3 contains guidelines for assigning priorities to MED EVAC requests.
 - (b) Sparrow Hawk. Two CH-46 and two UH-1E escort aircraft are on Condition III alert during daylight hours at MMAF for lifting of a reinforced rifle squad. Sparrow Hawk is requested through the normal air request channels, using the format as outlined in Appendix 4. Div OperO 304-67 (Revised) applies.
 1. CH-46 aircraft are currently in a restricted flight status. While this circumstance exists, CH-46's will be utilized only for emergency lifts. The Commanding General will determine whether or not the mission is an emergency.
 2. Sparrow Hawk flights, other than emergencies, will be constituted from available helicopter assets as soon as possible. The time delay is dependent on the disposition of aircraft.

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- (c) Bald Eagle. Two CH-46 aircraft are on Condition V alert. In the lifting of a Bald Eagle force they are combined with the two CH-46's and the two UH-1E gunship escort of the Sparrow Hawk mission. Div OperO 304-67 (Revised) applies.
1. CH-46 aircraft are currently in a restricted flight status. While this circumstance exists, CH-46's will be utilized only for emergency lifts. The Commanding General will determine whether or not the mission is an emergency.
 2. Bald Eagle flights, other than emergencies, will be constituted from available helicopter assets as soon as possible. The time delay is dependent on the disposition of aircraft.
- (d) Fast Reaction Gunships. Two UH-1E gunships are on Condition III standby at MMAF. They are normally launched as escort for the Sparrow Hawk/Bald Eagle Force. One may be launched by the DASC as TAC (A) when necessary.
- (e) Aerial Observer. One visual reconnaissance observation aircraft is airborne within the Division TAOR during the hours of darkness. A second aircraft on Condition IV alert is available through normal air request channels.
- (f) Flaeship. One aircraft is airborne in the DA NANG area throughout the hours of darkness. Priority service is provided to units in contact. An additional aircraft is kept on Condition IV alert at the DA NANG or CHU LAI airfields. Flaeship requests are passed via normal air request channels.
- (g) Close Air Support. Strike aircraft on Condition III alert at DA NANG and CHU LAI are available at all times through normal air request nets. These aircraft are loaded with mixed ordnance. During periods of marginal weather a "Scud Alert" is available. Aircraft are normally armed with low delivery ordnance such as napalm and 20mm.
- (4) The use of herbicides for defoliation are requested as outlined in reference (f) through normal request channels.
- (5) Aerial delivered Riot Control Agents (CS) are available for use by ground forces through normal air request channels. Reference (g) provides guidelines for use of RCA. Normal lead time is given when requesting RCA.

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b. Considerations

- (1) The daily commitments of 1st MAW limited helicopter assets dictate that restraints be observed in their employment. To this end, every effort is made at all levels of command to consolidate helilift requirements, thereby ensuring efficient utilization of assets. When time is not a factor, helicopters are not used for routine transportation of personnel and materials between points connected by serviceable roads or reasonably timely fixed wing transport flights.
- (2) Alert status of aircraft. Appendix 5.
- (3) Aircraft Armament codes. Appendix 6.
- (4) Target weather minimums. Appendix 7.
- (5) Priority system. Appendix 8.

4. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION—ELECTRONICSa. Communication-Electronics. Annex L (Communication—Electronics)b. Control Agencies

- (1) FSCC. Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (2) TACC (TADC). The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing TACC (TADC) is located within the DA NANG TAOR.
- (3) DASC. The DASC serving the DA NANG TAOR/RZ is located in the 1st Marine Division CP.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
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APPENDIXES:

- ✓1 - Tactical Air Request Form
- ✓2 - Aircraft Mission Request Form
- ✓3 - Helicopter Medical Evacuation Request Form and Priorities
- ✓4 - Sparrow Hawk Request Form
- ✓5 - Alert Status of Aircraft
- ✓6 - Aircraft Armament Codes
- ✓7 - Target Weather Minimums
- ✓8 - Air Operations Priority System
- ✓9 - Air Support Format for Planned Operations

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Appendix 1 (Tactical Air Request Form) to Annex H (Air Support) to
Operation Order 301-68

| | | | | | | |
|--|---|------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| ORIG
CALL | (TOR) _____ | | OPERATOR'S INITIAL _____ | | NET _____ | FREQ _____ |
| | TACTICAL AIR REQUEST _____ | | | | | MISSION NO. _____ |
| MISSION REQUEST | 1. (TACP) _____ THIS IS (TACP) _____ | | | | | |
| | 2. I HAVE _____ | | | | | |
| | () EMERGENCY () PRIORITY () ORDINARY () SEARCH/ATTACK MISSION | | | | | |
| | 1. TARGET IS _____ | | | | | |
| | () AAA POSIT () MORTAR POSIT () SUPPLIES () TROOPS () _____ | | | | | |
| | () GUN POSIT () PILL BOX () TANKS () VEHICLES () _____ | | | | | |
| | 2. IN (t.s.) _____ CHART (no.) _____ | | | | | |
| | 3. TARGET BEARS _____ TRUE _____ FROM (land mark) _____ | | | | | |
| | DISTANCE _____ yd/meters | | | | | |
| | 4. () STATIONARY () MOVING (give direction) _____ ON/THRU _____ | | | | | |
| | 5. () WILL () WILL NOT MARK WITH (color) _____ SMOKE _____ | | | | | |
| | ARTY
NGF | 6. REQUEST _____ | | | | |
| () BOMBING () STRAFING () ROCKET () NAPALM () ATTACK | | | | | | |
| 7. HEADING (mag) _____ PULL OUT _____ MINIMUM ALTITUDE _____ | | | | | | |
| () RIGHT () LEFT () STRAIGHT | | | | | | |
| 8. REQUEST (runs) _____ USING (armament) _____ | | | | | | |
| PER RUN | | | | | | |
| 9. RUN MISSION _____ time between and | | | | | | |
| () ASAP () AT () AFTER () BETWEEN | | | | | | |
| 10. FRONT LINES FROM (g.c.) _____ TO (g.c.) _____ | | | | | | |
| () MARKED () NOT MARKED WITH (color) () PANELS () SMOKE | | | | | | |
| 11. () FRONT LINE () FAC IS (give distance and direction) FROM TARGET | | | | | | |
| 12. () I CAN OBSERVE () I WILL CONTROL () TARGET HIDDEN () USE OTHER CONTROL | | | | | | |
| MISSION APPROVAL
AND
BRIEFING MESSAGE | 13. REMARKS _____ | | | | | |
| | ARTY INFO | | int. | TARGET LOCATION CHECK | | APPROVED |
| | NGF INFO | | int. | FRONT LINE CHECK | | TIME BY |
| | 1. (TACP) _____ THIS IS _____ | | | | | |
| | 2. MISSION (no.) () APPROVED () TADC () TACA WILL CONTROL | | | | | |
| | () CANCELLED () TACP () FLT LEADER | | | | | |
| | 3. CONTACT _____ WITH () VF LOAD _____ NET | | | | | |
| | () FA | | | | | |
| | 4. RESTRICTED FIRE PLAN _____ IN EFFECT FROM (time) _____ TO (time) _____ | | | | | |
| | () IS NOT () IS | | | | | |
| | 5. REMARKS _____ | | | | | |

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

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DAMAGE ASSESSMENT


AND

AMMO, EXPENDITURE

| | | | | | |
|------------------|--|------|--------|-----|------|
| 1. (TADC) | THIS IS | | | | |
| 2. TARGET | <input type="checkbox"/> NOT <input type="checkbox"/> COMPLETELY <input type="checkbox"/> PARTIALLY <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED <input type="checkbox"/> NEUTRALIZED <input type="checkbox"/> COVERED | | | | |
| 3. REMARKS | | | | | |
| 4. | NO. | TYPE | | NO. | TYPE |
| BOMBS | | | NAPALM | | |
| AMMUNITION | | | MISC | | |
| ROCKETS | | | | | |
| 5. ACI COMMENTS: | | | | | |

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Appendix 2 (Aircraft Mission Request Form) to Annex H (Air Support) to
Operation Order 301-68

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

AIRCRAFT MISSION REQUEST FORM
(HELICOPTER - FIXED WING TRANSPORT)

REQUEST NO. _____
MISSION NO. _____

1. ACTION ADDRESSEE (CALL SIGN) THIS IS (CALL SIGN)
2. THIS MISSION REQUEST FOR
() HELICOPTER () FIXED WING TRANSPORT () OE/LIAISON
3. THIS MISSION IS
() EMERGENCY () PRIORITY () ASAP () ROUTINE
4. TYPE OF MISSION
() TROOPS () SPOT/OBSERVE () VIP CODE
() LOGISTICS () PHOTO () EVAC (URGENT OR ASAP)
() ADMIN () STAFF () SAR
() RECON () UNIT CMDR () OTHER
5. AIRLIFT DESCRIPTION (NUMBER/WEIGHT)

NUMBER OF TROOPS _____

DESCRIPTION AND WEIGHT/CUBE INTERNAL CARGO _____

DESCRIPTION AND WEIGHT OF EXTERNAL CARGO _____

(PALLET-BASKET-TYPE VEHICLE-EQUIPMENT)

REMARKS _____

6. INSTRUCTIONS (SHACKLE WHEN NECESSARY)
- | PICK UP COORDINATES | LOCAL DATE/TIME | DESTINATION COORD |
|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| A. _____ | _____ | _____ |
| B. _____ | _____ | _____ |
| C. _____ | _____ | _____ |
| D. _____ | _____ | _____ |

7. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

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8. LZ/SITE WILL BE

☐ UNMARKED

☐ PANELS

☐ LIGHTS

☐ MARKED WITH

☐ SMOKE

☐ FLARE

(COLOR)

☐ OTHER

9. COMMUNICATIONS

☐ SENT

☐ PHONE

☐ RECEIVED

☐ RADIO NET

DTG INIT
1 Div 3320/6 (4-66)

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Appendix 3 (Helicopter Medical Evacuation Request Form and Priorities) to
Annex H (Air Support) to Operation Order 301-68 ()

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

HELICOPTER MED EVAC REQUEST MISSION # _____

() EMERGENCY () PRIORITY () ROUTINE A/C CALL SIGN _____
REQUESTING UNIT _____ RELAYING UNIT _____ NET _____
DATE/TIME REQUEST RECEIVED _____ H. BY _____
PICK UP AREA (NAME &/OR COORDINATES) _____
NUMBER OF WIA _____ KIA _____ ILL _____ (U.S.) (ARVN) (CIV) _____
PICK UP LOCATION FOR DOCTOR OR CORPSMAN _____ (U.S.) (ARVN) _____
AIRBORNE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE REQUIRED? YES () NO () _____
LANDING ZONE: SECURE () NOT SECURE () BEST APPROACH DIRECTION _____
LANDING ZONE IDENTIFICATION: PANELS () LETTER _____ COLOR _____
SMOKE () COLOR _____
OTHER _____
LANDING ZONE FREQUENCY _____ CALL SIGN _____
REMARKS/SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS _____
TIME REQUEST RECEIVED _____
TIME RECEIVED BY MAG _____
TIME HELIOS AIRBORNE (RIO) _____
TIME MISSION COMPLETED (RIO) _____

MISSION # _____

1 Div 3320/4 (4-66)

Med Evac Priority System

1. Med Evac Priorities. The originator of a request for helicopter medical evacuation will classify each such request as either ROUTINE, PRIORITY, or EMERGENCY. Definitions of these classifications are as follows:
 - a. Routine: Evacuation of deceased personnel; evacuation of a patient with minor injury or illness; or the routine transfer of a patient from one medical facility to another.

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- b. Priority: Evacuation of seriously wounded, injured, or ill personnel who require early hospitalization, but whose immediate hospitalization is not a matter of life or death.
- c. Emergency: Evacuation of critically wounded, injured or ill personnel whose immediate evacuation is a matter of life or death.

This classification is justified when a case falls into one of the following categories:

- (1) The casualty is unconscious from a head wound.
- (2) The casualty is in severe shock.
- (3) The casualty is actively bleeding.
- (4) The casualty has suffered the loss of an arm or leg, has an abdominal wound, or has a penetrating chest wound.
- (5) The casualty is paralyzed.

2. Considerations. Prior to requesting emergency helicopter evacuations the following will be assessed by the ground commander:

- a. Security of the landing zone and freedom from interdicting enemy fire.
 - (1) If insecure, movement of evacuee to a secure area will be attempted.
 - (2) If movement is impossible, every effort will be exerted to utilize suppressive fire by local unit small arms, artillery, aircraft, or a combination while evacuation is in progress.
- b. Communication between ground commander and aircraft is essential to exchange pertinent information concerning landing approach, pick up point, and terrain characteristics.
- c. Provide assistance to pilot in locating the pick up point. The use of hoist should only be undertaken when the terrain and vegetation make landing impossible, a landing site cannot be cleared, and movement of the casualty is impossible.
- d. Rarely will ambulatory casualties require emergency helicopter evacuation.


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Appendix 4 (Sparrow Hawk Request Form) to Annex H (Air Support) to Operation
Order 301-68

SPARROW HAWK REQUEST FORM

REQUEST NO. _____
MISSION NO. _____

TO: LANDSHARK

FROM: _____

LINE

A. NUMBER OF TROOPS _____
B. PICK-UP COORDINATES _____
C. DESTINATION COORDINATES _____
D. LOCATION OF FRIENDLY TROOPS _____
E. COORDINATES OF ENEMY _____
F. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY _____

G. REMARKS (i.e., DIRECTION OF ATTACK) _____

H. CALL SIGN AND FREQUENCY

TIME RECEIVED (DASC) _____

TIME SENT TO MAG _____

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Appendix 5 (Alert Status of Aircraft) to Annex H (Air Support) to
 Operation Order 301-68 (Revised)

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL


- a. CG, 1st MAF requires aircraft and crew be maintained in such a state of readiness as to be airborne from time of call within the time limits prescribed below. The alert status condition will be as specified in the aircraft schedule and will be in accordance with the following codes:

| <u>CONDITION</u> | <u>ALERT STATUS</u> | <u>AIRCRAFT STATUS</u> |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| (1) Condition I | 2 Minutes | Cockpit manned engine running |
| (2) Condition II | 5 Minutes | Cockpit unmanned |
| (3) Condition III | 15 Minutes | Cockpit unmanned |
| (4) Condition IV | 30 Minutes | Cockpit unmanned |
| (5) Condition V | As directed | Cockpit unmanned |

2. RECONSTITUTING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Aircraft on lesser alert condition will automatically assume higher condition vacated by scramble.

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Appendix 6 (Aircraft Armament Codes) to Annex H (Air Support) to Operation
 Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. Aircraft will be loaded as indicated by the aircraft schedule.
 All loads include full internal ammunition for automatic weapons.
- b. Flight leaders are directed to report flight ordnance status using
 the following codes to the controlling agency after each CAS mission.

2. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE CODES

| <u>CODE</u> | <u>ORDNANCE</u> |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| a. D-1 | MK 81 250# Low Drag GP bomb |
| D-1A | MK 81 Snakeye |
| b. D-2 | MK 82 500# Low Drag GP bomb |
| D-2A | MK 82 Snakeye |
| c. D-3 | MK 83 1000# Low Drag GP bomb |
| d. D-4 | MK 84 2000# Low Drag GP bomb |
| e. D-5 | Aero 7D Pod 2.75" FFAR (19) |
| f. D-6 | AN-M66A2 2000# High Drag GP bomb |
| g. D-7 | LAU-10A Pod 5" Zuni FFAR (4) |
| h. D-8 | AN-M64 500# High Drag GP bomb |
| i. D-9 | MM77 Fire Bomb 500# NAPALM |
| j. D-10 | Mk 79 Fire Bomb 1000# NAPALM |
| k. D-11 | AN-M57A1 Banded Lug 250# GP bomb |
| l. D-12 | AN-M81 Banded Lug 260# Frag bomb |
| m. D-13 | AN-M88 Banded Lug 220# Frag bomb |
| n. D-14 | CBU 1 A/A |

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| | |
|---------|--------------------------------------|
| o. D-15 | CBU 2 A/A |
| p. D-16 | AIM 7E Sparrow Missile |
| q. D-17 | AIM 9B Sidewinder Missile |
| r. D-18 | AGM 12B Bullpup 565# |
| D-18A | AGM 12C Bullpup 1800# |
| s. D-19 | AGM 45 Shrike |
| t. D-20 | 20mm Ammunition |
| u. D-21 | FS Smoke (MK 12 Smoke Tank) |
| v. D-22 | MK 24 Parachute Flare |
| w. D-23 | MK 44 Lazy Dog |
| D-23A | Aero 7E Lazy Dog |
| x. D-24 | MK 4 Gun Pod |
| y. D-25 | AN-M65 1000# High Drag GP Bomb |
| z. D-26 | MK 117 750# Low Drag Demolition Bomb |

3. FUZES

| <u>CODE</u> | <u>DELAY</u> |
|-------------|--|
| V | VT (Proximity) |
| C | Chemical Delay (Delay stated in hours) |
| M | Mechanical Delay (Delay stated in seconds) |
| Y | Instantaneous |
| Z | Point detonating |

4. NWIP 20-1, Naval Weapons Selection-Aircraft, contains the conditional kill probability, lethal area, and effective miss distance for each type of ordnance against a wide variety of targets.

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Appendix 7 (Target Weather Minimums) to Annex H (Air Support) to Operation
 Order 301-68 ()

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. The following weather minimums are prescribed for air support within the target area. Weather minimums must meet, or equal, the following criteria. A cloud condition of broken to overcast constitutes a ceiling.
- b. When weather minimums are not met air support missions will be cancelled or delayed.

2. TARGET AREA WEATHER MINIMUMS

Type Aircraft

a. Helicopters

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------|
| (1) Daylight operations | 1000'/2 miles |
| (2) Night operations | 1500'/2 miles |

b. Jet air - to - ground

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------|
| (1) Daylight operations | 3000'/3 miles |
| (2) Night operations | 5000'/5 miles |

c. Aerial resupply, fixed wing

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------|
| (1) Daylight operations | 1000'/3 miles |
| (2) Night operations | 1000'/3 miles |

d. Fixed wing observation

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------|
| (1) Daylight operations | 1500'/3 miles |
| (2) Night operations | 1500'/3 miles |

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Appendix 8 (Air Operations Priority System) to Annex H (Air Support) to
Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. PRIORITIES. Priorities, with the exception of MANDATORY priority, will be assigned each mission by the requesting agency and will be monitored and confirmed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and/or the Division Air Officer, as appropriate. Commanders will consider priorities assigned to missions in making their decision to conduct flights in marginal weather. The following priorities are established:
 - a. ROUTINE. Administrative or tactical transport of personnel, material or equipment, where time is not a critical factor and delay will not endanger lives or loss of material. Applied to air targets, this category includes missions against targets that are not time sensitive, for example, bridges and buildings.
 - b. PRIORITY. Tactical movement of personnel, material or equipment where excessive delay will jeopardize successful accomplishment of the mission. This category includes air strikes on targets that are time sensitive; i.e., of a fleeting nature such as enemy troops, vehicles, and vessels. It also includes cargo operations where delays will result in excessive material loss through spoilage or seizure by the enemy.
 - c. EMERGENCY. Mission involves safety of human lives or requires immediate transport of vital supplies or equipment. Medical evacuation of wounded personnel and air support of units under attack including resupply of ammunition or medical supplies are examples of emergency missions.
 - d. MANDATORY. Mission is emergency in nature and involves safety of human life or national prestige to the extent that normally unacceptable risks will be accepted to accomplish mission. This priority will only be assigned to a mission by CG, III MAF or CG, 1st MAW. Mandatory missions will not be cancelled because of weather.

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Appendix 9 (Air Support Format for Planned Operations) to Annex H (Air Support) to Operation Order 301-68

FM: CG, FIRST MARDIV

TO: CG, FIRST MAW

INFO: _____

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HELO FIXED WING REQUIREMENTS FOR OP _____
PASS TO G-3 ASAP

1. GENERAL

- A. D-DAY _____
- B. L-HOUR _____
- C. UNITS TO BE LIFTED _____
- D. DURATION _____
- E. LZ/COORDINATES _____
(1) _____
(2) _____
(3) _____
- F. LSA LOCATION _____
- G. MED EVAC LOCATION _____
- H. COMMAND POST LOCATION _____

2. TASKS

- A. LIFT _____ TROOPS, _____ CARGO AS FOLLOWS:
(1) EVENT 1 LIFT _____ TROOPS/CARGO FROM _____ TO LZ _____
AT L-HOUR. CONTACT _____ ON _____. REQ _____
TROOPS MIN IN FIRST WAVE. RMKS _____
(2) EVENT 2 LIFT _____ TROOPS, _____ CARGO FROM _____
TO LZ _____ AT L+ _____ CONTACT _____
ON _____. RMKS _____
- B. REQ _____ AIRCRAFT FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM _____
LSA, _____ TO _____ D-DAY AND _____ TO _____
DAILY THEREAFTER.
- C. REQ 1 UH-34/1 UH-1E (GUN) AIRCRAFT FOR MEDEVAC FROM _____ TO _____
D-DAY AND _____ TO _____ DAILY THEREAFTER.
THE ABOVE IN ADDITION TO THE REGULAR MED EVAC PACKAGE.
- D. REQ _____ AIRCRAFT FOR GROUND UNIT COMMAND AND CONTROL AT _____
CP FROM _____ TO _____ D-DAY AND _____
TO _____ DAILY THEREAFTER. CONTACT _____ ON _____
- E. REQ TAC(A) ON STATION _____ FOR LZ PREP D-DAY AND ROS AS REQ
FOR DURATION OF OP.

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- F. REQ AO ON STATION FROM _____ TO _____ DAY AND _____ TO _____ DAILY THEREAFTER. THIS REQ IN ADDITION TO NORMAL SUPPORT.
- G. REQ AIR PREP OF LZS FROM _____ TO L-HOUR. CONTACT LANDSHARK _____ ON _____ TAC(A) CONTROL ON _____ OR _____ AS ASSIGNED.
- H. REQ SMOKE AREA _____ OF LZ _____ FROM L-5 TO L-HOUR. TAC(A) CONTROL ON _____ OR _____ AS ASSIGNED.
- I. REQ VMA/VMFA CAP/CAS OF OPERATION FROM _____ TO _____ D-DAY. COND III THEREAFTER. TAC(A)/FAC CONTROL

3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- A. REQ FIXED WING/GUNSHIP ESCORT FOR ALL HELO TROOP LIFTS.
- B. REQ FLARESHIP ON COND IV SUNSET TO SUNRISE DAILY.
- C. ALL P/U LZS MARKED WITH YELLOW SMOKE ON CALL.
- D. UTILIZE SPARROW HAWK/BALD EAGLE FOR RAPID REACTION RESERVE COMMITMENT.
- E. ALL AIRCRAFT CONTACT LANDSHARK _____ ON _____ FOR SAV-A-PLANE INFO. CONTACT _____ ON _____ FOR SPECIFIC SAV-A-PLANE/AIR STRIKE COORDINATION IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA.
- F. _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

4. COMMUNICATIONS

- A. COMMAND POST _____
- B. LZ _____ - _____ ON _____
- LZ _____ - _____ ON _____
- LZ _____ - _____ ON _____
- C. _____ LSA. _____ ON _____
- D. ALL FIXED WING USE _____ OR _____ AS ASSIGNED BY LANDSHARK _____.

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DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
160800H October 1967

Annex I (Alert/Defense Postures) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) I Corps Coordinator Instruction 5500.1
(b) COMUSMACV Directive 525-2

Time Zone: H

1. GROUND DEFENSE OPERATIONS

a. Concept

- (1) The concept for the defense of the division TAOR is based on the establishment of sectors and sub sectors.
- (2) Sector commanders are responsible for the coordination of the defense of their assigned sectors. Commanding Officers of tenant units are responsible for local security of their installations.
- (3) Division rear area sector commanders have the same authority within their assigned sectors as TAOR commanders enjoy regarding coordination of defensive/security measures and control of supporting arms.

b. Execution

(1) 5th Marines (Rein)

7th Marines (Rein)

2d Bn (Rein), 5th Marines

- (a) Assume operational control of all tenant units within assigned sector for ground defense planning and execution of ground defense operations.
- (b) Assigned sector is contiguous with assigned TAOR.

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(2) 11th Marines (-) (Rein)/Northern Sector Defense Command

- (a) Assume operational control of all tenant units within the Northern Sector of the division rear area for ground defense planning and execution of ground defense operations.
- (b) Provide artillery fire support for defense of the division rear area sectors as required.

(3) 1st Tank Battalion/Southern Sector Defense Command

- (a) Assume operational control of all tenant units within the Southern Sector of the division rear area for ground defense planning and execution of ground defense operations.
- (b) Request fire support from the CO, 11th Marines as required.

(4) Coordinating Instructions

- (a) Organize assigned sector into sub-sectors as required.
- (b) Designate a sub-sector commander for each sub-sector.
- (c) Issue orders as necessary to accomplish the assigned defense mission.

2. MACV SECURITY CONDITIONS

- a. General. The threat to the security of U.S. personnel and material in Vietnam is continuous and may occur in the form of a ground attack, mortar/rocket fire, terrorist activity, or sabotage. Basically, all military organizations must provide for their own internal security.
- b. The following security conditions have been established by COMUSMACV and promulgated by reference (a).
 - (1) Security Condition WHITE: Will exist whenever information indicates the need for unusual precautions to be exercised on the part of all MACV personnel throughout Vietnam, unless specifically localized by the direction of COMUSMACV. Such conditions will be announced for a specified period of time and may be expected during holidays or events having special significance in the Republic of Vietnam. Sensitive periods or dates which require special precautions are announced periodically by the Embassy or MACV Memorandum.

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- (2) Security Condition GRAY: Will exist in an area upon receipt of a warning of a disorder where safety of American personnel, property, or installations is likely to be threatened.
- (3) Security Condition YELLOW: Will exist in a specific area or all of Vietnam when disorders of significance occur which threaten MACV or other American personnel, property, or installations, or when an attack has occurred against any of the above.
- (4) Security Condition RED: Will exist throughout Vietnam when a significant deterioration of internal security within the Republic of Vietnam has occurred, or external aggression against the Republic of Vietnam has taken place, or is imminent.

3. MACV READINESS CONDITIONS

a. General

- (1) There are five Defense Readiness Conditions (DEFCON), in accordance with the uniform system of progressive readiness conditions established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DEFCON 5 is the peacetime normal condition and DEFCON 1 is the condition of maximum readiness. Normal Defense Readiness condition for MACV is DEFCON 3.
- (2) Each DEFCON has associated with it a universally applied exercise term, which is used only during the conduct of defense readiness condition tests or exercises. Actual readiness terms, short definitions, and exercise terms are set forth below:

| <u>ACTUAL READINESS TERM</u> | <u>SHORT DEFINITION</u> | <u>EXERCISE TERM</u> |
|------------------------------|--|----------------------|
| DEFCON 5 | Normal readiness | FADE OUT |
| DEFCON 4 | Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures | DOUBLE TAKE |
| DEFCON 3 | Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness | ROUND HOUSE |
| DEFCON 2 | Further increase in force readiness but less than maximum readiness | FAST FACE |
| DEFCON 1 | Maximum force readiness | COCKED PISTOL |

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- (3) Defense Readiness Conditions need not necessarily be declared in sequence. Any condition, 5 to 1, may be declared as the situation requires. On declaration of a DEFCON of greater readiness, action required of lesser readiness conditions, whether declared or not, is automatically required.
- (4) In the event a Defense or Air Defense Emergency is declared prior to declaration of DEFCON 1, forces will immediately assume a posture of maximum readiness.

b. Classification

- (1) To enable rapid dissemination of a readiness status, terms DEFCON 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, together with a DTG and declaring command, may be transmitted in the clear over nonsecure circuits.
- (2) The fact that a force is actually increasing its posture of readiness is classified information.
- (3) The fact that tests, exercises or drills are being conducted is not classified.
- (4) The association of DEFCON with its related exercise term is not classified.
- (5) Short definitions, as set forth in paragraph 3a(2) above, may be related to their appropriate DEFCON on a "For Official Use Only" basis.

- c. Press Queries. When assuming a DEFCON requiring a greater degree of force readiness, precautions will be taken to minimize public speculation. However, should queries be received from news media concerning readiness action being taken, the following reply will be given: "We do not comment publicly on the state of readiness or alert status of forces of this command."

d. Exercises

- (1) Test or exercise directives, designed to simulate declaration of increased readiness conditions, will use only designated exercise terms.
- (2) The term DEFCON will not be used for exercises. Press queries concerning readiness exercises will be handled as in paragraph 3c above.

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- (3) The term ALERT will not be used in connection with readiness tests and exercises.

4. ANTIMCHANIZED WARNING AND ALERT CONDITIONS

- a. Division Order P3000.1_ (Standing Operating Procedures for Operations)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON


H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex N (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68 ()

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
1st Marine Division (Rein)
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
160800H October 1967

Annex J (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 301-68

- Ref: (a) MACV Directive Number 525-3
(b) III MAF/SA I Corps Order 3040.3
(c) MACV Directive Number 525-9
(d) I Corps Coordinator Instruction 05530.1
(e) 1st MarDiv Order 005080.5
(f) MACV Directive Number 525-18
(g) CTG 70.8 OperO 320-67 (Gun 12)
(h) CTG 115 OperO 201-67
(i) MACV Directive Number 95-4
(j) 1st MarDiv Order 03400.9
(k) 1st MarDiv Order F3410.1

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. Rules of engagement herein are prescribed to minimize noncombatant personnel and property losses which may occur in the execution of military operations against the enemies of RVN. The source of these rules of engagement is contained in references (a) through (k).
- b. The use of unnecessary force leading to noncombatant battle casualties in areas temporarily controlled by the enemy embitters the population, drives them into the arms of the enemy, and makes the long range goal of pacification more difficult and costly. Circumstances in RVN call for exercise of restraints not normally required on the battlefield. All unit commanders apply only that force necessary to accomplish their mission, giving due regard to safety of their command and importance of preventing injury to non-combatant populace.
- c. Incidents of noncombatant casualties and destruction of property by RVNAF and U.S. combat forces are exploited by the enemy to the fullest extent to enhance their objectives, to foster resentment against GVN and U.S. and to permanently alienate the people from GVN.
- d. The 1st Marine Division establishes a reputation of being able to move at will throughout its assigned area of responsibility and to defeat any enemy force encountered. Concurrently, 1st Marine Division units constantly demonstrate their concern for the safety of noncombatants, compassion for the injured and willingness to aid and assist the sick, hungry and dispossessed.

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2. APPLICATION

All commanders are directed to plan and conduct operations in accordance with the following guidelines:

- a. Consider both military and psychological objectives of each operation.
- b. Hold troop indoctrination briefings before each operation to emphasize both short and long range importance of minimizing non-combatant battle casualties.
- c. Concurrent air/ground planning to ensure proper selection of helicopter landing zones and proper employment and integration of artillery, naval gunfire and air strikes to avoid unnecessary damage to lives and property of noncombatants.
- d. Brief forward air controllers on areas where air strikes should not be called because of the presence of friendly or potentially friendly populace. Such information is sought from local officials at province and district level.
- e. Configure free strike zones to avoid populated areas except those in accepted enemy bases.
- f. Plan operations in coordination with province/sector and district/subsector chiefs with due regard to security of plans. A liaison officer from Marine forces conducting operations in a particular province/sector is positioned at district/subsector headquarters for coordination. District/subsector advisors perform this function in the absence of liaison officer.
- g. With due regard to the security and success of the mission, people are warned of impending air strikes or operations by leaflets and broadcasts whenever possible. This warning emphasizes that the enemy, by his presence, makes the action necessary and that the enemy is directly responsible for damages resulting from combat in populated areas.
- h. Hamlets and villages are attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving movement of ground forces through an area, and if, in the judgment of the ground commander, his mission is jeopardized by such warning.
- i. Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations are not attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker system or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.

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- j. Participation of Vietnamese forces in operations is encouraged so that the war does not appear to be a U.S. action against Vietnamese people. Regional and Popular Force participation is sought at Marine battalion or company level so they may assist in search of private dwellings, obtain information and contribute to the desired effect of cooperative war effort.
- k. Assignment to Marine forces of qualified RVNAF liaison officers from appropriate RVNAF commands is essential and is arranged between Marine commanders and appropriate advisors for each significant operation. These liaison officers, through their knowledge of the area of operations and the population, assist in identification of personnel and help ensure close coordination with all Vietnamese forces.
- l. In carrying out search and destroy operations, take all practicable measures to minimize destruction of indigenous private property and to ensure its proper control, disposition, and safeguarding. Plans include procedures for protection of private property and reporting, security and disposition of excess supplies.
- m. A civic action plan supports each operation even if the area has been controlled by the enemy. As each situation dictates, operation plans provide for utilization of all available assets to include a program for dispensing of medical supplies, transportation and distribution of emergency rations, medical evacuation of injured or sick regardless of suspected or known political affiliation, and light engineering work within the capabilities of tactical units.
- n. Whenever possible, utilize appropriate leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, ground loudspeakers and/or face-to-face teams to separate noncombatants from the enemy.
- o. The following practices are self-defeating and are not tolerated:
 - (1) Employment of unobserved and unregistered harassing and interdiction fires upon a populated area, when attack from that area is not indicated by available information.
 - (2) Use of heavy supporting arms upon populated areas when resistance received is not such as to impede maneuver of our forces to the objective or accomplishment of the mission.
 - (3) Use of noncombatant civilians as the point for combat patrols or for a unit in the approach march.
- p. Established rules of good military conduct and discipline are enforced.

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3. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

a. General

- (1) Local instructions specify where challenges are required. In those instances where a challenge is required, the sequence of engagement is:
 - (a) Normal challenge.
 - (b) If person challenged makes an overt attempt to avoid apprehension, opens fire or commits any other hostile act and thereby endangers life of challenger, challenger may fire.
 - (c) Unit commanders prescribe illumination prior to firing if local circumstances allow.
 - (d) Requirement for challenge is waived by local commander if required by tactical situation and no friendly forces are known to be operating in the area.
- (2) Magazines are not inserted in weapons in a camp area during daylight hours unless under attack.
- (3) Warning shots are not employed on contact with the enemy with the exception of daytime control of waterborne traffic. Craft failing to respond to challenge are warned by fire.
- (4) Rounds are not chambered in individual weapons unless contact with enemy is imminent. Senior Marine present determines if, in his judgement, measures must be taken to preserve lives of 1st Marine Division personnel. Initiation of any offensive or defensive formation implies imminent contact with the enemy.
- (5) Within the TAOR and RZ and during operations in areas external thereto, establishment of a curfew is the responsibility of GVN officials. Assistance in enforcing the curfew is normally devolved upon 1st Marine Division organizations and units. In such instances, indigenous personnel are informed of time limits involved and requirements for strict adherence. It is further explained that the purpose of the curfew is to ensure that innocent civilians are not mistaken for the enemy and shot.

b. Destruction of VN Property

- (1) Civilian dwellings are not burned, nor are private property and livestock destroyed except as an unavoidable consequence of combat actions. Therefore, the firing of tracers into dwellings is avoided unless absolutely necessary to accomplish the commander's mission.

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- (2) Destruction of Vietnamese dwellings and livestock as a measure of denying their use to enemy is left to RVNAF units. Requests from Vietnamese authorities for employment of 1st Marine Division to perform such destruction will be referred to this Headquarters.

c. Artillery/Naval Gunfire

- (1) Use of artillery and naval gunfire against known or suspected enemy targets in hamlets and villages occupied by noncombatants is governed by the following criteria:
- (a) All attacks are controlled by airborne or ground observers or RVNAF observers and are executed only after U.S./GVN/RVNAF approval, as appropriate.
 - (b) Except as specified below, hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations are not attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though fire is received from them.
 - (c) Villages and hamlets are attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving maneuver of ground forces through the area, and if in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission is jeopardized by such warning.
 - (d) The use of incendiary type ammunition is avoided unless absolutely necessary in the accomplishment of the commander's mission.
- (2) In areas exclusive of villages and hamlets, artillery fire and naval gunfire is directed against enemy forces in contact in accordance with normal procedures. However, unobserved fire is directed only at targets or target areas declared hostile by GVN, VN liaison personnel, or air and/or ground observers. Further, unobserved naval gunfire is employed only under exceptional circumstances and in cases where:
- (a) Requested naval gunfire support missions fall within specified strike zones approved by GVN/RVNAF as appropriate.
 - (b) Requested naval gunfire support missions cannot be observed due to terrain, weather or other factors.
 - (c) No U.S. ALO's, FAC's or airborne artillery spotters trained in naval gunfire spotting are available. (Conduct of naval gunfire support missions under this provision are taken as an acknowledged deviation from standard procedures).

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- (3) All supporting arms missions, with exception of barrages and preplanned unobserved fires, are controlled by an airborne or ground FAC, forward observer, NGF Spot Team or RVNAF observer. All observed and unobserved fires, except barrages, are executed only after US GVN/RVNAF approval, as appropriate.
- (4) The following measures are effective within the MARKET TIME area which extends along the south Vietnamese coast from the mouth of the rivers out to sea to an average of about 16 miles.
- (a) No water craft is taken under artillery fire, NGF, air attack or any other armed attack unless target craft is:
 1. Firing on friendly forces. In this case, the hostile craft may be taken under fire, but the Division COC is notified immediately. The Division COC immediately notifies CTG 115.1.
 2. Conducting hostile maneuvers or other actions, and coordination has been effected with the Division COC and/or CTG 115.1.
 3. Certified as non-friendly by the Division COC or CTG 115.1. In this case, consideration is given to the presence of VNN units and friendly non-military watercraft in proximity to the target craft.
- (5) Following measures are effective in the RVN/Cambodian Border Area.
- (a) All fire missions with intended target areas within 2000 meters of the RVN/Cambodian border are observed. This requirement is in addition to applicable control procedures stated elsewhere in this directive.
 - (b) Fire missions with intended target areas more than 2000 meters from the RVN/Cambodian border may be unobserved, subject to applicable control procedures stated elsewhere in this directive.
 - (c) Fire missions are not conducted where dispersion could result in fire being placed on or over the RVN/Cambodian border.

d. Air

- (1) All targets selected for an air strike are approved by the Province Chief or through higher ARVN authority.
- (2) All pilots endeavor to minimize noncombatant casualties and civilian property damage. Strikes are not executed where identification of friendly forces is in doubt.

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- [REDACTED]
- (3) All pilots have knowledge of the disposition of friendly forces and/or civilians prior to conducting strikes. This information comes from the ground or air briefing.
- (4) For purposes of this order, references to Forward Air Controller (FAC) also encompass and apply to Marine Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (TACA) and Aerial Observers (AO) when appropriate.
- (5) USAF, USMC, and USN strike aircraft are normally controlled by the following, in order of preference as listed:
- * (a) US Air Force ALO/FAC or Marine TACA/FAC.
 - * (b) VNAF FAC/FAO.
 - * (c) USAF MSQ-77 (SKY SPOT) or USMC TPQ-10.
 - * Under VFR conditions, when USAF, USMC, or VNAF FAC is not available, a qualified Army Target Identifying Pilot (TIP) may designate the target, and the flight leader of the strike aircraft controls the strike.
- (6) In an emergency, when no qualified means of control is available, the following personnel may designate a target for strike aircraft:
- (a) Commander of a ground unit or US advisor to a unit engaged with the enemy.
 - (b) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting a ground unit, who has radio contact with ground unit involved and/or can identify friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.
 - (c) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter required to operate within vicinity of hostile village or hamlet for the purpose of conducting a medical evacuation or supply mission, and where enemy fire presents an immediate threat to lives of helicopter or transport crews.
- (7) Close Air Support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages are always controlled by an FAC. If attack on a village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving movement of ground forces through an area, attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US/GVN/RVNAF approval is required, except in emergencies. If an attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, inhabitants are warned by [REDACTED] and or loudspeaker system prior to attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate area.
- [REDACTED]

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e. Specific Instructions for Close Air Support to Include Interdiction (Day or Night):

(1) ALO/FAC

- (a) Has a thorough knowledge of ground scheme of maneuver.
- (b) Makes every effort to secure VNAF observer to assist in directing an air strike. If VNAF observer is not available, an ALO/FAC is authorized to direct air strikes.
- (c) Maintains a reliable communications with ground unit and with strike aircraft.
- (d) Makes a positive identification and marks target.
- (e) Ensures that strike pilots are aware of friendly locations in relation to the target, characteristics of target area, and local weather conditions.
- (f) Uses a 1:50,000 scale map of target area, and photographs when available.

(2) Strike Pilots

- (a) Are under the control of, and have direct radio contact for a strike with, an FAC or designated control agency (airborne or ground).
- (b) Have visual contact with the target or target marker except as noted in paragraph (f) below.
- (c) Always ascertain position of friendly troops (or civilians, when applicable).
- (d) Ascertain local conditions regarding weather, target area, and surrounding terrain characteristics.
- (e) Defend themselves against ground fire if the:
 - 1. Source of fire can be visually identified.
 - 2. Strike can be positively oriented against source.
 - 3. Fire is of such intensity that counter action is necessary.
- (f) Strike at night only with flares, unless under control of TPQ-10 or MSQ-77.

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f. Border Restrictions for Aircraft Conducting Assigned Missions in RVN.

- (1) Aircraft do not cross demilitarized zone or Cambodian border unless specific authorization is obtained by this Headquarters.
- (2) All FACs operating in vicinity of border have a 1:50,000 map of target area. Maps, mosaics, and photos are made available to pilots.
- (3) Joint operations-intelligence facilities are established and complete prestrike briefings and poststrike debriefings are conducted for strikes within 5000 meters of border when practical.
- (4) Cambodian border restrictions which are additional to above:
 - (a) Strike aircraft within 5000 meters of Cambodian border are under positive control of FAC or MSQ-77/TPQ-10. Authority to waive this requirement must be obtained by this Headquarters.
 - (b) All organizations responsible for planning or execution of missions within 5 km of the border have posted a 1:250,000 or larger scale map on which the Cambodian border is distinctly marked, on the RVN side, to a depth of 5 km.
 - (c) Aircraft supporting border outposts (fire support, reconnaissance, supply, and transportation) are allowed to operate as necessary in outpost area, but neither cross nor fire across the border.

g. Jettison

- (1) Munitions are jettisoned only in designated specified strike zones.
- (2) During night or IFR conditions, aircraft are under positive radar control while jettisoning.
- (3) During the day, VFR drops are monitored by radar whenever possible.

h. US Armed Helicopters

- (1) US Army and US Marine armed helicopters are marked "U.S. Army" or "U.S. Marines," as appropriate, and may be manned with all U.S. crews at unit commanders discretion.

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- (2) If target involves noncombatants, such as in hamlet or village, an RVNAF observer is aboard the helicopter whenever possible and U.S./GVN/RVNAF approval to fire must be obtained unless the situation clearly presents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew.

i. Air Reconnaissance and Aerial Surveillance Missions

- (1) Operational restrictions placed upon reconnaissance aircraft near the RVN/Cambodian border for the purpose of insuring that inadvertent overflights do not occur, preclude aerial reconnaissance over large areas within RVN where significant enemy activity is known to be taking place. In order to eliminate immunity of such areas to observation and photography, these restrictions may be waived on a case-by-case basis.
- (2) Requests for reconnaissance coverage in areas which present a danger of overflight or border violation are forwarded through normal reconnaissance request channels.
- (3) US Army OV-1 aircraft may be armed with target marking ordnance while on surveillance missions.

4. POST OPERATIONS

- a. Where feasible, follow each operation with PsyWar/CA team to explain to the population what happened and how to avoid future non-combatant casualties.
- b. Following each operation wherein noncombatant casualties and/or property damage have occurred, coordinate with the Province/District Chief concerned for prompt identification of those affected. Consideration should also be given at this time to appropriate civic action measures.

5. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. USMC units do not have the authority to exercise police powers over the Vietnamese people; hence the majority of controls have to be established by National Police, Army of Vietnam Military Police, or other ARVN military units and Regional and Popular Force units as appropriate. In the event of civil disturbance, the nearest Vietnamese National Police establishment is notified. 1st Marine Division units will take no action other than to defend themselves and US property.
- b. Use of Riot Control Agents. Reference (j).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

H. J. Woessner
H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
160800H October 1967

Annex K (Controlled Items) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) MACV Directive Number 525-7
(b) MACV Directive Number 525-9
(c) 1stMarDivO 003100.2

Time Zone: H

1. References (a) and (b) provide background information concerning controlled items. Control measures are established in order to limit enemy access to the following controlled items; rice, money, medicine, contraband and food caches consistent with the guidelines below:

a. Rice

- (1) The rice which fills enemy caches is the product of an increasingly burdensome enemy tax program imposed on peasantry in areas which the enemy controls or to which they have access. Discovery of this rice and its return to villagers in the immediate area constitutes an opportunity for generation of a major psychological impact in support of U.S. RVN objectives. Use of recovered rice for civic action purposes also reduces the drain on government rice supplies and transportation. It is desired, therefore, that Marine commanders be alert in order to exploit enemy rice stocks for civic action purposes and also to reduce the drain on government rice supplies and transportation.
- (2) Rice harvests are controlled on a planned basis within the capability of available forces. Requests to destroy rice or rice fields which cannot be controlled are referred to this Headquarters. Approval of such destruction is granted only when assurances that legitimate food needs of the local populace can be anticipated and provided for by GVN provincial authorities, monitored and assisted by U.S. members of the Provincial Team.
- (3) Commanding Officers insure that these provisions are carefully explained to all hands. Further, rice and foodstuffs are destroyed only as a last resort. Where on-hand resources are inadequate for evacuation of such rice and foodstuffs, assistance is requested from higher echelon. Where rice caches are destroyed a written report is submitted to this Headquarters.

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(4) Procedures followed in protection of rice crops are:

- (a) Determine areas which produce large quantities of rice and establish priorities for protecting these areas.
 - (b) Conduct joint and combined military and police operations to protect people during rice harvesting.
 - (c) Protect convoys transporting rice harvest to agricultural cooperatives and farmers associations.
 - (d) Initiate propaganda activities and psychological warfare urging people to sell their rice only to GVN authorities or legal rice traders.
 - (e) Deny to the enemy, rice from paddies farmed or controlled by him. If enemy rice paddies are not accessible, consideration will be given to the use of herbicides to destroy the crop. Final decision to use herbicides always rests with GVN and always requires complete coordination of US and GVN agencies involved. Specific instructions for the use of herbicides are contained in reference (c).
- (5) Specific instructions for protection of rice harvests are contained in 1st MarDiv Operation Order 302-67 (GOLDEN FLEECE).

b. Money

- (1) The enemy relies heavily on extortion of money from RVN populace to finance his aggression. They have extorted about 2 to 4 billion piasters during the past twelve months. About 75% of this money was extorted from the people in the form of an alleged tax on agricultural produce and industrial goods; the balance was extorted from commercial civilian traffic on roads, trails and waterways of RVN. Many of these "tax collection" points are in areas which are accessible from the 1st MarDiv area of responsibility and can be successfully interdicted.
 - (a) Within the TAOR and during operations outside the TAOR, organizations coordinate with ARVN, PF and RF, those activities aimed at neutralizing enemy sources of money and money instruments. These activities are primarily attacks on enemy "tax collection" points on roads and waterways and provision of assistance to local populace in evading so-called enemy taxes and bond-selling efforts.
 - (b) Captured funds are handled in accordance with reference (b).

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c. Medicines

- (1) The enemy obtains medicines from Communist countries and by direct or indirect purchase in RVN from commercial establishments. NVN units bring a basic supply of medicine with them from North Vietnam and thereafter depend primarily on local purchase. Medicines are transported from cities and towns by every means of transportation using roads, trails, and waterways to enemy distribution points. Some medicines are also obtained by selective hijacking of civilian traffic. Local enemy sources of medicine must be identified and neutralized.
- (2) Captured or abandoned enemy medical stores or material including medical items which are determined or suspected to be contaminated, outdated or uncertified will not be intentionally destroyed.
- (3) Captured enemy medical supplies are used for the care and treatment of wounded or sick enemy personnel, but only when such use is under the supervision of enemy medical personnel. Enemy medical supplies are not used by U.S. medical personnel except in an emergency due to nonavailability of U.S. medical items of the type required.
- (4) Captured enemy medical supplies have great potential for harm due to unknown enemy standards of quality and doubtful enemy capability for adequate quality control of items. Release of captured medical supplies to local GVN officials or other relief agencies in the field is not made except in cases of urgent humanitarian need when U.S. supplies of the type and quantity required are not available. Such release will be limited to types and quantities of items required to meet the existing medical emergency as determined by the U.S. Military Surgeon in the incident area. The release is reported in the next sitrep to include types and quantities of items, date of release, name and location of recipient(s) and intended purpose for which released.
- (5) Every effort is made to extract all captured medical supplies by capturing units through established channels. If all available means have been exhausted and extraction remains impossible, they are left intact and in place. Date, location and estimate of quantities are reported to this headquarters.

d. Contraband


- (1) All contraband seized by units is turned into this headquarters for appropriate disposal.

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e. Food Caches

- (1) Large food caches, obviously over and above needs of local population as determined by local GVN officials, are reported to this headquarters for appropriate disposal. For extractions, where private ownership is claimed, a receipt system will be utilized. General security for extraction operations and packaging materials and transportation are provided, if requested by GVN officials. Plans provide for availability of these resources. The following measures, as a minimum, are coordinated with the local GVN officials:
 - (a) Procedures for informing GVN officials of locations and amounts of food supplies discovered.
 - (b) Procedures for provision of necessary labor, packaging materials, and transportation to permit extraction.
 - (c) Provision for GVN to furnish receipts for supplies extracted when private ownership is claimed.
 - (d) Procedures for use of 1st Marine Division personnel to furnish security elements during extraction operations.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
 160800H October 1967

ANNEX L (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 301-68 ()

Ref: (a) DivO PO2000.2
 (b) 1st MAJ O PO2000.6
 (c) Force O PO2000.1

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization) and Current Monthly Task Organization Report

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence), current INTSUM's and PERINTREP's.
- (2) The enemy has the capability to monitor, jam, and conduct imitative deception on friendly radio circuits. His capability continues to improve and will become more sophisticated if provided assistance by CHICOM, NVA and/or other communist bloc nations.
- (3) The enemy is capable of interdiction or disruption of metallic circuits, and destruction or damage to communication facilities.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) III MAF
 - (a) Coordinates Communication--Electronics operational and logistical requirements with higher and adjacent headquarters.
 - (b) Coordinates communication matters within the I Corps Tactical Zone.
 - (c) Controls and assigns radio voice call signs and frequencies for all III MAF Forces.
 - (d) Provides alternate route communications to III MAF units and world wide network through DCS.

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- (2) USMACV provides voice and teletype channels over SEASIA long haul tropospheric scatter and microwave systems to include channels to 2d ARVN Division in QUANG NGAI and Headquarters 5th and 6th ARVN Regiments in TAM KY.
- (3) I Corps Advisory Group provides voice and teletype channels to Comdr QUANG DA Special Zone.
- (4) Defense Communication Agency provides entry into world wide communication systems through manual torn-tape relay station DA NANG.
- (5) U.S. Navy, through interface of DCA circuitry, provides entry into world-wide communication system through Naval Communication Station, PHILIPPINES.
- (6) Force Logistics Command/1st FSR provides electronics supply and maintenance support.
- (7) Naval Supply Activities, DA NANG, provides supply support for fixed plant teletype equipments.
- (8) RPIO, Honolulu provides cryptographic support.
- (9) CRF SUBIC BAY provides cryptographic maintenance and repair support.
- (10) Detachment, 1st Radio Battalion provides communication security support.
- (11) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing establishes communications for close air support, air defense, and provides an alternate route means of communications to III MAF and entry to world wide communication system through DCA circuitry.
- (12) Command Posts. Paragraph 5, basic order.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Current Monthly Task Organization Report.

2. MISSION

Communication elements plan, install, operate, and maintain continuous reliable communication systems and facilities to support a combat base environment and 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF concept(s) of operation.

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3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations

- (1) Combat base communication-electronics systems are semi-permanent installations employing wire, DCA circuitry, and multichannel equipments for primary transmission paths backed up by tactical radio and radio relay equipments. Engineering of this system must provide an inherent flexibility which facilitates rapid expansion, integration, and support of tactical communications. The combat base communication-electronics system provides and supports:

- (a) Communication Center.
- (b) Division telephone and switching central.
- (c) COC, FSCC, and DASC circuits.
- (d) Liaison and coordination circuits with adjacent III MAF, FWMAF, and RVNAF forces within the I Corps Tactical Zone.
- (e) CRITICOM circuits (SSO).

- (2) Communication-Electronics support for amphibious and/or ground operations extending away from a combat base is provided by tactical equipment resources. Communication planning for operations must consider integration and maximum employment of existing combat base communication systems and facilities.

b. Headquarters Battalion

- (1) Install, operate, and maintain a communication-electronics system to support the following Division Combat Base facilities.
 - (a) Division Message Center.
 - (b) Teletypewriter terminal complex, to include requirements of the Combat Operations Center.
 - (c) Telephone Central.
 - (d) COC and FSCC wire, radio, and radio relay communications.

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- (e) Division interoffice voice communication systems.
 - (2) Plan, install, and be prepared to activate multichannel radio relay as backup to DCA communication systems and the cable system serving this Headquarters.
 - (3) Activate Division Tactical, Supporting Arms, and Logistical Nets as directed.
 - (4) Establish System and Technical Control Facilities and procedures for coordination with senior and subordinate commands to maintain circuit quality and to expedite restoration of internal communication systems.
 - (5) Establish and maintain personnel and equipment to support other than base type operations by the 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF.
 - (6) Provide communication guard for all 1st Marine Division units and reinforcing units under the ADCON/OPCON of the CG, 1st Marine Division.
 - (7) Provide communication guard either by relay or over-the-counter service to units external to the 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF as directed.
 - (8) Be prepared to activate external radio circuits to III MAF.
 - (9) Install and maintain circuit connections between 1st Marine Division (Rein) communications facilities and III MAF 31 Test.
 - (10) Provide 1st Marine Division Communication Center with electronic equipment repair support.
 - (11) Perform other communication services as directed by this Headquarters.
- c. 5th Marines (Rein)
7th Marines (Rein)
- (1) Plan, install, operate, and maintain communications to support assigned mission and be prepared to provide communications in support of tactical operations.

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- (2) Be prepared to provide communication guard, courier and/or over-the-counter service to attached, reinforcing, supporting and/or external units as directed by this Headquarters.
- (3) Be prepared to establish lateral radio relay links as directed.

d. 2d Bn.(Rein), 5th Mar

- (1) Plan, install, operate, and maintain communications to support assigned mission and be prepared to provide communications in support of tactical operations.
- (2) Activate stations on Division Radio Nets as directed.
- (3) Be prepared to provide communication guard, courier and/or over-the-counter service to attached, reinforcing, supporting and/or external units as directed.
- (4) Be prepared to support radio relay detachments providing lateral communications as assigned.

e. 11th Marines (-) (Rein)

- (1) Plan, install, operate, and maintain communication systems to support assigned mission and be prepared to provide communications in support of tactical operations.
- (2) Plan, install, coordinate, operate, and maintain a communication system in support of defensive operations in the Northern Sector, Division Rear Area.
- (3) Be prepared to provide communication guard, courier and/or over-the-counter service to attached, reinforcing, supporting and/or external units as directed.
- (4) Be prepared to establish lateral radio relay links as directed.
- (5) Provide the Division FSCC with personnel and equipment to establish, operate, and maintain stations on the 11th Marines Command/Fire Direction and Artillery Air Spot Nets.

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f. 1st Tank Bn

- (1) Establish, operate and maintain a communication center in the Southern Sector and provide communication guard, courier and/or over-the-counter service to attached, reinforcing, supporting, and/or external units as directed.
- (2) Plan, coordinate, install, operate, and maintain a communication system to support defensive operations in the Southern Sector, Division Rear Area.
- (3) Be prepared to provide communications to support tactical operations.

g. 1st Recon Bn (Rein)

1st AT Bn (-)
3d AmTrac Bn, FMF
1st Engr Bn (-)
1st MT Bn (-)
11th MT Bn, FMF
1st SP Bn
1st Med Bn (-)
1st Hospital Co

- (1) Be prepared to provide communications in support of missions assigned.
- (2) Be prepared to augment unit providing communications guard with personnel and equipment.

h. 7th Comm Bn

- (1) Be prepared to establish, operate, and maintain communication-electronics systems to support a combat base to include:
 - (a) Message Center.
 - (b) Teletype transmitting and receiving section and/or torn tape relay.
 - (c) Area Telephone Switching Central.
 - (d) Interoffice Voice Communication Systems.
 - (e) Installation and maintenance of external and internal cable systems.

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- (2) Be prepared to establish systems and technical control facilities and procedures, within capability, to expedite restoration of systems and maintain circuit quality.
 - (3) Be prepared to provide electronics maintenance support within capabilities.
 - (4) Be prepared to provide communication detachments in support of 1st Marine Division tactical operations.
 - (5) Be prepared to provide communication support to III MAF forces as directed.
- i. Naval Gunfire Communications. This Annex and Annex G (Naval Gunfire).
- j. Air Support Communications. References, (a) and (b).
- k. Coordinating Instructions
- (1) Communication procedures in accordance with reference (a), effective ACP's, JANAP's, and III MAF and USMACV directives.
 - (2) Communication security in accordance with ACP 122.
 - (3) Ensure that communication detachments are provided a basic unit of fire and personal combat essential equipment appropriate for assignment.
 - (4) Provide communication detachments with installation support, security, and resupply.
 - (5) Provide press service with communication support only when such support has been cleared with this Headquarters and does not interfere with tactical operations.
 - (6) Lateral communications as coordinated between adjacent units.
 - (7) Plan, coordinate and integrate combined action company/platoon communication systems to support operations, enhance reinforcement and supporting fires.
 - (8) Be prepared to enter Division Command and tactical nets in the event of land line and/or radio relay failure.

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(9) Messenger Service

- (a) This Headquarters establishes special helicopter messenger and courier service as required. Schedules are promulgated by separate message.
- (b) Units not being served by electrical means establish regular scheduled courier service to communication center providing communication guard.
- (c) Scheduled vehicular messenger service from Division Communication Center is announced as required.

(10) Radio

- (a) Frequencies, reference (a).
- (b) Radio call signs and tactical radio call signs, reference (a).
- (c) Intraunit reassignment of frequencies as promulgated by reference (a) are coordinated with, and approved by, this Headquarters.
- (d) Be prepared to activate secure voice upon order within a 30 minute time frame.
- (e) Enforce transmission security procedures, utilization of authentication and numeral codes to reduce enemy communication intelligence gathering capability.
- (f) Maintain radio logs as dictated by the tactical situation.
- (g) Interference and jamming reports in accordance with reference (c). (Reports of friendly interference should contain station call, signal strength, and degree of interference).

(11) Wire

- (a) Provides the basic communication paths in a defensive posture and is engineered and installed to provide a minimum of interruption due to enemy interdiction.
- (b) Prepare and submit two copies of circuit diagram for all combat base internal and external metallic circuits to include radio relay. Extent of unit circuit diagram

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includes test frame and connecting cable pairs installed by this Headquarters.

- (c) Prepare and submit two copies line route map of all external metallic circuits to include radio relay.
- (d) Installation crews and trouble shooting teams must be constantly alert for ambushes, mines, and booby traps.

(12) Radio Relay

- (a) Communication plans provide for radio relay backup to metallic trunk lines.
- (b) Frequency assignments, reference (a).
- (c) Coordinate frequency assignments AN/TRC-27 with this Headquarters.

(13) Visual and Sound. Reference (a).(14) Communications Center

- (a) Torn Tape Relay procedures in accordance with ACP 127 ().

(15) Cryptographic

- (a) Off-line and on-line procedures in accordance with current directives.
- (b) Be prepared to provide ARVN units with low level cryptographic support.

(c) Authentication and Numeral Code

1. KAC Q Series. The KAC Q series, combined authentication/numeral code, is used throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone by III MAF forces and I Corps Advisors and is used exclusively within this Division on all internal nets.
2. KAC 138. KAC 138 is the effective numeral code for joint use within the Pacific command and is used between units not possessing KAC Q series.

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3. KAA 60. KAA 60 has been designated as the RVN in-country authentication system for joint usage. It is used between units not holding the KACQ series.

(d) Operations Code

1. KAC P series. The KAC P series is employed within the I Corps Tactical Zone by III MAF units and I Corps Advisors and is used within this division on all internal nets.
2. KAC 132. KAC 132 is the U.S. Navy Operations Code Pacific Area and is only used when units do not hold KAC P series.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Administrative Order 301-67b. Supply and Maintenance

- (1) Organic maintenance capability is augmented as necessary to meet specific field requirements.
- (2) Communications planning encompasses establishment of an organic electronics repair and replenishment capability within the logistics support area, to include:
 - (a) Maintenance float.
 - (b) Repair facilities consisting of personnel and equipment.
 - (c) Stocks of high usage items and items susceptible to combat damage; e.g., antennas, antenna bases, hand sets, charged BB 451's and a capability to recharge, etc.
- (3) Lost equipment is reported in accordance with reference (c).
- (4) Contact teams are positioned at regimental level and lower if necessary to provide third echelon and overflow second echelon repair.

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- (5) In preparation for tactical operations care is exercised to ensure that correct levels of operating spares are available and readily accessible for each piece of equipment.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

H. J. Woessner

H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
 160800H October 1967

Annex M (Revolutionary Development) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Combined Campaign Plan 1967 (AB 142)

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. Reference (a) provides background information concerning Revolutionary Development.
- b. Revolutionary Development (RD) is the integrated military and civil program to restore, consolidate, and expand governmental control so that nation building can progress throughout the area. The focal point of the program is the people in the hamlets. RD aims at developing a secure environment with improved political, economic, and social standards of living for all. The ultimate goal of RD is to secure and develop sufficient hamlet and village areas throughout I CTZ that are free from Communist influence so that they can no longer thrive or pose a threat to the central government's efforts to build a free nation. Military forces are employed in areas surrounding the RD effort to establish a protective screen against VC/NVA main forces that seek to enter the inner area when RD is in progress. When this has been accomplished, RD teams establish initial government administration, organize the people for self defense, and initiate economy and social development projects to win the confidence of the people. The national police maintain law and order, and in conjunction with military RD teams, identify and eliminate the VC infrastructure.

2. MISSION

1st Marine Division forces support the RD program by destroying VC/NVA main forces, base areas, and resources and/or drives the enemy into sparsely populated and food-scarce areas, secure TAOR's, and provides a security screen in the vicinity of established RD bases; and is prepared to provide reaction forces to counter attack VC threats against RD bases.

3. CONCEPT

- a. Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 301-68
- b. The RD campaign is conducted in consonance with political, economic and sociological programs of GVN and US/FW agencies.

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RVNAF has the primary mission of supporting RD activities, with priority in and around national priority areas and other areas of critical significance, defending governmental centers, and protecting and controlling national resources. 1st Marine Division reinforces RVNAF for joint operations and, as necessary, conducts unilateral operations. In addition 1st Marine Division forces assist in the protection and control of national resources, as directed.

4. OBJECTIVES AND TASKS

a. To defeat VC/NVA forces.

- (1) Conduct sustained, coordinated, unilateral or combined offensive operations against VC/NVA forces and base areas.
- (2) Conduct a continuous harassing and destructive air offensive against enemy forces and base areas.
- (3) Interdict VC/NVA land and water LOC's through ground, sea and air operations.
- (4) Conduct psychological operations against VC/NVA personnel and civilians under the influence of the Viet Cong.
- (5) Conduct intelligence, counterintelligence, and counter-infiltration operations.
- (6) Provide reaction forces to counterattack VC threats against RD installations.

b. To extend GVN control in the Republic of Vietnam:

- (1) Establish, maintain, and secure military installations and supporting LOC's as necessary in RVN.
- (2) Secure the major political, economic, food producing and populated centers.
- (3) Identify and eliminate the VC guerrilla and communist infrastructure.
- (4) Conduct military clearing and securing operations to establish and maintain local security for areas undergoing Revolutionary Development.
- (5) Conduct military civic action to win the support of the people to the GVN.


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- (6) Provide relief, reorientation, rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees.
- (7) Perform emergency construction, repair and maintenance of roads and bridges that are required to support tactical and RD operations.
- (8) Assist RVNAF commanders in preparing and executing plans to secure controlled items and waterways within the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility and as directed.
- (9) Assist RVNAF commanders in conducting searches to uncover VC caches.

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
160800H October 1967

Annex N (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Div Order 5605.1_


Time Zone: H

1. Distribution of this order is as follows:

| | | | |
|---------------|----|----------------------------------|---|
| CG FMFPac | 2 | NCC | 1 |
| COMUSMACV | 5 | NAVSPTACT | 1 |
| COMSEVENTHFLT | 2 | CO I Corps Adv Grp | 4 |
| CG III MAF | 10 | 3d Nav Const Bde | 3 |
| CG 3d MarDiv | 3 | CTG 115.1 | 1 |
| CG 1st MAW | 20 | 2d Bn (Rein) 5th Mar | 2 |
| CG FLC/FSR | 5 | 11th MT Bn | 2 |
| CTG 70.8 | 2 | CO, Unilat Opns Bn, 149th MI Grp | 2 |
| CTG 70.8.9 | 2 | | |

E-1,2,4,8,10,12,14,15,16,21,23,26,27,32,34,35,39,46,65,(1);84,86,87,88,
89,90,91,92,93,95,97,98,101,102,(2);85,3,(6);7a,68,72,76,80,(10).

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

7A, DJM, tem
5215
19 Oct 1967

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Cancellation of certain 1st Marine Division Operation and
Administrative Orders

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5510.1C

1. The below listed Operation and Administrative Orders are hereby cancelled
and may be destroyed in accordance with reference (a), without report to
this Headquarters.

a. Operation Order 301-67

b. Administrative Order 301-66


D. J. MEYERS
By direction

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|------------------|-----------------|---------|----------------|
| CMC | THIRD ENGRBN | NCC | FIRST MAR-3 |
| CMCS | THIRD SPBN | NSA | 3/1 |
| CINCPAC | FIRST MTBN | I CORPS | FIFTH MAR-4 |
| CRICPACFLT | THIRD TKBN | NCR-30 | SEVENTH MAR-4 |
| FMFPAC (rear) | FIRST AMTRACBN | MAG 11 | ELEVENTH MAR-8 |
| FMFPAC (forward) | ELEVENTH MTBN | MAG 12 | FIRST ATBN |
| COMUSMACV | DET, THIRD DENT | MAG 13 | FIRST RECONBN |
| COMSEVENTHFLT | SECOND LAAM | MAG 16 | FIRST ENGRBN |
| III MAF | MACS-7 | MAG 36 | FIRST MEDBN |
| THIRD MARDIV | FIRST ENGRBN | MASS-2 | SEVENTH COMBN |
| FMAW | FIRST TKBN | MASS-3 | SEVENTH ENGRBN |
| FLC/FSR | CTG 70.8 | MMSG-17 | SEVENTH MTBN |
| COASTAL SURV | CTG 76.5 | PMO | HQBN |
| NINTH MAR | CTG 79.5 | COC | NINTH ENGRBN |
| THIRD ATBN | CTG 70.8.9 | 2/5 | FIRST HOSPCO |

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DANANG, Republic of Vietnam
190900H October 1967

Change 1 to Administrative Order 301-67

Time Zone: H

1. Administrative Order 301-67 is hereby redesignated as Administrative Order 301-68. All references to 301-67 in the order will be pen changed to 301-68.

2. File this change as page 9a following page 9 of Administrative Order 301-68.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
210800H October 1967

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Operation Plan 505-68 (Provisional Infantry Units)

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000; AMS Series L7014; Sheets 6540 I, II;
6541 II; 6640 I, II, III, IV; 6641 II, III
(b) 1stMarDiv OperO 301-68
(c) DivO P02000.2C
(d) DivO 120.20 (Prov Rifle Co SOP)
(e) 1stMarDiv OperO 90-67 (Counter Rocket)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Current Monthly Task Organization Report

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b).

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- (2) Current INTSUMS, PERINTREPS and SPIRS. Copy
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b. Friendly Forces. Reference (b).c. Assumptions

- (1) That the situation may arise which requires the use of provisional infantry units within TAOR's for special tasks or relief or augmentation of other forces.
(2) That activation of provisional infantry units may preclude the accomplishment of the providing unit's primary mission.

2. MISSION

1st Marine Division rapidly forms provisional infantry units as the situation requires for employment within the division TAOR on special tasks or to relieve or augment other forces.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations

- (1) Standard organization, equipment and supplies are prescribed

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for provisional infantry units throughout the division. Subordinate commands when tasked by this Headquarters to provide provisional rifle company or elements thereof organize, equip and supply unit in accordance with Annex A (Organization of Provisional Rifle Company) and Annex B (Equipment and Supplies).

- (2) Typical types of tasks for which provisional infantry units may be formed:
 - (a) Special security missions.
 - (b) To relieve organized unit within the TAOR for employment on another mission.
 - (c) To augment organized units within the TAOR.

b. Separate Battalions

- (1) When directed provide provisional infantry units as specified in execution frag orders.
- (2) Annex A (Organization of Provisional Rifle Company).
- (3) Annex B (Equipment and Supplies for Provisional Rifle Company).
- (4) 1st Tank Battalion (-)/1st Anti-tank Battalion (-)/3d AmTrac Battalion (-) (Rein) be prepared to provide provisional rifle company in accordance with reference (d).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Supply

- (1) Initial source is parent organization of provisional units.
- (2) Prescribed load.
 - (a) Class I. MCI w/fuel trioxane - 1 day.
 - (b) Class II
 - 1. Normal arms and equipment to include body armor (upper torso) in accordance with assigned job.
 - 2. Crew served weapons, communications equipment and vehicles. Annex B (Equipment and Supplies).

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3. Dry cell batteries. Minimum of 2 days supply for each item of battery powered equipment.

(c) Class III. Vehicle fuel tanks full.

(d) Class IV. None.

(e) Class V. Basic allowance for small arms plus items listed in Annex B (Equipment and Supplies).

(f) Water. Two full canteens per individual plus water cans listed in Annex B (Equipment and Supplies).

(3) Resupply. Organizations having OPCON of provisional infantry units are responsible for resupplying these units.

b. Casualty Evacuation. Evacuate casualties by the most expeditious means to the nearest 1stMarDiv medical facility unless directed otherwise by competent medical authority.

c. Transportation. Parent organizations of provisional units coordinate transportation to move units to initial employment location.

d. Personnel. Admin Order 301-67.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. Communication-Electronics

(1) Reference (c).

(2) Frequencies, call signs and other communications instructions to be promulgated in execution frag order.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- ✓A - Organization of Provisional Rifle Company
- ✓B - Equipment and Supplies
- ✓C - Distribution

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
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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
 210800H October 1967

Annex A (Organization of Provisional Rifle Company) to Operation Plan 305-68

Time Zone: H

1. The following organization is prescribed for provisional inf units activated IAW provisions of basic order.



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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
 210800H October 1967

Annex B (Equipment and Supplies) to Operation Plan 305-68

1. Required equipment.

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>Prov
Co Hq</u> | <u>Prov
PLAT</u> |
|---|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Radio Set AN/PRC-25 | 2 | 1 |
| Telephone Set TA-312/PR (or EE-8) | 2 | 2 |
| Cable Tele MX-306A/G-WD-1/TT (Comm Wire) | 2 | 1 |
| Machine Gun (Cal 7.62mm M60 or Cal 30/1919 A-4) | 0 | 3 |

2. Recommended equipment and supplies .

| <u>ITEM</u> | | |
|--|--------|---------|
| Truck utility $\frac{1}{4}$ T 4X4 M422A1 | 1 | 0 |
| Trlr utility $\frac{1}{4}$ T M-100 | 1 | 0 |
| Launcher Grenade 40mm M-79 w/BA ammo | 1 | 0 |
| Can Water, 5 gal (full) | 1 | 8 |
| Grenade, hand frag M26 | 0 | 4 cases |
| Grenade, hand, illum MK1 | 1 case | 0 |
| Grenade, hand smoke, colored,
assorted (red, green, yellow) | 1 case | 0 |
| Flare, surface, trip M49 | 1 case | 0 |

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
210800H October 1967

Annex C (Distribution) to Operation Plan 305-68

Ref: (a) Division Order 5605.1_


Time Zone: H

1. Distribution of this order is as follows:

| | |
|----------------|---|
| CG III MAF | 3 |
| CG 3dMarDiv | 3 |
| 2d Bn, 5th Mar | 3 |

E-1,2,3,4,7A,10,12,14,15,21,23,27,32,35,39,65 (1); 68,72,76,80 (6);
84,85,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,95,97,101 (3).

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
240800H October 1967

Change No 1 to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen change to Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 301-68.
 - a. On page A-1, fourth line add "160800H October 1967)".
2. This change provides an effective date of the task organization.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

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H. J. WOESSNER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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
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1650
10 Oct 1967

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on COMUSMACV ltr MACJO3 of 27 September 1967

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
To: Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray
Commanding Officer, 5th Marines
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines
Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion
Commanding Officer, 1st Engineer Battalion
Commanding Officer, 1st Medical Battalion
Commanding Officer, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
Commanding Officer, 1st Shore Party Battalion
Commanding Officer, 1st Tank Battalion
Commanding Officer, 7th Communication Battalion
Commanding Officer, 1st Hospital Company

Subj: Letter of Appreciation

1. Readdressed and forwarded with great personal pride.
Please ensure my well done is passed to all concerned.


DONN J. ROBERTSON

(128)

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7/rjn
1650
2 Oct 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on COMUSMACV ltr MACJ03 of 27 September 1967

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Letter of Appreciation

1. Forwarded with pleasure.
2. The high praise accorded to the performance of the officers and men of the 1st Marine Division during Operation SWIFT is a source of great pride to me. I would like to add my warmest congratulations to those of General Cao Van Vien and General Westmoreland for a superb record of accomplishment.

/s/ R. E. Cushman, Jr.
R. E. CUSHMAN, JR.

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HEADQUARTERS
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Office of the Commander
APO San Francisco 96222

27 Sep 1967

MACJ03

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

THRU: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO 96602

TO: Commanding General
1st Marine Division
FPO 96602

1. It is with sincere pleasure that I forward the attached letter of appreciation from General Cao Van Vien, Chief of Joint General Staff, RVNAF, lauding the achievements of the 1st Marine Division during Operation SWIFT.

2. To the praiseworthy remarks of General Vien, I add my personal congratulations for another outstanding performance by your command. Please convey to all participants my appreciation for a job well done. Their professional competence and dedication to duty reflect great credit on the United States Marine Corps and this Command.

/s/ W. C. Westmoreland

1 Incl
as

W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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General W. C. WESTMORELAND
Command US MACV

Dear General,

I wish to express my appreciation and admiration for the outstanding accomplishments of the officers and men who fought in operation SWIFT which was conducted in the area Northwest of Tam Ky between 4 to 15 September 1967.

The ability of the American forces to react swiftly and effectively with the enemy forces was successful in not only defeating the 2nd NVA Division but also impeded the enemy's oppressive and massive attack.

Again the US Marine Corps showed their combat effectiveness with courageous and firm fighting which reveals a high degree of professionalism.

Although heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy forces, it could not be accomplished without friendly losses. For those who have fallen, we share in the grief of their families and nation. To those who were wounded, we wish a quick and complete recovery.

To you and to all of the men who took part in this operation, I extend my thanks and best wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ General Cao Van Vien

General CAO VAN VIEN
Chief of Joint General Staff
RVNAF.

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)
FLEET MARINE FORCE
DANANG, VIETNAM 6 OCTOBER 1967



COMMAND DIRECTORY

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FOR OFFICIAL USE

| DIVISION COMMANDER | RTD | OFFICE PHONE | DANANG DIAL SYSTEM | QTAS |
|-------------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|------|
| MajGen D. J. ROBERTSON | Jun68 | Isherwood 6 | 6290 | 6 |
| Alde-de-Camp | Dec67 | Isherwood 13 | 6290 | 113 |
| Alde-de-Camp | Mar68 | Isherwood 13 | 6290 | 113 |
| Sergeant Major | May68 | Isherwood 406 | | |
| ASST DIVISION COMMANDER | | | | |
| Alde-de-Camp | Apr68 | Isherwood 905 | 6290 | 905 |
| 1stLt J. K. ALEXANDER | Apr68 | Isherwood 13 | 6290 | 113 |
| CHIEF OF STAFF | | | | |
| Staff Secretary | Jul68 | Isherwood 5 | 6465 | 909 |
| Asst Staff Secretary | Nov67 | Isherwood 38 | 6465 | 113 |
| Asst Staff Secretary | Aug68 | Isherwood 138 | | |
| ASST CofS, G-1 | | | | |
| Asst G-1 | May68 | Isherwood 1 | 6218 | 933 |
| Asst G-1 | Sep68 | Isherwood 1 | | |
| Asst G-1 | Sep68 | Isherwood 201 | | |
| Special Projects | Dec67 | Isherwood 101 | | |
| Special Projects | Feb68 | Isherwood 201 | | |
| ASST CofS, G-2 | | | | |
| Asst G-2 | Oct68 | Isherwood 2 | 6262 | 914 |
| Acquisition | Sep68 | Isherwood 2 | 6262 | |
| Production | Aug68 | Isherwood 302 | | |
| SCI Officer | Dec67 | Isherwood 202 | | |
| Chief Air Observer | Jul68 | Isherwood 502 | | |
| SIO | Jul68 | Isherwood Bailey | | |
| TaCdr 1ST IT | Dec67 | Isherwood 602 | | |
| TaCdr 7TH IT | Jul68 | Isherwood 502 | | |
| TaCdr 3RD ITT | Aug68 | Isherwood 502 | | |
| TaCdr 9TH ITT | Jun68 | Isherwood 502 | | |
| TaCdr 13TH ITT | Jul68 | Isherwood 502 | | |
| TaCdr 3RD CIT | Sep68 | Isherwood 502 | | |
| TaCdr 7TH CIT | May68 | Isherwood 502 | | |
| ASST CofS, G-3 | | | | |
| Plans/Current Opns | Jul68 | Isherwood 3 | 6307 | 944 |
| Asst G-3 | Jul68 | Isherwood 3 | | |
| Asst G-3 | Oct68 | Isherwood 3 | | |
| Opns | Jul68 | Isherwood 103 | | |
| Asst Opns | Oct67 | Isherwood 203 | | |
| OTC COC | Aug68 | Isherwood 203 | | |
| Asst Opns/Rpts | Aug68 | Isherwood 000 | | |
| Asst Plans | Aug68 | Isherwood 403 | | |
| Trng | Aug68 | Isherwood 103 | | |
| LMO Quang Da Spec 2 | Oct68 | Isherwood 303 | | |
| LMO 21ARVDiv | Oct68 | Rei An 103 | | |
| ASST CofS, G-4 | | | | |
| Asst G-4 | Dec67 | Quang Ngai 614/629 | | |
| Plans | Jul68 | Isherwood 4 | 6359 | 936 |
| Asst Plans | Sep68 | Isherwood 104 | | |
| Opns | Oct68 | Isherwood 204 | | |
| Asst Opns | Aug68 | Isherwood 204 | | |
| Asst Opns | Oct68 | Isherwood 304 | | |
| Asst Opns | Jan68 | Isherwood 304 | | |
| ASST CofS, G-5 | | | | |
| Asst G-5 | Nov67 | Isherwood 46 | 6287 | |
| CAO | Oct68 | Isherwood 46 | | |
| Asst CAO | Mar68 | Isherwood 46 | | |
| Asst CAO | Aug68 | Isherwood 46 | | |
| Admin | Feb68 | Isherwood 46 | | |
| PayOps | Nov67 | Isherwood 46 | | |
| Asst PayOps | Oct67 | Isherwood 146 | | |
| Personal Response | Dec67 | Isherwood 146 | | |
| Personal Response | Feb68 | Isherwood 146 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|-------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| ASST CoFS, COMPTROLLER
Asst Comptroller | LtCol R. L. BARRETT
Capt R. C. RAUSCH | Sep68
Apr68 | Isherwood 50
Isherwood 50 | 6287
937 | | | | | | |
| AREA AUDITOR | Capt F. FERRANTE | Feb68 | Auditor 150 | | | | | | | |
| ADJUTANT
Asst Adjutant
Per-O
OffPersO/TADO
CasualtyO | LtCol J. A. POLIDORI
Maj G. F. KUEITNER Jr.
CWO F. L. HOLL
2ndLt E. M. LISKENE
CWO O. R. MOWERY | Sep68
Dec67
Dec67
Jun68
Sep68 | Isherwood 7
Isherwood 207
Isherwood 47
Isherwood 147
Isherwood 107/707 | 6218 | | | | | | |
| NPS Custodian
AwardsO
SAC Files | 1stLt H. J. GOBLE
Capt J. J. GAVIS
CWO N. A. ZIMMERMAN | Jul68
Jun68
Nov67 | Isherwood 507
Isherwood 607
Isherwood 507 | | | | | | | |
| AIR OFFICER
Age+ At-O | Col H. J. FINN
Maj S. P. BRUTCHER | Aug68
Oct67 | Isherwood 14
Isherwood Bailey 14 | 6115
934 | | | | | | |
| AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR OFFICER | LtCol R. L. SHUFORD | Jul68 | Steele 6 | | | | | | | |
| ARTILLERY OFFICER | Col E. W. PAYNE | Aug68 | Awigo 6 | | | | | | | |
| RAND OFFICER | WO T. J. COOK | Jul68 | Auditor 55 | | | | | | | |
| CAREER ADVISOR | Capt T. R. DOVE | Nov67 | Auditor 401 | | | | | | | |
| CHAPLAIN
Asst Chaplain | Capt J. A. KEELEY, USN
Cdr E. H. KICKLIGHTER, USN | Aug68
Mar68 | Isherwood 19
Isherwood 19 | | | | | | | |
| CLUPS OFFICER | Capt J. J. BOWE Jr. | Aug68 | Isherwood 60 | | | | | | | |
| COMM ELNC OFFICER
Asst Comm Elec Off
Asst CBO/Plans/Opns
Asst CBO/Elect
Div Comm Center Off
DivSysContO
Asst CBO/Elect
DENTAL OFFICER
Admin Officer | Col A. M. CORDES
LtCol H. O. CONING
Maj D. J. VERDON
Maj L. A. SCHINKIDER
Capt R. F. ZUMBADO
2ndLt C. E. GIRADOT
WO B. F. PETERS
Capt T. J. PAPE, USN
Lt(JO) R. H. REYSEN, USN | Sep68
Jul68
Aug68
Aug68
Aug68
Jul68
Sep68
May68
Jan68 | Isherwood 10
Isherwood 10
Isherwood 110
Isherwood 210
Isherwood 111
Isherwood 69
Isherwood 210
Isherwood 40
Isherwood 40 | 6275
932 | | | | | | |
| DISBURSING OFFICER
Asst Disbursing Off | Maj G. W. COLEBURN
Capt J. A. PATTERSON | Mar68
Feb68 | Isherwood 18
Isherwood 18 | | | | | | | |
| EDUCATION OFFICER | 2ndLt E. H. FLYNN | Oct68 | Auditor 137 | | | | | | | |
| EMBARKATION OFFICER | LtCol C. B. WEBSTER | May68 | Isherwood 39 | | | | | | | |
| ENGINEER OFFICER
Asst EngrO
Asst EngrO
Base DevelopmentO
Div EquipmentO | LtCol J. W. WILSON
Maj J. M. MCKENZIE
Capt R. E. FRANZWA
Capt M. C. VROGEL
Capt J. D. BUCKLESW | Jul68
Nov67
Aug68
Jun68
Jun68 | Isherwood 15
Isherwood 15
Isherwood 115
Isherwood 15
Isherwood 115 | 6359
939 | | | | | | |
| EXCHANGE OFFICER | Capt C. E. LAND | Mar68 | Isherwood 44 | | | | | | | |
| FOOD SERVICES OFFICER | CWO J. T. WILLIAMS | Jul68 | Isherwood 56 | | | | | | | |
| INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFF | Capt J. M. GRATTO | Oct68 | Isherwood 41 | | | | | | | |
| INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFF | Capt J. D. KINDER | Jul68 | Isherwood 446 | | | | | | | |
| INSPECTOR | Col S. S. WOODS | Jun68 | Isherwood 32 | 935 | | | | | | |
| LEGAL OFFICER
Asst Legal Officer
Chief Review Off
Chief Trial Counsel
Chief Defense Counsel
Law Specialist
Claims/Legal Asst | Col J. L. OSTBY
LtCol M. T. WESTMORELAND
LtCol C. R. HARR
Capt M. F. GRANT
Capt R. T. ROBERTS
Lt J. J. MARTENS, USN
Capt D. E. MITZIO | Aug68
Feb68
Aug68
Apr68
May68
Jun68
May68 | Isherwood 17
Isherwood 417
Isherwood 17
Isherwood 317
Isherwood 217
Isherwood 217
Isherwood 217 | 6275
934 | | | | | | |
| MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER | Maj L. V. BARKLEY | Jan68 | Isherwood 35 | | | | | | | |
| NAVAL DUMPIER OFFICER | LCdr R. A. WHITCOMB, USN | Dec67 | Isherwood 14 | 6115 | | | | | | |
| ORDNANCE OFFICER | LtCol M. SOBOL | Feb68 | Isherwood 8 | | | | | | | |
| PHOTO OFFICER | WO H. L. HUNTLEY | Mar68 | Isherwood 341 | | | | | | | |
| PROTOCOL OFFICER | Maj T. W. HANCOCK | Nov67 | Isherwood 130 | | | | | | | |
| POSTAL OFFICER | WO E. GARCIA | Feb68 | Parchment 320 | | | | | | | |
| PROVOST MARSHAL | Maj R. V. O'BRIEN | Aug68 | Wave 6 | | | | | | | |
| REPRODUCTION OFFICER | 2ndLt J. M. WHEATLEY | Feb68 | Isherwood 307 | | | | | | | |
| SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER
Custodian Recreation Fund | Maj M. W. YOUNG
2ndLt E. J. LARKIN | Sep68
Jul68 | Isherwood 37
Isherwood 37 | | | | | | | |
| SUPPLY OFFICER
Asst SupplyO
SUNGEON
Admin Officer | Col G. J. EDMANN
LtCol W. E. KIRACOFE
Capt R. W. JONES, USN
LCdr A. W. KENDRICK, USN | Oct68
Jul68
Jul68
May68 | Isherwood 21
Isherwood 21
Isherwood 16
Isherwood 16 | 6359
939 | | | | | | |
| TANK OFFICER | LtCol R. M. TAYLOR | Nov67 | Happy Age 6 | | | | | | | |
| HEADQUARTERS BATTALION (Main)
Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant
CIC Sub Unit #1 | Col J. F. DONAHUE
Capt F. W. HARRING
Capt D. M. CUNNINGHAM | Aug68
Aug68
Oct67 | Auditor 6
Auditor 5
Auditor 7
Auditor Zulu | 931 | | | | | | |
| HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MARINES
Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant | Col H. E. ING Jr.
LtCol G. E. PETRO
2ndLt H. P. RAGAN | Jun68
Jan68
Oct67 | Blade 6
Blade 5
Blade 1 | 6
5 | | | | | | |
| 1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant | LtCol A. F. BELBUSTI
Maj G. A. POLSON
2ndLt W. M. GORTZ | Sep68
Jan68
Dec67 | Round 6
Round 5
Round 1 | 6
5 | | | | | | |
| 2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant | LtCol A. VANMINKLE
Maj L. H. JOY
1stLt H. E. COMAN | Aug68
Aug68
Aug68 | Cedar Bird 6
Cedar Bird 5
Cedar Bird 1 | 6
5 | | | | | | |
| 3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant | LtCol M. MCQUOWN
Maj W. W. THURMAN
1stLt M. PALLO Jr. | Sep68
May68
Sep68 | Chuck 6
Chuck 5
Chuck 1 | 6
5 | | | | | | |
| HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES
Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant | Col S. DAVIS
LtCol J. S. HICKER
Capt R. J. MULLERIN | Nov67
Jul68
Aug68 | Select 6
Select 5
Select 1/101 | 6
5 | | | | | | |
| 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES
Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant | LtCol O. W. VANDERBERG
1stLt R. C. CHEATMAN
1stLt W. P. VACCA | Oct68
Aug68
Mar68 | Grime 6
Grime 5
Grime 1 | 6
5 | | | | | | |
| 2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES
Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Adjutant | LtCol G. C. HENNINGTON
Maj A. T. FISHER
2ndLt L. D. ORLANDO | Aug68
Oct67
Jul68 | Grasshopper 6
Grasshopper 5
Grasshopper 1 | 6
5 | | | | | | |

3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer LtCol W. K. ROCKEY Sep68 Glove 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj R. R. GIMMIES Oct67 Glove 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt J. W. HORTON Dec67 Glove 1

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer Col R. R. MINER Sep68 Bonnie Hero 6 6
 Executive Officer LtCol T. J. BOHANNON Sep68 Bonnie Hero 5 5
 Adjutant Capt D. R. MUNCIE Dec67 Bonnie Hero 1

1ST BATTALION, 7TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer LtCol W. J. DAVIS Sep68 Booth 6 6
 Executive Officer LtCol J. L. HUELLER Jun68 Booth 5 5
 Adjutant 1stLt J. F. CURRAN Aug68 Booth 1

2D BATTALION, 7TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer LtCol J. R. LOVE Sep68 Dixie Diner 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj A. E. WOHOF Aug68 Dixie Diner 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt D. A. MOEN Dec67 Dixie Diner 1

3RD BATTALION, 7TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer LtCol J. D. COUNSELMAN Mar68 False 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj G. H. TURLEY Nov67 False 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt C. A. BARKER Dec67 False 1

HEADQUARTERS, 11TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer Col E. W. PAYNE Aug68 Amigo 6 6
 Executive Officer LtCol G. V. HENDRICKS Jul68 Amigo 5 5
 Adjutant Capt R. E. KIRKPATRICK Mar68 Amigo 1

1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer LtCol D. A. RAPP Aug68 Month 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj L. J. SZAFRANSKI Jr. Jul68 Month 5 5
 Adjutant 1stLt R. A. HARDIE Oct67 Month 1

2ND BATTALION, 11TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer LtCol D. A. CLARK May68 Prowl 6 6
 Executive Officer LtCol A. WHALLEY Jan68 Prowl 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt A. A. BOROWICKI Oct67 Prowl 1

3RD BATTALION, 11TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer LtCol G. T. BALZER Jul68 Laugh 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj O. K. JOHNSON Jr. Jun68 Laugh 5 5
 Adjutant 1stLt J. C. FITZSIMMONS Jul68 Laugh 1

4TH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES
 Commanding Officer Maj J. S. HOLLINGSHEAD Aug68 Plaid 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj G. V. MEMBER Oct67 Plaid 5 5
 Adjutant 1stLt J. W. WELLS Nov67 Plaid 1

1ST ANTI TANK BATTALION
 Commanding Officer LtCol P. D. REISSNER Aug68 Dance Card 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj P. G. RADTKE Sep68 Dance Card 5 5
 Adjutant WO E. M. JOHNSON Jul68 Dance Card 1

1ST DENTAL COMPANY
 Commanding Officer Capt T. J. PAPE, USN May68 Isherwood 40 931
 Admin Asst Lt (JO) R. H. KEYSER, USN Jan68 Isherwood 40

1ST ENGINEER BATTALION
 Commanding Officer LtCol U. CASSEY Aug68 Big Buddy 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj R. C. JONES Jul68 Big Buddy 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt J. MOUTON Dec67 Big Buddy 1

1ST HOSPITAL COMPANY
 Commanding Officer Cdr J. S. MAUGHON Aug68 Chu Lai 016 016
 Admin Asst Lt (JO) F. D. FISHER Jul68 Chu Lai 231

1ST MEDICAL BATTALION
 Commanding Officer Cdr G. H. LOWERY USN Aug68 Calhoun 6 6
 Executive Officer LCdr W. J. MULLINS USN May68 Calhoun 5 5
 Adjutant LCdr B. R. FORD USN Apr68 Calhoun 1

1ST MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION
 Commanding Officer LtCol K. M. BUSS Nov67 Quench 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj K. H. REAGAN Oct67 Quench 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt J. J. HORNAN Jan68 Quench 1

1ST RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION
 Commanding Officer LtCol E. C. STINEMETZ Aug68 Ironhand 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj D. R. TIDMORS Aug68 Ironhand 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt R. E. BURTON Jul68 Ironhand 1

1st Force Reconnaissance Company
 Commanding Officer Capt B. L. RUPP Aug68 Ironhand

1ST SHORE PARTY BATTALION
 Commanding Officer LtCol N. KAVAKICH Oct68 Consequence 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj E. J. TOWNSEND Feb68 Consequence 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt K. J. MILKESON Nov67 Consequence 1

1ST TANK BATTALION
 Commanding Officer LtCol R. W. TAYLOR Nov67 Happy Age 6 6
 Executive Officer LtCol V. J. GENTILE Sep68 Happy Age 5 5
 Adjutant WO W. A. ANAKOSHI Nov67 Happy Age 1

3RD AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALION
 Commanding Officer LtCol R. L. SHUFORD Jul68 Sleek 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj R. R. BERLING Sep68 Sleek 5 5
 Adjutant 1stLt B. G. BOWYER Apr68 Sleek 1

7TH COMMUNICATION BATTALION (CHU LAI)
 Commanding Officer LtCol W. M. CLELLAND Dec67 Chu Lai 206 6
 Executive Officer LtCol V. L. MITCHELL Sep68 Chu Lai 205 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt S. G. LADA Dec67 Chu Lai 207

7TH ENGINEER BATTALION
 Commanding Officer LtCol R. FUNDERBURK Aug68 Brogue 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj J. E. HANMAN Sep68 Brogue 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt R. G. BURCHAN Jan68 Brogue 1

9TH ENGINEER BATTALION (CHU LAI)
 Commanding Officer LtCol H. E. PERNA Sep68 Earthenware 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj E. W. LIPSET Nov67 Earthenware 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt J. R. HUDSON Jan68 Earthenware 1

11TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION
 Commanding Officer LtCol J. B. BROWN Jul68 Chester White 6 6
 Executive Officer Maj R. C. TASHJIAN Oct67 Chester White 5 5
 Adjutant 2ndLt R. O. BLANCHETTE Jan68 Chester White 1

AMERICAN RED CROSS
 Field Director W. E. BRALL Aug68 Isherwood 162

J. A. Polidori
 J. A. POLIDORI
 LtCol, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
 Division Adjutant