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FEB 23 1968

SECRET NOFORN (Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1stMarDiv ltr 3:HIST:lrs over 5750  
Ser: 00516-67 of 31Dec67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-30  
November 1967

1. Forwarded.

*W. E. Deeds*  
W. E. DEEDS  
By direction

Copy to:  
CG, 1stMarDiv

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3k/CLB/frc  
5750Ser: 003268  
JAN 5 1968

SECRET-NOFORN (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1) )

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:MIST:lrs 5750 Ser:  
00516-67 dtd 31Dec67

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for  
1-30 November 1967

1. Forwarded.

*F. L. Smith*  
F. L. SMITH  
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FME  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3:HIST:lrs  
5750  
Ser: 00516-67

31 DEC 1967

SECRET -- Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed

From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-30 November 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for November 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

  
DONN J. ROBERTSON

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HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FME

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FFO, San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
1 NOVEMBER to 30 NOVEMBER 1967

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. (U) DESIGNATION

Commanding General  
Assistant Division Commander

MajGen Donn J. ROBERTSON  
BGen F. C. LAHUE #

SUBORDINATE UNITSUNITCOMMANDING OFFICER

Headquarters Bn (Rein)  
1st Marines (Rein) (-)  
3rd Bn, 1st Marines  
5th Marines (-)  
7th Marines  
11th Marines (-) (Rein)  
2nd Bn, 5th Marines  
1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)  
1st Engr Bn (-)  
7th Engr Bn\*  
9th Engr Bn\*  
1st SP Bn (-)  
1st MT Bn

11th MT Bn  
3rd Amtrac Bn (-)  
7th Comm Bn (-)

1st AT Bn  
1st Tank Bn (-)

1st Med Bn  
1st Hospital Co  
1st Dental Co (-)

Col J. F. DONAHOE JR.  
Col H. E. ING, JR.  
LtCol M. MCQUOWN  
Col R. D. BOHN  
Col R. R. MINER  
Col E. W. PAYNE  
LtCol R. C. MCNAUGHTON  
LtCol B. C. STINEMETZ  
LtCol L. CASSEDY  
LtCol R. FUNDERBURK  
LtCol H. E. PEREA  
LtCol N. KAWAKICH  
LtCol K. M. BUSS (To 7Nov67)  
Maj C. F. CRESSWELL (Fr 8Nov67)  
LtCol J. B. BROWN, JR.  
LtCol R. L. SHUFORD  
LtCol W. M. CLELLAND (To 18Nov67)  
LtCol H. COWING (Fr 19Nov67)  
LtCol P. D. REISSNER  
LtCol R. M. TAYLOR (To 10Nov67)  
LtCol V. GENTILE (Fr 11Nov67)  
Cdr C. H. LOWERY, MC, USN  
Cdr J. S. MAUGHON, MC, USN  
Capt T. J. PAPE, DC, USN

\* ADCON ONLY

# ACTING COMMANDING GENERAL FROM 27OCT TO 28NOV 1967

2. (U) LOCATION

1-30 November 1967; Danang, RVN

3. (U) STAFF OFFICERS

Chief of Staff

Col H. J. WOESSNER II

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## Staff Secretary

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Compt

Adjutant

Air Officer

Artillery Officer

Band Officer

Career Advisory Officer

Chaplain

Comm-Electronics Officer

Dental Officer

Disbursing Officer

Clubs Officer

Exchange Officer

Embarkation Officer

Engineer Officer

Field Historian

Food Services Officer

Industrial Relations Officer

Information Services Officer

Inspector

Legal Officer

Motor Transport Officer

Naval Gunfire Officer

Ordnance Officer

Photographic Officer

Postal Officer

Provost Marshal

Reproduction Officer

Special Services Officer

Supply Officer

Surgeon

Tank Officer

Capt F. A. WATERS (To 31Oct67)

Capt F. L. LOVING (Fr 1Nov67)

Col W. R. EARNEY

Col R. E. COREY

Col J. C. SHORT

Col E. K. VICKERS, JR.

Col H. BECKINGTON

LtCol R. L. BARRETT

LtCol J. POLIDORI

Col H. J. FINN

Col E. W. PAYNE

WO T. J. COOK

Maj R. W. TOPPING

Capt J. A. KEELEY, CHC, USN

Col A. CORDES

Capt T. J. PAPE, DC, USN

Maj G. W. COLBURN

Capt J. J. BOWE

Capt C. E. LAND

LtCol C. B. WEBSTER

LtCol J. W. WILSON

Capt L. D. HUFF

Capt N. J. ANGELO

Capt J. D. KINDER

Maj J. M. GRATTO (To 18Nov67)

Capt H. C. JOHNSTON (Fr 19Nov67)

Col S. S. HUGHES

Col J. L. OSTBY

Maj L. V. BARKLEY

LCDR R. A. WHITCOMB, USN

LtCol H. SOBOL

CWO H. L. HUNTLEY

WO E. GARCIA

Maj R. B. O'BRIEN (To 5Nov67)

1stLt N. A. GROV (6-17Nov67)

Maj C. A. FOLSOM (Fr 18Nov67)

2ndLt J. N. WHEATLEY

Maj M. V. YOUNG

Col G. J. EDELMANN JR.

Capt R. W. JONES, MC, USN

LtCol R. M. TAYLOR (To 10Nov67)

LtCol V. GENTILE (Fr 11Nov67)

4. (U) AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
1140	20447

	<u>USN</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
157	1038

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARYPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. (C) Replacement and Rotation of Personnel

a. Total of Marine replacements received and Marines rotated during November 1967 were:

Replacements:  
 Officer 108  
 Enlisted 3215

Rotation:  
 Officer 78  
 Enlisted 1843

b. There were 9 officers and 330 enlisted personnel medically evacuated. 1 officer and 23 enlisted who were previously evacuated were returned to duty. 25 personnel departed on emergency leave/permanent change of station orders.

c. A total of 2 officers and 266 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour for special 30 day leave during November. 1 officer and 98 enlisted personnel departed on 30 days free leave during November 1967.

2. (C) Casualty and Graves Registration. The below listed casualties were sustained by units ADCON to the 1st Marine Division during November 1967.

	KIA	WIA	**DOW	MIA	CPT	OTHER	*NON-BATTLE DEATH INJURED	**TOTAL
USMC								
OFF	4	13					2	19
ENL	100	738	8				8 15	861
USN								
OFF		1						1
ENL	4	29	1					33
TOTAL	108	781	9				8 17	914

\* Injuries which result in absence from duty for more than 24 hours.

\*\*DOW figures included in WIA totals and not in horizontal total.

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3. (C) Awards. During the period 1-30 November 1967, 187 award recommendations were processed and forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. In addition, 717 Purple Heart Medals were awarded. 31 Commanding General Certificates of Commendation were awarded.

4. (C) Discipline, Law and Order. The following criminal investigations were reported for the month of November 1967:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Murder	1
Narcotics/marijuana	24
Attempted murder	2
Blackmarket	3
Burglary	2
Larceny of Government Property	4
Larceny of Private Property	2
Vehicle Theft	<u>8</u>
TOTAL	46

Eleven traffic violations were reported for the month of November 1967.

Two hundred and thirteen offense reports were issued to violators as follows:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Homosexual Acts	2
Illegal Possession of Alcohol	1
Assault	2
Weapons Violation	27
Disorderly Conduct	4
Currency Violation	1
Under Influence of Alcohol	4
Curfew Violation	29
Off Limits	113
UA	11
Out of Uniform	16
Disrespect	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	213

5. (C) Industrial Relations

a. Current utilization totals:

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>
Headquarters Battalion	70	72
Headquarters, 1st Marines	16	
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines	10	5
Headquarters, 5th Marines	30	30
Headquarters, 7th Marines	20	20
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines	0	14
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	10	11
Headquarters, 11th Marines	60	60
3rd 8" Howitzer Battery	10	10
1st Antitank Battalion	24	21
1st Tank Battalion	18	17
3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion	18	15
7th Communication Battalion	25	22
1st Engineer Battalion	60	60
7th Engineer Battalion	88	88
9th Engineer Battalion	62	59
1st Hospital Company	14	9
1st Medical Battalion	32	32
1st Motor Transport Battalion	26	24
11th Motor Transport Battalion	33	33
1st Reconnaissance Battalion	11	12
1st Shore Party Battalion	22	21
	<u>*2</u>	<u>—</u>
TOTAL	661	630

\* Reflects recent increase authorized by III Marine Amphibious Force.

3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion and 7th Communication Battalion recently moved to new areas and are not up to their ceilings yet, but are in the process of hiring new people and should reach their ceilings shortly.

6. (U) Personal and Morale Services

a. Chaplain. At the end of November the on-board strength of Chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division was as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Denomination</u>
23	Protestant
9	Catholic
<u>1</u>	Eastern Orthodox
TOTAL	33

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The following services were conducted during the month:

<u>Services</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number Attending</u>
Catholic Sunday Divine Services	100	4,626
Catholic Weekday Services	150	1,954
Latter Day Saints Lay Leader	21	203
Protestant Sunday Divine Services	180	4,307
Protestant Weekday Services	54	1,470
Protestant Bible Study	23	88
Memorial Services	22	2,097
Personal Response Program	52	1,799

b. Division Clubs. Gross income was \$310,057.90 for the month of November. 3 officers, 8 noncommissioned officers and 9 enlisted personnel operated the 56 clubs and 10 battalion accounts. 2 additional clubs are planned.

c. Division Exchange System. Gross sales were \$382,095.16 for the month of November. 2 officers and 44 enlisted personnel operated 14 stores and 3 mobile units in direct support of 1st Division units.

d. Division Band. The band performed at 20 military formations and 14 military concerts.

e. Informational Services. The ISO produced 140 news releases and 2039 Fleet Home Town News Releases. 16 feature interviews were produced for release to major radio networks. The Radio/TV section produced 66 minutes of live TV news coverage on AFTV-Danang.

Writer-Photographer teams covered the following named operations:

ESSEX

FOSTER

f. Postal

(1) The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this Command has received and dispatched during November 1967:

<u>Total Received</u>	<u>Total Dispatched</u>	<u>Total Handled</u>
975,194	318,526	1,293,720

(2) The following figures represent financial business transacted during November 1967:

U. S. Money Orders and Fees	\$872,242.67
Stamps, postage and insurance sales	\$16,500.00

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(3) Twelve unit post offices were inspected and audited as well as the audit of the main stamp stock retained by the Division Postal Chief. Air letter mail was received every day at Danang.

g. Career Advisory The following statistics represent reenlistment and extension of enlistment percentages for the month of November 1967:

(1) Reenlistment Percentages

a. First term	11.1%
b. Career	81.8%
c. Total	21.0%

(2) Extensions of enlistment executed

a. Career	2
b. Short term	16
c. Total	18

h. Special Services. Personnel of the 1st Marine Division were entertained during the month of November by the following shows and/or well known personalities:

13 Nov 1967 - National Cartoonist Show - 1st Med Bn  
 14-17 Nov 1967 - Denise Perrier Show - HqBn, 1st Med Bn, 1st Recon Bn, 1st MT Bn, 1st Engr Bn  
 14 Nov 1967 - Communicators Show - Hq, 7th Mar, 3rd Bn, 5th Mar

7. (U) G-1 Briefing for Executive Officers, Adjutants and Sergeants Major. This briefing was held twice, once on 20 November and again on 22 November 1967. Its purpose was to give a clear understanding of the G-1 Section's function, what support is available to units of the division and to spell out unit commanders responsibilities. The briefing lasted four hours and was well received. Attached is a copy of the briefing folder given to each unit attending. This folder consists of an agenda and complete scripts of talks given by each briefing officer.

8. (U) 1st Marine Division ARVN Interpreter Program

a. In April of 1966 the 1st Marine Division entered the MACV Interpreter Program and soon received its first graduates from the interpreter course at Saigon. There are two very solid reasons why this program was developed:

(1) We cannot afford to send large numbers of our men to long term

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schools that would make them fluent Vietnamese linguists.

(2) Experience has shown that better response is received from the Vietnamese people when working through their officials and their people.

b. What kind of men are these Interpreters?

(1) For most part they are conscripts - draftees who enter the Interpreter Training Program directly from induction offices. Most are college graduates or men who were close to graduation upon induction.

(2) At the Interpreter school they are tested and ranked by language proficiency, the best in the class receiving a rank of reserve Sergeant Interpreter unless they held a higher rank in the regular army in which case they retain their former rank. At present all of the 1st Marine Division's ARVN Interpreters have attained the rank of Staff Sergeant.

(3) The new mobilization policy enacted by President Thieu when he took office, has extended the usual four year service requirement for these Interpreters to the end of hostilities or until they reach age 33, whichever ever comes first.

(4) This tells us quite a bit about these men. They are bright, intellectually inclined, products of the cities of the Republic, come from better than average families, a few are financially well off, most are not, many who were teachers or professional men before induction took as much as a 2/3 reduction in their income when they entered the service, and above all most of them are totally unfamiliar with the military profession and way of life as we know it.

c. Division Order 5312.1A sets forth the ARVN Interpreter Program. This order is presently under revision, the new order will reflect lessons learned and will streamline reporting and personnel accounting procedures.

(1) 1st Marine Division presently has 77 ARVN Interpreters, as reflected in the attached roster.

(2) Basic personnel administration for these men is performed by Headquarters Company, Headquarters I Corps.

(3) They are assigned to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force who in turn allocates them to the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions.

(4) The ARVN Interpreter Program Projects Officer, 1st Marine Division (Major E. M. DUNN, Assistant G-1) assists Commanding General

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1st Marine Division in carrying out his administrative responsibilities for these men. These are set forth in MACV Directive 551-5 of 30Sep67 and III Marine Amphibious Force Order 5312.8A. This includes such matters as inter-Division assignment/reassignment, awards recommendations, issuance of identity cards, and tags etc.

(5) While these men are members of the 1st Marine Division they are assigned to regimental headquarters, battalions, and separate companies/batteries/teams. Operational control of these men is exercised through the Division G-2 Officer. WO-1 R. R. FITZGERALD (1st Interpreter Team) has been assigned as the officer in charge of ARVN Interpreters for the purpose of assisting the Division ARVN Interpreter Program Projects Officer in carrying out his tasks.

(6) The accompanying photographs show the billeting area and offices for the ARVN Interpreters, complete with recreation room and shower facilities. About twelve interpreters are housed here on a permanent basis, these are assigned to units in the Division Headquarters area and an additional five transients are usually present. These buildings also provide the offices and billeting spaces for members of the 1st Interpreter Team.

(7) The Senior ARVN Liaison Officer with the 1st Marine Division is tasked with the responsibility of bridging the gap between ARVN authorities and the 1st Marine Division in common and connected matters concerning these men, e.g. decorations, awards and promotion recommendations, leave, personal and family problems, etc. These tasks are ably carried out by Captain LUAT, ARVN. Captain Nguyen Hua LUAT provides valuable aid in many cases.

d. Significant events during November

(1) Probably the most significant event during the month was the loss of Staff Sergeant Ly Van HON 66/133173, killed in action on 8 November 1967 near Ap Hai (1), Quang Nam Province. Staff Sergeant HON was a member of Company "M", 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. As his company was moving into night defensive positions they were attacked by a strong NVA force. All the members of the squad near HON were wounded and he received wounds that killed him instantly. The loss of Staff Sergeant HON was preceded on 28 October 1967 by the death of Staff Sergeant Duong Minh Ngoc DIEP 64/106156 ARVN who was killed in action in Quang Tri Province while serving with Company "F", 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Staff Sergeant DIEP was one of the best ARVN interpreters in this Division.

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ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN1. ENEMY

a.(C) Main Force. The following Main Force enemy units are presently located within the 1st Marine Division's AOR: The K-4B Battalion in the Phu Loc area in the vicinity of (ZC 1395), the 368B Artillery Regiment located in Happy Valley in the vicinity of (ZC 0462). A battalion of the 368B Artillery Regiment is possibly located in Elephant Valley in the vicinity of (ZC 1382). The Headquarters of the 21st NVA Regiment and possibly one battalion are located east of Antenna Valley in the vicinity of (AT 9437). The 70th Independent Battalion, which has been carried in the Barrier Island area south of Hoi An and is suspected to be operating in the AOR in southeast Duy Xuyen District.

The Main Forces were somewhat in-active the past month. However, significant contact was made by friendly units participating in Operation ESSEX (6 Nov - 17 Nov), possibly with elements of the 3rd NVA and/or the 21st NVA Regiments.

b.(C) Local Force. Local Force units within the Division's AOR were quite active during the month of November. Elements of the 402nd Sapper Battalion, the R-20th Battalion and elements of some of the local force companies were probably responsible for two separate enemy attacks on 1 and 8 November against 3/7's military installations, refugee hamlets and peace villages located throughout Dai Loc District.

c.(C) Irregulars. Irregular activity continued to inflict a significant portion of USMC casualties during November. Also, several CAP units within the area came under fire from irregular forces. The irregulars also continue to employ command detonated mines throughout the TAOR.

2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a.(U) General. The weekly maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 83 and 71 degrees respectively for the month of November. The average humidity was 87% and approximately 8 inches of rain fell on the Danang area. The skies were partly cloudy with intermittent rain showers throughout the month.

b.(C) Effects of the Weather. Periodic rain showers and low ceiling caused interruptions in air support; including Infrared Coverage, Airborne Personnel Detector Coverage, reconnaissance insertion and extraction and Aerial Observation.

c.(C) Effects of the Weather on Terrain. Scattered rain showers resulted in some localized flooding but trafficability was not seriously affected.

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a.(U) Services and Support. During the period the unit provided general administrative services for the G-2 Section.

b.(C) Personnel. During the period the G-2 Section operated with an average of 99% of its assigned manning level of 29 officers and 53 enlisted. There is a lack of SNCO's in the OF 02.

c.(U) Logistics and Allowances. During the period approximately 50 percent of materials and supplies necessary for the operations of the Section and its attached teams were received as ordered. There is a need for typing chairs and filing cabinets.

2. ACQUISITION UNIT

a.(C) Acquisition section collected intelligence information from all areas of interest within the Division AO. AO/VR flights were conducted into the C-3, C-4, C-6 and C-7 areas throughout the reporting period.

b. Airborne Personnel Detector (APD)

(1)(C) The one helicopter mounted APD; when available, has continued to produce reliable and timely intelligence through the accurate location of enemy units in harbor sites, on trails and in suspected storage areas. The APD was requested and approved for 22 separate missions; however, only 5 of these missions were flown due to non-availability of gun fire support helicopters.

(2)(C) Information received from a Chieu Hoi indicated the presence of a large enemy force, possibly a battalion of the 368B artillery Regiment, in Elephant Valley. Based on this information two separate APD missions were flown in the general area specified by the Chieu Hoi, a quick reaction ARC Light was requested and flown. Pilot BDA during TOT indicated secondary explosions occurred, several of which were 5-6 times larger than the normal ARC Light explosion, the flash being further identified as blue-white in appearance. Subsequent targeting in this area produced 2 additional secondary explosions.

(3)(C) Gun support helicopters are normally provided by FMAW assets, however, one APD mission was flown using escort helicopters from the U.S. Army 282nd Aviation Support Company. Excellent results were achieved throughout the mission.

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c.(C) IR missions have achieved limited success during this reporting period due to the high moisture content and ground haze conditions that existed throughout the Division AO. During the monsoon season additional AO/VR areas were scheduled to extend coverage over areas normally supplemented by other detection means.

d.(C) The 245th Aviation Company, USA, continues to provide SLAR coverage for target acquisition in flat areas, especially the rivers and waterways throughout Dai Loc, Dien Ban, Hieu Nhon and Duy Xuyen. During the last two weeks of the reporting period, the SLAR Data-Link Van was not operative. By using the 1st Marine Division AO TAC net, SLAR aircraft can enter the net and report all targets directly to the AO radio operator within the Division COC. These targets are then immediately passed through the Division COC to the commanders concerned for appropriate action. During this reporting period, a total of 96 targets were identified by SLAR.

e.(C) Photo Imagery Interpretation Unit: The PIU continues to support the First Marine Division with vertical aerial photography, high and low altitude panoramic photography, photo mosaics, and various overlays associated with photointelligence. The intensified Infra-red program continued during the month of November with a total of fifty-five hot reports being received during the month. During the period 13 photo missions were requested, 7 were received, none were cancelled and 6 are still pending.

f.(C) Air Observation Unit: During the month of November, Air Observers flew 328 sorties for 687.1 hours of visual surveillance in the 1st Division TAOR. In conjunction with normal VR flights, the following missions were performed: Photo 2, 126 artillery, 200 air strikes TAC(C) and 3 Naval gunfire. The AO's also accounted for the following: 136 KIA (C), 115 KIA (P), 14 WIA (C), 57 bunkers destroyed, 68 sampans destroyed, 595 structures destroyed, 11 secondary explosions, 260 structures damaged and 455 meters of trench destroyed. The AO's provided support for Operations ESSEX and FOSTER.

g.(C) Interrogation-Translation Team (3rd, 9th and 13th ITT). Interpretation Team (1st and 7th IT): During the reporting period a total of 245 detainees were interrogated. These were classified as 20 PW's, 68 civil dependents, one returnee and 156 innocent civilians. Number of documents translated totaled 68.

h.(C) Combat Operations Center: COC-2 continues to serve as a focal point for the receipt of spot reports from ITT, CIT, tactical units, adjacent units and higher headquarters. Immediate intelligence requirements generated or suggested by reports, verbal and written, are disseminated to collectors.

3.(C) PRODUCTION UNIT: The Basic Intelligence Section continues to maintain background and technical studies, briefings, files on intelligence

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estimates, enemy units, spot reports, situation reports, climate, population, etc. This information is constantly being updated. Basic Intelligence also continues to receive, evaluate and process captured enemy ordnance and materiel. The following are among the accomplishments during November:

- (1) Screened, processed and forwarded 43 captured weapons, plus assorted equipment.
- (2) Assisted in the preparation, assembly and distribution of 14 Intelligence Studies on the THUA THIEN - QUANG TRI Province areas.
- (3) Completed and prepared for distribution the ELEPHANT VALLEY area study.
- (4) Commenced work on a special intelligence study of the ARIZONA area.
- (5) Continued work on a "Preliminary Estimate of VC/NVA Personnel Losses and Replacements" in QUANG NAM Province area.
- (6) Commenced work on Update #2 to the Rocket Study of 10Aug67.
- (7) Issued permits for the retention of War Trophies.
- (8) Disseminated tidal and related data.

4.(C) STAFF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT: During the period the unit provided routine administrative counterintelligence services to the Division Staff. The unit processed 5 denials of security clearance, forwarded 14 completed NAC investigations to Regiments, processed 3 requests for COFRAM access, prepared 16 Top Secret accesses, granted 9 Top Secret clearances, initiated 17 requests for security investigations and conducted inspections of 11 Division Units. In addition, the Staff Counterintelligence Unit conducted a total of 26 liaison visits.

a.(C) The Staff Counterintelligence Unit conducted a survey of all staff sections, consisting of clearances and access of personnel. This survey has been completed and each staff section has received a roster showing results. Also, an investigation of an incident involving possible compromise of classified material at Camp Hansen, Okinawa was completed.

b.(C) Kit Carson Scouts (KCS). During the period the KCS re-employed 2 scouts and accepted 2 new trainees. The Staff Counterintelligence Unit is working on a "Boot Camp" for KCS and it is scheduled to commence training on 4 December 1967. The KCS program has continued to show its effectiveness and general value to the Marine Corps on Operation FOSTER.

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## ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

1. (S) During the month of November three major search and destroy operations were conducted by Division units. The 7th Marines continued Operation Knox in the Dong Tap/Hai Van Pass area. The operation terminated 4 Nov after eleven days of search and destroy operations that resulted in negative to light contact. Due to intelligence reports of enemy activity, the 2nd Bn 5th Marines conducted a multi-company search and destroy operation in the southeastern portion of Antenna Valley. Operation Essex commenced on 6 November and continued through the 17th of November. Contact throughout this operation was moderate to heavy. On 13 November, the 7th Marines commenced Operation Foster, a search and destroy operation, located in the Dai Loc vicinity. This operation was initiated due to recent VC activity in this area. The operation terminated 30 November. Contact was moderate to heavy throughout the period and several large storage sites of rice were found.

2. (C) Major operations and the controlling headquarters were as follows:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
KNOX	7th Marines
ESSEX	2d Battalion, 5th Marines
FOSTER	7th Marines

3. (C) Extensive patrolling, security operations and other small unit activities as well as the major search and destroy operations accounted for enemy casualties of 327 VC KIA (Conf), 807 VC KIA (Prob), 75 NVA KIA (Conf), 131 NVA KIA (Prob), 1 VC Returnee, 1 NVA Returnee, 13 VC PW, 1 NVA PW, 218 Detainees, 13 Individual Weapons Captured, and 6 Crew-Served weapons captured.

4. (C) Normal fixed wing and helicopter support was utilized by the Division with large troop lifts being conducted during Operations ESSEX and FOSTER. Six naval gunfire ships fired support of the Division during November. The supporting ships and missions were as follows: USS Hornet (DD 681) supported the Division for four days firing 618 rounds of 5"; USS James E. Kyes (DD 78) supported the Division for two days firing 380 rounds of 5"; USS Carronade (IFS-1) supported the Division for two days firing 460 rounds of 5"; USS Providence (CGC-6) supported the Division for four days firing 753 rounds of 6" and 619 rounds of 5"; USS Dupont (DD 941) supported the Division for four days firing 1022 rounds of 5"; and USS O'Bannon (DD 450) supported the Division for four days firing 518 rounds of 5".

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PLANS

1. (S) Operation Plan 303-68 (Relief/Reinforcement of CIDG Camps) was published 7 November. This was an update of an existing plan reflecting changes in units tasked which were necessitated by changes of unit locations.
2. (S) Operation Order 306-68 (Counter-Rocket) was published 15 November. This was an update of Operation Order 90-67, which it cancelled. Rocket belt tasks formerly assigned the 1st Marines were assigned the 5th Marines as the result of the relocations of those units. The order also reflects refined OP-Counter Rocket Center organization, reporting and control as currently in use.
3. (S) Operation Order 308-68 (Waterway Control) was published 20 November. This order revises, updates and supersedes Operation Order 91-67. Principal changes were in locations of units and TAOR's and resultant changes in waterway responsibilities along with implementation of certain additional waterway controls as advocated by GVN authorities.
4. (S) A draft of Operation Order 309-68 (Realignment of Forces and Areas of Operations) was published 22 November 1967. A proposed task organization annex was enclosed to facilitate concurrent planning and to aid in the preparation of annexes for the order to expand the operational area of the 1st Marine Division into THUA THIEN Province.
5. (U) Division Order 3120.16A (SOP for COC and FSCC during Mortar, Artillery and/or Rocket Attacks) was published on 29 November. Changes in the notification and action check lists reflect the 5th Marines' move into the former 1st Marines area, the new wire call signs and incorporation of information formerly contained on a supplementary check list in COC.
6. (C) Planning continued on rewriting Operation Plan 305-68. This plan will be changed to reflect the redistribution of forces within the TAOR and the redesignation of some references in the plan. This plan will be issued as Operation Plan 102-68 in December to conform with the FMF Pacific system of numbering operation plans and orders.
7. (S) Planning continued on Operation Order 309-68, designated late in the month as Operation CHECKERS. This order governs the realignment of the 1st Marine Division northward and provides for the activation of TF XRAY for operations and its displacement into THUA THIEN Province. Operation Order 309-68 will be the basic document for the shift of forces and will be published in December.

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UNCLASSIFIEDTRAINING

1. During the month of November 38 officers and 158 enlisted men attend formal schools both in and out of country.
2. Two ten day classes were conducted on the AN/PPS-6 Radar Set. A total of 4 officers and 16 enlisted men attended from four Division units.
3. The 1st Engineer Battalion conducted several three day Demolitions, Land Mine Warfare and VC Boobytrap courses. 152 Marines attended.
4. The 11th Marine Regiment conducted three one day courses for non-artillerymen in the adjustment of artillery fire. The courses were attended by 58 Marines.
5. A two day Personal Response course was conducted by Division G-5 Section and was attended by 29 officers and 27 staff noncommissioned officers.
6. A three day school was conducted by the Division Embarkation section and was attended by 22 enlisted Marines from various units throughout the Division.
7. One officer attend a one day training seminar at LONG BINH RVN.
8. One day classes were conducted on the U.S.rifle M16A1. The classes consisted of the following instructions: functioning, care and cleaning, stoppages and immediate action. Zeroing of the individual's weapon and fan firing using 125 rounds of ammunition per man. 1053 officers and Marines attended.

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. (U) The major logistical activity during this reporting period was directed towards the support of combat operations.
2. (U) During the reporting period the G-4 Operations Officer, assisted by other special staff officers, conducted Materiel Readiness Inspections of eight units. The Embarkation Officer conducted readiness inspections of thirteen units and all special staff officers conducted numerous informal staff visits and inspections.
3. (U) M-16 Rifles. A field engineer from Colt Firearms, Mr. ITC, visited this Division during the month. It has been established that a large percentage of M-16 rifle chambers are unserviceably pitted. A conference was held at III MAF on 30 November and a program for replacement of unserviceable rifles was outlined. It was anticipated that a complete exchange of unserviceable rifles would be effected during December.
4. (U) The M109 Self Propelled Howitzer continued to be deadlined at an unacceptable rate due primarily to shortage of third echelon parts.
5. (C) Ammunition controlled by Available Supply Rates (ASR). The following ammunition items are controlled by an available supply rate:

DODACNOMENCLATURE

G704	Cartridge 4.2", HE
G895	Grenade Hand Illuminating
L307	Signal Illuminating, WSC, M159
L316	Signal Illuminating, WSC, M18
L314	Signal Illuminating, Ground, GSC

6. (U) During the month eight rough rider convoys were conducted between Danang and Phu Bai and two to Quang Tri. These convoys were conducted by this Division with vehicle augmentation from 1st Marine Air Wing and Force Logistic Command. No significant direct enemy action was encountered during the conduct of rough rider convoys.
7. (U) On 1 November the M-76 vehicle (Otter) assets of this Division were transferred from 1st Motor Transport Battalion to 11th Motor Transport Battalion.
8. (U) Force Logistic Command assumed the responsibility for resupply of An Hoa during the month thus relieving the Division of the requirement.
9. (U) There was no significant deterioration of roads during the month as a result of lighter than expected monsoon rains and efficient engineer effort.
10. (U) During the month the 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions' available vehicles were heavily committed. They travelled 214223 miles and

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transported 20394 tons of cargo and 68939 personnel.

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11. (U) Total sealifts for the month of November of 1st Marine Division units were 497 personnel, 38 vehicles and 202.33 short tons of cargo.
12. (U) Total airlifts for the month of November of 1st Marine Division units were 103 personnel and 20.8 short tons of cargo.
13. (U) BIT 3/1 was partially loaded on the USS NAVARRO on 30 November 1967. Loading was to continue until 3 December 1967.
14. (U) A three-day Embarkation School for Division personnel was conducted from 6-8 November 1967.
15. (U) 1st Engineer Battalion and 1st Shore Party Battalion completed fifty-one Division work orders during the period.
16. (U) The upgrading of major LOC's continued. Priority of effort continued to be focused on Routes 1 and 5. Major LOC's were kept open during the month of November.
17. (U) The repair of the airfield at An Hoa was accomplished by CB/NSA elements during the period 21 November to 1 December 1967. Approximately 72000 square feet of matting was replaced.
18. (U) The month of November celebrated Thanksgiving and the Marine Corps 192nd Birthday. Holiday meals were served where possible.
19. (U) OF 33 personnel shortages continue to exist. 88% of the authorized manning level of OF 33 personnel are currently on board.
20. (U) The Division Food Services Officer was assigned the control of garrison mess property during the period.
21. (U) The program to evaluate the protective qualities of MDX4-4056 protective foot ointment continued among 1500 men of the nine infantry battalions.
22. (U) The final report of evaluation of eleven vests, medical kit was submitted to Commanding General, III MAF on 7 November 1967. The general consensus of corpsmen testing the vest was that significant discrepancies existed in the test item. Primary of these were the position of the back pouches, lack of protection of medical supplies from water, poor fasteners, and incompatibility of the vest with the protective body armor and back pack.

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UNCLASSIFIEDCIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIL ACTION

- 1.(U) On 3 November there were several cases of plague reported in Nui Kim Son Hamlet (BT073708). By 12 November there had been 29 cases of plague reported in the Hoa Vang District, with 7 deaths attributed to the plague. On 20 November the 3rd Amphibious Tractor Battalion Medical Officer treated the last case of the disease in Nui Kim Son Hamlet. During the two week long epidemic the 3rd Amphibious Tractor Battalion evacuated 30 patients to the Danang USOM Hospital and inoculated over 5,700 Nui Kim Son residents.
- 2.(U) On 13 November, the reconstruction and remodeling of the clinic at Hoa Phu Village (AT923723) was completed by the 1st Engineer Battalion. The clinic has a treatment room with 3 medicine cabinets and 2 treatment tables. There is also a ward room with a maternity bed, 5 regular size beds, and 2 infant beds. The clinic serves approximately 3,000 people in the Hoa Phu area.
- 3.(U) The 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion completed a shower unit for the MEDCAP station in Nui Kim Son (BT073708) on 21 November.
- 4.(U) On 22 November, the 1st Engineer Battalion completed the construction of 5 wells in Phouc Hung Village (AT924724).
- 5.(U) Operation FOSTER terminated 301200H November with 11,668 refugees processed at the two refugee centers at Dai Loc (AT915573) and An Hoa (AT872478). The operation had commenced 131000H November in the old Arizona area.
- 6.(U) Projects underway in the 1st Marine Division CAAOR include: 3 schools, 4 pig breeding farms, 1 experimental rice farm, 3 dispensaries, and a maternity hospital.
- 7.(U) Assistance rendered within the CAAOR during November was as follows:

Services

MedCaps	25,509
DentCaps	406
English Classes	60 hours
Medical Evacuation Assistance	240
Refugee Evacuation Assistance	11,668

Commodities

Animal Feed (garbage)	54,700 lbs
Lumber (truck loads)	29
Tin (sheets)	170
Cement (bags)	64
Soap (bars)	3,365
Milk (pints)	436

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Narrative summary for the period 1 - 30 November 1967.

1. (U) Leaflet drops and aerial broadcast were made in support of operation Foster and Essex.
2. (U) The Division ran an extensive Rocket Rewards campaign.
3. (U) Extensive PSYOP Campaigns were directed at the 21st NVA Regiment, R:20 Battalion, and V25 Battalion, in support of reports that low morale existed in these units.

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COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS  
NARRATIVE SUMMARYC **DECLASSIFIED**

1. (U) On 11 November 1967 MSgt MYERS, CEO Maintenance Chief, was assigned TAD to Force Logistics Command for a period of 30 to 60 days. MSgt MYERS presence required by Force Logistics Command in order to aid in identification of Communications-Electronics parts and equipment presently stored at FLC.
2. (C) On 16 November 1967 Col. CORDES attended the Area Coordinator Communications Conference held at III MAF. BGem FRENCH, CINCPAC J6, addressed the conference relative to future outlook of long line and tactical communications. Further details on this conference are cited in the minutes of the Area Coordinator Communications Conference. (III MAF ltr 10D/ar 2000 of 18Nov67)
3. (U) On 18 November 1967 Major SCHNEIDER visited Supply Battalion of Force Logistics Command. The purpose of the visit was to observe progress of program now underway to break down multi-pacs that have been in FLC lot for an undue period of time. The program was progressing well and no further assistance from the CEO was necessary at this time.
4. (C) On 22 November 1967 a series of demonstrations displaying tactical Secure Voice Radio Equipment (KY-38) were presented. The one hour demonstrations were given by a three man team from FMFPac and coordinated through the Division CEO. Representatives from each of the regiments, support battalions, Force Logistics Command and 5th Communication Battalion attended the demonstrations which were held in the Headquarters Battalion Education Office.
5. (C) On 22 November 1967 Col CORDES and Major VERDON visited the 3rd Marine Division Command Post for the purpose of discussing the implications of the forthcoming relocation of certain 1st Marine Division units upon existing and planned communication systems. The visit also served to permit Major VERDON to become familiar with the facilities, installation and overall communication system of the 3rd Marine Division. Understanding was reached in a number of areas relative to the use of certain equipment by the 1st Marine Division incident to the aforementioned relocation.
6. (C) On 24 November 1967 LtCol MITCHELL, Commanding Officer, Division Communications Company, LtCol COWING, Commanding Officer, 7th Communication Battalion and Captain SHAVER of 7th Communication Battalion Radio Relay and Construction Company visited the CEO. The purpose of this meeting was to delineate responsibility concerning the outside cable plant with respect to construction, trouble shooting, and assignment of cable pairs. In addition, past, present and new pole line construction projects were discussed.

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7. (C) On 27 November 1967 Major VERDON represented the 1st Marine Division at a III MAF conference to examine the present structure, organization and control of the 5th and 7th Communication Battalions. Remaining within the specific parameters governing the study, it was determined that both battalions are being effectively and economically employed. It was concluded that no significant benefits could accrue from any reorganization or shift of control. The study, therefore, concluded that any further action was not required.

8. (U) During November 1967 work continued on a new switchboard installation to support telephone communications in the Division Command Post area. Two TFO-7 Switchboards are presently being installed by Division Communications Company and should be in operation by mid-December. Since the system will permit an increase in the number of operators handling calls a 30 percent increase in telephone service is anticipated.

9. (U) During November 1967 Materiel Maintenance Management Inspections were conducted at the following units.

1. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines
2. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
3. Hq 5th Marine Regiment
4. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines
5. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
6. 1st Battalion, 11th Marines
7. 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines
8. 4th Battalion, 11th Marines
9. 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
10. 1st Shore Party Battalion

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COMBAT CHRONOLOGY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. (U) The following distinguished visitors visited/toured the command during November 1967:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>
1Nov67	Preparedness Investigating Committee	Senate Committee on Armed Services
3Nov67	BGen W. E. BRYAN, JR.	DCofS, MACV
12Nov67	BGen J. E. GLICK	CG, 9th MAB
15Nov67	LtGen Sir Thomas PEARSON	Cdr Far East Land Forces
16Nov67	Sen Howard W. CANNON	Dem - Nevada
18Nov67	RAdm William W. BEHRENS, JR	COMPHIBGRU-1 Designate
22 Nov67	Rep William O. COWGER	Rep - Kentucky
24Nov67	Sen John G. TOWER	Rep - Texas

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ENEMY ACTIVITY

1 November (C) At 0120H, Hill 37 in the vicinity of the old Dai Loc Bridge at (AT 9158) received an unknown number of mortar rounds, and automatic weapons fire. At 0205H a reaction force from 3/7 was dispatched to the eastern end of Dai Loc Bridge. The enemy broke contact and withdrew.

Forty minutes later at 0200H, a ground assault by an estimated 100 enemy was launched on Hill 25 at (AT 8356) when a Marine platoon from M/3/7 received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar. After the mortar fire ceased, the enemy breeched the platoon's defensive wire in four places using bangalore torpedoes. Once inside the wire, the enemy made extensive use of satchel charges and grenades to destroy bunkers. Spooky came on station and artillery was fired in support of the Marine Platoon.

Concurrent with the activity on Hill 25, elements of 3/7 located on Hill 65 at (AT 8857) were also receiving mortar fire from an enemy position at (AT 8856). This maneuver by the enemy reduced the threat of reaction by the Marines on Hill 65 in support of the Marine platoon on Hill 25.

In addition to the attacks on Hill 25 and 65, CAP units C-3 and C-4 were both taken under fire at (AT 8657) by mortar and small arms fire.

Also, a similar terrorist attack occurred at the Tam Hoa refugee hamlet located in the vicinity of (AT 8757). Approximately 65 civilian dwellings were destroyed, ten civilians were killed and 34 wounded. Total enemy losses were reported as: 14 VC KIA (C), 40 VC KIA (P), 7 AK-47's, 25 satchel charges, 20 chicom grenades, 4 B-40 rocket rounds, and 4 bangalore torpedoes.

The main attack on Hill 25 was conducted by a unit highly trained in the use of sapper tactics. It is estimated that the main unit involved was the 402nd Sapper Battalion with elements of the R-20th Battalion and the Q-14th Company taking part in the diversionary actions.

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- 06 November (C) Operation ESSEX. Operation ESSEX commenced on 6 November in 2/5's TAOR and terminated on 17 November. Enemy losses for the operation were: 7 VC KIA (C), 40 VC KIA (P), 65 NVA KIA (C), 125 NVA KIA (P), 2 NVA PW's, 16 detainees, 6 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon.
- 13 November (C) Operation FOSTER. Operation FOSTER commenced on 13 November in 3/7's TAOR and terminated on 30 November. Enemy losses for the operation were: 115 VC KIA (C), 331 VC KIA (P), 10 NVA KIA (C), 3 NVA KIA (P), 72 detainees, 8 PW's, 10 individual weapons, and 2 crew served weapons. Several rice caches were uncovered on Operation FOSTER resulting in approximately 100 tons of rice captured.
- 08 November (C) At 0105H on 8 November, 3/7's CP, the Army advisory Compound at Dai Loc, and the Old Dai Loc Bridge, all in the vicinity of (AT 9157) received 82mm mortar fire, heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire, followed by ground assaults.
- At 0110H CAP C-1 at (AT 9256) received 57mm RR fire followed by a ground assault. The friendly units in the Dai Loc area were supported by Spookey and an I/3/7 reaction force was sent to reinforce CAP C-1.
- The Army Advisor in Dai Loc also reported that a number of small hamlets were attacked in a coordinated effort by the enemy. Refugee camps at (AT 9358), (AT 9159), (AT 9257) and a Peace Village at (AT 9158) were damaged or destroyed by satchel charges and enemy fire.
- At 0600H a sweep was conducted by I/3/7 in pursuit of the dispersed enemy and artillery and airstrikes were conducted. Enemy losses were 15 VC KIA (C), 43 VC KIA (P), 18 VC KBA (P), 8 individual weapons captured, and two PW's.
- The PW's stated they were from the R-20th Battalion and it is estimated that elements of the R-20th Battalion combined with the Q-14th Company and local guerrillas were the enemy units involved.
- At 0210H in 1/7's area, a VC sapper platoon swept through another peace hamlet located at (AT 9469) destroying a number of houses. Concurrently, CAP B-3 located in the same general area came under small arms and mortar fire effectively preventing them from supporting the peace hamlet.

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- 16 November (C) At 0900H on the 16th, a G/2/7 patrol fired at 15 armed enemy at (AU 8205) resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 2 VC KIA (P). Upon searching the area a rice cache of seven tons was found. A map written in Chinese and Vietnamese was also found on one of the KIA's body. The map was of the Phu Loc area and several U.S. military positions were plotted on it.
- 22 November (C) On the evening of the 22nd, in the vicinity of (AT 9066), a D/1/7 patrol observed approximately 125 enemy moving northeast. Some of the enemy were carrying long objects described as possibly being rockets. Marines fired small arms and artillery probably killing 20 enemy. The enemy broke up into small elements fleeing west and northeast. A platoon size reaction force dispatched by "D" Company made contact with rear elements of the enemy force and killed one VC. Further pursuit was ineffective due to heavy brush. It appeared that this action by "D" Company elements may have broken up a planned attack on friendly installations.
- 26 November (C) On Operation FOSTER at 1130H on the 26th, at (AT 8752) F/2/7 received a heavy volume of automatic weapons/small arms fire and 8 to 10 rounds of 60mm mortar from an unknown size enemy force in well fortified and camouflaged positions. L/3/7 maneuvered to make contact and they also came under heavy fire. AO Benchmark-15 was on station and directed airstrikes on the enemy position. Enemy losses were unknown and friendly losses were 12 USMC KIA and 66 WIA (MED EVAC). The next morning at 0655H in the vicinity of the previous day's contact, F/2/7 received heavy small arms fire and 15 rounds of 60mm mortar. I/3/7 attempting to link up with "F" Company, received small arms fire, M-79 and 60mm mortar fire. A total of 14 Marines were wounded in these contacts. At 1040H I/3/7 and F/2/7 linked up and conducted a search of the area finding 20 VC KIA (C), 2 Soviet Machine Guns and 2 individual weapons. Total marine losses for the two day action were 12 KIA and 80 WIA (MED EVAC).

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## ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

- 01 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div issued Frag Order 149-67 (Operation Essex) to be conducted by 2/5 in the southeastern portion of Antenna Valley on or about 5 Nov 67.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 011230Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 02 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div published the Division Task Organization as of 31 Oct 67.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 020610Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 02 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div issued change #1 to Frag Order 149-67 (Operation Essex), delaying Operation 24 hours.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 021345Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 02 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div sent a "well done" to the USS NEW for Naval Gunfire Support to the 1st Mar Div 12-30 Oct.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 021500Z Nov 67  
Tab B
- 03 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div issued Frag Order 147-67 (Rough Rider from 3rd Mar Div AO to Da Nang 4 Nov 1967).  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 030920Z Nov 67  
Tab B
- 02 Nov (S) - 3rd AMTRAC Bn assumed area of responsibility with TAOR of the 5th Marines.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 022330Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 03 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div reported the ARCLIGHT effectiveness against Base Area 116.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 030853Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 04 Nov (S) - 7th Marines chopped BLP 2/3 to CG 1st Mar Div at 041000H Nov 67.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 040250Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 04 Nov (S) - Operation Knox terminated 041000H Nov 67.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 040250Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 04 Nov (S) - Rough Rider Convoy entered 1st Mar Div AO from 3rd Mar Div AO.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 030920Z Nov 67  
Tab F

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- 04 Nov (S) - Rough Rider Convoy departed Phu Bai AO, destination Da Nang AC.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 030920Z Nov 67  
Tab B
- 06 Nov (S) - Operation Essex commenced 0800.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 0111230Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 06 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div published Frag Order 148-67 (Rough Rider from Da Nang to Phu Bai 7 Nov 67)  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 060054Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 07 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div published Operation Plan 303-68 (supporting arms fire in defense of THUONG DUC CIDG Camp).  
Ref: Operation Order 303-68  
Tab B
- 07 Nov (S) - Rough Rider Convoy departed Da Nang AO, destination Phu Bai.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 060054Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 08 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div issued instructions to the 1st Mar Div concerning the use of National Police in regard to Roadblocks conducted by 1st Mar Div personnel.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 081317Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 10 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div directed the reduction of fixed combat bases and further directed an increase in offensive operations.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 100509Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 10 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div issued instructions to the 1st Mar Div concerning air delivered munitions.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 100755Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 10 Nov (S) - CG 1st Mar Div issued Frag Order 150-67 (Rough Rider from Da Nang to Quang Tri 11 Nov 67).  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 100815Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 11 Nov (S) - Rough Rider Convoy departed Da Nang AO, destination Quang TRI.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 100815Z Nov 67  
Tab F

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- 12 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div issued Concept of Operation for Operation Foster/Badger Hunt to be conducted in the Dai Loc vicinity beginning 13 Nov 67.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 120433Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 12 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div issued Frag Order 151-67 (OP Foster/Badger Hunt to be conducted in the Dai Loc vicinity beginning 13 Nov 67.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 120933Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 13 Nov (S) 1st Mar Div commenced Operation Foster.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 120933Z Nov 67.  
Tab F
- 13 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div assumed OPCON of BLT 2/3 and passed OPCON TO CG 7th Marines effective 130600Z Nov 67.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 140007Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 14 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div issued Frag Order 152-67 (Rough Rider from Da Nang Phu Bai 16 Nov 67).  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 140655Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 15 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div published Operation Order 306-68 (Counter Rockets).  
Ref: Operation Order 306-68  
Tab F
- 15 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div extended the AO of Operation Foster to include portions of 2/5's TAOR.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 150351Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 16 Nov (S) Rough Rider Convoy departed Da Nang, destination Phu Bai.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 140655Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 17 Nov (S) Operation Essex terminated 170800H.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 161555Z NOV 67  
Tab F
- 20 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div published Div Bul 001300, logistics instructions for rotating BLT undergoing rehabilitating at Subic Bay.  
Ref: Div Bul 001300 dtd 20 Nov 67  
Tab B

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- 20 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div published Operation Order 308-68 (Waterway Control).  
Ref: Operation Order 308-68  
Tab B
- 23 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div issued Frag Order 153-67 (Rough Rider from Da Nang to Phu Bai 25 Nov 67).  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 230601Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 23 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div issued Frag Order 154-67 (Operation Denver to be conducted in the Duy Xuyen area commencing 26 Nov 67).  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 231505Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 24 Nov (S) CG 1st Mar Div sent an "outstandingly done" to CO USS PROVIDENCE (CLP-6).  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 240047Z Nov 67  
Tab B
- 25 Nov (S) Extension of AO for Operation Foster was cancelled.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 250440Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 25 Nov (S) Rough Rider Convoy departed Da Nang, AO to Phu Bai.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 230601Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 25 Nov (S) Rough Rider Convoy from Americal Div entered 1st Mar Div AO at 251115H.  
Destination of convoy is Da Nang.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 251417Z Nov 67  
Tab B
- 26 Nov (S) Operation Denver was cancelled.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 270230Z Nov 67  
Tab F
- 28 Nov (S) CMC of MIA 2/3 passed from 7th Marines to 5th Marines, 261800H.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 280340Z Nov 67
- 30 Nov (S) Operation Foster terminated 301200H.  
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 290725Z Nov 67  
Tab F

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## SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 6 - 8 Nov (U) Division Embarkation Training School conducted.
- 29 Nov (U) Blt 2/3 debarked from amphibious shipping and chopped to CG, 1st Marine Division.
- 30 Nov (U) Blt 3/1 commenced loading aboard amphibious shipping in preparation to chop to CG, 9th MAB as SLF-B

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UNCLASSIFIEDCIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIL ACTION

Foodstuffs	7,150 lbs
School Kits and Books	3,509
Clothing	3,475 lbs

Chronological Listing of Events:

- 3 Nov 1967 Plague epidemic reported in Nui Kim Son Hamlet.
- 13 Nov 1967 Hoa Phu Village Clinic completed by 1st Engineer Battalion.
- 21 Nov 1967 Shower unit at Nui Kim Son was completed by the 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion.
- 22 Nov 1967 5 wells at Phouc Hung Village were completed by the 1st Engineer Battalion.
- 30 Nov 1967 Operation FOSTER terminated with a total of 11,668 refugees processed by III MAF military forces.

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## PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Sequential listing of Psychological Operations in support of 1st Marine Division units for the period 1- 30 November 1967.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Leaflets Air Dropped</u>	<u>Leaflets Hand Distributed</u>	<u>Aerial Broad- casts (hours)</u>	<u>Ground Broad- casts (hours)</u>
1 Nov 67	3,800,000	5,550	00:30	-----
2	1,250,000	1,600	01:50	04:00
3	400,000	200	00:30	09:30
4	450,000	200	00:30	-----
5	200,000	4,900	01:40	03:00
6	400,000	8,350	01:45	-----
7	1,100,000	2,550	04:05	16:30
8	2,150,000	5,625	04:40	02:00
9	1,150,000	1,875	04:50	08:00
10	2,250,000	2,575	-----	-----
11	3,300,000	3,420	03:00	02:30
12	2,450,000	500	01:20	06:00
13	1,500,000	4,700	00:50	02:00
14	2,400,000	2,950	-----	02:00
15	1,620,000	4,300	02:30	01:00
16	2,100,000	6,725	02:35	02:00
17	980,000	5,225	06:30	02:00
18	1,000,000	2,675	06:50	09:00
19	1,350,000	5,175	03:10	06:00
20	1,750,000	2,925	01:50	06:00
21	1,400,000	2,675	03:00	11:30
22	2,050,000	2,500	03:00	10:00
23	1,700,000	3,950	04:30	11:00
24	1,650,000	3,425	01:20	14:00
25	2,950,000	3,700	03:20	-----
26	3,150,000	3,500	02:45	07:30
27	2,675,000	-----	-----	04:00
28	2,750,000	-----	02:30	02:30
29	-----	2,250	-----	03:00
30	1,900,000	2,500	02:30	06:30

Themes employed were:

- |   |                                  |
|---|----------------------------------|
| 1. "GVN Provides a Better Life"                     | 7. "VC Unjustly Tax/Force Labor" |
| 2. "USMC Comes in Peace"                            | 8. "VC/NVA Face Defeat"          |
| 3. "Rewards for Mines, Booby Traps and Information" | 9. "VC/NVA Hardships"            |
| 4. "Don't Harbor VC"                                | 10. "VC Not Welcome by People"   |
| 5. "VC Use Force/Terrorism"                         | 11. "GVN/US/FWMAF Offer Peace"   |
| 6. "VC Destroy the Youth"                           | 12. "Chieu Hoi"                  |
|   | 13. "Rocket Rewards"             |

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS  
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF  
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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- 1 November 1967 (C) LtCol HOUCK, Assistant CMO, attended a G-3 briefing relative to Operation Essex. During briefing communication requirements of 2Bn, 5th Marines were coordinated with 5th Marine Regiment.
- 1 November 1967 (U) Lt VOLT, Communication Officer of 1st Recon Battalion visited CMO to discuss establishment of a message center at 1st Recon Battalion. Decision was made to defer action in the matter due to shortage of fixed plant teletype equipment at Division Headquarters.
- 1 November 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 2d Bn, 5th Marines conducted by CMO PETERS.  
Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967.
- 3 November 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines conducted by CMO PETERS.  
Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967.
- 6 November 1967 (U) Lt McGINTY and CMO PETERS attempted to conduct a Materiel Management Inspection of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. The Inspection Team was turned back due to blown bridge.
- 7 November 1967 (U) LtCol CHASE, Division G-1, and LtCol MITCHELL, CO, Division Communication Company meet with CMO to determine quarterly manning level allocation for Division Communication Company.
- 8 November 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of HQ, 5th Marine Regiment conducted by CMO PETERS.  
Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967.
- 13 November 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines conducted by CMO PETERS.  
Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967.
- 14 November 1967 (U) LtCol HOUCK made a staff visit to III MAF CMO to coordinate agenda items for PAC CMO Conference.
- 14 November 1967 (C) Col GORRES made a staff visit to the 1st Marines, for the purpose of inspecting the Regimental HQ Communication Facilities. Various communication problem areas were discussed with Regimental CommO, particular attention was directed to the non-availability of AN/PRG-25 accessories.

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- 15 November 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines conducted by CWO PETERS.  
Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967.
- 16 November 1967 (U) LtCol HOUCK relieved LtCol COWING as Assistant CEO. LtCol COWING transferred to 7th CommBn to assume duties of Commanding Officer.
- 17 November 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 1st Battalion, 11th Marines was conducted by CWO PETERS.  
Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967.
- 22 November 1967 (U) LtCol HOLCROFT and SSgt SOLAMON, both from III MAF CEO, visited CEO; purpose of this visit was to explore the possible use of commercial equipment on non-tactical radio circuits, and thus relieve tactical equipment and frequencies for use in tactical situations.
- 24 November 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 4th Battalion, 11th Marines conducted by CWO PETERS.  
Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967.
- 25-27 November 1967 (C) Col CORDES and Major SCHNEIDER attended FMFFac CEO Conference held in Hawaii. Details of this conference will be presented in next months narrative summary section of the Command Chronology.
- 26 November 1967 (C) LtCol HOUCK submitted first draft annex H, (Comm-Elect) of Operation Order 309-60, to G-3.
- 27 November 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 3d Bn, 11th Marines conducted by CWO PETERS.  
Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967.
- 29 November 1967 (U) Materiel Management Inspection of 1st Shore Party Battalion conducted by CWO PETERS.  
Ref: DivBul 5041 of 11 June 1967.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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PART IVSUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

✓ TAB A	First Mardiv Perintreps, #30, 31, 32, 33-67	} Filed w/ Cmd Chron
✓ TAB B	Operational Documents #1-42	
✓ TAB C	Situation Reports	} Filed Sep
✓ TAB D	Photographs and News Releases /	
- TAB E	Command Directory	} Missing
- TAB F	G-3 Journal	
✓ TAB G	Hq Bn Command Chronology	} Filed
✓ TAB H	First Marines Command Chronology	
✓ TAB I	Fifth Marines Command Chronology	
✓ TAB J	Seventh Marines Command Chronology	
✓ TAB K	Eleventh Marines Command Chronology	
✓ TAB L	First Recon Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB M	First Anti-Tank Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB N	First Tank Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB O	First Engr Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB P	First Motor Transport Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB Q	First Shore Party Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB R	First Medical Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB S	First Hospital Co Command Chronology	
✓ TAB T	Third Amtrac Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB U	Seventh Comm Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB V	Seventh Engr Bn Command Chronology	}
✓ TAB W	Ninth Engr Bn Command Chronology	
✓ TAB X	Eleventh Motor Transport Bn Command Chronology	



SECRET

OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTSSUBJECT

CHANGE OF OPCON  
 OP KNOX  
 CHANGE OF OPCON  
 OP ESSEX  
 CHANGE OF OPCON  
 FRAG O 150-67  
 BOUNDARY CHANGE  
 SUPPORT OF BLT 2/3  
 FRAG O 151-67  
 BLT ROTATION  
 BLT ROTATION  
 BOUNDARY CHANGE  
 BLT ROTATION  
 BADGER HUNT  
 OP ESSEX  
 VISIT SENATOR CANNON  
 BOUNDARY CHANGE  
 A CO 1ST TANK BN  
 BLT ROTATION  
 TERMINATE OP ESSEX  
 VISIT RADN BEHRENS  
 NAME BRIDGE  
 LSU BLT 3/1  
 VISIT SENATOR TOWER  
 PLANNED OPMS DEC 67  
 BLT ROTATION  
 CO A 1ST AT BN  
 LSU BLT 3/1  
 FOSTER  
 OP DENVER  
 CHANGE OF OPCON  
 BLT 3/1  
 BOUNDARY CHANGE  
 CHANGE OF OPCON  
 OP PLAN 303-68  
 DIV O 3560.2A  
 DIV BUL 001300  
 OP ORDER 306-68  
 OP ORDER 308-68  
 DIV BUL 001300  
 DIV ORDER 5300.2 CH 1

CO 7TH MARINES	031415Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	040250Z	NOV	67	(S)
CTO 79.5	041515Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO III MAF	050725Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO III MAF	060140Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	100815Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	110145Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO III MAF	120713Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	120933Z	NOV	67	(S)
CTO 79.5	121452Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO III MAF	130542Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 5TH MARINES	130550Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	130712Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO III MAF	130808Z	NOV	67	(C)
CO 1ST MARDIV	150245Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	151330Z	NOV	67	(U)
CO 1ST MARDIV	151855Z	NOV	67	(C)
CO 1ST MARDIV	160747Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	161105Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	161555Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	171405Z	NOV	67	(U)
CO 1ST MARDIV	201255Z	NOV	67	(U)
CO 3D BN 1ST MAR	220843Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	220901Z	NOV	67	(U)
CO 1ST MARDIV	231002Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	231010Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARINES	240850Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO FORLOGCON	241504Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	250440Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	251052Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 5TH MARINES	270420Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	271338Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	290735Z	NOV	67	(C)
CTO 79.5	300548Z	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	070800H	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	7	NOV	67	
CO 1ST MARDIV	11	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	150800H	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	200800H	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	20	NOV	67	(S)
CO 1ST MARDIV	22	NOV	67	

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NOVEMBER 67

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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PERINTREP NO. 30-67

RELEASABLE TO FVMAF  
AND RVNAF

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1st Marine Division (Rein)  
 Danang, Republic of Vietnam  
 060900 November 1967

PERINTREP No. 30-67

Period covered: 291200H October - 051200H November 1967

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. There has been no change in the 1st Marine Division's mission.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation

(1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 84 and 71 degrees respectively with an average humidity of 81%. Approximately 3 inches of rain fell in the Danang area.

Partly cloudy skies with intermittent rain showers are predicted for the coming week. Maximum and minimum temperatures will average 83 and 69 degrees respectively. The humidity will average 81% and 4 to 5 inches of rain is expected to fall in the Danang area. Lunar illumination will range from 19% on the 6th to 78% on the 12th.

(b) Astronomical Data. See Annex A.

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength and Composition. See Annex A, PERINTREP No. 29-67.

(2) Locations

MAIN FORCE

2nd NVA Div	(AT 8733)	368B Arty Regt	(ZC 0968)
RQ-20th Sig Bn	(AT 9333)	1st Bn	(ZC 2064)
RQ-24th Engr Bn	(BT 1728)	2nd Bn	(ZC 1367)
3rd NVA Regt	(AT 9832)	3rd Bn	(ZC 1069)
1st Bn	(BT 1934)	1st VC Regt	(AT 9228)
2nd Bn	(BT 2049)	40th Bn	(AT 8527)
3rd Bn	(AT 9346)	60th Bn	(AT 9631)
21st Regt	(AT 9731)	70th Indep Bn	(BT 2939)
1st Bn	(BT 2222)	90th Bn	(AT 8827)
2nd Bn	(BT 1622)	804th Bn	(ZC 0697)
3rd Bn	(BT 1420)	K-4B Bn	(ZC 2099)

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LOCAL FORCE

Quang Da P.U.	(ZC 1038)	Q-15th Co	(BT 0060)
V-25th Bn	(BT 0554)	Q-16th Co	(AT 8865)
R-20th Bn	(AT 8755)	Quang Nam P.U.	(BT 1616)
Danang City Committee	(AT 9752)	72nd Bn	(BT 2121)
402nd Sapper Bn	(ZC 1860)	105th Bn	(BT 0444)
Q-12th Co	(BT 1856)	K-50th Co	(BT 0543)
Q-13th Co	(BT 0654)	K-51st Co	(BT 1747)
Q-14th Co	(AT 9354)	C-118th Co	(ZD 1302)

(3) Availability of Reinforcements and Replacements

Replacements may be obtained from infiltration groups or by in-country recruiting. Reinforcements may come from elements of the 2nd NVA Division which have the capability of moving north from Quang Tin. There continue to be sightings and contacts in the Antenna Valley indicating that elements of the 2nd NVA Division are probably located in this area.

(4) Aggregate Strengths. The estimated strengths of the enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's newly defined AOR are: Main Forces 2,150, Local Forces 1,780, and approximately 22,000 Irregulars.

(5) Movements and Activities. There were 94 enemy initiated incidents last week, of which 57 were the result of small arms fire, 22 were attributed to mines and booby traps, 8 mortar incidents, and 7 incidents due to enemy grenades.

(a) 5th Marines. In 3/1's area on the 1st, a L/3/1 patrol heard rifle fire in the vicinity of (BT 0863). An artillery mission cleared by 1/5 was conducted resulting in five secondary explosions.

In 1/5's area, Cap D-5 observed 15 enemy at (BT 1858) on the 29th and another 150 VC in the same area on the 30th. Artillery and small arms were fired by the Cap unit in both instances with unknown results.

At 1100H on the 2nd, Benchmark-2 observed five boats moving toward a restricted area at (BT 1452) and on the 3rd, another small group of boats was observed by Benchmark-4 in the vicinity of (BT 1653). An artillery mission was conducted resulting in 4 boats destroyed and 10 VC KIA (P).

At 1916H on the 4th, a B/1/5 patrol received 100-120 rounds of automatic weapons/small arms fire and 3 grenades from an estimated 12 enemy at (BT 1262).

On the 5th at 0040H, Hoi An received two mortar rounds in the vicinity of the air field at (BT 1458). No damage was reported.

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In 3/5's area, Cap D-3 observed 50 enemy on the 4th in the vicinity of (BT 0358). Requests for artillery were denied due to friendly villagers in the area.

(b) 2/5. In 2/5's area at 0840H on the 30th, recon patrol Elf Skin was forced to abort an attempted insertion at (AT 9434). The insertion aircraft received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire and a part of the recon team which was on the ground was extracted under fire. No casualties were reported.

Cap N-3 at (AT 8850) on the 30th, received automatic weapons fire from an estimated 8-10 enemy at (AT 8035). The patrol returned fire and called for 106 support. Direct hits with the 106 killed 5 VC.

At 1300H on the 1st, recon patrol War Cloud observed 12 VC unloading boats in the vicinity of (ZC 2131). On the afternoon of the 2nd, War Cloud again observed groups of enemy totaling 37 unloading gear from boats and digging a trench line in the same general area. On the 3rd, War Cloud once again observed 8 VC digging trenches in the vicinity of (ZC 2130). Artillery missions were fired in each instance with unknown results.

(c) 7th Marines. In the 7th Marines area, elements of 3/7 made heavy contact with enemy units during the early morning hours on the 2nd.

At 0120H, Hill 37 in the vicinity of the old Dai Loc Bridge at (AT 9158) received an unknown number of mortar rounds, and automatic weapons fire. At 0205H, a reaction force from 3/7 was dispatched to the eastern end of Dai Loc Bridge. The enemy broke contact and withdrew.

Forty minutes later at 0200H, a ground assault by an estimated 100 enemy was launched on Hill 25 at (AT 8356) when a Marine platoon from M/3/7 received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar. After the mortar fire ceased, the enemy breeched the platoon's defensive wire in four places using bangalore torpedoes. Once inside the wire, the enemy made extensive use of satchel charges and grenades to destroy bunkers. Spookey came on station and artillery was fired in support of the Marine Platoon.

Concurrent with the activity on Hill 25, elements of 3/7 located on Hill 65 at (AT 8857) were also receiving mortar fire from an enemy position at (AT 8856). This maneuver by the enemy reduced the threat of reaction by the Marines on Hill 65 in support of the Marine platoon on Hill 25.

In addition to the attacks on Hill 25 and 65, Cap Units C-3 and C-4 were both taken under fire at (AT 8657) by mortar and small arms fire.

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Also, a similar terrorist attack occurred at the Tam Hoa refugee hamlet located in the vicinity of (AT 8757). Approximately 65 civilian dwellings were destroyed, ten civilians were killed and 34 wounded. Total enemy losses were reported as:

- 14 VC KIA (C)/ 40 VC KIA (P)
- 7 AK-47's
- 25 satchel charges
- 20 chicom grenades
- 4 B-40 rocket rounds
- 4 bangalore torpedoes

The main attack on Hill 25 was conducted by a unit highly trained in the use of sapper tactics. It is estimated that the main unit involved was the 402nd Sapper Battalion with elements of the R-20th Battalion and the Q-14th Company taking part in the diversionary actions.

Elsewhere in 3/7's area, on the 30th at 0810H and 1030H, Benchmark-AU's 1 and 4 conducted airstrikes on a suspected enemy anti-aircraft position at (AT 8449) resulting in eight structures destroyed, eight structures damaged and three secondary explosions, one of which emitted a fireball 50 to 100 feet high.

At 1510H on the 3rd, recon patrol Elf Skin called artillery on two small groups of enemy at (AT 8146) resulting in two secondary explosions and evidence of 3 VC KIA (P).

At 1330H on the 31st, at (AT 8157) a M/3/7 squad combat patrol made contact with an unknown number of enemy firing automatic weapons/machine guns from fortified positions. Airstrikes were run resulting in four bunkers destroyed and one secondary explosion. Additional units of Company "M" moved in to search the area and they also received machine gun fire. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact. "M" Company conducted a thorough search of the area finding 2 VC KIA, several large caves, and about 800 pounds of rice.

Also on the 31st at 0130H, I/3/7's combat base at (AT 9253) received four rounds of 81 or 82mm mortar outside their perimeter. Once again on the evening of the 4th, I/3/7 received one mortar round near its perimeter. Fire was returned in both cases and no friendly casualties were incurred.

At 1740H on the 4th, recon patrol Elf Skin observed a total of 60 VC moving in a northeasterly direction at (AT 8048). A fire mission was conducted resulting in 5 VC KIA (P) and 4 secondary explosions.

On the 5th, recon patrol Elf Skin observed another 60 VC with large packs moving northeast in the vicinity of (AT 7948). A fire mission was conducted with good target coverage.

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In 1/7's area on the 1st, recon patrol Swift Scout engaged 3 VC with small arms fire killing two of them at (AT 8365). The recon patrol later ambushed 10 VC in the same area resulting in two VC KIA (C) and four VC KIA (P). One of the enemy was captured and later died of wounds.

In 2/7's area on the morning of the 2nd at 0750H, a recon diving team while conducting a bridge security check of Namo Bridge at (AT 9284) discovered an explosive device 18-20 feet below water rigged to be command detonated. At 1245H one recon diver and one Navy UDT diver went below to disarm the device, but found that the explosive charge had since been removed leaving behind only the wire which formed the electrical circuit for detonation.

On the night of the 3rd, H&S Company radio relay security on OP Falcon at (AT 9378) received 15-20 rounds of small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. Fire was returned and the area was searched with negative results.

(d) Operation Knox. At 0800H on the 31st, 2/3's CP located at (ZD 1801) received 43 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. An air-strike was run at (ZC 1797) on the suspected enemy mortar position.

Also, later in the afternoon on the 31st, recon patrol Golden Lemon received heavy small arms fire and 11 rounds of 82mm mortar at (AT 1799). Artillery called on the suspected enemy position caused two secondary explosions.

Operation Knox terminated at 1000H on the 4th. Total enemy losses were reported as 2 VC KIA (C), 10 VC KIA (P), and 7 detainees.

(e) Operation Samurai III. On the 30th of October, the 4th Ranger Company found a base area at (ZC 0468) large enough to accomodate at least a battalion sized unit. In this same area the company made several small unit contacts.

(f) IR, APD, and SLAR Emissions. The use of Infrared equipment was hampered the past week due to poor weather. However, IR coverage flown on the 1st at (ZC 0346) revealed two emissions or light activity.

Moderate human scent emissions were detected by the APD on the 30th in the vicinity of (AT 8370). APD surveillance on the 1st revealed a total of 60 emissions in the Elephant Valley area. Particular heavy concentrations were detected at the following locations: Along the high ground south of Route 545 at (AT 8885) and (AT 8782), along a trail complex at (AT 8384), along a ridge line at (AT 8088), along a stream bed at (ZC 1988), along the Song Cu De at (ZC 1685), and along a stream bed at (ZC 1583).

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On the evening of the 2nd, SLAR detected one boat at (AT 8855) and on the evening of the 4th, enemy river traffic was detected at (AT 9954) and (BT 1559).

(g) Other. Of interest the past week was that a Chieu Hoi named TRAN NGOC ANH rallied on the morning of the 1st to 2/5. He indicated that he was a member of the 21st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division and that he believes the 21st NVA Regiment is presently located at (BT 0930). ANH also stated that the morale of the regiment is low and that most of the men wish to desert and Chieu Hoi. He also stated that the 21st NVA Regiment has suffered heavy losses and that the regiment is down to about battalion size.

(h) Summary. Contact was relatively light in the 5th Marines area the past week. Of significance was that Cap Units D-3 and D-5 observed larger than usual groups of enemy moving near their areas. Also, AO's had several sightings of boat activity in the vicinity of (BT 1452) and (BT 1653).

In 2/5's area recon patrol Elf Skin was forced to abort an attempted insertion at (AT 9434) due to heavy enemy fire and recon patrol War Cloud sighted a total of 60 enemy over a three day period unloading boats and digging trench lines in the vicinity of (ZC 2131).

In addition to the heavy contact made by elements of 3/7 in the 7th Marines area, recon patrol Elf Skin observed a total of 120 enemy with heavy packs on the 4th and 5th moving northeast in the vicinity of (AT 8048).

(6) Operational Capability to Launch Rockets. The enemy's operational capability to launch rockets remains unchanged.

### 3. Enemy Capabilities

a. To conduct acts of terrorism and harassment with emphasis on countering the Revolutionary Development Program, and to continue interdiction of LOC's with the objective of increasing VC control over population and denying the GVN/US/FWMAF use of water and highways.

b. To conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields, and logistics installations.

c. To conduct less than regimental size attacks and harassment against isolated friendly forces and installations.

d. To continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.



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4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. The enemy has the capability to conduct unconventional warfare throughout the TAOR. Past activities indicate that the enemy places a high priority on lines of communication and the RD and CAP Programs. The increased requirements for the use of Route #1 will make it an even more likely target.

b. The enemy can attack by fire utilizing rockets or mortars. Although various potential rocket sites have possibly been eliminated due to weather conditions, the 368B Artillery Regiment continues to have the capability to launch 122 or 140mm rockets against the Danang Airfield or other vital installations. It is believed that a large scale attack would come from several dispersed rocket sites. There continue to be indications that local forces have a rocket support capability. To date, all of the attacks involving rockets have occurred during the hours of darkness. The major threat of large scale attack by fire on the vital areas in and around Danang comes from the western sector of the rocket belt. The 140mm rocket attacks associated with local forces may occur from any location.

c. Less than regimental size attacks may be conducted within the 1st Marine Division AOR. The past attacks on District Headquarters and key bridges may be an indication of the type of target to be hit in the future, however, any isolated unit or installation may expect an attack. The reliance on sapper tactics and the fear of supporting arms causes the enemy to conduct attacks at night.

d. The enemy has the capability to infiltrate additional personnel and units into Quang Nam from Central Laos, North Vietnam, or adjoining provinces.

5. Conclusions

a. Mining incidents, acts of terrorism, and other forms of guerrilla warfare will continue throughout the TAOR.

b. It is probable that the enemy will continue to make attempts to attack vital installations by fire utilizing the 140mm and 122mm rockets.

c. Several sightings by AO's/recon patrols in the southern portion of 3/7's TAOR indicate increased enemy activity within the area.

d. Low-level intelligence reports indicate the threat of possible enemy attacks by fire and/or ground assaults against the Lien Chieu Esso Plant/Namo Bridge area.

e. Sizeable enemy forces (possibly the 21st NVA Regiment and the 3rd NVA Regiment) located south of 2/5's TAOR indicate that moderate to heavy contact can be expected by friendly units in that area.

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COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEX: A. Astronomical Data

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	3rd MAW	(2)
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	Americal Division	(15)
	III MAF	(5)
	1st Recon Bn	(2)
	3rd ITT	(2)
	11th Marines	(5)
	9th ITT	(20)
	1st At Bn	(2)
	3rd CIT	(5)
	7th CIT	(9)
	CTG 79.5	(5)
	NSDC	(2)
	SSDC	(2)
	7th Comm Bn	(2)
	MCB 7	(2)
	3rd Amtrac	(2)
	1st Tanks	(2)
	G-3	(2)
	3rd MP Bn	(2)

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ANNEX B (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO 30-67

DATE	BMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOON RISE	MOON SET	% ILLUM
6 Nov	0556	0642	1815	1903	1053	2208	19
7	0556	0643	1815	1903	1151	2310	29
8	0557	0643	1815	1903	1243	----	39
9	0557	0644	1814	1903	1328	0009	50
10	0557	0645	1813	1903	1408	0104	60
11	0558	0645	1813	1902	1444	0155	69
12	0558	0645	1813	1902	1518	0244	78
13	0558	0646	1813	1902	1550	0330	85
14	0559	0646	1813	1902	1622	0420	91
15	0600	0647	1812	1902	1656	0503	96
16	0601	0647	1812	1901	1732	0551	99
17	0601	0648	1812	1901	1812	0641	100
18	0601	0648	1812	1901	1855	0732	99
19	0601	0648	1812	1901	1943	0826	97
20	0601	0649	1812	1901	2035	0920	93

A-1

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12 NOVEMBER 67

# 1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
ODD DIR 5200.10

PERINTREP NO. 31-67

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1st Marine Division (Rein)  
 Danang, Republic of Vietnam  
 130900H November 1967

PERINTREP NO 31-67

Period covered: 051200H - 121200H November 1967

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. There has been no change in the 1st Marine Division's mission.

2. Enemy Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation

(1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 84 and 70 degrees respectively with an average humidity of 80%. Approximately 1.18 inches of rain fell in the Danang area.

Increased cloudiness and rain showers are predicted for the coming week. Maximum and minimum temperatures will average 82 and 68 degrees respectively. The humidity will average 86% and three to five inches of rain is expected in the Danang area. Lunar illumination will range from 85% on the 13th to 97% on the 19th.

(b) Astronomical Data. See Annex A.

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength and Composition. See Annex A, PERINTREP No 29-67.

(2) Locations

MAIN FORCE

2nd NVA Div	(AT 9033)	368B Arty Regt	(ZC 1865)
RQ-20th Sig Bn	(AT 9333)	1st Bn	(ZC 1862)
RQ-24th Engr Bn	(BT 1728)	2nd Bn	(ZC 1563)
3rd NVA Regt	(BT 0729)	3rd Bn	(ZC 1283)
1st Bn	(BT 0831)	1st VC Regt	(AT 9027)
2nd Bn	(BT 2147)	40th Bn	(AT 8527)
3rd Bn	(BT 0429)	60th Bn	(AT 9224)
21st Regt	(AT 9638)	70th Indep Bn	(BT 2738)
1st Bn	(AT 9840)	90th Bn	(AT 8827)
2nd Bn	(Vicinity of Regt HQ)	804th Bn	(ZC 0794)
3rd Bn	(Vicinity of Regt HQ)	K-4B Bn	(AT 8197)

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LOCAL FORCE

Quang Da P.U.	(ZC 1038)	Q-15th Co	(BT 0060)
V-20th Br.	(BT 0453)	Q-16th Co	(AT 8865)
R-20th Bn	(AT 8653)	Quang Nam P.U.	(BT 1616)
Danang City Committee	(AT 9752)	72nd Bn	(BT 2018)
402nd Sapper Bn.	(ZC 1860)	105th Bn	(AT 9934)
Q-12th Co	(BT 1865)	K-50th Co	(BT 0543)
Q-13th Co	(BT 0753)	K-51st Co	(BT 1747)
Q-14th Co	(AT 9354)	C-118th Co	(ZD 1404)

(3) Availability of Reinforcements and Replacements

Replacements may be obtained from infiltration groups or by in-country recruiting. Reinforcements may come from elements of the 2nd NVA Division which have the capability of moving north from Quang Tin.

There are indications that the enemy has increased his strength along the periphery of the 1st Marine Division's TAOR.

There continue to be sightings and contacts in the Antenna Valley indicating that elements of the 2nd NVA Division are located in this area.

(4) Aggregate Strengths. The estimated strengths of the enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's newly defined AOR are: Main Forces 2,150, Local Forces 1,780, and approximately 20,000 Irregulars.

(5) Movements and activities. There were 127 enemy initiated incidents the past week of which 80 were the result of small arms fire, 27 attributed to mines and booby traps, 10 mortar incidents, and 10 incidents due to enemy grenades.

(a) 5th Marines. Enemy small arms and mining activity increased the past week in the 5th Marines TAOR.

During the early morning hours of the 6th, coordinated mortar attacks by the enemy were launched against Hoi An (BT 1457), Duy Xuyen at (BT 0651) and Phu My village at (BT 0952) followed by limited ground assaults at each location. Spookey and ARVN/Marine artillery were utilized in support and minimal damage was reported by the friendly units.

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CAP D-1 was hit on four separate occasions the past week, once on the 6th and 7th, and twice on the 9th at (BT 8363), (BT 0464) and (BT 0363). The CAP unit received a total of twenty-five 60mm mortar rounds and heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire. No friendly casualties were taken as a result of the contacts.

At 0815H on the 6th, Benchmark-12 observed what appeared to be an observation tower of bamboo construction at (BT 0055). Airstrikes and artillery were conducted on the target. At 1415H, a Sparrow Hawk from C/1/5, inserted to search the area, found one bamboo platform 6 x 8 feet, weighted down with rocks. The structure was destroyed by engineers.

CAP D-3 located at (BT 0458) on the 7th received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated ten enemy. Small arms fire and artillery were returned resulting in 4 VC KIA (C), 3 VC KIA (P), and one secondary explosion. Later that evening CAP D-3 came under fire again from an estimated 50-75 VC. Marines and PF's returned fire and the enemy broke contact.

At 1145H on the 8th, a squad recon patrol from L/3/1 made a search of several houses in the vicinity of (BT 0662) finding a rice cache totalling 3,000 pounds. 2,500 pounds of the rice was confiscated and the remaining 500 pounds was left for the local villagers.

Also on the 8th in 3/1's area, an unknown number of VC approached a M/3/1 LP at (BT 0967) and threw one satchel charge into the position. A reaction force in route to the LP received small arms fire.

At 1330H on the 10th, a Marine from a A/1/5 squad combat patrol detonated an unknown type mine at (BT 1062) initiating a VC ambush. The patrol received 100-150 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact. A search of the area revealed three claymore mines, seven 105mm rounds and eight homemade AP mines rigged in series to be command detonated and spaced 10-15 meters apart.

On the afternoon of the 11th, a total of 12 boats were taken under artillery fire by AG's at (BT 1956), (BT 1451), and (BT 0967). Eight boats were destroyed.

Later in the evening, in the vicinity of (BT 0063) a vehicle from Ho Company/5th Marines was ambushed by an estimated 15 enemy. A platoon from I/3/5 swept the area with negative results.

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(b) 2/5. Units committed to Operation Essex in 2/5's area made significant contacts during the past week.

On the afternoon of the 6th, H/2/5 became heavily engaged with an estimated NVA company in a fortified village at (AT 9138). Hotel Company received heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire and mortar fire from their front and right flank. Artillery and airstrikes were run on the enemy and G/2/5 linked up with Hotel Company in an effort to overrun the enemy position. Although Marines made repeated thrusts toward the position they were unable to overrun it. The next morning, G/2/5 launched an attack on the objective and met with negative enemy resistance.

On the afternoon of the 7th, G and H/2/5 located at (AT 9038) reported that they received 36 rounds of unknown type artillery or mortar. It was later evaluated that the rounds were possibly 120mm mortar. The rounds were received in two round volleys at three to four minute intervals. Six of the rounds received were reported to have emitted a gas somewhat milder than our CS gas. Shell craters appeared to be more characteristic of mortar than of artillery.

M/3/5 reported that they also received similar type rounds during contact on the evening of the 8th when they engaged an estimated NVA company at (AT 9036).

Also on the 8th, Recon Patrol Lunga Point in support of Operation Essex observed eight VC planting mines at (AT 9139). Artillery was conducted resulting in eight VC KIA (P) and two secondary explosions.

On the afternoon of the 11th, elements of G/2/5 observed 20 VC in a fortified village at (AT 9138). Artillery and airstrikes were conducted with unknown results due to darkness. Benchmark-12 observed 10 to 15 VC at (AT 8735). Two airstrikes were conducted resulting in three VC KBA (P) and one secondary explosion.

(c) 7th Marines. The 7th Marines area, particularly in 3/7's TACR, was the scene of significant enemy activity the past week.

On the 6th at (AT 8049), Recon Patrol Elf Skin called artillery on two groups of enemy totaling 29 whom they described as carrying packs and mortar tubes and moving in a northeasterly direction.

On the 7th, a squad security patrol from M/3/7 observed 35 enemy at (AT 8054). Artillery was conducted resulting in two VC KIA (C) and two VC KIA (P).

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At 0105H on the 8th, 3/7's CP, the Army Advisory Compound at Dai Loc, and the Old Dai Loc Bridge, all in the vicinity of (AT 9157) received 82mm mortar fire, heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire, followed by ground assaults.

At 0110H CAP C-1 at (AT 9256) received 57mm RR fire followed by a ground assault. The friendly units in the Dai Loc area were supported by Spookey and an I/3/7 reaction force was sent to reinforce CAP C-1.

The Army Advisor in Dai Loc also reported that a number of small hamlets were attacked in a coordinated effort by the enemy. Refugee camps at (AT 9358), (AT 9159), (AT 9257) and a Peace Village at (AT 9158) were damaged or destroyed by satchel charges and enemy fire.

At 0600H a sweep was conducted by I/3/7 in pursuit of the dispersed enemy and artillery and airstrikes were conducted. Enemy losses were 15 VC KIA (C), 43 VC KIA (P), 18 VC KBA (P), 8 individual weapons captured, and two PW's.

The PW's stated they were from the R-20th Battalion and it is estimated that elements of the R-20th Battalion combined with the Q-14 Company and local guerrillas were the enemy units involved.

At 0210H in 1/7's area, a VC sapper platoon swept through another peace hamlet located at (AT 9469) destroying a number of houses. Concurrently, CAP B-3 located in the same general area came under small arms and mortar fire effectively preventing them from supporting the peace hamlet.

Elsewhere in 3/7's area, on the 9th, Benchmark-8 conducted an artillery mission of four VC in a fortified position at (AT 9054) resulting in two VC KIA (C), one VC KIA (P), and one secondary explosion.

At (AT 9558) on the 10th, an unknown number of VC ambushed a Vietnamese vehicle, murdered two of the passengers and kidnapped a third who was the son of the Dai Loc National Police Chief.

In 2/7's area on the 6th, two Marine vehicles from G/2/7 were ambushed by an estimated 10 enemy at (AT 9292). The ambush was initiated with two command detonated mines followed by heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire.

(d) Americal Division. A document captured by A/2/12 on 6 November confirmed that there is at least one company of 120mm mortars organic to the support elements of the 2nd NVA Division.

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America previously reported that the interrogation of an NVA PW captured on 20 September indicated that a new NVA rocket unit has infiltrated into SVN and was probably located northwest of Hiep Duc. The PW identified his unit as the 1st Battalion, 68th Artillery Regiment and stated both the 1st and 3rd Battalions arrived in SVN in August and were enroute to Quang Ngai Province.

A second NVA PW captured on 9 November by B/5/7 Cav stated he was also a member of the 1st Battalion, 68th Artillery Regiment. He stated his battalion consisted of three companies each equipped with six 122mm rocket launchers for a total of 18 launchers. The PW stated that on 4 November his battalion was disposed between two streams to the west and northwest of Hill 81 in the vicinity of (ZC 1327) and (ZC 1326). He states that his battalion has been there for the last month.

(e) Other. The interrogation of a 16 year old VC who Chieu Hoi'd to CAP Q-5 on 12 November further confirms that there is possibly a sizeable enemy force (3 companies) located southwest of the Hal Van Pass near the Elephant Valley area. The source also stated that there are extensive ammunition storage areas located in the vicinity of (ZC 1483). There have been reports that a battalion of the 368B Artillery Regiment is located in the same general area.

There have been indications that elements of the 21st NVA Regiment have suffered heavy losses due to contacts with friendly units south of Antenna Valley and that their morale is very low.

There is further indication that elements of the 21st Regiment have moved north to the Go Noi Island area from Antenna Valley with intentions of gaining a rest and to be resupplied.

(f) IR, APD, and SLAR Emissions.

(1) On the 5th and 6th, an IR mission flown over the southern boundary of the AOR detected 17 emissions at (AT 8852), at (AT 8751) and one emission at (AT 8840). Five additional emissions were detected at (AT 8477).

An IR mission flown over the area south of Antenna Valley on the 7th detected a heavy concentration of emissions in the vicinity of (AT 9530).

One IR mission flown on the 8th detected 6 emissions in the vicinity of (ZC 1125).

(2) On the 5th the Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) detected heavy human scent concentrations in Happy Valley at (ZC 1070), (ZC 1166), (ZC 0873), (ZC 0367), and (ZC 0064).

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On the 7th, heavy human scent emissions identified the presence of enemy forces in the southeastern floor in Antenna Valley.

A sweep of the Bach Ma, Phu Loo, and Elephant Valley areas on the 9th with the APD detected heavy emissions at (ZG 1092) and very heavy emissions at (ZC 0592).

No significant boat traffic or vehicular movement was detected by SLAR this past week.

(g) Summary. Enemy small arms and mining activity increased the past week in the 5th Marines area.

Of significance was that coordinated mortar attacks were launched on the 6th at Hoi An (BT 1457), Duy Xuyen (BT 0651), and Phu My Village (BT 9052).

Cap D-1 was hit by enemy units on four separate occasions during the past week and CAP D-3 was hit twice by the enemy.

A total of twelve boats were observed and taken under artillery fire by AO's on the 11th at (BT 1956), (BT 1451), and (BT 0963).

In 2/5's area, units on Operation Essex made significant contacts with enemy forces the past week.

On the 6th, G/2/5 and H/2/5 engaged an estimated NVA Company at (AT 9138). On the evening of the 8th, M/3/5 engaged another NVA Company at (AT 9036).

In 7th Marines TAOR, 3/7's CP, the Army Advisory Compound at Dai Loo, and the Old Dai Loo Bridge, all in the vicinity of (AT 9157) came under mortar fire followed by ground assaults during the early morning hours on the 8th. In addition, a number of refugee camps and peace hamlets in 3/7's and 1/7's areas came under attack by enemy forces.

(6) Operational Capability to Launch Rockets. The enemy's operational capability to launch rockets remains unchanged.

### 3. Enemy Capabilities

a. To conduct acts of terrorism and harassment with emphasis on countering the Revolutionary Development Program, and to continue interdiction of LOC's with the objective of increasing VC control over population and denying the GVN/US/PWMAF use of water and highways.

b. To conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields, and logistics installations.

c. To conduct less than regimental size attacks and harassment against isolated friendly forces and installations.

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a. To continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

#### 4. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities

a. The enemy has the capability to conduct unconventional warfare throughout the TACR. Past activities indicate that the enemy places a high priority on lines of communication and the RD and CAP Programs. The increased requirements for the use of Route #1 will make it an even more likely target.

b. There are indications that enemy units having a rocket capability have an increased number of rockets in their possession. This information is based on several low-level intelligence reports which describe these units with a larger than usual number of rockets.

c. Less than regimental size attacks may be conducted within the 1st Marine Division AOR. The past attacks on District Headquarters and key bridges may be an indication of the type of target to be hit in the future, however, any isolated unit or installation may expect an attack. The reliance on sapper tactics and the fear of supporting arms causes the enemy to conduct attacks at night.

d. The enemy has the capability to infiltrate additional personnel and units into Quang Nam Central Laos, North Vietnam, or adjoining provinces.

#### 5. Conclusions

a. Mining incidents, acts of terrorism, and other forms of guerrilla warfare will continue throughout the TACR.

b. It is probable that the enemy will continue to make attempts to attack vital installations by fire utilizing the 140mm and 122mm rockets.

c. There continues to be a threat of up to battalion sized enemy attacks by fire and/or ground assaults against isolated allied positions in 3/7's and 2/5's TACR's.

d. There are indications of a sizeable enemy force located southwest of the Hai Van Pass near the STAP-74 Valley area which pose a threat of possible attacks by fire and/or ground assaults against the Lien Chieu Esso Plant, Namo Bridge, and other logistical installations within the area.

e. It is possible that elements of the 21st NVA Regiment have moved north to the Go Noi Island area thereby posing a threat to allied units within the area.

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*R. E. Corey*  
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 COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEX: A. Astronomical Data

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MCB 9	(1)
MCB 128	(1)
CICV	(1)
1st Air Cav Div (3rd Bde)	(2)
3rd MAW	(2)
1st Marines	(5)
5th Marines	(15)
2nd En, 5th Marines	(6)
7th Marines	(15)
9th MAB	(4)
5th MarDiv	(2)
USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.	(2)
Americal Division	(15)
III MAF	(5)
1st Recon Bn	(2)
3rd ITT	(2)
11th Marines	(5)
9th ITT	(20)
1st AT Bn	(2)
3rd CIT	(5)
7th CIT	(9)
CTG 79.5	(5)
CTG 79.4	(5)
NSDC	(2)
SSDC	(2)
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ANNEX A (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARLIV PERINTREP NO 31-67

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BMCT</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EECT</u>	<u>MOON RISE</u>	<u>MOON SET</u>	<u>% ILLUM</u>
13 NOV	0558	0646	1813	1902	1550	0330	85
14	0559	0646	1813	1902	1622	0420	91
15	0600	0647	1812	1902	1656	0503	96
16	0601	0648	1812	1901	1732	0551	99
17	0601	0648	1812	1901	1812	0641	100
18	0601	0648	1812	1901	1855	0732	99
19	0601	0649	1812	1901	1943	0826	97
20	0601	0649	1812	1901	2035	0920	93
21	0602	0649	1812	1900	2130	1014	87
22	0602	0650	1812	1900	2226	1105	79
23	0602	0650	1812	1900	2323	1153	71
24	0603	0651	1812	1900	----	1238	61
25	0604	0652	1812	1900	0019	1319	50
26	0605	0653	1812	1900	0115	1400	39
27	0605	0653	1812	1900	0211	1440	29

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# 1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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1st Marine Division (Rein)  
Danang, Republic of Vietnam  
200900H November 1967

PERINTREP No 32-67

Period covered: 121200H - 191200H November 1967

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series L7014

1. Mission. There has been no change in the 1st Marine Division's mission.2. Enemy Situationa. Characteristics of the Area of Operation(1) Military Geography

(a) Climate and Weather. The maximum and minimum temperatures averaged 81 and 71 degrees respectively with an average humidity of 84%. Approximately 2.4 inches of rain fell in the Danang area.

The seven day forecast calls for generally fair to partly cloudy skies with light rain showers expected during the latter part of the week. Maximum and minimum temperatures will average 80 and 67 degrees respectively. The humidity will average 80% and two to four inches of rain is expected in the Danang area. Lunar illumination will range from 92% on the 20th to 39% on the 26th.

(b) Astronomical Data. See Annex A.b. Enemy Military Situation(1) Strength and Composition. See Annex A, PERINTREP No 29-67.(2) Locations. Enemy unit locations are based on the best intelligence information available.MAIN FORCE

2nd NVA Div Hq	(AT 8122)	368B Arty Regt Hq	(ZC 0462)
RQ-20th Sig Bn	(AT 8719)	1st Bn	(ZC 1065)
RQ 24th Engr Bn	(BT 1728)	2nd Bn	(ZC 0766)
3rd NVA Regt Hq	(BT 0530)	3rd Bn (Tentatively loc	ZC 1283)
1st Bn	(BT 0831)	1st VC Regt Hq	(AT 8629)
2nd Bn	(BT 0429)	40th Bn	(AT 8527)
3rd Bn	(BT 2147)	60th Bn	(AT 9224)
21st Regt Hq	(Vic AT 9437)	70th Indep Bn	(BT 2738)
1st Bn	(Vic AT 9437)	90th Bn	(AT 8827)
2nd Bn	(Vic AT 9437)	804th Bn	(ZC 0396)
3rd Bn	(Vic AT 9437)	K-4B Bn	(ZC 0993)

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LOCAL FORCE

Quang Da PU	(ZC 1038)	Q-15th Co	(BT 0259)
V-25th Bn	(BT 1253)	Q-16th Co	(AT 8865)
R-20th Bn	(AT 8755)	Quang Nam PU	(BT 1616)
Danang City Committee	(AT 9856)	72nd Bn	(BT 2121)
402nd Sapper Bn	(ZC 1860)	105th Bn	(BT 0034)
Q-12th Co	(BT 1856)	K-50th Co	(BT 0543)
Q-13th Co	(BT 1055)	K-51st Co	(BT 1747)
Q-14th Co	(AT 9354)	G-118th Co	(ZD 1404)

(3) Availability of Reinforcements and Replacements. Replacements may be obtained from infiltration groups or by in-country recruiting. Reinforcements may come from elements of the 2nd NVA Division which have the capability of moving north from Quang Tin.

Indications continue to point to the possibility that the enemy has increased his strength along the periphery of the 1st Marine Division's TAOR. These indications include reports of the presence of the 368B Artillery Regiment to the west northwest of Heip Duc and the possible formation of a regimental organization in the Phu Loc area utilizing the 804th and K-4B Battalions, with the possible inclusion of the 802nd Battalion as well.

(4) Aggregate Strengths. The estimated strengths of the enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's newly defined AOR are Main Forces 2,550, Local Forces 1,780, and approximately 22,000 Irregulars. The change in Main Force strength reflects the movement of a battalion of the 3rd NVA out of 2/5's TAOR and the movement into 2/5's TAOR of elements of Headquarters, 21st NVA (estimated strength of 400) and one battalion of the 21st NVA. A study recently completed by the 1st Marine Division G-2 OQB analyst will be published in the near future. This study will revise the strength figures reflected above.

(5) Movements and Activities. There were 93 enemy initiated incidents the past week of which 66 were the result of small arms fire, 20 due to mines and booby traps, 2 mortar incidents, and 5 incidents due to enemy grenades. The 93 enemy initiated incidents this week showed a decrease from last week's 127.

(a) 5th Marines. There were several small arms and mining incidents in 5th Marines TAOR the past week.

On the afternoon of the 12th, an Army PC was destroyed and six soldiers were killed when a 500 pound bomb rigged as a mine was command detonated at (BT 1758).

At 1500H on the 14th, a I/3/5 combat patrol at (BT 0261) received heavy small arms fire from an estimated ten enemy. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact.

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Also on the 14th, a PF platoon located in the vicinity of (BT 0351) made contact with an unknown number of enemy. There were 5 PF's KIA, and 9 WIA. Enemy losses were 7 VC KIA (C) and an unknown number of KIA (P).

On the 15th, a total of 13 assorted mines and explosive charges were found and destroyed in the 5th Marines area. Seven of the mines were in the general vicinity of (BT 0966).

At 1620H on the 16th, at (BT 0858), a truck belonging to a D/2/11 convoy was damaged by a command detonated mine estimated to contain 200 pounds of explosive. A B/1/5 patrol sent to the area received small arms/infantry fire from an estimated 7 enemy. Fire was returned killing 2 VC.

Also on the 16th, at (BT 0770) CAP G-6 received heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned and the area was searched with negative results.

On the 18th at (BT 0359), an L/3/5 patrol received heavy small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact.

(b) 2/5. Recon teams had several sightings of enemy movement in 2/5's area the past week.

On the 12th, 13th, and 14th, recon patrol War Cloud sighted several groups of VC and NVA totalling 89 at (AT 9952), (AT 9852), and (AT 9848). The majority of these groups were moving in a northeasterly direction.

On the 18th, recon patrols Petrify and Thin Man called artillery on a total of 18 enemy (AT 8838) and (AT 9039) killing 3 VC.

Units committed to Operation Essex in 2/5's area made only light contact the past week.

On the 16th, M/3/5 found an estimated 3,500 pounds of rice at (AT 8936). The rice was evacuated to Duc Duc for distribution to refugees.

On the 17th, recon patrol Thin Man in support of Operation Essex observed a total of 80 VC throughout the day in the vicinity of (AT 8939). Artillery and airstrikes were conducted resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 4 VC KIA (P).

Operation Essex terminated at 0800H on the 17th. Enemy losses for the operation were: 7 VC KIA (C), 40 VC KIA (P), 65 NVA KIA (C), 125 NVA KIA (P), 2 NVA PW's, 16 detainees, 6 IWC and 1 CSWC.

(c) 7th Marines. There were several small arms incidents in the

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7th Marines TAOR the past week. However, most of the activity took place on Operation Foster in 3/7's area.

During the past week units on Operation Foster uncovered several rice caches totalling in excess of 95 tons in the vicinity of (AT 8248), (AT 8348), and (AT 8550).

On the 13th, AO Benchmark-9 in support of 3/7 observed two groups of 50 enemy each at (AT 8751) and (AT 8852). Airstrikes were conducted resulting in five structures destroyed and 20 KBA (P).

On the 15th, G/2/3 received heavy small arms fire and 12 rounds of 60mm mortar at (AT 8151). Countermortar fire was conducted with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties.

On the afternoon of the 16th, F and G/2/3 sighted several groups of enemy totalling approximately 80 in the vicinity of (AT 8348), (AT 8251), (AT 8149) and (AT 8249). Airstrikes and artillery were conducted in each instance resulting in 5 VC KIA (C) and 30 VC KIA (P).

On the evening of the 16th, elements of 2/3 received 60mm mortar fire, heavy small arms/.50 caliber fire at (AT 8150). Fire was returned with unknown results.

Recon teams in support of Operation Foster also had significant sightings the past week.

On the 16th, recon patrol Pony Boy observed several groups of enemy totalling 166 in the vicinity of (AT 8049) and (AT 8149). Artillery and airstrikes were conducted resulting in 10 VC KIA (C), and 13 VC KIA (P). Heavy canopy prevented good observation on several missions.

On the 18th, recon patrol Gold Lemon observed a total of 60 enemy at (AT 8047). Artillery and airstrikes were conducted resulting in 12 VC KIA (C), 7 VC KIA (P), and one secondary explosion.

From 1200H to 1800H on the 18th recon patrol Pony Boy observed several groups of enemy totalling approximately 250 moving northeast in the vicinity of (AT 8049) and (AT 8150). Airstrikes were conducted resulting in 30 VC KBA (P).

On the 19th, Pony Boy again observed approximately 44 enemy moving southwest in the vicinity of (AT 8251). Artillery was conducted with unknown results.

Also on the 19th, recon patrol Lucky Lark observed three groups of enemy

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totalling 55 in the vicinity of (AT 8247). Again, artillery was conducted with unknown results.

In 1/7's area, on the 12th, a CAP B-5 bridge security team at (AT 9469) received heavy small arms fire, grenades and six rounds of 60mm mortar from an estimated 20 enemy. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact.

On the 18th, a D/1/7 patrol called artillery and airstrikes on an estimated enemy squad at (AT 8865) with unknown results. Later in the day, another patrol from D/1/7 sighted 20 additional armed enemy at (AT 9364).

In 2/7's area on the 14th, two ARVN and 3 VN officials were killed in an ambush at (ZD 1401) by an estimated three enemy.

On the 15th, Benchmark-16 in support of G/2/7 conducted artillery and airstrikes on 20 VC at (AU 8205) with unknown results.

At 0900H on the 16th, a G/2/7 patrol fired at 15 armed enemy at (AU 8205) resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 2 VC KIA (P). Upon searching the area a rice cache of seven tons was found. Also one of the enemy KIA's appearance indicated the possibility that he was a Chicom advisor. A boy who was captured at the scene initially stated that the KIA was a Chicom advisor, but further interrogation indicated he was actually a local cadre leader or an NVA. A map written in Chinese and Vietnamese was also found on the KIA's body. The map was of the Phu Loc area and several U.S. military positions were plotted on it.

On the 18th, a G/2/7 squad at (ZD 1601) received heavy small arms fire and B-40 rocket rounds from an estimated seven enemy. A G/2/7 reaction platoon made contact with the enemy, killed 3 VC and captured 1 B-40 rocket launcher and 2 AK-47's.

Also on the 18th, recon patrol Rummage observed a total of 12 VC in the vicinity of (AU 8205). An artillery mission was conducted killing two VC and probably killing seven more.

(d) Other

(1) III MAF indicates increased NVA employment of special warfare type troops in up to battalion size units. These units are reportedly trained for an espionage and sabotage role with sabotage of air fields as one of their primary objectives. Although these units appear similar to VC/NVA Sapper units, their level of training and method of employment appear to be somewhat specialized.

(2) An NVA PW named THE CHUNG was captured by a reaction platoon from G/2/7 on the 18th in the Phu Loc area (ZD 163010). The source

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disclosed that he was from the 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment and also gave the unit designation as K-2. The latter is an AKA for the K-4B Battalion reported to be operating in the Phu Loc area. The PW stated that the battalion has 4 companies with a total strength of 400. The area of operation of the 2nd Battalion according to CHUNG is bounded by coordinated (ZD 120010) to (ZD 166020) to (ZC 160945) to (ZC 120953). The source also stated that the base area of the battalion is located on Hill 236 in the vicinity of (ZC 135954).

(e) IR, APD, and SLAR Emissions

(1) IR emissions were relatively light the past week throughout the TAOR.

An IR mission flown on the 18th in the vicinity of (ZC 2049) detected a moderate concentration of emissions.

(2) A high priority APD mission flown on the 19th in the vicinity of (ZC 1283) indicated the presence of a possible enemy company in the area.

(3) SLAR detected 3 moving targets on a river in the vicinity of (AT 9253) on the 14th.

Two additional moving targets were detected in the vicinity of (BT 0655) and (AT 8054) on the 16th and 19th.

(f) Summary. Activity in the 5th Marines TAOR was limited to small arms and mining incidents. On the 15th a total of 13 assorted mines and explosive charges were found and destroyed. Seven of the mines were in the general vicinity of (BT 0966).

In 2/5's area, units on Operation Essex made only light contact with enemy forces the past week. This operation terminated on the 17th of November with enemy losses of 72 KIA (C) and 165 KIA (P).

There were several small arms incidents in the 7th Marines TAOR the past week. Significant activity took place on Operation Foster in 3/7's area where units made several small unit contacts throughout the week and uncovered several rice caches totalling more than 195 tons in the vicinity of (AT 8248, 8348, and 8550).

Recon patrols in support of Operation Foster had sightings of several hundred enemy moving in the areas of (AT 8047, 8049, 8150, and 8247).

On the 18th, a G/2/7 reaction platoon made contact with an estimated 7 enemy in the vicinity of (ZD 1601). An NVA PW by the name of THE CHUNG was

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captured and upon interrogation the PW stated he was from the 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment or K-2 Battalion. The latter is an AKA for the K-4B Battalion suspected to be operating in the Phu Loc area.

(6) Operational Capability to Launch Rockets. The enemy's operational capability to launch rockets remains unchanged.

### 3. Enemy Capabilities

a. To conduct acts of terrorism and harassment with emphasis on countering the Revolutionary Development Program, and to continue interdiction of LOC's with the objective of increasing VC control over population and denying the GVN/US/FWMAF use of water and highways.

b. To conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields, and logistics installations.

c. To conduct less than regimental size attacks and harassment against isolated friendly forces and installations.

d. To continue increasing his strength in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

### 4. Analysis of enemy Capabilities

a. The enemy has the capability to conduct unconventional warfare throughout the TAOR. Past activities indicated that the enemy places a high priority on lines of communication and the RD and CAP Programs. The increased requirements for the use of Route #1 will make it an even more likely target.

b. There are indications that enemy units having a rocket capability have an increased number of rockets in their possession. This information is based on several low-level intelligence reports which describe these units with a larger than usual number of rockets.

c. Less than regimental size attacks may be conducted within the 1st Marine Division AOR. The past attacks on District Headquarters and key bridges may be an indication of the type of target to be hit in the future, however, any isolated unit or installation may expect an attack. The reliance on sapper tactics and the fear of supporting arms causes the enemy to conduct attacks at night.

d. The enemy has the capability to infiltrate additional personnel and

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units into Quang Nam from Central Laos, North Vietnam, or adjoining provinces.

### 5. Conclusions

a. Mining incidents, acts of terrorism, and other forms of guerrilla warfare will continue throughout the TAOR.

b. It is probable that the enemy will continue to make attempts to attack vital installations by fire utilizing the 140mm and 122mm rockets. This threat will increase as lunar illumination decreases in the coming week.

c. The suspected presence of Main Force units south and southwest of Hoi An indicates a threat to this area.

d. There are indications of a sizeable enemy force located southwest of the Hai Van Pass near the Elephant Valley area which poses a threat of possible attacks by fire and/or ground assaults against the Lien Chieu Esso Plant, Namu Bridge, and other logistical installations within the area.

e. There are indications that elements of the 21st NVA Regiment are located in 2/5's TAOR east of Antenna Valley thereby posing a threat to friendly units within the area.



R. E. COREY  
COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ANNEX: A. Astronomical Data

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Copy to: 2nd ROKMC Bde  
SA, Quang Tin  
SA, Quang Ngai  
SA, QNSS Ade Grp, Hoi An  
FLC  
MCB 1  
MCB 9  
MCB 128  
CICV  
1st Air Cav Div (3rd Bde)  
3rd MAW  
1st

(1)  
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1st Marines	(5)	(5)
5th Marines	(15)	(15)
2nd Bn, 5th Marines	(6)	(6)
7th Marines	(15)	(15)
9th MAB	(4)	(4)
5th MarDiv	(2)	(2)
USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.		(2)
Americal Division		(15)
III MAF		(5)
1st Recon Bn		(2)
3rd ITT		(2)
11th Marines		(5)
9th ITT		(20)
1st AT Bn		(2)
3rd OIT		(5)
7th CIT		(9)
CTG 79.5		(5)
CTG 79.4		(5)
NSDC		(2)
SSDC		(2)
7th Comm Bn		(2)
MCB 7		(2)
3rd Amtrac		(2)
1st Tanks		(2)
G-3		(2)
3rd MP Bn		(2)
C/S 1st MarDiv		(2)

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ANNEX A (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO 32-67

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BMCT</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EECT</u>	<u>MOON RISE</u>	<u>MOON SET</u>	<u>% ILLUM</u>
20 Nov	0626	0649	1812	1835	2035	0920	93
21	0626	0649	1812	1835	2130	1014	87
22	0627	0650	1812	1835	2226	1105	79
23	0627	0650	1812	1835	2323	1153	71
24	0628	0651	1812	1835	----	1238	61
25	0629	0652	1812	1835	0019	1319	50
26	0630	0653	1812	1835	0115	1400	39
27	0630	0653	1812	1835	0211	1440	29
28	0630	0653	1812	1835	0308	1521	19
29	0631	0654	1812	1835	0407	1604	10
30	0631	0654	1812	1835	0510	1652	04
1 Dec	0636	0659	1813	1836	0618	1748	01
2	0636	0659	1813	1836	0726	1847	00
3	0637	0700	1814	1837	0834	1956	03
4	0637	0700	1814	1837	0937	2055	08

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26 NOVEMBER 67

# 1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



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ANNEX "A" TO:  
PERINTREP NO. 33-67

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AND RVNAF

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), MAF  
APO, San Francisco, California 96602

2/TCF/hte  
27 November 1967

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From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Annex A (Strength, Location, Composition) to 1st MarDiv PERINTREP No 33-67

Ref: (a) 1st MarDiv PERINTREP No 33-67 dtd 27 November 1967  
(b) CG, 1st MarDiv ltr 2/PJP/wde 3800 dtd 28 Nov 67

Encl: ✓ Annex A (Strength, Locations, Composition) to 1st MarDiv PERINTREP No 33-67

1. Reference (a) indicated that the subject Annex would be issued separately. Enclosure (1) is the pertinent Annex. Strength figures reflected in this Annex are based on past data as adjusted by reference (b), a recently completed study of enemy unit strengths and combat effectiveness.

2. The aggregate strengths reported in subparagraph 2b (3) of reference (a) did not reflect the results of the strength study mentioned above except in the case of Irregulars. The following aggregate strengths as of 27 November do reflect consideration of reference (b):

Main Forces:	2,000
Local Forces:	1,735
Irregulars:	17,500

3. It will be noted that the strength of the R-20th Battalion as reported in enclosure (1) is higher than that shown in previous PERINTREP's. This increase in strength is based on the study referred to in paragraph 1 and 2. This study did not take into account possible enemy losses incurred in the two attacks on Dai Loc (D) in early November or those incurred during Operation Foster. These engagements are currently being studied to evaluate enemy losses and to relate these losses to the R-20th Battalion and/or other enemy units which may have been involved.

*R. E. Corey*  
R. E. COREY  
by direction

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SA, Quang Tin

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SA, Quang Ngai	(1)
SA, Quang Ngai Grp, Hoi An	(1)
PLC	(1)
MCB 1	(1)
MCB 9	(1)
MCB 128	(1)
CICV	(1)
1st Air Cav Div (3rd Bde)	(2)
3rd AAV	(2)
1st Marines	(5)
5th Marines	(15)
2nd Bn, 5th Marines	(6)
7th Marines	(15)
9th MAB	(4)
5th MarDiv	(2)
USMC Rep, USA, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.	(2)
Americal Division	(15)
1st MAF	(5)
1st Recon Bn	(2)
3rd ITT	(2)
11th Marines	(5)
9th ITT	(20)
1st AT Bn	(2)
3rd CIT	(5)
7th CIT	(9)
CTG 79.5	(5)
CTG 79.4	(5)
NSIC	(2)
SLIC	(2)
7th Comm Bn	(2)
MCB 7	(2)
3rd Amphtrac	(2)
1st Tanks	(2)
G-3	(2)
3rd AF Bn	(2)
C/S 1st MarDiv	(2)

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UNIT	EST STR	SOURCE	LAST RPT D LOC/DATE	ACCEPTED LOC	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	CATEGORY
1st Bn	300	I	(BT 0321)/16 Oct	S.A. Duy Xuyen/ Que Son (D)	2x81mm, 2x82mm, 4x60mm mtr, 3xHMG, 3x57mm RR, 9x40's	
2nd Bn	300	I	(BT 0926)/16 Oct	S.A. Duy Xuyen/ Que Son (D)	2x81mm, 3x60mm mtr, 3x57mm RR, 1x75mm RR, 4xMG	
3rd Bn (1)	300	I	(BT 0922)/16 Oct	Vic 21st Regt Hq	2x81mm, 2x82mm, 3x60mm mtr, 4x30cal MG, 2x57mm RR	
1st VC Regt	1,400					
Hqs & Spt Unit	200	U	(AT 8626)/1 Dec	Eastern Duc Duc/ N.E. Hiep Duc (D)		
40th Bn	400	I	(BT 1030)/2 Sep	N.E. Hiep Duc (D)	4x60mm, 2x81mm mtr, 3xHMG	C
60th Bn	400	I	(AT 8924)/6 Nov	N.E. Hiep Duc (D)	3x60mm, 3x81mm mtr, 4x57mm RR	C
90th Bn	400	I	(BT 1030)/2 Sep	N.E. Hiep Duc (D)	4x82mm, 6x60mm mtr, 1x57mm RR 3x30cal MG	C
368B Arty Regt	1,250					
Hqs & Spt Unit	100	U	(ZC 0462)/19 Nov	Happy Valley Area	6x82mm mtr	C
1st Bn	350		(ZC-1365)/15 Aug	Happy Valley Area	unk 140mm rkt & launchers, 2x71 radios	C
2nd Bn	350		(ZC-0667)/15 Aug	Happy Valley Area	18x122mm rkt launchers	C
3rd Bn (2)	350	I	(ZC-1382)/12 Nov	Elephant Valley	18x122mm rkt launchers	C

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ANNEX A (STRENGTH, LOCATION, COMPOSITION) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO 33-67

SOURCE LEGEND

A - Agent  
I - Interrogation  
D - Document  
U - Usually reliable source  
C - Contact

MAIN FORCE

UNIT	EST STR	SOURCE	LAST RPTED LOC/DATE	ACCEPTED LOC	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	CATEGORY
2nd NVA Div	5,800					
2nd NVA Div Hqs	200	U	(AT 7923)/1 Dec	N.E. Hiep Duc (D)		C
RQ-20th Sig Bn	200	A	(BT 1251)/19 Mar	Hiep Duc (D)	Indiv SA & SMG's, 6x15 watt AN/CRC-9 radios, 5x2 Chicom 71 radios, 12 Chicom telephones	C
RQ-24th Engr Bn	140	D	(BT 2244)/20 Oct	Hiep Duc (D)	Indiv SA & SMG's	C
Other Spt Units (4)	1,860			Hiep Duc (D)	Unk 75mm RR, Unk 120mm mtr, Unk DKZ's	
3rd NVA Regt (Rein)	1,000					
Hqs & Spt Unit	100	U	(AT 9931)/1 Dec	Thang Binh/Que Son (D)	12x75mm RR, 18x60mm mtr, unk # 82mm mtr, 24xB-40, 12x1MG, unk # HMG	C
1st Bn	300	I	<del>N.E. Thang Binh</del> (D) /23 Oct	N.E. Thang Binh (D)	Unk 82, 60, RR, MG's	C
2nd Bn	300	A	(AT 9835)/2 Dec	Thang Binh/Que Son (D)	Unk 82, 60, RR, B-40	C
3rd Bn (1)	300	I	(BT 2838)/23 Oct	Vic 3rd NVA Regt Hq	5x82mm, 6x60mm mtr, Unk RR, unk B-40	C
21st NVA Regt (Rein)	1,000					
Hqs & Spt Unit	100	U	(AT 9437)/19 Nov	S.E. Duy Xuyen/Que Son (D)	6x82mm mtr, 12x60mm mtr, 10x 81mm mtr, unk 75 & 77mm RR, unk HMG, unk B-40, 412.7 AA MG's, 2 flamethrowers	C

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UNIT	EST. SIZ	SOURCE	LAST RPTED LOC/DATE	ACCEPTED LOC	ARMS	EQUIPMENT	CATEGORY
70th Indep Bn (3)	350	A	Vic (BT 1351)/27 Nov	Se Duy Xuyen (D)	3x81mm mtr, 4x60mm mtr, 4x57mm RH, 5xMG, 4xb/40		C
804th Bn	350	I	Vic (YC 9496)/8 Oct	Phu Loc/Vinh Loc (D)	4x81mm mtr, 8x60mm mtr, 4xAA MG, 4x RH, 8xb/40 1xb-90		C
K-4B Bn	350	I	(ZC 1395)/18 Nov	Phu Loc (D)	4x81mm mtr, 8x60mm mtr, 12x60cal MG, 2x75mm mtr, 3x57mm mtr, 5xAA MG, 6xb-90		C

LOCAL FORCE

402nd Bn	400	U	(ZC 1860)/11 Oct	S. Central Hieu Duc District	16x81mm mtr, 6x60mm mtr, 2x12.7mm MG, 8x82mm mtr, 16xb/40, 4xHMG, 1x20mm mtr, 1-120mm MTR		C
R-20th Bn	500	I	(AT 7956)/25 Nov	Dai Loc (D)	3x81mm mtr, 3x60mm mtr, 1x57mm RH, 2xMG, 54xAR's, 6xb/40, 9xM-79, 1x75mm RH		C
V-25th Bn	400	I	Vic (BT 1152)/24 Nov	Duy Xuyen/Hieu Nhon (D)	3x81mm mtr, 1xDKZ 57mm RH, 2xM-60MG, 3x60mm mtr, 4x B-40, 4xb-41, 3xMG, 1x57mm RH, 5xM-16 & M-1 & M-1 rifles		C
105th Bn	300	I	Vic (BT 0634)/19 Nov	S.E. Que Son (D)	2x81mm mtr, 4x60mm mtr, 2xMG, 2x57mm RH, 9xAR,		C
Q-12th Co	75	A	(BT 1758)/18 Nov	Hieu Nhon (D)	1x60mm mtr, 9xSMG		C
Q-13th Co	75	A	(BT 0654)/1 Nov	Hieu Nhon (D)	1x60mm mtr, 1x30Cal MG, 9xAR's		C
Q-14th Co	75	I	(AT 8449)/24 Nov	Western Dai Loc (D)	1x60mm mtr, 1x30Cal MG, 4xM-79, 2xClaymore, 9xAR, 3xBARs, K-44s, US carbines, CKCs, a few AK-47's		C

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UNIT	EST STR	SOURCE	LAST RPTED LOC/DATE	ACCEPTED LOC	ARMS & EQUIPMENT	CATEGORY
Q-15th Co	75	A	(BT 0960)/2 Dec	Dien Ban (D)	2x60mm mtr, 1x81mm mtr, 1x57mm RR, 3xIMG	C
Q-16th Co	75	A	(AT 8571)/8 Nov	Hieu Duc (D)	2x60mm mtr, 1x81mm mtr, 1xIMG, 6xARs	C
K-50th Co	80	A	(BT 0745)/13 Sep	Northern Que Son (D)	1x60mm mtr, 1xAA MG, 1x 57mm RR, 2x30 Cal MG	C
K-51st Co	80	A	(BT 1747)/7 Jun	Northern Thang Binh (D)	2x60mm mtr, 1x57mm RR, 6xMG	C
C-118th Co	60	A	(ZC 1498)/10 May	Phu Loc (D)	Unk Small arms, Unk K-44, Unk K-50	C

FOOTNOTE:

- (1) Selection of 3rd Battalion as security element with Regiment headquarters is arbitrary. Could be another battalion of the regiment.
- (2) Selection of 3rd Battalion as located in Elephant Valley is arbitrary. Could be 1st or 2nd Battalion.
- (3) PW TRAN VAN NHI, captured 24 Nov 67, stated that he has seen and talked to members of the 70th Battalion in Duy Xuyen and that they are currently operating in this district and in Dai Loc (D).
- (4) Total strength of 2nd NVA Division's support units and Hq is estimated at 2,600. Specific breakdown for AA Battalion, RR Battalion and Mortar Battalion are not available. Estimated strength conforms with Americal estimates.

A-4

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UNIT	SUBORDINATION	AKA	PERSONALITIES	IBN
2nd NVA Div	MR-V	Ham Tu 2; Nam Hai; Thon A; 520; Nong Truong 2; Su Doan 2; 620th Div; Chi Lang; Agricultural Site 2; Tay An Div	CO: Col THACH XO: DAO PO: VIET	20.601MG-20.925GM Tay An; Nam Hai 20.800GM
RQ-20th Sig Bn	2nd NVA Div	RQ-20A; Gk-30; RQ-20B; Ham Tu 2/c	CO: TUNG APO: NGUYEN BA CHU	1803/CH Hai Cang 20; HT20.605GM Tay An;
RQ-24th Engr Bn	2nd NVA Div	GK-40	CO: Le Hung MANH	GK20.039 Tay An Nam Hai; HT26.309GM Tay An
3rd NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Worksite 3; 64th Regt; 51st Regt; 31st Regt; 46th Regt; Factory 10; Quyet Thang Regt	CO: Lt Col VIET SON XO: Maj TRANH ANH KIEN PO: TRUNG THANH	HT20.801GM An Binh; HT20.802GM An Binh; HT20.03GM An Binh
1st Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X1; CT3; Binh Minh; K1; Factory #1; 64th Bn	CO: THAO	20.825-20.828GM An Binh
2nd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X2; K2; Binh Da; 74th Bn; Factory #2	CO: Sr Capt THANH	20.837GM An Binh
3rd Bn	3rd NVA Regt	X3; K3; Binh Thien; Nguyen trai; Q-56; Mao Chu; Factory #3; 84th Bn	CO: Sr Capt NGUYEN TIEP	20848 GM An Binh
21st NVA Regt	2nd NVA Div	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; Cong Truong 21; A-21; An Long; Cong Truong 7 (?)	CO: Lt Col MINH XO: Maj TU PO: Lt Col TIEN	20756CN An Long; 20769GM Nam Dong; 43910 An Long; 20757 Bach Dang; 5201 Ap Nam 2

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UNIT	SUBORDINATION	AKA	PERSONALITIES	IBN
1st Bn	21st NVA Regt	11th Bn; 11th Worksite; An Chau; Factory 11; Chau; Dong Mai; 60th Bn	CO: LA XO: NA PO: KHOI	2007HG Bach Dong; 2678GM An Long; 5260-5264 Ap Nam 2; 6604
2nd Bn	21st NVA Regt	22nd Bn; 135th Bn; Long Thanh Dong Hai; 72nd Bn; 70th Bn; 70th Bn	CO: Sr Capt TIEP XO: OAN PO: TA	2019 Bach Dang; 5270-5274 Ap Nam 2; 2010-2014 Bach Dang (?)
3rd Bn	21st NVA Regt	33rd Bn; Long Thang; Dong Bien; Xuong 72; 75th Bn; Phi Truong Long Chau; 80th Bn	CO: Dinh CANH	3039HC Bach Dang; 5280-5284 Ap Nam 2
1st VC Regt	2nd NVA Div	Cong Truong 1; PS/40; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Truong Giang; Steel Regt	CO: Lt Col Chan Khoi DICH XO: Lt Col Chu An TAN PO: Lt Col HUYEN	6000-6199; 20.801-20.803 GM An Giang; 20.721-20.743 GM An Giang
40th Bn	1st VC Regt	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007-2009; 80th Bn; Nam Hai; Bau Bang; Phong Mai	CO: LAUN XO: Pham THANH PO: Dai Duo TUNG	2010HQ Bach Dang; 5645 Quang Trung St.
60th Bn	1st VC Regt	Thanh Ha; T-112; 1stBn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Binh Gia Factory; Bong Trang	CO: Maj PHONG XO: BAC PO: LICH	20735 An Giang
70th Bn	1st VC Regt	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Song Hong; Thuan Binh; Phong Bien	CO: XANG XO: PHONG PO: Ngo Danh TAN	6034 HD Truong Giang
368B NVA Regt	MR-V	Binh Minh Worksite; 575 Infiltration Group	CO: Maj Nguyen Huu CHAU XO: Maj Nguyen Xuan TU PO: Maj Do Xuan KHOAT	6503 Ap Binh; 21382 GM Dong Hai

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UNIT	SUBORDINATION	AKA	PERSONALITIES	LEN
1st Bn	368B NVA Regt	D-99; D.1 Bn; (130 Poss)	CO: Le Ngoc TOAN XO: TRAC PO: CUNG	
2nd Bn	368B NVA Regt	D.2	CO: MINH XO: TIEN PO: DANG	
3rd Bn	368B NVA Regt	D.3	CO: Phan CAN XO: Sr Lt LONG PO: Capt LIEN (BUONG)	
70th Indep Bn	2nd NVA Div	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Chu Song; Truong Son 70; 103; Inter-mt White Tiger Bn; F-07; Bong Trang Tay An; Binh Gia	CO: NAM XO: LY PO: HONG	1782HC 20
804th Bn	4th Regt (?)	K-4; VQ-74	CO: CHIEN XO: LANG PO: HAY	1504BK Di Hai; 1506BK Di Hai; 41.435
K-4B Bn	4th Regt (?)	2/6 (?); 804th Bn (?); 802nd Bn; K-2; Van Troi Bn; 2nd Bn, C-2, 3rd Bn	CO: KHANH	Q52.700 Bac Do; 1522BK Di Hai
<b>LOCAL FORCE</b>				
402nd Sapper Bn	Danang City	T.89 Special Engr Bn; YH-9; Ten Lua (Flaming Arrow); 5th Engr Bn; MK-3; Nghia Bu;	CO: NGON; Sr Capt TOY XO: Sr Lt THANH	21.391-21.396GM; Dong Hai 213956M Dong Hai
R-20th Bn	Quang Nam (P)	Q.N Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; Viet Dung; Hung-Gai-Ray; B-20; 1st Bn; 70th Bn	CO: Nguyen Van LAM XO: Dinh Van SA; Nguyen CU PO: Ho Van CHI	21.342; 21.341GM Ba Ha

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UNIT	SUBORDINATION	AKA	PERSONALITIES	LEB
V-25th Bn	Quang Nam (P)	Lam Bn; 5th Bn; Q-92 Bn; 2nd Bn; CQC; R-25th Bn; 75th Bn; Hieu Nhon Bn	CO: Quang LAM (AKA LUC); Nguyen Van THANH XO: THEU; Nguyen NHI PO: TOAN; Nguyen KHOA	A-4192 Anh Dung 2115; A-4192 Anh Dung; 92 Viet Dung; A4HT.194; 1304
72nd Bn	Quang Tin (P)	H-65; X-72; H-68; 305 Gp; Hai Cang 50; Truong Son R-13; Hap Dang 300 Ap Bac	CO: Tran CAN; Cao TUC XO: Danh MINH PO: Thanh LECH	21.443GM Ba Hanh; 21.993 Mrs Hanh; 25010; 21.446M Ba Hanh; 21.445 GM
1st Bn	Que Son (D)	3rd Bn; 5th Regt; Que Son Bn	CO: Cao KY (Nguyen Xuan NGU) XO: Nguyen THANH PO: UT	
Q-12th Co	Hoi An City	X-62 Co; Hoi An Co Unit 72; Q-12B; Thi Xa 120	CO: Le Hien NHAN XO: Nguyen NGOC	2102
Q-13th Co	Duy Xuyen (D)	H-52; Duy Xuyen Co; X-63 Co; 103rd Co; Q-13B Unit 73	CO: Tran Van CAM XO: Nguyen Chi THIEN PO: Vo Ca SON	2103
Q-14th Co	Dai Loc (D)	Dai Loc Co; H-42 Co; X-64th Co; Unit 74; Q-14B	CO: MOI; Le THANH; Nguyen LE XO: Tran TU PO: NAM; TAM	2104
Q-15th Co	Dien Ban (D)	Dien Ban Co; H-40 Co; H-55; X-65; H-35; Q-15B; Unit 75; 102nd Co; 104	CO: Le HY; Nguyen DIEN XO: Tran TU PO: Nguyen BA	2105; 21.335GM; Ba Ha; BC 203
Q-16th Co	Quang Da (D)	Hoa Vang Co; H-41; H-56; 100 Co; Q-16B; X-66; X-17; Hoa Hieu Co; Unit 76	CO: Nguyen DOA	2106; 21.336GM Ba Ha
K-50th Co	Que Son (D)	Que Son Co; 105th Unit; A-7	CO: TUNG	
K-51st Co	Thang Binh (D)	Thang Binh Co; A-10; F-14; D-21; 107	CO: KHOA	
G-118 Co	Phuc Loc (D)	Phuc Loc (D) LF Co; P.19	CO: SON	

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SECRET

OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTSSUBJECT

1 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON	CG 7TH MARINES	031415Z NOV 67	(S)
2 ✓ OP KNOX	CG 1ST MARDIV	040250Z NOV 67	(S)
3 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON	OTG 79.5	041515Z NOV 67	(S)
4 ✓ OP ESSEX	CG III MAF	050728Z NOV 67	(S)
5 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON	CG III MAF	060140Z NOV 67	(S)
6 ✓ FRAG O 150-67	CG 1ST MARDIV	100815Z NOV 67	(S)
7 ✓ BOUNDARY CHANGE	CG 1ST MARDIV	110145Z NOV 67	(S)
8 ✓ SUPPORT OF BLT 2/3	CG III MAF	120713Z NOV 67	(S)
9 ✓ FRAG O 151-67	CG 1ST MARDIV	120933Z NOV 67	(S)
10 ✓ BLT ROTATION	OTG 79.5	121452Z NOV 67	(S)
11 ✓ BLT ROTATION	CG III MAF	130542Z NOV 67	(S)
12 ✓ BOUNDARY CHANGE	CG 5TH MARINES	130550Z NOV 67	(S)
13 ✓ BLT ROTATION	CG 1ST MARDIV	130712Z NOV 67	(S)
14 ✓ ADGER HUNT	CG III MAF	130808Z NOV 67	(C)
15 ✓ ESSEX	CG 1ST MARDIV	150245Z NOV 67	(S)
16 ✓ VISIT SENATOR CANNON	CG 1ST MARDIV	151330Z NOV 67	(U)
17 ✓ BOUNDARY CHANGE	CG 1ST MARDIV	151855Z NOV 67	(C)
18 ✓ CG 1ST TANK BN	CG 1ST MARDIV	160747Z NOV 67	(S)
19 ✓ BLT ROTATION	CG 1ST MARDIV	161105Z NOV 67	(S)
20 ✓ TERMINATE OP ESSEX	CG 1ST MARDIV	161555Z NOV 67	(S)
21 ✓ VISIT RADM BEHRENS	CG 1ST MARDIV	171405Z NOV 67	(U)
22 ✓ NAMO BRIDGE	CG 1ST MARDIV	201255Z NOV 67	(U)
23 ✓ LSU BLT 3/1	CG 3D BN 1ST MAR	220843Z NOV 67	(S)
24 ✓ VISIT SENATOR TOLSON	CG 1ST MARDIV	220901Z NOV 67	(U)
25 ✓ PLANNED OPNS DEC 67	CG 1ST MARDIV	231002Z NOV 67	(S)
26 ✓ BLT ROTATION	CG 1ST MARDIV	231010Z NOV 67	(S)
27 ✓ CG A 1ST AT BN	CG 1ST MARINES	240850Z NOV 67	(S)
28 ✓ LSU BLT 3/1	CG FORLOGCOMD	241504Z NOV 67	(S)
29 ✓ OP FOSTER	CG 1ST MARDIV	250440Z NOV 67	(S)
30 ✓ OP DENVER	CG 1ST MARDIV	251052Z NOV 67	(S)
31 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON	CG 5TH MARINES	270420Z NOV 67	(S)
32 ✓ BLT 3/1	CG 1ST MARDIV	271338Z NOV 67	(S)
33 ✓ BOUNDARY CHANGE	CG 1ST MARDIV	290735Z NOV 67	(C)
34 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON	OTG 79.5	300548Z NOV 67	(S)
35 ✓ OP PLAN 303-68	CG 1ST MARDIV	070800H NOV 67	(S)
36 ✓ DIV O 3560.2A	CG 1ST MARDIV	7 NOV 67	
37 ✓ DIV BUL 001300	CG 1ST MARDIV	11 NOV 67	(S)
38 ✓ OP ORDER 306-68	CG 1ST MARDIV	150800H NOV 67	(S)
39 ✓ OP ORDER 308-68	CG 1ST MARDIV	200800H NOV 67	(S)
40 ✓ DIV BUL 001300	CG 1ST MARDIV	20 NOV 67	(S)
41 ✓ DIV ORDER 5300.2 CH 1	CG 1ST MARDIV	22 NOV 67	
42 ✓ Letter	CG 1st MARDIV	21 Nov 67	

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W/OIC  
H/ASB AOC  
H/CC

116  
BM

DE 63LS UR NR 015...015...0015

00 DXIU  
DE 63LS 025 3071415  
ZNY SSSSS

O 031415Z NOV 67  
FM SEVENTH MARINES  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV

*COC*  
~~ADV RT G-3~~  
G-3 TOR 031620Z  
CCN 1004

BT  
SECRET  
RLI 2/3 CHOPS TO CG FIRST MARDIV 041000H NOV 67.  
GP-4  
BT  
7TH MARS

031415Z NOV 67

DDJ  
01


1ST MARDIV 2100/5 (9/67)

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**

<i>W</i>	<i>OLL</i>
<i>W</i>	<i>ROLL</i>
	<i>CC</i>

*ST 17*

PP RUMHIE RUMHFL RUMHVH RUMHVP RUMFUV RUABQL RUAUBJN  
 DE RUMHLA 2387 3080250  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 RUMHIE I. FIRST HOSP CO

P 040250Z NOV 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/ G FIRST MAF  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHFL/CG FLC  
 ZEN/ FIRST MARDIV OPCON  
 RUABQL / IF SEVEN NINE  
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN SIX POINT FIVE  
 RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE  
 RUMHVH/SA I CORPS ADV GROUP  
 RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

**DRAFTER: G-3***COE***SECRET**

OPERATION KNOX

A. CG III MAF 281536Z OCT67

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 290359Z OCT67

1. OPERATION KNOX TERMINATES 041000H NOV67. FIRST MARDIV PASSED  
 OPCON BUI 3/3 (-) TO CG III MAF AT SAME TIME.

GP-4

BT

CG 1ST MAR DIV

940250Z NOV 67

*27***SECRET**

SECRET

W/OIC  
 ROKA AOKC  
 BT

S118

COC

VV MFL 735  
 DE RUMMAA 0485 3100142

ZNY SSSSS

O 060142Z NOV 67

FM CG III MAF

INFO CG FIRST MARDIV

O 041515Z NOV 67

FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

TO CG III MAF

INFO CG FM PAC

COMSEVENTHFLT

CTF SEVEN NINE

CTF SEVEN SIX

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

BLT TWO SLANT THREE

BT

SECRET

OPCON BLT 2/3 (U)

1. TYPHOON EMMA HAS REQUIRED ARG BRAVO TO MAKE TYPHOON EVASION AND  
 HAS PRECLUDED BACKLOAD OF BLT 2/3 AT THIS TIME.

2. REQUEST YOU ASSUME OPCON BLT 2/3 UNTIL ORIGINATOR RETURNS DANANG  
 REQUEST CHOP BE EFFECTIVE 042300H.

3. REQUEST PASS COPY OF THIS MSG TO CO BLT TWO SLANT THREE AND

PAGE TWO RUMMAA 0435 SECRET  
 CTG 79. S-3 AT YOUR HQ.

GP-4

BT

CTG 79.5



041515Z NOV 67

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

SECRET

3



**SECRET****ACTION**

PP UUMSE  
E UUMSEA 309 3090723  
NY SSSSS

050723Z NOV 67  
FM 111 MAF COC  
TO UUMSE/PACV COC  
INFO THIRD MARDIV COC  
FMAW OPNS  
FIRST MARDIV COC  
AMERICAL DIV TOC  
BT

ADV RT COC  
COC DIST ONLY

TOR:051205  
GCN:1664

**SECRET**

OP ESSEX

A. 111 MAF COC 121545Z NOV 67

1. IN PARA 1 OF REF A AFTER THE WORD CONCEPT ADD THE FOL: "SECOND EN(-)  
REIN."

2. BDY 1ST MARDIV/AMERICAL DIV TEMPORARILY MODIFIED PERIOD 050001H TO  
142400H NOV 67 TO INCLUDE FOLLOWING PORTION OF ESSEX AO AS AN EXTENSION  
OF 1ST MARDIV AO: FROM 1ST MARDIV/AMERICAL DIVDY AT CORD AT 9843  
ON A LINE TO AT 9836 THEN ON A LINE TO AT 9436 THEN ON A LINE TO  
1ST MARDIV/AMERICAL BDY AT COORD AT 8732.

GP-4

BT 111 MAF COC

COPY NR\*\*

**2**

050723Z NOV 67

**CANCELLED.**

MAJ. Wilson

**SECRET**

SECRET

W/OCC  
HOLL

COC  
5718

NNNN VV MFL 786  
DE RUMWAA 0436 3100140  
ZNY SSSSS

0 060140Z NOV 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV

INFO RUHFFNA/CG FMFPAC  
RUHGUL/COMSEVENTH FLT  
RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
RUABQL/CTG SEVEN NINE  
RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
RUABJN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
BT

SECRET

OPCON 9LT 2/3

4. CTG 79.5 041515Z NOV67 (S) PASEP

1. REF A PASSED OPCON 9LT 2/3 EFF 042300H NOV67

2. CG III MAF ASSUMES OPCON AS REQUESTED REF A AND PASSES TO CG  
1ST MARDIV SAME TIME.

GP-4

BT


CG 111 MAF

060140Z NOV 67

TOR: 060114Z NOV 67  
1853  
ADV RT: G-3

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

SECRET



100-152 NOV 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO ZENYCO III MAP

NUMBER 17 CG THIRD MARI DIV

ZENCO FIRST PAGE

10Z/HD BN FIRST MANDIV

SEVENTH MAR

7 FEBRUARY 1961

ZEIN/ELRST/ENGR BN

20N/SEVENTH ENGR BN

TELEPHONE SEVENTH MT. BN

INFO RUM HV H' SA 1 CORPS

RUHUNY/SA DANGANG SPECIAL SECTOR

THE FIRST LAM EN

1992

~~SECRET~~

PRAG 3 150-67 ROUGH RIDER CONVOY

3. CO III ICAE/SA I CORPS 270746Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

E. CG 111 MAF 289652 OCT 57 (NOTAL)

C. CO III MAF 010516Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

DRAFTER G-3

RELEASE: G-3

CONCU G-4.1 10

COO

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1148 S E C R E T

D. AMEX F TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN 0 301-67 (NOTAL)

2. THIRD CARDIV ADMIN 0 416-67 (NOTAL)

7. FIRST MARDIV 0 102000.20 (CEOI) (NOTAL)

S. THIRD BANDIV 0 2000.2E (CEOI) (NOTAL)

1. BUES A, B, AND C ESTAB SKED FOR ROUGH RIDEN CONVOYS TO NORTHERN  
ECZ. ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROVIDES FOR COOP OF OPERATIONS  
THROUGH BUNCVG 7. SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF CG-11 MAF, FIRST MARDIV  
CONDICIS CONVOY SKED DEPART DA NANG 11 NOV FO QUANG TRI.

2. PER CG III MAF

REQUESTAB PRIORITIES IN EVENT OF CONFLY IN USE OF LOCS.

REQ CONDUCT LIAISON AND COORDINATE WITH RVN FORCES ALONG  
ROUTE AS REQ'D FOR CONVOY PASSAGE, TRAFFIC CONTROL, SECURITY AND  
SPT ARMS.

3. FOR THE MAPS:

ALL REG ASSUME OCON AND PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE WHILE CONVOY IN THIRD MAINTIV TAGE.

RE ARRANGE AIR SPT PHU BAI TO QUANG TRI, QUANG TRI TO  
DA NANG.

C. THIS HQ TO PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY ON RABLE PLATOON REIN  
MONEY FOR FAC. ENR SPT AND CONTROL AND SERVICE VEH.

64 FIRST MARLEV

COPT# PAGE 1 OF 2

10 315Z NOV 67

1ST MARDIV 2100/5 (9/67)

# SECRET

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1148 S E C R E T

D. REQ PROVIDE BILLETING AND MESSING FOR APPROX 175 PERSONNEL RON 1 AND 13NOV67. REQ STAGING AREA APPROX 50 VEHs ON 11 AND 13NOV67.

E. CHOP POINT. FIRST/THIRD MARDIV BDRY CP 14.

F. FOR FIRST MAW. REQ PROVIDE VEH AUGMENTATION IAW REF A.

G. SEVENTH ENGR BN. REQUEST PROVIDE BRIDGING AS REQUIRED.

H. EXECUTION.

A. SEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE FORCES IAW PAR 3D OF REF D AND PAR 3E ABOVE.

B. ELEVENTH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT IAW PAR 3E OF REF D.

C. FIRST ENGR BN. PROVIDE SUPPORT IAW PAR 3G REF D LESS BRIDGING SPT.

D. ELEVENTH MT BN. PROVIDE MT SPT IAW PAR 3F REF D.

E. MA HQ. INSURE POSITIVE TRAFFIC CONTROL NORTH AND SOUTH APPROACHES NAMO BRIDGE/FERRY SITE BEGINNING 110300H. COORDINATE TRAFFIC CONTROL WITH VN POLICE.

F. COORD INST

(1) REF D AND E AS APPLICABLE

(2) D-DAY H-HOUR

(A) DANANG TO PHU BAI DEPART CP 33N 1000 ON 11NOV67.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1148 S E C R E T

RON PHU BAI.

(B) DEPART PHU BAI 12NOV67 WHEN DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV RON QUANG TRI.

(C) DEPART QUANG TRI 13NOV67 WHEN DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV RON PHU BAI.

(D) DEPART PHU BAI 14NOV67 WHEN DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV.

(3) ALL SPT DANANG TO PHU BAI ARRANGED BY THIS HQTRS.

(4) ALL RADIO NETS WILL BE CHECKED PRIOR TO CONVOY DEPARTURE.

(5) ALL PERSONNEL CARRY MESS GEAR AND GAS MASKS.

(6) ALL VEHs WILL HAVE AT LEAST TWO PERS ABOARD.

(7) DIRLAUTH ALCON

I. COM-ELECTM



A. REF A AND G.

B. SEVENTH MAR MONITOR THIRD MARDIV CONVOY CONTROL NET MK432 BEGINNING 110000 NOV 67.

(END)

PAGE 2 OF 2

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PP RUMFV RUMFV RUAUEN  
 IE RUMFV 1238 3150145  
 ZNY 90555

P 110152Z NOV 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO ZEN/CG III MAF

THIRD MARDIV

INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MAF

RUMFV/CG SEVEN SIX

RUAUEN/CG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUAUEN/CG SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE

ZEN SEVENTH MAR

ZEN ELEVENTH MAR

ZEN FIRST RECON BN

BT

**SECRET**

BOUNDARY CHANGE

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 101231Z NOV 67 (NOTAL)

1. CONCUR IN THE REQ CONTAINED REF A FOR TEMPORARY BOUNDARY CHANGE BETWEEN FIRST MARDIV/THIRD MARDIV EFF 120600H TO 282400H NOV 67.

2. NEW BOUNDARY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: FROM ZD140094 SOUTH ALONG N-S GRIDLINE 14 TO ZD140011 THENCE EAST ALONG ROUTE ONE TO ZD154011 THENCE SOUTH ALONG EAST BANK SONG BU LOT TO ZC160971 THENCE SOUTH

PAGE TWO RUMFV 1238 **SECRET**  
 ALONG N-S GRIDLINE 15 TO ZC160900.

OP-1

BT

CG 791 MAR DIV


110145Z NOV 67

FLSG-"B" 2100/2 (4-66)

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

N	01C
7/11/67	101C
H	

**ACTION**

COC

VV LIAOIMMZVA 345VV 981VV FCC145  
 00 RUMHLA  
 DE RUMF-R 450 3161007  
 ZNY SSSSS

0 120713Z NOV 67  
 FM 1st MAF COC  
 TO RUMHVP/CTHIRD MARDIV COC  
 RUMHLA/FIRST MARDIV COC  
 RUMEUG/CTG SEVEN NINE TW FIVE

ADV RT COC  
 COC

TOR:121115  
 CCNL4250

BT

**SECRET**

Support FOR BLT 2/3

A. 1st MAF COC 111613Z NOV67

B. CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE 111241Z NOV67

1. FOR THIRD MARDIV AND CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE DISREGARD PAR 2  
 REF A. FOUR SCOUT DOG TEAMS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO BLT 2/3 AT  
 PHU HAI TO BE RETAINED BY THAT UNIT.

2. FOR FIRST MARDIV. REF B YOURS FOR ACTION RELATING TO  
 BIRNYSKING SIX INTERPRETERS TO BLT 2/3 FROM DIVISION ASSETS.

3. DERLAUTAL CON.

GP-4

75

111 MAF

120713Z NOV 67 COPY HQ

3

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

122

Br

OO RUA BQL RUAUBJN RUMFUV RUMHFL RUMHVN RUMHVP RUMNGR  
DE RUMHL 1413 316052Z  
ZNY SSSSS

TO 120333Z NOV 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN  
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN  
ZEN/FIRST SP BN  
ZEN/FIRST MED BN

DRAFTER: G-3  
RELEASER: C/S  
CONCUR: G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, A10

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMHFL/CG FLC  
RUA BQL/CTG SEVEN NINE  
RUMFUV/CTG SEVEN SIX  
RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE  
RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN SIX POINT FIVE  
RUMHVN/SA I CORPS ADV GROUP  
RUMHVN/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE  
RUMNGR/COG FIFTH SPECIAL FORCES GP

BT

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1413 SECRET  
SECRET

FRAG 0 151-67 (OP FOSTER/BADGER HUNT)

A. III MAF CCC 110907Z NOV 67

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 120402Z NOV 67  
TASK ORGAN

SEVENTH MAR (-) REIN

3D BN (-), 7TH MAR

ELT 2/3 (SELECTED ELEMENTS) AFTER CHOP

DET FIRST RECON BN

1. SITUATION

A. EN FORCES. CURRENT INTENSIMS AND PERINTREPS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) CTG 76.5 CONDUCTS AMPH OPS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTAB  
THE LANDING FORCE (ELT 2/3) OF CTG 79.5 ASHORE WITHIN DESIGNATED  
AOA. ONCE ESTABLISHED, OPCON ELT 2/3 WILL BE PASSED TO CG III MAF  
THENCE TO CG FIRST MARDIV.

(2) FIRST MAW PROVIDES CAS AND HELO SUPPORT.

C. ATTACHMENTS. SEE TASK ORGAN.

2. MISSION. COMMENCING 13 NOV, SEVENTH MAR (-) REIN IN COORDINATION  
WITH CTG 76.5/79.5 CONDUCTS HELIBORNE ASLT WITHIN DESIGNATED AO FOL-

CG FIRST MARDIV

--PAGE 1 OF 2-- 120933Z NOV 67 COPY#

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMMLA 1410 SECRET  
 OWNED BY S&D OPS TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN FORCES, SUPPLIES AND  
 FACILITIES LOCATED THEREIN.

## 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. INITIAL HELICOPTER ARTY WILL BE CONDUCTED BY  
 CTG 73.5/79.5 INTO WESTERN PORTION OF AOA. AMPH OP3 AREA WILL BE  
 DISSOLVED UPON ESTAB OF LANDING FORCE ASHORE. SUBSEQUENTLY, 7TH  
 MAR WILL CONDUCT HELICOPTER ARTY INTO EASTERN PORTION OF AOA. OPERA-  
 TIONS WILL EMPHASIZE MOBILITY WITH HELIBORNE REACTION FORCES  
 RESPONDING AS REQ BY ENEMY SIT.

B. 7TH MARINES. ASSURE OPCOM RT 243 WHEN DIRECTED. CONDUCT  
 OPERATIONS WITHIN AOA TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY THE ENEMY.

C. 11TH MAR. PROVIDE ARTY SPT AS REQUIRED.

D. FIRST RECON BN. PROVIDE RECON AS DIRECTED.

E. FIRST ENGR BN. PROVIDE ENGR AUGMENTATION AS REQUIRED.

F. FIRST SP BN. PROVIDE MNT AUGMENTATION AS REQUIRED.

G. FIRST MED BN. PROVIDE MEDICAL/SURGICAL AUGMENTATION AS  
 REQUIRED.

## H. COORD INET

(1) AREA OF OPERATIONS. BOUNDED ON WEST BY N-3 GRIDLINE  
 22, ON NORTH BY E-W GRIDLINE 63 TO AT902650 TO AT907630 TO AT902620

PAGE FOUR RUMMLA 1415 SECRET  
 THENCE SOUTH ALONG WEST BANK OF SONG LA TNC TO AT984600 THENCE  
 SOUTH ALONG WEST BANK OF STREAM TO SONG LA TNC THENCE SOUTH  
 ALONG NORTH BANK OF SONG LA TNC TO AT902410 TO  
 GRIDLINE 23. AOA TO BE ANNOUNCED BY CTG SEVEN SIX POINT FIVE.

(2) ESTIMATED DURATION 10-15 DAYS.

(3) L-1011 AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE FOLLOWING ESTAB OF  
 LANDING FORCE IN AOA. TO BE ANNOUNCED BY CTG 76.2 AND CO TO THE BAR  
 RESPECTIVELY.

(4) D-DAY IS 0700 67.

CT-4

-PAGE 2 OF 2-



BT

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**SECRET**



NNNNVV LAAR3027A 7060V FM 1234567890  
P- RUMHLA  
DE RUMFUAG 256 3161507  
ZNY SSSSS

MED 030V MAG 100

2310

P 121452Z NOV 67  
FM CTG SEVEN NINE DT FIVE  
TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TOR: 122310Z NOV 67  
CON: 4402  
ADV RT: G-4

INFO RUMHMF/CG VII MAF  
MMSB/CG NINTH MAB

BT

**SECRET**

BLT ROTATION (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 120550Z NOV 67 (NOTAL)

B. FMFACO 001300.13A

1. FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED IN REPLY REF A.

BLT 2/3

2D BN (REIN) 3D MAR

DET, HQ CO, 3D MAR (RADIO RELAY)

DET, HQ BN, 3D MAR DIV (POSTAL, DISBURSING, PHOTO)

BTRY B, 1ST BN 12TH MAR

3D PLT (REIN), CO B 1ST AMTRAC BN

2D PLT (REIN), CO A 3D AT BN

1ST PLT (REIN), CO A 3D ENGR BN

2D PLT, CO B, 3D RECON BN

PAGE TWO RUMFUAG 256 **SECRET**

1ST PLT (7) (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN

1ST PLT (REIN), CO C 3D MT BN

2D PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D TANK BN

2D CLEARING PLT (REIN), CO B, 3D MED BN

DET, LSU, FOR LOG CMD

2. FOLLOWING UNITS DESIGNATED BY REF B NOT TASK ORGANIZED IN BLT 2/3

107MM MORTAR BTRY

FORCE RECON PLT

3. FOLLOWING UNITS DESIGNATED BY REF B WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO SELF/BLT 2/3 FROM NINTH MAB ASSETS AND WILL NOT ROTATE WITH 2/3.

MRC 62 RADIO RELAY DET

DET DENTAL CO

GP-4

BT


CTG 79.5

121452Z NOV 67

**SECRET**

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10 H

**SECRET**

MFL302PTT SZ YUW RUMWAA 1233 3120542-SSSS7-RUABQL RUABSR RUHHFMA

RUMEUAG.  
ZNY SSSSS

P 130542Z NOV 67

FM CG III MAF

TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV

INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUBQL/CG NINTH MAB

ZEN/CG FORLOGCMD

RUABSR/THIRD FOR SERVREGT

RUMEUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

BT

**SECRET**

BLT ROTATION

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 081425 NOV 67 (S)

B. CG FMFPAC 102126 NOV 67 (S)

1. RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN PARA 2 OF REFERENCE A ARE APPROVED

2. REF B RELATES.

GP-4

BT

CG III MAF

ADV RT DSO  
DSO

TOR:130718

CCN:4516

130542Z NOV 67 COPY NR\*


**SECRET**

**SECRET**

TO: BRIEF O & SSGT HAYNES  
 1. BRIEF THIS AND PLOT PRIOR TO BRIEFING ON  
 15 NOV.

P.A.W.

122  
 M



PP DXIU  
 DE K-167 31705500  
 ZNY SSSSS

F 130550Z NOV 67  
 FM FIFTH MARINES  
 TO THIRD BN, FIRST MARINES  
 THIRD BN, FIFTH MARINES

INFO CG, FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 SECOND BN, ELEVENTH MARINES  
 FIRST BN, FIFTH MARINES  
 BT

**S E C R E T**

CHANGE OF TAOR BOUNDARY

1. TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE FLEXIBILITY FOR TU CAU  
 BRIDGE TAOR OF THIRD BN, FIRST MARINES IS EXTENDED AS FOLLOWS:  
 SOUTH ON ROUTE NR ONE COORDS BT034639 EAST TO BT047639 NORTH  
 BT048645.

2. EFFECTIVE DATE OF CHANGE 150630H NOV 1967.


GP-4

BT

FIFTH MARINES

130550Z NOV 67 COPY#

**SECRET**

**SECRET**122  
OK

P RUABQL RUMUAG RUMHFL  
DE RUMHLA 1492 317071Z  
ZNY SSSSS

P 130712Z NOV 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/CG III MAF

DRAFTER: G-3

PLEASE: COMMANDING GENERAL  
CONCUR: G-3, C/S

INFO RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB  
RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSR  
RUMUAG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
RUMUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/FIFTH MAR  
ZEN/THIRD BN FIRST MAR  
BT

**SECRET**

BLT 3/1 TASK ORGANIZATION FOR BLT ROTATION (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 060441Z APR 67

B. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 280159Z OCT 67

C. FMFPAC 0 001300.13A

1. PAR 4 REF A AUTHORIZED DELETION OF 107MM/4/2 IN BTRY FOR SLF  
BRAVO.

2. ACCORDINGLY BLT 2/3 DOES NOT CONTAIN SUCH A BTRY. IT IS  
THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT BLT 3/1 BE AUTHORIZED TO DEPLOY TO SLF

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1492 **SECRET**  
WITHOUT 107MM MORTAR BTRY, SECOND BN, ELEVENTH MAR, AS SPECIFIED  
IN REFS B AND C.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV

130712Z NOV 67


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**SECRET**

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CC  
COL

WV MFL3090TT CZ YUW RUMMWAA 1249 3170808-CCCC--RUMEUAG.  
ZNY CCCCC

0 130808Z NOV 67  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMEUAG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV

ADV RT G-3 & COC

G-3

TOR: 130935Z  
CCN: 4555

BT  
CONFIDENTIAL  
BADGER HUNT

1. FOR CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE: RQST CHOP OPCON BADGER HUNT LANDING FORCE EARLIEST TO INSURE MAX COORD OPNS ASHORE.
2. FOR CG FIRST MARDIV: OPCON LANDING FORCE PASSED TO CG FIRST MARDIV EFFECTIVE AS OF CHOP TO CG III MAF.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF

130808Z NOV 67

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

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FIRST MARDIV COC

III MAF COC

3/JCS/ldh  
SHORT

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SECRET

SECRET

OPERATION EMBEX

A. III MAF COC 140631Z NOV 67

1. IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING IS A DETAILED SYNOPSIS OF THE ACTION COMPANIES MIKE AND HOTEL ENGAGED IN DURING THE PERIOD 081800H TO 092000H NOV AND WHICH MAY PROVIDE MORE MEANINGFUL INFORMATION TO THE QUESTIONS POSED REF A AND ANSWERED IN PARA 2 THIS MSG.

A. ENEMY CONTACT WA. SPORATIC IN THE MOVEMENT OF M/2/5 TOWARDS OBJECTIVE X-RAY (AT906368). AT 081705H CO M ESTABLISHED SOLID CONTACT WITH AN ENEMY FORCE OF UNKNOWN SIZE - RECEIVING SMALL ARMS, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND 60MM MORTAR FIRE. M/2/5 RETURNED SMALL ARMS, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND 81MM MORTAR FIRE. ENEMY BROKE CONTACT AND WITHDREW TO THE SOUTH - PURSUED BY COMPANY M.

AT 081800 COMPANY M RECEIVED A HEAVY VOLUME OF SMALL ARMS, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND MORTAR FIRE FROM OBJECTIVE X-RAY, A HIGHLY FORTIFIED VILLAGE AT AT905368.

ARTILLERY MISSIONS WERE CALLED AND 182 ROUNDS OF 155MM AND 8 INCH HE WERE FIRED INTO THE ENEMY POSITION. THREE FLIGHTS OF FIXED WING ALSO JOINED IN THE ATTACK ON THE TARGET AREA.

FIRST PAGE OF FIVE PAGES

154245

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COMPANY M ASSAULTED THE VILLAGE BUT BECAME DISORGANIZED AFTER RECEIVING A LARGE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, INCLUDING TWO OF THE RIFLE PLATOON LEADERS.

AFTER LOSING THE MOMENTUM OF THE ATTACK, ARTILLERY FIRES WERE PLOTTED AND FIRED AROUND THE COMPANY POSITION.

COMPANY H LOCATED AT AT910367 WAS ORDERED TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COMPANY M AND COMMENCED THEIR MOVE AT 082310H. THE SITUATION AT COMPANY M'S POSITION WAS CONFUSING AS THE COMPANY COMMANDER COULD NOT GIVE A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE ACTION AND FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME DID NOT COMMUNICATE WITH THE BATTALION. COMPANY H LINKED UP WITH COMPANY M AT APPROXIMATELY 090331H.

COMPANY H REMAINED AT COMPANY M'S POSITION, ASSISTING IN THE REORGANIZATION OF THE COMPANY AND IN LOCATING AND EVACUATING CASUALTIES. COMPANY D WAS DEPLOYED TO THE GENERAL VICINITY OF OBJECTIVE X-RAY AT FIRST LIGHT 9 NOV.

ARTILLERY FIRES AND AIR STRIKES WERE CONDUCTED ON OBJECTIVE X-RAY AS SOON AS THE SITUATION OF COMPANY M WAS CLARIFIED AND WAS FOLLOWED BY COMPANY D MOVING INTO THE ATTACK. COMPANY D OCCUPIED THE OBJECTIVE AGAINST LIGHT RESISTANCE AS THE ENEMY HAD WITHDRAWN DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS. ENEMY CASUALTIES WERE LISTED AS

SECOND PAGE OF FIVE PAGES

SECRET

6 KIA (C) AND 47 KIA (P) AND MAY HAVE BEEN HIGHER AS THERE WERE DRAG MARKS, BLOODED BANDAGES, BLOOD POOLS AND BODY PARTS IN PROFUSION. NO FURTHER CONTACT WAS MADE WITH ENEMY FORCES IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA ON 9 OR 10 NOV. COMPANY D CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE SEARCH OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA ON 9 AND 10 OCT UNCOVERING 3 ADDITIONAL ENEMY GRAVES.

2. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY REF A.

QUESTION 1 COMPANY H ARRIVED AT COMPANY M'S POSITION AT 090331H AT WHICH TIME ONLY LIGHT SPORATIC FIRE WAS BEING RECEIVED INTO THE COMPANY POSITION. COMPANY H ASSISTED IN THE REORGANIZATION OF COMPANY M AND IN LOCATING AND EVACUATING CASUALTIES. ARTILLERY FIRES WERE CALLED ON OBJECTIVE X-RAY AND APPROACHES WHICH COULD BE USED BY ENEMY FORCES AS ROUTES OF EGRESS. IT APPEARED AT THE TIME DUE TO THE LACK OF ENEMY FIRE THAT THE ENEMY WAS ATTEMPTING TO WITHDRAW UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS. THIS WAS LATER BORNE OUT WHEN OBJECTIVE X-RAY WAS ATTACKED BY COMPANY D THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

~~QUESTION 2~~  
THIRD PAGE OF FIVE PAGES



SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

QUESTION 2. THE ACTION COMPANY M ENGAGED IN ON 8 NOV HAD TERMINATED BY THE TIME COMPANY H CAME TO THEIR ASSISTANCE AT APPROXIMATELY 090331H. CONTACT HAD BEEN BROKEN BY THE ENEMY'S WITHDRAWAL FROM OBJECTIVE X-RAY AND COMPANY D ENCOUNTERED NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY RESISTANCE DURING THEIR EARLY MORNING ATTACK AGAINST THE OBJECTIVE. THE REMAINDER OF 9 NOV WAS SPENT SEARCHING THE OBJECTIVE AREA, REORGANIZING COMPANY M AND ATTEMPTING TO REGAIN THE CONTACT LOST THE PREVIOUS NIGHT.  
ATTACK WAS LOST.

QUESTION 3 YES. TWO WELL FORTIFIED, RECENTLY OCCUPIED VILLAGES HAD BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN THE ATTACK TOWARD OBJECTIVE X-RAY, HOWEVER, NO ENEMY WERE ENCOUNTERED IN EITHER OF <sup>THESE</sup> THE FIRST TWO VILLAGES CHECKED BY M CO.

QUESTION 4 COMPANY D MOVED TO COMPANY M'S POSITION AT FIRST LIGHT 9 NOV. COMPANY G SUPPORTED COMPANY M AND COMPANY H BY DEPLOYING TO POSITIONS ON COMMANDING TERRAIN APPROXIMATELY 300 METERS TO THE EAST OF OBJECTIVE X-RAY, AT FIRST LIGHT ON 9 NOV.

QUESTION 5 NO.

QUESTION 6 BY SMALL ARMS AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. A SMALLER

FOURTH PAGE OF FIVE PAGES

SECRET


PROPORTION WAS INFLICTED BY ENEMY MORTARS.

QUESTION 7 NO. THE ENEMY CONDUCTED AN EXCELLENT POLICE OF THE BATTLEFIELD AND NO POW'S, DOCUMENTS OR EQUIPMENT OF IMPORTANCE WERE CAPTURED DURING THIS PARTICULAR ACTION. EVIDENCES OF ENEMY OCCUPATION OF THIS POSITION WERE NUMEROUS BUT OF NO SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE VALUE.

GP-4

BT

FINAL PAGE OF FIVE PAGES



*COC*

<i>W</i>	<i>OIC</i>
<i>H</i>	<i>ADIC</i>
	<i>CC</i>

1778 313133Z

UNCLAS

151332Z NOV 67

FIRST MARDIV REIN  
FIFTH MAR

THIRD BN FIFTH MAR

THIRD BN FIRST MAR

FIRST MED BN

1ST RECON BN

1ST RECON BN

RE

UNCLAS E F T O

VISIT OF SENATOR HOWARD W CANNON TO FIRST MARDIV  
SEN HOWARD W CANNON, DEMOCRAT-NEVADA, WILL VISIT  
FIRST MARDIV 16 NOV 67 1530-1745, IAW FOL ITINERARY:

ALL FAIR WEATHER

1530-1545

1545-1555

1555-1605

1605-1615

1615-1630

1630-1645

1645-1655

EVENT

REMARKS

PICKUP AT III

MAF

ENR HILLTOP

ENR CONF RM

BY HELLO

BY VEH

PAGE TWO HUMLA 1778 UNCLAS E F T O

1555-1605

1605-1615

1615-1630

1630-1645

1645-1655

1655-1705

1705-1715

1715-1725

1725-1735

1735-1745

1745-1755

1755-1805

1805-1815

1815-1830

1830-1845

1845-1855

1855-1905

1905-1915

1915-1930

1930-1945

1945-1955

1955-2005

2005-2015

2015-2030

2030-2045

2045-2055

2055-2105

2105-2115

2115-2130

BRIEF

ENR HILLTOP

ENR 5TH MAR

VISIT 5TH MAR

ENR 3/5

VISIT 3/5

ENR 3/1

VISIT 3/1

ENR III MAF

ENR III MAF

ENR III MAF

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ENR III MAF

G-2, G-3 MEET CONSTITUENTS

BY VEH

BY HELLO

MEET CONSTITUENTS

BY HELLO

MEET CONSTITUENTS

BY HELLO

MEET CONSTITUENTS

BY HELLO

BY HELLO

BY HELLO

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1000-1015

PAGE 1 OF 2-

151330Z NOV 67

PAGE THREE RUMBLA 1778 UNCLAS E F T O

1650-1730 1ST RECON BN  
ENR 1ST MED BN BY VEH  
1730-1745 VISIT 1ST MED  
BN

1745-1755 ENR III MAF BY HELICOPTER  
2. ACTING CG WILL ACCOMPANY OFFICIAL PARTY. COMPOSITION  
OF PARTY:

SEN CANNON  
COL H V HUFSTATTER, USMC, III MAF ESCORT OFFICER  
COMDR RAY WEST, USN, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS  
LT ROY HUGHES, USN, MACV PROTOCOL  
3. COMMANDING OFFICERS OF UNITS TO BE VISITED IAW FAIR  
WEATHER ITINERARY PROVIDE SUITABLE AREA FOR SEN CANNON  
TO MEET WITH CONSTITUENTS AND BE PHOTOGRAPHED. REQUEST  
EACH CONSTITUENT HAVE AVAIL FOR INFO IN WRITING PRIOR TO  
VISIT:  
A. FULL NAME, RANK, SERNO, UNIT, FPO  
B. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN, HOME ADDRESS, TELEPHONE NUMBER  
C. ALL REF TO SEN CANNON'S VISIT ITINERARY WILL BE BY CALL-  
"HOLD NUMBER".

PAGE FOUR RUMBLA 1778 UNCLAS E F T O  
2. PROJECT OFFICER MAJ F. J. LENNARTZ (FIRST MARDAY)  
1745-1755  
17  
-PAGE 2 OF 2-

FIRST MARDIV COC

FIRST MAW COC

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F 000

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R.C. Opg

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BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL

## BOUNDARY CHANGE

A. FMAW COC 150715Z NOV 67

1. 2/5 TAOR: FM (BT 013440) NORTH TO (BT 014450) TO (BT 014460) TO (BT 012470) TO (BT 008490), THENCE WEST ALONG EW GL 49 TO (AT 864490), THENCE SOUTHWEST ALONG SONG TINH YEN TO (AT 843446) TO (AT 820420) TO (AT 813410) TO (AT 810390) TO (AT 810380) TO (AT 812370) TO (AT 818360) TO (AT 830350) TO (AT 880340) TO (AT 930340) TO (AT 946347), THENCE NORTH ALONG DUC DUC BOUNDARY LINE TO (AT 975400) TO (AT 993920) TO (BT 000427), THENCE NE ALONG DUY XUYEN BOUNDARY TO STARTING PT.


2. NEW CP AREA CP FOSTER: AREA BOUNDED BY NS GL 20-20, ON N BY EW GL 65 TO (AT 902650) TO (AT 947630) TO (AT 998689),  
 WEST BANK OF SONG VO GIA TO 987635 THENCE ALONG  
 THENCE S ALONG W BANK OF STREAM TO (AT 975612), THENCE ALONG W BANK OF STREAM TO (AT 974563), THENCE ALONG W/S BANK OF SONG KY LAM TO (AT 995544) TO (BT 008490), THENCE ALONG EW GL 49 TO (AT 863490) THENCE ALONG W BANK OF SONG TINH YEN TO (AT 842446) TO (AT 813410) THENCE WEST ALONG EW GL 41.

151855Z

17

**SECRET**

✓	OIL
	AOIL
A	



PO RUMVVO  
DE RUMFLA 1843 3222747  
ZNY 93385

P 160747Z NOV 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV RE IN  
TO RUMVVO/FIRST MAR  
INFO ZEN/FIRST TANK BN

DRAFTER: G-5  
RELEASER: G-3

*COL*

BT  
SECRET

A. FIRST MAR 120631Z NOV 67  
1. APPROVAL FOR CO A (-) REIN FIRST TANK BN TO BE ATTACHED  
TO FIRST MAR IS CONTINGENT UPON FUTURE PLANNED OPERATIONAL  
COMMITMENTS OF THIS DIVISION AND WILL BE DELAYED FOR  
THE PRESENT.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV

160747Z NOV 67 COPY#

*17*  
*18*

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

THIRD MARDIV COC

III MAF COC

3:JCS:kgb  
SHORT

CO

0-4  
Embark  
C/S

THIRD MARDIV COC  
CTF SEVEN SIX  
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

000

000

SECRET

SECRET

ELT ROTATION

A. III MAF COC 160025Z NOV67

1. CONCUR IN NO NECESSITY TO BACKLOAD 2/3.
2. EMBARKATION OF 3/1 REQUIRES PRIOR RELIEF IN TAOR BY 2/3. 2/3 PRESENTLY FULLY COMMITTED TO OPERATION FOSTER WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO CONTINUE UNTIL 30 NOVEMBER AT III MAF DIRECTION. A MINIMUM OF 3 DAYS FOR TACTICAL RELIEF AND TURN OVER IS INDICATED. CONSEQUENTALLY RECOMMEND COMMENCEMENT EMBARKATION OF 3/1 ON 3 DEC AS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED OR TERMINATION OF FOSTER NLT 27 NOV.

GP-4


BT

~~161105~~

~~1863~~

19

DECLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

W	OIC
MAJ	ADJL
H	

COC

CG RUMHAW RUMHFL RUMHIC RUMHVN  
 DE RUMHWA 1688 3201555

ZNY SSSES

O 161555Z NOV 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAR

RUMHFL/CG FLC

RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV

RUMHVN/DA I CORPS ADV GROUP

RUMHVN/ST QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

ZEN/FIFTH MAR

ZEN/SEVENTH MAR

ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR

ZEN/FIRST RECON BN

ZEN/FIRST SP BN

ZEN/THIRD AMTMC BN

ZEN/FIRST MSB BN

ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN

BT

SECRET

TERMINATE OPERATION ESSEX 170800N.

GP-4

BT

DRAFTER:G-3  
 RELEASER:G-3

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN.

161555Z

NOV 67

39<sup>20</sup>**SECRET**



DECLASSIFIED

ZNY EEEEE

FM 171405Z NOV 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
TO ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MARINES  
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN

INFO ZEN/FIFTH MARINES  
ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES  
ZEN/HQ BN FIRST MARDIV  
RUMUAG/SECOND BN THIRD MARINES

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

VISIT OF RADM WILLIAM W BEHRENS, JR. TO FIRST MARDIV  
1. RADM BEHRENS, USN, COMPHIBRGU 1 DESIGNATE, WILL VISIT  
FIRST MARDIV 18 NOV 67, 1500-1725, IAW FOL ITENERARY:

A. FAIR WEATHER

DATE/TIME	EVENT
1500	PICKUP AT 1STMAW
1500-1515	ENR CONF RM
1515-1550	BRIEF
1550-1555	ENR HILLTOP

DRAFTED: PROTOCOL  
RELEASES: C/S

CO

W	OIL
W	ADIL
A	

REMARKS

BY VEH  
G-2, G-3, G-4  
BY VEH



PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1983 UNCLAS E F T O

1555-1615	ENR AN HOA
1615-1705	VISIT 2/3
1705-1725	ENR III MAF

B. FOUL WEATHER

DATE/TIME	EVENT
1500	PICKUP AT 1ST MAW
1500-1515	ENR CONF RM
1515-1550	BRIEF
1550-1555	ENR 1ST RECONBN
1555-1640	BRIEF/VISIT 1ST RECONBN
1640-1645	ENR IITHMAR
1645-1715	BRIEF/VISIT IITHMAR
1715-1725	ENR III MAF

BY HELO

BY HELO

REMARKS

BY VEH  
G-2, G-3, G-5  
BY VEH

BY VEH

BY HELO

2. ACTING CG WILL ACCOMPANY OFFICIAL PARTY. COMPOSITION  
OF PARTY:

RADM BEHRENS

LCDR G H HENDRICKS, III MAF ESCORT

3. COMMANDING OFFICER, SECOND BN, FIFTH MARINES IS  
REQUESTED TO HOST THE VISIT TO AN HOA, PREPARED TO IN-  
CLUDE UNITS LOCATED AT AN HOA PARTICIPATING IN OPERA-

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1983 UNCLAS E F T O

TION FOSTER, AND THE DUC DUC REFUGEE CENTER.

4. PROJECT OFFICER MAJ F J LENNARTZ (FIRST MARDIV  
138 OR 105).

BT

CG 1ST MAR DIV

171405Z NOV 67

21

DECLASSIFIED



**SECRET**

W/OIC  
H/AOIC

COC

BT KIGT  
DE GYZA ZNS 3260743  
-I- CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
ZNY SSSSS

F 220843Z NOV 67  
FM THIRD BN FIRST MARINES  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
REQ REL  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO CG FOR LOGCOMD  
INFO THIRD BN FIRST MARINES

G-3 221905Z NOV 67  
CCN 8481  
ADV RT G-3

SECRET  
LSU BLT 3/1

1. YR MSG 191224Z NOV 67

1. REF A STATED LSU TO BE CARRIED ON ROLLS HAS BN FLC UNTIL CHOPPED TO 9TH COMDR ON OR ABOUT 3DEC67.
2. REQUEST THAT LSU BLT 3/1 BENTRANS TO CG THIRD BN EFFECTIVE

2-NOV67.

REQ SR PR REVDOR BE FURNISH BLT 3/1 FOR TIMELY ADMIN PROCESS/REPORTING BEFORE EMBARK DATE.

3. BLT 3/1 UNABLE TO SUBMIT REQUIRED RPTS TO CG 9TH MAB DUE CTO NON AVAILABILITY OF LSU PERSONNEL RECORDS.

CP-4

BT

THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES

220843Z NOV 67

**SECRET**

PP RUMHVH  
DE RUMHLA 2488 3260901  
ZNY EEEEE

P 220901Z NOV 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO ZEN/FIRST BN SEVENTH MARINES

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES

ZEN/HQ BN

RUMHVH/SENIOR PROVINCE ADVISOR, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
BT

UNCLAS E F T O

VISIT OF SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER TO FIRST MARDIV

1. SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER, REPUBLICAN-TEXAS, WILL VISIT FIRST MARDIV  
24NOV67, 1130-1445 IAW FOL ITINERARY:

DATE/TIME	EVENT	REMARKS
24 NOV 67		
1130	ARR HILLTOP	
1130-1135	ENR CONF RM	BY VEH
1135-1200	BRIEF	G-3, G-5
1200-1210	VISIT WITH CONSTITUENTS	
1210-1215	ENR ACTING CG'S QUARTERS	BY VEH
1215-1220	PREPARE FOR LUNCH ACTING CG'S QUARTERS	

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2488 UNCLAS E F T O

1220-1305

LUNCHEON

ACTIONCG'S MESS

1305-1315

ENR 1/7

BY HELO

1315-1340

BRIEF/VISIT 1/7

1340-1345

ENR TUY LOAN

BY HELO

1345-1445

VISIT TUY LOAN

RD TEAM 15; BRIEF

BY CORDS REP

1445

DEP TUY LOAN FOR

BY HELO

THIRD MARDIV

2. ACTING CG AND MR. PUCKETT OF CORDS WILL ACCOMPANY KOFFICIAL  
PARTY. COMPOSITION OF PARTY:

SEN. TOWER

COL JOHN O. MCFALLS, USAF, DEPT OF THE AF

COL D. L. FAW, USMC, III MAF ESCORT

MAJ GLENN W. POHLY, USA, MACV ESCORT

3. ALL REF TO SEN TOWER'S VISIT WILL BE BY CALLWORD "SIDE SADDLE".

4. PROJECT OFFICER MAJ F.J. LENNARTZ (FIRST MARDIV 138 OR 105).

BT


CG FIRST MARDIV

220901Z NOV 67

WO - In case you get a  
call asking for SIDE SADDLE  
You'll know what it's about.

P.A.W.

24

**SECRET**

W	OIL
W	ADIL
H	

RP RUMHFL RUMHIE RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHLA 2634 327100Z  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 RUMHIE 1 FIRST MDSR CO  
 P 231002Z NOV 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHFL/CG FLC  
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OFCON  
 BT

DRAFTER CG  
 RELEASER CG  
 CONCUR G-2 G-4 G-5 AIRO G-3 C/S

**SECRET**

PLANNED OPERATIONS DEC 1967

A. CG III MAF 090628Z SEP67 (NOTAL)

B. CG III MAF 140632Z OCT67 (NOTAL)

1. IAW PARA 10C REF A &amp; B THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED:

A. OP FULTON

(1) RECENT INTEL HAS INDICATED EN BUILDUP AND CONSTRUCTION OF FORTIFICATIONS ON BARRIER ISLAND SOUTH OF HOI AN POSING THREAT TO PROVINCE CAPITAL. ADDITIONALLY VISUAL RECON SIGHTINGS OF EN FORCES RETURNING TO ANTENNA VALLEY INDICATE DESIRABILITY OF CONDUCTING OPS IN THIS AREA. OP FULTON IS PLANNED FOR LATTER PART OF DEC BUT IS CONTINGENT UPON SLF PARTICIPATION.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2634 **SECRET**

(2) RECOMMENDED AOA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG BA REN, SONG THU BON AND SONG CAU DAI ON WEST BY RTE ONE ON SOUTH FROM BT219375 TO BT273423 AND ON EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA.

(3) TASK ORGAN. ONE SLF BLT.

(4) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. SLF BLT WILL CONDUCT AMPH ASLT IN AOA FOLLOWED BY SEARCH AND DESTROY OPS WITHIN AREA. SUBSEQUENTLY SELECTED ELEMENTS FROM BLT WILL CONDUCT S&D OPS IN ANTENNA VALLEY WITH AN AO BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GRIDLINE 43 FROM AT860430 TO AT978430 THENCE SOUTH ALONG THE QUAN DUC DUC AND QUAN QUE SON DISTRICT BOUNDARIES TO AT950350 TO AT940343 TO AT 912342 TO AT897340 TO AT886338 TO AT860344 THENCE NORTH TO AT860430.

(5) DURATION: 10-12 DAYS.

(6) TENTATIVE D-DAY: 19DEC67.

B. OPERATION BALLARD

(1) AO: AREA BOUNDED BY ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE ZC11, ON NORTH BY E-W GRIDLINE 88, ON EAST BY N-S GRIDLINE AT90 AND ON SOUTH BY E-W GRIDLINE 82.

(2) TASK ORGAN. SECOND BN SEVENTH MAR. COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AS REQ.

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 231002Z NOV 67 PAGE 1 OF 2

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2/34 S E C R E T

(3) CONCEPT OF OP. OP BALLARD IS PLANNED AS A SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION UTILIZING HELIBORNE FORCES FOR INITIAL ASLT. IV WILL CONDUCT DELIBERATE SEARCH FOR EN ROCKET FORCES INDICATED IN V C OF WESTERN PORTION OF AO.

(4) DURATION 8-12 DAYS.

(5) TENTATIVE D-DAY: 1 DEC 67.

(6) PEAK HCPTER REQ: LIFT MIN 120 TROOPS FIRST WAVE.

C. FIFTH MAR PLANS UNNAMED OPS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) FOUR ONE CO (REIN) THREE PASE S AND D OPS IN TAOR.

THREE PHASES CONSIST OF ISOLATION OF DESIGNATED AREA, SEGREGATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN COORD WITH GVN FORCES AND DETAILED DELIBERATE SEARCH FOR EN FORCES, SUPPLIES, INSTALLATIONS.

(2) TWELVE ONE PLAT (REIN) QUICK REACTION OPS. ON DATES WHEN ARE AVAILABLE, PLAT REACTS TO EN VR SIGHTINGS BY AIRBORNE AND GROUP WHICH DIRECTS ATK FROM OBSERVATION HELO.

D. SEVENTH MAR PLANS TWO UNNAMED OPS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) TWO CO'S MINUS UNDER OPCON 1/7 S AND D IN AO BOUNDED BY PLS AT 8871, 8862, 8862, 8869, TO BE CONDUCTED DATE TO BE DESIGNATED EARLY DEC.

(2) TWO CO'S UNDER OPCON 3/7 S AND D IN AO STARTING FROM

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2634 S E C R E T

POINT AT AT995617 THENCE SOUTH TO AT992580, THENCE WEST ALONG 61 E-W GRIDLINE 58 TO AT940580, THENCE NORTH TO AT940590 THEN NORTH WEST TO AT923604 THENCE ALONG ROUTE 5 NORTH TO THE 62 E-W GRIDLINE, THENCE EAST ALONG THE 62 E-W GRIDLINE TO AT950620, THENCE SOUTH TO AT950617 THENCE EAST ALONG THE 61 E-W GRIDLINE TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. TO BE CONDUCTED IN LATE DECEMBER.

E. SECOND BN, FIFTH MAR PLANS TWO UNNAMED BN MINUS OPNS.

(1) TWO CO'S MINUS UNDER OPCON 2/5 S AND D IN AO BOUNDED BY N BY SONG THU BON, ON E BY N-S GL 93, ON S-E BY RR, ON S BY 13E TY ROAD AND ON W BY N-S GL 87. FROM 4-8 DEC. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE WILL BE DETAILED SEARCH OF PHU NHUAN (3) (AT900505).

(2) TWO CO'S MINUS OPCON 2/5 S AND D IN SAME AO AS PARA (1) ABOVE FROM 18-22 DEC. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE WILL BE DETAILED SEARCH OF PHU NHUAN (2) (AT903513).

P-4

PAGE 2 OF 2


**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PP RUABQL RUABJN RUMHAG RUMHFL  
DE RUMHFLA 2635 3271010  
ZNY SSSSS

P 231010Z NOV 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/THIRD BN FIRST MAR  
RUMHAG/SECOND BN THIRD MAR

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB  
RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSR  
RUABJN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
RUMHAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
RUMHVP/FIRST MAR  
ZEN/FIFTH MAR  
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/HQ BN  
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN  
ZEN/FIRST AT BN  
ZEN/THIRD AMTRAC BN  
ZEN/FIRST TK BN  
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN  
ZEN/FIRST SP BN



G-3  
CG  
G-1  
CEO  
SURG  
EMBO  
G-4  
C/S

W	OIL
H	A016
	CC

COC

PAGE TWO RUMHFLA 2635 S E C R E T  
ZEN/FIRST MT BN  
ZEN/FIRST MED BN  
BT

S E C R E T

BLT ROTATION (H)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 280157Z OCT67

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 130712Z NOV67 (NOTAL)

1. REF A ESTABLISHED BLT 3/1 FOR PLANNING. SUBSEQUENTLY FIRST PLAT,  
FIRST FORCE RECON CO WAS DELETED THEREFROM. REF B REQUESTED DELETION  
OF MORTAR BTRY, SECOND BN, ELEVENTH MAR. ACTION IS STILL PENDING  
ON REF B.

2. BLT 2/3 WILL BE ASSEMBLED AT AN HOA ON 25 NOV67. SEVENTH MAR  
CHOP BLT 2/3 TO FIFTH MAR AFTER ARRIVAL BLT 2/3 AT AN HOA 25 NOV.  
FIFTH MAR WILL EMPLOY BLT 2/3 IN OPS AS DIRECTED 26-28 NOV.

3. BLT 2/3 WILL BE HELOLIFTED ON 29 NOV TO TAOR OF THIRD BN,  
FIRST MAR TO COMMENCE RELIEF ON POSITION OF THAT UNIT. RELIEF  
WILL REQUIRE 48 HRS.

4. BLT 3/1 IS ACTIVATED FOR OPERATIONS ON 29 NOV.

ON 1 DEC67 BLT 3/1 WILL BE PREPARED TO COMMENCE LOADING. AS OF  
010800H DEC67, FIFTH MAR WILL CHOP BLT 3/1 TO FIRST MARDIV WHICH

CG 1ST MAR DIV

PAGE 1 OF 2

231010Z NOV 67

✓ 30  
26

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2635 S E C R E T

AT THE SAME TIME WILL CHOP PLT 3/1 TO III MAF.

5. ON ORDER THIS HQ, IT IS PLANNED THAT FOLLOWING ATTACHMENTS  
BLT 2/3 BE ASSIGNED TO OPCON OF UNITS INDICATED.A. DET HQ CO, THIRD MAR (RADIO RELAY) INITIALLY REMAIN WITH  
SECOND BN, THIRD MAR.B. DET HQ BN, THIRD MARDIV (POSTAL, DISBURSING, PHOTO) TO  
HQ BN FIRST MARDIV.

C. BTRY B, FIRST BN, TWELFTH MAR TO ELEVENTH MAR.

D. THIRD PLAT REIN, CO B, FIRST AMTRAC BN TO THIRD AMTRAC BN.

E. SECOND PLAT REIN, CO A, THIRD AT BN TO FIRST AT BN.

F. FIRST PLAT REIN, CO A, THIRD ENGR BN TO FIRST ENGR BN.

G. SECOND PLAT, CO B, THIRD RECON BN TO FIRST RECON BN.

H. FIRST PLAT (-) REIN, CO C, THIRD SP BN TO FIRST SP BN.

I. FIRST PLAT REIN, CO C, THIRD MT BN TO FIRST MT BN.

J. SECOND PLAT REIN, CO A, THIRD TK BN TO FIRST TK BN.

K. SECOND CLEARING PLAT REIN, CO B, THIRD MED BN TO FIRST MED BN.

L. DET, LSU, FLC TO FLC.

M. MRC 62 RADIO RELAY DET AND DET DENTAL CO FROM NINTH MAR  
WILL NOT ROTATE WITH PLT 2/3.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

128

TO: MAF  
 137L DE 3825 H/W ZDX NR 412

THIRD MARDIV - T- MAF  
 MAF - T- FIRST MARDIV

MP 137L  
 DE 3825 3477 3280850

240850Z NOV 67  
 FM 1ST MARDIV  
 TO: 1ST MARDIV REIN  
 INFO: 1ST MARDIV

G-1 241150Z NOV 67  
 CGN 9096

COC

SE 04 01

DISPOSITION OF A 1ST AT BN

A. ON 241150Z NOV 67

1. HAV A REQUESTED THE REDUCTION OF 1ST AT BN TO ONE COMPANY AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

2. ON 241150Z NOV 67 PRESENTLY ATTACHED THIS REGIMENT REPRESENTS ONLY LIMITED VEHICLE CAPABILITY. ONTOS ARE USED EXTENSIVELY IN DAILY OPERATIONS WITH INFANTRY BATTALIONS.

3. HAS PROVEN HIGH DEGREE RELIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN TERMS OF THE NATURE OF THE REQUEST PRESENTLY ATTACHED AT 241150Z NOV 67 EIGHT ONTOS REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF THIS REQUEST.

G-1

1

FIRST MARDIV 240850Z NOV 67

27

1ST MARDIV 2100/5 (9/67)

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

128

6-3

TTVV LFA137

1. RUMBLE  
2. RUMBLE 3281504

1. 241504Z NOV 67  
2. CG FORLOGCOMD  
3. CG FORLOGCOMD FIRST MARDIV  
4. CG FORLOGCOMD FIRST MARDIV  
5. CG FORLOGCOMD FIRST MARDIV  
6. CG FORLOGCOMD FIRST MARDIV  
7. CG FORLOGCOMD FIRST MARDIV  
8. CG FORLOGCOMD FIRST MARDIV  
9. CG FORLOGCOMD FIRST MARDIV  
10. CG FORLOGCOMD FIRST MARDIV

G-3 241504Z NOV 67  
CCN 9018  
AD WRT G-3

2

3. 241504Z NOV 67  
4. CG FORLOGCOMD

1. CG FORLOGCOMD 240155Z NOV 67 (S) (NOTAL)  
2. CG FORLOGCOMD 101224Z NOV 67 (S) (NOTAL)

3. REF A AND B REFERS.

4. THE 3RD BN WILL BE CHOPPED TO CO THIRD BN FIRST MARINES  
5. THE 3RD BN WILL BE CHOPPED TO CO THIRD BN FIRST MARINES


6. FOR CO, HNSHT EARLY CHOP ESSENTIALLY FOR ADMIN PURPOSES.  
7. FOR CO, HNSHT EARLY CHOP ESSENTIALLY FOR ADMIN PURPOSES.  
8. FOR CO, HNSHT EARLY CHOP ESSENTIALLY FOR ADMIN PURPOSES.  
9. FOR CO, HNSHT EARLY CHOP ESSENTIALLY FOR ADMIN PURPOSES.  
10. FOR CO, HNSHT EARLY CHOP ESSENTIALLY FOR ADMIN PURPOSES.

CGFORLOGCOMD

241504Z NOV 67

2  
28**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED



W	OIC
<del>W</del>	ADIC
H	
	CC

PP RIUARQL RIMEUAG RUMFUV RUMHIE RUMHUV RUMHAW  
DE RUMHLA 2819 3299440  
ZNY SSSSS

RUMHIE-1-FIRST HOSP CO

P 25444Z NOV 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR  
ZEN/SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

*COC*

DRAFTER: G-3

RELEASER: G-3

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF  
RUMHFL/CG FLC  
RIUARQL/CTG SEVEN NINE  
RUMFUV/CTG SEVEN SIX  
RIMEUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE  
RIMEUAG/CTG SEVEN SIX POINT FIVE  
ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON (LESS ACTION ADDEES)  
RUMHUV/SA I CORPS ADV GROUP  
RUMHUV/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

*Check on this!  
Not briefed morning of 26th,  
should have been.*

BT

SECRET

OPERATION FOSTER

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV 152351Z NOV67
- B. CG FIRST MARDIV 120400Z NOV67

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2819 SECRET

1. AO EXTENSION DESCRIBED IN REF A IS CANCELLED. AREA OF OPERATIONS FOR OP FOSTER REVERTS TO ORIGINAL AO AS FOLLOWS: BOUNDED ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE 20, ON NORTH BY E-W GRIDLINE 65 TO AT902650 TO AT947630 TO AT990629 THENCE SOUTH ALONG WEST BANK OF STREAM TO AT975612 THENCE EAST ALONG SOUTH BANK OF SONG LA THO TO AT984609 THENCE SOUTH ALONG WEST BANK OF STREAM TO SONG THU BON, THENCE SOUTHWEST ALONG NORTH BANK OF SONG THU BON - SONG TIEN YEN TO AT847445 TO AT800410 AND ALONG E-W GRIDLINE 41 TO N-S GRIDLINE 20.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV



250440Z NOV 67 COPY NR#

(1ST MARDIV 2100/5 (9/67)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

29

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 DE RUMHLA 2882 3291052  
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 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR  
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
 ZEN/FIRST RECON BN  
 ZEN/FIRST TK BN  
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MT BN  
 ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES

DRAFTER G-3  
 RELEASER G-3

**COC**

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAF  
 RUMHFL/CG FLC  
 RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV  
 RUMUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 RUMUAG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON (LESS ACTION ADDRESSEES)  
 RUMHVH/SA I CORPS ADV GROUP  
 RUMHVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

BT  
 S E C R E T

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2882 S E C R E T  
 DUE TO GROUNDING OF WHITE HELICOPTERS D-DAY AND L-HOUR FOR OPN  
 DENVER ARE POSTPONED A MINIMUM OF 24 HRS. WILL ADVISE.  
 GP-4  
 BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN


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FM FIFTH MARINES

TO ZENSRD BN 1ST MARINES

2ND BN 3RD MAR

INFO: CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

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A. CG FIRST MARDIV 250940Z

B. FIFTH MARINES 241435Z

G-3 270550Z NOV 67  
CCN 10146

/COC

1. IAW REF(A) CG FIRST MARDIV PASSES COMMAND OF BLY 341 TO CG III  
MAF EFFECTIVE 010600H DEC 67. ACCORDINGLY PARA 4 OF REF (B) IS MODIFIED

TO READ CHOP TO OPCON FIRST MARDIV 010600H DEC 1967.

GP-4

BT


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270420Z NOV 67

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9000 THREE HUNDRED AND ONE ONE EIGHT  
 TOWARD TEAM FOUR  
 ALIEN DYNAMIC TIE SH  
 HAWK DYNAMIC TIE SH  
 GROUNDIE DYNAMIC BRIDGE RAMP  
 DLR DYNAMIC TIE SH  
 ECHO DYNAMIC TIE SH

1. FOLLOWING AT ALL TIMES TO BE  
 DESCRIBED AND LOADING SCHEDULE

PRIMER PLAN	LOADING	ANCHORAGE	FROM	TO
M-20A	100000	YBA	210700	221600ZEC
M-20A	100000	YBA	210700	221800ZEC
M-20A	100000	YBA	210700	221800ZEC
M-20A	100000	YBA	210700	221800ZEC
M-20A	100000	YBA	210700	221800ZEC
M-20A	100000	YBA	210700	221800ZEC
M-20A	100000	YBA	210700	221800ZEC
M-20A	100000	YBA	210700	221800ZEC

1. FOLLOWING AT ALL TIMES TO BE DESCRIBED AND LOADING SCHEDULE

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FIRST MARDIV COC  
AMERICAL DIV TOC

3/JDC/cbm  
COUNSELMAN

III MAP COC

PPP  
PPP

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AREA OF OPERATIONS EXTENSION

A. AMERICAL TOC MSG 290440Z NOV67

1. THE EXTENSION OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA REQUESTED BY REF (A)  
APPROVED FOR PERIOD 291230H TO 302400H.

GP-4


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P 300548Z NOV 67  
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

ADV RT G-3  
 G-3

TOR: 01012  
 COM: 01045

INFO RUHHFMAA/CG FMFPAC  
 RUHQUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
 MMSB/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 MMSB/RLT TWENTY SIX REAR  
 ZEN/BLT TWO SLANT THREE  
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A. CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE 241156Z NOV 67

11. ELEMENTS BLT 2/3 LISTED REF A CHOPPED TO CG 70 1ST MARDIV  
 EFFECTIVE 301600Z NOV 67.

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BT CTG 79.5

300548Z NOV 67

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
070800H November 1967

## Operation Plan 303-68

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. TIEN PHUOC: Sheets 6640 II, III; 6639 I, IV. BA TO: Sheets 6738 I-IV. KHAM DUC: Sheets 6540 II, III; 6639 I, IV. THUONG DUC 6540 I, II; 6640 III, IV.
- (b) III MAF LOI 5-66 W/Ch #1
- (c) CG III MAF/SA I Corps msg 161508Z Oct67
- (d) 1st MarDiv OperO 301-68

Time Zone: H

## 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex A (Intelligence).
- (2) Current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

b. Friendly Forces. Ref (b).

- (1) I ARVN Corps conducts operations against VC and NVA Forces throughout ICTZ. Major subordinate commands I Corps include 1st ARVN Div (11th Division Tactical Area (DTA), QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces), 2d ARVN Div (12th DTA QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces), QUANG DA Special Zone (QUANG NAM Province), Luc Long Dac Biet (LLDB, VN Special Forces) and Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG).
- (2) CG III MAF/SA I Corps exercises OPCON of U. S. Army Special Forces (USASF) A Detachments at CIDG Camps in ICTZ through Deputy Senior Advisor, I Corps and C-1 Detachment 5th USASF GP (Airborne). USASF Detachment Commanders serve as advisors to corresponding echelons of LLDB.
- (3) 7th Air Force operates MSQ-77 "Sky Spot" radar controlled bombing systems at PLEIKU (AR 7850) and DONG HA (YD 2461) in support of all-weather air operations in ICTZ. I Corps DASC provides for delivery of air support to CIDG Camps and provides FAC (Airborne) to support camps under attack.

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**HEADQUARTERS**  
**1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF**  
**67 4459**  
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- (4) FMAW provides air support to include TPQ-10 systems at DA NANG (AT 9574) and CHU LAI (BT 5211) in support of all-weather air operations in 1st Marine Division area of responsibility.
- (5) LLDB, in coordination with Det C-1 5th USASF Gp (Airborne) maintains nine CIDG Camps in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ), one in 1st Marine Division area of responsibility.

c. Assumptions

- (1) Mission and priority of task of Division will not change. (Reference (d)).
- (2) Normal combat and combat service support elements will be available.

## 2. MISSION

When directed by III MAF, in coordination with I Corps forces and U.S. Advisory personnel, 1st Marine Division provides supporting arms fire in defense of THUONG DUC CIDG Camp (ZC 142533); conducts spoiling attacks in vicinity of camp if threatened with attack; conducts operations to reinforce or relieve camp when under attack; reestablishes camp if seized, and pursues and destroys enemy forces involved.

## 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. Experience indicates enemy attacks on CIDG camps are most likely during extended periods of reduced visibility when friendly capabilities to relieve or support camps are minimized; enemy will establish ambushes along major avenues of approach likely to be used by ground relief forces; and enemy will interdict likely helicopter zones within their capability. Survival of a camp under attack will be dependent largely upon the speed with which friendly air, artillery, and/or ground support can be rendered.
- (1) Primary responsibility for support of THUONG DUC CIDG Camp is assigned to 7th Marines to ensure continuity of planning and minimum response time in execution. Secondary responsibility is assigned to 5th Marines to ensure flexibility in readiness to execute plans and to provide additional forces if required in support of camp. Through frequent liaison with A Detachment at THUONG DUC CIDG Camp, assigned units will keep continually abreast of friendly and enemy situations.

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- (2) Three successive phases of support are envisioned in execution of this plan. Sequence of phases depends on speed with which they can be brought to bear. Normal sequence is tactical air support, artillery support, and commitment of ground forces. Extent of USMC participation will be determined by III MAF.
- (a) All weather tactical air support is provided by TPQ-10 and MSQ-77 radar systems located to enable radar controlled bombing in vicinity of CIDG Camp. Camp is equipped with UHF radios to control air strikes under emergency conditions, to allow conduct of UHF/automatic DF homing, and to provide emergency communications via any U. S. aircraft to higher Headquarters. If camp is unable to operate UHF, a TAC (A) must be provided.
  - (b) Artillery support may be provided by artillery within camp, ARVN or US artillery within supporting range, or USMC artillery deployed to within supporting range of camp. Through preplanning and liaison, preplanned concentrations are prepared. Coordinated plans are developed for US artillery in support of ARVN ground forces moving to assist THUONG DUC CIDG Camp when under attack. Primary and alternate landing sites and firing positions are preselected where possible to ensure rapid deployment. Initial USMC artillery deployment envisions one battery reinforced with security element will be deployed either prior to or in conjunction with ground forces. In phasing of support, USMC artillery and associated security element, deployed in support of a camp under attack will pass to OPCON of the USMC ground force on its commitment.
  - (c) Relief forces may be ARVN, ARVN supported by US artillery, coordinated ARVN/USMC, or unilateral USMC. Initial USMC ground force is envisioned as one infantry battalion reinforced. When USMC ground force is committed, OPCON of USASF A Detachment passes to the senior USMC infantry commander in area of operation.

b. 5th Marines (Rein)  
7th Marines (Rein)

- (1) When directed, conduct unilateral or coordinated operations to reinforce or relieve THUONG DUC CIDG Camp (Annex B) under attack, reestablish camp if seized, and pursue and destroy enemy forces involved.

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- (2) Maintain liaison with USASF A Detachments, at THUONG DUC CIDG Camp to coordinate planning and maintain current intelligence of threat to camps.
- (3) Submit recommendations this Headquarters for operations vicinity THUONG DUC Camp to exploit intelligence developed concerning camps.
- (4) When directed, provide security elements when artillery units are deployed to support besieged camp.
- (5) Operations may be conducted inside CIDG camp TAOR's after local coordination with the "A" Detachment Commander at the CIDG Camp concerned.

c. 11th Marines (-) (Rein)

- (1) When directed, immediately deploy artillery units, reinforced with security element to provide fire unilaterally or in coordination with ARVN artillery in besieged CIDG Camp. Annex C (Artillery Support).
- (2) Be prepared to deliver fires as soon as possible in support of besieged camp from artillery located within supporting range of camps. Annex C (Artillery Support).
- (3) Assist in preparation and maintenance of plans as requested by 5th and 7th Marines.
- (4) When directed, provide forces in accordance with 5th and 7th Marines' plans.
- (5) Maintain liaison with USASF A Detachments at designated CIDG Camp to ensure preplanned concentrations are valid and fire support coordination procedures are established.

- d. Hq Bn (Rein)  
1st Recon Bn (Rein)  
1st AT Bn (-)  
1st Tk Bn  
3d AmTrac Bn (-)  
1st Engr Bn (-)  
1st MT Bn (-)  
11th MT Bn  
1st SP Bn (-)  
1st Med Bn (-) (Rein)  
7th Comm Bn (-)

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- (1) Assist in preparation and maintenance of plans as requested by 5th and 7th Marines.
- (2) When directed, provide forces and support in accordance with plans of 5th and 7th Marines.

e. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) In event information received that THUONG DUC CIDG Camp is threatened or has come under attack, immediately notify 1st Marine Division COC G-3 Watch Officer.
- (2) On notification of attack, this Headquarters will execute procedures of Annex D (COC/FSCC Immediate Action).
- (3) Notify this Headquarters immediately when current or planned operations would prevent execution of this plan.
- (4) Submit requests for external support to this Headquarters.
- (5) Direct liaison is authorized between all 1st Marine Division units and FLC.
- (6) Artillery support: Annex C (Artillery Support).
- (7) Air support, reference (d). Preplanned air targets: Annex E (Preplanned Air Targets).
- (8) No change in rules of engagement: Reference (d).
- (9) Direct liaison authorized with Senior Advisor QUANG DA Special Zone and 2d ARVN Division, as appropriate, in discussing coordinated plans.
- (10) Code name for specific operations will be assigned by Frag Order implementing this plan.
- (11) Provide this Headquarters with ten copies of all plans by 30Nov67.
- (12) This plan effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.
- (13) Designated areas which contain friendly population are enclosed by a fire coordination area. No fire will be delivered into these areas without clearance by the district/subsector chief. All fire support and air support will be cleared with appropriate Vietnamese officials prior to submission of the request to the supporting unit.

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(14) Overlay: Annex B (Overlay of THUONG DUC TAOR).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Administrative Plan 301-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Communications-Electronics: Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

b. Command

(1) As matter of U. S. policy, U. S. forces will not be placed under command or OPCON of allied commanders. However, this restriction does not preclude temporary tactical direction of U. S. Forces by ARVN commanders under exceptional circumstances and by mutual agreement, or temporary direction of ARVN Forces by U. S. commanders under certain circumstances. Matters of this nature will be referred to this Headquarters.

(2) Command Relationships. Annex G (Command Relationships).

(3) Command Posts. Reference (d).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

*H. J. Woessner*

H. J. WOESSNER  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- ✓A - Intelligence
- ✓B - Overlay of THUONG DUC TAOR
- ✓C - Artillery Support
- ✓D - COC/FSCC Immediate Action
- ✓E - Preplanned Air Targets
- ✓F - Communication-Electronics
- ✓G - Command Relationships
- ✓H - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution) to Operation Plan 303-68

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
 070800H November 1967

## Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 303-68

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014  
 (b) III MAF's Special Photographic Intelligence Study of THUONG DUC Special Forces Camp Ser: 063366 of 31May66 (C) (NOTAL)  
 (c) DivO P3800.1  
 (d) First MarDiv msg 300611Z Apr67

Time Zone: H

## 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

- a. See reference (b) for Special Photographic Intelligence Studies of THUONG DUC CIDG Camp.
- b. See current 1st Marine Division SPOTREPs, INTSUMs and PERINTREPs.

## 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION. Within 15 kilometers of CIDG Camp.

- a. Determine if enemy will attack THUONG DUC CIDG Camp. If so, when? Where? In what strength? With what units?
- b. Determine if enemy will use reinforcements in attack. If so, when? Where? In what strength? With what units?
- c. Determine if enemy will employ rockets, artillery, heavy mortars and/or recoilless rifles in support of attack. If so, what type and caliber of weapon? Where will firing position be located? What methods of fire control will be employed?
- d. Determine current combat effectiveness of enemy units that could be employed in attacks.
- e. Determine what avenues of approach enemy will use to reach CIDG Camp.
- f. Determine if enemy will attempt to infiltrate CIDG Camp prior to conduct of attack.
- g. Determine if enemy will attempt sabotage within CIDG Camp.
- h. Determine what tactics enemy will employ during conduct of attack.

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- i. Determine what means of tactical communications enemy will employ.

## 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

- a. Orders to Subordinate Units. 5th, 7th and 11th Marines. Prepare detailed intelligence annexes in support of this Operation Plan utilizing reference (b) studies, current INTSUMs and other studies and estimates provided by this Headquarters.
- b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent and Supporting Units. III MAF is requested to supplement and revise special photographic studies as required, and provide other studies and/or information bearing on conduct of intelligence planning for THUONG DUC CIDG Camp.
- c. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) Beleaguered CIDG Camp will receive first priority of reconnaissance available to this Headquarters.
  - (2) All will report as obtained:
    - (a) Information concerning significant enemy movement and activity which, if true, could threaten THUONG DUC CIDG Camp.
    - (b) Condition of overland lines of communication which could be utilized as approach routes for friendly reaction forces.

## 4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTIVES, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL. See Section VIII of reference (c).

## 5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. Standard tactical map for operations under this plan is VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014.
- b. Requisition and distribution will be in accordance with reference (c).
- c. Map corrections. All units will maintain record of map corrections. Corrections will be reported to this Hq (G-2) as encountered. Units will pass on map corrections and any additional geographic information to relieving units.
- e. Photographs. See paragraph 402 of reference (c).

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6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. See Section V of reference (c).

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

- a. Submit standard intelligence reports as prescribed in Section XII of reference (c), and as amplified below.
- b. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). Reporting period for daily INTSUMs submitted to this Headquarters (G-2) will be 0800 to 0800. INTSUMs will arrive at this Headquarters (G-2) by 1200 daily and will adhere to format specified by reference (d).
- c. Special Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICRs). SICRs will be promulgated by this Headquarters to direct collection effort of specific tactical and technical intelligence requirements. Pertinent SICRs will be forwarded to subordinate units for inclusion in their collection effort. Collection of information responsive to SICRs must be made in timely fashion.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



M. J. WOESSNER  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution) to Operation Plan 303-68

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
070800H November 1967

Annex C (Artillery Support) to Operation Plan 303-68

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014

Time Zone: H

### 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) ARVN artillery provides support when available.
- (2) FMAW provides air support.
- (3) 7th USAF provides air support.

### 2. MISSION

When directed, 1st Marine Division provides artillery support for relief of the beleaguered THUONG DUC CIDG Camp.

### 3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of artillery employment

- (1) Provide artillery support for THUONG DUC CIDG Camp when under attack from artillery within camp and/or artillery within supporting range of camp. Artillery available without displacement is as follows:
  - (a) 2 - 105mm How (ZC144532)
  - (b) 2 - 155mm Gun (SP) (AT876472)
  - (c) 4 - 175mm Gun (SP) (AT985675)
- (2) On order, artillery command and control unit together with one or more firing units will displace to positions from which fires can be delivered in support of friendly forces defending, reinforcing, relieving or reestablishing the beleaguered CIDG Camp.

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- (3) Surface movement to selected firing positions will be utilized where possible. For remote positions inaccessible by surface movement, artillery elements will move by either helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft.

b. Artillery Command and Control Group

- (1) Provide sufficient administrative and logistical personnel to effect OPCON over one or more batteries of field artillery ranging from 4.2" mortars to 155mm Howitzers.
- (2) Determine required local security augmentation upon assignment of a special mission and report this requirement to appropriate force commander.
- (3) Be prepared to exercise technical fire direction for one or more batteries described above.

c. Firing battery(ies)

- (1) Be prepared to helilift organic weapons by external means on order, to include providing slings for each weapon.
- (2) On order prepare basic load of ammunition in fiber containers to reduce weight of packing for initial ammunition lift.
- (3) Be prepared to conduct firing from observed firing charts.

d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Report position area and fire capabilities to Regimental FDC when established.
- (2) Available survey data will be furnished to units concerned by Regimental Survey Section.
- (3) Air observation will be provided when available.
- (4) Coordination or supporting arms will be exercised by a Detachment Commander, THUONG DUC CIDG Camp until such time as USMC relief forces are committed. At that time, fire support coordination will be exercised by senior USMC tactical commander in area.
- (5) Assumption of supporting arms coordination by USMC commander will coincide with assumption of OPCON of A Detachment on order of III MAF.

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- (6) 2 - 105mm Howitzers are available within THUONG DUC CIDG Camp.
- (7) Firing chart: Grid Sheet 1:25,000.
- (8) Artillery concentrations: Appendix 1 (Artillery Concentrations).


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administration of units attached to artillery command control group remains with parent organization.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Current USASF SOI.
- b. 1st Marine Division CEOI.
- c. Annex F (Command Electronics).
- d. Command relationships. Annex G (Command Relationships).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

  
H. J. WOESSNER  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX:

- ✓1 - Artillery Concentrations, THUONG DUC

DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution) to Operation Plan 303-68

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
 070800H November 1967

Appendix 1 (Artillery Concentrations, THUONG DUC), to Annex C (Artillery Support) to Operation Plan 303-68

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6540 I, II; 6640 III, IV

Time Zone: H

1. THUONG DUC CIDG Camp is located at ZC142533, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-109, 5th SFGA.

2. Target list:

<u>TGT NR</u>	<u>TGT LOCATION</u>	<u>ELEVATION</u>	<u>TGT DESCRIPTION</u>
1	ZC15005246	0	Village
2	ZC15705296	0	Village
3	ZC17185325	0	Village
4	ZC16145365	0	Village
5	ZC16545384	0	Village
6	ZC17105381	0	Village
7	ZC17185325	0	Village
8	ZC15875412	0	Village
9	ZC15105433	0	Village
10	ZC16395433	0	Village
11	ZC17285469	0	Village
12	ZC15715470	0	Woodline
13	ZC15875488	20	Hilltop
14	ZC15555593	20	Friendly OP
15	ZC11455441	70	Knoll
16	ZC15925546	10	Ridge finger
17	ZC11415374	150	Ridge finger, poss RR position
18	ZC11265261	140	Draw, staging area
19	ZC11465229	410	Ridge finger, OP
20	ZC15185531	0	East foot knoll
21	ZC15125570	0	Bottom of ridge
22	ZC11785340	250	Knoll, poss RR position
23	ZC14725599	0	Bottom of ridge
24	ZC14575620	20	Ridge finger
25	ZC14185640	0	Stream bed
26	ZC13985570	0	Village
27	ZC13855595	20	Ridge finger
28	ZC13355535	0	Village
29	ZC13575383	10	Creek entering valley
30	ZC13745325	50	Top of draw

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31	ZC13805353	10	Bottom of Draw
32	ZC13785274	90	Top of Draw
33	ZC14185342	20	Side ridge
34	ZC14515340	0	Grave
35	ZC14135186	0	Village
36	ZC14355225	0	Village
37	ZC18325375	0	Village
38	ZC11855291	296	Mortar position
39	ZC12145238	430	Ridge finger
40	ZC12725376	50	Infil route staging area
41	ZC12985331	90	Mortar position
42	ZC13205300	70	Mortar position
43	ZC13005260	110	Possible RR position
44	ZC12185570	0	Village
45	ZC11085586	0	Village
46	ZC10645653	0	Village
47	ZC13385315	110	Possible RR position
48	ZC12315119	0	South end of bridge
49	ZC13485273	130	Possible RR position
50	ZC11295055	0	Village

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration fires in the vicinity of THUONG DUC.

<u>RP NR</u>	<u>RP LOCATION</u>	<u>ELEVATION</u>	<u>RP DESCRIPTION</u>
1	ZC14245285	10 meters	Narrow valley
2	ZC14555345	0	Large grave
3	ZC13295358	70	Knoll
4	ZC14895317	10	Road junction

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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
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DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
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Annex D (COC/FSCC Immediate Action) to Operation Plan 303-68

Ref: (a) I Corps Advisory Group SOI

Time Zone: H

1. Upon notification that THUONG DUC CIDG Camp is threatened by or has come under enemy attack, Division G-3 COC Watch Officer will:
  - a. Contact Detachment C-1, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) to determine seriousness of threat or attack, action taken to counter threat or attack, and weather conditions in vicinity of camp.
  - b. Alert ACoS, G-3 of situation.
  - c. If initial information concerning camp received from sources other than III MAF, notify III MAF G-3 COC Watch Officer.
  - d. Contact Advisory Group Watch Officer at QUANG DA Special Zone or 2d ARVN Division as appropriate to obtain additional information.
  - e. Alert FSCC, air and artillery Watch Officers.
  - f. Start an immediate plot of situation.
  - g. Monitor tactical radio net of camp. Reference (a).
  - h. When directed:
    - (1) Alert 7th Mar (5th Mar) that THUONG DUC CIDG Camp has been threatened or attacked.
    - (2) During daylight hours, or at night if flare plane has been requested, arrange for AO to make assessment of situation.
2. FSCC Watch Officers will:
  - a. Alert Fire Support Coordinator.
  - b. Alert (as required):
    - (1) DASC.

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- (2) FMAW Operations.
- (3) 11th Marines.
- c. Be prepared to place camp in direct contact with agencies responding to:
  - (1) Air Support Requests.
  - (2) Artillery Fire Requests.
  - (3) Naval Gunfire Support Requests.

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Annex E (Preplanned Air Targets) to Operation Plan 303-68

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS L7014. Sheets 6540 I, II;  
 6640 III, IV

Time Zone: H

1. THUONG DUC CIDG Camp is located ZC142533, elevation 60 meters; Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-109, 5th SFGA.
2. Listed in paragraph 5 below are preplanned air targets primarily intended to be used for TPQ-10/MSQ-77 controlled air strikes during periods of reduced visibility in vicinity of camp. Targets represent likely avenues of approach, check points, assembly areas, OP's, and weapons positions.
3. Promulgation of target lists to fire support coordination elements likely to be committed in support of CIDG Camp under attack is directed.
4. All appropriate TPQ-10 computer data for each of targets listed in paragraph 5 is prepared by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and promulgated to the ASRT and DASC capable of supporting THUONG DUC CIDG Camp.
5. Target List:

<u>TGT NR</u>	<u>TGT LOCATION</u>	<u>ELEVATION</u>	<u>TGT DESCRIPTION</u>
I 1	ZC114539	110 meters	Defensive positions
I 2	ZC099504	10	Supply route
I 3	ZC112526	190	Draw
I 4	ZC148549	10	Approach route
I 5	ZC195551	10	Way station
I 6	ZC169529	30	Possible cache area
I 7	ZC198542	10	Defensive positions
I 8	ZC148563	90	Approach route
I 9	ZC139561	10	Possible mortar position
I 10	ZC181561	70	Infiltration route
I 11	ZC114522	30	Ridge finger
I 12	ZC165559	30	Possible cache area
I 13	ZC156566	70	Possible cache area
I 14	ZC117534	250	Knoll
I 15	ZC118529	296	Knoll
I 16	ZC128570	10	Infiltration route

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
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I 17	ZC145573	170 meters	Infiltration route
I 18	ZC173555	10	Infiltration route
I 19	ZC153504	670	DAI HIEP (3)(Possible cache area)
I 20	ZC155516	330	Ridge finger
I 21	ZC148514	230	Hillside
I 22	ZC190521	570	Edge of plateau
I 23	ZC195549	30	Friendly OP
I 24	ZC165554	10	HOANG PHUOC (1)(Possible VC staging area)
I 25	ZC096565	63	Hill 63 (Possible VC OP)
I 26	ZC121523	430	Ridge finger
I 27	ZC133563	10	Rice paddy (Possible cache area)
I 28	ZC125564	10	Bottom of hill
I 29	ZC104576	70	Middle of draw
I 30	ZC169555	10	Bottom of hill
I 31	ZC169560	30	Stream bank
I 32	ZC166567	10	Stream bank
I 33	ZC160526	10	Trail/stream crossing
I 34	ZC165537	10	DONG PHUOC (1)(Possible cache area)
I 35	ZC161536	10	DONG PHUOC (1)(Possible VC mortar position)
I 36	ZC127237	50	Draw
I 37	ZC113498	10	Bridge
I 38	ZC189556	05	River bank
I 39	ZC191559	10	Bridge
I 40	ZC132530	70	Draw
I 41	ZC130260	110	Ridge finger
I 42	ZC133531	110	Ridge finger
I 43	ZC155580	310	Trail cross hill (Possible VC base area)
I 44	ZC134527	130	Ridge finger
I 45	ZC137557	10	TAI SON Village (Possible VC mortar position)
I 46	ZC144520	10	Village (Possible staging area)
I 47	ZC104551	10	House (Possible staging area)
I 48	ZC127562	10	River bank
I 49	ZC152554	10	Houses (Possible staging area)
I 50	ZC084556	10	Bridge

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## Annex F (Communication -Electronics) to Operation Plan 303-68

- Ref: (a) 1st MarDiv OperO 301-68  
(b) 1st MarDiv O P02000.2 (CEOI)  
(c) Det C-1, 5th SFG (Airborne) SOI (NOTAL)  
(d) I Corps Advisory Team SOI (NOTAL)

Time Zone: H

## 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex A (Intelligence).
- (2) Current INTSUMs and PERINTREPs
- (3) Enemy has employed and will continue to employ monitoring, imitative deception, and makeshift jamming (any noise locally generated) of friendly radio and wire circuits.
- (4) Enemy will continue to harass communications systems by destroying or damaging communication facilities and by disrupting metallic lines.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) CG III MAF
  - (a) Coordinates communication requirements between 1st Marine Division and C-1 Detachment, 5th USASF Group which cannot be supported locally.
  - (b) Relays C-1 Detachment INTSUMs and SPOTREPs/SITREPs to this Headquarters via existing covered teletype circuits.
  - (c) Provides C-1 Detachment commander with sufficient communication security aids for immediate authentication, numeral, and brief tactical message encryption/decryption.
  - (d) Provides communication personnel and equipment augmentation as necessary to support requirements beyond capability of this Headquarters.

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- (2) C-1 Detachment, 5th USASF Group, authorizes 1st Marine Division and referenced subordinate units to enter existing USASF radio nets.
- (3) First Marine Aircraft Wing provides and coordinates close air support communications and on-call helicopter and/or transport aircraft for airborne radio retransmission packages and teams.
- (4) FLC provides emergency communication logistic support.

## 2. MISSION

When directed, 1st Marine Division communication -electronics elements install, operate and maintain continuous and reliable communication systems to support this plan.

## 3. EXECUTION

a. Communication Company (-), HqBn

- (1) Maintain normal command control communications for this Headquarters while located in DA NANG Combat Base.
- (2) Be prepared to enter radio nets which enable this Headquarters to communicate with QUANG DA Special Zone Advisors and with designated USASF Detachment(s) and/or THUONG DUC CIDG Camp.
- (3) Coordinate communications planning as directed by this Headquarters with 5th, 7th and 11th Marines as required.
- (4) Be prepared to provide retransmission package, to include equipment, personnel, frequencies and call signs.

b. 5th Marines (Rein)  
7th Marines (Rein)  
11th Marines (-) (Rein)

- (1) Plan for and be prepared to install, operate and maintain continuously reliable communications to support assigned missions.
- (2) Maintain existing communication -electronics installations in normal TAOR, AO.

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- (3) Determine communication requirements which cannot be organically supported and submit appropriate requests to this Headquarters, to include requests for retransmission aircraft.

c. Hq Bn (Rein)  
1st Recon Bn (Rein)  
1st AT Bn (-)  
1st Tk Bn  
3d AmTrac Bn (-)  
1st Engr Bn (-)  
1st MT Bn (-)  
11th MT Bn  
1st SP Bn (-)  
1st Med Bn (-) (Rein)

- (1) Be prepared to install, operate and maintain communications in support of mission specifically assigned in execution of this plan.
- (2) Provide communication -electronics planning support as required by 5th and 7th marines.

d. 7th Comm Bn (-)

- (1) Be prepared to provide communication -electronics support to augment forces committed to execution of this plan.
- (2) Carry out missions assigned paragraph 3c above.

e. Air Support Communications. Reference (a).

f. Artillery Communications. Normal

g. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Reference (b).
- (2) Annex D (COC/FSCC Immediate Action) for initial communication action requirements.
- (3) Communications Center. Phrase "PASS TO COC" will be included in passing instructions of operational messages transmitted to this Headquarters via common user circuits.
- (4) Communication Security Aids.
  - (a) Operation Code. KAC-PX. Reference (b).

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- (b) Numeral Code. KAC-QX. Reference (b).
- (c) Authentication Code. KAC-QX. Reference (b).
- (5) Radio
  - (a) Call Signs. References (b), (c) and (d).
  - (b) Frequencies. References (b), (c) and (d).
- (6) Radio Relay. Activated on order as tactical situation requires and develops.
- (7) Wire.
  - (a) Limited in objective area(s) until developing tactical situation requires installation of trunks and internal CP wire system(s).
  - (b) Switchboard Code Names. 1st Marine Division Telephone Directory.
  - (c) Be alert for booby traps when trouble-shooting wire lines.
- (8) Initial contact between a relieving unit and CIDG Camp should be accomplished on VHF Air Movement Frequency. Thereafter, combination of CIDG VHF and HF nets, and relieving units organic Command, Tactical, and Supporting Arms Nets would be used. Airborne radio retransmission will be employed, as required.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Admin Plan 301-68.
- b. Charged batteries, BB-451, available on call from LSA when established. Units return discharged batteries to LSA for exchange on one-for-one basis. Mark battery cases with unit designations.
- c. Limited third and overflow second echelon maintenance and exchange/float service available at LSA when established.
- d. Limited stock of high usage communications-electronics equipment accessory items available at LSA when established.
- e. Resupply of wire and dry cell batteries available at LSA when established.

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- (1) All expended dry cell batteries will be completely demolished or returned to LSA for destruction.
- (2) All units retrieve communication wire upon displacement from any position within objective area.

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
Annex G (Command Relationships) to Operation Plan 303-68

Ref: (a) III MAF LOI 5-66 w/Ch #1

Time Zone: H

1. Appendix 1 depicts relationships between ARVN units, province and district officials, III MAF command and operational control echelons, 7th Air Force, and USASF 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
2. Only CG, I ARVN Corps is in LLDB command and control structure. No command relationship exists between ARVN divisions and detachments at any level.
3. Senior LLDB officer at camp is camp commander.
4. USASF A Detachment commander is advisor to LLDB and has additional mission as advisor to local sector/sub sector commander. CG III MAF/SA I Corps exercises OPCON USASF A Detachments in ICTZ through Commander, I Corps Advisory Group and Commanding Officer, Detachment C-1, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
5. Special Forces liaison team is stationed QUANG NGAI City, QUANG NGAI Province for purposes of establishing contact with US and Free World Forces, and 2d ARVN Division, and informing them of Special Forces activities in 12th DTA. Liaison team represents Detachment C-1 but has no command or operational authority.

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APPENDIX:

✓ 1 - Command Relationships Diagram

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
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Appendix 1 (Command Relationships Diagram) to Annex G (Command Relationships)  
 to Operation Plan 303-68

Ref: (a) III MAF LOI 5-66 w/CH #1

Time Zone: H



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LEGEND:

\_\_\_\_\_ OPCON  
\_\_\_\_\_ \* \_\_\_\_\_ ADCON  
\_\_\_\_\_ - - - - - LIAISON  
\_\_\_\_\_ COORDINATION/COOPERATION  
\_\_\_\_\_ o \_\_\_\_\_ COMMUNICATION ONLY (when estab)  
\_\_\_\_\_ A \_\_\_\_\_ ADVISORY RELATIONSHIP

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Annex H (Distribution) to Operation Plan 303-68

Ref: (a) DivO 5605.1


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CG FLC/FSR	2
Det C-1 5th USASF Gp (Abn)	2
SA 2d ARVN Div	2
QUANG DA Spec Zone	2

E-1,2,3,4,8,10,14,15,16,21,23,26,34,35,38,39,46,65; 7A(25) C (less  
86,95,98,100,101,102)

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
PO Box 3000, San Francisco, California 96602

DivO 3560.2A  
3:PAW:kgb  
7 Nov 1967

DIVISION ORDER 3560.2A

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedures for the Combat Operations Center (COC)

Ref: (a) III MAF Order 3121 2\_ Instructions for Submission of Operational SITREPS  
(b) CG III MAF msg 132336Z Jul67 Reporting Casualties in SITREPS  
(c) Division Order 3120 16 Standing Operating Procedure for COC and FSOC During Mortar, Artillery and/or Rocket Attacks  
(d) Operation Order 301-67 Basic Oper Order  
(e) Operation Order 302-67 Golden Fleece Operations  
(f) Operation Order 303-67 Relief of CIDG Camps  
(g) Operation Order 304-67 Alert Forces  
(h) Operation Order 305-67 Provisional Infantry Units  
(i) Operation Order 307-67 County Fairs  
(j) Operation Order 309-67 Operations in BINH DIHN Province  
(k) Operation Order 311-67 Security of ARVN Ammo and Pol Facilities  
(l) Operation Order 60-66 Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan  
(m) Operation Order 102-67 1st MF Oper Order (JAILBREAK)  
(n) Div O PO2000 2 (CEOI)  
(o) Operation Order 90-67 Rocket Belt Defense  
(p) Div O 11132 2 Selection of Temporary Helo Landing Zone  
(q) CG III MAF ltr 3700/21 Ser 0182266 of 6 Dec 66 Helipad Directory  
(r) Operation Order 91-67 Waterway Control  
(s) Operation Order 101-67 Air Base Complex Defense

Encl: ✓(1) Duties of the G-3 Watch Officer  
✓(2) Duties of the G-3 Watch NCO  
✓(3) Duties of the G-3 Journal Clerk  
✓(4) Duties of the G-2 Watch Officer  
✓(5) Duties of the G-2 Watch NCO  
✓(6) Duties of the G-2 Journal Clerk  
✓(7) Combat Operations Center Reports  
✓(8) G-3 Spot Report Form  
✓(9) G-2 Spot Report Form  
✓(10) Land Line Communications  
✓(11) Voice Radio Communications  
✓(12) COC Teletype Communications

DivO 3560.2A

7 Nov 1967

1. Purpose. To establish standing operating procedures for the internal functioning of the 1st Marine Division Combat Operations Center (COC).

2. Cancellation. Division Order 3560.2.

3. General. The Division Combat Operations Center is organized to provide the Commanding General with a positive means of rapidly directing and controlling all subordinate units during all conditions of combat. It serves as a centralized source of intelligence and operational information for the purpose of assisting the Commanding General in evaluating situations and providing him the best available current information upon which to base decisions. A secondary mission of the COC is to provide information to higher Headquarters, subordinate and adjacent units. The COC will function as a combined G-2 and G-3 element directly concerned with combat operations. Appropriate representation from the Division General and Special Staffs may function in the COC as required by the situation.

4. Functions. The COC will:

a. Provide a center where the Commanding General and principal staff officers can confer with subordinate units, adjacent units, and higher headquarters on operational matters.

b. Provide the Commanding General a positive and rapid means of directing, controlling and maintaining tactical operations of his command.

c. Record, plot, display, and disseminate all significant operations and intelligence information received from or passed to subordinate units, adjacent units, and higher headquarters.

d. Maintain the status of all alert forces.

e. Maintain the status of specially organized units.

f. Maintain the current task organization of units involved in special operations.

g. Provide facilities for daily and special briefings, and conduct such briefings, or portions thereof as directed.

h. Prepare the Division Situation Report (SITREP), Historical Report (HISTREP) and Command Chronology based on information received from subordinate units and cognizant staff sections.

DivO 3560.2A  
7 Nov 1967

## 5. Organization

a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 has staff cognizance of the Combat Operations Center. The COC team is headed by an Officer-in-Charge appointed by the G-3, and is an integral part of the Operations Unit of the G-3 Section.

b. Personnel requirements for normal operations:

(1) OIC COC and/or Asst OIC, COC, NCOIC, COC Reports/Brief NCO as required.

(2) G-3 Watch Officer

(3) G-3 Watch NCO

(4) G-3 Journal Clerk

(5) G-2 Watch Officer

(6) G-2 Watch NCO

(7) G-2 Journal Clerk

(8) Teletype Operator

(9) Switchboard Operator

(10) Other communications personnel to operate tactical circuits located in COC.

(11) HISTREP Writer at period designated by OIC, COC.

c. Emergency Conditions. In addition to the above personnel, the following will man the center during emergency conditions and at other periods as directed by the Commanding General.

(1) ACoFS, G-2 or G-2A

(2) ACoFS, G-3 or G-3A

(3) ACoFS, G-4 or G-4A

(4) Fire Support Coordinator or his designated representative.

(5) Air Officer or his designated representative

DivO 3460.2A  
7 Nov 1967

(6) Other General and Special Staff Officers as designated by the Commanding General.

d. A separate location in the immediate vicinity of COC functional space is provided for the Commanding General, Assistant Division Commander, the Chief of Staff, and such officers as the Commanding General may designate.

6. Watch Instructions. Detailed instructions concerning the duties of COC Watch Personnel are contained in enclosures (1) through (6).

a. Time of Relieving. On-coming duty personnel shall report in sufficient time to be thoroughly briefed by the off-going watch prior to assuming the watch.

b. Relieving for Meals. On-coming duty personnel shall relieve in time for off-going personnel to eat during normal meal hours if the relief is scheduled during these hours. For reliefs scheduled outside normal meal hours, the G-2 and G-3 Watch Officers will make appropriate arrangements for their respective duty personnel to attend meals.

c. Scheduling

(1) The OIC, COC will assign personnel for the G-3 Watch requirements.

(2) The ACOFS, G-2 will assign personnel for the G-2 Watch requirements.

(3) The Commanding Officer, Communications Company, Headquarters Battalion will assign personnel for the COC Communications Watch requirements.

## 7. Internal Procedures

a. Routing

(1) Incoming intelligence or operational messages, directives, and documents will be delivered to the G-2 or G-2 Watch Officer as appropriate. The watch officers will carefully read all incoming traffic to determine the action addressee. He will further route all traffic to the action officer by the most rapid means consistent with security requirements.



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(2) The G-2 or G-3 Watch Officer will insure that the information contained in all incoming traffic is entered in the G-2 or G-3 Journal as appropriate.

(3) During those periods when a Command Duty Officer (CDO), representing the Commanding General, is on duty in COC all incoming traffic that affects the tactical or logistical situation will be routed to the Command Duty Officer (CDO) who will take the necessary action or forward such traffic to the cognizant action officer.

(4) All outgoing intelligence and operational traffic will be delivered to the G-2 or G-3 Watch Officer, as appropriate. The watch officers will carefully read all outgoing traffic to insure completeness and authenticity of information before release.

b. Spot Reports

(1) Enclosure (8) is the format for the G-3 Spot Report.

(2) Enclosure (9) is the format for the G-2 Spot Report.

(3) Spot Reports will be received by the G-2 or G-3 Watch NCO's and/or officers. The watch officers will examine the spot reports to ascertain that they are factual, informative and complete. In those cases where spot reports are incomplete the watch officers will take appropriate steps to obtain the additional information required.

(4) All Spot Reports will be given a G-2 or G-3 Journal number and entered into the respective G-2 or G-3 Journal.

(5) Enclosure (7) lists the reports that can normally be expected and provides a ready distribution list.

8. COC Communications

a. The primary functions of the COC communications facilities are to send and receive by expeditious means tactical information required for the Commanding General to effectively command and control his combat units. These facilities are not intended to be used for normal administrative traffic, nor are they to be used as a substitute for traffic that should be sent over command circuits except in an emergency situation when command circuitry is inoperable.

b. Enclosure (1) lists the land line communication of COC.

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c. Enclosure (11) lists the external voice radio circuits located in Radio Central COC.

d. Enclosure (12) contains instructions concerning the utilization of the teletype communications in COC.

9. Briefings

a. A daily briefing will be held to recap operational events, significant intelligence, administrative, and logistical status of the preceding twenty-four hour period to ensure that all members of the staff are informed of the activities of the command. This briefing will be held at the time designated by the Chief of Staff in the Command Briefing Room.

b. Use of the Command Briefing Room for Special Briefings will be scheduled with the Staff Secretary.

10. References. References (a) through (s) contain instructions and information relative to the operations of COC. All watch standers shall become familiar with the references which are pertinent to their area of responsibility. The OIC, COC will maintain this SOP with all references in the COC.

  
H. J. WOESSNER  
Chief of Staff

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DivO 3560.2A

7 Nov 1967

DUTIES OF THE G-3 WATCH OFFICER

1. Supervise the G-3 Watch NCO and Journal Clerk.
2. During the period 2400-0400, prepare the Division Situation Report (SITREP) for the previous 24 hour period (0001-2400).
3. Prepare the Six Hour Situation Report for special named operations, (0600-1200-1800-2400).
4. Prepare notes for the G-3 Briefing Officer.
5. Stay current on the plans, operations and tactical situation within the Division TAOR, operating area and those special operations in progress outside the TAOR or operating areas.
6. Act as representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 in the COC.
7. Be thoroughly familiar with references (a) through (s).
8. Notify the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, or in his absence his designated representative and/or the Command Duty Officer when:
  - a. Any Marine activity is receiving mortar, artillery, or rocket fire.
  - b. Any Marine activity is engaged in an action that would probably or already has resulted in total friendly or enemy casualties of ten or more either KIA or WIA.
  - c. Any significant event occurs such as a Blue Springs, Bald Eagle, Sparrow Hawk, downed aircraft, etc.
9. Report significant activities as they occur to III MAF COC Duty Officer in accordance with existing instructions.
10. Be prepared at all times to brief the Commanding General, principal staff officers or unit commanders as appropriate.
11. Personally review all incoming G-3 Spot Reports, take appropriate action and release to III MAF as appropriate.
12. Periodically review the operations of communications circuit. When a communication failure occurs promptly notify the Comm Center Duty Officer, and take necessary steps to reroute traffic (Courier, command circuit, radio, telephone, etc).

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13. Keep the OIC, COC and/or Asst OIC, COC informed of all significant events and action taken.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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DUTIES OF THE G-3 WATCH NCO

1. General Instructions. The Watch NCO is responsible to the G-3 Watch Officer and will assist the Watch Officer in the performance of the functions of the COC.

2. Special Instructions. The G-3 Watch NCO will be guided in the performance of his duty by the following special instructions:

a. Supervise the activities of the Journal Clerk to assure:

(1) The timely accurate entry of all applicable information in the G-3 Journal.

(2) The proper maintenance of the Journal file and all supporting documents.

(3) The proper conduct and appearance of the Journal Clerk throughout his tour of duty.

b. Insure that all messages with a SECRET classification are entered in the message log and insure that all other classified material is handled in accordance with regulations pertaining thereto.

c. Receive and process incoming Spot Reports and messages.

d. Supervise the routing of all traffic as directed by the Watch Officer.

e. Insure that all appropriate information is accurately plotted on the Situation Maps and the Contact/Incident Situation Board.

f. Be prepared to assist the Watch Officer in the preparation for or conduct of briefings as required.

g. Insure that the incoming Watch NCO is thoroughly briefed on all items not specifically covered by written instructions.

h. Insure that the COC is in an excellent state of police at all times to include the immediate area.

i. 0600-1400 Watch

(1) After the briefing, clean Situation Map and Contact/Incident Boards.

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- (2) Check inside and outside police of COC area.
- (3) Check Unit Weekly Position Overlays and make changes on Situation Maps as required.
- (4) Send previous day's patrol activities down to G-3 Drafting Section.
- (5) Insure that the FMFPac Historical Report Forms (marked for DPI) are delivered to the Division Guard Mail Section.
- (6) Post new password on Password Board. Check with G-2 and get Password Number.

j. 1400-2200 Watch

- (1) Prepare night patrol acetate.
- (2) Distribute all guard mail from evening courier flight. (Historical/Daily Situation Reports to appropriate box, unit patrol information to Watch NCO files, any other information to NCOIC's incoming box).
- (3) Prepare operation summary sheet and slide.
- (4) Pick up previous day's patrol activities acetate and overlay from G-3 Drafting Section and file them.

k. 2200-0600 Watch

- (1) Prepare day patrol acetate.
- (2) Prepare daily events sheet.
- (3) Prepare list of contacts by battalion and a Cumulative Casualty List and pass this information to the 3d Marine Division COC-3. Make note of the person called and the time.
- (4) Complete operation summary and acetate if not completed by the 1400-2200 Watch.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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DUTIES OF THE G-3 JOURNAL CLERK

1. General Instructions. The G-3 duty clerk is responsible to the G-3 Watch Officer and G-3 Watch NCO and will assist them in the performance of the functions of the COC.
2. Special Instructions
  - a. Pick up all messages from the 1st Marine Division Message Center, twice during each watch, and deliver them to the G-3 NCOIC.
  - b. Enter all secret messages in the log book.
  - c. Maintain the G-3 Journal, entering all material designated for entry by the G-3 Watch Officer and Watch NCO. The G-3 Journal runs from 0001 to 2400 daily.
  - d. All spot reports will be typed on the spot report form and returned to the Watch NCO for verification prior to distribution.
  - e. Prepare burn reports on all Secret material designated by the OIC, COC.
  - f. Pick up all material from the COC Box in the G-3 Admin Office at least once each watch, during normal working hours.
  - g. Insure that the COC is thoroughly policed each watch, prior to being relieved.
  - h. Perform preventative maintenance on the typewriters prior to being relieved on each watch.
  - i. Insure that the oncoming Journal Clerk is thoroughly briefed on the current situation and all future requirements.
  - j. Mail the FMFPac Historical Report Forms (marked for DPI).

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DUTIES OF G-2 WATCH OFFICER

1. Supervise the G-2 Watch NCO and Journal Clerk.
2. Stay current on the plans, operational and tactical situation within the 1st Marine Division TAOR, operating areas, and the significant events in progress outside 1st Marine Division TAOR (including 3d Marine Division (COC-2) and the Americal Division (TOC-2) who will be contacted by phone, daily at 0430H).
3. Notify the ACofS, G-2, or in his absence, his designated representative when:
  - a. Any Marine unit/activity is receiving mortar, artillery or rocket fire.
4. Notify III MAF COC (Attn G-2) when:
  - a. Interrogation spot report is required (IAW CG III MAF msg 121200Z May 67).
  - b. Submitting Daily VR Report (IAW CG III MAF msg 290348Z May 67).
  - c. Recon Team/Patrols are inserted or extracted 12 hours later than scheduled, and when an emergency extraction is required.
5. Notify Acquisition Officer, G-2 when:
  - a. Any Marine unit/activity is receiving mortar, artillery or rocket fire (after notifying the ACofS, G-2).
  - b. 1st Marine Division Recon Team/Patrols make contact with enemy, receive casualties, request emergency extraction or request assistance.
  - c. A request is received from any adjacent, higher or lower echelon concerning intelligence matters.
6. Review all incoming traffic and disseminate all information to the proper units (Marine and Allied) from spot reports or agent reports by the quickest means available.
7. Notify Current Intelligence Officer of all activities, USMC casualties, and/or enemy casualties as soon as possible.

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8. Assist the COC-3 Watch Officer in any matters requested or of mutual concern.
9. Inform the OIC, COC and/or Asst OIC, COC of all significant events and action taken.

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DUTIES OF G-2 WATCH NCO

1. Assist and keep the G-2 Watch Officer informed of all matters during the performance of his duties.
2. Supervise the Journal Clerk in the proper maintaining of the G-2 Journal.
3. Be aware of and stay current with the plans, operations and tactical situation within the 1st Marine Division TAOR, operation areas and significant events in progress outside of 1st Marine Division TAOR.
4. During the absence of the G-2 Watch Officer assume his duties and inform him of events that occurred during his absence.
5. During the following watch periods of:
  - a. 0001 to 0800 assist the G-2 Briefing Officer, by preparing the proper slides and plot the Sit Map, "point" for all Briefing Officers during the CG's morning brief and also prepare the night patrol overlays.
  - b. 0801 to 1600 prepare the day patrol overlays.
  - c. 1601 to 2400 plot recon patrols on Sit Map in conference room.

ENCLOSURE (5)

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DUTIES OF THE G-2 JOURNAL CLERK

1. Maintain and keep current the G-2 Journal Sheet (being certain to close out the Journal daily at 2400H).
2. Assist the G-2 Watch NCO and Officer.
3. During the absence of the Watch NCO assume his duties and inform him of events that occurred in his absence.

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# COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER REPORTS

REPORT NAME	INFORMATION CONTAINED	RECEIVED FROM	DISTRIBUTION
GOLD REPORT	IMPENDING ARVN OPERATIONS	ARVN LIAISON O I CTZ TOC QUANG DA ZONE USMC LSNO	OPS O G-3 WATCH O NCOIC COC G-2 WATCH O
LEAD REPORT	PROGRESS (SITREP) OF ARVN OPERATION	SAME AS GOLD REPORT	OPS O G-2 & G-3 WATCH O NCOIC COC
ZINC REPORT	NOTIFICATION OF ARVN VEHICLE CONVOY	I CTZ TOC ARVN LIAISON O	FSCC OPS O G-3 WATCH O
BLUE SPRINGS ALPHA OR BRAVO	RETRIEVAL OF USAF DRONE A/C	III MAF COC (DROP 10) (VIA TELEPHONE)	7TH MARINES OPS O DASC FSCC
RED HAZE	INFRARED A/C RECONNAISSANCE	III MAF COC (VIA TELEPHONE)	2 COPIES G-2 WATCH O 1 COPY FILE
IR MISSION	INFRARED A/C RECONNAISSANCE	III MAF COC (VIA TELETYPE)	2 COPIES G-2 WATCH O 1 COPY FILE
SLAR MISSION	AIRBORNE RADAR SURVEILLANCE	III MAF COC (VIA TELETYPE)	2 COPIES G-2 WATCH O 1 COPY FILE

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REPORT NAME	INFORMATION CONTAINED	RECEIVED FROM	DISTRIBUTION
BRIGHT LIGHT	SIGHTING OF US POW	ANY UNIT	2 COPIES G-2 WATCH 0 1 COPY FILE (IF TELETYPE)
SPOT INTELLIGENCE REPORT	INTELLIGENCE DATA	III MAF COC (VIA TELETYPE)	2 COPIES G-2 WATCH 0 1 COPY FILE
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN I CORPS FOR ALL UNITS	III MAF COC (VIA TELETYPE)	1 COPY G-2 WATCH 0 1 COPY G-2 WATCH 0 1 COPY FILE
FMAW ANTI-AIR INCIDENTS	ANTI-AIR INCIDENTS FOR PREVIOUS DAY	III MAF COC (VIA TELETYPE) FIRST MAW COC	1 COPY G-2 WATCH 0 1 COPY AIR 0 IN FSCC 1 COPY FILE
FMAW BDA	BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FOR PREVIOUS DAY	III MAF COC (VIA TELETYPE)	1 COPY G-2 WATCH 0 1 COPY AIR 0 IN FSCC 1 COPY FILE
ARC LIGHT STRIKES	INFO ON ARC LIGHT STRIKES	III MAF COC (VIA TELETYPE)	1 COPY C/S 1 COPY G-2 WATCH 0 1 COPY G-3 1 COPY FSCC
NGF MISSION REQUEST	NAVAL GUNFIRE INFO	III MAF COC VIA TELETYPE)	1 COPY FSCC 1 COPY NGF 0 1 COPY FILE
TPQ-10	ANY INFO ON TPQ-10 STRIKES	III MAF COC (VIA TELETYPE) FIRST MAF COC (VIA TELETYPE)	1 COPY FSCC 1 COPY G-2 WATCH 0 1 COPY FILES

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REPORT NAME	INFORMATION CONTAINED	RECEIVED FROM	DISTRIBUTION
SPOT REPORTS	ANY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OR ACTION	ALL DIVISION UNITS	ORIGINAL-G3 JOURNAL 1 COPY OPSO 1 COPY G3 WATCHO 4 COPIES G2 WATCHO 5 COPIES G2 WATCHO IF DETS OR PWS INVOLVED 1 COPY G5 IF INJURY OR DEATH TO VN IS INVOLVED 1 COPY DIV ORDNANCE O IF DUD A/C ORDNANCE INVOLVED 1 COPY III MAF IF US CASUALTIES ARE INVOLVED

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SPOT REPORT

G-3 (COG)

RECD FM: \_\_\_\_\_ DTG RECD: \_\_\_\_\_

A. UNIT: \_\_\_\_\_ B. DTG OF INCIDENT: \_\_\_\_\_

C. COORD: (FRDLY) \_\_\_\_\_ (EN) \_\_\_\_\_

D. INCIDENT: (INCLUDE TYPE OF ATTACK (ASSAULT, ATK BY FIRE) NUMBER OF  
EN, DIR OF MOVEMENT, NUMBER OF FRDLY FORCE, DISTANCE  
BETWEEN EN AND FRDLY, CURRENT STATUS, ETC, NOT TO DELAY  
REPORT)

E. ACTION TAKEN: (UNIT REACTION, ACTION NOW OR PLANNED)

COC PASSED INFO TO:

F. FRDLY KIA \_\_\_\_\_ I. VC KIA \_\_\_\_\_

G. FRDLY WIA MED EVAC \_\_\_\_\_ MINOR \_\_\_\_\_ J. VC KIA(P) \_\_\_\_\_

H. FRDLY MIA \_\_\_\_\_ K. PW \_\_\_\_\_

L. DETAINEES \_\_\_\_\_

M. WPNS CAPTURED: \_\_\_\_\_

N. EQUIP CAPTURED: \_\_\_\_\_

JOURNAL # \_\_\_\_\_, MAP \_\_\_\_\_, RS, G-2, III MAF, ENGR, G-3 OPS, TF XRAY COC

RECD BY: \_\_\_\_\_

TAOR \_\_\_\_\_ SPCL OPN: \_\_\_\_\_ COUNTY FAIR: \_\_\_\_\_

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G-2 SPOT REPORT

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_ TO: \_\_\_\_\_ DTG: \_\_\_\_\_ TOR: \_\_\_\_\_

OPERATION \_\_\_\_\_ (IF APPLICABLE)

TEXT

G-2 COMMENT:

DISSEMINATION

INTERNAL

G-2 \_\_\_\_\_

CI/EI \_\_\_\_\_

JNL \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

G-1 \_\_\_\_\_

G-3 \_\_\_\_\_

G-4 \_\_\_\_\_

G-5 \_\_\_\_\_

III MAF \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

EXTERNAL

1ST MAR \_\_\_\_\_

2/5 \_\_\_\_\_

7TH MAR \_\_\_\_\_

11TH MAR \_\_\_\_\_

1ST RECON \_\_\_\_\_

1ST TKS \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

JNL # \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE (9)



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LAND LINE COMMUNICATIONS

1. COC has a 46 drop switchboard providing direct telephone communications to higher headquarters, adjacent units, supporting units, and primary combat units of the 1st Marine Division. In addition, direct communications are provided the primary Division Staff Officers.

2. The following headquarters can be reached direct through the COC switchboard (ISHERWOOD COC):

- a. III Marine Amphibious Force
- b. 3d Marine Division
- c. Americal Division
- d. Task Force XRAY (When activated)
- e. Detachment C, 5th Special Forces Group A (Marble Mountain)
- f. Special Landing Force (When activated)
- g. 1st Marines
- h. 5th Marines
- i. 7th Marines
- j. 2d Battalion, 5th Marines
- k. 1st Military Police Battalion
- l. 1st Tank Battalion (SSDC)
- m. 11th Marines (NSDC)
- n. 3d Interrogation Translation Team
- o. 9th Interrogation Translation Team

3. The following Officers can be reached direct thru the COC switchboard at indicated stations.

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>QUARTERS</u>
Commanding General	X	X

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Chief of Staff	X	X
Deputy Chief of Staff (shared with Chief of Staff)		X
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	X	X
Deputy G-3, Plans and Current Operations	X	X
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2		X
Assistant G-2, Operations	X	X
Assistant G-3	X	X
Assistant G-4	X	
Command Duty Room	X	
OIC, COC	X	X

4. In addition to the above, the COC switchboard provides internal COC communications as required, and provides additional land line communications through the Division Switchboard (ISHERWOOD) and the Headquarters Battalion switchboard (AUDITOR).

ENCLOSURE (10)

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VOICE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

1. The following voice radio circuits are located in COC Radio Central.

a. Secure

Division TAC 1

Division TAC 2 stand by

III MAF TAC 1

b. Insecure

Special Net FM

Special Net HF

Division Convoy Control FM

Division Convoy Control HF

c. Additionally, COC Radio Central has the capability to activate other Special Nets as may be required.

2. The voice radio circuits in COC are functional circuits to facilitate rapid means of transmitting operational and intelligence traffic. They should not be used for administrative matters unless an emergency situation exists.

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### COC TELETYPE COMMUNICATIONS

1. Teletype communications in the Division COC are functional circuits to facilitate rapid handling of operational and intelligence traffic. There is a lesser degree of formality and recording on these circuits than is necessary on command circuits. COC traffic should not be encumbered with administrative delays inherent in filing, routing and distribution.

#### 2. TELETYPE HANDLING PROCEDURES

a. A COC originated message for transmission to another COC utilizing COC circuits will contain only COC headings.

b. COC messages to be transmitted over command circuits either to ensure receipt by addressees not members of COC circuits, or because of COC communications failure will be delivered to the Division Communication Center with COC headings and appropriate relaying instructions. The Division Communications Center will accomplish the necessary procedures of call sign assignment and message formatting to ensure receipt by addressees.

c. Ditto rolls will not be used in COC teletypewriter printers.

d. Messages containing garbles will be delivered immediately to the COC Watch Officer who will determine which portion of the message he wants serviced. Teletype operators will not hold messages until corrections are received.

e. A copy of all incoming or outgoing messages of command/admin significance will be delivered to the Communications Center with recommended routing for reproduction, distribution and filing.

f. Coincident with the action set forth in sub-paragraph e above, one copy of the message will be immediately routed to the Division Staff Section having cognizance over the subject matter contained in the message.

g. The teletype operator will maintain a log of all incoming and outgoing traffic.

h. The OIC, COC will maintain a file of all incoming and outgoing messages.

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i. The original outgoing machine "Has been sent" copy will be returned to the originating Staff Section and logged out in the check out log. The original message provided by the originating staff section will be maintained in the COC file.

j. All incoming messages will be signed for on the teletype operators log and will be delivered to the G-3 Watch Officer for distribution and filing.

k. COC teletype circuits may be used for command traffic when Communication Center circuits are inoperable and in emergency conditions. However, to insure proper message handling all such messages should first be delivered to the Communications Center who will in turn take necessary action for transmission over COC circuits.

### 3. Releasing Authority

The Commanding General, Assistant Division Commander, Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and those officers authorized in writing by any of the foregoing are authorized to release messages via the COC teletype circuits. Form I Div 2100/5 5-65 shall be used to grant releasing authority.

ENCLOSURE (12)

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

W/OIC  
NOIC  
SECRET CC

DivBul 001300

4/JPG/cag

Ser: 00485-67

11 NOV 1987

DIVISION BULLETIN 001300

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Logistics Instructions for Rotating BLT Undergoing Rehabilitation  
at Subic Bay (U)

Ref: (a) 9th MAB O P001300.5A  
(b) DivO 001300.7A  
(c) 9th MAB O P001300.8  
(d) DivO P4400.7B  
(e) DivO P4600.1E  
(f) DivO P5000.1E

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602  
11 NOV 1987

Encl: (1) Logistics Procedures  
(2) Supply Procedures  
(3) (SC) Embarkation Procedures

1. Purpose. To publish logistics instructions for Special Landing Force Battalion Landing Teams conducting rehabilitation at Subic Bay.

2. Background. Rehabilitation of BLT 3/1 will vary from the normal pattern to the extent that the rehabilitation will be accomplished at Subic Bay instead of at Okinawa. The rehabilitation at Subic Bay will be accomplished with in the same general concepts, objectives and framework outlined in references (a) and (b) as modified by reference (c). Since the rehabilitation on Okinawa was primarily a 3rd Force Service Regiment function with 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade units providing only operating stocks and Table of Equipment items, the same type of operation will be employed at Subic Bay. 3rd FSR, augmented by equipment and personnel from 9th MAB, will be responsible for maintenance and item rehabilitation. 9th MAB will retain responsibility for procurement and issue of operating stocks and T/E items to units of the BLT.

3. Logistics Procedures. Enclosure (1) prescribes the logistics procedures in rehabilitation of the BLT.

4. Supply Procedures. Enclosure (2) prescribes supply accounting procedures.

5. Embarkation Instructions. Enclosure (3) prescribes embarkation instructions.

6. Prescribed Levels of Supplies

a. The following will constitute the prescribed level of supplies for

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SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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units comprising the SLF:

Class I		15 days MCI and fuel compressed trioxane
Class II	Type 1	Initial T/E or prescribed allowances; 30 day replacement at combat active rates, including individual clothing
	Type 2	All operating stocks on hand; 15 days of dry cell batteries and a 30 day replenishment of non T/A items; 30 day operating level of spare parts
Class III		2 days MOGAS, 4 days diesel and 15 days of special oils, lubricants and packaged products, plus embarked LFORM
Class IV		Authorized allowances, to include for the BLT, field fortification material of 5000 sandbags, 600 metal posts, 60 rolls of barbed wire, and 100 coils of concertina, plus embarked LFORM
Class V		15 DOA plus mobile loaded basic allowance
Medical Block		30 days
Clothing Block		30 days
LSU Support Block		30 days

b. The infantry and artillery batteries will embark with T/E allowances of Class II, Type 1 (less sleeping bags, case sleeping bag, and hood field coat), plus 30 day replacement based on T/A combat active rates of T/E items and 30 day operating level of spare parts.

c. The 105mm artillery battery will be furnished one AN/MRC-83 by the parent artillery battalion, in addition to T/E allowances.

d. Attached units of the BLT that do not have a prescribed T/E will carry allowances as established in Appendix A to enclosure (4) of reference (b) as modified below, plus a 30 day operating level of Class II, Type 2. Spare parts will be furnished at Subic Bay by the Task Organized Supply Section of RLT-26 (Rear).

<u>Unit</u>	<u>T/A No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Change</u>
All	41020	Blanket, bed	Add: except one per indiv recon units
	41160	Hood, field coat	Delete
	43040	Canteen	Add: except eight per indiv recon units

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>T/A No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Change</u>
All	43050	Carrier, entrenching tool	Add: except seven per plt recon units
	43090	Case, sleeping bag	Delete
	43115	Cover, canteen	Add: except six per indiv recon units
	43160	Haversack	Add: except recon units
	43190	Entrenching tool	Add: except seven per plt recon units
	43200	Knapsack	Add: except recon units
	43230	Line, tent	Add: except recon units
	43235	Liner, poncho	Add: one per indiv
	43290	Pin, Tent, shelter half	Add: except recon units
	43320	Pole, section, tent	Add: except recon units
	43330	Poncho	Add: except two per indiv recon units
	43350	Shelter half, tent	Add: except recon units
	43360	Bag, sleeping	Delete
	43380	Suspenders, field pack	Add: except recon units
Recon Plt (Rein)			
Recon Bn	22260	Receiver Nancy C-3	Delete
	43385	Suspenders, field pack combat	Add: one per indiv
	45370	Boat, landing, CO2 inflatable	Add: one
	84670	Rucksack	Add: one per indiv
Det Shore Party Bn	21675	Public address set, AN/PIQ-5	Delete
	43001	Body armor lower	Change to ten
	44840	Extinguisher, dry, 4 lb	Change to five
	50913	Trailer, cargo, 4T, M416B1	Change to one
	51120	Truck, 2 1/2T, M-35	Delete
Tk Plt (Rein)	51180	Truck, M-54	Add: one

Next line after unit identification Hq Co, Inf Regt, add unit identification Det Hq Bn.

e. Sufficient amounts of Class V for security of movement to embarkation site will be taken from on position assets. Prior to actual embarkation, ammunition will be collected from individuals and stored in ships ammunition spaces.

f. Special allowances in accordance with enclosure (2).



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7. Rear Area Storage

a. Warehouse space presently occupied by 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines will be vacated by 1 December 1967.

b. An inspection will be conducted by a representative of the G-4 Section with a representative of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines at a mutually acceptable time.

8. Cantonment Area

a. The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines will ensure that vacated cantonment areas are thoroughly policed.

b. Cantonment areas will not be stripped of tin, lumber, and electrical facilities. Butler buildings and other pre-engineered structures will not be dismantled.

c. A joint inspection of cantonment areas will be conducted by representatives of the outgoing and incoming BLT's and a Division G-4 representative and a report of the results made in writing to this Headquarters (Attn: ACofS, G-4).

9. Advance Party. The BLT will provide an advance party to Subic Bay to coordinate training, administration, billeting, and logistics with 9th MAB representatives. Personnel should arrive at Subic Bay not later than 5 days prior to the arrival of the BLT. Instructions as to the date will be published.

10. Liberty Uniform. Summer Service "C" with jungle boots or civilian clothing.

11. Self-cancellation. 1 May 1968.

*H. J. Woessner*  
H. J. WOESSNER  
Chief of Staff

## DISTRIBUTION: "E"

G-1	(1)	Embark	(1)	CO 1st SP Bn	(1)
G-2	(1)	CO 1st Mar	(1)	CO 1st Tk Bn	(1)
G-3	(1)	CO 5th Mar	(1)	BLT 2/3	(1)
G-4	(2)	CO Hq Bn	(1)		
OrdO	(1)	CO 11th Mar	(1)	Copy to:	
CEO	(1)	CO 3rd Bn 1st Mar	(3)	CG FMFPac	(2)
Compt	(1)	CO 1st MT Bn	(1)	COMSEVENTHFLT	(1)
Engr	(1)	CO 3rd AmTrac Bn	(1)	CG III MAF	(3)
Air	(1)	CO 1st Med Bn	(1)	CG 3rd MarDiv	(2)
Surg	(1)	CO 1st Bn 11th Mar	(1)	CG 9th MAB	(3)
Supply	(1)	CO 2nd Bn 11th Mar	(1)	CG FLC/FSR	(3)
COC	(1)	CO 1st Recon Bn	(1)	FMFPac LnO Subic	(1)
Insp	(1)	CO 1st AT Bn	(1)	CTG 79	(2)
MTO	(1)	CO 1st Engr Bn	(1)	CTG 79.5	(2)
				CTF 76	(1)
				CTF 76.5	(1)
				CO 3rd FSR	(2)

SECRET

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11 Nov 1967 (7)LOGISTICS PROCEDURES**SECRET**

1. REHABILITATION. Rehabilitation of BLT 3/1 will vary from the normal pattern to the extent that the rehabilitation will be accomplished at Subic Bay instead of at Okinawa. The rehabilitation at Subic Bay will be accomplished within the general concepts, objectives and framework outlined in reference (c). Since the rehabilitation on Okinawa was primarily a 3rd Force Service Regiment function with 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade units providing only operating stocks and Table of Equipment items, the same type of operation will be employed at Subic Bay. 3rd FSR, augmented by equipment and personnel from 9th MAB, will retain responsibility for procurement and issue of operating stocks and T/E items to units of the BLT.

2. LOGISTICS PROCEDURES

a. Thirty days prior to embarkation in RVN a limited technical inspection/inventory of equipment and supplies will be conducted for all units included in the intra-theater rotation program, utilizing 3rd FSR personnel. The LTI/inventory will be provided to the Commanding Officer, 3rd FSR a minimum of 20 days prior to embarkation.

b. All elements of the BLT will embark with their own equipment in an "as is" condition and that equipment will be retained by the unit throughout the rotation cycle except as exchanged/replaced by 9th MAB. Exchange of equipment between elements of the BLT and other units is not permitted. Upon completion of LTI's units will ensure that equipment that has been LTI'd is not exchanged or replaced prior to departure for Subic.

c. Units of the rotational BLT will continue to submit equipment for repair in accordance with current procedures as modified below:

(1) TEROS for equipment presently in for repair will be upgraded to priority 02, with a RDD not later than 29 November 1967.

(2) TEROS will not be submitted after 26 November for equipment to be embarked with the BLT.

(3) TEROS submitted for equipment being turned in for repair will indicate a RDD of not later than 29 November 1967, with a priority 02, and "for BLT 3/1" in the remarks portion of the TERO.

d. Units will ensure that equipment is not left in repair shops when the BLT departs RVN. If repairs are unable to be completed prior to embarkation, items will be reassembled and evacuated with the BLT. Equipment will not be turned in after the BLT is activated in RVN except where assurance is provided that the item will be repaired and returned prior to embarkation.

e. Items which have been coded "H" will be embarked and taken to Subic Bay for turn in to 3rd FSR detachment there.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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f. Classes I, III, IV and V from on position assets will not be embarked. Therefore, all Class I, III, IV and V will be invoiced to the relieving unit except for sufficient Class V for the security of movement to the embarkation site.

3. DEPLOYMENT ENROUTE. In the event of contingency deployment enroute, other than in ICTZ, RVN; LFORM supplies will be utilized. Additional supplies will be provided to the BLT by the CG, 9th MAB and the CO, 3rd FSR by the most expeditious means available.

4. M-16E1 RIFLE. Sufficient assets of M-16 rifles and .45 caliber pistols will be available at Subic Bay to allow a complete turnover of weapons. The infantry battalion will exchange M-16's and all units will exchange .45 caliber pistols. Maximum use of a turnover will substantially reduce extensive required small arms repair time. All attached units will receive M-16 rifles before leaving RVN. Parent units will insure that training is accomplished prior to embarkation in RVN.

5. CANTONMENT. The BLT will ensure that vacated cantonment areas are thoroughly policed and suitable for immediate occupancy, by mutual consent of the commanders concerned.

#### 6. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN BLT EQUIPMENT REHABILITATION

a. Thirty days prior to rotation out of country, contact teams from 3rd FSR, as augmented by Provisional Service Battalion personnel, will LTI the designated BLT's equipment to determine what can be repaired within the rehabilitation time frame, and what will require replacement.

b. The contact teams, in addition to determining those items to be replaced, will also determine which equipment can be repaired during the rehabilitation time frame and what parts support is required. The parts will be procured and pre-positioned at Subic Bay.

c. 3rd FSR will pre-position equipment to be replaced, from BLT Layette assets, at Subic Bay. Liaison between 3rd FSR and FLC will be effected to obtain required end items not available in the Layette. The items will be issued to the BLT, without exchange, to be transported to Subic Bay along with the item replaced. Upon arrival at Subic the inoperative end items will be turned in to 3rd FSR personnel.

d. The designated rehabilitation period will be used primarily to effect the exchange of designated BLT end items from the pre-positioned Layette. The maintenance effort will be directed toward bringing inoperative equipment up to combat operational status through component replacement. If an item cannot be replaced and cannot be made combat operational within the rehabilitation period, it will, with the consent of the BLT commander, be retained in the maintenance facility during the training period. Upon completion of the training period all combat operational items available will be provided to the BLT. Any combat essential items remaining inoperative at the time of the BLT's departure will be repaired as soon as possible and shipped to the BLT on the first available transportation.

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SUPPLY PROCEDURESDivBul 001300  
11 Nov 1967**SECRET**

1. SUPPLY PROCEDURES FOR ROTATING BATTALION LANDING TEAM. Upon notification that a rotating battalion landing team (BLT) will be activated the following actions will be taken:

a. Division Headquarters

- (1) Form an "attached units supply section".
- (2) Convene a meeting of supply officers from the infantry battalion and parent units of all attachments to discuss procedures and insure a clear understanding of all requirements.
- (3) Monitor activation and subsequent supply operation of battalion landing team through embarkation.

b. Infantry Battalion

- (1) Conduct organic supply operations for own unit.
- (2) Provide space and assistance as required for the "attached units supply section".
- (3) Provide supply support of common items to attached units as required. In country support will normally be provided by parent unit.
- (4) Assign block of serial numbers to the attached units supply sections for use in requisitioning peculiar "as required" items.

c. Parent account of attached units

- (1) Prepare an allowance list in the format shown in figure 2-1, MCO P4400.15C. On hand, short, over and remarks block will be current as of the date material is invoiced to the infantry battalion (attached units supply section).
- (2) Prepare invoice, DD 1149/DD 1348, for all equipment (expendable and non-expendable) going to the infantry battalion. Separate invoice will be prepared on expendable and non-expendable supplies.
- (3) Memorandum Receipt Cards for individual equipment and weapons will be furnished for all personnel.
- (4) Prepare NAVMC 708 cards for all items being invoiced to the infantry battalion. Complete all required entries.
- (5) Prepare NAVMC 713 cards and interfile with NAVMC 708 cards where applicable. Complete all required entries.
- (6) Prepare NAVMC 10359 (Equipment Custody Record Cards) and complete to

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include current signatures of responsible officer who is a member of the attached unit.

(7) Deliver allowance list, invoices, NAVMC 708, 713, and 10359 cards to infantry battalion (prior to 20 November 1967). The supply officer/supply chief will accompany records which will be examined for completeness and accuracy by Division Supply Material Management Team.

(8) Ensure that all supply publications, SL-3's and SL-4's are furnished the units' maintenance section on all equipment.

d. 9th MAB/TOSS Supply Assistance

(1) Representatives of 9th MAB Supply and Task Organized Supply Section RLT-26 (Rear) (TOSS) will conduct liaison visit to the BLT in accordance with reference (c) to review shortages of operating stocks and T/E deficiencies. Deficiencies will be requisitioned from FLC for the 30 day period in country plus an additional 30 days; the items that cannot be obtained from FLC will be requisitioned from 3rd FSR. As directed by the 9th MAB Supply Liaison Team, these supplies will be shipped to Subic Bay.

2. REQUISITIONING. Upon receipt of warning order the following steps will be taken by all units to complete BLT equipment and supplies from RVN supply source (MC 100).

a. Infantry Battalion

(1) Thirty day replacement, based on T/A combat active rate, of Table of Equipment for BLT.

(2) Complete Table of Equipment requirements.

(3) Thirty day operating level of Class II Type II supplies including spare parts and clothing.

b. Attached Units

(1) Complete Table of Equipment.

(2) Thirty day operating level of Class II Type II supplies including clothing. (Thirty day block of repair parts will be furnished attached units at Subic Bay).

c. Artillery Attached Unit

(1) In addition to the requirements in paragraph 2.b, artillery attached unit will requisition thirty day operating level of spare parts.

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d. Upon a date to be specified by 9th MAB, 10 days after issue of warning order, all unfilled requisitions for the requirements specified above will be requisitioned from 3rd FSR (MR 100). These requisitions will be hand carried to the 3rd FSR by the 9th MAB Supply Liaison Section. Specific instructions for the preparation of these requisitions will be issued when received from 9th MAB.

3. GARRISON PROPERTY/ENCAMPMENT GARRISON T/E ALLOWANCES/CLASS IV FIELD FORTIFICATION. Unless otherwise directed all Class IV field fortification, garrison property, encampment/garrison allowances as listed in the Table of Equipment will remain in place (RVN) and will be turned over to the relieving unit. A report will be made to this Headquarters 15 days prior to embarkation (copy to CG, III MAF) using the following format, and separated into the categories listed above:

<u>T/A NO.</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>CONDITION CODE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
----------------	------------	-------------	------------	-----------------------	-----------------

a. Property will be invoiced to the relieving unit on DD 1149/DD 1348 with separate invoices for expendable and non-expendable equipment to relieving unit. Encampment/garrison allowance is as listed in Table of Equipment.

b. All garrison property will be signed over to the relieving unit by the III MAF Garrison Property Officer. The unit being relieved and the relieving garrison property officer will report to the III MAF Garrison Property Officer two days prior to the departure of the BLT.

c. Special allowance and monsoon items will be the subject of separate correspondence.

4. CLOTHING. Each member of the BLT will have in his possession the following articles of clothing:

a. Organizational Clothing

- (1) Jungle Utilities - 3 sets.
- (2) Towels, green - 2 each.
- (3) Coat, mans, field - 1 each

b. Special Clothing

- (1) Jungle boots - 2 pair.
- (2) Drawers, green - 3 pair.
- (3) Undershirt, green - 3 each.

c. Monsoon Clothing and Equipment

- (1) Rainsuit - 1 each.

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(2) Shower shoes - 1 each.

(3) Liner, poncho - 1 each.

d. In Kind Clothing. As required by paragraph 203.1 of reference (d).

(1) The liberty uniform will be khaki cotton.

(2) Survey of in kind clothing will be in accordance with reference (d).

(3) Cash sales for clothing will be available at Subic Bay.

5. FISCAL ACCOUNTING. Funding for the BLT will be the responsibility of 9th MAB beginning with submission of the requisition specified in paragraph 2d.

a. Requisitions will be prepared for submission direct to 3rd FSR (MR 100) and must include the following cost code in block 23:

(1) Digit two - Major Command Code "P"

(2) Digit three - Parent Command Code "K"

(3) Digits four and five - Unit Code "MC" for Division type units and "MN" for Force type units, i.e.,

8PKMC--~~000~~ for Division units

8PKMN--~~000~~ for Force units

b. Fiscal Reporting. In order that positive control over funds is maintained, a twice monthly report of obligations will be reported to CG, 9th MAB starting when the requisitions are submitted for the BLT as specified in paragraph 2d. The report to be as of the 15th and last day of each month, due on the 17th and 2nd of each month. The report consists of the total of obligations to date obligated against 9th MAB's funds.

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1st Marine Division (-) (Rain), FMF  
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
 150800H November 1967

Operation Order 306-68 (Counter-Rocket)

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6540 I, II, 6541 II; 6640 I, II, III, IV; 6641 II, III  
 (b) CG III MAF LOI 4-67  
 (c) III MAF Operation Order 308-67  
 (d) 1stMarDiv Operation Order 301-68  
 (e) Division Order 03120.19 (Counter Rocket Program)  
 (f) 1stMarDiv Operation Order 308-68 (Waterway Control)  
 (g) Division Order 3480.1  
 (h) 1stMarDiv Administrative Order 301-68  
 (i) 1stMarDiv GEOI P02000.2

**S & C FILES**  
**HEADQUARTERS**  
**1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF**  
**67 4612**  
 Copy 33 of 187 copies

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Current Monthly Task Organization Report

# 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.
- b. Friendly Forces
  - (1) References (b), (c) and (d).
  - (2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing conducts aerial counterinsurgency operations against enemy of GVN in ICTZ; provides fixed and rotary wing tactical units for all weather support of III MAF ground forces; provides aerial photo coverage as requested; and participates in air defense of ICTZ as directed by higher authority.
    - (a) Rotary and fixed wing tactical units provide airborne surveillance of the rocket belt and the approach routes thereto.
    - (b) Flare ships remain on station during hours of darkness, providing illumination on call.
    - (c) VMCJ provides aerial photo coverage as requested, to include vertical photography of rocket launcher sites. Appendix 2 (Exploitation of Enemy Attack by Rockets) to Annex B (Intelligence).

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- (3) Commanding Officer, 1st Military Police Battalion, Air Base Defense Battalion for III Marine Amphibious Force, provides ground security for III Marine Amphibious Force zone of DA NANG complex. Reference (c).
- (4) Commanding General, Force Logistic Command, provides Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, as required, for employment with Rocket Investigation Teams. Appendix 2 (Exploitation of Enemy Attack by Rockets) to Annex B (Intelligence).

c. Attachments and Detachments. Current monthly Task Organization Report.

## 2. MISSION

1st Marine Division participates in the defense of the DA NANG vital area, denies the enemy access to the rocket belt and to the positions from which rocket fire could be delivered into the DA NANG vital area, and maintains capability to seek out, fix and destroy enemy rocket forces.

## 3. EXECUTION

### a. Concept of Operations

- (1) The 1st Marine Division (-) (Rein) defends the DA NANG vital area with two infantry regiments, reinforced, together with supporting arms including air and naval gunfire, with particular attention to denying, detecting, attacking and destroying hostile rocket forces.
- (2) Two reinforced infantry regiments are positioned astride the rocket belt with battalions oriented toward main enemy avenues of approach from the northwest, west and south. Vigorous surveillance is continuously maintained within the rocket belt utilizing all types of patrol activity supplemented by observation posts and mechanical surveillance means as appropriate.
- (3) Supporting arms supplement and are coordinated with surveillance activities. Observation posts and searchlights are positioned to obtain maximum effectiveness and coverage within rocket belt and approaches thereto. Counter-rocket fire is capable of early and accurate massed response.
- (4) Artillery, air and organic infantry battalion supporting arms are principal reaction means. Each infantry unit in

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the rocket belt vicinity maintains a reaction force continuously in order to immediately exploit attack by fire on enemy positions and block escape routes. Helicopters, LVT's, motor transport and armor are used as available to facilitate movement of reaction forces.

- (5) Naval gunfire, as available, is employed to supplement counter-rocket fires.
- (6) Annex A (Operation Overlay) and Annex B (Intelligence).

b. 5th Marines (Rein)

- (1) Maintain forces within assigned TAOR with particular attention to rocket belt, area south of rocket belt and coastal area. Annex A (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Concentrate surveillance effort on main enemy avenues of approach and subsidiary routes into the rocket belt in TAOR.
- (3) Conduct high density patrol and surveillance activity within the rocket belt. Provide for complete coverage of the rocket belt in TAOR with requisite security elements.
- (4) Maintain, in coordination with GVN authorities, positive control of waterways within TAOR. Reference (f).
- (5) Be prepared to provide a reaction force for immediate employment in TAOR to destroy hostile rocket forces and to block possible enemy escape routes using best available means of mobility.

c. 7th Marines (Rein)

- (1) Maintain forces within assigned TAOR with one battalion assigned responsibility for each main enemy avenue of approach. Annex A (Operation Overlay) and Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Concentrate surveillance effort on main enemy avenues of approach and subsidiary routes into the rocket belt in TAOR.
- (3) Conduct high density patrol and surveillance activity to provide for complete coverage of that portion of rocket belt in TAOR.
- (4) Maintain, in coordination with GVN authorities, positive control of waterways within TAOR. Reference (f).

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- (5) Be prepared to provide a reaction force for immediate employment in TAOR to destroy hostile rocket forces and to block possible enemy escape routes using best available means of mobility.
- d. 2d Battalion (Rein), 5th Marines. Continue operations in presently assigned TAOR.
- e. 11th Marines (-) (Rein)/Northern Sector Defense Command
  - (1) 11th Marines (-) (Rein)
    - (a) Annex C (Supporting Arms).
    - (b) Reference (e) (Division Counter-Rocket Program).
    - (c) Coordinate surveillance from OP's and the utilization of searchlights.
    - (d) Coordinate counter-rocket fire efforts throughout the rocket belt.
    - (e) Establish Rocket Investigation Teams. Appendix 2 (Exploitation of Enemy Attacks by Rockets) to Annex B (Intelligence). Coordinate assembly and employment of teams at both launch and impact sites.
  - (2) Northern Sector Defense Command
    - (a) Be prepared to provide close-in support in the area enclosed by the rocket belt in zone.
    - (b) Establish and maintain counter-rocket observation posts. TAB A (Counter-Rocket Observation/Control) to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Supporting Arms).
- f. 1st Tank Battalion (-)/Southern Sector Defense Command
  - (1) Be prepared to provide close-in support in the area enclosed by the rocket belt in zone.
  - (2) Be prepared to provide immediate reaction forces as requested. Annex D (Provisional Rifle Company).
  - (3) Establish and maintain counter-rocket observation posts. TAB A (Counter-Rocket Observation/Control) to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Supporting Arms).

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g. 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein)

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Provide reconnaissance coverage over main enemy avenues of approach and subsidiary routes leading into the Division TAOR. Emphasis in the reconnaissance zone.

h. 1st Engineer Battalion (-) (Rein)

- (1) General support.
- (2) Be prepared to provide mine clearance teams to sweep rocket launch sites and adjacent areas as requested.

i. 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion (-) (Rein)

- (1) General support.
- (2) Be prepared to provide amphibian tractors as required for rapid deployment of reaction forces and for employment in waterway control.

j. 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-)11th Motor Transport Battalion

- (1) General support.
- (2) Be prepared to provide transportation as required for displacements of forces in accordance with this order.

k. 7th Communication Battalion (-)

- (1) General support.
- (2) Be prepared to provide an immediate reaction force as required. Annex D (Provisional Rifle Company).

l. 1st Antitank Battalion (-)

- (1) General support.
- (2) Be prepared to provide an immediate reaction force as required. Annex D (Provisional Rifle Company).

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- m. Headquarters Battalion (Rein). Provide photo team for rocket investigation teams. Appendix 2 (Exploitation of Enemy Attack by Rockets) to Annex B (Intelligence).
- n. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) Annex C (Supporting Arms).
  - (2) Reference (d) (1stMarDiv OperO 301-68).
  - (3) Reference (e) (Division Counter-Rocket Program).
  - (4) Reference (f) (1stMarDiv OperO 301-68, Waterway Control).
  - (5) Submit patrol plans to G-3, this headquarters (Attn: COC), in accordance with Annex C to Enclosure (5) of reference (g) (Operational Reports).
  - (6) Execute patrol plans as submitted and approved. Prior approval required from this headquarters before exception to patrol plan permitted. If emergency requires immediate change to plan, notify this headquarters of nature of emergency and action taken.
  - (7) Aerial observers provide reconnaissance coverage over the rocket belt and beyond the rocket belt, with emphasis on the enemy main avenues of approach and subsidiary routes.
  - (8) Units make maximum use of SID's, AN/TPS-21's, Starlight Scopes, illumination, and any other mechanical means or devices that assist with surveillance activity within the rocket belt and its approaches.
  - (9) In the event of rocket attack, the TAOR commander will secure the launch sites until the arrival of the Rocket Investigation Team dispatched by this headquarters. Ensure that only personnel authorized by division or higher headquarters enter the site, and that security personnel do not disturb the site or move enemy equipment or material.
  - (10) The vital area of the DA NANG complex is centered on two points: AT998763 and BT007737.
  - (11) The rocket belt is defined as that area that falls between radii drawn 8,000 and 12,000 meters from the two points identified in (10) above.
  - (12) This order supercedes and cancels Operation Order 90-67.

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## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Administrative Order 301-68.

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Reference (i) (Division CEOI PO2000.2\_).
- b. Code Name. The code name "FIRE ARROW" is used to identify message traffic dealing with enemy rocket threat. The words "FIRE ARROW" follow the subject of such a message.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



H. J. WOESSNER  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

## ANNEXES:

- ✓A - Operation Overlay
- ✓B - Intelligence
- ✓C - Supporting Arms
- ✓D - Provisional Rifle Company
- ✓E - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex E (Distribution) to Operation Order 306-68.

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1st Marine Division (-) (Rein) FMF  
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
150800H November 1967

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 306-68

References: (a) Maps 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6641 II, III, IV;  
6541 II; 6540 I; and 6640 I, II, III, IV.  
(b) 1st MarDiv Rocket Study 2/EBS/dwn over 3800/1 dtd 13Aug67  
(c) 1st MarDiv Rocket Study update 2/EBS/pjp over 3800/1 dtd  
1Sep67

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. See Special Intelligence Estimates (references (b) and (c)).

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

a. Essential Elements of Information

- (1) Determine if the enemy will employ rockets to attack the vital area; if so when, where and in what strength and the type and caliber of rockets to be employed.
- (2) Determine identification of unit(s) which will be employed in the attacks.
- (3) Determine avenues of approach and egress the enemy will use to transport rockets into the area and exit from the area, with particular attention to waterways.
- (4) Determine enemy resources available to support the attack.

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS

a. Area of Collection Responsibility

- (1) All commands are responsible for the collection effort within their respective areas of responsibility with special attention directed toward:

Group 4  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
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- (a) Maximum use of available intrusion detection devices.
  - (b) Remaining constantly alert for information/indications which could lead to the capture/destruction or aborting of any enemy force or effort of any enemy force threatening the vital area with rockets.
- b. Orders for subordinate units. In addition to responsibility stipulated in subparagraph 3a above:
- (1) 5th Marines (-) (Rein)
    - (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations in Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) with emphasis on daylight surveillance and night patrolling, especially in those areas considered the rocket belt, main and subsidiary avenues of approach, waterways and coastal area.
  - (2) 7th Marines (Rein)
    - (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations in TAOR with emphasis on daylight surveillance and night patrolling of the eastern end of Elephant Valley, Happy Valley, Thuong Due Valley, Charlie Ridge, main and subsidiary avenues of approach and waterways.
  - (3) 2nd Bn, 5th Marines (Rein)
    - (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations in TAOR with emphasis on daylight surveillance and night patrolling.
  - (4) 11th Marines (-) (Rein)/Northern Sector Defense Command
    - (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations within sector and conduct Air Observer/Visual Reconnaissance (AO/VR) daily coverage of the rocket belt.
    - (b) Maintain maximum surveillance from established observation posts (OP's).
  - (5) 1st Tank Bn (-)/Southern Sector Defense Command
    - (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations within Sector.
    - (b) Maintain maximum surveillance from established observation posts (OP's).
  - (6) 3rd Amphibian Tractor Bn (-) (Rein)
    - (a) Conduct Intelligence Operations within Sector.



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(b) Maintain maximum surveillance from established OP's.

(7) 1st Reconnaissance Bn (Rein)

- (a) Conduct area, route and point reconnaissance throughout the Reconnaissance Zone (RZ).
- (b) Conduct reconnaissance screen for company/battalion/regimental operations as directed.
- (c) In addition, provide reconnaissance to cover likely avenues of approach and egress the enemy could use to launch or withdraw from an attack on the vital area.

b. Request to Higher and Adjacent Commands

(1) CG, III MAF

- (a) Provide as obtained any information to satisfy the intelligence requirements.
- (b) In addition, provide information as obtained on the 122mm or comparable rockets in the following areas:
  - 1. Technical characteristics and standard method of employment.
  - 2. Number of trained personnel required for effective employment.
  - 3. What is the maximum ordinate?
  - 4. Any information which could assist the Division in preventing or neutralizing any rocket attack on the vital area.
- (c) Provide sidelooking airborne radar (SLAR) coverage as requested for major waterways.

(2) CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

- (a) Provide observation and surveillance aircraft as requested to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the TAOR on a 24 hour basis.
- (b) Provide on-call vertical photo coverage as requested.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL:

a. Prisoners of War

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(1) See Division Order 3461.2

b. Documents and Material

(1) See Division Order 3800.1

5. MAPS, CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

a. Maps and Charts

(1) See Division Order 3800.1

b. Photographs

(1) See Division Order 3800.1

c. Overlays

(1) Appendix 1; Road, Trail, River and Stream Overlay.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Information concerning rocket attacks on the vital area is a continuous target for all counterintelligence agencies.

b. Payment of a reward of up to \$100,000 Piasters for information leading to neutralization or capture of rocket/launchers is authorized.

7. REPORTS

a. Timely reports on movements, flashes or any other indication of rocket attacks are mandatory.

b. All units submit spot reports by fastest means available in accordance with Division SOP.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

*H. J. Woessner*  
H. J. WOESSNER  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX

1. Road, Trail, River and Stream Overlay (To be issued).
2. Exploitation of Enemy Attack by Rockets.

DISTRIBUTION: Annex E (Distribution) to Operation Order 306.58

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1st Marine Division (-) (Rein)  
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
 150800H November 1967

APPENDIX 2, (EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY ATTACK BY ROCKETS) TO ANNEX B  
 (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPERATION ORDE 306-68

Reference: (a) CG, III MAF ltr 21C/FAG/jpp over 3800/3 dtd 27Jul67 (NOTAL)

Time Zone: H

1. BACKGROUND

a. This appendix provides command guidance for exploitation of enemy attack by rockets or other new weapons posing a threat to the vital area within this Division TAOR.

2. ACTION REQUIRED

a. After the firing site has been neutralized and the danger eliminated, the responsible area/sector commander will insure the area is isolated and only the Rocket Investigation Team is authorized to enter the area.

b. Rocket Investigation Team for the Launch Position Area. This Team consists of:

<u>TYPE TEAM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PROV CMD</u>
Artillery Specialist	1			11th Marines
Team Commander				
Air Observer (AO)	1		KE-28 Camera	11th Marines/G-2 AO
Survey Team	1	4	Aiming Circle	11th Marines
			M2 Compass	
			50 Meter Tape	
			Maps	
ROD Team	1	2	Demo Kit	FIC
Photo Team	1	2	Wpns Characteristics	Hq Bn
Intelligence		2	List & Information	G-2
Specialists			As required	
Security as required				Sector or TAOR Cmdr

c. Rocket Investigation Team for the Impact Area. This team consists of:

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<u>TYPE TEAM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>PROV CMD</u>
Shell Report Team	1	4	Aiming Circle M2 Compass 50 meter tape Maps	11th Marines
Air Observer Security As Required	1		KE-28 Camera As required	11th Marines/G-2 Air Observer Sector or TAOR Cmdr

d. CG, 1st MAF provides "on call" aerial photo coverage as requested by CG, 1st MarDiv.

e. CO, 11th Marines coordinates assembly and employment of teams. Direct liaison directed.

f. CG, FLC provides EOD teams as requested herein.

### 3. REPORTS

a. All information gathered/observed by infantry units/technicians will be forwarded this Headquarters (Attn: G-2) at the earliest.

b. Special emphasis is placed on information required by TAB A.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

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TAB A

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1st Marine Division (-) (Rein)  
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
150800H November 1967

TAB A: (After Action Check List) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation  
Order 306-68

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF ROCKET ATTACK

- a. Where? (Installation/area name). What was target or apparent target of rocket attack?
- b. When? Duration?
- c. Number of rounds by type.
- d. Were rockets fired singly, in salvo, or in ripples?
- e. Were mortars or other weapons fired in conjunction with rockets?
- f. Did enemy follow up rocket attack with ground attack? Describe.
- g. Did enemy launch any diversionary (or apparent diversionary) attacks in conjunction with rocket attack? Describe.

II. FRIENDLY DEFENSIVE POSTURE TIME OF ATTACK

- a. Command responsible for rocket defense of area attacked by rockets?
- b. Does command have an integrated defense plan to detect/prevent/counter rocket attack? In writing?
- c. Describe patrol activity within 2000 meters of rocket position areas for 3 day period preceding attack.
- d. At what levels is patrol activity coordinated? At what level is the night's patrol activity within the command approved?
- e. What route of ingress into rocket position was most probably used? Describe reconnaissance activity along this route over week preceding attack.
- f. Were routes of ingress interdicted prior to attack? By artillery? By air? Evaluate effort.
- g. What coordination arrangements were in effect with province/district/FWF/RVNAF and US Forces in area surrounding rocket firing position?
- h. What measures were in effect to obtain rocket information from villagers, ARVN/RF/PF, other sources in rocket belt and approaches thereto?

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i. What countermeasures were in effect in area of rocket positions at time of attack? Towers, observation posts (OP's), air observers (AO's), electronic detection devices, night vision devices, countermortar/counterbattery (CM/CB) radar, searchlights (white light and infrared), sidelooking airborne radar/infrared (SLAR/IR) detection, minefields, barriers, ambushes, etc.

j. What offensive operations were conducted in area of rocket positions over month preceding attack? Size, type and location each operation?

**III. FRIENDLY REACTION**

- a. How were rocket positions initially located?
- b. How soon were they located?
- c. When and what was first counterfire delivered?
- d. Total rounds, counterfire by type? Include direct fire weapons, if applicable.
- e. Air contribution to counterfire?
- f. Was clearance to fire requested from district/province headquarters? How long did it take to obtain clearance? Who authorized counterfire to commence?
- g. Are procedures in effect to fire without obtaining clearance? Describe.
- h. Were ground reaction forces inserted? Size? How? Where? When?
- i. Did ground reaction force make contact with enemy? Locate rocket positions?
- j. Were routes of egress from rocket positions interdicted following attack? By what means? Total rounds interdiction fire by type. Air contribution to interdiction fire?

**IV. ROCKET POSITION AREA ANALYSIS**

- a. Was on-the-ground inspection of rocket positions made? By designated rocket position inspection team?
- b. Was rocket position inspection check list used?
- c. Number of rocket positions? Number individual rocket launch sites each position.
- d. Coordinates of rocket positions? How determined? Survey or map inspection?

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e. Prepare diagram for each rocket position. Measure and record all pertinent dimensions for each position and individual rocket launch sites within each position.

f. Direction of fire (azimuth)? ~~Firing angle of~~ elevation? Distance to mask? ~~Height of mask?~~

g. Describe, in narrative form, organization of position area and development of firing site. In open area? Near river? Hasty position? Near hamlet? Near friendly positions? Defensive positions constructed in area (as distinguished from firing control pits or crew protective shelters during firing)? Routes of ingress and egress?

h. Photograph position area and rocket firing sites. Include photos which show relation of position to surrounding terrain, direction of fire, and suspected routes of ingress and egress.

i. Photograph ordnance and abandoned enemy waste/equipment/material in place, as found. Follow up with close-up shots in posed position, as appropriate. Identify ordnance found, country/year of manufacture. Recover all items.

j. Any evidence of prior preparation for attack; i.e., burying or hiding equipment/ordnance until time for use?

k. Any evidence of mode of transportation of rockets and launchers?

l. Any evidence of enemy casualties? Any evidence of enemy discarding ordnance/equipment along routes of egress?

m. Estimate effect of counterfire.

n. Attitude of populace in vicinity rocket positions? Pacification ratings of hamlets in vicinity?

o. List indications of attack obtained prior to attack.

p. Estimate number enemy personnel directly involved in rocket attack. Were any special personnel used? Security forces?

## V. IMPACT AREA ANALYSIS

a. Was on-the-ground inspection of rocket impact area made? By designated rocket impact area inspection team? Was impact area inspection check list used?

b. Impact plot of rounds.

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- c. Type fuzing instantaneous, short delay, long delay, mixed.
- d. Size of craters (photos). Number of craters.
- e. Extent of damage.
  - (1) KIA, WIA, MIA
  - (2) Structural damage.
  - (3) Communications.
  - (4) Critical material and equipment.

VI. OTHER OBSERVATIONS (as appropriate).

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Annex C (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 306-68

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6540 I, II;  
 6541 II; 6640 I, II, III, IV; 6641 I, II  
 (b) 1stMarDiv Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Current Monthly Task Organization Report

### 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.
- b. Friendly Forces. Basic Order.

### 2. MISSION

Supporting arms conduct harassing and interdicting fires in coordination with surveillance activities to augment coverage of the rocket belt and approaches thereto and act to prevent, detect, attack and destroy enemy rockets and rocket forces.

### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Artillery. Appendix 1 (Artillery).
- b. Fire Support Coordination. Appendix 2 (Fire Support Coordination).
- c. Naval Gunfire Support
  - (1) Naval gunfire support ships when available will be utilized to augment artillery in firing counter-rocket missions. The artillery counter-rocket control center will pass grids to be fired by naval gunfire to Division Fire Support Coordination Center, which will in turn direct the spotter controlling the ship to fire those missions. Naval gunfire support ships when available will participate in counter-rocket drills.
- d. Air Support. Annex G (Air Support) to reference (b).

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Administrative Order 301-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

Annex L (Communication -Electronics) to reference (b).

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Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES

- 1 - Artillery
- 2 - Fire Support Coordination

DISTRIBUTION: Annex E (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

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1st Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF  
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
150800H November 1967

Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 306-68

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6540 I, II;  
6541 II; 6640 I, II, III, IV; 6641 I, II  
(b) Firing Chart: Grid Sheet, Scale 1:25,000  
(c) 1stMarDiv Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. Basic Order.
2. MISSION. Annex C (Supporting Arms).
3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Artillery Employment

- (1) The artillery regiment will coordinate with TAOR and sector commanders and augment their efforts to deny enemy rocket forces access to the rocket belt by conducting a continuous and dynamic interdiction program within the rocket belt and along the approaches thereto.
- (2) The artillery regiment will maintain means to deny and detect enemy rocket forces by employing and coordinating aerial and ground observation, searchlights using both visible and infrared light, and such mechanical detection and acquisition devices as are available.
- (3) Artillery will immediately attack enemy rocket forces detected, massing all artillery available within range to disrupt enemy attacks and destroy enemy forces involved.

b. Headquarters, 11th Marines

- (1) Establish/maintain OP's as indicated in TAB A (Counter-Rocket Observation/Control) to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Supporting Arms).
- (2) Recommend locations for supplemental OP's, as necessary, to be established within the rocket belt.
- (3) Staff and maintain the Artillery Counter-Rocket Control Center.

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- (4) Coordinate use of searchlights.
- (5) Establish/maintain mechanical surveillance/acquisition means to ensure maximum rocket belt coverage with equipment available.
- (6) Plan ground support counter-rocket interdiction fires.

c. Direct Support Battalions, 11th Marines

- (1) Establish Battalion Counter-Rocket Centers.
- (2) Conduct counter-rocket training program to include counter-rocket drill as directed.
- (3) Maintain OP's within the rocket belt and at other locations from which possible rocket firing positions and routes of approach into the rocket belt can be observed.
- (4) Assist supported infantry/sector commanders in selecting, establishing and orienting supplemental OP's within respective TAOR's.
- (5) Maintain responsive communications system with OP's.
- (6) Assist supported infantry/sector commanders in implementing coordinated counter-rocket interdiction plan.

d. General Support Battalion and Batteries

- (1) Maintain OP's and conduct counter-rocket drills as directed by Commanding Officer, 11th Marines.
- (2) Be prepared to deliver counter-rocket fires as requested by reinforced units and as directed by the Commanding Officer, 11th Marines

e. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) OP operations and responsibilities. TAB A (Counter-Rocket Observation/Control) to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Supporting Arms).
- (2) Battalion Counter-Rocket Centers/Artillery Counter-Rocket Control Center operations and responsibilities. TAB A (Counter-Rocket Observation/Control) to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Supporting Arms).

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- (3) Rules of engagement and clearance procedures. Appendix 2 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex C (Supporting Arms).
- (4) Report techniques used to cut reaction time and increase accuracy of counter-rocket fires.
- (5) Firing chart. Reference (b).


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Administrative Order 301-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

Annex L to reference (c).

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✓TAB A (Counter-Rocket Observation/Control)

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1st Marine Division (=) (Rein), FMF  
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Appendix 2 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex C (Supporting Arms) to  
 Operation Order 306-68

Ref: (a) 1stMarDiv OperO 301-68  
 (b) Division Order 03120.19\_

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. Basic Order.
2. MISSION. Annex C (Supporting Arms).
3. EXECUTION
  - a. Concept. Fire support coordination will be in accordance with Annex E to reference (a) except as modified below as provided in reference (b).
  - b. Coordinating Instructions
    - (1) Rules of engagement. Annex J to reference (a) except as modified by reference (b) and listed in 3b(2) below.
    - (2) Hostile rocket sites may be attacked by artillery when:
      - (a) Clearance is received from commander of area from which the rocket attack is being launched, or when;
      - (b) The hostile site is located by direct and positive observation, or when;
      - (c) A reliable three-ray intersection is achieved from azimuths reported by established observation posts.
    - (3) Under conditions specified in 3b(2)(b) and (c) above, artillery response may be initiated by the artillery commander concerned prior to receipt of clearance.
    - (4) Artillery commanders who initiate fires in accordance with 3b(3) above will report the area of impact to the commander normally responsible for clearance of fires in that area as soon as possible.

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- (5) Targets will not be taken under attack by naval gunfire until positive approval is received from the appropriate Fire Support Coordination Center.
- (6) Targets will not be attacked by air without positive approval by appropriate Fire Support Coordination Center except that:
  - (a) Air may attack hostile rocket sites without prior clearance when positive identification of the hostile site is established or when the rocket site is in the act of launching (firing) the rockets.
- (7) Artillery will have the primary attack priority. Aircraft will be directed to hold, and no check fires will be imposed on artillery firing at rocket sites to allow for air strikes.
- (8) Air strikes may be made without imposing a check fire on artillery at the pilots' discretion.
- (9) Artillery fire on active rocket sites will be stopped at the direction of the Division Commander or his immediate representative.

## 4. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

- a. Air strikes on active rocket sites may be made without imposing a check fire on the reacting artillery units when the criteria in 3b(6)(a) are met.
- b. Artillery fire on rocket sites will be stopped to permit air strikes only at the direction of the Division Commander or his immediate representative.
- c. When directed by the Division Commander or his immediate representative, normal aircraft safety procedures as listed in Annex E to reference (a) will be effected.

## 5. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

- a. Normal safety procedures will be used except as modified in 3b(2) above.
- b. Artillery counter-fires will be lifted when the cognizant ground commander of the area involved reports that he is ready to move a reaction force into the launch site area. This action will be reported to the Division Commander by the artillery commander.

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6. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

Annex L to reference (a).

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TAB A (Counter-Rocket Observation/Control) to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to  
 Annex C (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 306.68

1. Counter-Rocket Observation Posts

- a. Headquarters, 11th Marines will establish and maintain primary counter-rocket observation posts and provide for rapid exchange of information between Battalion Counter-Rocket Centers/Artillery Counter-Rocket Control Center.
- b. Artillery battalions and separate batteries will operate observation posts as directed by the Commanding Officer, 11th Marines, and will ensure rapid transmission of data to Battalion Counter-Rocket Centers/Artillery Counter-Rocket Control Center.
- c. The Northern Sector Defense Command will establish counter-rocket observation posts as follows, and will provide for the rapid transmission of rocket information to the 11th Marines Fire Direction Center via the Northern Sector Defense Command Post:

OBSERVATION POSTS

GRID

Tank #1	AT939793
Tank #3	AT964789
Headquarters Battalion Observation Post #1	AT959745
11th Motor Transport Battalion Command Post	AT936766
7th Engineer Battalion Bunker #17	AT951778
1st Reconnaissance Battalion Observation Post	AT968745
1st Force Service Regiment Bunker #14	AT936801
Combined Action Platoon Tower (CAP E-1)*	AT959767
Combined Action Platoon Tower (CAP E-2)*	AT938823

\* In coordination with Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

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- d. The Southern Sector Defense Command will establish a counter-rocket observation post at Tank #2 and will report rocket information via Armored Amphibian Company to the 11th Marines Fire Direction Center. Tank #2 is located at grid AT974703.
- e. Observation posts have the mission to perform continuous (24 hours/day) visual surveillance of the rocket belt and its approaches and report all sightings of unusual activity immediately, in the following format:
  - (1) Observation Post Identification.
  - (2) Nature of Target ("Rockets!").
  - (3) Azimuth to Target (in mils).

## 2. Counter-Rocket Control Centers

- a. The Artillery Counter-Rocket Control Center will be maintained at Headquarters, 11th Marines, and Battalion Counter-Rocket Centers at direct support artillery battalions as directed by the Commanding Officer, 11th Marines.
- b. Counter-rocket drills will be conducted as directed by the Commanding Officer, 11th Marines, exercising the observation post-counter-rocket center organization to refine techniques and reduce reaction times.

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Annex D (Provisional Rifle Company) to Operation Order 306 68

Ref: (a) III MAF LOI 4-67  
(b) 1stMarDiv OperO 301-68  
(c) 1stMarDiv OpPlan 305-68  
(d) 1stMarDiv CEOI P02000.2

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

Provisional Company

Capt (Tank Battalion)

1st Platoon

Lt (Tank Battalion)

2d Platoon

Lt (Antitank Battalion)

3d Platoon

Lt (7th Comm Battalion)

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. Reference (a) and reference (b).

2. MISSION

Be prepared to participate in defense of DA NANG vital area on order.  
Be prepared to relieve, reinforce or augment other forces as required.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. The Provisional Rifle Company provides a unit capable of defending or reinforcing an area on short notice. The company deploys on call from its assigned area in organic transportation no later than four hours after notification of activation for operations.
- b. 1st Tank Battalion (-)/1st Antitank Battalion(-)/7th Communication Battalion (-)

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- (1) Provide Provisional Rifle Company as indicated in Appendix 1 (Organization of Provisional Rifle Company).
- (2) Provide equipment and supplies as indicated in Appendix 2 (Equipment and Supplies for Provisional Rifle Company).
- (3) Conduct training sufficient to indoctrinate troops and ensure sound knowledge of infantry tasks employed in Republic of Vietnam.

c. Coordinating Instructions

Commanding Officer, Provisional Rifle Company will receive mission and order from this headquarters via Commanding Officer, 1st Tank Battalion.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Appendix 1 (Organization of Provisional Rifle Company).
- b. Appendix 2 (Equipment and Supplies for Provisional Rifle Company).
- c. Supply

(1) Initial source is parent organization of provisional unit.

(2) Prescribed load.

(a) Class I. MCI w/fuel trioxane - 1 day.

(b) Class II.

1. Normal arms and equipment to include body armor (upper torso) in accordance with assigned job.

2. Crew-served weapons, communications equipment and vehicles. Appendix 2 (Equipment and Supplies for Provisional Rifle Company).

3. Dry cell batteries. Minimum 2 days supply for each item of battery powered equipment.

(c) Class III. Vehicle fuel tanks full.

(d) Class IV. None.

(e) Class V. Basic allowance for small arms plus items listed in Appendix 2 (Equipment and Supplies for Provisional Rifle Company).

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(f) Water. Two full canteens per individual plus water cans listed in Appendix 2 (Equipment and Supplies for Provisional Rifle Company).

(3) Resupply. Organizations having OPCON of Provisional Rifle Companies are responsible for resupplying those units.

- d. Casualty Evacuation. Evacuate casualties by the most expeditious means to the nearest 1st Marine Division medical facility unless directed otherwise by competent authority.
- e. Transportation. Parent organizations of provisional units coordinate transportation to move units to initial employment location.
- f. Personnel. Administration Order 301-68.

#### 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Command Post. Initially with 1st Tank Battalion. Report locations upon displacement.
- b. Communications-Electronics
  - (1) Reference (d) (1st Marine Division CEOI P02000.2\_).
  - (2) Frequencies, call signs and other communications will be promulgated in execution frag order.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

#### APPENDIXES:

- ✓1 - Organization of Provisional Rifle Company
- ✓2 - Equipment and Supplies for Provisional Rifle Company

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
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1st Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
 150800H November 1967

Appendix 1 (Organization of Provisional Rifle Company) to Annex D  
 (Provisional Rifle Company) to Operation Order 306-68

Time Zone: H

1. The following diagram graphically portrays the organization for provisional infantry units established in accordance with Operation Order 306-68.



2. Personnel for company headquarters and one rifle platoon will be provided from the Tank Battalion. Antitank Battalion and 7th Communication Battalion will provide one platoon each.

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 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
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Appendix 2 (Equipment and Supplies for Provisional Rifle Company) to  
 Annex D (Provisional Rifle Company) to Operation Order 306-68

Time Zone: H

1. Required equipment.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Prov Co Hq</u>	<u>Prov Plat</u>
Radio Set AN/PRC-25	2	1
Telephone Set TA-312/PR (or EE-8)	2	2
Cable Tel MX-306A/G-WD-1/TT (comm wire) 1/4 mile	2	1
Machine Gun (7.62mm M-60)	0	3

2. Recommended equipment and supplies.

Truck utility 1/4 T 4x4 M422A1	1	0
Trlr utility 1/4 T M-100	1	0
Launcher, Grenade, 40mm M-79 w/EA ammo	1	0
Can Water, 5 gal (full)	1	8
Grenade, hand frag M-26 (case)	0	4
Grenade, hand, illum MK1 (case)	1	0
Grenade, hand smoke, assorted colors (case)	1	0
Flare, surface, trip M-49 (case)	1	0

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 150800H November 1967

Annex E (Distribution) to Operation Order 306 68

Ref: (a) Div Order 5605.1\_

Time Zone: H

1. Distribution of this order is as follows:

CMC (Code AO3H)	2	CG FLC/FSR	5
CMCS	2	CTG 70.8	2
CINCPAC	2	CTU 70.8.9	2
CINCPACFLT	2	NCC	1
CG FMFPAC	2	NAVSPACT	1
CG FMFPAC (Fwd)	1	CO I CORPS ADV GRP	4
COMUSMACV	5	NCR 30	15
COMSEVENTHFLT	2	CTG 115.1	2
CG III MAF	10	2d Bn, 5th Mar	5
CG 3d MARDIV	3	11th MT Bn	2
CG 1st MAW	20		

E-1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 23, 26, 27, 32, 34, 35, 39, 46, 65, (1); 84,  
 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 101, 102, (2); 85(6); 7a, 68, 72, 76, 80,  
 (10).

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1st Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF  
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
200800H November 1967

Operation Order 308-68 (Waterway Control)

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000; AMS Series L7014; Sheets 6540 I, II; 6541 II; 6640 I, II, III, IV; 6641 II, III
- (b) CG III MAF LOI 4-67
- (c) III MAF OperO 308-67
- (d) 1stMarDiv OperO 301-68
- (e) 1stMarDiv OperO 306-68 (Counter-Rocket)
- (f) 1stMarDiv OpPlan 126-67 (Operation TATTOO)
- (g) Division Order 3480.1
- (h) 1stMarDiv CEOI P02000.2

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF  
**67 4667**  
Chen 101st 122nd

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Current Monthly Task Organization Report

# 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (d) and current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.
- b. Friendly Forces
- (1) References (b), (c) and (d).
  - (2) Naval Support
    - (a) CTG 115.1 provides coastal surveillance (Market Time). Annex A (CTG 115.1 Support).
    - (b) Coastal surveillance and NAVSUPACT enforce fishing regulation in coastal and harbor waters. Annex B (Waterway Denial Plan).
    - (c) NAVSUPACT, in conjunction with DA NANG Air Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Battalion), patrols SONG CAU DO adjacent to the 1st Marine Division TAOR between coordinates AT999704 to BT060723. Harbor Entrance Control Post boats (NAVSUPACT) patrol DA NANG Bay.
    - (d) Commander, First Coastal Zone operates check point located at mouth of SONG HAN (DA NANG Bay) and controls all incoming and outgoing watercraft. All craft

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are checked for proper registration and cargo. District chiefs register watercraft within their districts.

- (e) Commander, Coastal Group 14 (Junk Fleet) operates check point located at mouth of SONG CUA DAI (east of HOI AN) and controls all outgoing and incoming watercraft from that location. All craft are checked for proper registration and cargo.
- (3) GVN Forces establish check points on the SONG TUY LOAN in vicinity grids AT937713 and AT960700 to control movement of watercraft engaged in sand and gravel industry.

## 2. MISSION

1st Marine Division (-) (Rein) participates in the defense of the DA NANG vital area; achieves and maintains positive control over waterways entering and within the TAOR; denies the enemy the capability of utilizing waterways as routes of ingress and egress to the TAOR; and denies the enemy freedom of movement on waterways within the TAOR.

## 3. EXECUTION

### a. Concept of Operations

- (1) 1st Marine Division (-) (Rein) maintains positive control over waterways in the division TAOR through the establishment of coordinated patrols and continuing surveillance.
- (2) Infantry regiments, reinforced with division supporting units as required, exercise control of waterways within their assigned TAOR/AO. All available surveillance and control measures are employed to deny the enemy freedom of movement into and through the division TAOR. Emphasis is placed on patrol activity, OP's and the use of mechanical detecting devices.
- (3) Artillery, air and naval gunfire are employed in a supporting role, as required. Aerial observers assist with surveillance and control of fire support.
- (4) Coastal areas are included in this concept and require coordination with naval forces.

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b. 5th Marines (-) (Rein)

- (1) Maintain surveillance means across the SONG VINH DIEN and the SONG CAU BIEN.
- (2) Maintain surveillance along the waterways adjacent to the coast, the SONG HA XAU, SONG CAN BIEN and the SONG DE VONG as required.
- (3) Conduct surveillance along coastal area. Coordinate with Market Time forces as required.
- (4) Coordinate with 1st MP Battalion (III MAF Air Base Defense Battalion) for effective coverage of the SONG CAU DO from grid AT999704 to BT060723. 1st MP Battalion has responsibility for the river, NAVSUPACT operates patrol craft thereon.
- (5) Coordinate with Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines for effective coverage of the SONG THU BON/SONG KY LAM where adjacent to the TAOR. River is 5th Marines responsibility.
- (6) Coordinate with Commander, Coastal Group 14 (Junk Fleet) for effective coverage of waterways in vicinity of mouth of SONG CUA DAI.
- (7) Interdict waterways within Division Supplementary AO, within capabilities, to minimize enemy freedom of movement. Be prepared to coordinate with the Commanding General, Americal Division, for operations adjacent to AO. The boundary between the Division Supplementary AO and the Americal Division on SONG BA REN between grids BT076496 and BT138504 is on south bank.
- (8) Direct liaison is authorized with Commanding General, Americal Division for purposes of coordinating operations and surveillance.
- (9) Maintain surveillance on all subsidiary waterways within TAOR (SONG LA THO, SONG BAU XAU, SUOI CO CA, SONG DO, SONG TAM GIAP, SUOI MAN QUANG, SONG BINH LONG, SONG CAM HA, and SONG THANH QUIT) as required, to deny the enemy use of these waterways.

c. 7th Marines (Rein)

- (1) Establish surveillance means astride the SONG CU DE, the SONG AI NGHIA, the SONG VU GIA, the SONG YEN and the SONG TUY LOAN.

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The SONG TUY LOAN is a Southern Sector Defense Command responsibility where adjacent to that sector.

- (2) Coordinate with Commander, Northern Sector Defense Command in establishing surveillance in vicinity of the mouth of the SONG CU DE. The mouth of the SONG CU DE is a 7th Marines responsibility.
- (3) Coordinate with Commander, Southern Sector Defense Command for effective coverage of SONG CAU DO adjacent to TAOR. SONG CAU DO is Southern Sector Defense Command responsibility where adjacent to that sector.
- (4) Coordinate with Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines for effective coverage of the SONG THU BON/SONG TINH YEN in TAOR. The SONG THU BON/SONG TINH YEN enters 7th Marines TAOR at grid AT846445.
- (5) Maintain surveillance, as required, to deny enemy use of the following:
  - (a) Waterway that flows into 5th Marines TAOR, from grids AT941593 to AT990624.
  - (b) Connecting waterway between the SONG VU GIA and SONG THU BON, grids AT901565 to AT918534.
  - (c) Lateral waterway in the rocket belt flowing from grids AT906750 to AT938710.
  - (d) Lateral waterway in the rocket belt flowing from grid AT885795 to the mouth of the SONG CU DE.

d. 2d Battalion (Rein), 5th Marines

- (1) Maintain surveillance astride SONG THU BON/SONG TINH YEN from point of entry into TAOR to grid AT846445.
- (2) Coordinate surveillance along SONG THU BON/SONG TINH YEN where river is adjacent to TAOR. Responsibility for river passes to 7th Marines at grid AT846445.
- (3) Coordinate surveillance activity along SONG THU BON with 5th Marines from grids AT978562 to AT997547. This segment of river is 5th Marines responsibility.
- (4) Maintain positive control on SONG BA REN during season when that river is navigable.
- (5) Maintain surveillance of lakes in TAOR as required to deny enemy movement thereon.

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e. 11th Marines (-) (Rein)/Northern Sector Defense Command(1) 11th Marines (-) (Rein)

- (a) General support.
- (b) Interdict waterways as requested by unit commanders.

(2) Northern Sector Defense Command

- (a) Conduct surveillance along coastal area of sector. Harbor Entrance Control Post boats patrol DA NANG Bay. Coordinate with NAVSUPACT.
- (b) Coordinate with 7th Marines in establishing surveillance in vicinity of mouth of SONG CU DE. Mouth of SONG CU DE is 7th Marines responsibility.
- (c) Maintain surveillance of waterways adjacent to the coast and extending inland as required to deny their use to the enemy.

f. 1st Tank Battalion/Southern Sector Defense Command

- (1) Coordinate with the 5th Marines for effective coverage of the SONG CAU DO. SONG CAU DO is Southern Sector Defense Command responsibility where adjacent to sector.
- (2) Coordinate with 7th Marines for effective coverage of the SONG TUY LOAN. River is Southern Sector Defense Command responsibility where adjacent to sector.

g. 1st Engineer Battalion (-). Be prepared to provide engineering assistance as required.h. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Emphasize surveillance activities on all waterways in conjunction with reference (e). Particular attention to those portions of waterways that lead into the rocket belt and waterways that provide lateral movement within the rocket belt.
- (2) Maintain positive control of all waterways. Deny the enemy the capability of transporting personnel, weapons or equipment along waterways.

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- (3) Use all available mechanical means to supplement patrols, check points, listening posts and observation posts.
- (4) Deny watercraft movement on all waterways between 1800 and 0600. TAOR/Sector commanders establish liaison with district chiefs concerning segments of waterways in which watercraft are not allowed, day or night. Unit commanders challenge all watercraft appearing in unauthorized zones at any time. Take under fire all challenged watercraft that do not respond. Annex B (Waterway Denial Plan) and reference (f).
- (5) Coordinate with GVN forces for establishment of check points on waterways. Check points which are established and maintained by GVN forces are preferable. USMC forces assist as requested.
- (6) Establish river patrols in small craft, as required, to assist with check point control and watercraft search.
- (7) Direct attention to areas adjacent to waterways to discover enemy cache sites, exit trails and boat assembly areas.
- (8) Consider the monsoon season when developing plans in order to provide for seasonal waterways and increased width and depth of existing waterways.
- (9) TAOR/Sector commanders coordinate with district chiefs to ensure complete dissemination of waterway denial plan and curfew instructions. Personal contact to ensure understanding of the order and the consequences of non-compliance is imperative.
- (10) Coastal watercraft whose identity is not apparent are identified through 1st Marine Division COC or direct with Market Time units. Annex A (CTG 115.1 Support).
- (11) SLAR aircraft have been requested to provide continuous coverage over all waterways throughout the Division TAOR. A Data Link van has been positioned at division headquarters for immediate read-out of any water borne craft in the TAOR. This information, once received, will be passed through COC to the TAOR commander concerned for appropriate action.
  - (a) Continuous flights have been requested; however, inclement weather and aircraft and Data Link availability will have a decided effect on the SLAR coverage provided.

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- (b) Specified times for SLAR coverage encompass the period 2100 to 0300 nightly.
- (12) Make maximum use of FIREFLY missions as required.
  - (a) The FIREFLY program is a U.S. Army program. It consists of a team of three helicopters; one light ship, one gun ship and one control ship. Flying waterways at night, the team is capable of illuminating targets and destroying them with immediate fire power. Army aviation units at DA NANG and CHU LAI have this capability.
  - (b) FIREFLY is ideally suited for surveillance on waterways difficult to cover with patrols, check points or OP's. Examples of waterways where extensive use of FIREFLY might be profitably employed are SONG THU BON, SONG VU GIA, SONG CU DE, and SONG KY LAM - SONG DIEN BINH - SONG CAU LAU - SONG HOI - SONG CUA DAI.
  - (c) Requests for FIREFLY are made to Headquarters, 1st Marine Division.
- (13) Recommended changes to Annex B (Waterway Denial Plan) are solicited from TAOR/sector commanders based on the situation in their individual areas.
- (14) This order supports the plan promulgated by the QUANG NAM Province Chief. Information is exchanged on a regular basis with the Headquarters, QUANG DA Special Zone. Unit commanders exercise sound judgement when conflicts arise with local VN citizens and/or officials regarding implementation or understanding of provisions of this order. Notify Headquarters, 1st Marine Division immediately of such conflicts that cannot be resolved on the local level.
- (15) Submit overlay of waterway control activities by 1800 daily. Waterway control activities should be depicted in red and may be included with the patrol reports required by references (e) and (g).
- (16) Make maximum use of psychological operations in support of waterway control efforts. Submit requests for special leaflets, broadcast tapes and Armed Propaganda Team support to this headquarters (Attn: G-5).
- (17) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to reference (d).

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- (18) Annex F (Artillery) to reference (d).
- (19) Annex G (Naval Gunfire) to reference (d).
- (20) Annex H (Air Support) to reference (d)
- (21) Annex J (Rules of Engagement) to reference (d).
- (22) This plan supersedes and cancels Operation Plan 91-67.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Administrative Order 301-68.

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Reference (h).
- b. Annex A (CTG 115.1 Support).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

*H. J. Woessner*  
H. J. WOESSNER  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

## ANNEXES

- ✓A - CTG 115.1 Support
- ✓B - Waterway Denial Plan (Overlay)
- ✓C - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex C (Distribution) to Operation Order 308-68



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1st Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
 200800H November 1967

Annex A (CTG 115.1 Support) to Operation Order 308-68

Ref: (a) Maps VIETNAM 1:50,000; AMS Series L7014; Sheets 6540 I, II; 6541 II; 6640 III, IV; 6641 I, II; 6641 II

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

a. Background

- (1) Task Group 115.1 is the U.S. Naval/Coast Guard coastal surveillance group (Market Time) operating in the coastal waters of I Corps. Units of the following types conduct continuous patrolling within two miles of the coastline:

(a) Coast Guard Cutters (WPB)

1. Voice Radio Call. "ARTICLE" plus letter suffixes "FOXTROT" through "MIKE." May be called "ARTICLE UNIT."
2. Armament. Five .50 caliber machine guns and one 81mm mortar, capable of firing destructive or illuminating fires.
3. Radio Frequencies. Continuous guard on 3450 KCS or 4085 KCS SSB/USB (net control "ARTICLE" - CTG 115.1), 37.5 MCS VHF/FM, and either 277.8 or 301.0 MCS UHF.

(b) "Swift" Patrol Boats (PCF)

1. Voice Radio Call. "NEWSBOY INDIA" plus "UNIT HULL NUMBER." May be called "NEWSBOY INDIA UNIT."
2. Armament. Three .50 caliber machine guns and one 81mm mortar capable of firing destructive or illuminating fires.
3. Radio Frequencies. Guards 3450 KCS or 4085 KCS SSB/USB, periodically comes up on 37.5 MCS, and can guard any other VHF/FM circuit.

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- (2) While the primary mission of these units is to prevent infiltration of hostile material or personnel through the coastal waters of I Corps, they can provide exfiltration patrol services, illumination using 81mm mortar, or, when cleared through the task group Commander, destructive fires utilizing both mortars and machine guns. These units are rarely more than 10 miles apart, so they are capable of rapid response at any point along the coast.

b. Coordination of Support

- (1) Support Requests. Normal requests for TG 115.1 support is made through III MAF and CTG 115.1. In an emergency, direct liaison may be established by units on the scene.
- (a) Exfiltration patrol and illumination fire may be provided upon request without prior clearance through CTG 115.1 when urgency of mission prohibits use of normal III MAF/CTG 115.1 channels.
  - (b) Destructive fire missions may be conducted without CTG 115.1 clearance only if the mission is of an extremely urgent nature. "Urgent" is defined as a situation when friendly forces have positive contact with enemy, are under hostile fire, and fire support is required in order to minimize friendly losses.
  - (c) Other scheduled or unscheduled destructive fire missions may be fired if permission is granted by CTG 115.1, and if a designated NGLO/ANGLICO team or forward air controller is available.
- (2) Required information. When requesting TG 115.1 support, submit the following information:
- (a) Identity of unit(s) to be supported.
  - (b) Voice calls and VHF frequencies on which unit(s) to be supported can be reached.
  - (c) Area where support is required.
  - (d) Type of support required.
  - (e) Time support is to commence and expected duration.

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(3) Coordinating Instructions

- (a) Requests for support should reach CTG 115.1 with info copy to CTF 115 at least 24 hours prior to the event.
- (b) If advance request is not possible, and if an urgent requirement for support exists, Task Group 115.1 units may be contacted directly on circuits listed in paragraphs 1a(1)(a)2 and 1a(1)(b)2.
- (c) TG 115.1 units carry KAC 138 but do not hold division CEOI or other directives.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON

*H. J. Woessner*

H. J. WOESSNER  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex C (Distribution) to Operation Order 308-68

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1st Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
 200800H November 1967

Annex C (Distribution) to Operation Order 308-68

Ref: (a) Division Order 5605.1

Time Zone: H

1. Distribution of this order is as follows:

CMC (Code AO3H)	2	CTG 70.8	2
CMCS	2	CTU 70.8.9	2
CINCPAC	2	NCC	1
CINCPACFLT	2	NAVSUPACT	1
CG FMFPAC	2	CO I CORPS	
CG FMFPAC (Fwd)	1	ADV GRP	4
COMUSMACV	5	COMNAVFORV	2
COMSEVENTHFLT	2	CTF 115	2
CG III MAF	10	NCR 30	5
CG 3d MarDiv	3	CTG 115.1	2
CG 1st MAW	20	2d Bn 5th Mar	5
CG FLC	5	11th MF Bn	2
CG Americal Div	3		

E-1,2,3,4,8,10,12,14,15,16,21,23,26,27,32,34,35,39,46,65,(1); 84,86,87,  
 88,89,90,91,92,93,95,97,98,101,102,(2); 85(6); 7a,68,72,76,80,(10).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ROBERTSON



H. J. WOESSNER  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

**SECRET**

DivBul 001300  
4/JPG/cag  
Ser No: 00495-67  
20 November 1967

**SECRET**

DIVISION BULLETIN 001300

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

**S & C FILES**  
**HEADQUARTERS**  
**1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF**  
**67 4882**  
Copy 32 of 59 copies

W/OIC  
H/W  
18/

Subj: Logistics Instructions for Rotating BLT Undergoing Rehabilitation at  
Subic Bay (U)

Ref: (a) DivBul 001300 of 11 November 1967

Encl: (1) Enclosure (3), Embarkation Instructions, to DivBul 001300 of 11 Nov 1967

1. Purpose. To transmit enclosure (3) to reference (a).

2. Action

a. Remove enclosure (1) attached hereto and insert as enclosure (3) to  
reference (a).

b. Upon removal of the enclosure, this letter is declassified.

3. Self-cancellation. 1 May 1968.

*H. J. Woessner*

H. J. WOESSNER  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "E"

G-1 (1)	CO, 1st Mar
G-2 (1)	CO, 5th Mar
G-3 (1)	CO, 11th Mar
G-4 (2)	CO, HqBn
Ord (1)	CO, 3rd Bn, 1st Mar
CEO	CO, 1st MT Bn
Compt	CO, 3rd AmTrac Bn
Engr	CO, 1st Med Bn
Air	CO, 1st Bn, 11th Mar
Surg	CO, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar
Supply	CO, 1st Recon Bn
COC	CO, 1st AT Bn
Insp	CO, 1st Engr Bn
MTO	CO, 1st Tank Bn
Embark	BLT 2/3

Copy to:  
FMFPac (2)  
COMSEVENTH FLT (1)  
III MAF (3)  
3rd Mar Div (2)  
9th MAB (3)  
FLC/FSR (3)  
FMFPac Ln0 Subic (1)  
CTG 79 (2)  
CTG 79.5 (1)  
CTF 76 (1)  
CTF 76.5 (1)  
CO, 3rd FSR (2)

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20 November 1967  
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EMBARKATION INSTRUCTIONS1. ORGANIZATION FOR EMBARKATION

- a. General. As prescribed by CO, BLT 3/1.
- b. Assignment to shipping. As prescribed by CO, BLT 3/1.

2. MATERIAL TO BE EMBARKED

- a. Organic equipment. As prescribed in the basic order.
- b. Types and amounts of supplies. As prescribed in the basic order.
- c. Preparation

(1) Packing, crating and marking in accordance with section IV of reference (e), Division Order P4600.1E Embarkation Procedures.

(2) Maximum palletization of supplies and equipment in accordance with section IV of reference (e), Division Order P4600.1E Embarkation Procedures.

(3) Vehicles will be prepared for deep water fording in accordance with paragraph (405), section IV of reference (e), Division Order P4600.1E Embarkation Procedures.

d. Movement

(1) CO, BLT 3/1 is responsible for coordination and movement of material organic to BLT 3/1.

(2) Movement schedule will be coordinated with this Headquarters (DivEmb0).

(3) Supplies will be scheduled for movement to embarkation areas to coincide with loading schedule. Staging of supplies and organic nonmobile equipment will be accomplished on the day preceding the scheduled loading date. Vehicles will move to the embarkation point to be designated, and load on the same day.

3. PERSONNELa. Uniform, equipment and baggage

(1) Uniform for embarkation will be jungle utilities and jungle boots, with normal arms and equipment. See Appendix 5.

(2) All embarking personnel will carry the field transport pack.

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Contents listed in Appendix 5.

(3) Officers and SNCOs are authorized to carry one (1) seabag and one (1) suitcase; all other enlisted one (1) seabag.

(4) All baggage will be classified as troop space baggage.

b. Advance details

(1) Working parties and security details will be moved to respective embarkation points prior to or in conjunction with the movement of any material to the embarkation area concerned.

(2) Advance parties will move to embarkation points to coincide with arrival time of respective ships.

(3) CO, BLT 3/1, will make provision for billeting and messing of advance details. Request for assistance to this Headquarters (Attn: G-4)

c. Movement of the main body

(1) The main body of troops of respective embarkation teams, will be moved to embarkation points to coincide with the expected time of completion of loading of supplies and equipment on assigned shipping.

(2) CO, BLT 3/1, will submit transportation requirements and desired movement schedule to this Headquarters (Attn: MTO) not later than 22 November 1967.

d. Embarkation rosters. In accordance with paragraph (114) of reference (f), Division Order P5000.1 Personnel and Administration.

4. EMBARKATION AREA

a. Assignment of areas and embarkation points

(1) Appendix 1 (to be issued when information and assignments become available).

(2) Direct liaison between CO, BLT 3/1 and embarkation point authorities is authorized upon assignment.

b. Preparation. CO, BLT 3/1, will make a reconnaissance with Division Embarkation Officer of embarkation points at Bridge Ramp, Ferry Landing, Deep Water Pier and Tien Sha Ramp by 20 November 1967.

c. Diagrams of embarkation points. See Appendix 2.

d. Material handling equipment. Requirements for material handling

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 ENCLOSURE (1)

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equipment in excess of that available at assigned embarkation points will be submitted by CO, BLT 3/1, to this Headquarters (Attn: DivEngR) not later than 22 November 1967.

e. Security. Upon execution, CO, BLT 3/1, will be responsible for security of supplies and equipment at assigned embarkation points upon commencement of staging and as coordinated with local port authorities.

## 5. EMBARKATION SCHEDULES

a. Limiting dates. Loading and embarkation will commence not earlier than 1 December and be completed not later than 4 December 1967.

b. Berthing and loading schedule. Appendix 3 (to be issued).

## 6. CONTROL

### a. Traffic circulation and control

(1) Routes 13C and 13 will be utilized to transport elements of BLT 3/1 to embarkation points at Bridge Ramp, Ferry Landing, Deep Water Pier and Tien Sha Ramp. The major control point is located at the intersection of Route 13 and the Danang River Bridge (049763).

(2) This Headquarters will coordinate traffic circulation and control measures with local embarkation point authorities.

(3) CO, Headquarters Battalion, will provide MP's at the major control point on order of this Headquarters. CO, BLT 3/1, submit requests for additional MP assistance, as required, direct to CO, Headquarters Battalion.

(4) Appendix 4 is the Traffic Control Plan (includes alternate route).

### b. Embarkation control offices

(1) The Division Embarkation Control Office will be maintained at 1st Marine Division Headquarters with liaison personnel at embarkation points.

(2) CO, BLT 3/1, will establish embarkation control offices at assigned embarkation points upon commencement of staging. Report time of opening to 1st Marine Division Embarkation Control Office.

(3) Control offices, when established, will operate on a 24 hour basis until loading is completed.

### c. Communications

(1) BLT 3/1 embarkation control offices will enter the Division

ENCLOSURE (3)  
ENCLOSURE (1)  
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Embarkation Control Radio Net (M-874, 61.4 megacycles) upon opening.

(2) Land line communications as already established between embarkation points and Division Embarkation Control Office may be used as an alternate means of communication.

## 7. MISCELLANEOUS

### a. Loading plans

(1) Ship characteristics loading pamphlets will be forwarded to CO, BLT 3/1.

(2) Individual ship loading plans will be prepared and distributed by CO, BLT 3/1 in accordance with paragraph (204.3) of reference (e), Division Order P4600.1E Embarkation Procedures. Four copies to reach this Headquarters 48 hours prior to the commencement of loading.

### b. Loading reports

(1) Initial report in accordance with section III of reference (e), Division Order P4600.1E Embarkation Procedures.

(2) Subsequent reports every four hours (2400, 0400, 0800, 1200, 1600, and 2000) in the following format:

ALPHA: (NAME AND HULL NO. OF SHIP) \_\_\_\_\_

BRAVO: (CUMULATIVE % PERSONNEL LOADED) \_\_\_\_\_

CHARLIE: (CUMULATIVE % VEHICLES LOADED) \_\_\_\_\_

DELTA: (CUMULATIVE % CARGO LOADED) \_\_\_\_\_

ECHO: (ESTIMATED TIME OF COMPLETION) \_\_\_\_\_

FOXTROT: (OTHER) \_\_\_\_\_

GOLF: (ACTUAL COMPLETION OF LOADING TIME; FINAL REPORT ONLY) \_\_\_\_\_

### c. Other embarkation instructions

(1) Submit dunnage requirements to this Headquarters (Attn: G-4) not later than 72 hours prior to embarkation.

(2) Provision of special vehicle slings will be the responsibility of the unit concerned.

ENCLOSURE (3)

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(3) CO, BLT 3/1, will submit one copy of Unit Embarkation Plan to this Headquarters.

Appendices:

1. Assignment of areas and embarkation points (to be issued)
2. Diagrams of embarkation points
3. Berthing and loading schedule (to be issued)
4. Traffic control plan
5. Equipment and clothing

ENCLOSURE (3)  
ENCLOSURE (1)  
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NAVY  
CONTROL

GATE

## BRIDGE RAMP

FACILITY DESCRIPTION

Location: BT 033761

Ship/Boat Capacity: Two LST's and two  
LCU's or LCM'sMaximum Available  
Staging Area: 969,000 Square FeetMaterials Handling  
Equipment: Best equipped facility in  
port system.Comment: Best facility for handling  
palletized cargo and tracked  
vehicles.

GATE

ENCLOSURE (1)

1

Appendix 2 to Enclosure (3)

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FERRY LANDING

FACILITY DESCRIPTION

Location: BT 040787

Ship/Boat Capacity: One LST and two  
LCU's or LCM's.

Maximum Available  
Staging Area: 33,400 Square Feet

Material Handling  
Equipment: adequate for capacity of  
facility.

Comment: Limited use type facility  
for handling small amounts  
of cargo.

NAVY  
CONTROL

GATE

2

Appendix 2 to Enclosure (3)  
ENCLOSURE (1)

7

SECRET

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SECRET

DivBul 001300  
20 November 1967

DivBul 001300  
11 November 1967

## DEEP WATER PIER

FACILITY DESCRIPTION

Location: BT 024843

Ship Capacity: Five deep  
draft shipsMaximum Available  
Staging Area: 2,348,800  
Square Feet

Materials Handling Equipment: Adequate

Comment: Not suitable for large unit  
moves due to high volume of  
commercial cargo handled and  
requirements for use of light-  
erage to transport tracked  
vehicles across the river.

GATE

NAVY  
CONTROL

ENCLOSURE (1)

3

Appendix 2 to Enclosure (3)

8

SECRET

SECRET

DivBul 001300  
11 November 1967

DivBul 001300  
20 November

## TIEN SHA RAMP

FACILITY DESCRIPTION

Location: BT 035837

Ship/Boat Capacity: Three LST's and  
five LCU's or LCM's

Maximum Available  
Staging Area: 45,000 Square Feet

Material Handling Equipment: Adequate for capa-  
city of facility.

Comment: This facility is generally not suitable  
for loading or offloading tracked veh-  
icles since they generally must be moved  
across the river by lighterage.



NAVY  
CONTROL


GATE

4  
9

Appendix 2 to Enclosure (3)  
ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

DivBul 001300  
November 1967



ENCLOSURE (1)

5  
FO

**Appendix 2 to Enclosure (3)**  
**SECRET**

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SECRET

DivBul 001300  
20 November 1967DivBul 001300  
11 November 1967EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING

## 1. Individuals will wear:

- a. Helmet, complete with cover green side out
- b. Upper body armor
- c. Jungle utilities; sleeves rolled up
- d. Gas mask worn across body with strap on right shoulder
- e. Jungle boots
- f. Cartridge belt with all individual equipment including:
  - (1) Suspenders (Army type)
  - (2) Cleaning gear
  - (3) Bayonet
  - (4) 2 canteens (filled), cup
- g. Jungle Kit
  - (1) 2 battle dressings
  - (2) Malaria tablets
  - (3) Salt tablets
  - (4) Water purification tablets
- h. Two (2) M-16 magazine pouches with 8 magazines (one (1) loaded with 18 rds) or .45 cal pistol magazine pouch with two (2) magazines (empty)

2. Pack will be:

- a. Field transport pack without belt suspenders; consisting of:
  - (1) Blanket roll, short
    - Blanket
    - Shelter half
    - Poles, pins, line
    - 5 sand bags
    - 4 blanket roll straps
  - (2) Haversack w/entrenching tool and cover
    - 2 pair socks
    - Mess Gear
    - Toilet articles to include: soap, tooth brush, paste, razor, and shaving cream
    - 1 pair boot laces
    - 1 towel
    - Poncho
    - Space for one (1) MCI
  - (3) Knapsack
    - 1 rain suit
    - 1 pair underwear (if desired)
    - 1 set utilities, Jungle
- b. Seabag (minimum)
  - Leave space for knapsack and blanket roll
  - Boots, jungle
  - Poncho liner
  - 1 pair utilities, jungle



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- 1 set Khakis with garrison cap and emblem
- 1 pair dress shoes or leather boots
- 1 set underwear
- 1 set civilian attire (optional)
- Other USMC clothing
- WP bag
- Towel
- Shower shoes

ENCLOSURE (1)

2

Appendix 5 to Encl (3)

12

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

*em* *014*  
*161* *AOL*  
DivO 5300.2 Ch 1  
1/HWH/mlb  
22 Nov 1967

DIVISION ORDER 5300.2 Ch 1

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Recurring Personnel Reports

Encl: (1) New page inserts to DivO 5300.2

1. Purpose. To transmit new page inserts and direct pen changes to the basic order.

2. Action.

a. Remove the present enclosure (3) and replace with the corresponding enclosure hereto. Insert new enclosures (7) and (8).

b. On page 1, insert the following under Enclosure:

"(7) Average Rifle Company Strength Report Instructions

(8) Weekly Chargeable Strength Report Instructions"

c. On page 1, insert the following under Reports Required:

"VII. Average Rifle Company Strength Report (Report Symbol 1Div-5300/8-1) Encl (7)

VIII. Weekly Chargeable Strength Report (Report Symbol 1Div-5300/9-1)"

d. In paragraph 3, change "Enclosure (1) through (6)" to read "(1) through (8)".

e. On page 2 of enclosure (1), after the 5th line, add:

"S. TOTAL OF-03 ON ROLLS: OFF \_\_\_\_\_ ENL \_\_\_\_\_"

f. On page 1 of enclosure (4), add the following at the bottom of the page:

"This report is classified when completed".

*H. J. Woessner*  
H. J. WOESSNER  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "B"

DECLASSIFIED

DivO 5300.2  
22 Sep 1967

PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT (PERSTAT) INSTRUCTIONS

Name of Report - Personnel Status Report (PERSTAT)

Frequency - Bi-weekly - commencing 29 November 1967

As of - 2359H Wednesday

Submitted to - This Headquarters (Attn: G-1)

Due Date - Not later than 0800H Friday

References - (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FLCO 3000.2B (NOTAL)

Submitted by - Regiments, separate battalions and separate companies/  
batteries ADCON to the 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

1. Reference (a) contains basic instructions for completion of the report. Note that reference (a) requires a report of chargeable strength as defined in paragraph 16079, MARCORPERSMAN.

2. Completed PERSTAT forms will be delivered to the Division G-1 where the figures will be tabulated. Reporting units will include in the narrative, as a minimum, critical MOS shortages and location of personnel by TAOR. Yellow narrative forms are for use on Division level only and must not be used by regiments and battalions. The Division G-1 will write a Division Narrative and deliver all forms to FLC (DPI #16) for transmission to CMC. Since the report, once delivered to FLC, will be read by an IBM 1232 Optical Scanner, it is extremely important that the forms be filled in correctly. Before submission, forms should be screened to insure that:

- a. No locally reproduced forms are used. (NOTE 1)
- b. All information on forms is marked with a #2 pencil only.
- c. Forms are not stapled, creased, torn, or bear extraneous pencil marks.
- d. All required information is filled in. All one-starred items must be filled in, except in cases where totals are the same as the previous report, or when there is a negative report. All critical MOS shortages must be shown each week.
- e. Complete and correct reporting unit codes are used. Addressograph plates will not be used.

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DivO 5300.2

22 Sep 1967

f. Consolidation and submission of subordinate unit data is not required at regimental levels provided complete reports including narratives are submitted for all battalions and the headquarters units of the regiment.

g. Form 001: Do not use card columns 14-27.

h. Form 111:

- (1) Do not include attached units in on board strengths.
- (2) Include detached units in on board strength.
- (3) Do not utilize card columns 35-52.
- (4) Maintain currency of CO's name and rank. All characters require one mark for coding except the letters Sierra through Zulu which require two marks.

(5) Do not report unit locations or changes thereto in card columns 53-66.

i. Form 112: Do not utilize card columns 65-76.

j. Form 110:

(1) Each narrative must be complete in itself. The system does not include narrative memory from report to report. Narratives will not exceed 99 lines for any RUC.

(2) Include unit designation and strength for all attached units only at the reporting level to which attached.

(3) Include unit designation and strength breakdown of all subordinate detached units only at the reporting level from which detached.

NOTE 1 - Reporting units will place requisitions for re-supply of forms to meet needs:

<u>FORM</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>NAVMC</u>
001	0000-006-1690	10643
110	0000-006-1740	10649
111	0000-006-1700	10644
112	0000-006-1710	10645

ENCLOSURE (3)  
Ch 1 (22 Nov 1967)

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DivO 5300.2  
22 Nov 1967

AVERAGE RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTH REPORT INSTRUCTIONS

Name of Report - Average Rifle Company Strength Report

Frequency - Weekly

As of - 2359H Wednesday

Submitted to - This Headquarters (Attn: G-1)

Due Date - Not later than 0800H Friday

Reference - (a) CG, 1stMarDiv ltr 1/MFM/rce over 5300 of 6Jul67

Submitted by - Infantry regiments ADCON to the 1st Marine Division (Rein),  
FMF (Infantry battalions physically separated from regimental TAOR will submit direct to G-1 with one copy to regiment.)

Reference (a) is hereby cancelled. Commencing upon receipt, the following format will be utilized:

1. Average on Rolls Strength: OFF \_\_\_\_\_ ENL \_\_\_\_\_ (3f)

2. Effective Strength: OFF \_\_\_\_\_ ENL \_\_\_\_\_ (4e)

3. Average on Rolls Enlisted Strength:

- a. Total OF-03 on rolls \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Minus T/O authorized for OF-03 \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Remainder \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Divide remainder by number of rifle companies authorized \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Add 4 (Non OF-03's per company) \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Total Average Enlisted on Rolls \_\_\_\_\_

4. Average Effective Enlisted Strength:

- a. Total Enlisted on Rolls (All MOS's) \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Minus total Non-Effectives\* (All MOS's) \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Remainder (Total Enl Effective on rolls) \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Divide 4a by 4c (Effective percentage) \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Multiply 3f by 4d (Average Effective Enlisted Strength) \_\_\_\_\_

\* Non-effectives - R&R, Leave, TAD, UA, Conf, Hosp, etc.

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DivO 5300.2

22 Nov 1967

WEEKLY CHARGEABLE STRENGTH REPORT INSTRUCTIONS

Name of Report - Weekly Chargeable Strength Report

Frequency - Bi-weekly (Each week that the PERSTAT Report is not submitted)

As of - 2359H Wednesday

Submitted to - This Headquarters (Attn: G-1)

Due Date - Not later than 0800H Friday

Submitted by - Regiments, separate battalions and separate companies/batteries  
ADCON to the 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

1. Commencing 22 November 1967, the following format will be used:

WEEKLY CHARGEABLE STRENGTH REPORT

As of \_\_\_\_\_

ORGANIZATION: \_\_\_\_\_

USMC

USN

OFF \_\_\_\_\_ ENL \_\_\_\_\_

OFF \_\_\_\_\_ ENL \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(SIGNATURE)

ENCLOSURE (8)  
Ch 1 (22 Nov 1967)

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

W/OIC  
ADIC  
H  
7A/RBM/rbm  
5215  
21 Nov 1967

TOP - DESTROY IT.

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Cancellation of 1st Marine Division Operation Order 303-67;  
notification of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INST 5510.10


1. The subject Operation Order is hereby cancelled and may be destroyed in accordance with reference (a), without report to this Headquarters.

*D. J. Meyers*  
D. J. MEYERS  
By direction

DISTRIBUTION:

G-1	3rd Bn, 1st Mar	1st Engr Bn
G-2	5th Mar (2)	1st Tk Bn
G-3	1st Bn, 5th Mar	3rd As Trac Bn
G-4	2nd Bn, 5th Mar (2)	7th Comm Bn
EmbO	3rd Bn, 5th Mar	Hq Bn
AirO	7th Mar	1st SPBn
SupO	1st Bn, 7th Mar	CMC (2)
Surg	2nd Bn, 7th Mar	CMCS (2)
EngrO	3rd Bn, 7th Mar	CG FMFPAC (2)
OrdO	11th Mar	COMUSMACV (2)
NGFO	1st Bn, 11th Mar	III MAF (2)
COO	2nd Bn, 11th Mar	3rd Mar Div (2)
MTO	3rd Bn, 11th Mar	FMAW (2)
FSOC	4th Bn, 11th Mar	FLC/FSR (2)
G-5	1st ATBn	2nd ARVN Div
1st Mar (5)	1st MTBn	Quang Da Sp Zone
	1st Recon Bn	Det C-1, 5th SFGA

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G-1 BRIEFING  
FOR  
EXECUTIVE OFFICERS  
ADJUTANTS  
SERGEANTS MAJOR



20 - 22 - 24 NOVEMBER 1967



## DECLASSIFIED

SCHEDULEG-1 BRIEFING FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICERS, ADJUTANTS, AND SERGEANTS MAJOR

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>BRIEFER</u>	<u>TIME</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	COLONEL EARNEY	1000 - 1005
II. ADMINISTRATION		
A. GENERAL	LTCOL CHASE, LTCOL HITE MAJ DUNN	1005 - 1100
BREAK		1100 - 1110
B. PERSONNEL	WO QUISENBERRY	1110 - 1115
C. CASUALTY REPORTING	CWO MOWREY	1115 - 1130
D. ADJUTANT	LTCOL POLIDORI	1130 - 1150
LUNCH		1150 - 1300
III. PROVOST MARSHAL	LT COLEMAN	1300 - 1310
IV. CAREER ADVISORY	GYSOT FACILI	1310 - 1320
V. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS	CAPT KINDER	1320 - 1330
VI. CHAPLAIN	CHAPLAIN KEELEY	1330 - 1340
VII. INFORMATIONAL SERVICES	CAPT JOHNSON	1340 - 1350
BREAK		1350 - 1400
VIII. SPECIAL SERVICES	MAJ YOUNG	1400 - 1415
IX. EDUCATION	CAPT BAILEY	1415 - 1425
X. CLUBS	WO PETERSON	1425 - 1435
XI. EXCHANGE	CAPT LAND	1435 - 1445
BREAK		1445 - 1500
XII. QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION		1500 -

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I -

INTRODUCTION

Good Morning,

As the first item on my agenda I would like to welcome you aboard and then tell you why I wanted to assemble you particular officers and Sergeants Major for this briefing.

The scope of activities under my staff cognizance, as Division G-1, covers a wide area and includes procedures and personnel services which are of vital importance to the proper administration and the morale of the personnel of this Division. As the result of staff visits by myself and my assistants I have found that many of the services we offer and much of the administrative procedure which we sponsor is not really well known to the very people we are trying to reach, those persons in the executive and management positions of the Divisional organizations.

Therefore, I have asked that you be assembled here to listen to, discuss, and question, my assistants and members of the special staff as they present a program contrived to give you a clear understanding of how we function, what is available to you, and what your responsibilities in these matters are. This program will require about 4 hours of your time, there will be periodic breaks and when you leave you will be provided with a copy of the complete presentation. That completes my introduction of the program and I would now like to address the subject of our current personnel situation.

The Commanding General recently received a message from CG, FMFPac on this subject and he has directed that I use the material contained in that message in my comments to you.

Much has been said in the past few weeks about our personnel outlook for the remainder of the year. During the past two months we have seen events take place which have made new inroads in our strength without suitable compensation, as predicted, the lean period is upon us. To the expected replacement shortfall for the fourth quarter we have added the heavier than normal casualties of September, the predictably greater administrative losses of December, including the holiday concentration of special leaves, and finally, conversion to the 395 day tour. The timing of this last feature could have been delayed into calendar year 68, but in so doing would have lost considerable effect. Since we cannot prevent a second Christmas away from home for most of those who departed COMUS last December, transition to the 395 day tour at this time is the most aggressive thing that we can do, in terms of getting the greatest number of our WestPac Marines home for the holidays. The changeover which cost us about 700 Marines in October and will cost us approximately 200 more for November and December, nevertheless seems to have the universal support of all concerned. It is CG, FMFPac's view that the immediate benefit to the individual Marines and the long term leveling of rotation - replacement flow to WestPac units make it worth the price, we in this Division support that view.

We are presently at about 85% of manning level and will increase to about 92% of manning level by the end of November, and by the end of December we should be back up to about 95% of our present manning level. CMC, FMFPac and we in the Division know that we need more personnel and every effort is being made and will continue to be made to provide them.

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In regard to the decision to make the transition to 395 days, we have, in effect, agreed upon taking a calculated manpower risk in the belief that it is in our ultimate best interests. Unfortunately this temporary and voluntary drawdown cannot go completely unnoticed by an observant press or by those among our own Marines who have a propensity for discussing or writing about unit strengths, rotation policies and the hardships they generate. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we keep the transition period in low key perspective and that we thoroughly inform both officers and men of the honest facts so that they will understand the improvement that the new tour computation brings to them.

The next speaker will be LtCol CHASE, Assistant to the G-1.

II -

ADMINISTRATION

II - A

G-1

395 DAY TOUR

There have been many interpretations and rumors connected with the recent establishment of the 395 day tour. Basically, the reason for the change from a 13 month tour to a 395 day tour was that it would insure equitable tours for all personnel. Under the 13 month policy, many senior staff NCO's and officer's were able to arrange their departure date from CONUS in order to take advantage of a short tour, whereas the majority of troops were forced to live with a longer tour. We estimated that under the old system, close to 20% of our personnel were remaining out of CONUS more than 13 full months and that close to 10% were spending more than 13 months in Vietnam.

The 395 day tour precludes this from happening, in that it provides for establishment of an RTD which will insure that a man departs Vietnam in sufficient time for him to return to the States no later than 395 days after his original date of departure, regardless of the number of calendar months involved. This policy, as implemented by the First Division, also provides for a first in - first out criteria when assigning aircraft seats, thus ensuring equitable distribution of seats among personnel, regardless of rank.

A common rumor connected with the new tour is that it is an initial step towards decreasing our tours to 12 months, and that soon we will be working on a 390 day tour, then a 385 day tour, and so on, until we get down to a tour of 365 days. This possibility has been discussed with re-

2-A-1

representatives from FMFPAC and they have emphasized that there is no plan to decrease the present 395 day tour and that this will remain in effect.

ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICER MOS'S

A continuing review must be made of an officer's qualifications for assignment of a primary or of additional MOS's. The MOS's an officer holds must show his current qualifications to perform both primary and staff type duties. The lack of a commander to insure that this is done will not only be detrimental to the officer himself when he is assigned but will also result in the Marine Corps and the command of which the officer is a part not being able to properly utilize the abilities he has, as a result of previous assignments.

The most prevalent problem concerning primary MOS's is the lack of many Division units to change an officer's primary MOS from basic to that of a qualified officer. Paragraph 3052 of the Marine Corps Personnel Manual requires that an officer be given a qualified MOS after completion of a formal school and upon demonstration of proficiency in his MOS. It further requires that if an officer does not demonstrate the required proficiency after six months, a report of the circumstances which has precluded his attaining this proficiency will be made to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with appropriate recommendations. There are some units in this Division which have established a policy that an officer cannot qualify for an MOS until he has been in country nine months, even after he has been a graduate of a formal school. Needless to say this is in direct conflict with CMC policy and does not reflect the intent or pur-

pose of the MOS system.

A second, and perhaps more common problem is that of assignment of additional MOS's. This MOS should show the staff capabilities of an officer. It is normal to assume that an officer should be qualified to acquire an additional MOS after he has successfully performed in a billet for a period of about four months. There is no specific amount of time connected with an additional MOS, but a commander can be the judge of whether or not an officer should be so designated. The importance of requesting assignment of an additional MOS, when rated, cannot be over-emphasized. The failure to do so because of oversight, or because the officer concerned doesn't think he wants the MOS is inexcusable. Officers are put in various assignments in order to better qualify them for future assignments in the Corps. If we fail to identify the skills they acquire in these assignments we are working against one of the purposes of the MOS system. Once an officer is considered to be qualified for an additional MOS the officer, or his CO, is responsible for requesting that CMC assign him this MOS.

As I have already mentioned, the assignment of an additional MOS should indicate an officer's staff capability, as opposed to his operational or command ability which is indicated by his primary MOS. In this regard, it is not generally intended that an officer should have two MOS's. For example, an infantry officer should not have an additional MOS of 1802, or 0802. When he is serving in the FMF his command time should be spent in the infantry and not in tanks or artillery. When it comes time for his staff duty, it should not be spent in these MOS's either, but

rather in an area such as logistics, intelligence, or infantry operations. There are many exceptions to this policy, such as the need to cross-train personnel in MOS's in which the Marine Corps has a shortage (2502 or 3502, for example). Generally, however, CMC will not approve the assignment of two primary type MOS's to one officer and will, when discovered, delete primary type MOS's from officers who possess them as an additional MOS.

#### FITNESS REPORTS

There has been a marked increase in the number of errors on fitness reports. Normally, CMC will screen fitness reports, detect errors and then send the reports directly back to the reporting senior for correction. Because of a large number of errors within this Division, CMC has recently been sending all enlisted reports to the CG for notation and for correction. We have, in turn, noted the units in error and have forwarded reports to the appropriate headquarters for correction. I will not belabor the point by pointing out specific errors, but recommend that everyone connected with the review and submission of fitness reports refer to paragraph 15068 of the Personnel Manual, or more specifically MCBul 1610 of 7 April 1967, which promulgates a change to the Marine Corps Personnel Manual, concerning fitness reports.

There is one area connected with submission of fitness reports which has been the cause of much misunderstanding among reporting seniors. that is: When should I refer a report to an officer or NCO for comment? According to the Personnel Manual, a report should be shown to an officer or NCO when it is adverse or marginal. Adverse reports are further described as those containing unsatisfactory marks, those describing the



officer as "prefer not to have" or those that contain unfavorable comments in section D. There is normally little trouble in the mind of a reporting senior concerning referral of an adverse report, most problems lie with the determination of what constitutes a marginal report. Once again, referring to paragraph 15068, a marginal report is defined as one which contains a below average mark in items 16 or 17 of section C, a mark in either of the two blocks to the left of average in the value to the service section, or which contains marginal remarks in section D. Most reports are returned for signature because of remarks made in section D. The best rule in this case is that if there is any doubt in your mind, whatsoever, as to whether your remarks will result in the report being considered marginal, then by all means refer the report to the individual concerned for comment.

Ever since the Marine Corps has gone to the no-show system on fitness reports, one of the biggest problem areas has been that officers are not aware of the caliber of their performance of duty. The fact that we do not show most reports to the officer or NCO concerned is no excuse for the officer or NCO being uninformed of how he stacks up as a Marine. Once again, the Personnel Manual is very explicit as to the requirement for counseling an individual as to his performance of duty. Having served as an officer monitor at Headquarters Marine Corps, it was normal to expect a continuing parade of officers who were passed over each year, to make a trip to Headquarters to review their files in order to determine the reason why they were passed over. These officers would come to my office, I would review

their cases with them, and, in an overwhelming majority of cases, they were surprised and amazed at what some of the reports contained, particularly in that they were never informed of their performance of duty.

In many cases I personally knew the reporting senior and I made it a point to check with them to see if they had counseled the officer concerned, and in most cases the claim of no-counseling was entirely justified. I'm sure you all realize that the fitness report is the most important bit of information contained in an officer's record when it comes to selection time. Our system, although subjected to many slams and criticisms, is still the best of any of the armed services and will, if properly used, assure the Marine Corps that the most qualified officers are selected for promotion. This can only be so, however, if reporting seniors use this report as it is intended to be used, both as a means of providing an evaluation of the officer concerned to CMC and as a basis for providing the officer personal counseling, with a constructive criticism or evaluation of his performance of duty.

My final comment concerning fitness reports pertains to that of the officer's statement of his preference for duty. Contrary to most opinions, the preference of duty is a very important part of the basis upon which a monitor makes assignments of an officer. However, because most officers do not make wise or judicious preferences of duty, the monitor is not given the opportunity to make use of this consideration. For example, a first lieutenant requires that he be assigned as follows: First choice - NROTC, second choice - Assistant Naval Attache - London, third choice -

Joint Staff Duty - overseas. As far as the monitor is concerned, none of these choices are possible for a lieutenant, therefore this officer's assignment cannot be influenced by his preference for duty. Granted these will be appropriate choices when this officer is of the proper rank and has the necessary prerequisites for this duty, therefore he should wait until that time to request them. The preference of duty section should not be used as a "dream sheet", but should indicate a preference of duty which is appropriate to the officer's rank, MOS, and experience and is in keeping with the characteristics of a desired career pattern, described in paragraph 4052 of the Personnel Manual. Some hints on requesting types of duty are: Only request that type of duty you should go to next in your career pattern, with the exception that once you receive a set of PCSO, project yourself to the subsequent tour of duty when making out a fitness report; don't request ahead three or four tours; don't request something that you don't really want, but that you think will look good on your report -- you may get it (example-many always feel they should request FMF).

I realize that this information is more or less common knowledge to the officer who has been around the Corps for awhile. However, most junior officers haven't the slightest idea as to how to request types of duty. This should be the topic of officers' schools or of counseling sessions held with officers.

#### ENLISTED PROMOTIONS

The Marine Corps is presently undergoing a change in its promotion policies. A representative of G-1, Headquarters Marine Corps, visited this

Division in September and informed us of the following pending changes to existing policies:

1. Promotions to Lance Corporal will be unlimited, the same as PFC's at the present time.
2. Promotions to corporal will probably be based on cutting scores, rather than being based on authorized M/L strength.

These changes are presently under study and we expect some policy guidance concerning them in the very near future.

The HQMC officer also informed us of two other areas which have resulted in many personnel being deprived of promotions. The first of these is our interpretation of the requirements for meritorious combat promotions. This Division had required that a man be assigned to a small combat unit and that he distinguish himself under fire before he was eligible for meritorious combat promotion. We were informed that the criteria for this promotion is that the Marine be in a hostile fire area, and that being in Vietnam met this requirement. We have since modified our Division Order to reflect this. A second problem existed as a result of WestPac units not making full use of the promotions to corporal and lance corporal which were available to them. Under our old system, each battalion within the Division computed their quotas based on their M/L and then promoted up to this ceiling. There was never any attempt made to consolidate the entire Division's status, determine its ceiling and then promote, Division-wide, up to this ceiling. During September we did this and determined that we had quotas for 1440 corporals and 1161 lance corporals which would not be used. Therefore, these were

distributed to units who had eligible personnel but did not have sufficient quotas. We requested similar information from all units for the month of October, fully intending to continue this process, however, we are presently awaiting guidance from CMC concerning the basis by which we should be computing our quotas. In this regard, MCBul 1418 of 12 March 1967, with changes 1 and 2, has a cutoff date of 31 October 1967. This Bulletin authorizes increased promotion quotas over those authorized by MCO 1418.9E. We have requested information from CMC as to their intentions to continuing computation of quotas based on the bulletin or returning to the old system. If you have affected promotions based on the bulletin, which permits up to 50% of excess of M/L strength in corporals and lance corporals, I request you to notify me of this before you leave today. All other units should promote based on the old authority, MCO 1418.9E pending receipt of word from CMC as to their intentions.

#### OFFICER PROMOTIONS

The recent increased officer promotions has lead to some misunderstanding concerning the temporary appointments of officers. In order to clarify the status of officers selected or not selected by recent boards, I think it best that we first consider the basis for promotion of officers under normal circumstances. In order to qualify for promotion under the provisions of our permanent promotion authority it is necessary that an officer meet statutory time in grade requirements. Paragraph 6100 of the Marine Corps Personnel Manual states these requirements as follows:

Lieutenants - 2 years

Captains and Majors - 4 years

Lieutenant Colonels - 5 years

A recent change to our promotion law has decreased the time in grade for Lieutenant Colonels to four years.

When the Marine Corps evaluated its capabilities to meet its increased grade requirements, it became evident that there were not sufficient numbers of officers available in the various ranks with the necessary time in grade to make them eligible for promotion. In order to alleviate this problem, CMC requested that the President authorize the Marine Corps to promote officers under provisions of a temporary law. This law allows us additional promotions to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Major, and Captain regardless of time in grade. It requires, however, that personnel selected under the temporary law be reselected by a selection board convened under the permanent promotion authority, after these personnel have sufficient time in grade. The selection boards which met this year were convened under both permanent and temporary authority. Promotion lists were published in two parts, indicating those officers who were selected under each of these authorities. As a result there has been considerable confusion among those officers not selected for promotion, and even among those selected for promotion, as to their status. In order to clarify this situation, we will consider four officers who were considered for selection:

Officer number one had sufficient time in grade and was in the zone for selection under the permanent law. He was selected for promotion under this law. However, in order to allow his earliest promotion and to fill

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existing requirements for Lieutenant Colonels, he was promoted on 1 October under the provisions of the temporary law. As soon as a vacancy exists for this officer in the permanent rank structure, he will receive his promotion warrant with an appropriate date of rank. In some cases this date of rank will be prior to 1 October 1967. This officer does not have to be reselected.

Officer number two had sufficient time in grade and was also in the zone for selection under the permanent law. He was selected for promotion under the temporary law, but was not selected under the provisions of the permanent law. This officer, although promoted on 1 October, has been officially passed over once, and will be considered for selection under the permanent law by next year's board. If he is passed over then he will have been officially passed over twice and will be required to retire upon completion of 20 years service. If this officer is not selected by the permanent board next year he will still retain his temporary appointment to Lieutenant Colonel until he gets out of the Marine Corps or until six months after cessation of the present hostilities. He will only lose this appointment as a result of unsatisfactory service.

Officer number three was not in the permanent zone but was selected under the temporary law. He must be reconsidered after he has sufficient time in grade. If selected by the permanent board he will get a date of rank under this law when a vacancy exists. If not selected by the permanent board he will be considered as being passed over but will retain his temporary appointment.

Officer number four was not in the permanent zone, was in the temporary zone, and was not selected for promotion. He is not considered to have

been

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been passed over. If he is selected by a subsequent permanent board he will be promoted when a vacancy exists. If he is not selected by this board he is officially passed over.

I'm sure there are other questions in your mind concerning these appointments. If you'll save them until the break I'll answer them if possible, or will get an answer for you.

UNIFORMS, DISCIPLINE, AND MILITARY COURTESY

A recent MACV message has expressed General WESTMORELAND's concern over the uniforms, discipline and military courtesies displayed by U. S. personnel in Vietnam. General LAHUE has, in turn, expressed his concern in this area. One has only to make a trip in the rear areas to learn that these concerns are well founded. III MAF is in the process of issuing a directive pertaining to this problem, which will include rigid controls of all personnel in the rear areas. Personnel who are out of uniform or who are out of order will be apprehended and given a written order returning them to their organization. This Division will be notified of all violations and commanders of units with a high rate of incidence will be required to explain what actions have been taken to preclude this. This problem, as is typical of so many of our problems, is a result of a lack of personnel getting the word from their immediate superiors. In many cases personnel stopped in these areas claim that their NCO's told them that they were not required to observe normal military courtesies, nor was it necessary that they be in a proper uniform. In any case, there are many officers and staff NCO's who frequent these facilities and who observe these many violations but do nothing about it. They are to blame



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as much, if not more, than the Private or PFC who is out of uniform or who neglects to display proper military courtesy.

Granted we are in a combat zone, but this is not an excuse for ignoring the basic tenets of military life for which the Marine Corps has become noted. At the present time this Division is unsatisfactory in this aspect. It is only through the efforts and diligence of every officer, SNCO, and NCO that this downhill trend will be reversed. There should be sufficient horsepower in this room to get the ball rolling within every unit of this Division. You will hear more about this program in a forthcoming Division directive.

#### REPORTS

Division Order 5300.2 contains instructions regarding the submission of weekly, monthly and quarterly personnel reports. Since the last Adjutant's conference there has been improvement in many areas. However, we still experience delay in the receipt of personnel reports. Time of receipt is most important since you have been given the maximum lead time available in order that we meet our deadline. In many instances it has been necessary for me or one of the clerks in our office to call units concerning late reports. In an effort to eliminate some of our difficulties I will briefly discuss the reports required by DivO 5300.2.

#### WESTPAC MONTHLY PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT

Section one was modified effective 31 October 1967, to include an additional item "sierra". This item includes the total OF-03 personnel on rolls, officer and enlisted.

Section two of this report includes the names of officers joined,

deaths, medevac, medevac not dropped, transferred to other WestPac commands and those rotated to CONUS. At Division level we consolidate all of this information and provide FMFPac a consolidated report. Difficulty is encountered primarily, due to officers joining Division on the last few days of a month. In order to reduce errors it is important that the joining activity closely monitor the date an officer reports to Division. (The last names submitted as joins during the month, are not just those officers who have reached their organization, but must reflect joins to the Division during the month. (Example - 2 officers report to Division on 30 October but do not physically report to their assigned organizations until 2 November. These officers must be included in total for period ending 2359, 31 October.) We do not report enlisted personnel by name in this section. However, the figures provided are equally as important.

We do not report intra-Division joins and drops. But report joins and drops from or to commands outside 1stMarDiv. However, should you join an officer from another Division unit it is a gain as far as your strength is concerned. Therefore, should this occur indicate the detaching unit opposite the individuals name. This will assist us in obtaining our total count and eliminate the possibility of counting an individual twice.

#### PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT (PERSTAT)

You were advised by CG, 1stMarDiv msg 130452Z Nov67 of the change in the "as of time" and "reporting frequency" for PERSTAT. Read this message carefully as certain requirements have been changed. There has been a reduction in the number of card columns utilized. Subsequent to submission of the 16 November report frequency has been reduced to every

two weeks. Reports to be submitted as of 2359 on Wednesday and due to G-1 NLT 0800 on Friday. This change in PERSTAT reporting to every two weeks means that we will not have weekly chargeable strength figures for Division units. Therefore, on those weeks that a PERSTAT is not required each unit will provide a report of chargeable strength. Include officer and enlisted USMC and USN. Reports are submitted as of 2359 each Wednesday when no PERSTAT is submitted, to arrive G-1 by 0800 on Friday.

I recently returned PERSTAT forms to most units for the following reasons:

- A. Reports were submitted on locally reproduced forms
- B. Forms were torn
- C. Forms stapled
- D. Marks were too light

In either of the above examples the end result was identical. The optical scanner at FLC cannot process these forms to reproduce the required EAM card. Ensure compliance with instructions contained in my memo to all Adjutants dated 6 November.

Narratives are used to express a commanders judgement of readiness. Many narratives are entirely too long. Maximum narrative length for one RUC is prescribed by new procedures. A shortage of personnel should be reported as critical when a commander is unable to take corrective action after assessing his total personnel resources and concludes that a lack of a certain number of Marines with certain skills and or grades significantly reduces his units ability to accomplish its assigned mission.

### III MAF NON-EFFECTIVE REPORT

This report has caused little difficulty. You compute your non-effectives in man-days and we convert to man-months for FMFPac.

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MONTHLY IN-COUNTRY STRENGTH REPORT

The purpose of this report is to provide the total number of Marine and Navy personnel in-country. There has been questions in the past concerning just what should be included under the TDY in-country column. Include only personnel TAD to your unit from out of country commands. If you include personnel TAD to you from other Division units we count these personnel twice. In the 3 months that I have been here I find it very difficult to get an accurate count of on-rolls strength of this Division. I feel that the main difficulty is our various methods of classifying personnel as chargeable, non-chargeable, effective, non-effective, on rolls strength etc. For period ending 31 October, FMFPac representatives stated their records indicated we should have 364 more personnel than our on-rolls figures indicated. It would be nice to be a little more accurate on strengths. Ensure that you utilize the proper criteria when reporting personnel strengths.

QUARTERLY PACFLT STRENGTH STATUS

Your only requirement is to ensure that a telephone call is made to G-1 stating the number of dependents who presently reside in the Pacific command. We require number and location only. The other portions of this report will be compiled by the G-1 section. Negative reports are required.

QUARTERLY REPORT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

No major problems with this one other than ensuring timely submission.

OPSTAT PERSONNEL PROJECTION

The OPSTAT is a G-3 function. However, prior to release each message is routed to G-1 for concurrence. Personnel projections should be made in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 16 of section II of FMFPacO P03000.5B,

supplementary instructions for reporting units that are minus detachments or reinforced with detachments are contained in paragraph 502, section V. The term "unknown" in reporting an attainment date of next expected rating level is not authorized. If you have questions on availability of incoming personnel contact the Division Officer or Enlisted assignment section.

#### MANNING LEVELS - T/O'S

There has been some question concerning the relationship of M/L and T/O's. T/O's for FMF organizations reflect authorized strength for combat operations. FMF T/O's therefore portray requirements. FMF manning levels portray current allowances and represent an organization's share of currently available manpower resources. It must be emphasized that manning levels represent only the average manning level which an organization can expect to experience during the period that particular M/L is in effect. As a sideline-adjustments to T/O's will not automatically result in an adjustment to the current M/L for a particular unit. However, it should be noted that every change in T/O will eventually have an effect on the distribution of skills within the manning level grade and MOS summaries. Marine Corps manpower resources are allocated consistent with the approved manpower ceilings contained in the five year force structure and financial program. Essentially, allocation is the process of apportioning authorized numbers in proportion to approved Marine Corps programmed requirements. This plan apportions all available numbers to activities and major organizations and does not provide for an unallocated reserve. FMF requirements as previously indicated are portrayed in current T/O. Since FMF T/O's provide a balance of functional capabilities among the various units of the overall force, any significant change in a functional area of an FMF T/O may well upset the balance of capabilities

throughout the force and require corresponding adjustment in other units. FMF allowances represent the number of personnel which the Marine Corps can allocate to the FMF and support under current strengths. FMF allowances are promulgated by means of M/L instead of block numbers since M/L permit a more equitable apportionment of available resources, and also an apportionment which differentiates between hard and soft skill areas. It must be emphasized that total FMF allowances represent the maximum number of personnel numbers available to the FMF for a given fiscal year. Requests for adjustment in the M/L submitted to Headquarters, Marine Corps by FMF commanders can not alter total FMF allowances, but can only affect a modification in the distribution of FMF allowances.

#### QUARTERLY M/L REVIEWS

FMFPac provides a quarterly manning level authorization for this Division. This M/L is broken down into total personnel, officer and enlisted by rank and MOS. The M/L authorization also reflects adjustments that have been necessary due to deprived MOS's, decreases in overall Marine Corps personnel assets in certain MOS's such as 0848 and 5591, conversion of OF-03 billets to MOS 8151 due to a shortage of deployable personnel in OF-03. Also affecting manning level authorizations is CMC policy that personnel will not be returned to RVN until after 24 months in CONUS, unless of course the individual waives this restriction and volunteers to return to RVN. To give you an idea how we arrive at M/L's for Division units, upon receipt of FMFPac quarterly M/L authorizations representatives of G-1 consult members of the Division staff, various unit representatives, review M/L changes submitted from the field, review current T/O's and then break down the

authorized personnel down to battalion and separate company level. You are then provided a DPI print out of the results. This printout contains all assets authorized this Division. There are no additional assets available. Just because you are authorized certain personnel by M/L does not assure receipt of these people. If they are not assigned to Division we can't possibly assign them to you. As a matter of interest, the letter of transmittal that provided our 3rd quarter FY-68 manning level allocated all authorized manpower resources in the FMF ground category. No reserve of manpower exists to support proposed increases in current FMF T/O or M/L; it is essential that all proposed increases be accompanied by compensatory reductions if immediate response to a request for increase is desired.

#### PROVISIONAL T/O

During the past 24 months it became evident that there are numerous areas which are not adequately provided for in current M-series T/O's for a prolonged land campaign in the Vietnam environment. In order that personnel staffing may more closely approach the specific needs of Marine ground elements operating in Vietnam, an extensive review of current T/O's was conducted by the First and Third Marine Divisions. As a result of this review, FMFPac submitted to CMC provisional T/O for a Marine division serving in Vietnam. This provisional T/O has not been approved, however, it is being staffed at HQMC and those of you that have as long to do out here as I may well see it in the field. In the meantime, we will continue to receive our personnel allowance via the quarterly manning level.

In summary evaluate your reports control procedures to ensure that we achieve a timely and accurate personnel reporting system.

2-A-19



II-A

## SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICER

Good afternoon gentlemen:

I am Major Dunn, Special Projects and Plans Officer, G-1 Section. In the next few minutes I will briefly discuss three of my projects which concern everyone present. (Chart II-A)

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING DISCREPANCIES

On 10 August 1967 CG, FMFPac set a goal of less than 1% error rate for information entered into the Marine Corps Personnel Accounting System. This objective was set as a result of CMC review of the high error rate in personnel accounting information being submitted from all Marine Corps commands. In order to assist commanders in WestPac DPI 3 was tasked with making monthly analysis by reporting unit, and forwarding the results to commanders concerned.

Within the 1st Marine Division command attention was immediately focused on this problem with the following results: (Chart II-B)

This is not very impressive, in fact we are losing ground; however let's look back at the statistics that started this program: (Chart II-C)

The month of lowest error rate, August, was a month in which maximum command attention was directed at this problem. It included conferences, visits to units by teams of experts, local education programs and so on. As soon as the pressure is off this area and old hands rotate, the error rate will go up again, as evidenced by September statistics.

In order to ensure that the Division arrives at and holds its objective of a 0.9% error rate, every reporting unit in the Division must reach

a 0.9% or less error rate. This is not an easy task. It is however a reasonable goal and one that we must achieve because of its importance in all other phases of Marine Corps Operations. Inaccurate personnel information results in incorrect and delayed pay, misassignment, delayed promotions, delayed orders, and increased paper work. These delays, mistakes and the increased workload and time lost in straightening them out do not increase individual or unit morale and are among the complaints registered by experienced and highly qualified Marines who leave the Corps each month. The end result is that the inexperienced and less qualified move up and the rest of us must work harder.

In order to assist commanders in reducing errors the G-1 technical administration inspection has gone to a quarterly cycle. DPP-16 is providing personnel to make monthly visits to designated units which are experiencing difficulties in reporting complete and accurate information. This will continue to be supplemented with staff visits by G-1 officers.

If the adjutant or executive officer of each organization represented here will check with me at the conclusion of this briefing I will provide them with a month by month breakdown of their unit's personnel accounting discrepancies as reported by DPI 3.

ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES (Chart II-D)

These figures speak for themselves. Some of those wounded were permanent losses to the service, others were losses to their unit anywhere from days to months.

The weapons of war are the tools of the military trade and like industrial machinery, procedures have been set down for their proper

care, maintenance, employment and user safety.

Research has shown that most industrial accidents are due to: (Chart II-E)

Lack of total familiarity with machinery and its operation

Careless actions born of overconfidence

Shortcutting of established procedures for safe operation

The preponderance of accidents take place when a man is physically exhausted or run down, mentally bored or distracted.

This is an over simplification, of course, but research of cases reported during this year showed that one or more of these factors were present in each case of an accidental discharge. Some other interesting facts are:

The preponderance of accidental discharges take place somewhere between the first and fourth month of the man's tour. The other large grouping falls in the last four months of a tour. We can't think for each man but these facts definitely triangulate the periods in a man's tour when weapons safety should be re-emphasized.

#### TWO NOTES IN CLOSING THIS SUBJECT

Please do not send initial accidental discharge reports via regimental or task force headquarters. We have recently received reports that were delayed as much as ten days, due to stops at intermediate commanders, above the battalion level. We must make further reports to higher headquarters which must be timely as well as accurate.

If you have an accidental firing of a weapon to:

- a. Inflict a wound on another marine or self or;
- b. To impress the local populace;
- c. For some other reason,

do not report this as an accidental discharge.

1ST MARINE DIVISION ARVN INTERPRETER PROGRAM

In April of 1966 the First Marine Division entered the ARVN Interpreter program and soon received its first graduates from the English language training course at Saigon. There are two very solid reasons for the development of this program:

a. We can not afford to send large numbers of our men to long term schools that would make them fluent Vietnamese linguists.

b. Experience has shown that better response is received from the Vietnamese people when working through their officials and their people.

What kind of men are these Interpreters?

For the most part they are conscripts - draftees who enter the Interpreter Training Program directly from induction offices. Most are college graduates or men who were close to graduation upon induction.

At the Interpreter school they are tested and ranked by language proficiency, the best in the class receiving a rank of reserve Sergeant Interpreter, unless they held a higher rank in the regular army in which case they retain their former rank. At present all of the 1st Marine Division's ARVN Interpreters have attained the rank of Staff Sergeant.

The new mobilization policy enacted by President Thieu when he took office, has extended the usual four year service requirement for these Interpreters to the end of hostilities or until they reach age 39, which ever comes first.

This tells us quite a bit about these men. They are bright, intellectually inclined, products of the cities of the Republic, come from better than average families, a few are financially well off, most are not, many who were teachers or professional men before

induction took as much as a 2/3 reduction in their income when they entered the service, and above all most of them are totally unfamiliar with the military profession and way of life as we know it.

As many of these men are not here of their own free will and have been in the service but a short time, they are easily susceptible to the frustrations and chafings that come of not understanding the system or trying to resist it. Additionally they are prone to be easily discouraged by barracks talk and influenced by moderately informed spokesmen. An example of this you will find in your briefing book.

The crux of this matter is that we must understand these men; their problems and concerns before we can expect to work efficiently with them. They must feel a part of your unit and take pride in working with Marines. The same forms of recognition, encouragement and fatherly instruction that give the average Marine the push he needs, will also work with the ARVN Interpreters. They do respond to the good example and persuasive leadership.

If we simply use these men and concern ourselves with their morale and welfare only when forced to do so, the UA rate and absenteeism will increase as well as losses due to disciplinary action. This Division can ill afford this as we presently have on board less than 60% of authorized and required ARVN Interpreters.

Division Order 5312.2A dealing with the ARVN Interpreter Program in this Division is being revised. The new order, when approved, will further clarify the unit commanders' position, authorities and responsibilities relative to assigned ARVN Interpreters and will contain simplified forms and formats for reporting required information.

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In addition check lists will be provided that should cover most contingencies, for example, steps to be taken when an ARVN Interpreter is:

UA

Over Leave

WIA

KIA,

and so on.

In conjunction with G-2 we are working on projects related to general welfare of our ARVN Interpreters and we are making solid progress with ARVN Authorities in simplifying and speeding up such matters as processing and delivering of remains of interpreters KIA to next of kin and processing recommendations for Vietnamese decorations and awards.

Basically, 1st Marine Division policy is that while these men are with us, they are our men and we take good care of our men.

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SPECIAL PROJECTS

1. PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING DISCREPANCIES
2. ACCIDENTIAL DISCHARGES
3. FIRST MARINE DIVISION ARVN INTERPRETER PROGRAM

II-A

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PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING DISCREPANCIES

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>1ST MARDIV ERROR RATE</u>
AUGUST	1.6%
SEPTEMBER	1.9%

II-B

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PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING DISCREPANCIES STATISTICS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STANDARDIV ERROR RATE</u>
MAY	2.3%
JUNE	3.4%
JULY	3.6%
AUGUST	1.6%
SEPTEMBER	1.9%

II-C

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ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES REPORTED

1967

INCIDENTS

151

KILLED

16

WOUNDED

124

II-D

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CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS

LACK OF TOTAL FAMILIARITY WITH MACHINERY AND ITS OPERATION

CARELESS ACTIONS BORN OF OVERCONFIDENCE

SHORTCUTTING OF ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES FOR SAFE OPERATION

II-B

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THIS "POSITION" PAPER WAS PRESENTED TO THE TEAM COMMANDER, 1ST INTERPRETER TEAM WHEN HE WAS ASSIGNED TO SUPERVISE THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARVN INTERPRETERS ASSIGNED TO THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION. ITS AUTHOR IS ONE OF THE BETTER ARVN INTERPRETERS ASSIGNED TO THIS DIVISION

Many cases of UA on the part of the interpreters have been reported to the 1st Interpreter Team lately, following are some of the reasons:

OVERWORK

Example: One Interpreter, assigned to a company, went on operation with the company's 1st platoon, when this platoon had finished its operation and came back for a break, the interpreter seldom got the same favor, but had to go with the 2nd platoon, and then the 3rd platoon. There are also unit commanders who don't let their interpreters go on leave and keep them working and so on.

LACK OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

Most unit commanders think that interpreters are assigned to work for them and not work side by side with them. So they only talk to interpreters whenever they need them. They neglect interpreters' living conditions. They don't even ask whether their interpreters have a place to sleep or not.

An interpreter would never go UA when a good relationship has been established between his unit commander and himself.

DIFFICULTIES TO GET TRANSPORTATION

After obtaining leave orders and travel orders from III MAF and Division G-1 respectively, interpreters have to go through VNAF in the 15th aerial port to get a flight. It usually takes them 2 to 3 days to

stand-by in the air terminal before they can catch a plane. Sometimes they have to be very tactful and must bear the humiliation if they want to be manifested.

In many cases, interpreters had to tip the person working at the 15th Aerial Port or had to go by commercial flight at their own expenses. Many of the Interpreters have been complaining that they work as Marines but have to go through VNAF for transportation even though they have travel orders signed by Marine Div. Officers.

#### NO AWARDS AS ENCOURAGEMENT

Interpreters get punishment easily when committing a mistake, but they rarely get awards for a good job they have done. During operations, wounded interpreters received nothing while wounded Marines were awarded purple hearts.

#### SOLUTIONS WHICH MIGHT HELP REDUCE UA CASES

- a. Unit commanders should treat interpreters as co-workers who need rest as Marines.
- b. Consider interpreters as members of his command and be treated accordingly.
- c. Interpreters should be authorized to go a ride through the US Air Forces without going through VNAF where, especially interpreters are treated without any cordiality.
- d. Give awards to encourage their work. (Besides sending letter of recommendation to I Corps, Marine Corps issues its own US Medals to interpreters.

However, there are also some interpreters who are really incapable and uncooperative. These should be returned to I Corps with a letter stating their lack of qualifications with a recommendation that these men should not be employed as interpreters on the future.

The case of Interpreter SSgt Nguyen Van Thin is a typical example:

SSgt THIN was an interpreter for 4th Marines, 3rd Division. He was killed in action on May 9, 1967 at Con Thien near the DMZ while attempting to save the life of his friend, a Marine Sergeant of 1/4. SSgt THIN was trying to drag the wounded Sergeant down to the foxhole under heavy enemy gunfire. Bullets came and ended both the Marine Sergeant's life and the interpreters life. The Marines of 1/4 sent his body to the Special Forces unit nearby. This unit refused to receive the dead body and sent it back. At last, 1/4 took the dead interpreter to the ramp of Dong Ha and left it there for 3 days. Then the body was recognized by other interpreters who took it back to D Med where it was refused once again because as they were told the Vietnamese dead have to be taken care of by Vietnamese units.

Facing that circumstance, interpreter SSgt CUU made every possible attempt to obtain from the Battalion Commander a Death Declaration Certificate and a plastic bag to hold the dead body which had stayed in the D Med for 3 days now.

7 days later, the body of interpreter THIN was flown to Danang along with 50 dead American bodies. In Danang airport, one ambulance came to transport all the American dead bodies, except SSgt THIN's. Finally, SSgt CUU had to shoulder carry his dead buddy from Danang airport to I Corps Headquarters.

The most remarkable thing which has to be mentioned was that the bag containing the corpse developed a leak through which a terrible odor and foul fluids emanated and soiled SSgt CUU's clothes.

SSgt THIN is now buried at NAM-O.

All the interpreters are very upset and demoralized by the above incident. They feel that the Marines are ungrateful to them and their efforts and are afraid that a similar situation may happen to them should their luck run out some day. It is strongly hoped that such a sorry and sad thing will not occur again in the future.

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II - B

PERSONNEL OFFICER

ROTATION OF PERSONNEL

Ref: DivO 1300.9 (Under revision)

The proper processing of personnel rotating from the RVN can only be accomplished through timely, accurate administrative procedures.

If you follow the sequence as set forth in DivO 1300.9 and submit correct reports on time to this Headquarters then the rotation of your people will function properly and the concept of first in country, first to rotate will be accomplished.

REPORTS REQUIRED

- A. Monthly Report of Officers Rotating
- B. Monthly Report of Sergeants - Sergeants Major
- C. Monthly Report of Corporals and Below
- D. Monthly Report of Transportation Requirements

Insure you report any additions or deletions to these reports.

ROTATION TOUR DATES

Ref: DivO 1070.1B

The importance of correct establishment, changing and reporting of RTD's cannot be stressed too strongly. The recent policy change of 12 months 20 days in RVN and the 395 day tour must be adhered to. There are many varied factors that will effect the RTD's; we must keep up to date on the procedures to be followed. Remember that all reporting of RTD's will be in the sequence of day, month and year.

VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF O/S TOUR

Ref: DivO 1300.8B

As discussed previously the main thing to watch out for is that all

prerequisites contained in the order are complied with. The time factor on submission of request is very important. Sergeants and above requests must be forwarded to FMFPac if they are less than 4 months from their RTD. Corporals and below may be approved by this Headquarters up to one month prior to their RTD.

SPECIAL 30 DAY LEAVE

The same applies with this program as it results from extending of a Marines O/S tour. We must have the request for special leave a minimum of 20 days in advance of desired date of departure.

To summarize what I have covered here would be as follows: Know the contents of the required references and follow the procedures that are contained therein. If after you have read and reread the Directive and there are questions in your mind as to what we want, then give us a call here and we will do our best to help you out.



II-C

CASUALTY REPORTINGNOTIFICATION TO NEXT OF KIN

Over two years ago the Marine Corps launched a program of notifying next of kin of wounds received by their family members engaged in combat in Vietnam. The program is similar to that, employed by the Marine Corps for notification of death. Since its inception, the impact of our program has been so great on the American public that the other services have developed like programs. Since there is continuous public interest in the activities in Vietnam, which is largely due to intensive press coverage, our casualty reporting procedures are designed to lessen, in every way possible, the worry of families of Marines in combat areas, by keeping the families as fully informed as possible, and also, in some degree, to lessen the shock experienced by the next of kin on learning of injuries, illness, or death of loved ones. I am sure many of you have had the delicate task of notifying the next of kin. You know the importance of accurate and complete information in casualty reports. Gentlemen, our casualty reports must be absolutely correct so that the officer making notification can do his job effectively, with dignity and assurance.

ACCURACY OF REPORTS

Our reports are checked against all existing records, in the parent unit, DPI locators and medical facilities. The checks and rechecks made, result in many telephone calls and repeated calls when there appears to be a discrepancy.

In cases of death, the service records must be delivered to the Division CRCC where the prepared death message is reviewed with the service record to assure accuracy. The many checks and re-checks are exasperating to units busily engaged in many other tasks connected with field operations, however,

we are determined in our task of accurate reporting. Recently, our incessant drive for accuracy resulted in locating several men, reported "Killed in Action", in hospitals, receiving treatment!

#### TIMELY SUBMISSION OF REPORTS

It is difficult to request "speed" in reporting casualties, and also demand "accuracy", but both are required for effective casualty reporting.

I would like to read to you a paragraph from a recent letter which I received from Headquarters, Marine Corps regarding this subject. Quote "The time established for submission of death reports generally can be stated as "ASAP". It is again realized that, on occasion, difficulties exist in recovery and positive identification of remains, thus necessitating a delay in reporting. Timeliness of such reports cannot be over-emphasized from the standpoint of maintaining a sound and trusting relationship between family and the Corps. Of course, accuracy in this area must always be the primary considerations as the impact of such information on the next of kin is immeasurable and leaves no room for error. Let accuracy and timeliness be your watchwords." Unquote.

Our casualty SOP sets times for submission of casualty reports as:

Death reports	=	within 12 hours
WIA reports	=	by 1200 the following day
WIANE reports	=	within 72 hours

#### ASSISTANCE GIVEN UNITS BY CRCC

The Division CRCC is equipped to assist units in the collection of information from medical facilities in Danang area. Besides normal telephone lines, we have a radio link with the major medical facilities. A complete casualty report requires reporting body part afflicted, condition, prognosis, period of hospitalization and location of the patient. This information is collected and relayed to the parent unit preparing the casualty report.

Reporting the casualty is the responsibility of the parent unit, however, many times the Marine is hospitalized and we are informed by the medical facility prior to the time the man's parent unit receives notification from the field. In this respect, our casualty reporting becomes a "two way street". The Division CRCC commences preparation of a report on information received from the medical facilities, the parent unit commences preparation on information received from the field. The marriage of both reports results in a completed casualty report.

We, maintain casualty records in the form of a card file of all wounds and hostile injuries reported and a separate card file of all persons, both hostile and non-hostile, medically evacuated from Vietnam. All reports of admittance to hospitals received are recorded. We also monitor and record all evac information from messages received. Our files are a valuable tool and can be used in the location of personnel medically evacuated from Vietnam. We are in business to assist you in your responsibility for reporting casualties. Our task is assuring accurate and timely reports to higher echelons.

#### IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS

It is important that all of you are familiar with the process of identification of remains of deceased personnel. All deceased personnel must be positively identified by two persons acquainted with the deceased.

Persons making identification are required to complete a standard "Statement of Recognition" form. Normally it is accomplished at the graves registration section. In periods of intense activity it is advantageous to complete the statement of recognition in the field where friends of the deceased are readily available. No death message is released until the statement of recognition has been completed. It is important that all efforts be made to

complete the identification process as soon as possible. Delay in identification has resulted in late reporting and worse in the deterioration of remains to the point the body is no longer viewable.

PERSONNEL MISSING, MISSING IN ACTION, AND UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE

The Division CRCC reports "hostile casualties" and the "non hostile" casualties where the physical condition is fair or worse.

"Missing" is a "non hostile" casualty including all personnel involuntarily absent from their duties who are not believed dead.

"Missing in Action" describes all battle casualties whose whereabouts or actual fate cannot be determined and who are not known to be in an unauthorized absence status. Personnel will not be considered "MIA" merely because their bodies have not been recovered. If circumstances definitely preclude the possibility of survival, such personnel are described as "KIA-BNR".

Personnel missing, presumed UA are processed in accordance with provisions of the Marine Corps Personnel Manual for UA.

The individuals parent unit must make the determination in the case of a missing person.

Investigation is required in cases of missing and missing in action.

FORWARDING OF SRB'S OF MEDEVAC AND KIA PERSONNEL

Division CRCC informs units by message of medical evacuation from Vietnam of their personnel. In the same message, authority to transfer the individual is granted and request is made for the delivery of the SRB with original copy of Battalion Special Orders, to be delivered to CRCC within five days after receipt of the message. Service records are forwarded through FLC by courier to Camp Butler. It is important that units drop medically evacuated personnel as notification is received. Otherwise, you are carrying non-effective personnel on your rolls.

Service records of deceased personnel are required to be delivered to Division CRCC with the commanding officer's letter of condolence to next of kin within four days after death. This time is due to requirement of prompt delivery of service records to Headquarters, Marine Corps. The processing of benefits for next of kin are held in abeyance pending receipt and review of service records.

#### CLOSING STATEMENT

Casualty reporting demands a continuing, vigorous program to insure accurate reports and rapid processing. It is a critical factor which vitally affects the morale and welfare not only of the combatant Marine, but the family and loved ones he has left behind. The Division CRCC is organized to assist you.

#### REFERENCES

Chapter 12, Marine Corps Personnel Manual

FMF Pacific Order P3040.2C

Policy and Procedures for Casualty Management, Western Pacific Area

1st Marine Division Order P3040.1\_

SOP Casualty Reporting and Management

II-D

DIVISION ADJUTANT

Good morning gentlemen. It is a pleasure to be able to address you personally instead of by messages as I am compelled to do so often.

My comments are generally directed to all adjutants in attendance this morning and primarily concern our joint problem areas.

Before I continue, let me assure you that I am not attempting to direct insults at any organization but only attempting to get the 1st Marine Division as administratively efficient as possible. In order to achieve this goal, it is imperative that each of you be as accurate and timely as possible in your daily functions, with the assistance of the management tools designed for efficiency.

I didn't have much to say at our last Adjutant's conference held on August 29th. However, since then I have been compiling notes related to discrepancies. My findings are alarming:

FAILURE TO KEEP COMMANDING OFFICERS INFORMED

I highly suspect that some adjutants are not keeping their commanding officers administratively informed. In this respect, I refer to the numerous airtakes sent by this headquarters to get simple information. Don't conceal anything from your executive officer or commanding officer because sooner or later the matter will come to light. It's your responsibility to keep your commander out of trouble, administratively.

CONGRINTS/WEIREPS/SPLINT

These are not new subjects to the majority of you and I will readily admit that this problem creates our biggest headache. I am sure many of you are exhausted with this problem, but due to its lasting importance, we are stuck with it. These things are taking up our valuable time and

the more effort we apply to the subject, in order to alleviate or reduce it, the more time we will have to devote to other important projects.

In this respect, no problem is too small or too petty to deny an individual his right to seek assistance within the chain of command in an attempt to alleviate his problem, whatever it may be. I surmise that many of our youngsters fail to seek assistance on the premise that nobody is willing to help or wants to be bothered; thus the individual feels his only recourse is to write to his parents who will in turn write to the Congressman, or he may write direct. Essentially, these youngsters must be encouraged, to relate any problem or problems, to their next superior NCO or Officer prior to voicing a complaint to his parents or congressman.

In this matter, I have a few suggestions to pass on which may help to eliminate or at least reduce this problem appreciably:

Personally encourage every individual at every level of command to write home regularly. (I often wonder what happened to our old system of ensuring that a letter was written at least once per week?) It is surprising how many Marines fail to write home, thereby automatically generating an excessive number of WEIREPS, usually filtered into Congress and then to HQMC. I'm sure you can appreciate that wives and parents experience great anxiety day by day, concerning the welfare of the individual. They feel that no news is bad news. Correspondence can also be appreciably reduced, if, when an individual is hospitalized or injured as a result of combat or noncombat circumstances, he relates true facts to his next of kin. We have received numerous WEIREPS

concerning minor non-hostile injuries which were fabricated in letters to the NOK indicating such injuries were a result of enemy action. You can imagine the chain reaction created when the NOK has learned that their loved one has been injured and they were not officially notified!

Another aspect of this problem is that many personnel who are misinformed, write their Congressman or Senators relative to assistance for a humanitarian transfer or discharge. They honestly believe that these representatives have the power to do anything. Advise your troops that such requests must originate from them and are initially handled at the unit level.

We can also reduce the volume by strict compliance with DivO 1700.5 and the format contained therein relative to informing the NOK of corporals and below who joined your organization. Added emphasis must be placed on this requirement, particularly to convey to the NOK that the commanding officer has the individual. Although this is a big chore, if we eliminate one CONGRINT/WEIREP, we have succeeded.

To conclude this subject, please rest assured that the Commanding General has taken a special interest in all CONGRINT/WEIREP and SPLINT cases. He personally signs each reply and is advised of the status of each case on a weekly basis. For this reason alone, take a close look at the guidance promulgated by CG's message 040555Z Oct67 because commencing last week, all such cases are closely monitored to determine the results gained, if any, from this directive.

#### CORRESPONDENCE

Each organization will periodically receive detailed endorsements from this headquarters outlining specific information required to answer



inquiries. In many, many instances, organizational replies do not meet the specific requirements therefore the correspondence must be returned for additional information. This imposes an additional administrative burden and anguish upon the organization and moreso upon me and my staff. In this respect, upon receipt of correspondence which requires a reply, please compare your answer with each of the outlined requirements to ensure that the information provided is in sufficient detail so that each point involved has been fully answered.

While on this subject, I would like to pass on some information which highly disturbs me. To my embarrassment, I have been advised that some of my subordinate officers and NCO's have been sending written communications, directive in nature, to various organizational commanders. I never have and never will condone such action. Therefore, matters of this nature that do not bear my signature are to be returned to me personally for appropriate action.

#### CASUALTY REPORTING

In this area, there has been a noted improvement, specifically in areas of timely submission of SRB's and condolence letters to include timely appearance of personnel to identify the remains of deceased personnel. However, be extremely cautious in preventing erroneous casualty information, for we recently received two official death reports which were erroneous. In both instances, the commanding officers concerned were apprised of these near misses and I will leave it to your assumption as to what happened to the adjutants involved. To assist you in casualty matters, a new and comprehensive Division Casualty SOP

(DivO P3040-1C) will soon be published. When you receive it, digest it and Chapter Twelve of the Marine Corps Personnel Manual and your problems will be virtually solved.

#### CONDOLENCE LETTERS

This is a touchy subject, primarily since such a vast amount of effort is placed into preparation and proofreading. Considering the volume submitted and received, this chore encompasses many man hours. For this reason alone check out the fact thoroughly to ensure accuracy in every detail. To give you a sample of the problems we encounter in this area, I will cite the most significant errors:

In many instances, the phraseology is atrocious which tends to indicate that no real meaning or thought was considered in preparation or composition. Remember, you are preparing a letter of condolence to a parent(s), wife, or other NOK supposedly expressing a true meaning of remorse. If you keep this thought in mind, your letters are bound to improve. Some of the poor examples we cite are:

The beginning of a letter which states: "It is with great sadness that I inform you of the untimely death of your son or husband." This is ridiculous since HQMC has detailed a casualty assistance call officer to personally inform the next of kin many days prior to receipt of the condolence letter.

Also, the cause of injuries leading to death often nauseate me when I read things such as "Your son was ambushed while on patrol. He received severe fragment wounds to the head, exiting through his face leaving massive tissue damage." or "Both legs were blown off by an enemy mine." In this respect, spare the gory details by letting the

NOK remember the Marine as they last saw him rather than visualize a massacred body inside a casket.

Many letters use the term "Your son was critically wounded and died instantly". Don't you feel it more proper to say, "He was mortally wounded and died instantly"? Another prime example is "He died instantly and suffered no pain." Rational dictates that if he died instantly he could not have suffered pain.

Many others contain misspelled words which is indicative of carelessness, or a letter to a sister may refer to "your son", or a letter to a father may state "your husband".

Also, text of some letters is often inconsistent with factual information transmitted on the death message. Since you receive a copy of all death messages, ensure that all facts contained in the message are in consonance with your letter. Keep in mind that the NOK would be very upset if information relayed in a condolence letter was contrary to that which they previously received in person.

In many instances, the individual had been in the organization a very short time: Specifically, less than 8 days in one case. However, the condolence letter stated, "He will be keenly missed"! I am sure you will agree that such a letter definitely lacked meaning and sincerity.

There are many other areas that I have not covered which are marginal. However, I feel that if you apply a little sincerity and ensure the contents are meaningful the bulk of our frustrations will be solved.

In an attempt to help you, I have attached a few sample condolence letters to this brief. If you use them as a guide and the illustration contained in Chapter 12, MCPM, you can't go wrong.

In concluding this subject, insure that all letters bear a type-written date vice a rubber stamp. Unless it's directed within the Marine Corps Family, a date stamp tends to cheapen a letter.

#### PERSONAL EFFECTS

Let's face it! This presents another big headache and brings forth more correspondence that we care to handle. Perhaps this is not within your realm of responsibility, but if not, pass the following information on to those responsible. It bothers me to suspicion that we have ghouls amongst our fellow Marines, but past factors and a recent comprehensive staff study on this subject tends to leave me with no other conclusion. In essence, I suspect some of our people are robbing the dead. The units involved and this Division can be spared much embarrassment if those responsible take immediate action to collect, inventory and properly dispose of personal effects upon notification that an individual has been KIA or medically evacuated. In relation thereto, and in direct connection with condolence letters, let me pass on a word of caution. Make sure when you tell the next of kin that, "John's personal effects have been prepared for shipment and will be delivered to you shortly", it is in fact, a true statement. Recently, three condolence letters which contained this positive statement later proved to be false. Unfortunately, when this command was queried relative to the personal effects that were to have been delivered to the NOK "shortly", everyone concerned was embarrassed because an extensive search revealed that said personal effects could not be located or accounted for.

#### PURPLE HEART POLICY

Because many people considered the purpose of the award had been degraded, it became necessary to revise the qualifications for award of the Purple Heart. Under the new policy, certain criteria must be met and must require

treatment by a medical officer. The guidelines have been established in Force Order 1650.7. If your files do not contain a copy of this directive, let me know and I will ensure that you get one.

#### TWICE/THRICE WOUNDED

This is a rather touchy subject with me, but, in view of the content of MCO 1300.21A, we must, at the present time, go along with the program. However, when time permits, I shall recommend to the Commanding General that a letter be sent to FMFPac to contest the current thrice wounded policy, which I feel leaves many gaps leading to suspected collusion. Conversely, I have never questioned the twice wounded policy, but many cases in which individuals qualify under the thrice wounded category disturb me to no end. My suspicions are aroused by the fact that after two legitimate hostile injuries become a matter of record, a third injury frequently crops up, having occurred six or more months earlier, which invariably involves a minor wound. In these instances, I scrutinize each such case with a suspicious mind. However, until the issue is resolved, I will continue to accept and honor these questionable thrice wounded reports provided the battalion commander signs the report.

#### MAIL AND VISITORS FOR HOSPITALIZED PERSONNEL

This is last but not least in the categories related to casualties. Periodic visits to and receipt of mail is vital to the morale and welfare of our incapacitated Marines. Take care of their needs.

UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE is a continuing problem which will probably never be solved. Notwithstanding this belief, be sure that your organization informs the NOK when an individual has been UA for a period of ten days. We have been embarrassed on occasion, since this requirement was not met, so keep

close tabs on this problem to avoid getting yourself in trouble. In this regard, the Marine Corps Personnel Manual is your guide.

In this matter of unauthorized absence, there is considerable confusion in making a distinction between a person UA or missing. If a person is suspected as missing under conditions other than UA, I recommend that any contemplated report be held in abeyance until such time as an appropriate investigation has been conducted. In this regard, a Division Unit, recently confronted with two unauthorized absences, took the initiative to request assistance from G-2 concerning those absences which were erroneously qualified as missing cases. Not doubting the organizations sincerity in this matter, G-2 directed one of their CIT teams to conduct an investigation. Subsequently, a counter-intelligence report was prepared and submitted to CG, FMFPac, who came back to us for an explanation. We had a hell of a time trying to prepare a reply to correspond with the fact that we goofed.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

Messages. You undoubtedly wonder why we deal in messages traffic vice telephone calls. Past experience dictates the necessity of this action or documented evidence as a matter of protection. I frowned upon this policy shortly after my arrival but soon changed my mind after I was repeatedly subjected to embarrassment by virtue of false information received over the telephone.

In reference to messages, please use a subject line, in order that we can readily identify the case at hand. This is often omitted.

Emergency/humanitarian leave/PCSO. In this area, and as confirmed by a Division Chaplain, I have gained the reputation of being a "Hard Nose". In this respect I am human and do possess sympathetic tendencies. However, various factors are involved in rendering a decision, which is finalized by the G-1. In these cases, I ask myself the following questions:

Does the request appear valid, particularly when emergency or humanitarian leave will gain a PCSO for the individual concerned who will have less than 120 days remaining on his tour?

Does the request meet the criteria as outlined in the Marine Corps Personnel Manual?

Has the situation been adequately covered by the Red Cross? (In most cases no.) However, in the area of family illness, we will never question a case when the condition and prognosis of a patient is indicated as critical/poor, or worse. These cases result in an automatic approval of emergency leave. On the other hand, many cases we receive suggest that the wife or family members are using a weak excuse in an attempt to get an individual home. Many of these involve anxiety reaction on the part of the family member, allegedly created by the serviceman's presence in RVN. Gentlemen, I and probably most of you in this room are confronted with this same situation. The final decision in the latter type case is disapproval.

Many other cases pertain to marital problems, based solely on a threat of divorce in a letter from the wife. In order for us to make a decision in these cases, the request must be supported by documentary evidence from a lawyer attesting to these facts. Also, it is apparent that many individuals who are really effected with a threat of divorce, are not aware of the provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors Relief Act which states that a wife may not divorce her husband while he is overseas, unless he consents in writing to such action.

Record of emergency data/SRB/SGLI (Serviceman's Group Life Insurance)

In many instances, particularly involving those WIA or KIA, we find the record of emergency data is not current. Aside from the fact that

this poses many problems, to include payment of death benefits, there is no need to elaborate on the importance attached thereto. Take time to ensure that this vital document is current. Also, as a matter of concern, a recent death revealed that a unit had not received a service record book for an individual. Here again, no need for elaboration.

Finally, in the area of problems, an excessive number of SRB's lack an SGLI designator sheet, although the individual is paying the \$2.00 per month, HQMC has a difficult time in making a determination as to who shall receive the dividend, particularly in cases where parents are separated or divorced. Keep on top of this problem.

Gentlemen, I've attempted to let you know of our larger problem areas and I know that your's are numerous also. However rest assured that I am always available to assist you, so don't hesitate to contact me when you are confronted with a problem you can't solve.

2-D-11



DECLASSIFIED

COMPANY  
Battalion & Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

26 October 1967

Mr. and Mrs. James H. Marine  
456 Center Avenue  
Anytown, Anystate (Zip Code)

My dear Mr. and Mrs. Marine:

The recent and untimely death of your son Lance Corporal Joseph J. Marine, U. S. Marine Corps, on October 24, 1967 in Duc Duc District, Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam, is a source of great sorrow to me and his many friends in this battalion.

Joe was a Rifleman in the First Platoon of \_\_\_\_ Company. At approximately 8:30 p.m. on October 24, 1967 Joe was on reconnaissance duty when his patrol was ambushed. Joe was hit by the initial burst of enemy fire and died as a result of the wounds received. It may comfort you to know that Joe was administered the last rites of the Catholic Church by Lieutenant J. J. Smith, U. S. Navy.

A Memorial Mass will be held in Joe's honor which will be attended by his many friends in Company \_\_\_\_.

Although joining this Battalion in September 1967, Joe had a record of consistently doing good work and his immediate seniors and contemporaries alike spoke highly of him. We in the Battalion hope the knowledge that your son is keenly missed and that we share your sorrow, will in some degree, make the suffering caused by your great loss easier to bear.

Your son's personal effects have been prepared for shipment and will be forwarded to you shortly.

If you feel that I can be of any assistance to you in the future, please do not hesitate to write.

Sincerely yours,

J. J. LEATHERNECK  
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

II-D-A

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

COMPANY  
Battalion & Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

6 August 1967

Mr. and Mrs. James H. Marine  
456 Center Avenue  
Anytown, Anystate (Zip Code)

My dear Mr. and Mrs. Marine:

It is difficult for me to express the regrets and sorrow felt by the Marines in this company over the recent death of your son, Lance Corporal Joseph J. Marine, U. S. Marine Corps, on August 1, 1967, at Danang, Republic of Vietnam.

Joe, as you know, was an automatic rifleman in our 2nd platoon. On July 31, 1967 his platoon was conducting a search and destroy mission near the Hamlet of Phuoc An. At approximately 4:30 p.m., Joe stepped on a concealed enemy mine and received multiple fragmentation wounds. The platoon Corpsman rushed to his aid and a medical evacuation helicopter arrived within minutes. He was flown to the 1st Medical Battalion Hospital for treatment. Although the surgeons did everything possible to save him, the wounds proved too severe and he died at 2.13 a.m. on August 1, 1967. The ministrations of a Protestant Chaplain were received by Joe just before his death. The Chaplain was Lieutenant J. J. Smith, U. S. Navy.

A Memorial Service was held in Joseph's honor on August 5, 1967 at the Battalion Chapel and was attended by his many friends.

Joe was one of the finest Marines I have ever known. His exemplary conduct, leadership, and singular determination to do every job well, were qualities that all of us respected. We will miss him and hope you will find some comfort in knowing this.

If there is anything I can do, please feel free to write me.

Sincerely yours,

J. J. LEATHERNECK  
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

II-D-B

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COMPANY  
Battalion & Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

6 August 1967

Mrs. Joseph J. Marine (To wife use husband's first name and middle initial)  
123 Main Street  
Anytown, Anystate (Zip Code)

My dear Mrs. Marine:

The recent death of your husband, Lance Corporal Joseph J. Marine, U. S. Marine Corps on August 1, 1967, at Danang, Republic of Vietnam, is a source of sorrow to me and his many friends. Please accept our deepest sympathy in your bereavement.

Joe was an automatic rifleman in our 2nd Platoon. On July 31, 1967 his platoon was conducting a search and destroy mission near the hamlet of Phouc An. At approximately 4:30 p.m., (Always use civilian time; i.e., 4:30 p.m. vice 1630) Joe stepped on a concealed enemy mine and received multiple fragmentation wounds. The platoon corpsman rushed to his aid and a medical evacuation helicopter arrived within minutes. He was flown to the 1st Medical Battalion Hospital for treatment. Although the surgeons did everything possible to save him, the wounds proved too severe and he died at 2:13 a.m. on August 1, 1967. The ministrations of a Protestant Chaplain were received by Joe just before his death. The Chaplain was Lieutenant J. J. Smith, U. S. Navy. (If deceased is Protestant the terminology is acceptable. However, if he is a Catholic, use: Joe's death came shortly after receiving the last rites of his faith from Catholic Chaplain Lieutenant A. B. Jones, U. S. Navy.)

A memorial service was held in Joseph's honor on August 5, 1967 at the Battalion Chapel and was attended by his many friends. (For Catholic personnel use: It may comfort you to know that a Mass was said for Joe on August 5, 1967 and was attended by his many friends.

Joe's quiet manner, eagerness to help and devotion to duty won for him the respect of all who knew him. We in the company hope the knowledge that your husband is keenly missed and that we share your sorrow will in some measure alleviate the suffering caused you by your great loss.

Joe's personal effects have been prepared for shipment and will be forwarded to you shortly. The money found in his personal effects will be forwarded to you via Registered Mail. (Ensure this has been or will be done prior to stating this fact.)

If you feel that I can be of any assistance, please do not hesitate to write.

Sincerely yours,

J. J. LEATHERNECK  
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding  
II-D-C

DECLASSIFIED

## III -

PROVOST MARSHAL

The mission of the Provost Marshal is to advise the Commanding General and Staff on Provost Marshal and Military Police activities; to employ Military Police in the direction of traffic in the rear area, traffic in the forward areas being the responsibility of the regiments; to provide Prisoner of War collection points in the forward areas at the request of unit commanders, through G-1; to prepare and supervise Military Police training on a daily basis; and finally to plan, direct, and supervise the following Military Police operations:

TRAFFIC CONTROL IN THE REAR AREA

This is accomplished through use of vehicle patrols, traffic patrols, traffic control points, and check points.

CIRCULATION AND CONTROL OF INDIVIDUALS AND STRAGGLERS

This is accomplished through the use of vehicle patrols, walking patrols within the principal villages, check points and periodic checks of personnel seeking to use recreational facilities. Through a cross-reference system, a man detained in the field can be checked through the desk sergeant to determine if he is wanted by a unit for UA, if that information has been provided by the unit. Dissemination of information of this nature is made by the Division Provost Marshal to all law enforcement organizations throughout I Corps by Military Police Alert.

APPREHENSION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Those apprehended during the hours of curfew are detained and released to an Officer or SNCO from their organization regardless of the reason for

apprehension. Offenders apprehended during daylight hours may be released to their own recognition depending on the seriousness of the offense and multiplicity of offenses. For example; off-limits, uniform and weapons violators are released on their own recognition. Black-marketers, money manipulators, possessors of marijuana, and those persons UA are released to their organizations. In the cases in which officers or SNCO's are unavailable, written authorization by the 1st Sergeant for an NCO to sign for an apprehended person is accepted.

#### PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AND INDIVIDUALS

Vehicles and weapons are of primary interest. Vehicles found unattended in locations other than military compounds, or areas where security of vehicles is not provided, are impounded for release to the unit. Weapons left unattended in vehicles are also impounded for release to the unit. Weapons can be reclaimed, in accordance with CG msg 152345Z Sep67, from the Division Ordnance Officer. Property of all descriptions is picked up periodically at recreational facilities and checked through the stolen and lost file. Weapons are turned into the supply system. Other items are retained for 60 days and released to chaplains, medical units, or supply as deemed appropriate. Owners are notified in the case of items which bear identification. Where the Vietnamese civilians are concerned, items used solely for war and items which can be clearly identified as U.S. organizational property, i.e. water cans with tactical markings, are confiscated through coordination with the National Police and returned through the supply system.

In all Military Police action the protection of individuals is primarily

preventive in nature in that individuals are ushered through off-limits areas; conversations with prostitutes, street vendors, and street urchins are broken up. Troops found riding in vehicles with ARVN, or found in exchange areas with Vietnamese are sent on their way to prevent the purchase of rationed items by unauthorized personnel. Individuals intoxicated, lost, or unable to care for themselves are detained for safekeeping and disposition to organizations and medical channels.

#### INVESTIGATIONS OF CRIMES

The Division Criminal Investigation Department investigates reported offenses and incidents which are purely criminal in nature such as homicide, rape, robbery, theft, blackmarket, and narcotics.

#### DETENTION OF U.S. PRISONERS

Owing to the close proximity of the III MAF Brig, detention facilities are not provided by the Provost Marshal's Office. In another circumstances this service would be provided. Our only detention facility is the Desk Sergeant's office wherein personnel detained can be held for short periods only, e.g., over-night.

#### PRISONER OF WAR HANDLING

Prisoner of War handling is currently limited to the operation of battalion and regimental collection points. This restricted activity is owed to the size of the Division rear area and the responsibilities attending therein. As most of you know, we maintain Prisoner of War compounds in all these regiments. Wherever possible, our own Military Police run the compounds. Otherwise, they supervise and instruct in the running of the compound by troops belonging to the individual units.

REAR AREA SECURITY

Military Police Company participates in rear area security by providing day and night patrols on rear area road nets, by manning the entrances to the Division CP security. Damage control is provided by our cordoning off affected areas as soon as we learn of the damage and then protecting government and personal property and the prevention of looting.

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

All accidents involving either U.S. and non-U.S. personnel are investigated. All injury accidents involving U.S. personnel are investigated. Accidents involving personnel with property damage in excess of \$50.00 are investigated. There is a lapsed time of one to four days before accident reports are mailed from the Provost Marshal's office depending upon the nature of the accident. Four days usually lapse in the case of death, or serious injuries involving Vietnamese. Unit investigation officers can be provided with documents regarding Vietnamese killed or injured by waiting for the accident report or by coming to the Provost Marshal's office. We have and will continue to provide them with as much material as possible in order that they can meet their appointment deadline dates.

MILITARY POLICE LIAISON

It is the Provost Marshal's responsibility to coordinate law enforcement activities with other military and civilian police activities. Surrounding and within the TAOR are: 1st MP Bn on the air base; 3rd MP Bn operating AFP Danang; Air Police; Air Wing Security; National Police (QS); and Vietnamese military Police (QC). The vital area commander is at Hoa Cam Training Center.

In sum, law enforcement and traffic control in the Division rear area extends to the Regimental rear area boundary. Criminal investigations and Prisoner of War handling extends throughout the Division TAOR. Requests for Criminal Investigation Department assistance should go directly to the Provost Marshal's Office. However, requests for Prisoner of War handling should go to G-1.

#### PROBLEM AREAS FOR PROVOST MARSHALL

Often too much time elapses between the occurrence and requests for investigative assistance, and units often fail to safeguard items of possible evidence. This disadvantages and handicaps the investigator greatly. We need prompt notice.

There is a failure to report UA's and stragglers and to do so promptly. We really have no way of telling if a man is in fact UA; your help here is essential and if possible within the first 24 hours. We have handled Marines and released them only to later learn that they were UA.

Finally, there is the problem of control and discipline. Troops often are without complete uniform, and in unauthorized clothing (Vietnamese campaign hats being the most obvious). Often they carry no weapons or ammunition. Without your local enforcement our job is impossible, because we can write men up, detain them and correct them, but in the final analysis these problems can only be successfully solved by yourselves, the unit leaders, by your requirement of those same standards that Marines are noted for. They are your men.



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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

DivO 3120.17  
27/DLD/rrt  
7 Jun 1967

DIVISION ORDER 3120.17

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Provost Marshal and Military Police Company Activities

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-1, par 1341  
(b) FM 19-90, The Provost Marshal  
(c) FMFM 6-1, par 409  
(d) FM 19-1, Military Police Support Army Divisions and Separate Brigades.  
(e) FM 19-10, Military Police Operations  
(f) FM 19-5, Military Policeman  
(g) FM-19-25, Military Police Traffic Control  
(h) FM 19-20, Military Police Investigations

1. Purpose. To provide guidance and direction for the Provost Marshal and the Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF activities in the Division Tactical Area of Responsibility.

2. Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshal is a member of the Division special staff and comes under the staff cognizance of G-1. He is also the Commanding Officer, Military Police Company and therefore exercises operational control of the Military Police Company. The Military Police Company is under the administrative control of the Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion for supply, administration and logistics. References (a) and (b) set forth the general duties and responsibilities of the Provost Marshal. Specific duties and functions are:

a. Advise Commanding General and staff on Provost Marshal and Military Police activities.

b. Recommend employment and utilization of the Military Police Company.

c. Prepare and supervise Military Police Training.

d. Plan, direct and supervise following Military Police operations:

(1) Traffic control.

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DivC 3120.17

7 Jun 1967

- (2) Circulation control of individuals.
  - (3) Apprehension of military personnel.
  - (4) Protection of property and individuals.
  - (5) Prevention and investigation of crime.
  - (6) Temporary detention of military prisoners.
  - (7) Prisoner of War operations.
  - (8) Military Police participation in rear area security and damage control activities.
- e. Coordinate activities with other military and civilian law enforcement agencies.

3. Military Police Company. References (c) through (h) provide detailed guidance for Military Police activities. The Military Police Company will provide the following support to the 1st Marine Division as required/directed:

- a. Traffic control.
- b. Prevention and investigation of crime.
- c. Operation of Prisoner of War collecting points to include evacuation of Prisoners of War from forward collecting points to a central Prisoner of War collecting point.
- d. Operation of straggler collecting points.
- e. Operation of temporary confinement facility for military prisoners.
- f. Assistance in Division rear area security and area damage control missions.
- g. Limited local and internal ground security for Division command post.
- h. Escort and security for special persons.
- i. Enforcement of military laws, orders and regulations.

4. Requests for Military Police Support

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a. Regiments are responsible for traffic control forward of their rear boundaries. Requests for Military Police assistance will be submitted to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 if a special problems arises in traffic control.

b. Requests for Military Police to establish Prisoners of War collecting points will be submitted to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

c. Requests for assistance in criminal investigations will be submitted to Division Provost Marshall.

d. Requests for all other types of Military Police support will be submitted to the Division Provost Marshal.

e. When a unit requests Military Police support, the requesting unit will be responsible to provide necessary logistic support such as rations, billeting, water and consumable supplies.

f. Requests for Military Police support should provide the following data:

- (1) Requesting unit.
- (2) Time and place to report.
- (3) Duration of employment.
- (4) Size of Military Police detachment desired.
- (5) Type of commitment (Prisoner of War collecting point, traffic control).
- (6) Person to contact for further information.

/s/ E. L. BALE, JR

E. L. BALE, JR  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "B"

## IV

CAREER ADVISORY

Good afternoon gentlemen my name is Gunnery Sergeant FAIOLI and I am with the Division Career Advisory Section. My topic for today deals with Career Advisory Problem Areas.

The first problem area is the assignment of Career Advisors. As a first step in this Divisions revitalization of the Career Advisory effort the attention of all commanders is invited to review DivO P1133.1D which is the SOP for Career Advisory. It states that assignment of Career Advisory NCO's on regimental and battalion level be assigned to either MSgt or GySgt and that this be his primary duties. However additional duties such as educational NCO may be assigned to company and battery Career Advisors. Personnel assigned to these duties should be thoroughly screened by commanders for motivation, appearance, and ability and should reflect the commanders concept of the ideal Marine and be mature with a thorough knowledge of the Marine Corps and its functions. In order to permit continuity of effort, personnel assigned as Career Advisors should remain in the billet for a period of at least six months, and be assigned insofar as personnel commitments permit. There should not be any gaps in the change-over of Career Advisory NCO's and a maximum possible snapping in period be required prior to take over.

The second problem area in the Career Advisory Program is the proper processing of scheduled interviews. Career Advisory NCO's are finding themselves trailing far behind in their interviews and this is largely due to lack of cooperation from personnel on section/company/battery levels. Again I stress the attention of all commanders to review DivO P1133.1D, and comply with it insofar as combat situations permit. The main objective of

the formal interview method is to provide the individual Marine with complete and factual information relative to the advantages and opportunities of a Marine Corps Career, and to advise and assist the individual with his career planning. As a reminder the initial formal interview will be conducted twelve months prior to a Marines expiration of enlistment. It is at this time that regular enlisted personnel become eligible for early reenlistment IAW current directives. Follow-up interviews will be conducted at 9 months prior to EAS by company/battery Advisory NCO's, 6 months prior to EAS by company/battery Commander's and 3 months prior to EAS by battalion Career Advisors. Every recommended and qualified Marine must be considered a potential reenlistment until the actual time of his separation.

Our third problem area is the drafting of the Administrative Action Form. Either incorrect or outdated references are being used and in some instances have no references at all. When options are submitted for a duty station for which there are specified requirements, MCO 1300.20B is not referenced and commanding officer's specific recommendations are not being made. Integration request of reserves are being submitted as reenlistment options. Augmentation of reserve personnel is determined by numerous factors and each case must be resolved on an individual basis in accordance with current regulations and directives. Requests are also being submitted on individuals as a first term reenlistment when in fact it is his second or subsequent reenlistment. If administrative personnel would apprise themselves of the current directives to the Career Advisor Program and become knowledgeable of their contents there would be a decrease in errors and an increase in effort toward this vital program.

Gentlemen if you will refer in your brief books to the section on Career Advisory you will notice that we have compiled for your convenience important information insofar as it pertains to Career Advisory matters... The first part deals with the elements of Career Advisory and the first element being command emphasis which is the key to reenlistments... The second part deals with Career Advisory Program pertaining to units from commanders on down to squad level... The third part refers to all Marine Corps Directives to include sections of the Marine Corps Manual and MARCORPERSMAN pertinent to the Career Advisory Program... The fourth part deals with reenlistment incentives for west coast and east coast commands and are to be utilized for 1st term reenlistments or extensions of 3 years or more... The fifth part with the variable reenlistment bonus you have the proposed pay scale, the variable multiples figured out for 6 years and 4 years. Reenlistments or extensions and the qualifying MOS's. Also for your convenience we have formatted the essential information required for the elements of a lump sum VRB request, and for an option request. On the last page we have broken down for your convenience a format of the Administrative Action Form, the correct preparation of reenlistment or extension requests which will prevent unnecessary delays in submission or in some cases resubmission. To further assist the assigned Career Advisors we are in the process of reproducing most of our MCO's and Directives pertinent to Career Advisory.

Gentlemen we have discussed some problem areas in Career Advisory as it pertains to reenlistment or extensions. We have talked about three problem areas - First the assignment of Career Advisors; second, interviews; and third, administrative action forms. Gentlemen, the success

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or failure of the Career Advisory Program insofar as reenlistments and extensions are concerned rests with the commanding officer and all officers and NCO's within the command.

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Elements of Career Advisory Program

1. Command emphasis:

a. This is the key to reenlistments. The success of the career advisory program is directly related to the amount of command attention and interest it receives.

b. Emphasis must be strong enough to reach to all echelons of command.

c. Include the following:

(1) Commanding General's/Officer's Conference

(2) Letters from Commanding General's/Officer's

(3) Adjutant Conference

(4) Career Advisory Conference

2. All hands effort:

a. Commanders of themselves reenlist few Marines. The commanders provide the impetus and support but the reenlistments are gained by leaders at the lower echelons of responsibility.

b. To be successful the career advisory program must have the active support and participation of all leaders and supervisors.

c. A low level, day to day effort will provide the best results.

d. If small unit leaders are to produce maximum results, they must have a good knowledge of incentives and options. This requires a briefing or short training session.

e. The briefing will also bring the Marine Corps as a career back into the proper perspective. We know it's a good career, but a reminder of the advantages doesn't hurt.

3. Good career advisors:

a. A full time career advisory NCO is required at the battalion and squadron level and full time career advisory officer at the major command level.

b. These Marines must be highly qualified. No matter what the career advisor says to the prospective reenlistee, he is really saying "Stick around and be like me." Marine Corps Order 1133.2F states that the career advisor should be the commander's concept of the ideal career Marine.



c. Continuity is necessary for the career advisor to be effective. We should strive for six months in the job.

d. Major commands should have a small, mobile team of highly qualified career advisors who can make a continuous swing through the units of the command to provide assistance, stimulate interest and evaluate programs.

#### Early interviews:

a. The reenlistment process actually commences as soon as the Marine enlists. Within each unit, the reenlistment process should start as soon as the man joins the unit. A reminder of the career advisory program and the benefits of a Marine Corps career should be included as part of the initial indoctrination. This is a soft sell.

b. The first formal interview should be given 12 months prior to the Marine's EAS. The lowlevel, day to day approach won't succeed unless interviews commence early, are continuous and are balanced between formal and informal.

c. Prepare interviews require a detailed knowledge of incentives; however we do not want to forget that the initial inclination for reenlistment is generally built on the intangible incentives: pride, the chance to be a leader, esprit, prestige.

d. The benefits that hold the greatest appeal differ with each man. An important part of the interview cycle is to listen and find out what the man's goals and aims are - what appeals to him.

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CAREER ADVISORY PROGRAM

UNIT PROGRAMS

Career advisory programs will vary from unit to unit. Each commander must adapt his career advisory program to fit the local situation. For this reason no precise rules can be established for a successful retention effort; however, the following guidelines are published for use by commanders in developing and maintaining career advisory programs:

1. Ensure personal command attention and supervision at all levels.
2. Search out and correct any areas of leadership, administration and welfare that may have an adverse effect on reenlistment.
3. Ensure that a positive approach is taken toward all requests for reenlistment incentives and options. Forward any reasonable request expeditiously.
4. Conduct a through training program for career advisory personnel to ensure precise and complete knowledge of career advisory and related matters. Pay particular attention to knowledge of incentives, both tangible and intangible.
5. Conduct periodic training programs for all officers and non-commissioned officers. These, especially on the company level, are the ones in most frequent contact with the potential reenlistee and are the ones that will bring success or failure to the retention program.
6. Achieve a balanced approach between the more formalized interviews conducted by the career advisory personnel and the informal talks by small unit leaders.
7. Commence reenlistment interviews when a Marine reports in and schedule them periodically during his time with your organization.
8. Assign career advisory noncommissioned officers on a full time basis at the battalion/squadron level.
9. Assign a command level career advisory officer on a full time basis with sufficient assistance to conduct training, coordinate the program, and reinforce the reenlistment efforts of the lower echelon career advisors.
10. Evaluate personnel assigned to career advisory billets to determine that they have the necessary qualifications. Personnel assigned as career advisors should meet your concept of the ideal career Marine.
11. Ensure that personnel assigned to career advisory billets on an additional duty basis have sufficient time available to do full justice to the assignment.

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12. Small unit leaders down to squad level should be familiar with the contents of the following orders:

- a. MCO 1133.2F                      Qualification for Reenlistment
- b. FMF PacO 1300.9E                Voluntary Extension of Overseas Tours
- c. MCO 1133.15H                    Reenlistment Incentives  
    FMF Pac Msg 112218Z Jul67
- d. MCO 7220.24A                    Variable Reenlistment Bonus

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MARINE CORPS DIRECTIVES PERTINENT TO THE CAREER ADVISORY PROGRAM

MCO/MCBul

SUBJECT

1001.1	Obligated Service Requirements UMTS Act
1001.3	Enlist, Reenlist, EAD Enlisted Reservists
1001.39	Indoctrination-Pers Discharged/Rel from ACDU
1040.9	Enlisted Commissioning Program
1040.14	LDO and WO Programs
1040.22	Naval Flight Officer Program
1080.26	Quota Orders Process; Management of
R1100.61	Recruiting Service Manual
1130.4	Enl Reenl Appointment/Reappointment; Procedures for
1133	Career Informational Bulletin/Career Advisory Bulletins
1133.2	Career Advisory Prog-Qualifications for Reenl
1133.4	Early Discharge for Immediate Reenl
1133.12	Career Advisory Publication - The Outlook for Your Future
1133.15	Reenlistment Incentives
P1133.18	Reenlistment Interview Manual
1133.21	Voluntary Extension of Enlistment
1200	Classification, Retraining and Critical MOS Bulletins
P1200.7	MOS Manual
1220.2	Retraining into Aviation Skills
1300	Assignment and Distribution Bulletins
1300.8	Overseas Tours of Duty and Movement of Dependents
1300.9	Assignment to Recruiting Duty
1300.11	Assignment of Enlisted Marines to Combat and Foreign Service
1300.20	Enlisted Assignment Prerequisites
1300.21	Assignment of Twice Wounded Marines to Vietnam

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MCO/MCBul

SUBJECT

1306.2	Assignment to Spl Foreign Duty w/Dept of State
1306.7	Selection of NCO's for Drill Instructors Crse
1306.8	Assignment of Enlisted Personnel to Recruiting Duty
P1500.12	MarCor Formal Schools Catalog
1530	U. S. Naval Prep Scol Nominations for
1530.5	Air Force Academy Prep Scol
1530.7	Appt Cadetship in USCG; Eligibility of MarCorPers
1530.8	Admin Instr Officer Candidate Program
1532.1	Selection of Enl Pers for OCC-AOCC-MARCAD
1560.15	NESEP for Enl Pers of the Marine Corps
1650.11	Career Advisory Achievement Award
1700	Morale Personal Affairs Bulletin
1700.19	Personal Counseling of Marines on Initial Enl
1740.11	Reemployment Rights Applicants for Enl MC
P1760.5	Marine Corps Retirement Guide
1800.3	Voluntary Retirement Policy-Criteria
1830.1	Active Duty-Overseas Preq for Ret-Tr FMCR
1900	Separation Bulletins
1900.1	Release from AcDu-Members of MCR
1900.2	Trans Enl Mar with Obl Serv to MCR
1910.23	Separation of Enl Marines
1910.24	Early Release of Enl Pers for College Enrollment
7220.12	Proficiency Pay Regulations
7220.24	Variable Reenlistment Bonus Program
<u>FMFPACO</u>	
1133.2	Reenl Incentives and Personnel Assignment
1133.4	Career Advisory Program

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FMFPACO

SUBJECT

1300.8 Exch of Pers Between FMFPac & POA Sec Force Units  
1300.9 Voluntary Ext of O/S Tour  
1300.12 Security Clearance for Assignment to POA

III MAFO

1300.1 Leave in Conjunction w/Vol Ext O/S Tour  
1300.2 Voluntary Ext of O/S Tour  
1306.1 Exch of Enl Pers Between FMFPac WestPac Avn and  
Grnd Units  
1550.1 III MAF Vietnamese Language Scol.  
1550.2 Schools

1stMARDIVO

1050.1 Leave  
1050.3 Special 30 day Leave  
P1133.1 SOP Career Advisory  
1300.8 Vol Ext of O/S Tour

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SECTIONS OF MARCORMAN & MARCORPERSMAN  
APPLICABLE TO CAREER ADVISORY PROGRAM

MARINE CORPS MANUAL

Para 1000	Personnel Management
Para 1040	Career Management
Para 1100	Procurement of Military Personnel
Para 1120	Officer Procurement
Para 1130	Enlisted Recruiting
Para 1133	Reenlistments and Extensions of Enlistments
Para 1430	Enlisted Promotions
Para 1510.3	Career Training
Para 1560	General Education
Para 1740	Personal Affairs
Para 1760	Civil Re-adjustment
Para 1772	Assistance to Survivors
Para 1800	Retirement

MCO P5000.3, MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL MANUAL

Chap 2	Officer and Enlisted Procurement
Chap 3	Classification of Military Personnel
Chap 4, Part C	Assignment and Distribution of Enlisted Personnel
Part B	Personnel Requests
Chap 5	Travel of Marine Corps Personnel and Dependents
Chap 6, Part F	Enlisted Promotion
Chap 9	Leave and Liberty
Chap 11	Personal Affairs
Chap 12, Part F	Casualty Assistance Calls Program
Chap 13, Part F	Types Discharges of Enlisted Personnel
Part G	General Instructions Relating to Discharges
Part I	Retirement of Enlisted Personnel and Transfer to FMGR
Part J	Physical Disability Retirements and Separations of Officers and Enlisted Personnel
Chap 14	Pay and Allowances
Chap 15, Part B	Miscellaneous Personnel and Identification Records
Part C	Service Record Books

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The Marine Corps Manual and MCO P5000.3, Marine Corps Personnel Manual, are items of significant importance to Career Advisory personnel, in that they contain information and instruction pertinent to almost every aspect of the Career Advisory Program. Every Career Advisor should familiarize himself with these references.

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

54/RWT/tjc  
1133  
14 Nov 1967

From: Division Career Advisory Officer  
To: Career Advisory Personnel, 1st Marine Division (Rein)

Subj: Reenlistment Incentives

Ref: (a) CG FMFPac msg 112218Z Jul67

1. Reference (a) published the following CONUS duty stations for use as reenlistment options IAW MCO 1133.15G for FY-68 as allocated by GMC.

WEST COAST COMMANDS

MB NAS ALAMEDA CALIF  
MB Bremerton Wash  
MB NAVWPNSTA Concord Calif  
MB NAD Hawthorne Nev  
MB NAVWPNSTA Fallbrook Calif  
MB LAKEMead BASE Las Vegas Nev  
MB NAVB Long Beach Calif  
MB NAD McCallester Okla  
MB NAS Moffet Field Calif  
MB NAS NI SDiego Calif  
MB NAS Whidbey Is Wash  
MB NAVSTA SDiego Calif  
MB SFRAN BAY NAVYD  
MB NAVWPNSTA Seal Beach Calif  
MB NAVB Vallejo Calif  
MB NAD Bangor Wash  
MB NAS Lemore Calif  
MB NAVSTA SFRan Calif

EAST COAST COMMANDS

MB NAVSTA Annapostia Md  
MB NAVB Boston Mass  
MB NAVB Brooklyn NY  
MB NAVB Charleston SC  
MB NAS Brunswick Maine  
MB NAVWPNSTA Charleston SC  
MB CLARKSVILLEB Tenn  
MB NAD Earle NJ  
MB NTC GLakes Ill  
MB NAVB Key West Fla  
MB NAS Lakehurst NJ  
MB NAVSUBBASE New London Conn  
MB NAVB Norfolk Va  
MB NAVB Phila Pa  
MB NAVSHIPYD Portsmouth NH  
MB NAVSHIPYD Portsmouth Va  
MB Quonset Pt RI  
MB NAS Sanford Fla  
MB NAVWPNSTA Yorktown Va  
MB NAVDISPCOM Portsmouth NH  
MB NAS Cecil Field Fla

MAJOR CONUS COMMANDS

MCB Camp Lejeune NC  
MCS, Quantico Va  
MCSC Albany Ga  
MCB Camp Pendleton Calif  
MCSC Barstow Calif

2. Above incentives are to be utilized only for first term reenlistments or extensions of enlistments for a minimum period of 3 years.

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OFFICE OF THE DIVISION CAREER ADVISORY  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

14 Nov 1967

VARIABLE REENLISTMENT MULTIPLES

SIX YEAR REENLISTMENTS

GRADE AND YRS SERV	BASIC MULTIPLE	MULTIPLE 1	MULTIPLE 2	MULTIPLE 3	MULTIPLE 4
SSgt 0/6	\$2010.60	\$4021.21	\$6031.80	\$8042.40	\$10,053.00
SSgt 0/4	1935.00	3870.00	5805.00	7740.00	9675.00
SSgt 0/3	1859.40	3718.80	5578.80	7437.60	9297.00
SSgt 0/2	1785.60	3571.20	5356.80	7142.40	8928.00
Sgt 0/6	1823.40	3646.80	5470.20	7293.60	9117.00
Sgt 0/4	1710.00	3420.00	5130.00	6840.00	8550.00
Sgt 0/3	1638.00	3276.00	4914.00	6552.00	8190.00
Sgt 0/2	1564.20	3128.40	4692.60	6256.80	7821.00
Cpl 0/6	1600.20	3200.40	4800.60	6400.80	8001.00
Cpl 0/4	1524.60	3049.60	4573.80	6098.40	7623.00
Cpl 0/3	1413.00	2826.00	4239.00	5652.00	7065.00
Cpl 0/2	1339.20	2688.40	4017.60	5356.80	6696.00
LCpl 0/4	1227.60	2455.20	3682.80	4910.40	6138.00
LCpl 0/3	1153.80	2307.60	3461.40	4615.20	5769.00
LCpl 0/2	1078.20	2156.40	3234.60	4312.80	5391.00

FOUR YEAR REENLISTMENTS

SSgt 0/6	\$1340.40	\$2680.80	\$4021.20	\$5361.60	\$6702.00
SSgt 0/4	1290.00	2580.00	3870.00	5560.00	6450.00
SSgt 0/3	1239.60	2479.20	3688.80	4958.40	6198.00
SSgt 0/2	1190.40	2380.80	3571.20	4761.60	5952.00
Sgt 0/6	1215.60	2431.20	3646.80	4862.40	6078.00
Sgt 0/4	1140.00	2280.00	3420.00	4560.00	5700.00
Sgt 0/3	1092.00	2184.00	3276.00	4368.00	5460.00
Sgt 0/2	1042.80	2085.60	3128.40	4171.20	5214.00
Cpl 0/6	1066.80	2133.60	3200.40	4267.20	5334.00
Cpl 0/4	1016.40	2032.80	3049.20	4065.60	5082.00
Cpl 0/3	942.00	1884.00	2826.00	3768.00	4710.00
Cpl 0/2	892.80	1785.60	2678.40	3561.20	4464.00
LCpl 0/4	818.40	1636.80	2455.20	3273.60	4092.00
LCpl 0/3	769.20	1538.40	2307.60	3076.80	3846.00
LCpl 0/2	718.80	1437.60	2156.40	2875.20	3594.00

FOR THREE YEAR REENLISTMENTS TAKE ONE-HALF OF SIX YEAR REENLISTMENTS  
FOR TWO YEAR REENLISTMENTS TAKE ONE-HALF OF FOUR YEAR REENLISTMENTS

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## VARIABLE REENLISTMENT BONUS

Ref: MCO 7220.24A

14 Nov 1967

## A. Four (4) Multiples LCpl and Above

2831	2833	2834	2835	2841	2843	2845	2847	2851	
2852	2857	2861	2862	2863	2864	2865	2866	2867	
2871	2872	2873	5914	5931	5932	5941	5942	5943	
5944	5949	5951	5961	5971	5973	5975	5976	5977	
5979	5981	6227	6233	6234	6235	6236	6238	6239	6613

## B. Three (3) Multiples LCpl Above

0241	0251	1341	1342	2131	4011	4021	4061	4071
4081	6213	6214	6215	6216	6217	6219	6222	6242
6243	6244	6245	6271	6311	6312	6314	6316	6317
6318	6319	6320	6321	6322	6331	6332	6341	6342
6351	6361	6412	6413	6418	6422	6441	6442	6444
6611	6615	6671	6711	6713	6811	6313	6443	

## C. Two (2) Multiples LCpl and Above

0221	0231	0239	0431	1141	1161	1391	2141	2142
2143	2144	2149	2151	2311	2561	2571	2572	2573
2574	2575	2576	3516	3517	5911	5912	5915	5917
6261	6262	6264	6465	6267	7511	6661	6741	

## D. Two (2) Multiples Cpl and Above

0311	0331	0341	0351	0353	0369	0811	0812	0842
0844	0846	0847	0848	0849	1371	1372	1181	1833
6742	1831							

## E. One (1) Multiples LCpl and Above

0141	0142	0211	0441	1381	2171	2336	2511	2529
2531	2532	2533	2541	2542	2543	3041	3042	3071
3072	3211	3371	3372	3373	3441	3461	3471	3531
3532	4091	4312	4313	5711	6761	7011	7041	7141

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# HERE ARE BASIC MILITARY PAY SCALES PROPOSED IN ADMINISTRATION BILL

## YEARS OF SERVICE

Pay

Grade Under 2 Over 2 Over 3 Over 4 Over 6 Over 8 Over 10 Over 12 Over 14 Over 16 Over 18 Over 20 Over 22 Over 26

O-10	-	1503.90	1557.00	1557.00	1557.00	1557.00	1616.40	1616.40	1740.60	1740.60	1865.10	1865.10	1989.30	1989.30	2113.80
O-9	-	1332.90	1367.70	1397.40	1397.40	1397.40	1432.50	1432.50	1491.90	1491.90	1616.40	1616.40	1740.60	1740.60	1865.10
O-8	-	1207.20	1243.50	1272.90	1272.90	1272.90	1367.70	1367.70	1432.50	1432.50	1491.90	1557.00	1616.40	1681.50	1681.50
O-7	-	1002.90	1071.60	1071.60	1071.60	1119.30	1119.30	1184.10	1184.10	1243.50	1367.70	1462.20	1462.20	1462.20	1462.20
O-6	-	743.10	816.90	870.30	870.30	870.30	870.30	870.30	870.30	900.00	1041.90	1095.30	1119.30	1184.10	1284.60
O-5	-	594.30	698.40	746.10	746.10	746.10	746.10	769.50	810.60	864.60	929.40	982.80	1012.20	1047.90	1047.90
O-4	-	501.60	610.20	651.30	651.30	663.00	692.70	739.80	781.20	816.90	856.20	876.30	876.30	876.30	876.30

## COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH LESS THAN 4 YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER

O-3	-	466.20	520.80	556.20	615.90	645.30	668.70	704.70	739.80	757.80	757.80	757.80	757.80	757.80	757.80
O-2	-	373.50	443.70	532.80	550.50	562.20	562.20	562.20	562.20	562.20	562.20	562.20	562.20	562.20	562.20
O-1	-	321.00	355.20	443.70	443.70	443.70	443.70	443.70	443.70	443.70	443.70	443.70	443.70	443.70	443.70

## COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER

O-3	-				615.90	645.30	668.70	704.70	739.80	769.50	769.50	769.50	769.50	769.50	769.50
O-2	-				550.50	562.20	580.20	610.20	633.60	651.30	651.30	651.30	651.30	651.30	651.30
O-1	-				443.70	473.70	491.40	509.10	526.80	550.50	550.50	550.50	550.50	550.50	550.50

## WARRANT OFFICERS

W-4	-	474.60	509.10	509.10	520.80	544.50	568.20	591.90	633.60	663.00	686.70	704.70	728.10	752.10	810.60
W-3	-	431.40	468.00	468.00	473.70	479.70	514.80	544.50	562.20	580.20	597.60	615.90	639.60	663.00	686.70
W-2	-	377.70	408.60	408.60	420.30	443.70	468.00	485.70	503.10	520.80	538.80	556.20	573.90	597.60	597.60
W-1	-	315.00	361.20	361.20	390.90	408.60	426.30	443.70	462.00	479.70	497.40	514.80	532.80	532.80	532.80

## ENLISTED MEMBERS

E-9	-								539.10	551.40	564.30	576.60	589.20	601.20	632.70	694.20	
E-8	-								452.40	465.00	477.30	489.90	502.20	514.50	527.10	558.30	620.10
E-7	-	284.40	340.80	353.40	366.00	378.30	390.30	402.60	415.50	434.10	446.40	458.70	465.00	496.20	558.30		
E-6	-	245.10	297.60	309.90	322.50	335.10	347.10	359.70	378.30	390.30	402.60	409.20	409.20	409.20	409.20		
E-5	-	211.50	260.70	273.00	285.00	303.90	316.20	328.50	340.80	347.10	347.10	347.10	347.10	347.10	347.10		
E-4	-	177.90	223.20	235.50	254.10	266.70	266.70	266.70	266.70	266.70	266.70	266.70	266.70	266.70	266.70		
E-3	-	128.70	179.70	192.30	204.60	204.60	204.60	204.60	204.60	204.60	204.60	204.60	204.60	204.60	204.60		
E-2	-	106.20	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80	148.80		
E-1	-	102.30	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20	136.20		
E-1	-	95.70															

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ELEMENTS OF LUMP LUM VRB REQUEST

NAME

RANK

SERVICE NUMBER

MOS

NUMBER OF YEARS FOR WHICH REENLISTING/EXTENDING

DATE OF REENLISTING/EXTENDING

REASON FOR DESIRING LUMP SUM PAYMENT

INCOME TAX BRIEFING

CO's RECOMMENDATION

ELEMENTS OF OPTION REQUEST

NAME

RANK

SERVICE NUMBER

MOS

OPTION DESIRED

QUALIFICATIONS FOR OPTIONS REQUESTING

NUMBER OF YEARS REENLISTING/EXTENDING

DATE REENLISTING/EXTENDING

RTD

EAS

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FORMS (NAVMC 10274 - ADM)

1. The correct preparation of reenlistment/extension requests will prevent unnecessary delays or in some cases resubmission.

2. The following format is recommended. Numbers correspond to blocks on the AA Form:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>INFORMATION</u>
1-6	Self Explanatory
7	CG 1stMarDiv (REIN), FMF (Attn: CarAdvO)
8	Reenl (or) ExtEnl Option, req for
9 (Attention is directed to MCO 1133.15_ for all requests)(Also see FMFPacO 1133.2_)	Pertinent References: MCO 1133.15_ (Reenl Option) MCO 1133.21_ (ExtEnl) MCO 1133.4_ (Early Reenl) MCO 1220.2_ (Avn Retrng) MCO 1300.8_ (O/S Tour) MCO 1300.9_ (Recruiting) MCO 1300.11_ (S&FD) MCO 1300.20_ (Asg Prereq) MCO 1306.2_ (Spl For Du) MCO 1306.7_ (DI Scol) MCO 1306.8_ (Recruiting) P1500.12_ (Formal Scol)
10	As required
11	List Marine's request to include EAS, RTD, Marital Status & Number of Dependents
12	Copy to DivCarAdvO
13	Self-explanatory
14	CO's endorsement must include recommendation and if man is qualified for request assignment(s) (AA Score, security clearance, etc) CO must verify the information in Block 11

3. Request for VRB will not be included in this request. MCO 7220.24\_ applies.

4. When in doubt, call the Division Career Advisory Office. It is better to put in too much information, than to delay a request to get more.

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V -

THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

Good Morning, Gentlemen. I'm Captain KINDER and the purpose of my briefing is to acquaint you with the Industrial Relations program for the 1st Marine Division for which I am the Industrial Relations Officer.

The mission of the industrial relations program is an important one and it directly coincides with our mission here in Vietnam. Through the use of local national civilian employees, this Division has a means of augmenting its manpower resources by permitting the fullest utilization of Marines in combat essential tasks. Therefore the employment of these local national civilians should be aimed toward the releasing, replacing or supplementation of Marines. Although this is the primary mission of the program, there are certain other beneficial side effects being derived from it that will in the long run benefit the Republic of Vietnam and make a substantial contribution to our overall efforts here.

Some of these side effects include the training of unskilled workers both on the job and in special classroom situations. By its very nature in that this program requires something in return equivalent to what is given, we are building a sense of pride and self respect for many of the Vietnamese, which is evident in their work and overall production. Considering that we have over 1200 employees in this Division and when we multiply this figure by the number of relatives and friends they may have or possibly support, it then becomes obvious as to the relative importance of this program.

We employ four categories of employees, which are: appropriated fund, non-appropriated fund, vendors or concessionaires, and housemaids or personal service type employees. The only type for which there is a ceiling are those employed under the appropriated fund.

Some of the jobs being performed by these people are depicted on the board over there (point). They show both unskilled and skilled or "white collar" type workers. They include kitchen helpers, laborers, carpenters, electricians, clerks, interpreter/translators and administrative assistants to mention just a few.

Some of the basic references that established and presently direct this program are shown here. (Chart V-A)

This next slide will show the organization of the industrial relations program. (Chart V-B)

Through the agreement between III Marine Amphibious Force and the Commander, U. S. Naval Support Activity, Danang, we follow the administrative policies and procedures that emanate from the Industrial Relations Department in Danang. Our Division ceiling is authorized and controlled by III MAF as is fiscal control. Currently, our ceiling for appropriated fund employees is 661.

My office is under staff cognizance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. My responsibilities include the following:

- a. That LNC's are not hired in excess of authorized ceilings.
- b. That all disciplinary action taken against LNC's is reviewed and approved should that be the case.
- c. Negotiate the settlement of all grievances submitted by LNC's in accordance with established procedures.
- d. Reviewing, approving if appropriate, and forwarding all administrative matters to the Industrial Relations Department in Danang.
- e. Acting as the labor management advisor for all units of the Division.

- f. Scheduling training for LNO's and Marine supervisory personnel.
- g. As directed, prepare changes or modifications to existing personnel authorizations and coordinate requests from subordinate commands for changes in their ceilings.

All unit commanders who employ LNO labor are required to appoint a unit Industrial Relations Officer who is responsible to:

- a. Insure all LNO's have a current and proper security clearance.
- b. Maintain close liaison with my office on all LNO matters.
- c. Supervise, control and administer all Vietnamese employees employed by his unit.
- d. Submit administrative matters to my office for review and approval.

After the hiring process, employees are then assigned to supervisors who deal or should deal directly with the employees.

Other responsibilities relative to this program include the Division Provost Marshal who has the responsibility to establish a pass and badge system as well as entry requirements for Vietnamese working aboard our bases. The Division Exchange Officer maintains cognizance over all vendors, concessionaires, merchants and barbers. The Division Surgeon has the responsibility to establish and enforce sanitation, medical and examination standards for LNO employees.

The security clearance required of all Vietnamese employed by the Division is called the MSS Clearance and it is obtained through the Military Security Service in Danang. This service is performed by Vietnamese security agents who run a background investigation on applicants. For the most part, this agency is funded for by the U. S. Government. Since there is often a considerable lapse of time between the initial



request and the final clearance (the time varies from two weeks to over three months), the use of a waiver has been authorized in the past under the provisions of MACV Directive 690-2. I have been discouraging the use of this waiver throughout the Division, however, in certain emergency type situations that prevail in the outlying areas, these waivers have been approved when properly signed by either the unit commander or his appointed Industrial Relations Officer.

Other regulations relative to these employees which appear in Division Order 12000.1 require that all employees are subject to search at any time while aboard a base. Any property other than their normal personal property being carried on or off a base will be accompanied by a properly signed pass and any employee suspected of a security violation will be apprehended and turned over to the unit IRO for disposition.

Generally speaking, we have not experienced any major problem areas in this program and we've received good cooperation from the unit IRO's throughout the Division. I would ask that your unit IRO's review and sign all requests for personnel action (standard form #52) before they are submitted to my office. I realize that the unit IRO's are pretty much tied down with their primary duties and consequently delegate much of their authority to their NCO assistants. However, since these forms are used to effect promotions, disciplinary actions, and dismissals to mention a few, I feel it is necessary that your unit IRO signify his approval since he has been designated the responsible officer.

Another area that occasionally concerns us has to do with employee relations. From time to time an employee will come directly to our office with what amounts to a relatively minor problem or complaint. These may include personality clashes, unfair supervisors, transportation difficulties


and so on. In most of these cases, we've found that the employee failed to discuss the matter with his unit supervisor or IRO and had he done so, it would have been readily solved or settled within the unit. Since these people do provide something in return for the money, time and effort we expend in their behalf and since upon employment they become a part of your unit, I only request that they be made to feel a welcome and essential part of your organization, at least until they should prove otherwise. In the meantime, my office will continue to assist you in any way we can.

At this time I'd be happy to answer any questions you may have concerning the Industrial Relations program.

BASIC REFERENCES GOVERNING THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

1. MACV - JL ltr ser 3905 of 17Sep67 (NOTAL) - established the agreement for the direct hire program between U. S. Forces and the government of the Republic of Vietnam for appropriated and non-appropriated labor.
2. Commander, USNSA, Danang ltr 90/wld:dw ser 2084 of 15Sep66 - established the authority for the Industrial Relations Department (IRD) Naval Support Activities, Danang to provide technical and personal services on civilian labor matters to Marine units in the I Corps area. These services also include fiscal and disbursing.
3. MCO P12000.7 - describes the Marine Corps Industrial Relations program.
4. COMNAVSUPPACT Danang ltr P12000.1 (NOTAL) - provides the policies and procedures for the administration of the LNC's employed by U. S. Forces in I Corps area. Future COMNAVSUPPACT instructions relative to the LNC labor program will be binding on this Command.
5. U. S. Forces Classification Manual Vietnam Jan66 (NOTAL) - provides classification, re-classification instructions and position descriptions for LNC employed by U. S. Forces.
6. Division Order 12000.1 w/chg 3 - established policies and procedures relative to the Industrial Relations program within the 1st Marine Division.
7. Division Order 5512.1 - established a basic criteria and procedures for issue, control, and recovery of passes for local National Civilians (LNC) working within cantonments of 1st Marine Division units located in the Danang TAOR.

## INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PROGRAM



## VI

DIVISION CHAPLAIN

This presentation will consist of a brief overall picture of the chaplain situation in the 1st Marine Division, a brief description of the many ways in which a chaplain may be utilized in the units to which he may be attached, and finally some closing notes of importance.

The 1st Marine Division currently has an allowance of 29 Chaplains to serve the needs of 24 major units. Twenty are Protestants, eight Catholic and one Eastern Orthodox. 28 of these men directly support the Division; the Eastern Orthodox is expected to cover the entire III MAF area and Okinawa.

Generally, the chaplain symbolizes - or should symbolize - the spirit of religion, always and everywhere. This spirit of religion is the strongest support for the convictions that differentiate our American forces from the Communists. The Communists are officially atheistic and regard man as an animal to be herded and killed at will. Americans are, officially at least, theistic and regard man as having a soul as the origin of his intellect and will; and believe he is endowed with natural rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We are here in South Vietnam to protect those basic rights of man for the Vietnamese and ourselves. So you can readily understand the importance of the chaplain in the military.

Let's take a quick look at the duties for which the chaplain is trained and the various ways in which your chaplain can be utilized, over and above these basic duties.

CONDUCTING DIVINE SERVICES

First, the conducting of divine worship is the primary part of the

religious ministry of the chaplain. Not only is he directed to conduct his religious ministry in the manner prescribed by the church in which he is ordained, but also he is responsible for setting up appropriate coverage for those of their faiths; he must do all he can to see that their religious needs are also met as adequately as possible. It is important to realize that, in our combat setting, this portion of his mission can be accomplished on any day in the week, not only Sunday, when the Chaplain is able to visit the men in various units of his command.

#### PASTORAL VISITATION

The second duty of the chaplain is that of pastoral visitation or "making the rounds". The chaplain should be expected to visit and know his men. This has the double result of keeping alive and awake their religious sensitivities, or home and church inspired consciences; then, if difficulties arise, the chaplain is known to those who are in need.

#### COUNSELING

Third, the counseling abilities of the chaplain can be of value and should be efficiently used. "Tell it to the chaplain" has often been said in jest, but there is a serious overtone. There are several ways in which the chaplain's training and talent may be used in counseling.

- a. Men with conflicts or problems of adjustment may be sent, often quite advantageously, to a chaplain.
- b. When personnel problems arise in families in CONUS, the chaplain can draw on experience, wisdom and sympathy to help such Marines.
- c. At least one battalion employs the counselling ability of the chaplain by routing "office hours" cases to him. Facetiously I might say that the very threat of this is a deterrent to misbehavior in itself.

d. While the chaplain must never become merely the "agent" of the Commanding Officer, he can often be of help where there are impending problems in morale.

#### PERSONAL RESPONSE PROGRAM

A fourth use of the chaplain can be found in the Personal Response Program. Division Order 5710.3 sets up guidelines for the establishment of Personal Response Councils. It is appropriate to have the chaplain be a member of this council although he should not be the cognizant staff officer. All chaplains are prepared to assist this program by giving two lectures:

Religiously Based Customs of Vietnam  
Religions of Vietnam

The chaplain can also assist in training other officers and NCO's to give these lectures and to participate in discussion groups on these subjects.

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS PROGRAM

Fifth, the chaplain can be of value in the Civil Affairs Program. Once again, the chaplain should not be appointed the Civil Affairs Officer but can and should be used in an advisory and aiding capacity. The chaplain will often have special knowledge concerning schools, orphanages and religious institutions in general; these institutions are frequent recipients of our charity in the Civil Affairs Program.

#### DISCUSSION GROUPS

Lastly, the chaplain may desire to establish study groups; he should be encouraged to do so. Depending upon the educational background and talent of the individual chaplain, various kinds of discussion groups may be started. Some of them are: marriage classes, Bible Study, depth discussion

groups and studies on various religious subjects.

#### CLOSING NOTES

Command Support of Chaplain. The first of these closing notes is concerned with command support of the chaplain's program. This takes the form of firm backing by attendance at divine worship by the Command and Staff (even occasionally), including the chaplain in regular staff meetings, and in providing transportation for the ministry of the chaplain. Occasional private meetings with the chaplain to discuss morale, particular problems and policies can often be most helpful.

Negatively, the chaplain should not be burdened with collateral duties, for the wise commander will recognize that the chaplain often will be covering an area for divine services wider than the unit's TAOR. He will be caring for CAP units which are OPCON and ADCON to III MAF since III MAF is not assigned sufficient chaplains to offer coverage. In another instance, the Catholic Battalion Chaplain is usually responsible for the care of the Catholic personnel in the entire regiment.

Relation of Unit Chaplain To Division Chaplain. Each chaplain is assigned by the Division Chaplain and is expected to keep in constant touch with the Division Chaplain. Unless involved in operations or prevented by some unusual circumstance, every unit chaplain is expected to attend a weekly meeting/training session conducted by the Division Chaplain on Wednesdays at 1000. Most chaplains combine this meeting with visits to their men located in the Medical Battalion Hospital, the NSA Hospital and the brig. The Division Chaplain also signs all fitness reports before submission and stands ready to advise a unit commander in their preparation when desired.



Employment of Chaplain in a Combat Situation. This has been a very "touchy" subject since the death in action of Chaplain Vincent Capodanno. The guidelines as determined in Division Order PL730.3B, Section 701 still hold. Negatively, the chaplain is not to move out with company-sized units in an effort to contact the enemy. As a positive understanding, the chaplain is to be located generally with the battalion aid station when this is an evacuation point for casualties or with the battalion command post.

In conclusion, the Division Chaplain hopes that the Command will provide an environment in which the chaplain can perform with maximum effectiveness as a man of God and contribute to the morale and effectiveness of each unit to which he is assigned.

## VII

INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER

"Oh would some gift the giftie gie us

To see ourselves as others see us" \_\_\_\_\_ Robert Burns

This fierce combat correspondent represents ISO as we see ourselves. More important, though, and an excellent way to introduce you to the functions of our office is to see ISO as others see it.

Higher headquarters view us from the point of view of material we prepare for their release to the news media--about 2000 written news releases; 300 news photographs; some motion picture footage; and 300-400 tape recorded interviews per year. This material is released to the news media by III MAF and HQMC in support of the Marine Corps Public Information Program.

Recruiters and smaller newspapers regard ISO as the source of hometown-type news. I'll talk more on this later. For now just note that we put out about 40,000 stories a year and with your cooperation could double or triple that total even though our present achievement in FHTN tops the Marine Corps.

The Commanding General views ISO as the coordinator of press activities within the TAOR, and, of course, as the staff section responsible for recommending and implementing public information policies.

The manner in which the various functions involved in informational services-- the things that ISO does, and the things that your organizations are expected to do in support of the Marine Corps information program will be defined for you quite clearly in the Division Informational Services SOP which is on mats now, and should be in your hands in the near future. You

will find that, among other things, it consolidates in a single reference most of the miscellaneous instructions on public information which you have been receiving fragmentarily.

There is, in your briefing folder, a chart listing the fleet home town news participation of the various Division units. Participation varies from battalions which have submitted over 3500 releases on their personnel to some which have not achieved even a hundred. It is such a simple program that lack of results can only be attributed to lack of effort. Each of you has been given a fleet home town news form. Look it over. You could fill it out in about 2 minutes. In two minutes, I could have filled out forms on as many of you as are here. That's all it takes when your unit has awards, promotions, and so forth to get the fleet home news requirement taken care of-- 2 minutes. How do you suppose these high scoring battalions do so well? It's simple. When personnel report in, a FHTN form is part of the check in. The battalion has mimeographed a standard release which is attached to the forms and sent to my office. The release is brief and simple. Blank has reported for duty with the such and such battalion, such and such regiment, First Marine Division, near Danang, Vietnam. The battalion is involved in military operations against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces and has conducted 21 such operations so far in 1967. The battalion is also active in Civic Action support for the Vietnamese civilian population, including medical care, road building and assistance to local schools...something like that.

Seeing that the FHTN program works is one of the duties of your Battalion TICO (Technical Information Contact Officer). He's your ISO and

every battalion is required to have one. He also will make arrangements for reporters who visit your unit, and notify me if there is some newsworthy event which will occur in your unit. Needless to say, your TICO should not be frequently switched, and should be an officer in a position to know generally what is going on in your unit-- an S-1, Adjutant, S-3 or the Sergeant Major. Included in your briefing folder is a handout "Tips for TICO's" which discusses his duties.

When really significant activities occur, such as major operations, reporters will be visiting your units. ISO will attempt to insure that you are warned in advance, and if III MAF hasn't assigned them an escort to see that they don't get lost on the way, he will. When they're in your area, see that they're briefed so they'll have enough background information to accurately interpret the events they observe and will report on. Provide them billeting and messing if required, and help them as much as you can with transportation. To most of you it may seem strange that the press is so well-treated in Vietnam, and it seem strange to me, too; but the MACV and III MAF directives on this matter are plain. When you receive the Division Informational Services SOP you will find in it the specific instructions concerning relations with civilian correspondents, rules for briefing and assistance to them and so forth. It will also contain some instructions concerning indoctrination information which should be given to incoming and departing personnel concerning their relations with correspondents.

In addition to civilian correspondents, there will be Marine combat correspondents and photographers visiting your unit. They will be from my office, from III MAF, from Leatherneck and, occasionally, from HQMC. They're

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on our side. See that they, too, are adequately briefed and assisted in covering your activities and that some sergeant doesn't grab them up and send them on a sand-bag filling detail as the news story of the year is going on elsewhere in your TAOR.

In closing, let me hearken back to some of the material I presented at the start. As others see us, the 1st Marine Division leads III MAF in Fleet Home Town News releases and in written releases. We have a good reputation with the press for prompt and cordial assistance to them. The success we've had and will have all hinges on your efforts. ISO is just the middle man. We collect up the FHTN's and check them and send them in. We round up the reporters and send them to you. If they are satisfied with their treatment, it's because of your efforts. We send our combat correspondents to your units, and they turn in a lot of stories. They do so because you let them move about freely to get the news. There are individual deficiencies in some units, to be sure, but I have no doubt that they're only temporary, and perhaps this meeting will set everything straight. But generally speaking, I'm well satisfied with your efforts, although like Walter Reuther or the United Auto Workers, whenever I'm asked what it is that I want, always promptly answer, "More."

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## FLEET HOME TOWN NEWS RELEASES - 1 Jan 67 to 31 Oct 67

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>RELEASES</u>
2/5	3824
HqBn	3413
1/1	3177
1/5	2622
7th EngBn	2523
3/5	1811
3/7	1270
2/11	1264
3/1	1243
2/1	1163
2/7	1057
11th MT Bn	1046
1st Tank Bn	888
1/7	881
3/11	861
9th Eng Bn	746
1st Recon Bn	731
4/11	617
1st Eng Bn	604
1/11	581
3rd AmTracBn	506
1st MT Bn	483
7th Comm	479
7th Marines Headquarters	477
1st Marines Headquarters	444
5th Marines Headquarters	350
11th Marines Headquarters	332
1st Anti Tank Bn	332
1st Med Bn	306
3rd 8" How	285
1st Shore Party Bn	272
1st ArmAmpCo	181
1st Hospital Co	171
3rd 155 Guns	68
1st Dental Co	16
(1st Marines	5980)
(5th Marines	8617)
(7th Marines	3685)
(11th Marines	3655)
TOTAL HOME TOWN RELEASES	35,883

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AUTHORIZED HOME TOWN NEWS RELEASE  
NAVSO-5724/1 (Rev. 7-65) S/N 0104-907-0010

TO: Fleet Home Town News Center, Great Lakes, Illinois, 60088

1. Print or type all entries.
2. The "Release Authorized By" box may be used when ten or less forms are submitted.
3. A transmittal letter should be used for over ten submissions.

FROM (Activity name and address) (Include Fleet, Squadron or Unit, etc., as appropriate)	PHOTO NUMBER	RELEASE NUMBER
	RELEASE AUTHORIZED BY	DATE PREPARED

**FILL IN AS APPLICABLE (By person involved)**

NAME (First, Middle Initial, Last)	RANK/RATE	SERVICE BRANCH	AGE
PERMANENT HOME OF RECORD (House No., Street or Avenue, City, State)			
PARENTS MARITAL STATUS (Check applicable box if you list one parent only or if parents last name differs from yours) (Marital Status is for record purposes only and is not published.)			
<input type="checkbox"/> DIVORCED	<input type="checkbox"/> SEPARATED	<input type="checkbox"/> FATHER DECEASED	<input type="checkbox"/> MOTHER DECEASED
<input type="checkbox"/> FATHER REMARRIED	<input type="checkbox"/> MOTHER REMARRIED		
PARENTS NAME (First, Middle Initial, Last) (If Mother only, delete "Mr."; if Father only, delete "Mrs.")			
<input type="checkbox"/> SON	<input type="checkbox"/> DAUGHTER	OF	MR. AND MRS.
PARENTS ADDRESS (House No., Street or Avenue, City, State) (This address will be used in newstory)			

FOR MARRIED PERSONNEL ONLY	HUSBAND'S/WIFE'S NAME (First, Middle Initial, Last) (If wife, include maiden name)
	HUSBAND'S/WIFE'S ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (House No., Street or Avenue, City, State)
YOUR HIGH SCHOOL (Name, City, State)	<input type="checkbox"/> NOW ATTENDING ATTENDED FROM TO GRADUATED 19
YOUR COLLEGE (Name, City, State)	<input type="checkbox"/> NOW ATTENDING ATTENDED FROM TO GRADUATED 19
NAME AND ADDRESS OF HIGH SCHOOL/COLLEGE NEWSPAPER IF APPLICABLE	NAME AND ADDRESS OF COMPANY/UNION/FRATERNAL/CHURCH/PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS

**TO BE FILLED IN BY ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL ONLY**

DATE ENTERED SERVICE	FORMER RESERVE PARTICIPATION (Check if applicable)
	<input type="checkbox"/> NAVY <input type="checkbox"/> MARINE CORPS <input type="checkbox"/> COAST GUARD <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)
FORMER RESERVE UNIT (If applicable)	LOCATION
FORMER EMPLOYER (Firm's Name, City, State) (If applicable)	
TE REPORTED PRESENT DUTY	PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

**TO BE FILLED IN BY ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING AND SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL ONLY**

EMPLOYED BY (Company Name and Address)	JOB TITLE
RESERVE UNIT AND LOCATION	
DATE ENTERED SERVICE	DATE RELEASED FROM ACTIVE DUTY
	DATE JOINED RESERVE
SHIPS/STATIONS DURING ACTIVE DUTY (Give brief description of duties)	

The above information is certified to be correct.	SIGNATURE OF PERSON INVOLVED	DATE
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Put news story on reverse. Type head to foot and double space copy. Include the WHAT, WHERE, and if applicable, the HOW and WHY, and the ACTUAL DATE of the NEWS EVENT.

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INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICE  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

JMG/jwj  
11 Nov67

MEMORANDUM

From: Informational Services Officer  
To: Technical Information Contact Officers, 1st Marine Division

Subj: Tips for Technical Information Contact Officers (TICO's)

Encl: (1) Quarterly Inspection Check List

1. Your assignment as a TICO for your unit has undoubtedly simply added to an ever-growing list of your additional duties. If you will occasionally review this memo and the Division SOP for Informational Services, you will find that you can accomplish your TICO responsibilities with relatively little difficulty.

2. Keep Informed. You must know what's going on in your unit in order to adequately perform your job; your job as TICO is, in short, to insure that your unit and the men in it receive public credit when credit is due. Promotions, heroic actions, unit achievements, personal sacrifices, and the like should not go unrecognized outside your immediate command. They represent news, and there is an outlet for every item of news. If it is a major event, it may be appropriate for release to, or perhaps coverage by the civilian correspondents here in Vietnam. It may be appropriate for the Sea Tiger or for Stars & Stripes. Perhaps it should go in Leatherneck or the Gazette. Perhaps it is of interest primarily to newspapers and radio stations in or near a Marine's home town. If it is news, however, there is an outlet for it, if it is provided to the news media promptly. If it is delayed, it is no longer news, but history. Inform the ISO as soon as a newsworthy event has occurred, or better still, inform the ISO ahead of time when the event is a scheduled rather than spontaneous occurrence.

3. The fact that a Marine is serving with the 1st Marine Division is news in his home town. You should familiarize yourself, as TICO, with the Fleet Home Town News Program. When a Marine checks in with a company in your unit, his filling out of a Fleet Home Town News release form (NAVSO 5724/1) should be a routine part of his "check-in" procedure. A little before Christmas, another form should be filled out and forwarded so that people in his home town will be reminded that he's serving here in case they wish to send him a card or a gift. In addition, should he be promoted, decorated or commended, a home town news release is appropriate. As a rule of thumb, you will be doing your job in the home town news department very well if you report on about 20 percent of the members of your command each month.

4. You will find that the officers of your command are perhaps less interested in the home town news program than the troops. Most, however, are interested in at least an occasional release to their college alumni magazine or to fraternity publications. Encourage them, particularly when they're promoted or decorated. Be sure to have the name of the college and the name of the alumni or fraternity bulletin on the form. The year the subject graduated is also useful.

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5. In infantry battalions and regiments, an ISO writer is normally assigned from the Division Informational Services Office to assist TICO's in covering activities such units and of the supporting arms which are under thier operational control or attached to them. During combat actions, he may be busy working as a combat correspondent, but at other times his main function is to simplify your liaison with the Division Informational Services Office. Use him! Remember, though, that in reinforced battalions, the battalion TICO should look out for the units attached and insure that anything newsworthy involving them is brought to ISO's attention.

6. Other units will rarely have an NCO from the Informational Services Section assigned to assist them. Their communications with, and proximity to the Division Headquarters, however, makes liaison with the Informational Services Section relatively easy. To arrange coverage or to tip off the ISO on a forthcoming newsworthy event, just stop by or phone (1st Division 41/141).

7. When correspondents require technical information, or wish to visit your command, the ISO is likely to call you either to get the answer or to make the local arrangements. Be sure you understand your CO's requirements in either instance. He may want to look over the response you're planning to make, and he is certain to be interested in reporters visiting your command.

8. Your efforts as TICO will be subject to quarterly review during the ISO staff visit to your command. A copy of the inspection check-list is attached as a useful guide. From it, you can readily ascertain many of the things which will make your efforts as a TICO productive.

9. One more thing. Insure that you have readily available a biography of your Commanding Officer and a few 4x5 photographs. If your unit does anything spectacular they will be needed right away. The best picture is a head-and-shoulders photo of the CO uncovered, in utilities, standing against a plain background. In addition, if your CO is a colonel, check with him to insure that he is aware of the requirements of MCO P5720.44, paragraph 2010. It requires him to file with CMC (Code AG) a current biography and official photograph. CMC sometimes sends letters to officers who are delinquent in this regard, and you as TICO, should insure that you boss doesn't get one. If you find your CO or any other colonel on your unit's rolls who has not provided an official biography to CMC (Code AG), inform ISO, and a writer will be sent down to obtain the necessary information and write one. It will be returned for approval to the subject and then forwarded to CMC (Code AG).

*J. M. Gratto*  
J. M. GRATTO

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INSPECTION CHECK LIST

UNIT INSPECTED \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

(YES) (NO)

1. Is there a Technical Information Contact Officer assigned? \_\_\_\_\_  
Name \_\_\_\_\_ Phone \_\_\_\_\_
2. Has a copy of the appointing order appointing the TICO been forwarded to Division and III MAF? (ForO P5700.1A) \_\_\_\_\_
3. Has the assigned TICO reported to the Division Informational Services Office for indoctrination? \_\_\_\_\_
4. Are the commanding officer, staff officers, company commanders and the TICO thoroughly familiar with the Force Informational Services SOP (ForO P5700.1A)? \_\_\_\_\_
5. Have new personnel been briefed concerning press relationships during orientation? (As outlined in ForO P5700.1A) \_\_\_\_\_
6. Are departing personnel debriefed concerning public information before departure? (As outlined in ForO P5700.1A) \_\_\_\_\_
7. Is there a copy of the SOP on file? \_\_\_\_\_
8. Is the Division ISO notified in the event of adverse incidents or accidents? \_\_\_\_\_
9. Does the TICO understand the sequence of obtaining ISO coverage for his unit? \_\_\_\_\_
10. Is there a supply of FHTNC news release forms on hand? \_\_\_\_\_
11. Has a supply requisition been submitted for more forms? \_\_\_\_\_
12. Is the TICO familiar with the FHTNC program and how it works? \_\_\_\_\_
13. Does the unit submit a FHTNC form on each man who:
  - a. Joins the unit? \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Is promoted? \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Is awarded a decoration, merit mast or letter of appreciation? \_\_\_\_\_
14. Is the TICO familiar with a roster story and how to prepare:
  - a. An "Is serving" roster story? \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Participation in an operation or significant event? \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(YES) (NO)

15. Was a roster story submitted on the unit's participation in all operations during the last quarter? \_\_\_\_\_

a. If not, why not? \_\_\_\_\_

16. Is the Division ISO or representative of the press-photographer team notified in advance of all operations or other events or situations that might lead to favorable press/radio-TV coverage? \_\_\_\_\_

17. Based on the TICO's files, the following number of FHTNC forms have been completed under his supervision and submitted to the Division ISO during the last quarter. \_\_\_\_\_

18. In the event of an operation, to whom does the press team report? \_\_\_\_\_

19. Has a press kit been submitted to the Division ISO for relaying to the CIB? (For O P5700.1A) \_\_\_\_\_

20. Does the press kit contain:

a. An official biography of the commander? \_\_\_\_\_

b. Photograph of the commander? \_\_\_\_\_

c. Up-to-date copy of the unit history? \_\_\_\_\_

21. Is the TICO maintaining daily contact with the ISO team when assigned to his unit? \_\_\_\_\_

22. Does the ISO team check in and out with the TICO on operations? \_\_\_\_\_

23. Does the unit provide working, billeting and messing facilities to the ISO team when assigned to their unit? \_\_\_\_\_

24. Is the TICO on the unit check-in list? \_\_\_\_\_

25. Are copies of the monthly bulletins issued on FHTNC results seen by the commanding officer and the TICO? \_\_\_\_\_

26. Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

## VIII -

SPECIAL SERVICESR&R

The primary objective of the R&R program is to ensure that each Marine gets a chance to remove himself from the tension and anxiety of war. In order to fulfill this objective a system has been evolved and promulgated in the monthly R&R bulletin. At the very basis of this system is the requirement that units submit their nominees for R&R to the Division Special Services Officer, six days before each flight departs; sooner if possible. The format for the rosters required is shown as an enclosure to the monthly R&R bulletin. No other agency should be a recipient of R&R rosters; this precludes the habit of sending information copies or original copies of rosters directly to III MAF R&R Center. Advance submission of individual copies of orders is also prescribed. Advance copies of orders serve no purpose to Division Special Services or III MAF R&R Center.

Another consideration of importance and admittedly pragmatic is the "no show" problem. A "no show" is any person who fails to report at the prescribed check-in time. "No shows" cause problems, particularly if it involves a wife left stranded in Hawaii. The presumption is, that a man properly booked will be at the R&R Center by the prescribed check-in time. When he fails to appear the following questions arise:

- (1) Where is he?
- (2) Who will fill the seat left vacant?
- (3) Has a wife been denied the pleasure of her husband's company?

Legitimate reasons for "no shows" do exist. Last minute cancellations can be called into the DivSSO or III MAF R&R Center. When cancellations

are not called in, a "no show letter" is sent for two reasons: (1) to inform the unit commander that one of his men did not appear at the right place at the right time and (2) to discover any flaws in the R&R system that might deprive a man of his entitlement to R&R. If administrative errors deprive a man of his entitlement, then the administrator responsible should be held to count for the misdeed.

In addition to our normal allocation of quotas we can acquire many more. Keep a pool of standbys ready for R&R on 12 hours notice. This can be very beneficial; you can use it as a reward system, or morale booster. If you can give us names we can get you quotas, in most instances.

#### MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS, AND PAPER BACKED BOOKS

Magazines are purchased annually with appropriated funds. The possibilities of this program as a morale builder are great. We need your requests by the 15th of December so that we can assemble the information and generate a contract. When you order magazines consider that they are to support your entire unit. Be liberal in your requests. A basis for ordering is one copy for fifteen men. If you haven't already submitted your request, use the form provided in the briefing packet; if you wish to change your order send us a new request and mark it as a resubmission.

The Stars and Stripes and the Sea Tiger are distributed by U. S. Mail, on the basis of one copy for each five men. If you are not getting your copies, check your mail clerk. If no flaws are found there call Division Special Services Office. Paper backed books are received at the rate of 5600 per month. We try to distribute them based on unit strength. We won't, however, break open a box to fill orders. This is to preclude Division Special Services from keeping the good ones and short change the units.

16MM MOTION PICTURES

The 16mm motion picture program presently provided by the Army & Air Force Motion Picture Service has been the subject of much controversy. The most frequently cited complaints are that the artistic quality and quantity of the movies are inadequate. Quantity and artistic quality are beyond our power to correct. The physical condition of the movies, however, is a matter susceptible to correction, by having a trained projectionist, and a good projector.

III MAF is publishing a new order concerning this matter. In substance it will outline several procedures for the conduct of the system. One definite point of emphasis is that each film may be shown only one time per film account. This means that you can't show a movie in the officer's club, the SNCO club, and the enlisted club, on the same night, if you have only one account. Swapping movies to avoid TV fillers is also prohibited. If you want additional accounts call DivSSO.

The Army Logistic Command is supposed to provide one projector for each film account number. Battalion sized units are supposed to have projectors on their T.E.. Apparently these sources are inadequate to meet the demand. Accordingly, we must solve a problem; shall special services buy projectors? We have in the past purchased Bell & Howell automatic threading machines. They are not adequate and have destroyed more film than they have shown. Accordingly, I propose to submit the matter to the Recreation Council on 16 December. The important questions to answer if the council decides to buy motion picture projectors are: how many shall we buy, and for whom shall we buy them?

SPECIAL SERVICES OPERATIONS

Complex as it may be, technical precision in managing a special services operation is mandatory. The key to a successful special services operation is unit participation. In order to help the user understand what is presently available in the recreation fund we have prepared the catalogue that you will find in the briefing packet. The preface to that catalogue is worthy of note, for it poses questions that must be answered before we managers can begin to respond to your needs in an intelligent manner.

Property accountability is simple. Conduct an inventory on relief of special services officers. Submit certificates of disposition monthly. Investigate missing property according to the JAG manual only when the commander suspects culpability. If you keep a rein on your special services property, accounting will be easy. If your property becomes damaged or in need of maintenance turn it in and we shall get it repaired. We are capable of immediate replacement on some items. Others may take a maximum of two weeks.

Property distribution is a problem that can only be solved by studying demands. As of the present we do not have an allowance list for special services equipment. I believe that we can develop something similar to an allowance list. It is necessary if we are to continue to give you support you need. The determination of what you need can only be developed by you. The time to do this is prior to the recreation council and recreation committee meetings. If you can feed me information before these meetings I can prepare meaningful proposals for consideration by each body.

Property requisitions are to be sent to Division Special Services in writing. We shall assemble your order and then call you to come and get it, if you prefer to come direct, you will waste time in waiting. If you are far away and unable to come to us, tell us what you want and we will figure a way to help you.

#### THE CUSTODIAN

The Custodian of the recreation fund is pecuniarily liable for all the money and property on the records. He is not an obstacle, even though he is compelled to supervise the proper negotiation of all the paper work. Please don't let the need for property accountability impede the mission of giving the Marines we lead the best possible support. The Custodian will try to make it as simple as possible for you.

#### SUMMARY.

We are the managers of your corporation. You are the board of directors. We are obligated to serve you. Your demands, however, must be as factual, meaningful, and complete as possible. With this help we can do any job you want us to do, as long as it supports the mission of special services: Recreation, Welfare, and Morale, for all Marines in this Division.



IX -

THE DIVISION EDUCATION SYSTEM

Good Afternoon Gentlemen:

I am Captain Bailey, your Division Education Officer. During the next ten minutes I will suggest ways for both of us to enhance your Marines' opportunity to improve their education. To accomplish this aim, the Division Education Office, located across the division access road from Division Legal, performs three basic functions: Counseling, Registration, and Testing.

Our office provides two tests which serve to gauge a Marine's educational attainments as well as to provide, if he makes a high enough score, a means for obtaining a high school diploma equivalent or college credit. These tests are the High School Level General Educational Development Test and the College Level GE-CLEP (General Examination - College Level Examination Program). To take either of these examinations a Marine is required to complete DD Form 179 and have the educational pre-requisites, which for the GED Test is completion of the eighth grade and for the GE-CLEP is graduation from high school or attainment of a high school equivalent certificate. Marines who fail either of these tests generally may not schedule a re-test for that examination for at least one year. This rule may be waived if the Marine concerned satisfactorily completes a USAFI course or a course of instruction approved by USAFI. Thus for the Marine with sufficient intelligence and knowledge, these examinations offer the chance to accelerate the attainment of academic credit without having to take certain courses, and as well, they offer other Marines the gateway to collegiate study and better job opportunities.

Through the Education Office, USAFI offers pre-high school courses, high school level courses and college level courses. Enrollment in these courses, assuming the Marine has the educational pre-requisites, is achieved by executing DD Form 305 and paying an initial \$5.00 enrollment fee through a postal money order or certified check made payable to the Treasurer of the United States. Until a Marine satisfactorily completes his initial course, he may take only one course concurrently.

There after, so long as he successfully completes each succeeding course, he pays no enrollment fee and may take courses concurrently.

A special opportunity, of which many Marines seem unaware, is the wide selection of courses offered by a number of state and private universities and colleges. Though these courses are sanctioned and largely financed by USAFI, Marines taking these courses deal directly with the university of their choice and are fully enrolled as a corresponding student just as any civilian student. A primary source of information for commanders on these courses is the handbook entitled, Correspondence Courses Offered by USAFI Through Civilian Universities and Colleges, NAVMC 1084. A similar authority for USAFI - Direct high school and college courses is the USAFI Catalogue, thirteenth edition (Rev-65). Both these publications are included along with several of the most important educational references in an enclosure to the handbook given you.

A brief enumeration of the tests administered by the Division Education Office in addition to the high school GED and GE-CLEP includes: USAFI achievement (Grades 4-9), end of course examinations, USAFI subject standardized tests and the Army Language Aptitude Test. We do not administer the College Board or Graduate Record Examinations since they are administered by the Naval Support Activity, Danang. For your convenience, application blanks can be obtained at the education office for the next CEEB Test to be given on 13 January 1968 and the next Graduate Record Examination to be held on 20 January 1968. The deadline for submitting applications for the CEEB is 10 December, and the test fee is \$14.00 for the complete battery of tests. 5 December is the application deadline for the Graduate Record Exam whose cost is \$12.00 for the entire battery.

It is important to note that though we are willing and capable of providing your Marines with technical advice and assistance on their educational needs, you have a command responsibility to see that your Marines are informed of the many

educational opportunities provided by the Marine Corps. You have the vital and inspiring task of counseling, motivating, assisting, coaching and encouraging your Marines in their quest for a better education. Your responsibilities are clearly cited in DivO 1560.1A and your briefing handout, but your success in carrying them out depends solely on the conviction and enthusiasm you bring to that great task.

In a word, the Division Education Program signifies opportunity for your Marines. If they are to take full advantage of this opportunity, your commands and this office must forge and effectively practice the spirit of teamwork. Take an active interest in the educational welfare of your Marines, become familiar with DivO P1560.1A, send your education officers and NCO's to us for frequent consultation, but above all, seek to show your Marines that you really care by frequent personal contact and all the encouragement and assistance that you can give.

**SUMMARY OF DIVISION EDUCATION  
SYSTEM AND ENUMERATION OF UNIT EDUCATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES**

1. The purpose of the education program within this division is to raise the educational level of personnel within the 1st Marine Division, to increase their value to the Marine Corps, to their country, and to themselves. To accomplish this aim the Division Education Office performs the following three basic functions; Educational Counseling, Educational Testing, and Administration and Course Registration.

a. Types of Tests Administered include:

- (1) Army Language Aptitude Test
- (2) USAFI End of Course Examinations
- (3) USAFI Subject Standardized Tests
- (4) High School GED
- (5) USAFI Achievement Tests (Pre-high school)
- (6) G E - College Level Examination Program (GE-CLEP)

b. Registration in following types of courses is administered by the Division Education Office:

- (1) Pre-High School
- (2) High School
- (3) College Level (USAFI Direct/College Correspondence)
- (4) Technical Courses
- (5) Courses from service extension schools
- (6) Spoken Foreign Languages

c. Through its educational counseling, the Division Education Office strives to help Marines evaluate their educational backgrounds with the objective of forming realistic educational goals. Each Marine will receive guidance on what courses to take based on his own decision, needs and academic background.

2. The subordinate units of the division have responsibilities which are just as vital to the quality of the Division Education system as are those of the Division Education Office. Without their co-operation the division education system can not assure itself of being truly responsive to the needs of the individual Marine. The primary unit educational responsibilities are as follows:

a. Submit monthly educational report (DivO 1560.1) to the Division Education Office not later than the fifth day of each month.

b. Schedule high school and college development testing by contacting the Division Education Officer (Auditer 137) - (Personnel should bring mess gear).

c. Interview all applicants prior to their enrolling in a course to determine proper qualification and motivation (Use MCO P1560.16A as an interview guide).

d. Prepare and keep on file an Educational Development Record for each individual in the organization who enrolls in an off duty course (Locally reproduce the format listed as figure 2 of DivO P1560.1A and utilize for this purpose).

LIST OF EDUCATION REFERENCES

The following publications give information and instructions which help clarify Educational opportunities open to Marines. In addition these publications set forth the procedures required to gain these opportunities. Some of these references list the responsibilities of the unit as well as those of the Division Education Officer. Finally they serve to implement Marine Corps policy:

1. Accredited Higher Institutions, RM 205.3, 1964, U. S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare.
2. State Department of Education Policies Ninth Edition, Jan 66
3. Marine Corps Educational Manual, MCO P1560.16A.
4. Procedures for Operations of the Division Education Program, DivO P1560.1A of 24 July 1967.
5. Correspondence Courses offered by USAFI through civilian Universities and Colleges, NAVMC 1084.
6. USAFI Catalogue, Thirteenth Edition (Rev-65).
7. VA Pamphlet 20-67-1 of August 1967.
8. Fact Sheet: Cold War GI Benefits Program, DOD FS-30.
9. LoveJoy's College Guide..
10. Announcement of Army Extension courses - TA 605329A, 350-66 of Sept 66.
11. MCI Handbook (Eighth Edition).

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REQUIRED EDUCATION FORMS

1. DD 179 Application for USAFI Test or Examination.
2. DD 295 Application for the Evaluation of Educational Experiences during Military Service.
3. DD 305 Application for Enrollment or USAFI Course Transfer.
4. DD 417 USAFI Testing Activity and Inventory Report (Available to testing sections only).
5. DD 815 Controlled Item (USAFI test material) Document Receipt (Available to Testing sections only).

IX-C

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X-

DIVISION CLUB SYSTEM

On return to your units each club will furnish free beer to the men at the expense of the Executive Officer and Sergeant Major. I believe that would be a big morale factor within your units. One of the highest priorities of all Commanding Officers, Executive Officers and Sergeants Major is the morale of your men. The Club System helps each unit to attain this goal. I've been talking to a great number of company commanders and they tell me that it's a great morale factor to come off an operation and find a cold beer waiting for them at their base camp. You could almost say that the three B's are all important to our men. Beans, Billets, and Beer in that order. In the next few minutes I plan on giving you a better insight to the operation of the club system. I will cover the organization of the Division Club System, organization of branch clubs, finances and statements, and future projects. (Chart X-A)

First we have the organization of the Division Club system. In the number one spot we have the Division Club Officer who has the job of insuring policy is carried out by treasurers and branch activities. He is also the purchasing officer for the club system.

Under the Club Officer we have four treasurers who are appointed by the Commanding General. They are responsible for financial records, cash handling, wages, hiring of entertainment, and merchandising. This summer we received approval from Headquarters Marine Corps to set up a Central Service Agency. At this time the Commanding General appointed a treasurer to take over the responsibility of the Central Service Agency. This treasurer handles

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all the warehousing of consumable items, and property bought by the purchasing officer. He is also responsible for paying all the bills accrued by the purchasing officer.

After this we have the three separate clubs; Commissioned Officers Mess (Open), Staff NCO, and Enlisted Club. These three clubs are operated independently of each other. (Chart X-B)

The commanding officer is responsible for the operation of clubs under his command. The commanding officer of each unit has to request the opening of the different clubs in his area. After being approved, he then appoints an advisory group, or if he desires, the members of the activity will elect representatives of the various organizational activities to constitute the advisory group. They in turn advise the commanding officer but shall not, as a group, engage in any management or operational duties. The advisory group shall consider expenditures not of a routine nature or that will incur long term indebtedness and then make recommendations for the commanding officer's consideration. The group will maintain a constitution and by-laws for approval by the commanding officer. The proceedings of each meeting of the advisory group shall be recorded and the action taken by the commanding officer thereon will be forwarded to the activity and filed. Copies of the proceedings with endorsements will be forwarded to the treasurer, and area auditor.

The club officer is responsible to the commanding officer to the operation of the clubs. He more or less is the go between from the manager to the commanding officer. The manager is appointed by the commanding officer in writing and a copy of the appointment is sent to the treasurer. The responsibilities and duties of the manager are as follows: exercise overall supervision of the activity; act as custodian of all records and government property



(to include their safekeeping and assure that they are not removed from the activity without proper authority). He is responsible for the receipt, and safekeeping of funds made by the activity and the turning in of the Daily Activity Records along with the funds taken in by said activity to the treasurer at the central office at least once a week. Any time that a manager is relieved there has to be an inventory of consumable stock and activity owned property. This inventory is taken by a board appointed by the commanding officer of the activity.

The treasurer is responsible for coordinating all branch activities. He is the custodian of all records and Government property; responsible for the issuance of all orders for supplies and equipment; responsible for the receipt, safekeeping, deposit, disbursement, and accountability of the funds; responsible for the proper maintenance of the accounts and records in conformance with accounting handbook for non-appropriated funds; responsible for the submission of all statements and reports required by regulations; and responsible for the preparation of the activity's budget. The treasurers and managers must work hand in hand to accomplish all of their responsibilities.

At the present time we are working on a couple of future projects that we think will help our club system. We have gone to III MAF for permission to set up a Navy-Marine Corps Liquor Locker, which would bring the price of liquor, beer, and soda down. As most of you know there is an order from MACV stating that we will buy from the Army - Air Force Exchange only. III MAF has gone to MACV with the problem, and they in turn have gone to Headquarters Marine Corps. All we can do is wait for a reply. I'm


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sure that everyone in this room is concerned with the prices we are presently paying for a drink. The fighting men here in Vietnam are paying a higher price for a drink than anywhere in the Far East.


We are also planning on signing contracts with different concessionaires. One of the concessions would be juke boxes and pin ball machines where we would split 50/50 with the concessionaire. As you know the enlisted man has nothing in his club except beer and soda. We feel that in the coming year there should be requests from the different clubs for pizza ovens. We can also add the necessary equipment for such a venture.

If at any time there are any questions in your minds concerning the Clubs, please call and we will do our utmost to answer.

DIVISION CLUB SYSTEM



ORGANIZATION CLUB SYSTEM



CLUB SYSTEM

The 1st Marine Division Club System is comprised of three separate Clubs: COM(O), SNCO Club, and Enlisted Club. These three clubs are operated independently of each other, and are headed by treasurers appointed by the Commanding General. Responsibility for financial records, cash handling, and merchandising rests with these treasurers.

The manager of each branch activity is a member of the command operating that activity and is responsible to his commanding officer for properly administering the activity. The managers work directly with the treasurers and at least once per week come to the central office to turn in cash and draw merchandise.

Furnishings, refrigeration equipment, and snacks are purchased by the Division Clubs Officer from vendors' representatives in Vietnam, Okinawa, Hong Kong and the Philippines. Each branch activity is billed for the merchandise and equipment it uses. This plus wages, mess fund assessments, the cost of maintaining the central office, and the charges for repairing items of equipment are borne by each branch activity. What remains is held on the books until such time as that activity may want to use it for professional entertainment, a free night, or happy hour.

Some information that may aid in administering your branch activity more efficiently:

- (1) MCO P1746.1A and DivO P1746.1A are applicable to the Club System.
- (2) The Division Clubs Officer is responsible for insuring policy is carried out by treasurers and branch activities.
- (3) The best way to reduce wages and salaries (and make more funds available for entertainment) is to hire Vietnamese bartenders and waiters. They are paid between 20 and 40 piasters an hour - Marines \$ 1.00.
- (4) You can keep abreast of your branch activity's financial situation only if your managers turn in receipts promptly.
- (5) Slot machines are an excellent means of increasing profit. Initial expense is high, but they can not lose money in the long run.

XI

EXCHANGEBACKGROUND

All exchanges in the Republic of Vietnam are operated under the Army Air Force Exchange Service. All merchandise, supplies, and equipment is purchased by the Central Office located in Saigon and is issued to using activities in the I Corps Area from a Central Warehouse located in Danang.

A percentage of the profits generated by the Army & Air Force Exchange Service is returned to the Division to help support the Special Services program. The current donation to the Special Services program is \$3.00 per man per month.

EXCHANGE OPERATION

The Division Exchange System consists of the Main Office, Main Store and Warehouse complex located in the Headquarters Battalion area with branch stores serving the following units: (Chart XI-A)

5th Marines CP	3rd Bn 7th Marines
1st Bn 5th Marines	3rd Bn 1st Marines
2nd Bn 5th Marines	1st Tank Bn
3rd Bn 5th Marines	1st Motors
7th Marines CP	7th Engineers
2nd Bn 7th Marines	3rd 8" Howitzers (SP)

In addition Mobile Exchange Service is provided to smaller outlying units from the main store, also from the stores located at 2nd Bn 5th Marines, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines and 3rd Bn, 7th Marines. Mobile Air Service is also

available upon request and contingent upon availability of aircraft.

The Army Air Force Exchange Service is the sole controlling agency for concessionaire service (Reference I Corps Coordinator Notice 4066 of 5 June 1967). A wide range of concessionaire service is available through the exchange system, such as barber shops, modern dry cleaning and laundry, tailor shops, watch repair, and photographic processing. For additional concessionaire service or expansion of existing services contact the Exchange Officer at Division 44.

The stock assortment available at outlying stores is limited only by the space available. They will normally have a complete line of health, comfort and convenience items and a limited supply of highly sophisticated electronic items. The normal merchandise inventory for a battalion size store is \$30,000.00 to \$35,000.00 with a regimental sized store carrying approximately \$65,000.00 in inventory.

#### SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM UNITS BEING SERVED

Division Order 4066.2 of 19 September 1967 sets forth unit Commanders responsibility for support of exchange operations and encompassing the following:

- a. Provide a suitable building to accommodate a branch exchange.
- b. Furnish transportation to the store managers for the purpose of restocking the store and turn in of cash.
- c. Provide an armed escort whenever cash receipts are transported.
- d. Provide a unit assistant on a full time basis to assist the store manager in the operation of the exchange.
- e. Appoint in writing, a liaison officer to assist the exchange officer in providing close supervision of the exchange operation in your area.

It is imperative that the above outlined support be furnished, as the exchange does not have the capability of providing transportation, buildings, and personnel for operating branch stores at the level required by the tactical situation here in Vietnam.

#### PERSONNEL

All personnel assigned to the exchange, with the exception of Unit assistants, are attached to Service Company, Headquarters Battalion and are further assigned to branch stores by the Exchange Officer. They are responsible to the Exchange Officer for the operation of the branch store in accordance with the requirements and desires of the unit being served.

#### RATIONED ITEMS

To assist in the control of black market activities, various items sold through the exchange have been designated ration type items. Upon arrival in country each military person should be issued a ration card which states the items that are rationed and the quantity which he is allowed to purchase. Instructions for the issue, control and use of ration cards is contained in I Corps Coordinator Notice 5512.1A and further amplified in Division Order 5512.2.

#### PROBLEM AREAS.

Limited storage space in each branch exchange severely restricts the amount of back-up stocks that can be stored, resulting in the requirement for frequent resupply, this in turn ties up tactical vehicles. In many cases the non-availability of vehicles for resupply results in an out of stock condition. Generally speaking there is no shortage of



merchandise only a shortage of storage space and transportation.

Road conditions, especially during the monsoon season cause a breakdown in our resupply. When no vehicle or traffic is moving, it places a severe strain on available aircraft and with the low priority of exchange merchandise it is almost impossible to move merchandise by air.

A severe shortage of qualified exchange personnel makes it mandatory that close supervision be exercised at the unit level as well as from the exchange staff.

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO, San Francisco, California, 96602

1/SMD/mlb  
5512  
17 Dec 1967

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, I Corps (Attn: AG Advisor)  
Subj: Monthly Interpreter Roster  
Ref: (a) Force Order 5512.8A

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following is a roster of the ARVN Interpreters in this command on 15 December 1967:

Name	Rank	Service Number	Remarks
AN, LUU NGOC	SSgt	61/105103	
AN, LUU VAN	SSgt	61/212301	
ANH, NGUYEN HOANG	SSgt	143470	
BA, TANG THANH	SSgt	130407	
BA, TRAN VAN	SSgt	100999	
BAC, TRUONG THANH	SSgt	117176	
BE, TRAN VAN	SSgt	64/140975	
BEN, NGO HUU	SSgt	59/192243	Hospital (NSA) 26Nov67
CHIEU, TANG VAN	SSgt	60/127026	
CHUC, MAI NGOC	SSgt	60/179974	
CUNG, DUONG DUC	SSgt	64/164703	
DAM, TRUONG CONG	SSgt	64/117148	
DINH, NGUYEN BA	SSgt	64/106021	
DOANH, TRAN VAN	SSgt	413006	Hospital
DON, LU VI	SSgt	62/179844	
DONG, NGUYEN TRONG	SSgt	59/101023	
DUNG, MAI TAN	SSgt	60/202406	
HA, PHAM VAN	SSgt	64/117073	
HAI, NGUYEN TU	SSgt	64/164424	
HOAN, NGUYEN NGOC	SSgt	54/401052	
HOANG, TRAN DINH	SSgt	61/194634	
HOANG, VU KHAC	SSgt	63/100021	
HUNG, CAO DUC	SSgt	64/117057	
HUNG, DO PHI	SSgt	62/160161	
HUNG, NGO DUC	SSgt	59/100204	
HUNG, NGUYEN THUC	SSgt	190399	
HUY, LUNG CAN	SSgt	64/194949	
HUY, LA DUC	SSgt	64/106370	
KHINH, NGUYEN VAN	SSgt	56/120962	
KIET, TAO	SSgt	56/124230	
KINH, MAI HUU	SSgt	61/195213	
LIEM, TRAN THANH	SSgt	190991	
LINH, NGUYEN THUY	SSgt	57/179013	
LUNG, NGUYEN VAN	SSgt	117105	

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1/200/mlb  
5312

LONG, NGUYEN HO THICKNG	1st Sgt	194754	
LUAN, NGUYEN VAN	1st Sgt	64/111776	Hospital
LUAT, PHAN HUU	1st Sgt	63/170822	
NGHIA, NGO TUAN	1st Sgt	190767	
PHUT, VUONG VAN	1st Sgt	54/151430	
NGOC, HUYNH THANH	1st Sgt	61/116905	
PHU, NGUYEN VAN	1st Sgt	66/133801	
PHU, TANG	1st Sgt	54/199201	
PHU, TRAN THO	1st Sgt	65/161875	
PHUNG, DINH VAN	1st Sgt	64/112688	Awaiting Court Martial (1st III MAP)
PHUOC, NGAN NGOC	1st Sgt	66/205303	
QUAN, HUA TRUNG	1st Sgt	60/140942	
QUAN, NGUYEN DINH	1st Sgt	58/800864	
QUAN, TRAN LAC	1st Sgt	66/133804	
QUY, NGUYEN KHAC	1st Sgt	60/141247	Hospital (Duy Tan) 11Dec
QUYNH, NGAN VAN	1st Sgt	66/143000	
ROC, NGUYEN XUAN	1st Sgt	58/115272	
SON, NGUYEN MINH	1st Sgt	54/804799	
SONG, HUONG NGOC	1st Sgt	64/106106	
TAM, LAI THI	1st Sgt	55/181855	
TAM, PHAN DINH	1st Sgt	163088	
TAN, LI TAN	1st Sgt	66/205046	
TAN, LY VAN	1st Sgt	67/203414	Hospital (Duy Tan) 4Dec67
TANG, VUONG THICH	1st Sgt	61/101672	Leave 12-19Dec67
THAI, NGUYEN VAN	1st Sgt	208194	
THAM, LI VAN	1st Sgt	404067	
THANG, NGUYEN TOAN	1st Sgt	162534	
THANH, HAI KHANH	1st Sgt	62/144554	
THANH, NGUYEN VAN	1st Sgt	67/203498	
THUY, NGO KIM	1st Sgt	67/203425	
TO, DUONG	1st Sgt	58/165771	
TOAN, NGUYEN VAN	1st Sgt	59/190552	
TRI, HONHON HANH	1st Sgt	65/188135	
TRIEU, HAN VAN	1st Sgt	201462	
TRINH, PHAN THANH	1st Sgt	181305	
TRINH, NGUYEN QUANG	1st Sgt	66/133168	
TRUNG, TRAN DUY	1st Sgt	117162	
THU, NGUYEN GUNG	1st Sgt	65/122555	
YANG, NGUYEN VAN	1st Sgt	62/199844	
VUNG, NGUYEN QUANG	1st Sgt	64/193090	
QUAN, HUYNH VAN	1st Sgt	190341	
XUAN, NGUYEN DUY	1st Sgt	63/183049	
XUONG, LA DINH	1st Sgt	64/117063	Hosp (1st Med) 12Dec67

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Copy to:  
CC, III MAP (attn: Adjutant)  
Omdr, 1st IF  
Senior USVN Liaison Officer, 1st MarDiv

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