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CONTENTS

Introduction	INTRO
<u>G-1 Section</u>	
G-1 Overview	G-1
Personnel Strength	1-1
USMC RVN Ceiling vs On Rolls Strength	1-1a
Increment IV Redeployment	1-1b
Overseas Extensions Processed	1-1c
Legal Matters	1-2
Trials Involving Crimes of Violence	1-2a
Unauthorized Absence Report	1-2b
Confined Marines	1-2c
Bad Conduct and Dishonorable Discharges	1-2d
Administrative Discharges	1-2e
Foreign Claims Investigations	1-2f
First Term Reenlistments	1-3
CONGRINT/SPLINT Correspondence	1-4
Decorations and Purple Hearts Processed	1-5
<u>G-2 Section</u>	
G-2 Overview	G-2
Estimated Enemy Strength Quang Nam Province	2-1
Deployment of Reconnaissance Teams	2-2
Sensors Employed	2-3
Enemy Activity	2-4
Enemy Sighted	2-4a
Enemy-Initiated Contacts	2-4b
Rockets Received	2-4c

30 SEP 1970

DECLASSIFIED

Mortar Rounds Received	2-4d
Lob Bombs Received	2-4e
Terrorist Acts	2-4f

G-3 Section

G-3 Overview	G-3
Friendly Casualties	3-1
Friendly Killed in Action	3-1a
Friendly Wounded in Action	3-1b
Mines and Booby Traps	3-2
Mines/Booby Trap Casualties	3-2a
Percentage of Mine/Booby Trap Casualties to Total Casualties	3-2b
Comparison of Mines/Booby Traps Found to Detonated	3-2c
Enemy Losses	3-3
Enemy Killed in Action	3-3a
Individual Weapons Captured	3-3b
Crew-Served Weapons Captured	3-3c
Combined Unit Pacification Program	3-4
Hamlet Population under CUPP Influence and Increase in Population in Secure Hamlets	3-4a
CUPP Units Established and Percentage of Insecure Hamlets covered by CUPP Units	3-4b
CUPP Casualties	3-4c
Enemy Losses Inflicted by CUPP Units	3-4d
Supporting Arms	3-5
Artillery Ammunition Expended	3-5a
Artillery Pieces Available	3-5b
Naval Gunfire Ammunition Expended	3-5c

30 SEP 1970

DECLASSIFIED

Naval Gun Ship-Days on Station	3-5d
Fixed Wing Fighter/Attack Sorties	3-5e
Helicopter Support	3-6
Helicopter Flight Time	3-6a
Helicopter Passenger Totals	3-6b
Helicopter Cargo Totals	3-6c

G-4 Section

G-4 Overview	G-4
Unit FORSTAT Ratings	4-1
Equipment Readiness	4-2
Combat Essential Equipment (Overall)	4-2a
Combat Essential Equipment (Comm-Elect)	4-2b
Combat Essential Equipment (Motor Transport)	4-2c
Combat Essential Equipment (Ordnance)	4-2d
Combat Essential Equipment (Engineer)	4-2e
Transfer of Equipment to RVNAF	4-3
Embarkation Progress, Increment IVA	4-4

G-5 Section

G-5 Overview	G-5
Cost of Civic Action	5-1
Percentage of Vietnamese Labor in 1st Marine Division Civic Action Projects	5-2
Vietnamese Treated by MEDCAP/DENTCAP	5-3

Division Inspector Section

Division Inspector Overview	INSP
Misuse of Weapons	I-1
Supporting Arms Friendly Fire Incidents	I-1a
Individual Weapons Friendly Fire Incidents	I-1b

30 SEP 1970

DECLASSIFIED

Accidental Discharges	I-1c
Motor Vehicle Accidents	I-2
Racial Incidents	I-3
Assault with Explosive Devices	I-4
Drug Abuse Actions After the Fact	I-5
<u>Medical Section</u>	
Medical Overview	MED
Malaria Incidence	M-1
Venereal Disease	M-2

30 SEP 1970

INTRODUCTION

The following pages contain an analysis of key personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics and civic action matters. Where possible, pertinent information is charted graphically, data for 1969 appearing in black and that for 1970 in blue. Exceptions to this general rule are clearly indicated on the graphs.

Certain explanations and analyses accompany the graphs on facing pages. Where appropriate, the significance of trends and comparisons with established norms and stated objectives are discussed.

The percentages appearing on the G-4 maintenance charts are based on all authorized quantities of combat essential line items listed in the MARES order.

The strength of the Division has generally risen on the occasion of the attachment of major units, such as the 26th Marines, and fallen when that unit and others were redeployed. However, the average strength of the Division in 1969 was not significantly greater than the average for the first eight months of 1970, being approximately 25,400 in former case and 22,900 in the latter, a difference of only 2,500 men.

15 SEPT 1970

INTRO

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G-1 OVERVIEW

The G-1 presentation contains twelve charts displaying historical data and trends, each chart supported by a narrative analysis. An overview of the presentation establishes that:

- a. Despite the personnel turbulence associated with Keystone Robin (ALPHA) redeployments, total strength continues to parallel the in-country ceiling, and it is anticipated that this condition will prevail subsequent to 15 October, when a revised ceiling of 12,512 becomes effective.
- b. The first term reenlistment rate of those Marines eligible and recommended for reenlistment declined sharply during the period April-August 1970. This can be attributed to general personnel turbulence and the extensive early release program, as the rate fell from 72% (41 reenlisting out of 57 eligible and recommended) in April to barely 22% (only 18 of 83) in August. However, the decline was apparently arrested in September, when 16 Marines reenlisted out of a total of 34 eligible and recommended, a rate of 47%. Despite the decline from April to August, the division's rate has remained above the USMC objective of 21% first term reenlistment and well above the Marine Corps' actual overall rate of 10%, a rate indicating that but a single first term Marine reenlists of each ten eligible and recommended.
- c. Administrative discharges processed during the first nine months of 1970 are more than seven times (755%) those processed during a like period of 1969, numbering 672 such discharges in 1970 compared to only 89 through September 1969. August and September totals, however, reflect a significant decline from the period January-July 1970. This appears to be a direct result of the concentrated weeding out process during the earlier months. It is believed that the program has stabilized and will remain stable in the future.
- d. Punitive discharges have averaged approximately fourteen discharges per month during the past two months.
- e. Unauthorized absences for September were slightly below the monthly average for the year 1970 - 17 compared to approximately 23. A slight downward trend may be discerned although there is not enough data to support that such a trend is definite.
- f. Over the first six months of 1970, the monthly average of Marines confined, approximately 111, was more than double the average of 51 experienced during the comparable period of 1969. However, the application of a liberal administrative separation policy and the transfer of prisoners sentenced to more than 60 days confinement to Camp Pendleton has reduced the Marine prisoner population significantly since January.

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g. Trials involving crimes of violence have increased since 1969. In part, this may be attributed to more effective investigation of such acts and the subsequent referral of offenders for trial.

h. There has been a tendency toward a smaller volume of congressional correspondence. Over the past four months such inquiries have decreased to an average of about 92 per month compared to an average of 133 over the first four months of the year.

i. The gradual reduction in operational activity has reduced the awarding of all awards to a level well below that of 1969. However, the processing of meritorious decorations shows a gradual increase over the last four months, due in part to an increasing number of personnel rotating in accordance with redeployment criteria.

j. The number of overseas extensions for the first nine months of 1970, a total of 921, falls well short of the total for the comparable January-September period in 1969, a total of 2835 extensions. In addition, the percentage of extensions approved during the January-September period of 1970 showed a significantly lower average than in 1969. During January-September 1969, only a single month, August, with a percentage of 0.94%, fell below the one-percent level, the other months ranging from 1.09% to 1.83%. However, in 1970 the highest percentage has been 0.78% in January and has fallen to less than 0.06% in May, when only 12 extensions were approved. The decline can be attributed to the personnel turbulence and the uncertainty associated with redeployment.

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PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Personnel strength of the division continues to fall as redeployment progresses. The personnel strength has not exhibited a steady decline, the reductions ranging from almost none in May to more than 3000 in March. During one month, July, division strength actually increased, but quickly fell by virtue of the start of Increment IV redeployments. Approvals of overseas extensions have been affected by the redeployments. Such approvals fell sharply because of the uncertain personnel situation, reaching a low of twelve in May, but have risen again to more than 100 per month and should remain at that level for the next few months. The RVN ceiling will be met by 15 October.

30 SEPT 1970

G-1-1

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), USMC RVN CEILING

VS

OVERALL STRENGTH CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart reveals that, in general, overall strength parallels the RVN ceiling. The marked increase in ceiling and strength in September 1969 reflects the joining of the 26th Marines. In November 1969 the strength started to decline steadily as a result of large scale redeployments of individuals based on RTD's and the early release program. In March 1970 the redeployment of the 26th Marines keyed an accelerated decline in both ceiling and strength. The ceiling will level off at 12,512 on 15 October when Increment IV redeployments have been completed. It is expected that subsequent to 15 October the Division strength will approximate the ceiling.

30 SEP 1970

6-1-1a


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) USMC RVN CEILING VS ON ROLL STRENGTH,
CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970

--- 1969 CEILING
 — 1969 STRENGTH

--- 1970 CEILING
 — 1970 STRENGTH

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969 OR	23948	24224	24263	23889	23694	23469	23440	22734	24284	30306	30899	29476
1970 OR	27490	26672	23405	21808	21805	20998	21442	19744	16400			

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Conf-19a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) INCREMENT FOUR REDEPLOYMENT

Projected strength is predicated upon currently known input, losses due to normal attrition and Keystone Robin (Alpha) redeployments, and transfers of excess personnel to commands outside RVN. The current and projected ceiling is determined by summing the Division Manning Level with the number of Out of Country Non-effective (OOCNE). On 1 July 1970, OOCNE was 51 officers and 1077 enlisted, whereas at the end of phase IV these figures will be reduced to 10 and 122.

Certain imbalances in MOS, either excesses or deficits in manning level, will occur during Phase IV. The imbalances will be temporary in nature as excesses are nominated to FMFPac for redistribution in West Pac.

30 SEPT 1970


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) INCREMENT FOUR DEPLOYMENT

STRENGTH (PROJECTED)

RVN CEILING (PROJECTED)



	1 JUL	15 JUL	1 AUG	15 AUG	1 SEP	15 SEP	1 OCT	15 OCT
CEILING	20437	21708	21708	21708	18936	(17780)	(17420)	(12880)
STRENGTH	20981	20365	21416	20579	19143	(17560)	(16280)	(12620)

C-11-11

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) OVERSEAS EXTENSIONS APPROVED

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Both the number and percentage of overseas extensions for the first nine months of 1970 fall significantly below the figures for the comparable period in 1969. The reduced number can be related directly to the major decrease in Division strength. The decline in percentage during the period February - May 1970 appears to be attributable to the uncertainty as to the retention of Marine forces in-country associated with the redeployment of the 26th Marines and the anticipated redeployment of other major Division units. The number of extensions rose sharply in June and July but again show a decline in August and September in what appears to be a direct correlation to the reduction in Division strength. Contrary to the trend established during the redeployments earlier in the year, the percentage of extensions has remained relatively stable since June

30 SEPT 1970

G-1-10


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE OVERSEAS EXTENSIONS APPROVED,
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



6-1-16

LEGAL MATTERS

The beginning of Calendar year 1970 has shown a marked increase in judicial and disciplinary proceedings, including trials for crimes of violence, and the processing of punitive and administrative discharges. The rise in courts-martial relating to crimes of violence does not necessarily mean that such crimes have increased in number, but that they are being investigated and prosecuted with more thoroughness. An adjunct to violent crimes was the mounting brig population experienced early in 1970.

Late spring and summer 1970, have brought downward trends in the brig population, crimes of violence, and punitive discharges. The new policy of transferring prisoners sentenced to more than 60 day confinement to Camp Pendleton, which became effective in August 1970, has substantially reduced 1st Marine Division confinees, and is responsible for the notable decrease in confinees depicted on the graph.

The decrease in punitive discharges and crimes of violence which occurred in late spring and summer and which appears to be continuing into the fall of 1970 is the result of the reduction in Division strength and also the deterrence resulting from increased effectiveness in techniques of investigation.

30 SEPT 1970

6-1-2

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), TRIALS INVOLVING CRIMES OF
VIOLENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The graph illustrates two trends, the first, originating in the fall of 1969, and continuing into the spring of 1970, reflects an increase in the number of trials for crimes of violence.

There appear to be at least two factors which explain this increase. The first is the implementation of the "County Court House" system of Justice, with its court procedures centralized at the 1st Marine Division Command Post. This system has resulted in increased effectiveness and competence in investigating and trying cases, i. e., more offenders are referred to trial.

The second factor is the decrease in the tempo of fighting within the Division area of operation. As a consequence, there is a greater amount of time to get into difficulties. In addition the decrease in fighting allows time for greater investigation of incidents. These might have to be less seriously regarded during periods of heavy fighting. The second trend, beginning in the late spring of this year reflects a gradual decrease in crimes of violence. One factor in the decrease is the reduction in Division strength. Another factor is the deterrence resulting from increased effectiveness in investigating cases - such as Force Order 3120.4.

On 14 August Force Order 3120.4, an SOP for investigating crimes of violence that occur within camps or cantonments, was published. This order provides for specific procedures to be followed to isolate and search the area, and interrogate all personnel involved. Commanding Officers were briefed by the Division Inspector and the Staff Judge Advocate to assist them in implementing this order.

30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION(REIN) CUMULATIVE TRIALS INVOLVING CRIMES OF VIOLENCE*
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



1969	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
TRIALS	15	49	64	89	104	129	136	151	169				169
%CMD	.07	.08	.06	.04	.07	.07	.08	.03	.03	.06	.07	.08	
1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
TRIALS	29	40	56	71	86	93	108	115	130	145	160	181	181
%CMD	.11	.08	.07	.09	.09	.13	.04	.08	.06				

*CRIMES OF VIOLENCE INCLUDE RAPE, MURDER, ASSAULTS, ROBBERY

G-1-234

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORTCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The monthly number and percentage of unauthorized absences has fluctuated widely throughout the year and can not be directly correlated to Major fluctuations in Division strength. The randomness of the distribution precludes establishing a pattern or trend which might be related directly to tempo of operations, the season of this year, redeployments, or the influx of replacements. However, in the majority of cases wherein the individual passes from a status of unauthorized absence to a status of desertion in-country it has been determined that a local national woman is involved and heavily influences the individual.

30 SEPT 1970

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
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**1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE UA REPORT, CALENDAR YEARS
1969/1970**

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



1969	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
NO UA							27	19	28	40	31	35	180*
% CMD							.12	.09	.12	.14	.11	.12	

1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
NO UA	23	17	36	12	17	42	24	17	17				203
% CMD	.09	.07	.16	.06	.08	.20	.11	.09	.10				

* TOTAL SHOWN IS FOR LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1969. THE DASHED LINE REPRESENTS A CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF UA'S DERIVED BY USING THE MONTHLY AVERAGE FOR JUL-DEC 1969.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CONFINED MARINESCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This graph reflects a trend, originating in early August 1969, toward an increased number of Marines in confinement.

The 1970 six month period, January to June, shows approximately a 100% increase in the number of Marine Confinees over the same six month period (January to June) in 1969.

The probable cause for this rising number of confined Marines is illustrated in the graph which reflects trials for crimes of violence (1-2a) committed by 1st Marine Division Marines from January 1970 to date.

A suspect of an offense involving a crime of violence is in most cases placed in pre-trial confinement since he usually represents a threat to the personnel of the parent unit.

Convicted offenders of crimes of violence, for the most part, receive confinement as part of their sentence and seldom have the confinement portion of the sentence suspended by the Convening Authority.

Application of a liberal Administrative separation policy (i.e. "Operation Clear House") should produce some immediate relief to the problem.

Long term relief will probably result as the Marine Corps raises its recruiting standards by screening and accepting only high quality candidates in its training program.

The decrease in the total number of 1st Marine Division Marines confined at the United States Army Vietnam Installation Stockade (USAVIS), formerly the III MAF Correctional Center, is the result of the implementation of a new III MAF policy to send adjudged, prisoners, with more than 60 days confinement to serve, to the Correctional Center, Camp Pendleton, as soon as possible after trial. In compliance with this policy 51 1st Marine Division prisoners were transferred to Camp Pendleton on 12 August 1970. Although the total number of Marine confinees for October and the remainder of 1970 will not drop as dramatically as those of August and September 1970, a continual decrease in the total number of confinees is expected due to the reduction in Division strength.


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CONFINED MARINE CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969 PRE-TRIAL	29	22	18	21	29	19	18	16	19	24	21	33
POST-TRIAL	29	26	24	30	28	31	44	29	37	44	44	76
TOTALS	58	48	42	51	57	50	62	45	56	68	65	109
% OF DIV PERSONNEL	26	21	18	16	23	25	22	20	21	23	24	33
1970 PRE-TRIAL	44	42	48	47	44	55	49	38	33			
POST-TRIAL	69	58	59	58	74	71	73	40	24			
TOTALS	133	100	107	105	118	126	121	78	57			
% OF DIV PERSONNEL	43	40	44	51	57	65	56	42	38			

G-1-220

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). BAD CONDUCT AND DISHONORABLE

DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Insofar as the monthly ratio of punitive discharges to total personnel strength within the Division are concerned, no discernible trend toward an increase or a decrease can be detected. There have been minor fluctuations from the norm, but the norm of approximately fourteen punitive discharges per month has not been exceeded by a number greater than five during the past six months of calendar year 1970. Due to reductions in Division strength, it appears likely that the slight downward trend showing on the graph in August and September will continue through the fall of 1970.

30 SEPT 1970

G-1-2d


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE BAD CONDUCT AND DEMONORABLE DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



1969	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
BCD & DD	15	14	16	16	11	12	13	16	13	11	16	16	171
% OF DIV PERSONNEL	.07	.06	.07	.07	.05	.06	.06	.07	.06	.04	.05	.06	
1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
BCD & DD	16	10	19	14	16	10	12	10	8				115
% OF DIV PERSONNEL	.06	.04	.09	.07	.08	.06	.06	.06	.05				

2-1-22

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIM) ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGESPROCESSED CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The rapid rise in administrative separations during the period January-July 1970 reflects command guidance issued in January in support of the Commandant of the Marine Corps' policy in this matter.

In August and September 1970, totals portray a significant decline in both numbers and in percentage of total strength. In part, the decline in numbers of separations can be attributed to the reduction in total Division strength. However, the decline in percentage appears to be a result of the weeding out process accomplished during January-July and a deterrent impact accruing from the growing realization on the part of certain recalcitrants that they face the reality of an undesirable or unsuitability discharge.

The percentage can be expected to rise slightly in October and November as a consequence of having retained in-country all those individuals who are now being processed for administrative separation while concurrently the total strength of the Division will have been reduced to 15,512.

30 SEPT 1970


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**1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES
PROCESSED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 C OF S													0
UD	4	8	6	7	6	1	7	9	15	15	8	4	90
UNSUB	4	1	5	1	1	4	5	3	2	1	1	3	31
TOTAL	8	9	11	8	7	5	12	12	17	16	9	7	121
% CND	.03	.04	.04	.03	.03	.02	.05	.05	.07	.05	.03	.02	
1970 C OF S													322
UD	12	10	27	18	35	41	57	28	24				262
UNSUB	6	6	13	11	20	11	14	4	4				87
TOTAL	18	25	78	29	120	115	140	32	31				349
% CND	.05	.09	.22	.27	.32	.22	.35	.35	.35				

G-1-22

1ST MARINE DIVISION (MAIN), FOREIGN CLAIMS INVESTIGA-
TIONS CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This graph represents a trend, originating with the month of August, 1970, toward an increase in the number of foreign claims investigations which have been processed through the 1st Marine Division.

Although the trend does not reflect any substantial or significant increase in the number of such claims processed, it may very well portend somewhat of an increase for the near future.

The primary reason for such an increase rests with the relatively recent policy effectuated by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate whereby potential foreign claims are excepted from Serious Incident Reports and brought to the attention of the respective units by means of a letter from the Division Foreign Claims Officer (Deputy Staff Judge Advocate) requesting the initiation of an investigation and the completion of the requisite Department of the Army forms.

Many incidents involving potential foreign claims had been overlooked prior to July, 1970. However, the aforementioned "watch dog" policy has resulted in an increased number of foreign claims investigations, over a relatively recent period of time. It is anticipated that this general trend will remain relatively stable for the foreseeable future.

It should be pointed out that this trend in no way reflects any greater amount of foreign claims within the Division. It is simply concerned with investigations of incidents which may ultimately involve potential foreign claims.

30 SEPT 1970

G-1-2f


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE FOREIGN CLAIMS INVESTIGATIONS
FORWARDED TO U.S. ARMY FOREIGN CLAIMS COMMISSION, CALENDAR
YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT RATECALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The average first term reenlistment rate for the first nine months of 1970 is 41%; a decrease from the 1969 rate of 54%. Despite this decrease the Division remains well above the Marine Corps' average of approximately 10%.

There had been a relatively steady decline during the period April-August 1970 which appears to have been arrested in September which reflects an increase to 47%.

The primary causes for the decline during 1969 appear to be the general personnel turbulence associated with the redeployment of forces; heavy turnover of Career Planning personnel; and the extensive early release program.

It is believed that the September increase signifies the results of a revitalized program keyed to the problems at hand and centered on increased command interest in all echelons and an expansion of the Division Career Planning Staff with experienced personnel.

30 SEPT 1970


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1st MARINE DIVISION(REIN) 1st TERM REENLISTMENT RATES, CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	1969	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
ELI/RECOM		188	182	157	107	125	159	176	167	183	65	63	56	1558
REENLIST		63	63	60	55	56	98	116	109	131	27	36	32	844
	1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
ELI/RECOM		45	65	88	57	89	86	97	83	34				644
REENLIST		24	30	29	41	48	26	32	18	16				234

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CONGRINT/SPLINT CORRESPONDENCE

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The volume of CONGRINT/SPLINT correspondence increased the first four months of 1970 over the 1969 average of 113 per month. However, since May 1970 there has been a downward trend and at present the monthly average for 1970 mirrors the monthly average for 1969. This is directly related to the reduction in Division strength. It is expected that the number of CONGRINT/SPLINT Correspondence will continue to decline as the Division strength decreases, but at a lesser rate than the reduction in Division strength.

30 SEPT 1970

G-1-4


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE CONGRINT/SPLINT CORRESPONDENCE
PROCESSED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969	82	90	123	111	138	110	103	120	91	130	145	124	1367
1970	136	143	136	122	108	92	98	99	80				1014

G-1-4

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) DECORATIONS PROCESSED

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

An average of 360 Purple Heart Medals have been awarded monthly during the first nine months of 1970 as compared to a monthly average of 764 throughout 1969. Processing of these decorations during 1970 averages 637 per month which equates to approximately seventy-five percent of the 1969 rate of 900 per month. The decrease in all awards reflects the significant decrease in operational activity which has occurred since September 1969.

The number of meritorious decorations is expected to increase significantly in October-November as a result of end of tour awards from units redeploying with Increment IV.


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G-1-5

1st MARINE DIVISION(REIN) CUMULATIVE AMERICAN DECORATIONS AND
PURPLE HEARTS AWARDED , CALENDAR YEARS 1969 /1970

— 1969 DECORATIONS — 1970 DECORATIONS
-- 1969 PURPLE HEARTS -- 1970 PURPLE HEARTS

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



1969	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
PHM	693	644	1209	819	1197	921	486	1130	866	408	413	381	9165
OTHER	924	672	1200	1057	965	995	903	841	927	766	647	526	10593

1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
PHM	444	454	428	410	388	348	272	279	197				3220
OTHER	344	624	809	403	462	678	792	916	810				5928

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G-2 OVERVIEW

The following pages depict in graphic and textual form an estimate of enemy force levels, utilization of reconnaissance teams, employment of sensor devices, and enemy activity within the 1st Marine Division TAOR.

In Quang Nam Province, estimated total enemy strength has declined from 16,800 (May 1969) to a current level of approximately 10,900 (September 1970). It is anticipated that the enemy will infiltrate replacements in sufficient numbers to maintain his force level between 10,000-13,000; since July 1969, enemy strength has remained within this parameter, and there are no present indication that infiltration will be increased to the point that overall forces in the province will be expanded. Personnel attrition in Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla units has required that the NVA utilize personnel to fill the ranks of units that are traditionally VC in origin. This trend is expected to continue in the foreseeable future due to the difficulties in recruiting from the indigenous manpower source. Enemy strength figures are based upon information derived from PW's and captured documents.

The Division's reconnaissance team assets are depicted as a percentage of teams deployed in relation to the number of teams available on a monthly basis. The minimum objective is to attain no less than 50% of operational teams available for deployment at a given time; remaining teams are standing down from missions or in training. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion has fulfilled this objective, and although Phase IV reductions have reduced the number of teams, it will not affect the percentage of teams available for deployment in the field.

Sensor utilization increased steadily throughout 1969 and until June 1970 when a decline in employment commenced. During July and August 1970, the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System) was removed as well as RF Sensor Strings in southern and central Quang Nam Province; in September, the deactivation of the readout site at FSB Ryder resulted in a further decline in sensors employed. Sensor utilization within the Division TAOR should remain relatively constant.

Enemy activity has steadily diminished during the first nine months of 1970. In general, this fact reflects the change in the nature of the enemy's strategy in South Vietnam. Following an unsuccessful attempt by the North Vietnamese to extend their aggression to a war of maneuver by introducing massive numbers of North Vietnamese Army Regulars, they have reverted to the type of guerrilla warfare prevalent prior to 1965. The change

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30 SEP 1970

6-2

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has been forced upon the enemy by attrition of his forces and the overall effectiveness of the pacification program, which has reduced his support base in the Republic of Vietnam. The graphs in this section reflect a reduction in enemy initiated contacts, enemy sightings, rocket attacks, mortar attacks, lob bombings, and terrorist acts.

30 SEP 1970

G-2

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ESTIMATED TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTHQUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Total enemy forces include NVA, MF and LF units as well as village/hamlet guerrillas. In Quang Nam Province, the estimated total enemy strength has declined from a high of 16,800 (May 1969) to a level of approximately 10,900 (September 1970). It is anticipated that the enemy will infiltrate in sufficient numbers to maintain his current force level in the province.

Unless substantial reinforcement is received from outside the province, enemy strength levels are expected to hold fairly constant within the 10,000 to 13,000 range. This has been the strength level since July 1969, and it appears that the enemy has the capability to introduce infiltration groups to replace losses. He does not appear inclined at this time to increase infiltration to a level that will expand his overall forces.

Recruitment of indigenous South Vietnamese does not play a significant part in overall manpower procurement as evidenced by the necessity to utilize NVA personnel in traditionally VC roles. On hand personnel assets will probably continue to be redistributed as appropriate; more NVA troops will be used to fill the ranks of MF and LF units; NVA, MF and LF personnel will also be used to rebuild the depleted guerrilla organization within the province.

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ESTIMATED TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLERECONNAISSANCE TEAMS DEPLOYEDCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart depicts the average percentage of reconnaissance teams deployed during a given month. The objective is to have at least half of the operational teams available for employment at any given time, with the remainder standing down from missions or in training. Lower than usual deployment of reconnaissance teams during November and December 1969 was caused by adverse weather. The decrease in February and March 1970 is associated with Phase III reductions and the early rotation of eligible personnel.

Two reconnaissance companies stood down for redeployment on 10 September in association with Phase IV redeployment. The average for the first 10 days in September was 41 teams available and 25 deployed. Since 11 September 1970, there have been 22 teams available and an average of six teams deployed. This smaller percentage of teams deployed is anticipated to continue due to curtailment of flight activities during the monsoon season. The figures on the chart represent the average for the entire month. Reduction in the number of total teams will not affect the percentage of teams available for deployment in the field.

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
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**1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE RECONNAISSANCE
TEAMS DEPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



TEAMS	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AVAILABLE							48	48	50	48	45	39
DEPLOYED							27	27	27	27	24	19
TEAMS	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AVAILABLE	38	50	57	54	55	54	48	48	28			
DEPLOYED	22	25	29	31	31	28	27	26	12			

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970

Sensor utilization decreased significantly during July and August with the deactivation of the DAISS as well as RF Sensor Strings in southern and central Quang Nam Province. During September, the deactivation of the readout site at FSB Ryder resulted in a further decline in sensors employed.

Sensor utilization within the Division should remain relatively constant.

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30 SEP 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



TYPE SENSOR		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969	RF	46	53	14	26	26	40	61	61	112	87	51	41
	LINE	14	14	49	80	106	106	192	132	189	163	168	188
	TOTAL	60	77	63	106	132	146	193	193	271	252	216	229
1970	RF	67	74	96	139	230	239	247	211	125			
	LINE	183	200	187	189	191	141	115	7	7			
	TOTAL	250	274	286	328	421	379	362	218	132			

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHINTACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

The following six graphs depict enemy initiated incidents occurring from 1 January to 30 September 1970. In general, enemy activity declined at a steady rate during the past nine months. The decrease in activity is a reflection of the enemy's forced reversion from a main force maneuver strategy to the guerrilla warfare posture that was prevalent prior to large scale commitment of North Vietnamese Army Forces in 1965. Since the enemy reduced the number of his offensive actions and began concentrating on administrative and logistical activities, his overt presence in the lowlands has declined significantly. The number of enemy sighted by 1st Marine Division units during the past nine months dropped from over 4400 monthly during January and February to less than 1400 for September.

Enemy initiated contacts increased to over 200 monthly during the enemy's spring offensive, declined to slightly more than 100 monthly in June, and remained at approximately this level throughout the third quarter of the year. The nature of these contacts changed markedly; on several occasions early in the year, enemy ground forces attacked relatively hard targets defended by Free World Force Units, however, from late May through September, the only ground attacks of any significance were launched against resettlement hamlets and an orphanage. This change can probably be attributed to deteriorating enemy morale, a declining number of enemy front line troops, and the increasing effectiveness of the pacification program.

In order to implement his policy of harassment and guerrilla warfare, the enemy has continued to employ rockets against area targets. For the VC/NVA the rocket is primarily a psychological weapon, since he has neither the logistics system nor combat capability to employ rockets in a militarily effective manner. The pattern of rocket attacks conforms closely to the surge and ebb of the enemy's campaigns. During January, April-May, and August-September time frames, the enemy attempted to increase offensive activities. Associated with these periods of increased action, he fired 167 of the 196 rockets that have been fired during the nine month period.

Mortars are used by the enemy to harass friendly units, cover troop and logistic movements, and to a lesser extent support ground attacks. Mortar employment has declined in consonance with decreasing enemy activity, as evidenced by 621 rounds employed against 1st Marine Division units in January as compared to only 58 employed in July. Even throughout September, the number of rounds received remained relatively low at 125. As was true of rocket attacks, mortar attacks are timed to coincide with general offensive surges.

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30 SEP 1970

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Lob bombs are used essentially by guerrilla forces in lieu of more sophisticated artillery that is unavailable. The lob bomb is strictly a harassing weapon because of its low reliability, notable inaccuracy, and tactical inflexibility. The VC employ these devices in a random method, utilizing them primarily against command posts or temporary defensive positions. The relatively infrequent use of lob bombs can probably be attributed to their low probability of success.

Terrorist activity has remained at a moderate level during the first three quarters of the year. Although captured documents and PW's have indicated that terrorism was to be selectively applied in support of propaganda campaigns to eliminate GVN officials and to intimidate the populace, it has in fact been administered in a random and relatively ineffectual manner by the VC. The number of incidents has varied from a high of 46 to a low of 11 during the nine month period; there has been no discernible pattern to these incidents.

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30 SEP 1970

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ENEMY SIGHTED

CALENDAR YEAR 1970

The number of enemy sighted monthly in the Division AO has declined rather steadily since January 1970. This decline should continue through 1970.

30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ENEMY SIGHTED, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ENEMY-INITIATED CONTACTS

CALENDAR YEAR 1970

The enemy, in January and February 1970, initiated few contacts. However, April's total more than quadrupled February's total and thereafter declined and leveled off to approximately 100-130 contacts per month.

30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ENEMY INITIATED CONTACTS. CALENDAR
YEAR 1970

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ROCKETS RECEIVED

CALENDAR YEAR 1970

In March and July, not a single enemy rocket was received in the 1st Marine Division AO, while in April and May, 58 and 36 rounds were received. The remainder of the monthly frequencies were well contained in the limits 20 to 25, with the exception of the 9 rounds received in February.

30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ROCKET ROUNDS RECEIVED, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) MORTAR ROUNDS RECEIVED

CALENDAR YEAR 1970

The total number of mortar rounds received per month has varied from a high of 621 in January to a low of 58 in July. Although the number more than doubled in August, from 58 to 119, and increased again slightly in September to 125, the average for July through September, slightly over 100, is significantly smaller than that of the preceding six months.

30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) MORTAR ROUNDS RECEIVED, CALENDAR
YEAR 1970

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) LOB BOMBS RECEIVED

CALENDAR YEAR 1970

There is no discernible pattern to the monthly number of lob bombs received, a high of 27 being experienced in June, and lows of zero in February and April.

30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), LOB BOMBS RECEIVED, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) TERRORIST ACTS

CALENDAR YEAR 1970

The number of terrorist acts have occurred in a more or less random fashion during the year, the frequency ranging from eleven in February and August to 46 acts in March.

30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) TERRORIST ACTS WITH TAOR, CALENDAR
YEAR 1970

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1970	26	11	46	26	15	12	29	11	13				189

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G-3 OVERVIEW

Although the level of combat has decreased from that experienced during 1970, the combat effectiveness of the 1st Marine Division, as evidenced by a number of revealing indicators, has increased. During the first nine months of 1970, Marine casualties have averaged 39.8 killed and 361.7 wounded monthly, whereas the monthly averages during 1969 were 87.6 and 773.6, indicating that we are suffering casualties at a rate only about 46.5% of that of 1969. The enemy, on the other hand, although himself suffering fewer losses than in 1969, has not reduced his losses to the extent the Division has. The enemy is losing 532.7 men killed, and 119.5 individual and 9.7 crew-served weapons monthly in 1970, compared to 803.5, 189.8 and 19.5 in 1969. These figures translate to 1970 rates approximately 63%, 63%, and 50% of those in 1969. Consequently, one may deduce immediately from these statistics that the effectiveness of the Division is increasing, as enemy losses are declining at a less rapid rate than are ours. One interesting statistic is that the enemy is losing crew-served weapons at a rate only 42% that of 1969, which indicates that the enemy is either unwilling or unable to equip his soldiers with these weapons. However, the lower the rate could also be due to a lower rate of enemy attacks, during the conduct of which crew-served weapons would be a necessity.

The increased percentage of casualties due to mines and booby traps is yet another indicator of the altered strategy of the enemy. Surprise firing devices are claiming twice the percentage of friendly casualties they did in 1969, which tends to show, when coupled with the evidence of a sharply lowered level of activity, that the enemy is content to lay back and allow such devices to exact their toll while conserving his manpower resources. Also discussed in this section is the Combined Unit Pacification Program, which continues to exert its influence on many people who otherwise would be subject to domination by the enemy. Although members of CUPPs suffer a disproportionate share of Division casualties, e.g., 11.0% of Division KIA while having a strength of only 10.2% of the rifle squads in the Division, an unknown quantity is the number, perhaps large, of casualties saved by denying the enemy the freedom of the countryside. Another intangible is the good will undoubtedly generated by CUPPs as they live and work among the villagers.

This section concludes with consideration of data concerning supporting arms, air, artillery and naval gunfire, and helicopter support. As redeployment continues, expenditures of ordnance in support of the Division decrease in volume. This decrease maybe attributed to both a lower level of combat and to withdrawal of artillery pieces with RLT-26 and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing reductions, and withdrawal of elements of the 11th Marines. This includes standdown of 1st 175mm Gun Btry, 3d 175mm Gun Btry, 1st 8in Howitzer Btry, 3d Bn, 11th Marines, and "M" Btry, 4th Bn, 11th Marines. Helicopter support has been reduced somewhat from 1969 levels, but the Division still enjoys excellent effort from the helicopter squadrons remaining.

30 SEPT 1970

G-3

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FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

As the level of combat has decreased, friendly casualties have correspondingly decreased. 353 Marines have been killed during the first nine months of 1970 and 3211 wounded, compared to totals of 911 and 8170 during the same period in 1969. This represents a 60% decrease in friendly casualties, but a larger proportion of the casualties are being caused by surprise firing devices. This pattern of lower casualties can reasonably be expected to continue as the enemy contents himself, through design or necessity, to make harrassing attacks and to employ a large amount of mines and booby traps.

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30 SEP 1970

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY KILLED INACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

In 1969, the 1st Marine Division averaged 77 friendly killed in action per month. In 1970, this average has dropped to 40 per month.

The primary reason for the decrease is the reduction in the level of enemy activity. He is no longer massing and deploying in company or battalion sized units. Enemy units encountered in 1970 have ranged from individuals to not more than an average of twenty. The enemy has changed his objectives and appears to be concentrating on harassment activities rather than destruction of FWMAF units.

Several large scale operations have been mounted by the 1st Marine Division during 1970. Although finds, in terms of weapons, ordnance and foodstuffs have been considerable, the cumulative results, in terms of enemy casualties or contacts, have not been remarkable. Pacification has become increasingly more important as reflected by current involvement in CUPP activities by several Marine Corps units.

Combined unit activities, primarily with the 51st ARVN and ARVN Rangers have increased, resulting in a more proportional operational balance between ARVN and Marine Forces. Since re-deployment commenced, the Division strength has been reduced. The reduction in operating forces has contributed to the decrease in friendly casualties.

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE USMC KIA, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969	94	139	103	88	147	106	63	129	47	36	88	42	1051
1970	53	61	80	44	24	81	22	27	21				383

MONTHLY AVERAGE 1969 87.6 1970

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY WOUNDED IN

ACTION (EVACUATED), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The rationale behind the lower number of casualties wounded in action during 1970, compared to a similar period in 1969, is the same as that offered for casualties killed in action, generally a significant decrease in enemy activity. This is in spite of the upward trend in percentage of casualties caused by mine/booby trap detonations, a trend illustrated by (3-2b) in the sub-section immediately following.

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE USMC WIA, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969	763	894	963	842	1199	993	603	1204	809	309	393	412	9294
1970	505	440	446	404	392	360	267	258	149				3211

MONTHLY AVERAGE 1969 773.6 1970 336.7

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MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

As the level of fighting has decreased, the enemy, either because of a lack of manpower or through design, has resorted in large measure to the emplacement of mines and booby traps to cause friendly casualties. Whereas just over 20% of USMC casualties in 1969 were due to mines and booby traps, over 45% of 1970 casualties have been caused by such devices. Such casualties are especially fruitful for the enemy, since he is able to conserve greatly on manpower and exercise economy of force to a fine degree. To counteract the growing menace of surprise firing devices, an engineer contact team is daily conducting comprehensive training in the detection and avoidance of such devices for forward units. They are instructing, on the average, 50 to 100 Marines per day. The Resident Mine Warfare School closed during August will be reopened on 12 October to provide the Division with non-engineer Marines trained to detect and to destroy in place surprise firing devices. In addition, dogs are being employed to search for surprise firing devices. August 1970 showed a sharp increase in the ratio of mines and booby traps found and destroyed to those detonated with casualties, and the September ratio continued to rise.

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30 SEPT 1970

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CASUALTIES BY MINES/BOOBYTRAPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

It is expected that casualties sustained by mines and booby traps will continue to require command attention as the enemy appears to be placing ever increasing emphasis in this area. Casualties from mines and booby traps accounted for 45% of the total casualties suffered by the Division during 1970, whereas the percentage was 20.6% during 1969.

The enemy has placed emphasis on the employment of surprise firing devices to inflict heavier casualties on FVMAF with minimum use of force. This indicates that the enemy trend is on conservation of manpower, and fewer forces available to launch large scale offensive actions.

Individual training through formal schooling and the employment of mine/booby trap dogs has done much to decrease the number of detonations while holding the finds at a reasonably steady level. In addition, command messages have been issued directing units to avoid known booby trap areas.

30 SEP 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES BY MINES/BOOBY TRAPS CALENDAR
YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 KIA	9	4	9	11	22	17	13	17	15	14	16	19	166
WIA	108	46	74	211	202	242	191	236	174	114	133	227	1229
TOTAL	117	50	83	222	224	259	204	253	189	128	149	246	1395
1970 KIA	11	21	22	12	5	18	10	10	2				117
WIA	226	184	177	151	141	157	173	133	111				1495
TOTAL	237	205	199	163	146	175	183	143	119				1570

9-3-2a

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF MINE/BT CASUALTIES

TO TOTAL CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

July 1970 showed the highest percentage of casualties due to surprise firing devices recorded during 1969 and 1970 with 45.5% of those KIA and 64.8% of those WIA due to mines and booby traps. August's percentage declined somewhat, but not enough to reverse the rising trend of the cumulative percentage for the year while September's percentage rose considerably. More than a third of KIA and almost 46% of WIA during calendar year 1970 have been caused by mines and booby traps, compared to 15.8% and 21.1% respectively, in 1969.

30 SEP 1970

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**1st MARINE DIV (TEND CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE) TOTAL DIVISION CASUALTIES
KIA AND WIA BY MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

-----1969 WIA
———1969 KIA

-----1970 WIA
———1970 KIA

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969												
% KIA BT	9.6	2.9	6.7	12.6	16.0	16.0	20.6	13.2	31.9	36.8	23.1	45.2
CUM %	9.6	5.6	6.6	7.8	9.6	10.6	11.6	11.7	12.8	13.7	14.6	15.6
% WIA BT	14.2	6.2	7.7	26.1	16.9	27.1	31.7	19.6	21.6	36.9	33.6	56.1
CUM %	14.2	9.3	6.7	12.7	13.6	15.9	17.4	17.6	16.2	18.6	19.6	21.1
M/B CAS/BT	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.4	1.7	1.6	2.0	1.7	2.0
1970												
% KIA BT	20.8	34.4	44.0	27.3	20.8	35.3	45.5	32.9	39.1			
CUM %	20.8	26.1	33.0	31.7	30.6	31.4	32.5	32.9	33.2			
% WIA BT	44.8	41.6	39.7	37.4	36.0	44.9	64.8	61.6	76.5			
CUM %	44.8	45.4	42.2	41.1	46.2	49.9	43.1	43.6	45.3			
M/B CAS/BT	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.3			

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMPARISON OF MINES/BOOBY TRAPSFOUND TO THOSE DETONATED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The ratio of surprise firing devices discovered and destroyed to those detonated with casualties exhibited large fluctuations in 1969, ranging from a high of nearly 4 to 1 in October of that year to less than 1 to 1 in January and April, but the year ended with an overall ratio of 1.83 to 1. The year 1970 has been marked by a more stable ratio, ranging from 2.38 to 1 in February to a low of 1.21 to 1 in July. July's 1.21 was the only deviation from a steadily rising trend that had begun in March, and August showed a continuation of the trend with a 1.87 ratio. September figures indicate a ratio of 2.36 discovered to destroyed, attesting to the efficiency of counter-measures taken by the Division.

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30 SEP 1970


G-3-2c

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS FOUND OR
DETONATED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

——— 1969 FOUND ——— 1970 FOUND
 - - - 1969 DETONATED - - - 1970 DETONATED

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 BT FOUND	86	90	114	141	218	277	196	199	272	242	254	274	2543
BT DETON.	75	29	49	166	125	142	147	161	116	63	88	121	1290
RATIO F/D	.82	3.10	2.33	.85	1.74	1.96	1.33	1.24	1.64	3.84	2.88	2.26	1.63
1970 BT FOUND	294	284	170	153	162	170	119	144	120				1616
BT DETON.	135	119	117	98	103	100	98	77	51				898
RATIO F/D	2.18	2.36	1.45	1.56	1.57	1.70	1.21	1.87	2.35				

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED IN ACTIONCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Enemy losses have increased over ours mainly because a large majority of his casualties are inflicted by supporting arms (Artillery & Air). The effectiveness of artillery fires since the introduction of the IOD in country has denied the enemy the ability to move about in large numbers. Increased reconnaissance efforts have produced a large number of enemy sightings and consequent air/artillery missions have produced substantial enemy losses. Improved training and employment of "Pacifier" and ambushes have had a marked effect on the overall increase of enemy losses by these activities. It should be noted that the enemy is directing his efforts toward disruption of CAP/CUPP pacification operations as opposed to direct confrontation with FWMAF.

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE ENEMY KIA, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969	802	1010	801	1010	974	725	894	810	807	803	1098	1011	9843
1970	1022	725	472	618	604	561	414	283	150				4704

MONTHLY AVERAGE 1969 803.5 1970 532.6

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CUMULATIVE ENEMY INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The number of enemy individual weapons captured during calendar year 1970 has decreased by 41% in proportion to the reduced number of enemy casualties sustained by comparison to 1969.

30 SEP 1970

g-3-36

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION(REIN) CUMULATIVE IWC, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

—1969

—1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969	422	221	216	230	194	162	87	174	111	81	286	114	2277
1970	206	83	68	208	146	118	122	72	88				1070

MONTHLY AVERAGE 1969 189.8

1970

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CUMULATIVE ENEMY CREW SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The number of enemy crew served weapons captured has decreased one and one half times as rapidly as the proportional decrease in enemy casualties and individual weapons captured. There is no apparent explanation for this decrease save that of fewer crew served weapons available to the enemy units engaged.

30 SEP 1970

7-3-3c

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE CSWC, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



MONTHLY AVERAGE 1969 12.5 1970

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COMBINED UNIT PACIFICATION PROGRAM

Since its inception in November of 1969, the Combined Unit Pacification Program has brought some 31,000 Vietnamese people under the influence of its units and increased the security of over 13,000 others living in neighboring hamlets. Presently there are 22 CUPPs in existence, their coverage extending to 7.2% of the marginally secure or insecure hamlets (category C or lower) in Quang Nam Province. Although units of the Division are redeploying, it is anticipated that the number of CUPPs will remain constant for the foreseeable future. Although CUPP units suffer more than 11% of Division casualties and inflict only 4% of the enemy's losses, an intangible is the good will engendered by the members of CUPPs, who live and work among the people.

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30 SEPT 1970

g-3-4

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HAMLET POPULATION UNDER CUPP

INFLUENCE AND INCREASE IN POPULATION IN SECURE HAMLETS

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart shows the continuing increase of the Vietnamese population brought under CUPP influence. The single month of decline is attributed to the movement of a CUPP unit to a different locale. Although no increase in the number of CUPP units is projected, the increase in local nationals coming under the influence of these units should continue to increase, although at a more moderate rate.

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30 SEPT 1970

g-3-4a

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) HAMLET POPULATION UNDER CUPP INFLUENCE INCREASE
IN POPULATION IN SECURE HAMLETS CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



1969	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
UNDER CUPP INFLUENCE											4016	5062	5062
SCTY INCREASED												1724	1724
1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
UNDER CUPP INFLUENCE	17904	18886	23081	24858	23067	24361	30148	30361	31411				
SCTY INCREASED	1397		4235		5559				308				

GRAND TOTAL OF INCREASE IN SECURE POPULATION

13511

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND PERCENTAGE
OF CATEGORY C OR BELOW HAMLETS COVERED BY CUPP, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970

This chart graphically portrays the growth of CUPP units in 1st Marine Division AO, which necessarily ceased with the redeployment of 26th Marines in March 1970 and shows percentage of hamlets in Category C and below in Quang Nam Province employing CUPPs. Category of hamlets are determined by the GVN Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Category A and B are secure with various degrees of political development. In Category C hamlets military control of the VC has been broken and most VC party apparatus is identified and its effectiveness is curtailed. Sniping and mining still occurs on routes to the hamlet. Without redeployment CUPP would have continued to expand. At present 18 of the 22 hamlets covered by CUPPs are in Category C or below. There are 306 Category C or below hamlets in Quang Nam Province.

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30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND % OF CATEGORY C OR BELOW HAMLETS COVERED BY CUPPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



1969	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 CUPP ESTABLISHED											3	5	8
% OF COVERAGE											1.0	1.6	2.6

1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1970 CUPP ESTABLISHED	11	3											14
% OF COVERAGE	3.6	1.0											4.6

TAL CUPPS ESTABLISHED

22

100 - PERCENTAGE OF COVERAGE OF TOTAL HAMLETS IN HBS CATEGORY C OR BELOW IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE

7.2

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUPP CASUALTIES

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Friendly KIA's and WIA (E)'s in CUPP units are reflected here to indicate total losses. The increasing trend in number of losses among CUPP personnel during the March 1970 thru June 1970 period was attributed to the targeting of CUPP units by the VC, attesting to the stabilizing effect the CUPP has on the population. The sharp decrease in CUPP casualties since June 1970 reflects the VC's apparent abandonment of his priority effort to reduce the effectiveness of the CUPP. At present there are a total of 308 Marines/Navy personnel assigned to all CUPP units.

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30 SEPT 1970

g-3-4c

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUPP CASUALTIES CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969												3	3
CUPP KIA												13	13
CUPP WIA												15	15
TOTAL CAS													40
1970													
CUPP KIA	3	5	3	8	7	8	2	3	1				
PP WIA	35	25	5	15	19	31	16	14	10				170
TOTAL CAS	38	30	8	23	26	39	18	17	11				209

9-3-42

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) LOSSES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

BY CUPP UNITS CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart reflects enemy losses as a result of CUPP action. It should be noted that 10.2% of the infantry squads in the Division are employed as CUPP units.

CUPP units are credited with 4% of the Division kills, while sustaining 11% of all Division killed in action.

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE LOSSES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY BY CLIFF
UNITS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 EN KIA												20	20
EN KIA CHAN												20	20
TOTAL												40	40
1970 EN KIA	25	23	27	20	34	23	11	12	10				192
EN KIA CHAN	23	35	28	2	6	3	10	4	1				121
TOTAL	48	58	55	22	40	26	20	16	20				315

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SUPPORTING ARMS

The employment of supporting arms has declined in volume during calendar year 1970, due mainly to the reduction in number of weapons available. The number of aircraft and artillery pieces available has gradually fallen due to redeployment and is expected to continue to decline. Additionally, the Navy has been required to cut back sharply on the number of ships available for naval gunfire support and there is no indication of change in the future. However, although the use of supporting arms has shown a marked decrease, air and artillery continue to be employed to excellent effect, and can claim a portion of the credit for the increased ratio of enemy casualties to friendly casualties.

30 SEP 1970

9-3-5

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart reports artillery ammunition expenditures by month since January 1969.

The expenditures each month are influenced to a large degree by the tempo of combat operations in Quang Nam Province. For example, during the enemy summer campaign of 1969, expenditures increased approximately 20 percent from the previous three month period. In March 1970, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, with 30 artillery pieces, was deployed out of country. In August and September 1970, with the reduction of overall 1st Marine Division assets, artillery support within the Division has been reduced by one-third. Consequently, ammunition expenditures have decreased accordingly.

30 SEP 1970

g-3-5a

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
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**1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED,
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969	178260	189793	58260	181697	156901	184136	187127	86449	32446	89383	69609	63872	1017086
1970	179062	156010	139640	140880	144986	130392	114288	27746	100809				1283882

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ARTILLERY PIECES AVAILABLE

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

As one easily sees from the graph, the number of pieces would generally remain constant except for a quantum increase or decrease when units joined the division or redeployed.

30 SEP 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISON (REIN) NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES AVAILABLE,
CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969												
HEAVY	10	10	12	18	18	18	18	18	18	24	24	24
MEDIUM	50	48	42	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36
LIGHT	113	101	102	90	90	90	90	90	90	96	96	96
TOTAL	173	159	156	144	144	144	144	144	144	156	156	156
1970												
HEAVY	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	12	6			
MEDIUM	36	36	30	30	26	26	26	26	20			
LIGHT	96	96	72	72	72	72	72	72	48			
TOTAL	156	156	126	126	122	122	122	110	74			

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) TOTAL ROUNDS NAVAL GUNFIRE

EXPENDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart shows the total number of rounds of Naval Gunfire expended each month in support of the Division. The number of rounds expended varied with a number of factors, such as the size of the guns available, the number and type of targets available, and the tactical situation, but the overwhelming factor has been the number of ship-days of support that were available during a given month. This factor has been declining steadily during 1970 and can be expected to continue in the future.

30 SEP 1970

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
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**1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE ROUNDS NAVAL GUNFIRE EXPENDED,
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) SHIP-DAYS ON STATION

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

As one can readily discern from the graph, the decrease in the amount of naval gunfire rounds expended is highly correlated with the number of ship-days of NGF support on stations. Through September 1970, the Navy had provided 193 ship-days of support, compared to 295 during the same period in 1969. The amount of NGF support available should continue to decline in the future.

30 SEPT 1970

G-3-5d


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE NGF SHIP-DAYS ON STATION,
CALENDAR 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FIXED WING FIGHTERATTACK SORTIES YEARS 1969/1970

Record data for the first five months of 1969 was not available at 1st MAW G-3 reports section. The significant decrease of fighter/attack sorties in 1969 coincides with the phase out and withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division, VMFA-334 (F-4B) and VMA (AW)-533 (A-6). The February 1970 drop in sorties represents the departure of MAG-12. Fixed wing sortie rate reductions commenced on 17 August 1970, however, the effect is not significant on this graph.

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30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION(REIN) CUMULATIVE FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES,
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969						3071	2468	2701	1619	882	761	700	12199
1970	1058	775	992	992	994	812	723	866	497				7410

* FIGURES UNAVAILABLE BEFORE JUNE 1969. DASHED LINE BASED ON MONTHLY AVERAGE OF LAST 7 MONTHS OF 1969.

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HELICOPTER SUPPORT

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing continues to provide excellent support for the 1st Marine Division. Although total flight time and total cargo tonnage carried declined in June through September of 1970, compared to those same months in 1969, the number of passengers carried in the comparable four month period has increased by an average of over 7,000 per month. Recent 1st MAW policy concerning flight time is expected to reduce usage factors considerably. However, this reduction may be indistinguishable from reduction effects of redeployment and monsoon weather.

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30 SEPT 1970

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) HELICOPTER FLIGHT

TIME, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Record data for the first five months of 1969 was not available at 1st MAW G-3 reports section. The significant decrease of helicopter flight hours in the latter part of 1969 coincides with the phase out and withdrawal of 3d Marine Division, MAG-36 and Provisional MAG-39. Monsoon weather effects are noteworthy from October 1969 through February 1970. The continuing drop in September 1970, of over twelve hundred hours, coincides with the August 1970 1st MAW policy of limiting flight hours to reduce and realign helicopter utilization in consonance with CNO guidelines.

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30 SEPT 1970

G-3-6a

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
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**1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME, CALENDAR
YEARS 1969/1970**

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969						11553	9721	9089	7849	6489	5819	5824	66516 *
1970	6883	5903	6446	7112	8227	8520	8067	7081	5824				64603

* FIGURES UNAVAILABLE BEFORE JUNE 1969. DASHED LINE BASED ON MONTHLY AVERAGE OF LAST 7 MONTHS OF 1969.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) HELICOPTER PASSENGER TOTALS

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Record data for the first five months of 1969 was not available at 1st MAW G-3 reports section. Data analysis offers no apparent reason for the sharp rise in passengers carried in July 1969. The departure of HMM-161 and recent 1st MAW policy may be reasons for the drop of more than 20,000 passengers recorded from July to September 1970. The peak months of May through July 1970 correspond with the division's efforts and the record flight time established by MAG-16.

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30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE HELICOPTER PASSENGER TOTALS,
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



* FIGURES UNAVAILABLE BEFORE JUNE 1969. DASHED LINE BASED ON MONTHLY AVERAGE OF LAST 7 MONTHS OF 1969.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) HELICOPTER CARGO TOTALS

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Record data for the first five months of 1969 was not available at 1st MAW G-3 reports section. The significant decrease of cargo carried in 1969 coincides with the phase out and withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division, MAG-36 and Provisional MAG-39.

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30 SEPT 1970

g-3-6c
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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE HELICOPTER CARGO TOTALS, CALENDAR
YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969						9836	10471	8621	5629	4813	3280	3207	48867
1970	3963	3485	3962	4164	5937	8138	4000	3804	3867				38520

* FIGURES UNAVAILABLE BEFORE JUNE 1969. DASHED LINE BASED ON MONTHLY AVERAGE OF LAST 7 MONTHS OF 1969.

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G-4 OVERVIEW

The first six charts reflect the current operational readiness status of combat essential equipment for the 1st Marine Division. These charts show that all but five of the twenty-eight reporting units are C-1. These remaining five are C-2 due principally to a small number of end items which are either deficient or are continual maintenance problem items.

Overall readiness of combat essential equipment has been in an up-trend during 1970 and now has reached 92%. Operational readiness by commodity groups of equipment has repeatedly improved during 1970 and all except engineer exceed the Marine Corps standard. Engineer equipment readiness is now 73% compared to the Marine Corps standard of 83%.

Embarkation of material leaving country under Keystone Robin Alpha is proceeding on schedule with 10,553 S/T and 170,460 sq. ft. embarked through Embarkation Unit XI against an estimated total of 14,261 S/T and 230,351 sq. ft.

Efforts under the DOD program for the interservice transfer of equipment of RVNAF have resulted in 1878 items accepted of 2011 offered - a 93.4% acceptance rate.

30 SEPT 1970

g-4

1ST MARINE DIVISION UNIT FORSTAT RATING AS OF 30 SEP 70

This chart reflects the consistently high degree of operational readiness existing in the 1st Marine Division. The circumstances degrading the readiness of five units to C-2 are as follows:

a. The Headquarters Companies of the Infantry Regiments are affected by a high deadline rate for the AN/TRC-27B Radio.

b. Headquarters Battery, 11th Marines is experiencing a high deadline rate for PU-668 and PU-669 generators and is T/E deficient PU-670 generators.

c. 1st Engineer Battalion is adversely affected by a high deadline rate for RFK-60 Forklifts, M51A2 Dump Trucks, M274A2 Mules, and the low density CEE base and high usage Engineer Equipment factor; and a deficiency of 72 items of T/E equipment.

d. 1st Medical Battalion is degraded by a T/E deficiency of PU-710 and PU-712 generators.

30 SEPT 1970

G-4-1

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) UNIT FORSTAT RATINGS

AS OF 30 SEP 1970

UNIT	EQUIP / SUPPLIES ON HAND		EQUIP READINESS	
	C-1	C-2	C-1	C-2
1ST MAR DIV	X		X	
HQ BN	X		X	
1ST MAR	X		X	
HQ CO	X			X
1/1	X		X	
2/1	X		X	
3/1	X		X	
5TH MAR	X		X	
HQ CO	X			X
1/5	X		X	
2/5	X		X	
3/5	X		X	
7TH MAR	X		X	
2/7	X		X	
3/7	X		X	
11TH MAR	X		X	
HQ BTRY	X			X
1/11	X		X	
2/11	X		X	
3/11	X		X	
4/11	X		X	
1ST 175 GUNS	X		X	
3RD 8 IN HOW	X		X	
1ST RECON BN	X		X	
1ST ENGR BN	X			X
1ST MED BN		X		X
1ST MT BN	X		X	
11TH MT BN	X		X	

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EQUIPMENT READINESS

The equipment of the Division remains in a high, yet improving state of readiness. The only category of combat essential equipment presenting problems of great magnitude is engineer equipment such as generators, of which the Division has only 69% of its T/E allowance, heavy tractors, TD-15 and TD-18, and 6000 pound forklifts, which present grave maintenance problems.

30 SEPT 1970

g-4-2

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970

This Chart reflects the continuing uptrend in operational readiness of combat essential equipment during 1970. All CMC objectives have been attained and/or exceeded. Especially noteworthy is the percentage of equipment in an operationally ready status, exceeding 92% compared to the CMC objective of 85%.

30 SEPT 1970


g-4-2a

**1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) READINESS STATUS OF COMBAT ESSENTIAL
EQUIPMENT, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969% OR											84	85
% NORM											3	6
% NORS											4	3
% IN/T											2	3
% DEFIC											7	4
1970% OR	86	87	90	91	89	90	92	94	92			
NORM	4	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	2			
NORS	4	4	2	2	3	4	3	3	4			
IN/T	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	2	1			
DEFIC	3	3	1	2	2	1	0	0	1			

G-4-2a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

(COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart reflects the continuing excellent overall status for communications-electronics equipment. The only significant problem item in this group is Radio Set AN/TRC 27B. Of 52 on hand only 2 are operationally ready. The remainder are deadlined, principally due to a deficiency of Generator PU-278.

30 SEPT 1970

G-4-26


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969

1970

AS OF 30SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969 % OR											76	99
% NORM											4	4
% NOBS											1	4
% IN/T											2	3
% DEFIC											19	3
1970 % OR	90	90	92	93	92	93	94	95	96			
% NORM	4	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	1			
% NOBS	3	3	2	2	3	4	4	4	4			
% IN/T	2	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	0			
% DEFIC	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0			

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

(MOTOR TRANSPORT) CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The operationally ready status of Motor Transport equipment continues to improve and to exceed the CMC standard of 85%. Motor Transport problem items include:

- a. Tractor, 10 Ton, M123A1C: Of 8 tractors on hand only 3 (37%) are operationally ready.
- b. Truck, Platform M274A2: Of 212 on hand only 167 (79%) are operationally ready.

The high deadline rate of M123A1C and M274 trucks is due principally to an excessive failure rate of clutches and power steering units. Many of these items have been retrograded to Okinawa for repair with the attendant long time to repair. Operational readiness float assets have been insufficient to meet the demand in the case of the M274A2. The M123A1C is not an operational readiness float item

30 SEPT 1970

C-4-2c


DECLASSIFIED

1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT)

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

—1969 —1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% OR											86	88
% NORM											8	8
% NORS											3	4
% IN/T											2	2
% DEFIC											4	3
% OR	85	88	93	92	90	90	91	88	84			
NORM	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2			
% NORS	4	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	3			
% IN/T	4	4	2	2	4	3	3	2	1			
% DEFIC	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			

G-4-2c

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

(ORDNANCE), CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970

The operational readiness of ordnance equipment continues to be excellent. There are no problem items.

30 SEPT 1970

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
1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ORDNANCE)

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969 %OR											92	92
% NORM											2	3
% NORS											2	2
% IN/T											1	2
% DEFIC											3	1
1970 %OR	91	92	95	97	96	95	95	95	95			
% NORM	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1			
% NORS	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2			
% IN/T	3	4	2	1	2	2	2	2	2			
% DEFIC	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0			

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1ST AVIATION DIVISION (ENGINEER) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ENGINEER)CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Although not attaining the CMC standard of 83%, the combat readiness of engineer equipment has improved and now stands at 73%. The following factors have contributed to the erratic behavior in the upward trend in operational readiness of the Division's engineer equipment.

1st Engineer Battalion had been scheduled to redeploy on 8 September 1970, so CG, MACV had requested that CMC publish instructions to cancel supply and shipping instructions for all active documents of 1st Engineer Battalion effective 20 August 1970. On 19 August 1970, because of changes in the redeployment schedule, CG, MACV requested that CMC disregard the previous communication. Follow-up action was taken to preclude the loss of lead time. However, confirmed cancellations have had to be requisitioned.

Recent T/E allowance changes for 600/700 series generators and the non-availability of assets to fill the T/E deficiencies caused by these changes have contributed materially to the low operational readiness of the Division's engineer equipment. Of 298 generators authorized, only 63% (188) are on hand. Deadlines decrease the overall operational readiness of these generators to 43% (144).

Additionally, as the result of redeployments, the total quantity of Engineer equipment has been reduced from 1092 to 647, a reduction of 41% in the mathematical base for computations. This reduction contributed to the erratic operational readiness percentages shown.

30 SEPT 1970

C-4-2e


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL ELEMENT (ENGINEER)
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30SEP1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969 %OR											58	60
% NORM											8	10
% NORS											7	7
% IN/T											4	10
% DEFIC											23	13
1970 %OR	63	66	68	66	59	63	74	83	98			
% NORM	6	3	6	7	6	7	6	5	5			
NORS	5	7	4	5	7	6	5	4	7			
% IN/T	7	5	5	6	8	6	6	6	4			
% DEFIC	19	19	17	16	20	18	9	2	11			

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INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIEL TO RVNAF

This chart reflects the current status of the turnover of major end items to the RVNAF. This is a Department of Defense Initiated program. The Chart portrays the high acceptance rate of equipment offered by division units. This high rate is directly attributed to the efforts of invoicing units to repair on the spot equipment initially questioned as to serviceability by RVNAF inspectors.

30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIAL TO RVNAF

— OFFERED

— ACCEPTED

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



DATE	TOTAL ITEMS		CUMULATIVE		
	OFFERED	ACCEPTED	OFFERED	ACCEPTED	% ACCEPTED
17 AUG	686	670	686	670	97.6
26 AUG	494	489	1180	1159	98.2
27 AUG	23	21	1203	1180	98.1
10 SEP	4	4	1207	1184	98.1
14 SEP	492	409	1699	1593	93.9
15 SEP	9	9	1708	1602	93.9
25 SEP	268	244	1976	1846	93.4
26 SEP	35	32	2011	1878	93.4

6-4-3

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CURRENT AND PROJECTED EMBARKATION PROGRESS-INCREMENT IVA

Embarkation of Increment IVA (Keystone Robin Alpha) is proceeding on schedule. No significant problems have been encountered. Embarkation Units II through V consisted of FLC and 1st MAW materiel. No 1st Marine Division assets were embarked. Embarkation Unit VII consisted principally of 7th and 9th Engineer Battalion Materiel. Embarkation Unit XIV consists principally of 7th Marines materiel. Through 30 September 1970, 10,337 short tons and 156,045 square feet of cargo had been loaded, representing 73% and 72% of the total amounts estimated for Increment IVA.

30 SEP 1970


g-4-4

1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CURRENT AND PROJECTED EMBARKATION PROGRESSINCREMENT IV A

— COMPLETED SHORT TONNAGE
 ---- PLANNED

— COMPLETED SQUARE FEET
 ---- PLANNED

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



TOTAL EST. INC. IV A REQUIREMENTS :

14261 SHORT TONS
 230351 SQUARE FT

TOTAL EMBARKED-

:

10337 SHORT TONS
 156045 SQUARE FT

9-4-4

G-5 OVERVIEW

This section presents a broad analysis of G-5 activities in 1970 as compared to those of 1969 in the areas of Civic Action, percent of Vietnamese participation in Civic Action projects, and the MedCap/DentCap program.

In mid-1969 G-5 Civic Action began to shift emphasis from long-term projects to short-term, high impact projects that contribute to the strengthening and extension of GVN authority, and participation of the Vietnamese in self-help projects.

Civic Action projects are now coordinated through GVN channels from the hamlet/village level and up through province headquarters. In some cases a project is funded through the village self-development program established by the GVN, and only coordination and technical assistance is required by military personnel, however in many cases a village may not have funds available and military assistance is requested. In regards to the latter, the total cost of Civic Action expenditures per month becomes a significant statistic in that the Division resources to support these projects are primarily salvageable items, items not required to support military operations, and 150,000 VN\$ per month from the AIK Fund.

Maximum Vietnamese participation in all projects is encouraged in hopes that the people will develop trust and confidence in their officials, achieve a sense of pride and ownership in their accomplishments, and cause them to protect these projects from destruction and deterioration.

MedCaps and DentCaps continue to be a significant and beneficial activity. The uncertainty of availability of project Handclasp medical supplies has forced our medical personnel to rely on organic expendable supplies to maintain a satisfactory program.

30 SEP 1970

25

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COST OF CIVIC ACTION

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Civic Action projects are supported by the issue of non-combat essential supplies from military resources, the expenditure of funds from the US/FWMAF Civic Action (AIK) Fund, and voluntary contributions. The US/FWMAF Civic Action (AIK) Fund is a revolving imprest fund account which provided 500,000 VN\$ per month during Calendar Year 1969, but during CY 1970 provides only 150,000 VN\$ per month. Since the cost of such projects is averaging in excess of 200,000 VN\$ more per month in 1970 than in 1969, and the AIK Fund is providing 350,000 VN\$ per month less, the 550,000+ deficit is being taken care of through the other two sources. The ultimate objective of the CA program is to transform Marine CA into Vietnamese CA with the minimum of cost and involvement of U. S. Forces.

30 SEP 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE COST OF CIVIC ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS
1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969	1.37	.81	.44	.15	.57	1.82	.71	.18	.99	1.71	1.55	1.54
1970	1.37	.68	.97	1.32	.60	1.45	2.23	1.65	1.41			

9-5-1

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), PERCENT OF VIETNAMESE
PARTICIPATION (LABOR) IN 1ST MARDIV CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The chart shows the percent of Vietnamese labor involved in all 1st Marine Division Civic Action projects. There is no goal or norm as such. Maximum Vietnamese participation is desired with Marines providing technical assistance as required. The trend is towards increasing involvement of Vietnamese. For example, in August, Vietnamese provided 95% of the labor for 1st Marine Division Civic Action projects, while in September they provided 93% of the labor.

30 SEP 1970


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENT OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION (LABOR) IN
1st MAR DIV CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969	2874	1709	3478	1037	4320	3278	2367	1764	2079	2505	2523	2369
1970	2736	2961	3074	2726	2245	2466	2181	2481	2866			

TOTAL MAN DAYS UTILIZED FOR PROJECTS

9-5-2

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) VIETNAMESE TREATED BYMEDCAP/DENTCAP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

As shown by the chart opposite, the number of Vietnamese people treated by the Medical and Dental Civic Action Programs during the first eight months of 1970 is larger than during a similar period in 1969. There is no numerical goal as such, the single objective being to treat as many people as possible, consistent with operational commitments. The average number of people being treated per month in 1970 is 11,030 compared to 10,812 per month in 1969, and this increase may, in part be attributed to a lessening tempo of operations, freeing medical personnel to conduct a vigorous program. Since the great majority of Vietnamese treated by MedCaps/DentCaps reside in AO's of the infantry regiments, the standdown and redeployment of some units has resulted in a reduction of the numbers of Vietnamese treated by MedCaps/DentCaps. This reduction will be compensated for in part by the Vietnamese Public Health teams, ARVN Political Warfare teams, and Regional Forces medics assuming responsibility for those areas vacated by redeploying units.

30 SEP 1970

9-5-3


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1st MARINE DIVISION(REIN) CUMULATIVE VIETNAMESE TREATED BY MEDCAPS/DENTCAPS,
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969	8486	7686	7794	11028	10325	10184	12156	6810	14706	14807	11820	13949
1970	14005	12020	11703	9910	8756	10891	11749	11612	9691			99337

9-5-3

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DIVISION INSPECTOR OVERVIEW

This section presents a compilation of data over which the Division Inspector has primary cognizance. Among the categories of data included in this section are the misplacement of friendly fires, accidental discharges, motor vehicle accidents, racial (or quasi-racial) incidents, assault with explosive devices (fraggings), and information on drug abuse. In some of these areas, notably supporting arms friendly fire incidents and fragging incidents, encouraging declines in frequency of incidents and the deaths and injuries attendant thereto, have been brought about by vigorous safety and investigatory programs. In addition, unit leadership councils and thorough emphasis on human rights have caused racial incidents to almost disappear in July, August, and September, only two incidents occurring during the three month span. In one category, motor vehicle accidents, Marine casualties have decreased while Vietnamese casualties have soared, due mainly to the phenomenal increase of civilian vehicles (mostly motorcycles and mini-busses) on the road, and the Vietnamese driver's lackadaisical attitude toward traffic regulations. To counteract this nonchalant attitude, Marine drivers are being held to strict compliance with traffic rules and conscientious exercise of the principles of defensive driving. In all of the categories of data included in this section, conscientious efforts are being made to reduce not only the frequency of such incidents, which should decline anyway due to reductions in Division strength, but also in the rate per Division strength.

30 SEPT 1970

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MISUSE OF WEAPONS

Included in this subsection are statistics on supporting arms friendly fire incidents, individual weapons friendly fire incidents, and accidental discharges. Overall, 246 incidents of this nature have occurred during the first eight months of 1970 compared to 360 during the same period of 1969, a decrease of 31.77%. Injuries due to such incidents have decreased at a less rapid rate, only 23.0%, whereas deaths have fallen more rapidly, at a rate of 56.0%. During the comparable eight-month periods, deaths have fallen from 91 to 40, and injuries from 421 to 324. The number of incidents occurring should decrease during the remainder of the year 1970, and consequently, deaths and injuries caused by the incidents should also decline.

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30 SEP 1970

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTSCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Friendly fire incidents involving supporting arms (air, artillery and crew-served weapons) showed a marked decline, averaging just over 5 such incidents a month compared to over 13 per month in 1969. This may be due to elaborate safety precautions in the clearance of fires and to a re-emphasis on ground safety. The relative lack of enemy activity has allowed the time for the users of supporting arms to be doubly cautious in the employment of such weapons, a luxury not often available in a rapidly moving situation.

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30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE SUPPORTING ARMS FRIENDLY FIRE
INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 INCID	18	21	11	11	8	9	12	20	16	12	10	8	158
KILLED	12	14	4	4	4	1	3	8	1	0	4	2	
WOUNDED	29	32	17	15	6	12	15	50	35	23	21	10	
1970 INCID	7	8	7	4	5	1	6	5	7				50
KILLED	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	4	0				7
WOUNDED	26	17	41	9	3	0	13	29	10				148

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Contrary to the case of supporting arms friendly fire incidents, individual weapons incidents remain rather high, averaging slightly less than ten per month in 1970 compared to 10.1 monthly in 1969, although the division strength is lower on the average. This may be due to a certain anxiety on the part of the troops engendered by the uncertain situation during redeployment and the relative lack of enemy activity. Vigorous ground safety and "accident awareness" programs are continually being conducted within the division, and such programs, coupled with a re-emphasis on the fundamentals of discipline, leadership and responsibility should ameliorate the situation.

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15 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS FRIENDLY
FIRE INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30SEP1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 INCID	7	13	12	5	11	5	5	4	16	11	20	12	121
KILLED	1	5	1	0	3	1	2	1	5	1	4	1	25
WOUNDED	3	7	12	5	2	6	4	0	12	8	7	6	72
1970 INCID	7	8	10	7	13	14	6	15	6				96
KILLED	0	1	2	3	0	4	1	6	2				19
WOUNDED	9	5	17	6	8	19	2	16	2				84

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGESCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Accidental discharges continue to be a problem within the division, but the trend is toward fewer such incidents, with an attendant reduction in the number of Marines killed and injured. In part, this reduction is due to a smaller division population, but may also be due to vigorous programs of instruction on small arms safety being conducted by units of the division. Another factor may be that the level of maturity within the division is increasing as its strength drops.

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INSP-1-10

30 SEPT 1970

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
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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES, CALENDAR
YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 INCID	17	19	17	16	20	15	17	18	27	17	20	17	
KILLED	1	5	4	1	2	0	3	2	3	1	4	3	
WOUNDED	18	21	17	15	18	15	14	16	25	16	15	15	
1970 INCID	16	13	10	16	9	16	11	11	8				110
KILLED	1	2	0	3	0	1	0	3	4				14
WOUNDED	13	10	11	13	7	14	11	17	8				92

1-10

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTSCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The year 1970 shows a trend toward fewer motor vehicle accidents, the initial nine months of the year showing a monthly average of 13.7 accidents, as opposed to an average of 19.7 in 1969. Many fewer Marines have been killed in this nine month period than the corresponding period in 1969, but injuries are continuing at approximately the same rate, mainly due to January and August, 1970, wherein 30 and 24 injuries were recorded. The 24 in August include 15 Marines injured in a single accident. The rate at which Vietnamese are being killed and injured exceeds that of 1969, a fact which is, in large measure, due to the fantastic growth of light vehicular traffic on the roads and the almost non-existent Vietnamese traffic control. However, division Marines are being constantly schooled in strict obedience to traffic regulations and in the art of defensive driving.

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30 SEPT 1970

INSP-1-2


CONFIDENTIAL

1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS,
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 ACCIDENTS	14	14	14	15	20	22	21	31	26	18	20	21	236
USMC KILLED	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	0	0	0	12
USMC INJURED	3	2	4	8	10	7	12	31	14	7	10	12	120
VN KILLED	4	5	2	1	4	1	2	2	11	4	0	9	45
VN INJURED	16	9	16	9	6	9	5	4	12	12	15	13	126
1970 ACCIDENTS	16	16	20	11	10	15	11	18	6				123
USMC KILLED	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0				3
USMC INJURED	30	9	8	1	3	2	6	24	2				65
VN KILLED	9	2	6	6	6	3	4	1	2				39
VN INJURED	5	11	10	4	6	13	16	14	2				91

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) RACIAL INCIDENTSCALENDAR YEAR 1970

Incidents thought to be racial in nature have fluctuated in frequency throughout the year 1970. There have occurred 32 such incidents during the year with almost a third of them, ten, taking place in January. August recorded not a single incident of this nature, and but one occurred in each of May and July and September. However, the occurrence of seven incidents in June precludes the establishment of a trend toward a stable climate, and incidents of such a volatile nature could erupt at seemingly slight provocation.

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30 SEP 1970


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1st MARINE DIVISION(REIN) RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



CONFIDENTIAL

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FRAGGING INCIDENTSCALENDAR YEAR 1970

Felonious "fragging" or assault with an explosive device, has occurred at a relatively steady rate of slightly more than three per month. The greatest frequency was in September and February, when five incidents each were recorded, the smallest frequency in July, with one fragging. Fortunately, no Marines have been killed in these attacks, but 37 have been injured. During the first four months of 1970, only two of the fourteen incidents recorded were solved, but a program of speedy and thorough investigation and swift disciplinary action has considerably improved that record, which shows that from the beginning of May through the end of August, six of the eleven incidents have been solved and two are still under investigation. Such thorough law enforcement may, in the future, tend to discourage potential assailants.

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30 SEPT 1970

INSP-1-4


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FRAGGING INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
INCIDENTS	3	5	8	12	15	17	21	22	25				30
KILLED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				0
WOUNDED	4	9	14	18	22	24	25	26	28				37

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIALACTIONS RELATING TO DRUG ABUSE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Depicted opposite is a graph representing the cumulative number of actions taken in relation to drug abuse within the 1st Marine Division during calendar years 1969 and 1970. Apparent from the graph is the sharp increase in such actions during the first eight months of 1970. Reference to the tabulated frequencies will reveal that, whereas non-judicial punishments have increased only slightly and courts-martial by only 27% (130 through August 1970 against 102 through August 1970), investigations of drug abuse have more than doubled (319 versus 127) and administrative discharges engendered by drug abuse have multiplied nineteen fold (170 versus 9). However, actions after the fact are not the only measures being taken. Lectures on the ill effects of drug abuse are being regularly presented to the men of the division. Since the beginning of 1970, over 16,000 Marines have been presented the lectures.

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30 SEPT 1970

INSP-1-5


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTIONS CONCERNING
DRUG ABUSE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 N.M.	2	7	4	2	8	3	1	1	0	3	8	4	43
INVS	20	8	4	17	16	35	12	9	9	25	26	26	204
COURTS	14	8	11	12	9	17	15	11	8	13	12	21	157
ADM DIS	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	0	1	1	2	15
TOTAL	36	21	19	32	24	57	30	23	14	44	27	53	317
1970 N.M.	2	7	3	3	1	6	4	6	11				42
YES	31	28	33	38	44	32	29	43	42				310
COURTS	21	13	12	18	12	18	11	7	18				130
ADM DIS	10	4	20	16	23	23	20	18	20				170
TOTAL	62	45	65	72	67	73	60	69	80				452

105 P-1-5

MEDICAL OVERVIEW

The next two charts present malaria and venereal disease incidence information in 1st Marine Division (Rein) during periods 1 January through 31 December 1969 and 1 January through 31 August 1970. During September 1969, 679 cases of malaria occurred in 1st Marine Division (Rein) of which 551 cases were acquired by 7th Marines. As a result of command awareness of this number one health problem and the enforcement of malaria protective measures, it is seen that during September 1970 total cases did not exceed 55% of the September 1969 totals. No significant differences in venereal disease case rates per thousand personnel have occurred between 1969 and 1970. As a reduction in troop strength occurs, however, it is projected that total cases will decline proportionately.

30 SEP 1970

MED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE MALARIA INCIDENTSCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Human malaria is the most significant Public Health problem in the 1st Marine Division.

It is caused by a protozoan and is transmitted to man by the bite of the Anopheline mosquito. Two forms of disease are present in I Military Region. They are vivax and falciparum malaria. Falciparum malaria is far more serious than vivax in that brain, lung or kidney conditions may result. Fatality rates may reach as high as 10% in untreated cases; no higher than 0.5% in untreated cases. Relapses may occur in a small percentage of cases. Average lost time for malaria is 21 days. Repeat infections are infrequent; less than 1%. The most essential malaria preventive measures are: prevention of bites (repellent, clothing, bed nets), chemoprophylaxis (C-P tablets), and killing the mosquito thru spraying. Chemoprophylaxis is almost 100% effective against vivax malaria and is ineffective against falciparum malaria. In I Corps falciparum malaria represents more than 80% of total cases. It is seen as a result of current command awareness of the hyperendemic malarious area and enforcement of malaria protective measures in 7th Marines AOR, that total cases of malaria during September 1970 did not exceed 55% of the September 1969 totals. 81% of total September 1969 cases occurred in the 7th Marines during their operations in the Que Son Mountains.

30 SEP 1970

MED-1


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE MALARIA INCIDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS
1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1969	9.7	4.7	6.3	3.6	3.4	6.1	5.7	9.6	24.6	12.7	13.4	5.1
1970	2.8	2.8	6.7	9.9	7.2	4.9	4.2	8.6	28.6			

RATES/1000/MONTH

MEAD-1

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) VENEREAL DISEASE CUMULATIVE

INCIDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Cumulative totals in venereal disease cases 1 January - 30 September 1969 and 1 January - 30 September 1970 approximate each other very closely. This situation is expected to change with the remainder of the 1970 totals declining as more units are redeployed and total strength is decreased.

30 SEP 1970

MED-2


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) VENEREAL DISEASE CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS
1969/1970

— 1969

— 1970

AS OF 30 SEP. 1970



RATES/1000/MONTH

MED. 2

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