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COMMAND INFORMATION NOTEBOOK

1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

15 NOVEMBER 1970

BRIGGEN E. H. SIMMONS

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

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INTRODUCTION

The first ten months of 1970 can best be characterized as a period of sweeping reductions -- reductions in men and equipment, in support available, in enemy activity and combat losses to both sides. Phase III and IV redeployments have reduced Division strength from a peak of more than 31,000 in November 1969 to less than 12,500 at the end of October 1970, the lowest strength figure since the Division arrived in the Republic of Vietnam in 1966. Estimated enemy strength has declined by about 3,000, from 12,400 at the beginning of 1970 to less than 9,500 on 31 October 1970. The enemy's decrease in strength and the grievous losses he has suffered in conventional warfare have forced him to revert to guerrilla tactics, consisting mainly of clandestine or terrorist activities. This is evidenced by the drastic reduction in enemy sightings (down from over 4,400 in January 1970 to less than 900 in October) and attacks by fire on Division positions (rounds expended in such attacks declining from over 600 in the single month of January 1970 to a total of less than 600 in the four month period July through October 1970). Many of the other indicators of activity which have experienced declines, such as friendly casualties and fire support expenditures, are due in part to the reductions in strength and force structure, but also are in large part a function of the sharp drop in enemy manifestations.

Although the indices of the level of combat have fallen, the Division continues to maintain its excellent record of performance and, in most cases, to improve upon it. Friendly casualties have declined from about 950 killed and 8,500 wounded during the first ten months of 1969 to 370 killed and approximately 3,400 wounded during the same period in 1970, a decrease of some 60%. Enemy losses over the same span of time have declined much more slowly, his troops suffering over 4,900 killed in action and losing 1,133 individual and 90 crew served weapons through October 1970 compared to figures in excess of 7,500, 1,900 and 210 through October 1969, reductions of approximately 34%, 40% and 57%, respectively. The 57% reduction in crew served weapons lost may be an indication that the enemy is becoming increasingly wary of risking his precious machine guns, rockets and mortars to the bleak future associated with engagements of USMC units, or it may simply show he is critically short of such weapons. As total friendly casualties have fallen, the percentage caused by enemy mines and booby traps has increased significantly. Just over 20% of 1969 casualties were caused by surprise firing devices, whereas the average thus far in 1970 is approximately 45%. However, the ratio of such devices discovered and harmlessly destroyed by Division personnel to those detonated with casualties has experienced a relatively steady rise since March 1970, increasing from 1.45:1 in that month to 2.82:1 in October 1970. This increase attests inter alia to the value of the vigorous program of instruction in mine warfare conducted by 1st Engineer Battalion. Further indications of the excellent performance of the Division include the continued Combat Readiness status of C-1

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and the high percentage of equipment maintained operationally ready by Division units, in most cases exceeding Marine Corps objectives by comfortable margins.

In the more recent past, the Division continued to carry the battle to the enemy. Operation Imperial Lake, begun with a massive artillery preparation of more than 13,000 rounds at the end of August 1970, continues in the Que Son Mountains, a traditional enemy haven jutting menacingly into the southern Division AO. The heavy use of company and platoon patrol bases, the employment of numerous reconnaissance teams and quick reaction units, and the rapid displacement of supporting arms to more advantageous positions have materially increased the Division's capability to exploit enemy sightings and discoveries of his base camps and caches of weapons, ammunition and foodstuffs. October witnessed the completion of Phase IV redeployments, with 7th Marines, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines and several other supporting units returning to the United States. Phase IV, begun in July 1970, effectively reduced Division strength by some 8,500 personnel and decreased the number of available maneuver battalions from nine to six and artillery firing batteries from nineteen to eleven. Such reductions required the extensive realignment of AOs, 1st Marines extending their boundary to include a major portion of the AO previously occupied by the 5th Marines with two battalions who, in turn, took responsibility for the former 7th Marines AO. Additionally, An Hoa Combat Base was vacated by Division units, a major portion of the base dismantled and levelled and the remainder turned over to ARVN forces. The latter part of September saw the advent of the rainy season, with over thirty inches of rain falling in the Division AO from 24 September to 31 October 1970, which caused extensive flooding of the lowlands in the latter part of October. In addition, Typhoon Kate passed directly over the Danang area, her winds in excess of 60 knots causing extensive property damage, but mercifully few casualties.

The remainder of 1970 should see a continuation of the relatively low level of enemy activity experienced during the last few months. The final stages of the rainy season will hamper his mobility somewhat, while continued pressure exerted by Division units should keep him lying low. The combat effectiveness of the Division, meanwhile, should keep improving, if the trends identified in the following pages remain as steady as they have in recent months.

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G-1 OVERVIEW

Personnel management has kept pace with the force structure reductions of the past year, as evidenced by the Command being continuously in Combat Readiness Category C-1. In other administrative areas involving such subjects as morale, discipline, and personnel services, appropriate norms of effectiveness have been rather well maintained. Abstracts of these norms, as well as over and under achievements, are presented below:

a. The Division strength, during the past two years, rose from a January 1969 level of 24,000 to an all time Vietnam high of 31,283 in November 1969. Commencing with the January Phase III Redeployment, force structure reductions initiated a sharp decrease in strength. By the end of October 1970 the Division strength rested at 12,425. (See Tab 1-1)

b. The overseas extension rate for enlisted personnel thus far during 1970 has decreased nearly 70% over the like 1969 period (4.7 per 1,000 strength in 1970 vs 12.8 per 1,000 in 1969). However, the rate for the past few months has somewhat stabilized at 6.2 per 1,000 or 112 extensions per month. Enlisted extension requests are generally approved for the lower ranks, whereas the probability of approval for staff NCO's and officers is less than 50% (CMC has recently been disapproving all requests from ground lieutenants). (See Tab 1-2)

c. The first-term reenlistment rate of 41% for the first ten months of 1970 is below the 1969 rate of 54%, but it is well above the Marine Corps average of 10%. The present trend is a declining one and it appears likely that the rate at the end of the year will approach 35%. (See Tab 1-3)

d. Congressional and special interest correspondence was received at a steady rate of about 4.5 pieces per 1,000 strength during 1970. However, beginning in early 1970 the rate began to increase slightly, and by the end of the tenth month, the average rate had increased by approximately 15% to a rate of 5.2 per 1,000. The trend for August, September, and October indicates that the year-end rate will be essentially equivalent to the rate at the past three months, which averaged 5.5 per 1,000. (See Tab 1-4)

e. Decorations and Purple Heart Medals were awarded at the generally steady rate of one per twenty-five personnel during the first nine months of 1969. However, beginning in late 1969 and continuing through October 1970, the Purple Heart award rate reduced fairly uniformly to a ratio of one per ninety personnel at the end of October 1970. The ratio for all other awards followed a different pattern: in the last quarter of 1969, the rate dropped to one per 50 for a three-month period, and then during the first ten months of 1970 an increasing trend was established thus significantly raising the ratio to one per 17 personnel at the end of October (highest ratio for 1969-1970).

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The new high level is explained by the accelerated rate of meritorious award recommendations prompted by the redeployments of the period. It is expected that further redeployments will keep the "other awards" rate at a high level. (See Tab 1-5)

f. Trials involving crimes of violence occurred at essentially a level rate of six per 10,000 personnel during most of 1969. However, during November the rate began to rise and the year ended with a December rate of eight per 10,000. For the period January through August 1970, the rate remained at the latter level and then for the months of September and October it dropped 25%, thus returning to the 1969 rate of six per 10,000. While no strong trend has developed, the rate would appear to be decreasing. (See Tab 1-6a)

g. Unauthorized absences for the first ten months of this year ran at a rate of 11 per 10,000. The rates for July through October of this year (11, 9, 10, 10, per 10,000) weakly imply that the rate for the remainder of the year will remain lower than last year's rate of 12 per 10,000 for the same period. (See Tab 1-6b)

h. Marines confined during the first ten months of this year represented a confinement rate double that of the like period last year (44 versus 22 per 10,000). However, the rates for August, September, and October 1970 declined sharply from 63 per 10,000 to 38 per 10,000. The decline was mainly due to the Commandant's administrative separation policy and CG, III MAF's policy of sending over-60-days confinees to Camp Pendleton. The confinement rates for the past three months predict a continuing decline for November, but one of small magnitude. (See Tab 1-6c)

i. Punitive discharges are running at essentially the same rate for 1970 as for the like period last year (6 per 10,000 personnel). Although the variance in the rates for both periods is moderately large (3/10,000 in 1969 and 5/10,000 in 1970) the trend line is level and predicts a rate of five discharges per 10,000 personnel for the remaining two months of the year. (See Tab 1-6d)

j. Administrative discharges processed during the first ten months of 1970 were nearly seven times those of 1969 (726 vs 121), thus reflecting implementation of the Commandant's "Clean House" policy. However, during August, September, and October 1970, the discharge rate was down to a mean of 35 per 10,000 personnel compared to the rate of 58 per 10,000 for the previous three-month period (May-July 1970). The recent data suggests that the rates for the next two months will remain at about 35/10,000--considerably below the mid-1970 high of 65/10,000. (See Tab 1-6e)

k. Foreign claims investigations have averaged 15 a month for the year to date and have evidenced no correlation with the force reduction. However, the number of investigations will begin to go to zero due to III MAF having taken sole responsibility for claim-processing effective 20 October 1970. (See Tab 1-6f)

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l. Administrative and judicial action rates (non-judicial punishment, courts, and investigations) concerning drug abuse have increased by nearly 200% in the first ten months of this year as compared to the like period last year thus reflecting not only a growing problem area but also intensified command attention. The monthly rate for administrative and judicial actions remained practically constant at about 35 actions per 10,000 personnel during March through August 1970. However, the following months of September and October recorded significant increases to rates of 56 and 43 per 10,000 respectively, thus hinting that the projected rate for November and December might also be higher than the previously stabilized mid-year rates. (See Tab 1-6g)

m. Racial incidents during 1970 occurred with such varying frequency that there has been no one trend established. While the number of incidents ranged from a high of ten in January to a low of zero in August, the fact that there were seven incidents in June highlights the unpredictable nature of such events. During the period of July through October the incidents numbered one, zero, one, and one respectively, and while the numbers indicate consistency, they do not correlate with the strength reductions. (See Tab 1-6h)

n. Fragging incidents during the first ten months of 1970 rather consistently averaged three incidents per month. However, when the incidents are normalized using personnel strengths, the resulting monthly rates increase from one to four per 10,000 during the period January through April, then drop sharply back to one per 10,000 for September and October. Unlike the racial incident rate which is inconsistent, the fragging rate appears to be cyclic in that it rose from one incident per 10,000 strength in January 1970 to four per 10,000 in April, then decreased to a rate of one per 10,000 during May through August, and finally during the period of September and October, it rose up to rates of four and three per 10,000 respectively. However, the available data-base which covers only ten months is insufficient to predict a trend. (See Tab 1-6i)

o. Ground safety is the general category which encompasses incidents involving friendly supporting arms, individual weapons outside a cantonment and accidental discharges. Of the three types of incidents, only the individual weapons category has exhibited an increasing casualty rate in 1970 compared to the same period in 1969, as shown below:

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Rate
(Casualties per 10,000 personnel per month)

<u>Type Incident</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Supporting Arms friendly fire	15	7
Individual Weapon outside cantonment	3	5
Accidental discharge	8	5

The data for 1970 suggests that the present casualty rates for all three categories will continue to apply for November and December. (See Tabs 1-7 through 1-7c)

p. Motor vehicle accidents during the past ten months have occurred at basically the same rate as that of the like period in 1969 (7.7 vs 7.5 per 10,000 personnel), and the data indicates that the rate is likely to continue at its present level. Regarding bodily injury to Vietnamese civilians, the number of fatalities to date this year has increased 19% over the like period last year (43 vs 36). Comparative figures concerning Vietnamese injured are more favorable in the sense that they are 10% lower for this year than for the same period last year (88 vs 93). However, when normalized by Division strength, the death and injured rate combined is slightly higher in 1970 than in the similar period in 1969. (See Tab 1-7d)

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DIVISION STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURECALENDAR YEARS 1969 AND 1970

During most of 1969, the Division strength was stabilized at the 24,000 level. In October of that year, a 6,000 strength increase was occasioned principally by the joining of the 26th Marines and the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. The Division continued to gain in personnel until 17 November 1969 when it reached the apex of its growth in South Vietnam--the strength figure stood momentarily at 31,283.

The next major strength change, driven by the force reduction, was characterized by a sharp and steady decline beginning in December 1969 and continuing through 1970. The result to date is that the Division on-board strength figure has been reduced by nearly 19,000 in the last eleven months. As of the end of October, the figure rests at 12,425. The Division force structure during the first nine months of 1969 consisted of the normal nine infantry and four artillery battalions, plus support and reinforcing units. A structure change in October of that year increased the number of infantry battalions to twelve (with the addition of the 26th Marines) and the number of artillery battalions to five (1st Battalion, 13th Marines was added).

During 1970, the Division structure was gradually reduced to six infantry and two artillery battalions. Concurrently, the headquarters, reconnaissance, and medical units were reduced in strength while the 1st Engineer Battalion remained at full strength. The Division retained two reduced strength motor transport battalions to cope with the Division's large area of responsibility and the possibility of reduced helicopter support.

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OVERSEAS EXTENSIONS PROCESSED

The number and percentage of enlisted personnel who extended their tour for the first ten months of 1970 fell significantly below the figures for the comparable period in 1969. The reduction in numbers from 3,107 to 989 was due primarily to CMC's nearly complete moratorium on taking action on extension requests prior to the time the redeployment schedules had been approved. The 1970 extension percentage was 4.7% vice 10.4% in 1969.

It is anticipated that an increase in extensions will occur during November and December as personnel extend their overseas tour in order to return to CONUS on special leave for Thanksgiving and Christmas. In November and December of 1969, for example, the rate increased 16% during that two-month period to a ratio of 14 extensions per 1,000 personnel. Approximately 85% of enlisted personnel E-5 and below have had their extension requests approved, whereas SNCO's only enjoy a 30% approval.

Regarding officers, of the 101 officers who requested extensions during the first ten months of 1970, only 49 have been approved with two pending. A monthly recap is shown below:


<u>Month</u>	<u>Requests</u>	<u>Approvals</u>
Jan	18	18
Feb	11	1
Mar	7	0
Apr	10	1
May	6	2
Jun	11	9
Jul	15	11
Aug	10	6
Sep	4	0
Oct	9*	1

* 2 pending approval/disapproval

For the past few months, CMC has been disapproving all extension requests for lieutenants who hold ground MOS's. It is assumed that the reason for this is to allow more lieutenants to serve in a combat situation. Favorable consideration by CMC will be given to captains' and field grade officers' requests.

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FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT RATES

The average first term reenlistment rate for the first ten months of 1970 is 41%, a decrease from the 1969 rate of 54%. Despite this decrease the Division remains well above the Marine Corps average of approximately 10%.

The sharp decline from a high of 72% in April 1970 to a low of 22% in August 1970 was arrested in September by an increase to 40%. October results, however, show a decrease to 28%.

The primary causes for the decline during 1970 appear to be the general personnel turbulence associated with the redeployment of forces, heavy turnover of Career Planning personnel, and the extensive early release program.


Present trends would indicate a projected reenlistment rate of approximately 35% for the month of November.

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THE HARBOR DIVISION (HMD), 1000 10TH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10018



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
ELIC/RECOM	188	132	137	107	125	159	176	167	183	65	63	56	1558
REENL	63	63	60	53	56	98	116	109	131	27	36	32	844
% REENL	35.0	47.7	43.8	49.5	44.8	61.6	65.9	65.2	71.6	41.5	57.1	57.1	54.1
1970													
ELIC/RECOM	45	65	88	57	89	86	97	83	48	36			
REENL	24	30	29	41	48	26	32	18	19	10			
% REENL	53.3	46.1	33.0	72.0	55.0	30.2	33.0	21.7	39.7	27.8			

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CONGRESSIONAL/SPECIAL INTEREST CORRESPONDENCE

The monthly volume of Congressional/Special Interest Correspondence for the first ten months of 1970 averaged 109 inquiries, which was slightly less than the 1969 monthly average of 113 inquiries. However, in percentage of total strength, the 1970 totals portray a 40% increase in such inquiries. The ~~complaints~~ received in 1970 fall into the following ~~categories~~:

Welfare Reports	205
Confinement/Discipline	180
Medical	156
Hardship/Humanitarian Transfers	112
Basic Allowance for Quarters	90
MOS Changes/Reassignments	52
Clothing/Equipment	46
Personal Effects	46
Mail	43
Emergency Leave	41
Harassment/Maltreatment	35
Miscellaneous	299


The following graph indicates that the volume of Congressional/Special Interest Correspondence for the next two months of November and December will essentially equal the volume (135/mo) for the same period in 1969. However, in percentage of total strength, it should remain at a slightly higher level than the first ten months of 1970 (.68 vs .43%) if the strong trend indicated by the graph continues.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REF) COGNITIVE CONSTRAINT/SPLINE CORRESPONDENCE

1970 —————

AS 45-33 001-454 1970



THE MEANS OF THE 3-6-9 MONTH PERIODS WERE .49-.49-.48, YIELDING A PREDICTIVE CONSTANT OF .49.

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DECORATIONS AND PURPLE HEART MEDALS

The number of decorations (excluding Purple Heart Medals) processed by the Division Awards Board during the first ten months of 1970 was 6,529. Although this amount was 30% less than the total of 9,350 for the similar period in 1969, the more interesting statistics are identified by the following normalized rates:

RATES (Awards per personnel)

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
January-October	1/27	1/29
January-May	1/26	1/35
June-October	1/28	1/24

The rate decrease during the January through May 1970 period is primarily explained by the lessened intensity of enemy actions. The most significant change occurred during the June through October 1970 period when the monthly decorations rate increased 85% from 1/31 at the beginning to 1/17 at the end of the period (highest monthly ratio for 1969-1970). The factor driving the increase was the concentrated submission of meritorious awards occasioned by the redeployment of units.

Purple Heart Medals were awarded at an average of 1/25 during the period January through September 1969. However, beginning in October 1969 and continuing through October 1970, the Purple Heart award rate reduced fairly uniformly to a low monthly ratio of 1/90 personnel.

The trend established during the May through October 1970 period indicates that Purple Heart Medals will be awarded at a gradually reduced rate. For the remaining two months of 1970, the award rate for all other decorations will likely decrease from the October 1970 high of 1/17 due to the present pause in the redeployment schedule.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REFIN) COMBATIVE PURPLE HEART MEDALS AND OTHER


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REFIN) COMBATIVE PURPLE HEART MEDALS AND OTHER

1. 1. TWO-POSITIONS Axiom 1, CONSIDER YEARS 1965/1970

1999, 2000, 2001).

1970 PROBLEMS

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LAW AND DISCIPLINE

The beginning of calendar year 1970 saw a marked increase in judicial and disciplinary proceedings. For example, trials for crimes of violence increased from a January-October 1969 monthly rate of six per 10,000 personnel to a 1970 rate of eight per 10,000. The rise in courts-martial relating to crimes of violence does not necessarily mean that such crimes have increased in number, but rather that they are being investigated and prosecuted with more thoroughness. An adjunct to violent crimes was the mounting brig population experienced in 1970. The mean confined-ratio for the months January through October 1970 was 48 per 10,000, which was a 120% increase over the 1969 rate of 22 per 10,000 for the like period.

Late spring and summer 1970 saw downward trends in the brig population, crimes of violence, and punitive discharges. The new policy of transferring prisoners sentenced to more than 60 days confinement to Camp Pendleton, which became effective in August 1970, has substantially reduced the confinee strength.

The decreases in punitive discharges (0.08% ~~to~~ 0.05%) and crimes of violence (0.13% to 0.06%) which occurred in late spring and summer, and which appear to be continuing into the fall of 1970, are the result of the reduction in Division strength and the deterrence resulting from increased effectiveness in techniques of investigation.

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TRIALS INVOLVING CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

A consistent ratio between crimes of violence and total strength of the Division is not demonstrable. This is because the number of trials in any given month is no indication of the amount of violence in the Division. There are occasions where a serious crime takes a considerable length of time to investigate. The case finally comes to trial two to three months and sometimes longer after the incident occurred. Thus the totals for the month may balloon to what appears to be an abnormally high total. June and August 1970 are examples of this situation.

The ratio of crimes of violence to Division strength increased from a January-October 1969 monthly rate of six per 10,000 to a 1970 rate of eight per 10,000. One factor contributing to the greater trial rate is the increased effectiveness in investigating such crimes. Further improvements in effectiveness are possible due to the publication of Force Order 3120.4 of 14 August 1970 which describes standard operating procedures for investigating crimes of violence.

A review of the trend illustrated in August, September, and October makes it appear that 0.06 will be a useful predictive constant for the remainder of 1970.

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G-1-6a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) TREATS INVOLVING CRIMES VIOLANCE

ALL OF MY OFFICIALS ARE



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UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORT

Unauthorized absence cases during the past four months of 1970 averaged 0.10% of the command, as compared with 0.12% for the same period in 1969. Although the current absence rate is smaller for this year, the difference is minimal.

A predictive constant of 0.10% can be established from the 1970 data, thus leading to a projected figure of 12 unauthorized absences for each of the two remaining months of this year.


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G-1-6b

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CORRELATES MARINE 71411 1 0 2 7 8 1 0 0 0 0 0

Call: 011 223 444 1111

1000

[illegible]

*TOTAL SHOWN IS FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1969. THE DASHED LINE REPRESENTS NUMBERS DERIVED BY MULTIPLYING DEV STRENGTH BY .12, BOTH THE MEAN AND MODE OF %CMD FOR 1969

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CONFINED MARINES

The 1970 six-month period, January to June, shows approximately a 100% increase in the number of Marine confinees over the first six months of 1969 (669 vs 306). The probable cause for this rising number of confined Marines is illustrated in the graph (Tab 1-6c) which reflects a 61% increase in trials for crimes of violence during the same period.

Persons suspected of crimes of violence are, in most cases, placed in pretrial confinement since they are considered to present a threat to personnel of their parent unit. Also, convicted offenders of crimes of violence, for the most part, receive confinement as part of their sentence and seldom have the confinement portion of the sentence suspended by the convening authority.


The application of a liberal administrative separation policy, which by ridding the Division of potential offenders, should alleviate the brig population problem, although it is impossible to establish a direct correlation. Long term relief will probably result as the Marine Corps raises its recruiting and reenlistment standards.

The decrease in the total number of Division personnel confined at the United States Army Vietnam Installation Stockade (USARVIS), formerly the III MAF Correctional Center, is the result of the implementation of a confinement to serve, to the Correctional Center, Camp Pendleton upon completion of the convening authority's action. In compliance with this policy, 51 prisoners were transferred to Camp Pendleton on 12 August 1970. Although the total number of Marine confinees for October and the remainder of 1970 will not drop as dramatically as those of August and September 1970, a continual decrease in the total number of confinees is expected due to the reduction in Division strength.

31 OCT 70

G-1-6c

183 MARINE DIVISION (R-34)



Q-1-6c

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BAD CONDUCT AND DISHONORABLE DISCHARGES

The graph reflects cases tried by courts-martial where either a bad conduct or a dishonorable discharge was part of the sentence. The graph is structured to represent the percentage of personnel within the Division receiving such sentences.

The number of punitive discharges for January-October 1969 is not appreciably different from the total number to date for 1970 (120 vs 137). However, there has been a 28% decrease in the rate at which punitive discharges have been adjudged during the months June-October 1970: The rate dropped from a monthly average of 7/10,000 during January-May to an average of 5/10,000 for the period June-October.


The steady trend rate of 5/10,000 the past five months would indicate that the rates for November and December are likely to be near this new low level.

31 OCT 70

G-1-6d

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REDN)

100



31 OCT 70

G-1-6d

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ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES

The rapid rise in administrative separations from a rate of 6/10,000 in January 1970 to a rate of 65/10,000 in July 1970 reflects command guidance issued in January in support of the Commandant of the Marine Corps policy on this matter.

The August and September 1970 monthly totals portray a significant decline in both numbers (from 140 to 51) and in percentages of total strength (from 0.65 to 0.43). In part, the decline in numbers of separations can be attributed to the reduction in total Division strength. However, the decline in percentage appears to be a result of the weeding-out process accomplished during January-July and a deterrent impact accruing from the growing realization on the part of certain recalcitrants that they face the reality of an undesirable or unsuitability discharge.

The percentage of the command to receive administrative discharges rose by two-fifths in October 1970 to 0.43%, and it can be expected to remain at this level in November and December due to the following factors: continuing emphasis on the Commandant's policy; and having retained, in-country, those individuals who are being processed for administrative separation while the Division strength is concurrently being reduced.

31 OCT 70


G-1-62

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

CONFIDENTIAL

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the polymer on the gelation time of the polymer solution. The concentration of the polymer was 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834

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	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
of G			NONE	PROG	IND	WING	REND	R YL	1969				0
D	4	8	6	7	6	1	7	3	15	15	8	4	90
SUIT	4	1	5	1	1	4	5	3	2	1	1	3	31
TOTAL	8	9	11	8	7	5	12	12	17	16	9	7	121
CMD	.03	.04	.04	.02	.03	.02	.05	.05	.07	.05	.02	.02	
1970													
of G	1	2	29	32	65	63	69	32	33	22			
D	12	10	37	18	35	41	57	28	24	28			
SUIT	5	6	13	11	20	11	14	4	4	4			
TOTAL	18	25	78	61	120	115	140	64	51	54			
CMD	.06	.09	.53	.28	.55	.55	.65	.32	.31	.42			

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G-1-62

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FOREIGN CLAIMS INVESTIGATIONS

Foreign claims investigations, averaging 15 per month, have exhibited a slightly rising trend during the past eight months. However, the number being processed by Division has already begun to decrease to zero due to III MAF's assumption of all initial claims-processing required on or after 20 October 1970.

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G-1-6p

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FOREIGN COUNTRIES TRIPS

1969 ~~SECRET~~



G-1-6A

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ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTION RELATING TO DRUG ABUSE

Administrative and judicial action rates relating to drug abuse have increased by nearly 200% in the first ten months of 1970 as compared to the like period in 1969 (35/10,000 vs 13/10,000). Comparing the first ten months of 1969 with the first ten months of 1970 reveals the following: non-judicial punishments have increased 25% (35 to 45); investigations have increased by 49% (178 to 351); and courts-martial have increased by 14% (117 to 136).

During the first ten months of 1970 there were eighteen times as many administrative discharges as there were by the end of October 1969 (180 vs 10). However, actions after the fact are not the only measures being taken. All training-schedule preventative lectures have been increased in scope and intensity. In supplement to that instruction, a special lecturer working out of Division Headquarters has presented 217 individual lectures to 17,171 members of the Division since January 1970.

31 OCT 70

G-1-6g

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTIONS CONCERNING

1969 INCIDENCE
1969 CUMULATIVE

INCIDENCE 1970
CUMULATIVE 1970

AS. OF



31 OCT 70

G-1-69

RACIAL INCIDENTS

A racial incident is a disagreement, disobedience and/or violence perpetrated between individuals or groups with ethnic difference as a cause.

Thirty-three incidents have been recorded during the period January-October 1970, with about one quarter (8) of them taking place in January. Based on strengths, the incident rate went from one per 3,500 in January to one per 12,500 in October. Because of the volatile nature of racial incidents, the above rates are not all that significant in describing a trend.

A factor that obviously could become of great importance regarding racial incidents is the decreasing tempo of operations: an individual has increasingly more time on his hands to influence others or to be influenced concerning racial issues, real or imagined.


Affecting the area of racial matters in a positive manner is the immeasurable and yet apparently successful impact of the Division Leadership Council Program.

31 OCT 70

G-1-6X

1ST DISTRICT, RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE

[illegible]

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FRAGGING INCIDENTS

Felonious "fragging", or assault with an explosive device, has occurred at the relatively steady average of slightly over three a month. The greatest frequency was in September and in February when five incidents were recorded in each of these months; the smallest frequency occurred in July, with only one fragging. There has been one Marine killed and forty injured in these attacks.

During the first four months of 1970, only two of the fourteen clandestine incidents were solved, but a program of speedy and thorough investigation through implementation of ForO 3120.4 ("Operation Freeze") and swift disciplinary action has considerably improved that record. As a result of this program, of the eleven incidents that occurred from the beginning of May through the end of August, six have been solved and one is still under investigation. Of the five perpetrated in September, three have been solved and one is under investigation. October recorded three cases with one solved and two under investigation. Such thorough law enforcement may, in the future, tend to discourage potential assailants.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FRAGGING INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1970~~

CASUALTIES

AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970

[illegible]

6-1-62

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GROUND SAFETY

In the categories of friendly firepower incidents and accidental discharges, there were 263 incidents recorded for the first ten months of calendar year 1970 as compared to 407 incidents listed during the same period in 1969. However, when based on strengths the average monthly incident rates for the first ten months of 1969 and 1970 were essentially equal (1.3/1,000 vs 1.2/1,000).

October 1970 ended with 17 friendly firepower incidents, or with the involvement of 0.96 Marines per thousand of the present total population. This can be compared favorably with 1969's thirty-nine friendly firepower incidents recorded in the month of October. That count affected 3.90 Marines per thousand of that past population.

In the first ten months of calendar year 1970, there were 41 deaths and 336 wounded by misuse of weapons and friendly firepower. During the same period in 1969 there were 93 deaths and 468 wounded from the same causes. When normalized by strength, the death rate for 1970 decreased 33% from the like period in 1969, and the injured rate remained about the same.

Of the three types of incidents, only the one involving individual weapons outside a cantonment has exhibited a greater rate of increase for this year compared to the same period last year.

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SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTS

Friendly fire accidents involving supporting arms (including air, artillery, and crew-served weapons) showed a marked decline, averaging just over five incidents a month in 1970 as compared to thirteen per month in 1969. Using the more definitive comparison of incidents per thousands of total population, there were 0.38 incidents per thousand Marines in October, 1970 and 0.46 incidents per thousand in October, 1969.

Intensive command interest has been devoted to this area of concern, as evidenced by the Commanding General's communications to commanders. The impact of this interest appears to be reflected in the data on the accompanying chart, which shows that the casualty rate for the Division has reduced 21% from a monthly average of 8/10,000 during January through May 1970 to an average of 6/10,000 during June through October 1970. During the period January 1969 to October 1970 a decreasing trend has been established which forecasts further reductions in the rate of friendly casualties.


31 OCT 70

C-1-7a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBATTING BULGARIAN ARMY, 1941

1960 PRINT

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G-1-7a

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INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS

Contrary to the case of friendly fire incidents with supporting arms, individual weapons incidents remain rather high, averaging 9.0 incidents a month for the first ten months of calendar year 1970 as compared to an average of 8.9 a month for the same period in 1969. Individual weapons incidents (recorded separately from in-cantonment accidental discharges) occurred at the rate of 0.38 incidents per thousand of the Division's total strength in October 1970. This is compared to a record of 0.46 incidents per thousand Marines in October 1969.

October 1970 was a particularly good month for individual weapons accident prevention with only four incidents in comparison with the year's high in August of fifteen. Vigorous ground safety and "accident awareness" programs are continually being conducted within the Division. Further preventative success concerning this problem is directly related to our ability to reverse the general attitude of unconcern among young Marines. This attitude is considered paramount among the causes of "pure" accidental discharges.

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G-1-78

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL RECORDS 11 MAY 1964


1969 INCIDENTS

1576 20240305

CAPITALS

CONCLUSIONS

AA 07 31.00903-8 1979



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G-1-74

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ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES


Accidental discharges with small arms continue to be a problem within the Division, but the trend continues pointing towards fewer such incidents. Predominant are accidents with the .45 caliber pistol and the M-16 rifle. During the first ten months of 1970, the accidental discharge rate has been 11.7 per month while during the same period in calendar year 1969 the average was 18.3 per month. During the month of October 1970, there were .62 accidental discharges per thousand.

As with the subject of casualties from friendly supporting arms incidents, this area of interest has received equally intensive command attention. The results to date are encouraging in that the accidental discharge casualty rate went from 8/10,000 in 1969 to 5/10,000 in 1970, a 38% decrease. The trend established for 1970 to date indicates a continuance of the lowered rate of casualties.

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G-1-7c

THE MARINE DIVISION (REUR)



G-1-7c

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MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS


During the first ten months of calendar year 1970 there was an average of 13.3 motor vehicle accidents per month as compared to a monthly average of 19.5 for the first ten months of 1969. When based on strengths, a comparison of 1969 and 1970 shows that the rates were practically equal (.64/1,000 vs .63/1,000). Concerning the past month, October 1970 showed a rate of .77/1,000, while October 1969 recorded a rate of .75/1,000.

Casualties resulting from motor vehicle accidents were lower in 1970, recorded at .46/1,000 for October 1970 and 2.9/1,000 for October 1969. The rate at which Vietnamese are being killed and injured exceeds that of 1969, mainly due to the fantastic growth of light vehicular traffic and almost non-existent Vietnamese traffic control. Division Marines are, however, being constantly schooled in strict obedience to traffic regulations and in the art of defensive driving.

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G-1-7d

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMPANY



G-1-7d

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G-2 OVERVIEW

Overall enemy activity in Quang Nam Province has diminished steadily during 1970. The most striking evidence of this decline is reflected in a monthly comparison of enemy sighted/enemy attacks by fire during the past ten months. Total enemy sighted monthly has dropped from 4425 (January) to a low of 878 (October), representing a 5:1 ratio. Total enemy attacks by fire (rockets, mortar rounds, lob bombs) have similarly declined; 658 rounds were received in January as compared to a cumulative figure of 555 rounds received during the last four months (1 July - 31 October).

This reduction in enemy activity can be attributed largely to the attritional losses sustained by units subordinate to Front 4 and to the resultant decision by the enemy to revert to guerrilla warfare techniques in order to conserve his depleted forces. Overall enemy strength in the province, once estimated as high as 16,800 (May 1969), has now diminished to an estimate of 9,475 (October 1970). Infiltration of replacements from North Vietnam has been minimal. The enemy's inability to recruit from the manpower base of indigenous South Vietnamese has resulted in the necessity to assign many NVA personnel to augment traditionally VC Main Force, Local Force and Guerrilla Units. A further illustration of the enemy's declining combat effectiveness is evidenced by his need to realign his organizational structure. In early 1970, Front 4 commanded four NVA Regiments, but at present it appears that only the 38th NVA Regiment has any degree of combat effectiveness. The disbanding of units, reduction of unit strengths, and realignment of operational control has resulted in an extensive reorganization of units as well as command and control relationships; the "Wing" concept of decentralized command and control is now apparently defunct. Unless an intense effort is made by the enemy to introduce sizeable reinforcements into the province, it is anticipated that his present force levels will continue to deteriorate. Confronted with FVMAF/ARVN preemptive operations, reduced manpower, food shortages, and monsoon conditions, enemy forces will be capable of conducting only the harassing activities that have characterized their efforts in recent months. In the populated lowlands, main efforts will be channeled toward rebuilding the depleted VC military and political structure at the hamlet and village level; in the highlands, NVA forces will be preoccupied with logistic activities.

As a result of Phase IV Reductions during September 1970, 1st Marine Division reconnaissance assets were reduced by two companies of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion as well as the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less a platoon detachment). Of the 24 reconnaissance teams currently available for Division employment, an average of 15 teams are available for field duty. These figures are expected to remain relatively constant. Although present monsoon conditions are restrictive to helicopter insertions/ex-

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tractions of teams, the current use of Platoon/Company Patrol Bases will facilitate the employment and resupply of teams operating in the field.

1st Marine Division sensor utilization has decreased significantly since July 1970 due to the removal of the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System) as well as RF Sensor Strings in southern and central Quang Nam Province. SCAMP personnel reductions, restrictions in the number of sensor channels, and monsoon conditions have likewise contributed to a decline in the number of sensors that may be effectively employed. A total of 112 sensors were in use as of 31 October, and this figure is expected to remain relatively constant for the remainder of 1970.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTHQUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Total enemy forces included North Vietnamese Army, Main Force and Local Force units as well as village/hamlet guerrillas. In Quang Nam Province, the estimated total enemy strength has declined from a high of 16,800 (May 1969) to a level of approximately 9,475 (October 1970).

Unless substantial replacements are received from outside the province, enemy strength levels will probably continue to decrease. While it appears that the enemy has the capability to introduce infiltration groups to replace some of these losses, he does not appear inclined at this time to increase infiltration to a level that will reconstitute former force levels.

Recruitment of indigenous South Vietnamese does not play a significant part in overall manpower procurement as evidenced by the necessity to utilize NVA personnel in traditionally VC roles. On-hand personnel assets will probably continue to be redistributed as appropriate; more NVA troops will be used to fill the ranks of MF and LF units; NVA, MF and LF personnel will also be used to rebuild the depleted guerrilla organization within the province.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) 353 BATTAL (REIN) 353 BATTAL (REIN) QUANG NAM PROVINCE

1. SUMMARY FROM JANUARY 1970

1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EST STRENGTH	11500	11750	116100	114540	116800	113700	112200	112840	112170	112770	111820	112400	NA
1970													
EST STRENGTH	111200	112430	112300	112900	112020	111700	112500	111300	110900	9475			NA

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G-2-1

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN): DEPLOYMENT OF
RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Division assets prior to September 1970 included the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. During this period deployed teams included those providing security for four Division observation posts.

A major reorganization of the Division reconnaissance effort was effected in September 1970 as a result of the redeployment in Phase IV of two companies of the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less a one platoon detachment). Division Reconnaissance Battalion was relieved of the security responsibility for three of the four Division observation posts and given the objective of maintaining a minimum of 24 operational teams with the capability to deploy and support 12 of these teams at any given time. Deployed teams are now defined as only those operating in the field on an assigned reconnaissance mission.


24 teams are currently available for Division employment. An average of 15 teams are prepared for field duty at any given time. These figures are expected to remain relatively constant. Actual deployment is significantly decreased due to curtailment of flight activities and weather restrictions during the fall monsoon season as indicated.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERSONNEL OF AVAILABLE KNOWLEDGE TRAIN

1. NAME: [REDACTED] 2. DATE: 10/1/50 3. ANY REVISION
4. BY: [REDACTED] 5. BY: [REDACTED]

40 OF 34 OCTOBER 1970



* THE 2D AND 3D LINE OF EACH DATA SET ARE THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF RECON DEPLOYED IN BOTH RECON AND SECURITY MNSNS, WHILE THE 4TH AND 5TH ARE THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TRMS DEPLOYED IN RECONNAISSANCE ROLE. G-2-2 31 OCT 70 CONFIDENTIAL

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS1969/1970

Sensor utilization decreased significantly from July through October with the deactivation of the Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System as well as RF Sensor Strings and Readout Sites in southern and central Quang Nam Province. There are presently four readout sites in the Division TAOR.

During July and August there were 82 targets detected by sensors, 69 of which were attacked with artillery fire. Bomb damage assessment was conducted with negative results.

During September and October, only 15 targets were detected by sensors, seven of which were attacked by artillery fire. BDA was conducted with negative results.

The decline in targets and the decrease in effectiveness of sensors within the Division TAOR is attributed to four factors:

a. The restriction of sensor channels (frequencies) from ten to four, imposed by XXIV Corps.

b. Reduction of the personnel strength of the Sensor Control And Management Platoon from 85 to 26.

c. Due to higher priority operations, security forces to escort SCAMP teams for sensor implants have been unavailable.

d. Inclement weather. Sensor effectiveness is reduced significantly during periods of heavy rain and wind.

Sensor utilization within the Division TAOR is expected to remain relatively constant at current levels throughout the remainder of the year.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), PRECIPITATION, QUANG NAM PROVINCECALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Seasonal precipitation in Quang Nam Province is associated with the Northeast Monsoon which prevails from September through January. Monthly rain accumulation during 1969 varied sharply from the mean only during the peak accumulation in October when 39.37 inches of rain were recorded. Monthly rainfall from January through October 1970 has corresponded closely to mean monthly totals.


During the monsoon season, frequent occurrences of rain, fog, and low visibility allow the enemy to move with a greater degree of freedom from friendly air and ground observation. Conversely, wet weather has a detrimental effect on enemy movement due to swollen streams and inundated lowlands. As the 1970 monsoon season continues, deterioration of food, ordnance and other supply caches will contribute to difficulties presently being encountered by enemy forces in the province.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) TANGIEN PROVINCE IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE

DATE RANGE YEAR 1969/1970

AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCHES	5.52	0.04	0.12	0.57	2.32	2.98	6.04	TRACE	12.80	39.97	10.09	3.97	84.42
1970													
INCHES	3.82	0.88	0.03	2.45	1.92	4.74	1.13	4.70	12.92	24.61			
MM (IN)	4.2	1.8	0.9	1.3	2.6	2.8	2.8	4.7	15.7	23.3	15.1	8.7	83.9

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHINTACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

Overall, enemy activity declined at a steady rate during the past ten months. This steady decrease in activity is attributed to the forced reversion to the guerrilla warfare tactics which were prevalent prior to the large scale commitment of North Vietnamese Army Forces in 1966. Since the enemy reduced the number of his offensive actions utilizing North Vietnamese Army units and began concentrating on the GVN Pacification Program, employing local force units, his overt presence in the lowlands has declined significantly.

In order for him to implement his strategy of guerrilla warfare, the enemy has continued to employ rockets against area targets, a tactic which serves as an excellent psychological weapon. Since he has neither the logistical system nor combat capability to employ rockets as a medium of close combat support, the enemy has utilized rockets as a medium to intimidate the civilian population and to a lesser degree, FWMAF. The pattern of rocket attacks conforms closely to surges and ebbs of the enemy's campaign. (During the month of January, the months of April and May, and the period August through September, the enemy attempted to increase his offensive activity. Consequently, of the 214 rockets he has launched during 1970, 185 were fired during these three periods.) There is no evidence that effectiveness of enemy rocket units will improve in the future. (See 2-5a)

Enemy efficiency in the employment of mortars has deteriorated as evidenced by the inaccurate fire reported by units in the 1st Marine Division TAOR during the month of October. Mortars have been used primarily as a harassing weapon since the enemy has elected not to commit sizeable forces in an offensive role. As is true of rocket attacks, mortar attacks are timed to coincide with general offensive surges. Although the number of rounds received surpassed those of September, the 145 employed in October were ineffective against 1st Marine Division Units. (See 2-5a)

The use of lob bombs is almost entirely for purpose of harassment. The round, composed of a crudely fused artillery round or aerial bomb lofted in the general direction of a target by a charge of explosive, travels approximately 600 meters. It is a grossly inaccurate system and the round is often a dud. (See 2-5a)

The number of enemy sighted by 1st Marine Division Units during the past ten months has steadily dropped from a high of 4,425 during January to a new low of 878 in October. This reflects the enemy's overall strength decline in the province (See 2-1) and also reveals his reluctance to jeopardize his remaining forces. Adverse weather during the remainder of the year will further contribute toward the reduction of sightings, since enemy movement will be severely impeded. (See 2-5b)

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS, AND LOBBOMBS RECEIVED, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

Enemy employment of rockets during 1970 has varied from a high during April when 58 were expended to two months (March and July) in which no rockets were fired in Quang Nam Province. Rocket attacks have been directed primarily against Danang and its environs, and while they frequently are planned for periods of low lunar illumination, the enemy's ability to launch such attacks is largely governed by his ability to avoid FWMAF/ARVN detection while attempting to establish launch sites. Preemptive small unit operations in the "Danang Rocket Belt" have contributed significantly toward denying the enemy ample opportunity to prepare multiple firing positions within range of lucrative targets. Rockets have also been employed recently against Hill 52 and Thuong Duc CIDG Camp, both located in the Thuong Duc Corridor. By virtue of occupying dominant terrain the enemy has a higher degree of selectivity in choosing firing sites within this area, however the inherent inaccuracy of this weapon renders it relatively ineffective if fired in small quantities. When afforded the opportunity, the enemy will continue to fire rockets in small numbers, but current monsoon conditions will degrade the reliability of the weapons's electrical firing sequence. TAB 2-5 also discusses enemy rocket employment.

Mortar rounds constitute by far the largest expenditure of enemy ordnance employed in stand-off attacks by fire. However, these attacks are primarily harassing in nature and are rarely followed by infantry or sapper exploitation. Enemy employment during the year commenced with a high of 621 rounds expended in January, followed by a drastic decrease that has not exceeded 285 (June).

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G-2-5a

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From July through October the average monthly expenditure has been 111 rounds per month. This is in consonance with the evidence of declining enemy activity throughout the province; friendly small unit operations have denied the enemy opportunity to conduct sustained barrages without detection, consequently the mortar team must resort to short-duration employment and resultant ineffectiveness. As evidenced by captured documents, availability of mortar ammunition has no significant bearing on the number of rounds fired, since adequate quantities are cached throughout the province. On the other hand, mortar tubes, while sufficient in quantity, are considered too valuable to risk capture and therefore are employed sparingly. In the foreseeable future, the enemy can be expected to employ his mortars in a cautious fashion, choosing neither to jeopardize men or weapons for the sake of limited results. Mortar attacks will remain harassing in nature. Additional comments on enemy mortar employment are contained in (2-5).

Employment of lob bombs this year has varied from a high during June when 27 were expended to two months (February and April) in which no lob bombs were utilized in Quang Nam Province. As portrayed by the graph, the only pattern in evidence is a usage that appears to vary inversely proportional to the expenditure of rockets or mortar rounds, thereby superficially indicating a "gap filler" weapon encountered during periods when conventional stand-off attacks by fire have declined. Despite such a pattern, there is no amplifying evidence to support this trend, and it is generally concluded that lob bombs are employed in random fashion by guerrilla forces. Although this crude weapon lends little to the enemy's supporting arms capability, it will continue to be employed infrequently by guerrillas as a harassing technique. Tab 2-5 also addresses lob bomb employment.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (RLIN)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1ST MAR	2	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
2ND MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
3RD MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
4TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
5TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
6TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
7TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
8TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
9TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
10TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
11TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
12TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
13TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
14TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
15TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
16TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
17TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
18TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
19TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
20TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
21TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
22TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
23TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
24TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
25TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
26TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
27TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
28TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
29TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
30TH MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			
31ST MAR	1	2	16	24	27	25	0	35	2	11			

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) ENEMY SIGHTED VS ENEMY KIA/ORDNANCERECEIVED, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

The number of enemy sighted monthly throughout the Division TAOR has declined rather steadily since January. This decline is attributed to the enemy's reluctance to commit NVA or MF units in the lowlands, along with deteriorating morale. Adverse weather and inundation will continue to hamper enemy movement in the lowland areas for the remainder of the year, thus reducing sightings. Significantly, October sightings were the lowest for the year and well below the monthly average of 2,891.


Concurrent with the diminishing number of sightings, enemy ordnance expenditure (rockets, mortars, lob bombs) has likewise declined throughout 1970. While the enemy expended 658 assorted rounds in January, only 155 and 164 rounds were recorded in September and October respectively. Reasons for this reduced expenditure are largely attributed to the same reasons cited above, as there is no apparent shortage in munitions available to enemy forces. A more detailed evaluation of the enemy's ordnance expenditure is incorporated as TAB 2-5a.

As sightings and other evidence of enemy activity have decreased, there has been a commensurate decline in enemy KIA's. All evidence points to an appreciable and steady reduction in the intensity of combat in Quang Nam Province during 1970, and it is apparent that the enemy has chosen to avoid contact in order to conserve forces that have already suffered heavy attrition. In the ensuing months, a further reduction in activity is anticipated, and food procurement is expected to be the enemy's primary preoccupation.

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WEST MARINE DIVISION (R111)



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G-3 OVERVIEW

Although the level of combat presently being experienced is down sharply from the level of 1969, and has also declined significantly from that of the earlier months of 1970, a number of indicators tend to reflect an increase in the combat effectiveness of the Division. As reflected in Sub-section 3-1, friendly casualties during the first ten months of 1970 are less than half those suffered during the first ten months of 1969, 373 KIA and 3,399 WIA having been suffered so far this year compared to 954 KIA and 8,477 WIA through October 1969. Furthermore, monthly Marine casualties for August through October 1970 averaged 24 KIA and 198 WIA, a more than fifty percent decrease from the monthly average of 55 killed and 464 wounded during January, February and March 1970. Enemy losses have also declined, as evidenced by Sub-section 3-3. He has suffered 4,948 KIA, 1,133 individual weapons captured and 90 crew served weapons captured from January through October 1970 compared to 7,534, 1,907 and 213 during the same period in 1969. Similarly, the other indices of combat activity included in this section (and others, e.g., Section G-2), such as the employment of supporting arms and the use of helicopters, have declined. Although such decreases in the employment of air, artillery and naval gunfire are most assuredly effects of the lower level of activity, they are also, in part, indicators of other factors. For example, while there exists a significant correlation between the number of enemy sighted and artillery expenditures (See 3-5a), a similarly significant correlation exists between the number of artillery pieces available and expenditures of ammunition. Furthermore, helicopter support is greatly reduced during periods of inclement weather.

Nevertheless, where comparisons of friendly to enemy statistics can be made, they point to an increasingly favorable friendly position. Friendly KIA are running 39% of their 1969 rate, and friendly WIA 40%. On the enemy side of the ledger, he is suffering KIA at a rate 66% that of 1969, losing individual weapons at a 59% rate and crew served weapons at a 42% rate. All three enemy loss indicators are decreasing less rapidly than friendly losses, attesting to the increased effectiveness of the Division, but the latter, crew served weapons captured, is most interesting. As can be readily observed, this index is decreasing almost as rapidly as friendly losses. This statistic could very well indicate that the enemy is either unwilling or unable to equip his troops with such weapons. However, the lower rate could also be due to the lower rate of enemy attacks, during which such weapons would be necessities.

As more conventional tactics have largely failed him, the enemy has reverted to the guerrilla mode of operation, and both friendly and enemy casualties have decreased. One would expect the enemy to concentrate on small-scale attacks, harassment and the use of mines and booby traps, and he has, but to lesser extent than one would anticipate. Although Mines/booby traps have been exacting

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a disproportionate share of Marine casualties and the casualties suffered by CUPP (Combined Unit Pacification Program) units remain comparatively high, both of these indicators have also been on the decrease. For months surprise firing devices have been claiming over fifty percent of friendly casualties, but only a third of such casualties in October were caused by such devices. Additionally, the ratio of mines and booby traps discovered and harmlessly destroyed to those detonated with casualties has, with the single exception of July, been rising steadily since February 1970, reaching the year's high of 2.83:1 in October 1970. This increasing effectiveness is due largely to a vigorous training program conducted by 1st Engineer Battalion, the unit sending contact teams to all of the Division's units to instruct in mine/booby trap discovery techniques. In addition, the same battalion has reinstituted its five-day school on land mine warfare, instructing some fifty Marines each week.

Therefore, almost without exception, all indices point to both a lower level of combat activity on both sides, coupled with increasing relative combat effectiveness of the Division. This trend should continue for the remainder of the year 1970, and the Division should suffer only about 40% of the casualties it did in 1969, while inflicting on the enemy losses in the vicinity of 60% of his 1969 loss rate.

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FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

During 1970, friendly casualties have decreased with the level of combat. 370 Marines have been killed during the first ten months of 1970 and 3,399 wounded, compared to totals of 954 and 8,477 during the same period in 1969. This represents a 60% decrease in friendly casualties, but a larger aggregate proportion of current casualties were caused by surprise firing devices during the first 10 months of 1970 as compared with the same period of 1969 (See Section 3-2.b). The pattern of reduced casualties can reasonably be expected to continue as the number of contacts and surprise firing devices detonated continue to diminish.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY KILLED IN
ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

In 1969, the 1st Marine Division averaged 77 friendly killed in action per month. In 1970, this average has dropped to 37 per month. During September and October, friendly killed in action dropped to 20 and 18 respectively, indicating a continuing decrease. The primary reason is the reduction in the level of enemy activity. He is no longer massing and deploying in company or battalion sized units. Enemy units encountered in 1970 have usually ranged from individuals to groups of not more than twenty. The enemy appears to be concentrating on harassment activities rather than destruction of FWMAF units.

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1ST DEANING DIVISION (09-2) [redacted] [redacted]



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-)((REIN), CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY WOUNDED IN
ACTION (EVACUATED), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

While the 1st Marine Division averaged 77⁴ friendly wounded in action per month in 1969, the 1970 monthly average has dropped to 340. The average is continuing to decrease as evidenced by September and October monthly totals of 192 and 129 respectively. The rationale behind the lower number of casualties wounded in action during 1970, compared to a similar period in 1969, is the same as that offered for casualties killed in action, generally a significant decrease in enemy activity. As the incidence of fire-fights has decreased there has been a corresponding upward trend in percentage of casualties, both killed and wounded, caused by mine/booby trap detonations, in relation to total 1970 casualties, a trend illustrated by (3-2b) in the sub-section immediately following.

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
G-3-18

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FORM 100-1

(CONTINUATION OF DIVISION REPORT)

REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE DIVISION'S WORK DURING THE MONTH OF _____



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 WJA	763	824	903	842	1199	893	603	1254	809	309	395	412	9294
% CMD	3.19	3.69	4.19	3.60	5.06	3.80	2.57	5.30	3.33	1.02	1.28	1.40	
70 WJA	505	440	446	404	392	350	267	274	192	129			
% CMD	1.84	1.65	1.91	1.85	1.80	1.67	1.24	1.39	1.19	1.01			

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MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

Even though the level of fighting has decreased, the enemy continues to emplace numerous mines and booby traps. Whereas just over 20% of USMC casualties in 1969 were due to mines and booby traps, over 45% of 1970 casualties thus far have been caused by such devices. Such tactics are especially advantageous to the enemy, since he is able to conserve manpower and exercise economy of force while continuing to inflict casualties on friendly forces. To counteract the continuing menace of surprise firing devices, an engineer contact team is daily conducting comprehensive training in the detection and avoidance of such devices for 1st Marine Division units. They are instructing, on the average, 70 Marines per day. As of 31 October, a total of 2,972 members of the Division have been so instructed. The Resident Mine Warfare School closed during August was reopened on 12 October to provide the Division with non-engineer Marines trained to detect and to destroy in place surprise firing devices. In addition, mine dogs continue to be employed to search for surprise firing devices. The ratio of mines found against mines detonated and causing casualties for the first ten months of 1970 exactly equals the 1969 Annual ratio of 1.83:1. In August this ratio was 2.0:1, in September it improved to 2.3:1, while the October ratio stands at 2.8:1, indicating arising trend in the ratio of mines and booby traps found to those detonated. Such steady improvement is expected to continue.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CASUALTIES BY MINES/BOOBYTRAPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Casualties from mines and booby traps have accounted for 45% of the total casualties suffered by the Division during 1970, whereas the percentage was just over 20% during the first ten months of 1969. While the percentage of casualties due to surprise firing devices relative to total casualties is too erratic to use for forecast purposes, the number of surprise firing device casualties has declined steadily throughout 1970 with the exception of June and July. As the number of finds with respect to detonations continues to increase, and the number of both detonations and finds continue to decline, casualties attributable to surprise firing devices will also continue to drop.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES BY MINES/BOOBY TRAPS

OCTOBER YEARS 1964/1970

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1970

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF MINE/BT CASUALTIES
TO TOTAL CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The percentage of total casualties due to surprise firing devices increased steadily from August through December 1969 from 19.0% to 54.3%. The 1970 percentage has remained above 35% for 1970 averaging 47.2% monthly. Too much fluctuation has been noted during the past five months to establish a positive trend, the most recent reflected by a 1970 monthly high of 70.4% to the year's second lowest total of 36.8%. It should be noted, however, that total casualties as well as casualties due to mines and booby traps are declining steadily in spite of erratic percentages.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) COMPARISON OF MINES/BOOBY TRAPSFOUND TO THOSE DETONATED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The ratio of surprise firing devices discovered and destroyed to those detonated with casualties exhibited large fluctuations in 1969, ranging from a low of less than 1:1 in January and April to a high of nearly 4:1 in October of that year, but the year ended with an overall ratio of 1.83 to 1. The year 1970 has been marked by a more stable average ratio of 1.83, ranging from 2.38 to 1 in February to a low of 1.21 to 1 in July. July's 1.21 was the only deviation from a steadily rising trend that had begun in March, and August showed a continuation of the trend with a 1.87 ratio. September figures indicate a ratio of 2.36 discovered to destroyed, while figures through 31 October reflect a ratio of 2.81, attesting to the efficiency of counter-measures taken by the Division. In general, both detonations and finds have been decreasing on a monthly basis since May 1970 although the level of friendly activity has remained high. While the ten month average ratio of 1.83 equals the 1969 yearly average, prospects for an improved 1970 ratio are bright if the present trend continues.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COLLECTED MINES ON 11/11/68 TRAPS FOUND ON

DETAINED, 1969/70 YEARS 1969/1970


711 10519

1970 FOUNDED

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* contents were determined by spectrophotometry using the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1987).

REFERENCES

AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970

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ENEMY LOSSES

The intensity of combat has decreased during 1970, causing a reduction in casualties on both sides, but friendly casualties are falling at a much greater rate than are those of the enemy, indicating a greater combat effectiveness on the part of the Division. Enemy KIA have fallen from 7,534 during the first ten months of 1969 to 4,948 during the same period in 1970, a reduction of 34.3%, while friendly KIA have dropped from 954 to 373, a reduction of 60.8%. Additionally, the amount of individual and crew-served weapons captured by 1st Marine Division units has experienced a decline. During the first ten months of 1969, 1,907 individual and 213 crew-served weapons were captured, compared to 1,133 and 90 from January through October 1970. These figures represent decreases of 40.4% for individual and 57.6% for crew-served weapons. The greater decline in number of crew-served weapons may be an indication that the enemy is either unwilling or unable to adequately supply his troops with such weapons.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED IN ACTIONCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

A gradual diminution of the intensity of combat in Calendar Year 1970 has served to reduce the number of enemy casualties from the 1969 level. Through October 1969, the enemy had sustained 7,534 KIA, while the cumulative total through October 1970 is 4,948, a reduction of 2,586 over the ten month period representing a decrease of 34.3%. The monthly average for 1970 is 495 enemy KIA, but the monthly frequency has shown a fairly steady downward trend, highs of 1022 and 723 having been recorded in January and February 1970 and lows of 150 and 154 in September and October 1970, respectively. Should this trend continue, the cumulative total for 1970 will be in the vicinity of 5,200 enemy Killed in Action, a significant reduction of almost 50% from Calendar Year 1969. However, friendly KIA have been reduced at an even greater rate (a 60.8% reduction through October 1970 (See 3-1a)), reflecting the increasing combat efficiency of the Division.

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CUMULATIVE ENEMY INDIVIDUAL/CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTUREDCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The enemy has lost an average of 113 individual and 9 crew-served weapons monthly through October 1970, compared to monthly averages of 191 and 21 through October 1969, representing decreases of 40% and 58%, respectively. When these figures are compared to the reduction in enemy KIA of 34% (See 3-3a), it is immediately apparent that the enemy is being more successful at conserving his weapons than he is his soldiers' lives. This could indicate either the enemy's inability to properly equip his troops or his unwillingness to jeopardize precious weapons. Another possible explanation is that a number of the groups of enemy engaged this year have been resupply parties including a sizable percentage of unarmed bearers. The trend toward a lower number of enemy weapon losses is expected to continue.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMPLETED INDIVIDUAL PRISON CAPTURES

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) (CHINA) TWO DAYS LATER. AMONG CAPTURED.

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COMBINED UNIT PACIFICATION PROGRAM

Since its inception in November of 1969, the Combined Unit Pacification Program has brought some 31,000 Vietnamese people under the influence of its units. Over 13,000 of these people live in hamlets which have been upgraded to HES ratings of A or B during the presence of CUPP units in these hamlets. Currently there are 21 CUPPs in existence, their coverage now extending to 6.9% of the marginally secure or insecure hamlets (Category C or lower) in Quang Nam Province. One CUPP was disestablished on 10 October 1970 after having attained the objectives of upgrading the security of its assigned hamlet and improving the proficiency of its counterpart Popular Force unit to a point where the latter now can stand on its own with confidence. Although there has been no reduction in CUPP units due to redeployment, as additional Division forces redeploy in the future the CUPP units provided by these forces will be disestablished concurrently. Although CUPP units suffer more than 11% of the Division's killed in action and inflict only 4% of the enemy's losses, an intangible is the good will engendered by the members of CUPP's, who live and work among the people.

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NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

CARRIED OVER

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NOVEMBER EDITION


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (BLIND) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

1970-1971: "HARD ROCK"

1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 26



GRAND TOTAL OF INCREASE IN SECURE POPULATION	13231
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G-34a

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND
PERCENTAGE OF CATEGORY C OR BELOW HAMLETS COVERED BY CUPP.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart graphically portrays the growth of CUPP units in 1st Marine Division AO, which necessarily ceased with the redeployment of 26th Marines in March 1970, and shows percentage of hamlets in Category C and below in Quang Nam Province employing CUPPs. Category of hamlets are determined by the GVN Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Category A and B are secure with various degrees of political development. In Category C hamlets military control of the VC has been broken and most VC party apparatus is identified and its effectiveness is curtailed. Sniping and mining still occurs on routes to the hamlet. Without redeployment CUPP would have continued to expand. At present 17 of 21 hamlets covered by CUPP are in Category C or below. There are 306 Category C or below hamlets in Quang Nam Province.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CUPP CASUALTIES VS ENEMYLOSSES TO CUPP

This chart indicates both friendly KIA's and WIA(E)'s (reflected as total losses) and losses inflicted on the enemy as a result of CUPP action.

The increasing losses among CUPP personnel during March - June 1970 was attributed to the targetting of CUPP units, attesting to the stabilizing effect the CUPP has on the population. The sharp decrease in CUPP casualties since June 1970 reflects the VC's apparent abandonment of his priority effort to reduce the effectiveness of the CUPP.

For calendar year 1970 CUPP units are credited with 4% of the Division kills, while sustaining 11% of all Division killed in action. There are a total of 502 Marines/Navy personnel presently assigned to CUPP duty. 9.7% of the infantry squads in the Division are employed as CUPP units.

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6-3-4c

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUPP CASUALTIES VS ENEMY LOSSES TO CUPP,

1962 MAR YEAR 1962/1970

1970 FRIENDLY

ENEMY

AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969												3	3
CUPP KIA												13	13
CUPP WIA												16	16
TOT CUPP												20	29
EN KIA												29	29
EW/HOI CM												49	49
TOT EN													
1970													41
CUPP KIA	3	5	3	8	7	8	2	3	1	1			179
CUPP WIA	35	25	5	15	19	31	16	14	10	9			220
TOT CUPP	38	30	8	23	26	39	18	17	11	10			211
EN KIA	25	23	27	20	34	23	11	12	19	17			130
HOI CM	23	35	28	2	6	3	19	4	1	9			341
EN	48	58	55	22	40	26	30	16	20	26			

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SUPPORTING ARMS

The amount of ordnance delivered by supporting arms has shown a steady decrease during calendar year 1970. For example, over 179,000 artillery rounds were expended during January 1970 compared to just over 50,000 in October 1970. The decrease in artillery ammunition expended is due in part to the reduction in the number of weapons available, down from 156 at the end of January to 74 at the end of October, and in part to the steady reduction in enemy sightings, down from 4,425 in January to 878 in October, both of which correlate quite closely to expenditure of ammunition.

As in the case of artillery, naval gunfire has steadily decreased in volume from 5,583 rounds in January to only 561 rounds in October 1970. This decrease can be attributed directly to the sharp cut-back in the number of ships available--the number of ship-days on station having dwindled from 37 in January 1970 to 7 in October--which, in turn, is a result of a reduction in the number of targets available which are suitable for naval gunfire.

As the graph amply demonstrates (See 3-5d), fixed wing fighter/attack sorties dropped precipitously during the latter half of 1969, reached a virtual plateau in the first five months of 1970, but since the beginning of June have fallen fairly steadily to a seventeen month low of 365 in October 1970. This decrease in support for the Division is due to a reduction in 1st MAW aircraft assets because of redeployment, the gradual reduction in enemy activity and, of course, the onset of reduced visibility weather in the late months of both years.

The employment of supporting arms should continue to decrease as enemy activity decreases and, as a direct or indirect consequence, redeployment continues.

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C-3-5

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDEDVS ENEMY SIGHTED CALENDAR YEAR 1970

This chart shows the relationship between artillery ammunition expended and enemy sighted since January 1970. One can easily see that the lines on the chart are somewhat parallel. Except for the ammunition expenditure for August 1970, both ammunition expenditures and enemy sighted have been declining at a fairly steady rate since January 1970. The increase in the ammunition expenditure for August 1970 can be attributed to the 10,000 round preparation fired for Operation Imperial Lake during the last days of the month. The nose dive decrease in expenditure of ammunition for the month of October 1970 is partially attributable to the continued decrease in enemy activity and partially to the change in policy requiring that unobserved pre-emptive/intelligence targets plotting within 1000 meters of a friendly hamlet/village will not be fired upon. Increases/decreases in ammunition expenditures are expected to continue to closely parallel increases/decreases in enemy activity.

31 OCT 70
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
G-3-5a

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), W/ 1ST AIRBORNE DIVISION, HAWAII, 3 V. 15, 1945

2019年10月10日 星期四

1947-1948-1949

[illegible]

* AMMO EXPENDITURES IN THOUSANDS EXPRESSED TO NEAREST HUNDRED

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Q-3-5a

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), ARTILLERY PIECES AVAILABLE VS
AMMUNITION EXPENDED CALENDAR YEAR 1970

It is easy to see from the graph that the number of artillery pieces available decreased as division units were redeployed. However, it should be noted that as this happened the remaining artillery pieces were constantly repositioned so that essentially the same area was covered. At first glance the graph would appear to indicate that the number of artillery pieces available has a direct correlation to the number of rounds expended. Closer perusal reveals that during the period June to July 1970 the number of pieces available remained constant, yet the rounds expended per month took a drop from 144,985 to 114,288. One also sees that during the month of August 1970 the available pieces dropped by 12, yet the ammunition expenditure increased by 13,468 rounds. Also, during the month of October 1970 the number of pieces available remained at 74 while the ammunition expenditure dropped drastically from 100,909 to 50,735. It should be noted that during October 1970 a change in policy was made requiring that unobserved pre-emptive/intelligence targets plotting within 1000 meters of a friendly hamlet/village will not be fired upon. From the above, one would surmise that the ammunition expended has more of a correlation to the need for fire support and the total area covered than it does to the number of artillery pieces available. Therefore, should enemy activity continue to decrease, it is logical to assume that ammunition expenditures will also decrease.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REGIN), 1ST MARINE DIVISION, 1ST MARINE DIVISION

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REGIN), 1ST MARINE DIVISION, 1ST MARINE DIVISION



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 ANNO	178.2	189.8	158.3	151.7	156.9	184.1	187.1	186.4	132.4	159.4	169.6	163.6	2017.7*
PCS 4.2"	32	24	24	12	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	
105	83	77	78	78	66	66	66	66	66	72	72	72	
155	50	48	42	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	
8"/175	6/4	6/4	6/6	6/12	6/12	6/12	6/12	6/12	6/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	
TOTAL	173	159	156	144	144	144	144	144	144	156	156	156	
70 ANNO	179.1	156.0	139.6	140.8	145.0	130.4	114.3	127.7	100.9	50.7			
PCS 4.2"	24	24	18	18	18	18	18	18	12	12			
105	72	72	54	54	54	54	54	54	36	36			
155	36	36	30	30	26	26	26	26	20	20			
8"/175	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	6/6	6/0	6/0			
TOTAL	156	156	126	126	122	122	122	110	74	74			

* AMMO EXPENDITURES IN THOUSANDS EXPRESSED TO THE NEAREST HUNDRED

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6-3-56

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), NGF SHIP DAYS ON STATIONVS NGF ROUNDS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

As one can readily discern from the graph, the decrease in the amount of naval gunfire rounds expended is highly correlated with the number of ship-days of NGF support on station. Reference to the chart contained in Section III 3-5c will also reveal a close correlation between NGF support on station/NGF rounds expended and enemy activity. Because of the steady decrease in enemy activity, the requirement for NGF support has decreased. NGF in the Division AO is presently being employed only in the Elephant Valley area due to the range of targets in other areas. Due to the limited number of suitable targets which can be observed from OP's, NGF is primarily fired during the hours of darkness on intelligence targets. The nature of terrain in the Elephant Valley area severely hampers ground damage assessment, hence the effectiveness of NGF is difficult to ascertain. The nature of current operations, terrain features and the availability of artillery limits the usefulness of NGF in the Division AO. If the enemy activity continues to decrease, it is expected that the requirement for NGF support will decrease, and thus the number of rounds expended will also decrease.

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G-3-5c

1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN) HAVE 6 MONTHS' STAY-BOYS ON STATION VERSUS

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

[illegible]

G-3-5c

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES; CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The significant decrease of fighter/attack sorties in October 1969 coincides with the phase out and withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division, VMFA-334 (F-4B) and VMA (AW)-533 (A-6). 1st Division and 3d Division records were combined by 1st Wing up to this point. The February 1970 drop in sorties represents the departure of MAG-12, while the subsequent increase is related to improved operating weather. Fixed wing sorties rate reductions by the 1st Wing commenced on 17 August 1970, however, the effect was absorbed by the impact of the departure of MAG-13 in October and reduced operating weather. Monsoon weather effects will have a greater impact on fixed wing sorties than on helicopter activities. Furthermore, ground operations do not appear to have as great an impact on fixed wing sorties due to an ability to reassign targets to be attacked rather than request increased sorties. Fighter/attack sorties are expected to remain at approximately their present level for the remainder of the monsoon season unless more lucrative targets appear.

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G-3-5d

187 MARINE DIVISION (RDLIN) MAR 19 1964 PRINTER/ATTN: OFFICE, CALENDAR

187 MARINE DIVISION (RDLIN) MAR 19 1964 PRINTER/ATTN: OFFICE, CALENDAR

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[illegible]

* JANUARY - MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

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HELICOPTER SUPPORT

1st Marine Aircraft Wing statistics recorded support of the 1st Division and 3d Division together in 1969. However, 1970 data reflects only 1st Division support and provides an accurate portrayal of the level of Division activity, available air support assets and the direct effects of weather. Helicopter support received is a direct function of the support requested. The primary variable is the 1st Wing's ability to provide the support in terms of available assets and operating weather. Thusfar in 1970 the 1st Marine Division has received 71% of the helicopter flight time flown by the 1st Wing with the remaining 29% going to the other units in III MAF and XXIV Corps. During October, the Division received 65% of the helicopter effort; however, during this same period there was a 17% decrease in the number of missions requested by the Division when compared to September 1970 figures. Seventy-three percent of Division's missions requested were completed with a 23% loss of missions to monsoon weather. Poor weather and a reduced demand explain October's 22% decrease in flight time, 38% decrease in passenger totals and 37% decrease in cargo totals from September's tallies. The creation of a quick reaction helicopter package for the 5th Regiment and possibly the 1st Regiment will increase support requests slightly. Helicopter support received for the remainder of 1970 will vary directly with the available operating weather and the activities of both infantry Regiments.

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HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME

Monsoon weather effects are noteworthy from October 1969 through February 1970. The peak months for Division activity, favorable operating weather and maximum asset availability were May, June and July 1970. A pattern of diminishing monthly flight time begins in August with the departure of HMM-161 (21 CH-46D flying an average of 800 hours per month) and establishment of the 1st MAW policy of limiting flight hours to reduce and realign helicopter utilization in consonance with CNO guidelines. The full impact of the latter is noted in September, in addition to the stand-down of the 7th Regiment and elements of the 11th Regiment. The reduced air support requirements in October, coupled with six days of unflyable weather, reduced flight time to a level at which the 1st MAW utilization policy was no longer significant. Monthly flight time for the remainder of 1970 is expected to fluctuate in the vicinity of 5,000 hours.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION IN) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

2003-04-21 02:00 PM 1990



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) PASSENGER TOTALSCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Passenger totals are indicative of a level of activity but do not address the specific reason for movement. Also, helicopter after action reporting duplicates passenger counts on subsequent sorties. Therefore, analysis of this data can only say accurately that May, June and July 1970 were exceptionally active months for the 1st Division supported with maximum helicopter flight time which is a function of reduced activity, reduced assets, and reduced operating weather. It is anticipated that the impact of these factors will dampen out as the level of activity settles down for the remainder of the 1970-71 monsoon season.

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C-3-66

1ST MARINE DIVISION (PITN) LOCATION FOR DISSEMINATING INFORMATION YEARING 1960/1970

[illegible]

* JANUARY - MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE.

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G. E. 6b

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) CARGO TOTALS

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Although monthly cargo totals can be remotely related to flight hours, a more accurate comparison can be made to the level of ground activity of Division units. Artillery resupply contributes greatly to the overall total and the decrease in cargo carried reflects the withdrawal of eight artillery batteries during September and October 1970 as well as the departure of the 7th Regiment. Some decrease in artillery expenditure resulting from Operation Hoang Dieu will be offset by the deteriorating road conditions during the monsoon season. Therefore, cargo totals during the remainder of 1970 can be expected to remain at or remain at or near the October level.


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G-3-6e

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) 1969-1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TONS						9836	10471	8621	5629	4813	3280	3207	45857*
1970													
TONS	3963	3485	3962	4164	5937	5138	4000	3804	3867	2510			

* JANUARY - MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE.

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G-3-6c

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G-4 OVERVIEW

The status of operational readiness for combat essential items within the 1st Marine Division remains excellent. All but five Division units are in a C-1 status. The five units are in a C-2 status essentially due to a relatively small number of end items which are either deficient or cause continual maintenance problems.

The overall readiness of combat essential items has been constantly improving during 1970 and now has reached 92.2%. All of the commodity groups substantially exceed the minimum Marine Corps standard except the engineer category. As of 31 October, the percentage of equipment operationally ready in the engineer commodity group has risen to 76%, from 73% on 30 September. In addition, the percentage of items that are deficient has been reduced from 11% to 5%.

The progress of the Department of Defense program to transfer certain selected items to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces has been excellent. The high acceptance rate of 93.8% (2,798 items accepted of 2,980) is attributed to the splendid efforts of recently deployed units.

The monthly total of malaria cases has dropped from 346 cases in September 1970 to 256 cases in October 1970 and is a significant reduction from the 396 cases during October 1969. With a continued emphasis on malaria prevention, total monthly cases are not expected to increase from October 1970 to November 1970 as they did for the corresponding months of 1969.

The case rates of venereal disease for each month of 1970 show no appreciable change and the monthly totals have been dropping proportionately since July 1970 with the reduction in troop strength. There were 153 cases of venereal disease during October 1970.

31 OCT 70

SECRET

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), UNIT FORSTAT RATING AS OF 31 OCT 70

This chart reflects the consistently high degree of operational readiness existing in the 1st Marine Division. The circumstances degrading the readiness of five units to C-2 are as follows:

a. The Headquarters Companies of the Infantry Regiments are affected by a high deadline rate for the AN/TRC-27B Radio.

b. Headquarters Battery, 11th Marines is experiencing a high deadline rate for PU-668 and PU-669 generators and is T/E deficient in PU-670 generators.

c. 1st Engineer Battalion is adversely affected by a high deadline rate for RFK-60 Forklifts, M51A2 Dump Trucks, Floodlight Trailers, and PU-667 generators. The operational readiness is also adversely affected by the low density combat essential equipment base, the high usage Engineer Equipment factor, and a deficiency of 33 items of T/E equipment.

d. 1st Medical Battalion is degraded by a T/E deficiency of PU-710 and PU-712 generators.

31 OCT 70
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970

This chart reflects the continuing upward trend in operational readiness of combat essential equipment during 1970. All CMC objectives have been attained and/or exceeded. Especially noteworthy is the percentage of equipment in an operationally ready status, exceeding 92% compared to the CMC objective of 85%.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), 'READINESS STATUS OF COMB' ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

1970

The graph displays the percentage of time spent in four activities throughout the year. The Y-axis represents the percentage, ranging from 0% to 100% in increments of 10%. The X-axis lists the months from JAN to DEC. The activities are represented by different line styles: IN/T (solid line), HORS (dashed line), NORM (dotted line), and OR (dash-dot line). The NORM activity is consistently at 0%. The IN/T activity shows a peak in the summer months (JUL, AUG) and a low in the winter months (JAN, FEB). The HORS activity shows a peak in the spring months (MAY, JUN) and a low in the winter months (JAN, FEB). The OR activity shows a peak in the spring months (MAY, JUN) and a low in the winter months (JAN, FEB).

Month	IN/T (%)	HORS (%)	NORM (%)	OR (%)
JAN	10	10	0	10
FEB	10	10	0	10
MAR	20	20	0	20
APR	20	20	0	20
MAY	20	20	0	20
JUN	20	20	0	20
JUL	30	30	0	30
AUG	30	30	0	30
SEP	20	20	0	20
OCT	20	20	0	20
NOV	10	10	0	10
DEC	10	10	0	10

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

(COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart reflects the continuing excellent overall status for communication-electronics equipment. The only significant problem item in this group is Radio Set AN/TRC 27B. Of 37 on hand only 4 are operationally ready. The remainder are deadlined, principally due to a deficiency of PU-278 generators.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT COMMUNICATIONS

ETHIOPIA), CALABAR WARS 1969/1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970



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U-4-20

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

(MOTOR TRANSPORT), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The operationally ready status of Motor Transport equipment continues to improve and to exceed the CMC standard of 85%.

Current operational readiness stands at 93% and the only significant problem item within this commodity area is the M51A2 Dump Truck. Of the 24 on hand 18 (75%) are operational. There is no specific trend or problem in the deadline of these vehicles.

31 OCT 70

A-4-26

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT)

1967 1968 1969 1970

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

(ORDNANCE), CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970


The operational readiness of ordnance equipment continues to be excellent. There are no problem items.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT INFANTRY EQUIPMENT (ORGANIZATION)



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

(ENGINEER), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Although not attaining the CMC standard of 83%, the combat readiness of engineer equipment has improved and now stands at 76%.

Recent T/E allowance changes for 600/700 series generators and the non-availability of assets to fill the T/E deficiencies caused by these changes have contributed materially to the low operational readiness of the Division's engineer equipment. Of 227 generators authorized, only 67% (153) are on hand. Deadlines decrease the overall operational readiness of these generators to 45% (102).


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REFIN), ON BOARD USS "LST-1161" (ENGINEER)

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
INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIAL TO RVNAF

The chart on the opposite page reflects the current status of the turnover of major end items to the RVNAF, a Department of Defense initiated program. Portrayed is the high acceptance rate of equipment offered by Division units, a rate directly attributable to the efforts of the invoicing units to repair on the spot equipment initially questioned as to serviceability by RVNAF inspectors. As indicated below, a total of 2,980 items of Communications-Electronics, Ordnance and Motor Transport items were offered during the period 17 August through 9 October, of which 2,798 items with a total value of \$1,232,805.00 were accepted, an acceptance rate of 93.8%. The program is now inactive until the next phase of redeployment.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY OFFERED</u>	<u>QUANTITY ACCEPTED</u>	<u>VALUE</u>
RADIO SET PRC 25	317	312	\$270816.00
MINE DETECTORS	476	65	46865.00
GRENADE LAUNCHER M79	128	114	28728.00
MACHINE GUN MOUNT M122	112	111	7548.00
MACHINE GUN M-60	79	73	46428.00
RIFLE, M-16	1563	1501	204136.00
PISTOL, CAL 45	551	496	28272.00
SEMI TRLR 25T	3	0	
TRUCK M54	1	1	11878.00
TRUCK, DUMP, M51	10	8	121160.00
AMBULANCE, M718	4	3	12315.00
TRUCK, M37B1	12	5	23165.00
RADIO SET GRC 125	48	40	43360.00
PUBLIC ADDRESS SET PIQ-5	10	10	1250.00
WATER TRLR, M149	4	0	
TRUCK, M151	7	6	18822.00
TRLR, M105	3	1	905.00
NIGHT VISION SIGHT, AN/PVS-2	30	30	90000.00
HOWITZER, 105MM	18	18	273600.00
TELE-TYPE SET AN/GGC-3	1	1	1730.00
MACH GUN, CAL 50	3	3	1827.00
TOTALS	2980	2798	\$1,232,805.00

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Date	10-11-70	10-11-70	10-11-70	10-11-70	10-11-70
17 Aug	8.50	8.50	8.50	8.50	8.50
26 Aug	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50
27 Aug	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50
1 Sep	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50
12 Sep	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50
14 Sep	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50
15 Sep	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50
25 Sep	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50
26 Sep	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50
1 Oct	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50
2 Oct	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50
3 Oct	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50
5 Oct	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50
6 Oct	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50
8 Oct	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50	12.50
9 Oct	13.50	14.00	13.50	14.00	13.50

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G-4-3

MEDICAL OVERVIEW

The next three charts present malaria and venereal disease incidence information in 1st Marine Division during periods 1 January through 31 December 1969 and 1 January through 31 October 1970. During October 1969, 396 cases of malaria occurred in 1st Marine Division of which 293 cases were acquired in the 7th Marines TAOR, a hyperendemic malaria area. As a result of command awareness of this number one health problem and the enforcement of malaria protective measures, it is seen that during October 1970 total cases (256) are significantly lower than the total for October 1969 (396). No significant differences in venereal disease case rates per thousand personnel have occurred between 1969 and 1970. As a reduction in troop strength has occurred, the total cases each month since July 1970 have declined proportionately.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), MALARIA INCIDENCECALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Human malaria is the most significant Public Health problem in the 1st Marine Division.


It is caused by a protozoan and is transmitted to man by the bite of the Anopheline mosquito. Two forms of the disease are present in Military Region I. They are vivax and falciparum malaria. Falciparum malaria is far more serious than vivax in that brain, lung, or kidney complications may result. Fatality rates may reach as high as 10% in untreated cases; no higher than 0.5% in treated cases. Relapse and repeat infections are infrequent; less than 1%. The most essential malaria preventive measures are: prevention of mosquito bites (repellent, clothing, bed and head nets), chemoprophylaxis (C-P tablets), and killing the mosquito through spraying. Chemoprophylaxis is almost 100% effective against vivax malaria and is only partially effective against falciparum malaria. In 1st Marine Division, falciparum malaria represents more than 66% of total cases.

There has been a very minor reduction in the number of personnel deployed in the Que Son Mountain area, which contributes over 70% of the malaria, however, cases for October 1970 (256) are significantly below the figures for the same period in 1969 (396). Current command awareness and enforcement of malaria protective measures in the 5th Marines TAOR and a command sponsored Field Malaria Indoctrination program are considered to have contributed to the reduced number of malaria cases.

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NAVY MARINE DIVISION (REFIN) UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, CLEVELAND, OHIO



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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), VENEREAL DISEASE INCIDENCECALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The cumulative incidence of venereal disease from 1 January to 31 October 1969 and from 1 January to 31 October 1970 approximate each other very closely, totalling 2,282 in the former case, 2,307 in the latter. However, since the average division strength during the 1969 period was some 24,400, while the average for 1970 is 21,200, the case rate per thousand for the first ten months of 1970 (10.9) is considerable higher than that for the comparable 1969 period (9.3). The 1969 case rate eventually reached 9.4 cases/1000, whereas the 1970 case rate should exceed 11.0 cases/1000. This latter case rate is projected because the number of cases per month should remain relatively stable for the remainder of the year, yielding case rates of about 11.5 each month.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), 1ST MCD, VERMONT, IN THE PROCEEDENCE




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1. MARINE DIVISION (RUM) - VETERAN SURVIVAL INCIDENCE AND CASE RATE/1000

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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Journal of Management Inquiry 19(4) 403-418

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* ANNUAL RATE

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G-5 OVERVIEW

The character of Civic Action has undergone a significant and continuous change throughout Calendar Year 1970.

In 1969, and the first few months of 1970, III Marine Amphibious Force was the senior U.S. headquarters in Military Region I, and there was a significant U.S. Navy presence. From December 1969, to March 1970, the 26th Marines, with a typical support package, was attached to 1st Marine Division. In 1969, the 1st Marine Division had a PsyOp/Civic Action AIK Fund allocation of 500,000\$VN per month.

The conditions as stated in the preceding paragraph all had significant effects upon the 1st Marine Division Civic Action Program and are important because they no longer exist.

III Marine Amphibious Force as the senior U.S. headquarters in Military Region I was the recipient of considerable support through the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund. This support included funds and materials. 1st Marine Division shared in the funds primarily by participating in the General WALT Scholarship Program, but also received a proportionate share of Civic Action materials donated through the Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Program. In view of the continually decreasing support received, III Marine Amphibious Force terminated the General WALT Scholarship Program on 30 May 1970, and materials are available in increasingly smaller quantities.

As the service manager for Project Handclasp, the U.S. Navy presence in the Danang area, assured a considerable amount of Handclasp materials directed to U.S. military forces in Military Region I. In addition, the 1st Marine Division had an arrangement with the U.S. Naval Support Activity wherein materials for civic action projects could be purchased with Civic Action AIK Funds at about one third the Vietnamese open market price.

When XXIV Corps became the senior U.S. military headquarters in Military Region I, the quantity of Project Handclasp materials was reduced to that donated specifically to 1st Marine Division, and the U.S. Army Logistic Command does not permit transactions involving AIK Funds, which left the Vietnamese open market as the source for AIK Fund materials.

In 1970, the 26th Marines and the 7th Marines, with support packages, have been withdrawn from Vietnam. The loss of these units resulted in a significant but, because of changing conditions, immeasurably reduced civic action capability.

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Finally, in Calendar Year 1970, the PayOps/Civic Action AIK Funds have been halved each quarter, beginning on 1 January 1970. On 1 April 1970, the division received the III MAF account, with the result that the monthly allocation of funds has dropped from 500,000\$VN per month in 1969 to 150,000\$VN per month subsequent to 1 July 1970.

By measurable comparison, the total 1970 1st Marine Division Civic Action effort has shown an increase over 1969. This increase has resulted from the excesses of non-combat essential expendable construction materials created in connection with phased troop reductions, and by a significant engineer effort in connection with Vietnamese resettlement projects and irrigation systems.

At the present time, excess non-combat essential construction materials for civic action projects appear to be exhausted, or are earmarked for a new Vietnamese resettlement project. This has appeared to be the case for several months, however, and materials have been found and projects have been completed.

For the near future, 1st Marine Division Civic Action Programs will be sustained by excess materials salvaged from abandoned cantonments. How long and on what scale depends upon future undetermined plans for Military Region I. Ultimately, and in keeping with the policy of Vietnamization, the 1st Marine Division Civic Action Program will decline in scope and shift increasingly from material assistance to technical assistance until it ceases to exist.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (RUCN), 1ST BATTALION OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION (LABOR)

1ST MARINE DIVISION (RUCN) 1ST BATTALION OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION (LABOR) 1969/1970
1970 PERCENTAGE



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
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