

DECLASSIFIED

COMMAND INFORMATION NOTEBOOK FOR NOVEMBER 1970

G-1

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONTENTS

I. <u>Introduction</u> . . . . .	INTRO
II. <u>G-1 Section</u>	
A. G-1 Overview . . . . .	G-1
B. Division Strength and Force Structure. . . . .	1-1
C. 1st Term Reenlistment Rates. . . . .	1-2
D. Congressional/Special Inquiry Correspondence . . . . .	1-3
E. Decorations and Purple Heart Medals. . . . .	1-4
F. Law and Discipline . . . . .	1-5
1. Trials Involving Crimes of Violence. . . . .	1-5a
2. Unauthorized Absence Report. . . . .	1-5b
3. Confined Marines . . . . .	1-5c
4. Bad Conduct and Dishonorable Discharges. . . . .	1-5d
5. Administrative Discharges. . . . .	1-5e
6. Actions Concerning Drug Abuse. . . . .	1-5f
7. Racial Incidents . . . . .	1-5g
8. Fraggings Incidents . . . . .	1-5h
G. Ground Safety. . . . .	1-6
1. Battle vs Non-Battle Casualties. . . . .	1-6a
2. Non-Battle Casualties 1969/1970. . . . .	1-6b
3. Supporting Arms Friendly Fire Incidents. . . . .	1-6c
4. Individual Weapons Friendly Fire Incidents. . . . .	1-6d
5. Accidental Discharges. . . . .	1-6e
6. Explosive Ordnance Incidents . . . . .	1-6f
7. Motor Vehicle Accidents. . . . .	1-6g
8. Operational/Occupational Incidents . . . . .	1-6h
H. Savings Bond/Savings Deposit Programs. . . . .	1-7
III. <u>G-2 Section</u>	
A. G-2 Overview . . . . .	G-2

# DECLASSIFIED

B. Estimated Enemy Strength, Quang Nam Province. . . . .	2-1
C. Deployment of Reconnaissance Teams. . . . .	2-2
D. Sensors Employed. . . . .	2-3
E. Targetable Sensor Activations. . . . .	2-4
F. Precipitation, Quang Nam Province . . . . .	2-5
G. Enemy Activity . . . . .	2-6
1. Enemy Rockets/Mortar Rounds/Lob Bombs . . . . .	2-6a
2. Enemy Sighted vs Enemy KIA/Ordnance Received . . . . .	2-6b
IV. <u>G-3 Section</u>	
A. G-3 Overview . . . . .	G-3
B. Friendly Casualties . . . . .	3-1
1. Friendly Killed in Action . . . . .	3-1a
2. Friendly Wounded in Action . . . . .	3-1b
C. Mines and Booby Traps. . . . .	3-2
1. Casualties from Mines/Booby Traps. . . . .	3-2a
2. Percentage of Mine/Booby Trap Casualties to Total Casualties . . . . .	3-2b
3. Comparison of Mines/Booby Traps Found to Mines/Booby Traps Detonated. . . . .	3-2c
D. Enemy Losses . . . . .	3-3
1. Enemy Killed in Action . . . . .	3-3a
2. Enemy Individual/Crew Served Weapons captured. . . . .	3-3b
E. Combined Unit Pacification Program . . . . .	3-4
1. Hamlet Population Under CUPP Influence and Increase in Population in Secure Hamlets . . . . .	3-4a
2. CUPP Units Established and Percentage of Category C or Below Hamlets Covered by CUPP. . . . .	3-4b
3. CUPP Casualties vs Enemy Losses to CUPP. . . . .	3-4c
F. Supporting Arms. . . . .	3-5
1. Artillery Ammunition Expended vs Enemy Sighted. . . . .	3-5a

30 NOV 1970

DECLASSIFIED

2.	Artillery Pieces Available vs Artillery. . . . .	.3-5b
	Ammunition Expended	
3.	Naval Gunfire Ship-Days on Station vs Naval. .3-5c	
	Gunfire Ammunition Expended	
4.	Fixed Wing Fighter/Attack Sorties. . . . .	.3-5d
G.	Helicopter Support. . . . .	.3-6
1.	Helicopter Flight Time . . . . .	.3-6a
2.	Helicopter Passenger Totals. . . . .	.3-6b
3.	Helicopter Cargo Totals. . . . .	.3-6c
V. <u>G-4 Section</u>		
A.	G-4 Overview . . . . .	G-4
B.	Unit FORSTAT Rating. . . . .	4-1
C.	Combat Essential Equipment. . . . .	4-2
1.	Combat Essential Equipment (Comm-Elect). . . .	4-2a
2.	Combat Essential Equipment (Motor Transport). .	4-2b
3.	Combat Essential Equipment (Ordnance) . . . .	4-2c
4.	Combat Essential Equipment (Engineer) . . . .	4-2d
D.	Interservice Transfer of Equipment to RVNAF . . .	4-3
E.	Preventive Medicine. . . . .	4-4
1.	Incidence and Case Rate of Malaria. . . . .	4-4a
2.	Incidence and Case Rate of Venereal Disease . .	4-4b
VI. <u>G-5 Section</u>		
A.	G-5 Overview. . . . .	G-5
B.	Cost of Civic Action. . . . .	.5-1
C.	Vietnamese Participation in Civic Action. . . . .	.5-2
D.	Vietnamese Treated by MEDCAP/DENTCAP. . . . .	.5-3

30 NOV 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

INTRODUCTION

The trends of reduction in combat activity and improvement of the 1st Marine Division's performance established earlier in calendar year 1970 continued through November and gave indications that they would continue to the end of the year and into 1971. Division strength, reduced by increment III and IV redeployments from a peak of over 31,000 in November 1969 to less than 12,500 at the end of October 1970, increased slightly during November, but remained in the general vicinity of 12,500. Estimated enemy strength, on the other hand, continued to decline, sliding to a figure less than 9,000. This represents a decrease of over 3,000 from the strength estimated in January 1970 and almost 7,000 from the January 1969 figure. The enemy's reversion to guerrilla tactics and continued pressure by friendly forces further reduced enemy sightings to less than 600, down almost 4,000 from January 1970. Enemy ordnance received -- rockets, mortar rounds and lob bombs -- also fell sharply during November, from 164 rounds in October and over 650 in January 1970 to only 34 in November. Most of the indicators in the area of personnel administration, being largely a function of Division strength, remained on a steady course or increased or decreased slightly, while aircraft usage increased somewhat because of the more favorable weather experienced in November than in October, a month of heavy rainfall and marginal visibility.

Although the indices of the level of combat activity continue to fall, the Division continues to maintain and enhance its record of performance. Friendly casualties have declined from over 1,000 killed and 8,800 wounded during the first eleven months of 1969 to 392 killed and 3,500 wounded in the comparable period of 1970, a decrease of over 61%. Enemy KIA and losses of individual weapons have decreased much more slowly over the same time span, his troops suffering over 5,000 KIA and losing almost 1,200 individual weapons over the first eleven months of 1970 compared to figures of about 8,500 and 2,150 through November 1970, representing decreases of 41% and 45%, respectively. The loss of crew served weapons by the enemy has declined by 60%, from 232 to 93 through November of each year, showing that he is still guarding carefully whatever supply of these weapons he has. Casualties inflicted on the Division by surprise firing devices continued to decline, but because overall casualties also declined, the percentage caused by mines and booby traps remained at about 45%. However, the ratio of such devices found to those detonated with casualties continued to climb, registering 3.55:1 in November and raising the average annual ratio to 1.90:1. This increase attests inter alia to the value of the vigorous program of instruction in mine warfare conducted by 1st Engineer Battalion. Further indications of the excellent performance of the Division include the continued C-1 Combat Readiness Status of the Division and the high percentage of equipment maintained operationally ready by Division units. In all categories except engineer equipment, this indicator exceeds Marine Corps objectives by a comfortable margin, and even engineer equipment, a low-density, high-usage category, continued to approach the USMC standard during November.

During November, the Division continued to carry the battle to the enemy. Operation Imperial Lake, begun with a massive 13,000 round artillery preparation at the end of August and characterized by the extensive use of company and platoon patrol bases, reconnaissance teams and quick reaction forces, is forcing

16 DEC 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

INTRO-1

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

the enemy to abandon large quantities of his equipment and foodstuffs. November also saw the beginning of the end for the rainy season, just over ten inches of rain falling during the month compared to over 24 inches in October. The consequent increase in favorable weather served as a stimulus for certain indicators, increases being recorded in fighter/attack sorties, helicopter flight time in support of the Division, and the number of Division passengers carried on 1st MAW helicopters.

December 1970 and the early months of 1971 should see a continuation of the trends established so far in 1970. There are no indications that the enemy has the ability to mount any offensive action beyond his present, relatively sedate efforts, therefore a continuation of a low level of enemy activity can be anticipated. Additionally, one example may serve to illustrate the improving efficiency of Division Marines. Through 15 December, only nine surprise firing devices have been detonated, whereas 57 such devices have been discovered and destroyed. Such continued improvement in favorable indicators is expected to continue in the foreseeable future.

16 DEC 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

G-1 OVERVIEW

Personnel management has kept pace with the force structure reductions of the past year, as evidenced by the Command being continuously in Combat Readiness Category C-1. In other administrative areas involving such subjects as morale, discipline, and personnel services, appropriate norms of effectiveness have been rather well maintained. Abstracts of these norms, as well as over and under achievements, are presented below:

a. The Division strength, during the past two years, rose from a January 1969 level of 24,000 to an all time Vietnam high of 31,283 in November 1969. Commencing with the January Phase III Redeployment, force structure reductions initiated a sharp decrease in strength. By the end of November 1970 the Division strength rested at 12,530. (See Tab 1-1)

b. The first-term reenlistment rate of 40% for the first eleven months of 1970 is below the 1969 rate of 54%, but it is 24% higher than the Fleet Marine Corps Pacific, First Quarter FY-71, average. Although the recent data suggests that the end-December 1970 rate will decrease to 38% the trend set by the rates of the past five months is an increasing one. (See Tab 1-2)

c. Congressional and special interest correspondence was received at a steady rate of about 4.5 pieces per 1,000 strength during 1969. However, beginning in early 1970 the rate began to increase slightly and by the end of the eleventh month, the average rate had increased by approximately 18% to a rate of 5.3 per 1,000. The trend for August, September, October, and November indicates that the year-end rate will be essentially equivalent to the rate of the past three months, which averaged 5.6 per 1,000. (See Tab 1-3)

d. Decorations and Purple Heart Medals were awarded at the generally steady rate of one per twenty-five personnel during the first nine months of 1969. However, beginning in late 1969 and continuing through October 1970, the Purple Heart award rate reduced fairly uniformly to a ratio of 1/112 personnel at the end of November 1970. The ratio for all other awards followed a different pattern: in the last quarter of 1969, the rate dropped to one per 50 for a three-month period, and then during the first ten months of 1970 an increasing trend was established thus significantly raising the ratio to one per 17 personnel at the end of October (highest ratio for 1969-1970). The high rate for October is explained by the accelerated submission of meritorious awards prompted by the redeployments of the period. Due to the completion of the Phase IV Increment redeployments in October, the awards submission in November 1970 were reduced nearly 50%. (See Tab 1-4)

e. Trials involving crimes of violence occurred at essentially a level rate of six per 10,000 personnel during most of 1969. However, during November the rate began to rise and the year ended with a December rate of eight per 10,000. The rate continued to rise during the period January through June 1970 and averaged nine trials per 10,000 personnel. However, during the period July through November the

30 NOV 1970

DECLASSIFIED

rate fluctuated and averaged seven per 10,000 for the five-month period. The overall rate for 1970 was 8/10,000 and suggested a decreasing trend. (See Tab 1-5a)

i. Unauthorized absences for the first eleven months of this year ran at a rate of 11 per 10,000. The rates for July through November of this year (11, 9, 10, 10, 13, per 10,000) weakly imply that the rate for the remainder of the year will remain lower than last year's rate of 12 per 10,000 for the same period. (See Tab 1-5b)

g. Marines confined during the first eleven months of this year represented a confinement rate double that of the like period last year (47 versus 22 per 10,000). However, the rates for August through November 1970 declined sharply from 63 per 10,000 to 42 per 10,000. The decline was mainly due to the Commandant's administrative separation policy and CG, III MAF's policy of sending over-60-days confinees to Camp Pendleton. The confinement rates for the past six months (.64, .56, .42, .38, .42) predict a continuing but small decline for December. (See Tab 1-5c)

h. Punitive discharges for the first eleven months of this year are running at a 7% lower rate than for the same period last year (5.5/10,000 vs 5.9/10,000). Moreover, the rate for June through November 1970 is 35% less than the rate for January through May 1970, due primarily to the very low number of general courts-martial held during the last six months. (See Tab 1-5d)

l. Administrative discharges processed during the first eleven months of 1970 were nearly seven times those of 1969 (768 vs 114), thus reflecting implementation of the Commandant's extensive administrative separation policy. However, during August through November 1970 the discharge rate was down to a mean of 35 per 10,000 personnel compared to the rate of 51 per 10,000 for the previous four-month period (April-July 1970). The recent data suggests that the rates for the next two months will remain at about 35/10,000--considerably below the mid-1970 high of 65/10,000. (See Tab 1-5e)

j. Administrative and judicial action rates (non-judicial punishment, courts, and investigations) concerning drug abuse have increased by nearly 200% in the first eleven months of this year as compared to the like period last year thus reflecting not only a growing problem area but also intensified command attention. The monthly rate for administrative and judicial action remained practically constant at about 35 actions per 10,000 personnel during March through August 1970. However, the following months of September, October and November recorded significant increases to rates of 56, 43 and 53 per 10,000 respectively, thus indicating that the projected rates for December and January 1971 might also be higher than the previously stabilized mid-year rates. (See Tab 1-5f)

k. Racial incidents during 1970 occurred with such varying frequency that there has been no one trend established. While the number of incidents ranged from a high of ten in January to a low of zero in August, the fact that there were seven incidents in June highlights the unpredictable nature of such events. During the period of July through November the

30 NOV 1970



incidents numbered one, zero, one, one and three respectively, and while the numbers indicate consistency, they do not correlate with the strength reductions. (See Tab 1-5g)

1. Fragging incidents during the first eleven months of 1970 rather consistently averaged three incidents per month. However, when the incidents are normalized using personnel strengths, the resulting monthly rates increase from one to four per 10,000 during the period January through April, then drop sharply back to one per 10,000 for September and October and then rise sharply to six per 10,000 in November. Of significance is the fact that during the period January through April 1970 only two of fourteen incidents were solved, while during the succeeding seven months twelve of twenty-three cases were solved. The data suggests that the current trend in incidents is slightly upwards. (See Tab 1-5h)

m. Ground safety is the general category which not only embraces the subject of battle versus nonbattle casualties but also encompasses incidents involving friendly supporting arms, individual weapons outside a cantonment, accidental discharges, explosive ordnance, motor vehicle accidents and operational/occupational incidents. An analysis of each category reveals the following:

(1) There is no correlation between the battle and nonbattle casualty rates. However, although there was no consistent relationship between the 1969 and 1970 battle casualty rates, there was a definite similarity among the nonbattle casualty rates for the years 1969 and 1970. The latter rates were setting a generally level trend for both years.

(2) Concerning the various incidents involved in this groupment, only the subgroups of individual weapons, explosive ordnance and operational/occupational incidents exhibited increasing casualty rates in 1970 compared to the same period in 1969, as shown below:

RATE		
<u>(Casualties per 10,000 personnel)</u>		
<u>TYPE INCIDENT</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Supporting Arms		
Friendly Fire	15.0	7.0
Individual Weapons		
	3.0	4.0
Accidental Discharges	8.0	5.0
Explosive Ordnance	8.0	9.4
Motor Vehicle Accidents	4.5	4.0
Operational/Occupational	3.5	4.1
Incidents		
(See Tab 1-6)		

30 NOV 1970

DECLASSIFIED

n. Participation in the Savings Bond Program was just slightly higher in 1969 than in 1970 (73.8% vs 72.6%). On the other hand, participation in the Savings Deposit Program, although very small, was 20% higher during the first eleven months of this year as compared to the same period in 1969 (4.1% vs 3.4%). The trend during the last two months of October and November has been upward and is expected to continue. (See Tab 1-7)

30 NOV 1970

G-1

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DIVISION STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURECALENDAR YEARS 1969 AND 1970

During most of 1969, the Division strength was stabilized at the 24,000 level. In October of that year, a 6,000 strength increase was occasioned principally by the joining of the 26th Marines and the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. The Division continued to gain in personnel until 17 November 1969 when it reached the apex of its growth in South Vietnam--the strength figure stood momentarily at 31,283.

The next major strength change, driven by the force reduction, was characterized by a sharp and steady decline beginning in December 1969 and continuing through 1970. The result to date is that the Division on-board strength figure has been reduced by nearly 19,000 in the last twelve months. As of the end of November, the figure rests at 12,530.

The Division force structure during the first nine months of 1969 consisted of the normal nine infantry and four artillery battalions, plus support and reinforcing units. A structure change in October of that year increased the number of infantry battalions to twelve (with the addition of the 26th Marines) and the number of artillery battalions to five (1st Battalion, 13th Marines was added).

During 1970, the Division structure was gradually reduced to six infantry and two artillery battalions. Concurrently, the headquarters, reconnaissance, and medical units were reduced in strength while the 1st Engineer Battalion remained at full strength. The Division retained two reduced motor transport battalions to cope with the Division's large area of responsibility and the possibility of reduced helicopter support.

The Division strength at the end of November 1970 was 12,530 which was 105 higher than the October figure and 19 higher than the Division RVN ceiling. Current strength projections show the Division operating right at total RVN ceiling for at least the upcoming months of December and January. The projections also indicate that the officer-shortfall of 45 which existed on 30 November 1970 will be reduced to essentially a zero level by the end of January 1971.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

6-1-1

DECLASSIFIED


**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), DIVISION STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

## 1969 STRENGTH

## 1970 STRENGTH

[illegible]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

G-1-1

**DECLASSIFIED**

FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT RATES

The average first term reenlistment rate for the first eleven months of 1970 is 40%, a decrease from the 1969 rate of 54%. The sharp decline from a high of 72% in April 1970 to a low of 22% in August 1970 was arrested in September by an increase to 40%. Results in October decreased to 28%, however in November first term reenlistments once again increased to 41%, which is 24% higher than the Fleet Marine Force Fiscal Year 71 average. The wide fluctuations seen on the graph are caused by the small numbers with which this analysis deals. When dealing with small numbers, small differences can produce radically different percentages, e.g., the figures for October and November 1970.

The primary causes for the decline during 1970 appear to be the general personnel turbulence associated with the redeployment of forces, heavy turnover of Career Planning personnel, and the extensive early release program. However, personnel stabilization and increased emphasis on Career Planning are beginning to evidence their effect by increasing the rates of retention. Present trends would indicate a projected reenlistment rate of approximately 38% for the month of December.


30 NOV 1970

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) 1ST TERM REENLISTMENT RATES, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970

1969 RATE

1970 RATE

CMC 1ST TERM REENLISTMENT OBJECTIVE

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
ELIG/REC	188	132	137	107	125	159	176	167	183	65	63	56	1,558
REENLISTEN	63	63	60	53	56	98	116	109	131	27	36	32	844
% REENL	35.0	47.7	43.8	49.5	44.8	61.6	65.9	65.2	71.5	41.5	57.1	57.1	54.1
1970													
ELIG/REC	45	65	88	57	89	86	97	83	48	36	34		
REENLIST	24	30	29	41	48	26	32	18	19	10	14		
% REENL	53.3	46.1	33.0	72.0	55.0	30.2	33.0	21.7	39.7	27.8	41.1		

CONGRESSIONAL/SPECIAL INTEREST CORRESPONDENCE

The monthly volume of Congressional/Special Interest Correspondence for the first eleven months of 1970 averaged 107 inquiries, which was slightly less than the 1969 monthly average of 113 inquiries. However, in percentage of total strength, the 1970 totals portray an 18% increase in such inquiries. The complaints received in 1970 fall into the following categories:

Welfare Reports	218
Confinement/Discipline	192
Medical	164
Hardship/Humanitarian Transfers	115
Basic Allowance for Quarters	104
MOS Changes/Reassignments	53
Clothing/Equipment/Personal Effects	52
Mail	48
Emergency Leave	43
Harassment/Maltreatment	37
Miscellaneous	<u>319</u>
TOTAL	1348

The following graph indicates that the volume of Congressional/Special Interest Correspondence for the month of December will essentially equal the volume (135/mo) for the same period in 1969. However, in percentage of total strength, it should remain at a slightly higher level than the first eleven months of 1970 (.53 vs .45%) if the strong trend indicated by the graph continues.

30 NOV 1970





DECORATIONS AND PURPLE HEART MEDALS

The number of decorations (excluding Purple Heart Medals) processed by the Division Awards Board during the first 11 months of 1970 was 6,892. Although this amount was 32% less than the total of 9,997 for the similar period in 1969, the more interesting statistics are identified by the following normalized rates:

RATES (Awards per personnel)

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
January-November	1/27	1/29
January-May	1/26	1/35
June-October	1/28	1/24
November	1/48	1/35

The rate decrease during the January through May period is primarily explained by the lessened intensity of enemy actions. The most significant change occurred in the June through October period when the monthly decorations rate increased 76% from 1/31 at the beginning of that period to 1/17 by the end (highest monthly ratio for 1969-1970). The factor driving the increase was the concentrated submission of meritorious awards occasioned by the redeployment of units. Submissions during November, when redeployment was no longer a factor, were barely 50% of the October total. This enormous decrease reflects the departure of an entire regiment and numerous supporting units.

Purple Heart Medals were awarded at an average of 1/25 during the period January through September 1969. However, beginning in October 1969 and continuing through October 1970, the Purple Heart award-rate reduced fairly uniformly to a low monthly ratio of 1/90 personnel. November saw a further reduction to a rate of 1/112 personnel.

The trend established during the May through November period indicates that Purple Heart Medals will be awarded at a gradually reduced rate. Barring further large-scale troop reductions, the number of awards processed during December should vary only a little from November's total.

30 NOV 1970

G-1-4


DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). RATIO OF U. S. DECORATIONS (HEROIC AND MERITORIOUS)

**PROCESSED TO PURPLE HEART MEDALS AWARDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

1969 RATIO

1970 RATIO -----

[illegible]

LAW AND DISCIPLINE

The beginning of calendar year 1970 saw a marked increase in judicial and disciplinary proceedings. For example, trials for crimes of violence increased from a January-November 1969 monthly rate of six per 10,000 personnel to a 1970 rate of eight per 10,000. The rise in courts-martial relating to crimes of violence does not necessarily mean that such crimes have increased in number, but rather that they are being investigated and prosecuted with more thoroughness. An adjunct to violent crimes was the mounting brig population experienced in 1970. The mean confined ratio for the months January through November 1970 was 47 per 10,000, which was a 110% increase over the 1969 rate of 22 per 10,000 for the like period.

Late spring and summer 1970 saw downward trends in the brig population, crimes of violence, and punitive discharges. The new policy of transferring prisoners sentenced to more than 60 days confinement to Camp Pendleton, which became effective in August 1970, has substantially reduced the confinee strength. An increase in violent crimes committed during November 1970, has caused the number of Marines in pretrial confinement to increase, but the total number of Marines confined remains substantially lower than it was during 1969 and the first half of 1970.

The decreases in punitive discharges (0.08% to 0.02%) and crimes of violence (0.13% to 0.09%) which occurred in late spring and summer, and which appear to be continuing into the fall of 1970, are the result of the reduction in Division strength and the deterrence resulting from increased effectiveness in techniques of investigation.

30 NOV 1970

TRIALS INVOLVING CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

A consistent ratio between crimes of violence and total strength of the Division is not demonstrable. This is because the number of trials in any given month is no indication of the amount of violence in the Division. There are occasions where a serious crime takes a considerable length of time to investigate. The case finally comes to trial two to three months and sometimes longer after the incident occurred. Thus the totals for the month may balloon to what appears to be an abnormally high total. June and August 1970 are examples of this situation.

The ratio of crimes of violence to Division strength increased from a January-November 1969 monthly rate of six per 10,000 to a 1970 rate of eight per 10,000. One factor contributing to the greater trial rate is the increased effectiveness in investigating such crimes. Further improvements in effectiveness are possibly due to the publication of Force Order 3120.4 of 14 August 1970 which prescribes standing operating procedures for investigating crimes of violence.

A review of the trend illustrated in August, September, October and November, makes it appear that 0.08 will be a useful predictive constant for the remainder of 1970.


30 NOV 1970

G-1-Sa

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS OF COMMAND TRIED FORCRIMES OF VIOLENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969 PERCENTAGE ————

1970 PERCENTAGE - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TRIALS	15	11	14	9	15	15	19	7	6	16	19	23	169
% CMD	.07	.05	.06	.04	.07	.07	.09	.03	.03	.06	.07	.08	
1970													
TRIALS	29	20	16	19	18	25	9	15	10	7	11		
% CMD	.11	.08	.07	.09	.09	.13	.04	.08	.06	.06	.09		

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE INCLUDE MURDER, RAPE, ASSAULT AND ARMED ROBBERY. G-1-5a

UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORT

For the period July through November 1970, the unauthorized absence rate has nearly equalled the 1969 rate for the same period (0.11% vs 0.12%). However, the November 1970 rate of 13% is not only slightly higher than the November 1969 rate but it is also slightly higher than the average rate for the previous months of July through October 1970.

A predictive constant of 0.11% can be established from the 1970 data, thus leading to a projected figure of 14 unauthorized absences for the remaining months of this year.

30 NOV 1970

*G-1-5b*


DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORT, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970

1969 ABSENCES

1970 ABSENCES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
ABSENCES							27	19	28	40	31	35	160*
% CMD							.12	.09	.12	.14	.11	.12	
1970													
ABSENCES	23	17	36	12	17	42	24	17	17	12	16		
% CMD	.09	.07	.16	.06	.08	.20	.11	.09	.10	.10	.13		

\* TOTAL SHOWN IS FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1969. G-1-54

DECLASSIFIED

CONFINED MARINES

The 1970 six-month period, January to June, shows approximately a 100% increase in the number of Marine confinees over the first six months of 1969 (669 vs 306). The probable cause for this rising number of confined Marines is illustrated in the following graph which reflects a 61% increase in trials for crimes of violence during the same period.

Persons suspected of crimes of violence are, in most cases, placed in pre-trial confinement since they are considered to present a threat to personnel. Also, convicted offenders of crimes of violence, for the most part, receive confinement as part of their sentence and seldom have the confinement portion of the sentence suspended by the convening authority.

The application of a liberal administrative separation policy, by ridding the Division of potential offenders, should alleviate the brig population problems, although it is impossible to establish a direct correlation. Long term relief will probably result as the Marine Corps raises its recruiting and reenlistment standards.

The decrease in the total number of Division personnel confined at the United States Army Vietnam Installation Stockade (USARVIS), formerly the III MAF Correctional Center, is the result of the implementation of a new policy whereby adjudged Marines receiving more than 60 days confinement at hard labor are transferred to the Correctional Center, Camp Pendleton upon completion of the convening authority's action. In compliance with this policy, 51 prisoners were transferred to Camp Pendleton on 12 August 1970.

The rate of confinement (confinees/strength) for the period September, October and November is 17% below the overall rate for the year 1970 to date. However, the confinees rate for the past eleven months have set a trend which is essentially level for 1970.

The data indicates that although the rate for December may rise above the present annual rate of 0.47%, the rates for January and February 1971 should decrease, thus offsetting the December rise.

30 NOV 1970

G-1-52




1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CONFINED MARINES (PERCENTAGE OF DIVISION

**STRENGTH), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

**1969 PERCENTAGE**

**1970 PERCENTAGE**

[illegible]

BAD CONDUCT AND DISHONORABLE DISCHARGES

The graph reflects cases tried by courts-martial where either a bad conduct or a dishonorable discharge was part of the sentence. The graph is structured to represent the number of personnel within the Division receiving such sentences each month.

The number of punitive discharges for January through November 1970 is 20% less than the total number for the same period in 1969 (123 vs 153). Based on Division Strength, the rate at which punitive discharges have been adjudged during the months June - November 1970 has decreased 35%: the rate dropped from a monthly average of 6.8/10,000 during January-May to an average of 4.4/10,000 for the period June-November.

The steady trend rate of 4.4/10,000 the past six months would indicate that the rate for December is likely to be near this new low level. The number of such discharges reported for the month of November 1970 is unusually low, and is attributable to the very low number of general courts-martial held during that month.

30 NOV 1970

G-1-5d

DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). BAD CONDUCT AND DISHONORABLE DISCHARGES.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969 DISCHARGES

1970 DISCHARGES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
BCD/DD	15	14	16	16	11	12	13	16	13	11	16	18	171
% CMD	.07	.06	.07	.07	.05	.05	.06	.07	.06	.04	.05	.06	
1970													
BCD/DD	16	10	19	14	16	10	12	10	8	5	3		
% CMD	.06	.04	.09	.07	.08	.05	.05	.05	.05	.04	.02		

G-1-5d

DECLASSIFIED

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES

The rapid rise in administrative separations from a rate of 6/10,000 in January 1970 to a rate of 65/10,000 in July 1970 reflects command guidance issued in January in support of the Commandant of the Marine Corps' policy on this matter.

The August and September 1970 monthly totals portray a significant decline in both numbers (from 0.65 to 0.43). In part, the decline in numbers of separations can be attributed to the reduction in total Division strength. However, the decline in percentages appears to be a result of the weeding-out process accomplished during January-July and a deterrent impact accruing from the growing realization on the part of certain recalcitrants that they face the reality of an undesirable or unsuitability discharge.

The percentage of the command to receive administrative discharges rose by two-fifths in October 1970 to 0.43%. This is the result of having retained, in-country, those individuals who were being processed for administrative separation while the Division strength was reduced. The percentage declined to 0.34% in November and is expected to remain at this level during December.


30 NOV 1970

a-5e

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES PROCESSED,

1969 DISCHARGES

**1970 DISCHARGES**



ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTION RELATING TO DRUG ABUSE

Administrative and judicial action rates relating to drug abuse have increased by nearly 200% in the first eleven months of 1970 as compared to the like period in 1969 (35/10,000 vs 13/10,000). Comparing the first eleven months of 1969 with the first eleven months of 1970 reveals the following: non-judicial punishments have increased 21% (39 to 47); investigations have increased by 120% (178 to 391); and courts-martial have increased by 4% (136 to 141).

During the first eleven months of 1970 there were eighteen times as many administrative discharges as there were by the end of November 1969 (199 vs 11). However, actions after the fact are not the only measures being taken. All training-schedule preventive lectures have been increased in scope and intensity. In supplement to that instruction, a special lecturer working out of Division Headquarters has presented 226 individual lectures to 17,723 members of the Division since January 1970.

30 NOV 1970

G-1-5f

DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTIONS CONCERNING

DRUG ABUSE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

## 1969 ACTIONS

## 1970 ACTIONS

[illegible]

G-1-5f

**DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

RACIAL INCIDENTS

A racial incident is a disagreement, disobedience and/or violence perpetrated between individuals or groups with ethnic difference as a cause.

Thirty-six incidents have been recorded during the period January-November 1970; eight of them taking place in January. Based on strengths, the incident rate went from one per 3,500 in January to one per 4,167 in November. Because of the volatile nature of racial incidents, the above rates are not all that significant in describing a trend.

A factor that obviously could become of great importance regarding racial incidents is the decreasing tempo of operations: an individual has increasingly more time on his hands to influence others or to be influenced concerning racial issues, real or imagined.

Affecting the area of racial matters in a positive manner is the immeasurable and yet apparently successful impact of the Division Leadership Council Program.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-1-5g

DECLASSIFIED




**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

**INCIDENCE** - - - - -

### CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE

[illegible]

G-1-5X

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FRAGGING INCIDENTS

Seven felonious "fraggings" or assaults with an explosive device, occurred during November. This is the greatest number that has occurred in any one month in 1970. The next greatest frequency was in September and February when five incidents were recorded. However, only three casualties resulted from the incidents in November, compared to an average of almost four a month for the first ten months. The other casualties are considered self-inflicted although there is insufficient proof to gain a conviction.

During the first four months of 1970, only two of the fourteen incidents were solved, but a program of speedy and thorough investigation through implementation of ForO 3120.4 ("Operation Freeze") and swift disciplinary action has considerably improved that record. As a result of this program, of the eleven incidents which occurred from the beginning of May through the end of August, six have been solved and one is still under investigation. Of the five perpetrated in September, three have been solved and one is under investigation. October recorded three cases with one solved and two under investigation. Three of the seven November incidents were solved and a fourth is the suspected self infliction. There were no casualties in the remaining three incidents which are still under investigation.

Three of these recorded "fraggings" involved the use of a CS (Riot Gas) grenade. While these incidents do not result in injury they do tend to intimidate and threaten the victim(s). There is definitely a judgment factor in the determination of these incidents as to whether it is a "fragging" or not.


30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-1-52

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FRAGGING INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1970**

INCIDENCE ——— CUMUL. INCIDENCE ——— CUMUL. CASUALTIES -----

[illegible]

G-1-5X

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**DECLASSIFIED**

GROUND SAFETY

In the categories of friendly firepower incidents and accidental discharges, there were 269 incidents recorded for the first eleven months of calendar year 1970 as compared to 407 incidents listed during the same period in 1969. Moreover, when based on strengths a comparison of the average monthly incident rates for the first eleven months of 1969 and 1970 shows that the 1970 rate of 1.15/1,000 is a 14% improvement over the 1969 rate of 1.34/1,000.

November 1970 ended with 6 friendly firepower incidents, or with the involvement of 0.48 Marines per thousand of the present total population. This can be compared favorably with 1969's forty-nine friendly firepower incidents recorded in the month of November. That count affected 1.59 Marines per thousand of that past population.

In the first eleven months of calendar year 1970, there were 46 deaths and 341 wounded by misuse of weapons and friendly firepower. During the same period in 1969 there were 105 deaths and 511 wounded from the same causes. When normalized by strength, the death rate for 1970 decreased 34% from the like period in 1969, and the injured rate remained about the same.

Of the three types of incidents (friendly firepower, individual weapons and accidental discharges), only the one involving individual weapons (outside a cantonment) has exhibited a greater rate of increase for this year compared to the same period last year. This year's individual weapons incident rate is 21% higher than last year's rate.

Although the 1970 explosive ordnance incident rate is about 25% higher than the 1969 rate for the first eleven months of each year, the trend set by the 1970 rate has been downward. The 1970 casualty rate also exceeds that of 1969, but only slightly. Concerning motor vehicle accidents, the statistics continue to show a declining accident rate. The 1970 rate is approximately 20% lower than 1969's rate. However, the Vietnamese casualty rate for 1970, when normalized by Division strength, slightly exceeds the 1969 rate. This is primarily due to the increased Vietnamese road traffic.

30 NOV 1970

BATTLE VS NONBATTLE CASUALTIES

The term casualty describes any person who is either lost to his organization by reason of having been declared dead, wounded, injured, diseased, captured or missing. The term also includes, for reporting purposes, those who sustain minor wounds and injuries, but whose services are not lost to their unit. For the purpose of this analysis, however, a clearer constrained definition provides the best frame of reference. In attempting to compare battle and nonbattle casualties, Vietnamese excluded, a clearer picture develops when spurious data, such as minor wounds and injuries, are not considered.

In the battle casualty category, those personnel receiving wounds not requiring evacuation are considered as minor wounded and are therefore excluded from the statistics. The latter parameter has averaged 31% of the battle casualties to date this calendar year. Regarding nonbattle casualties, the criterion for a minor injury is that the afflicted person be lost to his organization for a period of three days or less (Injury Classification F). The monthly average percentage for nonbattle of this gravity over the past eleven months of 1970 is 85%. Further regarding nonbattle casualties, this analysis selects out for comparison with battle casualties only those incidents which can be considered serious in physical impact and which have resulted in four or more days hospitalization. The specific incidents involved are those involving friendly fire, explosive ordnance, accidental discharges and motor vehicle accidents.

The 1969 battle casualty rate fell from an end-of-January rate of 715 casualties per million man-days (530 casualties) to an end-of-October rate of 308 (236 casualties). During that period, however, the rate fluctuated considerably, reaching a high of 1,110 in August before bottoming-out at the previously mentioned 308. Thereafter, the rate stabilized at approximately 325 casualties per million man-days for the remaining two months of 1969. Beginning in January 1970, the battle rate rose 54% to high of 500 at the end of March. From that point, the rate started a downward trend, marked by deviations only a fraction of those of 1969, which continued through the end of November, reaching a new two-year low of 234 casualties per million Man-days.

The nonbattle casualty rate, conversely, was fairly uniform throughout 1969, having an overall monthly average of 120 casualties per million man-days. This latter rate continued into the first quarter of 1970 and then, beginning in April, the rate decreased to the point where the average for the months of April through November was 82 casualties per million man-days.

A comparison of the battle and nonbattle casualty rates for the period January 1969 through November 1970 revealed the following:

(continued on preceding page)

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

1. The mean monthly battle rate for 1970 decreased 53% from the 1969 rate (367 vs 783).
2. The mean monthly nonbattle rate for 1970 decreased 21% from the 1969 rate (95 vs 120).
3. Unlike the battle casualty rate, the nonbattle rate for 1969 set a generally level trend which was closely paralleled by the 1970 situation.
4. The battle casualty rate does not appear to be a relevant parameter for the nonbattle rate. While both rates have decreased during the past 22 months, there appears to be no direct correlation between either the extent or the timing of the decreases.
5. Concerning the nonbattle casualty rates, a comparison of the 1969 normalized rates with the 1970 normalized rates exhibits the following changes, all of which are at least slight improvements over the previously reported rates (decreases from 1969 to 1970):
  - (1) Friendly Fire rate: Decreased 28% (50.2 to 36.0)
  - (2) Explosive Ordnance rate: Decreased 3% (27.8 to 27.0)
  - (3) Accidental Discharge rate: Decreased 35% (25.0 to 16.2)
  - (4) Motor Vehicle rate: Decreased 15% (15.1 to 12.9)
6. The battle casualty rate reduction in 1970, compared to 1969, is principally due to the lessened enemy activity. On the other hand, the nonbattle rate reduction was generally brought about by the sizeable decrease (shown above) in the rates for casualties caused by friendly fire and accidental discharges. While there are numerous independent variables which could have affected the nonbattle rates, it is quite likely that the rate reductions were driven by command attention given in response to the series of Commanding General's message directives on safety and welfare initiated in August 1970.
7. According to the data, the battle casualty rate for the period December 1970 through February 1971 should average about 260 casualties per million man-days. If the trends set during 1969 and 1970 continue to hold, the battle casualty rates will then rise through the first quarter of 1971 to a possible high of approximately 300 battle casualties per million man-days. The major variable involved here is the weather, which begins to improve during that period.
8. Regarding nonbattle casualties, it would appear that the rate for the December through February period will average 50 casualties per million man-days, as opposed to an end-of-November figure of 45.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-1-6a

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), BATTLE VERSUS NON-BATTLE CASUALTY RATES.


CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

## 1969 BATTLE RATE

NON-BATTLE RATE — — — — —

### 1970 BATTLE RATE

NON-BATTLE RATE - - - - -

[illegible]

Note 1: MILLION MAN-DAYS (n times  $10^6$ )

\* EXCLUDES WIANE BECAUSE NOT LOST TO UNIT

CASUALTY RATE = CASUALTIES/MILLIONS OF MAN-DAYS *G-1-6a*

**DECLASSIFIED**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Comparison of the cumulative data appearing on the following two charts (through November for both 1969 and 1970) shows that the incidence of each of the four types of nonbattle casualty has decreased during the eleven month period of 1970 from the incidence of the comparable period of 1969. Following is the percentage of decrease in each case:

- |                             |                    |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Friendly Fire:           | 34.8% (400 to 261) |
| 2. Explosive Ordnance:      | 20.6% (243 to 193) |
| 3. Accidental Discharge:    | 50.0% (226 to 113) |
| 4. Motor Vehicle Accidents: | 20.8% (120 to 95). |

The rates of decrease presented above must be viewed in light of the strength reduction experienced by the Division in 1970. The average on-roll strength of the Division in 1969 (first eleven months) was approximately 25,000, while average on-roll strength through November 1970 is approximately 20,400, an average reduction of about 18%. Therefore, a certain reduction in nonbattle casualties could be expected. However, normalization of absolute casualties to account for differences in strength revealed reductions above and beyond those due to population reduction (See 1-6a).

Command attention has been and continues to be brought to bear upon the problem of non-hostile casualties, and the Division should continue to improve upon the record of the past 23 months.

30 NOV 1970

6-1-68





**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR**


**YEAR 1969**

## FRIENDLY FIRE

## EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

## ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE

**MOTOR VEHICLE**

[illegible]

THIS CHART CONSIDERS CASUALTIES LOST TO UNIT FOR MORE THAN 3 DAYS.

**DECLASSIFIED**

SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTS

Friendly fire incidents involving supporting arms (including air, artillery, and crew-served weapons) showed a marked decline, averaging just under five incidents a month in 1970 as compared to thirteen per month in 1969. Using the more definitive comparison of incidents per thousand of total population, there were 0.16 incidents per thousand Marines in November, 1970, and 0.30 incidents per thousand in November 1969.

Intensive command interest has been devoted to this area of concern, as evidenced by the Commanding General's communications to commanders. The impact of this interest is reflected in the data on the accompanying chart which shows that the casualty rate for the Division has reduced 25% from a monthly average of 8/10,000 during January through May 1970 to an average of 6/10,000 during June through November 1970.

During the period January 1969 to November 1970 a decreasing trend has been established which forecasts further reductions in the rate of friendly casualties.

30 NOV 1970

G-1-6c

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTS AND


### CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

## 1969 INCIDENTS

## 1970 INCIDENTS

## CASUALTIES

**CASUALTIES**=====

[illegible]

G-1-6c

**DECLASSIFIED**

INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS

Contrary to the case of friendly fire incidents with supporting arms, individual weapons incidents remain rather high, averaging almost 9.0 incidents a month for the first eleven months of calendar year 1970. This compares to an average of 8.9 a month for the same period in 1969. However, the trend for the last three months has been down.

Individual weapons incidents (recorded separately from in-cantonment accidental discharges) occurred at the rate of 0.16 incidents per thousand of the Division's total strength in November 1970. This is compared to a November 1969 rate of 0.65.

November 1970 was a further improvement over the previous month as the Division experienced only two incidents in comparison with four for October and the year's high of fifteen for August.

Vigorous ground safety and "accident awareness" programs are continually being conducted within the Division. Further preventive success concerning this problem is directly related to our ability to reverse the general attitude of unconcern among young Marines. This attitude is considered paramount among the causes of "pure" accidental discharges.

30 NOV 1970


G-1-6d

DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS.

**1969 INCIDENTS  
CASUALTIES**

1970 INCIDENTS  
CASUALTIES=====



G-1-6d

**DECLASSIFIED**

ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES

Accidental discharges with small arms continue to be a problem within the Division, but the trend continues towards fewer incidents. Predominant are accidents with the .45 caliber pistol and the M-16 rifle. During the first eleven months of 1970, the accidental discharge rate has been almost 11 per month while during the same period in calendar year 1969 the average was 18.3 per month. During the month of November 1970, there were two incidents or a .16 accidental discharge per thousand rate.

As with the subject of casualties from friendly supporting arms incidents, this area of interest has received equally intensive command attention. The results to date are encouraging in that the accidental discharge casualty rate went from 8/10,000 in 1969 to 5/10,000 in 1970, a 38% decrease. The trend established for 1970 to date indicates a continuance of a lower rate of casualties.

30 NOV 1970

*G-1-6e*


**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES, CALENDAR**

## 1969 INCIDENTS

## CASUALTIES

## 1970 INCIDENTS

## CASUALTIES





EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

The 1970 explosive ordnance incident rate has had a downward trend throughout the year. The figures for both the incidents and casualties include those shown in the "fragging" chart (Tab 1-5h). The seven incidents in November 1970 represent a much lower rate than the average of almost 15 incidents per month for the first eleven months. Based on a strength comparison, the first eleven months of 1970 have a 7/10,000 incident rate which is higher than the 5/10,000 incident rate for the same period in 1969.


The explosive ordnance casualty rate for 1970 also exceeds the 1969 rate --- 0.94 vs 0.89 per 1,000 strength. However, the rate is erratic and thus precludes any definite trend prediction.

30 NOV 1970

*G-1-6f*

### CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

**1970 INCIDENTS  
CASUALTIES**



MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

During the first eleven months of calendar year 1970 there was an average of 12.5 motor vehicle accidents per month as compared to a monthly average of 19.5 for the first eleven months of 1969. When based on strengths, a comparison of the 1969 rate of 0.79 per 1,000 and the 1970 rate of 0.62 per 1,000 shows a 20% reduction in this year's rate. The past month of November 1970 showed a rate of .56/1,000 while November 1969 recorded a rate of .614/1,000.

Casualties resulting from motor vehicle accidents are lower for 1970, recorded at .08/1,000 for November 1970 and .32/1,000 for November 1969. The total number of Vietnamese killed or injured this year closely parallels the total number for 1969, thus the 1970 casualty rate based on Division strength exceeds the 1969 rate. This is primarily due to a continual and unusual growth of light weight vehicular traffic and the almost nonexistent traffic control by Vietnamese authorities.


Division Marines are constantly being schooled in strict obedience to traffic regulations and particularly in the art of defensive driving. A majority of the accidents in which Marine vehicles have been involved recently have not been the result of negligence or carelessness on the part of Marines.

30 NOV 1970

G-1-67

## 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970

1969 ACCIDENTS  
CASUALTIES1970 ACCIDENTS  
CASUALTIES

G-1-62

OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL INCIDENTS

The figures for 1969 have been reconstructed for this chart, but are considered valid enough to use them as a comparison basis for the 1970 figures.

The 1970 incident rate of 4.1/10,000 exceeds that of the 3.3/10,000 for 1969. The trend in the incident rate, however, is down for 1970 particularly for the past four months.

The 1970 casualty rate of 4/10,000 also is higher than the 3/10,000 rate for 1969. Once again, the trend for 1970 is now downward and the added command attention being directed towards this type of incident should further reduce both the incident rate and the resulting casualty rate.


30 NOV 1970

G-1-6X

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR

1969 INCIDENTS  
CASUALTIES

**1970 INCIDENTS**  
**CASUALTIES**



**DECLASSIFIED**

SAVINGS BOND/SAVINGS DEPOSIT PROGRAMS

Participation in the Savings Bond Program for the month of November 1970 was 72.6%, 9,094 persons out of the 12,530 on board participating, compared to 73.8%, 22,812 persons out of 30,899 on board participating, in November 1969.

Participation in the Savings Deposit Program for the month of November 1970 was 5.1%, 642 persons out of 12,530 on board participating, compared with 3.4%, 1,037 persons out of 30,899 on board participating in November 1969.

The trend in the last two months, since the Commanding General's message on the subject was released, has been upward in both the Bond and Savings Deposit Programs. This trend is expected to continue.

30 NOV 1970

G-1-7

DECLASSIFIED





CONFIDENTIAL

G-2 OVERVIEW

Overall enemy activity in Quang Nam Province has diminished steadily during 1970. The most striking evidence of this decline is reflected in a monthly comparison of enemy sighted/enemy attacks by fire during the past eleven months. Total enemy sighted monthly has dropped from 4425 (January) to a low of 576 (November), representing a 7.6:1 ratio. Total enemy attacks by fire (rockets, mortar rounds, lob bombs) have similarly declined; 658 rounds were received in January as compared to a cumulative figure of 589 rounds received during the last five months (1 July - 30 November).

This reduction in enemy activity can be attributed largely to the attritional losses sustained by units subordinate to Front 4 and to the resultant decision by the enemy to revert to guerrilla warfare techniques in order to conserve his depleted forces. Overall enemy strength in the province, once estimated as high as 16,800 (May 1969), has now diminished to an estimate of 8655 (November 1970). Infiltration of replacements from North Vietnam has been minimal. The enemy's inability to recruit from the manpower base of indigenous South Vietnamese has resulted in the necessity to assign many NVA personnel to augment traditionally VC Main Force, Local Force, and Guerrilla Units. A further illustration of the enemy's declining combat effectiveness is evidenced by his need to realign his organizational structure. In early 1970, Front 4 commanded four NVA Regiments, but at present it appears that only the 38th NVA Regiment has any degree of combat effectiveness. The disbanding of units, reduction of unit strengths, and realignment of operational control has resulted in an extensive reorganization of units as well as command and control relationships; the "Wing" concept of decentralized command and control is now apparently defunct. Unless an intense effort is made by the enemy to introduce sizeable reinforcements into the province, it is anticipated that his present force levels will continue to deteriorate. Confronted with FWMAF/ARVN preemptive operations, reduced manpower, food shortages, and monsoon conditions, enemy forces will be capable of conducting only the harassing activities that have characterized their efforts in recent months. In the populated lowlands, main efforts will be channeled toward rebuilding the depleted VC military and political structure at the hamlet and village level; in the highlands, NVA forces will be preoccupied with logistic activities.

As a result of Phase IV Reductions during September 1970, 1st Marine Division reconnaissance assets were reduced by two companies of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion as well as the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less a platoon detachment). Of the 24 reconnaissance teams currently available for Division employment, an average of 15 teams are available for field duty. These figures are expected to remain relatively constant. Although present monsoon conditions are restrictive to helicopter insertions/extractions of teams, the current use of Platoon/Company Patrol Bases will facilitate the employment and resupply of teams operating in the field.

1st Marine Division sensor utilization has decreased significantly since July 1970 due to the removal of the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System) as well as RF Sensor Strings in southern and central Quang Nam Province. SCAMP personnel reductions, restrictions in the number of sensor channels, and monsoon conditions have likewise contributed to a decline in the number of sensors that may be effectively employed. A total of 76 sensors were in use as of 30 November, and this figure is expected to remain relatively constant for the remainder of 1970.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH  
QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Total enemy forces include North Vietnamese Army, Main Force and Local Force units as well as village/hamlet guerrillas. In Quang Nam Province, the estimated total enemy strength has declined from a high of 16,800 (May 1969) to a level of approximately 8655 (November 1970).

Unless substantial replacements are received from outside the province, enemy strength levels will probably continue to decrease. While it appears that the enemy has the capability to introduce infiltration groups to replace some of these losses, he does not appear inclined at this time to increase infiltration to a level that will reconstitute former force levels.

Recruitment of indigenous South Vietnamese does not play a significant part in overall manpower procurement as evidenced by the necessity to utilize NVA personnel in traditionally VC roles. On-hand personnel assets will probably continue to be redistributed as appropriate; more NVA troops will be used to fill the ranks of MF and LF units; NVA, MF, and LF personnel will also be used to rebuild the depleted guerrilla organization within the province.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH, QUANG NAM PROVINCE**

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969 EST. STRENGTH ———

1970 EST. STRENGTH - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EST STR	15500	15750	16100	14540	16800	13700	12200	12840	12170	12770	11820	12400	N/A
1970													
EST STR	11200	12430	12300	12900	12020	11700	12500	11300	10900	9475	8655		N/A

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), DEPLOYMENT OF  
RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Division assets prior to September 1970 included the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. During this period deployed teams included those providing security for four Division observation posts.

A major reorganization of the Division reconnaissance effort was effected in September 1970 as a result of the redeployment in Phase IV of two companies of the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less a one platoon detachment). Division Reconnaissance Battalion was relieved of the security responsibility for three of the four Division observation posts and given the objective of maintaining a minimum of 24 operational teams with the capability to deploy and support 12 of these teams at any given time. Deployed teams are now defined as only those operating in the field on an assigned reconnaissance mission.

24 teams are currently available for Division employment. An average of 15 teams are prepared for field duty at any given time. These figures are expected to remain relatively constant. Actual deployment is significantly decreased due to curtailment of flight activities and weather restrictions during the fall monsoon season as indicated.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

C-2-2

DECLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS

DEPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969 %DEPL: ON ALL MISSIONS ——— 1970 %DEPL: ON ALL MISSIONS ———  
 %DEPL: RECON MSNS ONLY - - - - %DEPL: RECON MSNS ONLY ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TMS AVAIL							49	48	50	46	45	38	
ALL MSNS							27	27	27	27	24	19	*
% DEPL							55.1	56.3	54.0	58.7	53.3	50.0	*
RECON MSNS							19	19	19	19	16	11	**
% RECON							38.8	39.6	38.0	41.3	35.5	28.9	**
1970													
TMS AVAIL	38	50	57	54	56	54	48	42	28	24	24		
ALL MSNS	22	25	29	31	31	28	27	26	12	8	11		*
%DEPL	57.9	50.0	50.9	57.4	55.4	51.8	56.2	62.0	42.9	33.3	45.8		*
RECON MSNS	14	17	21	23	23	20	19	18	10	8	11		**
% RECON	36.8	34.0	36.9	42.6	41.0	37.0	39.6	42.8	35.7	33.3	45.8		**

\* NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TEAMS DEPLOYED ON BOTH SECURITY AND RECON MISSIONS.

\*\* NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TEAMS DEPLOYED ON RECON MISSIONS ONLY.

2-2-2

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS1969/1970

Sensor utilization decreased significantly from July through November with the deactivation of the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System) as well as RF Sensor Strings and Readout Sites in southern and central Quang Nam Province. There are presently four readout sites in the Division TAOR.

During July and August there were 82 targets detected by sensors, 69 of which were attacked with artillery fire. Bomb damage assessment was conducted with negative results.

In November only five targets were detected by sensors, two of which were attacked by artillery fire. BDA was conducted with negative results.

The decline in targets and the decrease in effectiveness of sensors within the Division TAOR is attributed to four factors:

- a. The restriction of sensor channels (frequencies) from ten to four, imposed by XXIV Corps.
- b. Reduction of the personnel strength of the Sensor Control and Management Platoon from 85 to 28.
- c. Due to higher priority operations, security forces to escort SCAMP teams for sensor implants have been unavailable.
- d. Inclement weather is a contributing factor, since sensor effectiveness is reduced significantly during periods of heavy rain and wind.

Sensor utilization within the Division TAOR is expected to remain relatively constant at current levels throughout the remainder of the year.


30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). SENSORS EMPLOYED, CUMULATIVE YEARS 1969/1970

## 1969 SENSORS

## 1970 SENSORS

[illegible]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), TARGETABLE SENSOR ACTIVATIONSCALENDAR YEAR 1970

During 1970, the number of targetable sensor activations that resulted in requests for fire missions varied greatly on a monthly basis. Only during the past three months (September through November) has there been a fairly consistent pattern of activations.

January was marked by the predominant use of a line sensor complex located west of Danang and known as the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System). Due to the "barrier" nature of these line sensors, the enemy was more apt to traverse the sensor string as opposed to following the axis of the string; although this resulted in fewer activations, these activations were considered intrusions and were targeted. Since a pattern or rate of movement was difficult to ascertain with line sensors, there was also a greater chance of firing on non-targetable activations. Air emplaced sensors were also frequently employed in January and were delivered into rear base areas/logistic routes utilized by enemy forces. Since the aforementioned line sensors were not adequately observed and air emplaced sensors were remotely located, neither means offered opportunity for accurate bomb damage assessment. Consequently, BDA for January was low despite the large number of activations and fire missions.

Since sensors were being utilized primarily for target acquisition, many string sites were compromised, resulting in a lower number of activations and fire missions in February. The SCAMP (Sensor Control and Management Platoon) was formed in March 1970, and the number of sensor strings and readout sites increased accordingly. This accounts for the increased number of targetable activations and fire missions during the month. Used predominantly in a target acquisition role from April through June, the string locations were once again gradually compromised, thereby accounting for a steadily decreasing number of targetable activations and fire missions. In July several new RF (Radio Frequency) Strings were implanted, and targets/fire missions increased.


During the past four months (August through November) SCAMP assets have been reduced by approximately 70% (personnel, readout sites, sensor strings). In addition, sensors have been used primarily for intelligence purposes rather than target acquisition. These factors contribute to the present decrease in targets/fire missions, and no marked change in this current pattern is anticipated.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL



**TARGETS DETECTED**

## FIRE MISSIONS



G-2-4

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN): PRECIPITATION, QUANG NAM PROVINCECALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Seasonal precipitation in Quang Nam Province is associated with the North-east Monsoon which prevails from September through January. Monthly rain accumulation during 1969 varied sharply from the mean only during the peak accumulation in October when 39.97 inches of rain were recorded. Monthly rainfall from January through November 1970 has corresponded closely to mean monthly totals.

During the monsoon season, frequent occurrences of rain, fog, and low visibility allow the enemy to move with a greater degree of freedom from friendly air and ground observation. Conversely, wet weather has a detrimental effect on enemy movement due to swollen streams and inundated lowlands. As the 1970 monsoon season continues, deterioration of food, ordnance and other supply caches will contribute to difficulties presently being encountered by enemy forces in the province.

30 NOV 70  
CONFIDENTIAL

C-2-5



CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN  
TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

Overall, enemy activity declined at a steady rate during the past eleven months. This steady decrease in activity is attributed to the forced reversion to the guerrilla warfare tactics which were prevalent prior to the large scale commitment of North Vietnamese Army Forces in 1965. Since the enemy reduced the number of his offensive actions utilizing North Vietnamese Army units and began concentrating on disrupting the GVN Pacification Program, employing Local Force Units, his overt presence in the lowlands has declined significantly.

In order for him to implement his strategy of guerrilla warfare, the enemy has continued to employ rockets against area targets, a tactic which serves as an excellent psychological weapon. Since he has neither the logistical system or combat capability to employ rockets as a medium of close combat support, the enemy has utilized rockets as a medium to intimidate the civilian population and to a lesser degree, FWMAF. The pattern of rocket attacks conforms closely to surges and ebbs of the enemy's campaigns. (During the month of January, the months of April and May, and the period August through September, the enemy attempted to increase his offensive activity. Consequently, of the 221 rockets he has launched during 1970, 185 were fired during these three periods.) There is no evidence that effectiveness of enemy rocket units will improve in the future. (See 2-6a)

Enemy efficiency in the employment of mortars has deteriorated as evidenced by the inaccurate fire reported by units in the 1st Marine Division TAOR during recent months. Mortars have been used primarily as a harassing weapon since the enemy has elected not to commit sizeable forces in an offensive role. As is true of rocket attacks, mortar attacks are timed to coincide with general offensive surges. With the expenditure of only 25 mortar rounds by the enemy during the month of November, this total represents approximately 4% of the number of rounds expended during January 1970. (See 2-6a)

The use of lob bombs is almost entirely for purpose of harassment. The round, composed of a crudely fused artillery round or aerial bomb lofted in the general direction of a target by a charge of explosive, travels approximately 600 meters. It is a grossly inaccurate system, and the round is often a dud. (See 2-6a)

The number of enemy sighted by 1st Marine Division Units during the past eleven months has steadily dropped from a high of 4,425 during January to a new low of 576 in November. This reflects the enemy's overall strength decline in the province (See 2-1) and also reveals his reluctance to jeopardize his remaining forces. Adverse weather during the remainder of the year will further contribute toward the reduction of sightings, since enemy movement will be severely impeded. (See 2-6b)

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS, AND LOB BOMBS RECEIVED  
CALENDAR YEAR 1970

Enemy employment of rockets during 1970 has varied from a high during April when 58 were expended to two months (March and July) in which no rockets were fired in Quang Nam Province. Rocket attacks have been directed primarily against Danang and its environs, and while they frequently are planned for periods of low lunar illumination, the enemy's ability to launch such attacks is largely governed by his ability to avoid FWMAF/ARVN detection while attempting to establish launch sites. Preemptive small unit operations in the "Danang Rocket Belt" have contributed significantly toward denying the enemy ample opportunity to prepare multiple firing positions within range of lucrative targets. Rockets have also been employed recently against Hill 52 and Thuong Duc Ranger Border Defense Camp, both located in the Thuong Duc Corridor. By virtue of occupying dominant terrain, the enemy has a higher degree of selectivity in choosing firing sites within this area, however the inherent inaccuracy of this weapon renders it relatively ineffective if fired in small quantities. When afforded the opportunity, the enemy will continue to fire rockets in small numbers, but current monsoon conditions will degrade the reliability of the weapon's electrical firing sequence. TAB 2-6 also discusses enemy rocket employment.

Mortar rounds constitute by far the largest expenditure of enemy ordnance employed in stand-off attacks by fire. However, these attacks are primarily harassing in nature and are rarely followed by infantry or sapper exploitation. Enemy employment during the year commenced with a high of 621 rounds expended in January followed by a steady decline that resulted in a mere 25 rounds fired during November. From July through November the average monthly expenditure has been 94 rounds per month. This is in consonance with the evidence of declining enemy activity throughout the province; friendly small unit operations have denied the enemy opportunity to conduct sustained barrages without detection, consequently the mortar team must resort to short-duration employment and resultant ineffectiveness. Although local shortages of mortar rounds are apparent in some instances, this situation usually results from logistic interdiction by FWMAF/ARVN Forces and does not necessarily reflect a province-wide ordnance shortage. Mortar tubes, while sufficient in quantity, are considered too valuable to risk capture and therefore are employed sparingly. In the foreseeable future, the enemy can be expected to employ his mortars in a cautious fashion, choosing neither to jeopardize men nor weapons for the sake of limited results. Mortar attacks will remain harassing in nature. Additional comments on enemy mortar employment are contained in (2-6).

Employment of lob bombs this year has varied from a high during June when 27 were expended to two months (February and April) in which no lob bombs were utilized in Quang Nam Province. As portrayed by the graph, the only pattern in evidence is a usage that appears to vary inversely proportional to the expenditure of rockets or mortar rounds, thereby superficially indicating a "gap filler" weapon encountered during periods when conventional stand-off attacks by fire have declined. Despite such a pattern, there is no amplifying evidence to support this trend, and it is generally concluded that lob bombs are employed in random fashion by guerrilla forces. Although this crude weapon lends little to the enemy's supporting arms capability, it will continue to be employed infrequently by guerrillas as a harassing technique. TAB 2-6 also addresses lob bomb employment.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-2-6a

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS AND LOB BOMBS RECEIVED


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS AND LAB BOMBS RECEIVED

**CALENDAR YEAR 1970**

## ROCKETS

## NOCTAN BOUNDS

**LOW BOMBS**

[illegible]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

G-2.6a

**DECLASSIFIED**

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) ENEMY SIGHTED VS ENEMY KIA/ORDNANCE  
RECEIVED, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

The number of enemy sighted monthly throughout the Division TAOR has declined rather steadily since January. This decline is attributed to the enemy's reluctance to commit NVA or MF units in the lowlands, along with deteriorating morale. Adverse weather and inundation will continue to hamper enemy movement in the lowland areas for the remainder of the year, thus reducing sightings. Significantly, November sightings (576) were the lowest for the year and well below the monthly average of 2,681.

Concurrent with the diminishing number of sightings, enemy ordnance expenditure (rockets, mortars, lob bombs) has likewise declined throughout 1970. While the enemy expended 658 assorted rounds in January, only 34 rounds were recorded in November. Reasons for this markedly reduced expenditure are largely attributed to the same reasons cited above. A more detailed evaluation of the enemy's ordnance expenditure is incorporated as TAB 2-6a.

As sightings and other evidence of enemy activity have decreased, there has been a commensurate decline in enemy KIA's. All evidence points to an appreciable and steady reduction in the intensity of combat in Quang Nam Province during 1970, and it is apparent that the enemy has chosen to avoid contact in order to conserve forces that have already suffered heavy attrition. In the ensuing months, a further reduction in activity is anticipated, and food procurement is expected to be the enemy's primary preoccupation.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-2-6a

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). ENEMY SIGHTED. CALENDAR YEAR 1970

ENEMY SIGHTED ----- ENEMY ORDNANCE RECEIVED ===== ENEMY KIA - - - -

[illegible]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

G-2-64

**DECLASSIFIED**



CONFIDENTIAL

G-3 OVERVIEW

With respect to tactical operations, a number of indications tend to confirm two conclusions: (1) the level of combat is down sharply from the level of 1969 and has also declined significantly from that of the earlier months of 1970, and (2) the relative combat effectiveness of the Division has increased. Friendly casualties during the first eleven months of 1970 are running less than 40% of those suffered during a comparable period in 1969, 392 men KIA and 3,500 WIA compared to 1,009 and 8,872 through November 1969 (See 3-1). Furthermore, the Division averaged 19 killed per month and 141 wounded per month during the three month period September through November 1970, only a third of the monthly average of 55 killed and 454 wounded during the period January through March 1970 (See 3-1). Enemy losses, while also declining during 1970, have not declined to the extent that USMC losses have (See 3-3). He suffered 5,063 KIA, 1,193 individual and 93 crew served weapons captured during the first eleven months of 1970 compared to 8,632, 2,163 and 232 during the comparable eleven month period in 1969, converting to 1970 rates 59%, 55% and 40% those of 1969. Similarly, other indices of combat activity included in this section, such as the employment of supporting arms and the use of helicopters (and indicators in other sections, e.g., G-2) have declined. Although such decreases in the employment of air, artillery and naval gunfire are most assuredly effects of the lower level of activity, they can also be traced, in part, to other factors, such as the two major redeployments that have occurred during the year 1970 (See 1-1), and seasonally, the curtailment of flight activity because of adverse weather.

In many cases, statistics on certain enemy losses either are not available or do not lend themselves to comparison with friendly statistics. Nevertheless, where such comparisons can be made, the point to an increasingly favorable friendly position. Friendly KIA are running 39% their 1969 rate and WIA 40%, whereas enemy KIA are running 59% their 1969 rate, individual weapons captured 55% and crew served weapons 40%. It is easily seen that all three enemy loss rates are decreasing less rapidly than friendly rates. However, one statistic, that of crew served weapons captured, is most interesting. As can be observed, this quantity is decreasing almost as rapidly as friendly losses, which could indicate that the enemy is either unwilling or unable to equip his troops with such weapons. Most certainly the Division is encountering the enemy in increasingly small, less well-armed numbers.

With his reversion to guerrilla tactics the enemy has increasingly concentrated his waning resources on terrorism, small-scale attacks by fire, harassment, and the use of mines and booby traps. Although mines and booby traps have been exacting a disproportionate share of Marine casualties and the casualties suffered by CUFP (Combined Unit Pacification Program) units remain relatively high, both of these indicators have also been on the decrease. While the percentage of total casualties produced by surprise firing devices is running at approximately 45% for 1970 (and November's rate is 45.8%), the absolute number of SFD casualties is decreasing apace with total casualties. A measure revealing the increasing efficiency of the Division regarding mines and booby traps is the ratio of such devices found and destroyed to those detonated with friendly casualties. The ratio has been increasing steadily since March 1970 and in November reached a high of 3.55:1. This increasing effectiveness is due largely to a vigorous program of instruction conducted by 1st Engineer Battalion, including both a contact team travelling to all the Division units to school

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

about 65 Marines a day in mine/booby trap discovery techniques and the five-day Land Mine Warfare School, instructing some fifty non-engineer Marines each week on the detection and destruction of surprise firing devices.

Thus, almost without exception, all indicators point to both a lower level of activity on both sides, and an increasing relative combat efficiency on the part of the 1st Marine Division. This trend should continue for the remainder of the year 1970 and into 1971. The Division should suffer, in 1970, less than 40% of the casualties it suffered in 1969, while simultaneously inflicting on the enemy losses in the vicinity of 55 - 60% his 1969 rate.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

C-3

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

During 1970, friendly casualties have decreased with the level of combat. 392 Marines have been killed during the first eleven months of 1970 and 3,500 wounded, compared to totals of 1,009 and 8,872 during the same period in 1969. This represents a 61% decrease in friendly casualties, but a larger aggregate proportion of current casualties were caused by surprise firing devices during the first 11 months of 1970 as compared with the same period of 1969 (See Section 3-2b). However, the detonation of such devices is on the decrease (See 3-2c) and, consequently, casualties caused by mines or booby traps are decreasing. The pattern of reduced casualties can reasonably be expected to continue as enemy contacts grow less numerous and the Division's Marines become more proficient in finding surprise firing devices.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY KILLED IN  
ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Thus far in 1970, the 1st Marine Division has suffered friendly KIA at a rate of just under 36 per month, an average less than half the rate of 88 per month experienced in 1969. However, the most significant decrease in KIA occurred in September 1969, when 47 deaths were recorded compared to August's 129, a reduction of almost two-thirds. Prior to September, the 1969 rate had been 109 KIA per month, with monthly frequencies ranging from 63 to 147. The average rate for the period September 1969 through November 1970 now stands at 38 per month, while in recent months (September - November 1970) the rate is 19 KIA per month, indicating a continuation of the trend of gradual reduction in battle deaths established after the quantum drop recorded in September 1969. The primary reason for this gradual reduction is a decrease in enemy activity. The enemy appears to be concentrating on harassment activities rather than on destruction of FWMAF units. Consequently, he has, during 1970, been encountered in very small groups only, ranging from individuals to platoon-sized units of 25 or 30 men (See 2-6b for the decrease in enemy sighted during 1970). This general trend has been well established and should continue into 1971.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-1a


**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE USMC KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970

**1969 KIA**

**1970 KIA**

[illegible]

G-3-1a

**DECLASSIFIED**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY WOUNDED IN  
ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The 1st Marine Division suffered an average of 774 friendly wounded in action per month during 1969, while the average for 1970 has dropped by more than half to 318 per month. However, this reduction in casualties follows essentially the same pattern as friendly KIA, i.e., a sharp, almost quantum decrease occurring in a single month, followed by gentle fluctuations in the monthly frequency resulting, in the long run, in a gradual decrease in casualties. (See 3-1a). In the case of friendly WIA, the pronounced decrease occurred in October 1969, when 309 Marines were wounded compared to 809 the previous month. Prior to October, WIA had averaged 908 per month, ranging from 603 in July to 1204 in August. From October 1969 through November 1970, the average has dropped to just under 330 per month and has not exceeded 505 (January 1970). During the past three months, the rate per month has been 141 WIA, with a two-year low of 101 recorded in November. The rationale for friendly wounded in action is the same as that for friendly KIA, i.e., a general reduction in enemy activity (See 3-1a), and, as in the case of KIA, WIA should continue to decrease slowly into 1971.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-1a

DECLASSIFIED


**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE USMC WOUNDED IN ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970

1969

1970 - - - - -

[illegible]

G-3-1b

**DECLASSIFIED**

CONFIDENTIAL

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

Even though the level of fighting has decreased (or perhaps because of the decrease), the enemy continues to emplace numerous mines and booby traps. While just over 20% of USMC casualties in 1969 were caused by the detonation of such devices, over 47% of the casualties suffered by the Division thus far in 1970 have been inflicted by mines and booby traps. The use of such devices is especially advantageous to the enemy, in that he is able to exercise economy of force while continuing to inflict a fairly large number of casualties on friendly forces. However, he is finding it increasingly difficult to accomplish his ends, because the Division has undertaken a number of countermeasures to combat the menace of such devices. Daily, an engineer contact team conducts comprehensive training in the detection and avoidance of mines and booby traps to an average of 65 Division Marines. As of 30 November, a total of 4,434 have received this training. The 1st Engineer Battalion Resident Mine Warfare School, closed during August, was reopened on 12 October to provide the Division with non-engineer Marines trained to detect and destroy in place surprise firing devices. In addition, mine dogs are actively employed to search for mines and booby traps. A good measure of the effectiveness of the Division's counter-SFD program is the ratio of devices found and destroyed to those detonated with casualties (See 3-2c). The monthly ratio, with the single exception of July, has consistently improved since March 1970, causing the ratio for the year to stand at 1.85:1 at the end of October and improve to 1.90:1 through November. This improving measure of effectiveness, surpassing 1969's annual ratio of 1.83:1, speaks well for the Division's efforts and should continue to improve into 1971.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CASUALTIES FROM MINES/BOOBY TRAPS,  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The year 1969 was fairly unpredictable insofar as predicting casualties the Division would sustain because of enemy mines and booby traps. Monthly casualties fell in February, rose in March, April, May and June, fell in July, rose in August, fell in September and October, and finally rose again in November and December. Conversely, 1970 produced a relatively well-behaved casualty function, the graph, with a couple of minor exceptions, decreasing steadily from 267 casualties in January to 54 in October and 55 in November. Furthermore, the percentage of Division strength killed or wounded by surprise firing devices during 1970 has been falling gradually, November's .44 being less than half of January's .97. However, the average number of casualties suffered per detonation has increased from 1.6 in the first eleven months of 1969 to 1.9 through November 1970. Such a difference may be due to statistical variation, but it could indicate that, because detonations are gradually decreasing (See 3-2c), the bulk of the devices being detonated are the more powerful and more sophisticated (and, consequently, the more carefully emplaced) of the lot. Casualties should continue to decrease as the Division's Marines become more proficient in finding surprise firing devices before they can produce casualties.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-2a


**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES BY MINES/BOOBY TRAPS,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969 CASUALTIES (CUM)

1970 CASUALTIES (CUM)

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), PERCENTAGE OF MINE/BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES  
TO TOTAL CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The percentage of Division casualties caused by the detonation of surprise firing devices generally rose during 1969, increasing from an average of 8.5% in January, February and March of that year to an average of 41.9% in October, November and December. Such a trend is not readily apparent in 1970. The percentage decreased slowly through the first five months of the year, falling from 47.8% in January to 35.1% in May, but rose sharply in June and July, fell somewhat in August, rose to a two-year high of 70.4% in September, then fell sharply to 36.8% in October before rising to 45.8% in November. However, one should remember that total casualties have been gradually decreasing, as have mine and booby trap casualties, but the latter quantity has been behaving somewhat more erratically than the former, which could account for the wider variation. Furthermore, November's percentage is close to the 1970 yearly average of 47.4%, making that month the sixth of the year to record a percentage between 40% and 50%. In addition, June barely surpassed that range with 50.5%. Therefore, percentages into 1971 should remain relatively close to the 40-50 range and, since total casualties are gradually decreasing, casualties due to surprise firing devices should, with some variation, decrease apace.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-24

DECLASSIFIED


**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), MINE AND BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES EXPRESSED AS

A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970	
1969 PERCENTAGE	1970 PERCENTAGE
100	100
90	90
80	80
70	70
60	60
50	50
40	40
30	30
20	20
10	10
0	0

**1969 PERCENTAGE**

**1970 PERCENTAGE**

[illegible]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

G-3-2b

**DECLASSIFIED**

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) COMPARISON OF MINES/BOOBY TRAPS  
FOUND TO THOSE DETONATED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The ratio of surprise firing devices discovered and destroyed to those detonated with casualties exhibited large fluctuations in 1969, ranging from a low of less than 1:1 in January and April to high of nearly 4:1 in October of that year, but the year ended with an overall ratio of 1.83:1. The year 1970 has been marked by a more stable average ratio of 1.90 (through November), ranging from 1.21:1 in July to a high of 3.55:1 in November. July's 1.21 was the only deviation from a steadily rising trend that began in March, and August showed a continuation of the trend with a 1.87 ratio. September figures indicate a ratio of 2.35 discovered to destroyed, while figures for October reflected a ratio of 2.82, attesting to the efficiency of counter-measures taken by the Division. In general, both detonations and finds have been decreasing on a monthly basis since May 1970 although the level of friendly activity has remained high. Although detonations rose slightly from 27 in October to 29 in November, the number of finds rose by 36% from 76 to 103, and the ratio of discovered to destroyed rose to 3.55, the second highest recorded since January 1969. While the ten month average ratio of 1.85 barely surpassed the 1969 yearly average, the current eleven month average has risen to 1.90, indicating bright prospects for an improved 1970 ratio.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL


G. 3-2c

DECLASSIFIED

DETONATED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

**1970 FOUND**

**DETONATED** = = = =



CONFIDENTIAL

ENEMY LOSSES

The intensity of combat has decreased during 1970, causing a reduction in casualties on both sides, but friendly casualties are falling at a much greater rate than are those of the enemy, indicating a greater combat effectiveness on the part of the Division. Enemy KIA have fallen from 8,632 during the first eleven months of 1969 to 5,063 during the same period in 1970, a reduction of 41.4%, while friendly KIA have dropped from 1,009 to 392, a reduction of 61.2%. Additionally, the number of individual and crew-served weapons captured by 1st Marine Division units has experienced a decline. During the first eleven months of 1969, 2,163 individual and 232 crew-served weapons were captured, compared to 1,193 and 93 from January through November 1970. These figures represent decreases of 45% for individual and 60% for crew-served weapons. The greater decline in number of crew-served weapons may be an indication that the enemy is either unwilling or unable to adequately supply his troops with such weapons.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

C-3-3

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

A gradual diminution of the intensity of combat in Calendar Year 1970 has served to reduce the number of enemy casualties from the 1969 level. Through November 1969, the enemy had sustained 8,632 KIA, while the cumulative total through November 1970 is 5,063, a reduction of 3,659 over the eleven month period representing a decrease of 41.4%. The monthly average for 1970 is 460 enemy KIA, but the monthly frequency has shown a fairly steady downward trend, highs of 1,022 and 723 having been recorded in January and February 1970 and lows of 154 and 115 in October and November 1970, respectively. Should this trend continue, the cumulative total for 1970 will be in the vicinity of 5,200 enemy killed in Action, a significant reduction of over 45% from Calendar Year 1969. However, friendly KIA have been reduced at an even greater rate (a 61.2% reduction through November 1970 (See 3-1a), reflecting the increasing combat efficiency of the Division.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-3a



DECLASSIFIED


CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970

1969 ENEMY KIA

1970 ENEMY KIA



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EN KIA	802	1010	801	1010	974	723	394	810	507	503	1098	1011	9,643
1970													
EN KIA	1022	723	472	615	604	511	414	283	150	154	115		

G-3-3a

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

CUMULATIVE ENEMY INDIVIDUAL/CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The enemy has lost an average of 109 individual and 8 crew-served weapons monthly through November 1970, compared to monthly averages of 197 and 21 through November 1969, representing decreases of 45% and 60%, respectively. When these figures are compared to the reduction in enemy KIA of 41% (See 3-3a), it is immediately apparent that the enemy is being more successful at conserving his weapons than he is his soldiers' lives. This could indicate either the enemy's inability to properly equip his troops or his unwillingness to jeopardize precious weapons. Another possible explanation is that a number of the groups of enemy engaged this year have been resupply parties including a sizable percentage of unarmed bearers. The trend toward a lower number of enemy weapons losses is expected to continue.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

C. 3-34


**CONFIDENTIAL**

**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED,**

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969 IWC

**1970 IWC**

[illegible]


**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE GRW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED,

**CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

**1969 CSWC**

**1970 CSWC**

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

COMBINED UNIT PACIFICATION PROGRAM

Since its inception in November of 1969, the Combined Unit Pacification Program has brought some 31,000 Vietnamese people under the influence of its units. Over 13,000 of these people live in hamlets which have been upgraded to HES ratings of A or B during the presence of CUPP units in these hamlets. Currently there are 21 CUPPs in existence, their coverage now extending to 6.9% of the marginally secure or insecure hamlets (Category C or lower) in Quang Nam Province. One CUPP was disestablished on 10 October 1970 after having attained the objectives of upgrading the security of its assigned hamlet and improving the proficiency of its counterpart Popular Force unit to a point where the latter now can stand on its own with confidence. Although there has been no reduction in CUPP units due to redeployment, as additional Division forces redeploy in the future the CUPP units provided by these forces will be disestablished concurrently. Although CUPP units suffer more than 10% of the Division's killed in action casualties and inflict only 4% of the enemy's losses, an intangible element is the good will engendered by the members of CUPP's, who live and work among the people. The tempo of contacts for November remained relatively constant as compared to October. CUPP units have continued to participate in flood relief programs following the flood evacuation operation in October. As a result of this activity, Vietnamese respect for and support of the CUPP program has increased significantly. RF and PF participation in the CUPP program has increased to a new high.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-4

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), HAMLET POPULATION UNDER CUPP

INFLUENCE AND INCREASE IN POPULATION IN SECURE HAMLETS, CAL-

ENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart depicts the expanding influence of the CUPP on the Vietnamese population. A decline in May was attributed to the relocation of a CUPP unit to a new hamlet, while the decrease in October reflects the disestablishment of one CUPP unit. Although no increase in the number of CUPP units is projected, the increase in local nationals coming under the influence of these units should continue to increase, although at a more moderate rate.

30 Nov  
31 OCT 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

6-3-4a

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HAMLET POPULATION UNDER GOPP INFLUENCE AND

**INCREASE IN POPULATION IN SECURE HAMLETS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

1969 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) == 1970 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) —

SCTY INCREASED (CUM) ===== SCTY INCREASED (CUM) -----

[illegible]

GR TOT IN - GRAND TOTAL INCREASE IN SECURE POPULATION

6-3-4a

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND PERCENTAGE OF  
CATEGORY C OR BELOW HAMLETS COVERED BY CUPP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart graphically portrays the growth of CUPP units in 1st Marine Division AO, which necessarily ceased with the redeployment of 26th Marines in March 1970 and shows percentage of CUPP Hamlets in category C and below in Quang Nam Province employing CUPPs. The category of a hamlet is determined by the GVN Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Category A and B are secure with various degrees of political development. In category C hamlets, military control of the VC has been broken and most VC party apparatus is identified and its effectiveness is curtailed. Sniping and mining still occur on routes to the hamlet. Without redeployment CUPP would have continued to expand. At present 17 of the 21 hamlets covered by CUPPs are in category C or below. In November, however, 6 hamlets were upgraded from category D to category C, leaving 7 hamlets remaining in category D. There are 306 category C or below hamlets in Quang Nam Province.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

6-3-76



DECLASSIFIED


CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND % OF CATEGORY C

OR BELOW HAMLETS COVERED BY CUPPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969 # OF CUPP UNITS -----

1970 # OF CUPP UNITS -----



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CUPP ESTE											3	5	8
TOT CUPPS											3	8	
% COVRG											1.0	1.6	2.6
CUM %											1.0	2.6	
1970													
CUPP ESTE	11	3								-1			
TOT CUPPS	19	22								21			
% COVRG	3.6	1.0								-0.3			
CUM %	6.2	7.2								6.9			

G-3-14

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CUPP CASUALTIES VS ENEMY  
LOSSES TO CUPP

This chart indicates both friendly KIA's and WIA(E)'s (reflected as total losses) and losses inflicted on the enemy as a result of CUPP action.

The increasing trend in number of losses among CUPP personnel during March - June 1970 was attributed to the targeting of CUPP units, attesting to the stabilizing effect the CUPP has on the population. The sharp decrease in CUPP casualties since June 1970 reflects the VC's apparent abandonment of his priority effort to reduce the effectiveness of the CUPP.

For calender year 1970 CUPP units are credited with 4.2% of the Division kills, while sustaining 10.5% of all Division personnel killed in action. There are a total of 502 Marines/Navy personnel presently assigned to CUPP duty. 9.7% of the infantry squads in the Division are employed as CUPP units.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-4c


**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUPP CASUALTIES VS ENEMY LOSSES TO CUPP.

**CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

1969 FRIENDLY LOSSES  
ENEMY LOSSES

1970 FRIENDLY LOSSES  
ENEMY LOSSES

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPPORTING ARMS

The volume of ordnance delivered by supporting arms has decreased at a steady, almost uninterrupted rate during calendar year 1970, from a total of over 179,000 artillery rounds and over 5,500 rounds of naval gunfire during January to less than 22,000 artillery rounds and 605 rounds of NGF in November. Although the decrease in ammunition expended by artillery can be attributed partly to a decrease in the average number of weapons available per month, down from 156 tubes during January to 74 in October and November, the decrease can be attributed more directly to a steady reduction in the number of enemy sighted, down from 4,425 in January to 576 in November, and more recently to more selective targetting policy adopted by the Division. The decrease in naval gunfire can be attributed to a sharp cut-back in the number of NGF ships available, the number of ship-days on station having dwindled from 37 in January 1970 to five in November.

The number of fixed wing fighter/attack sorties flown in support of the Division, starting from a high of 3,071 in June 1969, dropped precipitously during the latter half of 1969, leveled off during the first five months of 1970, and then fell steadily to a low of 365 in October before rising to 455 during November 1970. (See 3-5d). The resultant decrease of over 85% is the collective result of the reduction of 1st MAW aircraft assets because of redeployment, the gradual reduction in enemy activity and, of course, the onset of reduced visibility weather in the latter months of both years. The increase in sorties flown from October to November is the result of the gradual conclusion of the rainy season over the Division AO.

The employment of supporting arms should continue to decrease as enemy activity decreases and, inevitably, as redeployment continues.

30 NOV 70  
CONFIDENTIAL

6-3-5

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED VERSUS  
ENEMY SIGHTED, CALENDAR YEAR 1970

During calendar year 1970 both the volume of artillery ammunition expended and the number of enemy sighted have decreased steadily. Close correlation exists between the value of the two quantities from month to month (the rank-difference method of determining a correlation coefficient yielding +.959), but relatively poor correlation exists between the absolute differences from one month to the next (corr. coeff = +.200) and percentage of decreases (corr. coeff. = +.503). Enemy sighted seems to have decreased in steps in the early part of the year, virtual plateaus occurring in January-February, March-April-May, and June-July, but thereafter decreasing almost linearly. Ammunition expended has not been as well-behaved a function, increases having occurred during three months. The sharpest jump occurred from July to August, due primarily to the massive 13,000 round preparation fired to initiate Operation Imperial Lake. Since the end of September, expenditures have decreased sharply. This reduction is due in part to the decrease in enemy sightings, but also in large measure to the more selective policy of target engagement instituted during these months. Ammunition expenditures are expected to continue to parallel closely enemy activity.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

6-3-5a


**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED VS ENEMY SIGHTED

**CALENDAR YEAR 1970**

## EXPENDITURES

# ENEMY SIGHTED

[illegible]

\* AMMO EXPENDED EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS TO NEAREST HUNDRED.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

G-3-5a

**DECLASSIFIED**

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN), ARTILLERY PIECES AVAILABLE VERSUS  
AMMUNITION EXPENDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The number of artillery pieces available decreased from a high of 174 at the beginning of 1969 to 74 tubes after the 15 October 1970 redeployments. However, the remaining artillery pieces have been continually repositioned so that essentially the same area is covered. The graph would appear to indicate that the number of rounds expended correlates directly to the number of artillery pieces available, and computation of the rank-difference correlation coefficient for the value of the two quantities monthly yields a closely correlated +.913. However, there exists almost no correlation between absolute decreases and rates of decrease between the two quantities, and closer perusal of the graph shows a number of deviations from close correlation. During the period May-June-July 1970, the average number of tubes available remained constant, yet expenditures dropped from almost 145,000 rounds in May to less than 115,000 in July. During August 1970 the number of pieces available dropped by four, but expenditures increased by over 13,000 rounds over the previous month. Also, during October and November 1970, the average number of pieces available remained at 74 while ammunition expenditures dropped sharply from over 50,000 rounds in October to less than 22,000 in November. Much of this decrease in rounds expended is due to a more highly selective policy for the engagement of targets, as well as the continuing decrease in enemy sightings (See 3-5a). From the above, it can be seen that ammunition expended is related more to the need for fire support and the total area covered than it is to the number of tubes available. More succinctly, ammunition expenditure is largely a function of enemy activity and targetting policy.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL


6-3-56

## EXPENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

## 1970 PIECES

**EXPENDED**

## EXPENSES

[illegible]

\* AMMO EXPENDED EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS TO NEAREST HUNDRED. 6-3-56

**\*\* AVERAGE NUMBER OF PIECES AVAILABLE DURING A GIVEN MONTHS.**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN), NGF SHIP DAYS ON STATIONVS NGF ROUNDS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The decrease in the amount of naval gunfire rounds expended is highly correlated with the number of ship-days of NGF support on station. However, because of the steady decrease in enemy activity, the requirement for NGF support has diminished. The nature of current operations, terrain features and the availability of artillery limits the usefulness of NGF in the Division AO. NGF in the Division AO is presently being employed only in the Elephant Valley area due to the range to targets in other areas. Because of the limited number of suitable observed targets, NGF is primarily fired during the hours of darkness on intelligence targets. The nature of terrain in the Elephant Valley area severely hampers ground assessment, hence the effectiveness of NGF in the current situation is difficult to ascertain.

30 NOV 70  
CONFIDENTIAL

A-3-50

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIP-DAYS ON STATION VERSUS

**ROUNDS EXPENDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

**1969 ROUNDS EXPENDED  
SHIP-DAYS**

**1970 ROUNDS EXPENDED  
SHIP-DAYS**

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN), FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES.CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The significant decrease in fighter/attack sorties flown in October 1969 coincides with the phase-out and withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division, VMFA-334 (F4-B aircraft) and VMA(AW)-533 (A-6 aircraft), and to adverse weather conditions experienced during that month. 1st and 3d Marine Division records were combined by 1st MAW up to this point. The February 1970 drop represents the departure of MAG-12, while the subsequent increase is related to improved operating weather. Fixed wing sorties rate reductions by the 1st MAW commenced on 17 August 1970, however, any noticeable effects of this policy were combined with impact of the departure of MAG-13 in October and the deteriorating weather during the rainy season, the weather effects, of course, having a greater effect on fixed wing aircraft than on helicopters. Ground operations do not affect fixed wing aircraft operations as greatly as they do helicopter employment, since the fighter/attack units are normally assigned a fixed number of sorties and any increase in ground activities can be adequately supported by the diversion of aircraft from the attack of intelligence targets. Fighter/attack sorties are expected to remain in the vicinity of their November level as monsoonal effects continue to decrease.

30 NOV 70  
CONFIDENTIAL

C-3-5d

DECLASSIFIED


**CONFIDENTIAL**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK PARTIES. CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970

1969

1970

[illegible]

\* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE.

G-3-5d

**DECLASSIFIED**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

HELICOPTER SUPPORT

1st Marine Aircraft Wing statistics combined support of the 1st Marine Division and 3d Marine Division in 1969. However, 1970 data reflects only 1st Division support and provides an accurate portrayal of the level of Division activity, available air support assets, and the direct effects of weather. Helicopter support received is a direct function of the support requested. The primary variable is the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's ability to provide the support in terms of available assets and operating weather. Thus far in 1970 the 1st Marine Division has received 71% of the helicopter flight time flown by the 1st Wing with the remaining 29% going to the other units in III MAF and XXIV Corps. During November, the Division received 69% of the helicopter effort. While there was a 7% decrease in missions requested when compared to October figures, a 5% increase in missions completed was realized. This is principally a result of the relatively light rainfall for the month; 67% of the last five years average. In addition, a minor increase is seen in helicopter flight time and passenger movement while only a minor decrease in cargo is experienced. Helicopter support received for the next two months should remain at approximately the present level and will vary directly with the available operating weather and the activities of both infantry regiments.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-6

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME

Monsoon weather effects are noteworthy from October 1969 through February 1970. The peak months for Division activity, favorable operating weather and maximum asset availability were May, June, and July 1970. A pattern of diminishing monthly flight time begins in August with the departure of HMM-161 (21 CH-46D flying an average of 800 hours per month) and establishment of the 1st MAW policy of limiting flight hours to reduce and realign helicopter utilization in consonance with CNO guidelines. The full impact of the latter is noted in September, in addition to the stand-down of the 7th Regiment and elements of the 11th Regiment. The reduced air support requirements in October, coupled with six days of unflyable weather, reduced flight time to a level at which the 1st MAW utilization policy was no longer significant. Monthly flight time for the remainder of 1970 is expected to fluctuate in the vicinity of 5,000 hours.

30 NOV 70  
CONFIDENTIAL

C-3-6a

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME, CALENDAR YEARS**

1969/1970

1969 \_\_\_\_\_

1970 - - - - -

[illegible]

\*JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

G-3-6a

CONFIDENTIAL

**DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) PASSENGER TOTALS

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Passenger totals are indicative of a level of activity but do not address the specific reason for movement. Also, helicopter after action reporting duplicates passenger counts on subsequent sorties. Therefore analysis of this data can only say accurately that May, June, and July 1970 were exceptionally active months for the 1st Marine Division supported with maximum helicopter flight time. Subsequent reductions are directly related to reduced activity, reduced assets and reduced operating weather. It is anticipated that the impact of these factors will dampen out as the level of activity settles down for the remainder of the 1970-71 monsoon season.

30 NOV 70  
CONFIDENTIAL


G-3-68

DECLASSIFIED



CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER PASSENGERS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970



\* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), CARGO TOTALS  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Although monthly cargo totals can be remotely related to flight hours, a more accurate comparison can be made to the level of ground activity of Division units. Artillery resupply contributes greatly to the overall total and the decrease in cargo carried reflects the withdrawal of eight artillery batteries during September and October 1970, as well as the departure of the 7th Marines. The decrease in artillery expenditures resulting from changed targetting policy (See 3-5a and 3-5b) has been offset by the deteriorating road conditions during the monsoon season. Therefore, cargo totals during the remainder of 1970 can be expected to remain at or near the October level.

30 NOV 70  
CONFIDENTIAL

C-36c

DECLASSIFIED


CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER CARGO TOTALS, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970

1969 \_\_\_\_\_

1970 - - - - -

[illegible]

\* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

C-3-6c

**DECLASSIFIED**

CONFIDENTIAL

G-4 OVERVIEW

The status of operational readiness for combat essential items within the 1st Marine Division remains excellent. All but four Division units are in a C-1 status. The four units are in a C-2 status essentially due to a relatively small number of end items which are either deficient or cause continual maintenance problems.

The overall readiness of combat essential items has been constantly improving during 1970 and now has reached 92.7%. All of the commodity groups substantially exceed the minimum Marine Corps standard except the engineer category. As of 30 November, the percentage of equipment operationally ready in the engineer commodity group has risen to 78% from 76% on 31 October.

The progress of the Department of Defense program to transfer certain selected items to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces has been excellent. The high acceptance rate of 93.8% (2,798 items accepted of 2,980 offered) is attributed to the splendid efforts of recently deployed units.

The mean malaria prevalence rate for the Division thus far in 1970 stands at 9.8 cases per 1,000 men, an increase of 0.8 cases per 1,000 men over the mean for 1969. The monthly number of cases of venereal disease continues to decline as the population at risk is decreased. However, the prevalence rate per 1,000 men has increased from a mean of 8.8 cases per 1,000 men in 1969 to 10.3 cases per 1,000 to date in 1970.

30 NOV 70

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (Rein), UNIT FORSTAT RATING

This chart reflects the consistently high degree of operational readiness existing in the 1st Marine Division. The circumstances degrading the readiness of the units listed in a C-2 status are as follows:

a. Headquarters Battalion is C-2 as the result of a high deadline rate of PU-499 Generators and miscellaneous motor transport equipment, particularly the M151 1/4 ton Utility Truck, and a deficiency of sixteen T/E generators.

b. Headquarters Battery, 11th Marines is experiencing a high deadline rate for PU-688 Generators, the AN/GPS-5 Radar Chronograph.

c. 1st Engineer Battalion is adversely affected by a high deadline rate for RFK-60 Forklifts, M51A2 Dump Trucks, Floodlight Trailers, and PU-667 Generators. The operational readiness is also affected adversely by the low density combat essential equipment base, the high usage Engineer Equipment Factor, and a deficiency of thirty items of T/E equipment.

d. 1st Medical battalion is degraded by a T/E deficiency of PU-710 and PU-712 Generators.

30 NOV 70  
SECRET

SECRET

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), UNIT FORSTAT RATINGS

UNIT	EQUIP/ SUPPLIES ON HAND		EQUIP READINESS	
	C-1	C-2	C-1	C-2
1ST MAR DIV (-) (REIN)	X		X	
HQ BN (REIN)	X			X
1ST MAR (REIN)	X		X	
HQ CO (REIN)	X		X	
1ST BN, 1ST MAR	X		X	
2ND BN, 1ST MAR	X		X	
3RD BN, 1ST MAR	X		X	
5TH MAR (-) (REIN)	X		X	
HQ CO (REIN)	X		X	
2D BN, 5TH MAR	X		X	
3D BN, 5TH MAR	X		X	
1ST BN, 5TH MAR	X		X	
11TH MAR (-) (REIN)	X		X	
HQ BTRY (REIN)	X			X
1ST BN, 11TH MAR (REIN)	X		X	
2D BN, 11TH MAR (REIN)	X		X	
3D 8" HOW BTRY	X		X	
1ST RECON BN (-) (REIN)	X		X	
1ST ENGR BN (REIN)	X			X
1ST MED BN (-)		X	X	
1ST MT BN (-)	X		X	
11TH MT BN (-)	X		X	

30 NOV 70  
SECRET

6-4-1

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

This chart reflects the continuing upward trend in operational readiness of combat essential equipment during 1970. All CMC objectives have been attained and/or exceeded. Especially noteworthy is the percentage of equipment in an operationally ready status, exceeding 93% compared to the CMC objective of 85%.

30 NOV 1970


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). READINESS STATUS OF COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT,

**CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

1969

**CMC OP READY OBJECTIVE**

1970

[illegible]




1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT  
(COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The operationally ready status of Communication-Electronics equipment continues to be excellent. There is no problem items.

30 NOV 1970

G-4-2a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (COMMUNICATIONS-  
ELECTRONICS), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970  
1969 CMC OP READY OBJECTIVE 1970



DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT  
(MOTOR TRANSPORT), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The operationally ready status of Motor Transport equipment continues to be excellent.

Current operational readiness stands at 93% and the only significant problem item within this commodity area is the M51A2 Dump Truck. Of the 24 authorized 16 (67%) are operational. There is no specific trend or problem in the deadline of these vehicles.

30 NOV 1970

6-4-2 b

DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT)


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT)

**CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

1969

CMC OP READY OBJECTIVE

1970

[illegible]

G-4-2-b

**DECLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT  
(ORDNANCE), CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970

The operationally ready status of Ordnance equipment continues to be excellent. There are no problem items.

30 NOV 1970

G-4-2 c

DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT ( ORDNANCE ).


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT ( ORDNANCE ).

**CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

1969

CMC OP READY OBJECTIVE

**1970**

[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT  
(ENGINEER), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Although not attaining the CMC standard of 83%, the combat readiness of engineer equipment has improved and now stands at 78%.

Recent T/E allowance changes for 600/700 series generators and the non-availability of assets to fill the T/E deficiencies caused by these changes have contributed materially to the low operational readiness of the Division's engineer equipment. Of 232 generators authorized, only 75% (175) are on hand. Deadlines decrease the overall operational readiness of these generators to 56% (131).

30 NOV 1970

G-4-2d


DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT ( ENGINEER ).

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT ( ENGINEER ).

**CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**


1969 - - - - - CMC OP READY OBJECTIVE - - - - - 1970

[illegible]

G-4-2d

**DECLASSIFIED**



**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIEL TO RVNAF**

DATE	OFFERED	ACCEPTED	CUM OFFRD	CUM ACCTD	CUM % ACCTD
17 Aug	686	670	686	670	97.6
26 Aug	494	489	1180	1159	98.2
27 Aug	23	21	1203	1180	98.1
3 Sep	152	141	1355	1321	98.1
10 Sep	4	4	1359	1325	98.1
14 Sep	492	409	1851	1734	93.9
15 Sep	9	9	1860	1743	93.9
25 Sep	268	244	2128	1987	93.4
26 Sep	35	32	2163	2019	93.4
1 Oct	1	1	2164	2020	93.4
2 Oct	15	15	2179	2035	93.4
3 Oct	89	84	2268	2119	93.4
5 Oct	291	262	2559	2381	93.4
6 Oct	260	256	2819	2637	93.6
8 Oct	2	2	2821	2639	93.6
9 Oct	159	159	2980	2798	93.8

31 OCT 70

C-4-3

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

As the following charts reveal, the prevalence of malaria dropped sharply from October to November 1970 (256 cases to 84), while the incidence of venereal disease fell only slightly (153 cases to 147). However, the mean prevalence rates for both the diseases in the first eleven months of 1970 are ahead of the mean rates for the comparable period in 1969. Through November 1969, the mean malaria case rate was 9.4 cases per 1000 men, whereas the rate is 9.8 cases per 1000 men through November 1970, down from 9.9/1000 through October. Since it is unlikely the average rate will decrease significantly during December, the average rate for 1970 will probably surpass that of 1969. Morbidity from venereal disease continues to decline slowly (from 203 cases in August 1970 to 147 in November), but because the Division population has declined much more rapidly, the average annual case rate has slowly increased (from 10.0/1000 through August to 10.3/1000 through November). This general trend should continue through the final month of 1970, producing an average annual prevalence rate for venereal disease significantly higher than 1969's rate of 8.8 cases per 1000 men.

30 NOV 1970

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN), MALARIA INCIDENCE  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

Human malaria is one of the more significant public health problems in the 1st Marine Division. The disease is caused by a species of the protozoan genus and is transmitted naturally to man only by the Anopheles mosquito. Vivax and Falciparum malaria are the two prevalent forms of the disease in Military Region I. Of the two, falciparum malaria has the highest mortality ranging from as high as 10% in untreated cases to as low as 0.5% in treated cases. Chemoprophylaxis (C-P tablets) is virtually 100% effective against vivax malaria but it is less effective against falciparum malaria. Falciparum malaria represents 65% of the total morbidity from malaria in the 1st Marine Division.

30 NOV 1970

C-4-4a


DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE MALARIA INCIDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970

## 1969 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE

**1970 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE.**

[illegible]

G-4-4a

**DECLASSIFIED**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), VENEREAL DISEASE PREVALENCE  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970


The total number of venereal infections has decreased for the first 11 months of 1970 compared to the same period of last year; however, the rate of venereal infections per 1000 men has increased from a mean of 8.7/1000 in the first 11 months of 1969 to a mean of 10.3/1000 for the first 11 months of 1970.

30 NOV 1970

G-4-4b

**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE VENEREAL DISEASE INCIDENCE.**

1969 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE ——— 1970 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE - - - - -



G-4-4b


**DECLASSIFIED**

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). VENEREAL DISEASE INCIDENCE AND CASE RATE/1000,

**CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

## 1969 INCIDENCE

## 1970 INCIDENCE

[illegible]

6-4-4b

**DECLASSIFIED**

CONFIDENTIAL

G-5 OVERVIEW

The character of Civic Action has undergone a significant and continuous change throughout Calendar Year 1970.

In 1969, and the first few months of 1970, III Marine Amphibious Force was the senior U. S. headquarters in Military Region I, and there was a significant U. S. Navy presence. From December 1969, to March 1970, the 26th Marines, with a typical support package, was attached to 1st Marine Division. In 1969, the 1st Marine Division had a PsyOp/Civic Action AIK Fund allocation of 500,000\$VN per month.

The conditions as stated in the preceding paragraph all had significant effects upon the 1st Marine Division Civic Action Program and are important because they no longer exist.

III Marine Amphibious Force as the senior U.S. headquarters in Military Region I was the recipient of considerable support through the U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund. This support included funds and materials. 1st Marine Division shared in the funds primarily by participating in the General Walt Scholarship Program, but also received a proportionate share of Civic Action materials donated through the Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Program. In view of the continually decreasing support received, III Marine Amphibious Force terminated the General Walt Scholarship Program on 30 May 1970, and materials are available in increasingly smaller quantities.

As the service manager for Project Handclasp, the U. S. Navy presence in the Danang area, assured a considerable amount of Handclasp materials directed to U.S. military forces in Military Region I. In addition, the 1st Marine Division had an arrangement with the U.S. Naval Support Activity wherein materials for civic action projects could be purchased with Civic Action AIK Funds at about one third the Vietnamese open market price.

When XXIV Corps became the senior U.S. military headquarters in Military Region I, the quantity of Project Handclasp materials was reduced to that donated specifically to 1st Marine Division, and the U.S. Army Logistic Command does not permit transactions involving AIK Funds, which left the Vietnamese open market as the source for AIK Fund materials.

In 1970, the 26th Marines and the 7th Marines, with support packages, have been withdrawn from Vietnam. The loss of these units resulted in a significant but, because of changing conditions, immeasurably reduced civic action capability.

Finally, in Calendar Year 1970, the PsyOps/Civic Action AIK Funds have been halved each quarter, beginning on 1 January 1970. On 1 April 1970, the division received the III MAF account, with the result that the monthly allocation of funds has dropped from 500,000\$VN per month in 1969 to 150,000\$VN per month subsequent to 1 July 1970.

By measurable comparison, the total 1970 1st Marine Division Civic Action effort has shown an increase over 1969. This increase has resulted from the excesses of non-combat essential expendable construction materials created in connection with phased troop reductions, and by a significant engineer effort in connection with Vietnamese resettlement projects and irrigation systems.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL



DECLASSIFIED

At the present time, excess non-combat essential construction materials for civic action projects appear to be exhausted, or are earmarked for a new Vietnamese resettlement project. This has appeared to be the case for several months, however, and materials have been found and projects have been completed.

For the near future, 1st Marine Division Civic Action Programs will be sustained by excess materials salvaged from vacated cantonments. How long and on what scale depends upon future undetermined plans for Military Region I. Ultimately, and in keeping with the policy of Vietnamization, the 1st Marine Division Civic Action Program will decline in scope and shift increasingly from material assistance to technical assistance until it ceases to exist.

30 NOV 1970  
CONFIDENTIAL

6-5

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), COST OF

CIVIC ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1st Marine Division civic action projects are supported by the use of non-combat essential expendable supplies, salvage, the expenditure of funds from the US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund, and voluntary contributions.

The US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund provided 500,000\$VN per month during Calendar Year 1969, but has been progressively reduced to the July 1970 level of 150,000\$VN where it remains. Since the cost of projects in 1970 is averaging in excess of 200,000\$VN over the 1969 average and the AIK fund is providing 350,000\$VN less, the increase is coming from the other sources.

At the present time, salvage is the single significant source of civic action materials. Excess expendable supplies have been exhausted (until more are declared excess). Dunnage is being stockpiled for Vietnamese resettlement projects. Troop reductions have created excess cantonments and/or buildings which are salvaged for civic action purposes.

As this remaining source is exhausted the 1st Marine Division civic action program will decrease or change character to one of technical assistance only. This is not an undesirable trend. It is in keeping with Vietnamization trends wherein materials and funds are made available through GVN channels rather than U.S. military channels.

30 Nov  
31 OCT 70

G-5-1

DECLASSIFIED



1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), PERCENT OF VIETNAMESE  
PARTICIPATION (LABOR) IN 1ST MAR DIV CIVIC ACTION  
PROJECTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

There is no goal or norm established as such for Vietnamese participation in 1st Marine Division civic action projects. However, a high percentage of participation is desired, not only because it gives the Vietnamese individually and collectively an investment in their own development, but more importantly it involves an identification with the Vietnamese government. All 1st Marine Division civic action projects are coordinated with and approved by the GVN at least up to and including Province and the projects are attributed to the GVN. 1st Marine Division participation is limited to material, transportation, and engineering assistance not available through GVN channels.

The present high percentage of Vietnamese participation in 1st Marine Division civic action projects represents a desirable norm which will be maintained in the future.

30 Nov  
31 OCT 70



DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), VIETNAMESE

TREATED BY MEDCAP/DENTCAP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

The number of Vietnamese people treated by the Medical and Dental Civic Action Programs during the first ten months of 1970 is slightly greater than during a similar period in 1969. In 1970, several organizations, the most significant being 7th Marines, were redeployed from Vietnam. This represents a loss of MedCap/DentCap capability of approximately 25% both in the number of teams available and in the medical supplies available.

There is no numerical goal as such, the single objective being to treat as many Vietnamese as possible consistent with operational commitments. The determining factors are the tempo of operations and the availability of expendable medical supplies.

In 1969, and early 1970, the primary source of MedCap supplies was Project Handclasp. The public attitude and the reduced U.S. Navy presence in Military Region I has resulted in sharply reduced availability of Handclasp supplies and an undependable source.

As a result, MedCaps/DentCaps are programed and directed to use expendable military medical/dental supplies as the primary source. The limited availability of medical/dental supplies for civic action programs is the single, most important limiting factor in the number of Vietnamese treated. Since these supplies are subject to budgetary considerations it is expected that a somewhat fewer number of people, between 7,000 - 8,000 per month, represents a maximum capability of 1st Marine Division as presently constituted; both now and in the foreseeable future.

30 Nov  
31 OCT 70

