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COMMAND INFORMATION NOTEBOOK FOR JANUARY 1971 •

G-1

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

RPK/gmr
5000
24 February 1971

From: Command Information Officer
To: Distribution List


Subj: Update Data for Command Information Notebook, January 1971 Edition

Ref: (a) DivO 5000.3A

Encl: (1) Update Data

1. In accordance with reference (a), the information in enclosure (1) is published. Those data on charts carried over from 1970 are included. If any new charts (or charts that do not change) are included in the update packet, this fact is so indicated in enclosure (1).

2. If there are any questions, please call Capt KEMPF at 6133 or 6238.


R. P. KEMPF

Distribution: ACoFS, G-1
ACoFS, G-2
ACoFS, G-3
ACoFS, G-4
ACoFS, G-5
ACoFS, Comptroller
Division Inspector
Staff Judge Advocate
Division Surgeon
CO, 1st Marines
CO, 5th Marines
CO, 11th Marines
CO, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
OIC, Combat Operations Center

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<u>TAB</u>	<u>TITLE (Short)</u>	<u>DATA HEADING</u>	<u>JAN 1971</u>
✓1-1	Div Strength & Force Structure	MAN LVL	12514
		ON ROLLS	12623
		INF ENS	6
		BATTERIES	11
✓1-2	1st Term Reenlistment Rates	ELIG/REC	68
		REENLIST	6
		% REENL	8.8
✓1-3	Congrint/Splint Correspondence	PCS	57
		% CMD	.45
✓1-4	Decorations & Purple Hearts	PHM	127
		% CMD	1.00
		OTHER	418
		% CMD	3.31
		RATIO	3.29
✓1-5a	Trials for Crimes of Violence	TRIALS	19
		% CMD	.15
✓1-5b	Unauthorized Absences	ABSENCES	28
		% CMD	.22
✓1-5c	Confined Marines	PRETRIAL	27
		POSTTRIAL	22
		TOTAL	49
		% CMD	.39
✓1-5d	Bad Conduct & Dishonorable Discharges	BCD/DD	8
		% CMD	.06
✓1-5e	Admin Discharges	C of G	4
		UD	43
		UNSUIT	1
		TOTAL	48
		% CMD	.37
✓1-5f	Drug Abuse Actions	NJP	8
		INVESTIG	36
		COURTS	2
		ADMIN DIS	30
		TOTAL	76
✓1-5g	Racial Incidents	INCIDENTS	0

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TAB	TITLE (Short)	DATA HEADING	JAN 1971
1-5h	Fragging Incidents	INCIDENTS	0
		KILLED	0
		WOUNDED	0
		TOTAL CAS	0
		% CMD CAS	.00
1-5i	Major Offenses	(New Analysis - No Update)	
1-5j	Vehicle/Traffic Offenses	(New Analysis - No Update)	
1-5k	Miscellaneous Offenses	(New Analysis - No Update)	
1-6a	Battle vs Non-Battle Casualties	(New Chart - No Update)	
1-6b	Non-Battle Casualties	-do-	
1-6c	Supporting Arms Incidents	-do-	
1-6d	Individual Weapons Incidents	-do-	
1-6e	Accidental Discharges	-do-	
1-6f	Explosive Ordnance Incidents	-do-	
1-6g	Motor Vehicle Accidents	-do-	
1-6h	Operational/Occupational Incidents	-do-	
1-7	Savings Bond/Deposit Programs	BOND PROG	8203
		% PARTIC	64.1
		DEP PROG	635
		% PARTIC	5.0
2-1	Estimated Enemy Strength	EST STR	8325
2-2	Reconnaissance Teams	(New Chart - No Update)	
2-3	Sensors Employed	RF	99
		LINE	0
		TOTAL	99
2-4	Targetable Sensor Activations	TGT DETEC	35
		FIRE MSNS	11
		CONF KIA	8
2-5	Precipitation	(New Chart - No Update)	
2-6a	Rockets, Mortar Rounds, Lob Bombs	(New Chart - No Update)	

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TAB	TITLE (Short)	DATA HEADING	JAN 1971
✓2-6b	Enemy Sighted	EN SIG	1394
		EN ORDN	47
		EN KIA	211
✓3-1a	USMC KIA	KIA	15
		% CMD	.12
✓3-1b	USMC WIA	WIA	136
		% CMD	1.08
✓3-2a	Mine/Booby Trap Casualties	KIA	4
		WIA	68
		TOTAL	72
		CAS/DET	1.9
		% CMD	.57
✓3-2b	M/BT Casualties as Pct of Total Cas	TOT CAS	151
		M/BT CAS	72
		% M/BT	4.76
3-2c	Ratio Found to Detonated	(New Chart - No Update)	
✓3-3a	Enemy Killed in Action	EN KIA	211
✓3-3b	(1) Enemy Individual Weapons Captured	EN IWC	80
	(2) Enemy Crew-Served Weapons Captured	EN CSWC	6
✓3-4a	Hamlet Population Under CUPP Influence	INFLUENCE	31342
		SCTY INCR	0
		CUM INCR	0
		GR TOT INCR	15492
✓3-4b	CUPP Units Established	CUPP ESTB	-1
		TOT CUPPS	21
		% COVRG	-
		CUM %	-
✓3-4c	CUPP Casualties vs Enemy Losses to CUPP	CUPP KIA	0
		CUPP WIA	25
		TOTAL CUPP	25
		EN KIA	63
		PW/HOI CH	12
		TOTAL EN	75
✓3-5a	Arty Ammo Expended vs Enemy Sighted	ENEMY	1394
		AMMO EXP	35.4

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<u>TAB</u>	<u>TITLE (Short)</u>	<u>DATA HEADING</u>	<u>JAN 1971</u>
3-5b	Arty Pieces Available vs Ammo Expended	AMMO	35.4
		PCS 4.2"	12
		105	36
		155	20
		8"/175	6/ 0
		TOTAL	74
3-5c	NGF Ship-Days vs Rounds Expended	RDS EXP	295
		SHIP-DAYS	3
3-5d	Fixed Wing Sorties	1971	379
3-6a	Helicopter Flight Time	HOURS	5431
3-6b	Helicopter Passengers	PAX	37537
3-6c	Helicopter Cargo	HOURS	2259
4-1	Unit FORSTAT Ratings	(See Note 1)	
4-2	Combat Essential Equipment	(New Chart - No Update)	
4-2a	Combat Essential Equipment (Comm-Elect)	-do-	
4-2b	Combat Essential Equipment (Motor Trans)	-do-	
4-2c	Combat Essential Equipment (Ordnance)	-do-	
4-2d	Combat Essential Equipment (Engineer)	-do-	
4-3	Intersvc Xfer of Equip to RVNAF	(Same Chart - No Update)	
4-4a	Malaria Incidence	CASES	32
		RATE/1000	2.4
4-4b	(1) Venereal Disease Incidence	SYPHILIS	0
		GONORRHEA	196
		CHANCROID	6
		L.G.VENERUM	1
		L.G.INGUIN	0
		TOTAL	203
	(2) V D Incidence & Case Rate	CASES	203
		RATE/1000	15.1
5-1	Cost of Civic Action	MILL.\$VN	1.66

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<u>TAB</u>	<u>TITLE (Short)</u>	<u>DATA HEADING</u>	<u>JAN 1971</u>
5-2	Vietnamese Participation	(New Chart - No Data)	
5-3	MEDCAP/DENTCAP	PATIENTS	8306

Note 1: On Chart for Tab 4-1 (Unit FORSTAT Ratings) Change:

HQ BN (REIN) from C-1 to C-2 in Equip Readiness
 1ST ENGR BN (REIN) from C-2 to C-1 in Equip Readiness
 1ST MED BN from C-1 to C-2 in Equip Readiness

Note 2: All charts carried over from 1970 must have "/1971" added to the title and a legend entry or entries for 1971 added.

Note 3: For Tab 1-6b there are three charts. Two of them (1969 and 1971) are new to this update. The third (1970) remains the same.

Note 4: For Tab 4-3, both the chart and the narrative remain the same.

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INTRODUCTION

January 1971, when compared to the preceding month, can be best characterized as a period of mixed results, with a large number of indicators registering one month increases and a similarly sizable group of indicators posting decreases. However, when the entire set of indicators considered herein are compared to averages for the previous six months or one year, the January 1971 figures, almost without exception, represent gains (gains, in this context, meaning increases or decreases reflecting favorably on the progress of the Division).

The local (December to January) instability of these parameters may be attributed to the enemy's preparation for and execution of activities normally associated with the New Year, Tet and the early Spring, and to the efforts of the Division to disrupt his preparations and counteract his activities. A further, but less important cause of the local instability, especially in the areas of personnel administration, law and discipline, is the impending redeployment of a portion of the Division. When viewed in the larger context (comparison of January results to the averages for the previous six months or year), the reasons for the continuation of trends established during 1970 are reductions in both Division and enemy strength, and the enemy's reversion to guerrilla tactics.

The enemy, during the month of January 1971, was sighted a bit more often than in the previous month (1,394 sightings versus December's 1,331), although his estimated strength again decreased slightly (down 235 to 8,325). He again employed his "artillery" sparingly, expending only 46 mortar rounds and but a single rocket in attacks by fire on Division positions, the total figure of 47 representing a decrease of two from December's 49 rounds.

Although he killed 15 Division Marines or Navy corpsmen during January (up from 11 in December) and wounded 136 (up from 125), the enemy paid for this with the deaths of 211 of his soldiers (up from 162), and the loss of 80 individual weapons (down from 87) and 6 crew-served weapons (down from 9).

Friendly activity during the month included the continuation of Operations Imperial Lake (in the Que Son Mountains) and Upshur Stream (in the western Charlie Ridge area), and extensive patrol, ambush and reconnaissance activities. Especially active in January were the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units, which claimed 63 of the enemy's 211 KIAs, captured two guerrillas and influenced ten to rally to the government cause, while suffering 25 wounded. This was the second consecutive month of heavy CUPP activity and, as was the case with the Division's results overall, produced (considering December to January) a mixed bag of results, both friendly and enemy casualties increasing and the number of prisoners/ralliers decreasing. Artillery and naval gunfire expenditures, fixed wing sorties, and all three parameters associated with helicopter support (flight time, passengers carried, and tons of cargo carried) increased during January 1971. Most of these support indices increased moderately, but artillery expenditure increased 30% (from just under 27,000 rounds to over 35,000), the rise fueled almost exclusively by an intense attack by fire on portions of Charlie Ridge which accounted for over 11,000 rounds during the latter third of the month. This attack on probable enemy staging areas and

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bases of operation was part of an active program to disrupt the enemy's preparations for his expected Spring campaign.

During the past thirteen months, the enemy has increasingly avoided direct confrontation with our troops and has even reduced sharply his standoff attacks by fire on our positions (e.g., monthly averages of 3,736 enemy sighted and 350 rounds in attacks by fire in the first half of 1970, decreasing to averages of 1,401 and 90 in the last half, and finally decreasing to 1,394 and 47 (totals) in January 1971). Nevertheless, he has managed to make his presence felt through the use of mines and booby traps. January 1971 saw a sharp increase in both the number of surprise firing devices detonated and the resultant number of casualties (37 devices detonated versus December's 28 and 72 casualties versus 53). The 30% increase in the number of detonations produced a January find/detonation ratio of 3.19:1, a decrease from December's record 4.00:1 and the first such setback since July 1970. One notable (although, thankfully, fairly uncommon) incident during the month served to add significantly to January's totals for both detonations and casualties. On operation Upshur Stream, a Marine detonated a surprise firing device which wounded four men. A second device was detonated as members of the unit rushed to the assistance of the first casualties, wounding an additional four men. Finally, the rotor blades of the medical evacuation helicopter triggered four more booby traps upon landing, wounding three more Marines. In addition, five more devices were found and destroyed, bringing the totals for this incident to six booby traps detonated, five found and eleven men WIA and illustrating the density with which the enemy emplaces these weapons. Further discussion of the topics above may be found in Tab G-3 and the other tabs in the G-3 and G-2 Sections.

Even as battle casualties increased, the non-hostile casualty rate decreased for the second consecutive month (from 94 casualties per million man-days in November to 75 in December and 51 in January). However, not all categories of non-hostile casualties decreased during January, Accidental Discharges rising from five to nine and Motor Vehicle Accidents soaring from four to twelve, but continued command emphasis on the reduction of such incidents and their resulting casualties should bring these two categories into line with the others (See Section 1-6).

Just as with all other groups of indicators discussed thus far, mixed results obtained in the realm of personnel management, law and discipline. Much of the turbulence experienced is associated with the pending redeployments. Division strength crept higher in preparation for the unavoidable personnel realignments which will be occasioned by the redeployments, while the submission of award recommendations began to increase, as they did prior to both phases of redeployment in 1970. Certain indicators pertaining to law and discipline increased in January 1971 as Division units tried to clear court dockets and complete processing of recommendations for administrative discharges initiated in the latter part of 1970. However, it is gratifying to note that not a single "racial" or "fragging" incident occurred in January (See Tabs 1-5g and 1-5h) and the number of violent crimes committed by Division personnel fell from the seven recorded in December 1970 to two (one assault and one attempted homicide [See Tab 1-5i]).

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Another set of gratifying statistics contained herein are those treating readiness and maintenance management. The Division, in January 1971, continued to maintain a FORSTAT rating of C-1 (fully combat ready), while fully 95% of the Division's combat essential equipment was operationally ready, with three of the commodity groups (Communication-Electronics, Motor Transport and Ordnance) exceeding Marine Corps standards by a wide margin, and Engineer equipment registering its fourth consecutive month of increase and surpassing the standard by 3%.

The immediate future promises to be one of marked turbulence for the 1st Marine Division. As of the date of this introduction, one infantry battalion and three artillery batteries have commenced standdown. Eventually one full infantry regiment, six firing batteries and a wide variety of supporting units will depart country, requiring massive realignment of the remaining forces, including a sharp phasedown of such programs as the Combined Unit Pacification Program (already begun with the withdrawal of four CUPP units and the planned termination of another seven) and the medical and dental civic action programs. Consolidation of forces will require that a majority of friendly activity be conducted in the lowland areas, where the density of surprise firing devices is much greater than in the mountainous regions. Therefore, a certain increase in the detonation of such devices may be expected (already in February, 24 detonations have occurred, causing 44 casualties). Furthermore, some increase in enemy activity may be projected, as he attempts to harass to the maximum both remaining and redeploying forces. However, the combat efficiency of the Division has remained at a high level throughout its stay in the Republic of Vietnam, and there is no reason to believe that this record will not be at least maintained, if not improved.

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G-1 OVERVIEW

Personnel management, in January 1971 as well as in months past, has kept pace with the force structure reductions of the past 13 months, as evidenced by the Command being continuously in combat readiness category C-1. In other administrative areas involving such subjects as morale, discipline and personnel services, appropriate norms of effectiveness have been rather well maintained. Abstracts of these norms, as well as over and under achievements, are presented below:

a. The end-of-January 1971 strength of the Division was 12,623, an increase of 52 from December 1970 and 109 more than the RVN ceiling. The strength, which peaked at over 31,000 in November 1969 and dropped sharply during Phases III and IV of redeployment, will again drop with Phase VI, beginning in February 1971. (See Tab 1-1)

b. The January 1971 1st term reenlistment rate of 9% was a significant drop from December's 31% and the 1971 annual rate of 40%. Factors which may have affected the rate are the emphasis on reenlisting only Marines of the highest caliber and redeployments and subsequent reduction in overall Marine Corps strength. (See Tab 1-2)

c. Congressional and special interest correspondence received during January 1971 totalled 57 pieces compared to December's 71, representing 4.5 pieces per 1,000 strength compared to 5.7 and 1970's annual average of 5.3. Analysis reveals no statistical significance, but the increase during November 1970 may be attributed to correspondence generated as a result of the personnel redeployment criteria and, generally, can be grouped into the categories of welfare, confinement/discipline, and basic allowance/family separation. (See Tab 1-3)

d. During January 1971, Purple Heart Medals continued to be awarded at the rate of 10.0 per 1,000 personnel established in December 1970, while the rate for heroic/meritorious decorations increased from 27.4 to 33.1. While The Purple Heart rate was significantly less than 1970's annual rate (14.4/1,000) and less than one-third 1969's (31.3/1,000), it virtually equalled the average for the previous three months (9.7/1,000). The increase in the rate for all other awards may be attributed to the commencement of the program of early submission of award recommendations for deserving enlisted personnel of redeploying units and is a repeat of the pattern experienced during the two periods of redeployment in 1970. Additionally, an increase in combat activity during January fueled a rise in the submission of citations for heroism. (See Tab 1-4)

e. The rate for trials for crimes of violence involving Division personnel increased to 1.5 per 1,000 personnel during January 1971 and was a continuation of the rise in this rate that began in November 1970. The primary causes for the increase in the rate, the highest in 25 months and significantly higher than the averages for the past two years, are the increased effectiveness in the investigation of such crimes and the expedition of the case load concerning personnel redeploying with Keystone Robin (Charlie) units. (See Tab 1-5a)

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f. Although the 28 unauthorized absences reported in January 1971 does not represent the highest monthly total since this report was originated in July 1969, the corresponding rate of 2.2 absences per 1,000 personnel is the highest such rate in that same period. The absence rate, after remaining virtually steady during the period July through October 1970 (at about 1.0 per 1,000), increased to 1.3 in November, 1.7 in December, and 2.2 in January. If this trend continues, the rate for February 1971 will be 2.8 per 1,000 personnel. (See Tab 1-5b)

g. The number of Marines in confinement in January 1971 declined from December's 60 to January's 49. This seems to be a continuation of the downward trend established during 1970, wherein the year's monthly average was 90, that of the last half of the year 68, and that of the last three months of the year 52. However, because Division strength decreased apace, the confinement rate for 1970 was a relatively steady 4.5 per 1,000, from which January's 3.9 per 1,000 is not significantly different. Therefore, the rate in the future should remain in the range 4-5 per 1,000. (See Tab 1-5c)

h. During January 1971, eight punitive discharges were awarded, equalling the number awarded during December 1970, and, since Division strength during the two months was virtually unchanged, a steady discharge rate of 0.6 per 1,000 ensued. Both the number and rate were well above the figures for October and November because a greater number of general and special courts-martial were conducted during December and January than were conducted during the previous two months. However, January's rate equalled the annual rate for both 1969 and 1970, and rates in this vicinity should continue to occur in the near future. (See Tab 1-5d)

i. January 1971 saw the processing of 48 administrative discharges, up from 42 in November and 41 in December. The slight increase may be due to the fact that virtually all the recommendations for such discharges initiated during the latter part of 1970 were completed processing in January. Because the weeding-out process pursued during 1970 has been virtually completed, a distinct downturn in the rate of such discharges can be anticipated in the future. (See Tab 1-5e)

j. The number of judicial and investigatory actions concerning drug abuse increased only slightly during January 1971 (from 41 in December to 46), while the processing of administrative discharges increased by 250% (from 12 to 30). The rate of the former actions remained essentially the same as the three previous months (3.8 per 1,000 versus an average of 3.5 per 1,000), indicating relatively steady performance. The increase in the processing of drug-related administrative discharges may be attributed to the "clearing of the docket" (See Tab 1-5e) discussed in the paragraph above. (See Tab 1-5f)

k. There were no reported racial incidents during January 1971, a fact reinforcing the trend established during the last half of 1970, a period of time during which an average of just over one such incident occurred per month. Because of intense command interest, the reduced rate experienced in this recent period of time should carry over to the future. (See Tab 1-5g)

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1. As was the case with racial incidents above, there were no "fragging" incidents reported in January 1971, producing the second consecutive month during which no casualties resulted from such incidents. The trend in both cases and casualties is downward, although the evidence of a decreasing casualty trend is more convincing than that of incidents. (See Tab 1-5h)

m. Major offenses for January 1971 (encompassing those offenses criminal in nature) fell to 35 from December's 43, producing an offense rate of 2.8 per 1,000 compared to December's 3.4 and 1970's average of 3.3. It is significant to note that there were only two violent crimes (actual and attempted murder/homicide, simple and aggravated assault, rape, unlawful ordnance detonation, communicating a threat or armed robbery) compared to five in December and thirteen in November. (See Tab 1-5i)

n. The processing of vehicle/traffic offenses during January 1971 (a total of 122) increased more than three-fold over the average for the last three months of 1970 (36) and the monthly average for 1970 (102). These figures convert to offense rates of 9.7/1,000 (January 1971), 2.8/1,000 (October - December 1970), and 5.1/1,000 (1970). (See Tab 1-5j)

o. Miscellaneous offenses (encompassing those incidents not included in either the major or vehicle/traffic offense categories) increased to 95 from December's thirteen month low of 32, but decreased from the 1970 monthly average of 213, converting to offense rates of 7.5/1,000 personnel for January 1971, 2.5/1,000 for December 1970, and 10.8/1,000 for the year 1970. (See Tab 1-5k)

p. Ground safety is the general category embracing not only the subject of battle versus non-battle casualties, but also incidents involving friendly supporting arms, individual weapons (outside a cantonment), accidental discharges, explosive ordnance, motor vehicle accidents, and operational/occupational incidents.

(1) The battle casualty rate increased in January 1971 to 294 per million man-days from December's 212, temporarily arresting the gradual downward trend experienced over the previous nine months. The rate of non-battle casualties, on the other hand, decreased during January to 51 per million man-days from December's 75 and the average rate of 76 per million man-days during the last three months of 1970. (See Tab 1-6a)

(2) An analysis of the major categories of non-battle casualties reveals the following changes:

<u>TYPE INCIDENT</u>	<u>JAN 71</u> <u>RATE*</u>	<u>DEC 70</u> <u>RATE*</u>	<u>CHANGE</u>	<u>1970</u> <u>RATE*</u>	<u>CHANGE</u>
Friendly Fire	0.2	0.5	-60%	1.2	-83%
Explosive Ordnance	0.2	1.3	-85%	0.9	-78%
Accidental Discharges	0.6	0.4	+50%	0.5	+20%
Motor Vehicle	0.6	0.2	+200%	0.4	+50%

*Per 1,000 personnel

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q. Participation in the Savings Bond program during January 1971 decreased sharply from that achieved during the previous month (from 74.3% to 64.1%) and was well below the average for 1970 (69.8%). Participation in the Savings Deposit program, on the other hand, decreased negligibly from the 5.1% figure recorded in November and December 1970 (to 5.0%), while January's percentage surpassed 1970's average by a comfortable margin (5.0% versus 4.2%).

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DIVISION STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Division strength at the end of 31 January 1971 was 12,623, which was 52 higher than the December figure and 112 higher than the Division RVN ceiling. This was the second month in a row in which a slight gain was recorded in preparation for Increment VI redeployments.

During most of 1969, the Division strength was stabilized at the 24,000 level. In October of that year, a 6,000 strength increase was occasioned principally by the joining of the 26th Marines and the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. The Division continued to gain in personnel until 17 November 1969, when it reached the apex of its growth in South Vietnam - the strength figure stood momentarily at 31,283.

The next major strength change, driven by the force reduction, was characterized by a sharp and steady decline beginning in December 1969 and continuing through 1970. The result to date is that the Division onboard strength figure has been reduced by nearly 19,000 in the last twelve months. As of the end of December, the figure rested at 12,571.

The Division force structure during the first nine months of 1969 consisted of the nine organic infantry and four organic artillery battalions, plus support and reinforcing units. A structure change in October of that year increased the number of infantry battalions to twelve (with the addition of the 26th Marines) and the number of artillery battalions to five (1st Battalion, 13th Marines was added). During 1970, the Division structure was gradually reduced to six infantry and two artillery battalions. Concurrently, the headquarters, reconnaissance, and medical units were reduced in strength while the 1st Engineer Battalion remained at full strength to cope with missions peculiar to that "type" unit. The Division retained two reduced motor transport battalions to cope with the Division's large area of responsibility and the possibility of reduced helicopter support.

Current strength projections show the Division operating just under the 1971 total RVN ceiling. These overages will be eliminated as personnel transfers associated with Increment VI deployment become effective.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), DIVISION STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 STRENGTH

1971 STRENGTH

1970 STRENGTH



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
MAN LVL	23207	23207	23344	22596	22596	22582	22522	21736	21684	27732	27833	27833	
ON ROLLS	23948	24224	24263	23899	23694	23469	23440	22734	24285	30306	30899	29476	
INF BNS	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	12	12	12	
BATTERIES	27	25	24	22	22	22	22	22	22	24	24	24	
1970													
MAN LVL	27868	27868	27868	22018	22018	22018	22018	22018	22018	12511	12511	12511	
ON ROLLS	27490	26672	23405	21808	21805	20998	21442	19744	16400	12425	12530	12571	
INF BNS	12	12	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	6	6	6	
BATTERIES	24	24	19	19	19	19	19	17	11	11	11	11	
1971													
MAN LVL	12514												
ON ROLLS	12623												
INF BNS	6												
BATTERIES	11												

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FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT RATE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The first term reenlistment rate for January was 8.8% (6 of 68 eligible and recommended). This is a significant decline of seven-ninths from the previous month (8.8% vs 31.3%) and is attributed to the greater emphasis on reenlisting quality versus quantity, and redeployment of forces. We appear to be experiencing the results of the slow down of the Vietnam conflict and the overall reduction of Marine Corps strength.

The factors below were stated as reasons for personnel not reenlisting in the United States Marine Corps:

Desire for further education - - 44%

Civilian pursuits - - 22%

Discontent with the Military - - 14%

Slow promotion - - 10%

Insufficient pay -- 6%

Other -- 4%

Present trends would indicate a projected reenlistment rate of approximately 22% for the month of February 1971.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), 1ST TERM REENLISTMENT RATES, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970/1971

1969 RATE ———

1971 RATE ———

1970 RATE - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
ELIG/REC	188	132	137	107	125	159	176	167	183	65	63	56	1,558
REENLIST	63	63	60	53	56	98	116	109	131	27	36	32	844
% REENL	35.0	47.7	43.8	49.5	44.8	61.6	65.9	65.2	71.6	41.5	57.1	57.1	54.1
1970													
ELIG/REC	45	65	88	57	89	86	97	83	48	36	34	32	760
REENLIST	24	30	29	41	48	26	32	18	19	10	14	10	301
% REENL	53.3	46.1	33.0	72.0	55.0	30.2	33.0	21.7	39.7	27.8	41.1	31.3	39.6
1971													
ELIG/REC	68												
REENLIST	6												
% REENL	8.8												

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CONGRESSIONAL/SPECIAL INTEREST CORRESPONDENCE
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Congressional/Special Interest Correspondence received during January 1971 totalled 57 pieces converting to a rate of 4.5 pieces per 1,000 personnel. Both the number of pieces and the rate continue a downward trend established during the last quarter of 1970. During the month a total of 57 inquiries were received registering 76 complaints. By comparison, in December 1970, 71 inquiries were received. The January complaints are categorized as follows:

Welfare Reports	8
Confinement/Discipline	12
Medical	5
Hardship/Humanitarian Transfers	2
Basic Allowance for Quarters/Separation of Dependents	12
MOS Changes/Reassignments	8
Clothing/Equipment/Personal Effects	3
Administrative Discharges	1
Marriage to Alien	3
Emergency leave	1
Pay	3
Harassment/Maltreatment	3
Prejudice	4
Miscellaneous	<u>11</u>
TOTAL	76

(continued on preceding page)

31 Jan 1971

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The nature of many complaints received in January 1971 related to the period of October and November 1970. During this time the monsoon rains were exceptionally heavy causing flooding of many lowlands and making access roads to some units inaccessible. In addition some units were even inaccessible by air due to extremely low visibility in high mountainous areas. These weather factors greatly hampered the resupplying operations of units located in isolated areas. In the case of one unit, resupply of food was impossible for a period of two days. Illnesses and injuries became more prevalent. Treatment and medical aerial evacuation of the sick was often delayed. In general, everyday combat living conditions were poorer than normal.


The conditions described caused men to complain more and become more tense and resentful. As a result they initiated more correspondence of complaint to their Congressional Representatives than is normally received during any single month.

Therefore, this upsurge is not interpreted as a trend. Rather a reduction of Congressional Interest correspondence is predicted in the forthcoming months in view of reduced operational activity and anticipation of redeployment.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CONGRESSIONAL/SPECIAL INTERESTCORRESPONDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/19711969 PIECES1970 PIECES1971 PIECES

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 PCS	82	90	123	111	138	110	103	120	91	130	145	124	1,367
% CMD	.34	.37	.51	.46	.58	.47	.44	.53	.37	.43	.47	.42	.45
1970 PCS	136	143	136	122	108	92	98	99	80	84	74	71	1,243
% CMD	.49	.54	.50	.56	.50	.44	.46	.50	.48	.60	.50	.57	.53
1971 PCS	57												(57)
% CMD	.45												(.45)

31 JAN 71

DECORATIONS AND PURPLE HEART MEDALS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The number of decorations, (excluding Purple Heart Medals) processed by the Division Awards Board during January 1971 totalled 418, an increase of 66 over the December 1970 total. The increase can be attributed to a slight expansion of combat activities and more extensive use of the 10-month early awards submission program. The effect of this increase is reflected in the following rates:

RATES (AWARDS PER 1,000 PERSONNEL)

December 1970

27.4

January 1971

33.1

One hundred and twenty seven Purple Heart Medals were awarded during January 1971 (one more than in December 1970). This is statistically equal to the rate at which Purple Heart Medals have been awarded in the past several months, exemplified by the average of 10.0/1,000 personnel during both December 1970 and January 1971.

Purple Heart Medals are expected to continue being awarded at the rate of approximately 10.0 per 1,000 personnel, with a tendency to decrease as combat operations are lessened. The number of American Awards processed by the Division Awards Board, however, should increase greatly as units submit recommendations in anticipation of forthcoming troop withdrawals. On the basis of previous deployments, a minimal average of 800 recommendations per month can be projected. However, because of increased command attention and the greater number of troops involved, the actual average should be well in excess of 900 recommendations per month during the forthcoming months.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) RATIO OF U. S. DECORATIONS (HEROIC AND MERITORIOUS)

PROCESSED TO PURPLE HEART MEDALS AWARDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 RATIO

1971 RATIO

1970 RATIO



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
59 PHM	693	644	1209	819	1197	921	486	1150	866	406	413	381	9,165
% CMD	2.89	2.66	4.98	3.43	5.05	3.92	2.08	4.97	3.56	1.34	1.34	1.29	3.13
OTHER	924	672	1200	1057	965	995	903	941	927	766	647	596	10,593
% CMD	3.86	2.78	4.94	4.43	4.07	4.24	3.85	4.15	3.82	2.53	2.09	2.02	3.56
RATIO	1.33	1.04	.99	1.29	.81	1.08	1.85	.83	1.07	1.89	1.56	1.57	1.15
70 PHM	444	454	428	410	388	348	272	279	197	134	102	126	3,582
% CMD	1.62	1.70	1.83	1.88	1.78	1.66	1.27	1.41	1.20	1.11	.89	1.00	1.44
OTHER	344	624	809	403	462	678	782	916	810	701	363	352	7,244
% CMD	1.25	2.34	3.46	1.85	2.12	3.23	3.65	4.64	4.94	5.90	2.90	2.74	3.25
RATIO	.77	1.38	1.89	.98	1.19	1.95	2.88	3.29	4.11	5.13	3.56	2.80	2.02
71 PHM	127												(127)
% CMD	1.00												(1.00)
OTHER	418												(418)
% CMD	3.31												(3.31)
RATIO	3.29												(3.29)

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LAW AND DISCIPLINE

The beginning of calendar year 1971 has shown a marked increase in judicial and disciplinary proceedings. For example, trials for crimes of violence increased from December 1970 rate of 1.0 per 1,000 personnel to a January 1971 rate of 1.5 per 1,000.

The rise in courts-martial relating to crimes of violence does not necessarily mean that such crimes have increased in number, but rather that they are being investigated and prosecuted with more thoroughness.

An adjunct to violent crimes was the mounting brig population experienced early in 1970. Late summer 1970 saw downward trends in the brig population to where the January 1971 rate of 3.9 per 1,000 is a 19% decrease from the December 1970 figure of 4.8 per 1,000. The policy of transferring prisoners sentenced to more than 60 days confinement to Camp Pendleton has substantially reduced the confinee strength.

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TRIALS INVOLVING CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The ratio of crimes of violence to Division strength increased from a December rate of 1.0 per 1,000 to a January 1971 rate of 1.5 per 1,000. One factor contributing to the greater trial rate is the increased effectiveness in the investigation of such crimes, in addition to expedition of the case load involving personnel redeploying with Keystone Robin (Charlie) Increment VI.

A consistent ratio between crimes of violence and total strength of the Division is not demonstrable. This is because the number of trials in any given month is no indication of the amount of violence in the Division. There are occasions where a serious crime takes a considerable length of time to investigate. The case finally comes to trial two to three months and sometimes longer after the incident occurred. Thus the total for the month may balloon to what appears to be an abnormally high total.

A review of the trend illustrated in August through December 1970 makes it appear that .08% of Division strength will be a useful predictive constant factor for February and March.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS COMMAND TRIED FOR

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 PERCENTAGE

1971 PERCENTAGE

1970 PERCENTAGE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TRIALS	15	11	14	9	15	15	19	7	6	16	19	23	169
% CMD	.07	.05	.06	.04	.07	.07	.09	.03	.03	.06	.07	.08	
1970													
TRIALS	29	20	16	19	18	25	9	15	10	7	11	13	192
% CMD	.11	.08	.07	.09	.09	.13	.04	.08	.06	.06	.09	.10	.08
1971													
TRIALS	19												(19)
% CMD	.15												(.15)

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE INCLUDE MURDER, RAPE, ASSAULT AND ARMED ROBBERY. 31 JAN 71

UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORT, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The 28 unauthorized absences in January 1971, while not the highest number since July 1969, represents the highest per thousand rate. The rate over the past three months has demonstrated a steadily increasing trend (increased 0.3 per 1,000 in November, 0.4 per 1,000 in December, and 0.5 per 1,000 in January), and if it continues, a February rate of 2.8 per 1,000 personnel will ensue.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORT, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970/1971

1969 ABSENCES

1970 ABSENCES

1971 ABSENCES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
ABSENCES							27	19	28	40	31	35	180
% CMD							.12	.09	.12	.14	.11	.12	
1970													
ABSENCES	23	17	36	12	17	42	24	17	17	12	16	21	254
% CMD	.09	.07	.16	.06	.08	.20	.11	.09	.10	.10	.13	.17	.11
1971													
ABSENCES	28												(28)
% CMD	.22												(.22)

* TOTAL SHOWN IS FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1969.

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CONFINED MARINES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The graph reflects a confined ratio for the month of January 1971 of 3.9 per 1,000 which is a 19% decrease from the December 1970 figures of 4.8 per 1,000.

Persons suspected of crimes of violence are, in most cases, placed in pretrial confinement since they are considered to present a threat to personnel. Also, convicted offenders of crimes of violence, for the most part, receive confinement as part of their sentence and seldom have the confinement portion of the sentence suspended by the convening authority.

The application of a liberal administrative separation policy, by ridding the Division of potential offenders, is alleviating the brig population problem, although it is impossible to establish a direct correlation.

The decrease in the total number of Division personnel confined at the United States Army Vietnam Installation Stockade (USARVIS), is the result of the implementation of the policy whereby Marines receiving more than 60 days confinement at hard labor are transferred to the Correctional Center, Camp Pendleton, upon sentencing or as soon after trial as possible. The rate of confinement (confinees/div strength) should steadily decrease with the decrease in Division strength.

A review of the trend for September through January 1971 makes it appear that .40 - .45 percent of Division strength will be a useful predictive constant for February and March.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBINED MARINES (PERCENTAGE OF DIVISION

STRENGTH), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 PERCENTAGE

1970 PERCENTAGE

1971 PERCENTAGE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
PRETRIAL	29	22	18	21	29	19	18	16	19	24	21	33	
POSTTRIAL	29	26	24	30	28	31	44	29	37	44	44	76	
TOTAL	58	48	42	51	57	50	62	45	56	68	65	109	
% CMD	.26	.21	.18	.16	.23	.25	.22	.28	.21	.23	.24	.39	.24
1970													
PRETRIAL	44	42	48	47	44	55	48	38	33	21	39	42	
POSTTRIAL	69	58	59	58	74	71	73	40	24	21	14	18	
TOTAL	113	100	107	105	118	126	121	78	57	42	53	60	
% CMD	.41	.38	.46	.48	.54	.60	.56	.40	.35	.34	.42	.48	.45
1971													
PRETRIAL	27												
POSTTRIAL	22												
TOTAL	49												
% CMD	.39												(.39)

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
BAD CONDUCT AND DISHONORABLE DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The number of punitive discharges for the month of January 1971 remained the same as the number for the month of December. The figure remains at eight for a monthly average of 0.6/1,000 for the two months. This figure is higher than reported prior to December and is due to the greater number of general and special courts-martial held during December and January.

The trend should remain the same or slightly increasing during the months of February-March 1971 due to the expected case load involving personnel redeploying with Keystone Robin (Charlie) Increment VI.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), BAD CONDUCT AND DISGRACEFUL DISCHARGES.CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/19711969 DISCHARGES1970 DISCHARGES1971 DISCHARGES

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
BCD/DD	15	14	16	16	11	12	13	16	13	11	16	18	171
% CMD	.07	.06	.07	.07	.05	.05	.06	.07	.06	.04	.05	.06	.06
1970													
BCD/DD	16	10	19	14	16	10	12	10	8	5	3	8	131
% CMD	.06	.04	.09	.07	.08	.05	.05	.05	.05	.04	.02	.06	.06
1971													
BCD/DD	8												(8)
% CMD	.06												(.06)

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ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During January 1971, there were 48 administrative separations within the Command compared to 41 in December. This represents a rate of 3.7/1,000 for January, which is an increase of 12% from December. An explanation for the increase lies in the fact that almost all of the remaining recommendations for administrative separation generated during the latter part of 1970 were completed during January. Only eight of these cases are still pending.

It is believed the weeding-out process has been virtually completed as the Commandant of the Marine Corps expressed a desire to have all possible cases submitted for consideration by 31 December 1970. Any new cases received would presumably be related to newly joined Marines with old disciplinary histories from previous Commands or incidents of recent origin. Therefore a distinct downward trend is predicted during the forthcoming months.

31 JAN 71


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES PROCESSED

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 DISCHARGES

1970 DISCHARGES

1971 DISCHARGES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
C of G	—	—	NONE PROCESSED DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1969										0
UD	4	8	6	7	6	1	7	9	15	15	8	4	90
UNSUIT	4	1	5	1	1	4	5	3	2	1	1	5	31
TOTAL	8	9	11	8	7	5	12	12	17	16	9	7	121
% CMD	.03	.04	.04	.03	.03	.02	.05	.05	.07	.05	.03	.02	.04
1970													
C of G	1	9	28	32	65	63	69	32	23	22	9	19	372
UD	12	10	37	18	35	41	57	28	24	28	31	20	341
UNSUIT	5	6	13	11	20	11	14	4	4	4	2	2	96
TOTAL	18	25	78	61	120	115	140	64	51	54	42	41	809
% CMD	.06	.09	.33	.28	.55	.55	.65	.32	.31	.43	.33	.33	.35
1971													
C of G	4												(4)
UD	43												(43)
UNSUIT	1												(1)
TOTAL	48												(48)
% CMD	.37												(.37)

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ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTION RELATING TO DRUG ABUSE, CALENDAR YEARS
1969/1970/1971

Administrative and judicial actions relative to drug abuse continued to increase during January 1971. The 3.6 per 1,000 investigatory and judicial actions taken during January 1971 represents an increase of only 9% above the 3.3 per 1,000 similar actions taken the previous month. The 2.4 per 1,000 administrative discharges for January 1971 was an increase of 140% over the 1.0 per 1,000 administrative discharges for December 1970.

The decrease in the number of courts-martial, despite the growing number of cases, is due to the significant increase in the use of administrative discharges for processing drug offenses. During 1970, there were more than 16 times as many administrative discharges as there were in 1969 (211 vs 13).

Several new programs and instructional techniques were started during January 1971:

- a. A revised drug abuse lecture by a new lecturer was prepared. The group size of lectures will be limited to 25 persons.
- b. A Drug Information Workshop Training Period is scheduled for 9 February 1971, for all available medical officers and chaplains. The purpose is to train those in attendance to conduct workshops in their respective units.
- c. A Drug Information Contact Team will conduct seminars for groups of ten junior officers or Staff NCO's throughout the Division TAOR.
- d. A Unit Drug Information Library is being established at units down to company/battery level. The purpose of these libraries is to make available factual source documents as reference materials.

31 JAN 71

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTIONS CONCERNING

DRUG ABUSE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 ACTIONS

1971 ACTIONS =====

1970 ACTIONS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
NJP	2	7	4	2	8	3	1	1	0	3	8	4	43
INVESTIG	20	6	4	17	16	35	12	8	9	25	26	26	204
COURTS	14	8	11	12	9	17	15	11	5	15	19	21	157
ADMIN DIS	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	0	1	1	2	13
TOTAL	36	21	19	32	34	57	30	23	14	44	54	53	417
1970													
NJP	2	7	3	3	1	5	4	6	11	3	2	5	52
INVESTIG	31	26	33	38	44	32	26	45	42	34	40	35	426
COURTS	21	13	12	18	12	18	11	7	18	6	5	1	142
ADMIN DIS	10	4	20	16	23	23	36	18	20	10	19	12	211
TOTAL	64	50	68	75	80	78	77	76	91	53	66	53	831
1971													
NJP	8												(8)
INVESTIG	36												(36)
COURTS	2												(2)
ADMIN DIS	30												(30)
TOTAL	76												(76)

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RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

A racial incident is a disagreement, disobedience and/or violence perpetrated between individuals or groups with ethnic difference as a cause.

During January 1971, there were no reported incidents within the Division. August 1970 is the only other month in the past thirteen in which there were no incidents. It is significant to note that eight incidents were recorded during January 1970. This was the highest rate during 1970.

The impending standdown of certain Division units will present increased opportunity for individuals to attempt to influence others, or to be influenced concerning real or imagined racial issues.

The apparent continued success can, in some part, be attributed to the intensive interest in this matter on all levels of command.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1970/1971

INCIDENCE - - - - -
INCIDENCE = = = = =

1970
1971

CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE
CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE

[illegible]

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FRAGGING INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

During January 1971 (and to date in February), no incidents of felonious "fragging" have occurred. January was the first month in the thirteen recorded in which none occurred and the second consecutive month during which no casualties were recorded.

A fragging is defined as a deliberate, covert assault, by throwing or setting off a grenade or other explosive device, or the preparation and emplacement of such a device as a booby trap, with the intention of harming or intimidating another. During 1970, such incidents occurred at a rate of 3.9 per month with a relatively wide variation (assuming a normal distribution, a standard deviation of 1.6 obtained). Similarly, casualties from fragging incidents occurred at a rate of 3.2 per month with an even wider variation (a standard deviation of 2.6). In absolute terms, the number of incidents per month ranged from two in July and December to seven in February 1970, and casualties from none in December to eight in April. Although 26 of these acts were committed in the first half of the year and 21 in the last half, conversion to rates per 1,000 (Division strength) show that the rates for the two halves of the year were virtually equal (at approximately 0.2 per 1,000). However, only 14 casualties resulted from such acts during the last half of the year (versus 28 in the first half), converting to a rate of 0.15 per 1,000 (versus 0.20 per 1,000). Five of the 47 incidents involved the use of CS (riot gas) grenades, including four in the last two months of the year.

Of the 47 incidents in 1970, 22 were solved from which 37 suspects/offenders were identified through investigation. However, markedly better results were obtained as the year progressed. During the first half of the year, 10 acts of the 26 acts were solved (38%). During the following three month period, 5 of 10 were solved (50%), while during the last three months of the year, 7 of 11 were solved (64%). Much of this progress may be attributed to the implementation of Force Order 3120.4 (setting forth the provisions of "Operation Freeze", the swift isolation of a unit in which an act of violence has occurred, and the immediate and thorough investigation of the act), Division Bulletin 5830, and Division Order 5830.1. Division Order 5830.2 of 19 December 1970 has further aided in the solution of such crimes, in that it provides for the protection of informants. The effect of this order in one particular case was that four persons thus protected gave information resulting in the conviction of four of the five suspects (the fifth having already received a Bad Conduct Discharge for other reasons). In another case happening on 6 December 1970, the force of all the directives above provided for the solution of a fragging (through informants and the subsequent confession of the two offenders) in a single day.

In general, of the 47 incidents during 1970, 29 (or 62%) occurred in relatively secure areas (cantonments in or near the Danang/Division CP area), while the remaining 18 (or 38%) occurred in forward areas (Combat Bases, Fire Support Bases, Infantry Battalion CPs). They happened primarily in living areas or in the vicinity of Clubs. The 37 identified suspects/offenders received 6 General Courts-Martial, 15 Special Courts-Martial, 1 Non-Judicial Punishment and 5 Administrative Discharges. The remaining charges were dropped primarily because of insufficient evidence.

(continued on preceding page)

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Following is a list, by rank, of offenders, casualties and known intended victims

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OFFENDERS</u>	<u>CASUALTY</u>	<u>INTENDED</u>
Maj.	0.	0.	1
Capt	0.	1.	1
1stLt.	0.	5.	1
2dLt	0.	1.	0
CWO-4.	0.	1.	0
CWO-2.	0.	1.	0
SgtMaj/MGySgt.	0.	0.	1
GySgt.	0.	3.	3
SSgt	0.	6.	4
Sgt.	4.	5*.	4
Cpl.	4.	4.	1
LCpl	14.	11.	0
Pfc.	9.	4.	0
Pvt.	6.	0.	0

*one killed

Both incidents and casualties resulting therefrom should continue at the present low level because of three factors:


1. The emphatic implementation of the directives discussed above (and that knowledge by potetial assailants),
2. The continued reduction in Division strength, and
3. The knowledge (based on past experience) that few, if any, such incidents will occur in the units standing down.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). FRAGGING INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971



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MAJOR OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

In January 1971, the Division Military Police Section processed 35 major offenses (i.e., felonies) committed by Division personnel for an offense rate of 2.8 per 1,000 personnel, both of which represented decreases from a total of 43 offenses and an offense rate of 3.4 per 1,000 in December 1970. In addition, January's figures compare quite favorably with the monthly averages for 1970, just over 65 offenses per month and an offense rate of 3.3 per 1,000.

Of particular note is the sharp decrease in crimes of violence (actual and attempted murder/homicide, assault and aggravated assault, rape, unlawful ordnance detonation, communicating a threat, and armed robbery). This particular group of offenses has shown decreases for three consecutive months, falling from 13 in November to five in December and finally to only two such offenses in January 1971. If the trend continues, there will be no such crimes processed in February.

Marijuana violations remained steady in December and January (17 for both months), producing a continuation of the trend toward gradually decreasing occurrence of this type of offense. One hundred ten violations were processed in the 1st quarter of 1970 (for a monthly average of 37), 100 in the 2d quarter (a 33 average), 86 in the 3d quarter (29 per month) and 60 in the last quarter of 1970 (20 per month). However, the rate per 1,000 has remained virtually steady throughout the last 13 months, averaging 1.5 cases/1,000 per month with very little variation (January's rate was 1.4/1,000).

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, MAJOR OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OFFENSES FOR 1970													
MURDER/HOMICIDE	0	0	0	0	3	3	2	0	0	0	2	1	11
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	3	2	0	1	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	0	14
ASSAULT	2	6	10	1	8	0	0	3	2	1	0	0	33
ATTEMPTED MURDR/HOMCD	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	3	4	4	3	2	22
RAPE	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	4
UNLAWFL ORDNANC DETON	1	0	1	0	3	4	0	1	4	1	4	1	20
MARIJUANA VIOLATION	34	37	39	30	36	34	30	32	24	24	19	17	356
COMM A THREAT(MAJOR)	2	3	6	5	4	3	0	1	1	1	2	0	28
NARCOTICS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
CURRENCY VIOLATION	10	2	1	0	2	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	27
LARCENY	2	0	5	0	7	12	6	15	19	14	5	8	93
DANGEROUS DRUG ABUSE	19	16	24	13	22	18	6	7	8	15	5	9	162
ARMED ROBBERY	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	5
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OFFENSES 1970	73	66	86	50	86	78	54	66	67	64	44	43	777
OFFENSES FOR 1971													
MURDER/HOMICIDE	0												
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	0												
ASSAULT	1												
ATTEMPTED MURDR/HOMCD	1												
RAPE	0												
UNLAWFL ORDNANC DETON	0												
MARIJUANA VIOLATION	17												
COMM A THREAT(MAJOR)	0												
NARCOTICS	2												
CURRENCY VIOLATION	1												
LARCENY	6												
DANGEROUS DRUG ABUSE	7												
ARMED ROBBERY	5												
OTHER	0												
TOTAL OFFENSES 1971	35												
OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1970	2.7	2.5	3.7	2.3	3.9	3.7	2.5	3.4	4.1	5.2	3.5	3.4	3.3
1971	2.8												

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VEHICLE/TRAFFIC OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The 122 vehicle/traffic offenses committed by Division personnel and processed by the Division Military Police Section during January 1971 represent almost a 150% increase over the 45 processed during December 1970 and approximately a 240% increase over the average of 36 per month for the last quarter of 1970. The most notable increases occurred in citations for speeding (up from 44 in December to 96 January) and for the overloading of vehicles (up from zero to 17). If the number of offenses cited is any indication of the number committed, January's increased rate may be partially responsible for the significantly increased number of motor vehicle accidents occurring during the month (See Tab 1-6g). However, one must bear in mind that the number of citations during a period of time may bear no relation to the number of offenses committed (in the area of traffic regulation enforcement), since an increase in citations from one month to the next may be attributed to heavier patrolling or a more "hard nosed" attitude toward offenders (i.e., citations issued rather than lectures given). Nevertheless, with the caveat above in mind, January 1971 continued a trend established over the previous two months toward a greater offense rate (1.8 offenses/1,000 personnel in October increased to 3.3 in November, 3.6 in December, and 9.7 in January), although January's rate was a significant acceleration of the trend.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION. VEHICLE/TRAFFIC OFFENSES. CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OFFENSES FOR 1970													
SPEEDING	184	49	42	22	198	102	84	63	66	19	41	44	914
IMPROP/NO TRIP TICKET	8	6	7	4	4	2	2	1	5	1	0	0	40
RECKLESS DRIVING	5	3	3	1	4	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	23
FAILURE TO STOP/YIELD	1	3	3	0	3	3	8	1	26	0	0	0	48
IMPROPER BACKING	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
INVALID/NO DRIVER LIC	11	3	7	1	2	3	3	3	1	0	0	0	34
IMPROPER TURNING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MISAPPROP GOVT VEHICL	9	3	7	3	2	3	2	2	1	0	0	1	33
OVERLOADED VEHICLE	0	0	18	6	11	7	1	3	4	1	0	0	51
LEAVING SCENE OF ACDT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
INATTENTION	0	0	18	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	21
ILLEGAL TRANSPORTAT'N	0	0	12	1	14	11	3	0	0	0	0	0	41
HIT AND RUN	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3
IMPROP PASS'G/LANE US	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	8
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OFFENSES 1970	220	67	117	39	243	136	105	79	105	22	41	45	1219
OFFENSES FOR 1971													
SPEEDING	96												
IMPROP/NO TRIP TICKET	1												
RECKLESS DRIVING	0												
FAILURE TO STOP/YIELD	4												
IMPROPER BACKING	0												
INVALID/NO DRIVER LIC	1												
IMPROPER TURNING	0												
MISAPPROP GOVT VEHICL	0												
OVERLOADED VEHICLE	17												
LEAVING SCENE OF ACDT	0												
INATTENTION	1												
ILLEGAL TRANSPORTAT'N	0												
HIT AND RUN	0												
IMPROP PASS'G/LANE US	2												
OTHER	0												
TOTAL OFFENSES 1971	122												
OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1970	8.0	2.5	5.0	1.8	11.1	6.5	4.9	4.0	6.4	1.8	3.3	3.6	5.1
1971	9.7												

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MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

Miscellaneous offenses, encompassing all violations not covered by the major and vehicle/traffic offense categories and consisting largely of military offenses, totalled 95 during the month of January 1971, representing a significant increase in such offenses over the 32 recorded in December 1970 and the monthly average of 48 during the last quarter of 1970, but well below the average of 213 offenses per month registered for the year. When rates are computed to take decreasing Division strength into consideration, January's rate of 7.5 offenses per 1,000 personnel is still significantly higher than December's 2.5/1,000 and the October - December rate of 3.8/1,000. On the favorable side of the ledger, however, is that January's 7.5 remains approximately 30% below that of the year 1970 (10.8/1,000).

As is the case with traffic offenses (See Tab 1-6j), the number of offenses processed may bear little relation to the number actually committed, since off limits and curfew violations make up the bulk of the miscellaneous offense category. Therefore, January's large increase over the average for the previous three months may have occurred because of increased vigilance during the month.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OFFENSES FOR 1970													
OFF LIMITS	110	96	153	74	127	143	88	82	69	26	23	15	1006
CURFEW VIOLATION	50	36	47	8	32	27	19	30	0	2	1	0	252
I.D. CARD/ORDERS VIOL	28	27	32	13	18	31	12	15	0	0	0	3	179
UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE	30	13	46	19	39	51	38	23	6	32	18	8	323
DESERTING	4	6	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	13
DISRESPECT	2	4	12	4	5	14	7	6	3	1	0	0	58
RESISTING APPREHENS'N	6	4	4	2	10	10	7	7	0	2	0	0	52
DRUNK/DISORDERLY	1	1	5	3	4	10	3	7	5	5	0	4	48
UNDER INFLUENCE	0	1	1	0	2	3	0	2	0	1	0	0	10
OUT OF UNIFORM	12	8	12	4	10	16	6	12	0	0	0	0	80
DESTRUC GOVT PROPERTY	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DISOBEYING ORDER	1	0	0	0	2	2	5	4	0	0	0	0	14
INTERFERE W/MP DUTIES	0	0	13	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	18
WEAPONS VIOLATION	58	44	77	25	62	100	71	59	4	2	0	0	502
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OFFENSES 1970	302	240	404	152	312	407	258	249	87	71	42	32	2556
OFFENSES FOR 1971													
OFF LIMITS	46												
CURFEW VIOLATION	20												
I.D. CARD/ORDERS VIOL	2												
UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE	2												
DESERTING	0												
DISRESPECT	2												
RESISTING APPREHENS'N	0												
DRUNK/DISORDERLY	2												
UNDER INFLUENCE	0												
OUT OF UNIFORM	0												
DESTRUC GOVT PROPERTY	0												
DISOBEYING ORDER	0												
INTERFERE W/MP DUTIES	1												
WEAPONS VIOLATION	20												
OTHER	0												
TOTAL OFFENSES 1971	95												
OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1970	11.0	9.0	17.3	7.0	14.3	19.4	12.0	12.6	5.3	5.7	3.4	2.5	10.8
1971	7.5												

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GROUND SAFETY

January 1971, although recording more battle casualties than the previous month, produced fewer non-battle incidents and fewer non-hostile casualties. Thirty-three such incidents took place during the month (down from 59 in December and the 1970 monthly average of 129), accounting for 30 casualties (down from 65 for December and the average of 142). When these figures are converted to rates per 1,000 personnel, similar results are achieved in that the incident rate was down from December's 4.7/1,000 and 1970's monthly average of 6.6/1,000 to January's 2.6/1,000, while the casualty rate was down from 5.2/1,000 (December) and 7.2/1,000 (1970) to 2.4/1,000 (January 1971). A comparison of the six major categories of non-hostile incident (Supporting Arms, Individual Weapons, Accidental Discharges, Explosive Ordnance, Operational/Occupational and Motor Vehicles) reveals, however, that only four of the six recorded decreases, Accidental Discharges increasing from five in December to nine in January (causing an increase in casualties from five to eight) and Motor Vehicle Accidents from four to twelve (causing a casualty increase from four to seven). (See Tabs 1-6c through 1-6h).

The aggregate decreases discussed above reflect favorably on the Ground Safety Program of the Division. Continued emphasis on this program should further reduce the rates in the future and, as a consequence of the reduced rates and pending redeployments, reduce both the number of incidents and the number of casualties by an even greater percentage than the rates.

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BATTLE VERSUS NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The battle casualty rate increased from a December 1970 rate of 212 casualties per million man-days (83 casualties) to a January 1971 rate of 294 (115 casualties). This is the highest rate recorded since September 1970 when the rate was 318. The increases in enemy activity and contact are responsible for this increase. The nonbattle casualty rate decreased, however, from a December 1970 rate of 75 casualties per million man-days (29 casualties) to a January 1971 rate of 51 (20 casualties). This is the lowest recorded rate reflected in the Division records which began with January 1969. It is most evident the subjects of safety and welfare of individuals are receiving continued command attention. This is an enviable record for a Division operating in combat.

Regarding the nonbattle casualty rate, a comparison between December 1970 and January 1971 reveals the following (rates listed are of the dimensions "casualties per 1,000 personnel"):

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (1) Friendly Fire Rate: | decreased 50% (0.4 to 0.2) |
| (2) Explosive Ordnance: | decreased 85% (1.3 to 0.2) |
| (3) Accidental Discharges: | increased 50% (0.4 to 0.6) |
| (4) Motor Vehicle Accidents: | increased 200% (0.2 to 0.6) |

Continued enemy activity and contact in February would maintain the battle casualty rate at its present level. However, with units commencing standdown, the rate is expected to decrease in March. With continued emphasis on safety, the nonbattle casualty rate should remain low.

The term battle casualty is defined by MCO P3040.4 as "any person lost to his organization because of death, wounds, missing, capture, or internment providing such loss is incurred in action. In action characterizes the casualty status as having been the direct result of combat; sustained in combat or relating thereto; or sustained going to or returning from a combat mission provided that the occurrence was directly related to combat or, through misadventure, friendly action. However, injuries due to the elements weather or to self-inflicted wounds are not to be considered as sustained in action and are thereby not to be interpreted as battle casualties. Examples of injuries not to be interpreted as battle casualties are: frostbite, battle fatigue, sunstroke, heat exhaustion and diseases not verified as cases of biological warfare. Minor injuries or wounds neither requiring admission to a medical facility nor involving loss of personnel are also considered battle casualties for reporting purposes, if otherwise classified a battle casualty as defined above".

Nonbattle casualty is defined as "any person who is lost to his organization (dead, missing, ill, injured or incapacitated), provided such loss is not the result of enemy action. Nonbattle casualties include all those which occur outside a combat zone and those which occur within a combat zone that are not the result of enemy action".

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(continued on preceding page)

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For the purposes of this report the statistics on battle casualties do not include those personnel receiving wounds who are treated and returned to duty without being admitted to a hospital. Regarding nonbattle casualties only those serious injuries requiring hospitalization for a period of four days or more are calculated. The specific incidents involved are those resulting from friendly fire, explosive ordnance, accidental discharges and motor vehicle accidents.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) BATTLE VERSUS NON-BATTLE CASUALTY RATES,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
Note 1	.742	.675	.747	.721	.739	.709	.733	.717	.745	.767	.920	.968	9.183
BTL CAS*	530	629	554	588	798	639	411	793	494	236	304	313	6,289
BTL RATE	715	932	742	815	1090	900	560	1110	663	308	330	323	684
NBTL CAS	77	104	84	86	58	71	82	137	112	64	104	113	1,092
NBTL RATE	104	154	112	120	79	100	112	190	150	84	113	117	119
1970													
Note 1	.852	.748	.727	.655	.677	.631	.663	.611	.492	.384	.376	.391	7.207
BTL CAS*	378	323	328	284	242	271	187	226	156	91	88	83	2,557
BTL RATE	444	432	500	434	358	431	282	370	318	237	234	212	368
NBTL CAS	120	70	104	52	38	50	40	109	47	23	34	29	716
NBTL RATE	140	94	141	80	56	79	60	172	96	59	94	75	99
1971													
Note 1	.392												
BTL CAS*	115												
BTL RATE	294												
NBTL CAS	20												
NBTL RATE	51												

Note 1: MILLION MAN-DAYS (n times 10⁶)

* EXCLUDES VIA (NOT EVAC) BECAUSE NOT LOST TO UNIT

CASUALTY RATE = CASUALTIES divided by MILLIONS OF MAN-DAYS

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CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

January 1971 produced the lowest number of casualties considered in computing the non-battle casualty rate (See Tab 1-6a) that has been recorded since January 1969. Comparison of January's totals in the four categories considered with the monthly averages for 1970 (all of which, incidentally, were decreases from the 1969 averages) show a decrease in each category:

Friendly Fire:	-87%	(23 to 3)
Explosive Ordnance:	-90%	(19 to 2)
Accidental Discharges:	-20%	(10 to 8)
Motor Vehicle Accidents:	-12%	(8 to 7)

Command attention continues to be exerted on the problem of non-battle incidents and casualties and, if the comparisons above are any indication of a favorable trend, will serve to further reduce such fruitless losses in the future.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR

FRIENDLY FIRE

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE

MOTOR VEHICLE




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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR

MOTOR VEHICLE



6-1-6b
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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR

FRIENDLY FIRE

ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

MOTOR VEHICLE

[illegible]

THIS CHART CONSIDERS CASUALTIES LOST TO UNIT FOR MORE THAN 3 DAYS

31 JAN 71

G-1-6h


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SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

There were no supporting arms friendly fire incidents in January 1971, continuing a definite downward trend in this category of incidents (including, in this definition, not only air and artillery, but crew-served weapons as well) established over the previous three months. It is quite obvious that, if this trend continues, the number of incidents per month should remain in the vicinity of zero incidents, because the stringent control and clearance measures which have influenced favorably both the incident and casualty rates remain in effect. However, the prediction of casualties is much more uncertain, because a single supporting arms incident can produce a large number of casualties. For example, six such incidents occurred in May 1970, yet only three persons were injured, while five incidents in August 1970 produced four deaths and twenty-nine injuries.

31 JAN 71

6-1-6c

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTS AND**CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971****INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969----- 1970----- 1971-----**

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCIDENTS	18	20	11	11	8	9	12	20	15	11	9	7	151
KILLED	12	14	4	4	4	1	3	8	1	0	4	2	57
WOUNDED	29	32	17	15	6	12	15	50	35	23	21	10	265
TOTAL CAS	41	46	21	19	10	13	18	58	36	23	25	12	322
% CMD CAS	.17	.19	.09	.08	.04	.06	.08	.26	.15	.08	.08	.04	.11
1970													
INCIDENTS	7	8	7	4	6	1	6	5	7	5	2	1	59
KILLED	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	3	0	10
WOUNDED	26	17	41	9	3	0	13	29	10	3	3	3	157
TOTAL CAS	26	19	42	9	3	0	13	33	10	3	6	3	167
% CMD CAS	.09	.07	.18	.04	.01	.00	.06	.17	.06	.02	.05	.02	.06
1971													
INCIDENTS	0												
KILLED	0												
WOUNDED	0												
TOTAL CAS	0												
% CMD CAS	.00												

31 JAN 71

C-1-6c


INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In January 1971, three individual weapons friendly fire incidents were recorded claiming three casualties. As such, both numbers convert to rates representing continuations of a relatively level trend established over the previous four months. Incident rates in the period September 1970 through January 1971 have remained in the range 0.2 - 0.4 incidents per 1,000 personnel, while casualty rates have remained almost absolutely steady at 0.2 casualties per 1,000.

The relative constancy achieved during the period above compares most favorably with the preceding eight months, during which both incidents and casualties fluctuated widely (and averaged 0.4 incidents and 0.5 casualties per 1,000 per month), and reflects the influence of command attention at all levels.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS ANDCASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 =====

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCIDENTS	7	13	12	5	11	5	5	4	16	11	20	11	120
KILLED	4	5	1	0	3	1	2	1	5	1	4	1	25
WOUNDED	3	7	12	5	2	6	4	0	12	8	7	6	72
TOTAL CAS	4	12	13	5	5	7	6	1	17	9	11	7	97
% CMD CAS	.02	.05	.05	.02	.02	.03	.03	.00	.07	.03	.04	.03	.03
1970													
INCIDENTS	7	8	10	7	13	14	6	15	6	4	2	4	96
KILLED	0	1	2	3	0	4	1	6	2	0	1	0	20
WOUNDED	9	5	17	6	8	19	2	16	2	2	0	3	89
TOTAL CAS	9	6	19	9	8	23	3	22	4	2	1	3	109
% CMD CAS	.03	.02	.08	.04	.04	.11	.01	.11	.02	.02	.01	.02	.04
1971													
INCIDENTS	3												
KILLED	0												
WOUNDED	3												
TOTAL CAS	3												
% CMD CAS	.02												

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ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Accidental discharges continued, in January 1971, to be a major problem to the Ground Safety Program. The nine incidents occurring in January was the highest total for the past five months. These incidents resulted in a 0.7/1,000 rate, which almost doubled the 0.4/1,000 December rate. This subject is particularly emphasized during Ground Safety lectures; however, carelessness and negligent handling of firearms by troops result in these tragedies.

The impending standdown of several units and reduced operational commitments should reduce the incident rate in the immediate future, since the units standing down will still be on the rolls while the handling of weapons will be reduced to a minimum. However, reduced rates beyond the immediate future depend on continued emphasis on safe weapons handling.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 ——— 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCIDENTS	17	19	17	16	20	15	17	18	27	17	20	17	220
KILLED	1	5	4	1	2	0	3	2	3	1	4	3	29
WOUNDED	18	21	17	15	18	15	14	16	25	16	15	15	205
TOTAL CAS	19	26	21	16	20	15	17	18	28	17	19	18	234
% CMD CAS	.08	.11	.09	.07	.08	.06	.07	.08	.12	.06	.06	.06	.08
1970													
INCIDENTS	16	12	10	16	9	16	11	11	8	8	2	5	124
KILLED	3	2	0	3	0	1	0	3	2	1	1	1	17
WOUNDED	13	10	11	13	7	14	11	8	5	6	2	4	104
TOTAL CAS	16	12	11	16	7	15	11	11	7	7	3	5	121
% CMD CAS	.06	.04	.05	.07	.03	.07	.05	.06	.04	.06	.02	.04	.05
1971													
INCIDENTS	9												
KILLED	0												
WOUNDED	8												
TOTAL CAS	8												
% CMD CAS	.06												

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EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The downward trend that began in October 1970 continued through the first month of 1971. The lowest level in 25 months was reported during January 1971 with only two incidents recorded claiming two casualties (converting to rates of 0.2 casualties and 0.2 incidents per 1,000 compared to 1.3 and 0.7 in December 1970). Considered on a strength basis, the incident rate for January 1971 of 0.2/1,000 is the lowest for the 25 months listed on the chart.


This category produced disappointing results in 1970 as the incident rate (0.7/1,000) exceeded that of 1969 (0.6/1,000). An incident rate similar to that of January and continued throughout 1971 would be a vast improvement and presently is an obtainable objective.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE INCIDENTS ANDCASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 ——— 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCIDENTS	7	9	15	19	28	42	59	79	100	118	134	150	174
KILLED	3	1	6	7	3	1	2	1	1	1	2	6	34
WOUNDED	7	17	18	30	8	26	24	26	15	7	37	58	273
TOTAL CAS	10	18	24	37	11	27	26	27	16	8	39	64	307
% CMD CAS	.04	.07	.10	.15	.05	.12	.11	.12	.07	.03	.13	.22	.10
1970													
INCIDENTS	36	22	15	14	15	13	10	14	14	4	7	9	173
KILLED	3	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	4	1	1	1	16
WOUNDED	36	23	22	16	17	9	7	19	19	4	22	15	209
TOTAL CAS	39	24	24	17	17	10	7	20	23	5	23	16	225
% CMD CAS	.14	.09	.10	.07	.07	.05	.03	.10	.14	.04	.18	.12	.09
1971													
INCIDENTS	2												
KILLED	0												
WOUNDED	2												
TOTAL CAS	2												
% CMD CAS	.02												

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MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The twelve incidents occurring in January 1971 matched exactly the monthly average for 1970. However, there were 1.0 incidents/1,000 personnel during the month which was a sharp increase over December 1970 when there were 0.3/1,000 incidents.

Casualties from motor vehicle accidents for January 1971 also increased over December, but decreased from the same month in 1970. In January 1970 the casualty rate from motor vehicles was 1.1/1,000, in December the rate was 0.2/1,000 and in January 1971 the casualty rate was 0.6/1,000.

The results above were primarily due to the influx of lightweight vehicular traffic prevalent on all lines of communication and the almost nonexistent traffic control by Vietnamese authorities. Division Marines are constantly being schooled in strict obedience to traffic regulations, particularly in the art of defensive driving. A majority of the accidents in which Marine vehicles have been involved recently have not been the result of negligence or carelessness on the part of Marines.


31 JAN 71

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 ——— 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 ACCID	14	14	14	15	20	22	21	31	26	18	20	21	236
US KILLED	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	0	0	0	12
US INJRD	3	2	4	8	10	7	12	31	14	7	10	12	120
% CMD CAS	.01	.01	.02	.04	.05	.04	.06	.15	.06	.02	.03	.04	.04
VN KILLED	4	5	2	1	4	1	2	2	11	4	0	9	45
VN INJRD	16	9	16	9	6	9	5	4	12	12	15	13	126
70 ACCID	16	16	20	11	10	16	11	16	7	10	7	4	144
US KILLED	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3
US INJRD	30	9	8	1	3	2	6	23	3	6	1	2	94
% CMD CAS	.11	.03	.04	.00	.01	.01	.03	.13	.02	.05	.01	.02	.04
VN KILLED	9	2	6	6	6	3	4	1	2	4	0	1	44
VN INJRD	5	11	10	4	6	13	16	13	3	6	11	3	101
71 ACCID	12												
US KILLED	0												
INJRD	7												
% CMD CAS	.06												
VN KILLED	4												
VN INJRD	7												

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
OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

There were seven operational/occupational incidents during January 1971, which produced ten casualties. Both of these figures were greatly reduced from any monthly total experienced during the previous 24 months. Close attention at all levels of command served, during the last five months of 1970, to generate a moderate downward trend in both incidents and casualties. January's plunge (from 36 incidents and a like number of casualties in December 1970) was a departure (albeit favorable) from the trend, and a continuation of the previously established trend could very easily produce more incidents and casualties in February than in January.

Operational/occupational incidents are those incidents resulting in death or requiring four or more days hospitalization which do not fall within the purview of the other categories of the Ground Safety Program. Included in this category are falls, burns and drownings, among others.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL INCIDENTSAND CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 ——— 1971 ———

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCIDENTS	59	55	46	75	98	92	88	104	52	152	102	97	1,020
KILLED	1	5	3	2	3	0	0	2	0	5	0	0	21
WOUNDED	58	64	48	73	95	92	88	109	59	165	102	97	1,050
TOTAL CAS	59	69	51	75	98	92	88	111	59	170	102	97	1,071
% CMD CAS	.25	.28	.21	.31	.41	.39	.38	.49	.24	.56	.33	.33	.35
1970													
INCIDENTS	108	96	96	107	114	86	108	62	61	44	39	36	957
KILLED	0	1	3	1	2	3	7	1	2	0	1	0	21
WOUNDED	108	100	93	109	116	87	101	61	67	44	39	36	961
TOTAL CAS	108	101	96	110	118	90	108	62	69	44	40	36	982
% CMD CAS	.39	.38	.41	.50	.54	.43	.50	.31	.42	.36	.32	.29	.40
1971													
INCIDENTS	7												
KILLED	1												
WOUNDED	9												
TOTAL CAS	10												
% CMD CAS	.08												

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SAVINGS BOND/SAVINGS DEPOSIT PROGRAM

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Participation in the Savings Bond Program for the month of January 1971 was 64.1% (8,203 persons out of the 12,623 on board participating) compared to 70.4% (19,285 persons out of 27,490 on board participating) in January 1970.


Participation in the Savings Deposit Program for the month of January 1971 was 5.0% (635 persons out of 12,623 on board participating) compared with 3.5% (970 persons out of 27,490 on board participating) in January 1970.

The large percentage drop of 10.2% from December 1970 to January 1971 is primarily attributed to a loss of 2,058 personnel in January with evidently a large percentage of incoming personnel not taking advantage of the program.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). PARTICIPATION IN SAVINGS BOND AND SAVINGS

DEPOSIT PROGRAMS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
BOND PROG	18236	17933	17167	17196	16574	16780	16755	16346	16558	21497	22812	20788	18,220
% PARTIC	76.1	74.0	70.8	72.0	70.0	71.5	71.5	71.9	68.2	70.9	73.8	70.5	71.8
DEP PROG	480	620	517	1290	884	756	857	933	949	1047	1037	1038	867
% PARTIC	2.0	2.6	2.1	5.3	3.7	3.2	3.7	4.1	3.9	3.4	3.4	3.5	4.2
1970													
BOND PROG	19285	16894	16186	16473	15831	14924	15113	12792	10548	8710	9094	9309	13,910
% PARTIC	70.2	63.3	69.2	75.5	72.6	71.0	70.5	64.8	64.3	70.1	72.6	74.3	69.8
DEP PROG	970	1062	981	924	887	942	865	701	630	573	642	641	818
% PARTIC	3.5	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.5	4.0	3.6	3.8	4.6	5.1	5.1	4.2
1971													
BOND PROG	8203												(8,203)
%PART	64.1												(64.1)
DEP PR	635												(635)
% PARTIC	5.0												(5.0)

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G-2 OVERVIEW

During January 1971, enemy activity remained at a relatively low level of intensity. There were only 1,394 enemy sighted during the month (a slight increase over December 1970), and the enemy again chose not to present himself in strength, but instead conducted sporadic, harassing attacks directed toward disruption of the pacification effort and infrequent attacks by fire, during which he expended 46 mortar rounds and a single rocket. His major units spent most of the month in the mountainous base areas completing a lengthy phase of rehabilitation and resupply. During the latter days of the month, several Main Force and Local Force units left their base areas and returned to their traditional operating areas in the lowlands in preparation for the spring offensive. Major Main Force and NVA units remained in their rear areas concentrating on resupply, indoctrination, training and production. Division intelligence activity during the month included the implantation of nine new sensor strings using Phase III sensors and continuation of reconnaissance activity, which in turn included the daily inspection of all Q. L. 1 bridges in the Division AO by reconnaissance divers.

January reflected a continuation of the steady decline in enemy activity evidenced during 1970. The most striking evidence of this decline is reflected in a monthly comparison of enemy sighted/enemy attacks by fire during the past thirteen months. Total enemy sighted dropped from 4,425 (January 1970) to a low of 576 (November) with an increase to 1,331 (December) and 1,394 in January 1971 (locally significant, but in the long run relatively insignificant). In essence, more enemy were sighted during the first month of 1970 than were observed during the last four months of the year (4,159 observed from 1 September through 31 December 1970). Total enemy attacks by fire (rockets, mortar rounds, lob bombs) similarly declined; 658 rounds were received in January 1970 alone as compared to a cumulative figure of 638 rounds received during the last six months of 1970 (1 July through 31 December). In January 1971, 47 rounds were received, virtually equalling December.

This reduction in enemy activity can be attributed largely to the attritional losses sustained by units subordinate to Front 4 and to the resultant decision by the enemy to revert to guerrilla warfare techniques in order to conserve his depleted forces. Overall enemy strength in the province, once estimated as high as 16,800 (May 1969), diminished to an estimate of 8,325 (January 1971). Infiltration of replacements from North Vietnam has been minimal. The enemy's inability to recruit from the manpower base of indigenous South Vietnamese has resulted in the necessity to assign many NVA personnel to augment traditionally VC Main Force, Local Force, and Guerrilla Units. A further illustration of the enemy's declining combat effectiveness is evidenced by his need to realign his organizational structure. Throughout 1969 and during early 1970, Front 4 commanded four NVA Regiments, but at present it appears that only the 38th NVA Regiment remains active in the province. The disbanding of units, reduction of unit strengths, and realignment of operational control has resulted in an extensive reorganization of units as well as command and control relationships; the "Wing" concept of decentralized command and control is now apparently defunct. Unless an intense effort is made by the enemy to introduce sizable reinforcements into the province during 1971, it is anti-

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pated that his present force levels will continue to deteriorate. Confronted with FWMAF/ARVN preemptive operations, reduced manpower, and food shortages, enemy forces will be capable of conducting only the harassing activities, that have characterized their efforts in recent months. In the populated lowlands, main efforts will be channeled toward rebuilding the depleted VC military and political structure at the hamlet and village level; in the highlands, NVA forces will be preoccupied with logistic activities.

During January 1971 there were 24 Reconnaissance Teams available to the Division. Of these an average of 15 was available for field employment on any given day. An average of 8 teams was actually deployed, there being some curtailment of flight activities incident to reconnaissance activities due to the winter crachin. As a result of Phase IV reductions during September 1970, 1st Marine Division reconnaissance assets were reduced by two companies of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion as well as the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less a platoon detachment). The availability of Reconnaissance Teams in January (1971) was the same as the last quarter of 1970. These figures are expected to remain relatively constant until Increment VI Redeployment is initiated. Although present weather conditions are restrictive to helicopter insertions/extractions of teams, the current use of Platoon/Company Patrol Bases will facilitate the employment and resupply of teams operating in the field.

A significant increase in ground sensor activity occurred in early January 1971. This is attributed to the arrival and employment of Phase III (Improved) Sensor Equipment. A total of 99 sensors was in use as of the 31st of January. This increased usage is expected to continue through Increment VI Redeployment.

1st Marine Division unattended ground sensor utilization has decreased significantly since July 1970 due to the removal of the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System) as well as RF (Radio Frequency) Sensor Strings in southern and central Quang Nam Province. SCAMP personnel reductions, restrictions in the number of sensor channels, and monsoon conditions likewise contributed to the decline in the number of sensors that could be effectively employed.

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ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Total enemy forces include North Vietnamese Army, Main Force and Local Force as well as village/hamlet guerrillas. Enemy strength continued to decrease in Quang Nam Province during January 1971, reflecting an overall reduction of an estimated 235 (from 8,560 in December 1970 to 8,325). Unless substantial replacements are received from outside the province, enemy strength levels will probably continue to decrease in 1971.

In reviewing total enemy strength in Quang Nam Province over the past two years, two distinct periods of reduction are evident. In 1969, overall strength declined from a high of 16,800 (May) to a level of approximately 11,000 - 12,000 for the remainder of the year and into early 1970. Enemy force levels fluctuated within this range until July 1970, when another steady decline commenced. By January 1971, enemy strength in the province was estimated at 8,325, thereby representing nearly a 50% reduction from the mid-1969 force level.

While it appears that the enemy has the capability to introduce infiltration groups to replace some of these losses, he does not appear inclined at this time to increase infiltration to a level that will reconstitute former force levels.

Recruitment of indigenous South Vietnamese does not presently play a significant part in overall manpower procurement as evidenced by the necessity to utilize NVA personnel in traditionally VC roles. On-hand personnel assets will probably continue to be redistributed as appropriate; more NVA troops will be used to fill the ranks of MF and LF units; NVA, MF, and LF personnel will also be used to rebuild the depleted guerrilla organization within the province.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH, QUANG NAM PROVINCE

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 EST. STRENGTH

1970 EST. STRENGTH - - - -

1971 EST. STRENGTH



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EST STR	15500	15750	16100	14540	16800	13700	12200	12840	12170	12770	11820	12400	N/A
1970													
EST STR	11200	12430	12300	12900	12020	11700	12500	11300	10900	9475	8655	8560	N/A
1971													
EST STR	8325												N/A

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DEPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During January 1971, 24 reconnaissance teams were maintained by the Division, of which an average of 15 was available for field employment on any given day, the same availability of teams as December 1970. An average of 8 teams was actually deployed during the month as a result of enemy action and curtailment of flight activities due to the winter crashin. Average team employment has been directly related to weather and enemy action over the past four months.

Division assets prior to September 1970 included the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. During this period, deployed teams included those providing security for four Division observation posts. A major reorganizations of the Division reconnaissance effort was effected in September 1970 as a result of the redeployment in Increment IV of two companies of the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less one platoon detachment). Division Reconnaissance Battalion was relieved of the security responsibility for three of the four Division observation posts and given the objective of maintaining a minimum 24 operational teams with the capability to deploy and support 12 of these teams at any given time. Deployed teams are now defined as only those operating in the field on assigned reconnaissance missions.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS

DEPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

% DEPLOYED ON RECON MISSIONS 1969 ——— 1970 ——— 1971 ———
 % DEPLOYED ON ALL MISSIONS (JUL 1969 - OCT 1970)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TMS AVAIL							49	48	50	46	45	38	
ALL MSNS							27	27	27	27	24	19	*
% DEPL							55.1	56.3	54.0	58.7	55.3	50.0	*
RCN MSNS							19	19	19	19	16	11	**
% RECON							38.8	39.6	38.0	41.3	35.5	28.9	**
1970													
TMS AVAIL	38	50	57	54	56	54	48	42	28	24	24	24	
ALL MSNS	22	25	29	31	31	28	27	26	12	8	11	10	*
% DEPL	57.9	50.0	50.9	57.4	55.4	51.8	56.2	62.0	42.9	33.3	45.8	41.6	*
RCN MSNS	14	17	21	23	23	20	19	18	10	8	11	10	**
% RECON	36.8	34.0	36.9	42.6	41.0	37.0	39.6	42.8	35.7	33.3	45.8	41.6	**
1971													
TMS AVAIL	24												
ALL MSNS	8												*
% DEPL	33.3												*
RCN MSNS	8												**
% RECON	33.3												**

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SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

January 1971 saw the introduction of Phase III sensors into the Division inventory. Concurrent with the arrival of this improved equipment a preemptive counter-rocket sensor implant operation was conducted. Nine new sensor strings were employed along infiltration routes around the periphery of the Division rocket belt. Three new strings consist of a total of 42 radio-frequency sensors, while 25 of the older sensors were deactivated, producing a net gain of 17 (from 82 in December to 99).

The resurgence of sensor implants in January continued an apparent reversal in the downward trend of sensor employment evident during the period June - November 1970. This trend had resulted from the reduction in SCAMP personnel during the Phase IV redeployment, inclement weather during the fall monsoons and high priority tactical operations for remaining forces which precluded tactical security support for sensor implants.

1970 saw major changes in emphasis and sensor employment within the Division. Sensor utilization, which increased steadily during 1969 and remained relatively steady during the first half of 1970, decreased significantly during most of the latter half of 1970, commencing in July with the deactivation of the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System). Due to the "barrier" nature of these line sensors, the enemy was more apt to traverse the string than to follow its axis. Therefore, although fewer activations resulted from this arrangement, any such activations were considered intrusions and were targetted (See Tab 2-4). However, since a pattern or rate of movement was difficult to ascertain, there was a greater chance of firing on non-targettable activations. Air emplaced sensors were also frequently emplaced during this period of time, being delivered into rear base areas/onto logistic routes used by enemy forces. Neither means afforded adequate opportunity for bomb (or ground) damage assessment, because the line sensors were not adequately observed and the air delivered sensors were remotely located. Consequently (as can be seen in Tab 2-4), BDA was low despite a large number of activations and subsequent fire missions.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 SENSORS

1971 SENSORS

1970 SENSORS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 SENSORS													
RF	46	63	14	26	26	40	61	61	112	87	51	41	
LINE	14	14	49	80	106	106	132	132	159	163	163	163	
TOTAL	60	77	63	106	132	146	193	193	271	252	216	229	
70 SENSORS													
RF	67	74	96	139	230	258	247	211	125	107	76	82	
LINE	183	200	187	189	191	141	115	7	7	5	0	0	
TOTAL	250	274	283	328	421	399	362	218	132	112	76	82	
71 SENSORS													
RF	99												
LINE	0												
TOTAL	99												

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TARGETABLE SENSOR ACTIVATIONS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971


January 1971 saw the introduction of new Phase III sensors and auxiliary equipment being utilized by the Division in conjunction with former Phase I sensor strings. The pre-Tet upsurge of enemy activity resulted in 37 targetable activations being detected within the Division Area of Operations. 11 fire missions were conducted and gunships were directed to sensor activation sites on four occasions resulting in a total of eight confirmed enemy KIA.

This January activity was a considerable increase over the targetable activations of the previous four months, during which 29 targetable activations were detected and no fire missions were fired. The lack of activations in late 1970 is believed to be associated with the low level of enemy activity during the fall monsoon and the probable enemy avoidance of former implant areas.

The number of targetable sensor activations varied greatly during 1970. Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP) was organized in the Division in early 1970 and a large number of sensor strings were implanted and their activations used for target acquisition, as indicated on the graph. Over a period of time the practice of firing on all activations resulted in compromising the location of many sensor strings and they were subsequently avoided by the enemy. As the year progressed the emphasis on sensor activations was shifted from target acquisition to intelligence collection which reduced the requested fire missions. During the last half of 1970 SCAMP's assets were reduced by approximately 70% due to redeployment. This reduction included personnel, sensor strings, and monitor sites. This reduction combined with increased use of sensors for intelligence resulted in a low number of targets detected and fire missions called during the latter part of the year.

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TARGETS DETECTED	=====	1970	FIRE MISSIONS	-----	1970
	=====	1971		=====	1971



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PRECIPITATION, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Seasonal precipitation in Quang Nam Province is associated with the Northeast Monsoon which prevails from September through January. The rainy season drew to a close in January 1971 with a 0.85 inches of precipitation, a sharp decline from January totals of the previous two years.

Monthly rain accumulated during 1969 varied sharply from the mean only during the peak accumulation in October when 39.97 inches of rain were recorded. Monthly rainfall during 1970 corresponded closely to mean monthly totals. Cumulative precipitation for the year was approximately five inches below the norm.

During the monsoon season, frequent occurrences of rain, fog and low visibility allow the enemy an opportunity to move with a greater degree of freedom from friendly air and ground observation. Conversely, wet weather has a detrimental effect on enemy movement due to swollen streams and inundated lowlands. Deterioration of food, ordnance, and other supply caches during the 1970 monsoon season has contributed significantly to the difficulties encountered by enemy forces in the province. The enemy has, and may be expected to continue to increase his logistic activities in an endeavor to recoup the losses to his supply base.

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ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DIVISION TAOR, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

Overall enemy activity continued, when considering the long run, to decline in January 1971, although limited increases in certain statistics over figures for December 1970 occurred. The number of enemy sighted during the month rose slightly to 1,394 from the 1,331 sighted during the previous month. The January figure was just over half the monthly average (2,568) for 1970. The enemy fired 46 mortar rounds at friendly positions during the month and a single rocket, the 47 rounds representing a decrease of two from December. These decreases may be attributed to the enemy's forced reversion to the guerrilla warfare tactics which were prevalent prior to the large scale commitment of North Vietnamese Army forces in 1965. The enemy continued in January 1971 to reduce the number of his offensive actions using NVA units, concentrating instead on the disruption of the GVN pacification effort, terrorism and the employment of Local Forces. Therefore, his overt presence in the lowlands continued to decline significantly.

The number of enemy sighted by 1st Marine Division Units during 1970 steadily dropped throughout the year 1970 as illustrated by the high of 4,425 enemy observed in January in comparison to the 2,785 sighted during the latter quarter of the year (October, November, December). This reflects the enemy's overall strength decline in the province (See Tab 2-1) and also reveals his reluctance to jeopardize his remaining forces. While sightings have begun to increase (1,394 in January) slightly due to the passing of the monsoon season and pre-Tet activity, monthly totals almost certainly will not reach the levels observed in 1969 or early 1970. (See Tab 2-6b)

Enemy efficiency in the employment of mortars has deteriorated as evidenced by the inaccurate fire reported by units in the 1st Marine Division TAOR during recent months. His mortars have been used primarily as a harassing weapon since the enemy has not elected to commit sizable forces in an offensive role. As is true of rocket attacks, mortar attacks are timed to coincide with general offensive surges. With the expenditure of only 66 mortar rounds during November and December, this total represents approximately 2.7% of the number of rounds expended throughout 1970 and further illustrates a decrease in enemy activity. In January 1971, 46 mortar rounds were expended indicating no significant change in the enemy's employment of mortars. (See Tab 2-6a)

The use of lob bombs is almost entirely for purpose of harassment. The round, composed of a crudely fused artillery round or aerial bomb lofted in the general direction of a target by a charge of explosive, may travel as far as 600 meters. It is a grossly inaccurate system, and the round is often a dud. (See Tab 2-6a)

In order for him to implement his strategy of guerrilla warfare, the enemy has continued to employ rockets against area targets, a tactic which serves as an excellent psychological weapon. Since he has neither the logistical system nor combat capability to employ rockets as a medium of close combat support, the enemy has utilized rockets as a medium to intimidate the civilian population and to a lesser degree, FWMAF. The pattern of rocket attacks conforms closely to surges and ebbs of the enemy's campaigns. (During the month of January 1970, the months of April and May, and the period August through October, the enemy attempted to increase his offensive activity. Consequently, of the 229 rockets that he launched during 1970, 185 were fired during these three periods). In January 1971 the enemy launched 1 rocket in the Division TAOR.

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There is no evidence that the effectiveness of enemy rocket units will improve in 1971. (See Tab 2-6a)

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ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS, AND LOB BOMBS RECEIVED, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The employment of rockets, mortars and lob bombs by the enemy in Quang Nam province remained at a low level during January 1971, during which month 46 mortar rounds were fired at friendly positions (an increase of five over the previous month), a single rocket was fired (down seven from December), and no lob bombs were employed (the second consecutive month). As can be easily seen, mortar rounds continue to be, by far, the largest medium of enemy firepower, but mortar attacks are primarily harassing in nature and are rarely followed by infantry or sapper exploitation.

Enemy employment of rockets during 1970 varied from a high during April, when 58 were expended, to two months (March and July) in which no rockets were fired in Quang Nam Province. Rocket attacks have been directed primarily against Danang and its environs, and while they frequently are planned for periods of low lunar illumination, the enemy's ability to launch such attacks is largely governed by his ability to avoid FWMAF/ARVN detection while attempting to establish launch sites. Preemptive small unit operations in the "Danang Rocket Belt" have contributed significantly toward denying the enemy sufficient opportunity to prepare multiple firing positions within range of lucrative targets. Rockets have also been employed recently against Hill 52 and Thuong Duc Ranger Border Defense Camp, both located in the Thuong Duc Corridor. By virtue of occupying dominant terrain, the enemy has a higher degree of selectivity in choosing firing sites within this area, however, the inherent inaccuracy of this weapon renders it relatively ineffective when fired in small quantities. When afforded the opportunity, the enemy will continue to fire rockets in small numbers, and employment in 1971 will probably reflect a low level of intensity similar to that observed in 1970. Tab 2-6 also discusses enemy rocket employment.

Enemy employment of mortars during 1970 commenced with a high of 621 rounds expended in January 1970 followed by a steady decline that resulted in a mere 25 and 41 rounds fired during November and December, respectively. From January through December the average monthly expenditure has been 85 rounds per month. This is in consonance with the evidence of declining enemy activity throughout the province; friendly small unit operations have denied the enemy opportunity to conduct sustained barrages without detection, consequently the mortar team must resort to short-duration employment and resultant ineffectiveness. Although local shortages of mortar rounds are apparent in some instances, this ~~situation~~ usually results from logistic interdiction by FWMAF/ARVN Forces and does not necessarily reflect a province-wide ordnance shortage. Mortar tubes, while sufficient in quantity, are considered too valuable to risk capture and therefore are employed sparingly. In the foreseeable future, the enemy can be expected to employ his mortars in a cautious fashion, choosing to jeopardize neither men nor weapons for the sake of limited results. Mortar attacks are predicted to remain harassing in nature. Additional comments on enemy mortar employment are contained in Tab 2-6.

Employment of lob bombs during the past thirteen months has varied from a high during June, when 27 were expended, to four months (February, April, and

(continued on preceding page)

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December 1970 and January 1971) in which no lob bombs were utilized in Quang Nam Province. As portrayed by the graph, the only pattern in evidence is a usage that appears to vary in inverse proportion to the expenditure of rockets or mortar rounds, thereby superficially indicating a "gap filler" weapon encountered during periods when conventional stand-off attacks by fire have declined. Despite such a pattern, there is no amplifying evidence to support this trend, and it is generally concluded that lob bombs are employed in random fashion by guerrilla forces. Although this crude weapon lends little to the enemy's supporting arms capability, it will probably continue to be employed infrequently by guerrillas as a harassing technique. Tab 2-6 also addresses lob bomb employment.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS AND LOB BOMBS RECEIVED

DURING ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

ROUNDS RECEIVED: 1970

1971 - - - - -

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ENEMY SIGHTED VS ENEMY KIA/ORDNANCE RECEIVED, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The total number of enemy sighted in January 1971 was 1,394, but, although it represented an increase over December's 1,331, this figure remained well below the 1970 monthly average of 2,688. As the monsoon season faded out in January 1971, sightings increased slightly, however it is not anticipated that they will return to the level observed in early 1970, because the overall enemy strength in the province has continued to decline (See Tab 2-1). January also saw a total of 46 mortar rounds and one rocket expended by the enemy (See Tab 2-6a) and 211 of his soldiers killed (See Tab 3-3a).

The number of enemy sighted monthly throughout the Division TAOR declined rather steadily throughout 1970. This decline is attributed to the enemy's reluctance to commit NVA or MF units in the lowlands because of, or in addition to, his deteriorating strength. Adverse weather and inundation during the Northeast Monsoon (See Tab 2-5) also hampered enemy movement, thereby accounting for the low sighting totals in October and November (878 and 576, respectively).

Concurrent with the diminishing number of sightings, enemy ordnance expenditure (rockets, mortar rounds, lob bombs) likewise declined throughout 1970. While the enemy expended 658 assorted rounds in January 1970, only 49 and 47 rounds were expended in December 1970 and January 1971, respectively. Reasons for this markedly reduced expenditure are largely attributed to the same reasons cited above. A more detailed evaluation of the enemy's ordnance expenditure is incorporated as Tab 2-6a.

As sightings and other evidence of enemy activity decreased, there has been a commensurate decline in enemy KIA's. There was an appreciable and steady reduction in the intensity of combat in Quang Nam Province during 1970, and it is apparent that the enemy chose to avoid contact in order to conserve forces that have already suffered heavy attrition. The present low level of enemy activity is expected to continue in 1971 as the enemy's efforts are directed toward rebuilding a depleted infrastructure and procuring food for residual NVA and MF units.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). ENEMY SIGHTED. CALENDAR YEAR 1970/1971

1970 ENEMY SIGHTED ----- ENEMY ORDNANCE RECEIVED ===== ENEMY KIA -----
1971 ENEMY SIGHTED ===== ENEMY ORDNANCE RECEIVED [] ENEMY KIA =====

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G-3 OVERVIEW

January 1971 saw a minor upsurge in both friendly and enemy activity in the 1st Marine Division Area of Operations. Most indicators considered in this section showed an increase over those recorded in December 1970, yet when one compares January's figures with the monthly averages for 1969 or 1970 (or, for that matter, with monthly averages for the last three or six months), the downward trend in activity established over the past 25 months remains valid.

Both friendly and enemy casualties increased slightly in January, with USMC/USN KIA and WIA running 15 and 136 compared to 11 and 125 in December 1970. Enemy troops killed in action rose from 162 to 211, while enemy weapons losses (virtually the only statistics that experienced declines during the past month) dropped from 87 individual and 9 crew-served weapons captured to 80 and 6, respectively.

Mines and booby traps continued to take their toll of Division personnel in January. Such devices claimed 72 casualties in January compared to 53 the preceding month. The 72 casualties were caused by the detonation of 37 devices, while 116 mines or booby traps were found and rendered harmless by Division troops, resulting in a find/detonation ratio of 3.19:1. The figures for both finds and detonations represent increases over December, whereas the 3.19:1 ratio was the first downturn in that statistic since July 1970.

Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units continued, in January 1971, to provide a measure of security to over 31,000 people located in some of the more remote hamlets of Quang Nam Province, even though one of the 22 units was disestablished during the month. A price was paid for this security, since 25 Marines and Corpsmen were wounded during the month, but CUPP members killed 63 of the enemy and were responsible for 12 prisoners or Hoi Chanhs (ralliers). The 25 CUPP casualties were a marked increase over the one killed and nine wounded in December, while the enemy's 63 KIA represented an increase of nine over December's 54.

All statistics in the areas of supporting arms employment and helicopter usage (with the single exception of naval gunfire ship-days on station) experienced increases. Artillery and Naval gunfire expenditures were up from 26,999 artillery rounds and 217 rounds of naval ordnance in December 1970 to 35,400 and 295 in January 1971. Aircraft employment in support of the Division included 379 fighter/attack sorties (up from 333) and 5,431 hours of helicopter flight time (up from 4,941), during which 37,537 passengers and 2,259 tons of cargo were carried (up from 35,427 and 1,999, respectively).

As was mentioned above, comparison of January's statistics with those of past months continues to provide solid evidence of a downward trend in activity in the Division AO. In addition, similar comparisons can be made in the area of relative combat effectiveness. In Table I following January 1971 figures are compared to average statistics for the past six months, the six months previous to that (January - June 1970) and the twelve months of 1969.

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TABLE I. Comparison of January statistics to those of several previous periods.

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>JAN 71</u>	<u>JUL - DEC 70</u>	<u>COMPAR TO JAN</u>	<u>JAN - JUN 70</u>	<u>COMPAR TO JAN</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>COMPAR TO JAN</u>
Fr KIA	15	20	- 25%	47	- 68%	88	- 83%
En KIA	211	213	- 1%	658	- 68%	804	- 74%
Fr WIA	136	181	- 25%	423	- 68%	774	- 82%
En IWC	80	76	+ 5%	138	- 42%	189	- 58%
En CSWC	6	6	0%	11	- 45%	20	- 70%
CUPP KIA	0	1	-100%	6	-100%	3	-100%
CUPP WIA	25	11	+127%	22	+ 14%	13	+ 92%
KIA to CUPP	63	21	+200%	25	+152%	20	+215%
PW/HC to CUPP	12	13	- 8%	16	- 25%	29	- 59%
M/BT Found	116	112	+ 3%	206	- 44%	195	- 41%
M/BT Deton	37	52	- 29%	110	- 66%	107	- 65%
Ratio F/D	3.19	2.18	+ 46%	1.86	+ 72%	1.83	+ 74%
Arty Exp	35400	73702	- 52%	148490	- 76%	168138	- 79%
NGF Exp	295	911	- 68%	3393	- 91%	5501	- 95%
Ship-Days	3	10	- 70%	25	- 88%	31	- 90%
Sorties	379	490	- 23%	937	- 60%	1743	- 78%
Helo Hours	5431	5895	- 8%	7182	- 24%	8074	- 33%
Helo Pax	37537	46295	- 19%	60823	- 38%	53335	- 30%
Helo Cargo	2259	3077	- 27%	4442	- 49%	6551	- 65%

Perusal of the table above lends credence to the conclusion that most activity in the Division AO, both friendly and enemy, is well below that of previous months and, additionally, because earlier periods of time have tended to produce higher statistics, such decreases have occurred gradually. Furthermore, because statistics reflecting favorably on Division performance tend to be decreasing

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less rapidly than adverse data (e.g. enemy KIA in January 1971 are down only 1% from the average for the previous six months and enemy individual weapons captured have actually increased 5%, while friendly KIA have decreased 25%), the excellent relative combat effectiveness of the Division appears to continue to improve.

Although the next few weeks will surely be marked by a turbulence rendering prediction a chancy undertaking, the Division should, in all circumstances, continue to maintain its excellent combat record.

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FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

During January 1971, friendly casualties increased slightly over December 1970 totals. In January, 15 Marines were killed and 136 wounded in action compared to 11 killed and 125 wounded in December 1970. This increase reflects the upsurge in enemy activity brought on by the virtual end of the rainy season and the traditional increase in activity associated with the Lunar New Year. However, when January's figures are compared to the average monthly figures for 1970 (32 killed and 302 wounded per month) and for 1969 (88 killed and 774 wounded per month), it is apparent that the casualty trend is still definitely downward. January 1971 casualty statistics represent a decrease of approximately 26% from the monthly average for the last half of 1970, 68% from the first half, and about 82% from the average figures for 1969. This gives an indication of the progressive nature of the reductions in casualties overall. However, mines and booby traps continued to claim almost 50% of the total casualties (See Section 3-2), as they did throughout 1970.

At present, it is difficult to predict the nature and frequency of future casualties. Losses may be expected to decline as any redeployments occur, but the intensity of enemy activity is a variable which, of course, must be considered. If he increases his activity significantly, it is quite possible that friendly casualties would rise.

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CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Although January 1971 produced 15 USMC/USN killed in action, an increase of four over the 11 killed in December 1970, the trend of a decreasing number of friendly deaths established over the past two years remains valid. During 1970, an average of 34 men were killed per month, while the average for 1969 was 88 per month.

Of the 15 killed in January, only four died as the result of surprise firing devices (See Tab 3-2a) compared to the eight who were killed by booby traps in December. However, this result can be attributed more to chance than to any particular design or trend. No CUPP Marines were killed during January (See Tab 3-4c). This result follows from the trend established over the previous four months, during which time period not more than one CUPP member has been killed in any one month.

As discussed in Tab 3-1, prediction for the next few weeks is difficult, if not impossible.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE USMC KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 KIA

1971 KIA

1970 KIA

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CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY WOUNDED IN ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

January 1971 saw 136 Division personnel wounded in action, an increase of eleven over the 125 who were wounded in December 1970. As was the case with KIAs, this casualty rate, although an increase over the previous month, was a decrease from the average for the past six months (181) and for the year 1970 (302) overall, which, in turn, was a significant decline from the average for 1969 (774). Therefore, the downward trend in battle casualties in the 1st Marine Division remains valid.

Contrary to January's experience with KIAs, however, were the men wounded by mines or booby traps, or those who were members of CUPPs (Combined Unit Pacification Program units). Exactly half of those men wounded in January 1971 became casualties as a result of surprise firing devices (See Tab 3-2a), and 25 CUPP members were wounded in action during the month, compared to only nine the previous month. (See Tab 3-4c).

Casualties (both killed and wounded) should, in future weeks, depend largely on enemy activity; therefore, the extent of such casualties is difficult to predict.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE USMC WOUNDED IN ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 WIA (CUM)

1970 WIA (CUM)

1971 WIA (CUM)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 WIA	763	894	963	842	1199	893	603	1204	809	309	395	412	9,286
% CMD	3.19	3.69	4.19	3.68	5.06	3.80	2.57	5.30	3.33	1.02	1.28	1.40	3.21
70 WIA	505	440	446	404	392	350	267	274	192	129	101	125	3,625
% CMD	1.84	1.65	1.91	1.85	1.80	1.67	1.24	1.39	1.19	1.04	.81	1.00	1.45
71 WIA	136												(136)
% CMD	1.08												(1.08)

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MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

As has been established previously, the level of both friendly and enemy activity has progressively decreased (See Section G-2 and the other Tabs in Section G-3), but mines and booby traps continue to claim a major share of the casualties suffered by the Division (as they did throughout 1970). Four of the fifteen Marines/Corpsmen killed in action in January 1971 and fully one-half of those wounded (68 of 136) were claimed by mines/booby traps. The 72 surprise firing device casualties thus recorded in January represent a significant increase over the average of 54 per month for the previous three months (October - December 1970) and were the direct result of an increase in the number of such devices detonated by Division personnel during the month.

Because of the almost one-third increase in detonations and a much smaller proportional increase in the number of devices found and harmlessly destroyed, the ratio of finds to detonations for January 1971 decreased (to 3.19) for the first time since July 1970. However, January's ratio was still well above the ratio for the last half of 1970 (2.18:1), for 1970 overall (1.96:1), and for 1969 (1.83:1).

The enemy's present modus operandi almost dictates that the proportion of total casualties caused by surprise firing devices will remain relatively large, but the Division continues to pursue a vigorous counter-SFD program, and the ratio of finds to detonations should, in the long run, continue to improve.

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CASUALTIES FROM MINES/BOOBY TRAPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In January 1971 the number of casualties suffered by the Division because of the detonation of surprise firing devices increased substantially, from the 53 in December 1970, to 72. This increase was the first departure from the virtually steady situation obtaining in the last three months of 1970 and represented a rise of more than 40%, yet January's figure was well below the monthly average for the last half of that same year (in this same vein, the percentage of Division strength killed or wounded by such devices has virtually paralleled actual casualties and the same arguments can be mounted).

The increase in January 1971 discussed above can be attributed to an increase in the number of mines/booby traps detonated, which rose to 37 from December's 28 (See Tab 3-2c). This frequency of detonation yielded 1.9 casualties per detonation, equal to December's figure and to the annual rate for the year 1970.

In the present volatile situation, with the enemy attempting to mount a Spring campaign, predictions concerning casualties and casualty rates are, at best, risky. However, the Division's efforts to counter the enemy's surprise firing devices (See Tab 3-2c) should keep casualties reasonably low, at worst not exceeding January's relatively high total.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES BY MINES/BOOBY TRAPS,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 CASUALTIES (CUM) 1970 CASUALTIES (CUM) - - - - -
1971 CASUALTIES (CUM)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 KIA	9	4	9	11	22	17	13	17	15	14	16	19	166
WIA	108	46	74	211	202	242	191	236	174	114	133	227	1,958
TOTAL	117	50	83	222	224	259	204	253	189	128	149	246	2,124
CAS/DET	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.0	1.7	2.0	1.6
% CMD	.49	.21	.30	.93	.94	1.10	.87	1.11	.78	.42	.48	.83	
70 KIA	18	31	28	18	9	23	11	17	12	6	3	8	184
WIA	249	205	197	172	137	175	167	130	107	48	52	45	1,684
TOTAL	267	236	225	190	146	198	178	147	119	54	55	53	1,868
CAS/DET	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.4	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.7	1.9	1.9
% CMD	.97	.88	.96	.87	.66	.94	.83	.74	.73	.43	.44	.42	.74
71 KIA	4												(4)
WIA	68												(68)
TOTAL	72												(72)
CAS/DET	1.9												(1.9)
% CMD	.57												(.57)

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PERCENTAGE OF MINE/BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES TO TOTAL CASUALTIES,CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

January 1971 produced 72 casualties from mines/booby traps which, when taken with the total number of casualties suffered by the Division during the month, further produced a mine/booby trap percentage of 47.6%. This percentage, although an increase over the figure for December 1970 (39.0%), conforms very closely to the annual percentage for 1970 (46.4%).

Fairly drastic changes in this percentage may be expected from month to month because the absolute numbers with which we are dealing have been greatly reduced from those obtaining in 1969 and the first half of 1970. For example, from January through June 1970, total casualties each month exceeded 400 and the percentage caused by surprise firing devices varied from 35.1% to 49.4%, a range of 14.3 percentage points. The last half of 1970, on the other hand, was marked by total casualties well below 400 and the percentage ranged from 36.8% to 62.2%, a range of 25.4 percentage points.

Total casualties in the future should continue to occur at the present relatively reduced rate and therefore, the casualties from mines and booby traps will be difficult to predict. However, because much of Division activity will be in the lowlands in future weeks (where surprise firing devices are more likely to be emplaced), a mean percentage in excess of 50% is projected.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), MINE AND BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES EXPRESSED AS

A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 PERCENTAGE

1970 PERCENTAGE

1971 PERCENTAGE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TOT CAS	857	1033	1066	930	1346	999	666	1333	856	347	450	454	10,337
M/BT CAS	117	50	83	222	224	259	204	253	189	128	149	246	2,124
% M/BT	13.7	4.8	7.8	23.9	16.7	25.9	30.6	19.0	22.2	36.9	33.2	54.2	20.6
1970													
TOT CAS	558	501	496	448	416	401	286	307	212	147	120	136	4,028
M/BT CAS	267	236	225	190	146	198	178	147	119	54	55	53	1,868
% M/BT	47.8	47.1	45.4	42.4	35.1	49.4	62.2	47.9	56.1	36.8	45.8	39.0	46.4
1971													
TOT CAS	151												(151)
M/ BT CAS	72												(72)
% M/BT	47.6												(47.6)

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COMPARISON OF MINES/BOOBY TRAPS FOUND TO THOSE DETONATED.CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

As the first month in 1971 ends, we find that the ratio of surprise firing devices discovered and destroyed to those detonated with casualties decreased from December 1970's record (for the 25 months considered herein) high ratio of 4.00:1 to January's 3.19:1, computed using 116 finds and 37 detonations. Both of these last two figures were increases from December's 112 and 28. It should be noted, however, that 3.19:1 is still significantly higher than semi-annual ratio for the last half of 1970 of 2.18:1 and the annual ratios of 1.96:1 for 1970 and 1.83:1 for 1969, indicating that a generally increasing trend remains in effect.

The increasing trend established early in 1970 is reinforced by the vigorous counter-SFD program pursued by the Division, including a resident Mine Warfare School presenting a week-long course of instruction, a contact team travelling to the several Division units to familiarize the unit members with the techniques of discovery and avoidance of surprise firing devices, and the extensive use of dogs, as well as close command attention.

Because of these efforts, the detonation of surprise firing devices should decrease in the future, but, of course, such a decrease is dependent upon the enemy's actions and the attention paid to the problem by both the individual Marine and his commander.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). RATIO OF MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS FOUND TO

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS DETONATED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

RATIO FOUND/DETONATED 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - - 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
FOUND	66	90	114	141	218	277	196	199	272	242	254	274	2,343
DETONATED	73	29	49	166	125	142	147	161	116	63	88	121	1,290
RATIO F/D	0.82	3.10	2.33	0.85	1.74	1.95	1.33	1.24	1.64	3.84	2.88	2.26	1.83
1970													
FOUND	294	284	170	153	162	170	119	144	120	76	103	112	1,907
DETONATED	135	119	117	89	103	100	98	77	51	27	29	28	973
RATIO F/D	2.18	2.38	1.45	1.56	1.57	1.70	1.21	1.87	2.35	2.82	3.55	4.00	1.96
1971													
FOUND	116												
DETONATED	37												
RATIO F/D	3.14												

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ENEMY LOSSES

January 1970 produced 211 enemy soldiers killed in action, and the loss of 80 of his individual and 6 of his crew-served weapons. The KIA figure represents a increase over the 162 killed in December 1970, while both the weapons figures are decreases from the 87 individual and 9 crew-served weapons he lost in December. However, comparison of January's figures with the averages for the last six months of 1970 of 213 killed, 76 individual weapons captured and 6 crew-served weapons captured show that the former figures approximate closely the latter.

Comparison of the changes in enemy losses to the changes in friendly losses (See Tab 3-1) reflects favorably on the Division in the area of relative combat effectiveness. Using as a base the last half of 1970 (monthly averages), one sees that friendly KIA have decreased by 33% (20 to 15) and friendly WIA have decreased by 25% (181 to 136), while enemy KIA have fallen by only 1% (213 to 211), crew-served weapons captured are equal (6 to 6) and individual weapons captured have actually increased (76 to 80). Additionally, January's 3.19:1 ratio of mine/booby trap finds to detonations represents an increase over the July - December 1970 semi-annual ratio of 2.18:1, tending to reinforce the evidence of the constantly improving combat efficiency of the Division.

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CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The enemy lost a total of 211 men killed in action during January 1971 compared to the 162 he lost in December 1970, an increase of just over 30%. Over the same period, friendly KIA increased from 11 to 15, a jump of some 36%. These figures, used to construct a "kill ratio", convert to a ratio of just under 15 enemy to each friendly KIA for December and just over 14 to one for January, a very slight decrease. However, if one computes the ratio for the last six months of 1970 (under 11 to one), we see that this statistic is progressing favorably for the Division.

The number of enemy casualties in the future will depend almost entirely upon his own actions. If he exposes himself to observation or attempts to press ground attacks on friendly positions, he must expect to lose a number of troops. However, if he continues the more or less covert method of operation, his casualties should remain in the vicinity of 200 or less per month.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 ENEMY KIA

1970 ENEMY KIA

1971 ENEMY KIA

[illegible]

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CUMULATIVE ENEMY INDIVIDUAL/CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTUREDCALENDER YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In January 1971, the enemy lost 80 individual and 6 crew-served weapons, a figure less than the 1970 monthly averages. The enemy lost an average of 107 individual and 9 crew-served weapons monthly through 1970, compared to monthly average of 190 and 20 in 1969, representing decreases of 44% and 56%, respectively. When these figures are compared to the reduction in enemy KIA of 46% (See Tab 3-3a), it is apparent that the enemy was more successful at conserving crew-served weapons than he was his soldiers' lives. This could indicate either the enemy's inability to equip properly his troops or his unwillingness to jeopardize precious weapons. Another possible explanation is that a number of the groups of enemy engaged in 1970 were resupply parties including a sizable percentage of unarmed bearers. The trend toward a lower number of enemy weapons losses is expected to continue during the remainder of 1971.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 IWC —————

1971 IWC =====

1970 IWC - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EN IWC	422	221	216	230	194	162	87	174	111	81	256	114	2,268
1970													
EN IWC	206	83	68	208	146	115	122	72	53	58	60	87	1,280
1971													
EN IWC	80												(80)

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 CSWC

1971 CSWC

1970 CSWC



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EN CSWC	8	41	29	47	30	19	5	17	11	6	19	2	234
1970													
EN CSWC	11	3	7	30	6	9	11	8	2	3	3	9	102
1971													
EN CSWC	6												(6)

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COMBINED UNIT PACIFICATION PROGRAM

During January 1971, combat action involving Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units continued at the high level experienced during December 1970. In the 5th Marines Golf Cupp Area, aggressive patrol and alert ambush activities accounted for 63 NVA/VC killed in action (an increase of nine over the number recorded in December), two enemy captured and ten ralliers under the Chieu Hoi program. The majority of the sharp fighting again took place west of Baldy Combat Base in the Phu Huong (BT 1146) area. During the period 12 - 22 January, Golf CUPP 6, supported extensively by armed helicopters, killed 36 enemy without sustaining a single casualty. However, the CUPP units' success during the month was not without its price, as 25 CUPP members were wounded in January.

Since its inception in November 1969, CUPP has brought an increased measure of security to over 31,000 Vietnamese people, providing an atmosphere for growth of GVN strength in heretofore VC-dominated regions. Composed of Marine infantry squads integrated with Vietnamese Regional or Popular Force platoons, there are currently 21 CUPPs performing their mission in a like number of hamlets. Initially assigned to marginally secure or insecure hamlets (rated C or below on the Hamlet Evaluation System scale), these CUPP units form a viable screen behind which pacification and rural development can flourish at the grass roots level of Vietnamese society. There are over two Marine rifle companies assigned to the CUPP mission with a strength of 502 Marines and corpsmen. While there has been no reduction to date in the number of CUPP units because of redeployment, a schedule for the disestablishment of certain CUPP units has been approved and will be executed shortly. (See Tab 3-4b)

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HAMLET POPULATION UNDER CUPP INFLUENCE, AND INCREASE IN POPULATION

IN SECURE HAMLETS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During January 1971, the Chau Son CUPP unit, located one mile south of Hill 55, was disestablished. The effect on the population resulting from the disestablishment of this CUPP unit on 9 January was negligible, as but 110 Vietnamese resided in that sparsely populated hamlet region. While no further expansion of the Combined Unit Pacification Program is contemplated, the mantle of security by the presence of CUPP units is expected to spread to encompass additional civilians, albeit at a moderate rate.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). HAMLET POPULATION UNDER CUPP INFLUENCE AND**INCREASE IN POPULATION IN SECURE HAMLETS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970**

1969 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) ===== 1970 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) -----
 SCTY INCREASED (CUM) ===== SCTY INCREASED (CUM) -----
 1971 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) ===== 1971 SCTY INCREASED (CUM) -----



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INFLUENCE											4016	5062	
SCTY INCR												1724	
CUM INCR												1724	
GR TOT INC												1724	
1970													
INFLUENCE	1790	18886	23081	24658	23067	24361	30148	30361	31411	28391	28559	31672	
SCTY INCR	1397		4235		5569				306	-852		3113	
CUM INCR	1397		5632		11201				11507	10655		13768	
GR TOT INC	3121		7356		12925				13231	12379		15492	
1971													
INFLUENCE	31342												
SC INCR													
CUM INCR													
GR TOT INC	15492												

GR TOT INC = GRAND TOTAL INCREASE IN SECURE POPULATION

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CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND PERCENTAGE OF CATEGORY C OR BELOW HAMLETS COVEREDBY CUPP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

One CUPP unit was disestablished during January 1971 as elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment assumed responsibility for the Chau Son area, centered one mile southwest of Hill 55. Normally assigned to category C or below hamlets (A and B rated hamlets are considered secure with reasonably strong political development in progress), CUPP units provide local security while ferreting out the remaining VC and VCI and securing vital lines of communications. Over 13,000 Vietnamese now reside in hamlets upgraded to HES ratings of A and B as a result of CUPP influence; of the 21 CUPP platoons in operation, 17 are deployed in hamlets graded C or below. Opportunity for further growth of the program has been curtailed by the troop redeployments.

The following schedule has been adopted for the disestablishment of certain CUPPS because of redeployment:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HAMLET</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
2/4/1	QUAN NAM	AT 9081	ASAP
3/3/M	HOA YEN	AT 9155	15 Feb 71
2/3/M	PHU THUNG	AT 9155	15 Feb 71
1/3/M	NHGIA NAM	AT 9056	15 Feb 71
1/4/M	PHU HUONG	AT 8253	15 Mar 71
2/4/M	LAM PHUNG	AT 8255	15 Mar 71
3/4/M	HA NHA	AT 8054	15 Mar 71
1/2/M	BICH NAM	AT 9963	15 Apr 71
2/1/M	BICH BAC	AT 9863	15 Apr 71
3/2/M	THAI CAM	AT 9763	15 Apr 71
2/2/M	LE SON	AT 9865	15 Apr 71

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND % OF CATEGORY C

OR BELOW HAMLETS COVERED BY CUPPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969 # OF CUPP UNITS

1970 # OF CUPP UNITS

1971 # OF CUPP UNITS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CUPP ESTE											3	5	8
TOT CUPPS											3	8	
% COVRG											1.0	1.6	2.6
CUM %											1.0	2.6	
1970													
CUPP ESTE	11	3								-1		1	14
TOT CUPPS	19	22								21		22	
% COVRG	3.6	1.0								-0.3		0.3	4.6
CUM %	6.2	7.2								6.9		7.2	
1971													
CUPP ESTE	-1												(-1)
T CUPPS	21												
% COVRG													(0)
CUM %													

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CUPP CASUALTIES VS ENEMY LOSSES TO CUPP

During January 1971, 25 CUPP members were wounded (up from 9 the previous month), but none were killed, and CUPPs claimed 63 NVA/VC killed (up from 54 in December 1970), 2 prisoners and 10 Hoi Chanhs. In sharp contrast to the calendar year 1970 record of CUPP units accounting for but 5.3% of the enemy killed by Division units while sustaining 10.4% of the Marines killed, CUPP results for the past two months (December and January) include 34% of the Division's kills and 3.8% of Marines killed in action. A concerted targetting of CUPP hamlets by the enemy during early 1970 in an unsuccessful effort to counter pacification programs was the primary cause of the seemingly disproportionate share of casualties during 1970. In recent months, particularly in the 5th Marines Golf CUPP region, CUPP patrols and ambushes have taken a heavy toll of enemy troops.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUPP CASUALTIES VS ENEMY LOSSES TO CUPP.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69CUPP KIA												3	3
CUPP WIA			4									13	13
TOTAL CUPP												16	16
EN KIA												20	20
PW/HOI												29	29
TOTAL EN												49	49
70CUPP KIA	3	5	3	8	7	8	2	3	1	1	0	1	42
CUPP WIA	35	25	5	15	19	31	16	14	10	9	7	9	195
TOTAL CUPP	38	30	8	23	26	39	18	17	11	10	7	10	237
EN KIA	25	23	27	20	34	23	11	12	19	17	15	54	280
PW/HOI	23	35	28	2	6	3	19	4	1	9	4	42	176
TOTAL EN	48	58	55	22	40	26	30	16	20	26	19	96	456
71CUPPKIA	0												(0)
WIA	25												(25)
CUPP	25												(25)
EN KIA	63												(63)
PW/HOI CH	12												(12)
TOTAL EN	75												(75)

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SUPPORTING ARMS

The volume of ordnance delivered by supporting arms during the month of January 1971, including the number of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fighter/attack sorties flown in support of the Division, increased over comparable statistics for December 1970. Artillery ammunition expended rose from 26,999 rounds in December to 35,400 in January, naval gunfire expenditures from 217 rounds to 295, and fixed wing sorties from 333 to 379. The lone statistic considered in this section that experienced a decline from December to January was the number of ship-days on station, which dropped from four to three. The local increases listed above are due, in large measure, to an upsurge in enemy manifestations (enemy sighted rose from 576 in November to 1,331 in December and 1,394 in January) and to a massive attack by fire conducted during the latter third of January (and, presently, continuing) designed to deny to the enemy probable bases of operation for his pre-Tet and post-Tet activities.

The local increases outlined above do not reverse the general downward trend in the employment of fire support established over the past several months. During 1969, artillery expenditures, although exhibiting sizable fluctuations from month to month, demonstrated a relatively level trend in monthly totals and averaged approximately 168,000 rounds per month. The average for 1970 was 111,000 rounds per month, but the monthly totals for the first half of the year were well above that average, while those for the latter half were, generally, well below that average, producing a definite downward trend. Increases in December 1970 to some 27,000 rounds (from November's two-year low of 21,500) and the aforementioned 35,400 in January affected only slightly the trend, which can be attributed to the general decrease in enemy activity (See Tab 2-1 and Sub-Section 2-6) and a more selective targetting policy adopted in the latter stages of 1970.

Naval gunfire expenditures in support of the Division, after averaging over 8,000 rounds per month in the Spring of 1969 (March - May), fell rather steadily and produced a 1969 average of 5,500 rounds per month and a 1970 average of 2,200. Monthly totals for the past six months (August 1970 through January 1971) have all been well under 1,000 rounds per month, a continuation of the downward trend. This continuing reduction can be attributed to a massive reduction in the monthly totals of ship-days on station for naval gunfire vessels (down by a factor of ten since the earlier months of 1969) which, in turn, has been accompanied by a lack of suitable observed targets in the Division AO (See Tab 3-5c).

The number of fixed wing fighter/attack sorties, after having dropped precipitously during the latter half of 1969, levelled off during the first five months of 1970, decreased gradually until September, and has since remained in the range 350 - 500 sorties per month. The large total decrease experienced during 1969 and 1970 is a result of reduced 1st Marine Aircraft Wing assets due to redeployment, the general decrease in enemy activity and, to a certain extent, the unfavorable flying weather occurring during the two rainy seasons covered on this report.

The employment of supporting arms will wax or wane in the near future in response to three factors: (1) the intensity of enemy activity, (2) the

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need for fire support by the Division and other allied units, and (3) redeployments as they occur.

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ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED VS ENEMY SIGHTED, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

Enemy sightings in January 1971 increased slightly over the number recorded in December 1970, 1,394 to 1,331, while ammunition expenditures increased by more than 30% (26,999 rounds to 35,400). The small increase in the number of enemy sighted may have influenced the relatively large increase in expenditures, but the chief causative factor was almost certainly an intense attack by fire on probable enemy positions in the Charlie Ridge area, during the course of which over 11,000 rounds were fired. Had it not been for the concentrated attack, December and January figures would have probably been similar.

January's increases in both sightings and expenditures, coming on the heels of sizable increases in December, temporarily arrested the downward trend established during the first eleven months of 1970, during which time rounds fired and enemy sighted fell from 179,000 and 4,400 in January to less than 22,000 and 600 in November, respectively. During this period, neither function decreased uniformly, sightings falling in a stepwise fashion while expenditures alternated between slight increases and sizable decreases on a month-to-month basis. That the two quantities have increased over the past two months is most probably due to the step-up in enemy activity traditionally associated with the New Year and Tet.

Expenditures during the coming months will be strongly affected by impending redeployments as well as the level of enemy activity and the frequency of such special operations as the attack by fire discussed above.


31 JAN 71
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G-3-5a

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED VS ENEMY SIGHTED

CALENDAR YEAR 1970/1971

[illegible]

* AMMO EXPENDED EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS TO NEAREST HUNDRED.

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ARTILLERY PIECES AVAILABLE VERSUS ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED, CALENDAR YEARS
1969/1970/1971

January's 35,400 rounds represents an increase of some 31% over December 1970, when almost 27,000 rounds were expended, which, in turn, represented a 25% rise from November's 21,500. This lends further credence to the supposition that the correlation between ammunition expended and the number of pieces available for fire support is, at best, superficial. Further evidence refuting correlation between the two quantities is provided by closer inspection of the curves in question. Whereas the number of tubes available rose and fell gently during 1969 with the attachment or detachment of artillery units and traced a uniformly non-increasing curve over the past thirteen months, the expenditure curve behaved in a much more unpredictable manner. A specific example of such behavior occurred in the four month period June through September 1969. During the first three months of the period, the number of tubes available remained absolutely steady at 144, and expenditures virtually paralleled pieces with approximately 185,000 rounds fired each month. However, while the number of pieces remained at 144 in September, expenditures plunged more than 25% to about 132,000 rounds.

The total monthly expenditures over the past three months have been dictated largely by the intensity of enemy activity (See Tabs 3-5a and 2-6b) and a more selective targetting policy which reserves the bulk of fires for the most likely and potentially lucrative targets. A direct result of this selective policy is January's large increase in expenditures caused by the concentrated attack by fire on the Charlie Ridge area. This policy, the Division's need for fire support and the enemy's activity should continue to influence directly the amount of ammunition expended.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (RMV), ARTILLERY PIECES AVAILABLE VS AMMUNITION

EXPENDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 AMMO	178.2	189.8	158.3	151.7	156.9	184.1	187.1	186.4	152.4	159.4	169.6	163.6	2,017.7
PUS 4.2"	30	26	24	20	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	/
105	84	79	78	78	62	66	66	66	66	68	72	72	/
155	50	49	42	38	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	***
8"/175	6/4	6/4	6/7	6/10	6/12	6/12	6/12	6/12	6/12	7/12	12/12	12/12	/
TOTAL	174	164	157	152	140	144	144	144	144	147	156	156	/
70 AMMO	179.1	156.0	139.6	140.8	145.0	130.4	114.3	127.7	100.9	50.7	21.5	27.0	1,333.0
PUS 4.2"	24	24	22	18	18	18	18	18	17	12	12	12	/
105	72	72	64	54	54	54	54	54	52	36	36	36	/
155	36	36	33	30	26	26	26	26	23	20	20	20	***
8"/175	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	9/11	6/4	6/0	6/0	6/0	/
TOTAL	156	156	143	126	122	122	122	118	102	74	74	74	/
71 AMMO	35.4												(35.4)
PUS 4.2"	36												/
105	36												/
155	20												***
8"/175	6/0												/
TOTAL	74												/

* AMMO EXPENDED EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS TO NEAREST HUNDRED.

*** AVERAGE NUMBER OF PIECES AVAILABLE DURING A GIVEN MONTH.

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NAVAL GUNFIRE AMMUNITION EXPENDED VERSUS SHIP-DAYS ON STATION, CALENDAR YEARS1969/1970/1971

Naval gunfire support used by the Division during January 1971 continued to follow the downward trend established in May 1969. Although January's 295 rounds expended exceeded December's 217, the January total was considerably smaller than the average for any two or more month period in 1970 or 1969. In addition, January's expenditure was fired during only 3 ship-days on station (only a single vessel provided this support), the sixth consecutive month in which a decrease was recorded for this statistic (ship-days on station).

The nature of current operations, adverse terrain and the ready availability of artillery limits the usefulness of NGF in the Division Area of Operations, in which such support is being employed only in the Elephant Valley area because of the prohibitive range to targets in other areas. Because of the limited number of suitable observed targets, NGF is fired primarily on intelligence targets during the hours of darkness, and the nature of the terrain in the Elephant Valley area severely limits ground damage assessment. Therefore, the effectiveness of naval gunfire in the current situation is difficult to ascertain.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) , NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIP-DAYS ON STATION VERSUS

ROUNDS EXPENDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
RDS EXP	3696	6368	8811	7304	8395	5363	5138	4973	3651	3228	5011	4070	66,008
SHIPDAYS	42	40	37	29	40	33	29	19	26	24	25	29	373
1970													
RDS EXP	5583	4153	3433	3712	2230	1248	2585	807	693	561	605	217	25,827
SHIPDAYS	37	30	33	23	12	13	23	13	9	7	5	4	209
1971													
RDS EXP	295												(295)
SHIPDAYS	3												(3)

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FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

A slight increase in sorties was realized in January 1971 as a result of the unseasonably favorable monsoon weather. Fighter/attack sorties dropped 26% from November to December 1970. This is directly proportional to a reduction throughout MR-1 (24%) as a result of increased out-of-country activity. The same conditions existed in January 1971. Sorties are expected to remain in the vicinity of the January level until out-of-country activity is reduced and monsoonal effects decrease. The significant decrease in fighter/attack sorties flown in October 1969 coincides with the phase-out and withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division, VMFA-334 (F-4B aircraft) and VMA(AW)-553 (A-6 aircraft), and to adverse weather conditions experienced during that month. 1st and 3d Marine Division records were combined by 1st MAW up to this point. The February 1970 drop represents the departure of MAG-12, while the subsequent increase is related to improved operating weather. Fixed wing sortie rate reductions by the 1st MAW commenced on 17 August 1970, however, any noticeable effects of this policy were combined with the impact of the departure of MAG-13 in October and the deteriorating weather during the rainy season, the weather effects, of course, having a greater effect on fixed wing aircraft than on helicopters. Ground operations do not affect fixed wing aircraft operations as greatly as they do helicopter employment, since the fighter/attack units are normally assigned a fixed number of sorties and any increase in ground activities can be adequately supported by the diversion of aircraft from the attack of intelligence targets.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK PARTIES, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969						3071	2465	2701	1619	882	761	700	12199
1970	1058	775	992	992	994	812	723	566	497	365	455	333	8562
1971	379												(379)

* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE.

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HELICOPTER SUPPORT

January 1971 totals remain very close to those of November and December 1970 in all respects. The slight increase is a result of uncommonly light rainfall for January. 1970 data reflects only 1st Marine Division support and provides an accurate portrayal of the level of Division activity, available air support assets, and the direct effects of weather. Helicopter support received is a direct function of the support requested. The primary variable is the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's ability to provide the support in terms of available assets and operating weather. In 1970 the 1st Marine Division received 70% of the helicopter flight time flown by the 1stMAW, with the remaining 30% going to the other units in MR-1, including I Corps, XXIV Corps, and III MAF, although the bulk of this 30% remainder is provided the 2d ROKMC Brigade. Helicopter support received in the next several weeks should remain at the present level and will vary directly with the available operating weather and the activities of both infantry regiments.

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HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Helicopter flight time during January 1971, while exhibiting a small increase over December 1970 (5,400+ compared to 4,900+), remained in the general vicinity of 5,000 hours, as had totals for the previous four months. The peak months for Division activity, favorable operating weather and maximum asset availability were May, June, and July 1970. A pattern of diminishing monthly flight time begins in August with the departure of HMM-161 (21 CH-46D flying an average of 800 hours per month) and establishment of the 1st MAW policy of limiting flight hours to reduce and realign helicopter utilization in consonance with CNO guidelines. The full impact of the latter is noted in September, in addition to the standdown of the 7th Marines and elements of the 11th Marines. The reduced air support requirements in October, coupled with six days of unflyable weather, reduced flight time to a level at which the 1st MAW utilization policy was no longer significant. Monthly flight time during the first quarter of 1971 is expected to remain in the vicinity of 5,000 hours per month and then gradually decrease as air and ground units redeploy simultaneously.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970/1971

1969

1971

1970



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 HOURS						11553	9721	9089	7849	6659	5819	5826	56516
70 HOURS	6883	5903	6446	7112	8227	8520	8067	7081	5824	4532	4926	4941	78,462
71 HOURS	5431												(5,431)

*JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

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
HELICOPTER PASSENGER TOTALSCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

January's 35,537 passengers virtually equalled totals for the previous two months (November and December 1970). Passenger totals are indicative of a level of activity but do not address the specific reason for movement. Also, helicopter after action reporting duplicates passenger counts on subsequent sorties. Therefore, analysis of this data can only say accurately that May, June, and July 1970 were exceptionally active months for the 1st Marine Division supported with maximum helicopter flight time. Subsequent reductions were directly related to reduced activity, reduced assets and reduced operating weather. It is anticipated that the impact of these factors will dampen out as level of activity settles down for the remainder of the 1970-1971 monsoon season and until redeployment and realignment of forces causes a temporary increase of passenger movement.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) HELICOPTER PASSENGERS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	
69 PAX						43424	59907	59605	53609	52753	53518	50526	373342	*
70 PAX	56113	55355	55019	59601	70755	68095	70752	54580	50327	31201	35485	35427	645,710	
71 PAX	37537												(37,537)	

* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

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~~SECRET~~HELICOPTER CARGO TOTALSCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Favorable weather during January 1971 explains the slight increase in cargo carried (2,259 tons compared to 1,999) and allowed support of increased artillery expenditures. Although monthly cargo totals can be remotely related to flight hours, a more accurate comparison can be made to the level of ground activity of Division units. Artillery resupply contributes greatly to the overall total and the decrease in cargo carried reflects the withdrawal of eight artillery batteries during September and October 1970, as well as the departure of the 7th Marines. The decrease in artillery expenditures during the latter months of 1970 resulting from changed targetting policy (See 3-5b and 3-5a) was offset by the deteriorating road conditions during the monsoon season. Cargo totals can be expected to remain in the vicinity of 2,000 - 2,500 tons per month until redeployment and realignment of forces reduce air support assets and requirements.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER CARGO TOTALS, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	*
69 TONS						9836	10471	8621	5629	4813	3280	3207	45857	
70 TONS	3963	3485	3962	4164	5937	5138	4000	3804	3867	2510	2283	1999	45,112	
71 TONS	2259												(2,259)	

* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

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G-4 OVERVIEW

The January 1971 figures presented herein, together with data for past months, reflect the improving logistics picture within the 1st Marine Division.

The status of operational readiness for combat essential items within the Division reflected in the unit FORSTAT ratings remains excellent. The Division overall and all but two of its subordinate units are presently in a C-1 status. As was the case previously, the Headquarters Battalion and the 1st Medical Battalion are C-2 essentially because of a relatively small number of end items which are either not available because of a deficiency or which cause continual maintenance problems.

The overall percentage of the Division's combat essential items of equipment maintained operationally ready continues to improve and currently stands at 95% compared to 85% at this time (the end of January) last year. Three of the four commodity groups used to determine overall readiness, Communication-Electronics, Motor Transport, and Ordnance, substantially exceed the minimum Marine Corps standard of 85%, while the fourth, Engineer equipment (for which incidentally, the standard is 83%), continues to improve and now stands at 86%, exceeding the standard for the second month in a row.

The Department of Defense program to transfer certain selected items to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces remains dormant, as no Division units were involved in Increment V redeployments. However, Division units achieved a high acceptance rate of 93.8% (2,798 items accepted of 2,980 offered) during Increment VI. The lessons learned during that phase of redeployment, together with the present high state of readiness of the Division's equipment, should serve to effect an improvement on that percentage in any future redeployments.

The prevalence of malaria remained low in January 1971, with 32 cases being recorded for a case rate of 2.4/1000 men. January was the fourth consecutive month in which a reduction in the case rate was reported. On the other hand, the venereal disease case rate of 15.1/1000 men was the highest that has been recorded in the past 25 months.

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UNIT FORSTAT RATING

As in previous months, the FORSTAT rating for the Division overall remains at C-1 (fully combat ready) in both equipment/supplies on hand and equipment readiness with but two subordinate units rated C-2 in either category. The circumstances degrading the readiness of the two units in a C-2 status are as follows:

I. Headquarters Battalion is adversely affected by a high deadline rate for 600 and 700 series generators. Deadlined communication-electronics equipment also contributes to the battalion's adversity.

II. 1st Medical Battalion is degraded by a T/E deficiency of PU-710 and PU-712 generators.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN). UNIT FORSTAT RATINGS

UNIT	EQUIP/ SUPPLIES ON HAND		EQUIP READINESS	
	C-1	C-2	C-1	C-2
1ST MAR DIV (-) (REIN)	X		X	
HQ BN (REIN)	X			X
1ST MAR (REIN)	X		X	
HQ CO (REIN)	X		X	
1ST BN, 1ST MAR	X		X	
2D BN, 1ST MAR	X		X	
3D BN, 1ST MAR	X		X	
5TH MAR (REIN)	X		X	
HQ CO (REIN)	X		X	
2D BN, 5TH MAR	X		X	
3D BN, 5TH MAR	X		X	
1ST BN, 5TH MAR	X		X	
11TH MAR (-) (REIN)	X		X	
HQ BTRY (REIN)	X		X	
1ST BN, 11TH MAR (REIN)	X		X	
2D BN, 11TH MAR (REIN)	X		X	
3D 8" HOW BTRY	X		X	
1ST RECON BN (-) (REIN)	X		X	
1ST ENGR BN (REIN)	X		X	
1ST MED BN (-)		X		X
1ST MT BN	X		X	
11TH MT BN	X		X	

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COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Over the course of January 1971, the operationally ready status of all combat equipment in the 1st Marine Division continued to improve, attaining 95%. This was the third consecutive month the Division has increased its percentage of equipment operationally ready. In addition, all CMC objectives have been attained or exceeded, with the percentage of equipment not operationally ready due to supply (NORS) decreasing during the month from 4% to 3%, while the other categories (NORM, In transit, Deficient) remained static.

31 JAN 71


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) READINESS OF COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969) - - - - -

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											84	85	
% NORM											3	5	
% NORS											4	3	
% IN/T											2	3	
% DEFIC											7	4	
1970													
% OR	86	87	90	91	89	90	92	94	92	92	93	94	
% NORM	4	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	
% NORS	4	4	2	2	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	
% IN/T	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	
% DEFIC	3	3	1	2	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	
1971													
% OR	95												
% IN/T	1												
% NORS	3												
% IN/T	1												
% DEFIC	0												

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COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS) CALENDAR YEARS
1969/1970/1971

At the end of January 1971, the operationally ready status of Communication-Electronics equipment continues to be excellent at 96%. This is the sixth consecutive month this commodity group has recorded an operationally ready percentage of 95% or above. As such, there are no problem areas within the commodity group.

31 JAN 71

G-4-2a

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (COMMUNICATION-

ELECTRONICS), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969) - - - - -

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE = - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											74	86	
% NORM											4	4	
% NORS											1	4	
% IN/T											2	3	
% DEFIC											19	3	
1970													
% OR	90	90	92	93	92	93	94	95	95	95	95	96	
% NORM	4	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	
% NORS	3	3	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	
% IN/T	2	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	
% DEFIC	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1971													
% OR	96												
% RM	0												
% NORS	2												
% IN/T	2												
% DEFIC	0												

31 JAN 71

COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The operationally ready status of Motor Transport equipment at the end of January 1971 continues to be excellent. Current operational readiness stands at 94% and the only significant problem item within this commodity area is the M-274A2 Mule. Of the 213 Mules on hand, only 172 (80%) are operational. There is no specific trend or problem in the deadline of these vehicles.

31 JAN 71

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT)

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969)

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE =====



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											86	86	
% NORM											5	5	
% NORS											3	4	
% IN/T											2	2	
% DEFIC											4	3	
1970													
% OR	85	88	93	92	90	90	91	93	94	93	93	92	
% NORM	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	
% NORS	4	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	
% IN/T	4	4	2	2	4	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	
% DEFIC	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1971													
% OR	94												
% NORM	2												
% NORS	3												
% IN/T	1												
% DEFIC	0												

31 JAN 71

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COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ORDNANCE), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The operationally ready status of Ordnance equipment continues to be excellent. There are no problem items. Of particular note is the high state of operational readiness (98%) achieved for the month of January, equalling that achieved in December 1970.

31 JAN 71

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT, (ORDNANCE)

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969)

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE = = = = =



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											92	92	
% NORM											2	3	
% NORS											2	2	
% IN/T											1	2	
% DEFIC											3	1	
1970													
% OR	91	92	95	97	96	95	96	96	95	94	96	98	
% NORM	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	4	2	1	
% NORS	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	
% IN/T	3	4	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	
% DEFIC	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1971													
% OR	98												
% NORM	1												
% NORS	1												
% IN/T	0												
% DEFIC	0												

31 JAN 71

G-4-2c
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COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ENGINEER), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The operational readiness status of Engineer equipment continues to improve and currently stands at 86%, January 1971 marking the fourth straight month an increase has been recorded for this statistic. The non-availability of T/E authorized 600/700 series generators and the deadline rate of those on hand is a continuing problem. Of the 226 generators authorized only 81% (183) are on hand and deadlines decrease the overall operational readiness of 66% (148). Additionally, the high deadline rate of floodlight trailers adversely affects the readiness of engineer equipment.

31 JAN 71

G-4-2d

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ENGINEER).

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969) -----

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE -----



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											58	60	
% NORM											8	10	
% NORS											7	7	
% IN/T											4	10	
% DEFIC											23	13	
1970													
% OR	63	66	68	66	59	63	74	83	73	76	78	84	
% NORM	6	3	6	7	6	7	6	5	5	8	4	3	
% NORS	5	7	4	5	7	6	5	4	7	8	9	10	
% IN/T	7	5	5	6	8	6	6	6	4	3	4	3	
% DEFIC	19	19	17	16	20	18	9	2	11	5	5	0	
1971													
% OR	86												
% NORM	3												
% NORS	5												
% IN/T	2												
% DEFIC	4												

31 JAN 71

G-4-2d

INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIAL TO RVNAF


The chart on the opposite page reflects the current status of the turnover of major end items to the RVNAF, a Department of Defense initiated program. Portrayed is the high acceptance rate of equipment offered by Division units, a rate directly attributable to the efforts of the invoicing units to repair on the spot equipment initially questioned as to serviceability by RVNAF inspectors. As indicated below, a total of 2,980 items of Communications-Electronics, Ordnance and Motor Transport items were offered during the period 17 August through 9 October, of which 2,798 items with a total value of \$1,232,805.00 were accepted, an acceptance rate of 93.8%. The program is now inactive until the next phase of redeployment.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY OFFERED</u>	<u>QUANTITY ACCEPTED</u>	<u>VALUE</u>
RADIO SET PRC 25	317	312	\$270816.00
MINE DETECTORS	276 128	65	46865.00
GRENADE LAUNCHER M79	128	114	28728.00
MACHINE GUN MOUNT M122	112	111	7548.00
MACHINE GUN M-60	79	73	46428.00
RIFLE, M-16	1563	1501	204136.00
PISTOL, CAL 45	551	496	28272.00
SEMI TRLR 25T	3	0	
TRUCK M54	1	1	11878.00
TRUCK, DUMP, M51	10	8	121160.00
AMBULANCE, M718	4	3	12315.00
TRUCK, M37B1	12	5	23165.00
RADIO SET GRC 125	48	40	43360.00
PUBLIC ADDRESS SET PIQ-5	10	10	1250.00
WATER TRLR, M149	4	0	
TRUCK, M151	7	6	18822.00
TRLR, M105	3	1	905.00
NIGHT VISION SIGHT, AN/PVS-2	30	30	90000.00
HOWITZER, 105MM	18	18	273600.00
TELE-TYPE SET AN/GGC-3	1	1	1730.00
MACH GUN, CAL 50	3	3	1827.00
TOTALS	2980	2798	\$1,232,805.00

31 Oct 70

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIEL TO RVNAF



DATE	OFFERED	ACCEPTED	CUM OFFRD	CUM ACPTD	CUM % ACPTD
17 Aug	686	670	686	670	97.5
2 Aug	494	489	1180	1159	98.2
2 Aug	23	21	1203	1180	98.1
3 Sep	152	141	1355	1321	98.1
6 Sep	4	4	1359	1325	98.1
10 Sep	492	409	1851	1734	93.9
11 Sep	9	9	1860	1743	93.9
15 Sep	268	244	2128	1987	93.4
16 Sep	35	32	2163	2019	93.4
1 Oct	1	1	2164	2020	93.4
2 Oct	15	15	2179	2035	93.4
3 Oct	89	84	2268	2119	93.4
4 Oct	291	262	2559	2381	93.4
5 Oct	260	256	2819	2637	93.6
6 Oct	2	2	2821	2639	93.6
9 Oct	159	159	2980	2798	93.8

31 OCT 70

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PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

During the month of January 1971 the prevalence of malaria remained low with the expected seasonal low point producing 32 cases for a January case rate of 2.4/1000 men, the lowest case rate in the past 25 months. Conversely, morbidity from venereal disease increased significantly, with the majority of these cases occurring in the immediate Danang area. Case rates increased from 11.3/1000 men in December 1970 to 15.1/1000 in January, the highest case rate in the past 25 months.

Rabies prophylaxis for the month accounted for the loss of 440 man-days of combat effectiveness. Morbidity from amebiasis, shigellosis, hepatitis, and the gastro-intestinal diseases continues to cause a relatively low but nevertheless significant loss of combat effectiveness.

31 JAN 71

G-4-4

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MALARIA PREVALENCE, ~~SEMI~~ YEAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971


During the month of January 1971, only 32 cases of malaria were contracted by members of the Division, producing a case rate of 2.4 cases per 1,000 men, the lowest such rate in 25 months. This low incidence was the expected seasonal low, but one must note that this was the fourth consecutive month in which a decrease in the case rate has been recorded.

31 JAN 71

G-4-4a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE MALARIA INCIDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS1969/1970/1971

1969 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE ——— 1970 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE - - - - -
 1971 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE = = = = =



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CASES	247	121	160	91	85	152	141	232	679	396	437	159	2,900
RATE/1000	9.8	4.7	6.3	3.6	3.4	6.1	5.7	9.7	26.6	12.7	13.4	5.1	9.0
1970													
CASES	84	84	227	377	221	224	158	259	346	256	84	67	2,387
RATE/1000	2.8	3.0	9.3	16.4	9.7	10.1	7.0	13.0	21.2	19.5	6.4	5.1	9.6
1971													
CASES	32												(32)
RATE	2.4												(2.4)

31 JAN 71


G-4-4a

VENEREAL DISEASE PREVALENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Although the number of venereal infections in January 1971 fell below those recorded in the first month of both 1970 and 1969 (203 versus 278 and 304), January's total exceeded those of September, October, November and December and equalled August's total. This relatively high frequency of infection, combined with the present low population base, produced the highest case rate experienced in the last 25 months (15.1 cases per 1000 men). The total of 203 for January included seven cases of the more exotic strains of VD (six cases of chancroid; one of lympho-granuloma venereum) compared to none in December and a single case of chancroid in November. Analysis of contacts revealed that 63% of the cases (127 of 203) occurred in the immediate Danang area.

31 JAN 71

G-4-4b

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE VENEREAL DISEASE INCIDENCE,CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/19711969 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE 1970 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE1971 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 SYPHILIS	4	1	2	0	1	0	1	0	5	4	2	0	20
GONORRHEA	283	213	229	213	242	252	162	162	172	251	251	317	2,747
CHANCROID	16	9	5	17	7	10	4	2	4	7	7	1	89
L.G. VENERUM	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	4
L.G. INGUIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL V.D.	304	224	236	230	250	262	168	164	181	263	260	318	2,860
70 SYPHILIS	0	3	1	0	0	5	0	1	1	1	0	0	12
GONORRHEA	272	226	219	232	274	239	259	200	187	148	146	150	2,552
CHANCROID	5	3	4	5	9	3	0	2	1	2	1	0	35
L.G. VENERUM	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	4
L.G. INGUIN	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL V.D.	278	232	224	238	283	248	259	203	189	153	147	150	2,604
71 SYPHILIS	0												(0)
GONORRHEA	196												(196)
CHANCROID	6												(6)
L.G. VENERUM	1												(1)
L.G. INGUIN	0												(0)
TOTAL V.D.	203												(203)

31 JAN 71

G-4-48

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), VENEREAL DISEASE INCIDENCE AND CASE RATE/1000

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 INCIDENCE ———

1970 INCIDENCE - - - - -

1971 INCIDENCE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CASES	304	224	236	230	250	262	168	164	181	263	260	318	2,860
RATE/1000	12.0	8.8	9.2	9.1	10.0	10.5	6.8	6.8	7.1	8.4	8.0	10.2	8.9
1970													
CASES	278	232	224	238	283	248	259	203	189	153	147	150	2,604
RATE/1000	9.2	8.2	9.2	10.4	12.3	11.2	11.5	10.2	11.6	11.6	11.2	11.3	10.5
1971													
CASES	203												(203)
RATE/1000	15.1												(15.1)

31 JAN 71

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G-5 OVERVIEW

During January 1971, two of the parameters associated with 1st Marine Division civic action increased, while the other two decreased (from December 1970 values). The cost of civic action declined from 2.25 million \$VN to 1.66 million \$VN and Vietnamese participation in Division civic action projects fell from 93.5% to 90.5%, while the number of man-days of labor by U.S. personnel rose from 545 to 684 and the number of Vietnamese treated by MEDCAP/DENTCAP increased from 8,224 to 8,306. When compared with the monthly averages for 1969 and 1970, a similar mixed result is produced, although all four of the comparisons are reversed in sense, i.e., where, in comparing January with December, an increase was obtained, comparisons of January with the averages for 1970 and 1969 produce a decrease, and vice-versa. Therefore, January's cost of civic action was greater than the averages for 1970 (1.35 million \$VN) and 1969 (0.99 million \$VN), Vietnamese participation greater than 1970's 86.7% and 1969's 74.2%, U.S. labor provided less than 1970's 1,508 man-days and 1969's 1,194, and Vietnamese patients treated less than 1970's 10,454 and 1969's 10,813.

The character of Civic Action underwent a significant and continuous change throughout Calendar Year 1970. In 1969, and for the first few months of 1970, III Marine Amphibious Force was the senior U.S. headquarters in Military Region I, and there was significant U.S. Navy presence. From December 1969 to March 1970, the 26th Marines, with a typical support package, was attached to 1st Marine Division. In 1969, the 1st Marine Division had a Psyop/Civic Action AIK Fund allocation of 500,000\$VN per month. The conditions as stated in this paragraph all had significant effects upon the 1st Marine Division Civic Action Program and are important because they no longer exist.

III Marine Amphibious Force as the senior U.S. headquarters in Military Region I was the recipient of considerable support through the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund. This support included funds and materials. 1st Marine Division shared in the funds primarily by participating in the General Walt Scholarship Program, but also received a proportionate share of Civic Action materials donated through the Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Program. In view of the continually decreased support received, III Marine Amphibious Force terminated the General Walt Scholarship Program on 30 May 1970, and materials are available in increasingly smaller quantities.

As the service manager for Project Handclasp, the U.S. Navy presence in the Danang area assured a considerable amount of Handclasp materials directed to U.S. military forces in Military Region I. In addition, the 1st Marine Division had an arrangement with the U.S. Naval Support Activity wherein materials for civic action projects could be purchased with Civic Action AIK Funds at about one third the Vietnamese open market price.

When XXIV Corps became the senior U.S. military headquarters in Military Region I, the quantity of Project Handclasp materials was reduced to that donated specifically to 1st Marine Division, and the U.S. Army Logistic Command does not permit transactions involving AIK Funds, which left the Vietnamese open market as the source for AIK Fund materials.

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In 1970, the 26th Marines and the 7th Marines, with support packages, were withdrawn from Vietnam. The loss of these units resulted in a significant but, because of changing conditions, immeasurably reduced civic action capability.

Finally, in Calendar Year 1970, the Psyops/Civic Action AIK Funds were halved each quarter, beginning on 1 January 1970. On 1 April 1970, the division received the III MAF account, with the result that the monthly allocation of funds dropped from 500,000\$VN per month in 1969 to 150,000\$VN per month subsequent to 1 July 1970. The monthly ceiling for 1971 remains at 150,000\$VN.

By measurable comparison, the total 1970 1st Marine Division Civic Action effort showed an increase over 1969. This increase resulted from the excesses of non-combat essential expendable construction materials created effort in connection with phased troop reductions, and by a significant engineer effort in connection with Vietnamese resettlement projects and irrigation systems.

At the present time, excess non-combat essential construction materials for civic action projects appear to be exhausted, or are earmarked for a new Vietnamese resettlement project. This has appeared to be the case for several months, however, and materials have been found and projects have been completed.

For the near future, 1st Marine Division Civic Action Programs will be sustained by excess materials declared excess of operational needs. As redeployment progresses, and in keeping with the policy of Vietnamization, the 1st Marine Division Civic Action Program will decline in scope and shift increasingly from material assistance to technical assistance until it ceases to exist.

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COST OF CIVIC ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1st Marine Division civic action projects are supported by the use of non-combat essential expendable supplies, salvage, the expenditure of funds from the US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund, and voluntary contributions. During January 1971 330,000\$VN of the 1.66 million \$VN cost of civic action was in the form of voluntary contributions in support of Tet activities.

The US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund provided 500,000\$VN per month to 1st Marine Division during Calendar Year 1969, but the contribution was progressively reduced to the July 1970 level of 150,000\$VN, where it remains.

At the present time, salvage is the single significant source of civic action materials. Excess expendable supplies have been exhausted (until more are declared excess). Dunnage is being stockpiled for Vietnamese resettlement projects. Troop reductions have created excess cantonments and/or buildings which have been salvaged for civic action purposes.

As this remaining source is exhausted the 1st Marine Division Civic Action program will decrease or change character to one of technical assistance only. This is not an undesirable trend, and it is in keeping with Vietnamization wherein materials and funds are made available through GVN channels rather than U.S. military channels.

31 JAN 71

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE COST OF CIVIC ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 MILLIONS OF \$VN

1970 MILLIONS OF \$VN

1971 MILLIONS OF \$VN =====

[illegible]

G-5-1

31 JAN 71

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PERCENT OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION (LABOR) IN 1ST MAR DIV CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS,CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971


The percent of Vietnamese participation achieved in January 1971 was 90.5% as compared against the monthly average of 86.7% in 1970 and 74.2% in 1969. There is no goal or norm as such established for Vietnamese participation in 1st Marine Division civic action projects. However, a high percentage of participation is desired, not only because it gives the Vietnamese individually and collectively an investment in their own development, but more importantly, it involves an identification with the Vietnamese government. All 1st Marine Division civic action projects are coordinated with and approved by the GVN at least up to and including Province, and the projects are primarily attributed to the GVN. 1st Marine Division participation is limited to material, transportation, engineering assistance, and technical advice not available through GVN channels.

The present high percentage of Vietnamese participation in 1st Marine Division civic action projects represents a desirable norm which will be maintained in the future.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION (LABOR)

IN 1ST MARINE DIVISION CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971
 % PARTICIPATION 1969 ——— 1970 — — — 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
MAN-DAYS	1369	1030	1901	637	2298	1772	1353	1764	1188	1542	1649	1595	18,098
% VN PART	59.3	66.0	83.0	89.0	88.0	85.0	75.0	81.0	75.0	69.0	53.0	67.0	74.2
1970													
MAN-DAYS	1546	1673	1680	1494	1220	1381	1160	1106	620	1296	610	545	14,331
% VN PART	77.0	77.0	83.0	82.5	84.0	80.0	88.0	95.0	93.0	97.0	90.5	93.5	86.7
1971													
MAN-DAYS	684												
% VN PART	90.5												

* MAN-DAYS OF U.S. LABOR

31 JAN 71

VIETNAMESE TREATED BY MEDCAP/DENTCAP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The number of persons treated during January 1971 was 8,306, this is 2,148 below the monthly average of Vietnamese civilians treated by the Medical and Dental Civic Action Programs during 1970. In 1970, several organizations, the most significant being 7th Marines and 26th Marines, were redeployed from Vietnam. This represented a loss of MedCap/DentCap capability of approximately 25%, both in the number of teams available and in the medical supplies available.

There is no numerical goal as such, the single objective being to treat as many Vietnamese as possible consistent with operational commitments. The determining factors are the tempo of operations and the availability of expendable medical supplies.


In 1969, and early 1970, the primary source of MedCap supplies was Project Handclasp. The public attitude and the reduced U.S. Navy presence in Military Region I has resulted in the sharply reduced availability and dependability of procurement of Handclasp supplies.

As a result, MedCaps/DentCaps are programmed and directed to use expendable military medical/dental supplies as the primary source. The limited availability of medical/dental supplies for civic action programs is the single most important limiting factor in the number of Vietnamese treated. Since these supplies are subject to budgetary considerations it is expected that between 7,000 - 8,000 persons represents the maximum capability of the 1st Marine Division as presently constituted and will be reduced proportionately as Division Units redeploy.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE VIETNAMESE TREATED BY MEDCAP/DENTCAP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970

1969 THOUSANDS OF PATIENTS ——— 1970 THOUSANDS OF PATIENTS - - - - -
 1971 THOUSANDS OF PATIENTS ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
PATIENTS	8486	7686	7794	11028	10325	10184	12156	6810	14706	14807	11820	13949	129.751
1970													
PATIENTS	14005	12020	11703	9910	8756	10691	11749	11612	10040	7618	8716	8224	125.444
1971													
PATIENTS	8306												8.306