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COMMAND INFORMATION NOTEBOOK FOR FEBRUARY 1971

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

RPK/gmr  
5000  
24 February 1971

From: Command Information Officer  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Update Data for Command Information Notebook, January 1971 Edition

Ref: (a) DivO 5000.3A

Encl: ✓(1) Update Data

1. In accordance with reference (a), the information in enclosure (1) is published. Those data on charts carried over from 1970 are included. If any new charts (or charts that do not change) are included in the update packet, this fact is so indicated in enclosure (1).

2. If there are any questions, please call Capt KEMPF at 6133 or 6238.

  
R. P. KEMPF

Distribution: ACoFS, G-1  
ACoFS, G-2  
ACoFS, G-3  
ACoFS, G-4  
ACoFS, G-5  
ACoFS, Comptroller  
Division Inspector  
Staff Judge Advocate  
Division Surgeon  
CO, 1st Marines  
CO, 5th Marines  
CO, 11th Marines  
CO, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion  
OIC, Combat Operations Center

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<u>TAB</u>	<u>TITLE (Short)</u>	<u>DATA HEADING</u>	<u>JAN 1971</u>
1-1	Div Strength & Force Structure	MAN LVL	12514
		ON ROLLS	12623
		INF ENS	6
		BATTERIES	11
1-2	1st Term Reenlistment Rates	ELIG/REC	68
		REENLIST	6
		% REENL	8.8
1-3	Congrint/Splint Correspondence	PCS	57
		% CMD	.45
1-4	Decorations & Purple Hearts	PHM	127
		% CMD	1.00
		OTHER	418
		% CMD	3.31
		RATIO	3.29
1-5a	Trials for Crimes of Violence	TRIALS	19
		% CMD	.15
1-5b	Unauthorized Absences	ABSENCES	28
		% CMD	.22
1-5c	Confined Marines	PRETRIAL	27
		POSTTRIAL	22
		TOTAL	49
		% CMD	.39
1-5d	Bad Conduct & Dishonorable Discharges	BCD/DD	8
		% CMD	.06
1-5e	Admin Discharges	C of G	4
		UD	43
		UNSUIT	1
		TOTAL	48
		% CMD	.37
1-5f	Drug Abuse Actions	NJP	8
		INVESTIG	36
		COURTS	2
		ADMIN DIS	30
		TOTAL	76
1-5g	Racial Incidents	INCIDENTS	0

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TAB	TITLE (Short)	DATA HEADING	JAN 1971
1-5h	Fragging Incidents	INCIDENTS	0
		KILLED	0
		WOUNDED	0
		TOTAL CAS	0
		% CMD CAS	.00
1-5i	Major Offenses	(New Analysis - No Update)	
1-5j	Vehicle/Traffic Offenses	(New Analysis - No Update)	
1-5k	Miscellaneous Offenses	(New Analysis - No Update)	
1-6a	Battle vs Non-Battle Casualties	(New Chart - No Update)	
1-6b	Non-Battle Casualties	-do-	
1-6c	Supporting Arms Incidents	-do-	
1-6d	Individual Weapons Incidents	-do-	
1-6e	Accidental Discharges	-do-	
1-6f	Explosive Ordnance Incidents	-do-	
1-6g	Motor Vehicle Accidents	-do-	
1-6h	Operational/Occupational Incidents	-do-	
1-7	Savings Bond/Deposit Programs	BOND PROG	8203
		% PARTIC	64.1
		DEP PROG	635
		% PARTIC	5.0
2-1	Estimated Enemy Strength	EST STR	8325
2-2	Reconnaissance Teams	(New Chart - No Update)	
2-3	Sensors Employed	RF	99
		LINE	0
		TOTAL	99
2-4	Targetable Sensor Activations	TGT DETEC	35
		FIRE MSNS	11
		CONF KIA	8
2-5	Precipitation	(New Chart - No Update)	
2-6a	Rockets, Mortar Rounds, Lob Bombs	(New Chart - No Update)	



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<u>TAB</u>	<u>TITLE (Short)</u>	<u>DATA HEADING</u>	<u>JAN 1971</u>
2-6b	Enemy Sighted	EN SIG	1394
		EN ORDN	47
		EN KIA	211
3-1a	USMC KIA	KIA	15
		% CMD	.12
3-1b	USMC WIA	WIA	136
		% CMD	1.08
3-2a	Mine/Booby Trap Casualties	KIA	4
		WIA	68
		TOTAL	72
		CAS/DET	1.9
		% CMD	.57
3-2b	M/BT Casualties as Pct of Total Cas	TOT CAS	151
		M/BT CAS	72
		% M/BT	4.76
3-2c	Ratio Found to Detonated	(New Chart - No Update)	
3-3a	Enemy Killed in Action	EN KIA	211
3-3b	(1) Enemy Individual Weapons Captured	EN IWC	80
	(2) Enemy Crew-Served Weapons Captured	EN CSWC	6
3-4a	Hamlet Population Under CUPP Influence	INFLUENCE	31342
		SCTY INCR	0
		CUM INCR	0
		GR TOT INCR	15492
3-4b	CUPP Units Established	CUPP ESTB	-1
		TOT CUPPS	21
		% COVRG	-
		CUM %	-
3-4c	CUPP Casualties vs Enemy Losses to CUPP	CUPP KIA	0
		<del>CUPP KIA</del>	25
		TOTAL CUPP	25
		EN KIA	63
		PW/HOI CH	12
		TOTAL EN	75
3-5a	Arty Ammo Expended vs Enemy Sighted	ENEMY	1394
		AMMO EXP	35.4

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<u>TAB</u>	<u>TITLE (Short)</u>	<u>DATA HEADING</u>	<u>JAN 1971</u>
3-5b	Arty Pieces Available vs Ammo Expended	AMMO	35.4
		PCS 4.2"	12
		105	36
		155	20
		8"/175	6/ 0
		TOTAL	74
3-5c	NGF Ship-Days vs Rounds Expended	RDS EXP	295
		SHIP-DAYS	3
3-5d	Fixed Wing Sorties	1971	379
3-6a	Helicopter Flight Time	HOURS	5431
3-6b	Helicopter Passengers	PAX	37537
3-6c	Helicopter Cargo	<del>TONS</del> HOURS	2259
4-1	Unit FORSTAT Ratings	(See Note 1)	
4-2	Combat Essential Equipment	(New Chart - No Update)	
4-2a	Combat Essential Equipment (Comm-Elect)	-do-	
4-2b	Combat Essential Equipment (Motor Trans)	-do-	
4-2c	Combat Essential Equipment (Ordnance)	-do-	
4-2d	Combat Essential Equipment (Engineer)	-do-	
4-3	Intersvc Xfer of Equip to RVNAF	(Same Chart - No Update)	
4-4a	Malaria Incidence	CASES	32
		RATE/1000	2.4
4-4b	(1) Venereal Disease Incidence	SYPHILIS	0
		GONORRHEA	196
		CHANCROID	6
		L.G.VENERUM	1
		L.G.INGUIN	0
		TOTAL	203
	(2) V D Incidence & Case Rate	CASES	203
		RATE/1000	15.1
5-1	Cost of Civic Action	MILL.\$VN	1.66

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<u>TAB</u>	<u>TITLE (Short)</u>	<u>DATA HEADING</u>	<u>JAN 1971</u>
5-2	Vietnamese Participation	(New Chart - No Data)	
5-3	MEDCAP/DENTCAP	PATIENTS	8306

Note 1: On Chart for Tab 4-1 (Unit FORSTAT Ratings) Change:

HQ BN (REIN) from C-1 to C-2 in Equip Readiness  
 1ST ENGR BN (REIN) from C-2 to C-1 in Equip Readiness  
 1ST MED BN from C-1 to C-2 in Equip Readiness

Note 2: All charts carried over from 1970 must have "/1971" added to the title and a legend entry or entries for 1971 added.

Note 3: For Tab 1-6b there are three charts. Two of them (1969 and 1971) are new to this update. The third (1970) remains the same.

Note 4: For Tab 4-3, both the chart and the narrative remain the same.

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INTRODUCTION

Two over-riding factors influenced the bulk of 1st Marine Division activity during February 1971 -- the continuing Division effort toward defeat of the enemy (and the enemy's counter-effort to thwart the attainment of our objectives and begin his planned Spring campaign), and preparation for Increment VI redeployment. The enemy's activities were marked by a significant increase in standoff attacks by fire on friendly positions and his continued emphasis on the use of surprise firing devices, while the Division, through the continuation of Operations Imperial Valley and Upshur Stream and extensive repositioning of forces, exerted uninterrupted pressure on the enemy, despite the standdown of one infantry battalion and three firing batteries.

Although estimated enemy strength in Quang Nam Province continued to decline (from 8,325 in January to 7,710 in February 1971), and he was observed less often in the Division Area of Operations (enemy sightings falling from 1,394 to 1,146), he more than doubled his expenditure of ammunition in standoff attacks by fire during the month. The enemy increased his expenditure of mortar rounds from 46 in January to 69 in February (up 50%), the volume of his rockets fired from zero to 21 (and, incidentally, surpassing by 50% his total output for the previous three months), and his use of crude lob bombs from zero to four (February's four rounds exceeding the enemy's total expenditure of this makeshift weapon for the preceding four months). That the enemy was physically less in evidence may be fairly well established by noting that the number of enemy soldiers killed fell by 34% (from 211 in January to 139) and the number of his weapons captured dropped similarly (from 80 individual and 6 crew-served to 50 and 2, respectively). However, the decline in enemy sightings may not be a good indication of enemy activity during February, because a combination of factors tended to reduce the surveillance capacity of the Division. The Division AO was somewhat smaller during the month because of temporary AO extensions granted adjacent units, and the Division's means of observation decreased with the retrograding of the Integrated Observation Device from OP Roundup and the ship's binoculars from FSB Ryder and the standdown of the units mentioned above.

In addition to the continuation of the operations previously mentioned and extensive patrol, ambush and reconnaissance activity, supporting efforts kept pace with Division activities, although most indicators recorded small decreases. Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units, after having engaged in two consecutive months of heavy contact, experienced a certain tapering-off in combat action. However, while members of CUPPs suffered less than 12% of the Division's casualties during February (one killed, fifteen wounded), they accounted for almost 27% of the enemy's deaths (37 enemy KIA of a total of 139). All but one of the indicators in the area of supporting arms and helicopter support fell during the month, the single exception being fixed wing aircraft support to the Division (up from 379 sorties in January to 413), but almost a third of the sorties flown were provided by non-1st Marine Aircraft Wing sources.

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Just as enemy losses decreased during February, so did Division casualties, although at a less rapid rate. This phenomenon may be attributed to the detonation of 33 booby traps which claimed 63 casualties, 46% of the Division total. Friendly casualties would have been noticeably lower but for the ill fortune of one company which suffered 24 men wounded in a three-day period because of the detonation of 11 surprise firing devices. The company was operating in the northern Arizona, a densely booby-trapped portion of the Division AO. The 33 detonations combined with a sizable drop in finds (from 116 in January to 74) and served to depress the find to detonation ratio to 2.24:1 (the lowest ratio since August 1970).

Non-battle casualties remained at the low level experienced in January (indeed, both the frequency of incidents [down from 33 to 31] and the casualties resulting [down from 30 to 24] decreased from January to February, but falling Division population rendered the rates virtually equal), but the vagaries of fate were such that the 24 casualties included ~~four~~ deaths, this figure exceeding the total number of non-hostile fatalities during the preceding two months. The Division continues to emphasize the reduction of non-hostile casualties, and the present low level should be, at worst, maintained, if not bettered.

The effects of redeployment were most noticeable in the area of personnel management, law and discipline during February 1971. The standdown of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and Batteries D, F and K, 11th Marines contributed to a significant decrease in Division strength from 12,623 at the end of January to 10,440 at the end of February, and general anticipation of redeployment may have tended to lower the volume of Congressional and special interest correspondence received (down sharply from 57 pieces to 38). The 1st term reenlistment rate remained below 10% during February, while the early submission of recommendations for meritorious awards pushed the number of citations processed close to 600. Although violence has seemingly subsided, as evidenced by a number of indicators (e.g., the Division Military Police section processed only two major offenses involving violence during February), both the number of trials for violent crimes and the corresponding trial rate continued to increase, as the Staff Judge Advocate section labored to reduce its case backlog prior to redeployment.

The logistics picture within the Division remains bright, as the Division maintained its FORSTAT combat readiness rating of C-1 in both equipment readiness and supplies/equipment on hand. In addition, all categories of combat essential end-items of equipment continued to achieve operationally ready percentages well in excess of Marine Corps standards. However, the performance of numerous limited technical inspections (LTI) during the past month revealed that many items (especially in the motor transport commodity group), although fit for operations in the Republic of Vietnam, are unsuitable for retrograde due to age or condition. The Department of Defense sponsored program to transfer equipment to the Vietnamese armed forces commenced again during February, and the efforts of all concerned resulted in 100% acceptance of the 243 items offered thus far.

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The turbulence predicted in previous editions of this document is now being experienced. In addition to the units previously mentioned, a number of others have commenced standdown in early March, including the headquarters of both 5th and 11th Marines, the remaining batteries of 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Engineer Battalion (-), 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-), 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-), Detachment, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company and Battery L, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines. The inevitable personnel and unit realignment concomitant with operations of this nature will continue in March as the remainder of the units involved in Phase VI of redeployment standdown. However, actual combat action thus far in March has been relatively light. For example, in the first fourteen days of the month, the Division has suffered only 37 casualties and has expended just over 5,000 rounds of artillery ammunition. If this trend continues, March may provide record low frequencies for most, if not all of the indicators considered in this book. However, redeployment notwithstanding, the 1st Marine Division will continue to carry the battle to the enemy.

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G-1 OVERVIEW

Personnel management, in February 1971 as well as in months past, has kept pace with the force structure reductions of the past 14 months, evidenced by the fact that the Command has been continuously in combat readiness category C-1. In other administrative areas involving such subjects as morale, discipline and personnel services, appropriate norms of effectiveness have been rather well maintained. Abstracts of these norms, as well as over and under achievements, are presented below:

- a. The end-of-February strength of the Division was 10,440, a decrease of 2,183 from January 1971 and 468 less than the RVN ceiling. The strength, which peaked at over 31,000 in November 1969 and dropped sharply during Phases III and IV of redeployment (in 1970), will continue to fall during Phase VI (See Tabs 1-1 and 1-1-1).
- b. The February 1971 1st term reenlistment rate of 10% was a significant drop from December's 31% and the 1970 annual rate of 40%. Factors which may have affected the rate are the emphasis on reenlisting only Marines of the highest calibre, redeployments, and the subsequent reduction in overall Division strength. (See Tab 1-2).
- c. Congressional and special interest correspondence received during February 1971 totalled 38 pieces (registering 53 complaints) compared to January's 57 (registering 71 complaints), representing 3.6 pieces per 1,000 personnel for February compared to 4.5 in January and 1970's annual average of 5.3. Both the number of pieces received and the rate continue on a downward trend, February's figures being the lowest yet recorded in either category (See Tab 1-3).
- d. During February 1971, Purple Heart Medals were awarded at the rate of 12.6 per thousand compared to January's 10.0 per thousand and the 1970 average of 14.4 per thousand per month. February's rate was significantly higher than the average rate for the previous four months (9.8/1,000) and reflected the increase in the enemy's post-Tet activities. Recommendations for heroic/meritorious/meritorious end of tour awards increased dramatically from the 33.1 per thousand in January to 56.0 per thousand in February 1971. The sharp increase may be attributed to the early submission of recommendations for deserving enlisted personnel of redeploying units and is a repeat of the pattern experienced prior to the end of the two periods of redeployment in 1970. Additionally, the increase in combat activity during the month fueled a rise in the submission of citations for heroism (See Tab 1-4).
- e. The rate of trials for crimes of violence involving Division personnel (1.4/1,000) in February virtually equalled January's rate (1.5/1,000) and was a continuation of the trend toward higher rates established in late 1970. The primary causes for the rate increase are improved effectiveness in the investigation of such crimes and expedition of the case load involving personnel redeploying with Keystone Robin (Charlie) units (See Tab 1-5a).

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f. Although the 33 unauthorized absences reported in February do not represent the highest monthly total since the initiation of this report in July 1969, the corresponding absence rate of 3.1 per thousand is the highest on record. This rate has been increasing at an accelerating rate for the past four months and should reach 3.5/1,000 (and possibly 4.0/1,000) in March 1971 (See Tab 1-5b).

g. The number of Division Marines in confinement in February 1971 declined from January's 49 to February's 46. Computation of confinement rates, however, reveal that February's 4.4 prisoners per thousand personnel was a slight increase over January's 3.9 per thousand and virtually equalled 1970's annual average of 4.5 per thousand. Therefore, the rate in the immediate future should remain in the range 4.0 - 5.0 per thousand (See Tab 1-5c).

h. During February 1971, fourteen punitive discharges were awarded, well above the eight awarded in each of January and December, causing the rate to more than double that of the two previous months. The reason for this increase was the greater number of general and special courts-martial conducted in February than in the previous two months. March's rate should remain in the range 1.0 - 1.5 per thousand (See Tab 1-5d).

i. February 1971 saw the processing of 25 administrative discharges, down from 48 in January and 41 in December. The decrease is due to the fact that virtually all the recommendations for such discharges initiated during the latter part of 1970 were completed processing in January. Because the weeding-out process pursued during 1970 has been virtually completed, a distinct downturn in the rate of such discharges can be anticipated (See Tab 1-5e).

j. The number of judicial and investigatory actions concerning drug abuse increased only slightly during February 1971 (from 46 in January to 48), while the processing of administrative discharges decreased by 60% (from 30 to 12). The number of all such actions has fluctuated somewhat in the past, but should begin to decrease rather steadily as redeployments continue (See Tab 1-6f).

k. There were no reported racial incidents during February 1971, a fact reinforcing the trend established during the last half of 1970 and reflecting favorably on the racial climate in the 1st Marine Division. Because of intense command interest, the present low rate of such incidents should continue in the future (See Tab 1-5g).

l. Although one incident of felonious "fragging" occurred during February 1971 (the detonation of a CS grenade), February was the third consecutive month during which no casualties resulted. Both the number of incidents and the number of casualties appear to be maintained on a very low level which should continue in the future (See Tab 1-5g).

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m. Two of the three categories of offenses committed by Division personnel and processed by the Division Military Police Section showed sizable decreases from January to February 1971, while the third showed a definite increase. Major (felonious) offenses fell from 35 to 26 and vehicle/traffic offenses from 122 to 43, while miscellaneous offenses rose from 75 to 105. Violent crimes continued at the low level experienced in January, marijuana violations and larceny decreased 50%, but "hard" narcotics violations rose from 2 to 7. Speeding citations fell by two-thirds, accounting for most of the drop in vehicle/traffic offenses, while increases in off limits violations and drunk/disorderly citations accounted for the bulk of increase in miscellaneous offenses (See Tabs 1-5i, 1-5j and 1-5k).

n. Ground safety is the general category embracing not only the subject of battle versus non-battle casualties, but also treating individually incidents involving friendly supporting arms, individual weapons (outside a cantonment), accidental discharges, explosive ordnance, motor vehicle accidents and operational/occupational incidents.

(1) The battle casualty rate increased, in February 1971, to the highest level since September 1969 (459 casualties per million man-days). The non-battle rate, on the other hand, while increasing slightly over the record low recorded in January (82 versus 77), remained at less than half the average for the last three months of 1970 and approximately a third the average rate for any period prior to that (See Tab 1-6a).

(2) An analysis of the major categories of non-battle casualties reveal the following changes (See Tabs 1-6b through 1-6h):

<u>TYPE INCIDENT</u>	<u>71 RATE</u>	<u>70 RATE</u>	<u>%CHANGE</u>	<u>69 RATE</u>	<u>%CHANGE</u>
Friendly Fire	0.2	1.2	-83%	1.4	-86%
Accid Discharge	0.6	0.5	+20%	0.8	-25%
Explosive Ord	0.3	0.9	-67%	1.0	-70%
Motor Vehicle	0.3	0.4	-25%	0.4	-25%
Operatnl/Occupatnl	1.0	4.1	-76%	3.5	-71%

Rates above per 1,000 personnel.

o. Participation in the Savings Bond Program during February 1971 increased slightly over that experienced in January (66.3% of Division strength versus 64.1%), but participation in the Savings Deposit Program declined significantly (4.1% in February versus 5.0% in January). (See Tab 1-7).

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DIVISION STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Division strength at the end of February 1971 stood at 10,440, reflecting initial reductions in personnel for Increment VI redeployments. The February strength was a decrease of 2,183 from January's figure and was 468 less than the RVN ceiling. The force structure of the Division also experienced an alteration during the month, the number of infantry battalions falling from six to five with the standdown of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, and firing batteries from eleven to eight.

During most of 1969, Division strength was stabilized at the 24,000 level. In October of that year, a strength increase of 6,000 was occasioned by the joining of the 26th Marines and 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. The Division continued to gain in personnel strength until 17 November 1969, when it reached the apex of its growth in the Republic of Vietnam, on which date the strength stood at 31,283.

The next major strength change, driven by the force reduction, was characterized by a sharp and steady decline beginning in December 1969 and continuing through 1970. The result to date is that the Division onboard strength figure has been reduced by nearly 20,000 in the last fifteen months.

The Division Force structure, after rising to twelve infantry battalions and five artillery battalions (with support and reinforcing units) during late 1969 and early 1970, fell throughout 1970 because of two major redeployments (Increments III and IV). In steps, the number of infantry battalions in the Division dropped to nine in the Spring, six in the Fall, and presently stands at five, while the number of firing batteries fell to nineteen and eleven (from 24) and now stands at eight. Supporting units have been reduced accordingly.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), DIVISION STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 STRENGTH

1970 STRENGTH

1971 STRENGTH



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
MAN LVL	23207	23207	23344	22596	22596	22582	22522	21736	21684	27732	27833	27833	
ON ROLLS	23948	24224	24263	23899	23694	23469	23440	22734	24285	30306	30899	29476	
INF BNS	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	12	12	12	
BATTERIES	27	25	24	22	22	22	22	22	22	24	24	24	
1970													
MAN LVL	27868	27868	27868	22018	22018	22018	22018	22018	22018	12511	12511	12511	
ON ROLLS	27490	26672	23405	21808	21805	20998	21442	19744	16400	12425	12530	12571	
INF BNS	12	12	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	6	6	6	
BATTERIES	24	24	19	19	19	19	19	17	11	11	11	11	
1971													
MAN LVL	12511	12511											
ON ROLLS	12623	10440											
INF BNS	6	5											
BATTERIES	11	8											

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DIVISION STRENGTH VS EFFECTIVE MANNING LEVEL, INCREMENT VI C

On 28 February 1971, the strength of the Division stood at 10,440, placing this figure twenty below the effective manning level for that date. Effective manning level is determined by using as a basis the assigned Division manning level for 31 December 1970 and reducing that manning level by the strength of each unit as it stands down.

Below is a list of standdown dates, space reductions and units standing down during Phase VI redeployments:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SPACES</u>	<u>UNITS</u>
15 Feb	1,525	3d Bn, 5th Mar Btry D, 2d Bn, 11th Mar Btry F, 2d Bn, 11th Mar Btry K, 4th Bn, 11th Mar
28 Feb	529	1st Engr Bn (-)
3 Mar	1,941	Hq Co, 5th Mar Hq Co, 11th Mar 2d Bn, 5th Mar Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar Btry E, 2d Bn, 11th Mar Mortar Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar Btry L, 4th Bn, 11th Mar
6 Mar	129	1st MTBn (-)
14 Mar	232	1st Recon Bn (-) Det, 1st For Recon Co
24 Mar	2,501	Hq Bn (-) 1st Bn, 5th Mar 11th MT Bn 1st Med Bn (-) 2d Spec Scty Comm Tm 7th Interp Tm 13th Interr-Transl Tm

The 11th Motor Transport Battalion will be deactivated upon return to CONUS.

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


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1ST MARINE DIVISION, DIVISION STRENGTH VS EFFECTIVE MANNING LEVEL  
INCREMENT VI C

DIVISION STRENGTH ————— EFFECTIVE MANNING LEVEL - - - - -



EFFECTIVE MANNING LEVEL

DATE	31Dec	15Feb	28Feb	3 Mar	6 Mar	14Mar	24Mar
MAN LVL	12.511	10.989	10.460	8.519	8.382	8.150	5.549

DIVISION STRENGTH

DATE	31Dec	2 Jan	9 Jan	16Jan	23Jan	30Jan	31Jan
STRENGTH	12.571	12.450	12.345	12.643	12.504	12.658	12.623

DATE	6 Feb	13Feb	20Feb	27Feb	28Feb	6 Mar	13Mar
STRENGTH	12.495	12.086	11.360	10.451	10.440		

DATE	20Mar	27Mar	31Mar	3 Apr	10Apr	15Apr	
STRENGTH							

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FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT RATE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971


The first term reenlistment rate for February was 9.8%. This compares with an 8.8% rate for the month of January. The realignment of personnel throughout the Division resulted in 50% of the previously assigned Career Planning NCO's being reassigned. The redeployment of forces is apparently creating an unusual decline in the reenlistment rate.

The factors below were stated as reasons for personnel not reenlisting in the United States Marine Corps:

- Civilian pursuits - - 32%
- Desire for further education - - 28%
- Discontent with the military - - 26%
- Insufficient pay - - 12%
- Family considerations - - 2%

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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) 1ST TERM REENLISTMENT RATES, CALENDAR YEARS**

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
ELIG/REC	188	132	137	107	125	159	176	167	183	65	63	56	1,558
REENLIST	63	63	60	53	56	98	116	109	131	27	36	32	844
% REENL	35.0	47.7	43.8	49.5	44.8	61.6	65.9	65.2	71.6	41.5	57.1	57.1	54.1
1970													
ELIG/REC	45	65	88	57	89	86	97	83	48	36	34	32	760
REENLIST	24	30	29	41	48	26	32	18	19	10	14	10	301
% REENL	53.3	46.1	33.0	72.0	55.0	30.2	33.0	21.7	39.7	27.8	41.1	31.3	39.6
1971													
ELIG/REC	68	92											(160)
REENLIST	6	9											(15)
% REENL	8.8	9.8											(9.4)

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CONGRESSIONAL/SPECIAL INTEREST CORRESPONDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Congressional/Special interest correspondence received during February 1971 totalled 38 pieces, converting to a rate of 3.6 pieces per 1,000 personnel. Both the number of pieces and the rate continue a downward trend established during the last quarter of 1970. During the month a total of 38 inquiries were received registering 53 complaints. By comparison, in January 1971, 57 inquiries were received registering 76 complaints. The February complaints are categorized as follows:

Welfare Reports	6
Confinement/Discipline	8
Medical	5
Hardship/Humanitarian Transfers	6
Rotation Tour Dates	6
Basic Allowance for Quarters/Separation of Dependents	2
MOS Changes/Reassignments	3
Marriage to Alien	2
Unit Policies	2
Administrative Discharges	2
Harassment/Maltreatment	2
Miscellaneous	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	53

The reduction of Congressional interest correspondence is predicted to continue in the forthcoming months in view of reduced operational activity and preparation for redeployment.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CONGRESSIONAL/SPECIAL INTEREST

CORRESPONDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 PIECES

1970 PIECES

1971 PIECES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 PCS	82	90	123	111	138	110	103	120	91	130	145	124	1,367
% CMD	.34	.37	.51	.46	.58	.47	.44	.53	.37	.43	.47	.42	.45
1970 PCS	136	143	136	122	108	92	98	99	80	84	74	71	1,243
% CMD	.49	.54	.59	.56	.50	.44	.46	.50	.48	.68	.59	.57	.53
1971 PCS	57	38											(.95)
% CMD	.45	.36											(.41)

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DECORATIONS AND PURPLE HEART MEDALS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The number of decorations, excluding Purple Heart Medals, processed by the Division Awards Board during February 1971 totaled 585, an increase of 167 over January's total. This increase of nearly 40% can be attributed almost entirely to the upcoming redeployment. During the final two weeks in February, Increment VI units began to enter their standdown period. This period coincides roughly with the 30-day early submission program period. Under this program, deploying units may submit end of tour awards for deserving persons with at least five months service in RVN (at the time of the unit's float date) who are being reassigned as a result of the deployment. The effect of the increase is reflected in the following rates:

## AWARDS PER 1,000 PERSONNEL

December 1970	January 1971	February 1971
20.2	33.1	56.0

The statistic above can be expected to rise considerably during March inasmuch as only two weeks of February could legitimately be considered "deployment" weeks.

One hundred thirty-two Purple Heart Medals were awarded during February 1971, a slight increase from the 127 during January 1971. Statistically, this increase is reflected as follows:

## PURPLE HEART MEDALS PER 1,000 PERSONNEL

December 1970	January 1971	February 1971
10.0	10.0	12.6

This increase may be the last the Division experiences. With the deployment of an entire regiment, combat activities should be severely curtailed. The number of American awards, however, should increase greatly once again, as more units become eligible for the 30-day early submission program. An average of 800 to 900 award recommendations per month can be expected.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) RATIO OF U. S. DECORATIONS (HEROIC AND MERITORIOUS)

PROCESSED TO PURPLE HEART MEDALS AWARDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 RATIO

1970 RATIO

1970 RATIO



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
59 PHM	693	644	1209	819	1197	921	486	1150	866	406	413	381	9,165
% CMD	2.89	2.66	4.98	3.43	5.05	3.92	2.08	4.97	3.56	1.34	1.34	1.29	3.13
OTHER	924	672	1200	1057	965	995	905	941	927	766	647	596	10,593
% CMD	3.86	2.78	4.94	4.43	4.07	4.24	3.85	4.15	3.82	2.53	2.09	2.02	3.56
RATIO	1.33	1.04	.99	1.29	.81	1.08	1.85	.83	1.07	1.89	1.56	1.57	1.15
70 PHM	444	454	428	410	388	348	272	279	197	134	102	126	3,582
% CMD	1.62	1.70	1.83	1.88	1.78	1.66	1.27	1.41	1.20	1.11	.80	1.00	1.44
OTHER	344	624	809	403	462	678	782	916	810	701	363	352	7,244
% CMD	1.25	2.34	3.46	1.85	2.12	3.23	3.65	4.64	4.94	5.90	2.90	2.74	3.25
RATIO	.77	1.38	1.89	.98	1.19	1.95	2.88	3.29	4.11	5.13	3.56	2.80	2.02
71 PHM	127	132											(259)
%Cmd	1.00	1.26											(1.13)
OTHER	418	585											(1003)
%CMD	3.31	5.60											(5.60)
RATIO	3.29	4.43											(4.43)

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LAW AND DISCIPLINE

The beginning of calendar year 1971 has shown a marked increase in judicial and disciplinary proceedings. For example, trials for crimes of violence increased from December 1970 rate of 1.0 per 1,000 personnel to January and February 1971 rates of 1.5 per 1,000 and 1.4 per 1,000, respectively. The rise in courts-martial relating to crimes of violence does not necessarily mean that such crimes have increased in number, but rather that they are being investigated and prosecuted with more thoroughness.

An adjunct to violent crimes was the slight increase in the brig population for February of 4.4 per 1,000 as compared to the January 1971 rate of 3.9 per 1,000, although the absolute population decreased from 49 to 46. The policy of transferring prisoners sentenced to more than 60 days confinement to Camp Pendleton, will continue to substantially reduce the confinee strength during future months.

The increase in punitive discharges from the January 1971 rate of .06 per 1,000 to the February 1971 rate of 1.3 per 1,000 is attributed to the greater number of general and special courts-martial tried during February.

All rates should substantially remain the same for March due to the expected case load involving personnel redeploying with Keystone Robin (Charlie) Increment VI.

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TRIALS INVOLVING CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The ratio of crimes of violence to Division strength remained substantially at the same rate of that for January 1971 at 1.4 per 1,000. One factor contributing to the greater trial rate for January and February is the increased effectiveness in the investigation of such crimes, in addition to expedition of the case load involving personnel redeploying with Keystone Robin (Charlie) Increment VI.

A consistent ratio between crimes of violence and total strength of the Division is not demonstrable. This is because the number of trials in any given month is no indication of the amount of violence in the Division. There are occasions where a serious crime takes a considerable length of time to investigate. The case finally comes to trial two to three months and sometimes longer after the incident occurred. Thus the total for the month may balloon to what appears to be an abnormally high total.

A review of the trend for January and February 1971 makes it appear that 0.10 - 0.15 percent of Division strength will be a useful predictive constant factor for March.

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
## 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS COMMAND TRIED FOR

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 PERCENTAGE

1970 PERCENTAGE

1971 PERCENTAGE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TRIALS	15	11	14	9	15	15	19	7	6	16	19	23	169
% CMD	.07	.05	.06	.04	.07	.07	.09	.03	.03	.06	.07	.08	.06
1970													
TRIALS	29	20	16	19	18	25	9	15	10	7	11	13	192
% CMD	.11	.08	.07	.09	.09	.13	.04	.08	.06	.06	.09	.10	.08
1971													
TRIALS	19	15											(34)
%	.15	.14											(.15)

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE INCLUDE MURDER, RAPE, ASSAULT AND ARMED ROBBERY. 28 FEB 71

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UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORT, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The 33 unauthorized absences in February 1971 was an increase of five over the 28 recorded in January and, because Division strength fell from January to February, the rate of such absences increased even more rapidly (from 2.2 absences per 1,000 personnel in January to 3.1 per 1,000 in February). February was the sixth consecutive month during which the number of absences per 1,000 personnel has either increased or remained the same as the preceding month. Thus September 1970 showed an increase of 0.1/1,000 over August (0.9 to 1.0), October registered the same rate as September (1.0/1,000), and then November, December, January 1971 and February showed successive increases of 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively. If this continuing increase in the absence rate holds true, a rate of approximately 3.5 absences per 1,000 personnel may be expected in March 1971.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORT, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970/1971

1969 ABSENCES

1970 ABSENCES

1971 ABSENCES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
ABSENCES							27	19	28	40	31	35	180
% CMD							.12	.09	.12	.14	.11	.12	.12
1970													
ABSENCES	23	17	36	12	17	42	24	17	17	12	16	21	254
% CMD	.09	.07	.16	.06	.08	.20	.11	.09	.10	.10	.13	.17	.11
1971													
ABSENCES	28	33											(61)
% CMD	.22	.31											(.26)

\* TOTAL SHOWN IS FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1969.

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CONFINED MARINES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The graph reflects a confined ratio for the month of February 1971 of 4.4 prisoners per 1,000 personnel, which is a slight increase from the January 1971 figure of 3.9 per 1,000. The cause for the slight increase is due to the number of general and special courts-martial tried during the month of February 1971.

Persons suspected of crimes of violence are, in most cases, placed in pretrial confinement since they are considered to present a threat to personnel. Also, convicted offenders of crimes of violence, for the most part, receive confinement as part of their sentence and seldom have the confinement portion of the sentence suspended by the convening authority.

The application of a liberal administrative separation policy, by ridding the Division of potential offenders, is alleviating the brig population problem, although it is impossible to establish a direct correlation.

The continuing effort to decrease the total number of Division personnel confined at the United States Army Vietnam Installation Stockade (USARVIS), is an established policy, and as a direct result is the implementation of the policy whereby Marines receiving more than 60 days confinement at hard labor are transferred to the Correctional Center, Camp Pendleton upon sentencing or as soon after trial as possible. The number of confinees should steadily decrease with the decrease in Division strength.


A review of the trend for January and February 1971 makes it appear that 0.40 - 0.45 percent of Division strength will be a useful predictive constant for March.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CONFINED MARINES (PERCENTAGE OF DIVISION STRENGTH). CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 PERCENTAGE 1970 PERCENTAGE 1971 PERCENTAGE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
PRETRIAL	29	22	18	21	29	19	18	16	19	24	21	33	
POSTTRIAL	29	26	24	30	28	31	44	29	37	44	44	78	
TOTAL	58	48	42	51	57	50	62	45	56	68	65	109	
% CMD	.26	.21	.18	.16	.23	.25	.22	.28	.31	.23	.24	.39	.24
1970													
PRETRIAL	44	42	48	47	44	55	48	38	33	21	39	42	
POSTTRIAL	69	58	59	58	74	71	73	40	24	21	14	18	
TOTAL	113	100	107	105	118	126	121	78	57	42	53	60	
% CMD	.41	.38	.46	.48	.54	.60	.56	.40	.35	.34	.42	.48	.45
1971													
PRETRIAL	27	24											
POSTTRIAL	22	22											
TOTAL	49	46											
% CMD	.39	.44											(.41)

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BAD CONDUCT AND DISHONORABLE DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The number of punitive discharges for the month of February 1971 of 1.3/1,000 is a noticeable increase over the January 1971 figure of 0.6/1,000. The increase for the month of February is attributed to the greater number of general and special courts-martial held during February.

A review of the trend for January and February 1971 makes it appear that 0.1 percent of Division strength (one discharge/1,000 personnel) will be a useful predictive constant factor for March and is due to the expected case load involving personnel redeploying with Keystone Robin (Charlie) Increment VI.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), BAD CONDUCT AND DISCHARGEABLE DISCHARGES.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 DISCHARGES

1970 DISCHARGES

1971 DISCHARGES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
BCD/DD	15	14	16	16	11	12	13	16	13	11	16	18	171
% CMD	.07	.06	.07	.07	.05	.05	.06	.07	.06	.04	.05	.06	.06
1970													
BCD/DD	16	10	19	14	16	10	12	10	8	5	3	8	131
% CMD	.06	.04	.09	.07	.08	.05	.05	.05	.05	.04	.02	.06	.06
1971													
BCD/DD	8	14											( 22)
% CMD	.06	.13											(.10)

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ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEAR 1971

During February 1971, there were 25 administrative separations within the Command compared to 48 in January. This represents a rate of 2.4/1,000 for February, which is a decrease of 35% from January. One reason for this decrease is because the weeding - out process of undesirables was virtually completed in January. Of the 25 administrative discharges approved in February, 22 were at the individual's request to preclude trial by court-martial. Any new cases received for substandard performance would presumably be related to newly joined Marines with old disciplinary histories from previous Commands or incidents of recent origin. Therefore it is expected that a slight downward trend will continue in the forthcoming months.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES PROCESSED

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 DISCHARGES

1970 DISCHARGES

1971 DISCHARGES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
C of G	—	—	NONE PROCESSED DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1969										0
UD	4	8	6	7	6	1	7	9	15	15	8	4	90
UNSUIT	4	1	5	1	1	4	5	3	2	1	1	3	31
TOTAL	8	9	11	8	7	5	12	12	17	16	9	7	121
% CMD	.03	.04	.04	.03	.03	.02	.05	.05	.07	.05	.03	.02	.04
1970													
C of G	1	9	28	32	65	63	69	32	23	22	9	19	372
UD	12	10	37	18	35	41	57	28	24	28	31	20	341
UNSUIT	5	6	13	11	20	11	14	4	4	4	2	2	96
TOTAL	18	25	78	61	120	115	140	64	51	54	42	41	809
% CMD	.06	.09	.33	.28	.55	.55	.65	.32	.21	.42	.22	.33	.35
1971													
C of G	4	0											(4)
UD	43	22											(65)
UNSUIT	1	3											(4)
TOTAL	48	25											(73)
% CMD	.37	.24											(32)

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ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTION RELATING TO DRUG ABUSE, CALENDAR YEARS  
1969/1970/1971

Administrative and judicial actions relating to drug abuse decreased during February 1971 in absolute numbers, but the rate per 1,000 increased. The 4.6 per 1,000 investigatory and judicial actions taken during February 1971 represents an increase of 28% from the 3.6 per 1,000 similar actions taken the previous month. The 1.1 per 1,000 administrative discharges for February 1971 was a decrease of 54% from the 2.4 per 1,000 administrative discharges for January 1971.

The overall decrease in the number of courts-martial, despite the growing number of cases, is due to the significant increase in the use of administrative discharges for processing drug offenses. During 1970, there were more than 16 times as many administrative discharges as there were in 1969 (211 vs 13).

Several new programs and instructional techniques were started during January 1971:

- a. A revised drug abuse lecture by a new lecturer was prepared. The group size of lectures will be limited to 25 persons.
- b. A Drug Information Workshop Training Period is scheduled for 11 March 1971, for all available medical officers and chaplains. The purpose is to train those in attendance to conduct workshops in their respective units.
- c. A Drug Information Contact Team conducts seminars for groups of ten junior officers or Staff NCO's throughout the Division TAOR. A seminar is scheduled for SNCO's on 16 March and for junior officers on 18 March.
- d. A Unit Drug Information Library has been established at units down to company/battery level. The purpose of these libraries is to make available factual source documents as reference material.
- e. The Platoon Leaders' Pamphlet "Drug Problem" has been prepared and is being distributed to every junior officer and SNCO in-country. Incoming personnel of those ranks will also receive a copy when reporting aboard.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTIONS CONCERNING

DRUG ABUSE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 ACTIONS

1970 ACTIONS

1971 ACTIONS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
NJP	2	7	4	2	8	3	1	1	0	3	8	4	43
INVESTIG	20	6	4	17	16	35	12	8	9	25	26	26	204
COURTS	14	8	11	12	9	17	15	11	5	15	19	21	157
ADMIN DIS	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	0	1	1	2	13
TOTAL	36	21	19	32	34	57	30	23	14	44	54	53	417
1970													
NJP	2	7	3	3	1	5	4	6	11	3	2	5	52
INVESTIG	31	26	33	38	44	32	26	45	42	34	40	35	426
COURTS	21	13	12	18	12	18	11	7	18	6	5	1	142
ADMIN DIS	10	4	20	16	23	23	36	18	20	10	19	12	211
TOTAL	64	50	68	75	80	78	77	76	91	53	66	53	831
1971													
NJP	8	11											(19)
INVESTIG	36	34											(70)
COURTS	2	3											(5)
ADMIN DIS	30	12											(42)
TOTAL	76	60											(136)

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RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

A racial incident is a disagreement, disobedience and/or act of violence perpetrated between individuals or groups with ethnic difference as a cause.

There were no reported incidents within the Division during the first two months of 1971. August 1970 is the only other month in the past 14 months in which there were no incidents. It is significant to note that during the comparable period (January and February) of 1970 there were 13 reported incidents.

The impending standdown of certain Division units will present increased opportunity for individuals to attempt to influence others, or to be influenced concerning real or imagined racial issues.

The apparent continued success of the Division in preventing such occurrences can, in large measure, be attributed to the intensive interest on all levels of command.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1970/1971

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 1970/1971

INCIDENCE \_\_\_\_\_  
INCIDENCE \_\_\_\_\_

1970

### CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE

INCIDENCE — — — —

1971

### CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE

[illegible]

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FRAGGING INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

During February 1971, one incident of felonious "fragging" occurred. The device used was a CS grenade and there were no casualties. To date the case has not been solved. February was the third consecutive month during which no casualties were recorded.

A fragging is defined as a deliberate, covert assault, by throwing or setting off a grenade or other explosive device, or the preparation and emplacement of such a device as a booby trap, with the intention of harming or intimidating another. During 1970, such incidents occurred at a rate of 3.9 per month with a relatively wide variation (assuming a normal distribution, a standard deviation of 1.6 obtained). Similarly, casualties from fragging incidents occurred at a rate of 3.2 per month with an even wider variation (a standard deviation of 2.6). In absolute terms, the number of incidents per month ranged from two in July and December to seven in February 1970, and casualties from none in December to eight in April. Although 26 of these acts were committed in the first half of the year and 21 in the last half, conversion to rates per 1,000 (Division strength) show that the rates for the two halves of the year were virtually equal (at approximately 0.2 per 1,000). However, only 14 casualties resulted from such acts during the last half of the year (versus 28 in the first half), converting to a rate of 0.15 per 1,000 (versus 0.20 per 1,000). Five of the 47 incidents involved the use of CS (riot gas) grenades, including four in the last two months of the year.

Of the 47 incidents in 1970, 22 were solved from which 37 suspects/offenders were identified through investigation. However, markedly better results were obtained as the year progressed. During the first half of the year, 10 acts of the 26 acts were solved (38%). During the following three month period, 5 of 10 were solved (50%), while during the last three months of the year, 7 of 11 were solved (64%). Much of this progress may be attributed to the implementation of Force Order 3120.4 (setting forth the provisions of "Operation Freeze", the swift isolation of a unit in which an act of violence has occurred, and the immediate and thorough investigation of the act), Division Bulletin 5830, and Division Order 5830.1. Division Order 5830.2 of 19 December 1970 has further aided in the solution of such crimes, in that it provides for the protection of informants. The effect of this order in one particular case was that four persons thus protected gave information resulting in the conviction of four of the five suspects (the fifth having already received a Bad Conduct Discharge for other reasons). In another case happening on 6 December 1970, the force of all the directives above provided for the solution of a fragging (through informants and the subsequent confession of the two offenders) in a single day.

In general, of the 47 incidents during 1970, 29 (or 62%) occurred in relatively secure areas (cantonments in or near the Danang/Division CP area), while the remaining 18 (or 38%) occurred in forward areas (Combat Bases, Fire Support Bases, Infantry Battalion CPs). They happened primarily in living areas or in the vicinity of Clubs. The 37 identified suspects/offenders received 6 General Courts-Martial, 15 Special Courts-Martial, 1 Non-Judicial Punishment and 5 Administrative Discharges. The remaining charges were dropped primarily because of insufficient evidence.

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Following is a list, by rank, of offenders, casualties and known intended victims:

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OFFENDERS</u>	<u>CASUALTY</u>	<u>INTENDED</u>
Maj. . . . .	.0. . . . .	.0. . . . .	1
Capt . . . . .	.0. . . . .	.1. . . . .	1
1stLt. . . . .	.0. . . . .	.5. . . . .	1
2dLt . . . . .	.0. . . . .	.1. . . . .	0
CWO-4. . . . .	.0. . . . .	.1. . . . .	0
CWO-2. . . . .	.0. . . . .	.1. . . . .	0
SgtMaj/MgySgt. . . . .	.0. . . . .	.0. . . . .	1
GySgt. . . . .	.0. . . . .	.3. . . . .	3
SSgt . . . . .	.0. . . . .	.6. . . . .	4
Sgt. . . . .	.4. . . . .	.5* . . . . .	4
Cpl. . . . .	.4. . . . .	.4. . . . .	1
LCpl . . . . .	14. . . . .	11. . . . .	0
Pfc. . . . .	.9. . . . .	.4. . . . .	0

\*one killed

Both incidents and casualties resulting therefrom should continue at the present low level because of three factors:

1. The emphatic implementation of the directives discussed above (and that knowledge by potential assailants),
2. The continued reduction in Division strength, and
3. The knowledge (based on past experience) that few, if any, such incidents will occur in the units standing down.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). FRAGGING INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971



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MAJOR OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

In February 1971, the Division Military Police Section processed 26 major felonious offenses committed by Division personnel for an offense rate of 2.5 per 1,000 personnel, both of which represented decreases from a total of 35 offenses and an offense rate of 2.8 per 1,000 in January 1971. In addition, February's figures compare quite favorably with the monthly averages for 1970, just over 65 offenses per month and an offense rate of 3.3 per 1,000 per month. February witnessed a decided decrease in crimes of violence (actual and attempted murder/homicide, assault and aggravated assault, rape, unlawful ordnance detonation, communicating a threat, and armed robbery). The Division experienced 2 such incidents during February compared to 2 in January, 5 in December 1970 and 11 in November 1970.

Marijuana violations decreased by nearly 50% during February as compared to the month of January; however, the occasion of narcotics violations increased from 2 to 7 cases. This may indicate the heavier usage of narcotics (e.g., heroin) vice marijuana and may also indicate that such narcotics are becoming more readily available. The offense rate per thousand of marijuana violations decreased from 1.35/1,000 in January to 0.77/1,000 in February, while cases involving hard narcotics increased from 0.16/1,000 in January to 0.67/1,000 in February.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, MAJOR OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OFFENSES FOR 1970													
MURDER/HOMICIDE	0	0	0	0	3	3	2	0	0	0	2	1	11
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	3	2	0	1	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	0	14
ASSAULT	2	6	10	1	8	0	0	3	2	1	0	0	33
ATTEMPTED MURDR/HOMCD	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	3	4	4	3	2	22
RAPE	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	4
UNLAWFL ORDNANC DETON	1	0	1	0	3	4	0	1	4	1	4	1	20
MARIJUANA VIOLATION	34	37	39	30	36	34	30	32	24	24	19	17	356
COMM A THREAT(MAJOR)	2	3	6	5	4	3	0	1	1	1	2	0	28
NARCOTICS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
CURRENCY VIOLATION	10	2	1	0	2	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	27
LARCENY	2	0	5	0	7	12	6	15	19	14	5	8	93
DANGEROUS DRUG ABUSE	19	16	24	13	22	18	6	7	8	15	5	9	162
ARMED ROBBERY	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	5
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OFFENSES 1970	73	66	86	50	86	78	54	66	67	64	44	43	777
OFFENSES FOR 1971													
MURDER/HOMICIDE	0	0											0
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	0	1											1
ASSAULT	1	0											1
ATTEMPTED MURDR/HOMCD	1	0											1
RAPE	0	0											0
UNLAWFL ORDNANC DETON	0	0											0
MARIJUANA VIOLATION	17	8											25
COMM A THREAT(MAJOR)	0	0											0
NARCOTICS	2	7											9
CURRENCY VIOLATION	1	0											1
LARCENY	6	3											9
DANGEROUS DRUG ABUSE	7	6											13
ARMED ROBBERY	0	1											1
OTHER	0	0											0
TOTAL OFFENSES 1971	35	26											61
OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOT
1970	2.7	2.5	3.7	2.3	3.9	3.7	2.5	3.4	4.1	5.2	3.5	3.4	3.3
1971	2.8	2.5											2.7

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VEHICLE/TRAFFIC OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

There were 43 vehicle/traffic offenses committed by Division personnel and processed by the Division Military Police Section during the month of February 1971. This is a decrease of almost 185% from the preceding month and is approximately equal to the number of offenses in December 1970. The most noticeable decrease occurred in citations for speeding, (down from 96 in January to 32 in February) and in overloaded vehicles (down from 17 in January to 6 in February). These decreases are partially the result of the shorter length of the month (only 28 days in February); the reduction in the number of 1st Marine Division motor vehicles on the road due to standdowns; and, finally, the limited number of Division Military Police patrols during the month (only two motorized patrols were on the road). For these reasons, one must bear in mind that the numbers of citations during a period of time may bear no relation to the number of offenses committed (in the area of traffic regulation enforcement), since a decrease in citations from one month to the next may be attributed to lighter patrolling or a less "hard nosed" attitude towards offenders (i.e., lectures given rather than citations issued). The offense rate decreased from 9.7/1,000 in January to 4.1/1,000 in February.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, VEHICLE/TRAFFIC OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
<b>OFFENSES FOR 1970</b>													
SPEEDING	184	49	42	22	198	102	84	63	66	19	41	44	914
IMPROP/NO TRIP TICKET	8	6	7	4	4	2	2	1	5	1	0	0	40
RECKLESS DRIVING	5	3	3	1	4	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	23
FAILURE TO STOP/YIELD	1	3	3	0	3	3	8	1	26	0	0	0	48
IMPROPER BACKING	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
INVALID/NO DRIVER LIC	11	3	7	1	2	3	3	3	1	0	0	0	34
IMPROPER TURNING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MISAPPROP GOVT VEHICL	9	3	7	3	2	3	2	2	1	0	0	1	33
OVERLOADED VEHICLE	0	0	18	6	11	7	1	3	4	1	0	0	51
LEAVING SCENE OF ACDT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
INATTENTION	0	0	18	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	21
ILLEGAL TRANSPORTAT'N	0	0	12	1	14	11	3	0	0	0	0	0	41
HIT AND RUN	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3
IMPROP PASS'G/LANE US	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	8
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL OFFENSES 1970</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>1219</b>
<b>OFFENSES FOR 1971</b>													
SPEEDING	96	32											128
IMPROP/NO TRIP TICKET	1	1											2
RECKLESS DRIVING	0	0											0
FAILURE TO STOP/YIELD	4	2											6
IMPROPER BACKING	0	0											0
INVALID/NO DRIVER LIC	1	2											3
IMPROPER TURNING	0	0											0
MISAPPROP GOVT VEHICL	0	0											0
OVERLOADED VEHICLE	17	6											23
LEAVING SCENE OF ACDT	0	0											0
INATTENTION	1	0											1
ILLEGAL TRANSPORTAT'N	0	0											0
HIT AND RUN	0	0											0
IMPROP PASS'G/LANE US	2	0											2
OTHER	0	0											0
<b>TOTAL OFFENSES 1971</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>43</b>											<b>165</b>
<b>OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000</b>	<b>JAN</b>	<b>FEB</b>	<b>MAR</b>	<b>APR</b>	<b>MAY</b>	<b>JUN</b>	<b>JUL</b>	<b>AUG</b>	<b>SEP</b>	<b>OCT</b>	<b>NOV</b>	<b>DEC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
1970	8.0	2.5	5.0	1.8	11.1	6.5	4.9	4.0	6.4	1.8	3.3	3.6	5.1
1971	9.7	4.1											(6.9)

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MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

Miscellaneous offenses, encompassing all violations not covered by the major and vehicle/traffic offenses categories and consisting largely of military offenses, totalled 105 during the month of February 1971, representing a sizable increase in such offenses over the 75 recorded in January. In addition, February's 105 offenses was a more than three-fold increase over the 32 recorded in December of 1970, and was more than twice the monthly average of 48 during the last quarter of 1970; but was well below the average of 213 offenses per month registered for the year. When rates are computed to take decreased division strength into consideration, February's rate of 10.0/1,000 personnel was appreciably higher than January's 5.9/1,000 and approached the rate for the year 1970 (10.8/1,000).

February's increase of miscellaneous offenses may bear little relation to the number actually committed, since increased vigilance may have produced the larger number of offenses processed. It may be noted that there was a significant increase in off limits violations and cases of drunk/disorderly. These increases may have been a result of having more Marines in rear areas with more free time in which to engage in these questionable activities.

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## 1ST MARINE DIVISION, MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OFFENSES FOR 1970													
OFF LIMITS	110	96	153	74	127	143	88	82	69	26	23	15	1006
CURFEW VIOLATIONS	50	36	47	8	32	27	19	30	0	2	1	0	252
I.D. CARD/ORDERS VIOL	28	27	32	13	18	31	12	15	0	0	0	3	179
UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE	30	13	46	19	39	51	38	23	6	32	18	8	323
DESERTING	4	6	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	13
DISRESPECT	2	4	12	4	5	14	7	6	3	1	0	0	58
RESISTING APPREHENS'N	6	4	4	2	10	10	7	7	0	2	0	0	52
DRUNK/DISORDERLY	1	1	5	3	4	10	3	7	5	5	0	4	48
UNDER INFLUENCE	0	1	1	0	2	3	0	2	0	1	0	0	10
OUT OF UNIFORM	12	8	12	4	10	16	6	12	0	0	0	0	80
DESTRUC GOVT PROPERTY	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DISOBEYING ORDER	1	0	0	0	2	2	5	4	0	0	0	0	14
INTERFERE W/MP DUTIES	0	0	13	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	18
WEAPONS VIOLATION	58	44	77	25	62	100	71	59	4	2	0	0	502
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OFFENSES 1970	302	240	404	152	312	407	258	249	87	71	42	32	2556
OFFENSES FOR 1971													
OFF LIMITS	46	70											116
CURFEW VIOLATIONS	0	0											0
I.D. CARD/ORDERS VIOL	2	6											8
UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE	2	1											3
DESERTING	0	0											0
DISRESPECT	2	4											6
RESISTING APPREHENS'N	0	0											0
DRUNK/DISORDERLY	2	12											14
UNDER INFLUENCE	0	0											0
OUT OF UNIFORM	0	1											1
DESTRUC GOVT PROPERTY	0	0											0
DISOBEYING ORDER	0	0											0
INTERFERE W/MP DUTIES	1	0											1
WEAPONS VIOLATION	20	2											22
OTHER	0	9											9
TOTAL OFFENSES 1971	75	105											180
OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOT
1970	11.0	9.0	17.3	7.0	14.3	19.4	12.0	12.6	5.3	5.7	3.4	2.5	10.8
1971	5.9	10.0											7.9

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GROUND SAFETY

As was the case with January, February 1971 produced fewer non-hostile incidents and fewer non-battle casualties than the previous month, although the drop in both incidents and casualties was less steep from January to February than it had been from December 1970 to January. In absolute terms, non-hostile incidents fell from 33 in January to 31 in February, and casualties from 30 to 24. However, when incident and casualty rates per 1,000 personnel are computed, an analysis of the rates shows that while the overall casualty rate for February (all categories of incident considered) decreased from January's 2.4 casualties per 1,000 personnel to 2.3 per 1,000, February's incident rate topped January's, 3.0 per 1,000 to 2.6 per 1,000.

Comparing the average statistics thus far in 1971 to the averages for 1969 and 1970, one discovers that the average number of incidents per month for 1971 is less than one-quarter the monthly average for 1970 and less than one-fifth the average for 1969, while casualties have declined even more impressively, 1971's average being less than one-fifth the average for 1970 and one-sixth the average for 1969. Even when one considers rates (to take declining Division strength into consideration), the decreases remain highly significant. The 1971 incident rate of 2.8 incidents per 1,000 personnel is less than half 1970's 6.6 and 1969's 6.3, while the 1971 casualty rate of 2.3 casualties per 1,000 personnel is less than a third 1970's 7.2 and 1969's 7.1. The fact that casualties are apparently declining at a more rapid rate than incidents may be easily explained by noting that there have been no supporting arms incidents in 1971. Such incidents tend to cause a sizable number of casualties per incident.

Because of pending redeployments and vigorous implementation of the Division Ground Safety Program, both the number of incidents and the number of casualties should decline in the future. Maximum effort by all members of the Command will also serve to continue the trend toward lower incident and casualty rates.

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BATTLE VERSUS NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The battle casualty rate increased from a January 1971 rate of 294 casualties per million man-days (115 casualties) to a February 1971 rate of 459 (134 casualties). This is the highest rate recorded since September 1969 when the rate was 663. The increases in enemy activity and contact are responsible for this increase. The non-battle casualty rate increased from a January 1971 rate of 77 casualties per million man-days (30 casualties) to a February 1971 rate of 82 (24 casualties). This is the second lowest recorded rate reflected in the Division records which began with January 1969 (the lowest being January 1971). It is most evident the subjects of safety and welfare of individuals are receiving continued command attention. This is an enviable record for a Division operating in combat.

Regarding the non-battle casualty rate, a comparison between January 1971 and February 1971 reveals the following (rates listed are of the dimensions "casualties per 1,000 personnel"):

- (1) Friendly Fire Rate: decreased 100% (0.2 to 0.0)
- (2) Explosive Ordnance: increased 25% (0.2 to 0.25)
- (3) Accidental Discharges: decreased 87% (0.6 to 0.08)
- (4) Motor Vehicle Accidents: decreased 83% (0.6 to 0.1)
- (5) Operational/Occupational Incidents: increased 18% (0.9 to 1.1)

With units commencing standdown, the number of such incidents is expected to decrease in March. With continued emphasis on safety, the non-battle casualty rate should remain low.

The term battle casualty is defined by MCO P3040.4 as "any person lost to his organization because of death, wounds, missing [sic], capture or internment providing such loss is incurred in action. 'In action' characterizes the casualty status as having been the direct result of combat; or sustained going to or returning from a combat mission provided that the occurrence was directly related to combat or, through misadventure, friendly action. However, injuries due to the elements [weather] or to self-inflicted wounds are not to be considered as sustained in action and are thereby not to be interpreted as battle casualties. Examples of injuries not to be interpreted as battle casualties are: frostbite, battle fatigue, sunstroke, heat exhaustion and diseases not verified as cases of biological warfare. Minor injuries or wounds neither requiring admission to a medical facility nor involving loss of personnel are also considered battle casualties for reporting purposes, if otherwise classified a battle casualty as defined above".

For the purposes of this report the statistics on battle casualties do not include those personnel receiving wounds who are treated and returned to duty without being admitted to a hospital. Regarding non-battle casualties only those injuries requiring hospitalization for a period of four days or more

(continued on preceding page)

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are calculated. The specific incidents involved are those resulting from friendly fire, explosive ordnance, accidental discharges, motor vehicle accidents, and operational/occupational incidents.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), BATTLE VERSUS NON-BATTLE CASUALTY RATES,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

BATTLE RATE	1969	=====	NON-BATTLE RATE	1969	-----
	1970	=====		1970	-----
	1971	=====		1971	-----



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
Note 1	.742	.675	.747	.721	.739	.709	.733	.717	.745	.767	.920	.968	9,183
BTL CAS*	530	629	554	588	798	639	411	793	494	236	304	313	6,289
BTL RATE	715	932	742	815	1090	900	560	1110	663	308	330	323	684
NBTL CAS	136	173	135	161	156	163	170	248	171	234	206	210	2,163
NBTL RATE	183	256	181	223	211	230	232	346	230	305	224	217	236
1970													
Note 1	.852	.748	.727	.655	.677	.631	.663	.611	.492	.384	.376	.391	7,207
BTL CAS*	378	323	328	284	242	271	187	226	156	91	88	83	2,657
BTL RATE	444	432	500	434	358	431	282	370	318	237	234	212	368
NBTL CAS	228	171	200	162	156	140	148	171	116	67	74	65	1,698
NBTL RATE	268	229	275	247	230	222	223	280	236	174	197	166	236
1971													
Note 1	.392	.292											
BTL CAS*	115	134											
BTL RATE	294	459											
NBTL CAS	30	24											
NBTL RATE	77	82											

Note 1: MILLION MAN-DAYS (N TIMES 10)

\* EXCLUDES WIA (NOT EVACUATED) SINCE NOT LOST TO UNIT

CASUALTY RATE = CASUALTIES PER MILLION MAN-DAYS

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CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During February 1971, the comparatively low rate of non-battle casualties sustained by the Division that began in January 1971 continued. Overall totals for February were lower than those for January (24 versus 30), the lowest number yet reported for a single month. However, the non-battle casualty rate increased slightly from January's 77 casualties per million man-days to February's 82 per million (See Tab 1-6a).

Table I below compares the monthly averages thus far in 1971 for the several categories of non-battle casualties with the monthly averages for 1969 and 1970 and shows the dramatic reduction in such casualties made by the Division during the past 26 months.

TABLE I. Comparison of 1971 Non-Battle Casualties to Those of 1969 and 1970.

<u>CATEGORY OF INCIDENT</u>	<u>1971 AVG</u>	<u>1970 AVG</u>	<u>PCT DECR</u>	<u>1969 AVG</u>	<u>PCT DECR</u>
Operational/Occupational	11.0	81.8	87%	89.3	88%
Friendly Fire	2.0	23.0	91%	34.9	94%
Explosive Ordnance	3.5	18.7	81%	25.6	86%
Accidental Discharges	6.5	10.1	36%	19.5	67%
Motor Vehicles	4.0	7.8	49%	11.0	64%

Command attention continues to be exerted on the problem of non-battle casualties and, if the comparisons above are any indication of a favorable trend, will serve to reduce further such unfortunate losses in the future.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR

FRIENDLY FIRE	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE	MOTOR VEHICLE

OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL - - - - -




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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES. CALENDAR

FRIENDLY FIRE	=====	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE	-----
ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE	=====	MOTOR VEHICLE	=====
OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL		-----	



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
SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

There were no supporting arms friendly fire incidents in February 1971, continuing a definite downward trend in this category of incidents (including, in this definition, not only air and artillery, but crew-served weapons as well) established over the previous four months. It is quite obvious that, if this trend continues, the number of incidents per month should remain in the vicinity of zero incidents, because the stringent control and clearance measures which have influenced favorably both the incident and casualty rates remain in effect. However, the prediction of casualties is much more uncertain, because a single supporting arms incident can produce a large number of casualties. For example, six such incidents occurred in May 1970, yet only three persons were injured, while five incidents in August 1970 produced four deaths and twenty-nine injuries.

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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTS AND****CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971****INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 ——— 1971 ———**

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCIDENTS	18	20	11	11	8	9	12	20	15	11	9	7	151
KILLED	12	14	4	4	4	1	3	8	1	0	4	2	57
WOUNDED	29	32	17	15	6	12	15	50	35	23	21	10	265
TOTAL CAS	41	46	21	19	10	13	18	58	36	23	25	12	322
% CMD CAS	.17	.19	.09	.08	.04	.06	.08	.26	.15	.08	.08	.04	.11
1970													
INCIDENTS	7	8	7	4	6	1	6	5	7	5	2	1	59
KILLED	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	3	0	10
WOUNDED	26	17	41	9	3	0	13	29	10	3	3	3	157
TOTAL CAS	26	19	42	9	3	0	13	33	10	3	6	3	167
% CMD CAS	.09	.07	.18	.04	.01	.00	.06	.17	.06	.02	.05	.02	.06
1971													
INCIDENTS	0	0											( 0 )
KILLED	0	0											( 0 )
WOUNDED	0	0											( 0 )
TOTAL CAS	0	0											( 0 )
% CMD CAS	.00	.00											(.00)

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INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In February 1971, five individual weapons friendly fire incidents were recorded claiming one casualty. As such, both numbers convert to rates representing continuations of a relatively level trend established over the previous four months. Incident rates in the period September 1970 through February 1971 have remained in the range 0.2 - 0.5 incidents per 1,000 personnel, while casualty rates have remained steady at either 0.2 or 0.1 casualties per 1,000.

The relative constancy achieved during the period above compares most favorably with the preceding eight months, during which both incidents and casualties fluctuated widely (and averaged 0.4 incidents and 0.5 casualties per 1,000 per month), and reflects the influence of command attention at all levels.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCIDENTS	7	13	12	5	11	5	5	4	16	11	20	11	120
KILLED	4	5	1	0	3	1	2	1	5	1	4	1	25
WOUNDED	3	7	12	5	2	6	4	0	12	8	7	6	72
TOTAL CAS	4	12	13	5	5	7	6	1	17	9	11	7	97
% CMD CAS	.02	.05	.05	.02	.02	.03	.03	.00	.07	.03	.04	.03	.03
1970													
INCIDENTS	7	8	10	7	13	14	6	15	6	4	2	4	96
KILLED	0	1	2	3	0	4	1	6	2	0	1	0	20
WOUNDED	9	5	17	6	8	19	2	16	2	2	0	3	89
TOTAL CAS	9	6	19	9	8	23	3	22	4	2	1	3	109
% CMD CAS	.03	.02	.08	.04	.04	.11	.01	.11	.02	.02	.01	.02	.04
1971													
INCIDENTS	3	5											( 8 )
KILLED	0	0											( 0 )
WOUNDED	3	1											( 4 )
TOTAL CAS	3	1											( 4 )
% CMD CAS	.02	.01											(.02)

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ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Accidental discharges continued, in February 1971, to be a major problem to the Ground Safety Program. However, the four incidents occurring in February represented a distinct decrease from the January total. These incidents resulted in a casualty rate of 0.5/1,000 which compares favorably with the 0.6/1,000 January rate. This subject is particularly emphasized during Ground Safety lectures; however, carelessness and negligent handling of firearms by troops continue to cause these tragedies.

The continuing standdown of units and reduced operational commitments should further reduce the incident rate, since the units standing down will still be on the rolls while the handling of weapons will be reduced to a minimum. However, reduced rates beyond the immediate future will depend upon continued emphasis on safe weapons handling.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 ——— 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCIDENTS	17	19	17	16	20	15	17	18	27	17	20	17	220
KILLED	1	5	4	1	2	0	3	2	3	1	4	3	29
WOUNDED	18	21	17	15	18	15	14	16	25	16	15	15	205
TOTAL CAS	19	26	21	16	20	15	17	18	28	17	19	18	234
% CMD CAS	.08	.11	.09	.07	.08	.06	.07	.08	.12	.06	.06	.06	.08
1970													
INCIDENTS	16	12	10	16	9	16	11	11	8	8	2	5	124
KILLED	3	2	0	3	0	1	0	3	2	1	1	1	17
WOUNDED	13	10	11	13	7	14	11	8	5	6	2	4	104
TOTAL CAS	16	12	11	16	7	15	11	11	7	7	3	5	121
% CMD CAS	.06	.04	.05	.07	.03	.07	.05	.06	.04	.06	.02	.04	.05
1971													
INCIDENTS	9	4											(13)
KILLED	0	1											(1)
WOUNDED	8	4											(12)
TOTAL CAS	8	5											(13)
% CMD CAS	.06	.05											(.06)

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EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971


Although February 1971 produced increases in all indicators within this category of non-battle incidents over comparable figures for January (incidents increased from two to four, casualties from two to five, incident rate from 0.2/1,000 to 0.4/1,000 and casualty rate from 0.2/1,000 to 0.5/1,000), the numbers produced during the month were well below comparable averages for 1969 or 1970. The most unfortunate aspect of February's figures was that three men died as a result of such incidents, equalling the total deaths for the previous four months.

There appears to be no definite trend established in either incidents or casualties due to explosive devices. The number of incidents per month continues to fluctuate and, as is the case with supporting arms incidents, a certain number of detonations can produce few or many casualties. However, if the Division does no worse than February, 1971 should be a vast improvement over the two previous years.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE INCIDENTS ANDCASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 ——— 1971 ———

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCIDENTS	7	9	15	19	8	14	17	20	11	8	16	30	174
KILLED	3	1	6	7	3	1	2	1	1	1	2	6	34
WOUNDED	7	17	18	30	8	26	24	26	15	7	37	58	273
TOTAL CAS	10	18	24	37	11	27	26	27	16	8	39	64	307
% CMD CAS	.04	.07	.10	.15	.05	.12	.11	.12	.07	.03	.13	.22	.10
1970													
INCIDENTS	36	22	15	14	15	13	10	14	14	4	7	9	173
KILLED	3	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	4	1	1	1	16
WOUNDED	36	23	22	16	17	9	7	19	19	4	22	15	209
TOTAL CAS	39	24	24	17	17	10	7	20	23	5	23	16	225
% CMD CAS	.14	.09	.10	.07	.07	.05	.03	.10	.14	.04	.18	.12	.09
1971													
INCIDENTS	2	4											( 6 )
KILLED	0	3											( 3 )
WOUNDED	2	2											( 4 )
TOTAL CAS	2	5											( 7 )
% CMD CAS	.02	.05											(.03)

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MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The six incidents occurring in February 1971 were exactly one-half the average for 1970. There were 0.5 incidents/1,000 personnel during the month which was a sharp decrease over January 1971 when there were 1.0/1,000 incidents.

Casualties from motor vehicle accidents for February 1971 also decreased significantly from those for January. In January 1971 the casualty rate from motor vehicles was 0.6/1,000 as compared to 0.1/1,000 for February 1971. In addition, Vietnamese casualties from such accidents continued to occur at a rate of approximately one per accident.

The accidents and injuries which have occurred in the past 26 months were primarily due to the influx of lightweight vehicular traffic prevalent on all lines of communication and the almost non-existent traffic control by Vietnamese authorities. Division Marines are constantly being schooled in strict obedience to traffic regulations and also in the art of defensive driving. A majority of the accidents in which Marine vehicles have been involved recently have not been the result of negligence or carelessness on the part of Marines.

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
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## 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 =====



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 ACCID	14	14	14	15	20	22	21	31	26	18	20	21	236
US KILLED	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	0	0	0	12
US INJRD	3	2	4	8	10	7	12	31	14	7	10	12	120
% CMD CAS	.01	.01	.02	.04	.05	.04	.06	.15	.06	.02	.03	.04	.04
VN KILLED	4	5	2	1	4	1	2	2	11	4	0	9	45
VN INJRD	16	9	16	9	6	9	5	4	12	12	15	13	126
70 ACCID	16	16	20	11	10	16	11	16	7	10	7	4	144
US KILLED	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3
US INJRD	30	9	8	1	3	2	6	23	3	6	1	2	94
% CMD CAS	.11	.03	.04	.00	.01	.01	.03	.13	.02	.05	.01	.02	.04
VN KILLED	9	2	6	6	6	3	4	1	2	4	0	1	44
VN INJRD	5	11	10	4	6	13	16	13	3	6	11	3	101
71 ACCID	12	6											(18)
US KILLED	0	0											(0)
US INJRD	7	1											(8)
% CMD CAS	.06	.01											(.04)
VN KILLED	4	1											(5)
VN INJRD	7	4											(11)

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OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

There were twelve operational/occupational incidents during February 1971, which produced twelve casualties. Both of these figures were greatly reduced from any monthly total experienced during the previous 25 months with the exception of January 1971. Close attention at all levels of command during the last six months appears to have generated a moderate downward trend in both incidents and casualties. January's plunge (from 36 incidents and a like number of casualties in December 1970) was a departure (albeit favorable) from the trend, and February's figures, while still slightly higher than January's, were a further acceleration of the downward trend.


Operational/occupational incidents are those incidents resulting in death or requiring at least four or more days hospitalization which do not fall within the purview of the other categories of the Ground Safety Program. Included in this category are falls, burns and drownings, among other such accidents.

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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL INCIDENTS  
AND CASUALTIES. CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971**  
**INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES (CUM) 1969 ——— 1970 ——— 1971 ———**



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
<b>1969</b>													
INCIDENTS	59	55	46	75	98	92	88	104	52	152	102	97	1,020
KILLED	1	5	3	2	3	0	0	2	0	5	0	0	21
WOUNDED	58	64	48	73	95	92	88	109	59	165	102	97	1,050
TOTAL CAS	59	69	51	75	98	92	88	111	59	170	102	97	1,071
% CMD CAS	.25	.28	.21	.31	.41	.39	.38	.49	.24	.56	.33	.33	.35
<b>1970</b>													
INCIDENTS	108	96	96	107	114	86	108	62	61	44	39	36	957
KILLED	0	1	3	1	2	3	7	1	2	0	1	0	21
WOUNDED	108	100	93	109	116	87	101	61	67	44	39	36	961
TOTAL CAS	108	101	96	110	118	90	108	62	69	44	40	36	982
% CMD CAS	.39	.38	.41	.50	.54	.43	.50	.31	.42	.36	.32	.29	.40
<b>1971</b>													
INCIDENTS	7	12											(19)
KILLED	1	0											(0)
WOUNDED	9	12											(21)
TOTAL CAS	10	12											(22)
% CMD CAS	.08	.11											(.10)

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
SAVINGS BOND/SAVINGS DEPOSIT PROGRAM

Participation in the Savings Bond Program for the month of February 1971 was 66.3% (6,903 persons out of the 10,440 on board participating) compared to 64.1% (8,203 persons out of 12,623 on board participating) in January 1971, a slight increase from January to February. On the other hand, participation in the Savings Deposit Program for the month of February 1971 was 4.1% (443 persons out of 10,440 on board participating) compared with 5.0% (635 persons out of 12,623 on board participating) in January 1971. The decline in participation in the Deposit Program may have been caused by many personnel anticipating redeployment during Increment VI.

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## 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), PARTICIPATION IN SAVINGS BOND AND SAVINGS

## DEPOSIT PROGRAMS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
BOND PROG	18236	17933	17167	17196	16574	16780	16755	16346	16558	21497	22812	20788	18,220
% PARTIC	76.1	74.0	70.8	72.0	70.0	71.5	71.5	71.9	68.2	70.9	73.8	70.5	71.8
DEP PROG	480	620	517	1290	884	756	857	933	949	1047	1037	1038	867
% PARTIC	2.0	2.6	2.1	5.3	3.7	3.2	3.7	4.1	3.9	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.4
1970													
BOND PROG	19285	16894	16186	16473	15831	14924	15113	12792	10548	8710	9094	9309	13,910
% PARTIC	70.2	63.3	69.2	75.5	72.6	71.0	70.5	64.8	64.3	70.1	72.6	74.3	69.8
DEP PROG	970	1062	981	924	887	942	865	701	630	573	642	641	818
% PARTIC	3.5	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.5	4.0	3.6	3.8	4.6	5.1	5.1	4.2
1971													
BOND PROG	8203	6930											(7,566)
% PARTIC	64.1	66.3											(65.6)
DEP PROG	635	443											(539)
% PARTIC	5.0	4.1											(4.7)

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G-2 OVERVIEW

During February 1971, enemy activity remained at a relatively low level of intensity. There were only 1,146 enemy sighted during the month (a slight decrease from January 1971), and the enemy again chose not to present himself in strength, but instead conducted sporadic, harassing attacks primarily directed against GVN forces and functions, during which he expended 69 mortar rounds, 21 rockets and 4 lob bombs within the Division's AO. His major units spent most of the month in the mountainous base area continuing a lengthy phase of rehabilitation and resupply. Main Force and Local Force Units continued to operate in their traditional operating areas in the lowlands in execution of the initial periods of their spring offensive. The increase in the number of rounds received in attacks by indirect fire can be accredited to the enemy's high points in activity in connection with initial periods of Phase I and II of his K800 spring offensive.

February reflected a continuation of the steady decline in enemy activity evidenced during 1970. The most striking evidence of this decline is reflected in a monthly comparison of enemy sighted/enemy attacks by fire during the past fourteen months. Total enemy sighted dropped from 4,425 (January 1970) to a low of 576 (November) with an increase to 1,331 (December), 1,394 (January 1971) and a slight decrease to 1,146 in February 1971. In essence, more enemy were sighted during the first month of 1970 than were observed during the last four months of the year (4,159 observed from 1 September through 31 December 1970). Total enemy attacks by fire (rockets, mortar rounds, lob bombs) similarly declined; 658 rounds were received in January 1970 alone as compared to a cumulative figure of 637 rounds received during the last six months of 1970 (1 July through 31 December). In February 1971, 94 rounds were received, equalling the sum of enemy ammunition expended in both December (1970) and January (1971). The overall reduction in enemy activity can be attributed largely to the attritional losses sustained by units subordinate to Front 4 and to the resultant decision by the enemy to revert to guerrilla warfare techniques in order to conserve his depleted forces.

Overall enemy strength in the province, once estimated as high as 16,800 (May 1969), diminished to an estimated 7,710 (February 1971). Infiltration of replacements from North Vietnam has been minimal. The enemy's inability to recruit from the manpower base of indigenous South Vietnamese has resulted in the necessity to assign many NVA personnel to augment traditionally VC Main Force, Local Force, and Guerrilla Units. A further illustration of the enemy's declining combat effectiveness is evidenced by his need to realign his organizational structure. Throughout 1969 and during early 1970, Front 4 commanded four NVA Regiments, but at present it appears that only the 38th NVA Regiment remains active in the province. The disbanding of units, reduction of unit strengths, and realignment of operational control has resulted in an extensive reorganization of units as well as command and control relationships; the "Wing" concept of decentralized command and control is now apparently defunct. Unless an intense effort is made by the enemy to introduce sizable reinforcements into the province during 1971, it is anticipated that his present force levels will continue to deteriorate. Confronted with FWMAF/ARVN preemptive operations, reduced manpower, and food shortages, enemy forces will be capable of conducting only the harassing activities that have characterized

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their efforts in recent months. In the populated lowlands, main efforts will be channeled towards rebuilding the depleted VC military and political structure at the hamlet and village level; in the highlands, NVA forces will be preoccupied with logistic activities.

During February 1971, there were 24 Reconnaissance Teams available to the Division. Of these, an average of 14 was available for field employment on any given day. An average of 9 teams was actually deployed. As a result of Phase IV Reductions during September 1970, 1st Marine Division reconnaissance assets were reduced by two companies of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion as well as the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less a platoon detachment). The availability of Reconnaissance Teams in January (1971) was the same as the last quarter of 1970. These figures are expected to remain relatively constant until Increment VI Redeployment is initiated. Although present weather conditions are restrictive to helicopter insertions/extractions of teams, the current use of Platoon Patrol Bases will facilitate the employment and resupply of teams operating in the field.

Unattended ground sensors were employed for the first time to monitor enemy activity on positions recently vacated by redeploying Division forces during February 1971. These new strings consisted of 20 radio frequency sensors, thus bringing the total number of sensors employed within the Division's area of operations to 117 in February.

The continued increase in sensor use each month is a result of two factors. As Marine units redeploy, sensors are used to cover areas infantry units once controlled. Also, there is an increased understanding of sensor capabilities by unit commanders of the Division, resulting in additional sensor requests.

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ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Enemy strength in Quang Nam Province during February 1971 reflected a total estimated reduction of 615 (from 8,325 in January 1971 to 7,710), the total of 7,710 including North Vietnamese Army, Main Force and Local Force Units as well as village/hamlet guerrillas. Unless substantial replacements are received from outside the province, enemy strength levels will probably continue to decrease in 1971.

In reviewing total enemy strength in Quang Nam Province over the past two years, two distinct periods of reduction are evident. In 1969, overall strength declined from a high of 16,800 (May) to a level of approximately 11,000 - 13,000 for the remainder of the year and into early 1970. Enemy force levels fluctuated within this range until July 1970, when another steady decline commenced. By February 1971, enemy strength in the province was estimated at 7,710, thereby representing nearly a 50% reduction from the mid-1969 force level.

While it appears that the enemy has the capability to introduce infiltration groups to replace some of these losses, he does not appear inclined at this time to increase infiltration to a level that will reconstitute former force levels. Recruitment of indigenous South Vietnamese does not presently play a significant part in overall manpower procurement as evidenced by the necessity to utilize NVA personnel in traditionally VC rôles. On-hand personnel assets will probably continue to be redistributed as appropriate; more NVA troops will be used to fill the ranks of MF and LF units; NVA, MF, and LF personnel will also be used to rebuild the depleted guerrilla organization within the province.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH, QUANG NAM PROVINCE

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 EST. STRENGTH

1970 EST. STRENGTH - - - -

1971 EST. STRENGTH



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EST STR	15500	15750	16100	14540	16800	13700	12200	12840	12170	12770	11820	12400	N/A
1970													
EST STR	11200	12430	12300	12900	12020	11700	12500	11300	10900	9475	8655	8560	N/A
1971													
EST STR	8325	7710											N/A

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DEPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During February 1971, 24 Reconnaissance teams were maintained by the Division, of which an average of 14 teams was available for field employment on any given day, reflecting a decrease of one in the availability of teams during December 1970 and January 1971. An average of 9 teams per day was actually deployed during the month for a monthly average of 37.5%. Reconnaissance efforts were primarily directed at preempting the enemy's infiltration of rockets into the forward area of the Division's TAOR.

Division assets prior to September 1970 included the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. During this period, deployed teams included those providing security for four Division observation posts. A major reorganization of the Division reconnaissance effort was effected in September 1970 as a result of the redeployment in Increment IV of two companies of the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less one platoon detachment). Division Reconnaissance Battalion was relieved of the security responsibility for three of the four Division observation posts and given the objective of maintaining a minimum of 24 operational teams with the capability to deploy and support 12 of these teams at any given time. It is expected that these figures will remain constant until Increment VI redeployment is initiated. Deployed teams are now defined as only those operating in the field on assigned reconnaissance missions.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS

DEPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

% DEPLOYED ON RECON MISSIONS 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 ———

% DEPLOYED ON ALL MISSIONS (JUL 1969 - OCT 1970) .....



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TMS AVAIL							49	48	50	46	45	38	
ALL MSNS							27	27	27	27	24	19	*
% DEPL							55.1	56.3	54.0	58.7	53.3	50.0	*
RCN MSNS							19	19	19	19	16	11	**
% RECON							38.8	39.6	38.0	41.3	35.5	28.9	**
1970													
TMS AVAIL	38	50	57	54	56	54	48	42	28	24	24	24	
ALL MSNS	22	25	29	31	31	28	27	26	12	8	11	10	*
% DEPL	57.9	50.0	50.9	57.4	55.4	51.8	56.2	62.0	42.9	33.3	45.8	41.6	*
RCN MSNS	14	17	21	23	23	20	19	18	10	8	11	10	**
% RECON	36.8	34.0	36.9	42.6	41.0	37.0	39.6	42.8	35.7	33.3	45.8	41.6	**
1971													
TMS AVAIL	24	24											
ALL MSNS	8	9											*
% DEPL	33.3	37.5											*
RCN MSNS	8	9											**
% RECON	33.3	37.5											**

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SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

February 1971 saw the use of sensors in the "stay behind" role. As redeployment progressed, certain positions were vacated. These former positions had sensors selectively placed in and around the position. Both seismic and acoustic sensors were used. These new strings consisted of a total of 20 radio frequency sensors. During this period two implanted sensors were deactivated. This produced a net gain of 18 sensors, increasing the number of sensors employed from 99 in January to 117 in February.

The continued increase in sensor utilization each month is a result of two factors. As Marine units redeploy, sensors are used to cover areas infantry units once controlled. Also, there is an increased understanding of sensor capabilities by unit commanders of the Division, resulting in additional sensor requests.


Major changes in emphasis on employment of sensors within the Division occurred in 1970. Sensor utilization, which had increased relatively steadily during 1969 and the first half of 1970, decreased significantly thereafter, commencing in July with the deactivation of the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System). Due to the "barrier" nature of these line sensors, the enemy had been more apt to traverse the string than to follow its axis. Therefore, although fewer activations resulted from this arrangement, any such activations were considered intrusions and were targetted (See Tab 2-4). However, since a pattern or rate of movement was difficult to ascertain, there was a greater chance of firing on non-targetable activations. Air emplaced sensors were also frequently used during this period of time, being delivered into rear base areas and logistic routes used by enemy forces. Neither means afforded adequate opportunity for bomb damage assessment, because the line sensors were not adequately observed and the air delivered sensors were remotely located. Consequently, as can be seen in Tab 2-4, bomb damage assessment was low despite the number of activations and subsequent fire missions.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



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TARGETABLE SENSOR ACTIVATIONS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

During February, there were a total of 11 targetable sensor activations resulting in 2 fire missions. For the first time, sensors were used to monitor enemy activity on positions recently vacated by friendly redeploying forces. OP Roundup and FSB Ryder were the two positions where sensors were employed for target acquisition and detection of enemy presence at the vacated positions.

There were 29 targets detected during January, upon which 11 missions were fired. Although the total targetable activations and fire missions, 11 and two, respectively, showed a decrease during February, the 40 activations in the first two months of 1971 represent a significant increase over the 29 targetable activations for the last four months of 1970. Primary reasons for the difference in activations for the periods were the monsoon rains, which restricted enemy movement during late 1970, followed by an increased level of enemy activity during TET and the K800 campaign. (See Tab G-2).


When the Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP) was organized in early 1970, sensor equipment was used primarily for target acquisition. The practice of firing on all sensor activations resulted in compromise of the locations of sensor strings and, by avoiding sensor seeded areas, the enemy neutralized the effectiveness of this equipment. However, as the year progressed and experience was gained in sensor utilization, emphasis was shifted from target acquisition to collecting information on enemy movements. SCAMP assets, including personnel and equipment, have been reduced by approximately 70 percent due to redeployments; however, assets are being used better. Sensors will play an increasingly important role in intelligence collection as other intelligence assets are lost through redeployment.

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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). TARGETABLE SENSOR ACTIVATIONS, CALENDAR**

**YEAR 1970/1971**

**TARGETS DETECTED** ——— **1970** **FIRE MISSIONS** - - - - -  
**TARGETS DETECTED** ——— **1971** **FIRE MISSIONS** - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
<b>1970</b>													
TGT DETEC	190	67	145	116	62	28	67	14	9	6	3	9	720
FIRE MSNS	152	58	117	94	56	18	59	10	6	1	3	0	574
CONF KIA	2	0	8	14	15	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	41
<b>1971</b>													
TGT DETEC	37	11											( 48)
FIRE MSNS	11	2											( 13)
CONF KIA	8	0											( 8)

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PRECIPITATION, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Precipitation in Quang Nam Province continued to decline during February 1971. Seasonal precipitation in Quang Nam Province is associated with the Northeast Monsoon which prevails from September through January. The rainy season drew to a close in January 1971 with a 0.85 inches, followed by 0.53 inches in February 1971, totalling 1.38 inches for the two months, a significant decrease from the comparable period in 1969 (5.56 inches) and 1970 (4.70 inches).

Monthly rain accumulated during 1969 varied sharply from the mean only during the peak accumulation in October when 39.97 inches of rain were recorded. Monthly rainfall during 1970 corresponded closely to mean monthly totals. Cumulative precipitation for the year was approximately five inches below the norm.


During the monsoon season, frequent occurrences of rain, fog and low visibility allow the enemy an opportunity to move with a greater degree of freedom from friendly air and ground observation. Conversely, wet weather has a detrimental effect on enemy movement due to swollen streams and inundated lowlands. Deterioration of food, ordnance, and other supply caches during the 1970 monsoon season has contributed significantly to the difficulties encountered by enemy forces in the province. The enemy has, and may be expected to continue to increase his logistic activities in an endeavor to recoup the losses to his supply base.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). PRECIPITATION IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PRECIPITATION IN INCHES: 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - - 1971 ———  
27 YEAR MONTHLY MEAN (INCHES): ▽ (MEAN LOCATED AT LOWER VERTEX)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCHES	5.52	0.04	0.12	0.57	2.32	2.98	6.04	TRACE	12.80	39.97	10.09	3.97	84.42
1970													
INCHES	3.82	0.88	0.03	2.45	1.92	4.74	1.13	4.70	12.92	24.61	10.27	11.23	78.70
1971													
CHES	0.85	0.53											(1.38)
27 YEAR MONTHLY MEAN													
INCHES	4.2	1.8	0.9	1.3	2.6	2.8	2.8	4.7	15.7	23.3	15.1	8.7	83.9

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ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DIVISION TAOR, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

Overall enemy activity continued, when considering the long run, to decline in February 1971, although limited increases in certain statistics over figures for December 1970 and January 1971 were observed. The number of enemy sighted during the month declined slightly to 1,146 from the 1,394 sighted during the previous month. The February figure was just under half the monthly average (2,568) for 1970. The enemy fired 69 mortar rounds, 21 rockets and 4 lob bombs at friendly positions during the month. The 94 rounds received equalled the totals for December 1970 (48) and January 1971 (46) combined. The increase in rounds received can be attributed to the high points in activity in connection with initial periods of Phase I and Phase II of the enemy's spring offensive. Decreases over the long run can be attributed to the enemy's forced reversion to guerrilla warfare tactics which were prevalent prior to the large scale commitment of North Vietnamese Army forces in 1965. The enemy continued in January 1971 to reduce the number of his offensive actions using NVA units, concentrating instead on the disruption of the GVN pacification effort, terrorism and the employment of Local Forces. Therefore, his overt presence in the lowlands continued to decline significantly.

The number of enemy sighted by 1st Marine Division units during 1970 steadily dropped throughout the year 1970 as illustrated by the high of 4,425 enemy observed in January in comparison to the 2,785 sighted during the last quarter of the year (October, November, December). This reflects the enemy's overall strength decline in the province (See Tab 2-1) and also reveals his reluctance to jeopardize his remaining forces. While sightings increased slightly in January 1971 (1,394), and decreased in February 1971 (1,146). This could be attributed to XXIV Corps temporary AO extension and redeployment of 1st Marine Division units. However sightings in Quang Nam Province are almost certain to increase, but not reach the levels observed in 1969 or early 1970 (See Tab 2-6b).

Enemy efficiency in the employment of mortars has deteriorated as evidenced by the inaccurate fire reported by units in the 1st Marine Division TAOR during recent months. His mortars have been used primarily as a harassing weapon since the enemy has not elected to commit sizable forces in an offensive role. As is true of rocket attacks, mortar attacks are timed to coincide with general offensive surges. With the expenditure of only 66 mortar rounds during November and December, this total represents approximately 2.7% of the number of rounds expended throughout 1970 and further illustrates a decrease in enemy activity. In January 1971, 46 mortar rounds were expended and 69 in February 1971, indicating no significant change in the enemy's employment of mortars, although February was the third consecutive month the enemy has increased his expenditure of mortar rounds (See Tab 2-6a).

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The use of lob bombs is almost entirely for purpose of harassment. The round, composed of a crudely fuzed artillery round or aerial bomb lofted in the general direction of a target with a charge of explosive, may travel as far as 600 meters. It is a grossly inaccurate system, and the round is often a dud (See Tab 2-6a).

In order for him to implement his strategy of guerrilla warfare, the enemy has continued to employ rockets against area targets, a tactic which serves as an excellent psychological weapon. Since he has neither the logistical system nor combat capability to employ rockets as a medium of close combat support, the enemy has used rockets as a medium to intimidate the civilian population and to a lesser degree, FWMAF. The pattern of rocket attacks conforms closely to surges and ebbs of the enemy's campaigns. (During the month of January 1970, the months of April and May, and the period August through October, the enemy attempted to increase his offensive activity. Consequently, of the 228 rockets launched during 1970, 185 were fired during these three periods). In February 1971, the enemy launched 21 rockets. There is no evidence that the effectiveness of enemy rocket units will improve in 1971 (See Tab 2-6a).

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ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS, AND LOB BOMBS RECEIVED, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The employment of rockets, mortars and lob bombs by the enemy in Quang Nam Province remained at a low level during February 1971, during which 69 mortar rounds were fired in stand-off attacks on friendly positions (an increase of 23 over the previous month). Twenty-one rockets were fired (none were fired in January 1971), and 4 lob bombs were employed (none were employed the previous 2 months). As can be easily seen, mortar rounds continue to be, by far, the largest medium of enemy firepower, but these mortar attacks are primarily harassing in nature and are rarely followed by infantry or sapper exploitation. The increase in number of enemy rockets expended can be laid to the high points in activity in connection with initial periods of Phase I and Phase II of his K800 spring offensive.

Enemy employment of rockets during 1970 varied from a high during April, when 58 were expended, to two months (March and July) in which no rockets were fired in Quang Nam Province. Rocket attacks have been directed primarily against Danang and its environs, and while they frequently are planned for periods of low lunar illumination, the enemy's ability to launch such attacks is largely governed by his ability to avoid FWMAF/ARVN detection while attempting to establish launch sites. Preemptive small unit operations in the "Danang Rocket Belt" have contributed significantly toward denying the enemy sufficient opportunity to prepare multiple firing positions within range of lucrative targets. Rockets have also been employed recently against Hill 52 and Thuong Duc Ranger Border Defense Camp, both located in the Thuong Duc Corridor. By virtue of occupying dominant terrain, the enemy has a higher degree of selectivity in choosing firing sites within this area, however, the inherent inaccuracy of this weapon renders it relatively ineffective when fired in small quantities. When afforded the opportunity, the enemy will continue to fire rockets in small numbers, and employment in 1971 will probably reflect a low level of intensity similar to that observed in 1970. Tab 2-6 also discusses enemy rocket employment.

Enemy employment of mortars during 1970 commenced with a high of 621 rounds expended in January 1970 followed by a steady decline that resulted in a mere 25 and 41 rounds fired during November and December, respectively. From January through December the average monthly expenditure was some 85 rounds per month. This is in consonance with the evidence of declining enemy activity throughout the province; friendly small unit operations have denied the enemy opportunity to conduct sustained barrages without detection, consequently the mortar team must resort to short-duration employment and resultant ineffectiveness. Although local shortages of mortar rounds are apparent in some instances, this situation usually results from logistic interdiction by FWMAF/ARVN Forces and does not

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necessarily reflect a province-wide ordnance shortage. Mortar tubes, while sufficient in quantity, are considered too valuable to risk capture and therefore are employed sparingly. In the foreseeable future, the enemy can be expected to employ his mortars in a cautious fashion, choosing to jeopardize neither men nor weapons for the sake of limited results. Mortar attacks are predicted to remain harassing in nature. Additional comments on enemy mortar employment are contained in Tab 2-6.

Employment of lob bombs during the past thirteen months has varied from a high during June, when 27 were expended, to four months (February, April, December 1970 and January 1971) in which no lob bombs were employed in Quang Nam Province. As portrayed by the graph, the only pattern in evidence is a usage that appears to vary in inverse proportion to the expenditure of rockets or mortar rounds, thereby superficially indicating a "gap filler" weapon encountered during periods when conventional stand-off attacks by fire have declined. Despite such a pattern, there is no amplifying evidence to support this trend, and it is generally concluded that lob bombs are employed in random fashion by guerrilla forces. Although this crude weapon lends little to the enemy's supporting arms capability, it will probably continue to be employed infrequently by guerrillas as a harassing technique. Tab 2-6 also addresses lob bomb employment.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS AND LOB BOMBS RECEIVED

DURING ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

ROUNDS RECEIVED: 1970

1971

[illegible]

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ENEMY SIGHTED VS ENEMY KIA/ATTACKS BY FIRE, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The total number of enemy sighted in February 1971, was 1,146, representing a decrease over December's 1,331 and January's (1971) 1,394. This figure remained well below the 1970 monthly average of 2,688. As the monsoon season faded out in January 1971, sightings increased slightly and in February decreased. The explanation for this reduction could be twofold. The first reason may be the continuing decline in enemy strength in the province (See Tab 2-1), while the second may be a combination of the XXIV Corps temporary AO extension, the retrograding of the integrated observation device at Ross and the set of ship's binoculars at Ryder, and the redeployment of other 1st Marine Division units, thereby reducing the area in which, and the means through which enemy may be sighted. February also saw a total of 69 mortar rounds, 21 rockets and 4 lob bombs expended by the enemy (See Tab 2-6a) and a total of 139 of his soldiers killed (See Tab 3-3a).

The number of enemy sighted monthly throughout the Division TAOR declined rather steadily throughout 1970. This decline is attributed to the enemy's reluctance to commit NVA or MF units in the lowlands because of, or in addition to, his deteriorating strength. Adverse weather and inundation during the Northeast Monsoon (See Tab 2-5) also hampered enemy movement, thereby accounting for the low sighting totals in October and November (878 and 576, respectively).

Concurrent with the diminishing number of sightings, enemy ordnance expenditure (rockets, mortar rounds, lob bombs) likewise declined throughout most of 1970. While the enemy expended 658 assorted rounds in January 1970, only 48 and 46 rounds were expended in December 1970 and January 1971, respectively, and 94 rounds in February 1971. Reasons for this markedly reduced expenditure are largely attributed to the same reasons cited above. A more detailed evaluation of the enemy's ordnance expenditure is incorporated as Tab 2-6a.

As sightings and other evidence of enemy activity decreased, there has been a commensurate decline in enemy KIAs. There was an appreciable and steady reduction in the intensity of combat in Quang Nam Province during 1970, and it is apparent that the enemy chose to avoid contact in order to conserve forces that have already suffered heavy attrition. The present low level of enemy activity is expected to continue in 1971 as the enemy's efforts are directed toward rebuilding a depleted infrastructure and procuring food for residual NVA and MF units.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). ENEMY SIGHTED VERSUS ENEMY KIA/ORDNANCE

CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

1970	ENEMY SIGHTED	=====	ENEMY KIA	----	ENEMY ORDNANCE	●-----●
1971	ENEMY SIGHTED	=====	ENEMY KIA	----	ENEMY ORDNANCE	●-----●

[illegible]

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G-3 OVERVIEW

After a minor upsurge in both friendly and enemy activity in the 1st Marine Division Area of Operations during January 1971, a decline ensued in February 1971 below the low point established in December 1970. When comparing February's figures with the monthly averages for the past 25 months, one sees the downward trend in activity continuing.

Both friendly and enemy casualties decreased in February, with USMC/USN KIA and WIA running 9 and 128, respectively, compared to 15 and 136 in January 1971. Enemy troops killed in action fell from 211 to 139, while enemy weapons losses dropped from 80 individual and 6 crew-served weapons captured to 50 and 2, respectively.

Mines and booby traps continued to take their toll of Division personnel in February. Such devices claimed 63 casualties in February compared to 72 the preceding month. The 63 casualties were caused by the 33 devices, while 74 mines or booby traps were found and rendered harmless by Division troops, resulting in a find/detonation ratio of 2.24:1. The figures for both finds and detonations represent decreases from January; however, the 2.24:1 ratio is less favorable, after having improved throughout 1970 to a December ratio of 4.00:1.

Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units continued, throughout February 1971, to provide a measure of security to over 31,000 people located in some of the more remote hamlets of Quang Nam Province. The disestablishment of four CUPPs during the month notwithstanding, there was no degradation in security of the hamlets involved, since these combined Marine and territorial force elements had succeeded in upgrading the hamlets to a level of B on the HES scale. The level of action diminished sharply in February; however, CUPP patrols and ambushes decreased Quang Nam's enemy population by 49 (37 killed and 12 captured), while sustaining one Marine killed and 15 wounded during the same period.

All statistics in the area of supporting arms employment and helicopter usage (with the single exception of fixed wing sorties) experienced decreases. Artillery and Naval gunfire expenditures were down from 35,400 artillery rounds and 295 rounds of naval ordnance in January 1971 to 31,362 and zero in February 1971, respectively. Aircraft employment in support of the Division included 413 fighter/attack sorties (up from 379) and 5,278 hours of helicopter flight time (down from 5,431), during which 31,935 passengers and 2,000 tons of cargo were carried (down from 37,537 and 2,259, respectively).

As was mentioned above, comparison of February's statistics with those of past months continues to provide solid evidence of a downward trend in activity in the Division AO. In addition, similar comparisons can be made in the area of relative combat effectiveness. In table I following average statistics for January and February 1971 are compared to average statistics for the last six months of 1970, the six months previous to that (January - June 1970) and the twelve months of 1969.

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TABLE II. Comparison of 1971 statistics to those of several periods in 1970 and 1969.

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>AVG JAN</u> <u>-FEB 71</u>	<u>AVG JUL</u> <u>-DEC 70</u>	<u>COMPARE</u> <u>TO 1971</u>	<u>AVG JAN</u> <u>-JUN 70</u>	<u>COMPARE</u> <u>TO 1971</u>	<u>AVG</u> <u>OF 1969</u>	<u>COMPARE</u> <u>TO 1971</u>
Frndly KIA	12	20	-40%	47	-74%	88	-86%
Enemy KIA	175	213	-18%	658	-66%	804	-78%
Frndly WIA	132	181	-27%	423	-69%	774	-83%
Enemy IWC	65	76	-14%	138	-53%	189	-66%
Enemy CSWC	4	6	-33%	11	-64%	20	-80%
CUPP KIA	1	1	0	6	-83%	3	-67%
CUPP WIA	20	11	+82%	22	-9%	13	+54%
En KIA to CUPP	50	21	+138%	25	+100%	20	+150%
PW/HoiCh to CUPP	12	13	-8%	16	-25%	29	-59%
M/BT Found	95	112	-15%	206	-54%	195	-51%
M/BT Detonated	35	52	-49%	110	-68%	107	-54%
Ratio F/D	2.72	2.18	+25%	1.86	+46%	1.83	+48%
Arty Ammo Exp	33381	73702	-55%	148490	-78%	168138	-80%
NGF Ammo Exp	148	911	-84%	3393	-96%	5501	-97%
Ship-Days NGF	2	10	-80%	25	-92%	31	-94%
Fx Wg Sorties	396	490	-19%	937	-58%	1743	-77%
Helo Hours	5354	5895	-9%	7182	-25%	8074	-21%
Helo Pax	34736	46295	-25%	60823	-43%	53335	-35%
Helo Cargo	2130	3077	-31%	4442	-52%	6551	-67%

Perusal of the table above lends credence to the conclusion that most activity in the Division AO, both friendly and enemy, is at a level well below that of previous months and, in addition, the trend in most statistics is gradually downward (e.g., friendly KIA have fallen from an average of 88 per month in 1969 to 47 per month for the first half of 1970 to 20 per month for the last half of 1970 to 12 per month for the first two months of 1971). Furthermore, because statistics reflecting favorably on Division performance tend to be decreasing less rapidly than adverse statistics (e.g., enemy KIA are decreasing less rapidly than friendly KIA), the excellent relative combat effectiveness of the Division continues to improve.

As the Division's operations in the Republic of Vietnam draw to a close during the next few weeks, turbulence associated with redeployment renders prediction difficult, if not impossible. However, the Division should continue to maintain its excellent combat record in all circumstances.

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FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

During February 1971, friendly casualties decreased from January 1971 totals. In February, 9 Marines were killed and 128 wounded in action compared to 15 killed and 136 wounded in January 1971. January's figures reflected the upsurge in enemy activity brought on by the end of the rainy season and the traditional increase in activity associated with the Lunar New Year. From February's figures it is apparent that the casualty trend is still definitely downward. February 1971 casualty statistics represent a decrease of approximately 32% from the monthly average for the last half of 1970, 71% from the first half. This gives an indication of the progressive nature of the reduction in casualties overall. However, mines and booby traps continued to claim almost 50% of the total casualties (See Section 3-2), as they did throughout 1970.

At present, it is difficult to predict the nature and frequency of future casualties. Losses can be expected to decline as any redeployments occur, but the intensity of enemy activity is a variable which, of course, must be considered. If he were to increase his activity significantly, it is quite possible that friendly casualties would rise.

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CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY KILLED IN ACTION, YEARS 1969/1970/1971

February 1971 produced 9 USMC/USN killed in action, a decrease of six from the 15 killed in January 1971, continuing to demonstrate that the trend of a decreasing number of friendly deaths established over the past two years remains valid. During 1970, an average of 34 men were killed per month, while the average for 1969 was 88 per month, both numbers significantly greater than the average thus far in 1971 (12 per month).

Of the 9 killed in February, only three died as the result of surprise firing devices (See Tab 3-2a) compared to the four who were killed by booby traps in January. One CUPP Marine was killed during February (See Tab 3-4c). This result follows from the trend established over the previous five months, during which time period not more than one CUPP member has been killed in any one month.

As discussed in Tab 3-1, present low casualty rates are expected to continue.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE USMC KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 KIA

1970 KIA

1971 KIA



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 KIA	94	139	103	88	147	106	63	129	47	38	55	42	1,051
% CMD	.39	.57	.42	.37	.62	.45	.27	.57	.19	.13	.18	.14	.36
70 KIA	53	61	50	44	24	51	19	33	20	18	19	11	403
% CMD	.19	.23	.21	.20	.11	.24	.09	.17	.12	.14	.15	.09	.16
71 KIA	15	9											( 24 )
% CMD	.12	.09											(.11)

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CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY WOUNDED IN ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In February 1971, 128 Division personnel were wounded in action, a decrease of eight from the 136 who were wounded in January 1971. As was the case with KIAs, this casualty rate was a decrease from the average for the past six months (181) and for the year 1970 (302) overall, which in turn, was a significant decline from the average for 1969 (774). Therefore, the downward trend in battle casualties in the 1st Marine Division remains valid.

Approximately half of those men wounded in February 1971 became casualties as a result of surprise firing devices (SFD) (See Tab 3-2a), while in January exactly half those wounded were the result of SFD. Fifteen CUPP members were wounded in action during the month, compared to 25 the previous month.

Although casualties (both killed and wounded) depend largely on enemy activity and this is not completely predictable, there is no apparent reason why the present trend of diminishing casualties should not continue.

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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE USMC WOUNDED IN ACTION, CALENDAR**


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE USMC WOUNDED IN ACTION, CALENDAR

**YEARS 1969/1970/1971**

1969 WIA (CUM)

1970 WIA (CUM)

1971 WIA (CUM)

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MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

As has been established previously, the level of both friendly and enemy activity has progressively decreased (See Section G-2 and the other tabs in Section G-3), but mines and booby traps continue to claim a virtually unchanging proportion of the total casualties suffered by the Division. Sixty-three of the 137 Division casualties in February 1971 were the result of the detonation of 33 surprise firing devices. Thus, mine and booby trap casualties for the month represented 46.0% of total casualties, the ninth month since the beginning of 1970 during which surprise firing devices caused between 40% and 50% of Division casualties. Additionally, the 33 detonations and 63 casualties therefrom produced a ratio of 1.9 casualties per detonation, the third consecutive month during which this ratio obtained and, as was the case in January, equalling the annual ratio for 1970.

Because of the precipitous drop in the number of SFDs found during February, the find to detonation ratio fell for the second straight month (from 3.19:1 in January to 2.24:1 in February). However, February's ratio was still above the ratio for the last six months of 1970 (2.18:1) and well above the annual ratios for 1970 (1.96:1) and 1969 (1.83:1).

The enemy's present modus operandi (guerrilla tactics) almost dictates that the proportion of total casualties caused by surprise firing devices will remain relatively large, but the Division continues to pursue a vigorous counter-SFD program and, with any luck whatsoever, March 1971, should produce at least as high a ratio of finds to detonations as February.

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CASUALTIES FROM MINES/BOOBY TRAPS, CALENDAR YEAR 1969/1970/1971

In February 1971, the number of casualties suffered by the Division because of the detonation of surprise firing devices decreased, from the 72 in January 1971, to 63. The number of casualties, while lower than January, were greater than the average of 54 per month for the last three months of 1970.

The decrease in February 1971, discussed above can be attributed to a decrease in the number of mines/booby traps detonated, which fell to 33 from the 37 detonated in January (See Tab 3-2c). This frequency of detonation yielded 1.9 casualties per detonation, equal to January's figure and to the annual rate for the year 1970.

In the present volatile situation, with the enemy attempting to mount a Spring campaign, predictions concerning casualties and casualty rates are, at best, risky. However, the Division's efforts to counter the enemy's surprise firing devices (See Tab 3-2c) should keep casualties reasonably low; at worst not exceeding the relatively high totals for January and February.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES BY MINES/BOOBY TRAPS.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 CASUALTIES (CUM)

1970 CASUALTIES (CUM)

1971 CASUALTIES (CUM)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 KIA	9	4	9	11	22	17	13	17	15	14	16	19	166
WIA	108	46	74	211	202	242	191	236	174	114	133	227	1,958
TOTAL	117	50	83	222	224	259	204	253	189	128	149	246	2,124
CAS/DET	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.0	1.7	2.0	1.6
% CMD	.49	.21	.30	.93	.94	1.10	.87	1.11	.78	.42	.48	.83	
70 KIA	18	31	28	18	9	23	11	17	12	6	3	8	184
WIA	249	205	197	172	137	175	167	130	107	48	52	45	1,684
TOTAL	267	236	225	190	146	198	178	147	119	54	55	53	1,868
CAS/DET	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.4	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.7	1.9	1.9
% CMD	.97	.88	.96	.87	.66	.94	.83	.74	.73	.43	.44	.42	.74
71 KIA	4	3											(7)
WIA	68	60											(128)
TOTAL	72	63											(135)
CAS/DET	1.9	1.9											(1.9)
% CMD	.57	.60											(.56)

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PERCENTAGE OF MINE/BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES TO TOTAL CASUALTIES.  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

February 1971, <sup>↓</sup> produced 63 casualties from mines/booby traps. This figure represents 46.0% of the total number of casualties suffered by the Division for the month. This percentage, a decrease from the percentage for January 1971 (47.6%), remained close to the annual percentage of 1970 (46.4%), and was the ninth month since the beginning of 1970 during which the percentage ranged between 40% and 50%.

Marked changes in this percentage may be expected from month to month because the absolute numbers with which we are dealing have been greatly reduced from those in 1969 and the first half of 1970. For example, from January through June 1970, total casualties each month exceeded 400 and the percentage caused by surprise firing devices varied from 35.1% to 49.4%, a range of 14.3 percentage points. The last half of 1970, on the other hand, was marked by total casualties well below 400 and the percentage ranged from 36.8% to 62.2%, a range of 25.4 percentage points. However, thus far in 1971, the percentage has remained virtually steady, low casualty totals notwithstanding.

Total casualties in the future should continue to occur at the present relatively reduced rate. However, because much of Division activity will be in the lowlands in future weeks (where surprise firing devices are more likely to be emplaced), a mean percentage in excess of 50% may be expected.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), MINE AND BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES EXPRESSED ASA PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 PERCENTAGE

1970 PERCENTAGE

1971 PERCENTAGE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TOT CAS	857	1033	1066	930	1346	999	666	1333	856	347	450	454	10,337
M/BT CAS	117	50	83	222	224	259	204	253	189	128	149	246	2,124
% M/BT	13.7	4.8	7.8	23.9	16.7	25.9	30.6	19.0	22.2	36.9	33.2	54.2	20.6
1970													
TOT CAS	558	501	496	448	416	401	286	307	212	147	120	136	4,028
M/BT CAS	267	236	225	190	146	198	178	147	119	54	55	53	1,868
% M/BT	47.8	47.1	45.4	42.4	35.1	49.4	62.2	47.9	56.1	36.8	45.8	39.0	46.4
1971													
TOT CAS	151	137											(288)
M/ BT CAS	72	63											(135)
% M/BT	47.6	46.0											(46.9)

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COMPARISON OF MINES/BOOBY TRAPS FOUND TO THOSE DETONATED, CALENDAR YEARS  
1969/1970/1971

During February 1971, the number of surprise firing devices found and destroyed decreased significantly (from 116 in January to 74), while the number detonated with resulting casualties fell much less rapidly (from 37 to 33). This situation produced a find to detonation ratio for February of 2.24:1, a sizable decrease from January's 3.19:1 and the record high (for the 26 months considered herein) of 4.00:1 in December 1970.

February was a particularly unfortunate month for the Division. During one three day period, a single company, operating in an area sown densely with booby traps, had the misfortune to detonate eleven such devices. Twenty-four men were wounded and evacuated as a result of these detonations. Had it not been for this uncommon event, the Division's mine/booby trap statistics for February would have been much more favorable, the find to detonation ratio exceeding that of January and the number of casualties per detonation below the comparable ratio for January.

The Division continues to pursue a vigorous counter-SFD program, including the week-long Mine Warfare School, the contact team travelling to all units of the Division to familiarize the individual Marine with the techniques of discovery and avoidance of surprise firing devices, and the extensive use of dogs, as well as close command attention. This program should provide the incentive and the means for reducing such casualties to a minimum in the future, but everything in the area of mines and booby traps depends ultimately on the attention paid the problem by the Marine in the field and his commander.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). RATIO OF MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS FOUND TOMINES AND BOOBY TRAPS DETONATED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

RATIO FOUND/DETONATED 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - - 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
FOUND	66	90	114	141	218	277	196	199	272	242	254	274	2,343
DETONATED	73	29	49	166	125	142	147	161	116	63	88	121	1,290
RATIO F/D	0.82	3.10	2.33	0.85	1.74	1.95	1.33	1.24	1.64	3.84	2.88	2.26	1.83
1970													
FOUND	294	284	170	153	162	170	119	144	120	76	103	112	1,907
DETONATED	135	119	117	89	103	100	98	77	51	27	29	28	973
RATIO F/D	2.18	2.38	1.45	1.56	1.57	1.70	1.21	1.87	2.35	2.82	3.55	4.00	1.96
1971													
FOUND	116	74											(190)
DETONATED	37	33											(70)
RATIO F/D	3.14	2.24											(2.72)

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ENEMY LOSSES

February 1971, produced 139 enemy killed in action and the capture of 50 of his individual weapons and 2 crew-served weapons. In all three categories there were decreases from the previous month (January 1971), during which 211 enemy were killed, 80 individual and 6 crew-served weapons captured.

Comparison of the change in enemy losses to the change in friendly losses (See Tabs G-3 and 3-1) reflects favorably on the Division in the area of relative combat effectiveness. Comparing the last half of 1970 (monthly averages) to the first two months of 1971 (monthly averages), one sees that friendly KIA have decreased by 40% (20 to 12) and friendly WIA have decreased by 27 (181 to 132), while enemy KIA have fallen by only 18% (213 to 175). There is no reason to believe that this trend (friendly casualties falling more rapidly than enemy casualties) will not continue in the future.

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CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The enemy lost 139 men killed in action during February 1971, compared to a total of 211 killed during January, a decrease of 35%. Over the same period, friendly KIA decreased from 15 to 9, a decrease of 40%. These figures, used to construct a "kill ratio", convert to a ratio of just over 15 enemy to each friendly KIA for February and just over 14 to one for January, a slight increase. If one computes the rate for the last six months of 1970 (under 11 to one), we see that this statistic is progressing favorably for the Division.

The number of enemy casualties in the future will depend almost entirely upon his own actions. If he exposes himself to observation or attempts to press ground attacks on friendly positions, he must expect to lose a number of troops. However, if he continues the more or less covert method of operations, his casualties should remain in the vicinity of 200 or less per month.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 ENEMY KIA

1970 ENEMY KIA

1971 ENEMY KIA

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CUMULATIVE ENEMY INDIVIDUAL/CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED  
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In February 1971, the enemy lost 50 individual and 2 crew-served weapons, figures less than the 1970 monthly averages and the January figures of 80 individual and 6 crew-served weapons captured. The enemy lost an average of 107 individual and 9 crew-served weapons monthly through 1970, compared to monthly averages of 190 and 20 in 1969, representing decreases of 44% and 56%, respectively. When these figures are compared to the reduction in enemy KIA of 46% (See Tab 3-3a), it is apparent that the enemy was more successful at conserving crew-served weapons than he was his soldiers' lives. This could indicate either the enemy's inability to equip properly his troops or his unwillingness to jeopardize precious weapons. Another possible explanation is that a number of the groups of enemy engaged in 1970 were resupply parties including a sizeable percentage of unarmed bearers. The trend toward a lower number of enemy weapons losses is expected to continue during the remainder of 1971.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED,CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 IWC —————

1970 IWC - - - - -

1971 IWC —————



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EN IWC	422	221	216	230	194	162	87	174	111	81	256	114	2,268
1970													
EN IWC	206	83	68	208	146	115	122	72	55	58	60	87	1,260
1971													
EN IWC	80	50											(130)

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 CSWC

1971 CSWC

1970 CSWC



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EN CSWC	8	41	29	47	30	19	5	17	11	6	19	2	234
1970													
EN CSWC	11	3	7	30	6	9	11	8	2	3	3	9	102
1971													
EN CSWC	6	2											(8)

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COMBINED UNIT PACIFICATION PROGRAM

In sharp contrast to that experienced during December and January, the level of combat action involving Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units declined substantially in February, as the enemy showed little inclination to engage these ubiquitous CUPP patrols and ambushes. Nevertheless, through comprehensive saturation operations and assiduous employment of supporting arms firepower, CUPP forces took 49 enemy out of action (37 killed and 12 captured), while also seizing eight weapons; one Marine was killed and 15 wounded during the month's fighting. Again, the bulk of the action was concentrated in the Golf CUPP (5th Marines) area, where the Marines and their territorial force counterparts have recorded marked success in upgrading the security of an area previously considered under enemy domination.

Since its inception in November 1969, CUPP has brought an increased measure of security to over 31,000 Vietnamese people, providing an atmosphere for growth of GVN strength in heretofore VC-dominated regions. Composed of Marine infantry squads integrated with Vietnamese Regional or Popular Force Platoons, there have been as many as 24 CUPPs performing their mission in a like number of hamlets. Initially assigned to marginally secure or insecure hamlets (rated C or below on the Hamlet Evaluation System scale), these CUPP units have formed a viable screen behind which pacification and rural development flourish at the grass roots level of Vietnamese society. February saw a reduction in the size of the program, as four CUPP units (those in Hoa Yen, Nghia Nam, Phu Thung, and Quan Nam hamlets) in the 1st Marines AO were disestablished, having accomplished their mission by elevating these hamlets to a B grade on the HES scale. Due to impending redeployment of Marines from RVN, no new CUPP units were established; for the same reason, all ten Golf CUPP units will be disestablished during 1 - 3 March, with the 1st Marines' Thuong Duc CUPPs likewise dissolving on the 15th.

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HAMLET POPULATION UNDER CUPP INFLUENCE, AND INCREASE IN POPULATION  
IN SECURE HAMLETS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

On 13 February, CUPPs were disestablished in Hoa Yen, Phu Thung, and Nghia Nam (all located just to the south of Hill 37), and two days later on the 15th, the CUPP unit in Quan Nam (a mile and a half southwest of Nam O Bridge) followed suit. No adverse effect on the population influenced by CUPP resulted from the dissolution of these units; to the contrary, the actions of these CUPP units over the past year were the instrument by which all four of the above cited hamlets achieved secure status. Overall, more than 13,000 Vietnamese now reside in hamlets upgraded to HES ratings of A and B as a result of CUPP influence. During February, Bich Bac hamlet, located one mile north of Hill 55, advanced from D to C grade on the HES scale, leaving but two CUPP hamlets (nearby Bich Nam and Phu Trach in Golf CUPP AO) rated below C.

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
## 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). HAMLET POPULATION UNDER CUPP INFLUENCE AND

INCREASE IN POPULATION IN SECURE HAMLETS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) ===== 1970 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) -----

SCTY INCREASED (CUM) ===== SCTY INCREASED (CUM) -----

1971 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) ----- 1971 SCTY INCREASED (CUM) -----



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INFLUENCE											4016	5062	
SCTY INCR												1724	
CUM INCR												1724	
GR TOT INC												1724	
1970													
INFLUENCE	17904	18886	23081	24658	23067	24361	30148	30361	31411	28391	28559	31672	
SCTY INCR	1397		4235		5569				306	-852		3113	
CUM INCR	1397		5632		11201				11507	10655		13768	
GR TOT INC	3121		7356		12925				13231	12379		15492	
1971													
INFLUENCE	31342	31799											
SC INCR		457											
CUM INCR		457											
GRTOTINC	15492	15949											

GR TOT INC = GRAND TOTAL INCREASE IN SECURE POPULATION

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CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND PERCENTAGE OF CATEGORY C OR BELOW HAMLETS COVERED  
BY CUPP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Four CUPP units were disestablished during February 1971, reducing the number of CUPPS in operation to 17. Normally assigned to Category C or below hamlets (Hamlet Evaluation System ratings - hamlets rated A or B are considered secure with reasonably strong political development in progress), CUPP units provide local security while ferreting out the remaining Viet Cong and Viet Cong infrastructure and securing vital lines of communication. Over 13,000 people now live in hamlets upgraded to HES ratings of A or B as a result of CUPP influence.

The CUPP program is presently being phased out because of redeployment. Table III below gives the status of the CUPP units in operation at the beginning of February.

TABLE III. Status of CUPP units.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HAMLET</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STATUS (28 FEB 71)</u>
2/4/1	Quan Nam	AT 9081	Already Disestablished
3/3/M	Hoa Yen	AT 9155	"
2/3/M	Phu Thung	AT 9155	"
1/3/M	Nhgia Nam	AT 9056	"
Golf 1	Son Phong	BT 0737	Disestablish 3 March 71
Golf 2	Phuoc Thuong	BT 0839	"
Golf 3	An Xuan	BT 0840	"
Golf 4	Xuan Phuoc	BT 1041	"
Golf 5	Thach Khe/ Phu Cuong	BT 1243	"
Golf 6	Phu Trach/ Huong Hoa	BT 1046	"
Golf 7	Huong Quan	BT 1446	"
Golf 8	Phu Trach	BT 1048	"
Golf 9	Mong Lanh	BT 1350	"
Golf 10	Duong Mong	BT 0950	"
1/4/M	Phu Huong	AT 8253	Disestablish 15 March 71
2/4/M	Lam Phung	AT 8255	"
3/4/M	Ha Nha	AT 8054	"
1/2/M	Bich Nam	AT 9963	Disestablish 15 April 71
2/1/M	Bich Bac	AT 9863	"
3/2/M	Thai Cam	AT 9763	"
2/2/M	Le Son	AT 9865	"

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND % OF CATEGORY C

OR BELOW HAMLETS COVERED BY CUPPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 # OF CUPP UNITS

1970 # OF CUPP UNITS

1971 # OF CUPP UNITS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CUPP ESTE											3	5	8
TOT CUPPS											3	8	
% COVRG											1.0	1.6	2.6
CUM %											1.0	2.6	
1970													
CUPP ESTE	11	3								-1		1	14
TOT CUPPS	19	22								21		22	
% COVRG	3.6	1.0								-0.3		0.3	4.6
CUM %	6.2	7.2								6.9		7.2	
1971													
CUPP ESTE	-1	-4											(-5)
TOT CUPPS	21	17											
% COVRG	-0.3	-1.3											(-1.6)
CUM %	6.9	5.6											

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CUPP CASUALTIES VS ENEMY LOSSES TO CUPP

During February, CUPP offensive action accounted for 37 enemy killed and another 12 captured, while Marine casualties were one killed and 15 wounded. While the number of enemy killed by the CUPP units in February was just slightly more than half of January's 63, the total represented some 31% of the enemy killed by 1st Marine Division units during the month -- this despite the fact that less than 10% of the Division's infantry assets are employed in the CUPP role. Thus far in 1971, CUPP units have killed 100 enemy soldiers, nearly 30% of the total (350) registered by the 1st Marine Division during this two-month period.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUPP CASUALTIES VS ENEMY LOSSES TO CUPP.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69CUPP KIA												3	3
CUPP WIA												13	13
TOTAL CUPP												16	16
EN KIA												20	20
PW/HOI												29	29
TOTAL EN												49	49
70CUPP KIA	3	5	3	8	7	8	2	3	1	1	0	1	42
CUPP WIA	35	25	5	15	19	31	16	14	10	9	7	9	195
TOTAL CUPP	38	30	8	23	26	39	18	17	11	10	7	10	237
EN KIA	25	23	27	20	34	23	11	12	19	17	15	54	280
PW/HOI	23	35	28	2	6	3	19	4	1	9	4	42	176
TOTAL EN	48	58	55	22	40	26	30	16	20	26	19	96	456
71CUPPKIA	0	1											( 1 )
CUPPWIA	25	15											( 40 )
TC CUPP	25	16											( 41 )
EN KIA	63	37											( 100 )
PW/HOI	12	12											( 24 )
TOT ENEMY	75	49											( 124 )

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SUPPORTING ARMS

All indicators within the area of fire support to the Division changed from January to February 1971, although the changes were not all in the same sense. While the number of fixed wing fighter/attack sorties increased by 9% (from 379 to 413), artillery ammunition expenditures fell 11% (from 35,400 to 31,362) and no naval gunfire support was used by the Division during February, the first month in at least the last 26 during which such zero use has occurred.

The decreases above can be directly related to the decrease in enemy sightings (down from 1,394 in January to 1,146 in February), whereas the slight increase in fixed wing sorties may be attributed to the increased availability of such aircraft because of poor flying weather elsewhere in Military Region I. Almost a third of the sorties flown in February involved aircraft from sources other than the 1st MAW (U.S. Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force).

The gradually decreasing trend in the volume of ordnance delivered by supporting arms, which started in January 1970, is expected to continue in the coming months. The four factors influencing supporting arms employment are: (1) The scope of enemy activity, (2) The need for fire support by the Division, (3) The diminishing size of the Division Area of Operations, and (4), To a lesser extent, ongoing redeployments as they occur.

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ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED VERSUS ENEMY SIGHTED, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The number of enemy sighted during the month of February 1971 decreased to 1,146 from January's 1,394, a decrease of 18%, while artillery ammunition expenditures decreased from 35,400 to 31,362, a drop of 11%. Most of the decrease in rounds expended can be attributed to a tapering-off of the attack by fire on probable enemy positions in the Charlie Ridge area. During January, over 11,000 rounds were fired in the course of the attack (actually during the last third of the month), while only 5,718 rounds were fired during February. Some of the decrease may be laid to the drop in enemy sightings and the beginning of Increment VI redeployments. During the month, three firing batteries stood down, reducing the average number of pieces available to 66 from 74, where it had stood for the previous four months. (See Tab 3-5b).

Both enemy sighted and ammunition expended fell relatively uniformly from January through November 1970, and then rose in December 1970 and January 1971, before both indicators fell in February. Ammunition expenditures should continue to depend chiefly on enemy activity in the coming months, rising if enemy sighting rise and falling if such manifestations fall.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED VS ENEMY SIGHTED

CALENDAR YEAR 1970/1971

[illegible]

\* AMMO EXPENDED EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS TO NEAREST HUNDRED.

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ARTILLERY PIECES AVAILABLE VERSUS ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED, CALENDAR  
YEARS 1969/1970/1971

February 1971 saw the expenditure of 31,362 rounds of artillery ammunition, a decrease of some 4,000 rounds from January's 35,400. The decrease of 11% was the first since November 1970. Coincidentally, the average number of artillery pieces available to the Division also decreased by 11% during the month, falling from 74 (which had not changed for four months) to 66.

Any correlation between the number of pieces available and the number of rounds expended can only be characterized as very loose. The average number of pieces available monthly rose and fell in a gentle manner during 1969 and, since January 1970, has traced a uniformly non-increasing curve. Expenditures, on the other hand, have fluctuated between increases and decreases from month to month, although a generally falling trend has been established.

Expenditures in the past have been dictated largely by the scope of enemy activity and, more recently, by the selective targetting policy instituted in the latter months of 1970. These two factors should continue to influence ammunition expenditures, further reductions in the number of tubes available serving only to put an upper limit on such expenditures.


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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ARTILLERY PIECES AVAILABLE VS AMMUNITION**

EXPENDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	
69 AMMO	178.2	189.8	158.3	151.7	156.9	184.1	187.1	186.4	132.4	159.4	169.6	163.6	2,017.7	*
PCS 4.2"	30	26	24	20	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24		
105	84	79	78	78	62	66	66	66	66	68	72	72		
155	50	49	42	38	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	***	
8"/175	6/4	6/4	6/7	6/10	6/12	6/12	6/12	6/12	6/12	7/12	12/12	12/12		
TOTAL	174	164	157	152	140	144	144	144	144	147	156	156		
70 AMMO	179.1	156.0	139.6	140.8	145.0	130.4	114.3	127.7	100.9	50.7	21.5	27.0	1,333.0	*
PCS 4.2"	24	24	22	18	18	18	18	18	17	12	12	12		
105	72	72	64	54	54	54	54	54	52	36	36	36		
155	36	36	33	30	26	26	26	26	23	20	20	20	***	
8"/175	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	9/11	6/4	6/0	6/0	6/0		
TOTAL	156	156	143	126	122	122	122	118	102	74	74	74		
71 AMMO	35.4	31.4											(66.8)	*
PCS 4.2"	12	12												
105	36	30												
155	20	18											***	
8"/175	6/0	6/0												
TOTAL	74	66												

\* AMMO EXPENDED EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS TO NEAREST HUNDRED.

\*\*\* AVERAGE NUMBER OF PIECES AVAILABLE DURING A GIVEN MONTH.

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NAVAL GUNFIRE AMMUNITION EXPENDED VS SHIP-DAYS ON STATION, CALENDAR YEARS  
1969/1970/1971

The Division used no naval gunfire support during February 1971. Consequently, both ship-days and ammunition expended fell to zero during the month, supporting (albeit in extremum) the general downward trend in the two indicators established over the preceding 25 months.

The nature of current operations, adverse terrain and the ready availability of artillery limits the usefulness of naval gunfire in the Division Area of Operations, in which such support is being employed only in the Elephant Valley area. This restricted use of such support is occasioned by the prohibitive range to targets in other areas.

Because there exist a limited number of suitable observed targets, NGF is fired primarily on intelligence targets during the hours of darkness, and the nature of the terrain in Elephant Valley limits ground damage assessment. Therefore, the effectiveness of naval gunfire in the current situation is difficult to ascertain.

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
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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) , NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIP-DAYS ON STATION VERSUS**

ROUNDS EXPENDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
RDS EXP	3696	6368	8811	7304	8395	5363	5138	4973	3651	3228	5011	4070	66,008
SHIPDAYS	42	40	37	29	40	33	29	19	26	24	25	29	373
1970													
RDS EXP	5583	4153	3433	3712	2230	1248	2585	807	693	561	605	217	25,827
SHIPDAYS	37	30	33	23	12	13	23	13	9	7	5	4	209
1971													
RDS EXP	295	0											(295)
SHIPDAYS	3	0											(3)

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FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During February 1971, 413 fixed wing sorties were flown in support of the Division, an increase of 34 (9%) over the 379 flown in January, which, in turn registered an increase of 46 (14%) over the figure for December 1970. Thirty-two percent (32%) of February's sorties were flown by aircraft from non-1st MAW sources (USAF, RAAF).

Fighter/attack sorties dropped 26% from November to December 1970. This is directly proportional to a reduction throughout MR-1 (24%) as a result of increased out-of-country activity. The same conditions existed in January and February 1971. Sorties are expected to decrease with the redeployment of VMFA-115 (17 F-4B) and until out-of-country activity is reduced. The significant decrease in fighter/attack sorties flown in October 1969 coincides with the phase-out and withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division, VMFA-334 (F-4 aircraft) and VMA(AW)-553 (A-6 aircraft), and to adverse weather conditions experienced during that month. 1st and 3d Marine Division records were combined by the 1st MAW up to this point. The February 1970 drop represents the departure of MAG-12, while the subsequent increase is related to improved operating weather. Fixed wing sortie rate reductions by the 1st MAW commenced on 17 August 1970, however, any noticeable effects of this policy were combined with the impact of the departure of MAG-13 in October and the deteriorating weather during the rainy season, the weather effects, of course, having a greater effect on fixed wing aircraft than on helicopters. Ground operations do not affect fixed wing aircraft operations as greatly as they do helicopter employment, since the fighter/attack units are normally assigned a fixed number of sorties and any increase in ground activities can be adequately supported by the diversion of aircraft from the attack of intelligence targets.

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
**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES, CALENDAR**

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969

1970

1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	
1969						3071	2465	2701	1619	882	761	700	12199	*
1970	1058	775	992	992	994	812	723	566	497	365	155	333	8,562	
1971	379	413											(792)	

\* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE.

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HELICOPTER SUPPORT

February 1971 exhibited decreases across the board in helicopter support for the 1st Marine Division (drops being recorded from January's figures of more than 150 hours of flight time, 250 tons of cargo carried and 5,000 passengers) as redeployment and realignment affected such support. This gives evidence of reversing the trend of the past two months toward slight increases in all categories brought on by unseasonably favorable flying weather.

Although the helicopter support data for 1969 combined the figures for both 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, 1970 data reflected only 1st Marine Division support and provided an accurate portrayal of Division activity, available air support assets and direct weather effects. In 1970 (and thus far in 1971), 1st Marine Division received 70% of the helicopter flight time flown by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with the remaining 30% going to other units in Military Region I, including I Corps, XXIV Corps and III MAF, although the bulk of the remainder went to 2d ROKMC Brigade.

Helicopter support provided during the month of March 1971 should decline from its present level, varying not only with available operating weather and the activities of the remaining infantry and artillery units, but also with the standdown of additional infantry battalions and artillery batteries.

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HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In February 1971, helicopter flight time in support of the 1st Marine Division declined from January's 5,431 hours to 5,278, apparently arresting a trend toward slightly increasing monthly totals established over the previous three months. The decrease was occasioned by the standdown of an infantry battalion and three artillery firing batteries on 15 February, as well as the standdown of HMM-364 (16 CH-46D aircraft).

The peak months for Division activity, favorable flying weather and maximum asset availability were May, June and July 1970 (although a glance at the graph opposite reveals higher monthly totals in 1969, these totals included support provided 3d Marine Division). A pattern of diminishing flight time began in August 1970 with the departure of HMM-161 (21 CH-46D flying an average of 800 hours per month) and the establishment of the 1st MAW policy of limiting flight hours to reduce and realign helicopter use in consonance with CNO guidelines. The full impact of this policy was felt in September, in addition to the impact of the standdown of the 7th Marines and elements of the 11th Marines. However, reduced air support requirements brought on by the departure of the ground units above and six days of unflyable weather reduced flight time to a level at which 1st MAW utilization policy was no longer significant.

March totals should be further reduced from those of February, since another infantry battalion and three more artillery firing batteries are scheduled to standdown early in the month, and an additional infantry battalion near the middle of the month.

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
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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME, CALENDAR YEARS**

1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 HOURS						11553	9721	9089	7849	6659	5819	5826	56516 *
70 HOURS	6883	5903	6446	7112	8227	8520	8067	7081	5824	4532	4926	4941	78,462
71 HOURS	5431	5278											(10,709)

\*JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

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HELICOPTER PASSENGER TOTALS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The number of helicopter passengers recorded during the month of February 1969 fell to 31,925, a drop of more than 4,000 from the average monthly total for the preceding three months (36,000 plus). This drop may be directly attributed to the standdowns discussed in Tabs 3-6 and 3-6a.

Passenger totals are indicative of a level of activity, but do not address the specific reason for movement. In addition, helicopter after action reporting duplicates passenger counts on subsequent sorties. Therefore, analysis of the data contained herein can yield only the observation that May, June and July 1970 were exceptionally active months for the Division supported by maximum helicopter flight time (See Tab 3-6a). The subsequent precipitous drop and levelling-off were directly related to reduced activity, assets and operating weather.

Redeployment and realignment of forces has already begun and will continue through March 1971. Therefore, the number of passengers carried in March should be below the February total and may be below 25,000.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). HELICOPTER PASSENGERS. CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970



\* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

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HELICOPTER CARGO TOTALS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

After having increased from 1,999 tons in December 1970 to 2,259 tons in January 1971, helicopter cargo tonnage fell to 2,000 tons in February 1971. This decrease was brought about by a decrease in artillery expenditures (See Tabs 3-5a and 3-5b) and the standdown of HMM-364, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and three firing batteries (See Tabs 3-6a and 3-6b).

Although monthly cargo totals may be remotely related to flight time, a more valid relationship exists between tonnage and the level of ground activity of Division units. Artillery resupply contributes greatly to the overall total and any decreases in cargo tonnage are, in large measure, due to the redeployment of artillery batteries and changes in targetting policy (See Tabs 3-5a and 3-5b).

As with the other helicopter support indicators, cargo tonnage should decrease in March 1971 as additional units standdown.

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
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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER CARGO TOTALS, CALENDAR YEARS**

1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	*
69 TONS						9836	10471	8621	5629	4813	3280	3207	45857	*
70 TONS	3963	3485	3962	4164	5937	5138	4000	3804	3867	2510	2283	1999	45,112	
71 TONS	2259	2000											(4,259)	

\* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

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G-4 OVERVIEW

Although the 1st Marine Division is fully prepared to accomplish its present mission in combat, as evidenced by the ~~logistics figures contained herein~~, Increment VI redeployments, already begun with the standdown in February 1971 of an infantry battalion and three artillery batteries, will cause unavoidable degradation of combat readiness. The ~~following~~ paragraphs reflect the present situation regarding continuation of the Division's combat mission in the Republic of Vietnam, but losses of combat essential equipment during redeployment resulting from the factors below will have to be replaced for the Division to again achieve combat readiness. The four factors are:

1. Interservice transfer of equipment to RVN Armed Forces.
2. Disposal of obsolete or limited standard equipment in accordance with CMC SPD LTR AO 4G-pmh-2 of 11 Jan 71.
3. Equipment provided 3d Force Service Regiment to meet Mountout/Mountout Augmentation requirements.
4. Equipment coded as unrepairable or uneconomically repairable due to age or condition.

The status of operational readiness for combat essential items within the Division reflected in the unit FORSTAT ratings remains excellent. The Division overall, and all but one of its subordinate units are presently in a C-1 status. The 1st Medical Battalion is C-2 essentially due to deficiencies of a relatively small number of end items (See Tab 4-1).

The overall percentage of the Division's combat essential items of equipment maintained operationally ready continues at a 95% level compared to 87% at this time (the end of February) last year. Three of the four commodity groups used to determine overall readiness, Communication-Electronics, Motor Transport, and Ordnance, substantially exceed the minimum Marine Corps standard of 85% while the fourth, Engineer equipment (for which the standard is 83%), has significantly improved and now stands at 86%, exceeding the standard for the third month in a row (See Tabs 4-2 through 4-2d).

The Department of Defense program to transfer certain selected items to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces was reactivated during February. Transfers completed during the month numbered 243 items offered and accepted for an outstanding acceptance record of 100%. (See Tab 4-3).

Embarkation planning and preparation has commenced for units redeploying during Increment VI. The first Division units to redeploy, detachment, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines and Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines are scheduled to embark on 3 March 1971 (See Tab 4-5).

The prevalence of malaria remained low in February 1971, with 25 cases being recorded for a case rate of 2.2/1000 men. February was the fifth consecutive month in which a reduction in the case rate was reported. On the other hand, the venereal disease case rate of 15.5/1000 men was the highest that has been recorded in the past 26 months (See Tab 4-4 through 4-4b).

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UNIT FORSTAT RATING

As in previous months, the FORSTAT rating for the Division overall remains at C-1 (fully combat ready) in both equipment/supplies on hand and equipment readiness with but one subordinate unit rated C-2. The 1st Medical Battalion is degraded to C-2 in both categories, essentially due to a T/E deficiency of PU-710 and PU-712 generators.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN). UNIT FORS. RATINGS

UNIT	EQUIP/ SUPPLIES ON HAND		EQUIP READINESS	
	C-1	C-2	C-1	C-2
1ST MAR DIV (-) (REIN)	X		X	
HQ BN (-) (REIN)	X		X	
1ST MAR (REIN)	X		X	
HQ CO (REIN)	X		X	
1ST BN, 1ST MAR	X		X	
2D BN, 1ST MAR	X		X	
3D BN, 1ST MAR	X		X	
5TH MAR (-) (REIN)	X		X	
HQ CO (REIN)	X		X	
2D BN, 5TH MAR	X		X	
3D BN, 5TH MAR	X		X	
1ST BN, 5TH MAR	X		X	
11TH MAR (-) (REIN)	X		X	
HQ BTRY (REIN)	X		X	
1ST BN, 11TH MAR (REIN)	X		X	
2D BN, 11TH MAR (REIN)	X		X	
3D 8" HOW BTRY	X		X	
1ST RECON BN (-) (REIN)	X		X	
1ST ENGR BN (REIN)	X		X	
1ST MED BN (-)		X		X
1ST MT BN	X		X	
11TH MT BN	X		X	

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COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Over the course of February 1971, the operationally ready status of all combat equipment in the 1st Marine Division continued at a 95% level. This was the second consecutive month the Division has maintained its percentage of equipment operationally ready at this level. All CMC objectives have been attained or exceeded.

Condition coding of equipment by limited technical inspection teams commenced early this month. These inspections were begun on a systematic basis to identify equipment that did not meet established redeployment criteria. Results to date indicate that items in the Ordnance, Communication-Electronics and Engineer commodity areas are, with minor exceptions, satisfactory for retrograde. However, in the Motor Transport commodity area it is anticipated that 21% of combat essential equipment or 465 items will be coded out as obsolete or uneconomical to repair and will be disposed of prior to redeployment.

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
## 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) READINESS OF COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969)

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE = = = = =



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											84	85	
% NORM											3	5	
% NORS											4	3	
% IN/T											2	3	
% DEFIC											7	4	
1970													
% OR	86	87	90	91	89	90	92	94	92	92	93	94	
% NORM	4	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	
% NORS	4	4	2	2	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	
% IN/T	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	
% DEFIC	3	3	1	2	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	
1971													
% OR	95	95											
% NORM	1	1											
% NORS	3	3											
% IN/T	1	1											
% DEFIC	0	0											

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COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS), CALENDAR YEARS  
1969/1970/1971

At the end of February 1971, the operationally ready status of Communication-Electronics equipment continues to be excellent at 97%. This is the seventh consecutive month this commodity group has recorded an operationally ready percentage of 95% or above. There are no problem areas within the commodity group.

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
G-4-2a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969)

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE = - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											74	86	
% NORM											4	4	
% NORS											1	4	
% IN/T											2	3	
% DEFIC											19	3	
1970													
% OR	90	90	92	93	92	93	94	95	95	95	95	96	
% NORM	4	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	
% NORS	3	3	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	
% IN/T	2	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	
% DEFIC	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1971													
% OR	96	97											
% NORM	0	0											
% NORS	2	2											
% IN/T	2	1											
% DEFIC	0	0											

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G-4-2a

COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The operationally ready status of Motor Transport equipment at the end of February 1971 continues to be excellent. Current operational readiness stands at 93% and the only significant problem item within this commodity area is the M-274A2 Mule. Of the 209 Mules on hand, only 173 (83%) are operational. There is no specific trend or problem in the deadline of these vehicles.

Limited technical inspection of Motor Transport equipment commenced early this month to identify items of equipment that do not meet established redeployment criteria, i.e. are obsolete or uneconomical to repair (condition code H or 2). Approximately 25% of the items of equipment in units inspected to date are unsatisfactory for retrograde. An analysis of the age and condition of equipment on 465 Motor Transport items, primarily trailers, will fail to meet redeployment criteria and be disposed of prior to redeployment. As most of these items of equipment are presently operational they are presently included in the 93% level of operational readiness.

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G-4-2b

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT)

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969)

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE =====



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											86	86	
% NORM											5	5	
% NORS											3	4	
% IN/T											2	2	
% DEFIC											4	3	
1970													
% OR	85	88	93	92	90	90	91	93	94	93	93	92	
% NORM	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	
% NORS	4	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	
% IN/T	4	4	2	2	4	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	
% DEFIC	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1971													
% OR	94	93											
% NORM	2	2											
% NORS	3	3											
% IN/T	1	2											
% DEFIC	0	0											

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G-4-26

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COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ORDNANCE), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The operationally ready status of Ordnance equipment at the end of February continues to be excellent. There are no problem items. Of particular note is the fact that operational readiness has remained at a high level of 98% for three consecutive months.

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G-4-2c

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT, ( ORDNANCE )

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969)

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE =====



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											92	92	
% NORM											2	3	
% NORS											2	2	
% IN/T											1	2	
% DEFIC											3	1	
1970													
% OR	91	92	95	97	96	95	96	96	95	94	96	98	
% NORM	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	4	2	1	
% NORS	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	
% IN/T	3	4	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	
% DEFIC	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1971													
% OR	98	98											
% NORM	1	0											
% NORS	1	1											
% IN/T	0	1											
% DEFIC	0	0											

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G-4-2c

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COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ENGINEER), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The operational readiness status of Engineer equipment at the end of February stood at 86%, marking the third straight month this commodity area has exceeded the Marine Corps standard. The non-availability of T/E authorized 600/700 series generators and the deadline rate of those on hand is a continuing problem. Of the 219 generators authorized only 85% (186) are on hand, and deadlines decrease the overall operational readiness to 71% (155). Additionally, the high deadline rate of floodlight trailers adversely affects the readiness of engineer equipment.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ENGINEER).

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1970

1971 (AND DEC 1969) - - - - -

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											58	60	
% NORM											8	10	
% NORS											7	7	
% IN/T											4	10	
% DEFIC											23	13	
1970													
% OR	63	66	68	66	59	63	74	83	73	76	78	84	
% NORM	6	3	6	7	6	7	6	5	5	8	4	3	
% NORS	5	7	4	5	7	6	5	4	7	8	9	10	
% IN/T	7	5	5	6	8	6	6	6	4	3	4	3	
% DEFIC	19	19	17	16	20	18	9	2	11	5	5	0	
1971													
% OR	86	86											
% NORM	3	3											
% NORS	5	7											
% IN/T	2	1											
% DEFIC	4	3											

28 FEB 71

G-4-2d



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INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIEL TO RVNAF

Project 805 is a DOD-initiated program which transfers major items of equipment to the RVNAF in furtherance of the Vietnamization effort. During Increment IV (17 Aug - 9 Oct 1970), a total of 2,980 items were offered, of which 2,798 items with a total value of \$1,232,805 were accepted with an overall acceptance rate of 93.8%. The chart on the opposite page and the items/figures below reflect the current status of the turnover during Increment VI.


<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY OFF</u>	<u>QTY ACC</u>	<u>VALUE</u>
POWER SUP PP2953	3	3	\$1,530.00
LIGHT MARKER DISTRESS	50	50	550.00
ANTENNA RC-292	14	14	3,696.00
TEL TA-312	56	56	10,864.00
CASE BC-5	7	7	80.08
REEL UNIT RL-31	3	3	282.00
CABLE TEL WO-1/TT	11	11	682.00
CABLE TEL ON RL-159	11	11	671.00
RADIO AN/GRC-125	6	6	6,504.00
RADIO AN/PRC-25	33	33	28,644.00
TRLR M105A1	2	2	1,816.00
TRK M151A1	5	5	15,685.00
HOW 105MM	12	12	182,400.00
RKT LAUNCHER 3.5	<u>30</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>3,030.00</u>
TOTALS	243	243	\$256,434.08

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIAL TO RVNAF  
INCREMENTS IV A (1970) AND VI C (1971)

CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF ITEMS TRANSFERRED: 1970 \_\_\_\_\_ 1971 -----  
 PERCENTAGE OF ITEMS ACCEPTED (CUMLTIV): 1970 \_\_\_\_\_ 1971 -----



<u>DATES</u>	<u>OFFERED</u>	<u>ACCEPTED</u>	<u>CUM OFF</u>	<u>CUM ACC</u>	<u>CUM % ACC</u>
17-27 Aug 70	1203	1180	1203	1180	98.1
3-15 Sep 70	657	563	1860	1743	93.9
25-26 Sep 70	303	256	2163	2019	93.4
1- 9 Oct 70	817	779	2980	2798	93.8
21 Feb 71	155	155	155	155	100.0
24 Feb 71	58	58	213	213	100.0
28 Feb 71	30	30	243	243	100.0

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PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

During the month of February 1971 the prevalence of malaria remained low with the expected seasonal low point producing 25 cases for a February case rate of 2.4/1000 men, the lowest case rate in the past 26 months. Conversely, morbidity from venereal disease increased slightly, with the majority of these cases occurring in the immediate Da Nang area. Case rates increased from 15.1/1000 in January to 15.5/1000 in February, the highest case rate in the past 26 months.

Rabies prophylaxis for the month accounted for the loss of 118 man-days of combat effectiveness. Morbidity from amebiasis, shigellosis, hepatitis, and the gastro-intestinal diseases continues to cause a relatively low but nevertheless significant loss of combat effectiveness.

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MALARIA PREVALENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Losses to malaria in February 1971 continue to decline as a result of the normal seasonal low combined with a decline in operations. The total cases in February 1971 were 25 for a case rate of 2.4/1000 men.

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G-4-4a


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE MALARIA INCIDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970 /1971

1969 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE ——— 1970 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE - - - - -  
1971 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CASES	247	121	160	91	85	152	141	232	679	396	437	159	2,900
RATE/1000	9.8	4.7	6.3	3.6	3.4	6.1	5.7	9.7	26.6	12.7	13.4	5.1	9.0
1970													
CASES	84	84	227	377	221	224	158	259	346	256	84	67	2,387
RATE/1000	2.8	3.0	9.3	16.4	9.7	10.1	7.0	13.0	21.2	19.5	6.4	5.1	9.6
1971													
CASES	32	25											(57)
R. /1000	2.4	2.4											(2.4)

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VENEREAL DISEASE PREVALENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The number of venereal infections in February 1971 declined somewhat from January (203 versus 172); however, the ever decreasing population at risk is reflected in the slightly higher case rate of 15.5/1000 men as compared to 15.1/1000 for January.

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G-4-4b


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE VENEREAL DISEASE INCIDENCE.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE ——— 1970 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE - - - -

1971 CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 SYPHILIS	4	1	2	0	1	0	1	0	5	4	2	0	20
GONORRHEA	283	213	229	213	242	252	162	162	172	251	251	317	2,747
CHANCROID	16	9	5	17	7	10	4	2	4	7	7	1	89
L.G. VENERUM	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	4
L.G. INGUIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL V.D.	304	224	236	230	250	262	168	164	181	263	260	318	2,860
70 SYPHILIS	0	3	1	0	0	5	0	1	1	1	0	0	12
GONORRHEA	272	226	219	232	274	239	259	200	187	148	146	150	2,552
CHANCROID	5	3	4	5	9	3	0	2	1	2	1	0	35
L.G. VENERUM	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	4
L.G. INGUIN	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL V.D.	278	232	224	238	283	248	259	203	189	153	147	150	2,604
71 SYPHILIS	0	0											(0)
GONORRHEA	196	170											(366)
CHANCROID	6	2											(8)
L.G. VENERUM	1	0											(1)
L.G. INGUIN	0	0											(0)
TOTAL V.D.	203	172											(375)

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), VENEREAL DISEASE INCIDENCE AND CASE RATE/1000

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 INCIDENCE

1970 INCIDENCE

1971 INCIDENCE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CASES	304	224	236	230	250	262	168	164	181	263	260	318	2,860
RATE/1000	12.0	8.8	9.2	9.1	10.0	10.5	6.8	6.8	7.1	8.4	8.0	10.2	8.9
1970													
CASES	278	232	224	238	283	248	259	203	189	153	147	150	2,604
RATE/1000	9.2	8.2	9.2	10.4	12.3	11.2	11.5	10.2	11.6	11.6	11.2	11.3	10.5
1971													
CASES	203	172											( 375 )
RATE/1000	15.1	15.5											(15.3)

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CURRENT AND PROJECTED EMBARKATION PROGRESS  
INCREMENT VI

Embarkation planning and preparation has commenced for units redeploying during Increment VI. The first Division units to redeploy, Detachment 2d Battalion, 11th Marines and Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, are scheduled to embark on 3 March 1971. There are no embarkation problems anticipated during this redeployment phase.


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G-4-5  
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1ST MARINE DIVISION, CURRENT AND PROJECTED EMBARKATION PROGRESS.  
INCREMENT VI C

CUBIC FEET (PERCENTAGE): PLANNED - - - - - COMPLETED \_\_\_\_\_  
 SQUARE FEET (PERCENTAGE): PLANNED = = = = = COMPLETED \_\_\_\_\_

SCHEDULED

DATE	3 Mar	13 Mar	22 Mar	29 Mar	31 Mar	16 Apr	25 Apr	TOTAL
CUFT		14,997	34,848	24,798	6,596	16,542	41,155	138,196
CUM CUFT		14,997	49,845	74,643	81,239	97,781	138,936	
% TOTAL		10.8	35.9	53.8	58.5	70.4	100.0	
SQFT	14,500	4,000	20,493	43,745	15,231	7,094	84,326	189,389
CUM SQFT	14,500	18,500	38,993	82,738	97,969	105,063	189,389	
% TOTAL	7.5	9.8	20.6	43.7	51.7	55.5	100.0	

ACCOMPLISHED

DATE								
CUFT								
CUM								
%TOT								
DATE								
SQFT								
CUM								
%TOT								

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G-5 OVERVIEW

During February 1971 two of the parameters associated with 1st Marine Division civic action increased, while the other two decreased (from January 1971 values). The cost of civic action declined from 1.66 million \$VN to 1.27 million \$VN and the number of Vietnamese treated by MedCap/DentCap decreased from 8,306 to 7,703, while the number of man-days of labor by U. S. personnel rose from 684 to 767 and the percent of Vietnamese participation in civic action projects increased from 90.5% to 92%. When compared with the monthly averages for 1969 and 1970 a similar mixed result is produced; 1971's average cost of civic action was greater than the averages for 1970 (1.35 million \$VN) and 1969 (0.99 million \$VN), Vietnamese participation greater than 1970's 86.7% and 1969's 74.2%, U. S. labor provided less than 1970's 1,508 man-days and 1969's 1,194, and Vietnamese patients treated less than 1970's 10,454 and 1969's 10,813.

The character of civic action underwent a significant and continuous change throughout Calendar Year 1970. In 1969, and for the first few months of 1970, III Marine Amphibious Force was the senior U. S. headquarters in Military Region I, and there was significant U. S. Navy presence. From December 1969 to March 1970, the 26th Marines, with a typical support package, was attached to 1st Marine Division. In 1969, the 1st Marine Division had a Psyop/Civic Action AIK Fund allocation of 500,000 \$VN per month. The conditions as stated in this paragraph all had significant effects upon the 1st Marine Division Civic Action Program and are important because they no longer exist.

III Marine Amphibious Force as the senior U. S. headquarters in Military Region I was the recipient of considerable support through the U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund. This support included funds and materials. 1st Marine Division shared in the funds primarily by participating in the General Walt Scholarship Program, but also received a proportionate share of Civic Action materials donated through the Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Program. In view of the continually decreased support received, III Marine Amphibious Force terminated the General Walt Scholarship Program on 30 May 1970, and materials are available in increasingly smaller quantities.

As the service manager for Project Handclasp, the U. S. Navy presence in the Danang area assured a considerable amount of Handclasp materials directed to U. S. military forces in Military Region I. In addition, the 1st Marine Division had an arrangement with the U. S. Naval Support Activity wherein materials for civic action projects could be purchased with Civic Action AIK Funds at about one third the Vietnamese open market price.

When XXIV Corps became the senior U. S. military headquarters in Military Region I, the quantity of Project Handclasp materials was reduced to that donated specifically to 1st Marine Division, and the U. S. Army Logistic Command does not permit transactions involving AIK Funds, which left the Vietnamese open market as the source for AIK Fund materials.

In 1970, the 26th Marines and the 7th Marines, with support packages, were withdrawn from Vietnam. The loss of these units resulted in a significant but, because of changing conditions, immeasurably reduced civic action capability.

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Finally, in Calendar Year 1970, the Psyops/Civic Action AIC Funds were halved each quarter, beginning on 1 January 1970. On 1 April 1970, the division received the III MAF account, with the result that the monthly allocation of funds dropped from 500,000 \$VN per month in 1969 to 150,000 \$VN per month subsequent to 1 July 1970. The monthly ceiling for 1971 remains at 150,000 \$VN.

By measurable comparison, the total 1970 1st Marine Division Civic Action effort showed an increase over 1969. This increase resulted from the excesses of non-combat essential expendable construction materials created in connection with phased troop reductions, and by a significant engineer effort in connection with Vietnamese resettlement project. This has appeared to be the case for several months, however, and materials have been found and projects have been completed.

For the near future, 1st Marine Division Civic Action Programs will be sustained by excess materials declared excess of operational needs. As redeployment progresses, and in keeping with the policy of Vietnamization, the 1st Marine Division Civic Action Program will decline in scope and shift increasingly from material assistance to technical assistance until it ceases to exist.

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COST OF CIVIC ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971


February 1971, saw the cost of civic action decline from 1.66 million \$VN (January 1971) to 1.27 million \$VN. 1st Marine Division civic action projects are supported by the use of non-combat essential expendable supplies, salvage, the expenditure of funds from the US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund, and voluntary contributions. During February of 1971, the three largest expenditure areas were: social welfare, 760,000 \$VN; education, 250,000 \$VN; and refugee assistance, 200,000 \$VN. During January 1971, 330,000 \$VN of the 1.66 million \$VN cost of civic action was in the form of voluntary contributions in support of Tet activities.

The US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund provided 500,000 \$VN per month to 1st Marine Division during Calendar Year 1969, but the contribution was progressively reduced to the July 1970 level of 150,000 \$VN, where it remains.

At the present time, salvage is the single significant source of civic action materials. Excess expendable supplies have been exhausted (until more are declared excess). Dunnage is being stockpiled for Vietnamese resettlement projects. Troop reductions have created excess cantonments and/or buildings which have been salvaged for civic action purposes.

As this remaining source is exhausted the 1st Marine Division Civic Action program will decrease or change character to one of technical assistance only. This is not an undesirable trend, and it is in keeping with Vietnamization wherein materials and funds are made available through GVN channels rather than U.S. military channels.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE COST OF C&C ACTION, CALENDARYEARS 1969/1970/19711969 MILLIONS OF \$VN1970 MILLIONS OF \$VN1971 MILLIONS OF \$VN

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
MILL.\$VN	1.37	.81	.44	.15	.57	1.82	.71	.18	.99	1.71	1.53	1.54	11.84
1970													
MILL.\$VN	1.37	.68	.97	1.32	.60	1.45	2.23	1.65	1.41	1.30	.92	2.25	16.15
1971													
MILL.\$VN	1.66	1.27											(2.93)


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PERCENT OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION (LABOR) IN 1ST MARDIV CIVIC ACTION PROJECTSCALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

With February's 92.0%, the average percent of Vietnamese participation achieved thus far in 1971 is 91.25%, compared to the monthly average of 86.7% in 1970 and 74.2% in 1969. There is no goal or norm as such established for Vietnamese participation in 1st Marine Division civic action projects. However, a high percentage of participation is desired, not only because it gives the Vietnamese individually and collectively an investment in their own development, but more importantly, it involves an identification with the Vietnamese government. All 1st Marine Division civic action projects are coordinated with and approved by the GVN at least up to and including Province, and the projects are primarily attributed to the GVN. 1st Marine Division participation is limited to material, transportation, engineering assistance, and technical advice not available through GVN channels.

The present high percentage of Vietnamese participation in 1st Marine Division civic action projects represents a desirable norm which will be maintained in the future.

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**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION (LABOR)****IN 1ST MARINE DIVISION CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971****% PARTICIPATION 1969 ——— 1970 — — — 1971 =====**

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
MAN-DAYS	1369	1030	1901	637	2298	1772	1353	1764	1188	1542	1649	1595	18,098 *
% VN PART	59.3	66.0	83.0	89.0	88.0	85.0	75.0	81.0	75.0	69.0	53.0	67.0	74.2
1970													
MAN-DAYS	1546	1673	1680	1494	1220	1381	1160	1106	620	1296	610	545	14,331 *
% VN PART	77.0	77.0	83.0	82.5	84.0	80.0	88.0	95.0	93.0	97.0	90.5	93.5	86.7
1971													
MAN-DAYS	684	767											(1,451) *
% VN PART	90.5	92.0											(91.2)

\* MAN-DAYS OF U.S. LABOR

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VIETNAMESE TREATED BY MEDCAP/DENTCAP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During February 1971, 7,703 Vietnamese were treated, a decrease of 603 from January. The average number of people treated per month in 1971 is therefore just over 8,000, compared to over 10,000 per month for each of 1969 and 1970. However, February's total is not significantly different from the monthly totals for the previous four months. In 1970, ~~several~~ organizations, the most significant being 7th Marines and 26th Marines, were redeployed from Vietnam. This represented a loss of MedCap/DentCap capability of approximately 25%, both in the number of teams available and in the medical supplies available.

There is no numerical goal as such, the single objective being to treat as many Vietnamese as possible consistent with operational commitments. The determining factors are the tempo of operations and the availability of expendable medical supplies.

In 1969 and early 1970, the primary source of MedCap supplies was the Project Handclasp. The public attitude and the reduced U.S. Navy presence in Military Region I has resulted in the sharply reduced availability and dependability of procurement of Handclasp supplies.

As a result, MedCaps/DentCaps are programmed and directed to use expendable military medical/dental supplies as the primary source. The limited availability of medical/dental supplies for civic action programs is the single most important limiting factor in the number of Vietnamese treated. Since these supplies are subject to budgetary considerations it is expected that between 7,000 - 8,000 persons represents the maximum capability of the 1st Marine Division as presently constituted and will be reduced proportionately as Division units redeploy.

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). CUMULATIVE VIETNAMESE TREATED BY MEDCAP/

DENTCAP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 THOUSANDS OF PATIENTS ———

1970 THOUSANDS OF PATIENTS - - - -

1971 THOUSANDS OF PATIENTS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
PATIENTS	8486	7686	7794	11028	10325	10184	12156	6810	14706	14807	11820	13949	129,751
1970													
PATIENTS	14005	12020	11703	9910	8756	10691	11749	11612	10040	7818	8716	8224	125,444
1971													
PATIENTS	8306	7703											(16,009)

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