

28/rad 5750 **0224**7

JUL 1 9 1969

CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal from basic letter)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/rrs 5700 Ser: 015-69 dtd 20 June 1969

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

To:

Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 May 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.


R. D. WHITE By direction

Copy to: CO, 1st CAG CG, III MAF




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28 JUN 1969

classified upon removal from the basic let 76769

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/rrs 5700 Ser: 015-69 of 20 Jun 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 May 1969 to 31 May 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

Copy to:

CO, 1st CAG

R H BARROW

By direction



2 June 147 P





HEADQUARTERS

1st Combined Action Group

III Marine Amphibious Force

O, San Francisco, California 96602

6/JEH/rrs 5700 Ser: 015-69 20 June 1969

Committed (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 May 1969 to 31 May 1969

Ref: (a) 500 P5750.11A

(b) FIFPacO 5750.8A

Encl: (1) 1st Combined Action Group, III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3-year intervals, declassified after 12 years, DOD Dir 5200.10.

. E. HEWNEGAN

Copy | of 12 Copies

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# **DECLASSIFIED**





# HEADQUARTERS lst Combined Action Group III Marine Amphibious Force FPO, San Francisco, California 96602



COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 May 1969 to 31 May 1969

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DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

ENCLOSURE (1)



# PART I

#### ORGANIZATIONAL DETA

1.	DESIGNATED

Co: mander

1st Combined Action Group III Marine Amphibious Force FPO, San Francisco, California LtCol J. E. HENNEGAN 1 May 69 - 31 May 69

#### SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1

Captain L. H. ROSS 1 May 69 - 31 May 69

Combined Action Company 1-2

Captain R. R. WELFOTT 1 May 69 - 31 May 69

Combined Action Company 1-3

Cartain P. G. MITCHELL 1 May 69 - 31 May 69

Combined Action Company 1-4

Captain K. M. SEARS
1 May 69 - 31 May 69

#### ATTACHED UNITS

#### None

# 2. LOCATIONS

CACO 1-1

CACO 1-1

CACO 1-2

Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CACO 1-3

Binh Son District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CACO 1-4

Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

MTT-1

Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Frovince, RVN

# 3. STAFF OFFICERS

MTT-2

Executive Officer

Major J. H. LAWSON 1 May 69 - 31 May 69

Adjutant/S-1


2ndLt B. W. SMITH 1 May 69 - 31 May 69



Binh Son District, Cuang Ngai Province, RVN

CONFIDENTIAL ENGLOSURE (ED)

#### **DECLASSIFIED**



5

S-2/S-3

S-4/Supply

Communications Officer

S-5/Special Services

Medical Section

Major R.F. ENDERT 1 May 69 - 31 May 69

Cartain T. M. GARBOWSKI 1 May 69 - 31 May 69

Major R. F. INDERT 1 May 69 - 31 May 69

Major J. H. LAWSON 1 May 69 - 31 May 69

HMC R. W. EILERS 1 May 69 - 20 May 69

HM1 T. A. ROBINSON 21 May 69 - 31 May 69

4. AVER/GE NOTTHLY STRENGTH


USMC Off Enl 9 471 USN Off Enl 0 35 OTHER
Off Enl
1 4(ARVN)



ENCLOSURE (1)

1-2

#### DECLASSIFIED



c. Casualties. Casualties durin the month of May 1969 were as follows:

10220110	KIA	DAI	DOW	AIW	WIANE	NBC	WIA/NBC RET TO DU
USMC	2	G	0	19	8	1	10
usn	0	0	0	2	3	0	Ö

- d. CONGRINTS/SPLINTS/WELREP. There were four Congressional Interest Correspondence and four Welfare Reports during the month of May 1969.
  - e. Administrative Assistance.
- (1) Two Group directives were promulgated during the reporting month. A copy of this order is located in the documents section (section IV) of this chronology.
  - (a) Group Order 1740.11 Request Mast
  - (b) Group Order Pll240.2 SOP for Motor Transport f. Legal. A breakdown of legal activities for May is shown below:

Art 32 Investigations Informal Investigations NJP SPCM SCM 6

Two Article 32 Investigations were pending at the end of the reporting period.

- g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and special sorvices equipment available to all hands. Quotas for both out of country and in country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) are effectively being utilized. The following is a break down.
  - (1) Out of country RAR Quotes Utilized hh
  - (2) In country Ref 4
- (3) A party is held at a different CAP each week consisting of a cook out, beer and soda. Each CAP sends a man in to the rear on a staggered schedule to allow him to relax and enjoy the club facilities.
- h. Career Planning. The career planning program continues to be stressed at all levels of command. A continuing effort is being made to increase the civilian education level of Marines within the command through USAFI GED testing.

ந்நில<u>ு அதை தார் நாசி</u>நி

ENCLCSURE (1)

II-2







# TART II

#### NARRATIVE SUCTARY

1. Personnel Administration.

a. Joined and transferred. During the month of May, the 1st Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number personnel listed in the four categories below:

(1)	Of icers	
-----	----------	--

Enlisted 72

(2) Rotated CONUS

Officers

Enlisted

(3) Transferred within WestPac Command.

Officers

Enlisted

(4) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospitals).

Officers

Enlisted

b. Awards.

(1) There was one Silver Star, one Legion of Merit, one Navy and Marine Corps Medal, six Bronze Stars for heroism and eight end of tour awards submitted to FMSTac for approval during the month of Lay 1969.

SSM

LOM

NMCN

BSM

NCM

NAM Li

(2) Awards returned approved from F FPac included the following:

BSM

NCM

NAM

(3) Personnel of the 1st Combined Action Group also received the following awards as a result of combat wounds, heroic/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam.

PHM VC0

Commendation from RVN Government



II-1

ENCLOSURE (1)

#### **DECLASSIFIED**



i. Mail. Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows:

#### Letters

Incoming bag

Outgoing bag

Packages

Incoming 4 bags

NCTE: One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

j. Promotions. Fifty-nine enlisted promotions were effected during the month of May 1969 as follows:

Gunrory Sorgeant	1
Staff Sergeant	J -
Sergoant	0
Corporal	33
Lance Corporal	1
PFC .	0 .

k. Hospital Visits. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital corpsman representative, the Casualty NCC and the Mail Orderly along with frequent visits by the Commanding Officer, Executive, Adjutant and First Sergeant. Casualties are visited as soon as they are evacuated from the field. Normally, the Commanding Officer or his representative, having been notified by Dustoff Control Chu Lai, of the destination of the individual are weiting at the hospital when the casualty arrives. The dead are identified within hours of arrival at Chu Lai.







a. General. Here was no change in the intelligence chain for the month of May. There was an increase in the number of intelligence reports emanating from the MacV Advisor. Team at Binh Son District headquarters however, which was the result of closer coordination. The local villagers provided the best tactically exploitable intelligence, as usual, with approximately 40% of the information producing results. Of the 17 occasions of intelligence reports from villagers, 7 produced the following results:

 VC KTA (C)
 VCS
 VC POW
 OTHER

 1
 5
 2
 4 contacts

- b. Situation. Generally, April had produced a low level of contacts in ICTZ. Toward the end of the month, contact increased for lat CAG units, particularly those involving indirect fire, indicated a probable increase in enemy activity for May, possibly a renewal of the Winter-Spring offensive. Because of increased enemy activity, the main areas of concern were Tam Ky District headquarters, Binh Son District headquarters, and Quang Ngai and the area surrounding these locations. It was felt that these areas would be subjected to an increasing amount of indirect fire, and possible sapper attacks.
- (1). Period 1 11 May 1969. While elsewhere in the ICTZ, the first two weeks of May provided a low level of activity, the expected increase of enemy activity in the 1st CAG area materialized almost immediately. The effensive was first removed in the Tam Ky area, where the three northernmost CAPs of CACO 1-1 accounted for 27 chemy kills in the first days of the month. Contact was initially made with what was suspected to be the 74th MF Bn. What was at first taken to be the start of a major offensive on the Tam Ky area, soon diminished, however, the second week of May produced few significant contacts.
- (a) The CACO 1-2 cres, an area known for its security, experience the same lack of energy contact as was noted elsewhere in the ICTZ.
- (b). The number of contacts in the CACO 1-3 area increased in the first two weeks of May, mainly in attacks by heavy sniper fire. An increase in the number of attacks by small arms fire on the civilian populace was noted, and the CAPs accommodated this situation by increasing the security patrolling where villagers worked in their fields.
- (c) CACO 1-4 had increased contacts which paralleled those of the 1st and 3rd companies. This increase was in the number of sniping incidents, including fire at civilians, and harassment by mortar fire. There was also a rise in the number of Chicu Hois, indicating a possible impending enemy activity.
- (a) These contacts, while not constituting an offensive in themselves, were indications of the enemy activity to come. The activity in the CACO 1-1 area showed the obvious interest the enemy had in the Tam Ky area. The fact that many of the more outstanding contacts were made in the daylight hours, while the enemy was on the move, and that the enemy did not appear inclined to maintain contact when it was established, was assumed to be the result

of the enemy's positioning of units for attack.

- (2). Du A. 12 30 Nev
- (a) Intelligence from all sources, both military and civilian pointed out tow dates as likely to be periods of high enemy activity. These were Ho Chi Minh's birthday on 19 May and The Buddha's birthday on 30 May. The period of main concern was that preceding Ho Chi Minh's birthday from 12-21 May. This period also coincided with the dark of the moon, a normal planning factor for NVA/VC.
- (b). The NVA/VC attack plan for installations in the Americal Division area was captured by US Army unit prior to the initiation of the attacks. The plan envisioned capturing and holding hamlet areas and the destruction of US installations personnel and material. Attacking units were levied quotas of personnel to kill or capture and amounts of artillery and vehicles to destroy. US Army position was to be attacked in daylight and held. All of this seemed directed towards influencing negotiations in Paris toward creating an impression of high damage to gain strength at the barguining table.

- (c) In the early morning hours of 12 May, the expected attacks begrn. All companies of the 1st Combined Action Group reported incoming sniper fire or norter fire, as did US Army and ARVN installations along National Route #1. Most firebases reported fire, with LZ's BUFF, GATOR and DOTFIE roceiving ground probes.
- (1). In the First Company, CAP 1-1-7 was the most heavily engaged. The CAP reacted to the mortaring of an RF compound in their TAOC with artillery fire and sweeps of suspected enemy locations. In incidents between 12 May and 15 May, CAP 1-1-7 accounted for 62 kills. Intelligence from the battle field confirmed the enemy unit to be the 16th Sapper Bn, with elements of the 70th and 74th battalions. CAPs 1-1-1 and 1-1-4 were noticeable in the docline of significant contacts, other than the to be expected contacts with village guerrilla and snipers. This was believed to be the result of the enemy's concentrated attack on the RF units in Tien Phuoc area west of Tam Ky and the CAP areas.
- (2). In the CACO 1-2 area there was an increase in sniper fire, and nortar fire, but despite the increase, the level of contact was still low. Second Company countered the possibility of any escalated enemy activity in their area by holding a multi-CAP sweep operation throughout their TAOCs.
- (3). There was an increase in activity in the 3rd CACO TAOC which paralleded the activity in the 1st Company. It, however manifested itself in increased sniper fire and nortar fire on 3rd Company CAPs. This activity appeared to be an effort to maintain pressure in the area while increasing attacking LZ BUFF to the west of National Route #1. Another possibility which may have been responsible for the lack of ground activity is found in the interrogations of the Chieu Hois taken by the CAPs during the month.

PENETRAL PROPERTY.




as that in the land company crea. There was no appreciable increase in the ground activity, but a sked increase in sniger activity, and harassing fire. Here too, as in the Third Company, and Second Company, a sweep operation was conducted to clear an area of possible enemy influence. The Fourth Company received 60% of all Chicu Hois.

- sibility of high periods of contact around Ho Chi Minh's birthday, and The Buddha's birthday. The earlier attack materialized while there was no activity in CAP TACC's on the religious holiday. Intelligence showed an increasing interest in the Tan Ky area, along with allied fixed installations. It was learned from Hoi Chanhs that the enemy was suffering from material and food shortages, and from disease. The wave of attacks conducted in mid-May bore out the captured attack plan, generally, but fell short of the goals of destruction as spoiling attacks were mounted against NVA/VC and their movement was pursued after the attacks with general success. In some cases, individual CAPs, especially along the Tra Bong River were of assistance in securing LZ's when USA and ARVN units passed through their TACCs.
- d. Promosis. The prognosis for enemy activity in the coming month is a sharp decline of activity in the CAP TAOCs during the first two weeks. The enemy will concentrate on regrouping, reforming his units with replacements, and preparing for his next offensive phase, possibly during the last part of the month.
- e: ARVN Liason Officer and interpreters During the month of May, 1st CAG received an ARVN 2nd Lt. to replace the Liason Officer who left in March. There were four interpreters assigned to 1st CAG. One of these remained UA.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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
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#### a General.

- (1) The 1st Combined Action Group continued to conduct operations in accordance with its mission of village level security in the two southermost provinces of the I Comps Tactical Zone. The month proved more profitable in terms of kills than any preceding month, as 211 enemy were killed in contacts with the CAPs. Sixty-one weapons were captured in these actions, most of which took place in the First Company TAOCs.
- (2). Due to a continuing lack of maintenances support, the river patrolling operations fell off again in this period. The Southern Patrol came to a halt, as the maintenance load at the Northern Patrol precluded time being available for the NCOIC there to handle remain problems of both patrels. Wear on old engines kept the patrolling at the Northern Fatrol down to about fifty percent, with next daylight patrolling secured in favor of naintenance needed to have engines up for night work. Despite these problems, the Morthern Patrol was able to provide transportation from time to time to the Americal G-5 and Psyop sections corrying Medcap and Loudspeaker terms into areas accessible by water. In addition, during the menth's peak period of attack threat, the MCOIC and his crew managed to keep two boats in the water about ninety percent of the time, so that they were available to atrol when intelligence indicated a supper threat from two locations across the channel to the north. For six nights the two boats added to security of the LSF Ram at Chu Lai Base: As prospects for re-establishing naintenance support have dismed, arrangements are being made to relinquish this mission.

#### b. Activities

- (1). During the reporting poriod, there were 4 multi-CAP, and 2 Joint CAP-U. 5. Army operations conducted by units of 1st CAG. With one exception, these operations produced little in terms of results, but did produce a coordinating organization of the Vietnamese forces involved as well as the Americans. Given the prosent outplasts on returning the war to Vietnamese hands, these coordination experiences are significant.
- (a). Although CAGO I-1 accounted for the greatest number of kills again this month, its single joint operations with a 1/1 Cavalry Armored Personnel Carrier element and a five-CAP TAGC sweep did not produce significant results.
- (b). CACO 1-2 conducted a joint operations involving three CAPs and a platoon of 1/6 Infantry of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade. Two of the CAPs and the U.S. Army platoon were helelifted into the operational area, a new experience for the CAPs. The operation was under the control of the Ly Tin District S-3, with CACO 1-2 Headquarters acting in a limison/advisory capacity. This operation was most significant due to the magnitude and nature of coordination involved.
- (c). On 29 and 30 May, four CACO 1-3 CAPs participated in a Binh Son District Operation in northeastern Binh Son which resulted in the relocation







A second second

of approximately 559 villagers to a Government controlled area at the mouth of the Tra Bong River. This was a classic night operation, with four CAPs noving on separate axes into positions to provide security for the removal of the civillans from VC-controlled area. The operation was consumated with maximum surprise, as it was conducted on the night and early norning before the "Cease-Fire" in honor of the birth of the Buddha. Surprise was also due to the complete secrecy with which plans were laid and executed. The result was a minimum of casualties and a successful mission. The VC sustained one KIA confirmed. Leter, villager reports indicated an additional number of VC KIA in the action, but these remain unconfirmed since the Friendly Forces did not phsyically recover the bodies.

- (d). CACO 1-4 conducted two joint operations with up to one company of Son Tinh District Pw and the CACO 1-4 headquarters. Results in both cases however were insignificant except the coordination affort involved. That there was no contact in an operational area in which CAP 1-4-1 normally is taken under fire upon entry was of interest as it indicates a possible security problem.
- (2). The following statistics reflect the results of 1st CAG operations and activities for the month of May:
  - (a) Night Petrols 1117 IP's 754

    Day Patrols 825 Multi-CAP

    Ambushes 1571
  - (b) Energy Casualties

		110	
KIA (C)	$\underline{PW}$	DETAINEES	HOI CHANES
211	5	19	10

(c) Friendly Casualties.


	KIA	MA	MIA	POW
USMC	2	29	0	0
USN	0	1	0	0
PF'	10	44	0	0

(d) Weapons Captured

AK-47	41	Pistol, 9mm	1.
AK-50	ī	MAS 36	ī
SKS-56	ì	Thompson Sub Mg	1
M-1	6	* B-40 Rocket Launcher	4
BAR	. 3	* .30 Cal Mg	i
AK-44	4	* 7.62 Mg	1
Grease Gim	2		

<sup>&</sup>quot; Indicate crew served weapons.

II-8



- (1). General. During this period, training conducted by 1st CAG included Vietnamese Language and Personal Response instructions for the USMC personnel as well as General Military Subjects and First Aid instructions for both Vietnamese forces and USMC personnel.
- (2). CAP Training. The formal training conducted on the CAP level consisted of 1120 hours of instruction. This is an addition to informal instruction conducted by CAG and CACO Headquarters personnel during visits to each CAP and during CAP Commanders' meetings. The depth of training was increased as each CAF was forwarded a Lesson Plan, from this Headquarters, on all subjects conducted on the CAP level.

Type of Training	Location	Hours
General Military Subjects	CAP	837
Vietnamese Language	CAP	195
Personal Responso	CAP	52

- (3). HET Training. The two MPT's conducted 108 hours of formal instruction while training Vietnamese forces. This is in addition to On The Job Training resulting from night ambushes, LP's and sentry duty.
- (a). MIT 1-1, located in Tan Ky District, trained 104 Combat Youth who are to be employed as hanlet security.
- (b). MTT 1-2, located in Binh Son District, trained 30 Popular Forac soldiers of Quang Ngai, PF Platoon #189.

# (4) Other Training.

- (a) Four lat CAG Marines completed the nonth-long Vietnamese Language course conducted at 2nd CAG Headquarters in Danang.
- (b). All newly-joined Marines received a one day Indoctrination Course prior to attending CAP School.
- d. Inspections. Each CACO Headquarters and CAP was inspected by a member of the 1st CAG Headquarters during the period. General YOUNGDALE rade a visit to CAP 1-1-1 in the Tan Ky area which produced some excitement when two rounds of incoming nortar fire were received. There was no damage to the General's party or the aircraft however. The Commanding Officer, 1st CAG inspected many of the CAPs by air and road during this month.
- (1). The difficulty in inspection CAPs experienced by Third and Fourth Companies pensists due to lack of dependable and timely helicopter transportation. Nonetheless, the inspections are conducted, though not with any officiency in terms of time.

II-9



- (2) I haspector strength remains the same, with two MCO's assigned.

  Newly-joined for the conducted spot classes on Map Reading, and the 60mm mortar this month, the inspecting the CAPs as part of their pre-CAP School orientation to 1st CAG.
- e. Air Support. Fixed Wing CAS continued best in the Tam Ky area with CAGO 1-1 utilizing the Quang Tin Province FAC, Forward Air Controller on at least seven occasions on which there were kills from the contact. In all a total of eighty-six kills obtained from contacts in which CAPs received air support during the month of May.
- f. Fire Support. The fire support situation changed slightly with the addition of a plateon of 105mm Howitzers from the Direct Support Artillery of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade at hill 26 in the CAP 1-4-4 TAOC. These howitzers were emplaced to support joint U. S. Army/ARVN screening operations to the southwest, west, and northwest of the Fourth Company CAP TAOC's on the Batangen Fenninsula and in the southeastern coast of Son Tinh District.
- g. Scout Dog Teams. There were four Scout Dog Teams operating in support of 1st CAG companies at varying times throughout the month. Two teams remained at the end of the month, with two more expected to arrive early in June
- h. Other Support. Toward the end of May, IZ MINUTERIE, located on the Batangan Penninsula, was vacated by "C" Company of the 5/46th Infantry, 198th LIB. This position was taken over by the 228th Regional Forces company. The vacating company remained in the area conducting joint screening operations with two ARVE Battalions of the 6th Regiment, 2d ARVE Division. These operation maintained pressure on the 48th Local Force Battalion, which operates between the Batangan and Rational Route #1. These units accounted for over forty kills and kept the 48th LF Battalion on the move, preventing coordinated, heavy attacks on the refugee hamlets on the Batangan. These operations account for the diminished number of contacts for the two Batangan CAPs.
- (1) In May, Americal Division interest in the Batangan sector of its Operational Zone was reflected in the presence of Engineers whose task it is to build defensive berms and clear fields of fire around the several refugee hamlets on the Batangan and along the Son Tinh east coast to the south of the Penninsula. In addition, these engineers will conduct mine-clearing operations to assist the CAPs. This interest has and will continue to benefit the CAPs as well as the refugee population in these areas.
- i. Psychological Operations. In May, 1st CAG, in coordination with the Americal Division dropped over eight million propagands leaflets, and conducted over twenty-two hours of temped aerial and ground broadcasts.
- (1) In order to exploit instances of VC terror attacks, the killing of civilians by VC mines, and the dissemination of enemy propaganda against FVMAF and Republic of Vietnam forces and political cadre, ground broadcast teams were employed in a general Rewards program. Information concerning food and vectors eaches, enemy troop movement, location of mines, rocket sites, and the names and living places of VC Infrastructure were all requested during a total

UNGLASSURE (1)







oxisted in the "He band. This is because helicopter radios are not capable of operating is a frequency range. A Liaison visit to the Americal Division Signal Officer resulted in 1st GAG being assigned frequencies in the 70 band on a continuous basis. An immediate improvement was noted in that "override" from other nearby higher powered stations was minimized. Communications with helicopters is accomplished over a group Air-Ground common net which has a frequency compatible with helicopter radios.

# (2). Tochnical Assistance.

(a). Two SNCO representatives were sent to the 1st CAG from 5/7 Communications Battalions at our request to study the communications situation in 1st CAG AO. It was determined that, considering terrain characteristics and distances involved, communications reliable as possible with existing equipment. To improve communications reliability it was recommended that certain higher powered radio equipment be loaned temporarily to 1st CAG from 5/7 Communication Battalion. Accordingly 1st CAG initiated a letter to G-6, III MAF requesting:

AN/MRC-83 6 each w/operators AN/PRC-47 2 each w/operators

It was further determined the AN/PRC-74 on temporary loan is not adequate to meet the communications requirements of 1st CAG. The AN/PRC-74's were turned back to 5/7 Communications Battalion.


# (3). Radio Ropairs.

- (a) 1st FSR. An indication of repair support is becoming evident. During the period from September to December 1968, the average RT-505/PRC-25 "turn-eround" time was 62 days. During the period 1 January 1969 to present, the average "turn-around" time was 38 days. The overall average from September 1968 to present is 55 days. Although some improvement is evident the regain support from 1st FSR Maintainance Battalion is still far below satisfactory. A satisfactory "turn-around" time is considered to be one day in shop.
- (b) Let CAG. Since lat CAG established its our 2nd cahelon repair shop for AN/RIG-25, use of the 1st FSR facilities have been minimized, and a significant decrease of "turn-around" time is apparent. Average "turn-around" time for 31 jobs completed on the RT-505/FRC-25 has been 6 days.

# (4) Repair Work Summary.

AN/PRC-25	1st FSR 1	CAG-1 15	lst FSR 1	CAG-1 9	TOTAL DIL	TOTAL RET 10
RT-524	1	0	0	0	1	0
H-189	13	1	. 0	1	14	1
AN/GRA-39	1	0	7.00	0	1	1. 3.
LS-166	0	1	0	1	1	3.
TA-312	1	0	0 • II-11	0 .		NCLASSIEIED MCLOSUM (1)

#### **DECLASSIFIED**







of 132 hours of madcasting. A total of five hours of Chieu Hoi appeals were broadcast towar a enemy areas. The size of the listening audiences in these cases unknown.

(2) The following statistics result from Psychological Operations in

Mat:

LEAPTERS		AMO UIT!	BROADCAST TIME
Chieu Hoi		3,936,000	1:40
Rewards		403,000	1:30
Pro-GVN		1,013,000	2:40
anti-VC		347,000	<b>\$</b> 55
Anti-NVA	-	114,000	:20
Rally		2,080,000	<b>3:3</b> 0 ,

- j. <u>Kit Carson Scouts</u>. During the CAP 1-3-8 assault of a VC element in the vicinity of Phuoc Thuan hamlet in Binh Son District, KCS THO was killed in action the night of 9 May, 1969. This reduced the KCS complement at 1st CAG to 11, including the new KCS assigned late in April to CACO 1-1,
- k. Volunteer Informant Program. A total 26,500 \$VN was spent during May under the VIP program. All expenditures were for weapons or ordnance turned in or pointed out in place to the CAPs. CACO 1-1 and 1-4 followed, with CACO 1-2 spending the least in VIP funds. It is felt the low response to the VIP program in Ly Tin District (CACO 1-2) is the result of the good security, as well as competition for the ordnance between 1/6th Infantry Psyop Section and the Chu Lai Base PMO, whose motorized patrols saturate that particular area. An absence of U. S. Army competition for the CACO area is given credit for the highe VIP expenditures.
  - (1). The following statistics recep VIP expenditures for May:

NUMBER.	TYPE ORDHANCE	NUIBER.	 TYPE ORDNANCE
9 4 22 24 6 5 1,212 2,500	82mm rounds 81mm rounds 60mm rounds 57mm round B-40 rockets 40mm rounds -50 c-1 linked rounds -30 c-1 linked rounds	28 28 2 1 5 1	M-26 grenades Chicom grenades M-72 LAAW Claymore mine M-16 mines Bounding type mine Trip flare Smoke grenade

#### 1. Communications.

# (1). Radio Vave Propagation.

(a). During the reporting period 1st CAG's radio frequencies were analyzed and it was determined the least used frequencies in this area





# 4. S-4/Suppl:

# a. Significant Events.

- (1) A unit Motor Transport SOP was published.
- (2) The 2nd echelon maintenance required for motor transport equipment will be accomplished by Sub-Unit 1, 1st FSR. The maintenance support is a result of a request initiated by this command in which Manintenance Battalion, 1st FSR was tasked with 2nd echelon support of 1st CAG.
- (3) Completed Mechanized Embarkation Data System (MEDS) cards were submitted to III MAF.

# b. Supply.

- (1) The overall supply posture within the Group is satisfactory. Certain Table of Equipment (T/E) deficiencies affect the combat readiness of the organization in the area of communications and motor transport equipment. Also M-60 machine guns are a potential problem.
- (2) Replacement requisitions for the handset, H-189/GR, and antenna, AT-271A/PRC, have been outstanding and liaison with the Central Control Point (CCP), FIC indicate the items to be critical in the supply system.
- (3) Helmets and helmet liners became a problem at the end of the month, however, receipts are expected shortly.

## c. Maintenance.

- (1) Maintenance support of communications, motor transport and ordnance equipment by responsible agencies has been excellent during the month. An increased attrition of machine gun (M-60) barrels and the unserviceability of M-60's resulting from Code "H" letters is a problem.
- (2) The maintenance support to be afforded the Group by 1st ESR should enhance the operational effectiveness of the unit in the Motor Transport area. Limited Technical Inspections (ITI's) are to be held on each vehicle and a maintenance repair schedule established. The establishment of a 2nd echelon repair parts block to support the maintenance effort is being programmed by Shop Stores, 1st FSR.

# d. Motor Transport.

(1) During the month a high deadline rate of the M37Bl 3/4 ton truck was experienced. Presently 2 M37's are in FSR for repair, 3 vehicles have been LTI'd and replacement through the Rebuild Program will be effected. In addition the 2 M274A2 truck platform will be exchanged with the Rebuild Program. Progress is being made in establishing an effective Motor Transport Operation.





#### AL TOUNT LAL


# e. Miscellareous.

- (1) During the month recommended T/E changes were reviewed and comments made and returned to the CAP Directors! office.
- (2) The Group enlisted shower point was renovated to more adequately accomodate the troops.
- (3) Periodically, during May, M-79 (40mm) ammunition was in short supply. No critical problem was experienced; however, liaison with the AMMO ICP, FLC indicates this item may become a problem.

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ENCLOSURE (1.)





#### f. Medical

- (1) General. hany needed medical supplies were ordered, received, and have been reordered to maintain a continuous incoming flow of necessary medical materials. During the month, the Group Aid Station has been making preparations to move all bulk medical supplies to a space that has been provided in the Group Supply Marshouse. This move will enable the Group Aid Station to advantageously perform its primary mission, i.e., care and treatment of the sick and injured.
- (2) Evacuation. Americal medevac helicopter support continues to be quite satisfactory.
- (3) Additional Information. The following areas are reported for the month of tay.

# (a) Personnel Hospital Corpsmen


Reported for duty	09
In country transfers	Ol
notated to CUIUS	02
Radevaced out of country	02
NIA's (1 Del)	<b>0</b> 6
Awarded the Purple Heart	03
Awarded the Bronze Star W/Combat "V"	01
Necommended for the Harry Achievement Medal W/Combat "V"	01
Promoted to HM3	Ol
Promoted to E12	07

#### (4) Techniques

(a) Canitary inspections are conducted weekly of the CAG Headquarters compound by Hall BORINGON, UBN. Are as of improvement were pointed out in field sanitation. Hall BORINGON has started a program of visiting all Dark stressing field sanitation and Med Cap techniques.

(b) beloaye Conductord	Totals	
Pationts tropt. A	25,693	
Adulto evacuatio	99	UNGLASSIFIED
		ENCLOSUEE (1)

#### **DECLASSIFIED**






	Gaildren evacuated		140
	Dentesps conducted	÷	108
(c)	U. S. personnel treated at CAG Sick Call		412
(d)	Kospitulized		
	WIA		36
	Illness		78

(e) The monthly meeting of all CAG femior Corpsmen was held on 28 may 1)69 at the III mar Force Surgion's Office, Daning. Topics discussed were hepatitis, enteric disorders, heat casualties, treatment of non-pet ble unter, psychiatric profiles being processed out of service, hospital corpsmen (T/A for CAGs), and deworming procedures for CAUS retatees. In this area a program for deworming personnel returning to CAUS will be instituted by the Group Aid Station in conjunction with the Group S-1.




CONFIDENTIAL ENGLOSUM (1)




# 5. Civic Action.

- a. The Combined Action Flatoons were responsible for treating 25,643 Vietnamese during May through regularly scheduled MEDCAPS. There were a total of 55 adults and 13 children evacuated for Medical reasons.
- b. There were 1147 pounds of food distributed to the resettlement villages on the Batangan Penninsula. Small quantities of soap, food, and clothing were also distributed by the CAPs. Only 1 midwife kit was given out.
- c. There was only one significant project completed. This was the repair of a roof and one side of a 5 room school in CAP 1-3-3's area in the hamlet of Phuoc Hoa, Village of Binh Thong, Binh Son District. Other smaller projects included a new well and pump at the Binh Son Orphanage by CAP 1-3-7. CAP 1-4-3 dug a large drain and sump for one of the hamlet wells at An Hai on the Batangan Penninsula. In addition, there were a number of hamlet protective fences repaired and one public shower at CAP 1-3-8's position (BS 575915).
- d. It should be a matter of record that the relationship between this Group and that of the G-5 Staff, Americal Division, continues to be excellent on both a professional and personal basis.



ENCLOSURE (1)



PART III

UENLIAL LISTING OF CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS

1 May

2 May

CAP 1-1-4. An estimated NVA squad opened fire with small arms and machine gun fire at BT 258200. The CAP returned the fire with organic weapons killing I NVA and capturing 1 AK-47. A medevac was requested for one PF wounded in the action. Gunships escorting the medevec plane were employed on the enemy positions and a CAP sweep conducted upon completion of the medevac found 5 NVA KIA and 1 M-1 carbine. RESULTS: 6 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47, and 1 M-1 carbine, 1 PF

CAP 1-1-6. A patrol found a tunnel at BT 234245. The tunnels were found to contain 3 NVA and 1 VC who were shot and killed by the CAP. RESULTS: 3 NVA KIA, 1 VC KIA, 1 M-2 carbine, 1 AK-47, 1 submachine gun, and 1 M-26 grenade.

CAP 1-4-2. Two Chieu Hois surrendered to CAP. The two claimed to have information concerning the whereabouts of LOVC and 20 NVA from unit K-48. They were taken to District Headquarters for exploitation. RESULTS 2 Hoi Chanhs.

CAP 1-4-2. Two Hoi Chanhs came to CAP. Three VN females accompanied 1 of the Hoi Chanhs and were detained as VCS. RESULTS: 2 Hoi Chanhs, 3 VCS.

CAP 1-5-4. Three VN males, 1 with shrapnel wounds, came to position at BF 621017. The VN stated the shrapnel wounds had been inflicted by the fire mission called by CAP during contact. The wounded man and his two escorts were detained as VCS. RESULAS: 3 VCS.

CAP 1-4-1. One VM male ran from patrol checking ID Cards in the vicinity of BS 624814. The male was pursued and detained as VCS. RUSULTS: 1 VCS.


CAP 1-3-4. Received approximately 10 M-79 rounds from an estimated 4 or 5 VC at BT 521007. The CAP returned organic fire and swopt the area-with negative results;

III-l

UNGLASSI ISJ EMCLOSURE (1)







CAP 1-3-3. An element received approximately 50-199 SA rounds from an unknown size force. The CAP returned fire and called an artillery mission with undetermined results. RESULTS: Unknown.

CAP 1-3. While setting up security for VN harvesting rice CAP received SAF from an estimated squad of VC at 679969. The CAP returned fire and called an artillery mission with unknown results: RESULTS: Unknwon.

CAP 1-1-7. A patrol on aged and exchanged SAF with approximately 13 VC at BT 315316. The VC broke contact, fleeing N. The CAP swept area finding 4 VC KIA, and 1 AK-47. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA, and 1 AK-47.

CAR 1-1-6. A patrol received SAF, 60mm, and M-79 fire from approximately 18 VC at BF 232244. The CAP returned organic weapons fire causing the enemy to fice N. Gunships were employed in the area and the CAP swept the area finding 3 VC KIA and 1 Thompson Submachine Gun. 3 PF's were WIAE in the contact. RESULTS: 3 PF WIAE, 3 VC KIA, 1 Thompson Submachine Gun.

CAP 1-1-4. A patrol made contact with approximately 1 platoon of VC at BT 248198. The GAP called gunships and airstrikes on the enemy position. A sweep of the area found 10 VC KIA, 3 AK-47's, and 1750 lbs of rice. Villagers reported seeing 14 VC carrying bodies of wounded to the W. 1 USMC, 1 USM, and 1 PF received minor wounds in the contact and 1 PF was WIAE. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA (M), 1 USM WIA(M), 1 PF WIAE, 1 PF WIAE 10 VC KIA, 3 AK-47's, 1750 lbs of rice.

CAP 1-3-7. An ambush from CAP observed and opened fire on 3 or 4 VC at BS 615935. The VC fled S and the CAP swept the area with negative results; RESULTS: Negative.







5 May



CAP 1-3-4. 3 to 5 VC opened fire on VN civilians putting up a fonce at BS 628999. Patrol sent to the area received 50-60 SA rounds a 4 M-79 rounds. The patrol returnof fire and called an artillery mission, causing the VC to flee SV. The CAP swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-4-2. 3 VN children brought 2 M-79 rounds and 1 dud trup flare to position, at BS 776858. A VIP payment was made and the ordnance was destroyed. RESULTS: 2 M-79 rounds, 1 trip flare.

CAP 1-3-10. A patrol apprehended 3 VCS coming out of a tree line at BS 618867. The tree line area was swept, finding 7 M-79 rounds. The VCS were sent to Binh Son District Headquarters. RESULTS: 3 VCS. 7 M-79 rounds.


CAP 1-1-4. CAP received SAF from approximately 15 VC at BT 255194. The CAP return fire, causing the enemy to floe to the NW. The CAP swept the area finding 2 VC KIA. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-1-6. Received sniper fire at BT 243245. The CAP swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIAE.

CAP 1-4-3. One Hio Chanh surrendered to CAP at BS 768838. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

CAP 1-3-9. The CP group at BS 473875, received between 500-600 rounds of SAF. An artillery mission was fired on suspected enemy positions resulting in one secondary explosion. The area was swept the the CAP finding 1 VC KIA, and drag marks. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-4-1. An element received heavy small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad BS 610805. The CAP unit returned fire and returned fire and directed both an artiller mission and fixed wing sirstrikes on the on One bomb was observed to land among 5 VC. The area was swept finding several body





7 May

8 May

9 May

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CAP 1-3-2. 1 Noi Chanh surrendered at BS 547886, with his weapon and one grenade. RISULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh, 1 INC, 1 grenade.

CAP 1-3-5. A PF detenated a mine at BS 712961 as the CLP was setting up security in the area. Immediately thereafter the CAP received sniper fire from an unknown number of enery. Fire was returned with organic weapons and 81m mortans. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA, 2 PF's WIAE.

CAP 1-3-2. Approhended 1 VCS, at BS 556892. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

CACO 1-4, and CAP 1-4-1. Participated with three PF platoons in a sweep of the area from grid BS 6283 to 6280. The sweep was conducted in response to local intelligence concerning the location of one VC squad. The CAP unit found one empty turnel which was destroyed, 15 VCS apprehended.

CAP 1-2-3. A patrol found 1 French 36 snipe: rifle in an old bunker at BT 444115. RESULT 1 TWC.

CAP 1-3-1. One PF was ambushed and killed enroute to his home at BS 683988. A patroi from the CAP swept the area with negative results. RESULES: 1 PF KTA, 1 M-2 carbine last.

CAP 1-3-9. Patrol surprised 9-10 VC enting at BS 506877. The VC started to flee and the CAP opened fire killing 6 VC and capturing 4 chicon grenades and 1 M-26 grenadas RESULTS: 6 VC KIA, 4 chicon grenades, 1 M-2 grenade.

CAP 1-1-1. Patrol received sniper fire. from 3 enemy at BT 267174. The patrol returned fire; the enemy broke contact and fled W. The CAP swept the area finding 1 NVA KIA, 1 9mm Chinese pistol, 1 bottle of vitamins and 782 gear. Pictures and documents in the KIA's wallet identified him as a 1stLt from the 74th Main Force Battalia The Lieutenant has a brother in school in Russia. RESULTS: 1 NVA KIA, 1 9mm Chinese pistol.





CAP 1-1-7. Fatrol opened fire on 1 squad of VC at BT330294, killing 2, capturing 2 VC and 2 AK-44's. The enery broke contact to the NE and the CAP pursued killing more VC and capturing 1 AK-44 and 1 M-1 carbine. RESULTS: 4 TC KIA, 2 VC POW, 4 IVC.

CAP 1-1-4. Ambush observed 4 people carrying rice to a VC contested area at BT 266202 The CAP approhended the 4 as VCS and sent them to Tam Ky District Headquarters. RESULTS: 4 VCS.

CAP 1-1-7. 3 booby traps were detenated in the protective wire of CAP. The CAP immediately fired the FFL and requested preplanned artillery. A sweep of the area found 1 VC KIA in the wire. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAF 1-1-2. An element from CAF engaged 5 VC noving down a trail at BT 322187. Two VC were KTA and the remaining 3 fled to the SE. RESULTS: 2 VC KTA, 1 grosse gun captured.

CAP 1-3-3. An element employed artillery on 1 squad of VC at BS 656994. One VC was observed to have been hit. The area was swept with negative results. RESURTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-8. Observed an unknown number of VC entering the old CAP compound at BS 572922. The CAP opened fire and swept the area finding 1 VC KIA. While on the sweep the CAP received SAF from a trench line near the compound. The CAP fired artillery on the enemy position, illuminated the area, and escaulted causing the enemy to withdraw to the V. One KCS was KIA in the action. RESULTS: 1 KCS KIA, 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-1-4. A patrol was hit by a command detonated 105mm trap at BT 259202. The patrol immediately received small arms fire from approximately 1 squad of enemy that withdrew to the W when the CAP returned fire. The area of contact was swept with negative results. RESULTS: 2 USMC WIAE, 2 FF WIAE.

ENCLOSURE (1)

10 May





Il May

12 May



CAP 1-1-6. A patrol received fire from an estimated reinforced enemy squad at BI 234249. The patrol returned fire killing 3 VC and causing the remainder to flee to the S. W. fl. An AO arrived on the scene and director artillery on the flowing enemy A sweep of the area produced negative further results. One VCS had been picked up by the patrol prior to the contact.

RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 1 VCS.

CAP 1-1-4. Patrol discovered 5 VC bedies in a ravine near where daytime contact had taken place at BT 257209. The enemy dragge the bodies to this location. RESULTS: 5 VC KIA, 1 destroyed AK-47.


CAP 1-2-2. Hieren't moving to check out movement engaged approximately 3 VC at BT 400127. The enemy find ME without returning fire. RESULTS: Megative.

CAP 1-3-3. Patrol opened fire on 2 VC at BS 672979. The VC fled S and the patrol checked the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-4-2. I NVA Hoi Chanh came position at BS 776858. He stated he was from the 48th NVA Battalion, and he was sent to Birk Son District Headquarters. RESULTS: 1 Not Chanh.

CAP 1-3-9. Anbush initiated fire on 3-4 VC at BS 481870. The VC threw 2 grenades and fled N. The CAP pursued and requested illumination but was unable to maintain contact. A sweep of the area discovered 1 box mine. 1 USMC and TF received minor wounds in the contact. RESULTS: 1 USMC VIA(M), 1 PF VIA(M), and 1 box mine.


CAP 1-1-6. Heard movement near their CP and discovered approximately 1 squad of VC attempting to probe the CP perimeter. The CAP opened fire with SA and claymores, called immunication and swept the area finding 7 VC KIA, 2 AK-47's and 2 chicon grenade RESULES: 7 VC KIA, 2 AK-47's, 2 chicon grenades.



COMPTDU

12 May





CAP 1-2-4. AVW civilian brought I claymore mine and I snoke grande to CAP at BT 466081. A VII payment was made. RE-SULTS: 1 claymore and I snoke grande.

CAP 1-3-2. An enemy force attacked OP at BS 556892, with approximately 35-40 B-40 rocket rounds, 20-30 60mm north rounds and heavy SAF. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and forced the enemy to flee S. A sweep of the area found 3 VC KIA, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 3 B-40 rockets, and 15 chicon grandes. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 3 B-40 rockets, 15 chicon grandos.

CAP 1-3-5. Received 3 incoming grenades and 50-70 SA rounds from an enemy force located at BS 709962. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and 60mm mortar fire with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-9. Received approximately 75-100 SA rounds. The CAP returned fire and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-7. CAP was attacked by approximately 30 VC at BS 613937. The enemy utilized 60mm mortar fire, satchel charges and SAF. 1 USMC was WIAF but DOW. 4 FF's were WIAE. The VC fled to the East and a sweep of the area found 3 VC KIA and 1 wounded VN female. RESULTS: 1 USMC DOW, 4 FF's WIA(M), 1 USN WIAE, 1 RD WIAE, 7 RD WIA(M), 3 VC KIA, 6 chicon granades, 1 satchel charge.



III-7 COMPUNITATION (1)

# CONFIDENTIAL.

12 May



13 May



MTT 1.2. Received approximately sever or eight 50rm norter mounds at BS 597921. The NET reversed 50rm and 50 enliber fire and scopt the area at first light. The MTT found 1 craters believed to be launching sites for 122nd recleits. The craters indicated a MW firing direction. RESULTS: Nogative.

CAP 10-1-4 and 1-10-1. Deformted a SFD at BT 275180, nounding 2 USIC and 2 PFs. RESULTS: 2 USMC HIAE, 2 PF WIAE.

CAP 1-2-5. An element node contact with 3-5 VC at BT 403122, killing one VC and capturing 2 AK-47: RESULTS: 1 VC KVA, 1 IVC.

CAP 1.3-9. A patrol found 2 105mm rounds rigged for entapy ting at BS 172872. The rounds had low velocity charges undermouth and were arried with friction fuzes. The patrol also found two sites that had been used the night before. All positious were aimed at the village and were made of bamboo. RESUMTS: 2 105mm rounds destroyed in place.

CAP 1-1-7. Received 5 60nm nortar rounds 4 RFG rounds and noderate SAF from an unknown number of enemy at BF 297287. The CAP returned fire with organic weapons and called an artillery mission. The area was later swept finding 3 VC KIA. RESULTS: 1 USHC WIAE, 5 FF WIAE, 3 VC KIA.

CAP 1-4-2. One Hoi Chash surrendered at BS 778858. RESULES: 1 Hoi Chanh.

CAP 1-3-2. An element received approximate 5 hand grenedes and a heavy volume of SAF fire from an unknown number of energy. The CAP returned fire with organic weapons and requested an artillery mission on the energy positions. A sweep was conducted with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-1-7. Reported that an element of the CAP, while on a sweet of the CAP AO, found fresh graves at BP 290275, BP 310255, and BP 310275. The graves contained the


III-8

ENCLOSURE (1)





14 May




CAT 1.3.3. An OF received approximately 100 rounds of SAF. The CAF returned fire and conducted a sweep with negative results RESUATS: Megative.

MPT 1-2. Received 6 incoming 60mm northrounds at BS 599919. Counter battery was delivered and the area swept with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-8. An element opened fire with that I arms and crtillery on an estimated VC squad at BS 563918. The enemy returned samil arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area found 1 VC KTA and numbrous blood trails. RESULTS: 1 VC KTA and 1 chicom grenade captured.

CAP 1.4-2. A patrol was in the process of apprehending 2 VCS at BS 772829, when it was fixed upon by 1 VC. The patrol returned fire and engaged 3 other VC who were in the immediate area. The VC broke contact heading SE. The patrol found 2 VC KIA and 1 M-1 carbine. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 2 VCS and 1 IWC.



ENCLOSTRE (1)



15 May

CAP 1-5-9. Proceived approximately 200 rounds of SAN at BS 473890. The CAP returned fire with shall are and artillary; illumination and shapt the area with negative reselve. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1.3.3. Received 3 impoming 82mm mortar rounds at ES 564977. The CAP fired CB on suspected enemy positions with negative results: RESURS: Regative.

CAP 1-4-1. Reported that a patrol at 23 608795 had received approximately 150 rounds on SAN from 20 VC during the period 0825 to 0925. The patrol engaged and pursued the enemy, observing one to call to the ground wounded. 7 VCS were apprehended in the area cathout identification. RESULTS: 3 VC

CAP 1-2-2. A VN child turned in one M-25 grenade to CAP at BT 418124. A VIP payment was made. PESULTS: 1 M-26 grenade.

CAP 1.1-6. An element received SAF from an estimated Vi platoon at BE 242267. The CAP unit returned fire and requested an artillery mission causing the enemy to withdraw to the west. A sweep of the area produced 5 VC FMA and 1 AK-47. 1 PF was wounded in the centact. RESULTS: 1 PF WIAE, 5 VC KIA, 1 TyC.

CAP 1-3-7. Received SAF from an unknown sized enemy force at BS 614935. The CAP returned fine and swept the area with negative mosults. RESULTS: Hegative.

CAP 1-4-4. Reported that the RF CP at BS 754814, had received small ams and mortar fire from an unknown number of enemy. Shortly thereafter the CAF received 20 - 30 rounds of SFF and a patrol was dispatched to sweep the area. The patrol adjusted artillery on movement sighted in the area and completed the sweep with negative findings or contact. RESULES: Negative.









18 May

CAP 1-2-4. Reported finding 2 chicom grenadus righted as a body trap at BF 419076 The CAP blet, the burby trap in place.

RESULTS - 2 chicons grenades destroyed.

CAP 1-0-0. In element observed 1 YCold US 670980. The MAP opened fibre, called for illumination and scept the area, finding 1 VC FOA and 1 AK-17. 1 MF received minor wounds from the VC a return fibre. A resweep of the area as first light discovered 3 AK-47 magnumes and 3 chicom grenades. RESULES: 1 MF VIA(H), 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC, 3 chicom grenales.

CAP 1-1.6. Fat in with AIC at RT 247155 when they received 8240 locket fire and SAF. The CAP and the APC returned fire and colled artillary and illumination, causing the one-known size enemy firse to withdraw to the SW. The area was sumpty with negatibe result RESULTS: Negative,

CAGO 1-1. A VN boy brought 6 mecoiless rifle mounds to CAGO. A VIP payment was made. RESULTS: 6 recoiless rounds.

CAP 1-3. An ambush called am artillery mission on 6 VC observed at BS 664985. The CAP swept the great with negative results RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-4-1. (Delayed Report) CAP and 3 PF platoons in joint sweep in the vicinity of grid 6779, detained 1 VCS. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

CAP 1-1-6. Two Marines tent to the river at BT 247266. One Marine tripped an M-14 mine; causing both Marines to be WIAE.

RESULES: 2 USMC WIAE.

CAP 1-3-3. In element observed 1 male and . 1 female fishing in an off limits area at BS 641974. The CAP detained the two as V. VCS at the PF's identified them as VC. RESULL: 2 VCS.

CAP 1-2-5. Givilians brought one 60mm WP round and 1 chicom grenade to CAP at BT 415123. A VIP payment was made. RESULTS: 1 60mm WP round and 1 chicom grenade.



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20 May

21 May



CAP 1-3-2. A VN male brought parts of one AK-47 to CAP at BS 576905. The weapon had been hit by artillery. A VIP payment was made. RESULTS: 1 AK-47.

CAP 1-3-5. An element observed energy activity at BS 719955. The CAP called an artillery mission causing the enemy to flee SE. A sweep of the area found 1 M-14 mine. RESULTS: 1 M-14 mine.

CAP 1-3-1. An element received heavy small arths fire from capproximately 30 VC traveling SE in the vicinity of BS 697967. The CAP called a 60mm mortar mission and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-1-4. Civilians brought one wounded male to CAP 1-1-4 at BT 285200. The wounded man was evacuated as a VCS. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

CAP 1-3-2. Two 60mm HE mortar rounds were turned in to CAP by civilians at BS 552890. VIP payment made. RESULTS: 2 60mm rounds destroyed.

CAP 1-2-4. Reported that in the past 3 days 19 bunkers had been found and destroyed in the vicinity of grid square BT 4608. The bunkers were estimated to be 20-25 days old. Several widely scattered spider holes were also found and destroyed. RESUMTS: 19 bunkers and an unspecified number of spider holes destroyed.


CAP 1-2-3. An element engaged 5 VC with organic weapons at BT 455102. The VC broke contact and fled W. A search of the contact area was made. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-50 with 3 magazines, and assorted 782 gear.

CAP 1-3-7. An ambush conducted a sweep of an area there they had observed lights at BS 612934. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-1-4. Discovered fresh graves containing 20 NVA bodies dressed in dark green uniforms, vicinity of grid square BF 2719.

III-12

enclosure (1)





The graves and weapons were found in an area where the CAP had run fixed wing air strikes on suspected enemy at 201750H. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-9. Observed approximately 20 VC moving SE at BS 473863. The CAP called an artillery mission and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-7. An element received SA and M-79 fire at BS 614935. The CAP element called illumination and swept the area finding blood trails and sections from a rifle grenade. RESULTS: Negative.

CAF 1-4-2. An element operating with PRU units detenated one SFD at BS 774848. A reaction patrol from CAP 1-4-2 received SAF when it was dispatched to secure the IZ for the emergency nedevac. The patrol returned fire causing the enemy to withdraw to the NW. After the CAP elements had combined, they detenated a second SFD at BS 774852, wounding 2 UEMC, 2 PF's and 2 PRU's. The CAP returned to the CAP CP and effected nedewacs for all wounded. RESULTS: 1 PRU Advisor, KIA, 3 PRU Advisors WIAE, 3 UEMC VIAE, 2 PF WIAE, 3 PRU WIAE and 2 USMC WIA(M).

CAP 1-3-8. Reported that one VC entered the hamlet of Phuoc Thuan and assassinated a PF, wounded his wife, and taken the PF's rifle. The CAP dispatched an element as a reaction force to sweep the area at BS 578922. The sweeping element received approximately 40 rounds of SAF but was unable to make worthwhile contact with the flooing enemy. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA and 1 VN female WIAE.

CAP 1-3-7. Swept area of previous contact at BS 611932, finding 1 VC KIA, 2 rifle grenades, and 1 chicom grenades, 1 blood trails, and a cartridge belt. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 2 rifle & 1 chicom grenades.

CAP 1-3-6. Received 40 - 50 rounds of SAF from S of their CP at BS 574937. The fire was returned and the area swept with negative results. MESULES: Negative.



III-13

ENCLOSURE (1)



23 May



24 May



CAP 1-1-7. (Dolayed Report) An element made contact with ap roximately one company of VC at BT 313392. A spotter plane was requested and artillery was adjusted on the energy to withdraw N. A sweep of the area found 3 VC KIA, 2 M-26 grenades, 5 chicom grandes, 2 BAR magazines, 4 AK-47 magazines, and 4 blood trails. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 2 M-26 grandes and 5 chicon granades.

CAF 1-4-3. 2 USMC personnel acting as security from 1st CAG Headquarters, observed and engaged 2 armsd NVA in green uniform at BS 774728. The NVA returned SAF wounding 1 USMC. A reaction unit from CAP 1-4-3 was sent to aid the security element and the combined elements received SAF from an unknown number of enemy. Fire was returned and the e emy broke contact and fled NE. A search of the area found one blood trail. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(M).

CAP 1-1-7. An element were on a patrol at BT 302290, when they received a heavy volume of SA and RPG fire from an estimated VC company. 3 PF's were KIA, 3 USMC and 3 PFs were WIA from the initial enomy volley. The CAP unit returned fire and the enemy broke contact and moved NV. A sweep of the contact area found 8 VC KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 BAR, and 1 carbine. RESULTS: 8 VC KIA, 3 IWC, 3 PF KIA, 3 USMC WIAE, and 3 PF WIAE.


CAP 1-4-3. A patrol walked to within 50 meters of the rear of an enemy cabush at BS 776831. Both spotted the other at the same time and exchanged SAF resulting in min wounds for 1 USMC. The enemy withdrew into a neargy tree line. A search by CAP element found 3 bunkers, 5 M-26 grenades, and 1 cal..50 toe popper. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(M), 5 M-26 grenades, and 1 cal..50 toe popper.

CAP 1-4-2. A hardet chief from a hanlet nec CAP reported that the VC had captured 20 to 25 civilians at BS 770860. The VC were reported to have been armed with M-16's carbines and groundes. They supposedly took the civilians to the general area of

UNCLASSIFICATION (1)



24 May



25 May

26 May

BS 753866. The civilians were on the beach searching for food at the time of their abduction. RESULTS: 20-25 civilians abducts

CAP 1-3-7. A patrol conducted a sweep of an area where lights had been observed at BS 619931. Movement was spotted and the CAP initiated fire on an unknown number of enemy. 4 VC were later spotted fleeing E. A sontinuation of the sweep netted 1 VC KIA, 4 VCS, and 1 M-1 carbine. RESUMS: 1 VC KIA, 4 VCS, and 1 IWC.

CAP 1-1-2. Patrol was set in ambush site, heard noises from new life village. Patrol proceeded to check out area, received SA fire from estimated squad VC Patrol returned with SA and enemy broke cont ct, fleeing SW. Called artillery in direction of withdrawal. Swept area. RESUMS:

CAP 1-3-6. Received 100 rounds SA from ES 573933. Returned fire with SA and M-60 MG, called illumination, checked area. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-1-7. On patrol when an estimated company size VC unit opened fire with heavy volume. SA and B-40 rockets. 3 USMC WIA, 3 PF WIA, 3 PF KIA, RESULTS: 3 USMC WIA, 3 PF KIA, 3 PF WIA, 1 AK-47, 1 M-1 carbine.

CAP 1.4.1. 2 ARVN vehicles proceeding S on Highway #1 received sniper fire from unknown size VC element at BT 651755.

PF's said approximately 20 VC sniping RESULES: 1 ARVN WIA:

CAP 1-4-3. While blasting trees at 767833. Marines found 2 VC KIA, which are suspecte to have been killed in action 16 April 69. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-4. Received approximately 100 round SAF from BF 635988. Approximately 6 VC fled SE. Returned fire with SA and 60mm sweet area with negative round. RESULTS:

ENCLOSURE (1)

III-15



27 May



28 Hay

30 Hay



CAP 1-2-2. Element spotted 3 VC at BS 400134. Opened up with SAF, request illumination to sweep area. Spotted 20-30 VC exchanged SA fire and pulled block to red line. MISUAS: Regutive.

CAP 1-3-2. I VN male brought 2 M-26 mines with fuse to this position. They were found in rice paddy beside village. Blow in place, VIP payment made. RUSWAS: 2 H-26 mines destroyed.

CAP 1-1-4. CAP CP has writing to displace to new night time CP. The CAP commander was discussing the new site with the village police nen and PF leader outside a village shop. Grenade thrown inside while 5 USEC were getting a cold drink. RESULTS: 7 USEC TEA.

round found at B5 552900. VIT rayment made. RESULES: 1 105 round destroyed;

CAP 1-3-10. Patrol spotted 3 VC at BS 595867. Called fire mission. Swept at first light. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-5-2. Patrol S w 3 VC and opened fire. Received 15-20 rounds carbine fire. Called illumination. Suept area. RESULES: Negative.


CAP 1-1-4. On patrol estimated squad of enemy opened up with small arms fire. CAP returned small arms and M-79 fire. Called artillery. Enemy broke contact and withdrew to M. RESULES: 1 NVA conteen cover, 1 M-79 shot gun round, 1 pair MVA trousers, 30-40 empty AK-47 casings.

CAP 1-3-2. I VN whild brought 3 60mm rounds to CAP at BS 505906. The rounds destroyed and VIP payment made. RESULTS: 3 60mm rounds destroyed.

MAT 1-2. 1 VN male brought 1 setchel charge to MTT at BS 599915. The charge was destroyed and VIP paid. MISURES: 1 setchel destroyed.

ENCIOSURE (1)

III-15



30 Hay


## UNCLASSIFIED

31 May

CAP 1-1-2. Detained 1 to mage male VCS at BF 5.0178. On 31 May the VCS led the CAP to the homes of 3 other VCS in the same area. RESUMES: 4 VCS.

CAP 1-1-2. A VN child brought 1 M-72 to CAP at EN 457068. WIF payment made. RESULTS: 1 N-72.

CAF 1-1-7. A joint Biet Lop, CAP patrol received SAF and B-40 wookets from an estimated energy plateen at DF 305294. 1
Biet Lop was KEA and 2 Biet Lops were VIII.
The patrol returned SAF and called a spotter plane. Airstrikes were run on the amon resulting in 15 VC KIA, and 4 AK-47 I C.



III-17





# HEADQUARTERS 1st Combined Action Group III Marine Amphibious Force FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

GroupO 1740.1A 1/BWS/jlg 1 May 1969

#### GROUF ORDER 1740.1A

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Request Mast

Ref: (a) U. S. Navy Regulations 1948

(b) MARCORPMAN, par 1701

(c) For 0 1740.1A

- 1. Purpose. To establish procedures and publish instructions governing Request Mast within this Group in accordance with references (a) through (c).
- 2. Cancellation. Group 0 1740.1.

#### 3. General

- a. Request Mast is defined as the right of any person in the Maval Service to communicate directly and privately with his Communicate for personal advise, or to make requests, reports, or statements.
- b. Individuals requesting mast have the right to have a direct interview with the Commanding Officer and the subject matter of the requested interview need not be discussed with any intermediate.

  Request Mast is considered confidential and will be handled accordingly.
- c. Personnel availing themselves of the right of Request Mast in good faith may do so without fear or prejudice to their interests.
- d. The Commanding Officer will hold Request Mast in his office at any time during normal working hours except when scheduled activities requiring his presence elsewhere make it impossible to do so.

#### 4. Action

- a. Personnel desiring to appear at Request Mast before the Commanding Officer will comply with the following procedures:
- (1) Inform his Company Commander/Section Head that he desires to request mast with the Group Commanding Officer.
- (2) Make application in writing and submit application to the Group First Sorgeant for appointment.

Groupo 1740.1A 1 May 1969



- b. In the event the Commanding Officer is unable to resolve the applicant's problem, or if the applicant expresses a desire to appear before the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, the necessary arrangements will be made in accordance with the provisions of reference (c).
- c. The contents of this order will be brought to the attention of all personnel at regular intervals and posted on all Bulletin Boards.

J. E. HENTEGAN

DISTRIBUTION: A, B

HEADQUARTERS

1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

Gru0 P11240.2 4/TMG/drg 19 May 1969

#### GROUP ORDER P11240.2

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedure for Motor Transport

Ref:

(a) Force Order P4000.5B

(b) FMFPacO P11240.2

(c) FMFPacO 11240.3

Encl: (1) Locator Sheet

1. Purpose. To establish guidance for the operation, administration and maintenance of automotive vehicles and equipment within the 1st Combined Action Group.

2. Certification. Reviewed and approved this date.

J. E. HENNEGAN

DISTRIBUTION: A & B

## DECLASSIFIED





GruO P11 240.2 19 May 1969

## LOCATOR SHEET

Subj:	Standing	Operating	Procedure	for	Motor	Trans	port		
LOCATIO	ON:	te the lo	eation(s)	of th	le cop	y(ies)	of this	publicati	on)

12-4

ENCLOSURE (1)





Gru O P11240.2 19 May 1969

## RECORD OF CHANGES

Log completed change action as indicated.

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## DECLASSIFIED



## SECTION VII

## REPORTS

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#### GELTRAL

101. Applicability. This order is applicable to all companies within the lat Combined Action Group. Notor Transport procedures shall be in accordance with this orders and references (a) through (c). Should the provisions of this SOP conflict with the directives of higher authority the latter shall prevail.

102. Action, All personnel in the 1st Combined Action Group will comply with the provisions of this order. All personnel directed to perform daily in Motor Transport will be thoroughly familiar with, and comply with the provisions of this order.

## 103. Responsibility.

- 1. Staff. The group Supply Officer/S-4 is also designated the Motor Transport Officer, and he is directly responsible to the Commanding Officer in the performance of his duties. The group Supply Officer/S-4 will coordinate Motor Transport functions for the Commander, to include assignment of vehicles.
- 2. Individual. All officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted pursonnel have a duty to prevent abuse and/or misuse of Notor Excusport equipment and to initiate promptly such corrective action as may be required in the interest of safe operation and preservation of equipment.



#### SECTION II

#### OF TRATIONS

#### 201. Conoral.

- 1. Tactical and logistical requirements are the governing factors in our loyment of Notor Transport.
  - 2. Vehicles will be utilized for official use only.
- 3. Vehicles will be operated only by properly licensed personnel pessessing a valid SF-46 with the authorized capacity for the vehicle to be operated.
- h. Company Commanders will ensure they have personnel trained, licensed, and assigned to operate and perform first echalon maintenance on vehicles in their charge in accordance with the T/E.

## 202. Responsibilities.

- 1. The group S-4 has starf cognizance over the operations and maintenance of vehicles.
- 2. The group S-4, through the group Motor Transport Chief, will also:
- a. Twercise control over all vehicles in order to eliminate misuse or chuse and ensure maximum utilization, and that safe operating procedures are being employed.
- b. Ensure timely performance of all required organizational maintenance and the evacuation to higher echalons of repair.
- c. Review the dispatching record dealy and sign the last entry for the day.
- d. Supervise dispatching and ensure the accuracy of all lieter Transport records.
- o. Theure qualified personnel are available for the purpose of operating and maintaining 21% ton volicles.
  - f. Be prepared to doploy the group on order.
  - 3. Operators of all vehicles will:
    - a. Have in his possession a valid SF-46 issued in his name.
- b. Be responsible for the safe operation of the vehicle assigned to him and for the proper loading and safety of passengers and cargo being transported.
- c. Operators will comply with all military and civilian traffic regulations. The operator will be held responsible for all traffic violations and any demage resulting from negligence.

- d. Operators will promptly report any mechanical defects to the dispatcher.
- e. Every operator is responsible for performing the required preventive maintenance on the day assigned.
- f. Operators will ensure they have a properly completed trip ticket, Vehicle Accident Report Form (SF-91), and bilingual Vietnamese Accident Identification card in his assigned vehicle.
- 4. Company Commanders will ensure drivers are familiar and comply with the above requirements.

## 203. Dispatching Procedures.

- 1. A duty dispatcher will be on duty at the Group Noter Pool on a 24 hour-day basis.
- 2. The dispetcher will maintain a daily dispatching log, noting all information and remarks necessary to any attendant circumstances pertaining to commitment.
- 3. The dispertence will review all trip tickets for correctness and possible misuse prior to completing the log.
  - 4. Records will be maintained in accordance with Th. 4700-15/1\_.
- 5. He vehicle will be dispatched unless the driver has in his pessession the following:
  - a. A valid SF-46.
  - b. SF-91 Accident Report Form.
  - c. Bilingual Identification Card.
  - d. Trip Ticket.
  - 6. Only vehicles in saio operating condition will be dispatched.
- 7. No vehicle will be dispatched until the required operators

## .. Tiple Security.

- 1. Proper security in order to prevent damage to or theft of vehicles till be exercised on a continual basis. Security of a vehicle, after it has been dispatched, is the driver's responsibility.
- 2. Vehicles will be returned to the Motor Pool when the requirement for its use has ended unless reasonable conditions dictate otherwise.
  - 3. Vehicles will be locked when not in use.





### 205. Passenger Loads.

1. Government vehicle loads, including the operator, will not exceed the following passenger limits;

TYPE	FRONT	REAR	TOTAL
(1) Truck, kton, MISIAL	2	2	14
(2) Truck, 3/4 ton, M37BIL	2	8	10
(3) Truck, 2 ton, M35A2	2	20	22

## 206. Traffic Regulations.

- 1. All traffic regulations promulgated by military and civilian authorities will be obeyed.
- 2. Vehicles will not be operated at a speed greater than reasonable under existing conditions, posted speed limits not withstanding.
- 3. No government vehicle shall be backed until the driver has positively ascertained that the maneuver can be accomplished in safety. A guide will be used at nights when backing up or travelling cross country.
- 4. No vehicle will be towed at a distance exceeding 16 feet behind another.
- 5. Operators will exercise extreme caution when operating under blackout conditions. Guides will also be used when off main roads.

#### 207. Administrative Deadline.

1. There will be no required administrative deadline in a combat area. Where feasible, in the interests of combat availability, the placing of vehicles on administrative dealine is authorized.

#### 208. Motor Vehicle Accidents.

- 1. Each driver issued a trip ticket will also be issued a blank Accident Report Form (SF 91).
- 2. All accidents, regardless of how slight the injury or damage, will be reported to the Group Motor Transport Chief.
- 3. The group S-4 will be responsible for submitting required accident reports to higher authority.
- 4. Drivers will complete the SF-91 at the scene of the accident while the incident is fresh in his memory.
- 5. Investigations of accidents will be conducted in accordance with procedures found in MARCORSUPMAN; JAG INST P5800.7 and MACV Directive 25-1.





#### HAINTHANCE

- 301. General. Maintenance is a Command responsibility. Commanders at all levels must take an active interest and allocate sufficient time for the care of assigned equipment. Maintenance of all Motor Transport equipment and maintenance records must comply with the requirements of reference (b).
- 302. Maintenance Program. An offective maintenance program is de-
  - (1) Command Interest and Supervision.
- (2) Training. Technical training for mechanics and drivers will be conducted on a continuing basis.
- (3) Facilities. This includes an adiquate shop, necessary tools and equipment, the portioent publications, and required parts and supplies on hand.
- (h) Time. Proper care of equipment requires that adequate time be set aside for daily and weekly preventive maintenance.

#### 303. Preventive Haintenance.

- l. Preventive maintenance, or operator's maintenance as it is more commonly called, is the most important echolon of maintenance.
  The entire maintenance program is dependent on the success or failure of first echolon maintenance.
- 2. Maintenance procedures will comply with the instructions contained in TI 11240-15/1, Tactical Motor Transport Vehicles Preventive Maintenance, appropriate Medicio After Instructions, Imbrication instructions, and individual vehicle manuals.
- 3. The majority of maintenance problems will be avoided if conscientious and continuous preventive maintenance is adhered to.

### 104. Hodifications.

1. Modification of Marine Corps furnished equipment will be afformed in accordance with instructions contained in Marine Corps and Michiganian Instructions and Technical Publications.

#### 305. Docalining Vohicles.

- 1. Volicles requiring quarterly or annual preventive maintenance will be deadlined until the equired maintenance has been performed.
- 2. In the event that a vehicle involved in a combat situation is not available, preventive maintenance fill be performed as circumstances allow.

3. Vehicles to be evacuated to a higher echelon of repair will have all required organizational maintenance accomplished prior to turn-in. The Motor Transport Chief will prepare the TERO and Deadline Report as required.

14-13



#### SUPPLY

#### 401. Responsibility.

- 1. It is the responsibility of the Supply Officer to procure and maintain appropriate stock levels or repair parts required to maintain equipment in serviceable condition.
- 2. It will be the responsibility of the Motor Transport Chief to ensure that personnel requesting and turning in repair parts adhere to apply the supply procedures.

## 1,02. Usaga Date.

l. Correct usage data is important in order that an adequate level of supplies and repair parts may be maintained. One way of invalidating usage data is the practice of procuring supplies and parts from other than the nermal sources, (commonly called "scrounging"), and not reporting it to the Supply Officer.

## 403, Procedures.

. . . .

- 1. Supplies and parts required by the Motor Transport unit will be requisitioned as follows:
- a. Required repair arts for a vehicle wall be requested on a
  - b. Other supplies and equipment will be requisitioned on a

#### SECTION V

#### FIRE AND SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

## 501. Hormal Operations.

- 1. Garages, shops and other enclosures will be well ventilated.
- 2. Artificial light other than electrical lamps will not be used in connection with extrination or repair of vehicles, i. e.; candles, eigeretve lighters.
  - 3. Sacking will not be permitted in shops or garages.
- 4. "Wo Smoking" signs will be displayed in areas where smoking presents a hazard.
- 5. Vehicles being filled with gesoline or not in use will have the engine turned off and parking brake engaged.
- 6. Cosoling or other flammables will not be used for cleaning purposes. Only authorized cleaning solvents may be used.

## 502. Pire Provisions.

- I. The Meter Transport Chief is responsible for posting and maintaining a fire bill.
- 2. Fire stations will be marked and fire fighting equipment available.
  - I Thre staticas will be buildned by the Hotor Transport, Chief.





#### SECTICH VI

#### TRAINING

60%. General. Technical and general training of Motor Transport personal is a commend responsibility. On-the-job training for the development of driver and methanic technical skills is desirable and encouraged. Gross-training in subject material portaining to drivers and mechanics is necessary. Training in the requirements of individual vohicle types for preventive maintenance services is particularly necessary for operators.

602. Training Requirement. In order to meet the requirements for technical training the Notor Transport Chief will conduct classes for all Notor Transport personnel as the tempo of combat operations allow.

# SECTION VII

- 701. Unsatisfactory Equipment Report (UER). UER's will be submitted by the Soli in accordance with MCO 1700.1. The UER is one of the most important methods that can be used to assist in the correction of equipment deficiencies.
- 702. Stolen/Hissing Vehicle Report. Operators of vehicles will report stolen on masing vehicles to the Motor Transport Chief. The Provost Marshal will be immediately notified. The Group S-4 will take further appropriate action.
- 703. Vehicle Status Report. This report will be submitted daily to apprise the Commending Officer of the status of the group vehicles. It further provides a report of deadline equipment.
- 70h. Tochmical Training Robert. To be submitted to the S-4 as training is conducted. This report will contain the subject metter, hours of instruction and personnel attending.
- 705. Quartually Donsity Report. This report will be submitted as required by reference (b).