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SEP 17 1969


(Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/djm over 5750 Ser:
020-69 dtd 14 August 1969

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 July - 30 July 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness
and is forwarded herewith.


R.D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG

PERMANENT RETENTION
Report Destruction to HQ Classified Files Sect. (Code ABQ)

3

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6910063

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Ser

9 SEP 1969

0105369

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/djm over 5700 Ser: 020-69
of 14 Aug 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 July 1969 to 31 July 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. L. Reed

R. L. REED
BY DIRECTION

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

6/JEH/djm
5700
Ser: 020-69
14 Aug 1969

~~REDACTED~~ (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AQ3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 July 1969 to 31 July 1969

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.11A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8A

Encl: (1) 1st Combined Action Group, III Marine Amphibious Force
Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),
enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3-year intervals, declassified after 12 years,
DOD Dir 5200.10.

J. E. Henneagan
J. E. HENNEGAN

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Copy 1 of 12 Copies ~~REDACTED~~

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1 July 1969 to 31 July 1969

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DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

1-1

ENCLOSURE (1)

PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATED

1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California

Commander

LtCol J. E. HENNEGAN
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1

Captain L. H. ROSS
1Jul69 - 24Jul69

Captain N. H. GROSZ
25Jul69 - 31Jul69

Combined Action Company 1-2

Captain R. R. WEINROT
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

Combined Action Company 1-3

Captain P. G. MITCHELL
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

Executive Officer
Combined Action Company 1-3

1stLt J. J. MULHEARN JR.
26Jul69 - 31Jul69

Combined Action Company 1-4

Captain K. M. SEARS
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

ATTACHED UNITS

1. None.

2. LOCATIONS

Hq, 1stCAG	Chu Lai, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CACO 1-1	Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CACO 1-2	Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CACO 1-3	Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
CACO 1-4	Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
MTT - 1	Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
MTT - 2	Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

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ENCLOSURE (1)

Executive Officer

Major J. H. LAWSON
1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

Adjutant/S-1

2ndLt B. W. SMITH
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

S-2/S-3

Major R. F. ENDERT
1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

S-4/Supply

Captain T. N. GARBOWSKI
1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

Communications Officer

Major R. F. ENDERT
1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

S-5/Special Services

Major J. H. LAWSON
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

Medical Section

HML T. A. ROBINSON
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC		USN		OTHER	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
9	472	0	28	1	4 (ARVN)

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration.

a. Joined and transferred. During the month of June, the 1st Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below:

(1) Joined

Officers
2

Enlisted
93

(2) Rotated CONUS

Officers
1

Enlisted
59

(3) Transferred within WestPac Command.

Officers
0

Enlisted
12

(b) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospitals)

Officers
0

Enlisted
11

b. Awards.

(1) There were two Bronze Stars, nine Navy Commendation, and six Navy Achievement award recommendations submitted to FMFPac for approval during the month of July 1969.

(2) Awards returned approved from FMFPac included the following:

BSM
1

NCM
6

NAM
2

(3) Personnel of the 1st Combined Action Group also received the following awards as a result of combat wounds, heroic/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam:

PHM
15

VCG
4

c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of July 1969 were as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DAI</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>WIANE</u>	<u>NBC</u>	<u>WIA/NBC RET TO DU</u>
USMC	5	0	1	15	3	2	0
USN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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e. Administrative Assistance. There were three group directives promulgated during the reporting month.

Art 32 Investigations Informal Investigations NJP SPCM SCM

0 2 6 0 1

(1) Out of country R&R - Quotas	Utilized
43	43

(2) In Country Risk - 11

h. Career Planning. The career planning program continues to be stressed at all levels of command. A continuing effort is being made to increase the civilian education level of Marines within the command through USAFI GED testing. During the month of July 1969 one Marine applied for a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve under the enlisted commissioning program. There was one career reenlistment, one career extension of enlistment and five first term extensions of enlistment effected.

Letters

Incoming
to bag

Outgoing
1/2 bag

Packages

Incoming
4 bags

NOTE: One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

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j. Promotions. 66 enlisted promotions were effected during the month of July 1969 as follows:

Sergeant 2

Corporal 1

Lance Corporal 63

k. Hospital Visits. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital Corpsman representative, the Casualty NCO and the Mail Orderly who delivers mail to the patients located in hospitals at Chu Lai. Frequent visits are also made by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, the Adjutant, and the First Sergeant. Usually, the Commanding Officer or his representative, having been notified by Postoff Control Chu Lai, of the destination of the individual medevaced from the field, are waiting at the hospital when the casualty arrives. The dead are identified within hours of arrival at Chu Lai.

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2. Intelligence

a. General. The month began and ended with the same general lack of activity experienced during the last week of June, with the majority of contact continuing in Binh Son District (CACO 1-3). No wave of attacks initiating the Second Phase of the Summer Campaign occurred, although this was warned of on two occasions by higher headquarters and 1st CAC alerted for them. The relative quiet in CACO 1-1 and the near-silence in the MACG's of CACO's 1-2 and 1-4 were consistent with the lull experienced generally throughout the ICET. Only CACO 1-3 broke the mold with significant contacts reported almost daily.

(1) Enemy propaganda efforts increased, with the leaflets collected carrying VC victory and US pullout of the RVN as themes.

(2) More than 20 of the enemy rallied to the GVN at CAP locations mostly in the vicinity of CAPs 1-4-2 and 1-4-3. Again, Operation Mantucket Beach appears responsible for this increase in Chieu Mois. All Hoi Chanh reported their knowledge of the program coming from both leaflets and aerial broadcasts, with at least part of their motivation provided by the fact their families were under GVN control (mostly in refugee center.)

(3) CACO 1-1 again this month was second in the number of contacts, while again producing the greatest number of kills. But enemy activity against the 1st Company CAPs was low, with no significant contact at all for the Tam Ky District CAPs during either the first or last week of the month.

(a) The strongest contact occurred two kilometers northwest of Binh Son District Headquarters on July 16th, when a reported 20 VC ambushed CAP 1-3-3 while it was on the move after dark to a night defensive position. An effective mine ambush, it accounted for a dozen friendly casualties with only one VC killed.

(4) CACO 1-2 experienced only four significant contacts all month, and these paid off in part because of a MACG boundary shift in line with needs of pacification. This shift of boundaries caught the enemy without all hands being notified and four VC died as a result.

(5) CACO 1-3 had significant contact 21 days of the month, most of it occurring in eastern Binh Son, and the majority of contacts during the 2nd and 3rd weeks of the month.

(a) Toward the end of the month, the enemy was faced with Operation Mantucket Beach in Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts east of National Route #1, and this caused a reduction in his activities. This was unfortunate for BLT 2-26, which entered the coastal CACO 1-3 MACG's on 24 July (Operation Bold Armada) to find the enemy preferred to lie low. At month's end, there had been a few kills for the BLT, and the most significant accomplishments lay in discovery and destruction of a number of tunnels and capturing of some small caches weapons/food caches. The operation kept the enemy action against CAPs 1-3-1, 1-3-3, 1-3-4 and 1-3-5 at a near standstill, with only three contacts reported during the last week of July. The operation was scheduled to go into the first week of August.

(6) CACO 1-4 had only four significant contacts for the entire period.

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(7) Intelligence from higher headquarters regarding the future of guerrilla operations indicates greater emphasis on political and propaganda activities aimed at establishing the People's Revolutionary Party as a recognized entity, terrorist attacks against middle and low level GVN cadre, and attacks against PIR/PF and CAP-type local security in the continuing effort against the GVN control.

b. Intelligence Chain. There was no change in the Intelligence Chain during the month. 1st CAG/Americal Division G-2/198th IAD G-2 relationships remained the same, and the 1st CAG G-2 briefed incoming reliefs of Intelligence Section Heads for the above units during the month.

(1) Approximately 60% of village intelligence paid off during the month even though the volume of reports to the CAPs fell off some. This intelligence was responsible for 3 VC MIAs, the destruction of four bunkers and the destruction in place of four pressure-detonation type mines in CAP 1-3-2 and 1-4-2, where an ARVN battalion was conducting an operation along the road to Tru Dong.

c. ANVN Liaison Officer/Interpreter. There was little change in this area. The ANVN Interpreter assigned to CAGO 1-3 who had been employed primarily with HMM 1-2 was scheduled at month's end to move into the CAGO headquarters because of the cessation of HMM training activities.

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3. Operations

a. General.

(1) 1st Combined Action Group operations in support of village security and pacification was affected markedly by F/MAF support of the Accelerated Pacification Program for 1969 during the month of July. In further support of the same program, several TAOC modifications were accomplished or planned, and training at both 1st CAG MTTs ceased when the training mission was turned back to the MACV Mobile Training Teams, and the teams went into normal CAP operations without a change of TAOC, though changes were projected.

(2) Up until this month, 198th Light Infantry Brigade had concentrated their efforts on the west side of National Route #1 with the exception of periodic forays into the Batangan area to screen the friendly refugee hamlets there to keep the 48th VC Local Battalion off balance. Increased enemy attacks against CAPs and other Binh Son District-controlled hamlets to the east of National Route #1 called attention to the need for larger unit operations in the area, and brought about Operation Nantucket Beach conducted by the 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry, 198th LIB. The overall operation would include the 2d Battalion, 26 Marines (SLF-B) and the 6th Regiment of the ARVN 2d Division, and particularly affect the CAPs of CACO 1-3 along the eastern Binh Son coast. The operation was planned in support of the Accelerated Pacification Program and would have the side effect of working over an area in Son Tinh District where two new CAPs projected for 4th Company were planned for insertion in August.

b. Activities.

(1) During the period there were six joint CAP-District RF/PF operations, two of which involved more than one CAP as a part of the joint friendly forces. These operations produced only 10 NVA KIA, but the weapons ration was high: 5 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured. Also 10 VCS, 11 VCI, and 12 draft dodgers were apprehended. CACO 1-1 claimed the greatest number of kills as usual, with CACO 1-2 obtaining the remaining kills, probably due to the change in TAOC boundaries as much as the tactic of stay-behind ambushes following cordon and search operations which caught the enemy coming out of his holes early in the evening.

(a) CACO 1-3 was limited in operations to some extent by the presence of the SLF in its eastern CAP TAOC's. During the period, Operation Bold Armada was conducted as a complement to Operation Nantucket Beach (198th LIB) which continued after the SLF left the area. 1st CAG/198th LIB/BLT 2-26 coordination was outstanding, and 1st CAG had the opportunity to contribute in some measure to the success and smoothness of the operation by providing close liaison and local information regarding minefields, enemy habits, the friendly civilian situation and the like. Prior to the operation, the SLF coordinated with USA and 1st CAG at a meeting at Americal Division headquarters held at the end of June. At a subsequent meeting at the headquarters of the 198th LIB, 1st CAG provided a liaison team consisting of the Company Commander, CACO 1-3 and two radiomen from CAP 1-3-3 Marines to serve as radio liaison teams with the BLT. The radiomen were highly experienced in the projected area of operations and it was felt they could provide additional assistance to the battalion by their knowledge. The Company Commander of CACO 1-3 and the liaison team radiomen went

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board ship from the coordinating staff from the SLF at the conclusion of the meeting. On the day following, S-3, 1st CAG attended SLF briefing of the III MAF Staff with the ACS/CAP at Camp Horn, Danang. At this time CO, CACO 1-3 was aboard ship conducting a briefing of BLT 2-26 Company Commanders for the following days landing. The cooperation and interest shown by the staff of BLT 2-26 and the SLF were highly satisfactory. It was the interest of the 1st CAG to provide for the protection of friendly civilians as well as the CAPs and other GVN forces in the operational area, and this interest appeased of prime concern to the SLF and BLT staffs. For the period of operations, the CAPs 1-3-1, 1-3-3, 1-3-4 and 1-3-5 are limiting operations to within 1000 meters of their base hamlets, and providing secure LZ's for the companies as well as guide local intelligence information, regarding the safety of movement outside the hamlet. Operation Bold Armada has been successful to date from the standpoint of smooth coordination if for no other reason, by proving again that the SLF can function effectively in conjunction with a mixed FVMAF force in this type of situation.

(b) The most significant aspects of CACO 1-4 operations were the coordination with USA and ARVN units pursuing Operation Nantucket Beach to the west of CAPs 1-4-2, 1-4-3, and 1-4-4 and the increase in VIP ordnance turn-in especially in the Batangan area, where VIP revenue contributed to an easing of the peoples difficulties to some extent. During the period, an 81mm mortar section moved into CAP 1-4-2's position to provide assistance to the 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry forces conducting screening operations to the west of Batangan, and from time to time these forces based at the CAP locations and conducted joint patrols and ambushes in the CAP TAOC. In July, CACO 1-4 received the greatest number of Chieu Hoi's, as the local guerrilla forces began to come in to the GVN side due mostly to their families being housed in the refugee centers on the Batangan.

(2) The following statistics derive of 1st CAG operations and activities during July:

(a)	Night Patrols	83	Multi-CAP Operations	36
	Ambushes	1056	Day Patrols	854

(b) Enemy Casualties

<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>DETAINEES</u>	<u>HOI CHANGS</u>
76	2	20	22

(c) Weapons and Ordnance Captured

<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
24	1

(d) Friendly Casualties Sustained

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIAE</u>	<u>WIAM</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
USMC	6	13	7	0	0
USN	0	0	0	0	0
PF	4	26	6	0	0

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c. Training

(1) General. Formal training during the period included General Military Subjects and Leadership and Tactics training for USMC and Popular Force personnel, and Vietnamese Language and Personal Response training for USMC personnel only. This is in addition to the preponderance of time spent in On the Job Training while carrying out the normal CAP mission.

(2) CAP Training. On the CAP level, 33 hours of formal training were completed at each CAP position, meeting the requirements of the Group training Schedule which is promulgated weekly. Each CAP has been provided with the bilingual training manual: Handbook of Basic Military Principles published by FMFPAC, and weekly with lesson plans covering each subject required by the training schedule. Essentially, all CAP leaders need to do is review the lesson plans and utilize experience and the FMFPAC handbooks for background in the conduct of his formal training. A page of Vietnamese language is also published weekly and coincides to some degree with the lesson plans subject.

(3) MTT Training. MTT 1-1 (Tam Ky) conducted 77 hours of formal instruction while training Vietnamese forces. This, in addition to On the Job Training in normal CAP Operations. MTT 1-2 (Binh Son) conducted no training due to lack of PF availability, and continued normal CAP operations with Quang Ngai platoon #189, the last platoon trained there, which had remained.

(a) MTT 1-1 trained 73 Popular Self Defense Force personnel and conducted classes on the M-16 rifle for another eight platoons of those Popular Self Defense Forces. It is noted that in the pidgin translation these forces are referred to as: "People Self Defense Force."

(b) On the 26th of July MTT training ceased and the MTT's conducted normal CAP operations in assigned TAOC's while awaiting further orders. Plans called for MTT 1-1 to be redesignated as CAP 1-1-5 and go into a projected TAOC at such time as new PF platoons became available. MTT 1-2 was scheduled for deactivation, with the personnel being used to provide the nuclei for two new CAPs to be activated and installed in Son Tinh District in support of the Accelerated Pacification Program. The last-trained PF platoons remained at both locations providing the PF element for CAP operations.

(4) Other Training

(a) Four 1st CAG Marines completed the month-long Vietnamese language course conducted by III MAF at the old 2d CAG headquarters, vicinity of Camp Horn, Danang.

(b) Eight 1st CAG Marines completed the three day Artillery course... conducted by the Americal Division Artillery at Chu Lai Base. This course is designed to provide personnel with the capability of calling and adjusting support artillery. Response to the course has been quite good from all Marines attending.

(c) All newly-joined Marines received a one day indoctrination course prior to attending CAP School. This included the firing of the M-16 in both day and night familiarization courses. The firing is conducted at a small range.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

on the beach near 1st [redacted] headquarters on Ky Ha Peninsula [redacted]

d. Inspections. A member of the 1st CAG headquarters inspected each CACO headquarters during the period. Company Commanders and/or their Gunnery Sergeants inspected their CAPs, remaining overnight in many instances.

(1) I&I Section Inspector strength remained constant during July. Training inspections were conducted at all CAPs by I&I Inspector personnel. The practice of orienting replacement CAP leaders by having them accompany an I&I Section Inspector on his rounds of the CAPs continues and is felt to be an effective tool for focusing the replacement's thinking and providing motivation for learning at the CAP School which he attends prior to a permanent assignment. On one occasion the 1st CAG assistant training NCO and a replacement he was orienting distinguished themselves along with a CAP Leader by extracting two downed and injured helicopter pilots from a friendly minefield into which the pilots had wandered. Three Navy Commendation Medals were awarded.

e. Fire Support. The Fire Support situation changed to some degree with the commencement of Operation Nantucket Beach, when the platoon of 105's at Hill 26, vicinity of CAP 1-4-4 was moved out in support of 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry operations further north of the Batangan, and the 4.2" mortar battery was shifted from the same position to LZ Minuteman on the Batangan Peninsula as planned but not executed the previous month. In addition, a squad of 81mm mortars was moved in at CAP 1-4-2's position on the northern Batangan to provide additional support to 5th/46th recon elements screening the area while the battalions companies were occupied further north. During the conduct of Operation Bold Anamite, artillery support of the eastern Binh Son CAPs is being provided by Marine 105's and 4.2's. Coordination has proved good due to the presence of CACO 1-3 liaison NCOs with BLT 2-26, and that battalion's efforts in coordinating every aspect of the operation tightly.

f. Air Support

(1) Tactical air support included the employment of helicopter gunships and Fixed Wing on a total of nine occasions. This support again proved most responsive in the 1st Company's TAOC's, as the Quang Tin Province FAC's continue their fine cooperation with the CAPs.

(2) Administratively, helicopter support of 1st CAG improved with the allotting of an Americal helicopter for Group use on an all-day basis when called for. This increased opportunities for Visual Reconnaissance and inspections and facilitated paycall for the CACO 1-3 and CACO 1-4 CAPs, which often wait a few days before receiving their pay because of difficulties obtaining transportation. Some missions were turned down from time to time however, and the request system became more cumbersome with the need for submission of a form which involves increased time for completion and limits flexibility to some degree as it requires a specific flight plan from which some pilots will not deviate. For the entire month, there was a total of 34 hours flown by Americal helicopters in support of 1st CAG. This figure excludes the time flown in logistical support of the Companies, as that support is provided out of Hade-time allotted the battalions which support the CACOs.

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(a) The 19th LTB continued to provide LOH support when available and requested. This fine Army unit has been a consistent friend to the Group and generous with its assets when available.

g. Scout Dog Teams. This month, all companies had a Scout Dog Team working almost the entire period. Teams were available and there were no unduly long periods a company was left uncovered by the rotation of teams. In an incident July 16th the Dog Team supporting CAP 1-3-8 was at the point when the enemy initiated a mine ambush against the CAP while it was on patrol to its night position. Both dog and handler were killed by command detonated mines.

h. Modification of CAP TAOC's

(1) During the month, increased emphasis on the Accelerated Pacification Program brought about TAOC changes for CAP 1-1-7 (Tam Ky District) and CAP 1-2-2 (Ly Tin District). The TAOC's were modified in order to provide optimum employment of existing forces in the upgrading and further development of certain hamlets within the above districts of Quang Tin Province.

(2) In Quang Ngai Province, plans were made for the modification of CAP 1-4-1's TAOC, but this planning did not go beyond the local GVN chain and there was no change in the Son Tinh District CAP TAOC's.

(3) In Binh Son District, the Accelerated Pacification Program and the landing of BLT 2-26 in Operation Bold Armada provided the basis for plans to relocate two eastern Binh Son CAPs into areas targeted in the Pacification Plan. The relocations however, did not come about by the end of the month, as the plans await the approval of higher headquarters in both the GVN and American chains of command.

(4) Planning for the activation of two new CAPs in eastern Son Tinh District to secure the line of communication to the coast and the Batangan refugee centers have been firmed and are awaiting approval at higher headquarters. These CAPs should be inserted during the month of August.

i. Psychological Operations. In July, 1st CAG in cooperation with the Americal Division, dropped over five million propaganda leaflets and conducted approximately fourteen hours of broadcasts by air. Additionally, another five million leaflets were distributed by hand throughout CAP TAOCs and there were twelve hours of propaganda films shown by Army HE teams at the CAP locations. The breakdown is as follows:

(1) Aerial Distribution

<u>LEAFLETS</u>	<u>VOLUME</u>	<u>BROADCASTS (HRS)</u>
Rewards	456,000	11:15
Chieu Hoi	4,118,000	11:30
Anti-VC	204,000	00:10
Pro-GVN	382,000	01:10

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1. Leaflets and Broadcasts

<u>LEAFLETS</u>	<u>VOLUME</u>	<u>MOVIES</u>	<u>BROADCASTS</u>
Rewards	1,500,000	02:30 hrs	
Chieu Hoi	500,000		08:00 hrs
Anti-VC	3,000,000	03:00 hrs	
Pro-GVN		06:30 hrs	

(3) In addition to the above, liaison was made with Quang Ngai Sector PsyOps Advisors and a quantity of Huong Que and The Gioi Tu Do magazines were obtained and distributed to GVN administrative cadre in the interior CAPs of CACO 1-3 and CACO 1-4. In the case of the above magazines, copies were also provided to the Popular Forces platoon leaders of the CAPs in order not to slight their importance and to keep relations good all around. The distribution of the magazines will, it is hoped, provide another reason for CAP-Revolutionary Development Team contact and increase cooperation between the two to include improved intelligence information flow. Several thousand copies of the May issue of Ban Tin newspaper were received and distributed during July.

(4) Enemy PsyOps. In July, a number of propaganda leaflets were employed by the enemy in CAP TAOC's. The most frequent theme concerned the withdrawal of American troops and the increasing "Vietnamization" of the war. In these times, the enemy pointed to the reduction of US forces as a victory for the communist side and proclaimed they had driven the US out and that the day of victory was not far off; that communist forces should not then, lose courage. Another leaflet claimed that the Friendly Vietnamese forces were being deserted by the Americans who had previously denigrated their capabilities as soldiers, but were now proclaiming those same capabilities and leaving, causing an increased front line employment of Vietnamese forces and an accompanying increase to Vietnamese casualties. Another leaflet quoted Dr. Benjamin SPOCK'S views with regard to the US involvement in the war. Still another leaflet--one which has been seen quite often on both this area and the Danang area--provided statements against US involvement in the war, purported to have come from a list of American prisoners whose names were listed. Most of these leaflets were well organized and translated and had been printed on a press. Some examples of these leaflets appear in rough translation under supporting documents section of this report.

j. Kit Carson Scouts. The KCS continued to contribute to the effectiveness of CAP operations. In CAP 1-1-7, the KCS assigned there got a kill this month and a weapon by leaping into a trail and shooting down a lone VC.

k. Volunteer Informant Program. A total of 164,500 \$VN were spent during July under the VIP program. With few exceptions, these expenditures were for ordnance, as the Batangan CAPs received a greater volume of ordnance than in previous months. CACO 1-3, 1-1, and 1-2 followed in volume of expenditures in that order.

(1) Two unusual things turned up this month to attack the VIP with regard to the ordnance turn-in program.

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(a) An [redacted] Division MP patrol brought [redacted] 82mm mortar round purchased from a boy [redacted] National Route #1. It was discovered that this round was equipped with an eight hour chemical delay fuze which had been initiated prior to the round having been turned in. As soon as the incident was learned of, all CACO's were informed and warned to be on the lookout for rounds so fuzed, and to avoid collections of VIP ordnance at any locations by ensuring such ordnance was blown in place ASAP. Americal G-2 put out information on this fuze within a few days.

(b) It became apparent that the VIP program has spawned an entrepreneur in the Ly Tin District, as Army personnel in that area were being offered dummy chicom grenades for VIP. CACO 1-2 obtained one of these at no cost and turned it over to the S-2/S-3 of the CAG. The item consists of a small C-ration size can fitted with a wooden plug, the end of which is carved into a deceptively authentic handle. The can and handle are sealed together with road tar. In the production of this item, a short length of bamboo was used to simulate a spoon and was tied down to the grenade body with straw. The fact that the "grenade" is quite light in weight and that the handle does not consist of a hollow wooden tube with a cap and pull string make it easily identified as a dummy.

(2) The following statistics recap VIP expenditures for July:

2	4.2mm rds	1	M-72 LAAM
36	105mm rds	13	Claymore mines
4	82mm rds	60	M-16 mines
13	81mm rds	15	M-14 mines
23	60mm rds	95	M-26 grenades
8	57mm rds	40	M-79 rds
1	B-40 rocket rd	9	Chicom grenades

Miscellaneous Items

1 AK-47 damaged	1 1 lb. stick TNT
1 60mm bomb fuze	1 500 lb. bomb fuze

1. Communications

(1) Operations. During the reporting period, 1st CAG received, on a temporary loan basis from 5/7 Communication Battalion, one radio set AN/GRC-125 and five log-periodic antennas, AS-22*6. A sergeant 25*1 was sent TAD from 5/7 Communication Battalion to assist in the installation of the antennas. The performance of these antennas along with the AN/GRC-125 and other radio equipment of the 1st CAG is satisfactory. The communication system of the 1st CAG now meets the reliability criteria set forth by the Commanding Officer.

(2) Communication Chief's Conference. On the 10th of July a Combined Action Program Communication Conference was convened. The Communication Chiefs from all Combined Action Groups, representatives from G-6 III MAF, CAP Director, CAP S-3 and CAP S-4 were in attendance. The agenda items discussed by the 1st CAG Communication Chief are:

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(a) Back communication personnel authorized by present W/O.

(b) Direct Exchange Program.

(c) Radio Equipment AN/GRC-125, AN/VRC-12, and Antenna Log-Periodic AS-2236.

(d) Recommended changes to include the AN/VRC-12 and/or AN/GRC-125.

(e) Present Antenna AG-292 be replaced with the Antenna AS-2236.

(3) Repair Work Summary

(a) During the reporting period, Sub Unit #1, Maintenance Battalion, 1st MAW/PRC was transferred to FING A and became Maintenance, ISU-3, FING A (ISU-3A). At present ISU-3A has not been in existence long enough to show any appreciable returns on Repair Orders submitted to them.

REPAIR ORDER NO.	1ST MAW/PRC	ISU-3A	1ST CAG	1ST MAW/PRC	ISU-3A	1ST CAG	TO D/E	FILE
AN/PRC-25	7	5	1	7	1	4	13	12
AN-189/GR	7	11	0	11	1	0	18	12
AS-454/U	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
AG-671/PRC-47	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
AG-312/PR	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	2
AG-2329/GR-39	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1

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ATTACHMENT OF US NATIONAL IDENTITY

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AN APPENDIX TO US AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM

US servicemen, we represent officers and men of the Americal Division, 1st Air Cavalry, and 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions who have been captured in various battles by the people's Liberation Armed Forces. Among us are whites, Negroes, and an American Indian.

We are very hopeful of the war ending soon so, that we may return to our families and loved ones. But due to the stubbornness of the present US administration and their Saigon puppets, the war the needless suffering and slaughter of the Vietnamese people continues to drag on.

Their attitude of ill will has been clearly shown time and again first by seven months of delaying the Paris talks by their refusal to stop the bombing of North Vietnam! And now by the Saigon Governments obduracy in continuance of the US aggressive war in the South. And continuing violation of North Vietnam air space, their warlike aggressive natures has been laid bare.

On the other hand, the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, the genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, is an organization full of good will and striving for peace. Their policy toward captured POW's is lenient and humane. All during the war our needs as regarding food, clothing, shelter, and medical attention are well met.

They have clearly demonstrated their peaceful aspirations, and their wishes to end American and Vietnamese suffering. They want only peace and the right to settle their own affairs. To prove this they have sent without delay a delegation to Paris, ordered a three day suspension of military attacks at the Christmas and New Years holidays, and recently announced the release of three American POW's, which is living proof of their good intentions and lenient and humanitarian policy.

Like the Front and the Vietnamese people, we are earnestly hopeful and desirous of a speedy peace. You can help bring this about. Bring an end to the useless killing. It is the job of freedom loving Americans everywhere.

American servicemen, we American POW's appeal to you to demand:

1. That the US government stop its aggression in Vietnam so that we all may return to our families and loved ones.

2. Do not interfere in the Peoples affairs while they overthrow Thieu, Ky, warlike administration and try to set up a peace government.

3. Inform all American GIs to avoid a useless death by all means. Refuse to take part in merciless operations sympathize and support the Vietnamese people's struggle for peace. For it is in conformity with the peace aspirations of all US servicemen.

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(said Dr. B. [redacted] in 1966)

Baby doctor Benjamin SPOCK says about the US government's Vietnamese policy in his book in Vietnam: Our government has been an intruder in Vietnam for more than 15 years now. We gave France 2.5 billion dollars to put down the Vietnamese struggle for independence. We replaced the French and imposed a puppet dictatorship of our own choosing. We refused to allow free elections in 1966. We armed a Saigon military force so that our puppets could control the Vietnamese people. When all this failed and the people of South Vietnam rebelled, we sent 500,000 Americans to keep our dictatorship in power. We have destroyed hamlets and cities, poisoned crops, burnt homes, crammed the refugee camps to overflowing and killed men, women, and children by the hundreds of thousands with shells, bombs, and napalm.

Can we just pull out? Many Americans, Congressmen, former ambassadors, clergymen, veterans of the Vietnam war itself have expressed their outrage at the war. They feel that we were wrong to get involved at all, that it is immoral for us to be killing civilians, that the war cannot be won.

Yet, no established politician in the US, even those opposed the war, has said in public that we can end the mutual carnage without anyone else's consent simply by withdrawing our troops. Withdrawal is strong medicine. And most politicians would rather tell us what they think we want to hear that justice is on our side, that victory is just around the corner, that the enemy is responsible for the continuation of the war. None of them are brave or bold enough to tell us that we are still free to act: The US can admit its mistakes and bring its young men home and alive.

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4. S-4/Supply

a. Significant Events.

(1) Conference held at 2nd CAG by CAP S-4 for Group S-4's. A discussion of T/E changes and final recommendations resulted.

(2) Combat losses for the month were 3 M-16 rifles, 1 M-79 grenade launcher, 2 AN-PRC/25 radios.

(3) The Supply Chief and Logistic Chief both rotated during the month

b. Supply.

(1) The supply posture within the Group during July was satisfactory. Certain T/E deficiencies still effect overall readiness as the unit is in a C-2 condition for supplies and equipment. In addition certain shortages in Class II, organizational clothing and equipment continue to be a problem. Tracer action on outstanding documents reveal a backorder status. Continual emphasis has been placed on sending unit representatives to Danang, on a weekly basis, to receive material on the RUC line, thereby reducing valuable leadtime.

c. Motor Transport.

(1) The motor transport section logged 23,318 miles for the month. The Group still has a T/E deficiency for 1 M37B1 Truck 3/4 TOn.

(2) During the month M35A2C 2½ Ton vehicles were deadlined periodically, however, repair was accomplished by SUB-1 Maintenance quite rapidly. Lack of spare parts is a problem with the M37B1 and contributes to long downtimes.

d. Maintenance.

(1) The maintenance support provided by the FLSG-A support unit at Chu Lai has directly contributed to keeping downtime at a minimum on all communications, Motor Transport, and ordance equipment. 1st echelon maintenance is being stressed to maintain equipment operationally ready.

e. Miscellaneous.

(1) The Garrison Property Account was reconciled during the month with the Garrison Property Office at FLC.

(2) The DX program for body armor was effectively utilized at FLC allowing for the exchange of 60 sets of body armor.

(3) All unchromed chambered rifles were turned in to FLC and chromed chambered rifles received.

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f. Medical. The following was received during the Senior Corpsman's meeting in Chu Lai during the month of July 1969.

(1) Clean-up and general sanitation efforts in the villages and hamlets of all the CAPs was discussed. A continuing effort will be made in this direction through classes and demonstrations of sanitation methods for the villagers.

(2) A continuing effort will be made by all CAP corpsmen in teaching care and cleaning of teeth to the villagers.

(3) A visual audit of all health records will be conducted to ensure that "shots" are up to date.

(4) Techniques

(a) Field inspections of all CAPs and the CAG Headquarters continue to be conducted weekly. Improvements in field sanitation are steadily being made. Field inspections of the villages and hamlets in the villages and hamlets are also being conducted. All CAP corpsmen are stressing the importance of sanitation to the villagers.

(b) Medcaps conducted	Totals
Patients treated	23,275
Adults evacuated	72
Children evacuated	54
Dentcaps	117
(c) U. S. Personnel treated at CAG Sick Call	219
(d) Hospitalized	65
(e) WIA	20
(f) Illness	34
(g) KIA (DOW 1)	6

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5. Civic Action

a. Some 11,500 pounds of food and 300 pounds of clothing were distributed during the past month. The bulk of the food was captured rice that was redistributed to the hamlet, Ky Xuyen and An Ky in CAP 1-4-4's AO. The clothing was distributed to the hamlet of An Hoi in CAP 1-4-3's AO. 600 pounds of sugar was also distributed through all the CAP's AO's through the MEDCAPS.

b. There were three children fitted for wooden legs from CAP 1-3-7's area. This was done through the Quaker's Hospital in Quang Ngai City.

c. MTT-1-1 started an english class three weeks ago which inially had on 10 children. To date it has grown to 40. Corporal VEECH, teaches the class and with his excellent knowledge of the Vietnaemes language has excelled results.

d. The following civic action projects were completed during June.

(1) CAP 1-1-1 cleaned one well. Also policed up one road at BT186273. The village that these two projects were done in is Nui Can located in Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province.

(2) CAP 1-1-7 helped the people put a fence around Tam Ky BT 291303. Located in Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province.

(3) CAP 1-1-2 installed one water pump at the village of Thach Kiev BT 192332. This project is located in Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province.

(4) CAP 1-1-6 put in one culvert. Also the road into Thon Sau was graded BT251242. These two projects are located in Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province.

(5) CAP 1-2-5 installed one hand water pump in the village of Diem Pho (III) BT127403. Located in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province.

(6) CAP 1-3-4 helped the people put on three sanitation ditches. This was done so as to cut down on mosquitoes and flies BS831772. Located in Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS

1 July

CAP 1-3-2. CP element heard an explosion and several rounds of SAM in the village 700 meters to their west at BS 577905. A CAP element investigated and found that the village chief's office had been destroyed and approx 10-15 meters of the village bamboo fence had been burned. A sweep of the area found VC Chieu Noi leaflets in both English and VN. Some leaflets were typewritten, others were mimeographed. VN civilians reported that approx 50-60 NVA had been in the area and had departed in a SW direction. Americal Division and the 198th LTB have been informed of the incident. RESULTS: 1 village chief's office destroyed, 1 section of village fence burned, and several leaflets retrieved and delivered to District Headquarters.

CAP 1-3-2. A VN male turned in 1 105mm dud round and 1 60mm dud round to CAP at BS 575897. A VIP payment was made and the ordnance destroyed. RESULTS: 1 105mm and 1 60mm round destroyed.

2 July

CAP 1-3-8. A patrol apprehended 1 VN female and 2 VN children carrying food at BS 575915. The detainees were delivered to the District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 3 detainees.

3 Jul

CAP 1-3-2. CP at BS 570904 received about 5 satchel charges, 4 B-40 rockets, 10 82mm mortar rounds, and estimated 2,000 SA rounds, and numerous grenades, followed by a ground attack by an estimated 35 VC. The CAP returned fire with organic weapons and requested artillery support. The enemy broke up into small bands and withdrew to the N and NW. Artillery was employed on possible escape routes and a sweep was begun. While sweeping, the CAP received 1 82mm mortar round and approx 200 SA rounds believed to have been delivered by a BAR. The CAP returned fire, requested artillery on the suspected mortar site, and continued the

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3 Jul

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4 July

sweep finding 1 AK-47, parts of another that had been destroyed during the fight, and numerous blood trails and drag marks. During the contact, 1 USMC received minor fragment wounds not requiring evacuation; 1 PF and 1 PSDF received minor fragment wounds requiring evacuation. RESULTS: 2 IWC, 1 USMC WIA(M), 1 PF KIA, and 1 PSDF KIA.

CAP 1-3-2. A liaison party at the RF compound at BS 556892 reported that the RF compound received 3 82mm mortar rounds and light SAFF from an USRF. The RFs returned fire and the CAP liaison team called artillery on the suspected enemy position. Incoming 82mm was also received at 0230H, 0300H, and 0400H with counter battery delivered in each instance. 1 secondary explosion was observed as a result of the counter battery delivered following the 0400H ARF. A first light sweep was conducted by the RFs with negative results. At 1050H 4 armed VC were spotted by the RF company with weapons at BS 551891. At the same time VN civilians were observed vacating the area. A joint CAP/RF activity consisting 1 CAP squad (3 Marines and 10 PFs) and a RF platoon, was ambushed by an estimated enemy platoon while sweeping toward the suspected enemy location. 1 Marine was wounded in the initial volley; 2 other Marines were wounded as they rushed to his aid. RFs and PFs returned organic weapons fire, called artillery on AV positions, and requested emergency evacuations for the wounded Marines. The enemy, tentatively identified as elements of the 21st NVA Regiment, broke contact and withdrew NW. As a result of this and the previously reported CAP contact, 1st CAG has directed that the Marine element of CAPs in the area be strengthened, and has requested a comparable increase in PF strength. The 2nd ARVN Division was requested, and has agreed to conduct an operation in the area. The 198th and the 5th of the 46th are monitoring operations in the area. RESULTS: 3 USMC KIA.

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

GruBul 1650
1/EWS/djm
15 July 1969


GROUP BULLETIN 1650

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Meritorious Mast; case of Sergeant Thomas S. DALE, 207 81 44, USMC

Ref: (a) MCO P5000.3, par 8052

1. Purpose. To award a Meritorious Mast to the subject man.
2. General. Under the provisions of reference (a), you are awarded a Meritorious Mast for your outstanding performance of duty on 13 July 1969. Your performance of duty in arranging and setting up dinner demonstrated a high degree of professional knowledge and skill in your MOS. Your enthusiasm, initiative, and hard work were exemplary and materially aided in improving the relationship between the United States and the Vietnamese people. The dinner prepared and served by you was an outstanding selection of food with combined taste desires of both countries. Your devotion to duty, aggressiveness, and leadership has been an inspiration to all and truly reflects the high standards of performance for a Marine Noncommissioned Officer.
3. Action. By copy hereof the Adjutant is directed to ensure that appropriate service record book entries are made in accordance with reference (a), and that a copy of this Mast is attached to your next fitness report.
4. Self-cancellation. 15 October 1969.


J. E. HENNEGAN

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "B" plus
LSU-3 (10)

IV-1

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4 July

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CACO 1-2. VN teenagers brought 1 M-26 grenade, 1 105mm round and 1 60mm round to CACO Headquarters at BT 483072. The CACO destroyed the ordnance and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 M-26 grenade, 1 105mm round and 1 60mm destroyed.

5 July

CACO 1-2. On three separate occasions on 5 July VN civilians delivered dud ordnance to CACO at BT 482075. In each case the ordnance was destroyed and a VIP payment made. RESULTS: 5 M-79 rounds, 2 M-26 grenades, and 1 107mm mortar round destroyed.

6 July

CAP 1-3-3. A CAP OP at BS 664985 received sniper fire from an unseen enemy. The OP returned fire and called an artillery mission on the suspected enemy position. A sweep of the area had negative findings. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-7. The CP element spotted 3 VC starting fires on the hamlet fence line at BS 619935. Illumination was requested and the enemy was taken under fire with an M-60 MG, causing the enemy to flee SE. A sweep of the area found one wounded VN who was dusted off as a VCS. Approx 100 meters of fence had been burned. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

7 July

CAP 1-1-4. Patrol received SAF from an estimated 5 VC at BT 259201. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called a fire mission, causing the VC to withdraw NW. The CAP swept the area finding 3 VC KIA, 1 IWC, 3 chicom grenades, 1 booby trapped 81mm round. The booby trap was set in the middle of a trail and had a pressure type detonator. The CAP blew the booby trap in place. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 1 IWC, 3 chicom grenades, 1 booby trapped 81mm round destroyed.

CAP 1-1-2. A patrol heard SAF at the vicinity of BT 332183 and moved into the area to investigate. Civilians directed the CAP patrol to a seriously wounded VN who was dusted off as an emergency evacuation. The patrol then heard more firing in the:

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7 July

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New Life Hamlet and moved to that area where civilians and RD cadremen stated 4 VC, dressed in ARVN uniforms and wearing 2d ARVN Division patches, had entered the hamlet and opened fire on the RDs. The RDs returned fire and the 4 VC broke contact and withdrew SW. RESULTS: 1 RD WIA.

CAP 1-3-2. A VN civilian brought a 105mm round and a bangalore torpedo to CAP at BS 577905. The CAP destroyed the ordnance and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 105mm round and 1 bangalore torpedo destroyed.

CAP 1-3-2. 2 105mm rounds were delivered to CAP at BS 577885 by a VN male civilian. The rounds were destroyed and a VIP payment made. RESULTS: 2 105mm rounds destroyed.

CAP 1-4-3. 1 female and 3 male Hoi Chanhs turned themselves in to CAP at BS 768827. The Hoi Chanhs reported they had been operating in the vicinity of BS 595866 but had been driven E by airstrikes. The Hoi Chanhs also reported to the CAP that VC live in large tunnels at BS 777836. Further interrogation is being conducted by VN officials. CAP swept the area of the reported tunnels on 8 July 1969 with negative findings. RESULTS: 4 Hoi Chanhs.

8 July

CAP 1-1-4. CAP received SAF and 1 60mm mortar round from approx 6 VC in a tree line at BT 262203. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called an artillery mission, causing the VC to flee SW. A sweep of the area found 4 VC KIA. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-9. A Chieu Hoi came to CAPs position at BS 473866 for the reported reason that he had heard there was going to be a USA operation in the area. The Hoi Chanh carried an AK-47 and had 2 M-26 grenades, 2 AK-47 magazines with rounds and 1 cartridge belt. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh, 1 IW.

CAP 1-3-5. CP in the hamlet at BS 712973 received approx 400 rounds of SAF from an USFF at grid BS 708966. The CAP element returned fire with organic weapons, illum:

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8 July

inated and swept area finding spent cartridges. The enemy had withdrawn S. 1 VN female wounded by enemy fire, was evacuated at 1845H. RESULTS: 1 VN civilian KIA.

CAP 1-3-1. The OP received sniper fire from an unseen enemy at BS 692977. The CAP unit returned fire on suspected enemy locations and swept the area with negative results. 1 VN female received a minor wound from the enemy fire. RESULTS: 1 VN civilian KIA.

9 July

CAP 1-3-6. A patrol sent to investigate an explosion heard at BS 574937, found 1 cow KIA by a booby trapped hand grenade. The patrol searched the surrounding area and found one other booby trapped M-26 which was blown in place. RESULTS: 1 friendly cow KIA, 1 booby trapped M-26 grenade destroyed.

CAP 1-3-4. CAP triggered a squad sized ambush on 6-7 VC at BT 624005. The VC returned fire and withdrew SW. Illumination was requested, mortars fired on possible escape routes, and the area was swept finding 2 VC KIA, 1 chicon grenade, and 15 M-1 garand clips of ammunition. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-2. Element at BS 556992 received 20-30 rounds of SAF from an estimated 8-10 enemy at grid BS 556894. The CAP unit returned fire, requested illumination, and swept the area finding footprints leading N. RESULTS: Negative.

11 July

CAP 1-1-6. Received 12 incoming mortar rounds, the closest landing 30 meters from the CAP's position at BT 245255. The CAP called artillery on the mortar position at BT 238247, silencing the mortars. A first light sweep had negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-2. At BS 556892, CAP received 1 incoming 60mm round from an unknown source. The CAP requested illumination but was unable to determine the enemy

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11 July

location. At 110100H the CAP received an additional 4 incoming 60mm rounds. Artillery was fired on logical enemy positions and H&I fires were requested on those sites for the remainder of the night. A first light sweep was unable to locate the enemy firing position. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-10. A village chief came to the CP at BS 623870 and informed the CAP of 11 VC setting in an ambush at BS 624880. Artillery was called on the reported position and 1 secondary explosion resulted. A first light sweep had negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CACO 1-3. The CACO and Binh Son District Headquarters at BS 602922 received 3 incoming 60mm mortar rounds from an unknown location. The rounds caused negative casualties or damage. RESULTS: Negative.

12 July

CAP 1-1-6. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire on an estimated NVA squad at BF 236248. The enemy returned SAP and fled SW after an artillery mission called by the CAP caused a secondary explosion. The CAP swept the area and found 5 NVA KIA and 4 chicom grenades. RESULTS: 5 NVA KIA, and 4 chicom grenades captured.

CAP 1-2-3. An ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 5 VC spotted moving E at BF 436100. 3 VC fled E and 1 fled W. The CAP swept the area under illumination finding 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 with full magazine and documents. The CAP swept the area again at first light with negative further results. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 AK.

MTF 1-2. Two VN males brought ordnance and mines to MTF at BS 599919. The CAP destroyed the ordnance and mines and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 60mm round, 2 105mm rounds, 10 claymore mines and 1 M-16 mines destroyed.

13 July

CAP 1-1-6. A patrol approaching a hamlet at BF 244229 received fire from an estimated VC squad. The CAP returned fire, killing 3 VC and causing the enemy to withdraw.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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13 July

NV. The CAP pursued the enemy and made contact again at BT 236249, killing 2 more VC and capturing 1 wounded VC and 1 AK-47. After airstrikes were directed on the VC by an AO, the CAP swept the area with negative further results. RESULTS: 5 VC KIA, 1 VC POW, 1 IWC.

CAP 1-3-3. Element called a fire mission on 10-15 VC spotted at BS 666992. The VC fled W. The CAP was unable to sweep the area due to mines in the vicinity. RESULTS: Unknown.

CAP 1-4-4. Following a presentation by an Army PsyOps team, the hamlet turned in 3 M-1 carbines with ammunition, 1 cartridge belt, and 3 chicom grenades to CAP at BS 754816. The hamlet chief reported that the cache had been found at 1100H but not turned in to him until after the speech concerning VIP payments. A VIP payment was made. RESULTS: 3 IV recovered, 3 chicom grenades destroyed.

14 July

CAP 1-1-7. 2 elements were sweeping vicinity grids BT 313316 and 307324, when the element at the first grid received SAE from an estimated VC platoon causing wound to 8 PFs. The CAP unit returned fire with small arms and 60mm mortars and adjusted an 81mm mission on the enemy. At this time the second element at BT 307324 received incoming mortar rounds and called artillery on the mortar position. An AO conducted airstrikes on the enemy positions and a sweep by the CAP elements found 7 VC KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 M-1 carbine, and 1 B-40 rocket launcher. RESULTS: 6 PF KIA, 2 PFs VIA, 7 VC KIA, 2 IWC, and 1 CSWC.

CAP 1-4-3. A 17 year old Hoi Chanh armed with 2 chicom grenades surrendered to CAP and reported that 17 VC were at grids BS 778832, and 779833. Artillery was called on the suspect grids by the CAP and first were requested by USA personnel. CAP conducted a sweep of the area and found 2 destroyed huts, 1 NVA pack, 3 ponchos, remains of 1 body, 500 lbs of rice and food stuffs, and 1 bloody medium battle dress.

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14 July

ing. The Hoi Chanh was delivered to Binh Son District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh, 1 NVA/VC KIA, 500 lbs of rice and foodstuffs, 2 chicon grenades, 1 NVA pack, and 3 ponchos

CAP 1-3-9. A patrol apprehended 2 VN females at grid BS 513876, after it was determined they had information concerning VC activities in the area. The suspects were turned over to the DIOCC for interrogation. RESULTS: 2 VCS.

CAP 1-4-2. 1 VC Hoi Chanh, age 44, and 2 boys ages 10 and 7, surrendered to CAP at BS 777858. They informed the CAP of an unknown number of enemy at grids BS 732893, 695898, and 7285 and reported tunnels and bunkers in grid BS 7289. The enemy was alleged to be from the 48th Regiment commanded by LE-THO. Weapons were reported to consist of 2 81mm mortars, 2 60mm mortars, 8 M-79s, 3 50mm (NFI), 15 M-16s, a number of AK-47s, 8 B-40 rocket launchers (NFI), a quantity of AP mines, and one 90mm RR. The Hoi Chanh stated the enemy had been in those locations for about one week and that they were to stay there for another week. The TAOR commander was notified. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh and 2 boys.

15 July

CAGO 1-3. Reported that Binh Son District Headquarters at BS 602922 received 5 incoming 82mm mortar rounds from grid BS 628938, causing negative casualties or damage. Artillery was called on the enemy gun position and a first light sweep of the area was conducted by CAP 1-3-7. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-3. An element was moving into position vicinity BS 665960 to act as a blocking force for an RF sweep when it received 82mm mortar, AW, and SAF from an estimated 50 enemy located in fortified positions. 1 PF was KIA in the initial contact. The CAP element returned fire, requested artillery and gunship support, and called the remainder of the CAP as reinforcements. CAP 1-3-3 moved to BS 664973.

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15 Jul

and provided covering fire while the element evacuated the PF KIA and withdrew to a better position. F/V air strikes were run at 1600H against small arms fire. The enemy withdrew to the SE following the air strikes. Artillery was employed on the enemy withdrawal routes. A sweep could not be conducted due to mines in the area. The RF sweep had negative contact. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA.

CAP 1-3-3. An ambush employed organic weapons fire and grenades on 2 VC spotted at BS 664980. The VC fled SE and the CAP swept the area under illumination with negative results. A resweep of the area at first light discovered propaganda leaflets. RESULTS: Propaganda leaflets collected.

MTT 1-2. A VN male turned in 1 60mm round and 1 chicom grenade to MTT at BS 599919. A reward was paid and the ordnance destroyed. RESULTS: 1 60mm round and 1 chicom grenade destroyed.

16 July

CAP 1-3-10. An estimated platoon of VC employed approx 7 satchel charges, 20 M-79 rounds, and SAF on CP at BS 611879. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called artillery and illumination, causing the VC to flee SW. 1 USMC was KIA in the attack and 3 USMC and 1 PF received minor wounds. On a sweep of the area at first light, VN civilians informed the CAP that 5 VC KIA had been carried off, and the civilians pointed out the location of 1 wounded VC. The CAP captured the wounded VC and under interrogation by 5th/46th USA personnel, the POW revealed he was from the C-31 company. RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA, 3 USMC WIA(M), 1 PF WIA(M), 1 VC POW.

CAP 1-3-8. The CP group enroute to a night position, was ambushed by approx 20 VC using command detonated mines and SAF at BS 582925. 3 USMC, 3 PFs, and 1 scout dog were KIA in the initial contact. The CAP returned fire, requested illumination, and a reaction force from CAP 1-3-6. The enemy broke contact and withdrew W. Emergency evacuation was completed for 2 USMC.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

16 July

2 PF, and 4 RD wounded in the contact. A sweep under illumination found one AK-47 magazine, 2 M-16 magazines, 1 hell box and two wires. Civilians in the area denied any knowledge of VC presence. A first light sweep found 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47, and 2 chicon grenades. 2 M-16s, 1 M-79, and 1 AN/PRC-25 were lost in the contact. RESULTS: 3 USMC KIA, 3 PF KIA, 1 scout dog KIA, 2 USMC MIAE, 2 PF MIAE, 4 RD MIAE, 1 VC KIA and 1 IVC. 2 M-16s, 1 M-79 and 1 AN/PRC-25 lost. (Lost equipment assumed to have been heavily damaged by the mines.)

17 July

CAP 1-1-1. A Marine on a patrol tripped a booby trapped M-26 grenade at BT 278187, wounding himself and 1 PF. The M-26 was hidden in the brush at the side of the trail and had been rigged with a trip wire. RESULTS: 1 USMC MIAE, 1 PF MIAE.

CAP 1-1-7. The point element of a patrol received SAM from an estimated 2 squads of VC at BT 320304. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and the VC fled NE. The CAP swept the area finding 3 VC KIA and 1 AK-47, and pursued the fleeing enemy. Artillery was called on the VC and the CAP found an additional 10 VC KIA, 3 AK-47s, 1 M-1 carbine and 8 chicon grenades. 2 Diet Lops accompanying the CAP were MIAE. RESULTS: 2 Diet Lop MIAE, 13 VC KIA, 5 IVC, 8 chicon grenades captured.

CAP 1-1-2. Patrol initiated organic weapons fire on 3 VC crossing a river at BT 320176. 2 VC were KIA, but the CAP could not locate their weapons on the river bottom. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-4-3. A VN female received a VIP payment for leading the CAP to an M-16 mine emplaced at BS 767832. The CAP blew the mine in place. RESULTS: 1 M-16 mine destroyed.

CAP 1-3-3. A PF was wounded by a sniper round at BS 664980. The CAP returned M-60 fire on suspected enemy locations and requested an emergency evacuation for the

III-10

CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

17 July

wounded PF. RESULTS: 1 PF WIAE.

CAP 1-4-3. A VN boy brought a chicon grenade to CAP at BS 768830. 2 VN males brought to the CAP 1 75mm RR round that had been found at BS 768830. In both cases the CAP made a VIP payment and destroyed the ordnance. RESULTS: 1 chicon grenade and 1 75mm RR round destroyed.

CAP 1-4-3. A VN boy found 1 3.5" rocket round at BS 769828 and turned it in to CAP for VIP reward. RESULTS: 1 3.5 rocket round destroyed.

CAP 1-4-3. VN boy returned in one dud 105mm round and size (believed to have come from a bomb) to CAP at BS 767832. RESULTS: 1 105mm round and 1 fuze destroyed.

18 July

CAP 1-1-1. CAP was on patrol at BT 268173, when five rounds of sniper fire were received causing 1 USMC WIAE. The CAP returned fire on the enemy position, a small house on a hillside, and swept through the area with negative results. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIAE.

CAP 1-4-3. VN children turned in assorted ordnance to CAP at BS 767832. The ordnance was destroyed and VIP payments were made. RESULTS: 1 155mm MRE round, 2 M-79 rounds and 1 anti-personnel mine destroyed.

CAP 1-1-6. A Hoi Chanh, age 17, came to position at BT 245255. The Hoi Chanh stated that he lived in Thon Mot hamlet of Phuoc Long village at BT 180230, and that his job had been to collect and carry rice for the VC. The Hoi Chanh provided the names of other VC and these personnel will be brought to District Headquarters for interrogation. A USA PsyOps team is coordinating with CAGO 1-1 in exploiting the incident. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

19 July

CAP 1-4-3. A Hoi Chanh surrendered to CAP at BS 767832. The Hoi Chanh stated he had been the supply NCO for a squad assigned to stand security for a VC Head-

III-11

CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (1)
UNCLASSIFIED

19 July

quarter (NFI) at BS 775837. The CAP called an artillery mission on the reported VC position and airstrikes were run on the area. The CAP swept the area finding blood trails. PsyOps have been initiated to exploit the Hoi Chanh. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

CAP 1-3-8. CAP reported the recovery of the M-16 rifles reported missing after the CAP's contact of 162130H at BS 582925. The rifle had belonged to a USMC WIA in the contact and had been in the possession of a PF in the CAP. RESULTS: 1 M-16 recovered.

20 July

CAP 1-1-7. While searching a tunnel and bunker complex at BT 318308, CAP found 20 82mm rounds still in cases, 20 B-40 rockets in wrappers and 4 cases of AK-47 ammunition. The CAP destroyed the ordnance. RESULTS: 20 82mm rounds, 20 B-40 rockets and 4 cases of AK-47 ammunition.

CAP 1-4-3. 2 Hoi Chanh came to the village at BS 769828, and told the people they wanted to Chieu Hoi. Villagers reported the incident to CAP and a patrol was sent to pick up the VC. 1 of the males had his wife and 9 year old son with him at the time of surrender. The Hoi Chanh were delivered to the DIOCC for interrogation. PsyOps exploitation is planned. RESULTS: 2 VC Hoi Chanh and 1 woman and 1 child detained.

21 July

CAP 1-3-4. 3 VC Hoi Chanh surrendered to the village Chief at BT 621009, claiming to be members of the 95th Sapper Unit at BS 701957. Sapper weapons were reported to include 1 M-79, 1 60mm mortar, 1 M-60 MG, several AK-47s, some BARs, 1 M-16, some M-16s, and 2 RPG launchers. The 3 Hoi Chanh were taken to Binh Son District by CAP personnel. RESULTS: 3 VC Hoi Chanh.

CAP 1-4-4. A VN boy led CAP to 2 VC mines of an unknown type emplaced at BS 754816. The CAP destroyed the mines and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 2 mines destroyed.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

21 July

CAP 1-4-3. A CAP ambush initiated SAF on 5 VC spotted moving E across a bridge at BS 765835. The VC fled E without returning fire. The CAP swept the area finding 1 VC KIA and 3 chicom grenades. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 3 chicom grenades captured.

22 July

CAP 1-1-7. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire on 1 NVA carrying a B-40 rocket at BT 302292. RESULTS: 1 NVA KIA, 1 B-40 rocket destroyed.

23 July

CAP 1-3-2. A VN male found 1 AK-47 at BS 578904, and brought it to CAP in exchange for a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 IW turned in.

CAPs 1-2-4, 1-2-7, participated with a PF platoon from Ly Tin District Headquarters on a sweep of the area in the vicinity of BT 448072. After the conclusion of the sweep, 2 ambushes from CAP 1-2-7 and 2 ambushes from the PF platoon remained in the objective area. 1 of the PF platoons initiated organic weapons fire on 3 VC spotted from a bunker in front of the PF's position. The CAP elements joined in a sweep of the area finding 3 VC KIA, 2 AK-47s, and 1 cal .45 pistol. RESULTS: (not CAP) 3 VC KIA, 3 IW.

CAP 1-4-1. During the morning of 23 July, CAP participated in a combined sweep with RFs and PFs in the vicinity of grids BS 6077, and BS 6078. 4 draft dodgers and 3 VCS were detained on the sweep and taken to District Headquarters. RESULTS: 3 VC

24 July

CAP 1-1-6. A joint patrol by an RF platoon and CAP received SAF from an estimate squad of enemy (NFI) at BT 235244. 1 RF received minor wounds in the contact. The patrol returned organic weapons fire causing the enemy to withdraw to the W. A sweep of the area found 2 VC KIA. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 RF KIA(M).

CAP 1-1-6. CAP elements enroute to the CAP CP received SAF from an estimated 2 squads of VC at BT 235247, causing 2 USMC KIAE. The CAP returned organic weapons

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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24 JUL 1968

24 July

fire; gunships and airstrikes were employed in the area. While sweeping the area, 1 USMC from the CAP stepped on a mine causing 5 USMC WIAE, 1 later DOW, and 1 USMC WIA(M). RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA, 6 USMC WIAE, 1 USMC WIA(M).

CAP 1-1-7. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire on 2 NVA spotted running across a rice paddy at BT 314313. A sweep of the area found 2 NVA KIA, 1 SKS, 1 M-1 carbine, 6 chicom grenades and 2 M-26 grenades. RESULTS: 2 NVA KIA, 2 IMC.

CAP 1-1-7. CP received SA, M-79 and 1 round of 60mm mortar fire from an USMC at BT 303293. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called an artillery mission. A sweep of the area found 4 VC KIA. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-3. A 14 year old VN boy, Pham To, came to the home of a CAP PF to Chief Hoi at BS 665957. The Hoi Chanh stated he had been kidnapped from his home and forced to work for the B-95 unit (NVC) as a food carrier. The Hoi Chanh stated there were 3 platoons in his company, with each platoon containing 30 VC. The Hoi Chanh was taken to District Headquarters for further questioning. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

25 July

CAP 1-4-3. Received a report from a village chief of an estimated VC company at BS 778831. The CAP called artillery and mortar fire on the reported location and swept the area. Two M-16 mines were found emplaced on a path and were blown in place. One of the mines had been marked by having a square drawn around it in the dirt. Continuing the sweep, the CAP discovered a house, showing signs of recent occupation, and 4 bunkers destroyed by the artillery fire. One VC was spotted by the CAP and fled after the CAP initiated fire. RESULTS: 2 M-16 mines, 1 house and 4 bunkers destroyed.

III-1A

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

25 July

CAP 1-3-4. A VN male led CAP personnel to a booby trapped chicom grenade rigged with a trip wire across a trail at BF 621017. The CAP blew the booby trap in place and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 booby trapped chicom grenade destroyed.

26 July

CAP 1-2-5. Ambush spotted 1 VC traveling from S to N in the vicinity of grid 400123. Engaged enemy with small arms fire. Swept area finding 1 VC KIA, 1 cartridge belt, 1 battle dressing, 1 chicom grenade. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 chicom grenade and 1 cartridge belt captured.

27 July

CAP 1-2-2. Ambush spotted and engaged 5-10 VC at BF 399125. Approx 5 minutes later the ambush was surrounded by an estimated 20 VC. The remainder of the CAP moved as a reaction force, but the enemy had withdrawn and the reaction forces were unable to regain contact. Artillery was employed on possible escape routes and a sweep of the area at first light had negative results. RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA(M), and 1 VC KIA(M).

CAP 1-4-4. CAP called artillery on 1 VC observed at BS 752816. An AO was requested and employed gunships, artillery, and fixed wing air strikes on an estimated VC platoon. RESULTS: 7 VC KIA.

28 July

A PF compound at BF 315307, received incoming 82mm and 50mm mortar rounds, and B-40 rocket rounds. In response to a PF request, CAP 1-1-7 called an artillery mission on the suspected enemy position at BF 312318, silencing the incoming. A PF sweep of the area found 3 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 and 1 M-1 carbine. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 2 IVC (NOT CAP).

CAP 1-3-3. Received 1 incoming mortar round at BS 664980. The CAP checked the suspected enemy location with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

29 July

CAP 1-4-4. Elements exchanged organic weapon fire with an USF withdrawing from a village at BS 752816. The CAP called an artillery mission on the enemy and swept the area with negative results. The CAP was informed by

III-15

ENCLOSURE (1)

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29 July

a PF that the VC had beaten a hamlet chief
hamlet chief at 1111. CAP medevaced the
been initiated to exploit the 1-2-3 has
activity. RESULTS: 1 hamlet chief

CAP 1-3-4. 1 male and 2 female civilians
with fragmentation wounds were brought by
villagers to CAP at BT 621017. The CAP
medevaced the VCS. RESULTS: 3 VCS.

CAP 1-4-2. Spotted 6 sampans operating in
the vicinity of BS 777858 to BS 787872.
Artillery, 4.2 mortars, and swift boats
were employed against the 6 sampans. A
CAP sweep on the shore line produced neg-
ative but the swift boats recovered 1 VC
KIA and 3 VCS from the water. The VCS
were turned over to District Headquarters
for interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA,
3 VCS.

30 July

CAP 1-1-4. CAP called an artillery mission
on approx 30 VC at BT 285200. Shortly
after the completion of the fire mission
2 Vietnamese approached the CAP with frag-
mentation wounds. The village Chief ident-
ified the 2 as VCS. After medical treat-
ment the VCS will be turned over to District
Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS:
2 VCS.

CAP 1-4-2. Spotted 4-6 sampans operating
in the vicinity of BS 770858 to 790878.
After the CAP fired a 4.2 mortar mission
swift boats were requested to check out
the area. Swift boats found 1 VC KIA, 2
VC KIA, and 7 VCS. The VC KIA were med-
evaced and the VCS were turned over to
District Headquarters for interrogation.
RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 2 VC KIA, and 7 VCS.

31 July

CAP 1-1-4. While on patrol a PF tripped
a booby trapped M-26 grenade at BT 265197.
Causing 1 PF KIA and 1 PF KIA(M). RESULTS:
1 PF KIA, 1 PF KIA(M).

CAP 1-1-4. Received intelligence form BT
that VC were located at BT 256201. Art-
illery was fired on the suspected grid and
sweep found 3 VC KIA with 5 chicom grenades.

III-16

ENCLOSURE (1)

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31 July

RESULTS: 3 VC KIA

CAP 1-1-7. A patrol was engaged by an estimated squad of VC at BT 305360. The CAP patrol returned fire and the enemy withdrew NW. A sweep of the contact area found 4 VC KIA, and 2 AK-47s. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA, and 2 IWC.

CAP 1-4-2. RDS delivered 2 Hoi Chanh to CAP for evacuation to the BDOC. The Hoi Chanh claimed to be farmers for the VC at grid BS 714805. RESULTS: 2 Hoi Chanh (NOT CAP).

1st CAG reported minor MAOC boundary adjustments for CAP 1-1-7, and CAPs 1-2-2, and 1-2-5. The adjustments were made in order to more effectively support the Phase II, 1969 Pacification Plan in Quang Tin Province. Support capabilities and requirements were not changed as a result of the adjustments.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
APO San Francisco, California 96602

Grud 2000.1
3/JEH/rob
2 July 1969

GROUP ORDER 2000.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedure, 1st CAG Combat Operations Center (COC)

1. General. The COC shall operate within the cognizance of the 1st CAG Operations Officer and under the direct supervision of the Communication Chief.

2. Spot Reports.

a. All Spot Reports will be PRINTED neatly and legibly EXACTLY as received.

b. Each Spot Report will be logged in the Spot Report Log and assigned a number. Numbers will run consecutively for a period of one month and will be prefixed with the month number. EXAMPLE: 07/234 - This number indicates the 234th Spot Report received in July.

c. An original and one carbon copy will be made on all Spot Reports. The carbon copy will be filed in the radio station file and retained for one month, after which they will be destroyed.

d. If it should become necessary to repeat a Spot Report which has been called in previously, the repeat shall not be called in using the carbon copy. The original will be provided by the S-3/S-2 clerk when requested for this purpose. Clearance for the repeat will be obtained according to paragraph 2.e below.

e. Effect delivery of the original copy as outlined below:

(1) Deliver immediately to one of the following officers in the order indicated:

- (a) Operations Officer (S-3)
- (b) Executive Officer
- (c) Commanding Officer

(2) The cognizant officer will direct the radio operator as appropriate in each case.

(3) The radio operator will then deliver, by phone, the Spot Report

GruO 2000.1
2 July 1969

to the addressees indicated, with the exception of III MAF (this is accomplished by the S-3/S-2 clerk at a prescribed time).

(4) After the Spot Report has been completely delivered to all local addressees, it will be given to the S-3/S-2 clerk for further action and file.

f. KIA/WIA Reports. This is a separate form which is prepared in duplicate for delivery to the Adjutant and the Chief Corpsman. The appropriate information for this form will be extracted from any Spot Report which contains information of a 1st CAG Marine being either KIA or WIA. The delivery of this report will coincide with delivery of the Spot Report.

3. Daily Activities. These are received from each company twice daily and must be plotted on the maps of the respective company area of operations prior to 0600 and 1800. The 2400-0800 watch is responsible for plotting the day activities prior to 0600. The 1600-2400 watch is responsible for plotting night activities prior to 1800. However, the 0800-1600 watch shall plot night activities as they are received from each company up to the time he is relieved, providing the workload permits him to do so.

4. Other Messages.

a. Incoming.

- (1) Log the message in the Radio Station Log.
- (2) If necessary for delivery, print the message neatly and legibly on a message blank EXACTLY as received.
- (3) Deliver to the appropriate staff section.

b. Outgoing.

- (1) Write the message on a message blank.
- (2) Log the message in the Radio Station Log.
- (3) Transmit the message, EXACTLY AS WRITTEN, to the appropriate addressees.
- (4) Write a Time of Delivery (TOD) on the message blank and return it to the originating section.

5. Radio Station Logs. These will be used by each operator to record all messages and/or transmissions sent and received over the 1st CAG Command Net. The log will be maintained neatly and legibly by each operator in accordance with separate instructions. The log will be retained in the radio station file for a period of 6 months, after which they will be destroyed by burning.

6. Care Of Equipment.

a. All radios, handsets, loudspeakers, and power supplies located in the COC will be P.M.'d daily by the 2400-0800 watch. P.M. will be accomplished in accordance with Group Order 2302.2. Any equipment which is malfunctioning or defective will be reported to the Communication Chief.

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2 July 1969

7. COC Police. The COC will be maintained in a neat and orderly condition at all times. It is the responsibility and duty of each radio operator to sweep down and swab prior to being relieved. There will be no unofficial reading material allowed during the day watch.

J. E. Henneagan
J. E. HENNEGAN

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

GruO 2302.3
3/JEH/reh
16 July 1969

GROUP ORDER 2302.3

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: 1st Combined Action Group Voice Radio Operating Procedures

1. This publication constitutes a directive whereby the 1st Combined Action Group Voice Radio Networks will operate.
2. No deviations from the instructions contained herein are authorized.
3. All personnel shall familiarize themselves with the contents of this publication, particularly those personnel which routinely act as radio operators.
4. Suggested changes or modifications to the instruction contained herein shall be brought to the attention of the 1st Combined Action Group Operations Section (Attn: Communication Chief).
5. W A R N I N G. THIS PUBLICATION IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. ITS CONTENTS SHALL NOT BE DIVULGED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS. ALTHOUGH THIS PUBLICATION IS UNCLASSIFIED, IT WILL BE HANDLED AND STORED AS CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL.

J. E. Hennegan
J. E. HENNEGAN

Distribution: A & B



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ANNEX A: Basic Message Format Schematic Diagram

ANNEX B: Illustrative Examples of Plaindress and Abbreviated Plaindress Message Format

ENCLOSURE (1): Compromised Classified Material Report

10-6

DECLASSIFIED

(1) Preliminary Call. A preliminary call is used by the calling station and all answer stations to initially establish communications. It consists of the call sign(s) of the called station(s), the proword THIS IS, the call sign of the calling station, and the proword OVER or OUT, whichever applies. The proword EXEMPT may also be used if a station or stations are being exempted from a preliminary call employing a net call sign.

(2) Abbreviated Call. An abbreviated call is used by all stations after initially establishing communications. An abbreviated call consists of the proword THIS IS, and the call sign of the calling station, and the proword OVER or OUT, whichever applies.

(3) Single Call. A call in which the calling station calls only one station.

(4) Multiple Call. A call in which the calling station calls two or more stations. Stations called will be in alphabetical-numerical order.

(a) Answering Multiple Calls. Stations called in a multiple will answer in the order called. If any station fails to answer in turn within 5 seconds, the next station in order will answer followed by all other called stations in order. The station which failed to answer in turn will answer last.

(5) Net Call. A call in which the calling station calls all other stations on that net by using a call sign which means: ALL STATIONS THIS NET.

(a) Answering a Net Call. The stations included in a net call will answer the calling station in alphabetical-numerical order. In any station fails to answer in turn, the same procedure as for Multiple Call is followed.

B. CALLING AND ANSWERING EXAMPLES

(1) Preliminary Call and Answer

CORAL REEF-THIS IS- BIG DRIP-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-CORAL REEF-OVER

(2) Preliminary Multiple Call and Answers

CORAL REEF-DRY SAND-JIM DANDY-THIS IS-BIG DRIP-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-CORAL REEF-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-DRY SAND-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-JIM DANDY-OVER

(3) Preliminary Net Call and Answers

ALL STATIONS-THIS NET-THIS IS-BIG DRIP-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-CORAL REEF-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-DRY SAND-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-JIM DANDY-OVER
...BIG DRIP-THIS IS-DRY SAND-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-DRY SAND-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-DRY SAND-OVER

LINE # REASON FOR DELETION

- 1 Not used in radio procedure
- 4 Used only as necessary
- 6-9 When the call serves as the address
- 10 Required only when the message text is coded
- 14 Required only when numbers are in the text
- 15 Used only as necessary

(5) Determining Lines To Be Used. In the plaindress form, use only those components, lines, and contents which are necessary for the rapid and clear transmission of the message.

C. Abbreviated Plaindress Form.

(1) Purpose. This Form, generally, is used for messages which need not be copied, and are usually exchanges of information between operators.

(2) Use. The Abbreviated Plaindress Form is used for the transmission of messages between operators to exchange communication information, to obtain or request corrections, repetitions, verifications, and other information concerning messages, radio networks, procedures, call signs, frequencies, etc. This Form may be used in place of the Plaindress Form when necessary.

(3) Message Format Lines Used. Generally, the below listed message format lines are used in the abbreviated plaindress form:

LINE # LINE TITLE

- 2-3 Message Call
- 4 Transmission Instructions (only as required)
- 12 Text
- 15 Final Instructions (only as required)
- 16 Ending Sign

(a) Rules of Exceptions.

1. If a date-time group is used, the separations are necessary.
2. If all stations are not in direct contact with each other the address must be used.
3. The text will usually consist of prowords, message identification, and correcting and verifying information.
4. Abbreviated Plaindress may be used for other types of messages.

309. CALLING AND ANSWERING.

A. Establishing Communications. When initially establishing communications, all stations involved will use preliminary calls to contact each other.

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1V-23

E. Basic Message Format Components. Each Part of the Basic Message Format is further divided into Components.

(1) Heading. The Heading consists of 5 Components:

- (a) Procedure
- (b) Preamble
- (c) Address
- (d) Prefix
- (e) Separation

(2) Text. The Text consists of the subject and textual matter.

(3) Ending. The Ending consists of 2 Components:

- (a) Separation
- (b) Procedure

F. Basic Message Format Lines and Contents. Each Component consists of a certain number of Format Lines and Contents. These are outlined in the Basic Message Format Schematic Diagram, shown in Annex A.

308. FORMS OF MESSAGES.

A. Purpose. Because all messages do not require all components and contents of the Basic Message Format for their transmission, there has been devised three different forms of the Basic Message Format. Each Form is designed to fit a particular need. The three Forms of messages are: Plaindress, Abbreviated Plaindress, and Codress.

B. Plaindress Form.

(1) Definition. The term "plain dress" is a contraction of the phrase "plain address", which indicates a message is transmitted with the address either in plain language or unencrypted call signs. This form will also contain all Format parts, components, lines, and contents, as required for the transmission of the message.

(2) Purpose. To provide the operator with a format in which all components and lines of the Basic Message Format are used, as necessary for the transmission of the message.

(3) Use. The Plaindress Form will be used whenever any message which must be copied and delivered to the addressee(s).

(4) Format Lines Omitted. The following message format lines may be deleted from the message only for the reason stated below during its transmissio

Z	FLASH	<u>MEANING:</u> The precedence of this message is Flash. <u>USE:</u> Same as immediate.
-----	FIGURES	<u>MEANING:</u> The numbers (punctuation) following are to be copied as symbols.
-----	INITIAL	<u>MEANING:</u> The phonetic equivalent(s) following are to be copied as initial(s).
-----	I SPELL	<u>MEANING:</u> To avoid confusion, the following group will be spelled.
-----	MESSAGE FOLLOWS	<u>MEANING:</u> The following message is to be copied for record purposes. <u>USE:</u> After the preliminary call to indicate to receiving operator he must be prepared to copy.
-----	TIME	<u>MEANING:</u> The numbers following will be a time group, or a date-time group; copy as symbols.
-----	WILCO	<u>MEANING:</u> I have receipted for, understand and will comply with the content of this message.

307. MESSAGE.

A. Definition. A message is any thought or idea transmitted in plain of secret language by any means of communication.

B. Originator. The originator of a message is the command by whose authority the message is sent. Messages are sent for and in the name of the unit commander. Therefore, the unit commander is the originator of all messages sent from his unit; even though he may not actually write all messages transmitted; the responsibility for their contents rests with him. The unit commander should be aware of the contents of all messages sent from his command. :....

C. Message Format. All messages to be transmitted by radio are prepared for transmission using a format specifically designed for this purpose. This is known as the Basic Message Format. The Basic Message Format applies to all types of electrical communications. For Voice Radio Procedure, the operator need be concerned only with those contents of the format which pertains to voice operating procedure. :....

D. Basic Message Format Parts. The Basic Message Format is divided into three parts for identification purposes, which are: The Heading, Text, and Ending. :....

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DECLASSIFIED

PROSIGN

PROWORD

MEANING/USE

J

VERIFY

MEANING: Verify with the originator of the message and repeat the message, or portions requested.

USE: To confirm doubtful or questionable messages or portions of messages.

K

OVER

MEANING: This is the end of my transmission, your receipt is invited.

USE: In the message Ending.

NR

NUMBER

MEANING: The station serial number of this message is _____.

USE: In the message Call.

O

IMMEDIATE

MEANING: The precedence of this message is Immediate.

USE: In the message Preamble, prior to the date-time group.

P

PRIORITY

MEANING: The precedence of this message is priority.

USE: Same as Immediate.

R

ROGER

MEANING: I am receipting your message.

R

ROUTINE

MEANING: The precedence of this message is routine.

USE: Same as Immediate.

T

RELAY (TO)

MEANING: Relay this message to the station whose call sign follows.

USE: In the message Transmission Instructions.

TO

TO

MEANING: All addresses following this proword are action.

WA

WORD AFTER

USE: To indicate a word or group, after which, another word or group was not received.

WB

WORD BEFORE

USE: To indicate a word or group, before which, another word or group was not received.

XMT

EXEMPT

MEANING: The station(s) whose call sign(s) following this proword are exempted from the Call (Address)

USE: In the message Call or Address.

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<u>PROSIGN</u>	<u>PROWORD</u>	<u>MEANING/USE</u>
DE	THIS IS	<u>MEANING:</u> The call sign of the calling station is _____ <u>USE:</u> In the Message Call.
EEEEEEEE	CORRECTION	<u>MEANING:</u> The last word or group sent is in error, the correct version is _____ <u>USE:</u> Whenever an error occurs which must be corrected.
EEEEEEEE AR	DISREGARD THIS MESSAGE	<u>MEANING:</u> Disregard this message as if it had never been sent. <u>USE:</u> To cancel a message being sent
F	DO NOT ANSWER	<u>MEANING:</u> After I have transmitted this message, do not receipt for it. <u>USE:</u> In the message Transmission Instructions.
G	READ BACK	<u>MEANING:</u> After I transmit this message read it back to determine if your copy is correct <u>USE:</u> In the message Transmission Instructions
FM	FROM	<u>MEANING:</u> The originator of this message is _____ <u>USE:</u> In the Message Address.
GR	GROUPS	<u>MEANING:</u> The groups counted in the text of the message are _____ <u>USE:</u> In the message Prefix.
HRNG	GROUPS NO COUNT	<u>MEANING:</u> The groups in the message text have not been counted. <u>USE:</u> In the message Prefix.
HM HM HM	SILENCE SILENCE SILENCE	<u>MEANING:</u> Emergency silence is imposed. <u>USE:</u> To impose emergency silence.
IMI	SAY AGAIN; I SAY AGAIN	<u>MEANING:</u> All words after this proword are repeats (I) (you) requested. <u>USE:</u> To indicate an answer to a request, or a request for a repetition.
INFO	INFORMATION	<u>MEANING:</u> All addressees following this proword are information. <u>USE:</u> In the Address of the Message.
INT	INTERROGATIVE	<u>USE:</u> To indicate that a proword is being used as a question rather than a statement.



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DECLASSIFIED

C. Use. Prowords are used extensively in the Basic Message Format, in procedure message texts, and in establishing communications. Therefore, each radio operator must know these prowords, their meanings, and where they are used. This will provide each operator with the means for more rapid and reliable transmission of messages.

D. Prowords. Contained below is a list of all prowords authorized for use on the 1st Combined Action Group radio networks. All operators shall make maximum use of these prowords at all times when transmitting messages, or other traffic.

<u>PROSIGN</u>	<u>PROWORD</u>	<u>MEANING/USE</u>
<u>XX</u>	UNKNOWN STATION	<u>USE</u> : To call an unidentified station.
<u>AA</u>	ALL AFTER	<u>USE</u> : To indicate a word or group, after which, a part of a message was not received.
<u>AB</u>	ALL BEFORE	<u>USE</u> : To indicate a word or group, before which, a part of a message was not received.
<u>AR</u>	OUT	<u>MEANING</u> : This is the end of my transmission. No reply is expected. <u>USE</u> : Transmission Ending Sign.
<u>AS</u>	WAIT	<u>MEANING</u> : I will pause for a few seconds, standby. <u>USE</u> : By the sending operator to inform the receiving operator he must leave the net for a few seconds.
<u>ASAR</u>	WAIT OUT	<u>MEANING</u> : I will pause for longer than a few seconds, do not standby. <u>USE</u> : By the sending operator to indicate he must interrupt the transmission.
<u>B</u>	MORE TO FOLLOW	<u>MEANING</u> : After this message is receipted for, I have more traffic. <u>USE</u> : In the message Final Instructions.
<u>BT</u>	BREAK	<u>USE</u> : To separate the message text from the heading and ending.
<u>C</u>	CORRECT	<u>MEANING</u> : That is correct. You are correct. <u>USE</u> : To indicate a repeated portion of a message is correct.
<u>CFN</u>	CONFIRMATION	<u>MEANING</u> : All text numbers are confirmed as follows _____. <u>USE</u> : Follows the text of a message after the Break, all numbers are repeated

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A. **Transmitting Numbers As Figures.** To avoid confusion between the spell version and the figure version of a number, the figure version should be prefixed with the proword "FIGURES" which means: The numbers following this proword are to be copied as symbols. The receiving operator will then copy the number as a figure symbol.

EXAMPLE (1): "FIGURES SEVEN" will be copied by the receiving operator as the figure symbol "7".

EXAMPLE (2): "SEVEN" will be copied by the receiving operator as the spelled version "S-E-V-E-N".

305. **PUNCTUATION.** The punctuation included below is authorized for transmission by radio and other means of communication.

<u>PUNCTUATION</u> <u>SYMBOL</u>	<u>WRITTEN</u> <u>ABBREVIATION</u>	<u>PRONOUNC I A-</u> <u>TION</u>	<u>PUNCTUATION</u> <u>SYMBOL</u>	<u>WRITTEN</u> <u>ABBREVIATION</u>	<u>PRONOUNC I A-</u> <u>TION</u>
/	SLANT	slant	(PAREN	pair-en
.	PD	period)	UNPAREN	un-pair-en
,	COM	comma	-	DASH	dash
;	SEMICOL	semi-colon	\$	DOL	dollar
:	CIN	colon	?	QUES	question
" "	QTE	quote	&	AND	and

A. **Transmitting Punctuation As Symbols.** To avoid confusion between the written abbreviation and the punctuation symbol, the symbol version should be prefixed with the proword "FIGURES." The receiving operator will then copy the punctuation as a symbol.

EXAMPLE (1): "FIGURES DOLLAR" will be copied by the receiving operator as the punctuation symbol "\$".

EXAMPLE (2): "DOLLAR" will be copied by the receiving operator as the written abbreviation "DOL."

306. **PROCEDURE WORDS.**

A. **Definition.** Procedure words, or Prowords as they are commonly called are pronounceable words or short phrases with predetermined meanings which convey orders, requests, and information of a common communication nature. Prowords were designed for use between operators to increase brevity and clarity of transmissions.

B. **Prosigns.** These are abbreviated forms of prowords which convey the same meaning as the proword, but are designed for use in other means of communications. Prosigns are not to be used on voice networks, however, for ease in copying, the receiving operator may write the prosign in lieu of the proword, further, this practice is encouraged.

J. Radio Volume. Keep this at a comfortable level for the station you are receiving. It may vary from station to station, depending on many factors such as; distance, antenna site, terrain, weather, etc. The volume being too high will cause noise and voice distortion.

303. PHONETIC ALPHABET. The phonetic equivalents of the alphabet should be used whenever single letters are to be transmitted to avoid misunderstanding or confusion. The phonetic equivalents and their correct pronunciation is included below:

<u>LETTER</u>	<u>PHONETIC EQUIVALENT</u>	<u>PRONOUNCIATION</u>	<u>LETTER</u>	<u>PHONETIC EQUIVALENT</u>	<u>PRONOUNCIATION</u>
A	ALFA	al - fah	N	NOVEMBER	no-ven-ber
B	BRAVO	brah-voh	O	OSCAR	os-car
C	CHARLIE	char-lee	P	PAPA	pa-pa
D	DELTA	del-tuh	Q	QUEBEC	kay-bek
E	ECHO	ek-oh	R	ROMEO	now-me-oh
F	FOXTROT	foks-trot	S	S IERRA	see-air-uh
G	GOLF	golf	T	TANGO	tang-oh
H	HOTEL	ho-tell	U	UNIFORM	you-ni-form
I	INDIA	in-dee-uh	V	VICTOR	vick-ter
J	JULIETT	jew-lee-et	W	WHISKEY	wis-kee
K	KILO	key-low	X	X-RAY	eks-ray
L	LIMA	lee-ma	Y	YANKER	yank-ee
M	MIKE	mike	Z	ZULU	zoo-loo

A. Transmitting Initial Letters. To avoid confusion between the spelled version and the initial version of phonetic letters, the initial version should be prefixed with the proword "INITIAL" which means: The phonetic equivalent(s) following are to be copied as initials. The receiving operator will then copy the phonetic letter as an initial

EXAMPLE (1): "INITIAL CHARLIE" will be copied by the receiving operator as the single letter "C".

EXAMPLE (2): "CHARLIE" will be copied by the receiving operator as the spelled out phonetic equivalent "C-H-A-R-L-I-E".

304. NUMBERS. The pronunciation and proper method of writing numbers is included below:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PRONOUNCE</u>	<u>WRITE AS:</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PRONOUNCE</u>	<u>WRITE AS:</u>
One	wun	1	Six	siks	6
Two	too	2	Seven	sev-en	7
Three	thuh-ree	3	Eight	ate	8
Four	fo-wer	4	Nine	nine	9
Five	fi-yuv	5	Zero	zee-row	0

CHAPTER 3: VOICE RADIO OPERATION PROCEDURES

301. General. The operating procedures explained and illustrated in this chapter shall be followed by all personnel acting as radio operators. All personnel in the 1st Combined Action Group shall familiarize themselves with the procedures contained herein.

A. Training. In order to maintain the highest state of training possible, the Company Communication NGO will conduct a communication school at Company level as required. To ensure all radio operators are familiar with the Voice Radio Procedures contained herein, Company Commanders should ensure maximum participation of personnel when this school is scheduled.

B. Procedure. The 1st Combined Action Group radio networks shall operate in accordance with the procedures contained in the current edition of the ACP-125, and the instructions contained herein. No deviations are authorized. In the event situations occur which are not covered by these instructions, sound judgement and good common sense should be used to resolve the situation.

302. TECHNIQUES OF VOICE OPERATION. Talking over radio is different than talking over a telephone, or person to person. For maximum intelligibility, each operator should practice the following techniques of voice radio operation:

A. Talk Slowly. Remember, the receiving operator may have to copy what is being transmitted.

B. Talk Distinctly. Pronounce each syllable of each word distinctly, but do not exaggerate.

C. Talk In Monotone. Do not raise or lower the pitch of your voice while talking. The frequency response of the radio handset is not as broad as the range of your voice. If you vary the pitch of your voice as you talk some of the words may be partially transmitted or completely lost.

D. Speak Clearly. Do not slur your words, form each word separately.

E. Do Not Hesitate. Know what you have to say BEFORE keying the transmitter. Convey the message to the receiving operator in as few words as possible. REMEMBER: BE BRIEF, CLEAR, AND CONCISE.

F. Procedure Words (Prowords). Make each transmission as short as possible by making maximum use of prowords.

G. Voice Volume. Do not shout or whisper, use a natural voice level.

H. Do Not Become Irritated. Remain calm, cool, and collected. This attitude should be reflected in your voice at all times. When acting as a radio operator you are not a personality, but a part of the radio.

I. Push-To-Talk Lever. Keep this depressed tightly while transmitting, otherwise your voice will be intermittently cutout.

(b) Equipment.

1. Burn. Place a white phosphorous or thermite grenade on the radio or in the battery case.

2. Disintegrate. Place equipment in a hole with a fragmentation grenade. After the explosion inspect to ensure all equipment is completely destroyed.

3. Smash. Use any heavy object to smash the radio so it is not usable by the enemy. Antennas can be bent until broken. Handsets can be taken apart by unscrewing the plastic caps over the transmitter and receiver portions and cutting the power cord. Scatter the different components. Batteries should be torn apart and scattered.

(3) During emergency destruction, all documents and equipment must be completely destroyed. It is better to have a few documents and equipment destroyed beyond use than to have many partially destroyed.

204. PREVENTION OF COMPROMISE.

A. Responsibility. The commanding officer of each company within the 1st Combined Action Group is responsible for the accountability, handling, and stowage of all classified material within that company.

B. Safeguarding.

(1) Accountability. This is the "key" to security. The commanding officer of each company should account for all classified material under his command at regular intervals. This will ensure all copies are being handled and stowed properly.

(2) Stowage. Classified material should not be allowed to indiscriminately lie in any place which is convenient. All stowage places should be viewed from the standpoint of maximum security and minimum chance of compromise. When the classified material is not in use, it should be stowed in these areas of stowage. Further, the commanding officer of each company should assign an NCO in each platoon responsible for the accounting, stowage, and handling of classified material.

(3) Security Inspections. The company commander should, from time to time, make security checks to ensure the provisions of this chapter are being complied with.

205. DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.

A. Routine Destruction. A security measure designed to prevent superseded classified material from falling into the hands of unauthorized persons. As soon as classified material is superseded it should be destroyed completely by burning. Superseded classified material has not lost its security, just its usefulness. It is mandatory that it be destroyed completely without delay.

B. Emergency Destruction.

(1) Purpose. In the event any position is in danger of being overrun by the enemy, all classified material shall be destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy. This should be accomplished without delay.

(2) Means of Destruction.

(a) Documents.

1. Burn. This is the most effective method of destruction. Place all documents together with a white phosphorous or thermite grenade, or soak the documents with gasoline, kerosene, or other flammable liquid.
2. Shred. If the means to burn is not available, tear the documents into small pieces and scatter them over wide areas.
3. Bury. This is the least desirable method and should be used only as a last resort.

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PART 2. PHYSICAL SECURITY

201. **DEFINITION.** Physical security is that phase of communication security which concerns itself with the physical means by which classified material is safeguarded from loss or compromise.

A. **Responsibility.** Physical security is the responsibility of everyone that comes into contact with or handles classified material.

B. **Methods.** The methods by which physical security is enhanced are through:

- (1) Proper handling.
- (2) Proper stowage.
- (3) Accountability.
- (4) Timely destruction.

202. **COMPROMISE.**

A. **Definition.** Any classified material which is unaccounted for, falls into the hands of, or viewed by, unauthorized persons is compromised. When classified material is compromised it has lost its security value and must be reported immediately to the next higher headquarters. It must be assumed the enemy has knowledge of it, and its use must be discontinued.

B. **Compromise Categories.** There are several degrees of compromise which depend on the circumstances of compromise. These categories are:

- (1) Known compromise.
- (2) Possible compromise.
- (3) Unknown compromise.

Of the categories listed above, the Unknown Compromise is by far the most serious. An unknown compromise is a compromise that has occurred, but has remained undiscovered, or has been discovered but not reported to proper authority. Therefore, the material which has been compromised will continue to be used with possible serious consequences.

203. **REPORTING OF COMPROMISED CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.**

A. When a compromise of classified material is discovered, the report shall be made by the Commanding Officer of the company in which the compromise occurred. This report shall contain the information outlined in Enclosure (1) and shall be forwarded to S-2, 1st Combined Action Group by the most expeditious means without undue delay.

B. Upon receipt of the compromise report, the S-2, 1st Combined Action Group shall determine, in-so-far as possible, if the material is, in fact, compromised.

C. If the S-2 determines the material is compromised, the report of compromise shall be forwarded to the G-2, Americal Division for action. If the compromised material concerns communication security a copy of the report shall be forwarded to the Signal Officer, Americal Division for information.

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commanding officer to prevent the enemy from prematurely learning of a unit's presence and sending plans through traffic analysis. Radio silence shall be imposed and lifted only by the commanding officer. During radio silence, no stations under radio silence shall transmit traffic, or key their transmitters. However, stations under radio silence may monitor incoming traffic from higher or adjacent commands.

B. Imposing Radio Silence.

(1) The operator will transmit the following warning message with all numbers shackled, at the direction of the commanding officer.

RADIO SILENCE WILL BE IMPOSED AT (Date-time group).
SILENCE WILL BE LIFTED AT (Date-time group) BY MY COMMAND.

(2) The first receipting operator only will challenge the sending station to authenticate. All other receipting operators will have monitored the challenge and reply, thereby knowing the message is authentic. All other operators will receipt.

(3) At the time indicated in the warning message, the station imposing radio silence will transmit the following order:

ALL STATION THIS NET SILENCE SILENCE SILENCE

(4) No further authentication is necessary. No station will receipt and no further transmission will be made until silence is lifted.

C. Imposing Emergency Silence. In the event sufficient time does not exist to transmit a warning message, and radio silence must be imposed without delay, the station imposing radio silence will transmit the following message:

ALL STATIONS THIS NET SILENCE SILENCE SILENCE

(1) The first receipting operator will challenge the sending station to authenticate. All other receipting operators will have monitored the challenge and reply, thereby knowing the message is authentic. All other operators will receipt. After the final operator has receipted for the message, no other transmissions will be made until silence is lifted.

D. Lifting Radio Silence. Only the station which imposed radio silence, or higher authority may lift it. Lifting radio silence is accomplished:

(1) Upon order from the commanding officer, the radio operator at the station which imposed radio silence will transmit the following message

ALL STATIONS THIS NET LIFT RADIO SILENCE

(2) The first receipting operator will challenge the sending operator to authenticate. The remaining stations will have monitored the challenge and reply, thereby knowing the transmission is authentic. After radio silence is lifted, normal communications will continue.

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B. Purpose. The purpose of imitative deception is to cause confusion, disrupt troop movements, unnecessary radio transmissions, and possible disaster. If operators are not alert to imitative deception attempts, possible bogus messages containing false orders luring patrols into enemy ambushes may be the result.

C. Measures To Defeat Imitative Deception.

- (1) Operators must be alert for imitative deception attempts
- (2) Operators should become thoroughly familiar with the voice characteristics, and procedural mannerisms of distant friendly operators
- (3) When the operator suspects imitative deception is being attempted, the sending operator should be challenged to authenticate. If the authentication is incorrect, follow the procedure outlined in paragraph 106.B.
- (4) Operators should be suspicious of any sudden changes in radio tone, or voice quality.
- (5) In order to defeat attempts at imitative deception, the operator must be thoroughly trained, and alert at all times.

110. JAMMING.

A. Purpose. Jamming is an attempt by the enemy to disrupt communications of friendly radio networks by introducing noise and static on the net. Jamming will either interrupt, or completely obliterate radio signals.

B. Antijamming Procedures. Should jamming occur on the 1st Combined Action Group radio networks, the operator should first disconnect the radio antenna to determine if it is jamming, or merely noise caused by an internal malfunction of the radio. When the antenna is disconnected and the noise persists, the radio receiver is defective. If the noise disappears it is jamming, and the operator should take one or more of the following steps:

- (1) Notify the commanding officer or squad leader
- (2) Screen the antenna. The screen should be placed between your antenna and the jamming station. Shift the screen around the antenna in several directions until the position is found in which the noise is diminished the most. This will also affect the incoming signal but may enable you to read through the noise.
- (3) Shift the radio to another site. If this does not work the first time, try several more, preferably amongst trees, buildings, or other obstructions which may help to screen out the jamming station.
- (4) Vary the volume control. The intensity of the incoming signal may be raised above that of the jamming.
- (5) If the above procedures do not provide sufficient signal separation, request a change to an alternate frequency and call sign.
- (6) IMPORTANT. Do not let the enemy know his jamming is effective. Do not request excessive repetitions.

111. RADIO SILENCE.

A. Purpose. Radio silence is a security measure available to the

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originator with which to encode numbers which make an otherwise unclassified message correct.

B. What To Shackle. The shackling of the below listed numbers is mandatory:

- (1) Friendly KIA and/or WIA
- (2) Coordinates of friendly positions NOT KNOWN to the enemy
- (3) Quantities of supplies, rations, ammunition and other ordnance
- (4) Dates and times of planned or pending operations
- (5) Coordinates of future ambush sites, defensive positions, or patrols
- (6) Radio frequencies linked with the plain equivalent of the command it represents.

C. What Not To Shackle.

- (1) Friendly MIA, or POW
- (2) Enemy KIA, WIA, and/or POW
- (3) Coordinates of enemy positions
- (4) Coordinates of friendly positions KNOWN to the enemy
- (5) Numbers of enemy troops, or quantities of enemy supplies, ammunitions, other ordnance, and rations.
- (6) Generally, any information which is known by the enemy. IF THERE IS DOUBT, DO NOT SHACKLE. Remember, the shackle cipher is relatively insecure, and can be compromised very easily.

D. Shackle Cipher Tables. These are provided by the Group Communication Section at regular intervals. They shall be used in accordance with the instructions contained therein.

108. OPERATIONAL CODE.

A. Purpose. The operational code is a means available to the message originator by which certain commonly used words and phrases may be encoded for radio transmission. Normally, the operational code will be used to encode Confidential information. In an emergency situation the operational code may be used to encode Secret information, if no other means is available, and it is imperative the information be transmitted. This code will not be used to code Top Secret information.

B. Operational Code Tables. These are provided by the Group Communication Section at regular intervals. They shall be used in accordance with the instructions contained therein.

109. IMITATIVE DECEPTION.

A. Definition. Imitative deception is an attempt by the enemy to "dupe" an unwary operator into accepting a fraudulent message as one which is authentic, by imitating the procedures and voice characteristics of an operator at another station on the net.

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106. AUTHENTICATION.

A. Definition. Authentication is a security measure available to the operator to ensure a received message is from a friendly station, and not an attempt at imitative deception by an enemy station. Authentication, therefore, is a means to defeat imitative deception.

B. Types. Generally, there are two types of authentication employed by operators on radio nets:

- (1) Challenge and reply authentication
- (2) Transmission authentication

C. Challenge And Reply. This is a method by which the receiving operator challenges the sending operator. The challenge consists of characters selected at random. If the correct reply is not received, the sending station is assumed to be an enemy.

D. Transmission. This method of authentication is transmitted in the Final Instructions of the message, and consist of characters selected from pre-determined positions of the message. This method of authentication will not be used on the 1st Combined Action Group Networks.

E. Receiving Wrong Authentication Reply. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THE CHALLENGING OPERATOR INDICATE TO THE REPLYING OPERATOR THE AUTHENTICATION REPLY IS INCORRECT. If the challenging operator does not receive a correct authentication reply, the challenging operator will challenge twice more. If a wrong reply is received each time, the operator will discontinue challenging and make the following notation on the message received: "NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED." This will indicate to the addressee that the message is a possible attempt at imitative deception, and may be bogus.

F. When To Authenticate. It is mandatory that authentication be performed when the following situations arise:

- (1) When imitative deception is suspected
- (2) When challenged
- (3) When lifting or imposing radio silence
- (4) When a classified message sent in plain language is cancelled
- (5) When initially entering a net
- (6) When leaving a net
- (7) For training purposes, maximum use of authentication

procedures shall be made by all operators.

G. Authentication Tables. These are provided by the Group Communication Section at regular intervals. They shall be used in accordance with the instructions contained therein.

107. SHACKLE CIPHER (NUMERICAL CODE)

A. Purpose. The shackle cipher is a means available to the message

CHAPTER 1. TRANSMISSION SECURITY

101. **DEFINITION.** Transmission security is defined as all those practices and measures which are taken to prevent the enemy from gaining useful intelligence from friendly radio transmissions.

102. **PRACTICES.** In a combat or tactical situation it must be assumed that the enemy is monitoring all transmissions made by friendly radio stations. Therefore, in view of this, every radio operator shall be aware of, and practice, proper radio procedures, thereby minimizing the possibility of the enemy gaining intelligence from our radio networks.

A. Practices Strictly Forbidden.

- (1) Linkage of call signs and/or frequencies with their plain language equivalents or meanings.
- (2) Transmission of any classified information in plain language.
- (3) Transmission of unauthorized messages.
- (4) Profane or obscene language.
- (5) Excessive testing and tuning.
- (6) Operator chatter.

B. Mandatory Practices.

- (1) Proper radio procedure at all times.
- (2) Strict observance of radio silence when imposed.
- (3) Proper use of authentication, shackie cipher tables, operational codes, and their procedures.
- (4) Immediate recognition of attempts at imitative deception, and, jamming.

103. **LINKAGE.** No call sign and/or frequency linked with the unit it identifies will be transmitted in plain language over the radio. All frequencies shall be encoded in the Shackie Cipher prior to transmission.

104. **TRANSMISSION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.** No classified information shall be transmitted in plain language by radio, except as authorized by the commanding officer.

A. In an emergency situation, the commanding officer may authorize Confidential information to be transmitted in plain language over the radio. In the event this becomes necessary, the first word of the text will be: "CLEAR." The security classification will not be transmitted. The warning "CLEAR" indicates to the addressee(s) that the contents of the message are Confidential which were probably compromised during its transmission, and should be handled accordingly.

B. Under no circumstances shall Secret or above classified information be transmitted in plain language by radio, or any other means of communication.

105. **AUTHORIZED MESSAGES.** Only those messages which affect the tactical situation, facilitate administration or supply are authorized for transmission.

(4) Abbreviated Call

THIS IS-BIG DRIP-OVER

(5) Station Failing to Answer in Turn

CORAL REEF-JIM SAND-JIM DANDY-THIS IS-BIG DRIP-OVER
 BIG DRIP-THIS IS-CORAL REEF-OVER
 (JIM SAND fails to answer within 5 seconds)
 BIG DRI-THIS IS-JIM DANDY-OVER
 BIG DRIP-THIS IS-JIM SAND-OVER

0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 0

DECLASSIFIED

ANNEX A

MESSAGE FORMAT SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM

PART	COMPONENT	LINE#	LINE TITLE	CONTENTS
H E A	P	1	Pilot	Not used in radio procedure.
	R			
	O	2-3	Message Call	Call sign(s) of called station(s); proword EXEMPT; call sign(s) of exempted station(s) proword THIS IS; call sign of calling station; proword NUMBER and station serial number of calling station.
	E			
	D			
	U			
	R			
	E	4	Transmission Instructions	Prowords READ BACK, or DO NOT ANSWER, or RELAY (TO).

D	PREAMBLE	5	Date-time group	Prowords ROUTINE, or PRIORITY, or IMMEDIATE, or FLASH; proword TIME; date-time group; zone suffix; message instructions.

I	A	6	Message Originator	Proword FROM; call sign of message originator.
	D			
		7	Action Addressee(s)	Proword TO; call sign(s) of action addressee(s).
	D			
N	R	8	Information Addressee(s)	Proword INFORMATION; call sign(s) of information addressee(s).
	E			
G	S	9	Exempted Addressee(s)	Proword EXEMPT; call sign(s) of exempted addressee(s).
	S	10	Accounting Information	Proword GROUPS followed by numerical count of total number groups in text; proword GROUPS NO COUNT

	SEPARATION	11	Long Break	Proword BREAK, separates Text from Heading.

T E X T	TEXT	12	Text	Message classification or UNCLAS; passing instructions; drill or exercise identification; subject line, references, textual material.

	SEPARATION	13	Long Break	Proword BREAK, separates Text from Ending.

		14	Confirmation	Proword CONFIRMATION; all numbers and/or odd groups in text repeated.
		15	Final Instructions	Prowords MORE TO FOLLOW; CORRECTION; DISREGARD THIS MESSAGE; ALL AFTER; ALL BEFORE; WORD AFTER; WORD BEFORE;
		16	Ending Sign	Prowords OVER or OUT

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ANNEX B

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAM LINES OF PLAINDRESS AND ABBREVIATED PLAINDRESS MESSAGE FORMAT

B1. Plaindress Form With All Necessary Format Lines.

LINE# TRANSMISSION CONTENTS

2-3 BIG DRIP-SMALL ANCHOR-THIS IS DRY SAND
 4 SMALL ANCHOR-RELAY TO-CORAL BEACH
 5 ROUTINE-TIME 021535H-JAN 69
 6 FROM-DRY SAND
 7 TO-SMALL ANCHOR 03
 8 INFORMATION-CORAL BEACH 03
 BIG DRIP 03
 10 GROUPS 11
 11 BREAK
 12 UNCLAS RPT UIC QTE SDF LEV ZKC VEN 123 456 789
 13 BREAK
 14 CONFIRMATION-123 456 789
 15 TIME 1540H-AUTHENTICATE
 16 OVER

B2. Plaindress Form With Minimum Necessary Format Lines.

LINE# TRANSMISSION CONTENTS

2-3 BIG DRIP-SMALL ANCHOR-THIS IS DRY SAND
 5 ROUTINE-TIME 021600H-JAN 69
 11 BREAK
 12 UNCLAS MESSAGE PLAN ALFA SERTIO
 13 BREAK
 16 OVER

B3. Abbreviated Plaindress With Minimum Necessary Format Lines.

LINE# TRANSMISSION CONTENTS

2-3 DRY SAND-THIS IS BIG DRIP
 12 UNCLAS YOU-TIME 021535H REQUEST REPEAT-ALL AFTER INITIAL
 SIERRA DEIRA FOA TROT
 16 OVER

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