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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/DFS/glc over 5700 Ser:  
026-69 of 26Nov69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 October 1969 to  
31 October 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness  
and is forwarded herewith.

*R. D. White*  
R. D. WHITE  
By direction

Copy to:  
CO, 1stCAG

Hist

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~PART 1ORGANIZATIONAL DATADESIGNATED

1st Combined Action Group  
 III Marine Amphibious Force  
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMANDER

LtCol J. E. HENNEGAN  
 10ct69 23Oct69

LtCol D. F. SEILER  
 24Oct69 31Oct69

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1

Captain N. H. GROSZ  
 10ct69 31Oct69

Combined Action Company 1-2

Captain J. E. KNIGHT  
 10ct69 31Oct69

Combined Action Company 1-3

1st Lt. J. J. MULHEARN Jr  
 10ct69 22Oct69

Combined Action Company 1-4

Captain J. W. MURPHY  
 23Oct69 31Oct69

Captain K. M. SEARS  
 10ct69 6Oct69

Captain P. G. MITCHELL  
 7Oct69 31Oct69

ATTACHED UNITS

1. None

2. Locations

Hq 1st CAG	Chu Lai, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CACO 1-1	Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CACO 1-2	Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CACO 1-3	Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
CACO 1-4	Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

1-1

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3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

Major W. D. THOMPSON  
10ct69 31Oct69

Adjutant/S-1

1stLt J. E. TYLER  
10ct69 31Oct69

S-2S-3

Major R. L. PADGETT  
10ct69 31Oct69

S-4Supply

Captain F. M. GARBOWSKI  
10ct69 31Oct69

S-5Special Service

Major W. D. THOMPSON  
10ct69 31Oct69

Medical Section

HMC T. A. ROBINSON  
10ct69 31Oct69

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC

USN

OTHER

OFF  
10

ENL  
439

OFF  
0

ENL  
34

OFF  
1

ENL  
1

1-2

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PART II  
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

## 1. Personnel Administration.

a. Joined and transferred. During the month of October, the 1st Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below:

(1) Joined

Officers  
2

Enlisted  
91

(2) Rotated CONUS

Officers  
2

Enlisted  
0

(3) Transferred Within WestPac Command

Officers  
0

Enlisted  
0

## (4) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospital)

Officers  
0

Enlisted  
4

b. Awards.

(1) There were Four Silver Stars, Five Bronze Stars, and Six Navy Commendation recommendations submitted to FMFPac for approval during the month of October 1969.

(2) Awards returned approved from FMFPac included the following:

SSM  
4

BSM  
5

NCM  
6

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(3) Personnel of the 1st Combined Action Group also received the following awards as a result of combat wounds, heroic/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam:

PH  
17

VCG  
5

c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of October 1969 were as follows:

	KIA	DAI	DOW	WIA	WIA/NE	NBC	WIA/NBC	RET TO DU
USMC	8	0	3	23	7	2		35
USN	0	0	0	3	0	0		4

d. CONGRATS SPLINTS WELREPS. There were no pieces of congressional Interest Correspondence and 10 Welfare Reports handled by this Command during the month of October 1969.

e. Administrative Assistance. There was one group directive promulgated during the reporting month.

f. Legal. A breakdown of legal activities for October is shown below:

Article 32 Investigations: 0

Informal Investigations: 0

General Courts-Martial: 0

Special Courts-Martial: 0

Summary Courts-Martial: 2

g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and special services equipment available to all hands. Quotas for both out of country and in country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) are effectively being utilized. The following is a breakdown of the R&R within this command:

(1) Out of Country R&R - Quotas	38	Utilized	38
(2) In Country R&R	- 2		2

(3) Five parties are held at a different CAP each week consisting of a cook out, beer and soda. Each CAP sends a man into the rear on a staggered schedule to allow him to relax and enjoy club, beach and USO facilities.

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h. Career Planning. The career planning program continues to be stressed at all levels of command. USAFI GED testing is constantly being stressed at all personnel who have not completed high school. During December 1969 this command will send one Staff NCO to the Career Planners School in Okinawa.

i. Mail. Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows.

Letters

<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>
1 bag	2 bags

Packages

<u>Incoming</u>
4 bags

NOTE: One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

j. Promotions. 110 enlisted promotions were effected during the month of October 1969 as follows:

Sergeant .....0

Corporal .....2

Lance Corporal .....108

Private First Class .....0

k. Hospital Visits. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital Corpsman representative, the Casualty NCO and the Mail Orderly, who also delivers mail to the patients located in hospitals at Chu Lai. Frequent visits are made by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, the Adjutant, and the First Sergeant. Normally, the Commanding Officer or his representative, having been notified by Dustoff Control Chu Lai of the destination of the individual medevaced from the field, are waiting at the hospital when the casualty arrives. The dead are identified within hours of arrival at Chu Lai.

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2. Intelligencea. General

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(1) The month was characterized by increased enemy activity throughout the CAP AO. There seemed to be some type of local organized offensive in the Binh Son District, as CAPs 1-3-5 and 1-3-8 were both the target of well coordinated ground attacks during the month. Although these attacks did not coincide by date or method of engagement, they were both aimed at CAPs in the 3rd Company, with the objective of destroying the CAPs and demonstrating to the people that the GVN and NVLAF are unable to protect them. Evidence indicates that these attacks were not made by the same unit. In the attack at CAP 1-3-8 the enemy employed sniper tactics, while the tactics employed at CAP 1-3-5 were conventional in nature. The 4th Company continued its efforts to reduce the population of the 48th LF VC Bn, and was rewarded for their efforts with 17 enemy kills and one Hoi Chanh from the 48th Bn who may prove very helpful to the southernmost CAPs in their assigned task. The 1st Company was moderately successful in attaining Hoi Chahns, as a total of 11 rallied to the GVN during the month. This should help to strengthen the 1st Company's influence in their TAOC. The 1st Company also received moderate contact resulting in 11 VC kills. The three northern-most CAPs in the company continued to take casualties from an abundance of mines and booby traps in their TAOC's. Conjecture is that the enemy units in this area are attempting to use the mines and booby traps as a deterrent to the CAP, rather than meet the CAP in an open fight.

b. Activities

(1) CACO 1-1, experienced an increase in contacts over the previous month but was still well below its usual average. Intelligence construes this to be a period of withdrawal on the part of the enemy to retrain and resupply its personnel to build up for a maximum offensive effort, probably beginning in the next two months. The CACO received 11 Hoi Chahns for the month which is relatively high, further attesting to the theory of low moral and insufficient logistics on the part of the VC/NVA. Five of the Hoi Chahns rallied on the 16th to CAP 1-1-7. They were reportedly hamlet guerrillas who worked for an NVA unit in their area. Of the five, one was a doctor, one worked in propaganda and the other three were ammunition carriers. More evidence supporting the theory that the enemy units around the 1st Company's TAOC are attempting to avoid contact, lies in the number of kills compared to the number of contacts. During the month, the CACO tallied eleven (11) kills in eight (8) significant contacts. There were no ground assaults directed toward any CAP, and a minimum of harassing attacks during this reporting period. Close attention will be paid to any intelligence concerning troop movements or build-up in this area.

(2) CACO 1-2 received little enemy contact during the month, but managed to come up with 2 enemy kills. One kill was produced the first day of the month by a successful ambush at CAP 1-2-4, which was a joint effort

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by the CAP and number of Revolutionary Development Cadre personnel. Also captured in the ambush were two individual weapons. The second kill was produced on the 25th of the month when a CAP patrol came upon two VC talking and then killed one. The lack of contact in the 2nd Company's TAOC enabled them to concentrate on psychological operations and their civic action program.

(3) CACO 1-3 received most of the increase in enemy initiated activity during the month, as at least one CAP was in contact on 28 of the 31 days. The two largest actions involved CAPs 1-3-5 and 1-3-8, and prompted conjecture that this was part of an organized effort of the VN/NVA to eliminate the CAP's in Binh Son District. On the 12th, CAP 1-3-5 received a heavy volume of 82mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from an estimated company of VC. The VC attempted to infiltrate the CP, but were unsuccessful. A reaction force was called from CAP 1-3-1 and the enemy was driven off. Besides the friendly casualties, the CAP lost one P-40-25 radio destroyed and one M-60 machinegun captured. Seven days later, on the 19th CAP 1-3-8 was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. The attack on 1-3-8 was different than the attack on 1-3-5 in that superior tactics were employed. The enemy initiated contact with RPG fire, and followed up with satchel charges and chisel grenades. The amount of small arms fire directed on the CAP during the entire action was small. Other developments during the month included capturing three (3) VC men and two (2) NVA women at CAP 1-3-5. 3rd Company collected only one Hoi Chanh during the month, but he proved valuable when it was ascertained that he was previously a member of the 95th Sapper Bn., which is a constant problem to the CAPs in the 3rd Company area. The majority of contact for the rest of the month was limited to harassing attacks and attacks by fire with no significant results. The CACO completed the month with twenty seven (27) confirmed kills.

(4) CACO 1-4 was the second highest CACO in the number of kills for the month, with 17. There was drop in enemy initiated contact, as the CACO got 11 of its kills in one action involving CAP 1-4-5 on the 9th. The action began when a neighboring Regional Force unit began taking small arms fire. The CAP then received a large volume of 81mm mortar rounds and heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The CAP called artillery, gunships and spack. This was the largest CAP conducted engagement in Quang Ngai Province during the month. Also of great importance was a Chieu Hoi from the 48th VC LF Bn.. The fact that he rallied from the 48th Bn is promising, in that they are the dominate enemy unit in the area, and any news of low moral or logistics problems with them is good news.

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Operations

a. General

(1) During the reporting period the 1st Combined Action Group (CAG) continued to conduct operations in accordance with its assigned mission of village/hamlet security and in support of the Accelerated Pacification Program (ACP). In conjunction with the ACP and mobilization of the Combined Action Platoons (CAP'S), new areas were studied for possible relocation of certain CAP'S. The ACP continued to progress satisfactorily despite an increase in enemy activity in both Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. It appears that after a lapse of several months the ARVN is becoming more aggressive and willing to initiate contact.

(2) The American Division experienced a month of moderately light contact throughout the AO. The Division continued Operation Geneva Park in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th company TLOC'S, with minimal contact. Operation Frederick Hill also continued in the 1st Company's area with no major or significant contacts. The company that initiated the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program continued to operate with success and plans are being formulated to move the company to a new area to continue the ACP. The brigades of the Division continues to provide logistical and reaction forces as required, with the 190th Infantry Brigade providing seventy five percent of the 1st CAG'S logistical support in an outstanding manner.

b. Activities

(1) During the period there were nineteen (19) combined operations with the RVN'S PFS and U. S. Army units. Several of these operations involved more than one CAG. The concept of combined operations is working well and the Vietnamese forces seem ever more aggressive when accompanied by CAP Marines. The American Division continued to devote most of its efforts west of National Highway 1 while conducting smaller operations or platoon and company size in the 3rd and 4th CAG areas to the east of RD Hwy 1.

(2) CAG 1-1 had an active month and experienced an increase in contacts and kills. This was in keeping with the apparent upsurge in enemy activity throughout the 1st CAG's area of operations. The in enemy activity throughout the 1st CAG's area of operations. The company had sixteen contacts (18) and four (4) sightings which resulted in eleven (11) enemy KIA'S, one (1) WOS, one (1) POW and eleven (11) ROI. The District received eleven (11) new PFS platoons from training in Da Nang; this provides an ample number of PFS for all CAP'S in the Tam Ky District. The Group Operations Officer sent the night at CAP 1-1-4 on 14 October and the CAP experienced its first contact in over six(6) months in the form of an attack by fire, including B-40 rockets, 1-79 rounds and automatic weapons fire. On 23 October, Major General BO MAN visited CAP 1-1-4.

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(3) CACO 1-2 experienced another month of very light contact although the number of enemy sightings increased and the company accounted for two (2) kills and two (2) captured weapons. Indications are that the enemy is attempting to infiltrate into Ly Tin District and procure foodstuffs and collect taxes. Khuong Tho hamlet appears to be the primary area of VC activity and plans are underway to conduct intensive operations in this particular hamlet.

(4) CACO 1-3 led the Group in contacts, sightings and kills. The presence of the 48th Local Force Bn. and the 95th Sapper Bn. continues to provide a threat to the CAP's in the Binh Son District, especially those along the coast. The company experienced forty three (43) contacts, twenty six (26) sightings and accounted for twenty seven (27) KIA's and thirty (30) VCS detained. The most notable change in the 3rd CACO's area is the increase in activity close to the city of Binh Son itself. Several daytime contacts in the District indicate a willingness on the part of the enemy to engage FNL and Vietnamese forces without the cover of darkness. The frequency and size of contacts continues to increase in the 3rd Company's area. The well organized and well executed attacks against CAP's 1-3-5 and 1-3-8 indicate more sophisticated training and probably a large percentage of NV personnel in the local units.

(5) CACO 1-4 ranked second in number of contacts and sightings but third in kills. Enemy activity continued high in CAP's 1-4-4, 1-4-5 and 1-4-6's TAOC's. The enemy seems particularly concerned about the presence of CAP 1-4-6 and the contacts and sightings are frequent in that area. Due to the lack of populated areas the 4th Company CAP's continue to utilize artillery and airstrikes to great extent during their contacts and sightings. Plans are underway to relocate CAP's 1-4-6 and 1-4-5 to provide them with more populated TAOC's in which to operate.

(6) The following statistics are the results of the 1st CAG's operations and activities for the month of October:

(a) Friendly Activities

Night Patrols	86
Day Patrols	968
Ambushes	1610

(b) Enemy Casualties/Losses

KIA	POW	DETAINES	HOI CHINHS
46	7	45	17

(c) Weapons and Ordnance Captured

IMC	CSWC
12	2

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c. Training

(1) General. Formal training for the period covered the subjects of General Military Subjects, Leadership, Small Unit Tactics, Infantry Weapons and Supporting Arms. 1st Bn., 14th Artillery, USA sent an FO Team to the CAP's in the 3rd and 4th CACO's to refresh the CAP Marine's knowledge of artillery call for fire techniques and procedures. This instruction was most beneficial since it was provided by the unit that actually fires the CAP's fire missions and it will be repeated in the future.

(2) CAP Training. The individual CAP's conducted daily classes as prescribed by the Group training schedule.

(3) Other Training

(a) Twelve (12) Marines attended the Vietnamese Language Course at Da Nang.

(b) Three (3) Marines attended the IO School conducted by Division Artillery, Americal Division, USA. An increase in the quota to this school has been requested and approved and the Group anticipates an input of ten (10) to twelve (12) a month in the future.

(c) All new personnel reporting to the command received a one day indoctrination course prior to their assignment to the field.

(d) Instruction on the new P-SID and the Starlight Scope was given to selected personnel from all CACO's.

e. Inspections. The S-3 Section continued to visit the individual CAP's to inspect personnel and equipment with the emphasis on weapons and radios.

e. Fire Support. The US artillery units continued to provide excellent fire support throughout the month. ARVN artillery fired a few missions in support of CACO 1-1 in the Tam Ky area. The 1st Bn., 14 Arty continued to provide timely and accurate fire support in an outstanding manner. Through intensified coordination between the CAG and the 1/14, the time per fire mission has been reduced to a minimum.

f. Air Support

(1) Tactical air support was utilized fifteen times during the month, this included fixed wing strikes, helicopter gunships strikes, Spooky, Shadow, flareships and visual reconnaissance missions.

(2) The aforementioned figure does not include the missions flown for logistical resupply of the CAP's as this time is allotted by the proximate battalion on a daily basis and these missions are not requested or controlled by the CAG.

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g. Scout Dog Teams. During the month Scout Dog Teams were available to the 3rd and 4th Companies and a request was submitted to the CAG Directorate for an increase in the number of teams allotted.

h. Psychological Operations

(1) Friendly Operations. During the month the 1st CAG continued to make maximum utilization of the support provided by the Americal Division and this resulted in the distribution of 974,000 leaflets exploiting the Chieu Hoi Program and anti-VC and pro-GVN themes. The number of Hoi Chanh's increased again for the month to seventeen (17).

(2) Enemy Psyops. The 1st CAG experienced no VC/NVA attempts at psyops as it had the previous month in the form of VC loudspeaker teams and enemy leaflets.

i. Kit Carson Scouts. The KCS continue to be extremely beneficial to the CAG's and their knowledge of the enemy and his tactics is invaluable. The 1st CAG has requested additional KCS's and the possibility exists of receiving additional support from the Americal Division. The Scouts accounted for nine (9) enemy KI's, captured nine (9) weapons, discovered two SFD's and conducted three (3) psyops broadcasts.

j. Volunteer Informant Program. 11,100\$VN were spent during the month under the VIP Program. This was much less than in previous months but it seems the CAG's are finding and trapping fewer SFD's than in the past, consequently the people are finding less to turn in also. As part of the CAG's psyops program a leaflet promoting the reward for turning in SFD's was printed; this may lead to an increase in the amount of VIP payments.

k. Communications

(1) Operations. During the reporting period, communications between Group Headquarters and CAG Headquarters were generally satisfactory. Due to the use of Ground Plane Antenna KC-292, communications problems between each CAG and their CAG's were minimal.

(2) Maintenance Support

(a) MG-12. Due to the continuing support of the radio repair facilities of MG-12, the time between dead-line and return to the field for use has steadily decreased. In the near future it will become possible to see that the CAG's radios are not on dead-line for more than three to five days at a time.

(b) FLSG-4. The turn-around time for equipment dead-lined to FLSG-4 is still excessive in many cases. The main problem is the time necessary for completion of repairs on H-189/GK handsets. Periods in excess of thirty days are not unusual and put a strain on the existing useable stock. Some of the trouble of excessive turn-around time is due to road and weather conditions between Chu Lai and Da Nang.

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(3) Administrative Communications Net. The administrative communications net between CAG Director and Combined Action Groups is operating successfully, however, the hours of operation for the afternoon (1500 until told to secure) are at time extremely inconvenient. This comes at a time when 1st CAG radio operators are in the process of taking daily activities from the CAGOs. It would be easier and more efficient if this time could be changed to a less active part of the afternoon.

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## 4. S-4/Supply.

a. Significant Events.

(1). Combat losses during the month was one AN/PRC-25 radio, one 60mm Mortar and three Machine Guns, M60.

(2). An LTI of weapons was conducted at CACO's 1-1 and 1-2. Results were satisfactory.

(3). The move of the administrative office spaces, i. e., CO, XO, 1stSgt and S-1 was completed during the month.

b. Supply.

(1). T/E deficiencies continue to effect overall unit readiness, however, the combat mission has not been impaired. The receipt of 6 AN/PRC-25 radios during the month has reduced T/E deficiencies. Expected receipt of 13 machine guns during November will add to the readiness posture.

(2). Stocks of organizational clothing and equipment has become critical in some areas, as reported, by the monthly LOGSUM. A back order status from the supply source contributes to the problem.

(3). The rains have periodically closed vehicular traffic to Danang during the month and material has to be transshipped by FLC. Any long delay in shipment processing may hamper the supply posture.

(4). Short supply of Class V illumination at the ASF's became critical during October. Effort was generated by the CAP S-4 to ship assets which solved the immediate problem. Shortages of various illumination type Class V exists and will continue to be a problem until adequate assets are held at ASF's.

c. Maintenance.

(1). Excessive turn-around time of communications equipment, particularly DX items, continues to be a problem. Lack of assets within the DX program is the significant factor in deadline time frames. Motor transport and ordnance maintenance support is satisfactory.

d. Motor Transport.

(1). During the month Group motor transport logged 20,853 miles.

(2). Deadline equipment did not hamper the operations.

e. Miscellaneous.

(1). LTI's of CACO 1-3 and 1-4 weapons are scheduled for November.

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## SERIUAL LISTING OF CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS

1 October 1969

CAP 1-2-4. An RD ambush, working in con junotion with a CAP ambush, initiated SAF on 5 VC at BT 457071. The enemy returned fire on the RD's and fled SW. An RD sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, 1 M-1 carbine, 1 .357 caliber pistol, 1 NL-26 grenade, 2 chicom grenades and various documents. One RD was WIA(E) in the contact. RESULTS: 1 RD WIA(E), 1 VC KIA, 2 IWC, 1 NL-26 and 2 chicom grenades destroyed, various documents captured. (All items not CAP).

2 October 1969

CAP 1-1-7. Acting on information from a villager, a patrol located 3 VC at BT 313283. The CAP and VC exchanged SAF before the VC fled SE. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA and 1 M-1 carbine. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC.

CAP 1-3-2. Acting on information from villagers, a patrol located a home-made box-type mine at BS 563898. The mine was destroyed. RESULTS: 1 home-made mine destroyed.

3 October 1969

CAP 1-3-4. The USMC portion has been relocated to operate in the vicinity of BT 647006. 1F platoon #8 will comprise the Vietnamese portion of the CAP.

CAP 1-3-8. While an element of the CAP and local villagers were repairing a fence, 1 USMC was WIA(E) by an M-79 round fired by a VC in the vicinity of BS 572922. The CAP returned SAF and searched the area with negative results. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E).

4 October 1969

CAP 1-1-6. 2 Hoi Chanks turned themselves in to CAP at BT 245255. The Hoi Chanks, ages 16 and 17, were reportedly members of a squad sized unit which operates in the Ky An village area at BS 223236. 5 chicom grenades were surrendered by the rullions. The Hoi Chanks were delivered to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 2 Hoi Chanks, 5 chicom grenades destroyed.

5 October 1969

CAP 1-4-5. Acting on information from the 780th RF Company, CAP called a fire mission on an estimated company of VC spotted by the RF's in the vicinity of BS 741777. The enemy fled in an unknown direction. Most of the impact area was not swept due to numerous mines. The area that was swept revealed 2 bunkers destroyed. RESULTS: 2 bunkers destroyed.

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6 October 1969

CAP 1-1-4. CAP assisted by a National Policeman, detained a VN male carrying a large amount of foodstuffs under his shirt at BT 285200. The VN was evasive during preliminary interrogation by the policeman. It was learned however, that the VN had rallied to the RVN two months ago. The CAP turned the detainee over to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

CAP 1-4-3. A 16 year old Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BS 767835. The Hoi Chanh was reportedly a member of a unit from the 48th VC Bn which operates periodically in the Thu My village area. The rallied was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

CAP 1-3-7. An ambush initiated organic weapon fire on 2 VC at BS 617937. The enemy fled in an unknown direction. A sweep under artillery illumination disclosed 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA who died of his wounds shortly after being discovered. 2 AK-47's and 2 chicom grenades were also found. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 2 WIA, 2 chicom grenades destroyed.

7 October 1969

CAP 1-1-6. A VN male attempting to enter a hamlet at BT 239247, was recognized as a VC boy by the CAP PF's. The VC was shot and killed when he attempted to escape capture. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

9 October 1969

CAP 1-4-4. CP and the surrounding hamlet received approximately 35 82mm mortar rounds and SAF from an estimated 2 platoons of VC in the vicinity of BS 760824. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called a mortar mission on the enemy causing them to break contact and flee NW. A sweep of the area under illumination revealed several drag marks and blood trails. Villagers reported 1 VN child was killed and several dwellings were damaged by the enemy mortars. 1 VN child was kidnapped by the fleeing VC. PsyOps was contacted. RESULTS: 1 VN child KIA, 1 VN child kidnapped, several dwellings damaged.

CAP 1-4-5. CP and the surrounding hamlet received 25-30 82mm mortar rounds and SAF from an USMC in the vicinity of BS 775735. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and was supported by artillery and helicopter gunships. The enemy broke contact and fled in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area revealed 11 VC KIA, 5 AK-47's, 2 RPG launchers, 2 RPG rounds, 3 Bangalore torpedoes and 20 chicom grenades. Villagers reported several dwellings were damaged by the enemy mortar attack. PsyOps was contacted. RESULTS: 11 VC KIA, 5 WIA, 2 CSAC, 2 RPG rounds, 3 Bangalore torpedoes and 20 chicom grenades captured.

CAP 1-1-4. A patrol received SAF from 5 VC spotted at BT 262198. The CAP called an artillery mission causing the enemy to flee in an unknown direction. As the CAP approached the impact area 1 VC was seen fleeing NW. The CAP initiated SAF with negative results. A sweep of the area revealed 1

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VC KIA by artillery and a small quantity of rice and canned goods captured.

10 October 1969

CAP 1-4-3. A Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BS 774829. The Hoi Chanh was reportedly a squad leader of an unnamed VC unit which operates in the vicinity of BS 779835. 1 M-1 rifle, 1 M-26 grenade, 1 M-33 grenade, 1 chicom grenade and 1 document were surrendered by the rallier. The Hoi Chanh was turned over to the 198th Brigade USA for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh, 1 IWC, 1 M-33 grenade, 1 M-26 grenade and 1 chicom grenade destroyed, 1 document captured.

CAP 1-3-5. During a patrol, PF's recognized 3 unarmed VC in a treeline at BS 710946. As the patrol approached, the VC raised their hands and surrendered. Initial interrogation by the CAP PF's failed to yield the PJW's unit identification. RESULTS: 3 VC POW's.

11 October 1969

CAP 1-3-3. A Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BS 650980. The rallier was reportedly from the 95th VC sapper unit. 3 chicom grenades were surrendered by the Hoi Chanh. He was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh, 6 chicom grenades destroyed.

CAP 1-1-7. A patrol received SAE from an USMF at BT 276283. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called an artillery mission causing the enemy to flee in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area disclosed 2 VC KIA and 1 AK-47. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 IWC.

CAP 1-3-4. CAP received SAE and 20-25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an USMF in the vicinity of BT 624017. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called an artillery mission on the enemy causing them to flee NE. One RD at the CAP's CP was VIA(E). A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 RD VIA(E).

CAP 1-3-3. A Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BS 650980. The rallier was reportedly from the 95th Sapper unit. 6 chicom grenades were surrendered by the Hoi Chanh. He was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh, 6 chicom grenades destroyed.

12 October 1969

CAP 1-3-5. CAP in NDP at BS 722956 received heavy SAE, 50-70 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, and a ground assault from an estimated VC company. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and was supported by artillery and gunships. The CAP was reinforced by reaction forces from CAP 1-3-1 and 5/46 Inf. The enemy force fled SE. 17 PF's and 2 USMC were KIA, 16 PF's and 3 USMC were VIA(E) in the contact. 1 M-60 machinegun was captured by the enemy and 1 PRC-25 radio was destroyed by enemy fire. A sweep of the area recovered 6 VC KIA, 2 AK-47's, 4 B-40 rounds, 20 chicom grenades, and 11 AK-47 magazines. A letter found on one of the VC KIA indicated he was possibly a member of the

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95th VC sapper unit. RESULTS: 2 USMC KIA, 7 PF KIA, 3 USMC WIA(E), 16 PF WIA(E), 1 M-60 machinegun lost, 1 PRC-25 radio destroyed; 6 VC KIA, 2 IVC, 4 B-40 rounds, 20 chicom grenades and 11 AK-47 magazines captured.

CAP 1-4-6. While in an NDP, CAP initiated organic weapons fire on an estimated platoon of VC at BS 716774. The enemy returned grenades, SAF, satchel charges, and 20 82mm mortar rounds. The enemy then broke contact and fled S. The CAP called an artillery mission on suspected routes of escape. 3 USMC and 2 PFs were wounded in the contact. A sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E), 2 PF WIA(E), 2 USMC WIA(M).

13 October 1969

CAP 1-2-1. A patrol detained 1 VN male without an ID card at BT 470079. The detainee was delivered to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

CAP 1-4-7. A Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BT 298289. Preliminary interrogation indicated the raller was a member of a local village guerrilla force in Ky Que village. The Hoi Chanh was taken to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

14 October 1969

CAP 1-1-6. A CAP patrol was moving across a rice paddy at BT 236256, a PF tripped an M-16A1 mine killing himself and wounding 1 PF. A VN male in the immediate vicinity was detained for not possessing an ID card and for questioning concerning the mine incident. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA, 1 PF WIA(M), 1 VCS.

CAP 1-1-4. A patrol spotted a VN male carrying a large quantity of rice at BT 282198. CAP PFs told the VN to halt but the VN began to run. The CAP pursued and caught up with the man who then stopped, pulled out a .45 caliber pistol, and shot himself. CAP PFs and villagers recognized the VN to be a VC from the local village guerrilla force. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 IVC, and 50 lbs of rice captured.

CAP 1-4-5. Having been informed that 3 VNs were WIA(E) by a mine explosion a patrol was dispatched to the area to effect a medevac. As members of the patrol were carrying the VN WIA to the medevac helicopter, 1 USMC stepped on an M-16A1 mine at BS 723797. 2 USMC and 2 of the VN mine victims were KIA. 1 USMC and 1 USN corpsman were WIA(E). RESULTS: 2 USMC KIA, 2 VN KIA, 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 USN WIA(E), 1 VN WIA(E).

15 October 1969

CAP 1-1-4. A CAP NDP received RPG, M-79, and SAF from an USEF at BT 286201. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called for artillery illumination causing the enemy to break contact. 2 USMC and 4 PFs were wounded in the contact. 1 PFDF at the CAP NDP was also wounded. A sweep

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of the area disclosed 1 Mi-72 and 2 chicom grenades. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E), 2 FF WIA(E), 1 USMC WIA(M), 2 FF WIA(M), 1 ISDF WIA(M), 1 IWC, and 2 chicom grenades destroyed.

16 October 1969

CAP 1-1-1. A patrol received SAF from 3-5 VC at BT 273178. The CAP returned SAF causing the enemy to flee in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, 2 M-26 grenades and 1 pack containing assorted documents. The documents were forwarded to District Headquarters. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 2 M-26 grenades destroyed, assorted documents captured.

CAP 1-1-7. 5 Hoi Chanks turned themselves into CAP at BT 297287. Reportedly members of a local village guerrilla force at Ky Anh, the Hoi Chanks were delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 5 Hoi Chanks.

CAP 1-3-8. A patrol received SAF from an USMC at BS 583927. The CAP returned organic weapons fire. The enemy fled N. 2 USMC were WIA in the contact. RESULTS: 2 USMC WIA(E).

17 October 1969

CAP 1-3-5. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire and called 81mm mortar and artillery missions on 6 NVA at BS 704949. The enemy returned SAF and fled in an unknown direction. During a sweep of the area the CAP detained 2 VN women who admitted being VC. The 2 POWs were delivered to District Headquarters where they were confirmed to be VC. No additional information has been learned. Interrogation is continuing at District Headquarters. RESULTS: 2 VC POW.

18 October 1969

CAP 1-1-1. During a patrol, a FF tripped an M-26 grenade booby trap wounding himself and 1 USMC at BT 265176. A search of the area for additional booby traps was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 FF WIA(M).

CAP 1-1-7. A Hoi Chanh turned herself in to CAP at BT 300280. Reportedly a VC nurse in Binh Nam village, the Hoi Chanh was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

CAP 1-3-5. A patrol called an artillery mission on 8 VC spotted at BS 702957. The enemy fled in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, and 1 chicom grenade. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, and 1 chicom grenade destroyed.

CAP 1-4-4. 3 Hoi Chanks turned themselves in to CAP at BS 754817. The ralliers who were reportedly from the 48th NVA Bn, were delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 3 Hoi Chanks.

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CAP 1-3-3. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire on 10-15 VC spotted in the vicinity of BS 678958. The enemy fled W and initiated SAF. The CAP requested and directed airstrikes on the fleeing enemy. During the airstrikes several secondary explosions were recorded. A sweep of the area disclosed 3 VC KIA, and 2 M-26 grenades. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 2 M-26 grenades destroyed.

19 October 1969

CAP 1-3-8. CAP in an NDP at BS 575923 received a surprise sapper attack from the E by an USEF using Bangalore torpedoes, satchel charges, RPGs, and grenades. 1 CAP patrol had just returned to the NDP and a second patrol was just about to depart when the attack was launched. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and engaged the enemy in close combat as the NDP was penetrated. At 0225H the enemy began to break contact and withdraw to the E. A CAP 1-3-6 reaction force led by the CO of CACO 1-3 arrived on foot at the site at 0315H. Co A 5/46 USA was heli-lifted into the area at 0430H and received moderate SAF from a USEF which fled W when the USA troops returned organic weapons fire. RESULTS: 5 USMC and 8 PF KIA in the principal contact, and four USMC, 1 USN and 4 PF WIA(E). There were 5 VC/NVA KIA found in the area of contact.

CAP 1-2-5. A CAP ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 3 VC at BT 401121. The enemy returned SAF and fled W. A sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E).

CAP 1-4-6. During a patrol a USMC was WIA(E) when he tripped a 7.62mm cartridge booby trap at BS 717777. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E).

21 October 1969

CAP 1-1-2. CP heard SAF within the hamlet at BI 371185. A patrol was dispatched to the area and spotted 4 VC firing SA at the Village Chief's office. The CAP initiated SAF on the VC who then directed their fire at the CAP patrol killing 1 PF and wounding 1 VN. 2 VC were killed by the CAP. The CAP captured 1 M-16, 1 M-14, and a letter found on 1 of the VC KIA which indicated that he had been the leader of the VC. The document was turned over to District Headquarters. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA, 1 VN WIA(E), 2 VC KIA, 2 IWC, 1 document captured.

22 October 1969

CAP 1-3-3. In a combined operation with a USA unit received SAF from an USEF at BS 638959. 1 USMC was wounded by the enemy fire. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called in helicopter gunships causing the enemy to break contact and flee SW. Secondary explosions occurred as the gunships expended their ordnance on the enemy position. CAP then swept the area and found bunkers and tunnel complex. Destroyed bunkers produced 1 chicom grenade 10 lbs of gunpowder, and AK-47 parts. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E), bunkers, tunnel complex, 10 lbs gunpowder, 1 chicom grenade and AK-47 parts destroyed.

CAP 1-4-6. A CAP NDP initiated organic weapons fire on an USEF at BS 714776. The enemy returned SAF and fled NW. The CAP then called an artillery mission on possible escape routes. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, and 1 chicom grenade. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 chicom grenade destroyed.

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23 October 1969

CAP 1-1-7. During a patrol, 2 PF's were WIA(E) when an M-26 grenade booby trap was tripped at BT 283285. A search for additional booby traps was nonproductive. RESULTS: 2 PFs WIA(E).

CAP 1-1-7. A NDP at BT 272285 shot and killed a VC infiltrator, the CAP received SAF from a second VC in a nearby treeline. When the fire was returned the VC fled in an unknown direction. One PF was wounded in the contact. A sweep of the treeline area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 PF WIA(E), 1 VC KIA.

24 October 1969

CAP 1-3-8. As CAP was proceeding across an open field to its ambush site, a scout dog alerted the patrol to enemy presence and a CAP PF initiated SAF at the suspected enemy location at BS 583928. A scream was heard and the CAP investigated finding two VN, one slightly wounded by the SAF. The VN were evasive to questioning by CAP PFS and were detained. The CAP corpsman treated the wounded VN and the two VN were turned over to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 2 VCS.

25 October 1969

CAP 1-1-6. One Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BT 249255. The rallier, reportedly a member of the local village guerrilla force of Ky Ky, was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.


CAP 1-4-6. A CAP ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 5 VC moving W at BS 704774. The CAP then called an artillery mission as the enemy fled S. A daylight sweep of the area disclosed 4 VC KIA, 3 chicom grenades and 2 AK-47 magazines. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA, 3 chicom grenades destroyed, 2 AK-47 magazines captured.

CAP 1-4-5. A CAP ambush initiated organic weapons fire on an estimated platoon of VC on a ridgeline at BS 709773. The enemy returned grenades and SAF wounding 2 USMC and 2 PFs. The CAP then used artillery and spoopy support causing the enemy to break contact and flee in an unknown direction. A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 PF WIA(E), 2 USMC WIA(L), 1 PF WIA(L).

26 October 1969

CAP 1-3-2. A VN received a VIP payment for delivering 2 M-16AL mines and 1 105mm round to CAP at BS 571903. The ordnance was destroyed. RESULTS: 2 M-16AL mines and 1 105mm round destroyed.

CAP 1-4-6. In a 1 day combined operation with RFs, CAP discovered 1 M-16AL mine and 3 bunkers in the vicinity of BS 696775. After searching the bunkers with negative results, the bunkers and mine were destroyed. RESULTS: 3 bunkers and 1 M-16AL mine were destroyed.



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CAP 1-3-1. Acting on information from villagers, a patrol located 1 VC KIA in a field at BS 685974. The VC had been killed by SAF approximately 4-5 days ago, possibly during a contact on 21 October. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-2. Acting on information from PFs, a patrol located 8 VC buried in shallow graves at BS 569877. It was estimated the 8 VC had been killed by artillery about 2 days ago. RESULTS: 8 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-3. An ambush initiated SAF on 2 VC at BS 560922. The VC fled N. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA and 1 chicom grenade. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 chicom grenade destroyed.

28 October 1969

CAP 1-3-4. During a combined USA and CAP patrol at BT 665005, an M-26 grenade booby trap was tripped wounding 1 USMC and 1 USA. A search for additional booby traps was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(H), 1 USA WIA(H).

CAP 1-3-5. A patrol called a fire mission on 6 VC spotted at BS 553903. The enemy fled SW. A sweep of the impact area disclosed a camp fire and various cooking utensils. As the patrol was returning to its day CP, CAP F's recognized 2 local VC reconnoitering the CAP's CP. The patrol surrounded the VC who surrendered upon being discovered. The POW's members of a village force in Binh Thang, were delivered to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 2 VC POWs.

CAP 1-3-6. A patrol detained 4 VN who ran from the patrol as it was approaching them on a trail at BS 685967. The 4 VN refused to answer questions and were turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 4 VCS.

29 October 1969

CAP 1-3-7. A CP received 3 grenades and 1 satchel charge from an USEF in the vicinity of BT 658001. The CAP returned organic weapons fire after which no further enemy activity was encountered. One USMC was WIA(E) in the contact. A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E).

30 October 1969

CAP 1-1-1. During a patrol a USMC detonated a mine (M1) wounding himself and 2 other USMC at BT 260190. RESULTS: 2 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIA(H).

CAP 1-3-8. An ambush received grenades and SAF from an estimated platoon of VC at BS 578828. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and used artillery support. The enemy broke contact and withdrew to the SE. A sweep of the area was nonproductive. One RF was KIA and 1 PF was WIA(H). Two RDs who had participated in the ambush were also wounded in the contact. RESULTS: 1 RF KIA, 1 PF WIA(H), 2 RD WIA(E).

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CAP 1-3-4. A combined USA and CAP patrol detained 3 VN who had no ID cards and were in a restricted area. As the patrol was heading back to its CP, one of the VCS triggered a 15mm round booby trap at BT 575006, killing himself the other 2 VCS, and 1 USMC. RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA, 2 USA WIA(E), 3 VCS KIA.

CAP 1-1-4. A combined CAP 1-1-1 and CAP 1-1-4 NDP received 2 B-40 rounds, 3 rounds of 60mm mortar fire, and SAIF from a USEF in the vicinity of BT 257107. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and used artillery and helicopter gunship support. The enemy broke contact and withdrew to the S. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA and 4 chicom grenades. 2 PFs were KIA, 1 USMC and 1 PF were wounded in the contact. RESULTS: 2 PFs KIA, 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 PF WIA(E), 1 VC KIA, 4 chicom grenades destroyed.

CAP 1-3-8. A CAP CP spotted 3 VN observing the CP and apparently drawing a diagram on the ground at BS 575924. A CAP patrol was dispatched to the area and detained the 3 VN who refused to answer questions by CAP PFs. The detainees were taken to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 3 VCS.

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

GruO 1301.3  
6/DFS/djm  
24 Oct 1969

GROUP ORDER 1301.3

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Assumption of Command

Ref: (a) Art. 0503 NavyRegs

1. Purpose. To publish an assumption of command as required by reference (a).
2. Cancellation. Group Order 1301.2
3. Directive. I have this date assumed command of 1st Combined Action Group, III Marine Amphibious Force. All orders issued by my predecessor remain in effect until cancelled or superseded by my order.

*D F Seller*  
D. F. SELLER

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "B" plus  
CG, III MAF, CG, FLC,  
CG, AmcalDiv, CO,  
9th Engr Bn, CO, MAG-12,  
CO, MAG-13, OIC, Sub-  
Unit #1, FLSG-Alpha

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

GruBul 1650  
1/JET/jet  
22 Oct 1969

GROUP BULLETIN 1650

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Meritorious Mast

1. Purpose. To promulgate a Meritorious Mast for HM 2 Jerry W. BOYCE, B30 27 83, USN.

2. On 22 October 1969 a Meritorious Mast was awarded to HM 2 BOYCE by the Commanding Officer. The following information is quoted from that Mast:

"During your tour of duty with this organization, your performance of duty has been exemplified by sacrifice, diligence, industry and genuine professionalism. You are meticulously accurate in your work and have a high sense of personal responsibility. You are an imaginative thinker, with a retentive memory. In addition you have the exceptional ability to examine and analyze methods and procedures and to devise ways and means of increasing their effectiveness and efficiency.

These exceptional efforts on your part have helped raise and maintain the morale of this organization at a high level and has resulted in an increase in the combat effectiveness of the organization."

3. Action. By copy hereof the Adjutant is directed to ensure that appropriate service-record book entries are made in accordance with current regulations, and that a copy of this Mast is attached to your next fitness report.

4. Self-cancellation. 22 November 1969.

*J. E. Hennegan*  
J. E. HENNEGAN

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "B"

*IV-a*