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1st Marines : Combat Operations  
After Action Reports

1967

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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Ser:

20 AUG 1967

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1st MarDiv ltr 3:30:16b over 3480, Ser: 00323-67  
dtd 9 Aug 67

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
(Attn: MCJ-343)

Subj: Combat After Action Report; Operation ELLIOT

1. Forwarded.

FRED HAYNES  
BY DIRECTION

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5-6 Jul 1967

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3:0P:kgb  
3480  
Ser: 00323-67  
9 AUG 1967

\_\_\_\_\_ -- Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Subj: Combat After Action Report; Operation ELLIOT  
Ref: (a) MACV Dir No 335-8  
      (b) FMFPacO 3000.4  
Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.
2. Operations of this nature are necessary to confirm or deny intelligence reports. Although characterized by very light contact, Operation ELLIOT did confirm that the area has been used by the enemy. The operation was considered a success in that it further served to keep the enemy off balance.

H. J. WOESSNER  
Chief of Staff

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Declassified after 12 years.

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## HEADQUARTERS

1st Marines (Rein)

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

REF ID: A2917

3/VG/gle

3480

31 Jul 67

SER #0025-67

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation ELLIOT)

Ref: (a) 1st Marines Frag-Order 56-67

1st MARINES S&amp;C COMINT NO.

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0075-67

1. Code Name: Operation ELLIOT (Search and Destroy Operation)2. Dates of Operation: 050600H July 67 to 062400H July 67.3. Location: Area bounded on North by E-W GL 62, on East by line from BT 028620 to BT 028617, South along SUOI CO CA to BT 012568, on the South by RT 14 and on the West by the N-S GL 97.4. Command Headquarters:

1st Marines

Colonel RADICS

1st Battalion, 1st Marines

Lieutenant Colonel PETRO

2nd Battalion, 1st Marines

Lieutenant Colonel HEWLETT

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Lieutenant Colonel ROWLEY

1st Battalion, 11th Marines D/S Major MARRON

S &amp; C FILES

Company A (-), 1st Shore Party

HEADQUARTERS

1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

Company A (-), 1st Engineers

Captain ITCHKAWICH

67 3074

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5. Task Organization:

1st Marines (-) (Rein)

Colonel RADICS

1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-)

Lieutenant Colonel PETRO

1st M&amp;S Company

Company A, 1st Battalion

Company B, 1st Battalion

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2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) Lieutenant Colonel HEWLETT

Det H&S Company

Company E, 2nd Battalion

Company H, 2nd Battalion

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Lieutenant Colonel ROWLEY

Det H&S Company

Company A, 1st Battalion

Company D, 1st Battalion

6. Supporting Forces:

a. Marine Helicopters (1st Marine Aircraft Wing)

(1) Helicopter requirements were kept at a minimum, and no assault forces were landed by air. The bulk of helicopter requirements were for the resupply of units in the field.

(2) The lack of helicopters was overcome by close liaison with the Division TACP and the Division "Working Birds" were used to fill the gaps in the 1st Marines requirements.

b. Marine Fixed Wing Support:

(1) There were no requests for fixed wing aircraft and none were employed.

(2) Observer aircraft were employed during the operation to make visual reconnaissance of suspected enemy assembly areas.

c. Artillery:

(1) 1st Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support of 1st Marines. There were a total of 14 artillery missions fired in support of Operation ELLIOT. A breakdown of ammunition expended is as follows:

	HE	WP	ILLUM	SMOKE
105MM	138	35	1	6

(2) "A" and "B" Batteries supported Operation ELLIOT from their primary positions within the T40R. Two LVT H-6's were attached to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines for direct fire support.

d. Naval Gunfire: There was no naval gunfire used during Operation ELLIOT

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c. Company A (-), 1st Shore Party Battalion: Provided one HST per Company and for each Battalion Command Group and was prepared to provide additional support as required.

f. Company A (-), 1st Engineers Battalion: Provided engineer support teams to accompany each Company and Battalion Command Group and was prepared to provide additional support as required.

7. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Forces Anticipated In Objective Area: Based on sightings and contacts by Marine Units prior to the operation, it was estimated that the objective area contained approximately 30-50 guerillas. There were also numerous low-level intelligence reports of units up to company size within the objective area.

b. Enemy Forces Actually Encountered In The Objective Area:

(1) Sporadic small contacts confirmed that no companies or large size units operated within the objective area and that the agent reports were grossly exaggerated. The absence of enemy forces could be attributed to the defection of VO NGOC AN on the 3rd of July, two days prior to the commencement of Operation ELLIOT. VO NGOC AN partially confirmed the estimate of VC forces when he stated he was a member of a 12 man squad that normally operated in the area covered by Operation ELLIOT. VO NGOC AN also stated that the TAOR boundary between 1st Marines and 7th Marines was a commonly used infiltration route into the DA NANG TAOR.

(2) Mines and Booby Traps. During Operation ELLIOT 28 mines were discovered and destroyed by friendly forces. Seven mines were detonated resulting in 7 USMC WIA's.

(3) Caves and Tunnels. Four man-made caves and one bunker were discovered and destroyed by friendly forces. None of the caves contained any personnel or equipment but did indicate signs of recent occupancy.

c. Terrain:

(1) Cover and Concealment. During Operation ELLIOT built up areas, hedgerows and cultivated areas offered good concealment. Limited cover was provided by topographical variations and built up areas.

(2) Critical Terrain Features. None.

(3) Observation and Fields of Fire. Fields of fire were good and were only restricted by hedgerows and built-up areas.

(4) Obstacles. Natural obstacles were non-existent in the operation area, however, hamlets tended to channelize troop movements.

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(5). Avenues of Approach. The main avenue of approach into the objective area was along the western side of the TAOR boundary between 1st and 7th Marines, this was confirmed as a commonly used infiltration route for both guerrillas and Main Force units by the rallied, VO NGOC AN.

8. Mission: 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conduct search and destroy operation in area bounded on North by E-W GL 62, on East by a line from BT 028620 to BT 028617 South along the SUOI CO CA to BT 012568, on the South by Route 14 and on the West by N-S GL 97, to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies and facilities in the area of operation and to interdict enemy routes of communications.

9. Concept of Operations: 1st Marines at H-Hour D-Day 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conducts S&D Operations with three Battalion (-). One Battalion attacks from the West and establishes blocking positions on the 1st Marines-7th Marines common boundary. Simultaneously two Battalions cross the IOD on Eastern flank of the Area of Operation and attack Westward to the Railroad Tracks. A systematic S&D of the Area of Operation is then conducted.

a. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein): At H-Hour cross Route 14 and sweeps Northwest conducting a Search and Destroy operation in its ZOA, bounded on the South by Route 14, the SUOI CO CA on the East and existing Battalion Boundaries on North and West.

b. 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein): At H-Hour cross N-S GL 97, 017 and E-W GL 62 and sweep west in a Search and Destroy operation in its ZOA bounded on the East by a line from BT 028620 to BT 028617 on the North by the E-W GL 62 and on the South and West by existing Battalion boundaries.

c. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein): At H-Hour enter DUC KY peninsula from the North and sweep East to the 1st Marines-7th Marines common boundary and establish contact with 2nd Battalion. Simultaneously enter the area of operation from the vicinity of CAM VAN (3) AT 973587 and sweep East toward the 1st Marines-7th Marines common boundary and establish contact with 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

10. Execution:

a. 03 July 1645H Concept of Operations for Operation ELLIOT was submitted to 1st Marine Division for approval.

b. 04 July 1967

(1) 0947H, Received approval from 1st Marine Division on the Concept of Operations for Operation ELLIOT.

(2) 1100H, Briefing held at 1st Marines CP with all units on the proposed Concept of Operations.

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c. 05 July 1967

(1) 400H, Upon 1st Battalion, 7th Marines passed to 1st Marines.

(2) 0600H, All units crossed LOD to commence Operation ELLIOT.

(3) 0715H, Company E-2-1, vicinity AT 995617, found 4 Zulu-10 type mine and 1 unknown type mine. Both mines disarmed and forwarded to the Battalion CP.

(4) 0805H, Company A-1-7, vicinity AT 978606, apprehended 1 VN male with ID card. Kit Carson Scout identified Detainee as a member of a local VC platoon. Detainee forwarded to Battalion CP.

(5) 1025H, Company A-1-7, vicinity AT 977796, Marine detonated unknown type mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA MedEvac.

(6) 1115H, Company A-1-1, vicinity BT 007595, found reinforced bunker 2'X6'X5'. Bunker constructed with false floor and reinforced with bamboo. Also discovered a tunnel leading to another exit approximately 8 meters from the bunker. Searched bunker and found 1 poncho, 1 flashlight, 1 first aid kit and 1 cooking stove. Gear forwarded to Battalion CP and bunker destroyed with C-4.

(7) 1440H, Company H-2-1, vicinity AT 989600, patrol member detonated 2 81MM rounds rigged as a mine resulting in 4 USMC WIA MedEvacs.

(8) 1500H, Company D-1-7, vicinity AT 987609, patrol found one cave approximately 3'X3'X12' with bamboo and brush concealment. Destroyed cave with C-4.

(9) 1545H, Company H-2-1, vicinity AT 993598, patrol member detonated an M-26 grenade rigged as a mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA MedEvac.

(10) 1640H, Company G-1-1, vicinity AT 989588, patrol member detonated an M-26 grenade rigged as a mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA MedEvac. Area searched and found another M-26 grenade rigged as a mine. Mine blown by engineers.

(11) 2025H, Company A-2-1, vicinity AT 999579, while moving to PPB spotted a light in a brush and observed 3 VC near house. Unit received 10 rounds small arms fire. Patrol opened fire with small arms fire and M-79s. Searched area found 2 M-26 grenades and a first aid kit.

(12) 2145H, Company A-1-1, vicinity BT 006585, while moving into PPB received approximately 100 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 4 VC resulting in 1 USMC KIA. Returned small arms and 81MM mortars. Searched area but found no evidence of VC casualties.

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d. 06 July 1967

(1) 1200H, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines returned operational control to 7th Marines.

(2) 1330H, Company H-2-1, vicinity AT 9859, 9959, 9860 with rallied discovered 3 anti-personnel mines, 1 round 81MM, 1 M-79, 3 ChiCom grenades, 1 M-26 grenade and (1) 60MM mortar round all rigged as mines. All mines destroyed with C-4.

11. Results:

- a. USMC KIA - 1
- b. KIT CALSON KIA - 0
- c. USMC WIA - 7
- d. USMC MIA - 0
- e. VC KIA (Conf) - 0
- f. VC KIA (Prob) - 0
- g. Detainee - 1
- h. POW - 0

i. Friendly Equipment Losses. None.

j. Captured Enemy Equipment.

- (2) M-26 Grenades (1) Poncho
- (1) Bag Medical Supplies (1) Flashlight
- (2) First Aid Kits Assorted Documents

12. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: Supply support for the field elements was provided by parent organizations. Combat loads carried by the companies were sufficient to meet all requirements. Resupply in the field was accomplished by LVT's and Otters, however, in instances where time or terrain was a limiting factor helicopters were utilized. Helicopter support Teams (HST's) were provided for each company. Resupply requests were transmitted via the HST logistics net to Battalion rear.

b. Maintenance: Due to the short duration of the operation, no maintenance problems were encountered.

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c. Casualty Treatment and Medical Evacuation: All battle casualties were evacuated directly to division-level medical facilities. After treatment all troops with minor injuries were returned to their parent organization for further care.

d. Transportation: Due to the Operational Area being within the 1st Marines TAOR no transportation was required for the movement of troops.

e. Communications: Operation ELLIOT was controlled from the Regimental CP because of its close proximity to the Operations Area. All circuitry was reliable and no communications problems were encountered during the operations.


**13. Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs Support:**

a. Psychological Warfare: There were no psychological warfare activities carried on during Operation ELLIOT but on 08 July the after action activities related to ELLIOT saw the use of a leaflet drop and both aerial and ground broadcasts in the Operation area. The tapes used for the broadcast were made by a rallied from the QUANG DONG Hamlet, VO HUOC AN.


b. Civil Affairs: None.

**14. Special Equipment and Techniques:** A diver team from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was employed during the second day of operations.

**15. Commanders Analysis:** During Operation ELLIOT, no significant contact was made or casualties inflicted upon the enemy. Because of this, it was not a resounding success. It did confirm however, that the operations area, specifically the common boundary between 1st and 7th Marines, is a commonly used infiltration route into the DA NANG TAOR. It also confirmed that the area is heavily mined and booby trapped to hamper our efforts to patrol and block this Avenue of Approach.

  
R. O. RITTS  
Executive Officer

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1st MarDiv ltr 3:DEB:kgb, 3480.1, Ser 00374-67  
dtd 8 Sep 67

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
Subj: Combat After Action Report; Operation PIKE

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

Copy to:  
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THOMAS L. RANDALL  
By direction

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3:DBB:kgb  
3480.1  
Ser: 00374-67

SEP 8 1967

~~SECRET~~ — Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat After Action Report; Operation PIKE

Ref: (a) MACV Dir No. 335-8  
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.

2. Operation PIKE was a search and destroy operation which was conceived on short notice, was well planned and executed, and achieved very favorable results with a kill ratio of better than 10:1.

JAMES C. SHORT  
By direction

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 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

FMAR-SAC NO 00806

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3/ELP/adr  
 3480  
 30 Aug 67

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation PIKE).

Ref: (a) 1st Marines Operation Order 126-67

1. Code Name: Operation PIKE (Search and Destroy Operation).

2. Dates of Operation: 010600H August 67 to 032000H Aug 67.

3. Location: Area bounded on the North by East-West grid line BT 58, on the East by the South China Sea, on the South by East-West grid line BT 40 and on the West by North-South grid line BT 15. Area of operation included portion of DUY XUYEN District, QUANG NAM Province, and the North-East sector of QUANG TIN Province.

4. Command Headquarters:

1st Marines (-) (Rein)	Colonel ING
1st Bn, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)	Lt. Col. PETRO
3rd Bn, 5th Marines (-) (Rein)	Lt. Col. WEBSTER
1st Bn, 11th Marines D/S	Lt. Col. RAPP
Co B, 3rd Amtrac Bn D/S	Captain VAN ANTWERP
Co A, (-) 1st Engineer Bn D/S	Captain ITCHKAWICH
Platoon (-), 29th CA Company D/S	Captain CAMERON
Co C, (-) 1st Tank Bn D/S	1st Lt. O'BRIEN
Co A, 1st Bn, 7th Marines	Captain SAMPSON

5. Task Organization

1st Marines (-) (Rein)	Colonel ING
Det Hq Co, 1st Marines	
Det 29th Civil Affairs Company	

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 1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

67 3590

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~~SECRET~~1st Bn. 1st Marines (-) (Rein)

Lt. Col. PETRO

Det H&amp;S Company

Co C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

Co D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

Co F, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines

Co L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines

NGF Spot Team, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines

3rd Bn. 5th Marines (-) (Rein)

Lt. Col WEBSTER

Det H&amp;S Company

Co I, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines

Co L, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines

Co C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines

Regimental Reserve

Captain SAMPSON

Co A, 1st Bn, 7th Marines

6. Supporting Forces

a. Helicopters. Heli availability throughout the operation was marginal as a result only emergency medevac and limited resupply missions could be fulfilled without interruption.

(1) Supply. 17,500 lbs of supplies were delivered during the operation. Due to the non-availability of helicopters, alternate re-supply methods were utilized and operations were not affected.

(2) Medical Evacuation. Requests on the first day included 15 emergency, 5 priority and 1 routine medevac. UH-34 aircraft originally scheduled for re-supply were utilized for medevac service; however, on subsequent days, service was significantly improved. A total of 47 WIA's, 6 KIA's, 5 NBC (USMC) and 2 WIA's (CIVILIAN) were evacuated by helicopter.

b. Fixed Wing

(1) Airborne observers flew a total of 29.5 hours and coverage was responsive to requests.

(2) Close Air Support. Eight sorties under TAG (A) control, resulted in:

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34 Structures destroyed  
 34 Structures damaged  
 1 Large secondary explosion  
 16 KBA (confirmed)  
 23 KBA (probable)  
 50 Meters of trench line destroyed

c. Artillery

(1) "B" Battery, 1st Bn, 11th Marines provided direct support for 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and "F" Battery, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support of 3rd Bn, 5th Marines. General support/reinforcing fires were provided by "L" Battery (-), 4th Battalion, 11th Marines. "B" and "L" Batteries displaced from their normal positions within the TAOR to the HOI AN Airfield (BT 143577) to ensure proper coverage of the objective area with supporting fires. An artillery command group was established by 1st Battalion, 11th Marines at the "B" Battery/"L" Battery position.

(2) A total of 200 missions were fired in direct support. Ammunition expenditures and missions fired are as follows:

	HE	SMOKE	WP	ILLUM	MISSIONS
105MM	782	0	126	43	67
155MM	362	61	26	15	133

d. Naval Gunfire

(1) The USS HARRY E. HUBBARD (DD-748) was assigned in direct support of 1st Marines from 011100H to 031400H Aug 1967. Twenty-five missions were fired expending 359 rounds of 5"/38 ammunition.

e. The following units were in direct support of the First Marines (-) (Rein):

<u>Supporting Unit</u>	<u>Unit Supported</u>
Co A (-), 1st Sp Bn	1st Bn, 1st Marines
Co B (-), 3rd Amtrac Bn	1st Bn, 1st Marines
Co C (-), 1st Tank Bn	1st Bn, 1st Marines
Co A (-), 1st Engr Bn	1st Bn, 1st Marines
3rd Plat, Co B, 1st Engr Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Marines
2nd Plat, Co B, 1st Sp Bn	3rd Bn, 5th Marines

7. Intelligence

a. Enemy Forces Anticipated in Objective Area. Agents and rallier reports for the month of July fixed elements of the V-25th Battalion and the Q-12th Local Force Company within the objective area supported by local guerrillas. Approximately 200 escaped prisoners from the HOI AN Prison were reportedly being trained in guerrilla tactics within the objective area. The total enemy force anticipated was:

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**"SECRET"**

V-25th Battalion	300
Q-12th Company	80
Local Guerrillas	80
Total	460

**b. Enemy Forces Actually Encountered**

(1) The strong resistance encountered during Operation PIKE and sightings by friendly forces verified the agent and rallier estimates of VC forces in the objective area. An assessment of the casualties of each contact indicates that the local guerrilla suffered an estimated 50% of the total enemy casualties. An estimated 200 main force soldiers were able to evade friendly forces or exfiltrate from the operation area.

**c. Terrain**

(1) Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment was excellent in the hamlet areas and in the mangrove swamps along the northern edge of the operation area, from BT 180542 to BT 208563. Paddie dikes in the area ranged in size up to fourteen feet in height and provided excellent cover. The sandy beach area and island sand strips from BT 177527 to BT 235464 were completely broken and offered no cover or concealment.

(2) Critical Terrain Features. The critical terrain features within the objective area were the hamlets; in particular the complex in BT 1952, 1953 and 1954.

(3) Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation and fields of fire were excellent in the sandy area and across the paddie portion of the objective area. In the central portion of the objective area vision was limited to approximately 50 meters because of the bamboo, pine growth and high paddie dikes. Observation and fields of fire along the coast were good except for an occasional heavy pine forest.

(4) Obstacles. The paddie dikes and mangroves were the major natural obstacles encountered. No significant man-made obstacles were encountered.

(5) Avenues of Approach. No significant avenues of approach were encountered in the objective area.

8. Mission. 1st Marines (-) (Rein) commencing 010600H Aug 67 conducts search and destroy operations in the area of operations to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies, and equipment encountered. Area of operations bounded on the North by the SONG THU BON, on the East by the South China Sea, on the South by E-W grid line 40 and on the West by the SONG LY LY.

**9. Concept of Operations**

a. 1st Marines (-) (Rein): By 010430H August 67, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-) (Rein) occupies blocking positions west of the MUONG GIANG. At 010600H August 67, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) crosses the SONG CAU DAI near the northeast corner of the objective area and conducts search and destroy operations to the south and southeast within the area of operation. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines provides forces to occupy blocking positions in the southern portion of the operating area.

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~~"SECRET"~~b. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein):

(1) From assembly area, vicinity TRIEM TRUNG (2) move with three infantry companies to the north of the SONG CAU DAI, vicinity PHUOC TRACH (1), cross CAU DAI and conduct search and destroy operations in the operation area to destroy or capture enemy personnel and equipment. Simultaneously position one rifle platoon with LVTH-6's in the southern portion of objective area (vicinity Obj A) to block withdrawal of enemy forces to the south.

(2) Position one rifle company by 010430H August 67 on DONG THANH Island (BT 1754) to block withdrawal of enemy forces to the northwest. Be prepared to move this company south to conduct search and destroy operations in area of operation.

c. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-) (Rein): With three infantry companies move to blocking positions west of the TRUONG GIANG. Occupy blocking positions by 010430H August 67. Be prepared to reposition forces to the southeast of initial blocking positions to block possible enemy withdrawal routes to the southwest.

10. Execution

a. 27 July: The concept of Operations was submitted to Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

b. 30 July: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division approved the Concept of Operations and D-Day/H-Hour. 1st Marines Operation Order 126-67 distributed.

c. 31 July:

(1) Company "L", 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines displaced to vicinity BT 1062.

(2) Company "A", 1st Battalion, 7th Marines displaced to BT 105582.

(3) All attachments became effective at 1200H.

d. 01 August:

(1) 0415H, Co "C", 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in position on DONG THANH Island.

(2) 0450H, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-) (Rein) in blocking position west of the TRUONG GIANG.

(3) 0645H, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines commenced crossing the SONG CAU DAI.

(4) 0720H, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, units all across river and commencing sweep toward phase line BLUE.

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(5) The period 0720H to 1200H resulted in light contact for the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines in blocking positions on the west side of the SONG TRUONG GIANG. Casualties included 2 USMC KIA, 1 VC (NVA) KIA, 1 VC WIA. An airstrike was run in the vicinity of BT 174484. Of the companies sweeping southeast on line, only Company "F", 1st Battalion, 1st Marines made significant contact. Four small engagements resulted in 3 USMC KIA, 6 USMC WIA and 3 VC KIA confirmed. Company "D", 1st Battalion, 1st Marines killed one VC in a brief skirmish.

(6) From 1200H until sunset, contact increased markedly in the vicinity of the 1835 GS. Between 1330H and 1400H, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Command Group and Company "C", 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in two separate instances, received from an estimated 30 to 50 VC, large volumes of small arms, supported by B-40 rockets, 57MM recoilless rifles, 60MM mortars and rifle grenades. Small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, artillery and air strikes repelled the attacks with 31 VC KIA confirmed, 18 VC KIA probable and 11 Detainees. Marines casualties were 3 KIA and 14 WIA. At 1530H, the Regimental Reserve Company "A", 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was committed to the operation. Other small unit actions resulted in 9 USMC WIA, 17 VC KIA confirmed and 11 VC KIA probable. Supporting arms were employed. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines remained in a blocking position mainly employing air and artillery missions in the vicinity of the 1945 GS. This fire resulted in 15 VC KIA confirmed, 20 VC KIA probable and 3 secondary explosions. Two mines in the vicinity of the 1651 GS wounded 3 Marines.

e. 02 August: Enemy encounters were divided equally between the sweep and blocking forces (9 and 9 incidents) as the VC attempted to evade or exfiltrate the Marine cordon. Contact throughout the day was light and sporadic usually involving not more than 1 or 2 VC. Casualties were 6 USMC WIA, 14 VC KIA confirmed, 24 VC KIA probable, 3 POW and 2 Detainees.

f. 03 August:

(1) There were numerous single VC sightings (14) during the final sweep portions of Operation PIKE. Casualties were 2 USMC KIA, 9 VC KIA confirmed, 8 VC KIA probable, 1 POW and 20 Detainees. At 1030H, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Command Group conducted an air strike on 30 VC in the open at BT 218496 resulting in 8 VC KIA confirmed and 18 VC KIA probable.

(2) 1200H returned operational control of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and Company "A", 1st Battalion, 7th Marines back to their parent organizations.

(3) 1800H all units of 1st Marines have reached crossing point, vicinity BT 213566, commenced crossing SONG CAU DAI under sporadic small arms fire.

(4) 2000H Operation PIKE terminated.

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a. USMC KIA	8
b. KIT CARSON KIA	0
c. USMC WIA	60
d. USMC MIA	0
e. VC KIA (CONF)	99 (1-NVA)
f. VC KIA (PROB)	95
g. POW	4
h. Detainees	54

i. Friendly Equipment Losses. There were no friendly equipment losses during the operation.

## j. Captured Enemy Equipment:

1 M-1 Rifle	2 Cartridge belts
1 M-1 Carbine	3 Carbine magazines
1 7.62 ChiCom Rifle	1 Boat
1 Rifle (Unknown Type)	2 Packs
11 ChiCom Grenades	14,440 Piasters
1 M-26 Grenade	Assorted maps and documents

12. Administration Matters

a. Supply. Combat loads carried by all units were adequate. The primary source of resupply by helicopter was the LSA at Hill 63, (PF132452). Requests for resupply were submitted by the Shore Party Liaison Team via the Helicopter Support Logistics Net. The source of resupply for the LWT's was 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Rear CP, (BT 105582).

b. Maintenance. No maintenance problems were encountered.

## c. Casualty Treatment and Medical Evacuation

(1) All casualties were evacuated by helicopter except minor wounds that could be treated by the platoon corpsman. From 0800H to 1800H daily the medevac helicopters worked directly from the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Rear Command Post. The crew corpsman, after evaluating the condition of the casualty, directed the pilot to the appropriate medical facility.

(2) All minor casualties which could not be treated in the field and non-battle casualties, were returned directly to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, Battalion Aid Station, and remainder taken to division-level facilities. From 1800H to 0800H the medevac helicopter worked from MAG-16, Marble Mountain Air Facility running only emergency missions, and taking all such casualties directly to division-level facilities.

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d. Transportation. Two plastic Assault Boats, powered by 35HP engines, and six rubber boats were used to move C-1-1 from its initial blocking position into the objective area. Each Assault Boat carried 12-15 troops and towed two rubber boats loaded with troops. No transportation problems were encountered during the operation.

e. Communications

(1) The location of the Regimental Forward CP with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines provided for an economy of equipment and personnel by allowing use of existing telephone and teletype circuits. A manual relay station located at CAP-D-5 (BT 181588) was used to maintain contact with subordinate units in the objective area.

(2) No separate FM HD/TAR was available for the operation and the increase in air/ground coordination requirements in addition to the normal TAR requirements on the HD/TAR (Yellow) NET, caused some coordination problems.

(3) An automatic radio retransmission team from Communication Co, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division was assigned to 1st Marines for the operation. Due to equipment failure this team did not become operational, but this did not hamper communications with higher headquarters.

13. Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs Support

a. Psychological Operations

(1) On the morning of 1 August 1967, aircraft of the 9th ACS made a 35 minute on-call aerial broadcast throughout the operating area instructing the people to go to the beach and move north if they desired to flee from VC control.

(2) A leaflet drop of 440,000 leaflets was made during the operation. The breakdown on the leaflets was as follows:

Chieu Hoi Program	60,000
Safe Conduct Passes	80,000
Notice to Populous	50,000
Refugee Instructions	50,000
Don't run from Marines	50,000
GVN Gives a Better Life	150,000

(3) The Regimental Psy War Team and a team from the 244th Psy Ops Company operated with the Junk Fleet Craft on the SONG CAU DAI and along the sea coast. There were eight hours of broadcast utilizing standard tapes, Vietnamese music and live broadcasts by members of the Junk Fleet.

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
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~~SECRET~~b. Civil Affairs Support for Operation PIKE

(1) No refugees were generated during the operation but two wounded civilians were evacuated by helicopter to NSA Hospital DA NANG.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques. None Utilized.

15. Commanders Analysis. The relative tactical surprise enjoyed on this operation came as a direct result of the use of a highly mobile attacking force moving under the cover of darkness and the subsequent rapid movement into the objective area. The vegetation in the objective area was the greatest single feature to limit tactical movement and control. High hedgerows and heavy stands of brush and trees limited observation and provided the enemy with excellent concealment. The use of aerial observers and artillery fires partially overcame this restriction. Close control of the movement of ground units through continuous position reporting was vital. Resupply was not a major problem due to the capability of the amphibian tractors to carry needed supplies. The use of the command amphibian vehicles with their array of superior communications equipment was a significant factor in positive control. Close air support aircraft and naval gunfire as well as direct fire from tanks and LVTH-6 vehicles provided a balance of fire power which was employed throughout.

16. Recommendations. None.

E. L. PARKER Jr.  
By direction

  
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S&C FILES

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3480 HEADQUARTERS III MAF  
Ser: 00366367

10 NOV 1967

SECRET—Declassified upon removal of basic correspondence

FIRST INFORMATION on CG 1st MarDiv ltr 3:RD:tblb 3480.1 Ser: 00455-67

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
(attn: MACV 343)

Subj: Combat After Action Report; Operation KILL DEVIL

1. Forwarded.

Copy to  
RCS  
DCM  
DCM  
CRS

P. L. SMITH  
By direction

1st Marine  
a/c CPT SHERMAN  
112-28-16-1112

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3:DEB:kgb  
3480.1  
Ser: 00455-67  
2 NOV 1967

SECRET -- Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding General  
To: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: MACJ  
343) APO, U.S. Forces 96222  
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SHELEVILLE

Ref: (a) MACV Dir No. 335-8  
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.
2. Operation SHELEVILLE was a search and destroy operation which achieved its purpose of keeping the enemy off balance and disrupting his lines of communication.

3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 16 of the subject report are concurred in as qualified below:

a. Recommendation b: This recommendation is only one of a number of techniques which may be employed by Division units operating in the area, since repetitive, stereotyped techniques are self defeating.

b. Recommendation d: Cover and deception plans are applicable to all operations conducted by the 1st Marine Division. The extent to which these plans are developed and used is normally dependent on the over-all situation obtaining and time available.

H. J. WOESSNER  
Chief of Staff

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DDP DIR 5200.10

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Marines (Rein)  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

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3480  
18 Oct 67  
S004 0088-67

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation SHELBYVILLE)

Ref: (a) 1st Marines Operation Order 127-67

1. Code Name: Operation SHELBYVILLE (Search and Destroy Operation).

2. Dates of Operation: 220730H Sept 67 to 280700H Sept 67.

3. Location: Area bounded on the North by the SONG CAU LAU-SONG DIEN BINH-SONG THU BON, on the East by National Route #1, on the South by the SONG BA REN-SONG CHIEM SON and on the West by the N-S grid line 94.

AMMUNITION SEC CONTROL NO. 0088-67

4. Command Headquarters:

Copy . . . of . . . 14. Copies

1st Marines (-) (Rein)	Col ING
2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (-)	LtCol VAN WINKLE
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-)	LtCol ROCKEY
1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (-)	LtCol THOMAS

1st Battalion, 11th Marines-D/S

LtCol RAPP

Co A, 1st Engineer Battalion-D/S

Capt BUTLER

Plat, Co A, 1st SP Battalion

Capt SMITH

5. Task Organization

1st Marines (-) (Rein)

Col ING

Det Hq Co, 1st Marines

1st ITT, FMF PAC

57 431  
507 4 11

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (-)

LtCol VANWINKLE

Det H&S Company  
 Co E, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines  
 Co F, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-)

LtCol ROCKEY

Det H&S Company  
 Co I, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines  
 Co K, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines  
 Co L, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines

1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (-)

LtCol THOMAS

Det H&S Company  
 Co A, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines  
 Co B, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines  
 Co C, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines  
 Co D, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines

1st Battalion, 11th Marines

LtCol RAPP

(2) 105 How Btrys  
 (1) 155 (SP) How Btry  
 (1) 8" How Flat

Co A, 1st Engineer Bn

Capt BUTLER

Flat, Co A, 1st SP Bn

Capt SMITH

QDSZ

2/4 APC Troop

~~DECLASSIFIED~~6. Supporting Forces

a. Helicopters. The helicopter availability throughout the operation was adequate. Resupply was conducted with two Helos from 0800 - 1200 and two Helos from 1300 - 1800 daily.

(1) Supply. 46,582 lbs of supplies were delivered during the operation and 433 passengers were carried.

(2) Medical Evacuation. During the operation there were 11 emergency, 7 priority and 8 routine MedEvac missions requested. Of these, one priority and one routine MedEvac was cancelled by the requesting unit prior to completion. A total of 6 KIA, 41 WIA, 4 NBC (USMC), 1 WIA (civilian), 2 WIA (Vietnamese Detainees) and 2 WIA (P. F.) were evacuated by helicopter.

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(3) Other. On 2 occasions, gunfire/illumination a/c (Firefly) were utilized effectively.

b. Fixed Wing

(1) Airborne observers flew a total of 56.3 hours. Aerial observation was a necessity in the flat terrain with limited ground observation.

(2) Close Air Support. Seventy five sorties under TAC (A) control resulted in:

69	Structures Destroyed
40	Structures Damaged
4	Bunkers Destroyed
16	KIA Confirmed
37	KIA Probable
1	Secondary Explosion

c. Artillery

(1) A and B Batteries, 1st Bn, 11th Marines provided support for all units of the operation, with general support/reinforcing fires coming from "K" Battery and "L" Battery, 4th Bn, 11th Marines. To provide adequate coverage of the operation area, two displacements were made. "B" Battery was displaced to DIEN BAN District Headquarters (BT 066582), while "A" and "L" Batteries supported from their normal positions. A tactical artillery command group was set up by 1st Bn, 11th Marines in the "A" Battery position. On D+4, "B" Battery moved from DIEN BAN to the 2nd Bn, 1st Marines cantonment position (BT 015625), and "A" Battery, along with the artillery command group, displaced to the 7th Marine Regt cantonment position (AT 962609) on hill 55. "K" Battery supported from its normal position.

(2) A total of 302 missions were fired in direct support of the operation. Ammunition expenditures and missions fired are as follows:

	<u>HE</u>	<u>SMOKE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ILLUM</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>
105MM	1770	39	150	140	248
155MM	180	-	8	-	46
8" How	37	-	-	-	8

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d. Naval Gunfire

(1) The USS GOLDSBOROUGH (DDG-20) was assigned in direct support of 1st Marines from 220800H to 221630H Sep 1967. No suitable targets within range were identified.

7. Intelligence

a. Enemy Forces Anticipated in Objective Area. Intelligence information during September 1967 preceding the operation indicated elements of one enemy battalion and elements of local force companies within the objective area.

b. Enemy Forces Actually Encountered. An estimated two companies were located during the operation. A POW reported that units of the Q-15th Local Force Company and the R-20th Battalion were located in the operational area. The enemy employed 60MM mortars on three occasions, frequently used automatic weapons, and there was one report of .50 caliber machine gun fire. The PHU KY area continues to be a staging and rest area for Local Force Companies and Battalions.

c. Terrain

(1) Cover and Concealment. The PHU KY area is extremely thick with elephant grass, hedge rows, and uncultivated fields providing excellent cover and concealment. Damaged structures, rice dikes and extensive trenches throughout the area provide excellent cover against supporting arms.

(2) Critical Terrain Features. Two ridge lines are located in the south central portion of the operation area. Both ridges are barren and were not occupied by either forces during the operation.

(3) Observation and Fields of Fire. Ground observation and direct fire weapons were limited to distances of 100 meters and less throughout the area. In the hamlets, observation and effective fires were limited to 50 to 75 feet. Aerial observers provided exceptional support and are mandatory for operations in this area. Their employment, reduced friendly casualties by detecting enemy ambushes and inflicting heavy casualties upon enemy forces.

(4) Obstacles. Every hamlet with its hedgerows, destroyed structures, and weed growth hindered movement of foot troops. As an example, HLT 1/3 required nine hours to move through the village of BAO AN DONG (AT 985532) while in contact with the enemy. The SONG THU BON-SONG KY LAM-SONG DIEN GINH River complex (AT 940538 - BT 074545) is a major obstacle to troops and cannot normally be crossed without assistance. Armored personnel carriers were able to negotiate this river without difficulty. The SONG BA REN - SONG CHIEM SON River complex (AT 950542 - BT 074545) is a minor obstacle to foot troops but is fordable at the following areas:

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AT 950542 - BT 010522  
BT 067533 - BT 072535

(5) Avenues of Approach. Attacking forces have a better approach to the objective area from the East and South across the SONG BA REN - SONG CHIEM SON. Within the objective area, the long axis of most hamlets lies East to West and attacks on these hamlets are best executed along this axis.

8. Mission. 1st Marines (-) (Rein) commencing 220730H Sep 67 conducts search and destroy operations in the area of operations to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment. Area of operations bounded on the North by the SONG CAU LAU - SONG DIEN BINH - SONG KY LAU - SONG THU BON, on the East by National Route #1, on the South by the SONG BA REN - SONG CHIEM SON and on the West by the N-S grid line 94.

#### 9. Concept of Operations

a. 1st Marines (-) (Rein). By 220730H Sep 67, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conducted search and destroy in the area of operation with HLT 1/3 conducting a heliborne landing in vicinity BT 0154, and 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (-), and 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines occupying blocking positions to the East and South respectively (Phase I). On D+4 units were to be prepared to continue search and destroy operations in Western sector of operations on order (Phase II).

b. 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)

(1) By 211200H (D-1) moves to assigned assembly area, vicinity MY HAT and by H-Hour move West to assigned blocking positions. Conduct search and destroy operations vicinity blocking positions (Phase I).

(2) On D+3 about 1600H move by APC to area North of SONG CAU LAU - SONG DIEN BINH - SONG PHU BON Complex. Conduct search and destroy operations and blocking positions North of river (Phase II).

c. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-)

(1) Conducted a night overland movement (beginning D-1) from Hill 63 along axis of Route #1 to vicinity DUY XUYEN District Headquarters, thence along Route 537 to assigned objectives. Maintain blocking position south of the SONG CHIEM SON. Conduct search and destroy operations vicinity blocking positions (Phase I).

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(2) On D+4, on order, attack to the West on right flank of 1st Bn, 3rd Mar to secure assigned Regimental objective. Continue attack on order, conduct search and destroy operations vic Regimental objective (Phase II).

d. ELT 1/3 (-)

(1) On 220730H (D-Day) conducts heliborne landing in LZ, and seizes assigned Regimental objectives. Upon seizure of assigned objectives prepare for continuation of new attack to the East (Phase I).

(2) On D+4, on order, attack to the West on left flank of 3rd Bn, 5th Mar to secure assigned Regimental objective. Continue attack on order, conduct search and destroy operations vic Regimental objective (Phase II).

e. QDSZ Forces

(1) Conduct screening operations in the area North of SONG KY LAM between National Route #1 and railroad to the West.

(2) On D+3 about 1600H move 2nd Bn, 1st Mar to vic blocking position North of SONG CAU LAU - SONG DLEN BINH - SON THU BON complex. Upon completion move ARVN unit to vic Northwest of river complex to conduct screening/blocking operations (Phase II).

10. Execution

a. 19 Sep: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division approved First Marines Concept of Operations including D-Day/H-Hour.

b. 21 Sep:

(1) 1st Marines Operation Order 127-67 distributed.

(2) 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines displaced to assembly area vic BT 102534.

(3) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines displaced to LOD, in position by 0530H.

c. 22 Sep:

(1) 3rd Battalion crossed LOD and attacked toward assigned objectives vic designated phase line.

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(2) APC unit in blocking/screening position in area North of SONG KY LAM between National Route #1 and railroad to West.

(3) HLT 1/3 ( ) landed by helo in assigned LZ at H-Hour and attacked toward objective A.

(4) During the period 0730H - 1200H there were nine (9) significant contacts netting 24 VC KIA (Conf), 7 VC KIA (Prob) and several weapons.

(5) Throughout the remainder of the day additional contact resulted in 1 VC KIA (Conf), 2 VC KIA (Prob) and 2 USMC WIA. Co L, 3rd Bn, 5th Marines captured 1 semi-auto rifle 7.62 USSR Lomy 1953, 1 map case with personnal documents, 1 cartridge belt and 2 ChiCom grenades.

d. 23 Sep: Significant enemy encounters were divided evenly among attacking and blocking forces. Company C, 1/3 picked up 17 women and 5 children injured by air strikes. They reported 5 VC coming into village and killing 5 persons and when air strikes on the area commenced VC prevented injured personnel from using bunkers. Company K, 3/5 patrol, at BT 040522 killed 2 VC (Conf), captured 1 US Carbine #2474325, 2 cartridge belts, 3 ChiCom grenades. At BT 047526, Co K, 3/5 snipers observed 4 VC with weapons, fired 4 rds S/A and observed 3 VC fall, river boundary prevented search, results 3 VC KIA (Prob). Co A, 1/3, vic BT 022547, ambush observed movement to front and received 50 to 100 rds S/A fire from 6 to 8 VC resulting in 1 USMC KIA. Also same unit, vic BT 021549, received 100 rds S/A resulting in 1 USMC KIA.

e. 24 Sep: All units continued search and destroy operations. Co I, 3/5 vic BT 027527, LP observed approximately 20 to 30 VC. Called flareship and gunship on station. Opened fire with 36 rds M-79, 34 rds 60MM and called 81MM mission. Fixed wing strike resulted in 1 VC KIA (Conf) and 20 VC KIA (Prob). Blackcoat 2, vic BT 006518, spotted 15 VC, called air strike resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf) and 2 VC KIA (Prob). An airstrike vic AT 995518 was called resulting in 1 VC KIA (Conf) and 3 VC KIA (Prob). Co F, 2/1 patrol received 2 rds sniper fire from unknown number of VC. Returned fire and searched the area resulting in 1 VC KIA (Conf).

f. 25 Sep: Search and destroy operations continued with several significant contacts. Co E, 3/5, vic BT 003526, while enroute to Obj received heavy S/A and M-79 fire from estimated 50 VC resulting in 4 USMC WIA MedEvac. The company found the enemy extremely well dug in and concealed. Returned S/A fire, called artillery mission and airstrike. The Company searched the area and found drag marks and blood trails indicating 5 VC KIA (Prob). Co E, 2/1, vic BT 043544 captured a POW platoon leader of 1st Co, 4th PH-V25th Bn. A sniper team from 3/5, vic BT 013522 received approximately 40 rds of sniper fire from an estimated 2 VC. The team returned fire and observed 1 VC fall; they observed the body through field glasses for 45 minutes indicating 1 VC KIA (Conf).

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g. 26 Sep: 1200H Co H, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines joined operations to provide blocking force to southwest of area of operation (Phase II). The days activities were heightened by air activity. The total casualties for the day were 12 VC KIA (Conf), 24 VC KIA (Prob), 3 USMC KIA and 29 USMC WIA. At 261225H, Blackcoat AO observed VC Company with packs and rifles in a trench. AO conducted an airstrike resulting in 5 VC KIA (Prob). At 261225H, Blackcoat AO observed a large group of VC moving West, AO conducted an airstrike resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf), 4 VC KIA (Prob). At 261300H Blackcoat AO, vic AT 954431 observed several VC. AO conducted airstrike resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf).

h. 27 Sep: Search and destroy operations continued throughout the day and night resulting in 9 VC KIA (Conf), 24 VC KIA (Prob), 1 POW and 5 IWC. Co H, 2/5, vic AT 965543, observed 6 VC moving toward an LP site, fired approximately 30 rds S/A, 4 M-79 rds and searched the area finding blood trails indicating 4 VC KIA (Prob). Co I, 3/5 in blocking operations, vic AT 970554, found 2 VC hiding, the VC tried to escape, opened fire with 20 rds S/A. Co I searched the area finding 2 VC KIA (Conf), 1 US Carbine, 1 M-16 (French rifle), 1 SKS.

i. 28 Sep:

(1) 280700H Sep 67 Operation SHELBYVILLE terminated by direction of CG 1st MarDiv.

(2) 280730H units commenced withdrawal from operational area.

(3) 281700H Sep 67 returned operational control of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines to parent unit.

(4) 281730H Sep 67 returned operational control of 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines to parent unit.

11. Results

- a. USMC KIA 10
- b. Kit Carson KIA 0
- c. USMC WIA 63
- d. USMC MIA 0
- e. VC KIA (Conf) 50

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f.	VC KIA (Prob)	95
g.	POW	2
h.	Detainees	60
i.	IWC	3

j. Friendly Equipment Losses. At 261200H, Co E, 2/1, vic AT 976546, recon elements crossing river. 2 M-16 rifles lost while crossing river. Co H, 2/5 lost one AN/PRC-25 radio set on a helicopter.

k. Captured Enemy Equipment:

1	ChiCom LMG, 7.62
8	rifles
24	grenades
	Medical supplies
	Documents

12. Administrative Matters. Normal Regimental administrative functions continued throughout the operation.

a. Supply

(1) A Logistics Support Area (LSA) was established at the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines CP by FLC. Company "A", 1st Shore Party Battalion provided an HST at the LSA and one HSS for each field element.

(2) Supply dumps at the LSA were established with 3 days of supply for Classes I, II and V. The 3 day level was maintained daily and resupplied from FLC to the LSA was effected when necessary.

(3) Resupply of field elements was accomplished by helicopter. Eight (8) M-76 Otters were positioned at the CAU LAU Bridge for both resupply and evacuation purposes for the first three days of the operation and later re-positioned at Liberty Bridge for the duration of the operation. The Otters were on a stand-by basis in the event that helicopters were not available. Supplies that could not be obtained from the LSA and FLC were requested from unit parent commands. Initial combat loads carried by the assault troops were sufficient.

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b. Maintenance. No maintenance problems were encountered. Comm/Elec and Ordnance Contact Teams were available on a two-hour notice. Contact teams were not employed.

c. Medical Evacuation. Medical evacuation was accomplished by helicopter to the 1st Medical Battalion or NSA Hospital as required. A field medical facility was positioned at the CAU LAU Bridge with the Regimental Surgeon for the first three days of the operation and relocated to Liberty Bridge for the duration of the operation. The value of this facility was proved when the Regimental Surgeon treated a traumatic amputee within minutes of the incident causing the injury.

d. Transportation. There were no transportation problems encountered.

e. Communications

(1) General. The Regimental Forward CP was positioned at the 1st Bn, CP. This location was selected both geographically for command and control purposes and as a site from which secure communication circuits (both radio and teletype) could be provided to higher headquarters. Telephone communications to the Regimental Rear CP and to higher headquarters were provided by the existing radio relay link between the Regimental Rear CP and the 1st Bn. Teletype service was provided by augmenting the 1st Bn. Communication Center. Radio facilities were totally separate from 1st Bn facilities. All communication circuitry worked well with minimal outages. No significant communication problems were encountered.

(2) Departure from Normal Operations. The nature of the operating area with its dense vegetation and the movement of the maneuver elements away from the CP location during the second phase of the operation were successfully overcome by the employment of automatic radio retransmission equipment for the most critical radio nets.

13. Civic Action/Psychological Operations

a. Civic Action

(1) Civic Action/Civil Affairs participation was planned but as the area was under almost total Viet Cong control these functions were minimized. The DIEN BAN District Chief participated in the planning and was daily briefed on events within the objective.

(2) No refugees were generated.

(3) Approximately 1800 pounds of rice were bagged and evacuated to DIEN BAN District.

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b. Psychological Warfare:

(1) Psy/War efforts were conducted on the Battalion and Regimental level. Leaflet drops, aerial broadcasts and an armed propaganda team were employed.

(2) A special leaflet was prepared and dropped to exploit the VC atrocity of 23 Sept as described in paragraph 10.d above.

(3) An armed propaganda team, and the DLEN BAN District Vietnamese Information Services team were employed at the detainee processing camp located at the LSA (2nd Bn rear). Vietnamese people who were initially detained, screened and subsequently released were the target of these teams.

(4) Special packets of leaflets consisting of 200 pamphlets were issued to each squad. Each packet contained Chieu Hoi, Life at Home, Family Misses You and Safe Conduct passes. These leaflets were hand distributed.

c. Statistics:

(1) Leaflet Identification	Amount Employed
Special (Death of VC)	75,000
Chieu Hoi	100,000
Safe Conduct	100,000
Family Misses You	100,000
Life at Home	100,000
How Hoi Chenhs are Treated	100,000
Special (USMC Power)	75,000
Rally	100,000
Special	100,000
Chieu Hoi Passes	100,000

## (2) Aerial Broadcasts: 4 hours.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques. None utilized.

15. Commander's Analysis. The development of an operation plan considered and, wherever possible, employed overland movement during the hours of darkness rather than daylight tactical moves by helo and/or truck. This proved important especially during phase II in the Western PHU KY sector.

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
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The enemy was located in a defended village in prepared positions. The approach during darkness of BLT 1/3 (-) and the abrupt reversing of the direction of attack of the preceding three days forced the enemy into a location and a situation where a maximum firepower and troop density could be employed. Rapid maneuver and subsequent follow up searches exploited the situation. Dense brush lines limited ground observation; aerial observers continued observation over the operating area during daylight hours and the employment of aircraft and artillery illumination reduced this limitation.

16. Recommendations

- a. That the PHU KY area be exploited whenever the availability of forces permit.
- b. That operations in that area be conducted employing approach by stealth and the maximum use of aerial observation and artillery supporting fires to limit/interdict enemy movement.
- c. That the duration of operations be from 5-10 days in order to gain maximum exploitation.
- d. That a cover/deception plan be developed for opns of this nature.
- e. That opns be planned in detail for rapid execution with a minimum delay from the initial planning phase until execution.

  
E. L. PARKER Jr.  
By direction

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 1st Mar ltr 3/PB/gle over 3480 Ser: 0096-67  
Jtd 5Nov67

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
(Attn: MARJ 343)  
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation NORMA) (RCS 25.3  
3-32) (S-1)

1. Forwarded.

F. L. SMITH  
By direction

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Ser: 003A03068  
30 Jan 1968

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1stMar ltr 3/FM/gle over 3480 Ser: 0096-67  
dtd 5 Nov 1967

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Reinforced), FMF  
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation MEDINA)

Ref: (b) MACV Dir 335-8

1. Redressed and forwarded in accordance with reference (b).
2. Contents noted, no action deemed necessary.

*A. L. Michaux, Jr.*

A. L. MICHAUX, JR.  
By direction

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3/FJM/gle  
 3480  
 SerNo. 0096-67  
 05 Nov 67

*1st MAR S&C Control NO 0096-67*  
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From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation MEDINA)  
 Ref: (a) 3d MarDiv O 3100.1D

1. Code Name: Operation MEDINA (Search and Destroy Operation)
2. Dates of Operation: 110800H Oct 67 to 201800H Oct 67
3. Location: Base Area 101 HAI LANG Forest Reserve, located 10.5 km SW of QUANG TRI City in QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN Provinces, bounded by the following coordinates: YD 392370, YD 340312, YD 300287, YD 280290, YD 241392, YD 280440, YD 350464, YD 374410.

4. Task Organization

<u>1st Marines (-) (Rein)</u>	Col ING
Det Hq Co, 1st Marines 7th ITT (-), FMF PAC Det Radio, Relay and Const Co, 7th Comm Bn	Capt LINDSEY
<u>1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)</u>	LtCol BELBUSNI

Det, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 1st Mar  
 Co A, 1st Bn, 1st Mar  
 Co B, 1st Bn, 1st Mar  
 Co C, 1st Bn, 1st Mar  
 Co D, 1st Bn, 1st Mar

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2d Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) LtCol VAN WINKLE

Det, H&S Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Mar  
 Co E, 2nd Bn, 1st Mar  
 Co F, 2nd Bn, 1st Mar  
 Co G, 2nd Bn, 1st Mar  
 Co H, 2nd Bn, 1st Mar

Co A (-), 1st AT Battalion Lt WOODS

Co A (-) (Rein), 1st Engr Battalion Capt BUTLER

Co B (-), 1st Med Battalion Lt Cmdr HAMILTON

Co B (-), 1st MT Battalion Lt SHEEHAN

Co A (-) (Rein), 1st SP Battalion Capt Smith

1st Battalion, 3d Marines LtCol THOMAS

Det, H&S CC, 1st Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co A, 1st Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co B, 1st Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co C, 1st Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co D, 1st Bn, 3d Marines

1st Battalion, 4th Marines Maj HOPKINS

Det, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 4th Marines  
 Co A, 1st Bn, 4th Marines  
 Co B, 1st Bn, 4th Marines

1st Battalion, 12th Marines (-) (Rein) LtCol HUGHES

"A" Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Marines  
 "W" Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar  
 "A" Btry, 1st Bn, 40th Arty Grp  
 Plat, 1st Prov, 155mm Gun Btry  
 Plat, 175 Gun (SP), 8th Arty Bn, 4th Arty Grp

3rd Engr Battalion (-) LtCol MCCUTCCHAN

3rd Recon Battalion (-) (Rein) Maj BELL

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1st ARVN Division (-) (Rein)

9th ABN Pn, 1st ABN Div  
 2d Bn, 1st ARVN Regt  
 7th Armd CAV TRP  
 "A" Btry, 34th Arty Bn  
 "C" Btry, 11th Arty Bn  
 122d RF Co  
 Black Panther Co  
 2 PRU Teams

5. Supporting Forces

a. Helicopters. The helicopter support throughout the operation was adequate. Assets were limited and resupply was accomplished when helo availability permitted, at times this was a handicap to the tactical plan.

(1) Supply. 214,042 lbs of supplies were delivered during the operation. HMM 163, attached to the SLF provided assistance, without which, timely resupply of units in the field would not have been accomplished.

(2) Troop Movements. A total of 2,432 troops were carried by helicopter during Operation MEDINA, this figure excludes MedEvacs. Seventeen missions and 464 sorties were flown in support of troop movements.

(3) Medical Evacuation. During the operation 39 MedEvac missions were completed and 220 sorties were flown. A total of 34 KIA, 145 WIA, 34 NBC (USMC), 3 WIA (VC) and 1 WIA (ARVN) were carried by MedEvac helos.

(4) Other

Type	Missions	Sorties
C&C	2	7
Recon	6	20
Admin	2	6
POW	1	4

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~~DECLASSIFIED~~b. Fixed Wing

(1) Airborne Observer. Airborne observers flew a total of 68.3 hours averaging 6.8 hours per day. Coverage was generally responsive to requests.

(2) Close Air Support. During the operation 52 sorties were flown under TAG (A) control and 187,250 lbs of ordnance was expended against targets in the operating area. Close air support was available as needed by the units in the field.

(3) Other. C-47's and flareships were available, but the reaction time was generally 30 minutes to an hour before the aircraft was on station.

c. Artillery and Naval Gunfire

(1) Artillery support for the 1st Marines was provided by the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (-) (Rein). On D-1, "B" Btry, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and "A" Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, along with one ARVN 105mm How battery and 4 ARVN 155mm Hows (Towed) occupied a joint position on Hill 34 (YD 334469). Additional supporting fires during the operation were provided by "A" Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and "W" Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines located in cantonment positions at (YD 335504) and (YD 336495) respectively. General support artillery for the operation was provided by 12th Marines from DONG HA. A section 155mm Guns (SP) of the 1st Provisional 155mm Gun Battery displaced to the QUANG TRI airfield (YD 305558), and a section 175mm Guns (SP) of the 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery Group, USA which displaced to (YD 314552). The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines Command Group was located with the 1st Marines at (YD 338506).

(2) On D-1, the artillery prep of selected targets was conducted from H-1<sup>1/2</sup> hr until H-1 hr. During this prep, intensive fires were placed on LZ's Buzzard and Dove. Total rounds fired during Operation MEDINA were as follows:

	WP	LL	SMK	MISSIONS
4.2 Mortar	541	16	15	116
105mm	5944	458	282	1033
155mm Gun	563	19	"	128
175mm Gun	456	"	"	87
TOTALS	6504	493	297	1364

(3) No naval gunfire support was utilized during Operation MEDINA.

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a. Prior to the operation it was believed that the enemy forces that would be encountered in the operational area would be the 9th NVA Regiment, including it's (5) organic regimental companies, the 3rd Bn, 9th Regt (AKA 416th Bn), the 814th Bn and 808th Bn. Also reported in the area were the 31st Bn (AKA T-2 Sapper Bn) and the TRIEU PHONG Local Force Company. These units were reported in the HAI LANG Forest area by III MAF, 3d MarDiv intelligence documents, local USA advisory units, ARVN sources and numerous low level agent reports. The total force anticipated in the objective area was approximately 1900 NVA/VC. It was thought that the enemy forces would be located in base/rest areas within Base Area 101. Extensive defensive networks as reported by above mentioned sources, were also anticipated.

b. During the operation two indications of enemy unit designation were established. Under interrogation, three POW's captured by First Battalion, Third Marines at 110830H at (YD 378842) indentified their organization as the 2d Battalion, 9th NVA Regiment (AKA 808th Battalion), which they located in the vicinity of (YD 3440). While sweeping a base camp at 151725H at (YD 338384) Second Battalion, First Marines uncovered a green uniform shirt with "TROUNG K10K2", sewn into the left breast pocket flap. This indicates the presence of the 802d Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment (AKA K2) in the area either before or during the operation.

c. During the course of the operation several enemy installations were destroyed. Significant amounts of weapons, equipment and rice were found. A brief description of these installations follows:

- (1) YD 323378 Weapons/equipment cache
- (2) YD 338384 Unoccupied Regt Base Area
- (3) YD 332381 Battalion size position made up of bunkers and foxholes
- (4) YD 332384 Base camp containing ammunition, equipment and rice
- (5) YD 305395 Patrol base surrounded by bunkers and foxholes
- (6) YD 346376 Base camp containing weapons, ammunition, equipment and rice,

REMARKS

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d. The terrain in the operational area consist of canopy throughout (approximately 60 ft high) with sparse under growth reaching approximately 8-10 feet. There were areas without canopy that were characterized by heavy brush and vines which seriously hindered movement and obstructed vision and fields of fire. In some areas visibility was limited to approximately 10 mtrs to either side. There were numerous trails, 4-5 feet wide consisting of hard packed earth, traversing the area in a general east-west, southwest-northeast direction. The weather was above average for the seasonal period. There were three (3) separate incidents when the operational LZ's were closed in for periods of 1-2 hours because of low ceiling and heavy winds.

7. Mission. 1st Mar (-) (Rein) conducts multi-battalion assault operations in coordination/cooperation with elements of 1st ARVN Div, to locate, destroy and capture enemy forces, installations and logistic supplies vic enemy Base Area 101, HAI LANG Forest Reserve.

8. Concept of Operations

a. 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conducts search and destroy in area of operations with 2 Battalions landing by heliborne assault vic LZ Dove. One battalion provide blocking/screening force in designated areas to NE. Upon completion of search and destroy operations continue attack NE to vic FCL. Be prepared to conduct screening operations along axis of Route #1 as directed.

b. 2d Battalion, 1st Mar (-) (Rein)

(1) By 0800H, D-1 provide security for helo landing of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines designated area.

(2) At L-Hour, D-day land vic LZ Dove, secure LZ for subsequent landing of 1st En, 1st Mar, conduct search and destroy operations in Area II, SW of PL Plum for period of about 4 days. Seize Regt'1 objs in Zone of Action. Coordinate with ARVN Forces vic obj 1.

(3) D+4 on order, attack in Zone of Action NE of PL Plum to vic FCL.

(4) Upon closure FCL by D+7, be prepared to conduct screening operations along Route #1, as directed.

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c. 1st Bn, 1st Mar (-) (Rein)

- (1) On order, land vic LZ Dove, pass through 2d Battalion to the SE, conduct search and destroy operations in Area III, SW of PL Plum for period of about 4 days to seize Regt'l obj's in Zone of Action.
- (2) By D+2, develop obj 5 as a possible LZ for resupply.
- (3) D+4, on order, attack in Zone of Action, NE of PL Plum to vic FCL.
- (4) Upon closure FCL by D+7, be prepared to conduct screening operations along Route #1, as directed.

d. 1st Bn, 3d Marines (-) (Rein)

- (1) Land by helo vic ID 395450 on D-1, move to assigned assembly area.
- (2) During hours of darkness on D-1 move to blocking/screening position and conduct blocking/screening operations.
- (3) Be prepared to attack to the SW.
- (4) Be prepared to provide 1 rifle Co as Regt'l reserve for movement by helo or truck.

e. 1st Bn, 4th Marines (-) (Rein). Commencing D-Day provide 1 rifle company and 2 platoons for screening/security operations to W and SW of airfield. Return to airfield security each night for duration of operation.

9. Execution

a. 08 Oct: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division approved First Marines Concept of Operations including D-Day/H-Hour.

b. 09 Oct: Radio Relay team displaced to relay station, vic YD 385256. Due to inclement weather only a portion of the team with security and reconn personnel were inserted on 9 Oct. The remaining personnel were displaced on 10 Oct.

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(3) There were no incidents throughout the day, in any of the zones of Action.

e. 12 Oct: 1st Bn and 2d Battalions, 1st Marines continued search and destroy operations in zones of Action, SW of Plum while 1st Bn, 3d Marines continued blocking/screening operations to the NE. Between 1850H and 1930H, Co C, 1/1 in an attack on Negt'l obj 6 came under intense enemy fire. The Company withdrew to attack position. The result of this action was 1 USMC KIA, 12 USMC WIA (7 NonEvac). There was no confirmed enemy count but heavy losses can be suspected due to close range of heavy volume of fire. Later Co C, 1/1, met and engaged approximately 3 enemy companies, with intense S/A and A/W enemy fire. Co C assumed offensive/defensive position and was quickly reinforced by Co D and the situation was immediately restored. During the evening and till early morning an LZ was cleared with the use of a power chain saw lifted into 1/1 position during the night. By early morning a correct count of enemy and friendly losses was accomplished, the results were 30 VC KIA (Conf), VC KIA (Prob) undetermined, friendly casualties were 8 USMC KIA, 39 USMC WIA (MedEvac), 2 USMC WIA (NonEvac).

f. 13 Oct:

(1) Search and destroy operations continued during the day with units operating SW of PL Plum. Casualties for the day resulted in 3 VC KIA (Conf), 14 VC KIA (Prob), 18 USMC WIA (MedEvac), 22 USMC WIA (NonEvac). Co D, 1/1 via YD 328369 during search found 2 AK-47's, 7 ChiCom grenades, 6 AK-47 magazines with 380 rds, 1 B-40 rocket rd. At 1000H, Co D, 1/3 squad ambush site spotted approximately 25 indigenous personnel, some of which were carrying weapons. Squad called artillery mission and estimated 10 VC KIA (Prob). Co A, 1/3 patrol at 1655H while moving to ambush site received S/A fire. The unit moved to alternate positions and called 81mm mortar mission, alter, searched area and found indications of 4 VC KIA (Prob).

(2) At 2330H while operations continued in the HAI LANG Forest, the 1st Bn, 4th Mar (Fwd) CP located at QUANG TRI airfield received 25-30 rds of 82mm mortar fire. They immediately executed counter mortar battery fire to suppress the enemy attack. Friendly casualties totaled 9 USMC WIA (MedEvac), 21 USMC WIA (NonEvac). There was no damage to the airfield.

g. 14 Oct: Search and destroy operations continued in Zone of Action with several significant events.

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(1) 1730H, Co D, 1/1 rear man on squad patrol returning to CP spotted 2 VC. Squad opened fire, killing 1 VC (Conf) and 1 VC KIA (Prob).

(2) 1820H, Co I, 1/1, squad position came under intense small arms fire, vic YD 325562. The squad was immediately reinforced and intense fire resulted in 4 NVA KIA (Conf) and 1 NVA KIA (Prob). Friendly casualties were 2 USMC KIA and 5 USMC WIA.

(3) 1820H, Co D, 1/1, was attacked while set in defensive positions. A patrol from Co C, 1/1 enroute to 1/1 CP for resupply was in vicinity of the attack and took immediate action to reinforce Co D by fire. The enemy immediately withdrew. Results of this action were 1 USMC KIA, 12 USMC WIA (MedEvac), 6 USMC WIA (NonEvac), 2 NVA KIA (Conf), 9 NVA KIA (Prob).

(4) 1500H, Co H, 2/1 in the vicinity YD 322278, found huts with supplies consisting of 15 packs, 30 assorted uniforms, 35 ChiCom grenades, 2 French grease guns, 4 AK-50's, 2 SRS 7.62 ChiCom rifles and assorted field gear, clothing and documents.

(5) Total casualties for the day were 3 USMC KIA, 21 USMC WIA (MedEvac), 7 USMC WIA (NonEvac), 6 NVA KIA (Conf), 9 NVA KIA (Prob), 1 VC KIA (Conf) and 5 VC KIA (Prob).

h. 15 Oct:

(1) Frag Order to Operation Order 128-67 was issued. The concept envisioned the 1st Marines at H-Hour or D+4 continue the attack to the NE toward Route #1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines was assigned the task to secure Regt 1 obj's 8 (YD 304395) and 10 (YD 315466), by night of D+4 and to continue attack NE to secure Regt 1 obj's 11 (YD 324423) and 15 (YD 334455) by night of D+6. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines attack to NE to secure Regt 1 obj's 9 (YD 332385), 12 (YD 346405), 13 (YD 371304) and 14 (YD 364437) by night of D+6. 1st Battalion, 3d Mar continues to conduct search and destroy operations vic blocking position.

(2) During the remainder of the day, 2d Battalion secured Regt 1 obj 9 (YD 332385) and 1st Battalion continued attack to the NE toward Regt 1 obj 9 (YD 304395). Co D, 1/3 at 1500H, vic YD 362443, found a tunnel containing 1 Chinese rifle NR A 678558, 1 Shotgun (unk type) 7551, 2 transistor radios, documents and grenades.

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(3) Co G, 2/1 at 1725H, vic YD 338304, found assorted documents, food, clothing and equipment, including (8) B-40 rockets with boosters, 2 M67-10 Soviet mines, ChiCom grenades, rifle grenades, 160mm mortar complete, 1 FN 44 rifle, 1 MAT 50 submachine gun and entrenching tools.

(4) Total casualties for the day were 2 USMC KIA, 8 USMC WIA (MedEvac), 7 USMC WIA (NonEvac), 2 NVA KIA (Conf), 9 NVA KIA (Prob), 5 VC KIA (Prob).

i. 16 Oct: Search and destroy operations continued to the NE. Casualties for the day tallied 4 USMC WIA (MedEvac), 2 VC KIA (Conf), 1 VC KIA (Prob), 2 individual and 1 crew served weapons were captured. At 1610H, Co E, 2/1 patrol point received 10 rds small arms from 1 VC. Returned fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (Conf). During search of area, patrol located a base camp with 2 French sub machine guns and 1 light machine gun, rice, clothing, etc.

j. 17 Oct:

(1) The attack continued to the NE with 2d Battalion moving to secure Regt'l obj's 12 (YD 346405) and 13 (YD 371304), 1st Battalion, 1st Marines attacked toward Regt'l obj 10.

(2) 1st Marines received CG 3d MarDiv msg 170103Z assigning 1st Marines security for QUANG TRI airfield vice 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. Plans were made to helilift Co's C and D, 1/1 at 181200H for airfield security.

k. 18 Oct:

(1) 2d Battalion, 1st Marines continued attack to the NE. Co's A and B and Battalion Cmd Grp of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued attack toward Regt'l obj's 14 and 15. 1st Bn, 4th Marines continued search and destroy operations to the West and Southwest of QUANG TRI airfield in the area of the AI TU River Valley.

(2) The helilift of Co's C and D, 1st Bn, 1st Mar to the QUANG TRI airfield commenced at 181230H. Enemy forces were sighted in the LZ area prior to lift, airstrikes were conducted and the helilift was completed without incident. The remainder of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued attack to NE to Regt'l obj 15 and moved on to Hill 34, artillery position and conducted motor march back to vic QUANG TRI airfield.

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(3) At 1345H, Co's G and H, 2d Battalion approached Regt '1 obj 13 (Hill 86). Lead elements of Co G detonated a large mine resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 5 USMC WIA (MedEvac). Co H, 2/1 moving in trace and to the flank engaged an estimated plateau of NVA on SW slope of Hill 86. The enemy was throwing satchel charges and grenades. Co E, 2/1 was immediately dispatched to lend assistance to Co H, and continued to maintain contact until dark. Action resulted in 10 USMC KIA, 18 USMC WIA (MedEvac), 2 NVA KIA (Conf), 12 NVA WIA (Prob).

1. 19 Oct:

(1) 2d Battalion, 1st Marines continued attack to the NE passed through 1st Battalion, 3d Marines area to Route #1 via HAI LANG for motor march at 1400H to CP.

(2) 191200H, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines chopped OpCom 4th Marines, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines assumed mission security for QUANG TRI airfield.

(3) 1st Marines conducted extensive combat patrols/ambushes in assigned portion of Regt '1 TAOR to the west and SW of airfield.

2. 20 Oct:

(1) 0600H-1800H, extensive combat patrols/ambushes were conducted in Regt '1 TAOR with light contact. 1st Battalion continued security of the QUANG TRI Airfield.

(2) 1800H Operation MEHNA secured.

10. Results:

a.	USMC KIA	35
b.	USMC WIA (MedEvac)	174
c.	USMC WIA (NonMedEvac)	59
d.	NVA KIA (Conf)	58
e.	VC KIA (Conf)	6
f.	NVA KIA (Prob)	77
g.	VC KIA (Prob)	26
h.	Detainees	26
i.	NVA POW	4
j.	VC POW	2
k.	IWC	25
l.	CSWC	3

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m. Captured Enemy Equipment

- (2) 60mm mortars
- (5) AK-47's
- (2) B-40 Rocket Launchers
- (1) ChiCom 7.62 LMG
- (5) ChiCom K-44 Carbines
- (5) PPS-41
- (1) 9mm ChiCom pistol
- (3) MAT 49 SMG (FR)
- (1) Shotgun (unk type)
- (31) Grenades
- (15) M-79 rds

Assorted Clothing and Equipment

Medical Supplies

Documents

11. Administrative Matters

a. Supply. The administrative portion, of the operation was adequate. The plan to lift 2 DOS to objective 5 was not accomplished due to change in tactical plans. An LSA was established at YD 338504 by Company A (-) (Rein), 1st Shore Party Battalion. Supply dumps were established for all classes of supply except Class III non-consumables and Class IV. On D-2 build up of the LSA commenced from FLSU-1 DONG HA by 6X6, tractor trailer and CH-53. The build up was delayed 2 days due to a bridge at YD 417478 being washed out by heavy rains. The LSA was loaded and commenced resupply operations on D+1 as scheduled. The purpose of establishing an LSA at this position was to reduce turnaround-time and maximum utilization of the CH-53. CH-53's were utilized to resupply LZ Dove and were controlled by HST in LZ. A resupply point was located at LZ Dove with 2 DOS and replenished as required. The 1st and 2d Bn's were resupplied from LZ Dove but this was time-consuming due to the terrain traversed. The 1st Bn, 3d Marines was resupplied direct from the LSA.

b. Maintenance. Maintenance was accomplished in the field where possible. When necessary items were sent to the LSA and returned to the parent organization for checking repairs or evacuation to 3d echelon repairs. The major items were AN/PRC-25 accessories, 60mm mortar sights, M-60 machine guns and AN/PRC-41's. A limited maintenance float of PRC-25 radios was provided by FLSU-1.

~~SECRET~~c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation and Hospitalization

(1) Treatment. Casualties were handled in the standard, routine manner with all casualties of significant degree being evacuated via helicopter to central medical facilities (D-Med, Hospital Ships, PHM BAI, etc.) as directed by DASC, according to existing facilities. Helo evacuation seemed impossible, but was the only means of evacuation, due to the mountainous terrain and high jungle canopy. Despite the existing conditions, helicopter evacuation was most satisfactory and performed with laudable skill by crews involved, even though, at times, an undesirable, but unavoidable, delay was involved.

(2) A forward shock and resuscitation station was established at LZ Dove. This station consisted of the necessary logistic gear, the "A" sections of the BAS's of 1/1 and 2/1, and directed and operated by the Regimental Surgeon. This facility was unable to function for its intended purposes, for the following reasons: (1) LZ Dove was unacceptable as a medical support site. No tents could be erected, due to the terrain and the immediate enemy situation. (2) It was impossible to effectively transport casualties who were greater than 500 meters away to the LZ Dove area. However, the medical personnel of the forward shock and resuscitation facility were able to provide routine BAF care to the troops in the LZ Dove area. The forward facility personnel remained in position for the first 4 days of the operation and were then extracted because of increased mobility of the troops at LZ Dove.

d. Casualty Reporting. No significant problems were encountered in the actual treatment of casualties, their evacuation and/or hospitalization. However, substantial problems were encountered in the reporting of casualties to the 1st Marine Division Casualty Reporting Control Center (CRCC). Failure to submit timely casualty reports and follow-up administrative matters was due to the initial non-availability of Service and Health Records. The majority of these records were not located with parent units, but were spread along "Rough Rider" convoys and staged in rear area pending completion of the relocation of 1st Marines (++) (Rein) from the DA NANG TAOR to the QUANG TRI TAOR.

e. Communications

(1) General. Operation MEDINA presented a dual challenge to

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communications, namely, the mountainous, heavy forested area of operations and that the operation was controlled from the Regimental base camp, which was still in the initial communications build-up stage. Three steps were taken to ensure adequacy of FM radio communications. First, a relay site was selected at YD 384256 which had previously been used by the Fourth Marines and Third Reconnaissance Bn and which was known to provide line of sight communications to the Regt CP. This site also commands the objective area from the south but at a range further than desirable. However, as being the best available site, it was developed by the helicopter insertion of a security element and manual retransmission teams for selected radio nets. Secondly, three PRC-25/MK-456 automatic retransmission set-ups provided for the operation from 1st MarDiv were also inserted, but did not significantly improve communications because of the weak signal from the operating area. Last the Regt Command Net was activated (HF-SSB) and the Battalions took an HF capability into the objective area. If communications failed, then contact could be maintained over the HF command net. Throughout the course of the operation, adequate FM radio communications were maintained although there were short periods of time when manual relay stations were employed.

(2) Lessons Learned. Valuable lessons about the propagation of FM radio signals in heavily forested terrain were learned. Generally these were in the nature of improving the antenna on the radio set as much as possible while at a halt. Installation of very short (two mast section) RC-292 antenna significantly improves communications because of the ground plane elements of the antenna, even though antenna height is not significantly increased. This also lightens the load of the antenna, as the balance of the mast sections need not be carried. A possible solution to the problem, which depends on helicopter availability, would be to insert the PRC-47 by helo when a unit establishes a position and extract it by the same means prior to the unit moving out. HF radio back-up is considered necessary to Battalions when operating in this type terrain because of the sometimes marginal communications available by FM radio.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. On the evening of 12 Oct 67 (141), a McCulloch chain saw, MOD 99 was helilifted to Co C, 1/1 position to clear an LZ for evacuation of casualties. Working most of the night, the company cleared a heavily forested area into an acceptable LZ for Medevac purposes.

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15. Commander's Analysis

a. Concept. The Division Concept for Operation MEDINA was excellent as far as the disposition of both Marine and ARVN forces were concerned. The time element for the execution of the mission was not sufficient for the search and destroy mission in the area of operations nor was it sufficient for movement to designated areas for future operations.

Recommendation. Future planning for operations in Base Area 101 should be for a minimum of two weeks duration. Three to four weeks would be desirable.

b. Forces. While the reinforcement capability of one battalion to another is questionable, due to terrain/vegetation, the more forces located in the area insure a more thorough coverage and cause the NVA to divide his available force.

Recommendation. A minimum of two (4) company Battalions be employed in the immediate objective area.

c. Helicopters. Performed in an outstanding manner the day of insert and at other times, when available.

Recommendation. Helicopter availability must be consistent and in a direct support role throughout the operation. A minimum of four H-34 aircraft should always be available on call to the Regimental Commander. This, of course, is for logistic support and air reconnaissance by all unit commanders prior to and during the operation.

d. Air Observation Aircraft (O-1). The contribution that an air observer can make to this type of operation is unlimited and has a direct effect on the success of committed ground forces.

Recommendation. Plans must include 20 availability from dawn to sunset over the objective area.

e. Logistic Support. While no problem in itself, the delivery of supplies equipment and the extraction of enemy documents, weapons and material is directly related to the helicopter when it is needed, not when it is available. On several occasions, tactical movement was halted or otherwise influenced by the lack of helicopters when needed. Troops could not leave one Heli LZ in sufficient time to arrive at another before late evening. Consequently, on my order, they did not move at all.

Recommendation. See paragraph 15-E

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F. Communications. With few exceptions, communications were excellent throughout the operation. A relay station, established to the south, was used and proved valuable.

Recommendation. Insert relay team, consisting of representatives of both Marine and ARVN forces on high ground southwest of Base Area 101.

G. General. I believe that Marines must operate in this area, on occasion, but not too frequently. The insertion of a major force into an area most suited to the NVA/guerrilla tactic is questionable unless we are prepared to accept a kill ratio lower than that normally achieved by Marine forces. With the exception of the flexibility and fire power inherent in Marine artillery and air, the numerical superiority, employment of organic weapons and the tactical mobility and variety of formations normally used by Marine infantry cannot be employed to minimum effectiveness.

Recommendation. That operations in Base Area 101 not be attempted during any portion of the monsoon season. That two major operations of lengthy duration, be planned for early summer and late fall of 1968.



E. T. COOK, Jr.  
By direction

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