


010601-020600

$$\begin{array}{r} 06 \\ + 32 \\ \hline \end{array}$$
[illegible]
$$\begin{array}{r} 26 \\ + \\ 98 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

SUBMITTED BY: Fox Co. DATE OF PLANS: 31 MAR 67

UNIT	SIZE	NAME	TOD	TOR	MISSION	REMARKS
F2A,B+C	3 SQD		010200	010500	CBT PTL	
F2A,B+C	3 SQD		010500	010800	SAD	
F2A,B+C	3 SQD		010800	011000	CBT PTL	
F3A	SQD		020100	020500	CBT PTL	
F3A	SQD		020500	020600	AMB	

CANCEL F2 ACTIVITY REPORTED ON YESTERDAY'S SIT REP

1DIV 3400/1 (5-66)

DECLASSIFIED

O 161250Z MAR 67
FM CG TASK FORCE X-RAY
TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
ZEN/FIRST MAR
ZEN/ELEVENMH MAR
ZEN/HQ BN, FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/FIRST AT BN
ZEN/DET THIRD ENGR BN
ZEN/FIRST MT BN
INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHMF/CG FLC/FSR
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/NINTH ENGR BN
BT

SEC.....AT.....H

COC.....AT.....H

FRAG O 19-67 (ROUGH RIDER)
A. ANNEX G TO ADMIN O 301-66
B. FIRST MARDIV O P 02000.2C
C. FIRST MARDIV MSG 210219Z MAR 67

1. MISSION: ROUGH RIDER FROM CHU LAI TO FIRST MT BN CP DANANG.
 2. EXECUTION: REF A, B, & C APPLY.
MAJ KENNETH REAGAN, 1ST MT BN, IS CONVOY COMDR.
 3. D-DAY H-HOUR
A. 170800H
B. IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS REQ CANCELLATION CONVOY
RESCHEDULED FOL DAY.
 4. ADMIN & LOG: REF A
 5. COMM-ELECT: REF B
- GP-4
BT

TOR:1800Z/16MAR67/CC :856/GRH/UEC

23

DECLASSIFIED

COPY 7 OF 8 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED

P 0219Z MAR 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG TF XRAY
FIRST MAR
ELEVENTH MAR
HQ BN
FIRST AT BN
DET THIRD ENGR BN
FIRST MT BN
INFO: CG III MAF
CG FMAW
CG FLC/FSR
SEVENTH ENGR BN
NINTH ENGR BN
BT

SEC.....AT.....H

COC.....AT.....H

SECRET

FRAG 045-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)
A. ANNEX G TO MY ADMIN O 301-66
B. FIRST MARDIV O PO-000-2CACE 01
C. MISSION: FIRST MARDIV CONDUCTS ADMIN MILITARY CONVOY FROM

FIRST MT BN CP DANG TO CHU LAI AND RETURN IAW REF A.

2. EXECUTION

A. CG TF XRAY

(1) ASSUME OPCON CONVOY WHILE CONVOY IS SOUTH OF CHECK PT
NR 41.

(2) PROVIDE BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES FOR CONVOY
PERSONNEL.

B. FIRST MAR: REF A.

C. ELEVENTH MAR: REF A AS APPLICABLE.

D. FIRST AT BN: REF A.

E. DET THIRD ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED PARA 3G REF A.

F. FIRST MT BN: REF A.

G. COORD INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) REF A.

(2) CHECK POINTS: REF A.

(3) D-DAY H-HOUR

(A) DA NANG TO CHU LAI: 05000H

(B) CHU LAI TO DA NANG: 16 MAR 67 AS DIRECTED BY CG

TF XRAY.

NOTE: IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS REQUIRE CAN-

CELLATION, CONVOY TO BE RESCHEDULED FOR DAY.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS: REF A.

5. COM-ELECT: REF B.

GP-4

BT

DECLASSIFIED

TOR:0530Z/11MAR67/CCN:522/GRH/WEC

14
COPY X OF 4 COPIES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

O 090855Z MAR 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON.
BT

S&C.....AT.....H

1/11.....AT.....H

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROTECTION FOR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES (U)

A. COMUSMACV 280335Z FEB 67

COC.....AT.....H

B. CG III MAF 041040Z MAR 67

1. REF A CITES NEED FOR POSITIVE ACTION TO ASSURE PROTECTION OF COMM FACILITIES.

2. REF B REQUESTS REPT ON MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO ASSURE SUBJ SECURITY.

3. FOLLOWING CONSIDERED MINIMUM MEASURES NECESSARY FOR PROTECTION OF COMM FACILITIES:

A. ADEQUATE SANDBAG OR OTHER PROTECTIVE CONSTRUCTION.

B. SUFFICIENT FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT.

C. NECESSARY PERSONNEL SHELTER FACILITIES.

D. EFFECTIVE WARNING SYSTEM.

E. DETAILED PLANS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENSE DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE PERSONNEL CASUALTIES, EQUIPMENT DAMAGE AND GENERAL

CONFUSION WHICH RESULTS FROM SUDDEN EN ATTACK.

F. COMPLETE PERIMETER DEFENSE PLAN TO INCLUDE LOCATION OF INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS WITH THEIR FIELDS OF FIRE.

4. FOR INFO REQUIRED THIS HQ NLT 11MAR67 FOR COMILATION AND SUBMISSIONS:

A. ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE OF REEXAMINATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES.

B. LIST OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES IMPLEMENTED IN ADDITION TO THOSE LISTED ABOVE.

GP-4

BT

TOR:1119Z/09MAR67/CON:422/GRH/WEC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG TF XRAY
HQB N FIRST MARDIV
FIRST MAR
NINTH MAR
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
FIRST AMPHIB BN
DET MASS TWO DASC
INFO FIRST MARDIV REIN OP CON
CG III MAF
BT

DECLASSIFIED

COMM SPT FOR VISIT LTGEN V.H. KRULAK, CG FMFPAC
A. MY 070625Z MAR67
B. MY 070247Z MAR67
C. FIRST MARDIV 020000-2C (CEO)
D. CG III MAF 060840Z MAR67
E. FORCED 020000-1A (COMPLAIN TWO)
1. TEFS A AND B PROMULGATE FAIR/FOUL WEATHER ITINERARY FOR VISIT

BY CG FMFPAC ON 9 MAR 67.

2. COMM SPT

A. FOR CG TF XRAY:

REQ YOU ESTAB COMM IAW REF D.

B. COMMO. HQBN

(1) ACTIVATE STA ON III MAF CMD NR ONE AT 090715. III MAF
ALSO GUARDS III MAF TAC NR ONE.

(2) ACTIVATE DIV SPL PURPOSE NET (FM), M703, AT 090715
REMOTE TO DIV COC.

C. ACTION ADCEES (LESS CG TF XRAY, HQBN, DET MASS TWO-DASC):
ACTIVATE STA DIV SPECIAL PURPOSE NET M703 AT AREA TO BE VISITED
FIFTEEN MINUTES PRIOR TO SKEED ARRIVAL CG FMFPAC AND PARTY.

D. DET MASS TWO (DASC): MAINTAINS POSITIVE COMM WITH CG
FMFPAC HELO ON ASSIGNED AIR NETS AT ALL TIMES PARTY AIRBORNE.
RELAYS PERTINENT TRAFFIC TO FIRST MARDIV COC.

E. COC:

(1) RECEIVES AND RELAYS TO III MAF COC ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE
REPORTS OF CG FMFPAC AND PARTY.

(2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE INSTANTANEOUS TELEPHONE COMM
BETWEEN III MAF COC AND CG FMFPAC VIA DEDICATED CQC CIRCUITS.

DECLASSIFIED

3

DECLASSIFIED

F. FIRST MARDIV REIN (OPCON): BE PREPARED TO ESTAB REQ COM
IF ITINERARY REVISED.

G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) CALL SIGNS IAW REF C AND E.

(2) SECURE WORD FOR LTGEN KRULAK IS CAMERA CASE.

(3) FREQS IAW REF C AND E.

(4) SUBMIT ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE REPORTS VIA TELEPHONE.

RADIO NETS PROVIDE BACK UP COMM.

(5) GUARD RADIO NETS FOR FIFTEEN MINUTES AFTER DEP OF
CG FMFPAC OR UNTIL SECURED BY NCS.

(6) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE MOBILE STA ON DIV SPECIAL
PURPOSE NET IN EVENT ITINERARY REVISED TO REFLECT TRAVEL BY
CONVOY.

(7) AUTHENTICATION: EFF EDITION KAG-QX.

(8) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE TELEPHONE COMM
DIRECT TO III MAF COC FROM INTERMEDIATE STOPS WHERE EXISTING
TELEPHONE LINES INSTALLED.

(9) INSURE EXACT LOCATION CG FMFPAC AVAIL TO FIRST
MARDIV COC ON CALL.

(10) ENSURE CONTINUOUS COMM AVAIL AT ALL TIMES.

(11) THIS MSG CANCELLED 14 APR 67.

GP-4
BT

TOR:1306Z/7MAR67/CCN:327/AJM/SMG

DECLASSIFIED

TAB G

Operation STONE After Action Report

TAB G

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marines (Rein)
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP
APO, San Francisco, 96602

1ST MARINES S&C NO. 0012-67
COPY 42 COPIES

3/DLM/rmw
3480
14 Mar 67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation STONE)
Ref: (a) 1st Marines Operation Order 123-67

1. Code Name. Operation STONE (Search and Destroy Operation)
2. Dates of operation. 120700H Feb 67 to 221300H Feb 67.
3. Location

a. Phase I. GAMOI Island, DIEN BAN District, QUANG NAM Province, Republic of VIET NAM.

b. Phase II. KY DIENH Village and HANG HA (2) Hamlet, DIEN BAN District, QUANG NAM Province, Republic of VIET NAM.

4. Command Headquarters.

1st Marines	COLONEL RADICS
1st Battalion, 1st Marines	LIEUTENANT COLONEL DELL
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines	LIEUTENANT COLONEL TERRY
2nd Battalion, 4th Marines	LIEUTENANT COLONEL DEFORE
1st Battalion, 11th Marines D/S	LIEUTENANT COLONEL FENNELL
Co. A, First Amphib Battalion D/S	MAJOR BUSTIN
Co. C, First Tank Battalion D/S	CAPTAIN VAIGAND
Co. A, First Anti-Tank Battalion D/S	CAPTAIN FARRIS

5. Task Organization.

1st Marines (-) (Rein) (for Operation STONE) COLONEL RADICS

HoCo (-), 1st Marines

Det. 29th Civil Affairs Company

1st Bn., 1st Mar. (Rein)

Co. B, 1st Bn.

Co. C, 1st Bn.

Co. F, 2nd Bn., 26th Mar. (effective 111300H)

NGF 3rd Bn., 1st Bn., 11th Mar.

Det. 1st Shore Party Bn. (HBT)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DELL

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWN GRADATION AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

3rd Bn., 1st Mar. (Rein)

Co. I, 3rd Bn.

Co. K, 3rd Bn.

Co. L, 3rd Bn.

NGF S&T Tn., 1st Bn., 11th Mar.

Det. 1st Shore Party Bn. (H&T)

2nd Bn., 4th Mar. (-) (Rein)

Co. B, 2nd Bn.

Co. F, 2nd Bn.

Co. G, 2nd Bn., 5th Mar.

Det. 1st Shore Party Bn. (H&T)

Regt'l Reserve

Co. G, 2nd Bn., 1st Mar.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DEATLEY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BUNCH

CAPTAIN LYNCH

6. Supporting Forces.

a. Marine Helicopters (1st Marine Aircraft Wing).

(1) Helicopter requirements were kept to a minimum, and as aircraft forces were landed by air. Two battalions were extracted by helicopter; Third Battalion, 1st Marines was lifted from the Phase I area on 18 February to the First Battalion, First Marines contingent by 16 CH-46's, and First Battalion, First Marines was lifted from the Phase II area and returned to their CO on 22 February by CH-46 at the termination of the operation.

(2) Two CH-34's and one UH1G escort were provided in direct support of the Horizontal Medical Facility at the R&I air strip. Casualty evacuation was consistently achieved in minimum time and at times rescue missions were completed in as little as 15 minutes.

(3) Adverse weather caused recurring problems in helicopter support. To compensate for this and the fluidity of the tactical situation, on 14 February it was requested that four CH-34's be scheduled in direct support daily from 0700 to sunset for the remainder of the operation. Logistical support thereafter was particularly effective. In addition to handling all resupply missions the D/S helicopters flew refugee evacuation, POW extraction, and miscellaneous missions which contributed to the overall success of STANL. Over 150,000 pounds of supplies and equipment were moved by helicopter. Pilot response to rapidly changing conditions and situations was outstanding.

b. Marine Fixed Wing Support (1st Marine Air Wing)

(1) Flareships were employed nightly to provide continuous illumination over the area of operations restricting enemy activity during hours of darkness.

(2) Observer aircraft and C&C helicopter support were employed throughout the operation to provide necessary intelligence gathering and control functions.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Attack aircraft. Planned air strikes were cancelled due to weather. Twenty-four air strikes were employed during operation STANB with excellent effect. Most missions were controlled by coordination between FAC and FAC (A). Missions included suppression of enemy fire, target neutralization, destruction of caves and helicopter cover.

c. Artillery.

(1) 1st Battalion, 11th Marines assigned direct support of 1st Marines. A total of 395 artillery missions were fired in support of Operation STANB. Breakdown of ammunition expended is as follows:

	HE	SMK (EC)	WP	ILLUM	MISFIRE
105mm	2934	205	488	390	334
155mm	506	0	68	53	61
TOTAL	3440	205	556	443	395

(2) Throughout the operation, emphasis was placed upon utilization of supporting arms. The timely and efficient utilization of these fires for preparation, reconnaissance, harassment, interdiction, illumination, and in the attack of targets of opportunity contributed markedly to the low ratio of friendly casualties to enemy casualties which resulted from the operation. A total of 60 VC KIA CONFIRMED and 36 KIA PROBABLE was attributed to artillery fire. In addition to the high rate of enemy casualties attributed to artillery fire, numerous structures, trenches, and foxholes were destroyed. All artillery units exhibited excellent response to all calls for fire.

c. Naval Gunfire. USS ARVIDGE (CG-6) was assigned in direct support of the 1st Marines from 120600H to 141900H February 1967. Fires included harassing, sniper fire suppression, area preparation and destruction missions for a total of 548 rounds.

d. Co. 4, 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion.

(1) Two platoons, 26 LVT-5s, were employed during operation STANB. The 3rd platoon assigned in direct support of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines was employed to transport the battalion from an assembly area to the line of departure and beyond. The 1th platoon was assigned in direct support of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

(2) Due to low water (except within narrow channels), soft silt and sand bottoms, unpredictably changing sand bars, soft banks, and swift current, the 3 NG HY LM/DIN BUSH/CAN LM drivers are unsuitable for employment of amphibian tractors in operations wherein long river drives, particularly upriver runs, on critical time schedules are planned. Only known splash points should be utilized for tractor crossings in future operations.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

e. Co. A, 1st Anti-Tank Battalion

(1) Co. A, 1st Anti-Tank Battalion provided three platoons of Ontos in support of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines for Phase I of Operation SKIRMISH. Initially all three platoons were used for convoy escort and later on D-Day for screening forward of the 3rd Battalion line of departure. On 13 February 1967 two platoons were returned to routine FLOH activity with one platoon held in reserve at the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines CP.

(2) Commencing 18 February, the 3rd platoon provided direct support for the 1st Battalion until conclusion of the operation on 22 February 1967.

(3) Co. A, 1st Anti-Tank Battalion fired a total of 77 rounds of 106mm and 4250 rounds of small arms on targets of opportunity and for objective preparation fire accounting for 4 VC KIA CONFIRMED and 9 VC KIA PROBABLE. Two squads of security personnel from H&S Co., 1st Anti-Tank Battalion accompanied the Ontos Platoons relieving the infantry commander of the burden for Ontos security.

f. Co. C, 1st Tank Battalion

(1) Two platoons (13 tanks) were assigned from Co. C, 1st Tank Battalion in direct support of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines. Due to LCM-8 ferry breakdown, some tanks were delayed 24 hours in supporting 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines.

(2) The tanks fired a total of 124 rounds 90mm H, 12 rounds 90mm WP, 46 rounds 90mm cannister, 6,000 rounds 30 cal, and 9,000 rounds 50 cal. Fires included targets of opportunity, preparation, and neutralization. Tank search lights were employed in illuminating and locating enemy with good effect.

g. RVN Forces. During Phase I of Operation SKIRMISH the RVN Popular Forces Platoon occupied blocking positions at coordinates 014556. Three Regional Forces Companies, the 325th, 579th, and 467th occupied their normal positions along Route 537. The 4th Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment conducted a two day operation on 13-14 February in vicinity of Grid Square 0853. The positioning of all these units contributed to the denial of escape routes for the VC.

7. Intelligence.

a. Enemy Forces Anticipated in Objective Area

(1) The 1st Marines' S-2 Section began a thorough systematic collection and analysis of information on GO NOI Island three months prior to Operation SKIRMISH. Agents reports were collected, recorded and evaluated. Small unit leaders and company commanders who had worked in the objective area were thoroughly debriefed. Frequent liaison visits were made to USMC units whose TAO's are adjacent to the GO NOI Complex or who were actually involved in operations in close proximity to GO NOI. Helicopter resupply runs to the 1st Marines outpost at NUI LAC SON were periodically used to make aerial reconns of the various hamlets on the island. As a result of this comprehensive collection effort, an accurate and detailed contemporary history of GO NOI Island was compiled by the S-2 Section.

UNCLASSIFIED

UN

FILED

(2) Immediately prior to Operation Stone, the 3-2 Battalion estimated that seventeen hundred Main Force and local guerrillas were concentrated in the G. M. I. Sanctuary for the T. T. holiday. Agent reports, provided by DIEM HALL SubSector, Third CI Team, Revolutionary Development Cadre, Census Grievance Cadre and National Police, located three Main Force units in the island; the V.25 and K.20 battalions, and elements of the 70th Battalion. These reports were substantiated and supplemented by interrogation reports of a VC who was captured on 28 January, and of a Kallier, who rallied on 6 February, indicating that the Marines could expect intense, determined and well organized resistance.

b. Enemy Forces Actually Encountered.

(1) During Phase I of Operation Stone, 1st Marines fought with harassing fire and scattered resistance from local guerrillas, VC and elements of the K-20 Battalion. Interrogation of all detainees revealed that Marines engaged an estimated 500 VC. The detainees stated that the VC knew the Marines were about to launch an operation on G. M. I. Island and began to leave the area between the 9th and 12th of February 1967. Three hundred Main Force VC left on 9-10 February 1967.

(2) Prior to Phase II agent reports indicated that one unit of VC had withdrawn to the 1st Marines Task in the vicinity of the FY I VC peninsula. A KIT C-45. N Scout and interrogation reports confirmed this information. The contact on Phase II more than confirmed the reports. During this phase of the operation contact was made with the K-20th Battalion, the Q-15 Company, and possibly an element of the T-89. Captured documents indicated Unit - 75 was also in the area.

(3) Mines and Baby Traps. A total of 25 mines and baby traps were encountered by the 1st Marines sweep forces. Twenty-four were detonated and one was discovered and destroyed.

(4) Caves and Tunnels. A total of 29 well constructed and concealed bunkers, caves, tunnels and trenches were discovered and destroyed.

c. Terrain

(1) Cover and Concealment. During both phases of the operation numerous built-up areas, bamboo thickets and hedgerows bordering on rice paddies and cultivated areas afforded good concealment. Limited cover was offered by topographical variations and civilian dwellings.

(2) Critical Terrain Features. None

(3) Observation and Fields of Fire. During both phases of the operation observation and fields of fire were generally fair due to the thick vegetation and built-up areas.

(4) Obstacles. Man made obstacles encountered consisted of a network of well developed trenches, mines, and fences. Natural obstacles were the rivers, THUAN, KY LAM, DIEM HALL, B. H. K., and CHUAN SH, and minor streams and canal networks.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(5) Avenues of approach. There are three main avenues of approach to G. M. I. Island; Route 537 approaching from the east, the THU BAN, KY LAM and MIEN BINH rivers on the north, and the sandy flat area on the west of the FONG BA LAM. Local trails, paths, and dikes provided good avenues of approach for foot troops.

8. Mission.

a. Phase I. 1st Marines (Main) conduct unilateral or coordinated operations on G. M. I. Island to capture or destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment.

b. Phase II. Conduct two battalion search and destroy operation vicinity of KY MINH Village and PHONG BA (2) Favellet.

9. Concept of operations.

a. Phase I.

(1) Commencing H-Hour on D-Day, First Marines (-) (Main) attacks with three battalions (-) from south, west, and east to capture or destroy enemy forces, supplies, and equipment on G. M. I. Island Complex.

(2) First Battalion crosses L&D vicinity BT 065560 - BT 083548 at H-Hour and crosses FONG DUN BINH in LVT-5's supported by platoon of LVT-6s. Attacks to west in Z&A to L&A vicinity N-3 Grid Line 03.

(3) Third Battalion moves by motor convey and foot march to L&D vicinity BT 064513 prior to 1st light on D-Day. At H-Hour crosses L&D and attacks to west and north to seize blocking positions vicinity L&M D NG (2), Grid Square 0152, and L&H L&M, Grid Square 0253. In order, continue the attack to the north in Z&A.

(4) Second Battalion, Fourth Marines crosses L&D vicinity N-3 Grid Line 93 in LVT-5s supported by 2 platoons of tanks at H-Hour. Establishes blocking positions vicinity BT 980520, attacks to the east to L&A vicinity N-3 Grid Square 00.

(5) Feint will be executed in form of fake helicopter force landing vicinity Grid Square 0249 at H+30 following NGF drop of LZ (Not executed due to weather-hold on aircraft).

(6) Maximum use to be made of all supporting arms to reduce known targets commencing at H-Hour and to provide continuing on-call support. Direct support artillery battalion will be reinforced by fires of variety of calibers from variety of locations. NGF support requested of USS ARVIDEN. Fixed wing and helicopter support on station.

b. Phase II.

(1) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Main) conducts a search and destroy operation in the area bounded by river following trace of N-3 Grid Line

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

98 on the west, by the S NG LA TH on the north, by the S VC KY LM on the south and on the east by the trace of the line running from coordinates 042994 to 047579.

(2) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines extracts objective area from the south and attacks to the north along both sides of the railroad embankment.

(3) 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines provides company size blocking force to the south of the S NG LA TH to prevent escape of VC to the north.

(4) 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines continues search and destroy in Z-A bounded by NS GL 99-02 and on the south by EW GL 52.

(5) Expected Duration: 2 days.

10. EXECUTION

a. 10 February

(1) The final concept of operations was submitted to CG, First Marine Division.

(2) At 1100H, a briefing was conducted for all subordinate and supporting units on the proposed Concept of Operations.

b. 11 February

(1) CG, First Marine Division approved the concept of operations and D-Day/H-Hour. First Marine Order 123-67 distributed.

(2) At 1600H, Third Battalion, First Marines Command Group with Companies I, L, and K, displaced to First Battalion, First Marines CP by LVT to effect truck movement the next day to the objective area.

(3) At 1500H, First Marines Command Group for Operation Stone commenced displacement by helicopter and vehicle en route to First Battalion, First Marines CP. Displacement completed at 1700H.

(4) All attachments became effective at 2400H.

c. 12 February (D-Day)

(1) 0715. Third Battalion, First Marines crossed L-D and advanced toward Phase Line Cat against sporadic contact.

(2) 0720. First Battalion, First Marines crossed L-D and advanced towards Phase Line Dog against sporadic contact.

(3) 0800. Company G-2-5, vicinity 960523, received 50 rounds S/A fire from estimated 10 VC resulting in one USMC KIA and one USMC WIA (Waf) returned fire with M-79 and S/A. Search of area produced blood trails and track marks indicating one VC KIA (prob).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) 0845. Second Battalion, Eighth Airborne crossed LOD and advanced toward Phase Line 104-32 against light contact.

(5) 0900. Co. B-1-1, vicinity 062544, observed one VC fleeing from sweep force. VC was taken under fire with 81mm mortar producing one VC KIA (Conf).

(6) 1200. Co. D-1-1 platoon blocking position at 025555 observed 30 VC with weapons in the open to their south. 2 VC were taken under fire and killed by UMC Sniper Team. 81mm mortar mission was called on remainder of VC as VC attempted to recover the bodies resulting in an additional 10 VC KIA (Prob).

(7) 1255. Co. G-2-4 at 960520 sighted 13 VC running from sweep force and tanks fired 12 rounds 90mm at VC. Search of area resulted in VC body and 7 blood trails indicating 7 VC KIA (Prob).

(8) 1700. Co. I-3-1 sweep force apprehended 5 VC males at 005528 and forwarded same to 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines CP where they were classified as civil defendants.

(9) 1805. Co. G-2-5 sweep force vicinity 054535, received 3 rounds of 81mm fire from 1 VC. Returned fire with M-79, 81mm and 81mm mortars. Search of area produced large blood trail indicating 1 VC KIA (Prob).

(10) 1900. Co. F-2-26 vicinity 050534, observed 4 VC in tree line at 048553. After firing 50 rounds 81mm area was searched resulting in 2 large blood trails indicating 2 VC KIA (Prob).

(11) 2015. Co. F-2-4 squad blocking position, vicinity 962540, observed 3 VC in front of position. 30 rounds 81mm and M-79 fire produced three blood trails indicating 3 VC KIA (Prob).

(12) 2100. Co. D-1-1 platoon blocking force, vicinity 005559, observed 4 VC in boat moving to the east. Artillery mission called on target and sank the boat resulting in 4 VC KIA (Prob).

(13) 2359. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines forward CP located at 062583, Co. B-1-1 at 050543, Co. F-2-26 at 034533, Co. C-1-1 at 050543. Units maintained blocking positions through out the night and conducted ambushes and B&I fires under continuous flare ship illumination.

(14) 2359. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines forward CP located at 031512; Co. I-3-1 at 005528; Co. K-3-1 at 017529; Co. L-3-1 at 025534. Units maintained blocking positions through out the night and conducted ambushes and B&I fires under continuous flare ship illumination.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(15) 2359. Second Battalion, Fourth Marines forward GI located at 952534; Company D at 963542; Company F at 963511; Company G 2-5 at 983522. Units maintained blocking positions throughout the night and conducted ambushes and R&I fires under continuous flare ship illumination.

d. 13 February

(1) 0540. Co. G-2-5 squad ambush, vicinity 977517, observed 5 VC approach ambush position and took VC under fire. Search of area at first light produced 1 VC KIA (Conf) and one back containing clothing.

(2) At first light, First Battalion, First Marines, and Second Battalion, Fourth Marines began Search and Destroy operations in their Zone of Action, Third Battalion, First Marines maintained blocking positions along base line CAT conducting Search and Destroy operations in the populated areas adjacent to their positions.

(3) 1130. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep force vicinity 044548 saw 2 VC running from G-1-1 sweep force. VC were challenged and killed when they failed to halt.

(4) 1450. Co. G-2-5 squad combat patrol vicinity 000517 observed 1 VC enter cave. Squad threw one M-26 grenade after all other means failed to get VC out, searched cave discovering 1 VC KIA and 1 M-26 grenade. Cave destroyed.

(5) 1555. Co. K-3-1 squad search force apprehended 2 VC males in house at 015528. Search of house revealed numerous documents, clothing and uniforms. POW's had no ID cards and were fwd to Battalion collection point.

(6) 1630. Co. K-3-1 platoon sweep force at 015528 apprehended 1 VN female identified by Kit Carson Scout as VC. POW taken to 3-1 forward GI for interrogation.

(7) 1630. Co. F-2-4 platoon sweep force at 955548 received 20 rounds 3/4 fire resulting in 1 UNK KIA (Waco). Force returned 3/4 and 3.5 rocket fire. Search of area produced 1 VC KIA (Conf) and blood trail indicating 1 VC KIA (Prob).

(8) 1630. Co. C-1-1 sweep force at 040540 apprehended 5 VN males and 2 females who under interrogation revealed that VC who normally operate in that area held a meeting the night of 11-12 February and then moved out to the northwest. Detainees were fwd to the battalion collection point for further interrogation.

(9) 1830. Co. I-3-1 sweep force vicinity 999533 received 30 rounds 3/4 fire from VC at 999534 resulting in 3 UNK KIA (Nonevno). Unit assaulted VC position and found trenchline but VC broke contact. Trenchline was destroyed.

(10) 1830. Co. F-2-26 blocking force at 975541 received 14 rounds 3/4 fire from unknown number of VC. Returned 35 rounds 3/4 fire. Search of area revealed two VC KIA (Conf).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(11) 1845. Third Battalion, First Marines, called air strike on large number of VC spotted vicinity of 0154 Grid Square. Air strike destroyed 17 structures producing one secondary explosion. As requested over target observed 19 VC KIA (Conf).

(12) 1900. Co. G-2-5 blocking position observed 50 VC moving across ridge line at 965508. Tanks fired 12 rounds 90mm and artillery mission of 41 HE rounds called on target with excellent coverage. 5 VC KIA (Conf) and estimated 15 VC KIA (Prob).

(13) 2010. Co. L-3-1 sweep force observed one VC fleeing from unit at coordinates 020533. Force fired 10 rounds 81 killing VC.

(14) First Marine units found a total today of 32 caves and 2 bunkers all of which were reinforced with bamboo or wood and oriented against attack from the south.

(15) 2359. First Battalion, 1st Marines established defensive positions along phase line ZENNA with Companies "B", "C" and "F"-2-26 running linearly from north to south. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines CI located at coordinates 041552. All units established L's, ambushes and security patrols utilizing H&I fires and continual illumination from flare ship.

(16) 2359. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines established linear night defensive positions with Companies "I", "L", and "K" running west to east along phase line CAT tying into 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on the east. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines forward CI located at 005528. All units established L's, ambushes and security patrols utilizing H&I fires and continual illumination from flare ships.

(17) 2359. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines established linear night defensive positions with Companies "B" and "F" running from north to south along phase line FNBZ. Co. G-2-5 blocking force located at 993522 using perimeter defense. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines CI forward located at coordinates 950532. All units utilized L's, ambushes, and security patrols in addition to H&I fires and continuous illumination by flare ships.

c. 14 February

(1) 0730. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines initiated a one company Search and Destroy operation with F-2-26 vicinity of hamlets at 044530 and 050534. Companies "B" and "C" remained in blocking positions along phase line ZENNA, conducting Search and Destroy operations in that area.

(2) 0730. 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines began Search and Destroy operations to the north in their Zone of Action concentrating on the hamlet complex along the 55 Grid Line.

(3) 0730. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines began attack to the east with Companies "B" and "C". Co. G-2-5 remained in blocking position.

(4) 1000. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines S-2 Scouts and ITT apprehended 1 VC male at 041552 confirmed as RVN. VC forwarded to collection point.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(5) 1010. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep force sighted 6 VC crossing an open area at 040560. Force called 81mm mortar mission on target. Unit searched area and found 1 VC held with M-26 grenade and forwarded him to collection point.

(6) 1030. Co. D-1-1 platoon blocking position sighted 15 VC moving across open area at 022558 with packs. UMG sniper fired one round killing one VC (Conf) and 81mm mortar mission on target accounted for an additional 5 VC KIA (Prob).

(7) 1115. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Fwd and air observer called air strike on 15 VC in black and grey uniforms running from a structure at 001539. Aircraft dropped 500 pound bombs and napalm killing 10 VC (Prob).

(8) 1120. Co. G-2-5 platoon blocking force at 000517 observed 2 VC running in a northeast direction. After firing 10 rounds S/L fire, area was searched and no large blood trail was found indicating one VC KIA (Prob).

(9) 1145. Co. D-1-1 snipers vicinity 042572 observed 4 VC in 2 boats moving southwest. When VC spotted blocking force they turned and headed their craft northeast. Snipers observed 1 VC fall from sniper fire indicating one VC KIA (Conf).

(10) 1545. Co. K-3-1 squad vicinity 007547 observed one VC in green uniform run from squad and was killed with 4 rounds S/L fire.

(11) 2145. Co. G-2-5 squad ambush at 002510 saw 2 VC moving west 25 meters from ambush position. Squad fired 20 rounds S/L. After searching area, one dead VC was found. Squad heard moans nearby and fired 1 M-79 round in that direction then discovered one VC KIA (Conf) and 1 VC WIA who was taken into custody. Squad captured 2 M-26 grenades, one poncho, and 3 packages of food and health & comfort items.

(12) 2359. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines units resumed their portion of the regimental cordon with Co. D at 032550, Co. C at 032540, and Co. F-2-26 at 031532. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines forward C located at 042552. All units conducted L's, ambushes and security patrols utilizing H&I fires and illumination from flare ships.

(13) 2359. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines established night defensive positions as follows: Bn. C, 009541; Co. I, 003545; Co. L, 018532; Co. K, 009541. All units conducted L's, ambushes and security patrols utilizing H&I fire and continuous illumination from flare ships.

(14) 2359. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines established night defensive positions as follows: Bn. C, 950533; Co. E, 973524; Co. F, 979536; Co. G-2-5 996522. All units conducted L's, ambushes, and security patrols utilizing H&I fires and continuous illumination from flare ships.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

f. 15 February

(1) 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines and 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines resumed Search and Destroy operations in their Zone of Action at first light. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued maintenance of blocking positions along phase line Zebra and search activities in vicinity of their positions.

(2) 0900. Co. I-3-1 search force discovered one VC body killed by small arms fire at coordinates 004546. Large blood trail leading from area indicates an additional VC KIA (Prob).

(3) 0925. Co. K-3-1 platoon sweep force observed movement in haystack in field at 010551. Artillery mission and 81mm mortars called on target. Search of area revealed spider hole from which 2 VC threw a grenade. 2 VC were killed with M-26 grenade thrown into hole by sweep force. 2 other VC hiding in an adjacent cave were flushed out with CS and captured. Search of cave produced 75 rounds ammo, 3 M16 magazines and one suitcase full of documents. CS and gear forwarded to 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines S-2.

(4) 1110. Co. L-3-1 platoon sweep force apprehended one VC WIA near 018535 who, under interrogation, revealed that 150 Main Force VC departed area on 10 February in a northern direction. PW forwarded to 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines S-2 for processing.

(5) 1200. 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines dispatched a 50 man combat patrol from Co. G-2-5 to search ridgeline area to the south vicinity 917501 in reaction to report of VC in that area.

(6) 1235. Co. F-2-4 platoon sweep force received 20 rounds S/L fire from 20 VC at 965556. Fired 1 round 90mm from tank and killed one VC (Conf).

(7) 1320. Co. K-3-1 platoon sweep force vicinity 010551, apprehended 5 VN without ID cards. Search of adjacent area produced cave in which CS grenade was thrown. CS flushed out 4 VC with packs and uniforms who were captured. Search of cave revealed 3 VC KIA from earlier artillery mission.

(8) 1405. Co. L-2-4 platoon sweep force detonated one M-26 grenade at 980535 wounding one Marine (Honevac). Platoon continued and at 1410 another marine tripped M-26 mine at 987530 wounding another USMC (Evao).

(9) 1500. Co. L-2-4 platoon sweep force apprehended one VN male in house at 983533 who stated he knew of VC troop movement. Detainee forwarded to collection point for interrogation.

(10) 1813. Co. L-2-4 Co. H-34 helicopter resupply landing at 976535 received 10 rounds S/L fire wounding one crew member. Unit returned S/L fire but VC broke contact.

(11) 2050. Co. L-3-1 squad ambush vicinity 010548 observed movement to their front and fired 25 rounds S/L. Search of area revealed one VC KIA (Conf)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(12) 2359. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued to maintain blocking positions with no change in location from 14 February. Units conducted night L's, ambushes, and security patrols utilizing M&I fires and continuous flare ship illumination.

(13) 2359. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines continued methodical search in their zone of action setting night positions as follows: 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines Co, 008549; Co. I, 008547; Co. K, 001548; Co. L 011549. Units conducted L's, ambushes and security patrols utilizing M&I fires and continuous illumination from flare ships.

(14) 2359. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines continued search and destroy operation east to limit of Zone of Action, reversed, then began sweep west. F-2-4 night position at 977539; G-2-4 located at 974536; G-2-5 remained in blocking position occupied on 14 February and 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines Co remained in their 14 February location. All 2nd Battalion 4th Marines units established night L's, ambushes, and security patrols utilizing M&I fires and continuous flare ship illumination.

(15) Due to lack of significant enemy contact on G. M. I Island and to exploit intelligence that VC units had moved north, planning was completed at the Regimental level and orders issued for the conduct of Phase II of Operation STONE oriented toward the railroad track area vicinity Grid Square 9955-9660.

C. 16 February

(1) At first light 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines and 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines resumed methodical Search and Destroy operations in their Zones of Action, while 1st Battalion, 1st Marines maintained blocking position and commenced preparations for Phase II of Operation Stone.

(2) 0800. Co. I-3-1 plato sweep force discovered a cave at coordinates 010554. After blowing entrance they found one VC KIA and two PWs. Search of cave revealed 2 M108 grenades, 1 hand flare, and assorted documents.

(3) 0800. 1st Marines Co-2 reclassified detainees as 4 PWs, 38 civil defenders, and 13 detainees held for further questioning.

(4) 0840. Co. I-3-1 discovered a cave at 011532 and threw a smoke grenade into it. An explosion went off inside the cave and two VC KIA and two VC PWs were found inside the cave along with assorted gear and grenades.

(5) 0900. Co. G-2-5 sweep force saw 2 VC moving in tree line at 002510 and killed VC with M1 fire.

(6) 1230. Co. K-3-1 squad patrol was led by a CO to a cave at coordinates 009548 in which a K-50 MNG and documents were found.

(7) 1245. Co. I-3-1 squad threw a US grenade into a cave at 018553 resulting in capture of 2 VC, 1 M-44 rifle, 3 M108 grenades and assorted equipment.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(8) 1300. Co. L-3-1 squad sweep apprehended one VC who led them to a nearby cave at 005540 which contained assorted documents.

(9) 1500. Co. L-1-1 squad patrol discovered 1000 rounds of ammo, 2 grenades, a gas mask, and a 10 pound shaped charge at 025546.

(10) 1530. Co. L-3-1 sweep force discovered a tunnel at 006553. CS was used to flush 2 VC from tunnel. RVs were sent back into tunnel to entice remainder of VC out of tunnel. One frag grenade was thrown out by VC, detonating in the air killing 1 UZU, 1 Kit Carson scout and wounding 8 Marines. 4 VC attempted to escape and were killed by 3/4 fire.

(11) 1700. Co. G-2-5 sweep force saw 3 VC moving in tree line at 972617. Tanks fired 2 rounds 90mm on target resulting in one VC KIA (Cont) and one VC KIA (Arch).

(12) 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines CI at 947531 received 500 rounds 3/4 fire and 16 rounds 60mm mortars resulting in one UZU KIA.

(13) 2250. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines CI at 947532 received 1000 rounds 3/4 and 4/4 fire with no resulting casualties.

(14) 2359. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines maintained night defensive positions held on 15 February in Zone of Action and conducted security patrols and ambushes.

(15) 2359. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued with established blocking positions utilizing ambushes and security patrols in the vicinity of night defensive positions. Plans were made to cross the SANG KY LK on 17 February to take position for commencement of Phase II.

(16) 2359. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines made preparations to depart assigned Zone of Action on 17 February, and return to operational control of the 9th Marines.

h. 17 February

(1) 0700. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines began movement of units to positions along the SANG KY LK for night crossing by rubber boat.

(2) 0700. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines began movement to their original Line of Departure in preparation for return then to 9th Marines.

(3) 0700. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines continued deliberate search and destroy activities in the northern portion of their Zone of Action while planning for helolift on 18 February and beginning of Phase II of Operation STANB.

(4) 0810. Co. L-3-1 platoon sweep found one unoccupied cave at 018551 containing one M-1 carbine, 3 magazines and one M-26 grenade.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(5) 0900. Co. K-3-1 -sweep force f and one unoccupied cave at 013548 containing 5 shot charges and 2 grenades.

(6) 1730. Co. I-3-1 Scout Sniper Team observed 12 VC moving out of village at 996537 and killed 2 VC (Conf).

(7) 1800. 1st Marines B-2 reported that as a result of further interrogation, VN personnel so far apprehended were classified as follows: 2 POW; 43 civil defenders, and 17 detainees for further interrogation. Remainder of detainees were released.

(8) 2359. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines mounted individual company perimeter defenses as follows: 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines Co. I, 009547; Co. J, 009547; Co. K, 011548; Co. L, 018549. Units utilized night ambushes and security patrols and prepared for helicopter assault Battalion, 1st Marines near CI on 18 February for Search and Destroy operations vicinity of 1H VC Hc (2) Harlet, as part of Phase II, Operation STONE.

(9) 2359. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines units all crossed the 9AFG KY LHM at night by rubber boat and were positioned for commencement of Phase II as follows: 1st Battalion, 1st Marines CI, 019569; B-1-1, 009562; C-1-1, 009562; D-1-1, 042579; E-2-26, 009555.

i. 18 February

(1) 0500. Co. B-2-1 departed the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines CI and at 0700 was in blocking position from 986605 to 015605.

(2) 0700. Phase II of Operation STONE commenced. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines units began sweep and destroy operation along railroad north of 1H VC LHM with B-2-1 blocking. Co. E-2-26 was detached from 1st Battalion, 1st Marines CI and began foot march to Grid Square 0453 for untracking to parent unit.

(3) 0800. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines prepared for helilift to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines CI for further Search and Destroy operations in PH NG TR (2), as part of Phase II.

(4) 0800. Co. B-2-1 blocking position fired 3/4 at 3 VC at 002606 observing 2 VC fall and accounting for 2 VC KIA (irrob).

(5) 0815. Co. D-1-1 sweep observed 2 VC in khaki at 982552 and fired 10 rounds 3/4. Search of area produced one VC KIA (Conf).

(6) 0820. Co. B-2-1 Scout Snipers fired 2 rounds 3/4 at 2 VC at 997620 killing 2 VC (Conf).

(7) 0830. Co. D-1-1 sweep force fired 5 rounds 3/4 at two green and khaki clad VC vicinity 021602 resulting in one VC KIA (Conf) and one VC KIA (irrob).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(8) 0900. Co. B-2-1 block force received 150 rounds 3/4 fire from VC squad at 996604. Force returned 3/4 fire and artillery mission. Search produced 3 VC KIA (Conf).

(9) 1020. Co. B-2-1 Scout Sniper fired one round at one VC with pack at 000605 killing VC (Conf).

(10) 1350. Co. B-1-1 sweep fired 20 rounds 3/4 at 7 VC vicinity 912589 resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf), one VC KIA (Prob), and capture of one ChiC m rifle, one U.S. carbine and assorted gear.

(11) 1410. Co. B-1-1 sweep detonated one 105 round rigged as a mine at coordinates 987584 killing one VC.

(12) 1500. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines received unit report of 35 VC changing clothes near pag das at 985591 and quickly maneuvered units to the east, west and south to cordon the area.

(13) 1530. Co. B-1-1 sweep fired 20 rounds 3/4 at two khaki clad VC at 91597 killing 2 VC (Conf).

(14) 1600. Co. B-1-1 sweep fired 200 rounds 3/4 at 8 VC moving south. Search of area revealed 6 VC KIA (Conf).

(15) 1600. Co. B-1-1 observed one VC running from sweep force at 977595 and killed VC with 20 rounds 3/4 fire.

(16) 1600. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines began hoist lift from GI HAI Island to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines GI for Search and Destroy operations vicinity 13 IG H. (2).

(17) 1630. Co. C-1-1 platoon sweep sighted 15 VC in graveyard at 993690 and fired 200 rounds of 3/4 and called artillery mission. Search of area revealed blood trails indicating 4 VC KIA (Prob).

(18) 1630. Co. B-2-1 blocking force took 1 VC at 984601 under fire with 35 rounds 3/4 accounting for 4 VC KIA (Conf).

(19) 1630. Co. B-2-1 blocking force took 8 VC under fire at 980601 with 75 rounds 3/4. Search revealed 1 VC KIA (Conf) and blood trails accounting for 2 VC KIA (Prob).

(20) 1700. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep force received 10 rounds 3/4 fire from 2 VC at 004584 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

(21) 1700. Co. B-2-1 blocking force called artillery mission and placed 200 rounds 3/4 fire on 20 VC running in trenchline at 991610 resulting in 10 VC KIA (Prob).

(22) 1730. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep fired 50 rounds 3/4 fire on 6 VC running west at 994605. Search of area produced 2 VC KIA (Conf) and 1 ChiCm grenade.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(23) 1730. Co. D-2-1 block force received 120 rounds S/L fire from VC at 980603. 60mm mortar mission and 350 rounds S/L returned killing 4 VC (Capt).

(24) 1750. Co. D-1-1 platoon sweep apprehended 1 VC while attempting to infiltrate unit. Interrogation of suspect confirmed him as POW.

(25) 1745. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines completed helolift of Co. I-3-1 to 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines Rear CP to assume regimental reserve relieving G-2-1 and returned G-2-1 to support of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines Forward CP, Co. L-3-1 and Co. K-3-1 completed helolift to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Rear CP for Search and Destroy operations in I-H NG II (2).

(26) 1915. Co. D-1-1 platoon sweep captured 2 VC males and one VC female dressed in khaki at 981595. VC had 4 grenades and assorted small arms ammunition.

(27) 1915. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines Command Group with Companies "L" and "K" began movement to objective area vicinity I-H NG II (2) by airforce.

(28) 1945. Co. L-3-1 mortar struck estimated 30 pound mine at coordinates 986617 wounding 3 UHNG. Vehicle was towed to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines CP for repair of truck.

(29) 2112. Co. D-1-1 cordon position saw 3 VC approaching position and fired 20 rounds S/L. 2 VC were seen carrying off one VC indicating 1 VC KIA (prob).

(30) 2359. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines maintained cordon with units located as follows: Co. B, 978600 to 984504; Co. D, 981504 to 985508; Co. D, 996508 to 993600; Co. D-2-1, 993660 to 978600.

(31) 2359. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines established night positions in preparation for Search and Destroy operations on 19 February as follows: Battalion CP, 976626; Co. K, 985605; Co. L, 975632.

j. 19 February

(1) 0700. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines with Companies "K" and "L" began deliberate Search and Destroy operations via I-H NG II (2).

(2) 0830. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines utilized Psychological Warfare broadcasts from helicopters over cordon area in attempt to induce VC to surrender prior to further operations in their cordon.

(3) 0930. Co. L-3-1 tank supporting sweep struck 50 pound mine at coordinates 975626. No casualties incurred and tank repaired on spot.

(4) 1011. Co. C-1-1 squad security patrol tripped 105 round rigged as mine at 986504 resulting in 3 UHNG WIA moderate.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(5) 1015. Co. D-2-1 blocking force saw 1 VC crawling in a garden at 982601 and fired 3 M 16 rounds killing VC.

(6) 1040. Co. D-1-1 platoon search found one 1903 Springfield rifle with ammo at 995597.

(7) 1100. Co. C-1-1 platoon suffered 3 WIA removed from premature air burst of rifle grenade.

(8) 1130. Co. C-1-1 sweep force sustained 1 WIA removed at 991504 from punji pit.

(9) 1330. Co. C-1-1 discovered fresh graves of 3 VC bodies at 985503.

(10) 1400. Co. C-1-1 sweep force took group of VC under fire with M-79 and S/A at 980500. Search of area revealed 11 VC KIA, 2 fresh graves and medical supplies.

(11) 1400. Co. D-1-1 platoon sweep at 970590 detonated 2 pressure type M mines wounding 7 M rines.

(12) 1400. Co. D-2-1 blocking force took 30 VC under fire with artillery at 983601. Search of area revealed 1 VC KIA.

(13) 1400. Co. D-2-1 blocking force took 5 VC under fire at 985601 with 50 rounds S/A killing 1 VC (Conf).

(14) 1530. Co. K-3-1 sweep force pulled the top off spider hole at 067625 and 6 VC ran out running and shooting. 4 VC were killed with shotgun and rifle fire and two captured. Force captured 1 M-14 rifle, one bolt action rifle and 2 M-26 grenades. No USMC casualties.

(15) 1530. Co. D-2-1 blocking force observed 10 VC running from sweep at 981601 and placed S/A and M-79 fire on VC. Search revealed 4 VC KIA (Conf) and blood trail indicating 4 VC KIA (Prob).

(16) 1600. Co. K-3-1 supporting tank hit 50 round mine at 067620 resulting in slight damage to track.

(17) 1600. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines completed sweep of PHMG H (2) and were released from operation STONE to resume operations in TAI.

(18) 1600. Co. D-1-1 platoon sweep attempted to extract one VC from cave at 979598 with translator and later with CS. When this failed, VC was killed with M-26 grenade.

(19) 1600. Phase II of Operation STONE was reduced to a Battalion size operation and control for continuations of the operation was passed from CO, 1st Marines to CO, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. 1st Marines forward CP closed and displacement to Rear CP commenced.

(20) 1600. Co. D-1-1 observed 5 VC hiding in grass at 982594 and all 5 VC were killed with S/A fire. Search of bodies produced one 38 cal pistol, 8 M-26 grenades, 6 ChiCom grenades and documents.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(21) 1615. Co. D-1-1 search force killed one VC with M-26 grenade climbing into well at 980601.

(22) 1630. Co. D-1-1 maneuver 4 squads to 977596 to take 50 VC with automatic weapons under fire. Result of firefight included 15 VC KIA (Conf), 13 VC KIA (Prob) and 2 USMC KIA.

(23) 1645. Co. B-1-1 sweep force at 970590 detonated a 105 round rigged as a mine killing one Marine and wounding 4 others including Company B Commander.

(24) 1645. Co. E-1-1 took one VC under fire at 986600. Search of area revealed 2 VC KIA (Conf), 1 cartridge belt and 1 M-26 grenade.

(25) 1700. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep apprehended 4 VN males at 981594 attempting to infiltrate force. IPT later confirmed detainees as ICWs.

(26) 1720. Co. D-1-1 sweep force took 2 VC with packs under fire at 978594 killing both. Packs contained clothing.

(27) 1800. Co. C-1-1 search force at 983593 uncovered 39 fresh graves containing bodies of 39 young male VC killed by S/A fire and fragmentation.

(28) 1800. Co. E-2-1 block force took one running VC under fire with S/A at 985601 killing VC.

(29) 1815. Co. E-2-1 search force flushed VC from cane field at 986599. VC threw 3 grenades at Marines and Marines killed 5 VC with S/A and M-79 fire. 9 VC surrendered with cartridge belts, 2 M-26 grenades, 1 ChiCom grenade, Soviet S/A ammo, packs, clothing, and documents.

(30) 1830. Co. A-1-1 sweep force received S/A fire from 4 VC at 987600. Returned fire with 75 rounds S/A fire and 2 M-79 rounds killing 4 VC. Assorted documents of unknown origin found on bodies.

(31) 1845. Co. D-1-1 platoon sweep force took one running VC under fire at 978590. Force followed blood trails to VC body clad in khaki shorts.

(32) 1930. Co. E-1-1 sweep force took one running VC under S/A fire at 990595 and killed one VC.

(33) 2110. Co. E-2-1 sweep at 974600 observed 4 VC crossing bridge. VC were taken under fire and all four killed (Conf).

(34) 2130. Co. E-2-1 blocking force at 985601 observed 10 VC moving east to west. Unit opened fire with S/A and 19 rounds M-79. Search of area revealed 3 VC KIA (Conf) and blood trails indicating 3 VC KIA (Prob).

(35) 2359. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines maintained cordon with units established as follows: Co. B, 979601 to 980580; Co. C, 980500 to 973590; Co. D, 973590 to 973600; Co. E-2-1, 973600 to 977601; 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Forward Op, 993595. All units conducted LP's and security patrols with ambushes at likely avenues of escape.

UNCLASSIFIED

k. 20 February

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) 0600. Co. B-2-1 at 986600 surprised one VC on trail and threw one M-26 grenade. VC on trail indicated 1 VC KIA (prob).

(2) 0615. Co. C-1-1 platoon at 979504 observed 1 VC attempt to break out of coordn. VC were taken under fire with 3/A and search revealed 4 VC KIA (Conf) wearing khaki shorts.

(3) 0630. Co. B-2-1 blocking force at 990601 fired 50 rounds 3/A at 4 VC running. Search of area revealed bundle of clothing and blood stains indicating 1 VC KIA (prob).

(4) 0710. Co. B-1-1 at coordinates 977595 received fire from sniper in tree across river at 976595. One M-72 fired in tree scored a direct hit, killing the VC.

(5) 0830. Co. E-2-1 block force at 985601 took running VC under fire with 3/A and 60MM mortars. Search produced body of 1 VC.

(6) 0830. Co. D-1-1 sweep force challenged 2 VC hiding in grass at 993596. When VC attempted to flee they were killed by 3/A fire.

(7) 0830. Co. D-1-1 at 992603 apprehended 3 VC hiding in woods armed with one M-26 grenade and 2 carbine magazines.

(8) 0855. Co. D-1-1 sweep force discovered 6 VC hiding in grass at 990595. One VC was killed when he attempted escape. Remainder of VC taken into custody. Gear captured included several batteries taped together.

(9) 0910. Co. B-1-1 platoon apprehended 2 VC hiding in a bunker at 981593. One VC had bullet wound.

(10) 0940. Co. D-1-1 found one VC in cave at 985503. When unit threw 03 in cave, VC threw M-26 grenade out. VC killed by 3/A fire. Found 3 sets of uniforms and first aid kit in cave.

(11) 1055. Co. D-1-1 sweep force at 983594 flushed one VC from high grass and killed VC with 3/A fire.

(12) 1100. Co. C-1-1 platoon sweep found one VC KIA from 3/A fire at 987507. Documents were found on body.

(13) 1120. Co. D-1-1 took one VC under fire running from house at 979599 killing VC.

(14) 1140. Co. D-1-1 took 2 VC in trap line at 982505 under fire with 3/A and M-72 killing 2 VC.

(15) 1150. Co. D-1-1 took 2 VC running in open at 984598 under fire with 3/A killing 2 VC.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(16) 1150. Co. D-1-1 apprehended 4 VC males hiding in bunker at 983594. Later confirmed as KIA.

(17) 1400. Co. D-1-1 sweep force at 984595 apprehended 2 hamlet guerrillas, 1 VC hamlet chief, and one messenger from Q-15 according to ITF interrogation.

(18) 1545. Co. B-1-1 fire team found bodies of two VC KIA at 981594 by S/A fire. Bodies were searched and documents were found.

(19) 1605. Co. D-1-1 platoon sweep at 983594 discovered 1 M-1 carbine, 5 carbine magazines, 1 ChiCom grenade, notebooks, pencils, and food.

(20) 1700. Co. B-2-1 sniper observed one VC at 993601 and killed VC (Conf) with one round.

(21) 2040. Co. B-1-1 platoon in cordon position took one VC under fire trying to break through cordon at 983592. Search of area produced one VC KIA (Conf).

(22) 2359. First Battalion, First Marines reported finding two radio components: (1) JC-52 and (1) RH/UM 20. Night cordon positions for 1-1 units as follows: First Battalion, First Marines CP, 993595; Co. B, 992599 to 992580; Co. D, 992601 to 992589; Co. B-2-1, 993601 to 992601.

1. 21 February

(1) 0200. Co. D-1-1 block force took one VC under fire attempting to break out of cordon at 994594. Search of area revealed one VC KIA with cartridge belt.

(2) 0215. Co. C-1-1 cordon position at 989593 received one incoming grenade wounding 2 USMC.

(3) 0720. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep found 1 M16-41 mine at 977594 and blew it in place.

(4) 0900. Co. C-1-1 platoon sweep found one VC KIA at 980594 and blood trail which led to one VC KIA hiding in a small cave. VC was forwarded to First Battalion, First Marines B-2.

(5) 0905. Co. C-1-1 platoon sweep found 3 VC KIA from 81mm mortars at 985500.

(6) 0945. Co. C-1-1 apprehended one VC hiding in grave yard at 986505. VC was armed with one ChiCom grenade and cartridge belt.

(7) 1030. Co. C-1-1 platoon sweep found 1 VC KIA from M-79 at coordinates 986500.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(8) 1400. Co. B-1-1 at 983596 apprehended one VC WIA from W. hiding in banana fields.

(9) 1110. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep, at 984597, found binoculars with night vision device and mount from a U.S. Tank.

(10) 1200. Co. B-1-1 with 1st Recon Battalion Underwater Team found 2 VC bodies in cave at 983596. VC had been killed by fragmentation.

(11) 1200. Co. B-2-1 Sniper Team took one VC under fire at 982601 killing VC with one round.

(12) 1230. Co. B-2-1 Sniper Team took one VC wearing camouflage at 975605 under fire with one round hitting VC but unable to confirm kill. One VC KIA (prob).

(13) 1230. Co. B-1-1 at 979506 found bodies of 6 VC KIA by fragmentation. One body had been hit by tracked with ChiCom grenade.

(14) 1259. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep at 980590 saw hand moving at waters edge. Took VC under fire and heard explosion. Search of area revealed cave with 3 VC KIA who had blown themselves up. Platoon also discovered one .45 pistol, one SM pistol, 2 M-26 grenades, ammo and assorted gear.

(15) 1325. Co. B-1-1 search force at 980591, found 1 M-1 rifle, 1 M-1 carbine, uniforms and documents.

(16) 1400. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep force at 984592 found body of 1 VC KIA by artillery.

(17) 1400. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep at 982581 found one VC KIA from S/A fire. VC was wearing blue-green uniform.

(18) 1405. Co. B-2-1 sweep unit took one VC with grenade under fire at 986600 killing VC.

(19) 1445. Co. B-1-1 platoon sweep at 977505 discovered one VC hiding in cave. When VC would not come out after CS grenade was thrown into cave, VC was killed with M-26 grenade. One M-1 rifle, ammo and documents captured.

(20) 1545. Co. B-2-1 search force observed 2 VC running from cave at 982600. VC were killed with S/A fire. Search of cave revealed one additional VC KIA and pack with clothing.

(21) 1550. Co. B-1-1 at 979504 found 2 VC hiding in cave and flushed them out with CS. Search of cave produced 2 M-44 rifles.

(22) 1600. Co. B-2-1 sweep force at 955600 took 4 VC under fire with S/A. Search of area produced 1 VC KIA, one US Carbine, one Russian Moser, and one K-50 Sub Machine Gun.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(23) 1600. Co. D-1-1 platoon sweep at 980594 found 2 VC hiding in cave who tried to throw grenade at force. 2 VC were killed with S/A fire. Search of cave revealed S/A ammo and cartridge belt.

(24) 1630. Co. D-1-1 at 977595 took 2 VC under fire with S/A killing two VC.

(25) 1640. Co. D-1-1 at 977594 while checking cave observed 2 VC run out of cave throwing grenade injuring one USMC. 2 VC were killed with S/A fire. Search of cave revealed one M-1 rifle, one Soviet carbine, magazines, ammo and assorted 702 gear.

(26) 1800. Co. E-2-1 sniper team took one VC at 983597 under fire with one round killing 1 VC.

(27) 1830. Co. C-1-1 at 983594 observed one VC approaching position to surrender. POW stated that he was from A-20th Battalion and hadn't eaten in 4 days.

(28) 1845. Co. E-2-1 at 993600 called artillery mission on 7 VC in tree line with estimate of 4 VC KIA (prob).

(29) 1945. Co. E-2-1 sweep force apprehended one VC swimming across pond at 986601.

(30) 1950. Co. E-2-1 snipers took 4 VC at 986602 under fire killing one VC.

(31) 2100. Co. C-1-1 cordon block observed one VC attempt to break through cordon. VC threw grenade wounding one Marine. VC was killed with S/A and M-79 fire.

(32) 2359. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines tightened and reconstituted cordon with unit locations as follows: Co. B, 979593 to 970600; Co. C, 983601 to 973594; Co. D, 973594 to 979593; Co. E-2-1, 970600 to 983601. Units utilized security patrols, L's and ambushes along with continuous illumination from flare ships. Plans made to secure operation on following day and helolift units to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines near CP.

m. 22 February

(1) 0800. Co. D-1-1 sweep at 977595 VC throw one grenade from fighting halo. Unit killed VC with one M-26 grenade.

(2) 0850. Co. D-1-1 sweep force at 977595 threw CS in cave resulting in 2 VC running and firing from cave. 2 VC were killed with S/A fire. Search of bodies and cave resulted in one .45 cal S&W, one ChiCom rifle, 2 blue-green uniforms, assorted ammo, 702 gear and documents.

(3) 0905. Co. D-1-1 corpsman at 977595 found one Cam French as cult machine gun while searching river bottom.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) 0945. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines 3-2 Scouts at 987594 found body of one VC KIA by S/A fire.

(5) 0945. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines 3-2 Scouts led by S/W to cove at 97269 where they produced his K-44 rifle.

(6) 1000. Co. C-1-1 destroying fortifications at 979595, found one VC KIA from artillery.

(7) 1300. Operation ST NE terminated. Co. D-2-1 chopped to and lifted to parent unit. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines units began helicopter 1st Battalion 1st Marines Rear CT.

II. Results

- a. USMC KIA - 9
- b. RIT CARSON KIA - 1
- c. USMC WIA - 76
- d. USMC MIA - 0
- e. VC KIA CONF - 291
- f. VC KIA PROB - 112
- g. POW - 74
- h. CIVIL DEFENDANTS - 86

i. Friendly Equipment Losses. On 12 February 1967, a 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines rifleman became entangled in undergrowth and dropped his rifle in a flooded rice paddy. A search was made with negative results. There were no other major losses of equipment.

j. Captured Enemy equipment:

7 M-2 Carbines
4 Russian K-44's
1 M-149 SMG Gren
1 ChiCom rifle
1 Springfield rifle, 1903
3 M-1 rifles
1 Russian launcher
1 Russian M-2 Carbine
1 .45 Cal SMG with 2 mags
1 9mm French Assault MG
1 ChiCom rifle
1 9mm Pistol (M-20) ChiCom

1 .45 Cal Pistol
1 .38 Cal Pistol
1 unknown type weapon
1 LAW (M-72)
13 9mm rounds
52 Rounds 7.62 (Russian)
105 Assorted rounds S/A ammo
50 rounds K-44 ammo
1 Helmet
13 Packs with clothing
34 M-26 Grenades
41 ChiCom Grenades

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 1 Mark 4 Grenade
- 1 Hand Illum Grenade
- 1 Hand Flare
- 11 Uniforms (Blue-Green)
- 21 Cartridge Belts
- 4 Ponchos
- 11 M-14 Magazines
- 5 M-1 Carbine Magazines
- 1 Magazine with 8 Rounds
- 3 .45 Magazines
- 5 M-14 Magazine pouches
- 1 M-16 Magazine Pouch
- 2 Clips for U.S. Charges
- 3 Support TBT Charges
- 1 M-1641 M Mine
- 1 M-14 Mine
- 6 10 Lb Shape Charge
- 2 Bayonets with Scabbards
- 1 Knife
- 2 Gas masks
- Assorted Documents
- 1 Transistor Radio
- 5 Packages of Typing Paper
- 2 Bags Surgical Instruments
- 5 Bottles of Pills and Medical Supplies

- 3 Maps
- 4 Flashlights
- 4 Notebooks
- 2 I. O. Cards
- Assorted Irregular Leaflets
- Assorted Photos
- 2 Bags of Rice
- 1 Nightlight Battery
- Assorted Parts of B.306 with Wire
- Assorted Candles
- 3 Battle dressings
- 1 Stretcher
- 1 Wrist Watch
- 2 Holsters
- 1 U.S. Canteen Cover
- 2 U.S. Canteens
- 1 Ammo Can with Gear
- 1 HELL Box
- 1 Binocular Night Vision Device
- 1 Rocket Arm (Aircraft)
- 1 M-14 Combination tool

12- Administration Matters

a. Supply. Combat loads, ammunition, and weapons were adequate for the mission. Resupply was effected to company level with requests forwarded through Regimental Admin Net.

b. Maintenance. First and second echelon maintenance was performed at battalion level.

c. Casualty Treatment and Medical Evaluation.

(1) In accomplishing initial medical/surgical management of acutely injured participants, it was decided to rely entirely upon the physicians, corpsmen and medical supplies organic to the regiment. The medical department was to use evacuation modes, primarily the helicopters, as efficiently as possible to minimize the delay between the time of initial injury and institution of professional medical/surgical care. In reliance upon the assignment to and direction by the regimental staff of medical evacuation helicopters, it is felt that a unique and efficient aspect of medical support was achieved. It is felt that subsequent use of these methods will enhance the medical support of future operations. This is especially true as operations are conducted further away from existing established treatment facilities.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) A mobile medical facility was assembled on 11 February 1967 at the command post of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Equipment necessary for the immediate treatment of in excess of 100 serious casualties was loaded aboard two trucks. The medical support team consisting of the following personnel was assembled and briefed;

- (MC) Regimental Surgeon LT (MC)
- 1st Battalion Surgeon LT (MC)
- (EC) Regimental Chief (EMC)
- 7 Corpsman (EM3-EM)
- (DC) Regimental Dental Officer LCDR (DC)
- (CEC) Regimental Chaplain LCDR
- 3rd Battalion Chaplain LT

(3) At 0630 12 February 1967 the unit departed the 1st Battalion's camp at H I N airstrip. This site had been chosen for the following reasons:

- (a) Large landing zone in a relatively secure area which enabled team to have medical facility contiguous to the medical unit.
- (b) There is a hospital for Vietnamese in the city of H I N.
- (c) This location allowed the helicopters to fly without crossing gun target lines.
- (d) Relative proximity to both the combat zone and the regimental command group.

(4) At 0700 the medical unit arrived and was met by the security squad from Co. 4, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Immediate assembly of acute treatment equipment was started concomitant with the 0700 jump-off time. Within fifteen minutes the facility was ready to accept patients and by 0830 the erection of all facilities was complete. The facilities included an acute treatment area housed in a GI tent, and a ward and quarters for the team similarly housed in two additional GI tents. A smaller shelter was erected to house the dead pending transit to the morgue.

(5) Communications with the Regimental Command Group were achieved by using a PRC-25 radio. This allowed communications not only with the regiment but with the airborne helicopters as well.

(6) Initially three helicopters were provided. Evacuation from the combat zone to the medical unit was accomplished by a CH-34 accompanied by an armed UH-1H. After initial treatment patients were then evacuated either to the 1/1 BAS ward, the 1st Medical Battalion, or Naval Support Activity hospital. Evacuation to the latter two facilities was accomplished by a CH-46. These aircraft were assigned exclusively to the medical unit and when not in use were maintained at the medical unit's location. All medevac calls come through this unit and considerable time was saved as well as flight hours in having the aircraft close to the combat zone.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(7) Throughout the next five days the unit performed the following functions:

- (a) Triage
- (b) Immediate treatment of shock, maintenance of airways, securing of hemostasis, debridement and dressing of wounds.
- (c) Care of the dead.
- (d) Maintenance of landing facility for less seriously injured participants.
- (e) Evacuation of wounded to centers where definitive care could be instituted.

(8) 46 U.S. WIA and (2) KIAs were handled, 4 enemy casualties were treated as were 8 civilians. Approximately 25% of the U.S. casualties were taken to the ward at 1st Battalion, 1st Marines thus decreasing the patient load on the centers in the rear. All Vietnamese with the exception of one were taken to Vietnamese hospitals. The one taken to the 1st Medical Battalion was a POW who was quite seriously injured. At no time during the five day period was the unit's capacity taxed and it quickly became apparent that a much heavier patient load could be handled with ease.

(9) At 2130 17 February 1967 an intelligence report was received stating that a mortar attack was planned that evening. The unit was ordered to break up and at 2230 it was extracted to a more secure area. The casualty evacuation for Phase II of the operation was conducted in the normal direct evacuation to Medical Battalion, inasmuch as the operating area was closer to these facilities.

d. Transportation. Wheeled and tracked vehicles were used to transport the battalions into the area of operations. Some of the LVT-5s scheduled to transport the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines across the SONG KY LAM bogged down on silt deposits in the river. This difficulty was attributed to low tide and a lack of knowledge of the exact course of the channel. Tanks accompanying 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines were delayed when the LCM-8 ferry across the SONG THU BAN broke down. Within the area of operations, steep river banks and near cross-country trafficability curtailed the use of tracked vehicles, eliminated wheeled vehicle use, and placed reliance on helicopter transportation.

e. Communications.

(1) Communications throughout the operation were highly satisfactory with only minor instances of interference.

(2) Location of Regimental Command Group within a Battalion Rear Command post ensured telephone and teletype communications to Rear CG and higher headquarters via an existing AN/THC-27 radio relay circuit. This co-location also contributed to economy in use of radios and antennas.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) An additional net (designated as the Regimental Admin Net (FM)) was used to pass logistics requirements of the battalions to the Regiment plus any overload from the Tac nets. In numerous instances the Admin Net proved itself to be of great value in the rapid processing of traffic. All distances involved were within the capabilities of the AN/PRC-25 with KC-292 antenna.

13. Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs Support.

a. Psychological Operations. The Psychological Warfare team supported Operation SFAMU with leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts. The team made a leaflet drop of 100,000 leaflets on the objective area on 12 February 1967. The topics included: 60,000 of 10-65 "Marines Are Friends", 13,000 "Don't Run From Marines", 20,000 of 124-66 "CHINH I I", and 7,000 of SA-893 "Safe Conduct Passes". On 16 February 1967 another drop of 100,000 leaflets was made. The topics were: 10,000 of SA-893 "Safe Conduct Passes", 30,000 of 2-65 "CHINH I I (ARVN Life vs VC Life)", and 60,000 of Q-66 "CHINH I I (Death with VC or Life with GVN)". A one hour broadcast was also made over the objective area pointing out to the VC that the Main Force units had deserted them. Other aerial broadcasts during the final days of the operation were aborted due to adverse weather. It is difficult to determine the exact extent that psychological warfare effected the morale of the VC.

b. Civil Affairs Support for Operation SFAMU.

(1) Chronological Narrative

(a) 12 February. GI tents were erected, and rice, cooking pots, and other basic food commodities furnished to the BINH DIN District Chief for processing and caring for any refugees from the District generated by the operation. Arrangements were made for on-call provisions of USIA food commodities (bulgar, cooking oil, corn, powdered milk) by the JFEG NM refugee advisor, H I AN. Contact was made with QUANG NAM Sector Headquarters in coordinating for 200 refugees who had moved from the operation area to QUY XUYEN District Headquarters.

(b) 14 February 1967. 90 refugees gathered in the First Battalion's area of operation. 200 pounds of rice was flown out for their subsistence.

(c) 15 February 1967. QUANG NAM Province refugee section trucked USIA commodities and rice to QUY XUYEN District Headquarters to provide for the 200 refugees generated by Operation SFAMU. 170 refugees, accumulated by the First Battalion, were flown by helicopter from the operational area on G M I Island to BINH DIN District Headquarters. Salt, dehydrated soup, meat supplements and blankets were furnished by the First Marines 3-5 Section. The refugees were housed, processed, and fed at the facilities erected at BINH DIN District Headquarters.

(d) 17 February 1967. 100 of the 170 refugees mentioned above were allowed to move in with relatives in VINH HOC and VINH LAM C Villages, to the immediate west and south of BINH DIN District Headquarters.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(c) 16 February 1967. Additional USARV food and commodities in support of refugees arrived at J N H H District Headquarters.

(f) 22 February 1967. The First Battalion transported by truck 260 refugees from the operation ST-5 base II, operating area to J N H H District Headquarters where they were housed, fed, and processed.

14. Special Equipment And Techniques

a. Scout-Sniper Platoon. Operation STONE was the Regiment's first opportunity to employ the Scout/Sniper Platoon in a large scale operation. Teams employed by companies in blocking positions accounted for 15 confirmed VC KIA's including several long range (1100 meter) kills. When used on sweeps, the snipers were able to pin down small groups of VC with accurate long range fire until supporting arms fire could be placed on the enemy or until infantry units could maneuver to engage the VC at closer range.

b. Underwater Swimmers. Scuba Teams from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion were employed to search for underwater caves and to locate hidden VC weapons and equipment. They were successful in both undertakings during Phase II of Operation STONE and in addition found several VC bodies which would otherwise have been undetected.

c. Scout Dogs. Conditions for utilization of Scout Dogs were ideal. The terrain was dry, the weather was clear, the search was slow and deliberate, and there were no GVN troops working in conjunction with the Marines (the presence in the past of GVN troops has reduced the effectiveness of the Dog Teams). The Dog Teams were instrumental in discovering tunnels, caves and fresh VC graves.

d. River Crossing Operation. Three companies and the command group of the 1st Battalion were ferried across the RUC KY LAM at night prior to commencement of Phase II of Operation STONE. The 1st Battalion's training and experience with rubber boats was instrumental in their undetected movement to the Phase II objective area and the subsequent success therein.

e. Riot Control Agents. Although CS was used, it cannot be assumed that its use will cause passive surrender from the VC. In many instances, the enemy had to be killed with fragmentation grenades or demolition charges when the VC did not emerge from tunnels and caves into which CS was introduced. On several occasions after using CS, the enemy ran from their tunnels firing small arms and throwing grenades. In most cases, however CS did prove effective; it made the VC come out of his hole. One side effect of using RCA is the delay that is often time caused in waiting for the CS to clear before a search of the cave or hole can be accomplished. Cave search troops wearing field protective masks are affected by the irritant effect of the gas on exposed skin.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

f. Care of Refugees. Refugees generated by Operation STONE were processed and provided for in an efficient fashion. GVN and USAID agencies were alerted in advance and were materially prepared for processing. Marine support was offered and offered only where absolutely required, and when similar support was not available through GVN channels; i.e. transportation of refugees to handling points, provisions of certain food commodities, and erection of tentage. Real difficulties would have been encountered however, had large numbers of refugees been returned to GVN control.

g. Medical Facility. The formation of a Regimental Medical Support Activity using organic personnel and equipment was one of the many successes of Operation STONE. The unit demonstrated its ability to deploy and move quickly, bringing well equipped, professional aid to the individual Marine.

15. Commanders Analysis.

a. The success realized in Operation STONE was the direct result of adherence to plans as initially drawn coupled with the flexibility to react to the situation as it developed. There are numerous fundamentals which contributed to the over-all success. However, the following fundamentals are singled out as those which contributed most significantly to Operation STONE.

(1) Surprise. In the past, most operations conducted south of the SONG KY ILS have involved helicopter assaults. In Operation STONE, all forces were introduced by surface means, tank, truck and LVT/Saspara and foot movement. Although there were indications that the majority of VC had vacated GO NOI Island, those remaining were quickly isolated on the island by the almost simultaneous movement of forces from the East, South and West. Entering the objective area from those directions, particularly from the South, vice the usual entry from the North, resulted in rapid isolation of the objective area. Thus, those enemy units attempting to exfiltrate from the objective area had to move in a northerly direction where they were exposed to the observation of other friendly units not directly involved in the operation. The additional surprise movement of the 1st Battalion by rubber boat in a night river crossing to assume attack positions for commencement of Phase II, and the employment of the blocking force along the north edge of the Phase II operating area again achieved tactical surprise.

(2) Deception. The terminal phase of the GO NOI Island operation indicated that friendly forces were departing the area to return to base camps. The 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines daylight movement to the west out of the operating area and the subsequent daylight movement to the East by the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines were the indicators alluding to departure from the area. The timing of the 1st Battalion's movement was such that it reached its river crossing point in the dark and immediately commenced a silent crossing and moved to its Phase II attack positions.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Reaction to Intelligence. It became evident early in Phase I that VC forces were not on the island in the numbers anticipated. Reports of sightings to the south and interrogation of refugees indicated that many VC had departed to the south during the last two days of T.H. (10-11 February). Other reports indicated that sizable numbers of VC moved across the R.M.G. IV I M to the north. Exploitation of these reports resulted in the highly successful Phase II of the operation.

(4) Fire and Maneuver. The ratio of Marine losses to VC losses was extremely favorable. This can be attributed to a great extent to the extensive use of fires of both small arms and artillery, naval gunfire and air to neutralize enemy fires during maneuver. Suspected enemy positions were reconnoitered by fire before exposing maneuver forces. The accuracy of fire of all supporting arms and their rapid response to the ground commanders' needs contributed significantly to the success of the operation.

(5) Rapid Movement of Forces. As the attack of Phase II commenced it became apparent from the initial contact by the blocking force to the north that the enemy had been surprised and appeared to be disorganized. Further, an adjacent friendly unit to the West of the operating area immediately reported enemy sightings from their vantage point as did the aerial observers working with the ground unit. Upon receipt of this intelligence, the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines recognized that the opportunity presented itself to enclose the VC forces in the area of operation. He directed his units to rapidly move into positions from which an effective cordon could be formed before the VC could realize that they were in danger of being encircled. The speed of movement of the forces involved resulted in the closing of the cordon prior to the VC being able to react. The result of this rapid movement was the establishment of a highly successful cordon which permitted a systematic and unhurried destruction of the VC forces therein. A less rapid movement of forces on the ground would have enabled the enemy to escape.

b. CA/psy War activities conducted and the planning therefor, was considered to have been adequate and contributed to the operation. CA operations presented no unusual problems and the response by GVN officials was noteworthy. Psy War operations could not be assessed during the operation nor has this command been able to assess after operation effects. The need to abort the airborne Psy War broadcast due to weather limitations was the only problem encountered. Ground exploitation of the Psy War broadcast could not be effected due to the timing of ground movement in relation to the planned aerial broadcast. Both ground and air broadcast capabilities will be included in future operations.

c. The plans for control of non-combatants were made with the Headquarters Quang Tri Special Zone, and provided for GVN agencies to handle non-combatants. Details concerning this part of the operation are contained in paragraph 13.b. Plans made were considered to have been adequate and the response of GVN was most acceptable.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

16. Recommendation. For the first time, adequate forces were assigned to block escape routes, cordon the enemy, and conduct Search and Destroy operations on Go Noi Island. It is therefore recommended that any future operations in that area be conducted with forces of similar size.

E. J. Radics
E. J. RADICS

DISTRIBUTION:

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>NO. OF COPIES</u>
CG, 1st MarDiv	9
CG, 1st MAW	4
CG, 11th Marines	1
CG, 1st Bn, 11th Marines	1
CG, 1st Tank Bn	1
CG, 1st Amphib Bn	1
CG, 1st Anti Tank Bn	1
CG, 3rd Ingt Bn	1
CG, 1st Shore Party Bn	1
CG, 9th Marines	2
CG, 2nd Bn, 5th Marines	1
CG, 1st Bn, 26th Marines	1
CG, 2nd Bn, 26th Marines	1
CG, 7th Motor Transportation Bn	1
CG, 1st Recon Bn	1
CG, 1st Bn, 1st Marines	2
CG, 3rd Bn, 1st Marines	2
CG, 2nd Bn, 4th Marines	2
CG, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines	2
CG, USS PROVIDENCE (CLG-6)	1
SA QUANG DI Special Zone	1
Command Chronology	1
File S&C	4
Total	42

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB H

OpPlan 303-67 (KHAM DUC)

TAB H

DECLASSIFIED

Copy ___ of ___ Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
220800 Feb 67

Operation Plan 303-67

Ref: (a) MAPS: MGS: Series L 701: Sheets 6557 II and 6557 III
(b) 1st Marine Division OpPlan 303-66
(c) 1st MarDiv O P2000.2 - (CEDI)
(d) RegtO P2000.2A (Ccmn SCN)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: ___ Battalion (-) (Rein)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) U. S. Army Special Forces Team attached to KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.
- (2) GVN Forces assigned KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.
- (3) GVN Forces as may be assigned.
- (4) 1st MAF provides helicopter and fixed wing support.

2. MISSION. When directed by 1st Marine Division, in coordination with I Corps Forces and U. S. Advisory personnel, 1st Marines provides ground forces in defense of KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp; conducts operations to relieve enemy pressure on KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp; pursues and destroys VC/NVA Forces withdrawing from vicinity KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp; and provides security to artillery units positioned to support KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.

3. EXECUTION. See Annexes C through E (Concepts of Operation).

a. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Supporting Arms. Annex F.
- (2) Rules Of Engagement. Reference (b).
- (3) Code name for specific operation will be assigned by Frag Order implementing this plan.
- (4) This plan effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. To be issued.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. (1) See reference (c)
- (2) See reference (d)
- (3) Battalion Command Group, embarked on Command Helicopter with SSR capability, guards Regimental Command Net (M-39).
- (4) Upon landing Battalion enters Regimental Tactical Net via airborne automatic retransmission (AUTOCAT) aircraft provided by 1st MAW. Battalion transmits on M-1050 and 1st Marine Regiment transmits on M-545.
- (5) Upon order Battalion activates SSR station on Regimental Command Net (M-39), and AUTOCAT Aircraft secures.
- (6) U. S. Army Special Forces Team at KHAM TUC is 4.34 Mc (US2). Call sign is Brassy Study.
- (7) Air Force Air-Ground Net monitored at KHAM TUC is 42.0 Mc. Call sign is Brassy Study.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL RADICS

G. C. Petro
G. C. PETRO

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

UNEX Air

- A. (omitted)
- B. Intelligence
- C. Execution (Under Attack)
- D. Execution (Attack Imminent)
- E. Execution (Enemy Withdrawal)
- F. Supporting Arms
- X. Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex X (Distribution) to OpPlan 303-67

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy of Copies
1st Marines (Rein) FMP
DA NANG, RVN
220800 Feb 67

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 303-67.

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS series L7014, sheets 6540II, 6540III, 6639I, 6639IV
(b) 1st Marine Division Operation Plan 303-66
(c) DivO P3800.1F (SOP for Intelligence)
(d) RegO P3800.1 (SOP for Intelligence)
(e) III MAF IG 5-66

TIME ZONE: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

- a. See Annex B (Enemy Situation) to Intelligence Estimate 2-67 (Kham Duc CIDG Camp).
- b. See current Perintreps, Intsums, and Spotreps.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (Within 15 kilometers of Kham Duc CIDG Camp)

- a. Determine if enemy will attack the CIDG Camp at Kham Duc. If so, when? Where? In what strength? With what units?
- b. Determine if enemy will use reinforcements in the attack of the Kham Duc CIDG Camp. If so, when? Where? In what strength? With what units?
- c. Determine if the enemy will employ artillery, heavy mortars and/or recoilless rifles in support of the attack against the camp. If so, what type and caliber of weapons? Where will firing positions be located? What methods of fire control will be employed?
- d. Determine current combat effectiveness of enemy units that could be employed in attacks against the Kham Duc Camp.
- e. Determine the avenues of approach the enemy will use to reach the camp.
- f. Determine if the enemy will attempt to infiltrate Kham Duc Camp prior to the attack.
- g. Determine if the enemy will attempt sabotage within the Camps.

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- h. Determine what tactics the enemy will employ during the conduct of the attack.
- i. Determine what means of tactical communications enemy will employ.
- j. Determine routes of withdrawal enemy will utilize after attack on the Kham Duc Camp.

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. Orders to Subordinate Units.

(1) All Units:

- (a) Plan and conduct integrated and complete surveillance of area of operation.
- (b) Report all enemy contact including strength, disposition and identification.
- (c) Submit Air/Ground reconnaissance support request to the Regimental S-2. (See reference (d) for detailed instructions).

b. Request to higher, adjacent and supporting units.

(1) CG, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FTF

- (a) Provide Tactical air observation support on request.
- (b) Provide information on enemy activity affecting the Kham Duc CIDG Camp.
- (c) Provide current and predicted weather data.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND CAPTURED MATERIAL. See references (c) and (d) for detailed instructions.

5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. Standard reference maps: See reference (a).
- b. Submit Aerial Photography requests to the Regimental S-2 in accordance with reference (d).

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

- a. See references (c) and (d).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

b. The following Counterintelligence measures will be implemented by all units.

- (1) Maintain strict control of classified material and limit access to a strict "need to know" basis.
- (2) Immediately report the loss or compromise of classified material to the Regimental S-2.
- (3) Comply strictly with communication security measures.

c. Challenge and Password.

- (1) Challenge and Password, unless compromised or otherwise changed, will normally be in effect from 1200H to 1159H.
- (2) The Regimental S-2 will be notified immediately when compromise of the challenge and password is suspected.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

- a. Reporting of any or all information with regard to the enemy must be continuous. Reports will be submitted to the S-2 or S-3 in accordance with the procedures set forth in reference (d).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL RADICS

C. E. PEIRO

Lieutenant Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

1. Intelligence Estimate (Issued Separately)

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Plan 303-67.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy ___ of ___ Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
DA FONG, RVN
220800 Feb 67

Annex C (Concept of Operations) to OpPlan 303-67

Ref: MAP3; AM3; Series L 701; Sheets 6557 II and 6557 III

Time Zone: B

1. ASSUMPTIONS

- a. That the KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp is under heavy attack and is in danger of being over-run.
- b. That CIGG outposts have been over-run.
- c. That artillery support will be provided on request.

2. MISSION. To attack and relieve pressure on the KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. _____ Battalion lands via helicopter in designated LZ (s) and conducts operations to relieve forces within the KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.
- b. _____ Battalion
 - (1) Land at H-hour on D-day and secure designated LZ (s).
 - (2) Establish positive communications and coordination with KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.
 - (3) Attack enemy forces threatening KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.
 - (4) Provide security for artillery.
 - (5) Be prepared on order to seize and defend specified objectives.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

c. 11th Marines

- (1) Provide artillery group to be helo-lifted vicinity
KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.
- (2) See Annex E (Supporting Arms)

d. 1st Recon Battalion

- (1) Provide one Recon platoon to be helo-lifted vicinity
KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.

e. 3rd Engineer Battalion

- (1) Provide one Engineer platoon to be helo-lifted vicinity
KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL RADICS

G. E. PETRO

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex X (Distribution) to OpPlan 303-67

C-2 DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy ____ of ____ Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
Da Nang, RVN
220800Z Feb 67

Annex B (Execution) to Operation 303-67

Ref: (a) MAPS: AMS: Series L 701: Sheets 6557 II and 6557 III

Time Zone: E

1. ASSUMPTIONS

- a. That enemy attack of the KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp is imminent.
- b. That artillery support will be furnished on request.

2. MISSION. To reinforce and assist in defense of the KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. ____ Battalion lands within confines KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp to reinforce and assist in defense of the base complex.
- b. Battalion
 - (1) Land at H-hour on D-day in specified LZ (s).
 - (2) Establish communications and coordination with KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.
 - (3) Reinforce existing outposts and defensive positions.
 - (4) Develop counter-attack plans for possible enemy penetrations along KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp perimeter.
- c. 11th Marines
 - (1) Provide artillery gun to be hoisted vicinity KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.
 - (2) See Annex C (Supporting Arms).

D-1

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

d. 1st Recon Battalion

- (1) Provide one Recon platoon to be helolifted vicinity
KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.

e. 3rd Engineer Battalion

- (1) Provide one engineer platoon to be helolifted vicinity
KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL RADICS

G. E. PETRO

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex X (Distribution) to OpPlan 393-67

D-2 DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy of Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
DA NMC, RVN
220800 Feb 67

Annex E (Execution) to OpPlan 303-67

Ref: (a) MAPS: 1:50,000 Series L 701: Sheets 6557II and 6557 III.

Time Zone: H

1. ASSUMPTION

- a. That the enemy has over-run KIM DUC Special Forces Camp and is withdrawing.
- b. That artillery support will be provided on request.

2. MISSION. To pursue and destroy withdrawing VC/PA Forces.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. _____ Battalion lands via helicopter in designated LZ (s), and pursues and destroys withdrawing VC/PA Forces.

- b. _____ Battalion

- (1) Land at 1-Hour on D-Day in specified LZ(s).
- (2) Destroy withdrawing enemy forces by assuming blocking position or conducting pursuit in force.
- (3) Provide security for artillery battery.

- c. 11th Marines

- (1) Provide artillery group to be helolifted vicinity KIM DUC Special Forces Camp.
- (2) See Annex F (Fire Support)

- d. 1st Recon Battalion

- (1) Provide one Recon platoon to be helolifted vicinity KIM DUC Special Forces Camp.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy 1 of 1 Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
220800 Feb 67

c. 3rd Engineer Battalion

- (1) Provide one Engineer platoon to be helolifted vicinity
NAM BUC Special Forces Camp.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL RADICS

[Signature]
G. E. PETRO
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex X (Distribution) to OpPlan 303-67

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy ___ of ___ Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
D.K. NG, KVR
22000 Feb 67

Annex F (Supporting Arms) to OpPlan 303-67

Ref: (a) MAPS; USG Series I 701: Sheets 6540 II, III, 6639 I, IV.
(b) 11th Marines 014000-70
(c) EPR 7-3

Time Zone: F

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. Basic Order.

2. MISSION. When directed, 1st Marine Division provides artillery and air support to support/relieve KMAC Special Forces Group.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Artillery. Seventh Marines provides a Battery Group comprising one 105mm Howitzer Battery and one 4.2 Mortar Battery as direct support for 1st Battalion (Rein) in the reinforcement of KMAC Special Forces Group; the relief of the Group, if under attack and in the event of the enemy if Group has been overrun.
- b. Air Support. 1st Marine Air Wing provide tactical and logistical air support as required in order to support the contingency movement of 1st Battalion (Rein) to the vicinity of KMAC Special Forces Group and for subsequent operations in that area.
- c. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Fire Support Coordination. Coordination of supporting arms will be exercised by Special Forces Detachment Commander until such time as relief force is committed. At that time, fire support coordination will be exercised by the senior Marine Corps Tactical Commander in the area.
 - (2) Air observation to be provided when available.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(3) Artillery

- (a) Zone of Fire. 6400 miles
- (b) Firing Sheet. Grid Sheet. Scale 1:25,000
- (c) Registration. No limitations
- (d) Counter Battery Policy. Active
- (e) Operations in accordance with reference (b).
- (f) Artillery Concentrations. Appendix 1 (Army Concentration).

(4) Air

- (a) Preplanned Air Targets. Appendix 2 (Preplanned Air Targets).
- (b) Helicopter Landing Zone. Annex B (Intelligence).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL RADICS

[Signature]
C. E. PETRO
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDICES:

- 1. Artillery Concentrations
- 2. Preplanned Air Targets

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex X (Distribution) to OpPlan 303-67

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy _____ of _____ Copies
1st Marines (RCIN)
D. NANG, RVN
220800H Feb 67

Appendix 1 (Army Concentrations, KHAM DUC) to Annex F (Supporting Areas) to
OpPlan 303-67

Base (a) Area: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, M.S. Series L7014. Sheets 6540 II, III;
6539 I, IV.

Time Zone: H

1. KHAM DUC CIDG Camp is located at ZC 004076, elevation 360 meters.
Special Forces contingent in Detachment 1-105, 5th SFG.
2. Target List:

TGT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TGT DESCRIPTION
1	YC 98171015	812 meters	CP
2	YC 97950655	380	Trail junction
3	YC 98250676	390	Old village
4	YC 99260605	430	Bivouac area
5	YC 98480760	410	Avenue of approach
6	YC 98350705	450	CP
7	YC 98800779	390	Trail junction
8	YC 99300695	390	Avenue of approach
9	YC 99590655	210	River junction
10	YC 99350812	380	Avenue of approach
11	YC 99500901	390	Bridge
12	ZC 00410645	370	Mortar site
13	ZC 00450732	360	Trail
14	ZC 00450760	310	Avenue of approach
15	ZC 00650779	330	Trail
16	ZC 00650785	340	Trail
17	ZC 00850825	260	Avenue of approach
18	ZC 00840845	270	Bridge
19	ZC 01000885	450	OP
20	ZC 00851029	390	Bridge
21	ZC 01151095	310	Bridge
22	ZC 01400845	450	OP
23	ZC 02600755	350	Bivouac area
24	ZC 02600813	390	Bivouac area
25	ZC 01220694	370	Mortar position
26	ZC 02720647	372	Bivouac area
27	ZC 01320755	190	Ford
28	ZC 05000767	170	River junction
29	ZC 01100610	390	Bivouac area
30	ZC 02670961	470	Mortar site
31	YC 95569986	440	Bridge
32	YC 96170376	410	Bridge
33	YC 96600780	380	Abandoned village

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

34	ZC 04551394	360	Ford
35	ZC 03601054	300	Old OP
36	ZC 02821105	320	Bridge
37	ZC 04350967	170	Bridge
38	ZC 03800354	170	Adver junction
39	ZC 03630548	200	Ford
40	ZC 05080324	210	Ford
41	ZC 02530420	676	Old OP
42	ZC 03000320	430	Trail
43	YC 93950765	549	Divorce area
44	YC 97731350	1028	OP
45	ZC 00240260	550	Divorce area
46	ZC 01200380	550	Marker position
47	ZC 07860852	240	Stream crossing
48	YC 95571120	450	Marker position
49	YC 97800535	790	Divorce area
50	ZC 00901280	500	Trail

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration lines in the vicinity of KVMJ DEC.

RP. NR	RP. LOCATION	ELEVATION	RP. DESCRIPTION
#1	ZC 02550430	676 meters	Old OP
#2	ZC 02160657	457	Hilltop
#3	YC 99361010	630	Hilltop
#4	YC 99420782	510	Hilltop

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ADAMS

[Signature]
G. H. PETRO
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex X (Distribution) to OpPlan 303-67.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy ____ of ____ Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
220800H Feb 67

Appendix 2 (Preplanned Air Targets, KHAM DUC) to Annex F (Preplanned Air Targets) to Operation Plan 303-67.

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS L 7014. Sheets 6540 II, III; 653 I, IV.

Time Zone: E

1. KHAM DUC CIDG Camp is located at ZC 004073, elevation 360 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment 1-105, 5th SFGA.

2. Target list:

TGT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TGT DESCRIPTION
E 1	ZC 004077	340 meters	Perimeter
E 2	ZC 005078	340	Perimeter
E 3	ZC 006080	360	Perimeter
E 4	ZC 008083	360	Perimeter
E 5	ZC 007038	370	Perimeter
E 6	ZC 004068	370	Perimeter
E 7	ZC 002085	370	Perimeter
E 8	ZC 001083	370	Perimeter
E 9	YC 999081	370	Perimeter
E 10	YC 997078	370	Perimeter
E 11	YC 999075	370	Perimeter
E 12	ZC 004075	330	Perimeter
E 13	ZC 008078	350	CP #3
E 14	ZC 012092	380	Trail junction
E 15	ZC 006090	410	Highway #10
E 16	ZC 014094	450	CP #7
E 17	ZC 016096	450	CP #5
E 18	ZC 013109	460	Highway #14
E 19	YC 997093	370	Highway #14
E 20	YC 995090	390	Highway #14
E 21	YC 994086	370	Highway trail junction
E 22	YC 993071	370	Trail
E 23	YC 998070	340	Trail
E 24	YC 998091	750	CP #1
E 25	YC 988071	450	CP #6
E 26	YC 981067	370	Trail
E 27	YC 977066	390	Highway #14
E 28	YC 961084	330	Trail
E 29	YC 972095	750	Trail
E 30	YC 993102	340	Trail

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

E 31	YC 993165	180 meters	Trail
E 32	YC 960036	470	Highway #14
E 33	YC 972045	410	Highway #14
E 34	YC 963018	450	Highway #14
E 35	YC 964039	430	Possible CP
E 36	YC 963015	450	Sub site for rest force
E 37	YC 971074	440	Sub site for rest force
E 38	YC 965024	770	Main trail
E 39	YC 952076	600	Trail
E 40	ZC 021157	150	Highway #14
E 41	ZC 034143	420	Highway #14
E 42	ZC 046112	270	Highway #14
E 43	ZC 050037	270	Trail
E 44	ZC 072001	250	Trail
E 45	ZC 088009	390	Trail
E 46	ZC 001039	300	Trail
E 47	ZC 025032	410	Possible CP
E 48	ZC 042058	150	Trail
E 49	ZC 051133	210	Trail
E 50	YC 997161	120	Trail

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL RADTOS

[Signature]
G. L. RAYNO
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex X (Distribution) to OpPlan 303-67

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy ___ of ___ Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
220800H Feb 67


ANNEX X (Distribution) to OpPlan 303-67

Time Zone: H

ORGANIZATION

I Corps	2
CG, III MAF	2
CG, 1st MarDiv	2
1st Mar	6
CG, 1st MAF	2
9th Mar	4
11th Mar	6
KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp	2
SA, QUANG DA Special Zone	2
1st Recon Bn.	2
3rd Engr Bn.	2
1st Bn., 11th Marines	2
1st Bn., 1st Marines	5
2nd Bn., 1st Mar	3
3rd Bn., 1st Mar	5
Co. F, 1st Mar	1
File	10
Command Chronology	1
Total	61

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL RADICS


G. E. PETRO
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to OpPlan 303-67

DECLASSIFIED

TAB I

OpPlan 311-67 (ARVN POL Security)

TAB I

DECLASSIFIED

COPY 53 064 Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
DA MAPS, RVN
250700H Mar 67

Op Plan 311-66 (Security for 511th ARVN Ammo Depot, Da Nang and Port POL Facilities)

- Ref: (a) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AAS Series L7014 Da Nang, Sheets 6841 II & III.
(b) CG III MAF 140802Z Aug 66 (S) (TOTAL)
(c) 1st MarDiv Cplan 311-66
(d) 1st MarDiv O 003400.9A
(e) 1st MarDiv Op O 301-66
(f) 1st MarDiv Admin O 301-66
(g) 1st MarDiv O P02000.2C

1ST MARINES SAC CONTROL NO. 0017-67

Time Zone: II

1. SITUATION

III MAF is prepared to exercise control and to provide necessary security for ARVN Ammunition Depots and POL facilities within the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) should the situation require in order to ensure support to loyal GVN forces and to deny support to disloyal and dissident elements. Reference (b).

A. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Basic Intelligence Studies on Ammunition Supply Points located in the DA NANG Area (to be issued).
- (2) Intelligence Spot reports, Intelligence Summaries and Periodical Intelligence Reports as issued.

B. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Naval Support Activity supervises the offloading of ammunition ships at DA NANG.
- (2) I Corps Area Logistics Command (I ALC) Advisory Team Six exercises control of ammo issue by the ARVN Ammunition Depot, DA NANG and the Senior Advisor reports to the Commander, Naval Support Activity.
- (3) I Corps Area Logistics Command (I ALC) Advisory Team Six exercises control of POL issue and reports to the Commander, Naval Support Activity.
- (4) III MAF continues operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone.
- (5) First Marine Air wing provides air support on request.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

C. ASSUMPTIONS.

(1) That I ALC will be notified through RVN-F channels which units are authorized to receive ammunition and POL and in what quantities. Concurrently, I ALC Team Six will receive the same information through the appropriate channels.

(2) Ammunition Section, 81st CRD CP, I Corps Area Logistics Command will continue functioning in order to determine P&NS and to direct shipments for storage facilities outside the Da Nang area.

2. MISSION

On order, 1st Marines assumes the responsibilities for security of the ARVN 511th Ammunition Depot, Da Nang (objective 1) which is located in the vicinity of coordinates BT 050790 and for security of the Port POL facilities (objective 2) which is located in the vicinity of coordinates BT 033768.

3. EXECUTION

A. Concept of Operations. Upon notification from Commanding General, 1st Marine Division to provide security for the ARVN 511th Ammunition Depot, Da Nang and the Port POL Facilities, 1st Marines elements proceed by motor convoy, armored column or helicopter to their assigned locations and assume the responsibility of security. Control of receipts and the distribution of Class III and V items will remain the responsibility of the Senior Advisor I Corps Area Logistics Command Advisory Team Six who will report to the Commander Naval Support Activity or the Commanding General Third Marine Amphibious Force, as appropriate. I Corps Area Logistics Command will inform Marines which ARVN units are authorized to receive POL and ammunition and in what levels or quantities. The USMC security force commander at each location is responsible for the security of the supply against enemy or dissident/loyal GVN forces and answers only to the Commanding Officer, 1st Marines. When the political situation stabilizes, the security of the supply points will be reassigned to loyal GVN forces and 1st Marines units will be withdrawn on order from Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

B. Battalion.

(1) On order, provide one (1) rifle company for security of ARVN 511th Ammunition Depot.

(2) On order, provide one (1) rifle platoon (rein) for security of Port POL Facilities.

(3) Upon assuming control of the Ammunition Depot and the Port POL Facilities, establish communications with I ALC Advisory Team Six.

DECLASSIFIED

C. 1st Anti-Tank Battalion

- (1) Be prepared to escort an armored column or a motor convoy from Bn CP to objective (1).
- (2) Be prepared to escort an armored column or a motor convoy from Bn CP to objective (2).

- (2) Be prepared to escort an armored column or motor convoy from Bn CP to objective (2).

1. 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-) (Rein)

- (1) Be prepared to transport one rifle company from _____ Bn CF to objective (1).

- (2) Be prepared to transport one rifle platoon (Rain) from Bn CP to objective (2).

E. 1st Antrec Battalion (-) (Rein).

- (1) Be prepared to move one rifle company by LVT-5 from Bn CP to objective (1).

- (2) Be prepared to move one rifle platoon (rein) by LVTP-5 from En 02 to objective (2).

W. 1st Tank Battalion (-).

- (1) Be prepared to escort an armored column or a motor convoy from _____ Bn CP to objective (1) and provide a unit to support the rifle company in the objective area.

- (2) Be prepared to escort an armored column or a motor convoy from _____ Bn CP to objective (2) and provide a unit to support the rifle platoon in the objective area.

G. 1st Engineer Battalion

- (1) Be prepared to provide a unit to support the assigned rifle company in the area of objective (1).

- (2) Be prepared to provide a unit to support two assigned rifle platoons in the area of objective (2).

3. Detachment 3rd Shore Party Battalion

- (1) We prepared to provide lighting for objectives (1) and (2).

I. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Direct Liaison is authorized to all units concerned.

- (2) Coordination with GVN Forces in the execution of this plan will be on a cooperation and coordination basis.

DECLASSIFIED

- (3) This plan becomes effective for planning upon receipt and for execution on order.
- (4) Artillery fires and/or Air Support will be called on to ammunition Depot or the Port POL Facilities only as a last means of preventing supplies from falling into the hands of enemy or dissident elements.
- (5) The use of riot control agents is authorized in accordance with reference (c).
- (6) Rules of Engagement will be in accordance with reference (f).
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Will be in accordance with reference (f).
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
- A. Communications-Electronics. Will be in accordance with reference (g).
- B. Command. Changes.

E. J. RAEICS
E. J. RAEICS

DISTRIBUTION:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Copies</u>
III MAF	2
1st MarDiv	2
1st MAW	2
I ALC Advisory Tm Six	1
I Corps Adv Grp	1
SA, 2nd ARVN Div	1
SA, QUANG DA Spcl Force	1
1st Mar	6
9th Mar	2
11th Mar	2
1st AT Bn	2
1st MT Bn	2
1st Tk Bn	2
1st Engr Bn	2
1st AmTrac Bn	2
DEF 3rd SP Bn	2
1st Bn, 1st Mar	5
2nd Bn, 1st Mar	5
3rd Bn, 1st Mar	5
CO. F, 1st Mar	1
File	20
Command Chronology	1
TOTAL	69

DECLASSIFIED

TAB J
Frag Order 03-67 Operation LAFAYETTE

TAB J

DECLASSIFIED

Copy ____ of ____ Copies
1st Marines (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
010800H Mar 67

Frag Order 03-67 Operation LAFAYETTE

Ref: (a) MACS: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; Series L701, Sheets 6658 I, IV; 6659 II, III
(b) 1st MarDiv Op Order 301-66

Time Zone: E

Task Organization:

1st Mar (-) (Rein)

COLONEL RADICS

HqCo

Det., 29th CA Co.

1st Bn., 1st Mar (-)

LIEUTENANT COLON L BELL

Co. A

Co. B

2nd Bn., 1st Mar (-)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HUGLIOTT

Co. E

Co. G

3rd Bn., 1st Mar. (-)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DENTLEY

Co. K

Co. L

Co. M

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) QUANG DA Special Zone provides Cultural Drama Teams, Vis Tm and military support.
- (2) DIEN BAN DISTRICT provides village cadre teams.
- (3) 51st Regiment ARVN provides blocking forces to west of SONG VINH DIEN north of 665 GL.

2. MISSION

1st Marines (-) (Rein) conducts search and destroy operations via HCAN TRUNG - PHANG Ho Complex.

1
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation

First Marines establish cordon on west and south of S&D objective area at H-Hour on D-Day. Sweep forces attack south from vic MAN QUAN (2) and HAI AN (2) at H-Hour on D-Day to capture/destroy enemy forces or to force them into S&D objective area. Forces to east of objective area position forces to establish killing zones to destroy enemy forces attempting to escape to the east, then on order assume cordon position. Upon establishment of cordon, ZOI's will be swept to remove local populace. Sweep force will be GVN Forces if available. Populace will be located in Bn collection points. COUNTY FAIR type activities will be conducted at the Bn Collection points. ZOI's will then be systematically searched for enemy forces, supplies and equipment.

b. 1st Bn., 1st Mar.

- (1) Establish cordon from 059596 to 081598 at H-Hour - D-Day.
- (2) Establish killing zones general vicinity of PL ~~081598~~ ^{Apple}; on order, assume cordon position.
- (3) Upon establishment of cordon move or assist in movement of civilians from ZOI to Bn collection point and commence systematic search and destroy in ZOI.

c. 2nd Bn., 1st Mar.

- (1) Commencing 01 Mar 67, conduct S&D operations from PL ~~081598~~ ^{BRADG} to east.
- (2) Establish cordon at H-Hour D-Day.
- (3) Establish plt blocking position vicinity BU MUNG (1) at H-Hour, D-Day.
- (4) Be prepared, on order, to cross LANG VINH DIEN.

d. 3rd Bn., 1st Mar.

- (1) Commencing H-Hour D-Day conduct S&D ops from northern portion T&R to cordon.
- (2) Establish killing zones general vicinity of PL ~~081598~~ ^{Apple}; on order, commence movement to cordon position.
- (3) Upon establishment of cordon move, or assist in movement, of civilians from ZOI to Bn collection point and commence systematic search in ZOI.

e. 1st Bn., 11th Mar. 0/3 1st Mar.

DECLASSIFIED

f. Co. C, 1st Tank Bn.

Det. D/S 1st Bn., 1st Mar.
Det. D/S 3rd Bn., 1st Mar.

g. Co. A, 1st Anti Tank Bn.

Plt. D/S 1st Bn., 1st Mar.
Plt. D/S 2nd Bn., 1st Mar.
Plt. D/S 3rd Bn., 1st Mar.

DECLASSIFIED

h. Co. A, 1st Anti Tank Bn.

Det. D/S 1st Bn., 1st Mar.
Det. D/S 2nd Bn., 1st Mar.
Det. D/S 3rd Bn., 1st Mar.

i. HMM - 361.- 2 H-34 Helos D/S 1st Mar.

j. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) D-Day, H-Hour: Tentatively 020700H Mar 67.
- (2) Utilize appropriate KC. in clearing and destroying fortifications and tunnels.
- (3) All request for smoke cleared with this Headquarters.
- (4) Rules of Engagement: Reference (b).
- (5) PsyOps broadcast/leaflet drops to be conducted in coordination with establishment of cordon.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

No change except Regimental POW collection point via BT 104583.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MEDICS

[Signature]
G. J. PETRO

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX:

1. Operation Overlay


DISTRIBUTION:

1st Mar
1st Bn., 1st Mar
2nd Bn., 1st Mar
3rd Bn., 1st Mar
1st Bn., 4th Mar

DECLASSIFIED

Annex A (Operations (Play) to Frag Order 03-67 Operations in LAFAYETTE

Ref: MAPS: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; Series L701, Sheets 6658 I, IV, 6659 II, III



BY COMMAND OF COLONEL RADICS

[Signature]
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

TAB K

Battalion's Concept of Operation LAFAYETTE III

TAB K

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
San Francisco, California, 96602

Concept of Operations for proposed Operation LAFAVETTE II March 1967

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS L 707 Sheet 6658 I

Time Zone H

1. MISSION. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines conducts search and destroy operations to and establishes cordon at assigned LOA. (See Overlay).

2. CONCEPT. Commencing at H-hour on D-day 1st Battalion, 1st Marines will conduct search and destroy operation from vicinity of DIEN BAN District Headquarters; 1st Battalion, 1st Marines CP; and the Horseshoe area, closing on the assigned LOA from the east, south and southeast to establish cordon and tie in with 3d Battalion, 1st Marines units on the right and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines on the left. The operation will continue with detailed search and destroy operations within the cordoned area (See Overlay).

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL VAN D. BELL, JR.

John A. Scott

JOHN A. SCOTT
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DECLASSIFIED

Task Organization for proposed Operation JAFAYETT 11 March 1967

Time Zone: H

1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)

Maj SCOTT

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Command Group B

Company A (Rein)

Capt CUMMINGHAM

Co A

Plat, Co C

PO Tm, Ptry A, 1st Pn, 11th Mar

PAC Tm

2 Demo Tms, 2d Plat, Co A, 1st Eng Pn

Company B (-) (Rein)

2d Lt CHUPIK

2 Plats, Co B

Plat, Co D

PO Tm, Ptry A, 1st Pn, 11th Mar

2 Demo Tms, 2d Plat, Co A, 1st Eng Pn

1st Platoon (-), Company C, 1st Tank Battalion

1st Platoon (-), Company A, 1st AmTrac Battalion

Section LVTE-1 Plat, Company A, 1st AmTrac Battalion

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL VAN D. BELL, JR.

John A. Scott

JOHN A. SCOTT

Major, U. S. Marine Corps

Executive Officer

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2nd Bn, 1st Marines
DANANG, RVN
27 February 1967
SER No. 0067-67

FRAG ORDER 120-67

Ref: (a) First Marines FRAG ORDER 01-67

Time Zone: H

Hdqs 2// 1st Mar Div

Log No. 067-67

Task Organization

Copy No. 1 of 5 Copies

2nd Bn, 1st Marines(-)(Rein)

Lt Col M.K. HEWLETT

Det, H&S Co

Co E (Rein)

Capt T.M. PRATT

Co E

FO Team, 1st Bn, 11th Marines

FO Team, 81mm Mort Plat

Det, Intel Sec

Det, Med Plat

Scout/Sniper Team, 1st Mar

Det, Scout Dog Plat

Co G (Rein)

Capt G.L. LYNCH

Co G

FO Team, 1st Bn, 11th Mar

FO Team, 81mm Mort Plat

Det, Intel Sec

Det, Med Plat

Scout/Sniper Team, 1st Mar

81mm Mort Plat(-)(Rein)

GySgt J.J. MORENO

81mm Mort Plat(-)

Det, Med Plat

1. SITUATION

A. Enemy. Current IntSums.

B. Friendly.

- (1) First Marines conducts operation LAFAYETTE I, II, and III in accordance with reference (a) and Annex A (Operation LAFAYETTE Concept).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- (2) Light Section, 2nd Plat, Co A, 1st A-T Bn direct support Co G.
- (3) _____ Plat, Co A, 1st AmTrac Bn direct support.
- (4) Sqd, 1st Plat, Co A, 1st Engr Bn direct support.

2. MISSION. Second Battalion conducts search and destroy, sweep and cordon operations in area bounded by 1st Marines/9th Marines boundary, gridline 59, SONG VLEN DIEN and Anderson Trail to commence on order.

3. EXECUTION

- A. Concept. Annex B(Concept of Operations).
- B. Co E. At H-Hour on D-Day commence search and destroy operations in ZOA. Emphasize search aspects. Be prepared to continue operations in accordance with Annex B.
- C. Co G. At H-Hour on D-Day commence search and destroy operations in ZOA. Emphasize search aspects. Be prepared to continue operations in accordance with Annex B.
- D. 81mm Mort Plat(-). At H-Hour plus 2 on D-Day displace with one section to coord 042620 and support operations in accordance with Annex B.
- E. Coordination
 - (1) D-Day, H-Hour to be announced.
 - (2) Assembly area is Second Battalion perimeter.
 - (3) Companies commence search and destroy operations from attack positions in assigned ZOA west of Phase Line ALPHA at H-Hour.
 - (4) Companies have freedom of maneuver in assigned ZOA except that river lines will be covered by coordinated sweeps on either side.
 - (5) Contact is from left to right.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- (6) Position reports hourly.
- (7) Co E has fire and maneuver clearance in 9th Marines sector between gridlines 61 and 59 and west to the railroad.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. Supply

- (1) Class I. Three meals MCI, one hot meal per day after cordon is set.
- (2) Class II. One gas mask per squad.
- (3) Class IV. MITY MITE Blower with required chemicals prepared for movement to field as required.
- (4) Class V. Basic allowance. One extra bandolier for Co E. At least one CS grenade per fire team.

B. Resupply. Bn supply by helicopter and vehicle.

C. Transportation. OTTER platoon requested for direct support.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

A. Command

- (1) Bn CP. Command Group moves with Co E.
- (2) Co CP's. Report initial location and changes thereafter.

B. Communications

- (1) Second Battalion guards First Marine TAC Net: M-653.
- (2) Second Battalion TAC Net: M-838.
- (3) S-4, Second Battalion activates Second Battalion secondary TAC Net (M-569) as requested to receive

DECLASSIFIED

company LOG requests. Companies enter this net for resupply requests only.

(4) Air Nets

(a) HD/TAR

Primary: HD-5, GRIMSON M-561

Secondary: HD-1, GOLD M-1240

Alternate Secondary: HD-4, YELLOW M-599

(b) TAD

Primary: HD-9, OLIVE M-1250

Secondary: TAD-1, BLUE M-1223

(c) Med-Evacs. LZ CONTROL, M-700

C. Authenticate IAM effective addition KAC-JJ.

D. Operational code effective addition KAC-PAPA.

E. Current shackle sheets and thrust lines required.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL M.M. HEWLETT

W. F. Hohmann
W. F. HOHMANN
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Annexox:

A(Operation LAFAYETTE Concept)
B(Concept of Operations)

DISTRIBUTION: Special


4
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Copy No. 1 of 5 copies
2nd Ed., 1st Edition
1962, 1967
7 February 1967
SEC No. 0067-67

Figure 8 (Concept of Operations) to PRAG ORDER 1-70-67

Note: (a) HRF: 150,000, Sheet 66,027-0100, Sheet 66,027-0100




SECRET

Copy No. 1 of 5 copies
2nd Ed., 1st Revision
DISTRIBUTION
64449 006 727

Amex A (Operation LAFALETTE Concept) to FRAG ORDER 120-47

Ref: (a) First Marines FRAG ORDER 01-47
(b) MAP: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS 17014, Sheet 644000 DAT 100, AMS 1701, Sheet 6441 F&I PO



BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL L. M. RABBITT

L. M. RABBITT
L. M. RABBITT
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

261209Z FEB 67
FM THIRD BN FIRST MAR
TO FIRST MAR

BT

A: FIRST MAR FRAG O 21-67 251320Z FEB 67

1. IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED:

A. TASK ORGANIZATION

H&S CO (-)

CO K (REIN)

CO L (REIN)

CO M (-) (REIN)

PLAT, CO C 1ST TANK BN

PLAT, CO A 1ST AMTRAC BN

B. PLANS

1. UPON CHOP OF CO M FROM 1/1 AT COMPLETION OF PHASE 1. IT WILL MOVE TO VIC 090650 AND CONDUCT S&D OPNS IN VIEM DONG, CAM SA HAMLETS.

2. UPON CHOP OF CO K FROM 1/1 AT COMPLETION OF PHASE 1, IT WILL MOVE TO BN CP AND CONDUCT S&D OPNS IN VIC 0767 VTRA KHE (2) AND CAU HA (2) AND IN VIC 0667 HAI AN AND NGAN CAU.

3. CO L WILL COMMENCE S&D OPNS IN VIC 0468 MAN QUAN (1), (2) AND AN LUU ON 28 FEB.

4. ALL COMPANIES WILL CONTINUE OPNS IN ASSIGNED AREAS UNTIL ORDERED TO COMMENCE SWEEP. THEY WILL THEN ATTACK TOWARD OBJECTIVE AREA AND ESTABLISH CORDON ALONG EDGE OF THE NGAN TRUNG--PHONG HO COMPLEX IN CORDINATION WITH 1/1 AND 2/1.

5. UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDON, A COLLECTION POINT WILL BE SET UP IN VIC 0764 AND CLEARING AND S&D OPNS WILL BE INITIATED.

6. BN CP WILL DISPLACE UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDON TO VIC OF 0760

7. UPON TERMINATION OF OPN LAFAYETTE, INTENTIONS ARE TO SHIFT LV FORCES NORTH AND CONDUCT S&D OPN IN TU CAU.

GP-4

BT

TOR: 1525/26 FEB 67/CCN: 2437/AJM/SMG

DECLASSIFIED

COPY 4 OF 5 COPIES

BURN

FILE

Act on
S-3 _____
S-3A _____
Air Off _____
OPCHIEF _____

TAB L
Frag Orders for Month

TAB L

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

ACT 100
S-3
S-3A
Air Off
OPCHIEF

O 140302Z MAR 67
FM FIRST MARINES
TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
Z 130942Z MAR 67
1 FIRST MARINES
TO FIRST ON FIRST MRINES
SECOND ON FIRST MARINES

HAS BEEN SENT
BURN

THIRD BN FIRST MARINES
BT

~~SECRET~~
ERAC 0 20-67

FILE ✓

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV MSG 130003Z MAR 67
1. FIRST ON FIRST MARINES:
 - A. PREPARE IMMEDIATELY PLANS FOR EFFECTING RELIEF/REINFORCEMENT OF GVN DIST HQTRS AT DIEN BAN.
 - B. PLANS TO INCLUDE:
 - (1) PROVISIONS FOR COMMITMENT OF ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) BY MOTOR OF FOOT MARCH, DAY OR NIGHT FOR REINFORCEMENT OR RELIEF OF DIEN BAN DIST HQ.
 - (2) COORDINATION WITH US ADVISORS FOR SCHEME OF MANUEVER AND PLAN OF SUPPORTING FIRES.
 2. SECOND BN FIRST MARINES:
 - A. PREPARE IMMEDIATELY PLANS FOR EFFECTING RELIEF/REINFORCEMENT OF DIST HQ AT DUY XUYEN.
 - B. SAME AS PARA 1 (B) ABOVE EXCEPT DUY XUYEN VICE DIEN BAN, AND ADD PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR ONE COMPANY BY HELILIFT.
 3. THIRD BN FIRST MARINES:
 - A. PREPARE PLANS FOR REINFORCEMENTS BY ONE HELILIFTED COMPANY OF FORCES COMMITTED BY FIRST BN OR SECOND BN.
 - B. COORDINATE SCHEME OF MANUEVER AND PLANS OF SUPPORTING FIRES WITH FIRST BN OR SECOND BN.
 4. ADDITIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETION OF PLANS DIRECTED BY REF (A) WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.
- GP-4
BT

COPY 4 OF 5 COPIES

TOO:0210Z/14MAR67/CCN:105/GOP/RCV

DECLASSIFIED

HAS BEEN SENT

OP 141520Z MAR 67
FM FIRST MARINES
TO FIRST BN FIRST MARINEE
SECOND BN FIRST MARINES
THIRD BN FIRST MARINES
FIRST BN ELEVENTH MARINES
SA QUANG DA SECTOR
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)
BT

S-3
S-3A
Air Off
OPCHIEF

BURN

FILE

FRAG ORDER 21-67 (REACTION PLANS FOR RD PROTECTION)

A. 1ST MARDIV PO--000.2 (CEOI) B. HQ I CORPS SOI, EFFECTIVE EDITION
IN SITUATION. RECENT ATTACKS ON GVN FACILITIES CONFIRMS VC/NVA
INTENTIONS TO DISRUPT RD CAMPAIGN PLANS. RD ACTIVITIES IN AND NEAR
FIRST MARINES TAOR WILL SERVE AS A FOCUS FOR VC/NVA EFFORTS. ONLY IMM-
EDIATE REACTION BY SPT ARMS AND OR MANEUVER FORCES CAN PREVENT TOTAL
SUCCESS OF SUCH ATTACKS.
2. MISSION. FIRST MARINES PROVIDES SUPPORTING ARMS FFIRE IN DEFENSE
OF BELEAGUERED GNV INSTALLATIONS, CONDUCTS UNILATERAL OF COORDINATING

OPNS TO REIN OR RELIEVE INSTALLATIONS UNDER ATTACK, AND PURSUE ENEMY
FORCES INVOLVED.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- (1) MANEUVER. UPON NOTIFICATION OF ATTACK ON GVN INSTALLATIONS
WITHIN TAOR, REACTION FORCE WILL MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY, IN COORD-
INATED OR UNILATERAL MANEUVER, TO REIN/RELIEVE BELEAGUERED POS-
TION, AND WILL BE PREPARED TO MOVE TO BELEAGUERED INSTAL-
LATIONS OUTSIDE TAOR ON ORDER.
- (2) FIRE SUPPORT. UPON NOTIFICATION OF ATTACK ON GVN INSTALLATIONS
PREPLANNED SUPPORTING ARMS FIRE WITHIN CAPABILITY WILL PROVIDED
AS REQUESTED BY BELEAGURED POSITION, OR ITS HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.
FIRE SUPPORTER REIN/RELIEF FORCE WILL BE COORDINATED WITH
BELEAGUERED POSITION, OR ITS HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.
- (3) COMMUNICATIONS. INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF ATTACK WILL BE PASSED
TO APPROPRIATE BATTALION BY THAT INSTALLATION UNDER ATTACK
OR BY QUANG NAM SECTOR HEADQUARTERS.

B. FIRST BN. ESTABLISH NECESSARY LN AND PREPARE PLANS FORE FIRE
SPT/RELIEF OF HIEU NHON (BT 165576) AND DIEN BAN (BBT 065582)
DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. AND FOR QUANG NAM PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS
(BT 152581).

DECLASSIFIED

- C. SECOND BN. ESTABLISH NECESSARY LN AND PREPARE PLANS FOR FIRE SPT/RELIEF OF DUY XUYEN (BT 164515), QUE SON (BT 142347) THANG BINH (BT 168415) AND HOA VANG (BT 012723) DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS.
- D. THIRD BN. BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE PLANS DEVELOPED BY FIRST AND SECOND BATTALIONS.
- E. SA, QUANG DA ZONE.
- (1) REQUEST THAT A DEFENSIVE FIRE PLAN FOR EACH GVN INSTALLATION COVERED BY THIS PLAN BE PREPARED AND SUBMITTED TO FIRST MARINES
- (2) REQUEST THAT DAILY COMMUNICATIONS DRILLS BE INITIATED BY GVN INSTALLATIONS TO APPROPRIATE BATTALION OF THE FIRST MARINES.
- F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
- (1) PROVIDE SPT/REACTION FORCES TO INSTALLATIONS UNDER ATTACK WITHIN BN TAOR ON OWN INITIATIVE.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SPT/REACTION FORCES TO INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE BN TAOR ON ORDER.
- (3) ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CAPABILITY TO COMMIT ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) IN SPT OF ABOVE MISSION ON ONE HOUR NOTICE FROM 1800-0600H WITH FOLLOW-ON FORCES AS REQUIRED.
- (4) DELIVER FIRES ASAP IN SPT OF BESIEGED INSTALLATION WITHIN CAPABILITY UPON REQUEST.
- (5) ALL PLANS TO BE PREPARED ON PRIORITY BASIS. 75 COPIES TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.
- (6) PREPARE FIRE PLAN FOR THE REIN/RELIEF OF APPROPRIATE GVN INSTALLATIONS.
- (7) BALD EAGLE COMPANY BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE PLANS FOR REIN/RELIEF OF ALL GVN INSTALLATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS PLAN FROM 0600-1800H DAILY.
- (8) ENTREGGJMENTATIONS OF U.S. ADVISORS ASSIGNED TO GVN INSTALLATIONS FOR REIN/RELIEF MANEUVER.
- (9) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME MISSION OF OTHER UNITS.
- (10) DESIGNATE PLANS AS FOLLOWS:
- | | |
|------------|--------|
| HOI AN | 21A-67 |
| HIEU NHON | 21B-67 |
| DIEN BAN | 21B-67 |
| DUY XUYEN | 21D-67 |
| QUE SON | 21E-67 |
| THANG BINH | 21F-67 |
- (11) COMMAND COMM-ELECT
- A. OPCON OF REACTION FORCE REMAINS WITH PARENT UNIT UNLESS CHOPPED BY FIRST MARINES. RELATIONSHIP WITH ARVN/FUMAF IS ON BASIS ON COORD/COOPERATION.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

B. COMMUNICATIONS

- (1) SEE REF (A)
- (2) SEE REF (B)
- (3) CONDUCT LIAISON WITH APPROPRIATE GVN INSTALLATIONS TO COORDINATE.
 - (A) MOST EXPEDITIONS MEANS AVAILABLE FOR BELEAGUERED INSTALLATION TO NOTIFY APPROPRIATE BATTALION OF ATTACK.
 - (B) NETS TO BE UTILIZED AFTER REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. CALL SIGNS AND FREQUENCIES IAW REF B.
- (4) ESTABLISH PRECEDURES FOR DAILY COMMUNICATION DRILLS.
- (5) EFFECTIVE EDITION KAC-Q FOR AUTHENTICATION AND KAC-P FOR OPERATIONAL CODE.
- (6) PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS IAW REF (A) AND (B). SIGNAL REQUESTS FOR BOMBARDMENT MUST BE CONFIRMED BY RADIO. PANEL MARKERS OR HIGHER HQ.

GP-4
BT

TOD:1720Z/14JAN67/CCN:116/GRH/UEC

DECLASSIFIED
~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

220630. H

BLU

220630. H 57
FM FIRST MARINES
TO FIRST BN FIRST MARINES
SECOND BN FIRST MARINES
THIRD BN FIRST MARINES
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
BT

S-3

S-3A

Air Off

OPCHIEF

FRAG ORDER 23-67

A. CG FIRST MARDIV MSG 060005Z MAR 67

2. SITUATION. INTELLIGENCE CONTINUES TO INDICATE HEAVY ENEMY RELIANCE ON RIVER MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES WITHIN THE AREA. BY UTILIZING WATERWAYS ENEMY HOPES TO AVOID FRIENDLY PATROLS AND AMBUSHES, AND SUPPORT FORCES LOGISTICALLY WITH MINIMUM MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS. EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION OF SUCH TRAFFIC IS VITAL TO REDUCE AND DESTROY THIS CAPABILITY.

2. MISSION. FIRST MARINES CONDUCTS ACTIVITIES IN TAOR TO INTERDICT ENEMY WATERBORNE TRAFFIC.

3. EXECUTION.

A. FIRST BN. CONDUCT PATROLS AND AMBUSHES ALONG RIVER BANKS, FORDING AND LANDING POINTS MAKING FREQUENT SPOT CHECKS AND INSPECTIONS OF SAMPAN CARGO AND PASSENGERS, INCREASE FREQUENCY OF RUBBER BOAT PATROLLING, AND MAINTAIN CLOSE LIASION WITH GVN/ARVN/VNN WATER PATROLS AND CHECKPOINTS.

B. SECOND BN. CONDUCT PATROLS AND AMBUSHES ALONG RIVER BANKS, FORDING AND LANDING POINTS MAKING FREQUENT SPOT CHECKS OF SAMPAN CARGO AND PASSENGERS, CONDUCT MOTORIZED BOAT PATROLS OF WATERWAYS AS CRAFT BECOME AVAILABLE, CONSTRUCT OBSERVATION TOWER ADJACENT TO SONG CAU DO, CONTINUE USE OF COMM LIASION TEAM WITH VNN, MAINTAIN WATER CHECKPOINTS AND LIASION WITH GVN/ARVN WATERCHECK POINTS.

C. THIRD BN. CONDUCT PATROLS AND AMBUSHES ALONG RIVER BANKS, FORDING AND LANDING POINTS MAKING FREQUENT SPOT CHECKS AND INSPECTIONS OF SAMPAN CARGO AND PASSENGERS, AND MAINTAIN CLOSE LIASION WITH GVN/ARVN WATER CHECKPOINTS.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) UTILIZE SUPPORTING ARMS FOR SUPPRESSIVE AND H&I FIRES ALONG KEY PINTS ON WATERWAYS.
- (2) UTILIZE AO AIRCRAFT FOR GROUND AND WATER SURVEILLANCE AND FIXED WING AS NECESSARY TO DESTROY KNOWN ENEMY WATERCRAFT.
- (3) UTILIZE EXISTING NIGHT VISION AND DETECTION DEVICES AND OTHER MEANS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

HAS BEEN SENT

- (4) CURFEWS AND BOATING RESTRICTIONS FOR ALL WATERWAYS IN TAOR TO FOLLOW BY SEPARATE LETTER.
- (5) THIRD BN COORDINATE WITH SECOND BN FOR ALL ACTIVITIES ON SONG VINH DIEN.
- (6) REPORT WATERWAYS PATROLS, AMBUSHES, AND CHECKPOINTS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS IN DAILY SITREP PLANS.

GP-4
BT

COPY 4 OF 9 COPIES

TOD; 1030Z/21 MAR 67/COM; 153/GWP/GS

DECLASSIFIED

250748-H

BRIEF

DECLASSIFIED

00 242010Z MAR 67
FM FIRST MARINES
TO ZEN/SECOND BN FIRST MARINES
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)
ZEN/FIRST BN FIRST MARINES
ZEN/THIRD BN FIRST MARINES
SA, QDSZ
BT

BURN

FILE

S-3

S-3A

Air Off

OPCHIEF

FRAG ORDER 24-67

1. ENEMY SITUATION:

- A. ESTIMATED VC BN ATTACKED ARVN CONVOY 24 MARCH, WITHDRAWING TO WEST. AGENT REPORTS INDICATE ONE CO IN GS 0746 14 MARCH. FOR-
TIFICATIONS INSIDE AREA BOUNDED BY 067469-079461-081474-079479.
- B. FRIENDLY FORCES:
 - (1) QUANG NAM SECTOR COMMAND
 - (A) 3/51 BN
 - (B) 4/51 BN
 - (C) 2/4 APC CO
- C. TASK ORGANIZATION

HAS BEEN SENT

SECOND BN (-) (REIN)

CO G

CO M

81MM MORTAR PLAT (-)

- MISSION: SECOND BN (-) (REIN) LANDS BY HELICOPTER AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY VICINITY BT 071475 TO BT 092449 AND ESTABLISHES BLOCKING POSITION IN SW OF AREA OF OPERATIONS.

3. EXECUTION:

- A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ARVN FORCES UNDER QN SECTOR COMMAND ATTACK SW FROM ROUTE C1 IN AREA OF OPERATIONS BT 101510 TO BT 123482 TO BT 092449 TO BT 069476. MARINE FORCES PROVIDE BLOCKING FORCE VIC BT 071475 TO BT 092449.
- B. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
 - (1) TENTATIVE H-HOUR, D-DAY 250900H.
 - (2) COORDINATE ESTABLISHMENT OF FCL WITH QN SECTOR COMMAND.
 - (3) SUBMIT SPOT REPORTS DIRECT THIS HEADQUARTERS.


4. LOGISTICS. NO CHANGE

5. COMMAND-COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS

- A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USMC AND ARVN ONE OF COORDINATION AND COOPERATION.
- B. COMMUNICATIONS.
 - (1) SEE FIRST MARDIV CEOI
 - (2) BN CMD GRP GUARD REGT TAC NET (M-653). AFTER ARRIVAL OBTAIN AREA RELAY THROUGH ANNUNCIATE IF UNABLE TO CONTACT BLACKWELL.

COPY 4 OF 9 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED

 DECLASSIFIED

- (3) UPON ARRIVAL OBJ AREA BN CMD GRP ACTIVATES STATION REGT
CMD NET (H-39).
- (4) AUTHENTICATION KAC-Q OP CODE KAC-P
- (5) CALLSIGNS OF FRIENDLY UNITS AND "REG GUARDED"
 - (A) SECTOR COMMAND GROUP (44.6MC) AND (30.4MC)
 - (B) 3D BN, 51ST REGT (ARVN) LEVEL PROOF CHARLIE (30 AMC)
 - (C) 4TH BN, 51ST REGT (ARVN) LEVEL PROOF DELTA (30 AMC)
 - (D) 2/4 APC MASTIC PATRON BRAVO (30.4 MC)

GP-4
BT

TOD: 2035Z/24MAR67/OCN:186

DECLASSIFIED 

DECLASSIFIED

250745-H
BWW

[REDACTED]

HAS BEEN SENT

0 0 242200Z MAR 67
FM FIRST MARINES
TO SECOND BN FIRST MARINES
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/FIRST BN FIRST MARINES
ZEN/THIRD BN FIRST MARINES
QDSZ
BT

BURN

FILE

S-3
S-3A
Air Off
OPCHIEF

CHANGE NO. 1 MY FRAG 0 24-67

1. PARA 2 CHANGE TO READ, "VIC BT 060480 TO BT 085460."
 2. PARA 3A CHANGE TO READ "AREA OF OPERATIONS BT 101510 TO BT 065480 TO BT 085460 TO BT 131476. MARINE FORCES PROVIDE BLOCKING FORCE VIC BT 060480 TO BT 085460."
 3. PARA 5 B (5). DELETE (44.6) AND (30.4) WHERE SHOWN AND ADD, PRIMARY FREQ (44.6MC) ALT FREQ (30.4MC).
- GP-4
BT

TOD: 2225Z/21 MAR 67/CCN:188/GRH/VEC

COPY 3 OF 9 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED

010515-4

BEA

DECLASSIFIED

BURN

FILE

S-3

S-3A

Air Off

Relief

B

O 311410Z MAR 67
FM FIRST MARINES
TO FIRST BN FIRST MARINES
INFO SECOND BN FIRST MARINES
THIRD BN FIRST MARINES

FRAG ORDER 25-67

1. SITUATION. VILLAGE ELECTIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ON 2 APRIL 1967
VICINITY BT 063573 AND BT 163573. QUANG DA SECTOR HAS REQUESTED
MC ASSISTANCE FOR ELECTION SECURITY.

2. MISSION. FIRST BATTALION PROVIDE SCREENING FORCES IN
AREAS AS INDICATED TO LIMIT OF CAPABILITY:

- A. FROM BT 049580 TO BT 020560 TO BT 015590 TO BT 047595 TO BT 049580.
- B. FROM BT 160600 TO BT 109560 TO BT 060600 TO BT 160600.
- C. FROM BT 180586 TO BT 160560 TO BT 198560 TO BT 180586.

3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- A. DURATION OF SCREENING FROM 011700H TO 030600H APR 67.
- B. INSURE THAT NO USMC GO NEAR POLLING PLACES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH (1)
UNLESS DIRECTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

GP-4
BT

TOR:1517Z/31MAR67/CON:232/AJM/RCV

DECLASSIFIED

HAS BEEN SENT

TAB F

Communications Supporting Documents

TAB F


SECRET

Copy No. 1 of 3 copies
2nd Bn, 1st Marines
DANANG, RVN
SERNO 0067167

Annex A (Operation LAFAYETTE Concept) to FRAO ORDER 120-67

Ref: (a) First Marines FRAO ORDER 01-67
(b) MAP: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS L7014, Sheet 66405V DAI LOC, AMS L701, Sheet 6581 FAI PO

68 $\begin{array}{c} \text{00} \\ | \\ \text{---} \end{array}$





11
+ 69

3 $\begin{array}{c} \text{H} \\ \text{X} \end{array}$ 1



3 $\begin{array}{c} \text{H} \\ \text{X} \end{array}$ 1



II
ON ORDER

IN COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL M.H. HEMLETT

A. P. Robinson
A. P. ROBINSON
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

SECRET