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PRIMARIES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

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10770 F942 of 12 October 1971.

A. S. Coffey 9/10/22

Signature/date

19. *Phragmites australis* (Cav.) Trin. ex Stev. (1824) 100

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marines (Rein)
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

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5750
15 Oct 1968

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology for Period 010001H - 302100H Sept 68

Ref: (a) Div O 5750.2D

Encl: (1) Command Chronology for September 1968

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is submitted.

R. G. Lauffer
R. G. LAUFER

S & C FILES
HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
68 4320
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15 MAR S & C Files

00124-68	
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1st Marines (Rein)
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
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15 Oct 1968

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
010001H September 68 to 302400H September 68

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Enclosure (1)

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PART I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>
1. 1st Marines (Rein)	1-30 September 1968 Colonel R. C. TAUFFER
<u>SUBORDINATE UNITS</u>	
HqCo 1st Marines	1-28 Sep 68 1stLt R G WILSON 29-30 Sep 68 Maj R L WALSH
1st Battalion, 1st Marines	1-8 Sep 68 LtCol A VANWINKLE 9-30 Sep 68 LtCol A W KELFER
2nd Battalion, 1st Marines	1-30 Sep 68 LtCol J E POINDEXTER
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines	1-30 Sep 68 LtCol D J QUICK
2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines	1-10 Sep 68 LtCol J W DAVIS
2. <u>LOCATION</u>	Da Nang 1-30 Sep 68
3. <u>Staff Officers</u>	
Executive Officer	1-14 Sep 68 Col R L BARRETT, JR. 25-30 Sep 68 LtCol W A HEYER
S-1/Adjutant	1-30 Sep 68 Capt E W GRADY
S-2	1-6 Sep 68 Capt F J MURPHY, JR. 7-15 Sep 68 CW02 F L WEAVER 17-30 Sep 68 Capt J M DAWKINS
S-3	1-21 Sep 68 Maj J W GRATTO 22-30 Sep 68 Maj J K REILLY
S-4	1-21 Sep 68 Maj J K REILLY 22-30 Sep 68 Maj E F MANN
S-5	1-30 Sep 68 Capt R F ENDERT
Communications Officer	1-30 Sep 68 Maj A A BERGMAN
Air Liaison Officer	1-30 Sep 68 Maj A A DITTMER
Regimental Chaplain	1-6 Sep 68 LCDR E H LUFKIN 7-30 Sep 68 LCDR B L SIMMONS
Regimental Surgeon	1-30 Sep 68 LT S A KLEIMAN

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4. Average Monthly Strength

Officer	<u>USMC</u>
116	Enlisted
3472	

Officer	<u>USN</u>
10	Enlisted
161	

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Part II
Narrative Summary

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PART II
SECTION A
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

I. Personnel

a. Average Monthly Strength

<u>Unit</u>	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
HqCo	20	225	2	5
1stBn	32	1072	3	50
2ndBn	32	1092	3	51
3rdBn	32	1083	2	55

b. Casualties

<u>KIA</u>	<u>BATTLE</u>			<u>NON-BATTLE</u>			<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>SERIOUS</u>	<u>NON-SERIOUS</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	
16	142	1	3	7	59	1	229

c. Replacements Received

<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
22	583	4	624

d. Rotation during month

9	106	1	8	124
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e. Problem Area. Upon relocating to our present area of operations the administrative echelons were further removed from the operating forces, than had been previously experienced. This situation continued for an extended period of time (in excess of two weeks). During this time there was virtually no communications between these two echelons. This created numerous problems in administration and in particular the area of casualty reporting. Division CRCC, acting as a relay point between these two echelons, helped considerably to keep reports current. However, in some cases additional information could only be obtained by courier which, due to distance involved, was time consuming. Recommendation: Only separate administrative sections from the operating forces when essential to do so and even then, ensure that administrative representatives are with each echelon of the operating forces to insure timely reporting of strength and casualties.

2. Legal and Discipline

	<u>HqCo</u>	<u>1/1</u>	<u>2/1</u>	<u>3/1</u>
NJP	0	10	19	8
SCM (Completed)	1	1	1	4
SCM (Pending)	0	3	0	0
SPCM (Completed)	0	0	3	3
SPCM (Pending)	0	0	5	2
GCM (Completed)	0	0	0	0
GCM (Pending)	0	0	0	0
Investigation (Completed)	0	5	3	2
Investigation (Pending)	0	5	11	1

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3. R&R Program. The following is a recapitulation of the R&R quotas for September 1968.

	HqCo	1/1	2/1	2/3
Hawaii	3	13	13	13
Australia	3	6	6	7
Kuala Lupur	1	2	2	2
Penang	1	2	2	2
Singapore	1	2	2	2
Okinawa	1	4	4	3
Manila	0	2	2	2
Tokyo	2	5	6	6
Taipei	4	7	7	7
Hong Kong	2	8	7	8
Bangkok	6	13	13	13
Total	24	64	64	65

4. Chaplain Support

a. Chaplains Attached:

- (1) Regimental Chaplain: LCDR ~~Wade~~ L. SIMMONS, CHC, USNRC
- (2) 1st Battalion: LT Aldon E. PURDHAM, CHC, USNRC
- (3) 2nd Battalion: LT Donald B. REESE, CHC, USNRC
- (4) 3rd Battalion: LT Vincent P. GERLOCK, CHC, USNRC

b. Divine Services Conducted by the Regimental Chaplain:

- (1) Sunday Services:
No. 6 Attendance: 156
- (2) Weekday Services:
No. 7 Attendance: 213
- (3) Baptismal Services:
No. 1 Baptized: 3

c. Related Activities:

- (1) Distributed gift boxes from individuals and religious organizations to troops in the field.
- (2) American Red Cross messages handled: 7

d. Pastoral Activities:

- (1) Personal Counseling cases: 18
- (2) Pastoral type letters sent: 3

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PART II
SECTION B

ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN

1. Enemy. The enemy situation within the 1st Marines TAOR was characterized by small unit actions to harass friendly CP's, FPB's, QP's, patrols and bridges. Elements of the T89 Sapper Battalion detonated an explosive device which partially destroyed the center beam on the Tu Cau Bridge. Characteristics of other sapper attacks on friendly positions included firing of B40 rockets, combined with heavy A/W's fire followed with satchel charges. There were numerous contacts with NVA/VC units of 5-25 persons. In the majority of these encounters the enemy broke contact, after a brief fire fight with negative results. Friendly units were fired on by groups of 20-25 NVA/VC from across the Song Thanh Quyt River to the South. In each case the enemy was taken under fire with negative results. There were many enemy sightings of up to 30 personnel. These groups were taken under fire by artillery and searches of the area indicated bodies had been dragged away in many cases. There were 3 instances in which friendly units were taken under fire by 60/82mm mortars. There were 2 instances in which rockets were fired from within the 1st Marines TAOR. On 15 September 2 rockets were fired from via BT 098673, and on 22 September 6 rockets were observed being fired from via BT 056671. Incidents of mines and booby traps were at a high level with a total of 148. Numerous tunnels were located and caches of up to 500 lbs of rice found. Reports of enemy firing A/W's at aircraft, usually at helicopters entering or departing LZ's, were received as well as a report from an RD team indicating 30 NVA/VC, with AK47's, had conducted propaganda activities in the Thanh Quyt area. Enemy activity was concentrated along rivers, battalion boundaries and the eastern boundary of the TAOR, but in general the enemy continued to avoid major contact with USMC forces in this area. Enemy units located within the TAOR included elements of the R20 Bn, V25 Bn, T89 Sapper Bn, Q82 and X16 Local Force companies. The V25 Bn had been defeated with heavy losses in engagements within this TAOR on 24 and 25 Aug, after which they retreated to Go Noi Island and further South to regroup and replenish both personnel and material. It is significant that during late September elements of this Bn and the R20 Bn (both part of the 38th Regt) were reported again in our TAOR.

INCIDENTS 1-30 SEP 68

Significant Contacts	79
Harassing Fire	14
Sniper Fire	20
Bunkers & Tunnels Dest'd	39
Mines/SFD's	148
Rocket Attacks	2
Enemy Sightings	95
Total	377

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ENEMY CASUALTIES

	REGT	1/1	2/1	3/1
PW's	13	11	2	0
Detainees	204	141	58	5
KIA	67	36	17	14
IWC	11	4	6	1
OSWC	3	1	2	0

VIP PROGRAM

Total items turned in	2115
Total piastres paid	80650

2. Weather. Warm and humid weather prevailed in the 1st Marine TACR with an average high temperature of 85 degrees. The average low temperature was 74 degrees, with humidity average 86 percent. Visibility was excellent to good with the exception of afternoons late in the period when visibility was restricted by local showers. Northeasterly winds prevailed during the period with average velocity of 7-9 knots and gusts to 15 knots. A typhoon which occurred during the 1st week of September brought heavy winds and rains which restricted foot and vehicle traffic, reduced air support, and brought friendly and enemy activities to a low point.

3. Terrain. Trafficability on established routes of communication throughout the 1st Marine TACR was generally good with the exception of route 10 from Cau Do Bridge to the Ha Dong Bridge. This road is in poor condition due to large potholes causing slow vehicular movement. The use of oil on roads has improved them to some degree. Small streams and rice paddies continue to hamper foot traffic and immobilize vehicles.

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PART II
SECTION C
OPERATIONS

I. Mission

- a. The 1st Marinos (Rcin) mission was to conduct unilateral, joint and combined offensive operations within assigned TAOR to locate and destroy enemy bases and logistic installations, with primary emphasis on those forces and bases which pose the greatest threat to GVN control of important population and economic centers and to the security of friendly military installations.
- b. Deploy forces throughout assigned TAOR to provide defense of Danang vital area and military complex with emphasis on routes of approach to probable rocket/mortar launch positions, to include waterways.
- c. Assume designation as officer in charge of construction and defense of Danang barrier.
- d. Be prepared to conduct offensive and reconnaissance operations within the RZ, on order.
- e. Support the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned TAOR. Be prepared to provide a reaction force for the relief of HOA VANG District Headquarters (BT 012723).
- f. Locate and interdict routes of infiltration in TAOR.
- g. Provide security for engineer projects and upgrading of Routes 1 and 1C, and other essential roads within the TAOR.
- h. Be prepared to provide a company sized reaction force for the defense of Soa Anchor (BT 092690).
- j. Be prepared to provide a company sized reaction force to the CO, Basso Dofonso Battalion (1st MP BN) for the purpose of blocking the escape of prisoners of war from the compound at (BT 075715) or for employment in the Danang area in connection with the evacuation of non-combatants.

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k. Be prepared to provide one reinforced battalion for employment anywhere in RVN on 12 hour notice;

1. Upon commitment of the reinforced battalion, be prepared to deploy the remainder of the Regiment within an additional 12 hours.

2. Operations. During the month of September, 1st Marines conducted offensive operations in the Danang TAOR; Interdicting routes of infiltration involving waterways; providing security for engineer units and general traffic on Route 1 and 1C and other critical roads in the TAOR; ensuring security for the following fixed installations: Bridges at (BT999699), (BT994687), HA DONG (AT990642), CAU DO (AT997706) and TU CAU (BT036648). The "CROW'S NEST" was manned in accordance with REGT O 3120.1 and security was provided at the A-6 position. Separate reaction forces were maintained in support of, HOA VANG District Headquarters (BT012723), Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Bn) for the purpose of blocking any escape of prisoners from the compound at (BT075715), and the defense of Sea Anchor (BT092690). Additional reaction forces were organized for immediate employment in TAOR to destroy hostile rocket sites and block possible enemy escape routes. In addition to daily ambush, patrol and search and destroy operations throughout the 1st Marines TAOR, significant contacts occurred as follow:

a. Contacts:

(1) 010805H, Marine F/2/1 vic BT076655 detonated SFD resulting in one WIAE.

(2) 011345H, satchel charge detonated beneath F/2/1 tower vic BT068682. Area searched. Neg results.

(3) 011700H, G/2/1 received S/A fire vic BT058659 resulting in one WIAE.

(4) 011745H, B/1/1 PPB vic AT995644 sighted one VC in vic of area where friendly unit had received fire earlier in day. Engaged with S/A. Results, one VC(KIA). Recovered two grenades (Chi Com), one M-26, one belt (NVA) and misc 782 gear.

(5) 011930H, C/1/27 Sqd Amb vic BT966647, Marine detonated unknown type SFD. Ambush aborted. Results, two WIA(Minor).

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(6) 012130H, G/2/1 PFB vic BT 062650, Marine detonated unknown type SFD, possible 81mm/105mm. Results, one WIAE.

(7) 020210H, 2/1 OP vic BT 070657 received seven 60mm mortar rounds, origin unknown. Results, two WIAE.

(8) 020940H, G/2/1 Plt Cnb vic BT 064633 received approximately 20 rounds S/A from BT 066636. Returned fire, with M-79 and S/A. Area searched with negative assessment. Results, one WIAE.

(9) 021510H, F/2/1 PFB vic BT 095664 received sniper fire from vic BT 088665. Returned fire with S/A. Area searched, with negative assessment. Results one WIAE. Minevac completed 021542H.

(10) 021600H, H/2/27 convoy vic BT 070693, load truck detonated SFD, type unknown, possible box type in excess of 50 pounds. Search of area revealed wire leading from crater to tree line. Convoy continued, truck was retrieved by 1800H. Results, six WIAE, seven WIH (MINOR).

(11) 030910H, G/2/27 CO S/D vic BT 004673 discovered 150 rounds AK-47, one AK-47 magazine, misc 762 gear, three plastic gas masks, six Chi Com grenades, four blasting caps, two 250 pound bombs and 12 fresh graves containing 12 VC (KIA). All items destroyed except 250 pound bombs. Marked for future destruction.

(12) 040355H, B/1/27 Sqd Cnb vic BT 964653 received one hand grenade. Fired S/A at suspected enemy site. Area searched with negative assessment. Results one WIA (MINOR).

(13) 041110H, G/2/1 Plt Cnb vic BT 063643, enroute to PFB, Marine detonated SFD, type unknown possible M-26 rigged with pressure type detonator. Results two WIAE.

(14) 04175H, F/2/1 Plt Sec vic BT 090663, while organizing PFB Marine detonated SFD, possible Chi Com grenade rigged with pressure type detonator. Results, one WIAE.

(15) 050910H, H/2/27 vic BT 054643, Marine detonated SFD, possible 82mm mortar round rigged with trip wire. Results one KIA, two WIAE and two WIH (MINOR).

(16) 051145H, G/2/27 vic BT 062644, Marine detonated pressure type SFD, type unknown. Results one KIA.

(17) 051250H, B/1/1 Sqd Cnb vic BT 968647, Marine detonated pressure type SFD, type unknown. Results one KIA.

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(18) 051300H, G/2/1 via BT 072657 sighted two VC digging in same area where SFD's were discovered 04 Sep 68. Engaged with S/A. Squad deployed to exploit contact. On arrival discovered one hole 2'x 2'x1' and one wounded VN female. Female Evac to Bn CP. Further search of area disclosed negative results.

(19) 052115H, G/2/1 Plt Soc vic BT 054653, Marine detonated SFD, type unknown, rigged with trip wire. Results one WIA (MINOR).

(20) 062000H, G/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 058645, Marine detonated SFD, possible 81mm mortar round, rigged with trip wire. Results one WIA (MINOR).

(21) 062015H, E/3/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 995670 received undetermined number S/A. Returned fire with M-16 and M-79. Results, one WIAE.

(22) 072230H, H/2/1 Plt Soc vic BT 032648 detected movement in water, man using reed as breathing tube swimming underwater toward TU CAU bridge. Engaged with S/A and 1/2 pound of TNT. TNT did not detonate. Immediately thereafter, one satchel charge was thrown into a defensive position NE of bridge. Concurrently another detonation occurred beneath the bridge. Preliminary inspection disclosed two center pilings damaged, causing 28 motors of the center section to buckle approximately six inches at the south end and twelve inches on the northern side. All timbers on surface loose. Bridge can handle foot traffic but is closed for vehicular travel.

(23) 081300H, B/1/1 Sqd Cmb vic AT 955637 engaged approximately three VC vic AT 955636. VC returned fire, broke contact and fled south. VC were pursued physically and by fire. Area searched, one AK-47 and one 9mm pistol recovered. Results one WIAE.

(24) 090110H, 2/1 MEDCAP vic BT 033651, Village Chief pointed out one VC sympathizer. Detained and EVAC to Bn CP.

(25) 091915H, H/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 066633 received 10 rounds S/A and 60mm resulting in one WIAE. MEDEVAC helicopter received S/A on touch down and lift off. Fire returned in both cases. Searched area, with negative assessment.

(26) 100100H, B/1/1 Sqd Cmb vic AT 954638 engaged approximately 5 V. Returned S/A fire. VC broke contact and withdrew. Results one WIAE, three WIAE.

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(27) 101010H, 2/1 Bn CP vic BT 069693, Antrac detonated possible 250 pound bomb rigged as mine with pressure type firing device. Antrac destroyed. Crater in MSR repaired. Results, two WIAE.

(28) 101830H, H/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 067643, Marine detonated possible homemade SFD. Search of area revealed three additional SFD's. Results, one KIA.

(29) 110715H, E/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 091658, Marine detonated SFD, possible Chi Com grenade rigged as mine. Results, one WIAE.

(30) 111630H, H/2/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 046657, SFD malfunction caused only minor detonation. Device consisted of 82mm, one Chi Com grenade and blasting cap. Buried wire traced for $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to tree line vic BT 046659. Results one WIAE (MINOR).

(31) 120200H, H/2/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 052638 received S/A fire from BT 055638. Returned fire with S/A. Results, one WIAE.

(32) 120920H, 2/1 Plt Sec (minesweep) vic BT 060662, tank detonated SFD, possible 40 pound buried mine. Results, two WIAE. Tank towed to 2/1 CP.

(33) 121025H, 2/1 CP vic BT 070655, MCB-1 vehicle detonated 60 pounds TNT packed in styrofoam. Results, one KIA (USN), one WIAE (USN), two WIAE (VN).

(34) 131345H, H/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 065644, Marine detonated SFD, possible C-Ration can full of explosives and metal. Concurrently received S/A fire. Returned fire with S/A and M-79. VC broke contact. Results one WIAE.

(35) 132325H, B/1/1 Plt PIB vic AT 958636 received one Chi Com grenade. Returned fire with S/A and M-79. Results, three WIAE.

(36) 140730H, 2/1 Roadsweep detonated one SFD, Chi Com grenade w/ trip wire, vic BT 067711. Results, one WIAE.

(37) 142300H, M/3/1 Sqd Cmb engaged estimated 15 VC vic BT 036726. Results one WIAE.

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(38) 151045H, I/3/1 Sqd Cnb vic AT 984693, Marino detonated unknown type SFD. Results, two WIA.

(39) 170120H, 4/1/1 FT OP vic BT 021636 received approximately eight B-40's and four satchel charges and heavy A/W fire from possible Sapper Sqd vic BT 020638. Enemy broke contact and withdrew west. Returned fire with S/L. Platoon deployed to render assistance and reinforce. Results three KIA, two WIA and, one WIA (MINOR).

(40) 171310H, 2/1 Sqd Sec vic BT 062649 discovered one SFD, type unknown, rigged for CDD. While preparing to destroy first SFD, Marino detonated a second SFD. Results, one WIA (MINOR).

(41) 171810H, 4/1/1 Sqd Cnb vic BT 047654 received S/L and A/W fire from vic BT 050650 and BT 047658. Fire returned with S/L, 81mm and artillery. Results, one KIA, one WIA and one KIA (VC).

(42) 181015H, C/1/1 Sqd Cnb vic AT 980611 sighted VC in river vic AT 979610. Engaged VC and sighted body floating down river.

(43) 181910H, H/2/1 vic BT 053643 was engaged by enemy force of unknown strength with A/W, grenades and M-79's at a range of 300 meters. Returned fire with M-16, M-79 and M-26's. Fire fight lasted approximately 40 seconds. Results, two KIA, one WIA.

(44) 182400H, Sqd Sec vic BT 093643, five man Killer Team preparing to displace was engaged by enemy force of unknown size. Team returned fire with S/L, M-79 and M-26's. During fire fight wounded Marino rolled onto enemy grenade, absorbing entire impact. Searched area with negative assessment. Results, two KIA (USMC), one WIA.

(45) 190530H, E/2/1 Co S/D vic BT 096656 detected enemy movement and concurrently received one Chi Com grenade. Results, one WIA.

(46) 201000H, E/2/1 Co S/D vic BT 087678 Marino detonated SFD, C-Ration can full of TNT and scrap metal with pressure type detonator. Results two WIA.

(47) 201725H, D/2/1 CO S/D vic BT 085662, Antrac detonated possible 50 pound box mine. Results four WIA and one WIA (MINOR). ANTAC towed to Bn CP.

(48) 210830H, 4/1/1 Sqd Cnb vic BT 041662, U. S. Army helicopter Offspring 6-2 and 6-5 sighted VC working. Helos engaged VC, and landed to make contact w/patrol. Helo guided unit into area. Search of area revealed three VC KIA and one VC (WIA). Recovered one AK-47 and documents.

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(49) 210850H, 4/1/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 062638, Marine detonated SFD w/pressure type detonator. Results, one WIAE.

(50) 210920H, 4/1/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 062638, Marine detonated one SFD, type unknown, rigged w/trip wire. Results, one WIA (MINOR).

(51) 220200H, Co A, 3d Artrac Bn vic MT 083705 sighted six rockets being fired from BT 056671. Concurrently IF unit received S/A and 4/W fire from approximately 30 VC. 3d Artrac Bn and GAP 2-5-1 also received sporadic S/A fire from vic BT 070705, BT 072706 and BT 074706. Fire continued until 220500H. In all cases fire was returned. First light S/D Ops commenced vic Crown Nest, 4-6 and Marble Mountain. Results two WIAE, two WIAE (TF), and two detainees. Recovered one M-16, six 3.5 rocket rds, one Chi Ccr grenade, three M-26's and one SFD.

(52) 220230H, 2/1 CP vic DT 074655 received eight 60mm mortar rds from vic BT 078648. Returned fire with 81mm. Results, 10 WIAE.

(53) 220430H, E/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 037664 engaged VC with S/A. Results, three VC KIA and seven detainees.

(54) 220745H, E/2/1 Plt Dof vic DT 099660 received 15 rds 4/W fire from vic BT 104660. Returned fire with S/A, M-79 and M-60. Results, one WIAE.

(55) 221350H, B/1/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 027618, Scout Sniper engaged one VC. VC was observed to fall to ground and not got up.

(56) 230130H, G/2/1 Sqd Cmb vic DT 053713 was fired on with AK-47's, returned fire with S/A. Results, one VC KIA. Recovered one

AK-47 and one satchel charge.

(57) 230835H, E/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 087672, Marine detonated SFD rigged with trip wire. Stonos marking site were clearly visible. Results, two WIAE.

(58) 230930H, 2/1 Bn CP vic BT 072700, truck detonated 40-60 pound mine, possible CDD. Results, six WIAE. Truck evac to 1st MT BN

(59) 231010H, A/1/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 058647, Marine detonated SFD. Results, two WIAE.

(60) 231240H, E/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 103661, Marine detonated SFD, M-26 in C-ration can w/trip wire. Results, one WIAE.

(61) 231325H, E/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 103661, Marine detonated C-ration can full of explosives. Results, one WIAE.

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(62) 231730H, E/2/1 Flt Cmb vic BT 066636 received A/W fire from vic BT 068631. Returned fire with S/A, 60mm and artillery. Results, one KIA (USMC).

(63) 231730H, E/2/1 Co S/D vic BT 095673 received S/A and A/W fire from estimated six VC. Returned fire with S/A, 81mm and artillery. Results, four WIAE.

(64) 240900H, A/1/1 Flt Cmb BT 058647, Marino detonated SFD, 105mm rigged w/trip wire. Results one WIAE.

(65) 241015H, A/1/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 056650, Marino detonated SFD, Chi Con grenade and 60mm round rigged w/trip wire. Results three WIAE.

(66) 250745H, A/1/1 Flt Cmb vic BT 065644 sighted 15 VC. Received and returned S/A fire. Results one VC KIA and three detainees.

(67) 250800H, A/1/1 Flt Cmb vic BT 062638, Marino detonated possible homemade claymore SFD rigged w/trip wire. Results six WIAE.

(68) 251000H, C/1/1 Co S/D vic BT 058658 engaged VC force of unknown size with S/A. Results, one WIAE, eight VC KIA, seven IW (VC) and 30 detainees.

(69) 251420H, F/2/1 Flt Cmb vic BT 063645, Marino detonated pressure SFD. Results, one WIAE.

(70) 260645H, F/2/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 067700, observed two VC running vic BT 067705. Fired S/A resulting in two VC KIA.

(71) 260820, A/1/1 Flt Cmb vic BT 050649, Marino tripped Chi Con grenade SFD. Results two WIAE and one Scout Dog WIAE..

(72) 270740H, C/1/1 Co S/D vic BT 016606, helicopters closing on LZ received S/A fire from vic BT 020606. Results, one WIAE.

(73) 270825H, C/1/1 Co S/D vic BT 017607 inbound helicopter received S/A fire. Returned fire and deployed unit in area. Results, two VC KIA and one detainee.

(74) 271745, I/3/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 983694, Marino detonated M-26 w/trip wire. Results two WIAE.

(75) 271700H, E/2/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 094666 received S/A, M-79 and M-79 fire from vic BT 091664. Returned fire with S/A and 60mm. Results, one WIAE.

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(76) 272210H, F/2/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 069702 received S/I and three hand grenades from vic BT 069704. Returned fire with S/I and M-79. Search area with negative assessment. Results, one WIA (MINOR).

(77) 281400H, C/1/1 Co S/D vic BT 981602, Marine detonated Chi Con grenade SFD. Results, one WIA (MINOR).

(78) 281420H, D/1/1 Co S/D vic BT 987602, Marine detonated Chi Con grenade SFD. Results, one WIA (MINOR).

(79) 281505H, 4/1/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 043649, VC moving toward road was challenged, fled, was engaged with S/I. Results, one VC KIA.

(80) 281530H, 4/1/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 046652, engaged VC with S/I and M-79. Results, one VC KIA, three VC PW'S and two USMC WIAE.

(81) 281715H, 4/1/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 048649, Marine tripped SFD, tin can w/explosives, glass and metal. Results, five WIAE.

(82) 281730H, E/2/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 098674 received approximately 50 rounds S/I and M-79. Searched area with negative assessment. Results one WIAE.

(83) 281845H, A/1/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 048649, Marine detonated unknown type SFD. Results, two WIAE.

(84) 281850H, E/2/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 073675 received 20-30 rounds artillery. Results, one WIA (MINOR).

(85) 290050H, 1/3/1 Sqd Cmb vic BT 987644 sighted five VC to front. Engaged with S/I and concurrently unit experienced experienced explosion to rear of unit. Results, three WIA (MINOR).

(86) 291730H, E/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 077657 received S/I, A/W, and M-79 fire from vic BT 076657, BT 077653 and BT 065658. Concurrently 2/1 CP received fire from aero grids. Returned fire with S/I, 60mm, 81mm and M-79. Search area resulted in nine WIA DEFAINEES.

(87) 291950H, F/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 069644 received approximately 30 rounds of S/I and one Chi Con grenade. Returned fire with S/I and M-79. Searched area with negative assessment. Results, two WIA (MINOR).

(88) 292015H, F/2/1 Plt Cmb vic BT 095675, Marine detonated M-26 SFD. Results one WIAE.

(89) 300200H, B/1/1 Plt Soc vic BT 028618 received approximately 30 rounds 82mm, origin unknown. Results one KIA, five WIAE.

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(90) 300930H, A/1/1 Sqd vic BT032648 detonated unknown type SFD. Results, two WIAE, one WIA (MINOR).

(91) 301330H, A/1/1 PT Gmb vic BT045648, Marine detonated unknown type SFD. Results, one WIA (MINOR).

(92) 301425H, I/3/1 Sqd Gmb vic AT985692, Marine detonated unknown type SFD. Results, two WIAE.

3. Artillery and Naval Gunfire.

a. Artillery

(1) General. The first part of the month was devoted to establishing artillery and fire support coordination procedures and reviewing doctrine in the First Marines TAOR in Danang. Special emphasis was placed on reviewing the rules of engagement in order to avoid the possibility of inflicting casualties among innocent civilians and on counter rocket doctrine to insure expeditious counter battery fire. Also, in order to provide rapid counter rocket surveillance and recognition, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines provided spot teams to man the observation towers at Crow's Nest, BT06797049; Hawk, AT97417039 and Parrot, AT99266774.

(2) Dispositions. The positions of firing units in direct support of the First Marines are as follows:

A-1-11	BT070656
B-1-11	BT012626
W-1-11	BT012628
W-2-13	BT991675
D-2-13	AT988714

(3) On 6 Sept C-1-11 displaced to AT988714 and relieved D-2-13. On 10 Sept W-1-11 displaced to AT991675 and relieved W-2-13. General support and reinforcing fires were provided by the 11th Marines utilizing 155 and 8 inch howitzer fires.

(4) The summary of the artillery missions and rounds expended in support of 1st Marines was: 1,284 missions and 15,851 rounds expended.

b. Naval Gunfire. No naval gunfire was fired into the First Marines TAOR during the month of September.

4. Air Support and Defense.

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a. General. The 1st Marines continued to employ air support to the maximum, contingent with the requirements of supported units, air craft utilization and weather, during the month of September.

b. Statistics:

(1) Helicopters

TYPE	SORTIES	REMARKS
Troop	76	600 personnel lifted
Logistic	120	82,300 pounds of cargo
Admin	66	69 passengers
Med-Evac	446	186 casualties (See Note 1)
VR	76	97 passengers
C&C	4	4 passengers
Gunship	16	7½ Hours on station
Firefly	309	97½ Hours on station

Note 1: Med-Evac Reaction Time Average for September is: Emergency-37 minutes, Priority-109 minutes and routine-114 minutes

(2) Fixed Wing

TYPE	SORTIES	REMARKS
GAS/DAS	102	295,750 pounds of bombs 456 2.75 Rockets and 800 Rounds of 20MM
TPQ-10	0	None
AO	63	65 Hours on station
Flareship	2	4 Hours of illumination
Spooky	2	3/4 Hours on station

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Part II
Section D

Training

1. During the month of September, 1st Marines (Rein) continued to conduct combat operations in Regimental TAOR. For the most part, training was limited to indoctrination of newly arrived personnel. This training was conducted in accordance with current CG, 1st Marine Division directives and consisted primarily of the following:

- a. Participation of Free World Forces in the War.
- b. Culture, Religions and the Vietnam People.
- c. Conduct and Behavior of the individual Marine.
- d. Alcholic Beverages, Marihuana and other drugs.
- e. Respect for Local Customs.
- f. Accidental Discharges.
- g. Serious Incidents.
- h. Current and Planned Operations.
- i. Mine Warfare.
- j. Wearing of Helmets and Body Armor.
- k. Revolutionary Development.
- l. Use of Gas Mask.
- m. Rules of Engagement.
- n. Treatment of Detainees and POW's.
- o. Handling of Captured Personnel/Material.
- p. Trophies/War Trophy fire arms.
- q. Care and cleaning of M-16A1.
- r. Care and cleaning of Individual Equipment.
- s. Morale and Personal matters to include:
 - (1) R&R
 - (2) Pay
 - (3) Chaplain Services
 - (4) Request Mast
 - (5) Personal Property, customs and currency control

2. Quotas for formal schools were filled from 1st Marines (Rein) as follows:

a. Comm Crypto Course	1 (Japan)
b. Basic Ammo Tech School	1 (Okinawa)
c. Basic Infantry Wpns Repair Course	1 (Okinawa)
d. Embarkation Course	3 (Okinawa)
e. Division Embarkation Course	3
f. RPS	2
g. Basic Organic Accounting School	2

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h. 16mm Projectionist School	1
i. Officer Leadership School	6
j. SNCO Leadership School	4
k. NCO Leadership School	22
l. Scout/Sniper School	6
m. Duck Blind Team Training	11
n. Disease Vector Control Course	4
o. Landmine Warfare	90
p. Kit Carson Scout Orientation Crs	2

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PART II
SECTION E
LOGISTICS

1. Supply. Relocation was completed. First FSR was the source for all classes of supply. Stocks were replenished and shortages of 782 gear and jungle utilities were negligible. Jungle boots were still in short supply. Complete re-warehousing was accomplished.
2. Transportation. Movement of personnel, vehicles, and materials from the Regimental Rear in Phu Bai was accomplished by moving a few priority sections by C-130 Aircraft, the majority of vehicles and personal gear by motor convoy, and the bulk supply items by LCU from the Hue ramp. Transportation from POE to present position was adequately provided for by Division MTO. No significant transportation problems occurred subsequent to completion of embarkation.
3. Maintenance. After the unit settled into the new area, a strong effort was made to bring all maintenance work up to standards. Quarterly inspections were held as required on all vehicles, and all items requiring third echelon maintenance were turned into 1st FSR. Over 100,000 sandbags were replaced in the Regimental cantonment alone.
4. Messing. Messing facilities were adequate. Hq Co mess personnel were augmenting 3/1's with Hq Co gear in storage.
5. Sanitiation and Hygiene. Cantonment sanitation was poor but improving. The 1st Marine Division Preventive Medicine Section inspected on 15 September and gave many good recommendations.
6. Exchange. Hq Bn, 1st Marine Division operated an Exchange in the Regimental cantonment. It was adequately stocked.
7. Medical. Medical treatment facilities were adequate. Personnel requiring care beyond the capability of the Regimental Aid Station were normally referred to the Naval Support Activity Hospital in Danang.

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Part II
Section F
Civil Affairs - Civic Action

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1. During the period, the Regimental S-5 continued to seek out and become acquainted with civil affairs and military resources in Hoa Vang and Dien Ban districts, as well as with 1st Division and III NAF personnel and organizations. Included were: MACV/CORDS Advisory personnel at both district headquarters, and at Sector headquarters at Hoi An. Vietnamese officials included: two (2) district chiefs, local RF Company commander and 59th RF Bn staff officers; also the hamlet chiefs of Yen Ne (3), Duong Son (2), and Phong Nam were met and projects discussed. The Revolutionary Development Team Advisor, Mr. Fitzgerald provided a tour of three (3) RD Teams in Hoa Vang district, acquainting the S-5, S-2, and S-3A, 1st Marines, with these teams and their potential.
2. The Regimental S-5 Section responded to the needs of the people of Hoa Vang District town when that location was damaged by an NVA/VC attack late in August by providing several truckloads of artillery ammunition boxes for rebuilding of business and dwelling places.
3. Special care was given the children of two (2) local families. A five year old boy was hospitalized on the German Red Cross ship HEILIGE LAND for major surgery to remove shrapnel from above his heart. His parents were provided transportation to visit the child aboard ship and to bring him home on release. The 1st Marines Regimental surgeon continued to monitor the child's healing until recovery was complete. Two (2) girls, two (2) and seven (7) years old of age, were hospitalized at Camp Book Children's Hospital for pneumonia. Again transportation was provided the parents for visits and the return of the children upon release.
4. A storm damaged the refugee hamlet of Yen Ne (3), and nearby Duong Son (2). Damage was major in Yen Ne (3), as the hamlet lacks extensive tree lines. The Regimental S-5 answered the problem of blown down houses by providing artillery ammunition boxes, demolition and scrap lumber from any available source. At month's end these hamlets were mostly rebuilt in preparation for the coming monsoon.
5. Lumber was provided for the building of six (6) coffins to assist a local resident in the relocation of family graves which he believed necessary due to 1st Marines installation of a drainage pipe through the original grave area.

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PART II
SECTION G
COMMUNICATIONS

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1. After having taken over all communications facilities from the 27th Marines on 31 August, the 1st Marines communication platoon continued to provide communications for the 1st Marines Command Post at Duong Son II. The platoon also maintained a contingent at Phu Bai for the first half of the month to provide communications for the Regimental rear. The 1st Marines continued to provide comm guard for 1/27 and 2/27 until their departure.
2. The emphasis in the early part of the month was on improving communication and power facilities within the CP and radio relay to First and Second Battalions. The original AN/PCC-1 equipment from Seventh Comm Bn was replaced with new equipment at the beginning of the month. This in turn was used to replace the AN/TRC-27 circuit to 1/1. The platoon also replaced the two 100 KW Fairmont generators with two Allis-Chambers 150 KW generators.
3. During the latter part of the month emphasis shifted to preparing for the October Material Management Inspection by 1st Division. On 23 September, a Division Assistance Inspection Team made a preliminary inspection of the 1st Marines communications material. Emphasis was placed on record keeping and maintenance.
4. From 18 September to the end of the month, a team from 7th Engineer Bn along with Regimental Headquarters and 3/1 electricians worked on re-wiring the entire CP area.

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Part III
Sequential Listing of Significant Events

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Operations

Section A

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Section B

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Part III
Section A
Operations

01 Sept 68 - Chopped OPCON Co F, 2d Bn, 27th Mar to 5th Marines.

02 Sept 68 - Co H, 2d Bn, 27th Marines chopped to 1st Marines and concurrently chopped to 2d Bn, 1st Marines.

04 Sept 68 - Assumed OPCON 2d Bn, 27th Marines and concurrently passed same to 2d Bn, 27th Marines.

04 Sept 68 - Co D, 1st Bn, 1st Marines designated to provide Sparrow Hawk/Bald Eagle.

07 Sept 68 - Assumed ADCON/OPCON 3d Bn, 1st Marines.

07 Sept 68 - Chopped OPCON 2d Bn, 27th Marines to RLT-27.

08 Sept 68 - Chopped OPCON 1st Bn, 27th Marines to RLT-27.

09 Sept 68 - Lt. Col. A.W. KELLER assumed command of 1st Bn, 1st Marines from Lt. Col. A. VANWINKLE.

10 Sept 68 - Chopped ADCON 2d Bn, 3d Marines to CG, 3d MarDiv.

12 Sept 68 - 3d Plat, Co H, 2d Bn, 1st Marines established blocking positions vic TU CAU (1), BT035663, in conjunction with ROKMC land clearing operation.

13 Sept 68 - 3d Plat, Co H, 2d Bn, 1st Marines terminated blocking position in support of ROKMC.

14 Sept 68 - Co C, 1st Bn, 1st Marines designated Sparrow Hawk reaction force.

14 Sept 68 - Co I, 3d Bn, 1st Marines designated Bald Eagle reaction force.

15 Sept 68 - 3d Plat, Co I, 3d Bn, 1st Marines provided to 1st MarDiv as security for Rough Rider.

18 Sept 68 - Chopped Co K, 3d Bn, 1st Marines OPCON to 1st MarDiv.

20 Sept 68 - Two platoons of 1st Bn, 1st Marines, one each from companies B and D, chopped OPCON to 3d Bn, 1st Marines. Frag O 135-68 refers.

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21 Sept - A boat transporting Marines from H&S Company 3d Bn, 1st Marines capsized in river vic AT966670 resulting in two USMC MIA.

22 Sept - Recovered body of Marine who drowned when boat capsized on 21 Sept.

23 Sept - Recovered second body of Marino who drowned when boat capsized on 21 Sept.

24 Sept - 3d Bn, 1st Marines chopped OPCON of platoons from Companies B and D 1st Bn, 1st Marines to 1st Bn, 1st Marines.

27 Sept - Artillery mission impacted short of target resulting in one KIA (NBC) and 13 WIAE (NBC) from Company B, 1st Bn, 1st Marines.

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**PART III
SECTION B
COMMUNICATIONS**

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1 Sep 68 - The communications platoon continued to man facilities at the main CP at Duong Son II and the Regimental rear at Phu Bai. The latter consisted mainly of a message center while the former included radio, radio relay, wire, message center, electric power, and a communication repair facility.

2 Sep 68 - On 1 and 2 September, the AN/PCC-1 equipment on temporary loan from 7th Comm Bn was replaced with a new issue which included four new receiver/transmitter units. The Regiment also received a PU-482 generator invoiced from 1/27, providing the Regimental Headquarters a tactical generator capability again.

3 Sep 68 - AN/TRC-27 radio relay shot to 1/1 replaced by AN/PCC-1.

4-6 Sep 68 - The Regiment experienced a tropical storm during this period. The communications platoon worked to maintain communications despite high winds and heavy rain. The flooding of the underground communications center forced its abandonment and subsequent move above ground. Storm damage consisted of minor damage to antennas. All communications were maintained throughout the storm.

7 Sep 68 - The Regiment assumed communications guard for 3/1 and dropped it for 2/27.

8 Sep 68 - 1st Marines dropped comm guard for 1/27.

14 Sep 68 - The remainder of the communications platoon arrived from the Regimental rear at Phu Bai.

17 Sep 68 - Two Allis-Chambers 150 kilowatt generators for the Regimental CP were acquired from the Naval Support Activity in Da Nang while two Fairmont 100 kilowatt generators were returned.

18 Sep 68 - Seventh Engineer Bn personnel started rewiring the main power distribution system within the Regimental CP.

23 Sep 68 - The First Division Assistance Inspection team delineated problem areas in regard to communications maintenance and record keeping.

30 Sep 68 - The Regimental Headquarters Company received its allowance of AN/PPS-6 battlefield surveillance radar sets, which are replacements for the AN/TPS-21.

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PART III
SECTION C
INTELLIGENCE

1. 072235H; H/2/1 at BT 032648. The Sapper attack on the Tu Cau Bridge on 7 Sept 1968 can be indirectly attributed to the typhoon which caused a large amount of debris, roots and branches to float down the river and pile up on the upstream side of the bridge. This debris extended across the river and upstream at least 50 meters, was about 3 feet thick, and could support a man's weight. It was under this debris that the sapper attacks occurred.

The attack occurred when the Tu Cau Bridge security observed movement in the water, believed to be a man using a reed as a snorkel. Fired S/A and threw 1 lb TNT into water which failed to detonate. Simultaneously a satchel charge was thrown into a defensive position NE of the bridge causing no injuries, while another detonation occurred beneath the bridge damaging it. The bridge remained standing, but was closed to traffic. Center of the bridge was buckled. (See attached photo)

2. 152110H; E/2/1 Sqd ambush vic BT 096675 sighted 2 rockets fired from vio BT 098673. Sqd. deployed toward site and enroute received S/A's fire. Fired arty, searched area, and found two nose plugs, burned wire insulation, foot prints leading toward beach and and back indicating arrival and departure by boat, oblong depression in sand 12' x 8' indicating possible back blast.

3. 210045H; E/2/1 with National Police; Search and cordon of Vien Dong (BT 0965); found 6 SFD's (3 were 105 rds rigged for command detonation) clothing and medical gear.

260400H; F/2/1; Search and cordon of Nui Kim Son (BT 0671); found and destroyed 2 caves; 1 secondary explosion observed from 1 cave.

280130H; I/3/1; at AT 973641; Spotted 20 VC, took under fire; searched area and found 2 shape charges, 1 satchel charge, 15 ChiCom grenades, 2-4' Bangalore Torpedoes, 1 RPG round and miscellaneous field gear. (See attached photo).

4. 220200H; Co A 3rd AMTRAC Bn Sighted 6 rockets being fired from BT 056671. Concurrently PF unit received S/A's and A/W's fire from approximately 30 VC. 3rd Amtrac Bn and CAP 2-5-1 received sporadic S/A's fire from vio BT 070705, 072706, 074706. In all cases fire was returned. 13 marines deployed to reinforce PF's. At first light search of area resulted in 2 detainees, captured 1 M16, six 3.5" rocket rds, one grenade (ChiCom) 3 M26's, one SFD, (illumination cannister full of TNT).

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Part IV
Supporting Documents

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- ✓ A. Command Chronology, Headquarters Company, 1st Marines
- ✓ B. Command Chronology, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
- ✓ C. Command Chronology, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
- ✓ D. Command Chronology, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines
- ✓ E. 1st Marines (Rein) Frag Orders 127 through 142-68
- ✓ F. 1st Marines (Rein) Situation Reports 1-30 September 1968
- ✓ G. 1st Marines (Rein) Awards Recommendations, September 1968

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1st Marines (Rein)

DANANG, RVN

301200H, Aug 1968

OPERATION ORDER 314-68 *W/CH 1, CH 2,*

Ref: (a) Maps; Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014 Sheets 6640I,
6640IV, 6641II and 6641III
(b) 1st Mar Div Op O 301-68
(c) 1st Mar Div O 003330.2A
(d) Div O 3400.1A w/Ch 1, 2, 3

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization

First Marines

Col LAUFFER

Headquarters Company

Lt. WILSON LA PORTE

Ketter

1st Bn, 1st Mar

LtCol J. M. ENNIE

2D Bn, 1st Mar

LtCol P. INDEXTER

3d Bn, 1st Mar

Lt C. L. QUICK

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) CG, 1st Marine Division (Rein), locates and destroys enemy forces, installations and LOO's in zone; provides security for Danang and Phu Bai TAOR's, locates and interdicts infiltration routes in area of operations, provides security for engineer effort in National Route 1; provides security for logistic craft and inland waterways, conducts surveillance and reconnaissance in zone and other such areas as assigned; supports the RVNAF RD and pacification programs, provides supporting fires and reaction forces for CAP's, CIDG camps and district Headquarters within assigned areas and performs duties as sub-zone coordinator for the control IOTZ.

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- (2) Commander, U. S. 7th Fleet provides shore bombardment and gunfire support to forces operating ashore in South Vietnam.
- (3) Commander, U. S. 7th Air Force conducts offensive and defensive tactical air operations.
- (4) Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, in coordination with Commander Vietnamese Navy (VNN), detects and restricts enemy seaborne infiltration traffic into ICTZ.
- (5) CG, I (ARVN) Corps, in coordination with CG, III MAF supports the RD program, conducts operations in ICTZ to protect and control natural resources, open and secure LOC's and eliminates the VC infrastructure and actively defends principal capitals and district towns.
- (6) CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing conducts aerial counter insurgency against enemies of the RVN within ICTZ, and other such places as directed by higher authority, provides fixed and rotary wing aircraft for all weather support of III MAF ground forces, RVNAF, and other FMAF; and, participates in the air defense effort of mainland Southeast Asia air defense region from assigned bases and other such locations as may be directed by higher authority.
- (7) MACV Advisory Groups, provide advice to RVNAF and reinforces liaison functions between RVNAF and U. S. and other FMAF.
- (8) Commander, Quang Nam Special Sector conducts operations and supports the RD program in Quang Nam province.
- (9) CG, 2d Brigade, ROKMC, conducts operations in assigned TAOR and denies enemy access to rocket belt and the Danang Vital Area from the South.
- (10) CO, 10th Psychological Battalion, ARVN, conducts psychological operations in ICTZ.
- (11) CO, 7th PSYOP Battalion, U. S. A., advises CO, 10th Psychological Battalion and supports psychological operations conducted by the CO, 10th Psychological Battalion and CG, III MAF.

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- (12) CO, Company C, 5th Special Forces Group (ABN) and subordinate detachments, advises, assists and supports Vietnamese Special Forces and selected district chiefs at Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps throughout IOTZ.
- (13) CO, 7th Marines conducts offensive operations in assigned TAOR to destroy enemy forces and deny enemy access to the Danang complex and support RD in assigned, TAOR.
- (14) CO, 5th Marines conducts offensive operations in assigned TAOR to destroy enemy forces and deny enemy access to Danang, the rocket belt and An Hoa industrial area.
- (15) CO, 11th Marines (Rein) provides general and direct support artillery and coordinates of Northern Sector Defense Command. Trains and maintains rocket investigation teams.
- (16) CO, 1st Bn, 11th Marines. Direct support of 1st Marines.
- (17) CO, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion conducts reconnaissance operations in the Division TAOR's, AO and RZ.
- (18) CO, 1st Tank Battalion (Rein). GS, First Mar Div. Provides one company DS 1st Marines (Rein). Supports units assigned contingency tasks.
- (19) 3d Amtrac Bn. DS 1st Mar Div; supports units assigned contingency tasks.
- (20) 1st Engr Bn. GS 1st Marine Division; conducts daily mine sweep operations as required to open critical roads throughout TAOR's/AO; provides engineer support to units assigned contingency tasks.
- (21) 11th MP Bn. GS 1st Marine Division.
- (22) 1st Shore Party Bn. GS 1st Marine Division. Provides HST'S as requested within capabilities.
- (23) 1st Medical Bn (-) (Rein). GS 1st Marine Division.

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- (24) 7th Comm Bn. GS 1st Marine Division.
- (25) 3d MM. Direct support.
- (26) 51st ARVN Regt. Conducts offensive operations and RD program in 1st Marines TAOR.
- (27) 59th RF Bn, under operational control of 51st ARVN Regiment. Conducts offensive operations and RD program in 1st Marines TAOR.
- (28) 170th PF Co. Operates within 1st Marines TAOR in support of RD program.
- (29) CAP's 2-53 (BT 027704), 2-54 (AT 985681), 2-55 (BT 017667) operate within First Marines TAOR in support of RD program. 2-51 (BT 043620) operates on Route 1 at the southern boundary. CAP-2-56 (AT 997704) operates vicinity Cao Do bridge.
- (30) 1st MP Bn. Provides Da Nang AB Security.

2. MISSION.

- a. Conduct unilateral, joint and combined offensive operations within assigned TAOR to locate and destroy enemy bases and logistic installations, with primary emphasis on those forces and bases which pose the greatest threat to GVN control of important population and economic centers and to the security of friendly military installations.
- b. Deploy forces throughout assigned TAOR to provide defense of Da Nang vital area and military complex with emphasis on routes of approach to probable rocket/mortar launch positions, to include waterways.
- c. Assume designation as Officer in Charge of construction and defense of Da Nang barrier.
- d. Be prepared to conduct offensive and reconnaissance operations within the RZ, on order.
- e. Support the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned TAOR. Be prepared to provide a reaction force for the relief of Hoa Vang District Headquarters (BT 012723) (coordinate with ARVN forces and CO, 1st MP Bn as applicable).

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- f. Provide security for the following bridges Tu Ca (BT 036648)
Ha Dong (AT 990642), **CAU DO (AT 999706)**.
- g. Locate and interdict routes of infiltration in TAOR.
- h. Provide security for engineer projects and upgrading of Routes #1 and 1C, and other essential roads within the TAOR.
- i. Be prepared to provide a company sized reaction force for the defense of Sea Anchor (BT 092690).
- j. Be prepared to provide a company sized reaction force to the CO, Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Bn) for the purpose of blocking the escape of prisoners of war from the compound at Grid (BT 075715) or for employment in the Danang area in connection with the evacuation of non-combatants.
- k. Be prepared to provide one reinforced battalion for employment anywhere in RVN on 12-hour notice.
- l. Upon commitment of the reinforced battalion in the preceding paragraph, be prepared to deploy the remainder of the regiment within an additional 12 hours. Be prepared to deploy the remainder of the regiment anywhere in RVN within an additional 12.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operation.
1st Marines (Rein) deploys forces throughout assigned TAOR, conducts unilateral, joint and combined offensive operations within TAOR to locate and destroy enemy ~~units~~ ^{forces} and logistic installations, with primary emphasis on those forces and bases which pose the greatest threat to GVN control of important population and economic centers and to the security of friendly military installations, to permit maximum small unit patrols, ambushes, OP's and IP's, particularly on routes of approach to possible mortar/rocket sites, while at the same time meeting fixed and mobile security requirements and supporting the Revolution Development Program. Annex B. (Operations Overlay).

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b. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

- (1) Conduct unilateral, joint and combined offensive operations within assigned TAOR to locate and destroy enemy bases and logistic installations, with primary emphasis on those forces and bases which pose the greatest threat to GVN control of important population and economic centers and to the security of military installations.
- (2) Deploy forces throughout assigned TAOR to provide defense of the Denang Vital Area and military complex; emphasis on routes of approach to probable rocket/mortar launch positions, to include waterways.
- (3) ~~At 1200H, 30 August 1968, provide one platoon to 1st Strike Party B Battalion for employment as cantonment security.~~
- (4) Be prepared to conduct offensive and reconnaissance operations within the Division RZ on order.
- (5) Support the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned TAOR.
- (6) Provide security for the following bridges; MA DONG (AT 990642).
- (7) Locate and interdict routes of infiltration in TAOR to include waterways.
- (8) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations exterior to TAOR and RZ, on order.
- (9) Be prepared to deploy anywhere in RVN on 12 hours notice.
- (10) Be prepared to conduct County Fair operations as required. Annex H.
- (11) Be prepared to conduct Golden Fleco Operations in RZ, on order. Annex M.
- (12) Be prepared to provide rapid reaction forces. Annex G.

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- (13) Be prepared to provide Rough Rider security on order. Annex U.
- (14) Be prepared to provide reaction forces to reinforce, relieve or counter attack to restore combined action platoons in TAOR.
- (15) Provide security for engineer projects and the upgrading of Route #1 and #1C, and other critical roads within the TAOR.
- (16) Be prepared to provide a reaction force for immediate employment in TAOR to destroy hostile rocket forces and block possible enemy escape routes using best available means and mobility. Annex I.

c. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines

- (1) Conduct unilateral, joint and combined offensive operations within assigned TAOR to locate and destroy enemy bases and logistic installations, with primary emphasis on those forces and bases which pose the greatest threat to CVN control of important population and economic centers and to the security of friendly military installations.
- (2) Deploy forces throughout assigned TAOR to provide defense of the Danang Vital Area and military complex; emphasis on routes of approach to probable rocket/mortar launch positions, to include waterways.
- (3) Be prepared to conduct offensive and reconnaissance operations within the RZ, on order.
- (4) Support the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned TAOR. Be prepared to provide a reaction force for relief of Hoa Vang District Headquarters (BT 012723), or evacuation of civilians, coordinate with ARVN forces and CO, 1st MP Bn as required. Annex L.
- (5) Provide security for engineer projects and road upgrading in TAOR, and security for TU CA bridge (BT 036648).

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- (6) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations exterior to TAOR and RZ, on order.
- (7) Be prepared to provide a company size reaction force for the defense of Sea Anchor (BT 092690).
- (8) Be prepared to provide a company sized reaction force to the CO, Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Bn) for the purpose of blocking the escape of prisoners of war from the compound at (BT 075715) or for employment in the Danang area in connection with evacuation of noncombatants. *MAINTAIN 160RR ON CROWS NEST AND A-6 POSITIONS*
- (9) Man the TRS-21 site on the Crew's Nest. Annex K.
- (10) Be prepared for employment any where in RVM on 12-hour notice.
- (11) Be prepared to conduct County Fair operations as required. Annex N.
- (12) Be prepared to conduct Golden Fleece operations on order. Annex M.
- (13) Be prepared to provide Rough Rider security, on order. Annex V.
- (14) Be prepared to reinforce, relieve or counter attack to restore combined action platoons in TAOR.
- (15) Be prepared to provide a reaction force for immediate employment in TAOR to destroy hostile rocket forces and to block possible enemy escape routes using best available means of mobility. Annex I.

d. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

- (1) Conduct unilateral, joint and combined offensive operations within assigned TAOR to locate and destroy enemy bases and logistic installations, with primary emphasis on those forces and bases which pose the greatest threat to CVN control of important population and economic centers and to the security of friendly military installations.

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- (2) Deploy forces throughout assigned TAOR to provide defense of the Danang Vital Area and military complex. Emphasis on routes of approach to probable rocket/mortar launch positions, to include waterways.
- (3) Be prepared to conduct offensive and reconnaissance operations within the Division RZ, on order.
- (4) Provide security for bridges at (BT 999699) and (BT 994687).
- (5) Support the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned TAOR.
- (6) Locate and interdict routes of infiltration in TAOR.
- (7) Provide security for engineer projects and upgrading of Route 1 and #1C, and other critical roads within the TAOR.
- (8) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations exterior to the TAOR, on order.
- (9) Be prepared to deploy anywhere in RVN on 12 hours notice.
- (10) Be prepared to provide reaction force for immediate employment in TAOR to destroy hostile rocket forces and block possible enemy escape routes using best possible means of mobility. Annex I.
- (11) Be prepared to conduct County Fair operations required. Annex N.
- (12) Be prepared to conduct Golden Fleco operations, on order. Annex M.
- (13) Be prepared to relieve, reinforce or counterattack to restore combined action platoon in TAOR.
- (14) Be prepared to provide Rough Rider Security, on order. Annex U.
- (15) Coordinate defense of 1st Mar CP.

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e. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Be prepared to provide local defense or participate in the defense of other U. S. or GVN installations within the TAOR.
- (2) Conduct all operations so that noncombatant casualties and damage to civilian property are minimized. Annex J to ref (b), and ref (o) (Rules of Engagement).
- (3) Establish control measures to limit enemy access to foodstuffs, weapons, medicine and money. Annex J to reference b and c.
- (4) Make maximum use of VN liaison personnel during conduct of operations for identification of friendly forces and as a means of contact with VN civilians.
- (5) Establish liaison with GVN officials at sector, district and village level, as appropriate, to facilitate the coordination of intelligence and operational activities.
- (6) Battalion commanders be prepared to field one primary and secondary command group, each capable of exercising tactical control of two or more maneuver elements.

f. Fire Support Coordination (Annex C).

g. Artillery (Annex D).

h. Air Support (Annex E).

i. Naval Gunfire (Annex F).

j. Alert and Rapid Reaction Forces (Annex G).

k. Anti-mechanized (Annex H).

l. Counter-rocket (Annex I).


m. Relief of CIDG Camps and Refugee Villages (Annex J).

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- n. Radar Surveillance from Crow's Nest (Annex K).
- o. Non-combatant Emergency Evacuation Plan (Annex L).
- p. Golden Fleece (Annex M).
- q. County Fair (Annex N).
- r. Counter Attack Plan (Annex O).
- s. Psychological operations (Annex P).
- t. Civil Affairs (Annex Q).
- u. Revolutionary Development (Annex R).
- v. Waterways Control (Annex S).
- w. Reports (Annex T) and ref. d.
- x. Rough Rider (Annex U).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER


R. L. BARRETT, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEXES:

- ✓ A. Intelligence (TBI)
- ✓ B. Operation Overlay
- ✓ C. Fire Support Coordination
- ✓ D. Artillery
- ✓ E. Air Support
- ✓ F. Naval Gun Fire
- ✓ G. Alert and Rapid Reaction Force

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- ✓ H. Antimechanized
- ✓ I. Counter Rocket
- ✓ J. Relief of CIDG Camps
- ✓ K. Radar Surveillance from Crow's Nest
- ✓ L. Non-combatant Emergency Evacuation Plan
- ✓ M. Golden Fleece
- ✓ N. County Fair
- ✓ O. Counter Attack Plan
- P. Psychological Operations (TBI)
- Q. Civil Affairs (TBI)
- R. Revolutionary Development (TBI)
- ✓ S. Waterway Control
- ✓ T. Reports (TBI)
- U. Rough Rider (TBI)
- ✓ V. Communication - Electronics
- ✓ W. **OPERATION OVERLAY, TWO BN TDOR.**
- X.
- Y.
- ✓ Z. Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 314-69.

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161200 SEP 68

Change 1 to Operation Order 314-68

1. The following pon changes to Operation Order 314-68 are directed:
 - a. Page 1; Task Organization substitute Lt Col Keller vice VanWinkle
 - b. Page 5; paragraph 2f add CAU DO (AT 997706)
 - c. Page 5; paragraph 3a line 3, substitute forces vice bunkers
 - d. Page 6; paragraph 3b (3) cancellcd.
 - e. Page 9; paragraph 3c (9) add after last word "maintain 106RR on Crow's Nest and A-6 positions."
 - f. Page 11; under ANNEK substitute coordination vice coordinator in ANNEK C.
 - g. Page G-2; Para G (6) (b) substitute 3/1 vice 1/27 delete *(Tentative).
 - h. Page G-4; after paragraph 2b add subheading "2. Alert Rifle Company."
 - i. Page G-2; paragraph 3b (3) substitute 3/1 vice 1/27
 - j. Remove pages G-2, I-3, I-1-3, I-1-4, J-2 substituting enclosed replacement pages.
2. Insert, Annex T (Reports) to Operation Order 314-68, appended hereto.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER

J. M. Gratto

J. M. GRATTO
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
3-3

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Change 2 to Operation Order 314-68

1. The following pen changes to Operation Order 314-68 are directed:
 - a. Page 1; Task Organization substitute Lt Col LaPorte vice Lt Col Keller
 - b. Page 12; Annex P delete TB 1.
 - c. Page 12; Annex T delete TB 1.
 - d. Page 12; Add Annex W (Operation Overlay, Two Bn TAOR).
2. Insert Annex W (Operation Overlay, Two Bn TAOR) to Operation Order 314-68, appended hereto.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFFER

W. A. Heyer
W. A. Heyer
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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Annex A (Intelligence) to operation Order 314-6.

Reference: (a) MAPS 1:50,000 AMS Series L/014 Sheets 6641 II, 6641 III,
6540 I, 6540 IV.

(b) RegtO B3600.1B (SOP for Intelligence)

Time Zone: E

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. Appendix 1

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Determine if any enemy will attack in the 1st Marines TAOR. If so, where, when, in what strength, from what direction and in what forces? Special attention to the waterways and National Highway #1.
- b. Determine if the enemy will defend areas he now holds or controls in the 1st Marines TAOR. If so, where, when, in what strength, where will his main defences be located?
- c. Determine if the enemy will reinforce elements in or near the 1st Marines TAOR. If so, when, with what forces? Special attention to elements of Group 44, elements of which are located near the vicinity of the 1st Marines TAOR.
- d. Determine if the enemy will withdraw his forces from the 1st Marines TAOR. If so, when, to where, for what purpose? Special attention to effect of friendly patrolling activity, Flayways program, etc.
- e. Determine the location of enemy rocket, artillery, and mortar position in and around the 1st Marines TAOR.
- f. Determine the location of enemy infiltration routes. Special attention to the trails, roads and waterways leading into the 1st Marines TAOR.
- g. Determine the location of enemy base camps, storage areas, training areas, Headquarters, etc. Special attention to rocket storage areas, how are rockets transported, what route is used?
- h. Determine current enemy identification in the vicinity of the 1st Marines TAOR.

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1. Determine enemy strength of units encountered, the toll of recent casualties, the cause of the casualties, the type and effect of his training.
3. ORDER OF BATTLE/INTELLIGENCE (4. INTELLIGENCE)
 - a. Determine if the enemy is infiltrating local villages. If so, what strength, what tactic is he using to infiltrate, what route is he using, at what time does he infiltrate?
 - b. Determine what villages are VC/PA controlled/occupied. If enemy controlled, is the village fortified by bunkers/trench line? Does the village show signs of heavy and recent enemy activity?
 - c. Determine what assistance the indigenous personnel are providing the VC/PA. If so, when, where, to what extent? Special attention to areas used as propaganda meetings.
 - d. Determine the methods and techniques utilized by the enemy to infiltrate friendly installations. Special attention to enemy use of clandestine means, use of enemy agents located within installations.
 - e. Determine the effect of enemy Psyops program on the civilian populace. What are his control measures, what means does he utilize, what is the enemies message?
 - f. Determine the types of communication/signal utilized by the enemy. What signal does he use to attack, break contact, indicate U.S. forces in the area, mark airfields, unsafe lanes? What manifestations or indications of the civilian populace indicate the enemy's presence in the area?
 - g. Determine the location of helicopter LZ's. How many helicopters will it accomodate, type of terrain, location of enemy positions/locations in the vicinity of LZ.
 - h. Determine if the enemy will use NBC weapons, if so what type, where.
 - i. Determine what effects the civil affairs/Psyops program have on the local populace?
 - j. Determine the following concerning enemy soldiers:
 - (1) How is his morale, is LZ a morale big problem?
 - (2) Is he adequately supplied with food and ammunition?
 - (3) How has he been affected by the artillery/air strikes in the area?
 - (4) Is he aware of the Chieu Hoi program?

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k. Determine the location of enemy mines, and booby traps. Special attention to well used trails, roads, shoulders of roads, heavily vegetated areas, along waterways, paths/trails or areas civilians avoid.

(1) Determine the enemy's method of resupply. In doing so, traffic his primary routes.

4. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING AIDS

a. Attached and subordinate to units

(1) 5th INF provides interrogation and transcription capability to all subordinate to units of this regiment, as required.

(2) All attached and subordinate units conduct normal intelligence activities in assigned U.S. to provide information on EEL's to this regiment as required. Report information concerning all unusual events, contact, sightings, and locations of supply and storage areas.

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Coordinating units.

(1) CG 1st MarDiv

(a) Provides information concerning EEL's and other Intelligence Requirements.

(b) Arranges reconnaissance support as requested.

(c) Arranges AO support as required.

(d) Provides aerial imagery and photo interpretation and other intelligence as requested.

(e) Provides IR, night/day photography, SAR and AID as required.

(f) Provides OOB assistance as required.

(2) 19th CIB

(a) Provides counterintelligence and OOB capability as requested.

5. STANDARDS FOR HOLDING INFORMATION, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL.

a. Reference (b) applies.

b. Subordinate and supporting units are referred to the following orders for guidance:

(1) Division Order 5461.2A

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(2) Force Order 3461.2A.

c. Captured Personnel and Documents

(1) Subordinate and Supporting Units should:

- (a) Advise this Headquarters promptly upon capture of weapons, personnel, or documents.
- (b) Evacuate captured weapons, personnel, and documents to this headquarters immediately.
- (c) Account to this Headquarters for weapons captured and reported on spot reports.
- (d) Insure that all captured enemy weapons, personnel, and documents denote the capturing unit, date, time, location and circumstance of capture. It is important that POW's and documents found on the COM be evacuated simultaneously for the most effective interrogation.
- (e) Treat all captured personnel as POW's until their status can be ascertained.

d. Captured Materials

- (1) Captured materials will be processed through the normal channels. Except when falling within one of the below categories, captured ammunition, explosives, and materials may be destroyed. Items listed below are of special intelligence interest and should be forwarded to this headquarters.
 - (a) All captured material (weapons, ammunition, food-stuffs, and medical supplies) that have not yet been encountered.
 - (b) All communications equipment to include telephones, radios, and electronics.
 - (c) All chemical warfare material (protective masks, decontamination kits, and chemical munitions).
 - (d) VC/NVA uniforms of all types, including headgear and accoutrements.
 - (e) All equipment pertaining to the VC/NVA capability to transport, hide, or launch rockets.
 - (f) Miscellaneous items such as flags, banners, political propaganda, pictures, etc.

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6. DOCUMENTS AND/OR INFORMATION REQUIRED

a. Maps and Charts

- (1) This headquarters will prescribe standard tactical and strategic maps for each operation.
- (2) The standard map for operations in Vietnam is: Map, Vietnam 1:50,000 AB Series I7014 and will be issued on request by this headquarters.

b. Aerial Photographs

- (1) Requests for aerial photography to include high performance photography should be submitted to CG 1st InfDiv (Attn: C of S, G-2) via this headquarters.

7. Counterintelligence

a. Reference (b).

b. 19th CIR provides counterintelligence assistance as required.

c. Challenge and password will be published separately.

d. All units should retain in their possession the current CAC-F and CAC-C's as authorized.

e. All units maintain strict control and physical security of classified information. Utilize "SecureNet" capability in communication when necessary.

c. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a. Reports

- (1) Reference (b)
- (2) Report all information satisfying EGI's and other intelligence requirements by spot report to the Regimental S-2 as soon as possible.
- (3) Intelligence summaries will be published by this headquarters covering a period 0000-0000 daily.
- (4) Intelligence summaries are not required by subordinate units.
- (5) Submit mine/booby trap reports in accordance with Division Order 3020.1.

b. Distribution

- (1) Intelligence summaries will be distributed to subordinate and attached units.

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(2) All agent/intelligence reports covering enemy movements and locations will be passed to subordinate units when applicable and will be included on the intelligence summary.

C. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Normal reconnaissance and observation will be conducted by all units in their assigned areas of operations and report results of patrol debriefs to the Regimental S-2.

b. Units in contact will make maximum effort to take prisoners.

c. Target Information

(1) All rocket, mortar, or artillery positions, ammunition/foodstuffs supply caches, base camps, bivouac areas, rally points, etc, should be reported to this Headquarters for targeting.

BY COMPTD OF COLONEL L. UFFER

L. Uffer
Colonel Uffer

Adjutant (Commander) 1st Battalion 11th

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Appendix I (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex A (Intelligence) to
Operation Order 314-68

1. MISSION

- a. Conduct unilateral, joint and combined offensive operations within assigned TAOR to locate and destroy enemy bases and logistic installations, with primary emphasis on those forces and bases which pose the greatest threat to RVN control of important population and economic centers and to the security of friendly military installations.
- b. Deploy forces throughout assigned TAOR to provide defense of Danang vital area and military complex with emphasis on route of approach to probable rocket/mortar launch position, to include waterways.
- c. Assume designation as Officer in Charge of construction and defense of Banong barrier.
- d. Be prepared to conduct offensive and reconnaissance operations within the RVN on order.
- e. Support the Revolutionary Development Program within assigned TAOR. Be prepared to provide a reaction force for the relief of Moi Vang District Headquarters (DT 012723) (coordinate with RVN forces and CO, 1st MP Bn as applicable).
- f. Provide security for the following bridges: Fu Cau (DT 056648), Ha Dong (AT 990642), and Cau DS (AT 990706).
- g. Locate and interdict routes of infiltration in TAOR.
- h. Provide security for engineer projects and upgrading of Routes #1 and #1C and other essential roads within the TAOR.
- i. Be prepared to provide a company sized reaction force for the defense of Sea Anchor (DT 092690).
- j. Be prepared to provide two company sized reaction force to C, Base Defense Battalion (1st MP Bn) for the purpose of blocking the escape of prisoner of war from the compound at grid (DT 075715) or for employment in the Danang area in connection with the evacuation of noncombatants.

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4. k. Be prepared to provide one reinforced battalion for employment anywhere in RVN on 12-hour notice.

(1) Upon commitment of the reinforced battalion in the preceding paragraphs, be prepared to deploy the remainder of the regiment within an additional 12 hours.

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. Characteristics of Area of Operations

(1) Military Geography

(a) Topography

(1) Terrain: The terrain in Quang Nam Province is one of three types; the Coastal Plain, the Piedmont Region, and the mountains. The areas we are most concerned with in the 1st Marines TLOR are the Coastal Plain, and Piedmont areas.

(a) Coastal Plain. This region extends along the Eastern boundary where the land meets the South China Sea. Characteristics of the plains are shallow water table, brackish lagoons, and sand dunes which channelize over-beach traffic. The area has poor fertility and is inundated by floods during the rainy seasons. The area extends from one to four miles inland from the sea.

(b) Piedmont Area. The Piedmont plateau is flat and fertile. Soils consists of light to heavy clays. The large waterways which flow from the west to east in the province compartment travel and slow communications. Almost all rice grown in the province is harvested in the Piedmont area.

(2) Vegetation

(a) Coastal area. This area is often devoid of vegetation. However, there are grass of various species, cactus, and some evergreen trees in the area.

(b) Piedmont area. Low soil porosity holds water in the soil. Crops grown in the area include rice, tobacco, manico, sweet potatoes, and green vegetables.

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Hedges of bayonet grass, as well as bamboo, bananas, and coconut trees are located throughout the area.

(3) Relief and Drainage.

(a) Rivers in the Coastal Pl. in area are generally slow and bordered with greatly sloping banks. They are wide and deep with sand bottoms. Rivers and streams located 4/5 km from the sea contains fresh and salt water during periods of high tide.

(b) Main Waterways

(1) Da Nang River is made up of the Cam Le and the Vinh Dien Rivers. The current is sluggish, width is approximately 300 meters with shallow banks.

(2) Thu Bon River rises in the Truong Son Mountains and empties into the sea near Hoi An. The width is 120 to 300 meters.

(3) Cam Le River flows from mountains into the Cam Le River. Width is 50-120 meters wide.

(4) Vinh Dien River flows from Thu Bon River into the Da Nang river. Average width is 40 to 70 meters, current is swift and the banks are steep.

(c) The rivers provide the enemy with one of his main infiltration routes and means to move supplies and ammunition.

(d) Flooding is very common and disastrous from October to February

(4) Trafficability.

(a) Coastal Plain. During the dry season tracked and wheeled vehicles can move across the sand dunes and shallow lagoons relatively easily. During the heavy rains in the winter much of the area is flooded and roads washed away.

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(b) Piedmont area. In the dry season off road trafficability is poor due to the flooded rice paddies. In the wet season this area is subject to floods and movement is negligible except for amphibious vehicles.

(5) Effects of Terrain on Military.

(a) Observation and Fields of fire. Good observations and field of fire exist along National Highway #1 in the Piedmont area and coastal plain. Aerial observation is excellent in the coastal and Piedmont area. Observation and fields of fire for direct and indirect fire weapons is good in the lowland and very limited in the highlands.

(b) Cover and Concealment. Excellent cover and concealment in the highlands afford secure movement of infantry units at all times. There is also good cover and concealment in lowlands due to the many cultural features, groves of trees and cultivated areas.

(c) Obstacles. There are no obstacles to foot movement in the dry seasons, immense rainfalls and swollen rivers interdict or halt infantry movements at all times. Vehicular movement is blocked by paddy areas or many rivers. This is true in winter when all roads save National Highway #1 are under water.

(d) Key Terrain.

(1) Qui-Van Pass

(2) National Route #1

(3) National Railroad, tunnel and bridges

(4) Danang

(5) Hoi An

(6) Dien Bien

(7) Hoa Vang

(8) All waterways, streams, and canals

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(e) **Avenues of Approach:** The main avenues of approach are the National Hwy #1, the railroad, and all roads and waterways leading from the mountainous area in the west through the Go Noi Islands, and north along the main waterways the Song Yen and Song Vinh Dien.

(6) **Climate and Weather.**

(a) This area is characterized by North East monsoon (or prevailing wind condition). It covers a period from early November to mid-March. Prevailing wind direction at Danang from September through January generally changes from east to north. During the period from September through November or December, storms at sea and typhoons cause increased precipitation. Additionally as moist air from the South China Sea moves inland it hits the mountains and loses its moisture in the form of rain. For these reasons, precipitation along the coast is intense during the NE monsoon. The increased cloudiness and decrease in visibility during this period will also severely limit the use of air support, aerial observers, and supply and movement of troops by helicopters. Land and sea breezes are common to the coastal lowland.

(b) The Crachin is a prolonged period of widespread fog, drizzle, or light rain which primarily effects the Eastern coastlands. This condition greatly affects aircrafts operations. It is a persistent low level stratus phenomenon accompanied by prolonged precipitation. The clouds are generally 3,000 to 5,000 feet thick with ceilings under 1,000 feet. Visibility was generally below 2 miles and frequently below $\frac{1}{2}$ mile. This condition exists between late November and late March.

(2) **Transportation.**

(a) **Highways, Roads, and Trails.** The only all weather road in Quan Nam province is National Highway #1. It is inundated in places during the rainy season and is eroded along its edges by water. The route is subject to traffic disruptions where a bridge is blown or washed away. The remainder of the roads and trails are gravel, rock, or sand construction. Nearly all roads are damaged each winter by rain and floods.

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Traffic is also greatly interdicted by the enemy mining/boobytrap activity along most of the well used routes. The area on the coast is most heavily boobytrapped.

- (b) Airways. There is one airport in the area capable of handling heavy aircraft, the Danang airport. Other airfields are constructed of locally obtainable materials and are poorly drained.
- (c) Inland Waterways. The main waterways in the area are the Song Yen, Song Vinh Dien, and the Danang River. These waterways are used by the enemy to transport troops and supplies to more strategic locations.

(3) Politics. There are two (2) political parties recognized in Quang Nam Province. These parties are legal and are of prime importance in the psychological warfare effort at insurgency. The parties are:

- (1) The Greater Vietnam Party
- (2) Vietnamese Nationalist Party

(4) Economics. Quang Nam Province is potentially rich in minerals, forest resources, fishing, and agricultural products. Fishing is greatly pursued and much of the rich land is unused. Labor is cheap and unemployment extensive. The greatest percentage of people earn their living by farming, namely 85 percent. Most of the farmers also market their own products and work at labor associated with farming throughout slack seasons. Family handicrafts such as the weaving of mats or cheap cotton fabrics is commonly done. Professional soldiers are drawn in significant numbers from the province.

(5) Sociology. The Family is the basic social unit as in most Asian countries. Most customs or traditions stem from the religious belief. The Vietnamese is religious by nature, and will often consult the lunar calendar or a priest before undertaking a new venture. The majority of the people are either Roman Catholic or Buddhist. The school system in the Quang Nam Province is inadequate. Physical facilities vary from good to poor dependent upon the hamlet, village or district wealth. Extreme over crowding of classrooms is the rule. The students show great zeal for learning and all teaching is done by repetition and memorization.

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(b) Enemy Military Situation

(1) Recent and Present Activities

(a) The enemy utilizes the 1st Marines TAOR as part of the Military Region V Reconnaissance Zone. The area consists of the area North of Go Noi Island and West of the Song Yen. The 2nd NVA Division and elements of Group 44 (36th and 38th Regiments) utilize the Go Noi Island and the area to the south as a base area for training, resting, administration, and resupply. The area to the west, the mountainous area west of the Song Yen is utilized as a base area for the 36th NVA Regt and the 360B Artillery Regiment. It is believed that the T99 or 402nd Scupper Battalion also uses this western area as a base camp. There are two (2) Local force VC units which live and work in the vicinity of 1st Marines TAOR, they are the Q15 or (Q84) Hoa Vang District Company. In addition to these two (2) district companies, village/hamlet guerrillas also remain within the TAOR at all times. The village/hamlet guerrillas only leave the area for training in the mountains to the west or Go Noi Island to the South.

(b) Regular units only enter the 1st Marines TAOR on their way to conduct offensive in Danang or to conduct offensive actions against US and ARVN units in this area.

(c) The VC/NVA utilize National Route #1 and the waterways running North and South as major LOC'S/infiltration routes through the TAOR. Defensive positions located near hamlets and tunnels within the hamlets are used as way stations during movement through or in the TAOR.

(2) Strength, Composition, and Location.

(a) Locally available the enemy has two (2) District companies (Q15 and Q16) in the TAOR at all times. In addition the local village/hamlet guerrillas are armed with unknown number of 82MM mortars, 60MM mortar LMG's and an assortment of small arms.

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(b) Other Forces:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Est Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Group 44</u>	NVA	UNK	ZC 1741
31st Regt	NVA	1,580	ZC 1959
36th Regt	NVA	1,105	AT 9553
38th Regt	NVA	430	Go Noi Island
141st Regt	NVA	1,550	ZC 1643
1st Bn, 68B Arty Regt	NVA	350	Duc Duc
368B Arty Regt	NVA	1,160	ZC 1461
R.20DN	LF	310	BT 0965
V.25BN	LF	310	BT 1649
D.7BN	MF	325	AT 9356
T.07 Scupper Bn	MF	350	ZC 7960
T.89 Scupper Bn	MF	375	ZC 7960
Q15/Q82 Co	LF	165	
Q16/Q84 Co	LF	80	BT 0376

(3) Availability of Reinforcements. Locally available forces can be reinforced immediately by the R-20 and V-25 Local Forces Battalions within a matter of hours, reinforced with 82mm mortars, 60mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles. The enemy can be reinforced with elements of Group 44, namely elements of the 36th and 38th Regiments and Scupper Battalions, reinforced by supporting fires consisting of 122 and 140 rockets, mixed mortars and recoilless rifles within 24 to 36 hours, and a third regiment from the west, the 31st with supporting arms within 36 to 72 hours. Also the 2nd NVA Division reinforced by mixed mortars and recoilless rifles, presently located to the South vicinity of Hieu Duc could reinforce, in the case of a full scale offensive, in a matter of 36 to 72 hours.

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(4) Movements and activities.

(a) The enemy's plan of attack for the Banning area has been to use the local force units to give the way for an offensive. Local forces are used to conduct:

- (1) Reconnaissance of friendly units positions.
- (2) Interruption of JOCES.
- (3) Reconnaissance of infiltration routes into friendly positions of Amer L. forces.
- (4) Main attacks of up to company size and diversion, or supporting attack for regular R. forces.

(b) Information on recent activities by the enemy were gained as a result of 160 interrogations. The report covered the recent attack on Banning, 25-26 July 1950. The ROK claimed that the R. 9th regiment was the unit attacking the Yang Hwa bridge. Elements crossed the river between the Can Do and Can Le Bridges in 20 boats, 10 men per boat. They also crossed the river by R. 6 on the night of 24-25 July. The ROK stated that during the attack on the bridge the enemy lost 50 men and many more by the ensuing fire and voluntary attacks. The R-45th regiment and elements of the R-20th ran into heavy resistance from R. 1st and ROK units south of Banning in the 1st Marines RAR. It is believed that attack was committed to set the stage for a larger attack on Banning city and installations by regular R. V. forces. This is further evidence of the enemy's practice of utilizing local forces to give the way for a major offensive.

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In moving to the attack the enemy guided on Route #1 and crossed the Ho Dong Bridge. As stated before Route #1 is one of his main infiltration routes. During the ensuing two (2) days following the unsuccessful attack, 1st MP Battalion and elements of the 27th Marines found a total of 183 enemy dead. Add to this the V-25th and R-20th casualties suffered further south at the hand of US and ARVN forces and the enemy's plan for a full scale offensive has been faltered, or at least delayed for a time.

(5) Logistics. Weapons and ammunition are brought in country via Laos and sea infiltration by Sampan. The main storage areas are located to the south of Goi Noi Island and west of the Song Yen. Also several storage areas have been located along the main waterways, banks of the river, and in bunkers throughout the area. Medical supplies are obtained from the local villagers.

(6) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses.

(c) Strengths. The NVA soldier is a master of detail. They are meticulous in their planning for operations and always rehearse until all elements have mastered the plan. Fire discipline is generally good, his communications fair. Regular forces conduct training programs for the local force guerrillas in the Go Noi Islands. The guerrillas are hard fought soldiers, dedicated to their movement to over throw the RVN.

(b) Weaknesses. The NV soldier is a creature of habit. Once a plan is developed and rehearsed, they cannot react to changing situation. He must go through with the plan regardless of the outcome. Recently the training for NVA soldiers has not been adequate, the experienced, seasoned soldier is hard to find, the recruits are young and as a result units are taking heavy casualties. The local force guerrillas are poorly trained, and ill-equipped. Training conducted on Go Noi Island and in the base camps to the west is often curtailed due to commitments in local areas or US/ARVN operations or harassing fires. Once exposed and beaten by American fire power, they are depressed by the inequity of their fire power. Medical attention is poor when units are in SVN.

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(7) Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation.

- (a) Guerrillas. Two VC local forces companies work in the TAOR. They infiltrate into populated villages and hamlets taxing, terrorizing and collecting foodstuffs for the regular forces.
- (b) Psyops. The enemy's psyops effort has been extensive. He has utilized propaganda meetings in the local villages and hamlets attempting to convince the people that the Americans are the aggressors, that they should join arms with their fellow Vietnamese against American terrorist activities. The enemy has utilized the propaganda leaflets and also maintains a loud speaker capability and has used this effectively. Also, the enemy places VC cadre in villages or hamlets to sway the people to their cause either by force or persuasion.

(8) Enemy Capabilities.

- (a) Attack any location in the 1st Marines TAOR with up to two Divisions preceded by Local Force companies and reinforced by an artillery regiment with mixed rockets and mortars.
- (b) Defend with forces in present positions or any fortified village or hamlet in the TAOR supported by unknown number of 60mm and 82mm mortars, and rockets reinforced with regular and main forces units.
- (c) Reinforce with uncommitted elements operating in close proximity to the contact.
- (d) Evade main elements of friendly forces.
- (e) Withdraw all forces from the area prior to US operation or withdraw after a US attack has been made, fighting only to permit withdrawal of forces.
- (f) Continue to lay mines and boobytraps along all roads, trails, stream beds, or any other route used by friendly forces.

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(g) Continue to launch harassing rockets and attacks from sitos, during hours of darkness, against all US/ARVN installations and positions.

(9) Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.

(a) Attack. The enemy in the past has conducted small sized harassing attacks in the 1st Marines TAOR. It is felt he will do this against all US/ARVN positions and patrols with increasing frequency to search out weak spots for

(b) Defend. The enemy has not favored this course of action in the past in the 1st Marines TAOR. He will usually conduct delaying actions as friendly forces sweep an area. During operations south in Go Noi Island, the enemy could be seen to do this. It is felt that this type of activity will continue.

(c) Reinforce. In the past it has been the enemy's intention to reinforce when a weak spot is found in friendly positions, but quick reaction and saturation patrolling by defending forces has prevented this. This was exemplified in the enemy's attack on the outskirts of Da Nang, Cua Do and Cua Lo Bridges by the V-25th and R-20th Battalions and Sapper units. The attack was stopped short of its planned route.

(d) Evasion. This is a basic VC/NVA tactic. He will only fight to withdraw or when he has the tactical advantage.

(e) Withdraw. The enemy has practiced this course of action when forces of superior size are encountered. Also he knows that US Operations are of short duration and that he can regain the area at a later time.

(f) Mines and Booby Traps. This has been the enemy's most frequent course of action in the past. It is felt he will continue this program with increased frequency because of the arrival of new and inexperienced units in this TAOR.

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(8) Harass by fire. The enemy has harassed friendly installations with rocket and mortar fire in the past. Areas of prime interest for the enemy has been the Danang airfield, FLC, Marble Mountain, etc. The enemy is effective with this course of action and as a result will continue to launch harassing fires from different locations in the TACR.

(10) Conclusions:

(a) Relative probability of adoption of available courses of action:

- (1) Mines and Booby traps
- (2) Harass by fire
- (3) Evade
- (4) Attack
- (5) Reinforce
- (6) Withdraw
- (7) Defend

(b) Effects of Enemy Capability on the accomplishment of the assigned Mission.

- (1) Mines and booby trap activity by the enemy will hinder operations. Continuous saturation patrolling of the TACR especially at night, will discourage this course of action by the enemy.
- (2) One of the 1st Marinos missions is to conduct saturation patrolling to deny the enemy access to fire rocket/mortar at friendly installations. Continued saturation patrolling in all confirmed and suspected areas of rocket mortar sites must be conducted, and quick reaction to an attack by bringing fire on the enemy position and/or dispatching troops to the site is the only means to discourage this course of action by the enemy.

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- (3) Enemy efforts to evade will hinder operations if this course is used to attack another location. Good coverage and constant patrolling by friendly forces will prevent the enemy from remaining undetected for too long a time.
- (4) Enemy efforts to attack positions within the 1st Marines TAOR will hinder operations. Only by continuous wide coverage patrolling, along with judicious use of reconnaissance units can a surprise attack by the enemy be prevented.
- (5) Enemy effort to reinforce could tie up friendly forces in a location while other enemy units are moving to mine or perform other terroristic activities in the TAOR. Again constant patrolling, and well planned, coordinated operations by friendly units to include reaction forces will prevent this course of action by the enemy.
- (6) Withdrawal of enemy forces from the vicinity of the 1st Marines TAOR would enhance our mission.
- (7) Enemy efforts to defend in the 1st Marine TAOR will hinder operations. Enemy defense in an area could be construed as a diversionary tactic to draw friendly forces away from planned terroristic activities.

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McGraw
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Operations Officer

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1st M-200s (Rein)
Danang, RVN
301200H, AUG 1968

Annex E (Operations Overlay) to Operation Order 314-68

I. Annex E, is appended hereto.

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1st Marines (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
301200H, Aug 1968

Annex C (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 314-68

Ref: (A) DivO P 3000.1 (SOP for Operations)
(B) FMFM 7-1 (Fire Support Coordination)
(C) MACV Directive 525-18 (Conduct of Artillery, Mortar and Naval Gunfire)
(D) 1st Mar Div O 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces.
- b. Friendly Forces.
 - (1) Annex D (Artillery).
 - (2) Annex F (NGF).
 - (3) Annex E (Air Support).

2. MISSION.

The Fire Support Coordination Center exercises overall responsibility for coordination of all supporting arms in the tactical area of responsibility to insure maximum effective fire support and troop safety to all units. The principle function is to provide the commander the means for planning coordinating and controlling his available fire support.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operations. Fire Support Coordination is in accordance with references (a) through (d).
- b. 1st Mar FSCC
 - (1) Coordinate fires within TAOR.
 - (2) Coordinate fires outside of TAOR when direct liaison is authorized by this Headquarters.

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(3) When directed be prepared to operate forward FSCC to coordinate supporting arms in operations outside TAOR.

6. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Annex J (Rules of Engagement) to Reference (d).
- (2) 1st Marines establish precleared zones in coordination with local GVN Eq's whenever and wherever possible. Forward overlays of precleared zones to 1st Mar Div FSCC.
- (3) Targets are not attacked by artillery or Naval Gunfire without approval of appropriate FSCC as modified by Annex I (Counter Rocket Plan).
- (4) Include cannister impact coordinates in requests for clearance to fire illumination missions.

4. FIRE SUPPORT MISSION CLEARANCE.

a. Fire Missions will be cleared with 1st Marines FSCC when:

- (1) Target falls within 500 meters of unit boundary or within 500 meters of the coast.
- (2) Anytime another unit, either U. S. or allied, is in or overlapping, TAOR, clearance must be obtained through 1st Marines FSCC.
- (3) Any other special situation which might be promulgated periodically.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY.

- A. SAV A PLANE. SAV A Plane described in Reference (a) is implemented to ensure aircraft of safety with respect to surface to surface firing.
- B. Restrictive Fire Plan. Restrictive fire plan is recommended by unit when that unit feels plan is necessary for aircraft safety.

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6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES.

a. Fire Coordination Line (FCL) normally established to coordinate fires between two converging forces. It is established by the Headquarters controlling the two forces. It should, whenever possible, be established along an identifiable terrain feature.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.

a. Annex V (Command and Communication-Electronics).

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1st Marine (Roin)
DANANG, RVN
301200H AUG 1968

Annex D (Artillery) to Operation Order 413-68

Ref: A. Firing Chart: Grid Sheet, Scale 1:25,000 and 1:50,000
B. Div O P02000.2 D (CGOI)
C. 11th Mar Order P3000.3F (Operation SOP)
D. 11th Mar Order P2000.1 (Comm - Elec SOP)

TIME ZONE: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence), current IS US and REINTREPS.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 4th Bn, 11th Mar (-). General Support/Rainforcing Fires.
- (2) 3rd Bn, 11th Mar (-). Reinforcing Fires.
- (3) 1st Ammd Amtrac Co. (-) (LVIE-6). Reinforcing Fires.
- (4) "B" Btry, 8th Bn, 4th Arty USA (175 Guns). General Support.
- (5) "A" Plat. 3rd 8" HCO Btry. General Support.

2. MISSION. First Battalion, 11th Marines (-) provides artillery fires in direct support of 1st Marine Regiment (parations. Zone of fire) as directed by higher headquarters.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Artillery Employment.

- (1) 1st Bn, 11th Marines (-) provides close and continuous fire support to 1st Marines from positions established laterally and in depth within and adjacent to the ~~unit~~.
- (2) Supported infantry commanders will be provided with 105mm and 107mm artillery fires where possible from mutually supporting artillery positions.
- (3) General support and reinforcing artillery fires can be made available upon request.

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b. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Position areas and fire capabilities. Report to 1/11 and 11th Marines FDC when changes occur.
- (2) Firing charts. Reference (a).
- (3) Registrations as directed and controlled by 1/11 FDC.
- (4) Registration points data available from 11th Marines and battalion TMS list.
- (5) Survey in accordance with reference (c).
- (6) Target numbers in accordance with reference (c) and following allocations.

(a) 1/11 FDC RX0001 - 5000

Unit FSCC	PERM on calls	TEMP on calls/H&I'S
1st Mar	RX 5001-6000	RX 6001-9999
1/1	RB 0001-1000	RA 1001-9999
2/1	RB 0001-1000	RB 1001-9999
3/1 4/1	RT 0001-1000	RT 1001-9999

*(Tentative)

- (a) Permanent on - calls, will be reviewed monthly for possible deletions and updating.
- (7) Counter mortar/rocket priorities. Active.
- (8) Meteorological data. Electronic data furnished three times daily (0900, 1500, 1900).
- (9) Air observation. Available upon request from 1st Mar Div G-2 and 11th Mar S-2.
- (10) Ammunition restrictions established ASR'S will not be exceeded without approval of higher headquarters.

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(11) No-Fire Lines: Annex C (Fire Support Coordination).

(12) Restrictions Annex C (Fire Support Coordination).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. 1st Mar Administrative Order 314-68.

b. Reports: Annex T and reference (c).

c. Available supply rate (RDS/TUBE/DAY).

107mm MF .18

105mm HOW. 58.5

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. Annex V (Command and Communication - Electronics).

b. References (b) and (d).

c. Command Posts. Report all displacements.

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1st Marines (Rein)
DANANG, RVN
301200H Aug 1968

Annex E (Air Support) to Operation Order 314-68

Ref: (a) 1st Mar Div Op O 301-68

Time Zone: Hotel

1. PROCEDURES.

a. General.

- (1) Tactical air operations coordination responsibilities and procedures conform to existing doctrine as contained in reference (a).
- (2) General procedures and operation restrictions governing the use of U. S. Military air delivered fire power in RVN is contained in appendix (e) of reference (a).
- (3) Air strikes within TAOR/RZ must be under the positive control of a TACP, TAC (A), or ASRT. Air activities outside the TAOR/RZ will be coordinated with adjacent units and the 1st Marine Division FSCC.
- (4) Helicopter support for the 1st Marine Regiment is normally provided by MAG-16 (Marble Mountain). Overall coordination for the employment of helicopter resources rests with the CG, 1st Mar Div and ultimately with the CG, III MAF.

b. Considerations. The daily commitments of the 1st MAW's limited helicopter assets dictate that restraints be observed in their employment. To this end, every effort is made at all levels of command to consolidate, helilift requirements, thereby ensuring efficient utilization of assets. When time is not a factor, helicopters are not used for routine transportation of personnel and materials between points connected by serviceable roads.

2. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. Communication - Electronics. Annex V (Communications - Electronics).

b. Control Agencies.

- (1) FSCC. Annex C (Fire Support Coordination).

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- (2) TACC (TADC). The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing TACC (TADC) is located within the Da Nang TAOR.
- (3) DASC. The DASC serving the Da Nang TAOR/RZ is located in the 1st Marine Division CP.

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1st Marines (Rein)
DANANG, RVN
301200H, Aug 1968

Annex F (Naval Gunfire) to Operation Order 314-68

Ref: (a) 1st Mar Div Op O 301-68
(b) Com Cru Des Gru 7th Flt Op O 320A-67 (Gun 12)

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) Annex A (Intelligence).

(2) Current THREATS and PERIMETERS

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Op O 314-68.

(2) 1st Bn, 11th Mar. Provide two naval gunfire spot teams to man the observation towers at Op Tiger (BT 939709) and Op Crow's Nest (BT 063705). Be prepared to provide spot teams to subordinate maneuver battalions as required.

2. MISSION. Provide general and direct support to elements of the 1st Marine Division as requested utilizing fire from ships of the 7th Fleet.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Naval gunfire will be used in conjunction with other supporting arms to engage targets of opportunity, intelligence targets and to provide harassing and interdiction fires as requested.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) All requests for naval gunfire support ships will be received at the 1st Marines FSCC. Requests will be forwarded to the 1st Division FSCC, for assignment for firing unit.

(2) Request for NGF will be submitted to the 1st Marine Division FSCC in the format shown in reference (a).

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.


a. Administrative Order 314-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. Frequencies for NGF spot and liaison teams are outlined in Appendix 2, Annex G of 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-68.

b. Naval Gunfire spotters located at Op Tiger and Op Crow's Nest will normally maintain communications on the 1st Mar Div Rocket Net.

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1st Marines (Rein)
Danang, RVN
301200, Aug 1968

Annex G (Alert and Rapid Reaction Forces) to Operation Order 314-68

Ref: (A) 1st Mar Op O 304-67.

1. SITUATION.

a. ENEMY FORCES. Annex A (Intelligence).

b. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) Para 1., Op O 314-68.

(2) 1st MAW provides rapid reaction helicopterborne package as required by CG, 1st Mar Div to include two UH-1E (Gun Platforms) 24 hours a day; two CH-46 "Sparrow Hawk" Helicopters on 30 minutes alert from sunrise to sunset and four CH-46 "Bald Eagle" helicopters on one hour alert from sunset to sunrise; reconstitutes alert assets when committed and scrambles additional helicopters as required.

2. MISSION 1st Marines maintain reaction forces specified in reference (a), to include:

a. Alert Squad on 15 minutes alert during daylight hours.

b. Alert Platoon on 30 minutes alert during daylight hours.

c. Alert Company on 60 minute alert during daylight hours.

d. Rapid reaction company, on order.

3. EXECUTION.

a. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. 1st Marines maintain alert and rapid reaction forces, as directed, for deployment by helicopter in execution of specific missions. The size and type unit to be employed is determined by the mission and tactical situation. Those forces may be committed in the 1st Marines TACR by CO, 1st Marines and outside it, by the Commanding General, 1st Mar Div, Alert and Rapid Reaction Forces employed are:

(1) Alert Squad.

(a) Tasks.

1. Engage and destroy small enemy forces contacted or sighted within the 1st Mar Div TACR or outside, on order.

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2. Protect downed aircraft in Division TAOR.

3. Protect drones in execution of "Blue Springs" within Division TAOR.

(b) Alert Status. 30 minutes (maximum elapsed time before helicopters become airborne at airfield).

(c) Authority To Commit. Regimental Commander.

(2) Alert Platoon:

(a). Tasks.

1. Engage and destroy small enemy forces contacted or sighted.

2. Protect downed aircraft.

3. Exploit supporting arms employment.

4. Reinforce friendly units.

(b) Alert Status. 30 minutes (maximum time elapsed before helicopters become airborne at airfield).

(c) Authority To Commit. Regimental Commander.

(3) ALERT COMPANY.

(a) Tasks.

1. Engage and destroy enemy forces contacted or sighted; exploit supporting arms employment; reinforce friendly units.

2. Protect downed aircraft.

3. Rough Rider Reaction Force.

(b) Alert Status. 60 minutes (maximum time elapsed before helicopters become airborne at airfield).

(c) Authority To Commit. Regimental Commander.

b. 1st Battalion, First Marines (On Order).

2d Battalion, First Marines (On Order).

3d Battalion, First Marines (On Order).

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(1) Maintain a minimum of one alert squad on 15 minutes alert during the daylight hours.

(2) Maintain a minimum of one alert platoon on 30 minute alert during daylight hours.

(3) Maintain one alert Rifle Company during daylight hours.

(4) Maintain a rapid reaction company, on order.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Assigned alert forces maybe part of a larger alert force.

(2) Be prepared to employ the alert squad, platoon or company outside assigned FICR as directed.

(3) Be prepared to reinforce or withdraw units committed in support of this requirement.

(4) Reconstitute alert forces committed.

(5) Notify 1st Marines by 1700 daily of units designated as alert forces and provide following information.

(a) ID number and location.

(b) Radio frequencies.

(c) Call signs.

(6) Alert Force Composition.

(a) Squad, platoons and companies are normally reinforced when designated as alert forces. Maximum number of personnel with weapons and equipment for an alert squad is 30, for alert platoon 60, for an alert company 210.

(b) Personnel, weapons and equipment will normally include at a minimum:

(1) Alert Squad

(a). Artillery FO, FIC and /or Spotter as appropriate.

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b. Four M-72 LAWs.

c. One M-60, MG.

d. One 3.5 Rocket Launcher W/WP Ammunition.

e. One AN/PRC 25 Radio.

2. Alert Platoon

a. Artillery FO, FAC and/or NGF Spotter as appropriate.

b. Elements of 60mm Mortar Squad, MG Squad and Asslt Squad.

ALERT RIFLE COMPANY

a. Artillery FO, FAC and/or NGF Spotter as appropriate.

b. Other attachments as necessary.

1. Appendix A (Checklist For Alert Forces).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. AdminO 314-68.

b. Class I - One Day MCI W/~~Food~~ Trioxane.

Class V - Basic Allowance.

Halozone

Water - Two full canteens, plus one day ... / Iodine tablets and Eight salt tablets.

Special Equipment. As appropriate.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. Annex V (Intelligence).

b. Alert Forces be prepared to enter tactical radio nets other than those of parent command in the event of employment under operational control of another organization/command.

c. Rapid Reaction Company communication in accordance with Appendix 1. (Rapid Reaction Company) to Annex G (Alert and Rapid Reaction Force).

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d. 1st Marine Division, Headquarters, establishes initial communications with appropriate RIMM/ARVN units, if required, in support of alert forces missions.

el. Code Names.

- (1) Alert squad/platoon-Sparrow Hawk
- (2) Alert Company: Bald Eagle
- (3) Drone Recovery: Blue Springs

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER

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Lieutenant Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIX

- 1 - Rapid Reaction Company
- 2 - Checklist for Alert Recovery

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 314-60

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1st Marines (Rein)
D R R, RVN
301200Z JUN 1968

...endin: 1 (Rapid Reaction Company) (RR Company) to Annex G (Alert and Rapid Reaction Forces) to Operation Order 314-68

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) Annex A (Intelligence).

(2) Current Intsums and Reconintreps.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Operation Order 314-68.

(2) CG, 1st M. provides six CH-46 colocated with reaction force capable of immediately launching reaction forces on order and provides AH-1E Gun Platform and other air support as requested and available.

c. 1st Recon Bn. Report all significant sighting of enemy forces. Assigned with supporting units and is prepared to provide guidance and other information to RR Company exploitation forces.

2. Annex: On order, 1st Marines (Rein) designates and maintains RH-46 Company on immediate alert colocated with helicopters for employment as exploitation force.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Units, on order, designate and maintain RR Company under Division control capable of immediate commitment as helicopterborne exploitation force.

(2) Helicopters are colocated with RR Company capable of being launched immediately with embarked exploitation force.

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- (3) Upon sighting significant number of enemy and engaging them with supporting arms, RR Company, on order and after receiving detailed brief from Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, conducts heliborne assault into center of enemy force to exploit supporting arms employment.
- (4) Upon commitment, COCOM of RR Company passes to the regiment in whose TICR the sighting was made for concurrent chop to appropriate infantry battalion. RR Company enters the RIC net of infantry battalion exercising COCOM and receives artillery support from battalion, direct support, artillery battery.
- (5) RR Company enters appropriate recon net to maintain contact with recon team observing objective area.

b. 3d Bn, 1st Mar

1st Bn, 1st Mar.

2d Bn, 1st Mar.

- (1) Be prepared, to provide RR Company, on order.

- (2) Be prepared, to employ RR Company if assigned to exploit supporting arms employment on enemy sightings in your TICR.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Assigned RR Company, on order:

(a) Conduct helicopter assault to destroy enemy forces and capture prisoners, weapons and material of intelligence value.

(b) Evaluate effectiveness of firebreaker ammunition employed.

(c) Be prepared for employment in Arizona/In Hoa area, Elephant Valley area or any current operational CO.

(d) Be prepared to chop to battalion in whose TICR the sighting is made and to use communications net and supporting arms assigned to that battalion.

(e) Enter appropriate recon net in order to maintain contact with recon team observing the objective area.

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- (2) RR Company will be committed only by the Commanding General 1st Mar Div or his designated representative.
- (3) Prior to commitment the RR Company will receive detailed brief by G-3 representative.
- (4) Anticipated duration of RR Company operations. Three hours.
- (5) Extraction upon termination of exploitation operations will normally be by helicopter.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. Class I: One day MCI W/Fuel, Trioxane.
- b. Class V: Basic allowance, as modified by Division CG for specific RR Company operations.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. Communication.

- (1) RR Company enter TAC net of infantry battalion exercising OCON.
- (2) RR Company enter net of recon team having observation over objective area.
- (3) RR Company will carry RC 292 as part of communications package.

b. Report Command Post.

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Appendix 2 (Checklist for Alert Forces) to Annex G (Alert and Rapid Reaction Forces) to Operation O 314-68.

1. The following checklist is provided for leaders of alert forces:
 - a. Is the Alert Force organized to best accomplish assigned mission?
 - b. Is the Alert Force properly equipped to include individual equipment complete with protective masks, maps, communications equipment with spares, compasses, special equipment, weapons, munitions and ammunition as required?
 - c. Has Alert Force been briefed on the following:
 - (1) Enemy Forces.
 - (a) Location.
 - (b) Strength and Composition.
 - (c) Weapons and Equipment.
 - (d) Dispositions and/or direction of movement.
 - (2) Friendly Forces.
 - (a) Locations and composition in objective area.
 - (b) Call signs and frequencies for superior and adjacent units, helicopters and ammunition as required?
 - (c) Locations of boundaries and other tactical control measures.
 - (3) GENERAL.
 - (a) Location of objective area target area, downed aircraft or drone, enemy sighting or contact, etc.
 - (b) Civilian Populace in area.
 - d. Has frag order been prepared and issued? Does it include a scheme of maneuver and a plan for employment of supporting fires? Is special equipment required, e.g., Nylon rope, stretchers, chainsaws? Have med-evac instructions been provided? Does it contain the following administrative instructions:

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
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- (1) Class I - One day MCI w/Fueltrioxane.
- (2) Class V - Basic allowance as modified by unit commander.
- (3) Water - two full canteens plus one day halazone/iodine tablets and eight salt tablets.

e. Have Communications been thoroughly checked out.

- (1) Frequencies pre-set
- (2) Operators checked into appropriate nets?
- (3) Extra batteries
- (4) Comm check made?
- (5) FO, EAC, and NGF spotter radio checks.

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1st Marines (Rein)
Danang, RVN
301200, Aug 1968

Annex H (Antimechanized Plan) to Operation Order 314-68.

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).
 - b. Friendly Forces.
 - (1) 11th Marines prepared to mass fires in Regimental TAOR.
 - (2) 1st Tank Bn prepared for employment in Regimental TAOR against enemy armor elements. Conducts reconnaissance to determine most suitable enemy armored approach routes.
 - (3) 1st Reconnaissance Battalion conducts deep reconnaissance patrols along avenues of approach for hostile armor.
 - (4) 1st Engineer Battalion conducts Bridge Demolition Reconnaissance to establish and record demolition requirement for bridges to be destroyed. Prepared to install obstacles.

2. MISSION.

- A. Establish Antimechanized Warning and Defense within TAOR with priority to protect the Southern flank of the Danang Vital Area and enemy approaches on Routes 1, 1A, 538, and North South Railroad Route.
- B. Be prepared to execute any or all of the following tasks.
 - (1) Destroy bridge at BT 041620.

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- (2) Be prepared to destroy other selected bridges on Route 1, as necessary.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

- (1) Locate Hostile armor as far from vital area as possible.
- (2) Engage Hostile armor when sighted with all available fire support.
- (3) Canalize, delay, and deny enemy armor Routes by means of natural obstacles and barriers.
- (4) Organize blocking positions laterally and in depth roadblocks, hasty minefields, artillery and naval gun fire will be employed in conjunction with antitank weapons. Responsibility for the organization and coordination of these positions rest with the commander in whose TAOR the enemy armor threat is imposed.

b. 1st Bn, 1st Mar.

2d Bn, 1st Mar.

3d Bn, 1st Mar.

- (1) Be prepared to destroy the bridge at BT 041620 and other bridges which may be selected on Route One and elsewhere within the TAOR's.
- (2) Establish antimechanized warning devices and defense within TAOR with priority to protect the Southern flanks of the Danang Vital Area and enemy approaches on Route 1, 1A, 2, 538, and North South rail road within respective TAOR's.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Actual sighting of enemy armor will be reported by fastest available means via normal reporting channels.

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- (2) Execute, on order, any obstacles which may be directed. Cover all obstacles with observation and/or antitank fires.
- (3) Be prepared to request and adjust any supporting arms.
- (4) Be prepared to displace antitank means to blocking positions to protect vital area installations.
- (5) Enemy armor is a priority target for all supporting arms.
- (6) All units take maximum advantage of available natural cover from enemy armor.
- (7) All units stress training of personnel in use of organic weapons in antitank defense.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

Admin Order 314-68

5. Command and Communications - Electronics.

Annex V (Command and Communication - Electronics)

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1st Marines (Rein)
DANANG, RVN
301200H Aug 1968

Annex I (Counter Rocket) to Operation Order 314-68

Ref: (a) 1st Mar Div Op O 3064-68
(b) 1st Mar Admin O 314-68

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex 4 (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 7th Marines (Rein).- Maintains forces within its assigned TAOR with particular attention to the rocket belt and with one battalion assigned responsibility for each main enemy avenue of approach; concentrates surveillance effort on main enemy avenues of approach and subsidiary routes into the rocket belt in TAOR; conducts high density patrol and surveillance activity within the rocket belt providing for complete coverage of the rocket belt in TAOR; maintains, in coordination with GVN authorities, positive control of waterways within TAOR; provides a reaction force for immediate employment in TAOR to destroy hostile rocket forces and to block possible enemy escape routes using best available means of mobility.

(2) 11th Marines (Rein)/Northern Sector Defense Command.

(a) 11th Marines coordinates surveillance from OP's and the utilization of search lights; coordinates counter-rocket fires throughout the rocket belt; establishes rocket investigation teams and coordinates assembly and employment of teams at both launch and impact sites.

(b) Northern Sector Defense Command provides close in support in the area enclosed by the rocket belt in zone.

(3) 1st Tank Battalion/Southern Sector Defense Command provides close in support in the area enclosed by the rocket belt in zone.

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- (4) 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-) provides reconnaissance coverage over main enemy avenues of approach and subsidiary routes leading into the Division TAOR.
- (5) 1st Engineer Battalion provides mine clearance teams to sweep rocket launch sites and adjacent areas as requested.
- (6) 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion (-) (Rein) provides amphibian tractors as required for rapid deployment of reaction forces and for employment in waterway control.
- (7) 11th Motor Transport Battalion (Rein) provides transportation as required for displacement of forces.
- (8) Headquarters Battalion (Rein) provides photo team for rocket investigation teams.

2. MISSION. 1st Marines (Rein) maintains forces within assigned TAOR with particular attention to the rocket belt and coastal area; conducts high density patrol and surveillance activity within the rocket belt and provides for complete coverage of the rocket belt in the TAOR. Maintains in coordination with 2d Brigade ROKMC and GVN authorities, positive control over the waterways within, adjacent to, and leading into TAOR. Is prepared to provide a reaction force for immediate employment in TAOR to destroy hostile rocket forces and block possible enemy escape routes using best available means of mobility; in the event of rocket attack from within TAOR, complete an after action report using the format in Appendix 1.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operations.
 - (1) The 1st Marines (Rein) assist in the defense of the Da-nang Vital Area with particular attention to denying, detecting, attacking and destroying hostile rocket forces.
 - (2) Three ~~infantry~~ battalions are positioned astride the rocket belt with companies oriented toward main enemy avenues of approach. Vigorous surveillance is continuously maintained within the rocket belt utilizing all types of patrol activity supplemented by observation posts and mechanical surveillance means as appropriate.

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- (3) Supporting arms are coordinated with surveillance activities. Observation posts and searchlights are positioned to obtain maximum effectiveness and coverage within rocket belt and approaches thereto. Counter-Rocket fire is capable of early and accurate massed response.
- (4) Artillery, air and organic battalion supporting arms are principle reaction means. Each battalion in the rocket belt vicinity maintains a reaction force continuously in order to immediately exploit attacks by fire on enemy positions and block escape routes. Helicopters, LVT's, motor transport and/or armor are used as available to facilitate movement of reaction forces.

b. 1st Bn, 1st Mar.

2d Bn, 1st Mar.

3d Bn 1st Mar.

- (1) Conduct high density patrol and surveillance activity within the TAOR. Provide for complete coverage of the rocket belt in the TAOR.
- (2) Maintain, in coordination with this Headquarters, positive control over the waterways within, adjacent to, and leading into TAOR.

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(3) Be prepared to provide a reaction force for immediate employment in TAOR to destroy hostile rocket forces and block possible escape routes using best available means of mobility.

(4) In event of rocket attack from within TAOR, complete an after action report using the format in appendix 1.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Submit patrol plans to this Headquarters, (Attn: S-3) 48 hours in advance.

(2) Execute patrol plans as submitted and approved. If a change to plan is required, notify this Headquarters of change.

(3) Report daily, those areas into which artillery counter-fire may be placed without further clearance in the event of a rocket firing from the area.

(4) Make maximum use of illumination and any other mechanical means or devices that assist with surveillance activity within the rocket belt and its approaches.

(5) In the event of rocket attack, the commander of the TAOR from which rockets were launched will secure the launch sites until the arrival of the rocket investigation team. Ensure that only authorized personnel enter the site, and that security personnel do not disturb the site or move enemy equipment or material.

(6) The vital area of the Danang complex is centered on two points: Grids AT 998763 and BT 007737.

(7) The rocket belt is defined as that area that falls between radii drawn 8,000 and 12,000 meters from the two points identified in (6) above.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Reference (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. Annex V (Command and Communications - Electronics).

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b. Code Name: The code name "Fire Arrow" is used to identify message traffic dealing with enemy rocket threat. The words "Fire Arrow" follow the subject of such a message.

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APPENDIX:

✓ 1 - After Action Check List

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1st Marines (Rein)
DANANG, RVN
301200H, Aug 1968

Appendix 1 (After Action Check List) to Annex I (Counter Rocket) to
Operation Order 314-68

1. CHARACTERISTICS OF ROCKET ATTACK.

- a. Where? (Installation/Area Name). What was target or apparent target of rocket attack?
- b. When? Duration?
- c. Number of rounds, by types.
- d. Were rockets fired singly, in salvo, or in ripples?
- e. Were mortars or other weapons fired in conjunction with rockets?
- f. Did enemy follow up rocket attack with ground attack? Describe.
- g. Did enemy launch any diversionary (or apparent diversionary) attacks in conjunction with rocket attack? Describe.

2. FRIENDLY DEFENSIVE POSTURE TIME OF ATTACK.

- a. Command responsible for rocket defense of area attacked by rockets?
- b. Does command have an integrated defense plan to detect/prevent/counter rocket attack? In writing?
- c. Describe patrol activity within 2000 meters of rocket position areas for 3 day period preceding attack.
- d. At what levels is patrol activity coordinated? At what level is the night patrol activity within the organization approved?
- e. What route of ingress into rocket position was most probably used? Describe reconnaissance activity along this route over week preceding attack.
- f. Were routes of ingress interdicted prior to attack? By artillery? By air? Evaluate effort.
- g. What coordination arrangements were in effect with province/district/FWF/RVNAF and U. S. forces in area surrounding rocket firing position?

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- h. What measures were in effect to obtain rocket information from villagers, ARVN/RF/PF, other sources in rocket belt and approaches thereto?
- i. What counter measures were in effect in area of rocket positions at the time of attack/towers, observation posts (OP's), air observers (AO's), electronic detection devices, night vision devices, counter mortar/counter battery (CM/CB) radar, searchlights (white light and infrared), sidelooking airborne radar/infrared (SLAR/IR detection, minefields, barriers, ambushes, etc.
- j. What offensive operations were conducted in area of rocket positions over month preceding attack? Size, type and location each operation?

3. FRIENDLY REACTION.

- a. How were rocket positions initially located?
- b. How soon were they located?
- c. When and what was first counterfire delivered?
- d. Total rounds, counterfire by type? Include direct fire weapons, if applicable.
- e. Air contribution to counterfire.
- f. Was clearance to fire requested from district/province Headquarters? How long did it take to obtain clearance? Who authorized counterfire to commence.
- g. Are procedures in effect to fire without obtaining clearance? Describe.
- h. Were ground reaction forces inserted? Size? How? Where? When?
- i. Did ground reaction force make contact with enemy? Locate rocket positions.
- j. Were routes of egress from rocket positions interdicted following attack? By what means? Total rounds interdiction fire by type. Air contribution to interdiction fire?

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4. ROCKET POSITION AREA ANALYSIS.

- a. Was on the ground inspection of rocket positions made? By designated rocket position inspection team?
- b. Was rocket position inspection check list used?
- c. Number of rocket positions? Number individual rocket launch sites each position.
- d. Coordinates of rocket positions? How determined? Survey or map inspection?
- e. Prepare diagram for each rocket position. Be sure and record all pertinent dimensions for each position and individual rocket launch sites within each position.
- f. Direction of fire (azimuth)? Firing angle of elevation? Distance to mask? Height of mask?
- g. Describe, in narrative form, organization of position and development of firing site. In open area? Near river? Hasty position? Near hamlet? Near friendly positions? Defensive positions constructed in trees (as distinguished from firing control pits or crew protective shelters during firing)? Routes of ingress and egress?
- h. Photograph position area and rocket firing sites. Include photos which show relation of position to surrounding terrain, direction of fire, and suspected routes of ingress and egress.
- i. Photograph ordnance and abandoned enemy waste/equipment/material in place, as found. Follow up with close-up shots in posed position, as appropriate. Identify ordnance found, country/year of manufacture. Recover all items.
- j. Any evidence of prior preparation for attack: i.e., burying or hiding equipment/ordnance until time for use?
- k. Any evidence of mode of transportation of rockets and launchers?
- l. Any evidence of enemy casualties? Any evidence of enemy discarded ordnance/equipment along routes of egress?
- m. Estimate effect of counterfire.

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- n. Attitude of populace in vicinity rocket positions? Pacification ratings of hamlets in vicinity?
- o. List indications of attack obtained prior to attacks.
- p. Estimate number enemy personnel directly involved in rocket attack. Were any special personnel used? Security forces?

5. IMPACT AREA ANALYSIS.

- a. Was on the ground inspection of rocket impact area made? By designated rocket impact area inspection team? Was impact area inspection check list used?
- b. Impact plot of rounds.
- c. Type fuzing instantaneous, short delay, long delay, mixed?
- d. Size of craters (photos)? Number of craters?
- e. Extent of damage.
 - (1) KIA, WIA, MIA.
 - (2) Structural damage.
 - (3) Communications.
 - (4) Critical material and equipment.

6. OTHER OBSERVATIONS. (AS APPROPRIATE).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFFER

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Major, U. S. Marine Corps
S-3

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Danang, RVN
301200H AUG 1968

Annex J (Relief of CIDG camps and Refugee Villages) to Operation Order 314-68

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. OP O 314-68
- c. Assumptions.

- (1) Mission and priority of tasks of Regiment will not change.
- (2) Normal combat and combat service support elements will be available.

2. MISSION.

- a. When directed, conduct unilateral or coordinated operations to reinforce or relieve Thuong Duc and Nong Son CIDG camps when the camps are under attack, reestablish camps if seized and pursue and destroy enemy forces involved; develop contingency plans for relief/reinforcement/counterattack for Thuong Duc and Nong Son CIDG camps; conduct rehearsals of plans developed; notify 1st Mar Div; prepare defensive positions in coordination with CIDG forces as appropriate; maintain liaison with USAF "A" detachments at Thuong Duc and Nong Son CIDG camps to coordinate planning and maintain current intelligence of threat to camps; submit recommendations to 1st Mar Div for operations in vicinity of Thuong Duc and Nong Son camps to exploit intelligence developed concerning the camps; when directed, provide security elements when artillery units are deployed to support the besieged camps; operations may be conducted inside the CIDG camp's FAVOR after local coordination with the "A" Detachment Commander at the CIDG camps.
- b. When directed provide immediate relief/reinforcement for 3d Bn, 51st ARVN Regt located at Binh Ky (1) and execute counter-attack against Binh Ky (1) if seized by enemy forces; maintain capability to rapidly commit forces to disrupt an attack on La Son and Yen Ng resettlement areas; block the withdraw route and pursue and destroy attacking forces.

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3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operations. Experience indicates enemy attacks on camps or refugee villages are most likely during extended periods of reduced visibility when friendly capabilities to relieve or support camps or villages are minimized; enemy will establish ambushes along major avenues of approach likely to be used by ground relief forces; and enemy will interdict likely helicopter zones within their capability. Survival of a camp under attack will be dependent largely upon the speed with which friendly air, artillery, and/or ground support can be rendered.
- b. 3d Bn, 1st Mar.
 - (1) Develop contingency plans for relief/reinforcement/counter-attack for Thuong Duc and Nong Son, CIDG camps.
 - (2) When directed, conduct unilateral or coordinated operations to reinforce or relieve Thuong Duc and Nong Son CIDG camps when the camps are under attack, reestablish camps if seized, and pursue and destroy enemy forces involved.
 - (3) Prepare defensive positions in coordination with CIDG forces as appropriate.
 - (4) When directed, provide security elements when artillery units are deployed to support the besieged camps.
 - (5) Maintain capability to rapidly commit forces of reinforced squad/platoon size to disrupt an attack on Le Son and Yen Ne resettlement areas, block the withdraw route and to pursue and destroy the attacking forces.
 - (6) Continue assigned mission.
- c. 1st Bn, 1st Marines.
 - (1) Continue assigned mission.
- d. 2d Bn, 1st Marines.
 - (1) Prepare contingency plan for the relief/reinforcement/counterattack for Binh Ky (1).
 - (2) When directed, provide immediate relief/reinforcement for the 3d Bn, 51st ARVN Regt located at Binh Ky (1) and execute counterattack against Binh Ky (1) if seized by enemy forces.
 - (3) Continue assigned mission.

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o. ALL OTHER UNITS.

(1) Continue assigned mission.

f. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) In event information is received that Thuong Duc or Nong Son CIDG camps are threatened or have come under attack, immediately notify 1st Marines COC Watch Officer who will notify 1st Mar Div COC Watch Officer.

(2) Notify this Headquarters immediately when current or planned operations would prevent execution of this plan.

(3) Submit request for external support to this Headquarters.


(4) Provide this Headquarters with 15 Copies of all contingency plans developed in accordance with this plan.

(5) This Annex effective for planning or receipt, execution or order.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Administrative Order 314-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS. Annex V (Command and Communication - Electronics).

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DANANG, RVN
301200H, Aug 1968

Annex K (Radar Surveillance From Crow's Nest) to Operation Order 314-68

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Subordinate battalions of 1st Marines conduct day and night patrol activities in assigned TAOR to interdict enemy infiltration and to deny enemy access to locations within assigned TAOR from which he can launch rocket, mortar and/or ground attacks on allied installations, particularly Danang AB, Marble Mountain Air Facility and other vital command and logistic installations in the Danang Area.
- (2) 7th Marines, Southern Sector Defense Command (1st Tank Bn), 3d Amtrac Bn, 1st MP Bn, and 2d ROKMC Brigade conduct similar operations in assigned area of responsibility.
- (3) 51st ARVN Regiment conducts operations in assigned area of responsibility as directed by higher authority.

2. MISSION. 1st Marines conduct radar surveillance of approaches to the Danang Vital Area by use of Radar Set AN/TPS-21 or AN/PPS-5 located at Crow's Nest observation post (BT 068705) to detect unfriendly movement during hours of darkness, and coordinates appropriate denial/destruction operations when movement is detected.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Utilizing Radar Set AN/TPS-21 or AN/PPS-5, maintain continuous surveillance during hours of darkness in the sector from 500 yards to 1300 yards.
- (2) Operator will look on any movement indicated and report location to the 1st Marines COC which will determine if movement is friendly or enemy and initiate action as appropriate. After each contact is evaluated and appropriate action taken, the operator will, on order of 1st Marines COC, resume search operations.

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b. 2d Bn, 1st Mar.

- (1) Install, operate, and maintain a Radar Set at OP Crow's Nest (BT 068705) providing sufficient personnel to provide continuous surveillance in the sector from 500 yards to 1300 yards during hours of darkness.
- (2) Provide sufficient communications support to ensure uninterrupted communications between the radar site and 1st Marines COC during hours of darkness.
- (3) Furnish equipment and personnel to operate radar site and all logistic support incident thereto.

c. 1st Marines COC.

- (1) Determine identification of all contacts through liaison with subordinate and adjacent commands and FSCC.
- (2) Initiate action to fully exploit information obtained from emplaced radar.

d. Headquarters Company. Obtain and hold in Headquarters Company account sufficient radar equipment and associated support equipment to ensure continuous operation of the radar surveillance site at Crow's Nest and conduct the necessary training required.

e. All Subordinate Units. Take action as appropriate on information derived from radar equipment to deny enemy access to locations within assigned TACR from which he can launch rocket, mortar and/or ground attacks on friendly installations.

f. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Information will be passed between Crow's Nest and 1st Marines COC utilizing 1st Mar Regimental Tactical Net. Subordinate battalions will monitor these reports and take actions to determine status of contacts falling within their TCR, and report this information to the 1st Marines COC ASAP without awaiting further instructions.

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(2) Subordinate units need not await authority from this Headquarters to take action on contacts falling within their TAOR but will keep the 1st Marines apprised of any action taken or contemplated. No action will be taken on contacts falling outside their assigned TAOR without prior clearance from this headquarters.


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. 1st Mar Admin Order 314-68.
- b. 2d Bn, 1st Mar will provide class I, III, and V, logistic support for Grow's Nest installation.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

- a. Annex V (Command and Communication - Electronics)
- b. 2d Bn, 1st Mar will provide as a minimum the following equipment to support the radar surveillance site:
 - 1 - AN/PRC 25 Radio/Accessories
 - 1 - RC-292 Antenna
 - 1 - AN/GRA-39

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1st Marines (Rein)
DANANG, RVN
301200H, AUG 1968

Annex L (Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan) to Operation Order 314-68

1. SITUATION.

A. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

B. Friendly Forces.

(1) 26th Marines

- (A) Provides assistance to move U. S. noncombatants and designated aliens to the secondary assembly point at Phu Bai.
- (B) Arranges for the reception and care of noncombatants while they await transportation at Phu Bai Airfield.
- (C) Provides emergency MEDIVAC care at Phu Bai as required.
- (2) 11th Marines and 1st Tank Battalion. Provide support as directed.
- (3) 11th Motor Transport Battalion.
 - (A) Provides transportation to lift one Rifle Company (-) (Rein) within Danang TACR.
 - (B) Provides transportation to move U. S. noncombatants and designated aliens to Danang TACR.

2. MISSION.

On order, provide one Rifle Company (-) (Rein) to 1st MP Battalion for employment in Danang. And provide assistance, as directed, to move U. S. noncombatants and designated aliens to major assembly area at Danang Air Base.

3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operations. 1st Marines while continuing assigned mission, as ordered:

- (1) Provides one Rifle Company (-) (Rein) to 1st MP Battalion for employment in Danang.

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(2) Provide assistance as directed to move U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens to the major assembly area at Danang Air Base.

B. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

2nd Battalion, 1st Marines.

3d Battalion, 1st Marines.

(1) Be prepared to provide, on order, one Rifle Company (-) (Rain) to 1st MP Battalion for employment in Danang.

(2) Be prepared to provide assistance as directed, to move U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens to major assembly area at Danang Air Base.

C. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Continue assigned Mission.

(2) This plan effective for planning upon receipt and for execution, on order.

(3) Direct liaison authorized for all concerned.

(4) Medical facilities will be used for their intended purpose and will not be employed as holding or staging areas.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. 1st Mar Admin O 314-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

A. Annex V (Command Communication - Electronics).

B. The organic communications facilities of the participating units, one control agencies and the established radio and telephone system will be used to coordinate the evacuation effort within the regiments TAOR.

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By Command of Colonel LUFTER

R. L. Bennett, Jr.

R. L. BENNETT, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operations Order 314-63

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1st Marines (Rein)
DANANG, RVN
301200H, Aug 1968

Annex M (Golden Fleece) to Operation Order 314-68

Ref: (a) 1st Mar Div Op O 302-67

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 11th Marines (Rein).

(a) Coordinates Golden Fleece Operations for Northern Sector.

(b) Supports operations for rice harvest and rice harvest movement as required.

(2) 1st Tank Bn (-).

(a) Coordinates Golden Fleece Operations for Southern Sector.

(b) Supports operations for rice harvest and rice harvest movement as required.

(3) 1st AT Bn (-).

3d Amtrac Bn (-).

1st Engr Bn (-).

1st MF Bn.

11th MF Bn.

1st SP Bn (-).

(a) Supports operations for protection of rice harvest and movement of harvest to include, as applicable, combat support, mine sweeps, transportation of harvesters and troops, and movement security.

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2. MISSION. Conduct operations within TAOR for protection of rice harvest areas and harvested rice as it is moved to central locations during periods when rice harvest is in progress. On order, conduct similar operations in RZ and outside RZ.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. 1st Marines (-) (Rein) provides security and assistance to Vietnamese nationals for rice harvest and safeguards removal of harvested grain from VC infested harvest areas to central storage areas. Coordinates patrols operating near the periphery of TAOR with local villagers to protect rice harvest activities.

- (1) Maneuver elements conduct patrols and ambushes to provide protective screens for local harvest areas and for movement of harvest rice to designated storage facilities.
- (2) Fire support provides protective fires to harvest areas and along routes over which rice is moved to central storage.

c. 1st Bn, 1st Mar.

2d Bn, 1st Mar.

3d Bn, 1st Mar.

- (1) Conduct operations within TAOR for protection of rice harvest areas and harvested rice as it is moved to central locations during periods when rice harvest is in progress. On order, conduct similar operations in RZ and outside of RZ.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Battalion commanders in consultation with Civil Operations of Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) describe harvest areas to be assisted within their own area.
- (2) Obtain exact dates of harvest from local Vietnamese authorities. Golden Fleece operations may be conducted during smaller harvests which fall outside of the principal period.
- (3) Direct liaison between participating units authorized.

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- (4) Report commencement and termination of harvest protection operations in TAOR. Termination report will include estimated tons harvested, rice storage methods, and attitudes of local populace.
- (5) Include in daily summary of day's activities to include, but not limited to,
 - (a) Size of harvest area protected (Sq Km).
 - (b) Amount of rice harvested.
 - (c) Number of vietnamese workers protected.
 - (d) USMC and free world forces participating in operations.
 - (e) Other forms of assistance, such as transportation of workers.
 - (f) ARVN/RF/PF force participation in operation.
 - (g) Casualties: Friendly and enemy.
- (6) Request psychological operations support from this Headquarters.
- (7) Designate reports in support of this order as Golden Fleece and number sequentially by battalion for example; 1st BN, 1st Mar first operation report Golden Fleece 1/1-1.
- (8) Cognizant unit commanders encourage district and village chiefs to arrange transportation for harvesters and harvested rice from local means. If transportation for harvesters and rice are not available or are insufficient, Marine aircraft and vehicles are authorized to be used.
- (9) This order effective for planning on receipt, and execution at beginning of rice harvest season.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. ADMIN O 314-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. Annex V (Command and Communication - Electronics).

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b. Request additional communication support from this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER

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1st Marines (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
301200H, Aug 1968

ANNEX II (County Fair) to Operation Order 314-68

Ref: (a) 1st Mar Div Op O 301-68

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces: Annex A. (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces

(1) 11th Mar (Rein) provides artillery support as required.

(2) 1st Recon Bn (Rein)

1st AT Bn (-)

1st TK Bn (-)

3rd Amtrac Bn

1st Engr Bn (-)

1st SP Bn

1st MT Bn

11th MT Bn

1st Med. Bn (-)

(a) Provide forces in support of specific operations.

(b) Provide planning support as required.

2. MISSION.

Arrange for and conduct County Fair operations in assigned TAOR's. Provide a force to cordon the selected area in support of the County Fair operation. Within capabilities provide medical personnel in support of CIVIL medical activities in the TAOR. Within capabilities provide equipment, facilities and supplies consistent with available resources and essential requirements.

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3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) County Fair is a clearing operation which combines and coordinates military, governmental, civic and psychological warfare activities, and re-establishes GVN control over the populace of a given area. It is designed to remove the enemy from the community in which he is a parasite, while at the same time insuring that the populace is not alienated from the government. Military actions, civic actions and psychological warfare programs have the purpose of convincing the Vietnamese people that the GVN is an effective government interested in the welfare of the people, and that GVN victory over the VC is inevitable.
- (2) USMC participation in County Fair operations consists of establishing a cordon around a preselected target area (Village, Hamlet, Etc.) to isolate it for the duration of an operation (normally 4-5 days), and to provide limited medical and logistical assistance. The cordon is normally established during predawn hours. To the extent possible, GVN military, police and civil authorities perform the task of searching target areas and handling the populace. This is considered an essential element of the County Fair operation since one of its primary purposes is to restore confidence in the Government of Vietnam and instill a sense of trust and loyalty toward duly appointed officials.
- (3) The following are types of activities to which the civilian population is exposed during the County Fair operation.
 - (a) Collection and assembly as noted above, collection and assembly of civilians is located temporarily in area adjacent to the actual site of the search.
 - (b) Civic action and psychological warfare. This is focused on a series of activities designed to gain the villagers trust and cooperation.

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Feeding facilities are established to compensate for inconvenience caused by requiring the villagers to wait in assembly areas and to undergo processing while waiting, the populace is exposed to an intensive psyops program consisting of taped messages from local and national officials, educational films, newsreels, leaflets, and addresses by local officials, Kit Carson scouts, armed propaganda team members and Vietnamese information service cultural drama team members using loudspeakers.

(c) Searching and identification. Qualified RVN administrators assemble the villagers in the target area. Among administrative items accomplished at this stage are:

1. Census Taking.
2. Issuance of ID Cards.
3. Initial interrogation to determine background, whereabouts of family members, etc. VC suspects are retained for further questioning by qualified ARVN interrogators. Interrogators are assisted, as required, by U. S. personnel and equipment.

(d) Medical. A medical team is normally composed of two or three corpsmen who provide medical assistance in conjunction with the medcap program. The team is capable of administering first aid and treating minor wounds and superficial injuries. When available, and if required U. S. Navy physicians accompany the medical team. Participation by RVN physicians and corpsmen is encouraged.

(e) Entertainment. When possible, provisions are made for entertainment of villagers to break the monotony of prolonged lectures, broadcasts and speeches. Movies, music and live entertainment have been well received in most villages. The Division Band or Division Drum and Bugle Corps are available on request. Submit requests via this Headquarters.

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(4) To achieve the desired results from County Fair operations, the area should be sealed off long enough to cause the VC hiding in the area to leave their place of concealment when their food and water are exhausted.

b. 1st Bn, 1st Mar.

2nd Bn, 1st Mar.

3d Bn, 1st Mar.

(1) Arrange for and conduct County Fair operations in assigned TAOR's.

(2) Provide a force to cordon the selected area in support of the County Fair operation.

(3) Within capabilities provide medical personnel in support of GVN medical activities in the area of operations.

(4) Within capabilities provide equipment, facilities and supplies consistent with available resources and essential requirements.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Unclassified code name "County Fair".

(2) Rules of engagement. Reference (a).

(3) Direct liaison is authorized between units conducting a County Fair, supporting units and appropriate RVN military and civil authorities. Thorough planning and coordination with GVN participants is necessary. In this regard a criterion used in selecting hamlets and villages is the capability of permanent self defense forces after the operation is terminated.

(4) Intelligence support may be obtained on request to this Headquarters.

(5) Apprehend and turn over to the GVN officials any Vietnamese attempting to enter or leave the objective area.

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(6) Obtain authority to conduct County Fair operations requiring an infantry battalion (-) or larger from this Headquarters. Notify this Headquarters no later than 14 days in advance of desired date for conduct of operations, to include target area, participating units (U. S./GVN) plans for providing security for the area after the operation and reasons for selecting the particular target. Include in the request to conduct the County Fair operations a statement that the plan has been coordinated with the appropriate senior province advisor.

(7) Identify each County Fair operation by the number of the Battalion conducting it. Example: County Fair 1/1-1, County Fair 1/1-2, etc.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. 1st Mar Admin O 314-68.

(1) Employ medical personnel organic to units. Notify this Headquarters of additional personnel required.

(2) Except in cases of emergency, use only medcap supplies for treatment of civilians. Resupply is through unit civil affairs officer. Transfer civilians requiring other than out patient treatment to the nearest civilian hospital. Vietnamese civilians injured under circumstances requiring an SIR, may be hospitalized at the 1st Marine Division Medical facilities when the unit Commanding Officer determines such hospitalization in the best interest of the U. S..

(3) Report the number of patients treated in accordance with existing medcap instructions.

(4) Food and water. Each family takes sufficient basic foodstuffs to the holding area for the period of time they are expected to be processed. Families should provide their own cooking, eating and drinking utensils.

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The unit conducting the operation is encouraged to provide hot soup and tea to augment rations brought by villagers. The unit should provide the supply of water in the holding area, with local wells as source of water. All water which is provided should be purified.

(5) Facilities. A unit coordinating an operation should establish minimum essential facilities required for care of civilians detained in the holding area provide suitable facilities for cooking and sanitation (heat). Adequate shelter from the weather may be provided for sick, or wounded, old and infirm, infant children and women in advanced stages of pregnancy.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

- a. Annex V (Command and Communication - Electronics).
- b. Command Relationship. Cooperation and coordination between U. S. and GVN forces and agencies.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER

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Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Order 314-68

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1st Marines (Rein)
Lexar, RVN
301200H, AUG 1968

Annex O (Counter Attack Plan) to Operation Order 314-68

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 11th Marines. Provides requested fire support with priority to counterattacking force.
- (2) 1st Tank Bn. Prepared to pass OPCON of one tank company (-) or Tank Platoon to 7th Marines or 1st Marines for employment with Division or Regimental reserve.
- (3) ~~3d Antiaic Bn.~~ Prepared to pass OPCON of one Platoon of Antiaic to 1st Marines for employment with Division or Regimental reserve.

2. MISSION.

- a. On order provide a three company battalion as Division Reserve. Be prepared to assume OPCON of one tank company (-) and one platoon antiaics to employ as portion of Division Reserve.
- b. Be prepared to employ one tank platoon with Regimental Reserve.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Counterattack forces will be activated on order and will be comprised of a three company Battalion.

(2) Upon activation OPCON of reserve is passed to CG, 1st Mar Div.

b. 1st Bn, 1st Marines. (On Order).

2d Bn, 1st Marines. (On Order).

3d Bn, 1st Marines. (On Order).

- (1) Be prepared to provide a three company battalion as Division Reserve.

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(2) Be prepared to assume OPCON of one tank company (..) and one platoon of Amtraos.

(3) Be prepared to employ one tank platoon with Regimental Reserve.

o. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Upon activation, Division Reserve chops OPCON, CG, 1st Mar Div and elements thereof will not be committed without permission from CG, 1st Mar Div.

(2) Upon activation, Division Reserve will be prepared for employment by helicopter or other means on four hours notice.

(3) When directed, Division Reserve be prepared to destroy enemy force in locations to be specified.

(4) The three company battalion designated may be employed without restriction prior to activation as Division Reserve provided it is capable of being committed as Division Reserve within four hours.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. 1st Mar Administrative O 314-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

Annex V (Command and Communication - Electronics).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER


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1st Marines (Rein)
DANANG, RVN
301200H Aug 1968

Annex S (Waterway Control) to Operation Order 314-68

Ref: (a) 1st Mar Div Op 0 308-68
(b) 1st Mar Admin O 314-68

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence) and current intsums and perintreps.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Reference (a) and Para 1. b. of this order.

2. MISSION. Maintain surveillance means across the Song Vihn Gein and the Song Can Dien rivers; coordinate with Southern Sector Defense Command and 1st MP Battalion for effective coverage of the Song Tuy Loan and Song Cau Do rivers. Rivers are responsibility of SSDC and 1st MP Battalion; conduct surveillance along coastal area. Coordinate with Market Time forces as required; coordinate with 2d Brigade ROKMC for effective coverage of the Song Thanh Quyt/Song La Tho rivers; rivers are 2d Brigade ROKMC responsibility; maintain surveillance on the waterway from grids AT 974612 to HT 004654. Coordinate with 7th Marines where that waterway forms common boundary. River is 1st Marines responsibility; coordinate with 7th Marines to ensure effective coverage of the Song Yen river adjacent to TAOR. The Song Yen is a 7th Marines responsibility; maintain surveillance on the Song Bau Xeu, Song Man Quan and all subsidiary waterways within the TAOR as required to deny the enemy use of these waterways; direct liaison is authorized with Commanding General, 2d Brigade ROKMC for purpose of coordinating operations and waterway surveillance.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) 1st Marines (Rein) in coordination with 7th Marines and 2d Brigade ROKMC maintains positive control over waterways in the 1st Mar Div TAOR through the establishment of check points, coordinated patrols and continuing surveillance.

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- (2) 1st Marines reinforced with supporting units as required, exercise control of waterways within assigned TACR. All available surveillance and control measures are employed to deny enemy freedom of movement into and through the regimental TACR. Emphasis is placed on patrol activity, OP's and the use of mechanical detecting devices.
- (3) Artillery, air and naval gunfire are employed in a supporting role as required. Aerial observers assist with surveillance and control of fire support.
- (4) Coastal areas and inland waterways bordering on coastal areas are included in this concept and requires coordination with naval forces.

b. 1st Bn, 1st Mar.

- (1) Maintain surveillance means across the Song Vinh.
- (2) Coordinate with 2d Brigade ROKMC for effective coverage of the Song Thanh Quit. River is 2d Brigade ROKMC responsibility.
- (3) Maintain surveillance on the waterway from grids AT 974612 to HF 007647. Coordinate with ~~2d~~ and 7th Marines where that waterway forms common boundary. River is the 1st Marines responsibility.
- (4) Maintain surveillance on the Song Bau Xau and all subsidiary waterways within the AO as required to deny the enemy use of the waterway.
- (5) Continue assigned mission.

c. 2d Bn, 1st Mar.

- (1) Maintain surveillance means across the Song Vinh Dien and the Song Can Dien.
- (2) Continue assigned mission.

d. 3d Bn, 1st Mar.

- (1) Maintain surveillance means across the Song Vinh Dien.

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- (2) Coordinate with Southern Sector Defense Command and 1st MP Battalion for effective coverage of the Song Tuy Loan and Song Cou Da. Rivers are responsibility of SSDC and 1st MP Battalion.
- (3) Maintain surveillance of the waterway from grids BT 007647 to BT 004654. Coordinate with 1/1 and 7th Marines where that water way forms a common boundary. River is 1st Marines responsibility.
- (4) Coordinate with 7th Marines to ensure effective coverage of Song Yen adjacent to TAOR. The Song Yen is a 7th Marines responsibility.
- (5) Maintain surveillance on the Song Dou Xau, Suoi Mon Quan and all subsidiary waterways within the AO as required to deny the enemy use of these waterways.
- (6) Continue assigned mission.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Reference (a).


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. Reference (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

- a. Annex V (Command and Communication - Electronics) to Operation Order 314-68.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER


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1st Marines (Rein)
DANANG, RVN
301200H, 1968

ANNEX V (COMMUNICATIONS) TO OPERATION ORDER 314-68

Ref: (a) 1st MarDivO PO2000.2D (CEOI)
(b) I CORPS SOI

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) Annex A (INTELLIGENCE).

(2) The enemy has the capability to conduct all forms of Electronic Warfare, especially intercept or jamming on tactical radio circuits.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Secure teletype communications into DCS is provided by 1st Marine Division.

(2) 7th Communication Battalion installs and maintains wireline trunks between Regiment and Division, Regiment and 1st Battalion, Eleventh Marines, and that portion of the regimental cable system on the railroad bed road extending from the 1st Marines Command Post to Hill 55.

(3) Radio relay augmentation is provided from Headquarters Battalion and 7th Communication Battalion, as required.

(4) 1st Battalion, 11th Marines provides communication equipment and personnel to operate the Regimental FSCC.

2. MISSION

Communication-Electronics elements provide communication and electronics support for 1st Marines and attached and supporting units.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Headquarters Company.

(1) Install, operate, and maintain communication facilities to support the 1st Marines Command Post.

(2) Provide radio relay teams to subordinate and adjacent units as directed.

(3) Install and maintain the regimental wire system.

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(4) Provide teletype or "over the counter" message delivery for all subordinate organizations.

- b. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.
- 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.
- 3d Battalion, 1st Marines.

(1) Maintain and operate facilities necessary for command and control of operations assigned in TAO and as directed.

- c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Cryptographic operations in accordance with reference (a).

- (2) Radio.

(a) See Appendix (1) (Radio frequency and call sign plan) and reference (a).

(b) Maintain secure speech capability ready for immediate use on Regimental Tactical Net #2.

(c) Maintain effective editions of reference (b) (I Corps SOI).

- (3) Wire and Radio Relay.

(a) Wire will be utilized to the maximum extent possible consistent with the tactical situation.

(b) Battalions are responsible for providing wirelines to the battalion terminal of the radio relay circuit with regiment.

(c) Wirelines backed up with radio relay equipment will be engineered and installed to enable rapid switchover to the radio relay channels in the event of wireline outage.

(d) Wire installation and trouble shooting teams are to be trained in recognizing and avoiding mines and booby traps.

- (4) Visual and Sound.

(a) The visual and sound portion of reference (4) is effective for this Operation Order.

- (5) Communication Center.

(a) All battalions not colocated with the Regimental Command Post will establish secure teletype facilities with regiment.

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. AdminO 314-68.
- b. Radio Relay teams detached from the Regimental Headquarters will receive all classes of supply less Class II (non-consumable) from the supported organization.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUTER

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APPENDIX:

- (1) Radio Frequency and Call Sign Plan

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 314-68

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1st Marines (Rein)
DANANG, RVN
301200H Aug 1968

Appendix 1 (Radio Frequency and Call Sign Plan) to Annex V to
Operation Order 314-68

1. Call Signs

CG 1st Marine Division	BURLAP
1st Marines	HANWORTH
1st Bn 1st Marines	PERSPECTIVE
2d Bn 1st Marines	TEXAS PETE
3d Bn 1st Marines	AROMA
1st Bn 11th Marines	TERRAPIN
5th Marines	GUNSMOKE
7th Marines	MOVABLE
27th Marines	PATTY SHELL
11th Marines	OFFSPRING

For other units in 1st Marines TACR, see references (a) and (b).

2. Radio Nets and Frequency Assignments

a. 1st Marines

NET	FREQ	DESIG
Regt Command	(P) 2778 (S) 11595	M-242 M-1104
Regt Tac #1	(P) 68.7 (S) 66.2	M-480 M-22
Regt Tac #2	(P) 58.6 (S) 2705	M-113 M-256
TACP Local	32.5	M-759
106MM RR Cmd	55.25	M-854

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b. 1st Bn, 1st Mar

Bn Tac #1	5637	M-197
Bn Tac #2	(P) 65.3	M-492
	(S) 64.7	M-582
81MM Mort COF	62.7	M-636
Co "A" Tac	43.0	M-769
Co "B" Tac	40.5	M-1154
Co "C" Tac	59.55	M-201
Co "D" Tac	45.65	M-737

c. 2d Bn, 1st Mar

Bn Tac #1	5950	M-1038
Bn Tac #2	(P) 57.1	M-557
	(S) 63.8	M-646
81MM Mort COF	64.85	M-829
Co "E" Tac	62.75	M-24
Co "F" Tac	68.05	M-599
Co "G" Tac	65.15	M-9
Co "H" Tac	35.4	M-489

d. 3d Bn, 1st Mar

Bn Tac #1	6279	M-697
Bn Tac #2	(P) 65.35	M-977
	(S) 61.5	M-838
81MM Mort COF	43.65	M-1008
Co "I" Tac	56.15	M-527
Co "J" Tac	60.35	M-543
Co "L" Tac	57.25	M-558
Co "M" Tac	44.75	M-454

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
e. 1st Bn, 11th Mar

Bn Comd/ED	(P) 36.85	M-162
	(S) 61.65	M-469
Btry "A" COF	68.55	M-600
Btry "B" COF	66.75	M-413
Btry D/2/13 COF	35.95	M-246
Mort Btry (W) COF	39.65	M-689

f. Special Allocation.

AN/PCC-1	68.5	M-847
AN/PCC-1	43.15	M-398
AN/PCC-1	56.3	M-266
AN/PCC-1	71.85	M-957
AN/PCC-1	63.5	M-884

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER


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Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 314-68

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1ST MARINES (REIN)
DANANG, RVN
121200H Sep 68


ANNEX T (Reports) to Operation Order 314-68.

Ref: (a) Div O 3480.1A

Time Zone: E

1. Purpose. To establish operation reports required from subordinate units.
2. General. The nature of operations in Vietnam requires the timely submission of detailed operational reports covering all aspects of U.S. operations. Reports content is essential both analysis in planning future operations and from a historical stand point. Appendix 1 thru 7 furnish references, guide lines format and pertinent instructions relative to preparation of reports.
3. Action. Subordinate units to include battalions, separate battalions, separate companies and task units, when established, will submit operational reports as indicated in the appendix.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER



R.L. BARRETT
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
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Appendix: ✓1 - Commander Combat Readiness Report

✓2 - Ground Base Defoilliant Report

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Appendix Continued:

- ✓ 3 - Lessons Learn Report
- ✓ 4 - Command Chronology
- ✓ 5 - Patrol Plan and Ambushes
- ✓ 6 - Combat After Action Report
- ✓ 7 - OPSTAT Report

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1ST MARINES (REIN)
DANANG, RVN
121200H Sep 68

Appendix 1 (Commander's Combat Readiness Report) to Annex T (Reports) to Operation Order 314-68.

Ref: (a)NCO 3000.2

Time Zone: II

1. Format

a. Report will be prepared in letter form in accordance with reference (a).

(1) Part I. Evaluation of Command. A brief narrative statement in which the commander evaluates the combat readiness of the command as a whole rather than the subordinate units of the command.

(2) Part II. Evaluation of units. This part will be a list of those units in the command which the commander considers will be ineffective during the reporting period. For the purpose of this report an ineffective unit is one which in the judgment of the commander is not capable of accomplishing its combat mission.

(3) Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments. Current contingency plans will be listed for which the reporting commander provides forces. Part III is not to be submitted unless specifically requested.


b. The report is prepared for the forth coming Fiscal Quarter. For example; the report prepared in February is for the 4th Quarter of the Fiscal Year.

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2. Subordinate Unit Input:

- a. Input Units: Battalions, separate companies/batteries OPLAN to the Regiment.
- b. Special Instructions: Submit an original and one copy.
- c. Due Date: To reach this Headquarters no later than 1600 on the 10th day of the second month of each quarter.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER



R.L. BARRETT
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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1ST MARINES (REIN)
DAKANG, RVN
121200H Sep 68

Appendix 2 (Ground Base Defoliant Report) to Annex T (Reports) to Operation Order 314-68.

Ref: (a) For O 3100.1

Time Zone: H

1. Format

a. Reports will be submitted by letter and contain the following information:

(1) Summary of hand and ground based power spray operations performed during the previous quarter.

(2) A brief description of each operation indicating location, area, type of vegetation, reason for defoliation, dates of execution, method of defoliation, type and amount of herbicide and evaluation of results.


b. Negative reports not required.

2. Subordinate Unit Input.

a. Input Units. Battalion GPOON to 1st Marine Regiment.

b. Date Due. Units will submit to S-3 by the 1st of the month following each quarter.

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R.L. BARRETT
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Executive Officer

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1ST MARINES (REIN)
DANANG, RVN
121200H Sep 68

Appendix 3 (Lessons Learned) to Annex T (Reports) to Operation Order
314-68

Ref: (a) FMF PAC O 3400.1
(b) For O 3400.2A
(c) For O 5420.6


1. Format.

- a. Report will be prepared in letter form.
- b. For each item reported; item, comment, and lesson learned must be shown.

2. Special Instructions.

- a. Original and one copy required.
- b. Negative reports not required.
- c. Due date: 1st of the month.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFFER


R.J. BARRETT
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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1ST MARINES (RVN)
DANANG, RVN
121200H Sep 66

Appendix 4 (Command Chronology) to Annex T (Reports) to Operation Order 314-66.

Ref: (a) Div 0 5720.2

Time Zone: H

1. Format. Format for submission by subordinate units in accordance with reference (a).

2. Subordinate Unit Input.

a. Input Units. Battalions, separate batteries and companies under the administrative control of this Command.

b. Special Instructions. The original Command Chronology with supporting documents and seven copies without supporting documents will be forwarded to this Headquarters.

c. Due Date.

(1) 10th of month
(2) Special submission in accordance with reference (a).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFFER


R.L. BARRETT
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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1ST MARINES (REIN)
DANANG, RVN
121200 Sep 68

Appendix 5 (Patrol Plans and Ambushes) to Annex T (Reports) to
Operation Order 314-68.

Ref: (a) Div O 3400.1A

Time Zone: H


1. Format in accordance with reference (a).

2. Subordinate Unit Input.

a. Input Units. Infantry battalions OPCON to the 1st Marine
Regiment.

b. Due Time. Not later than 1200H one day prior to period
covered.

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Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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1ST MARINES (REIN)
DANANG, RVN
121200H Sep 68

Appendix 6 (Combat After Action Report) to Annex T (Report) to Operation Order 314-68.

Ref: (a) Div O 3460.1

Time Zone: H

1. Format. In accordance with reference (a).

2. Subordinate Unit Input.

a. Input Units. Battalions, separate batteries/company shall complete the report and forward to this Headquarters for all named operations.

b. Special Instructions. Original and 14 copies of named operations are required.

c. Due date: The complete Combat After Action Report will be forwarded to this Headquarters no later than 10 days after termination of the Operation.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFFER


R.L. BRATT
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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DANANG, RVN
121200H Sep 68

Appendix 7 (OPSTAF Report) to Annex T (Reports) to Operations Order 314-68.

Ref: (a) FMF PAC 0 3000.5

Time Zone: H

1. Format. As prescribed in reference (a).


2. Subordinate Unit Input.

a. Input Units. All battalions, separate companies/batteries and task units when organized.

b. Due this Headquarters as changes occur in a reportable item as defined in reference (a).

c. An OPSTAF is due on the last day of each month.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL LAUFER


R.L. BARRETT
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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