

UNCLASSIFIED

1ST MARINES

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

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10770 F942 of 12 October 1971.

*R. B. Tiffany* 10/8/76  
Signature/date

2 JAN 1961

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marines (Rein)  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3/RM/mst  
5750  
20 Feb 69

~~SECRET~~  
From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Via: (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
(2) Commanding General, III MAF  
(3) Commanding General, FMFPac

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPAC 5750.8A

Encl: ✓(1) 1-31 January Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR  
INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER  
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

*R. G. Laufer*  
R. G. LAUFER

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1ST MARINE DIVISION FMF  
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0011-69
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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marines (Rein)  
1st Marine Division (Rein), MAF  
APO San Francisco 96602

3/MA/mst  
5750

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
010001H January to 312400H January 1969

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Enclosure (1)

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PART I  
ORGANIZATION DATA

<u>DESIGNATION</u>		<u>COMMANDER</u>
1. 1st Marines (Rein)	1-31 January 1969	Colonel R. G. LAUFFER
<u>SUBORDINATE UNITS</u>		
HqCo, 1st Marines	1 January 1969	1stLt C. N. MORPHIS
HqCo, 1st Marines	2-31 January 1969	Maj R. W. SHAW
1stBn, 1st Marines	1-31 January 1969	LtCol A. A. LAPORTE JR.
2ndBn, 1st Marines	1-31 January 1969	LtCol J. E. POINDEXTER
3rdBn, 1st Marines	1-31 January 1969	LtCol T. E. BULGER
2. <u>LOCATION</u>	1-31 January 1969	DUONG SON (2), RVN

3. Key Billets

Commanding Officer	1-31 January 1969	Col R. G. LAUFFER
Executive Officer	1-31 January 1969	LtCol W. A. HEYER
S-1/Adjutant	1-31 January 1969	Capt E. D. SANFORD
S-2	1-31 January 1969	Capt J. M. DARNELL
S-3	1-31 January 1969	Maj J. A. REILLY
S-4	1-31 January 1969	Maj L. R. HUTTON
S-5	1-24 January 1969 25-31 January 1969	Maj R. F. ENDERT 1stLt C. N. MORPHIS
Communications Officer	1-31 January 1969	Maj J. F. MCNEELIS
Air Liaison Officer	1-29 January 1969 30-31 January 1969	Maj A. A. DITTMER Maj M. W. LUTES
Regimental Chaplain	1-31 January 1969	CDR A. W. ROBERTSON
Headquarters Commandant	2-31 January 1969	Maj R. W. SHAW

4. Average Monthly Strength

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
123	3363	10	159

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PART II  
Narrative Summary

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PART II  
SECTION A  
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

## 1. Personnel

## a. Average Monthly Strength

UNIT	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
HqCo	22	224	2	5
1stBn	33	1027	3	49
2ndBn	34	1052	3	53
3rdBn	34	1060	2	52

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## b. Casualties

KIA	BATTLE		DOW	SERIOUS	NON-BATTLE		DEATH	TOTAL
	WIA	MIA			NON-SERIOUS			
25	176	0	2	19	36	1	259	

## c. Replacements Received.

USMC		USN	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
12	305	2	17

## d. Rotation during month.

6	235	1	11
---	-----	---	----

e. Personnel Summary. At the close of the reporting period the personnel strength was as follows: 122 Officers, 3314 Enlisted - U. S. Marine Corps and 10 Officers, 159 Enlisted, U. S. Navy. Normal replacement procedures were in effect.

2. Legal and Discipline

	HqCo	1/1	2/1	3/1
NJP	2	14	43	15
SCM (Completed)	0	0	2	7
SCM (Pending)	0	0	4	0
SPCM (Completed)	0	2	4	2
SPCM (Pending)	1	7	3	3
GCM (Completed)	0	1	0	0
GCM (Pending)	1	0	0	0
Investigations (Completed)	1	2	5	3
Investigations (Pending)	1	3	8	0

3. R&R Program. The following is a recapitulation of the R&R quotas for Jan 69:

Hawaii	5	17	17	17
Australia	5	17	17	16
Kuala Lumpur	1	3	2	2
Singapore.	0	1	1	1
Penang	1	4	3	2
Okinawa	2	3	3	3
Tokyo	2	5	6	5
Tai Pei	2	8	8	7
Hong Kong	2	9	9	9
Manila	0	0	0	0
Bangkok	4	14	15	14

Enclosure (1)

#### 4. CHAPLAIN SUPPORT

##### a. Chaplains Attached:

- |                          |                                   |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| (1) Regimental Chaplain: | CDR. Alla W. ROBERTSON, CHC, USN  |
| (2) 1st Battalion        | LT. Aldon E. PURDIAM, CHC, USNR   |
| (3) 2nd Battalion        | LCDR. Arthur B. PEPPER, CHC, USNR |
| (4) 3rd Battalion        | LT. Vincent P. GERLOCK, CHC, USNR |

##### b. Divine Services Conducted by Regimental Chaplain:

- (1) Sunday Worship Services:  
Services Conducted 13 - Attendance 438
- (2) Weekday Worship Services:  
Services Conducted 7 - Attendance 309
- (3) Holy Communion 95

##### c. Related Activities:

- (1) Distribution of gift boxes from individuals and religious organizations. Distributed V.F.W. gifts to men in isolated Security Posts.
- (2) MARS priority requests 9.
- (3) Weekly visits with Battalion Chaplains.
- (4) Four (4) men attended the Protestant Monthly Rally at 95th Evacuation Hospital.

##### d. Pastoral Activities:

- (1) Personal counseling cases: 21
- (2) Pastoral type letters and "Thank You" notes: 9
- (3) Baptized four (4) men.

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Enclosure (1)

PART II  
SECTION B  
ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN

1. **ENEMY.** Throughout the month of January contact with the enemy was light. Most contacts involved enemy harassing and sniper fire, although occasionally the enemy defended positions briefly. The **DODGE CITY** AO extention continued to produce its share of enemy sightings and contacts. Elements of the 1st Battalion conducted sweep operations in the area resulting in numerous contacts. The major one occurred on 6 Jan when A/1/1 observed approximately 150 NVA transiting the area. The encounter resulted in 8 NVA KBA. During this particular sweep A/1/1 also found a Surprise Firing Device factory consisting of a mold, sheet metal and assorted equipment. Recon units also operating in **DODGE CITY** had one significant contact resulting in 23 NVA KBA and forced extraction of the team. Elsewhere throughout the TAOR enemy movement and sightings increased slightly over the previous month but on the whole the enemy avoided contact with Marine Forces.

a. A total of 466 incidents were reported during the month. This was an increase over December's total of 381 by 15%.

b. As in December, the major cause of casualties in the 1st Marines TAOR continued to be Surprise Firing Devices. There was a slight increase in the number employed with a total of 153 encountered. The First Bn AO contained the majority of SFD's for the month, while the Second Bn AO, which usually has the majority of SFD's, dropped noticeably. First Bn AO had a total of 100 found/detonated while 2nd and 3rd Bns AO's had only 53 between them. The SFD's consisted of Chi-Com and U.S. grenades, box mines, rigged mortar rounds (60, 81, 82mm), artillery rounds, and a large number of homemade types. Homemade SFD's usually consisted of C-Ration or soft-drink cans and similar containers filled with explosives and shrapnel. Most SFD's were employed with trip wires. Pressure type and command detonated SFD's and Mines were employed on roads and trails.

c. There was one rocket attack reported during the month. Four rockets, fired from vic BT 054669, impacted on the DaNang Air Facility.

d. There was an increase in mortar firings over the last month. Eight attacks were recorded for January to December's three. 1st and 2nd Bn's each had four attacks.

e. The enemy units identified as operating in the 1st Marines TAOR during the month were elements of the 36th Regiment and units from the R-20 Bn, T-89 Sapper Bn, Q-82 Bn, and the X-16 Local Force Company. Indications are that the 31st Regt may be entering the AO on the western boundary.

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Enclosure (1)

## f. Incidents 1-31 Jan 69

Significant Contacts	50
Harassing Fire	43
Sniper Fire	15
Bunkers/Tunnels	101
Mines/SFD's	129
Rocket Attack	1
Enemy Sightings	64
Other	63
TOTAL	466

## g. Enemy Losses 1-31 Jan 69

## (1) Personnel

(a) Total Detainees 298

POW 6

CIV DEF 7

INN CIV 235

(b) KIA 219

## (2) Weapons and Equipment

(a) IWC 28

Sub MG 1

SKS 5

AK-47 7

M-16 5

7.62mm Pistol 4

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M-1944 Carbine	1
M-79	1
(b) CSWG	2
B-40 Rocket Launcher	2
(c) Equipment Captured	
Misc 782 gear, uniforms, medical supplies	
(d) Rice	
10,340 lbs.	

2. WEATHER. During January the weather had little to no effect on enemy and friendly operations. There was a total of 5.51 inches of rainfall during the month. Average temperatures for the month were 76° for the high and 71° for the low. Average humidity was 84% and visibility was good to excellent.

3. TERRAIN. The majority of the TAOR consists of flat rice growing paddy-land dotted with numerous small hamlets, patched by bamboo hedgerows, criss-crossed by meandering rivers, waterways, and canals. Routes 1, 1B, 1C, 12B, 12W, 13C, and 583 are located in or pass through the area.

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Enclosure (1)

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5750**UNCLASSIFIED** PART II  
SECTION C  
OPERATIONS

1. During the month of January the 1st Marines (Rein) continued to conduct offensive operations in the DANANG TAOB. In addition to day and night small unit combat patrols and night ambushes the 1st Marines conducted frequent Cordon and Search operations.

a. The 1st Marines continued combat patrol operations in the DODGE CITY AO north of Route 4 to disrupt attempted enemy reorganization and development of installations and fortifications. One company from the 1st Battalion combined with one company of the 51st Regiment (ARVN) at intermittent intervals of three to seven days throughout the month, crossing the LA THEO River to conduct combined combat patrols. On 6 January, Company "A" 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (AT996598) engaged an enemy unit of unknown size with small arms resulting in three KIA (NVA). An artillery mission was called resulting in an additional five KBA (NVA). Three days later a Recon insert working in the same area (AT993607) observed 27 NVA and called in an air strike which resulted in 22 NVA killed by air. During January, 47 enemy were killed in the DODGE CITY AO and 97 new enemy bunkers were destroyed.

b. The VC continued saturating the THANH THUY village complex with surprise firing devices and actively operating in hamlets in the area. The District Chief at DIEM BAN authorized destruction of the area in and around THANH THUY village. On 2 January Company "C", 1st Battalion, 1st Marines supported by elements of 1st Engineers, 1st Tank Battalion and 3d Amtracs commenced land clearing operations along the VINH DIEM River. Dubbed "Project Woodpecker" by the Engineers, the detailed land clearing operation extended into February.

c. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines transformation of the LEPROSARIUM (BT099664) to a Company Combat Base resulted in a significant decrease in enemy activity in the surrounding area. However the fact that the LEPROSARIUM now cuts one of the main VC routes of infiltration makes this position subject to attack at all times and requires constant support and tactical improvement.

d. On 12 January Company "B" was chopped back to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines by Task Force Yankee. Company "K", 3d Battalion, 1st Marines was chopped to Task Force Yankee and continued to work in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines AO throughout the month.

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e. On 15 January the searching unit of a two company Cordon and Search (E,H/2/1) vicinity BT083644 received a heavy volume of small arms fire and M-79 rounds. The unit engaged the enemy force with small arms, 60mm and 81mm mortars and gunships. Results of the action resulted in 21 KIA (VC), 2 PW (VC), three AK-47's, five M16's, two SKS rifles, one M-79, and one French submachinegun captured. Two KIA (USMC) and four WIA (USMC) also resulted from the action.

f. The 1st Marines also added greater flexibility to their Cordon and Search operations. On 20 January Company "D" (Rein), 1st Battalion, 1st Marines conducted a night illuminated heliborne assault, landing simultaneously on the North and South banks of the THANH QUIET River in the vicinity of THANH QUIET (4). Although enemy kills were low (three VC KIA), this operation smoothly executed by one company (rein) in 11 CH46's with four UH1E gunships reaffirmed the flexibility provided by heliborne operations.

g. Closer coordination among units occupying positions within the Marble Mountain Mortar Belt was effected through conferences with the Regimental Commanders and tenant units. It was established that CAP 2-7-6 with their PF and RF counterparts would operate the village complex of NUI KIM SON in accordance with their assigned Combined Action missions. The 3rd Amtrac Battalion was tasked to provide military police of the MSR through the village during daylight hours, and to secure the road into the 3rd Amtrac CP 24 hours a day. CROWS NEST, CAP's, the positions on the hill mass just north of CROWS NEST called Alpha -6, and the Command Control North (Special Forces) located on CHIN STRAP directly across from Alpha-6, are exchanging plans for activities within their positions.

## 2. Artillery and Naval Gunfire.

### a. Artillery

(1) General. During the month of January, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and general support units of the 11th Marine Regiment provided artillery support for the Marine and ARVN units in the 1st Marine TAOR. Coordination of fires was especially stressed to optimize artillery support. Counter rocket doctrine was also stressed to provide rapid and accurate counterbattery fire. 1st Battalion, 11th Marines provided spot teams at CROWS NEST BT06797049, HAWK AT97417039 and PARROT AT99266775 for counter rocket surveillance.

(2) Dispositions. The positions of the firing units in direct support of the 1st Marine during January were as follows:

A-1-11 BT012626  
B-1-11 BT070656  
C-1-11 AT991675  
W-1-11 AT989709

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(3) On January 11, two 4.2" mortars were moved from Whiskey Battery to BT01206241 to form Whiskey-X Battery. On January 16, the two mortars were returned to Whiskey Battery.

(4) The summary of artillery missions and rounds expended in support of the 1st Marines during January is as follows:

Missions: 1,064  
Rounds: 15,824

b. Naval Gunfire. Naval Gunfire was not employed in the 1st Marines TAOR during the month of January.

### 3. Air Support and Defense

a. General: The 1st Marines continued to employ air support to the maximum during the month of January.

#### b. Statistics

##### (1) Helicopters

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Troop Lift	152	390 Troops Lifted
Logistic	294	183,640 Lbs of Cargo
Admin	86	108 Passengers
Med-Evac	462	216 Casualties (See Note 1)
VR	124	701 Passengers
C&C	4	5 Passengers
Gunship	40	10 3/4 Hours on Station
Recon	2	8 Passengers
POW	12	3 POW's

Note 1: Med-Evac reaction time for January is:  
Emergency - 39 minutes, Priority - 49 minutes,  
Routine - 45 minutes

##### (2) Fixed Wing

CAS/DAS	82	182,500 Lbs of ordnance
CSS/TPQ	0	
AO	420	183 1/2 Hours on Station
Flareship	10	7 3/4 Hours on Station
Spooky	8	5 3/4 Hours on Station
		21,000 rds 7.62

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Enclosure (1)

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SECTION D  
TRAINING

1. Because of operational commitments, for the most part training was limited to indoctrination of newly arrived personnel. This training was conducted in accordance with current 1st Marine Division directives.

2. Quotas for formal schools were filled from 1st Marines (Rein) as follows:

Communication Security Crypto School	1 Japan
Basic Ammo Tech School	5 Okinawa
Basic Infantry Wpns Repair School	5 Okinawa
Embarkation School	1 off 3 enl Okinawa
Career Planner School	1 Okinawa
Basic Organic Supply Accounting School	1
16mm Projectionist School	1
Officer Leadership School	6
SECO Leadership School	6
RCO Leadership School	26
Scout/Sniper School	4
Landmine Warfare School	136
Kit Carson Scout Orientation School	3
Communication Security School	256
III MAF Vietnamese Language School	1
Career Planner School	2 1st Div

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3. The 1st Marines made a careful study of it's contacts with the enemy to determine the relationship between the total number of rounds expended and the number of enemy killed. Statistics show that the number of enemy kills compared to the number of rounds expended is disproportionate. Regimental Order 1500.1A was promulgated and a comprehensive marksmanship program was established within the Regiment to place greater emphasis on marksmanship training and marksmanship effectiveness. Each battalion established a Marksmanship Team which consists of a Marksmanship Officer, Marksmanship NCO and one Marksmanship NCO from each company. The Battalion will conduct intensive training in both individual and crew served weapons including instruction on techniques of fire such as "Quick Kill", night firing and fire discipline as well as weapons safety. Each Battalion is currently establishing and will maintain a firing range. Close supervision and support by the Regimental Marksmanship Officer (Scout/Sniper Platoon Commander) will be provided also during January, will be provided.


4. The Executive Officer, 1st Marines, prepared a package of instruction on Supporting Arms for the officers and staff of Headquarters Company and each of the Battalions. The instruction was designed to refresh officers and staff with the basic principles involved in the proper selection and utilization of supporting arms. Instruction was given by the Fire Support Coordinator, the Naval Gunfire Officer and by the 1st Marines Air Liaison Officer.

5. A Communication Security class was conducted by Radio Battalion for all watch officers, watch NCO's, assistant S-3's, TACP personnel and company and platoon radio operators. Those Company Commanders and Platoon Commanders who were available also attended. A total of 256 attended one of the two classes which were held 8 and 9 January. Instruction in this subject will continue periodically.

6. Gas chamber exercises were conducted for elements of the 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion to increase the Marine's confidence in NBC equipment. During January approximately 300 Marines participated in these exercises which will continue in the future.

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Enclosure (1)  


PART II  
SECTION E  
LOGISTICS

1. SUPPLY. FLC was the supply point for all classes of supplies. Normal day to day supply operations continued throughout the month. The fiscal records of all units were inspected by the Division Comptroller. The results were satisfactory with the exception of the 1st Battalion which will be reinspected in February. All units received Budget Guidance from 1st Marine Division and began preparation to submit requirements.

2. TRANSPORTATION: Movement of personnel, material and supplies in support of the 1st Marine Regiment during January was generally satisfactory. This was accomplished by utilization of both organic and housekeeping vehicles assigned to the regiment. Division assets of 10 motor vehicles were utilized to haul 500 South Vietnamese Popular Forces to their ARVN firing range in Danang for familiarization firing of their weapons. Additional Division assets were furnished as required to haul lumber, rations, and normal supply requirements.

3. MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEER ASSISTANCE: The Engineer effort and assistance during January have been excellent:

a. Materials were receipted for by each unit for major construction in each cantonment for heads, showers, strongbacks, messhall extensions, and other various structures.

b. Construction in 3rd Battalion Cantonment is scheduled to commence early February. All major constructions in other cantonments are progressing very well.

c. Completion of the CAU DO and Cooper(TU CAU) bridges.

The equipment maintenance provided by 1st FSR, FLC continues to be satisfactory. The table below depicts the number of tactical equipment repair orders submitted during January and of those submitted, the number completed.

	<u>SUBMITTED</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>
Motor Transportation	94	60
Ordnance	169	97
Comm/Elect	157	77
Engineer	12	8

4. EMBARKATION. During the month of January an informal inspection was held by the Regimental Embarkation Officer. A "satisfactory with minor discrepancies" was the result of the inspection. During the latter part of the month a strong emphasis was placed on updating the MEDS System in all units, which are to be inspected some time in February.

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5. SANITATION. The sanitation conditions in the cantonments within the Regiment have been improving steadily. Constant work and improvement by all hands are responsible in reducing undersirable conditions. It has been noted that Malaria is still a problem in the 1st Marine Division. The number of Malaria cases in the Regiment is still quite low.

6. MEDICAL. During the month of January medical facilities were maintained throughout the Regimental TAOR, each holding routine sick call twice daily and administering emergency treatment when needed. These medical facilities were manned by a total of 10 Medical Officers and 170 Naval Hospital Corpsman. The following is a listing of the patient load seen during the month of January 1969:

A. Sick Call Patients Seen

1. Total patients seen	2,896
2. Evacuated	90
3. Skin Disorders	409
4. Diarrhea	50
5. New V.D. Cases	36
6. Upper Respiratory Infections	140
7. Malaria	2
8. Fever of Unknown Origin (FUO)	18
9. Dental patients seen	628

B. MEDCAP/DENTCAP

1. Medcap patients seen	4,360
2. Dentcap patients seen	180
3. Immunizations given	432

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## ANNEX-F

## CIVIL AFFAIRS-CIVIC ACTION

1. In the month of January, the 1st Marines continued to coordinate its civil affairs and civic action programs in accordance with the 1969 Government of South Viet Nam's Pacification Program, by continually effecting liaison with Quang Nam Province Advisors and both Hoa Vang and Dien Ban District officials to keep abreast of current situations and developments. Several land clearing operations and subsequent relocation projects were initiated and completed within the 1st Marines AO during the month of January. In the 1/1 AO an area of land, bounded by the coordinates: BT0563; BT0565; BT0763; and BT0765; was cleared with Dien Ban District approval. The local populace affected by this operation is presently allowed to farm the land during the daylight hours, but must vacate the area from dusk to dawn. Another significant land clearing operation within the 2/1 AO is presently in progress. This operation was coordinated with village officials of Hoi Hai Village and further coordinated with Hoa Vang District Chief. This involves the relocation of four (4) hamlets with an estimated population of 170 families from their present location to the Tra Khe (2) area(vicBT069687). Both of these operations support the GVN Pacification Program for 1969.

2. The medical civic action program of the battalions is rapidly gaining momentum, indicating Vietnamese trust in the Marines is improving. This program is the mainstay in our overall civic action/civil affairs program. The mobile medcap program in both the 1/1 and 3/1 AO's have shown highly favorable results. All battalion S-5's continued to provide transportation for local Vietnamese who wish to visit relatives in the various hospitals in the Da Nang area.

3. S-5 personnel of both 3/1 and 1/1 initiated self-help agriculture projects with the villagers of Thanh Quit (BT041621), Phong Lo (2) (BT002702), Bo Mung (BT025655), and Viem Tay (BT040640). The projects consist of procuring, distributing, and teaching the villagers how to farm the various vegetables involved in the projects. These projects are aimed at introducing a greater variety of food to the Vietnamese diet and at improving the local economy. Progress in all locales is highly satisfactory and the villagers's reaction to the projects is favorable.

4. The S-5 from 3rd Battalion and the inhabitants of the hamlet of Quang Chau (BT0068) have begun a joint project to construct homes for seventy displaced persons, who now reside with relatives and friends living in that hamlet.

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5. A total of 58 General Walt Scholarships were awarded to the children of Phong Le (2) during the month. A presentation ceremony was held in the hamlet on the 2nd of January with the CO, 1st Marines, G-5, CO, 3/1, Regimental S-5, and various local village officials present. The presentation was coordinated by 3/1 S-5, and the Division Band provided the musical entertainment.

6. During the month, the Regimental S-5 coordinated several civil affairs items with local village and hamlet officials. On the 2nd of January, a local inhabitant requested permission to remove a grave from the cantonment. His request was approved, and a guide was provided. On the 30th, the hamlet chief from Duong Son (2) requested financial assistance in procuring candles and incense necessary for the celebration of the upcoming TET Festivities. The Regimental S-5 coordinated financial assistance with G-5, and the hamlet chief and a village elder were provided the necessary transportation to procure the items requested. The Regimental S-5 also coordinated the procuring of school equipment for the school in Yen Ne (3) with the hamlet chief. The Regimental S-5 continued its personal assistance program by procuring and distributing 3 truckloads of dunnage lumber to the villagers of Duong Son (2). The S-5 personnel also distributed thirty (30) sheets of tin to be used for home building projects in the same hamlet.

7. Vietnamese reactions to our self-help type projects, medical programs, and personal assistance efforts, are becoming more favorable. This factor indicates that a satisfactory Marine/Vietnamese relationship is being formed and strengthened by active participation from all parties involved.

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Enclosure (2)

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PART II  
SECTION G  
COMMUNICATIONS

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1. During the month of January 1969, the 1st Marines Communication Platoon continued to provide radio, telephone (wire and radio relay) and teletype circuits from the DOUNG SON (2) contonment to the 1st Marine Division, 1/1 and 2/1. The Platoon maintained Comm/Crypto Guard for 3/1. Telephone circuits were maintained to the 7th Marines, 1/11 and it's A, B, and C Batteries, 4/11 and Battery L, 1st Tanks, Co A 1st Engineers, CAP 2-5-4, HOA VANG District Headquarters, 51st ARVN Regiment and 1/51st ARVN.
2. In late January the Division Communication Company installed an AN/MRC-62 radio relay terminal at the DOUNG SON (2) contonment. The primary means of communications for the two Common User, the COC Hotline, the FSCC Hotline and teletype circuits between 1st Marine Division and 1st Marines were shifted from wire to radio relay means. Improvement in circuit quality was noted and improvement in circuit reliability is anticipated. Planned for the near future is the installation of an AN/MRC-97 radio relay terminal which will facilitate the shifting of all telephone and teletype circuits to radio relay means and the implementation of limited dial service. A significant improvement of circuit quality and reliability is anticipated upon installation of the AN/MRC-97 equipment.
3. Military and technical training was extensive and intensive during the month of January. Instruction included communication operating procedures, preventive maintenance procedures and communication security.
4. Embarkation requirements and data were reviewed, re-evaluated and updated in January.
5. During the later part of the month, preparation for the Quarterly Command Material Management Inspection commenced.

UNCLASSIFIED

II-G-1

Enclosure (1)

3/RM/mst  
5750

Part III  
Sequential Listing of Significant Events

INDEX

Operations

Section A

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Section B

Intelligence

Section C

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Enclosure (1)

3/RMM/mst  
5750

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PART II  
SECTION A  
OPERATIONS

- 01 Jan 69 - 011204H, A/1/1 Squad Combat vicinity BT076703 Village Chief informed unit of four VC suspects in NUI KIM SON. Results, detained one VC suspect.
- 02 Jan 69 - 020130H, Platoon Security (CROW'S NEST) BT069705 sighted four rockets being fired from vicinity BT054669. Fired 32 rounds 106 RR. Observed one secondary explosion.
- 021000H, 2/1 S-2 BT070676 Village Chief NUI KIM SON pointed out one VC suspect. Results, one detainee taken to 2/1 ITT.
  - 021500H, C/1/1 Bridge Security BT030646 ARVN truck detonated mine consisting of four to five ration cans filled with C-4. Results, one ARVN KIA, two ARVN WIA (EVAC), one USMC WIA (minor).
- 03 Jan 69 - 030800H, C/1/1 Company Clearing Operation BT054654 searched huts, found 19 VN, 300 pounds of potatoes, 1500 pounds of rice. Detained 19 VN, destroyed huts, potatoes, and salvaged rice. Cleared 200 meter area using tanks, flame and explosives.
- 05 Jan 69 - 051150H, A/1/1 and Recon Company, 51st ARVN Combined Company Combat vicinity BT022600 (DODGE CITY) received heavy automatic weapons and mortar fire. Returned fire with organic weapons and artillery. Results, one USMC KIA, four USMC WIA (EVAC), one ARVN WIA (EVAC), six VC KIA.
- 06 Jan 69 - 061715H, A/1/1 Platoon Combat vicinity AT996598 engaged an enemy unit of unknown size with small arms and called in artillery mission. Results, three NVA KIA and five NVA killed by artillery.
- 07 Jan 69 - 071100H, 3rd CTF vicinity BT031648 detained one VN probable district level cadre. Detainee sent to 1st Marines POW compound.
- 09 Jan 69 - 090500H, E&H/2/1 Two Company Cordon and Search vicinity BT 062661 screened 408 VN. Results, four VC infrastructure, one VC suspect detained.
- 090930H, Recon Insert AT993607 observed 27 NVA. Called in air strike. Results, 22 NVA killed by air.
  - 091000H, Recon Insert AT993604 engaged estimated 25 NVA. Results, three USMC WIA (EVAC), one NVA KIA.

III-A-1

Enclosure (1)

3/RMM/mst  
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- 11 Jan 69 - 111050H, C/1/1 Platoon Combat vicinity BT066630 received one B-40 rocket, small arms from ten NVA. Returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, 90mm. Swept area. Results, one NVA KIA, one NVA PW, one AK-47, one SXS, two chicom grenades, 50 pounds of rice, and three bunkers destroyed.
- 13 Jan 69 - 131430H, (DNR LOCH) Aerial Observer operating for 1st Marines w/S-3 aboard BT097642 on target acquisition mission sighted one VC. Aerial Observer with M14 rifle took VC under fire. Results, one VC KIA.
- 131530H, B/2/1 Platoon Security BT067644 received approximately 30 rounds small arms fire. Returned fire with small arms and M79's. Checked area. Results, one VC KIA.
- 132105H, MAP 2-7-6 vicinity BT083705 received small arms and automatic weapons fire. Returned fire with small arms and M79's. Checked area. Results, one VC KIA, one M16 rifle.
- 14 Jan 69 - 142030H, B/1/1 Platoon Combat vicinity AT999610 received approximately 30 rounds small arms, ten rounds M79. Returned fire with small arms, artillery and gunships. Results, one USMC KIA, two USMC MIA (SWAC).
- 15 Jan 69 - 150800H, BSB/2/1 two Company Cordon and Search vicinity BT080650 received small arms, M79 fire from approximately 15 VC. Returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, M79's, 60mm and 81mm mortars, artillery. Results, two USMC KIA, four USMC MIA (SWAC), eight VC KIA, two PW (MIA (SWAC)).
- 151315H, B/2/1 two Company Cordon and Search BT082648 and BT080650 sweep with flame and gun tanks resulted in thirteen VC KIA, six PW. Found arms cache of five M16's, two SXS, one M79, two AK47, one French submachine gun, miscellaneous web gear and ammunition.
- 151330H, C/1/1 Squad Combat vicinity BT062627 spotted six VC running from village. Took under fire with small arms. Results, one VC KIA, 800 pounds of rice and four bunkers destroyed. 64 detainees taken to 1st Battalion CP for interrogation.
- 20 Jan 69 - 201215H, B/2/1 Company Sweep BT078650 interrogated 250 Vietnamese found 50 bunkers. Results, detained one VN and destroyed bunkers.
- 202230H, C/1/1 Platoon Combat vicinity BT058626 spotted three VC on trail engaged with small arms, M26 grenades. Results, three VC KIA.

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Enclosure (1)

3/AMH/mst  
5750

- 21 Jan 69 - 211230H, L/3/1 Platoon Combat AT973642 Marine detonated box mine. Results, one NIA (emergency EVAC). Medevac completed 1244H.
- 22 Jan 69 - 220750H, D/1/1 Company Sweep BT006607 Marine tripped SFD, M26 grenade rigged with trip wire. Results, one USMC KIA, one USMC NIA (EVAC), one ARVN NIA (minor), one USMC NIA (minor).
- 23 Jan 69 - 231725H, D/1/1 Company Sweep vicinity BT010593 observed five VC. Took under fire with organic weapons, called in artillery. Results, one VC KIA (artillery).
- 24 Jan 69 - 240845H, D/1/1 Company Sweep BT011591 received small arms fire and B-40 rocket. Returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, 60mm mortars and artillery. Checked area. Results, one USMC KIA, one USMC KIA, six USMC NIA (EVAC), one ARVN NIA (EVAC), one NVA KIA.
- 26 Jan 69 - 260530H, D/1/1 Company Combat Patrol vicinity BT022606 received small arms fire from estimated five VC. Returned fire with small arms, LAW's, M79's. Checked area. Results, one USMC NIA (EVAC), two VC KIA, one VC PW (KIA), one AK47, two chicom grenades, two M26 grenades.
- 261100H, C/1/1 Company Land Clearing CP BT057641 tank hit mine consisting of 40 to 60 pounds of C-4. Results, three NIA (EVAC), tank damaged.
- 27 Jan 69 - 271845H, B/1/1 Squad Combat BT004615 Marine tripped SFD, M26 grenade. Results, one KIA.
- 272245H, B/2/1 Squad Combat vicinity BT085659 sighted three VC, two with weapons. Engaged with small arms. Results, one VC KIA.
- 28 Jan 69 - 281515H, H/2/1 Company Cordon and Search BT063682 received two chicom grenades. Returned fire with small arms, M26 grenades. Checked area. Results, three USMC NIA (EVAC), two USMC NIA (minor), four VC KIA, one VC PW, one VN detainee, three AK47, three M16's, one SM, one chicom pistol, one K-54 pistol, one claymore, six chicom grenades, four M26 grenades, one LAW, one B-40 rocket, 300 rounds 5.56mm, miscellaneous equipment and documents.
- 29 Jan 69 - 291600H, B/2/1 Squad Combat BT068648 found bunker with grenades and cartridge belts outside. Threw two M26 grenades. Observed one VC run, fired small arms. Results, two VC KIA.

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Enclosure (1)

3/111/mst  
5750

- 29 Jan 69 - 291915H, D/1/1 Squad Ambush BT007598 observed estimated NVA squad. Engaged with small arms, M26 grenades. Results, one NVA KIA, one SKS.
- 292110H, A/1/1 Squad Combat BT023623 ambushed by approximately four VC. Returned fire with organic weapons. Results, three USMC MIA (EVAC), one USN MIA (EVAC), two VC KIA.
- 31 Jan 69 - 310300H, H&E/2/1 Two Company Cordon and Search BT082648 screened 817 civilians. Detained two VN on blacklist. Found 4000 pounds rice.

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III-A-4

Enclosure (1)

## PART III

## SECTION B.

## COMMUNICATIONS

- 4 Jan 69 - A new 25-pair underground cable was installed to the CGC to replace several existing 5-pair cables and individual lines.
- 8-9 Jan 69 - 1st Radio Battalion personnel conducted transmission security training for 257 radio operators and watch officers of the Regiment.
- 9 Jan 69 - Regimental Communication Chief medevaced. No replacement provided during the remainder of the month.
- 10 Jan 69 - All wire circuits, except one Common User and teletype lines to Division were severed. Circuits switched to AN/FCC-I radio relay backup equipment and service restored within 20 minutes. The wire circuits were restored on 11 Jan.
- 24 Jan 69 - Division Communication Company installed an AN/MRC-62 radio relay link to Division.

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III-B-1

Enclosure (I)

PART III  
SECTION C  
INTELLIGENCE

1. 020830H. C/1/1 Plt Cbt. Fd 2 rkt launching pads vic BT 049640. Fd electrical gear and large bolts and screws.
2. 021300H. 2/1 Tower. Observed 4 rockets fired from vic BT 054669 and took under fire w/32 rds 106mm RR fire. Observed 1 secondary explosion.
3. 041510H. A/1/1 Plt Cbt. Rec'd heavy A/W fire from vic BT 025600. Ret'd fire resulting in 2 VC KIA.
4. 041515H. L/3/1 Sqd Cbt. Rec'd S/A and mortar fire from ville vic AT 956637. Ret'd fire w/neg results.
5. 051000H. A/1/1 Co Cbt. Observed 3 VC/NVA moving west along tree line vic BT 018597. Took under fire with arty resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA and documents.
6. 051150H. A/1/1 Plt Cbt. Rec'd heavy A/W and mortar fire from vic BT 025600. Ret'd fire with arty and S/A resulting in 5 VC/NVA KIA.
7. 061715H. A/1/1 Plt Cbt. Engaged an unknown sized unit with small arms and arty, resulting in three NVA KIA and five NVA WIA.
8. 062305H. 2/1 CP. Received two round unknown artillery/mortar fire.
9. 071445H. A/1/1 Plt Cbt. Fd SFD factory consisting of Chi-Com mold, sheetmetal, 4 cylinder engine, and assorted equipment vic AT 986600.
10. 072210H. F/2/1 Plt Sec. Rec'd unknown caliber mortar and 10 grenades from BT 090669. Ret'd fire w/neg assessment.
11. 082100H. 1st Mar FSCC. Fired arty support of 4/51 (ARVN) vic BT 073679 and BT 070682 resulting in 5 VC KIA.
12. 090930H. Recon Insert. Observed 27 NVA vic AT 993687. AO ran AS resulting in 22 NVA KIA.
13. 091000H. Recon Insert. Engaged estimated 25 NVA vic AT 993604 resulting in 1 NVA KIA.
14. 111150H. C/1/1 Plt Cbt. Rec'd 1 B-40 rd. and S/A fire from estimated 10 VC/NVA vic BT 063627. Ret'd fire and swept area resulting

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Enclosure (1)

in 1 VC KIA and 1 VC POW. Unit also captured 2 Chi-Com grenades, 50 lbs rice, 100 AK-47 rds, 1 AK-47, 1 SKS, and 3 bunkers. Dest'd bunkers and gear.

15. 112000H. H/2/1 CP. Rec'd approx 200 rds A/W fire from vic BT 078655. Ret'd fire w/81mm. A/W fire ceased.
16. 121830H. D/1/1. Fd 1 bunker, 500 lbs rice, 155 SFD's, and 20 fighting holes vic AT 984599. Dest'd w/C-4.
17. 122050H. 2/1 A-6 Tower. Observed movement near cave vic BT 070710. Engaged w/S/A and M-79 resulting in 1 secondary explosion.
18. 130930H. D/1/1 Flt Cbt. Fd 5 x 82mm mortar rds, 2 x 20' trench lines and 1 fighting hole vic AT 980599. Destroyed w/C-4.
19. 131530H. H/2/1 Flt Sec. Rec'd approx 30 rds S/A fire from vic BT 065644. Ret'd fire w/S/A and M-79 resulting in 1 VC KIA.
20. 132105H. CAP 2-7-6. Rec'd S/A and A/W fire from vic BT 075706. Unit ret'd fire and checked area resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 M-16.
21. 132330H. D/1/1 Co Sweep. Rec'd approx 8 rds 82mm mortar fire from vic AT 982599. Fired arty. Mortar fire ceased.
22. 142200H. D/1/1. Rec'd S/A fire and 5 x 82mm mortar rounds from vic AT 982597. Ret'd fire. Mortar fire and S/A ceased.
23. 150800H. 2/1 C&S. Rec'd S/A and M-79 fire from vic BT 078648. Ret'd fire w/S/A, A/W and arty resulting in 8 VC KIA and 2 VC WIA.
24. 151000H. C/1/1 Sqd Cbt. Obs'd 1 VC in treeline. While moving to check out area, unit rec'd S/A fire from vic BT 059638. Ret'd fire w/arty and tanks resulting in 2 VC KIA, 64 detainees, 4 bunkers, and 600 lbs rice.
25. 151315H. 2/1 Co Sweep, w/PF's. Began sweep of bunkers vic BT 079648. Resulted in 10 VC KIA and 6 detainees.
26. 152153H. CP Tower. Obs'd mortar tubes firing from vic BT 019663 and impacting vic BT 031653. Called mortar mission. Enemy fire ceased.
27. 152340H. FT LP. Rec'd S/A fire from vic BT 064714. Ret'd fire w/S/A. G/2/1 reactionary force and MF's established cordon around enemy position.

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Enclosure (1)

28. 161245H. Follow Up to 151315H. F/2/1 searched area of previous days activity resulting in additional 3 VC/NVA KIA.
29. 172010H. H&S 3/1 Bridge Security. Rec'd unknown type CS gas vic AT 997697. NBC personnel unable to determine type gas.
30. 211415H. 2/1 Road Security proceeded to area of explosion. Fd road grader had det'd 50 lb box mine vic BT 069690.
31. 230300H. 4/51 ARVN FPB observed enemy move vic BT 057678. Called U.S. F/M resulting in 7 VC KIA.
32. 231855H. D/1/1 Co Sweep. Rec'd 7 rds 82mm mortar fire vic BT 006597 and 003597. Ret'd fire. Mortar fire ceased.
33. 232000H. B/1/1 Plt Cbt. Heard voices from vic BT 024607. Called F/M and rec'd S/A fire. F/M resulted in 1 secondary explosion.
34. 240845H. D/1/1 Co Sweep. Rec'd S/A fire and 1 B-40 rd from unknown size unit vic BT 010590. Ret'd fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA.
35. 241205H. M/3/1 Co Sweep. Fd metal bridge vic AT 980688. Dest'd w/C-4.
36. 241450H. M/3/1 Fd 24 M-79 rds, 21 lbs of C-4 and 3 batteries vic AT 975687. Dest'd w/C-4.
37. 252030H. C/1/1 Plt Cbt. Heard VC propaganda broadcast from vic BT 064631. Fired mortar mission and broadcast ceased.
38. 252040H. A/1/1 Plt Sec. Heard VC propaganda broadcast from vic BT 026640. Called F/M. Broadcast ceased.
39. 252215H. E/2/1 Sqd Cbt. Rec'd heavy S/A and A/W fire vic BT 064649. Ret'd fire and enemy fire ceased.
40. 260330H. D/1/1 C&S. Rec'd S/A fire from vic BT 032607. Ret'd fire resulting in 2 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA, and 1 AK-47 captured.
41. 260800H. C/1/1 Co Operation. Tank det'd 105mm rd set as SFD vic BT 057630.
42. 261100H. C/1/1 Co Sweep. Tank det'd 40-60 lb box mine vic BT 057641
43. 262025H. A/1/1 Sqd Cbt. Observed VC who appeared to be setting SFD's vic BT 021638. Engaged w/S/A and M-79. Checked area. VC evidently fled. No trails.

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Enclosure (1)

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44. 272245H. E/2/1 Sqd Cbt. Obs'd 3 VC vic BT 085639. Engaged w/S/A resulting in 1 VC KIA.
45. 281515H. H/2/1 C&S. Rec'd 2 Chi-Com grenades from tunnel complex vic BT 083682. Unit ret'd fire w/S/A and grenades resulting in 4 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 and 1 Chi-Com pistol captured. 1 VC WIA and 1 VN dtnl. Asst'd gear evaced to S-2.
46. 291600H. F/2/1 Sqd Cbt. Engaged 2 VC in bunker vic BT 068645. Resulted in 2 VC KIA.
47. 291915H. D/1/1 Sqd Amb. Engaged NVA sqd vic BT 007598. Resulted in 1 NVA KIA and 1 SKS captured.
48. 292110H. A/1/1 Sqd Cbt. Amb by approx 4 VC vic BT 023623 resulting in 2 VC KIA.
49. 301220H. D/1/1 Sqd Cbt. Obs'd 1 VC in river vic BT 023597. Engaged w/S/A resulting in 1 VC KIA. Unit rec'd sniper fire from area of above grid. Ret'd fire. Sniper fire ceased.
50. 311905H. 1st Mar FSOC. Fired arty in support of ARVN in DODGE CITY area resulting in a total of 127 NVA KIA.

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III-C-4

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

ZNY SSSSS  
 O P 021117Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/FIRST MAR (COIL)

REQ REL

FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO FIRST ENG BN  
 FIRST TANK BN  
 THIRD AMTRAC BN  
 RT

SECRET

FRAG O 001-49 (S)

A. OP O 314-68

R. ADMIN O 314-68

1. (S) SITUATION

A. FRIENDLY.

(1) DISTRICT CHIEF, DIEN BAN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE AUTHORIZES DESTRUCTION OF AREA IN AND AROUND THANH THUY VILLAGE IN LETTER DATED 30 DECEMBER 1968.

R. ENEMY

(1) REF A AND CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS.

PAGE TWO 056T SECRET

(2) VC CONTINUE SATURATION OF THANH THUY VILLAGE WITH

SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES, AND ACTIVELY OPERATE IN HAMLETS OF THANH THUY.

2. (S) MISSION. 1ST MARINES CONDUCT ENEMY DENIAL OPERATIONS IN THANH THUY VILLAGE TO DISRUPT, DISORGANIZE, FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, AND TO CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY CACHES, INSTALLATIONS & FORTIFICATIONS.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ON D-DAY, AT H-HOUR, 1ST MARINES WITH ONE COMPANY SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF 1ST ENGINEERS, 1ST TANK BN, 3RD AMTRACS, COMMENCE LAND CLEARING OPERATION IN AND AROUND THANH THUY VILLAGE (ANNEX A: OP OVERLAY TPI) TO DENY ENEMY OPERATIONS IN THE AREA AND TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

R. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION (AM REF A).

(2) WITH ONE COMPANY SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF 1ST ENGINEERS, 1ST TANK BN, 3RD AMTRACS CONDUCT LAND CLEARING OPERATION IN AND AROUND THANH THUY VILLAGE (ANNEX A: OP OVERLAY) TO DENY ENEMY OPERATIONS IN THE AREA AND TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/OR

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SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE THREE OS6T S E C R E T

DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

C. 2ND BN 1ST MARINES

3RD BN 1ST MARINES

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

D. CO. A, 1ST ENGINEERS (DS)

(1) PROVIDE SUPPORT REQUIRED

E. CO. C, 1ST TANK BN (DS)

(1) PROVIDE SUPPORT REQUIRED.

F. HEADQUARTERS, 3RD AMTRAC BN (GS)

(1) PROVIDE SUPPORT REQUIRED

G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) D-DAY: 03 JANUARY 1969

(2) H-HOUR: 0700

(3) DURATION: 20-25 DAYS

(4) REPORTS: NORMAL SPOTREPS/SITREPS PLUS LAND CLEARING  
PROGRESS REPORT DAILY AT 1600, AND ON ORDER.

(5) ANNEX A: OP OVERLAY - TO BE ISSUED

(6) AUTHORITY: ALCON

4. (S) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. REF R: NO CHANGE

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B. SECURITY.

(1) 1ST BN, 1ST MARINES WILL PROVIDE SECURITY FOR

SUPPORTING UNITS AND EQUIPMENT, REMAINING IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA  
DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.(2) WHENEVER FEASIBLE, SUPPORTING UNITS AND EQUIPMENT  
WILL MOVE TO SECURE AREAS DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.

C. MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS.

(1) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR EQUIPMENT WILL BE PROVIDED  
BY 1ST BN, 1ST MARINES WITHIN CAPABILITIES.

(2) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED SUPPORTING

UNITS IN CLASS I, III, V.

5. (S) COMMAND AND COMM-FLEC. REF A: NO CHANGE.

GP-4

RT

TOD/TT/0214/07/DIV, 1/1, 2/1, W-2/CON: 008/SKE  
COUR/3/1/HQCO

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**IMMEDIATE**

ZNY SSSSSS  
 O P 031300Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)

REQ RELEASE

FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO 51ST ARVN REGIMENT DNG RVN  
 INFO FIRST RECON BN

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FRAG 0 002-69 (S)

A. OP 0 314-68

2. ADMIN 0 314-68

1. (S) SITUATION

A. ENEMY

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE.

(2) INT EST TO BE ISSUED

B. FRIENDLY

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE

(2) 51ST REGIMENT (ARVN) PARTICIPATES IN COMBINED

PAGE TWO OS6T 013

OPERATION WITH 1ST MARINES.

(3) ELEMENTS OF 1ST RECON BN OPERATE IN DODGE CITY  
 SOUTH OF ROUTE 4 DURING COMBINED PATROL OPERATIONS OF 1ST  
 MARINES AND 51ST REGIMENT (ARVN).

2. (S) MISSION. 1ST MARINES WITH ONE COMPANY IN CONJUNCTION  
 WITH ONE COMPANY 51ST REGIMENT (ARVN) CONDUCT COMBAT PATROL  
 OPERATIONS IN DODGE CITY AO NORTH OF ROUTE 4 TO DISRUPT ENEMY  
 FORCES. AND TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES,  
 CACHES, MATERIAL, INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

3. (S) EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. COMMENCING D-DAY AT H-HOUR  
 1ST MARINES WITH ONE COMPANY IN CONJUNCTION WITH ONE COMPANY  
 51ST REGIMENT (ARVN) CONDUCT COMBINED COBAT PATROLS IN DODGE  
 CITY AO NORTH OF ROUTE 4 AT INTERMITTENT INTERVALS OF 3-7 DAYS  
 TO EXPLOIT SUCCESS OF OPERATION MEADE RIVER BY DISRUPTING  
 ENEMY REORGANIZATION OPERATIONS, AND TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/  
 OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL, INSTALLATIONS/  
 FORTIFICATIONS.

B. 1ST BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

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PAGE THREE OS6T 013 [REDACTED]

(2) ON D-DAY, AT H-HOUR, COMMENCE COMPANY SIZE COMBAT PATROL OPERATIONS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ONE COMPANY OF 51ST REGIMENT (ARVN) IN DODGE CITY AO NORTH OF ROUTE 4 AT INTERMITTENT INTERVALS OF 3-7 DAYS TO EXPLOIT SUCCESS OF OPERATION MADE RIVER BY DISRUPTING ENEMY REORGANIZATION OPERATIONS AND TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

(3) ASSUME OPCON ONE COMPANY OF 3/1 AT 031230H JAN 69.

(4) BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO PROVIDE REACTION FORCE IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION.

C. 2ND BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

(2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE REACTION FORCE WITHIN 60 MIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION.

D. 3RD BN 1ST MAR

(1) CHOP ONE COMPANY TO 1/1 AT 031230H JAN 69

(2) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION

(3) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE REACTION FORCE WITH 120 MINUTES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION

E. 51ST REGT (ARVN)

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PAGE FOUR OS6T 013 [REDACTED]

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTION

(1) D-DAY 04 JAN 69

(2) H-HOUR 0630H

(3) DURATION: 3-7 DAY INTERVAL INDEFINITELY

(4) FOL WITH RECON TMS: ROUTE 4

(5) DIR NAUTH: ALCON

4. (S) ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

A. REF R. NO CHANGE.

B. HELICOPTER RESUPPLY AUTHORIZED

5. (S) COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

REF A: NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT

TOD: 031130Z/TT/CON-013/DIV/1/1-2/1/W-1/CBW  
031135Z/COUR/3/1/HQ CO

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(CC)\*

R

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S-3  
03/11/7

ZNY CCCC  
O 021617Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO FIRST BN FIRST MAR  
BT

SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS  
REQUIRES PASS COPY TO PARTICIPATING ARVN FORCES.  
ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO FRAG ORDER 002-68

(A) APPENDIX 1 TO OPERATION ORDER 314-68  
(P) MAPS: 5640 SERIES I AND II

## 1. MISSION:

1ST MARINES WITH ONE COMPANY IN CONJUNCTION WITH ONE COMPANY 51ST  
REGIMENT (ARVN) CONDUCT COMBAT PATROL OPERATIONS IN DODGE CITY AO.  
NORTH OF ROUTE #4 TO DISRUPT ENEMY FORCES AND TO DESTROY ENEMY  
FORCES CACHES, MATERIEL, INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

## 2. ENEMY SITUATION:

A. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA OF OPERATION. SEE REF (A)

## B. RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITY.

13 DEC 68	TUNNELS	007595
13 DEC 68	15 FOXHOLES	002594
19 DEC 68	PINKERS & POSITIONS	001556
19 DEC 68	PINKERS	007596
19 DEC 68	10 FOXHOLES	962593

1ST MAR DIV 2100/4 (9/67)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE TWO GS6T [REDACTED]

21 DEC 68	25 FOXHOLES	983593
21 DEC 68	100 FOXHOLES	988582
21 DEC 68	STRONG POINT	988481
21 DEC 68	15 FOXHOLES	992592
21 DEC 68	STRONG-POINT	996566
23 DEC 68	AA POSITION	986561
23 DEC 68	2 BUNKERS	006566
26 DEC 68	BUNKERS & AA SITE	000556
26 DEC 68	BUNKERS CAMOUFLAGED	000559
26 DEC 68	BUNKERS CAMOUFLAGED	000558
26 DEC 68	3 BUNKERS	006597
26 DEC 68	BUNKERS COMPLEX & CONSTRUCTION	988553
27 DEC 68	CAMOUFLAGED BUNKERS	008596
27 DEC 68	CAMOUFLAGED BUNKERS	004596
27 DEC 68	CAMOUFLAGED BUNKERS	001596
27 DEC 68	CAMOUFLAGED BUNKERS	987598
27 DEC 68	CAMOUFLAGED BUNKERS	983599
28 DEC 68	BUNKERS	996586
28 DEC 68	BUNKERS	998586

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PAGE THREE OS6T [REDACTED]

29 DEC 68	BUNKERS	998585
30 DEC 68	1 STRUCTURE & 3 BUNKERS	990550
30 DEC 68	1 BUNKER	985561
30 DEC 68	FOXMOLES	009578
30 DEC 68	FOXHOLES	015588
30 DEC 68	FOOTBRIDGE	015592
30 DEC 68	BUNKERS	983518
30 DEC 68	STRONG-POINT	016585
30 DEC 68	STRONG-POINT	014584

DECLASSIFIED

- C. STRENGTH. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 700-900 MEN IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS.
- D. COMPOSITION. THE ENEMY UNITS ARE RELIEVED TO BE ELEMENTS OF THE Q-82 BN, R-20 BN, AND T-3 SAPPER BN.
- E. LOCATION AND DISPOSITION. THE UNITS ARE RELIEVED TO BE DEPLOYED IN HA NONG TRUNG (0058), AND DONG LEIN (0159) AND HA NONG TAY (0059) USING BUNKERS AND DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
- F. AVAILABILITY OF REINFORCEMENTS. REINFORCEMENTS CAN COME FROM ELEMENTS OF THE 36TH REGIMENT LOCATED AT PHONG THU (9757) AND

PAGE FOUR OS6T [REDACTED]

EASTERN GO NOI ISLAND (0254) ALSO ELEMENTS OF THE 38TH REGIMENT LOCATED AT NONG SON (9857) AND EASTERN GO NOI ISLAND (0652) REINFORCEMENTS CAN ARRIVE IN FORCE BETWEEN 2-3 HOURS AND PIECE-MEAL WITHIN 1 HOUR FROM VIC 9857.

G. MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES:

18 DEC 68

1. Q-82 BN LOC VIC RT 006577, BT 015576, BT 016585. (F/G)

20 DEC 68

1. Q-82 BN LOC VIC RT 015575 AND RT 016585. (F/G)

2. U/I PN LOCATED VIC AT 980575, AT 998585, AND 009582. (F/G)

21 DEC 68

1. R-20 BN LOC VIC RT 015575, BT 015590 AND RT 015596. (F/G)

2. 2/36 LOC VIC RT 003631. (F/G)

3. Q-82 LOC VIC RT 003613. (F/G)

23 DEC 68

1. (1) U/I VC BN LOC RT 005595 AND RT 002597 (F/G)

2. 1 VC BN LOC VIC RT 005595 AND RT 002597 (F/G)

3. 1 VC BN LOC VIC RT 0023588 (F/G)

4. Q-82 LOC VIC RT 003613. (F/G)

1ST MARDIV 2100/4 (9/67)

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PAGE FIVE OS6T [REDACTED]

1. 0-82 LOC VIC PT 017588 (F/6)
2. 2/36 LOC VIC AT 580575, AT 978570, AT 987585, AT 995586. (F/6)

30 DEC 68

1. (1) NVA PN LOC VIC PT 004615 AND PT 013617. (F/6)

31 DEC 68

1. R-20 PN LOC VIC PT 004615 AND PT 013617. (F/6)

1 JAN 69

1. 13 VC LOC AT 004607 (A/1)
2. 2 VC LOC VIC PT 003607 (A/1)
3. 17 NVA LOC VIC PT 003607 (A/1)
4. 9 NVA LOC VIC PT 003607 (A/1)
5. 14 VC LOC VIC PT 004605 (A/1)

H. SIGNIFICANT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.

1. STRENGTHS. THE ENEMY UNIT HAVE CONSTRUCTED BUNKERS AND FIGHTING HOLES THROUGH OUT THE AREA OF OPERATION. THESE POSITIONS ARE WELL CAMOUFLAGED HAVE NUMEROUS SUPPORTING FIELDS OF FIRE AND ARE SUPPORTED BY MORTAR AND ANTI-

AIRCRAFT POSITIONS.

2. WEAKNESSES. THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT LARGE & MEDIUM SUP-

PORTING ARMS AND VULNERABILITY TO AIRSTRIKES REMAIN THE ENEMIES

PAGE SIX OS6T [REDACTED]

PRIMARY WEAKNESSES. INADEQUATE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES WILL CONTINUE TO UNDERMINE THE MORALE AND FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE ENEMY TROOPS.

## 3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

- A. ATTACK. ENEMY FORCES CAN ATTACK AT A PLACE AND TIME OF HIS CHOOSING WITH AN ESTIMATED 3 BATTALIONS SUPPORTED BY MORTAR'S B-40'S AND ORGANIC WEAPONS.
  - B. DEFEND. THE ENEMY HAS THE CAPABILITY OF DEFENDING A PLACE OF HIS CHOOSING WITH 3 BNS. SUPPORTED BY ORGANIC WEAPONS, SUPPLEMENTING DEFENSE POSITIONS WITH SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES.
  - C. REINFORCE. THE ENEMY CAN REINFORCE PIECEMEAL WITH ELEMENTS OF 2 BN'S IN THE HOUR WITH UP TO TWO BATTALIONS IN 2 TO 3 HOURS.
  - D. WITHDRAW. THE ENEMY MAY WITHDRAW AT A TIME OF HIS CHOOSING TO A PLACE OF HIS CHOICE.
  - E. EVADE. THE ENEMY CAN EVADE FRIENDLY FORCES BY HIDING IN BUNKERS, CAVES AND CAMOUFLAGED FIGHTING HOLES.
4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
- A. ATTACK. THE ENEMY HAS AN ESTIMATED 3 BN'S OPERATING IN THE
  - AND THE USE OF ALL OR ANY PORTION OF THIS STRENGTH TO

ATTACK FRIENDLY UNITS IS POSSIBLE.  
PT

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C. FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS  
 B. DEFENDING USING EXISTING DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND DEFENSIVE FIRES  
 THE ENEMY UNITS CAN DEFEND AGAINST FRIENDLY GROUND ATTACKS.

C. REINFORCE. THE ENEMY CAN REINFORCE HIS UNITS IN THE AO WITH  
 UNITS OF THE 36TH AND 38TH OPERATING ON EASTERN GO NOI ISLAND  
 AND VIC AT 9857.

D. EVADE. HIDING IN BUNKERS HAS BEEN THE ENEMIES CHIEF METHOD OF  
 EVADING FRIENDLY FORCES. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE ENEMY WILL  
 CONTINUE TO USE THE METHOD.

E. WITHDRAW. THIS TACTIC OFFERS THE ENEMY THE OPTION OF CHOOSING  
 THE TIME & PLACE OF COMBAT. THE ENEMY WILL USE THIS OPTION TO  
 SUIT HIS TACTICAL NEEDS, FIGHTING ONLY WHEN THE SITUATION IS  
 FAVORABLE.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

A. RELATIVE PROBABILITY OF ADOPTION OF AVAILABLE COURSES OF ACTION.

(1) WITHDRAW.

(2) EVADE

(3) ATTACK

PAGE TWO OS6T

(4) REINFORCE

(5) DEFEND

B. EFFECTS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) WITHDRAW. WITHDRAW WILL PREVENT THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THAT  
 PORTION OF THE MISSION PERTAINING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF  
 ENEMY FORCES BUT WILL ENHANCE THE DESTRUCTION OF  
 ENEMY FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS AS WELL AS DISRUPTING  
 ENEMY ACTIVITIES.

(2) ATTACK. AN ATTACK BY THE ENEMY FORCES WOULD PRECLUDE  
 ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION BY FORCES ASSIGNED. A DAYLIGHT  
 ATTACK BY ENEMY FORCES WOULD SUBJECT THEIR FORCES TO PARTIAL  
 DESTRUCTION BY OUR SUPPORTING ARMS AND AIR.

A NIGHT TIME ATTACK WOULD RESTRICT OUR USE OF  
 SUPPORTING ARMS AND AIR. IN BOTH CASES THE MISSION ASSIGNED WOULD  
 NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED.

(3) REINFORCE. REINFORCEMENT OF ENEMY UNITS IN THE AREA WOULD  
 PRECLUDE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION BY FORCES ASSIGNED.

(4) DEFEND. IF THE ENEMY DEFENDS IT WILL ENHANCE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT  
 OF THE MISSION AND ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY  
 FORCES BY OUR SUPPORTING ARMS AND AIR.

(5) EVADE. EVASION OF FRIENDLY UNITS BY THE ENEMY WOULD RESULT

PAGE THREE OS6T

IN THE DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES, CACHES, AND MATERIEL BUT NOT  
 ENEMY FORCES: THERE BY ONLY PARTIALLY ACCOMPLISHING

THE MISSION.

GP-1

BT

TOD/1/1-031820Z/CCN: 015/DCF

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ZNR 00000

OF 060725Z JAN 69

FM FIRST MAR

TO FIRST MAR (CULL)

INFO CG FIRST MAR DIV

BT

PRAGO 063-69

A. CPO 314-68

B. ADMINO 314-68

1. (S) SITUATION

A. ENEMY

(1) REF A

(2) CURRENT INTSUMS AND PFF INTSUMS

B. FRIENDLY

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE.

(2) 51ST REGIMENT (ARVN) PARTICIPANTS IN COMBINED OPERATION W/FIRST MARINES.

(3) PFF'S ASSIGNED TO FIRST MAR TO CONDUCT SEARCH PORTION OF CORDONS AND SEARCH OPERATIONS AND OTHER APPROPRIATE MISSIONS.

2. (S) MISSION. 1ST MAR CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION AND IN

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PAGE TWO 0561 37

CONJUNCTION W/ARVN, PFF FORCES, CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH OF NGAN CAU VILLAGE COMPLEX (CENTER MASS PT065665) TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. COMMENCING ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR, UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS, 1ST MARINES W/ELEMENTS OF TWO COMPANIES, CORDON VILLAGE COMPLEX OF NGAN CAU (CENTER MASS PT065665) IN CONJUNCTION WITH ONE COMPANY OF 4/51ST ARVN. AT FIRST LIGHT, ONE PLAT, 1ST MAR; ONE PLAT 4/51ST ARVN, ONE PLAT PFF, COMMENCE SEARCH INSIDE CORDON TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

B. 2ND BN, 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

(2) ON D-DAY, AT H-HOUR UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS, CONDUCT CORDON VILLAGE OF NGAN CAU (CENTER OF MASS 065665) W/ELEMENTS OF TWO COMPANIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH ONE COMPANY 4/51ST ARVN. AT FIRST LIGHT, W/ONE PLAT USMC, ONE PLAT 4/51ST ARVN, ONE PLAT PFF COMMENCE SEARCH INSIDE CORDON TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, AND INSTALLATIONS

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PAGE THREE US6T 37. [REDACTED]  
 FORTIFICATIONS.

C. 1ST BN, 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

D. 3RD BN, 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) D-DAY: 09 JAN 69

(2) H-HOUR: 0500 (CORDON COMPLETE)

(3) DURATION: ONE WAY

(4) DIRLNAUTH: ALCON

(5) SITREP AT 0715 AND AT CONCLUSION OF OP. SPOT REP AS USUAL

4. (S) ADMIN&LOGISTICS

A. REF B. NO CHANGE.

5. (S) COMMAND AND COMM-ELECT.

A. REF A. NO CHANGE.

GP-4 TOD/TT/DIV/1A, 2/1-090830Z/COM:37/DCF

BT  
 TOD/COUR/3/1-080910Z

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FLC 2100/4 (1/68)

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ZNY SSSSS  
 O P 091530Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO FIRST MAR(COLL)  
 BT  
 S [REDACTED]

R S-3  
 091530

FRAG 0 004-69 (S)

A. OP 0 314-68  
 B. ADMIN 0 314-68  
 1. (S) SITUATION.  
 A. ENEMY.

(1) VILLAGE OF YEN NE (3)(CENTER OF MASS AT982678) IS  
 SUSPECTED HAVEN FOR VC OPERATING IN WESTERN AREA 3RD BN, 1ST  
 MAR TAOR.

B. FRIENDLY.

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE.

(2) 59TH R.F. BATTALION AND COMBINED ACTION PLATOON  
 2-5-4 (ARVN) PARTICIPATES IN OPERATIONS W/FIRST MARINES.

2. (S) MISSION. 1ST MAR CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION AND IN CON-  
 JUNCTION WITH RE AND CAP. FORCES CONDUCT BLOCK AND SEARCH OF  
 VILLAGE OF YEN NE (3)(CENTER OF MASS AT982678) TO FIND, FIX,

PAGE TWO 044 056T [REDACTED]

CAPTURE AND /OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL, AND  
 INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR, UNDER COVER  
 OF DARKNESS, 1ST MARINES W/ONE COMPANY, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ONE  
 COMPANY 59TH RF (ARVN) ESTABLISH BLOCK IN VICINITY OF VILLAGE OF  
 YEN NE(3)(CENTER OF MASS AT982678). AT FIRST LIGHT, 1ST MARINE CO,  
 --59TH RF PLAT AND ACTION PLATOON 2-5-4 COMMENCE SEARCH TOWARD BLOCK TO  
 FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES, --53483),  
 AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

B. 3RD BN, 1ST MAR.

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

(2) ON D-DAY, AT H-HOUR UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS EST/B-  
 ISH BLOCK FICINITY OF VILLAGE OF YEN NE(3)(CENTER OF MASS AT  
 982678) W/ONE COMPANY IN CONJUNCTION W/ONE COMPANY 59TH RF BAT-  
 TALLION (ARVN). AT FIRST LIGHT W/CO, 59TH RF PLAT AND COMBINED ACTION  
 PLAT 2-5-4- SEARCH TOWARD PLOCK TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY  
 ENEMY FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

C. 1ST BN, 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION

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PAGE THREE 044 056T [REDACTED]  
D. 2ND, 1ST MAR  
(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.  
E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS  
(1) D-DAY: 10 JAN 69  
(2) H-HOUR: 0700H (SEARCH COMMENCES)  
(3) DURATION: ONE DAY  
(4) DIRLNAUTH: ALCON  
(5) SIT REP AT 130002H AND AT CONCLUSION OF OP. SPOT  
REP AS REQUIRED.  
4. (S) ADMIN AND LOGISTICS.  
A. REF B. NO CHANGE.  
5. (S) COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.  
A. REF A. NO CHANGE.  
GP-4  
BT  
TOD/TT/2/1 091610Z/ 1/1 COUR 0-3/RH

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FLC 2100/4 (1/68)

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S-3  
181200

O P 101200Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
INFO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
BT

FRAGD 005-69 (S)  
A. OPD 314-68  
B. ADMINO 314-68  
1. (S) SITUATION  
A. ENEMY

(1) REF A.

(2) NUMEROUS RPTS REC OVER LAST TWO MONTHS OF VC AGENTS C PURCHASING RICE, SUPPLIES FROM BO MUNG MARKET. ON 14 JAN RPT REC INDICATING EIGHT MEMBER ASSASSINATION SQ DISPATCHED BO MUNG MISSION AS ASSINATING U.S. OFFICERS /INTERPRETERS WORKING W/ U.S. ORCS. RPT PARTIALLY CONFIRMED 17 JAN WHEN KCS ATTACHED 2/1 SHOT AT IN BO MUNG MARKET AREA. BO MUNG NOT CONSIDERED EN STRONGHOLD. AGTS /PROSELYTING PERSONNEL UTILIZE AREA TO CONTROL LOCAL PEOPLE, PROQUIRE SUPPLIES TO SUPPORT VC THIS AREA.

PAGE TWO 0109  
B. FRIENDLY

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE.

(2) ONE PFF PLT PARTICIPATES W/ FIRST AMR. AS SEARCH ELEMENT IN CORDON AND SEARCH OPS.  
2. (S) MISSION. FIRST MAR IN CONJUNCTION W/ PFF'S CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH OF BO MUNG (2) TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND /OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL AND INSTALLATIONS /FORTIFICATIONS.  
3. (S) EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPNS. ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR FIRST MAR W/ ONE CO (REIN) IN CONJUNCTION W/ ONE PLT PFF'S CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH OF BO MUNG (2) BT027652 TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND /OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL AND INSTALLATIONS /FORTIFICATIONS.

B. 1ST BN, 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

(2) ON D-DAY AT HOUR W/ ONE CO (REIN) IN CONJUNCTION W/ ONE PLT PFF'S CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH OF BO MUNG (2) BT027652 TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND /OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL AND INSTALLATIONS /FORTIFICATIONS.

C. 2ND BN, 1ST MAR

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68) BN, 1ST MAR COPY 2 OF 8 COPIES

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PAGE THREE 0109 S [REDACTED]  
(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.  
D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS  
(1) D-DAY: 19 JAN69  
(2) H-HOUR: 0930H  
(3) DURATION: ONE DAY  
4. (S) ADMIN AND LOGISTICS  
A. REF B. NO CHANGE.  
5. (S) COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC  
A. REF A. NO CHANGE.

GP-4  
BT

TOD: 1/1, DIV(TT)/CCN: 109/NH/U-1  
2/1, 3/1(COOR)/181810Z

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(cc) \*

1. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 2. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

3. (S) SITUATION  
 4. ENEMY

5. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 6. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

7. (S) SITUATION  
 8. ENEMY

9. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 10. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

11. (S) SITUATION  
 12. ENEMY

13. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 14. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

15. (S) SITUATION  
 16. ENEMY

17. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 18. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

19. (S) SITUATION  
 20. ENEMY

21. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 22. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

23. (S) SITUATION  
 24. ENEMY

25. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 26. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

27. (S) SITUATION  
 28. ENEMY

29. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 30. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

31. (S) SITUATION  
 32. ENEMY

33. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 34. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

35. (S) SITUATION  
 36. ENEMY

37. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 38. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

39. (S) SITUATION  
 40. ENEMY

41. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 42. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

43. (S) SITUATION  
 44. ENEMY

45. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 46. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

47. (S) SITUATION  
 48. ENEMY

49. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 50. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

51. (S) SITUATION  
 52. ENEMY

53. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 54. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

55. (S) SITUATION  
 56. ENEMY

57. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 58. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

59. (S) SITUATION  
 60. ENEMY

61. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 62. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

63. (S) SITUATION  
 64. ENEMY

65. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 66. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

67. (S) SITUATION  
 68. ENEMY

69. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 70. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

71. (S) SITUATION  
 72. ENEMY

73. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 74. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

75. (S) SITUATION  
 76. ENEMY

77. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 78. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

79. (S) SITUATION  
 80. ENEMY

81. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 82. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

83. (S) SITUATION  
 84. ENEMY

85. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 86. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

87. (S) SITUATION  
 88. ENEMY

89. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 90. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

91. (S) SITUATION  
 92. ENEMY

93. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 94. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

95. (S) SITUATION  
 96. ENEMY

97. REF A. CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTSUNS  
 98. INDICATIONS ARE EN FORCES USE THANH QUIT (4)

99. (S) SITUATION  
 100. ENEMY

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PAGE TWO OS6T 1118 [REDACTED]

AS CROSSING POINT ON VINH DIEN RIVER FROM DODGE CITY TO COASTAL AREA AND FURTHER INTO DANANG. RD TEAMS HAVE REY PRESENCE LOCAL VC THANH QUIT AREA. PROPAGANDA OPS CONDUCTED BY VC TO COUNTER U.S. / GVN PACIFICATION EFFORTS.

B. FRIENDLY

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE

(2) 1ST MAW PROVIDES HELO SUPPORT NT OPS 1ST MAR TAD

(3) POLICE FIELD FORCES PROVIDE PERFORM SEARCH ELEMENT PORTION CORDON & SEARCH OPS.

(4) 2D ROKMC BDE EXTEND AO TO 1ST MAR AS REQ THANH

QUIT (4) OPS - 500 METERS SOUTH OF THANH QUIT (4).

2. (S) MISSION. 1ST MAR CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION AND CONDUCT NT HELO-LIFTED CORDON & SEARCH THANH QUIT (4) BT055626 TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND /OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL AND INSTALLATIONS & FORTIFICATIONS.

3. (S) EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. USING MAXIMUM DECEPTION, 1ST MAR

W/ONE CO (REIN)

MOVE BY 2300 L ON D-DAY. PP 1 OR TO L-HOUR TO STAGING AREA (MARBLE MTN AIRFIELD). ON D-DAY AT L-HOUR, ONE CO (REIN) CONDUCTS A HELO SUPPORTED NIGHT ILLUM LANDING SIMULTANEOUSLY

PAGE THREE OS6T 0118 [REDACTED] RE I

NORTH AND SOUTH OF THANH QUIT RIVER TO CORDON THANH QUIT (4). JOINED BY PLT ON EAST BANK VINH DIEN RIVER TO COMPLETE CORDON. FOLLOWED AT FIRST LIGHT D PLUS 1 BY DELIBERATE, DETAILED SEARCH INSIDE CORDON W/USMC PLT REIN W/PFF PLT TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND /OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, INSTALLATIONS & FORTIFICATIONS.

B. 1ST BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION

(2) ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR USING MAX DECEPTION W/

ONE CO (REIN) CONDUCT HELO SUPPORTED ILLUMINATED NT LANDING

CORDON AND SEARCH OF THANH QUIT (4) VIC BT055626, IN CONJUNCTION W/PFF PLT TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND /OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL AND INSTALLATIONS & FORTIFICATIONS.

C. 2ND BN 1ST MAR

3RD BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) D-DAY: 20 JAN 65

(2) H-HOUR: 2300

(3) DURATION: 1 DAY

(4) AIR SUPPORT: AMEN EX-A

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[REDACTED] SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED

PAGE FOUR OS6T 0118 [REDACTED]

(5) ARTY SUPPORT: ARTY ILLUM ALT  
DELIVERY MEANS.

6. (S) PREP FIRES: NONE.

(7) DIRLNAUTH: ALCON

4. (S) ADJ AND LOGISTICS: REF B. NO CHANGE

5. (S) COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC

REF A. NO CHANGE

B. THIS IS NOT ILLUM OPN. PRIMARY MEANS ILLUM

PYROTECHNICS: AIR DELIVERED PARACHUTE FLARE. ALT DEL: [REDACTED]

ANNEX A (AIR SUPPORT) (S)

1. (S) PRESTAGE LZ 412 1730H TO MCAF MARBLE MTN.

2. (S) FOLLOWING A/C UTILIZED:

A. TRANSPORT HELOS : 11 CH-46D OR 14 CH-46A

B. GUNSHIPS : 4 UH1E'S

C. FIXED WING : 1 FLT

D. MED EVAC : 1 STD

E. C&amp;C : 1 UH1E

F. ILLUM : 1 C-117 OR C-130

3. (S) CORDON EMPLACED ONE LIFT UTILIZING LZ'S APPROVED HAC (A).

4. (S) LANDING AREA ILLUM ON CALL HAC (A).

PAGE FIVE OS6T 0118 [REDACTED]

5. (S) GUNSHIPS AND FW FIRE ONLY WHEN FIRED UPON.

6. (S) FRIENDLY POS OUTSIDE CORDON AT:

BT045630

BT042621

BT066623

7. (S); TRANSPORT HELOS LAND HEADING WEST IN TRAIL.

8. (S) ALT LZ (IF ABORTED PRIMARY LANDING AREA) CLEARED AREA BT033648

GP-4

BT

TOB:191120Z/T T-DIV 1/1/CON -11P/1-1/SUB

COU R-2/1 3/1

ZNY 55555

O P 270900Z JAN 69

FM FIRST MAR

TO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)

INFO CG FIRST MAR DIV

BT

FRAG 0 007 - 69 (S)

A. OP 0 314-68 (S)

B. ADMIN 0 314-68 (C)

1. (S) SITUATION

A. ENEMY

(1) REF A. CURRENT INTSUMS AND PERINTSUMS

(2) VILLAGE OF TRA LO (CENTER OF MASS BT 084683)

LOCATED ALONG MAIN ENEMY INFILTRATION RTE, ALSO MAY CONTAIN SUPPLY CACHES.

B. FRIENDLY

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE.

(2) ONE PLT NATL PFF ASSIGNED FIRST MAR PERFORM SEARCH PORTION OF CORDON AND SEARCH OPN.

2. (S) MISSION. 1ST MAR CONJUNCTION W/HFF'S CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH VILLAGE OF TRA LO (CENTER OF MASS BT 084683) TO FIND, FIX,

PAGE TWO 056T 0167

CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL AND INSTALLATIONS / FORTIFICATIONS

3. (S) EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPNS. ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR FIRST MAR W/TWO CO

(REIN) IN CONJUNCTION W/ONE PLT PFF'S CORDON AND SEARCH VILLAGE OF

TRA LO (CENTER OF MASS BT 084683) TO FIND FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR

DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL AND INSTALLATIONS / FORTIFICATIONS.

1ST BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

(2) ASSUME OPCON ONE CO 1ST BN 1ST MAR AT 271400H JAN 69

(3) ON D-DAY, AT H-HOUR ESTABLISH CORDON AROUND VILLAGE

OF TRA LO (CENTER OF MASS BT 084683) W/TWO COMPANIES (REIN). AT

FIRST LIGHT CONDUCT SEARCH OF VILLAGE IN CONJUNCTION WITH PLATOON PFF'S

TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL

AND INSTALLATIONS / FORTIFICATIONS.

C. 15 BN 1ST MAR

(1) AT 271400H JAN 69 CHOP ONE CO 2D BN

1ST MAR.

(2) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION

1ST BN 1ST MAR

1ST BN 1ST MAR

111 MAF 210077 (3/68)

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PAGE THREE CS6T 0167

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) D-DAY: 28 JAN 69

(2) H-HOUR: 0500 (CORDON EST)

(3) DURATION: TWO DAYS

(4) DIRLNAUTH: ALCON

4. (S) ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

A. REF B. NO CHG.

5. CO C, 1ST TK BN PROVIDES TK DOZER FOR DETAILED SEARCH  
OF HILL 10 (BT087678) IN VDC TRA LO.

5. (S) COMMAND AND COMM-ELECT

A. REF A. NO CHG.

GP-4

BT

T OD-27 0910/TT/CON -1-97 AV-1/CR W/DIV -1/1

2/1-KY -8

270915Z/COUR/3/1

~~SECRET~~

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OP 281050Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
INFO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
BT

FRAG 0 008-69 (S)  
A. OP 0 314-68 (S)  
B. ADMIN 0 314-68 (C)  
1. (S) SITUATION.

A. ENEMY.

(1) REF A. CURRENT INTSUMS AND PERINTSUMS

B. FRIENDLY

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE.

(2) 51ST REGT CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN DODGE CITY.

2. (S) MISSION. 1ST MAR CONDUCT LIMITED CMB PATROL  
OPNS NE CORNER DODGE CITY AREA TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE  
AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL AND INSTAL-  
LATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO OS6T 0173

A. CONCEPT OF OPNS. ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR FIRST MAR  
W/ONE CO MOVE BY FOOT TO NE CORNER DODGE CITY AND  
COMMENCE LIMITED CMB PATROL OPNS TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE  
AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL AND INSTAL-  
LATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

B. 2ND BN 1ST MAR

(1) TERMINATE CHOP OF CO "D" 1ST BN, 1ST MAR  
EFF 281500H JAN 69.

(2) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

C. 1ST BN 1ST MAR

(1) ASSUME OPCON CO "D" EFF 281500H JAN 69.

(2) ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR WITH ONE CO, CONDUCT  
LIMITED CMB PATROL OPNS NE CORNER DODGE CITY TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/  
OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL, AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICA-  
TIONS.

(3) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

D. 3RD BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) D-DAY: 29 JAN 69

PAGE THREE OS6T 0173

(2) H-HOUR: 0800H

(3) DURATION: 3-4 DAYS

4. (S) ADMIN-LOG

(1) REF B. NO CHANGE.

5. (C) COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT

TOD: DIV-1/1-2/1-281130Z JAN 69/EE/CCN#173/W-2/TW

TOD: 3/1-281200Z JAN 69/COURIER

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FLC 2100/4 (1/69)

~~SECRET~~

O P 281045Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
INFO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
BT

FRAG U 009-69 (S)

A. OP 0 314-68 (S)

B. ADMIN 0 314-68 (C)

1. (S) SITUATION

A. REF A NO CHANGE

B. SOUTHERN SECTOR DEFENSE COMMAND USMC RIFLE CO 521ST RF CO CONDUCT OPNS W/1ST MAR IN 3/1 TAOR.

2. (S) MISSION. 1ST MAR CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION AND CONDUCT BLOCK AND SEARCH OPNS IN YE NE (4) AND LA BONG (1) TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL, AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

A. ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR 1ST MAR W/ONE CO (REIN) IN CONJUNCTION WITH USMC AND RF ELEMENTS OF DANANG SOUTHERN SECTOR DEFENSE COMMAND CONDUCT BLOCK AND SEARCH OPN OF YE NE (4) AT 972682 AND LA BONG (1) AT 970670 TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL,

PAGE TWO 056T 0172 [REDACTED]  
AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

B. THIRD BN FIRST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION

(2) ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR, WITH ONE CO (REIN) IN CONJUNCTION W/USMC RIFLE CO, AND RF CO OF DANANG SSC, CONDUCT BLOCK AND SEARCH OF YE NE (4) AT 972682 AND LA BONG (1) AT 970670 TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES, MATERIEL, INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

C. FIRST BN FIRST MAR

SECOND BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) D-DAY: 29 JAN 69

(2) H-HOUR: 0800H

(3) DURATION: ONE DAY

(4) NO FIRE LINE AND FPOA: 67 GL.

(5) DIRLNAUTH: ALCON

4. (S) ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

(1) REF B. NO CHANGE

5. (S) COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC

PAGE THREE 056T 0172 [REDACTED]

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE

GM-4

BT

TO: DIV-1/1-2/1-281145Z JAN 69/TF/COM#172/V-2/TFW

100:3/1-281200Z JAN 69/COURIER

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FLC 2100/4 (1/68)

~~SECRET~~

ZNY SSSSS  
 O P 300730Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 INFO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 BT

FRAG 0 010-69 (S)  
 A. OP 0 314-68 (S)  
 B. ADMIN 0 314-68 (C)  
 1. (S) SITUATION  
 A. ENEMY.

(1) REF A. CURRENT INTSUMS AND PERINTSUMS.  
 B. FRIENDLY.

(1) REF A. NO CHANGE.

2. (S) MISSION. FIRST MAR W/TWO VONDUCT CORDON AND  
 SEARCH CAM SA (1) TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY EN  
 FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ON D-DAY, AT H-HOUR, FIRST MAR  
 W/TWO CO'S AND GROUP, EST CORDON VILLAGE CAM SA (1) VIC

PAGE TWO CS6T 0178

GS BT 0864. AT FIRST LIGHT COMMENCE SEARCH VILLAGE TO FIND,  
 FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, AND  
 INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

B. 2D BN 1ST MAR.

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

(2) ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR W/TWO CO'S AND CMD GROUP EST  
 CORDON VILLAGE CAM SA (1) VICINITY GS BT 0864. AT FIRST LIGHT  
 COMMENCE SEARCH VILLAGE TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY  
 EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, AND INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

C. 1ST BN 1ST MAR

3RD BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

D. COORD 1MSTR

(1) D-DAY: 31 JAN 69

(2) H-HOUR: 0200H

(3) DURATION: 1 DAY

4. (S) ADMIN AND LOG

A. REF B NO CHANGE.

5. (S) COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC

A. REF A NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT

TOD:300815Z/TT/DIV-1/1-2/1/CON:178/1-2/TES

TOD:300815Z/COUR/3/1

2 of 8

~~SECRET~~

ZNY SSSSS

O P 300800Z JAN 69

FM FIRST MAR

TO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)

INFO CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

S

FRAG 0 011-69 (S)

A. OP 0 314-68 (S)

B. ADMIN 0 314-68 (C)

1. (S) SITUATION.

A. ENEMY

(1) REF A.

(2) ANNEX A: SV INTELL RPT (ISSUE SEP TO 1ST BN 1ST MAR)

B. FRIENDLY

(1) REF A NO CHANGE.

(2) PRU TEAM ATTCHD TO 1ST MARINES TO CONDUCT APPROPRIATE MISSIONS WITHIN TAOR.

2. (S) MISSION. FIRST MAR CONDUCT TWO PHASE CORDON AND SEARCH OPN VIC AN TU (1) - THANH QUIT (1) AREA (PHASE I) AND VIEM TAY (1) AREA (PHASE II) TO UNCOVER SUSPECTED ENEMY CACHES AND UKK

1 PAGE TWO QS6T 0179 S

INSTALLATIONS IN CONJ W/PRU TM QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AND TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES.

3. (S) EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

(1) PHASE I: ON D-DAY AT H-HOIR 1ST MARINES WITH ELEMENTS OF TWO COMPANIES, IN CONJUNCTION WITH PRU TM CORDONS AREA VIC OF AN TU (2) - THANH QUIT (1) CENTER MASS BT023625. AT FIRST LIGHT COMMENCES DETAILED, DELIBERATE SEARCH OF CORDONED AREA TO UNCOVER EN CACHES AND INSTALLATIONS, AND TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES.

(2) PHASE II: ON D PLUS 1 AT H-HOIR 1ST MARINES WITH PHASE I FORCES CORDON VIEM TAY (1). AT FIRST LIGHT COMMENCE DETAILED, DELIBERATE SEARCH OF CORDONED AREA TO UNCOVER EN CACHES AND INSTALLATIONS, AND TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES.

B. FIRST BN, FIRST MAR

(1) CONDUCT TWO PHASE CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATION IN VIC OF AN TU (1) - THANH QUIT (1) AREA (PHASE I) AND IN VIEM TAY (1) (PHASE II), TO UNCOVER SUSPECTED EN CACHES AND INSTALLATIONS AND TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES. (SEE CONCEPT OF OPS)

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C. 2D BN 1ST MAR

3D BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) D-DAY: 31 JAN 68

(2) H-HOUR: 0400 (PHASE I)

0400 (PHASE II)

(3) DURATION: 2 DAYS

(4) OPERATING FORCES CONDUCT NORMAL NIGHT ACTIVITIES BETWEEN PHASES I AND II OF THIS OPERATION.

4. (S) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

(1) REF B NO CHANGE.

5. (S) COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC

(1) REF A NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT

TOD:300900Z/T T/DIV-1/1-2/1/CCN:179/1-1/TFS

TOD:300915Z/COU R/3/1

~~SECRET~~

ZNY SSSSS  
O P 301030Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)

REQ REL

FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
TO SOUTHERN SECTOR DEFENSE COMMAND  
INFO CO, SEVENTH MAR  
CO, 10 BN SEVENTH MAR  
BT

S [REDACTED]  
FRAG 0 012-69 (S)  
A. OP 0 311-68 (S)  
B. ADMIN 0 314-68 (C)  
1. (S) SITUATION  
A. ENEMY. REF A NO CHAN  
B. FRIENDLY  
(1) REF A.

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PAGE TWO 0601 0182 [REDACTED]  
(2) DANANG SDC SEC DEF CMD PARTICIPATES IN OPERATIONS  
WITH 1ST MARINES.

2. (S) MISSION. ON D-DAY, AT H-HOJR 1ST MAR W/ONE CO (REIN)  
IN CONJUNCTION W/ONE USMC CO 521ST R.F. COMPANY (ARVN) OF  
DANANG SDC. CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH VILLAGE PHONG LE (1) TO  
FIND, FIX, CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL,  
INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPN. ON D-DAY AT H-HOJR, 1ST MAR W/ONE CO  
(REIN) IN CONJUNCTION USMC CO DANANG SDC EST CORDON VILL PHONG  
LE (1) AT 995698. CONDUCT SEARCH INSIDE CORDON W/ONE PLT USMC  
IN CONJUNCTION W/521ST R.F. COMPANY (ARVN) TO FIND, FIX, CAP-  
TURE, AND /OR DESTROY EN FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, INSTALLATIONS /  
FORTIFICATIONS.

B. 3D BN 1ST MAR

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

(2) ON D-DAY AT H-HOJR W/ONE CO (REIN) IN CONJUNCTION  
USMC CO DANANG SDC EST CORDON VILL PHONG LE (1) AT 995698.  
CONDUCT SEARCH INSIDE CORDON W/ONE PLT USMC IN CONJUNCTION  
W/521ST RF CO (ARVN) TO FIND, FIX, CAPTURE, AND/OR DESTROY

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE THREE OSIT 0182 [REDACTED]  
FORCES, CACHES, MATERIAL, INSTALLATIONS/FORTIFICATIONS.  
C. 1ST BN 1ST MAR  
2ND BN 1ST MAR  
(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.  
D. COORD INSTR  
(1) D-DAY: 31 JAN 69  
(2) H-HOUR: 0730H  
(3) DURATION: 9.3 S-6  
(4) DIRLNAUTH: ALCON  
4. (S) ADMIN LOG. REF B. NO CHANGE.  
5. (S) COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC. REF A. NO CHANGE.  
GP-4  
BT

TOD:301100Z/TT/DIV-1/1-2/1/CCN:182/A"-2/TFS  
TOD:301130Z/COUR/3/1

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 011500Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

SIT REP 010001H - 012410H JAN 69 (C)  
 1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE  
 2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE  
 3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE  
 4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE  
 5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.  
 A. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. 1ST MARBONS (REIN)  
 (1) 010945H, A/1/1 SOD CMB AT 984612 DETAINED FOUR VN

ATTEMPTING EXUDE UNIT  
 (2) 011000H, A/1/1 SOD CMB PT008117 DETAINED ONE VN W/ONI.D.  
 (3) 011130H, L/3/1, SOD CM AT 966636 DETAINED ONE VN AS VC  
 SUSPECT.  
 (4) 011204H, 2/1 S-2 SOD CMB PT071703 VILLAGE CHIEF IM-  
 FORMED UNIT OF FOUR VC SUSPECTS IN NUI KIM SON. DETAINED ONE VC  
 SUSPECT.

PAGE TWO 006T 006  
 (5) 011525H, C/1/1 SOD CMB PT044664 MARINE TRIPPED SFD,  
 M-26 GRENADE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EMER. EVAC.). MEDEVAC COMPLETED 1545H.  
 (6) 011540H, C/1/1 SOD CMB PT044664 MARINE TRIPPED SFD

UNKNOWN TYPE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EVAC.).

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE

7. (C) RECAP OF PN UPMS

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D	LIST	SCOUT
	FT.	SOD	PLAT	BT	SOD	PLAT	CO	PST	SNIPER
1/1D	3	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	4
N	3	12	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
2/1D	0	11	1	0	1	0	0	8	3
N	0	14	2	0	13	0	0	9	3
3/1D	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
N	2	7	0	2	7	0	0	12	0

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROV/CORD	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/AT984612	010945H	SOD/CMB	0	4	US
QUANGNAM/PT008617	011000H	SOD/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT966636	011130H	SOD/CMB	0	0	US
QUANGNAM/PT076703	011204H	SOD/CMB	0	1	US

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PAGE THREE OS6T 706 C [REDACTED]

QUANGNAM/RT044663 011525H SQD/CMP 1 0 VC

QUANGNAM/RT044664 011540H SQD/CMP 1 0 VC

9- (C) UNIT LOCATION: NO CHANGE

10- (C) MONTHLY RECAP OF RESULTS/CASUALTIES BY BATTALION  
UNIT TOT DAY NIGHT KIA MIA MIA KIA PW IWC/CWCS

[REDACTED] NN VC/NVA

1/1 95 72 23 5 38 0 64 9/0 14/4

2/1 121 65 56 6 26 0 19 0/0 3/0

3/1 5 1 4 2 17 0 5 1/0 5/0

GP-4

RT

TOD/TT/011615Z/CCN: -006/W-2/SKE

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 021435Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO ZFN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 RT

SIT REP 020000H - 022400H JAN 69 (C)  
 1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE  
 2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE

3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE  
 4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE  
 5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. HEADQUARTERS. 1ST MARINES (REIN)

(1) 020130H, PLT SEC (CROWSNEST) (VIA 2/1) BT069705  
 SIGHTED FOUR RKTS BEING FIRED FROM VIC PT054669. FIRED 32 RNDOS  
 105KR. OBSERVED ONE SECONDARY EXPLOSION.  
 (2) 020430H, 2A1 BT066674 TANK STRUCK CDD (30-40 LB). 9  
 RESULTS. ONE WIA (MINOR). ONE HEAVILY DAMAGED TANK.  
 (3) 020800H, D/1/1 SOD CMB BT019637 MARINE  
 TRIPPED SFD, PINEAPPLE GRENADE RIGGED W/TRIP WIRE ON GATE.

PAGE TWO 056T 020945H  
 RESULTS. ONE WIA (MINOR).  
 (4) 020945H, C/1/1 SOD CMB BT040652 DETAINED 16 VN

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IN AREA TO BE CLEARED.

(5) 021000H, 2/1 S-2 75070676 VILLAGE CHIEF NUI  
 KIM SON POINTED OUT ONE VC SUSPECT. RESULTS, ONE DETAINEE  
 TAKEN TO 2/1 ITT.  
 (6) 021005H, H/2/1 PLT CMB BT079659 MARINE TRIPPED

SFD, UNKNOWN TYPE. RESULTS, TWO WIA (EVAC).  
 (7) 021500H, C/1/1 PLT SEC BT030646 ARVN TRUCK DETONATED  
 MINE. FOUR TO FIVE RATION CANS W/C-4. RESULTS, ONE ARVN KIA,

TWO ARVN WIA (EVAC). ONE USMC WIA (MINOR).  
 (8) 021515H, C/1/1 SOD CMB BT048647 MARINE TRIPPED  
 SFD, M-26 GRENADE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EVAC).  
 (9) 021740H, C/1/1 PLT CMB BT043663 DETAINED FOUR VN  
 SEVERAL SFDs.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE  
 7. (C) RECAP OF RN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS	AMRUSHES	S&D	LIST	SCOUT			
FT	SOD	PLAT	FT	SOD	PLAT	CU	POST	SNIPER
1/1 D	3	11	2	0	0	0	0	4

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PAGE THREE OS6T 0

N	3	8	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
2/1	0	14	1	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	0	16	2	0	14	0	0	9	3
3/1	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
N	2	7	0	2	7	0	0	12	0

## 8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE/CORDINATE	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/PT066674	020430H	- /TK	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/PT019637	020800H	SOD/CMR	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/PT040652	020945H	SOD/CMR	0	16	US
QUANGNAM/PT070676	021000H	FT/S-2	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/PT079659	021005H	PLT/CMR	2	0	VC
QUANGNAM/PT080646	021500H	PLT/SEC	4	0	VC
QUANGNAM/PT048647	021515H	SOD/CMR	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/PT043663	021740H	PII/CMR	0	4	US

## 9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

1/3/1: AT950641

GP-4

RT

TOD: DIV, 1/1, 2/1(TT)/021615Z(CON) 009/NH/1-1  
 3/1, HQ00/0001/021928Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZNY CCCCC  
O P 031545Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
BT

SIT REP 03001H - 032400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE
2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE
4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. 1ST MARINES (REFIN)

(1) 031035H. F/2/1 CO SEC BT 067685 DETAINED ONE VN  
W/O ID.

(2) 031110H. C/1/1 PLT CMB BT 054654 SEARCHED HUTS,  
FOUND 19 VN 300 LBS POTATOES, 1500 LBS RICE. DETAINED 19 VN  
DESTROYED HUTS POTATOES RICE.

(3) 031300H. 3/1 SPEC ACT AT978688 FOUND TUNNELS CON-  
TAINING 40 LBS OF RICE, VN CLOTHING. WHILE RETURNING SFD TRIPPED  
RESULTS. ONE USMC KIA. (EVAC) THREE PF KIA (EVAC) ONE VILLAGE

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO 056T  
CHIEF WIA (EVAC).

(4) 031410H. H/2/1 SOD CMB VIC BT 082648 RECEIVED A/W,  
S/A FIRE F/EST FOUR VC. RETURNED FIRE W/M79, S/A. SEARCHED  
AREA W/NEG ASSESSMENT. RESULTS, THREE WIA (EVAC).

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE

7. (C) RECAP OF RM OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS				AMBUSHES		S&D		LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SOD	PLAT	FT	SOD	PLAT	CO	POST		
1/1 D	3	13	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	
N	3	7	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	
2/1 D	0	12	2	0	0	0	0	8	3	
N	0	10	3	0	7	0	0	11	3	
3/1 D	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	
N	2	9	0	2	9	0	0	12	0	

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE/CORDONATE	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BT067685	031035H	CO/SEC	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT054654	031110H	PLT/CMB	0	19	US
QUANGNAM/AT978688	031300H	SOD/SPEC ACT	5	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT082648	031410H	SOD/CMB	3	0	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

M/3/1: BT015628

K/2/1: AT992678

GP-4

BT

TOD/TT/DIV, 1/1. 2/1-031630Z/CCN: 14/RP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(cc) \*

ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 041450Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

5-3  
 041450

STT REP 040001-042400 JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE.
4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

DECLASSIFIED

6. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. 1ST MARINES (REFIN)

(1) (LATE REPORT) 030800H, C/1/1 CO/CLK OP VIC PT054654 DETAINED 15 VN, DESTROYED SEVEN HUTS, CLEARED 200 METER AREA USING TANKS, FLAME, EXPLOSIVES.

(2) (LATE REPORT) 032730H, C/1/1 PLT CMB BT052018 DETAINED 23 VN W/O I.D.

(3) (LATE REPORT) 032330H, 1/15-5 TM VIC BT024637 RECEIVED S/A FIRE, GRENADES. REACTION FORCE ESCORTED TM TO CP. RESULTS, ONE VIA (MINOR).

PAGE TWO OSST

(4) 041355H, C/1/1 SGT SEC BT055649 SPOTTED TWO VC ON TRAIL. FIRED S/A, M79. RESULTS, ONE VC KIA.

(5) 041100H, M&S 3/1 SPEC AT AT985679 DETAINED ONE VN W/QUESTIONABLE I.D.

(6) 041355H, C/1/1 PLT CMB VIC BT056649 OBSERVED VN RUNNING

FM UNIT, FIRED S/A, M79 W/NEG RESULTS. M79 RND MALFUNCTION RESULTED ONE USMC WIA (MINOR).

(7) 041500H, C/1/1 PLT CMB BT033649 DETAINED ONE VN QUESTIONABLE I.D.

(8) 041510H, A/1/1 PLT CMP VIC PT023600 RECEIVED RY A/W FIRE

FM ACROSS RIVER, RETURNED FIRE WITH S/A, A/W, ARTY. RESULTS, ONE USMC VIA (EVAC), ONE USMC (MINOR), TWO VC KIA (BNR).

(9) 041515H, 1/3/1 SQD CMB VIC AT056636 RECEIVED S/A FIRE FM TWO VC. RETURNED FIRE W/ARTY, 81MM. WHILE CHECKING AREA RECEIVED TWO RND HORROR, S/A. RESULTS, TWO USMC WIA (EVAC).

(10) 041535H, TMT, 3D ITT VIC PT031644 DETAINED ONE VN FOUND W/20 BTL PENICILLIN, VITAMINS, DRY FOOD, ALCOHOL.

(11) 041720H, 1/3/1 SQD CMB AT068639 DETAINED ONE VN W/QUESTIONABLE I.D.

(12) 041800H, A/1/1 PLT SEC VIC PT019600 OBSERVED SIX VC. TOOK UNDER FIRE WITH S/A. RESULTS, ONE VC KIA (BNR).

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PAGE THREE OS6T

(13) 041940H, C/1/1 PLT SEC VIC PT 040665 RECEIVED ONE B-40 RND, S/A. RETURNED FIRE W/ARTY. NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT. RESULTS, ONE WIA (MINOR).

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE.

7. (C) RECAP OF FM OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D	LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SQD	PLAT	FT	SQD	PLAT	CO	POST	SNIPER
1/1 D	3	13	2	0	0	0	2	0	4
N	3	10	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2/1 D	0	12	1	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	0	16	2	0	14	0	0	5	3
3/1 D	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
N	2	9	0	2	13	0	0	12	0

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROV/CORD	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FFLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BT054654	030800H	CO/CIF OP	0	19	US
QUANGNAM/BT032048	031730H	PLT/CMB	0	23	US
QUANGNAM/BT024637	032330H	TM/S-5	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT056649	040305H	SQD/SEC	0	1	VS
QUANGNAM/AT985679	041100H	CO/SPEC ACT	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT056649	041355H	PLT/CMB	1	0	US

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE FOUR OS6T

QUANGNAM/BT033649	041500H	PLT/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT023600	041510H	PLT/CMB	2	2	US
QUANGNAM/AT956636	041515	SQD/CMB	2	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT031644	041535H	TM/ITI	0	1	US

QUANGNAM/AT968635	041720H	SQD/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT019625	041800H	PLT/SEC	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT040665	041940H	PLT/SEC	1	0	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE. EXCEPT:

A/1/1: BT017604

M/3/1: BT000612

GP-24

BT TOB-041650Z/TT/CON 18/JAJ

1/1-2/1

COUR-3/1-HQ CO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(cc)\*

DECLASSIFIED

R 5-3  
051500

ZNY CCCCC  
O P 051500Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
INFO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
BT

SIT REP 050001H - 052400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE
2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE
4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS
- A. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. 1ST MARINES (REIN)

1. 041515H (FOLLOW UP); L/3/1 SQD CMB VIC A1956636 ONE  
USMC KIA (EVAC) PREVIOUSLY REPORTED; DOW DURING EVAC. DELETE  
ONE USMC KIA (EVAC); ADD ONE USMC KIA (DOW).

2. 051030H; A/1/1 & RECON CO (51ST ARVN) CUMB CO VIC BT 010605 OBSERVED  
THREE NVA. FIRED ARTY. RESULTS; THREE NVA KIA; FOUR PACKS; MICS  
DOCUMENTS.

3. 051150H; A/1/1 & RECON CO (51ST ARVN) CUMB CO VIC BT 022600  
RECEIVED HVY A/W; MORTAR FIRE. RETURNED FIRE W/ORGANIC WEPS; ARTY.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO CS61 [REDACTED]  
 RESULTS, ONE USMC KIA, FOUR USMC WIA, (EVAC), ONE ARVN WIA (EVAC)  
 SIX VC KIA (BNR).

4. 051255H, 1/3/1 PLAT SEC AT 990642 DETAINED ONE VN TURNING  
 IN SUSPICIOUS QUANTITIES MUNITIONS.

5. 051415H, 1/3/1 SOD CMB AT 995645 MARINE DETONATED SFD,

81MM RND. RESULTS, TWO WIA (EVAC).

6. 051630H, 3RD ITT BT022644 DETAINED FOUR VN RESULT OF  
 INTERROGATION CD.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE

7. (L) RECAP OF BN OPNS

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D	LIST	SCOUT	DECLASSIFIED
	FT	SOD	PLAT	FT	SOD	PLAT	CU	FUST	SNIPER	
1/1D	3	12	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	
N	3	5	0	0	5	0	1	0	0	
2/1D	0	13	2	0	0	0	0	8	3	
N	0	15	3	0	11	0	0	8	3	
3/1D	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	
N	2	7	0	2	7	0	0	12	00	

8. MSMALE UNIT CONTACTS

PROVINCE/CORDNATE	DTC	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	FNLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/AT956636	041515H	SOD/CMB	FOLLOW-UP	NO	CHANGE
QUANGNAM/BT010605	051030H	COMBCCO/CMB	0	3	US
QUANGNAM/BT022600	051150H	COMBCCO/CMB	6	6	US
QUANGNAM/AT990/42	051255H	PLT/SEC	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT995645	051415H	SOD/CMB	2	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT 032644	051630H	-/ITT	0	4	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT

A/1/1: PT005605

M/2/1: BT02656

GP-4

75

TOD: 051520Z/TT/CON-22/DIV/1/1-2/1/U-1/CBW  
 051525Z/COUR/3/1/HQ CO

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(cc)\*

DECLASSIFIED

RS-3  
061430

ZNY CCCCC  
O P 061400Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)

RT

O

SIT REP 060001H - 062400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE.
4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.
7. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. 1ST MARINES (REIN)
- (1) (LATE REPORT) 052145H. H/2/1 CO PLOCK VIC BT

098654 RECEIVED APPROX SEVEN RNDSS/A. TWO M79 RNDSS. RETURNED  
FIRE W/M79, M26 GRENADES. RESULTS, TWO WIA (EVAC).  
(2) 061045H. A/1/1 SOD CMP BT 066008 MARINE TRIPPED  
SFD, M26 GRENADE RIGGED W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS, TWO WIA (EVAC).  
(3) 061300H. D/1/1 SOD CMP BT 035663 MARINE TRIPPED  
SFD. M26 GRENADE RIGGED W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EVAC).

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO OS6T [REDACTED]

(4) 061715H, A/1/1 PLT CMB VIC AT 996598 FOUND CO BIVOUAC AREA. SPOTTED 30 NVA, ENGAGED WITH S/A; ALSO SPOTTED APPROX 120 NVA FURTHER SOUTH, CALLED ARTY MISSION. RESULTS, THREE NVA KIA, FIVE NVA KEA.

(5) 061940H, F/2/1 PLT CMB BT 089676 MARINE DETONATED SFD, CHICOM GRENADE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EVAC).

(6) 061955H, F/2/1 PLT CMB VIC BT 090670 PPR RECEIVED ONE 60MM RND, 200 RND S/A. RETURNED FIRE WITH S/A, ARTY MISSION. RESULTS, ONE USMC WIA (MINOR).

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMRUSHES			S&D LIST SCOUT		
	FT	SQD	PLAT	FT	SQD	PLAT	CO	POST	SNIPER
1/1 D	3	14	3	0	0	0	2	0	1
N	3	11	1	0	3	0	1	5	0
2/1 D	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	0	9	0	0	6	0	0	9	0
3/1 D	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
N	1	9	0	1	9	0	0	12	0

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PAGE THREE OS6T [REDACTED]

PROVINCE/CORONATE	DIC	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	FNLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BT098654	052145H	CO/BLK	2	0	US
QUANGNAM/PT006628	061045H	SQD/CMP	2	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT035683	061300H	SQD/CMP	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/AT996598	061715H	PLT/CMP	0	8	US
QUANGNAM/PT089676	061940H	PLT/CMP	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT090670	061955H	PLT/CMP	1	0	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE.

GP-4 TOD 061600Z/TT/CON 26/JAN

BT 1/1-2/1-DIV

COOR-3/1-HQ CO

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZNY CCCCC  
O P 071450Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
INFO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
BT

SIT REP 070001H - 072400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE.
4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. 1ST MARINES (REIN)

(1) (LATE REPORT) 062000H, H/2/1 PLT CMB AT090653 RECEIVED ONE RND SNIPER FIRE. RETURNED FIRE WITH S/A. RESULTS, ONE USMC WIA (EVAC).

(2) 071100H, 3RD CIT VIC BT031648 DETAINED ONE VN PROBABLE DISTRICT LEVEL CADRE. DETAINEE SENT TO 1ST MAR POW COMPOUND.

(3) 071220H, A/1/1 PLT SWP. AT987606 MARINE TRIPPED SED, RATION CAN W/C-4 RIGGED W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS, TWO USMC WIA (EVAC).

PAGE TWO 056T  
ONE ARV WIA (EVAC), TWO USMC WIA (MINOR).

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE.
7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT PATROLS AMBUSES S&D LIST SCOUT

	FT	S&D	PLT	FT	S&D	PLT	CG	POST	SNIPER
1/1 D	2	10	1	0	0	0	2	0	2
N	3	1	0	0	8	0	1	0	0
2/1 D	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	0	12	0	0	10	0	0	5	3
3/1 D	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
N	0	10	0	0	10	0	0	12	0

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROV/CORD	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/AT090653	062000H	PLT/CMB	1	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT031648	071100H	IMPACT	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT987606	071220H	PLT/SWP	5	0	VC

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

A/1/1 BT 015628

GP-4

BT TOD/TT/DIV, 1/1, 2/1- 71600Z/CON:33/DOF

TOD/COUR/3/1-071620Z

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(CC)\*

R

S-3  
081430

EMY CCCCC  
 OF 081430Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

SIT REF 080001H - 082400H JAN 69 (C)  
 1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.  
 2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE.  
 3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE.  
 4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.  
 5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.  
 6. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. 1ST MARINES (REIN)  
 1. 081750H, H&S 3/1 SPECIAL ACT AT997663 DETAINED

DECLASSIFIED

ONE VN ON BLACK LIST.  
 6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE.  
 7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	S&D	LIST	SCOUT
1/1D	3	11	1	0	0
FT SQD	PLAT	FT SQD	PLAT	CO	POST
1/1D	3	11	1	0	0
2	0	2	0	0	2

PAGE TWO 056T 38 0  
 N 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 2/1 D 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 8 2  
 N 0 16 2 0 14 0 0 9 3  
 3/1D 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 0  
 N 1 14 0 1 19 0 0 12 0

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS  
 PROVINCE/CORDONATE DIG SIZE/TYPE EFLUSS ENLUSS INIT  
 QUANGNAM/1907663 081750H - 7SPEC AG1 0 1 US  
 9. (C) UNIT LOCATION. NO CHANGE  
 BT

TOD: DIV/1/1/2/1 (TT)/081800Z/CON: 038/NH/1-1  
 3/1, HQCO/COUR/082100Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZNY CCCCC  
 OP 091445Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

SIT REP 090001H - 092400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE.
4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.
6. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. 1ST MARINES (REIN)
- (1) 090027H, D/1/1 SQD CMB VIC PT020636 RECEIVED  
 FOUR RND S RPG, S/A. RETURNED FIRE WITH S/A, M79, TWO LAAW.  
 RESULTS, FOUR KIA (MINOR).
- (2) 090500H, E&H/2/1 C&S BT062661 SCREENED 408 IN.  
 RESULTS, FOUR VCI, ONE VCS.
- (3) 091430H, L/3/1 SQD CMB AT967657 DETAINED ONE VN  
 W/QUESTIONABLE ID.

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO 056T 43 C

6. (C) IMPACT OF [REDACTED] NEGATIVE.
7. (C) RECAP OF PN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMPUSHES			S&D CO	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPER
	FT	SQD	PLAT	FT	SQD	PLAT			
1/10	3	11	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
N	3	2	0	0	8	0		0	0
2/10	0	10	1	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	0	15	2	0	14	2	0	8	3
3/10	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
N	1	10	0	1	8	0	0	14	0

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE/CORDINATE	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BT020636	090027H SQD/CMB		4	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT062661	090500H 2 CO/C&S		0	5	US
QUANGNAM/067657	091430H SQD/CMB		0	1	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT /CON: 43/W-3/RH

TOD/TT/2/1, DIV, 091540Z/ 1/1 COUR:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) \*

R

ANY CCCCC  
 OP 101400Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO ZEN/ FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

S-3  
 101400

DECLASSIFIED

SIT REP 100001H-102400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
2. (C) SIGNIFICANT SMALL FEEBLESS CONTACTS. NEGATIVE.
3. (C) PLANS, SUMMARY. NEGATIVE.
4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.
- A. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. FIRST MARINES (REIN)

- (1) (LATE REPORT) 090530H, RECON INSERT AT 093607 OBSERVED 27 NVA. CALLED IN AIR STRIKE. RESULTS, 22 NVA KIA (AIR).
- (2) (LATE REPORT) 001000H, RECON INSERT AT 092604 ENGAGED 25 NVA. RESULTS, THREE USMC WIA (EVAC). ONE NVA KIA.
- (3) 100410H, H/2/1 PLT SEC BT060654 MARINE THREW M26 GRENADE AT SOUND BELIEVING TO BE ENEMY. RESULTS, THREE USMC WIA (EVAC).
- (4) 101025H, HXVXQ SQD CMB BT063653 RECEIVED 35 RND S A/W FIRE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO OS610

WITH S/A. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EVAC).

(5) 101130H, C/1/1 PLT CMB BT052653 DETAINED 17 VN IN FREE FIRE ZONE. ALSO FOUND 1/4 LP C-4, TRIP WIRE, ONE CC UNIFORM, ONE PONCHO LINER, MISC DOCUMENTS.

(6) 101415H, 3RD AMTRACS BT084684 DETAINED ONE VN W/ O ID.

(7) 101445H, 1ST AMTRACS BTPUYUFG DETAINED ONE VN DIGGING HOLE AROUND ROAD.

(8) 101530H, QXQ 11T BT015628 DETAINED ONE VN IN TRASH DUMP.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE.

7. (C) RECAP OF EN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D CO	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPER
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT			
1/1 D	0	14	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
M	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
1/1 D	1	7	1	1	0	0	0	8	3
N	1	13	2	1	11	2	0	9	3
3/1 D	1	10	0	0	0	0	1	5	0
N	3	11	0	0	11	0	0	12	0

DECLASSIFIED

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROV/CORD	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FKLOSS	FKLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/AT993607	090930H	TM/RECON	3	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT993604	091000H	TM/RECON	0	22	US
QUANGNAM/M/BT060654	100410H	PL1/SFC	3	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT085653	101025H	SQD/CMB	1	0	7
QUANGNAM/BT052653	101130H	PL1/CMB	0	17	US
QUANGNAM/BT084684	101405H	-/AMTRACS	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT076701	101445H	-/AMTRACS	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT015628	101530H	TM/ITT	0	0	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE.

GF-4

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 111430Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

(cc)\*

S-3  
 111730

SIT REP 110001H - 112400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
2. (C) SIGNIFICANT UNIT CONTACTS. NEGATIVE.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEGATIVE.
4. (C) SPECIAL UNIT OPERATIONS. NEGATIVE.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.
6. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. FIRST MARINES (REIN)

1. (LATE REPORT) 101200H, K/3/1 CO SEC AT987677 300  
 VN COLLECTED WITH SUPPORT FROM BN S-2 AND S-5, 59TH RF, 3RD IIT.  
 RESULTS, TEN DETAINEES.

2. (LATE REPORT) 102315H, H/2/1 PLT CMB BT063652 RECEIVED  
 ONE GRENADE. RETURNED FIRE WITH S/A. ONE CLAYMORE. CHECKED AREA W/  
 NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT. RESULTS, ONE MIA (EVAC).

3. 110730H, H/2/1 PLT CMB BT079659 SPOTTED THREE

PAGE TWO 0561 055 [REDACTED]  
 VC, ENGAGED WITH S/A. RESULTS, TEN PW.

4. 111050H, C/1/1 PLT CMB VIC BT066630 RECEIVED ONE B-40  
 RKT, S/A FROM TEN NVA. RETURNED FIRE WITH S/A, A/W, 90MM  
 SWEEP AREA. RESULTS, ONE NVA KIA, ONE NVA PW, ONE AK-47, ONE  
 SKS, TWO CHICOM GRENADES, 50LBS RICE.

5. 111230H H/2/1 PLT CMB BT085651 DETAINED THREE VN W/O

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES		S&D		LIST		SCOUT	
	FT	S&D	PLAT	CO	POST	SNIPER	CO	POST	SNIPER		
1/10	0	11	1	0	0	0	1	0	2		
N	0	1	0	0	9	0	1	0	0		
2/10	0	10	1	0	0	0	0	8	3		
N	0	14	2	0	11	2	0	0	3		
3/10	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	9	2		
N	3	15	0	7	19	0	0	12	2		

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROVINCE/CORDNATE	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FKLOSS	EMLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/AT987677	101200H	CO/SEC	0	10	US

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DECLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE GS61 55 [REDACTED]

QUANGNAM/BTC66352	102015H	PL1/CMB	1	US
QUANGNAM/BTC79650	110730H	PL1/CMB	2	US
QUANGNAM/BTC66630	111250H	PL1/CMB	2	US
QUANGNAM/BTC89651	111230H	PL1/CMB	3	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

H/2/1: B106981

K/3/1: A1952678

GP-4 TOD/T17 1/1 018 11 700Z

BT TOD/COVR/ 1/1 111715Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

O P 121440Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

DECLASSIFIED

121440

SIT REP 120021H-122400H JAN 69 (C)  
 1. (C) MAJOR OPS. NEG.  
 2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.  
 3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.  
 4. (C) SPL UNIT OPS. NEG.  
 5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.  
 A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REFIN)  
 (1) (LATE RPT) 111000H, D/1/1 PLT CMB VIC AT986606  
 REC RPG, M79 RND. RET FIRE, LAAN'S, M-79, 60MM MTR, S/A.  
 WEPT AREA W/NEG ASSESSMENT. RESULTS, TWO WIA (EVAC).  
 (2) (LATE RPT) 111300H, D/1/1 PLT CMB VIC AT987607  
 REC RPG, M79, S/A FIRE, RET FIRE, S/A. CHECKED AREA W/NEG  
 ASSESSMENT. RESULTS, THREE WIA (EVAC).  
 (3) (LATE RPT) 111415H, D/1/1 PLT CMB VIC AT 986606  
 REC RPG, S/A FIRE, RET FIRE, 60MM MTR, S/A. CHECKED AREA

PAGE TWO OS6T  
 W/NEG ASSESSMENT. RESULTS, TWO WIA (EVAC).  
 (4) (LATE RPT) 111600H, D/1/1 PLT CMB AT992598 MAR  
 TRIPPED SFD, UNK TYPE. RESULTS, TWO WIA (EVAC).  
 (5) (LATE RPT) 112030H, H/2/1 CO PLK VIC BT083643  
 REC APPROX 60 RND. S/A, FIVE RND. M-79, RET FIRE, S/A.  
 CHECKED AREA W/NEG ASSESSMENT. RESULTS, 9, 3 28- (MONOR).  
 (6) 120215H, G/2/1 FT/LP VIC BT065711 REC ONE HAND  
 GREN. ONE M79 RND. REACTIONARY FORCE CHECKED AREA W/NEG  
 ASSESSMENT. RESULTS, THREE WIA (EVAC). MEDEVAC COMPLETED  
 120245H  
 (7) 121350H, H/2/1 SDD CMB BT079649 DETAINED ONE VN  
 OBS UNIT CLOSELY.  
 (8) 121420H, C/1/1 PLT CMB BT032645 DETAINED ONE VN  
 W/FALSE ID.  
 6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE.  
 7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMPUSHES			S&D LIST SCOUT		
	FT	SDD	PLAT	FT	SDD	PLAT	CO	POST	SNIPER
1/1 D	3	9	3	0	0	0	2	0	2
N	3	12	0	0	3	0	1	3	0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE OS6T

2/1 D	0	8	1	0	0	0	0	10	3
N	0	10	2	0	8	0	0	10	3
3/1 D	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	5	2
N	3	16	0	20	0	0	12	2	

## 8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROVINCE/CORDINATE	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	EMLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/AT986606	111000H	PLT/CMB	0	P	US
QUANGNAM/AT987607	111300H	PLT/CMB	3	0	US
QUANGNAM/5986606	111415H	PLTCMB	2	0	US
QUANGNAM/AT992598	111600H	PLT/CMB	2	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT083643	112030H	CO/BLK	1	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT065711	120215H	FT/LP	3	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT079649	121350H	SQD/CMP	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT032645	121420H	PLT/CMB	0	1	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATION. NO CHANGE.

GP-4  
BT

TOD: DIV. 2/1 (TT)/122020Z/OCN: 063/NH/U-1  
1/1. /COUR/3/1/122120Z

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DE OS6T 0070 131410  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 131410Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO FIRST MAR(COIL)  
 2BT

DECLASSIFIED

5-3  
131410

SIT REP 130000H-132400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.
- A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)
- (1) 130930H, C/1/1 SOD CMB BTR 32649 DETAINED ONE VN W/O ID.
- (2) 131530H, H/2/1 PLT SEC VIC BTR 67644 REC APPROX 30 RND S/A FIRE.
- RET FIRE WITH S/A, M-79. CHECKED AREA. RESULTS, ONE VC KIA.
- (3) 131600H, E/2/1 SOD CMB BTR 57673 DETAINED ONE VN FOUND IN HOUSE W/700 LBS RICE.
6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEG.
7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

PAGE TWO OS6T 70

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D	LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SOD	PLT	FT	SOD	PLT	CU	POST	SNIPER
1/1D	3	9	5	0	0	0	2	0	2
N	3	12	0	0	2	0	1	2	0
2/1D	0	13	1	0	0	0	0	8	2
N	0	12	2	0	10	0	0	8	2
3/1D	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	9	2
N	3	14	0	3	18	0	0	12	2

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROV/CORD	DIG	SIZE/TYP	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BTR 2649	130930H	SOD/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BTR 67644	131530H	PLT/SEC	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BTR 57673	131600H	SOD/CMB	0	1	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT: D/1/1 AT 991584.

GP-4 TOD/TT/DIV 131700Z

BT

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DECLASSIFIED

ZNY CCCCC

O F 141415Z JAN 69 (C)

FM FIRST MAR

TO CG FIRST MAR DIV

INFO FIRST MAR (COLL)

BT

O

ST REP 140001Z 142400Z JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)

(1) (LATE REPORT) 131430H. AO OPERATING FOR 1ST MAR BT097642 ON TGT  
 ACQUISITION/VP MISSION SIGHTED ONE VC. AO W/M14 RIFLE TOOK VC  
 UNDER FIRE. RESULTS. ONE VC KIA (BMR).

(2) (LATE REPORT) 132105H. CAP 2-7-6 VIC BT082705 REC  
 S/A AND/V FIRE. RET FIRE WITH S/A. M79. CHECKED AREA.  
 RESULTS. ONE VC KIA. ONE M16.

(3) (LATE REPORT) 132339H. D/1/1 EO SWP VIC A1591585

1ST MAR DIV 2100/4 (9/67)

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PAGE TWO 056T 0075 [REDACTED]  
 REC EIGHT 82MM RND. CALLED ARTY MISSION. RESULTS. THREE  
 USMC WIA (EVAC). ONE ARVN WIA (EVAC).

(4) 140800H, P/1/1 PLT CMB AT998667 MAR TRIPPED SFD,  
 M26 RIGGED W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EVAC).

(5) 140830H, F/2/1 PLT CMP BT090660 ARVN TRIPPED SFD,  
 M26 GREN. RESULTS, ONE ARVN WIA (EVAC).

(6) 141023H, C/1/1 PLT CMB BT02647 DET ONE VN W/O ID.

(7) 141730H, D/1/1 CO SWP VIC AT983599 REC FIVE M79 RND.  
 /A F8RE EST THREE TO FIVE VC. SET FIRE W/ORGANIC WPNS. ARTY  
 MISSION. CHECK FIRE CAKED ONE TO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

GUNSHIPS CALLED IN. RESULTS, ONE USMC WIA (EVAC). ONE USMC WIA (MINOR)

ONE ARVN WIA (EVAC).

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEGATIVE.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS	AMPUSHES	S&D	LIST	SCOUT
T SQD	F PLAT	FT S&D	PLAT	CO POST	SNIPER
1/1D	3 12	1	0	0	2
N	0 2	0	4	8	0
2/1D	0 8	1	0	0	0
N	0 11	2	0	9	11
3/1D	0 9	0	0	0	12
N	3 11	0	3	18	0
					12

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE 056T 0075 [REDACTED]

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE/CORDNATE	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BT097642	131430H	-/AO	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT083705	132105H	-/CAP	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT991585	132330H	CO/SWP	4	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT998667	140800H	PLT/CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT090669	140830H	PLT/CMP	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT032647	141023H	PLT/CMP	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT983599	141730H	CO/SWP	3	0	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

F/2/1 BT02665

G/2/1 BT056710

GP-4

BT

TCD: DIV. 2/1, (TT)/CON: 075/NH/U-1/141700Z  
 1/1, 3/1 (CONR)/141720Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(CC)\*

DE OS6 T 0082 0151500  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 151500 Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRSH MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

S-3  
 151500

SIT REP 150000TEEEZELEH - 152400 H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

DECLASSIFIED

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)

1. (LATE REPORT) 142030 H, B/1/1 PLT CMB VIC AT999610 REC APPROX 30 RND S/A, TEN RND M-79. RET FIRE WITH S/A, ARTY, GUNSHIPS. RESULTS, ONE USMC KIA, TWO USMC WIA (EVAC).
2. (LATE RPT) 142200 H, D/1/1 CU SWP VIC AT983599 REC S/A FIRE, FIVE 82 MM RND. RET FIRE WITH S/A, 60MM MRS. CHECKED AREA W/NEG ASSESSMENTS. RESULTS, TWO ARMY WIA (EVAC).
3. 150400H, B/1/1 PLT CMB BT045658 MAR TRIPPED SFD, M-26

PAGE TWO OS6T

GREN. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EVAC).

4. 150800H, E&H/2/1 TWO CON C/ S VIC BT080650 REC S/A, ARMY, M-79 FIRE FM APPROX 15 VC. RET FIRE WITH S/A, ARMY, M-79, 60MM MTR, 81MM MTR, AGTY. RESULTS, TWO USMC KIA, FOUR USMC WIA (EVAC) EIGHT VC KIA, TWO PW (WIA (EVAC)).
5. 151000H, C/1/1 SQD CMB VIC BT05936 SPOTTED ONE VC IN TREELINE. REC 30 RND S/ A. RET FIRE WITH S/A, ARMY. CHECKED AREA. RESULTS, ONE VC KIA.
6. 151008 H, L/3/1 SQD CMB AT993632 DET ONE W BELIEVED ON BLACKLIST.
7. 151145 H, B/1/1 SQD CMB BT014606 MAR TRIPPED SFD, CHICOM GREN. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EVAC).
8. 151225H, C/1/1 SQD CMB BT032648 DET ONE W W/ O ID.
9. 151300 H, A/1/1 SQD CMB BT020636 DET TWO W W/ FALSE ID.
10. 151315H, B/1/1 PLT CMB VIC BT035667 REC S/ A FM EST TWO VC. RET FIRE, CHECKED AREA W/ NEG ASSESSMENTS. RESULTS, ONE WIA (MINOR).
11. 151315 H, E/2/1 CU SWP BT082645 FD ARMS CACHE, FIVE M-16, TWO SKS, ONE M-79, ONE FRENCH SMG, TWO AK-47, MISC WEB GEAR AND AMMO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE THREE OS610

12. 151315H (C) 2/1 TWO CO S&amp;C VIC BT080650 SWEEP W/ FLAME AND GUN TKS RESOLVED IN TEN VC KIA, SIX PW.

13. 151330H (C) 1/1 SQU CMB VIC BT062627 DET 64 W IN VILLAGE. SPOTTED SIX W LEAVING AREA, TOOK UNDER FIRE WITH S/A. CHECKED AREA. RESULTS, ONE VC KIA, 800 LBS RICE, FOUR LIVING BUNKERS. DESTROYED RICE, BUNKERS, DET REX 1/1 ITT.

14. 151610 H, 2/1 S-5 TM BT078654 MAX DET BOX MINE. RESULTS ONE WIA (EMER EVAC). MED EVAC COMPLETED 151625H.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER - NEG.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN UPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&C LIST		SCOUT
	FT	SQU	PLAT	FT	SQU	PLAT	CO	POST	SNIPER

1/1 D		12	1	0	0	0	2	0	2
N	3	12	0	0	5	0	1	4	0

2/1 D	0	10	1	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	1	10	2	1	10	0	0	9	3

3/1 D	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	9	2
N	3	15	0	0	19	0	0	12	2

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE FOUR OS610820

QUANGNAM/AT999610	142030H	PLT/CMB	3	0	US
QUANGNAM/AT01ET00	GRWWPP H	CO/SWP	2	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT045658	150400H	PLT/CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT080650	150800H	2 CO/C&S		6	10 US
QUANGNAM/BT 059636	151000H	SQU/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/A 993632	151008H	SQU/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT014606	151145H	SQU/CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT032648	151225H	SQU/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT020630	151300H	SQU/CMB	0	2	US
QUANGNAM/AT035035667	151315H	PLT/CMB	1	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT080650	151315H	2 CO/C&S	0	16	US
QUANGNAM/BT062627	151330H	SQU/CMB	0	65	US
QUANGNAM/BT078654	151610H	TH/S-5	1	0	VC

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS - NO CHANGE EAC-PTT/

D7121: BT015628

GP- 4

BT

TOD/TT/1/1 2/1-DIV-151700

TOD/COUR:/3/1-151720Z/CON: 704/V-2/JK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(CC)\*

DECLASSIFIED

KAEECS6T 0093 0161430  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 CP 161430Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 ET

S-3  
 161430

SIT REP 160001H - 162400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPS. NEG.
4. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HQ FIRST MAR (REIN)

- (1) (LATE REPORT) 152340H, G/2/1 PLT SEC VIC BT065713  
 REC S/A FIRE. RET FIRE WITH S/A. AREA CORDONED, SEARCHED  
 FIRST LIGHT. RESULTS, DETAINED EIGHT VCS ON BLACKLIST.
- (2) 161215H, M/3/1 CO SWP AT 984691 MAR TRIPPED SFD.  
 M26 GREN. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EMER EVAC). MEDEVAC COMP 161245H.
- (3) 161245H, E/2/1 SQD CMB BT 078649 SEARCHED AREA OF  
 PRE V CONTACT. RESULTS, FD THREE NVA /VC KIA BY S/A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO OS6TC

(4) 161849H, E 2/1 SQD CMB VIC BT 078641 REC A W FIRE.  
RET FIRE WITH S/A. SEARCHED AREA W/NEG ASSESSMENT. RESULTS,  
ONE WIA (E VAC).

(5) 161900H, CAP 4SQD CMB VIC AT 983679 SIX VC ENTERED  
HAMLET, KILLED ONE VN SEC POLICE. REACTION SQD SEARCHED AREA  
/NEG ASSESSMENT 81MM MTR FIRE PLACED ON PROB WITHDRAWAL RTE.  
RESULTS, ONE SEC POLICE KIA.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D	LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT	CO	POST	SNIPER
1/1 D	3	19	1	0	8	0	1	0	2
N	3	11	0	0	9	0	0	2	0
2/1 D	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
N	1	14	0	1	14	0	0	0	9
3/1 D	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
N	3	15	0	3	19	0	0	0	12

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE /CORDNATE	DTG	SIZE /TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
		PLT /SEC	0	8	US
QUANGNAM /BT 065713	152340H				

PAGE THREE OS6TC

QUANGNAM /AT	DTG	CO /SWP			
QUANGNAM /BT 078649	161215H	SQD /CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM /BT 078641	161245H	SQD /CMB	0	3	US
QUANGNAM /BT 078641	161849H	SQD /CMB	1	0	US
QUANGNAM /AT 983679	161900H	SQD /CMB	1	0	VC

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE.

EP-4 TOD/TT/DIV, 1/1, 2/1-161530Z/CON:93/DCF  
BT TOD/COUR/3/1-161545Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(cc)\*

ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 171400Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO ZEN/IRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

S-3  
 171400

SIT REF 170001H - 172401H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
- RM KC) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

DECLASSIFIED

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)

(1) 171010H, A 7/1 SQD CND BT009639 DET ONE VN W/O ID.

(2) 171745H, E 2/1 SQD CMB VIC BT082642 REC 50 RND

S/A. RET FIRE, S/A. M79. CHECKED AREA W/NEG ASSESSMENTS.

RESULTS, ONE WIA (MINOR)

6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT PATROLS AMBUSHES S&D LIST SCOUT

PAGE TWO 086010Z C

	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT	CO	POST	SN. PL.
1/10	3	11	2	0	0	0	1	0	2
N	3	11	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
2/10	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	10	3
N	0	11	0	0	10	0	0	8	3
3/10	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	9	2
N	2	16	0	2	20	0	0	12	2

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE / COORDINATE	DTG	SIZE / TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BT009639	171010H	SQD / CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT082642	171745H	SQD / CMB	1	0	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT

TOD: 171455Z(TT) / CON: 102/NH/W-1

DIV, 2/1(TT)/171435Z

1/1, 3/1(COUR)/171500Z

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) \*

DE 056T 0112 0181345  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 181345Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV

INFO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

DECLASSIFIED

S-3  
181345

SIT REP 180001H - 182400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPN. SNEG.
2. (C) STG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.
- A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)
- (1) (LATE REPORT) 172000H, CAP 2-5-3 BT035716 SPOTTED  
 THREE VC LVE HUT. TOOK UNDER FIRE WITH S/A. RESULTS, ONE VC  
 KIA.
- (2) 181554H, E 2/1 PLT SWP VIC BT094644 TWO VN CAPTURED  
 15 JAN LED UNIT TO CACHE. RESULTS, ONE SKS, ONE SOWET 7.62 MM  
 M1944 CARBINE. FOUR BAR MAG W/ RND, 250 LBS RICE.
6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG.

PAGE TWO 056T 0112

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D CO	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPER
	FT	S&D	PLAT	FT	S&D	PLAT			
1/1 D	3	12	4	0	0	0	1	0	2
N	3	14	0	0	4	0	0	3	0
2/1 D	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	11	3
N	0	12	0	0	11	0	0	14	3
3/1 D	2	6	2	0	0	0	1(-)	9	2
N	2	15	0	2	19	0	0	12	2

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE / CORDNATE	DTG	SIZE / TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM / BT035716	172000H	- / CAP	0	1	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT

TOD: DIV/1/1(TT)/CON: 112/NH/W-1  
 2/1, 3/1(COUR)/182155Z

1ST MARDIV 2100/4 (9/67)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(CC)\*

ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 191410Z JAN69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

S-3

91410

DECLASSIFIED

STT REF 190000H - 192400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLAN SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)

< (1) 191230H, HU 1/1 S-2 BT028651 DET THREE VN; TWO SUSPECTED BLACKLIST; ONE 150,000 P.S. FD MISC MED SUPPLIES IN HUT. RESULTS, THREE DET.

(2) 191500H, E 2/1, SQD CMB BT080647 DET NINE VN W/ QUESTIONABLE ID. FD ONE FRC-25 BTRY SET AS DETONATOR F/SMD.

PAGE TWO 0119

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEG.
7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT PATROLS AMBUSHES S&D LIST SCOUT

UNIT	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT	CO	POST	SNIPER
1/1D	3	11	2	0	0	0	1	0	2
N	3	9	0	0	2	0	0	2	0
2/1D	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	1	13	0	1	12	0	0	9	3
3/1D	2	9	0	0	0	0	0	9	2
N	3	16	1	3	20	1	1	12	2

8. (C) CONTACTS
- PROV/CORD DTG SIZE /TYPE FRLOSS ENLOSS INIT
- QUANGNAM/BT028651 191230H - INT 0 3 US
- QUANGNAM/BT080647 191500H SQD/CMB 0 9 US
9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS: NO CHANGE EXCEPT
- CO "C"; BT055646

GP-4

BT

T OD: DIV -1/1-2/1-191435Z JAN 69/TT/CON/119/AN-2/TPH  
 T OD: 3/1-191830 JAN 69/COU RIFR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 201500Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO ZEN FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

SITREP 200001H - 202400H JAN 69 (C)

DECLASSIFIED

S-3  
 201500

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
2. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS
- A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)
- (1) 201045H, C/A/1 SQD CMB BT 055635 DET ONE VN.
- (2) 201100H, F/2/1 SQD CMB BT 083690 MAN DET SFD, #26 GREN  
 RIGGED W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (ENER EVAC). REDE WAC  
 COMPLETED 1120H.
- (3) 201215H, E/2/1 CO SWP BT 078650 INTERROGATED 250 VC,  
 FD 50 BUNKERS. RESULTS, DET ONE VN, DESTROYED BUNKERS.
6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG.

PAGE TWO 056T

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	FT	SQD	PLAT	FT	SQD	PLAT	CO	LIST	SCOUT
								POST	SNIPER
1/ID 3	10	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
N 3	12	0	0	5	0	0	2	0	0
2/ID 0	9	0	0	0	0	0	8	3	3
N 1	11	0	1	11	0	0	8	3	3
3/ID 1	9	0	0	0	0	0	9	2	2
N 3	20	0	3	24	0	0	12	2	2

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE /CORDONATE	DTG	SIZE /TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM /BT 055635	201045H	SQD /CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM /BT 078650	201100H	SQD /CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM /BT 078650	201215H	CO SWP	0	1	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

M/3/1 AT 963653

GP-4

BT

TOD: DIV/1/1. 2/1(TT)/CCN :126 /N H/W-1  
 3/1(COU R)/201210Z

(CC)\*

O P 210445Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
INFO ZEN/FIRST MAJ (COL)  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

R  
5-3  
211445

212400H JAN 69 (C)  
1- (C) MAJOR OPS. NEG.  
2- (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG  
3- (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.  
4- (C) SPL UNIT OPS. NEG.  
5- (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.  
A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR. (REIN)  
1- (GATE RPT) 202230H. C 1/1 PLT CMB VIC BT058626  
SPL THREE VC ON TRAIL. ENGAGED WITH S/A, M26 GREN. RESULTS.  
THREE VI KIA. MED SUPPLIES.  
2- 200054H. A 1/1 PLT CMB BT004631 DETAINED ONE VN. /  
QUESTIONABLE ID.  
3- 21215H. E 2/1 PLT CMB BT093652 MAR TRIPPED SFO,  
BAT CAMP/BLASTING CAP. RESULTS. ONE WIA (MINOR).

PAGE TWO 056T  
211244H. L 3/1 PLT CMB BT973642 MAR DETONATED BOX MINE  
RESULTS. ONE WIA (FEMERAL). MEDEVAC COMPLETED 1244H.  
(C) 211044H. 2/1 RD SEC BT059690 EXPLOSION RPT BY  
OP 3. CHECKED BY RAT PATROL. GRADER DET 50 LB BOX MINE.  
RESULTS. TWO US. WIA (EVAC).  
(C) 211954H. G 2/1 PLT CMB BT065709 DETAINED TWO VN IN HUT WHERE  
LOCKER BOX. 1000 RND S/A AND MISC EQUIP FD.  
(C) 212145H. 4/51 ARVN VIC BT088675 OBS VC MOVEMENT. CALLED  
ARTY. RESULTS. 2 VC KIA (ARTY).  
6- (C) IMPACT OF WIA. NEG.  
7- (C) RECAP OF BM OPS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D CO	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPER
	FT	SOO	PLAT	FT	SOO	PLAT			
1/10	3	9	3	0	0	0	2	0	2
N	3	12	3	0	1	0	0	1	0
2/10	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	1	13	0	1	1	0	0	10	3
3/10	1	9	0	0	0	0	0	9	2
N	3	15	0	3	10	0	0		

8- (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

1ST MARDIV 2100/4 (9/67)

DECLASSIFIED

PROVINCE / COORDINATE	DTG	SIZE / TYPE	FR LOSS	EN LOSS	INIT
QUANG NAM / BT056626	202230H	PLT / CMB	0	3	US
QUANG NAM / BT004631	210905H	PLT / CMB	0	1	US
QUANG NAM / BT002652	211215H	PLT / CMB	1	0	VC
QUANG NAM / BT056612	211230	PLT / CMB	1	0	VC
QUANG NAM / BT056690	211415H	FT / SEC	2	0	VC
QUANG NAM / BT065709	211954H	PLT / CMB	0	2	US
QUANG NAM / BT088675	212145H	4 / 51	0	7	US

3. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS - NO CHANGE.

GP-1  
BT

TOP/TT/211700Z/M-2/1-DIV/CCN:1050/W-2/JS

ZNY CCCCC

O P 221500Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
INFO 2EN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
BT

STT REF 220000H-222400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)

(1) 220750H, D/1/1 CO SWP BT 006607 MAR TRIPPED SFD, M-26  
GREN W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS, ONE USMC KIA, ONE USMC WIA (EVAC), ONE  
ARVN WIA (MINOR), ONE USMC WIA (MINOR).

(2) 221035H, D/1/1 CO SWP BT 008607 MAR TRIPPED SFD, M-26 GREN  
W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS, THREE USMC WIA (EVAC), ONE ARVN WIA (EVAC).

(3) 22135H, 3/1 S-2 AT 997677 DTNED ONE VN W/IMPROPER ID.

(4) 221850H, L/3/1 SQD AMB VIC AT 969638 SIGHTED THREE VN IN

PAGE TWO OS6T 0136 [REDACTED]  
TREE LINE. REC ONE M79M VDETIED ONE VN IN AREA.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEG.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D	LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT	CO	POST	SNIPER
1/ID	3	12	2	0	0	0	1	0	2
N	3	11	0	0	10	0	1	0	0
2/ID	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	0	10	0	0	10	0	0	11	3
3/ID	1	12	0	0	0	0	0	9	2
N	3	15	0	0	19	0	0	12	2

8. (V) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROV/CORD	DTG	SIZE /TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BT 006607	220750H	CO/SWP	4	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT 008607	221035H	CO/SWP	4	0	VC
QUANGNAM/AT 997677	221350H	-/S-2	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT 969638	221850H	SQD/AMB	0	1	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT: C/1/1 BT 060634  
D/1/1 BT 015600

CP-4

BT

TOD: DI V /2/1(TT)/221510Z/CON: 136/N H /W-1  
1/1, 3/1(COU R)/221600Z

DE VS6T 0140 0231430  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 231430Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO ZEN FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 RE [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

SIT REP 230001H - 232400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)

1205H, E 2/1/1 SQD CMB BT079651 DTNED ONE VN W/  
 QUESTIONABLE IDW.

2. 231225H, D 1/1/1 CO SWP BT012589 MAR TRIPPED SFD, UNK TYPE.

RESULTS, TWO WIA (EVAC), ONE WIA (NNOR).

(3) 231340H, B 1/1/1 PLT CMB VIC BT014613 REC S/A FIRE

FM APPROX SIX TO EIGHT VC/NVA. RET FIRE W/ORG WPNS, ARTY.

SEARCHED AREA, FD NINE VN, ONE W/O ID, ONE W/SCHRAPNEL WOUNDS.

PAGE TWO 056T [REDACTED]

RESULTS, NINE DTNES. (4) 231445H, F 2/1/1 SQD CMB BT 087675 HEARD S/A  
 OBS SIX VC/NVA W/ WPNS. ENGAGED WITH S/A, A/W, 60MM MORTARS. LATER  
 FD ARVN HAD BEEN AMBUSHED AND WERE ALSO IN PURSUIT. RESULTS, FOUR  
 DTNES.

(5) 231515H, E 2/1/1 SQD CMB BT086655 ONE VN W/POSSIBLE INFO  
 NVA POSITIONS DTNED.

(6) 231530H, C 1/1/1 PLT CMB VIC BT063632 REC S/A FIRE. RET FIRE  
 WITH S/A, GREN. ONE WIA (EVAC) PUT ON TK FOR MEDEVAC, TK HIT MINE  
 UNK SIZE, CAUSING TWO USMC WIA (EVAC), TWO USN WIA (EVAC).

(7) 231725H, D 1/1/1 CO SWP VIC BT010593 OBS FIVE VC. TOOK  
 UNDER FIRE W/ORG WPNS, ARTY. RESULTS ONE VC KBA (ARTY).

6. IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEG

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D LIST SCOUT		
	FT	SQD	PLAT	FT	SQD	PLAT	CO	POST	SNIPER
C 1/1	3	10	4	0	0	0	2	0	2
N	3	9	0	0	4	0	1	4	0
E 2/1	0	12	2	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	0	9	0	0	5	0	0	12	3

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE 056T

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPER
	FT	SQD	PLAT	FT	SQD	PLAT			
B/ID	1	9	1	0	0	0	0	9	2
N	3	18	0	3	22	0	0	12	2

## 8. SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROVINCE /CORDNATE	DTG	SIZE /TYPE	FRLOSS	EMLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BT079651	231205H	SQD /CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT012589	231235H	CO /SWP	3	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT014613	231340H	PLT /CMB	0	9	US
QUANGNAM/BT087675	231445H	SQD /CMB	0	4	US
QUANGNAM/BT086655	231515H	SQD /CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT063632	231530H	PLT /CMB	5	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT010593	231725H	CO /SWP	0	1	US

## 9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS - NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

D /1 /1: BT010593

GP-4

BT

T08/TT/2316207/2/1

1/1, 3/1, H 000 COB: 231730Z

DECLASSIFIED

ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 241430Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO ZEN/FIRST AD (COLL)  
 BT

5-3  
 241430

SIT REP 240001H - 242400H JAN 69 (C) .

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.
- (2) (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)

(1) 240730H, G/2/1 PLT CMB BT 057714 DTNED TWO VN IN SAMBAN.

(2) 240845H, D/1/1 CO SWP BT 011591 REC S/A SNIPER FIRE, B-40 RKT. RET FIRE WITH S/A, A/W, 60MM MORTAR, ARTY. CHECKED AREA. RESULTS, ONE USMC KIA, ONE USN KIA, SIX USMC WIA (EVAC), ONE ARVN WIA (EVAC), ONE NVA KIA.

(3) 241045H, 2/1 FT SEC VIC BT 065675 GRADER ON MSR

PAGE TWO 056T 0143

REC ONE RND SNIPER FIRE. RESULTS, ONE USN WIA (EVAC).

(4) 241230H, D/1/1 CO SWP BT 011590 FD BUNKER W/DEAD VC INSIDE. RESULTS, ONE VC KIA, BUNKER DESTROYED.

(5) 241430H, D/2/1 SQD CMB BT 079652 SPOTTED THREE VN. ONE VN RAN AS UNIT APPROCHED. FIRED S/A W/NEG ASSESSMENT. DET TWO VN.

(6) 241500H, C/1/1 LAND CLEARING BT 065635 DTNED 42 VN IN VILLAGE. ONE VN W/O ID. RET DTEES 1/1 ITT.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNITS	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			CO	POST	LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SQD	PLAT	FT	SQD	PLAT				
1/1D	3	10	3	0	0	0	2	0	2	
N	3	12	0	0	4	0	1	4	0	
2/1D	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	8	3	
N	0	13	0	0	12	0	0	10	3	
3/1D	0	12	0	0	0	0	2	9	2	
N	3	15	0	3	19	0	0	12	2	

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE /CORDINATE DTG SIZE /TYPE FRLOSS ENLOSS INIT

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE OS6T 0143 [REDACTED]  
 QUANGNAM/BT057714 240730H PLT/CMB 0 2 US  
 QUANGNAM/BT011591 240845H CO/20 9 1 US  
 QUANGNAM/BT0655675 241045H PT/SEC 1 0 US  
 QUANGNAM/BT011590 241230H CO/SWP 0 1 US  
 QUANGNAM/BT079652 241430H SQD/CMB 0 2 US  
 QUANGNAM/BT065635 241500H PLT/CMB 0 42 US  
 9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS - NO CHANGE.  
 GP-4  
 BT

TOD: DIV 1/1. 2/1(TT)/241045Z/COM : 143/NU/1-1 [REDACTED]  
 1ST MARDIV 2100/4 (9/67) (COUR) /241610Z

ZNY CCCCC  
O P 251415Z JAN 69  
FM FIRST MAR  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
BT

SIT REP 250001H-252400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT VVNY. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.
- A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)

(1) 250515H, F/2/1 CO C&S BT090690 BEGAN C&S TAN AN W/CO 4/51ST ARVN. SCREENED 200 VN, DTNED TWO VN, ONE ON BLACKLIST. RESULTS, TWO DTNES.

(2) 251100H, C/1/1 PLT CMB BT032647 DTNED ONE VN W/O PICTURE ON ID.

(3) 251130H, B/1/1 PLT CMB BT039662 MAR TRIPPED SFD, M26 GREN. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EMER EVAC). MED EVAC COMPLETED 1540H.

(4) 251535H, C/1/1 PLT CMB BT032648 DTNED FOUR VN, ONE W/O ID.

PAGE TWO OS6T  
RESULTS, FOUR DTNES.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D	LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT			
1/ID	3	11	3	0	0	0	2	0	2
N	4	10	0	1	7	0	1	4	1
2/ID	0	11	1	0	0	0	0	8	3
N	0	10	0	0	8	0	0	11	3
3/ID	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	9	2
N	3	12	0	3	15	0	0	12	2

8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROV/CORD	DTG	SIZE /TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/AT090690	250515H	CO/C&S	0	2	US
QUANGNAM/BT032643	250915H	PLT/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT032647	251100H	PLT/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT011616	251130H	PLT/CMB	0	4	US
QUANGNAM/BT039662	251500H	PLT/CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT032648	251535H	PLT/CMB	0	4	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT: C/1/1 BT059635 - D/1/1 BT015600

PAGE THREE OS6T  
ADDENDUM:

(5) 250915H, A/1/1 PLT CMB BT032643 DTNED ONE VN ON BLACKLIST.

(6) 251500H, B/1/1 PLT CMB BT039662 MAR TRIPPED SFD, M26 GREN, RESULTS, ONE WIA (EMER EVAC). MED EVAC COMPLETED 1540H.

GP-4

BT

T OD: DI V, 1/1, 2/1 (TT)/CCN: 156/251455Z/N

3/1 (COUR)/25 1510Z

DECLASSIFIED

ZNY CCCCC  
 OP 261530Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

SIT REP 260001H- 161400H JAN 69 (C)  
 1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.

2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG

3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.

4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.

5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN)

(1) (LATE RPT) 252050H, A/1/1 SQD CMB BT054632 OBS ONE VC, ENGAGED WITH S/A, RESULTS, ONE VC KIS, ONE AK-47

(2) (LATE RPT) 252145H, B/1/1 PLT CMB VIC BT009616 REC S/A, ONE RPG RND, TWO CONCUSSION GREN FM EST FOUR VC. RET FIRE WITH S/A, 60MM MORTAR. CHECKED AREA W/NEG ASSESSMENT. RESULTS, TWO WIA (E VAC).

(3) 260530H, D/1/1 CO C&S VIC BT022606 REC S/A FIRE FM EST FIVE VC. RET FIRE WITH S/A, LAAW'S, M-79S. CHECKED AREA.

2. SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO OS6T 0160 [REDACTED]  
RESULTS. ONE USMC WIA (EVAC) TWO VC KIA. ONE VC PW(WIA) ONE AK-47  
TWO CHICOM GREN. TWO M-26 GREN.

(4) 260945H. B/1/1 PLT CMB BT041668 MAR TRIPPED SFD, M-26  
GREN. RESULTS. ONE WIA(EVAC).

(5) 261100H. C/1/1 CO SWP BT057641 TK HIT MINE, 40-60 LBS  
C-4. RESULTS. THREE WIA (EVAC)

(6) 261205H. D/1/1 CO SWP VIC BT022605 REC ONE M-79 RND. RET  
FIRE WITH S/A. M-79. CHECKED AREA W/NEG ASSESSMENT. RESULTS. FIVE  
WIA(EVAC)

(7) 261330H. E/1/1 CO SWP BT018607 MAR TRIPPED SFD, M-26  
GREN. RESULTS. ONE WIA(EVAC)

(8) 261410H. CC/1/1 CO SWP BT056634 MAR TRIPPED SFD, M-26  
GREN. RESULTS. ONE WIA(EVAC)

(9) 261415H. F/2/1 SQD CMB BT100665 OBS THREE VN DIGGING  
IN SAND. 105MM DUD FD IN AREA. RESULTS.  
THREE DTNEES, DESTROYED 105MM DUD.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	S&D	LIST	SCOUT			
FT	SWD	PLAT	FT	SQD	PLAT	CO	POST	SNIPER

PAGE THREE OS6T 0160 [REDACTED]

1/1 D	3	11	3	0	0	0	2	0	2
N	3	10	0	0	8	1	1	2	0
2/1 D	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	3

N	0	11	0	0	11	0	0	11	3
3/1 D	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	9	2

PROVINCE	COORDINATE	DTG	SIZE /TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM	BT054632	252050H	SQD /CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM	BT009616	252115H	PLT /CMB	2	0	US
QUANGNAM	BT027606	260530H	CO /CMB	1	3	US
QUANGNAM	BT041668	260945H	PLT /CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM	BT051641	261100H	CO /SWP	3	0	VC
QUANGNAM	BT022605	261205H	CO /SWP	5	0	US
QUANGNAM	BT018607	261330H	CO /SWP	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM	BT056634	261410H	CO /SWP	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM	BT100665	261415H	SQD /CMB	0	3	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

D/1/1: BT015628

GP-4

BT

TOD: DIV , 1/1, 2/1(TT)/26 1610Z/CON: 160/NH/1-1

3/1(COUP)/2611 30Z

DECLASSIFIED

DE 056T 01680271420  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 271420Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

SIT REP 270001H - 272400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (REIN).

(1) 270715H. B/I/I PLT SEC BT043664 MAR TRIPPED SFD,  
 M26 GREN. RESULTS. ONE WIA (EVAC).

(2) 270938H. C/I/I PLT CMB BT032647 DTND ONE VN  
 BELIEVED ON BLACK LIST.

(3) 270950H. B/I/I PLT CMB BT043664 MAR TRIPPED SFD,  
 M26 GREN. RESULTS. ONE WIA (EVAC).

(4) 271050H. C/I/I SGO CMB BT032647 DTND TWO VN

PAGE TWO 056T 0168  
 BELIEVED ON BLACK LIST.

(5) 271300H. B/I/I PLT CMB BT043664 MAR TRIPPED SFD,  
 M26 GREN RIGGED W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS. TWO WIA (EVAC).

(6) 271500H. C/I/I PLT CMB VIC BT057637 REC ONE RND  
 S/A FM ACROSS RIVER. RET FIRE W/ORGANIC WPNS W/NEG ASS SS.  
 RESULTS. ONE WIA (EMER EVAC). MEDEVAC COMPLETED 1540H.

(7) 271840H. C/I/I PLT CMB BT065630H. DTND 11 VN. INTEL. 2720  
 VILLAGE.

(8) 271845H. B/I/I SGO CMB BT074615 MAR TRIPPED SFD,  
 M26 GREN. RESULTS. ONE KIA.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG.

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&I CO	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPER
	FT	SGO	PLAT	FT	SGO	PLAT			
1/10	4	12	3	0	1	0	1	0	2
2/10	3	11	0	0	8	0	0	0	0
3/10	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
N	0	11	0	0	10	0	0	11	3
3/10	1	15	2	0	0	0	0	11	2
N	3	15	0	3	19	0	0	12	2

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## B. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROVINCE / CORDNATE	DIG	SIZE / TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM / BT043664	270715H	PLT / SEC	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM / BT032647	270938H	PLT / CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM / BT043664	270950H	PLT / CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM / BT032647	270050H	SQD / CMB	0	2	US
QUANGNAM / BT043664	270300H	PLT / CMB	2	0	VC
QUANGNAM / BT057697	270500H	PLT / CMB	1	0	US
QUANGNAM / BT065638	270640H	PLT / CMB	0	11	US
QUANGNAM / BT004615	270845H	SQD / CMB	1	0	VC

## 9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

D / 1 / 1 BT073706

H / 2 / 1 BT073706

GP-4 TOB/TT/1/1, 2/1, DIV, 3/1, COUR: 271600Z

BT G CM: 160000-3/RH

ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 281500Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR  
 INFO ZEN/FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

SIT REP 280000H-282400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.
2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (COLL)

- (1) (LATE RPT) 272130H, CAP 2-8-6 VIC BT 071707 SPOTTED APPROX 30VC. IMMEDIATELY REC APPROX 300RND S/A, EIGHT GREN, 15 M79'S FROM FOUR VC. RET FIRE WITH S/A, M-79'S. CHECKED AREA, FOUND MISC EQUIP. RESULTS, THREE USMC WIA (ECAC), ONE PF WIA (EVAC).
- (2) (LATE RPT) 272235H, F/2/1 CO SEC VIC BT 100673 REC SNIPER FIRE. RET FIRE WITH S/A. ONE M-16 EXPLODED. AREA CHECKED W/NEG ASSIES. RESULTS, ONE WIA (MINOR).

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- (3) (LATE RPT) 272245H, E/2/1 SQD CMB VIC BT 085659 SIGHTED THREE VC, TWO W/VPNS. ENGAGED WITH S/A. RESULTS, ONE VC KIA.
- (4) 280850H, A/1/1 PLT CMB AT 974671 DTNED ONE VN W/ UNREADABLE ID.
- (5) 281030H, A/1/1 PLT CMB BT 006632 DTNED ONE VN W/O ID.
- (6) 281115H, E/2/1 SQD CMB BT 061653 MAR TRIPPED SFD, M26 GREN RIGGED W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EMER EVAC). MED EVAC COMPLETED 1150H.
- (7) 281440H, F/2/1 PLT CMB BT 083681 MAR TRIPPED SFD, CHI COM GREN RIGGED W/TRIP WIRE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EVAC).
- (8) 281515H, H/2/1 CO C&S BT 083682 REC TWO CHI COM GREN. RET FIRE WITH S/A, M26 GRENS. CHECKED AREA. RESULTS, THREE USMC WIA (EVAC), TWO USMC WIA (MINOR), THREE VC KIA, ONE VC PW, ONE AK-47 ONE CHI COM PISTOL, ONE CLAYMORE, TWO CHI COM GRENS, TWO M26 MISC EQUIP AND DOCUMENTS.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WEATHER. NEG

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

UNIT	PATROLS		AMBUSHES		S&D		LIST	SCOUT	
<	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT	CO	POST	SNIPER
1/10	3	9	3	0	1	0	1	0	2

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W  
 2 /ID 3 11 0 0 8 0 0 0 0  
 N 14 0 0 0 0 0 8 3  
 3 /ID 0 12 0 0 16 0 0 10 3  
 N 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 9 2  
 N 3 13 0 3 17 0 0 12 2

## 8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

PROV/CORD	DTG	SIZE/TYPE	FRLOSS	ENLOSS	INIT
QUANGNAM/BT071707	272130H	-/CAP	4	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT100673	272235H	CO/SEC	1	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT085659	272245H	SQD/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT974671	280850H	PLT/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT006632	281030H	PLT/CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT061653	281115H	SQD/CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT083681	281414H	PLT/CMB	1	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT083682	281515H	CO/C&D	5	4	US

## 9. (C) UNIT LOCATION: NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

C/1/1 BT015628

D/1/1 BT015628

GP-4

BT

TOD:TT/281535Z/DIV-1/1-2/1/CCN:171A"-1/T FS

TOD:GOUZ/281700Z/-/1



ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 301545Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 BT

(cc)\*  
 S-3  
 301545  
 DECLASSIFIED

SIT REP 300001H - 302400H JAN 69 (C)

1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG
2. (C) SQ UNIT CONTACTS. NEG
3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG
4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG
5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.

A. (LATE REPORT) 292030H. G/2/1 PLT PPB VIC 3T052693  
 REC S/A FIRE. RET FIRE WITH S/A. 60MM MORTARS. ARVN UNIT IN  
 VIC FIRED S/A. M79, 106MM RR, 81MM MORTARS. DURING ACTION, MAR  
 REPORTED REC APPROX 20 60MM RND, POSSIBLE FRIENDLY 106MM RR  
 FIRE FM UNDETERMINED POS. AREA CHECKED W/NEG ASSESSMENT.  
 RESULTS, FOUR WIA (EVAC).

(2) (LATE REPORT) 292110H. A/1/1 SQD CMB BT023623 AMB

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B. APPROX FOUR VC W/KA-47. RET FIRE W/ORGANIC WINS. RESULTS, THREE MAR WIA (EVAC), ONE USN WIA (EVAC), TWO VC KIA.

(3) 300010H. A/1/1 SQD CMB BT023623 PREP FIRE OF  
 TREE LINE W/M79 CAUSED ONE USMC WIA (EMER EVAC) MEDEVAC  
 COMPLETED 0105H.

(4) 300435H. C/1/1 SQD CMB BT043662 MAR DETONATED SFD,  
 M26 GRENADE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (MINOR).

(5) 301220H. D/1/1 SQD CMB VIC BT021597 OBS ONE VC IN  
 RIVER, REC SNIPER FIRE. RET FIRE WITH S/A. RESULTS, ONE VC  
 KIA (BNR).

(6) 301330H. C/1/1 PLT CMB BT043644 MAR TRIPPED SFD,  
 M26 GRENADE RIGGED W/TRIPPED WIRE. RESULTS, ONE WIA (EMER EVAC)  
 MED EVAC COMPLETED 1315H.

(7) 301710H. A/1/1 PLT CMB BT031642 DTIED TWO VN W/  
 QUESTIONABLE ID.

(8) 301820H. C/1/1 PLT CMB BT030649 DTIED ONE VN  
 POSSIBLY ON BLACK LIST.

6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG

7. (C) RECAP OF BN OPNS.

ATTN: PATROLS AMBUSHES SSG LIST SCOUT

### 8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS - NO CHANGE.

62

1ST MARDIV 2100/4 (9/67)

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0185 001100Z  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 311430Z JAN 69  
 FM FIRST MAR  
 TO CG FIRST MAR DIV  
 INFO ZEN FIRST MAR (COLL)

BT

SIT REP 310301H - 312400H JAN 69  
 1. (C) MAJOR OPNS. NEG.  
 2. (C) SIG UNIT CONTACTS. NEG.  
 3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY. NEG.  
 4. (C) SPL UNIT OPNS. NEG.  
 5. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS.  
 A. CONTROLLING HQ. FIRST MAR (COLL)  
 (1) (LAE REPORT) 302210H. SRD AMTRAC SQD AMR BT077708 REC  
 ONE GREN. CHECKED AREA W/NEG ASSESS. RESULTS. TWO WIA (EVAC).  
 (2) 310300H. H&E 2/1 TWO CO CBS BT 002641 GREENED 817 CIV'S  
 DTNED TWO VN ON BLACKLIST. FD 4000 LBS RIG. OPN TERMINATED 311330H.  
 (3) 310845H. C/A/D PLT CMB BT 032047 DTNED TWO VN ON BLACKLIST.  
 (4) 310957H. L/B/D PLT SEC AT 990641 DTNED ONE VN W/NO ID.

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(5) 311100H. C/A/D PLT CMB BT 032647 DTNED. TWO VN. ONE ON  
 BLACKLIST. RESULTS. TWO DTNEES.  
 (6) 311320H. C/A/D PLT CMB BT 032648 DTNED ONE VN W/  
 QUESTIONABLE ID.  
 (7) 311415H. SRD AMTRAC SQD CMB BT 031648 OBS SIX BN WHO  
 RAN ON SIGHTING UNIT. ENGAGED WITH 3/A. RESULTS. TWO VG  
 PW (ONE WIA EVAC).  
 (8) 311520H. C/A/D PLT CMB BT 032648 DTNED ONE VN POSSIBLE  
 ON BLACKLIST.  
 (9) 311725H. B/A/D SQD CMB AT 994619 MAR DET SFD. M26 GREN  
 AND ONE LAAN. RESULTS. TWO WIA (EVAC).  
 (10) 311740H. C/A/D PLT CMB BT 033043 DTNED ONE VN POSSIBLE  
 ON BLACKLIST.  
 (11) 311830H. HQ/1ST MAR S-2 AT 999720 DTNED ONE VN W/34BY.  
 HAD NO ID. RESULTS. TWO DTNEES.  
 6. (C) IMPACT OF WX. NEG.

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PAGE THREE OS6T 0185 [REDACTED]

K/IO	3	4	2	0	0	0	4	0	2
N	3	7	0	0	4	0	1	4	0
Z/IO	0	16	1	0	2	0	0	10	3
N	0	13	1	0	13	0	0	3	3
X/IO	2	9	0	0	0	0	0	9	2
N	3	13	0	3	1	0	0	12	2

## 8. (C) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROV/CORD	DTG	SIZE /TYPE	FRLUSS	ENLUSS	ITIT
QUANGNAM/BT 077708	302210H	SQD /AMB	2	0	US
QUANGNAM/BT 082648	310300H	2CO /C8S	0	2	US
QUANGNAM/OT 032647	310345H	PLT /CMB	0	2	US
QUANGNAM/AT 990641	310957H	PLT /SEC	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT 032648	311320H	PLT /CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/BT 081633	311415H	SQD /CMB	0	2	US
QUANGNAM/BT 032648	311522H	PLT /CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT 994619	311725H	SQD /CMB	2	0	VC
QUANGNAM/BT 033648	311740H	PLT /CMB	0	1	US
QUANGNAM/AT 999700	311830H	- /S-2	0	2	US

9. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS - NO CHANGE EXCEPT: C A /I BT 063650

PAGE FOUR OS6T 0185 [REDACTED]

C A /I BT 015623

GR 4

BT

FOR/ [REDACTED] /TT/ [REDACTED]

FOR/ [REDACTED] /TT/ [REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marines (Rein)  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

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3/JKR/mst  
3480  
10 Jan 1969

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division FMF

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation MEADE RIVER)

Ref: (a) First Marines Opn O 315-68  
(b) First Marines Admin O 315-68

1. Code Name. Operation MEADE RIVER (Cordon, Search and Clear Operation).
2. Dates of Operation. 200800H November 68 to 091800H December 68.
3. Location. Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Command Headquarters. 1st Marine Regiment (-) (Rein).
5. Reporting Officer.  
1st Marines (-) (Rein) Col LAUFFER
6. Task Organization.  
1st Marines (Rein)

Hq, 1st Marines (Rein)

CMD GROUP ALFA

CMD GROUP BRAVO

Plt (Rein), Co C 1st Tank Bn

Plt, 1st Recon Bn + 1 Scuba Tm

Det, Bridge Co, 7th Engr Bn, FMF

Det, MP Co, 1st Mar Div

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION FMF

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COLONEL LAUFFER

1st Mar S & C Files

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

A/RPT (OPN MEADE RIVER)

20 NOV-8 DEC 1968

TAB-C

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Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn

Det, 11th MT Bn

Co B, (Otters)

Det, 1st MT Bn

1-Plat, Co A

2 Plat, Co B

1 Plat, Co C

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Det, Btry G, 29th Arty (SL) USA

Det, Rad/Rel &amp; Constr Co, 7th Comm Bn

Det, Comm Spt Co, 7th Comm Bn

Det, 7th Psyops Bn, USA (6 HBT)

Det, 29th Civil/Affairs Co, USA

Det, 3rd ITT, FMF

Det, 3rd CIT, FMF

Det, 9th ITT, FMF

Det, 13th ITT, FMF

Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div (ISO)

HST, 1st SP Bn

1st Bn, 1st Marines (-)(Rein)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LAPORTE

1st Bn, 1st Marines

Det, Co B, 11th MT Bn, FMF (Otters)

Det, Co A, 1st Eng Bn

Det, G Btry 29th Arty (SL) USA

2nd Bn, 1st Marines (-)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL POINDEXTER

3rd Bn, 1st Marines

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BULGER

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2nd Bn, 5th Marines

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEMPLE

2nd Bn, 5th Marines

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Det, Co A, 1st Eng Bn

HST, 1st SP Bn

Det, 3rd MP Bn, FMF (Scout Dog Tm)

3rd Bn, 5th Marines

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ATKINSON

3rd Bn, 5th Marines (-)(Rein)

Co I

Co K

Co L

Co B, 1st Bn, 5th Marines

Det, Co A, 1st Eng Bn

HST, 1st SP Bn

1st Bn, 7th Marines (-)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BETHEL

Co A

Co C

Det, Co A 1st Eng Bn + (Demo Tm)

DET 2/7

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NELSON

2nd Bn, 7th Marines

Det, 3rd ITT FMF

Det, 3rd MP Bn, FMF (Scout Dog Tm)

HST, 1st SP Bn

DET 2/26

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SPARKS

2nd Bn, 26th Marines

Det, Co A, 1st Eng Bn

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Det, 3rd ITT, FMF

Plt (-) G Btry, 29th Arty (SL) USA

Det, Co B, 11th MT Bn, FMF (Otters).

3rd Bn, 26th Marines (-)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERTSON

CMD Group

Co 1

Co K

Co L

HST, 1st SP Bn

Det, Co A, 1st Eng Bn

Det, 3rd MP Bn (4 Scout Dog Tm's)

7. Supporting Forces.a. 11th Marines

COLONEL DICKINSON

1st Bn, 11th Marines

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON

Btry D, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines

Btry W, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines

Btry K, 4th Bn, 11th Marines

Btry L, 4th Bn, 11th Marines

Btry Z, 4th Bn, 11th Marines

Flat, 3rd 8" How Btry

1st 155mm Gun Btry

b. Aviation.

Operation MEADE RIVER commenced on 20 November with the largest Marine heliborne assault of the Vietnam conflict. The cordon as established was almost 15 miles in circumference and entrapped a major enemy force. This operation was primarily supported by air for personnel movement, med-evac and resupply. Virtually all units of the First Marine Aircraft Wing participated during the operation. A compilation of data

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provides the following statistics:

(1) Helicopters

<u>TYPE MSN</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Troop lift	1,028	8,900 personnel lifted
Logistic	661	1,066,901 lbs of cargo
Admin	406	473 passengers
Med-Evac	498	833 casualties
VR	220	220 passengers
C&C	448	314 passengers
Gunship	884	252 Hours on station
Firefly	112	27 Hours on station
POW	28	21 POW's
		70 Detainees
Armed Recon UH-1E	8	18 passengers

(2) Fixed Wing

CAS/DAS	264	893,300 lbs of ordnance
		142 5" Zuni rockets
		250 2.75 FFAR rockets
		80 Mk-4 Gunpods
CAS/TPQ	0	
AO	360	378 Hours on station
Flareship	106	203 Hours on station
Spooky	100	72 Hours on station
		609,000 rnd's 7.62 expended

c. Artillery

General. From 20 November 1968 through 9 December 1968, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, selected components of other 11th Marine units, and General Support Units of the 11th Marines, provided artillery support for Operation MEADE RIVER. A forward FSOC, drawn from 1st Marines FSOC, was established at the operation command post BT012626.

(1) Dispositions. Firing unit locations for Operation MEADE RIVER were as follows:

A/1/11 - BT012626  
 B/1/11 - BT070656  
 S/1/11 - AT991675 (20 Nov - 1 Dec)  
 CX/1/11 - AT991675  
 WX/1/11 - BT012626 (20 Nov - 1 Dec)  
 D/2/11 - AT916527 (21-28 Nov; 7-8 Dec)  
 W/3/11 - AT967618 (20 Nov - 1 Dec)  
 K/4/11 - AT879579  
 L/4/11 - AT967618

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Z/4/11 - AT989714  
 Plat 8" - AT967618  
 1st 155 Gun Plat - AT966621

(2) Artillery missions and rounds expended during Operation MEADE RIVER are as follows:

1,286 Missions  
 27,513 Rounds Expended

(3) Fire Support Coordination for Operation MEADE RIVER was generally effected with dispatch despite the inherent communications strain of multi-battalion operations. It should be noted that precision destruction missions, utilizing 8" howitzers, were called in as close as 200 meters from our forces with excellent results. This was done for 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines units in the HORSESHOE (Fig 3).

(4) The following recommendations are made:

(a) All requests for air support of any type, should be forwarded through the air section of the FSOC to avoid conflicts.

(b) A centralized FSOC, as employed in Operation MEADE RIVER was once again demonstrated to be essential. This is particularly true for successful coordination in air/artillery operations involving units from different organizations working in unfamiliar terrain, and subordinate to an unfamiliar Command Group.

d. Naval Gunfire.

(1) The USS New Jersey (BB-62) fired 153 16" rounds against bunkers in support of the operation.

e. Allied Forces.

(1) ARVN

(a) PHASE II of Operation MEADE RIVER was conducted by the 51st Regiment (ARVN) commencing on D-Day. The Regiment initially conducted an early search of four selected hamlet complexes in the area between DODGE CITY and Route 1. The 51st Regiment flushed out and destroyed 46 of the enemy. Upon reaching the CO CA River the 51st ARVN established blocking positions until ~~released~~ <sup>retrieved</sup> by 2nd Bn, 5th Marines and BLT 2/26.

(2) APC's

(a) On 8 December an ARVN armored personnel carrier troop in conjunction with 3rd Bn, 26th Marines (Rein) launched an assault to

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destroy the remaining enemy forces. Utilized were twelve APC's and sixty-five personnel of the 2nd Troop, 4th Cavalry (ARVN). The APC troop was credited with 84 enemy kills, and with uncovering several enemy KBA.

(3) ROKMC

(a) The 1st and 2nd Companies, 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st ROKMC Division participated in Operation MEADE RIVER forming part of the cordon in vicinity of their cantonements. The companies were credited with 2 enemy KIA (NVA).

8. INTELLIGENCE

a. Estimate of the Situation.

(1) Enemy forces. It was estimated that elements of the following enemy units would be encountered in the Cordon:

R-20 Bn	225
Q-82 Co	80
X-16 Co	50
1st Bn, 36 Regt	275

(a) The objective area contained, also, two major infiltration routes to DANANG, DIEN BAN, and HOI AN. Therefore, the estimate also established the possibility that as many as 600-900 NVA/RFVC could be located in the area when the cordon was set.

(2) Enemy Courses of Action. Once the enemy became aware that they were encircled, it was estimated that they would mass and attempt to break the cordon, or try to exfiltrate in small groups. It was also estimated that the enemy would conceal themselves undercover until sweeping forces passed, and then try to escape.

b. Locations and Dispositions. See Figure 1.

c. Agencies Utilized: Sources of intelligence were derived from the following agencies:

- (1) Provincial Reconnaissance Units
- (2) Sector, District, 1st Mar Div, and Battalion Intelligence Sections
- (3) URS Reports
- (4) PPS-6 (Coverage of avenues of approach and infiltration routes)
- (5) Air Reconnaissance (IR, Photo, AO)
- (6) CIT/ITT
- (7) Division Reconnaissance Units
- (8) ARVN, PF and National Police Units

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




FIG (1)

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d. Situation Encountered. The situation as estimated was generally valid. However, we were fortunate enough to have entrapped more enemy than anticipated. Found in the objective area was a sizeable, well organized and well trained enemy force which chose to stand and fight. Utilizing fortifications throughout the AO (See Figure 2), the enemy attempted to inflict as many casualties as possible on friendly forces. Other small units and elements of larger units were located in the Cordon, and tried to exfiltrate. However, due to the tight, well coordinated Cordon, exfiltration was not feasible as indicated by several attempts which were turned back. The enemy did attempt concealing themselves underground until the sweeping forces had passed. This tactic, however, was utilized only on a limited scale.

(1) The first contact was made 20 November by 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines while attempting to close on the railroad berm. A sizable enemy force was encountered deployed in well fortified positions in the HORSE-SHOE of a river, centered vicinity AT981597 (Fig 2). This contact confirmed that a large scale VC/NVA force had been caught in the Cordon. The objective was secured on 23 November. It contained a multi-bunker complex, fighting holes, and trench lines which had apparently been a battalion defensive position.

(2) The second brief encounter was made in LA HOA (1), GS 9958, where the enemy also had well fortified positions. This appeared to be a site where the enemy consolidated his forces and equipment and moved from there into a better defensive position.

(3) The third sustained contact was made on 2 Dec in another well fortified river "horseshoe" on the west bank of the SUOI CO CA River, GS 0158. This area, referred to as the "HOOK", also consisted of many well fortified positions which had been in existence and used for a long period of time.

(4) The fourth and last contact with enemy forces took place 7-8 December. The remaining enemy consolidated on the south bank of the SONG LI THO River, vicinity BT002608, (known as the NORTHERN BUNKER COMPLEX), where other well fortified defensive positions were prepared. There he made his last stand.

e. VC/NVA Units Identified. VC/NVA units found within the AO as verified by POW's and documents are listed below:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>
D.3 Bn 38th Regt	200
3rd Bn 36th Regt	250
1st Bn 68B	350
Recon Co 573 Arty Bn	20
Q82 Co	72

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
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FIG (2)

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ELEMENTS OF OTHER UNITS IN A.O. (DISTRIBUTION UNK)

- 1) ELEMENTS OF T.89 BN
- 2) ELEMENTS OF 577 BN
- 3) ELEMENTS OF 573 BN
- 4) ELEMENTS OF Q.82 Co
- 5) ELEMENTS OF Q.89 Co
- 6) ELEMENTS OF Q.92 Co
- 7) LAU CHAU LOCAL GUERRILLAS

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V34 Eng Co (possible)	56
1st Co V-25	150
5th Co V-25	72
2 Co's R-20 Bn	150
Q-90 (Sapper Cells) and Hamlet Sqds	48
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,368</b>

f. **Significant Intelligence.** It was reported by VCI that news of the Cordon and Search Operation was received one day prior to the operation. This is possible since only a portion of the VCI were apprehended in the screening of detainees. If this is true, then a breakdown in the chain of command between the political arm and the military arm must have existed, since either the military did not receive information of the Cordon or did not know how large it would be.

g. **Cover and Concealment.** The enemy had an advantage over attacking forces due to excellent cover and concealment in the AO. 360 fortified bunkers, encircled with numerous fighting holes and connecting trench systems were encountered. Spider holes and tombs, which provided the enemy with excellent cover and concealment from advancing troops, were also prevalent throughout the area. Elephant grass in abundance afforded the enemy concealment. The NEMDE RIVER AO, from all indications, had been utilized by enemy forces for a lengthy period of time. Confirmation of this extensive occupation was apparent from the well built fortifications.

h. **Obstacles.** Obstacles encountered included SFD's, mines, rice paddies, elephant grass, spider holes, and well concealed snipers. A total of 39 SFD's were found and/or detonated in the NEMDE RIVER AO.

## 9. MISSION.

Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day, 1st Marines (-)(Rein) establish a cordon around objective area, Annex G: (Operation Overlay), and in conjunction with ARVN, GVN and ROKMC Forces, PFF and PRU elements searches and clears villages and adjacent areas to destroy enemy forces, caches, materiel, and installations, and captures VC infrastructure.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. 1st Marines (-)(Rein) stage forces on D-1 Annex C: (D-1 Staging), using maximum deception to launch on D-Day with ROKMC Forces a cordon around objective area Annex G: (Operation Overlay) by foot march, motor march, and helolift (PHASE I); in conjunction with ARVN and GVN Forces, PFF and PRU elements search and clear THANH PHONG village complex and adjacent areas to destroy enemy forces, caches, materiel, and installations, and to capture VC infrastructure (PHASE II); followed by 1st Marines (-)(Rein) deliberate and detailed search of Sector A and B, Annex J: (Search & Clear Overlay) (PHASE III); upon completion of PHASE III, 1st Marines (-)(Rein) conduct search and destroy operation in DODGE CITY AO to find, fix, capture and/or destroy enemy

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forces, caches, materiel, and installations/fortifications. (PHASE IV)

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a. Specifics.

(1) PHASE I. With seven Marine Battalions and two ROKMC Companies establish a cordon 24,000 meters in circumference. Move BLT 2/7 from USS Tripoli, in 12 CH46's. Helilift 2/5 and 3/5 from AN HOA in 14 CH46's each battalion. Land 3/26 from DAI LA in 7 CH-53's. While simultaneously moving all heli-lifted battalions, truck BLT 2/26 from 1/1's CP to Route 1, and move 1/7 (-) and 1/1 by foot to positions along the north bank of the SONG LA THO. Upon completion of cordon, BLT 2/7 moves eastward to DODGE CITY Railroad Berm. This move releases 3/26 and 1/7's two companies for further missions as screening and bald eagle forces respectively.

(2) PHASE II. Two Battalions of 51st Regiment (ARVN) move to assembly areas southeast of cordon to assist in moving villagers to collection points for further transportation to CORDS Processing/Refugee Center, and to search the eastern sector of MEADE RIVER AO from positions along Route 1 westward to the CO CA River; there to establish blocking positions.

(3) PHASE III. 2/5 and BLT 2/26 conduct a coordinated, simultaneous,\* detailed and deliberate search from positions along Route 4 and Route 1 to the CO CA River, relieving the ARVN Battalions as blocking forces along the River. At the same time, 3/26, pinched out of cordon position by BLT 2/7's move to the Railroad Berm, conducts a helicopter move into Southern DODGE CITY, sweeping from South to North as cordon screening force.

(4) PHASE IV. With cordon tightened on the East to the Railroad Berm, to the rivers on the North and East, and to Route 4 on the South, 3/5 is relieved of responsibility for Route 4 sector of cordon by 3/26 and commences attack to the North inside cordon.

\* Original concept of moving BLT 2/26 first, followed upon completion by 2/5 was modified in favor of this concept.

A. 1st Bn, 1st Marines

(1) Assume OPCON of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (-). Assume OPCON of one company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines; CHOP time both times UNITS 190900H Nov 68. (See paragraph 11.i)

(2) With Battalion (Rein) move, on order, by foot to prescribed positions, Annex G: (Operation Overlay) to cordon North sector along SONG LA THO from AT975612 East to BT026615 assuming responsibility for enemy activity along the SONG LA THO, and maintaining visual contact with elements of BLT 2/26 on East and with BLT 2/7 on West; capture and/or destroy enemy forces in vicinity of sector.

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(3) Be prepared, on order, to CHOP 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (-) as Regimental Reaction Force; and reduce western boundary, linking up with BLT 2/7 at ruined bridge, vicinity of AT994608.

(4) Be prepared, on order, to assume OPCON of Reaction Force to fix, capture and/or destroy enemy forces found in assigned sector.

C. 2nd Bn, 1st Marines.

(1) Continue assigned mission in accordance with OP O 314-68.

(2) CHOP one company to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at 0900 on D-1.

(3) Be prepared, on order, to commit one company as Bald Eagle in objective area Annex G: (Operation Overlay).

D. 3rd Bn, 1st Marines.

(1) Continue assigned mission in accordance with OP O 314-68.

(2) Provide Air Control and HST support as required.

E. 2nd Bn, 5th Marines.

(1) With Battalion (Rein) move by helicopter to prescribed positions, Annex G: (Operation Overlay), to cordon Southeast sector along Route 4 commencing at junction of Route 4 and Route 1 (BT057588) West to BT027575; maintain visual contact with elements of BLT 2/26 on Route 1, and with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines along Route 4 on West, linking up cordon with them to avoid gap developing at Coordination Point; capture and/or destroy enemy forces in vicinity of cordon in assigned sector.

(2) Provide for rapid movement of refugees/detainees East along Route 4 to collection points as required.

(3) Be prepared, on order, to assume OPCON of reaction force to fix, capture and/or destroy enemy forces found in assigned sector.

(4) Be prepared, on order, to conduct block along Eastern sector of DODGE CITY during PHASE IV operations.

F. 3rd Bn, 5th Marines.

(1) With Battalion (Rein) move by helicopter to prescribed positions, Annex G: (Operation Overlay), to cordon Southeast sector along Route 4 commencing at BT027575 West to junction of Route 4 with railroad berm in DODGE CITY AT992577; maintain visual contact with elements of 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines on East and with 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines on West linking up with them to avoid gap developing at

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Coordination Points; capture and/or destroy enemy forces vicinity of cordon in sector.

(2) Be prepared, on order, to assume OPCON reaction force to fix, capture and/or destroy enemy forces found in sector.

(3) Provide for rapid movement of refugees/detainees East along sector of Route 4 to collection points as required.

(4) Be prepared, on order, to conduct search and destroy operations in Eastern sector of DODGE CITY (PHASE IV).

G. BLT 2/7.

(1) Upon CHOP to 1st Marines (Rein), with Battalion (Rein) move by helicopter to prescribed positions, Annex G: (Operation Overlay), to cordon Northeast sector initially along Route 1D from Golden Gate Bridge AT968606 to junction with Route 4 AT969583, maintaining visual contact with elements of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines North of SONG LA THO, and linking up with 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines to avoid gap developing at Coordination Points; capture and/or destroy enemy forces vicinity of cordon in sector.

(2) On order, close to railroad berm running North-South through DODGE CITY linking up with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines at AT992577 and with 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at Ruined Bridge site AT994607.

(3) Be prepared, on order, to assume OPCON of reaction force to fix, capture and/or destroy enemy forces found in sector.

H. BLT 2/26.

(1) With Battalion (Rein) move by truck to staging area vicinity of LZ 412 on D-1.

(2) On D-Day, on order, commence motor march from vicinity of Route 12E down Route 1 (South) to prescribed positions Annex G: (Operation Overlay), to cordon Eastern sector West of Route 1 Southwest of the Danang Barrier Sector. Maintain visual contact with elements of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on Northwest, and link up with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines to avoid gap developing at Coordination Points. Capture and/or destroy enemy forces in vicinity of cordon.

(3) Be prepared, on order, to assume OPCON of reaction force to fix, capture and/or destroy enemy forces found in sector.

(4) Provide for rapid movement of refugees/detainees through cordon in ARVN/GVN custody points as designated.

(5) Be prepared, on order, to conduct detailed, deliberate search of sector A Annex J: (Search and Destroy Overlay) of AO to find, fix,

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capture and/or destroy enemy forces, caches, materiel and fortifications/ installations.

I. 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines (-)

(1) With 3 companies and Command Group move by helicopter to prescribed positions Annex G: (Operation Overlay) to cordon Southwest sector of cordon along Route 4 commencing at junction of Route 1D and terminating at junction of Route 4 with railroad berm in DODGE CITY AO; link up with elements of BLT 2/7 on West and with elements of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines on East; capture and/or destroy enemy forces vicinity of cordon in sector.

(2) Be prepared, on order, to assume OPCON of reaction force to fix, capture and/or destroy enemy forces found in Sector.

(3) Upon close of railroad berm by BLT 2/7, terminate cordon mission and on order, conduct screening operations in AO south of cordon.

(4) Be prepared, on order, to conduct mobile reserve (reaction force) mission within the area of operations.

(5) Be prepared, on order, to conduct block during search and destroy operations along Eastern sector of DODGE CITY AO (PHASE IV).

J. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (-)

(1) CHOP to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at (D-1) 0900H Nov 68.

(2) Be prepared, on order, to terminate CHOP to 1st Battalion, move to positions at LZ 412 and conduct Bald Eagle operations anywhere within Area of Operations.

(3) Be prepared, on order, to CHOP to Battalion designated to conduct search and destroy operation in Eastern Sector of DODGE CITY. (PHASE IV).

11. EXECUTION.

a. On 13 November 1968, the Regimental Commander received a warning order to conduct Operation MEADE RIVER. A meeting of key personnel (USMC, GVN, ARVN, ROKMC LNO) was held at 1st Division Conference Room. The mission and concept of operation were given at that time.

b. Upon approval by CG, 1st Marine Division, the CO, 1st Marines modified the concept of operations mainly in the areas of pre-staging units, and use of helicopter assets.

c. It was determined that the entire helicopter assets of the 1st MAW would be required to support Operation MEADE RIVER. If the cordon was to be snapped shut effectively, the assault units must

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combat and combat support units.

i. 19 November was utilized to clarify the few remaining details. Also, elements of Command Group ALPHA moved to the COC of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines to establish that Command Post. It was determined on this date that since an adequate command group of the 1st Bn, 7th Marines was available, they would not be attached to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

j. 20 November was D-Day. At 0400 all units checked in on the Regimental Tactical net. Operation MEADE RIVER was on the net, "loud and clear."

k. PHASE I and II are reported together to lend clarity to the execution Phases of Operation MEADE RIVER:

(1) The Regimental Commander was airborne at 0715 on D-Day observing the preparations and movements by helicopter, 6x6 truck, and foot. H/L Hour was planned for 0800. However, the Commanding Officer observed heavy ground fog in 3/5's landing zone and, therefore, delayed H/L Hour for 15 minutes.

(2) The cordon snapped shut at 0825 with assault elements of seven battalions surrounding 24,000 meters of perimeter. Follow up forces continued to land. The final lift landed at 1000. The Regimental Commander personally observed that the cordon was effectively in place. Fire teams were no more than 15 meters apart. This movement of nearly 5000 Marines into a tight, simultaneously established, cordon position was the initial key to successful accomplishment of the mission of MEADE RIVER. It was executed as follows:

a. 1st Bn, 1st Marines and 1st Bn, 7th Marines moved to positions north of the SONG LA THO (River) by foot departing early in the morning.

b. BLT 2/26 departed from 1st Bn, 1st Marine's CP in 48 trucks traversing Anderson Trail east to Route 1, then south along Route 1. Six minesweep teams were prepositioned to ensure that all roads were swept.

c. BLT 2/7, utilizing 12 CH-46 helicopters, landed from the USS Tripoli without incident along Route 1D. Their first lift was 144 Marines.

d. 3rd Bn, 26th Marines was lifted from DAI LA Pass in 7 CH-53's along southwestern sector of Route 4. 210 in their first lift.

e. 2nd Bn, 5th Marines and 3rd Bn, 5th Marines were lifted from AN HOA by 14 CH-46 helicopters with each Bn. Each had 168 men in their first lift.

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be emplaced simultaneously around 24,000 meters of terrain. A total of 72 helicopters, and two flights of Fixed Wing were required.

d. The Regimental Staff submitted their estimates of supportability. The following was forwarded to 1st Division on 14 November 1968:

Attachments Required

A. Engineers:

4 Mine Detector Tms to be used on Route 1 and road south of Golden Gate Bridge on D-1 and on D-Day. Reduce to 2 Tms after D+1.

4 Demolition Tms to be used during Search Operations from D+1 throughout entire operation.

Det, Bridge Co to be used from D+3 throughout Operation.

4 M54 (dump) trucks w/gravel to move with convoy.

B. Communications:

Det, Rad Rel & Constr Co, 7th Comm Bn  
Det, Comm Spt Co, 7th Comm Bn (Msg Cntr and Rad)

C. Civic Affairs/PsyOps/ITT

Det, 29th CA Co, USA  
6 HB Tms, 7th PsyOps Bn, USA  
12 Interpreter/Translators (for SLF's)

D. Motor Transport

10 Marginal-Terrain Vehicles (Otters)  
48 M35 (2 1/2 T) for initial motor march  
(2 Trk Plats to remain throughout Operation for resupply runs to FLC)

E. Shore Party

HST Tms F/22 Companies (Some Co's have Tms now)  
NHE F/LSA  
OIC of LSA

F. Recon

1 Scuba Tm from D+4 to termination of operation  
1 Recon Plat from D-1 to termination of operation

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G. MP

4 Mobile Patrol Tms  
 Plat, MP Bn (PW Control - Exclusion area sentries)  
 7 Dog Tms from D+3 to termination of operation  
 (3 Bns have Tms now)

## H. Night Illumination Assistance

2 Search Light Tms  
 Flare Ship (as required - Grnd Alert)

Support Required

## A. EOD

As required

## B. ISO

2 Tms assigned from D-3 termination of operation

## C. Helicopter Support

<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Meters in sector</u>	<u>Est Total Lift</u>	<u>1st Lift</u>	<u>CH-46/CH-53 Required</u>
3/26 (-)	2000	510	140	0/7
2 Bn/5th	3700	700	190	14/0
3 Bn/5th	3500	700	190	14/0
2/7 (BLT)	2000	800	190	12/0
TOTALS	11,200	2710	710	40/7

CH-46/CH-53 package recommended: 40/7 plus 6 CH-46 and 1 CH-53 on station to support assault; 2 UH1E C&C choppers, 14 UH-1E Gunships and FAC (4) plus 2 UH-34 medevac.

NOTE: Require 40 ON STATION from SUNRISE to SUNSET from D-Day to termination of operations; ON CALL during hours of reduced capability. Also during Operation require 8 CH-46 and 4 UH-34 with gunship cover for resupply/medevac.

## D. VMF/A Support

As requested through Reg'tl 14 (Grnd Alert)

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(1) PERSONNEL (From 7th Comm Bn) (See para 2.d.B. above)

(2) FREQUENCIES 11 VHF FREQUENCIES  
16 SHF CHANNELS(3) EQUIPMENT

<u>QTY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
1	AN/GCG-3 Teletypewriter Set
1	AN/TOC-114A (V) Teletypewriter Set
4	SB-22 Switchboard
2	RT-524 Radio Set or 1 AN/MRC-110
4	RC-292 Antenna
2	AN/MRC-109 Radio Sets
1	Field Safe
5	AN/MRC-62 Radio Terminal Sets (w/o power source)
9	AN/TNC-27 Radio Sets (8 w/power source)
2	AN/PCC-1 Terminal Sets, Telephone-Telegraph

From 2d Bn, 1st Marines

2	AS-2236 Antennas
5	AN/PRC-25 Radio Sets

From 3d Bn, 1st Marines

1	Duplicating Machine
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e. With very minor exceptions, the support required was filled. Combat support and combat service support detachments contacted their Regimental counterparts and plans began shaping up.

f. On 16 November, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines conducted the initial briefing for the Battalion Commanders, Wing Representatives, GVN, ARVN, and ROKMC representatives. An operational brief followed the Regimental Commander's announcement of policy. Discussion provided clarification of several points.

g. On 17 November 1968, an advance party, primarily communicators, commenced pre D-Day operations in the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines TAOR. The immensity of the communications required to support Operation MEADE RIVER demanded that comm-personnel set up their equipment well in advance.

h. OP Order 315-68 with accompanying Admin Order was promulgated on 18 November 1968 at a second Commanders' Briefing, while staff counterparts at all levels discussed final arrangements for complete integration

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Altogether 2800 troops were helilifted while approximately 2200 moved by other means. 14 UH-1E gunships and 4 UH-34 med-evac helos plus 6 CH-46 and 1 CH-53 were on station to support the assault.

(3) Just prior to landing one of the last elements of 3rd Bn, 5th Marines, a CH-46, carrying part of Co I, crashed and burned resulting in 6 KIA, 5 WIAE, and 4 minor non-evac casualties. As the truck convoy moved down Route 1, a command detonated mine exploded half way down the line of vehicles, destroying the truck and causing 19 WIAE. Immediately, prepositioned dump trucks loaded with gravel and marston matting remedied the situation, and the remainder of the convoy continued to join those in front of the explosion with little delay.

(4) As planned, PSYOPS airborne loudspeakers summoned the civilians inside the cordon to collection points from where they would be taken to the Government controlled refugee tent site outside of 1st Battalion, 1st Marine CP. BLT 2/7 arranged for the movement of 91 civilians accounting for the estimated number that would be to their front during their planned movement to the Railroad Berm in DODGE CITY (Op O 315-68).

(5) BLT 2/7 began their movement east. Immediately, they came under intense enemy fire including small arms, automatic weapons, RPG's and 60mm mortars. BLT 2/7 called in heavy artillery and air support. A large force was in heavily entrenched, well prepared, bunker positions.

(6) As BLT 2/7 re-evaluated their plans to close on the Railroad Berm, the remainder of the cordon force started to improve their positions, digging in and processing civilians. The first day nearly half the villagers were collected and moved to the refugee center.

(7) On D+1, the day started with heavy air and artillery missions on the enemy positions in front of BLT 2/7 (HORSESHOE: See Figure 3). Numerous strong points in the HORSESHOE were linked by a hexagonal-shaped trench ringing the entire sector. Trenches were 3 to 4 feet deep with ground fighting holes every 15 meters. The enemy moved with relative ease through these trenches from strong point to strong point. Even after continuous bombing-napalm runs, aircraft took heavy fire from these positions. The move to the Railroad Berm would require a major effort.

(8) Along the cordon other units were active. Villagers were being collected, and some units were engaging NVA and VC scattered enemy trying to break out of the cordon:

a. At 201350H (D-day) B/1/1 sighted 6 NVA on the south bank of SONG LA THO. The Scout Snipers fired resulting in 1 KIA (NVA). The other five moved back away from the cordon's edge.

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


FIG (3)

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b. At 201500H, the 3rd Battalion of the 51st Regiment (ARVN) detained a VN who later proved to be the adjutant of the Political Sector, 3/36th Regiment (NVA).

c. A recon team inserted at 201630H west of the cordon killed eight NVA after being discovered. They also captured one 82mm mortar tube. The team suffered only 1 WIA.

d. H/2/26 searched in front of their sector after a fire fight ensued at 210100H. They found 1 KIA (VC), a Chicom grenade and a cartridge belt.

e. The 51st Regt (ARVN) commenced their sweep on D-Day (PHASE II) continuing for four days. This friendly movement also flushed more enemy units into the sights of cordon elements.

f. A recon team, SPILLWAY, was inserted on D-Day south of GOI NOI island (AT998517). Observing groups of enemy during their stay, they accounted for several KBA.

(9) On D+2, Co E, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines tried to maneuver their way across the river into the HORSESHOE. The volume of enemy fire was too heavy. They resumed their positions and precision destruction missions continued the remainder of the day.

(10) On D+3, BLT 2/7 secured the HORSESHOE. Co D, 1st Bn, 1st Marines was attached to BLT 2/7 to remain in the HORSESHOE providing security for engineers who were lifted in to blow the numerous bunkers, and level this fortified position. This engineer effort lasted for two weeks. Found in the complexity of bunkers were many enemy bodies, equipment such as a typewriter, reams of paper, 782 gear, and thousands of rounds of ammo. Also uncovered was lime, and lime sprayer, assumed to be used to decompose bodies. BLT 2/7 moved on the berm on D+3, but continued to meet heavy resistance along the way.

(11) As BLT 2/7 advanced to within 200 meters of the railroad berm, an enemy force commenced fire along their right (south) flank from covered positions within the area called the TRIANGLE (AT988585) - another enemy fortified area. The remainder of D+4 was spent reducing it.

(12) On D+5, BLT 2/7 secured the Berm. The 3rd Bn, 26th Marines was now free to screen south of the cordon. 1st Bn, 7th Marines (2 Co's) remained in position north of the SONG LA THO since D/1/1 had been pulled out to provide security in the HORSESHOE.

(13) At 0800H on D+6, the 3rd Bn, 26th Marines was helilifted into southern DODGE CITY directly south of the cordon. They accounted for 15 kills moving back to the north.

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(14) Meanwhile, the 1/51st and 4/51st completed their sweep and moved into blocking positions in SUOI CO CA.

1. PHASE III commenced on D+6 as the 2nd Bn, 5th Marines and BLT 2/26 started a simultaneous, coordinated move to the west, probing and searching every foot of the way. Fresh graves were uncovered as well as a considerable amount of supplies. BLT 2/26 found one cache of 180 surprise firing devices (SFD's) ready to be emplaced. Other finds included 782 gear, miscellaneous documents, five tons of rice buried in the ground in urns. In the meantime, D/1/1 with the engineers was finding fresh graves and more equipment in the HORSESHOE.

(1) On D+8, the 2nd Bn, 5th Marines and BLT 2/26 completed PHASE III relieving the ARVN of their blocking positions along the SUOI CO CA. Typical of their SPOTREPS were:

a. 260620H, F/2/5 BT041577 found two KIA (NVA), one WIA (NVA), one SKS, one AK-47, and two Chicom grenades. Wpns and PW forwarded to Regt'l S-2.

b. 270900H, G/2/26 BT034605 found appx 500 lbs rice, determined to be spoiled. Destroyed.

c. 271145H, G/2/26 BT025605 rec'd two rds sniper fire. Returned fire with small arms resulting in one KIA (VC), holster, magazine pouch, Chicom grenade, documents and transistor radio.

d. 271800H, F/2/5 BT028590 found one tunnel, 10 fresh spider holes and fresh blood trails. Destroyed positions with C-4.

(2) D/1/1 with the engineers were, in the meantime, uncovering such items as partially buried bodies (NVA), E-tools, NVA uniforms, cartridge belts, helmets, hammocks and other equipment, all NVA manufactured.

(3) The 3rd Bn, 26th Marines was back along Route 4 on D+8 ready to take up 3rd Bn, 5th Marine's positions along the cordon securing PHASE III. The cordon was now tightened around eastern DODGE CITY. What had been earlier estimated to be two enemy battalions inside, now appeared to be elements of four battalions plus several VC companies.

n. PHASE IV commenced on D+9. From midnight on a heavy volume of artillery fire pounded the area inside the diminished cordon. At 0600 until 0700 the enemy was offered an opportunity to CHIEU HOI. They chose to fight. At 0700 a heavy air and artillery prep fire commenced.

n. Three Phase lines had been established to control the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines during the attack (Figure 3). As they moved through Phase line ALPHA, heavy small arms, and automatic weapons fire caused several casualties. It took all of D+9 to secure Phase line ALPHA.

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o. On D+10, the 3rd Bn, 5th Marines took heavier fire including 82mm and 60mm mortars, but managed to reach phase line BRAVO by late afternoon.

p. On D+11, the hardest fighting of the operation thus far commenced as the 3rd Bn, 5th Marines encountered the enemy bunker complex along their right flank in what became known as the HOOK. This Spot Report was indicative of what lay ahead:

(1) L/3/5 vicinity of BT011586 encountered enemy bunker complex. Received small arms, automatic weapons, grenades and 60mm mortar rounds. Returned fire with S/A's, A/W, 81mm mortars, arty, and air. Results, 2 USMC KIA, 22 USMC WIAE, 6 USMC WIANE, and 7 NVA KIA.

q. The HOOK was not to be taken in a few hours. The enemy fire from well entrenched, reinforced bunkers was devastating. The 3rd Bn, 5th Marines advance was temporarily halted. On D+12 after spending most of the previous day and night shooting heavy precision destruction missions into the HOOK, 3rd Bn, 5th Marines continued to receive casualties from enemy fires. Artillery and airstrikes were called for by 3/5. On the evening of D+12, Bravo Company 1st Bn, 5th Marines (OPCON to 3rd Bn, 5th Marines) sealed off the HOOK, while the remainder of the battalion moved on to phase line CHARLIE.

r. On D+13, 3rd Bn, 26th Marines was moved from Route 4 to phase line BRAVO in preparation of continuing the attack against the HOOK. After airstrikes of 750 lb bombs and napalm, 3/26 fought its way into the southern portion of the HOOK. By nightfall of D+14, they had worked around to the rear. Although, in very close proximity to the target area, 3/26 called for artillery and air support all night.

s. At first light on D+15, the enemy was once again given an opportunity to become a HOI CHANH. In this attempt to grant amnesty, the Field Commander, and I Corps Commander both taped broadcasts to entice the enemy out of the HOOK. The hard core NVA chose to continue the battle.

t. Later, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines assaulted and secured the HOOK. After securing this objective, over 100 enemy dead were counted, 15 PW's were pulled out of partially destroyed tunnels and bunkers, and numerous weapons were uncovered.

u. Also on D+15 the 3rd Bn, 5th Marines started a turning movement north of phase line CHARLIE, sweeping west to east across the top of DODGE CITY. On D+16, because of other commitments, this battalion secured from MEADE RIVER. But B/1/5 which had remained on phase line CHARLIE stayed with the 3rd Bn, 26th Marines. Co E, 2nd Bn, 26th Marines which had been with the 3rd Bn, 5th Marines remained in a reconnoitering role north of phase line CHARLIE. And 3rd Bn, 26th Marines, having thoroughly mopped up the HOOK, moved on to positions along phase line CHARLIE.

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The cordon continued to remain intact. The final, most furious of battles had yet to be fought, as Co E, 2nd Bn, 26th Marines, in their careful and deliberate search, ran into heavy contact in the NORTHERN BUNKER COMPLEX (See Figure 3).

v. Co E, of 2/26 made this contact at 1445H on D-16. They remained in close proximity of the last objective through the rest of the day and through that night, providing observation and a physical presence to ensure the enemy remained entrapped. In the meantime, the 3rd Bn, 26th Marines was joined by additional forces. The Regimental Commander had tasked A/1/7, H/2/5, and D/1/1 to 3rd Bn, 26th Marines giving them the mission to completely destroy the bunkers in the HOOK (engineers with D/1/1), and to attack the NORTHERN BUNKER COMPLEX.

w. Co E, 2nd Bn, 26th Marines was relieved of their blocking mission at first light on D-17 and crossed the SONG LA THO to join 1st Bn, 1st Marines. The 3rd Bn, 26th Marines was joined by 2 Troop, 4th Cavalry provided by General LAM. These APC's were light and provided mobility to the final attack. They arrived at 1630 on 7 December. A tight line was drawn surrounding the NORTHERN BUNKER COMPLEX.

x. From these positions, the attack commenced on D-18. All day, the 3rd Bn, 26th Marines reinforced inched forward, maneuvering the APC's towards bunker after bunker, and directing small arms fire against the determined enemy. At one point late in the day, Co I, 3/26 moved to within 20 meters of what was thought to be the last of the series of in depth positions. From these final bunkers, deep in the NORTHERN BUNKER COMPLEX, came deadly, accurate, automatic weapons fire. Although suffering heavy casualties Co I silenced the machine gun position.

y. On D-19 the final assault was executed. Over 300 enemy bodies were found. This time they were unable to bury their dead.

z. On 9 December 1968 at 1800 Operation MEADE RIVER was terminated. Units were returned to their parent organizations after 20 days of vicious, intense fighting. The 1st Bn, 1st Marines took over and mopped up the NORTHERN BUNKER COMPLEX for two more days. During this post-MEADE RIVER period, 1/1 found additional bodies and killed some NVA remaining in bunkers, refusing to come out. A total of 50 enemy KIA were accounted for. They also recovered numerous additional enemy individual and crew served weapons.

#### aa. CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(1) General. Operation MEADE RIVER developed in response to an I CORPS CORDS/MACV proposal generated by intelligence indicating a concentration of Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) northwest of the DIEN BAN District town of VINH DIEN. The concept of this operation involved

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not only a large cordon and detailed search, but the removal of all civilians from within the cordon area to a Temporary Camp provided by QUANG NAM Province. While the operation continued, civilians in the camp would be screened by Province, DIEN BAN District police and by intelligence agencies to extract the VCI from the camp population. Upon termination of the operation, the civilians would be returned to their homes.

(a) Planning for the civil affairs and psychological operations portions of Operation MEADE RIVER began on 15 Nov 68 with a briefing at the 1st Marines CP by the 1st Marine Division G-5 Section. At that point it became apparent that the 1st Marines were going to be involved in supporting the civil affairs part of the operation with personnel and logistical resources.

(b) Coordination between G-5, 1st Marines S-5, and U.S. Advisors occurred following the regular weekly Province Advisors briefing at HOI AN on 16 Nov 68. It was a short meeting, which established the 18th as the date for a conference between G-5, 1st Marines staff, and the GVN Officials of QUANG NAM Province and DIEN BAN District military, paramilitary, and civil sections. On the meeting of the 18th the following plans were drawn, and later executed:

(1) The GVN military and paramilitary sections of the Province and District headquarters would be capable of executing on D-Day the intelligence and VC Infrastructure screening and providing the necessary National Police, National Police Field Forces, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and transportation support planned. It was further agreed that intelligence and logistical augmentation from the 1st Marines would be provided.

(2) For a variety of reasons, mostly involved with mustering of necessary logistical support, the Province and District Refugee Service officials and their U.S. Advisors would be unable to begin operations until D+1.

(3) The 1st Marine Regiment S-5 would fill the gap created with respect to Refugee Service problems with its own and 1st Division personnel and logistical resources until the Refugee Services could get into operation. 1st Marine Division PsyOps assets were requested (Det-1, 7th PsyOps Bn., USA) and those were supplemented by two additional Ground Loudspeaker Teams. Flight One of the Ninth Special Operations Squadron, USAF support was obtained through 1st Marine Division PsyOps to provide an aerial loudspeaker broadcast capability.

(c) QUANG NAM Province CHIEU HOI PsyOps section provided six (6) Armed Propaganda Teams (APT's) to assist in the movement and control of civilians to and from the collection points along the cordon, and to broadcast CHIEU HOI appeals from the cordon. A two man headquarters team was attached to Alpha CP and controlled by the 1st.

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Marines S-5.

(d) During the operation there were several taped messages broadcast by air or ground or both media which took advantage of Psychological opportunities, exploiting them in reasonable time. One special leaflet was made up to assist in informing the population about the cordon and where the collection points were.

(e) The S-5 Section divided for the operation, with the S-5 Officer, driver, and interpreter moving by jeep to 1/1 CP area with the Alpha CP. The S-5 Section Chief, Civil Affairs Clerk and PsyOps Clerk remained at CP Bravo. Normal S-5 functioning was maintained by the Regiment and all battalions throughout the operation.

bb. PHASE I

(1) This phase was comprised of the insertion of the cordoning forces, the establishment of collection points, and the beginning of movement out of the cordoned area by the civilian populace.

(a) Along the cordon, three collection points were established: one at the northwestern corner at the junction of the railroad berm and LA THO River cordon lines; one at the southeastern corner at the junction of Routes #1, and #4; and one at the northeastern corner at the junction of Route #1 and the northern cordon line. (See Op Overlay to reference a).

(b) PsyOps ground loudspeaker teams and aerial broadcast messages directed the civilians to move to the cordon lines to be collected and transported north to the Temporary Camp. They were told to bring a day's food, family history, and cooking utensils. Except in the case of four Pro-GVN hamlets along Route #1, the people were told to turn their livestock loose. One person per family was authorized to stay behind and care for livestock in the Pro-GVN hamlets.

(c) As planned, establishing the Temporary Camp did not begin until well into D-Day. G-5 personnel, including the 29th Civil Affairs Company, USA, detachment which supports the 1st Marine Division, went into action to provide the initial refugee encampment. Tentage, concertina, field ranges, water tanks, cooks, rice and other foodstuffs, and transport for civilians and water were all provided.

(d) The Province Refugee Service furnished a Vietnamese working party to erect the canvas, and once civilians began coming in from the cordon, the Refugee Service was able to requisition food and other materials for refugee support. Province canvas assets were staged at AN HOA, and could not be lifted in until D+1 by Marine helicopters which were heavily committed to the movement of troops and supplies on D-Day. The basic camp sufficed to handle the civilian population which grew from 400 to 1800 by D+2. On D+2, however, the Refugee

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Service was providing its own resources and was in control of the Temporary Camp, with G-5 personnel released to monitor the progress of the operation and provide assistance when necessary. The 29th Civil Affairs Company from HOI AN provided further support.

(e) The civilians were well cared for at the camp. They were tented by hamlet. Food, water, sanitation facilities, paper blankets and fuel for their cooking fires, were provided them. On D+2 fish and green vegetables were provided to supplement the rice diet.

(f) During their stay, they were entertained variously by CHIEU HOI and Revolutionary Development Team drama troupes, and a Vietnam Information Service loudspeaker truck furnishing television, movies, live broadcasts and radio news and music. The Revolutionary Development teams provided haircuts and hairstyling and conducted games and singing sessions with the children while sandwiching in appropriate propaganda messages.

(g) Medical treatment was provided by two Province medical teams, periodic visits by the Province MILHAP medical advisors and the German Red Cross medical team based in HOI AN, with the assistance of RD medical aides.

(h) In the meantime, District and Province intelligence and police sections screened out VC Infrastructure, took census, and identified each family by hamlet.

(2) By the end of D+2, all civilians collected by 2nd Bn, 7th Marines in their eastward progress to the railroad berm had been delivered to the refugee camp. Further use of the northwestern collection point was abandoned and the National Police team employed there was returned to the District police group at the Temporary Camp. This left two collection points in use along the cordon on Route #1. The northeastern collection point had been moved 1500 meters south, as existing trails channeled the civilians to that point during their movement out of the cordoned area.

cc. PHASE II

(1) During PHASE II (D+3&4), the ARVN forces conducted their sweep and cleared the remaining civilians out of the cordoned area. ARVN and National Police Field Forces issued an identification sheet to the one person per family remaining behind in the friendly hamlets to tend livestock. This eliminated problems when Marine forces began sweeping in PHASE III, and gave the civilians a feeling of GVN concern for their interests.

(2) PsyOps teams broadcast CHIEU HOI appeals from the cordon during PHASE II.

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dd. PHASE III

(1) During PHASE III, Marine units swept the cordoned area. The civilians at the camp settled down to a program of entertainment, medical treatment, propaganda and intelligence screening. There were 2663 civilians in the camp, which had been classified into 2590 IC, 71 VCI and 2 CD.

(A) The HB and APT teams moved into the sweep with the Marine units, broadcasting CHIEU HOI and Surrender or Die messages. An amnesty period was declared during this phase and the enemy encouraged to give up. One CHIEU HOI had come in by D+4.

(2) Screening ended on 30 Nov 68 (D+10) and the camp was closed. USMC trucks supplemented ARVN transportation in order to return all innocent civilians to their hamlet areas by 1730. The VCI and CD were detained by Province and District agencies.

ee. PHASE IV

(1) At the beginning of PHASE IV, it was necessary to return one of the HB teams to 7th PsyOps battalion for employment elsewhere. By this time a second team had been reconstituted due to the injury of one U.S. soldier. The enemy was forced into two main pockets of resistance, and a CHIEU HOI crossed the SUOI COI CA river providing the identity of the force trapped inside the HOOK. This information was exploited by a taped message from General LAM and a message from CO, 1st Marines to the NVN unit commander personally encouraging his surrender. The enemy chose to disregard the appeal.

(2) During PHASE IV, one of the APT's was wounded slightly, not requiring evacuation, and the equipment of one HB Team took small arms fire while broadcasting. The equipment was replaced within 24 hours. The APT's began to reach the extent of their capacity for sustained field work, as their equipment began to need repair and their clothing and boots gave out. The tactical situation allowed their removal as the cordon shrank and the HB teams, with their greater loudspeaker range were able to completely dominate the terrain.

(3) By D+15, the last APT had been extracted and returned with their headquarters team to HOI AN, and the Regimental S-5 returned to CP Bravo to conduct coordination and normal business from that location. Province MAC/CORDS had provided two Advisor liaison officers to the Alpha CP and the Regimental PsyOps Officer took over control of the HB Team which remained with 1st Bn, 1st Marines on the northern cordon line. On D+17, the last CHIEU HOI was taken from the operational area. The operation ended on D+19.

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ff. Statistics

(1) Logistical Support provided GVN by 1st Marine Division during Operation MELDE RIVER:

## (a) Foodstuffs:

Rice	14,000	lbs
Oil Cooking	8	cases
Creole sauce	30	cases
Babyfood	3	cases
Navy beans	5	bags
Candy	10	cases

## (b) Other:

Water	45,500	gal
Water bladders	2	
Water trailer	1	
Water tanker	1	(3000 gallon 2x daily)
Immersion burners	8	
GI cans	8	
Field ranges	7	(w/2 cooks)
Firewood	10	6x's
Plywood	20	sheets 4'x4'
Garden kits	4	
Soap	4	cases
Tents	31	
Trucks	5	(D-Day & D+7)
Concertina	50	rolls
Pipe tobacco	2	gross
Toys	4	boxes
500 kw generator	1	(w/operator)

## (c) Materials provided by QUANG NAM Refugee Service:

Green Vegetables	1500	bundles
Nuoc Man	200	gals
Fresh fish	65	bags
Salt	7	bags
Tents	40	

## (d) Materials provided by 29th C. A. Company:

Corn meal	570	bags
CSM	150	bags
Bulgur	215	bags
Cooking oil	25	cases
Powdered Milk	50	cases (IRC)

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## (c) Civilian Statistics:

(1) Civilians transported to camp - 2,663

(a) Adults 955  
(b) Children 1708

(2) Civilians screened 1873

(3) VCI/CD Identified/arrested 73

12. Results:FRIENDLY LOSSES:

## US

KIA	108
WIA (EVAC)	383
WIA (MINOR)	130

## ARVN

KIA	2
WIA	37

ENEMY LOSSES:

KIA	1023
POW	123
CHIEU HOI	6
VCI	71
CD	2

TOTAL	1225
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IWC	174
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CSWC	25
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RICE CAPTURED	39,950 lbs
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BUNKERS DESTROYED	360
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13. Administrative Matters

a. As outlined in reference (b), prescribed loads were as follows:

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(1) Class IC

3 days of MCI w/fuel trioxane  
 3 full canteens plus 7 days halizone  
 10 Iodine tablets and 24 Salt tablets

(2) Class IIE & M

Normal arms and equipment to include the following:

M16 Cleaning equipment  
 Gas mask  
 3 pair of socks  
 1 can of foot powder  
 Poncho/rainsuit  
 One warming tent w/stove per company

(3) Class IIW

3 days

(4) Class IV

None

(5) Class V-W

BA plus 3 DOL, and 3 days of demolition, CS and smoke  
 grenade

(6) Class VI

None

(7) Class VII GKM

Combat essential T/E and Special Allowances as prescribed  
 by Commanders

(8) Class VIII

BA plus malaria tablets available for all troops

(9) Class IX GKM

Critical high usage items

(10) Class X

None

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b. RESUPPLY:

(1) Resupply for Operation MEADE RIVER was accomplished by utilizing the existing LSA on Hill 55. In addition to the regular staff permanently maintained at the LSA, each battalion was required to furnish one SNCO S-4 Representative and a two man working party. Overall coordination and supervision of resupply was the responsibility of the 1st Marine Regiment S-4 Representative. In addition, the Division G-4 furnished two representatives to assist and offer guidance in the initial stages of activating and restocking the LSA.

(2) The primary means of delivery was by helicopter. A platoon of trucks was initially staged at the LSA to aid in resupply of 2nd Bn, 26th Marines and 2nd Bn, 5th Marines who were positioned along Route 1. With the movement to PHASE II, all resupply was by helicopter and the number of vehicles were reduced until at the end of the operation the LSA maintained only two vehicles.

(3) Medical supplies was the only problem area encountered by the LSA in obtaining supplies. It normally took 3-4 days for the requests to be delivered. To overcome this long delay, walk-thru requisitions were initiated and they were handled expeditiously by the Medical Section. The instant and rapid response in all other commodity areas by the FLC and ASP 1 are to be commended.

c. STATISTICS:

(1) The below listed services and supplies were provided by the LSA.

(a) Surface Deliveries:

Vehicles	48
Passengers	328
Cargo Weight	257,155

(b) Air Deliveries:

Total lifts	661
Passengers	696
Cargo Weight	1,066,901

(2) The following commonly used items were provided:

MCI (meals)	270,896
Sundries	406
Batteries	
BA386	2,166
BA30	1,328
Handsets H-189	95

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(3) The below listed ordnance was issued:

UNCLASSIFIED	81 MM Rounds	
	HE	11,473
	Illum	1,943
	WP	<u>1,932</u>
		15,348
	60 MM Rounds	
	HE	4,260
	Illum	940
	WP	<u>810</u>
		6,010
	40 MM Rounds	11,130
	3.5 Rocket	426
	LAWS	1,155
	7.62 rounds	125,600
	5.56 rounds	336,000
	M26 grenades	5,568
	Mines, claymore	244
	Demolition, Ch	57,120 lbs

d. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

(1) The primary means of medical evacuation was by helicopter. LZ's were established in the combat areas. All medevacs were lifted to the NSA Hospital and/or the 1st Medical Battalion. Personnel of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, when feasible, were lifted to the USS Tri-poli.

(2) There were no problem areas encountered.

e. MEDICAL:

(1) Standard medical procedures were followed throughout this operation. No problem areas were discovered.

f. TRANSPORTATION:

(1) Just about all types of transportation were available and used during this operation. On D-2 48 vehicles were sandbagged at Red Beach by 2/26. On D-1 2/26 was trucked to the 1/1 CP area. A platoon of vehicles was staged at the LSA to assist in resupplying 2/26 and 2/5 while in their static positions along Route 1. 10 Otters were also utilized for resupply purposes to 1/1, 2/5 and 3/26. In addition, these vehicles were used as eating and drying spaces for elements of 2/26, who were in waist deep water for several days.

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(2) In addition to using vehicles for resupplying and carrying troops, they were also utilized by the 1st Marines S-2, S-5, and CORDS for carrying civilians, detainees, Prisoners of War, Advisory Teams and miscellaneous equipment necessary to maintain a refugee camp and POW compound. Much of this support came from the vehicles staged at the LSA. On two occasions it was necessary to place a commitment on the Division Motor Transportation Officer for additional vehicles to carry out this mission. The required support was provided. The flexibility demonstrated during Operation MEADE RIVER proved that the system of closely coordinated logistics and operations is mandatory. The desks of the Regimental S-3, and the S-4A were side by side. In this manner, the S-4A was able to anticipate the logistical requirements forthcoming. Timely planning diminished logistical problems and assured supportability of every maneuver conceived by the Regimental Commander.

g. COMMUNICATIONS. For Operation MEADE RIVER, the Regiment established an ALFA CP at PHONG LUC (3) for operational control and support of the seven Marine Battalions, ARVN units and regional forces participating in the operation. The original CP, located at DONG SON (2), was designated the BRAVO CP and continued normal communications with two Marine Battalions. The Communication Platoon was supplemented by 42 personnel from the 7th Communication Battalion and equipment from organic battalions, Division Communication Company and the 5th and 7th Communication Battalions for installation and operation of the massive communications system required for support of these CP's. Wire and radio relay circuits were the primary means of a communications from the ALFA CP to Division and to the BRAVO CP. FM radio was the primary means of communications between the ALFA CP and the participating units. Radio supplanted FM radio as the primary means of communications to battalions, when feasible under the tactical situation.

(1) RADIO. Major VHF radio interference, anticipated due to the over 600 VHF radio sets known to be operating on over 100 VHF frequencies in the TAOR, was non-existent. Firm technical control of frequencies employed and mandatory use of minimum antenna equipment required for reliable communications minimized this problem area. The lack of vehicles by some units (due to topography), to provide power for speech encipherment equipment, reduced the effectiveness of radio communications. This problem area will be resolved upon the issue of the AN/PRC-77 and KY-38 equipment. Normal radio nets to Division were guarded at the ALFA and BRAVO CP's. Five Regimental Tactical Nets were in operation as shown below:

<u>RT#</u>	<u>STATIONS</u>
1	ALFA, BRAVO, LSA, Rear Bn's
2	# ALFA, North and East cordon Bn's - admin type traffic
3	# ALFA, South and West cordon Bn's - admin type traffic

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<u>RT #</u>	<u>STATIONS</u>
4	ALFA and cordon Bn's - Common Uncovered (6 or 3's use only)
5	ALFA and cordon Bn's - Common Covered (6, 3 or 2 use only)

Note: #Secured when radio relay terminals in operation at Bn.

(2) WIRE. Normal wire communications were employed, though on a massive scale. The Wire Section installed a 3 mile heavy construction type overhead cable, and buried all internal CP cables for the operation.

(3) RADIO RELAY. The operation saw the first known large-scale employment of the AN/PCC-1 radio relay equipment. This equipment, on loan from the 5th and 7th Communication Battalions, proved to be significantly more reliable, more mobile and to require less support than the AN/TRC-27 equipment now organic to the Regiment. Experimentation showed that the battalion terminals could effectively use whip antennas, vice the large LPS's, thus greatly increasing mobility and eliminating two large targets which drew hostile fire early in the operation. Radio traffic with battalions was drastically reduced when those terminals were in operation. The only problems encountered were the initial lack of familiarity with the equipment and the relatively short-life span of the wet-cell battery, in use by units without vehicles or other power sources. Lack of formal training was overcome by "crash" training and OJT. The second problem area was solved by exchange of batteries on the daily helicopter-courier run and establishment of a battery charging facility at ALFA. Issue of the new 48-hour battery will alleviate this problem. From experience gained on this operation, it is felt the issue of the AN/PCC-1 and the AN/VCC-2 equipment to the Regiment will significantly increase the effectiveness of this units communications system.

(4) MESSAGE CENTER. The full-duplex was installed to the ALPHA CP and tape traffic was directly-patched or relayed as required. No teletype was utilized by the cordon battalions. The ALFA Message Center forwarded traffic daily on scheduled helicopter and vehicular courier runs.

#### 14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Due to the size, scope and concept of Operation MEADE RIVER, some special equipment and special techniques were used.

(1) Metal Probes. 2500 metal probes, manufactured by FLC were issued to all battalions to aid and assist in their search for fighting holes and caches. These probes were constructed of 1/2" round steel stock, 36-48" in length with a T-handle and a forged point. These probes were instrumental in the discovery of numerous holes and caches.

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~~SECRET~~

(2) Towers. Two 25' towers were utilized by 1st Bn, 1st Marines in their static positions to enable them to have better fields of fire and observation.

(3) Crushed Rock and Matting. The 1st Engineer Battalion provided two M151 Dump Trucks loaded with crushed rock and two trucks carrying Marston Matting to accompany the convoy transporting BLT 2/26 to the cordon. Enroute to their positions on D-Day one of the vehicles struck a mine along Route 1. The prepositioned dump trucks were immediately dispatched to the crater and dumped the crushed rock, thereby, allowing the convoy to proceed to their objective with a minimum time loss. Because of the need to emplace the cordon simultaneously, it was imperative that this convoy proceed without delay. The forethought of requiring the 1st Engineer Battalion to provide two dump trucks filled with crushed rock enabled BLT 2/26 to carry out their mission by arriving on time at their cordon positions.

(4) SandBags. The 48 vehicles assigned to transport troops of BLT 2/26 were dispatched on D-2 to Red Beach where they were sand bagged by 2/26. This procedure, while not guaranteeing complete safety from land mines and fragments, is a definite morale factor for the troops on the vehicles.

(5) Scuba. During PHASE III and IV Scuba Teams were used to search river banks; water filled bomb craters and clear water springs. On 26 November a Scuba Team from the 1st Recon Bn was helilifted to BLT 2/26 CP to conduct a search of TAM GIAM River for caves and hidden enemy supplies. The team searched selected locations of the river with negative results. On 2 December a Scuba Team was helilifted to Company G, BLT 2/7 where they searched a water filled bomb crater, 15 feet deep. Discovered was a case of enemy .50 caliber ammunition, some SCAR (2.75) rockets and miscellaneous 782 gear. Additionally, on 5 and 6 December, teams were helilifted to Companies A and B, 1st Marines to search suspected areas of hidden enemy equipment on the banks and bottom of the SONG LA THO. Nothing was found.

(6) Water Pump. During PHASE IV of the Operation, engineers used a 55 GPM water pump to drain a bomb crater 20 feet deep and uncovered numerous items of NVA 782 gear.

#### 15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

In addition to MEADE RIVER, the 1st Marines has employed over 50 cordon type operations - from company size to two battalion size which have proven to be most effective. I'm even more convinced now that this method is the best way to achieve success with the enemy. They will avoid contact with a large force and fade away. They will hit small or unalert forces from prepared positions and slip away after inflicting heavy casualties. With cordons they have been forced to fight. Although they are extremely tenacious when fighting for their lives, they can and

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have been hurt. Very few eluded the cordon in MEADE RIVER, as is evidenced by the final totals. The compression of the cordon cannot be rushed, nor can part of the cordon be formed merely by a terrain obstacle. The area must be physically covered by a fire team every fifteen meters and the search must be a deliberate, probing and detailed affair. Patience and professionalism are the key to a successful cordon and search. Small unit tactics and leadership are essential ingredients, as is the coordinated application of supporting arms.

The combined, multiple mission accomplished in MEADE RIVER reduced immeasurably the enemy's capabilities in the DANANG AO. With all the effort, planning, and coordination between GVN, ARVN, ROKMC, and USMC forces, the "Grunt" was still the man to do the job. He stood in the rice paddy, and tramped through elephant grass in the face of a determined enemy. He endured the adverse conditions, and he, as usual, did an outstanding job.

*R. G. Lauffer*  
R. G. LAUFFER

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