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U.S. MARINES
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

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7-66

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S & C FILES

30 MARINES

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100566

ORIGINAL

1st BN.

1st MAR.

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 FEB - 28 FEB 66

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 1st Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
San Francisco, California, 96601

100566

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3/JCM/jmb

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Ser. No. 0012-66

3 March 1966


From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, (Rein) FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1
(b) RegtO 3120.1A
(c) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000 AMS Series, L701, Sheets
66581V and 66591II

Encl: (1) Command Chronology for the period 1-28 February 1966.

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is submitted.


JOHN E. WATSON
Executive Officer

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 1st Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
San Francisco, California, 96601

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 February through 28 February 1966

Part I

Organizational Data Sheet

Part II

Significant Events

Part III

Supporting Documents

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PART I

1. Reporting Unit: 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. Command Post: DA NANG, RVN Coordinates (AT 953723)
3. Period Covered: 1 February - 28 February 1966
4. Date of Submission: 3 March 1966
5. Average Monthly Strength:

	USMC	USN	
Officers	32	3	
Enlisted	930	50	53
	468	53	968
			1021

6. Commanding Officer: LtCol H. A. HATCH

7. Principal Staff:

S-1	1 Feb - 5 Feb 66	1st Lt P. T. JONES
	6 Feb - 28 Feb 66	1st Sgt E. B. MCGINNIS
S-2		1st Lt B. F. X. AHEARN
S-3		Maj F. S. JOHNSON
S-4		Capt D. L. CARTWRIGHT
CommG		Capt H. M. GRIFFIN

8. Subordinate Units:

Co A	1 Feb - 4 Feb 66	1st Lt G. R. LANGFORD
	5 Feb - 28 Feb 66	Capt M. E. P. DOMINGUEZ
Co B	1 Feb - 15 Feb 66	Capt D. R. RAISELIS
	16 Feb - 28 Feb 66	Capt J. J. CRATIS
Co C		Capt R. G. NEAL
Co D	11 Jan - 31 Jan 66	1st Lt R. K. TAUBERT
	1 Feb - 28 Feb 66	Capt J. C. TULLY
H&S Co	1 Jan - 31 Jan 66	Capt J. C. TULLY
	1 Feb - 28 Feb 66	Capt H. M. GRIFFIN

ENCLOSURE (1)

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**1st Plat
Co A, 3d TkBn

2d Lt G. D. ROSE

**1st Plat
Co A, 3d AT Bn

2d Lt R. F. Mc MEER

*Plat 678th Co.
52d Br. ARVN

W. O. DONG

9. Mission Assigned

a. 1st Bn, 1st Marines occupies and controls assigned sector of TAOR; defends MLR in assigned sector of TAOR; provides security for the installations on HILL 327 (AT 971737) and HILL 268 (AT 969744); provides a security force, in conjunction with Popular Forces, for the bridges at (AT 46699); conducts unilateral search and destroy operations in assigned sector of TAOR; conducts aggressive combat/reconnaissance patrolling throughout assigned sector of TAOR; and prepares to conduct combined and coordinated operations within or beyond the boundaries of the TAOR.

10. Background

a. General. Rifle companies exert maximum influence in their respective areas of responsibility with daily combinations of patrols, village sweeps, and ambushes. Deep patrols are undertaken to locate and destroy the enemy's offensive capabilities. Frequent search and clear operations and pacification projects employing all available civil affairs/psychological warfare capabilities, are conducted to expand the secure areas within the TAOR, gradually increasing the number of Vietnamese civilians who are able to return to a peaceful routine of living without fear of attack or reprisal by the Viet Cong. Concurrently, forces are maintained in a state of readiness to participate in large-scale operations beyond the boundaries of the TAOR, when opportunities present themselves.

b. Defense. The concept of the defense places heavy emphasis on the ability to detect and break up enemy concentrations well forward of the MLR. Company base areas organized for local defense against enemy attack. The bulk of the defensive effort is devoted to the maintenance of a constantly shifting screen of patrols, ambushes, listening posts, observation posts, roadblocks, and checkpoints--to disrupt the enemy's ability to follow his three main courses of action: infiltration; limited objective attacks, and major attacks. Maximum use is made of visual and sound detection devices for this capability.

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In the event of enemy attack, defensive planning envisions the use of fire support and reserve forces to destroy the enemy as he attempts to withdraw, after the attack has been stopped.

c. Offense. The patrolling which forms part of the defensive screen described above is essentially offensive in nature, in that it attempts to gain and maintain contact with enemy forces and to develop information for large-scale operations against enemy forces of significant size; and their supply, training, and bivouac areas. Interpreters, Popular Forces and ARVN personnel are used whenever possible, to improve communications with civilians encountered during operations and, consequently, to provide the most current intelligence information possible. Maximum use is made of sniper teams, scout dog teams, and other specialized units in the conduct of operations.

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PART II
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. PERSONNEL.

a. Replacements. During this reporting period, the battalion received the following personnel as replacements.

- (1) Officers - - - - - 2
- (2) Enlisted - - - - - 45
- (3) USN Enlisted - - - - 4

b. Rotation. The following number of personnel were rotated to CONUS

- (1) Officers - - - - - 4
- (2) Enlisted - - - - - 68
- (3) USN Enlisted - - - - 5

c. Personnel lost through attrition other than rotation.

- (1) WIA - - - - - 39
- (2) WIA-USN - - - - - 2
- (3) WIANE - - - - - 20
- (4) WIANE USN - - - - - 2
- (5) KIA - - - - - 2
- (6) Non Battle Casualties - - - - 4
- (7) Intradivision Transfers
 - (a) USMC Officer - - - - - 1
 - (b) USMC Enl - - - - - 33
 - (c) USN - - - - - 4

d. R&R. The following number of personnel were assigned R&R quotas to the locations indicated:

- (1) Hong Kong - - - - - 3
- (2) Bangkok - - - - - 9

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DEPT (R)

- (3) Okinawa - - - - - 17
- (4) Saigon - - - - - 10
- (5) Tokyo - - - - - 4
- (6) Taipei - - - - - 2
- (7) Manila - - - - - 2

a. Special Services.

1. During February the following special services items were received:

- (a) 30 portable ice chests
- (b) Two boxes of pocket books and magazines
- (c) 1,000 Third Marine Division money clips
- (d) Approximately 100 christmas packages from Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity at the University of California.
- (e) Approximately 150 christmas packages from various organizations in the United States.
- (f) A Parade/athletic field was constructed at H&S Company and is used daily for volleyball, basketball, football and softball.

(g) Movies continue to be presented according to the following schedule:

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
EM Club (1900)	Security Plt. (0800)	EM Club (1900)	Security Plt. (0800)	EM Club (1900)	Security Plt. (0800)
	Staff & Officer (1930)		Staff & Officer (1930)		

2. Administration.

- a. Personnel Accounting. None
- b. Awards.

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(1) The following awards were processed and forwarded to higher headquarters for action.

(a) Bronze Star Medal - - - - - 1

(b) Navy Commendation Medal - - - - - 2

(2) The following awards were presented.

(a) Silver Star Medal - - - - - 2

(b) Bronze Star Medal - - - - - 1

(3) Purple Heart Medals forwarded or processed for presentation - 62

C. Promotions.

(1) Staff Sergeant - - - - - 3

(2) Corporal - - - - - 15

(3) Lance Corporal - - - - - 7

(4) Private First Class - - - - - 32

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3. Intelligence.

a. Enemy situation at the beginning of the period. Viet Cong forces continued to avoid contact with friendly troops but increased harassing activities and probes of defensive areas. Three reports were received of an impending attack on the pontoon bridge (AT946699). One report included the Viet Cong concept for the attack which is considered a most probable course of action. Viet Cong units varying, in size from (1) platoon to (2) companies, were reported in the BO BAN (2) area (AT966697), approximately 2000 meters to the east of the bridge site; however, the reported attack failed to materialize. Incidents involving booby traps and mines kept pace with the rate of incidents for the previous month and showed no sign of decreasing.

b. Enemy initiated incidents during the period.

(1) There were eighty-one incidents reported during the month of February and compared with January as follows:

	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>
Engagements	8	4
Mine Incidents	32	41
Harassing Fire	18	33
Sniper Fire	7	2
Mortar Fire	0	1
Ground Fire	1	0

(2) As the above chart illustrates, the majority of incidents centered on harassing fire and mines/booby traps. The increase in harassing fire incidents is obviously due to the increase of friendly patrols beyond the periphery of controlled areas. It was expected that mining incidents would remain high as this would enable the Viet Cong to harass friendly forces while limiting their own casualties. Information gathered indicates that the mining incidents were the result of the actions of an engineer platoon located in the mountainous region to the west of the TAOR. This unit is tentatively identified as the V-15 platoon of the DOC LOP Main Force Battalion. Other reports indicate an influx of directional type mines into the area, although only two incidents occurred involving directional type mines. The following table compares mining incidents of January and February:

	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>
Total Mining Incidents	32	41
% of Mines Discovered	38%	50%
No. of Casualties	47	40

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(3) At 010200H an "A" Company patrol received 4 rounds of 81mm mortar fire vicinity (AT953723). The direction from which the fire was received could not be determined. No friendly casualties.

(4) At 060425H an "A" Company ambush moving into position detonated a directional type mine vicinity (AT894665). The mine was triggered by a trip wire and situated so as to have maximum fragmentation effect on the long axis of the troop formation.

(5) At 101310H a "B" Company patrol detected a heavily mined and booby trapped area vicinity (AT866626). Along a 110 meter portion of an E - W trail the patrol found 2 grenade booby traps, (1) ChiCom mine and ten panjiri traps. It is unusual for the Viet Cong to employ explosive devices so extensively in an area well removed from friendly positions. It is possible that the Viet Cong had hoped to discourage friendly troops from entering the area by inflicting prohibitive casualties. A thorough search did not reveal any Viet Cong facilities in the immediate area. (See Part III Supporting Documents - Intelligence Summary for period 12-1800H February 1966).

(6) At 141300H a mine sweep detail on the MSR located an explosive charge composed of 30-40 pounds of explosives and a 155mm dud vicinity (AT-943667). The device was removed by EOD personnel.

(7) At 221600H a "B" Company patrol killed a Viet Cong vicinity (AT942669). The Viet Cong carried a pistol, 3 hand grenades and several documents. A cursory interpretation of the documents revealed the Viet Cong to be a Local Force squad leader acting as liaison between different units. A diary found on the KIA contained a chronological listing of mining incidents within the area. Other documents mentioned the planned assimilation of Local Force cadre into Main Force units.

c. Summary of enemy casualties, captured, and equipment captured during the period.

(1) Viet Cong Losses (Personnel)

- (a) KIA - Three
- (b) WIA - Eleven (probable)
- (c) VCC - 0
- (d) VCS - Fifty-seven

(2) Viet Cong Losses (Weapons)

- (a) One .38 cal. double action, German made pistol

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(3) Viet Cong Losses (Miscellaneous)

- (a) Fourteen Mines/Booby Traps
- (b) 215 Panjii Stakes
- (c) Sixteen Caves/Tunnels
- (d) Three 105mm Rounds
- (e) Two 155mm Rounds
- (f) One 90mm Round
- (g) One 81mm Mortar Round
- (h) Twenty-six Panjii Traps
- (i) 1500 Pounds of Rice
- (j) Three ChiCom Grenades
- (k) Five Mine Markers
- (l) One Bear Trap
- (m) One uniform

d. Significant trends noted during the period. On six occasions anti artillery rounds were found in areas frequently patrolled by friendly troops. The circumstances and locations of the finds indicate that the Viet Cong had transported the rounds into the area for future use as booby traps. In all cases the rounds were found in heavily vegetated areas or camouflaged. Incidents involving explosive devices increased over the previous month but friendly forces exhibited a greater acuity in detecting the devices, especially at night. It is significant to note that casualties inflicted by mines resulted in the lowest casualty to incident ratio for one month during the six-month period from September 1965 to February 1966.

e. Enemy situation at the end of the period. During the latter part of the month three reports were received of Viet Cong company sized units operating along the southeastern border of the TAOR, while 2 separate battalion sized units were reported in the highlands to the west. No increased enemy activity resulted from these sightings. A local agent reported that the Viet Cong influence in HIEU DUC District, which is located within the TAOR, is fast waning and the enemy is concentrating his efforts to the south, primarily DAI LOC District. The lack of Viet

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has prompted the enemy to threaten the villagers to gain support. On occasion they have stated that they will harass Marine units from friendly villages thereby causing the Marines to destroy the villages. This threat has thus far been ineffective.

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4. Training.

a. Objectives. Training during the month of February had the double task of fully indoctrinating replacement personnel with a great amount of "need-to-know" information about combat in Vietnam, and disseminating to the more experienced personnel the refinements of "lessons learned" about tactics, weapons employment, and the nature of the enemy. Emphasis was placed on the importance of the Marine Corps' role in civic action programs. As the enemy intensified his mining and booby trapping efforts through the month, the objective of familiarizing all hands with techniques of mine detection and destruction and with tactical measures to minimize mine casualties became paramount. Fifty key personnel, from all companies, attended the 3d Marine Division Land Mine Warfare School conducted by the 3d Engineer Battalion. Students were designated on the basis of their ability to conduct follow-up instructions in their own companies.

b. Training Highlights.

(1) Training at company level was conducted in accordance with BnBul 1500 of 7 February 1966 (Part III: Supporting Documents). In addition, battalion level classes were conducted to cover helicopter support team operations (including practical application with logistic support helicopters); and the employment of the Detection Set, Intrusion AN/PRS-1 (SID). A demonstration of scout dog teams training and employment was also conducted at battalion level.

(2) Weekly, each company fires all individual and crew-served weapons. These firings are conducted in conjunction with serviceability checks by unit armorers and followed by care and cleaning periods.

5. Special Operations. None conducted.

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6. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and other Special Types of Warfare. None conducted during this reporting period.

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Command and Control

a. At the close of this reporting period, the 1st Bn, 12th Marines was task organized as shown below:

1st Bn, 1st Marines (Rein)

LtCol HATCH

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Capt GRIFFIN

H&S Co (-)

LtM; Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
Plat, 768th Co, 52d Bn, ARVN

Co A (Rein)

Capt DOMINGUEZ

Co A

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
3d Sec, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co
Det, Comm Plat, H&S Co

Co B (Rein)

Capt ORAVITS

Co B

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
2d Sec, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co
Det, Comm Plat, H&S Co

Co C (Rein)

Capt NEAL

Co C

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
1st Sec, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
Det Med Plat, H&S Co
Det Comm Plat, H&S Co

Co D (Rein)

Capt TULLY

Co D

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co
Det, Comm Plat, H&S Co

81mm Mortar Plat (-)

SSgt PLINT

106RR Plat

SSgt SULLIVAN

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b. Command Posts

- | | |
|-------------------------|-------------|
| (1) 1st Bn, 1st Marines | (AT 953723) |
| (2) 8th Co | (AT 953723) |
| (3) Co A | (AT 924691) |
| (4) Co B | (AT 935663) |
| (5) Co C | (AT 922736) |
| (6) Co D | (AT 953723) |

c. Attachments and Detachments. No change during reporting period.

d. Control. During the reporting period, the battalion was controlled from a command bunker in the battalion command posts. Wire and radio were the primary means of communication.

e. Problem Areas. None encountered.

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Communication Electronics.

- a. Wire. Normal operations.
- b. Radio. Radio set AN/PRC-25 continues to provide outstanding communications over long ranges.
- c. Radio relay. Normal communications.
- d. Message center/teletype. The battalion message center had trouble-free operations for the third consecutive month using equipment AN/TGC 14A(V) and KW-7.
- e. Maintenance and supply. Normal operations
- f. Problems encountered. None.

Enclosure

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9. Small Unit Combata. Operations Conducted

<u>SIZE</u>	<u>SEARCH/DESTROY</u>	<u>PATROLS</u>	<u>AMBUSHES</u>	<u>LP'S</u>	<u>SCT/SNP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Fire Team	0	0	0	494	0	494
Squad	166	258	185	0	0	609
Platoon	33	7	0	0	0	40
Company	1	0	0	0	0	5
Battalion	0	0	0	0	0	0
Combined	0	0	0	0	0	0

b. Significant Events

(1) 1 February - During this period, the battalion conducted eight daylight patrols--five squad-sized and three platoon-sized. At 1615H, a patrol from Co A tripped a booby-trapped fragmentation grenade, which had been attached to a stake in some heavy brush near (AT 901701). Two Marines were wounded by the explosion, and evacuated by helicopter within 30 minutes. No Vietnamese were seen in the area, and no other traps were found in the subsequent search. No contact was experienced before midnight by the nine squad-sized patrols, 10 squad-sized ambushes, or 10 listening posts which were established.

(2) 2 February - At 0400H, Co C outpost #6 (AT 924730) shot and killed one VC as he moved in a southerly direction about 70 meters from the position. No weapon was found when the area around the KIA was searched. No identification was found on the body, which was dressed in a black shirt and white shorts. At 1045H, a five-man detail from Co B was trouble shooting communication wire at (AT 929669) when the lead man tripped a wire rigged to a booby-trapped fragmentation grenade. One Marine was wounded in the explosion and evacuated by helicopter. During the day, other patrols from Co B apprehended two VCS on two separate occasions, and sent them to IIT for interrogation. Another patrol from Co B found a device made of wood and the tail fin assembly of an 81mm mortar round near (AT 927666). This was believed to be a mock-up of a mortar, possibly used as a guerrilla training aid. Nine daylight patrols (six squad-sized and three platoon-sized) were conducted this day; eight squad-sized night patrols, ten ambushes, and 19 listening posts were established without enemy contact.

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(3) 3 February - The eight daylight patrols (five squad and three platoon-sized), nine night patrols (squad-sized), 10 ambushes (squad-sized), and 18 listening posts established during this period did not make contact with the enemy. A patrol from Co B apprehended a total of five VCS in grid squares (AT 9267), (AT 9266) and (AT 9368). All the VCS were evacuated by helicopter to IIT for interrogation about mine and booby trap incidents in the area. One VCS was later confirmed by IIT to be a member of the VC Farmers' Association.

(4) 4 February - At 0929H, a platoon-sized patrol from Co B was searching the hamlet of AN MY (3) (AT 925607) when its lead squad received small arms fire simultaneously from three positions south and east of the hamlet. An estimated two or three VC occupied each firing position. As the Marines returned fire and began an envelopment, the VC fled into AN MY (1) (AT 924604). The Marines pursued the VC, receiving additional small arms fire as they launched an assault into the hamlet. A search of the hamlet produced one VC document, one VC helmet (French-type), and nine females who had no information to offer. One Marine was wounded in the initial exchange of fire and was evacuated from the scene by helicopter. At 1400H, Marines of Co A teamed up with the 1st Bn, 1st Marines civil affairs team and an audio-visual team from I Corps for a psychological warfare/civic action operation in AN TAN (AT 917702). About 350 civilians watched newsreels and feature films, and heard speeches by North Vietnamese defectors ("ralliers"). The civil affairs team held sick call and distributed foodstuffs. During this period, the battalion conducted 10 daylight patrols (six squad and four platoon-sized); eight night patrols (squad-sized); 14 squad-sized ambushes; and established 19 listening posts.

(5) 5 February - At 1115H, a squad-sized patrol from Co B challenged two Vietnamese, who were moving across a field at (AT 932637). The Vietnamese began to run, and the patrol fired warning shots--including two M79 rounds beyond them--in an attempt to halt them. As the Vietnamese entered a treeline, the entire patrol opened fire. Upon entering the treeline, the patrol found one Vietnamese female about 18 years old, dead of a bullet wound. Two older women were hiding in the bushes nearby. All were dressed in black shirts, black shorts, and conical straw hats. None had identification. The two women were taken to the HIEU DUC District Headquarters. One, who proved to be the mother of the dead girl, was permitted to leave the following day to make funeral arrangements for her daughter, and then was required to return for further questioning. At 1155H, another patrol from Co B received 10 rounds of small arms fire at (AT 923603) from approximately 400 meters to the south. The patrol returned fire and saw one VC fall, but could not find him when the area was searched.

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At 1530H, a squad-sized patrol from Co A apprehended a Vietnamese who attempted to run when the patrol approached him at (AT 911695). The VCS was sent to the HIEU DUC District Headquarters for questioning when it was determined that his description and his identification card did not fit. During this period, the battalion conducted nine daylight patrols (seven squad and two platoon-sized); 11 night patrols (squad-sized); nine squad-sized ambushes; and established 16 listening posts. One squad (Rein) from Co D acted as a blocking force for Co L, 3d Bn, 3d Marines, in connection with Operation SKULL, conducted in the 9th Marines' TAOR.

(6) 6 February - At 0120H, a squad from Co C, enroute to an ambush site, suffered four WLA's as a result of two explosions in rapid succession in the vicinity of (AT 905710). The first was believed to be a grenade, rigged with a trip wire; the second appeared to be non-directional mine mounted in a tree approximately seven feet above the ground and detonated electrically. The Marines were in column, approximately ten paces apart. The center of the column was hit by the explosions. Medical evacuation by helicopter was completed at 0220H. The area was searched at first light for evidence of additional mining, without results. At 0425H, a squad from Co A, also enroute to an ambush site, tripped a directional mine at (AT 894665). The mine was attached to a bush, several feet off the ground, in an open area of knee-deep grass. (See 1st Bn, 1st Marines ISUM of 061920H February 66--Enclosure (1) - Supporting Documents). Six Marines were wounded by the explosion, and were evacuated by helicopter at 0515H. At 2012H, members of the 1st Platoon, Co C, received an estimated 20-30 rounds of small arms fire from two or three VC near their position at (AT 923704). The VC withdrew as the Marines returned fire and began pursuit. Marines searched the area for signs of VC casualties with negative results. During this period, the battalion conducted six daylight patrols (four squad and two platoon-sized); 12 squad-sized night patrols; seven squad-sized ambushes; and established 14 listening posts. At 1600H, Co A was placed under operational control of 3d Reconnaissance Bn, for the duration of Operation TURT BOW.

(7) 7 February - At 0800H, two Marines from Co G were wounded as they attempted to detonate a booby trap which had been discovered by a squad-sized patrol earlier. Helicopter evacuation of the wounded was completed at 0825H. A subsequent search of the area located another booby trap (trip-wire activated M26 grenade), which was destroyed in place. Both traps were placed in the vicinity at (AT 887714). At 0942H, a squad-sized patrol from Co B found a foot trap in the vicinity of (AT 921676). The trap was a foot deep and approximately 11 inches square, covered with a thin bamboo mat. A trip wire woven into the mat was designed to set off an M26 grenade on a short stake inside the trap.

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The trap was destroyed in place by the patrol. Commencing at 1935H, the 1st Platoon of Co C, occupying positions vacated by Co A during its participation in Operation TAUT BOW, experienced two probing attempts by the enemy. In the first, a squad position at (AT 914702) received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 10 VC about 75 yards away from their position. The VC withdrew under the Marines' return fire. The Marines called for six rounds of 81mm HE on the withdrawing enemy, as they commenced physical pursuit. Contact was not reestablished. The second incident occurred at 2030H, as two VC were spotted in a treeline near a squad position at (AT 927681). The squad fired about 150 rounds of small arms fire, 4 M79 rounds and one hand illumination flare. Under the illumination, they observed one man dragging another away from the scene. The Marines opened fire again, apparently hitting the standing man before the illumination round burned out. The Marines moved toward the treeline, finding pools of blood enroute which indicated that both men had been hit. The Marines received carbine fire from the flanks and automatic weapons fire from the center of the treeline, and launched an immediate assault. The VC withdrew under fire. Within the treeline, the Marines found three trails of blood. One appeared to have been made by a man being dragged face down. The trails were lost in dense undergrowth 300 meters to the southwest, and contact was not reestablished. During this period, the battalion conducted six daylight patrols (five squad and one platoon-sized); six squad-sized night patrols; six squad-sized ambushes; and established 10 listening posts.

(8) 8 February - No enemy contact was developed by five daylight patrols (four squad and one platoon-sized); four night (squad-sized) patrols; four squad-sized ambushes; and 17 listening posts. At 2135H, a patrol from Co C located a booby trap and attempted to detonate it with a grappling hook without success. The area was marked to be checked by daylight. A check the following morning revealed an M-26 grenade with a vine wrapped around it. The free end of the vine had been stretched across a trail at a height of six inches. The grenade had the pin removed; the spoon was held in place by the vine wrappings. The grenade was placed to roll when the vine was tripped, unwrapping the vine and releasing the spoon.

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(9) 9 February - Five daylight patrols (four squad-sized and one platoon-sized); seven squad-sized night patrols; five squad-sized ambushes; and 16 listening posts were unable to develop any contact with the enemy during this period. From 1300-1600H approximately 300 Vietnamese attended a showing of seven films (newsreels and feature films) presented by an audio-visual team from the I Corps PsyWar Detachment at the TRUE BAO New Life Hamlet School (AT 937715). The reaction was extremely favorable and follow-up PsyWar efforts in that area were elated.

(10) 10 February - During this period, the battalion conducted five daylight patrols (four squad-sized and one platoon-sized); seven squad-sized night patrols; five ambushes; and established 16 listening posts. No enemy contact was experienced. At 1310H, a patrol from Co B, in the vicinity of (AT 867626), found what appeared to be a homemade mine, approximately three inches in diameter and six inches long. The mine had an eyelet on one side and a piece of bamboo (which was believed to contain a fuze) protruding from the other side. The patrol destroyed the mine in place, and destroyed several punji traps which were located in the area. Two hours later, the same patrol found two similar homemade booby traps at (AT 864626), and destroyed them in place. At 1515H, a patrol from Co C found a pyramidal mine marker in the vicinity of (AT 914695). A complete description of the marker is contained in the 1st Bn, 1st Marines ISUM of 101945H Feb 66 (See enclosure (1) - Supporting Documents). A device, believed to be a grenade rigged as a booby trap, was detonated with a grappling hook in the area of the marker.

(11) 11 February - During this period, the battalion conducted six daylight patrols (four squad-sized and two platoon-sized); seven squad-sized night patrols; five ambushes; and established 20 listening posts. A listening post from Co C received an incoming hand grenade and approximately 15 rounds of harassing fire (carbine) in the vicinity of (AT 921691) at 2040H. The Marines returned fire and moved out to search the area, but were unable to find the estimated one VC who was involved.

(12) 12 February - Co D (-) (Rein) conducted a search and destroy mission in the wooded area west of KHUONG MY (2) (AT 9069), in reaction to information that an estimated VC company was known to bivouac in that area. No contact was made. For details, see After-Action Report 3-66 (Enclosure (1) - Supporting Documents). At 1445H, a patrol from Co C found approximately 1400 pounds of rice in a house in GIAO TRI (1) (AT 884705). The rice was evacuated by helicopter to HLUU DUC District Headquarters. At 2045H, a patrol from Co C found a booby trapped M26 grenade with trip wire attached. The patrol marked the site and continued on its route. When the grenade was destroyed in place the following morning, it was determined that it was modified to detonate instantly when tripped.

SECRET

During this period, the battalion conducted (in addition to the search and destroy operation) four daylight patrols (three squad-sized and one platoon-sized night patrols; five ambushes (squad-sized); and established 20 listening posts.

(13) 13 February - A squad-sized patrol from Co C had intermittent contact with the enemy for a good part of its day-long patrol. It engaged a single VC at 0850H in the vicinity of (AT 929701); but could not pursue him. A river separated the patrol from the VC, who had been firing harrassing fire. At 1050H, the patrol apprehended one VCS in the vicinity of (AT 917708). The Vietnamese male was carrying propaganda leaflets. He had no identification, and had a bruise on his shoulder which appeared to have come from carrying a weapon at sling arms. The VCS was sent to HIEU DUC District Headquarters. An hour later, at (AT 902706) the patrol entered an area which appeared to be a VC supply point. The houses in the heavily tunneled area had been destroyed. Chickens, pigs, and a large amount of chopped wood were found. As the patrol entered the area, it received 20-30 rounds small arms fire, which ceased as the patrol returned fire and began to close in on the VC. During the firing, the livestock scattered and could not be rounded up. At 1430H, two Marines from the patrol were wounded by a booby trap attached to two bamboo sticks in tall grass beside a trail in the same area. The explosion left a crater 1 1/2 to 2 feet in diameter and 2 feet deep, and left a cloud of black smoke. No trip wire was found, but a wire was found leading away from the trap 20-30 meters into the brush. It is believed that the trap was command detonated when the point of the patrol was five or six meters past the point of detonation. One of the Marines required helicopter evacuation, which was completed at 1520H. At 1535H, the patrol, at (AT 908708), received 10-20 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated three to five VC on a ridgeline at (AT 903705). The patrol leader called in an 81mm mortar fire mission (seven rounds HE) on the enemy position. The VC withdrew as the patrol assaulted their position, and results of the fire mission could not be determined. At 1638H, the patrol found two holes which had been prepared for grenade mines. The holes had been covered with leaves and twigs. No mines or booby traps could be located in the area. The patrol returned without further incident. Another patrol from Co C suffered two WIA's at 0945H as it tripped a grenade booby trap on a trail at (AT 874715). The wounded Marines were evacuated by helicopter. A patrol from Co B apprehended four VCS at 1040H. The VCS were stopping Vietnamese civilians near (AT 937635) and checking their identification. One of the VCS had penicillin syringes in his possession, and had blood on his shirt. The VCS were taken to ITT for interrogation. During this period, the battalion conducted six daylight patrols (five squad-sized and one platoon-sized); nine night patrols (squad-sized); eight squad-sized ambushes; and established 20 listening posts.

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(14) 14 February - At 1300H a mine sweeping detail from 1st Engineer Bn located an explosive charge buried in the MCR (AT 943667). The charge was deposited by a T-shaped trench and composed of 30-40 pounds of explosive and 155mm dud round. The explosives were staked down and covered with a plastic sheet, bamboo, and dirt. Two wires were found buried near the top of the trench; the ends of the wires were stripped and ready to splice. The fuze was friction type used with a pull wire. Possible areas from which the device could have been detonated were DUYEN SON hamlet, 250 meters west of the road, or from a concrete foundation in the same area. Elements of the 1st Platoon, Co C received harassing fire (from a distance of about 300 meters) from southwest of their position in grid square (AT 9268) at 1945H. They returned fire and searched the area, with negative results. At 2010H, similar harassing fire was delivered from (AT 939662) at the Btry K, 12th Marines, position on HILL (AT 935665). A patrol from Co B was dispatched to check the area, but could not establish contact with the VC. During this period, the battalion conducted eight daylight patrols (seven squad-sized and one platoon-sized); five squad-sized night patrols; eight squad-sized ambushes; and 20 listening posts. Approximately 400 civilians gathered at the TRUE BA0 New Life Hamlet School (AT 933715) to hear speeches by North Vietnamese "Walliers" and see movies presented by the I Corps PsyWar Detachment's audio-visual team between 1300-1600H. The 1st Bn, 12th Marines Civil Affairs Team held sick call and distributed 200 bars of soap.

(15) 15 February. No enemy contact was developed during this day by the six daylight patrols (four squad-sized and two platoon-sized); five squad-sized night patrols; seven squad-sized ambushes; and 20 listening posts which were sent out by the battalion.

(16) 16 February. At 1030H, a patrol from Co C sighted a VC with a weapon at (AT 913682). The patrol pursued the VC, but lost contact. As the patrol reached the vicinity of (AT 913682), they discovered two caves and destroyed the larger of the two. The patrol sighted the VC two more times as it continued pursuit for approximately one hour before contact was finally broken. At 1240H, another patrol from Co C detonated a booby trap of undetermined description on a trail at (AT 885713). The area was thickly vegetated. The explosion produced fragments and left a crater two feet deep and one foot in diameter. It was believed to be activated by a trip wire, although no positive evidence of this could be found. Four Marines were wounded in the explosion and were evacuated from the scene by helicopter. In another mining incident at 1200H, a Vietnamese child was killed by a mine of unknown description at (AT 946662). 3d Bn, 2d Marines commenced an investigation of the incident.

DEFINITION

At 1530H, a patrol from Co C on the north bank of the river (AT 853706) spotted wires leading across the river to the south bank. The wires lead to a north bank trail, running parallel to the river. The patrol leader threw a grenade at the suspected mine/booby trap position on the trail. A secondary explosion, estimated to be caused by a pound of C4, was observed as the grenade detonated. At this time, the patrol received 8-10 rounds of small arms fire from two positions on the south bank of the river vicinity (AT 899704). The patrol returned fire and called in an 81mm mortar fire mission (six rounds HE) on the enemy position. Results of the mission could not be determined because the unfordability of the river. Enemy firing ceased and the patrol continued on its mission. During this period, the battalion conducted five daylight patrols (four squad-sized and one platoon-sized); seven night patrols (squad-sized); five squad-sized ambushes; and established 20 listening posts. Co A returned to the operational control of 1st Bn, 1st Marines at 1600H, upon completion of Operation TAUT BOW.

(17) 17 February - At 1045H, a patrol from Co C had one Marine slightly wounded (MEDVAC not required) by a mine, believed to be electrically detonated, at (AT 870696). Three men had passed the point of detonation before the mine, believed to contain a pound of C4, exploded. The mine was placed above the ground and left no crater. A search of the area produced no other mines. At 1530H, a patrol from Co A exchanged fire with an estimated 10-15 men (one of whom was wearing camouflaged utilities) in the vicinity of (AT 904706). The VC fled, and contact was not reestablished. As the patrol continued its mission in the same area, the flank security tripped a booby trap believed to be a 100mm grenade mounted in a tree. Two Marines were wounded by the blast, and evacuated by helicopter. As the helicopter lifted off, it received 5-6 rounds of carbine fire from long range. The fire was too distant for the patrol to pinpoint the position of the shooters. At 1815H, a patrol from Co B tripped a booby trap (200mm grenade placed in a 2 gallon can, rigged with trip wire) as it crossed a stream near (AT 933667). Two Marines received minor wounds, and did not require evacuation. In a subsequent sweep of PHUOC HINH (2) (AT 927667), the patrol found a sign which warned villagers of booby traps on trails in the area. At 2115H, the point man of a squad from Co C, enroute to an ambush site, hit a trip wire and heard a spoon fly off a hand grenade. He found the grenade quickly—in the dark—and threw it away from the remainder of the squad before it detonated. No casualties. During this period, the battalion conducted six daylight patrols (five squad-sized and one platoon-sized); eight night patrols (squad-sized); eight ambushes (squad-sized); and established 20 listening posts.

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(18) 18 February - At 1505H, a patrol from Co A tripped a moby-trapped grenade (at ground level) near (AT 917678). A Marine suffered minor wounds and was evacuated by vehicle. During this period, the battalion conducted eight daylight patrols (seven squad-sized and one platoon-sized); 11 night patrols (squad-sized); six night ambushes (squad-sized); and established 20 listening posts.

(19) 19 February - A squad-sized observation post from Co C observed six people enter a house in GIAO TRI (1) (AT 883706). The squad maneuvered to investigate. At 1130H, the squad heard what appeared to be a single warning shot. Near the house they apprehended two male VCS—one of whom had an unusual identification card. Entering the house at approximately 1200H, the squad found it empty. An unfinished hot meal had been left behind. The VCS and documents found in the house were sent to ITT. At 1600H, a squad-sized patrol from Co C was crossing the SONG TUY LOAN in the vicinity of (AT 883706) when it received fire from an estimated five VC. The VC broke contact when the Marines returned fire. The squad searched the VC firing position and found tracks where one man had been dragged away. One VC was observed to fall during the exchange of fire and two others were believed to have been hit. At 2030H, Co B position on HILL #1 (AT 941662), received approximately 20 rounds of small arms fire from (AT 941662). A patrol was dispatched to check the area, but no contact was established. At 2230H, Marines in Co C position received two incoming hand grenades and harassing small arms fire from (AT 915715). The Marines returned fire and searched the area without establishing contact. During this period, the battalion conducted eight daylight patrols (seven squad-sized and one platoon-sized); 12 squad-sized night patrols; eight squad-sized ambushes; and established 22 listening posts.

(20) 20 February - At 1112H, a patrol from Co C tripped a moby-trapped M26 grenade rigged in thick vegetation. One Marine was wounded by the explosion and was evacuated by helicopter. At 2200H, a patrol from Co E, while crossing a rice paddy, heard two VC moving at the rear of the patrol column (AT 936647). As the patrol took these two under fire, two other groups of VC, estimated at five men each, began to flee the area—one moving east and the other moving west. The patrol called an 81mm mortar fire mission (six rounds HE) on the western group at (AT 932642). The Marines heard screaming as the rounds impacted. Three VC were estimated WIA. The patrol chased the eastern group of VC across the battalion boundary—into an ambush set by 3d Bn, 3d Marines. (3d Bn; 3d Marines estimated one VC WIA by the ambush). Two hours later, a patrol from 3d Bn, 3d Marines chased an estimated five VC across the battalion boundary in front of the Co B positions on HILL #1 (AT 936663). Tanks in the area used searchlight illumination and fired 50 rounds of machine gun fire at the enemy.

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positive indications of enemy casualties were found by patrol from Co B which was dispatched to search the area. During this period, the battalion conducted eight daylight patrols (seven squad-sized and one company (-) sized); 12 night patrols (squad-sized); eight ambushes (squad-sized); and established 22 listening posts.

(21) 21 February - At 1015H, a patrol from Co C tripped a booby trap at (AT 873698). The trap was believed to contain two pounds of explosive, placed above the ground in thick brush. A vine was used as a trip wire. The explosion caused some grey-colored smoke. Two Marines were wounded by the explosion and evacuated by helicopter. At 1105H in the same vicinity, the same patrol tripped an M26 grenade booby trap, which was located in a bush, with a rock holding the grenade spoon in place. One Marine was wounded by the explosion and was evacuated by helicopter. Immediately after the explosion, the patrol received 6-8 rounds of small arms fire from (AT 871699). The patrol returned fire and assaulted the firing position, but the VC fled before the patrol could arrive there. During this period, the battalion conducted six daylight patrols (five squad-sized and one company (-) sized); 11 squad-sized ambushes; and established 17 listening posts.

(22) 22 February - At 0800H, a squad from Co C, returning from a night ambush position, tripped an M26 grenade booby trap at (AT 878706). A vine was used as the trip wire. One Marine was wounded by fragments, and was evacuated from the scene by helicopter. At 1510H, a patrol from Co A tripped an M26 grenade at (AT 915678). Three Marines were wounded by fragments and were evacuated by helicopter. A search of the area disclosed a mine marker sign on a grave near the scene of the explosion. At 1600H, a patrol from Co B was approaching (AT 942668) when the left flank security fire team spotted one VC entering the hamlet of PHOUC NINH. The VC ran into a house. The patrol surrounded the house and three Marines and one ARVN soldier accompanying the patrol, began to enter, using three different entrances. The VC, hiding under a bed, threw two grenades, killing the ARVN soldier and one Marine, and wounding two other Marines. Remaining members of the patrol entered the house and killed the VC with rifle fire. The VC was carrying a German-make .38 Special Revolver (double action Frontier model) and several documents, including a diary. INTERPRETER'S NOTE: The VC was believed to be highly placed. His diary spoke of his involvement in the October 1965 attack on BULL 22 (same area) and a subsequent mining incident in the area which resulted in the destruction of a USMC "Mighty Mite" and two Marines KIA's. At 2130H, Marines from Co D and Popular Forces personnel in the vicinity of the bridges at (AT 946699) received fifty rounds of incoming small arms fire from the vicinity of (AT 946697). The Marines and Popular Forces drove the VC away with small arms and machine gun fire. During this period the battalion conducted six daylight patrols (four squad-sized, one platoon-sized, and one company (-) sized); 11 night patrols (squad-sized); nine ambushes (squad-sized); and established 11 listening posts.

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(23) 23 February -- At 1040H, a squad from Co B found an explosion at (AT 915677). A search of the area revealed that an M26 Grenade had detonated. A trip wire and grenade spoon were found in the area. It was believed that the booby trap had detonated when a breeze disturbed the bush in which the trip wire was attached. At 1455H, a patrol from Co B found two 105mm duds lying in a field of tall grass at (AT 925658). The rounds, about 40 meters apart, appeared to have been carried into the area, but were not booby trapped. An EOD team destroyed the duds. During this period, the battalion conducted seven daylight patrols (six squad-sized and one company (-)-sized); nine squad-sized night patrols; 10 squad-sized ambushes; and established 17 listening posts.

(24) 24 February -- At 0930H, Marines at the Co D position (AT 925734) apprehended two VCS. One male was tampering with aismic Intrusion Detector "jug" which was buried in the ground. The other male was found hiding in a hole nearby. Both VCS were sent to the HIEU DUC District Headquarters for questioning. At 1100H, a patrol from Co A apprehended one male VCS at (AT 902675). The VCS, who had an altered identification card, was sent to the HIEU DUC District Headquarters for interrogation. At 1505H, a patrol from Co A received 30 rounds incoming small arms fire from east of their position at (AT 904688). The patrol could not pinpoint the VC position and did not return fire. The VC fire ceased after the initial burst. Shortly afterward, the patrol apprehended three VCS, one of whom was leaving a cave, in the area and sent them to the HIEU DUC District Headquarters for questioning. At 1615H, a patrol from Co A found an M26 grenade booby trap at (AT 916686) and destroyed it in place. During this period, the battalion conducted seven daylight patrols (squad-sized); 13 night patrols (squad-sized); and seven ambushes (squad-sized); and established 17 listening posts.

(25) 25 February -- At 0825H, a patrol from Co B found a M79 round which appeared to be booby trapped. Two trip wires led from the trap, which was found at (AT 932655). At 0955H, the patrol found an 81mm illumination round which also appeared to be booby trapped. A trip wire led from the round which was found at (AT 931648). A mine marker--three rocks in a pile-- was found nearby. An EOD team destroyed both traps. At 0945H, a patrol from Co B apprehended a VCS at (AT 915674). The VCS had one permanent identification card, two temporary identification cards, and numerous pictures from other identification cards. The VCS' own identification card appeared to have an incorrect birthdate on it. The VCS was sent to the HIEU DUC District Headquarters for questioning. At 1100H, ten VC and five civilians approached the barbed wire 200 meters from the missile site at (AT 975735). Most of the civilians left when approached, except for two males who tried to hide in holes nearby and two others who refused to leave. Reason for gathering could not be determined.

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did not appear to be any type of demonstration or protest. At 25H, a patrol from Co B apprehended one Vietnamese male with a valid identification card at (AT 938668) and sent him to the District Headquarters. Shortly afterward, the patrol apprehended another male with no identification at (AT 938668) and sent him to the District Headquarters. At 1800H, members of the Popular Forces reported finding a booby trap about 200 meters from the Co C command post at (AT 906719). A search of the area disclosed a large ShiCom grenade, with a trip wire, employing a dead fall activating device. The Marines used a grappling hook to detonate the device. During this period, the battalion conducted nine daylight patrols (squad-sized); 12 night patrols (squad-sized); eight ambushes (squad-sized); and established 17 listening posts.

(26) 26 February - At 1145H, Marines from Co D spotted four civilians at (AT 977737) who appeared to be cutting brush. The civilians fled when a USMC truck came up the road. A 15 year-old male and two women were apprehended. One other male disappeared into the brush and could not be found. A check of the area revealed no evidence of unusual activity. The VCS, who all had proper identification, were sent to ITT for questioning. At 1950H, a patrol from Co A sighted two Vietnamese males at (AT 925679). The men ran as the patrol approached. The patrol opened fire, wounding one VC, who died of wounds shortly afterward, the other escaped. The dead VC had no identification and no weapon was found. At 2135H, a listening post from Co B, received one incoming grenade at (AT 934663). One Marine received a slight fragmentation wound in the right leg. Medical evacuation was not required. The area was searched with negative results. During this period, the battalion conducted nine daylight patrols (squad-sized); 12 night patrols (squad-sized); seven ambushes (squad-sized); and established 17 listening posts.

(27) 27 February - Co A (-) conducted a search and destroy operation in KHUONG HI (2) (AT 9169) from 0740H-1200H. Results: 1 VC (taken to HIEU HUC District Headquarters); 200 punji stakes and 15 punji traps destroyed; one fighting hole, and two mines destroyed. During the operation, at approximately 0800H, a grenade booby trap, with trip wire attached, was discovered near a punji trap. The trap was detonated in place, and one Marine was cut slightly by a stray fragment. MEDEVAC was not required. At 272125H, a patrol from Co C was moving along a trail vicinity (AT 905711) when an electrically detonated mine exploded, wounding three Marines. Two required evacuation from the scene by helicopter. The mine was located approximately two feet off the ground and three feet off the trail, and cleared a 14 foot circle of brush around the point of detonation. During this period, the battalion conducted eight daylight patrols (squad-sized); 13 night patrols (squad-sized); eight ambushes (squad-sized); and established 17 listening posts.

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(28) 28 February - During this period, rifle companies of 1st Bn, 3d Marines assumed responsibility for operations in areas of responsibility of 1st Bn, 1st Marines rifle companies, in anticipation of a shift in overall battalion responsibility scheduled for March 1966. During this period, Marines of both battalions conducted eight daylight patrols (squad-sized); 13 night patrols (squad-sized); eight ambushes (squad-sized); and established 17 listening posts.

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16. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination. There were significant events in this area. Both organic 81mm mortars and the supporting artillery battalion fired daily harassing and interdiction missions, to account for the bulk of indirect fire activity.

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11. Logistics
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a. Supply

(1) A sufficient number of mount out boxes were constructed this month to completely warehouse Battalion Supply in compliance with prescribed procedures.

(2) Two Hundred and sixty four ration supplement sundry packs were received during the reporting period. Issues were made to companies eligible under the criteria of inaccessability to exchange facilities.

(3) Quarterly reconciliations were accomplished with FLSG, and 3d FSR.

(4) Technical Inspections were performed on the battalion's crew served weapons with repairs effected as required.

(5) The February Critipak shipment from Barstow included 76% of items requested; a significant improvement over previous shipments.

(6) CG Inspection of Supply and Ordnance was conducted.

b. Maintenance

(1) M-274 (Mechanical Mule) 0% (0 of 30)*

(2) M-422 (Mighty Mite) 0% (0 of 14)**

*14 Mules were invoiced to this unit from 1st Bn, 3d Marines as replacements for coded X Mules and for M-274A1's which must be turned into 3d Marine Division.

**Six mites have been Coded X by FLSG.

(3) Motor Transport was inspected by the Commanding General's Inspection Team.

c. Food Service

(1) At present this unit operates one battalion mess.

(2) Each day one hot meal is prepared and delivered to two companies in the field.

(3) Food services was inspected by the CG Inspection Team.

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(4) The new 500 man galley was completed and is presently in use.

(5) A new 12'X12' Garbage house was constructed.

d. Cantonment and Camp Facilities

(1) The cantonment program is 98% completed with the following structures/items to be constructed.

- (a) Five GP Strongbacks.
- (b) Shower building (Under construction).
- (c) Steps for 30 strongback GP tents.
- (d) Screen doors for 25 Strongback GP tents.

(2) 40 rolls of screen wire are needed to complete the screening of the strongback tents.

e. Transportation. Six 5-Ton trucks were provided daily from 9th Motor Transport for logistic support of this unit.

f. Water. The average daily rate of water usage was as follows:

- (1) 4000 gal. - Potable
- 1500 gal. - Non-potable

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Air Defense. None.

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13. Combat Air Support. During the reporting period, Marine helicopters supported the 1st Bn, 1st Marines with MEDEVAC missions, resupply and other logistic missions, troop lifts, and reconnaissance missions. No fixed wing close air support was requested.

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14. Medical and Dental Support(Support).

a. Names of Surgeons:

Battalion Surgeon: J.E. BOCKER LT MC USN
Assistant Surgeon: R.H. REID LT MC USN

b. Significant Events: Six(6) men were bitten by a dog presumed to be rabid, and are undergoing a 14 day treatment of anti-rabies vaccination.

c. Medical Trends: The number of troops suffering from infections of the feet and lower legs remains high. Emphasis has been stressed to platoon corpsman on foot checks and on platoon commanders who have been informed of the necessity of constant foot care. Venereal disease has remained low with only six(6) cases this month.

d. Number of Combat Casualties Treated: The number of minor combat casualties treated this month at the BAS was nine(9). The majority of combat casualties were evacuated directly from the battle zone to 3rd Medical Battalion. The total number of combat casualties for the month of February was twenty nine(29) USMC WIA'S, two(2) USN WIA'S, twenty(20) USMC WIA'S(not evacuated), and two(2) KIA'S USMC.

e. Number of Non-Battle Casualties Treated: There were One-Thousand and Forty-four (1044) treatments rendered to the men of this battalion during the month of February.

f. Preventative Medicine and Sanitation: Malaria prophylaxis was continued by administration of one(1) Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet per man per week. Sanitation inspection was held weekly and overall great improvement has been made in the sanitary conditions of the battalion.

g. Civil Action Medical Support Rendered: There were Three-thousand One Hundred and Eighty(3,180) medical treatments rendered to Vietnamese Civilians. There were several visits by a Dental officer to the villages in the battalion area.

(1) Amount by Type of Medicine Dispensed:

Gauze Pad 4x4	10	PG
Gauze Pad 2x2	10	PG
Adhesive Tape 10"x6yds	1	RL
" " 3"x5yds	1	RL
BandAids, Absorbant Adhesive	20	BX
Purified Cotton Roll	2	PG
Applicators, Cotton Tipped	10	PG
Small Battle Dressings 4oy7"	1	PG
Triangular Bandage	1	PG

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Roller Gauze 2"by6yds	1	BK
Roller Gauze 4"by6yds	1	BK
Elastic Bandage, Ace Wrap	6	EA
Tongue Depressors 100s	1	BK
Estomach Liquid 1 pt.	10	BT
Pro Penn Injection in oil 400000 u 20s	1	BT
Pro Penn Injection Aqueous 1,500000 u	1	BT
Oxytetracycline Tablets 100s	1	BT
Erythromycin Tablets 100s	2	BT
Benzoin Tincture 1 pint	1	GA
Carbimazole sol.	2	BT
Tetracycline Hydrochloride Tablets 100s	4	BT
Boric acid Oph Ointment	12	TU
Hydrocortisone Ointment 12s	1	BK
Oxytetracycline-Polymixin B Oph	12	TU
Bacitracin Ointment	6	TU
Calamine Lotion 2 oz.	8	BT
Surgical Soap Hand	24	EA
Merthiolate Tincture 1 pint	3	BT
Tetracycline Oph Oint	6	TU
Tedral Tablets 1000s	0	BT
Chlortrimeton Tablets 1000s	1	BT
Phisohex 5 oz.	5	BT
Compazine Tablets 100s	0	BT
Hydrogen Peroxide Sol. 1 pint	10	BT
Aspirin Tablets 1000s	1	BT
Alb Tablets 1000s	1	BT
Caprecol Lozenges	4	BK
Chlortrimeton Syrup 1 Gal.	1	BT
Pyperazine Citrate Tablets	1	BT
Sulfasoxazole Tablets	3	BT
Eugenol USP 1 oz	0	BT
Diarrhea Tablets 1000s	1	CN
Nitrofurazone Oint.	2	JR
Sodium Salyolate Tablets 1000s	2	BT
Nonavivitamins 100s	12	BT
Isopropyl Alcohol 1 pint	2	BT
Morphine Syrettes $\frac{1}{2}$ gr.	2	EA

h. Schooling Conducted: Six(6) lectures on venereal diseases were presented with a total attendance of approximately Two Hundred and Fifty(250).

i. Problem Areas: The majority of the problems that exist in the field of sanitation have been corrected this month, and the overall medical condition is satisfactory.

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15. Chaplain Support

a. Battalion Chaplain 1/1: Lt John J. SCANLON, CHC, USMC

Support from: Chaplain Brown - 2d Mar Chaplain

b. Services Conducted:

(1) Protestant: Sunday: Four (4) with fifty-four (54) attending.

Weekday: One (1) with twenty-two (22) attending.

(2) Catholic: Sunday: Eleven (11) with two-hundred-ninety one (291) attending.

Weekday: Twenty-three (23) with one hundred ninety (190) attending.

c. Counselling: Fifty-two (52).

d. Instructions: Sixteen (16) sessions with eighteen attending.

e. Significant activities:

(1) Three Memorial Services.

(2) Channelled packages from USA to troops approximately one and one-half tons (1½T).

(3) Assisted in 5 Red Cross cases.

(4) Obtained pulpit and storage cabinet for chapel.

(5) Attended Staff meeting daily and Division Chaplain's meeting weekly.

f. Facilities:

(1) Strongback, tin roofed (16 X 32) used for Chapel in the Battalion CP. Furnished simply with CP tent used for office.

(2) Transportation by Mighty Kite is available.

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16. Civil Affairs/Military Government/Psychological Warfare.

a. Significant Activities

(1) Medical Assistance. During the month of February, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines MEDCAP sickcall treated 2,592 Vietnamese civilians, and have given 2,813 treatments. Since 1 September 1965, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines MEDCAP program has treated over 15,471 Vietnamese civilians throughout its TAOR. During February, the Company D corpsman treated 1,155 Vietnamese civilians at the pontoon bridge site, (AT 947700). Also during this month, 3 Vietnamese civilians were medically evacuated to the USOM Hospital in Da Nang by the CAO, BAS, and Helicopter.

(2) Dental Assistance. On 11 February, the Navy Dentist and Technician held dental sickcall in Hoa Thinh Village, (AT 948701). At the sickcall 24 villagers were treated, and 28 extractions were performed. This was the first sickcall in the new dental hygiene program of this battalion, which is being concentrated on school age children. On 15 February, dental sickcall was held at the Hieu Duc District School, (AT 943688). The team performed 74 extractions and treated 62 Vietnamese civilians.

(3) Countryside Band Concerts. On 8 February the 3rd Marine Division Band held a 1 hour concert at the Tuy Loan Market, (AT 946698), before a crowd of 800-1000 villagers. Later that morning the band played a concert at the new Thach Nham Hamlet School, (AT 938714), for approximately 500 persons. This concert was attended by the Hoa Thinh Village Chief, all the village officials and hamlet chiefs.

(4) Psychological Warfare/Civil Action Patrols. During February, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines conducted seven such patrols. The patrols were supported by a USA/ARVN PsyWar team, and were conducted on 1 February at Trang My (1), (AT 929688), 4 February at An Tan, (AT 925705), 9 February at Thach Nham School, (AT 938714), 10 February at Phuoc Ninh (4), and 11 February at Son (4), (AT 936682) and (AT 945655), 14 February at Ap Thach Nham, (AT 938714), 15 February at Duong Lam (1), (AT 944693), and 17 February at Phuoc Bao, (AT 908717). Highlights of the patrols were the speeches by North Vietnamese soldiers on 4 and 14 February. Movies of current and rural reconstruction projects were also shown. The Civil Affairs patrol consisted of sickcalls held by the Battalion MEDCAP Team, and the distribution of food and clothing items.

b. Materials Distributed.

(1) Foodstuffs

- (a) Candy
- (b) Salt
- (c) Soup Mix
- (d) Raisins

15 Feb 66

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(2) Shoes	20 pr.
(3) Clothing	155 lbs.
(4) Soap	2599 Bars
(5) Cement	100 lbs.
(6) Lumber	200 lbs.

C. Special Civil Affairs Projects.

(1) A diving board was constructed by Company D in the vicinity of the pontoon bridge site, (AT 947700), for recreational use by Vietnamese Children.

(2) The Buddhist priest of Hoa Thinh village was provided a 6X6 truck for hauling 100 bags of cement from Da Nang to the Thach Nham pagoda, (AT 954715).

D. Apparant results of Civil Affairs Program.

(1) During February, villagers behind the MLR continued to be very friendly towards Marines. No incidents between Marines and Vietnamese Nationals occurred during the month which would alienate the local populace against American Forces.

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PART III

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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 - 051200H Feb to 121200H Feb 66
 - 121200H Feb to 191200H Feb 66
 - 191200H Feb to 281200H Feb 66
- ✓F - BnBul 1500 of 7 Feb 66
- ✓G - BnBul 3433 of 15 Feb 66
- ✓H - BnO 03440.1A of 18 Feb 66
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- ✓L - INTSUMS - Feb 66 *[un-numbered]*
- ✓M - S-2/S-3 Journal, Feb 66
- ✓N - Civil Affairs Summaries - Feb 66 (1-23 Feb); also C/A SITREP₂

ENCLOSURE (1)
SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 1st Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
San Francisco, California, 96601

3/JGM/jmb
3100
14 February 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines

Subj: After-action Report #3-66 to cover Co D operation
12 Feb 66.

Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1A
(b) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000 AMS Series L701
Sheets 6658 IV and 6659 III

Encl: ✓(1) Operation Order 4-66
✓(2) Operation Overlay

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

a. General. Co D (-) (Rein) conducted a search and destroy operation on 14 Feb 1966 as a result of intelligence information provided by local agents (See enclosure (1)).

b. Significant events. (See enclosure (2)).

(1) Designated blocking forces from Co B and Co C were positioned by 120700H.

(2) Co D (-) moved by truck to HIEU DUC District Headquarters (AT 935688) where they were joined by one Popular Forces squad. The convoy proceeded to dismount point at (AT 923692) and moved into position to commence the search at 120800H.

(3) No enemy contact was developed during the operation. At 121000H, three beds were found in the dense brush vicinity (AT 903695). They were constructed entirely of bamboo and vines, similar in design to those found in hamlets throughout the area. Branches from surrounding bushes had been broken or bent, about four feet from the ground, to form a frame capable of supporting a covering for the beds.

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3100
14 February 1966

The area was examined for booby traps, and the beds were destroyed in place.

(4) All participating units returned to their respective company areas by 121600H.

H. A. Hatch
H. A. HATCH

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, VIETNAM
111300H February 1966

Operation Order 4-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000 AMS Series L701
Sheets 6658 IV and 6659 III
(b) 1st Bn, 1st Marines Operation Order 129-65
(c) Div Order 06040.1

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

Co D (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Capt TULLY

Co D (-)
Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Bn, 1st Marines
Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Bn, 1st Marines
Plat, 678th Co, 52d Bn, ARVN
FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
FAC Tm, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines
Det, Comm Plat, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines
Engr Tm, Co A, 3d Engr Bn

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. The following intelligence reports are pertinent to this operation:

- (1) 011230 Feb. Local agent report (F-3): A Viet Cong company known as the Reconnaissance and Engineer Company is located in the vicinity of KHUONG MY (2). This unit sleeps on a thickly wooded piece of high ground vicinity (AT 903694) known locally as GO LANG. This area is reported to be "hard to get into because of the thick brush", and Marines are supposed to have "passed by there often".
- (2) 102015 Feb. Local agent report (F-3): Two Viet Cong platoons, of 36 men each, operate in the KHUONG MY (2) area (AT 910693) and withdraw to the vicinity of (AT 903694) when friendly patrols enter the area. The VC are alerted to the approach of Marines by two OP's:

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(1) located in a house near the trail junction at (AT 909697)---owned by TU TIEN; (2) located in a house vicinity (AT 909689)---owned by CUU LIEN. The agent reports that there are extensive caves and tunnels in the vicinity of both houses and in the KHUONG MY hamlet area.

b. Friendly forces. See reference (b).

c. Attachments and detachments. Task organization.

2. MISSION. Commencing 120800 Feb, 1st Bn, 1st Marines conducts a deliberate search and destroy operation in wooded area vicinity (AT 9069), to destroy or capture all enemy forces, equipment, and emplacements in the area.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. 1st Bn, 1st Marines, with one company (-) (Rein), moves to objective area, establishes blocking forces as indicated in ANNEX A (Operation Overlay); conducts search and destroy operation within objective area; returns to 1st Bn, 1st Marines area by 121900 Feb or on order.

b. Co D (-) (Rein). See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

c. Coordinating instructions.

(1) See reference (b).

(2) Be alert for booby traps in the objective area.

(3) Employ riot control agents only after requesting permission from this headquarters.

(4) Destroy significant caves or emplacements with demolitions.

(5) Do not destroy any rice caches found in the objective area. Report size and location and request disposition instructions from this headquarters.

(6) Request employment of SPARROW HAWK from this headquarters if the opportunity arises.

(7) Attachments effective 120500 Feb.

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4. ~~DECLASSIFIED~~
ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See reference (b).
- b. Resupply. Emergency only.
- c. Evacuation. Reference (c) applies.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- a. See reference (b).
- b. Report location of command group when established in objective area.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HATCH


JOHN E. WATSON
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX:

✓ A - Operation Overlay


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OPERATION OVERLAY (After-Action)



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8 19 1967



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1st Bn, 1st Marines
D. LANG, VIETNAM
11:00H February 1966

Annex A (Operation Overlay) : Operation Order 4-66


Ref: (a) Maps VIETNAM: 1:50,000, ANS Series L701 Sheets 6658 IV
and 6659 III

Time Zone: H



LEGEND:


 SWEEP FORCE

 BLOCKING FORCE

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HATCH

JOHN E. WATSON
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, VIETNAM
111300H February 1966

Operation Order 4-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000 AMS Series L701
Sheets 6658 IV and 6659 III
(b) 1st Bn, 1st Marines Operation Order 129-65
(c) Div Order 06040.1

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

C. D (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Capt TULLY

Co D (-)

Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Plat, 678th Co, 52d Bn, ARVN

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines

FAC Tm, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Det, Comm Plat, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Det, Med Plat, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Engr Tm, Co A, 3d Engr Bn

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. The following intelligence reports are pertinent to this operation:

(1) 011230 Feb. Local agent report (F-3): A Viet Cong company known as the Reconnaissance and Engineer Company is located in the vicinity of KHUONG MY (2). This unit sleeps on a thickly wooded piece of high ground vicinity (AT 903694) known locally as GO LANG. This area is reported to be "hard to get into because of the thick brush", and Marines are supposed to have "passed by there often".

(2) 102015 Feb. Local agent report (F-3): Two Viet Cong platoons, of 36 men each, operate in the KHUONG MY (2) area (AT 910693) and withdraw to the vicinity of (AT 903694) when friendly patrols enter the area. The VC are alerted to the approach of Marines by two OP's:

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(1) located in a house near the trail junction at (AT 909697)--owned by TU TIEN; (2) located in a house vicinity (AT 909689)--owned by OUU LIEN. The agent reports that there are extensive caves and tunnels in the vicinity of both houses and in the KHUONG MY hamlet area.

b. Friendly forces. See reference (b).

c. Attachments and detachments. Task organization.

2. MISSION. Commencing 120800 Feb, 1st Bn, 1st Marines conducts a deliberate search and destroy operation in wooded area vicinity (AT 9069), to destroy or capture all enemy forces, equipment, and emplacements in the area.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. 1st Bn, 1st Marines, with one company (-) (Rein), moves to objective area, establishes blocking forces as indicated in ANNEX A (Operation Overlay); conducts search and destroy operation within objective area; returns to 1st Bn, 1st Marines area by 121900 Feb or on order.

b. Co D (-) (Rein). See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

c. Coordinating instructions.

(1) See reference (b).

(2) Be alert for booby traps in the objective area.

(3) Employ riot control agents only after requesting permission from this headquarters.

(4) Destroy significant caves or emplacements with demolitions.

(5) Do not destroy any rice caches found in the objective area. Report size and location and request disposition instructions from this headquarters.

(6) Request employment of SPARROW HAWK from this headquarters if the opportunity arises.

(7) Attachments effective 120500 Feb.

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See reference (b).
- b. Resupply. Emergency only.
- c. Evacuation. Reference (c) applies.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- a. See reference (b).
- b. Report location of command group when established in objective area.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HATCH


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Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX:

✓ A - Operation Overlay

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

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, VIETNAM
1113 00H February 1966

Annex: Operation Order 4-66

Ref: (a) Maps VIETNAM; 1:50,000 AMS Series L70' Sheets 6658 IV
and 6659 III

Time Zone: H



LEGEND:

 SWEEP FORCE

 BLOCKING FORCE

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HATCH

JOHN E. WATSON
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Executive Officer

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
220900H February 1966

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Operation Order 5-66

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIENTIANE, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets
6658 IV, 6659 III
(b) 3d Marines Operation Order 326-65
(c) RegtO 3120.1 (Operational Reporting)
(d) RegtO 3000.6 (Rules of Engagement)
(e) BnBul 3100 of 14 Oct 65
(f) BnO 03440.14 (Antipersonnel Mines; employment of)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) 3d Marines occupies and controls assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR and defends DA NANG vital area in sector; occupies and defends HUE-PHU BAI TAOR to protect and defend the HUE-PHU BAI vital area; prepares to conduct unilateral and/or coordinated operations with GVN armed forces within and beyond the periphery of the DA NANG and HUE-PHU BAI TAOR's; and prepares to provide one mobile reserve company as directed by CG, 3d Marine Division.
- (2) 1st Bn, 3d Marines occupies and controls assigned sector of 3d Marines TAOR, north of 1st Bn, 1st Marines northern boundary; defends MLR in sector; and maintains one rifle company on one-hour alert to be employed as either 3d Marines or 3d Marine Division Reserve.
- (3) 9th Marines occupies, controls, and defends assigned TAOR east of 1st Bn, 1st Marines eastern boundary.
- (4) FMAW conducts air operations, providing offensive air support, anti-air warfare, service support, aerial reconnaissance, and control of assigned missiles and aircraft.
- (5) 3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein) general support 3d Marine Division.
- (6) 1st Bn (-) (Rein), 12th Marines, direct support 3d Marines.

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Tab C

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- (a) Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines, direct support 1st Bn, 1st Marines
- (7) Co A (-), 3d Tank Bn, direct support 3d Marines.
 - (a) 1st Plat, Co A, 3d Tank Bn, direct support 1st Bn, 1st Marines
- (8) Co A (-), 3d MT Bn, direct support 3d Marines.
 - (a) 1st Plat, Co A, 3d MT Bn, direct support 1st Bn, 1st Marines.
- (9) 1st Plat, Co B, 1st AmTrac Bn, direct support 3d Marines.
- (10) (a) Plat, 1st AmTrac Bn, direct support 1st Bn, 1st Marines on call.
- (10) 3d Engr Bn (-) (Rein) general support 3d Marine Division.
- (11) Plat, Co A, 3d MT Bn, direct support 3d Marines.

c. Attachments and detachments. Annex .. (Task Organization).

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines occupies and controls assigned TAOR; defends MLR in assigned TAOR; provides security for the installations on HILL 327 (AT 971737) and HILL 268 (AT 969741); provides a security force, in conjunction with Popular Forces, for the bridges at (AT 946699); conducts unilateral search and destroy operations in assigned TAOR; conducts aggressive combat/reconnaissance patrolling throughout assigned TAOR; and prepares to conduct combined and coordinated operations within or beyond the boundaries of the TAOR.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. Annex B (Concept of Operation).

b. Co A (Rein).

- (1) Defend MLR in assigned area of responsibility. See Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Conduct search and destroy operations within assigned area of responsibility.
- (3) Conduct aggressive patrols and ambushes within assigned area of responsibility. Emphasize night operations.

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- (4) Maintain surveillance over avenues of approach into MLR.
- (5) Maintain close liaison with Vietnamese civil and military agencies within assigned area of responsibility.
- (6) Develop comprehensive and progressive psychological warfare/civic action programs within assigned area of responsibility.

c. Co B (Rein)

- (1) Defend MLR in assigned area of responsibility. See Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Conduct search and destroy operations within assigned area of responsibility.
- (3) Conduct aggressive patrols and ambushes within assigned area of responsibility. Emphasize night operations.
- (4) Maintain surveillance over avenues of approach into MLR.
- (5) Maintain close liaison with Vietnamese civil and military agencies within assigned area of responsibility.
- (6) Develop comprehensive and progressive psychological warfare/civic action programs within assigned area of responsibility.

d. Co C (Rein).

- (1) Defend MLR in assigned area of responsibility. See Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Conduct search and destroy operations within assigned area of responsibility.
- (3) Conduct aggressive patrols and ambushes within assigned area of responsibility. Emphasize night operations.
- (4) Maintain surveillance over avenues of approach into MLR.
- (5) Maintain close liaison with Vietnamese civil and military agencies within assigned area of responsibility.
- (6) Develop comprehensive and progressive psychological warfare/civic action programs within assigned area of responsibility.

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Co D (-) (Rein).

- (1) See Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Provide one rifle squad to maintain security for radar installation on HILL 268 (AT 969744).
- (3) Provide one rifle platoon (-) (Rein) to maintain security for missile site on HILL 327 (AT 971737).
- (4) Provide one rifle squad (Rein) to maintain security for bridges (AT 946699).
- (5) Conduct search and destroy operations within assigned area of responsibility.
- (6) Conduct aggressive patrols and ambushes within assigned area of responsibility. Emphasize night operations.
- (7) Maintain close liaison with Vietnamese civil and military agencies within assigned area of responsibility.
- (8) Develop comprehensive and progressive psychological warfare/civic action program within assigned area of responsibility.

f. H&S Co (-).

- (1) See Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Provide security for 1st Bn, 1st Marines command post.
- (3) Be prepared to provide three-platoon reaction force on order.

g. 81mm Mortar Plat (-), H&S Co: General support.

h. 106mm RR Plat, H&S Co: General support.

i. Bn Reserve: Co II (-)

- (1) Occupy position shown in Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Be prepared to conduct special operations on order.

j. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) See Annex D (Fire Support).

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- (2) See Annex E (Air Support).
- (3) See Annex F (Psychological Warfare Operations).
- (4) See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).
- (5) See Annex H (Patrol Area Designation).
- (6) Reports.
 - (a) SITREPS will be submitted to this Headquarters (S-3) at a minimum of every two hours on the even hour.
 - (b) SPOT REPORT on significant events will be submitted to this headquarters (S-3) as the events occur. See reference (c).
 - (c) FLASH REPORTS will be submitted to this headquarters (S-3) upon contact with enemy forces of platoon size or larger, incoming artillery or mortar fire, and/or air or armored attack.
- (7) Rules of engagement. See reference (d).
- (8) Patrols, ambushes, and isolated defensive positions will contain at least eight men, and will have positive means of communication (wire, radio, or both) with their parent units. Specific plans for re-establishing communications, in the event of communications failure, will be developed before any of these combat activities departs its parent unit's area.
- (9) Outposts, checkpoints, roadblocks, and other surveillance activities outside of friendly small arms range will contain at least four men and will have positive means of communication (wire, radio, or both) with their parent units. Specific plans for re-establishing communications, in the event of communications failure, will be developed before any of these combat activities departs its parent unit's area.
- (10) Under no circumstances will a Marine be permitted to depart unaccompanied from a command post, base camp, or other area occupied by friendly forces.
- (11) Extreme care will be taken in all operations to minimize casualties from mines and booby traps. Measures will include repeated and detailed briefings on latest mine warfare developments; maximum linear and lateral dispersion of tactical formations; and carrying of

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special equipment (e.g., grappling hooks) to detect and destroy mines and booby traps in place. All mining incidents, to include early detection of mines/booby traps, will be reported through SPOT REPORTS immediately. Detailed follow-up reports, to include diagrams where appropriate, will be submitted to this headquarters (S-2) as soon as possible after every mining incident.

(12) Protective equipment.

- (a) Body armor, upper torso, is mandatory for personnel manning defensive positions, and for most offensive operations. Authority to omit body armor for special operations must be granted by this headquarters.
- (b) Steel (or ballistic) helmets will be worn at all times, except in designated command post areas.

(13) Submit operation plans to this headquarters (S-3) in accordance with reference (e).

(14) Employ antipersonnel mines in accordance with reference (f).

(15) Vehicles will not be permitted to travel south of the bridges (AT 946700) unless they are in a convoy of two or more vehicles. Convoys will maintain adequate interval to minimize effects of mines and ambushes.

(16) Emphasize camouflage measures in offensive and defensive activities.

(17) Emphasize communication security measures.

(18) Make maximum use of infra-red devices, AN/TPS-21 tears, and seismic intrusion detection devices.

(19) Employ riot control agents only with clearance from this headquarters (S-3).

(20) Avoid incidents with civilians.

(21) Contact right to left.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Administrative Order 1-66.

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
220900H February 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1st Bn, 1st Marines: (Rein)

LtCol HATCH

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Capt GRIFFIN

H&S Co (-)

InfM, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
Plat, 768th Co, 52d Bn, ARVN

Co A (Rein)

Capt DOMINGUEZ

Co A

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
3d Sec, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co
Det, Comm Plat, H&S Co

Co B (Rein)

Capt CRAVITS

Co B

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
2d Sec, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co
Det, Comm Plat, H&S Co

Co C (Rein)

Capt NEAL

Co C

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
1st Sec, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co
Det Med Plat, H&S Co
Det Comm Plat, H&S Co

Co D (Rein)

Capt TULLY

Co D

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
Det Med Plat, H&S Co
Det Comm Plat, H&S Co

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81mm Mortar Plat (-)

SSgt FLINT

106RR Fla

SSgt SCHULTZ

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HATCH

JOHN E. WATSON

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 5-66

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
220900H February 1966

Annex B (Concept of Operation) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series 1:50 Sheets
6658 IV and 6659 III

Time Zone: K

1. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines occupies and controls assigned sector of TAOR; defends MLR in assigned sector of TAOR; provides security for the installations on HILL 327 (AT 971737) and HILL 268 (AT 969744); provides a security force, in conjunction with Popular Forces, for the bridges at (AT 946699); conducts unilateral search and destroy operations in assigned sector of TAOR; conducts aggressive combat/reconnaissance patrolling throughout assigned sector of TAOR; and prepares to conduct combined and coordinated operations within or beyond the boundaries of the TAOR.

2. CONCEPT.

- a. General. Rifle companies exert maximum influence in their respective areas of responsibility (See Annex C (Operation Overlay)) with daily combinations of patrols, village sweeps, and ambushes. Deep patrols are undertaken to locate and destroy the enemy's offensive capabilities. Frequent search and clear operations and pacification projects, employing all available civil affairs/psychological warfare capabilities, are conducted to expand the secure areas within the TAOR, gradually increasing the number of Vietnamese civilians who are able to return to a peaceful routine of living without fear of attack or reprisal by the Viet Cong. Concurrently, forces are maintained in a state of readiness to participate in large-scale operations beyond the boundaries of the TAOR, when opportunities present themselves.
- b. Defense. The concept of the defense places heavy emphasis on the ability to detect and break up enemy concentrations well forward of the MLR. Company base areas organized for local defense against enemy attack. The bulk of the defensive effort is devoted to the maintenance of a constantly shifting screen of patrols, ambushes, listening posts, observation posts, roadblocks, and checkpoints--to disrupt the enemy's ability to follow his three main courses of action: infiltration; limited objective attacks; and major attacks. Maximum use is made of visual and sound detection devices for this capability.

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At the event of enemy attack, defensive planning envisions the use of fire support and reserve forces to destroy the enemy as he attempts to withdraw, after the attack has been stopped. (See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan)).

- c. Offense. The patrolling which forms part of the defensive screen described above is essentially offensive in nature, in that it attempts to gain and maintain contact with enemy forces and to develop information for large-scale operations against enemy forces of significant size, and their supply, training, and bivouac areas. Interpreters, Popular Forces and ARVN personnel are used whenever possible, to improve communications with civilians encountered during operations and, consequently, to provide the most current intelligence information possible. Maximum use is made of sniper teams, scout dog teams, and other specialized units in the conduct of operations.
- d. Fire Support. See Annex D (Fire Support Plan).
 - (1) Defense. Fire support plans, providing for maximum employment of preplanned fire on likely avenues of approach and withdrawal, are developed in conjunction with defense plans. Harrassing and interdiction fires are scheduled to deny the enemy the use of assembly areas (e.g., VT-fuzed fires over rice paddies disrupt enemy attempts to harvest rice at night).
 - (2) Offense. Fire plans are developed to support all offensive operations, including patrols and ambushes. Maximum use is made of indirect fire to mark terrain features for land navigation purposes, to reconnoiter by fire, and to seal off enemy escape routes once contact has been made.
- e. Coordination with Vietnamese agencies. Continuous coordination and liaison is established with Vietnamese military and civilian agencies. Where possible, Vietnamese defenses are considered and included in unit defense planning. Every effort is made to gain Vietnamese cooperation in providing early warning of enemy approaching or entering the TAO. Whenever possible, telephone or radio communication links are established with Vietnamese military and civilian officials. Defensive fire plans include concentrations, mutually agreed upon, which support Vietnamese units. Operations in areas of mutual interest are coordinated carefully.

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Annex C (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 5-66


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Annex C (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L701; Sheets
6658 IV and 6659 III

Time Zone: H



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Annex D (Fire Support) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination
(b) FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support
(c) FMFM 7-3, Air Support
(d) FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support
(e) 3d Marines Operation Order 326-65

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces. See current ISUMS.
- b. Friendly forces. Operation Order 5-66.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines coordinates indirect fires in support of offensive and defensive operations within its TAOR.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

- (1) Within the DA NANG TAOR/RZ, 3d Marine Division FSCC exercises overall coordination of supporting fires, including the coordination of fires with local GVN Armed Forces Commander.
- (2) 3d Marines FSCC coordinates fires of supporting arms within 3d Marines TAOR/RZ.
- (3) 1st Bn, 1st Marines FSCC coordinates fires of organic and attached units within 1st Bn, 1st Marines TAOR, and relays requirements for naval gunfire, and air support to 3d Marines FSCC.

b. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) Fire support coordination measures will be based on reference (a) through (d). Coordination will be accomplished at the lowest echelon capable of executing all coordination requirements.
- (2) Fire plans. Unit commanders will prepare defensive fire plans and fire plans for operations, submitting them to this headquarters (FSCC) for review and approval. Changes to fire plans will be submitted as they occur.

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Harrassing and Interdiction (H&I) fires.

- (a) Artillery. Daily schedules of preplanned "deep" concentrations will be prepared by FSCC, subject to approval by the Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 1st Marines. Unit commanders submit target information to this headquarters (FSCC) as it is developed.
- (b) 81mm mortar. Daily schedules of preplanned "close" concentrations will be prepared by unit commanders, subject to review by FSCC and approval by the Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 1st Marines. These fires will be scheduled to provide maximum support to patrols and ambushes.
- (4) Targets of opportunity. Coordination of fires delivered on targets of opportunity will be initiated by the 1st Bn, 1st Marines FSCC as soon as requests are received. Supporting arms will prepare to attack such targets, but must receive positive clearance from the Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 1st Marines and the 3d Marines FSCC before firing, except in emergency situations described below.
- (5) Emergency fire missions.
 - (a) Emergency fire missions may be fired upon approval of the Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 1st Marines, without positive clearance from higher echelon. They will be sent directly to the supporting artillery battalion for firing. The decision to fire a mission as "emergency" will be based upon the description of the target and other information concerning the situation. Typical "emergency" conditions would include: a unit's being heavily engaged with the enemy; an enemy attack either imminent or in progress; or the development of a highly lucrative enemy target.
 - (b) The following format will be used by the 1st Bn, 1st Marines FSCC in requesting emergency missions: "Fire mission; Emergency; Bound 6 sends."
 - (c) The 1st Bn, 1st Marines FSCC will notify 3d Marines FSCC as soon as an emergency mission is passed to the supporting artillery battalion,

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(5) Restrictions

- (a) Every effort will be made to preserve religious structures, medical facilities, public utilities, cultural areas, and other non-military structures.
- (b) Fires in heavily populated areas will be kept to an absolute minimum and will be initiated only when enemy fire is received.
- (c) 1st Bn, 1st Marines FSCC will request establishment of air space restriction as required.
- (d) Illumination should not be requested as a means to discourage attempts at infiltration.
- (e) Use of screening smoke will be authorized and controlled by the Commanding Officer, 3d Marines.

(6) Safety of ground forces.

- (a) See references (a) through (d).
- (b) Artillery fire missions within 600 meters of friendly troops will include the word "close" in the classification-of-fire element of the fire command.
- (c) Naval gunfire missions within 1500 meters of friendly troops will include the word "danger" in the danger-to-friendly-troops element of the initial fire request, followed by the direction and distance of friendly troops from the target. Naval gunfire missions within 600 meters of friendly troops will be further classified by adding the word "close" after "danger".
- (d) Artillery missions classified "close" and naval gunfire missions classified "danger" will be observed. Such missions must be positively controlled by the U. S. observer/spotter nearest the target and capable of observing both target and nearest troops.


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Administrative Order 1-66.

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5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See Appendix 2 to Annex H (Fire Support Communications-Electronics) to reference (e).

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Annex E (Air Support) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series, L701, Sheets
6658IV and 6659III
(b) BnO 06040.1

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy situation. See current ISUMS.
- b. Friendly situation. See Operation Order 5-66

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines requests, coordinates and controls air support for offensive and defensive operations within its TAOR.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of operation. 1st Bn, 1st Marines requests, coordinates and controls fixed wing and helicopter close air support, and helicopter support for tactical and administrative troop movement, resupply, and messenger/courier service.
- b. Coordinating instructions.
 - (1) Landing zones.
 - (a) CUCKOO - (AT 949722)
 - (b) WHIPPOORWILL - (AT 939722)
 - (c) GOOSE - (AT 927736)
 - (d) CANARY - (AT 970936)
 - (e) KILDARE - (AT 929689)
 - (f) Co A - (AT 923690)
 - (g) HILL 41 - (AT 935663)
 - (2) Request routine air support from this headquarters (FSCC-Air Liaison Officer) by 0900 of the day preceding the requested mission. Emergency missions may be requested at any time.

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(3)Helicopter landing points.

- (a) Select landing points which provide helicopter pilots adequate space to maneuver into the wind during landing approaches.
- (b) All landing points will be at least 100 feet in diameter. Ensure that overhead wires or antennae do not obstruct the selected point.
- (c) Hard ground, solid rock, or grass provide the best landing surfaces. Avoid areas which contain gravel or loose rock. Extremely dusty areas should be avoided when possible.
- (d) Ensure that debris and any other loose material is removed from the landing point prior to the arrival of helicopters.

(4) Safety precautions.

- (a) All hands will stand clear of arriving and departing aircraft.
- (b) Approach aircraft only after a beckoning signal from the pilot, co-pilot, or crew chief.
- (c) Approach and depart large cargo helicopters from the front.
- (d) Approach and depart other type helicopters from the right front.

(5) Surface-to-air communications.

- (a) See Annex I (Communications-Electronics).
- (b) Use LZ Common frequency for non-MEDEVAC missions.
- (c) Use battalion/company tactical nets for MEDEVAC missions, where possible. Airborne FM radio equipment has an upper frequency limit of 51.9 mc.

(6) Close air support. Close air support will be used for significant targets which cannot be attacked effectively by other means. Submit requests to this headquarters (FSCC). All fixed wing air strikes will be controlled by a forward air controller or a tactical air controller (airborne), who will recommend a direction of attack.

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Whenever possible the direction of attack will be parallel to front lines. Positive identification of front lines by unit commanders is essential. Air panels will be displayed before air strikes are conducted.

(7) Alert status.

- (a) Normal alert (CAS)...30 minutes.
- (b) Strip alert (CAS)....15 minutes.
- (c) Normal alert (Flareship)...30 minutes.
- (d) Normal alert (MEDEVAC).....10 minutes.

(8) MEDEVAC. See reference (b). MEDEVAC requests will contain the following information:

- (a) Requesting unit.
- (b) Coordinates of landing zone.
- (c) Airborne medical assistance required/not required
(A request for medical assistance will delay the MEDEVAC for at least 10 minutes).
- (d) Landing zone secured/not secured
- (e) Landing zone markings to be used.
- (f) Call sign of requesting unit.
- (g) Description of casualty/casualties.
- (h) Amplifying remarks.

(9) Helicopter resupply. The following procedures apply:


- (a) Receiving units enter LZ Common net and check in with Pilsner 14 five minutes prior to the expected arrival time of the helicopters.
- (b) Receiving units have landing zone/point prepared and ready to mark at least five minutes before the expected arrival time of helicopters.
- (c) Receiving units notify Pilsner 14 when aircraft are in sight and when resupply mission is complete.

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- (10) Landing zone marking. Unit commanders will insure that all patrols, ambushes, and similar units deployed away from their base camp areas are equipped to mark landing zones for daylight or night helicopter missions.

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Annex F (Psychological Warfare Operations) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) FM 33-5

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current ISUMS

b. Friendly forces.

(1) See Operation Order 5-66

(2) 1st Psy Ops Fld Spt Det (Prov) direct support 3d Marine Division.

c. Attachments and detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines undertakes psychological warfare operations to create, build, and maintain confidence in the government of Vietnam, and to establish a climate of national and local unity behind the war effort; to expose the true nature of Viet Cong objectives; to induce disaffection among the Viet Cong and their supporters; and to insure that the people are aware that we are here at the request of the government and will depart when peace is restored.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. 1st Bn, 1st Marines integrates psychological warfare operations as closely as possible with tactical and civil affairs operations, to achieve the following objectives:

(1) To create, build, and maintain confidence in the government of Vietnam by convincing the people that a SVN/allied victory is inevitable; that the government is concerned with the welfare of the people; and that the quickest way to end the war is to support the government of Vietnam.

(2) To establish an attitude of unity behind the war effort by convincing the people that all government efforts are directed toward the defeat of the Viet Cong and that the government must have the effective support of all the people if the Viet Cong are to be defeated.

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- (3) To expose the true nature of the Viet Cong objectives by convincing the people that the Viet Cong are not patriots but are forces of international Communism, promising nothing but the end of individual freedom and the loss of personal dignity.
- (4) To induce disaffection among the Viet Cong and their supporters by convincing them that they are fighting for a Communist-controlled, and not an independent Vietnam. To create distrust and fear of the Viet Cong leadership and convince the people that a GVN victory is inevitable.
- (5) To insure that the people of Vietnam are aware that the Allied forces are here at the request of the GVN, and that they intend to withdraw once peace is restored.

b. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) Companies will make maximum use of local Vietnamese civilian or military authorities in planning psychological warfare operations within their respective sectors.
- (2) Psychological warfare operations will be planned on a "progressive" basis, depending on the degree of pro- or anti-GVN sentiment prevalent in the selected hamlets.
- (3) Psychological warfare operations will be accompanied by tangible expressions of good will, wherever possible--to include medical treatment, food and clothing distribution, and work on civil projects.
- (4) Requests for psychological warfare support will be forwarded to, and reports of results attained made to this headquarters (S-3).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. PsyWar materials available.


- (1) Pamphlets, photographs, and posters, ranging from surrender inducements for "hard core" VC to handouts for local villagers explaining GVN agricultural, medical, and educational programs and soliciting their cooperation with local government officials.

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- (2) Patriotic music and taped messages. A capability exists to record messages from local officials, dealing with subjects of strictly local interest.
 - (3) Films--both newsreels and feature length movies.
 - b. Trafficability. Since some of the heavier equipment is road-bound, requests for Psywar support should indicate whether the intended audience can be reached by road. Portable equipment is available for use in relatively inaccessible areas.
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See Annex I (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 5-66.

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Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series, L701, Sheets
6658IV and 6659III
(b) 3d Marines Operation Order 330-65

Time Zone: F

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces. See current ISUMS.
- b. Friendly forces. Operation Order 5-66.
- c. Attachments and detachments. Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 5-66.
- d. Assumptions.
 - (1) That enemy attacks against defensive positions/installations will take place during hours of darkness.
 - (2) That the command post of the position under attack is relaying timely information to this headquarters (S-3).
 - (3) That preplanned mortar/artillery illumination concentrations are being fired.
 - (4) That destructive preplanned mortar/artillery concentrations, barrages are being fired.
 - (5) That any force-platoon-sized or larger--committed to a reinforcing/blocking mission will have radio communication and, if possible, an artillery/81mm mortar FO team.
 - (6) That H&S Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines, has the capability of organizing a three platoon-sized reaction force on short notice.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines conducts retaliatory action to inflict maximum damage on attacking enemy forces and equipment and to minimize casualties among friendly units/installations.


3. EXECUTION. See Appendixes 1 through 5, and reference (b)

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- a. Concept of operation. 1st Bn, 1st Marines inflicts maximum damage on the enemy by:
 - (1) Fixing the location of enemy attacking and support elements.
 - (2) Placing maximum supporting fires upon the enemy.
 - (3) Employing infantry maneuver elements to block the enemy's withdrawal, maintaining contact with enemy forces until they are destroyed by fire and close combat.
- b. Coordinating instructions.
 - (1) Fire support. See Annex D (Fire Support Plan).
 - (2) Air support.
 - (a) See Annex E (Air Support).
 - (b) Request flare plane and AO on station if enemy attacks during hours of darkness.
 - (3) Patrols, ambushes, and other elements deployed away from the position under attack will remain in position until they receive instructions from their parent units. This will minimize delays in coordinating supporting fires.
 - (4) Units will be designated as blocking or reinforcing forces based on their availability and the deployment of the battalion at the time of attack.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Administrative Order 1-66.
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
 - a. See Annex I (Communications-Electronics).
 - b. Report establishment of alternate command posts if appropriate.

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
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Annex H (Patrol Area Designation) to Operation Order 5-66

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1st Lt. William
B. Watson, was
29 March 1964

Annex B (District and Subdistrict) to Operation Order 5-66
Note: (a) Name: TICTELA, 1:50,000 and Tictela, 1:50,000, District: CAMPST and CAMPST
Time Zone: B



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NOTE: DISTRICT: Annex J (District) to Operation Order 5-66

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APPENDIX.

✓1 - Plan RED

✓2 - Plan WHITE

✓3 - Plan BLUE

✓4 - Plan YELLOW

✓5 - Plan GREEN

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Appendix 1 (Plan RED) to Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to
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Appendix 1 (Plan RED) to Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series, 1:701 Sheets 6650IV and 6650III
(b) 3d Marines Operation Order 524-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces. See current ISOPS.
- b. Friendly forces.
 - (1) Operation Order 5-66.
 - (2) Regimental Reserve Co (Rein), 1st Bn, 3d Marines.
 - (3) SPARROW HAWK. See reference (b).
- c. Attachments and detachments. No change.
- d. Assumptions.
 - (1) See Annex G.
 - (2) That the enemy will attack the 1st Bn, 1st Marines command post simultaneously from more than one direction.
 - (3) That the enemy will not attempt to hold his attack objective, but will execute a carefully planned withdrawal over multiple routes as indicated.
 - (4) That the enemy will make maximum use of hamlets along withdrawal routes for hiding places, for treatment of wounded, and for burial of dead.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines conducts retaliatory action to inflict maximum damage on attacking enemy forces and equipment and to minimize casualties within friendly units/installations.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of operation. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).
- b. On order, designated units occupy blocking positions indicated; prepare to conduct search and destroy missions on order.
- c. Coordinating instructions. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).
 - (1) Fire support. See current Target List.
 - (2) Coordinate fire support and maneuver of forces with 3d Bn, 3d Marines, and with HIEU DUC District Headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Administrative Order 1-66.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See Annex I (Communications-Electronics).

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Appendix 2 (Plan WHITE) to Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to
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220900H February 1966

Appendix 2 (Plan WHITE) to Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series, L701 Sheets 6658IV and 6659III
(b) 3d Marines Operation Order 329-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) Operation Order 5-66.

(2) Regimental Reserve: Co (Rein), 1st Bn, 3d Marines.

(3) SPARROW HAWK. See reference (b).

c. Attachments and detachments. No change.

d. Assumptions.

(1) See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).

(2) That the enemy will attack the bridges vicinity (AT 946699) simultaneously from more than one direction.

(3) That the enemy will ^{not} attempt to destroy the bridges, and will execute a carefully planned withdrawal over multiple routes as indicated.

(4) That the enemy will make maximum use of hamlets along withdrawal routes for hiding places, for treatment of wounded, and for burial of dead.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines conducts retaliatory action to inflict maximum damage to attacking enemy forces and equipment and to minimize casualties within friendly units/installations.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).

b. On order, designated units reinforce using routes indicated.

c. On order, designated units occupy blocking positions indicated; prepare to conduct search and destroy operations on order.


d. Coordinating instructions. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).

(1) Fire support. See current Target List.

(2) Coordinate fire support and maneuver of forces with 3d Bn, 3d Marines and with HIEU DUC District Headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Administrative Order 1-66.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See Annex I (Communications-Electronics).



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Appendix 3 (Plan BLUF) to Annex C (Retaliatory Action Plan) to
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Appendix 3 (Plan BLUE) to Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series, L701 Sheets 665AIV and 6659 III
(b) 3d Marines Operation Order 329-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces. See current ISUMS.
- b. Friendly forces.
 - (1) Operation Order 5-66.
 - (2) Regimental Reserve: Co (Rein), 1st Bn, 3d Marines
 - (3) SPARROW HAWK. See reference (b).
- c. Attachments and detachments. No change.
- d. Assumptions.
 - (1) See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).
 - (2) That the enemy will attack HIEU DUC District Headquarters and adjacent rifle company positions simultaneously from more than one direction.
 - (3) That the enemy will not attempt to hold his attack objective, but will execute a carefully planned withdrawal over multiple routes as indicated.
 - (4) That the enemy will make maximum use of hamlets along withdrawal routes for hiding places, for treatment of wounded, and for burial of dead.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines conducts retaliatory action to inflict maximum damage to attacking enemy forces and equipment and to minimize casualties within friendly units/installations.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of operation. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).
- b. On order, designated units occupy blocking positions indicated; prepare to conduct search and destroy operations on order.
- c. Coordinating instructions. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).
 - (1) Fire support. See current Target List.
 - (2) Coordinate fire support and maneuver of forces with 3d Bn, 3d Marines, and with HIEU DUC District Headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Administrative Order 1-66

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See Annex Y (Communications-Electronics).

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Appendix 4 (Plan YELLOW) to Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to
Operation Order 5-66

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
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Appendix 4 (Plan YELLOW) to Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series, L701 Sheets 6658IV and 6659III
(b) 3d Marines Operation Order 329-66

Time Zone: R

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) Operation Order 5-66.

(2) Regimental Reserve: Co (Roin), 1st Bn, 3d Marines.

(3) SPARROW HAWK. See reference (b).

c. Attachments and detachments. No change.

d. Assumptions.

(1) See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).

(2) That the enemy will attack positions vicinity HILL 41 (AT 9366) simultaneously from more than one direction.

(3) That the enemy will ^{NOT} attempt to hold his attack objective, but will execute a carefully planned withdrawal over multiple routes as indicated.

(4) That the enemy will make maximum use of hamlets along withdrawal routes for hiding places, for treatment of wounded, and for burial of dead.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines conducts retaliatory action to inflict maximum damage to attacking enemy forces and equipment and to minimize casualties within friendly units/installations.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).

b. On order, designated units occupy blocking positions indicated; prepare to conduct search and destroy operations on order.


c. Coordinating instructions. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).

(1) Fire Support. See current Target List.

(2) Coordinate fire support and maneuver of forces with 3d Bn, 3d Marines, and with HIEU DUC District Headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Administrative Order 1-66.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See Annex I (Communications-Electronics).



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DA NANG, RVN
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Appendix 5 (Plan GREEN) to Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to
Operation Order 5-66

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
220900H February 1966

Appendix 5 (Plan GREEN) to Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series, L701 Sheets 6658IV and 6659III
(b) 3d Marines Operation Order 329-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) Operation Order 5-66

(2) Regimental Reserve: Co (Rein), 1st Bn, 3d Marines.

(3) SPARROW HAWK. See reference (b).

c. Attachments and detachments. No change.

d. Assumptions.

(1) See Annex G (Retaliatory Plan).

(2) That the enemy will attack positions vicinity (AT 8971) simultaneously from more than one direction.

(3) That the enemy will not attempt to hold his attack objective, but will execute a carefully planned withdrawal over multiple routes as indicated.

(4) That the enemy will make maximum use of hamlets along withdrawal routes for hiding places, for treatment of wounded, and for burial of dead.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines conducts retaliatory action to inflict maximum damage to attacking enemy forces and equipment and to minimize casualties within friendly units/installations.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).

b. On order, designated units occupy blocking positions indicated; prepare to conduct search and destroy operations on order.

c. Coordinating instructions. See Annex G (Retaliatory Action Plan).

(1) Fire support. See current Target List.

(2) Coordinate fire support and maneuver of forces with 1st Bn, 3d Marines, and with BIEU DUO District Headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Administrative Order 1-66.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See Annex I (Communications-Electronics).

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
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Annex I (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 5-66

- Ref: (a) LtrO 9200.2C (3d MarDiv COI)
(b) DivO P2000.4B (3d MarDiv Comm SOP)
(c) 3d Marine Division Operation Order 343-65
(d) RegtO P2000.1B (3d Marines Comm SOP)
(e) 3d Marines Operation Order 326-65
(f) BnO P2000.1 (1st Bn, 1st Marines Comm SOP)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See current ISUSE.
- (2) The enemy can be expected to:
 - (a) Cut and remove wire lines whenever possible.
 - (b) Monitor both wire and radio communications whenever possible.
 - (c) Employ sabotage, initiation, deception, and jamming whenever possible.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Operation Order 5-66
- (2) Signal posts. See Annex C (Operation Overlay).

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines installs, maintains, and operates communications facilities to support operations within its TAO.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Comm Plat, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines.

- (1) Install, maintain, and operate communications facilities in accordance with references (a) through (f).
- (2) Assist in operation of AN/TRC-27 radio relay equipment of link to 3d Marines in accordance with reference (d) and Appendix 1 (Wire-Radio Relay Plan) to Annex F of reference (e).

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b. Air support communications. See Annex E (Air Support).

c. Coordinating instructions.

(1) See references (a) through (f).

(2) Message Center

(a) Use GMT (ZULU) for all message date-time groups. Local time may be used within the texts of messages, if appropriate time zone is indicated.

(b) CW call signs will be used as routing indicators on teletype messages.

(3) Messenger service. All messengers will be accompanied by armed guards-consistent with the danger involved. Each messenger run will be accompanied by at least one armed guard in addition to the driver. Messengers will not travel during hours of darkness without specific authorization from the Battalion Commander or Executive Officer.

(4) Radio.

(a) All units guard assigned nets and only assigned nets. Do not leave an assigned net without requesting permission from the net control station. If a need arises to enter an unassigned net, request permission from the net control station.

(b) Report jamming, interference, and/or imitative deception to this headquarters (Bound 10).

(5) Wire.

(a) Wire will be used as the primary means of communication whenever possible.

(b) All units will provide adequate security for wiremen working outside of their command post areas. At a minimum, this security will consist of one armed escort. The amount of security provided will depend on the local situation. Determination of the security required will be made by unit commanders, and not the wiremen concerned.

(c) Switchboard code names. See reference (a).

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(6) Pyrotechnic.


- (a) Authentication. Effective edition of KAA-60.
- (b) Numerical code. Effective edition of KAC-138.
- (c) Covered TT circuit (KW-7). Effective edition of KAK-2641.

(7) Warning, Visual, Sound, and Pyrotechnics. See Appendix 2 (Visual and Sound Signals).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See Administrative Order 1-66.
- b. Second echelon repair and maintenance of communication equipment can be accomplished at this headquarters.

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APPENDICES:

- ✓ 1 - Radio Frequency Plan
- ✓ 2 - Visual and Sound Signals

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA HANG, RVN
22000H February 1966

Appendix 1 (Radio Frequency Plan) to Annex I (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 52-661 JFAS 27

Ref: (a) DivO P2000.4B (3d MarDiv Comm SOP)

Time Zone: H XOFPAW .27 000L

ORGANIZATION	CALL SIGN	CIRCUIT DESIGNATION		FREQUENCY		EMISSION
		Pri	Sec	Pr	Sec	
		CIRCUIT TITLE				
1st Bn, 1st Mar	Pilsner	D-220	D-236	44.6mc	46.8 mc	36F3
81mm Mortar	Pilsner Whiskey	D-268		53.6mc		36F3
Co A	Pilsner Alfa	D-253		50.6mc		36F3
Co B	Pilsner Bravo	D-267		53.2mc		36F3
Co C	Pilsner Charlie	D-247		49.4mc		36F3
Co D	Pilsner Delta	D-261		52.2mc		36F3
Sierra	Pilsner Sierra	D-205		42.8mc		36F3
		D-240		49.8mc		36F3
		D-247		59.2mc		3A35/G.1A1

LEGEND:

O - NET CONTROL

X - GUARD

W - WHEN DIRECTED

Y - COPY

O - IS REQUIRED

LEGEND:

- O - NET CONTROL
- X - GUARD
- W - WHEN DIRECTED
- Y - COPY
- O - AS REQUIRED

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TO	FROM	DATE	INITIALS	REMARKS
1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30
31	32	33	34	35
36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45
46	47	48	49	50
51	52	53	54	55
56	57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64	65
66	67	68	69	70
71	72	73	74	75
76	77	78	79	80
81	82	83	84	85
86	87	88	89	90
91	92	93	94	95
96	97	98	99	100

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
220900H February 1966

Appendix 2 (Visual and Sound Signals) to Annex I (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 5-66

1. Warning and Alert Signals

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>HOW DISEMINATED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
"Flash Red (if known airborne atomic or gas add to "Flash Red")	Air attack imminent. (This includes aircraft and missiles).	Flash msg and short repeated sounding of sirens. Word of mouth	Sirens will not be used for any other purpose in the objective area
"Flash Blue"	Friendly atomic attack imminent. (5 minutes).	Flash msg to appropriate units. Word of mouth	Preparatory msg will normally be sent.
"Gas"	Gas. (Enemy or friendly).	Percussion bells, gongs, triangles, shell cases, etc. Flash msg to appropriate units. Word of mouth	Preparatory msg will normally be sent 45 minutes prior to execution of friendly gas attack.
"All Clear (Red, Blue or Gas.)	All clear from flash red, blue or gas.	Message, word of mouth	

2. Aircraft Manuever Signals

<u>AIRCRAFT MANEUVER</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
360° left turn	Display CP identification
360° right turn	Mission completed
*Alternate dips and climbs	Display front line markings
Rock wings	Message or displays understood
W right-left	Standby for message drop
Sharp S-turn	Will support, you mark target

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AIRCRAFT MANEUVER

MEANING

Circle right-locking wings

Am trying to contact you by radio

*It is impractical for jet aircraft to execute these maneuver signals.

3. Illumination.

TYPE

MEANING

Red star cluster M5241 (One signal is fired)

Encircled, or attacked by enemy. Request for support (Type of support must be affirmed by radio).

Red star cluster M5241 (Continuous fire of 3 or more signals).

Request for emergency illumination. (Radio liaison must be established).

Red star cluster M1841 (Continuous fire of 3 or more signals).

Request for ceasing of illumination, firing or shelling.

Red star parachute M126 (Hand held) (Fire one signal)

We are withdrawing from this position.

Red star parachute M126 (Fire two signals)

Area not secure, do not land/drop supplies.

Green star parachute M1941 (Fire 2 signals)

Area secure safe to land/drop supplies.

Green star parachute M1341 (Fire one signal)

Request for ammunition

Green star cluster M125 (Hand held) Continuous fire of 3 or more signals)

Request to wait. We are withdrawing from this position.

Green star cluster M125 (Hand held) (Fire one signal)

Request for medical evacuation

White star cluster M1341 (Fire one signal)

Request for radio comm on the air-ground frequency.

White star parachute M127 (Hand held) (Fire one signal)

Radio breakdown

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TYPE

MEANING

Green star cluster M125 (One)
and white star cluster M5241 (One)
(Fired at the same time)

Fire final protective fires

Green star cluster M125 (One) and
red star cluster M5241 (One) (Fired
at the same time)

Patrol returning to friendly
lines

4. Smoke Signals

TYPE

MEANING

Yellow smoke M64, or M22A2,
or M18

Marking of friendly position

Violet smoke, M23 or M18

Objective taken

Green smoke, M65, M15, or M18

Inform us of the enemy direction
or position.

Red smoke, M2202 used by aircraft
for liaison with ground units.

Marking of enemy position

HC white (Smoke) M18, or white
star cluster M1841 (Fire one signal)

Request for radio comm on the
air-ground frequency

Green smoke M18

Inform us of the enemy position

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
220900H February 1966

Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 5-66

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Copies</u>
CG, 3d MarDiv	2
CO, 3d Marines	4
CO, 12th Marines	2
CO, 1st Bn, 12th Marines	2
CO, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines	2
CO, MAG-12	2
CO, MAG-16	2
CO, 1st Bn, 1st Marines	25
CO, 1st Bn, 3d Marines	2
CO, 3d Bn, 3d Marines	2
CO, 3d Recon Bn	2
CO, 3d Engineer Bn	2
CO, 3d AT Bn	2
CO, 3d Tank Bn	2
DaNANG Special Sector	2
File	10

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DA NANG, RVN
270800H February 1966

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1st BN, 1st MAR LOG

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Operation Order 6-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000 AMS Series, L701, Sheets
6658IV, 6659III, 6659II and 6658I

Task Organization: No change

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy situation. See current ISUMS.
- b. Friendly situation. No change, except:
 - (1) 1st Plat, Co A, 3d Bn direct support 2d Bn, 3d Marines on order.
 - (2) 1st Plat, Co A, 3d AT Bn direct support 2d Bn, 3d Marines on order.
 - (3) Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines direct support 2d Bn, 3d Marines on order.
- c. Attachments and detachments. Plat, 68th Co, 52d Bn, ARVN detached.

2. MISSION. When relieved in TAOR by 2d Bn, 3d Marines, 1st Bn, 1st Marines (-) moves administratively to vicinity DA NANG EAST (BT 070711); assumes mission as 3d Marine Division Reserve. One company (Rein) moves administratively to (AT 939782); reverts to OPCON 3d Marines.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of operation. 1st Bn, 1st Marines assists 2d Bn, 3d Marines in relief of lines, conducting joint patrols/ambushes and establishing joint measures for local security. When 2d Bn, 3d Marines has established necessary control facilities--and at a time mutually agreed upon by the Commanding Officers, 1st Bn, 1st Marines, and 2d Bn, 3d Marines--2d Bn, 3d Marines assumes responsibility for 1st Bn, 1st Marines TAOR and 1st Bn, 1st Marines commences administrative move to new positions. Division Reserve and OPCON 3d Marines status will be assumed immediately upon relief by 2d Bn, 3d Marines.
- b. Co A (Rein)
 - (1) Assist Co H, 2d Bn, 3d Marines in relief of lines and familiarization with area of responsibility.

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(2) Upon relief, assume two-hour alert posture.

c. Co B (Relief):

(1) Assist Co B, 2d Bn, 3d Marines in relief of lines and familiarization with area of responsibility.

(2) Upon relief, assume six-hour alert posture.

d. Co C (Relief):

(1) Assist Co C, 2d Bn, 3d Marines in relief of lines and familiarization with area of responsibility.

(2) Upon relief, assume six-hour alert posture.

e. Co D (Relief):

(1) Assist Co D, 2d Bn, 3d Marines in relief of positions and familiarization with area of responsibility.

(2) Upon relief, revert to OPCON 3d Marines. Prepare to move administratively to (AF 939782) and execute subsequent missions as directed.

f. 81mm Mortar Plat:

(1) Assist 81mm Mortar Plat, 2d Bn, 3d Marines with fire planning and area familiarization.

(2) Upon relief, revert to general support, 1st Bn, 1st Marines.

g. 106mm Plat: General support

h. Coordinating instructions.

(1) The effective time of the shift of responsibility for the T&OR will be announced in the clear to all companies by the code word PLAYBOY followed by the DTG.

(2) 1st Bn, 1st Marines units continue preparing operational plans until relief is effected.

(3) 1st Bn, 1st Marines units provide guides for incoming units down to squad/section level.

(4) 1st Bn, 1st Marines units leave rear echelons in position for approximately 24 hours after relief is effected. The minimum composition of rear echelons is as follows:

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- (a) One FT Leader per rifle squad.
- (b) RT Guide per platoon.
- (c) One officer or qualified SNCO per Co Hdqtrs.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Instructions issued separately.


5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS.

a. Communications-electronics. No change.

b. Command.

- (1) 1st Bn, 1st Marines command post (tentative):
BT 070711.
- (2) Each company report command post closing and reopening.

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
1st Bn, 1st Marines
DANANG, VIETNAM
051200H February 1966

WEEKLY OPERATIONAL OVERLAY SUMMARY

PERIOD COVERED: 291200H January to 051200 February 1966

Ref: Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000 AMS Series L701; Sheets 6659111
and 6659114.

Time Zone: H



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
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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DANG'G, VIETNAM
121200H February 1966

PERIOD COVERED: 051200H February to 121200H February 1966

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
WEEKLY OPERATIONAL OVERLAY SUMMARY

PERIOD COVERED: 121200H February to 191200H February 1966

Ref: Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000 AMS Series, L701; Sheets 6659III and 6658IV

Time Zone: H

1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
121200H February 1966



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Table E, 1

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
WEEKLY OPERATIONAL OVERLAY SUMMARY

PERIOD COVERED: 191200H February to 281200H February 1966

Ref: Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000 AMS Series, 1701; Sheets 6659III and 6658IV

Time Zone: II

1st Bn, 1st Marine
9. BATT, 100
281200H February 1966



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Tab E, 10, 4