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1ST BN 1ST MARINES
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
W/ENCL 5 A-9
DEC 1966

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IN BT, IN MAR LOG 008-67

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

COPY 2 OF 11 COPIES

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3 Jan 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 1st Marines

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

Ref: (a) DivO 3480.1
(b) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6640
IV, 6658 I and 6659 II and III

Encl: (1) Command Chronology for the period 1-31 December 1966

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.

John A. Scott
JOHN A. SCOTT
Acting

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1-31 December 1966

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PART I

1. Organizational Data

a. Designation and location. During December 1966 the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines was located at DANANG, Vietnam. The Battalion was composed of Headquarters and Service Company and four rifle companies. Units from the 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Anti-Tank Battalion and 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion were in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

b. Period Covered. 1-31 December 1966.

c. Commanding Officer, Staff and Principal Subordinates

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>INCLUSIVE DATES</u>
CO	VAN D. BELL JR.	LtCol	1-31 Dec
XO	JOHN A. SCOTT	Maj	1-31 Dec *
S-1	B. R. FREEMAN	2dLt	1-31 Dec
S-2	J. J. BURTON	Maj	1 Dec
	P. A. RAY	2dLt	2-31 Dec
S-3	T. M. STOKES	Maj	1-31 Dec
S-4	D. M. CUNNINGHAM	Capt	1-21 Dec
	J. I. GATLIFF	Maj	22-31 Dec
S-5	C. M. HENDRICKS	2dLt	1-31 Dec
CommO	J. A. GALLAGHER	Capt	1-31 Dec
SupO	F. L. PIERCE	2dLt	1-31 Dec
MTO	G. J. FISHER	1stLt	1-31 Dec
Chaplain	J. E. DORSEY	Lt(CHC)	1-31 Dec
BnSurgeon	F. M. FOLEY	Lt(MC)	1-31 Dec
AsstBn Surgeon	T. A. OTTER	Lt(MC)	1-31 Dec
Dentist	D. J. LOOMIS	Lt(DC)	1-31 Dec

CO, Co A	A. F. LUCAS	Capt	1-21 Dec
	D. M. CUNTINGHAM	Capt	22-31 Dec
CO, Co B	B. D. LAIN	Capt	1-31 Dec
CO, Co C	M. M. CARTER	Capt	1-31 Dec
CO, Co D	M. J. KELLY	Capt	1-31 Dec
CO, H&SCo	J. I. GATLIFF	Maj	1-31 Dec

* Maj SCOTT acted as CO during the period 16-31 December while LtCol BELL was on leave.

d. Average monthly strength during the period 1-31 December.

	USMC	USN
Officers	32	3
Enlisted	1002	56

PART II

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2. Narrative Summary

a. Personnel

(1) Replacements. During this reporting period the Battalion received the following personnel as replacements:

(a) USMC Officers	1
(b) USMC Enlisted	221
(c) USN Officers	0
(d) USN Enlisted	2

(2) Rotation

(a) USMC Officers	0
(b) USMC Enlisted	65

(3) Officers lost through attrition other than rotation

(a) USMC W1:	1
BN	0

(4) Enlisted lost through attrition other than battle

(a) USMC KIA	10
(b) USMC DOW	2
(c) USMC MIA	0
(d) USMC WIA	54
(e) USMC WIANE	33
(f) USN WIA	3
(g) USN WIANE	3
(h) USMC Non-battle	6
(i) Intradivision Transfers	15

(5) Rest and Relaxation. The following number of personnel were assigned R&R quotas to the locations indicated:

(a) Okinawa	6
(b) Hong Kong	19
(c) Bangkok	12
(d) Tokyo	26
(e) Manila	6
(f) Taipei	17
(g) Hawaii	11
(h) Singapore	8
(i) Kuala Lumpur	9

(6) Special Services

(a) Movies continue to be shown nightly at the Battalion CP.

(b) The enlisted club is under reconstruction to provide additional space for a recreation room and more overall space within the club.

(c) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines monogrammed stationary was secured and distributed to personnel in the Battalion. See Tab A of Part IV.)

(d) Two television sets were obtained and installed in the enlisted club.

b. Administration

(1) Personnel Accounting. No major problems were encountered.

(2) Awards

(a) Sixty-one Purple Heart Medals were presented or forwarded for presentation by this Battalion.

(b) Special emphasis was placed on recommending junior grade officers and enlisted personnel for achievement awards.

(3) Promotions

(a) First Sergeant 1

(b) Sergeant 4

(c) Corporal

(d) Lance Corporal

(e) Private First Class 1

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(4) Pay No change.

(5) Exchange. This Battalion continued to be serviced by a PX trailer. Items offered were considered to be adequate. There was an inconsistent flow of items with a high demand such as razors, certain foods, and cigars; consequently these items were not always available.

c. Intelligence

(1) Enemy situation at the beginning of the period

(a) Translation of captured enemy documents indicated the VC were urging the population to plant more rice in order to increase the rice harvest. The VC were also urging the population to unite against the free world to help defeat them.

(b) Interrogation of captives continued to indicate enemy movement north and south through the eastern TAOR. Reports of increased movement and sightings of groups of VC in different types of uniforms were consistent throughout.

the period covered. This indicated the presence of larger-sized units in the area than were previously reported. The interrogation of a VC officer captured by ARVN forces disclosed that plans to attack the Battalion CP last October were postponed due to changes in the perimeter defense.

(c) Intelligence reports increased over the last reporting period and in some instances were substantiated by interrogation reports of captives. An increase of intelligence reports indicating attacks on USMC positions was received but none materialized, possibly due to the increased Marine activity in the areas covered by the reports.

(2) Significant intelligence items during the reporting period

(a) On 2 December interrogation reports of seven VC disclosed a 32 man platoon living and operating in the vicinity of HA MY DONG (3) Hamlet.

(b) On 8 December a CIT agent reported units of the 707th Battalion infiltrating from XUYEN THO Village north to the CAM HAI Village area. This report was later corrected to designate the battalion as the 507th.

(c) On 9 December DIEN BAN District Headquarters reported two VC companies withdrawing from KY NGOC and KY MINH Village areas southwest to PHU MY Village after an engagement with U. S. forces. It was further reported that the units were carrying 11 dead and six wounded VC. This report was confirmed from interrogation of villagers in the area by ITT.

(d) On the morning of 11 December a 1st Marine Division report indicated a battalion-size unit at KY NGOC Village.

(e) On 14 December DIEN BAN National Police reported two VC battalions located in the vicinity of PHU PHONG Village. The reported mission of the units was to conduct an attack on the Popular Forces stationed at PHU LOC Village or to mortar DIEN BAN District Headquarters.

(f) On 19 December HOI AN Sub-Sector reported one VC company located in KY NGOC Village.

(3) Enemy initiated incidents during the reporting period. The Viet Cong initiated 141 incidents within the T10R. The incidents are categorized as follows:

(a) Engagements	<u>TOTAL</u> 60
(b) Harassing fire	38

(c) Mines and booby traps	<u>TOTAL</u> 34
(1) Anti-personnel	30
(2) Anti-tank/vehicular	4
(d) Mortar fire	5
(e) Ambushes	4

(4) Summary of enemy casualties personnel captured and equipment captured during reporting period

(a) Viet Cong losses (personnel)

	<u>FBGF</u>	<u>KBMTQWS</u>	<u>KEPA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA (confirmed)	120	4	3	127
KIA (probable)				34
WIA (probable)				28
VCE				98
VCS				136
VCS to civilian				70
VCS to VC				52
VCS to civil defendant				12

(b) Viet Cong losses (weapons)

	<u>TOTAL</u>
Thompson SMG	4
Carbine, M-1	4
Carbine, K-44	3
SMG, K-50	4
SMG, K-50, PPSH 1941	1
Rifle, M-14	2
BAR	1
Revolver, .38 cal, S&W	1

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(c) Viet Cong losses (miscellaneous). (See Tab B of Part IV).

(5) Significant trends noted during the period

(a) Intelligence reports doubled those of the previous month indicating a marked increase of enemy activity within the TAOR. Intelligence reports stressed that the VC were using propaganda in an attempt to increase rice production and unite the population against U. S. forces.

(b) Incidents involving the VC increased 20% over the previous month. Incidents continued to be concentrated in the southeastern and western sections of the TAOR which substantiated intelligence reports of enemy activity in these areas.

(c) Enemy units continued to avoid large scale contact whenever possible and appeared to be continuing their tactics of harassing and sniping from safe distances. In one instance they positioned a large unit preparatory to ambushing a rifle company. Once foiled in this attempt by an unexpected maneuver of the USMC forces, they appeared confused and attempted to flee the area. In their flight they only conducted harassing fires for the probable purpose of diversion and screening their departure.

(6) Situation at the end of the reporting period. Operations conducted both immediately prior and subsequent to the Christmas stand down continued to confirm the presence of organized enemy units operating in the western TAOR. The populace remaining in the area continued to harbor VC in their homes, to feed them, and warn of the approach of USMC forces. Freshly dug fortifications and new minefields continued to be reported by patrols. In the southeastern TAOR reports continued to state the desire of the VC to gain an impressive victory over U. S. or combined forces for propaganda purposes. The majority of these reports indicated the PHUOC TRACH bridge as the most likely target. Consistent activity and rapid reaction to intelligence reports in this area has kept the VC from effecting any coordinated actions.

d. Operations and Training

(1) During the reporting period this Battalion continued extensive patrols and ambushes within its TAOR with emphasis on night fire team ambushes, patrols and listening posts. The Battalion supported two operations which were conducted by RVN forces. (See Tabs C and D of Part IV.) Operation TRINIDAD commenced on 7 December but was terminated prior to any significant results because of increased enemy activity in the western portion of the Battalion TAOR. (See Tab E of Part IV.)

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This increased enemy activity precipitated Operation TRINIDAD II. (See Tab F of Part (IV).) On 17 December this Battalion resumed operational control of Company "A" from the 1st Military Police Battalion. On the same day this Battalion was directed to provide necessary security forces and convoy commander for a ROUGH RIDER convoy to CHU LAI. This operation was executed during the period 20-21 December. (See Tabs G, H and I of Part IV.) Renewed enemy activity in the western portion of the TAOR brought about Operation SHASTA II on 19 December. (See Tab J of Part IV.) As indicated by intelligence reports the Christmas and New Year truce periods were marked by VC movement and VC initiated contacts. During December the Battalion conducted (804) fire team, (399) squad, (67) platoon and (10) company operations in addition to three battalion-size operations. Additionally on 27 December 1966 this Battalion commenced selective mine/booby trap warfare in accordance with 1st Marines message 230715Z Dec66.

(2) The following schools were conducted by the Battalion during December.

(a) A five day orientation school was conducted for 163 newly joined personnel.

(b) Familiarization firing on the Battalion 900 inch range resulted in 350 Marines adjusting their battle sights on the M-14 rifle, M-60 machinegun, 3.5 inch rocket launcher and M-79 grenade launcher familiarization firing. was also conducted.

(c) A school on the man pack personnel detector had to be terminated because of inoperative equipment.

(3) Personnel attended the following schools outside the Battalion.

(a) Mine Warfare School	70 graduates
(b) Vietnamese Language School	2 graduates
(c) Infantry Weapons Repair School	2 graduates
(d) Ammunition Technician School	2 graduates
(e) Vehicle Waterproofing School	1 graduate

e. Logistics

(1) Supply. The shortage of individual equipment continued and became critical when replacement personnel joined the Battalion. The shortage of batteries for mine sweepers stopped mine sweeping operations until a battery pack was jury-rigged from available batteries.

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(2) Maintenance

(a) Motor Transport. During the month of December M422A1 vehicles traveled a total of 28,238 miles. These vehicles began to wear out wheel bearings and seals at a rapid rate. This was caused by operation in sand within the Battalion CP and frequent runs to Danang along essentially unimproved routes.

(b) Ordnance. At the end of the reporting period 53 M14 rifles were on deadline for 3d echelon repair, with a total of 63 ordnance items on deadline.

(c) Communications-Electronics. Replacement parts for the AN/PRC-25 continued to be unavailable and critipack resupply was requested for these items. The AN/PRC-25 replacement parts most needed are modules and hand sets. Maintenance of other comm-elec items presented no unusual problems during this month.

(3) Food Service. This organization operated one battalion-size messhall. During December the Mess Section provided support for a civic action Christmas Party for 400 Vietnamese children. The Christmas Day hot meal was provided to all units in the field. During the month two rifle companies subsisted on C rations supplemented by soup, onions, potatoes and canned items of different types.

(4) Contonment and Camp Facilities. A bull dozer from 1st Engineer Battalion was used to build a berm around the Company "B" CP and improve the Battalion CP berm. Daily improvement of defense positions around the Battalion CP continues. The shower drainage system at the Battalion CP was found unsatisfactory due to a high water table and a work request was submitted.

(5) Transportation

(a) This organization has been supported by a detachment of five 2½ ton trucks from 1st Motor Transport Battalion. This support is supplemented by 2½ ton trucks supplied by 1st Marine Regiment on an as requested basis. By the end of the month the requirement for trucks stabilized at about five trucks per day.

(b) National Route 14 in the western portion of the TAOR continued to deteriorate during December and required the continuous use of three Otters from 3d Motor Transport Battalion. The Otter's capacity was not sufficient to carry the required supplies so helicopter resupply started on 26 December. Helicopter resupply will be required on a continuing basis until that portion of National Route 14 in the western portion of the TAOR is repaired.

(6) Water. Water was supplied by a water supply point operated by the Support Company, 3d Engineer Battalion. One rifle company from this Battalion was resupplied with water by helicopter from the Battalion CP.

f. Civic Action

(1) General. The Civil Action effort during the month of December consisted mostly of a continuation of Medcaps and assistance in the care of Vietnamese civilians during critical periods.

(2) Medcaps. There were 3,380 patients cared for during the period. These broke down into 390 men, 621 women and 2,360 children. The Medcaps were conducted primarily at the Battalion CP and at two CAC locations.

(3) Assistance. Assistance for the care of Vietnamese civilians was directed mostly through Hieu Nhon and Dien Ban District Headquarters. For example, food to feed refugees displaced from the western portion of our TAOR as a result of Operation TRINIDAD II and SHASTA II was given to Dien Ban. The total food stuff included over 1600 lbs of rice and wheat, 200 lbs of soap, and 100 lbs of clothing.

(4) Special Projects

(a) Rolls of barbed wire were given to Triem Trung (2) Hamlet adjacent to the Battalion CP for construction of a single apron on the exposed side of the hamlet. Engineers attached to this Battalion provided instruction on how to build the fence but the men in the hamlet did all the work including cutting the bamboo used for stakes.

(b) A Christmas party was held for approximately 400 children from a Catholic orphanage in Hoi An. In addition to cartoons and games a meal was served followed by Christmas sweets. Santa presented gifts to all the children as they were lead by in small groups by their Marine hosts.

g. Psychological Operations. These operations consisted of the distribution of leaflets by patrols and the distribution of newspapers, magazines and pamphlets by the CAC units located near the hamlets of Tan Than (2) and Triem Tu (1). In addition Mr. Robert Kelly of JUSPAO gave a talk to a platoon of Marines on the subject of relations with the Vietnamese. This was the first talk given in a planned program that is intended to reach all personnel in this Battalion.

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h. Fire Support Coordination and Naval Gunfire

(1) Artillery support for the month of December was provided by the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. An "Introduction to Forward Observer Procedures" was presented by the Artillery Liaison Section in conjunction with the Battalion orientation program. Four artillery forward observer teams were in support of the Battalion during the month.

(2) Artillery missions for the period 1-31 December

- (a) Harrassing and interdiction 279
- (b) Close support of battalion operations 191
- (c) Illumination missions 13

(3) Mortar Missions (81mm Mortar Platoon)

- (a) Harrassing and interdiction 294
- (b) Close support of battalion operations 74
- (c) Registration mission 18

(4) Naval Gunfire Missions

- (a) Harrassing and interdiction 75 rounds

1. Air Support and Defense. Air support during the month of December was provided by the 1st Marine Air Wing with fixed wing and helicopter missions. Fixed wing aircraft supported the Battalion with 15 close air support missions. Helicopter support consisted of ten cargo, two Sparrow Hawks, and 27 medical evacuation missions. One flareship mission was used during the month. On 26 December daily helicopter resupply commenced to the 2d Platoon, Company "D". Cargo consists of Class I, IV and V.

j. Medical and Dental Support (Surgical)

(1) Medical Trends. Effective Malaria prophylaxis is evident by the appearance of only one new case of Malaria this month. The VD rate is still high with 14 new cases reported to the BAS. December also witnessed the first significant case load of Immersion Foot casualties. The majority of these cases occurred in the very wet western area of the T10R during operations which precluded withdrawal of these men from the adverse conditions. Provisions for rotation of line companies from this area have now been made; the problem of Immersion

Foot should, subsequently, be decreased. An increasing incidence of psychiatric disorder has also been noted; a study of this problem, directed at prophylaxis, is underway.

(2) Number of Combat Casualties Treated. The BAS instituted treatment of 34 WIA's.

(3) Number of Non-Battle Casualties Treated. There were 993 medical treatments and 224 dental treatments administered during the month of December.

(4) Preventive Medicine Section. Malaria prophylaxis was continued by the administration of one Chloroquine - Primaquine tablet per man per week. Sanitation inspection was conducted weekly with a written report submitted to the Commanding Officer.

(5) Schooling Conducted. Orientation of new corpsmen was conducted in the form of individual and group discussions. Weekly classes on medical and administrative subjects were conducted for corpsmen in the BAS. Instruction in first aid, buddy aid, care of the feet, venereal disease, etc., was conducted for Marine Corps personnel by the line company corpsmen. Orientation classes, for new Marine Corps personnel, on pertinent medical subjects were begun.

k. Chaplain

(1) Services conducted within the Battalion

(a) Protestant. Twelve Sunday worship services were conducted with 307 personnel in attendance and 282 communing. Eleven services were conducted during the week with 278 attending and 261 communing. A Christmas candlelight worship service was held with an attendance of 73 and 73 communicants. One Lay-Leader service was conducted on a Sunday with seven in attendance.

(b) Catholic. Five Sunday services were conducted with 220 personnel in attendance. Four services were conducted during the week with 39 attending. LtCdr James S. JENNER, CHC, USNR, Regimental Chaplain, served the Catholic personnel in this Battalion.

(2) Counseling. During the reporting period 77 men were counseled.

(3) Lectures

(a) Four orientation lectures were presented with an attendance of 114.

(b) Four character education and moral leadership lectures were given with 114 personnel in attendance.

(c) Two lectures on Religions in Vietnam were presented to 93 men.

(4) Significant Activities

(a) Six memorial services were conducted with 158 personnel in attendance.

(b) One hundred and forty-nine hospital visits were made at Company "C", 1st Medical Battalion and the Naval Support Activity Hospital.

(c) Ten visits were made on men confined to the III MAF Brig.

(d) Approximately 138 gift boxes were distributed to the troops in the field.

(e) An annual inspection was conducted by Captain D. J. CASAZZA, CHC/USN, 1st Marine Division Chaplain.

(f) Interior and exterior Chapel Christmas displays were constructed including a Manger Scene and a Madonna and Child.

(g) An appropriate prayer (Catholic) was offered at the side of a Marine killed in action.

(h) Because of operations, disposition of men, transportation, and monsoon rains, activities were somewhat curtailed. On several occasions it was necessary to conduct a visitation rather than a preaching ministry.

1. Problems Encountered and Lessons Learned

(1) Problems Encountered

(a) During the reporting period this Battalion was supported by helicopters for resupply and medical evacuations. The primary problem encountered with this support was the lack of positive communications with the ground unit prior to the helicopter arriving over a designated landing zone. Positive communications are mandatory between aircraft and ground units as helicopters approach the area of operation in order to lift or shift supporting artillery fire, to give approach directions to the helicopters, and to coordinate the escort gun ships with ground units.

b. In addition the aircraft mission request format requires that the destination coordinates be given the request is submitted. This is obviously designed for support in a static situation. It is not possible to give exact coordinates in a fast moving situation. The specific place of drop must remain flexible as enemy contact and unit movement cannot be predetermined.

c. On two occasions during the reporting period a TACA and an airstrike were requested by the pilot of a helicopter flying support missions requested by this Battalion. On both occasions the ground force commander was unaware of the request for fixed wing air support until the aircraft were on station. The problem here is fire support for other units engaged in the area of operations. The ground commander must be able to rapidly select target priority and appropriate weapons systems in support of his units engaged on the ground and the arrival of unannounced air on station precludes this rapid selection.

(2) Lessons Learned. The lessons learned during this reporting period support those previously reported.

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PART III

3. Sequential Listing of Significant Events

a. 1 December

(1) At 010600H Companies C and D commenced a combined operation with the 759th Popular Force Company from DIEM BAN. (See Tab K).

(2) At 010730H a tank/infantry security patrol from Company D received several incoming rounds of sniper fire at coordinates (BT 076626) resulting in two Marines KIA. The patrol returned fire with small arms and maneuvered a unit in pursuit. Two VC were observed fleeing from the patrol and were killed by small arms fire.

(3) At 011500H the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division arrived at the Battalion CP for presentation of awards.

(4) At 011630H a patrol from Company B received a heavy volume of automatic small arms fire from coordinates (BT 127617) resulting in one Marine KIA. The patrol returned fire with small arms and maneuvered a squad in pursuit. The VC broke contact which was not regained.

b. 2 December

(1) At 020255H a patrol from Company C, while moving into a blocking position in support of 759th Popular Force Company, detected enemy movement at coordinates (BT 010577). An 81mm fire mission was called resulting in two short rounds which wounded five Marines. The wounded were evacuated by helicopter.

(2) At 020810H the blocking force from Company C observed five VC crossing the river evading the sweep force at coordinates (BT 028615). The blocking force opened fire with small arms resulting in five VC KIA (probable). The bodies were not confirmed due to the water barrier.

(3) At 020915H a combined force made up of the Battalion Scouts and a Popular Force Platoon from HIEU NHON District captured seven VC at coordinates (BT 145607). The VC were forwarded to the HIEU NHON District Headquarters for interrogation.

c. 4 December. At 042020H an ambush from Company B at coordinates (BT 173523) received small arms fire and rifle grenades from an estimated ten VC resulting in four USMC KIA. Small arms fire was returned and a unit was maneuvered in pursuit but the VC broke contact.

d. 5 December

(1) At 050945H one amphibian tractor detonated a mine at coordinates (BT 983584) resulting in four Marines KIA.

[REDACTED]

(2) At 051400H a platoon patrol from Company D at coordinates (BT 084603) received four rounds of incoming sniper fire resulting in one Marine 'MIA'. A unit was sent in pursuit but the VC broke contact which could not be regained.

(3) At 051516H a platoon blocking force from Company D observed several VC fleeing. The blocking force opened fire resulting in eight VC 'MIA'.

g. 6 December

(1) At 060530H blocking forces from Company C were in position to support a one day search and destroy operation conducted by the 4th Battalion, 51st RVN Regiment. (See Tab B).

(2) At 060800H a staff briefing was conducted for the unit commanders involved in Operation TRINIDAD. This included the Popular Force Unit Commanders from BINH PHON District.

(3) At 061424H a platoon moving from a blocking position received small arms fire from coordinates (BT 008584) resulting in four Marines 'MIA' and one 'MIA'. Fire was returned with small arms, 81mm mortars, and artillery. A maneuver element was sent out but the VC broke contact. A landing zone was set up and secured with small arms and artillery fire. A helicopter was called for the evacuation of casualties and, upon landing, it received two rounds of sniper fire which disabled the craft. Artillery and air strikes were called to suppress the fire in the landing zone and the helicopter evacuation of the wounded and downed crew was completed at that time.

h. 7 December

(1) At 070630H Operation TRINIDAD commenced but was cancelled by the Commanding Officer, 1st Marines. (See Tab K).

(2) At 071440H a helicopter landed in the Company C landing zone with a maintenance team to work on the helicopter disabled the previous day. The helicopter received two or three rounds of sniper fire setting it on fire, and it was decided to reinforce Company C due to the increasing VC activity in that area.

(3) At 071630H this Battalion commenced Operation TRINIDAD II.

i. 8 December

(1) At 081030H a platoon patrol from Company B was searching a mangrove at (BT 145594). Four VC ran from the swamp and two were 'MIA' and one was 'MIA'. Further search of the mangrove revealed evidence of a VC haven. One VC was found hiding underwater and was captured.

(2) At 081955H CAC-2 sent out a patrol in reaction to intelligence reports of a VC meeting at coordinates (BT 197575) and received incoming sniper rounds. Fire was returned and a fire team was sent in pursuit but the VC fled and contact was not regained. The skirmish resulted in one Marine KIA who was later evacuated by helicopter.

(3) At 081920H a squad from Company B, while moving into an ambush position at coordinates (BT 197575), received incoming sniper fire resulting in one Marine KIA. Fire was returned but pursuit was not possible because of a water barrier.

h. 9 December. At 091430H a patrol from CAC-2 approached two VCS at (BT 197575). Questioning by C/M N Village Cadre disclosed that the VCS had housed several VC the night before. Both VCS were forwarded to the Battalion CP for processing.

i. 11 December. At 111600H Operation TRIVIDIO II was terminated.

j. 12 December

(1) At 121202H a patrol from Company C observed one VC fleeing across a rice paddy. A unit was sent in pursuit and opened fire with small arms resulting in one VC KIA.

(2) At 121000H a patrol from Company D observed one VC on a trail attempting to hide some equipment in a water hole. The point of the patrol opened fire and killed the VC. The materiel captured included individual equipment, a Thompson sub-machinegun, and one caliber 45 pistol.

k. 13 December

(1) At 130900H a patrol from Company B received incoming fire from coordinates (BT 197565) resulting in two Marines KIA. The patrol returned fire with small arms and called an artillery mission. A squad was maneuvered to the flank and crossed the river in pursuit under the cover of 60mm mortar and small arms fire. The VC broke contact. Further search revealed one carbine magazine and one Thompson sub-machinegun magazine and footprints indicating five or six VC had been in the area.

(2) At 131410H a patrol from Company B observed three VC near a house. The VC discovered the patrol and fled. The patrol opened fire killing one VC. A squad was sent in pursuit but contact with the VC was lost. A Soviet 7.62 sub-machinegun was captured with some individual equipment.

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1. 14 December

(1) At 141220H four VCS were observed fleeing in a boat at coordinates (BT 034574). They failed to halt and the patrol opened fire with small arms. The boat returned to shore with one of the VCS wounded. All four were apprehended and were without ID cards. Upon returning the patrol apprehended five VCS who were fleeing. Nine VCS were forwarded to the Battalion CP for processing.

(2) At 141340H a patrol from Company B apprehended two VCS who were without ID cards. Both were forwarded to the Battalion CP for processing.

m. 15 December

(1) At 151330H a Marine on a patrol from Company B tripped a booby trapped Chinese Communist grenade at coordinates (BT 182583). The Marine was wounded and evacuated by helicopter.

(2) C-C-1 and C-C-2 were formalized and redesignated C-C-D4 and C-C-D5 respectively.

n. 16 December

(1) At 160930H a two-company search and destroy operation commenced in C'M T'ANH Village involving Companies B and D. (See Tab E).

(2) At 161010H a scout-sniper employed in a blocking position at coordinates (BT 176561) observed one VC with a weapon and pack at coordinates (BT 178563). The sniper opened fire and killed the VC. The body was not recovered because of a water barrier.

(3) At 161345H a patrol from Company D received 25 incoming rounds of small arms fire. Fire was returned and a maneuver element was sent out in pursuit. The VC broke contact which was not regained. A sweep of the area produced two VCS who were apprehended and sent to the Battalion CP for processing.

(4) At 161405H the sweep force from Company B found 1100 pounds of untilled rice at coordinates (BT 185586) which was forwarded to USU WUOM District Headquarters for distribution.

(5) At 161615H a Marine on the sweep force from Company B observed one VC about to throw a hand grenade at coordinates (BT 185570) and killed him.

(6) At 161615H a patrol from Company D observed three VC fleeing at coordinates (BT 191567). The patrol opened fire and maneuvered a unit in pursuit. One of the VC was killed; the other two broke contact which was not regained.

(#) At 161946H an ambush from Company D killed one VC moving down a trail.

c. 17 December

(1) At 171215H the sweep force from Company B found one boat, some documents, and four large urns of rice. The boat was destroyed and the rice was forwarded to USJ MHOV District for distribution. The documents were forwarded to the Battalion CP for translation.

(2) At 171600H the two-company search and destroy operation ended.

d. 18 December. At 171845H a Marine from Company D trimmed a heavily treachered M-26 grenade resulting in two Marines KIA. The wounded were evacuated to the P'S by vehicle.

e. 19 December. At 190600H Operation SH ST II commenced. (See Tabs J and M).

f. 20 December. Operation SH ST II continued and this Battalion provided a company commander and security forces for a ROUGH RIDER operation. (See Tabs C and R).

g. 21 December

(1) At 211200H Operation SH ST II was terminated. Companies C and D continued the search and destroy operation for three more days in the same area of operations.

(2) At 211230H the sweep force from Company C made contact with approximately 20 VC at coordinates (BT 002596). The VC had small arms, 60mm mortars, and many automatic weapons. On initial contact the VC split up with one VC element headed northeast and the other one west. The initial contact resulted in two VC KIA. Units of Company C split and pursued the VC. The 1st Platoon of Company C pursued north to coordinates (BT 003609) and lost contact at the river. The remainder of Company C pursued east and called for a STERD HAWK to block from the west. The Battalion Scouts were maneuvered to block between coordinates (BT 002590) and (BT 007530). The 1st Platoon of Company D was maneuvered to block from coordinates (BT 008580) and (BT 014590). The 2d Platoon of Company D was moved to intercept the VC moving southwest. A reinforced platoon occupied defensive positions at coordinates (BT 005595) and (BT 004584). Artillery missions were called on the VC positions, and units of Company C assaulted and overran the enemy. Results of this initial contact were four Marines KIA and two 'I'. VC casualties were two confirmed KIA and six probable. One M-14 and one Thompson sub-machinegun were captured. The VC broke contact and carried their dead and wounded with them.

(3) At 211530H the 2d Platoon of Company D observed three VC on the west side of the river at coordinates (BT 012596). The VC were taken under small arms fire resulting in one VC KIA.

(4) At 211640H the 2d Platoon of Company A, the SP RIFLE HAWK, received several incoming rounds of sniper fire from coordinates (BT 016598) as they landed. A fire team maneuvered in pursuit and killed the VC. A thorough search of the area was conducted but no weapon was found.

(5) At 211700H a fire team ambush from Company D observed a large number of VC moving past their position at coordinates (BT 014592). The fire team took the rear of the column under fire resulting in four VC KIA and two carbines and four Chinese Communist grenades captured. The VC broke contact.

(6) At 211730H a scout from Company D observed one VC moving along a trail at coordinates (BT 991598). The VC was killed and one French sub-machinegun and one Chinese Communist grenade were captured.

(7) At 211730H the 2d Platoon of Company C in a blocking position observed ten VC moving near a tree line at coordinates (BT 993579). The platoon opened fire and killed two VC. The bodies were picked up by the VC as they broke contact and fled.

(8) At 211745H the Battalion Scouts in a blocking position observed approximately 20 VC moving across a rice paddy. An 81mm mortar mission was called resulting in excellent coverage. The VC were also taken under small arms fire. The VC broke contact and withdrew to trench lines to the northeast and carried ten VC KIA with them. The scouts pursued but were hit by automatic weapons fire from a tree line on their flank. Again the VC broke contact and dispersed. An artillery mission was called but further pursuit was not possible due to darkness.

t. 22 December

(1) At 220900H the scouts apprehended one female who was positively identified as a female who was acting as a guide for a VC unit the previous day. She was forwarded to the Battalion CP for interrogation.

(2) At 220915H a platoon scout force from Company D captured one VC who had been KIA by small arms fire at coordinates (BT 997578). In the same vicinity three VCs were apprehended who were attempting to evade the scout force by hiding in a hamlet. The VCC and VCs were forwarded to the Battalion CP for interrogation.

(3) At 221050H a platoon scout force from Company A captured one VCC who was hiding in a cave at coordinates (BT 001579). The cave was destroyed and the VC was forwarded to the Battalion CP for interrogation.

(4) At 221055H a platoon sweep force from Company C received incoming small arms fire from coordinates (BT 993581) resulting in one Marine KI. The sweep force returned fire with small arms and maneuvered one squad to pursue. The VC broke contact.

(5) At 221330H an MTOB on a reconnaissance patrol heading east at coordinates (BT 012568) ran over a pressure type mine (estimated 100-110 pounds of explosives) resulting in one Marine KI, three Marines WI, and a total loss of the vehicle. All MIA personnel were evacuated by helicopter.

(6) At 221330H a platoon sweep force from Company D observed four VC at coordinates (BT 016587) who attempted to flee. The sweep force opened fire with small arms resulting in two VC KI and one VC WI and captured. The fourth VC could not be located. The following equipment was captured: two M-14 Carbines, 2 Chinese Communist grenades, and assorted individual equipment.

u. 23 December

(1) At 231042H a patrol from Company C received 15-20 rounds of incoming small arms fire from coordinates (BT 110620). The patrol returned fire and sent an element in pursuit. They observed a VC attempting to flee and killed him. They also found an anti-personnel mine which was blown in place.

(2) At 231445H a patrol observed three VC fleeing at coordinates (BT 028582). The patrol opened fire killing two VC. The remaining VC was pursued but could not be located.

v. 24 December. At 241000H two VC surrendered at the C C-D5 position. They were forwarded to the Battalion CP for processing.

w. 26 December. At 261057H a screening force from Company D received some incoming carbine fire from coordinates (BT 013588). Small arms fire was returned and a maneuver element was sent out in pursuit. The VC broke contact and fled. The enemy fire resulted in one Marine WI.

x. 27 December. At 270815H a patrol from Company C observed 15 VC fleeing at coordinates (BT 065500). The patrol opened fire and linked with a 217th BN SF unit which was pursuing the VC. The results were 14 VC KI and one VC WI. Captured were two Thompson sub-machineguns, three M-1 Carbines, one Browning automatic rifle, two M-14 rifles, two M-50 sub-machineguns, and one K-44 carbine.

y. 28 December. This Battalion provided a SP 270th BN SF unit to 1st Division control to extract a reconnaissance team in the (BT 9131) area source. During the execution of the mission one Marine was KI and one Marine was WI. The SP 270th BN SF unit returned on the morning of 29 December. (See Tab N).

g. 29 December

(1) At 290830H a patrol from Company C observed two VCS fleeing from a house as the patrol approached at coordinates (BT 080596). Both VCS were apprehended and forwarded to the Battalion CP for processing.

(2) At 291405H a Marine on patrol from Company C tripped a mine which was placed in waist high brush at coordinates (BT 085588). Soon after, the patrol received small arms fire from coordinates (BT 084587). The results were one Marine KIA and three 'I'. The unit was sent in pursuit but the VC broke contact and fled.

aa. 30 December. At 301300H a patrol from Company B observed two VC in the brush at coordinates (BT 177566). The patrol opened fire and sent a unit in pursuit. The route of egress was covered by artillery fire. The unit in pursuit found heavy blood trails and one Thompson sub-machinegun and an ammunition can filled with medical supplies. Further pursuit in direction of blood trail resulted in the patrol regaining contact with the VC who was fleeing in a boat. The patrol opened fire and killed the VC.

bb. 31 December

(1) At 310600H a small security patrol from Company D received incoming small arms fire from coordinates (BT 018589). The patrol returned fire with small arms and sent a unit in pursuit. One VC was killed and several documents were found. The documents were forwarded to the Battalion CP for processing.

(2) At 311355H a platoon from Company I on a security patrol received incoming small arms fire from coordinates (AT 995550). Fire was returned resulting in two VC KIA. Captured was one caliber 38 revolver, 11 Chinese Communist Grenades, and some clothing.

(3) At 311510H a security patrol from Company B surprised one VC in the brush who threw a hand grenade. The patrol returned fire and killed the VC. The VC had two M-26 grenades, a cartridge belt, and some documents which were forwarded to the Battalion CP for processing.

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Part IV

4. Supporting Documents

Tab A - 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Monogrammed Stationery
B - Viet Cong Losses (Miscellaneous) *Expt*
C - 1st Marines Frag Order DTG 301100Z Nov 1966
D - 1st Marines Frag Order 357-66
E - 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Frag Order 53-66
F - 1st Marines Frag Order 258-66
G - 1st Marines Frag Order 47-66 DTG 170621Z Dec 1966
H - 1st Marines Frag Order 47-66 DTG 171019Z Dec 1966
I - 1st Marines Frag Order 47-66 DTG 171235Z Dec 1966
J - 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Frag Order 55-66
K - After Action Report TRUNG D II
L - 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Frag Order 54-66
M - After Action Report SH'ST' II
N - 1st Marines message DTG 280830Z Dec 1966 SP' FROM H'K
O - Weekly Operation Overlays
P - Intelligence Summaries
Q - Journal for December 1966 *3rd Dec 1966 missing*

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1st Battalion - 1st Marines
"Fighting First"

SECRET

Viet Cong Losses (Miscellaneous)

Arms, K-50	1090 rds
Arms, .45 cal.	285 rds
Arms, Carbine, M-1	85 rds
Arms, BAR	40 rds
155mm	1 rd
105mm	11 rd
60mm	3 rds
3.5 Rocket	1 rd
Rockets 2/rocket mod	7
Grenades, M-26	9
Grenades, ChiCom	39
Mines, AP	4
Mine, M-16A1	1
Pon-up cannister	1
Knives	3
Bayonet w/scabbard	2
Magazines, Thompson SMC	12
Magazines, K-50	11
Magazines, Carbine, M-1	5
Magazines, BAR	2
Magazines, M-14	2
VC Structures	8
Sniper roosts	2
Boats	6
Ladder	1
Bunkers	2
Tunnels	2
Punji pits	3
Medical supplies	75 lbs
Binoculars	1
Compasses, U. S.	2
Wrist Watches	3
Fishing box	1
Packs	3
Cartridge belts, U. S.	8
First aid kit, U. S.	1
Shelter halves, U. S.	2
Flashlights, military	3
Whistle, military	1
Canteens, U. S.	2
Canteen cup, U. S.	1
VC gas masks	3
Documents, assorted	70 lbs
VC propaganda leaflets	15 lbs
Mine and booby trap manual	1
Book of weapons	1
Maps	2
Village official document seal	1

SECRET

VC banners	3
Clothing	assorted
Uniforms	assorted
Coat, military	1
Raincoats	2
Ponchos, VC	7
Covers, camouflaged	6
Web belt	1
Rice	3000 lbs

O P 301100Z NOV 66
FM FIRST MARINES
TO FIRST BN FIRST MARINES
SECOND BN FIRST MARINES
THIRD BN FIRST MARINES
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

ORDERXD

1. THE 759TH PF COMPANY IN DIEN BAN DISTRICT WILL CONDUCT OPE

ATION

156, A TWO DAY SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION, IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR
OF THE FIRST MARINES TAOR. MARINE SUPPORT HAS BEEN REQUESTED.

2. FIRST BN:

PROVIDE REQUESTED FORCES TO SUPPORT THE 759TH PF COMPANY ON
OPERATION 156 FOR THE PERIOD 1ST AND 2ND DEV TO BE IN
POSITION NO LATER THAN 010600H DEC. DIRECT LIASION IS
AUTHORIZED.

3. FOR SECOND BN:

PROVIDE GUIDE TO FIRST BN BLOCKING FORCE THAT WILL OPERATE
IN SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SECOND BN TAOR ON 2 DECEMBER.

4. COORDINATE INSTRUCTIONS:

1. UNITS OF THE FIRST BN WILL SUPPORT OPN 156 AS
BLOCKING FORCE.

PAGE TWO 5825

2. PORTION OF THE FIRST BN BLOCKING FORCE WILL OPERATE IN THE
THIRD BN TAOR IN GS 0662 AND 0762 ON 1 DEC AND IN THE SECOND
BN TAOR IN GS 0261 AND 0362 ON 2 DEC.

3. FIRE SUPPORT WILL BE COORDINATED THROUGH FIRST BN.

BT

Tab 5

~~"CONFIDENTIAL"~~

FIRST BATTALION, FIRST MARINES
COMMUNICATION CENTER

IMMEDIATE

O 050540Z DEC 66

FM: FIRST MARINES

TO: FIRST BN FIRST MARINES
SS COND BN FIRST MARINES

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRAG O 357-66

A. OPERATION OVERLAY (ISSUED SEPARATELY)

1. 4TH BN 51ST ARVN REGT WILL CONDUCT A ONE DAY SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION ON 05 DEC 66.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: 4TH BN 51ST ARVN REGT (-) ONE COMPANY OF ARVN APC'S AND ONE COMPANY WILL CONSTITUTE SEARCH FORCE. MARINE UNITS WILL SUPPORT BY PROVIDING BLOCKING FORCE.
SEE REF A.

3. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES

A. PROVIDE CONTROL UNITS FOR MARINE UNITS

B. PROVIDE TWO PLATOONS FOR BLOCKING POSITIONS.

2ND BN FIRST MARINES

A. CHOP OPCON ONE PLATOON TO 1ST BN EFFECTIVE 051800H DEC 66.

4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES DIRTIAUTH WITH QUANG NAM SECTOR.

B.

B. BLOCKING POSITIONS EFFECTIVE 060430H DEC 66.

C. MARINE UNIT IS IN SUPPORT OF A RVN FORCE.

D. TACTICAL RADIO NET FREQUENCY 51.3. ALTERNATE FREQUENCY 57.95.

GP-4

BT


Tab D

~~"CONFIDENTIAL"~~

PHÒNG ĐỘ 1
 HƯỚNG ĐIỂM LỘA-TUYẾN 157 Bản đồ tỷ lệ: 1/50.000

A B C D E F G

Bản đồ: 09/20
 Bộ Chỉ-Huy Tiểu-Khu/Q. Nam
 H.T. 147572
 050800N/12/1966



1


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3

4

5

6



Cánh A: TĐ N/STH

B: ĐĐĐĐ + 354/DPO

C: CẢM TĐ + ĐĐĐ/HO/TU


Trung-Tổ L8-THI-QUIN
 Tiểu-Khu-Trưởng Tiểu-Khu Quảng-Nam

(Ký tên và đóng dấu)

PHÓ B' AN:

CHỦ ANS


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
Bản đồ: Hạng - Quân - Đơn - Tuyến 197
 Bản đồ tỷ lệ: 1/50.000

Bản số: 04 / 1
 Bộ Chỉ huy TK/QU
 BT. 147.772
 050800H/12/66




Trung tá Lê Triệt
 Điều hành - Trưởng TK/QU
 (tên và chức vụ)



Phó B. AN:
 (tên và chức vụ)



MẬT

PHONG ĐỒ 
HÀN-QUÂN HÒA-TUYÊN 157 Bản đồ tỷ lệ : 1/50.000


Bản số : 09 /
Bộ Chỉ-Huy TK/QUAM
BT. 147572
050800H/12/66



05 Trung-Tả Lê-Trí-tân
Tiểu-Khu-Trương Tiểu-Khu Q.Nam
(Ký tên và đóng dấu)

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.





1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
050700H December 1966

FRAG ORDER 53.66 Operation TRINIDAD

Ref: (a) Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I
(b) RegtO 3120.4

Task Organization: Annex A (Table Organization)

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1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. Interrogation reports from seven VC captured on 2 December 1966 indicate the presence of a 32 man guerrilla platoon operating within the objective area. CI Agent reports one platoon from 2-12 Local Force Company operating and training with guerrillas in this area. Weapons include one 60mm mortar, two sub-machine guns and individual arms.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) PF Plt, HIBU NHDN participates in Operation TRINIDAD.

(2) Elm, Junk Fleet - 14 provides screening force.

(3) Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Mar, direct support.

(4) 3rd Plt, Co A, 1st Anti-Tank Bn, direct support.

(5) Det 3rd CIT, 3rd Mar Div participates in Operation TRINIDAD.

(6) One squad, 2nd Plt, Co A, 1st Engineer Bn, direct support, provides three Engineer Teams, one to Co B, one to Co D, and one to H&S Co (-).

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Mar (-) (Rein) commencing at 070630H conducts search and destroy operations in area of CAM AN, CAM HAI, and CAM HA Villages, see Annex B (Operations Overlay).

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. 1st Bn, 1st Mar (-) (Rein) conducts a search and destroy operation in area indicated in Annex B (Operations Overlay).

b. Co B (Rein). Commencing at H-hour with OAC-2 cross LOD and commence search and destroy in zone of action and upon completion set in assigned cordon. See Annex B (Operations Overlay). Be prepared on order to conduct detailed search and destroy operations within the cordoned objective area.

Tab B

c. Co D (Rein). Commencing at H-hour cross LOD and commence search and destroy in zone of action and upon completion set in assigned cordon. See Annex B (Operations Overlay). Be prepared on order to conduct detailed search and destroy operations within the cordoned objective area.

d. WCS Co (-). Utilizing Bn Scouts commencing at H-hour in coordination with HHCN WHP PP Plst cross LOD and commence search and destroy in zone of action and upon completion set in assigned cordon. See Annex B (Operations Overlay). Be prepared on order to conduct detailed search and destroy operations within the cordoned objective area.

e. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) D-day 7 December 1966.
- (2) H-hour 0630.
- (3) Contact is from left to right.
- (4) Six hour SitRons will be submitted in accordance with reference (b) as of, 1800, 2400, 0600 and 1200 due one half hour after reporting period ends.
- (5) Reference Point for operation is BT 1260.
- (6) Color code for the operation is red.
- (7) Duration 3-5 days.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Administration. No change.

b. Logistics.

- (1) Bn S-4 provides support as required.
- (2) Unit distribution by LVT from Bn CP.
- (3) Prescribed load
 - (a) Normal arms and equipment/LMP
 - (b) DOA plus two handoleers
- (4) Resupply requests will be submitted on Bn Log Net.

5. COMMAND AND COORDINATION.

a. Communications. No change.

b. Command Post.

(1) No CP No 1441.

(2) Other units report when established.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL VAN D. BELL, JR.

John A. Scott

JOHN A. SCOTT
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEXES:

- A. Task Organization
- B. Operations Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: A

1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NAT 3, RVN
050700Z December 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Frag Order 53-66

Time Zone: H

1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)
H&A Co (-) (Rein)
Command Group

Lt Col BELL

Company B (-) (Rein)

Capt LAM

CD-2
FO Tn, Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Mar
FAO Tn

Company D (Rein)

Capt KELLY

FO Tn, Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Mar

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL VAN D. BELL, JR.

John A. Scott

JOHN A. SCOTT
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer


DISTRIBUTION: See Frag Order 53-66

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
 Da Nang, RVN
 050700H December 1966

Annex P (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 53-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I



1. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES
2. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES
3. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES
4. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 2

1. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES WILL CONDUCT A TWO DAY SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN
CONTINUING TO DEC 66.
2. CONDUCT OF OPNS. 1ST BN WILL CONDUCT SEARCH OF AREA BOUNDED
BY HIGHWAY 14 (984594 TO 984573). 1ST BN (984573 TO 984595). GRID LINE 10.

(984595 TO 984599) SONG LA THO (984599 TO 984599) AND STREAM
(984599 TO 984599). CO F. 2ND BN WILL BLOCK ALONG NORTH UICHONG
(984599 TO 984599). CO D 1ST BN 25TH MARINES WILL BLOCK
ALONG WEST SIDE OF STREAM (984599 TO 984594).

1. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES
A. PROVIDE CONTROL GROUP FOR OPN.
B. PROVIDE SEARCH FORCE.
C. COMMENCE SEARCH FROM 100 AT 14-HOUR

PAGE 3 0525 CONFIDENTIAL

2ND BN 1ST MARINES
A. PROVIDE ONE COMPANY FOR BLOCK ON NORTH SIDE OF 984599 AREA.
B. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO MOVE BLOCKING FORCE SOUTH OF SONG LA THO.
C. ORDER. CHOP (984599 TO 984599) OF CO E TO 1ST BN.
1ST BN 25TH MARINES
A. SUPPORT OPN BY PROVIDING ONE COMPANY BLOCKING FORCE.
B. CROSS 100 (984594 TO 984599) AT 14-HOUR MOVE EAST TO 100.
C. HOLDING POSITION (984599 TO 984594).
COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
A. 1ST BN 1ST MARINES COORDINATE WITH 2ND BN 1ST MARINES AND 1ST
BN 25TH MARINES.
B. 14-HOUR. 100700H DEC 66.
C. TACTICAL RADIO NET FREQUENCY 5404.
D. FIRE COORDINATION LINE. FROM 984594 TO 984596. ALONG STREAM
FROM 984596 TO 984599 TO 984599.

CP-1
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

FIRST BATTALION, FIRST MARINES
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

IMMEDIATE

00 170021Z DEC 66

FM: FIRST MARINES

TO: CG FIRST MARDIV

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO: FIRST BN FIRST MARINES
ELEVENTH MARINES
SEVENTH MARINES
TASK FORCE X-RAY

SECRET

ROUGH RIDER

A. FRAG ORDER 47-66

B. ANNEX G TO DIV ALMNO 301-61

1. FOLLOWING PLANS ESTABLISHED IAW REF A AND B.

A. H-HOUR 100000H DEC 66

B. SECURITY UNIT: PLAT (REIN) CO A FIRST BN FIRST MARINES

C. STAGING AREA FROM BT 000700 TO BT 010000

D. VEHICLES

| | |
|---------------|----|
| SECURITY | 5 |
| CARGO | 10 |
| BRIDGING | 6 |
| CMD & CONTROL | 4 |
| ONTOS | 3 |
| TOTAL | 29 |

E. SUPPORTING ARMS:

| | |
|------|--------------|
| AIR | IAW REF B |
| NGF | USS CANBERRA |
| ARTY | IAW REF B |

F. COMMUNICATIONS: IAW REF A AND B

GP-4

TOR: 1020H / 17 DEC 66 / CGN: 830 / TTY / LHW

Tab G

COPY 5 OF 5 COPIES

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Ø 191145Z DEC 66
FM FIRST MARINES
TO FIRST BN FIRST MARINES

Z 171019 DEC 66
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO CG TASK FORCE XRAY
FIRST MAR
ELEVENTH MAR
HQ BN

SEVENTH MT BN
FIRST AT BN
DET THIRD ENGR BN
NED CG 1111 MAF
CG FIRST MAW
NINTH ENGR BN
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Ø AG O 47-66 ROUGH RIDER, CH ONE (U)

A. MY 160701Z DEC 66

B. TF XRAY CBC 170031Z DEC 66 (NOTAL)

1. REF A MOD AS FOL:

A. CHANGE PARA 3B (1) AND 3C (2) TO TEAD CHECK PT NR TWENTY-ONE
VICE THIRTY-ONE. REF B REFERS.

B. CHANGE DATES PARA 3HVA) AND (3) TO READ 20 DEC 66 AND 21 DEC 66
RESPECTIVELY.

GP-4

BT

Tab H

COPY 5A OF 9 COPIES

~~SECRET~~

URGENT

O 171235Z DEC 66
FM FIRST MARINES
TO FIRST BN FIRST MARINES
INFO SECOND BN FIRST MARINES
THIRD BN FIRST MARINES

O 160701Z DEC 66
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO CG TASK FORCE X-RAY
FIRST MAR

ELEVENTH MAR

NO BN

SEVENTH MT BN

FIRST AT BN

DET TULON ENGR BN

INFO CG 111 MAF

CG FIRST MAR

NINTH ENGR BN

BT

SECRET

PPAG O 47-66 ROUGH RIDER (U)

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PAGE TWO 5925 SECRET

A. ADVISORY TO DIV ADMIN O 311-66

B. FIRST MARDIV O P 01004-2C (DECI)

1. SITUATION. REF A.

2. MISSION. FIRST MARDIV CONDUCTS TACTICAL MILITARY CONVOY FROM
DAMANG TO CHI LAI AND RETURN (AM REF A.)

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. REF A AS MODIFIED HEREIN

B. CG TF XRAY

(1) EXERCISE OPCON OF CONVOY SOUTH OF CHECK PT NINETY

(2) PROVIDE SHELTERING AND MESSING FACILITIES FOR CONVOY
PERSONNEL.

C. FIRST MAR.

(1) CONDUCT TACTICAL CONVOY (AM REF A.)

(2) OPCON OF CONVOY SOUTH OF CHECK PT NINETY ONE.

TF XRAY

(3) EMPLOY APPROPRIATE ELMS FIRST AT BN WITH CONVOY

D. ELEVENTH MAR. REF A.

E. SEVENTH MT BN. REF A.

F. FIRST AT BN. PROVIDE ELMS AS REQ FIRST MAR.

Tab I

~~SECRET~~

THREE SRTS ~~SECRET~~
F. DET THIRD ENGR

- (1) ASSUME NSM ASST FLOT ENGR BN REF A.
- (2) COORD AERIAL RECON WITH DIV ENGR OFF.

H. COORD INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) REF A.
- (2) CHECK POINTS. REF A.
- (3) D-DAY. H-HOUR.
- I. (A) DAMANG TO CHU LAI. 18 DEC 66
- (B) CHU LAI TO DAMAG. ON OR ABOUT 19 DECEMBER AS DIRECTED BY CG TF XRAY

(C) IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS REQUIRE CANCELLATION CONVOY TO BE RESCHD FOR DAY.

(D) H-HOUR AS ESTAB BY FIRST MAR. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL DEPARTURE TIME OF CONVOY FROM EITHER DAMAG OR CHU LAI BE LATER THAN 1030H OF DAY OF DEPARTURE, UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THIS HQ. INFORM THIS HQ H-HOUR WHEN ESTAB.

(E) DPLAITH ALCON.

J. HQ(M)N AND LOGIST. CS. REF A.

K. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

L. REF B AND APPENDIX TWO (COMM/ELECT) TO REF A.

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PAGE FOUR S226 ~~SECRET~~

B. EXTERNAL COMMAND NET LISTED PAGE G-2-1 OF REF A MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS.

DIVISION TACTICAL NET NR 2
FREQ. 4.024 KC M-109

D. STATIONS- CONVOY COMMANDER

FIRST MARDIV HQ (COC)

TF XRAY HQ (COC)

FIRST MAR

OTHER FIRST MARDIV UNITS AS REQUIRED

FIRST MARDIV AIR OBSERVERS AS REQUIRED/DESIRED.

C. YOUR ATTENTION INVITED TO CHANGES TO REF B WHICH AFFECT RADIO FREQUENCY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN APPENDIX TWO TO REF A.

GP-4

BT

BT

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
191900H, Dec. 1966

FRAG ORDER 55-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I
(b) RegtO 3120.4

Task Organization

1st Battalion, 1st Marines
WFS Co (-) (Rein)
Command Group

Major SCOTT

Company C (-) (Rein)
Co C
FO Tm, Strv A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
FAC Tm, WFS Co
Det, 2nd Plat, 1st Engr Bn

Capt. CARTER

Company D (-) (Rein)
Co D
FO Tm, Strv A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat

Capt. KELLY

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current INTSUMS.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) 1st Bn, 11th Marines in direct support.
- (2) 2nd Plat, 1st Amphibian Tractor Bn, FMP, direct support.
- (3) 3rd Plat, Co A, 1st Anti-Tank Bn, FMP, direct support.
- (4) Co E, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines, direct support.
- (5) Co D, 1st Bn, 26th Marines, direct support.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) commencing at 190700H conducts a search and destroy operation in area of villages centered at (BT 0061), and Annex B (Operations Overlay Phase I).

3. EXECUTION.

Sequence of Operations. See Annexes A and B (Operations Overlay).

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b. Company C (-) (Rain). Continuing at H-hour contact search and destroy operations for Phase I in assigned zone of action. Be prepared, on order, to conduct operations in support of Phase II.

c. Company D (-) (Rain). Chgo OpCon of one platoon to Company C at 182100Z. Be prepared to reinforce Company C on order.

d. HPG Company (-).

(1) On order the command group will displace to (BT 109571) and establish a forward command post for the operation.

(2) The S-2 Scout section in support of the operation.

e. Coordinating instructions.

(1) D-day 19 December 1966

(2) H-hour 0700

(3) Reference point for operation is (BT 9658)

(4) Color code for the operation is red.

(5) Duration 2 days

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Administration. No change.

b. Logistics.

(1) Bn S-4 provides support as required

(2) Unit distribution by helicopter for class V as required

(3) Prescribed load

(a) Normal arms and equipment/IMP

(b) DCA plus two bandoleers

(4) Resupply requests will be submitted on Bn Log Net

5. COMM'ND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Communications. No change.

b. Command Post.

(1) Cmd Grp located at (BT 109571)

(2) Other units report when established.

John A. Scott
JOHN A. SCOTT
Acting


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1st Bn, 1st Marine
DA NANG, RVN
191900H Dec 1966

Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 55-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I

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DISTRIBUTION: See Frag Order 55-66


1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
191900H Dec 1966

Annex B (Operation Overview) to Frag Order 55-66

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Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I

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DISTRIBUTION: See Frag Order 55-66

B-1

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
San Francisco, California, 96602

3/TMS/ctn
18 December 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 1st Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation TRINIDAD II

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AM L 701, Sheet 6640 I

Encl: (1) 1st Marines Frag Order 358-66
(2) 1st Marines Frag Order 358-66 Change No. 1
(3) Operation Overlay Phase I, Operation TRINIDAD II
(4) Operation Overlay Phase II, Operation TRINIDAD II

1. Code Name. TRINIDAD II, Search and Destroy Operation.
2. Dates of Operation. 080100H to 111600H December 1966.
3. Location. QUANG NAM Province, HOI AN Sector, DIEN BAN District, KY NGOC, WU THUA, KY CHAU, KY MINH, and THANG PHONG Villages.
4. Control or Command Headquarters

1st Bn, 1st Marines
Co C, 1st Bn, 1st Marines
Co D, 1st Bn, 1st Marines
Co F, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines
3d Plt, Co C, 1st Bn, 26th Marines

LtCol BELL
Capt CARTER
Capt KELLY
Capt DEEGAN
2ndLt CAMPBELL

5. Task Organization

1st Bn, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)

Cmd Grp

In Tm, Btrv A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines

Company C (Rein)

Co C

Det W&S Co

FO Tm 3d Sec, 81mm Mort Plt

Det Comm Plt

Det Med Plt

Sec 3d Plt, Co A, 1st AT Bn

Sec 2d Plt, Co A, 1st AmTrac Bn

FO Tm, Btrv A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines

Dem Tm, 2d Plt, Co A, 1st Engr Bn

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Tab A

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Company D (Rein)

Co D

Det W&S Co

FO Tn 4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plat

Det Comm Plat

Det Med Plat

FO Tn, Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines

Demo Tn, 2d Plat, Co A, 1st Ingr Bn

Company F (Rein)

Co F

Plat, Co G, 2d Bn, 1st Marines

Det W&S Co

FO Tn 2d Sec, 81mm Mort Plat

Det Comm Plat

Det Med Plat

FO Tn, Btry B, 1st Bn, 11th Marines

3d Plat, Co C, 1st Bn, 25th Marines (Rein)

3d Plat

Det Med Plat, W&S Co

FO Tn, Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Marines

6. Supporting Forces:

a. Fire Support

(1) Artillery support was provided by the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, the principal firing battery was Battery E, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, with Battery L, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines, (SP) in a general support reinforcing role. Artillery was employed for close support missions and harassing and interdiction fires. Preparatory fires were employed at first light on likely enemy ambush sites or sniper positions prior to friendly movement. When delivered in this manner the artillery fires proved very effective in causing the enemy to evacuate or disclose his positions and ambush sites before he was able to effectively fire on friendly units.

(2) Naval Gunfire general support missions were fired by the USS CUMBER (CG-2) and the USS M'NLEY (DD-940). Unobserved fire was called against known or suspected VC concentrations, assembly areas and fortified positions. No observed, close support missions were fired or requested. Ground unit surveillance of target areas indicated the excellent effectiveness of Naval Gunfire against enemy bunkers and fortified structures.

b. The 2d Platoon, Company F, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was utilized in direct support to move forces into assembly areas, for resupply, and to extract the less critical casualties from the operation area.

c. The 3d Platoon, Company F, 1st Anti-Tank Battalion was utilized in direct support for night defense of the forward command post and for direct fire preparatory fires.

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d. Air

(1) Four fixed wing air strikes were called in support of Operation TRINIDAD II. Each was pre-planned and three of them had additional aircraft on station for relief. Due to the weather, however, the use of standby aircraft for as long as originally planned was precluded. For each strike a flight of two aircraft was employed, with additional flights on call. Sufficient aircraft had been made available for immediate reaction to any situation. Three of the strikes were called on areas from which heavy sniper fire had been received the previous day. The fourth was used as a preparatory measure on VC positions. A TAC was on station throughout most of the daylight hours and was a most important factor in the success of the air strikes.

(2) Helicopter support was employed for resupply and medical evacuation.

(3) Aerial observers were requested and employed as a reconnaissance capability for the ground forces, to locate VC positions, and to call supporting arms on observed enemy targets.

7. Intelligence

a. Enemy strength in the area of operations was indicated to be of Regional Force Company size augmented by one or two guerrilla platoons from the local villages. Increased movement reports and contacts with the enemy tended to confirm the presence of a large number of enemy in this area.

(1) 21 Nov - QUANG NAM Special Police Branch reports one VC main force company located vicinity (RT 068538). Rated E-2

(2) 30 Nov - HOI AN Sector Headquarters reports one VC company located vicinity (RT 015608). Rated E-6

(3) 30 Nov - QUANG NAM Special Police Branch reported one VC main force company located vicinity (RT 020630). Unrated

(4) 4 Dec - 1st Marine Division reported a VC unit operating in the western section of the DIEN BAN District. Rated E-2

(5) 8 Dec - 1st Marine Division reported a VC unit operating in the western section of DIEN BAN District. Rated E-2

(6) 9 Dec - DIEN BAN District reports two VC companies located vicinity (RT 0156) and scattering south to (RT 900536). Unrated

(7) 7 Dec - 1st Marine Division reported a VC unit located in the western section of DIEN BAN District. Rated E-2

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b. Interrogation of captives during the operation disclosed groups of VC of various sizes. The reports stated that captives saw groups ranging from 50 to 300 VC moving southwest through DIEM BAY District. The VC were well armed and dressed in a variety of uniforms. The uniforms included black pajamas, khakis, grey shorts, and blue or green uniforms. All captives reported units to be well armed with individual weapons, some 60mm mortars, and Chinese Communist machine guns. One captive stated that they spoke a northern dialect.

(1) No new VC units were identified during or after the operation.

(2) One VC KIA was identified as a member of a suicide platoon and a removal of mines and booby traps was taken from the body.

c. The terrain in the majority of the operating area is a paddy land network of deep stem banked streams, canals and ditches. The rice fields are separated by earth dikes one to two feet high. There is a road embankment running east to west and a railroad bed running north to south. Both have been severely damaged by rains, shelling and mines. There are numerous settlements with houses surrounded by thick hedges of shrub trees. Trees around villages have many closely spaced grove mounds. The soil stays muddy and flooded except for the months of March and April. The entire area is unsuited for both tanks and trucks. Foot movement is slow and difficult in flooded ricefields compartmented by deep streams and canals. The terrain offers some cover from flat trajectory fire afforded only in stream beds, mangroves and bamboo thickets. Weather throughout the operation was clear and advantageous to the Marines.

8. Mission. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) commencing at 080100H conducts a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of area bounded by grid squares 9960, 0160, 0157, and 9858.

9. Concept of Operation. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, with two companies (C and D), one reinforced company from the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and one reinforced platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines conducts a search and destroy operation in the western portion of its own T/OZ, with Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines acting as a blocking force, and Companies C and D as the sweep force.

10. Execution. On 6 December a helicopter, attempting to evacuate a USMC casualty, was disabled by small arms fire. On the morning of 7 December another helicopter, bringing a maintenance crew to the first

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received VC ground fire and burned at (BT 004578). Combined with intelligence, which showed the VC presence in force, these two incidents led to the termination of Operation TRINIDAD prior to its completion and precipitated Operation TRINIDAD II which commenced on 8 December 1966. (See enclosures (1), (2) and (3)).

At 071650H, the command group of Operation TRINIDAD with Company D commenced displacement to the forward command post for TRINIDAD II. Company D was placed in an assembly area for the night in the vicinity of (BT 0957). Displacement was completed by 071815H.

At 080600H, the 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was placed under operational control of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the blocking forces were in position. While waiting for Company D to reach the LOD at 080600H Company C received six to eight rounds of sniper fire. The returned small arms fire resulted in one VC KIA.

At 080700H, Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines observed seven VC, with weapons come out of a tree line at (BT 016605). An artillery mission was called and two VC were killed and five were reported as KIA probable. Pursuit was limited by a water barrier.

At 080915H, Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines observed six VC heading east. All of them had weapons and two of them had packs. An artillery mission was called but the VC could not be pursued because of the water barrier.

At 081045H, Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines observed one VC in a boat. VC was fired at with small arms, was hit and sank. The body was not recovered.

At 081055H, Company D and the 2d Platoon, Company C crossed the LOD.

At 081100H, the Battalion Scouts apprehended six VCS at (BT 008766) in the vicinity of a house from which Marines had previously received sniper fire. These VCS were forwarded to the forward command post for interrogation. They were later reclassified as VCC.

At 081415H, the 2d Platoon, Company C observed VC fleeing but could not make contact. The area was searched from which VC had fled and two panaches, a shelter half, and 300 pounds of rice were found. The rice was destroyed because of the inability to transport.

At 081435H, Companies C and D were in position to cover the lift-out of the downed helicopter.

At 081715H, the 3d Platoon, Company D observed one VC fleeing across a rice paddy and took him under fire killing him.

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At 081715H, Company D received sniper fire from an estimated three VC located at (BT 000597), resulting in three USMC KIA. Fire was returned and a maneuver element was sent in pursuit but contact with the VC could not be regained.

At 081730H, Company D, while crossing a rice paddy at (AT 997594), received small arms fire and approximately 15 60mm mortar rounds from two interlocking trench lines located vicinity (AT 996596) and (BT 000597). Fire was returned and these positions were assaulted. The VC broke contact and fled to the north. The contact resulted in one USMC KIA and 11 USMC WIA.

At 081730H, the 2d Platoon, Company C received sniper fire from (BT 013583) and spotted one VC across corn field. The VC was taken under fire and killed.

At 081745H, the 2d Platoon, Company C observed several VC fleeing along the river at (BT 014589) and took them under fire with small arms fire and M-79's resulting in six VC KIA.

At 081750H, 3d Platoon, Company G attached to Company F received one round of sniper fire resulting in one USMC WIA. Fire was returned with small arms, M-79's, and 81mm mortars; no further fire was received.

At 081800H, the FO from the 81mm Mortar Platoon attached to Company C spotted six VC fleeing the area of Company C command post at (BT 009598). The VC were taken under fire by small arms resulting in two VC KIA.

At 081800H, Companies C and D began to dig-in and consolidate night defensive positions. The sweep force was set in along Phase Line Blue. (See enclosure (3)). USMC wounded were evacuated by helicopter from the area of operation. Prior to dark unit distribution of Class I and V was provided by helicopter resupply to units in the objective area. Final ambush sites were selected and occupied for the night.

At 082252H, the following Frag Order was issued: At first light continue search and destroy operations in ZOA to LOA. On order, when sweep units have reached LOA, Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines will be released to 2d Battalion, 1st Marines; 3d Platoon, Company C 1st Battalion, 26th Marines will be returned to the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. On order, Companies C and D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines will commence a sweep south in ZOA. Company D will sweep in ZOA with one unit west of railroad tracks and one platoon east of them. Sweep to southern limit of TAOR and then to the Battalion command post (BT 019571). When Company D reaches the command post it will return to Company D command post by vehicle. The 1st and 2d Platoons, Company C will sweep south on Route 14 using the river as west flank. At this point link up with the 2d Platoon, Company C and sweep over between Route 14 and north boundary of TAOR. LOA for sweep is north to south grid line 04. The 2d Platoon, Company C will then be returned to the Battalion forward command post.

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At 090630H, Companies C and D reported that they were ready to move out and resume the sweep. Preparation fires were fired and Company C had one 60mm mortar round fall 250 meters short wounding one Marine at (BT 010596).

At 090700H, Companies C and D moved out to sweep to the LO.

At 090730H, the 2d Platoon, Company D observed one VC running across a rice paddy in the vicinity of (BT 014592). The VC was killed with small arms fire.

At 090740H, it became evident that there were two pockets of enemy resistance forming and the following Frag Order was issued to Companies C and D: Company C hold right flank, Company D hold left flank and move center up until the LO is reached, to establish two cordoned areas.

At 090840H, the 3d Platoon, Company C apprehended five VCS in the vicinity of (BT 020606) who were later reclassified as VCC. At the same time Company C also reported that it had discovered a sniper roost in the vicinity of (BT 019600). The sniper roost was destroyed. The 3d Platoon, Company G attached to Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines reported that it had seen a VC, with weapon, across the river from their blocking position in the vicinity of (BT 018603). The VC was taken under fire with small arms and was probably killed.

At 091000H, the Battalion Scouts completely destroyed two houses at (BT 009465). One was an excellent sniper position and observation post, the other was covered with anti-American slogans.

At 091000H, Companies C and D reached the LO and commenced detailed search and destroy operations in their respective cordoned areas. The 3d Platoon, Company C discovered the body of one VC and apprehended two VCS at (BT 017604). At the same time the 1st Platoon, Company C apprehended two VCS at (BT 011603). The four VCS had no identification cards, were held for CI Team who reclassified the VCS as VCC. At this time the first rescue helicopter arrived at the Battalion command post.

At 091100H, the 3d Platoon, Company D apprehended seven VCS in a house located at (BT 056608). The VCS were returned to Company D command post where they were interrogated by CI Team and reclassified as VCC.

At 091200H, the 3d Platoon, Company D apprehended six VCS and returned them to Battalion command post where after interrogation they were reclassified as VCC.

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At 091515H, the 3d Platoon, Company D received approximately 50 rounds of small arms fire from (AT 985563) and returned fire and maneuvered toward VC position but were unable to regain contact. There was no evidence of any VC casualties but VC fire resulted in two USMC WIA.

At 091545H, Companies C and D set in night defensive positions in preparation for the sweep to the south towards original LOD. At this time Company F was released to the operational control of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines tied into the Company D night defensive positions.

At 091655H, all the helicopter lifted supplies for Company C were dropped at the 2d platoon's position and it was then necessary to request an emergency resupply for the remainder of Company C that night. Darkness precluded completion of the resupply.

At 091700H, units began setting in night defensive positions between Phase Line Blue (AT 990602) to (BT 025598) and the LOA, at the northern boundary of the T/OZ.

At 091815H, Company D received approximately 20 rounds of small arms fire from (AT 996601). Fire was returned and an artillery mission was called, but the VC broke contact. The VC fire resulted in two USMC WIA.

At 092110H, the following Frag Order was issued to Company D: Fire in concentrations directed before troops move out. At first light move VGC to Company C command post and be prepared on order to move out in search and destroy mission.

From 092250H to 100600H, Company D set out extensive ambushes and at 100700H, began to call preparation fires in before the sweep began to move south. Both companies moved out on the sweep at 100900H, with Company D moving to the southern boundary of the T/OZ and Company C to Battalion forward command post.

At 100925H, the following Frag Order was issued to Company D: When you move out in search and destroy have 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines on your right flank to Route 14. When you reach that position the 3d platoon will be released to its parent organization. This headquarters will arrange transportation.

At 100940H, CAC-3 sighted six to eight people fleeing into a hamlet at (BT 039591). They pursued and apprehended two VCS and discovered two large urns of rice which were forwarded to DIEM BIN District Headquarters and the VCS were forwarded to the Battalion command post for interrogation. The VCS were later confirmed as VCC.

At 101045H, the point man of 1st Platoon, Company C observed one VC fleeing across hidden bamboo bridge and killed him with small arms fire. A mine and booby trap manual found on the body of VC led to identification as a member of a VC sapper squad.

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At 101155H, Company C searched a house located near (BT 010584) from which Marine aircraft had received sniper fire and apprehended two VC who were forwarded to the Battalion command post for interrogation.

At 101215H, Company C found two fresh graves where an air strike had been called in the day before. The graves were shallow, the two male bodies in them were not in caskets, and appeared to have been severely burned and asphyxiated. The bodies were designated as two VC KIA.

At 101930H, the following Frag Order was issued to Company D: When you move out in search and destroy have 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines move on your right flank to Route 14. When you reach that position the platoon will revert to operational control of 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. This headquarters will arrange transportation and pick-up coordinates with parent unit.

At 101220H, Company C reached the Battalion command post and prepared to sweep east to the Company C command post. The Battalion surgeon met them to treat numerous cases of immersion foot. Company D, with 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines attached, continued its sweep to the southern boundary of the TACR.

At 101300H, an air strike was called on VC in a trenchline at (AT 992600). Napalm was used resulting in five VC KIA probable. Again, at 101400H, at (AT 992570), an air strike was called in on VC positions with excellent coverage.

At 101430H, when Company D reached Route 14 on its search and destroy sweep southward the 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was released to Battalion command post for further transportation to parent unit.

At 101445H, the 2d Platoon, Company D at (BT 003564) flagged one VC from a hiding place in a cane field. When the VC fled he was killed with small arms fire. Another VC tried to flee at the approach of 2d Platoon, Company C at (BT 003589), resulting in one additional VC KIA by small arms fire.

At 101640H, Company C commenced a search and destroy sweep to Company C command post and reached that position at 101800H after light and sporadic contacts. Two platoons of Vietnamese Regional Forces were utilized as a block which extended along the 04 grid line from north boundary of TACR to Route 14. Company D had swept south through Phase Line Red (BT 990596) to (BT 019587). Upon reaching Phase Line Red, Company D set in night defensive positions involving extensive ambushes.

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At 101810H, the Battalion Scouts at (BT 019574), apprehended seven VCS and forwarded them to the Battalion command post for interrogation. The 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines arrived at the Battalion command post for transportation back to parent unit.

At 102035H, the following Frag Order was issued to Company D: After firing preparation fires, continue to search and destroy in assigned area. Anchor right flank of unit on the water at (AT 978566) and search thoroughly at the waters edge to the LOA. Search for boats, both on the surface and submerged and destroy them. Report the number of boats found. Use supporting arms to the maximum. Report effectiveness of air strikes and naval gunfire. Fixed wing aircraft will be on station at 110730H, an aerial observer will be on station at 110730H.

At 110720H, the following Frag Order was issued to Company D: When you reach the 56.8 east-west grid line hold one unit east of the railroad and the third unit search through the peninsula west of railroad. Upon completion of the search, without orders, move by the nearest route to this Battalion forward command post.

At 110730H, Company D commenced search and destroy operations and swept through to the southern boundary of the Battalion TOR meeting no enemy resistance. The sweep was finished at 111500H, at which time Operation TRINIDAD II was secured.

11. Results.

a. Personnel Losses

(1) USMC

KIA 1

MIA 20

(2) Enemy

KIA 32

KIA (probable) 10

MIA (probable) 7

VCC 38

b. Enemy Arms/Equipment Losses

1. 2. VCC weapons

1 3.5 inch rocket round (dud)

1 USMC shelter half

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1 Mine and booby trap manual (from body of VC suspect)
300 pounds of rice and two urns

c. Enemy Structures Destroyed

8 VC fortifications

1 VC sniper roost

Numerous trenchlines including some bunkered with logs.

12. Administrative Matters

a. During Operation TRINIDAD II all companies received unit distribution by helicopter resupply. The Battalion S-4 provided a Liaison NCO who on a logistics not consolidated resupply requests and transmitting them to the Battalion S-4 for staging at the Battalion Landing zone. The establishment of an Administrative/Logistics Net greatly relieved traffic on the Battalion Tactical Net.

b. Serious casualties were air evacuated out of the area of operation. Those less seriously injured were transported back to the Battalion command post where they were evacuated by vehicle.

c. Troop movement within the area of operations was by foot. Water barriers and raddios restricted the employment of wheeled or tracked vehicles.

d. Medical Evaluation. Immersion foot was prevalent and could not be avoided or prevented because of the nature of terrain and the continual movement of the units.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. Equipment. None.

b. Techniques. One of the most vulnerable periods in the movement of a sweep force is the jumpoff from night defensive positions at first light. To lessen the vulnerability of friendly forces at this time, heavy artillery preparatory fires upon likely ambush sites were delivered prior to friendly movement. This technique proved very successful in causing the enemy to evacuate or disclose his foremost positions before being able to deliver effective fire on friendly units as they moved out from foxholes to continue search and destroy operations.

14. Commanders Analysis

a. Operation TRINIDAD II was initiated to clear VC from an area in which two F-34 aircraft had been disabled by small arms fire. The Battalion (-) moved into and cleared the VC from the objective area. The

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disabled helicopters were then extracted. Air was requested and utilized throughout the operation. Although the fixed wing air was excellent in both response and effectiveness, the helicopter support, was not without problems. The primary problem encountered was the lack of positive communications with the ground unit prior to the helicopter arriving over a designated landing zone. Positive communications is mandatory between air and ground as helicopters approach the area of operation in order to lift or shift supporting artillery fire, to give approach directions to the helicopters and to coordinate the escort gunships with ground units. Additionally, in a fast moving ground situation time and place of pickup or drop must remain flexible and can not always be fixed as enemy contact and unit movement cannot be predetermined.

b. As the area of operations was an uninhabited free fire area, no civil affairs or psychological warfare activities were planned or executed. The few non-combatants encountered were evacuated from the objective area to DIEM PAW for relocation.

John A. Scott

JOHN A. SCOTT
Acting

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~~1st Marine Div Order 350-66~~

FRIG ORDER 350-66

1. FRIENDLY FORCES. CO R-2-1 AND ONE PTBN PLAT NINTH MAR ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS.

2. MISSIONS. FIRST BN CONDUCT BN (-) SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN VIC AREA BOUNDED BY GRID SQUARES 9060, 0160, 0157, AND 9858 COMMENCING 080100H DEC 66.

3. CONCEPT OF OPNS

A. PTBN PLAT FM NINTH MAR ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSN VIC AT 982583 TO BT 986608 EFFECTIVE 080600H DEC 66.

B. CO F SECOND BN ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS NORTH OF SONG LA THO VIC AT 990608 TO BT 021609.

C. FIRST BN (-) SEARCH NORTH FROM LOO VIC AT 986583 TO BT 020573 COMMENCING FIRST LIGHT

4. COORDINATING INSTR.

A. CO F WILL PASS DOWN WIRE ON UPON REQUEST AND ON ORDER THIS HEADQUARTERS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES ENTER FIRST BN TAG NET AT 080400 DEC 66 (DESTROY 94).

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1st Marine Fmg Order 358-66 Change No 1

A. FRAG ORDER 358-66


CHANGE TO FRAG ORDER 358-66

1. CHANGE PARA 3.A. OF FRAG ORDER 358-66 TO READ
MAIN PLAT FROM NINTH MR ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITION VIC AT 992593
TO AT 991578 EFFECTIVE 000000H DEC 66.

2. ADD PARA 4.C. BEH PLAT FROM NINTH MR PASS OPON FIRST BN
AT 080600H DEC 66.

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Operation Overlay Phase I, Operation TERNIDAD II




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ENCLOSURE (1)

Operation Overlay Phase II. Operation TREMIDAN II

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1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
141200H December 1966

FRAG ORDER 54-66

Ref: (a) Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I
(b) Regt 3120.4

Task Organization.

1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)
H&S Co (-) (Rein)
Command Group

Maj SCOTT

Company B (-) (Rein)
Co B
FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Mar
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat

Capt LAIN

Company D (-) (Rein)
Co D
FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Mar
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
FAC Tm, H&S Co

Capt KELLY

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current INTSUMS.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) Elm, Junk Flt 14 - provides water screen to the East of the objective area.
- (2) Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Mar in direct support.
- (3) 2d Plat (-) 1st AmTrac Bn, lands Company D in the objective area at H-hour on D-day and provides subsequent water blocks on order.
- (4) Sect, LVTH-6 supports the Company D amphibious landing at H-hour on D-day and provides water blocking positions as ordered.
- (5) Sect, 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Tank Bn, provides direct fire support for the amphibious landing of Company D and provides other support as directed.

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Tab L

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- (6) One sqd, 2nd Plt, Co A, 1st Engr Bn, provides two demolition Teams to Company D and one demolition Team to Company B for the Operation

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Mar (-) (Rein) commencing at 160930H conducts search and destroy operations in area of CAM THANH Village centered at (BT 1857), see Annex B (Operations Overlay).

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. 1st Bn, 1st Mar (-) (Rein) conducts a search and destroy operation in area indicated in Annex A and B (Operations Overlays for Phase I and II).

b. Co B (-) (Rein). Commencing at H-hour conduct search and destroy operations for Phase I in assigned zone of action. Be prepared, on order, to conduct operations in support of Phase II. (See Operations Overlay).

c. Company C (Rein). No change.

d. Company D (-) (Rein). On D-1 stage two Platoons, a command group reinforced with two sections of LVFP-5 and one section of LVTH-6 attached, in the vicinity of TAN THANH (1) (PT 168601) and AN BAN (2) (PT 160605). On order move the force to a splash point at (PT 210571), by amphibious landing enter your zone of action and conduct search and destroy operations in your assigned zone of action. Be prepared on order to occupy blocking positions in support of Phase II. (See Operations Overlay).

e. HQ S Co (-).

(1) On order the command group will deploy to (BT 173579) and establish a forward command post at that position for the duration of the operation.

(2) The S-2 Scout section in support of the operation will establish an outpost at (BT 175562) and be prepared to conduct further operations on order.

(3) QA 7-2 provides blocking forces as indicated on Operations Overlay - blocking forces to be in position prior to H-hour.

f. Coordinating instructions.

(1) D-day 16 December 1966.

(2) H-hour 0930.

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(3) Reference Point for operation is (BT 1955).

(4) Color code for the operation is red.

(5) Duration 2 days.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

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a. Administration. No change.

b. Logistics.

(1) Bn S-4 provides support as required.

(2) Unit distribution by helicopter at 161600H. LZ's must be designated by 161500G.

(3) Prescribed load

(a) Normal arms and equipment/LMP

(b) DO plus two bandoleers

(4) Resupply requests will be submitted on Bn Log Net.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Communications. No change.

b. Command Post.

(1) Cmd Grn located at (BT 173579).

(2) Other units report when established.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL VAN D. BELL, JR.

John A. Scott

JOHN A. SCOTT
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEXES:

A - Operations Overlay (Phase I)

B - Operations Overlay (Phase II)


DISTRIBUTION: 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1st BN, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
141200H December 1966

Annex A (Operations Overlay - Phase I) to Frag Order 54-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 MS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I



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BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL VAN D. BELL, JR.

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Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

OFFICIAL:

John A. Scott
J. M. STOKES, JR.
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
B-3

DISTRIBUTION: See Frag Order 54-66

A-1

RECEIVED

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I

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15.

54 BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL VAN D. BELL, JR.

JOHN A. SCOTT
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Executive Officer

OFFICIAL:

T. M. STOKES, JR.
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
-3

CONTRIBUTION: See Page Order 5466

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
San Francisco, California, 96602

3/TMS/ctm
3120
31 December 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 1st Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SHASTA II (g)

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series I. 701, Sheet 6640 I

Encl: (1) First Marines msg 181825Z Dec 1966
(2) First Battalion, First Marines Trag Order 55-66

1. Code Name. Operation SHASTA II, Search and Destroy Operation.
2. Dates of Operation. 190600Z to 211200Z December 1966.
3. Location. QUANG NAM Province, HOI AN Sector, DIEU BAN District, KY HOC, VU TH HOA, KY QUANG, KY CHAU, KY MINH and THANH PHONG Villages.
4. Control or Command Headquarters

| | |
|----------------------------|--------------|
| 1st Bn, 1st Marines | Maj SCOTT |
| Co C, 1st Bn, 1st Marines | Capt CARTER |
| Co D, 1st Bn, 1st Marines | Capt KELLEY |
| Co E, 2d Bn, 1st Marines | Capt PRATT |
| Co D, 1st Bn, 26th Marines | Capt JOHNSON |

5. Task Organization

1st Bn, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)

Cmd Grp

Lt Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines

Company C (-) (Rein)

Co C (-)

3d Plat, Co D, 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Det H&S Co

FO Tm, 3d Sec, 81mm Mort Plat

Det Comm Plat

Det Med Plat

P4C Tm

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Tab. M

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Det 2d Plt, Co 1, 1st Bn, 11th Marines
FO Tm, Btrv 1, 1st Bn, 11th Marines
Company D (-) (Rein)
Co D (-)
Det 4th Co
FO Tm, 4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plt
Det Comm Plt
Det Med Plt
FO Tm, Btrv 1, 1st Bn, 11th Marines
Company D (Rein), 1st Bn, 26th Marines
Co D
Det, W-S Co, 1st Bn, 26th Marines
FO Tm, 4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plt
Det Comm Plt
Det Med Plt
FO Tm, Btrv 1, 1st Bn, 13th Marines

6. Supporting Forces

a. Fire Support

(1) Artillery support was provided by the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. The principle firing battery was Battery B, 1st Battalion 11th Marines, with Battery L, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines (SP) in a general support-reinforcing role. Artillery was employed for close support missions and harassing and interdiction fires. Preparatory fires were employed on likely enemy ambush sites or sniper positions prior to friendly movement. When delivered in this manner, the artillery fires proved very effective in causing the enemy to evacuate or disclose his positions and ambush sites before he was able to effectively fire on friendly units.

(2) Naval gunfire general support missions were fired by the USCGC (CGC-2). Unobserved fire was called against known or suspected VC concentrations, assembly areas, and fortified positions. No observed close support missions were fired or requested. The results of the naval gunfire are unknown because there was no surveillance in the target area.

b. Air. Three fixed wing air strikes were called in support of Operation SUAVE II. The strikes were pre-planned and controlled by the forward air controller working through the FAC. A total of six flights of two aircraft each were employed. The primary ordnance was provided by 20mm cannons and rockets which had no visible effect upon the trench line targets.

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7. Intelligence

a. In addition to intelligence gathered prior to and during Operation SHASTA II, information reflected in this report includes that gained in contacts in the same area of operations immediately after the conclusion of Operation SHASTA II. During those two days, major contacts were made with enemy units which resulted in the capture of weapons, equipment and documents. This captured material identified enemy units, strengths and individual personnel occupying the area of operation for Operation SHASTA II.

b. Enemy strength in the area of operations was estimated to be at least four companies reinforced by local guerrillas. This was indicated by reports prior to the operation and substantiated by contacts which carried beyond the operation. Intelligence sources indicated the following units and arms may have been operating within, and/or near the area of operation:

(1) One district main force company, designated as C-15.B, also known as K-65 or K-75 (may be a part of the 75th Battalion), with an estimated strength of 120 men. They were reported to be equipped with one 60mm mortar, one .30 caliber machinegun, two R-40 anti-tank guns, five Browning automatic rifles, and sufficient individual weapons. This unit was reported to be located at (BT 0125A6) by the FV WOC Village Chief.

(2) One undesignated company was located at (BT 011581) and (BT 021588). Its strength and weapons were unknown. The source was MOI AM Sector Headquarters.

(3) One company from R-20th Battalion equipped with mortars and light machineguns was located at (AT 987554). Its strength was unknown, and it was reported by MOI AM Sector Headquarters.

(4) One main force company, designation unknown, was located at (BT 023606). It had an estimated strength of 120 men armed with one light machinegun, six automatic rifles, and individual weapons. Source of report was DIEN BAN District Headquarters.

c. A description of the military aspects of the terrain is of significance.

(1) The area of the operation consists of many large open areas of rice paddies, with a network of deep steep-banked streams, canals, and ditches. The rice fields are separated by earthen dikes one to two feet high and remain flooded and dry ten months out of the year. During the months of April and September, the soil is usually firm as a result of rice harvesting work performed by the villagers. Numerous settlements containing many native houses are scattered throughout the

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area. The houses are surrounded by thick hedges of shrubs and trees, with many closely spaced grave mounds in the rice paddies nearby. The river areas are steeply banked with abundant underbrush, trees and bamboo thickets.

(2) Trafficability throughout the area of the operation is unsuitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles because of rice paddy dikes, hedges in settlements, and embankments. Foot movement is slow and difficult in the flooded rice fields that are compartmented by deep streams and canals.

(3) Cover from flat trajectory fire is afforded by grave mounds, dikes, banks of streams, canals, and ditches. The area offers little cover from indirect fire.

(4) Concealment along river banks, streams, bamboo thickets and grave mounds is excellent for troops but very poor for vehicles. The numerous rice paddies in the area afford very little concealment from ground observation.

d. The weather remained warm and clear except for the last day of the operation when light rains fell. Overall weather conditions were favorable to Marine units; however, immersion foot was still a concern relative to sustained operations in the area since a considerable part of the area was inundated.

e. Interrogation and observation of enemy activity in the area indicated that the enemy was relatively new to the area and that his numbers may have been recently augmented. The following information tends to substantiate the above:

(1) Interrogation of villagers revealed that the VC had asked directions to foot bridges.

(2) Fortifications were freshly dug.

(3) Extensive newly emplaced mines and booby traps were found in the area of operation.

(4) VC units of 40 to 80 personnel were sighted throughout the area of operations.

(5) Documents captured during the operation included personal mail from NORTH VIETNAM.

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f. No new VC units were identified but the following units were reconfirmed:

(1) R-23d Company, R-20th Battalion, by a book containing a complete company roster of personnel, location, date of birth, and residences of relatives of the VC.

(2) R-15 (Local Force Company) by papers which were changed to read R-75.

(3) R-20th (B) Company of Unit 71 by promotion papers captured from a dead VC promoting him to vice political company leader/commander and dated 1 September 1966.

(4) 501st and 507th Battalions are mentioned in promotion papers taken from a dead VC promoting him to platoon leader.

(5) Items mentioned in sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) above were captured from the same individual and dealt with the same name, indicating the probability of a recent transfer or change in unit designations of the above units.

(6) R-20th Company, R-20th Battalion, by promotion papers, promoting a dead VC to squad leader, dated 15 June 1966.

f. Arms and equipment captured indicated that this was a well equipped unit with a large amount of extra clothing and ammunition. The sub-machineguns captured had from 300 to 1000 rounds of ammunition per gun. It was also noted that the bores and moving parts of the captured weapons were in excellent condition.

g. Intelligence gained from the operation reconfirmed known units in the general area of the operation and particularly the R-20th Battalion in the immediate operational area. Documents captured listed complete companies by individual name, which will improve the present blacklist. Contact with the enemy suggested that the VC were unfamiliar with terrain and had a definite destination which is unknown at this time. The people in the area are under VC control and help them by supplying food, directions, and by warning them of Marines entering the area. The VC were well trained in techniques of fire, maneuver, and camouflage. When the VC positions were over run, their flight was confused and disorderly and very similar to mob flight, which indicated a loss of control by unit leaders.

8. Mission. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) commencing at 190700H conducts search and destroy operations in the villages of KY HINH, THANG HUNG, HUNG HOA, MY NGOC and MY QUU.

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9. Concept of Operations. See paragraph (2) of enclosure (1).

10. Execution. As a result of increased enemy activity in the general area of the boundary between 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines search and destroy operations were directed to be conducted by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines and the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines in adjacent T'OH's.

At 190700H, Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines crossed their respective Lines of Departure, and Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines took up assigned blocking positions. See Annex A to enclosure (1).

At 190725H, the 1st Platoon of Company C apprehended one VC at (AT 005575). The VC was forwarded to the Battalion command post for processing.

At 191050H, the Battalion Scouts observed four VC at (BT 00:566) heading southwest. The scouts took up pursuit and took them under small arms fire. Two VC were killed and two were captured. The VC were carrying assorted medical supplies, some home-made and commercial batteries, two packs, a compass, and numerous maps and documents. The captured VC and materiel were sent to the Battalion command post for processing.

At 191250H, the 2d Platoon of Company D discovered a munition booby trapped with an M-26 grenade at (AT 00583); the platoon commander was wounded when destroying the M-26 grenade and he was evacuated.

At 191220H, a Marine from the 3d Platoon of Company C, while participating in the sweep, activated a pressure or trip-time booby trapped 155mm round at (AT 00584). Four USMC KIA's resulted.

At 191400H, the 3d Platoon of Company C received several incoming rounds of sniper fire from (AT 00585). Fire was returned with small arms and a maneuver element was sent out but contact with the sniper was lost.

At 191600H, a Marine from the 3d Platoon of Company D tripped an M-16 mine which detonated three other M-26 grenades carried by the Marine. One USMC KIA and two US C KIA resulted.

At 191630H, a patrol from the 2d Platoon of Company D observed four VC fleeing. The patrol took up pursuit and opened fire with small arms which resulted in four VC killed. The VC were armed with several grenades and military equipment. All equipment was forwarded to the Battalion S-2 for processing.

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At 191200H, the following Frag Order was issued to participating units: Establish night defensive positions and plot your night defensive fires. Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines tie-in on the north with Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and on the south with Company C. Be prepared to continue search and destroy operations at first light.

At 200045H, the 3d Platoon of Company C, while continuing the sweep received four incoming sniper rounds from (AT 980690) resulting in one Marine KIA. Fire was returned and a maneuver element was sent out in pursuit but contact with the VC could not be regained. An evacuation was not required for the wounded Marine.

At 201004H, a Marine from the 1st Platoon of Company C tripped a mine made up of two M-79 rounds at (AT 988599). The Marine was evacuated by a resupply helicopter. Several moments later the platoon ran into 10 to 12 VC with small arms and received approximately nine 60mm mortar rounds from the north. The platoon returned fire with 60mm mortars and maneuvered an element to make contact. The VC broke contact and fled.

At 201045H, operational control of Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was passed to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and all friendly and enemy casualties were recapitulated to reflect that unit's activities since 181200H. Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines statistics reflected at this time were six VC KIA (probable), one USMC KIA, 12 USMC TI's. Marine casualties were sustained by VC mines and sniper fire while the unit was moving into a blocking position.

At 201515H, the 3d Platoon of Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines observed three VC fleeing at (AT 984599). The platoon sent out a unit in pursuit and opened up with small arms fire killing two VC. The third VC was captured and sent to the Battalion command post for processing.

At 201600H, a Marine from 3d Platoon of Company C tripped what was believed to be a booby trapped Chinese Communist grenade at (AT 986599). The platoon commander and radio operator received minor fragment wounds in the legs and were evacuated on the resupply helicopter.

At 201715H, a pressure type mine composed of approximately 20 pounds of TNT was detonated by a Marine from Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines at (AT 984603). The results of this were three Marines wounded and one killed. All were evacuated by helicopter.

At 201730H, the 3d Platoon of Company D killed one VC with small arms fire. The VC had four grenades, a K-50 sub-machinegun, a pack, cartridge belt, and additional field equipment.

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At 202020H, the point on a patrol from the 2d Platoon of Company D observed two VC moving along a road. The point opened fire and killed one VC; the other was wounded but not captured. The dead VC had one M-26 grenade with him.

At 210330H, the night defensive positions of Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines received one incoming 60mm mortar round at (AT 994604). One Marine WIA (MIA) result.

At 210930H, movement was observed in a house at the rear of the 2d Platoon of Company C at (AT 995454). A squad was sent out to investigate, and one Marine tripped a booby trap and received minor lacerations. Medical evacuation was not required.

At 211200H, Operation SUAST II was terminated.

11. Results

a. Enemy Losses and Equipment Captured or Facilities Destroyed.

(1) Personal Losses

| | |
|-------------------|----|
| VC KIA | 11 |
| VC KIA (probable) | 6 |
| VC MIA (probable) | 5 |
| VCC | 3 |
| VCS | 15 |

(2) Equipment Captured and Facilities Destroyed

(a) Equipment Captured

| | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| U. S. Caliber 30 Carbine | 1 |
| K-50 Sub-machinegun | 1 |
| K-50 Magazines | 2 |
| .30 Caliber Carbine Magazines | 1 |
| M-26 Grenades | 2 |
| CHICOM Grenades | 7 |
| U. S. Bayonet w/Scabbard | 1 |
| U. S. Cartridge Belts | 3 |
| U. S. Canteens | 2 |
| U. S. Canteen Cups | 1 |
| U. S. Canteen Covers | 2 |
| Binoculars | 1 |
| Trietatches (civilian) | 3 |
| Flashlights | 2 |
| Conchos | 3 |

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| | |
|--------------------------------|---------|
| Rice | 15 lbs. |
| U. S. Compass | 1 |
| Becks | 4 |
| Village Official Document Seal | 1 |
| Assorted Documents | |
| Assorted Uniforms | |

(b) Facilities Destroyed

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| Unit Hts | 1 |
| Mines | 3 |
| Numerous Trenches | |

b. Friendly equipment and personnel losses and facilities destroyed

(1) Personnel Losses

| | |
|-----|----|
| VIA | 3 |
| DE | 33 |
| MIA | 0 |

(2) Equipment Losses. None

(3) Facilities Destroyed. None.

12. Administrative Matters

a. Unit distribution of CLASS V was provided for the three companies in the area of operations by helicopter resupply. Adequate CLASS I was carried by the individual Marine for the duration of the operation, supplemented by the local water supply.

b. Treatment of casualties, evacuation, and hospitalization were as follows:

| <u>Battle Injuries</u> | | | <u>Non-Battle Injury</u> |
|------------------------|----|------|--------------------------|
| VIA | DE | TANK | |
| 3 | 14 | 19 | 1 |

c. Troop movement was principally on foot.

d. Administrative/Logistics Net was established between the forward supply point and the Battalion S-4 office in the rear command post. This reduced the load on the Battalion Tactical Net and provided more rapid means of passing of logistical information.

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c. Casualties were evacuated from the area of operations by helicopters and tracked vehicles.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

14. Commanders Analysis

a. When Operation SVASTA II was terminated, Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued in light and sporadic contact with the VC in the same area of operations. This erupted into heavy contact when the lead elements, two rifle squads, of the sweep force made contact with a well camouflaged, dug-in enemy platoon position reinforced with mortars and machineguns. Simultaneously, adjacent elements of Company C discovered pockets of enemy resistance. Primary contacts were made in grid square (BT 0059). These contacts were exploited by the commitment of additional 1st Battalion, 1st Marines units into the area of operations. A platoon from Company A was inserted into a blocking position at (BT 017537) by SPARROW HAWK, and elements of Company D and the Battalion Scouts were moved to contact the fleeing VC. Of significance to the success of Operation SVASTA II are the following enemy losses/casualties suffered by the VC as a result of this subsequent operation:

24 VC KIA (confirmed)
14 VC MIA (probable)
9 VC WIA
18 VCC

Captured enemy weapons/equipment included one Thompson sub-machinegun, two K-44 Carbines, one K-50 sub-machinegun, one automatic carbine, and assorted grenades and field equipment.

b. As the area of operations was an uninhabited free fire area, no civil affairs or psychological warfare activities were planned or executed. The few non-combatants encountered were evacuated from the objective area to DIEN BAN for relocation.

John A. Scott
JOHN A. SCOTT
Acting

Conv to:

CO, 2d Bn, 1st Marines
CO, 1st Bn, 26th Marines

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FIRST MARIERS MESS CG 181825Z DEC 1966

FRIG ORDER 258-66

1. 1ST BN, 1ST MARIERS WILL CONDUCT A TWO DAY SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN COMMENCING 19 DEC 1966.

2. COMBAT OF COMS. CO D, 1ST BN, WILL CONDUCT SEARCH OF AREA BOUNDED BY UTCHAM 14 (984584) TO (996572). LOC (996572) TO (000585). GRID LINE (000585) TO (000608) SONG L. THO (000608) TO 985609. N. STREET (985609) TO (984585). CO D, 2ND BN WILL BLOCK LONG NORTH SIDE SONG L. THO (000608) TO (985609). CO D, 1ST BN, 26TH MARIERS WILL BLOCK LONG NORTH SIDE OF STREET (985609) TO (984584).

3. 1ST BN, FIRST MARIERS
A. PROVIDE CONTROL GROUP FOR OPN
B. PROVIDE SEARCH FORCE
C. COMBAT SEARCH FROM LOC AT 1400H

2ND BN, FIRST MARIERS

A. PROVIDE ONE COMPANY FOR BLOCK ON NORTH SIDE OF ORJ ARE.
B. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO MOVE BLOCKING FORCE SOUTH OF SONG L. THO ON ORDER. GROUP ORIGIN OF CO D TO 1ST BN.

1ST BN, 26TH MARIERS

A. SUPPORT OPN BY PROVIDING ONE COMPANY BLOCKING FORCE.
B. CROSS LOC (970584) TO (970592) AT 1400H MOVE EAST TO OCCUPY BLOCKING POSITION (986909) TO (984584).

4. DETERMINING INSTRUCTIONS.

A. 1ST BN, FIRST MARIERS DISCUSS WITH 2ND BN, FIRST MARIERS AND 1ST BN, 26TH MARIERS.
B. D-DAY 1400H 190700H DEC 1966
C. TACTICAL RADIO NET FREQUENCY 64.4
D. FIRE COORDINATION LINE FROM (976584) TO (976596) LONG STREET FROM (976596) TO (985609) TO (984609).

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ENCLOSURE (1)

1st Bn, 1st Marines
DL NUNG, RAN
191900H, Dec 1966

FRAG ORDER 55-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 MGS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I
(b) RegtO 3120.4

Task Organization

1st Battalion, 1st Marines
HQ-9 Co (-) (Rein)
Command Group

Major SCOTT

Company C (-) (Rein)
Co C
FO Tm, Btrv A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
FAC Tm, HQ-9 Co
Det, 2nd Plat, 1st Engr Bn

Capt CARTER

Company D (-) (Rein)
Co D
FO Tm, Btrv A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat

Capt KELLY

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current INTSUMS.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) 1st Bn, 11th Marines in direct support.
- (2) 2nd Plat, 1st Amphibian Tractor Bn, FMT, direct support.
- (3) 3rd Plat, Co A, 1st Anti-Tank Bn, FMT, direct support.
- (4) Co E, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines, direct support.
- (5) Co D, 1st Bn, 26th Marines, direct support.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 1st Marines (-) (Rein) commencing at 190700H conducts a search and destroy operation in area of villages centered at (BT 0061), see Annex B (Operations Overlay Phase I).

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations: See Annexes A and B (Operations Overlay).

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b. Company C (-) (Rein). Commencing at H-hour conduct search and destroy operations for Phase I in assigned zone of action. Be prepared, on order, to conduct operations in support of Phase II.

c. Company D (-) (Rein). Check OpCon of one platoon to Company C at 182100Z. Be prepared to reinforce Company C on order.

d. W-9 Company (-).

(1) On order the command group will displace to (BT 109571) and establish a forward command post for the operation.

(2) The S-2 Scout section in support of the operation.

e. Coordinating instructions.

(1) D-day 19 December 1966

(2) H-hour 0700

(3) Reference point for operation is (BT 9658)

(4) Color code for the operation is red.

(5) Duration 2 days

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Administration. No change.

b. Logistics.

(1) Bn S-4 provides support as required

(2) Unit distribution by helicopter for class V as required

(3) Prescribed load

(a) Normal arms and equipment/LMP

(b) DOA plus two bandoliers

(4) Resupply requests will be submitted on Bn Log Net

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Communications. No change.

b. Command Post.

(1) Cmd Cpo located at (RF 109571)


(2) Other units report when established.

John A. Scott
JOHN A. SCOTT
Acting

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Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 55-66

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Abstract

1st Bn, 1st Marines
DA NANG, RVN
191900H Dec 1966


Annex B (Operation Overlow) to Frag Order 55-66

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Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701, Sheet 6658 I

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PHASE II

John A. Scott

JOHN A. SCOTT
Acting

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IMMEDIATE

O 280441Z DEC 66

FM FIRST MARINES

TO: FIRST BN FIRST MARINES

BT

S E C R E T

SPARROWHAWK

PREPARE ONE SPARROWHAWK FOR PICKUP LZ FRIED CHICKEN 291615.

CHOP OPCON T O CORSAIR UPON PICKUP.

BT

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
Tab N

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
DA CIVC, NYC
4 Dec 1964

[illegible]

1st Bn, 1st Marines
 Da Nang, RVN
 11 December 1966

Weekly Operation Overlay for Period Ending 1st 2008 December 1966


Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series I 701, Sheet 45
 5558 I and 6642 II



Tab 0

1st Co, 1st Marines
2d Bn, 1st MA
10 Dec 1966

Refr (a) Map: VIENTIANE, 1:50,000 2nd Series L 701, Sheet:
6658 I and 6648 IV




Optimal

F. K. STROSS, JR.
 Major, USMC
 3-3

Tab No. 1st Edition
 01 12/10, 1955
 25 Dec 1956

Weekly Operation Overlay as of 251200Z Dec 1956

Ref: (a) Map: YIPRAN, 1:50,000 at Series L 701, Points 6658 I and 6660 IV



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 1. 12/10/56, 27.
 1/10/57, 28.
 1/1/58, 29.

Tab 0

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

2. INTSUM #263 301200H to 011200H ^{DEC} November 1966

3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) D-1-1, 010600H, BT063621, patrol cap (5) VCS, males
fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(2) D-1-1, 010730H, BT073625, patrol moving on tanks
rec harassing fire from approx (2) VC, returned fire and pursued,
observed (1) VC running from area, did not heed warning (1) VC
KIA, no I.D. card.

(3) D-1-1, 011000H, BT095620, patrol cap (1) VCS running
from area where sweep was being conducted. Fwd (1) VCS age 19-20,
no I.D. card fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 1

B. Captives - 6 VCS

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. CIT reports, 30 Nov 2000H, Special Bn 887 and 888 have
moved to DOFG LAM Mt. in vic of AT820620 on about 22 Nov 66. No
friendly civilians reside in this area. CIT rates this report C-3.

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

J. J. BURTON
J. J. BURTON
Maj. S-2

Tab P

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

2. INTSUM #264 01200H to 021200H ^{DEC} ~~November~~ 1966

3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) D-1-1, 011530H, BT073614, stay back ambush spotted (3) VC with carbines, moving down trail, opened fire and pursued, VC withdrew under fire, unable to regain contact.

(2) B-1-1, 011630H, BT130617, patrol rec heavy automatic s/a fire from approx (5) VC, returned fire with s/a and called in arty mission, VC withdrew under fire.

(3) C-1-1, 011745H, BT042577, patrol cap (1) VCS male, no I.D. card, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(4) C-1-1, 020255H, BT010577, unit moving to blocking position heard enemy movement across river, called Almm mortar mission on enemy position. Search was not conducted due to river.

(5) C-1-1, 020800H, BT022599, blocking force cap (3) VCS female and (1) VCS male, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(6) D-1-1, 020820H, BT028615, blocking force observed (3) VC attempting to cross river, fired on VC unable to recover bodies due to river. 30 minutes later blocking force observed (2) VC in same area, fired on VC unable to search area due to river, (5) VC KIA (probable).

(7) C-1-1, 020845H, BT019602, rec harassing fire from approx (2-3) VC, returned fire with s/a fire, maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire.

(8) HSS-1-1, 020915H, BT145606, Bn Scouts and HHSU NYON PF Plt in blocking position cap (7) VC confirmed by PF's. (1) found in haystack, (1) in rafters of house and (5) in hedgerows. PF's identified the VC as follows: (1) VC squad leader, (2) PF deserters, (3) guerrillas and (1) was a body guard for HHSU NYON District Chief. PF Plt has custody of (7) VC in HHSU NYON District Hq awaiting interrogation by CTF.

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(9) C-1-1, 021100H, BT015598, blocking force rec harassing s/a fire, returned fire with s/a fire and called in arty mission, VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 5 probable

B. Captives - 5 VCS, 7 VCG

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. C-T reports 30 Nov (1) VC Company cmd by TRAN CAT, estimated 120 men, armed w/ (1) 60mm and (4) B-40, loc via BT019608, BT016607 and BT045605. Probable mission is to harass road clearing on hwy

1. Rated F-6 by ROT AN, rated F-3 by Rn S-2 1/1.

(1) VC Company rein with guerrillas loc at BT022564 with 30 boats enroute from BT019559 to BT010559. DIEN BAN District believes mission is to attack VIEN DIEN. Rated F-6 by ROT AN.

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. OTHER: Interrogation reports Enclosures (1) thru (10) fwd to Regt only.

J. J. Burton
J. J. BURTON
Maj S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

2. INTSUM #265 021200H to 031200H ^{DEC} November 1966

3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) C-1-1, 021650H, BT012568, patrol rec harassing s/a fire, returned fire with s/a and 81mm mortar mission, maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire.

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. DIEN BAN Special Police Branch reports that in the afternoon of 30 November 1966, VC's DIEN BAN District Unit Main Force Company, strength estimated at 120 men, the designation unknown, armed with 1 MG, 6 auto rifles, sufficient individual weapons, and by NGUYEN LUIG as the company leader moved from the direction of THANH TRUONG Village BT020630 to station at DONG HO Hamlet approx BT023606, THANH PHONG Village, DIEN BAN District. Mission to ambush and attack the American Vietnamese allied force units patrolling scattering in the area. Rated C-2 by DIEN BAN.

B. 3 December HIEU NHON Outpost reports sighting (1) VC Company loc at BT025558 in VINH CHANH Hamlet #1.

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. OTHER: Interrogation report Enclosure (1), fwd to Regt only.

MRAY
P. H. RAY
2nd Lt. S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

2. INTSUM #263 031200H to 041200H December 1966

3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) B-1-1, 031319H, BT183578, patrol found (1) M-26 Grenade Mine with trip wire, destroyed in place.

(2) D-1-1, 031430H, BT100598, patrol found (1) dud 60mm mortar rd, destroyed in place.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

C. Equipment destroyed or captured: (1) M-26 Grenade Mine, (1) dud 60mm mortar rd.

5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately.

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. OTHER: Interrogation reports, (1) thru (7) Enclosures fwd to Regt only.

Correction of item 12, INTSUM #263, #264, and #265: DTG reported as November 1966, correct to December 1966.

Bill Ray

P. H. RAY
2nd Lt. S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. LITSUM #267 041200H to 051200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) B-1-1, 042020H, BT173573, ambush rec a large volume of s/a, 50 cal and grenade fire from approx (10) VC, returned fire and dispatched a reaction squad for support, VC withdrew under fire. Search of area indicated (1) VC MIA (probable).

(2) C-1-1, 042030H, BT015571, patrol enroute to ambush site detected enemy movement prior to moving thru area. Patrol pulled back, Ontos and 81mm mortar fired on enemy position.

(3) D-1-1, 042300H, BT103580, LP moving to position heard voices, called for illumination, saw (1) VC running from area. Fired on VC and pursued, unable to regain contact.

(4) D-1-1, 050800H, BT082592, patrol rec s/a sniper fire from (1) VC, returned fire with s/a and pursued, VC withdrew under fire.

(5) 1/1, 050945H, BT983584, Amtrac detonated a mine on hwy 4, upon detonation Amtrac rec sniper fire from BT983588. Returned fire and maneuvered troops. VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. VC MIA (probable) - 1

5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately.

11. None

12. None

13. None

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~~REDACTED~~
14. None

15. None

J. P. M. A. S.
P. H. R. I. V.
2nd Lt. S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #268 051200H to 061200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) C-1-1, 051305H, BT034577, patrol found (1) 155mm arty rd in road, believed to be booby trapped, destroyed in place.

(2) D-1-1, 051400H, BT083603, patrol rec harassing s/a fire from approx (2) VC, returned fire and pursued, unable to regain contact.

(3) B-1-1, 051410H, BT169571, patrol found (1) mined 105mm arty rd w/pressure release device, destroyed in place.

(4) B-1-1, 051515H, (3) units of Company "B" simultaneously rec heavy s/a fire from BT176577 and BT18584, returned fire with s/a fire and called in arty mission. Dispatched reaction units for assistance, VC withdrew under fire. Searched area (2) VC KIA (probable).

(5) D-1-1, 051516H, BT063623, patrol observed (20) VC running from patrol, fired on VC, (8) VC KIA, no I.D. cards. (1) VC KIA was wearing ARVN issue uniform. Captured (1) belt, (2) ChiCom Grenades and (1) VC poncho, fwd to Bn S-2.

(6) B-1-1, 051540H, BT074632, patrol observed (6) VC running from blocking force, fired on VC saw (3) VC fall, no search was made, blocking position was maintained, (3) VC KIA (probable).

(7) D-1-1, 051830H, BT075634, observed (5) VC running from Marines, fired on VC, (1) VC KIA (probable).

(8) C-1-1, 060645H, BT037597, blocking force exp (3) made VCS, ages 30, 25, 35, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(9) C-1-1, 061025H, BT010590, blocking force rec harassing s/a fire, returned fire and called in 81mm mortar mission, VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces: 10 VC KIA, (6) VC NIA (probable).

B. Captives: 3 VCS

C. Equipment destroyed or captured:

- (1) Mined 105mm arty rd
- (1) 155mm arty rd
- (1) web belt
- (2) ChiCom Grenades
- (1) VC poncho

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5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 051800H - HIEU NHON District Police Chief and CAN HAI Village Chief visited 1/1 CP with a request for Marines to return to CAN HAI Village. They further stated that since Company "C" 1/1 left CAN HAI the VC are returning.

B. 052000H, - HOI AN Sector Agent reports (1) VC Co cmd by KIA, scattering in the vic of VT987554. (pns include mortars and L&G. Designated part of R-20th Bn. Reported mission is to reinforce local guerrillas and ambush USMC patrols.

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately.

11. None

12. None

13. None

15. Late Entries:

A. 1/1, 041200H to 041400H, tanks took under fire targets indicated by Junk Fleet, where they had rec harassing fire on 03 Dec. Junk Fleet confirmed destruction of (5) bunkers and killing (2) VC.

P. H. Ray
P. H. RAY
2nd Lt. 9-2

1st Bn, 1st Marines Log
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #269 061200H to 071200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) C-1-1, 061424H, BT008534, plt moving from blocking position rec heavy sniper fire from an unknown number of VC returned fire with s/a and called in arty mission, maneuver element was sent out, VC withdrew under fire. Medevac chopper rec sniper fire disabling it, called in fixed wing air support and flare ship. (2) air strikes was run by AO, fire was suppressed, medevac was completed.

(2) Operation Trinidad, H&S-1-1, 070815H, BT120604, Bn Scouts cap (9) VCS all under 40 years of age, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing after screening in the field.

(3) Operation Trinidad, L-1, 070925H, BT149601, amtracs rec harassing s/a fire observed (1) VC fall, (1) VC MIA (probable).

(4) C-1-1, 071035H, BT008588, security force rec harassing s/a fire, returned fire with s/a and arty mission, VC withdrew under fire.

(5) Operation Trinidad, B-1-1, sweep force has captured (10) VCS, (7) of which were captured by PF's. A total of (970) civilians have been collected and will be screened by cadre. Further information on Operation Trinidad will follow in later INTSUM's.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. (1) VC MIA (probable)

B. (19) VCS

5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately.

11. None

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12. None

13. None

14. Other: Interrogation reports Enclosures (1) thru (8) fwd to Regt only.

For *McLaurin*
P. H. RAY
2nd Lt. S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #270 071200H to 081200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) C-1-1, 071440H, BT008577, helicopter, after landing, rec sniper fire which disabled it. A fixed wing air strike was called on enemy position, one secondary explosion was heard.

(2) DIEN BAN Sub-Sector, 080225H-080240H, BT056589, rec heavy mortar fire from estimated (1) VC plt, most of the rds landed near VIEN DIEN Bridge, search of area at first light revealed automatic weapon links and fin assemblies from B-40 anti-tank weapons at BT054593.

(3) C-1-1, 08600H, BT010579, rec harassing s/a fire from unknown number of VC, returned fire with s/a fire and arty mission, maneuver element spotted (1) VC running from area, did not heed warning, fired on VC, (1) VC KIA no I.D. card.

(4) B-1-1, 081030H, BT146595, patrol sweeping mangroves flushed (4) VC, did not heed warning, (2) VC KIA, (1) VC MIA probable, and captured (1) VC. Fwd VCC to Battalion S-2 for processing.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces: (3) VC KIA, (1) MIA(probable)

B. Captives: (1) VC

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 07 Dec 1966, CIP agent reports that on 7 December there was 27 guerrillas located in the vic of HA BANG BT104693; a MF Plt of 30 men, reinforced with 26 guerrillas located in the vic of VIE: DAIK BT093658 and armed with 1 MG, 1 M-79, 4 SIG and adequate individual weapons; (1) plt of guerrillas located in the vic of CAM SA (1) BT081648.

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Agent also informs that since the U.S. Marines have moved from their positions at BT122629 that the VC have returned to the hamlets in the surrounding area. They have reestablished their control and are collecting taxes.

B. 071800H, DIEN BAN reports (2) VC MF Bn scattering from BT025545 to BT060545. VC are reported staying in houses in groups of 5.

C. HIEU NHON Sub-Sector Agent reports (1) VC Co moved to BT178554 and coordinate with (1) plt of guerrillas with intentions to attack PF Outpost and CAC-2 to celebrate the birthday of the Liberation Front in South VN on 20 December 1966

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately.

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. Other: Interrogation reports enclosures (1) and (2) fwd to Regt only.

P. H. RAY
P. H. RAY
2nd Lt. S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #271 081200H to 091200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

UNCLASSIFIED

A. Ground Activity

(1) H&S-1-1, 081850H, BT183587, combined action plt rec harassing s/a fire from approx (1) VC, returned fire with s/a and maneuvered to search area, VC withdrew under fire.

(2) B-1-1, 081920H, BT175583, patrol moving into ambush site rec harassing s/a fire from unknown number of VC, returned fire and maneuvered to sweep area. Sweep force rec automatic weapons fire from BT177574, returned fire, could not search due to river.

(3) H&S-1-1, 081955H, BT197575, combined action plt patrol was ambushed from a house by an unknown number of VC, returned fire and maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire.

(4) The following incidents from Operation Trinidad II:

(a) D-1-1, 08213H, BT009579, found (1) rocket pod containing (7) rockets, destroyed on place.

(b) C-1-1, 081415H, BT010578, observed (3-5) VC running from area, fired on VC and pursued VC broke contact. Found (2) VC ponchos, (1) USMC shelter half and (200-300) lbs of rice. Fwd gear to Bn S-2, destroyed rice.

(c) D-1-1, 081630H, BT997594, unit crossing rice paddy rec mortar and heavy s/a fire from approx (15) VC located in (2) interlocking trench lines at BT996596 and 000594 with (rein) log bunkers, returned fire and assaulted position, VC withdrew to the north under fire.

(d) C-1-1, 081715H, BT006583, saw (1) VC running from patrol fired on VC, (1) VC KIA.

(e) D-1-1, 081715H, BT000597, rec harassing s/a fire team
(3) VC, returned fire and maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire.

(f) C-1-1, 081730H, BT013583, saw (1) VC in area of sniper
fire, fired on VC, (1) VC KIA.

(g) C-1-1, 081800H, BT009598, observed (2) VC running from
CP area, fired on VC, (2) VC KIA.

(h) C-1-1, 081915H, BT014589, observed (6) VC running along
river, fire on VC, (6) VC KIA.

(i) C-1-1, 090730H, BT014592, plt sweep observed (1) VC running
from sweep, fired on VC, (1) VC KIA.

(j) C-1-1, 090830H, BT019600, located (1) sniper post with
room for sniper, destroyed, nothing found inside.

(k) C-1-1, 090840H, BT020606, cap (5) VC ages 25-45 with
I.D. cards, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(l) G-2-1, 090950H, BT018603, saw (1) VC in open with I.D. card
fired on VC, (1) VC WIA probable.

(m) C-1-1, 091000H, BT011603, cap (2) VC ages 35 to 40 no I.D.
cards, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(n) C-1-1, 091015H, BT013604, found (1) body of (1) VC and
cap (2) VC ages 25-35, no I.D. cards, fwd to Vn S-2 for processing.

(o) C-1-1, 091100H, BT017605, cap (1) VC ages 40, no I.D.
card, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(p) H&S-1-1, 091100H, BT009565 and BT008565, destroyed (2)
houses; (1) with anti-american slogans on walls and (1) which was believed
to be a sniper's position.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces: 12 KBMA: 1

B. Captured: 10 VC

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C. Equipment captured or destroyed:

- | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (1) dud 3.5 rocket rd | (5) bundles of clothing (uniforms) |
| (2) boats | (1) Rocket pod w/7 rockets |
| (1) M-26 Grenade | (2) VC ponchos |
| (1) box fishing gear | (1) USMC shelter half |
| (5) bundles of documents | (300) lbs rice |
| (1) sniper roost | (2) VC houses |

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. HIEU NHON Special Police Branch reports, on 2 Dec 1966, one VC MF Squad, armed with (4) K-50 and (2) 60mm mortars moved from BT118570 to BT120625. Mission is to harass Provincial Capitol HOI AN in the near future.

Also reports HIEU NHON District VC had assembled a number of people and organized a wave of learning the 2 letters of HQ CHI MINH and South Vietnam Nation's Liberation Front asserting to initiate the "1966-1967 Winter Spring Campaign". This learning started on 3 Dec 1966 and ended on 6 Dec.

From exploitation of captured VC guerrilla agent HIEU NHON District learned that the VC had dug and built a number of caves with cement at the concerned hamlets in the following: At HA MY DONG and HA MY TAY Hamlets BT121619, BT125623, BT133605, and BT148607, there were 15 caves. At Inter-Families 33 HA GIA Hamlet, BT115635 there were 4 caves. At Inter-Families 18 Hamlet 2 HA MY TAY, BT120625 there were 2 caves. The aforesaid number of caves were reserved for the cadre elements of VC's HOI AN City Committee and a number of local guerrilla cadre to conceal in case the VN American allied forces arrived there on operation.

This reports is rated C-2 by HIEU NHON.

B. GIT reports 8 Dec 1966, During the early part of Dec 1966 the 707th Bn began infiltrating from XUYEN THO Village north along the coast. Their destination is the area known as the "Horseshoe" in the vic of HA BANG Hamlet (BT105632). The Bn strength is estimated at 300 due to losses suffered in a recent operation.

10. Weather and terrain conditions: issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

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14. Other:

1. Captured Documents: Introduction Papers

(1) Document captured on 081030H at BT146595 states that the cadre mentioned (HOAN) has permission to enter the following villages; XUYEN THO, XUYEN PHUOC and XUYEN AN (BINH DUONG). The reason for traveling in these villages is to take coolie laborers to station. It also gives permission for the cadre to carry one carbine rifle. Issued on 12 Nov 66 and expires on 12 Dec 1966.

(2) Another document captured at the same time as the above states that the cadre mentioned (NGUYEN THANH BA) has permission to go into any village within QUANG NAM Province. It also gives permission for this cadre to carry one 38 cal revolver. Issued on 7 Nov 66, expires 31 Dec 66. Issued by DONG THU or DONG THO.

15. Late Entries:

A. Ref INTSUM #270, 3., (4), captured gear is as follows; (2) boats, (1) M-26 Grenade, (1) box of fishing gear, (5) bundles of documents, (5) bundles of clothing (uniforms), and misc. writing gear. Captured gear fwd to Bn S-2 EFP for Regimental S-2, fishing boats were destroyed in place.

B. The following are late entries from Operation Trinidad II.

(1) H&S-1-1, 071445, BT146598, Bn Scouts found (1) dud 3.5 rocket rd., destroyed in place.

(2) C-1-1, 080730H, BT019571, rec harassing fire from unknown number of VC, called in fixed wing air strike, searched area (1) VC KIA.

(3) F-2-1, 080915H, BT017605, observed (6) VC moving east armed with weapons and (2) packs, called arty mission on enemy position, could not search due to river.

Benjamin M. Jenkins, Jr.
for P. H. RAY
2d Lt S-2

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INTELIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #272 091200H to 101200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

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A. Ground Activity

(1) B-1-1, 091350H, BT180579, patrol found (1) booby trapped ChiCom Grenade, destroyed in place.

(2) H&S-1-1, 091430H, BT197575, combined action patrol cap (2) VCS; (1) male and (1) female. Questioning by personnel from HQI AN Sector revealed that VC had slept in their house the night before and the woman gave warning as Marines approached. Fwd (2) VCS to Bn S-2 for processing.

(3) B-1-1, 101035H, BT154598, searching mangroves found (1) platform, (2) raincoats, (1) shelter half, VC banner, (1) pair trousers, fishing gear and food, fwd to Bn S-2 PFT to Regimental S-2.

(4) The following are incidents from Operation Trinidad II.

(a) D-1-1, 091200H, BT002608, cap (5) VC male and (1) VC female, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(b) D-1-1, 091515H, BT985583, rec harassing s/a fire from approx (4) VC, returned fire with s/a and maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire.

(c) D-1-1, 091815H, BT996600, rec harassing s/a fire from approx (3) VC, returned fire with s/a and called in arty mission, VC withdrew under fire.

(d) H&S-1-1, 100940H, BT039591, combined action company observed (6-8) VCS run into hamlet, pursued and apprehended (2) VCS female age approx 14 and 24. Search of house resulted in finding (2) large urns of rice buried under floor of house. Fwd (2) VCS to Bn S-2 for processing, turned rice over to district headquarters.

(e) C-1-1, 101045H, BT007577, saw (1) VC running from patrol, did not heed warning, (1) VC KIA. Searched VC finding (1) Mine and Booby Trap Manual and documents, fwd to Bn S-2.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces: 7 , 11 probable , 6 NIA probable

B. Captives: 18 VCC, 11 VCS

C. Equipment captured or destroyed:

| | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| (1) booby trapped Chicom Grenade | (2) urns of rice |
| (1) platform | (1) Mine Booby trap Manual |
| (2) raincoats | fishing gear |
| (1) shelter half | documents |
| (1) VC banner | food |
| (1) pair trousers | |

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 09 Dec 66, DIEN BAN Agent reports (2) VC Companies equipped w/ (1) 81mm mortar and (1) 60mm mortar and individual weapons loc at KY NGOC and KY MINH Villages, cad by THAI and DONG. They engaged with USMC at 081300H and withdrew to the southwest toward the PHU MY Zone and scattered at AT980536. They carried with them (6) VC NIA and (11) VC KIA. This report is rated C-3 by DIEN BAN.

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. Other -- None

15. Late Entries:

A. 07 Dec 66, Junk Fleet cap (7) VCS, one of which is known as a VC on black list, fwd to BN 8-2 for processing.

B. 080825H, artillery in support of 4th Bn, 51st ARVN Regt, killed (6) VC at BT086496 and BT0950. This was confirmed thru NOI AN by supported unit.

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C. C-1-1, 091025H, BT018604, sweep force cap (5) VC males ages (25-40),
fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

D. D-1-1, 091100H, BT0056608, cap (7) VC females confirmed by ITR, fwd
to Bn S-2 for processing.

E. Correction on INTSUM #271, 3., 4., (4), k; the number of VCC picked
up should be 4.

Benjamin J. Jenkins 3y Sgt
P. H. RAY
2d Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #273 101200H to 111200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) H&S-1-1, 102400H, BT182588, Combined Action Company CP rec
(3) incoming rifle grenades, returned s/a fire, called for illumination,
VC withdrew under fire.

(2) The following are incidents from Operation Trinidad II.

(a) C-1-1, 101210H, BT014569, while prep firing for unit
returning to fwd CP observed secondary explosions at BT009562, BT011563
and BT008567.

(b) G-1-1, 101215H, BT014569, found (2) VC buried in freshly
dug shallow graves in area of air strike. VC were killed from burns and
suffocation. (2) VC KIA (KMA).

(c) D-1-1, 101300H, AT992600 and AT992607, called fixed wing
air strike on trench line where Company "D" was receiving s/a fire. (5)
VC KIA probable, (2) secondary explosions were heard.

(d) Air Strike, 101400H, AT980570, fixed wing air strike on
VC fortifications and defensive positions resulted in (5) structures destroy-
ed and (1) secondary explosion.

(e) G-1-1, 101430H, BT023589, saw (1) VC running from sweep
force, did not heed warning, (1) VC KIA.

(f) H&S-1-1, 101810H, BT019574, Bn Scouts found (5) female
and (2) male VCS in a house, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses

A. KIA: KBGF - 2 KMA - 2, 5 probable

B. Captives - 9 VCS

C. Equipment destroyed or captured - 5 VC structures

5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

15. Late Entries:

A. D-1-1, 101045H, BT003564, saw (1) VC run from sweep force, (1) VC KIA.

B. C-1-1, 101155H, BT010564, while searching house in area of sniper fire, apprehended (2) VCS female, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

OK Ray
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2d Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #274 111200H to 121200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) B-1-1, 120820H, BT183574, rec harassing s/a fire from (1) VC in mangroves, called arty mission on enemy position, searched area finding a ladder against a tree with foot prints leading away from tree, destroyed ladder.

(2) C-1-1, 120900H, BT049578, patrol apprehended (1) VCS, no I.D. card, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(3) B-1-1, 121000H, BT182584, patrol tripped (1) ChiCom Grenade booby trap.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - None

B. Captives - 1 VCS

C. Equipment destroyed or captured - (1) ladder.

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 10 Dec 66 - HIEU NHON District Agent reports on 09 Dec 66 a VC Local Force Co (Q-12B) held a meeting to discuss plans of attack on USMC element at PHUOC - TRACH Bridge (BT181589) with simultaneous attacks on HOI AN Town Outpost and mortar attack on USMC 1/1 CP to restrict support and reinforcement. (1) Suicide Squad will carry explosive to blow up Ontos at PHUOC - TRACH Bridge. The meeting was held at the house of a man named CHU in AN BAN Hamlet BT150600. QUANG NAM S-2 Comment: Reports indicate VC Local Force units will increase activities to celebrate anniversary of the Foundation Day of National Liberation. Rated F-3 by QUANG NAM S-2.

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately.

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[REDACTED]

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

15. None

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2d Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #275 121200H to 131200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) C-1-1, 121750H, BT016578, sqd cmt pti saw (10) VC running across rice paddies, pursued and called 81mm mortar mission on enemy, searched area finding (1) VC KIA, no weapon.

(2) D-1-1, 121900H, BT099592, sqd ambush observed (1) VC on trail, opened fire, (1) VC KIA. Equipment captured: (1) military type flashlight, (1) U.S. cartridge belt, (2) M-26 Grenades, (2) ChiCom Grenades, (1) bayonet, (2) Thompson SMG magazines, (1) Thompson SMG, (1) set green utilities and (1) set black pajamas, (1) camouflaged cover and (45) rds. 45 cal ammo. Fwd captured gear to Bn S-2.

(3) E-1-1, 130900H, BT176564, sqd cmt pti rec a heavy volume of s/a fire, returned fire with s/a and called in arty mission, maneuvered and searched area finding footprints indicating (5-10) VC, (1) carbine magazine and (1) Thompson SMG magazine. Fwd to Bn S-2.

(4) H&S-1-1, BT197578, CAC sqd cmt pti swept through village collecting all male VN. Screening by Sector revealed (4) males with names on black list, (1) male no I.D. card, (1) male, father of a VC. Patrol also found (1) mother of a VC and (2) females, no I.D. cards attempting to escape sweep force. Fwd (9) VCS to Bn S-2 for processing.

(5) S-1-1, 131135H, BT137583, CP working party apprehended (1) VCS age (25-30) no I.D. card, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(6) B-1-1, 131145H, BT185560, sqd cmt pti observed (3) VC attempting to evade patrol, opened fire, (1) VC KIA. Pursued the other (2) VC, unable to regain contact. Captured equipment: (1) cartridge belt, (2) ChiCom Grenades, (1) poncho, (1) pack, (1) bag K-50 ammo, (1) K-50 magazine, assorted documents and pictures and (1) K-50 SMG, fwd to Bn S-2.

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4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 3

B. Captives - 10 VCS

C. Equipment destroyed or captured

| | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| (1) K-50 SMG | (1) military type flashlight |
| (1) Thompson SMG | (1) bayonet |
| (1) K-50 magazine | (1) set green utilities |
| (4) Thompson SMG magazines | (1) set black pajamas |
| (1) bag K-50 ammo | (1) camouflaged cover |
| (4) ChiCom Grenades | (45) rds 45 cal ammo |
| (2) M-26 Grenades | (1) carbine magazine |
| (2) U.S. cartridge belts | (1) poncho |
| (1) pack | (1) knife |
| (1) tunnel | (1) khaki shirt |
| (1) green coat | assorted documents and pictures |

5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

15. Late Entries:

A. Ref: Item 3, A,(6) this INTSUM, the VC KIA was wearing a khaki shirt and the (2) other VC were wearing khaki uniforms. Patrol in pursuit of VC found a cave at BT182564, destroyed. Further report of equipment captured: (1) knife and (1) green coat.

P. H. Ray
P. H. RAY
2d Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #276 131200H to 141200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) Junk Fleet 14, 131545H, requested tanks fire on enemy positions at BT210565 and BT209564, Junk Fleet reported (2) bunkers destroyed.

(2) B-1-1, 132045H, BT175580, Company "B" 3d Plt CP rec harassing s/a fire from across river, returned fire with s/a, no search was made due to water barrier.

(3) B-1-1, 141145H, BT176565, sqd cmt plt rec harassing s/a fire from approx (2) VC, simultaneously Company "B" 3d Plt CP rec harassing s/a fire from (1) VC at BT176576. Returned fire with s/a and called arty mission on enemy, VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

C. Equipment destroyed or captured: (2) bunkers

5. None

6. Enemy movements/locations:

A. CIT reports on 9 Dec 66 artillery fire destroyed one tunnel, 3 houses and killed 15 VC in the vicinity of BT155504 and BT152522.

A B-52 Bomb strike directed against T/87 and T/89 Bn's was 300 meters off the target. Which direction from the target was not known.

Report 17-u/18-66 regarding the 707th Bn was incorrect regarding the designator which is correctly called the 507th. The Bn is presently located in the vicinity of XUYEN THO (V), XUY XUYEN (H). Source informed that the personnel were dressed in green uniforms with green hats on which a star is affixed with the number 507 on the star. The battalion has just returned from a trip from AN BAN (1)(H) BT1561 on to HA QUANG (1)(H) BT1263 and from there to the vicinity of LAI NAGHI (1)(H) BT0960 and on to THANH TIN (2)(H) BT1258 and from there in a easterly direction north of HOI AN City to the vicinity of BT1657 via an unknown route to their present positions.

Notes 1. 1/1 killed a VC with a green uniform and cap, as described by source, except for the metal star, which could have been removed by friendly forces on 13 Dec 1966. Documents in his possession revealed a list of tax payments CHOUNG HO (H) (BT0959).

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

15. None

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #277 141200H to 151200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) C-1-1, 141220H, BT034574, sqd cmt ptl apprehended (4) VCS in a boat, and (5) more VCS running from patrol. Fwd VCS to Bn S-2 for processing.

(2) B-1-1, 141325H, BT173574, sqd cmt ptl apprehended (2) VCS female, no I.D. cards, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(3) B-1-1, 141935H, BT180580, sqd cmt plt rec harassing s/a fire from approx (5) VC, returned fire with s/a and called in arty mission, VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

B. Captives - (11) VCS

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A.. CIT reports on the evening of 14 Dec 66 (80) Provincial MF Soldiers and (50) guerrillas arrived at BT1855. CIT rates C-3

10. Weather and terrain conditions - Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #278 151200H to 161200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A.. Ground Activity

(1) B-1-1, 151330H, BT182583, sqd ambt ptl tripped (1) ChiCom Grenade booby trap w/trip wire.

(2) B-1-1, 151410H, BT178578, sqd ambt ptl found (1) 60mm mortar rd booby trapped with trip wire, destroyed in place.

(3) B-1-1, 151515H, BT090614, sqd ambt ptl rec harassing s/a fire from approx (1) VC. Returned fire with s/a and maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire. Searched area finding (1) cartridge belt w/knife.

(4) B-1-1, 160045H, BT143588, sqd returning from ambush site rec harassing s/a fire from approx (1) VC. Returned fire with s/a and maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire.

(5) H&S-1-1, 161010H, BT178563, Bn Scout sniper saw (7) VC across river, (1) VC w/weapon and (2) VC w/packs. Sniper opened fire, (1) VC KIA and (1) VC WIA (probable), other VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses

A. KIA by ground forces - 1, 1 VC WIA (probable)

B. Equipment destroyed or captured - (1) cartridge belt, (1) knife

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 161010H, DIEN BAN reports (1) VC platoon loc vic (BT095584).

B. 161200H, CIT reports (1) VC Co loc vic (BT095584) and (BT098597) estimated 180 men. CIT rates C-2.

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10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #279 161200H to 171200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) D-1-1, 161345H, BT095590, sqd cmt Ptl rec harassing s/a fire from an unknown number of VC at BT096536. Returned fire with s/a and maneuvered to sweep area, VC withdrew under fire. Ptl apprehended (2) VCS, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(2) B-1-1, 161450H, BT185586, plt s/d pti found 1100 lbs unmilled rice. (1) house was set afire by M-79 rds, secondary explosion of 50 cal ammo was observed.

(3) D-1-1, 161615H, BT185570, plt sweep observed (1) VC with hand grenade ready to throw, opened fire on VC, (1) VC KIA (KBGP). Grenade went off in VC's hand after he was KBGP.

(4) D-1-1, 161615H, BT191567, plt cmt pti observed (3) VC at BT190568 running from pti, opened fire on VC, (1) VC KIA. Pursued other (2) VC unable to regain contact. Equipment captured: (4) ChiCom Grenades, (1) M-26 Grenade, (4) carbine rds, (1) military whistle, (1) cartridge belt, (1) hunting knife and (1) first aid kit. Fwd captured gear to Bn S-2.

(5) D-1-1, 161630H, BT183568, sqd sweep of area of contact at 161615H apprehended (1) VCS male, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(6) D-1-1, 161800H, BT194567, plt blocking force observed (1) VC attempting to break thru block. Pursued and cap (1) VC, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(7) D-1-1, 161930H, BT184571, sqd ambush observed (1) VC moving down trail, opened fire on VC, (1) VC KIA age (25-30).

(8) B-1-1, 162200H, BT196568, sqd ambush observed (3) boats at BT197568 with estimated (3) VC in each boat attempting to cross river. Opened fire on VC, (2) boat was sunk, (3) VC KIA probable. (2) boats moved into mangroves unable to pursue due to water barrier.

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(9) B-2-1, 170900H, BT194574, plt sweep force rec heavy s/a fire from approx (10-20) VC at BT195574. Returned fire with s/a and called in arty mission. VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 3 confirmed, 3 probable

B. Captives - 3 VCS, 1 VCC

C. Equipment destroyed or captured -

| | |
|-------------------|-------------------------|
| 1100 lbs rice | 1 military whistle |
| 4 ChiCom Grenades | 1 cartridge belt |
| 1 M-26 Grenade | 1 hunting knife |
| 4 rds carbine | 1 first aid kit |
| 1 boat | 1 structure (destroyed) |

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 16 Dec 66 DIEN BAN Reports

(1) 1 VC Co moved from DUU XUYEN to BT120560. May attack CAC-1 by crossing river.

1 VC Co vic BT013577 to attack VINH HOA PF'n. Rated C-3 by DIEN BAN and F-6 by Bn S-2.

S-2 L/1 comment rated F-6 on size of unit and mission but believe attack on CAC-1 would come from the north west duplicating their previous attack.

(2) Reports mortar attack on 1/1 CP tonight from 60mm mortars. VC unit departing from BT099550 to set up at BT09569 or BT087556. Reported possessing (6) 60 mm mortars. Rated B-2 by DIEN BAN. S-2 L/1 rates F-6 on number of mortars and F-3 on possibility of attack.

B. CIT Reports

(1) 161845H - (1) plt of subject unit of 180 VC (INTSUM #273) now located in TRIEM TU (5) vic BT090580. Remainder of unit still between BT095564 and BT098597 where majority of civilians had been evacuated by VC commanded by NGUYEN DUU KHUYEN. S-2 comment: F-3 on size of unit, C-2 on location of some VC elements. Intentions unknown.

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

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11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #280 171200H to 181200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity
 - A. Ground Activity

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(1) B-1-1, 171215H, BT180568, sweep force found (1) 15 ft boat, documents and (4) urns of rice. Destroyed boat, fwd documents to Bn S-2 for translation, rice turned over to District Chief.

(2) Junk Fleet 14, 161030H, BT194578, observed (1) VC in a boat at BT190578. VC did not heed warning (1) VC KIA.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 1

C. Equipment destroyed or captured:

1 15 ft boat documents
4 urns of rice

5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

P. H. RAE
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2nd Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #281 181200H to 191200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

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A. Ground Activity

(1) D-1-1, 181315H, BT087616, plt cmt pti found (1) tunnel (3'x 6'x 3') w/concealed bamboo entrance. Tunnel destroyed after search.

(2) D-1-1, 181345H, BT090606, plt cmt pti rec harassing s/a fire from approx (3) VC at BT088598. Called arty mission on enemy, maneuvered to search area, VC withdrew under fire.

(3) B-1-1, 181350H, BT171566, plt cmt pti observed (1) VC running from patrol at BT170566. Pti opened fire with s/a and called arty mission on suspected withdrawal route. Searched area, unable to regain contact.

(4) B-1-1, 181400H, BT175566, plt cmt pti observed (1) VC female running from pti at BT176567, did not heed warning, (1) VC MIA captured. VC had no I.D. card. Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(5) D-1-1, 181500H, BT100599, plt cmt pti found (1) dud 60mm mortar rd, destroyed in place.

(6) C-1-1, 181800H, BT018571, AO observed (2) VC w/weapons in a boat at BT022560. VC were seen to come ashore, AO called 81mm mortar fire mission on enemy. AO was unable to spot VC again.

(7) D-1-1, 181845, BT015579, plt cmt pti detonated (1) M-26 or M-79 booby trap.

(8) C-1-1, 190725H, BT996575, sweep force apprehended (1) VCS w/I.D. card. Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(9) HOI AN, 190800H, 190820H, BT1457 rec (7) rds 60mm mortar from unk number of VC at BT142550 and BT141546. (4) rds hit in Province HQ's and (3) rds fell near river.

(10) A-1-1, 190925H, BT093608, Company sweep apprehended (9) VCS, Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(11) H&S-1-1, 191050H, BT002566, Bn Scouts on sweep spotted (4) VC moving along river. Unit pursued by fire and physically, (2) VC KIA, (2) VC captured. Captured equipment: (2) packs, (1) compass, maps and documents. Fwd (2) VCC and captured equipment to Bn S-2.

(12) D-1-1, 191110H, BT990583, sweep force found (1) punji pit booby trapped w/ (1) M-26 Grenade, destroyed in place.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - ² 6

B. Captives - ³ 9 VCS, 1 VCC

C. Equipment captured or destroyed --

(1) tunnel

(1) dud 60mm mortar rd

(1) M-26 Grenade

(2) packs

(1) compass

(1) punji pit

maps

documents

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5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

For
F. H. RAY
2nd Lt S-2

1st Bn, 1st Marines Log
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #282 191200H to 201200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

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A. Ground Activity

(1) Operation Shasta II, C-1-1, 191230H, AT986584, sweep force detonated (1) booby trapped arty rd (105mm or 155mm). Size of crater, 4'x 2 1/2'.

(2) Operation Shasta II, C-1-1, 191400H, AT986584, sweep force found (3) mines, destroyed in place.

(3) Operation Shasta II, C-1-1, 191400H, AT986584, sweep force rec harassing s/a fire from (1) VC at AT987585. Returned fire and maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire.

(4) Operation Shasta II, D-1-1, 191445H, AT986586, S&D ptl tripped (1) M-26 Grenade booby trap.

(5) Operation Shasta II, D-1-1, 191600H, AT986586, S&D ptl detonated (3-4) booby trapped M-26 Grenades tied together.

(6) Operation Shasta II, D-1-1, 191630H, BT006566, sweep unit saw (4) VC running from sweep. Sweep force pursued and KBGP (4) VC and cap (6) VCS. Equipment captured: (1) carbine, (1) M-26 Grenade, (1) carbine magazine, (3) ChiCom Grenades, (1) pair binoculars, (3) wrist watches, (2) flashlights, (2) U.S. cartridge belts, (1) U.S. bayonet w/scabbard, (3) VC ponchos, (1) camouflaged cover, (15) lbs rice, (2) U.S. canteens, (1) village official document seal, assorted documents, medical supplies and clothing. Fwd VCS and equipment to Bn S-2.

(7) B-1-1, 200310H, BT110592, sqd cmt ptl rec harassing s/a fire from (1) VC at BT106594. Returned fire with s/a and swept area apprehending (3) VCS, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(8) Operation Shasta II, C-1-1, 200845H, AT986593, sweep force rec harassing s/a fire from approx (2) VC at AT980692. Returned fire with s/a and maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire.

[REDACTED]

(9) Operation Shasta II, C-1-1, 200950H, AT967599, sweep force
decorated (1) AP mine.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 4

B. Captives - 11 VCS

C. Equipment destroyed or captured:

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 3 mines | 1 pair binoculars |
| 1 carbine rifle | 3 wrist watches |
| 1 M-26 Grenade | 2 flashlights |
| 3 ChiCom Grenades | 2 U.S. cartridge belts |
| 1 carbine magazine | 1 U.S. bayonet w/scabbard |
| 3 VC ponchos | 1 camouflaged cover |
| 15 lbs rice | 2 U.S. canteens |
| 1 village official document seal | |
| assorted documents | medical supplies |
| clothing | |

5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

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2nd Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #283 201200H to 211200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) Operation Shasta II, D-126th, 201415H, AT984607, blocking force observed (4) VC crossing river at AT985607. Blocking force opened fire on VC, (1) VC KIA (probable), VC withdrew under fire.

(2) B-1-1, 201445H, BT119628, plt cmt ptl rec heavy s/a fire from approx (10) VC at BT114625, BT120626 and BT123627. Returned s/a fire and maneuvered to search area, VC withdrew under fire.

(3) Operation Shasta II, C-1-1, 201515H, AT984599, sweeping force KBGF (2) VC and pursued and cap (1) VCC in a cave age (25-30). Fwd VCC to Bn S-2 for processing.

(4) Operation Shasta II, C-1-1, 201600H, AT986599, sweeping force detonated (1) ChiCom booby trap, pressure detonated.

(5) B-1-1, 201640H, BT138620, plt cmt ptl apprehended (1) male VCS, age 60, attempting to change clothes and run from patrol. Fwd VCS to S-2 for processing.

(6) Operation Shasta II, D-1-26, 201715H, AT984603, blocking force detonated (1) unk type AP mine (estimated 20 lbs TNT) employed on river bank.

(7) Operation Shasta II, D-1-1, 201730H, AT991598, sweep force KBGF (1) VC. Equip captured: (1) French 9mm SMG, (4) ChiCom grenades, (1) pack, (1) cartridge belt, equipment fwd to S-2.

(8) B-1-1, 201800H, BT155609, plt cmt ptl apprehended (1) male VCS, age 30, fwd to S-2.

(9) Operation Shasta II, D-1-1, 202020H, AT998560, sweep force observed (2) VC moving along road. Opened fire resulting in (1) VC KBGF, (1) VC withdrew under fire. Equip captured: (1) pack, (1) cover, (1) US Canteen cup, (1) pop-up canister and assorted documents. Captured gear fwd to S-2.

(10) Operation Shasta II, D-1-26, 210330H, AT984604, blocking forces rec (1) 60mm mortar rd from unk direction.

(11) Operation Shasta II, D-1-26, 210845H, AT984604, blocking forces detonated (1) unk type firing device.

(12) Operation Shasta II, C-1-1, 210900H, AT993603, sweep force observed VC movement in tree line. Called arty mission and fixed wing air strike against enemy, VC withdrew under fire.

(13) Operation Shasta II, 2109030H, AT996554, sweep force from C-1-1 detonated (1) unk type booby trap on trail.

(14) H&S-1-1, 210930H, BT106560, GAC sweep force rec harassing s/a fire from (1) VC at BT113554. Returned fire and VC withdrew.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 4, 1 KIA probable

B. Captives - 1 VCC, 7 VCS

C. Equipment captured or destroyed:

1 9mm French SMG
2 packs
4 ChiCom Grenades
1 pop up canister

1 U.S. cartridge belt
1 cover
1 U.S. canteen cup
assorted documents

5. Norm

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. GIT reports - (1) MF District Recon Plt (via BT068606) on 19 Dec 66. Weapons include (2) 60mm mortars, (2) 81mm mortars, (3) MG, plastic AP mines, (4) SMG; mission is to attack 1st Bn, 1st Mar GP. GIT rates B-1. S-2 1/1 comment: Amount of heavy weapons does not coincide with size of unit nor of recon/attack mission. F-2 on size and loc, F-4 on weapons, F-3 on mission. Several reports of units preparing mortar attack of 1/1 GP in last two weeks.

B. DIEN BAN reports from secret agent - (1) VC MF Co scattered from BT062615 to BT080612 with mission of attacking units in this area. VC are reported to be repairing bridge (AT997547) with bamboo. District rates B-2. S-2 1/1 comment: F-4 on attacks; VC in all areas avoiding any decisive contacts; F-3 on bridge building, very possible this may be

attempted before truce in order to facilitate movement at that time.

C. HOI AN reports from agent, 201400H - The villagers (vic 9954) have cut 6000 bamboo poles to be used for stretchers and to repair bridge loc (vic AT998548). S-2 1/1 comment: confirms HOI AN report, and elements this unit moving to contact VC Battalion reported in this area presently, rated F-2.

D. ITT reports VC have (1) large aid station in AN CU (V), DUY XUYEN (D), and (1) aid station in XUYEN THO (V), QUE SON (D). S-2 1/1 comment: F-3 on AN CU Aid Station; F-2 on XUYEN THO Aid Station, this has been reported location of aid station and training area for some time. Source was captured in CAM THANH (V) HIEU NHON (D) on 16 Dec 1966.

10. Weather and terrain conditions - Issued separately.

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

15. Late Entries:

A. Operation Shasta II, G-1-1, 201015H, AT988598, plt steep force rec heavy s/w fire and (12) rds 60mm mortar from (10-12) VC at AT989599. Returned fire with s/a and 60mm mortars, VC withdrew under fire.

B. Operation Shasta II, Hqs -1-1, 201105H, BT014575; Bn Scouts cap (5) VCS, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

Phla
P.H. RAE
2nd Lt S-2

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #284 211200H to 221200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) C-1-1, 211230H, BT002596, S&D operation made contact with (20) VC armed w/mortars, s/a and a/w. VC split into two groups and withdrew to the east and northeast. Pursued and KBGF (2) VC confirmed and (6) probable. Captured (1) M-14 Rifle and (1) Thompson SMG and assorted equip.

(2) D-1-1, 211530H, BT013585, blocking position observed (3) VC on west side of river BT012586. Opened fire with s/a (1) VC KIA.

(3) D-1-1, 211500H, AT998564, unit moving into blocking position detonated (1) M-26 mine.

(4) C-1-1, 211600H, BT001596, sweep force trapped (8) VC in a bunker, unable to reach position due to heavy MG fire. (1) VC KIA KBGF as he tried to escape. Gordon was set around bunker for the night. Searched area at first light with negative results.

(5) D-1-1, 211700H, BT014593, FT ambush observed (50-75) VC moving thru their position, opened fire killing (4) VC confirmed. The remaining VC withdrew under fire. Captured: (1) auto carbine, (4) ChiCom Grenades and assorted equipment.

(6) A-1-1, 211700H, BT016598, sparrow hawk rec harassing s/a fire from unk number of VC. Returned fire with s/a and maneuvered to flank VC (1) VC KIA.

(7) C-1-1, 211730H, AT993578, blocking position observed (10) VC moving toward their position. Opened fire with s/a, (1) VC KIA. The remaining VC withdrew under fire.

(8) H&S-1-1, 211745H, BT003582, Bn Scouts moving to blocking position observed approx (40) VC moving across rice paddies. Opened fire with s/a and 81mm mortar mission, (10) VC KIA confirmed, (2) KIA probable. VC withdrew under fire to a trenchline. Arty mission was called in on enemy position, unable to search due to darkness.

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(9) C-1-1, 211800H, AT997596, FO spotted (25) VC w/weapons running across rice paddies at AT998587. FO called arty mission on enemy, (6) VC KIA probable and (8) VC WIA probable.

(10) A-1-1, 212315H, BT015598, unit moving to Company "D" position detonated (1) booby trap. It was believed to be an M-26 Grenade booby trap.

(11) A-1-1, 220020H, BT110594, FT ambush observed (1) VC moving toward their position. Opened fire with s/a, searched area w/negative results. Ambush returned to CP.

(12) B-1-1, 220910H, BT130593, plt cmt ptl saw (1) VCS, male, running from ptl, did not heed warning. Ptl pursued and cap (1) VCS, no I.D. card.

(13) H&S-1-1, 220900H, BT020594, Bn Scouts apprehended (1) female, age 20, identified as VN leading VC yesterday. Apprehended (1) male VCS and (6) female VCS in same area. Fwd (8) captives to Bn S-2 for processing.

(14) D-1-1, 220915H, BT997578, sweep force cap (1) VC WIA, age approx 40. Apprehended (2) male VCS and (1) female VCS in same area. Fwd (4) captives to Bn S-2 for processing.

(15) B-1-1, 221045H, BT148582, plt cmt ptl apprehended (4) VCS, no I.D. cards. Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(16) A-1-1, 221050H, BT001579, sweep force found (1) VC hiding in a cave, fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(17) C-1-1, 221055H, AT993586, sweep force rec harassing s/a fire from est (2) VC at AT993585. Returned fire with s/a and pursued, VC withdrew under fire.

(18) B-1-1, 221130H, BT147584, plt cmt ptl rec harassing s/a fire from BT146585. Returned fire and swept area finding (1) female VN with a bullet wound in leg. Apprehended (1) male VCS, age 20. Search of area revealed (1) carbine w/magazine. VCS claims to be rural construction worker. VCS rel after questioning by ITT. Fwd wounded VN female to HOI AN Hospital.

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4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 21 confirmed, 14 probable, 8 WIA probable

B. Captives - 15 VCS, 3 VCC

C. Equipment destroyed or captured:

1 M-14 Rifle
1 Thompson SMG
1 automatic carbine
1 semi-auto carbine

4 ChiCom Grenades
1 carbine magazine
assorted equipment

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. CIT reports - In the last few weeks a VC District MF Co was formed at XUYEN THO (V) DUY XUYEN (D). The company is named DOG LAP, QUANG DA. It is commanded by SON, whose home is in THANH TRUNG (V) DIEN BAN (D). Two plt leaders were indentified as BINH whose home is in XUYEN CHAU (V) DUY XUYEN (D) and KIEU whose home is XUYEN PHUOC (V) DUY XUYEN (D). The majority of the personnel in the company come from GAM HA (V), HIEU NHON (D). The company conducts it training and is stationed at T205530. It is armed with (1) SMG and half of the company is armed with carbines and K-44's, the remainder are armed with grenades. Source also informed that there is a independent guerrilla plt, whose mission is to support this company, who have been training with the company at BT205530. Rated B-3 by CIT, 21 Dec 66.

B. DIEN BAN reports, 212000H - (2) VC MF Co, unk designation, strength, about 200 men, scattering in VINH XUAN (V). Maybe will cooperate with local VC guerrillas to harass USMC units at VINH XUAN (V) and THANH THUY (V). S-2 1/1 comment: F-4 on size of unit. F-2 on mission of infiltrators to this TAOR. Several reports of this size unit, but contact has been exclusively with harassing incidents in this part of 1/1 TAOR. Rated C-2 by DIEN BAN.

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately.

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

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P. H. Ray
P. H. RAY
2nd Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #285 221200H to 231200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) D-1-1, 221330H, BT012568, Ontos detonated (1) pressure type mine (100-150 lbs unk type of explosive). Crater size 9'x 6'. Vehicle completely disabled.

(2) D-1-1, 221330H, BT016587, plt cmt pl observed (4) VC running from ptl. Opened fire with s/a, (2) VC KIA, (1) VC KIA probable. Captured (2) ChiCom Grenades, (2) M-44 Carbines, assorted equip. Equipment and wps fwd to Bn S-2.

(3) B-1-1, 221450H, BT122592 and BT126593, plt cmt pl found (2) punji pits w/ChiCom Grenade mines. Destroyed punji pits.

(4) D-1-1, 231030H, BT032578, Otters on resupply run apprehended (1) VCS female, no I.D. card. Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(5) A-1-1, 231040H, BT092602, plt cmt pl rec harassing s/a fire from approx (3) VC. Returned fire with s/a and 81mm mortar mission. VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 2, 1 KIA probable

B. Captives - 1 VCS

C. Equipment destroyed or captured:

2 ChiCom Grenades, 2 M-44 Carbines, assorted equip, 2 punji pits with
2 ChiCom Grenade mines.

5. None

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8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 23 Dec CIT reports - On the morning of 23 Dec Province officials apprehended the VC Village Guerrilla Leader of VINH XUAN Village at HOI AN Hospital where he had gone for treatment. Interrogation reports will be forwarded as they become available from VN Officials.

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. Other:


A. Ref: INTSUM #283, 3, A, (7): The M-14 reported as captured not captured.

B. Ref: INTSUM #284, 3, A, (7): The weapon captured was reported as a French 9mm SMG, should read K-50 SMG.

C. Additional captured equipment not reported earlier:

| | |
|----------------------|------------------------|
| 8 K-50 magazines | 1000 K-50 rds ammo |
| 2 BAR magazines | 40 BAR rds ammo |
| 6 Thompson magazines | 180 Thompson rds ammo. |

P. H. Ray
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2nd Lt S-2



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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #287 231200H to 241200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) A-1-1, 231042H, BT107618, sqd cmt plt res had been in contact from BT110620. Returned fire and maneuvered to sweep area. Suscep. platoon KBGP (1) VC and found (1) VN female wounded by s/a fire, fwd to Bn Bn for treatment. Found (1) AP mine, expended cartridges and VC propaganda leaflets. Destroyed AP mine in place and fwd leaflets to Bn S-2.

(2) D-1-1, 231445H, BT029580, plt cmt plt observed (3) VC running from plt. Opened fire with s/a, (2) VC KIA, no I.D. cards.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses

A. KIA by ground forces -- 3

C. Equipment destroyed or captured -- 1 AP mine, VC propaganda.

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. HIEU NHON Sub Sector reports that 200 VC at BT187577, BT181579 and BT174586. The mission of this group is to attack PHUOC TRACH Bridge. Rated C-2 by Sector.

B. CIT reports -- During the period 2100-2200 hours 21 Dec 66 sender was listening to a GVN radio station news broadcast that originated in SAIGON, RVN. The news commentator stated that the "National Liberation Front and President HO CHI MINH had accepted a two hour truce during the period 2300, 24 Dec 66 to 0100, 25 Dec 66. Note: Extensive effort was made to ensure that no mistake had been made in the required translation of the times and dates. Rated B-6 by CIT.

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C. DIEN BAN Special Police Branch reports on 20 Dec 66 - At the insecure villages like PHU THO, PHU HUNG, PHU TAN, PHU MY Villages of PHU KY region, DIEN BAN District, VC have been propagandizing to the people that sooner or later the Vietnamese - American forces will launch a big sweep and attack operation at PHU KY region, therefore they forced the local people especially the elderly to urgently evacuate and move their properties away from the PHU KY region to avoid loss, at the same time enable the Liberation (VC) troops to timely prepare the battle field and be ready to counteract and resist the Puppet (VNC) troops arriving there on operation. They also encouraged the local people not to co-operate and be determined to directly struggle and counter the sweep at the aforesaid villages. Rated C-2 by DIEN BAN.

D. DIEN BAN Special Police Branch reports on 21 Dec 66 - VC are now plotting to plan for the Buddhist to hold a Buddhist ceremony on the nights of 14 and 15 Lunar Calendar (25 and 26 December 1966) at the Buddhist temples aiming at Christmas with the purpose of letting the people going to and fro to attend the ceremony. Meanwhile they will take advantage of this occasion to organize struggle to oppose the Catholics, propagandize that the present Government is Catholic so as to arouse division. Rated C-1 by DIEN BAN.

10. Weather and terrain conditions - Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

P. H. Ray
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2nd Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #288, 241200H to 251200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) H&S-1-1, 241400H, BT182588, CAC 2; (2) VC surrendered to U.S. troops and the village police chief of PHUOC TRACH Hamlet. The VC were brought to 1/1 CP for interrogation and possible exploitation. HIEN NHON District was assured of an opportunity to interrogate the VC.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

B. Captives - 2 VC

5. None

8. Enemy movements/location:

A. CIT reports 24 Dec 66

(1) At the present there is (1) VC Bn destroying road from (BT095528) to (BT070516). They are building bunkers along the road also. Rated B-3 by CIT.

(2) There are (2) VC guerrilla plt loc vic AT947580. Their strenght is estimated to be 60 men. They are armed with (2) MG and adequate personal weapons. They wear black and grey uniforms. Mission is to provide support, mainly security, to the VC proselyting cadre training class for DIEN BAN and DAI LOC Districts. This training is conducted at BAI NGHI Temple loc vic AT945572. Rated B-6 by CIT

10. Weather and terrain conditions - Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

P. H. RAY
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2nd Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #239 251200H to 261200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) D-1-1, 251945H, BT037578, sqd in route to ambush site rec harassing s/a fire from (1) VC. Returned fire with s/a and maneuvered. Maneuver element detonated (1) M-26 Grenade booby trap. VC withdrew under fire.

(2) D-1-1, 261030H, BT014590, plt cmbt ptl rec harassing s/w fire from (1) VC at BT013588. Returned fire with s/a, VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses: None

5. None.

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 251930H, HIEU NHON reports (2) VC Co loc via GS1957. Report confirmed by Junk Fleet #14 and Rated B-2.

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. Other:

A. Dec 251345H to 251410H Major General N. NICKERSON JR., CG 1st MarDiv paid a visit to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

P. H. Ray
P. H. RAY
2nd Lt S-2

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Tab P

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUK #290 261200H to 271200H December 11 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) C-1-1, 270815H, BT062588, plt cmt ptl observed VC fleeing area where PF unit was ambushed. Opened fire with s/a and pursued, (8) VC KIA, (1) VCG WIA. Captured (2) Thompson SMG, (2) M-1 Carbines, (1) K-44 Carbine and (1) M-14 Rifle. Turned weapons and VCG over to DIEN BAN ARVN's. Will obtain serial numbers of weapons and forward ASAP.

(2) B-1-1, 270830H, BT125560, blocking force cap (1) VCS with CHIEU HOI Pass. Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(3) B-1-1, 271045H, BT170566, sqd cmt ptl detonated (1) M-14 AP Mine.

(4) A-1-1, BT007574, plt cmt ptl rec harassing s/w fire from est (2) VC at BT007572. Returned fire with s/a, VC withdrew under fire.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 8

B. Captives - 1 VCG, 1 VCS

C. Equipment destroyed or captured

2 Thompson SMG
2 M-1 Carbines
1 K-44 Carbine

1 M-14 Rifle

5. None

6. None

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10. Weather and terrain conditions - Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

P. H. RAY
P. H. RAY
2nd Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #291 271200H to 281200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity
 - A. Ground Activity
4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:
 - A. KIA by ground forces - 1
5. None
10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately
11. None
12. None
13. None
14. None
15. Late Entries:

A. Ref: INTSUM # 290, 3, 4, (1) total enemy losses were: (14) VC KIA, (1) VCC KIA, (2) M-14 Rifles, (2) K-50 SMG, (3) M-1 Carbines, (1) BAR, (1) TSMG, (1) K-44 Carbine and (7) ChiCom Grenades.

B. A-1-1, 271150H, BT157596, ptl cmt ptl apprehended (2) VCS, age (45-47). Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

B.M. Jenkins, Sr. Lt
for P.H. RAY
2nd Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #292 281200H to 291200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

4. Ground Activity

(1) B-1-1, 281545H, BT127602, plt cmbt ptl observed (1) VC running from ptl, opened fire on VC with s/a. Searched area and cap (1) VC MIA, fwd to HOI AN Hospital, ITT will interrogate VCC at HOI AN Hosp (A1).

(2) B-1-1, 290510H, BT122595, PT moving from ambush site detonated (1) Chicom Gravel booby trap.

(3) B-1-1, 290800H, BT123859, sqd cmbt ptl apprehended (1) male VCS w/book of weapons. Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(4) B-1-1, 290815H, BT121602, plt cmbt ptl apprehended (1) male VCS running from ptl. Ptl rec harassing s/a fire from (7) VC at BT129607. Returned fire and pursued VC. VC withdrew under fire. Fwd VCS to Bn S-2 for processing.

(5) C-1-1, 290830H, BT080596, plt cmbt ptl apprehended (2) VCS running from ptl. Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

B. Captives - 1 VCC, 4 VCS

C. Equipment destroyed or captured: Book of weapons

5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

~~_____~~
13. None

14. None

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P. H. RAY
2nd Lt S-2

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #293 291200H to 301200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) B-1-1, 291310H, BT178570, plt cmt ptl rec harassing s/a fire from east (4) VC at BT178569. Returned fire with s/a and arty mission. Search could not be conducted due to water barrier.

(2) AO, 291400H, AT985565, observed (3) VC in brush. AO called in arty mission, (3) VC KIA.

(3) C-1-1, 291405H, BT085586, plt cmt ptl, while crossing a stream, hit what was believed to be an electrically detonated mine and rec heavy s/a fire from (4-6) VC at BT094587. Returned fire with s/a and pursued VC. Searched area apprehending (5) VCS, fwd to Bn S-2, for processing.

(4) D-1-1, 300830H, AT995565, ptl returning from ambush site apprehended (2) VCS. Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(5) B-1-1, 301025H, BT170566, plt cmt ptl detonated (1) AP mine in a punji pit.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 3

B. Captives - 7 VCS

5. None

8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 281600H, 987583, A -1-1, a Marine while on patrol found 1 wallet containing documents. Documents included a sketch map and papers identifying units. Documents fwd to Regt S-2.

10. Weather and terrain conditions - Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #294 301200H to 311200H December 1966
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) B-1-1, 301300H, BT177566, plt cmt pti observed (2) VC at BT177566. Opened fire with s/a and arty mission. Searched area finding blood trails indicating (1) VC KIA (prob), (1) TSMG, (1) ammo can full of medical supplies and (1) compass. Observed (1) VC in boat leaving area of contact. Opened fire with s/a, (1) VC KIA, boat sunk. Fwd captured gear to Bn S-2.

(2) A-1-1, 301500H, AT995550, plt cmt pti rec harassing s/a fire from est (4) VC at AT993558. Returned fire with s/a and pursued, VC withdrew under fire.

(3) B-1-1, 301530H, BT117600, plt cmt pti apprehended (1) male VCS running from pti. Fwd to Bn S-2 for processing.

(4) C-1-1, 301930H, BT081608, a mine was detonated (believed to be command detonate) approx 3 ft to the left of a tank. Crater was 3 ft deep and 4 ft wide, no damage to tank.

(5) D-1-1, 310800H, BT019586, sqd ssc pti rec harassing s/a fire from est (2) VC at BT018589. Returned s/a fire and maneuvered through area finding (1) VC KIA, and documents. Fwd documents to Bn S-2.

4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

A. KIA by ground forces - 2 WIA (probable) - 1

B. Captives - 1 VCS

C. Equipment destroyed or captured:

| | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 TSMG | 1 boat |
| 1 can of medical supplies | 1 compass, U.S. type |
| documents | 1 TSMG magazine |

5. None

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8. Enemy movements/locations:

A. 28 Dec 66 - National Police Report HIEU NHON rated B-2.

VC HOI AN Township Company (Q-15) plans to join along with ME unit (size and designation unk) and local guerrillas for an attack on USMC/GVN Forces located at PHOUK TRACH Bridge. Purpose is to gain a victory for the winter spring campaign for the local company. Rated F-3 by HOI AN. S-2 1/1 comment: HOI AN Township Company also known as Q-12 ME Unit possibly 507th reported previously by HOI AN and CIT, rated F-3.

10. Weather and terrain conditions: Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines
2. INTSUM #295 311200H December 1966 to 011200H January 1967
3. Summary of enemy activity

A. Ground Activity

(1) 1-1-1, 311215H, AT981555, plt cmt & plt observed a house burning and heard secondary explosions.

(2) 3-1-1, 311345H, BT030594, plt cmt plt rec harassing s/a fire from (2) VC at BT025592 and BT030597. Returned fire with s/a and pursued, VC withdrew under fire.

(3) 1-1-1, 311355H, AT995550, plt cmt plt rec harassing s/a fire from under a bridge. Spotted (4) VC fleeing area. Opened fire with s/a, (2) VC KIA. Captured (1) revolver, .38 cal., (11) ChicCom Grenades, s/a ammo and clothing. Fwd captured equipment to Bn S-2.

(4) 3-1-1, 311510H, BT150613, plt cmt plt rec (1) hand grenade and observer (1) VC in brush. Opened fire with s/a, (1) VC KIA. Captured (1) cartridge belt, (2) M-26 Grenades, (1) camouflaged scarf and documents. Fwd captured equipment to Bn S-2.

(5) 1-1-1, 311510H, AT996551, 40 spotted (2) VC at AT994548. VC withdrew into mangroves. 40 reported destruction of (1) boat with equipment in it.

(6) 1-1-1, 010940H, BT006578, plt cmt plt rec harassing s/a fire and spotted (2) VC. Returned s/a fire, (1) VC KIA (probable). VC withdrew under fire.

(7) 1-1-1, 011100H, BT015588, plt cmt plt rec harassing s/a fire from east (3) VC at BT015590. Returned fire with s/a and maneuvered, VC withdrew under fire. Found (1) bunker and (1) spider hole, destroyed.

A. Enemy personnel and equipment losses:

1. KIA by ground forces - 3 KIA (probable) - 1

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B. None

C. Equipment destroyed or captured:

| | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1 house | s/a ammo |
| 1 revolver, .38 cal. | clothing |
| 11 ChiCom Grenades | 1 cartridge belt |
| 2 M-26 Grenades | 1 camouflaged scarf |
| 1 boat | 1 spider hole |
| 1 bunker | 1 M-16A1 Mine |
| | 1 dud 60mm rd |

5. None

10. Weather and terrain conditions - Issued separately

11. None

12. None

13. None

14. None

15. Late Entries:

A. A-1-1, 310900H, AT983582, plt capt pti found (1) dud 60mm mortar rd and (1) M-16A1 Mine on a trail. Both were destroyed in place.

B. C-1-1, 311150H, BT084609, plt capt pti rec harassing s/a fire from BT076609. Returned fire with s/a and pursued, VC withdrew under fire.

Phelan
P. H. MAY
and Lt S-2

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| | |
|--------------|--------------|
| Opened (DTG) | Closed (DTG) |
| 010001H Dec | 012400H Dec. |

| TIME | | SER
NO. | DTG | INCIDENT, MESSAGES, ORDERS | ACTION |
|------|-----|------------|--------|---|--------|
| IN | OUT | | | | |
| 0006 | | 1 | 010006 | TB-T: Bravo 1 C ret. Bravo 1 C 1 buddha. | F |
| 0024 | | 2 | 010024 | TB-T: Bravo LP 1 ret. | F |
| 0100 | | 3 | 010100 | Conn-T: All secure. | F |
| 0136 | | 4 | 010136 | TC-T: Charlie 3 C ret. | F |
| 0200 | | 5 | 010200 | Conn-T: All secure. | F |
| 0210 | | 6 | 010210 | TD-T: Dep ckpt.4. | F |
| 0230 | | 7 | 010230 | TB-T: Bravo 2 A & Bravo 2 A 1 in buddha. | F |
| 0246 | | 8 | 010246 | TB-T: Bravo 1 A ret. | F |
| 0300 | | 9 | 010300 | Conn-T: All secure. | F |
| 0220 | | 10 | 010320 | TB-T: Bravo 1 C 1 in psn. | F |
| -325 | | 11 | 010325 | TB-T: Bravo 1 A 1 & Bravo 1 A ret. | F |
| 0327 | | 12 | 010327 | TD-T: All scorpions ret to units. | F |
| 0400 | | 13 | 010400 | Conn-T: All secure. | F |
| 0500 | | 14 | 010500 | Conn-T: All secure. | F |
| 0558 | | 15 | 010558 | TC-T: Charlie 2 C ret. | F |
| 0600 | | 16 | 010600 | Conn-T: All secure. | F |
| 0601 | | 17 | 010601 | TD-T: Delta 3 in blocking psn. | F |
| 0630 | | 18 | 010630 | TC-T3: Ch C2C Awake for 1 Dec to C2B. | F |
| 0633 | | 19 | 010633 | TD-T: LP 2 coming in notify rear entrance | F |
| 0640 | | 20 | 010640 | TB-T: Bravo 2 A ret. | F |
| 0648 | | 21 | 010648 | TL6-TB16: Send 1 HM to BAS for Tran to C | F |
| 0650 | | 22 | 010650 | DBA2-T: Comm mine sweep. | F |
| 0650 | | 23 | 010650 | TD-T: LP 1 and LP 2 ret. | F |
| 0654 | | 24 | 010654 | TD-T: Boarding Tigers preparing to leave | F |
| 0656 | | 25 | 010656 | TB-T: Bravo 1 C dep. | F |
| 0657 | | 26 | 010657 | TD-T: Delta 6 dep. | F |
| 0630 | | 27 | 010630 | TD-T3: Plans for 2 Dec. | F |
| 0658 | | 28 | 010658 | TB-T: Bravo 2 A 1 ret. | F |
| 0702 | | 29 | 010702 | Conn-T: All secure. | F |
| 0709 | | 30 | 010709 | CAC2-T: CAC 2 A dep. | F |
| 0723 | | 31 | 010733 | C6-3A: Conversation. | F |
| 0724 | | 32 | 010724 | DBA2-T: Mine sweep complete. | F |
| 0726 | | 33 | 01 736 | TB-T: Bravo 1 C ckpt.1. | F |
| 0740 | | 34 | 010740 | TD6-T: 1 Rd sniper, 1 WIA. | F |
| 0730 | | 35 | 010730 | CAC2-T: CAC 2 A ckpt.2. | F |
| 0750 | | 36 | 010750 | CAC3-TC: CAC 3 and Charlie 2 B dep. | F |
| 0800 | | 37 | 010800 | Conn-T: All secure. | F |
| 0757 | | 38 | 010757 | BN-T: Courier cancelled. | F |
| 0801 | | 39 | 010801 | C6-T: Resupply run. | F |
| 0830 | | 40 | 010830 | CAC1,2,TC: Status report. | F |
| 0831 | | 41 | 010831 | TD-T: Psn rpt. | F |
| 0841 | | 42 | 010841 | TD-T: Corpman for WIA. | F |
| 0843 | | 43 | 010843 | TA-T: Contact A LL | F |
| 0900 | | 44 | 010900 | TD Spot Rpt # 1. | F |
| 0846 | | 45 | 010846 | T2-Conn: Password. | F |
| 0852 | | 46 | 010852 | CA 1-T: CAC 1 A ckpt.1. | F |
| 0859 | | 47 | 010859 | CAC2-T: CAC 2 A ckpt.3. | F |