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HEADQUARTERS

S & C FILES
3D MARINES

"SECRET"

2nd Battalion (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein)
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
o/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

ORIGINAL

3:RJB:mgh

5750

5 March 1966

Ser No 00165-66

18166

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Attn: G-3)
Via: Commanding Officer, 3rd Marines
Subj: Command Chronology; submission of
Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1
(b) RegtO 3120.1A
(c) Maps: VIETNAM: 1:50,000 AFS Series L701 Sheets 6560
III and 6559 IV

Encl: (1) Command Chronology for the period 1 - 28 February
1966.
(2) Operation Order 204-66.
(3) After Action Report; Operation 204-66.
(4) After Action Report; Operation New York (Pho Lai
Village and PHU THU Peninsula).

Added from S-C = 290 476/60000

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosures (1)
through (4) are submitted.

(5) *Letter from 3rd Marine Division message dtd 18 28 Nov 1966 on Pursuit of Enemy
Forces w/ Navy Speed letter of July 1966 of USSF
Mach's Activities in
Opn New York*
R. T. HAMILTON, JR.

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HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein)
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 February through 28 February 1966

Part I

Organization Data Sheet

Part II

Significant Events

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PART I

1. REPORTING UNIT. 2nd Battalion (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein)
2. COMMAND POST. HUE-PHU BAI, RVN (885136)
3. PERIOD COVERED. 1 February - 28 February 1966
4. DATE OF SUBMISSION. 5 March 1966
5. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH.

	USMC	USN
OFFICERS	38	3
ENLISTED	990	56

6. COMMANDING OFFICER. Lieutenant Colonel R.T. MANIFIN, JR.
7. EXECUTIVE OFFICER. Major E.Z. GRABOWSKI
8. PRINCIPAL STAFF.

S-1 1st Lt. C.C. KRUTAK

S-2 Capt R.E. LAVAN

S-3 Capt A.J. SIBLEY

S-4 Capt G.L. HALMOND

Comm Capt E.D. READ

9. SUBORDINATE UNITS.

H&S Co Capt J.J. CARRY

Company E Capt R. K. LARSEN

Company F Capt D.E. MARKS

Company G 1st Lt. M.T. HEFREN

Company H Capt J.h. NOLAN

2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd Recon Bn 1st Lt. R.D. DONOHO

2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd TK Bn 1st Lt. H. STEIGLEMAN

2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd AT Bn 1st Lt. D.J. NOONAN

2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn 1st Lt. E.R. GORDIE

SFCP, Hq Btry, 4/12 Lt (JG) J. A. VOLK

4th Bn, 12th Marines

LtCol E.H. RUDZIS

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10. MISSION. 2nd BN (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein) defends PHU BAI Airfield and 8th RRU; controls assigned TAOR; conducts combat/reconnaissance patrols throughout assigned TAOR; conducts unilateral search and destroy operations in assigned TAOR and combined operations with RVNAF within and beyond boundaries of assigned TAOR. Prepares defense and counterattack plans to restore integrity of defensive perimeter to include PHU BAI Airfield and 8th RRU facilities.

11. BACKGROUND. To accomplish the assigned mission the battalion TAOR has been divided into company sectors with each rifle company conducting aggressive patrolling, sweeps, and numerous ambushes in their assigned sector. The companies defend their portion of the MLR by employing observation posts, listening posts, road blocks, checkpoints and through occupation of prepared positions in critical areas.

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PART II

PERSONNEL

a. Number of replacements received.

- (1) Marine Officers - 0
- (2) Marine Enlisted - 25
- (3) Navy Officers - 0
- (4) Navy Enlisted - 7

b. Personnel received via Division/Regt Transfers

- (1) Marine Officers - 6
- (2) Marine Enlisted - 181

c. Number of personnel rotated.

- (1) Officers - 0
- (2) Enlisted - 7

d. Number of personnel lost through attrition other than rotation.

- (1) WIA - 49
- (2) KIA - 15
- (3) DOW - 2
- (4) Humanitarian/Emergency transfer - 0
- (5) Non-battle injuries - 4 Non-battle deaths - 1
- (6) Intra-Division/Regiment - 192

e. R&R Trips - 141

f. Special Services activity.

(1) Entertainment for 2nd Battalion (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein), consisted of 84 movies and 11 performances by local entertainment group.

(2) The first of a series of volleyball games was played with Dong Da Training Center.

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ADMINISTRATION

a. Personnel Accounting. No difficulties have been encountered.

b. Awards

(1) The following awards were processed and recommended to higher headquarters for action:

(a) Bronze Star Medal - 1

(b) Navy Commendation Medal w/Combat "V" - 1

(2) The following awards were received:

(a) Navy Commendation Medal w/Combat "V" - 1

(b) Purple Heart Medal - 3

c. Promotions.

(1) 1 Master Sergeant to Master Gunnery Sergeant

(2) 2 Staff Sergeants to Gunnery Sergeant

(3) 1 Sergeant to Staff Sergeant

(4) 4 Privates to Private First Class

d. Postal. Parcel post continues to arrive regularly. Letter mail service is fair arriving 4 to 5 times a week.

e. Pay. There have been no problems encountered during the reported period.

f. Post Exchange. Basic items (i.e. toilet articles) are adequate in number. Increased amounts of luxury items have arrived due to improvement of air transportation between DA NANG and PHU BAI. During the reported period PX facilities were increased when the PX was moved to a larger building offering more shelf space.

g. Legal and Discipline.

(1) Special Courts Martial - 2

(2) Summary Courts Martial - 2

(3) Battalion Commander's Office Hours - 8

Enclosure (1)
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INTELLIGENCE

a. The enemy situation on 1 February 1966 was as follows:

There is one Local Force Unit, the C 117 Armed Unit, estimated strength 80 men, operating in the TAOR. Enemy activity within the TAOR consisted of perimeter harassment during the hours of darkness, laying of mines, limited attacks on outlying Marine units, assassination, and intelligence gathering with infiltration of VC through the TAOR in order to gather food, spread propaganda and political information and to reach other areas of operation.

Enemy units that operate near our TAOR

(1) 810th Main Force Battalion, estimated strength 300-500 men. Equipped with 2-81mm mortars, 2-57mm RR, 3 machine guns; 2-40 (RPG) Anti-tank weapon. Located vicinity of YC 925955.

(2) K-41/C-106 Company, estimated strength 60 men, located vicinity YD 995975.

(3) C-115 Local Force Company, estimated strength 65 men, located vicinity YD 640482.

(4) C-116 Local Force Company, estimated strength 65 men, located vicinity YD 860045.

(5) C-119 Local Force Company, estimated strength 80 men, located vicinity YD 749017.

b. The enemy initiated the following incidents during the period.

(1) 011215H.- Foxtrot patrol fired at by estimated 5 VC vicinity YD 837196 with small arms and possible automatic weapons. Swept LOI NONG hamlet (YD 937197). Small arms sniper rounds received while approaching hamlet. 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA (estimate), and 1 VCS.

(2) C12040H. CAC 3 patrol received one grenade from vicinity of YD 909104. Patrol swept area with negative results.

(3) 021000H. Approximately 100 Vietnamese from AN LOI (AP. LOI NONG) (YD 839195) carrying a dead body were moving south on highway 1 toward Huong Thuy District Headquarters. The reason for the demonstration was the killing of an innocent Vietnamese by the Marines during a fire fight with the VC. The hamlet was visited by a VC political cadre (possible LE VAN LE) and one VC squad during the night and incited the villagers to demonstrate. The District police dispersed the demonstrators.

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(4) 042037H. H&S ambush (YD 872132) received small arms fire from unknown number of VC. Patrol pursued VC. 1 VC WIA (estimate). Further contact not made.

(5) 042210H. 4 VC walked into CAC 5 ambush (YD 835176) when VC broke contact, ambushed pursued. Blood trail was followed until lost. 2 VC WIA, 1 MAT 49, 2 magazines, 2 VC grenades, and 1 cartridge belt.

(6) 072020H. H&S defensive positions received small arms harassing fire. No further contact.

(7) 130826H. Vietnamese train struck a mine at YD 994043. Engine damaged, two cars derailed.

(8) 151250H. Golf 1 patrol fired on by unknown number of VC (YD 855180). 1 VC KIA (body), 1 VC KIA (estimate), 1 VCC, 2-K53, 1-M1 carbine.

(9) 170305H. One VC attempted infiltration of H&S wire (YD 880127). Lines fired at VC. 1 VC WIA (estimate). Patrol searched area with negative results.

(10) 171230H. EOD found one VC cast iron cylindrical fragmentation mine with trip wire (YD 889087).

(11) 174355H. Golf 1 found one VC cast iron cylindrical fragmentation mine with trip wire (YD 793123).

(12) 192200H... 200015H. CAC 2 attacked by unknown number of VC (YD 903152). Received small arms sniper fire and several fragmentation grenades. 1 VC WIA (estimate).

(13) 192200H. WONG DIEN resident assassinated (YD 965046).

(14) 200100H. Hamlet chief assassinated (YD 945092).

(15) 202155H. OP 180 (YD 854130) received small arms harassing fire from 3 VC.

(16) 212105H. OP received 6 rounds small arms fire from 6 VC (YD 855129). OP returned fire 1 VC WIA (estimate).

(17) LOC BON village chief HO NGOC HOA stated that he has received several messages stating in essence Marines have from 25 February to sometime in March to leave the area or be wiped out along with the village chief, hamlet chiefs, and police officials.

(18) 231420. 2 C-130 hit by ground fire (YD 940145). Both aircraft hit while making approach (250-300 feet altitude). Received one round each of ground fire. First craft hit port wing and second craft hit starboard wing. Crew chief spotted 35-40 people in area where hit.

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(19) 242235H. CAC 5 had two VC walk into ambush site. VC broke contact. VC dropped 1 VC cast iron fragmentation grenade.

(20). 242330H. Unknown number of VC entered Recon patrol base and threw 4-5 TNT concussion grenades. VC withdrew under fire. 1 VC KIA (body), 1 VC WIA (estimate). VC dropped 1 K50, 3 magazines, 6 CHICOM grenades, and miscellaneous equipment.

(21) 250200H. CAC 3 (YD 940120) under attack by unknown number of VC throwing TNT satchel charges. The VC withdrew under cover of sniper fire.

(22) 250316H. Golf 2 patrol shot at by 2-3 VC. VC broke contact and fled east from YD 901132.

(23) 250955H. ARVN units report heavy contact vicinity grid square 8521.

(24) 251015H. Still heavy contact with estimated 1 VC Company (YD 845210).

(25) 251330H. Air Viet Nam aircraft 1 WIA from 1 round ground fire (YD 940145). CH-47 received 1 round small arms fire, CH-47 saw 1 VC in paddy and fired at him, 1 VC KIA (estimate).

(26) 251945H. 1) received light to moderate small arms fire (7-8 rounds) at YD 845200. Light to moderate small arms fire (7-8 rounds) at YD 870198, YD 867300. Received 35-40 rounds of automatic weapons fire from YD 843201.

(27) 260055H. Echo 1 (blocking position YD 857203) attacked by 10-12 VC with small arms and automatic weapons. 6 VC KIA (body), equipment: 1 MAF 49, 1 BAR, 2 K51, and 1 Enfield Rifle Model 1917, and 7 packs.

(28) 262215H. Civilian Radio Station vicinity GC (YD 835178) was hit by rounds of 60mm mortars.

(29) 271037H. 4/12 FO School 3/4 ton truck hit a anti-tank mine at YD 890092. Another truck struck another anti-tank mine in the same area.

(30) 271315H. Engineers found anti-tank mine with 4 pounds of TNT under it at YD 888047.

(31) 272130H. Echo 1 patrol tripped booty trap and were ambushed with automatic weapons (YD 885134) VC broke contact.

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(32) 282230H.- OP 180 (YD 855134) was probed by 4 VC. VC opened fire with 4-5 small arms rounds and withdrew under fire.

c. Summary of Enemy Casualties, Captured and Equipment captured.

- (1) VC KIA (confirmed) LL - (estimated) 0
- (2) VC WIA (confirmed) 0 - (estimated) 10
- (3) VCC - 0
- (4) VCS - 5
- (5) Equipment - 2 MAT 49, 1 Enfield Winchester Model 1917 Rifle, 1 BAR, 3 K50, 2 M-1 Carbines, 22 VC grenades, 2 VC cast iron cylindrical fragmentation mines, 1 VC locally made anti-tank mine, 9 ponchos, 3 magazine pouches, 4 sandels, 2 covers, 1 pair of wire cutters, 10 magazines, 128 rounds of assorted small arms ammunition, 1 set of cleaning gear, 1 first aid packet.

d. Summary of Enemy casualties, captured and captured equipment for operations outside the TAOR see After Action Reports.

e. Significant trends during period:

- (1) The VC have increased use of mines within the HUE-PHU BAI area.
- (2) The VC have increased employment of trail markers, direction indicators, and other signs around the defensive perimeter.
- (3) The VC's potential for massing units for an attack on the HUE-PHU BAI defensive complex has increased to a significant degree.

f. Enemy Situation at End of Period.

(1) The estimated 231 casualties (KIA, WIA, VCC) inflicted on the 810th Battalion out of an estimated strength of 300-500 men, would seemingly render this Battalion inoperable. They still however represent a threat to the security of the HUE-PHU BAI defensive complex.

(2) Situation of Local Force Units at the end of the period remain essentially the same as (a).

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TRAINING

a. Objectives.

- (1) To conduct familiarization and orientation training on the Claymore mine, recently introduced into service for perimeter defense in Phu Bai.
- (2) To conduct FAM firing of M-14 rifles.
- (3) To conduct Forward Observer Training for infantry personnel.
- (4) To conduct communication school on radio voice procedure and radio security.
- (5) During this reporting period work continued on improving defensive position; scouting and patrolling was conducted extensively, and one Battalion (-) size operation was conducted.

b. Major Training Highlights

(1) Several units conducted FAM firing of M-14 during reporting period and all units conducted live firing of all organic weapons.

(2) Communications school was conducted by the Battalion Communications Section. The training consisted of radio voice procedure and security and was conducted in three increments for radio operators, staff NCO's and officers.

(3) There were three 4 day artillery F.O. schools conducted by 4/12 for rifle squad leaders. A total of 56 marines attended the school and all were given a thorough practical application on both day and night firing and artillery adjusting.

(4) The 2nd platoon of 3rd Engineer Battalion conducted a special school on the employment of the Claymore mine while stressing safety and security. Approximately 150 marines attended.

Special operations

a. Amphibious operations. None.

b. Combined Operations.

(1) Operation 204-66. See enclosures (2) and (3).

(2) Operation New York (Pho Lai Village). See enclosure (4) (After Action Report).

(3) Operation New York (Phu Thu peninsula). See enclosure (4). (After Action Report).

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c. Psychological Operations. See Civil Affairs section of this report.

d. River Operations. None.

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and other Special Types of Warfare.

a. During the reporting period, there was no instances of use by this Battalion of NBC Warfare or equipment peculiar to NBC Warfare.

b. Training Accomplished. None.

c. Status of NBC Equipment on Hand. All items of NBC equipment authorized by TE is held by this command is operational.
Command and Control.

a. Task Organization

2nd Bn, 1st Marines (Rein)

H&S Co (Rein)

H&S Co

1st Plat, Co A, 3rd Recon Bn

2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

Det, Hq Co, 3rd Mar

Co "E"

Co E

Det, Med plat, H&S Co

Co "F"

Co F

Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

Co "G"

Co G

Det, Med plat, H&S Co

Co "H"

Co H

Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

81mm Mortar platoon

106mm RR platoon

2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd TK Bn

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2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd AT Bn

4th Bn (-)(Rein), 12th Mar

Hq Btry, 4/12
Btry M, 4/12
Btry B, 1/11
107mm Mortar Btry, 1/11
CMR TM, Bldgtrs, 11th Mar
SFCP, 11th Mar
AO, 12th Mar

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b. Command posts

- | | |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| (1) 2nd Bn, 1st Mar | (885136) |
| (2) H&S Company | (885136) |
| (3) Company "E" | (885136) |
| (4) Company "F" | (885136) |
| (5) Company "G" | (896146) |
| (6) Company "H" | (896146) |
| (7) Combined Action Company | (885136) |

c. Attachments and Detachments. Company "K", 3/3 and Company "F", 2/9 were attached to 2/1 from 27 February until end of this reporting period.

d. Control. Control of the Battalion was exercised from the Battalion Command Post throughout the entire reporting period. Wire and radio communications continue to be used equally to exercise control over the subordinate units.

e. Problem Areas. No significant problem area encountered.

Communication-Electronics.

- a. Wire. Normal operations.
- b. Radio. Normal operations.
- c. Radio Relay. Normal operations.
- d. Message Center/Teletype. Normal operations.
- e. Problems Encountered. None noted.

Close Combat

- a. Operations conducted

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(1) patrols

(a) Squad size. There were 633 squad size patrols conducted.

(b) Platoon size. There were 12 platoon size patrols conducted.

(c) Company size. None.

(2) operations.

(a) Operation 204-66.

(b) Operation NEW YORK (Pho Lai Village).

(c) Operation NEW YORK (Phu Thu peninsula).

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b. Significant Events.

(1) Sequential listing of all contacts, general description of scheme of maneuver and results attained.

(a) 1 February - At 1215H a patrol from Company F made contact with unknown number of VC at YD 850184. VC had automatic weapons and 1 machine gun. The patrol engaged with fire and conducted a sweep of the area. Contact results: 1 VUS captured and 1 Marine WIA (Hand wound). At 2040H CAG-3 patrol received one grenade at YD 909104. CAG-3 formed a skirmish line and assaulted with negative results. Contact results: 1 Marine WIA wounded by grenade fragments. There were 22 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 11 squad size and 1 platoon size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(b) 2 February - There were 24 squad size patrols conducted with 14 squad size ambushes and 19 listening posts employed.

(c) 3 February - At 0440H H&S Company was probed by 3 VC in their portion of the perimeter and received 2 incoming small arms rounds. H&S returned fire with negative results. At 2130H 1 VC was sighted at coordinates YD 815177. Company F pursued and fired 2 M-79 rounds with negative results. Operation 204-66 commenced at 2230H. See enclosures (2) and (3). There were 22 squad size patrols conducted with 13 squad size ambushes and 19 listening posts employed.

(d) 4 February - At 2035H H&S night time position at YD 872132 spotted 2-3 VC moving toward 877127 and VC fired into their position. Pursued VC with negative results. At 2210H CAG-5 ambushed 4 VC. Contact results: 1 automatic weapon captured, 1 VC WIA (unconfirmed). There were 24 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 3 squad size and 1 platoon size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(e) 5 February - Rough Rider arrival 2nd Battalion (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein) C.P. at 1230H and departed at 1340H. At 1720H patrol from OP 225 made contact with 5 VC at coordinates YD 788108. Patrol engaged VC with fire. Contact results: 2 VC KIA (unconfirmed). There were 25 squad size patrols conducted with 13 squad size ambushes and 19 listening posts employed.

(f) 6 February - There were 25 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 10 squad size and 1 platoon size ambushes and 19 listening posts employed.

(g) 7 February - At 2015H H&S received 2 rounds small arms. Observed flashes and returned fire. Negative results. There were 21 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 13 squad size and 1 platoon size ambushes and 19 listening posts employed.

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(h) 8 February - There were 26 squad size patrols conducted with 13 squad size ambushes and 19 listening posts employed.

(i) 9 February - At 1500H Recon sighted 1 VC at coordinates YD 791109. Sniper fired at VC and artillery mission called. Area was searched with negative results. There were 24 squad and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 12 squad and 1 platoon size ambushes and 19 listening posts employed.

(j) 10 February - At 1000H Recon reported a VC patrol of 12 persons sighted at coordinates YD 790111. Sparrow Hawk Force was committed at 1049H to sweep area with Recon establishing a blocking position. Sparrow Hawk landed at coordinates YD 793117 at 1105H and swept south. Sparrow Hawk had negative contact. Recon called a artillery mission on 8 VC at coordinates YD 776115. Results unknown. Sparrow Hawk returned at 1430H. At 1800H Recon found 2 M-605 combination fuzes, 1 M-1 Carbine with loaded magazine, 1 poncho and 1 rainhat at coordinates YD 804106. There were 22 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 8 squad size and 1 platoon size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(k) 11 February - At 2315H CAC-2 sighted 3 VC within 50 meters of their position. VC were engaged with fire and area searched with negative results. There were 24 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 12 squad size and 1 platoon size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(l) 12 February - At 0145H CAC-2 fired at 2 VC approaching their CP. Area searched with negative results. At 1330H H&S lines received 2 rounds sniper fire from coordinates YD 877127. H&S returned fire and spotted 1 VC running away. Contact results; 1 VC MIA (unconfirmed). Area searched with negative results. There were 21 squad size patrol conducted with 9 squad size ambushes and 19 listening posts employed.

(m) 13 February - At 1530H patrol captured 3 VCS at coordinates YD 900096 who were attempting to run away from patrol. VCS were turned over to CIT. There were 23 squad size patrols conducted with 11 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(n) 14 February - There were 24 squad size patrols conducted with 11 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(o) 15 February - At 1250H 1st Platoon, Company G received fire from coordinates YD 855180 from approximately 5 VC. Fire was returned and 2 VC were observed falling and being dragged away when VC broke contact. It was later reported to CAC-7 that PF's picked up two bodies from the G-1 contact. At 1820H CAC-1 made contact with 4 VC at coordinates YD 864188 resulting in 1 VC KIA. 1 VCC and 1 VCS. 1 VC was captured by PF's while fleeing from the Marines in CAC-1. There were 24 squad size patrols conducted with 14 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

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(p) 16 February - There were 25 squad size patrols conducted with 11 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(q) 17 February - At 0029H H&S lines spotted 4 persons laying just outside of the perimeter wire, H&S fired small arms and threw 2 grenades. Area was illuminated and searched with negative results. At 0315H a patrol from H&S spotted 1 VC at coordinates YD 880127 and engaged with fire. VC was observed falling. A search of the area was conducted with negative results. Contact results: 1 VC WIA (unconfirmed). There were 26 squad size patrols conducted with 15 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(r) 18 February - At 2120 H CAC-3 spotted 3 VC at coordinates YD 927127 moving southwest. VC taken under fire and area searched with negative results. At 2030H CAC-5 made contact with estimated 10-20 VC at coordinates YD 836196. VC taken under fire resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 bolt action weapons, 2 grenades, 2 cartridge belts captured. CAC-5 estimated 3 VC KIA. There were 23 squad and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 11 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(s) 19 February - At 2000H CAC-3 encountered 5 VC at coordinate YD 906109. VC taken under fire. Contact results: 1 Marine WIA, wounded in left arm from VC grenade. At 2200H CAC-2 received 1 grenade in their CP from unknown direction. CAC-2 made sweep of area with negative results. There were no casualties. At 2200H patrol from H&S received fire from estimated 2 VC at coordinates YD 880126. VC taken under fire and patrol made sweep of the area with negative results. There were 25 squad and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 11 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(t) 20 February - At 0045H CAC-2 received 6 rounds carbine fire in their CP. CAC-2 returned fire and swept area with negative results. At 0100H estimates 20 VC entered LOC SON Village while CAC unit was on patrol and assassinated a village official. Upon return to village CAC-9 searched village with negative results. At 1640H Recon patrol took 2 VC under fire at coordinates YD 787115. One of the VC was observed bleeding as they ran away. Contact results: 1 VC WIA (unconfirmed). OP-180 received 5 incoming small arms fire from 3 VC at coordinates 854130. Returned fire with negative results. There were 26 squad and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 11 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

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(u) 21 February - At 2105H 2 VC set off two trip flares in front of OP 180 at coordinates YD 885129. VC taken under fire resulting in 1 VC WIA (unconfirmed). There were 25 squad size patrols conducted with 9 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(v) 22 February - There were 23 squad size patrols conducted with 9 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(w) 23 February - 2 USAF C-130 Aircraft were fired upon from coordinates YD 940145. Both were hit. 1st plane in right wing fuel tank and 2nd plane hit in left wing elevator. Both planes landed safely. There were 19 squad and 1 Platoon size patrols conducted with 8 squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(x) 24 February - At 1430H M Battery and 3rd Platoon Hotel Company displaced to PK-17 to be utilized in support of Lam Son 234 and 235. M Battery and the 3rd Platoon returned to 2/1 C.P. 261600. At 0030H Company F reported newspapers were placed on their tactical wire at coordinates YD 883127. No incident occurred. At 2025H 2 VC entered CAC-5 ambush site with automatic weapons. CAC-5 returned fire and sweep area capturing 1 grenade and several rounds of ammo. At 2055H Recon made contact with 2 VC at coordinates YD 903089. VC taken under fire and artillery mission adjusted on VC. Contact results: 1 VC KIA, 1 K-50 rifle, 3 magazines, 84 rounds of ammo, 1 cartridge belt, 1 first aid packet, 6 blocks of TNT, 1 grenade, and 1 pair wire cutters captured. There were 23 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 10 squad and 1 platoon size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(y) 25 February - At 0025H CAC-2 sighted 3 VC at their CP. VC taken under fire and area searched with negative results. At 0145H CAC-3 made contact at their CP after returning from patrol. Unknown number of VC fired small arms and machine guns at CAC and threw 20-25 TNT explosive charges into their position. CAC-3 returned fire and Bn TOT was fired in support. There were 5 marines and 2 PF's wounded, none seriously. Enemy casualties unknown. At 0220H patrol from Company G made contact with 3 VC at coordinates YD 901132. VC opened fire and patrol returned fire and pursued VC. VC broke contact. Area was searched with negative results. On 25 February during operation TT 177B one platoon from 2/1 was requested by 3-3A 2/1 to act as security and blocking force with THUA TRINH Sector Advisor and his counterpart who were observing the operation from a nearby vantage point. At 251830H 1st Platoon E Company moved into position at YD 857203. At 260100H approximately 10 VC walked up to the Marine location unaware of its presence. The marines opened fire with machine gun, small arms and M-79. The VC were able to get off one magazine of BAR fire, killing one marine, but withdrew quickly leaving three

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bodies and weapons in full view of the Marine position. Upon inspection of the battle area next morning 6 VC bodies with weapons, packs, and full web gear were found. An additional pack was found further out indicating the possibility of additional wounded VC carried away.

(z) 26 February - Operation NEW YORK (PHO LAI Village) commenced and secured on 27 February. See enclosure (4) (After Action Report). At 2155H OP 180 was probed by approximately 5 VC. VC were fired upon and area searched with negative results. There were no friendly casualties resulting from this incident. There were 17 Squad size patrols conducted with 5 Squad size ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(aa) 27 February - Operation New York (PHU THU Peninsula) commenced. See Enclosure (4) (After Action Report). At 1045H a 3/4 carrying students from 4/12 FO school detonated an AT mine at coordinates YD 890092 resulting in 8 WIA's. A retriever was dispatched to bring in the damaged 3/4 Ton Trn and a retriever also detonated a mine at coordinates YD 888097. There were no injuries from the second mine. At 2052H a patrol from E Company line made contact with unknown number of VC at coordinates YD 885116. Artillery fire mission adjusted and VC were pursued. Contact results: 1 friendly WIA. Enemy casualties unknown. There were 18 Squad size patrols conducted with 6 Squad size ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(bb) 28 February - Company E was detached to 1/1 for operation TROUI. At 2000H patrol from Company E made contact with unknown number of VC in ambush at coordinates YD 877114. VC were fired upon by patrol. Artillery mission adjusted on target. Contact results: 1 friendly WIA. Enemy casualties unknown. At 2152H OP 180 was probed by estimated 4 VC at coordinates YD 853131. VC were fired upon and were observed fleeing south. No casualties.

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FIRE SUPPORT AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

a. Significant Events:

1 February - 3 unobserved missions were fired on suspected storage area at YD 799089, a VC agricultural area at YD 789093, and supply area at YD 720060. B Battery fired a counter mortar drill that night.

3 February - The Howtar Battery displaced to YD 895080, to support the Regimental NCO, FO School, and fired 12 observed missions. At 1730H, B Battery displaced to YD 859868 to remain overnight.

4 February - At 0930H, M Battery moved to YD 874108, and fired 4 observed mission for the FO school. The 105mm Howitzers fired two missions on 2 suspected VC companies at YD 811141. No surveillance was obtained. M Battery also fired one mission on this target after their return.

5 February - Batteries M and W displaced early, to YD 883092 and 895080 respectively. W fired 7 missions for the FO trainees, while M fired 5 unobserved missions on suspected targets. That evening, M fired 3 illumination missions for the ARVN on a suspected VC platoon at YD 872242, 872236 and 878245. No VC were seen.

6 February - Again the 155 howitzers and the Howtars displaced, this time to YD 882315 and 871139 respectively. While W Battery practiced Reconnaissance, selection and occupation of position, M fired 13 unobserved missions. Of these 5 were on suspected targets and 8 were blocking fires for a 2/1 patrol. After returning to their primary position, B Battery fired a destruction mission for the AO on a camouflaged foxhole. End of mission was given without destroying the hole, to avoid wasting an excessive number of rounds.

7 February - The Batteries remained in their primary position, and performed maintenance. 5 unobserved missions on suspected targets were fired by B Battery.

8 February - The Battalion displaced to the southern portion of the TAOR, to fire into an area known to be occupied by the VC, vicinity grid squares YD 8896 and 8996. Many bridges, cart tracks, and well worn trails were reported in this area by the AO. From those positions the Battalion fired 32 observed missions for the AO, obtaining excellent effect on bridges, buildings, assembly areas, etc. An FO party fired 1 observed mission on 10 VC at YD 79820264. Although the entire battalion fired this mission, no surveillance was obtained. Back in the primary position, a 105mm mission was fired in support of CAC-3 on a suspected VC squad at YD 90490995. No

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surveillance was obtained. During the night, B battery fired on lights at YD 867088 extinguishing them. M Battery fired an illumination mission on a suspected VC assembly area at YD 874255 in support of ARVN, firing HE underneath. Good effect, no surveillance.

9 February - Batteries B and W displaced to YD 883092 and 895080 respectively, and fired 27 observed missions on suspected avenues of approach, assembly areas, harboring sites, and OP's in the southern portion of the TAOR. M Battery fired an observed mission on 3 VC at YD 791101, but no bodies were sighted. Later, the 155's fired an observed illumination mission for CAC at suspected VC. The illumination disclosed no VC.

10 February - The 105 howitzers and 107mm Howtars displaced to YD 895080 and 883092 respectively. From these positions, they fired 30 observed missions on suspected targets in the southern portion of the TAOR. M Battery fired an observed mission at 5 VC at YD 786108 and 3 VC at YD 776115 and YD 784114. The rounds were on target, but no bodies were in evidence.

11 February - The Batteries remained in their primary position, firing 5 observed missions on suspected targets, including one illuminating mission for the ARVN at YD 845215.

12 February - M Battery displaced to YD 869119 and fired 15 missions on suspected targets in the south western portion of the TAOR. Back in the primary position the 155's fired one illumination mission in support of the ARVN at YD 872237. No VC movement was revealed.

13 February - The batteries remained in primary position, firing one illumination mission in support of the ARVN at YD 870258. No surveillance was obtained.

14 February - B Battery fired two observed illumination missions on suspected VC movement at YD 808159 and 858158. No VC were revealed. M Battery destroyed a boat at YD 798066, and a bridge at YD 821024. Both missions were observed by the AO.

15 February - M Battery displaced to YD 869119 and fired 3 observed missions on suspected targets in the south western portion of the TAOR.

16 February - At 0730 B Battery displaced to YD 869119 and fired 19 observed missions in support of the 12th Marines NCO, FO School. The AO destroyed a boat using M Battery at YD 812057. At 0502H, the 50,000th round for the battalion in Viet Nam was fired. This round was also 15,000th for M Battery. This statistical feat was accomplished without disrupting tactical operations.

17 February - Batteries W and M displaced to YD 899868 and 869119 respectively. From these positions they fired 16 missions in support of the 12th Marines NCO, FO School. From their primary position, M Battery destroyed 2 boats at YD 798066.

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18 February - The FO's were supported by Batteries B and M, which displaced to YD 874108 and 882115 respectively. The neophytes fired 27 missions on suspected troops in the open, suspected assembly areas, and suspected snipers. The AO adjusted M Battery on a sniper hole at YD 790885 and destroyed it.

19 February - Batteries W and M displaced to YD 883092 and 874108 respectively. The student FO's adjusted them on 23 suspected targets.

20 February - The batteries remained in their primary position, as the Howtars fired 2 observed illumination missions at YD 914148 and 984147. Both targets were suspected movement, but none was discovered. The 105 Howitzers fired 3 observed illumination missions on 5 VC at YD 908111, 906102 and 908109.

21 February - In the morning, B and M Batteries displaced forward to support the 12th Marines FO School. The 105's fired 14 missions, and the 155's fired 8 in the south western position of the TAOR. In the afternoon, M Battery fired 2 prep fires for recon platoon at YD 790117 and 785117.

22 February - Ten 105mm fire missions were adjusted by ARVN forces in the vicinity of grid squares YD 9614, 8824 and 9220. Surveillance revealed blood and hand grenades in the area. Nine 105mm prep fires were shot in grid squares YD 9517, 9518, 9616, 9617, 9516, 9515, and 9615 for the ARVN. 10 VC KIA. B Battery also fired 9 observed missions in support of the student FO's.

23 February - Fifteen missions were fired by B Battery in support of the ARVN. The targets were VC in the open at YD 958140, 973148, 958140, 973148, 903200, 908198, 898200, 925192, 930190, 932187, 940193, 937105, 940180 and 937183. The only surveillance received was blood and drag marks in the sand at YD 9020. M Battery fired 1 mission on VC activity in support of the ARVN at YD 859240 obtaining no surveillance. W Battery displaced forward and along with B Battery supported the FO School.

24 February - B Battery fired 4 missions in support of the ARVN at YD 790117, 794119, 795126 and 798125. The targets were VC movement, but no surveillance was obtained. At 0720H B Battery displaced to YD 874108 and returned at 0943H.

25 February - 1002 rounds were expended on this day in 13 (10 - 105mm, 3 - 105mm) missions on VC activity in grid squares YD 8523, 8524, 8521, 8420, and 8620. The Sector Intelligence Officer credited this Battalion with 47 VC KIA for the period 25 - 26 February.

26 February - W Battery displaced to YD 859868 to support the FO School. They fired 12 mission in the south western portion of the TAOR. B Battery fired 10 missions at suspected VC activity in the areas of YD 8420 and 9620. The ARVN reported excellent effect on target for all missions.

27 February - B Battery fired 5 observed missions on VC dug in at YD 943186. The AO reported 24 KIA. At 1045H while enroute from the OP a 3/4 ton truck carrying students of the 12th Marines FO School hit a mine at YD 890092. 7 of the students, and a driver from this Battalion were wounded. 2 of the students died of wounds. At 1305H the wrecker, while going out to retrieve the damaged truck, hit another mine at YD 888067. No injuries were sustained.

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28 February - The Battalion (less Howtars) fired on a VC mortar position at YD 944189, with excellent effect on target. M Battery fired on a VC boat at YD 791060, obtaining a secondary explosion reported by the AO.

b. Artillery units providing support;

4th Battalion, 12th Marines

MB Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines
MM Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines
MM Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines

c. Naval ships providing naval gunfire support. The USS MASON was employed in the PHU HAI enclave on 26 February.

d. Type and number of missions delivered;

Observed - 508
Unobserved - 205
Registrations - 2
Destruction - 7
Harrassing and Interdicting - 3,338

e. Ammunition expended by type;

	105mm	107mm	155mm	Total
HE	4832	1043	3510	9435
WP	368	225	348	941
ILL	249	48	320	617
Smoke	22	-	-	22
Total	5521	1316	4178	11025

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LOGISTICS

- a. Supply. Supply functions during the period have been normal. A shipment of Class IV has arrived enabling a start on the planned expansion of enclave field fortifications.
- b. Maintenance. Maintenance facilities provided by the FLSU #2 have been satisfactory. A total of 464 Tactical Equipment Repair Orders have been processed to date.
- c. Food Service. "A" ration availability has increased during the period. Two 16' X 64' dining buildings have been completed and are operating in conjunction with the 500 man modified messhall.
- d. Cantonment and Camp Facilities Development. Planned structures under the cantonment project DAG 1110-102 have been limited due to a shortage of building materials. No screening available.
- e. Transportation and Roads. Roads in the enclave continue to improve through managed use of the existing combat engineer capabilities.
- f. Fiscal. No deviations of the previous fiscal trend have been noted.
- g. Water. The supply of potable water has been adequate.
- h. Motor Transportation. Preventive maintenance checks and inspections are being performed in preparation for the forthcoming Commanding General's inspection.
- i. Embarkation. This unit has not participated in either embarkation or debarkation during the period.
- j. Hospitalization and Evacuation. 15 KIA's and 19 WIA's were evacuated to Collecting and Clearing Company A during this reporting period as a result of Operation NEW YORK.

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Air Defense. None.

Combat Air Support.

a. Aviation units providing support. HMM-163, and 1st MAW attack aircraft.

b. Significant events.

(1) Sequential listing of aircraft employed in CAS.

28 February - 8 sorties of CAS aircraft used to support Task Unit Hotel. 2 UH-1E's used for CAS in support of Task Unit Hotel.

(2) Sequential listing of aircraft employed for other than CAS.

1 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225 and troop lift from 225.

2 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225 and Recon within the TAOR.

3 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225.

4 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225 and troop lift to Hills 180 and 225. 2 helicopters used for troop lift and medical supplies for Civil Affairs program. 2 helicopters utilized for admin flight to DANANG for disbursing officer.

5 February - 2 helicopters utilized for visual recon in vicinity of Hill 225. 2 helicopters used for recon in area 790109.

7 February - 2 helicopters used for resupply of Hills 180 and 225.

8 February - 2 helicopters used for troop lift from 2/1 to 2/7 CP 12 and return. 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225. 2 helicopters utilized for lift of unit commander, from CP LZ to LZ EAGLE (Reg't).

9 February - 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift from CP LZ to coord 817124. 2 helicopters utilized for Med Evac of 1 WIA American, from 905104 to A-Med.

10 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225.

11 February - 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift from HUE-PHU BAI Airfield to air freight, DANANG. 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift from coordinates 817124 to CP LZ. 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225.

12 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225. 2 helicopters utilized for admin run to III MAF for disbursing officer.

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13 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225. 2 helicopters utilized for recon of the BA LONG area.

15 February - 2 helicopters utilized for recon of KHE SANH and KANG VEI. 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift from CP LZ to 837075. 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225.

16 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225.

17 February - 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift from coordinates 822083 to CP LZ.

17 February - 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift from III MAF to CP LZ. 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift from CP LZ to Hill 180. 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225.

18 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225. 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift to Hills 180 and 225.

19 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225.

20 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225. 3 helicopters utilized for troop lift from CP LZ to coordinates 811122.

21 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225. 3 helicopters utilized for troop lift from coordinates 795125 to CP LZ.

22 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225. 1 helicopter utilized for rappelling practice at airfield.

23 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225.

24 February - 3 helicopters utilized for troop lift from CP LZ to coordinates 886089. 2 helicopters utilized for Med Evac from coordinates 912110 to A-Med.

25 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply of Hills 180 and 225. 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift to CP LZ.

26 February - 2 helicopters utilized to transport Battalion Commander to HUE and back. 2 helicopters utilized to resupply Hills 180 and 225 and lift troops to Hill 225. 12 helicopters utilized to lift a reinforced rifle company north of HUE. 2 A-4's utilized for helicopter escort. 2 F-4's utilized for CAS.

27 February - 2 helicopters utilized for resupply to Hills 180 and 225. 2 helicopters utilized for troop lift from CP LZ to YD 805128. 2 helicopters utilized for med evac. 2 helicopters utilized for administrative run to hill 225. 10 helicopters utilized to lift 3 reinforced rifle companies and command group from PHU BAI airfield to YD 935194.

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1 ARVN flare aircraft and 1 Air Force flare aircraft used to support Task Unit Hotel.

28 February - 2 helicopters utilized to resupply Hills 180 and 225. 2 helicopters utilized to transport troops and supplies to Task Unit Hotel. 2 helicopters utilized to transport Battalion Commander to Task Unit Hotel. 4 helicopters utilized for med evac from Task Unit Hotel. 2 UH-1E's utilized for recon flight for Task Unit Hotel. 2 UH-1E's utilized for resupply Task Unit Hotel. 2 Air Force flare aircraft utilized to support Task Unit Hotel. 4 helicopters utilized to lift reinforced rifle platoon to YD 955109.

ENCLOSURE (1)
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a. Medical Officers:

- (1) Battalion Surgeon - LT Anthony O. COLEY, MC, USNR
- (2) Assistant Battalion Surgeon - LT Gerald M. BRANNOCK, MC, USNR

b. Hospital Corpsmen - 54

E7 - 2
E6 - 6
E5 - 11
E4 - 17
E3 - 18

c. Significant Events: NONE

d. Medical Trends: 149 cases of diarrhea were treated during the month 4 were diagnosed as amoebic and 18 as bacillary dysentery. Three cases of laboratory confirmed hookworm were treated.

e. Number of Combat Casualties Treated: One Marine was treated for Combat injuries at the Battalion Aid Station.

KIA - 15
WIA - 40
DOW - 2

f. Number of Non-Battle Casualties Treated: 858 men were treated at the Battalion Aid Station.

g. Preventive Medicine and Sanitation: Live bait traps continue to be used on a local level and the results are highly satisfactory.

h. Civil Affairs Medical Support rendered.

- (1) Number persons treated: 5213
- (2) Amount, by type, of medicine dispensed:
 - 6 pg Benzalkonium Chloride Tincture, tinted
 - 5 bt Hydrogen Peroxide Solution, USP
 - 4 jr Nitrofurazone Oint., NF, water soluble, 1:500, 1 lb.
 - 264 ck Soap, Surgical, 4 oz.
 - 102 bt Anacin Tabs., 100's
 - 1 bt Aspirin, Phenacetin, and Caffeine Tabs., 1000's
 - 11 bt Aspirin, 1000's
 - 8 bt Sodium Salicylate Tabs., USP, 1000's
 - 8 bt Chlorpheniramine Maleate Tabs., USP, 4 mg. 1000's
 - 6 bx Oxytetracycline-Polymyxin B Oph Oint., 1/8 oz.
 - 3 bt Sodium Bicarbonate, Charcoal and Peppermint tabs., 1000's
 - 25 bt Vi Penta Vitamin drops
 - 17 bt Vi Gran Vitamin tabs, 100's
 - 2 bt Primaquine Phosphate tabs., USP, 1000's
 - 9 bt Sulfadiazine Tabs, USP, 1000's
 - 4 bt Trisulfapyrimidines Oral Suspension, USP, 10%, 1 pt.
 - 6 bt Acetyl Sulfisoxazole Oral Susp., USP, Podiatric, 10% 1 pt.
 - 2 on Piperazine Tartrate Tabs., 1000's
 - 9 bt Piperazine Citrate Syrup, USP, 1 pt.

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MEDICAL AND DENTAL SUPPLY (Continued)

26 bt Procaine Penicillin for aqueous Inj., 1,500,000 Units
8 pg Benzathine G Susp., Sterilo, USP, 400,000 Units 20's
23 bt Erythromycin Tabs.
148 pg Band Aids
26 oa Medium Battle Dressings
26 pg 2 x 2's
2 pg 2cc syringes, 100's
6 pg 2 oz bottles, 72's
12 pg Drug Envelopes, 100's
1 pg Ointment Tins, 12's

1. Problem Areas: NONE

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CHAPLAIN SUPPORT

- a. Name of Chaplain: LT Thomas B. HANDLEY, CHC, USNR
- Chaplain Support: LT R. J. UZENZA, Catholic Chaplain, 4 Med, conducted four Sunday Masses with one hundred fifty-seven men in attendance, four Wednesday Masses with forty-eight men in attendance, and six services in CAC village with forty-three men in attendance.
- b. Number of Services: Ten Sunday Services with one hundred thirty men in attendance, and five week day services in CAC village with thirty-one men in attendance. One Memorial Service was held with twenty-five men in attendance.
- c. Number of personnel receiving Counseling: Seventeen.
- d. Significant Activities:
1. The Chaplain made a courtesy call on the Catholic Chaplain of the 1st ARVN Division.
 2. Five hundred paperback books were distributed to men of this command. Book shelves were built for magazines in the library which is located in the chapel.
 3. The arrival of Chaplain R. FULLILOVE who reported to HMM-163 will expand the religious coverage of the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR.
 4. The Battalion Chaplain had an audience with Mr. THICH MAT NGUYN, Vice-Chairman of the Unified Buddhist Association of HUE, and the discussion centered upon American and Buddhist relationship.
- e. Facilities: The facilities are excellent, however, with time, additional improvements will be forthcoming.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT/COMMUNITY RELATIONS

a. Significant Activities

1. During February the 3d Marine Division Band made two trips to Phu Bai for the purpose of playing people-to-people, civic action concerts.

On 5 February the band played two concerts in Hue consisting of martial music, Vietnamese and American favorites, and several novelty numbers. The first concert was played at 1st ARVN Division Headquarters in Hue and was attended by the Commanding General, General Chuan, members of his command and convalescents from Hue Hospital. A later concert was played at the Rector's Auditorium at Hue University before 350 members of the student body and faculty. The program was greeted with enthusiastic response.

This contact is particularly noteworthy in that it was the first made at the University by the U.S. Marine Corps. Due to the unique political freedom enjoyed by the students and the corresponding influence they have been able to wield, student organizations have on occasion perpetrated anti-U.S., anti-war demonstrations which have commanded support from some of the conservatively cast Hue citizenry and profoundly influenced the national government in Saigon. In order to reduce the probability of the occurrence of exploitable incidents, it has been past policy to avoid all contact with the University except for instructional exchanges involving the surgeons from "A" Company, 3d Medical Battalion. In view of the inroads made by the Division Band, however, it appears that a common ground for understanding has been uncovered in the form of cultural exchange.

On 26 February the 3d Division Band and Drum and Bugle Corps returned to perform for the people of Hue. In an hour and one half program the Band and Drum and Bugle Corps played before the Thua Thien Province Chief and Mayor of Hue, Lieutenant Colonel Khoa, and over 3000 people. The impact of the Band was tremendous. It is without doubt one of the Marine Corps' greatest assets in the cementing of U.S.-Vietnamese friendship.

2. During the month of February 5077 Vietnamese were treated at daily sick call and by the MEDCAP teams from 2/1 and "A" Bn. In addition 130 civilians received dental care from the dental detachment, 3d Medical Company.

b.

Material Distributed

1. 3154 bars of soap
2. 200 pounds of flour
3. 600 pounds of candy
4. 95 pounds of clothes
5. 625 C.A.R.E. school kits
6. 6 truckloads of scrap wood

ENCLOSURE 11

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Civic Action Projects

On 12 February Marine Engineers repaired vital segments of the road linking Thuy Tan and Thuy Luong. Two small bridges had deteriorated to the point where vehicular traffic was no longer possible. The bridges were removed and two-eighteen-foot sections of steel culvert were installed at YD889165 and at YD888167. A twelve-foot section was also placed at YD884168. Vietnamese from Luong Dong Hamlet turned out to assist the Marines.

d. Apparent results of Civil Affairs program.

The attitude of the local Vietnamese continues to be warm and friendly toward Marines.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Copy 23 of 30 copies
2nd Bn (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein)
HUE-PHU BAI, RVN
030800H February 1966
Ser No 087-56

Operation Order 204-66

Ref: (a) NAM HOA Sub-sector # 3; MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet
6560 III
Time zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. Possibility of C-49th company operating in the objective area. They are composed of 60-70 armed with 2 BAR's, K-50's, Z-44's and M-1 Carbines.
- b. Friendly forces.
 - (1) 4th Bn, 12th Marines (-)(Rein).
 - (2) 921st Regional Force company.
 - (3) Peoples Action Team Platoon.
 - (4) Popular Force Platoon.
- c. Attachments and Detachments.
 - (1) Det, 1st Plt, Co B, 3rd AT Bn.
 - (2) Sqd, 2d Plt, Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 - (3) FC Team A/12

2. MISSION

2/1 (-)(Rein), commencing at H-hour on D-day provide one company (Rein) in a blocking position vicinity GC YD 789148 to YD 792140. See Annex A (Operation Overlay). Be prepared to provide additional support as required.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of operation. 2/1 (-)(Rein), commencing at H - 5 hours, moves one company by motorized column to GC YD 820132. Company continues movement to blocking position by foot. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).
- b. 4th Bn, 12th Marines (-)(Rein).
 - (1) General support.
 - (2) At 1800H on D-1 Displace B Battery to GC YD 850110.

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88

- c. Co G (Rein). Commencing at H - 5 hours move by motorized column to GC YD 820182. Continue move to blocking position on foot. Establish blocking position vicinity GC YD 789148 to YD 792140.
- d. Co F. Be prepared, on order, to provide one platoon (Rein) in support of the operation.
- e. Co E. Be prepared, on order, to provide one platoon (Rein) in support of the operation.
- f. Coordinating instructions.
 - (1) D-day: 4 February 1966
 - (2) H-hour: 0600H
 - (3) ARVN personnel will wear a red scarf on their left arm.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Supply

- (1) Unit distribution
- (2) Prescribed load.
 - (a) Class I. 1 MIC, 2 full canteens.
 - (b) Class II. Batteries - 2 day supply
 - (c) Class III. All vehicles with gas tanks full, plus 1 full 5 gallon expeditionary can.
 - (d) Class IV. Fuel required.
 - (e) Class V. Basic allowance.
- (3) Resupply. Submit requests to this Headquarters (1000000000).
- (4) Captured material. Return to this Headquarters.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization

- (1) Evacuation.
 - (a) By helicopter to 2/1 BAS.

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- (b) Request Med Evac Via Battalion Tactical Net.
- (2) Hospitalization. "AB Med (USMC).
- c. Service. HQ 2/1 prepares and stages selected Class V items on pallets vicinity 2/1 LZ HUE-PHU BAY.
- d. Personnel. VCC will be evacuated by helicopter to 2/1 HQ in HUE-PHU BAY for screening and interrogation by 2/1 CIT and ITT.
5. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
- a. Communications-Electronics.
- (1) Draw 1st ANCN Division, SOI and call signs from 2/1 message center.
- (2) Enter Tactical Net at 032300H.
- (3) Attached artillery F.G. Teams will enter Artillery conduct of fire net at 032300H.
- (4) Co G (Rein) draw one AN/PRC-25 from 2/1 radio section.
- b. Command Posts. Report Command Post location when established.

R. T. Hamlin, Jr.
R. T. HAMLIN, JR.

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX:

A - Operation Overlay

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 22 YEARS
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HUE-PHU BAI, RVN,
030800H February 1966
Ser No 087-66

Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Plan 204-66


Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6560 III (HUE)

Time Zone: H

⊙ CP 1

78
+
17

⊙ CP 2



R. T. HANLIN, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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A-1

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28 Mar 1966

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on CO 2dDn, 1stMar ltr 3:AFS:ugh over 5213 of 6Mar66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV/RCS/
J3/32)

Subj: 2dDn, 1stMar Combat After Action Report, Operation New York

Ref: (b) MACV Directive 335-8

1. Forwarded, in accordance with reference (b).
2. This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of the basic letter and enclosures.

J. R. CHAISSON
By direction

Copy to:
COMUSMACV (3) (MACJ2-MACT)
CMC
CMCS
CG FMFPac

290 476

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO, San Francisco 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3/JRF/wmr
3120.1
18 March 1966
0228 66

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding Officer, Task Group Foxtro, PHU BAI

Subj: Pursuit of enemy forces

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV 010235Z (Copy appended)

1. It is requested that reference (a) be analyzed by your command relative to pursuit of enemy forces.
2. Forward analysis of Operation NEW YORK exemplifying the principles set forth in reference (a) to reach this Headquarters prior to 25 March, 1966. The subject material will be used by the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force in forthcoming Seminar.

F. R. WILKINSON
By direction

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Encl. 5

6-3

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Ser No 0224-66
16 March 1966

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~~SECOND ENDORSEMENT~~ on CG, 2dBn, 1stMar ltr 3:AFS:mgh over 5213 dtd 6thar66

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (Attn: J321)
APO U. S. Forces 96243
Via: III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: 2dBn, 1stMar, After Action Report; Opn New York.

1. Forwarded.

F. R. WILKINSON
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein)
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California, 96601

Hdqs 2/1 1stMarDiv

Log No. 107-66

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 3rd Marines

3:RJB:rjo
5213
081200 February 1966
Ser No 0107-66

Subj: After Action Report, Operation 204-66

Ref: (a) RegtO 3120.1A

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following report is submitted on the subject operation.

a. Enemy.

(1) The C-49th Company was known to be operating in the objective area.

(2) Enemy reserves that could have affected our situation consisted of 2 VC Companies (Unit unknown).

(3) There was no enemy contact.

(a) The strength of the VC unit operating in the objective area was estimated to be from 60-70 men.

(b) Previous intelligence determined the C-49th Company to be armed with 2 BAR's, K-50's, K-44's and Carbines. Material, food, ammunition and morale could not be determined due to lack of enemy contact.

(c) The lack of VC units in the objective area indicated possible knowledge of the intentions of friendly forces through the use of observation posts, affording sufficient warning to withdraw from the area of operation.

(4) Conclusions: Withdraw from the area of operation.

(5) Enemy losses: None. (a) the following report is submitted on the subject operation.

b. Operations.

(1) At 032225H Co G (Rein) commenced the attack in a motorized column escorted by a light section of tanks to check point 1 (YD 820182), disembarking at this point at 032300H.

(2) Enemy reserves that could have affected our situation consisted of 2 VC Companies (Unit unknown).

(3) There was no enemy contact.

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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(2) Co G continued the attack by foot in a southerly direction and made a juncture with the 3rd platoon, Co F at YD 816171 by 032330H.

(3) Co G assumed OpCon of 3rd platoon, Co F and proceeded to vicinity YD 813167 establishing a 360 degree perimeter by 040025H.

(4) At 040130H Co G detached 3rd platoon, Co F and resumed the attack along axis of advance to YD 783139 where a blocking position was established by 040430H.

(5) At first light the participating ARVN units commenced a sweep of the objective area encountering negative resistance.

(6) At 040930H the 2/1 MedCap team landed in the objective area and commenced operations. They were well received by the local populace.

(7) At 041100H Co G commenced withdrawal to 2/1 perimeter arriving at 1300.

(8) By 041600H the MedCap team had returned to 2/1 CP and the operation completed.

c. Lessons Learned. None.

d. Personnel.

(1) The personnel strength of the participating units of the 2nd Battalion (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein) was as follows:

<u>USMC Officers</u>	<u>USMC Enlisted</u>	<u>USN Officers</u>	<u>USN Enlisted</u>
18*	321*	1	6

* These figures reflect participating units from 4th Bn, 12th Marines (-)(Rein) and the two reserve platoons from 2nd Bn (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein).

(2) Friendly casualties. None.

(3) Enemy casualties. None.

(4) Discipline, Law, and Order, None.

(5) Captives. None

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- (6) Burials and Graves Registration. None.
- (7) Morelo. Outstanding.

R. T. Hamlin Jr.
R. T. HAMLIN, JR.

Copy To: Senior Advisor, 1st Infantry Division, ARVN

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S. & C FILES

3d MARINES

19066

101066

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on CC, 21 Apr, 1st Mar ltr 3d Marines over 5213 dtd 16 Mar 66

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division

Subj: After Action Report, Operation NEW YORK PW 141 Village and
PHU LAM Peninsula

Ref: (a) Div 03190.1B

1. Forwarded.

Van D. BELL, Jr.
By direction

3d Marines
COPY 6 of 17
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HEADQUARTERS
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2nd Battalion (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein)
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF,
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

S & C FILES
3D MARINES

19066
101066

3: AJS: mgh
5213
061300H March 1966
Ser No 0173-66

Hdqs 2/1stMarDiv

Log No. 173-66

Copy No. 6 of 17 Copies

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 3rd Marines

Subj: After Action Report, Operation NEW YORK PHO LAI Village and
PHU THU Peninsula

Ref: (a) Div O 3100.1B

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay (Pho Lai Village)
(2) Operation Overlay (Pho Lai Village)
(3) Operation Overlay (Phu Thu Peninsula)
(4) Operation Overlay (Phu Thu Peninsula)
(5) Operation Overlay (Phu Thu Peninsula)

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following report is submitted
on the subject operation.

a. Enemy.

(1) One Local Force Company is known to be operating in the first
objective area, consisting of three platoons of four squads each.

(2) Enemy reserves that could have affected our situation con-
sisted of one local force company (AO-2) located north of this objective
area.

(3) There was no enemy contact.

(a) The estimated strength of the VC in the area of opera-
tion was approximately 100 men.

(b) Weapons, material, food and ammunition status could
not be determined as there was no contact established.

(c) Morale of the VC could not be determined due to the
lack of captives.

(d) VC units located in the area of operations did not
appear to have any prior knowledge of the intentions of friendly forces.

(4) Conclusions.

(a) Withdraw from the area of operation.

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330P1

(b) Harass friendly forces with sniper fire.

(c) The enemy used paragraph (a) above.

b. Operations.

(1) At 261300H February 1966, C.O. Task Unit HOTEL received a briefing at 1st ARVN Division Headquarters assigning an operation area (Enclosure (1)) and operational control of the Regional Force and Popular Force Units in the QUANG DIEN District.

(2) At 261500H February 1966, a verbal fragmentary order was given by C.O. Task Unit HOTEL to search, capture or destroy VC personnel and material in the Task Unit area of operation (Enclosure (1)). Companies F and G, move from HUE-PHU BAI by mechanized/motorized column to vicinity of GC (YD 660318), search and capture or destroy VC personnel and material in the company sectors of operation, (Enclosure (1)). Company K land in LZ HAWK vicinity GC (YD 685323) and establish a blocking position oriented south from vicinity GC (YD 680323 to YD 689323).

(3) At 261545H February 1966, Companies F and G (Rein) and Command Group moved from HUE-PHU BAI in a mechanized/motorized column to the Task Unit area of operation. The CP was established vicinity GC (YD 670324).

(4) At 261700H February 1966, Company K (Rein) landed in LZ and moved to blocking position from GC (YD 680323 to YD 689323) with negative contact.

(5) At 261752H February 1966, Companies F and G (Rein) continued the attack to Company K's blocking position. Companies F and G moved into Company K's position at 262225H February 1966 with negative contact.

(6) At 262230H February 1966, Company K commenced to move to a blocking position GC (YD 652315 to YD 659318) as ordered by C.O. Task Unit Hotel to block any possible VC escape from the Task Unit area of operation. Company K completed the move with negative contact at 270215H February 1966.

(7) At 270830H February 1966, operation overlays were delivered to Companies F and G (Rein) and orders given to search and clear their assigned sectors within Task Unit zone of action. (Enclosure 2).

(8) At 270910H February 1966, Companies F and G (Rein) began search and clear operations. (Enclosure 2).

(9) At 271215H February 1966, Companies G, K and Command Group began move to PK 17 GC (YD 642287). Move completed with negative contact at 271400H February 1966.

(10) At 271405H February 1966, Company F completed search and clear with negative contact. Company F picked up by trucks at 271430H February 1966 at GC (YD 652313).

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(11) At 271430H February 1966 convoy shuttle began moving units to HUE-PHU BAI. At 271815H February 1966 all units arrived at HUE-PHU BAI with negative contact.

c. Lessons learned. Where contact with VC is confirmed early in the day, the decision to launch quick reaction forces must be arrived at the earliest. In this first phase of the operation, too much time elapsed between confirmed contact and actual decision as to commitment. As a result the troops arrived in an unfamiliar objective area just prior to darkness.

d. Personnel

(1) The personnel strength of the participating units of Task Unit Hotel was as follows:

<u>USMC Officers</u>	<u>USMC Enlisted</u>	<u>USN Officers</u>	<u>USN Enlisted</u>
24	516	1	32

(2) The personnel strength of participating units of the Quang Dien District Headquarters was as follows:

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
9*	27*

*Note: These figures include one officer and one enlisted of the U.S. Army.

(3) Friendly casualties. None

(4) Enemy casualties. None

(5) Discipline, Law, and Order. Normal.

(6) Captives. None

(7) Burial and Graves Registration. None

(8) Morale. Outstanding.

A continuation of Operation NEW YORK (Phu Thu Peninsula).

a. Enemy.

(1) The Viet Cong units operating in this objective area were:

(a) The 810th main force battalion consisting of four infantry companies and one weapons company.

(b) The B-28; local platoon (Vinh Phu Village) consisting of 3-4 squads.

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1. The estimated strength of the Viet Cong units was approximately 350 - 450.

2. Weapons, material, food, and ammunition were in abundance for limited operations.

3. Morale of the Viet Cong units was considered high.

4. Viet Cong units located in the area of operations did not appear to have any prior knowledge of the intentions of the friendly forces.

(c) Conclusions.

1. Withdraw from the area of operations.

2. Defend from previously prepared positions.

3. Harrass friendly forces with sniper fire and small unit ambushes.

4. During operation a combination of (2), (1), and (3) in that order, was used by the enemy.

(d) Weapons and Equipment. A total of ~~sixty-nine~~ (69) weapons, including 4 separate types of crew served weapons and associated material, was captured.

(2) Operations.

(a) At 272000H February 1966, C.O. Task Unit Hotel was briefed at 1st ARVN Division Headquarters, and assigned an operating area. (Enclosure 3). C.O. Task Unit Hotel was assigned operational control of 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, plus Regional Force and Popular Force Units of Phu Thu District.

(b) At 272100H February 1966, C.O. Task Unit Hotel issued a verbal ~~frequency~~ order to heli-lift Task Unit Hotel into a LZ at G0 (YD 935194) and relieve the pressure on 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, and Popular and Regional Force Units and U.S. Advisors located at G0 (YD 932194). To be prepared on order to conduct search and clear operations southeast on the Phu Thu Peninsula.

(c) At 272320H February 1966, the first wave of Company F lifted into an LZ, which was 1500 meters north of the proposed LZ. The C.O. Task Unit Hotel ordered the remaining waves into the correct LZ. The first wave was picked up subsequently and landed in the correct LZ. The entire lift of all units was completed at 280200H February 1966, with negative contact. A perimeter defense was established and platoon size patrols failed to gain contact.

(d) At 280800H February 1966, an order was issued to search and clear Area B southeast along Phu Thu Peninsula with 3 companies abreast. 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division was given the mission of

searching and clearing Area A within Task Unit operating area. One RF squad was attached to each USMC rifle company. U.S. Advisors and Phu Thu District personnel moved with the Command Group, behind the center company. (Enclosure 3).

(e) At 291205H February 1966, Company F received 2 rounds of sniper fire, from vicinity GC (YD 956152).

(f) At 281305H February 1966, Company F moving to vicinity GC (YD 960147) made heavy contact with Viet Cong. At 281315H, C.O. Task Unit Hotel issued an order for the 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division minus one company, to move from vicinity GC (YD 937187) to vicinity GC (YD 974154) to reinforce elements of Task Unit Hotel which had assaulted through V.C. lines. The contact lasted until 281530H at which time the V.C. broke contact and withdrew in small disorganized groups.

(g) At 281730H February 1966, 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment (-), 1st ARVN Division arrived at GC (YD 974154) and established a perimeter defense east of and adjacent to Task Unit Hotel. All units continued to receive sporadic small arms and mortar fire until approximately 281800H.

(h) At 281900H February 1966, Task Unit Hotel had established a defense perimeter at GC (YD 962153)

(i) At 281930H February 1966, the order was given to continue search and clear operations the next morning south-east down the peninsula to the blocking position composed of 2 Popular Force Platoons and 1 Regional Force Platoon of Thue Thien Sector. C.O. 2nd Battalion (Rein), 1st Marines (Rein) ordered Company H and Combined Action Company Units into blocking positions (Enclosure 3). The Junk Fleet was used to block the waterway east of the peninsula.

(j) At 282000H February 1966, Thue Thien Sector Advisor with one platoon of Popular Forces, a part of the defense perimeter, received small arms fire. A patrol was dispatched and 1 Viet Cong KIA resulted. Negative contact remainder of the night.

(k) At 010900H March 1966, Task Unit Hotel and 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division continued the attack southeast of the blocking position finding evidence of fresh graves, equipment that had been discarded and 1 WIA Viet Cong.

(l) At 011030H March 1966, The Command Group, with the Thue Thien Sector Advisor and Phu Thu District personnel displaced to vicinity GC (YD 963145).

(m) At 011330H March 1966, Task Unit Hotel and 1/3 junctured with blocking force. At 011330H C.O. Task Unit ordered Task Unit Hotel units and 1/3 to search and clear northeast to position vicinity GC (YD 965145) to establish defensive perimeter.

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(n) At 011655H March 1966, 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division moved into defensive position for the night, vicinity GC (YD 987152).

(o) At 011800H March 1966, orders issued for search and clear operations the next morning northwest up the peninsula with 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment (-), 1st ARVN Division, G, and K companies abreast, with Company F to be heli-lifted to a blocking position at GC (YD 935145). One (1) company of 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division was ordered by C.O. Task Unit Hotel to move northwest from GC 937187 to GC (YD 974145) up the peninsula to secure the LZ for Company F and link up with Company F in a blocking position (Enclosure 4).

(p) At 020540H March 1966, 2-4 Viet Cong approached 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment (-), 1st ARVN Division position and threw a grenade wounding 2 ARVN.

(q) At 020830H March 1966, 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment (-), G and K Companies continued the attack northwest. (Enclosure 5).

(r) At 021000H March 1966, Company F and 1 company from 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment (-), 1st ARVN Division moved into blocking position with negative contact.

(s) At 021150H March 1966, Company K killed one Viet Cong vicinity GC (YD 950178). VC was identified as a local guerrilla platoon commander, disguised as Buddhist Monk, well armed, and equipped with grenades and rifle.

(t) At 021430H March 1966, The Command Group sighted 6 Viet Cong vicinity GC (YD 943178). Command Group opened fire and Company F assaulted through the area killing 3 Viet Cong.

(u) At 021450H March 1966, Company F sighted 3 Viet Cong moving into the blocking position. (Enclosure 4). Company F opened fire and killed 2. The remaining 2 moved in the direction of the advancing units.

(v) At 021625H March 1966, Company K had contact with 2 Viet Cong vicinity GC (YD 946188). (Company K killed the 2 Viet Cong).

(w) At 021730H March 1966, Task Unit Hotel and 1/3 made contact with the blocking forces and commenced consolidation of position for the night.

(x) At 021900H March 1966, order issued for withdrawal of Task Unit Hotel to the HUE-PHU BAI area, commencing 030900H March 1966. OpCon of 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division returned to Deputy Province Chief. District Popular Forces, Regional Forces, and U.S. Army Advisors to be heli-lifted to Phu Tam District Headquarters. There was negative contact the night of 2 March 1966.

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(y) At 031000H March 1966, heli-lift of Task Unit Hotel to HUE-PHU BAI completed. Negative Contact.

(1) Lessons Learned.

(a) Helicopters can be successfully utilized for large night troop lifts, providing secure HLS is marked.

(b) Combined operations with U.S. Marines and ARVN Units, are highly successful due to the fact that presence of the U.S. Forces and U.S. leadership seem to give the ARVNS confidence in themselves and their capabilities. Such Combined operations also enable U.S. Forces to have up to date intelligence in the operation area and to surmount the language barrier between operating forces and the local population.

(c) Basic Squad, Platoon, and Company size tactics proved to be completely applicable in the war in Vietnam.

(d) The lack of prominent terrain features prevented effective on ground orientation, and the close proximity of the enemy hampered the positive control of artillery and naval gunfire by F4C's and FJ's. In this instance A0's were utilized.

PERSONNEL

(a) The personnel strength of the participating units of Task Unit Hotel were as follows:

<u>USMC Officers</u>	<u>USMC Enlisted</u>	<u>USN Officers</u>	<u>USN Enlisted</u>
29	593	1	22

(b) The personnel strengths of other participating units were as follows:

1st Bn, 3rd Regt, 1st ARVN Div	398
--------------------------------	-----

221st Regional Force Company, Thua Thien Province	61
--	----

RF/PP Platoons	63
----------------	----

Advisor Group	20
---------------	----

Junk Force	239
------------	-----

H Company, 2nd Bn (Rein), 1st Mar (Rein) (-)	54
--	----

220th Aviation Company	23
------------------------	----

HM-163	276
--------	-----

USS NELSON

Unknown

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(c) Friendly Casualties

- (1) KIA - 15
- (2) WIA - 37
- (3) WIA - 18
- (4) DOW - 2
- (5) MIA - 0

(d) Enemy Casualties

- (1) KIA (Confirmed) - 122
- (2) KIA (Estimated) - 56
- (3) WIA (Confirmed) - 1
- (4) WIA (Estimated) - 35
- (5) VUC - 7
- (6) VCS - 9

(e) Discipline, Law and Order - Normal.


(f) Burials, Graves Registrations - All processed through "A" Company, 3rd Med Battalion.

(g) Morale - Outstanding.

R. T. Hanifin
R. T. HANIFIN, JR.

CONCLUSIONS

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HUE-PHU BAI, RVN
261545H February 1966
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
Operation New York
(Phu Tim Peninsula)

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HUE-PHU BAI, RVN
010800H March 1966

Ref: (a) MAPS; Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS L 701, Sheets 6560 II and III

18 96

13 95



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15 95


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Operation Overlay, Operation NEW YORK
(Pho Lai Village)

Ref: (a) MAPS, Vietnam, AFS L701, Sheets
6560 IV and 6460 I

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HUE-PHU BAI, RVN
270830H February 1966
Ser No 016 -66

64
+
27



Rf
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72

ENCLOSURE (2)


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Operation NEW YORK

Ref: (a) MAPS: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS L701
Sheets 6560 II and III

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HUE-PHU BAI, RVN
272300H February 1966
Ser No 016 - 66



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SERIAL 0489-56

16 July 1966

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TO:

Commanding Officer
USS LEONARD F. MASON (DD-652)
FPO, San Francisco, Calif., 96602

(Fold)

Subj: Operation NEW YORK; participation in

Ref: (a) USS MASON Splitter 0700G Zerr 051 of 4 July 1966

Reference (a) requested substantiation of MASON's participation in Operation NEW YORK. The records of this Command indicate that MASON assumed the duties as Naval Gunfire Support Ship in support of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment 26-27 February, inclusive, for the duration of Operation NEW YORK.

WILLIE L. BECK
By direction

COPY TO

COMPRESSION THREE

ADDRESS:

Commanding General
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, Calif., 96602

← SENDER'S MAILING ADDRESS

Address reply as shown at left or reply hereon and return in window envelope (size 8 1/2" x 3 1/4"), if not classified as confidential or higher.

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4 of 4

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3D MARINE DIVISION

3/21/9B

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ZNY 00000
OF 281543Z
TO SECOND BN FIRST MARINES 3RD MAR DIV
FM CG THIRD MAR DIV 11 MAR 66

3 O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
PASS TO 1ST BATTAL, 3RD, PRIOR TO 250800H
~~3 O N F I D E N T I A L~~
~~3 O N F I D E N T I A L~~

PURSUIT OF ENEMY FORCES IN OPERATION NEW YORK.
1. REF A REQ ANALYSIS OF O. NEW YORK RELATIVE TO PURSUIT OF ENEMY
FORCES (AW PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN REF B.
2. THE FOLLOWING DISCUSS OF PRINCIPLES IN REF B WILL BE COMMENTED
ON FOR EACH OF THE TWO PHASES OF O. NEW YORK:
A. MISSION OF U.S. FORCES IS TO SUPPORT THE RVNAF IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT

PAGE TWO C O N F I D E N T I A L
OF ITS MISSION.

- 3.7.4: TACTICAL COMMANDERS WILL ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS
WITH VIETNAMESE DIVISION, PROVINCE AND REGIONAL HQ.
- C. ENGAGEMENT AND PURSUIT OF VC FORCES WHICH REVEAL THEIR PRESENCE
BY OFFENSIVE ACTION MUST BE PRIORITY NUMBER ONE AT ALL LEVELS.
- D. UPON ATTACK BY VC FORCES UPON ISOLATED ARVN UNITS OR REGIONAL OR
POPULAR FORCES, U.S. CNDRS WILL:
 - (1) PLAN FOR ADEQUATE IMMEDIATE SUPPORT
 - (2) ISSUE NECESSARY ORDERS FOR PURSUIT
 - (3) THROW FRESH UNITS INTO BATTLE
 - (4) INTENSIFY AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
 - (5) CONDUCT ARTILLERY/AIR STRIKES AGAINST LIKELY WITHDRAWAL ROUTES
 - (6) ADOPT THE ATTITUDE OF THE HUNTER
 - (7) VIGOROUSLY PURSUE AFTER ENGAGEMENT

3. OPERATION NEW YORK - PHASE 1 - QUANG BINH DISTRICT

A. ON 26 FEB TASK UNIT HOTEL WAS ACTIVATED FOR PURPOSE OF PROVIDING A
RESERVE FOR CG, FIRST ARVN DIVISION WHICH AT THAT TIME WAS TOTALLY

COMMITTED TO THREE OPERATIONS (LAKSON 250) LAKSON 255 AND THUA THIEN 251.
B. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS CONCERNING THIS PHASE PERTINENT TO PRINCIPLES
OUTLINED IN REF B.

28 15 45 MAR 29 1966
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3D MARINE DIVISION

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PAGE THREE C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) ACTIVATION OF TASK UNIT HOTEL IMPLEMENTED MISSION OF U.S. FORCES TO SUPPORT RVNAF.

(2) EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO, WIRE, LNO) WITH FIRST RVN DIV WERE IN EXISTENCE AT THIS TIME. UPON COMMITMENT OF TU HOTEL TO QUANG DIEM DISTRICT, COMMUNICATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED WITH DISTRICT AND PROVINCE HQ THROUGH U.S. ARMY ADVISORY TMS AND RVN REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE HQ WHO ACCOMPANIED TU HOTEL HQ WITH MOBILE AND BACK-PACK RADIOS.

(3) WHEN DECISION WAS MADE BY CG FIRST RVN DIVISION TO COMMIT TU HOTEL TO ITS ASSIGNED OBJECTIVE AREA, THE MOVEMENT FROM BASE CAMP WAS EXECUTED RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

(4) ADEQUATED FORCES WERE TAKEN (ALL OF TU HOTEL)

(5) ORDERS WERE ISSUED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM BASE CAMP. BASICALLY THEY INVOLVED A HAMMER AND ANVIL OPERATION TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY VC REPORTED IN AREA.

(6) ALL UNITS WERE FRESH.

(7) CONTINUOUS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE WAS PROVIDED BY L-19 AIRCRAFT OF THE 220TH AVIATION COMPANY, U.S. ARMY DURING HOURS OF DAYLIGHT. ORGANIC TU HOTEL AD'S WERE UTILIZED IN THE AIRCRAFT.

(8) ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES WERE CONDUCTED ALONG LIKELY WITHDRAWAL ROUTES ONCE CLEARANCE TO FIRE WAS OBTAINED FROM DISTRICT/PROVINCE

PAGE FOUR C O N F I D E N T I A L

(9) TO PREVENT INFLECTION OF CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE UPON LOCAL VILLAGERS AND VILLAGES. IT IS NOTED THAT THE DISTRICT CHIEF HAD RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE VC PLATOONS IN THE MAJORITY OF THE NEIGHBORING VILLAGES.

(10) THE ATTITUDE OF THE HUNTER WAS MOST CERTAINLY ADOPTED IN THIS CASE. ARRIVAL OF THE TASK UNIT IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA AT 1700 WAS FOLLOWED BY AN INTENSIVE SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATION BY TWO COMPANIES TOWARDS A COMMON BLOCKING POSITION. THE SEARCH CONTINUED DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS AND IN THE FOLLOWING DAY.

(11) THE VC WERE NOT VIGOROUSLY PURSUED IN THIS PHASE SINCE CONTACT WAS NEGATIVE THROUGHOUT.

(12) OPERATION NEW YORK-PHASE 11- PHU THU DISTRICT

(13) AT 1935H ON 27 FEB66, CG FIRST ARVN DIV REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM TU HOTEL TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURES ON AN ISOLATED ARVN BN AND A SMALL GROUP OF REGIONAL/POPULAR FORCES WITH US ADVISORS. ALL OF WHOM WERE LOCATED ON THE PHU THU PENINSULA IS ADJACENT TO THE ASSIGNED TADR OF THE 2D BN, 1ST MAR.

(14) FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS CONCERNING THIS PHASE PERTINENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN REF B:

(15) TASK UNIT HOTEL STILL HAD MISSION OF SUPPORTING FIRST RVN

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PAGE FIVE C O N F I D E N T I A L

DIVISION AT TIME OF REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE.

(2) COMMUNICATIONS WITH FIRST DIV WERE STILL IN EFFECT. ADDITIONALLY TU HOTEL CAME UP ON USA ADVISOR'S NET (ADVISORS WITH DISTRICT CHIEF AND REGIONAL POPULAR FORCES LOCATED ON PHU THU PENINSULA). CALL SIGNS AND FREQUENCIES ARE CONTAINED IN FIRST DIVISION 401 WHICH 2DBN, 1 ST MAR MAINTAINS IN CURRENT STATUS.

(3) UPON ASSIGNMENT OF AN OBJECTIVE AREA, THE POSSIBLE LOCATION AND SIZE OF THE VC FORCE, IMMEDIATE REQUESTS WERE SUBMITTED FOR SUPPORTING FORCES (HELICOPTERS, USAF FLARE PLANE, AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, NAVAL GUN FIRE SUPPORT SHIP, VIETNAMESE JUNK FLEET). CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT WERE PLANNED FOR ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. ARTILLERY WAS ALREADY IN DIRECT SUPPORT AND COULD FIRE FROM POSITION IN BASE CAMP.

(4) ORDERS WERE ISSUED AT 2100H 27 FEB FOR A NIGHT HELICOPTER LANDING AND IMMEDIATE DESPATCH IN 6 OF PATROLS TO SEEK AND MAINTAIN CONTACT, WITH VC FORCES.

(5) THE INFANTRY ELEMENTS OF TU HOTEL WERE NOT FRESH BUT THEY WERE ALL THAT WAS AVAILABLE. THE ANTICIPATION OF ENGAGEMENT WITH A VC FORCE BOXED IN ON A PENINSULA OVERCAME PHYSICAL HANDICAPS ON THE PART OF THE TROOPS.

(6) AERIAL SURVEILLANCE WAS INTENSIFIED THROUGH USE OF TWO USA L-19'S BT

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IN SECOND BN FIRST MARINES

TO CG THIRD BARRON

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AND TWO USMC UNIFORMS ON THE 28TH.

(7) SINCE THE PHU THU PENINSULA WAS CONSIDERED PACIFIED PRIOR TO THIS ENGAGEMENT, ARTILLERY MISSIONS AND AIR STRIKES WERE FIRED ONLY UPON SUSPECTED WITHDRAWAL ROUTES. NOT CONSIDERED HARMFUL TO CIVILIAN POPULACE. MISSIONS WERE CLEARED WITH DISTRICT CHIEF AND DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF (SECURITY) WHO REMAINED WITH COMMAND GROUP OF TV HOTEL.

(C) THE ATTITUDE OF THE HUNTER WAS AGAIN ADOPTED BOTH PRIOR TO AND AFTER THE HEAVY CONTACT ON THE 28TH. THE MARINES WERE HIGHLY AGGRESSIVE AND ASSAULTED THROUGH INTENSE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND HEAVY MORTAR FIRE.

PAGE TWO C O N F I D E N T I A L

ARTILLERY MISSIONS AND AIR STRIKES CORRESPONDINGLY WERE ADJUSTED TO BLOCK OFF VC ESCAPE. THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF THE MAIN BATTLE POSITION OF THE VC, PARTOLS SEARCHED VILLAGES AND RICE PADDIES CONSTANTLY IN PURSUIT OF THE VC. THIS WAS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT THE JUNG FLEET AND TH COMBINED ACTION COMPANY (CAC) ELEMENTS OF 2D BN, 1ST MAR KILLED VC IN FLIGHT DURING THE NIGHT OF 25 FEB AND EARLY MORNING OF 2 MARCH.

(C) THROUGHOUT THE NEXT TWO DAYS BOTH USMC AND RVN FORCES RELENTLESSLY PURSUED VC TOWARD BLOCKING POSITIONS AND CONTINUALLY AND METHODICALLY SEARCHED VILLAGES AND RICE PADDIES. UPON WITHDRAWALS OF TU HOTEL ON 3 MARCH, THE RVN KEPT ONE 10 BATTALION IN THE AREA TO POLICE UP STRAGGLERS AND WEAPONS.

5. CONCLUSIONS

A. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT OPERATION NEW YORK COMPLIED WITH THE PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED IN REF B.

B. IT IS NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE TACTICS AND FIRD SUPPORT PLANNING AND EXECUTION IN OPERATION NEW YORK REFLECT THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF MARINE CORPS TACTICS. ALTHOUGH THEY AGREE WITH REF B, THEY SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS NEW OR REVOLUTIONARY.

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