

2/1st Marines
Command Chronology

Apr 66

SECRET

R.B. Jeffrey

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DGC CIR 5200.10

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file

HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 1st Marines
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

203166

3:RJB:rja
5750
3 May 1966
Ser No 00277-66

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Attn: G-3)
Via: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines (Attn: S-3)

Subj: Command Chronology, Submission of

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1
(b) DivO 3100.1B
(c) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000 MMS Series L701, sheets 6560 III
and 6559 IV

Encl: (1) - Command Chronology for the period 1-30 April 1966
(2) - Battalion Order 1550.1 (Submitted with original copy only)
(3) - Combat Instruction #2 (Submitted with original copy only)
(4) - Battalion Order 3100.1A (Submitted with original copy only)
(5) - Proposed Battalion Operation for 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines
(Submitted with original copy only)
(6) - Summary of CAG Operation (Submitted with original copy only)

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosures (1) through (5)
are submitted.

R. T. Hanifin, Jr.
R. T. HANIFIN, JR.

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PART I

1. REPORTING UNIT. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
2. COMMAND POST. HUE-PHU BAI, RVN (885136)
3. PERIOD COVERED. 1 April 1966 - 30 April 1966
4. DATE OF SUBMISSION. 4 May 1966

5. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH.

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
OFFICERS	30	3
ENLISTED	1010	54

6. COMMANDING OFFICER. Lieutenant Colonel R. T. HANIFIN JR.
7. EXECUTIVE OFFICER. Major E. Z. GRABOWSKI
8. PRINCIPAL STAFF.

S-1	1stLt E. T. CLARK III
S-2	1stLt D. W. PICKERSGILL
S-3	Major J. COLLIA
S-4	Capt G. L. HAMMOND
ComO	Capt H. D. READ

9. SUBORDINATE STAFF.

H&SCo	1stLt J. A. CHAMBERS
Company E	Capt R. A. LARSEN
Company F	Capt D. E. MARKS
Company G	Capt R. E. LAVAN
Company H	Capt J. M. NOLAN

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Enclosure (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 1st Marines
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO, San Francisco, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 April through 30 April 1966

Part I Organization Data Sheet

Part II Significant Events

ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART II

PERSONNEL

a. Number of replacements received.

- (1) Marine Officers - 0
- (2) Marine Enlisted - 34
- (3) Navy Officers - 1
- (4) Navy Enlisted - 3

b. Personnel received via Division/Regt Transfers

- (1) Marine Officers - 0
- (2) Marine Enlisted - 1

c. Number of personnel rotated.

- (1) Marine Officers - 5
- (2) Marine Enlisted - 97

d. Number of Personnel lost through attrition other than rotation.

- (1) WIA - 6
- (2) KIA - 0
- (3) DCW - 0
- (4) Humanitarian/Emergency Transfers - 1
- (5) Non-battle injuries - 2; non-battle deaths - 0
- (6) Intra-Division/Regiment Transfers.
 - (a) Marine Officers - 1
 - (b) Marine Enlisted - 12
 - (c) Navy Enlisted - 3

e. R&R Trips - 110

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Enclosure (4)

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10. MISSION. 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines defend PHU BAI Airfield and 8th RRU; control assigned portion of HUE-PHU BAI Combat Base; conduct combat/reconnaissance patrols in assigned portion of HUE-PHU BAI Combat Base and combined operations with RVNAF within and beyond boundaries of assigned portion of HUE-PHU BAI Combat Base. Prepares defense and counter-attack plans to restore integrity of defensive perimeter to include PHU BAI Airfield and 8th RRU facilities.

11. BACKGROUND. To accomplish the assigned mission the Battalion portion of HUE-PHU BAI Combat Base has been divided into company sectors with each rifle company conducting aggressive patrolling, sweeps and numerous ambushes in their assigned sector. The companies defend their portion of the MLR by employing observation posts, listening posts, road blocks, checkpoints and through occupation of prepared positions in critical areas.

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f. Special Services Activity.

(1) Entertainment for the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines consisted of 82 movies, and 3 performances by a local entertainment group.

(2) Continuous difficulty is being encountered in acquiring and transporting beverages and soft drinks to Phu Bai for the clubs of the Battalion.

ADMINISTRATION

a. Personnel Accounting. No difficulties have been encountered.

b. Awards.

(1) The following awards were processed and recommended to higher headquarters for action.

(a) Navy Cross Medal - 3

(b) Silver Star - 1

(c) Legion of Merit - 2

(d) Navy and Marine Corps Medal - 2

(e) Bronze Star Medal - 14

(f) Navy Commendation Medal - 6

(2) The following awards were received and presented.

(a) Bronze Star Medal - 2

(b) Purple Heart Medal - 19

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c. Promotions.

(1) 1 Gunnery Sergeant to Master Sergeant

(2) 1 Sergeant to Staff Sergeant

(3) 7 Privates to Private First Class

d. Postal. Letter mail service continues to be adequate, though at various times during the month, three or four days go by without letter mail service. The current political situation in Vietnam and strike in CONUS are supposedly the basis for those delays.

e. Pay. No problems encountered during the reporting period.

f. Post Exchange. 4th Marines Post Exchange continues to provide adequate quantities of luxury and necessity items for this Battalion.

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Legal and Discipline.

(1) During the reporting period the following action was taken.

- (a) Special Courts Martial - 5
- (b) Summary Courts Martial - 4
- (c) Battalion Commanders Office Hours - 0

(2) The following legal action is pending.

- (a) Special Courts Martial - 1
- (b) Summary Courts Martial - 2

RECORDS

-4-

Enclosure (1)

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INTELLIGENCE

a. The enemy situation on 01 April 1966 was as follows:

There are two (2) Local Force Companies, the C-117 Armed Unit and the C-116 Armed Unit with an estimated strength of 100 and 80 men respectively, operating in the TAOR. Enemy activity within the TAOR consisted of perimeter harassment by small enemy units during the hours of darkness, limited probing of the outlying Marine units, propaganda meetings with the local populace, infiltration into the TAOR for rice and intelligence gathering.

Enemy units that operate near our TAOR:

(1) Elements of the 95th Regiment with an estimated strength of 500-600 men, is located in the vicinity of grid square ZC 0493. Weapons are unknown.

(2) The 810th (Code name K-10) Main Force Battalion with an estimated strength of 200-300 men is located in the vicinity of grid square YC 9293. Weapons include 2-81mm mortars, 57mm RR, B-40 (RPG) anti-tank weapon, machine guns, SMG and individual rifles.

(3) The 319th Main Force Battalion, located in the vicinity of YD 972005. Weapons include 4-57mm RR, 4 B-40 anti-tank weapon, and 2 75mm RR. The strength is unknown.

(4) HUONG THUY Armed Unit (C-116/D-4), a Local Force Company, with an estimated strength of 80 men has been operating throughout HUONG THUY District.

(5) PHU THU Armed Unit (C-117/D-1), a Local Force Company, with an estimated strength of 100 men has been operating throughout the PHU THU Peninsula.

(6) Elements of the Intelligence-Reconnaissance Company (C-11) have been operating, from a base in the vicinity of YD 785102, in the HUE-NAM HOI-PHU BAI area. The estimated strength is 80 men.

(7) One SAPPER squad, with an estimated strength of 8-10 men, has been operating in the southern portion of the TAOR.

(8) An unknown number of local guerrillas, operating in conjunction with VC Main Force and Local units, are operating in the HUE-PHU BAI area.

b. The enemy initiated the following incidents during the period:

(1) 012130H. An estimated four (4) VC approached a CAC-8 ambush site in the vicinity of YD 818174. Small arms fire was initiated by the ambush with the VC returning fire with a burst of automatic weapons fire. The VC broke contact and withdrew to the south. An immediate search was made with negative results.

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(2) 021945H. Three (3) VC were taken under fire by CAC-3 personnel in the vicinity of their CP (YD 911119). Four rounds of M-79 and approximately 300 rounds of 7.62 were fired. A search of the area was made with negative results.

(3) 022020H to 022105H. Four VC were spotted attempting to probe the perimeter of CAC-2 (YD 912149); a sweep of the area was made with negative results. A booby trap (grenade) located to the rear of the CP was detonated by an unknown individual. A second search was conducted with negative results.

(4) 022125H. One VC was observed and fired on by CAC-1 patrol in the vicinity of YD 815197. The VC returned the fire with several rounds of small arms and withdrew to the southwest, with the patrol in pursuit. After losing visual contact, a search of the area proved negative.

(5) 031935H. While proceeding north on Highway #1 a vehicle with driver and 2 passengers from FOXROT Company received 4 rounds of small arms fire from the vicinity of YD 918112. Several rounds were fired in return with negative results.

(6) 050030H. A sniper fired several rounds of small arms fire at CAC-3 personnel from the vicinity of YD 900115. A patrol searched the area with negative results.

(7) 052220H. Two VC moving southwest, were pinpointed by the S-2 Scouts while operating the AN/TPS-21 in the vicinity of YD 912117. The Scouts opened fire with 5-10 rounds and called for illumination. During the illumination 20-30 rounds of M-60 were fired at the VC who were now moving in a westerly direction. The patrol searching the area found four bundles of rice that were dropped by the VC. The patrol returned with no further contact.

(8) 061900H. Three VC fired approximately 100 rounds of automatic weapons fire at a FOXROT Company vehicle traveling north on Highway #1 in the vicinity of YD 899138. The VC moved across the highway in a northeast direction toward TO DL (YD 908138). The vehicle was turned around, visual contact with the VC was regained and the Marines pursued the fleeing VC. Fifty rounds of 7.62 and 20 shotgun rounds were expended when the VC broke contact and disappeared into a tree line. One hit was sustained in the rear of the vehicle.

(9) 091005H. A patrol from ECHO Company received one round of sniper fire from the vicinity of YD 896123. The area was searched with negative results.

(10) 112205H. One grenade was thrown into the GOLF Company perimeter from the vicinity of YD 905144. Several rounds of small arms and one M-79 round were fired with negative results.

(11) 140305H. Four to five VC near the defensive wire in the vicinity of YD 855128 fired several rounds of small arms toward

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the OP 180 positions. Approximately 50 rounds of small arms fire was returned. The VC withdrew with no further contact.

(12) 172100H. CAC-2 patrol established contact with an estimated six VC in the vicinity of YD 912148, firing 200 rounds of 7.62 and several rifle grenades. The VC dispersed, and withdrew in two groups, one to the west and the other to the southwest. The area was swept with negative results. VC casualties - 3 WLA (possible).

(13) 172115H. Three VC were observed by a HOTEL Company patrol in the vicinity of YD 901141. Ten rounds of small arms were fired at the VC with several rounds being returned. The area was swept with negative results.

(14) 180015H. One VC was observed by MCB-7 personnel moving near the wire (YD 898137). The VC threw one grenade causing negative damage. During illumination, the VC was observed moving into the brush. MCB-7 personnel fired approximately 20 rounds of 7.62 into the area. A search of the area proved negative.

(15) 191915H. CAC-7 patrol fired approximately 200 rounds of small arms fire at three VC in the vicinity of YD 835173. The VC returned fire with 80 rounds of carbine and automatic weapons fire. The VC broke contact and withdrew. The area was searched with negative results.

(16) 201030H. FOXTRAP personnel, traveling north on Highway #1 in the vicinity of YD 921111 received two rounds of sniper fire. A patrol from CAC-3 searched the area with negative results.

(17) 211300H. PF working in conjunction with a CAC-10 patrol in the LOI NUNG area (YD 825198) captured 2 VC.

(18) 220305H. At approximately the same time movement was heard by GOLF Company personnel, they received an incoming grenade. The infra-red searchlight was used to search the area. There was no further contact.

(19) 221325H. A patrol from GOLF Company received small arms fire from the vicinity of YD 787114. An artillery mission was called on the target while the patrol fired M-60, M-79 and 3.5 rocket fire into the area. The artillery rounds were on target; no assessment was made as the target was across the river.

(20) 221330H. An estimated 2-3 VC fired on the GOLF Company water detail from the vicinity of YD 791113. Fire was returned and the area swept with negative results.

(21) 222300H. While in their night time position (YD 827178), CAC-7 patrol opened fire with small arms at 2 VC. The area was searched with negative results.

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(22) 232115H. ECHO Company patrol opened fire on 4-5 VC in the vicinity of YD 884117. The VC withdrew to the southeast with the patrol in pursuit. After losing contact with the VC, a search of the area was made with negative results.

(23) 260619H. While sweeping the Hamlet of THON HA TRU II CAC-5 received several rounds of small arms fire from the vicinity of YD 934143. The treeline was searched with negative results.

(24) 262125H. An estimated four VC fired 10 rounds of small arms fire into CAC-9 CP (YD 933084). The CAC-9 patrol was diverted to search out the area. The search proved negative.

(25) 271400H. An estimated 10-12 VC located in the vicinity of YD 832195 opened fire on a CAC-7 patrol. The patrol returned fire and maneuvered toward the VC position. The area was searched with negative results.

(26) 272100H. An estimated 8-10 VC approached an ambush position occupied by a GOLF Company patrol in the vicinity of YD 795098. The patrol fired at the VC resulting in two VC WIA (possible). After the VC withdrew, the patrol moved to the vicinity of YD 794098 and set in another ambush position. There was no further contact.

(27) 282150H. CAC-8 sent out a patrol to investigate the small arms fire in the vicinity of YD 807190. Arriving in the area, the patrol found that the VC had spread propaganda leaflets in the hamlet. Returning to their IP (YD 898191), movement was heard to the rear of their position. CAC-8 threw one hand illumination which was thrown back at them. A search of the area proved negative.

(28) 282215H. Four rounds of small arms fire were received by ECHO Company patrol in the vicinity of YD 892119. The patrol pursued the VC until contact was lost in the vicinity of YD 895120.

(29) 292325H. ECHO Company patrol spotted three VC in the vicinity of YD 831078. Four rounds of small arms were fired by the patrol as the VC withdrew to the southeast and northwest. Contact with the VC was not regained.

c. Summary of Enemy Casualties, Captured and Captured Equipment.

- (1) VC KIA (confirmed) 0 (possible) 0
- (2) VC WIA (confirmed) 0 (possible) 5
- (3) VCC 2
- (4) VCS 0
- (5) Rallies 3
- (6) Equipment. Clothing, packs and medical supplies.

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d. Significant trends during period.

(1) The enemy continued his efforts of infiltrating small units into the rice area for the collection of rice.

e. Enemy situation at the end of period remain the same as in paragraph a. above with the exception of one new VC battalion, the 319th. This battalion has not been confirmed and indications point to the possibility that it may be a cover name for the 810th Battalion.

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a. Objectives.

- (1) To conduct training on Employment and Safety Procedures on the Claymore Mine.
- (2) To conduct Forward Observer Training for Infantry personnel.
- (3) To conduct FAM fire for all organic weapons.
- (4) To conduct 81mm mortar exercises within the HUE-PHU BAI TAGR.
- (5) To conduct training on RCA agents, munitions available, equipment, employment and M-17 Field Protective Masks.
- (6) To conduct classes on Basic Military Subjects.
- (7) During this reporting period work continued on improving defensive positions, extensive ambushes and patrolling was conducted.

b. Major Training Highlights.

- (1) All companies conducted FAM firing of M-14 rifles, M-60 machine guns, .45 Cal. pistols, M-75 grenade launchers and shotguns during this reporting period.
- (2) 2/1 FSCC conducted a 3 day artillery FO school for 18 men, 2 days consisted of classroom lectures and application, 1 day was utilized in practical application in the field.
- (3) The battalion Ready Reserve was called out for 3 practice alerts. Classes were conducted on basic fire team and squad tactics.
- (4) The Legal Officer presented a 1 hour class on the UCMJ for all officers of this battalion.
- (5) The below is a listing of General Military Subjects taught throughout this reporting period.

(a) Buddy Aid	H&S Company	45 minutes
(b) Poisonous Snakes and Treatment	H&S Company	30 minutes
(c) Field Sanitation	H&S Company	30 minutes
(d) SOI & HST	H&S Company F Company	30 minutes each company
(e) LAAW (Instruction and Safety)	H&S Company E Company F Company G Company H Company	1 hour each company

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(f)	Vietnamese Customs and Religion	H&S Company E Company F Company G Company H Company	2 hours each company
(g)	Patrolling (Squad)	H&S Company F Company G Company	1 hour each company
(h)	Isisatic Compass	H&S Company	1 Hour
(i)	Mines and Booby Traps	H&S Company	45 minutes
(j)	Claymore Mines (Safety and Employment)	H&S Company E Company F Company G Company H Company	1 Hour each company
(k)	Service Record Books	H&S Company	1 hour
(l)	UCMG	H&S Company	30 minutes
(m)	Code of Conduct	H&S Company	30 minutes
(n)	M-17 Field Protective Mask (fitting and masking procedures)	H&S Company E Company F Company G Company H Company	30 minutes each company
(o)	Riot Control Agents (capabilities, employment, and munitions)	H&S Company E Company F Company G Company H Company	1 hour each company
(p)	Use of M-106 Mighty Mite (Turbine Blower/Sprayer)(Employment and Capabilities)	H&S Company E Company F Company G Company H Company	30 minutes each company
(q)	Construction of Defensive Positions	F Company G Company H Company	1 hour each company
(r)	Preparation of Overlays	H&S Company E Company F Company G Company H Company	30 minutes each company

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(s) Radio Procedures and Operations	H&S Company E Company F Company G Company H Company	1 hour each company
(t) Map Orientation and Thrust Lines	G Company H Company	1 hour each company
(u) Elevation and Relief	H Company	1 hour
(v) Marginal Information, and Grid Coordinates	H Company	1 hour
(w) Night Firing	H&S Company E Company F Company G Company H Company	30 minutes each company

Special Operations.

- a. Amphibious operations. None.
- b. Combined operations. One (See enclosure (6)).
- c. Psychological operations. None.
- d. River operations. None.

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Other Special Types of Warfare.

- a. During the reporting period, there were no instances of use by this battalion of NBC Warfare or equipment peculiar to NBC Warfare.
- b. Training Accomplished. During the reporting period seventy-five percent of the command received an average of 2 hours on:
 - (1) Field Protective Masks M-17 (Fitting and Masking Procedures).
 - (2) RCA agents (capabilities, employment and conditions)
 - (3) The Mighty Mite M-106 (Turbine Blower/Sprayer). (The employment and capabilities).
- c. Status of NBC Equipment on hand. All items of NBC equipment authorized by T/E are held by this command and is operational.

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(1) Company E detached Op Con 1/4 effective 201645H March. Detachment terminated 021450H April.

(2) Company L, 3/4 attached effective 231730H March and detached at 030800H April.

(3) G/H Companies detached 1 SNCO and 20 Marines to Shore Party Battalion for security of CALCO Causeway effective 100900H. 10 Marines from Company H returned to 2/1 Op Con at 281500H. 11 Marines, including a SNCO from Company G remained detached.

(4) Lt 121615H attached 3rd Plat, Co L, 1/1 to provide security for M Btry (-) in support of Recon Zone III. Detached to parent unit on 17 April.

(5) Lt 171615H attached 1st Plat, Co K, 3/4 to provide security for M Btry (-) in support of Recon Zone III. Detached to parent unit on 23 April.

(6) FAC Team (1 Officer & 4 Enlisted) detached to Op Con 1/1 for operation VIRGINIA effective 121800H. FAC Team returned to Op Con 2/1 on 30 April.

(7) At 231345H attached 2nd Plat, Co L, 3/4 to provide security for M Btry (-) in support of Recon Zone III. Attachment still in effect.

d. Control. Control of the Battalion was exercised from the Battalion Command Post throughout the entire reporting period. Wire and radio communications continue to be used equally to exercise control over the subordinate units.

e. Problem Areas. No significant problem areas encountered.

Communications-Electronics.

- a. Wire. Normal Operations.
- b. Radio. Normal Operations.
- c. Radio Relay. Normal Operations.
- d. Message Center/Teletype. Normal Operations.
- e. Problems Encountered. None noted.

Close Combat

a. Operations Conducted.

(1) Patrols

(a) Squad size. There were 866 squad size patrols conducted.

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Command and Control

a. Task Organization

2nd Battalion, 1st Marines

H&S Co.

H&S Co

Co E

Co E
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

Co F

Co F
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

Co G

Co G
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

Co H

Co H
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

81mm Mortar Platoon

106mm RR Platoon

b. Command Posts

- | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------|
| (1) 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines | (YD 885136) |
| (2) H&S Company | (YD 885136) |
| (3) Company E | (YD 885136) |
| (4) Company F | (YD 885136) |
| (5) Company G | (YD 885146) |
| (6) Company H | (YD 885146) |

c. Attachments and Detachments.

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b. Significant Events.

(1) Sequential listing of all contacts, general description of scheme of maneuver and results attained

(a) 1 April - At 012130H CAC-8 fired upon 4 VC near their ambush position at YD 819175. The VC immediately broke contact, firing 1 short burst from an automatic weapon and fled south. A sweep of the area was conducted with negative results. There were 23 squad and 2 platoon size patrols conducted with 23 ambushes and 17 listening posts employed.

(b) 2 April - At 022105H CAC-2 reported a booby trapped hand grenade was set off in rear of their CP at YD 911149. CAC-2 swept area with negative results. At 021100H CAC-3 sighted 4 VC vicinity YD 911118. VC were taken under fire and they immediately fled. The VC did not return fire. It was observed that 2 of the VC were armed and all were dressed in black. Contact results: Unknown. There were 25 squad size patrols conducted with 25 ambushes and 17 listening posts employed.

(c) 3 April - At 031935H a mighty mite from Company F received approximately 4 rounds of small arms fire from the west side of Highway #1 at YD 918112. Fire was returned by 2 passengers into the suspected sniper location. The vehicle proceeded on its way to 2/1 CP not stopping to investigate. There were 24 squad and 1 platoon size patrol conducted with 24 ambushes and 17 listening posts employed.

(d) 4 April - At 041000H three North Vietnamese ralliers surrendered to the PF's of CAC-9. The 3 ralliers were turned over to PHU LOC District Headquarters with 3 packs containing clothing and medical supplies. No weapons were surrendered. At 042230H CAC-2 reported a booby trapped grenade was set off in rear of their CP at YD 910149. A fire team conducted a sweep of the area with negative results. There were 25 squad and 2 platoon size patrols conducted with 21 ambushes and 17 listening posts employed.

(e) 5 April - At 050037H CAC-3 patrol reported receiving 2 incoming sniper rounds from vic GC YD 901117. The patrol was located at YD 900115. The patrol moved across the river and conducted a search of the area with negative results. There were no casualties. At 052215H CAC-3 sighted 2 VC via YD 915114. VC taken under fire and artillery illuminated the area. A sweep of the area revealed the VC dropped and scattered 3 to 4 bags of rice. There were no known VC casualties. There were 30 squad size patrols conducted with 24 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(f) 6 April - At 061900H a resupply vehicle from Company F was fired upon by 3 VC at YD 899129 with automatic weapons. The vehicle returned fire and pursued the VC for approximately 300 meters with the VC fleeing North. No casualties were received by enemy sniper fire and no enemy casualties were suspected. There were 26 squad size patrols conducted with 20 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

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conducted. (b) Platoon size. There were 15 platoon size patrols

(c) Company size. None.

(2) Ambushes. There were 693 squad size ambushes employed.

(3) Listening Posts. There were 529 Listening Posts employed.

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(g) 7 April - There were 27 squad size patrols conducted with 20 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(h) 8 April - There were 27 squad size patrols conducted with 22 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(i) 9 April - At 091005H a patrol from Company B received 1 sniper round at YD 896123. Area was searched with negative results. There were 27 squad size patrols conducted with 22 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(j) 10 April - There were 26 squad size patrols conducted with 26 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(k) 11 April - There were 33 squad size patrols conducted with 29 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(l) 12 April - There were 33 squad size and 2 platoon size patrols conducted with 29 ambushes and 22 listening posts employed.

(m) 13 April - At 130245H 2nd Platoon, Company K, 3/4 under Op Con of 2/1 received 2 grenades approximately 30 meters from their position from estimated 2 VC at YD 922054. K-2 opened fire and illuminated the area with the VC fleeing Northeast. Contact results: Unknown. At 132230H OP 180 fired 4 rounds illumination after hearing movement. Negative surveillance. There were 25 squad patrols conducted with 22 ambushes and 22 listening posts employed.

(n) 14 April - At 140310H OP 180 received 4 to 5 rounds of small arms fire into their position. Fire was returned and area illuminated revealing 4 to 5 VC west of the base of Hill 180. The VC broke contact and fled. A search of the area was conducted with negative results. There were 28 squad size patrols conducted with 24 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(o) 15 April - At 152255H MCB-7 sighted 1 VC near their lines at YD 099137. Area was illuminated and 1 frag grenade thrown with the VC fleeing south. At 152235H MCB-7 received dirt chunks in their positions at YD 898137. It was believed the VC were trying to draw fire in order to pinpoint fire position however fire discipline prevented this. At 150240H MCB-7 lines reported unknown number of VC moving between YD 898137 to YD 897136. MCB-7 threw 4 frag grenades resulting in 1 VC KIA (Unconfirmed). There were 33 squad size patrols conducted with 24 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(p) 16 April - At 162130H MCB-7 sighted 1 VC moving towards the perimeter via YD 898137. Area was illuminated and 1 frag grenade expended with negative results. There were 32 squad size patrols conducted with 27 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(q) 17 April - At 172100H a patrol from Company G observed 3 VC at YD 831088 moving southwest carrying weapons. Fire team was dispatched and VC were pursued. VC broke contact and fled southwest. At 172100H CAC-2 patrol made head on contact with 5 VC at YD 912148. CAC-2 took VC under fire and assaulted with the VC dispersing and fleeing southwest. Area searched with negative results. Contact results: 3 VC WIA (unconfirmed). At 172115H a patrol from Company H observed 3 VC via YD 901141. Area was illuminated and VC taken under fire. VC broke contact fleeing south. Area searched with negative results. Contact results: Unknown. There were 33 squad size patrols conducted with 24 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(r) 18 April - At 180015H MCB-7 left flank position reported sighting 2 VC via YD 898137. Area was illuminated and VC taken under fire with small arms, M-79 rounds and frag grenades. A search of the area was conducted with negative results. There were 33 squad size patrols conducted with 24 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(s) 19 April - At 191915H CAC-7 sighted 3 VC at YD 855173. VC were taken under fire and VC broke contact. CAC-7 conducted search of area without further contact. There were no known casualties. At 192030H a sentry from OP 225 movement near the defensive wire. Area was illuminated and 1 frag grenade expended with negative results. At 192130H a tank crewman at Company G lines sighted VC movement through infra-red light on tank. Tank fire 24-30 rounds of 50 Cal. ammunition. Area was illuminated and a sweep conducted with negative results. There were 32 squad size patrols conducted with 24 ambushes and 18 listening posts employed.

(t) 20 April - At 201030H a CAC vehicle enroute to CAC was fired upon by estimated 1 VC at YD 921111. CAC-3 conducted sweep with negative results. There were no friendly casualties. There were 28 squad size patrols conducted with 18 ambushes and 17 listening posts.

(u) 21 April - At 211300H 2 PF's from CAC-8 dressed in black pajamas sighted 2 VC working in rice fields via YD 825198. The PF's called to the VC and the VC unsuspecting walked up to the PF's who captured and turned them over to HUONG THUY District Headquarters. CIT confirmed they were VCC. There were 28 squad size patrols conducted with 18 ambushes and 17 listening posts employed.

(v) 22 April - At 220115H Company G detected movement along defensive wire at YD 886147 and suspected wire cutting. 1 frag grenade was thrown and area illuminated. The lines received 1 incoming frag grenade. There were no known casualties. At 220805H a squad size patrol from Company K received 4 rounds of sniper fire from vic GS YD 8710. One fire team was dispatched to sweep area with negative results. At 221330H a platoon size patrol from Company G came under small arms sniper and 60mm mortar fire at YD 886157. Artillery mission was adjusted on suspected VC areas with good effect on target. Area was searched with negative results. There were no friendly casualties and no known VC casualties. At 222300H CAC-7 patrol sighted 2 VC near their ambush site at YD 827178. VC were taken under fire and CAC-7 pursued the VC with negative results. There were 36 squad size patrol conducted with 24 ambushes and 17 listening posts employed.

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(u) 23 April - At 232111H a patrol from Company B encountered 4 to 6 VC sitting in the patrol route at YD 884127. Patrol opened fire and assaulted to VC with the VC immediately fleeing southwest. At vic YD 892114 contact was lost. There were no known casualties. There were 30 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 21 ambushes and 14 listening posts employed.

(x) 24 April - There were 27 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 25 ambushes and 17 listening posts employed.

(y) 25 April - There were 28 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted with 18 ambushes and 17 listening posts employed.

(z) 26 April - At 260610H CAC-5 received sniper fire from the tree line in vic YD 934143. A search of the area was conducted with negative results. At 262126H CAC-9 received 10 incoming rounds at YD 933084. CAC-9 diverted from scheduled patrol into area where rounds were suspected to have come from and conducted search with negative results. There were no casualties. There were 26 squad size and 1 platoon size patrols conducted and 20 ambushes and 18 listening posts.

(aa) 27 April - At 271400H CAC-7 received incoming small arms rounds from estimated 10 to 12 VC from YD 832198. CAC-7 diverted scheduled patrol by fire maneuver to enemy position to regain contact, VC broke contact in an unknown direction. There was 1 Marine WIA and it was undetermined if there were any VC casualties. At 272033H approximately 8 VC neared ambush site of 1st platoon, Company G at YD 794098. G-1 opened fire and VC broke contact fleeing in an unknown direction. A search of the area conducted at first light revealed numerous blood spots. Contact Results: 2 VC KIA (Unconfirmed). There were 28 squad size patrols and 1 platoon size patrol: conducted and 23 ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(bb) 28 April - At 282130H Op from Company E spotted 2 unidentified personnel standing on northern side of river at YD 886124. 2 Marines from the OP challenged the 2 men and they fled. Company E dispatched a patrol to sweep the river bed at YD 889121. The VC fired 4 sniper rounds at the patrol and broke contact fleeing east. Contact results: Negative. There were 27 squad size patrols and 1 platoon patrol conducted with 19 ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

(cc) 29 April - At 292100H a patrol from Company E sighted 3 VC vic YD 831078. Patrol took the VC under fire, illuminated the area and pursued the VC. The VC broke contact and fled. Contact results: Unknown. There were 33 squad size patrols and 1 platoon patrol conducted with 25 ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

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(d) 30 April - At 301530H, MCB-7 received 3 rounds, small arms (Unconfirmed) enroute to HUE City in vicinity of YD 810189. Vehicle immediately returned to CP area. Negative results. At 302400H, CAC-3 sighted 1 VC in vicinity of fence at coordinates YD 912118. CAC-3 opened fire with small arms and expended 20 rounds. A search of the area yielded negative results. There were 31 squad size patrols and 1 platoon size patrol. conducted with 26 ambushes and 20 listening posts employed.

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

TERMS

-ES-

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LOGISTICS

a. Supply. Rough Rider convoys from Da Nang to Phu Bai Combat Base have increased, therefore supplies are arriving on a more frequent basis. Items that are in short supply are communications spare parts, office supplies, blank forms and concertina wire. Individual equipment has been received, but not in sufficient quantities to fill the Battalion requirements. Some of the items that are in short supply are canteens, canteen covers, steel helmets, first aid packets with components and bayonets.

b. Maintenance. Maintenance functions performed by FLSU #2 have been satisfactory except for typewriter repairs due to a lack of parts. One typewriter has been in for repair since 20 January, one since 9 February and another since 15 March. 143 Tactical Equipment Repair Orders were submitted to FLSU #2 during the month and 63 were completed. Below is a breakdown by section of the work orders submitted and completed:

	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>Completed</u>
Ordnance	56	33
Communications	75	29
Motor-Transport	6	0
Supply	6	1

c. Food Service. Food services personnel and facilities are still overtaxed due to the number of people and the limited facilities available. The mess hall was originally designed to feed 500 men and is currently feeding an average of 1,400 Marines per meal. Messing facilities will come under the control of the 4th Marine Regiment on 1 May 1966.

d. Cantonment and Camp Facilities Development. Future cantonment and camp facilities development for the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines is being provided by higher Headquarters. Future cantonment plans for this organization consist of 110 tropical huts and a 500 man mess hall with a modified galley.

e. Transportation and Roads. Roads within the Phu Bai Combat Base have been maintained in a satisfactory condition. No transportation difficulties were encountered during the month.

f. Fiscal. During the month of April the Battalion obligated \$24,429.25 for Stock Fund Account items. This was a decrease of \$8,374.37 from the previous month.

g. Water. One well has been dug in the Battalion area and is currently in operation. This well provides all the potable water for the Battalion with the exception of the pipeline to the mess hall which runs directly from the 8th R.R.U. Army Compound.

h. Motor Transportation. Preventive maintenance is being performed on a continuing basis. Eighteen new M-422A1 Mighty Mites were received on 18 April and this organization expects to receive 13 new M-274A1 Mechanical Mules. Six M-274 mules are currently in for repairs at the FLSU #2.

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i. Embarkation. This organization has participated in no embarkation or debarkation during the period. A two hour class was held on embarkation with one representative from each company and each section of H&S Company in attendance. An inspection of all cargo and embarkation data was held to determine the embarkation status of each company. Discrepancies were noted and have since been corrected.

j. Hospitalization and Evacuation. Continued support has been provided by Collecting and Clearing Company "A". The Battalion Aid Station treated a total of 1,207 patients during the month.

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Air Defense. None.

Combat Air Support.

a. Aviation units providing support. HMM-163 and 1stMAW attack aircraft.

b. Significant events.

(1) Sequential listing of aircraft employed in CAS. None.

(2) Sequential events of aircraft employed for other than CAS.

2 April - Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.

3 April - Two UH-34D's used for troop lift from LZ GOONEY to Hill 225.

4 April - Two UH-34D's used for troop lift of 11 men to coordinates 829139 from LZ GOONEY.
Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.

5 April - Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.

6 April - Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.

7 April - Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.

8 April - Two UH-34D's used for troop lift from LZ GOONEY to Hills 180/225. Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.

9 April - Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
Three UH-34D's used for troop lift of 26 men from LZ GOONEY to Causeway.

10 April - Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
Three UH-34D's used for troop lift of 23 men from the Causeway to LZ GOONEY.

11 April - Two UH-34D's used for troop lift of Pay Master to 1/4 CP. Two UH-34D's used for troop lift of 5 men to 1st Marine CP at CHU LAI from LZ GOONEY. Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.

12 April - Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.

13 April - Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
Two UH-34D's used for troop lift from LZ GOONEY to Hill 225.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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- 14 April- Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
- 15 April- Two UH-34D's used for troop lift from LZ GOONEY to Hill 180/225.
- 16 April- Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
- 18 April- Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
Two UH-34D's used for troop lift of 11 men to Hill 225 from LZ GOONEY.
- 20 April- Two UH-34D's used for the resupply of Hills 180/225.
- 22 April- Two UH-34D's used for Recon of area at YD 9111 to YD 9117. to YD 9611 to YD 9111. Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
- 23 April- Two UH-34D's used for troop lift from LZ GOONEY to Hill 225.
- 24 April- Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
Two UH-34D's used for troop lift from LZ GOONEY to Hills 180/225.
- 25 April- Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
- 26 April- Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Golf Red-1 on Hill 163 from LZ GOONEY.
- 27 April- Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Hills 180/225.
Two UH-34D's used for water resupply of Golf Red-1 from LZ GOONEY to YD 800109.
- 28 April- One UH-34D used for water resupply of Hill 225.
Two UH-34D's used for resupply of Golf Red-1 from LZ GOONEY to YD 797120.
- 29 April- Two UH-34D's used for troop lift from LZ GOONEY to Hills 180/225.
Two UH-34D's for resupply of Hills 180/225.
- 30 April- 1 UH-34D used for recon of area YD 8803 to YD 9103 to YD 9107 to YD 8807. Two UH-34D's used for gear pick up from Golf Red-1 to LZ GOONEY.

ENCLOSURE (1)
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MEDICAL AND DENTAL SUP. ORP

- a. Medical Officers:
(1) Battalion Surgeon - LT Anthony O. COLEY, MC, USNR
(2) Assistant Battalion Surgeon - Allan S. PIRNIQUE, MC USNR
- b. Hospital Corpsmen - 57
E7 - 2
E6 - 8
E5 - 10
E4 - 25
E3 - 12
- c. Significant Events: NONE
- d. Medical Trends: 114 cases of diarrhea were treated during the month, 18 were diagnosed as Amebic and 55 as bacillary dysentery. Five cases of laboratory confirmed hookworm were treated.
- e. Number of Combat Casualties Treated; Three Marines were treated for combat injuries.
KIA * 0
WIA's - 3
- f. Number of Non-Battle Casualties Treated; 793 men were treated at the Battalion Aid Station.
- g. Preventive Medicine and Sanitation: An aggressive sanitation program continues in effect with a noticeable drop in diarrhoeal diseases.
- h. Civil Affairs Medical support rendered:
(1) Number persons treated; 2,804
(2) Amount, by type, of medicine dispensed is as follows:
- | | | |
|-----|----|--|
| 5 | G1 | Alcohol |
| 30 | Pg | Benzalkonium Chloride Tinc, 3's |
| 34 | Bt | Calamine Lotion, Phenolated |
| 20 | Tu | Garna Benzene Oint. 1% |
| 24 | Tu | Hydrocortisone Oint. 1% |
| 40 | Bt | Hydrogen Peroxide Sol. 1 lb. |
| 21 | Jr | Nitrofurazone Oint. 1 lb. |
| 206 | Ck | Soap Surgical, 40z |
| 40 | Tu | Undecylenic Acid Oint. 1oz |
| 7 | Bt | Lapixin Tablets, 1000's |
| 3 | Bt | Codeine Sulfate tabs, 1/2gr. 100's |
| 2 | Bt | Eugenol, 1oz |
| 13 | Tu | Dibucaine Oint. 1%, 1oz |
| 18 | Bx | Cetylpyridinium Chloride Lozenges |
| 3 | Bt | Chlorpheniramine Maleate Syrup, 1 Gal. |
| 9 | Bt | Chlorpheniramine Maleate Tabs. 4mg. 1000's |
| 23 | Bx | Oxytetracycline-Polymyxin-B oph. oint. 1/8 oz 10's |
| 40 | Cn | Diarrhoea Tabs. 1000's |
| 14 | Bt | Sodium Bicarb Charcoal and peppermint tabs. |
| 204 | Bt | Octivitamin drops 30cc |
| 4 | Bx | Chloroquine Hcl Inj. |

5 Bt Chloroquine Phosphate tabs.
 1 Bt Primaquine Phosphate tabs.
 1 Bt Sulfadiazine Tabs.
 20 Bt Sulfasoxazole tabs. 1000's
 36 Bt Leetyl Sulfasoxazole Oral Susp. 1pt
 24 Pg Benzathine Penicillin G.
 4 Bt Chlorotetracaine Hcl. Caps. 4gr. 100's
 41 Bt Erythromycin Tabs. 4gr. 100's
 36 Bt Erythromycin Ethylcarbonate for oral susp.
 24 Bt Hexylresorcinol Pills
 36 Bt Oxytetracycline for oral susp.
 6 Bt Piperazine Syrup 1pt
 21 Bt Tetracycline tabs. 4gr. 100's
 4 Bt Trisulfapyrimidines, oral syrup 10% 1 pt.
 34 Bx Water for inj.
 7 Sl Adhesive Plaster
 4 Pg Cotton Purified, 1 lb
 48 Pg Pad Gauze, 4x4 200's
 65 Pg Pad Gauze, 2x2 100's
 12 Pg Applicator, Wood, Cotton tipped 100's
 3 Pg Blade, Surgical Prep. Razor, 5's
 6 Bx Depressor, Tongue, Wood, 500's
 5 Bx Needle, Disposable, 18 ga. 100's
 5 Ea Thermometer, Human Oral
 6 Pg Bottle, Screw Cap, Prescription 2oz, 72's
 2 Bk Label, Prescription, 750's
 12 Pg Envelope, Drug Dispensing, 100's
 9 Pg Box, Ointment 12's

1. Problem areas: NONE

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT/COMMUNITY RELATIONS.

a. Significant Activities.

On 19 April 1966 a squad of the Combined Action Company was moved to the village of Thuy Duong (YD 798195) causing the CAC influence to be extended approximately two miles further north along Highway # 1. The squad has developed a defensive position adjacent to the village. The corpsman assigned to the squad conducts a daily sick call for the villagers at the village headquarters. The people have shown no hesitation in taking advantage of the medical assistance and twenty to thirty villagers are treated daily.

Corpsmen of the Combined Action Company treated 2,390 civilians during the month of April. Twenty-one civilians were medically evacuated for treatment to "A" Medical Battalion.

b. Material Distributed.

- (1) Soap - 666 bars
- (2) Tooth brushes - 222
- (3) Food - 140 kilograms of rice
- (4) Clothes - 138 pounds.

c. Special Civil Action Projects. None.

d. Apparent results of Civil Affairs Program. The general attitude of the villagers is receptive and friendly. The medical assistance has been especially effective and there has been very little evidence of the political demonstrations within the Battalion TAOR that have been so prevalent in the HUE area this month.

ENCLOSURE (1)
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Chaplain Support

a. Name of Chaplain: Lt. Thomas B. HANDLEY, CEC, USNR.

Chaplain Support: LCDr N.W. HUBBLE, 4th Marines Catholic Chaplain, conducted Eight Sunday Masses with Nine hundred, seventy-two in attendance, and twenty-six weekday masses with Two hundred, eighty-four men in attendance.

b. Protestant Services. Sixteen Sunday Services were held with four hundred, ninety-four men in attendance and ten weekday with eighty-one in attendance. One Memorial Service was held with thirty men in attendance.

c. Number of Personnel receiving counselling: Twenty-five.

d. Significant Activity:

(1) The chaplains of the Phu Bai Combat Base conducted joint Holy Week Services. Each chaplain was responsible for one day of the week.

(2) A joint Protestant Sunrise Service was held by the chaplains of the Phu Bai Combat Base.

(3) The lecture series "The Religions of Viet-Nam" was delivered seven times to all units of 2/1.

(4) The chaplain of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines is being sent T.D to the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines on 30 April 1966.

e. Facilities. The chapel facilities are excellent.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (Rein)
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

BNO 1550.1
3:AJB:ugh
2 April 1966

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BATTALION ORDER 1550.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Troop Indoctrination Program

Ref: (a) DivO 1306.1

Encl: (1) - Troop Indoctrination Subjects
(2) - Orientation Schedule for Newly Arrived Personnel
(3) - Statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk
(4) - Guide for Troop Indoctrination
(5) - Rules of Engagement
(6) - Individual Coordinating Instructions/Safety Instructions
(7) - Treatment of Captured Personnel
(8) - Troop Indoctrination Subjects for Rotating Personnel

1. Purpose. To set forth and implement an expanded training program to ensure that personnel of this battalion serving in the Republic of Vietnam receive information and education on Vietnam and to publish a training program for newly arrived and rotating personnel.

2. General. It is necessary for each member of this command to be afforded the opportunity to learn the meaning of the conflict in Vietnam. This knowledge will enable all Marines to serve with an understanding of the challenges they face and be better able to meet these challenges. Additionally, measures are desirable that assist the rotating Marine who may possibly be interviewed by news media upon arrival in CONUS. Limited observation, lack of information or lack of understanding, of our role in Vietnam, should not contribute to rotating personnel making thoughtless comments which create erroneous impressions and degrade the excellent record earned by Marines in defeating the Viet Cong and our providing assistance to the Vietnamese people through civic action programs.

3. Action. In accordance with reference (a):

a. All personnel will be indoctrinated in the subjects listed in enclosure (1) by unit leaders.

b. The orientation schedule set forth in enclosure (2) will be conducted as centralized training under the supervision of the S-3.

c. The contents of enclosure (3) will be promulgated by Unit Commanders to all personnel within their command.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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EnO 1550.1
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d. Rotating personnel of this command will be indoctrinated as indicated in enclosure (6) by the S-1.

4. Information. Assistance is available from the S-3 Training Section.

E. Z. Grabowski

E. Z. GRABOWSKI
By direction

DISTRIBUTION: A plus 10 copies to S-3

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EnO 1550.1
2 April 1966

Troop Indoctrination Subjects

1. Why we are Here.
2. Relationships with the Vietnamese People
3. Vietnamese History, Culture and Customs
4. The Code of Conduct, Discipline and Conduct
5. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Missions and Objectives
6. The Free World Effort in Vietnam
7. The Nature of the Viet Cong
8. Monthly Recapitulations of Military Activities in Vietnam
9. Topics of Local Interest

BnO 1550.1
2 April 1966

ORIENTATION SCHEDULE

<u>Time</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Instructor</u>
0900	Welcome Aboard	C.O.
0915	Intelligence Briefing	S-2
0930	"Guide for Troop Indoctrination" Rules of Engagement/Pursuit. Mission of the Battalion	S-3
1000	Logistics Instructions	S-4
1015	Administrative Briefing	S-1
1030	Preventative Medicine	BAS
1045	Morale Guidance	Chaplain
1100	SgtMajor's Briefing	Bn Sgt Major

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EnO 1550.1
2 April 1966

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK

The United States would like to see Hanoi and Peiping and Moscow and others come to a conference table and find a peaceful solution in Vietnam. Many efforts to seek a peaceful settlement have been made by the United States and others; Through bilateral diplomacy, the machinery of the Geneva Conference, the machinery of the United Nations, the appeals of India, the proposed Commonwealth Peace Mission, President Johnson's offer of unconditional discussion, and all sorts of public and private initiatives. But Hanoi and Peiping have turned down all suggestions for a peaceful settlement.

Meanwhile, the United States is continuing to meet its commitment in Vietnam. This is a simple commitment: To assist the government and people of South Vietnam to preserve their independence. Hanoi has been sending tens of thousands of armed men into the south.

It was said in Peiping recently that the object in South Vietnam is capitulation of the United States.

The United States is not going to capitulate, but, on the other hand, we do not want or ask for surrender by Hanoi, or surrender by Peiping. All we are asking them to do is stop shooting at people at whom they have no right to shoot, and take home the people that have infiltrated into South Vietnam, including some of the regular North Vietnamese armed forces. The objective of the exercise is that Hanoi and Peiping learn to live at peace with their neighbors.

Many of the questions in regard to the prosecution of the War in Vietnam concern bombing of targets in North Vietnam. The United States has no desire to inflict damage upon the civilian population of North Vietnam, nor indeed upon the daily livelihood of these people. U.S. planes have been hitting the northwestern part of the country; such things as ammunition dumps, depots for gasoline and oil to supply the infiltration forces, barracks, radar sites and military targets of that sort.

The United States is not waging war upon the civilian population of North Vietnam, nor the North Vietnam regime as such. The United States has never undertaken to destroy that regime, but simply wants them to stop bothering their neighbors. We hope very much that they will realize, before this gets into a much larger conflict, that this is the essential purpose.

The bombing attacks on military installations in the north have had an important practical effect upon the ability of the north to support or to increase the support of their effort in South Vietnam.

The United States had never expected that bombing in itself would be a decisive element. But it is important that the aggressors have discovered that they are not going to be permitted to send tens of thousands of guerrillas to attack South Vietnam while continuing to live in safety and comfort there in the North.

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The idea of the sanctuary is dead as far as this situation is concerned; and that is something that all of the others who may be supporting Hanoi must take fully into account.

The Viet Cong have been suffering very substantial casualties in the past few weeks, not only in infantry action but also from bombing. Nevertheless it would seem that the refusal of Hanoi and Peiping to come to the conference table is based upon their hope that they will achieve something substantial during these next weeks and months. But that is not going to happen, because the United States will do what is required to prevent it.

Current Viet Cong operations are basically still in what might be called the guerrilla stage; they are still attacking undefended district towns and the civilian population. They have not sustained a battalion in combat for more than a day or two at a time.

The central point remains the fact of the U.S. commitment in South Vietnam. The integrity of the commitment has a major bearing upon similar commitments of the United States in other parts of world; and the integrity of the American commitment is the principal pillar of peace in the present world.

Since 1945 there have been many episodes in which the communist world has resorted to force. They left behind troops in Iran with the aim of taking over that country. Guerrillas came down from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia against Greece. There was the blockade of Berlin, there was the massive invasion of South Korea. There have been many efforts in this Post-war period to take over neighbors by force.

This is because that American people and most of their friends abroad are dedicated to the idea of building a peaceful and decent world order. The problem is how to bring these acts of aggression under control, to turn them back and in the process organize a more stable peace in the world. That has been, and is, the objective of U.S. Policy.

President Johnson has made it clear that the United States, in accordance with its simple commitment, will do what is required in Vietnam.

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BnO 1550.1
2 April 1966

Guide for Troop Indoctrination

Marines -

Welcome to Vietnam - Many people have asked why are we here? The answer to that is relatively simple. We are here to stop the spread of communism; stop it before it spreads further, enslaves more people, takes over in all of Southeast Asia. We cannot stand aside and let nation after nation fall in virtual slavery until finally it threatens our country or mankind.

As it was in Korea, once again the freedom of people is being seriously challenged. This time the scene is Vietnam. The character of the threat is somewhat different but the basic concept using suppression and aggression to force a false doctrine upon a population is the same. We have been asked to come to the aid of this population, but make no mistake, it is as much our fight as theirs. Had this threat to free people gone unchallenged, all of Southeast Asia would have been lost, next year it would be another country and perhaps in a decade our own USA. So then, today, our challenge is here in Vietnam.

Many people have also asked why do the Communists want Southeast Asia? The most obvious, of course, is that it would give a stepping stone to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Eventually they would build seaports at Denang, Saigon, Bangkok and Rangoon. It would put them closer to the rich areas of Australia and New Zealand. If they were to oust the United States Forces and its allies in Southeast Asia it would serve as a further incentive to attempt aggression in other parts of the world. It would mean a breakdown of faith in ability in and desire of the U.S. to support freedom seeking countries. That is why they want this country as a start and why we are here to prevent their taking it.

Since we are here, there are certain basic things we should know and practice:

Number One: Remember we are guests in Vietnam - These people have been fighting for a long time against the Communists. They need and deserve our help because it is our fight too. They have asked us to come and help and we are here to do just that; without asking favors or special privileges.

Number Two: We'll have better allies among them if we get to know them. Really join them. Learn about the way they live, respect their way of life, their customs - their laws. Remember it's their country - learn as much of their language as you can - even a few words or phrases will help you in many ways.

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April 1966

Number Three: Be polite to their women, respect them as you would your own mothers, sisters, wives or sweethearts. This will go a long way in winning over the people who are sitting on the fence - wondering whether you are the monsters the Viet Cong claim you are.

Number Four: Make friends with their soldiers and the rest of the people. They can be a big help to you - you may be fighting side by side with them or depending on them to guard your rear and flanks. It is your advantage!

Number Five: Give the Vietnamese the right of way whether you are walking or driving - remember, as I said, it is their country. You are bigger than they are physically - our cars & trucks are more powerful than theirs - be a little patient - don't push them around.

Number Six: The Vietnamese are a quiet people - they don't approve of loud, unusual behavior or sky-larking. They are dignified - try and match their dignity.

Number Seven: The long time they have been fighting has made many of them poor. By their standards - all of us are wealthy - don't make a public display of your money and what you have that they don't. By the same token don't over-pay them for what you buy - this only hurts the whole system.

Number eight: Remember, you are representing the United States and the Marine Corps in every way - whether you are fighting or on liberty. Be smart - Shape up - Be a Marine in every way!

Number Nine: Be alert no matter where you are - the Viet Cong cannot be identified by appearance alone - be ready to react in the manner in which you have been trained.

If you will follow these nine points we'll go a long way to winning this fight - we will gain the confidence and help of the people and that is really what we want.

From the standpoint of fighting - we have a tough, slippery and smart enemy. But we've got most of the marbles - we've got air superiority, we've got the artillery, we've got the ships and most of all we've got the training! We are beginning to hurt the Viet Cong badly - he is hungry and becoming desperate - he had never fought an enemy that reacts the way we do - our fire teams and squads can and have fought him and beat him on his own ground - by being smarter, tougher and more aggressive. He is finding out what it means to fight a trained military force instead of murdering defenseless village chiefs, school teachers, medical technicians, and kidnapping doctors and other officials as he has done.

We have come a long way in recent months - but we still have a long way to go. This is one we've got to win and I'm looking to you Marines to give your best at all times. We cannot afford to let Communism take over in this country - if we do most of Southeast Asia is lost - The Viet Cong know it - we know it - lets win this one big!

UNCLASSIFIED

BnO 1550.1
April 1966

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Unit Commanders may direct fire when:

- (1) They observe and positively identify a person or persons as enemy.
- (2) Fire is being delivered on friendly troops.
- (3) Personnel are attempting, by hasty or suspicious acts, obviously to avoid contact with friendly forces.
- (4) Requested to fire by friendly Vietnamese commanders after approval from appropriate RVNAF Officials.

UNCLASSIFIED

1550.1
April 1966

INDIVIDUAL COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS/SAFETY REGULATIONS

1. Body armor mandatory for personnel manning defensive positions. Body armor optional on patrols/operations. Any individual desiring to wear body armor may be permitted to do so.
2. Steel helmet or ballistic helmet liner mandatory for all patrols or operations and during the hours of darkness on defensive positions.
3. No weapon will be loaded with a round in the chamber unless immediate firing is considered necessary.
4. Loaded magazines will be inserted in weapons only when directed by unit commanders. This will be based upon an analysis of the type duty being performed and the tactical situation.
5. Loaded magazines will be removed from the weapon immediately upon being relieved of duties requiring such loading. The weapon will be cleared and the chamber will be checked.
6. Unless authorized by competent authority magazines will not be inserted in weapons in a permanent camp area.
7. When removing a round from the chamber or a magazine from the weapon, all weapons will be pointed upward at a 45 degree angle.
8. All weapons containing live ammunition will be in a "SAFE" condition unless required by the tactical situation.
9. All weapons prior to being cleared, will be inspected in the same manner as indicated above, just as if a round were in the chamber and/or a loaded magazine in the weapon.
10. Skylarking with weapons, practicing fast draws, and pointing weapons at individuals will not be tolerated.
11. All weapons will be treated as loaded weapons at all times.

UNCLASSIFIED

BrO 1550.1
2 April 1966

Treatment of Captured Personnel

1. Captives are in the power and custody of the detaining power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them.
2. Each unit is responsible for the handling of captives whom it apprehends.
3. Captives will in all circumstances be treated humanely while in the custody of U.S. Forces and U.S. Personnel, and must be protected against acts of violence.
4. No violence will be done to their person, no outrages of any kind committed against them, pending delivery to higher headquarters, the wounded and sick will be cared for.

UNCLASSIFIED

1550.1
2 April 1966

TROOP INDOCTRINATION SUBJECT FOR ROTATING PERSONNEL

1. A Marine, returning to the U.S. may speak of his unclassified experiences, but:

- a. Stress accuracy of experiences
- b. Avoid exaggeration
- c. Avoid hearsay

2. Indoctrination program will:

a. Ensure rotating personnel comprehend and understand why they have been here in Vietnam.

b. Point out that any frivolous comments rotating personnel may make could have adverse effects on Marines remaining behind in Vietnam, in their fight for the freedom of the Vietnamese people.

HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 1st Marines
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3:JC:rjc
1300
5 April 1966

COMBAT INSTRUCTION #2

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: VC Pursuit

Ref: (a) CG, Third MarDiv msg 250820Z March 1966
(b) COMUSMACV msg 010235Z March 1966

1. References (a) and (b) provide guidance and information on the principles for pursuit of the Viet Cong as part of the primary mission of every commander. It further states that a commander who fails to pursue the Viet Cong after contact is established, is considered to have failed in part of his primary mission.

2. The company, platoon, squad, and fireteam levels of command normally will be most concerned with pursuit tactics, therefore, discussions must be stressed on those levels. An aggressive, indoctrinated Marine on the squad and fireteam level is the most effective element to conduct timely pursuit which makes it possible to FIND, FIX, and DESTROY the Viet Cong.

3. Unit commanders will be prepared to intervene on contacts in behalf of isolated ARVN units and those contacts developed locally. The following is offered as a guide to assist in planning pursuit tactics:

a. Plan to respond on short notice with maximum effectiveness in order to insure vigorous pursuit upon engagement.

b. Develop planning check lists which will insure maximum use of aerial surveillance, artillery, and air strikes on likely Viet Cong withdrawal routes.

c. Instill the attitude of the hunter when conducting aggressive Search and Destroy operations.

4. This Combat Instruction should be reviewed for each new replacement joining subordinate units of this Battalion. Pursuit tactics is recommended as a topic for the interchange of ideas in unit discussion groups for developing and improving pursuit tactics.

E. Z. Grabowski

E. Z. GRABOWSKI
By direction

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

ENCLOSURE (3)

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 1st Marines
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FPMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

BnO 3100.1A
3:JC:rjc
5 April 1966

BATTALION ORDER 3100.1A

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Sparrow/Hawk

Ref: (a) Div OpO 364-66
(b) Regt OpO 329-66

1. Purpose. To promulgate instructions on the operation of the Battalion Sparrow/Hawk.

2. Cancellation. Battalion Order 3100.1.

3. Background.

a. In order to exploit enemy contacts and sightings, which cannot be engaged effectively by supporting troops already on the ground, a need arises for a small ready reserve. (Sparrow/Hawk).

b. The Sparrow/Hawk will consist of the following personnel:

	<u>No. of personnel</u>
(1) Officer or NCO	1
(2) Corporal	1
(3) Artillery F.O.	1
(4) Radio Operator	1
(5) 3.5 Rocket Team	2
(6) Machine Gun Team	2
(7) T.O. Rifle Squad	<u>14</u>
Total	<u>23</u>

4. Action.

a. Sparrow/Hawk stand-by force will be assigned to subordinate units of this Battalion by Battalion Bulletin.

ENCLOSURE (4)

BnO 3100.1A
5 April 1966

- b. Sparrow/Hawk will be designated from the rifle companies for the period 0730-1730 daily and from H&S Company for the period of 1730-0730 daily.
- c. Sparrow/Hawk will maintain a state of readiness to be able to deploy on a five minute alert by means of motor vehicle and/or helicopter.
- d. OIC's or NCO's in Charge of Sparrow/Hawk will report to the BOC by 0715H and 1715H daily for confirmation of details and receive a general briefing.
- e. Surface transportation (1 truck) will report to the BOC at 0715 and 1715 daily for dispatching to the Sparrow/Hawk Company. (Attn: S-4).
- f. Communication equipment (PRC-10 radio) will be maintained in Battalion Communications Center for immediate pick-up by the Sparrow/Hawk. The radio provided will be on the Battalion TAG Net and completely checked out prior to issue. (Attn: Comm O).
- g. Upon notification that the Sparrow/Hawk may be committed, the OIC or NCO will immediately report to the BOC or other place designated for a briefing by the Battalion S-3 Section. In the event the Sparrow/Hawk is to be heli-lifted, the briefing will take place in the HMM-163 pilot briefing room. (eg. location of LZ, direction of approach, etc.).
- h. Sparrow/Hawk deployment by helicopter will require each unit to prepare and assign personnel into heli-teams with appropriate cards or rosters. This will be done in advance.
- i. The Battalion ALO will check with HMM-163 at 0715H and 1715H daily to insure that the 3 UH-34's, the stand-by helicopters, are in fact, alerted to the Sparrow/Hawk requirements.
- j. The OIC or NCO in charge of Sparrow/Hawk will report to the Battalion S-2 for debriefing in the event Sparrow/Hawk is committed.

E. Z. Grabowski
E. Z. GRABOWSKI
By direction

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

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SUMMARY OF OPERATION

UNIT: Foxtrot Company. Combined Action Company.

SIZE OF OPERATING FORCE: 4 Reinforced CAC Squads.

TYPE OF OPERATION: Population Control, Search and Destroy highlighted by a river crossing. (See attached overlay).

NARRATIVE: Foxtrot Company, Headquarters (-) plus 4 CAC squads conducted population control/search and destroy operation on the night of 25 April and morning of the 26th of April 1966. The squads were reinforced with national police, engineer personnel with a mine detection capability. The river crossing was conducted by swimming at 2300-2400 on the 25th of April with ambush sites established through 260430H. The search commenced at 260430H and the Civic Action Med Cap Team commenced operating - the operation secured at 261030H.

EVALUATION: While the operation didn't produce tangible results with VC and weapons, the operation provided valuable experience for the PF's involved and for future operations. The surprise element was highly successful in getting all personnel into position without detection from the local population.


RESULTS: Negative.

ENCLOSURE (6)

UNCLASSIFIED

Combined Action Company Operation Overlay for
Period 25-26 April 1966

Ref: Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Sheets 6560 II and III



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2/11 April 66
w/ Encl. 6