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21 Feb 1979

Signature

Date 7/10/92

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/1

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 February 1968 - 3 March 1968

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3 Bn, 1st Marines S&C No. 00 522-68
Copies 1 of 20 copies

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 3/1
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
APO San Francisco, California 96602

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3/THS/rmh
3000
9 Mar 68
005-68

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 February 1968 - 3 March 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) 9th Mar Brigo 5750.1B

Encl: ✓(1) Battalion Landing Team 3/1 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b), and (c) enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This letter downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

J. V. Knapp
J. V. KNAPP
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Acting

SLF TaskGoup 79.5
S&C Control No 0010113

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	✓ Combat After Action Report (Operation BADGER CATCH).	

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PERIOD COVERED

1 February 1968 - 3 March 1968

A. UNIT DESIGNATION

1. Battalion Landing Team 3/1

Company I
Company K
Company L
Company M

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

3rd Plt (Rein), Co C, 1st Tank Bn
3rd Plt (Rein), Co C, 5th AT Bn
1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st MT Bn
3rd Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn
4th Plt (Rein), Co B, 3rd AmTrac Bn
1st Plt (Rein), Co D, 1st Recon Bn

2nd Plt (Rein), Co C, 1st Med Bn
Det, Co A, 1st SF Bn
Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div
Det, LSU, For Log Cmd

2. Attached Units

Btry C, 1st Bn, 11th Mar
Btry W, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar

LtCol M. MCQUOWN

Capt. L.R. MORAN
Capt. J.E. REGAL
Capt. E.S. HEMPEL
Capt. R.A. THOMAS
(31 Jan-15 Feb)
Capt. R.B. LEWIS
(15 Feb-3 Mar)
Capt. R.J. FISHER
Lt. R.E. PARRISH
Lt. D.L. BROWN
Lt. T.B. BOGEL
Lt. C.J. MALONEY Jr
Lt. E.L. METZIGER
Lt. P.R. YOUNG
(31 Jan-7 Feb)
Sgt. D.M. WOO
(7 Feb-3 Mar)
Lt. M.R. POMERANTZ
Lt. R.J. HEXUM
Lt. R.W. RIPP
Lt. A.M. COWARD

B. STAFF OFFICERS

XO
S-1

S- 2
S-3
S-4

Maj. W.M. THURMAN
Lt. M. PALLO Jr
(31 Jan-9 Feb)
Lt. S.E. GRIFFIN
(9 Feb-3 Mar)
Lt. R.D. TEMPLETON
Maj. T.H. SHANNON
Capt. D.E. NEWELL

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Embarkation Officer

Communications Officer

Air Liaison Officer

Supply Officer

Motor Transport Officer

Chaplain

Medical Officer

1stLt A. VAART

(31 Jan-7 Feb)

2dLt C. D. EMBREY

(7 Feb-3 Mar)

Capt. J. S. BECKER

(31 Jan-3 Feb)

Capt. R. G. SKINNER

(3 Feb-3 Mar)

Capt. C. E. FLEMING Jr

2dLt P. G. MCCARTHY

2dLt T. B. VOGEL

Lt A. A. GUETTERMAN

Lt G. F. CARLOMAGNO

C. LOCATION

01 Feb 68 - 18 Feb 68: See PART IV.

18 Feb 68 - 290600H Feb 68: Operation SALINE - Quang Tri
Province, RVN.290600H Feb 68 - 03 Mar 68: Operation SALINE/NAPOLEON -
Quang Tri Province, RVND. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
63	1574	7	86

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H. LOGISTICS

See PART IV.

I. CIVIL ACTION

See PART IV.

J. ADMINISTRATIVE

1. Awards Two Navy Commendation Medals were received from CG 9th MAB to be awarded as soon as conditions permit. The BLT has recommended three Silver Star Medals and ten Bronze Star Medals as of this writing and many more will follow as soon as the combat situation permits.

2. Legal and Discipline Two investigations of injury were initiated to inquire into circumstances of possible misconduct. There were no courts-martial or non-judicial punishments during this period. Two men remain "UA", having missed movement on 29 February, 1968, when the ARG returned from the Philippines. Overall discipline remains excellent.

3. Postal Mail delivery has been as good as possible under the combat conditions present. Mail was re-routed twice when the BLT staff section moved ashore to Dong Ha while the ARG was in the Philippines. Lack of space available for the sorting and storing of mail continues to be a problem.

4. R&R Quotas The BLT did not receive its R&R quotas for February until 18 February, however it used all possible quotas since none had been available since 1 December 1967. The quotas used were: 7 for Bangkok, 10 for Hawaii, 6 for Hong Kong, 2 for Kuala Lumpur, 5 for Sidney, 5 for Taipei, 3 for Tokyo, and 1 each for Manila, Penang, Singapore, and Okinawa.

5. Promotions There were 75 regular promotions for Corporal, 64 for Lance Corporal, and 15 for PFC during the period. There was one meritorious promotion to Sergeant, as well as two combat meritorious promotions to both Sergeant and Corporal. There were 16 promotions to First Lieutenant and one to Captain.

6. Pay and Allowances All men in the field were given an opportunity to send pay to their next of kin by endorsed government checks. In addition, all Marines being transferred, going home on emergency leave, or filling R&R quotas were paid prior to their departure.

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7. Post Exchange Post Exchange facilities were very limited due to combat operations. However, sundry packs were issued to meet most health and comfort needs.

8. Religious Services During this period, with the BLT ashore, Chaplain Hugh O'Regan conducted one Roman Catholic Mass for the BLT. Forty worshipers attended. Other Masses were canceled due to tactical maneuvers. However, Roman Catholic Lay Services were conducted by lay leaders. The Battalion Chaplain conducted nine protestant services with total attendance of 435. There were also three protestant Lay Services with 50 attending. Chaplain Clark Tea of the 1st AmTracs conducted two services for "C" Battery with 123 attending.

9. Personnel Changes

	USMC		USN	
(a) Losses	Officer	Enlisted	Officer	Enlisted
Battle	5	165	0	8
Admin	7	136	0	0
(b) Replacements	11	272	0	5

K. MEDICAL/DENTAL AFFAIRS

During the first 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ weeks of February BAS and the C&C Plt remained aboard the Valley Forge handling casualties resultant from BLT 3/1's operations ashore.

On 12 Feb 68 it was decided to set up a BAS ashore. The Battalion Surgeon along with $\frac{1}{2}$ the BAS corpsmen excluding the casualty reporting section joined the BLT ashore at this time. The personnel remaining aboard ship continued to function as before.

On 17 Feb 68 the remainder of the BAS along with two doctors and 10 corpsmen from the C&C Plt off loaded and proceeded to "D" Co 3rd Med Bn at Dong Ha to reinforce that facility. The remainder of the C&C Plt stayed aboard the Valley Forge to render continuing care to the patients already hospitalized. It was subsequently decided to set up a rear area BAS at the mouth of the Cua Viet River in the 1st AmTrac Bn cantonment. This was done by the Assistant Battalion Surgeon and a contingent of BAS corpsmen on 20 Feb 68.

L. INTELLIGENCE

See PART IV.

M. COMMUNICATIONS

See PART IV.

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N. **WEATHER**

See PART IV.

O. FIRE SUPPORT

See PART IV.

P. AIR SUPPORT

See PART IV.

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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 3/1
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

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03/THS/rmh
3000
14 Mar 1968
Ser. No. 0003-68

From: Commanding Officer
To: CTG 79.5

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation BADGER CATCH)

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67
(b) MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series 6442 IV

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay
(2) Sketch Maps of Major Engagements
(3) Extracts From S-3 Journal

1. Operation BADGER CATCH

2. Dates and Location.

a. Operation BADGER CATCH began on 23 January 1968 and was terminated on 18 February 1968.

- (1) Phase I of Operation BADGER CATCH lasted from 231630H Jan 68 until 261400H Jan 68 and was under the control of CTG 79.5.
- (2) Phase II: at 261400H Jan 68 BLT 3/1 CHOP to 3rdMarDiv and continued basically the same mission under control of the 1st AmTrac Bn with code name SALINE. For BLT 3/1, this phase continues as of the end of this reported period.

b. The mission assigned to BLT 3/1 was to clear the north bank of the Cua Viet River and adjacent areas of enemy forces. The mission has remained unchanged throughout the operation. The exact boundaries of the area of operation were adjusted numerous times; however, all BLT 3/1 activities were conducted within 10,000 meters of the mouth of the Cua Viet River. See enclosure (1).

3. Command Headquarters

- a. BADGER CATCH 231800-261400H Jan 68--SLF B (CTG 79.5) aboard USS VALLEY FORGE.
- b. SALINE from 261400H Jan 68--1st AmTrac Bn--1st AmTrac Bn Combat Base (YD 345695).


SLF Task Group 79.5

S&C Control No. 000004

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
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TAB A




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4. Task OrganizationBLT 3/1H&S CO (-) (Rein)

Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div
 Det, Hq Co, 1st Mar
 Det, Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar
 Det, Comm Plt, Hq Co, 1st Mar
 Det, Dental Co, 9th MAB
 2d Plt (Rein), Co C, 1st Med Bn
 3d Plt (Rein) (-) Co A, 1st Eng Bn
 Det, LSU, For Log Cmd
 Det, Co A, 1st SP Bn
 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st MT Bn
 (At 262040H Jan 68 a provisional rifle co
 (Co N) was formed utilizing personnel from
 attached units)

Lt. Col. M. MCQUOWN

Capt R. J. FISHER

Co I (Rein)

Co I

Det, H&S Co
 FAC Tm
 Det, Med Plt
 FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
 NGF Spot Tm
 Det, Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar
 Tm, 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn
 HST Tm, Det, Co A, 1st SP Bn

Capt L. R. MORAN


Co K (Rein)

Co K

Det, H&S Co
 FAC Tm
 Det, Med Plt
 FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
 NGF Spot Tm
 Det, Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar
 Tm, 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn
 HST Tm, Det, Co A, 1st SP Bn

Capt J. E. REGAL

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Co L (Rein)

Capt E. S. HEMPEL

Co L
Det, H&S Co
FAC Tm
Det, Med Plt
FO, 81mm Mortar Plt
Det, Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar
Tm, 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn
HST Tm, Det, Co A, 1st SP Bn

Co M (Rein)

Capt R. A. THOMAS

Co M
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plt
FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
Det, Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar
Tm, 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn
HST Tm, Plt, Co A, 1st SP Bn

23 Jan - 15 Feb

Capt R. B. LEWIS

15 Feb - 18 Feb

Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar

Capt P. A. MCLAUGHLIN

Btry W, 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Capt J. T. WINKLER

81mm Mortar Plt

Lt K. M. HAGGERTY

3d Plt (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn

Lt R. E. FARRISH

4th Plt (Rein), Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn

Lt E. L. METZIGER

1st Plt (Rein), Co D, 1st Recon Bn

Lt P. R. YOUNG

23 Jan--7 Feb

Sgt D. M. WOO

7 Feb--18 Feb

3d Plt (Rein), Co C, 5th AT Bn

Lt D. L. BROWN

Tk Plt, BLT 2/4--assigned in direct support of BLT 3/1 as of
27 Jan 68.

AmTrac Plt, BLT 2/4--assigned in direct support of BLT 3/1.

5. Intelligence

- a. Enemy strength prior to operation. The AOA was the normal operating area of elements of the 303d and 812th Regiments, 324th NVA Division. In addition, VC units of up to company size were believed operating in the general vicinity of Mai Xa Thi and Vinh Quanh Ha near the Cua Viet River.

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b. Enemy Strength, Mission, and Tactics During the Operation.

Interrogation of POW's taken during the operation confirmed that the enemy units contacted during the early phases of the operation in My Loc, Xuan Khanh, Lam Xuan, and Le Xuyen were subordinate to the 803d NVA Regiment. The heaviest contacts were with elements of the 3d Bn, 803 Regiment, but POW's were also taken from units of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 803d Regiment, as well as one POW who claimed to be from the 4th Bn, 270th Regiment. The primary mission of enemy units in the AOA was to harass and interdict waterborne traffic on the Cua Viet River between the Cua Viet port facility and Dong Ha Combat Base. Prior to, and at various times during the operation the enemy conducted attacks by fire on river traffic utilizing small arms, automatic weapons, rocket launchers, and mortars. To accomplish his primary mission, the enemy had moved units of up to company size into hamlets that fronted on the Cua Viet River and had set up fortified defense positions.

The enemy established fortified defensive lines on the edges of the hamlets, with defensive positions in depth running back into the center of the hamlets themselves. In many instances he converted the "family" type bomb shelters that had been constructed by the civilian population into fortified positions for his own use. The enemy defended his positions with tenacity and skill and did not attempt to break contact until after dark in the apparent belief that the friendly forces would pull back and establish defensive positions as darkness approached. He was largely unsuccessful in this tactic because BLT 3/1 continued the attack throughout the night when necessary and made extensive use of illumination to light the battle area and to deny the enemy access to escape routes.

Enemy units contacted during the operation were armed with normal small arms, heavy and light machine guns, recoilless rifles, 60mm mortars and 82mm mortars. Extensive use was made of RPG-2 and RPG-7 rocket launchers against friendly tanks, antos, and amtracs. Anti-tank mines were placed in likely avenues of tracked vehicle approach and were successful in disabling several tracked vehicles. Noteworthy was the almost complete absence of booby traps and other surprise firing devices in the captured hamlets, indicating that the enemy believed he could hold these areas against friendly attack and had not anticipated the direction nor intensity of friendly actions.

The enemy displayed the ability to direct and adjust artillery fire on maneuvering friendly units as well as on friendly defensive positions. However, his artillery fires were of short duration and largely ineffective. Relatively few friendly casualties and equipment damage were the direct result of enemy artillery fires.

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Both field radios and field telephones were captured during the operation, indicating the enemy's communication capabilities. In Lam Xuan, where the enemy's battalion CP was located, wire communications had been laid from a central bunker to a number of outlying bunkers for command and control coordination. Among the items taken from one radio operator's field pack in the area was a map with one of the friendly thrust points marked on it. However, the thrust points had been changed several days earlier due to a suspected compromise.

The large amounts of captured weapons and equipment taken during this operation as well as a number of classified documents, diaries, etc, also support the belief that the enemy intended to hold his positions and was only forced by intense friendly pressure to segment his units and attempt to withdrawal.

In summary, the main enemy tactic during the operation was to attempt to defend and hold in his fortified hamlet positions, in order to utilize these locations to interdict traffic on the Cua Viet River. The only large-scale aggressive action he attempted was in the early morning hours of February 2 when he conducted a battalion size attack on the nightdefensive positions of Co K. However, intelligence developed from documents and POW's taken several days earlier in the operation had indicated such an attack was imminent. In light of this intelligence Co K had moved their defensive position several hundred meters just after dark. The enemies preparatory artillery and mortar fire was directed harmlessly on the previously vacated positions. When he launched his ground assault, he was exposed to intense friendly artillery and naval gunfire attack, as well as small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fires from the new Co K positions. This attack cost the enemy 141 dead as well as the loss of a large number of individual and crew served weapons.

- c. Terrain. The most prominent terrain feature within the AOA was the Cua Viet River running southwest to northeast. A belt of sandy barren soil extends inland about 5000 meters on both the north and south banks of the Cua Viet. This area has some hamlets, cultivated fields and paddies but large areas are barren and uninhabited. An extensive paddy area borders on the sandy area. It is heavily populated with numerous hamlets and is a rich rice growing area. Treelines along the river and within the hamlets were composed mostly of a species of pine tree and bamboo which provided the enemy excellent concealment and ideal locations for his fortifications. Extensive paddy areas prohibited the use of wheeled vehicles and in many cases proved difficult for tracked vehicles.

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- d. Weather. Weather for the first five days of the operation was characterized by early morning fog and then bright, sunny weather with unlimited visibility. For the remainder of the operation, the weather was typical of the "Crachin" period, characterized by fog, light drizzle, and ceilings generally under 200 feet. Both tactical and resupply operations by air were severely hampered and in many cases resupply had to be effected by LVT from the 1st AmTrac Battalion location near the mouth of the Cua Viet River. The poor weather during the period also contributed materially to the trafficability problems encountered in the area by tracked vehicles.
6. Mission. BLT 3/1's mission during Operation BADGER CATCH was to clear the north bank of the Cua Viet River and adjacent areas of enemy forces.
7. Execution.
- a. Concept. At the start of the operation, it was known that NVA forces had occupied positions on the north bank of the Cua Viet and from these positions had begun to interdict river traffic between the mouth of the Cua Viet River and Dong Ha Combat Base. Recent ARVN attacks on these positions had produced uncertain results and enemy strength in the area was unknown. BLT 3/1 landed at the mouth of the Cua Viet and began search and clear operations in the hamlets along the north bank. The direct support artillery battery was positioned within the 1st AmTrac Bn Combat Base to provide necessary fire support. NVA units were to be forced from positions along the river and when necessary the BLT would occupy strategic positions to prevent re-occupation by the enemy.
 - b. Operations. BLT 3/1 found that the NVA still occupied strategic locations along the north bank despite recent ARVN operations. Five separate attacks were launched from 23 January to 3 February to secure enemy held positions. A combat base was established at My Loc (YD 305680) to protect Btry W and the 81mm Mortar Plt. On 14 Feb 68 BLT 3/1 was directed to move to the south bank of the Cua Viet and to sweep the heavily populated rice growing area adjacent to the river. Operations in this area continue as of the end of the reported period with one engagement so far at Vinh Lai.
 - c. Major Engagements. A summary of engagements involving units of a company size or greater follows. Sketch maps for each action appear in enclosure (2).
 - (1) My Loc (YD 305680) 25 Jan 68. Co K attacked prior to dawn on a narrow front. Rules of engagement applied and "prep" fires were not used. One platoon moved around to the right flank to block. The blocking platoon came under intense close in small arms fire.

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Tanks reinforced Co K and assisted in evacuation of wounded. Tanks exchanged fire at very close range with enemy anti-tank weapons. Despite 5 RPG hits, no tanks were lost. Co K withdrew and enemy positions were shelled with artillery, Naval gunfire, and CAS. Co K assaulted again in the afternoon and was able to sweep through the enemy positions with little resistance as the enemy had withdrawn. The hamlet was occupied and a combat base established. This site was selected because of its strategic location relative to river traffic.

- (2) Lam Xuan (1) (YD 285689) 26 Jan 68. Co I assaulted Lam Xuan (east) from east to west on the afternoon of 26 Jan 68. Initially there was no resistance. As Co I reached the first treeline of the hamlet, they came under heavy small arms fire. Snipers opened up from the scrub area to the rear of Co I's lines inflicted moderate casualties and causing the attack to bog down. Casualties were evacuated with the aid of tanks, but only with difficulty. The attack was discontinued because of darkness.
- (3) Lam Xuan (2) (YD 285689) 28 Jan 68. Co L attacked with one and two platoons of tanks in direct support. Three tanks were knocked out by mines moving into the attack position. Co L made contact in the first treelines of the hamlet. The advance was slow and deliberate to ensure no enemy were by-passed. During the afternoon Co K moved up on line and attacked with Co L. As darkness approached the enemy began to break. The attack was continued well into the night under illumination. This was the first time the NVA displayed their often repeated tactic of withdrawing at dusk.
- (4) Mai Xa Thi (East) (YD 286672) 31 Jan 68. Co M moved into the attack position under cover of darkness. Co K moved one platoon down from the north to conduct a diversionary attack on the opposite side of the hamlet. Surprise was achieved; however, the enemy rapidly adjusted his defenses. Co M attacked throughout the day. A section of LVTH-6's arrived in direct support of Co M at about 0930H. Good progress was made on the left but none on the right. Co I moved up by LVT on the left to allow Co M to concentrate on the right flank. Co L moved up to assist Co M and Co I. Throughout the operation the enemy delivered effective mortar, artillery, and RR fire from their positions across the river in the western part of the hamlet. At dusk the enemy broke. Co M and Co I moved forward continuing the attack under illumination.

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Night defensive positions were established about 2300H. The remainder of the position was occupied the next morning. Among the weapons captured were a 32mm mortar and a 12.7mm machine gun.

- (5) Lam Xuan (3) (YD 285689) 2 Feb 68. The third battle at Lam Xuan was enemy initiated. Initially Co K occupied a defensive position within the hamlet. The company shifted its position 200 meters to the East after darkness in response to an intelligence report which predicted an attack. The enemy launched his attack from the north just before 0400H. Co K LP's gave warning of the enemy's approach. An intense mortar barrage fell on Co K's old position, completely missing Co K. All supporting fires and illumination were brought to bear on the enemy and his attack became confused and stopped short of Co K's position. Despite heavy losses, large numbers of the enemy remained close to Co K's positions after daylight. They used positions left over from previous battles. Co M with tanks was brought up to assist Co K. It took all day to drive the remaining enemy from the hamlet. A hasty body count was made and weapons were collected before withdrawing south at darkness.
- (6) Vinh Lai (YD 326637) 16 Feb 68. This engagement resulted from sweep operations south of the Cua Viet. After clearing adjacent villages Co L encountered heavy small arms fire as they entered Vinh Lai from the north east. Tanks and ontos were in direct support but terrain hindered their effectiveness. Co I moved to a position on the west side of the hamlet and was able to effectively block the enemy's escape attempts. Supporting arms including air were used effectively and by night fall Co L was within the hamlet. Co I with one tank in support killed many of the enemy as they tried to flee at dusk. Co I moved into the hamlet and set up a defensive position in conjunction with Co L.

d. Supporting Arms.

- (1) General. The quality and amount of available fire support was outstanding. In addition to BLT 3/1's two attached batteries, fire support was available from the LVTH-6 battery supporting the 1st AmTrac Bn, 3dMarDiv artillery, Naval gunfire ships and air. Tanks, ontos and LVTH-6's delivered direct fire in close support of attacking infantry. Extensive use of all available supporting fire made it possible to maintain a favorable casualty ratio against a determined and well dug-in defender.

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(2) Artillery. Artillery support consisted of 375 observed fire missions, 3 TOTs and numerous battery, one H&I's and other unobserved missions. An approximate total of 18,000 rounds 105mm, 6000 rounds 107mm, and 300 rounds 155mm and 8" were expended. The heavy schedule of H&I fires was delivered on areas of known enemy activity and in response to intelligence information passed from higher echelons. Close-in missions were fired as close as 50 to 100 meters in front of advancing infantry units and were instrumental in weakening enemy resistance. Firing units were cooperative and responsive. Communication difficulties were minimal. Overall, artillery support was utilized to its maximum with excellent results.

(3) Naval Gunfire. NGF was used extensively in support of BLT 3/1 during operation BADGER CATCH. A total of 14 different ships were used for close supporting, counterbattery, saturation, and H&I type missions.

NGF ships delivered 1,170 rounds of close supporting fires during actions Lam Xuan (2) and Lam Xuan (3). The attack by fire of Mai Xa Thi (west) from 4 Feb to 14 Feb was supported with 5,363 rounds of NGF. NGF Whiskey Papa proved especially effective for producing fires to burn the cover from enemy positions.

In all a total of 10,143 rounds of NGF was expended in support of BLT 3/1 during this operational period. In addition NGF units under control of Third Marine Division provided suppressive fire against enemy artillery batteries whenever the BLT received incoming rounds. Good availability of ships and ammunition enabled NGF to provide a valuable service in conjunction with the BLT's organic supporting arms.

(4) Air Support.

(a) CAS. BLT 3/1 used 36 two-plane flights consisting of Marine A-4's, A-6's, F-4B's and F-8's; Navy A-4's and Air Force F-4C's. These planes dropped 411 250 lb bombs, 140 500 lb bombs, and expended thousands of 20mm rounds, and several hundred 2.75 inch rockets. Reported battle damage was 75 structures destroyed, 400 meters of trench line damaged, 20 bunkers destroyed, 11 secondary explosions, 28 NVA KIA confirmed and 11 NVA KIA probable. The amount of CAS available was adequate considering that prevailing bad weather prevented CAS on most days. On occasions when weather permitted use of CAS, its effectiveness was minimized by a failure to adhere to schedule and the inability of the DASC to predict the time of arrival on station.

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For this reason CAS was reduced to the roll of a supplemental supporting arm, to be used when available, but not to be depended upon. Once close support aircraft arrived and established communications with ground/air controllers, their performance was excellent providing accurate and effective close support for ground troops.

- (b) TPQ-10's. Extensive use was made of TPQ-10 directed aircrafts for dropping bombs on suspected enemy locations and supply routes. Some difficulty was encountered on several occasions when bombs were dropped off target endangering friendly troops.
- (c) Flareships. Flareships were used on several occasions to support attacks continuing past dark. Some difficulty was encountered because DASC was unable to predict when the aircraft would arrive on station. After adjusting the flares on target illumination was outstanding.
- (d) AO's. BLT 3/1 had the services of AO's in O-1, O-2 and UH-1E aircraft. O-1 and O-2 aircraft proved more satisfactory due to their greater endurance on station and better availability from incountry sources.
- (e) Medevac's. HMM 165 provided helicopters for medevac throughout the reported period. The medevac flights provided excellent support often flying into "hot" LZ's and flying while the weather was below minimum.

e. Logistics

- (1) The LSA was established aboard the LPH-8 on D-Day and remained aboard until 2 Feb 68 at which time it was transferred to Dong Ha for a two day period. The LSA was re-established aboard LPH-8 on 4 Feb remaining so through 16 Feb 68. Moving ashore on 16 Feb 68 the LSA was established with one detachment at Dong Ha Combat Base and one at 1st AmTrac Bn Combat Base. The LSA remains in these positions as of the end of the reported period.
- (2) HMM-165 provided helicopters for resupply from 23 Jan 68 through 16 Feb 68. After this period resupply was staged at Dong Ha Combat Base and moved to 1st AmTrac Bn Combat Base by LCM for distribution to BLT units by LVTP-5.
- (3) The major problem encountered during the reported period was the nonavailability of certain Class IV resupply items, such as 81mm ammo, at Dong Ha Combat Base during the period 2-4 Feb 68.

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f. Communications: Communications were very good. Some minor problems were encountered with mutual interference, but frequency changes usually solved them. Use of the LVT-C was beneficial from a communications point of view. Although power difficulty precluded constant use of the command tractor's radios, the tractor provided a dry communications center and excellent antennas for the PRC-25 radios.

8. Resultsa. Friendly

(1) USMC Casualties

(a) Enlisted

KIA: 40WIA: 233MIA: 0

(b) Officers

KIA: 3WIA: 11MIA: 0

(2) USN Casualties

(a) Enlisted

KIA: 4WIA: 11MIA: 0

(b) Officers: None

(3) Equipment Damage

(a) Tanks: 3 damaged - AT mines.

1 damaged - Enemy AT fires.

1 Submerged and destroyed during combat operations.

(b) LVTP-5: 2 destroyed by AT mines.

b. Enemy(1) Personnel

(a) NVA KIA (Conf): 376

(b) NVA POW: 22

(c) VC Suspects detained: 23

(2) Weapons captured

(a) AK-47 rifles: 64

(b) SKS carbines: 28

(c) RPD light machine guns: 15

(d) RPG-2 rocket launchers: 11

(e) RPG-7 rocket launchers: 6

(f) SC-43 7.62mm machine guns plus 2 spare barrels: 4

(g) RF-46 company size machine guns: 2


(h) 82mm mortars: 2

(i) 60mm mortars (U.S. type): 2

(j) 75mm recoilless gun: 1

(k) 12.7mm (DSHK) heavy machine gun, AA mounts, tripods and 2 spare barrels: 1


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- (3) Grenades and Mines Captured
 - (a) Grenades, "Chi Com": 412
 - (b) Grenades, M-26: 22
 - (c) Grenades, Soviet Fragmentation: 16
 - (d) Claymore mines, "Chi Com": 6
 - (e) Claymore mines, U.S.: 2
 - (f) Satchel charges: 4
 - (g) Anti-tank mines: 10
 - (h) NVA Bangalore torpedoes: 4
- (4) Ammo Captured (by rounds)
 - (a) 82mm mortar: 248
 - (b) 75mm recoilless gun: 42
 - (c) 60mm mortar: 168
 - (d) 57mm recoilless rifle: 4
 - (e) RPG-7: 33
 - (f) RPG-2: 58
 - (h) 7.62mm: 45,902
 - (i) 30 cal. carbine: 120
 - (j) 12.7mm/50 cal: 6450
- (5) Gas Mask Captured
 - (a) NVA type: 108
 - (b) U.S. type: 4
 - (c) VC type: 33
- (6) Miscellaneous Equipment Captured
 - (a) Field Radios: 3
 - (b) Field Phones: 2
 - (c) AK-47 magazines: 221
 - (d) Keying device: 1
 - (e) Large boxes of medical supplies: 3
 - (f) 82mm mortar wrenches: 10
 - (g) assorted documents and 782 gear.

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


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9. Commander's Analysis

- a. Fire Support Coordination. Delays in coordinating supporting fires in the SACC were unacceptable. Most of the difficulty resulted from artillery and Naval gunfire being checked for aircraft far in advance of the aircraft entering the danger area. Difficulty with CAS resulted from a combination of the ship's inadequate communications and the in-country control agency's inability to predict the arrival of aircraft on station. Difficulty with check fires in connection with resupply and medevacs resulted from the SACC's attempt to check all supporting fires as soon as the helicopters left the ship without regard to gun-target lines or the tactical situation. In this operation, terrain features and gun-target lines were such that easily followed flight lanes were available that did not require a check fire until the landing zone was reached. While SACC was controlling supporting fires, check fires in excess of fifteen minutes resulted from medevacs. After passage of control ashore, they rarely exceeded four minutes. Instances of unnecessary check fires occurred throughout 25 January during the attack on My Loc. On 26 January, excessive check fires resulted from medevac flights. In one instance BLT 3/1 was told that no medevac helicopters would leave the ship until all fires were checked. This occurred during an extremely tight situation, showing a complete disregard by SACC of the tactical situation ashore. Basic principles are being forgotten. Fire support coordination should be conducted at the lowest echelon possible. The communications capability in the BLT FSCC was at least as good if not better than that of the SACC. The BLT supporting arms coordinators were certainly in better position to monitor the tactical situation. It must also be remembered that the coordination of air support involves more than checking surface fires when aircraft take off. In many cases helicopters can be vectored around surface fires without any check fire at all. In other instances aircraft can be held outside the impact area while surface fire missions are completed. Only the BLT Air Liaison Officer is sufficiently aware of all aspects of the situation to effect coordination of this type.
- b. Helicopter Support. HMM 165 provided outstanding helicopter support during the period in which helicopters were available. The squadron's policy of tree top flying was ideal for the BLT. Low flying reduced the time for landing and take off and minimized the duration of check fires. This policy also prevented long range enemy observation of landing zones and minimized the instances when long range artillery fires were brought to bear on the landing zones.

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


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10. Lessons Learned

- a. Use of LVTH-6. The LVTH-6 was found to be an effective substitute for delivering direct fires in areas where water barriers preclude tank use. The 105mm howitzer was more effective than the 90mm gun for reducing dirt and log fortifications and fighting holes. Care must be exercised to protect the LVTH-6 from close in anti-tank fires. The thin skin and high silhouette make it an easy target. Another factor increasing its vulnerability is the necessity to turn the turret to the side for maximum depression thereby exposing the side of the vehicle to the enemy.
- b. Use of Direct Fire Weapons. The use of direct fire from tanks, ontos and LVTH-6's is essential if casualties are to be kept at a minimum. The fire power, armor, and better trafficability make tanks superior to ontos and LVTH-6's. BLT 3/4 found that tanks can be used effectively in generally unfavorable terrain provided a careful reconnaissance is made and due care exercised by tank crews. The psychological effect of attacking armor was significant. It was noted that despite high exposure to the enemy's many anti-tank weapons, no tanks were knocked out by enemy fire. A high rate of ordinance expenditure by the tanks and close cooperation with protecting infantry were contributing factors in avoiding enemy AT fire. The 106mm HE round of the ontos is extremely effective. However, its inferior trafficability, small ammunition capacity and lack of armor detract from its usefulness as a direct support weapon.
- c. Use of the Tank Xenon Search Light. The visible light feature of the Xenon light proved valuable when attacking under illumination. The light was used to mark flanks, maintain orientation for attacking ground units and to illuminate areas of suspected enemy activity.
- d. Stereotyped NVA Tactics. Except for his one attack, the enemy's tactics always followed the same pattern. He established a well camouflaged and well constructed 360 degrees defensive perimeter within a hamlet. He held his fire until friendly units were extremely close. He fought tenaciously and skillfully during daylight hours neither retreating or surrendering. At nightfall he would withdraw and if closely pursued leave his dead and equipment. Success was amplified during the latter stages of the operations by anticipating their tactics and taking appropriate countermeasures.

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- e. Lack of Intelligence. Despite extensive use of the reconnaissance platoon, air observation and reliable intelligence reports from higher echelons, BLT 3/1 was not able to ascertain when the enemy occupied a given area. All areas that could be occupied by the enemy were assumed to be defended and were all attacked rather than occupied. This practice consumed time and resources but prevented the kind of surprise encounters which had been costly on previous operations.
- f. Effect of Indirect Fires. Despite large volume and good coverage, indirect fires were relatively ineffective in reducing the enemy's defensive positions. His positions are well constructed and only subject to damage from direct hits. During actual fire fights he is usually not subject to friendly mortar and artillery fires because of the closeness of contact. Friendly units should assume minimum effect from preparatory fires in planning and decision making.
- g. Effectiveness of Enemy Weapons. The enemy's best weapons were his individual weapons, machine guns, grenades, and mortars. In most cases mortars were used at ranges less than 1000 meters and were accurate and effective--particularly the 82mm. The enemy's AT fires were very poor. Despite his many AT weapons and large number of targets available only one vehicle was knocked out by AT fires and it was not seriously damaged. As usual AT mines were highly effective. AP mines and surprise explosive devices were not used. The enemy's artillery fires were poorly adjusted and the blast effect of most of the rounds encountered was relatively small.
- h. S-2 Recommendations for Future Operations.
- (1) The intelligence effort was seriously hampered by the lack of a competent interpreter attached directly to the BLT. The local exploitation of POW's was satisfactory only on those occasions when direct interrogation was accomplished in the field using a "borrowed" interpreter.
 - (2) An interrogator/translator team attached to and working directly with the BLT in the field would have reduced considerably the time and effort involved in processing and evaluating the large quantities of captured documents taken throughout the operation.

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- (4) The "beach jumper" teams used in psychological operations were largely ineffective due to the constantly changing tactical situation. It is recommended that in future operations ashore, the "psyops" team remain aboard ship "on call" to the BLT. When it is apparent that the BLT will be in static positions for a number of days and a target for "psyops" exists, the BLT will initiate a request for the teams.
- (5) The Provisional Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) personnel attached to the BLT during the early phases of the operation were of little value. It is recommended that PRU's not be attached to the BLT for future operations ashore.
- (6) The handling of POW's, captured weapons and equipment, and the prompt forwarding of captured documents to the intelligence section was outstanding throughout the operation, reflecting the efforts of the small unit leaders and individual marines. Several days prior to this operation, classes on the handling of POW's and captured material had been conducted aboard ship by the S-2 section on the platoon level. It is recommended that whenever possible in the period between operations ashore, similar classes be included on the shipboard training schedule to be conducted by S-2 personnel.
- (7) Thrust points were changed four times during the operation due to a suspected compromise and the remainder of the times due to length of time they had been in use. The difficulty in disseminating new thrust points to widely separated supporting units is apparent. Therefore, it is recommended that intelligence estimates for future operations include three alternate sets of thrust points, the changeover could then be effected by a simple message informing unit leaders to switch to an alternate set at a given time.


J. V. Knapp
J. V. KNAPP
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Acting

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(C-4)

ENCLOSURE (1)
BLT 3/1 OPERATION OVERLAY
OPERATION BADGER CATCH
MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000,
AMS SERIES 6442 IV



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
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ENCLOSURE (2)
LAM XUAN (3) 2 FEB 68

USMC	NVA
KIA WIA	KIA POW VCS
8 37	141 7 0



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

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ENCLOSURE (2)
WINH LAI 16 FEB 68

USMC		NVA	
KIA	WIA	KIA	POW VCS
2	14	47	2 0



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
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ENCLOSURE (2)
LAM XUAN (2) 28 JAN 68

USMC		NVA		
KIA	WIA	KIA	POW	VCS
8	41	69	2	0



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
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ENCLOSURE (2)
MAI XA THI (EAST) 31 JAN 68

USMC	NVA
KIA WIA	KIA POW VCS
12 46	44 2 0



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
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ENCLOSURE (2)
MY LOC 25 JAN 68

USMC		NVA	
KIA	WIA	KIA	POW VCS
6	9	20	1 2

31




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RIVER


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


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


ENCLOSURE (2)
LAM XUAN (2) 26 JAN 68

USMC	NVA
KIA WIA	KIA POW VCS
8 29	17 2 0



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BLT 3/1 - Chronology of Events - Operation BADGER CATCH/SALINE

231850H-Co I landed at LZ Robin and has moved to Blue Beach to set up night defensive positions.
 231910H-Co L reports they landed at Red Beach at 1900H and Blue Beach at 1910H.
 231925H-Bn CP lands in LZ Robin.
 231950H-Co K lands at LZ Robin.
 232005H-Co L and Co I have joined together and are digging in.
 232100H-CP and Co K moving by AmTrac to Blue Beach.
 232130H-CP and Co K arrive at Blue Beach from LZ Robin.
 232200H-Co L's position report: YD 336702.
 232230H-Btry "C" has landed.
 232355H-Tanks arrive at Blue Beach and have been positioned with Co K and Co I.
 240211H-Ontos landed at Blue Beach and are positioned with Co I and Co K.
 240530H-First elements of Co L departing to secure LZ Sparrow.
 240655H-Co L is at northern tip of Obj 1.
 240713H-Leading elements of Co I have reached Obj A.
 240825H-Co I is searching Obj A.
 240840H-LZ Sparrow is secure.
 240946H-At 0830H Co L found one M-26 grenade at YD 324700. Grenade was blown in place with C-4.
 240953H-Co L reports receiving fire from general direction of Obj 2.
 240958H-Co L reports that an LCM was blown up south of Obj 2.
 241015H-Co I has cleared Obj A and B and is moving to Obj C.
 241038H-CP group moving out. Co K informed to have four tanks ready to go.
 241120H-Co M lands in LZ Sparrow.
 241130H-CP and Co L receiving 8 rounds incoming artillery from a northerly direction.
 241200H-81mm Plt lands in LZ Sparrow.
 241335H-Co I at Obj C receives 8-10 rounds SAF.
 241340H-Co K's position report: YD 320693. New CP location: YD 315705.
 241430H-Co L is ready to move to island area at YD 315663. Co L will be lifted by helicopter to obj area.
 241625H-AO reports observing 300-400 civilians moving across river at YD 318683.
 241630H-Co L has landed first wave with negative contact.
 241650H-Remainder of Co L has landed.
 241655H-Co K receiving 10 rounds of 130mm artillery south of Obj 2.
 241705H-Co K receiving 7 rounds of 230mm artillery resulting in 3 WIA's 1 of which was non medevac.
 241715H-Co K receiving 14 rounds of 130mm 50 meters north of Co K's CP.

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ENCLOSURE (3)
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241800H-Position reports received as follows: Co M (YD 316692), Co K (YD 317705), Co I (YD 313714), Co L (YD 307663).

242152H-Co L reports initial search of area with negative results. Will continue tomorrow.

250510H-Co L at 0330H received 20 rounds SAF. Returned fire and wounded 1 VC with M-26 grenade, capturing 1 AK-47.

250725H-Co K receiving SAF from Obj 2.

250920H-Tank hit by RPG rocket round at YD 315687.

250921H-Co L receiving SAF at YD 293667.

250926H-Co K trying to get wounded out.

250940H-ARVN's report NVA Bn with 57mm RR at Obj 2.

250958H-Ontos Plt sent to join Co M.

251000H-Co K reports WIA's have been evacuated by tank.

251030H-Co K reports pulling back from Obj 2. One tank was hit by RPG round but still operable. Commencing to bring all supporting fires to bear on Obj 2.

251030H-First air strike in progress.

251035H-Co L and Co I's position reports same as last night.

251205H-Co K receiving 10 rounds of 130mm artillery.

251230H-Co K at YD 308683 reports receiving 800 rounds semi and automatic weapons fire from fortified positions since 0730H. Tank reported 15 anti tank rounds fired by enemy with 5 hits. Action up to this time resulting in 3 NVA KIA.

251231H-Second air strike in progress on Obj 2.

251245H-Co K says that the berm wall at the edge of Obj 2 has not been hit by supporting fires.

251335H-Third air strike now in progress. Supporting arms are set to follow.

251435H-Fourth air strike now in progress.

251450H-Co K is now moving toward the obj. Artillery is supporting Co K's movement.

251515H-Co K has moved well into obj area with negative contact.

251535H-Co K taking SAF.

251550H-Co K well into obj finding fighting holes and RPG-7 rocket launcher in excellent shape.

251620H-Co K reports 12 rounds 130mm artillery hitting in front of their position. Direction of incoming: 5700 mils.

251715H-Sparrowhawk platoon landed at CP location and will remain for night defense.


251805H-Co K receiving 19 rounds incoming mortar fire.

251830H-Co I LP reports observing 9 NVA moving in treeline with packs and weapons at YD 298692. Called in fire mission. Results unobserved.

251935H-Position reports received: CP (YD 312710), Co K (YD 306683), Co I (YD 299693), Co L (YD 345697), Co M (YD 317705), Btry "C" (YD 345697).

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252025H Received Frag Order #4 from SLF Bravo.

252250H-Preparations made for TOT and TPQ-10 on area in vicinity of YD 284689.

252338H-Co I at YD 298693 observed 25 people in open and engaged with grenades and SAF. Will check out the area at first light.

260015H-TPQ-10 completed with bombs on target.

260600H-TOT now in progress on suspected NVA Bn in fortified position.

260725H-Co I has one detainee. Will be forwarded on first available helicopter.

260730H-Co M challenged small boat at YD 345689. Boat did not respond. Fired on boat. Search of river after losing sight of boat revealed nothing.

260845H-Co K's air strike delayed 30 minutes. Co K will use other supporting arms and will not wait for air. Co K will jump off at 0915H toward Obj 2.

260930H-Air strike being directed by Co I against Lam Xuan (YD 285689).

260945H-Co K has entered north end of Obj 2 with no contact and no significant findings.

260945H-Co I (YD 298693) reports that their lines were probed through out the night. Called for two 81mm missions and fired 60mm mortars. Search of area revealed that a large amount of enemy ammunition was being transported southwest.

260952H-Co L reports suspected VC on south bank of river (YD 303672). Called artillery mission. Patrol checking out area.

260955H-Sparrowhawk Plt is now at Co M's position.

261000H-Co I receives 10 rounds incoming artillery at YD 298694 from a direction of 5700 mils.

261108H-Co K completed sweep securing Obj 2.

261215H-Co I is in attack position and ready to move against YD 284689.

261230H-Ontos Plt moving to Obj 2 area.

261240H-Btry "W" now moving by helicopter to Obj 2.

261248H-Co I receiving heavy artillery from northerly direction.

261258H-Co I reports taking 60mm mortars from outside objective.

261302H-Co I reports incoming on last night's position.

261320H-Air is on station for Co I's use.


261340H-AO spotted VC in bunkers and is marking position with smoke at YD 287692.

261345H-Co I meeting heavy resistance at YD 284690. Air strikes and supporting arms will be used.

261355H-Co I is pinned down making withdrawal from obj very difficult. Northeast end of obj has 300 meters of heavily fortified positions with overhangs.

261400H-End Operation BADGER CATCH-CHOP to 3d MarDiv-begin Operation SALINE.

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261400H-Ontos and tanks are moving north to aid Co I.
 261405H-Calling in smoke to help Co I move back to direct air strikes.
 261510H-Co I still in close contact with NVA - slowly extracting his people.
 261530H-Co M and Co K receiving incoming artillery from 6100 mils. Total of 20 rounds of 130mm artillery.
 261630H-Co I still does not have all casualties out of area.
 261840H-CP moving to Obj 2.
 261845H-Co I receiving heavy mortar fire.
 261900H-CP arrives at new location (YD 304681).
 261925H-BLT 3/1 CHOP to 1st AmTrac Bn.
 262025H-Co N proceeding to CP.
 262040H-Co N arrives at CP.
 262340H-Co L at YD 314674 reports suspected VC movement. Fired 16 rounds 60mm mortar with negative results.
 270805H-GL-3A informs 3/1 that there are 5 tanks available from BLT 2/4.
 271020H-Requested tanks (BLT 2/4) be sent to Blue Beach. Informed that tanks are already there.
 271130H-CP receiving incoming artillery from a direction of 6200 mil. Incoming consisted of 23 rounds 130mm artillery.
 271213H-CP moving to new location (YD 308683).
 271320H-Ontos Flt now at Blue Beach ready for pick up.
 271320H-Co M receives 6 rounds artillery (YD 305679).
 271500H-Co M reports finding 2 females leaving obj area at YD 287673 where Co M has been observing hostile movement. Detainees were forwarded to 1st AmTrac Bn.
 271600H-ARVN unit to north advises it will not be able to attack obj at YD 284691 due to darkness.
 271615H-Co L moved by helicopters to Blue Beach and are setting up in night defensive positions.
 271955H-Informed 1st AmTracs that we will attack Lam Xuan tomorrow.
 272100H-Intelligence report indicates NVA mortar element located in vicinity of YD 283715 or YD 279715. Also, mine field at YD 280674.
 272300H-TPQ-10 run at YD 285689.
 280450H-Co I received 1 incoming grenade.
 280600H-CP receiving incoming 140mm rockets.
 280820H-MGE mission now in progress at YD 284691. Co L preparing to move out.
 280837H-Co L moving out.
 280846H-Tanks hit AT mine at YD 298686 breaking axle---out of action. Co K to provide security for tanks. Co L utilizing mine sweep teams. Air strike now in progress.
 280920H-Second air strike in progress--fixed wing receiving SAF on passes.
 280935H-Another tank hit AT mine at YD 298686.


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
281020H-Advised Co L that 803rd NVA Company in obj area.
 281048H-CP and Co L at YD 298686 received 24 rounds of 130mm artillery from 315 degrees.
 281118H-Co L moving behind tanks and receiving negative resistance.
Co L reports that one tank while crossing paddy sunk into large bomb crater and is submerged.
 281125H-Co L reports hitting booby trap resulting in casualties.
 281130H-Co L taking SAF from obj area.
 281135H-Co K advised to be prepared to move out.
 281210H-AO spots 4 NVA moving out of obj west across river.
 281212H-Co L reports tank hit by RPG.
 281215H-Artillery AO reports enemy moving around in obj. Calling in artillery on target.
 281217H-Co L ordered to hold back so air can be utilized against enemy attempting to move out of west side of obj.
 281230H-CP receiving 22 rounds incoming 130mm artillery.
 281236H-Co L advised to bring tanks back for air strike. Co L requesting Co K for support.
 281240H-CP receiving 16 more rounds incoming.
 281312H-CP receiving more incoming artillery. Co K preparing to move out.
 281315H-Co L advised to take it slow and make maximum use of supporting arms. Co K moving up.
 281330H-Co L reports taking heavy casualties.
 281340H-Air strike in progress. AO reports that air strike accounted for 10 NVA KIA's and that enemy is moving around in obj area.
 281421H-Air strike completed and Co K reports making good progress.
 281510H-Half way through obj still meeting heavy resistance.
 281523H-Co L advised to keep moving and call in fire support.
281531H-Tank reported stuck.
 281550H-Co M at YD 293678 sighted bunkers with VC. Called in artillery and NGF destroying 5 shelters and 100 meters of trenchline.
 281600H-Requested to have Flames fueled and ready to go tomorrow.
 281640H-Air strike conducted-BDA: 14 NVA KIA.
 281721H-Artillery firing at YD 282689 credited with 4 NVA KIA.
 281740H-Co L just knocked out big bunker with automatic weapon that was holding them back.
 281745H-Air strike conducted-BDA: 7 bunkers destroyed and 3 secondary explosions.
 281800H-Co L reports finding an enemy 30 cal. MG, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 8 NVA KIA, and a lot of gear in obj area. Total is 36 NVA KIA for this obj so far.
281813H-AmTracs report tank hitting mine as they were attempting to pull it from a paddy. AmTracs will try again tomorrow.
 281815H-AO observed 4 NVA moving into a house. AO is adjusting artillery on house.

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281820H-Co M moving to take up a position north of the obj to block and observe enemy withdrawal.

281825H-Co L advised to continue attack by using illumination. Will use NGF and artillery to provide illumination. Flareshape has been requested.

281850H-Co M reports 1 NVA KIA when he ran into blocking force at YD 278696.

281855H-Air strike in progress, AO reports a large secondary explosion.

282015H-Flareshape reports on station.

282140H-Co L reports 15 more NVA KIA found in obj. Co L and Co K told to consolidate their position.

282235H-Position reports: Co M (YD 277693 to YD 283694), Co L (YD 282688 to 287686), Co K (YD 280693 to YD 283688), Co I (YD 300682) CP (YD 310684), AmTracs (YD 310684), Ontos and Tanks (YD 282688 to YD 287686), Btry "C" (LZ Robin), Recon Plt (YD 300682), Co N (YD 306680), and Btry "W" (YD 305680).

290145H-Co L and Co K at YD 285688 receiving 23 rounds incoming artillery believed to be 130mm from a direction of 5300 mils.

290150H-Co L and Co K advised to be watchful for ground attack.

290450H-Co K to move at 0645--advised to coordinate with Co L.

290606H-Position report from Co M: (YD 288688).

290945H-Co L and Co K informed to have FO's register danger close fire missions.

291010H-Co I at (YD 285672) observed NVA moving about; called in artillery mission resulting in 3 NVA KIA.

291010H-Co M at (YD 289689) finds 1 NVA KIA with gear.

291030H-Co I at (YD 293674) detained 2 males age 19 and 24, turned over to S-2.

291055H-Prisoner captured at YD 287691 is member of 4th Co, 3rd Bn, 82nd NVA Regt. States that 110 men were in obj. Many escaped.

291120H-Co L reports taking 15 rounds 130mm artillery at YD 284689 from a direction of 6000 mils.

291137H-Co L will be moving out very shortly. Co L and Co K again taking incoming artillery: 10 rounds.

291255H-Co K reports finding 2 more NVA bodies.


291305H-Co K advised scout dogs are available.

291350H-Co M starting to search obj area with Co L.


291445H-Obj is completely secured. Co M is advised to move to YD 300685 at 1600H. Co M has found 1 NVA KIA with AK-47 in burned out bunker.

291735H-Co K reports finding 2 NVA KIA and various documents. Co L after search of obj area reports 37 dead NVA, assorted equipment and gear.

291800H-Received information that the "TET cease fire" will not go into affect.



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291830H-Co K reports receiving 40 rounds of incoming artillery.
 291950H-TPQ-10's will be run on Obj 3 (YD 286672).
 292000H-Position report: CP (YD 307681), Co L (YD 285690), Co K (YD 283688), Co I (YD 303681), Co M (YD 300686).
 292130H-TPQ-10's being run against Obj 3 (YD 286672).
 300140H-Co M at YD 301686 receiving 3 hand grenades and approximately 5 M-79 grenades.
 300945H-Co L has 1 Platoon across river to west of obj area.
 300955H-Co K has 2 NVA POW's, 1 rocket launcher and 2 light MG's. Co K requests interpreter for interrogation of POW's. POW's were found by scout dogs at YD 281689.
 301035H-Co K while searching at YD 285688 found 1 dead NVA outside bunker.
 301115H-Intelligence report reveals that on 22 Jan Chieu Hoi reported AP mine field in the vicinity of YD 286676.
 301130H-Co L found 2 NVA bodies in shallow graves, assorted documents and gear. Gear believed to be that of a cornsman.
 301215H-Interrogation of 2 POW's found by Co K indicates that there is a Bn CP at YD 286673.
 301500H-Co L at YD 281689 finding bloody bandages leading north and west across river.
 301515H-Co M at YD 292687 found 1 artillery 105mm dud which was blown in place.
 301530H-Request TPQ-10's on YD 288677 and YD 286675 be dropped before 2400 due to patrols in area after that time.
 301630H-Air strike on Obj 3 in progress.
 301720H-Co L at YD 286690 while searching a bunker found 1 NVA body and 3 chi com grenades.
 301855H-Co L at YD 285691 received approx 12 rounds incoming 130mm artillery. They request counter battery fire against suspected enemy artillery positions.
 301935H-Co K at YD 287688 received 20 rounds of enemy 130mm artillery from a direction of 6000 mils.
 302310H-TPQ-10's now being dropped.
 310130H-1 squad from Co M departing toward Obj 3 (YD 286673) are to act as guides for Co M movement to attack position.
 310230H-Co M now moving to assembly area to arrive there at 0530H.
 310555H-Co K's plt. sized diversionary force now in position at YD 288678.
 310655H-Co M is in attack position awaiting first light.
 310702H-Co K's diversionary force now in the attack from north. Will attack by fire for 15 minutes.
 310710H-CP taking 15 rounds incoming 130mm artillery from a northerly direction.
 310715H-Co M reports receiving incoming artillery and 50 cal. MG fire.

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310730H-Co M reports assault elements inside first treeline of obj in heavy contact with well dug in NVA. Attack continuing utilizing maximum supporting arms fire. Waiting for fog to lift to direct fixed wing support. LVTH-6's now moving down Cua Viet river to Co M's position to lend direct fire support.

310750H-Bn CP receiving 15 more rounds 130mm artillery at YD 307681. Direction 6000 mils.

310830H-Co M moving forward slowly against heavy resistance. Enemy has 50 cal. MG and mortars. Co M is employing 81mm mortars, artillery, NGF, and awaits CAS and LVTH-6's.

310845H-LVTH-6's have arrived at Co M's position.

310900H-Co M is meeting heavy resistance reporting 50 cal MG's in 4 bunkers which must be knocked out prior to advance. Co M still reports incoming artillery rounds from a direction of 6050 mils. Enemy is employing RR from obj area.

310915H-Co I is moving out by LVT's to support Co M in the attack. 2nd Plt Co M taking heavy casualties. Co M receiving 50 rounds 130mm artillery, and recoilless rifle fire.

311005H-Co I now taking incoming artillery fire. Direction 5800 mils

311040H-At YD 287672 Co M is still held up due to SAF and incoming artillery. Co I is moving up on west flank. Supporting fires taking heavy toll on enemy.

311200H-Fixed wing has yet to arrive on station. Co M is advised that CAS is doubtful and to proceed without it.

311207H-Co I is moving up behind smoke screen.

311215H-Co I and Co M are prepared to mark lines for air strike.

311235H-Co M and Co I at YD 287672 continue to maintain contact with the enemy and are pressing the attack using smoke and whiskey papa as a screen.

311250H-Co I reports negative observation of bridge on west side of obj.

311425H-Co L given warning order to be ready to move.

311430H-Co M and Co I in close contact with enemy in fortified positions at YD 287672. Co L will be moved to support the attack if required. Very little progress being made at this time.

311515H-AO and fixed wing are on the way. Co M dropping back for air strike.

311545H-Co M (YD 287672) with Co I on their left flank continuing to attack with little progress. More CAS is on the way. Co M estimates 40 casualties up to this time.

311555H-Air strike in progress. Requesting flare ship and relief.

311600H-Co L moving out on order to position behind Co I and Co M. After pulling back for air strike Co I and Co M returned to the attack. Air strike was largely ineffective due to haze and many duds.

311700H-Co I and Co M have moved into hamlet making better progress

311750H-Co L has moved into position behind Co M.

311810H-Report received that there will be more fixed wing available.

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311900H-Co L moving in trace of Co I and Co M. Attacking units making better progress.

311930H-Attacking units now well into Obj 3.

312050H-Co I reports that its lead elements are through the obj.

312130H-At this time Obj 3 is 80% secured. Co I and Co M and Co L all occupying positions within the hamlet. Sniper fire continues but organized resistance has ceased.

312355H-Flare ship leaving obj area. All units set into night defensive positions.

010005H-Co L at YD 287670 received 3 rounds 82mm mortars from YD 271668 resulting in 4 USMC WIA's.

010510H-CP group received 40 rounds incoming 82mm mortar and artillery fire. Counter battery fire being directed against suspected enemy artillery positions.

010750H-Co I at YD 286676 had man trip booby trap while moving through hedge row resulting in 1 USMC WIA Medevac.

010800H-Co M and Co I now moving out to conduct detailed search of area and sweep through rest of obj.

010835H-Co K at YD 285687 while checking area of last night's ambush found 1 NVA KIA, 2 rifles, 1 additional pool of blood and various equipment.

010856H-Co I captured 1 NVA WIA. Initial interrogation reveals NVA is a corpsman with 3rd Co, 3rd Bn, 803rd NVA Regt and that the Bn CP was located at this point.

011310H-Co I while conducting sweep and detailed search of obj found 17 NVA KIA, large amounts of enemy weapons, radios and equipment including 1 Russian 30 cal light MG.

011415H-Co M and Co L receiving heavy artillery fire from a northerly direction.

011500H-Co K receiving 4 rounds 60mm mortar fire.

011510H-Co M reports, while attacking Obj 3, sustaining 9 USMC KIA's, and 37 WIA's.

011530H-Co L at YD 285688 received 6 rounds 82mm mortar fire resulting in 2 USMC WIA's.

011540H-Co M at YD 287675 completed sweep finding weapons, RPG rounds and a 12.7mm MG. Co L reports finding another NVA POW and 2 NVA KIA's.

011715H-Co L, Co I, and Co M conducted a detailed search of Obj 3 finding fortifications orientated for an attack from north or east. Enemy's defense was complete with a communication's system of comm wire connecting bunkers. A total of 44 NVA KIA's, 2 POW's, weapons, and assorted gear was captured.

012030H-Position reports: Co L (YD 287671), Co I (YD 285672), Co M (YD 302681), Co K moved from its position at dusk to (YD 288687) because of intelligence report indicating possible attack in area.


020352H-Co K receiving approx 70-100 rounds incoming mortars and artillery.

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
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
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020355H-WGF to give illumination for Co K
 020403H-All companies directed to be on 100% alert. Be ready to move in support of Co K.
 020410H-1st AmTrac Bn advised that Co K is under heavy ground attack. Flareship is requested to support Co K.
 020412H-Tanks directed to be ready to move. Co M advised to be ready to move.
 020420H-Co M to send 1 platoon with tanks to aid Co K.
 020425H-Co K directed to consider any routes for possible enemy withdrawal. Routes can be covered by artillery.
 020435H-Flare ship on station.
 020445H-Enemy troops in front of Co K CP location and are milling around. 81mm mortars firing at observed troop movement.
 020540H-Tanks advised to use mine sweep team and move out with 1 platoon from Co M to support Co K. Co K directing 81mm mortars, 107mm mortars, artillery, and WGF with repeated fire for effects. Tanks will check for possible ambush.
 020620H-Co M advised to have rest of company ready to move out.
 020630H-Co K continues to receive enemy fire and what appears to be a second assault. Enemy made first assault on position that Co was in before moving after dark. Co K continues to call in fire support and has received tanks and Co M's platoon in support.
 020745H-Enemy attack seems to have been repulsed. Sniper fire continues from the direction of the attack. Tanks and Co K continue to direct fire on avenues of enemy withdrawal. An AO has been requested for obj area.
 020810H-CP group at YD 307682 received 16 rounds of artillery from a northerly direction. Calling in counter battery fire.
 020815H-Co K receiving large amounts of mortar fire from within hamlet of Lam Xuan. Also, receiving automatic weapons fire. Directing artillery and WGF on mortar positions at this time.
 020900H-Co K and Co M receiving mortar fire and automatic weapons fire from west side of river and Mai Xa Thi. Large numbers of NV appear to be moving out of hamlet to the north. Directing maximum use of supporting fires against enemy.
 020930H-Mortar fire continues to be directed against Co M. Mortar believed to be 82mm from a direction of 6100 mils. Co M with tanks are pressing the attack.
 021000H-Enemy 82mm mortar fire continues from north. Believe it to be coming from Nhi Ha (YD 2770 grid square). Co M continuing to make good progress moving in the attack. Mortar fire is continuous and heavy.
 021050H-Co M and Co K are moving forward meeting automatic weapon fire and taking large numbers of 82mm rounds. Progress is slow--using tanks to knock out enemy in fortified positions.



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021245H-Co M and Co K continue to maintain pressure on enemy. Intense SAF and close in grenade exchange is occurring with the enemy.

021250H-Co I at YD 286674 received a total of 17 rounds of 130mm artillery from a direction of 5600 mils.

021255H-Recon plt while maintaining defensive positions observed 1 NVA at YD 292684 moving to the east trying to flee from obj area.

021445H-Co M and Co K continue to meet resistance from enemy, however, most of hamlet area has been secured. Large numbers of NVA bodies and amounts of equipment are being found throughout the area.

021550H-Request was made to destroy submerged tank because of inability to remove it from bomb crater. Permission received to destroy tank after it is stripped.

021600H-Co M and Co K are still in close contact. The enemy retains a foot hole in the western edge of the hamlet. Attack continues with casualties estimated at 135 NVA KIA and 7 POW's plus two 60mm mortars captured.

021640H-FAC team directed "Huey" gunship against snipers shooting across river resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

021735H-Co I reports finding 1 NVA KIA while conducting search of Obj 3 area.

021815H-AmTrac while on resupply run from 1st AmTrac Bn to CP location hit 40 lbs pressure detonated mine at YD-303686.

021820H-Co M and Co K advised to continue search of area till dark, then move back to Obj 3 area and Mai Xe Thi (east).

022100H-Co M and Co K report casualties for day at 8 USMC KIA and 39 WIA's with 141 NVA KIA's.

030815H-Intelligence report indicates NVA will attempt large scale movement in this area.

030936H-Co L receiving 13 rounds incoming artillery.

031405H-Tank #202142 that was submerged at YD 288687 was destroyed.

031440H-Co I while observing bridge and west side of river from Obj 3 saw NVA moving in hamlet. Called in artillery and fired 3.5 rocket resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

031830H-Co I reports sporadic sniper fire from west side of river at YD 284670.

031850H-Co L receiving incoming mortars from unknown direction.

040655H-Co I and Co K began to move on the attack at YD 285689 and meeting no resistance. Obj is secured and now conducting detailed search of area.

041215H-Co L at YD 278670 received 3 rounds 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 WIA USMC.

041440H-Co L received 3 rounds 82mm resulting in 1 USMC KIA.

041445H-Btry "C" reports incoming rockets on their position (YD 343686) resulting in 1 damaged truck (6 X 6) and 2 USMC WIA non-mechanized.

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041715H-Co I received 14 rounds 60mm mortar fire. Spotted possible mortar position and are calling in counter mortar fire.

050945H-Co L receiving 6 rounds 82mm mortar fire from YD 282669.

051530H-Co I while search area at YD 276698 came under intense sniper fire and incoming 60mm mortar fire. AmTracs with Co I received RPG rounds. Co I is responding with artillery and NGF missions.

060855H-Co I at Obj 3 saw 3 NVA at first light and opened fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

061200H-Co L spotted movement across river and fired on approximately 5-10 NVA moving from bunker to bunker resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

070700H-Continuing to bombard area west of Obj 3 with NGF and artillery fire. TPQ-10 concentrations also being conducted in this area.

080230H-TPQ-10 being dropped.

080930H-TPQ-10 being dropped.

081350H-AmTrac hit pressure detonated mine of 150 lbs at YD 316688. AmTrac burst into flame and was completely destroyed.

081435H-Co L at YD 286672 received 2 incoming 82mm mortar rounds; 1 direct hit on bunker resulting in 3 USMC WIA's.

081845H-TPQ-10 dropped.

081935H-TPQ-10 dropped.

082225H-TPQ-10 dropped.

082230H-TPQ-10 dropped.

090220H-TPQ-10 dropped.

090320H-TPQ-10 dropped.

091030H-Co I saw 1 NVA at YD 284670 and fired 30 rounds M-16 resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

091215H-Co L at Obj 3 receiving 4 rounds artillery from a direction of 6200 mils and 10 rounds 82mm mortar fire.

091250H-Co L at Obj 3 receiving 7 rounds 60mm mortar fire from YD 280670.

091640H-TPQ-10 dropped.

091657H-TPQ-10 dropped.

091720H-TPQ-10 dropped.

091745H-TPQ-10 dropped.

091935H-TPQ-10 dropped.

100700H-0830H-7 TPQ-10's were dropped. Normal day activities are being conducted to the north and northeast throughout the day. Bombardment of area west of Obj 3 will continue throughout the day.

110001H-112400H-Conducted normal security activities and directed NGF and artillery against area west of Obj 3.

120001H-122400H-Conducted normal security activities, and directed NGF and artillery against area west of Obj 3.

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
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
- 21 131510H-Co I fired 60mm mortars and 106mm rounds in area west of Obj 3 causing 1 NVA to flee from structure. NVA was taken under fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA.
- 22 141205H-Co I and Co K and Co L told to destroy positions at Obj 3 and prepare to move on order.
- 141430H-Co I taking incoming mortars and artillery from direction 5900 mils.
- 141445H-Bridge to be destroyed at YD 284672.
- 141515H-Co I fired 5 rounds 106mm RR at bridge knocking out 8-10 foot section.
- 141630H-Co K moving from present position to go south of the Cua Viet River by AmTrac.
- 141650H-Co I now moving out in trace of Co K. Co L will follow.
- 141720H-Co L is taking approximately 2 rounds of artillery.
- 141800H-Co M and Co N with Btry "W" remain at YD 304680. Co K, Co L, Co I, and CP are now at 1st AmTrac's CP preparing to continue south for sweep.
- 142100H-Co L, Co K, Co I, and CP now setting in new night defensive positions at YD 345654.
- 142235H-Co M at YD 303680 receiving 5-6 rounds incoming artillery. TFO-10 now being dropped.
- 23 150925H-AO reports heavy fortifications at YD 344634 and YD 336634.
- 151250H-Tank now on way from Blue Beach to CP position.
- 151640H-Recon plt reports finding fighting holes and bunkers at YD 335650 and YD 342640.
- 152345H-TFO-10 being dropped.
- 24 160530H-Co I reports ready to move out.
- 160600H-Co L reports ready to move out.
- 160650H-Co L and Co I dismounting tracs--have arrived at attack position (YD 352620). AmTracs returning to CP.
- 160730H-Co L and Co I sweeping Le Xuyen (YD 344634) meeting no enemy resistance.
- 160800H-Ordered to move out and sweep area of YD 356625.
- 160925H-CP now located at YD 349630. Received Co K's position report (YD 346621).
- 161015H-Co K is now across river at YD 344622.
- 161135H-All units moving well with no contact. NVA believed to have moved from the area 2 days ago.
- 161145H-Co K's position: YD 335618.
- 161400H-Co K is moving to north side of river.
- 161405H-Co L at YD 327639 is receiving SAF from hamlet at YD 325637 (Vinh Lai).
- 161420H-Co L is still taking SAF from unknown size unit. Fire fight started with small arms sniper fire and has developed into intense small arms and automatic weapons fire. Tanks are moving up to support Co L at YD 326637. Supporting arms are being directed against the enemy.

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161530H-New CP location at YD 333627.
 161545H-Co I and 2 tanks are in blocking position at YD 323634.
 AO on station is directing first air strike.
 161600H-AO while directing fixed wing strike on obj at YD 326635
 claimed 1 NVA KIA and 1 large secondary explosion.
 161610H-AO is calling in artillery on obj.
 161625H-Platoon from Co K moving up to left flank of Co L. Co L
 pressing the attack from northeast to southwest.
 161650H-Flare ship requested.
 161715H-Air strike in progress. Fixed wing receiving heavy
 automatic fire on bomb runs.
 161825H-Co L and tanks have penetrated into obj area. Continuing
 to press the attack with a rolling cover effect by supporting arms.
 161925H-Illumination started in order to continue the attack.
 161945H-CP group spotted 10-12 VC/NVA fleeing obj attempting to
 cross river about 75-100 meters from CP location. CP group
 opened fire on enemy resulting in 7 NVA KIA and 1 POW.
 162210H-Co L is still proceeding through hamlet area meeting
 resistance.
 25 170420H-Co I and Co L's lines now tied together for the remainder
 of the night.
 170820H-Co K moving to attack hamlets at YD 314630 and YD 316634.
 171100H-Co K at YD 317632 while reconning obj at YD 316634 made
 contact with 3 VC in a house resulting in 3 VC KIA.
 171200H-CP now located at YD 322641.
 171300H-Co I and Co L report after conducting detailed search of
 obj area at YD 325636 finding 30 NVA KIA.
 171400H-Co K at YD 316633 encountered a small delaying force left
 behind while 20-30 VC fled to north. Attack by Co K killed 3 VC,
 found 6 weapons (3 of which were found near the 3 VC killed in a
 house previously mentioned), 1 POW, and munitions.
 171520H-Co K and Co I now moving to YD 307637.
 171630H-CP moving to new location by AmTracs.
 172315H-TPQ-10 being dropped at YD 285689.
 26 180255H-TPQ-10's being dropped on Obj 3.
 180800H-Co I sweeping through hamlet YD 320646--no contact.
 Everything appears normal.
 181000H-Co K at YD 310654 reports all is normal.
 181200H-CP is now at YD 309657 awaiting to be picked up by LCM's
 to return to 1st AmTrac Bn.
 181500H>Last tank loaded on LCM. CP group now moving out by LVT's.
 181600H-3P arrives at 1st AmTrac Bn position

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