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JAN 07 1970

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG ltr 3/LEN/gbs over 3000 of  
31Oct69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 August to 31 August  
1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness  
and is forwarded herewith.

*[Signature]*

R. D. WHITE  
By direction

Copy to:  
CO, 2dCAG

*HIST*

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18 DEC 1969

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG ltr 3/LEN/gbs over 3000  
of 31Oct69

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 August to 31 August  
1969

1. Forwarded.

*L.E. Poggemeyer*

L.E. POGGEMEYER

BY DIRECTION

Copy to:  
CO, 2dCAG

2

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HEADQUARTERS  
2d Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/LEN/gbs

3000

31 October 1969

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From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 August to 31 August 1969

Ref: (a) ACO 5750.1A  
(b) CPacO 5750.8A

Encl: (1) 2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Enclosure (1) is downgraded at 3 year intervals. Declassified after 12 years. DOD Directive 5200.10

*D. P. Christensen*  
D. P. CHRISTENSEN

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HEADQUARTERS  
2d Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

## COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 August 1969 to 31 August 1969

INDEX

		<u>Page</u>
Part I	ORGANIZATIONAL DATA	2-1 - 2-2
Part II	NARRATIVE SUMMARY	3-1 - 3-20
Part III	SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS	4-1 - 4-8
Part IV	SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	5-1 - 5-26

DO NOT REMOVE 15-YEAR INTERVALS:  
REVIEW AFTER 12-YEARS

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA


<u>1. Designation</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>Date</u>
2d Combined Action Group	LtCol E. L. LEWIS	1 Aug 69 31 Aug 69

SUBORDINATE UNITS

1st Combined Action Company	Capt. J. E. SEITZ	1 Aug 69 8 Aug 69
	Capt. H. A. BAKER	9 Aug 69 31 Aug 69
2d Combined Action Company	1stLt. P. E. EBAUGH Jr.	1 Aug 69 31 Aug 69
3rd Combined Action Company	Capt. W. J. CAMPBELL	1 Aug 69 31 Aug 69
4th Combined Action Company	Capt. D. A. VOGELGESANG	1 Aug 69 31 Aug 69
5th Combined Action Company	Major A. H. MOORE	1 Aug 69 31 Aug 69
7th Combined Action Company	Capt. G. E. BROWN	1 Aug 69 31 Aug 69
8th Combined Action Company	Capt. A. P. TOKARZ	1 Aug 69 15 Aug 69
	Capt. R. D. TOMLIN	16 Aug 69 31 Aug 69
9th Combined Action Company	Capt. D. D. DEAN	1 Aug 69 31 Aug 69

ATTACHED UNITS

Detachment, Scout Dog Platoon, 3rd M. P. Battalion  
 Detachment, Kit Carson Scouts, 1st MarDiv G-2 (C-I)  
 Detachment, ARVN Interpreters/Translators, III MAF  
 Detachment, Medical Section, HQ, III MAF



2. Locations.

1 August 1969 to 31 August 1969

HQ 2d CAC

CACO 2-1

CACO 2-2

CACO 2-3

CACO 2-4

CACO 2-5

CACO 2-7

CACO 2-8

CACO 2-9

Hieu Nhon District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
 Hieu Duc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
 Dai Loc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
 Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
 Hieu Nhon District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
 Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
 Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
 Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
 Duc Duc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

3. Staff Officers.

Executive Officer/Civic Action  
 S-5 Officer

Major J. A. McCARTY 1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

S-1 Officer

1stLt. H. NAGAI 1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

S-2/S-3 Officer

Major L. E. NUGENT 1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

Asst S-2/S-3 Officer

1stLt. P. E. CASWELL 1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

S-4 Officer/Supply Officer

Capt. C. A. BURR 1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

4. Average Monthly Strength.USMCUSN

OFF ENL  
 14 610

OFF ENL  
 0 34

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## PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY1. Personnel Administration.

a. Joined and Transferred. During the month of August, the 2d Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below:

(1) Joined

Officers  
2

Enlisted  
124

(2) Rotated CONUS

Officers  
1

Enlisted  
50

(3) Transferred within WestPac Command

Officers  
1

Enlisted  
4

(4) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospitals)

Officers  
0

Enlisted  
28

b. Awards.

(1) Award recommendations during the reporting month were processed and forwarded to FMFPac for approval as follows:

HeroicEnd of Tour

USMC  
SS  
0

BS  
1

NCM  
1

USN  
BS  
0

USMC  
BS  
2

NCM  
15

NAM  
12

(2) Fifty one personnel of the Group also received Purple Heart medals as a result of combat wounds received during the month.

c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of August were as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>DAI</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>WIANE</u>	<u>NBC</u>
USMC	4	1	0	29	20	1
USN	1	0	0	1	1	0

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d. Congrats/Splints/Welrep. This group did not process any congressional or special interest correspondence during the month of August. However the Administrative section did process a total of 11 welfare reports during the reporting period.

e. Legal. Legal activities during the reporting month were as follows:

<u>Article 32 Investigations</u>	<u>Informal Investigations</u>	<u>NJP</u>
0	4	6
<u>SCM</u>	<u>SPCM</u>	
3	0	

f. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and recreational activity is available to all hands.

g. The following Rest and Recuperation (R&R) leave quotas, out of country, were received and utilized:

(1) Out of Country R&R - Quotas	Utilized
35	32

h. Promotions. Promotions effected during the month of August were follows:

	<u>Meritorious</u>	<u>Regular</u>
L/Cpl	0	11
PFC	0	3

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## 2. INTELLIGENCE

a. General. The proposed T/O changes in the Operations Section for a Lieutenant, Assistant S-3/S-2 and a S/NCO, as an Intelligence Chief are still pending at this time.

b. Enemy Situation. For the first week in August enemy activity remained at a low level, continuing the "lull" which had existed for the past two months. Contact was usually limited to CAP activities initiating fire on enemy troops moving in small groups. However, a significant terrorist attack occurred on 5 August when 2 grenades were thrown into a meeting of village elders 1km S.W. of Hoi An.

During the second week the enemy began his well-publicized Summer-Fall Campaign. The CAP's made contact with larger groups of enemy than in the week previous, as the VC/NVA were setting up for attacks. Particularly heavy contact was made on the nights of 11 and 12 August.

The enemy continued his offensive into the third week. Contacts by the CAP's remained at the same high level. Also 2 CAG Headquarters and the CAGO 2-2 CP became targets on the night of the 16th as 2d CAG received 7 RPG's and CAGO 2-2 took 3 rounds of 82mm mortar incoming.

During the final week the high level of ground contact prevailed, and there was an increase in terrorist attacks. On 25 August a booby-trap was detonated, blowing off the legs of a Village Chief 1km E. of Hoi An; two days later the VC/NVA mortared a hamlet 2km S. of Dien Ban causing 2 VN civilians KIA, 7 VN civilians WIA(E) and 10 VN civilians WIA(M).

c. Enemy Plans and Policies. The enemy modus operandi for the first two weeks of August was consistent with the pattern of the two previous months. Emphasis was placed on those activities designed to destroy or otherwise render ineffective the local government administration and pacification assets. Propaganda themes centered on the appeal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The Summer-Fall Offensive, beginning in the second week, brought ground attacks and attacks by fire, along with stepped-up terrorism and propaganda. These attacks, and selective assassinations of GVN sympathizers and low level officials continued until the end of the month.

d. Interrogator/Translator. During the month of August 242 detainees, 26 POW's (5 NVA, 23 VC) and 6 Hoi Chanh's were turned over by the CAGO's to their respective District Headquarters for processing through the DIOCC. Feedback of information produced as a result of these interrogations was provided 2d CAG and the capturing CAGO's.

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e. Counter Intelligence. Timely and accurate counter intelligence support was supplied to 2d CAG by the 3rd, 5th and 9th Counter Intelligence Teams. Blacklists, agent reports, and interrogation reports were provided to augment the counter intelligence activity of the DIOCC's.

f. Interpreters. 3 Interpreters were employed by 2d CAG during the month of August. 7 were assigned to CACO's and 1 remained at 2d CAG Headquarters.

g. Enemy Statistics. Enemy statistics for the month of August were as follows:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>POW</u>	<u>DETAINEES</u>	<u>HOI CHANH</u>
42	26	242	6

(1) Weapons and Ordnance Captured.

Weapons

AK-47	13
SKS	3
M-16	3
M-14	1
M-1 Carbine	1
Pistol, 9mm	1
RPG-2 Rocket Launcher	1
M-79	1

Ordnance

M-26 grenades	28
Chicom grenades	55
M-14 rifle grenades	1
Smoke grenades	1
M-61 grenade	1
155mm round	3

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105mm round	12
82mm rounds	5
81mm rounds	15
60mm rounds	17
57mm round	1
3.5 rounds	2
RPG-7 rounds	2
B-40 rounds	15
RPG boosters	2
M-79 rounds	41
M-72 LAAW's	7
500 lb bomb	1
20 lb charge	5
2 lb TNT	1
1 lb C-4	1
30 lb mine	1
M-1041 mines	2
Small arms round	160
Boji Stakes	100
(2) <u>Equipment Captured</u>	
Binoculars, pair	1
Gas mask belt	1
M-7 magazines	2

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M-16 magazines	4
BAR magazines	2
Packs	4
Bayonet	3
E-Tool	1

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### 3. OPERATIONS.

a. General. During the month of August, with the beginning of the enemy's Summer-Fall Campaign, the CAP's of 2d CAG contended with increasing propaganda, terrorism and ground activity.

Although the first week of August saw a continuation of the previous two month "lull", CAP activities made 8 significant contacts, killing 5 NVA and capturing 2 terrorists who had thrown grenades into a meeting of village elders. 3 suspects were also picked up for suspicion of providing food and money to the VC. Also 4 bunkers were found and destroyed during the period.

The second week began as CAP's 2-9-1 and 2-9-2 on a sweep with RF elements picked up 200 VCS on 8 August. On the 11th and 12th the enemy began to step up activities; there were 18 significant contacts altogether during the week, as the CAP's killed 12 enemy, took 1 prisoner and captured 4 VCS. 2 NVA were Hoi Chanh's.

The offensive continued into the third week, but the CAP's killed 16 enemy in 16 contacts and had 2 VC Chieu Hoi to them.

Activity tapered off at the end of the month. However the CAP's managed to kill 9 more enemy to up the monthly total to 42, an increase of 18 from the month previous.

Mobility. At the end of the reporting period, 2d CAG had thirty-three (33) mobile CAP's and three (3) static CAP's operating in Quang Nam Province, two CAP's (CAP 2-7-5 and CAP 2-8-2) were converted from static to mobile during the reporting period. It is anticipated that one more CAP will be converted from static to mobile next month.

c. Training. Training plans for the month of August were submitted for approval to the Commanding Officer, 2d CAG by all CACO's in accordance with Group Bulletin 1500. Emphasis remained on training all Marines and PF's primarily in general military subjects such as patrolling, setting ambushes and listening posts, and calling for fire support.

(1) 2d CAG Mobile Training Team. During August the Mobile Training Team (MTT) was utilized as a security element for the 2d CAG Compound. The MTT was also used for security patrols, running 20 daylight patrols, capturing (1) M-1 Carbine, (1) NVA pack, (2) BAR magazines, (2) M-16 magazines and (2) AK-47 bayonets. The MTT was deactivated on 20 August 1969.

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d. Inspections. During the month of August a regular schedule of Staff Inspections was conducted throughout the CAP's. These inspections consisted of detailed critiques of undesirable trends and were submitted to CACO's so they could take corrective action. Also inspected were records being kept and co-ordination accomplished on both the CACO and CAP levels. Supply and communications inspections were also conducted in order to evaluate the state of readiness at the CAP and CACO level, based on usage data compiled at 2d CAG Headquarters.

e. Conferences/Meetings.

(1) Staff Conference. 2d CAG Headquarters continued to hold weekly staff meetings where matters of multiple staff cognizance were discussed.

(2) Combined Action Company C.O.'s Meeting. During the month of August a meeting was held on a weekly basis for all Combined Action Company Commanders and the Headquarters Staff. These meetings are specifically designed for the purpose of working out problems of support and coordination in addition to promulgating command guidance. At each of these meetings the individual CACO CO or his representative gave a projection from the DIOCC (District Intelligence/Operations Control Center) concerning intelligence in their area for the coming week.

(3) CAP Commander Conference. The monthly CAP Commanders Conference was held on the first Sunday in August. All agenda items were submitted by the individual CACO Commanders several days prior to the scheduled conference for review. The suggested agenda items were evaluated, arranged in a logical sequence, and distributed at the conference to the individual CAP Commanders as a guide for discussion. The main purpose for this meeting was to provide an opportunity for discussion of problem areas, such as training techniques for PFs and Marines. Among other problems discussed special attention was given to the PF-Marine relationship in the field and group support of civic action projects.

f. Special Operations.

(1) Kit Carson Scouts. There were 9 Kit Carson Scouts deployed in 2d CAG units during August. They participated in 210 day and night patrols, killed 4 enemy, apprehended 2 suspects and recovered 1 weapon. In addition 3 booby traps and 3 arms caches were found. In one incident KCS Le Van Hein, when his unit was taken under fire, moved to the fighting and helped to direct fire on the enemy positions. As one Marine was being manuevaced, KCS Hien stayed at the rear to cover the movement to the movement to the LZ. After the contact KCS Hien led the Marines back to the area of contact and showed them 3 enemy bodies.

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(2) Scout Dogs and Handlers. During the month of August 2d CAG operated with 4 organic Scout Dog Teams, assigned to CACO's, 2-1, 2-3, and 2-7. They were effective in locating caves, tunnels and booby trapped areas; in detecting enemy movement and in warning of enemy ambushes.

g. Voluntary Information Program. The total amount of funds expended as rewards to Vietnamese Nationals during August for information pertaining to enemy activity and/or enemy equipment and ordnance was 226,000\$VN. This represents a decrease of 109,300\$VN from July and a decrease of 216,705\$VN from June.

h. Artillery Support. During the month of August 2d CAG units called in (22) artillery fire missions and (15) 81mm mortar missions on either suspected or known enemy targets.

i. Air.

(1) Fixed Wing. During August no missions were flown in direct support of 2d CAG operations against the enemy.

(2) Flareships and Gunships. A total of 6 missions were flown in direct support of 2d CAG operations during the reporting period.

Basketball Missions	0
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Spooky Missions	6
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(3) Medical Evacuation Missions. A total of (45) medical evacuation missions were requested/controlled by 2d CAG units during August. These missions included medevacs for Vietnamese civilians and PFs as well as Marines.

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4. LOGISTICS

a. General. Status has not changed as far as MARES/COMSTAT; the rating remains C-2. Although the unit has T/E deficiencies, its capabilities have not been reduced, and the preventive maintenance performed on equipment during this time has kept deadlines to a minimum.

b. Significant Events

(1) There were no significant events to report during this period.

c. Damage to Weapons Due to Enemy Action

(1) No weapons were damaged during this period.

d. Motor Transport

(1) The Group Motor Transport section drove a total of 37,804 miles during the reporting period.

(2) A total of five (5) vehicles were deadlined for second echelon repair during the reporting period. A breakdown by vehicle type is as follows:

(a) M37B1 Truck Cargo, (2)

(b) M35A02 Truck Cargo, (3)

(3) No vehicles were deadlined for 3rd echelon maintenance. Average deadline time: 2nd echelon, three (3) days.

e. Air Lift

(1) No air lifts were scheduled during this reporting period.

f. Messhall

(1) Approximately 19,750 meals were served during this reporting period by the Group Messhall.

(2) "B" Rations in the amount of forty (40) cases were issued to the field units. "A" Rations were issued on a daily basis to all companies that requested them. A total of 3,600 meals were issued.

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g. Armory

(1) During this period, the armory repaired 47 weapons. Thirty-four (34) weapons were sent to Ordnance Maintenance Company, 1st FSB for repair.

h. Miscellaneous Services

(1) Continuous garbage and trash pick-up was provided by Vietnamese through contract service.

(2) The Laundry Platoon at FLC continued to provide adequate support to this command.

i. Supplies

(1) No major items of equipment were received during this reporting period. Spare parts and miscellaneous supplies essential to this unit's operation were received in time, eliminating unnecessary hardships. Lack of T/E items previously ordered, are still responsible for the unit's C-2 MARES/FORSTAT rating.

j. Problem Areas

(1) Supply - The unit operated without a logistics chief and a warehouse chief during August. The jobs were filled by the supply chief. This hindered the effectiveness of the supply office. Rotation of other personnel without replacements put additional burdens on the supply section. Also lack of trained personnel continues to hamper the S-4 section. In addition, T/E deficiencies continue to keep this unit at a C-2 MARES/FORSTAT RATING. Examples of shortages are shown below:

(a) Telephone Set, TA-312	67
(b) Telephone Set, TA/1-PT	190
(c) Radio Control Group AN/GRA-59	26
(d) Generator Set, PU-482	2
(e) Address Plate Machine	2
(f) Embossing Machine Address Plate	1
(g) Binoculars 6X30	61
(h) Mount Tripod, ML22	39
(i) Truck Cargo 3/4T M37B1	3

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(j) Night Vision Scope	51
(k) TRLR, LT, M418B1	11
(l) TRIR, Water 400 gal, M149	4
(m) Duplicating Set, Spirit Process	1
(n) Duplicating Set, Stencil Process	1

2. Motor Transport - Due to the fact that 2d CAG has been unable to obtain wreckers for headlined vehicles there are unsatisfactory deadline periods for Motor Transport. Additionally the failure of supporting units to provide replacement vehicles puts increased requirements on remaining operative equipment.

### 3. Communications

a. The main problem in this area is the lack of T/E items. Direct exchange, though, is working at a satisfactory level.

### 4. Heavy Equipment

a. The unit has a 6,000 lb rough terrain forklift now operating; however, during the reporting period, the vehicle was headlined for minor maintenance due to the inexperience of the operator. It is felt a contact team should inspect this vehicle at least once every two weeks.

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## 5. CIVIC ACTION/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

a. During the month of August, Civic Action NCO's from the eight companies of the 2d CAG continued their efforts to act as liaison between hamlet, village, and district officials in initiating civic action and community development projects. As a result of the recent offensive, many CAPs have concentrated on the tactical situation and were still able to help in many ways to rebuild destroyed homes, schools and pagodas. Civic Action has continued at an acceptable level despite enemy activity during the period.

b. Continued emphasis has been put on no cost/no material projects, which has resulted in an advantageous form of civic action for mobile CAPs, in particular, wherein the Marines profit from living among the people, realizing their needs, and profiting from gaining their respect and friendship.

(1) An example of the no cost/no material approach is the emphasis which has been put on health and sanitation. It has become routine with the mobile CAPs to have police calls in their hamlets and villages, swim and bath calls, and physical education programs in the form of organized sports.

c. Since being expanded in August, agricultural civic action projects have rapidly become promising. Because of the adaptability of such projects to the Vietnamese economy, they have been readily accepted.

(1) The 2d CAG Civic Action NCO has made available to all the CAPs various kinds of seeds. CAP 2-9-1 has started a joint garden and has gotten a lot of cooperation from the villagers.

(2) The raising of rabbits has met with enthusiasm. Although few of the people have had the experience of eating rabbit, they are fully aware of the high price of rabbit on the market. The money which can be made from selling rabbits is a prime motivator. For fast dissemination of rabbits among others in a village, a method is planned wherein the first two litters of each doe must be given to the families previously selected by the hamlet chiefs. In this way, eventually, the rabbit population will be generalized throughout the village, and every family which desires rabbits will have them.

(3) Agricultural civic action projects being developed include the raising of hogs, chickens, and new varieties of vegetable crops. The results have been satisfactory, although costs and difficulty in acquiring needed materials prevent the progress desired. The potential of these projects is great and long-lasting.

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d. Commodities distributed during the month of August were as follows: food, 2438 pounds; soap, 528 pounds; clothing, 164 pounds; and personal hygiene kits, 200.

e. During August, CAP personnel of the Group assisted Vietnamese civilians in completing the following projects: culverts 8; fences 12; dwellings 10; public heads 1; wells 10; pagodas 14; bridges 1; family bunkers 5; and public showers, 2.

f. MedCaps held resulted in the treatment of 14,284 Vietnamese civilians; in addition 164 dental cases were treated. 163 Vietnamese children and 48 adults were medically evacuated during the month.

g. CAP corpsmen continued to train Vietnamese civilians in the basics of first aid. During the month, 48 such civilians were undergoing training. These aides assist in MedCaps and serve as interpreters for the corpsmen.

h. The CAPs put up more bulletin boards this month, in support of psychological operations. The bulletin boards show recent news, planned events, and any news the villagers want to pass along as well as psychological operations material.

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C. COMMUNICATIONSa. Problem areas:

(1) The same problem areas still exist as were reported in several previous reports. Lack of T/E items.

(a) Telephone Set, TA-312 #83

(b) Telephone Set, TA-1 190

(c) Radio Control Group, GRA-39 26

\*ACSA Phila message 251410Z June 1968 stated 66 TA-312's being shipped.

(2) The turn-around time for Direct Exchange items is improving. It is taking an average of (15) to (20) days vice (20) to (25) days.

b. Communications:

(1) Security: Call signs were changed on the 15th of August.

(a) 5 security violations were received from 1st Radio Battalion during the month of August. These were disclosure of proposed fires, disclosure of proposed fire mission coordinates, disclosure of friendly units approximate location, disclosure of a units location and the compromise of a call sign. CACO's and company communication NCO's were briefed and operating personnel are continuing to be instructed in transmission security during staff visits and inspections.

(2) Inspections: From 2-29 August all CACO/CAPs were inspected. Preventative Maintenance and operating conditions were checked with the following results:

(a) A build up of dirt in hard to get at spots.

(b) Frayed or torn handsets.

(c) Messages being held for more than 6 months.

(d) Batteries being left in field phones and radios that are not in use.

(e) Recommendations were made for immediate action to effect direct supervision for future maintenance.

(3) Radio Relay: PCC-1 radio relay equipment was installed for period of 1-17 August and the AN/GRC 10 radio relay equipment from 17-31 August. Down time for the PCC-1 was 30 hours; 30 hours, frequency

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block, 4 hours, bad coax cable and 1 hour, bad control unit.

(a) Down time for the AN/GRC-10 was (2) hours and that was for a frequency change and movement of antennas.

(b) The PCC-1 was not operating properly; an AN/GRC-10 was installed and good phone communication was established and has prevailed since.

(4) Combat Operation Center: Overall traffic increased slightly. The following communications traffic was passed through the Combat Operation Center over various nets.

Incoming Messages	660
Outgoing Messages	170
Spot Reports	282
Casualty Reports	60
Intell Reports	1
SIR	<u>3</u>
Total Traffic	1,176

(5) Communication Supply: Components of end items were in adequate stock throughout the month. The following reflects requisition status of communication items:

Requisitions Submitted	20
Requisitions Completed	0
Requisitions Outstanding	<u>20</u>
Total Requisitions Outstanding	44

(6) Maintenance: Support or repair of components of end items and the RT-505 radio set by the Direct Exchange System at FLC is improving. The average turn-around time for the RT-505 is (2) weeks, the H-189 handset is (1) week and the LS-454 loudspeaker is (3) weeks.

Work Requests Submitted	103
Work Requests Completed	78
Work Requests Outstanding	26

7. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

a. General. Emphasis on the training of selected Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers to act as Corpsemen in the event that a Corpseman is not available in the CAP was again stressed during the month of August. These Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers treated battle casualties and, in many cases, held MedCaps with the Vietnamese civilians. There was an increase in the use of Iodine tablets and as a result the number of hospital admissions due to intestinal disorders decreased considerably. The use of Malaria tablets was also emphasized. Log books were maintained by each of the platoon Corpsemen to record daily sick calls, ensure immunizations were up to date and ensure that each Marine took his Malaria tablet.

b. Personnel:

- (1) Medical Department Representative: HMC T. W. WILLIAMS, USN
- (2) Administrative/Sick Call Petty Officer: HES O. B. REEDER, USN
- (3) Supply/Sick Call Petty Officer: HML M. A. REEDER, USN
- (4) Hospital Corpseman Personnel Statistics for the month of August 1969:

(a) Attached	<u>1</u>
(b) Joined	<u>2</u>
(c) TAD Personnel Attached	<u>0</u>
(d) TAD Personnel Terminated	<u>0</u>
(e) Casualties:	
1. KIA	<u>1</u>
2. WIA	<u>2</u>
3. Twice WIA and Evacuated out of RVN	<u>0</u>
4. Died of Wounds	<u>0</u>

- (f) During the month of August the 2d Combined Action Group (CAG) at Station treated 194 PFC/USN personnel at routine sick call.

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EXEMPT 1 (1)

c. Medical Civic Action Program: (MedCap's)

(1) During the month of August 1969, CAP Corpsmen treated 17,702 Vietnamese civilians at daily routine MedCaps. This was an increase of 7,408 from the month of July. There were also 77 Vietnamese civilians treated as a result of hostile action.

(2) The 2d CAG Headquarters Medical Section treated a limited number of Vietnamese civilians due to our new location. The 2d CAG Headquarters Medical Section has supplied organizations with medical supplies for their own use.

d. Training:

(1) During the month of August 1969 CAP Corpsmen conducted a total of 64 classes resulting in a total attendance of 383 Vietnamese civilians and Popular Forces Soldiers. This represents a decrease of 1 class and a decrease of 177 people attending. Corpsmen were instructed to increase classes and encourage attendance.

e. Sanitation:

(1) Routine sanitation inspections were conducted within the 2d CAG Headquarters Compound during the month. All problems that were encountered were of a minor nature and were rectified immediately. For the month of August the sanitation in the 2d CAG Headquarters Compound was excellent.

f. Noteworthy Items:

(1) During the month there were six 2d CAG personnel admitted to hospitals with intestinal disorders. This is a decrease of four from the month of July and a decrease of twelve from the month of June. There were six cases of Fever of Unknown Origin during August, a decrease of seven from the month of July.

(2) On 8 August 1969 PFC W. J. OCHILL was WIA while on ambush with CAP 2-4-3.

(3) On 12 August 1969 PFC J. P. HALL was WIA while at a day room with CAP 2-3-3.

(4) On 20 August 1969 PFC S. J. DOR was KIA while at a day room with CAP 2-4-3.

UNCLASSIFIED  
ENCLOSURE (1)



5. Inspections:

(1) HMC T. W. WILLIAMS conducted routine monthly inspections of CAP units of 2d CAG during the month of August. Most of the discrepancies noted were of a minor nature and corrected immediately. Emphasis was placed on medical log books, Iodine tablets, Malaria tablets and personal hygiene in all CAPs.

UNCLASSIFIED

## 9. SPECIAL SERVICES

a. The month of August started slowly, but picked up considerably towards the end of the month. Special Services was still a little disorganized by the move of Headquarters from DaNang to Hoi An. Also there was a change of Custodians and a change of the Special Services NCO.

b. The most popular single items handled through Special Services is the weekly issue of beer and soda. The nature of the Combined Action Platoon is such that water supply is restrictive, and the beer and soda help to alleviate the problem. Soda is consistently more popular than beer in this regard. During the month, 310 cases of soda and 230 cases of beer were issued to the eight companies of the Group.

c. Special Services continued its function of handling monthly orders for pre-recorded tapes under the program provided by III Marine Amphibious Force Special Services. During August, Marines and Navy of 2d CAG purchased 41 tapes.

d. Almost 500 paperback books were received during the month of August, from donors in the United States. The paperback books were distributed to all the CAPs.

e. August was a bad month for Hong Kong trips. Special Services had two trips to Hong Kong during the month, but had some difficulty in getting the merchandise from the retailers. But this problem should overcome in the near future.

UNCLASSIFIED  
ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

## PART III

## Sequential Listing of Significant Events

1 Aug 69

A CAP 2-3-1 patrol detonated a booby-trapped grenade 21km N.E. of Dien Ban, causing 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 PF WIA(E) and 3 USMC WIA(M). Two hours later, in approximately the same location, a second booby-trapped grenade was tripped, causing another USMC WIA(E). Continuing the patrol, the CAP found 2 bunkers and 2 more booby-trapped grenades, which were destroyed.

3 Aug 69

A CAP 2-1-3 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 20 NVA moving N. at AT950699. The NVA returned fire wounding 4 RF's accompanying the CAP and causing minor wounds to 2 USMC. After 2 hours of exchanging fire the NVA broke contact. A subsequent sweep of the area by the CAP found numerous blood trails.

A CAP 2-1-4 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on an USEF 6.5km S. of DaNang air base. A sweep of the area revealed 1 NVA KIA and miscellaneous 782 gear.

4 Aug 69

CAP 2-2-4 was informed that there was an abnormal amount of activity in a house 5km W. of Dai Loc. Checking the house, the CAP found 3 females and evidence that they had cooked food for about 25 personnel. A further search uncovered a bunker, various documents, currency and 782 gear. The 3 female suspects were turned over to District Headquarters.

5 Aug 69

Upon investigating 2 explosions 11km S.W. of Hoi An, CAP 2-4-2 found 5 VN civilians KIA and 11 VN civilians WIA(E) by 2 grenades thrown into a meeting of village elders. The CAP recovered the casualties and swept the area, detaining 1 male and 1 15 year old female as suspects in the incident. At District Headquarters interrogation by the DIOCC revealed the VC had paid the suspects 600\$VN to throw the grenades.

UNCLASSIFIED  
ENCLOSURE (1)

6 Aug 69

CAP 2-9-1 initiated organic weapons fire on 8 VC 4km N.E. of An Hoa. A fire mission was called in and the VC fled to the N. without returning fire. A sweep of the area revealed 1 VC KIA.

7 Aug 69

The CAP 2-8-5 CP initiated organic weapons fire on 7 VC 7km N.W. of DaNang air base. The VC fled to the N. and the CAP swept the area with negative results. At first light the CAP swept the area again finding 2 bunkers, containing 5 bags of rice, 5 ponchos, 2 chicom grenades, 2 first aid packs and cigarettes and candy. The CAP destroyed the bunkers.

A CAP 2-1-3 ambush detonated 1 claymore and initiated organic weapons fire on 10 enemy moving E. 8km S.W. of DaNang air base. The enemy fled and the CAP swept the area with negative results. In a re-sweep at first light the CAP found 2 NVA KIA and 2 chicom grenades.

8 Aug 69

On a combined sweep with CAP 2-9-1 and 17 elements 3km N.E. of An Hoa, CAP 2-9-2 tripped a box mine, causing 1 USMC WIA(E) and 2 RF WIA(E). 200 VCS were detained during the sweep and forwarded to District Headquarters.

A CAP 2-8-4 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 10 NVA spotted 7km W. of DaNang air base. The NVA returned SAF causing minor wounds to 1 USMC before fleeing E. A sweep of the area found 1 AK-47, 2 AK-47 magazines, 1 cartridge belt, 2 packs and 2 chicom grenades. Moving to a new ambush site, the CAP received AWP from G. A. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called for a reactionary force from "I" 3/26. The CAP and the reactionary force assaulted the position causing the NVA to flee E. 1 CAP USMC was KIA. A sweep of the area found 2 NVA KIA and 3 AK-47's.

9 Aug 69

1 NVA Hoi Chanh turned himself into CAP 2-1-2 5km W. of DaNang air base. The Hoi Chanh was taken to District Headquarters.

UNCLASSIFIED  
ENCLOSURE (1)

11 Aug 69

A CAP 2-1-3 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 25-50 NVA moving W. 7km S.W. of DaNang air base. The enemy returned SAF and the CAP called in an 81mm mortar mission. A sweep of the area revealed 1 NVA KIA and 1 USMC was WIA(E). On a further sweep at first light the CAP found 1 NVA WIA who when interrogated, said his units strength was 50 men and that 3 NVA KIA and 5 NVA WIA had been carried off after the fire fight.

12 Aug 69

CAP 2-4-2 was returning from its night ambush site when 15-17 VC initiated AW, RPG, and SAF 7km S.E. of Dien Ban. The CAP returned fire and called an artillery mission causing the enemy to break contact and withdraw S.W. 1 USMC and 1 PF were WIA(E). A sweep of the area produced negative results.

Two USMC and 1 PF from CAP 2-7-6 were WIA(E) when they tripped 2 separate booby-traps in an attempt to destroy an NVA flag 5km S.E. of DaNang air base.

A CAP 2-7-5 patrol investigated an explosion 4km S.E. of the DaNang air base and found 1 NVA with multiple fragmentation wounds. The NVA had tripped 2 booby-trapped M-26 grenades. The POW was medevaced for interrogation.

Acting on information provided by PF's, CAP 2-1-6 sent a patrol to reconnoiter the area 11 km S.W. of the DaNang air base. The patrol observed 20 enemy moving W. and initiated fire on them. Gunships were employed as the enemy withdrew. Contact was then made with 10 more enemy who withdrew as the CAP initiated fire, an artillery mission was called in and the CAP swept the area, finding 1 NVA KIA in a USMC camouflage shirt bearing the insignia of an NVA 1st Lt.

CAPs 2-3-1, 2-3-2, 2-3-3, 2-3-4, 2-3-5, and 2-3-6 participated in a joint sweep 2km S.E. of Dien Ban. 18 suspects were detained, 4 were classified VCS by the DIOCC.

UNCLASSIFIED  
ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

A CAP 2-8-3 element was moving to its ambush site when it received two grenades and SAF 12km N.W. of the DaNang air base. The CAP returned organic weapons fire causing the enemy to withdraw. 6 PF's were WIA(E) and 4 were WIA(M). A sweep of the area produced negative results.

In response to local information CAP 2-5-1 dispatched a patrol to pick up a VC who reportedly wanted to Chieu Hoi 5km S.W. of the DaNang air base. Upon arrival the patrol found 1 VC lying in a bush with a grenade in his hand. The patrol spent 20 minutes trying to talk the VC into surrendering. When he attempted to throw the grenade the patrol killed him.

A CAP 2-1-4 ambush was setting in when it received SAF from an USEF 9km S.W. of the DaNang air base. The CAP returned fire and the enemy broke contact. There were 1 USMC WIA(M), 2 PF's WIA(M) and 1 PF seriously wounded. A medevac helicopter was unable to land due to intensive SAF in the LZ. Gunships and Spooky were called in to strafe the area. The PF DOW. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, 5 20lb charges with electrical firing devices emplaced under a bridge on route 540. Blood trails, an "E" tool, and 1 bayonet were also found.

A CAP 2-1-2 ambush initiated fire on an USEF 9km S.W. of the DaNang air base. The enemy fled to the N.W. A sweep of the area found 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47.

A CAP 2-8-3 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 7 NVA 11km W. of the DaNang air base. The enemy returned SAF and fled W. A sweep of the area produced 1 NVA KIA, 2 VN civilians KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 pair of binoculars and 1 chicken.

A CAP 2-1-5 patrol discovered 3 enemy bodies in shallow graves 8km S.W. of DaNang air base. 2 of the bodies were NVA and the third was identified by documents as VC. They had been killed by artillery.

70 AUG 68

UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCLUDED (17)

DECLASSIFIED

16 Aug 69

A CAP 2-1-3 ambush initiated SAF on 2 NVA moving NE 8km S.W. of the DaNang air base. A sweep of the area revealed 2 NVA KIA and 4 chicom.

CACO 2-2 received 8 rounds of 82mm mortar fire 1km N. of Dai Loc. 4 VN civilians were WIA(E). Negative action was taken due to the unknown location of the mortars.

6 VN children received VIP payments for informing CAP 2-4-1 of the location of 7 M-16A1 mines, 1 M-26 grenade, and 1 60mm illum round. The ordnance was destroyed.

17 Aug 69

2d CAG Headquarters received 7 RPG's and sporadic AWF from an USEF 2km W. of Hoi An. The CP returned SAF, AWF and fired 60mm illum. 2 USMC were WIA(M).

A CAP 2-1-5 sweep received SAF from 1 NVA in a spider hole 8km S.W. of the DaNang air base. The CAP returned organic weapons fire killing the NVA in the spider hole and 3 NVA spotted fleeing the area while pursuing other NVA observed in the area. The CAP received fire from 20 NVA who fled S.E. when the CAP returned fire. The CAP swept the area and found 4 AK-47's, 1 SKS, 10 chicom grenades, 1 B-40 rocket and documents.

A CAP 2-3-5 ambush received 4 B-40 rockets and SAF from 2 squads of NVA 2.5km S. of Dien Ban. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called an 81mm mission causing the NVA to withdraw to the S.W. 2 USMC were WIA(F). A sweep of the area revealed 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47.

21 Aug 69

A joint CAP 2-1-3/RF ambush initiated organic weapons fire on an USEF spotted moving E. 8km S.W. of DaNang air base. The enemy returned SAF and 2 RPG's, causing 1 RF KIA, 6 USMC and 2 RF's WIA(E) and 2 USMC WIA(M). A CAP sweep at first light had negative results.

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DECLASSIFIED

CAP 2-3-2 elements enroute to an ambush position set up a hasty ambush and initiated organic weapons fire on 3 VC spotted 2km N. of Dien Ban. 1 VC was KIA and before fleeing N. the other 2 VC threw a chicom grenade causing minor wounds to 2 PF's. The CAP swept the area finding 1 M-14 and assorted documents.

An USEF detonated a claymore mine as CAP 2-2-1 elements were passing enroute to a night ambush site. 1 USMC and 1 PF were WIA(E). The CAP returned fire and swept the area finding 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47.

A CAP 2-3-1 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 6 VC spotted 1km E. of Dien Ban. 1 VC KIA was found on a sweep of the area.

20 AUG 69

A CAP 2-1-3 ambush initiated fire on 40-10 NVA moving N. 1.2km N. of Hieu Duc District Headquarters. Artillery and mortar fire were fired on suspected withdrawal routes. 1 NVA was found KIA on a sweep at first light.

21 AUG 69

A CAP 2-1-4 USMC was WIA(E) when he tripped a booby-trapped claymore 7km S.W. of DaNang air base. A search of the area found 2 booby-trapped chicom which were destroyed.

A CAP 2-3-1 patrol spotted 3 bunkers 1km E. of Dien Ban. 1 VC was KIA as he attempted to throw a grenade from one of the bunkers. A pack, miscellaneous documents, clothing, and 10 blasting caps were captured. The bunkers were destroyed.

A VN woman led a CAP 2-4-2 patrol to a VC who wanted to Chieu Hoi 2km S.W. of Hoi An. The Hoi Chanh was turned over to District Headquarters.

22 AUG 69

A CAP 2-2-1 USMC was WIA(E) when he tripped a booby-trapped chicom 1km S. of Dai Loc.

23 AUG 69

A CAP 2-1-4 patrol tripped a booby trapped claymore causing 1 USMC and 1 PF WIA(E).

DECLASSIFIED  
EXCLUDED (1)



25 Aug 69

CAP 2-4-3 investigated an explosion at a village meeting house 1km E. of Hoi An. The CAP found the village chief with his legs blown off by a booby trap attached to the meeting house door.

CAP 2-4-5 received 1 homemade grenade at their ambush site 1km E. of Hoi An. 2 more incoming grenades resulted in 2 USMC WIA(E), 1 PF WIA(E) and 1 PF WIA(M).

26 Aug 69

VN children informed CAP 2-4-5 of the location of 3 M-72 LAAW's, 1 M-26 grenade, 1 M-79 rnd, 1 81mm HE rnd and 1 60mm HE rnd 1km E. of Hoi An. The ordnance was destroyed and a VIP payment was made.

A CAP 2-7-6 USMC was WIA(E) when he tripped a booby trapped M-26 grenade 5km S.E. of Da-Nang air base.

27 Aug 69

A CAP 2-3-4 ambush received SAF from an USEF 1km S. of Dien Ban causing minor wounds to 1 USMC and 1 PF. The CAP returned SAF killing 1 NVA. 81mm mortars were called in on suspected enemy positions. The CAP swept the area finding 1 NVA WIA, 1 SKS, and 1 M-16.

CAP 2-3-5 was informed by villagers that their hamlet had been mortared and there were many casualties, 2km S. of Dien Ban. The CAP found 2 VN civilians KIA, 7VN civilians WIA(M). A sweep of the area disclosed 2 82mm mortar rin. assemblies. PsyOps was initiated.

CACO 2-9 Headquarters received SAF and AWF from an USEF 2km N.E. of An Hoi. The CACO returned SAF, AWF, 60mm mortars and 81mm mortars, silencing the enemy.

28 Aug 69

1 VN civilian was KIA and 4 VN civilians were WIA(E) when an USEF set off a command detonated claymore mine 1km N. of Dai Loc. CACO 2-2 Headquarters contacted PsyOps to exploit the incident.

29 Aug 69

A CAP 2-3-6 patrol received MGF and SAF from 2 VC 2km N. of Dien Ban. The CAP returned SAF causing the VC to flee to the N.W. A sweep of the area found 7 bunkers, 1 of which contained not chow cooking and miscellaneous documents. The CAP destroyed the bunkers and turned the documents over to District Headquarters.

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DECLASSIFIED

A CAP 2-2-4 patrol detained 2 VN females carrying 75 lbs of rice into a tree line 3km W. of Dai Loc. The 2 VCS were taken to District Headquarters for interrogation.

4 VN children brought to CAP 2-9-2 1 105mm rnd, 6 81mm mortar rnds, 13 B-40 rockets, 5 M-79 rnds found 4 km N.E. of An Hoa. The ordnance was destroyed and VIP payments were made.

30 Aug 69

Acting on local intelligence, CAP 2-5-1 detained 1 VCS 6km S.E. of DaNang air base. The suspect was taken to District Headquarters where he was classified by the DIOCC as a VC security cadre leader.

UNCLASSIFIED  
ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
2d Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
APO San Francisco, California 96302

3/LMN/gbs  
3000  
2 August 1969

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attention  
Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program)  
Subject: Readjustment of CAP Tactical Areas of Coordination (TAOC's),  
Dai Loc District

Encl: (1) Overlay of present Dai Loc CAP TAOC's  
(2) Overlay of proposed Dai Loc CAP TAOC's

1. It is recommended that the CAP location in Dai Loc District be readjusted to those TAOC's shown on enclosure (1).

Coordination has been made with the Province Chief, Quang Nam-Đà Nẵng and he has submitted a parallel request to I Corps. The proposed moves will enhance the overall defensive plan of the area as well as the pacification of marginal Hamlets. All Commanders and advisors concerned are in full agreement with the proposed moves and support them unanimously.

a. CAP 2-2-1 (See overlay, enclosure (1)). We propose shifting CAP 2-2-1's TAOC in Ai Dong Hamlet to encompass part of CAP 2-2-2's TAOC in Hoa My Hamlet. The present CAP 2-2-1 TAOC is too restricted in area. The new TAOC will allow more flexibility of movement. It covers an approach that was once extensively used by VC infiltrators and probably would be used again unless we maintain surveillance of the area.

b. CAP 2-2-2 (See overlay, enclosure (1)). The area presently occupied by CAP 2-2-2 will be covered by the new TAOC for CAP 2-2-1. I recommend moving the CAP 2-2-2 TAOC West across the river in the vicinity of grids AT8957 and AT8958. This area has a requirement for a unit to extensively patrol and control vital routes of approach into Dai Loc. The northern part of this proposed TAOC has been used extensively as mortar sites to strike at District Headquarters and the American combat bases in the area of hill 37, and locating CAP 2-2-2 in this area would deter the enemy's efforts against friendly forces in Dai Loc.

c. CAP 2-2-3 (See overlay, enclosure (1)). CAP 2-2-3 in Hamlets An My, Phu Bac and Dong Mai has not made any significant contacts for nearly six months. CAP 2-2-3 has served its purpose as a fixed Compound CAP in this area and has accomplished its mission. We recommend that this CAP be assigned a mobile mission that will support the 1969 pacification plan and add to the overall security of the Dai Loc area. The new Mobile CAP will provide security for the Loc Chanh area in the vicinity of grids AT9059 and AT9160. It will also deny the enemy use of this area for mortar or rocket launch sites against Dai Loc.

d. CAP 2-2-4 (See overlay, enclosure (1)). The present TAOC will change only slightly to add more maneuver room to the West in the vicinity of AT8457 which is an area the enemy uses constantly. The change in size will allow the CAP to better control avenues of approach from the West into Dai Loc.

E. L. LEWIS

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
 2d Combined Action Group  
 III Marine Amphibious Force  
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/LEN/gbs  
 3000  
 22 August 1969

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, Assistant  
 Chief of Staff Combined Action Program

Subj: Noise Suppressors, Models E4A and NOL, Troop test of

Ref: (a) CG, III MAF ltr 30/map 3960 of July 1969 (NOTAL)

(b) AC of S CAP ltr 14:GPM:che 1550 of 25 July 1969

Encl: (1) Information Sheet on Subject Tests with Extra Questionnaires  
 (2) Instructions for the Completion of Subject Tests

1. The results of the troop test directed by reference (b) of noise suppressors, models E4A and NOL is provided below. Questions provided in enclosure (1) of reference (a) have been answered. The eight tests were conducted by four separate Combined Action Platoons representing two Combined Action Companies of 2d CAG.

a. Tests were conducted in accordance with instructions contained in reference (a).

2. All suppressors received by units of 2d CAG were in excellent condition.

a. Although three of the model E4A were assigned only one alignment tool was provided.

b. Each suppressor also required a burned powder blow back shield to protect the firer from getting residue in his eyes. Two of these shields were provided for five suppressors.

3. a. Test No. 1 - Physical Characteristics

(1) Purpose. To determine the noise suppressors suitability as configured.

(2) Only one person felt that the suppressor was unwieldy in thick growth or any problem at all as far as weight and configuration are concerned. His dissatisfaction was with the NOL model, the larger of the two suppressors. There was no adverse evaluation in this category for the E4A model.

## b. Test No. 2 - Ease of Operation

(1) Purpose. To determine if the suppressor is adequately simple to operate.

(2) Only one of the testers had used a muzzle attachment of any type before. The weapons were fired on both automatic and semi-automatic fire using from 20-300 rounds in each model. Every user felt that the weapon needed much more frequent cleaning with the suppressor installed. Two testers also complained of difficulty in cleaning their weapon. There seemed to be no distinctions made between the E4A and NOL models in this respect. One suppressor, the E4A model, was damaged due to keyholing (caused by the bullet hitting the end of the suppressor) with the only apparent explanation being that it was knocked down from a standing position. The alignment tool had been used to install the suppressor initially. The same weapon had been submerged in water but was not thought to have been damaged by it. No problems of keyholing were encountered with the NOL model. An alignment tool was used to install the suppressor on 4 of the weapons (2 NOL and 2 E4A). As was previously mentioned, in the only case of keyholing an alignment tool had been used.

## c. Test No. 3 - Durability and Reliability

(1) Purpose. To evaluate the durability and reliability of the noise suppressor.

(2) Both models of the suppressor were subjected to a variety of weather conditions including wind, sand and dust, light rain and salt water. None of these conditions seemed to produce a particularly adverse affect on their operation. Approximately 60% of the testers described marked decreases in state of fire as the carbon built up in the chamber and on moving parts of the weapon. No heavy rains were present during the testing period. No safety hazards were discovered when the suppressor was attached except that without the shield placed behind the rear sight the carbon residue tended to blow back in the shooters eyes.

## d. Test No. 4 - Operational Value

(1) Purpose. To determine if the noise suppressor has a definite operational value to the Marine Corps in Southeast Asia.

(2) The NOL and E4A noise suppressor were tested in both day and night ambushes under weather conditions of wind, sand and high humidity with occasional light rain. These weather conditions are typical in the Danang area of I Corps during July and August. Therefore the operational usefulness of this weapon in the CAPs during the period tested was determined under typical operating conditions. The conclusion was that an M-16 equipped with either model noise suppressor would be of limited value in an ambush because it could not deliver a continuous high rate of fire. However, it was also noted that during the day or night at distances greater than 100 meters the target was confused about the direction being fired from if the muzzle flash was

concealed. Little no reduction was observed in muzzle flash of the weapon compared to the flash without the suppressor. Several testers felt that a suppressor equipped M-16 would be very effective for a sniper particularly during the day at ranges greater than 100 meters from a concealed position. It was a limitation of these evaluations that no enemy contacts were made close enough to determine their reaction and very few suppressors were available for testing over a brief period of about fifteen days actual field time.

Several suggestions were made regarding the usefulness of the weapon. If the muzzle flash were further reduced; some method of reducing the rapid carbon build up; and some kind of lock nut were developed to help keep the suppressor in place it would be an excellent accessory for the M-16 rifle. Pending these improvements the consensus seemed to be that the suppressor had negligible value even for snipers.

e. Test No. 5 - Recommended allowance

(1) Purpose. If adoption by the Marine Corps is recommended to determine allowances for the test item.

(2) If the Marine Corps did adopt this weapon it is recommended that allowances be guided by the use of the weapon by snipers only pending further improvements.

E. L. LEWIS

HEADQUARTERS  
2d Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

10/AJN/gbs  
2000  
23 August 1969

From: Communications Chief  
To: Commanding Officer, 2d Combined Action Group  
Subj: Communications Chief Conference, 10 July 1969

Encl: (1) Recommended changes to T/E  
(2) Recommendation for the CAP TACTICAL NET  
(3) Recommended steps to take for T.E shortages  
(4) Recommended changes for Direct Exchange System at Chu-Lai  
(5) Recommended changes to CAP school syllabus  
(6) Miscellaneous Items Discussed

1. The 2d Combined Action Group was host unit for a communications chief conference held 10 July, 1969. The communication T/E and Combined Action Program schools class on calling in artillery and medevacs were discussed at length, as were the status of PRC-88's. Also discussed were the CAP tactical radio net, FLC's direct exchange system and a shortage to I/O communications within the CAG's.

2. The changes contained in enclosures (1) thru (6) are recommended by all Combined Action Group Communication Chiefs and are submitted for evaluation.

A. J. NADEAU

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ENCLOSURE (1)



## Recommended Changes to T/

1. The equipment listed below would be used at the CAG Headquarters to perform 1st and 2d echelon maintenance on all communications electronic equipment organic to the CAG.

- a. Test Kit MK-992/URC-12 (RT-524)
- b. Test Kit MK-993/PRC-25
- c. Multimeter ME-25A/N
- d. Test set, Radio Frequency Power AN/URR-430
- e. Battery Tester TS-183 B/N
- f. Signal Generator TS-505
- g. Tool Kit AN/USN-15

2. The equipment listed below would be used at CAG Headquarters and at CAGC Headquarters. It has a much greater operating range, better receiving capabilities, and in general is much more reliable than the T/PRC-25 now being used. It has increased our communications reliability from 70% to 90%.

- a. (1) AN/URC-12 Radio Set
- (2) AN/URC-125 Radio Set
- (3) PP-295 3/W Power supply

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EXCLUDED (E)

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Recommendations for CAP Tactical Net

1. It is recommended that the CAP Director be given additional frequencies from Q-6. One of the existing two frequencies can not be used because of atmospheric conditions. A number of frequencies are desired.

a. A JTFMRF Q-6 representative stated that the above requested frequencies would be given to the CAP Director.

b. Existing call signs and frequencies have been distributed. Additional frequencies will be sent to the CAG's when available.

c. The hours of the first test, to determine feasibility of frequency, will be on 19 July, from 0700-0800, 1500-1600, and 2000-2100. The CAP director will be net control.

d. The power source will be two 12 volt vehicle batteries run in series.

UNCLASSIFIED  
ENCLOSURE (2)

DECLASSIFIED

Recommended steps to take for T/O shortages

1. Check with supply to ensure equipment ordered is a valid requisition.
2. If initial order was on a Priority 5 or higher it may help to drop the priority to a 2, providing it is combat essential.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (3)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Recommended changes for Direct Exchange System at 48-141

1. The present repair time of communications equipment is unsatisfactory. Equipment is turned in to LSU-3 and then evacuated to FLJ. 1st CAS is only able to operate satisfactorily because it has obtained extra equipment from nearby units. FLSG A on 15 July 1969 will join LSU-3 into their organization. LSU-3 has three communications technicians but does not have a repair facility, test equipment, or parts.
2. Parts and equipment to operate a third echelon repair facility are recommended when LSU-3 and FLSG A join.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (4)

Recommended changes to WAF School Syllabus

1. After carefully considering the artillery and medevac class the foregoing conclusion has been made.

a. Artillery has two hours of lecture and four hours of actual application.

(1) It is recommended that the class remain the same.

b. Helicopter support and medevac procedures have two hours of lecture and no application.

(1) It is recommended that the classes remain the same.

2. It is felt that the students are getting adequate instruction. The individual, however, feels that he must call in an artillery mission and medevac chopper. Instruction given with large classes makes this unfeasible.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (5)

## Miscellaneous Items Discussed

1. There are 480 POC-88's scheduled for the Combined Action Program. FIC is the holder but III MAF G-6 does not want to issue them until component parts are received. The parts lacking are Crystal sets and Alignment indicators.

2. Representatives from G-6 informed the communication chiefs why there is such a long turn-around time on some items in the Direct Exchange System. There is not enough equipment in the system. FIC, G-3 Maintenance, is trying to increase the assets in this system.

3. The AS-2236 antenna was discussed at length. May CAG units order them? Will the AS-2236 do a better job than the RC-292 antenna?

a. The AS-2236 antenna was designed for use with the VCC-1 and POC-2 radio relay equipment. It is a special allowance item, but this does not restrict a unit from ordering. 2d and 3d CAG's have already ordered several.

b. The range of the RC-292 antenna with the POC-25 radio set is approximately (20) miles. The AS-2236 antenna is omnidirectional to a range of (30) miles and directional up to (100) miles. Other differences being insignificant the latter would give much better service.

## 4. Personnel:

a. In 1st CAG there is a need for more Sgt's. with the MOS of 2431. Most CAGO Headquarters have O3s as communication NCO's. The quality of instruction would be much greater under the direction of a T/O 2431/Sgt.

b. 2d and 4th CAGs are over T/O in communicators. Most of these Marines hold the position of Comm NCO at the CAGOs but there are some O3s holding this job. Some of the 24s came into the program on a personnel section is concerned the CAPs as O3s. As far as the III MAF personnel section is concerned the CAGs have communicators in their units that aren't doing their primary job. This is a command problem not theirs.

c. 3d CAG is short (3) Sgts.

## d. Recommendations:

- (1) That the T/O be filled by rank.
- (2) That the communicators in the CAPs remain there without counting against the units T/O.

ENCLOSURE (6)

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(3) That the OAG Commanders submit a roster of OAG communicators to the personnel officer III MAF and then fill the remaining gaps.

(4) It is felt that the existing rank for the T/O remain constant. Any deletion of ranking NCO's would significantly diminish the knowledge available to Marines in the field.

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Hoa Vang BT013725  
Date 23 August 1969

ANNEX O TO HOA VANG  
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON  
MILITARY PLAN 687

From: Hoa Vang Subsector Headquarters  
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2

Ref: MAP INDOCHINA; Sheet 6641 III

1. Organization

a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of QM Platoon 45 and U.S. Marines from the 8th Combined Action Company, 2d Combined Action Group is hereby designated as mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 to protect the people of Huong Phuoc & Than Tung Son Hamlet (a) from the terroristic tactics of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TAOC) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QM Platoon 45 and U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

2. Mission. Provide security from VC/NVA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

Ban văn số  
Số chỉ Huy Chi khu Hòa-Vang  
Hòa-Vang BT013725  
Ngày 23-8-1969

Mục O của các trung đội  
Hội-Hợp Hòa-Vang trong năm 1969  
Thuộc kế hoạch quân sự 687

Nội gửi: Bộ chỉ Huy chi khu Hòa-Vang  
Nhận: trung đội Hội-Hợp 2-8-2.

Tham chiếu: Bản đồ INDOCHINA, số 6641 III

1. Tổ chức

a. Một trung đội hội-hợp gồm có trung đội Nghĩa-Quân QM 45 và T.Q.L.C. Mỹ thuộc Đại-đội hội-hợp 8th thuộc liên đoàn lực lượng hội-hợp 2 được biệt phái đến trung đội hội-hợp 2-8-2 lưu động để bảo vệ dân chúng ấp Huong-Phuoc, và Than Tung Son tránh khỏi chiến thuật khủng bố của hạ tầng cơ sở địch cũng tránh khỏi địch cố xâm nhập vào thôn ấp, và những nhiệm vụ khác được sự chấp thuận đồng nhất giữa chỉ khu trưởng, Chỉ khu hòa-vang và công sự viên cao cấp, Đại đội trưởng đại đội hội-hợp 5.

b. Lệnh này và những lệnh khác trong tương lai có liên quan đến nhiệm vụ chống ý niệm hành quân, Khu phối hợp chiến thuật (TAOC) và sự phối hợp với các đơn vị Việt-Nam cùng khu Hòa-Kỳ ở lân cận sẽ chỉ dành cho trung đội Nghĩa-Quân QM 45 và các quân nhân T.Q.L.C. Mỹ được biệt phái đến làm việc chung với họ trong trung đội hội-hợp 2-8-2. Lệnh này và những lệnh khác trong tương lai sẽ được Chỉ Khu, Trưởng chỉ khu Hòa-Vang và công sự viên cao cấp Đại đội Trưởng đại đội 5 ký và ban hành.

2. Nhiệm vụ. Cung cấp an ninh trong khắp toàn bộ Khu phối hợp chiến thuật để tránh bị VC cùng quân chính này đặt chân vào được chỉ định theo...

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- a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.
- b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.
- c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.
- d. Conduct vigorous civic action and psyops programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.
- e. Organize local intelligence units.
- f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District BHOCC and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units.
- g. Train and assist the Hamlet Peoples Self Defense Force.
- h. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other FVMAF Units.

### 3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command post/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will remain at the day command post/base of operations to conduct local MedCaps, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire TAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

- a. Phá vỡ hạ tầng cơ sở Việt-Cộng
- b. Bảo vệ chính trị bạn và các cơ sở xã hội của ta.
- c. Sắp xếp tuần tiễu, phục kích trong phạm vi Khu Phối hợp chiến thuật chỉ định.
- d. Bày mạnh công tác dân sự và chương trình tâm lý chiến để tạo được sự tin tưởng của dân chúng địa phương vào nói ta.
- e. Tổ chức đơn vị tình báo địa phương
- f. Báo cáo mọi tin tình báo quân sự lập tức cho trung tâm tình báo hỗn-hợp tại quận và các đơn vị Việt-Nam cũng như Mỹ ở lân cận.
- g. Huấn luyện và giúp đỡ nhân dân tự vệ trong thôn ấp.
- h. Tham dự các cuộc hành quân hỗn-hợp với đơn vị chính quy Việt-Nam hay các đơn vị đồng minh T.Q.L.C.

### 3. Thi hành

a. Ý niệm hành quân. Trung đội Hỗn-hợp 2-8-2 sẽ hoạt động tại những ấp nằm trong khu phối hợp chiến thuật chỉ định cho mình theo nguyên tắc lưu động đánh bất ngờ, chẳng bao giờ tạo nên một mẫu mực hoạt động giống nhau trong một vị trí mỗi ngày phải thay đổi chỗ đóng bộ chỉ huy, ngày và đêm cũng các hoạt động cần biến hằng ngày. Chỗ đóng bộ chỉ huy và các hoạt động thường gồm nhiều nhà khác nhau nằm trong thôn ấp để trung đội hỗn-hợp có thể tấn công. Một phần ba Trung đội hỗn-hợp 2-8-2 sẽ ở lại bộ chỉ huy để làm công tác dân sự và huấn luyện lập kế hoạch hoạt động đêm, liên lạc cần thiết với các đơn vị bạn kế cận và tuần tiễu. Ban khi trời tối trung đội hỗn hợp 2-8-2 sẽ di chuyển đến bộ chỉ huy và căn cứ hoạt động mà đã chọn trước và đi tuần tiễu, phục kích trong khắp khu phối hợp chiến thuật của mình. Tất cả cuộc tuần tiễu, phục kích và các hoạt động khác sẽ phải phối hợp xuống cấp tiểu đội.

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### B. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations

(1) Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size patrols daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

(c) Change the command post location/base of operations every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings nor concrete structures.

(d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TAOC without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

c. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Artillery Company.

### d. Planning

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3a. and b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAOC.

### b. Tuần tiêu, phục kích nổi động bộ chỉ huy.

(1) Trung đội hỗn hợp 2-8-2 sẽ đi tuần tiêu, phục kích và nổi động bộ chỉ huy như sau

(a) Tối thiểu phải có hai cuộc tuần tiêu hay phục kích theo cấp 2 tiểu đội phối hợp hàng ngày giữa khoảng thời gian từ 19 giờ đến 07 giờ.

(b) Tối thiểu có một tiểu đội hỗn hợp, cấp tiểu đội đi tuần tiêu trong khoảng thời gian từ 07 giờ đến 19 giờ hàng ngày.

(c) Cứ 12 tiếng thay đổi chỗ bộ chỉ huy, các hoạt động thường, bộ chỉ huy sẽ không dừng ở tòa nhà công cộng mà cũng không ở các nhà băng xi-măng.

(d) Trong 24 tiếng, tuần tiêu hay phục kích trong mỗi ấp khu phối hợp chiến thuật chỉ định không dùng cùng một lối đi đường mòn, và một đường lối giờ giấc hoạt động giống nhau.

c. Những hoạt động khác. Trung đội hỗn hợp 2-8-2 sẽ thi hành những hoạt động khác khác khu Trưởng chỉ khu Hoa-Vang và đại đội Trưởng đại đội hỗn hợp 5 chỉ định.

### d. Kế hoạch.

(1) Lộ trình tuần tiêu, phục kích và các hoạt động khác của trung đội hỗn hợp sẽ căn cứ theo đoạn 3a. và b. ở trên, nguồn tin tình báo hay các kế hoạch dự định và tất cả các đường xâm nhập hoặc những nơi mà trước đây địch đã hoạt động phải kiểm soát, ngăn chặn hàng ngày khắp toàn bộ khu phối hợp chiến thuật của mình.

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(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective QNM Platoon Commander and the CAP leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and/ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the QNM Platoon Leader and the Marine CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hoa Vang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 1000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and CP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

#### e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TAOC will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines and the other ARVN AND FVMAF units as necessary.

(2) Firesupport and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines.

#### 4. Administration/Logistics

a. Administration and Logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Hoa Vang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

(2) Trung đội trưởng Nghĩa quân và toàn Trưởng T.Q.L.C. Mỹ phải hoàn tất kế hoạch. Những sự bất đồng về vị trí, số lần công tác và số quân tuần tiêu hay phục kích hoặc những hoạt động khác phải đề trình về chỉ khu Trưởng chỉ khu Hoà-Vang và sĩ quan phối hợp cao cấp Đại đội Trưởng đại đội hỗn hợp 5, hay vị phụ tá đại diện quyết định. Mọi trường hợp bất đồng ý kiến, Trung đội trưởng QNM và toàn trưởng T. Q. L. C. Mỹ sẽ phải báo cáo ngay về Bộ chỉ huy quân Hoà-Vang. Mọi sự bất đồng ý kiến phải được giải quyết trước 10 giờ trong ngày để công tác hay tuần tiêu được thi hành trở lại.

(3) Tất cả cuộc tuần tiêu, phục kích, nổi động bố chỉ huy phải hoạch định trước và đề trình về Chỉ huy Trưởng chỉ khu Hoà-Vang và đại đội Trưởng đại đội hỗn hợp 5 vào ngày thứ Bảy để kế hoạch đó được thi hành vào tuần tới từ thứ Hai cho đến Chúa Nhật. Có thể chỉ khu trưởng chỉ khu Hoà-Vang và đại đội trưởng đại đội hỗn hợp 5 hoặc các vị đại diện đồng cho phép sửa đổi kế hoạch công tác hành quân.

#### e. Huấn thi phối hợp.

(1) Khu vực hoạt động chỉ định, Khu phối hợp chiến thuật theo phụ lục (1) chỉ định cho trung đội hỗn hợp 2-8-2 để biết rõ chắc chắn khu vực riêng của mình để giúp mình trong việc phối hợp với tất cả đơn vị bạn. Tất cả cuộc tuần tiêu, phục kích hay những hoạt động khác trong phạm vi khu phối hợp chiến thuật chỉ định sẽ phải liên lạc với chỉ huy Trưởng Trung đoàn 26th T.Q.L.C. Mỹ và các đơn vị Việt-Nam cùng khu đồng minh khi cần thiết.

(2) Hoà lực yểm trợ và lực lượng tiếp ứng sẽ liên lạc với Chỉ huy Trưởng trung đoàn 26th T.Q.L.C. Mỹ.

#### 4. Quản trị và tiếp vận

a. Việc quản trị và tiếp vận cho trung đội hỗn hợp 2-8-2 do quân đội Việt-Nam và T.Q.L.C. tại bộ chỉ huy chỉ khu Hoà-Vang riêng biệt đảm trách, ngoại trừ trường hợp sửa đổi lệnh này.

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b. Members of the CAP 2-8-2 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

## 5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the QNM Platoon 45 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.


b. The QNM Platoon 45 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Hoa Vang District Headquarters.

b. Các quân nhân thuộc trung đội hỗn hợp 2-8-2 sẽ phải chắc chắn duy trì gương mẫu cho kẻ khác và gìn giữ chỗ ở sạch và gọn.

## 5. Chỉ huy và liên lạc.


a. Việc chỉ huy trung đội Nghĩa quân QNM 45 và các T.Q.L.C. Mỹ được chỉ định đến trung đội hỗn hợp 2-8-2 là do cấp chỉ huy của Nghĩa quân và toàn trưởng T.Q.L.C. Mỹ riêng biệt chỉ huy thuộc hạ mình. Việc thống nhất chỉ huy sẽ tùy thuộc vào sự hỗ trợ về hợp tác và phối hợp.

b. Trung đội Nghĩa quân QNM 45 và các T.Q.L.C. Mỹ phải chịu trách nhiệm về phương tiện liên lạc của mình với bộ chỉ huy Chi Khu Hòa-Vang.



Appendix I CAP 2-8-2 . IOC

*A. H. Moore*  
Major A. H. Moore  
Senior Coordinator/  
Commanding Officer  
5th Combined Action  
Company



*Thien Ta A. H. Moore*  
Thieu Tai Mai-xuan-Hau  
Chỉ huy trưởng chi khu Hòa-Vang

Thien Ta A. H. Moore  
Chống sử viên cao cấp  
Đại đội trưởng  
Đại đội hỗn-hợp 5

Phụ lục I Khu phối hợp chiến thuật  
của trung đội hỗn hợp (CAP) 2-8-2.

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DATE 06-17-2008 BY 60322 UCBAW



MAJOR A.M. LOUGHE, SENIOR,  
COORDINATOR, COMMUNITY OFFICER  
FORTH COMENET ACTION COMPANY

222

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Hoa Vang Vital Subsector Hqtrs.  
Hoa Vang BTO13725  
Date 23 August 1969

ANNEX H TO HOA VANG  
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON  
MILITARY PLAN-697

From: Hoa Vang Subsector Headquarters  
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5

Ref: MAP INDOCHINA; Sheet 6641 I, 6640 IV, 6641 I, & 6641 III

1. Organization

a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of QNM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines from the 7th Combined Action Company, 2d Combined Action Group is hereby designated as mobile Combine Action Platoon 2-7-5 to protect the people of Binh Ky Ba Tung Hamlet (a) from the terroristic tactics of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TAOC) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QNM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

2. Mission. Provide security from VC/NVA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

Bản văn số  
Bộ chỉ huy chi khu Hòa-Vang  
Hòa-Vang BT 013725  
Ngày 3-5-69

Mục H của các trung đội  
HỖN HỢP HOA VANG TRONG NĂM 1969  
THUỘC KẾ HOẠCH QUÂN SỰ 687

Nơi gửi : Bộ chỉ huy chi khu Hòa-Vang  
Nơi nhận : TRUNG ĐỘI HỖN HỢP 2-7-5

THAM CHIẾN: BẢN ĐỒ INDOCHINA; so 6641I, 6640IV, 6641I, 6641III

1. Tổ chức.

a. Một trung đội hỗn hợp gồm có trung đội Nghĩa-quân QNM 52 và T.Q.L.C.Nhĩ thuộc đại đội hỗn hợp 7th thuộc liên đoàn Lực Lượng Hỗn-hợp 2 được biệt phái đến trung đội hỗn hợp 2-7-4 lưu động để bảo vệ dân chúng ấp Bình-Kỳ và Ba-Tung tránh khỏi chiến thuật khủng bố của hạ tầng cơ sở địch cùng tránh khỏi địch cò xam nhập vào thôn ấp, và những nhiệm vụ khác được sự chấp thuận đồng nhất giữa Chi Khu Trưởng Chi Khu Hòa-Vang và công sự viên cao cấp, Đại Đội Trưởng Đại Đội Hỗn-hợp 5.

b. Lệnh này và tất cả lệnh khác trong tương lai có liên quan nhiệm vụ, những ý niệm hành quân, khu phối hợp chiến thuật (TAOC) và sự phối hợp với các đơn vị Việt-Nam cũng như Hoa-Kỳ ở lân cận sẽ chỉ dành cho trung đội Nghĩa-quân QNM 52 và các quân nhân T.Q.L.C.Nhĩ được biệt phái đến làm việc chung với họ trong trung đội Hỗn-Hợp 2-7-5 lệnh này và những lệnh khác trong tương lai sẽ được chỉ huy Trưởng Chi Khu Hòa-Vang và công sự viên cao cấp, Đại Đội Trưởng Đại Đội Hỗn-Hợp 5 ký và ban hành.

2. Nhiệm vụ : Cung cấp an ninh trật tự trong khắp toàn bộ khu phối hợp chiến thuật để tranh khởi VC cùng quân chính quy đặt chân vào được chỉ định theo phụ lục (1) và gồm những phần việc như sau:

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- a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.
- b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.
- c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.
- d. Conduct vigorous civic action and psyops programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.
- e. Organize local intelligence units.
- f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DEOCC and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units
- g. Train and assist the hamlet Peoples Self Defense Force.
- h. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other FVMAF Units.

### 3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, one day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command post/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will remain at the day command post/base of operations to conduct local Med Caps, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire TAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

- a. Phá vỡ hạ tầng cơ sở Việt-Cộng.
- b. Bảo vệ chính trị bạn và các cơ sở xã hội của ta.
- c. Sắp xếp tuần tiễu, phục kích trong phạm vi khu Phối Hợp Chiến Thuật chỉ định.
- d. Bấy mạnh công tác dân sự và chương trình tâm lý chiến để tạo được sự tin tưởng của dân chúng địa phương vào nơi ta.
- e. Tổ chức đơn vị tình báo địa phương.
- f. Báo cáo mọi tin tình báo quân sự lập tức cho trung tâm tình báo Hỗn hợp tại quân và các đơn vị Việt-Nam cũng như ở lân cận.
- g. Huấn luyện và giúp đỡ Nhân dân tự vệ trong thôn ấp.
- h. Tham dự các cuộc hành quân hỗn-hợp với đơn vị chính quy Việt-Nam hay các đơn vị đồng Minh T.Q.L.C.

### 3. Thi hành.

a. Ý niệm hành quân. Trung đội Hỗn-hợp 2-7-5 sẽ hoạt động tại những ấp nằm trong khu Phối Hợp Chiến Thuật chỉ định cho mình theo nguyên tắc lưu động đánh bắt ngỗng, chẳng bao giờ tạo nên một mẫu mực hoạt động giống nhau trong một vị trí, mỗi ngày phải thay đổi chỗ đóng bộ chỉ huy ngày và đêm cũng các hoạt động căn bản hằng ngày. Chỗ đóng bộ chỉ huy và các hoạt động thường gồm có nhiều nhà khác nhau trong thôn ấp để trung đội hỗn-hợp có thể tản mác ra. Một phần ba Trung đội hỗn-hợp 2-7-5 sẽ ở lại bộ chỉ huy để làm công tác phân phát thuốc men cho đồng bào địa phương, công tác dân sự, huấn luyện, lập kế hoạch hoạt động đêm, liên lạc cần thiết với các đơn vị bạn kế cận và tuần tiễu. Sau khi trời tối Trung đội Hỗn-hợp 2-7-5 sẽ di chuyển đến bộ chỉ huy và căn cứ hoạt động mà đã chọn trước và đi tuần tiễu, phục kích trong khắp khu Phối Hợp chiến thuật của mình. Tất cả cuộc tuần tiễu, phục kích và các hoạt động khác sẽ phải Phối hợp xuống cấp tiểu đội.

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b. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations

(1) Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size patrols daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

(c) Change the command post location/base of operations every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings nor concrete structures.

(d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TAOC without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

c. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

d. Planning.

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3 a. and b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAOC.

b. Tuần tiễu, phục kích, nối đông bộ chỉ huy.

(1) Trung đội hỗn-hợp 2-7-5 sẽ đi tuần tiễu, phục kích và chốt nối đông bộ chỉ huy như sau:

(a) Tối thiểu phải có hai cuộc tuần tiễu hay phục kích theo cấp 2 tiểu đội phối hợp hằng ngày giữa khoảng thời gian từ 19 giờ đến 07 giờ.

(b) Tối thiểu có một tiểu hỗn-hợp, cấp tiểu đội đi tuần tiễu trong khoảng thời gian từ 07 giờ đến 19 giờ hằng ngày.

(c) Cứ 12 tiếng thay đổi nơi chỉ huy, các hoạt động thường bộ chỉ huy sẽ không đóng ở tòa nhà công cộng mà cũng không các nhà xây bằng xi-măng.

(d) Trong 24 tiếng đóng bộ, tuần tiễu hay phục kích trong 4 mối áp khắp khu phối hợp chiến thuật chỉ định, không được dựng cùng một lối đi, đường mòn và một đường lối đi để hoạt động giống nhau.

c. Những hoạt động khác. Trung đội hỗn-hợp 2-7-5 sẽ thi hành những hoạt động khác khi Chi Khu Trưởng Chi Khu Hòa Vang và Đại Đội Trưởng Đại Đội hỗn Hợp 5 chỉ định.

d. Kế hoạch.

(1) Tuần tiễu, đóng bộ, phục kích và các hoạt động khác của trung đội hỗn-hợp sẽ căn cứ theo đoạn 3a, và b. ở trên, nguồn tin tình báo hay các kế hoạch dự định và tất các đường xâm nhập hoặc những nơi mà trước đây địch đã hoạt động phải kiểm soát ngăn chặn hằng ngày trên khắp toàn bộ Khu Phối Hợp chiến thuật của mình.

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(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective QNM Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and/ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the QNM Platoon Leader and the Marine CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hoa Vang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 1000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and CP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TAOC will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines and the other ARVN and FVMAF units as necessary.

(2) Firesupport and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Hoa Vang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

(2) Trung đội Trưởng Nghĩa Quân và toàn trưởng T.Q.L.C. Mỹ phải hoàn tất kế hoạch. Những sự bất đồng về vị trí, số lần công tác và quân số tuần tiễu hay phục kích hoặc những hoạt động khác phải đề trình về chỉ huy Trưởng Chi khu Hòa-Vang và sĩ Quan phối hợp Cao cấp Đại đội Trưởng Đại đội hỗn hợp 5 hay vị phụ tá đại diện quyết định. Mọi trường hợp bất đồng ý kiến, Trung đội Trưởng QNM và toàn Trưởng T.Q.L.C. Mỹ sẽ phải báo cáo ngay về bộ chỉ huy quân Hòa-Vang. Mọi sự bất đồng ý kiến sẽ phải được giải quyết trước 10 giờ trong ngày để công tác hay tuần tiễu được thi hành trở lại.

(3) Tất cả cuộc tuần tiễu, phục kích, nối dồng bộ chỉ huy phải hoạch định trước và đề trình lên Chỉ huy Trưởng Chi khu Hòa-Vang và đại đội Trưởng Đại đội hỗn hợp 5, vào ngày thứ Bảy để kế hoạch đó được thi hành vào tuần tới từ thứ Hai đến Chúa nhật. Có thể Chỉ huy Trưởng Chi khu Hòa-Vang và Đại đội Trưởng Đại đội hỗn hợp 5 hoặc các vị phụ tá Đại diện đồng cho phép sửa đổi kế hoạch công tác hành quân.

e. Hiện thi phối hợp.

(1) Khu vực hoạt động chỉ định, Khu Phối Hợp Chiến Thuật theo phụ lục (1) chỉ định cho trung đội hỗn hợp 2-7-5 để biết rõ chắc chắn khu vực riêng của mình để giúp mình trong việc phối hợp với các đơn vị bạn. Tất cả cuộc tuần tiễu, phục kích hay những hoạt động khác trong phạm vi khu phối hợp chiến thuật chỉ định sẽ liên lạc với Chỉ huy Trưởng Trung Đoàn I T.Q.L.C. Mỹ và các đơn vị Việt-Nam cũng như Đồng Minh khi cần thiết.

(2) Hỏa lực yểm trợ và lực lượng tiếp ứng sẽ liên lạc với Chỉ huy Trưởng Trung Đoàn I T.Q.L.C. Mỹ.

4. Quản trị và tiếp vận.

a. Việc quản trị và tiếp vận cho trung đội hỗn hợp 2-7-5 do quân đội Việt-Nam và T.Q.L.C. Mỹ tại bộ chỉ huy Chi khu Hòa-Vang riêng biệt đảm trách, ngoại trừ trường hợp sửa đổi lệnh này.

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b. Members of the CAP 2-7-5 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Hoa Vang District Headquarters,



Thiếu tá Xuân-Hau  
Hoa Vang Subsector Commander

Major A. H. MOORE  
Senior Coordinator/  
Commanding Officer  
5th Combined Action  
Company

Appendix I CAP 2-7-5 TAOC

b. Các quân nhân thuộc trung đội hỗn hợp 2-7-5, sẽ phải chắc chắn duy trì giường ngủ cho kẻ khác và giữ gìn chỗ ở sạch và gọn.

5. Chỉ huy và liên lạc.

a. Việc chỉ huy của trung đội Nghĩa Quân QM 52 và các T.Q.L.C. Mỹ được chỉ định đến Trung Đội Hỗn Hợp 2-7-5 là do cấp Chỉ Huy của Nghĩa Quân và Toán Trưởng T.Q.L.C. Mỹ riêng biệt chỉ huy thuộc hạ mình. Việc thống nhất chỉ huy sẽ tùy thuộc vào sự hỗ trợ về hợp tác và phối hợp.

b. Trung đội Nghĩa Quân QM 52 và các T.Q.L.C. Mỹ phải chịu trách nhiệm về phương tiện liên lạc của mình với BCH Chi Khu H/V



Thiếu tá Xuân-Hau  
Trưởng Chỉ Khu Hoà Vang

Thiếu tá A. H. Moore,  
Cộng Sĩ Viên Cao Cấp  
Đại Đội Trưởng  
Đại Đội Hỗn Hợp 5

Phụ lục I Khu Phối Hợp Chiến Thuật  
của Trung Đội Hỗn Hợp (CAP) 2-7-5





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PHỤ LỤC 1 THUỘC MỤC HỒ SƠ  
TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC HỢP HÒA VÀO 1967  
KẾ HOẠCH QUÂN SỰ 687  
BẢN ĐỒ SỐ: 6640 I, 6640 II  
TỶ LỆ: 1:50,000  
SỐ LƯU: 1:50,000



THIẾU TÁ MAI VĂN HẠC  
CHỈ HUY TRƯỜNG CHỖ VƯỜN HÒA VÀNG

MAI VĂN HẠC, SENIOR  
CORPORATE, COMMANDING OFFICER  
FUNG CONG VIET ACTION COMPANY

09

66

5-25

ITEMS CONCERNING VIP PAYMENT PROGRAM

155mm rnd.	12
140mm rnd.	1
105mm rnd.	27
82mm H.E. rnd.	8
81mm H. E. rnd.	61
61mm H. E. rnd.	7
60mm rnd.	94
57mm rnd.	2
5.56 rnd.	13
M-72 LAAW	32
M-79 H.E. rnd.	365
M-79 canister	1
B-40 rnd.	53
B-40 Booster	1
M-28 grenade	162
Chicom grenade	65
CS grenade	7
W.P. grenade	4
Illumination grenade	2
Rifle grenade	3
M-53 grenade	1
"Pineapple" frag grenade	1
Homemade grenade	5
Claymore Mines	35
Claymore Wires	2
Claymore "Hell Boxes"	2
50lb. Box Mine	1
Unknown weight Box Mines	2
"Bouncing Betty" mines	5
Det cord, roll	1
Blasting Cap	2
Bomb fuse	3
C-4, 2 lb. blocks	3
Trip Mine	3
Aircraft illum canister	1
U.S. Compass	1
.50 cal rnds.	80
7.62 linked rnds.	300
.30 cal linked rounds.	200
5.56 rnds.	1,620
AK-47 magazine	2
M-16 Magazine	4

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