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HEADQUARTERS
3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
APO San Francisco, California 96602

3/SPA/jcs
05750
11 April 1969
22-69

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (ACofS, G-3 (Field Historian))

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-30 March 1969

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2C

Encl: ✓(1) March 1969 Command Chronology
✓(2) Copies of March 1969 Situation Reports and other amplifying documents

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), enclosures (1) and (2) are herewith submitted.

2. Upon removal of enclosures (1) and (2), this letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

K. D. THATENHURST, SR.


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3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
APO San Francisco, California 96602

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 to 31 March 1969

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- PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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11 April 1969PART I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Maj J. W. RAHILL, 1-5Mar

Maj K. D. THATENHURST, SR, 6-31Mar

ATTACHED UNITS

NONE

2. LOCATION: 1-31 March 1969; Quang-Nam Province; DaNang, Republic of South VietNam3. STAFF OFFICERS

ExecO - Maj J. W. RAHILL, 6-31Mar
 S-1 - 1stLt I. E. STINSON, 1-23Mar
 Capt G. R. FAIRCHILD, 24-31Mar
 S-2 - Capt H. C. BARGER, 1-31Mar
 S-3 - Capt J. R. WILLIAMS, 1-19Mar
 Maj D. W. MAILLER, 20-31Mar
 S-4 - 1stLt J. T. TERRELL, 1-18Mar
 Maj J. F. CARNEY, 19-31Mar

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
24	597

<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
2	14

<u>OTHER</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
0	0

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PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the reporting period, the Battalion supported the 1st, 5th, 7th, 26th Marines and the 2nd Brigade, ROKMC. Specifically, our unit deployment can be broken down thusly; two platoons (rein) with the 2nd ROKs, one platoon each to 2/1, 5th Marines, 1/7, 3/7 and 1/26. See Enclosure (2).

Authority had been received during March to conduct training and operation of the LVTE-1 platoon. The vehicles had been withdrawn from use since the latter part of January pending the results of an investigation into the cause of a premature detonation of a line charge and subsequent destruction of an LVTE-1 and the loss of seven Marines in support of Operation BOLD MARINER. Training of the crews has been completed and it is expected that approval to commence live firing of the line charges will be received shortly from III MAF.

LVTP-5's utilization throughout the Division remained at a high level as a result of stepped-up friendly movements during the post-TET offensive and infantry battalion displacements in preparation for Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. A total of seven mine incidents of varying severity were experienced resulting in ten Marines wounded and four vehicles damaged, one of which detonated what appeared to be an 80 pound enemy mine and was damaged to the point of requiring replacement.

No incoming enemy fire into the Battalion's cantonment occurred during the reporting period. A report as to the final determination of the source of one incoming 155mm artillery round on 27 February reported in last month's Command Chronology has not been received by this Command to date.

The month of March saw extensive repairs as well as plans for future construction within the cantonment. Future construction for which plans have been submitted and approved are; a new Post Exchange facility, high-intensity lighting for the cantonment perimeter, steel observation towers to replace existing wooden structures, upgrading of existing road net, and replacing the ten existing sandbag bunkers on the cantonment perimeter with ten reinforced underground fighting units with sleeping facilities for line personnel.

A total of fifteen day and thirty-two night patrols were conducted. Four persons were detained as VCS. All four of these detainees were released as innocent civilians. During the reporting period there was one enemy sighting totaling three VC. A total of ten enemy contacts were reported as follows:

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- (1) 7 mined vehicles
- (2) 1 Antipersonnel mine
- (3) 1 Anti-tank mine
- (4) 1 Attack by fire

The Battalion had an average of 116 vehicles committed daily in direct support of the First Marine Division. The mission and frequency of specific tasks were:

- Ambush - 1
- MedEvac - 14
- Resupply - 144
- Recovery - 9
- Security - 81
- Convoy Escort - 62
- Blocking Force - 6
- Reaction Force - 6
- Administrative - 51
- Troop Movement - 118
- Search and Destroy - 28
- Patrol and Minesweep - 28
- Waterway Denial and River Patrol - 7

Vehicle utilization averaged six hours per day carrying an average of fourteen persons and 257 pounds of cargo per day.

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. TOPICS

a. Personnel and Administration

(1) The personnel readiness category remains at C-2. This Battalion has had a significant displacement of personnel during the past month. We do not anticipate a change in this category unless at least a ten percent loss in personnel is evidenced or unless a significant increase in replacements occurs.

(2) Four Marine officers and eighty Marine enlisted rotated to CONUS. Six Marine officers and seventy-one Marine enlisted were received as replacements.

(3) Our reenlistment rate for the month was 40%. This was based on two reenlistments.

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(4) The Battalion sustained the following casualties: No KIAs and eleven Marine enlisted were wounded and all were evacuated out of country.

(5) Six USAFI and nine MCI enrollments were received this reporting period.

(6) There were six Purple Hearts awarded.

(7) Eleven Marines went on R&R. This program receives full participation and is essential to the morale of this Command.

(8) There were nineteen extensions of overseas tours that were forwarded to First Marine Division Headquarters for approval. These extensions have made a substantial increase in this Battalion's Combat Readiness and Effectiveness.

(9) The Battalion's Savings Bond participation is 80.6%.

(10) The Exchange services are excellent.

b. Enemy

(1) Due to the fact that this Command no longer has a TAOR, no extensive patrolling is being conducted; however, the villages of NUI KIM SON, XOM SON THUY, TAN LU and south to AN TRA are still being patrolled.

(2) The enemy units operating near our perimeter range from squad to platoon size. These units usually operate in the areas South, Northwest, and West of our C.P. Due to the Viet Cong's limited capabilities around our perimeter, they are forced to conduct harassing type activities, and continually avoid engaging our patrols and bunker perimeter guards in any form of prolonged contact.

(3) The enemy continues to use surprise firing devices and mines to inflict casualties and to hamper operations in the general area outside our perimeter.

(4) The enemy still has the capabilities to launch mortar and rocket attacks, sniper fire from the four mountains within our general area. This Command is also aware of sapper units located south of our C.P. which are capable of conducting sapper attacks during the hours of darkness.

(5) According to current intelligence reports, the Marble Mountain complex remains under VC/NVA plans for an attack by the 36th NVA Regiment from the South, the R-20 Battalion from the Southwest and infiltration by elements of the T-87 Sapper Battalion. Local guerilla forces will assuredly

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participate in any attacks that are planned for the Marble Mountain Area.

(a) Civilian Population. The inhabitants of the villages mentioned above are basically pro-government of South Vietnam (GVN), but due to the pressure of the Viet Cong they do render assistance to the VC i.e., feeding and hiding them. The attitude displayed by the villagers is one of knowledge of any incidents prior to its occurrence, and total lack of warning to friendly troops. Many inhabitants have indicated through interrogation, their fear of Viet Cong retaliation should they give information to GVN or American officials, thus lending credence to the control factor of the VC in the area.

c. Weather

(1) During the month of March 1969, the monthly mean precipitation decreased to .12 inches. The temperature ranged from a low of 67° to a high of 91°. The illumination ranged from a high of 99% on 5 March to a low of 0% on 18 March. The average visibility was six plus miles. The wind direction was variable with an average velocity of 8-12 knots.

(2) The general overall weather condition for the month of March was partly cloudy with early morning haze and a few days of dust and sand storms.

(3) This Command could have participated with other units in low and mid level operations during the month of March without being hampered by severe weather conditions.

d. Terrain. Generally this area can be subdivided into three distinct regions. The first region is the commanding terrain called Marble Mountain, consisting of four major peaks (Chin Strap, Marble Mountain, Crow's Nest, and Alpha Six). The highest of these peaks is Chin Strap which is 105 meters. Indications are that the enemy utilizes this peak for storage of supplies and munitions. The U. S. Army Special Forces (Command and Control, North) has two combat outposts on Chin Strap. Personnel from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment have combat outposts on Crow's Nest and Alpha Six. Each have a 106mm recoilless rifle and on Crow's Nest a xenon light. The second region is the coastal pine forests of moderate density. These have an average width of approximately 600 meters. The third region is the paddy or rice growing region which is located exclusively along the west southwest perimeter of this Command. The immediate area surrounding our perimeter consists of loose granular sand.

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e. Training

(1) Formal Training and OJT were conducted in conjunction with operational commitments. The following classes were presented:

- (a) Personal Response
- (b) Weapons Safety
- (c) Care and Cleaning of Weapons
- (d) VC Mines and Booby Traps
- (e) Individual Responsibility
- (f) Land Mine Warfare
- (g) Quick Fire/Kill
- (h) Compass and Map Reading
- (i) Voice Radio Procedures
- (j) Pacification Indoctrination
- (k) Map and Aerial Photograph Reading
- (l) Military Courtesy and Discipline
- (m) Care and Cleaning of Uniforms and Equipment
- (n) Tactical Trends
- (o) Combat Leadership
- (p) Operations Against Guerillas

(2) One officer and six enlisted Marines attended formal schools during this period as follows:

- (a) Officer Leadership Course - 1
- (b) SNCO Leadership Course - 1
- (c) NCO Leadership Course - 1
- (d) Vietnamese Language - 1
- (e) Maintenance Training KY 28/38 Course - 1
- (f) Basic Organic Supply - 1
- (g) Civic Action - 1

f. Logistics(1) Supply

(a) Responsiveness of the supply system with the exception of a few items remains at a high level.

(b) T/E deficiencies are four LVTP5A1's and two LVTE-1's. The Command is awaiting disposition instructions on two LVTP5A1's and two LVTE-1's.

(c) Jungle clothing and fire retardent clothing remains NIS items.

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(d) M-60 machineguns and magazines and cleaning rods for M-16 rifles are considered critical items in view of the inability to acquire them from the supply source.

(e) LVT transmissions, engines and ONAN auxiliary generators are not available through the Direct Exchange Program because of the nonavailability of third echelon spare parts and therefore are considered critical. LVT parts obtained through the supply system and have been on order for sixty days and are considered critical examples are; hubs, starters, starter jaws, adapter bolts, and rim assembly readwheels.

(2) Maintenance

(a) During this reporting period one LVTP5A1 was declared a combat loss as a result of mine damage and was replaced from the Maintenance Float, Force Logistics Command. In addition, four LVTP5A1's received minor mine damage and were repaired within this Command's repair capabilities.

(b) One LVTR1A1 was received from the R&E program.

(c) The average daily deadline during this reporting period was eight LVTP5A1's and three LVTE-1's.

(3) Communications

(a) As reported in the December 1968, January 1969 and February 1969 reports, a maintenance are which is quickly developing into a problem is the antenna matching unit (MX6707). As of this reporting period there are forty-nine antenna matching units in the DX program at 1st Force Service Regiment. In the December 1968 report, there were only sixteen antenna matching units at 1st Force Service Regiment. None of these units (49 now) have been repaired or replaced. As reported previously the absence of one matching unit on an LVT leaves a six inch diameter hole on the top side of the vehicle. This six inch hole affords an existing avenue for the sea and other elements in addition to decreasing the vehicle's communications capability. The lack of replacement items or authorization to requisition new antenna matching units is a problem of growing concern.

(b) There are presently over one hundred Tractor Crewman's Helmets (CVC) in a deadlined status within this Command because microphone assemblies M133 and 138 are being packaged under the same FSN. The M133 microphone is not adaptable to the present helmet being used by this Command. The M138 microphone is the desirable item.

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(4) Motor Transport

- (a) The daily deadline rate for wheeled vehicles was 8%.
- (b) Total mileage logged by the Battalion Motor Transport was 32,320 miles.
- (c) During the reporting period two Trailers, Lube, Fifteen CFM were evacuated. In addition, one Trailer, Amphibious, Cargo, M-100, received a Code H and two Trailers, Cargo, M-105A1 were received.

(5) Medical. The following statistical information is provided concerning medical activities:

Venereal Disease Cases (New)	-	4
Physical Examinations	-	12
Patients Seen on Med-Cap Program	-	36
Patients Seen in BAS	-	425
Number of Innoculations Given	-	747

One corpsman was detached and two corpsmen joined.

g. Civil Affairs/Civic Action

(1) Twenty students of the HOA LONG Elementary School in NUI KIM SON were presented 500\$VN each towards their scholarship awards. Ten of these were awarded by the General WALT Scholarship, while the remaining ten are from the Third Amphibian Tractor Battalion Scholarship (as reported in the last report).

(2) A water pump and a volley ball set were given to the Elementary School of HOA LONG. The pump is already in operation.

(3) 15,000\$VN was expended to Vietnamese personnel who had turned in various types of munitions.

(4) Material such as wood and tin continue to be difficult to obtain for our Civic Action Programs. MAG-16, who has furnished such items in the past, is no longer furnishing this material.

h. Communications

(1) Personnel. Personnel strength is near T/O and no critical shortage is foreseen or exists at the present time.

(2) Equipment

(a) The communications platoon has eighteen items deadlined

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awaiting parts and a total of seventy-two items at 1st Force Service Regiment for third and fourth echelon maintenance. These are six pieces of test equipment in for calibration and ten test pieces of test equipment on requisition.

(b) A T/E shortage still exists for seventeen Radio Sets, AN/PRC-77 and one AN/PRC-109. Requisition for these items are valid.

PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. See Enclosure (2) for supporting documents.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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Williams
FM 3D AMTRACBN
TO CG 1STMARDIV
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BT

SITREP 027 AS OF 020001H TO 022400H MAR69

1. UNIT LOC: NO CHNG
2. SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG
3. CONTACTS: AT 021455H AT COORD 074707 3D AMTRACBN PATROL RPTD ARVN VEHICLE WITH TWO (2) US ARMY (GREEN BERET) AND SEVERAL ARVN PERSONNEL STOPPED IN NUI KIM SON AND FIRED APPROX FIFTEEN RDS SML ARMS FIRE IN BUILT UP AREA. 3D AMTRACBN PATROL DID NOT DETAIN OR QUESTION PERSONNEL DUE TO RAPID DEPARTURE OF VEHICLE. REQUEST YOU INVESTIGATE TO PRECLUDE ANY FURTHER OCCURANCES.
4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE
5. CAS: NONE

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GP4

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Enclosure (2)

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FM 3D AMTRACBN
TO CG 1STMARDIV
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BT

SITREP 028 AS OF 040001H TO 042400H MAR69

1. UNIT LOC: NO CHNG
2. SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG
3. CONTACTS: AT 041900H AT COORD 104538, 11TH COMPANY, 2ND ROKMC
TOOK ONE (1) ROUND 82MM MORTAR FROM UNK POS. ONE (1) USMC MED-EVAC
TO 1ST MED BN.
4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE
5. CAS: ONE (1) USMS WIA (PRIORITY)

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GP4

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Enclosure (2)

THIRD

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J. Williams
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FM ~~3D~~ AMTRACBN
TO CG 1ST MARDIV
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BT

SITREP 029 AS OF ~~050001H~~ TO ~~052400H~~ MAR69

1. UNIT LOC: NO CHNG
2. SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG
3. CONTACTS: AT ~~051300H~~ AT COORD 905473 AN AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR, A-41, STRUCK A MINE WHILE IN SUPPORT OF ~~THE~~ 5TH MAR. MINE EST TO BE APPROX 80 LBS. MINE DETONATED ON PORTSIDE UNDER DRIVERS SEAT. VEH DID NOT CATCH FIRE. THREE (3) USMC WIA. ESTABLISHED SECURITY AND CONDUCTED MED-EVAC. NOW IN PROCESS OF RECOVERING VEHICLE.
4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE
5. CAS: THREE (3) USMC WIA (MINOR)

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GP4

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Enclosure (2)

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R-090130Z MAR 69
FM THIRD AMTRACBN (*DNB RUN*)
TO CG FIRSTMARDIV (*DNB RUN*)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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SITREP 030 AS OF 080001H TO 082400H MAR69

HAS BEEN SENT

1. UNIT LOC; NO CHNG
2. SUM OF OPER; NO CHNG
3. CONTACTS; AT 080830H AT COORD 083705 DURING ROUTNE MNESWEEP 1ST SHORE PRY BN (ENGS) ASSGND TO THIS BN DISCOVD ONE (1) ANTI-TNK MINE. MINE CONSTD OF ONE 82MM MORTR INSRD INTO A 40LB ROCK MINE. WAS RIGGD FOR PRESS DETON. ESTAB SEC & BLEW IN PLACE.
- B. AT 081945H AT COORD 078707 THIRD AMTRACBN PTL, WHILE MOVNG INTO AMBUSH POS WAS HIT BY ONE (1) CLAYMORE MINE. ESTAB SEC & CONDUCTD MEDEVAC TO NSA HOSP.
- (A) N. ONE BOX MINE
- (B) G. ONE (1) USMC
4. SIGNIF EVNTS; NONE
5. CAS; ONE USMC WIA

HAS BEEN SENT

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
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TO CG FIRST MARDIV
BT
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Handwritten signature/initials

(U) SITREP #31 AS OF 160000H TO 162400H MAR69

- 1. (U) UNIT LOC: NO CHNG
 - 2. (U) SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG
 - 3. (C) CONTACTS: AT 161630H AT BT#61654 B-11, THIRD ANTRAC IN COL OF THREE, HIT MINE. MINE BELEVD 105MM RND W/PRESS FUZE. ESTAB SEC & CONDUCTD MED EVAC TO 2/1 BAS.
 - 4. (C) AT 162205H AT BT#77707 ONE 60MM MORTAR ILLUM RND FR FOB-4 IGNITD & BURND TWO HUTS IN NUI KIM SON. KEPT AREA UNDR OBS FOR POSS MED EVAC.
 - 5. (C) (A) THREE USMC WIA (MINOR)
 - 6. (C) (A) PORT SIDE NR1 RDWHEEL, RADIO GEAR
(B) TWO VILLE HUTS DESTRD
 - 7. (U) SIGNIF EVNTS: NONE
 - 8. (C) CAS: THREE USMC WIA (MINOR)
- GP4
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SERVICE MAN 11-636 (D)
W. Kline

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170240 11 MAR 69

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FM THIRD AMTRAC BN
TO CG FIRST MARDIV
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(U) SITREP 032 AS OF 170000H TO 172400H MAR 69

- HAS BEEN SENT**
1. (U) UNIT LOC: NO CHNG
 2. (U) SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG
 3. (O) CONTACTS: AT 171535H AT BT109645 FIRST AMTRAC IN COL, B-24.
HIT PRESS DET 60LB BOX MINE. SET UP SEC TOWED VEH TO 2ND ROK C.P.
CONDUCTD MEDEVAC TO NSA.
 4. (C) (A) ONE USMC WIA (MINOR)
 5. (C) (A) NR 1 & 2 RDWHEEL ASMBLY, CRACKED LVT HULL, DENTED FENDER
SKIRT
 6. (U) SIGNIF EVNTS: NONE
 7. (C) CAS: ONE USMC WIA (MINOR)

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Enclosure (2)

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John

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FM THIRD AMTRACEN
TO CG FIRST MARINE
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(U) SITREP 033 AS OF 200001H TO 202400H MAR69

1. (U) UNIT LOG: NO CHNG
2. (U) SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG
3. (C) CONTACTS: AT 01710H AT 07955 20LB MINE WAS CND DETGNTD BETWEEN
LVTS B-47 AND B-49. CAUSED NEG DAM TO LVTS. COMTD TO OBJTVE & CALLED IN
ROUT MKDEVAC.
6. (C) (A) ONE USMC WIA
4. (U) SIGNIF EVNTS: NONE
5. (C) CAS: ONE USMC WIA

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FM THIRD AMTRACBN
TO CG FIRST MARDIV
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(U) SITREP 034 AS OF 212001H TO 212400H MAR69

1. (U) UNIT LOC: NO CHNG
2. (U) SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG
3. (C) CONTACTS: AT 212010H AT BT076708 PTL FIRED M-79 AT THREE PERS MOVING AT BASE OF CHIN STRAP MNTN. FOLWD BLOOD TRAILS TO CAVE ENTRNCE. CHOKD CAVE ENTRNCE. THREW IN GRENADE W/ ONE SECONDRY EXPLOS. SET UP SEC AT ENTRNCE TO CAVE. WILL CHOK ENTIRE CAVE SYST AT FRST LIGHT.
4. (U) SIGNIF EVNTS: NONE
5. (U) CAS: NONE

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SITREP 035 AS OF 240001H TO 242400H MAR69

1. (U) UNIT LOC: NO CHNG
2. (U) SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG
3. (C) CONTACTS: AT 240815H AT ~~07870907~~ ROUT DAILY MINE SWEEP ON LVT ROAD (BT078709) DISCOVD ONE BOOBY TRAP CONSISTNG OF AMMO CAN FILLED W/ GLASS & ONE M-26 GRENADE INSIDE SET TO DETONATE WHEN LID WAS OPENED. GRENADE REMOVED & DISARMED. BOOBYTRAP BROUGHT TO THIS POS.
(B) (C) AT 241515H AT ~~099675BT~~ WHILE MOVING TO THIRD AMTRACBN POS, B-3 (AMTRAC) FND DUD 105MM RND ON BEACH. ESTAB SEC. RECD ASSIST FR THIRD AMTRACBN MINE SWEEP TEAM, WHO BLEW IN DUD IN PLACE. TRACTOR AND MINE SWEEP TEAM RETRND TO THIRD AMTRACBN POS.
4. (U) SIGNIF EVNTS: NONE
5. (U) CAS: NONE

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FM THIRD AMTRACDN
TO CG FIRST MARDIV
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

(U) SITREP #36 AS OF ~~250000H~~ TO ~~252400H~~ MAR69

1. (U) UNIT LOC: NO CHNG
2. (U) SMT OF OPER: NO CHNG
3. (C) CONTACTS: AT 251650H AT 926841BT WHILE IN RIVT PTL IN SONG
C/U DE, LVT DETONTD FLOATNG SMALL EXPL DEVCE. CKD AREA ADD MINES
W/NEG RES.

N. (C) (A) DMGD RUBBER ON NO. 9 RDWHEEL; JARRED BATTERIES LOOSE

4. (U) SIGNIF EVNTS: NONE

5. (U) CAS: NONE

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(U) SITREP #37 AS OF 261730Z TO 262100Z MAR69

1. (U) UNIT LOC: NO CHNG

2. (U) SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG

3. (C) CONTACTS: AT 261730Z AT 917830Z AT WHILE ON RIVER PTL LVT DET SMALL EXPL
DEVCE ATTCHD TO FLOATING CAN. SRCHD AREA ADD MINES W/NEG RES.

N. (C) (A) RECOVD TIN CAN W/TRIP WIRE ATTCHD

h. (U) SIGNIF EVNTS: NONE

5. (U) CAS: NONE

GPh

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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FM THIRD AMTRACBN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

(U) SITREP #38 AS OF 270000H TO 272400H MAR69

1. (U) UNIT LOC: NO CHNG
2. (U) SUM OF OPER: NO CHNG
3. (C) CONTACTS: AT 271500H AT 925840BT LVT DET SMALL EXPL DEV IN WATER CAUSING SLIGHT DAMAGE. FLOATING CAN OBSVD PRIOR EXPL. STRING PULLED BY IDLER WHEEL. NOTIF ALL AMTRAC PERS.
N. (C) SLIGHT DAM TO NO. 9 RDWHEEL
4. (U) SIGNIF EVNTS: NONE
5. (U) CAS: NONE

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Enclosure (2)

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AFTER OPERATION REPORT
"B" Company, 3d AmTracBn

20 Mar 1969

1. CODE NAME: Victory Dragon 9
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 7 March - 18 March 1969
3. LOCATION: Grid Squares 1250, 1350, 1251, 1351 HOI AN, 6640 I, 1:50,000
4. UNITS SUPPORTED: 11th Co, 9th Co, - 3d Bn, 2d ROK MC Brigade
5. LVT TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDER: GySgt CARBON - Plt Cndr; 2d Plt "B" CO. 6 LVTP5's.
6. LVT MISSION: Search and Destroy, Resupply and blocking forces for both KMC Companies.
7. BRIEF SUMMARY OF OPERATION: on 7th March, 11th Co. and 9th Co. moved from their home bases to the objective - the island of PHU TRANG. The six LVT's were involved in the movement of these troops. At and around the objective, various search and destroy missions were conducted by the LVT's. Additionally, initially three LVT's were used as a blocking force.
8. RESULTS:

LVT KIA <u>0</u>	VC/NVA KIA <u>20</u>
LVT WIA <u>0</u>	VC/NVA KIA (PROB) <u>0</u>
LVT MIA <u>0</u>	VC/NVA PW <u>35</u>
9. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES AND LESSONS LEARNED:

Special Equipment: None

Lesson Learned: It is imperative to coordinate completely between the 106mm recoilless rifle crews on the tractors and the LVT crewmen to avoid any injuries as a result of the back blast of these recoilless rifles.

Additionally, it is important to be constantly aware of difficulties when crossing rivers. A good recon, if possible, of the objective is essential.
10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (MI'S LOGISTICS PROBLEMS)

No difficulties were encountered on the course of this operation.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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AFTER OPERATION REPORT
"B" Company, 3d AmTracBn

23 Mar 1969

1. CODE NAME: Victory Dragon IX
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 12-22 March 1969
3. LOCATION: S.W. of DIEN BAN - coordinates 046 578 DAI LOC 6640 IV, 1:50,000
4. UNITS SUPPORTED: 1st Battalion, 2d ROK Brigade
5. LVT TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDERS: Fourth Plt, "B" Co, 3d AmTracBn
10 LVTP5's, 1 LVTC-1 1stLt NELSON
6. LVT MISSION: Assault landing of the islands of CAM LAU 1 and 2
7. BRIEF SUMMARY OF OPERATION: The 1st Section of the Fourth Platoon was to make an assault landing on the Southwestern side of the CAM LAU BAC #1 and the second Section was held as a reserve unit on the Southeastern side of the island. Also, the Platoon was used to resupply 3d Co, 2d ROK MC. Neither section made it to the islands, however, the first section did manage to transport the troops of 1st Co. across the river and; they in turn went on to their objective.

8. RESULTS:

<u>LVT KIA</u> 0	<u>VC/NVA KIA</u> 10
<u>LVT WIA</u> 1	<u>VC/NVA KIA (PROB)</u> 0
<u>LVT MIA</u> 0	<u>VC/NVA PW</u> 0

9. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES AND LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Equipment: 150ft cable

2. Techniques and Lessons Learned: There was an aerial recon of the area of operation on 10 March. From the air and at the time, the terrain looked very good and we did not see any problems as far as getting to the objectives. However, when we arrived at the objectives by LVT's, the terrain was very much different from what we had seen in the air. Specifically there were 10 to 12 ft very steep embankments surrounding the islands. Therefore, if an aerial recon is possible, it is important to get as close to the terrain as tactically possible.

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (MINUS LOGISTICS PROBLEMS)

The water around the islands were treacherous - with a mixture of both sand and thick mud at the bottom. The LVT's got stuck and there were no clearings on the island in order to get the tractors on the objective.