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HEADQUARTERS

3d Reconnaissance Battalion

3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF

FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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3:RWO:jhs

3100.1

Ser, No. 07-66

9 March 1966

G-3
95366

142-66

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: G-3)
Subj: Command Chronology
Ref: (s) DivO 05750.3

- Encl: (1) Operation Order 2-66 w/Ch 1 (Opn TAUT BOW)
(2) After Action Report, Operation Order 2-66 (Operation TAUT BOW)
(3) CO, 3rdReconBn msg 280300Z January 1966
(4) CO, 3rdReconBn msg dtd 4 February 1966
(5) CO, 3rdReconBn msg 060600Z February 1966
(6) CO, 3rdReconBn msg 060730Z February 1966
(7) Operation Order 9-66, 10 Sub 66
(8) Operation Order 10-66
(9) Patrol Report of 3 February 1966 (Co A) Re: Op O 6-66
(10) Patrol Report of 6 February 1966 (Co A) " " " #8-66
(11) Patrol Report of 22 February 1966 (Co A) " " " 9-66
(12) Patrol Report of 1 March 1966 (Co C) " " " 10-66
(13) Patrol Report of 6 February 1966 (Co C) " " " #7-66
(14) Patrol Report of 22 February 1966 (Co C) " " " 9-66
(15) Patrol Report of 25 February 1966 (Co C) " " " 10-66
(16) Patrol Report of 26 February 1966 (Co C) " " " 10-66
(17) Patrol Report of 5 February 1966 (Co D) " " " 4-66
(18) Patrol Report of 7 February 1966 (Co D) " " " 5-66
(19) Patrol Report of 9 February 1966 (Co D) " " " 7-66
(20) Patrol Report of 13 February 1966 (Co D) " " " 10-66
(21) Patrol Report of 16 February 1966 (Co D) " " " 11-66
(22) Patrol Report of 23 February 1966 (Co D) " " " 12-66
(23) Patrol Report of 16 February 1966 (Co D) " " " 13-66
(24) Patrol Report of 28 February 1966 (Co D) " " " 14-66
(25) Patrol Report of 25 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) Re: Frag O #24-66
(26) Patrol Report of 22 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " " #25-66
(27) Patrol Report of 25 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " " #26-66
(28) Patrol Report of 28 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " " #28-66
(29) After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE) (Recon Group Alfa)
(30) After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE, Phase II) (Group Alfa)
(31) Patrol Report of 3 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) Re: Op O #11-66
(32) Patrol Report of 3 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " " #11-66
(33) Patrol Report of 5 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " " #12-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
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(34) Patrol Report of 7 February 1966 * (Recon Group Alfa) Re: 8 Feb 13-66
 (35) Patrol Report of 8 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 14-66
 (36) Patrol Report of 9 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 15-66
 (37) Patrol Report of 10 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 16-66
 (38) Patrol Report of 12 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 17-66
 (39) Patrol Report of 13 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 18-66
 (40) Patrol Report of 12 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 19-66
 (41) Patrol Report of 16 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 20-66
 (42) Patrol Report of 17 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 21-66
 (43) Patrol Report of 18 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 23-66
 (44) Patrol Report of 21 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 24-66
 (45) Patrol Report of 28 February 1966 (Recon Group Alfa) " " 27-66

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1. In compliance with reference (a), the below report is submitted.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

a. Reporting Unit: 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (AT 959750)

b. Period covered: 1 - 28 February 1966.

c. Commanding Officer	LtCol. R. R. VAN CLEVE
Executive Officer	Major T. R. STUART
Operations Officer	Major D. A. COLBY
Adjutant	2ndLt. M. J. GILDEA
S-2	1stLt. E. W. NASH Jr.
S-4	1stLt. G. V. SMITH
CO, H&S Company	1stLt. E. W. NASH Jr.
CO, Company A	Capt. B. G. HUNTER
CO, Company C	Capt. W. D. SHUMAN
CO, Company D	Capt. J. S. TARDY
CO, Recon Group Alfa	Capt. J. L. COMPTON
CO, Company B	Capt. J. L. COMPTON
CO, Company C, 1stReconBn	Capt. R. B. TIFFANY
CO, Company A, 1stReconBn	Capt. M. R. TARDIFF

d. Average Monthly Strength:

(1) USMC Officers	43
(2) USN Officers	1
(3) USMC Enlisted	619
(4) USN Enlisted	34

3. Significant Events

a. Logistics

- (1) Received February CRITAPAK.
- (2) Tested and evaluated the STONER WEAPONS SYSTEM.

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- (3) Received (26) M-422-11, truck utility, as part of the R&E Program.

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- (4) Received two 13" typewriters from Maintenance Float, FLSG.
(5) Received AKAI Court Room Tape Recorder utilizing open purchase program.

b. Civil Affairs

- (1) The battalion continued to support a library program for the HOA VANG High School.
- (2) The battalion constructed a playground for the PHU THOUNG Orphanage and continued to make arrangements for building an extension on the orphanage cafeteria.
- (3) The battalion doctor treated children and adults at the PHU THUONG XA Refugee Center.

4. Operations

- a. The 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, in general support of the 3rd Marine Division, maintained its elements deployed around the periphery of the Division's TAOR's, and conducted a Battalion (-) (Rein) operation in the Happy Valley area beyond the DA NANG TAOR. The battalion also provided a reconnaissance element to support Task Force DELTA during Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I and II.
- b. The Battalion (-) (Rein), enclosure (1), conducted a 10 day operation in the Happy Valley area from 070900H Feb 1966 to 161150H Feb 1966. They reported (14) contacts totalling (72) Viet Cong. (8) Viet Cong were confirmed killed, while (7) were confirmed wounded. (15) Viet Cong were reported killed by artillery. In addition to the Viet Cong casualties the following was accomplished. Three sets of documents were captured plus five weapons and various pieces of gear. Two villages and six campsites were discovered. (26) huts and (75) caves, tunnels and fighting holes, were discovered and destroyed. (18) fighting holes were found but not destroyed. Numerous punji stakes and pits were found throughout the area of operations. Two ambushes and numerous snipers were encountered. 8,000 pounds of rice and grain were destroyed. (77) artillery rounds were fired resulting in three small secondary explosions and accounting for possibly 15 Viet Cong killed. (36) napalm and (12) 1,000 pound bombs were dropped resulting in 2 secondary explosions and a large fire in the jungle. Six grenade booby traps were located and destroyed. Fourteen USMC wounded were sustained during this operation. (Enclosure (2)).

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CONFIDENTIALc. Co A

- (1) The company conducted one company size operation in support of Battalion Operation "TAUT BOW". During this operation the company located 15 huts, which included a Viet Cong Camp large enough to hold 300 people, with what appeared to be BOQ and NCO buildings along with many tunnel complexes and defensive positions. 1000 pounds of rice were destroyed. There were 16 contacts totalling 119 Viet Cong which resulted in five enemy killed, six wounded and one possibly wounded. Three weapons, miscellaneous 782 gear and documents were captured. Four Marines were wounded.
- (2) During the month the company operated in the field for a total of 45 platoon patrol days. Exclusive of operation "TAUT BOW" (above) five new trails, eight large pits the fragments of a downed aircraft, two VC campsites, three well cultivated areas and elephant tracks along a previously known trail about 30 hours old were sighted. Three VC were sighted but not contacted. On one occasion two VC were contacted and fired upon with negative results and 65 VC were contacted on another. The 65 VC, were armed with semi-automatic and automatic weapons and at least one .30 caliber machine gun. One VC was killed and five wounded. There were no USMC casualties.

d. Co C

- (1) The company conducted one company (-) operation in support of Battalion Operation "TAUT BOW". During this operation the company located four sniper tree platforms and moved over many trails not previously seen or utilized by Marines. There were five VC contacts resulting in three VC killed and one wounded by small arms. An artillery mission was called on a VC ambush site occupied by 15 - 25 VC. A VC prisoner taken later stated that this mission killed 15 of his comrades.
- (2) During the month the company operated in the field for a total of 35 platoon patrol days. Exclusive of operation "TAUT BOW" (above) eight huts, five campsites, one cave, three bunkers and one large area defended by panji stakes was discovered. There were 16 sightings totalling 37 VN, 25 VC and 8 VCS. One contact with 2 VC resulted in the capture of two VC packs containing foodstuffs; the 2 VC escaped. 2 Artillery missions were called resulting in 14 VC possibly killed or wounded.

- e. Company D conducted one company (-) operation to reconnoiter the French Resort at BA NA Mountain for suspected Viet Cong activity and conducted reconnaissance patrols for a total of 45 platoon patrol days for the month of February. Panji pits, fighting holes and huts were located and destroyed. New trails and harbor sites

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were discovered and destroyed. 13 contacts with a total of 55 Viet Cong resulted in one enemy killed, three wounded and three possibly wounded. Four Marine wounded were sustained during this period. (Inclosures 17 - 24).

f. Reconnaissance Group Alfa

- (1) The Group, consisting of Company B(-) (Rein), Company C (Rein), 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and Company A (-), 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was split during a large portion of the month to form the command echelon and nucleus of the Provisional Reconnaissance Group for Task Force DELTA during operations DOUBLE EAGLE I and II. The Provisional Reconnaissance Group was further augmented by major elements of 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-).
- (2) During the period 1 - 16 February, major elements of Reconnaissance Group Alfa operated in support of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I and II. During these operations, 182 significant sightings were made totalling 1149 VC and 450 VCS. 38 contacts were made resulting in 25 VC KIA and 14 VC WIA by small arms. In addition, 25 artillery and 7 Naval Gunfire missions were fired resulting in 19 VC KIA confirmed and 28 possible VC KIA and 2 81mm mortars destroyed. One VCC was captured. Patrols located and destroyed 5 tons of rice, 500 pounds of salt, 10 bolts of material and 60 gallons of kerosene in VC harbor sites. Many documents were captured and forwarded to G-2. Friendly casualties and losses included 2 USMC KIA, 5 USMC WIA, 2 AN/PRC-25 radios lost, 1 AN/PRC-10 radio lost and 2 M-14 rifles lost. (Enclosures 29 and 30).
- (3) During the month, the Group operated in the field for a total of 62 platoon patrol days. Exclusive of Operations DOUBLE EAGLE I and II, new fighting holes, base camps, storage areas and harbor sites were discovered. 500 pounds of rice and two booby traps were destroyed. A large Viet Cong training area with classrooms and billeting facilities was located. The Group reported 58 sightings totalling 64 VC and 22 VCS. 9 contacts with 12 VC resulted in one enemy killed, two probably wounded. 29 Vietnamese who were political prisoners of the Viet Cong were located and freed from a Viet Cong prisoner compound. One Marine WIA was sustained during this period.

R. R. Van Cleave
 R. R. VAN CLEEVE

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Copy no 61 of 72 copies
 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein)
 Da NANG, RVN
 231600 H January 1966
 APG-7

Operation Order 2-66 (Operation TANT BOW) W/CH#1

Ref: (a) Maps: VIET NAM, 1:50,000, Sheet Numbers: 6659 III, 6658 IV,
 6559 II, 6558 I, Series L701
 (b) 3dMarDiv OpO 356-65
 (c) BnOpO 349-65

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein)

H&S Company
 Arty Ln Tm
 Arty FO Tm
 FAC Tm
 Det, 3rd Engr Bn

Company A
 Company PC
 Co G, 1st Bn, 3rd Marines

Capt. HUNTER
 Capt. ~~FRANK~~ SHUMAN
 Capt. BROWNELL

A

1st

Domingues

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Reference (b).
- (2) Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 3rd Marines conduct deep patrolling in high ground on axis (AT 8562), NORTH EAST to (AT 9165) during the period G-3 through G+5 days.
- (2) 3rd Marines is prepared on order to commit one rifle company by helicopter into the objective area which will chop to Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion on touchdown.
- (3) 12th Marines provides fire support to NS gridline 14.
- (4) 1st MAW provides fixed and rotary wing air support as requested.

c. Attachments and Detachments

- (1) Task Organization.
- (2) Attachments effective 0600 G-4 days.

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Encl. (1)

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2. MISSION. Commencing G-Day, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion conducts reconnaissance of EAST and (EAST NS GL 16) of Happy Valley from previously established patrol base(s) to determine location, identity, strength, movement and armament of VC/PAVN units; capture VC/PAVN prisoners; and locate assembly areas, training and logistics bases and infiltration routes.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation

- (1) On G-2, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein) moves by vehicle to vic HILL 41. At H-Hour, G-2 commence movement by foot to vic HILL 310 (AT 862665). Moves thence to vic HILL 502 (AT 832659) and establishes an initial patrol base.
- (2) On G-Day patrol Westward into the Eastern end of Happy Valley, locate additional patrol base(s) and OP's overlooking Happy Valley. Move into Eastern end of Happy Valley and execute reconnaissance mission.
- (3) Withdrawal will be by foot to HILL 41 and thence to Camp Reasoner by vehicle. *OR by helicopter if Happy Valley*
- (4) One company provides rear guard for withdrawal and leaves ~~one platoon in RV 4 upon exit of the remaining of the Battalion.~~
- (5) 3rd Marines provides supporting arms coordination from 0001, G-3 days to conclusion of operation.

b. Co G (-)

- (1) On G-2 and G-1 act as rear guard for movement of 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein) from HILL 41 to initial patrol base.
- (2) Conduct patrolling as directed.

c. Co A

- (1) ~~On G-2 locate and occupy a suitable battalion harbor site vic HILL 310 (AT 862665).~~
- (2) On G-1 locate and occupy a suitable site for an initial battalion patrol base vic HILL 502 (AT 832659).
- (3) Provide guides and advance guard for movement of 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein) from HILL 41 to site of initial patrol base.
- (4) Conduct patrolling as directed.

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~~(5) Leave one platoon in RZ-4 to continue the screening mission upon exit of the battalion.~~

d. Co A, 1st Marines

- (1) On G-2 move from HILL 41 to patrol base as part of the main body. Be prepared to provide flank security.
- (2) Establish and maintain security of the patrol base(s).
- (3) Be prepared to reinforce either or both reconnaissance companies.

e. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Reference (c).
- (2) Employment of riot control agents on authority this Headquarters only.
- (3) Unclassified code name: "FAUT BOU".
- (4) Direct liaison between participating units has been authorized.
- (5) Each company submit a patrol roster to this Headquarters (attn: S-1) on G-3.
- (6) Submit SITEMP to this Headquarters on even hours over Battalion TAC Net.
- (7) Submit position (BRAVO) reports to this Headquarters on odd hours over Battalion TAC Net.
- (8) Be prepared to call and adjust artillery fire.
- (9) If an airstrike is requested and approved, display a single red panel at position when aircraft are on station.
- (10) Be prepared to recommend infantry reinforcement and suitable primary and alternate LZ's for its entry.
- (11) G-Day: ^{9 Feb.} ~~31 January~~ 1966. H-Hour ⁰⁹⁰⁰ ~~1930H.~~
- (12) Vietnamese property, including livestock, will not be destroyed except on order this Headquarters.

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Supply

- (1) General. Resupply will be arranged by and be the responsibility of, the Battalion Supply Officer located at Camp Reasoner.
- (2) Prescribed Load. Attached units obtain prescribed load Class II, IV and V from parent unit prior to reporting.

Class I	⁵ / ₄ Days long range patrol rations per man w/fuel. Two canteens of water.
Class II	Combat essential equipment. One entrenching tool per 4 Marines, 2 machetes per squad.
Class III	None.
Class IV	2 Protective masks per squad.
Class V	B/A plus one bandolier. 2 one pound blocks of TNT per man; M79: 30rds per weapon. Shotguns as prescribed by Company Commander. 4 Stoner LMG's per Recon Co. 2 CM/CS grenades to be carried by each squad. Carry one 60mm Mortar round per man.

(3) Resupply

- (a) Initial resupply (4 Days Class I, Class V) will be to the Battalion Patrol Base by helicopter at 1st light on G+² or as early thereafter as weather will permit.
- (b) Second resupply at 1st light G+⁶ if required.
- (c) Submit resupply requirements (Class I and V only) to this Headquarters NLT 1500H G+⁵ and G+⁵.
- (d) Emergency resupply as required. Requests for emergency resupply through this Headquarters.

(4) Salvage

- (a) Damaged or inoperable weapons or radio equipment will be evacuated to Battalion Rear by resupply helicopter.
- (b) Captured material will be tagged and evacuated to Battalion Rear by resupply helicopter.
- (c) Items of captured material that cannot be made serviceable or evacuated will be destroyed on authority this Headquarters.

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- b. EVACUATION. Emergency medical evacuation will be requested through this Headquarters. Submit HLZ coordinates with request.

c. MISCELLANEOUS

(1) Rear Echelon

- (a) Companies will have a minimum number of personnel in rear echelon.
- (b) Major T. R. STUART is designated C1C Rear Echelon.

(2) Uniform and Individual Equipment

- (a) Uniform: Utilities, combat boots, soft covers. Uniform for rifle company: normal combat.
- (b) Equipment: T/O weapons with equipment, poncho, pack as prescribed by Company Commander.
- (c) Each individual will carry a minimum of two changes of socks in a waterproof container and other such changes of clothing as may be desired or prescribed by the Company Commander.

(3) Personal Hygiene

- (a) Company Commanders will cause each Marine to dry his feet and change socks daily.
- (b) Every effort will be made to give each Marine the opportunity to bathe and change his clothing at least every other day.

- (4) Trash. All trash and garbage will be buried and the site camouflaged.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Communications-Electronics

- (1) Reference (c) except as modified herein. 0700 H, G+Z
- (2) Battalion Tactic 1 Net will be activated 1900H G-2. All companies including attachments guard the Battalion Tactical Net upon activation.
- (3) Companies establish and maintain internal communications as required.

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- (4) Company "B" establish and maintain a station on the Division Reconnaissance Net and the Bn T.C. Net of the 3rd Marines CP. Relay reports to SCAT REAR and MON until activation of SCAT, thereafter monitor.

- (5) Couple: GRAY HOUNDS/1234567890, first day is G-2. Numbers move (1) space left each day.

- (6) Authentication:

- (a) CASINO/ROYALE
- (b) DOCTOR/NO
- (c) THUNDER/BALL
- (d) MAJESTY/SERVICE
- (e) MOON/RIVER
- (f) RUSSIA/LOVE
- (g) GOLD/FINGER
- (h) GREEN/FIELDS

G-2
GRAY HOUNDS
(1234567890)
G-1
GRAY HOUNDS
2345678901

GD 3
4GD 18
[SUDD] GRID LINE
DN
GRAY HOUNDS
3456789012
30,000
92600
NUSNN

b. Command Posts

- (1) During displacement of the Command Post the advance party will maintain contact with the rear element on the Battalion Tactical Net.
- (2) The Division Reconnaissance Net station will be activated on reaching initial patrol base and will remain activated during the remainder of the operation.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

R. R. Van Cleave

R. R. VAN CLEAVE
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX:

- A. Intelligence
- B. Opn Overlay
- C. Fire Support
- D. Frequencies & Call Signs
- E. Distribution

F. REPORTS (NOTAL)

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G+2

GRAY HOUNDS
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HEADQUARTERS
3d Reconnaissance Battalion
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3: DAC:jhs
3100
19 Feb 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1B
(b) 3rdMarDivOpO 356-65
(c) 3rdReconBn OpO 2-66 w/Ch#1

Encl: (1) Enemy Situation Overlay
(2) Operation Overlay
(3) Patrol Report

1. Code Name. "TAUT BOW".

2. Dates of Operation. 070900H February 1966 through 161000H February 1966.

3. Location. Happy Valley. An area bounded by grid lines (16) to the WEST, (82) to the EAST, (67) to the NORTH and (62) to the SOUTH, WSW of DA NANG.

4. Control or Command Headquarters.

3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein) LtCol. R. R. VAN CLEVE

5. Task Organization

3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein)
H&S Company
Artillery Liaison Team
Artillery FO Teams (2)
FAC Team
Det, 3rd Engineer Battalion
Company A
Company C (-)
Company A, 1st Bn, 1st Marines

LtCol. VAN CLEVE
2ndLt. HUBERT

Capt. HUNTER
Capt. SHUMAN
Capt. DOMINGUEZ

5. Supporting Forces

a. 12th Marines: 1 platoon 155 Howitzers
1 platoon 8" Howitzers
1 155 Gun

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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Fired 77 rounds for registration and in effect. Artillery was responsive and effective. A 40 round mission for effect on 15 February 1966 produced three secondary explosions. The rounds were adjusted by the Artillery Liaison Officer and were on target.

- b. 1st Marine Air Wing: Fixed wing and helicopter support. Air was requested over the TAR Net, through the Air Officer of the 3rd Marines and through the Division Air Officer at one time or another. Air was always responsive to the requirements of the unit. Medical support was of particular note. A sortie of 12 VA was requested for a destruction mission on 15 February 1966. They were controlled by both an AO airborne and by an FAC on the ground. The aircraft hit the targets designated achieving one large secondary explosion, one small secondary explosion and kindled a large fire that burned for several hours under the canopy. (This had to be a man made object as the jungle does not burn).

7. Intelligence

- a. For enemy situation anticipated see enclosure (1).
- b. For enemy situation found, units, etc., see enclosure (3).

- 8. Mission. Commencing G-Day, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion conducts reconnaissance of EAST end (EAST of NS GL 16) of Happy Valley from previously established patrol base(s) to determine location, identity, strength, movement and armament of VC/PAVN units; capture VC/PAVN prisoners; and locate assembly areas, training and logistics bases and infiltration routes.

9. Concept of Operation

- a. Move by foot from vic HILL 41, over the ridge line formed by the 310, 502, 705 HILL complexes into Happy Valley. Establish patrol bases and carry out the reconnaissance mission. Utilize the attached rifle company for patrol base security and exploitation.
- b. Fire support coordination was provided by the 12th Marines liaison team attached and the FAC team. Artillery fires did not have to be coordinated outside the objective area as the objective area was bounded by a fire coordination line. No aircraft were authorized in the air space between the artillery pieces and the objective area except on request and with the concurrence of Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion.
- c. For operations overlay see enclosure (2).

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ENCLOSURE (2)

~~C DECLASSIFIED A L~~10. Execution

- a. The directive to execute reference (b) was published by the Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division message 050512Z February 1966 and received at the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion 052200H February 1966. The operation was initiated with a foot march leaving HILL 41 at 0900H 7 February 1966.
- b. For actions and contacts, see enclosure (3).
- c. There were no civic action or psychological warfare activities during the operation. (See paragraph 14.b.)

11. Results

- a. See paragraph 5.a., enclosure (3).
- b. Areas where air strikes were conducted were not searched by ground forces.

12. Administration Matters

- a. One resupply was scheduled and executed by helicopter. Five days supply of food and ammunition was carried by every man. Water was obtained along the route of march.
- b. Two doctors provided excellent medical attention in the field and daring Med-Evac techniques by Med-Evac helicopters provided timely evacuation of wounded to medical facilities.
- c. Communications was by PRC-47, 41, 25, 10, 9 and 6. Only the PRC-25 and PRC-41 proved adequate for the job for which designed. An unsatisfactory equipment report is being prepared on the PRC-47.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques.

- a. The Stoner Light Machinegun and automatic rifle were used for the first time in a combat situation during the operation. All five of the LMG configurations failed to function, all for a failure to extract. A complete report is being prepared.
- b. The PSR-1 was carried and used each night on the patrol base perimeter. There were no contacts with this instrument.
- c. CN/CS was used for clearing caves. No persons were found within any of the caves but utilizing the RCA enabled the caves to be searched for documents and other items of intelligence value. Clearing by explosives would have precluded the search.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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- a. One principle lesson from this operation is if the commander is to control his units, even the company commander his platoons, in the mountainous interior of VIET NAM, the PRC-25 is a must. The PRC-10 is inadequate and the PRC-6 useless. A better, more rugged, more reliable AM radio is needed for long range communications, preferably one which does not require batteries.
- b. The people in this area are hostile to non-communist forces. They apparently will not present an opportunity for civic action in any operation. Ethnically they are of the RAHDE tribe and apparently do not speak or read much Vietnamese. This must be taken into account in any future psychological warfare effort in the area.
- c. The utilization of combined infantry/recon elements in this environment seems to be sound. Having an exploitation force readily available is encouraging to the reconnaissance units and enables quick, efficient reaction to recon sightings. The availability of a secure patrol base from which to work provides reconnaissance flexibility not otherwise available. The work of the infantry company was excellent during this entire operation. The operation could not have been successful without this support.
- d. It is felt that the location of the VC "Secret Zone" reported earlier by intelligence sources was confirmed and definitely located. This zone is centered on the stream extending SOUTH from (ZC 205640) to THO THENON. It is estimated to extend 500 to 1000 meters to either side of the stream.

15. Recommendations

- a. That an infantry battalion establish a patrol base in Happy Valley and systematically destroy the remaining VC installations.
- b. That additional combined infantry/recon operations be conducted in the interior.
- c. That ARC Light strikes be conducted in the following areas: (ZC 202634), (ZC 207626), (AT 803652), (AT 809644), and (ZC 187636), (ZC 187626), (ZC 217636), (ZC 217626).

R. R. Van Cleve
R. R. VAN CLEVE

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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Operation Order: 2-66
 Patrol: 3rd Recon Bn. (-) Rein
 Debriefing: 1st Lt. E.W. NASH
 Map Sheet: 6659 III, 6658 IV, 6559 II, 6558 I

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 3rd Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 170800H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (15) Marine Officers, (278) Marine Enlisted, (2) Navy Doctor Officers, (17) Navy Enlisted, (1) ARVN Officer, (5) ARVN Enlisted.
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: 1. (1) Infantry Company, 2. (2) Artillery FO Teams 3. (1) Forward Air Controller Team, 4. (2) Engineer Squads.
- 5. 1 ARTILLERY LN TEAM.**
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (2) AN/PRC - 47
 (1) AN/PRC - 41
 (11) AN/PRC - 25
 (15) AN/PRC - 10
 (1) AN/PRC - 9
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: 7x50 and 6x30 binoculars, M-26 Spotting Scope.
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: (4) PSR - 1
 (700) pounds T.N.T.
 (200) pounds C-4
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: Shotguns, Sniper Rifles, (5) Stoner Light Machine guns, and (1) Stoner Automatic Rifle.

2. MISSION: Conduct reconnaissance of East end (East NS GL 16) of Happy Valley from previous established patrol base(s) to determine location, identity, strength, movement and armament of VC/NVA units; capture VC/NVA prisoners; and locate assembly areas, training and logistics bases and infiltration routes.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 070900H/161000H February 1966

4. ROUTE: See Patrol Overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS: During 234 continuous hours of operation 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein) contacted (72) Viet Cong in (14) contacts. There were no VC sighted that were not contacted. (8) VC were confirmed killed, (7) confirmed wounded, (15) possibly killed by Artillery. Three sets of documents were captured with five weapons and equipment. Two villages.

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 ENCLOSURE (3) to Encl. 2

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and six campsites were discovered. (26) huts and (75) caves, tunnels and fighting holes were discovered and destroyed. (18) fighting holes were found but not destroyed. Numerous pangli stakes and pits were found throughout the area of operation. Two ambushes and numerous snipers were encountered. 8000 pounds of rice and grain were destroyed. Numerous small cultivated areas for growth of potatoes, onions, and other dry crops were found in the areas surrounding formerly inhabited campsites and villages. (77) artillery rounds were fired resulting in three small secondary explosions and possible (15) VC casualties. (36) napalm and (12) 1000 pound GP Bombs were dropped during one air mission resulting in one large and one small secondary explosion. (3) med-evacs were conducted. (14) USMC battle casualties were sustained and (8) non-battle casualties occurred.

b. ENEMY:

(1) 081525H, (AT 821651), 1st Plt. Co. A was engaged by (4) VC while moving Southwest on a trail to hill 800. (2) VC wore khaki clothing and (2) wore grey shirts with black trousers. No equipment was noted and description of weapons could not be determined. 200 rounds were exchanged with the VC. There were no casualties sustained or inflicted.

(2) 091410H, (AT 813653), 2 VC snipers engaged the forward elements of the 1st Plt. Co. A. The VC wore black clothing. When fire was returned by the patrol, the VC fled up the hill. Blood was found on the trail indicating one VC had been wounded. The wounded VC was not located.

(3) 091425H, (AT 807650), 5 VC engaged elements of the 1st Plt. Co. A with (3) automatic weapons and (2) rifles. The VC wore black clothing. The 1st Plt. Co. A assaulted the hill the VC were occupying with fire support from the 3d Plt. Co. A. The VC withdrew and contact was broken. On securing the high ground, (8) fighting holes were found well concealed and dug near a rock formation. There were no casualties sustained or inflicted.

(4) 100700H, (AT 807650), 2d Plt. Co. C, acting as point, picked up tracks of three men, barefoot, west of the base camp on hill 785. Followed tracks to coordinates (AT 798649). At this point in a radius of 200 meters four sniper platforms were found. They were situated 50-75 feet off the deck in trees. They would accommodate one to three men each.

(5) 100830H, (AT 815647), elements of Company A, observed 6 armed VC attired in khaki clothing preparing to leave a VC campsite. Fire was brought upon the VC and they fled into the canopy. The campsite, consisted of 3 large huts constructed of bamboo and saplings. It was also noted that 6 caves, 5 tunnel complexes and 9 fighting holes had

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been constructed to protect and defend the campsite. The fighting holes had been dug near rock formations affording natural cover and concealment. The tunnels, caves, and fighting holes were destroyed in place by the engineers with use of demolitions.

(6) 101000H, (AT 798649), 2d Plt. Co. C found numerous fresh footprints less than twelve hours old.

(7) 101005H, (AT 799649), as 2d Plt. Co. C moved West they were ambushed by fifteen to twenty five VC. One machine gun, five automatic rifles and ten to twenty semi-automatic rifles along with four shape charges pointed down the trail were used. The VC used an L-shaped ambush and continued the fire for about fifteen seconds. At this time all VC fire ceased with the exception of two or three snipers to the North of the trail. At least one VC wounded by small arms fire. Artillery mission conducted in the area. VC later captured reported fifteen killed as result. ~~but doubtful.~~

(8) 101230H, (AT 815645), company A located a VC campsite situated near a stream. The complex contained 10 large huts constructed of bamboo and saplings with the roof's thatched with banana leaves. Located within its periphery were 1 pig pen and 1 fowl pen. The dwellings were uninhabited but had been recently used by small groups. This complex could easily accommodate 300 people. Certain areas within the campsite had been utilized as classrooms. One dwelling was a possible BOQ, another an NCO quarters and another enlisted quarters. To the rear of the BOQ a small hut had been used as a barber shop. Large portions of cut hair were still visible on the ground as well as a barber chair. The BOQ had elaborate built in shelves and overlooked the campsite. The complex was connected with a well constructed tunnel network which ran from hut to hut and a 100 meters up 3 surrounding ridges. These tunnels were shored with timbers. The camp was well policed although some huts need repair.

(9) 101240H, (AT 816647), company A, received sniper fire from an estimated 2 VC, 1 armed with an M-2 Carbine and the other a rifle. One VC wore a blue shirt with black trousers, the other black clothing. When fire was returned, the VC fled into the brush up a hill. No casualties were inflicted or sustained.

(10) 101200H, (AT 815645), Company A was taken under fire by the 2 previously reported VC. When fire was returned, the VC fled up a hill. No casualties were inflicted or sustained.

(11) 101300H, (AT 797645), trail in this area heavily used. Old rusty scrap iron found in area. Looked to be used as shrapnel. Unfired Mauser rounds found in the mud. Fields of fire cut and blown out in this area.

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(12) 101400H, (AT 793653), Co. A, 1st Bn., 1st Marines discovered two huts 10x15 feet; medical supplies and clothing, and approximately 1000 pounds of rice. All were destroyed.

(13) 101515H, (AT 797645), Three marines from 2d Plt. Co. C checking out trail fired upon by two snipers. They returned fire killing one sniper. Weapon was captured along with gear and documents. VC was wearing blue-green trousers, a jungle hat, and neckerchief. He was clean shaven with fresh haircut and clean clothes.

(14) 110850H, (AT 795643), Co. A received sniper fire from 2 VC from prepared positions. Fire was returned and the VC fled. No casualties were sustained or inflicted.

(15) 111020H, (AT 799649), three VC moved in behind the battalion. The rear guard, 1st Plt. Co. C opened fire wounding and capturing one armed with a sub-machine gun. When he was interrogated by the interpreter he said he was a member of H-59 unit, he was a member of the Rhade tribe of Montagnards. He also said the artillery called on the ambush mentioned in (7) above killed fifteen men. He died of wounds later.

(16) 111125H, (AT 799649), when the battalion moved out, they were being watched by four men. 1st Plt. Co. C threw grenades at the men but with negative results. The men wore black PJ's and jungle covers and carried weapons.

(17) 111500H, (AT 793651), 2 VC fired on the 1st Plt. Co. A, from prepared positions. Fire was returned with negative results. The VC wore black clothing.

(18) 121115H, (AT 790648), the 3d Plt. Co. A made contact with 4 VC maneuvering to their front. The VC were engaged with small arms and M-79 fire resulting in 1 VC, wounded when he was hit twice, fell on impact, got up and fled. The other VC fled into the brush.

(19) 121130H, (AT 790648), the 3 VC previously mentioned crossed the front of the 2nd Plt. Co. A, and were immediately engaged with small arms fire. The VC returned the fire, 1 VC was killed, body and weapon were recovered. The other 2 VC were observed hit by small arms fire but fled into the brush. A search was initiated for the VC wounded terminating with negative results.

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(20) 121245H, (ZC 210647), the 2d Plt. Co. A was engaged by an estimated 35 VC who fired from defensive positions near the base of a large finger. This defensive position was engulfed by a partially constructed 8 foot fence constructed of saplings. The VC threw grenades and were generally armed with automatic weapons. Due to their concealed positions clothing and weapon characteristics could not be determined. The patrol engaged the VC with small arms fire, M-79, shot guns, and grenades. Approaches to the fortified area were littered with panji stakes. After the VC broke contact 4 USMC casualties were sustained, 1 by panji stakes, 2 from grenades and 1 from grenade and small arms. The casualties were Helo evacuated at 121500H. Condition considered good.

(21) 121630H, (ZC 207638), the 2nd Plt. Co. A, 1st Bn., 1st Marines discovered a VC village with eight huts, eight animal pens and extensive tunnels used primarily to store rice. Many pigs and some chickens were in the area. Two huts had been recently constructed and used for classrooms. Many bicycles and thousands of pounds of grain were found. Additional villages are also in this area. The platoon was fired on by the VC out of the village. One USMC WIA was sustained.

(22) 121700H, (AT 796645), the 3d Plt. Co. A while in a maneuvering in support of the 2d Plt. Co. A, made contact with 3 armed VC. (1) VC wore a blue shirt and black trousers. The other VC wore black clothing. (1) VC was armed with a French 98 rifle, (1) with an M-1 Carbine, and the other an American Thompson sub-machine gun. The 3d Plt. engaged the VC with small arms fire resulting in 2 VC killed (body count) and 1 VC wounded observed falling on impact, getting up and fleeing into the brush. (2) weapons and documents returned by helo on Br. resupply and forwarded to G-2.

(23) 131045H, (ZC 210633), the 3rd Plt. Co. A, 1st Bn., 1st Marines were taken under fire from an elevated position by 8 - 10 VC. The platoon returned the fire, assaulted the position and over ran it. Eight USMC WIA's were sustained as a result of a mine booby trap of undetermined origin. M-79 rounds exploded in the VC position and blood stains were found. No estimate of VC casualties were available. The med - evac for the eight WIA's was completed at 131513H.

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(24) 141630H, (ZC 187647), the 2d Plt. Co. A, were engaged by 2 VC snipers from concealed positions. (1) VC was armed with an automatic weapon, the other a rifle. On the exchange of fire, 1 VC was wounded when the position was over run. This was determined by blood stains in the position. The VC had fled prior to the patrols arrival.

(25) 141630H, (ZC 187647), the 2d Plt. Co. A, received sniper fire from 1 VC armed with an automatic weapon, fire was returned with negative results.

(26) 151315H, (ZC 178652), one sniper was shot from the fork of a tree by 1st Plt. Co. C. He fell out of the tree and over a cliff no gear was recovered. Two blasts from a shotgun were used to hit the sniper.

(27) 151400H, (ZC 179651), fresh blood, which was not over two hours old, was found by 1st Plt. Co. C on the trail.

(28) 151015H, (ZC 189645), the 3d Plt. Co. A, received automatic weapons fire from 2 VC wearing black clothing. Fire was returned with negative results.

(29) 151415H, (ZC 196640), the 1st Plt. Co. A, was engaged by 1 VC sniper from an unknown location. Fire was not returned.

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. The infantry company assigned as the support element of the Bn. provided excellent support and contributed greatly to the dislodging of VC elements which engaged reconnaissance patrols throughout the operation.

b. 081630H, (AT 832659), Co. A elements destroyed 1 VC booby trap (M-26), and 1 ChiCom grenade which had been rigged across the trail. The 2 traps were destroyed.

c. 101315H, (AT 813645), Co. A, located 3 elaborate graves with metal head markers. The markers were dated May 1965. Engraved on the markers were the names, nick names, date of birth, death, and 3 unit designations, H-59, H-50, and H-55.

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c. 101130H, (AT 813645), Company A, located 7 huts connected by a tunnel complex near a stream. This hut complex was enclosed by a 10 foot high fence closely welded by saplings. The huts were constructed of bamboo, saplings and thatched with leaves. The huts were used as a sleeping, cooking and utility spaces. Numerous trails led into the complex. There were indications of recent use and the area was well policed. Engineers destroyed the camp with demolitions.

d. 101515H, (AT 811646), Company A, located 5 large huts near a stream. A tunnel complex joined the huts. Found in its enclave were 11 fighting holes, 3 bunkers reinforced with logs and 4 panji pits, animal pens and a natural swimming hole. The camp was well policed, uninhibited and was destroyed by the combat engineers.

e. 112100H, (AT 796651), Company A, heard the banging of someone hitting rocks together for a period of 2 hours.

f. 121300H, (AT 791645), the 3d Plt. Co. A, discovered a thatched wooden hut containing 1000 lbs. of rice. The hut and rice were destroyed by burning.

g. 121600H, (ZC 211643), the 3d Plt. Co. A, located a well fortified area which consisted of 3 bunkers, 15 fighting holes 3x3x5 feet and a trench network 2 feet wide and 4 feet deep. The area was unoccupied, had recently been used and had been constructed within the last 30 days. Due to insufficient quantities of demolitions and equipment this fortified areas was not destroyed.

h. 121330H, (AT 790643), Company A, located 2 freshly constructed panji pits 2x1x1 $\frac{1}{2}$ feet on a secondary trail. Stakes had been placed at bottom and sides.

i. 121630H, (AT 793645), the 1st Plt. Co. A, located 2000 lbs. of rice in a cave. This cache was later destroyed by the engineers.

j. 131140H, (ZC 204645), elements of company A, located a sign which had been placed across the trail supported by 2 Y shaped saplings approximately 4 feet off the ground. The sign board had been made of tree bark and either end was shaped into an arrow head. A paper message had been glued to the bark which read "TUYET DOI VUNG NAY CAM KHACH". 3 small sentry structures were located along the axis of this trail near the vicinity of the sign. Small fire places had been constructed near these structures.

k. 151110H, (ZC 207637), ~~2nd Plt. Co. A~~, witnessed secondary explosions resulting from friendly artillery and an air strike. 1 large and 1 small explosion from air and 3 small explosions from artillery.

l. A 12 guage shot gun utilized during the operation was instrumental in the killing of 1 VC.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

m. Demolitions utilized by engineer personnel were instrumental in the destruction of campsites, villages, tunnel networks, caves, and bunkers.

n. Three helo medical evacuations were conducted under extremely difficult circumstances. 20 injured Marines were evacuated to medical facilities at this time. Outstanding professional ability by the helo pilots were instrumental in successful evacuations and recovery's.

o. A special report will be forwarded on the performance of the Stoner rifle weapon system.

7. ~~CONDITION OF PATROL~~ Good, morale excellent. Condition of 14 Marine WIA's and 8 Non Combatant casualties considered good. Prognosis of 1 WIA considered poor.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

CONCLUSIONS:

1. Although it is conceivable that the Viet Cong could initiate an attack from the SONG LO DONG Valley, information collected indicates they will not attack from this area at the present time or in the near future. At present the area is being used as a military and political training area. There are also indications that portions of the DANANG area are being supplied by personnel and some equipment based in the SONG LO DONG Valley.

2. The Viet Cong will carry out delaying tactics in case of USMC offensive operations in the form of ambushes, sniping, and booby traps of numerous types. The ambushes are situated in excellent positions and are manned with seven to twenty-five men. Sniper teams are from one to four men. They show tendencies to defend the high ground. The most important weakness lies in bad marksmanship among the Viet Cong in both ambushes and sniping and the short duration of the ambush.

3. The Viet Cong employ fighting holes, bunkers and elevated platforms for defense positions. The availability of large rocks used as cover increases the effectiveness of these positions. Trenches and/or tunnels connect all buildings with each other and provide escape routes away from the villages. Most villages are encircled by a fence of some kind. Automatic weapons are employed basically the same as we employ them. The machine gunners are well trained in fire discipline but not in marksmanship.

4. The Viet Cong have the ability to reinforce units now in contact with Marine Forces. There is no evidence whether they will do so or not.

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5. It is probable that mortars would be employed from positions in the foot hills to the East of SONG LO DONG Valley. Anti-aircraft weapons are easily employed but there is inadequate clearance for other long range machine guns.

6. There are no roads in the area but well used foot paths and trails are found throughout the area. There seems to be a main route in the valley running East and West parallel to the river, and also one on the Northern slope of the THO THENON Ridgeline running East and West.

7. The Rhade Tribe of Montagnards is working with the Vietnamese elements in the area. It is interesting to note that these two formerly-warring ethnic tribes are working together in this area.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Extensive operations be conducted in the SONG LO DONG Valley (Happy Valley).

R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

9. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS:


1. It is necessary that patrols be debriefed immediately upon completion.

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ENCLOSURE (2)



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3rd Reconnaissance Bn.
PATROL ROUTE'S USED BY BATTALION
DURING OPERATION TAUNT BOW


MAP SHEETS 6658IV & 6558I
SER: L-701.



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Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-66

- Ref: (a) Maps: AMS; Series L-701, 1:50,000; Sheets 6558 I; 6559 II;
 6558 IV; 6659 III
 (b) 3d Marine VO 3800 LA
 (c) 3d Reconnaissance OpO 349-65

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.a. General.

(1) The Viet Cong continue to infiltrate small units and supplies into the western portion of the DANANG TAOR by way of the SONG LO DONG - TAM VAO basin complex.

(2) To support the movement of personnel and equipment into the DANANG sector, the Viet Cong have established and are presently operating harboring and production/development sites within the TAM VAO valley complex (Happy Valley). Utilizing the natural cover and concealment of the adjacent mountainous, rough surfaced, terrain, the Viet Cong are able to concentrate supplies and equipment in close proximity to the major trail networks and waterways leading into the DANANG enclave.

(3) Indications are, that the Quang Da Command Headquarters and the Quang Nam District Dispensary are also located within the basin area. The Quang Da is reportedly the high command of all Viet Cong forces operating in and immediately around the DANANG TAOR. The command group is a small, highly mobile, administrative and command unit. Its location can be rapidly adjusted to ensure continuous coordination among main, local and guerrilla forces. Various District Committees of the Viet Cong are also reported within and adjacent to the valley complex.

(4) The Viet Cong have the capability of infiltrating additional small units through the outer defenses of DANANG. Taking advantage of the ethnic identification problem that exists in South Vietnam, along with the natural cover and concealment the terrain and weather afford, the Viet Cong has, and will continue to increase his striking force potential in and around the Happy Valley area.

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ENCLOSURE (/)

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- b. See current Patrol Reports, Periodic Intelligence Summaries and special intelligence reports as published by this headquarters.
- c. See Appendix 1 (Enemy Situation).
2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.
- a. See reference (c) paragraph 2.
3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.
- a. See reference (c) paragraph 3.
4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.
- a. See reference (c) paragraph 4.
5. MAPS, CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
- a. See reference (c) paragraph 5.
6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
- a. See references (b) and (c).
- b. Countersigns: See Section 8 of reference (b) and Section 10 of reference (c).
7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.
- a. Significant sightings and contacts will be reported immediately to the Battalion Command Post.


R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Enemy Situation
- 2 - Helicopter Landing Zone Suitability
- 3 - Astronomical Data and Weather Summary

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Operation Order 2-66

ENCLOSURE (1) 4-2

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DANANG, RVNAppendix 1 (Enemy Situation) to Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation
Order 2-66Ref: (a) Maps: AMS: Series L-701, 1:50,000: Sheets 6558 I, 6559 II,
6658 IV: 6659 III.

Time Zone: H

1. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Composition. The units located within and adjacent to the area of operation consist of main and local force personnel, and as such carry the normal arms of Viet Cong units.

(1) Ground. The following ground units have been reported within and in the near vicinity of the valley complex:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GRID SQUARE</u>	<u>EVALUATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Doc Lap Bn. (Hdqs)	ZC 1760	(Confirmed)	8 Dec 65
43d Bn. W/UI Regimental Hdqs	AT 7967	(Possible)	1 Jan 66
U/I Bn.	ZC 1165	(Possible)	17 Dec 65
U/I Bn.	ZC 1165	(Possible)	17 Dec 65
H-41 Co.	AT 8368	(Confirmed)	8 Dec 65
278 Co. (SAPPER)	AT 8565	(Probable)	4 Jan 66
V15 Co. (SAPPER)	AT 8671	(Confirmed)	4 Jan 66

(2) Air. The Viet Cong do not possess this capability in the DANANG TAOR. No enemy aircraft are expected in the area of operations.

(3) Naval. The Viet Cong have the capability of employing an unknown number of small craft within this area and the western portion of the basin complex.

b. Strength and Combat Efficiency.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L3d Reconnaissance Battalion(-)Rein
DANANG, RVN(1) Locally Available. See TAB A (Enemy Situation Overlay).

(a) Confirmed, probable and possible units, as indicated on TAB A (Enemy Situation Overlay), located within and along the eastern approach to Happy Valley would place the strength of the Viet Cong at well over 1000 men. Evaluation of present enemy situation reports would lend credibility to two Viet Cong Battalions being located within and adjacent to the complex.

(b) There are indications that the valley complex contains several training camps which the Viet Cong have utilized for the training of recruits and guerrilla personnel. The exact number of recruits in the area can not be determined, but it is reported that the training facilities are designed to accomodate 2500 men.

(2) Reinforcements. Reinforcements of Viet Cong Forces within the area of operation is not anticipated.

(3) Combat Efficiency. The training and general proficiency of these forces is fair to good. Reports of Viet Cong training camps within the area of operation would allow for a period of advance training for guerrilla and local force personnel. The Viet Cong is considered to be a capable adversary. What the average Viet Cong soldier lacks in training, marksmanship and tactical techniques is well countered by his courage, patience, stamina and initiative.

c. Disposition. See TAB A (Enemy Situation Overlay).

d. Arms and Armament.

(1) The Viet Cong possess a variety of small arms made available through their normal supply channels and through the capture of ARVN and U. S. weapons. Approximately 24% of the weapons in the hands of the Viet Cong are of Chinese Communist manufacture. The remainder of the weapons are of Russian, French and U. S. manufacture. The number of small arms and crew served weapons in the area of operation is unknown.

e. Recent and Present Activities.

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- (1) See Patrol Reports published by this headquarters.
- (2) The enemy continues to employ harassing tactics.
- (3) The Viet Cong is locating supply and harboring sites forward.
- (4) Viet Cong units continue to infiltrate the DANANG TAOR in small groups.

f. Logistics Consideration. The present status of Viet Cong supplies in the DANANG TAOR is considered to be inadequate to support a major offensive. The shortage of ammunition, food and medical supplies is of primary concern to them. The Viet Cong build up of logistics has been slow, but progressive within the area.

g. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.

- (1) Personnel. In general, the personnel replacement system of the Viet Cong at best is sporadic within the immediate area. The local and guerrilla force ranks are plagued with sickness and low morale. Defections are increasing among these units.
- (2) Intelligence. The Viet Cong have sufficient numbers of sympathizers in the eastern area of operation to provide them with an early warning system of the approach, movement, strength and equipment of Marine units engaged in the operation. Their sources of information involve the use of women and young children.
- (3) Operations. The Viet Cong are presently employing a quasi defensive posture. The use of villages and hamlets within the area as bases of operations has been reported. Indications are that the Viet Cong will not employ a stationary defense against an attack by Marines. They will, however, attempt to engage an enemy in a series of "triangle" ambushes, to wear down, disorganize and discourage any would be attacking unit.
- (4) Logistics. Present available supplies are considered to be inadequate, but not critical to Viet Cong operation. The operations which have taken place in the western Dien Ban District have made it difficult for the Viet Cong to collect rice in their area during

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DANANG, RVN

crucial harvest time. However, since there are other large rice producing areas in the Quang Nam Sector the loss, resulting from these operations, can not be considered crippling to the majority of Viet Cong units.

h. Assistance From Neighboring Forces. None is believed to be available.


R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

TAB:

A - Enemy Situation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Operation Order 2-66

A-1-4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (1)

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DANANG, RVN

Tab A to Appendix 1 (Enemy Situation) to Annex A (Intelligence) to
Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS; Series L-701, 1:50,000; Sheets 6558 I; 6559 II;
6658 IV; 6659 III


R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (/)

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Appendix 2 (Helicopter Landing Zone Suitability) to Annex A (Intelligence)
to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: Maps: AMS; Series L-701, 1:50,000, Sheets 6558 I, 6559 II,
6558 IV and 6659 III

Time Zone: H

1. Helicopter Landing Zones. Refer to TAB A.

a. Landing Zone I.

- (1) Location. Centered at (ZC 157656) adjacent to PHU HOA (1).
- (2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 325 feet long by 70 feet wide. 100% useable.
- (3) Helicopter Absorbition. Two UH-1E's in line and no UH-34's.
- (4) Obstacles. Low brush and scattered trees on the east and west sides and the north end. At the south end a hill rises abruptly to a height of about 70 meters and is heavily forested with high trees.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone has no slope. The vegetation in the area consists of grass with scattered low brush.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone I is situated 6300 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 220 degrees and 5350 meters southeast of the intersection of the SONG YANG and SONG LANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 120 degrees.

b. Landing Zone II.

- (1) Location. Centered at (ZC 155657) approximately 950 meters west of PHU HOA (2).
- (2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 660 feet long by 70 feet wide. 90% useable.
- (3) Helicopter Absorbition. Area will accomodate five UH-1E's and no UH-34's.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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(4) Obstacles. Paddy dikes with low grass and brush growing from them. Hills with low brush and trees surround the zone. A strand of trees located at the north end of the landing zone.

(5) Surface Features. Consists of paddies separated by dikes.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone II is situated 6350 meters southwest of hill 11487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 222 degrees and 5125 meters eastsoutheast of the intersection of the SONG YANG and SONG IANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 106 degrees.

c. Landing Zone III.

(1) Location. Centered at (ZC 153660) approximately 600 meters westnorthwest of PHU HOA (1) (ZC 157656) and approximately 1050 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668).

(2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 275 feet long by 112 feet wide. 100% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorbition. Two UH-1E's or two UH-34's in line.

(4) Obstacles. Landing Zone III is generally flat, sloping gently down at the west end. An extensive tree line is located southwest of the zone. The remainder of the zone is surrounded by low brush and scattered trees.

(5) Surface Features. Grass and low brush throughout the zone.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone III is situated 6330 meters southwest of hill 11487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 221 degrees and 4875 meters eastsoutheast of the intersection of the SONG YANG and SONG IANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 104 degrees.

d. Landing Zone IV.

(1) Location. Centered at (ZC 151660) 2225 meters eastsoutheast of MANG MAY (1) (ZC 130666) and 1125 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668).

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(2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 450 feet long by 80 feet wide. 100% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorption. Four UH-1E's in line and no UH-34's.

(4) Obstacles. Low hills, heavily forested with high trees at the west end of the zone. Remainder of the zone consists of low brush and scattered trees.

(5) Surface Features. Area is flat with vegetation consisting of low grass.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone IV is situated 6375 meters southwest of hill 1487 on a magnetic azimuth of 225 degrees and 4800 meters eastsoutheast of the intersection of the SONG YANG and SONG LANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 104 degrees.

e. Landing Zone V.

(1) Location. Centered at (ZC 151658) approximately 2225 meters eastsoutheast of MANG MAY (1) (ZC 130666) and 1225 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668).

(2) Size. 90 feet long by 80 feet wide. 100% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorption. One UH-1E and no UH-34's.

(4) Obstacles. The landing zone is surrounded by low brush with a tree at the northeast corner.

(5) Surface Features. The landing zone is flat and is covered with low grass.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone V is situated 6400 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 225 degrees and 4750 meters eastsoutheast from the intersection of the SONG YANG and the SONG LANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 105 degrees.

f. Landing Zone VI.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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(1) Location. Centered at (ZC 144658) approximately 1650 meters eastsoutheast of MANG MAY (1) (ZC 130666) and 1775 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668).

(2) Size. Roughly rectangular. 760 feet long by 80 feet wide. 90% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorbtion. Seven UH-1E's in line and no UH-34's.

(4) Obstacles. Scattered trees surround the eastern area of the zone. Paddy dikes and scattered trees.

(5) Surface Features. Low brush on the paddy dikes.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone VI is situated 700 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 228 degrees and 4100 meters eastsoutheast from the intersection of the SONG YANG and the SONG LANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 108 degrees.

g. Landing Zone VII.

(1) Location. Centered at (ZC 141656) approximately 2150 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668) and 1500 meters southeast of MANG MAY (2) (ZC 133670).

(2) Size. Irregular shaped. 600 feet long by 130 feet wide. 80% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorbtion. Eight UH-1E's or seven UH-34's staggered in the zone.

(4) Obstacles. Scattered trees and brush surround the area.

(5) Surface Features. Consists of flat paddy land with dikes dissecting the zone.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone VII is situated 7325 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 229 degrees and 3850 meters eastsoutheast from the intersection of the

A-3-4 C O N F I D E N T I A L

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SONG YANG and the SONG LANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 112 degrees.

h. Landing Zone VIII.

(1) Location. Centered (ZC 150703) adjacent to TA PHENG village and approximately 3700 meters north northeast of MANG MAY (1) village (ZC 133670) and 3650 meters north northwest of PHU HUA (3) village (ZC 159668).

(2) Size. Oval shaped, 330 feet long axis and 275 feet short axis. 90% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorption. Area will accomodate five UH-1E's, or three UH-34's.

(4) Obstacles. Obstacles within landing zone consist of a tree and some brush. A horse shoe shaped tree line and a stream border the west and north sides of zone. Low brush and rice paddies border the south and east sides.

(5) Surface Features. Consists of grass and soil, area is probably an abandoned dry crop field.

(6) Reference Point. Landing zone is situated 5000 meters west of BA NA Mtn (ZC 205705) on a magnetic azimuth of 269 degrees, and 4300 meters northeast of the junction of the TAM VAO stream and the TAM KHO stream (ZC 127667) on a magnetic azimuth of 043 degrees.

i. Landing Zone IX.

(1) Location. Centered at (AT 843724) adjacent to TUNG SON.

(2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 130 feet long by 70 feet wide. 90% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorption. One UH-1E and no UH-34's.

(4) Obstacles. Low brush on the east and west side and northern end. Extensive tree line along eastern side and northern end. Scattered low brush extending from the center to the northwest.

(5) Surface Features. The vegetation in the zone consists of grass with scattered low brush.

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(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone IX is situated 2900 meters northeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 045 degrees and 1600 meters south of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 185 degrees.

j. Landing Zone I.

- (1) Location. Centered at (AT 844723) adjacent to TUNG SON.
- (2) Size. Square shaped. 125 feet by 125 feet. 90% useable.
- (3) Helicopter Absorbition. Three UH-1E's and one UH-34.
- (4) Obstacles. Low brush and scattered trees on the east and west sides. Thick low brush at the north end and a cluster of brush near the center of the zone.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone has no slope. The vegetation in the area consists of grass and scattered low brush.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone X is situated 2900 meters northeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 045 degrees and 1700 meters south of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 180 degrees.

k. Landing Zone XI.

- (1) Location. Centered at (AT 845722) adjacent to TUNG SON.
- (2) Size. Roughly rectangular shaped. 400 feet long by 250 feet wide. 100% useable.
- (3) Helicopter Absorbition. Fifteen UH-1E's and seven UH-34's.
- (4) Obstacles. The landing zone is surrounded by low brush. Scattered trees line the eastern side with an extensive tree line located from the west side to the south end. One tree approximately 20 feet high is located in the northeast corner of the zone.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone is flat cultivated land with patches of low grass.

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(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone XI is situated 2950 meters northeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 045 degrees and 1800 meters from hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 180 degrees.

1. Landing Zone XII.

(1) Location. Centered at (AT 844722) adjacent to TUNG SON.

(2) Size. Rectangular shaped. 500 feet long by 250 feet wide. 90% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorbition. Twelve UH-1E's and seven UH-34's.

(4) Obstacles. Thick brush and scattered trees on the west and east side and south end. Extensive brush line running generally northwest to southeast is half way through the center of the zone.

(5) Surface Features. The landing zone is flat cultivated land with patches of low grass.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone XII is situated 2850 meters northeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 045 degrees and 1800 meters south of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 180 degrees.

m. Landing Zone XIII.

(1) Location. Centered at (AT 850677).

(2) Size. Rectangular shaped. 450 feet long by 100 feet wide. 90% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorbition. Four UH-34's or six UH-1E's.

(4) Obstacles. Three to four foot brush is located in the landing zone. A tree line containing twenty to thirty foot trees is located on the eastern side of the zone.

(5) Surface Features. The landing zone is flat cultivated land, grown over with grass and brush.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone XIII is located 4000 meters

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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CONFIDENTIAL3d Reconnaissance Battalion(-) Main
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southeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 135 degrees and 3700 meters northwest of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 327 degrees.

n. Landing Zone XIV.

- (1) Location. Centered at (AT 845675).
- (2) Size. Rectangular shape. 375 feet long by 100 feet wide. 95% useable.
- (3) Helicopter Absorbtion. Three UH-34's or 5 UH-1E's.
- (4) Obstacles. The landing zone is surrounded by twenty to thirty foot trees on the southeast and southwest ends.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone is flat cultivated land grown over with grass and low brush.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone XIV is situated 3700 meters southeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 140 degrees and 3500 meters northwest of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 333 degrees.

o. Landing Zone XV.

- (1) Location. Centered at (AT 865653) 1000 meters west of DONG NGHE (AT 802653).
- (2) Size. Roughly rectangular in shape. 6000 feet long and 1000 feet wide. 60% useable.
- (3) Helicopter Absorbtion. In excess of 100 UH-34's or UH-1E's.
- (4) Obstacles. The zone is lined on the north and south sides by a tree line intermittently extending into the zone. The trees average twenty to thirty feet.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone is flat cultivated land grown over with the grass and brush.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone XV is situated 6600 meters

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southeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 140 degrees and 1300 meters northeast of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 022 degrees.

p. Landing Zone A. See (m) of appendix.

q. Landing Zone B. (Medical evacuation/resupply by hoist only)

(1) Location. Centered at (AT 832658).

(2) Size. Roughly rectangular. 650 feet long by 200 feet wide. 75% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorbtion. None. Hover only.

(4) Obstacles. Extensive tree line enclose all sides. Six to eight foot brush throughout zone.

(5) Surface Features. The landing zone is located on a slope. Tall brush cover the entire surface.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone B. is situated 4600 meters south of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 162 degrees and 3200 meters northwest of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 303 degrees.

r. Landing Zone C. (Medical evacuation/resupply by hoist only)

(1) Location. Centered at (AT 833658).

(2) Size. Roughly rectangular. 1250 feet long by 125 feet wide. 80% useable.

(3) Helicopter Absorbtion. None. Hover only.

(4) Obstacles. The landing site is on a slope with extensive tree line surrounding the zone.

(5) Surface Features. The zone is predominately scrub grass and eight to ten foot grass with an occasional thirty to forty foot tree.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone C. is situated 4800 meters

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ENCLOSURE (7)

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south of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 162 degrees and 3250 meters northwest of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 325 degrees.

s. Landing Zone D. (Medical evacuation/resupply by hoist only)

(1) Location. Centered at (AT 834659).

(2) Size. Roughly rectangular. 650 feet long by 175 feet wide. 50% useable.


(3) Helicopter Absorbtion. None. Hover only.

(4) Obstacles. Twenty to thirty foot trees are found intermittantly throughout the zone. Fourty to sixty foot trees surround the zone.

(5) Surface Features. Five to ten foot brush is found throughout the zone.

(6) Reference Point. Landing Zone D. is situated 4800 meters south of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 167 degrees and 3000 meters northeast of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 302 degrees.

NOTE: Information obtained from photographs dated 30 August 1965 and 27 October 1965 and vegetation in the landing zone is subject to seasonal changes.



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TAB:

A-- Helicopter Landing Zone Suitablity Overlay

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Tab A to Appendix 2 (Helicopter Landing Zone Suitability) to Annex A
(Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: Maps: AMS; Series L-701, 1:50,000, Sheets 6658 I, 6559 II,
6658 IV and 6659 III


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DANANG, RVNAppendix 3 (Astronomical Data and Weather Summary to Annex A
(Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. ASTRONOMICAL DATA:

DANANG

<u>DATE:</u>	<u>EMNT:</u>	<u>EMNT:</u>	<u>SRISE:</u>	<u>SSET:</u>	<u>BENT:</u>	<u>EENT:</u>	<u>MR:</u>	<u>MS:</u>	<u>MPHASE:</u>
27Jan66	0632	0655	0718	1842	1905	1928	1086	2315	
28Jan66	0632	0655	0718	1842	1905	1928	1130	----	
29Jan66	0632	0655	0718	1843	1906	1929	1204	0002	
30Jan66	0632	0655	0718	1844	1907	1930	1243	0054	FIRST
31Jan66	0632	0655	0718	1844	1907	1930	1325	0145	
01Feb66	0631	0654	0717	1845	1908	1931	1415	0243	
02Feb66	0630	0653	0716	1845	1908	1931	1511	0345	
03Feb66	0630	0653	0716	1845	1908	1931	1614	0450	
04Feb66	0630	0653	0716	1846	1909	1932	1722	0554	
05Feb66	0629	0652	0715	1846	1909	1932	1831	0654	FULL
06Feb66	0629	0652	0715	1846	1909	1932	1938	0751	
07Feb66	0629	0652	0715	1847	1910	1933	2041	0841	
08Feb66	0629	0652	0715	1847	1910	1933	2140	0927	
09Feb66	0628	0651	0714	1848	1911	1934	2239	1009	
10Feb66	0628	0651	0714	1848	1911	1934	2334	1050	
11Feb66	0628	0651	0714	1848	1911	1934	----	1132	
12Feb66	0628	0651	0714	1849	1912	1935	0030	1214	LAST
13Feb66	0628	0651	0714	1849	1912	1935	0119	1257	
14Feb66	0627	0650	0713	1850	1913	1936	0221	1345	
15Feb66	0627	0650	0713	1850	1913	1936	0315	1434	
16Feb66	0626	0649	0712	1850	1913	1936	0409	1526	
17Feb66	0626	0649	0712	1850	1913	1936	0459	1618	
18Feb66	0625	0648	0711	1851	1914	1937	----	----	
19Feb66	0625	0648	0711	1851	1914	1937	----	----	
20Feb66	0624	0647	0710	1852	1915	1938	----	----	NEW

2. WEATHER SUMMARY:

a. Precipitation. January and February marks the middle of the season of the cool and relatively dry phase of the Northeastern monsoon. Precipitation occurring in the north will normally be in the form of light rain showers with infrequent periods of heavy precipitation. It

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DANANG, RVN

is anticipated that generally dry weather will prevail during the period of operations. Mean precipitation during January and February is 6. inches.

b. Visibility. Maximum cloudiness occurs during the December to February period. Approximately 61 percent of the days in January will be involved with low scattered and broken clouds. These clouds normally begin to form two to three hours prior to sunrise and increase to a maximum in cloud coverage around sunrise. Throughout the morning hours, the clouds will gradually lift and tend to dissipate. The most favorable weather will normally occur from 1400 to 1600 hours, the time when scattered to broken conditions or likely to occur. The Crachin, a prolonged period of light rain and widespread fog, will still be evidenced during January and February. It is characterized by low ceilings which quickly and greatly reduce visibility, generally below two miles and frequently below one-half mile. Crachin weather will occasionally be found far up the windward slopes of the higher terrain and far up the river valleys. Crachin weather generally dissipates in the afternoon and reforms in the evening.

c. Surface Winds. Winds in the DANANG TACR will be variable from the north, northwest and north northwest.

d. Temperatures. The average daily temperature during January and February will be 70 degrees, with an absolute maximum of 94 degrees and an absolute minimum of 52 degrees. Mean relative humidity is approximately 86 percent.


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DA NANG, RVN
231600H January 1966

ANNEX B (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIET NAM, 1:50,000, Series L-701, Sheet Numbers 6558 I
and 6658 IV

Time Zone: H


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231600H January 1966

ANNEX C (Fire Support) to 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIET NAM, 1:50,000, Sheet Numbers 6659 III, 6658 IV,
6559 II, 6558 I, Series L701

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. See basic order.
2. MISSION. 12th Marines support areas of operation by long range fire.
3. EXECUTION
 - a. 1st 8" Howitzer Battery (-) (Rein) moves two 8" howitzers and one 155mm Gun Battery to HILL 41 (AT 935665) position NLT 291500H. Remaining weapons support operation from present position.
 - b. 12th Marines provides one artillery liaison officer with radio operator (PRC-25) to Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion for planning by G-6 and operations on G-2.
 - c. 1st Battalion, 12th Marines provides one forward observer team with PRC-25 to Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion for planning by G-4 and operations on G-2.
 - d. Coordinating Instructions
 - (1) Concentration Numbers. See Appendix 1 (Target Overlay) and Appendix 2 (Target List).
 - (2) Fire Coordination Line
 - (a) See Appendix 1 (Target Overlay).
 - (b) Fire Coordination Line (FCL) as shown in Appendix 1 (Target Overlay) describes the no fire zone for the operation area. No supporting arms will fire into the zone without approval of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion.
 - (3) ^{Recon} 3rd ~~Marines~~ provides fire support coordination for all operations in the objective area.
 - (4) Aerial observer working areas in and around the TAUT BOW Operation area will check in with the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion on the Artillery Conduct of Fire Net.

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CONFIDENTIAL4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See back cover.5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Artillery Conduct of Fire Net ((P) ³⁶⁰ 29.5 mcs D-147, (S) ¹⁶⁴ 36.7 mcs D-174). Station on net will be FO team, liaison team, artillery relay station, 1st 8" Howitzer Battery (-) (Rein).

b. Artillery Call Sign:

1st 8" Howitzer Battery

RAINBELT

Artillery Relay Station

MUSTER RELAY

Liaison O

MUSTER 3A

FO (Co A)

MUSTER A1

FO (Co C)

MUSTER C1



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APPENDIXES:

1. Target Overlay

2. Target List

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3rd Reconnaissance Battalion(..)(Rein)
DA NAM, RVN
231600H January 1966

Appendix 2 (Target List) to ANNEX C (Fire Support) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIET NAM, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheet Numbers 6658 IV
and 6558 I

Time Zone: H

TARGET LIST

<u>CONC NO</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>ALT</u>
RC-1	Junct trail & Stream	AT 89246607	0
RC-2	HILL 162	AT 88126654	162
RC-3	HILL 310	AT 86236648	310
RC-4	HILL 502	AT 83156596	502
RC-5	Stream Junct	AT 87486533	20
RC-6	Trail & Stream Junct	AT 85536540	20
RC-7	Trail & Stream Junct	AT 82796715	30
RC-8	Stream Junct	AT 80576685	100
RC-9	HILL 785	AT 80756500	785
RC-10	Stream Junct	ZC 20846623	30
RC-11	Stream Junct	ZC 20236615	40
RC-12	HILL 541	AT 79136730	541
RC-13	HILL 449	ZC 20456524	449
RC-14	HILL 462	ZC 18956485	462
RC-15	HILL 762	ZC 19136787	762
RC-16	Stream Junct	ZC 18546600	180
RC-17	HILL 444	ZC 17826527	444
RC-18	HILL 686	ZC 17836803	686
RC-19	HILL 864	ZC 17706366	864
RC-20	HILL 391	ZC 16556606	391
RC-21	HILL 1025	AT 80686277	1025
RC-22	HILL 1235	ZC 19956199	1235
RC-23	HILL 482	ZC 19566502	482


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ENCLOSURE (1)

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
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3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Team)
DA 30201, RVN
231600N January 1966

Appendix 1 (Target Overlay) to ANNEX C (Fire Support & Operation
Order of Battle)

Ref: (a) MAPS: VIET NAM, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheet Numbers 6658 IV
and 6558 I

Time Zone: H



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
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 DA NANG, RVN
 231600 H Jan 1966

ANNEX D (Frequencies and Call Signs) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) DivO 02000.20

Time Zone: H

1. FREQUENCIES

a. Division Reconnaissance Net	(P) 2452 D-6 (S) 6770 D-52
Battalion Tactical Net	(P) 46.9 D-237 (S) 38.8 D-182
Company "A" Command	51.0 D-25
Company "C" Command	42.3 D-218
Landing Zone Control	49.3 D-249

2. CALL SIGNS

a. Division Reconnaissance Net:

- (1) 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (Deployed) SCAT
- (2) 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (Camp Reasoner) SCAT REAR
- (3) 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (Advance Party during CP displacement). SCAT X-RAY
- (4) 3rd Marine Division MONROE
- (5) 3rd Marines STAKEOUT
- (6) Co C, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion SCAT

b. Battalion Tactical Net

- (1) Headquarters, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion SCAT
- (2) Company A SCAT ALPHA
- (3) Company C SCAT CHARLIE

--1--

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(4) Company D

SCAT DELTA

(5) Company C, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines

SCAT HELPER

R. R. Van Cleve

R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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DA NANG, RVN
231600 H Jan 1966

ANNEX E (Distribution List) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. The below listed units will receive the specified copies of Operation Order 2-66.

CG, 3rd Mar Div	(3)
1st MAW	(3)
ADC CMD GRP (CHU LAI)	(2)
G-3	(5)
G-2	(2)
G-4	(1)
3rd Mar Div FSCC	(1)
3rdMar	(5)
12thMar	(4)
1st Recon Bn	(1)
1st Bn 3rd Mar	(2)
3rd Engr Bn	(2)
CO 3rd Recon Bn	(3)
Recon Group Alpha	(3)
Recon Off	(1)
1st Force Recon Co	(2)
H&S Co	(3)
Co A	(3)
Co C	(2)
Co D	(3)
Co C, 1st Bn 3rd Mar	(3)
CommO	(1)
SupplyO	(2)
MTO	(1)
File	(15)

TOTAL

73

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 DA NANG, RVN
 231600H January 1966

ANNEX F (Reports) (NOTAL) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1A

Time Zone: H

1. Reports from subordinate units.

- a. Each company operating as a separate unit or controlling patrols on the Company TAC Net will make the following reports to this Headquarters:

- (1) SITREP on even hours over Bn TAC Net.
- (2) Position (BRAVO) reports on odd hours to this Headquarters.
- (3) SALUTE reports as sightings occur. (Appendix 1).
- (4) CONTACT report as contacts occur. (Appendix 2).

- b. Independent patrols coordinated with the Bn TAC Net will make the following reports:

- (1) SITREP on even hours.
- (2) Position (BRAVO) reports on odd hours.
- (3) SALUTE reports as sightings occur. (Appendix 1).
- (4) CONTACT report as contacts occur. (Appendix 2).

2. Reports to adjacent and higher headquarters.

- a. This battalion (S-3) will submit the following reports to adjacent and higher headquarters over the 3rd Marine Division Reconnaissance net.

- (1) SITREP on even hour + 30 minutes. (Appendix 3).
- (2) SPOT reports as occurring. (Appendix 4).

3. Positions will be reported as follows:

- a. From Thrust Lines: Z: AT 850680; E: AT 830680; Y: AT 830650;
 F: ZC 200650; X: ZC 150670. Base direction is NORTH.

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- b. By couple.
- c. Azimuth and distance from pre-plotted concentration.
- 4. SUPPLY REPORTS (Requests) will be submitted on the format shown in Appendix 5.


R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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Appendixes:

- 1. SALUTE Report
 - 2. CONTACT Report
 - 3. Battalion SITREP (ZULU Report)
 - 4. SPOT Report
 - 5. Supply Report (YANKEE Report)
- DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX E (Distribution)

--2--

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3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein)
DA NANC. RVN
231600H January 1966

Appendix 1 (SALUTE REPORT) to ANNEX F (Reports) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Reporting units will use the following SALUTE format to report sighting:

S--SIZE

A---ACTIVITY

L--LOCATION

U--UNIFORM

T--TIME

E--EQUIPMENT


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3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
231600H January 1966

Appendix 2 (CONTACT Report) to ANNEX F (Reports) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Reporting units will use the following CONTACT format to report VC/PAVN contacts.

C--COMMAND

O--OCCURRENCE

N--NEEDS (Tactical)

T--TIME

A--ACTION TAKEN

C--CASUALTIES (Enemy) (Friendly)

T-- TYPE OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT NEEDED


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3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 231600H January 1966

Appendix 3 (Battalion SITREP) to ANNEX F (Reports) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

ZULU REPORT

1. The following report (ZULU Report) will be submitted by the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein) to adjacent and higher headquarters on even hours + 30 minutes.

a. Time.

b. Location Battalion CP.

c. Location Company A

(1) Company CP.

(2) 1st Platoon.

(3) 2nd Platoon.

(4) 3rd Platoon.

d. Location Company C

(1) Company CP.

(2) 1st Platoon.

(3) 2nd Platoon.

(4) 3rd Platoon.

e. Location of Company 4, 1st Bn 1st Marines

(1) Company CP.

(2) 1st Platoon.

(3) 2nd Platoon.

(4) 3rd Platoon.

ENCLOSURE (/)

➤ (Only those paragraphs will be reported which are different from b.)

--1--

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f. Sightings (Note: Contacts will be reported by SPOT report)

- (1) Time.
- (2) Location.
- (3) Nature of sighting.
- (4) Action taken.

(This paragraph will be reported as often as necessary)

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R. R. VAN CLIVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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**B. # OF RDS ARTY FIRED
DURING REPORTING PERIOD.**

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3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
231600H January 1966

Appendix 4 (SPOT Report) to ANNEX F (Reports) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. The following format will be used by the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion to submit reports of contacts to adjacent and higher headquarters.

ALPHA Reporting Unit
BRAVO Local DTG
CHARLIE Location (6 place coordinate)
DELTA Incident
ECHO Action taken as result of DELTA
FOXTROT Friendly KIA
GOLF Friendly WIA
HOTEL Friendly MIA
INDIA VC KIA
JUILETT VC WIA
KILO VCC
LIMA VCS
MIKE Weapons captured
NOVEMBER Equipment, documents captured


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3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein)
DA NANG RVN
25 JAN 1966

Appendix 5 (Supply Request) to ANNEX F (Reports) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

YANKEE REPORT

1. a. Meals.
2. a. BA 386
 - b. BB 451
 - c. BA 279
 - d. H-33
 - e. PRC-10 ✓
 - f. PRC-47
 - g. PRC-25
 - h. Communication wire $\frac{1}{4}$ mile.
 - i. TA-1/PT
 - j. Message Books
 - k. Insect repellent (Btl)
3. a. Ctg. 40mm
 - b. Ctg. 7.62mm Ball
 - c. Ctg Cal .45
 - d. Ctg 12 Ga.
 - e. Grenade M26 (Frag)
 - f. Grenade M34 (WP)
 - g. Signal Day/Night ea.
 - h. Signal Grenade, Yellow smoke ea. ENCLOSURE (/)
 - i. Signal Grenade, Green smoke ea.

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j. Signal Grenade, Red smoke	ea.
k. Signal White Star Para	ea.
l. Signal Red Star Para	ea.
m. Signal Green Star Smoke	ea.
n. Signal Green Smoke Para	ea.
o. Signal Red Smoke Para	ea.
p. Rocket LAAW	ea.
q. TNT, 1 lb	ea.
r. Igniter, Blasting Fuse M2	ea.
s. Electric Blasting Caps	ea.
t. Non-Electric Blasting Caps	ea.
u. Claymore Mine M18	ea.
v. Fuse, Blasting, time	ft.
w. Primacord	ft.
x. Ctg 7.62mm Linked	ea.
y. Ctg 7.62mm Tracer	ea.
z. M-14 Rifle M14	ea.
aa. Grenade CS	ea.
bb. Grenade CN	ea.
4. a. Morphine Syrettes, 5's	bx.
b. Battle dressing, small	ea.
c. Battle dressing, med	ea.
d. Battle dressing, large	ea.
e. Malaria prophylactic, tablets, combined 1000's	bottle
f. Salt tablets 1000's	btl
g. Collapsible stretcher nylon	ea.
h. Water purification tabs, 50's	Btl

ENCLOSURE (1)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------|
| i. Anaphylactic Medication | One man |
| j. Diarrhea Medication | One man |
| k. Band-aid, 100's | Bx |
| l. Benzalconium, Tinc, 3's | Pkg |
| m. Hospital Corpsman | One |

(Only the paragraph number and letter required along with amount will be transmitted.)

5. Date/time/coordinates DELIVERY REQUIRED.

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R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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Copy 61 of 73 copies
 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-)(Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 8 February 1966

Change No. 1 to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen change in Operation Order 2-66:

a. Basic Order

- ✓(1) Under "Task Organization": Delete Company D and add Company C (-), Capt. SHUMAN. A-1-1, Capt DOMINGUES.
- ✓(2) Paragraph 3.a.(3). After "by vehicle" add: "or by helicopter from Happy Valley".
- ✓(3) Paragraph 3.a.(4). Delete all after "for withdrawal".
- ✓(4) Paragraph 3.b. Change Company A to read Company C (-).
- ✓(5) Paragraph 3.c. Change Company D to read Company A. Delete sub-paragraph 3.c.(1) and 3.c.(5).
- ✓(6) Paragraph 3.d. Delete Company C, 3rd Marines and add Company A, 1st Bn, 1st Marines.
- ✓(7) Paragraph 3.e.(11). Change G-Day to read 9 February 1966. H-Hour 0900H.
- ✓(8) Paragraph 4.a.(2). Class I change 4 Days to 5 Days.
- ✓(9) Paragraph 4.a.(3)(a). Change G+1 to read to read G+2.
- ✓(10) Paragraph 4.a.(3)(b). Change G+5 to read G+6.
- ✓(11) Paragraph 4.a.(3)(c). Change G-Day and G+4 Day to read G+2 and G+5.
- ✓(12) Paragraph 5.a.(2). Change to read "0700 G+2"
- (13) Paragraph 5.a.(4). Change Company C to read Company D.
- (14) Under "ANNEXES" after "E (Distribution)" add: " F Reports (NOTAL)".

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C O N F I D E N T I A Lb. ANNEX C

- ✓ (1) Paragraph 3.d.(3). Delete "3rd Marines" and insert "3rd Reconnaissance Battalion".
- ✓ (2) Paragraph 5.a. Delete "((P) 29.5 mos D-147; (S) 36.0 mos D-164)" and add: "((P) 36.0 mos D-164; (S) 36.7 mos D-171)".
- (3) Paragraph 5.b. Delete last line "FO" and add: "FO (Co A) - MUSTER A1 and FO (Co C) - MUSTER C1".
- (4) Appendix 2. Under "COORDINATES" delete line #17 "ZC 1882 6527" and add: "ZC 17826527".
2. Include the following new pages, attached hereto as ANNEX F (Reports) (NOTAL) to Operation Order 2-66.

R R Van Cleve
R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX E (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-66

--2--

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OPNAV FORM 21 (1-64) (REV. 5-61)

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(when filled in)

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NO. H. VAN CLEVELAND	L. A. COLBY				1	1		
DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY				
20 JAN 1966								
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

FROM: OO 3RD MCGO BN

TO: G-3

G-2

3RD MAR

1ST BN 1ST MAR

1ST BN 3RD MAR

RECON GROUP ALPHA

REF MY OPO 4-66. D-DAY IS 30 JANUARY 1966

DISTRIBUTION:
(PAGE ONE ONLY)

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

200300Z JAN 1966

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NAVAL MESSAGE
OPNAV FORM 2110-26A (REV. 3-61)**CONFIDENTIAL**

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DATE 4 FEB 66	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		
MESSAGE	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY
		ACTION				
		INFO				

FROM: CO, 3RD RECON BN

TO: CO, COMPANY D, 3RD RECON BN

OPO 6-66. DURING THE PERIOD OF OPERATION TAUT BOW, MAINTAIN THE RECONNAISSANCE SCREEN OF THE DA NANG TACZ UTILIZING NO MORE THAN 50% OF AVAILABLE FORCES. THE AREA FROM TAUT BOW SOUTH WILL BE COVERED BY FRIENDLY FORCES. YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO PARA 5.a.(4) OF OPO 2-66 (W/CH 1). BE ALSO PREPARED TO ESTABLISH A RELAY SITE ON HILL 327 IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS OVER EITHER THE BN TAC NET OR THE DIV RECON NET.

DISTRIBUTION:
(PAGE ONE ONLY)

C-2	(2)
3rd Mar	(1)
3rd Mar FSCG	(3)
1/1	(1)
1/3	(1)
3rd Recon Bn	(6)
ReconOff	(1)
ReconGroup Alpha	(1)
Co D	(6)

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

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DATE 6 FEB 1966	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY				
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE DENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

FROM: CO, 3RD RECON BN

TO: RECON GROUP ALPHA

A. OPO 3-66

OPO 7-66. DURING THE PERIOD 16 FEB 1966 - 20 FEB 1966 INCLUSIVE, CONDUCT CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS IN RZ'S 2 AND 3 AND THAT PORTION OF RZ-4 (CHU LAI) WEST OF GRID LINE 55 EMPHASIZING CRITICAL AVENUES OF APPROACH. UTILIZE 50% OF AVAILABLE FORCES DURING THE PERIOD. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS AS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE.

DISTRIBUTION:
(PAGE ONE ONLY)

0-2
0-3
7thMar
4thMar
ReconOff
3rdReconBn
ReconGroupAlpha

(2)
(1)
(3)
(3)
(1)
(1)
(1)

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

040600Z FEB 1966

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DATE 6 FEB 1966	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY
		ACTION				
		INFO				

FROM: CO, 3RD RECON BN
TO: CO, COMPANY C, 1ST RECON BN
RECON GROUP ALFA

OPERATION EASTERN STAR

A. 3RD MAR DIV OPO 365-66

OPO 8-66. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO SCREEN TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH ALONG HIGHWAY #1 WEST OF EASTERN STAR OBJECTIVE AREA. OBSERVE ENEMY MOVEMENT, ARMAMENT, STRENGTH, LEAVING OR ENTERING, THE OBJECTIVE AREA. RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF CO, 7TH MAR. UTILIZE TWO PLATOONS AND COMPANY COMMAND GROUP. COMMUNICATIONS DIRECT TO REGT HQ, 7TH MARINES WITH RECON GROUP ALFA MONITORING. RECON GROUP ALFA COMPILE AND SUBMIT SITREP TO THIS HQ 0600, 1000, 1500, 2100 DAILY UTILIZING BETA 13 DURING EMPLOYMENT ~ CO C (-) IN SUPPORT OF EASTERN STAR. DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED.

DISTRIBUTION:
(PAGE ONE ONLY)

CG, 3rd Mar Div (G-3)	(3)
7th Mar	(1)
ABG CHIEF (CHS LAY)	(1)
1st Mar	(1)
Recon Group Alfa	(2)
Co C, 1st Recon BN	(1)
File	(3)

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

6 FEB 1966

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 DA NANG, RVN
 180700 11 February 1966

Operation Order 9-66

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIET NAM, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheet Numbers 6559 I, II; 6559 I, III, IV; 6558 I, II; 6658 I, II; 6657 I, II; 6657 II, III, IV; 6656 I, 6756 I, IV.
- (b) BnOpO 349-65
 - (c) CO, 3rdReconBn OpO 7-66
 - (d) 3rdMainDiv OpO 365-66
 - (e) CO, 3rdReconBn OpO 8-66
 - (f) BnO 1500.1

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Reference (b).1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUM's.
- b. Friendly Forces. Reference (b).
- c. Attachments and Detachments. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein) establishes and maintains a reconnaissance network in the Division TAOR's/RZ's and conducts reconnaissance missions in the vicinity of Special Forces Camps as directed.

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operation

- (1) Reference (b).
- (2) Platoons fulfilling the screening mission will generally operate as two squad size patrols, well separated.

b. Go A

- (1) During the period 18-28 February 1966 inclusive, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in or WEST of RZ-3. Be prepared to utilize 2/3 of available forces during the period 18-23 February 1966.

--1--

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ENCLOSURE (7)

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- (2) On order, be prepared to conduct infantry reinforced operations in the Elephant Valley area.

c. Co C

- (1) During the period 18-25 February 1966 inclusive, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in RZ-5. Utilize 1/2 of available forces during the period 18-23 February 1966.
- (2) During the period 26 February - 2 March 1966, conduct training in basic reconnaissance skills. You will be guided by the provisions of reference (f).

d. Co D

- (1) During the period 16-28 February 1966 inclusive, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in and WEST of RZ-4. Be prepared to utilize 2/3 of available forces during the period 18-23 February 1966.
- (2) During the period 26 February - 2 March 1966 inclusive, conduct reconnaissance operations with one platoon in RZ-5 (DA NANG).

e. Recon Group Alfa. During the period 18-28 February 1966, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in RZ's 2 & 3 and that portion of RZ-4 (CHU LAI) WEST of grid line 55. Utilize 2/3 of available forces during the period 18-23 February 1966.

- (1) Co B. Be prepared on order to relocate by increments to Camp Reasoner, RVN.
- (2) Co C, 1st Recon Bn
- (a) Reference (c).
- (b) Be prepared on order to execute reference (e).

f. 1st Force Recon Co. Conduct reconnaissance missions as directed during the period 18-28 February 1966.g. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Fire support and infantry reinforcement requirements will be effected by direct liaison with cognizant Regimental Commanders.
- (2) Submit company employment schedules for the required period by 201900H. Company C submit special training schedule by 231900H.

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- (3) Coordinate all missions with cognizant Regimental Commanders
- (4) EEI's: Annex A to reference (b).
- (5) Submit helicopter requirements and operation orders to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) not later than 48 hours prior to commencement of missions
- (6) Use varying means and times of entry and exit. Halo landing zones will normally be no closer than 3000 meters to objective area.
- (7) Submit patrol roster to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) prior to execution of assigned missions. (DA NANG Only).
- (8) Cause patrol leaders to report to Battalion S-2 or the Company debriefing officer at CHU IAI immediately on return to the unit area for debriefing.
- (9) Be prepared to call and adjust artillery fire.
- (10) Be prepared to insert and/or extract by foot.
- (11) If an air strike is requested and approved, display a single red panel at position when aircraft are on station.
- (12) Be prepared to recommend infantry exploitation or reinforcement and suitable primary and alternate landing zones for its entry.
- (13) Each company in the DA NANG enclave shall report hourly to this Headquarters, the location and situation of each element of each patrol.
- (14) At least one school trained sniper with rifle will accompany each patrol.
- (15) Any patrol out of contact for a period of six hours shall abort its mission and return to camp.
- (16) Each squad shall carry at least 2 entrenching tools. All trash and garbage will be buried and the site camouflaged. Every effort will be made to obscure all evidence of patrol passage.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Reference (b).
- b. Utilize long range patrol packet when available.

--3--

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ENCLOSURE (7)

CONFIDENTIAL5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Reference (b).
- b. Each platoon size patrol shall carry a PRC-25 for its primary means of communications. ~~Inner~~ platoon communications by PRC-10.
- c. Field relay sites will carry both primary and alternate means of communications.

R. R. Van Cleve
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Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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DISTRIBUTION

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3rdMarDiv FSCC	(1)
G-3	(3)
G-2	(1)
3rdMar	(3)
4thMar	(3)
7thMar	(2)
9thMar	(3)
12thMar	(2)
1stReconBn	(1)
ReconGrpAlpha	(3)
1stForceReconCo	(3)
CommO	(1)
Bn Supply O	(1)
Co A	(3)
Co C	(3)
Co D	(3)
File	(15)
<hr/>	
TOTAL	53

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(ENCLOSURE (7))

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Copy no 53 of 53 copies
 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
 DA NANG, RVN
 8 February 1966

Operation Order 10-66

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIET NAM, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheet Numbers 6559 I, II; 6659 I, III, IV; 6558 I, II; 6658 I, II; 6657 I, II; 6757 II, III, IV; 6656 I, 6756 I, IV.
- (b) BnOpO 349-65 w/Ch 1
 - (c) BnOpO 5-66
 - (d) CO, 3rdReconBn OpO 8-66
 - (e) BnO 1500.1
 - (f) BnOpO 9-66

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Reference (b).

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUM's.
- b. Friendly Forces. Reference (b).
- c. Attachments and Detachments. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein) establishes and maintains a reconnaissance network in the Division TAOR's/RZ's in the DA NANG and CHU LAI enclaves and conducts reconnaissance/infantry reinforced operations against VC forces beyond the TAOR's.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation

- (1) Reference (b).
- (2) Platoons fulfilling the screening mission will generally operate as two squad size patrols, well separated.

b. Co A

- (1) During the period 1-15 March 1966 inclusive, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in or WEST of RZ-3. Utilize 1/3 of available forces for operations.
- (2) On order, be prepared to conduct infantry reinforced operations in the Elephant Valley area in accordance with reference (c).

--1--

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 ENCLOSURE (8)

C O N F I D E N T I A Lc. Co C

- (1) During the period 3-15 March 1966 inclusive, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in RZ-5. Utilize 1/3 of available forces for operations.
- (2) During the period 4-8 March inclusive, conduct reconnaissance operations with one platoon in RZ-4 (DA NANG).

d. Co D

- (1) During the period 9-15 March 1966 conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in and WEST of RZ-4. Utilize 1/3 of available forces for operations.
- (2) During the period 4-8 March 1966, conduct training in basic reconnaissance skills. Be guided by the provisions of reference (e).

e. Recon Group Alfa. During the period 1-15 March 1966, conduct continuous operations in RZ's 2 and 3 and that portion of RZ-4 (CHU LAI) WEST of grid line 55. Operate in the expanded RZ SOUTH of GL 15 but within supporting artillery range. Utilize 40% of available forces.

- (1) Co B. Be prepared on order to relocate by increments to Camp Reasoner, RVN.
- (2) Co C (-) (Rein) 1st Recon Bn. Be prepared on order to execute reference (d).

f. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Fire support and infantry reinforcement requirements will be effected by direct liaison with cognizant Regimental Commanders.
- (2) Submit company employment schedules for the required period by 271900H. Company D submit special training schedule by 1900H, 1 March 1966.
- (3) Coordinate all missions with cognizant Regimental Commanders.
- (4) EEI's: Annex A to reference (b).
- (5) Submit helicopter requirements and operation orders to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) not later the 48 hours prior to commencement of missions.
- (6) Use varying means and times of entry and exit. Helo landing zones will normally be no closer than 3000 meters to objective area.

--2--

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (8)

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- (7) Submit patrol roster to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) prior to execution of assigned missions. (DA NANG Only).
- (8) Cause patrol leaders to report to Battalion S-2 or the company debriefing officer at CHU LAI immediately on return to the unit area for debriefing.
- (9) Be prepared to call and adjust artillery fire. Make personal liaison with 12th Marines (S-3) for artillery coordination.
- (10) Be prepared to insert and/or extract by foot.
- (11) If an air strike is requested and approved, display a single red panel at position when aircraft are on station.
- (12) Be prepared to recommend infantry exploitation or reinforcement and suitable primary and alternate landing zones for its entry.
- (13) Each company in the DA NANG enclave shall report hourly to this Headquarters, the location and situation of each element of each patrol.
- (14) At least one school trained sniper with rifle will accompany each patrol.
- (15) Any patrol out of contact for a period of six hours shall abort its mission and return to camp.
- (16) Each squad will carry at least 2 entrenching tools. All trash and garbage will be buried and the site camouflaged. Every effort will be made to obscure all evidence of patrol passage.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Reference (b).
- b. Utilize long range patrol packet when available.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Reference (b).
- b. Each platoon size patrol shall carry a PRC-25 for its primary means of communications. Inner platoon communications by PRC-10.
- c. Field relay sites will carry both primary and alternate means of communications.

--3--

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (8)

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d. Utilize battalion brevity code as promulgated by reference (b).



R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION

1stMAW	(1)
ADC CmdGrp (CHU LAI)	(1)
3rdMarDiv FSCC	(1)
G-3	(3)
G-2	(1)
3rdMar	(3)
4thMar	(3)
7thMar	(2)
9thMar	(3)
12thMar	(2)
1stReconBn	(1)
ReconGrpAlfa	(3)
1stForceReconCo	(3)
CommO	(1)
BnSupply O	(1)
Co A	(3)
Co C	(3)
Co D	(3)
File	(15)
<hr/>	
TOTAL	53

--4--

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (8)

S - 3

Operation Order: 6-66
 Patrol: 3d Plt. Co A
 Debriefer: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
 Map Sheet: 6659 III, 6559 II

Copy No 22 of 30 Copies
 3d Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 03930H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (1) Off, (14) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None.
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 25, (2) AN/PRC 10's.
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) 7x50 binoculars
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: (1) S.I.D. (Sizematic Intrusion Device)
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (1) M-79

2. MISSION: Conduct day and night undetected land reconnaissance to locate Viet Cong campsites, storage areas, communication routes and signs of activity; capture and return to U. S. Control VC or VCS (SNATCH); establish day OP's and selective night ambush positions (SNAP) within the assigned patrol area.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 290800H/030830H February 1966

4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS: 96 hours of patrolling in the northwestern portion of the RZ resulted in negative sightings of friendly and enemy personnel. Within this period, 5 new trails not presently illustrated on the map were recorded. One trail contained 8 large pits, and another, fragments from a downed aircraft. In addition, 2 VC Campsites were found uninhabited. The patrol discovered 3 well kept cultivated areas as indicated in the terrain analysis.

b. ENEMY:

(1) On the 30th of January 1966 the patrol utilized a trail in grid square (AT 8081), and (AT 8080). The trail ran generally from the northeast to the southwest. (Refer to Overlay) Found along its axis, and centered on the trail, were 8 large pits rectangular in shape and approximately 10 feet long, 6 feet wide, and 20 feet deep. The largest pit was 40 feet deep. The pits were free of panji stakes and the top soil had been removed. Timbers which had been used as revetments were rotted. The pits had been excavated approximately 4 to 5 years ago.

ENCLOSURE (9th)CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) 301200H, (AT 801808) the patrol located an old VC campsite approximately 30 meters in diameter. Within its periphery, were 6 matted down areas and 4 recently used camp fires. On the southwest face of the hill (AT 801806) 4 areas had been cleared for fields of fire. The fan for these fields of fire were approximately 45 degrees and covered the south, and western approaches for 50 meters. The area was well policed after having been used approximately one week prior to its discovery.

(3) 311630H, (ZC 207811), the patrol located a well used trail 1 meter wide. (Refer to Overlay) Fresh foot prints approximately 7 hours old were found along its axis. The tracks went in a northerly direction. The trail was free of booby traps and trail markers.

(4) 020845H, (ZC 200817), the patrol located a VC encampment. Within its enclave was a large dwelling constructed of saplings 15x15x8 feet the roof thatched with Banana leaves. The interior contained a sleeping platform 1 foot off the ground, and the area was littered with broken bottles, cooking utensils, discarded sandals, and burned BA-30's. The immediate area around this dwelling contained 8 animal pens approximately 4 feet square. No animals occupied these pens. Indications are, this camp had not been used for several months.

c. TERRAIN:

(1) 011100H, (ZC 207815), the patrol discovered 330 yards of terraced dry crops. The area was well maintained and cultivated. The entire periphery was fenced with a four foot fence made of posts 4 to 6 inches in diameter connected by rails 4 to 6 inches in diameter. (Refer to sketch)

(2) 011300H, (ZC 207817), the patrol discovered a tea plot approximately 500 meters square. The tea plots had been cultivated on a steep slope at these coordinates. The tea plants were 4 feet high and appeared to have been well taken care of. A fence previously mentioned had been constructed around its periphery.

(3) 021630H, (ZC 197817), the patrol observed a well cultivated field which had been plowed a few days before. The following day, when the patrol returned to the same location for helicopter retraction they noted fresh humis had been placed over the plowed area, which indicated the field had been worked that night. A wide rail fence constructed of logs enclosed the field.

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ENCLOSURE (7)

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6. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. 011430H, (ZC 208818), the patrol located an extremely well used trail generally running northwest, to southeast. The trail was 1 meter wide and fragments of an unidentified aircraft littered the area for 300 meters. Radio and photographic equipment were not discovered. Large portions of the fragments found were twisted and burned. It was evident that indigenous personnel had dismantled and cut portions of the aircraft. It was noted that in a field portions of a jet tail pipe assembly was being utilized as a scare crow.

b. 011530H, (ZC 208818), an empty sardine can was found near the vicinity of a trail. Portions of the oil were still in the can indicating someone had eaten the contents within the last 48 hours. The sardines had been imported from Portugal and distribution was by Guaraldo and Brothers in San Francisco, California.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No visual or physical contact made.

8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale good.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Conclusions:

a. The cultivated area around coordinates (ZC 2081) is supplying a permanent establishment of some type. Aerial photographs of 28 July 1965 show that the area was worked at that time. The size unit can not be estimated at the present time.

b. The cultivated areas are being worked at night to avoid possible observation by U. S. Aircraft.

Recommendations:

a. It is recommended that further surveillance be conducted in this area to ascertain the size, type, exact location and activity of the unit working in this area.

b. Recommended that an aerial photograph mission be flown over that area and the area to the north of the SONG CA DE Valley (Elephant Valley).

J. LATEERRA
1st Lt. Co. A

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: Concur with patrol leader.


ENCLOSURE (7)

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
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Map Corrections:
Patrol: 3d Flt. Co. A
Map Sheet: 6659 III, 6559 II

83 ——— 19



PATROL ROUTE




ENCLOSURE (7)

DECLASSIFIED

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FENCE SIMILAR TO THIS AROUND
CULTIVATED AREAS.



ENCLOSURE (9)

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

S-3

Operation Order: 8-66
 Patrol: 1st Platoon, Co. A
 Debriefing: 1st Lt E.W. Nash
 Map Sheet: 6658 IV, Ser. L-70L

Copy No 7 of 38 Copies
 3d Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 061100H February 1966

PATROL REPORT1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- A. COMPOSITION: (14) Enl USMC, (2) Enl USN, (1) ARVN.
- B. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None
- C. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 25, (2) AN/PRC 10.
- D. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (1) 7x50 Binoculars.
- E. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None
- F. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (2) M-79, (2) Pump Shotguns.

2. MISSION: Conduct day and night undetected land reconnaissance to locate Viet Cong campsites, storage areas, communication routes and signs of activity; capture and return to U. S. Control VC or VCS (SNATCH); establish day OP's and selective night ambush positions (SNAP) within the assigned patrol areas from 3-7 February 1966.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 030800H/061000H February 1966

4. ROUTE: See Patrol Route Overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS: During the 74 hours of operation two suspected Viet Cong were contacted and fired upon with negative results.

b. ENEMY:

(1) 032000H, (AT 837791), met two men moving North to South on trail. Men turned and ran North. Patrol opened fire and pursued. Negative contact.

c. TERRAIN: None.

6. OTHER INFORMATION: 031130H, patrol heard a fire fight which lasted for about two hours in the vicinity of Hill 32 (AT 8780).

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: Negative results.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

DECLASSIFIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

8. CONDITION OF PATROL: One man evacuated with itching sensation of unknown origin. One man returned with high fever. Condition otherwise good.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.


H. R. LEFTHAND
SGT 1st Plt. Co. A

11. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: None.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (VA)

DECLASSIFIED



LEGEND

- PATROL ROUTE
- 30 Checkpoint
- LZ 0 LANDING ZONE
- Δ OBSERVATION POST

PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY

1st Platoon, Company A
 3-6 FEB 1966
 MAP SHEET 6658 IV
 EWSN

ENCLOSURE (b)

89

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Operation Order: 9-66
Patrol: 3rd Plt. Co. A
Debriefing: 1stLt. E.W. NASH
Map Sheet: 6558 I, Ser. L-701

5-3
Copy No 13 of 30 Copy
3rd Reconnaissance Bn.
DANANG, RVN
221830H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (1) Off, (14) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None.
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 10, (1) AN/PRC 25
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) 7x50's.
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: M-79, Stoner LMG

2. MISSION: To conduct an area reconnaissance in the vicinity in and around (ZC 2081) and to attempt the capture and return to U.S. Control of enemy or suspected enemy.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 201400H/221830H February 1966

4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS: 52 continuous hours of patrolling resulted in one sighting of (3) Vietnamese men and one contact with a minimum of 65 Viet Cong and an estimated 80-90. Weapons of semi-automatic and automatic characteristics up to and including one 30 cal. machingun were identified. Clothing consisted of the usual black pajamas, grey and khaki uniforms. There was one confirmed VC KIA and five confirmed wounded. No USMC casualties were sustained. No enemy weapons, equipment or documents were captured.

b. ENEMY:

(1) 202000H patrol heard 4-5 rounds of semi-automatic rifle fire in the vicinity of (ZC 205814).

(2) 211400H, (ZC 207810), three Vietnamese men cutting wood in a field while the patrol moved through the brush towards the clearing. Upon arriving at the clearing the Vietnamese had moved away.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (//)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(3) 212000H, patrol again heard 4-5 rounds of semi-automatic rifle fire in vicinity of (ZC 205814).

(4) 220700H-1200H, as patrol moved South drums were heard throughout the morning to the North.

(5) 221530H-1830H, the patrol moved into their intended night position at (ZC 208806) and set into a perimeter defense (See Figure 1). It became evident that this unit had occupied the same position on a previous patrol on 1 February 1966. At this time however, panji stakes had been placed every foot in an area 50 square feet. On the Western and Northern sides of the positions the stakes were pointed inboard. A half-filled basket of unused panji stakes were also found in the area.

At approximately 1600H a heavy volume of fire utilizing K-50's and M-2 Carbines was directed at position #2 (See Figure 1) from less than 15 meters. One incoming M-26 grenade followed from a position about 10 meters distance from position #2 and exploded 5 feet from the position. No friendly casualties. Fire was returned by the patrol and one M-26 grenade was thrown. It was caught by a Viet Cong about 10 meters away and thrown back into position #2 where it exploded. No friendly casualties. They continued to return fire wounding one Viet Cong. Another M-26 was thrown by the men in position #2 wounded another Viet Cong. The latter began to yell in broken English, "GORPSMAN", "YANKEE GO HOME", "YANKEE GET OUT OF VIETNAM", and "LONG LIVE VIETNAM". All Viet Cong seen thus far wore black pajamas. The patrol continued to return fire.

At this time (2) M-2 Carbines opened up on position #3 from about 20 meters away. More than 100 rounds were fired from each weapon. Fire was returned and the two Viet Cong attempted to flee but were both cut down, wounded, and possibly killed.

Semi-automatic weapon fire from an M-1, Mauser or MAS 36 began coming from down hill into position #4. One M-14 and one Stoner light machinegun began returning fire. The Stoner jammed after 20 rounds and then intermittantly thereafter until extraction.

The second assault came from across the stream and consisted of five to seven minutes of heavy automatic weapons fire covering the entire patrol base and pinning down all hands. There was then three or four rounds of a heavy semi-automatic weapon after which the assault ceased. After waiting approximately five minutes the patrol began moving in the direction of the LZ. Large, thick blotches of blood were found along the trail. The Viet Cong sniped at the rear of the column as the patrol moved towards the LZ.

The patrol was in the LZ by 1700H at which time they received 4-5 rounds from the left flank to the Southwest. The M-79 was fired into the area and one Viet Cong wearing black fell out of a tree from about 50 feet up.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (1)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

A column of Viet Cong were spotted moving toward the patrol from the North at (ZC 205813). They numbered 30 or more and as they moved to about 500 meters from the patrol they deployed on line and began firing as they advanced. Besides semi-automatic and automatic weapons fire, there was at least one 30 cal. machine-gun. They were wearing grey uniforms and appeared to be wearing soft covers. HU-1E's were requested and began making passes over the area. The patrol began taking a heavy volume of automatic fire from their right flank to the East. At this time as two UH-34's began to make their descent into the LZ a Viet Cong ran to the center of the LZ firing point blank at the first Helicopter. The point shot and killed him. He wore black pajamas. The patrol then noticed 5-10 Viet Cong firing as they attacked from the South. They were dressed in khaki uniforms. The helicopters were taking fire from 360 degrees as they made the extraction. The HU-1E's continued to provide effective covering fire for the pick-up and it was completed at 221830H.

c. TERRAIN:

(1) Several foot paths approximately 18 inches wide were found throughout the area. All had been freshly used by large numbers of people. A few heavy animal prints probably of cows were noted on the trails. All tracks appeared less than 48 hours old.

(2) A fence which was located in the landing zone at (ZC 205817) had been torn down by the patrol on 1 February 1966. It had been repaired upon inspection on 20 February 1966.

(3) All streams are easily forded.

(4) Cultivated area had been worked since patrol was lost in area on 1 February.

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. As mentioned in paragraph 5b above, the Stoner Light Machinegun jammed several times while being fired.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: (1) enemy KIA and (5) WIA.

8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale good.

9. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Conclusion:

(1) The unit contacted was a well trained, well disciplined unit of at least a company size. Morale seems to be high.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (1)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

(2) Large cultivated area indicates food supply for large number of personnel. Area adequate for battalion size unit.

(3) Village or housing area nearby.

Recommend:

(1) Immediate reaction to information in the form of TPQ missions and ground operations in this area.

J. LATERRA
1stLt Co. A

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: Probably main force unit of battalion size. Unit unidentified.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED







Figure 1



LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
<p>● LZ - LANDING ZONE</p>	<p>SCAT 3 ALFA</p> <p>MAP SHEET: 6659III & 6559II</p> <p>SER: L-701.</p>

ENCLOSURE (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Order: 10-66
 Patrol: 2nd Plt. Co. A
 Debriefing: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
 Map Sheet: 6659 III, Ser. L-701

Copy No. 16 of 26 Copies
 3rd Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 010930H February 1966
 March

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (15) Enl, (2) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None.
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 25, (1) AN/PRC 10
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (1) pr. 6x30's, (1) pr. 7x50's
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (1) Stoner Machine Gun, (1) M-79, (1) Shotgun (12 gauge)

2. MISSION: Conduct day and night undetected land reconnaissance to locate Viet Cong campsites, storage areas, communication routes and signs of activity; capture and return to U. S. control VC or VCS (SNATCH); establish day OP's and selective night ambush positions (SNAP) within the assigned patrol areas.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 240930H/010830H February 1966

4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS: 120 hours of patrolling and surveillance in RZ #3 resulted in negative sightings and findings of enemy and friendly activity. Elephant tracks 30 hours old were discovered along the patrol route indicating recent activity.

b. ENEMY: No visual or physical contact made.

c. TERRAIN: No new terrain characteristics were recorded.

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. 270800H, (AT 802790), the patrol discovered numerous elephant tracks generally running Southeast down a ridge line, then turned North-east to (AT 806789), and continued to follow another ridge line to (AT 814792). On reaching this point, the tracks became obscure and traces were lost. It was believed that the tracks had been made by 2 or possibly 3 elephants. The tracks were estimated to be 30 hours old. Fresh elephant dung was visible along portions of the trail.

b. The Stoner Machine Gun, M-79, and shot gun were not required to be utilized.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No visual or physical contact made.

8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale fair.


9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

ENCLOSURE (12)**CONFIDENTIAL**

R. J. BOYDA
 SGT Co. A

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: None.

CONFIDENTIAL



LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
△ OBSERVATION POST	PATROL: 2nd Plt. Co. A SHEET: 6659 III SERIES: L-701
O LZ LANDING ZONE	

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Order: 8-66
 Patrol: 2d Lt. Co. C
 Debriefed: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
 Map Sheet: 6658 IV

Copy No 16 of 30 Copies
 3d Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 061200H February 1966

PATROL REPORT**1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:**

- a. COMPOSITION: (18) Enl, (1) USN (1) ARVN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None.
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (2) AN/PRC 25, (2) AN/PRC 10's
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) pr. 7x50's, (2) pr. 6x30's
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: None.

2. MISSION: Conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in RZ#5 DANANG emphasizing surveillance of SONG VU GIA and Mortar Valley avenues of approaches.**3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 021230H/061120H February 1966****4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay.****5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:**

a. SYNOPSIS: 120 hours of continuous surveillance in RZ#5 resulted in negative sightings of enemy activity. Hill 419 (AT 867626) was found to be heavily infested with old and new pengi stakes. One booby trap was deactivated and buried at this location. 2 men required Helo evacuation for noncombatant wounds. 10 sightings totaling 37 indigenous personnel were recorded as friendly activity and no unusual occurrences were noted.

b. ENEMY: No physical or visual contact made.

c. TERRAIN: No new characteristics were recorded.

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. It was noted that woodcutters are presently moving further north along the slopes of the NUI SON GA Hill masses.

b. 021315H, (AT 867626), one booby trap was located near the topographical crest of hill 419. A trip wire had been attached to a ChiCom grenade. The mine was unarmed and buried by members of the patrol.

ENCLOSURE 
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c. Normal working routines were observed being conducted by local inhabitants in the village and rice paddy complexes.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No physical or visual contact made.
8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale good, two men required Helo evacuation. Condition good.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Recommend: That the trail complex in grid square (AT 8761) generally running East and West be reconnoitered in the future for possible VC activity.


R. THOMPSON
SGT 2d Plt. Co. C

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: Concur with the patrol leaders comments.

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ENCLOSURE 

DECLASSIFIED



LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
<p>—— PATROL ROUTE</p> <p>LZ O LANDING ZONE</p> <p>RLZ O RECOVERY LANDING ZONE</p>	<p>2ND PLATOON, COMPANY C</p> <p>8-6 FEB 1966.</p> <p>MAP SHEET 665812</p> <p>GMR</p> <p>ENCLOSURE (✓)</p>

CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Order: 9-66
 Patrol: 1st Plt. Co. C
 Debriefing: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
 Map Sheet: 6658 IV, Ser. L-701

5-3
 Copy No. 14 of 30 Copies
 3rd Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 221845H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (16) Enl, (2) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None.
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (2) AN/PRC 25
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (1) M-49 Scope, (4) pr. 7x50's
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None
- f. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: (1) M-1 Sniper Rifle.

2. MISSION: Conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ #5, DANANG, emphasizing surveillance of SONG VU GIA and Mortar Valley avenues of approach.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 181730H/221800H February 1966

4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS: 96 hours of continuous surveillance in RZ #5 resulted in 4 VC sightings numbering 21 VC. It was further noted that friendly activity has increased on the Northwestern slopes of the NUI-SON-GA. 2 artillery missions were requested with excellent effects on both missions resulting in possibly 14 VC wounded or killed.

b. ENEMY:

(1) 221110H, (AT 836597), 2 men and 4 women wearing mixed clothing were proceeding Southeast down a trail carrying packs, with bushes attached to the upper portions of their torsos. No weapons were visible. Visual contact was lost when the VC crossed a ridge line.

(2) 201150H, (AT 836596), 10 VC armed with rifles and packs with bushes attached to their bodies were first observed moving down a trail wearing mixed clothing, straw hats, jungle covers, and pith

ENCLOSURE (4)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

helmts. At (AT 836596) they left the trail and were noted taking a break. On this occasion a fire mission was requested with excellent effects on the target. After the cease fire, the area was observed for a period of 2 hours. No activity or movement was detected.

(3) 221235H, (AT 827604), 4 VC were noted occupying an OP position wearing black pajamas and straw hats. 1 weapon was noted. Artillery was requested with excellent effect on target. No further movement was detected.

(4) 221350H, (AT 836597), 1 VC was observed moving Southwest on a trail, wearing green utilities a jungle cover carrying a pack with brush used as a camouflage means protruding from the pack. The VC was armed with a rifle. On reaching the vicinity where a fire mission had previously been called on 10 VC he briefly paused and then rapidly fled towards the West.

c. TERRAIN: New terrain characteristics were not observed.

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. It was noted that small groups of indigenous personnel are presently working the Northwestern foothills of the NUI-SON-GA hill masses in grid squares (AT 8658), (AT 8759), and (AT 8860).

b. 200740H, (AT 8660) and (AT 8760), 78 people wearing mixed clothing were noted carrying baskets, cutting tools and yolk sticks. They later broke off into 2 groups and then were observed cutting saplings, bundling the wood and then burned the brush. Some generally vacated the area at 1200, others at 1700.

c. 202000H, (AT 916581) a fire fight and tracer rounds were observed and heard from this vicinity for a duration of 10 minutes.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No physical contact made.

8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Excellent, morale excellent.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Recommend: That H & I fires be conducted at night on a trail complex generally running Southeast from (AT 827605) to (AT 845580).


J. J. KENNEDY
SSGT Co. C

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: Concur with patrol leader's recommendation.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE *W*

DECLASSIFIED



LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
LZ - LANDING ZONE	SCAT 1 ● HARLEY
● - CHECK POINTS	MAP SHEET: 6658IV
▲ - OBSERVATION POST	SER: L-701.

ENCLOSURE 14

Operation Order: 10-66
 Patrol: 2nd Plt, Co. C.
 Debriefer: SSGT R.P. REGANOT
 Map Sheet: 6658 IV

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 DANANG, RVN
 251615H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (20) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 25, (1) AN/PRC 10
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (1) pr. 7x50, (2) pr. 6x30's
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (1) Stoner Machine Gun

2. MISSION: Conduct Reconnaissance operations in RZ #5, DANANG, emphasizing surveillance of Song Vu Gia and Mortor Valley avenues of approach.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 221700H/251600H February 1966

4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS: 7 1/2 hours of surveillance in RZ #5 resulted in 1 VC sighting and 1 VCS sighting numbering 4 VC and 8 VCS. Three artillery concentrations were requested. Numerous small boat activity was noted along the Song Vu Gia in grid square (AT 8355) with no unusual occurrences noted.

b. ENEMY:

(1) 231700H, (AT 831600), the patrol observed 4 VC moving North on a trail, one wearing a white top and black trousers. The others wore black pajamas. One VC was armed and no equipment was visible. Artillery registration was requested on the hill mass the VC had previously passed through. During the artillery adjustments the VC had fled towards the North and visual contact was broken. After the artillery adjustment, this registration was recorded as a concentration by the patrol leader.

(2) 241100H, (AT 828600), the patrol observed 8 VCS moving North on a trail wearing black pajamas. No weapons or equipment were noted.

ENCLOSURE (15)

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During this sighting the VCS moved into a wooded area and visual contact was broken. A artillery registration was requested from the previous concentration to cover the trail complex on which the 8 VCS had been observed. After adjustments, effects on the trail were good and recorded as a concentration.

c. TERRAIN:

(1) One trail presently not shown on the map was recorded.

6. OTHER INFORMATION: No opportunity to fire the Stoner Machine Gun was encountered.
7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No physical contact made.
8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale good.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

A. C. HYMER
SGT Co. C

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: None.

ENCLOSURE (K)

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84
61



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MAP CORRECTIONS

NEW TRAIL NOT PRESENTLY SHOWN ON MAP.
MAP: VIETNAM: 1-50,000
SHEET: 6658IV, SER L-701.

ENCLOSURE (15)

DECLASSIFIED



LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
<p>O - LANDING ZONE</p> <p>— PATROL ROUTE</p>	<p>SCAT 2 CHARLEY</p> <p>MAP: VIETNAM 1:50,000</p> <p>SHEET: 6658IV</p> <p>SER L-701.</p>

ENCLOSURE (5)

5-3

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Operation Order: 10-66
Patrol: 3rd Plt. Co. C.
Debriefed: E.W. NASH
Map Sheet: 6658 IV

Copy No 18 of 26 Copies
3rd Reconnaissance Bn.
DANANG, RVN
261600H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:
 - a. COMPOSITION: (1) Off, (17) USMC En., (2) USN
 - b. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None
 - c. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT: (3) AN/PRC 10, (1) AN/PRC 25
 - d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) M-49 Scope, (2) 7x50, (3) 6x30
 - e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
 - f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (1) M-60, (2) M-79's.
2. MISSION: Conduct reconnaissance in RZ #5, DANANG, emphasizing surveillance of Song Vu Gia and Mortor Valley avenues of approach.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 221600H/260930H February 1966
4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay
5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - a. SYNOPSIS: During 87 1/2 hours of continuous operations in RZ #5 this patrol made one contact with two VC. No friendly or enemy casualties were sustained. (8) huts were located in (5) harbor or campsites, (1) cave and (3) bunkers were found but none were destroyed. Two packs were captured and contents destroyed. One writing from a house was copied and recovered.
 - b. ENEMY:
 - (1) 241000H, (AT 847622), harbor site abandoned six months to a year.
 - (2) 241600H, (AT 839624), ahut made of rough sawn boards held together with notch and peg type connection. The hut measured 8 feet x 18 feet and contained two wooden storage bins measuring 6 feet x 8 feet x 6 feet which were thus far unused. There was writing on the building as shown on copies forwarded to division G-2. An attempt was made to destroy the building with a W.P. grenade but was not successful.

ENCLOSURE (7)

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) 250945H, (AT 833627), harbor site accommodating (10-12) men. It consisted of one rotting and deteriorating hut measuring 8 feet x 18 feet and about 5 feet high. The ground had been levelled around the hut and logs abutted the circumference of the building at its base. A path led to the Southwest to an empty cave about 10 meters distant.

(4) 251000H, (AT 832628), large camp containing five permanent dwellings. One was 30 feet x 15 feet with sleeping racks off the ground and would accommodate approximately (30) people. One was 25 feet x 15 feet and would accommodate approximately (20) people. Two were 15 feet x 8 feet, but one of these was collapsed. The other had a table, sleeping mat, overhead storage rack and would accommodate approximately (6) people. 100 meters to the Northeast was one house measuring 40 feet x 15 feet and accommodating approximately (40) people. It had a small storage bin 4 feet x 2 1/2 feet x 3 feet. Rice hulls, civilian flashlight batteries (Size D) and empty cans including one five gallon can were found in the area. Outside both areas were constructed small tables made of sticks and held together by vines. They measured 4 feet x 2 feet x 3 feet.

(5) 251045H, (AT 834628), at this point on the trail a small two inch high medicine-type bottle was found suspended by a watch-type chain to a limb. It was filled partially with a clear fluid and covered by a black cap. A yellow device was tied on the inside of the cap and what appeared to be an old shoe string hung into the fluid.

(6) 251230H, (AT 837630), while the patrol was situated in an assembly area two Vietnamese came into sight moving uphill to the Southwest. Each had a pack and a weapon. Both weapons appeared to be submachine guns. They spotted each other simultaneously and the Recon patrol fired first. The enemy dropped their packs and ran into the brush. Patrol pursued but lost contact. Each of the packs were recovered and contained a five gallon can filled with small 4 inch fish and cooking oil of some type and five pounds of rice. It was all destroyed.

(7) (AT 835632), a small trail running Southwest to Northeast. Two well camouflaged positions measuring 3 feet x 2 feet x 3 feet were situated on the West side of the trail.

(8) (AT 836633), large rock with a small two-man bunker built of rocks packed with mud at its base. Aperture faced East down the stream and trail.

(9) (AT 837636), the hill mass at this point is covered with panji stakes, about one per 1 1/2 square feet. At East end of hill mass there is a post and rail fence. It is 3 feet high and about 30 meters long. The posts are 14 feet apart and there are 3 rails 1 foot apart.

ENCLOSURE (6)

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(10) (AT 841638), panji stakes and small foot traps extended from here to (AT 835635). Some of the foot traps were lined with stakes and some were not and were situated every 20 feet along the trail. at 100 meters intervals there are man traps 3 feet x 3 feet x 4 feet lined with panji stakes and covered with a camouflage covering.

b. TERRAIN:

(1) (AT 858633), house which is plotted at this position on map is situated as shown but it appears to be abandoned.

(2) (AT 835635 - AT 851638), with the exception of the site prepared by the patrol (AT 850638), there are no suitable landing sites. This one is suitable for one UH-34.

(3) Other landing Zones are located as follows:

(AT 850620)	1	UH-34
(AT 855621)	2	UH-34's
(AT 859622)	1	UH-34
(AT 862623)	1	UH-34

(4) (AT 846623), streambed is a good avenue of approach to the highground.

(5) (AT 8463), good OP sites for observation to the North are located in this grid square.

(6) (AT 839624), the trail continues to the Southwest. Several small trails branch to either side but they end after a brief distance.

(7) (AT 835635), trail junction with one main East - West trail on ridge and a well used trail going from this point North.

(8) The canopy in most of the area shown on the map as heavy vegetation is 80 - 100 feet.

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. (AT 854636), one hole 6 feet x 4 feet at top and 6 feet x 2 feet at bottom and 16 feet deep. Not used for at least two months.

b. (AT 853637), one hole 4 feet x 4 feet x 3 1/2 feet at least two months old.

c. (AT 851638), series of three small rectangular shaped holes 1 foot x 1 foot x 1 foot.

ENCLOSURE (1/6)

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- d. (AT 854637), dogs were heard barking and chickens were heard crowing in this area throughout the duration of the patrol.
 - e. (AT 852638), an artillery concentration was registered.
 - f. (AT 836629), it was evident that this was the area that the boards referred to in 6a(2) were prepared.
- 7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: Captured two packs.
 - 8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale good.
 - 9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

T. C. CARTER
1stLt. Co. C

- 10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: None.

ENCLOSURE (1)

82

64

3 CHARLEY 1

3 CHARLEY 2

LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
<p>_____ - PATROL ROUTE</p> <p>● - LANDING ZONE</p>	<p>3 CHARLEY</p> <p>MAP: VIETNAM, 1-50,000</p> <p>SHEET: 6658IV</p> <p>SER: L-701.</p>

87

82
64

—

LEGEND	MAP CORRECTIONS
<p>--- -- NEW TRAIL</p>	<p>NEW TRAIL PRESENTLY NOT SHOWN ON MAP. MAP: VIETNAM, 1-50,000 SHEET: 6658IV SER: L-701.</p>

6
87

ENCLOSURE (16)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Operation Order: 4-66
 Patrol: 1st Plt. Co. D
 Debriefing: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
 Map Sheet: 6658 IV, Ser. L-701

Copy No 15 of 30 Copies
 3d Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 051830H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:
 - a. COMPOSITION: (1) Off, (15) Enl, (2) USN, (1) ARVN
 - b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENT: None,
 - c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 25, (1) AN/PRC 10
 - d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) pr. 7x50
 - e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
 - f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (2) M-79, (1) Shotgun 12 guage
2. MISSION: Conduct continuous Reconnaissance in RZ #4, to determine extent of enemy activity.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 271500H/051700H February 1966
4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay.
5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - a. SYNOPSIS: 216 hours of patrolling in RZ #4 resulted in the patrol making 11 contacts with a total 52 VC. 1 VC was killed. (confirmed), and 3 wounded (possible) from small arms fire. During the 9 day patrol, 5 Marines were WIA, 2 required Helo evacuation. Along the 502 (AT 8365), and 785 (AT 8064), hill mass and trail complexes, recently constructed panji pits, stakes, and fighting holes were found in abundance. (Refer to para. (b) enemy situation) In addition, 3 huts were found unoccupied. These dwellings, as well as caves and tunnels, were destroyed by the use of demolitions.
 - b. ENEMY:

(1) 271720H, (AT 903674), as the patrol was crossing towards a dike, a grenade was thrown by a VC at a distance of 12 meters. The point man was slightly wounded by fragments and helicopter evacuated to C-Med. On the initial contact, the VC was brought under fire and killed. He did not possess a weapon and had in his possession an american made cartridge belt, M-26 grenade pins, 1 Chicom grenade, a wallet, and numerous documents. All items were returned with the wounded Marine to Division G-2. Two other VC who were seen in the same vicinity (unarmed) were taken under fire but successfully

ENCLOSURE ✓C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

fled along a trail. Blood stains were observed on the trail and along the waters edge, indicating one VC had been wounded.

(2) 291400H, from (AT 837659) to (AT 822655), the patrol located newly dug panji pits and stakes along the axis of a trail. These pits and stakes were 4 or 5 days old. Approximately 40 fighting holes paralleled this trail. Generally, the holes were 2 feet deep, 4 feet long and 2 feet wide. These holes were situated on small knolls and placed near rock masses. Panji stakes were placed in front, around, and in between the holes. The area was well policed, and trees had been felled accross the trail as obstacles. Some holes were oblong in shape and could easily accomodate 2 men. It was further noted that saplings had been cut to afford fields of fire.

(3) 291430H, (AT 838658), the platoon leader and one patrol member stepped into a panji trap which inflicted minor wounds. No med. evacuation was required.

(4) 300845H to 301130H, (AT 822655), the patrol discovered that the southern portion of a trail contained numerous fighting holes and panji traps. The fighting holes had been recently dug and were naturally camouflaged among rock formations.

(5) 301000H, (AT 827656), a trail marker was found centered on the trail. The marker was circular in shape with 4 verticle shafts protruding from its circumference. The marker was constructed of bamboo.

(6) 301020H, (AT 813650), the patrol heard automatic and small arms fire, plus loud talking in the Vietnamese language from an estimated 9 or 10 VC. Artillery fire and an air strike were conducted with good effects on the target.

(7) 311210H, (AT 833654), the patrol received a heavy volume of automatic and small arms fire from an estimated 4 or 5 VC. Fire was immediately returned with no casualties sustained or inflicted.

(8) 311400H, (AT 839660), the patrol linked up with one squad from Company C, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines.

(9) 311500H, one plt. from Company C, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines received harrasing fire from the rear.

(10) 011000H, (AT 827653), Helos, attempting to resupply the recon and infantry elements received small arms fire from 5 or 6 VC. One pilot was wounded. The resupply was aborted.

(11) 011630H, (AT 832658), one VC fired an automatic weapon at the patrol. No activity was observed.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (2)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(12) 011730H, (AT 831660), 1 armed VC walked into a Marine position killed one Marine and wounding another.

(13) 020930H, (AT 825655), as the patrol was proceeding towards hill 785, they observed 9 armed VC vacating an OP towards the West. They wore black pajamas, and no head gear.

(14) 020945H, (AT 826656), the patrol was taken under sniper fire from a lone VC at a distance of 100 meters. The Plt. leader was wounded in the leg from initial round and required a helo evacuation. Evacuation was completed at 021015H. Blood stains on the trail indicated the VC sniper had been wounded when the patrol returned the fire.

(15) 021300H, (AT 825654), the patrol was taken under sniper fire from 1 VC who fired one round at a distance of 150 meters. The VC could not be observed due to the dense vegetation. No casualties were sustained.

(16) 021355H, (AT 823654), the patrol received 1 round of sniper fire from a VC wearing a blue shirt, black trousers, and long black hair. After the initial round, he fled into the brush towards the West. No casualties were sustained.

(17) 021410H, (AT 823654), the patrol discovered 3 uninhabited huts. Two huts were 20x40x18 feet, and 1 12x18x10 feet. They were constructed of bamboo and the roof was thatched with banana leaves. 1 hut was used as a sleeping area, 1 as a cooking space, and the other was a mine factory. Numerous mine molds and plates were found in its interior. These dwellings were later destroyed by demolition teams attached to Co. C, 1st Bn., 3d Marines.

(18) 031110H, (ZC 798647), contact was made with 1 unarmed VC moving north on a trail. He carried a packboard, wore a straw hat and black pajamas. He was immediately engaged by fire, but fled into the brush losing his cover in the attempt.

(19) 031120H, (ZC 793647), as the patrol was proceeding south along a trail they heard noise. At (ZC 797648) they discovered 2 bamboo poles 5½ feet long and 4 inches in circumference secured with a vine to form an apex. This pole complex straddled the trail. As the point reached this point, the patrol was taken under heavy fire from the northwest and northeast (ZC 797648) at a range of 150 meters from an estimated 1 MG, 3 automatic weapons and 5 rifles. Fire was immediately returned by the patrol and after 2½ minutes, the VC broke contact. It was estimated that 15 VC were deployed in an "L" shaped ambush. No casualties were sustained or inflicted.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE 17

CONFIDENTIAL

(20) On the 4th and 5th of February 1966, the patrol proceeded to return to the pontoon bridge at (AT 946699) (Refer to Overlay). Old punji traps were found located at (AT 8267) and (AT 8367) along a stream bed.

c. TERRAIN:

(1) a well used trail generally running from East to West for 1000 meters is approximately 1 to 2 meters wide, well used, and has a hard dirt base. (Refer to Overlay)

6. OTHER INFORMATION: None.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: (1) VC KIA (confirmed). (2) VC WIA (possible).

8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale good. 5 WIA, 2 requiring Med. evacuation. Condition fair.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Conclusion:

a. A unit, approximately two hundred in number, is presently located in the vicinity of Hill 785 (AT 807650) and the hill mass to the South and southwest. They are presently in a semi-permanent status but will probably change positions in the near future. At the time the contacts were made, the enemy seemed to be fighting a delaying action.

b. A unit going into this area in the near future can expect booby trapped trails and enemy resistance in the area surrounding Hill 502 (AT 832660), Hill 785 (AT 807650) and the area to the West.


Recommendation:

a. It is recommended that patrols be limited to platoon size or smaller when working in this and other jungle-type terrain. Larger units have much difficulty moving stealthily. Increasing size of the unit does not add appreciably to the security of the patrol due to the limited maneuver area in this type terrain.

W. J. BUHL
GYSGT 1st Plt Co. D

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: The punji traps, stakes, and fields of fire in the vicinity of Hill 502 (AT 8365) were constructed between 3 - 27 January 1966.

CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Operation Order: 5-66
 Patrol: Co. D
 Debriefer: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
 Map Sheet: 6659III, 6658IV, 6658I

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 3d Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 DTG 071800H February 66.

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (3) Off, (45) Enl, (3) USN, (2) ARVN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: (1) FAC team.
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (3) AN/PRC 25, (3) AN/PRC 10's
 (1) AN/PRC 47, (1) AN/PRC 41
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (7) pr. 7x50
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (7) L.A.W., (4) Shotgun 12 guage

2. MISSION: Reconnoiter the trail network in the BA-NA area to determine VC activity and capture VC prisoners.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 301300/071630H February 1966

4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS: 194 hours of patrolling West of RZ #4 resulted in negative sightings of enemy activity. The old French resort on BA-NA was found to be deserted and presently uninhabited. Presently the buildings are considered in fair condition and most of the roofing's have collapsed. There were no indications of recent enemy use.

b. ENEMY:

(1) No physical or visual contact was made.

c. TERRAIN:

(1) Portions of the old French road leading to the BA-NA resort, presently illustrated on the map, are in portions hard surfaced and deeply rutted. The road is approximately 12' wide. Booby traps and trail markers were not encountered.

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. At (AT793705), it was noted that 15 hasty shelters had been constructed near a building. Stakes which had been driven in the ground to support a poncho or tarp were still standing. These stakes had been made from small saplings. These shelters may have been used 6 months ago.

b. Few old French C-ration cans were found scattered in the BA-NA resort complex.

c. At (ZG195705), numerous small fire pits possibly 6 months old were found in the hotel and telegraph office. It was further noted that the inscriptions 7-2-64, had been engraved into the face of a cut on the road.

d. Flumes, 6' deep, 2' wide and in some areas 50' long carried trapped rain water to the resorts buildings. Individuals using these flumes would easily be concealed from air observation.

ENCLOSURE (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

e. 031100H, (ZC208705), numerous elephant tracks and dung were located near a building. The tracks and dung were estimated to be 5 to 6 months old.

f. 071300H, (AT905667), a VC booby trap partially buried was disarmed and destroyed by the use of an M-26 grenade. After it's destruction, it was noted that fragments of wood were in the hole.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No visual or physical contact was made.
8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, moral excellent. 1 ARVN required helo evacuation for exhaustion. Condition good.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Recommendation:

a. That a future reconnaissance be conducted along the Song Lo Dong valley complex from grid square (AT8167) East to (AT7966) West.

Conclusion;

a. That the French resort at BA-NA is not currently harboring VC elements or units as presently reported in recent I-Corps Insums. It was however evident, that the VC may have utilized the BA-NA complex 5 to 6 months prior as indicated by the shelters, camp fires, and elephant tracks.


G. V. BEST JR.
1st Lt. Co. D

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: Concur with the patrol leaders recommendations and conclusions.

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ENCLOSURE (18)

LEGEND	
—	PATROL ROUTE
HLP	HELD LANDING POINT
HLS	HELD LANDING SITE
PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY	
Company D.	
5-6 FEB 1966	
MAP SHEETS 665941, 665881	
65581	
GMR.	



DECLASSIFIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Operation Order: 7-
Patrol: 1st Plt, Co. D
Debriefing: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
Map Sheet: 6659III, Ser. L-701

Copy 4 of 30 Copies
3d Reconnaissance Bn.
DANANG, RVN
091700H February 1966

PATROL ROUTE

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (10) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENT: None.
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 25, (1) AN/PRC 10
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) pr. 7x50
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (1) Sniper rifle W/8 power scope.

2. MISSION: 1st Platoon, Company D establish OP's to provide reconnaissance surveillance of the valleys paralleling the ridge line in grid square (AT 8272). The OP/OP's will be manned from 7-9 February 1966. Report VC/NVA movement in the area.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 071810/091545H February 1966

4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. SYNOPSIS: 46 hours of patrolling in RZ #4 resulted in negative sightings of enemy or friendly activity.
- b. ENEMY: No visual or physical contact made.
- c. TERRAIN: No new terrain characteristics were recorded.

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

- 1. Hill 350 in grid square (AT 8375) is considered to be an excellent terrain feature for observation post. The topographical crest of this hill is suitable for a Helicopter landing zone.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No visual or physical contact made.

8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale good.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

R. N. HOLT
SSGT. Co. D

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: None.

C O N F I D E N T I A L


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PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
SEAT 1 DELTA
MAP SHEET 6659III
SER L-701

89
+ 79



ENCLOSURE (A)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Operation Order 14-66
 Patrol: 3rd Plt. Co D
 Debriefing: SSgt. R. P. REGALOT
 MAP Sheet: 6659 III, Ser L701

Copy no 16 of 20 copies
 3rd Recon Bn
 DA NANG, RVN
 131515H February 1966


PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:
 - a. COMPOSITION: (16) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
 - b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None.
 - c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (2) AN/PRC-25's
 - d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) Pair 7 X 50
 - e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
 - f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (2) 12 Gauge shot guns.
2. MISSION: Maintain a reconnaissance screen of the DA NANG TAOR.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 101400H - 131500H.
4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay.
5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - a. Synopsis: 72 hours of surveillance in RZ-3 resulted in negative sightings of enemy or friendly activity.
 - b. Enemy: No physical or visual contact made.
 - c. Terrain: No new significant terrain characteristics were recorded.
6. OTHER INFORMATION: None.
7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No contact made.
8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, Morale Excellent.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

R. J. OLIVE
 Sgt USMC
 3rd Plt CoD

10. ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY DEBRIEFER: None. ENCLOSURE (20)

C O N F I D E N T I A L



LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
<p>———— PATROL ROUTE</p> <p>----- NEW TRAIL</p> <p>O HELO LANDING ZONE</p>	<p>CO "D" 3RD PLT</p> <p>MAP SHEET 6659</p> <p>SER L-701</p>

ENCLOSURE (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Order: 11-66
 Patrol: 2d Plt. Co. D
 Debriefers: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
 Map Sheet: 6659 III

Copy No 15 of 30 Copies
 3d Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 161500H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (13) Enl (1) USN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None.
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (2) AN/PRC 25, (1) AN/PRC 10
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) pr 7x50's binoculars
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: None.

2. MISSION: Conduct continuous surveillance in RZ #3.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 131430H/161500H February 1966

4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS: 72 hours of surveillance in RZ #3 resulted in negative sightings of friendly and enemy activity. No unusual occurrences were noted.

b. ENEMY: No visual or physical contact made.

c. TERRAIN: No new terrain characteristics were recorded.

6. OTHER INFORMATION: None.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No physical or visual contact made.

8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale excellent, (1) 2/15/66

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

G. E. RATLIFF
 SGT Co. D

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: None.

ENCLOSURE (2)



3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 131430H/161500H

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PATROL ROUTE 2 DEITA
MAP SHEET: 6659111
SER: L-701.



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ENCLOSURE (2)

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Order: 12-66
 Patrol: 3d Flt, Co. D
 Debriefing: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
 Map Sheet: 6658 IV, Ser. L-701

5-3
 Copy No. 15 of 30 Copies
 3rd Reconnaissance Bn.
 DANANG, RVN
 231915H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:
 - a. COMPOSITION: (1) Off, (17) Enl, (1) ARVN, (2) USN
 - b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None.
 - c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 10, (1) AN/PRC 25
 - d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) pr. 7x50's.
 - e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
 - f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (3) 12 guage Shot guns.
2. MISSION: Maintain the reconnaissance screen of the DANANG TAOR emphasizing the area East of the entrance to Happy Valley.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 161545H/231700H February 1966
4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay.
5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - a. SYNOPSIS: 140 hours of continuous patrolling and surveillance in RZ #3 resulted in 3 enemy sightings numbering 7 VC with 3 VC possibly seriously wounded when engaged by the patrol. 4 VC campsites were located, searched, and 2 burned and destroyed by the patrol. 2 of the VC campsites were found to have been recently occupied. A large garden and cultivated area was discovered containing numerous banana, pineapple, sweet potatoes, peppers, and potatoe roots. VC radio jamming was frequent when the patrol attempted to transmit.
 - b. ENEMY:
 - (1) 201145H, (AT 819658), 2 groups of VC were observed moving East to West on a trail. One group consisted of 2 VC, 1 wearing green utilities unarmed and carrying a pack. The other wore blue shorts and also carried a pack. No weapon was visible. The second group consisted of 5 VC, wearing black shorts and khaki shirts, and all were armed with rifles. The patrol engaged the VC possibly wounding 2. This was confirmed by large trails of blood. A search was initiated resulting in negative findings.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

c. TERRAIN: No new terrain characteristics noted.

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

(1) 201105H, (AT 823658), the patrol located 2 huts presently uninhabited near a stream bed. One hut had been used as a storage area and the other a living quarters. These huts were old and had been constructed of bamboo. There were no significant findings.

(2) 301215H, (AT 823658), the patrol entered a VC campsite which contained 5 huts constructed of bamboo and thatched with palms. On entering, they observed one VC attempting to evade through the hut complexes. He was taken under fire, but made good his escape. He wore black clothing and was unarmed. 4 of the huts were 8x10x8 feet and 1 6x3x8 feet. 3 of the huts had been utilized as living areas and the other 2 as sleeping quarters. The huts were considered old, but it was evident the campsite was or had been presently occupied. This was indicated by cooking utensils, rolls of new matting and grain being processed. The huts were destroyed by burning.

(3) 201400H, (AT 817658), the patrol located 3 huts constructed of bamboo near a stream bed. Found within its enclave were 14 bundles of stripped bamboo, 1 ChiCom grenade, 2 spears, cooking utensils, 1 chicken coop, 1 pig pen, and 14 animal traps (refer to diagram). Some of the traps contained small game. It was noted that the huts contained an attic used for storage and the ground floor as living areas. It is believed the campsite had been used within the last two weeks. The area was not well policed and indications are, that the site had been vacated in haste. Rock formations in the vicinity provided natural sleeping and storage areas. Fire pits were noted in some of these shelters.


(4) 201500H, (AT 817058), 300 meters East an old abandon campsite contained 1 hut. It appeared there may have been 5 other huts but they may have been dismantled and carried away. A tin container 24x14x8 inches and grey in color was found containing the following writing "BAC AN AD5: K-44 44ORT = 11KG5". This area was not well policed and had not been recently used. A trail which led into the site contained an 8 foot high wooden fence with a gate which was situated near a rock formation and used as a portal.

(5) 211400H, (AT 8366), the patrol discovered and entered a large garden and cultivated area which contained groves of banana, pineapple, sweet potatoes, peppers and potatoe roots. A sign in this vicinity had been engraved on a tree which read "MIN" (mine). The area contained old panji traps, and stakes, no mines or booby traps were encountered. The area in (AT 837667) would provide an excellent Helo landing site.


C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (2)

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ANIMAL TRAP FOUND AT (AT 817658)
SMALL BRUSH LINE WAS PARALLEL TO THE TRAP.



ENCLOSURE 28

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

(6) Throughout the patrols operation, VC radio jamming occurred whenever the patrol attempted to transmit. This was verified by the ARVN interpreter who monitored the VC jamming. Music and talking were used as means of jamming. This also occurred after the frequency had been changed.

(7) 191800H, (AT 820662), one Marine was killed when attempting to rig an M-26 grenade as a booby trap. Med evacuation by Helo was accomplished at 200830H.


7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: 2 VC possibly wounded by small arms fire.
8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Fair, morale fair. 1 USMC KIA when attempting to rig an M-26 grenade as a booby trap (1) USMC WIA when Marine sat on a panji stake, condition good.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Recommend: That a 4 day operation be considered in the same area in the near future.

G. V. BEST
1stLt, Co. D

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: Concur with the patrol leaders recommendation:

C O N F I D E N T I A LENCLOSURE *JB*



LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
O LZ = LANDING ZONE	<p>SCAT 3 DELTA</p> <p>MAP SHEET: 6658IV</p> <p>SER: L-701.</p>

ENCLOSURE 28

C O N F I D E N T I A L

S-3

Operation Order: 13-66
Patrol: 1st Plt. Co. D
Debriefing: 1st Lt E.W. NASH
Map Sheet: 6659III

Copy No 16 of 20 Copies
3d Reconnaissance Bn.
DANANG, RVN
161500H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:
 - a. COMPOSITION: (11) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
 - b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENTS: None.
 - c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 25, (1) AN/PRC 10
 - d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) pr 7x50 binoculars
 - e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
 - f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: (1) Sniper rifle
2. MISSION: Maintain the reconnaissance screen of the DANANG TAOR emphasizing observation of the SONG THUY LOAN and THON THUAC SAN avenues of approach.
3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 161450H/211440H February 1966
4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay
5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - a. SYNOPSIS: 120 hours of continuous observation resulted in no enemy or civilian sightings or contacts.
 - b. ENEMY: No visual or physical contact made.
 - c. TERRAIN: No new terrain characteristics were recorded.
6. OTHER INFORMATION: None.
7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No physical or visual contact made.
8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.
10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: None.

W. W. MILES
SGT Co. D

ENCLOSURE 22

C O N F I D E N T I A L

82
77

LZ
LZ

74
85

LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
○ LZ - LANDING ZONE	1 ST PLT Company "D"
○ - OBSERVATION POST	MAP SHEET: 6659 III
	SER.: L-701.

ENCLOSURE (23)

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S-3

Operation Order: 14-66
Patrol: 2nd Flt. Co. D
Debriefing: SSGT R.P. REGALOT
Map Sheet: 6658 IV, Ser. L-701

Copy No 15 of 26 Copies
3rd Reconnaissance Bn.
DANANG, RVN
281300H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. COMPOSITION: (16) Enl, (1) USN
- b. SPECIAL ATTACHMENT: None.
- c. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: (1) AN/PRC 25, (1) AN/PRC 10
- d. OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT: (2) pr. 7x50's
- e. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: None.
- f. SPECIAL WEAPONS: None.

2. MISSION: Maintain the reconnaissance screen of the DANANG TAOR emphasizing the area East of the entrance to Happy Valley.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 221530H/281030H February 1966

4. ROUTE: Refer to Overlay

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. SYNOPSIS:

(1) 140 hours of patrolling and surveillance in RZ #4 resulted in negative sightings of enemy or friendly activity. A VC harboring sight was located uninhabited, 12 chickens and 2 pigs were observed wondering in its enclave.

b. ENEMY: No visual or physical contact made.

c. TERRAIN: A trail not presently located on the map was recorded. (Refer to Overlay)

6. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. 251335H, (AT 815669), the patrol located an uninhabited VC harboring site possibly 3 months old. The site was situated near a stream which contained many rock formations. Also evident were matted down areas and fire pits. The site was 75 meters in diameter with a 40 foot rain forest canopy providing excellent concealment from ground and air. Found within its enclave were 12 chickens,

ENCLOSURE (2)

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2 pigs, numerous empty sardine tins, bottles, and 6 sweet potatoes. Also noted were fresh cow tracks. Numerous panji stakes approximately 2 month old were found within the periphery.

b. A well used trail 4 feet wide and narrowing to 2 feet wide in some areas generally ran from West to East from (AT 811669) West to (AT 821673) East. The trail contained fresh buffalo and sled tracks. The trail appears well used hard surfaced and free of obstructions. Trail markers made of bamboo and placed on trees paralleled the trail indicating and pointing to the location of the harbor site. Refer to diagram.

7. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No contact made.
8. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, morale excellent.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None



G. E. RATLETT
SGT Co. D

10. DEBRIEFER COMMENTS: None.


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ENCLOSURE *ny*


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LEGEND	PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
O LZ. = LANDING ZONE	PATROL: 2 DELTA MAP: VIETNAM, 1-50,000 SHEET: 6658IV SER: L-701.




LEGEND	MAP CORRECTIONS
--- = NEW TRAILS	NEW TRAILS NOT PRESENTLY SHOWN ON MAP. MAP: VIETNAM, 1-50,000 SHEET: 6658IV SER: L-701.



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TRAIL MARKER: FOUND ON 251340H
AT COORDINATES (815699).

MAP: VIETNAM, 1-50,000
SHEET: 6658IV, SER: L-701.

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B, 3rd Recon Bn
Lai, Vietnam
251300H February 1966

Group Frag Order 24-66

Patrol: LITTLE JACK, Seat 1 Bravo

Debriefing: SSgt. W. A. BASS

Map: Vietnam 1:50,000, Tra Bong 6756 IV

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: (1) Off, (14) Enl, (1) USN
- b. Special Attachments: None
- c. Communications Equipment: 1 AN/PRC-25, 1 AN/PRC-10 radio
- d. Observation Equipment: 1 pair 7X50 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None.
- f. Special Weapons: None.

2. MISSION: Determine VC activity, trail network and suitable LZ's vicinity Hill 410 (BS 445928).

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 201400H 241535H February 1966.

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay.

5. SYNOPSIS:

a. The patrol covered a period of 97 hours with a total of five sightings. No VC or VCS were seen. An old VC harbor site, four spider traps and one hut were found.

b. Two VC compounds were searched, the first netting 28 Vietnamese who were prisoners of the VC. The prisoners, along with documents, medical supplies, etc. were turned over to the Chu Lai collection point. Approximately 500 pounds of rice was scattered throughout the area.

6. OBSERVATIONS OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. At 210900H, an old harbor site, large enough for about 12 men, was found at coordinates BS 442931. It had not been used in a long time.

b. At 211600H, 2 Vietnamese appeared out of a tunnel at coordinates BS 455925. They immediately held up their hands and yelled "No VC", "No VC". As the point of the patrol moved forward, they found six buildings. As the patrol moved closer, 2 Vietnamese were seen running southeast. No weapons or equipment were seen. Both wore black pajamas. At this time, Vietnamese started coming out of tunnels and buildings. In all, 28 Vietnamese came out with their hands up, yelling "No VC". There were 6 women and 22 men. One of the men showed the patrol the stocks in which they were locked up at night. When they laid down at night, their legs were locked in old fashioned stocks. Articles found included 10 cans, 5 rounds of .45 cal. ammunition, documents, rosters, rice bags, work lodgers, camouflage hat, 2 sets of

ENCLOSURE (25)

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khaki, 2 Chinese first-aid packs, 2 blue packs, 1 green pack, and about 500 pounds of rice. The ID cards were in a suitcase and some matched the prisoners. The prisoners were billeted in one portion of camp, while the VC had their quarters outside the compound, up on the hill. Inside the buildings was about 20 pounds of hot rice, cooked and ready to eat.

The compound had a bamboo fence about 7 feet high around it. The fence was interwoven with vines. Four tunnels were found that acted as bomb shelters. The camp and the tunnels all looked new.

The Vietnamese indicated that they had not been very well fed. Only one bowl of rice per day for about 2 weeks. One man showed cigarette burns or stick burns under one arm and on his chest. His eyes had been blinded by burns. One woman had a broken arm, and two men were just about completely starved. All were in poor physical condition, the women being in better condition than the men. The Vietnamese were fed the rice and fish that was already hot, plus some "C" rations. The patrol moved out with the prisoners. Two men collapsed on the trail and had to be given some canned fruit and water for energy. The patrol harbored for the night, still guarding the Vietnamese. At 221100H, the Vietnamese were evacuated by helicopter from the LZ at coordinates BS 464924 and returned to the Chu Lai collection point. Pfc. LANE was also med-evacuated at this time with a bad leg, which he had injured in moving down a hill.

c. At 221130H, at coordinates BS 464924 at least four spider holes were found; also, a battery, wrapped in green oil cloth, strapped to the side of a tree as if to be used as an electrical detonating device.

d. At 231200H, a single hut about 20 feet by 10 feet was found at coordinates BS 449931. The trail went about 30 meters past the hut and ended. A bag of clothes and a hypodermic syringe, minus the needle, was found in the hut.

e. At 231430H, the platoon moved into a VC compound at coordinates BS 451933. This compound has previously been reported by Seabrook 2C, in detail.

7. OTHER INFORMATION: The Vietnamese prisoners reported that there had only been 10 VC guards, who ran in all directions at the patrol's approach.

8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: None.

9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Pfc. LANE returned to duty from injured leg. The remainder of the patrol: good.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Conclusion: The Vietnamese from this compound had probably been moved there from the other compound seen later.

b. Recommendation: TPQ missions be run at coordinates BS 454925 and the draws on Hill 410 in grid square BS 4492.

J. J. CASSIDY
1stLt. USMC

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (25)

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13707, B CO 3rd BATTAL
 VIETNAM 120,400
 TRA BOND 6716 IV
 Donald J. Martin

+95
 #3



+90
 #8

ENCLOSURE (2)

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Co B, 1st Recon Bn
Chuoi, Vietnam
221300H February 1966

Frag Order 25-66
Patrol: Seat 2 Bravo
Debriefing: SSgt. W. A. BASS
Map: Vietnam 1:50,000, Tri Binh 6757 III

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: (10) Enl
- b. Special Attachments: None.
- c. Communications Equipment: 1 AN/PRC-25, 1 AN/PRC-10 radio
- d. Observation Equipment: 3 pair 7X50 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None.
- f. Special Weapons: None.

2. MISSION: Determine VC activity and suitable LZ's and OP's high ground between Hills 99 (BT 398090) and 194 (BT 377112).

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 181815H/211445H February 1966

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay.

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of 68½ hours and had a total of 13 sightings. A total of 55 VC and VCS were sighted. Two artillery missions were called, one was cancelled due to the VC disappearing, the other could not be adjusted due to helicopters in the area. The platoon was retracted due to 25 VC and 5 women seen in the immediate vicinity of the OP site, mostly moving towards the OP site from different directions. As the helicopters landed for the retraction, fire was received from 3 VC. One was killed. No casualties were sustained by the patrol. VC casualties totaled 1 KIA and 1 WIA.

6. OBSERVATIONS OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. At 181830H in the LZ, 2 Vietnamese wearing black pajamas and coolie hats were seen at coordinates BT 405085. No weapons were visible. They hid in the bushes and were not seen again.

b. 182200H, one VC fired one round on patrol BATMAN's point at coordinates BT 389096. 14 M-14 rounds were fired and the VC was heard moaning. Due to the fact that there were only five men in the patrol at this time, they bypassed the wounded VC.

c. At 182300H, as team ROBIN set up a harbor site for the night at coordinates BT 397090, one small arms round was received from the north. No other fire was heard and no movement seen.

ENCLOSURE 26

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d. At 190500H, patrol BATMAN was moving at coordinates BT 388097. 4 VCS were seen silhouetted on the hill at coordinates BT 388098. The patrol was certain that they had been seen.

e. At 190655H, 2 VCS wearing black with coolie hats were seen moving southwest over the hill at coordinates BT 405087.

f. At 190815H, one VCS walked up the hill towards BATMAN's OP at coordinates BT 384104. He was about 400 meters northwest of the OP site and stood around for about 15 minutes, then disappeared.

g. At 190955H, one VC with a pack and weapon moved east on a trail at coordinates BT 395108. He wore black pajamas.

h. At 200815H, four VC with packs moved east on the trail at coordinates BT 405100. All wore black pajamas. No weapons were visible.

i. At 211330H, eight VC with rifles were seen at coordinates BT 407091. They were moving fast, heading south on a trail. A fire mission was called for where the VC were expected to come out into the open, but they did not appear, so the fire was cancelled.

j. At 211340H, eight VCS were seen sitting in a group looking around, at coordinates BT 402083. All wore black with no weapons or equipment visible. At this same time at coordinates BT 407089, four VC with weapons moved off the trail and moved up towards the OP site. All wore black with coolie hats. They were followed by five women, two in blue, two in white and one in black.

k. At 211410H, four VC wearing black pajamas and coolie hats were seen at coordinates BT 404087. All had weapons and were moving north up the finger of the hill towards the OP site. Eight more VCS in black were seen moving northwest along the ridge line at coordinates BT 402087 towards the OP site. The platoon moved south immediately to coordinates BT 393087 and established an LZ defensive position and awaited pickup. A fire mission was called on the OP site but could not be adjusted due to helicopters coming to retract the platoon. As the helicopters landed, small arms fire was received from coordinates BT 394086. Three VC were seen firing towards the helicopter tail section. Cpl. RUDDER, Pfc. LANTZ and the helicopter machine gunner fired on them, resulting in 1 VC KIA, while the other 2 ran back into the brush.

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. "C" rations cans had been buried at the harbor site at coordinates BT 397090. As the team passed through on the return trip 24 hours later, the cans had been dug up and were laying around.

b. ROSEMONT reported two freshly dug, unoccupied gun positions at coordinates BT 387098 and BT 384104. They could not be found by the patrol, even though the area was sparsely vegetated.

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c. Hills 99 at coordinates BT 398090, 148 at coordinates BT 387097 and 194 at coordinates BT 377112 afford very little concealment and no cover. The Vietnamese check them out every time that helicopters land. It appears that the area has been used too often by Marines.

d. Radio interference was heard during the patrol in the form of whistling, singing, mimicing stations, etc.

8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WL.

9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Recommendation: That whenever Recon elements are working in this area, a relay be established on Hill 69.

R. T. ROHWELLER
Cpl. USMC

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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Co B, 3rd Recon Bn
Chu Lai, Vietnam
251400H February 1966

GROUP FRAG ORDER 26-66

Patrol: BOOKCOVER, 3rd Plt, Co A, 1st Recon Bn

Debriefers: SSGT. W. L. BASS

Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Sheets 6757III, 6657II, 6657I and 6757IV

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: (2) Off, (18) Enl, (1) USN
- b. Special Attachments: 1 PIO man
- c. Communications Equipment: 1 AN/PRC-25, 2 AN/PRC-10 radios
- d. Observation Equipment: 2 pair 7X30, 2 pair 6X30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: 1 M-60 machine gun, 1 M-79 grenade launcher

2. MISSION: Establish CP vicinity Hill 186 (BT 357132) to determine VC activity vicinity Due Bo (BT 3514 & BT 3714) and surrounding area. Determine possible location of Soviet 85mm field gun and 37mm antiaircraft gun in Due Bo area by observation. Conduct ground reconnaissance of Hill 186 and hill mass that extends northwest to BT 346150 to determine VC activity and suitable LZ's and OP's.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 221755H/240950H February 1966.

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay.

5. SYNOPSIS:

a. The patrol covered a period of 40 hours with a total of 18 sightings. A total of 12 VC and 16 Vietnamese were observed during the period. Tire or cart tracks were seen at one location and lights were seen at 5 different times from two separate locations.

b. Sniper fire was received by the patrol 5 times during the period. There were 2 probable VC KIL and 1 probable VC WIL. Helicopters received fire from 4 different locations wounding 1 pilot, 1 crew chief and damaging the fuel tank on one helicopter. No helicopters were lost, however. Two grenades were thrown at the platoon CP with no casualties resulting.

c. Four structures were sighted, one of which appeared to be a large two story barracks type.

6. OBSERVATIONS OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. At 221830H, what appeared to be either tire or cart tracks were found at coordinates BT 362123.

ENCLOSURE 27 CONFIDENTIAL

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There were two sets visible, going southwest-northeast. They appeared to be two evenly spaced sets of cracks that ran parallel to the river. One set appeared to come out of a tunnel or digging of some type in the side of the hill, while the other set disappeared behind a small knoll to the southwest.

b. At 221915H, sounds were heard from the vicinity of coordinates BT 357124. They sounded more human than animal, as the tone changed and were too evenly spaced. They sounded like the words "Pocket, Pocket".

c. At 222200H, a light came on at coordinates BT 367123. It stayed on about 20 to 30 seconds, went out and was not seen again.

d. At 222320H, a light came on and then went off at about 20 to 30 second intervals. No particular pattern could be established. The same lights were seen again at 230200H, lasting both times for about a 5 minute duration. At 230230H, a light came on about the same consistency and brightness of a flare that had failed to ignite until it hit the ground as seen at the same coordinates BT 367123. It lasted about the same length of time as a flare.

e. At 232130H, a steady bright light was seen at coordinates BT 363-121. It stayed on for approximately 5 minutes, then was not seen again.

f. At 230645H, one VC sniper fired 2 carbine rounds at the patrol from coordinates BT 353129. No casualties were sustained and no fire was returned.

g. At 230850H, one VC fired five or six carbine rounds at the patrol from coordinates BT 356133. No casualties were sustained. 40 rounds of 7.62 and 2 rounds of M-79 were fired in return.

h. At 230925H, bare foot prints were seen at coordinates BT 355131 in the dirt in a washed out area. Three sets were observed, two pointing south-southeast and the third set running off in a due west direction, where they were lost in the grass.

i. At 230941H, a possible cave was sighted at coordinates BT 356129. The opening was about 3 to 4 feet in diameter, with a mound or parapet in front of it.

j. At 231025H, 13 Vietnamese were seen in two groups, one of six, the other of seven, moving southeast along the trail at coordinates BT 363130. They all wore black pajamas and conical hats, no weapons or equipment were visible.

k. At 231027H, a building that resembled the two story wooden barracks at Camp Pendleton, in shape and size, was seen at coordinates BT 389148. It appeared to be about the length of a barracks, but not quite as wide. The windows that were visible were tall with rounded tops and were all along the side, but none were on the end.

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l. At 231030H, 3 Vietnamese males were observed moving north on the trail at coordinates BT 350124. One wore purple pajamas, the other two black pajamas, all wore coolie hats. No weapons or equipment were observed.

m. At 231030H, a structure of some type was observed in a clump of trees at coordinates BT 363121. This structure was seen only because it was white. The distance was too great to determine shape, size or design.

n. At 231045H, 4 VC carrying carbines and automatic weapons, were observed at coordinates BT 358130. They observed LCpl. WINE and started to aim their weapons, so he fired at them, resulting in one probable KIA. The other three VC dropped into the brush and started firing. Three bursts of automatic weapons fire were received. The patrol threw 2 grenades in return, with undetermined results. However, the VC never fired again. No casualties were sustained by the patrol. A bag of cooked rice, still warm, was found.

o. At 231050H, four VC, armed with one machine gun, 2 carbines and what appeared to be a mortar, were seen moving south at coordinates BT 351133. Two wore black bottoms and khaki shirts, one wore green bottoms and khaki shirt, the other wore black pajamas with a white sweatshirt and coolie hat, draped down his back. At 1100H, the four VC dressed in black fired in the direction of the platoon CP. Sgt. WILSON shot the VC in black. The other three disappeared in the brush but were later seen at coordinates BT 352134, where they appeared to enter a well camouflaged cave. There was quite a bit of activity around the cave entrance at that time, so an artillery fire mission was called. When the artillery was fired, the rounds were scattered over 4000 meters, so the mission was cancelled with negative results. The same three VC were seen at 1200H, milling around above the entrance to the cave.

p. At 231100H, sniper fire was received in the platoon CP position. Sgt. ORDWAY observed 1 VC throwing a grenade. He wore a green rainhat and khaki shirt. Sgt. ORDWAY fired at him and saw him fall. A carbine round was fired at Sgt. ORDWAY'S position and another grenade was thrown towards the CP. No casualties were sustained by the patrol.

q. At 231220H, two columns of smoke were noted coming from the trees at coordinates BT 359117. On closer inspection, the top corner of a building could be seen under the column of smoke.

r. At 231530H, as the helicopter approached to extract the platoon, heavy machine gun fire was received from coordinates BT 362123, wounding a crew chief, a pilot and putting a hole in the fuel tank of the third helicopter. The fourth helicopter landed and extracted 6 of the patrol members. As the helicopter lifted off, it received five rounds of small arms fire from the vicinity of coordinates BT 338125. No casualties were sustained, but there were four or five bullet holes in the fuselage. As the helicopter passed over the village of Tien Xuan (3) at coordinates BT 417113, one round of small arms fire was fired at the helicopter, but did not hit it.

ENCLOSURE 2

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s. At 231600H, the helicopters returned to extract the remainder of the platoon, but received a large volume of fire from the vicinity of coordinates BT 377112. That, coupled with the clouds closing in, caused them to return to MAG-36 without extracting the platoon.

t. At 231645H, Vietnamese voices were heard by the patrol from the vicinity of coordinates BT 358128.

7. OTHER INFORMATION: Remains of small camp fires were seen spotting the area from coordinates BT 357128 to 357131, on top of Hill 186.

8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: 2 probable VC KIA, 1 probable VC WL. No friendly casualties were sustained by the patrol.

9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Conclusion: The area is heavily infested and VC controlled.

b. Recommendations:

(1) That infantry units sweep the area to the north and south of Hill 186. This hill is ideally suited for a combat outpost.

(2) TPQ and air strikes be made to cover grid square BT 3612.

(3) H&I fires be brought on Hill 186 and surrounding terrain, and the trail running north-south about 600 meters west of Hill 186.

(4) AN/PRC-25 radios replace AN/PRC-10's when the missions are run in this area.

(5) Helicopters extracting and inserting patrols in this area be accompanied by UH1E gunships.

J. D. BONE
2ndLt. USMC

11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBIL:

a. The tracks leading into a cave or diggings could possibly be some type of gun position where the gun is rolled out to fire and then retracted.

b. The large barracks-type building is probably a church.

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Group Frag Order 28-66
Patrol: Buffalo, 2nd Platoon
Debriefed: SSgt. W. A. BASS
Map: Vietnam 1:50,000, 6757 III

Copy 29 of 35 Copies
Co B, 3rd Recon Bn
Chu Lai, Vietnam
231900H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: (2) Off, (12) Enl, (1) USN
- b. Attachments: None.
- c. Communications Equipment: 1 AN/PRC-25, 2 AN/PRC-10 radios.
- d. Observation Equipment: 3 pair 7X50 binoculars.
- e. Special Equipment: None.
- f. Special Weapons: None.

2. MISSION:

- a. Establish OP's vicinity coordinates BT 355048 and BT 363040 to determine VC activity Trung Tin, Phuoc Khach, My Son 1 and 2 and Tu Chanh areas.
- b. Conduct ground reconnaissance of Hill 371 to determine any VC activity, suitable LZ's and OP's.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 241100H/280800H February 1966.

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay.

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of 90 hours and had a total of 10 sightings. Only 4 VC were seen during the period. On the attempted insertion of 24 February, the helicopters received small arms fire and were forced to turn back. After changing helicopters, the platoon was inserted in another LZ. On two separate occasions, helicopters were observed being fired on by small arms fire. 4 VC with 3 rifles were observed moving north up a trail but disappeared from sight before an artillery fire mission could be called.

6. OBSERVATIONS OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. At 241100H, as the helicopters entered the LZ, approximately 8 rounds of small arms fire were received from coordinates BT 345066. The helicopters returned fire with one probable VC killed. The helicopters returned the patrol to RLT-4 HIZ and returned to MAG-36 to change helicopters. At 241330H, they returned and picked up the patrol for insertion.

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ENCLOSURE (28)

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b. At 241400H, as the patrol moved out of the LZ, one Vietnamese male, dressed in black with white coolie hat, was observed just standing and watching the patrol from coordinates BT 362055. He was not seen after the patrol moved out of the area.

c. At 251230H, 6 Vietnamese were seen moving south on the trail at coordinates BT 373056. All wore black and no weapons or equipment were visible.

d. At 251425H, 12 Vietnamese wearing black were seen moving north at coordinates BT 373056. No weapons or equipment were visible.

e. At 251600H, 2 Vietnamese wearing black were seen moving north at coordinates BT 373056. No weapons or equipment were visible.

f. At 251600H, white smoke was seen rising from a building at coordinates BT 368067. No other activity was seen at that time.

g. At 251815H, as 2 UH1E helicopters flew over, they received 8 rounds of semi-automatic small arms fire (possibly M-1).

h. At 261210H, 8 Vietnamese were seen walking around the house from which the smoke had come at coordinates BT 368067. From 1030H to 1210H, a total of 14 people were sighted in that area. The village of Phuoc Khach is supposed to be deserted.

i. At 261520H, four VC were seen with 3 weapons moving north on the trail at coordinates BT 369065. All wore black except 1 man, who wore green.

j. At 271115H, 4 Skyraider aircraft dropped 10 bombs at coordinates BT 352013 to BT 358012. Nothing could be observed. At 271130H, 3 more aircraft dropped 8 more bombs at coordinates BT 363017. Again, nothing could be observed due to brush.

k. At 280735, as the helicopters came in to retract the patrol, they received approximately 11 rounds of small arms fire from coordinates BT 363067.

7. OTHER INFORMATION: The village of Phuoc Khach was seen from a distance. It appeared to be deserted.

a. Phuoc Khach, although it has been declared to be a deserted village, continues to show a buildup of activity. The village is supposed to be deserted.

b. Hill 371 in grid square BT 3504 does not appear to have any recent VC activity. The two bare spots shown on the map at coordinates BT 349050 and BT 353038 to BT 367034 are not presently bare.

c. Two wild pig traps were noted at coordinates BT 363048 and BT 363049.

8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: None.

9. CONDITION OF THE PATROL: Good. The patrol was seen walking around the house from which the smoke had come at coordinates BT 368067. From 1030H to 1210H, a total of 14 people were sighted in that area. The village of Phuoc Khach is supposed to be deserted.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

ENCLOSURE (2) At 261520H, four VC were seen with 3 weapons moving north on the trail at coordinates BT 369065. All wore black except 1 man, who wore green.

O. WILLSON

1stLt. USMC


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Annex A to Patrol Report
Group Frag Order 28-66
Operation Overlay
2nd Plt, C&D (-)(Rein)
3rd Recon Bn
Vietnam 1:50,000
Tri Binh 6757 III

39



LEGEND:

○ - HLZ

△ - OP

ENCLOSURE (2)

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PROVISIONAL RECON GROUP
TASK FORCE DELTA
3RD MARINE DIVISION, III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
c/o FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96601

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Task Force Delta

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE)

Ref: (a) DivOpOrder 32M-65

Encl: (1) Operational Daily Summary
(2) Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts
(3) OI Overlay D-2 to D+5 (Phase I)
(4) OI Overlay D+4 to D+13 (Phase II)
(5) OI Overlay D+12 to D+18 (Phase III) & Patrol Route Overlay D-7 to D+18

1. Provisional Recon Group
2. 21 January 1966 - 16 February 1966
3. Quang Ngai Province: (E-W) BS 50 - BS 90
4. Command Headquarters: Headquarters Group, Recon Group Alfa
5. Reporting Officers: Commanding Officer, Co D(-)(Rein), 3rd Recon Bn - Captain COMPTON
Commanding Officer, 1st Force Recon Co - Captain SHIVER
6. Task Organization: Co D(-)(Rein), 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
1st Force Reconnaissance Company
3rd Platoon, Co A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
2nd Platoon, Co A, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
7. Supporting Forces

HMM 261
HMM 362
HMM 363
HMM 364
VMO 6
108th Aviation Company
H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines
H Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines
H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
3rd Marine Division Air Observers
USS Topeka
USS Perry

ENCLOSURE (2)

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36 tactical helicopter lifts
 13 emergency helicopter retractions
 20 artillery missions
 7 naval gunfire missions
 See Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts (Enclosure (2))

8. Intelligence: See Operational Daily Summary (Enclosure (1)) and Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts (Enclosure (2)).

9. Mission: To conduct ground reconnaissance in support of Task Force Delta on Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I in assigned T.M.O.R.

10. Concept: Provisional Reconnaissance Group, Task Force Delta was composed of Headquarters, Recon Group Alfa, Co D(-)(Rein), 3rd Reconnaissance Bn. and 1st Force Recon Company, FMF. Co B, 3rd Recon Bn, less one platoon, was reinforced with 2nd Platoon, Co A, 3rd Recon Bn and 3rd Platoon, Co A, 1st Recon Bn.

Operational strength of the group consisted of 3 Reconnaissance platoons and two control headquarters. Provisional Group Headquarters and Co B Headquarters were colocated with Task Force Delta C1 and HIG-36 C1, while Force Recon Co Headquarters was at BaTo. Generally, Force Recon elements operated in an area described by an 11,000 meter circle with its center at BaTo. Co B operated in the remainder of the T.M.O.R.

1st Force Recon Co began operations in support of Task Force Delta on D-7, 21 January 1966, searching with 2 platoon patrols for enemy units and installations reported by other intelligence gathering agencies. On D-2, six team patrols from the same unit were inserted by foot to establish observation posts into the areas east and north of BaTo. Force Recon Co continued operations with team observation posts around the BaTo area for the remainder of the operation.

On D+1 Co A began inserting team observation posts in the remainder of the T.M.O.R. Until the completion of the operation, teams from Co B provided continuous surveillance into various sectors of the T.M.O.R. Additionally, Co B conducted two platoon patrols in search of personnel who were missing in action; one prisoner-capture platoon patrol and two company prisoner-capture, area reconnaissance patrols. Excepting the initial patrols from BaTo, all entries and retractions were accomplished by helicopter.

11. Execution: The Provisional Recon Group employed 35 team size OI's, 5 platoon patrols and 2 company patrols to accomplish its mission. The OI's were employed in 3 fairly distinct phases (Enclosures 3, 4 & 5) from D-7 to D+10 as the operation progressed. Platoon and company patrols were employed in area reconnaissance missions and to capture prisoners (Enclosure (5)). See Operational Daily Summary (Enclosure (1)).

12. During the operation, 153 significant sightings were made totaling 919 VC and 400 VCS. 31 contacts were made resulting in 23 VC KIA and 14 VC WIA by small arms. In addition, 21 artillery and 7 naval gunfire missions were fired resulting in 19 VC KIA confirmed and 22 possible VC KIA and 2 81mm mortars destroyed. One VCC was captured. Patrols located and destroyed 5 tons of rice, 500 pounds of rice, 10 bolts of material and 60 gallons of kerosene in VC harbor sites. Many documents were captured and forwarded to G-2.

ENCLOSURE (29)

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Friendly casualties and losses:

2 USMC KIA.
 2 USMC ILL.
 5 USMC WIA.
 2 AN/ARC-25 radios lost
 1 AN/ARC-10 radio lost
 2 M-14 rifles lost

13. Administrative matters: No problems encountered.

14. Special Techniques

a. Team Operations. Team (4-5 men) clandestine surveillance operations were used extensively, with 35 such elements being employed in the 28 days of reconnaissance operations during Double Eagle I. Maximum employment was 11 teams positioned and reporting at one time. Of these 35 teams, 11 were retracted prematurely because of compromise or contact; 3 were retracted because of communications failure. Teams made 140 sightings totaling 897 Viet Cong/NVA. 26 artillery and naval gunfire missions were called and adjusted from these observation posts, resulting in 19 confirmed VC/NVA killed, and 22 possibly killed. Teams, which inadvertently found themselves in contact, killed 10 Viet Cong/NVA and wounded 5 others. Friendly casualties were 2 KIA and 3 WIA. Considering that this operation marked the first time that the Force Reconnaissance Company had utilized this technique to any extent, the 19 OP's established by that unit did very well.

This technique requires helicopter entry, quick helicopter retraction capability and exceptionally well-trained reconnaissance personnel to be fully successful. Additionally, teams positioned in response to current order of battle information, on carefully selected OP's, produce more results than teams broadcast as a screen just to cover the map. This is directed reconnaissance as opposed to area screen or "shotgun" methods. Teams used as a part of a wide intelligence screen, specifically to the south of BaTo, had significantly fewer sightings than those placed in response to order of battle information on probable enemy escape routes.

Personnel used on team operations must be above average in intelligence, products of thorough training in team techniques and possess solid confidence in their own ability and complete faith in the ability of the command to react quickly enough to pull them out of difficult positions when they are encountered. If all precautions are taken, the target areas are wisely selected, and the command is capable of quick reinforcement or retraction in support of compromised teams, these operations can continue to be conducted with confidence and little cost. This cost seems to be far outweighed by the results achieved. This technique has been developed to a relatively high degree. Only the highlights are discussed above.

b. Platoon Operations. Five platoon patrols (15-25 men) were conducted during Double Eagle I. Missions were: two - search for MLAs, two - area reconnaissance, one - prisoner capture. Eight VC/NVA were killed and 3 were wounded. The only significant sightings reported by these patrols were the results of contacts. Three of these patrols, (the area reconnaissance and the prisoner capture), were retracted prematurely because of enemy contacts, which they could not handle. Two USMC MLAs resulted from these actions.

ENCLOSURE 21

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It appears obvious that a platoon is too large to move clandestinely and too small to take care of itself if hit. The results do not justify frequent use of this technique. The circumstances must be determinate, however.

No squad patrols (7-10 men) were employed; however, it appears that the same objections apply to squads as to platoons.

c. Company Operations. Two company patrols were conducted on Double Eagle I. The mission of each was twofold: (1) area reconnaissance and (2) prisoner capture. Four enemy supply areas were discovered containing a total of: 5 tons of rice, 500 pounds of salt, 60 gallons of kerosene, 15 bolts of cloth, large quantities of uniforms and documents, and a small amount of medical supplies, including 20 vials of penicillin. One prisoner was captured. Two VC were killed and 3 were wounded. Friendly casualties were: 1 USMC WIA (slight).

The concept used for these operations was as follows: Two 14 man elements (each a platoon minus) were landed at two different zones 2000-3000 meters apart. They then moved over covered jungle routes to ambush sites. A larger 28 man element (1 platoon and a Company Command group) was then landed at the third point of the triangle (3000-4000 meters away) and patrolled toward the two ambushes. Upon closing the smaller elements, the entire force would counter-march most of the axis of advance used initially by the largest force, using two routes converging at a fourth landing zone for retraction.

With this concept, a 56 man (company (-)) element can completely cover a 7 grid square area in one day, being inserted early in the morning and retracted in the evening. As in team operations, this technique has been more highly developed than is indicated here. Again, results from these operations far outweighed costs and fully justify continuation of the method.

d. Sniper Utilization. Snipers were employed by attaching them to infantry units or placing them in ambushes designed for prisoner capture. On two successive days, 2 snipers were attached to Co E, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines and employed from concealed positions against enemy across a large river from the infantry operation. One man fired 6 rounds at 6 targets and killed 3 VC/NVA confirmed. The weapon was an M1-D. The other man fired 7 times at 7 targets and wounded one VC/NVA. The weapon was a Winchester, model 70. The range in all cases was 700-800 meters. However, relative evaluation of the shooters and condition of the weapons gives no basis for a comparison of effectiveness of the two types of rifles per se. The snipers used in the ambushes were not presented with a suitable target, so they did not fire.

Sniper utilization with team observation posts has been rejected in areas of heavy enemy concentration. The clandestine mission of the team and the necessity for having automatic fire power if close contact is made, makes snipers inappropriate for these missions.

e. Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support. Use of the reconnaissance team as a Forward Observer continues to prove satisfactory in all respects. 22 of the 24 artillery missions and all of the naval gunfire missions fired by the Reconnaissance elements on Double Eagle I were called and adjusted by team OF's. These accounted for 19 VC/NVA killed, confirmed and 24 killed, possibly plus two 81mm mortars possibly destroyed. Well over 1000 rounds were fired in these missions. Because of the size of targets fired on, it is safe to assume that many more casualties were inflicted but because of dense growth, poor continued visibility and lack of physical surveillance, no numbers can be calculated.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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Missions called were primarily offensive, on targets of opportunity; however, four defensive fire missions were called by compromised teams. In each case, contact was broken by the enemy when the first rounds fell.

Once cleared, all missions fired were timely and accurate, requiring a minimum of adjustments. Problems with quick clearance of missions were frequently encountered. Sightings reported by the teams were used as a basis for H&I fires throughout the operation.

f. Air Support

(1) Helicopter. Team insertions by helicopter were conducted right after dawn or just before dark. Morning insertions proved to be futile since the team's movement from the zone to the OP site proved impossible without compromise. Evening insertion allowed the team to move to its OP under cover of darkness and greatly aided the clandestine mission. Emergency extraction of compromised or in-contact teams is credited with saving the lives of members of several teams which had encountered superior enemy forces at close quarters. Armed UH1E's conducting fire suppression, strafing and rocketing runs allowed the teams to break contact and move to a helizone for retraction.

The pilots proved to be exceptionally well qualified in map reading and low level navigation. The Air Group efficiently followed requested time schedules, making detailed planning, including light conditions, possible. Additionally, the marginal helicopter zones into which insertions were made and from which retractions were effected, were professionally and courageously accepted by the pilots. Emergency requests for retraction were expeditiously handled by all air control agencies and in all cases, emergency retraction aircraft had lifted within 15 minutes of notification of their mission.

Helicopter insertion and retraction was made in all company operations and three of the platoon operations. These lifts were excellent. The technique of placing the Commanding Officer or Operations Officer of the Recon Group in one of the armed escort aircraft for insertions is highly effective. Decisions to go to alternate zones or abort the mission entirely because of a zone being hot can be made on the spot and executed immediately. This procedure should be continued.

(2) Fixed Wing. Although no fixed wing aircraft were utilized to cover extractions or insertions during Double Eagle I, they may be used, although not as effectively or as closely, as armed UH1E's. Without F.M. radio equipment, the situation on the ground must be relayed through a helicopter if firing runs are required. Fixed wing aircraft were used to bomb hot zones from which emergency retractions were effected. In one case, 39 250 pound bombs were dropped, beginning 15 minutes after retraction from a particularly enemy infested zone. Sightings reported by all Reconnaissance elements were daily used as targets for TF-10 drops during the night.

g. Aerial Photography. Personal aerial reconnaissance by Recon elements before insertion is usually not available and rarely practical below the team leader level. To fill this deficiency, the complete aerial photos which were readily available in the Task Force G-2 were thoroughly exploited. Each and every member of all patrols was able to study the photos of his area of operation, along with his map, before entry. The photos were 1:5,000 in scale. This planning and briefing aid was the most important single improvement over previous Reconnaissance operations.

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h. Radio Communications. All communications with patrols were conducted on F.M.. 33 of the 35 teams were equipped with the AN/PRC-25 radio. The other two carried the AN/PRC-10 radio. Internal communication for company and platoon patrols was by AN/PRC-10/25. The PRC-25 continues to be the only acceptable radio for deep reconnaissance operations. Loud and clear communications were achieved on Double Eagle I at ranges up to 35,000 meters. Difficulties were experienced with the handset. When it becomes wet, it may lose either transmission or reception. Three teams were retracted because of these difficulties. One lost reception and two lost transmission. A heavy plastic material secured over the handset appears to completely alleviate this difficulty. Relay stations were used when elements were operating out of line of sight at great distances. Three positions were occupied solely for this purpose.

Communications between Group Headquarters at the Task Force CP and Force Recon Company Headquarters at BaTo were provided by A.M. using PRC-47 and PRC-75 equipment. This net was sporadic and of low quality being barely acceptable. Most of the difficulty was caused by the high concentration of similar equipment in the Task Force CP.

i. Coordination with Infantry Units. Although Reconnaissance elements were employed entirely in general support of the Task Force, circumstances frequently dictated close coordination with infantry battalions operating in the vicinity of the CP's. When infantry elements closed within 3000 meters of an CP position, the team was instructed to come up on the cognizant battalion tactical net and pass all sightings immediately to that station. Once each hour, the team returned to the Recon Report Net to pass a summary of the hour's activities. No artillery or naval gunfire missions were called by the CP unless the battalion requested them to do so. This procedure insured that the infantry elements did not fire into the CP position and provided the infantry commander with an additional source of enemy activity information to which he could immediately react.

j. Location of Reconnaissance Group Command Post. The contiguous location of the Provisional Reconnaissance Group Command Post to both Task Force "D" CP and the MAG-36 CP greatly facilitated planning, control and reaction. Facilities available in the CP area provided by both Task Force and MAG-36 eliminated all administrative and logistical problems. Helicopter operations were concurrently planned and executed with great ease and frequent face-to-face briefings in leisure. Debriefing of elements upon retraction was simplified with the results immediately available to Task Force Staff sections. The G-2 photo section was able to readily and quickly fulfill requests for prints of anticipated target areas. Time in reaction was cut significantly in every area from quick insertions of elements requested by the G-2 to emergency retraction of embattled teams. The Group CP location was excellent.

15. Commander's Analysis. Reconnaissance operations in support of Task Force "D" on Double Eagle I are considered to have been highly successful. The geography of the MACR provided excellent observation positions. Thousands of square meters, which help to make clandestine reconnaissance activities practical and possible were available. As the infantry operations gained in momentum, and changes were made from the original plans, locating reconnaissance elements ahead of or on the flanks of the infantry in specific areas became increasingly difficult.

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
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Some areas covered by observation became of little importance as operations changed directions, while other areas became vitally important where no reconnaissance elements were positioned. Lack of high helicopter priority on three occasions prevented timely insertions into imminent areas of infantry operations. Had this not occurred, even greater, more valuable support might have been furnished by reconnaissance elements. Although many sightings of the enemy were made and reported, some highly significant, the utilization of this information was frequently a little disappointing. The fleeting nature of the VC/NVA units makes some of this frustration unavoidable. The most difficult part of this war has previously been in finding the enemy. This has been at best partially solved by the effective use of ground reconnaissance. Perhaps our attention should now be directed to techniques and methods for fixing him until he can be destroyed. The Provisional Reconnaissance Group found and reported 918 enemy soldiers. The Task Force killed 312 Viet Cong/NVA.

16. Recommendations

- a. That the Reconnaissance Group continue in general support of Task Force "D" on future operations.
- b. That future Reconnaissance operations be confined to teams and companies.
- c. That co-locations of Task Force "D" CI and MAG-36 CI and Provisional Recon Group CI be continued.
- d. That more AN/PRC-25 radios be made available on a one-for-one basis of exchange for IRC-10 radios now in the T/E.
- e. That complete aerial photography coverage be made available for future operations as it was on Double Eagle I.


JAMES L. CONLTON
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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OPERATIONAL DAILY SUMMARY

21 Jan (D-7) One platoon size patrol operated vic BS 5236 (See Patrol Route Overlay, Enclosure (6)). 1 sighting of 4-6 VC was made; 1 contact was made, resulting in 1 USMC KIA.

22 Jan (D-6) Two platoon patrols were employed. 1 sighting of 30-50 VC was made; 1 contact resulting in 7 VC KIA and 1 USMC KIA was made.

23 Jan (D-5) One platoon patrol was employed. 1 sighting of 5 VC was made, and there was 1 contact, with no known casualties.

24 Jan (D-4) No active patrolling.

25 Jan (D-3) 1st Force Recon prepared to insert patrols to establish OP's.

26 Jan (D-2) 6 patrols operating to establish OP's (See OP Overlay, Enclosure (3)).

27 Jan (D-1) 6 OP's in operation. 4 sightings were made totaling 18 VC.

28 Jan (D-Day) 6 OP's in operation. 11 sightings totaling 53 VC were made. Significant movement to the West was noted in valley vic BS 5938.

29 Jan (D+1) 6 OP's were in operation. 7 sightings were made totaling 26 VC. Significant activity was again noted in valley vic BS 5938. 1 contact was made resulting in 2 VC KIA, 1 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIA (See Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts (Enclosure (2))). 2 artillery missions were fired with 6 possible VC KIA.

30 Jan (D+2) 8 OP's were in operation. 3 sightings totaling 15 VC were made. 1 artillery mission was fired, resulting in 6 possible VC KIA.

31 Jan (D+3) 9 OP's were in operation. 18 sightings were made totaling 106 VC and 300 VCS. Significant movement or activity was noted moving West across river vic BS 6147. 1 artillery mission was fired with unknown results.

1 Feb (D+4) 11 OP's were in operation; 23 sightings were made totaling 104 VC. 6 naval gunfire and 3 artillery missions were fired resulting in 19 VC KIA confirmed. One platoon size patrol was conducted vic BS 6038, and body of 1 USMC KIA was recovered. Significant movement to the Southwest was noted in valley vic BS 7931.

2 Feb (D+5) 10 OP's were in operation; 22 sightings totaling 58 VC were made. One platoon size patrol was conducted vic BS 5236, and a second platoon was inserted vic BS 7532 to commence prisoner snatch patrol. 1 contact was made with no known casualties, and 1 artillery mission was fired. Movement to the Southwest continued via BS 7931.

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- 3 Feb (D+6) 9 OP's were in operation; 17 sightings totaling 106 VC were made. 5 contacts were made resulting in 3 VC KIA, 4 VC WIA, and 1 USMC WIA. 2 artillery missions were fired. Sighting of possible PAVN elements was made vic BS 6529.
- 4 Feb (D+7) 8 OP's were in operation; 6 sightings were made totaling 49 VC. 3 contacts were made resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 USMC WIA. 1 naval gunfire mission was fired with excellent coverage of target. Significant movement Northwest vic BS 7732 was noted.
- 5 Feb (D+8) 4 OP's were in operation; 2 sightings were made totaling 15 VC. 2 contacts were made with no known casualties.
- 6 Feb (D+9) 4 OP's were maintained, but no sightings were made due to heavy fog and rain.
- 7 Feb (D+10) 3 OP's were in operation, and one company size patrol was conducted. 5 contacts were made resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 VC possible KIA, 3 VC WIA and 1 USMC WIA. 9 sightings were made totaling 60 VC. 2 artillery missions were fired.
- 8 Feb (D+11) 6 OP's were in operation; 7 sightings were made totaling 56 VC. 1 contact was made with no casualties, and 4 artillery missions were fired with unknown results.
- 9 Feb (D+12) 5 OP's were in operation, and one company patrol was conducted. 8 sightings totaling 36 VC were made, and 6 contacts were made resulting in 3 VC KIA, and 6 WIA. 1 POW captured.
- 10 Feb (D+13) 7 OP's in operation and 2 sniper teams were employed. 2 sightings were made of 8 VC. 2 contacts were made resulting in 3 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA.
- 11 Feb (D+14) 7 OP's were in operation. 2 sightings were made totaling 2 VC and 40 VCS. 1 contact was made with no casualties, and 3 artillery missions were called. Significant activity was noted of 30-40 VCS moving into hamlet near Task Force Delta Command Post.
- 12 Feb (D+15) 5 OP's were in operation and 5 sightings totaling 111 VC and 60 VCS were made. 1 contact was made and 1 artillery mission was fired resulting in possibly 10 VC and 2 81mm mortars destroyed. Hard-core or PAVN elements were located vic BS 5642.
- 13 Feb (D+16) 5 OP's were in operation and 4 sightings were made totaling 35 VC. 1 contact was made resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIA.
- 14 Feb (D+17) 2 OP's were maintained, no sightings were made.
- 15 Feb (D+18) All OP's were recovered.

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CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF ALL SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS

211705H	BS 521369	4-6 VC penetrated patrol base and fired small arms. 1 USMC MIA.
221015H	BS 524369	30-50 VC attacked patrol with small arms, wearing khaki uniforms w/leggings and rain hats. 7 VC KIA, 1 USMC MIA. Artillery fired to cover withdrawal.
231105H	BS 606375	5 VC fired on patrol. Appeared to wear khaki w/rain hats. No known casualties.
271030H	BS 635314	2 men moving north, wearing black w/packs.
271045H	BS 623314	2 men emplacing panji stakes, one in black, other in maroon shorts, w/packs.
271300H	BS 649139	3 men moving down streambed, wearing black w/weapons.
271238H	BS 616306	11 men setting panji stakes and camouflaging pits, 3 wearing khaki w/packs, all had rifles.
280825H	BS 639294- BS 644294	Observed panji stakes and fighting holes dug into roadbank facing south, recently camouflaged.
281005H	BS 622298- BS 634296	Observed roadblock consisting of large pits 3-5 feet deep every 20-40 yards.
281040H	BS 595385	15 men moving west, wearing dark uniforms w/packs and weapons.
281105H	BS 595385	4 men moving west, in dark utilities w/packs, undet- ermined weapons.
281140H	BS 591391	6 men crossed river moving north, wearing black w/packs and weapons.
281205H	BS 597387	3 men moving east, w/packs and undetermined weapons.
281220H	BS 595385	3 men moving west, w/packs.
2811430H	BS 656329	5 men moving down streambed, wearing black w/packs and weapons.
281510H	BS 595385	9 men moving west on road, three wearing grey uniforms and rain hats, 3 packs and 5 weapons.
281620H	BS 596387	3 men moving west, wearing rain capes, 2 packs, 1 suitcase and 3 weapons.
281700H	BS 638314	4 men walking on rice paddy dikes, wearing black w/weapons.

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281730H BS 638314 1 man moving in paddy, wearing black w/carbine. Possibly observed OP. Began beating on bamboo stick.

290930H BS 597387 6 men moving west, wearing black and 1 wearing construction-type helmet, w/weapons and 3 bicycles.

290940H BS 597387 2 men moving west, wearing black w/weapons.

291035H BS 596386 1 man moving east, wearing blue-grey uniform w/weapon.

291210H BS 602378 6 VC approached OP site from south and opened fire on team with M-1's and carbines. 1 USMC KIA. Team moved to BS 600380. Artillery fired while team withdrew to LZ.

291400H BS 599378 6 VC fired on team with automatic weapons and small arms from close range. VC wore black trousers and khaki shirts. 2 VC KIA, 1 USMC KIA. PRC-25 lost.

291535H BS 637313 1 man walking along paddy dike wearing black w/weapon.

291530H BS 651327 Encountered VC harbor site or OP during fog conditions and heard 9-10 VC yelling, but received no fire. Artillery fired w/6 possible KIA.

301305H BS 749395 4 men moving east on trail wearing black w/packs.

301315H BS 656328 5 men walking along river wearing black w/packs.

301505H BS 625284 6 men on Hill 763 setting panji stakes or booby traps. Artillery fired w/6 possible KIA.

311135H BS 652317 Fired artillery on possible VC harbor site. Number of VC undetermined. No surveillance.

311312H BS 635454 23 men in dispersed column moving northeast, appeared to come out of tunnel.

BS 634455 12 more men occupying position. Artillery unable to fire due to troop helilift.

BS 634455 9 boats moving north.

311345H BS 627426 5 men moving in woodline, wearing black w/3 rifles and 2 sacks.

311349H BS 617475 300 people milling around. No visible weapons.

311400H BS 751375 5 men moving east on trail wearing black w/3 cartridge belts and 1 rifle.

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311400H BS 620427 15 men in hamlet. 2 wearing khaki w/packs, rifles and 1 machine gun. Artillery unable to fire due to helilift.

311403H BS 617473 1 man moved from hedgerow to hut near river w/rifles.

311420H BS 746371 9 men came out of hut and moved southwest wearing black w/packs and cartridge belts.

BS 615476 4 men moving north on trail, wearing black w/packs and rifles.

311600H BS 670417 1 man and 1 boy running on trail wearing black w/1 rifle.

311602H BS 617475 2 men moving north on trail wearing camouflage utilities w/packs and rifles.

311650H BS 615470 7 men near river, 2 wearing camouflage utilities, no weapons or packs.

311700H BS 605354-
BS 653354 Observed signal light. Targeted for TRQ-10.

311740H BS 618476 1 man walking west on woodline, black trousers and khaki shirt w/pack.

311830H BS 630420 10 men moved south to village at BS 620427 wearing black w/6 rifles.

311845H BS 632422 5 men crossing river wearing black w/2 rifles. Appears to be ferrying point.

311830H BS 748355 6 men moving east on trail, 5 wearing grey uniforms w/5 packs and 2 unidentifiable objects on shoulders.

311855H BS 604483-
BS 627440 NO checking 311349H sighting reports over 150 boats and about 300 people in area.

010815H BS 782322 Observed area 30 meters X 50 meters of freshly cut panji stakes.

010940H BS 788314 4 men moving south west, 1 wearing grey w/3 packs and 1 rifle.

010950H BS 614259 2 men appear to be manning OP wearing uniforms of unknown color. w/2 packs and 2 rifles.

011040H BS 614260 8 men walking up hill with weapons. Artillery fired with unknown results.

011053H BS 788310 2 men moving southwest on trail, wearing green utilities, camouflage covers and packs.

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011115H BS 780314 2 men moving southwest in paddy wearing black w/1 pack and 1 rifle.

011200H BS 788310 10 men stacking heavy packs in bushes, wearing black w/10 packs.

011200H BS 787310 6 men moving southwest on trail, 2 wearing blue w/grey hats, packs and 2 rifles.

011210H BS 787310 3 men moving southwest on trail wearing green utilities w/green hats, 2 packs and 1 rifle.

011215H BS 788310 2 men stacking heavy packs in bushes, wearing black, w/2 packs.

011252H BS 788310 4 men moving south, wearing khaki uniforms with leggings, 1 helmet and 4 rifles. Naval gunfire fired on target. No surveillance.

011255H BS 790315 15 men moving north into group of huts, 6 wearing tan uniforms, others black, 6 rifles, 2 automatic weapons and 15 packs. 54 rounds of Naval gunfire fired on area, huts destroyed. 15 VC KIA.

011410H BS 750382 2 men walking north east on trail, wearing grey uniforms and covers, w/packs and rifles.

BS 793312 5 men moving south east on trail, 3 wearing utilities, w/4 packs and 2 rifles.

011420H BS 795332 4 men moving north east in paddy wearing black with 2 packs.

011455H BS 791314 5 men moving north east on trail wearing black w/ packs and weapons.

011505H BS 791314 2 men searching paddy where Naval gunfire landed 1 wearing white, w/1 rifle.

011530H BS 791314 3 men moving south west on trail, 1 wearing camouflage utilities, 1 in khaki and other in black, w/1 pack and 1 rifle.

011544H BS 791314 4 men moving north east on trail. 2 wearing tan and 1 camouflage utilities, w/4 packs and 2 rifles.

011606H BS 791314 1 man moving south west, w/ pack and rifle. 104 rounds of Naval gunfire fired on 5 areas of valley (3 harbor sites, group of huts and trail complex).

011755H BS 624428 6 men in woodline wearing black w/packs and 2 rifles. Artillery fired with good coverage of target.

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011835H BS 624428 4 men moved into huts wearing black, w/packs and rifles. Artillery fired and huts destroyed. 4 VC KIA.

011835H BS 755372 8 men moving east on trail, 1 wearing grey, w/5 packs and 1 weapon.

020845H BS 788322 1 man moving southeast in paddy wearing tan w/rifle.

020910H BS 747388 1 man moving north across paddy wearing grey w/pack.

021000H BS 787324 1 man moving east on trail wearing tan uniform w/pack and rifle.

021045H BS 739392 2 men walking north across paddy, wearing black w/packs and rifles.

BS 747388 2 men moving north across paddy wearing black, w/2 packs camouflaged with leaves.

021100H BS 593257 Observed air vent in hollow tree on side of hill. Light seen inside. Whole area smells of death and many recent graves.

BS 793325 2 men moving northwest on trail wearing black w/packs.

021105H BS 792324 3 men and 1 woman moving northwest on trail wearing black, w/2 packs.

021145H BS 787321 3 men in bushes wearing black w/rifles and cartridge belts.

021200H BS 653304 Observed VC harbor site for about 10 people. Recently used.

021330H BS 627429 3 people in bushes wearing black. w/1 pack.

021530H BS 748390 2 men and 1 boy walking south across rice paddy, wearing black with 3 packs.

021600H BS 788320 4 men running across paddies wearing tan uniforms w/4 packs.

021602H BS 745387 3 men moving east on trail, 1 wearing grey and 1 green, 3 packs and 2 cartridge belts.

021730H BS 625455 Observed 2 nd. Battalion 4th. Marine elements receiving mortar fire in LZ. Fired artillery mission against suspected mortar position.

021825H BS 788311 1 man walking southwest on trail wearing black w/pack.

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021838H BS 795307 4 men moving southeast on trail, 1 wearing khaki, w/2 packs and 2 rifles.

021844H BS 799296 8 men moving southwest in column wearing black, w/8 packs and 8 rifles.

021845H BS 742382 Team encountered unknown number of VC in landing zone and pursued VC by fire. Casualties unknown. 1 observed VC wore black.

021852H BS 794304 2 men placing panji stakes, 1 wearing khaki.

021940H BS 635434-
BS 636448 Observed signal lights. Areas targeted for TRQ and H&I fires.

022000H BS 750375 10-15 men wearing grey uniforms live in hamlet, but do no work.

030744H BS 796307 12 men sitting or standing in paddy, wearing black w/1 pack.

030915H BS 799296 3 men crossing paddy wearing black, w/3 packs and 3 rifles.

030928H BS 799296 3 men moving southeast wearing black w/1 pack and 3 rifles.

030940H BS 798295 3 men moving southwest wearing black w/packs.

030949H BS 796313 8 men moving northwest on trail wearing black pajamas w/packs.

030956H BS 797292 3 men moving southwest on trail wearing black w/packs.

031015H BS 638446 Observed 2 WP and 3 HE mortar bursts. Sensing indicates mortars located at BS 650450 - 650438.

031100H BS 674361 7 VC wearing black engaged rear point of 5 man patrol. 2 VC KIA and 2 VC WIA. Team recovered 031525H.

031130H BS 809267 4 men moving northeast along streambed, 2 wearing khaki, 1 green, and 1 black w/packs, 1 Thompson SIG, 2 carbines, 1 M-1.

031150H BS 576262 6 VC ambushed team while moving through elephant grass. Fire returned and patrol withdrew and called artillery mission.

031205H BS 795308 2 men and 1 woman moving north on trail wearing black w/2 packs and 2 weapons.

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031215H BS 580264 Team previously in contact received fire in LZ during recovery. 5 VC were observed wearing 2 khaki and 3 green uniforms, w/automatic carbines and M-1's.

031400H BS 659289 3 men moving southeast wearing black w/packs and rifles.

031500H BS 658298 15 VC moving toward OP wearing green camouflage utilities and helmets w/packs, rifles and 1 81mm mortar. Artillery fired right on target, unknown casualties. Helicopters received fire during recovery.

031926H BS 766323 Patrol ambushed 7 VC wearing camouflaged utilities w/rucksacks and weapons. 1 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA.

031930H BS 830253 Team got caught in middle of firefight between 20-30 VC and 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines. 1 USMC WIA as result of mortar round.

040700H BS 759323 Patrol being recovered received intense small arms fire in LZ.

041000H BS 806279 2 men moving east wearing black w/1 rifle and 1 pack.

041415H BS 777325 7 men moving north wearing black, w/4 rucksacks and 2 rifles.

041500H BS 774321 3 men moving south, 2 wearing grey shirts, w/1 rifle.

041530H BS 800280 Patrol encountered 2 VC wearing black w/1 carbine, resulting in 2 VC KIA. 5 additional VC were observed. Team withdrew and was recovered.

041840H BS 775325 30 men moving northwest wearing black w/packs and rifles. 67 rounds of naval gunfire covered target. Unable to observe casualties due to darkness.

051445H BS 805290 15 VC pursued patrol by fire. VC wore khaki and soft covers, and carried chinese carbines. Team withdrew and was recovered.

051815H BS 743273 Aborted insertion of team when helicopters received fire in LZ.

070920H BS 800298 Company patrol encountered 3 VC in black. 2 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA. Many documents captured indicating VC were economic and education cadre. 2 pistols captured.

071048H BS 805303 20 men moving in column wearing black. Artillery fired with excellent effect.

071257H BS 634241 5-10 men moving down streambed w/weapons. Artillery fired, no surveillance.

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071452H BS 798296 3 VC encountered. 1 VC WIA. 1 shotgun captured. 1 USMC WIA.

BS 788278 Patrol ambushed 3 VC in green uniforms. 1 VC WIA.

BS 792281 Concealed village located. 4 tons of rice and 10 bolts of silk and blanket material destroyed.

071720H BS 804303 6 VC in trees ambushed patrol with hand grenades and 1 submachine gun. 2 VC KIA (possible).

071800H BS 810315 Company received intense fire in LZ during recovery.

071940H BS 595238 15 people moving southwest. Too dark for further observation.

081239H BS 624265 3 men manning OP wearing black w/packs. Artillery fired, casualties unknown.

081307H BS 624265 VC harbor site. Artillery fired, no surveillance.

081550H BS 500299 30 VC in harbor site. Artillery fired, no surveillance.

081700H BS 561221 2 men walking south wearing khaki w/rucksacks.

081815H BS 730328 6 men in trench, 2 wearing brown w/weapons. Area covered with 5 feet panji stakes.

082130H BS 662362 15 men were observed close to OP wearing black and no covers w/carbines and bandoliers of ammunition.

090800H- BS 6423 Heard noise of possible generator or motor.
111800H

090130H BS 666363 10-15 VC encountered team. Firefight with small arms ensued, resulting in 2 VC KIA, 3 VC WIA.

090800H BS 652365 2 VC fired on helicopters recovering team. VC wore black and had carbines. 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA.

091110H BS 795324 3 men moving southwest in paddy, 1 wearing blue shirt, w/1 pack.

091115H BS 783337 1 VC wearing blue and black w/shotgun encountered patrol. 1 VC WIA.

091145H BS 767318 6-10 VC fired on patrol. 1 VC WIA.

091300H BS 805325 1 man discovered OP and fled, wearing black w/pack.

091735H BS 779337 Captured wounded VC from contact at 091115H. 2 other VC in black fled.

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091845H BS 614268 Patrol awaiting recovery fired on 2 VC in black with unknown results.

10 Feb BS 5623 Between 6-10 February, noise of an engine was heard. Believed that the engine was mobile and moved. Engine would race as if under varying degrees of stress.

100900H BS 781322 2 men on Hill with OP moving east. Possibly observed OP.

101205H BS 784324 6 men watching and pointing at OP, 2 wearing khaki w/packs and weapons.

101700H BS 8241 Recon snipers working with Co E, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines killed 3 VC and wounded 1 VC.

110905H BS 837384 2 men moving west on trail carrying stretcher with body on it. Men wearing black.

111100H BS 605374 Team being inserted by helicopter received .50 cal. machine gun fire.

112030H BS 522351-
BS 503347 Observed lights, possible signals. 2 artillery missions fired, no surveillance.

111100H BS 853381 30-40 men acting suspiciously. 1 man has a rifle.

112125H BS 524298 Patrol heard noise of possibly 4 men near their position. Artillery fired, no surveillance.

120741H BS 841374 50-60 people crossed river after firefight. Co E, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines reacting to 111100H sighting of 40 men.

121830H BS 568427 4 men moving north towards team's position wearing green uniforms.

BS 556432 7 men moving south towards team's position, wearing green uniforms, with camouflaged packs and rifles.

BS 543424 20 men moving northeast towards team's position, wearing camouflaged green utilities, camouflaged helmets, w/khaki packs, weapons and 2 81mm mortars. Split into two groups with one emplacing mortars and others moving towards team. Artillery fired with 10 possible VC KIA and 2 mortars destroyed.

121845H BS 545424 Artillery adjustment round landed in woods. 80 men moved out northeast in column on each side of SUOI LY river. Men wore green uniforms and covers, camouflaged with brush and weapons.

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130745H BS 830372 8 men moving southeast and southwest across paddies wearing mixed khaki and black. Weapons hidden under arms.

130910H BS 528387 20 men moving south, wearing mixed grey and black uniforms, with packs. Weapons not distinguishable. Requested fire mission, not fired due to unpositive VC identification.

131015H BS 527406 5 men standing on trail, 2 wearing grey, possibly have weapons.

131525H BS 503415 Unknown number of VC got above team and rolled satchel charge down hill. An unknown number then began encircling team. Enroute to HLZ, firefight ensued resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIA. Team's AN/PRC-25 radio was captured by VC.

Enclosure (2)

-10-

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ENCLOSURE

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PROVISIONAL RECON GROUP
TASK FORCE DELTA
3RD MARINE DIVISION, III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96601

3/JRG/rjm
28 Feb 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Task Force Delta

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE II)

Ref: (a) Combat After Action Report (Operation DOUBLE EAGLE)
(b) DivOpO 3214-65
(c) Frag Order 109-66

Encl: (1) Operations Summary
(2) Chronological Listing of Sightings and Contacts
(3) OP and Patrol Route Overlay

1. Provisional Recon Group
2. 19 February - 27 February 1966
3. Quang Tin Province: (E-W) BT 00-20
(N-S) BT 17-30
4. Command Headquarters: Headquarters Group, Recon Group Alfa
5. Reporting Officers: Commanding Officer, CoB(-)(Rein), 3rd Recon Bn -
Captain COMPTON
Commanding Officer, 1st Force Recon Co -
Captain SHIVER
6. Task Organization: Co C(-), 1st Recon Bn
1st Force Recon Co (-)
2nd Plt, Co A, 3rd Recon Bn
Headquarters Group, Recon Group Alfa
7. Supporting Forces:

HTM-261

HTM-362

HTM-363

HTM-364

VMO-6

H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines

H Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines

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8. Intelligence: See Operational Daily Summary (Enclosure (1)) and Chronological listing of Sightings and Contacts (Enclosure (2)).

9. Mission: To conduct ground reconnaissance in support of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE II in assigned TROs.

10. Concept: No change.

11. Execution: 5 team size OP's and 2 company size patrols were employed to accomplish the mission.

12. Results: During the operation 29 sightings were made totaling 130 VC and 50 VCS. 7 contacts were made resulting in 2 VC KI. by small arms. 4 artillery missions were fired, resulting in 6 VC KI. (possible). 1000 pounds of rice was destroyed. No USMC casualties or losses.

13. Administrative Matters: No problems encountered.

14. Special Techniques: No change.

15. Commander's Analysis: Reconnaissance operations in support of DOUBLE EAGLE II were only moderately successful. The primary reason for this was the restrictive size of the TRO and the high population density. Great difficulty was encountered in locating teams so as not to interfere with infantry operations or indicate future intentions to the enemy. Also, of the five teams employed, two were compromised by VC happening upon their positions and a third was compromised by VCS in the LZ upon insertion. Two other teams were unable to be inserted because all the available LZ's being hot or so heavily punji staked that helicopters couldn't land.

A secondary reason for only moderate success was the weather. When it wasn't raining, there was such a heavy ground fog as to preclude observation for large portions of the day.

16. Recommendations:

a. That the Reconnaissance Group continue in general support of Task Force Delta on future operations.

b. That reconnaissance elements be landed in areas prior to the commencement of infantry operations.


JAMES L. COMPTON

ENCLOSURE (2)

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OPERATIONAL DAILY SUMMARY

19 Feb (D-Day) 2 team size OP's in operation, 4 sightings were made totaling 6 VC, 1 contact. No casualties.

20 Feb (D+1) 2 team size OP's in operation, 7 sightings were made totaling 39 VC and 20 VCS. Infantry reaction platoon inserted to support OP.

21 Feb (D+2) 3 OP's in operation. 10 sightings were made totaling 36 VC and 30 VCS. 2 fire missions were called and 1 house destroyed and 6 VC possible KIA. Significant movement to the southeast was noted in valley at BT 2512. 1 team recovered due to compromise.

22 Feb (D+3) 2 OP's in operation. No sightings were made due to poor weather.

23 Feb (D+4) 2 OP's in operation. No sightings were made due to poor weather.

24 Feb (D+5) 2 OP's in operation. No sightings were made due to poor weather.

25 Feb (D+6) 2 OP's in operation and 2 company size patrols employed. 8 sightings were made totaling 49 VC. 6 contacts were made resulting in 2 VC KIA. 1000 pounds of rice was destroyed. 2 artillery missions were fired with no observed casualties.

26 Feb (D+7) All teams recovered. No sightings.

Enclosure (1)

ENCLOSURE (30)

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CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS

191815H	BT 204128	Helicopters received fire from unknown number of VC, uniform and equipment unknown.
191820H	BT 195118	LZ filled with tall punji stakes and helicopters unable to land.
191825H	BT 193134	6 men observed hiding in bushes around LZ, uniform and equipment unknown.
191830H	BT 1915	Observed men digging trenches across road. Trenches were 6'X5'X3' and were on alternate sides of road.
192005H	BT 1922	Heard heavy automatic fire.
200940H	BT 107215	4 men moving north on trail wearing grey-green utilities without brim hats, no visible weapons.
200945H	BT 167183	4 men sighted, one with weapon.
201015H	BT 167185	4 men running west from 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines patrol, wearing khaki uniforms, with rifles.
201123H	BT 157183	10 men moving east, carrying wounded man. Wearing black, one wearing blue, with 4 rifles.
201250H	BT 167183	6 men moving east and south in groups of 2 and 4, wearing black with 2 weapons.
201435H	BT 134209	13 men moving west and south towards OP, wearing green camouflaged uniforms, with packs and rifles. OP compromised. VC scared away by helicopters in area. Reaction platoon inserted to support OP.
201530H	BT 133207	Observed 2 elephants moving east on ridge. No equipment or people with them.
201800H	BT 239142	15-20 VCS were observed in area around LZ. No contact.
211045H	BT 265123	3 men moving southeast across paddy wearing black, with 2 rifles and 1 large pack.
211050H	BT 227115	3 men moving north across paddies, wearing black with 1 rifle.
211105H	BT 246118	Observed many people carrying bundles into 3 houses.
211137H	BT 246120	13 men moving southeast across paddies, 2 wearing khaki with bundles and 1 pack.

Enclosure (2)

ENCLOSURE (30)

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211209H BT 257127 9 men in column crossing paddy moving northwest and then turning southeast, wearing black, all with bundles. 2 carried something big, suspended from a pole, resembling a rifle box.

211310H BT 167197 10 men 100-150 meters from OP, wearing black and camouflaged with bushes, carrying weapons. Fire mission called, but ceased due to proximity of OP team. Team recovered by helicopter. UH1E's strafed and rocketed area.

211315H BT 254118 6 men going into house, wearing black with packs and rifles. Same house observed at 211105H.

211502H BT 131233 11 men in groups of 2 and 3 moving east and southeast with no equipment visible.

211705H BT 254118 Fire mission called on house with 6 VC. House destroyed, 6 possible VC KIA.

211730H BT 130226 1 man sending smoke signals, wearing black, no visible equipment.

211737H BT 254118 Observed secondary explosion 10-15 meters south of house destroyed in earlier fire mission.

211845H BT 263133 1 man walking north on road, wearing black with pack and rifle.

212100H BT 254118 Fired 1705H mission again, using replot.

250730H BT 140195 12 men with weapons. Artillery fired with good coverage of target.

250800H BT 166257 2 VC fired 15 rounds of automatic fire on patrol. Fire returned and contact broken. No casualties.

250845H BT 063280 Observed small arms fire at helicopters. Artillery fired.

251100H BT 160250 Found 1000 pounds of rice, destroyed same.

251240H BT 070305 20 people watching fire, wearing black, 6 with rifles. Fire caused by UH1E.

251300H BT 160124 2 VC fired on patrol. Fire returned, contact broken.

251345H BT 169182 5 VC walked into ambush, wearing black with weapons. 2 VC KIA. 1 carbine captured. Observed 4 VC moving west at BT 167177. They fired on ambush with automatic carbines.

ENCLOSURE (30)

Enclosure (2)

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251134H	BT 199193	Patrol received 5 rounds of small arms fire. Fire returned with unknown results. Contact broken.
251520H	BT 195188	7 men running west, 1 wearing khaki. 6 with packs, man in khaki carrying rifle.
251600H	BT 174178	1 VC fired 2 rounds at patrol. Fire returned, no casualties.
251715H	BT 184170	Helicopters recovering Scat units received intense fire from automatic weapons in LZ, from all sides. Fire returned by troops in LZ and by UH1E gunships.

ENCLOSURE (3)

Enclosure (2)

-3-

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FRAG ORDER 11-66

Team INDIAN

Debriefers: SSgt BASS

Maps: 6757 III, 1:50,000

Copy 16 of 45 copies
Co C, 1st Recon Bn
CHU LAI, RVN
031230H Feb 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT

- a. Composition: One officer, 4 enlisted, and 1 USN
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: 1 PRC-25 and 1 PRC-10
- d. Observation Equipment: 1 Pr 7.50 and 1 Pr 6x30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: None

2. MISSION: To establish CP's at BT 433010 and BT 420015, and observe the valley running east-west to the north east of the CP's.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 290700 Jan/031045H Feb 1966

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay.

5. SYNOPSIS: The entire patrol covered a period of approx. 99 hours with only two sightings being made. One spider trap was found and five VCS were seen with a rocket pod in their possession. One artillery mission was fired. A noticeable lack of activity was noted.

6. OBSERVATION OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. 011545H four VCS were seen tinkering with what appeared to be an old rocket pod at BT 426024. They were joined by one more VCS, all wore black PJ's and collie hats. No weapons were seen. Three of the five VCS then moved north-east towards the village of THANH MY TRUONG carrying the pod after camouflaging it with leaves.

(1) Artillery was called with negative results due to target being scattered. The other two VCS moved south west.

- b. 021300H one spider trap was found under the bushes at BT 420015. It was in good condition.

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

- a. It was noted that very little activity in the rice paddies and the areas west of the CP sites.

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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b. At neither of the landing sites, were there seen any mines or punji stakes.

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None

9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good with some dehydration due to heat.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. In possible future expansion of the TAOR, it is recommended that hill at BT 720015 be used as a infantry OP for complete command infantry control of the whole east/west valley complex.

S. W. CHIEFF

1stLt, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

11. ADDITIONAL REMARKS: None

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PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
Team: Indian, C. Co, 1st Recon Bn
Map Sheet, 6757 III, 1:50,000

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AZ 0 LZ WHITE
LZ Gold

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+ 98

ENCLOSURE (3)

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FRAG ORDER 11-65
Team CARDINAL
Debriefers: SSgt BASS

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CHU LAI, RVN
031330H Feb 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: 7 Enlisted
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: 2 PRC-10 radios
- d. Observation Equipment: 2 Pr 6x30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: One M-16 sniper rifle with 2.2 power scope

2. MISSION: Set up OP's at BT 398075 and BT 397090 and observe to the north east on hill 99 and to the south east from BT 398075.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 290700H Jan/031045H Feb 1966.

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay

5. SYNOPSIS: The entire patrol covered a total of approx. 99 hours. No significant sightings were made. It was noted on 1 Feb 66 that 6 VN entered the village in the afternoon than left in the morning. 29 left in the morning and 35 returned in the afternoon.

6. OBSERVATION OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN.

- a. On the 1st day of Feb, a total of 29 VN, 9 with baskets and 20 without left the village of TIEN XUANU at BT 407093. They moved south west on the trail and towards the hills. They were in groups of 1 to 7. In the afternoon a total of 35 VN returned to the village, 18 with baskets and 17 without baskets. They returned in groups of 1 to 5. No other activity was seen.

7. Other information: No opportunity was available for using the sniper rifle.

8. Results of enemy contact. None

9. Condition of patrol: Good

10. Comments and Recommendations: None

R. D. JOHNS
Sgt, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

11. Additional comments: None

ENCLOSURE (3)

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PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
Team: Cardinal, C.Co, 1st Recon Bn
Map Sheet: 6757 III, 1:50,000

$$\begin{array}{r} 08 \\ + \\ 37 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

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ENCLOSURE 32

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Co C, 1st Recon Bn
Chu Lai, Vietnam
050900H February 1966

Operation Order 12-66

Patrol: Red Socks, White Socks and Blue Socks

Debriefers: SSgt. W. A. BASS

Map Sheets: Vietnam 1:50,000, 6756 IV, 6757 III

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: (1) Off, (19) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. Special Attachments: None.
- c. Communications: 1 PRC-25, 3 PRC-10's
- d. Observation Equipment: 1 pair 7X50's, 3 pairs 6X30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None.
- f. Special Weapons: None.

2. MISSION: Establish OP and observe the villages of Tho An at coordinates BS 473954 and Tinh Trung at coordinates BS 437953. To patrol the area north of Tinh Trung and locate possible gun positions.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 010745H/040920H February 1966

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay.

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of approximately 74 hours. A total of three sightings were made, one of six people working in the brush either cutting or digging and two of old harbor sites. One new trail was seen, and normal activities were noted in the paddies.

6. OBSERVATIONS OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. At 011515H, six people were seen working in the brush along the river at coordinates BS 466954. It was impossible to see what they were doing. Their heads and coolie hats were seen bobbing up and down over the brush as they were either chopping or digging. At 1638H, they moved to the river and took a bath, then out to the village of Tho An.

b. At 020230H, an old harbor site was sighted at coordinates BS 435958. It was large enough to accommodate 8 to 10 people. Old cooking equipment was found along with sleeping boards. However, the site appeared not to have been occupied for two or three months.

c. At 030845H, an old harbor site was found at coordinates BS 439963, beside a trail running north to south with a stream paralleling it. It could accommodate approximately 100 people and contained pieces of old blue plastic ponchos, and old framework for single structures.

ENCLOSURE (3)

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A vine fence was built along the trail. A gun position was found about 2½ feet high with rocks piled up into a half moon shape. Possibly two men could have occupied the position. The harbor site did not appear recently used.

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. Normal activity was noted during the period (working on dikes, in the paddies and herding cattle).

b. At coordinates BS 448966, what is shown on the map as an evenly graduated slope is actually a steep cliff with a 300 foot drop.

c. At 011400H, 2 men were sent to check out the top of the hill at coordinates BS 442961. It was approximately 150 meters from the squad's position. After not finding a suitable OP site, they started their return to the squad position. However, in the thick brush they became disorientated and were forced to wait until daylight the next morning before returning to the squad.

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.

9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: Use the LZ at coordinates BS 438967 rather than the LZ at BS 453956 for entry into this area. This will save time, provide greater secrecy and security and allow for better orientation.


T. C. CARTER
1stLt. USMC
4th Plt, CoC
1stReconBn

11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: None.

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Patrol Route Overlay
Operation 12-66
Patrols: Red Socks, White
Socks and Blue Socks.
Map: Vietnam 1:50,000
6756 IV Tra Bong
6757 III Tri Binh



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ENCLOSURE (3)

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Co C, 1st Recon Bn
CHU LAI, RVN
071030H Feb 1966

FRAG ORDER 13-66

Team: ROYAL, WARRIOR, AND CELTIC

Debriefers: SSgt BASS

Maps: Sheet 6757 III, 6756 IV

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT

- a. Composition: Eight (8) enlisted
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: 1 PRC-25 and 1 PRC-10 radio
- d. Observation Equipment: 1 Pr 7x50 and 2 Pr 6x30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: None

2. MISSION: Establish OP's at BS 495926 and BS 490940 and observe any VC activities to the north and south of hill 109.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 030835H/061900H Feb 1966

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay

5. SYNOPSIS:

- a. The patrol covered a period of 81 hours with a total of 25 sightings with 101 VC and VCS sighted some of which possibly could be the same people seen more than once. More than the usual amount of activity was noted working in the rice paddies, herding cattle, etc., during the period.
- b. It was noted that people wearing white received a great deal of respect and courtesy from the others. When VC were seen moving in column generally the only rifle seen would be carried by the lead man.
- c. Smoke signals were seen and answers came from five different locations. Drums were heard on two occasions.
- d. The patrol received 7 sniper rounds while returning from patrol. No casualties were received and no fire was returned by the patrol.

6. OBSERVATION OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. At 031720H a large man in black PJ bottoms with no shirt or hat walked north-west across the rice paddies. No weapons were visible. He carried a basket on the end of a stick. He picked

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ENCLOSURE (34)

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up something in the middle of a rice paddy that looked like onions. He entered the rice paddy at BS 492921 and moved to BS 493923 then retraced his route in the opposite direction. He was real light complected and large for a Vietnamese. He was seen 3 more times during the patrol, sometimes herding cows and at other times working in the rice paddy.

- b. At 031800H about 25 VN were seen milling around in the village of PHUOC LAM (3) at BS 493919. At the distance involved the OP could not ascertain what they were doing. This movement continued until darkness. Most of these VN wore white. Others seemed to treat the people in white with unusual respect (Bowing, etc.)
- c. At 041010H four VCS moved east across the rice paddy at BS 488912. All wore black PJ's and were in column with approx a 5 meter interval. No weapons were visible, but the last two carried bundles.
- d. At 041040H 3 VN were working in the rice paddy with 2 water buffaloes. Three VCS moved out of the village at BS 486916. They moved in column to the men with the buffalo. They talked about 5 minutes then moved out in column again to the northeast maintaining about a 5 meter interval.
- e. At 041115H 2 VCS moved across the rice paddy at BS 485915 and entered the brush at BS 489915. Both wore black PJ's. The second man carried something on his back that was fairly large and bulky.
- f. At 141215H 5 VC moved from coord 489912 to BS 486915. The first VC carried a rifle; no others were visible. All wore black except the man in the center who wore white and appeared to be in charge. When they were approx 25 meters from the brush, the lead man ran into the brush. As the lead man entered the brush the last man in the column cut left and ran into the brush. The others continued to walk along into the brush.
- g. At 041225H 4 VCS marched in column into the paddy at BS 486915. They moved to the center of the rice paddy then circled and marched back disappearing into the brush at BS 486916. All wore black PJ's, and no weapons or equipment was visible.
- h. At 041231H 2 VCS crossed the rice paddy at BS 488912, just as they entered the paddy, everyone working in the paddy (approx 6 VN) picked up their tools and ran into the brush at BS 486913. The 2 VCS wore black PJ's.
- i. At 041245H one man entered the rice paddy and moved to coord BS 483913. At this coord an object had been observed all day, but it looked like a post as it never moved. The man walked up to it and held out something. The object moved and turned out to be a man, standing there completely naked. The man then turned and went

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back and re-entered the village. The naked man was still standing in the same spot until after dark, but was not there the next morning. He could be seen wiggling and bowing, but not walking.

CONFIDENTIAL At 041310H 1 VC man, 2 women, and 2 young boys were seen moving southeast. They observed L/Opl BUSTAMANTE in a tree observing them. The VC carried a rifle but they all took off running and disappeared at BS 491944. The 3 grown ups wore black and the 2 boys wore blue.

k. At 041320H 2 VC moved west at BS 502943, they wore gray uniforms. Both carried rifles and wore cartridge belts.

1. At 041320H 1 VC with a rifle entered a hut at BS 493918. He wore black bottoms and white top and carried a rifle.

m. At 041331H white smoke was seen coming from BS 489914. The smoke came up in puffs. About 3 hours later, 5 more white smokes were seen from 7 different locations. All were in puffs. (BS 494887, BS 489915, BS 486913, BS 489914, and BS 502910).

n. At 041346H 2 VC men, 2 women and 3 children moved south at BS 488911. The men wore black, the women white, but the children were naked. The man in the lead carried a rifle and was about 6 meters in advance of the column. The rest were spaced about 3 meters apart.

o. At 041355H 1 man moved from BS 489913 to BS 488913 where 1 man dressed in white jumped out of a hole right in front of him. The first man started bowing to the other man from the hole. After several bows both men went back and disappeared at BS 488913.

CONFIDENTIAL At 041525H 2 VCS crossed the rice paddies moving west at BS 483911 both carried either sticks or rifles. Which were carried like a rifle would be. Both wore black PJ's.

q. At 041535H 1 VCS walked to the center of the rice paddy at coord BS 487917 and waved his hat towards the far west end of the paddy. One man crossed the paddy from BS 488912 to BS 483911. He wore black. Five VC moved from BS 488914 across the rice paddy and entered the brush at BS 484916. The lead man of the 5 had a rifle and wore white. The rest wore black. When the five entered the brush the man with the rifle turned and recrossed the paddy entering the brush where they had originally exited at BS 488914.

r. At 041545H to 041600H, 3 VC (1 woman and 2 men) were seen moving southeast in a tactical column. All carried carbines. The woman was on point and wore blue. The 2 men wore black. They were observing the OP site and when they were about 200 meters away from the OP they turned and went towards TAY PHUOC (2) at BS 498947. Artillery could not be called due to just being able to observe them occasionally through the brush and close proximity to the OP site.

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
ENCLOSURE (34)

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PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
Team: WARRIOR, ROYAL and CELTIC
Maps: 6757 III and 6756 IV
071030H Feb 1966

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53



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FRAG ORDER 14-66

Team: PATRIOT and CHARGER

Debriefers: SSgt BASS

Map: Sheet 6757 III

Copy ~~new~~ of copies
Co C, 1st Recon Bn
CHU LAI, RVN
080900H Feb 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. COMPOSITION, SIZE AND EQUIPMENT

- a. Composition: 2 Officers, 12 enlisted, and 1 USN
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: 2 PKC-10 radios
- d. Observation Equipment: 1 Pr 7x50, 2 Pr 6x30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: 1 M-1 sniper rifle with 2.2 power scope

2. MISSION: Establish OI sites on hill 270, BT 419045 and hill 186 at BT 407035. Establish surveillance over Dong Co Valley, the trail networks and the Dong Nhon Valley. Establish surveillance over the villages of Ky Sanh (1), Ky Long (1) and (2).

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 040830H/071700H Feb 1966

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay

5. SYNOPSIS:

- a. The patrol covered a period of 81 hours with a total of 8 sightings. 3 VCS were seen performing some type of drill or tactics, and a total of 9 VCS were sighted during the patrol. Ironji stakes were found and one member of the patrol was slightly wounded by one. Lights were seen blinking off and on, but no patterns could be established.

6. OBSERVATION OF THE WEATHER AND TERRAIN:

- a. At 041430H, 7 VN herding 15 cows were seen just standing around at coord BT 428042. All were black PJ's. No weapons were seen. It was felt this was unusual due to the excess of people in ratio to the number of cows.
- b. At 041445H, 3 VCS were seen performing some type of tactics. All were black PJ's.
- c. At 051500H, 1 man wearing black moved past the village of Ky Long (2) at BT 432044. Everyone bowed to him as he passed.

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ENCLOSURE (33)

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- d. At 051701H, 4 VN were seen all sitting around listening to one man talk or lecture at BT 432044, they wore black, white and blue clothing.
 - e. At 051711H, 6 VCS walked N.E. in an evenly spaced column at BT 432041. They wore black with coolie hats. They disappeared into the brush.
 - f. At 061400H a fire fight was heard, it was later determined to be a fire fight between Marines, PF and VC.
 - g. 070935H - at coord BT 408033 on a trail about 20 punji stakes were found. They covered an area of about 5 meters by 10 meters. The stakes were well camouflaged in the grass. Cpl CROUCH was slightly wounded on the left shin just above the boot top by a stake.
 - h. At about 062030H lights were seen blinking off and on. No pattern could be established. Some were flashlights lighting trails. They were seen all around the villages in the area.
- 7. OTHER INFORMATION: The sniper rifle was not used.
 - 8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None
 - 9. CONDITION OF THE PATROL: Good. Cpl CROUCH was treated by the corpsman and immediately returned to duty.
 - 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
 - a. Artillery adjustments did not correspond with observers directions.
 - b. Recommend IRC-25 replace all PRC-10's which are inadequate for this type patrols.
 - c. Recommend T/E change be made to replace all 6x30 binoculars with 7x50 binoculars as the 6x30's are inadequate.

H.W. REED

1stLt, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

- 11. ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY DEBRIEFING: Consistent with both recommendations.


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PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY
Teams: PATRIOT and CHARGER
Map: 6757 III, 1:50,000
080900H Feb 1966

39
+06



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ENCLOSURE 35

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FRAG ORDER 15-66

Teams: 1st Plt, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

Debriefers: SSgt BASS

Maps: Sheets 6757 III, 6756 IV

Copy 19 45 copies
Co C, 1st Recon Bn
CHU LAI, RVN
091400H Feb 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT

- a. Composition: One off., 12 enl., and 1 USN
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: One PRG-25 and 3 PRG-10 radios
- d. Observation Equipment: Two 7x50 and one 6x30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: None

2. MISSION: Establish OP sites at coord BT 479967 and BS 495966 for surveillance of enemy movement on all routes of approach to CHU LAI.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 060900H/090900H February 1966

4. PATROL ROUTE: See attached overlay.

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of 72 hours and had two sightings. Only 2 VC were seen. A possible supply cache was observed with VN carrying empty baskets in and full baskets out.

6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. At 081231H, two VC were seen moving southwest into the village of TAY PHUOC (1) at coord BS 480980. Both wore camouflage and had rifles. The two VC appeared to come from BS 479959.

b. All morning on 8 Feb a group of about 7 VN left the village carrying empty baskets and disappeared at BS 479959. About 25 minutes later the same 7 would return with baskets loaded. One basket had a white cover. These VN made about six trips back and forth that morning.

7. OTHER INFORMATION: Normal activity was noted in the rice paddies. Most of the crops are now in. Lots of fresh water streams on hill 282 in grid square BS 4796 and 4896.

8. RESULTS OF ENEMY CONTACT: None

9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Recommendations: Infantry unit check out coord BS 479959 for a possible supply cache.

S. W. CHIEF
1stLt, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: None

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
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PATROL REPORT OVERLAY

Team: 1st Plt., Co C, 1st Recon Bn

Map: Sheet 6757 III, 6756 IV

091400H Feb 1966



LEGEND

- 1st Sqd
- x 2nd Sqd
- Pickup
- △ OP

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ENCLOSURE (5)

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FRAG ORDER 16-66

Teams: ELK and MOOSE, 4th Platoon

Debriefers: SSgt. W. A. DASS

Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Tri Dinh 6757 III

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 Co C, 1st Recon Bn
 Chu Lai, RVN
 101300H Feb 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: (1) Off, (16) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. Special Attachments: None.
- c. Communications: 1 PRC-25, 3 PRC-10 radios.
- d. Observation Equipment: 2 pair 7X50's, 2 pair 6X30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None.
- f. Special Weapons: None.

2. MISSION: Determine VC activity in RZ 2 from 7-10 February 1966.

3. ROUTE: See attached overlay.

4. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 070920H/100830H February 1966.

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of 71 hours with a total of four sightings. No VC were seen; only one possible VCS was seen who appeared to be searching for something. Harbor sites were found, one of which was fairly new and had 7 positions, well dug in, with positions set along the trail leading into it. One position next to the trail appeared to be a dummy position with a well-camouflaged position about 20 feet further off the trail. At one time, 2 or 3 chickens were heard in the brush.

6. OBSERVATIONS OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. 071500H. It was noted that on the high ground on the hill in grid square BT 4303, it was thick with harbor sites, some fairly recently used. The area has real thick brush about 10 feet high.

b. 080800H. Chickens were heard cackling at coordinates BT 409031. It sounded like two or three.

c. 091535H. One man dressed in a blue shirt and black shorts was seen moving around at coordinates BT 413035. He appeared to be looking for something. He dodged in and out of the brush and continued to search until about 1630H, when he disappeared into the brush and never came out.

d. 091700H. A harbor site was found at coordinates BT 422030. It contained seven positions dug back into the ground. Three were dug down about 3 feet and then back in about 4 feet.

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ENCLOSURE 6

CONFIDENTIAL

They were L shaped. The other four were the same at the entrance and dug back about 5 feet with a 1½ inch bamboo air vent at the back end. The digging was fairly fresh as the digging tool marks could still be seen. Two cooking fires were found, and 1 PRC-10 radio battery had been burned and destroyed. 1 complete clay pot, 3 broken dishes, 1 bottle of clear oil and portions of a basket that had been broken up were found. Some black and blue poncho material and bags were found. 2 milk cans about the size of C ration cans and a number 10 can were seen. The small cans were shiny but the big can was rusty. 8 flat rocks were seen stacked up in the center. The trail out to the northwest was well defined and about every 20 yards had pits dug about 3½ feet long by 2½ feet wide and 2 feet deep. They were in pairs on the south side of the trail. The position closest to the trail was not camouflaged, but the one about 20 feet off the trail was well camouflaged. Both overlooked the trail. A rock pile of eleven flat rocks was found midway along the trail. The trail was approximately 100 yards long where the positions were dug in. The whole trail is approximately 250 yards and leads into a rice paddy at coordinates BT 421033

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. New trail at coordinates BT 417036. See attached patrol route overlay.

b. Normal activity was noted in the rice paddies. About 40 cattle were grazing and being herded, about half were water buffalo.

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

9. CONDITION OF THE PATROL: Excellent.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS:

a. It is recommended that H&I fires be fired on the high ground in grid square DT 4303.

b. It is recommended that H&I or delay time fuze fire and/or napalm be fired on the harbor site and trail leading into it at coordinates DT 422-030.

T. C. CARTER
1stLt. USMC

11. ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY DEBRIEFER: None.

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Group FragO 17-66
 Team: SEABROOK 20
 Debriefers: SSgt BASS
 Map: 6756 IV, 6757 III

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 Co C, 1st Recon Bn
 CHU LAI, RVN
 121315H Feb 66

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: One off, 10 enl, and 1 USN
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: 1 PRC-25, 1 PRC-10 radios
- d. Observation Equipment: 2 Pr 7x50 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: None

2. MISSION: Determine VC activity via MUI DA MIEU 9-12 Feb 1966

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 090815H/120920H Feb 1966

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of 73 hours with a total of nine sightings. No VC or VCS were seen. A VC first aid station was found, a VC village and base camp were found and at three different locations ponji stakes were found.

6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. At 091050H at coord BS 451927, two piles of saw grass were found with fresh digging under them. Upon taking off the grass a mound of dirt was found with a dug up area bout 6 ft long and five foot deep and five foot wide in an oval shape. The ground in the center was mounded about 3 ft long, 1 1/2 ft wide and 1 ft high. It had been dug fairly deep as noted by the two different colors of soil. One mound was approximately 2 days old, the other was about 2 weeks old. The saw grass was fresh on both mounds.
- b. At 100920H a VC first aid station was found at BS 457922. It contained 25 vitamin ampoules, 3 vials, 1 interavenous bottle, some old clothes, and a crutch. One vial contained some liquid. The station had been recently used.
- c. At 101030H an old house was found hidden in the brush at BS 455921. There were no trails into the house and the house was caved in on its stilts. The thatched roof was caved in.

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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- d. At 101130H a VC base camp was found at BS 463924. It has previously been reported by Lt. WILLIAMS. No indication of use for approximately three to four months was found. There were six buildings three of which had no roofs. Only one black PJ top was found. An out-door class room was found with a well cleared area approx. 20 ft by 3 ft and a podium or small desk. Bombs had previously been dropped about 70 meters south west of the base camp.
- e. At 101545H a possible grave was found at BS 458927. It was covered with fresh saw grass. It was about 5 ft off the trail on the west side.
- f. At 101845H 2 rounds of carbine fire came from the village of AN KHUONG (1) BS 475938. Both rounds passed over the patrol CP side.
- g. At 111335H punji stakes were found on the trail at BS 453933. They pointed north and were right on the trail. A baracade of limbs was across the trail. A bamboo pole was stuck in the ground at the baracade. It was split at the top with a punji stake stuck in the split. More punji sticks were found at BS 452934. They were on the down hill side of the trail and pointed down hill.
- h. At 111445H a VC village was found at BS 451932. See attached sketch. The village had a 6 1/2 ft fence on the north side. It was made of bamboo. The village didn't appear to have been used for at least a month.
- i. Punji stakes were found on the hill at BS 452933. There were about 100 and all were pointing north.

7. OTHER INFORMATION: Several trails were found in the area and are shown on the attached overlay.

8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: None

9. CONDITION OF THE PATROL: Good

10. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

- a. Conclusions: That the MUI DA MIEU complex has been used in the past to a great extent by the VC. Not only as a supply route, but storage, training/first aid, and rest. The built-up area was evacuated before or during the monsoon season and left intact which could indicate further future use. All main trails in the area are well used and have indications of recent, fairly heavy traffic.
- b. Recommendations: That this area be subjected to a single long-term operation designed to completely reconnoiter the area and destroy all permanent installations to deny them use to the VC in the future.

R.D. WILLIAMS

1stLt, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

11. ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY DEBRIEFER: None

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
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PATROL ROUTE AND TRAILS OVERLAY
Patrol Report-Group FragO 17-65
Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS
Sheet 6756 IV
Co C, 1st Recon Bn
CHU LAI, RVN
121500H Feb 1966


LEGEND

X - HARBOR SITE
mm - STREAM BEDS
— - TRAILS



ENCLOSURE (38)

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Frag Order 18-66
Team: Seabrook 3C
Debriefers: SSgt BASS

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Co 1st Recon Bn
CHU LAI, RVN
131445H Feb 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. COMPOSITION, SIZE AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: 2 Off, 18 Lnl, and 1 USN
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: 2 PRC-10 radios
- d. Observation Equipment: 1 Pr 7x50, 1 Pr 6x30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: M-1 Sniper rifle with 2.2 power scope.

2. MISSION: Determine VC activity in RZ 2 from 10-13 Feb 66.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 100800H/131330H Feb 1966.

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of 77 hours with a total of 6 sightings. Only 4 VCS were physically sighted. Two artillery missions were called, but only one was fired. 2 VC harbor sites were found, one with VC physically present. 14 fires were seen and VN voices were heard on the Recon net frequency. An unidentified explosion was heard that made the hill shake on the 12th of Feb 1966.

6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. 100845H a VC harbor site was found at BT 405033. It overlooks the LZ at BT 410030 and would accomodate a company of VC. It had a one man fighting hole and a hole large enough for 3 men with a small cave about 2 1/2 ft in diameter and about 4 ft deep.
- b. At 111335H 4 VCS were seen running fire team tactics at BT 378057. They wore black PJ's and no hats. They would move and hit the deck then move again. No weapons were visible. An artillery fire mission was called, but disapproved due to no weapons.
- c. From 100200H to 120330H movement was heard to the south east of the 1st position at BT 388034. A strong VC odor was prevalent at that time.
- d. At 121010H a VC harbor site was found at BS 393035. An undetermined amount of VC were in the harbor site and could be heard talking from the O. site about 30 meters west of the VC harbor

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ENCLOSURE (39)

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site. The VC moved west through the brush. An artillery mission was called and the team moved out of the area. The mission was fired, but it was not fired until 30 minutes after initial request. A patrol was sent out to determine results of fire mission with negative results found.

- e. At 121010H what sounded like either an underground explosion or outgoing mortar were heard. It shook the hill. It sounded like it came from BT 393035. It was not heard again.
- f. At 121300H as Rosemont flew over, VN voices were heard on the Recon net on the radio. The voices lasted about 30 seconds.
- g. On the 11th of Feb, 14 large fires were seen burning in grid square BT 3607, 3707, and 3608.
- 7. OTHER INFORMATION: The sniper file was not used.
- 8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: None
- 9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good
- 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None
- 11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: None

H. W. REED

1stLt, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

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
PATROL ROUTE OVERVIEW

Team: Seabrook 3C - Eagle and Hawk

Co C, 1st Recon Bn

Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000

Sheet 6757 III



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ENCLOSURE 31)

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FRAG ORDER 19-66

Teams: Seabrook & Charlie

Debriefers: SSgt. W. A. BASS

Map: Vietnam 1:50,000, Tra Bong 6756 IV

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 Co C, 1st Recon Bn
 Chu Lai, RVN
 120900H February 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: (1) Off, (17) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. Special Attachments: None.
- c. Communications: 1 PRC-25, 5 PRC-10 radios.
- d. Observation Equipment: 2 M-49 Spotting scopes, 2 pair 7X50, 2 pair 6X30 binoculars.
- e. Special Equipment: None.
- f. Special Weapons: None.

2. MISSION: Conduct an area reconnaissance of the NUI PHO TINH hill mass.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 110800H/111735H February 1966.

4. ROUTE: See enclosed overlay.

5. SYNOPSIS: The entire patrol covered a period of 9½ hours, with only one sighting of panji stakes. No VC or VCS were sighted. One LZ large enough for two UH-34 helicopters was found with two others that could be used with some clearing. No man-made obstacles were found on Hill 106 (the objective area).

6. OBSERVATIONS OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN: At 110820H, panji stakes were encountered at coordinates BS 639937. The stakes were set at a 45° angle pointing east and west with 3 rows going each way. The rows were staggered in a V formation with the rows about 8 feet apart. The stakes were in good shape and firmly planted in the ground. They were in an area of low grass with no trails.

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. At coordinates BS 64259260, a 20 foot tall statue of the Virgin Mary facing south was seen. It would make a good reference point for working in that area. It was a bright white in color.

b. The only existing LZ found was at coordinates BS 654937. It would accommodate 2 UH-34 helicopters.

2. MISSION: Conduct an area reconnaissance of the NUI PHO TINH hill mass.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 110800H/111735H February 1966.

ENCLOSURE (4)

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c. A possible OP site was found at coordinates BS 656936 with observation to the east. This is not a VC OP site but would make a good friendly site.

d. No man-made obstacles were found on Hill 106 and the area did not appear to be used with the exception of possible wood cutters.

e. Other helicopter landing sites could be made with some clearing effort. See attached HLZ reconnaissance report.

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.

9. CONDITION OF THE PATROL: Excellent.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: It would be better to be inserted by helicopter the night before and move into the area from 3 to 4 thousand meters away when the specific mission is to check on VC activity for this short a period of time.

T. C. CARTER
1stLt. USMC

11. ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY DEBRIEFER: None.

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c. A possible OP site was found at coordinates BS 656936 with observation to the east. This is not a VC OP site but would make a good friendly site.

d. No man-made obstacles were found on Hill 106 and the area did not appear to be used with the exception of possible wood cutters.

e. Other helicopter landing sites could be made with some clearing effort. See attached HLZ reconnaissance report.

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.

9. CONDITION OF THE PATROL: Excellent.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: It would be better to be inserted by helicopter the night before and move into the area from 3 to 4 thousand meters away when the specific mission is to check on VC activity for this short a period of time.

T. C. CARTER
1stLt. USMC

ENCLOSURE (4)

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11. ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY DEBRIEFER: None.

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Patrol Route Overlay
Group Frag 0 19-66
Co C, 1st Recon Bn
Vietnam 1:50,000
Trà Bồng 6756 IV

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
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ENCLOSURE (4)

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HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

1. Helicopter landing zone coordinates BS 650937. Zone is north of main ridge line. Partly cleared. Landing zone would require work on it before use. The zone is approximately 35 X 40 yards. Two small trees inside of site, both about 15 feet high, 6 to 8 inches thick. Rest of the site is small brush from 3 to 6 feet high. Would require 4 men about 90 minutes to clear site for landing.

Approach only from northeast to northwest. Take off helicopter would have to lift 25 to 30 feet to clear trees to the northwest of site that are 15-20 yards away from the edge of the site. Gradient of landing site: 1:15. Type of soil: clay, small rock $\frac{1}{4}$ " to 1" and dirt. Grass covered. Troop assembly area northeast and southwest off the trail. Exits the same. No wheeled equipment could be landed here and driven off landing site.

2. Trail running north and south past east side of hill 106 checked to north from coordinates BS 649936 to BS 647938. This trail hasn't been used lately (about two months). Grass has almost grown back over the trail. At coordinates BS 649936, trail makes a fork running northeast to coordinates BS 654-937. This part of the trail is well used. Shows signs of foot wear, wood cutters leaving stumps where they cut. This trail runs through landing site noted above. Both trails contour hill as much as possible.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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1st Rgt Bn, Co C
CHU LTI, RVN
161400H Feb 1966

Frag Order: 20-66
Team Seabrook 10
Debriefers: SSgt BASS
Maps: 6757 III, and 6756 IV

Patrol Report

1. COMPOSITION, SIZE AND EQUIPMENT

- a. Composition: 1 Off, 11 Enl, 1 USN
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: 1 PRC-25, 3 PRC-10 radios
- d. Observation Equipment: 2 7x50, 1 6x30 binoculars
- e. Special weapons: None
- f. Special equipment: None

2. MISSION: Establish recon screen in RZ's 3 and 4 from 12-16 Feb 66.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 120800H/160915H Feb 1966

4. ROUTE: Same as on operation order Frag 20-66

5. SYNOPSIS: A total of 97 1/2 hours was covered by the patrol. Only 3 sightings were made with no activity either normal or unusual being seen. A bomb shelter was found that was thought to be booby trapped and a rest camp was found that has previously been reported. An M-26 grenade was found and destroyed. A heavy caliber automatic weapon was fired on the night of the 15th of Feb.

6. OBSERVATION OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. At 121130H a grenade was found at coord BS 445968. It was an M-26 grenade, but had a makeshift pin in it, with an eye that had a piece of cat gut through it. It was not attached to anything. It was destroyed by the patrol.
- b. At 141145H as the patrol passed through a deserted village at BS 432959, a dug in bomb shelter was seen. The dirt was mounded up on top. A plank was leaning over the entrance as if to keep out rain. However, it was thought to be boobytrapped because 3 vines had been hand placed so they hung over the opening and the plank held them in place. It was felt this was a sign of possible booby trapping the shelter.

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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- c. At 141345H a VC rest camp was found that had 4 huts standing and 2 demolished at BS 433967. They were well built, but did not appear to have been used for quite a while. It would accommodate a total of approximately 35 VC.
- d. At 151930H a heavy caliber automatic weapon was heard from the west of the OP site which was at BS 445965. The fire sounded like it was at least 3,000 meters west of the OP. Several bursts were heard.
7. OTHER INFORMATION: Some new trails were seen (see attached patrol route overlay). No activity normal or otherwise was seen.
8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: None
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good
10. CONCLUSIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS: None
- B.D. WARD
Cpl, Co C, 1st Recon Bn
11. OTHER REMARKS BY DEBRIEFER: None

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Chu Lai, RVN
170900H February 1966

FRAG ORDER 21-66

Team: Seabrook 4 Charlie

Debriefing: SSgt. W. A. BASS

Map: Vietnam 1:50,000, Tri Binh 6757 III

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: (1) Off, (19) Enl, (1) USN, (1) ARVN
- b. Special Attachments: None.
- c. Communications: 1 PRC-25, 3 PRC-10 radios.
- d. Observation Equipment: 1 M-49 BC Scope, 1 pair 7X50, 3 pair 6X30 binoculars.
- e. Special Equipment: None.
- f. Special Weapons: None.

2. MISSION: Establish reconnaissance screen in RZ 2.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 131250H/160930H February 1966.

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay.

5. SYNOPSIS:

a. The patrol covered a period of 69 hours with a total of 15 sightings being made. 18 VC and VCS were seen during the period, 2 VC harbor sites and one possible harbor site were found. One artillery mission was called and destroyed one of the two harbor sites.

b. 3 fighting holes were found, and people were seen digging in a trench. Other people were seen digging a hole.

c. One group of 41 Vietnamese was seen two times, both sitting, then later moving towards Ky Sanh. They had 2 rifles, and it was believed that they were PF's being trained by ARVN or Marines.

6. OBSERVATIONS OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

a. At 131400H, a harbor site was found at coordinates BT 392034. It would accommodate approximately 12 people. It did not appear recently used. It had 3 individual shelter frames. About 12 panji stakes were found on the west side of the harbor site. They were fairly new. 1 .38 Special round was found. It appeared to be new.

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ENCLOSURE 

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b. At 131500H, 3 fighting holes were found at coordinates BT 398033. Each would accommodate about 3 VC. Pieces of broken dishes were also found.

c. At 132030H, at the platoon harboring site at coordinates BT 411034, a fence made of bamboo and some woven reed was found. It was about 6 feet high and had sharpened points on the top. It ran east-west, and was fairly well grown over.

d. At 132045H, one VCS was observed moving south from the platoon harbor site. Throughout the night, it sounded like VCS moving all around the harbor site.

e. At 141010H, one VC wearing a green top and black bottoms was seen moving in the brush at coordinates BT 425042. He carried what appeared to be an M-1 Rifle. Later he was seen moving west through a small opening in the brush, accompanied by another VC.

f. At 141115H, a VC harbor site was found at coordinates BT 422029. It was large enough for about 12 VC to harbor. Artillery was called and the site destroyed.

g. At 141220H, 1 VC wearing green top, black bottom, tennis shoes and blue scarf was observed moving south along a trail at coordinates BT 428040. He then moved east, carrying a small pail and a bolt action rifle.

h. At 141400H, one woman in red top, black bottom and four men were seen at coordinates BT 430044. They would work in the paddy for a while, then go in a trench at that coordinates for a few minutes, then back to the paddy. The trench was about 30 feet long, 3 feet wide, and 5 feet deep. This activity continued until about 1630H, when they moved back towards the village of Ky Long.

i. At 141450H, four VCS wearing blue ponchos or raincoats were seen digging a hole at coordinates BT 416026. They had one hoe, a hand-carried bag or pack, and what appeared to be a rifle. They continued to work until about dark.

j. At 151054H, 6 VCS were seen moving east on the trail at coordinates BT 433033. They were in a single file and maintained about a 20 yard interval. The second and fifth man carried packs. Five wore complete black, the first man wore blue. No weapons were visible.

k. At 151230H, 41 people were seen sitting in a staggered column at coordinates BT 433038, all wore black pajamas and coolie hats. 2 carried rifles. They were thought to be PF's, due to the close proximity to ARVN and Marine outpost.

l. At 151435H, 17 people in a group moved east on the trail at coordinates BT 439046. All wore mixed black or white pajamas. 1 man wore a blue coat. At least ten people carried sticks shaped like a "V".

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m. At 151512H, four people were seen crawling around in the bushes at coordinates BT 430043. They appeared to be searching for something. All wore black pajamas with coolie hats, no weapons were visible.

n. At 151600H, the 41 people previously mentioned at 151230H, were seen moving northeast towards Ky Sanh (1) at coordinates BT 433038. No rifles were visible this time.

o. At 151750H, 5 Vietnamese were seen walking in the bushes at coordinates BT 431039. All wore black pajamas and coolie hats. No weapons were visible.

p. At 160750H, 1 carbine shot was heard from approximately grid square BT 4204.

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

a. At coordinates BT 419044 is a rock cliff with a cave big enough for about 20 men. It has a large rock in front of the entrance. Could be used as a harbor site.

b. If there are any harbor sites around Hill 270 in grid square BT 4204, they would have to be down along the rice paddies at coordinates BT 424044.

8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: None.

9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Infantry unit should raid the village complex of Ky Long (2).

b. Night ambushes should be conducted along the trail at coordinates BT 433039, BT 418033 and BT 420023.

T. C. CARTER
1stLt. USMC

11. ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY DEBRIEFER: None.

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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1st Recon Bn, Co C
181245H Feb 1966

FRAG ORDER 23-66

Patrol: Seabrook 30
Debriefers: SSgt BASS
Maps: 6757 III

PATROL REPORT

1. COMPOSITION, SIZE AND EQUIPMENT

- a. Composition: One Officer, 16 Enlisted and 1 USN
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: 2 PRC-10 Radios
- d. Observation Equipment: 2 7x50 Binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: 1 M-1 Sniper rifle w/2.2 sniper scope

2. MISSION: Establishes recon screen in RX 2 from 16-20 Feb 1966.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 160830H/180830H Feb 1966

4. ROUTE: See attached overlay

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of 48 hours and a total of approximately 34 VC or VCS were sighted. Two artillery missions were called with a total of eleven casualties observed. One limped away while the other 10 were drug away. About 32 individual fighting holes were found and a artillery crater was found that had been dug out.

6. OBSERVATION OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. At 161100H, 12 to 16 fighting holes were found at BT 409038. They had not been there three weeks ago when the patrol had passed through the area. The holes were circular 3 ft diameter and 6 Ft deep. They were set about 8 ft apart and circled from south to west. The holes overlooked the trail between hill 186 and the hill at BT 410040. They also overlooked the Dong Co Valley.
- b. At 161630H, 18 to 20 VCS were seen running Flt. tactics at BT 425040. A fire mission was called. Ten VCS did not move after the mission was completed. The bodies were drug off by the survivors. The VCS wore black with coolie hats. The leader wore green. He was not seen after the fire mission.

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ENCLOSURE (43)


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


- c. At 161645H approximately 15 VCS came out into the rice paddy and sat in a circle at coord BT 428043. A fire mission was called and had good coverage of the target, but the VCS had moved out into the brush before adjustments could be made. One man was observed limping as he moved off. All wore black with coolie hats.
 - d. At 170823H a series of five explosions were heard from G.S. BT 4308. It was possible TPQ. No aircraft were observed however.
 - e. At 170827H, 15 to 20 rounds of automatic weapons fire was heard from G.S. BT 4308. Could not be observed due to hill being in the way.
 - f. At 180400H approximately 6 VN voices were heard at coord BT 407038. Nothing was observed. Noise of movement was heard for approximately 30 minutes.
 - g. At 180745H, it was noted that at BT 405033 about 16 individual holes were seen overlooking Dong Co Valley and the LZ at BT 409028.
 - h. At 180750H where a artillery round had landed at BT 405031, the VC had dug the crater down approximately 13 feet and then diagonally south for an unknown distance.
- 7. OTHER INFORMATION: None
 - 8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: None
 - 9. CONDITION OF THE PATROL: Excellent
 - 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None
- H.W. REED
1stLt, Co C, 1stReconBn
- 11. OTHER REMARKS BY DEBRIEFER: None

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PATROL  OVERLAY
Team: Seabrook 3C
181400H Feb 1966
Map: 6757 III



ENCLOSURE (4)

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Co: C, 1st Recon Bn

CHU LAI, VN

211000H Feb 1966

Frag Order 24
 Patrol: Seabrook 20
 Debriefed: SSgt BASS
 Maps: 6757 III

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT:

- a. Composition: 2 Off, 14 Enl, 1 USN
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Communications Equipment: 1 PRC-25, 3 PRC-10 radios
- d. Observation Equipment: 2 pr 7x50, 1 pr 6x30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: None

2. MISSION:

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 160820H/201950H Feb 1966

4. ROUTE: See enclosures (1) and (2).

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of 107 hours and had a total of 10 sightings. Thirty one VC were sighted and one fire mission called resulting in one probable KIA. Several new map corrections were noted and are shown in enclosure (2) overlay.

6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

- a. At 171340H 2 VCS males were seen digging a hole at BS 467957. The hole looked circular and they dug for approx. 1 1/2 hrs. Both wore black PJ's and coolie hats.
- b. At 180935H, 2 VC with weapons were seen moving up the trail N.W. of THO AN at BS 463964. A fire mission was called, however, due to an air strike being in progress, the fire mission was called off. The two VC had left THO AN as the air strike began.
- c. At 181310H 1 VN with a dog on a leash was seen moving west on a trail at BS 465952. He disappeared at those coord. He wore black PJ's and a coolie hat.
- d. At 181415H 3 VC wearing packs moved east at BS 468959. All three wore black PJ's and coolie hats.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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- f. At 181505H, 4 VN wearing black PJ's and coolie hats, moved out of the village of Tho An to BS 466957, they stood around talking for about 20 minutes then returned to the village.
 - g. At 181725H nine men came from brush and stood around what appeared to be a grave at BS 476954. They then returned to the brush. All were black. No equipment was visible.
 - h. At 190815H 2 VC with rifles and packs were seen moving north-east at BS 479960. They wore black PJ's and coolie hats. A fire mission was called and one came running back out of the brush. Good coverage of the target was made with one probable KIL.
 - i. At 190915H, 11 VC, 7 with heavy packs came from the brush at BS 477860. All wore black with coolie hats. They were moving south-west. They moved on the run from brush clump to brush clump. A fire mission was not called due to close proximity of the village. They assembled into a tight group at BS 475955 and entered the village.
 - j. At 190950H 3 VC with packs followed the same route as the previous eleven did.
7. OTHER INFORMATION: Map corrections were noted and are shown on enclosure (2) overlay.
- a. Three out of four helos used for retraction received small arms fire and possible .50Cal from the Tinh Trung Valley area. Prior to that, one helicopter reported seeing an unknown number of personnel moving south from BS 444952 in the brush.
8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: None
9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Fair, due to bruises and scratches from helo crash landing on extraction.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
- a. Conclusions.
 - (1) In the vic of coord BS 479960 is a VC base camp or harbor site as almost all VC seen came out of that area.
 - (2) A single main trail goes from Tinh Trung to Phuoc Lam (1).
 - (3) That hill 261 and adjacent slopes in GS 4594 is not now being used by the VC nor has it been in the recent past.
 - (4) That the TPQ missions have served to deny the general area of operations to the VC.
 - b. Recommendations
 - (1) That the troop commander on the ground designate TPQ targets within the No Fire Zone on suitable targets within safety limits.
 - (2) With the added distance of operations, that CW comm. be utilized to maintain positive communications.

R.D. WILLIAMS
1stLt Co C, 1st Recon Bn


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
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46
+ 98

2C Patrol Route Overlay
Map: 6757 III
211200H Feb 1966



47
+ 97



ENCLOSURE (1)

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93
+ ENCLOSURE (2)

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46
+ 97

+

2C Patrol Route Overlay
Map Corrections Trail/Streams

- Trails
- Stream Beds
- Area heavily punji staked
(entire area)
- (1) Stream - 4 ft banks
- "B" Water - clear, with pointed
bamboo pole across stream at
trail junction



44
+ 93

ENCLOSURE (2)

Enclosure (2)

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19 FEB

2C 17 FEB

44
+ 93

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 Frág Order 27-66

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 Co C, 1st Recon Bn
 CHU LAI, RVN
 281410H Feb 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. COMPOSITION, SIZE AND EQUIPMENT

- a. Composition: 1 Off, 13 Enl.
- b. Attachments: None
- c. Comm Equipment: 1 PRC-25, 3 PRC-10 radios
- d. Observation Equipment: 1 pr 7x50, 3 pr 6x30 binoculars
- e. Special Equipment: None
- f. Special Weapons: M-60 Machine Gun

2. MISSION: Determine VC activity in PHUOC LAM complex from 24-28 Feb.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 241439H/280826H Feb 1966

4. ROUTE: See attached Overlay

5. SYNOPSIS: The patrol covered a period of 90 hours with a total of eight sightings. No VC were seen, however on two occasions, small arms fire landed near the patrols position. A VC compound containing ten structures and various supplies and clothing was found abandoned within 48 hours. A grainary was found half filled with barley. A large hole and a trench line were found. All appeared to be old. Seven new huts not yet completed were found.

6. OBSERVATION OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN

- a. At 241645H a VC POW compound was found at BS 459924. It consisted of ten structures: four barracks 10 ft by 15 ft, one stockade 10 ft by 15 ft, one classroom 15 ft by 25 ft, one cooking and storage shed, one headquarters hut, one animal pen, and one incomplete building. In front of the cooking shed was a bamboo bench and table. Four bomb shelters had been made by tunnelling under the buildings. About 18 people could get into the shelters. In the class room, was found the following: a barber kit, clothing, beer bottles, about 50 lbs of rice, three eggs and a handful of corn. In the cookshack was about 125 lbs of rock salt, 6 bush axe blades, 4 complete bush axes, one long thin knife, baskets of various sizes, a bamboo bird cage, one half gallon of Nuoc Nam, and large cooking pots full of water. In each building were several small sheets of colored plastic. In the stockade building was one set of stocks to clamp twelve prisoners' ankles in. Other items found were: typewriter ribbon, two desk calendars, one dated 21 Feb, the other 23 Feb.

ENCLOSURE (95)

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No documents were found however several scraps of paper were found scattered around outside, about five chickens were also seen. Three large bomb craters were found approx 20 meters west of the compound. See attached sketch.

- b. At 241700H the patrol checked out a grainery at BS 45049310. It had been previously reported and was full of barley. This time, it was only half full. The building is 6 ft high and $3\frac{1}{2}$ ft wide and $3\frac{1}{2}$ ft long, with a separate thatched roof next to a large rock mass.
- c. At 251230H as the patrol was preparing to leave the village, movement was heard by the patrol point at BS 451926. It sounded like someone tripped and fell, and a rifle butt hit a rock. An immediate ambush was set up, but after 35 minutes with no more signs of movement the ambush was secured.
- d. At 270115H a hole was found at the base of a tree at BS 45939108. It was 8 ft square and 8 ft deep. It was old with brush and trees growing in it.
- e. At 271400H, it was noted that a trail running north to south at BS 456907 had not been used in quite sometime. However the rice paddy right adjacent to the trail had been recently worked.
- f. At 271415H a 155 MM dud was found nosed barely in the ground at BS 46489090. It was left untouched. It had a large "P" printed on it.
- g. At 271435H a total of seven unfinished structures approx 8x12 ft and about 18 in off the ground, were found at BS 471907. All that was needed to complete them was the roof. The straw was stacked nearby. The area had bomb craters nearby. The buildings were fairly new.
- h. At 271535H voices were heard from BS 472908. The patrol could not determine the number, but they sounded like women and children.
- i. At 271610 the remnants of a building was found at BS 462913. Just to the east of the building a trench line was found that had been covered over with logs and mud. It had five small holes for entrances, and was about three ft deep, 15 inches wide and 15 meters long.
- j. At 280730H three bunkers were found at coord BS 462913. Two bunkers were 4 ft deep and 2 ft square, the third was a T-shape $2\frac{1}{2}$ ft with the long angle of the T being 4 ft long and 25 ft deep.
- k. At 1905 to 1910 each night drums were heard followed by automatic weapons fire. On the night of 27 Feb at 2145 one round was

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fired in the direction of the CP/OP. It came from the south. At 2350H a dog barked and about 10 rounds small arms fire was received in the vicinity of the patrol. The rounds were heard before the report of the weapon.

7. OTHER INFORMATION: 16 new trails were found that are not shown on the map. They are shown on the attached trail overlay.
8. RESULTS OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERS: None
9. CONDITION OF THE PATROL: Good
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions: That the VC have evacuated the 410 hill pass and the Nui Da Mieu mass and have moved south and are probably occupying the different villages in the area around G.S. 4690 and south. The movement has been precipitated by the heavy air bombardment in the highlands for the last month.

Recommendation: That the area to the south of the operating area be subjected to an infantry operation.

R.D. WILLIAMS
1stLt, Co C, 1stReconBn


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ENCLOSURE (25)³


Panel Route Overlay

2nd RIT, C Co




281400H Feb 1966



1. Harbor S. Te
2. Village



Team Patrols



TRAIL OVERLAY

① Piece of paper found of the same manufacture as was found strewn throughout village at coord. BS 45899264

89 ENCLOSURE (4)
44

SKETCH NO 1

SUBJECT: Patrol Report 22 to

COORDINATES 45099264

MAP SHEET: 87567

PATROL: Subpatrol 20

PATROL LEADER: J. Williams

DATE: 281400H Feb 66

1- Chicken coop

2,3,15- O.P.

4- H.Q.

5- Storage hut

6,7,14- Hut

8,10,11,12- Barracks

9- Stockade


13- Mess hall

16- Table

VC POW CAMP

8545099264

24 - 25 FEB 1966.



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