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P. B. Tiffey 4 May 77  
Signature/Date

3d Marine Division  
Command Chronology

Oct 1965

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Ser: 00109 66  
27 Jan 1966

(unclassified upon removal of the basic report)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 3dMarDiv ltr 3:JFM:af Ser 00157-65 of  
26Nov65From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division (-)(Rein) for  
the month of October 1965

1. Forwarded.

  
J. L. GIBNEY  
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103/DEW/r11  
ser No 0047265  
11 DEC 1965

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Hq 3d MarDiv ltr 3:JFM:af ser 00157-65 dtd 26 Nov 65

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division (-)(Rein) for the  
month of October 1965

1. Forwarded.
2. This sheet is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of the basic letter.

*G. C. Axtell*  
G. C. AXTELL  
Chief of Staff

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1 of 4

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96601

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26 Nov 1965  
Ser. No. 00157-65

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
  
Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division (Rein) for the  
month of October 1965  
  
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
      (b) CG FMFPAC msg 251942 Aug 65  
  
Encl: ✓(1) 3d Mar Div (Rein) Command Chronology for the period  
      1-31 October 1965  
  
1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),  
enclosure (1) is submitted.  
  
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure  
(1).

*D. W. Sherman*  
D. W. SHERMAN  
Chief of Staff

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ORGANIZATION DATA SHEET

THIRD MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED), FLEET MARINE FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 OCTOBER 1965 TO 31 OCTOBER 1965

SUBMITTED NOVEMBER 1965

FROM THE DIVISION COMMAND POST

IN THE

MARINE COMPOUND, DA NANG AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

COMMANDING GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS W. WALT, U. S. MARINE CORPS

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

BRIGADIER GENERAL MELVIN D. HENDERSON, USMC

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER, CHU LAI

BRIGADIER GENERAL FREDERICK J. KARCH, USMC

CHIEF OF STAFF

COLONEL DONALD W. SHERMAN, U. S.M.C.

GENERAL STAFF

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 COLONEL ROBERT W. PORT, USMCR

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD J. SCHRIVER, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, COLONEL DON P. WYCKOFF, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4, COLONEL FRANK R. WILKINSON, JR. USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMPTROLLER, COLONEL BERNARD M. BORESS, USMC

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Enclosure (1)

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Battalion (Rein)  
3d Marine Regiment (-)(Rein)  
4th Marine Regiment (-)(Rein)  
7th Marines Regiment (-)(Rein)  
9th Marines Regiment (-)(Rein)  
12th Marines Regiment (Rein)  
3rd Anti-Tank Battalion (Rein)  
3rd Engineer Battalion (Rein)  
3rd Medical Battalion (Rein)  
3rd Motor Transport Battalion (Rein)  
3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein)  
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Rein)  
3rd Tank Battalion (Rein)

COMMANDING OFFICERS

Maj John E. WATSON, USMC  
Col Norman R. NICKERSON, USMC  
Col James F. McCLANAHAN, USMC  
Col Oscar F. PEATROSS, USMC  
Col John E. GORMAN, USMC  
Col James M. CALLENDER, USMC  
LtCol Bruce A. HEFLIN, USMC  
LtCol Nicholas J. DENNIS, USMC  
Cmdr Almon C. WILSON, (MC), USN  
Maj Freddie J. BAKER, USMC  
LtCol Roy R. VAN CLEVE, USMC  
LtCol William D. POMEROY, USMC  
LtCol Milton L. RAPHAEL, USMC

## DECLASSIFIED

AVERAGE STRENGTH DURING OCTOBER

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
HW BN	178	1938
3D MARINES	122	3133
4TH MARINES	129	3160
7TH MARINES	151	3381
9TH MARINES	136	3128
12TH MARINES	224	3282
3D AT BN	23	465
3D ENGR BN	39	1039
3D MED BN	4	145
3D MT BN	20	378
3D RECON BN	35	516
1ST AMTRAC BN	32	854
3D TANK BN	35	744
TOTAL	1,128	22,173

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PERSONAL ADMINISTRATION

a. Personnel and Administration

(1) During the period there was a drop in the number of USMC officers assigned but the number of enlisted personnel increased slightly.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
30Sep	1370	25,468	199	1344
15Oct	1321	25,229	188	1299
31Oct	1337	25,756	183	1291

(2) At the direction of CG FMFPac, on 10 Oct 1965 the Division began a test of the Mechanized Combat Casualty Reporting System prescribed in MCO 3040.1. The test is progressing satisfactorily and will continue until 31 Dec 1965.

(3) Casualties sustained during the month included: 35 KIA, 9 DOW, 266 WIA, 19 non-battle casualties, 8 non-battle deaths, 2 missing. (Both missing returned to Military Control. The 1 missing reported previous month remains in a missing status.)

(4) During the period, 83 officers and 529 enlisted personnel were rotated to CONUS. In addition, 26 officers and 674 enlisted personnel were transferred by service records to CONUS commands and hospital supporting facilities.

(5) Incoming draft/fly-in personnel arriving during the period totaled 26 officers and 1,314 enlisted personnel. (This figure included 635 enlisted personnel joined from October draft.) All were processed through the Transient Facility at Camp Butler.

(6) During the period 5 Silver Stars, 2 Legion of Merits, 13 Bronze Stars, 1 Air Medal, 10 Navy Commendations and 771 Purple Heart Medals were presented.

(7) The Division Personnel Officer assumed the administrative cognizance of 58 ARVN interpreters assigned throughout the division.

b. Exchange Activities

(1) The Division Headquarters Field Exchange sales spaces were increased by approximately 100%, resulting in an increase in gross sales of 85%.

(2) Combining all Marine Field Exchange receipts, the gross sales volume for October 1965 was \$380,713.55, representing an increase of approximately 60% over September 1965. The customer demand was by no

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means satisfied, however, more quality merchandise was available. Health and comfort items were generally in good supply, therefore air-lifts of essential items ceased on 20 Oct 1965.

(3) The first indigenous employees were programmed into the Division Headquarters Field Exchange. More civilian employees will be employed and trained prior to expanding the resale activity into a Butler Building which will increase the potential of this location account by approximately 500%.

c. Clubs

(1) The Division Clubs System continues to operate on an informal basis pending assignment of sufficient personnel to accomplish formal accounting procedures.

(2) Semi-permanent type club buildings consisting of concrete decks, wood framing, metal/screen siding and metal roofing are being installed at all enclaves. Thirteen buildings have been completed with four more under construction.

(3) Sixteen self-contained electric coolers arrived and were distributed throughout the division area.

(4) The Club System sponsored two appearances of a Vietnamese variety show, the first of planned live entertainment throughout the Division Club System to be presented monthly.

d. Special Services

(1) Significant improvement of equipment stock levels was achieved with the following volume of receipt/issue:

Special Services equipment received.....	\$27,455.79
Special Services equipment issued.....	9,480.90

(2) The Rest and Recreation Program (R&R) continued to be an important factor contributing to morale and welfare. Under the program 1,239 Marines visited Okinawa, 471 to Bangkok and 96 to Hong Kong.

(3) "Operation Christmas Tree", a program whereby Marines can order Christmas gifts by mail from West Coast Exchanges, was inaugurated.

(4) Entertainment was provided to several Division units through the USO sponsored "Martha Raye" show and a variety show from the ARVN Political Warfare Department.

e. Informational Services

(1) Press coverage of 3d Marine Division activities included 279 news feature and hometown releases through the Command Information Bureau of III Marine Amphibious Force.

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(2) Most significant operational coverage during October was of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion's "Operation Trailblazer". A total of seven (7) releases resulted.

(3) Other coverage during the month included "Operation Golden Fleece"; the first claims payment to a Vietnamese national; General KRULAK presenting awards during his visit; and continued emphasis of civic action releases.

(4) On 7 Oct, the Informational Services' section moved to the new Division Command Post, the first Headquarters group section to do so.

(5) During the month of October correspondents assigned on a temporary basis to the Chu Lai area (4); 3d ReconBn (1); 1/9 (1); 1st 8" HowBtry (1); and Hue Phu Bai area (1).

## INTELLIGENCE

## 1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

a. Operation TRAILBLAZER; southwest edge of DANANG TAOR, ICTZ, Republic of Vietnam, 18-24 October. Operation TRAILBLAZER was a reconnaissance in force conducted by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion (-) in the mountainous area on the southwestern edge of the DANANG TAOR which was based on intelligence reports indicating that the Viet Cong were using the area for infiltration, staging and storage of supplies. Very little is known about enemy units in the area and none had been specifically identified nor unit locations identified. Several reports had been received stating that a Viet Cong storage area was located at a certain spot. The Reconnaissance Battalion succeeded in locating and destroying this installation wherein was located a large supply of rice, clothing and new hand and rifle grenades of North Vietnamese manufacture. There was light contact with the Viet Cong in the area and weapons retrieved from enemy KIA were two Chinese Communist copies of the Soviet 7.62mm AK Assualt Rifle. In addition, a great number of documents were captured and forwarded to COMUSMACV for translation and further exploitation.

b. Attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility; DANANG, ICTZ, Republic of Vietnam, 28 October. The well-planned, well executed raid against the helicopter units located at the Marble Mountain Air Facility early in the morning of 28 October was carried out by commando-type units supported by mortars and machine guns. Of significance was the evidence found of the modern weapons with which the enemy was armed. Marines defending the airfield captured a considerable stock of fragmentation, concussion and Thermite grenades, as well as three Bangalore torpedoes, several 40mm rounds for the Chinese Communist B-40 anti-tank rocket launcher. Weapons captured included six Chinese Communist copies of the Soviet 7.62mm AK Assault Rifle, two US caliber .45 automatic pistols, and a Chinese Communist copy of the Soviet 7.62mm Tokarev automatic pistol. The following day a machinegun link belt for the Chinese or Soviet RPD light machinegun was found as well as a clip of 7.62mm cartridges for the SKS Assault Carbine. This rounded out the picture of the attacking unit's armament which included all the latest family of weapons firing the 7.62mm intermediate cartridge. Of interest was the allegation of three captives that the major force involved landed by boats on the beach north of the air facility; however, it has not been possible to verify the stories of these captives concerning the amphibious nature, organization and commitment of the forces involved.

c. Viet Cong attack on Hill 22; southwest portion of the DANANG TAOR, ICTZ, Republic of Vietnam, 30 October. At about 0200H on 30 October, an estimated Viet Cong battalion of Main Force and guerrillas attacked Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on Hill 22. This

[REDACTED] SENSITIVE

was the first large scale attack on Marine positions in any of the TAOR's. Reports received indicated that the unit involved had just completed its training, that this was its first combat action and something of a final exercise. The number of Viet Cong dead found in the area the next morning, numbering 42, indicated that considerable damage was done by the Marines to the attackers since they failed to retrieve such a large number of casualties as has been the usual practice. Among the weapons and equipment found following the action there was the usual mixture of Chinese, US and French weapons. No new weapons were found. Of interest was the technique the attackers used in running a wire and field telephone, two of which were captured, from the support element forward with the assault force to aid in coordinating the attack and supporting fire by mortars and recoilless rifles. Among the documents captured there were several communication codes which were immediately photographed, translated and forwarded to COMUSMACV for further exploitation.

2. NEW DEVELOPMENTS. None

OPERATIONS

1. During October no regimental size operations were conducted in the DA NANG, CHU LAI and PHU BAI enclaves. Six battalion size operations were executed, four of which were in the CHU LAI enclave, one in the DA NANG enclave and one in the TUA MAI BAY area lying along the coast between the DA NANG and PHU BAI enclaves.
2. Operational activities during the month focused on the defense of vital installations and locating and destroying VC elements within the enclaves. In accomplishing this task Division units conducted 2,877 patrols and 1,061 ambushes which resulted in 70 contacts with the enemy. During a 24 hour period on eleven days of the month Division units launched more than 100 patrols. These patrols were predominantly of rifle squad size.
3. Early on 28 October suicide VC demolitions teams attacked the Marble Mountain Air Facility and the CHU LAI Airfield. Subsequently, VC elements delivered mortar fire on the naval hospital being constructed in the Marble Mountain Complex and the SeaBee Camp located in the same vicinity. At 1930 on 27 October Division artillery units delivered 680 rounds of H&I fires into an area where a VC battalion was reported moving east in the southwest portion of the DA NANG TAOR. Approximately an hour later a squad ambush from the 9th Marines encountered a large VC force, killing 15 VC's and driving the remainder south with heavy artillery and mortar fire. These two actions are believed to have thwarted a VC attack against the DA NANG Airfield, scheduled for the same time as the attacks on the Marble Mountain and CHU LAI Airfields.
4. At 0230 on 30 October a VC force estimated to be four companies attacked a 3d Marines company position on Hill 22 in the DA NANG enclave. After close combat the VC force was repelled from the hill with heavy losses in men and equipment.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Combined operations employing ARVN and Regional and Popular Force units with Division organizations continued to increase during October. The 1st Bn, 2d ARVN Regiment and the 11th Ranger Br joined with BLT 2/3 in executing Operation RED SNAPPER, 22-25 October. On 26-29 October, the 3d Bn, 6th ARVN Regt conducted a three day operation with the 2d Bn, 4th Marines in the CHU LAI enclave. Many smaller size search and destroy operations were conducted throughout all enclaves.
2. First kills for Division Sniper teams employing Winchester M70 Rifles with power scopes were scored on 15 October in the PHU BAI enclave when two VC were killed at a range of 700 yards.
3. 3d Recon Bn conducted operation TRAIL BLAZER 18-24 October in the southwest portion of the DA NANG enclave. Moving through dense jungle growth and encountering heavy rain storms the battalion located five VC

camp complexes and seized large amounts of VC medical supplies, uniforms, grenades, documents and rice caches.

4. With the completion of rice harvesting in all enclaves in late October, Operation GOLDEN FLEECE terminated. The total amount of rice collected, or denied the VC, under this operation was not assessable at the Division level. However, one composite estimate received from the HOA VANG District Headquarters reported 80,000 kilos were obtained through GOLDEN FLEECE operations within that District. This operation is considered to have been highly successful, producing benefits well beyond the amount of rice obtained. The VC were defeated and discredited in their unsuccessful efforts to obtain or disrupt the rice harvest. Cooperation between U. S., ARVN and GVN elements, as well as the general citizenry, was notable. The power and effectiveness of U. S. military forces was amply demonstrated and the U. S. concern for the welfare and protection of VN people will have a lasting effect in the area.

5. On 20 October Operation MARBLE MOUNTAIN commenced. This is a combined U. S./VN rural reconstruction program featuring the introduction of VN pacification teams into the southeastern portion of the DA NANG enclave. The 9th Marines and 59th Regional Force Battalion provided security and protection to the pacification teams as they work in an area encompassing nine villages, 38 hamlets and a population totalling 41,000 Vietnamese. The pacification teams, cadred along a typical village/hamlet infrastructure will work to rebuild the social, political and economic foundations in recently secured areas.

#### CLOSE COMBAT

1. The 2,877 patrols and 1,061 ambushes executed during the month emphasized the close combat environment in which Division units are engaged.

#### COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. During October the Division continued to provide one infantry battalion to be operationally controlled by CG III MAF as the DA NANG Airfield Defense Battalion.

#### NBC

1. In order to effectively cope with VC caves, bunkers and tunnel systems and to minimize noncombatant battle casualties authority to employ riot control on a case by case basis was received by the Division on 13 October. Riot control agents were used by the Division in three operations during the month, subject to the following guidelines.

a. Use was contemplated in area of tunnels, caves and other underground fortifications.

b. Use was contemplated in situations in which VC were intermingled

[REDACTED]

with civilians and use of conventional munitions would result in unacceptable combatant casualties.

c. Use was limited to CN and CS grenades.

2. A division order was promulgated on 10 October scheduling NBC readiness inspections for all Division units. Inspections will commence in November and are designed to insure continued NBC defense capability in counterinsurgency operations or a general war.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

1. During the month of October the Division intensified efforts in Psychological Warfare Operations. Extensive use of the ARVN 1st Corps Psy Ops Field Detachment Audio Team and the HOA VANG District Political Action Propaganda Team was utilized in conjunction with marine search and clear operations, particularly in the DA NANG enclave. These teams employ the use of loudspeakers mounted on truck, movies and taped broadcasts. Their theme is "Support the Government of Vietnam, and cooperate with U. S. and ARVN Forces". Since these units have been operating only a short time it has been difficult to evaluate their effectiveness. Indications are that the villagers are beginning to feel that the U. S. is in Vietnam to help the people. Along with each Psy War team that goes into a village, a Civil Affairs team along with medical personnel accompany the Psy War teams.

2. In addition to the Psy War teams, the FMAW employs a helicopter loudspeaker which broadcasts propaganda programs to the villagers. This helicopter has been used extensively within the DA NANG enclave.

3. The CHU LAI enclave has relied almost entirely on leaflet distribution with some assistance from the Psy War team from LY TIN. With a full time Psy War officer in the 4th Marines, extensive plans are underway for a more aggressive program. All units are more aware of the use of Psy War as evidenced by increased requests for leaflets, along with requests for the printing of leaflets written by the individual battalion. A Psy War annex is now required in battalion size or larger operation orders.

~~SECRET~~TRAININGI. General

A. Units continued familiarization firing at HOA CAM Regional Forces Training Area - DA NANG Enclave. Those units located in the HUE PHU BAI and CHU LAI Enclaves conducted firing in areas as designated by Unit Commanders. Emphasis is placed in firing crew-served weapons.

B. The selection of General Military Subjects to be instructed is determined by each unit. Emphasis is placed on Troop Information.

C. In as much as 3d Marine Division units are unable to fire rifle requalification and instruct the broad sphere of General Military Subjects both of these requirements have been suspended by Headquarters Marine Corps.

II. Intra-Division Training

A. Contact Teams - LFTU. Contact instruction teams from Landing Force Training Unit - Pac conducted Communication-Electronics/Motor Transport Waterproofing courses. One and two day courses were conducted continuously over an eleven day period with about thirty students receiving instruction in each course.

B. Contact Team - Generator Operation. A Contact Team conducted four two day courses on Generator Operation. This course included all phases of generator operation with emphasis on preventative maintenance.

C. Sniper Teams. The Division Sniper Team Project was initiated with the establishment of a training team consisting of one Captain and five Staff NCO's, all distinguished riflemen. Training has been completed in the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion and Sniper Rifles have been issued to that unit for subsequent employment.

D. 60mm Mortars. The 3d, 4th and 9th Marine Regiments have completed training on the 60mm Mortar. Employment of this weapon was limited due to a lack of ammunition. 7th Marines did not receive 60mm Mortars during this period.

E. Land-Mine Warfare. The 3d Engineer Battalion continued to conduct an excellent Land-Mine Warfare course. Over 300 students participated in the two day courses. This included fifteen U. S. Army Officers and Staff NCO's from the 1st Air Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions. Students also attended from the 1st Marine Division.

III. Specialist Schools

A. U. S. Army Advisors/Civil Affairs Course. Four division civil affairs officers, one from each infantry regiment attended this five day course.

B. Embarkation. Eleven Officers and ten Staff NCO's attended the LFTU two week Embarkation course on OKINAWA.

### LOGISTICS

#### I. Significant Events

. The method of reporting deadlined combat essential equipment was changed to a mechanized system where units, rather than consolidating and typing a report twice monthly, now submit their reports on key punch coding sheets from which cards are made and entered into the reporting system. The units reported only those items deadlined for repairs within their authorized echelon of maintenance. Items which are deadlined for a higher echelon of maintenance are reported by the activity which is authorized to effect repairs.

B. By 22 October the 3d, 4th and 9th Marines had placed the 60mm Mortar in service. This leaves only the 7th Marines without the 60mm Mortar.

C. The first 2 combat casualty replacement vehicles (LVTP-5's) arrived on 29 October and will be utilized to replace vehicles destroyed in combat.

D. On 12 October Major J. L. JOHNSON replaced Major W. DICKISON as Ordnance Officer for the 3d Marine Division.

E. On 8 October a Food Service Office was established within the CHU LAI Enclave. 1st Lt C. M. SIMMONS, USMC, was assigned duties as Officer in Charge and directed to advise the Commanding General and to assist subordinate commanders on all matters pertaining to Subsistence Management.

F. A Food Services trouble-shooting team was organized several weeks ago and has repaired a total of 45 deadlined field ranges and are expected to repair an additional 100 ranges when adequate transportation becomes available.

G. Strongbacking of the Headquarters Battalion Cantonment is complete. The 1600 man messhall is 75% complete; the 500 man messhall is 65% complete. The Command Post Bunker is essentially complete. Some minor interior work remains to be accomplished.

H. The 3d Engineer Battalion is pre-cutting timber to be used in bunker kits for the MLR Bunker Program. They will provide schooling and supervision to units regarding assembly of these kits.

I. The Force Logistics Support Group is evacuating engineer equipment to the Force Service Regiment on OKINAWA for 5th echelon maintenance.

J. On 21 October, the ACofS, G-4, briefed the Senate Preparedness Sub-Committee. The major topics presented were; readiness of equipment and the reporting thereof; backlog of requisitions and over-age engineer equipment.

K. On 26 October, a team of Division representatives headed by the Assistant G-4, participated in a conference at Headquarters, FMFPac/I MAC FWD concerning the problems involved in the BLT forthcoming rotation program.

L. The FMFPac Motor Transport Officer and a Technical Assistance Team arrived in DA NANG on 21 October to commence a technical evaluation of Motor Transport equipment. Estimated completion date is 5 November. Also for the M-422 vehicle. Instruction for the M-422 was given to organizations in the DA NANG enclave from 22 to 31 October.

M. The FMFPac General Supply Technical Assistance Team visited 3d Marine Division units. They inspected and condition coded General Supply type items and will assist this Headquarters to justify replacement of worn out equipment with new equipment. It is estimated that the team will complete its inspection on 5 November.

N. 11 Officers and 10 enlisted men attended a 2 week special embarkation course conducted by a mobile training team from LFTUPac

## II. New Developments

A. A complete list of all plant account and expendable mess property has been compiled for twenty-eight 1500 man messes, eighteen 500 man messes and one 250 man mess.

B. A Food Handlers Course is being organized. The intent of this course is to instruct indigenous mess personnel and our own food service personnel in proper and sanitary methods of preparing the course. The main problem area in this program is the acquisition of a qualified interpreter.

## III. Problem Areas

A. The controlled interchange of repair parts for limited amounts of engineer equipment is continuing as these parts are not being received through supply channels.

## COMBAT AIR SUPPORT

### I. Significant Events

A. The first phase of OPERATION QUICK DRAW began October 3d with the lift of a rifle company by 15 UH34's with 2 A-4's providing escort. 2 additional UH1E's accompanied the lift acting as TAC (A) aircraft. The

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second phase utilized 16 UH34's for the troop lift, 2 UH1E's for TAC (A) 3 UH1E's for suppressive fire, and 2 A-4's for helicopter escort. The retrograde movement on 4 October brought the operation to a close by lifting 500 7th Marines troops with 14 UH34's and 4 UH1E's. Two A-4's provided helo CAP during the movement which was conducted without incident.

B. On October 16th, 26 UH34's of MAG-36 lifted 697 3d Battalion, 7th Marines troops in support of OPERATION HERCULES. The LZ's were prepped by fixed wing aircraft who were controlled by a TAC (A) provided by VMO-6.

C. From 21-24 October, 2 UH1E's were utilized for recon/observation purposes in support of OPERATION RED SNAPPER. On 23 October, one rifle company was lifted by UH 34's from PHU BAI into the objective area.

D. LIEN KET, a joint 2d Battalion, 4th Marines/ARVN Operation, saw 26 UH34's lifting 640 Marines into fixed wing and artillery prepped LZ's. 4 UH1E's acted as TAC(A) and delivered suppressive fires while 4 MAG-12 A-4's provided helo CAP.

2. New Developments. A significant part of OPERATION HERCULES was the allocation of 4 troop-laden UH 34's as an immediate mobile reserve force. This force orbited the objective area for 2 hours ready to provide instant support when and where necessary.

3. Problem Areas. Currently, 1st MAW helicopters have a maximum hoist cable length of 100 feet. Helicopter support in jungle environment must sometimes utilize the hoist because of impossible landing conditions due to thick foliage. Occasionally, the 90-100 feet is insufficient and the drop on retraction/evacuation site must be moved to an area where the canopy is not so thick. This limits the effectiveness and expediency with which the mission is carried out. Longer cables would definitely enhance helicopter lift/drop capabilities in densely foliated area.

ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION1. Significant Events

a. Coordination and clearance for use of supporting arms in the Northern area of QUANG NAM Province presents no problems. Requests for supporting arms fire are cleared quickly and expeditiously in almost all instances.

b. The vast majority of supporting arms fire during the reporting period were harassing and interdiction upon known and suspected enemy positions.

c. Emphasis during the period was placed upon defensive fires to include barrages upon the most critical areas with the TAOR.

2. New Developments

a. Additional free fire areas for supporting arms were granted by the northern and southern sectors of QUANG NAM Province.

b. A large free bomb area west of the TAOR was cleared by DA NANG Special Sector and HOI AN.

3. Problem Areas

a. Coordination and clearance for use of supporting arms in the southern sector of QUANG NAM Province remains somewhat cumbersome and time consuming. Some improvement has been made during this period and effort is being exerted by this FSAC and the American advisors in HOI AN to improve the difficulties encountered.

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

1. Significant Events. The subject period was devoted to evolving the Division communication-electronics network from a tactical field communication system to a combination of tactical and semi-permanent system to compliment the enclave environment presently in being. In anticipation of the displacement of the 3d Marine Division Headquarters from the area occupied jointly by the Division Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters, and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters, to the 3d Marine Division Headquarters Command Bunker, (3½ miles west of Da Nang Airfield) extensive pole line and cable construction was accomplished. At the Bunker site all communication facilities were preinstalled to assist in the orderly displacement of the Headquarters. Communication features included in the Bunker facility not normally peculiar to a Marine Division Headquarters operating in the field included the installation of a complex of intercommunication systems linking General and Special Staff Sections. This innovation permitted a more rapid degree of coordination between the staff sections and an appreciable reduction of local CP telephone calls.

2. Problem Areas

a. Receipt of repair parts for communication-electronics equipment showed a slight increase during this period but not in sufficient quantities to relieve to any appreciable degree the large backlog of deadlined comm-elect equipment. The receipt of items as a result of the "Critipack" program was primarily responsible for the slight gain made in this area.

b. The nonavailability of dry cell batteries (primarily BA-279's) and Cable WD-1/TT in stock at the FLSG to meet current demands still plagues this Division. The stop-gap method of flying in on a priority basis limited amounts of these items to meet immediate operational needs is at best a tenuous solution to a continuing problem.

c. The shortage of Communication Officers MOS 2502, particularly company grade, is of concern. Their nonavailability requires the assigning of senior staff NCO's to billets that are designated to be filled by commissioned officers because of the responsibilities involved.

d. Special allowance requests for equipment continue to be received by the Division as the expansion of the enclave TAOR's progresses. Such items as EE-8 field telephones to support the pacification program and coordination with the Popular Forces of RVN operating within our TAOR. Also, AN/FRC-10 Radio Sets are requested to support more adequately the deep patrolling more effectively within the TAOR and RAOR of all three enclaves which are the responsibility of this Division.

CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

Orders and bulletins published by this section during this reporting period are enclosed as follows:

- (a) Division Order 5080.3
- (b) Division Order 6320.1
- (c) Division Order P5080.1
- (d) Division Bulletin 5080

1. Civic Action

A. Objective

(1) The basic objective of the 3rd Marine Division Civic Action continues to function under the provisions of Force Order 1750.1. The salient feature of the civic action effort remains the same, Marines "helping the people to help themselves". This can best be achieved by directing the Division's effort at enhancing the prestige of the duly constituted local government.

B. Highlights

(1) Marble Mountain Campaign

(a) This is a pacification effort commencing on 1 Nov. 1965 which involves 9 villages of Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province. Preliminary planning commenced on 20 Oct. at the Mieu Bong (017678) headquarters for the Vietnamese 59th Regional Force Battalion. The overall employment of this battalion and the ultimate employment of the People Action Teams (PATs) will be supported by the civic action effort of the 9th Marines. Coordination of the 9th Marines civic action support to this pacification effort will be coordinated by the Regimental Civil Affairs Officer and supported by Division Civil Affairs.

(2) Cam Ne Yen Ne New Life Hamlet

(a) Plans for the construction of a new life hamlet for 383 families presently living in Cam Ne Yen Ne Hamlets, are being formalized. This is a GVN effort, however, Marine Corps assistance is being requested. One such request was for Engineer liaison. This request was fulfilled by the Division Engineer Lt. Col. Lee. This officer will coordinate Marine Corps assistance and provide technical advice. A second request for a tractor to commence leveling of the proposed site (985675) will commence shortly. Progress reports will be forthcoming.

(3) Operation Golden Fleece

(a) This operation continued thru-out the month of Oct. and Marines were instrumental in the harvesting in excess of 200,000 lbs of rice which without Marine Corps security would not have been harvested by Pro-Government Vietnamese. This operation provided not only physical security under which the harvest was conducted, but it was also supported by Marine Corps trucks, tractors, and helicopters assisting in moving the rice to secured storerooms. This program will be repeated for 1966 and will be referred to as "Golden Fleece II".

C. Programs

(1) Operation Cleft Palate/Hare-Lip

(a) Operation "cleft palate/hare-lip" continues to assist a limited number of Vietnamese children. There were 2 operations conducted this period. This assistance is rendered primarily by the chaplains by making necessary arrangements for transportation, accommodation, and the actual operation in Saigon and return. The procedures for this operation assistance will be the subject of a Division Order or bulletin.

(2) MEDCAP

(a) During this period the Division Aid Stations treated a total of 34,300 Civilians on which treatments exceeded this number by several thousands. Treatments would have far exceeded this figure had it not been for the monsoon rains and excessive flooding. This program continues to be most receptive by the Vietnamese. Deeds such as the Hoa Loc village (912818) case where a mother and 2 children were flown to Saigon to correct a scar which resulted from a childhood accident, continues to impress the Vietnamese with the Marines concern for the people.

(3) Dental

(a) This is an initial report which introduces civic action dental care into the overall counterinsurgency effort. Through the guidance and efforts of the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Dental Company, dental care is rapidly contributing to the dental health void which existed previously. In addition to working with the regular MEDCAP program and providing dental service, such as routine examinations, extractions, scaling, the dental officers in the Huo-Phu Bai TAOR are presenting a series of 20 lectures to the Huo Medical School students who are fifth year medical students.

(b) Marines continue to teach English to interested Vietnamese. English is being taught at the following locations: (518085) (525086) (515114) (519091) (500066) (995685) (884767) (946697). Attendance will range from as few as 4 of 5 to as many as 50.

(c) Attendance at the MAC-V/USOM Advisory school in Saigon included the Regimental Civil Affairs Officers from the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 9th Marines. All participants indicated that the 5 day school Oct. 18-22, was excellent and provided an overall views of civic action Vietnam.

(d) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines is repairing the Hoa Thinh primary school (949704). This project is a result of a USMC illumination round burning down this school and its furnishings. A joint effort of USCM, Hoa Vang District Chief, MAC-V Advisory Team and USMC are restoring this school.

(e) Headquarters Battalion commenced on 9 Oct, of assisting the Venerable Thich Thanh Huu, Buddhist chaplain of the 6th Infantry Regiment (ARVN), in constructing a Buddhist School, Orphanage and Pagoda. (989786) The official beginning for this project got under way on 9 Oct. 1965 with a \$200.00 donation from the Division Chapel funds. Headquarters Battalion Civil Affairs Officer is coordinating this project. The corner stone for the elementary school was laid on 18 Oct. with Division Chief of Staff assisting.

#### D. Community Relations

##### (1) General

(a) Examples of closer relations that benefit the Vietnamese and USMC can be seen in the following; Combined USMC/Popular Forces roadblocks; providing furniture for the Chu Lai dispensary and Pagoda; combined sports activities; security for rice harvest; continued success of a Combined Action Company (CAC) composed of one platoon of Marines and six platoons of Popular Forces; cordial relations between village chiefs and TAOR commanders being expressed by dinner invitation as was the case of the Village Chief of Hoa Hai village (076798) inviting the Battalion Commanding Officer and Staff of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines to his home in order to express appreciation for Marine assistance; Battalion Commanding Officer of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines invited to the home of village Chief of Hoa Thanh (908782) and a combined Marine-Vietnamese talent show at Ky Ha Village (517112) where Marines of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines presented 7 acts and the Vietnamese presented 6 acts to a combined audience of 600 people.

Dental care is being provided to Buddhist and Catholic orphanages through out the entire Division TAOR as well as the many villages, hamlets and health centers where dental service is coordinated with the MEDCAP program. During this reporting period a dental highlight was the recent trip made by 2 Dental Officers and 2 Dental Technicians in company with Marine security, were flown to a remote Vietnamese Village of Khe Sanh near the Laotian border by helicopter, escorted by fighter Air Craft. Those officers and enlisted provided the following dental treatments: 44 examinations, 54 extractions, 1 filling, 2 scalings.

During this period the 3rd Dental Company enlarged its scope of operation and provided dental treatments to 488 Vietnamese. Treatments consisted of the following: 488 examinations, 389 extractions, 146 fillings, 44 root tips removal, 21 scalings, 10 post operative treatments, 1 pericornitis treatment, and 3 incision and drainage.

(4) Handclasp

(a) These supplies are beginning to be received in larger quantities and during this period the division distributed several tons of a variety of commodities. Some of these were: dishes, toys, books, sewing supplies, buttons, assorted can goods, misc. medical supplies, soap both hard and liquid, candy, salt, and assorted clothing for children, adults and infants.

(5) Soap

(a) This continues to be a most important item which is required on a continuing bases. Division received from Handclasp and private donations the following: 235 cases of face soap, 18 drums of hotel size bars, both new and used, 15,000 bars from both military organizations such as Marine Corps Reserve and private individuals, 1290 cans of liquid soap.

(6) Food

(a) There were no new food stuffs other than handclasp items introduced into the distribution program. Division units continue to distribute the 30 tons of Catholic Relief Service (CRS) food stuffs issued during the September reporting period. Food distribution highlights during this period consisted of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines at Phu Bai TAOR assisting several hundred displaced persons with 2400 lbs of cornmeal, wheat, salt, candy, and miscellaneous items.

1st Battalion, 4th Marines at Chu Lai TAOR, assisted Vietnamese families arriving into the battalion TAOR from insecure areas. In addition this battalion also assisted families on Ky Hoa Island (485105) with 2900 lbs. of cornmeal, Bulgar, wheat and candy; 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in the Da Nang TAOR provided feeding for 250 persons evacuated from a village while conducting a sweep.

(7) C.A.R.E.

(a) C.A.R.E. is currently providing a Da Nang representative to assist in expediting C.A.R.E. commodities and provide technical assistance in the use of tools requested where such assistance is required.

(b) During this reporting period three C.A.R.E. requisitions were submitted for processing. The following C.A.R.E. commodities were received: 300 notebooks, 150 pens, 150 rulers, 150 pencils, 300 erasers, 150 slates, 150 chalk bags, 100 packages of ink, 8 ink wells. These supplies were distributed through the village chief and school master for the Islands of Ky Hoa (485105) and Ky Xuan (500140).

(8) Clothing

(a) There were 60 boxes and 6 bags of assorted clothing received during this period. Distribution commenced immediately upon receipt of this clothing. With the advent of the Monsoon season it is anticipated that the clothing items will be received by the Vietnamese and used to provide a change of clothing during the wet season but will also serve as material cloth which can be reconstructed into blankets.

(9) Foreign Claims

(a) A total of 66 claims were submitted and 532,750 Piasters were paid to claimants during this period. Claims processing procedures are improving in that the time element between submission and payment of claims to claimants has been reduced. This effort continues to be well received by the Vietnamese. Coordination with the district chiefs by the Division claims officer prior to paying claims has gradually developed into a "claims day" routine at District Headquarters.

(10) Schools and Education

(a) Battalion Educational Development Section which was organized by 1st Battalion, 4th Marines is a good example of unit progress in assisting the overall education effort.

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Visit to villages by Senators, Representatives and Flag and General Officers have impressed the Vietnamese with the importance of the Vietnamese people to the overall cause in Vietnam.

(2) Marine Band

(a) The USMC Division Band played a concert at the dedication ceremony of the Chu Lia village dispensary. (511051) General Krulak was in attendance. All other concerts during this period were performed for Marine Corps organizations within III MAF.

(3) Sanitation and Health

(a) Continues to be stressed by all units thru-out Division TAOR's. 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines sprayed insecticide swamp area at (881173) in addition, community heads have been erected at (881173), (912118) Construction of shower facilities at Sam Hai Hamlet (515114) and Yen Bac (980705) assist to teach better health procedures.

(4) Holidays

(a) There were no significant holiday celebration during this reporting period, however, preparation for the 1 Nov. 1965 holiday celebration of "National Day" is being undertaken during this period which marks the 2nd anniversary of the Diem Regime overthrow.

(5) "War within a War"

(a) The film "War within a War" a Civil Affairs film which depicts III MAF organizations implementing civic action was shown thru-out the division subordinate commands. This film was well received by all units and was viewed by 3303 Marines.

(6) Economy

(a) Populated areas occupied by Marines have grown economically through the establishment of laundry service, barber shops, concession and souvenir stands through out all three enclaves.

E. Projects

(1) Playgrounds

(a) Commanding Officer of the 3rd Anti Tank Battalion dedicated the Yen Bac (985708) playground on 29 Oct. The Commanding General of the 3rd Division was in attendance.

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(b) Construction and improvement in playgrounds discussed in the last report continues.

(2) Bridges/Paths/Security Fence/Roads

(a) Marines assisted bridge and path projects at Sam Hai (515114); A fence project at An Tay Hamlet (518085) and (525086); road improvement into Duong Son (995685).

(3) Irrigation

(a) This effort in assisting the irrigation of land areas is limited to eliminating obstruction to natural water drainage. In the course of military construction projects, where the normal drainage may effect small areas or plots of cultivated lands by flooding, Marines assist by eliminating such obstructions. 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines assisted in the construction of a dike in Loc Bon (937115)

(4) Animal Husbandry

(a) 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines continue to coordinate and encourage the Chu Lai Hog Co-op. This attempt is designed to improve local pig stock. Vietnamese reluctant to attempt raising U. S. White hogs, however agreement has been reached to experiment with raising 5 of these White U. S. Hogs.

(5) Sick Call Shelters

(a) Division units are constructing sick call shelters with the assistance of the Vietnamese. One shelter has been completed at Hoa Krvong (935725) and another is under construction by the Anti Tank Battalion in Yen Bac (985708). An other shclter completed located at the Thuy Plu Hamlet (913118).

(6) Government

(a) There are increased efforts to support the existing local hamlet, village governments. Establishment of an "Area Security Council" in the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines TAOR is an example of mutual interest which is expressed by both the Marines and the village Chiefs of the area, to firm up and support matters of mutual interest. A recent problem was solved by this particular council by clearing of Vendors from the Battalion M.S.R.

(7) General Analysis

(a) Division civic action efforts attempts to develop programs that will be responsive to the needs of the rural population.

At the present time the personal needs of the Vietnamese people particularly the rural population, far exceeds the capability of this division to fulfill these needs. The impact of MEDCAP and dental assistance on the population have created personal contact with a large segment of the population. This type of contact portrays to the people a genuine interest on the part of the USMC and the Navy and contributes greatly to winning over the rural population. In other words this type of program provides quick and effective contacts of a personal nature.

Therefore, civic action should be administered by programs which have a high impact and is within the capability of the unit to carry out the action to completion. In this connection the programs of commodity distribution, MEDCAP and dental care are the most successful. This success is attributed to the fact that each of these activities have a high impact and the civic action can be implemented and completed quickly. Therefore, one conclusion drawn at this stage of civic action participation is that, trends for division programs conducted on the clearing and securing phases of rural construction which meet the criteria stated above are more receptive by the people and tend to meet with a greater degree of success in winning friends. The long term projects which require continued supervision and material assistance not normally available through civil affairs channels tend to lose some of their effects as the end results are not readily forthcoming.

Additional stress will continue to be placed on short term, high impact and low cost type of projects and programs.

DIVISION SURGEON

I. Staff Officers:

- (1) CAPT H. S. ARNOLD, MC USN, Division Surgeon. Capt ARNOLD relieved CAPT W. A. WULFMAN, MC USN, on 7 Oct 1965.
- (2) Division Medical Administrative Officer; CMDR L. W. GAY MSC, USN.

II. Average monthly strength during the period (Division Level)

Medical Officer	77
MSC Officers	11
Hospital Corpsmen	1236

III. Enlisted medical department personnel manning level remains close to T/O including all reinforcing elements.

IV. Medical and Dental Support: Detailed reports are submitted by 3d Medical Battalion and its component companies. The Medical Supply is included under FLSG reports. The Medical Supply picture continues to improve. Machine accounting becomes more sophisticated as time goes by.

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3d MARDIV  
Command Chronology  
10ct to 31Oct1965  
List of Supporting Documents

- ✓1. 3d MarDiv Sitreps Oct 1965
- ✓2. 3d MarDiv Journal Oct 1965
- ✓3. 3d MarDiv FSCC Oct 1965
- ✓4. 3d MarDiv Report of Battle and Nonbattle casualty, Oct 65 (to 26<sup>th</sup> NIE)
- ✓5. III MAF Intsum Oct 1965
- ✓6. VIP visits to 3d MarDiv
- ✓7. 3d Mar Reg Command Chronology
- ✓8. 1st Bn 1stMar " " "
- ✓9. 2d Bn 3dMar " " "
- ✓10. 3d Bn 3dMar " " "
- ✓11. 4thMar Reg " " "
- ✓12. 1st Bn 4thMar " " "
- ✓13. 2d Bn 4thMar " " "
- ✓14. 3d Bn 4thMar " " "
- ✓15. 7th MarReg " " "
- ✓16. 1st Bn 7 Mar " " "
- ✓17. 2d Bn 7 Mar " " "
- ✓18. 3d Bn 7 Mar " " "
- ✓19. 9th MarReg " " "
- ✓20. 1st Bn 9thMar " " "
- ✓21. 2d Bn 9thMar " " "
- ✓22. 3d Bn 9thMar " " "
- ✓23. 12th Mar " " "
- ✓24. 1st Bn 12thMar " " "
- ✓25. 2Bn 12thMar " " "
- ✓26. 3d Bn 12thMar " " "
- ✓27. 4th Bn 12thMar " " "
- ✓28. 1st B" HOW (S.P) " " "
- ✓29. Btry "L" 4th BN 12 " " "
- ✓30. 3d MT. Bn " " "
- ✓31. 3d Med Bn " " "
- ✓32. 3d Recon Bn " " "
- ✓33. 1st Amtrac Bn " " "
- ✓34. 3d Amtrac Bn " " "
- ✓35. 3d Tank Bn " " "
- ✓36. 3d Eng Bn " " "
- ✓37. Hq Bn 3d MarDiv " " "
- ✓38. Letter from 3rd Mar Div to III MAF dtd 27 Oct 1965, Subj: Golden Fleece Operations
- ✓39. Comments on Golden Fleece

HEADQUARTERS  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96601

3:DPW:af  
 3120.1  
 27 Oct 1965

From: Commanding General  
 To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
 Subj: GOLDEN FLEECE Operations

1. The following report is submitted on harvest protection and control conducted under the general name of GOLDEN FLEECE Operations.
2. GOLDEN FLEECE Operations commenced in early September 1965 in the coastal area of the DA NANG TAOR, when the 1st Bn, 9th Marines, in cooperation with local civil authorities, began military protection of harvesters who reported harrassment and confiscation by Viet Cong elements. Patrol clashes with VC were encountered on 8 September 1965, with company and battalion size VC units encountered on 9 and 10 September.
3. By 13 September, all major VC units had been driven from the area and security was being provided by multiple squad and platoon size patrols. In addition, and again in coordination with civil authorities, special measures were taken on population control. Village sweeps and road check points were used to clear the area of unauthorized or suspect civilians. 723 civilians were interrogated on 13 September, and 33 apprehended as VCS. VC reaction to these moves was terrorist mining of ripened rice paddies from which they had been denied. This was first encountered on 16 September in the 1st Bn, 9th Marines area. One USMC LVT was damaged by a mine that day, and reports received that 20 VC were laying mines in the area. Platoon size patrols, with engineer personnel, began providing security and mine sweeps of roads and paddy lands. In spite of these efforts, several harvesters and RF/PF/PAT personnel were killed or injured in mined rice fields during the period 16-21 September.
4. On 18 September, because of reports that rice confiscated by the VC was being moved south by boat to avoid land patrols and check points, a series of river check points and night ambushes were established to deny the enemy this means of transportation.
5. By 19 September, the rice fields in the vicinity of the CA DE SONG, 3d Marines area, were ripening. GOLDEN FLEECE operations were extended to the CA DE SONG river basin, utilizing experience obtained in the coastal region. This, coupled with the generally less intense Viet Cong activity in the northern DA NANG sector, permitted highly effective harvest control measures throughout the period 19-30 September. In addition to an effective harvest of covered areas, friendly VN groups were transported to areas on the edge of the TAOR where they harvested large quantities of rice from their former fields under military protection. This harvest was transported back to a safe area by LVT and helicopter.
6. Villagers throughout the DA NANG area become confident of the protective measures developed and the period after 20 September saw an intensified and increasingly effective harvest.
7. As VC contacts were reduced by protective measures and aggressive patrolling.

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operations were extended to locate the caches of rice previously seized by the VC and stored locally until it could be transported out of the area. Two tons of rice were found by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on 22 September and turned over to the HOA VANG District Headquarters for disposition. Another cache of three tons was found on 10 October. Other caches located included rice stored in 55 gallon drums, in houses of sympathizers, and in temporary shelters in the hill areas. Where these stores could be removed, they were turned over to local civil authorities. 300 bushels were destroyed in the hills by a Reconnaissance Battalion patrol on 6 October; smaller caches were destroyed by deep patrols south of the 9th Marines main positions.

9. By early October, harvest operations began in the CHU LAI area. 2d Battalion, 4th Marines provided a rifle company to cover the harvest of a valley area forward of the main positions. Over a four day period, the entire valley was harvested without incident; rice brought back to a central storage area protected by a local RF platoon. Patrols searched for and located VC rice caches, destroying them in place. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines turned over two tons of seized rice to local authorities on 14 October, and destroyed a large store of salt in place.

10. By mid-October, a psychological warfare effort was made to exploit the success of GOLDEN FLEECE operations. Oriented on the CHU LAI area, where harvest operations were principally in progress, the theme of comparing families under GVN and families under the VC under harvest conditions was developed and exploited by pamphlets and posters.

11. By the end of October, some GOLDEN FLEECE operations continued in the CHU LAI enclave, centered on the 4th Marines area. Harvesting had been largely completed in the DA NANG area. One company (E/2/4) maintained security over a harvest area beyond the main battle positions during the period 23-27 October, and the completion of this rice harvest essentially terminated GOLDEN FLEECE operations as a major effort.

12. The total amount of rice collected, or denied the Viet Cong, is not assessable on the Division level. Reports involving tonnage, bushels, amtrac or helicopter loads, cube and container, have been variously received. One composite estimate, received from the HOA VANG District Headquarters, reports 80,000 kilos of rice obtained through GOLDEN FLEECE operations in that District.

13. GOLDEN FLEECE is considered to have been a highly successful operation, producing benefits well beyond the amount of rice obtained. The VC were defeated and discredited in their unsuccessful efforts to obtain or disrupt the rice harvest. Cooperation between US, ARVN, and GVN elements, as well as with the general citizenry, was notable. The power and effectiveness of U. S. military forces was amply demonstrated, and U. S. concern for the welfare and protection of VN people will have a lasting effect in the area.

*D. P. Wyckoff*  
D. P. WYCKOFF  
By direction

DISTRIBUTION: "B" & "E"

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COMMENTS ON GOLDEN FLEECE

"Golden Fleece" is not all "shining and bright". There are certain aspects of the system (at least during 1965) which are deplorable and provide the Viet Cong with effective propaganda. Ergo it makes the operation so much more difficult to conduct. A certain portion of the rice which is legitimately harvested, and protected by the Marines, winds up in the pockets of certain local officials. The farmers have no way of legally complaining; the rice is given to a local official for safe-keeping. He siphons off a certain percentage. Its the old oriental "squeeze" and is nothing new. Now, however, his "lost" rice becomes rice that the Marines are guilty of stealing. There is no open accusations just sullen resentment. The local official involved will even keep this information (the resentment of the farmers) from USMC ears. He does not want us investigating the system. But this is backlash propaganda, and serves the V.C.

Based on 1965 "Golden Fleece" experience, what is needed is a leaflet/letter, signed by Province Leaders' or other responsible and recognized leaders stating the purpose of the operation, and that the Marines are involved specifically at the request of GVN authorities. In 1965, V.C. propaganda dwelled on the fact the Marines were confiscating the rice of the villages, without GVN permission.

Recommend that some "chit system" be developed so that when rice is confiscated from villages because the supply is excess of the allowed amount, villages may have some way of receiving credit for their loss. Tax credit would be one way. Marines confiscate this excess rice which is what the GVN orders but in many cases this rice is not VC rice, but is in excess quantities because the villagers: (1) lack transport. (2) honestly fear GVN confiscation if the rice is brought to a market place. (3) VC patrols interdict the movement of the rice. Confiscation without "chit credit" provides the VC with good PsyWar material. This is operational matter, but of prime interest to our PsyWar program.

In 1965, the areas in which "Golden Fleece" proceeded most smoothly were those in which we emphasized that the Marines and farmers were working as a team. We went to great lengths to demonstrate that the Marines were there to help and guard the people, and to insure that the Marines were not acting as if they were prison-chasers assigned over the farmers. This is important if we want cooperation. Some periodic demonstration of his team image is necessary - C/A can usually arrange some activity that can be utilized for the occasion.

Enclosure (1)  
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The influx of new, "outside" VC troops can serve our interests. Last year, the rice that the VC tried to get would go to feed mostly local VC forces, many of them from this area, therefore the people, to varying degrees, were in sympathy with the VC. The VC emphasized that this food was required to support the total effort, and all reference to the food ultimately going to VC base area in the mountains were deliberately avoided. A local boy, now a member of the VC, coming to his hamlet and appealing for food for himself and other local men, was an effective device for the VC to utilize. This year is a little different. The presence of VC units from other areas is known both to us and to the local villagers (see ITT prisoner interrogations of local suspects). With proper exploitation the presence of large numbers of strangers among the VC, robs the VC rice collection efforts of the local appeal. Differences of all types, provincial, national, etc. should be pointed out and emphasized. "North Vietnamese Rice goes to feed the Chinese (see recent news stories) South Vietnamese Rice is confiscated by the VC to replace rice given to China", might be a productive theme.

Enclosure (1)

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