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8 APR 1966

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 3dMarDiv (Rein) ltr 3/DVM/pnc Ser  
0061-66 of 17Feb66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein)  
for the month of December 1965 (U)

1. Forwarded.

*McDally*  
M. C. DALBY  
By direction

RECEIVED 10 APR 1966

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MARINE CORPS

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Ser:

0023766

6 Mar 1966

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 3dMarDiv ltr 3/DVM/pnc Ser: 0061-66 of 17Feb66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein) for  
the month of December 1965. (U)

1. Forwarded.

2. This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal from the  
basic document.

  
J. R. CHAISSON

By direction

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3d Marine Division  
Command Chronology  
1 Dec to 31 Dec 1965  
List of Supporting Documents

1. Div SitReps Dec 1965, #209-239
2. Div Journal Dec 1965
3. Div FSCC Journal Dec 1965
4. Div Daily Report of Battle and Non Battle Casualty
5. Civil Affairs
6. WIP Visits to 3d Marine Division
7. Div Operation Orders Issued in Dec 1965

UNITS COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

8. 3d Mar Reg
9. 4th Mar Reg
10. 7th Mar Reg
11. 9th Mar Reg
12. 12th Mar
13. 1st 8" How (With 12th Mar)
14. 3d MT Bn
15. 3d Recon Bn
16. 3d Med Bn
17. 1st AmTrac Bn
18. 3d Tank Bn
19. 3d Engr Bn
20. Hq Bn, 3d Mar Div
21. 9th MT Bn
22. 1st For Recon Co
23. 3d SP Bn
24. 3d AT Bn
25. 2d Bn, 1st Mar

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96601

3/DVM/pnc  
Ser 0061-66  
17 February 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein) for  
the month of December 1965.

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) CG FMFPAC msg 251942 Aug 65

Encl: ✓(1) 3d Mar Div (-)(Rein) Command Chronology for the period  
1-31 December 1965.

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),  
enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of  
enclosure (1).

*Leo J. Dulacki*  
LEO J. DULACKI  
Chief of Staff

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ORGANIZATION DATA SHEET

THIRD MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED), FLEET MARINE FORCE  
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 DECEMBER 1965 TO 31 DECEMBER 1965  
SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 1966

FROM THE DIVISION COMMAND POST BUNKER (AT 957751)

DA NANG, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

COMMANDING GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS W. WALT, U. S. MARINE CORPS

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

BRIGADIER GENERAL MELVIN D. HENDERSON, USMC 1-10 DECEMBER 1965

BRIGADIER GENERAL LOWELL E. ENGLISH, USMC 22-31 DECEMBER 1965

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER, CHU LAI

BRIGADIER GENERAL JONAS M. PLATT, USMC

CHIEF OF STAFF

COLONEL DONALD W. SHERMAN, USMC

GENERAL STAFF

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 COLONEL ROBERT W. PORT, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD J. SCHRIEVER, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3 COLONEL DON P. WYCKOFF, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4 COLONEL FRANK R. WILKINSON, JR., USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5, MAJOR JOHN COLIA, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMPTROLLER, COLONEL E. M. STIMSON, USMC

Enclosure (1)

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SUBORDINATE UNITS

COMMANDING OFFICERS

Headquarters Battalion (Rein)	Major John E. WATSON, USMC
3d Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)	Col Thell H. FISHER, USMC
4th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)	Col James F. McCLANAHAN, USMC
7th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)	Col Oscar F. PEATROSS, USMC
9th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)	Col John E. GORMAN, USMC
12th Marine Regiment (Rein)	Col James M. CALLENDER, USMC
3rd Anti-Tank Battalion (Rein)	LtCol Bruce A. HEFLIN, USMC
3rd Engineer Battalion (Rein)	LtCol Nicholas J. DENNIS, USMC
3rd Medical Battalion (Rein)	Cmdr Almon C. WILSON, (MC), USN
3rd Motor Transport Battalion (Rein)	Major Freddie J. BAKER, USMC
3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein)	LtCol Roy R. VAN CLEVE, USMC
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Rein)	LtCol William D. POMEROY, USMC
3rd Tank Battalion (Rein)	LtCol Milton L. RAPHAEL, USMC
3rd Shore Party Battalion (Rein)	Major John M. DEAN, USMC

Enclosure (1)

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AVERAGE STRENGTH DURING DECEMBER

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
HQBN	164	1636
3d Marines	131	3232
4th Marines	92	2165
7th Marines	135	3116
9th Marines	147	4040
12th Marines	217	3461
3d AT Bn	20	457
3d Engr Bn	36	976
3d Med Bn	3	149
3d MT Bn	17	322
3d Recon Bn	29	431
1st AmTrac Bn	34	950
3d Tank Bn	31	718
3d SP Bn	27	563
TOTAL	1083	22216

Enclosure (1)

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a. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

(1). Casualties sustained during the month included: 65 KIA, 12 DOW, 513 WIA; 1 MIA, 17 non-battle deaths, 2 non-battle casualties, and 3 missing.

(2). 26 officers and 812 enlisted personnel were rotated to CONUS. In addition, 7 officers and 296 enlisted personnel were transferred as non-battle casualties to Camp Butler, Okinawa; 14 officers and 187 enlisted personnel were transferred by SR's as battle casualties.

(3). Incoming draft personnel arriving during the period totaled 16 officers and 1265 enlisted personnel.

(4). During December, 93 Purple Heart, 5 Silver Star, 29 Bronze Star and 16 Navy Commendation Medals were presented. Additionally, 64 Purple Heart Medals were forwarded to units for presentation.

(5). 35 Commissions to Second Lieutenant from Warrant Officer and 78 Temporary appointments to First Lieutenant were received and forwarded to units for presentation.

b. POSTAL

(1). During December, the Directory Section readdressed and forwarded 1,405 pounds of letter mail and 26,489 pounds of all other classes of mail. This was more than twice as much directory mail as was processed during the preceding 30 days.

(2). Of the 1,558,933 pounds of mail received from out-of-country, during the month of December, 223,356 pounds represented mail generated by OPERATION CHRISTMAS STAR and its satellite programs. The distribution of this mail, in the DaNang enclave, was assumed by the III MAF Chaplain's Section, assisted by designated Division postal clerks. Mail of this nature for the Chu Lai and Phu Bai enclaves was forwarded, via military postal channels, to Chaplains in those areas for equitable distribution.

(3). On 3 December 1965, the 3d Marine Division received its first shipment of parcel post mail directly from a ship instead of via Saigon. No off-loading or distribution problems were encountered and it was noted that the mail was received in better condition than when received via Saigon. This was attributed to less handling and less exposure to the elements. This first shipment consisted of approximately 62,000 pounds. Information recently received from FPO SFRan indicates that the bulk of such mail will now be routed direct to DaNang and, depending on the availability of conexes, all mails for Vietnam will be conexed prior to dispatch from CONUS. This procedure should further decrease the amount of damage and delay previously experienced in transit.

ENCLOSURE (1)



(4). In spite of limited personnel and facilities at the Chu Lai Terminal Post Office, that activity received a total of 592,323 pounds of mail, and dispatched a total of 141,605 pounds, during the month of December. The direct receipt and dispatch of mails at Chu Lai considerably reduced the strain on the already overtaxed facilities at the Main Post Office situated at DaNang.

(5). Considerable damage of incoming mail was noted. The main Division Post Office rewrapped approximately 1,500 of these parcels that were damaged to the extent that they could not be handled any further unless such a service was afforded. This figure of 1,500 does not include parcels that were received with minor damage and were only temporarily reinforced with twine and/or tape to permit further dispatch to the addressees. Although a considerable amount of parcels may have been damaged as the result of mail not being conexed, it was noted that the majority of the damaged parcels were improperly packaged prior to mailing.

(6). The mail handling facilities throughout the command have been considerably improved. All unit post offices are now housed in strong-backed tents and have been provided ample working space which permits the mails to be protected from the elements. The double Butler building under construction to house the main Division Post Office has not been completed, but due to the heavy volume of mail received during this period it was necessary to utilize the building for receiving and dispatching mail during the period 16-31 December.

#### c. SPECIAL SERVICES

(1). The division stock of recreation equipment and athletic clothing improved during December. Of special note were the Christmas trees and decorations received and distributed throughout the division during the period 17 - 23 December. 15,800 paperback books were issued.

(2). The present status of the 3d Marine Division account is:

Balance of Appropriated Funds	\$ 50,000.00
Balance of Non-appropriated Funds	235,000.00
Equipment Issued during Dec 1965	15,119.00
Equipment Received during Dec 1965	6,693.00
Equipment still on order	133,000.00

(3). During December, Special Services processed Marines for six R&R programs; Okinawa, Saigon, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Taiwan, and Tokyo. Tokyo was added to the program on 22 December. Saigon R&R was cancelled twice during the month because of VC activity or the possibility of such as in the period over the Christmas holidays. The personnel figures for R&R participation during December are:

Okinawa	901 personnel
Saigon	77 "
Hong Kong	174 "
Bangkok	368 "
Taiwan	94 "
Tokyo	92 "
Total	1706

(4). Several USO shows toured the division units. The names, dates, and audience involved were:

Martha Raye	9 - 17 Dec	2500
Hugh O'Brien	11 - 13 Dec	2500
Eddie Fisher	17 - 19 Dec	2000
Vietnamese Drama Group	23 - 25 Dec	1000
Bob Hope	- 29 Dec	9000

d. FIELD EXCHANGES

(1). A new Exchange Site was opened in the 7th Engr Bn area on 6 Dec 1965. It is situated temporarily in a hard back tent, pending construction of a tin roofed building. Customer response has been excellent.

(2). The construction of a Butler Building in the Division Headquarters Area was completed on 23 Dec 1965 and the Store was officially opened by Brig/Gen ENGLISH on 26 Dec 1965. Customer response is excellent and the sales capacity is roughly quadruple that of the former location in the III MAF area. Night operating hours were established by the Exchange Officer to accomodate Marines who cannot get to the Exchange during daylight hours.

(3). A 1962 Ford commercial van was received and will be utilized as a Mobile Exchange.

e. INFORMATIONAL SERVICES

(1). Press coverage of 3rd Marine Division activities consisted of 117 news, feature and hometown releases through the Combat Information Bureau of III Marine Amphibious Force.

(2). The most significant operational coverage was "Operation Harvest Moon." A total of thirteen releases resulted.

(3). Other coverage during the month included civil affairs programs, human interest stories, unique incidents throughout the 3rd Marine Division and personal experiences of Marines involved in combat operations against the Viet Cong.

(4). During the month numerous Christmas cards and packages were received from individuals and civic groups in the United States. All cards were equally distributed among 3rd Marine Division units. A large majority of the packages were sent to "C" Company, 3rd Medical Battalion for distribution to the sick and wounded.

(5). Informational Services now has a writer assigned to every infantry battalion under the operational control of the 3rd Marine Division.

f. BAND

(1). In keeping with the policy of playing for all units at least once each month, the band presented Christmas concerts throughout the command. In conjunction with the Civic Action program, concerts were given at various Vietnamese orphanages and schools.

(2). A program is underway to organize a Drum and Bugle Corps and a Variety Show. Progress is slow due to non availability of rehearsal time for the individuals concerned.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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INTELLIGENCE

## 1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

a. Operation HARVEST MOON, QUANG TIN-QUANG NAM Provinces, I/CTZ, Republic of Vietnam, 8-20 December 1965. Operation HARVEST MOON was a coordinated USMC-ARVN ground operation launched to seek out and destroy Viet Cong elements in the vicinity of QUE SON-VIET AN. It was also planned as a spoiling attack since numerous reports had been received that the Viet Cong planned to attack QUE SON District Headquarters. In addition to local forces and guerrillas, Viet Cong units in the area were estimated to be the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, the 70th Main Force Battalion, the CHU DUNG Battalion, a possible 49th Battalion, and a possible unidentified battalion west of QUE SON District Headquarters.

## 2. NEW DEVELOPMENTS

a. General. The latter half of December was characterized by a marked increase in Viet Cong strength throughout the I/CTZ. Friendly forces are faced with more Viet Cong and PAVN forces than at any previous time. The enemy has demonstrated a willingness to engage ARVN forces during daylight as well as a willingness to engage aircraft with small arms and anti-aircraft fire. The Viet Cong continued to rely on ambushes and exhibited a marked improvement in the quantity and quality of their weapons and the employment thereof.

b. PAVN Infiltration in I/CTZ. Operation HARVEST MOON resulted in the confirmation of one PAVN AA battalion in QUANG TIN province; provided further evidence of large-scale PAVN infiltration and of the restructuring of Viet Cong and PAVN forces in I/CTZ; and gave an insight into Viet Cong/PAVN plans in I/CTZ.

(1) Captured documents and the statements of PAVN captives and ralliers confirm the presence of the 195th (also known as the 519th) AA Battalion in the QUE SON-VIET AN area. This unit was formed in North Vietnam from elements of the 308th PAVN Division on or about April 1965. It infiltrated the Republic of Vietnam in late September and arrived in the QUE SON-VIET AN area on approximately 20 October. In November, the 195th supported elements of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in an attack on HIEP DUC District Headquarters. It is believed this unit suffered 50%, and possibly as high as 75% casualties during Operation HARVEST MOON.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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SECRETOPERATIONS

1. Monsoon weather conditions continued during December to restrict cross country movement and air operations. Despite these adverse weather conditions, Division units conducted a total of 9,698 offensive operations to gain contact with VC elements. 510 contacts were made with VC elements during the month.
2. In addition to launching offensive actions, the Division continued to provide defensive protection to vital installations in the DaNang, Chu Lai and Hue Phu Bai enclaves. No significant actions were initiated by the VC against these installations during the month.
3. Operations continued to be characterized by small unit actions. 6,696 of the 9,698 offensive actions were conducted by platoon or smaller size units as is shown in the following table:

<u>SIZE</u>	<u>PATROLS</u>	<u>AMBUSHES</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Fire Team	703	599	1,302
Squad	2,156	2,308	4,464
Platoon	<u>710</u>	<u>220</u>	<u>930</u>
Total	3,569	3,127	6,696

4. Under the FMFPAC BLT Rotation program, 2d Bn, 1st Mar replaced 3d Bn, 4th Mar in the Hue Phu Bai TAOR on 25 December.
5. Division units suspended offensive operations during the Christmas cease fire 24-25 December, though twenty contacts were made with VC forces during the no fire period.
6. Two significant company sized operations during the month resulted in heavy VC losses. On 5 December Co C, 1st Bn, 7th Mar on a search and destroy operation in TUET DIEM (BT 654039) made contact with 70 VC. The VC suffered 30 killed, 14 wounded, 6 VC were captured and 3 weapons seized. While protecting a downed helicopter in the vicinity of (BT 796412) Co E, 2d Bn, 4th Mar, killed 17 VC and captured 7 weapons. It was estimated an additional 20 VC were killed in this action.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. In early December Task Force Delta was activated under the command of Brigadier General M. D. HENDERSON for the purpose of conducting a search and destroy operation in coordination and conjunction with elements of the 2d ARVN Division in the QUE SON-VIET AN-HIEUP DUC valley complex. This operation, named HARVEST MOON, commenced at 0600 on 8 December and was terminated at 2130 on 20 December. On 10 December, Brigadier General PLATT succeeded Brigadier General HENDERSON as the Task Force Commander.

2. Task Force Delta with three infantry battalions supported by combat support and service elements inflicted severe losses on elements of the 1st VC Regiment, local force guerrillas and the 919th AA Battalion (PAVN), which had been recently infiltrated into the HARVEST MOON objective area. Friendly and enemy losses during the period are shown in the following tables:

a. <u>Friendly</u>	<u>Total</u>
(1) KIA	44
(2) DOW	6
(3) MIA	1
(4) Non Battle Death	1
(5) WIA	265 *

\* As of 23 December 112 WIA had been returned to duty.

b. Enemy

(1) <u>KIA</u>	<u>CONFIRMED</u>	<u>POSSIBLE</u>
Normal Forces	314	327
Marine Air	69	284
SAC	22	UNK

(2) WIA: Estimated 100

(3) VCC: 33 (4 PAVN)

(4) VCS: 231

(5) Ralliers: 3 (2 PAVN)

3. In addition to inflicting heavy personnel losses on VC forces, HARVEST MOON resulted in the destruction of a large enemy supply installation as well as heavy losses in VC supplies and equipment. 107 enemy weapons were captured.

4. During HARVEST MOON B-52 strikes were employed for the first time by Marine units in support of tactical ground operations. Two of the four strikes delivered were exploited by Task Force Delta ground forces. The Task Force Commander reported that, "the bombs were dropped where they were supposed to be dropped, when they were supposed to be dropped and with excellent area coverage."

ENCLOSURE (1)

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5. Highway 1 was extensively used south from DaNang and north from Chu Lai during HARVEST MOON by troops, artillery and supply convoys. Four convoys were conducted over the highway during the period 9-20 December without serious opposition by the VC.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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TRAINING HIGHLIGHTSI. GENERALA. Intra-Rotation of BLT's, WEST PAC

1. The following schools/courses are made available on an as basis to BLT's upon their arrival - OKINAWA:

- (a) ~~Field Radio Operator~~
- (b) ~~Field Wireman~~
- (c) ~~Motor Vehicle Operator~~
- (d) ~~Basic Infantry Weapons Repair~~
- (e) ~~NBCD (Monitor and Survey and Decon Teams)~~
- (f) ~~Vietnamese Language~~
- (g) ~~Embarkation~~

2. The following unit training will be conducted:

- (a) Land Mine Warfare
- (b) Counter-Guerrilla Warfare
- (c) Jungle Lanes Firex
- (d) Weapons Familiarization Firing
- (e) LFTU Waterproofing courses for vehicle and comm-elect items (as the school is available).

- B. Non-Rotational Units. The following school quotas were requested for Division Units not under the purview of the Intra-Rotational BLT, WEST PAC system.

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>INPUT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>BASIS</u>
Infantry Weapons Repair	5	Okinawa	Monthly
Army Language Course (Vietnamese)	5	Okinawa	Monthly.
Embarkation	18 Officers 18 Enlisted	Okinawa	Monthly

ENCLOSURE (1)



<u>COURSE</u>	<u>INPUT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>BASIS</u>
Custodian Registered Publications Course	2	Yokosuka, Japan	Monthly
Civil Affairs Course	4	Saigon, RVN	Monthly

## II. INTRA-DIVISION TRAINING

- A. LVTB-6. The First Amphibian Howitzer Platoon completed required training. Employment will be curtailed until critical supply items are received.
- B. .50 Cal. Machine Gun. During the period 5-16 December 1965, a live firing Anti-Aircraft .50 Cal. Machine Gun course was conducted with the following accomplished:
  1. Three instruction and live fire periods for each student.
  2. Firing was conducted primarily from the Aerial Mount - M63, with motor transport units receiving emphasis in firing from the Vehicle Mount - M35A1.
  3. Each student fired 200 rounds at drone aircraft.
  4. Total of 505 students from each enclave received instructions.
  5. Total of eighteen drone aircraft were shot down.
- C. Sniper Team. The Division Sniper Team continued to provide both initial and refresher training for Division units. All infantry battalions have been trained with the exception of the 2d Bn, 1st Marines, and the 3d Bn, 3d Marines.
- D. Engineer Battalion Schools. A Division Bulletin was drafted and approved setting forth instructions for the conduct of a Land Mine/VC Booby Trap School.

## III. SPECIALIST COURSES. Three Division Officers attended the five day U. S. Army Advisors/Civil Affairs Course in Saigon, RVN.

## IV. INSPECTIONS. A Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Material Maintenance Inspection Team conducted a training inspection for selected Division Units.

ENCLOSURE (1)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LOGISTICS1. Significant Events

a. The Division Ordnance Officer attended the FMFPac Ammunition Pipeline Conference held on Okinawa during the period 7-9 December 1965.

b. A conference was held amongst interested parties on Nuclear Weapons Training on 27 December 1965.

c. Five 155MM gun tubes were received and installed.

d. Brake lining and wheel cylinder repair kits for all types of wheeled vehicles have become available at the FLSG. A quantity of these have been shipped to the FLSU's at Chu Lai and Phu Bai.

e. The Direct Exchange Program at FLSG is in operation. Such items as brake shoes, wheel cylinders and water pumps may now be directly exchanged.

f. Fulfillment of motor transport requirements for Operation Harvest Moon was very satisfactory considering the high deadline rate of the Division cargo carrying vehicles.

g. The 3d Engineer Battalion has pre-cut timber for bunker kits and these are being provided to units with engineer personnel assisting in the emplacements. The following is a recapitulation of bunkers to date:

<u>SIZE</u>	<u>NUMBER CUT</u>	<u>NUMBER ISSUED</u>	<u>READY FOR ISSUE</u>
20'x30'x8'	25	23	2
12'x24'x8'	46	14	32
8'x24'x8'	11	1	10
8'x 8'x8'	<u>59</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>25</u>
TOTAL	141	72	69

h. During the month of December the number of RED BALL items increased to such a number that it became necessary to refine the criteria for placing an item on RED BALL. Presently, in order to place an item on RED BALL it must be a repair part for equipment, the loss of which would put the unit in a REDOPS Combat Readiness Category 3 or 4. At this time the number of line items on RED BALL is 80.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (1)

## C O N F I D E N T I A L

i. CRITIPAKS were received during the period 16-23 December and have produced varying degrees of success. Listings were submitted for deletions and additions for the January pack. As a result of the November CRITIPAK, 51 end items were removed from deadline during the month.

j. Thirty indigenous boats were procured from local manufacture in Danang. Subject boats (made of local materials) are 13 feet long and 3½ feet wide. Distribution was as follows (for evaluations)

15 - 9th Marines  
3 - 3rd Marines  
6 - 4th Marines  
6 - 7th Marines

TOTAL 30

## 2. New Developments

a. Plans are being formulated at the FMFPac/CMC level to equip all infantry units of the Division with the M-16 rifle, Redeye and 60MM Mortar.

b. On 22 December 1965, 12 M-76 Otters were shipped to Chu Lai. Two of these Otters were for 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units in that enclave to be used as crash recovery vehicles. The remaining 10 Otters were assigned to Company "C", 3d Motor Transport Battalion for operations. The 21 Otters in the Danang enclave have been effectively utilized as resupply vehicles for forward units when road conditions prohibited the use of wheeled vehicles.

## 3. Problem Areas

a. The controlled interchange of parts for limited amounts of engineer equipment is continuing as these parts are not being received through supply channels.

b. Factory representatives from DROTT and INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER are working with Division units to determine causes of TD-15 mechanical failures.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCLOSURE (1)

COMBAT AIR SUPPORT  
DECEMBER 19651. Significant Events

a. Operation HARVEST MOON commenced on 9 December with the lift of two battalions into the TAOR. Extensive LZ preparation by 24 F-4 and A-4 aircraft resulted in 3/3 and 2/7 being landed virtually unopposed. An additional 56 fixed-wing strike sorties were flown on the first day of the operation between 0830 and 1800. The night of the 9th and early morning of the 10th saw ASRT controlled F-4B's drop 18 tons of bombs on selected targets while MAG-16 and MAG-36 helicopters provided around the clock resupply and Med-Evac.

b. Air Operations were controlled from a KC-130 airborne Direct Air Support Center from L-hour minus one until D-day plus two at which time the Task Force Delta DASC was established at Que Son. A helicopter control team was set up at the Logistics Support Area by MAG-16 Operations to control helicopters in and out of the LSA which also served as a helicopter staging area. Aircraft fuel was available at the LSA on D+2 to facilitate rapid servicing and minimize turn-around times. CH-37's provided heavy lift capability by transporting batteries of "stripped" 105mm howitzers into the objective area. Also supporting the artillery were KC-130's which air dropped 90,000 pounds of 105mm and 155mm ammunition.

c. Although the majority of air operations were conducted in an environment of marginal weather, mountainous terrain, and enemy fire, both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft were employed successfully. When "HARVEST MOON" came to a close, the First Marine Air Wing accounted for 710 fixed-wing and 3,262 helicopter hours in support of the operation.

2. New Developments. None during this period.

3. Problem Areas.

a. As weather improves and the tempo of operation increases, it becomes evident that an insufficient number of helicopters are available to support commitments generated by the tactical situation. Recently there has been inadequate air observation pointing out the necessity for fixed-wing observation aircraft or greater UH1E availability.

b. Marking of heli-landing sites, especially during periods of darkness and poor visibility leaves room for improvement. In addition to more effective utilization of panels and smoke, it is recommended ground units be equipped with aviator-type strobe lights for night operations. When used properly, these lights are highly visible and do not adversely affect the pilots' night vision.

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## FSCC

1. Significant Events:

a. Liaison was effected at request of the Northern Sector of QUANG NAM Special Sector regarding defensive fires for areas of ARVN responsibility. Lists were prepared and delivered on 20 December 1965.

b. QUANG NAM Southern Sector was notified of a forward observer school to be conducted at PHU BAI. Arrangements were made for 10 ARVN personnel to attend a three week session of this school.

c. During the reporting period artillery support of ARVN units within the TAOR increased considerably. Numerous observed missions were called on VC concentrations several of which produced confirmed VC KIAs. In addition, unobserved fires on reported VC positions and H&I fires have been delivered.

d. Communications with both the Northern and Southern QUANG NAM sectors have been good, although contact with HOI AN has been cumbersome at times.

2. New Developments: QUANG NAM Special Sector established a blanket policy that all H&I fires will be fired between the hours 2100-0500. This was done to have a standardized curfew policy in both the Northern and Southern sector.

3. Problem Areas: The southward extension of the Division TAOR created a few problems in the coordination and delivery of supporting fires within the 9th Marines sector. The new portion of the TAOR now encompasses ARVN and PF units operating in the vicinity of Highway 14. A Fire Coordination Line (FCL), utilizing the old TAOR, was established with the Southern Sector (HOI AN) but was not recognized by the 9th Marines. This problem should be resolved during the next reporting period to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICSa. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

(1) Considerable guidance was directed toward communication-electronic equipment preventative maintenance and repair throughout the Division. A concerted effort was made to upgrade the quality of preventive maintenance thereby reducing the frequency of equipment failures, and the restoration of thorough operator care of equipment was emphasized to enhance the combat readiness of communication equipment.

(2) The receipt of the Radio Set AN/PRC-25 prior to and during Operation HARVEST MOON was most timely and materially assisted those units participating in the Operation in maintaining tactical communications under adverse weather conditions. The Radio Set from first use appears to be rugged enough for the tasks to which assigned and battery life of the BA 386 is considered exceptional (40 to 90 hours service life while in use).

(3) The Division established a Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) station (station call: NOEFA) and commenced operation on 25 December from Ward 2, Division Field Hospital. This facility provides radio "phone patch" service for Division personnel from RVN to CONUS West Coast and thence commercial toll land-line to their respective residence telephone. It is an excellent morale feature for the Division, and approximately 15 telephone calls a day are completed, provided radio propagation is favorable. Additionally, radiograms are transmitted and received for personnel of the Division.

b. PROBLEM AREAS

(1) Repair parts support for communication-electronic equipment remains essentially marginal. Requisitioned components and accessories are not being received in the quantities required to maintain the communication-electronic material posture of this Division at the optimum level.

(2) The lack of available serviceable Batteries BB-451 and components thereof severely limits the employment of tactical Radio Sets AN/PRC-41/-47. Efforts are being made to resolve this most serious problem through the use of CG FMFPac "RED BALL" program and recommendation by this Division to CMC for increased

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allocation of 4 batteries per set vice the present 3. Additionally, a field modification for restoring the terminal posts in these batteries by the use of a wooden dowel was instituted by a unit. This modification is the subject of separate correspondence to CMC. Operation HARVEST MOON bore out again the difficulty of maintaining a sufficient number of these batteries in a "charge" status and the ability of placing the recharged batteries in the hands of the tactical units when required at critically combat committed times. All available assets of this battery were taken from units not engaged in the Operation in order to maintain required communications with Radio Sets AN/PRC-41 and -47.

(3) There has been no change in the communication officer status during this period. Essentially, this Division Reinforced has a total deficiency of 14 officers MOS 2502.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRETDIVISION SURGEON

## I. Staff Officers:

- a. Division Surgeon: Capt. H. S. ARNOLD, MC USN.
- b. Division Medical Administrative Officer: LCDR K. HYPES, JR, MSC USN.

## II. Average monthly strength during the period (Division level)

Medical Officers: 64

Medical Service Corps Officers: 13

Hospital Corpsman: 1,278

III. Enlisted medical department personnel manning level is currently above T/O. However, EPDOPAC has put a levy on the Division for 70 E-3/E-4 hospital corpsman for transfer to the U. S. Naval Hospitals at Yokosuka and Guam. This move will put the Division slightly below T/O for HM's but will not deter from the medical mission.

IV. Medical and Dental Support: During the report period authorization was received for the establishment of 15 clinical laboratories at selected Battalion Aid Stations. Those selected have been notified and requisitions have been submitted for the authorized supplies and equipment. These facilities are not T/E or organic in a usual Division.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (1)



1. G-5 Staff Section. Civil Affairs/Civic Action
2. Period Covered. 1-31 December 1965
3. Section on Board Strength

<u>No. of personnel</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>RANK/GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>
Officer	1		Major	0302
Enlisted	1		SSgt	0369
	1		LCpl	0141
	1		LCpl	3051
	1		LCpl	0161

#### 4. General

a. During this reporting period the redesignation of Division Civil Affairs from a special staff section to a general staff section G-5 was effected. The Civil Affairs Officer was redesignated as Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 effective 15 December 1965.

b. Papers published by this section and Civic Action daily situation reports submitted during this reporting period are enclosed as follows:

- (1) Division Civil Affairs Newsletter #3
- (2) Annex H (Civil Affairs) to Operation Order 1-65
- (3) Units Civic Action SITREPs

#### 5. Civic Action

##### a. Objective

(1) The basic objective of the 3rd Marine Division Civic Action program continues to function under the provisions of Force Order 1750.1 which attempts to enhance distressed areas, strengthen the popular appeal of the government in the eyes of the Vietnamese people and to improve the image of the Republic Vietnam Armed Forces (RVAF).

##### b. Highlights

(1) The "Marble Mountain Campaign" pacification efforts continues with some encouraging results, however, far from achieving its goal of securing the nine village complex. The most encouraging aspect was based on the progress in establishing hamlet and village councils. This is the first step in self government.

(2) Operation "Harvest Moon"

(a) Civic Action support for operation "Harvest Moon" was provided by the distribution of commodities, primarily "Handclasp", MEDCAP supplies and the utilization of Piasters for financial settlement of small damage claims. It is becoming evident from past experience and the experience of this operation, that Civic Action must be included in the future planning of tactical operations. Civic Action areas of prime importance are those dealing with population control, collection points, medical care, commodity distribution and Psy-War.

The following Civic Action commodities were utilized in support of Operation "Harvest Moon":

- blankets, 3 bales (150 blankets)
- hand soap, 3500 bars
- candy, 24 cases (Mason's candies donated by the 1st Marine Division Association)
- vitamins, 100 bottles
- MEDCAP supplies
- 10,000 Piasters

In addition to the above Civic Action commodities, the following "We Care" items were distributed to the Marines:

- Shaving Kits 720
- Shaving Cream 720 cans

(3) Cam Ne Yen Ne New Life Hamlet

(a) Plans for the relocation of 383 families currently living in the Cam Ne Yen Ne hamlets continue to be developed. Assistance in leveling of the proposed site (985675) has been the only formal request received by the Division from the Hoa Vang District construction chairman.

Consideration is being given to the idea of allowing the above families to remain in their present location and reconstruct the damaged homes vice relocating. This has been proposed unofficially by the USOM Province Representative of Quang Nam Province and the District Chief of Hoa Vang District, the construction chairman. Because of the repairs being effected by the families to the existing structures, the lesser cost involved in repairing vice relocating and having good tillable soil in the present area vice untillable soil in the new site, are the primary considerations for this new line of thinking.

c. Programs(1) Operation Cleft ~~Palate~~/Hare Lip

(a) Operation "Cleft Palate/Hare Lip" continues to assist a limited number of Vietnamese children. One operation was conducted during this period in Saigon. Arrangements made by Civil Affairs Officer, of 4th Marines.

(2) MEDCAP

(a) MEDCAP continues to provide a high psychological impact upon the Vietnamese people. During this period the Division Aid Stations and MEDCAP Medical Teams treated a total of 51,337 civilians. The medical highlight of the month was the collection of \$32.00 for the transportation of a cancer victim to Saigon. Headquarters Battalion MEDCAP Team while conducting normal Civic Action medical care, saw the patient and with no hope or resources for admittance to the cancer hospital, made it possible through donations both from Marines and the Vietnamese to send this cancer victim to the Popular Hospital in Saigon.

(3) DENCAP

(a) Dental care to the Vietnamese continues to be well received. During this period the 3rd Dental Company treated 1,290 civilians with a total of 2,512 procedures. Total teeth extracted during this period was 983. The series of dental lectures given to Hue Medical School continues.

(4) Handclasp

(a) Handclasp commodities received this month was greatly augmented by the private individual donations, with total tonnage exceeding 25 tons for the month. In addition, recent shipment of playground equipment from Commanding General, Marine Corps Supply Center Barstow, arrived. This equipment will be distributed during Jan/Feb 1966 to rural schools. It is anticipated that much of the private donations of clothing, foodstuffs and other household items shipped for Christmas distribution will continue to arrive through late January and early February.

(5) Soap

(a) Holiday Inn Motel/Hotel organization contributed 6000 bars of soap which represents the first increment of a million bars being donated in support of the Division Civic Action program. Response to the "CMC soap drive",

and other requests initiated by Marines continue to provide soap input. The highlight of the month for soap contributions was a donation of 18,000 bars of hand soap which was collected as a result of a newspaper story written by Marguerita Higgins on Civic Action in the Chu-Lai area. Division distributed 50,800 bars of soap throughout this period to subordinate commands and of this quantity 27,869 bars were distributed to the Vietnamese.

#### (6) Foodstuff

(a) Limited foodstuffs were introduced into the Civic Action program during this period. First Marine Division Association donated several cases of Mason's candy, of which the Division received and distributed 85 cases. Additional distribution of this candy will continue through Jan/Feb. Other donations consisted of Raisins (25 cases), cookies, nuts, candy, chewing gum and assorted can goods.

#### (7) C.A.F.E.

(a) Care commodities received this month are as follows: 35 physical education kits; 30 midwifery replacement kits; 8 midwifery kits; and 475 sewing kits. During this period 6 care requisitions were submitted.

#### (8) Clothing/Blankets/Toys

(a) Individual private donations of 68 boxes of clothing; 4 bales of CRS blankets; and a multitude of toys from many private sources were utilized and distributed to the Vietnamese.

#### (9) Foreign Claims

(a) A total of 14 claims were submitted to Division Foreign Claims for processing on behalf of the Vietnamese civilians and of these 9 were forwarded to Saigon. There were no settlements for pending claims during this period except for several claims paid off during operation "Harvest Moon".

#### (10) Schools and Education

(a) Continued emphasis is being placed upon schools and education through out all three enclaves. One of the most significant contributions is the teaching of English by Marine personnel.

English is being taught by Marines at the following locations: (518085) (525086) (515114) (519091) (500066) (995685) (884767) (946697) (901819). In addition arrangements by 3rd Shore Party Battalion were just completed to commence teaching English in 4 primary schools in the Hoa Phat/Hoa Tho village complex.

(b) 3rd Recon Battalion is assisting the Hoa Vang District High School (013724) in the establishment of a rural library which will provide service to students of both Hoa Vang and Hieu Duc Districts. Books and related materials will be forthcoming from the "Iva Mann Junior High School" in Tacoma, Washington. Major Dwain Colby, Operations Officer from 3rd Recon Battalion was instrumental in procuring the first U.S. text book for the start of this library. The associated student body of "Iva Mann Jr. High", through correspondence with Major Colby is supporting this program as a joint school effort by sending old U.S. text books.

(c) Other Vietnamese schools support continue to the Phong Le Bac (001716); Hoa Phat Buddhist (988765); Hoa Binh (949704); and the new addition of the Hoa Cam school (978703).

(d) Contact with the Vietnamese-American association (VAA) in Da Nang, has promised Vietnamese texts and novels for distribution to the rural schools.

(e) Attendance at the MAC-V/USOM Advisory school in Saigon included Civil Affairs Officers from the 3rd Anti-Tank Battalion, 3rd Marines, and the 12th Marines. School was conducted during the period 13-17 December.

(f) Civil Affairs Seminar was conducted for the officers and Staff NCO's of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines. Discussion centered on "Why Civic Action".

#### d. Community Relations

##### (1) General

(a) Vietnamese/Marine Corps relationships continue to improve. Examples of this improvement are evident by the following: luncheon given in honor of the 3rd Shore Party Battalion Surgeon, for his MEDCAP activity in support of school children in the Hoa Vang District area;

the Marine Corps assistance requested by the Buddhist leaders of Chu-Lai to fly a 300 lbs Buddha from Da Nang which further indicated that the Buddhist/Marine relationships continue to improve; and the deliverance of Christmas cards by the many Vietnamese officials and local citizens during Christmas week. This response certainly is attributed to contacts made through Civic Action primarily.

(2) Sanitation and Health

(a) 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines constructed 2 toilets for public use in the village of Thuy Tan (910149).

(3) Holidays

(a) Christmas was highlighted throughout all MAOR's by unit Christmas Parties. Gifts of candy, clothing, toys and blankets were distributed to several thousand children in 14 separate parties. Parties of special significance were: the Hoa Vang District (013724) Veterans Association Christmas Party, hosted by the district veterans and assisted by Division, for the widows and orphans of ARVN ex-servicemen; and the 1st Amph. Tractor Battalion Christmas party with its decorated tractor, provided several hundred gifts to the children of the Da Nang Sampan community (041753).

(b) Division Band participated throughout the entire period in support of the Civic Action effort. Programs presented were as follows: Conducted concert in conjunction with distribution of care commodities at the An Hai school (048769); conducted "People to People" concert at the "Market Place" in Tuy Loan #1 (943701); participated in the Hoa Vang District Veterans Christmas Party and ceremony (013724); and conducted Christmas concerts at other Division units in conjunction with parties for the Vietnamese children at both the Da Nang and Chu-Lai enclaves. The Division Band continues to highlight all activities in which it is involved and is an asset to the overall Civil Affairs Program.

e. Projects

(1) Playgrounds

(a) Playground equipment was received late in December from the Commanding General Marine Corps Supply Center Barstow. This equipment will be distributed to outlying rural schools in January 1966. Playground equipment is highly receptive by the children. 3rd Engineer Battalion constructed playground equipment for the Da Son school (961765); 3rd Anti Tank Battalion continues work on the An Hai playground (048769).

ENCLOSURE (1)  
enclosure

(2) Bridges

(a) 1st Battalion, 4th Marines completed work on a bridge at Ryn village (517111).

(3) Roads/Fence/Structures

(a) 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines constructed and installed 2 gates for a fence line going into the village of Thuy Luong (912118).

(b) 1st Battalion, 4th Marines constructed roof top for school house located at Khung Long (469070).

(c) 4th Battalion, 12th Marines provided lumber and assistance to the hamlets of Diem Tru, Di Bang and Phan Dong for the construction of rice storage bins (861161).

(4) Irrigation/Wells

(a) USOM provided 20 sacks of cement to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines for construction of a well located at Thach Nhan (955715).

(5) Soil/Agriculture

(a) USOM Representative distributed garden seed packets to the people of Ky Ha village through the Civic Action assistance rendered by 1st Battalion, 4th Marines.

(6) Sick Call Shelters

(a) 3rd Tank Battalion constructed a sick call (aid station) shelter at the Phong Bac/Hoa Tho school (001716).

(b) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines constructed a sick call shelter in the hamlet of Thach Nhan (955715).

(7) Government

(a) Civic Action efforts continue to emphasize the importance of local and national Vietnamese government. Evidence of government responsiveness is conspicuous by its absence in the rural hamlets and villages. This condition exists primarily because of insufficient security in these outlying areas.

### f. General Analysis

Time and experience thus far obtained from Civic Action indicates that the Division Civic Action programs and projects should continue to be directed toward the rural populated areas for the purpose of effecting maximum impact and contact. This direction is considered essential at this point in the Civic Action effort. Hopefully, after considerable exposure to the Marines assisting with MEDCAP, DENCAP commodity distribution, projects and social contacts, the Civic Action impact areas will become vulnerable and susceptible to GVN/ARVN Psy-War and general pacification.

The only experience being obtained ~~which can be related to the~~ direction proposed above is the "Marble Mountain Pacification Campaign". The pacification campaign is being conducted by one ARVN 59th Regional Force Battalion, People Action Teams, and other Pacification Cadres. Progress has been extremely slow in spite of the fact that Division Civic Action programs were prevalent throughout this area for 2 months prior to the GVN/ARVN pacification effort and therefore the results of this pacification effort should show more productivity. This slow progress can be attributed to either a premature pacification effort or insufficient Civic Action impact. This observation is derived from reports and discussions with the Pleu Bong pacification headquarters. Whereas ~~if this same~~ area could have had an extended Division Civic Action impact which is presently being applied in other areas such as the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, etc., the extent of progress may have been accelerated in the Marble Mountain Campaign.

Therefore, it appears that the Civic Action impact described in the Recap of Daily SITREPs, if applied to an area for 5 to 6 months prior to pacification efforts, that the pacification and securing of the area may be accelerated and achieve a greater degree of success. The mission of the Third Division Civic Action, of instilling in the populace of Vietnam confidence in their duly constituted government, and to gain the confidence and cooperation of the Vietnamese people residing in its TAOR's is further expanded to include Civic Action as the forerunner requisite for general pacification and securing of rural populated areas. It is concluded that a definite relationship exists ~~between pacification progress and~~ Civic Action impact, therefore, while additional experience is being obtained, Division Civic Action will continue to be directed to achieve maximum impact and contact with the civilian population.



g. Monthly Recap of Civic ActionA. Medical Assistance

No. female adults assisted:	8,862
No. male adults assisted	6,798
No. children under 18 assisted	35,677
Total persons assisted	51,337

B. Dental Assistance

No. of examinations	408
No. of extractions	983
No. of fillings	245
Total persons assisted	1,290

C. Personal Assistance

No. pounds food distributed	12,813
No. persons receiving food	13,127
No. pounds clothing distributed	11,166
No. persons receiving clothing	9,034
No. bars soap distributed	27,869
No. persons receiving soap	23,734

Evacuation Assistance

No. adults evacuated medically	83
No. children under 18 evacuated medically	72
No. adults evacuated operationally	13
No. children evacuated operationally	7

Contacts with local personnel

No. initial contacts	1,685
No. follow-up contacts;	3,108

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Div Operations Orders Issued in Dec 1965

*Back #1-6* Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 354-65 (LONG LANCE)

*#1* Operation Plan 354-65

*#2* Operation Plan 355-65

*#3* Operation Plan 356-65

*#4* Operation Plan 357-65 [S&C 286 422]

*#5* Operation Order 358-65 [S&C 286 448]

NOTE: Change to OpOrder 353-65 F/w 3d Mar Division C/Chronology, November 1965

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3d Mar Div

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**LONG LANCE**

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 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, RVN  
 181200Z Dec 1965  
 Ser. No. 00170-65

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Operation Plan 354-65

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series; L701, Sheets 6558 I & II and 6658 III & IV  
 (b) Div Op 0 343-65

Time Zone: Hotel

## Task Organization

3d Marine Division (Rein)

3d Marines  
 9th Marines  
 12th Marines  
 3d Recon Bn

MGen WALT  
 Col FISHER  
 Col GORMAN  
 Col CALLENDER  
 LtCol VAN CLEVE

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)
  - (1) ISUMS as issued.
- b. Friendly Forces. Reference (b)
- c. Attachments and Detachments. Effective on order.
- d. Assumptions. That the enemy situation does not substantially change from current estimates.

2. MISSION. Commencing M-Hour, D-Day, 3d Mar Div conducts search and destroy operation in the southwest corner of the DA NANG TAOR; finds, fixes, and destroys enemy forces in area in order to reduce Viet Cong potential for harassment and/or attack in DA NANG TAOR.

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operation

- (1) In coordination with ARVN forces operating south of the Song VU GIA and supported by the 1st MAW, Third Marine Division at L-Hour, on D-Day will land a heliborne blocking force vic NONG LAM (2) (AT 8356) to occupy high ground and prevent enemy exit to west; commencing at M-Hour, D-Day attack from LOD on axis of 3d Marines MSR, search and destroy enemy forces, and link up with heliborne force: continue search and destroy operation to HA NHA (2) (AT 7954); counter march, conduct return movement to LOD. Deception plan and secrecy of intentions

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considered essential to operation. Estimated duration of operation is three days. Annex B (Operation Overlay).

b. 3d Marines

- (1) Commencing at L-Hour on D-Day land heliborne blocking force to prevent enemy exit to the west.
- (2) Commencing at M-Hour, D-Day, conduct search and destroy operation along axis 3d Marines MSR and Route 14 to southwest corner DA NANG TAOR. Annex B (Operation Overlay).
- (3) Assume OPCON Division Reserve if committed.
- (4) Make maximum use of small units to find, fix and destroy by artillery/air Viet Cong forces in zone.

c. 12th Marines

- (1) Position necessary artillery units to provide support by 1600H D-1.
- (2) Priority of fires to Third Marines.

d. 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Provide observation and surveillance over objective area from high ground to the north of Route 14; report findings directly to 3d Marines in addition to normal reports to this Headquarters.

e. 9th Marines. Provide one company as Division Reserve at 0800H, D-1. Notify this Headquarters of designated company.

f. Division Reserve.

- (1) Co\_\_\_\_, Ninth Marines will be on one (1) hour alert for deployment with 3d Marines. CHOP to 3d Marines on order this Headquarters.

g. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Employment of Riot Control Agents authorized.
- (2) Unclassified Code Name: LONG LANCE
- (3) M-Hour and D-Day as designated by CO, 3d Marines, but no earlier than 140700H January 1966
- (4) This plan effective for planning upon receipt and for execution on order.
- (5) Direct liaison between participating commands authorized.

SECRET4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.a. Supply

- (1) General - FLSG is the initial source for Class I, III, IV and V. Re-supply from FLSG as required.
- (2) Prescribed Load
  - (a) Class I - 1 Day MCI w/fuel per individual
  - (b) Class II - Combat essential equipment as prescribed by commander.
  - (c) Class III - Vehicle tanks full, 5 gal fuel cans full and mounted on vehicles. 4 days special oils and lubricants.
  - (d) Class IV - As deemed essential by Commander.
  - (e) Class V - Basic allowance.
  - (f) Medical supplies - Full initial allowance plus three days high usage items.
  - (g) Water - 2 full canteens per man. All water cans full.
- (3) Resupply - All classes by surface or air from FLSG.
- (4) Distribution - Unit distribution.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization

- (1) Evacuation - Four hour evacuation policy.
  - (a) By most expeditious means to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion.
  - (b) Weapons and organizational equipment will be evacuated with casualties.
  - (c) VCC/VCS and indigenous civilian personnel, for emergency life saving surgery only, to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion.
- (2) Hospitalization - As determined by CO, 3d Medical Battalion.

c. Transportation

- (1) Motor Transport and helicopter.
- (2) 3d Motor Transport Battalion provides trucks as required.

d. Service - Driver/operator or crew maintenance only.e. Salvage - All damaged and unserviceable material will be turned in upon completion of operation.

SECRETf. Personnel

- (1) Casualty reporting in accordance with Div O 3040.2A.
- (2) Commencing D+1 submit Personnel Daily Summary as of 2400H D-Day by 1200H following day in accordance with DivO 1080.3.
- (3) Routine administration in accordance with current directives.
- (4) Graves Registration - KIA will be evacuated through medical evacuation prescribed in paragraph 4.b. above.

g. Captured Personnel and Documents - In accordance with CG, 3d Marine Division 190846Z October 1965 and DivO P3800.1E.

h. Miscellaneous

- (1) Uniform and equipment - as prescribed by commander.
- (2) Items of captured material that cannot be made serviceable or evacuated will be destroyed on authority this Headquarters.
- (3) Civil Affairs - In accordance with DivO 5080.1.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. Communication is in accordance with Annex I of reference (b) and DivO 02000.2 (c).

b. 3d Marine Division Communication Company - provide communication personnel and necessary equipment to the Division Liaison Officer and this Headquarters for the purpose of activating a Division Liaison Net #1.

## (1) Frequency:

(a) Primary 2264

(b) Alternate 5272

## (2) Emission - Voice

## (3) Call Signs

(a) Division Headquarters - MONROE

(b) Liaison Officer - MONROE KILO

c. Activate when directed.

e. Direct liaison authorized between participating Commands including I Corps on matters pertaining to Communication.

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f. Notify this Headquarters of Command post locations when established.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT:

*D. W. Sherman*

D. W. SHERMAN  
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- ✓A - Intelligence (To be published.)
- ✓B - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION:

CMC (AO3)	2
CMCS (MCEC)	2
CG, FMFPac	2
CG, III MAF	10
CG, FMAW	5
ADC CMC GRP	3
3d Marines	10
12th Marines	3
9th Marines	3
3d Recon Bn	3
3d Engr Bn	3
3d Tank Bn	3
1st AmTrac Bn	3
1st Bn, 12th Mar	3
FLSG	3
G-1	2
G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	3
CEO	3
3d Med Bn	2
3d MT Bn	2
S&C	2
3d AT Bn	3
G-5	1

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## Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 354-65 (LONG LANCE)

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000; AMS Series L701, Sheets 6558 I & II and 6658 III & IV  
(b) 3dMarDiv OpO 343-65  
(c) 3dMarDivO P3800.1E

## I. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Enemy Dispositions

- (1) The lowland area north of the SONG VU GIA between north-south grid lines ZC 21 and AT 83 (southwest corner of DANANG TAOR) is believed to be the operating area of the H54 and 113th District Companies. An unidentified company operates in the valley that runs northwest from the SONG VU GIA from ZC 1654. A battalion, unconfirmed as the 93d, operates north of the SONG VU GIA in vicinity ZC 1951.
- (2) The 347th Company (Provincial MF) is believed to be east of the confluence of the SONG VU GIA, SONG AI NGHIA, and SONG THU BOM in the general area of AT 9356. A battalion, unidentified but possibly the one reported to be commanded by LAM, is probably in the lowland area south of the SONG THU BOM from AT 8849 to AT 9352. An unidentified company (possibly elements of H54 and/or 113th companies) operate south of the SONG VU GIA in the area of ZC 1954.

b. Enemy Installations

- (1) VC rice and food storage areas have been reported in GS AT 8057 and AT 8157.
- (2) Despite ARVN installations located at DAI LOC vicinity AT 917582 and in vicinity Hill 65 at AT 8858, the VC enjoy relative freedom of action in the objective area.
- (3) There are indications that the hill area immediately north of the SONG VU GIA may be a staging or harboring area for VC units of at least company and probably battalion size. The presence of units in the hill area at any one time is seldom confirmed.

c. Enemy Activities. See Appendix 1 (Enemy Activity Overlay) and intelligence summaries and reports as issued.

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## 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather. See daily weather forecasts and weather summaries as issued in ISUMS. Weather features for the month of January are as follows:

- (1) Clouds - Mean cloudiness 77% with .3 to .6 cloud cover.
- (2) Ceilings - 3000-5000 feet w/visibility of 5 miles or better.
- (3) Temperature - Mean daily maximum 75° and minimum 65°.
- (4) Humidity - Mean relative 86%.
- (5) Precipitation - Mean 4.2 inch; maximum 12.4 inch; minimum 0.6 inch. Mean number of days with some showers - 14.

b. Astronomical and Tidal Data

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>TIDAL HT (ft)</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>
1	0401 1050 1846	3.8 2.7 3.8	0715	1826
2	0003 0529 1101 1904	3.3 3.5 2.9 4.0	0715	1826
3	0154 0743 1104 1932	2.9 3.2 3.0 4.4	0716	1827
4	0305 2009	2.4 4.7	0716	1828
5	0400 2050	2.1 5.0	0716	1828
6	0453 2136	1.7 5.3	0717	1829
7	0542 2224	1.4 5.5	0717	1830
8	0631 2313	1.4 5.6	0717	1830
9	0719	1.4	0717	1831

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SECRET

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>TIDAL HT (Ft)</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>
10	0003 0805	5.5 1.5	0718	1831
11	0053 0846	5.3 1.7	0718	1832
12	0144 0921	5.0 2.0	0718	1833
13	0236 0949 0719 2018	4.5 2.3 3.5 3.2	0718	1833
14	0333 1007 1742 2241	4.0 2.6 3.7 3.1	0718	1834
15	0437 1011 1813	3.6 2.8 4.0	0718	1834
16	0113 0625 0956 1851	2.9 3.1 2.9 4.3	0718	1835
17	0259 1933	2.5 4.6	0718	1836
18	0402 2017	2.2 4.8	0718	1836
19	0448 2101	2.0 5.0	0718	1837
20	0527 2144	3.1 5.0	0718	1837

## NOTES:

- (1) Duration of Civil Twilight is approximately 23 minutes.
- (2) Civil Twilight definition: The degree of illumination at the beginning and end of Civil Twilight is such that the brightest stars are just visible and terrestrial objects can be easily distinguished.

SECRET

SECRET

(3) DANANG local standard time is GCT plus 8 hours.

c. Terrain

- (1) Helicopter landing suitability - see Appendix 2.
- (2) Terrain trafficability - see Appendix 3.
- (3) Road, trail, and bridge status - see Appendix 4.
- (4) Waterway crossing sites - see Appendix 5.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Requirements) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) as modified and applicable to the specific area of operation.

b. Additional Intelligence Requirements:

- (1) Confirm the size, identification, and type of VC units that normally operate in the objective area.
- (2) How are VC units in the area of operations normally resupplied?
- (3) What is the nature and capacity of VC camps, training centers, storage areas, etc., located in the area? What is the purpose for these installations?
- (4) Are there any indications of captured U.S. personnel having been in the area of operation? Location? Exploitation?
- (5) Is there evidence of PAVN, CHICOM or other foreign advisors operating in the area?
- (6) See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Requirements) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) for other specific intelligence requirements.

4. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. Orders to Subordinate Units

(1) Infantry Units

- (a) Conduct normal unit reconnaissance and observation as set forth in reference (c).
- (b) Report information as obtained on EEIs and other intelligence requirements by most expeditious means to G-2.

SECRET

SECRET

(2) 3d Reconnaissance Battalion

- (a) Conduct reconnaissance and observation as set forth by mission in the basic plan.
- (b) Report information as obtained on EEIs and other intelligence requirements direct to 3d Marines in addition to normal reports to this Headquarters (G-2/G-3).

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units(1) Commanding General, III MAF

- (a) Provide information on the area of operation, as requested to include:

- 1 Special aerial photography.
- 2 Terrain and trafficability study.
- 3 HLZ suitability study.
- 4 Enemy activity study.
- 5 Water barrier crossing study.

- (b) Provide current and predicted weather data that would adversely affect the operation during the period 1-20 January 1966.

(2) Commanding General, 1st MAW. Provide observation aircraft for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance as requested.

## 5. MEASURE FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL

- a. All wallets and personal effects of VC casualties will be forwarded INTACT to G-2. Troops will be specifically instructed not to retain money, photographs, ID papers, jewelry, etc. recovered from VC dead.
- b. Every effort will be made to keep captured documents dry or, when wet upon capture, to minimize effect of wetting prior to forwarding to G-2.
- c. Captives found by screening to be VCC will be expeditiously evacuated to the Division Collection Point DANANG by helicopter:

Priority I - VC Officers, key cadre, foreign advisors.  
 Priority II - VC NCOs, guerilla leaders, communications personnel.  
 Priority III - All other VCC.

- d. See paragraph 5 of Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) for specific instructions.

## 6. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. Reference (a) is the tactical map for this operation.

SECRET

SECRET

- b. Map requirements will be submitted in accordance with reference (c).
- c. Retain all appendixes to this annex for Operation MALLARD to be announced.

## 7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

See Appendix 2 (Counterintelligence) to Annex A (Intelligence) to reference (b).

## 8. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

See paragraph 8 of reference (b).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

D. W. SHERMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

## APPENDIXES: (RETAIN FOR OPERATION MALLARD)

- ✓1 - Enemy Activity Overlay
- ✓2 - Helicopter Suitability Overlay
- ✓3 - Terrain Overlay
- ✓4 - Road, Trail & Bridge Overlay
- ✓5 - LVT (River) and Troop (Stream) Crossing Sites

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPLAN 354-65

OFFICIAL:

*R. J. Schriver*  
R. J. SCHRIVER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
G-2

SECRET

WAR BONNET

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 181200Z Dec-1965  
 Ser. No. [REDACTED]

SECRET

001 41 65

Operation Plan 355-65

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheet 6658 I  
 (b) Div Op O 343-65

Time Zone: Hotel

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and ISUM's as issued.b. Friendly Forces

(1) Reference (b)

(2) ARVN forces conduct search and destroy operation northward from HOI AN west of SONG DE VONG to prevent enemy escape to west from objective area.

(3) FMAW provides close air support, aerial reconnaissance and helicopter support.

(4) Naval Gunfire support to be provided.

(5) VNN Coastal Surveillance Force maintains security of coast of South China Sea and denies use of inland waters in objective area to VC elements.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).  
 Effective 0800H, D-1.

d. Assumptions

(1) That the enemy situation will remain virtually unchanged from current estimates.

2. MISSION. Third Marine Division at E-Hour on F-Day, in coordination with ARVN forces attacking from the southwest, conducts operations to search for and destroy enemy forces in the coastal area from (BT 123634) to (BT 183589) and bounded by HA XAU, HIEP and DE VONG Rivers on the west.

SECRET

SECRET3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operation. Commencing at E-Hour on F-Day, one infantry battalion (-) (Rein) conducts LVT landings in southern and central portions of objective area respectively; establishes blocking positions to the north and west of the objective area; the landed elements to conduct search and destroy operations in assigned zones, link up and continue search and destroy operations north within zones and to LVT landings. Deception plan and psy war plan to be concurrent with operations. Estimated duration of operation is 36 hours. Annex C (Operation Overlay).

b. 9th Marines

- (1) At E-Hour on F-Day conduct landings with available means in assigned objective area. Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Establish blocking force north and west portion of objective area to prevent enemy movement out of assigned zone.
- (3) Conduct operations to search for and destroy enemy forces in assigned zone.
- (4) Conduct psychological warfare to minimize non-combatant casualties.
- (5) Employ artillery and/or air to maximum when enemy forces fixed.
- (6) Establish liaison with ARVN forces by utilizing organic personnel and communications equipment.
- (7) Be prepared to assume OPCON of Division Reserve on order.

c. 12th Marines

- (1) Provide support from present position.
- (2) Priority of fires to 9th Marines during the operation.
- (3) Provide liaison to ARVN artillery as required.

d. 3rd Marines

- (1) Provide one company on two hour alert status as Division Reserve to be employed in objective area.

SECRET

SECRETe. Division Reserve

- (1) Company \_\_\_\_\_, 3d Marines CHOP to 9th Marines on order this Headquarters.
- (2) Be prepared to assume offensive mission assigned by 9th Marines.

f. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) E-Hour and F-Day as designated by CO, 9th Marines, but no later than 041400H January 1966.
- (2) Unclassified Operation Code Name is: WAR BONNET
- (3) Attachments effective 0800H, D-1.
- (4) Riot Control Agents authorized in assigned zone only.
- (5) This plan effective for planning on receipt, and execution on order.
- (6) Direct liaison between participating units is authorized.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICSa. Supply

- (1) General - FLSG is the initial source for Class I, III, IV and V. Resupply from FLSG as required.
- (2) Prescribed Load
  - (a) Class I - 1 day MCI w/fuel per individual.
  - (b) Class II - Combat essential equipment as prescribed by commander.
  - (c) Class III - Vehicle tanks full, 5 gal fuel cans full and mounted on vehicles. 2 days special oils and lubricants.
  - (d) Class IV - As deemed essential by commander.
  - (e) Class V - Basic allowance
  - (f) Medical Supplies - Full initial allowance plus two days high usage items.
- (3) (g) Water - Two full canteens per man. All water cans full.



SECRET

- (3) Resupply - All classes by most expeditious means from FLSG direct to units on dates determined by commander.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization

- (1) Evacuation. Four hour evacuation policy.
- (a) By most expeditious means available to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion.
  - (b) Weapons and organizational equipment will be evacuated with casualties.
  - (c) VCC/VCS and indigenous civilian personnel, for emergency life saving surgery only, to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion.
- (2) Hospitalization. As determined by CO, 3d Medical Battalion.

c. Transportation

- (1) By waterborne and surface means.
- (2) 3rd Motor Transport Battalion provides trucks as required.

d. Personnel

- (1) Casualty reporting in accordance with Div O 3040.2A
- (2) Commencing D plus 1 submit Personnel Daily Summary as of 2400H D-Day by 1200H following day in accordance with Div O 1080.3.
- (3) Routine administration in accordance with current directives.
- (4) Grave Registration. KIA will be evacuated through medical evacuation prescribed in paragraph 4.b. above.

e. Captured Personnel and Documents. In accordance with CG, 3d Marine Division 190846Z October 1965 and Div O P3800.1E.

f. Miscellaneous

- (1) Uniform and equipment as prescribed by commander.
- (2) Items of captured material that cannot be made serviceable or evacuated will be destroyed on authority this Headquarters.
- (3) Civil Affairs. In accordance with Div O 5080.1.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS

- a. Communication in accordance with annex I of reference (b) and Division Order 02000.1C.

SECRET

- b. In the event of emergency requirements for communication personnel and communication equipment contact Division CEO.
- c. Notify this Headquarters of command post location when established.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT:

*D. W. Sherman*

D. W. SHERMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- ✓A - Task Organization
- ✓B.- Intolligence (To be published)
- ✓C - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION:

(MO3)	2
(MCEC)	2
CG, FMFPac	2
CG, III MAF	10
CG, FMAW	5
ADC CMD G&P	3
3d Marines	3
12th Marines	3
9th Marines	10
3d Recon Bn	3
3d Engr Bn	3
3d Tank Bn	3
1st ArtTrac Bn	3
1st Bn, 12th Mar	3
FLSG	3
G-1	2
G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	3
CEO	2
3d Mod Bn	2
3d MT Bn	2
SAC	2
3d AT Bn	3
G-5	1

DECLASSIFIED

3d Marine Division (Rein)  
DA NAENG, RVN  
181200Z Dec 1965

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Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Plan 355-65

Time Zone: Hotel

(All attachments effective 0800H, D-1)

3d Marine Division (Rein)

MGen WALT

Fifth Marines (Rein)

Col GORMAN

B (-) (Rein), 1st AmTrac Bn  
1st Amphibian How Plt  
Co B, 3d Tank Bn  
Co C, 3d AT Bn  
\_\_\_ Plt, Co \_\_\_, 3d Recon Bn

Third Marines

Col FISHER

Twelfth Marines (Rein)

Col CALLENDER

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT:

*D. W. Sherman*

D. W. SHERMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

D. P. WYCKOFF

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

G-3

A-1.

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3d Marine Division, FMF  
DA NANG, RVN  
181200Z Dec 1965

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Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 355-65 (WAR BONNET)

Ref: (a) Map: 1:50,000, Vietnam, AMS Series L701, Sheet 6658 I  
(b) 3dMarDiv OpO 343-65  
(c) 3dMarDivO P3800.1\_

## 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Intelligence information received by this Headquarters include reports of the following VC units in the area bounded by BT 1265-0963-0958-1657-1959.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LAST REPORTED LOCATION</u>
U/I	164	BT 110635 - BT 132612 (16Nov)
U/I	UNK	BT 1059 and BT 1158 (17Nov)
101st Battalion	UNK	BT 1063 and BT 1163 (13Nov)
U/I Guerrilla Company	100	BT 0665 (Continuous)
101st Company	UNK	BT 1459) (24Nov)

- b. A VC training Camp of unknown capacity has been reported located at BT 132613.
- c. It is estimated that one MF company plus at least one company of guerrillas operate in the above area. In all probability the elements of these units are dispersed throughout the area rather than concentrated.
- d. See intelligence summaries and periodic and special intelligence reports as issued.
- e. Enemy defensive fortifications - See Appendix 1.

## 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

- a. Weather. See daily weather forecasts [REDACTED] and weather summaries as issued in ISUMS. Weather features for the month of January are as follows:
- (1) Clouds - Mean cloudiness 77% with .3 to .6 cloud cover.
- (2) Ceilings - 3000 - 5000 feet w/visibility of 5 miles or better.

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B-1

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- (3) Temperature - Mean daily maximum 75° and minimum 65°.
- (4) Humidity - Mean relative 86%.
- (5) Precipitation - Mean 4.2 inch; maximum 12.4 inch; minimum 0.6 inch. Mean number of days with some showers = 14.

b. Astronomical and Tidal Data

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>TIDAL HT (Ft)</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>
1	0401	3.8	0715	1826
	1050	2.7		
	1846	3.8		
2	0003	3.3	0715	1826
	0529	3.5		
	1101	2.9		
	1904	4.0		
3	0154	2.9	0716	1827
	0743	3.2		
	1104	3.0		
	1932	4.4		
4	0305	2.4	0716	1828
	2009	4.7		
5	0400	2.1	0716	1828
	2050	5.0		
6	0453	1.7	0717	1829
	2136	5.3		
7	0542	1.4	0717	1830
	2224	5.5		
8	0631	1.4	0717	1830
	2313	5.6		
9	0719	1.4	0717	1831
10	0003	5.5	0718	1831
	0805	1.5		

NOTES:

- a. Duration of Civil Twilight is approximately 23 minutes.

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b. Civil Twilight definition: The degree of illumination at the beginning and end of Civil Twilight is such that the brightest stars are just visible and terrestrial objects can be easily distinguished.

c. DA NANG local standard time is GCT plus 8 hours.

c. Terrain

- (1) Helicopter suitability - see Appendix 2.
- (2) LVT landing sites - see Appendix 3.
- (3) Route classification - see Appendix 4.
- (4) River widths - see Appendix 5.
- (5) River traffic obstacles - see Appendix 6.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Requirements) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) as modified and applicable to the specific area of operation.

b. Additional Intelligence Requirements:

- (1) Confirm the size, identification, and type of VC units that normally operate in the objective area.
- (2) How are VC units in the area of operations normally resupplied?
- (3) What is the nature and capacity of VC camps, training centers, storage areas, etc., located in the area? What is the purpose for these installations?
- (4) Are there any indications of captured U.S. personnel having been in the area of operation? Location? Exploitation?
- (5) Is there evidence of PAVN, CHICOM or other foreign advisors operating in the area?
- (6) See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Requirements) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) for other specific intelligence requirements.

4. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. Orders to 9th Marines (Rein)

- (1) Conduct normal unit reconnaissance and observation as set forth in reference (c).

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b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units(1) Commanding General, III MAF

(a) Provide information on the area of operation, as requested to include:

- 1 Special aerial photography.
- 2 Terrain and trafficability study.
- 3 HLZ suitability study.
- 4 Enemy field fortifications study.

(b) Provide ~~current~~ and predicted weather data that would adversely affect the operation during the period 1-10 January 1966.

(2) Commanding General, 1st MAW. Provide observation aircraft for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance as requested.

5. MEASURE FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL

- a. All wallets and personal effects of VC casualties will be forwarded INTACT to G-2. Troops will be specifically instructed not to retain money, photographs, ID papers, jewelry, etc. recovered from VC dead.
- b. Every effort will be made to keep captured documents dry or, when wet upon capture, to minimize effect of wetting prior to forwarding to G-2.

c. Captives found by screening to be VCC will be expeditiously evacuated to the Division Collection Point DA NANG by helicopter:

Priority I - VC Officers, key cadre, foreign advisors.  
 Priority II - VC NCOs, guerilla leaders, communications personnel.  
 Priority III - All other VCC.

d. See paragraph 5 of Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) for specific instructions.

6. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. Reference (a) is the tactical map for this operation.
- b. Map requirements will be submitted in accordance with reference (c).

7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

See Appendix 2 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b).

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8. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

See paragraph 8 of reference (b).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT


D. W. SHERMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

- ✓1 - Enemy Defense Overlay
- ✓2 - Helicopter Suitability Overlay
- ✓3 - LVT Landing Sites Overlay
- ✓4 - Route Classification Overlay
- ✓5 - River Width Overlay
- ✓6 - River Traffic Obstacles Overlay
- ✓7 - Population Density Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPLAN 355-65

OFFICIAL:

  
R. J. SCHRIVER  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
G-2

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 310800Z Feb 65

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Operation Plan 356-65

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6558 I, 6559 II,  
 6558 IV and 6559 III  
 (b) Operation Order 343-65  
 (c) Div O 02000.1C

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization:

3d Marine Division (Rein)

MAJGEN WALT

3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein)

LTCOL VAN CLEVE

3d Recon Bn (-)

Co \_\_\_\_\_ (Rein), 3d Marines

Co \_\_\_\_\_, 3d Marines

FO Team

FAC Team

Section, 81 mm Mortar Platoon

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. ISUMS as issued and Annex A (Intelligence) to be published.
- b. Friendly Forces. Reference (b) and current SitReps.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. Effective 0800, G-4 Days.
- d. Assumption. That the enemy situation will remain virtually unchanged from current estimates.

2. MISSION. Third Marine Division (Rein) conducts reconnaissance in force of the Happy Valley area to determine the location, identity, strength, movement and armament of VC/PAVN units; capture VC/PAVN prisoners; and locate assembly areas, training and logistic bases, and infiltration routes.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. Prior to G-Day, 3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein) will establish a patrol base vicinity East of Happy Valley by foot movement. Utilizing one Rifle Company (Rein) as patrol base (s) security element, 3d Recon Bn (-) commencing on G-Day will reconnoiter east end (East NS GL 16) Happy Valley for about five days. Retraction of forces may be by overland movement and/or helicopter lift. See Annex B (Operation Overlay).

JAN 7 1966

SECRET

Priority of helicopter support and supporting fires, including air, to 3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein) during operation.

b. 3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein)

- (1) Establish patrol base (a) vic east of Happy Valley prior to G-Day.
- (2) Commencing on G-Day, conduct reconnaissance of east end (East NS GL 16) of Happy Valley to determine location, identity, strength, movement and armament of VC/PAVN units; capture VC/PAVN prisoners; and locate assembly areas, training and logistic bases, and infiltration routes for about five days.
- (3) Be prepared to employ Division Reserve on order.

c. 3d Marines

- (1) ~~Detach Co~~ (Rein) 0800, G-4 Days.
- (2) Conduct deep patrolling in high ground on axis (AT 8562) northeast to (AT 9165) from G-3 Days to G plus 5 Days.
- (3) Maintain one Rifle Company (Rein) as Division Reserve on two (2) hour alert.
- (4) Coordinate supporting arms fires from 0001 G-3 Days to conclusion of operation.

d. 12th Marines

- (1) Detach one FO Team 0800 G-4. Report to CO, 3d Recon Bn.
- (2) Provide fire support as requested during movement into and out of the patrol base.
- (3) Pre-position long range artillery capable of supporting to NS GL 14 in Happy Valley prior to G-2 Days.

e. Division Reserve Co (Rein), 3d Marines

- (1) Chop to 3d Recon Bn on order this Headquarters.
- (2) Be prepared to assume mission assigned by 3d Recon Bn.

f. Coordinating Instructions

SECRET

- (1) G-Day as determined by Commanding Officer, 3d Recon Bn. NLT 31 Jan 66.
- (2) Employment riot control agents authorized.
- (3) Movement to objective area by foot; retraction by helicopter authorized.
- (4) Minimum use of aircraft enroute to avoid compromise of mission.
- (5) This plan effective for planning on receipt and execution on order.
- (6) Direct liaison authorized between participating units.
- (7) Unclassified code name: "TAUT BOW"

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICSa. Supply

- (1) General - FLSG is the initial source for Class I, IV & V. Resupply from FLSG as requested.
- (2) Prescribed Load

Class I	-4 days LRP rats w/fuel per man
Class II	-Combat essential equipment as prescribed by commander.
Class III	-None
Class IV	-As prescribed by commander.
Class V	-Basic allowance plus one bandolier.
Medical Supplies	-Full initial allowance plus three days high usage items.
Water	-2 full canteens per man
- (3) Resupply. All classes by air from FLSG direct to units on dates determined by commander.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization

- (1) Evacuation
  - (a) By most expeditious means available to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion
  - (b) Weapons and organizational equipment will be evacuated with casualties.
- (2) Hospitalization. As determined by CO, 3d Medical Battalion.

SECRET

c. Transportation. By foot march initially and by helicopter when directed.

d. Personnel

(1) Casualty reporting in accordance with DivO 3040.2A.

(2) Commencing G-1 submit Personnel Daily Summary as of 2400H D-Day by 1200H following day in accordance with DivO 1080.3.

(3) Routine administration in accordance with current directives.

(4) Graves Registration. KIA will be evacuated through medical evacuation prescribed in paragraph 4.b. above.

e. Captured Personnel and Documents. In accordance with CG, 3d Marine Division 190846Z October and DivO P3800.1E.

f. Miscellaneous

(1) Uniform and equipment as prescribed by commander.

(2) Items of captured material that cannot be made serviceable or evacuated will be destroyed on authority this Headquarters.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. Communication in accordance with Annex I of reference (a) and Division Order 02000.2C.

b. Commanding Officer, 3d Marines be prepared to enter Division Recon Net on order.

Freq: Primary: D-6 (2452)  
Alternate: D-52 (6770)

c. In the event of emergency requirements for communication personnel and communication equipment contact Division CEO.

d. Notify this Headquarters of command post location when established.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT:

*D. W. Sherman*  
D. W. SHERMAN

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

SECRET

SECRETANNEXES:

✓A - INTELLIGENCE (To be published)

✓B - OPERATION OVERLAY

DISTRIBUTION:

CMC	2
CMCS (MCEC)	2
CG FMFPAC	2
CG III MAF	10
CG FMAW	5
ADC CMD GRP CHU LAI	2
SA, I CORPS	2
3D MARINES	5
9TH MARINES	3
12TH MARINES	5
3D RECON BN	10
3D MED BN	3
S&C	1
G-1	1
G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	3

6-3

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Sev# 037 66

Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 356-65 (TAUT BOW)

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000; AMS Series L701, Sheets 6558 I,  
6559 II, 6658 IV & 6659 III  
(b) 3dMarDiv OpO 343-65  
(c) 3dMarDivO P3800.1E

Time Zone: HOTEL

## 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. Enemy Dispositions

- (1) The area known as HAPPY VALLEY in west of the DA NANG enclave has been considered as a secure area for the VIET CONG. Reports indicate probable existence of numerous production camps, training centers, headquarters, and other activities in the eastern portion of the valley. Reported activities are listed as follows:

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Location</u>
DIEN BAN District Committee Hq	AT 842623
HIEU DUC District Committee Hq	AT 843657
DA NANG City Committee Hq	AT 801682
DAI LOC District Committee Hq	ZC 171623
QUANG DA Hq	ZC 1867
Inter-district Dispensary	ZC 194646
PHU TU Secret Zone	ZC 1963
Production Camp	ZC 180646
Military Camps	ZC 164647
-do-	AT 807653
-do-	AT 811657
-do-	AT 815675
-do-	AT 824635
-do-	AT 842643
-do-	AT 843653
-do-	AT 843663
-do-	AT 844654
-do-	AT 844665
-do-	AT 852666
-do-	AT 7964
-do-	AT 7969

JAN 15 1966

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- (2) The following units are carried in HAPPY VALLEY at the locations indicated:

R. 20 Bn Hq	ZC 1761
278th Engr Co	AT 8565
V-15 Sapper Co	AT 8871

- (3) In addition to the above units, the installations and activities listed in subparagraph (1) above can be expected to be manned, to include possible security elements. No reports, however, have been received concerning strengths at these locations.

- (4) There have been some unconfirmed reports of battalion and regimental size units in this area; however, there has been no evidence to support these reports.

- b. Enemy Activities. See intelligence summaries and reports as issued for current enemy activities. Information generated by local collection agencies should be reported to and collated with information held by OOB this headquarters prior to conducting operations.

## 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

- a. Weather. See daily weather forecasts and weather summaries as issued in INTSUMs. Weather features for the months of January-February are as follows:

- (1) Clouds - Mean cloudiness 77% with .3 to .6 cloud cover in Jan; 64% in Feb.
- (2) Winds - From N at 9 knots in Jan; from E at 7 knots in Feb.
- (3) Temperature - Mean daily maximum 75° and minimum 65° in Jan; 78° and 68° in Feb.
- (4) Humidity - Mean relative 86%.
- (5) Precipitation - Mean 4.2 inch; maximum 12.4 inch; minimum 0.6 inch for Jan. Mean 1.8 inch; maximum 10.4 inch; minimum 0. inch for Feb. Mean number of days with some showers - 14 for Jan; 8 for Feb.

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b. Astronomical Data

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>MOON PHASE</u>
20 Jan	0718	1837	-	-	
21 Jan	0718	1838	-	-	NEW
22 Jan	0719	1838	-	-	
23 Jan	0719	1839	-	-	
24 Jan	0718	1839	0910	2053	
25 Jan	0718	1840	0947	2142	
26 Jan	0718	1841	1022	2227	
27 Jan	0718	1842	1056	2315	
28 Jan	0718	1842	1130	-	
29 Jan	0718	1843	1204	0002	
30 Jan	0718	1844	1243	0054	FIRST
31 Jan	0718	1844	1325	0145	
1 Feb	0717	1845	1415	0243	
2 Feb	0716	1845	1511	0345	
3 Feb	0716	1845	1614	0450	
4 Feb	0716	1846	1722	0554	
5 Feb	0716	1846	-	0654	FULL
6 Feb	0715	1846	1938	0751	
7 Feb	0715	1847	2041	0841	
8 Feb	0715	1847	2140	0927	
9 Feb	0715	1848	2239	1009	
10 Feb	0714	1848	2334	1050	

NOTES:

- (1) Duration of Civil Twilight is approximately 23 minutes.
- (2) Civil Twilight definition: The degree of illumination at the beginning and end of Civil Twilight is such that the brightest stars are just visible and terrestrial objects can be easily distinguished.
- (3) DA NANG local standard time is GCT plus 8 hours.

c. Terrain

- (1) Helicopter landing suitability - see Appendix 1.
- (2) Terrain trafficability - see Appendix 2.
- (3) Trails - see Appendix 2.



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## 3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Requirements) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) as modified and applicable to the specific area of operation.
- b. Additional Intelligence Requirements:
  - (1) Determine the size, location, identification, armament, and type of VC units that normally operate in the objective area.
  - (2) How are VC units in the area of operations normally resupplied?
  - (3) What is the nature and capacity of VC camps, training centers, storage areas, etc., located in the area? What is the purpose for these installations?
  - (4) Are there any indications of captured U.S. personnel having been in the area of operation? Location? Exploitation?
  - (5) Is there evidence of PAVN, CHICOM, or other foreign advisors operating in the area?
  - (6) See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Requirements) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) for other specific intelligence requirements.

## 4. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. Orders to Subordinate Units

- (1) Conduct normal unit reconnaissance and observation as set forth in reference (c).
- (2) Report information as obtained on EEIs and other intelligence requirements by most expeditious means to G-2.
- (3) Make every effort to capture VC/PAVN prisoners and expedite to Division Collection Point DA NANG.

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units

- (1) Commanding General, III MAF
  - (a) Provide, as requested, special aerial photography on the area of operation.

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- (b) Provide current and predicted weather data that would adversely affect the operation during the period 20 Jan-10 Feb 1966.

- (2) Commanding General, 1st MAW. Provide observation aircraft for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance as requested.

## 5. MEASURE FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL

- a. All wallets and personal effects of VC casualties will be forwarded INTACT to G-2. Troops will be specifically instructed not to retain money, photographs, ID papers, jewelry, etc., recovered from VC dead.
- b. Every effort will be made to keep captured documents dry or, when wet upon capture, to minimize effect of wetting prior to forwarding to G-2.
- c. Captives found by screening to be VCC will be expeditiously evacuated to the Division Collection Point DA NANG by helicopters.

Priority I - VC Officers, key personnel, foreign advisors.

Priority II - VC NCOs, guerrilla leaders, communications personnel.

Priority III - All other VCC.

- d. See paragraph 5 Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) for specific instructions.

## 6. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. Reference (a) is the tactical map for this operation.
- b. Map requirements will be submitted in accordance with reference (c).

## 7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

See Appendix 2 (Counterintelligence) to Annex A (Intelligence) to reference (b).

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8. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

See paragraph 8 of reference (b).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WAIT

D. W. SHERMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

- ✓1 - Helicopter Suitability Study
- ✓2 - Terrain Study

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPLAN 356-65

OFFICIAL:

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3d Marine Division, FMF  
DA NANG, RVN  
110800Z JAN 1966

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Appendix 1 (Helicopter Suitability Study) to Annex A (Intelligence) to  
Operation Plan 356-65

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701, Sheets 6558 I, 6559 II,  
6658 IV and 6659 III

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES. (Refer to Tab A)

a. Landing Zone I

- (1) Location. Centered at (ZC 157656) adjacent to PHU HOA (1).
- (2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 325 feet long by 70 feet wide. 100% usable.
- (3) Capacity. Two UH-1E's in line and no UH-34's.
- (4) Obstacles. Low brush and scattered trees on the east and west sides and the north end. At the south end a hill rises abruptly to a height of about 70 meters and is heavily forested with high trees.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone has no slope. The vegetation in the area consists of grass with scattered low brush.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone I is situated 6300 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 220 degrees and 5350 meters southeast of the intersection of the SONG YANG and SONG TANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 120 degrees.

b. Landing Zone II

- (1) Location. Centered at (ZC 155657) approximately 950 meters west of PHU HOA (2).
- (2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 660 feet long by 70 feet wide. 90% usable.
- (3) Capacity. Area will accommodate five UH-1E's and no UH-34's.

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- (4) Obstacles. Paddy dikes with low grass and brush growing from them. Hills with low brush and trees surround the zone. A strand of trees located at the north end of the landing zone.
- (5) Surface Features. Consists of paddies separated by dikes.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone II is situated 6350 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 916705) on a magnetic azimuth of 222 degrees and 5125 meters eastsoutheast of the intersection of the SONG YANG and SONG IANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 106 degrees.

c. Landing Zone III

- (1) Location. Centered at (ZC 153660) approximately 600 meters westsouthwest of PHU HOA (1) (ZC 157656) and approximately 1050 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668).
- (2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 275 feet long by 112 feet wide. 100% usable.
- (3) Capacity. Two UH-1H's or two UH-34's in line.
- (4) Obstacles. Landing Zone III is generally flat, sloping gently down at the west end. An extensive tree line is located southwest of the zone. The remainder of the zone is surrounded by low brush and scattered trees.
- (5) Surface Features. Grass and low brush throughout the zone.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone III is situated 6330 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 221 degrees and 4875 meters eastsoutheast of the intersection of the SONG YANG and SONG IANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 104 degrees.

d. Landing Zone IV

- (1) Location. Centered at (ZC 151660) 2225 meters eastsoutheast of MANG MAY (1) (ZC 130666) and 1125 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668).
- (2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 450 feet long by 80 feet wide. 100% useable.

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- (3) Capacity. Four UH-1E's in line and no UH-34's.
- (4) Obstacles. Low hills, heavily forested with high trees at the west end of the zone. Remainder of zone consists of low brush and scattered trees.
- (5) Surface Features. Area is flat with vegetation consisting of low grass.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone IV is situated 6375 meters southwest of hill 1487 on a magnetic azimuth of 225 degrees and 4800 meters eastsoutheast of the intersection of SONG YANG and SONG IANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 104 degrees.

e. Landing Zone V

- (1) Location. Centered at (ZC 151658) approximately 2225 meters eastsoutheast of MANG MAY (1) (ZC 130666) and 1225 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668).
- (2) Size. 90 feet long by 80 feet wide. 100% usable.
- (3) Capacity. One UH-1E and no UH-34's.
- (4) Obstacles. The landing zone is surrounded by low brush with a tree at the northeast corner.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone is flat and is covered with low grass.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone V is situated 6400 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 225 degrees and 4750 meters eastsoutheast from the intersection of the SONG YANG and SONG IANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 105 degrees.

f. Landing Zone VI

- (1) Location. Centered at (ZC 144658) approximately 1650 meters eastsoutheast of MANG MAY (1) (ZC 130666) and 1775 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668).
- (2) Size. Roughly rectangular. 760 feet long by 80 feet wide. 90% usable.
- (3) Capacity. Seven UH-1E's in line and no UH-34's.

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- (4) Obstacles. Scattered trees surround the eastern area of the zone. Paddy dikes and scattered trees.
- (5) Surface Features. Low brush on the paddy dikes.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone VI is situated 700 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 228 degrees and 4100 meters eastsoutheast from the intersection of the SONG YANG and the SONG IANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 108 degrees.

g. Landing Zone VII

- (1) Location. Centered at (ZC 141656) approximately 2150 meters southwest of PHU HOA (3) (ZC 159668) and 1500 meters south-east of MANG MAY (2) (ZC 133670).
- (2) Size. Irregular shaped. 600 feet long by 130 feet wide. 80% usable.
- (3) Capacity. Eight UH-IE's or so. UH-34's staggered in the zone.
- (4) Obstacles. Scattered trees and brush surround the area.
- (5) Surface Features. Consists of flat paddy land with dikes dissecting the zone.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone VII is situated 7325 meters southwest of hill 1487 (ZC 196705) on a magnetic azimuth of 229 degrees and 3850 meters eastsoutheast from the intersection of the SONG YANG and the SONG IANG (ZC 105671) on a magnetic azimuth of 112 degrees.

h. Landing Zone VIII

- (1) Location. Centered (ZC 150703) adjacent to TA PHENG village and approximately 3700 meters north northeast of MANG MAY (1) village (ZC 133670) and 3650 meters north northwest of PHU HUA (3) village (ZC 159668).
- (2) Size. Oval shaped, 330 feet long axis and 275 feet short axis. 90% usable.
- (3) Capacity. Area will accommodate five UH-IE's or three UH-34's.

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- (4) Obstacles. Obstacles within landing zone consist of a tree and some brush. A U-shaped tree line and a stream border the west and north sides of zone. Low brush and rice paddies border the south and east sides.
- (5) Surface Features. Consists of grass and soil; area is probably an abandoned dry crop field.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone VIII is situated 5000 meters west of BA NA Mt (ZC 205705) on a magnetic azimuth of 269 degrees, and 4300 meters northeast of the junction of the TAM VAO stream and the TAM KHO stream (ZC 127667) on a magnetic azimuth of 34 degrees.

i. Landing Zone IX

- (1) Location. Centered at (AT 843724) adjacent to TUNG SON.
- (2) Size. Rectangular shaped. Approximately 130 feet long by 70 feet wide. 90% usable.
- (3) Capacity. One UH-IE and no UH-34's.
- (4) Obstacles. Low brush on the east and west side and northern end. Extensive tree line along eastern side and northern end. Scattered low brush extending from center to the northwest.
- (5) Surface Features. The vegetation in the zone consists of grass with scattered low brush.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone IX is situated 2900 meters northeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 045 degrees and 1600 meters south of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 185 degrees.

j. Landing Zone X

- (1) Location. Centered at (AT 844723) adjacent to TUNG SON.
- (2) Size. Square shaped. 125 feet by 125 feet. 90% usable.
- (3) Capacity. Three UH-IE's and one UH-34.
- (4) Obstacles. Low brush and scattered trees on the east and west sides. Thick low brush at the north end and a cluster of brush near the center of the zone.



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- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone has no slope. The vegetation in the area consists of grass and scattered low brush.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone X is situated 2900 meters northeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 045 degrees and 1700 meters south of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 180 degrees.

k. Landing Zone XI

- (1) Location. Centered at (AT 845722) adjacent to TUNG SON.
- (2) Size. Roughly rectangular shaped. 400 feet long by 250 feet wide. 100% usable.
- (3) Capacity. Fifteen UH-1E's and seven UH-34's.
- (4) Obstacles. The landing zone is surrounded by low brush. Scattered trees line the eastern side with an extensive tree line located from the west side to the south end. One tree approximately 20 feet high is located in the northeast corner of the zone.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone is flat cultivated land with patches of low grass.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone XI is situated 2950 meters northeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 045 degrees and 1800 meters from hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 180 degrees.

m. Landing Zone XII

- (1) Location. Centered at (AT 844722) adjacent to TUNG SON.
- (2) Size. Rectangular shaped. 500 feet long by 250 feet wide. 90% usable.
- (3) Capacity. Twelve UH-1E's and seven UH-34's.
- (4) Obstacles. Thick brush and scattered trees on the west and east side and south end. Extensive brush line running generally northwest to southeast is half way through the center of the zone.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone is flat cultivated land with patches of low grass.

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- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone XII is situated 2850 meters northeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 045 degrees and 1800 meters south of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 180 degrees.

m. Landing Zone A. (Medical evacuation/resupply by hoist only)

- (1) Location. Landing Zone A is located at (AT 827712).
- (2) Size. Roughly square. 30 feet by 30 feet.
- (3) Capacity. None. Hover only.
- (4) Obstacles. Extensive tree line enclose all sides. Tall brush throughout the area.
- (5) Surface Features. The landing zone is located on a slope. Tall brush and grass cover the surface.
- (6) Reference Point. Landing Zone A is situated 995 meters northeast of hill 995 (AT 821705) on a magnetic azimuth of 040 degrees and 3300 meters southwest of hill 270 (AT 844740) on a magnetic azimuth of 215 degrees.

(NOTE: Information obtained from photographs dated 30 August 1965 and 27 October 1965 and vegetation in the landing zone is subject to seasonal changes.

The information in this study is compiled by S-2, 3d Recon Bn.)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

D. W. SHERMAN  
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TAB: ✓ A - Helicopter Landing Zone Suitability Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPLAN 356-65

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3d Marine Division, FMF  
DA NANG, RVN  
110800Z JAN 1966

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Appendix 2 (Terrain Study) to Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 356-65

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50000; AMS Series L-701, Sheets 6558 I, 6559 II, 6658 IV and 6659 III

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

a. Topography. See reference (a) and Tab A (Terrain Analysis Overlay).

(1) General Situation.

- (a) Relief: The area of operation is divided by one long narrow valley oriented east and west. The valley is paralleled on the south by a high ridge reaching 3800 feet to 4000 feet. This ridge is broken midway by a small north-south valley. The portion of the area north of the valley is a unit of complex mountains with peaks ranging to 4813 feet. The slopes of all the mountains and ridges are steep.
- (b) Drainage: The drainage forms a complex pattern flowing generally from the south and east through the complex of mountains to a main stream which drains to the west through the east-west valley.
- (c) Vegetation: Dense rain forest with canopies in excess of 100 feet cover the mountains and ridges. Bamboo patches, along with a few, very small cultivated areas, cover most of the valley floor. The eastern approaches to the valley complex contains forested hills and plains, with numerous settlements of houses and ricefields.

(2) Area Terrain Analysis. See Tab A (Terrain Analysis)

- (a) Area A. Consists of plains, with slopes of less than 10%. Little grass, with thin shrubs and scattered trees. Cultivated land, which includes a few ricefields and thin hedgerows of shrubs and trees. A small clustering of grave mounds are present in the area. Soils are commonly firm, but mixy during and for two or three days following rains of an inch or more. Ricefields in the area are only firm during and immediately following the harvest.

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- (b) Area B. Nearly flat sandy plains with long narrow marshes and small wet depressions. Slopes in this area are generally less than 10%. Dense to sparse shrubs. Scattered ricefields are located adjacent to the marshes and in the depressions. Numerous grave mounds. Soils are moderately firm, but miry during and briefly following rains of one inch or more. Ricefields are firm only during and immediately following the harvest. Marshes and depressions are perennially miry.
- (c) Area C. Consists of paddy land with a network of deep, steep-banked streams, canals, and ditches. Ricefields in the area are separated by earth dikes one or two feet high. There are some road embankments. Numerous settlements with houses surrounded by thick hedges of shrubs and trees. There are many clusters of closely spaced grave mounds in the vicinity of the village. Soils are flooded and miry most of the time; firm one to two months following the rice harvest, which started in September. Conditions of adjacent rice paddies are dependent upon the type of tillage practice followed.
- (d) Area D. Forested hills and plains with closely spaced trees, entwined with woody vines and dense undergrowth. There are some areas of thick shrubs. Numerous narrow, steep walled valleys, gorges and ravines are present.
- (e) Area E. Mountainous and rocky hills. This area consists of highly dissected land and rough surfaces. The terrain is commonly forested; rocky hills, however, are sparsely wooded. There are numerous narrow, steep-walled valleys, gorges and ravines located in the area.
- (f) Area F. Consists of flat plains with bamboo patches, thick shrubs and trees. Long narrow marshes and wet depressions in evidence. Small, and scattered, areas of cultivation. Soils are moderately firm but miry during and for one or two days following rains of one inch or more.

## 2. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

a. Obstacles.

- (1) Area A. FAIR movement for trucks and tanks when the ground is firm, becoming UNSUITABLE for trucks and POOR for tanks when the soil is miry. General movement is hindered by grave mounds, hedgerows, trees, and ricefields. Foot troop movement is only slightly hindered by scrub, but is slowed in the flooded ricefields.

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- (2) Area B. Conditions are POOR for trucks and FAIR for tanks when the ground is firm, becoming UNSUITABLE for trucks and POOR for tanks when the soil is miry. Movement of trucks through the cultivated and grassy areas is tortuous. Tanks are mainly hindered by forests and hedges. General movement in the ricefields is only feasible when the ground is firm. Foot troops are hindered by the thick scrub, forests, and flooded ricefields.
- (3) Area C. UNSUITABLE for trucks and tanks, becoming POOR when the ground is firm. Movement is severely compartmented by streams, canals and ditches. Trucks are hindered by dikes and road embankments and by the hedges in and around the settlements. Grave mounds are obstacles to general movement. Foot troops movement will be slowed by scrub and dense forests.
- (4) Area D. UNSUITABLE for trucks and tanks. Movement is precluded by closely spaced trees. Foot troop movement is difficult through undergrowth and scrub.
- (5) Area E. UNSUITABLE for trucks and tanks. Movement is precluded by steep slopes and rough, heavily vegetated surfaces. Movement of foot troops will be extremely slow, due to rough surfaces, heavily vegetated areas, and steep slopes.
- (6) Area F. UNSUITABLE for trucks and tanks. Off trail movement of foot troops will be extremely slow due to heavily vegetated areas.

b. Cover and Concealment.

- (1) Area A. Virtually no cover. Local cover from flat trajectory fire is afforded by the grave mounds in the area. Concealment from the air is virtually non-existent for either vehicles and personnel, except for that provided by the hedgerows. POOR concealment of personnel from ground observation afforded by grave mounds and hedgerows. Virtually no concealment from ground observation for vehicles.
- (2) Area B. POOR cover from flat trajectory weapons afforded by streams banks and surface irregularities. FAIR concealment of personnel and vehicles from air and ground observation is afforded by forests, scrubs and hedges, stream banks, houses and surface irregularities provide some concealment of personnel from ground observation.
- (3) Area C. Virtually no cover available. There is some cover from flat trajectory fire afforded by grave mounds, road embankments, dikes and steep banks of streams, canals and ditches. POOR concealment of personnel from ground observation by houses, hedges, grave mounds, dikes, banks of streams and ditches. Virtually no concealment for vehicles from air or ground observation.

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- (4) Area D. FAIR to GOOD cover from flat trajectory weapons is provided by steep walls of valleys and ravines. GOOD concealment of vehicles and personnel from air observation is provided by a forest canopy. GOOD concealment from ground observation is afforded by the dense undergrowth and scrub.
- (5) Area E. GOOD cover from flat trajectory fire afforded by steep slopes and walls of ravines, gorges and valleys. VERY GOOD concealment from air observation is provided by a high, dense forest canopy. FAIR to GOOD concealment from ground observation by undergrowth and scrub.
- (6) Area F. FAIR cover from flat trajectory weapons is afforded by stream banks and surface irregularities. GOOD concealment from ground observation by heavy undergrowth and scrub.
- c. American Approach. See reference (a) and Tab E (Trail Overlay).
- (NOTE: The information in this study is compiled by S-6, 3d Recon Bn.)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

D. W. SHERMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

## TABS:

- ✓A - Terrain Analysis Overlay  
✓B - Trail Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPLAN 356-69

## OFFICIAL:

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 Ser No: 00122-65  
181200H December 1965

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## Operation Plan 357-65

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheet 6658 IV  
 (b) Div Opn Order 343-65  
 (c) CG, 3dMarDiv ltr 3:DPW:jjw over 3120.1 Ser No 00150-65 of 27 Nov 1965  
 (d) DivO 02000.1C (COI)

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and ISUM's as issued.b. Friendly Forces

(1) Reference (b).

(2) QUANG NAM Special Sector will provide forces to conduct a coordinated operation/blocking forces.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Effective 0800 D-1

2. MISSION. 3d Marine Division (Rein) at H-Hour on D-Day conducts operations in south central portion of DA NANG TAOR to search for and destroy Viet Cong forces in zone.

3. EXECUTION.a. Concept of Operation. Annex C (Concept of Operation).b. Ninth Marines.

(1) Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day conduct operations in zone to search for and destroy Viet Cong forces therein. Annex D (Operation Overlay)

(2) Provide blocking forces as required to prevent Viet Cong movement out of zone.

(3) Make maximum use of small units to find and fix the Viet Cong in zone.

(4) Make maximum use of artillery to destroy the Viet Cong in zone.

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(5) In coordination with ARVN Forces, prevent use of river/waterways in zone, by other than friendly forces.

c. Twelfth Marines

(1) Priority of fires to Ninth Marines during this operation.

d. First Amphibian Tractor Battalion

(1) Provide LVTP-5's as required for river crossing.

(2) Provide LVTH-6's as required for operation.

e. Coordinating instructions

(1) H-Hour and D-Day as designated by CO, Ninth Marines, but not later than 10 January 1966.

(2) Use of riot control agents authorized.

(3) Attachments effective 0800 D-1.

(4) Direct liaison between commanders concerned is authorized on receipt.

(5) Unclassified code name is: BIG LODGE.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Supply

(1) General - FLSG is the initial source for Class I, III, IV and V. Resupply from FLSG as required.

(2) Prescribed Load

Class I - 1 day MCI w/fuel per man.

Class II - Combat essential equipment as prescribed by commander.

Class III - Vehicle tanks full, 5 gal cans full and mounted on vehicles. 4 days special oils and lubricants.

Class IV - As prescribed by commander.

Class V - Basic allowance.

Medical Supplies - Full initial allowance plus three days high usage items.

Water - 2 canteens per man. All water cans full.



SECRETb. Evacuation and Hospitalization(1) Evacuation - Four hour evacuation policy.

(a) By most expeditious means to Company "C", 3d Medical Battalion.

(b) Weapons and organizational equipment will be evacuated with casualties.

(c) VCC/VCS and indigenous civilian personnel, for emergency life saving surgery only, to Company "C", 3d Medical Battalion.

(2) Hospitalization - As determined by CO, 3d Medical Battalion.c. Personnel

## (1) Casualty reporting in accordance with DivO 3040.2A.

(2) Commencing D+1 submit Personnel Daily Summary as of 2400H D-Day by 1200H following day in accordance with DivO 1080.3.

## (3) Routine administration in accordance with current directives.

(4) Graves Registration - KIA will be evacuated through medical evacuation prescribed in paragraph 4.b. above.

d. Captured Personnel and Documents - In accordance with CG, 3dMarDiv 190846Z October 1965 and DivO P3800.1E.e. Miscellaneous

## (1) Uniform and equipment as prescribed by commander.

(2) Items of captured material that cannot be made serviceable or evacuated will be destroyed on authority this Headquarters.

(3) Civil Affairs - In accordance with DivO 5080.1.5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

## a. See Annex I (Comm-Elect) to reference (d) DivO 02000.1C.

b. Ninth Marines authorized direct liaison with ARVN units as required through QUANG NAM Special Sector. Request assistance from this Headquarters as necessary.

## c. Command Post. Notify this Headquarters where and when established.

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BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT:

*D. W. Sherman*  
D. W. SHERMAN

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence (To be issued)
- C - Concept of Operation
- D - Operation Overlay

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3d Engr Bn	3
3d Tank Bn	3
1st AmTrac Bn	3
1st Bn, 12th Marines	3
FLSG	3
G-1	2
G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	3
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DA NANG, RVN  
December 1965

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Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 357-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: Hotel

(ALL ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE 0800H D-1)

3d Marine Division (Rein)

MajGen WALT

9th Marines (Rein)

Col GORMAN

Co\_\_\_\_, 3d ATBn

Co\_\_\_\_, 3d TankBn

\_\_\_\_Plt, Co\_\_\_\_, 3d EngrBn

\_\_\_\_Plt, Co\_\_\_\_, 3d MTBn

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Annex C (Concept of Operation) to Operation Order 357-65

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:500,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6658IV  
 (b) CG, 3dMarDiv ltr 3:DPW:jjw over 3120.1 Ser No 00150-65 dtd 27 Nov 1965

Time Zone: Hotel

1. MISSION. 3d Marine Division (Rein) at H-Hour on D-Day conducts operations in south central portion of DA NANG TAOR to search for and destroy Viet Cong forces in zone.

2. General Plan

a. See Reference (b) and Annex D (Operation Overlay).

b. Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day, 3d Marine Division forces conduct search and destroy operation as follows:

(1) Attack south in 9th Marines zone, seize Hill 55 (AT 9661).

(2) On order, cross the SONG AI NGHIA, and continue search and destroy operation east in zone.

(3) On order, continue search and destroy operation north in zone to MLR positions.

3. Conceptual Details. As visualized, the above concept is the application of the following details:

a. A thorough and detailed search of all natural and man-made possible places of Viet Cong concealment, particularly when contact is established. These places include, but are not limited to:

(1) Caves and tunnels.

(2) Buildings and huts.

(3) Fields and paddies (Particularly those with four foot or higher growth).

(4) Culverts and ditches.

b. The rapid employment of small units in blocking positions to find and fix the VC for destruction by artillery and/or air.

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- c. Maximum use of artillery to destroy the VC when located.
- d. The use of ARVN Forces to block at the confluence of the SONG YEN and SONG AI NGHIA, and when required south of Route 14.
- e. The use of riot control agents to clear tunnels and caves, and those hamlets/villages wherein the VC are using the civilians for protection.
- f. The use of all available psychological warfare means to minimize non-combatant casualties.
- g. The use of a published tactical deception plan.
- h. The use of amtracs, including LVTH-6's, to assist the crossing of rivers/waterways.
- i. Prevent the use of waterways/rivers in zone during the operation, by other than friendly forces.
- j. A minimum of 96 hours to complete the operation.

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 241200Z December 1965

Operation Order 358-65

- Ref: (a) DivOp Order 343-65 (Rev 65)  
 (b) III MAF OpOrder 305-66  
 Short Title: PHUNG-SU  
 (c) DivO 02000.1C (C.O.I.)

Time Zone: Hotel.

Task Organization. No Change,

# 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See current ISUMS,
- b. Friendly Forces.
  - (1) Reference (a).
  - (2) Designated Popular Force (PF) platoons will be placed under OPCON 3d Marine Division. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. 3d Marine Division exercises operational control over designated PF platoons, and conducts integrated operations consistent with the PF basic mission for the twofold purpose of assisting PF combat effectiveness in their local environment and assisting 3d Marine Division operations in rear areas.

# 3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept. Annex A (Concept of Operation),
- b. Infantry Regiments.
  - (1) Assume OPCON of PF units as assigned.
  - (2) Assign one (1) T/O Rifle Squad (Rein) to each assigned PF platoon.
  - (3) Provide training to PF units, consistent with the mission, and as outlined in Annex B (Training of PF units).

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- (4) Be prepared to support assigned PF with reinforcing/counter-attack forces in TAOR.
- (5) Be prepared to provide supporting arms, to include helicopters, close air support and artillery, to PF assigned tactical missions.

c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Marine rifle squads will be carefully screened to ensure that mature Marines with a complete understanding of US-Vietnamese relationships are assigned to this program.
- (2) Marine rifle squads will be reinforced with one radio operator with a AN/PRC-10 radio, one hospitalman, and one interpreter.
- (3) The Marine Rifle Squad will be integrated into the PF platoon, with the squad leader acting as advisor to the PF platoon commander.
- (4) Maintain close and continuous liaison with village and district chiefs and the US advisor at respective District Headquarters.
- (5) Popular Force platoons are designed primarily to provide local defense of village/vital/local installations. Therefore, all actions of the Marine Rifle Squad must contribute to the accomplishment of the PF mission.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICSa. Administration. No change.b. Logistics. Infantry Regiments provide logistical support within capabilities.c. Reports

- (1) Upon initial assumption of OPCON Popular Forces report:
  - (a) Popular Forces location.
  - (b) Mission assigned by District Chief.
  - (c) New mission assigned.
  - (d) Popular Force Commander's name.

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- (e) Strength of unit.
- (f) Amount and type of weapons and equipment.
- (g) Submit written report on weekly basis as of 1800H Wednesday to arrive G-3, 3d Marine Division not later than 1200H Thursday. Report must summarize previous week's activities to include:
  - 1. Summary of operations conducted and results.
  - 2. Training conducted (type/hours).
  - 3. Problems encountered.
  - 4. Evaluation of progress.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.a. Communications

- (1) In accordance with reference (c).
- (2) Insure Marine rifle squads operating with PF are assigned call signs and frequencies of the infantry battalion in whose TAOR they are physically located. Provide frequencies/call signs to Marine/PF units as required.

b. CP Locations. No change.c. Command Relationships. Infantry Regiments assume OPCON of assigned Popular Force platoons.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT:

*D. W. Sherman*  
D. W. SHERMAN

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

A- Concept of Operations

B- Training of Popular Forces

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CG, FMFPAC	2		

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3d Marine Division (Rein)  
DA NANG, RVN  
241200Z Dec 1965

Annex A (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 358-65

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 Series L701

Time Zone: Hotel

1. MISSION. 3d Marine Division assumes operational control of designated Popular Force platoons to improve the coordination and tactical employment of PF units.
2. CONCEPT
  - a. Popular Force platoons are assigned the mission of providing defense of their village area and other local installations within the District area. The PF inherently have an intimate working knowledge of the village and hamlet complexes, district, village and hamlet officials, local ~~government~~, and local inhabitants. Further, the PF normally has operated over the terrain in the surrounding area communicating with the local populace thereby gaining some insight into the tactical and political operations of the local VC unit.
  - b. In examining the overall spectrum of two important aspects of Guerrilla Warfare, namely, Population Control and Food/Local Resource Control, we find that a combination of Popular and Marine forces are ideally suited to assuming responsibility for these tasks in those areas previously cleared of organized VC resistance. Marine units are thereby allowed greater freedom of action to expand their operations, assured that ready forces are controlling the village area to their rear.
  - c. The program must be approached from a standpoint of mutual concern and mutual cooperation between PF and Marines, combining talent, personnel and effort toward a common goal - defeat of the VC.
  - d. OPCON of PF/Marine units should be placed at the appropriate level, consistent with the missions, where these units will be continuously operating.

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- e. Commanders will insure that the employment of PF is within the mission set forth in sub-paragraph a. above.

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3d Marine Division (Rein)  
DA NANG, RVN  
241200Z Dec 1965

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- e. Commanders will insure that the employment of PF is within the mission set forth in sub-paragraph a. above.

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3d Marine Division (Rein)  
DA NANG, RVN  
241200Z Dec 1965

ANNEX B (Training of Popular Forces) to Operation Order 358-65

Time Zone: Hotel

1. Training for PF platoons will be conducted by the Marine squad supporting the PF. It is realized that the largest percentage of instruction will of necessity be conducted through an interpreter and is time consuming. However, the Marine squad should do their utmost to produce a combat ready PF unit capable of dealing with and defeating the VC forces.
2. Training will consist of the below listed subjects:
  - a. Nomenclature, stoppages and immediate action and care and cleaning of: U. S. Carbine Cal. 30; U. S. Rifle Cal. 30 M-1; U. S. Pistol Cal. 45 and the Browning Automatic Rifle.
  - b. Marksmanship.
  - c. Ambush Techniques.
  - d. Scouting and Patrolling.
  - e. Small unit formations, fireteam and squad.
  - f. First Aid, Field Sanitation and Personal Hygiene.
  - g. Tactics of the Rifle Squad ( Offensive and Defensive).
  - h. Hand and Rifle Grenades.
  - i. Assault Fires.
  - j. Helicopter Operations to include familiarization in loading and unloading.
  - k. Use of the Compass and Basic Map Reading.
  - l. Rifle Platoon in the attack and defense.
  - m. Hand and Arm Signals.

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3. Reorganize the PF Platoon to conform with the organization of a Marine Rifle Platoon.

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