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Ser: 00468 00

13 APR 1966

SECRET (unclassified upon removal of the enclosure)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 3dMarDiv ltr #/DVM/jjw Ser: 0073-66
of 3Mar66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division(-)
(Rein) for the month of January 1966 (U)

1. Forwarded.

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M. C. DALBY
By direction

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
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 3dMarDiv ltr 3/DVM/jjw Ser: 0073-66 of 3 Mar 1966

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein) for the
month of January 1966 (U)

1. Forwarded.

2. This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of the
basic correspondence.



E. G. GLIDDEN Jr
Deputy Chief of Staff

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3D MARINE DIVISION

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FMF (-) (REIN)



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COMMAND DIARY for the month of JANUARY 1966

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/DVM/jjw
Ser 0073-66
3 March 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein)
for the month of January 1966.

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG FMFPAC msg 251942 Aug 65

Encl: ✓(1) 3d Mar Div (-) (Rein) Command Chronology for the
period 1-31 January 1966.

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),
enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of
enclosure (1).

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI
Chief of Staff

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3d Marine Division
 Command Chronology
 1 Jan to 31 Jan 1966
 List of Supporting Documents

1. Division Sitreps
2. Division Journal
3. Division FSCC Journal
4. Daily Battle and Non Battle Casualty Report
5. VIP Visits
6. Operation Orders Issued in Jan 66
7. Division HISREP

UNITS COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

8. 1st Mar Regt
9. 3rd Mar Regt
10. 4th Mar Regt
11. 7th Mar Regt
12. 9th Mar Regt
13. 12th Mar Regt
14. 3rd Engr Bn
15. 3rd AT Bn
16. 3d Med Bn
17. 3d SP Bn
18. 3d MT Bn and 9th MT Bn
19. 3d Tank Bn
20. HqBn, 3d MarDiv
21. 1st AmTrac Bn
22. 3d Recon Bn
23. Civil Affairs.

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ORGANIZATION DATA SHEET

THIRD MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED), FLEET MARINE FORCE
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY 1966 TO 31 JANUARY 1966

SUBMITTED MARCH 1966

FROM THE DIVISION COMMAND POST BUNKER (AT 957751)

DA NANG, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

COMMANDING GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS W. WALT, U. S. MARINE CORPS

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

BRIGADIER GENERAL LOWELL E. ENGLISH, USMC

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER, CHU LAI

BRIGADIER GENERAL JONAS M. PLATT, USMC

CHIEF OF STAFF

COLONEL DONALD W. SHERMAN, USMC 1-23 JANUARY 1966

COLONEL LEO J. DULACKI, USMC 24-31 JANUARY 1966

GENERAL STAFF

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 COLONEL ROBERT W. PORT, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD J. SCHRIVER, USMC 1-3 JANUARY 1966

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 COLONEL GEORGE W. CARRINGTON JR. USMC 4-31 JANUARY 1966

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3 COLONEL DON P. WYCKOFF, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4 COLONEL FRANK R. WILKINSON, JR., USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5, MAJOR JOHN COLIA, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMPTROLLER, COLONEL E. M. STIMSON, USMC

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SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Battalion (Rein)

3d Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)

4th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)

7th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)

9th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)

12th Marine Regiment (Rein)

3rd Anti-Tank Battalion (Rein)

3rd Engineer Battalion (Rein)

3rd Medical Battalion (Rein)

3rd Motor Transport Battalion (Rein)

3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein)

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Rein)

3rd Tank Battalion (Rein)

3rd Shore Party Battalion (Rein)

COMMANDING OFFICERS

Major John E. WATSON, USMC 1-2Jan66

LtCol Robert J. PERRICH USMC 3-31Jan66

Col Thell H. FISHER, USMC

Col James F. McCLANAHAN, USMC 1-23Jan66

Col Donald W. SHEERMAN, USMC 24-31Jan66

Col Oscar F. PEATROSS, USMC

Col John E. GORMAN, USMC

Col James M. CALLENDER, USMC

LtCol Bruce A. HEFLIN, USMC

LtCol Nicholas J. DENNIS, USMC

Cmdr Almon C. WILSON, (MC), USN

Major Freddie J. BAKER, USMC

LtCol Roy R. VAN CLEVE, USMC

LtCol William D. POMEROY, USMC

LtCol Milton L. RAPHAEL, USMC

Major John M. DEAN, USMC

Enclosure (1)

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AVERAGE STRENGTH DURING JANUARY

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
HQBN	159	1542
3d Marines	131	3173
4th Marines	95	2187
7th Marines	122	3026
9th Marines	135	4068
12th Marines	211	3471
3d AT Bn	21	446
3d Engr Bn	34	974
3d Med Bn	3	141
3d MT Bn	17	313
3d Recon Bn	31	452
1st AmTrac Bn	34	941
3d Tank Bn	33	751
3d SP Bn	25	550
Total	1051	22035

Enclosure (1)

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PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. Personnel and Administration

a. Casualties sustained included: 50 KIA, 390 WIA, 10 DOW, 2 MIA, 1 MISSING (Returned), 6 NBD, and 7 NBC.

b. Personnel joining the Division totaled: 39 Officers and 1457 Enlisted. Five Officers and 990 Enlisted personnel were transferred by normal rotation; 19 Officers and 415 Enlisted personnel were transferred by Service Records.

c. Awards to Division personnel included: 5 Silver Star, 25 Bronze Star, 24 Navy Commendation, 1 Air Medal, and 842 Purple Heart Medals. Recommendations for medals forwarded to FMFPac included: 1 Medal of Honor, 2 Navy Cross, 12 Silver Star, 2 Legion of Merit, 2 Navy Marine Corps Medal, 53 Bronze Star, 26 Air Medal, and 41 Navy Commendation Medals.

2. Field Exchanges

a. The new Site Exchange in the Division Headquarters area experienced heavy traffic during the month of January. The sales volume exceeded the total of all other Exchange Sites in the Danang enclave.

b. The Division Exchange Officer inspected Site Exchanges in the Chu Lai and Hue Phu Bai enclaves during the month. Essential merchandise is in adequate supply. Any deficiency in luxury items is due to shortage of shipping space.

c. On 27 Jan 1966, theft in the amount of \$4,941.04 was incurred from trucks enroute to Phu Bai. Additionally, two cargo trucks completely loaded with Exchange Merchandise were reported as missing. The trucks were recovered by the Military Security Service, Army of the Republic of Viet Nam, with the loads intact, or suffering very light pilferage. The drivers were apprehended while selling Exchange merchandise, and this merchandise was recovered.

d. Hours of operation of the Division Headquarters Site Exchange were again modified to further accommodate customer shopping tendencies.

e. Substantial quantities of sound equipment were received during the month. The quantity received exceeded the total received during the past six months. Customer response was instantaneous and very favorable.

f. The Assistant Exchange Chief, GySgt Warren A. CLINE, was awarded the Navy Commendation Medal with combat device, by BGEN L. E. ENGLISH, for meritorious achievements in establishing Exchange facilities from the inception at Hue Phu Bai and again at Chu Lai.

3. Special Services

a. During January the division received recreation equipment both from the HSAS warehouse in Saigon and from purchases made in Okinawa. The first shipment of souvenir money clips for members of the division was received from Japan on the 22nd and distributed in the Danang area. The balance of the clips are expected by 15 February. January is the final month for purchases from the

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warehouse in Saigon. Of the equipment remaining or on order, 30% will automatically be given to III MAF for distribution to its units according to strength figures. After January, the division will purchase all its own recreation equipment for delivery direct to Daanang. The Recreation Fund will be replenished monthly by a cash distribution from III MAF based on strength figures, the money being received via the Army/Air Force Exchange system.

A second distribution throughout the division of selected athletic equipment and welfare items known as the A, B, and C Kits was begun in January and by the end of the month, 94 of each type had been dispensed to units in the Daanang and Phu Bai enclaves.

The status of the 3d Marine Division Recreation Fund as of 31 January is:

Balance - Appropriated Funds	\$ 50,000.00
Balance - Non-appropriated Funds	145,000.00
Equipment issued Jan 1966 (A, B, & C Kits not included)	23,430.44
Equipment received Jan 1966 (A, B, & C Kits not included)	24,893.63
Equipment on order Jan 1966 (Non-apprt-funds)	17,680.92
Equipment on order Jan 1966 (Apprt-funds)	100,000.00

The administrative responsibilities for the R&R program have been shifted during this month to the new III MAF R&R Center. Manila was added to the program on 12 Jan 1966. The personnel figures for division participation during January are:

OKINAWA	660 PERSONNEL
SAIGON	339 "
HONG KONG	158 "
BANGKOK	471 "
TAIWAN	91 "
TOKYO	222 "
MANILA	89 "
TOTAL	2030

During the period 17-20 January the Charleton Heston USO Show toured the division units. It is estimated that 3,000 personnel saw the show.

The initial meeting of the III MAF composite Recreation Council took place on 24 January 1966. The council voted to give \$2.00 per man to all unit recreation funds for the month of January to defray current planned expenditures and established the policy of allowing each unit to do its own purchasing and accounting for its funds as allocated by the III MAF Recreation Council. A MARS radio station purchased by the Division Recreation Fund and jointly operated by the Special Services Officer and the Communications-Electronics Officer, went on-the-air at the end of December. The station has been enthusiastically received by members of the division and its scheduled time is utilized to capacity for all types of calls to the United States.

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4. Informational Services

a. Press coverage of 3rd Marine Division and attached units included 165 features and Home Town releases through the Combat Information Bureau of III Marine Amphibious Force.

b. Emphasis during this month was placed on civil affairs programs, human interest stories, unique incidents and personal experiences of Marines involved in combat operations against the Viet Cong.

c. A Combat Information team concept has been implemented. A sergeant is in charge of each team consisting of four writers. There are three teams in the DaNang area and two teams in the Chu Lai area.

d. The correspondents, while attached to line battalions by name, are under administrative control of Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, and operational control of Division ISO. Regimental team leaders may at their discretion, utilize these correspondents for coverage of their units, as the combat situation dictates.

5. Postal

a. Four of the five unit post offices that were committed to support of Marine Corps camps on Okinawa were returned to operational control of the 3d Marine Division during this period. The current locations and functions of Division postal facilities are:

Main Office	DaNang	All phases of postal
Terminal Post Office	ChuLai	Annex of Main Office - receipt and dispatch of mail only
Unit PO - 1	DaNang	Inactive
2	Okinawa	Opcon Camp Butler
3	Chu Lai	All phases - less directory
4	DaNang	Inactive
5	DaNang	All phases - less directory
6	Chu Lai	Mobile money order sales only
7	DaNang	All phases - less directory
8	DaNang	All phases - less directory
9	Chu Lai	Mobile money order sales only
10	Phu Bai	All phases - less directory
11	Chu Lai	All phases - less directory
12	DaNang	Mobile money order sales only
13	DaNang	Mobile money order sales only
14	DaNang	All phases - less directory
15	DaNang	All phases - less directory

One of the currently inactive unit post offices will be placed into operation in the Chu Lai enclave upon arrival of three postal clerks presently with the SLP. It is anticipated that the other inactive unit post office will be placed into operation in the DaNang enclave as soon as sufficient personnel are available to maintain it.

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b. During January the Directory Section readdressed and forwarded approximately 1,542 pounds of airmail and 56,028 pounds of all other classes of mail. This was more than twice as much directory mail as was processed during the preceeding 31 days and approximately four times as much as was processed during November 1965.

c. A total of 31 known mail rifling incidents occurred prior to the mails entering Marine Corps custody during this period. Rifled parcels are being received in U. S. mail sacks that appear to have been slashed with a sharp instrument. In addition to those containing obviously rifled mail, several other slashed mail sacks have been received but the contents did not bear any noticeable evidence of rifling. However, it is impossible to determine if any articles of mail have been removed from these slashed mail sacks and the wrappers not reinserted. In view of the riflings occurring prior to this command accepting the mail from the U. S. Air Force, the matter was referred to the Office of Special Investigations (DaNang) for investigation and the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force has requested the COMUS MACV render assistance for correcting the situation.

6. Band

a. The Concert program to outlying units of the command is gaining in popularity. Units are now requesting the services of the Band for, not only concerts, but other festivities such as, awards ceremonies, and special occasions where the Commanding General or other officials are scheduled to be present. These requests include the units in Chu Lai and Phu Bai areas.

b. The Civil Affairs Program is making extensive use of the band. Each program is a huge success regardless of the size of the audience. For the most part these people have never before witnessed such spectacular performances as is presented to them, in music. There seems to be no language barrier in music. On all occasions we are presenting more and more Vietnamese music, of our own arranging, that has a special appeal. Programming of the Division Band for all concerts and musical activities, both Civil Affairs and local Command, has for the months of December 1965 and January 1966, covered sixty-four (64) separate performances. Of these eighteen were Civil Affairs and the remaining forty-six were military concerts and ceremonies.

c. The Drum and Bugle Corps has been formed and will be ready for performances beginning 7 February 1966. The Service Company motor pool parking area was made available for special drills as required. With the weather improving and the parking lot completion at the bunker area, the Band and Drum and Bugle Corps will be appearing for morning colors in the very near future.

d. The Commanding General spoke to the Bandmen at 1200 on 30 January 1966 indicating the importance and impact of our efforts and the value of music to the Vietnamese people.

7. Division Clubs

a. The enlisted clubs of the 4thBn 12thMar, and FLSU#2, at Phu Bai were formalized on 17Dec65. Receipts from these branch clubs are transmitted daily

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to the Treasurer, 3rd Division Enlisted Club, for processing and further transmittal to the Central Office, Camp Butler Club System, (Okinawa). At the present time all bookkeeping is being performed on Okinawa.

b. Various units within the Division continued to improve their physical facilities through the construction of new buildings and/or procurement of substantial furniture from the Philippines.

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INTELLIGENCE

1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

a. Operation MALLARD, QUANG NAM Province, I CTZ, Republic of Vietnam, 10-17 January 1966. Operation MALLARD was a joint USMC-ARVN ground operation launched to seek out and destroy Viet Cong elements in the vicinity of the AN HOA Industrial complex. Information received over the past two months indicated the Viet Cong were fortifying this area. Viet Cong forces in the area consisted of local force and guerrilla units and a probable 5th Battalion. Enemy losses as a result of operation MALLARD were: 37 KIA (3 poss), 21 VGC (6 MIA), 2 Railiers, 16 weapons (including four 60 mm mortars), 6 rice milling machines, and 72½ tons of rice.

b. Operation DOUBLE EAGLE, QUANG NGAI Province I CTZ, Republic of Vietnam, 27 January 1966 - (still in progress). Operation DOUBLE EAGLE is a joint USMC-ARVN operation launched to seek out and destroy Viet Cong/PAVE elements in the vicinity of MODUC - DUC PHO. Enemy forces in the area are believed to be elements of the 18th PAVN Regiment, the 2d VC Regiment, and the 38th Local Force Battalion, as well as guerrilla units and company-size district local force companies.

c. At 0043H on 25 January 1966, simultaneous harassing mortar attacks were received at three Division combat positions in areas south of DA NANG Airfield. Thirty-two rounds impacted near First Battalion, Ninth Marines, south of Marble Mountain; thirty rounds were received vicinity the Ninth Mobile Construction Battalion (BT 057737); and eighteen rounds impacted vicinity elements of Company H, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines (BT 043725). Crater analysis indicates enemy mortars were 81mm and 120mm.

2. NEW DEVELOPMENTS

a. The shelling of DA NANG Airfield with 120mm Mortars during the early morning hours of 25 January, confirms the reports that Viet Cong were infiltrating these weapons into QUANG NAM Province. The first substantive indication of the presence of these weapons in QUANG NAM was obtained from analysis of documents captured during Operation HARVEST MOON. The inaccuracy of the fire indicates Viet Cong mortar crews suffer from a lack of training. However, the harassment served to underscore the continuing threat from Viet Cong infiltration. The 120mm Mortars represent a significant increase in the fire support capability of the Viet Cong in QUANG NAM Province.

b. Viet Cong use of mines and booby-traps, which has been increasing steadily, reached a new high during January 1966. Viet Cong has been using more mines and booby-traps, with greater effectiveness than in the past. Statistics presently available indicate

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approximately 60% of USMC casualties, excluding casualties from USMC initiated operations, are caused by mines or booby-traps. The preponderance of incidents involving mines or booby-traps occur in the heavily populated areas in the southern portion of the DA NANG TAOR.

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OPERATIONS

1. With improved weather conditions resulting from the end of the monsoon season, Division units initiated the largest number of actions conducted during a month since arrival in SVN. A total of 11,738 actions were instituted during the month against the VC. While the vast majority of these continued to be small unit patrols and ambushes, the Division launched three battalions, one regimental and one task force size operation to establish a new high in the number of major operations executed during the month. These were WAR BONNET (3-4 January, 2dBn, 9th Marines), LONG LANCE (3-8 January, 1stBn, 1st Marines), BIG LODGE (15-17 January, 2dBn, 9th Marines), MALLARD (10-17 January, 3d Marines), and DOUBLE EAGLE (28 January-continuing, Task Force Delta). All of these major operations were conducted in close coordination with ARVN forces. Detailed information concerning these operations are contained in the unit command chronologies.

2. The following are illustrative of the effectiveness of small unit actions waged against the VC during the month:

a. An artillery survey section was in the vicinity of (BT 339148) northwest of the Chu Lai TAOR to survey defensive positions for a Popular Forces Unit when villagers reported that the VC were in the area collecting taxes. After requesting air coverage and receiving supporting fire from an UH1E on the suspected VC location, the Marines assaulted the position, killing three VC and capturing one. There were no Marine casualties.

b. Early on the morning of 14 January during operation MALLARD, a fire team patrol from F Co, 2dBn, 9th Marines, encountered approximately forty VC. The fire team leader detected the VC before they noticed the Marines and he ordered his team to bring heavy fire on the VC position. The VC were disorganized and dispersed. Upon being reinforced by a squad, the fire team launched an assault against the enemy position and the VC broke contact. The area was then illuminated and a search conducted. Four 60mm mortars were found along with four dead VC, two carbines, fifteen packs, eighty 60mm mortar rounds and assorted ammunition.

3. The Division experienced its second encounter with a ceasefire during the Vietnamese Tet holiday period, 20-23 January. During the ceasefire no offensive actions were initiated and harassing and interdiction fires of all kinds were suspended. Increased emphasis during the period was placed on reconnaissance and surveillance activities. The Division resumed offensive operations at 231800 January.

4. On 25 January the VC fired 81mm and 120mm mortars at installations in the DaNang area. Blocking positions against the suspected location of the VC mortars were immediately established by the 9th Marines and counter battery artillery and mortar fires delivered into the area.

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This was the second known instance of the VC employing 120mm mortars in SVN. The VC fire was extremely inaccurate and no damage resulted to vital equipment or installations. Marines casualties were one killed and six wounded.

5. RLT-1 commenced landing at Chu Lai on 17 January. On 20 January, the 1st Marines assumed operational control of the 4th Marines TAOR in Chu Lai and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 4th Marines. Headquarters, 4th Marines, was incorporated in the ADC Group and formed the nucleus of Task Force Delta Headquarters.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. First Force Reconnaissance Company reinforced with a 105mm Howitzer battery was helilifted to the BA TO Special Forces Training Camp on 10 January. The company conducted extensive patrolling and maintained OE's from the camp to determine to the location, strength, training areas and logistic bases of VC/PAVN forces located in the area. During the latter part of January, the company was placed under the operational control of Task Force Delta in support of operation DOUBLE EAGLE.

2. A concept calling for the rapid employment of a reinforced rifle squad by helicopters against VC targets of opportunity was developed by the 9th Marines during the month. Named SPARROW HAWK, the force was made available to battalions of the regiment as a separate maneuver element. The reinforced squad consists of 22 men, who in addition to their normal arms, have four M-72 LAWS, one M60 machine gun, one 3.5 rocket launcher and one 60mm mortar. The unit is transported by three H34 helicopters supported by two armed UH1E's. SPARROW HAWK executed twelve missions during January and was directly credited with killing one VC and combined in support of other units to kill 13 VC and capture two. SPARROW HAWK is employed primarily to block enemy routes of withdrawal, to close avenues of approach and to serve as a blocking force.

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TRAINING1. GENERALa. Formal School Training

(1) <u>Course</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>No. Students Attended</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
VN Language	Okinawa	5	Monthly Quota (5)
Embarkation	Okinawa	44	
Inf Wpns Rep	Okinawa	5	Monthly Quota (5)
SCUBA	P. I.	9	Will discontinue in favor of P. H. Courses now available.
MACV/Adv Trng	Saigon	4	
Reg Pubs	Yokusuka	2	

b. Intra-Division Training.

(1) Div Bul 1500 of 23 January, promulgated instructions for use of the HOA CAM Training Center ranges. Silhouette targets have been requisitioned for use by units using this facility.

(2) 3rd Engineer Battalion Mine Warfare School conducted 23 classes graduating 291 students.

(3) Division Scout-Sniper School graduated 68 students.

2. TRAINING PROJECTS PENDING

a. A proposal has been initiated for a small arms range facility for use by III MAF units.

b. A contact team will visit infantry units during period 5-14 Feb to conduct demonstrations on the use of scout dogs for patrols and ambushes.

c. Requests for quotas through FY 67 have been submitted to CG, FMFPAC for SCUBA training at P. H. Hawaii.

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LOGISTICS1. Significant Events

a. The Red Ball system is still operating. Incorporation of more refined criteria has reduced the number of Division sponsored items in the Red Ball program to 42. By keeping the number of items to a manageable level the total emphasis placed upon each item can be maximized with better results for the Division. The third Critipak has been received by most units. Although many needed items were received in this manner units are still not getting exactly what they requested.

b. On 15 January 1966, 16 LVTP5A, 2 LVTR1A1, and 2LVTP5A1 CMD vehicles were received as part of the FY-66 R&E program.

c. On 18 January 1966, 24 XENON searchlights were received by the 3d Tank Battalion and have been installed on tanks in all enclaves.

d. Unit ammunition sites throughout the three enclaves were inspected by members of the Division Ordnance Section. As a result of these inspections, detailed instructions were promulgated reiterating safe handling procedures and storage of ammunition in the field.

e. The revision of the unfunded portion of the FY-66 MILCON Program to reflect changed loading factors has been completed.

f. The 3d Engineer Battalion has pre-cut timber for bunker kits and these are being provided to units with engineer personnel assisting with the emplacement. The following is a recapitulation of the bunker program:

<u>Size</u>	<u>#Cut</u>	<u>#Issued</u>	<u>Ready for Issue</u>	<u>#Constructed</u>
20'x30'x8'	25	23	2	23
12'x24'x8'	53	44	8	34
8'x12'x8'	11	3	9	2
8'x 8'x8'	110	69	41	49
TOTAL	199	139	60	108

g. During the period of this report, out of 11,015 items of combat essential equipment on hand, 1,343 were deadlined for a 12.2% deadline rate. This is 2.2% higher than the deadline rate 10 months ago prior to the deployment into Vietnam.

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h. With the fiscal year more than 50% complete, less than half of the expected FY-66 R&E assets have been received. Of the 603 items allocated, 248 have been received in country.

2. New Developments - None

3. Problem Areas

a. A continuing low fill rate at the Force Logistics Support Group is hampering supply support within the Division. The Force Logistics Support Group is continuing to pass to the 3d Force Service Regiment the great majority of this Command's requirements. Problems continue to exist with regards to repair parts, cleaning gear, individual equipment and clothing. In the last Problem Items Listing published by the Force Logistics Support Group there are listed 759 items of which only 106 have sufficient assets in transit. While this is an appreciable decrease in Problem Items, it still indicates a lack of supply support which continues to hamper this Command's effectiveness.

b. Factory representatives from DROTT and INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER are still working with Division Engineer units to determine the causes of TD-15 tractor mechanical failures.

c. The controlled interchange of parts for engineer items of equipment is continuing since parts are not being received through supply channels.

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FSCC

1. Significant Events.

a. To provide firm guidance for the operation of the Division FSCC, Appendix I (Internal Functioning of the FSCC) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Division Operation Order 343-65, was promulgated.

b. A Fire Support Coordination Annex to Division Operation Order 361-66 (ROUGH RIDER) was written during this reporting period.

c. Lieutenant Colonel HONEYCUTT made a liaison visit to HOI AN on 20 January 1966 to discuss fire support coordination, with special emphasis on the Fire Coordination Line discussed in the December Chronology. A new Fire Coordination Line was approved and disseminated to all interested units by CG 3dMarDiv ltr Ser: 0024-66 of 21 Jan 1966.

2. New Developments: None significant.

3. Problem Areas: No new problem areas.

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COMBAT AIR SUPPORT1. Significant Events.

a. Operation WAR BONNET, conducted by 2/9, commenced on 3 January with a lift of 193 USMC personnel and 5,200 lbs of cargo by 10 UH-34D's, escorted by 2 UH-1E's and 4 A-4 aircraft. The second, and final days activities, were supported by two UH-34's carrying 9,850 lbs of cargo, 28 USMC personnel, 7 VC prisoners, and 1 Vietnamese civilian WIA, plus flying administrative, VIP, recon, and photo missions.

b. Also on 3 January 1/1 commenced Operation LONG LANCE, with the first helicopter lifts in support of this operation being made on the 5th. Two lifts were made that date; one with 12 UH-34's of 244 USMC personnel and 9,900 lbs of supplies; the other by 16 UH-34's lifting 248 USMC personnel and 4,300 lbs of supplies and equipment. 148 USMC, and 14,225 lbs of cargo were lifted on the 6th by UH-34's escorted by 4 armed UH-1E's. Support continued on the 7th with a lift, by the 4 UH-34's assigned, of 5 USMC personnel and 2,500 lbs of cargo, and was provided on the 8th, which terminated the operation.

c. 25 fixed wing sorties by A-4's marked the commencement of Operation MALLARD on 10 January. On that date 3 UH-1E's flew TAC(A) and recon missions, while 14 UH-34's supported by lifting 151 USMC personnel and 2,750 lbs of equipment and supplies. Activities on 11 January required 51 fixed wing sorties on pre-strike, landing zone prep, direct air support, and helicopter escort missions. 32 UH-34's escorted by 8 UH-1E gunships, lifted 658 USMC, and 10,000 lbs of supplies and equipment. Continuing support was provided on the 13th and 14th, while on the 15th 950 helicopter sorties were flown lifting 967 USMC personnel, and 56.6 tons of supplies in 292.8 flight hours. This days activities were remarkable in that no helicopter was hit by ground fire throughout the day. Flight support continued on the 16th and 17th, lifting USMC personnel, Vietnamese civilians, VCS, supplies, and Med Evacs to bring the operation to a close.

d. Initial landings of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE were made on 28 January, with air support being restricted to only 8 sorties due to inclement weather in the objective area. Weather continued to restrict flight support on the 29th, with 6 UH-34's lifting 27 USMC, and 6,400 lbs of cargo, while another 18 UH-34's, escorted by 2 UH-1E's lifted 192 ARVN troops. Again on the 30th weather hampered the air effort, however KC-130's managed to air deliver 87,600 lbs of rations, while 30 fixed wing sorties were also flown. 28 UH-34's, escorted by 4 Marine UH-1E's and 4 Army UH-1B's, lifted BLT 2/3 (-), in conjunction with the SLF UH-34's, from the USS Valley Forge to an air prepped landing zone ashore. On the 31st, 14 UH-34's and a CH-37 lifted a 105mm howitzer, 3,940 lbs of 105 ammo, and 3 USMC personnel into the objective area, while 2 USAF CH-3C's lifted 6 105mm howitzers, 79 USMC personnel, and 70,000 lbs of cargo and ammunition. 26 UH-34's lifted 179 USMC troops and a radio relay team. Escort was provided by 4 Army UH-1B's, while A-4's and F-4's prepped the landing zone under the control of a TAC(A) in a UH-1E. Next was a lift of 596 troops with their equipment by 32 UH-34's again accompanied by 4 Army UH-1B's. UH-1E's provided for command/control aircraft, recon, and the insertion of artillery and NGF observers. The operation continued into February.

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e. During the month of January, Operation SPARROW HAWK was initiated wherein a reinforced squad from the 9th Marines is "wedded" at the Marble Mountain Air Facility to 3 UH-34's and a UH-1E gunship escort on a 15 minute rapid response alert. First rehearsal was executed on the 15th. Several attempts to launch were later frustrated by weather, however, on the 27th an actual commitment was met in 14 minutes from the signal to execute until the troops were landed.

2. Significant Developments. The use of USAF CH-30's to lift completely assembled 105mm howitzers (less shield) during Operation DOUBLE EAGLE decreased sharply the time required for deployment and commitment of artillery.

3. Problem Areas. A continuing shortage of available VMO aircraft limits aerial observers and helicopter escort activities, while the diminishing numbers of UH-34 inhibits helicopter response capability to increasing demands for their services.

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COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS1. Significant Events.

a. Considerable progress has been made towards the upgrading of the preventive maintenance effort. The establishment of communication-electronics maintenance shops in improved tent/hut facilities has enhanced the effort considerably.

b. Operation DOUBLE EAGLE has again confirmed the performance superiority of the Radio Set, AN/PRC-25, over the AN/PRC-10.

2. Problem Area. The communication officer status has deteriorated since December's report. In January the Division was short fifteen communication officers MOS 2502 from authorized manning level strength.

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DIVISION SURGEON1. Staff Officers:

- a. Division Surgeon: Capt. H. S. ARNOLD, MC USN
- b. Division Medical Administrative Officer: LCDR K. HYPES, Jr.
MSC USN

2. Average strength during period.

- a. Medical Officers: 64
- b. Medical Service Corps Officers: 13
- c. Hospital Corpsmen: 1293
- d. Medical Officers. The Division is currently operating below T/O. A request for additional medical officers is being prepared.
- e. Enlisted medical personnel. The Division is presently above ML for a non-reinforced Division. However, a demand is being placed upon the Division to increase Battalion T/O's. This is due, primarily, to the breaking up of platoons into smaller scouting/patrol units with each unit requiring a hospital Corpsman. Also the civil affairs program creates an increased requirement for medical personnel.

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1. G-5 Staff Section. Civil Affairs/Civic Action
2. Period covered. 1-31 January 1966
3. Section on board strength

<u>USMC</u>	<u>RANK/GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>
Officer/Enlisted		
1	Major	0302
1	SSgt	0369
1	LCpl	0141
1	LCpl	3051
1	LCpl	0161

4. General

a. Papers published by this section and Civic Action Situation reports submitted by subordinate commands of this Division are enclosed as follows:

- (1) Division Civil Affairs Newsletter #4
- (2) Units Civic Action SITREPs

5. Civic Action

a. Objective

(1) The basic objective of the 3rd Marine Division Civic Action program continues to function under the provisions of Force Order 1750.1 which attempts to enhance distressed areas, strengthen the popular appeal of the government in the eyes of the Vietnamese people and to improve the image of the Republic Vietnam Armed Forces (RVAF).

b. Highlights

(1) "Marble Mountain Campaign" (Ngu-Manh Son Campaign) which commenced pacification of the 9 village complex of Hoa Vang District continues. The time frame for the successful completion of this campaign was originally 31 December 1965, however, due to several factors of which frequent changes of pacification chiefs have now retarded this time frame several months into the future. Major Nhat current pacification chief, recently briefed the Division G-5 on the new 3 phase concept for this campaign, concluding that the first phase which involves the villages of Hoa Loi (975665), Hoa Thai (981685), Hoa Chau (005685), Hoa Da (032705), and Hoa Phuc (021665), will be pacified during April 1966.

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The second phase consist of the villages of Hoa Phuong (051708), Hoa Long (067728), Hoa Lan (045678), and Hoa Hai (083681) with no date predicted for completion. The third phase involves the area South of the above nine villages and the time frame was not determined

The current strength of the pacification forces is as follows:

- (a) 59th RF Battalion - 424 men
- (b) Four platoons of PF - 80 men
- (c) Six teams of PATS - 135 men
- (d) One company (51st Regiment) - 110 men

In addition to the above, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines will assist in providing security on forward fringe areas of the pacification zone.

(2) Cam Ne Yen Ne New Life Hamlet (Cam Yen) Plans continue to be developed for the construction of the new life hamlet of Cam Yen. A provincial meeting of the Quang Nam Province Chief with Commanding Officer 9th Marines, III MAF G-5, Division G-5, USAID Province Representative, Hoa Vang District Chief, Hoa Vang District Sub-sector Advisor, Hoa Vang District Provincial Representative and other members of the Provincial Staff in attendance, was conducted on 19 January 1966.

It was announced that Saigon Ministry of Rural Construction had approved the plans for the new life hamlet and will provide 5,600,000 piasters. This funding will finance culverts, roads, classrooms, market place, shopping area, water wells, 383 houses, and defray other expenses such as survey etc. There were two committees established, the Hoa Vang District Construction Committee and the Provincial Consular Committee. The Division G-5 and Division Engineer sits on both of the committees.

The expressed purposes of this meeting were threefold, first to discuss the plans, second, to discuss and firm up the project organization and chain of command, and third, to officially request certain Marine Corps engineer assistance. The Province Chief at this meeting requested Marine Corps support for the leveling of the ground at the new proposed new life hamlet site (985675). Division G-5 and Division Engineer coordinated with Provincial Public Works representatives for commencing the above work on 26 Jan. 1966. Division Engineer provided a TD 18 tractor which commenced leveling on the 26th. Hoa Vang District Chief has responsibility for removing all grave sites in this area. The graves were scheduled to be removed by 1 February 1966 as this would hold up leveling the overall site.

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The graves have not been removed as promised. However, searching will continue where there are no graves.

The next meeting of the Hoa Vang District Construction Committee is scheduled for 2 Feb. 1966. Division G-5 and Division Engineer will be in attendance. An observation by Division G-5 at this time indicated lukewarm interest by the Provincial Staff for this project. However, the Division will support all requests within reason.

(3) Operation "Mallard" was highlighted during this reporting period. Through the coordinated efforts of the 3rd Marines Civil Affairs Officer and the District Chiefs of Dai Lac and Duc Duc Districts, the Civic Action effort processed 2,000 Vietnamese and return 70,000 lbs of V.C. foodstuffs back into GVN control. The lesson learned in this operation is as follows: "Work with and through GVN district level of government in all cases of evacuation of personnel, foodstuff or Vietnamese property. The evacuation of personnel normally never goes beyond the nearest District Headquarters".

Division Civil Affairs provided Civic Action logistic support of commodities, and 5,000 piasters. GVN district government provided personnel to the Civil Affairs section of the 3rd Marines to assist in handling of Vietnamese personnel and bagging of rice.

(4) Operation "Double Eagle" commenced during the end of this reporting period. Division Civil Affairs supported with Civic Action commodities, piasters, and provided the services of two Army Civil Affairs Teams assigned to III MAF. This was the initial introduction of Army Civil Affairs Teams into Marine Civic Action. Employment results of these teams will be reported next month.

c. Programs

(1) Operation Cleft Palate/Hare Lip

(a) Operation "Cleft Palate/Hare Lip" continues to assist Vietnamese children. 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines assisted in providing for an operation on a 15 year old in Loc Bon (YE928106).

(2) MEDCAP

(a) The MEDCAP Civic Action program continues to be effective in establishing contacts with a large segment of the population. During this period the Division MEDCAP Teams treated 38,383 Vietnamese civilians. This total was a decrease from last month, however, this was attributed to the lunar New Year celebration.

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(b) "A" Medical Company conducted a series of anesthesia lectures to the advanced medical students at Hue University Medical School.

(3) DENCAP

(a) Through the guidance and efforts of the Commanding Officer of 3rd Dental Company, dental care was expanded in its scope. During this period Civic Action dental care was provided to 1,692 Vietnamese. In addition, Hue Medical School advanced students received instruction on dental extraction and emergencies. Division Dental Officer presented health and oral hygiene lectures to 100 children at Hoa Cam Camp and 1st Corps dependents school.

(4) Handclasp

(a) There was an increase in the handclasp commodities received by the Division. This was attributed to the America "Christmas Train and Truck" (CTT) bringing the first increment of a 200 car train of Civic Action commodities. Division received and distributed approximately 25 tons of commodities.

(5) Soap

(a) The Holiday Inn Motel/Hotel soap is beginning to arrive as promised. An additional 78,000 bars were received and distributed to all Division units.

(b) Soap continues to be a highly desirable item and is instrumental in reducing many infections caused by dirt and grime. In addition to the Holiday Inn soap, 114,200 bars were received from Handclasp and private donations.

(6) Foodstuff

(a) Catholic Relief Service (CRS) foodstuffs were distributed throughout all three enclaves. The items consisted of the following:

Corn	400 bags	40,000 lbs
Bulgar Wheat	100 bags	10,000 lbs
Powder Milk	50 bags	2,500 lbs
Cooking Oil	50 cases	300 gals.
Rolling Oats	350 bags	35,600 lbs

The above foodstuffs were issued for assistance to needy families, used as "rations in kind" for payment of labor performed by villagers assisting Marines clearing brush and destroying V.C. fortifications and in support of combat operations.

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One such incident of noteworthy comment was "M" Company 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, achieving success in getting 160 Vietnamese to assist in clearing fields of fire and covering up V.C. trenchlines.

(7) CARE

(a) CARE commodities distributed in response to unit requisitions are as follows:

School Kits 2399
Woodworking Kits 23
Blacksmith Kits 5
Textile Packages 100
Mid-wife replacement Kits 30

(b) The Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action "CARE" fund now totals \$104,000.00. The money is contributed by the Marine Corps Reserve through the CARE organization in support of Marine Civic Action Vietnam. Vietnam rural schools are being considered as a target for the above funds. Commanding General III MAF was provided with a \$5,000.00 initial fund.

(8) Clothing/blankets/toys

(a) Clothing continues to be well received. Individual contributions from Marine families was primarily responsible for distribution of 103 boxes of assorted clothing.

(b) CRS contributed 1000 lbs of blanket material which was distributed for operational requirements in support of Civic Action on operation "Double Eagle".

(c) There were 169 boxes of assorted toys distributed during this period.

(9) Candy

(a) 1st Marine Division Association contributed 328 cases of "Mason's" candy to the Division Civic Action Program.

(10) Foreign claims

(a) A total of 16 claims were submitted to Division Foreign Claims for processing on behalf of the Vietnamese Civilians and of these 4 were forwarded to Saigon. During this reporting period 48 claims were paid off for the sum total of 342,000 piasters.

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(11) Schools and Education

(a) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines was instrumental in the opening of a new rural school at Thach Nham hamlet (943711). 4th Battalion, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines opened a rural school at An Trac #1 (968670).

(b) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines established a library at Hoa Vinh (899896).

(c) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines delivered 10 complete school desks and benches to the Hoa Thinh village school. (948705) The above were constructed by 3rd Engineer Battalion.

(d) English language instruction continues to be taught at the following locations:

Chu-Lai	San Hai Hamlet	(515114)
	Thanh Long Hamlet	(525086)
	An Thien Hamlet	(520032)
	Tri Binh Hamlet	(555987)

Average number of students attending class - 18.

(e) Attendance at the USOM/MAC-V Advisory School in Saigon included Civil Affairs Officers from 3rd Dental Company, 1st Amtrac Battalion, 3rd Shore Party Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. School was conducted during the period 17-21 January 1966.

(f) Attendance at the four week Vietnamese Language School located on Okinawa included Civil Affairs personnel from the 3rd, 4th, 7th, 9th and 12th Regiments. This was the first class attended by the 3rd Division personnel.

d. Community Relations(1) General

(a) Community relations between the Vietnamese and Marines continue to improve. The credit for this improvement certainly is directly related to programs and activities such as the "People to People" concerts; joint meetings with the Province, District and lower levels of government on problem areas; individual and collective interest on the part of the Marines as expressed in our Civic Action program such as MEDCAP, DENCAP, commodity distribution and minor construction projects. The above activities express a sincere and genuine interest in the welfare of the Vietnamese people.

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(2) Sanitation and Health/Rescues

(a) "A" Medical Company assisted the Hue Medical School by giving a 5½ hours series of Anesthesia lectures. (Hue-Phu Bai)

(b) Division Dental Officer presented health and oral hygiene lectures to 100 children at the Hoa Cam Camp and the Vietnamese 1st Corps dependents school.

(c) 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines bridge security rescued 3 Vietnamese children from drowning at the An Tan bridge (498067). (Chu-Lai)

(3) Holidays

(a) "TET" the Vietnamese new year observance which began the 21st of January and continued through the 27th of January was assisted by all Division units. To the Vietnamese, TET is the most important, most solemn and most festive holiday of the year.

(4) Division Band

(a) The Third Marine Division Band under the direction of W. O. Black has been instrumental and extremely effective in cementing relations between the Vietnamese and Marines. During this reporting period the band played a series of 13 "People to People" musical concerts to the enjoyment of 7,000 Vietnamese citizens both young and old.

(b) Because of the success of this program, the continued use of this band for this purpose can be expected. The band continues to highlight all activities in which it is involved and is a asset to the overall Civil Affairs program.

e. Projects(1) Playgrounds

(a) 1st Battalion, 1st Marines presented the Thach Nham hamlet (943711) school with a playground set donated by Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow.

(2) Bridges

(a) Repairs were initiated by the 3rd Engineer Battalion on a bridge at (940712) and required replacing culverts.

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(b) 1st Battalion, 4th Marines constructed a footbridge at Xuan-Trung hamlet (519091). (Chu-Lai)

(3) Roads/Fence/Walkways

(a) 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines constructed a sidewalk of wooden pallets at the health center located in Thuy Phuong (821182). (Chu-Lai)

(4) Irrigation/Wells/General Construction

(a) 4th Battalion, 12th Marines assisted the Phu-Bai refugee village (865161) in construction of 3 wells.

(b) 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (CAC) completed work on ammunition shelves in the village headquarters located in Thuy Tan hamlet (916149). (Phu-Bai)

(c) 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines assisted in the foundation construction for new houses at An Tan hamlet (499067) (Chu-Lai)

(5) Soil/Agriculture/Animal Husbandry

(a) Headquarters 4th Marines assisted in distributing 20 lbs of crop seeds in Ky Xuan (487103) and Ky Hoa (500139) hamlets. (Chu-Lai)

(b) 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines continue to coordinate and encourage the Chu-Lai Hog Co-op. Garbage is collected and distributed to this program daily. The program is designed to improve pig stock through introducing U.S. White hogs.

(6) Sick Call Shelters/Scrap Lumber

(a) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (940785) established a childrens clinic at the Battalion BAS and is presently treating 5 children and training 2 nurses.

(b) 3rd Shore Party Battalion donated several truck loads of scrap lumber to the Hoa Phat Buddhist Pagoda (988767).

(c) 3rd Anti Tank Battalion distributed 2 truck loads of scrap lumber to Yen Bac hamlet (985708).

(d) 1st Battalion, 12th Marines distributed 2 truck loads of scrap lumber to the people of Da Son hamlet. (963766)

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(7) Showers

(a) 1st Battalion, 4th Marines constructed a shower unit for the people of Xuan Trung hamlet (519091). (Chu-Lai)

(8) Construction Services

(a) Headquarters 4th Marines assisted USAID by delivering 1,950 sheets of corrugated steel to Ky Hoa (500139) for the construction and improvements to the refugee homes. (Chu-Lai)

(9) Government

(a) Division Civic Action efforts continue to emphasize the importance of encouraging the development of local level government, primarily the village and hamlet level. In this connection, area security, whether provided by the Marines or a combination of Marines and Vietnamese, is directly related to effective government on the local level. In the absence of security, local government is extremely difficult to organize.

f. General Analysis

Division Civic Action continues to develop programs that will be responsive to the needs of the rural population. At the present time the personal needs of the Vietnamese people particularly the rural population, far exceeds the capability of this Division to fulfill these needs. Therefore, programs developed must provide results which will have a high psychological impact on the population and yet have humanitarian overtones. In addition, the programs must be within the capability of the Civic Action unit to carry out its program to completion. In this connection, the MEDCAP, DENCAP, commodity distribution and short term/low key projects have been most successful. This success is attributed to the fact that each of these programs have a very high impact and they can be implemented quickly and completely. The impact of the above programs have created personal contact with a large segment of the population and portrays to the people a genuine interest in their welfare.

Commodity distribution continues to play a vital role of providing the atmosphere and base for good will. The additional experience being acquired by subordinate commands Civil Affairs Officers is providing a stronger and wider base from which future analysis can be made to project future programs and give improved directional guidance.

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g. Monthly Recap of Civic ActionA. Medical Assistance

No. Female adults assisted	7110
No. Male adults assisted	5771
No. children under 18 assisted	26,404
Total persons assisted	38,383

B. Dental Assistance

No. of Examinations	118
No. of Extractions	1359
No. of Fillings	80
Total procedures	1692

C. Personal Assistance

No. pounds food distributed	19,373
No. persons receiving food	11,301
No. pounds clothing distributed	7,963
No. persons receiving clothing	6,716
No. bars soap distributed	28,779
No. persons receiving soap	21,746

D. Evacuation Assistance

No. adults evacuated medically	94
No. children under 18 evacuated medically	65
No. adults evacuated operationally	10
No. children evacuated operationally	12

E. Contacts with local personnel

No. initial contacts	550
No. followup contacts	2,602

ENCLOSURE (1)
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Orders issued during January 1966-----3d Marine Division

- ✓ #1 - Frag Order 359-66
- ✓ 2 - Operation Order 360-66
- ✓ 3 - Frag Order 363-66
- ✓ 4 - Operation Plan 369-66
- ✓ 5 - Frag Order 370-66 WITH change
- ✓ 6 - Frag Order 371-66
- Added ✓ 7 - Operation Order 361-66, 31 Jan 66 [S&C 288 372]
- ✓ 8 - 3rd Marine Division "Double Eagle" Journal, 27 - 31 Jan 1966

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SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 3

CWO

CCN JAN 7 1966

IMMEDIATE 071532Z JAN 66

FROM: CG, THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CO, TWELFTH MARINES
 CO, THIRD RECON BN
 INFO: CG, III MAF
 CG, PHAW
 CG, TASK FORCE DELTA
 I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP
 1ST FORCE RECON CO
 DET C-1, 5TH SPL FORCES (DANANG)

//SECRET//
 FRAG ORDER 359-66

- A. MY 300843Z DEC 65
- B. III MAF FRAG O 11-66 (BIRDWATCHER II) (NOTAL)
- C. III MAF OPN O 306-66

1. SITUATION.

- A. ENEMY FORCES ISOMS AS ISSUED
- B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) PHAW PREPARED TO PROVIDE AIR LIFT OF PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT AS REQUESTED.

(2) US SPECIAL FORCES FORM AND ADVISE CIDG UNITS, PARAMILITARY FORCES CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE AND RECON ACTIVITIES IN AREA OF SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS, AND ARE RESPONSIBLE TO CG, I CORPS.

2. MISSION. THIRD MARDIV ESTABLISHES RECON BASE AT BA-TO SPECIAL FORCES CAMP NLT 10 JAN 66 TO CONDUCT RECON OPERATIONS TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION, IDENTITY, STRENGTH, MOVEMENT AND ARMAMENT OF VC/PAVN UNITS, CAPTURE VC/PAVN PRISONERS, AND LOCATE VC/PAVN ASSEMBLY AREAS, TRAINING AND LOGISTIC BASES, AND INFILTRATION ROUTES IN THE VICINITY OF BA-TO SPECIAL FORCES CAMP.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. TWO FORCE RECON PLTS WITH CO CMD GRV, UNDER OP CON THIRD RECON BN, AND ONE 105MM HOW BTRY (-) WILL BE AIRLIFTED TO BA-TO NLT 10 JAN 66 TO CONDUCT

RECON OPERATIONS, WITH ARTY FIRE SUPPORT, IN THE VICINITY OF BA-TO SPECIAL FORCES CAMP.

B. THIRD RECON BN.

(1) DEPLOY TWO PLATOONS AND CO CMD GRV, 1ST FORCE RECON CO TO BA-TO SPECIAL FORCES CAMP BY AIRLIFT NLT 10 JAN 66.

(2) PARA 3, REF A PROVIDES TASK.

C. TWELFTH MARINES.

(1) DEPLOY ONE 105 MM HOW BTRY (-) TO BA-TO NLT 10 JAN 66 TO BE D/S 1ST FORCE RECON CO DET.

(2) ASSIGN TWO FO TEAMS TO 3D RECON BN.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) REF B SUPERCEDES REF C.

(2) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE ON RECEIPT.

(3) DIRMVATH BETWEEN PARTICIPATING UNITS.

4. ADMIN AND LOG., TO BE PUBLISHED

5. CMD AND COMM-ELECT. TO BE PUBLISHED

6. CMD RELATIONSHIPS IAW FMFM 7-4 AND REF A.

OP-4

RELEASED BY _____

Copy 67 of 88 Copies
 3d Marine Division (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 Ser No: 002-66
 060800Z Jan 1966

SECRET

Operation Order 360-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6558 I and II, 6658 III and IV
 (b) Operation Order 343-65
 (c) DivO 02000.1C

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and ISUMS as issued.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) See reference (b).

(2) ARVN Forces conduct coordinated Search and Destroy Operation west of Highway 1 south of the SONG KY LAM-SONG VU BON to AN HOA (AT 8446).

(3) USAF provides Arc Light Strike vic (AT 7947) to (AT 8045).

(4) FMAN lifts one infantry battalion minus one rifle company by fixed wing aircraft Chu Lai to Da Nang; provides helicopters for heliborne assault of one battalion on D-Day and one battalion on D+1; provides CAS, med evac, aerial reconnaissance, airborne CB and anti-air warfare support.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Effective 0400H D-1.

2. MISSION. Commencing at H-Hour on ~~1966~~, 3d Marine Division lands heliborne or surface assault force to seize commanding ground in objective area, exploits Arc Light Strike, and captures or destroys enemy forces in objective area.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. The operation is visualized as a combination of the exploitation of Arc Light Strike by heliborne assault; and the search and destroy operation from seized objectives to the northeast, terminating at the SONG VU GIA. General scheme of maneuver is to exploit the Arc Light strike by heliborne assault, land additional forces by helicopter or surface means, combine forces to search for and destroy enemy forces in remainder of objective area. Priority of supporting fires to 3d Marines

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Encl #2

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during conduct of operation. Civil affairs and psychological warfare operations to be conducted concurrently with military operations to influence and assist civil population to maximum extent in objective area. Expected duration of operation is five (5) days. See Annex C (Operation Overlay).

b. Third Marines.

- (1) Land by heliborne or surface assault at H-Hour on D-Day to seize commanding ground in objective area.
- (2) Land by heliborne assault at L-Hour on D-Day to exploit the "Arc Light" strike. See Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (3) Conduct operations to search for and destroy enemy forces in objective area.

c. Seventh Marines.

- (1) Move one infantry battalion minus one rifle company by fixed wing aircraft Chu Lai to Da Nang on D-1.
- (2) Detach infantry battalion (-) at 0400H, D-1. Battalion CHOP's to 3d Marines when CP closes Da Nang Airfield.

d. Ninth Marines.

- (1) Be prepared to CHOP one infantry battalion minus one rifle company to Third Marines on order.
- (2) Maintain two hour alert of one rifle company; four hour alert of Command Group and one rifle company; and six hour alert remainder of battalion.

e. Twelfth Marines.

- (1) Pre-position artillery units prior to 1600H, D-1.
- (2) Priority of fires to 3d Marines during conduct of operation.

f. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) D-Day: 19 January 1966.
- (2) H-Hour: As designated by CO, 3d Marines.
- (3) L-Hour: 1100H
- (4) Direct liaison between units authorized.
- (5) Riot Control Agents authorized in objective area only.

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- (6) Submit special sitrep every two (2) hours commencing H-Hour.
- (7) Attachments/detachments effective 0400H, D-2.
- (8) Unclassified code name this operation: "MALLARD".
- (9) Priority of supporting arms to 3d Marines for duration of operation.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Supply.

- (1) General. FLSG is the initial source for Class I, III, IV & V. Re-supply from FLSG as required.
- (2) Prescribed Load.
 - (a) Class I - 1 Day MCI w/fuel per man.
 - (b) Class II - Combat essential equipment as prescribed by Commander.
 - (c) Class III - Vehicle tanks full, 5 gallon cans full and mounted on vehicles. 5 days special oils and lubricants.
 - (d) Class IV - As prescribed by Commander.
 - (e) Class V - Basic allowance.
 - (f) Medical Supplies - Full initial allowance plus three days high usage items.
 - (g) Water - 2 canteens per man. All water cans full.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization.

- (1) Evacuation. Four hour evacuation policy.
 - (a) By most expeditious means to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion.
 - (b) Weapons and organizational equipment will be evacuated with casualties.
 - (c) VCC/VCS and indigenous civilian personnel, for emergency lift saving surgery only, to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion.
- (2) Hospitalization. As determined by CO, 3d Medical Battalion.

c. Personnel.

- (1) Casualty reporting in accordance DivO 3040.2A.
- (2) Commencing D+1 submit Personnel Daily Summary as of 2400H D-Day by 1200H following day in accordance with DivO 1080.3.

SECRET

(3) Routine administration in accordance with current directives.

(4) Graves Registration. KIA will be evacuated through medical evacuation prescribed in paragraph 4.b. above.

d. Transportation. Transportation will be provided by the 3d Motor Transport Battalion.

e. Captured Personnel and Documents. In accordance with CG, 3d Marine Division 190846Z October 1965 and DivO P3800.1E.

f. Miscellaneous.

(1) Uniform and equipment as prescribed by Commander.

(2) Items of captured material which cannot be made serviceable or evacuated will be destroyed on authority this Headquarters.

(3) Civil Affairs. In accordance with DivO 5080.1.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. Communications in accordance with reference (c) and current communication directives.

b. Communications Company provide communication personnel and equipment required to enter following nets:

(1) 3d Marine Regiment TAC/Intel Net (Radio Central).

(a) Frequency: D-224.

(b) Call Sign: MONROE.

(c) Emission: Voice.

(d) Time of Activation: When directed.

(2) Div TAC #2 (Radio Central).

(a) Be prepared to establish a relay station at DAI LOC (AT 9158) in the event direct communication with the 3d Marines is not established.

(b) Frequency: D-208.

(c) Call Sign: MONROE RELAY.

(d) Emission: Voice.

SECRET

(e) Time of activation: When directed.

(3) DAO Net #2.

(a) Install operating position in area designated by Div G-2.

(b) Frequency: D-234.

(c) Call Sign: MONROE.

(d) Emission: Voice.

(e) Time of activation: When directed.

(4) Liaison Net #2 (Radio Central)

(a) Provide personnel and equipment to accompany Div Ln Officer.

(b) Provide personnel and equipment to operate Net in Radio Central.

(c) Frequency: D-96.

(d) Call Sign (LnO): MONROE QUEBEC.

(e) Emission: Voice USB.

(f) Time of Activation: When directed.

c. Request communication assistance from this Headquarters as necessary.

d. Command Posts Notify this Headquarters where and when established.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

D. W. Sherman

D. W. SHERMAN

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

Annexes:

- ✓A - Task Organization
- ✓B - Intelligence
- ✓C - Operation Overlay

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SECRETDISTRIBUTION:

CMC (AO3)	2
CMCS (MCEC)	2
CG, FMFHac	2
CG, III MAF	10
CG, FMAW	5
ADC CMD GRP, CHU LAI	3
3d Marines	10
12th Marines	3
9th Marines	3
3d Recon Bn	3
3d Engr Bn	3
3d Tank Bn	3
1st AmTrac Bn	3
1st Bn, 1st Marines	3
FLSG	2
G-1	2
G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	3
CEO	3
3d Med Bn	2
3d MT Bn	2
S&C	2
3d AT Bn	3
G-5	1
7th Marines	3
QNSS	2

3d Marine Division (Rein)
DA MANG, RVN
060800 Jan 1966

SECRET

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 360-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: Hotel

1. 3d Marine Division (Rein)

MajGen WALT

3d Marines (-) (Rein)

Col FISHER

1st Bn, 3d Marines

3d Bn, 7th Marines

4.2 inch Mortar Btry, 12th Marines

7th Marines (-) (Rein)

Col PEATROSS

9th Marines (-) (Rein)

Col GORMAN

12th Marines (-) (Rein)

Col CALLENDER

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

D. W. Sherman
D. W. SHERMAN

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

3d Marine Division, FMF
DANANG, RVN
060800Z Jan 1966

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Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 360-66 (MALLARD)

- Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000; AMS series L701, Sheets 6558 I & II and 6658 III & IV
(b) Annex A (Intelligence) to DivOPlan 354-64 (LONG LANCE)
(c) 3dMarDiv OpO 343-65
(d) 3dMarDivO P3800.1E

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Enemy Dispositions

- (1) Following is a list of confirmed units known to operate within and near the objective area:

<u>MF UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AREA OF OPERATION</u>
CHU DUNG Bn	500	-	-
Hq & Staff	(50)	AT 9630	QUE SON
HAI CANG 15 Co	(60)	AT 9631	QUE SON
HAI CANG 35 Co	(146)	BT 0039	QUE SON
HAI CANG 20 Co	(144)	AT 8839	DUC DUC
HAI CANG 45 Co	(100)	AT 8336	DUC DUC
QUANG NAM-DA NANG Bn (DOC LAP)	500	-	-
Hq & Staff	(30)	ZC 1761	N. QUANG NAM
R-21 Co(aka D61, 341)	(110)	AT 9355	HIEU DUC
R-22 Co(aka D62, 343)	(120)	AT 9560	DIEN BAN
R-23 Co(aka D63, 345)	(120)	AT 9963	DIEN BAN
R-24 Co(aka D64, 347)	(120)	AT 8458	DAI LOC
5th Bn	330	-	-
Hq & Staff	(30)	AT 8250	DUC DUC/DAI LOC
V24 Co(aka M51)	(100)	AT 8351	DUC DUC/DAI LOC
V25 Co(aka M52)	(100)	AT 8554	DUC DUC/DAI LOC
V26 Co(aka M53)	(100)	AT 8753	DUC DUC/DAI LOC

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<u>LF UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AREA OF OPERATION</u>
Q16 Co(aka H41, H56)	150	AT 9666	HOA VANG
Q15 Co(aka H40, H55, 104, H35)	120	AT 9754	DIEN BAN
H54 Co(aka G 70)	120	ZC 2155	DAI LOC
H31 Co(aka HIEN GIENG)	60	ZC 1753	THUONG DUC
H52 Co(aka 103)	100	AT 9550	DUYXUYEN/DUC DUC
H53 Co(aka D20)	100	BT 0839	QUE SON

- (2) Following is a list of probable units believed to be operating within and near the objective area:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AREA OF OPERATION</u>
93d Bn	300	AT 8247	QUE SON
23d Bn	500	AT 9659	QUE SON

- (3) A Volunteer Battalion has been frequently reported in the general vicinity of (AT 9354). Although this unit is not accepted, the number and consistency of the reports make it appear highly likely that a VC force of some size is operating in that area; probably one or two local and/or guerrilla company-size units. Although nothing is known concerning the organization of this unit (units), such an organization would probably consist of some 200-300 men armed primarily with automatic and semiautomatic weapons, and from two to four 60mm mortars.
- (4) Information developed during Operation HARVEST MOON indicates a PAVN infantry regiment and a PAVN AA battalion infiltrated into the mountainous area southwest of QUE SON during the month of November. There is no evidence that any of these forces have moved into the objective area; however, the infiltration of these units was accomplished without friendly knowledge. The mountainous region west of the objective area also presents the enemy with an assembly area for infiltrated units. This area is known to be a highly developed logistics base which could serve as a terminal point for infiltrated units.
- b. Armament. Specific weapons, and numbers thereof, in the inventory of each of the units listed above is not known. However, VC units in the area are known to possess 57mm recoilless rifles, B-40 rocket launchers, 60mm and 81mm mortars, light machine guns and automatic rifles. Although possible, there is no evidence to indicate that any of the above listed units possess 12.7mm or .50 cal machine guns.

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c. Recapitulation of Enemy Strength(1) IN OBJECTIVE AREA

5th Bn (confirmed)	-	330
93d Bn (probable)	-	<u>300</u>
*TOTAL		630

(2) CAPABLE OF REINFORCING

CHU DUNG Bn (confirmed)	-	500
DOU LAP Bn (confirmed)	-	500
23d Bn (probable)	-	500
Volunteer Bn (possible)	-	300
H-31 Co (confirmed)	-	60
H-52 Co (confirmed)	-	100
H-54 Co (confirmed)	-	<u>120</u>
*TOTAL		2080

- (3) Other LF Companies (Q15, Q16, and H53) are not listed as reinforcements although they are within reinforcing distance. Their mission as local district companies makes it highly unlikely that they would be employed to reinforce in the objective area.

* TOTALS do not include guerrilla strength which is undetermined.

d. Enemy Capabilities(1) Enumeration

- (a) CAPABILITY 1 - VC can attack friendly forces in Helicopter Landing Zones and at river crossing sites at any time with up to one confirmed battalion (5th) and one probable battalion (93d) supported by an undetermined number of guerrillas.
- (b) CAPABILITY 2 - VC can conduct small-scale attacks, ambushes, sniping, and harassment of friendly troops at a time and place of their choosing (particularly in HLZ's, at river-crossing sites, and as friendly troops advance through populated areas).
- (c) CAPABILITY 3 - VC can defend anywhere within the objective area with up to one confirmed battalion (5th) and one probable battalion (93d) supported by an undetermined number of guerrillas.
- (d) CAPABILITY 4 - VC can reinforce units in the objective area with the following forces at the times and from the places indicated:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>*REINFORCEMENT TIME</u>
CHU DUNG Bn	AT 9630	15-19 hrs
341st Co, DOC LAP Bn	AT 9355	30-45 min
343d Co, DOC LAP Bn	AT 9560	2-2½ hrs
345th Co, DOC LAP Bn	AT 9963	4-5 hrs
347th Co, DOC LAP Bn	AT 8458	30-45 min
23d Bn	AT 9659	2-2½ hrs
Volunteer Bn	AT 9354	45 min - 1 hr
H31st Co	ZC 1753	1 - 1½ hrs
H52d Co	AT 9550	1 - 1½ hrs
H54th Co	ZC 2155	30-45 min

* Indicates AFTER STARTING MOVEMENT

- (e) CAPABILITY 5 - VC can withdraw to the mountainous areas to the west or south of the objective area under cover of a delaying action (sniping and harassing) conducted by a rear guard and guerrilla elements. (The KHE GIO stream complex vicinity (AT 7947 and AT 7946) provides a route of egress for VC forces in the objective area.)
- (f) CAPABILITY 6 - VC can withdraw to the villages to the east of the objective area, attempting to blend into the local populace, under cover of a delaying action (sniping and harassing) conducted by a rear guard and guerrilla elements.

(2) Analysis and Discussion

- (a) CAPABILITY 1 - Terrain, and VC's familiarity with the area, favor VC's adoption of this capability, as does the vulnerability of friendly forces during the initial stages of heliborne and river crossing operations. VC's lack of heavy weapons support does not favor the adoption of this capability.
- (b) CAPABILITY 2 - The same factors which favor VC's adoption of Capability 1, favor VC's adoption of this capability. Furthermore, the lack of heavy weapons support does not mitigate against this capability as it does against the first. There are no factors opposing VC's adoption of this capability.
- (c) CAPABILITY 3 - VC's knowledge of the terrain, the extensiveness of the fortifications, and the density of the population favor VC's adoption of this capability. The vital nature of this area to the security of VC's base areas in the mountains to the west and south also favor adoption of this capability, as does VC's need to maintain

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relative freedom of movement along the SONG VU GIA-SONG TINH YEN axes. Opposed to VC's adoption of this capability is VC's lack of supporting arms, primarily anti-aircraft weapons, as well as VC's known reluctance to engage USMC forces in set-piece battles.

(d) CAPABILITY 4

- 1 CHU DUNG Battalion - It is believed that this battalion is charged with the security of the base areas in the highlands south and southeast of the objective area. It is doubtful that this unit would move to the lowlands to engage USMC forces unless Operation MALLARD were interpreted as a direct threat against the base areas. Also opposed to reinforcement by this unit is the fact that ARVN's operation lies between the CHU DUNG Battalion and the objective area.
- 2 DOC LAP Battalion - It is doubtful that this battalion could reinforce as a battalion due to the widespread disposition of its subordinate elements. The 341st and 347th Companies are in position to reinforce and are likely to do so for two reasons. First, these companies operate through portions of the objective and, therefore, have a direct stake in any development therein. Secondly, the ARVN operation coming from the east and the previous Operation LONG LANCE north of the SONG VU GIA are likely to force these units into the objective area. It is doubtful that the 343d or 345th Companies would reinforce since their operational areas and responsibilities are relatively far removed from the objective area.
- 3 23d Battalion - This battalion is believed to operate in the area immediately NE of the objective area, but is not known to have any territorial responsibilities and would, therefore, be free to move into the objective area.
- 4 VOLUNTEER BATTALION - It is believed this "battalion" is in reality a groupment of guerrillas and/or local forces, possibly operating with the 341st Company of the DOC LAP Battalion. It is considered probable that these elements would move into the objective area, or at least prepare to defend the eastern bank of the river connecting the SONG VU GIA and the SONG THU BON at (AT 9056) and (AT 9153).
- 5 H31st, H52d, and H54th Companies - These are local force companies operating around the fringes of the objective area. Operation LONG LANCE and the ARVN

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operation to the south might force the H52d and H54th Companies into the objective area. The H31st Company might be entrapped in the objective area by this operation.

- (e) CAPABILITIES 5 and 6 - Terrain and VC's previous actions when confronted by USMC units favors adoption of this capability. There are no factors which mitigate against the adoption of this capability.

(3) Probable courses of Action

Initially, VC will probably adopt Capabilities 2 and 3 switching to Capabilities 5 and 6 as VC's position becomes untenable.

- e. Enemy Activities. See Appendix 1 to reference (a) and Appendix (1) to this annex.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

- a. Weather. See daily weather forecasts and weather summaries as issued in ISUMS. Weather features for the month of January are as follows:

- (1) Clouds - Mean cloudiness 77% with .3 to .6 cloud cover.
- (2) Ceilings - 3000-5000 feet w/visibility of 5 miles or better.
- (3) Temperature - Mean daily maximum 75° and minimum 65°.
- (4) Humidity - Mean relative 86%.
- (5) Precipitation - Mean 4.2 inch; maximum 12.4 inch; minimum 0.6 inch. Mean number of days with some showers - 14.
- (6) Effect on Enemy Operations. Periods of low cloud cover and reduced visibility during Crachin should assist the VC in the movement of their forces without detection by friendly aerial reconnaissance. Inclement weather will not affect VC operations.
- (7) Effect on Friendly Operations. Friendly aerial reconnaissance, close air support and helicopter support will be somewhat restricted during periods of reduced visibility. Short periods of heavy precipitation that may occur would restrict vehicular movement and limit the majority of movement in the area to foot troops. Periods of high temperature and relative humidity can be expected to adversely affect individual physical endurance.

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b. Astronomical and Tidal Data

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>TIDAL HT (ft)</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>
5	0400 2050	2.1 5.0	0716	1828
6	0453 2136	1.7 5.3	0717	1829
7	0542 2224	1.4 5.5	0717	1830
8	0631 2313	1.4 5.6	0717	1830
9	0719	1.4	0717	1831
10	0003 0805	5.5 1.5	0718	1831
11	0053 0846	5.3 1.7	0718	1832
12	0144 0921	5.0 2.0	0718	1833
13	0236 0949 0719 2018	4.5 2.3 3.5 3.2	0718	1833
14	0333 1007 1742 2241	4.0 2.6 3.7 3.1	0718	1834
15	0437 1011 1813	3.6 2.8 4.0	0718	1834
16	0113 0625 0956 1851	2.9 3.1 2.9 4.3	0718	1835
17	0259 1933	2.5 4.6	0718	1836

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18	0402 2017	2.2 4.8	0718	1836
19	0448 2101	2.0 5.0	0718	1837
20	0527 2144	3.1 5.0	0718	1837

NOTES:

- (1) Duration of Civil Twilight is approximately 23 minutes.
- (2) Civil Twilight definition: The degree of illumination at the beginning and end of Civil Twilight is such that the brightest stars are just visible and terrestrial objects can be easily distinguished.
- (3) DANANG local standard time is GCT plus 8 hours.

c. Terrain

- (1) Existing Situation. The northern, western and southern limits of the area are mountainous, with elevations of over 600 meters in the south and 1025 meters in the north. These mountainous areas are covered by dense jungle or extensive forests. The lowland area in the central and eastern portion of the area is dissected by the river system of the SONG VU GIA-SONG AI NGHIA AND SONG TINH YEN - SONG THU BON, which forms a rough "H" oriented NE-SW. This lowland is populated and land use is largely agricultural. It is also cut by numerous small streams, which during periods of heavy precipitation would present obstacles to all means of ground movement. Running along the north bank of SONG VU GIA and crossing the S. AI NGHIA is Route 14, a major LOC connecting National Route 1 with DAI LOC (AT 9158) and THUONG DUC (ZC 1554). This highway, generally passable from the east to AT 8657, will not support sustained, heavy military traffic without engineer effort. LVT navigation on the major rivers in the area is considered possible with due regard to shifting sand bars. Observation and fields of fire in the mountainous area will be limited by the terrain and vegetation. In the lowland, where the ground is fairly level, observation and fields of fire will be limited by built-up (populated) areas and hedge-rows.
- (2) Effect on Enemy Operations. The terrain and natural concealment in the mountainous areas favor guerrilla tactics over those

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associated with conventional operations. Terrain compartmentation favors enemy ambushes by canalizing friendly forces, but limits enemy fields of fire. The cultivated area also presents opportunities for ambushes along trails and other routes of communications.

- (3) Effect on Friendly Operations. The rugged terrain, dense vegetation, and extensive forests in the northern western and southern portions of the area will severely restrict movement, maneuver, observation, effective supporting arms, and helicopter operations. Fields of fire and observation in the lowland area is restricted only by built-up areas, paddy dikes, tree stands, and hedgerows. Effective movement in the lowland will be restricted on these terrain features as well as by unfordable streams and flooded rice paddies.
- (4) Helicopter landing suitability - see Appendix 2 to reference (b) and Appendix 2 to this annex.
- (5) Terrain trafficability - see Appendix 3 to reference (b) and Appendix 3 to this annex.
- (6) Road, trail, and bridge status - see Appendix 4 to reference (b) and Appendix 4 to this annex.
- (7) Waterway crossing sites - see Appendix 5 to reference (b).

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Requirements) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (c) as modified and applicable to the specific area of operation.
- b. Additional Intelligence Requirements:
 - (1) Are there enemy anti-aircraft units in the area of operations? If so, where? Location and type of AA weapons?
 - (2) Confirm the size, identification, and type of VC units that normally operate in the objective area.
 - (3) How are VC units in the area of operations normally resupplied?
 - (4) What is the nature and capacity of VC camps, training centers, storage areas, etc., located in the area? What is the purpose for these installations?
 - (5) Are there any indications of captured U. S. personnel having been in the area of operation? Location? Exploitation?

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- (6) Is there evidence of PAVN, CHICOM or other foreign advisors operating in the area?
- (7) See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Requirements) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (c) for other specific intelligence requirements.

4. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. Orders to Subordinate Units

(1) Infantry Units

- (a) Conduct normal unit reconnaissance and observation as set forth in reference (d).
- (b) Report information as obtained on EEIs and other intelligence requirements by most expeditious means to G-2.
- (c) Expedite report of enemy anti-aircraft activities to supporting aircraft unit S-2 and to this headquarters.

(2) 3d Reconnaissance Battalion

- (a) Conduct reconnaissance and observation as set forth by mission in the basic order.
- (b) Report information as obtained on EEIs and other intelligence requirements direct to 3d Marines in addition to normal reports to this Headquarters (G-2/G-3).

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units

(1) Commanding General, III MAF

- (a) Provide as obtained information on enemy activities in areas contiguous to the area of operation, with special attention to the contingency area outlined by the appendixes to this order.
- (b) Provide current and predicted weather data that would adversely affect the operation during the period 5-20 January 1966.

(2) Commanding General, 1st MAW. Provide observation aircraft for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance as requested.

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5. MEASURE FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENT, AND MATERIEL

- a. All wallets and personal effect of VC casualties will be forwarded INTACT to G-2. Troops will be specifically instructed not to retain money, photographs, ID papers, jewelry, etc, recovered from VC dead.
- b. Every effort will be made to keep captured documents dry or, when wet upon capture, to minimize effect of wetting prior to forwarding to G-2.
- c. Captives found by screening to be VCC will be expeditiously evacuated to the Division Collection Point DANANG by helicopter:

Priority I - VC Officers, key cadre, foreign advisors

priority II - VC NCOs, guerrilla leaders, communications personnel

Priority III - All other VCC.

- d. See paragraph 5 of Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (c) for specific instructions.

6. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. Reference (a) is the tactical map for this operation.
- b. Map requirements will be submitted in accordance with reference (d).
- c. Appendixes to reference (b) (Operation LONG LANCE) will be used for this operation.

7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

See Appendix 2 (Counterintelligence) to Annex A (Intelligence) to Reference (c).

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8. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

See paragraph 8 of reference (c).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

D. W. SHERMAN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES (FOR CONTINGENCY USE):

- 1 - Enemy Activity Overlay
- 2 - Helicopter Suitability Overlay
- 3 - Terrain Overlay
- 4 - Road, Train & Bridge Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Operation Order 360-66

OFFICIAL:

G. W. Carrington, Jr.
G. W. CARRINGTON, JR.
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
G-2

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JAN 24 1966

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FROM: CG THIRD MAR DIV
 TO: THIRD MARINES
 INFO: CG III MAF
 CG FRAM
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 SA, I CORPS

// SECRET //

FRAG 1 06J-66

A. MY OPN 0 343-65

B. DIV 0 3100.1A

1. SITUATIONA. ENEMY FORCES. ISUMS AS ISSUED AND ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO REF A.B. FRIENDLY FORCES. REF A

2. MISSION. THIRD MAR DIV CONDUCTS DAILY COMBAT AND RECON PATROLS VIC LIEN CHIEU (AT 9286), HAI VAN PASS AND MOUNTAINS CONTIGUOUS TO THE PASS AND LIEN CHIEU.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. THERE IS A REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE AND COMBAT VC ELEMENTS OPERATING IN THE HAI VAN PASS AREA. BY CONDUCTING RECON PATROLS UP TO COMPANY SIZE PATROLS IN THE AREA, DIVISION ELEMENTS WILL KEEP VC UNITS OFF BALANCE AND ASSIST IN THE PREVENTION OF A COORDINATED VC ATTACK FROM THIS AREA.

B. THIRD MARINES

(1) COMMENCING 26 JAN 66 CONDUCT DAILY RECON AND COMBAT PATROLS VIC

1 OF 2

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LIEH CHIEU (AT 9286) AND HAI VAN PASS AND CONTIGUOUS MOUNTAINS.

(2) DETERMINE IDENTITY, STRENGTH, ARMAMENT, MOVEMENT AND LOCATION OF VC ELEMENTS.

(3) ENGAGE AND DESTROY VC ELEMENTS CONTACTED.

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) REPORTS IAW REF B.

(2) FILE SUPPORT IAW REF A.

4. ADPLAN AND LOG. OMITTED.

5. CHD AND COM-ELSCOT. NO CHANGES.

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2 OF 2

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Copy 83 of 90 Copies
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam
 Ser. 0026-66
 291200 Z January 1966

Operation Plan 369-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6756 - All;
 6757 - All; 6657 I, II; 6658 - All; 6659 - All; 6559 I, II, IV;
 6560 II, III, IV; 6460 I, II

(b) Div OpO 343-65

(c) DivBul 5726 dtd 31 October 1965

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. See ISUMS and special intelligence reports as issued.

b. Friendly Forces. Reference (b).

c. Assumptions

(1) That the requirement will exist to provide protection to rice harvesters during the harvesting seasons as outlined in reference (c).

(2) That VC will attempt to terrorize harvesters, gain access to ripened rice paddies and confiscate all available rice from which they have been denied.

2. MISSION. 3rd Marine Division conducts operations to protect Vietnamese Nationals and the rice crop during the main harvest seasons to deny the VC valuable foodstuffs, stifle his control over the local populace and increase the VC logistical problems.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. The most effective echelon to coordinate rice harvesting procedures is at the Infantry Battalion and Village Chief level thereby proving to the populace that the local Marine force is there to protect them against VC encroachment. No set pattern is applicable to all rice harvesting areas, however the following methods, tactics and procedures will prevail:

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- (1) Patrols operating near the periphery of the TAOR coordinate patrol and ambush activities with local villagers to protect them while harvesting and transporting rice.
- (2) Marine and ARVN/RF/PF forces coordinate in search and clear operations. Upon conclusions of search and clear operation, the Marine units establish outposts and ambushes, to safeguard the rice harvesting area, while ARVN/RF/PF forces escort the local populace to and from the rice fields to harvest crops.
- (3) Aggressive patrolling around the periphery of rice fields provides a screen of protection for local villagers, while RF/PF guard rice storage areas.
- (4) Marine and ARVN units coordinate activities to patrol and ambush as appropriate to protect the local populace and rice storage areas.
- (5) Extended search and clear operations outside of the TAOR allows sufficient time for helicopters to transport local villagers to the area of operations, harvest the rice crop and then transport the rice back to a safe area.
- (6) Village Chiefs make arrangements to transport rice to safe area by bus or sampan.
- (7) Marine units make arrangements to transport rice to safe area by tracked or wheeled vehicle, water craft and aircraft.

b. 1st Marines

Conduct operations for harvest protection in assigned sector of CHU LAI TAOR during period appropriate to locality.

c. 3d Marines

Conduct operations for harvest protection in assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR and the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR during period appropriate to locality.

d. 7th Marines

Conduct operation for harvest protection in assigned sector of CHU LAI TAOR during period appropriate to locality.

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f. 9th Marines

Conduct operations for harvest protection in assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR during period appropriate to locality.

g. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) This plan provides for operations during the below principal harvest seasons.

DA NANG May and Sep - October 1966

HUE-PHU BAI Feb and Sep 1966

CHU LAI May and Oct 1966

- (2) Direct liaison between participating units is authorized.

- (3) Report commencement and termination of harvest protection operations in TAOR.

- (4) This plan effective for planning on receipt and execution on order.

- (5) Unclassified code name is GOLDEN FLEECE II

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. In accordance with AdminO 343-655. COMMAND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.

- a. Communications in accordance with Division Order 02000.2C (COI).
b. Request additional communications support from this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT:

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

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G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	3
G-5	1
GEO	2
S&C	2

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B-3
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
DA NANG RVN
Ser 0048-66

281200 February 1966

Annex A (Psychological Warfare) to Operation Order 369-66

Ref: (a) Div Operation Order 343-65

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. General. The VC satisfies many of his support requirements by preying upon the local populace. One of these, his problem of providing rations for Viet Cong troops, is satisfied by confiscating from the people, a large portion of the semi-annual rice harvest. If this practice can be successfully disrupted, the Viet Cong war effort will be seriously curtailed.
- b. Enemy Forces. See current ISUM's and SIR's as issued.
- c. Friendly Forces.
 - (1) 1st PsyOps Field Detachment
 - (2) 27th PsyOps Field Detachment
 - (3) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

2. MISSION. The Psychological Warfare mission in Operation Golden Fleece II is:

- a. Inform the local populace of the purpose and scope of the operation thereby exploiting its psychological effect.
- b. Encourage cooperation by local populace to provide intelligence as follows:
 - (1) Information concerning the whereabouts and movement of Viet Cong units and individuals, location of Viet Cong weapons caches, mines, booby traps, and hideouts.
 - (2) Warning to friendly troops of intended or imminent Viet Cong actions against friendly forces.
- c. Promote confidence among the populace in the capability of the ARVN, USMC and local authorities to provide continued security for the population.
- d. Encourage Viet Cong defections within the area of operations.

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3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Phase I: In weeks prior to the operation, through various media, inform the populace of the impending operation and its purpose. The purpose of this phase is to develop the confidence which will result from fulfilled promises. This should not reveal the exact area of operations or time frame, but should be presented in very general terms.
- (2) Phase II:
 - (a) Through various media and face to face persuasion, encourage the local populace to cooperate with friendly forces, providing information and warnings to friendly troops.
 - (b) Posters, leaflets and audio means will be directed at local VC and VC sympathizers to present the picture of a better life with GVN, the folly and eventual failure of the Viet Cong movement, and the means by which the VC may surrender and enjoy the better life of a free Vietnamese.
- (3) Phase III: During the last two weeks of the operation and weeks following, remind the people of the success of the operation and show how their cooperation contributed to its success and the accomplishment of a peaceful, productive and oppression-free harvest. Assure the people that during future harvest periods, they will enjoy the same peace and security because of the strength and consideration of their government, supported by the United States.

b. Tasks.

- (1) Infantry Regiment and Battalion PsyWar Section.
 - (a) Inform participating troops of psychological themes and objectives, and means to be employed in their accomplishment, including face-to-face persuasion.
 - (b) Provide participating troops with dual-language copies of the leaflets, posters and briefs of audio messages which will be used in order that they may discuss these subjects in an intelligent and knowledgeable manner and better understand the PsyWar program.
 - (c) Provide selected troops with leaflets (VN language) for hand-to-hand delivery to members of the population with whom they come in contact during the operation.

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- (1) Develop and recommend themes and material to support the overall program as favorable opportunities and instances develop. Contribute this material for review and approval prior to dissemination.
- (e) Be alert for instances which may occur where certain elements of the program may backfire, or do not produce desirable effects.
- (f) Be alert for incidents in which friendly forces may be in an unfavorable light, and ready to counter-act such incidents with appropriate PsyWar action.
- (2) 1st and 27th PsyOps Field Detachments
 - (a) Provide leaflet and poster reproduction support as required.
 - (b) Provide U-10 aircraft support as required.
 - (c) Provide Audio/Visual support as required.
- (3) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 - (a) Provide UH1E aircraft as required for direct broadcasts.

c. Coordination

- (1) New themes and material will be coordinated and approved by regimental, Division and III MAF PsyWar sections prior to promulgation.
- (2) Themes to be stressed
 - (a) The people will no longer be oppressed, taxed and preyed upon by the Viet Cong.
 - (b) Cooperation with local authorities, ARVN and United States Forces will hasten the day of freedom from VC oppression.
 - (c) The GVN and the United States have a sincere interest in the welfare and happiness of the Vietnamese people.
 - (d) The military power of the GVN, supported by the United States will result in defeat of the VC and continued security for the people of RVN.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Request for routine PsyWar support will be forwarded using current PsyWar request forms.

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b. Leaflets; 1st PsyOps Field Support Detachment Catalog.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. In accordance with Division COI.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ENGLISH

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

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7TH MAR	9
9TH MAR	9
FLSG	3
G-1	2
G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	3
G-5	1
CEO	2
S&C	2

A-4

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Yellow

CHAPTER 3, 2CL, 100
SEC 2-3 PHONE Shows 3
TRANS TOC
CNO

CHE

OP IMMEDIATE ~~270830Z~~ JAN66

FROM: CG, THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG III MAF
12TH MARINES
9TH MARINES
3RD ENGR BN
3RD SP BN
3RD TANK BN
3RD MT BN
1ST AMERAC BN
HQ BN, 3RD MARDIV
INFO: CIVIL AFF OFF

3d AT BN

// S E C R E T //

CHANGE TO FRAG ORDER 370-66

- A. CG 3D MARDIV MSG 270830Z
- B. CG 3D MARDIV MSG 270837Z
- C. CO 9TH MAR MSG 280630Z

1. THIS IS CHANGE TO MY FRAG ORDER 370-66.
2. EFFECTIVE 011700Z FOLLOWING UNITS RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY AND CIVIC ACTION IN VILLAGES INDICATED BELOW:

12TH MARINES - VILLAGE AT COORD BT 055732, KNOWN AS THAN KHUE BAC OR DA HAN.

3RD ENGR BN - VILLAGE AT COORD BT 056728, KNOWN AS XOM DA ME OR SON THUY.

3. UNITS ASSIGNED PROVIDE ONE PROV RIFLE PLATOON DAILY 1700-0700 AND ONE PROV RIFLE SQUAD 0700-1700 DAILY TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND CONDUCT CIVIC ACTION UNDER OPCON OF RIFLE COMPANY ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR AREA. DIRECT LIAISON WITH 9TH MARINES AUTHORIZED.

4. OTHER UNITS ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY BY REFERENCE "A" RELIEVED AS OF 011700 FEB.

Encl 45, CL

5. CG III HAS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE SAME SUPPORT FOR VILLAGE AT COORD BY
052746, KNOWN AS PHU ANH AN THUANG, HOA KHUE DUNG, DONG GIANG OR MY THI.

GP-6

RELEASED BY _____

PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES

JAN 27 1966

DRAFTER 3:BFC:jtw
 SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 3
 TRANS TOD
 CWO

CCN

IMMEDIATE 270830Z JAN66

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: 3D ENGR BN
 3D SP BN
 HQBN, 3D MARDIV
 1ST AMTRAC BN
 3D TANK BN
 3D AT BN
 3D MT BN
 INFO: CG III MAF
 9TH MARINES
 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES

//SECRET//

SUBJ: FRAG ORDER 370-66 (ROUND ROBIN)

A. REF: MY OPN O 343-65

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES: REF A AND ISUMS AS ISSUED

B. FRIENDLY FORCES: REF A

2. MISSION. REF A.3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT: THERE IS A CURRENT REQUIREMENT TO INCREASE THE HOURS OF DARKNESS SECURITY IN THE HOA KHUE DONG - MY THI-AP NVOC MAN AREA OF DA NANG EAST; 3 RIFLE PLATOONS PROVIDED BY COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS WILL BE EMPLOYED DAILY 1700-0700 UNDER OPCON OF RIFLE COMPANY ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY OF AREA.

B. ACTION ADDEES PROVIDE ONE T/O RIFLE PLATOON TO REPORT TO

JAN 27 1966

AND BE UNDER OPCON COMMANDER, CO L, 3D BN, 9TH MARINES
AT 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES CP BY 1700H ON THE DATES
DESIGNATED BELOW:

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| (1) 3D ENGR BN: | 27,28,29,31 JAN, 1,2,4,5,6,8,9 FEB |
| (2) 3D SP BN: | 28,29,30 JAN, 1,2,3,5,6,7,9 FEB |
| (3) HQBN: | 29,30,31 JAN, 2,3,4,6,7,8 FEB |
| (4) 1ST AMTRAC BN: | 27,31 JAN, 5 FEB |
| (5) 3D TANK BN: | 27 JAN, 1,7 FEB |
| (6) 3D AT BN: | 28 JAN, 3,8 FEB |
| (7) 3D MT BN: | 30 JAN, 4,9 FEB |

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

- (1) DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN PARTICIPATING UNITS
AUTHORIZED.
- (2) UNCLASSIFIED CODE NAME: "ROUND ROBIN".

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. NORMAL EXCEPT CLASSES I AND V
PROVIDED BY RIFLE CO DA NANG EAST.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS. OMITTED.

GP-4

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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
DRAFTER 3/ MAJ C./MST
 SEC Q-3 PHONE SHOVE-3
 TRANS TOD _____
 CWO _____

CCN _____
 IMMEDIATE 280313Z JAN 66

FM: CO, THIRD MARINE
 TO: NINTH MARINES

//SECRET//

FRAG O 371-66



A. III MAF FRAG O. 13-66 (OPERATION CHARGING BUFFALO)

1. PROVIDE ONE RIFLE PLT (REIN) WITH ENGINEER SUPPORT TO CONDUCT SEARCH OF AREA BOUNDED BY HIGHWAY 1 ON WEST AND SONG VIEN DIEN ON EAST. PLT REPORTS NLT 281200H TO MAJ P. X. KELLY, USMC AT CP OF 51ST ARVN ROT, MIU BONG VIC GS (BT 0167). MAJ KELLY ASSUMES OPCON OF PLT UPON REPORTING. DURATION 48 HOURS.

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 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMT
 DA NANG, RVN
 Ser. No. 0014-66
 311200Z January 1966

Operation Order 361-66

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIET NAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L-701, Sheets 6756 - All;
 6757 - All; 6657 I, II; 6658 - All; 6659 - All; 6559 I, II,
 IV; 6560 II, III, IV; 6160 I, II
 (b) 3d Marine Division Operation Order 343-65
 (c) 3d Marine Division Order P3000.5, Chapter 19
 (d) 3d Marine Division Order 02000.2C
 (e) 3d Marine Division Order 1080.3

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and ISUMS as issued.
- b. Friendly Forces.
- (1) Reference (b)
 - (2) ARVN forces provide traffic control assistance at bridge sites, crossings and village/hamlet complexes; provide military assistance in the event of enemy attack; provide artillery support.
 - (3) FMAW provides aerial observation aircraft and convoy cover; provides close air support aircraft on Condition Three ground alert; provides emergency resupply and evacuation aircraft, as required.
 - (4) U. S. Navy Task Group 70.81 provides amphibious support ship.
 - (5) FLSG provides EOD Team.
 - (6) 7th Engineer Battalion provides portable bridging and equipment.

2. MISSION. 3d Marine Division opens National Route #1 for military convoy movement between HUE-PHU BAI and CHU LAI TAORS; conducts visual reconnaissance of highway and surrounding areas enroute; destroys enemy forces encountered; demonstrates capability to utilize highway and protect military convoys from VC attack.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. This Division opens National Route #1 for military convoy movement between USMC enclaves by conducting motorized marches at selected times, on a random pattern to avoid prepared ambush, from DA NANG to CHU LAI and HUE-PHU BAI. Convoys will consist of at least 10 2½-Ton or equivalent cargo vehicles, with necessary support and control vehicles. Personnel and material consigned to destination areas will be transported as available; however, convoys will move whether loaded or not. Infantry escort will be provided as well as supporting arms for cover throughout the route. All protective measures will be taken to insure safe arrival of convoys. Enemy forces encountered will be attacked and destroyed. The overall purpose is to demonstrate to both friendly and enemy forces the capability and determination of this command to maintain land lines of communication between vital areas.

b. 3d Marines.

- (1) On order, assign one infantry company (less 1 infantry platoon) (Rein) as convoy escort.
- (2) On order, assign one infantry platoon on 30 minute alert as convoy reserve for helicopterborne movement to convoy location in the event of an attack.
- (3) Coordinate planning and execution of assigned convoys to HUE-PHU BAI.
- (4) Be prepared to provide logistic, engineer, and tactical support from the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR to facilitate movement and insure safety of ROUGH RIDER NORTH convoys.

c. 9th Marines.

- (1) On order, assign one infantry company (less 1 infantry platoon) (Rein) as convoy escort.
- (2) Assign one infantry platoon on 30 minute alert as convoy reserve for helicopterborne movement to convoy location in the event of an attack.
- (3) Coordinate planning and execution of assigned convoys to CHU LAI.

d. 12th Marines.

- (1) Provide artillery support.
- (2) Authorized to displace artillery outside the TAOR into friendly (ARVN) areas to facilitate artillery support, as required.
- (3) Provide one Forward Observer Team per convoy.

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- (4) Provide liaison personnel with communication equipment to ARVN artillery units supporting the operation.
- (5) Provide one Naval Gunfire Spot Team per convoy.
- e. ADC Command Group. Be prepared to provide logistic, engineer, and tactical support from the CHU LAI TAOR to facilitate movement and insure safety of ROUGH RIDER SOUTH convoys.
- f. 3d Motor Transport Battalion.
 - (1) Provide minimum of ten hardened 2½-Ton trucks per convoy.
 - (2) Provide one .50 caliber machine gun with ring and ground mounts for every three trucks.
 - (3) Assign one officer to accompany each convoy.
- g. 3d Engineer Battalion.
 - (1) Conduct aerial engineer reconnaissance of Highway #1 no earlier than 24 hours before departure of each convoy. Report findings to this Headquarters.
 - (2) Provide Engineer Convoy Support Team to each convoy to provide engineer routes of communication support.
 - (3) Be prepared to destroy vehicles and equipment to prevent capture.
- h. Convoy Reserve Plt., Company, 3d/9th Marines. Convoy Reserve be prepared to assume missions as assigned by the convoy commander.
- i. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Convoys will be conducted on order this Headquarters. Days for departure (G-Day) and return trip will be as determined by the coordinating infantry regiment from a time frame established by this Headquarters; hours of departure (R-Hour) will be as determined by the convoy commander. Notify this Headquarters of G-Day and R-Hour 24 hours in advance.
 - (2) Instructions on personnel and/or material to be transported will be provided to the coordinating infantry regiment by this Headquarters 12 hours in advance of departure.
 - (3) Checkpoints as indicated in Annex C (Check Points). Convoy locations will be reported at least once every hour using check points as reference points.

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- (4) Reference (c) provides guidance for the conduct of motor transport operations in a guerrilla warfare environment; adherence to this reference is mandatory.
- (5) Destruction of vehicles and equipment will be on authority of this Headquarters only.
- (6) Direct liaison between participating units is authorized.
- (7) Rules of engagement: reference (b)
- (8) Unclassified Code Name: ROUGH RIDER.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. Supply Source - As outlined in Administrative Order to reference (b).
- b. Prescribed Load - In accordance with Administrative Order to reference (b) and as directed by convoy commander.
- c. Service - Maintenance service provided by FLSG/FLSUs. Maintenance Contact Teams available on request to FLSG/FLSUs. Requests will identify specific malfunctions and include pertinent information.
- d. Casualties - Evacuated by most expeditious means to nearest 3d Marine Division medical facility. Casualty reporting in accordance with reference (e).
- e. Personnel Reports - Normal.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS.

- a. Command.
 - (1) Infantry Company Commander will be designated convoy commander and will assume operational control of entire operation.
 - (2) An officer from the 3d Motor Transport Battalion will be designated assistant convoy commander whose primary responsibility shall be to control the technical operation of the convoy.

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- b. Communication-Electronics. Annex E (Communication-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT:

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- A- Task Organization
- B- Intelligence
- C- Check Points
- D- Supporting Arms
- E- Communication-Electronics
- F- Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F

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3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, RVN
311200Z January 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 361-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: Hotel

3d Marine Division (-)(Rein)

ADC Command Group

3d Marines

MajGen WALT

BGen PLATT

Col FISHER

Co____(-)(Rein), 3d Marines*

81mm Mortar Section

106mm RR Section

Arty FO Team

NGF Spot Team

FAC

EOD Team, FLSG

Det, 3d Engr Bn

Det, 7th Engr Bn

Det, Comm Co, HqBn

9th Marines

Col GORMAN

Co____(-)(Rein), 9th Marines**

81mm Mortar Section

106mm RR Section

Arty FO Team

NGF Spot Team

FAC

EOD Team, FLSG

Det, 3d Engr Bn

Det, 7th Engr Bn

Det, Comm Co, HqBn

12th Marines

Col CALLENDER

3d Motor Transport Battalion

Maj BAKER

3d Engineer Battalion

LtCol DENNIS

____Plt, ____Co, 3d/9th Marines

*ROUGH RIDER NORTH ONLY

**ROUGH RIDER SOUTH ONLY

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

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3d MarDiv (Rein), FMF
DANANG, RVN
311200Z Jan 1966

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Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 361-66 (ROUGH RIDER)

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701 Sheets 6756 (all); 6757 (all); 6657 I, II; 6658 (all); 6659 (all); 6559 I, II, IV; 6560 II, III, IV; 6160 I, II.
(b) 3d MarDiv OpnO 343-65
(c) 3d MarDivO P3800.1E

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

- a. Enemy Dispositions. Present dispositions of VC forces operating in the proximity or easy moving distance from National Route 1 are as follows:

(1) PHU BAI to HAI VAN PASS (AT 935915)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
*6th Bn (810th)	PHU LOC Dist	500	7X57 RR 3X81 Mort 6X60 Mort 12XHvy AAMG 25XB40 10XAR
PHU LOC Dist Armed Co	PHU LOC Dist	95	Unk
HUONG THUY (P-17) Co	HUONG THUY- NAM HOA Dists	80	3X81 Mort 3X60 Mort 6XBAP

(2) HAI VAN PASS to THANG BINH (BT 1741)

343d Co (D-62)	AT 9560 (DIEN BAN)	120	Unk
345th Co (D-63)	AT 9963 (DIEN BAN)	120	Unk
Q16 Co (H-41)	AT 9666 (HOA VANG)	150	1X81 Mort 2X60 Mort 1XLMG 7XAR 30XSMG

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D20 Co (H-53)	BT 0839 (QUE SON)	100	1X60 Mort
Guerrilla Co	BT 1952 (DUY XUYEN)	100	Unk
Guerrilla Co	BT 0965 (DIEN BAN)	100	Unk
Guerrilla Co	BT 0947 (QUE SON)	100	Unk
*77/1 Bn	AT 9088 (NAM YEN-NAMO- HAI VAN PASS)	300	7X81 Mort 7X60 Mort 7X57 RR
*23d Bn	AT 9260 (DIEN BAN- HIEU NHON)	450	2X81 Mort 3X60 Mort 1X57 RR 3XBMG 3XLMG 16XBAR
*7th Bn	BT 0963 (DIEN BAN- HIEU NHON)	300	1X81 Mort 1X60 Mort 1X57 RR 2XLMG 27XBAR
*101st Co	DIEN BAN	110	Unk
*C3E Co (Demolitions)	HIEU NHON- HOI AN	Unk	Unk

(3) THANG BINH to CHU LAI

70th Bn	Piedmonts of QUANG TIN	400	3X81 Mort 4X60 Mort 3X57 RR 5XLMG
A10 Co (D-21)	BT 1335 (THANG BINH)	100	2X60 Mort 1X57 RR 2XMG 23XAW
A16 Co	TAM KY	100	1X81 Mort 1X60 Mort 1X57RR 3XMG

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A19 Co	TAM KY- LY TIN	150	1X81 Mort 1X57 RR 4XMG 16XAW
A21 Co	TAM KY- LY TIN	100	1X60 Mort 1XMG 7XAW
*94th Bn	BT 4301	300	3X81 Mort 3X60 Mort 3X57 RR 2XAAMG 4XMG 16XAW

*Denotes probable units; others are accepted as confirmed by this Headquarters.

b. Armament. The exact inventory of weapons possessed by the above units is unknown; however, the types listed are indicative of those possessed by VC units. The armament of company-sized units is probably limited to one or two 60mm mortars, possibly one or two 57mm recoilless rifles, and small arms to include automatic weapons. The mortar attack on 25 January 1966 against USMC positions in the DANANG airbase area confirmed the existence of 120mm mortars in the I Corps Tactical Zone. In addition, the VC are known to have a wide-spread mining and demolitions capability.

c. Enemy Capabilities

(1) The enemy capability to conduct road interdiction through mining and demolitions operations generally along the entire Route 1 is acknowledged. However, it is anticipated that the VC will limit their road and bridge destruction to the extent consistent with meeting specific military objectives in ambush/attack operations against selected convoys in order to preserve main LOC's for their own future use. The VC capability to conduct simultaneous and multiple convoy ambush operations at critical areas (see paragraph (2) below) exists; however, this is unlikely because of the restriction on the number of military convoys that are likely to be moving at any one time. Further, unless in concert with larger tactical operations against friendly forces, particularly, those aimed at destruction of large-sized relief forces, the VC effort directed towards eliminating nuisance convoys will probably be secondary to that of destruction of key US/ARVN installations, facilities, and combat forces. However, the significant psychological victory derived from the decisive destruction of a USMC convoy may motivate the VC to ambush/attack a convoy once its convoy procedure is known.

(2) VC forces available and capable of conducting road interdiction, harassments, ambush or attack of military convoys along Route 1 are shown by road sections delineated by the checkpoints contained Annex C (Checkpoints).

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(a) DANANG to HUE-PHU BAI

<u>Rt Section</u> <u>By Checkpoints</u>	<u>VC Units*</u>
11 - 14	2 Co and one Bn (prob) loc in this area. Total strength - 675.
14 - 13	Approx 300-400 VC believed to be in this area. Although strength represents possible battalion, there are no confirmed organized units in the area at present.
13 - 10	No organized units in area. Possible harassment by guerrillas.

(b) DANANG to CHU LAI

10 - 26	No confirmed units in this area.
26 - 27	2 MF Co, one LF Co, and one guerrilla Co operating in this area. Total strength - 490. An additional 2 Bn (poss) and 2 Co (poss) may exist in this area.
27 - 21	One LF Co and 2 guerrilla Co operating in this area. Total strength - 300.
21 - 22	One MF Bn and one LF Co operating in this area. Total strength - 650.
22 - 24	3 LF Co and one Bn (prob) operating in this area. Total strength - 650.
24 - 33	No confirmed units in this area.

*Does not include small guerrilla units capable of harassing the route.

(3) The above units must be given the capability of extending their operations into adjacent areas, on short notice, if required.

4. Probable Courses of Action

(1) Initially, the VC may be expected to provide minimal overt resistance other than harassments by sniper fire, random mortar fire, physical road interdiction, and mining to test convoy reactions.

(2) Upon assessment of strength, composition, fire support, and actions of USMC convoys, the VC will mount an ambush at a selected site in a critical area (see paragraph 2 below) with the combined use of extensive road mining and limited road sabotage with the concentrated combat power, to include recoilless rifles and rocket launchers, required to accomplish the mission.

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2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather. See daily weather forecasts and weather summaries as issued in INTSUMs.

b. Terrain(1) Critical areas

- (a) In the PHU BAI-DANANG section of National Route 1, the entire northern portion in PHU LOC District is considered critical because of the nature of the terrain through which the highway traverses. Immediately southeast of PHU BAI, Route 1 is bordered by mountains and hills on one side and by the sea or large lagoons on the other side. The highway between Check Points 3 and 14 traverses a narrow land channel flanked by the sea to the east and a lagoon to the west. Refer to Appendix 1 for prominent chokepoints with suitable ambush cover along this entire portion of the route.
- (b) HAI VAN PASS provides excellent mining/ambush sites throughout its entire length. Between Check Points 19 and 3, the road contains a series of culverts and bridges considered either difficult or impossible to bypass in the event of their destruction. The heavily wooded terrain, the high hill mass overlooking tortuous winding of the road, and the isolated nature of the terrain favor the hit and run tactics used so successfully against the French in this sector.
- (c) Between DANANG and CHU LAI to the south, Route 1 traverses numerous rivers and water courses. The road section between Checkpoints 26 and 27 include 26 separate interdiction sites which are impossible to bypass; in addition, there are numerous sites that are extremely difficult to bypass. Numerous reports have been received recently of company and battalion size VC units operating in this general area. There is a hilly area immediately west of Checkpoint 21 that provides ambush cover for an otherwise flat terrain. However, the relative flatness of the terrain and long, straight stretches of the road is mitigated by the densely populated VC oriented areas that can harbor sizable VC forces within attack distance.
- (d) For details of chokepoints, critical areas, bridges and culverts, points susceptible to road flooding, etc., see Appendix I - Critical Areas Overlay.

- (2) Surface features. See Appendix 2 - Terrain Overlay.
- (3) Helicopter landing suitability. See Appendix 3 - Helicopter Landing Zone Overlay.

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3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Determine if the enemy will attack or ambush the convoy. If so, in what strength? Where? When? With what forces?
- b. Determine if the enemy will interdict helicopter landing zones in the proximity of their ambush site. If so, in what strength? Where? When? How?
- c. Determine evidence of recent route mining or establishment of road-blocks or other obstacles.
- d. Determine the condition of bridges on the route. If damaged, what is the extent of damage?
- e. Determine the most likely areas of washout or flooding in the event of heavy rains.
- f. Determine the locations of suitable road-fill materials (gravel, rock, laterite).

4. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONSa. Orders to Subordinate Units(1) 1st and 9th Marines

- (a) Conduct pre-operational reconnaissance as necessary in coordination with 3d Engineer Battalion.

- (b) Report information as obtained on EEI's by most expeditious means to Division G-2.

(2) 3d Engineer Battalion

- (a) Conduct pre-operational reconnaissance as directed in the basic order.
- (b) Report information as obtained on EEI's direct to regiment supported in addition to normal reports to this headquarters (G-2/G-3).

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units(1) Commanding General, III MAF

- (a) Provide information, as requested, on the following:

- (1) Critical areas, numbered from north to south, along National Route 1 to include chokepoints, key bridges, washouts, flooding areas, etc.

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- (2) Surface nature of terrain up to 1,000 meters from both sides of Route 1.
- (3) Helicopter landing zones in areas contiguous to all critical areas.
- (b) From I Corps, provide a summary of VC ambushes; attacks and other significant enemy activities along Route 1 for the past six months, in three-month increments, to include the following information:
 - (1) Date/time of ambush.
 - (2) Location of ambush.
 - (3) Size of convoy and security force.
 - (4) Direction of movement.
 - (5) Size and identification of VC forces involved.
 - (6) VC weapons/ordnance employed.
 - (7) Ambush site preparations (roadblocks, cuts, mining, etc.).
 - (8) Duration of ambush action.
 - (9) Casualties involved (both equipment and personnel).
- (c) Provide special aerial photography, as requested, on specified areas along the lines of communications.
- (d) Provide current and predicted weather data that would adversely affect convoy movement along Route 1.
- (2) Commanding General, 1st MAW. Provide observation aircraft for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance as requested.

e. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Extended reconnaissance and observation will be provided convoy commanders through prior arrangements with supporting units by parent unit headquarters.
- (2) Expedite forwarding of information, as obtained, to this headquarters (G-2/G-3) and laterally to major supporting units.

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5. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL

- a. VCC captured during the process of road clearing operations will be forwarded by helicopter to prearranged collection points for screening and further evacuation to the Division Collection Point DANANG.
- b. See paragraph 5 of Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b) for specific handling instructions.

6. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. Reference (a) is the tactical map covering the trace of National Route 1 from the HUE-PHU BAI to the CHU LAI enclaves.
- b. Map requirements will be submitted for only those sheets covering that portion of Route 1 assigned to the unit for convoy operations.
- c. Submission of map requirements will be in accordance with reference (c).

7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

See Appendix 2 (Counterintelligence) to Annex A (Intelligence) to reference (b).

8. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

See paragraph 8 of reference (c).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

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Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Critical Areas Overlay (8 sheets)
- 2 - Terrain Overlay (8 sheets)
- 3 - Helicopter Landing Zone Overlay (8 sheets)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex E (Distribution) to Opno 361-66

3d Marine Division
Da Nang, RVN

311200 Jan 1966

Annex C (Check Points) to Operation Order 361-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 6756 - All; 6757 - All; 6657 I, II; 6658 - All; 6659 - All; 6559 I, II, IV; 6560 II, III, IV; 6160 I, II

1. Check PointsA. Da Nang to Phu Bai

<u>CP#</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DISTANCE</u>	<u>MAP SHEET</u>
10	988720 (3d MT Bn CP)		AT 6659 III
5	987776	4.5 miles	AT 6659 III
7	947808	3.75 miles	AT 6659 III
13	928843	2.5 miles	AT 6659 III
19	936866	2.25 miles	AT 6659 III
17	938882	2.0 miles	AT 6659 III
6	944913	2.5 miles	AU 6659 IV
15	937916	.5 miles	AU 6659 IV
1	937923	.5 miles	AU 6659 IV
9	922928	1.5 miles	AU 6659 IV
12	913943	1.5 miles	AU 6659 IV
3	888957	2.75 miles	AU 6659 IV
14	833000	5.5 miles	AU 6659 IV
20	171010	5.25 miles	AU 6659 IV
4	114013	3.75 miles	ZD 6659 I
18	085007	2.5 miles	ZD 6659 I
2	015027	4.75 miles	ZD 6659 I
16	967063	3.75 miles	ZD 6659 I
8	926104	4.0 miles	YD 6560 III
11	878149	4.25 miles	YD 6560 III

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B. Da Nang to Chu Lai

<u>CP#</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DISTANCE</u>	<u>MAP SHEET</u>
10	988720		AT 6659 III
23	998707	2.0 miles	AT 6658 IV
26	017675	2.25 miles	AT 6658 IV
29	042621	3.75 miles	AT 6658 IV
30	055588	2.25 miles	BT 6658 I
36	093552	3.5 miles	BT 6658 I
27	102512	2.75 miles	BT 6658 II
21	145457	4.75 miles	BT 6658 II
31	176418	3.0 miles	BT 6658 II
35	207377	3.25 miles	BT 6658 II
37	231337	2.75 miles	BT 6658 II
34	259289	3.75 miles	BT 6657 I
28	279255	2.5 miles	BT 6657 I
22	314224	3.0 miles	BT 6657 I
25	330209	1.5 miles	BT 6757 IV
32	379175	4.0 miles	BT 6757 IV
24	430109	5.25 miles	BT 6757 III
33	497067	5.0 miles	BT 6757 III

COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

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 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DANANG, RVN
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Annex D (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 361-66

- Ref: (a) Map Sheets: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS L701 6756 I, II, III, IV,
 6757 I, II, III, IV, 6657 I, II, III, IV, 6659 I, II, III,
 IV, 6559 I, II, IV, 6560 II, III, IV, 6760 I, II.
 (b) 3d Marine Division current COL.

1. SUPPORTING ARMS

- | | | |
|----|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| a. | Artillery (see appendix I) | |
| b. | NGF | |
| | <u>Danang/Chu Lai</u> | <u>Danang/Phu Bai</u> |
| | One Destroyer | One Destroyer |
| c. | Air | |
| | <u>Danang/Chu Lai</u> | <u>Danang/Phu Bai</u> |
| | 2 UH1E's | 2 UH1E's |
| | <u>Convoy Escort</u> | <u>Convoy Escort</u> |
| | Fixed wing on call | Fixed wing on call |

2. OPERATION OF SUPPORTING ARMS

- a. Artillery. A combination of ARVN and Marine artillery will provide continuous coverage of entire route, north and south. 12th Marines will coordinate positioning prior to R-hour on G-day of liaison teams at key ARVN units. These individuals will act as a communication fire control link between the convoy and artillery.
- b. Naval Gunfire. A naval gunfire spot team will accompany the convoy and control naval gunfire as necessary. See Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire).
- c. Air. Air cover for convoys will be provided as required. Each convoy will have a Forward Air Controller (FAC) for control of air in support of the convoy. Air support requirements for each convoy will be submitted to the Division Air Officer 24 hours prior to the commencement of the convoy by the regiment providing convoy commander. Requests will contain frequencies, call signs, type of aircraft and ordnance required, and time on station.

3. CONTROL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

- a. At R-1 hour artillery liaison personnel and convoy FO will enter Convoy Conduct of Fire net.

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- b. AO will be airborne at R-hour G-day over convoy and enter the Convoy Conduct of Fire net, checking in with FO, FSCCs and Liaison Teams and act as AO/relay station for convoy movement.
- c. Convoy Commander will coordinate all supporting arms through direct communications with the FO, Naval Gunfire Spot team and FAC with the convoy.
- d. Liaison personnel will be relieved on order of 12th Marines.
- e. Division FSCC will monitor the Convoy Conduct of Fire net and the Convoy Movement Coordination Net during the movement.
- f. Liaison officers will coordinate with ARVN platoon commanders to effect appropriate direction of fire and expedite rapid delivery of fire along convoy route.
- g. Direct liaison is authorized between the 12th Marine Regt and ARVN artillery units for the positioning of Marine liaison teams.
- h. 12th Marines will provide Arty AO and make arrangements for observation aircraft.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

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Appendixes

- 1. Artillery Fire Plan
- 2. Naval Gunfire

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F

Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DANANG, RVN

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Appendix 1 (Artillery Fire Plan) to Annex D (Fire Support Coordination) to 3d Mar Div Operation Order 361-66.

Ref: (a) Maps Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets, 6560II, 6559I, 6659III, IV, 6658I, II, IV, 6657I, III, IV

(b) Current I Corp COI

1. Supporting Artillery Units. The following Marine/ARVN artillery units will support convoy movements by fire:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
1st Bn, 12th Marines	Da Nang (AT 957758)
2d Bn, 12th Marines	Da Nang (AT 995722)
3d Bn, 12th Marines Arty Bn Grp	Chu Lai (BT 549046)
4th Bn, 12th Marines	Phu Bai (YD 883142)
1st 8" Howitzer Btry	Da Nang (AT 955775)
Plat 2A 12th Arty Bn	Dien Ban (BT 066583)
Plat 3A 12th Arty Bn	Tra Kieu (BT 032500)
Plat 1B 12th Arty Bn	My Gia (AT 832988)
Plat 3C 12th Arty Bn	Phu Loc (ZD 096006)
Plat 1B 21st Arty Bn	Hill 49 (BT 337237)
Plat 1A 22d Arty Bn	Tam Ky (BT 309218)
Plat 2B 22d Arty Bn	Dai Loc (AT 917582)
Plat 1C 22d Arty Bn	Thang Binh (BT 160417)
Plat 2C 22d Arty Bn	Tuan Duong (BT 232314)
Plat 3C 22d Arty Bn	Hill 159 (BT 282157)
Plat 1B 34th Arty Bn	Tuan Duong (BT 230314)
Plat 2B 34th Arty Bn	Cam Ha (BT 111575)
Plat 3B 34th Arty Bn	Dien Ban (BT 066583)
Plat 1C 34th Arty Bn	Tam Ky (BT 290228)

2. Convoy Forward Observer.

a. Each convoy will be assigned one forward observer (FO) team consisting of a forward observer and one radio operator.

b. The FO team will guard the Convoy Conduct of Fire Net at all times.

3. Aerial Observers. An aerial observer (AO) will be stationed in support of convoy movements as directed. The Convoy Conduct of Fire Net, Convoy Movement Coordination Net, and the Convoy Tactical Air Direction Net will be monitored by the AO as required.

4. Communications. Communication call signs and frequencies shown in Annex E (Communication-Electronics) to 3d Mar Div Operation Order 361-66 and reference (b).

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5. Liaison. Marine Liaison Teams will be positioned at ARVN Artillery Headquarters at Phu Loc, Hoi An, and Tam Ky. Liaison Teams will provide a minimum of one radio capable of operating in the artillery frequency band.

6. Fire Requests.

- a. Fire requests for Marine Artillery will be passed directly to the Marine Fire Support Coordination Center/Marine Artillery Battalion Fire Direction Center.
- b. Requests for ARVN artillery fire support will be sent to the appropriate Marine Liaison Team where commands will be relayed to ARVN firing Platoons.
- c. The artillery coordinating headquarters for ARVN firing units will be as follows:

Phu Loc

Plat 3C 12thArtyBn
Plat 1B 12thArtyBn

Hoi An

Plat 2A 12thArtyBn
Plat 3A 12thArtyBn
Plat 2B 22dArtyBn
Plat 2B 34thArtyBn
Plat 3B 34thArtyBn

Tam Ky

Plat 1B 21stArtyBn
Plat 1C 22dArtyBn
Plat 2C 22dArtyBn
Plat 3C 22dArtyBn
Plat 1B 34thArtyBn
Plat 1C 34thArtyBn

7. Fire Capabilities. See Tab A (Fire Capabilities Overlay) to Appendix 1 (Artillery Fire Plan) to Annex D (Fire Support Coordination).

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Tab

A. Fire Capabilities Overlay

D-1-2

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Tab

A. Fire Capabilities Overlay

D-1-3

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3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DANANG, RVN
 311200Z January 1966

Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex D (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 361-66

Ref: (b) 3d Marine Division (Rein) Operation Order 343-65 (Annex H)

1. SUPPORTING UNITS

- a. One DD in direct support.
- b. One Naval Gunfire Spotting Team.
 - (1) Assigned by 3d Marines and 9th Marines for respective convoys.
 - (2) Inasmuch as fire support coordination is to be accomplished on scene, the Spotting Officer should be a naval officer.
- c. One Air Observer for spotting.
 - (1) Assigned by 3d Marine Division.

2. PROCEDURES. In accordance with reference (b).

3. COMMUNICATIONS

a. Frequencies

- (1) Bn SFG Spot Net: (P) D - 16 (3224 KCS)
 (S) D - 39 (5120 KCS)
- (2) NGF Air Spot Net: (P) D - 300 (262.2 MCS)
 (S) D - 307 (318.6 MCS)

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3d MAR DIV (Rein) FMF
 DANANG, RVN
 1120 January 1966

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Annex E (Communication-Electronic) to Op Order 361-66

Ref: (a) Div Op Order 343-66

(b) Div Order 02000, 28 (1965)

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) See Annex A (Communications)

(2) The enemy has the capability to:

(a) Employ imitative deception;

(b) Jam radio circuits;

(c) Insert deceptive traffic on any radio;

(d) Booby trap enemy communication equipment.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) See paragraph 1 b

(2) First Marine Aircraft Wing provides communications for tactical air support and air assault support as required.

(3) I Corps units are provided communications for other than Marine units on the Convoy Movement Coordination Net.

(4) Command Posts

(a) Hq, 3d Mar Div. No change

(b) Hq, ADC Chu Lai (AT 750570)

(c) 3d Marines (AT 004760)

(d) 4th Marines (AT 003070)

(e) 7th Marines (AT 000000)

(f) 9th Marines (AT 000000)

(g) 12th Marines (AT 000000)

(h) 3d Motor Transport Bn (AT 988720)

2. MISSION. Provide communications and electronic support required for convoy movement between Phu Bai, Da Nang and Chu Lai as directed.

SECRET

3. EXECUTION

a. Enter radio nets when directed as indicated herein.

(1) Convoy Movement Coordination Net. Convoy status and location shall be passed via this net. (This Net presently employed as I Corps Operation and Intelligence Net.)

Freq: 3432
Emission: Voice (USB)
Stations and Calls:

Convoy Commander
FSCC, 3d Mar Div
FSCC, Chu Lai

I Corps Hq
HUE

HOI AN

TAM KY

QUANG NGAI

*Div Air Observer

Naval Gunfire Ship

SLOW ROLL

MONROE BAILEY

PINCH HITTER

BAILEY

WHITE BOTTOM 6

WHITE BOTTOM 9

WHITE BOTTOM 5

WHITE BOTTOM 7

WHITE BOTTOM 3

ROSEMONT

*HU-1E Aircraft to Insure HF (SSB) Capability.

(2) Convoy Control Net.

Freq: 40.0 D-191

Emission: Voice

This Net shall be activated by C.O. 3d Motor Transport Bn. for the purpose of intra-convoy control. Serial commanders shall monitor this Net.

(3) Conduct of Fire Net.

Freq: 29.5

Emission: Voice

Stations and Calls:

FSCC, 3d Mar Div

FSCC, ADC Chu Lai

Div Air Observer

1st Bn 12th Mar

2nd Bn 12th Mar

3rd Bn 12th Mar

4th Bn 12th Mar

3rd Bn 11th Mar

4th Bn 11th Mar

1st 8" How Btry

Selected ARVN Arty Plts

MONROE BAILEY

PINCH HITTER

BAILEY

ROSEMONT

PERMISSION

SUNRISE

PAYABLE

PRIMROSE

TANNIC ACID

RUGGLES

RAINBELT

SECRET

E-2

SECRET

(4) Tactical Air Direction Net #1.

Freq: 312.0

Emission: Voice

FAC

TBA

Div Air Observer

ROSEMONT ()

Aircraft

TBA

(5) Shore Fire Control Party Spot Net #1.

Freq: 3224 D-16(R)

5120 D-39(S)

Emission: Voice

(6) Naval Gunfire Air Spot Net #1.

Freq: 262.2 D-300(P)

318.6 D-307(S)

Emission: Voice

(7) Tactical Air Request Net #1.

Freq: 7995 W-451(P)

2196 W-452(S)

Emission: Voice

b. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Cryptographic and Authentication

(a) Authentication - KAC JI 1000.

(b) Numerical Code - KAK 138

(c) Operational Brevity Code - ACP 165

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. See Admin Plan.

b. Submit emergency requests for electronic replacement equipment direct to parent regiment.

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Chief of Staff

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2.1.1, U.S. Marine Corps G-3

E-3

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3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
 DANANG RVN
 311200Z January 1966

Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 361-66

CMC(AO3)	2
CMCS(MCEC)	2
CG FMFPAC	2
CG III MAF	10
CG 1ST MARDIV	2
CG FMAW	5
ADC CMD GRP	5
SA I CORPS	4
1ST MARINES	2
3D MARINES	8
4TH MARINES	2
7TH MARINES	2
9TH MARINES	5
12TH MARINES	6
CTG 70.8	1
SA QNSS	2
SA 1ST ARVNDIV	2
SA 2D ARVNDIV	2
3D RECON BN	2
3D ENGR BN	3
3D TANK BN	1
1ST AMTRAC BN	1
3D MT BN	5
3D AT BN	1
3D SP BN	1
CTU 70.8.9	1
HQ BN	2
FLSG	2
G-1	2
G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	3
G-5	1
CEO	2
3D MED BN	2
S&C	2

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CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 270915H TO 281402H

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
			<u>"DOUBLE EAGLE JOURNAL"</u>	
270915H		1	FM: FOURTH MARINES 270900H 2/4-5 REPORTS BASE OF OBJECTIVE "E". 270830H REC'D SPORADIC SNIPER FIRE ENROUTE.	
271330H		2	FM: FOURTH MARINES: E 2/4 SECURED OBJECTIVE "E".	
271330H		3	FM: SEVENTH MARINES: AT 271300H G 2/7 RETURNING TO CHU LAI	
271545H		4.	(LATE ENTRY) FM: FOURTH MARINES: AT 271030H 2/4 EVAC THREE (3) HEAT CASUALTIES (NON-BATTLE)	
271545H		5.	(LATE ENTRY) FM: FOURTH MARINES: AT 271045H OBJECTIVE "E" AIR PREP	
271545H		6.	(LATE ENTRY) FM: FOURTH MARINES: AT 271100H TROOPS GOING UP HILL 163 NO REPORT OF OPPOSITION	
272400H		-	6 JOURNAL CLOSED	
280730H		-	JOURNAL OPENED	
280925H		1.	FM: 3D MARINE DIV REPORTS TFD HAS LANDED. NO FURTHER INFO	
281005H		2.	FM: 3D MARINE DIV TO COC: TFD REPORT LANDED 280700H. ENEMY OPPOSITION LIGHT. LANDING FORCE MOVING INLAND RAPIDLY. 1500 FT CEILING IN OBJECTIVE AREA. SCATTERED SHOWERS. POOR VISIBILITY WEATHER DETERIORATING.	
281125H		3.	MAF COC: TOC 2ND ARVN DIV REPORT VC BN W/HEAVY WPNS COMPANY LOCATED VIC (BS 744422) (BS 735423) AND (BS 743430). VC ACTIVITY ALONG HIGHWAY 1 FROM GRIDLINE 38 TO GRIDLINE 44.	
281145H		4.	FM: ICE PACK TO MOMENT 22; WAVES 1 & 2 OF 2/4 ASHORE, WAVES 3, 4 & 5 ON THE BEACH	
281325H		5.	FM: LANDSHARK XRAY: 2-400 SCATTERED. 1/2 MILE VISIBILITY 2/4 CP (BS 827448)	

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

ENCL-8

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SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 281402H

TO

"DOUBLE EAGLE JOURNAL"

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
281402H		6.	FM: MAF G-3: FOLLOWING EVENTS DELAYED AS INDICATED: ARC LIGHT PLUS 24 HRS 2/9 PLUS 24 HOURS. ARVN PLUS 24 HOURS. TFD EXCEPTS TO ASSUME OPCON AT 281700H. BAD WEATHER SET IN AREA. LANDING WENT ON SCHEDULE.	
281436H		7.	FM: DASC: AS OF 281045H FRONT LINE PNS (BS 829437) TO (BS 835417) NEGATIVE ENEMY CONTACTS.	
281450H		8.	FM: 3D MARDIV TO III MAF: SPECIAL SITREP #1 DOUBLE EAGLE AS OF 281300H: A. E 2/4 ON HILL 163 (BS 849391) 2/4 CP (BS 827448) OTHERS UNKNOWN. (B) H-HOUR WENT AS SCHEDULED AT 280700H. LANDING FORCE MOVING INLAND RAPIDLY. WEATHER SITUATION DETERIORATING G. INFO REC'D FROM MONITORED NET THAT 2/4 WAS ASHORE AT 281145H. NOT CONFIRMED BY TFD. (C) UNKNOWN (D) UNKNOWN E. ARC LIGHT 2/9 AND ARVN SLIPPED 24 HOURS DUE TO POOR WEATHER SITUATION IN OBJ AREA. EXCEPT CONTROL TO PASS ASHORE APPROXIMATELY 281700H.	
281529H		9.	FM: DIV G-3 TO DIV G-3 LIAISON: REQUEST SITREP ASAP INCLUD- ING STONEWALL.	
281540H		10.	FM: MAF COC TO 3D MARDIV: DOUBLE EAGLE A. 281400H TTY B. (1) MACV ADVISES THAT TO POSTPONE ARC LIGHT 24 HOURS WOULD PROBABLY MEAN TO LOSE IT. (2) ABOVE HAS BEEN PASSED TO CG TFD. CG TFD HAS THEREFORE DECIDED TO ADHERE TO ORIGINAL SCHEDULE. (3) ACTIONS REQUESTED REF A CANCELLED.	
281550H		11.	FM: DIV G-3 LIAISON TO DIV G-3: IN REF TO YOUR LAST. UN- ABLE TO SEND SITREP. I AM STILL ON SHIP AND WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SEND UNTIL I COME ASHORE.	
281555H		12.	FM: DIV RADIO OFFICER TO DIV LNO: REQUEST YOU CLARIFY SIT- UATION ON EQUIPMENT. INDICATE YOUR REQUIREMENT IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS	
281600H		13.	FM: DIV G-3 TO DIV LNO: REQUEST STATUS YOUR COMM W/UNITS ON BEACH.	
281601H		14.	FM: DIV RADIO OFFICER TO DIV LNO: HAVE TSC-15 MRC-83 AND MRC-62 GONE ASHORE.	

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

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SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
 G-3 SECTION

FROM 281605H TO

"DOUBLE EAGLE JOURNAL"

TIME		"J"	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
IN	OUT	#		
281605H		15	FM: 3D MARDIV TO III MAF COC: A. YR 280730H. (1) BEST INFO COMPANY IDENTIFICATION FOLLOWING BATTALIONS PARTICIPATING IN SUBJ OPERATION. 3/1 - CO I, K, L, M 2/4 - CO E, F, G, H 2/9 - CO E, H 2/3 - CO E, F, G, H	
281610H		16	FM: DIV RADIO OFF TO DIV 3: NEG CONTACT W/UNIT ASHORE. ONLY COMM AVAILABLE TO ME IS SHIP RADIO, TEMPORARILY.	
281620H		17	FM: DIV LNO TO DIV 3: CLOSED DOWN TILL 1800H	
281632H		18	FM: III MAF COC TO CG THIRD MARDIV: AIR TARGETS 1. FOLLOWING TARGETS RECOMMENDED FOR SATURATION BOMBING IN ORDER LISTED. RECOMMEND OBTAIN CLEARANCE FROM TFD PRIOR TO CLEARANCE FROM I TOC. TARGET A: (BS 485723) TO (BS 489721) TARGET B (BS 485714) TO (BS 485715) TARGET C: (BS 495716) TO (BS 491723) 2. IF APPROVED BY TFD RECOMMEND TARGET BE STRUCK AT EARLIEST TIME.	
281637H		19	FM: DIV 3 TO DIV LNO: REQUEST STATUS OFF LOADING IS 3/1 ASHORE. WHEN WILL TFD LAND.	
281804H		20	FM: LNO RADIO OPR TO DIV 3: NOTHING HAS BEEN OFF LOADED. 3/1 HAS NOT LANDED. NO INFO ON TFD.	
281806H		21	FM: LNO RADIO OPR TO LT COL FISHER: I HAVE A LONG WIRE. I OBTAINED COPPER WIRE FROM RADIO RELAY	
281815H		22	FM: LNO RADIO OPR TO LT COL FISHER: I AM WITH THE TSC-15 MRC-83 AND MRC-62 THEY ARE IN NUMERICAL ORDER AND WILL LAND THAT WAY. I WILL GIVE LIST OF GEAR WHEN I OFF LOAD AND MAN A INVENTORY TOMORROW. I AM NOT SURE ABOUT THE SERIAL 4 STUBS I WILL BE UP TWO HRS PRIOR TO OFF LOADING.	

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CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
 G-3 SECTION

FROM 281829H

TO

TIME		"J"	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
IN	OUT	#		
281820H		23	FM: MONROE Q TO MONROE 3 DO TO BAD WEATHER ALL OFF LOADING OF SHIP WILL BE CANCELLED FOR APPROXIMATELY 24 HRS. WILL CALL ABOUT 0730 TO 0830 FOR FURTHER REPORT.	
282400H			JOURNAL CLOSED	
290001H			JOURNAL OPENED	
290230H		24	FM: TFD TO DIVISION G-3 (SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT) PRIORITY FOR INFO AS OF 281800H. 281514H: 2/4 HOTEL FOUND AND AFLW IN PLACE ONE PINEAPPLE GRENADE BOOBY TRAP ON TRAIL WITH PUNJI STICKS ON BOTH SIDES (BS 800480) DTG 281622H RECEIVED TEN ROUNDS SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM (BS 804474) FROM UNKNOWN VC AT (BS 803474) AND RETURNED THREE ROUNDS SMALL ARMS FIRE. DTG 281715H 2/4 HOTEL RECEIVED ONE HUNDRED ROUNDS SMALL ARMS FIRE (BS 802474) FROM (BS 801474) AND RETURNED TWENTY ROUNDS. 281800H: 3/1 AND FORCE RECON NEGATIVE REPORT.	

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SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
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3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 290300H TO 291302

TIME IN	OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
290410H		25	FM: HERESAY THREE TO TFD THREE INFO MONROE 14 PRIORITY: 282355H APPROVAL GRANTED USE TWO ARMED HULE'S FOR ESCORT OF ARTY CONVOY PROVIDED MAINTAIN HERESAY REQUIREMENTS FOR TAO/TAC (A) OF TAO ON STATION, RELIEVED ON STATION COMMENCING 0645 ON STATION MENTALLY CONCURS.	
290725H		26	FM: III MAF TO DIV 2: WEATHER OBJ AREA CONT'D CLOUDS INTERMIT- TENT LIGHT RAIN AND DRIZZLE, VISIBILITY 3/4 TO 3 MILES CEILING 300-500 OCCASIONALLY 500-800 WIND 010-3KNOTS GUSTING 0015 CHU LAI 1200-1500 BROKEN 2000-3000 OVERCAST VISIBILITY 1-3 FIELDS LIGHT RAIN AND FOG WIND WE 8-12 BOTH RPTS TILL 291000.	
290900H		27	DIV LN 0 TO DIV 3: NO OFFLOADING AS YET. LOOKS LIKE THERE WILL BE NONE WITHIN NEXT 24 HOURS.	
291005H		28	FM: III MAF TO TFD: 1. HAS OPOON FAST ASHORE? 2. ADVISE OF PRESENT OPERATION AND WEATHER.	
291010H		29	FM: III MAF TO TFD: ADVISE OF PRESENT INFO ON EXISTING AND FOUR HOUR FORECAST WEATHER AND SEA STATE.	
291020H		30	FM: MAG 36 A: ESTIMATE 3000' OVERCAST, VIS 7MI WITH LIGHT RAIN.	
291030H		31	FM: DASH CHU LAI TILL 291000H TARBUSH 4 ON MISSION 3351, LOGISTICS FOR I CORPS BS 880330. THREE HELOS HIT BY GROUND FIRE. ONE PILOT KIA. TWO HELOS REPORTED TO CHU LAI AND ONE TO QUANG NGAI. PILOT TO DIED.	
291110H		32	FM: DIV 3 TO DIV LN 0: REQUEST SIREE AS OF 291100H IN FORMAT OF III MAF ORDER.	
291302H		33	FM: TFD TO III MAF: OPOON REMAINS WITH C.A.T.F. C.A.T.F. HAS CONCLUDED THAT TFD WILL COORDINATE ACTION ASHORE IN AN EMERGENCY. DUE TO LACK OF COMBAT ASHORE DELAYED BY WEATHER AND SURF CONDITIONS AND LACK OF COMBAT EQUIP. GOT ASHORE. FOR CONTACT WITH HIGH HEADQUARTERS. RESUMPTION UNLOADING ANTICIPATE APPROX 291400. WEATHER: LOW VISIBILITY SCATTERED LIGHT TO MODERATE RAIN SHOWERS. SURF EST 6-8 FEET.	

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

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3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM _____ TO _____

TIME IN	OUT	#	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
291330		34	DIV CAS REPORTING OFFICER REPORTS FOLLOWING DOUBLE EAGLE CAS: 2/4: 2 WIA, 3/1: 1 WIA	
291415H		35	FM: CGC III MAF TO 3D MAR DIV: CANCEL CG III MAF MACG 290746H WEATHER OBJ AREA 1000 OVERCAST VISIBILITY 0 MILES.	
291415H	291418H	36	FM: CG 3d MAR DIV TO CG III MAF SPECIAL SITREP NUMBER FOUR AS OF 291200H A. LAST REPORTED CP LOCATIONS. TFD BS 835427, BLT 3/1 BS 838437, BLT 2/4 BS 809483, PROV ARTY CP BS 836426. B. AT 291000H THREE HELOS REC'D GROUND FIRE: ONE PILOT WIA. UNDEVELOPED STILL IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO WEATHER. OPNS GULF BEACH C. LANDING ON SCHEDULE WITH NO REPORTED OPPOSITION. D. NO REPORT BS IN PARA 1A. E. OPCOM REMAINS WITH CATF. CATF CONCURS THAT TFD WILL CGC IN ITS ACTION ASSETS IN EMERGENCY. NO CGC EQUIP OFFLOADED FORCING CONTROL TO REMAIN AFLOAT. F. LIMITED OFFLOADING WILL BE ATTEMPTED AT 291400H. G. WEATHER: LOW VISIBILITY. SCATTERED LIGHT TO MOD RAIN SEA AND SURF BUT DIX TO LIGHT FT.	
291425H		37	FM: TFD TO DIV: SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR INFO AS OF 291200H. NEG REPORTS REC'D FROM 2/4 AND 3/1. THIS 24 HOUR PERIOD. CUMULATIVE VC CASUALTY FIGURES REMAIN 1 VC KIA, 1 VCS WIA. REPORT RECEIVED FROM PERMETKATKSK FORCES INCLUDES SIGHTINGS: 271338H 16 VC BS 616306, 271300H 3 VC 2/4 APPREHENDED 1 VCS AT 291477H CUMULATIVE TOTALS MYCSX. UNDEVELOPED STILL IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO WEATHER. OPNS GULF BEACH WEATHER OBJ AREA 1000 OVERCAST VISIBILITY 0 MILES. BS 649319, 271440H 2 VC BS 621312, 280825H PUNJI STAKES BS 644244, 281005H ROAD BLOCK BS 595385, 281020H 281040H 15 VC BS 595385, 281140H 6 VC BS 591391 281205H 3 VC BS 597387, 281225H 3 VC BS 595385, 281620H 3 VC BS 596387, 290930H 6 VC BS 597387, 290940H 2 VC BS 597387, Late Report: 291005H 2/4 APPREHENDED 1 VCS BS 803478 291140H 2/4 APPREHENDED 1 VC BS 797477. CUMULATIVE TOTALS VCS 2, VC EQUIPMENT LOSSES: 18 BAGS RICE, 26 BAGS CONCRETE, 20 BAGS SALT AND CONCRETE DESTROYED.	
291435H		38	FM: TFD TO DIV: SPECIAL SITREP NR FOUR. 1. TFD BS 825426, 2/4 E REMAINS ON OBJ. E. ARTY CP, LVTH, 3/11 AT BS 826425. AT 291045H 2/4 H AT BS 797474, 2/4 F AT 797479. AT 291005 2/4 F APPREHENDED 1 VCS MALE OF MILITARY AGE AT BS 893478 1140H. APPREHENDED 1 VCS MALE AT BS 797477. 2/4 F RAN INTO LOCAL POLICE PIT. 4 USMC WIA	

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3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 291445

TO 291910H

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
291445H		38	<p>WOUND SERIOUS. FOUND 26 BAGS CONCRETE, 20 BAGS SALT, 18 BAGS SALT AT BS 797474. SALT AND CONCRETE DESTROYED.</p> <p>2. 2/4 PLANS TO RETRACT E FROM OBJECTIVE E AND CHOP TO 2/4. 2/4 TO ATTEMPT RIVER CROSSING XXXX 3/1 CONTINUE SEARCH AREA.</p>	
291835H		39	FM: 2/9 TO TFD: ARRIVAL REPORT: MOVEMENT COMPLETE AT 291515H	
291840H		40	<p>COPY OF CG TFD MESSAGE TO CTG 76.6</p> <p>FM: TFD</p> <p>TO: CTG 76.6</p> <p>INFO: CTG 79.5</p> <p>WARNING ORDER</p> <p>1. ASSUMING CONTROL WILL BE ASHORE ON D-DAY PLUS TWO, FOLLING MY INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SLF.</p> <p>A. REQUEST ITS RELEASE FOR OPERATIONS ASHORE.</p> <p>B. UTILIZING SLF HELOS POSITION (2/3) ELEMENTS (COMMAND, 81MM FLT AND THREE RIFLE COMPANIES) AT UNOCCUPIED OUTPOST VIC BS 7242 COMMENCING ABOUT 301100H</p> <p>C. UTILIZING TWO USAF CH3C HELOS PSN 6 105 HOW WEAPONS AT THAT LOCATION.</p> <p>D. AS SLF HELOS OR OTHERS IF AVAILABLE LIFT 105HOW PERSONNEL AND EQUIP TO THAT LOCATION.</p> <p>E. LIFT ONE RIFLE COMPANY WITH FAC AND NGF SPOT TEAM TO HILL BS 7542 AFTERNOON D+ ONE BY SLF HELO.</p> <p>F. SUBSEQUENTLY PLAN TO USE 2/3 ELEMENTS AS WELL AS OTHER FORCES IN SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS IN HIGH GROUND FURTHER INLAND.</p> <p>2. SUBJECT YOUR CONCURRENCE REGARDS COMMITMENT OF SLF, REQUEST CONCURRENCE BE SCHEDULED AFLOAT THIS EVENING TO ARRANGE A DETAILS TO INCLUDE TROOP MOVEMENT. CAS, AND AIR CONTROL TF DELTA WOULD SEND OPERATIONS AND AIR REPS.</p>	
291900H		41	<p>FM: TFD TO DIV G-3 (SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT)</p> <p>DTG 291235H (REFER TO FOLDER WITH SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS)</p>	
291905H		42	<p>FM: TFD TO DIV G-3 (SITREP)</p> <p>SPECIAL SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 4 DTG 291300H (REFER TO FOLDER ON SITREP/SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS)</p>	
291910H		43	SITREP NUMBER 15 AS OF 28 JAN 66 FM: CTG 76.6 MSG 272328Z	

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CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 291930H

TO 292320H

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
291930H		44	SITREP NUMBER 16 AS OF 28 JAN 66 FM: CTG 76.6 MSG 280554Z	
291935H		45	SITREP NUMBER 17 AS OF 28 JAN 66 FM: CTG 76.6 MSG 281050Z	
291936H		46	SITREP NUMBER 18 AS OF 28 JAN 66 FM: CTG 76.6 MSG 281626Z JOURNAL ENTRIES 43-44-45-46- REFER TO FOLDER OF SITREP AND SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.	
292020H		47	FM: HEARSAY TO III MAF EACH SUPPORT AREA TO REPORT MESSAGE NUMBER FOUR NO CHANGE LST REMAINS BEACHED 25 FEET FROM BEACH FOUR FEET OF WATER AT LPH. 750 CASES OF RATIONS TO BE UNLOADED BY HELO FROM LPH	
292320H		48	FM TFD TO DIV G-3 SPECIAL SITREP NUMBER 5 2/4 CP (808483) 2/4 G (814784) 2/4 F (792479) 2/4 H (792472) FIGHT LINES (792422) TO (792479) 2/4 F FOUND 2-55 GALLON TUMS OF GAS AND ONE ENGINE FOUR CYLINDER AND SEVERAL DOCU- MENTS AT 291340H AT (BS297272) 2/4 F RECEIVED SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM VILLAGE AT (BS798479) AT 291240H. 2/4 RECEIVED INCOMING GRENADE AT 291347H AT (BS 796474) (02)WIA NON EVAC AT 291320H. 2/4 F FOUND 60 SPENT CARTRIGES (BS797479) 20 WERE 50 CAL. AND 40 WERE 30 CAL. CUMULATIVE (1) KIA(5) WIA 3/1 CP (836426) 3/1 I (816421) 3/1 M (821435) 3/1 L (1224/) 3/1 K (831437) 3/1 M AND I IN CONTACT WITH ENEMY DURING PERIOD. 3/1 I, L, AND M RECEIVED SPORATIC SNIPER FIRE DURING PERIOD. 3/1 K FOUND METAL PUNJI STAKES IN CULTIVATED AREA (BS836426) ONE SECTION ONTO'S FIRED MISSION AGAINST ENEMY MACHINE GUN IN BUILDING AT (BS 813423) BUILDING DESTROYED VC CASUALTIES NOT UNKNOWN. CUMULATIVE (1) KIA (7) WIA. 8 VCS APPREHENDED CAPTURED FROM VCS AT 291130H AT (BS828412) PROVISIONAL COMPANY FROM 3/1 TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR TFD, 2/3 E ON OBJ C AT 291657. 2/4 CP (843414) 3/1 ASSIGNED MISSION. CONTROL OF OPERATION ASHORE REMAINED WITH NATALIE WITH TFD TO COORDINATE ACTION IN EMERGENCY REVIEW (1) SCAT B SITREP AS OF 291700H (2) A. SCAT B LOCATED TFD CP LOCATED (BA) (TO) FORCE RECON D. FORCE RECON MAINTAINED (06) APS - (BS333384) (BS137319 (BS607308) (BS667295) (617282) (BS625295) C. 4 MEN OF DISCOVERED (2) (BS603384) (3) UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME (4) TEAM RECOVERED BY HELO 291545H (5) USMC (01) MIA BELIEVED KIA TWO VC KILLED D. SIGHTINGS (1) 6 MEN MOVING WEST (BS597387) WEARING BLACK ONE WITH CONSTRUCTION TYPE HELMET 290930H CARRYING WEAPONS THREE RIDING BIKES. (2) TWO MEN MOVING WEST (BS597387 WEARING BLACK ONE WITH RAIN HAT AT	

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

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SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 292320H

TO

300200H

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
292320H		48	(CONT) 290940H CARRYING WEAPONS.	
292345H		49	FM: PANHANDLE SIX TO KIT CARSON INFO DIV G-3 REQUEST AIR DELIVERY OF 50 TONS MCI RATIONS TO BSA ASAP.	
292350H		50	FM: TFD 2 TO DIV G-3 SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR INFO ID OF 291800H. AT 291240H 2/4 H FOUND TWO 55 GALLON DRUMS OF GAS, ONE FOUR CYLINDER ENGINE AND SEVERAL DOCUMENTS AT 291250H 2/4 F RECEIVED S/A FIRE FROM VIC OF VILLAGE (BS798479) AT 291300H 2/4 F RECEIVED ONE INCOMING RIFLE GRENADE FROM VIC (BS796474) AT 291100H 2/4 F LOCATED VC RICE CACHE VIC (BS 797474) CONTAINING 18 BAGS OF RICE. 2/4 F DESTROYED 12 FIGHT TRAPS VIC (BS797474) 3/1 K LOCATED METAL PUNJI STAKES VIC (BS797474) 3/1 K LOCATED METAL PUNJI STAKES VIC (BS826424) 3/1 L CAPTURED ONE MAP AND TWO VCS VIC (828412) AT 291130H	
292355H		51	FM: TFD TO DIV G-3 1. CASUALTIES REPORT A. 03 B. 01 C. 00 D. 12 E. 02 F. 00	
292357H		52	FM: DIV G-3 TO TFD REQUEST IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF 2/3 UNIT ASHORE.	
292400H		53	FM TFD TO DIV G-3 292225H REF 2/3 E LOCATED (754421)	
300001H			STANDARD SIGNED	
300002H			STANDARD OPENED	
300200H		54	FM: TFD TO DIV G-3 INFO: III MAF 1. UNIT STREET NUMBER 6 2. A. UNIT LOCATION UNCHANGED B. NO REIN CONTACT FOR REPORTING PERIOD. COMBAT B THREATENED TOWNS, ONE AT (735377) AND ONE AT (633406) AT 291731H. LATE ENTRY: H APPREHENDED THREE VC AT (B6800480) AT 291731H.	
292357H		55		

BRIEF 30 SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

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SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 300220H TO 300755

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J"	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
300220H		57	FM: TFD TO DIV G-3 1. US CASUALTY REPORT A. 3 B. 1 C. 1 D. 15 E. 3 F. 1	
300250H		56	FM: TFD TO DIV G-3 INFO YOUR 292230H BY 292225H IS CORRECT.	
300332H		57	FM: TFD TO DIV G-3 (SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT INFO AS OF 292400H 1. CUMULATIVE VC FIGURES 1. VC KIA 5 VCS 2. 292035H REPORT RELAY FROM ARVN 14 RECEIVED. 2. VC KIA 1 VCS 8 VCS AND 1 CHINESE COMMUNISTS RIFLE CAPT- URED BS678565 3. LTR REPORT TO AND PILOT FOLLOWING OBSERVATION DURING 291610, 291630H ESTIMATED 70 MEN RAN IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS BS757413 ALL CARRYING CLOTH BAG UNDER THEIR TOS, 6 IN GREEN UNIFORMS SEEN DISROBING. APPROXIMATELY 25 MEN OBSERVED BS760405 H MARCHING SOUTH ALONG STREAM 1 IN GREEN UNIFORMS APPROXIMATELY 30 MEN CAME FROM TRENCH B S 757411 PARALLEL TO NORTH SIDE ROAD.	
300755H		58	TFD TO DIV G-2: KLONDIKE SIGHTING FM 290900H TO 291900H 1. FOXHOLE AND TRENCHES SOME NEWLY DUG IN GRID SQUARES BS 7341 7441, and 7440. 2. (A) RECON FIRETEAM HIT. NO INJURIES AT BS 599382. (B) TEAM HIT AGAIN AT B OTTOM OF HILL EVACUATED 3 UNDER FIRE 1 MARINE KIA LEFT BEHIND BS 592310. ENEMY WAS ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WPNS. 3. DUNKER WITH 2 VC HIT AT BS 798498. 4. 50 PEOPLE 90% MALE AT BS 771410. 5. MANY NEWLY IN G FOXHOLES ON REVERSE SLOPE BS 771411 AND 775405. 6. VIC HEAVILY TRENCHED GRID SQUARES BS 7438, 7431, 7341, AND D 7639. 7. GROUND TROOPS RECEIVED AUTOMATIC WPNS FIRE BS 813426, BS 769412 AT 281345.	

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3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 300830H

TO

TIME		"J"	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
IN	OUT	#		
300830H	X	59	FM: MTD TO GOLDENFLOW: REQUEST SEA STATE AND TENTATIVE OFF/LOAD PLANS FOR TODAY. REQUEST INTENTIONS REGARDING 2/9.	
300833H	+	60	FM: TFD TO DIV: SPECIAL INTEL REPORTS FOR INFO AS OF 300600H 300115H: 2/3 REPORTED RECEIVING FOUR 60MM MORTAR FROM DUE WEST NO CASUALTIES. 2. CASUALTY REMAIN SAME ONE VC KIA AND 5VCS.	
300915H		61	MTD TO MAF: URGENTLY REQUIRED CODE DESIGN ATION FOR CHALLENGE AND PASS WORD, REQUEST EXPEDITE TO THIS HQ. ATTN G-2 PASS TO DIV TO PAS TO III MAF.	
300918H	(X)	62	TFD TO DEW: 1. SPECIAL S TREP NO 7 2. A UNIT LOCATION UNCHANGED 3. 2/3 RECEIVED 4 INCOMING 60MM MORTAR ROUNDS AT 300115H. NO CASUALTIES. 2/4 F REVERTED UNPON 2/4 291756	
301055H		63	FM DIV LN 0 TO DIV 3: HAVE JUST STARTED TO OFFLOAD TROOPS OVER THE SIDE. WE WILL MARRY WITH LCU'S TO UNLOAD EQUIPMENT. H AVE NO IDEA WHICH SERIALS WILL UNLOAD FIRST. THE OTHER LST'S ARE UN- LOADING ON B EACH, BUT DIV LN 0'S LST CANNOT BEACH DUE TO MECHANICAL DIFFICULTIES.	
301132H		64	FM CG III MAF TO CG 3D MAR DIV: LIEN KET 22. NO CONTACT RE- PORTED. UNITS TO REMAIN LAST NIGHTS PSN AND SEARCH OUT.	
301201H		65	FM: TFD TO DIV G-3: REF TY YR P301035H. FOLLOWING SUPPLIES ON LOADING. CLASS 1 15% CLASS 2 NEG CLASS 3 750 GALLONS DIESEL CLASS 4 NEG CLASS 5 10% OFF LOADING ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE TO CON VOY SUPPLIES TO QUANG NGAI FOR FURTHER OBJECTIVE AREAS.	

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CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 301220H TO 301650H

TIME	"J"	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT		TAKEN
301220H		66 FM: DIV LN 0 TO DIV G-3: L-H OUR DOUBLE EAGLE POSTPONED TO 1300H. LZ VIC (BS 720428).	
301310H		67 TFD TO DIV: 1. SPECIAL STREP NUMB ER 8 2. A. NO CHANGE IN UNIT LOCATIONS. B. NO CONTACT DURING PERIOD. C. 2/4 AND 2/3 CON DUCTING DELIBERATE COORDINATED SEARCH AND CLEAR FROM BEACH TO RH ASE LINE ORANGE. D. 2/3 L-H OUR N OW SCHEDULED 301400H E. UNLOADING DIFFICULT TO HIGH SURF.	
301350H		68 TFD TO DIV: CASUALTY REPORT: A. 00 SINCE LAST REPORT US WIA B. 00 SINCE LAST REPORT US KIA C. 00 US MIA SINCE LAST REPORT D. 16 WIA CUMULATIVE (US) E. 03 US KIA CUMULATIVE F. 01 US MIA CUMULATIVE.	
01355H		69 TFD TO DIV: SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT: FOR INFO AS OF 301200H: 1. COMMUNICATIONS WET, 3 VC KIA, 2 B Y RECON: 15 VCS 2. REPORT 7 2/3 REPORTS 8 301125H 2. AUTO WPN S FIRE REPORTED B Y HELO PILOT RECEIVED 30 RDS BS 832396, 20 RDS B S 803394 AND 150 RDS IN 10 - 15 RDS BURSTS FM B S 795426. BELIEVEDX LOCATION OF 2 & 3 WPNS.	
301415H		70 FM: DIV LN 0 TO DIV: OUR SHIP WILL ATTEMPT TO HIT THE BEACH AT APPROXIMATELY 1415H	
301503H		71 FL: III MAF COC TO DIV G-3: A. MY 301340H 1. L-H OUR COMPLETED AT 301500H.	
3016 50H		72 FM DIV LN 0 TO DIV G-3: GROUND 35 YARDS FROM BEACH. NOT MAKING ANY FORWARD PROGRESS. DOESN'T LOOK LIKE WE WILL MAKE IT TONIGHT ETCETERA.	

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CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 301705H TO

DOUBLE EAGLE JOURNAL SHEET H

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
301705H		73	REF TO TFD: REQUEST APPROVAL TO USE TWO ARMED HUAY ASSIGNED TO TFD TO COVER CONVOY STARTER AT 310830.	
301715H		74	TFD TO DIV: BOMB DAMAGE ASSIGNMENT 1. REFER 3800 OF 25 DEC 65 2. AT PRESENT STANDING BY POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF TARGETS TUESDAY. UPON INITIATION OF EXPLOITATION WILL COMPLY WITH PART THREE OF REF A. IF TARGETS NOT EXPLOITED WILL COMPLY WITH PART FOUR OF REF A EARLIEST.	
301716H		75	TFD TO DIV: U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM PRESENTLY ABOARD IS SUFFICIENT TO PERFORM REQUIREMENTS. NO FURTHER CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL REQUIRED.	
301850H		76	DIV LNO TO III MAF: AO REPORTED AT 1230H THEY RECEIVED 30-40 RDS OF AA FIRE ON B S 832396, 20 RDS AA VIC BS 803394, AND 100 RDS AA FROM VIC BS 795426. NEW SUBJECT. ITEMS RECEIVED FROM GOLDENFLOW RECEIVED TWO ITEMS YESTERDAY BOTH FROM III MAF. NOTHING OBTAINED LOCALLY.	
302100H		77	FM: TFD TO DIV G-3 1. US CASUALTY REPORT XXXXXXXX A. 4 B. 1 C. 0 D. 20 E. 4 F. 1 MARINES NOTED IN F IS FROM FORCE RECON STATISTIC RECEIVED FROM TAC NET NAME AND CIRCUM NOT YET AVAILABLE THIS LOCATION ITEM A AND D INCLUDE 3 WIA NE	
302300H		78	FM: REFER TO JOURNAL NUMBER 62 OF SPECIAL SITREP NUMBER 7 PTG 300918H (GEOO) (HET) (WTGEN) USA AND MR6 VISITED CP 20175782900041570 201300H CONTROL OF OPERATION ASSURED REMAINS MAINLY WITH TFD TO CO-ORDINATE ACTION IN CASE OF EMERGENCY.	
302400H			JOURNAL CLOSED	
310001H			JOURNAL OPENED	

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CLASSIFICATION

3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 310100H

TO

"DOUBLE EAGLE JOURNAL"

TIME IN	OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
310100H		78	FM: LNO RADIO OPR TO LNO (LTCOL MCCLOSKEY) REQUEST TO KNOW ASAP WHEN YOU EXPECT TO GET ASHORE	
310100H		79	FM: DIV G-3 TO LNO (LT COL MCCLOSKEY) REQUEST SHORT 1800 SITREP COPY FROM TFD SOME WHAT GARBLED.	
310500H		80	FM TFD TO DIV 3: INFO: III MAF 1. SPECIAL SITREP NUMBER 9 2. 2/4 PNS UNCHANGED. 2/4 G (BS 802480) REC'D S/A FIRE AT 301300H FROM (BS 800480) SUSTAINED 2 WIA. DG (BS 807475) REC'D S/A FIRE AT 301303H FROM (BS806474) APPROX 3 SNIPERS ONE A/W. 2/4 G SUSTAINED 1 KIA AND KK WIA. 2/4 G (BS 808473) REC'D 15 RDS S/A FIRE AND TWO INCOMING HAND GRENADES AT 301500H FROM (BS 808471) NO CASUALTIES. CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES (2) KIA AND 11 WIA. (2/4 G SUSTAINED 1 WIA) 3. 3/1 CP (836425) I (830400) K (829747) L (835413) M (824434) 3/1 M SQD REC'D 30 RDS S/A FIRE FROM (BS815437) AND (BS 811430) SQD ENGAGED VC SUPPORTED BY ONTOS DESTROYED BUILDING. VC CASUALTIES UNKNOWN. CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES 3 KIA AND 6 WIA. 4. 2/3-4 LOCATED (711429) 2/3 E (720424) 301400H LZ PREP BY FIXED WING. EXCELLENT COVERAGE AND COORDINATION. PREP TERMINATED BY ARRIVAL OF HUEY. FURNISHED CLOSE SUPPORT 301510H 2/3 (-) 36 IMMEDIATELY SECURED LZ ENTIRE OPERAT ION HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. COORDINATION AND GROUND EFFORT BY SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS OUTSTANDING. 5. HELO MAKING PICK UP CH-M REC'D FIRE FROM BUILDING (BS807436) AND (BS807431) IN EXCESS FOR IT HIT HELO. HELO PILOT REC'D 30 RDS A/W FIRE. (BS 832396) AT 301125H 20 RDS (BS 803394) 150 RDS, XXXXXX 10 TO 15 SEC BURST FROM (BS 795406) BELIEVED 2-3 (GEN) (ENGAGM) VISITED XXXXX TFD CP AT 301345H. (7) PLANS PREVIOUS GIVE G-3 AND ASSISTANT G-3 III MAF WITH EXCEPTION COMM RELAY STATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED 31 JANUARY. (F) SCAT B SITREP 301700H 2 (A) SCAT B (-) CP LOCATED TFD CP (BA TO) FORCE RECON CP B26 TO LINE B. 7 OPS WERE BEING MADE (BS 734377) (BS 634406) (BS XXXX B9318) (BS658202) (BS6672) (BS625295) (BS61783) LINE C NONE LINE D SIGHTINGS (1) 4 MEN MOVING EAST ON TRAIL (BS749395) WEAR ING BLACK 301305H CARRYING PACKS (2) VC OUTPOST DETECTED BY HEARING MANY VOICES AT 301300H VIC (BS36319) DURING PNS OF HEAVY FOG WHILE PATROL WAS ON MOVE. ARTY FIRE	

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3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

FROM 310500H TO

"DOUBLE EAGLE JOURNAL"

TIME IN	OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
310500H		80	(CON'T) NO OBSERVATION LINE B 5 MEN WALKING ALONG RIVER (BS656328) WEARING BLACK 301315H SMALL ARMS. LINE E. 2. TEAM OF SCAT B BEING INSERTED (BS675400) AND (BS620455) AT (305515)	
310720H		81	FM: COC-2 TIME 310636H. WEATHER FOR DOUBLE EAGLE. LIGHT RAIN, 2000' OVERCAST, 10 MILE VISIBILITY.	
310740H		82	FM: TFD FM: TFD REF A. YOUR 271297Z REF B. YOUR 302140H 1. RPT REQUIRED REFERENCE A SUBMITTED AT 301915H HAVE 3 - 4 HOUR REPORT BACKLOG, DUE TO TRANSMISSION DIFFICULTIES AND OVERLOAD. 2. REFERENCE B REFERS.!	
300945H		83	FM: TFD TO DIV G-3: SPECIAL SITREP NUMBER 10. 1. 3/1 LOCATION UNCHANGED. 2.A. 3/1 CONDUCTED 2 S&D PATROLS AND 6 AMBUSHES. B. LATE ENTRY: ONE VC KIA AT BS 817424 AT 301500H. UNABLE TO RECOVER BOAT BECAUSE OF HEAVY FIRE. C. 3/1 I DISCOVERED LARGE CACHE, 6000 POUNDS OF RICE AT 301300H ATBS 832426. D. 3/1 M SQUAD SUSTAINED KIA AS RESULT OF ENGAGEMENT NEAR BS 817424 AT 301500H. 1. 2/4 UNIT LOCATION UNCHANGED 2. LX: A. 2/4 G APPREHENDED 1 VCS MALE AT BS 804479 IN AREA FROM WHICH VC FIRE CAME AT 301400H B. 2/4 G APPREHENDED 1 VCS MALE AT BS 808472 IN AREA FROM WHICH FIRE CAME AT 301600H. C. 2/4 G APPREHENDED 1 VCS MALE AT BS 805477 IN AREA WHERE PATROL SAW GRENADE THROWN AT 301600H. D. 2/4 G APPREHENDED 1 MALE VCS AT BS 808474 HIDING UNDER MAT IN HOUSE AT 301606H E. 2/4 F APPREHENDED 1 MALE VCS AT BS 803487 IN A HOUSE WITH SEVERAL SPENT CARBINE RDS. F. TOTAL 16 VCS WENT TO COLLECTION PT. 3. 2/3 UNIT LOCATION UNCHANGED. XX 2/3 NEG VC CONTACT. 4. ARTY CP 839423, 3/11 H 839423, LVTH 825427 ARTY M 828724 arty H 826425 ARTY W AFLOAT. ARTY CP ASSUMED CONTROL ARTY UNITS ASHORE 302130H. LVTH FIRED TWO OBSERVED MISSIONS ONE PRECISION REGISTRATION AND ONE OBSERVED MISSION AT 301845H AT 15 VC IN RIVER VIC BS 844395. 36 RDS FIRED. NO BODIES FOUND BUT BLOOD OBSERVED PLANS: LAND ARTY W ASAP. 3/11 TO HELO TO VIC OBJ C 31 JAN	

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3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF, DANANG, RVN
G-3 SECTION

311000H
FROM

TO

"DOUBLE EAGLE"

TIME		"J"	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
IN	OUT	#		
310945	CON'T	83	DISPRACE ARTY CP TO 826426.	
311020H		84	FM MAF: WEATHER AS OF 310800H 1000 OVDRCST, VIES 2 20 MILE WITH RAIN. WINDS 320 DEGREES AT 5 KNOTS. TEMP. 72 DEGREES. BREAKERS AT THREE FEET, MAX 4-5. PERIOD OF BREAKERS 5-7, TYPE OF BILLOWING, 40, 60 SPILLING STRAIGHT, INSHORE CURRENT 0.4 LEFT SET. 4-5/110 IS NO OF BREAKERS. WIDTH OF SURF ZONE IS 110YDS.	
1024H		85	WEATHER ASOF 310900H. CLOUD COVERAGE 3000 OVERCAST, VIS 8 MILES WINDS 320 DEGREES AT 5 KNOTS. TEMP 72 DEGREES. BREAKER 3 FEET, MAXIMUM 4.5. PERIOD OF BREAKERS 5-7, TYPE 40 BILLOWING, 60 SPILLING STRAIGHT. INSHORE CURRENT 0.4 LEFT SET. 4-5/110 IS NO OF BREAKERS. WIDTH OF SURFZONE IS 110 YDS.	
311033H		86	FM: TFD TO DIV: SITREP 11 1. UNIT LOCATION UNCHANGED. 2. A. 302400H 2 VC'S PROBED LINES XXI 2/3 CHO PSN. B. 310340H AMBUSH FROM 3/1 M AT (BS 823435) RECEIVED EXPLOSION BELIEVED TO BEHOME MADE BOMB.	
311055H		87	FM: TFD TO DIV SITREP A. YOUR 302130H 1. TWO MRC-83, TWO MRC 87 ACTION ON D-4, HE D-6, AND VARIOUSA AIR NETS. BALANCE OF YEARNOT ASHORE YET. HOPEFULLY WILL BE BY 311300H. NO ADDITIONAL HELP.	
311215H		88	FM TFD TO DIV: SITREP FOR INFO ASOF 302400H INTELLIGENCE REPORT RECEIVED AT 1828H INDICATED THE VC -18 VC CO IS LEAVING FROM VIC BS 714496 AND MOVING EAST TO VIC BS 770520, BS 780510 AND BS 795491. THEY INTEND TO JOIN WITH THE C -20 CO FOR OPEN AGAINST USMC UNITS AT 1800H, 2/3 REPORTED 30 VCS MOVING NORTH AND 15 VCS MOVING EAST VIC BS 700406. AT 2110H, 2/3 SPOT TM REPORTED AN UNDETERMINED NO. OF VC FROM VS 714592 TO BS 770520 CUMULATIVE VC CASUALTY TOTL FOR OPN 3 VC KIA 28 VCC/ VCS.	
311218H		89	TFD 4 TO DIV: STATUSOF UNLOADING LST 1159-100%, LST 1170-100% LST 1149-30% LSD 22-70%.	
311219H		90	TFD TO DIV: CONTROL NOT YET PASSED ASHORE WILL NOTIFY BY FIASH MSG WHEN APPROPRIATE.	
XXXXXX	311220H	91	DIV TO DIV LN 0: HAS CONTROL PASSED ASHORE?	

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G-3 SECTION

FROM _____ TO _____

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
311310H		92	FM TFD TO DIV 3: REFERENCE YOUR 302118H 1. 1ST-5 ON BEACH ARE: 1170 AND 1167, FIFTY % ALL UNLOADING COMPLETED. 2. COMMAND REMAINS AFLOAT. 3. REFERENCE A REFERS:	
311345H		93	FM: TFD TO DIV: 1. SPECIAL SITREP 12 A 2/3 3/11 H WAS HELD LIFTED INTO MOORE PSN AT 31103H. L. UNIT LOCATION UNCHANGED. 3. A. 2/3 CONDUCTING PATROL WITHIN 2000 METERS RADIUS N OF POSITION. CO. PATROL N E TO 4145. L. 3/1 K RECEIVED TWO SA RDS FM BS 820599 AT 310855H SA AND AUTO WPNS FIRE RETURNED. 1 VC KIA, BODY OBSERVED FALLING FROM TREE. C. 3/1 RECEIVED SA FIRE FROM BS 81255290 AT 311055H. RETURNED FIRE, WITH SA AND AUTO WPNS FIRE AND 81MM MORTAR 5. A PLAN TO MOVE 2/4(-) INTO LZ VIC BS 600395 AT 311500 WITHIN ONE HOUR. OUR LZ AND AREA. PREP B. 2/4 E WITH RADIO RELAY TO BS 618369. LZ PREP FROM 311200H TO 311230H WITH LANDING AT TIME 311230H. C. 3/1 CONTINUED SEARCH AND WEEK CLEAR IN ASSIGNED ZONE OF ACTION. 2/9 ON STAND BY.	
311535H		94	FM: TFD TO DIV: S/R FOR INFO AS OF 311200H/ 3/1 I DISCOVERED LARGE CACHE OF RICE EST 6000 LBS VIC BS 832526. TF 79.6 RPTD 50 CAL MG FIRING ON F.O. A/C VIC BS 775528. MURKIE CALLED AND WEN DESTROYED W/D FIELD RPTD REC S/A FIRE FO VIC BS 725519. AREA TAKEN UNDER FIRE BY UH/IE A/Z, NO FURTHER FIRE REC'D. TF 79.6 RPTD AREA EXTENDING FM BS 615366 TO BS 618368 HEAVILY STAKED WITH PUNJI STICKS TWO A/N POS AND SOFT TRENCH LOC VIC BS 635357. NO PEOPLE OBS IN THIS VIC. 3/1 RPTD REC'D FR BS 812529 AND 5-5 S/A RDS REC'D FM BS XXXXXXXXXX 812329 AND 5-5 SA RDS REC'D FM VIC BS 823559. RTD FIRE WHICH RESULTED IN 1 VC KIA. 1 VCS PICKED UP SAME VIC. CUMULATIVE VC CAS FIGS 5 VC KIA, 29 VCC/VCS.	
311552H		95	FM: TFD 6 TO DIV: FOR G-1 1. US CASUALTY REPORT A. 4 WIA SINCE LAST RPT B. 1 KIA SINCE LAST RPT C. 00 MIA SINCE LAST RPT D. 27 WIA CUMULATIVE E. 7 KIA CUMULATIVE F. 1 MIA CUMULATIVE	

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1815 ~ 2/4 left concluded 1610 H - Rel 3 rds SA En

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G-3 SECTION

FROM _____ TO _____

TIME IN	OUT	"J" #	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
311700H		96	FM: DIV TO TFD: ADTAK MY 300617Z.	
311701H		97	FM LTCOL FISHER TO III MAF 19: DISPATCH CHAPLAIN ASAP TFD. OUTFIT COMPLETELY.	
311815H		98	FM GOLDEN GLOW TO III MAF: INFO MONROE. 311730H DURING HELLO LIFT INTO LANDING ZONE VIC BS 595295 SUDDEN DEATH (2/4) REC'D THREE RDS SA FIRE AT 1500H FM BS 603401 2/4 LIFT COMPLETED AT 1610H. NO FURTHER ENEMY CONTACT REPTD.	
	312010H	99	FM CG THIRD MARDIV TO CG III MAF. SPECIAL SITREP NR 11 DOUBLE EAGLE.	
312005H		100	FM LTCOL MCCLOSKEY TO THIRD MARDIV ALL CLEAR ASHORE AT PRESENT TIME. INFORM MONROE TWO AND THREE THIS NET HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. DO EITHER SECTIONS HAVE TRAFFIC.	
	312005	101	THIRD MARDIV TO LTCOL MCCLOSKEY NO SPECIAL TRAFFIC FOR YOU GRATIFIED THAT INTEL TEAMS AND INT PERS ARE READY TO FUNCTION. BRIEFING OFFICER WILL UTILIZE ANY INFO YOU HAVE FOR 010001H SPECIAL INTEL RPT.	
	312245H	J-102	FM G-3 TO LTCOL MCCLOSKEY REQUEST TO KNOW THE NUMBER OF ENEMY CASUALTIES AS OF 311800H.	
312250H		103	FM TFD TO THIRD MARDIV. SPECIAL SITREP # 13.	
	312355H	104	FM THIRD MARDIV 1. INTEROGATORY TFD ONE IN RECEIPT OF MY 300612Z. 2. THIRD MARDIV FIVE DESIRES RESPONSE ASAP AFTER TELETYPE IN. 3. BRIEFING OFFICER REQUESTS 9600 SITREP NLT 0400. SPOW REPS THERE AFTER.	
312355	X	105	FM TFD WEATHER FORECAST REQUEST THAT TASK FORCE D. BE FURNISHED DAILY WEATHER INFORMATION TO INCLUDE REPORTED AND FORECASTED WEATHER AS OF 0600 AND 1800 DAILY TO BE RECEIVED AT THIS HQ ASAP THERE AFTER.	
"		106	FM DIV LIAISON NO VC CASUALTIES AS HELD BY TFD AS OF 311800H. 16 KIA, 14 BY ARTY-RECON, 57 VCS.	
"		107	FM TFD TO THIRD MARDIV 1. CASUALTY RPT. PERIOD ENDING 311800H (LESS SUDDEN DEATH) A. 03 B. 00 C. 00 D. 31 E. 06 F. 01 2. CORRECT MY 311345H TO REPT D. 28 VICE 27 E. 06 VICE 07.	

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