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Ser: 00784-66

11 JUL 1966

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 3dMarDiv ltr 3/DVM/clp over  
5750.1 Ser 00127-66 of 2May66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division for the Month  
of March 1966 (U)

1. Forwarded.

*J. L. Gibney*  
J. L. GIBNEY  
By direction

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Ser: **0054466**

10 May 1966

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 3d Marine Division Command Chronology for March 1966

From: Commanding General

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology, forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

2. This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of the basic correspondence.

  
J. R. CHATSSON  
By direction

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# 3D MARINE DIVISION

## FMF (-) (REIN)



COMMAND DIARY  
for the month of  
MARCH 1966

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
HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

Copy / of 12 Copies  
3/DVM/clp  
5750.1  
Ser: 2027-66  
2 May 1966

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division for the  
Month of March 1966  
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) CG FMFPac msg 251942 Aug 1965  
Encl: ✓ (1) 3dMarDiv Command Chronology for the period 1-31  
March 1966 with supporting documents

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) and  
(b) enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal  
of enclosure (1).

  
J. B. SWEENEY  
Chief of Staff

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ORGANIZATION DATA

THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE  
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 MARCH 1966 TO 31 MARCH 1966

SUBMITTED APRIL 1966

FROM THE DIVISION COMMAND POST BUNKER (AT 957751)

DA NANG, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

COMMANDING GENERAL

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEWIS W. WAIT, U.S. MARINE CORPS 1-17 MARCH 1966

MAJOR GENERAL WOOD B. KYLE, U. S. MARINE CORPS 18-31 MARCH 1966

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

BRIGADIER GENERAL LOWELL E. ENGLISH, U. S. MARINE CORPS

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER . CHU LAI

BRIGADIER GENERAL JONAS M. PLATT, USMC 1-29 MARCH 1966

CHIEF OF STAFF

COLONEL LEO J. DULACKI, USMC

GENERAL STAFF

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 COLONEL ROBERT W. PORT, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 COLONEL GEORGE W. CARRINGTON, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3 COLONEL F. R. WILKINSON, JR., USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4 COLONEL JAMES E. MCANALANAHAN, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD H. MACKEL, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMPTROLLER, COLONEL E. M. STIMSON, USMC

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SUBORDINATE UNITS

|                                 |                                 |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Headquarters Battalion          | LtCol Robert J. PERRICH USMC    |
| 1st Marine Regiment             | Col Bryan B. MITCHELL, USMC     |
| 3d Marine Regiment              | Col Thell H. FISHER, USMC       |
| 4th Marine Regiment             | Col Donald W. SHERMAN, USMC     |
| 9th Marine Regiment             | Col Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC      |
| 11th Marine Regiment            | Col Peter H. HAHN, USMC         |
| 12th Marine Regiment            | Col James M. CALLENDER, USMC    |
| 3d Anti-Tank Battalion          | LtCol Bruce A. HEFLIN, USMC     |
| 3d Engineer Battalion           | LtCol Nicholas J. DENNIS, USMC  |
| 3d Medical Battalion            | Cmdr Almon C. WILSON, (MC), USN |
| 3d Motor Transport Battalion    | Major Freddie J. BAKER, USMC    |
| 3d Reconnaissance Battalion     | LtCol Roy R. VAN CLEVE, USMC    |
| 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion | LtCol William D. POMEROY, USMC  |
| 3d Tank Battalion               | LtCol Milton L. RAPHAEL, USMC   |
| 3d Shore Party Battalion        | Major John M. DEAN, USMC        |

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AVERAGE STRENGTH DURING MARCH

| <u>UNIT</u>   | <u>OFFICERS</u> | <u>ENLISTED</u> |
|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| HqBn          | 157             | 1661            |
| 1st Marines   | 115             | 3044            |
| 3d Marines    | 165             | 4392            |
| 4th Marines   | 25              | 285             |
| 9th Marines   | 141             | 1148            |
| 11th Marines  | 99              | 1971            |
| 12th Marines  | 178             | 2641            |
| 3d Recon Bn   | 41              | 637             |
| 3d Tank Bn    | 45              | 861             |
| 3d AT Bn      | 24              | 556             |
| 1st AmTrac Bn | 36              | 1058            |
| 3d SF Bn      | 27              | 564             |
| 3d Engr Bn    | 40              | 1143            |
| 3d MT Bn      | 28              | 419             |
| 3d Med Bn     | <u>143</u>      | <u>143</u>      |
| <br>TOTAL     | <br>1124        | <br>23523       |

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PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION1. Personnel and Administration

a. Casualties sustained during March included: 243 KIA, 1016 WIA, 24 DOW, 1 MIA, 1 NBD, and 4 NBC.

b. 41 Officers and 3269 Enlisted personnel joined the Division. 40 Officers and 2124 Enlisted personnel were transferred by normal rotation while 25 Officers and 763 Enlisted personnel were transferred by Service Records. On 25 March 1966, 36 Officers and 1287 Enlisted personnel were transferred from the 3d Marine Division to the Force Logistics Command.

c. Awards presented to Division personnel included 1016 Purple Hearts, 15 Silver Star, 46 Bronze Star, 37 Navy Commendation and 34 Air Medals. Recommendations for medals forwarded to FMFPac included: 3 Legion of Merit, 22 Silver Star, 52 Bronze Star, 65 Navy Commendation, 19 Air Medals and 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses.

2. Field Exchanges

a. A rapid increase in population coupled with a shortage of transportation due to operational commitments, created a shortage of merchandise in the Phu Bai Enclave. On 28 March 1966, an overland convoy carried 10 truck loads and 5 trailer loads of essential merchandise providing relief for the 4th Marines and other units in that enclave.

b. On 23 March 1966 the 4th RLT Exchange at Chu Lai was closed and remaining stock inventoried and transferred to the 1stMarDiv. On 31 March 1966 the 7th RLT account was transferred to the 1st Marine Division thereby terminating 3d Marine Division Exchange activities in the Chu Lai enclave.

c. The rationing of select items of exchange merchandise that are subject to black market traffic will be initiated on 1 April 1966. The Division Exchange Officer was appointed project officer for the distribution of ration cards to each regiment and separate battalion within the Division.

3. Special Services

a. Inspection of Special Services activities within the Division was completed for all units except 3/9 which will be inspected 1 April. All units were satisfactory.

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Enclosure (1)

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b. No significant increases in property of the Recreation Fund developed but total dollar value of Division assets increased due to receipt of the Division monthly share of Exchange profits. Present status of the Recreation Fund is:

|                               |              |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| Appropriated Fund Balance     | \$ 25,000.00 |
| Non-appropriated Fund Balance | \$151,341.63 |
| <u>Recreation Equipment:</u>  |              |
| March Issues                  | \$ 11,389.73 |
| March Receipts                | \$ 7,818.58  |
| <u>Equipment on Order:</u>    |              |
| Appropriated Funds            | \$ 95,411.36 |
| Non-appropriated Funds        | \$ 34,218.12 |

c. In addition to both high school and college level GED tests, the Special Services section administered additional testing through the Educational Testing Service of Princeton, N. J. These tests included college boards, law-school admission tests and tests for graduate study in business.

d. During March, the Ann Margret Show played for Division Marines. Crowd estimates are difficult due to combined audiences at all performances. A conservative number would be about 7,000.

e. The following numbers of Division personnel participated in the III MAF Rest and Recreation program:

|           |     |
|-----------|-----|
| Okinawa   | 782 |
| Saigon    | 502 |
| Hong Kong | 268 |
| Bangkok   | 540 |
| Taipei    | 56  |
| Tokyo     | 330 |
| Manila    | 129 |

f. The semi-annual and change of Custodian inventory was completed on 5 March. The required reports were presented to the Recreation Council on 29 March and approved. Each unit account has been reconciled and no problems have been encountered.

#### 4. Informational Services

a. Press coverage of 3d Marine Division activities included 138 news features and 983 hometown releases through the Command Information Bureau of the III Marine Amphibious Force.

b. The most significant operational coverages during March included Operations New York, Utah, Texas, and King.

c. Other coverage included civil affairs programs, human interest stories, unique incidents and personal experiences of Marines involved in combat operations against the Viet Cong.

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d. The Radio/TV section produced a total of 233 minutes of tape recorded air time. Including 50 minutes for two recorded features, 21 minutes for 7 interviews for WYSL, Buffalo, N. Y. (special request), and 162 minutes for 54 hometown recorded interviews.

e. With the arrival of the 1st Marine Division ISO at Chu Lai, the 3d Marine Division ISO team there was moved with the Fourth Regiment to the Phu Bai area.

## 5. Postal

a. The 1st Marine Division moved into the Chu Lai enclave during this period and postal support for that area has been assumed by that command. The current locations and functions of 3d Marine Division post offices are:

|             |         |                               |
|-------------|---------|-------------------------------|
| Main Office | Danang  | All phases of postal          |
| Unit PO 1   | Danang  | Inactive                      |
| 2           | Danang  | Inactive                      |
| 3           | Danang  | All phases - less directory   |
| 4           | Danang  | Inactive                      |
| 5           | Danang  | All phases - less directory   |
| 6           | Danang  | Inactive                      |
| 7           | Danang  | All phases - less directory   |
| 8           | Danang  | All phases - less directory   |
| 9           | Phu Bai | Mobile money order sales only |
| 10          | Phu Bai | All phases - less directory   |
| 11          | Danang  | Inactive                      |
| 12          | Danang  | Mobile money order sales only |
| 13          | Danang  | Mobile money order sales only |
| 14          | Danang  | All phases - less directory   |
| 15          | Danang  | All phases - less directory   |

## b. Personnel

|                      |       |         |
|----------------------|-------|---------|
| Beginning of period: | 3 Off | 111 Enl |
| End of period:       | 2 Off | 101 Enl |

c. The Directory Section readdressed and forwarded approximately 3,338 pounds of airmail and 27,791 pounds of all other classes of mail, for a total of 31,129 pounds processed during the 31 day period.

d. The following figures represent pounds of U. S. mail received and dispatched from and to points out of country during March 1966:

| <u>ENCLAVE</u> | <u>RECEIVED</u> | <u>DISPATCHED</u> | <u>TOTAL</u>  |
|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Danang         | 412,107         | 106,431           | 518,538       |
| Chu Lai        | 231,377         | 86,209            | 317,586       |
| Phu Bai        | <u>41,224</u>   | <u>17,593</u>     | <u>58,817</u> |
| TOTAL          | 684,708         | 210,233           | 894,941       |

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e. During March letter mail was not received at Danang on 5 different occasions, at Chu Lai on 5 occasions, and at Phu Bai on 3 occasions. The frequency of receipt of letter mail is improving at each enclave.

6. Band

a. Events for the month of March requiring participation of the band were somewhat curtailed due to the local political situation.

b. Of particular note was the change of command ceremony for LtGen WALT and MajGen KYLE involving the use of the Band and Drum and Bugle Corps. An outstanding performance was noted by Gen WALT with letters of appreciation for all members of both musical units.

c. A rehearsal area for the band including a stage type platform with cloth overhead has been established.

7. Division Clubs

a. During the period 1-10 March 1966 the 1st Marine Division Club System formalized 22 branches of the Enlisted Men's Club, 20 branches of the Staff NCO Clubs and seven branches of the Officer's Club.

b. It is estimated that at the present stage of formalization the net assets and the projected monthly gross sales of the Clubs are as follows:

|                     | <u>Net Assets</u> | <u>Projected Gross Sales</u> |
|---------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| Enlisted Men's Club | \$30,000.00       | \$100,000.00                 |
| Staff NCO Club      | 9,000.00          | 40,000.00                    |
| Officer's Club      | 7,000.00          | 9,000.00                     |

c. Temporary additional duty was authorized the Treasurer of the Enlisted Men's Club to go to Okinawa to purchase office supplies and equipment not to exceed \$2,500.00 which were urgently needed to accomplish the mission of the Division Club System. The necessary supplies and equipment were purchased for \$1,301.25.

d. The supply of beer and soft drinks is still critical. A purchase of a supplementary supply of 69,000 cases of San Miguel Beer was made by the Division Clubs Officer to relieve the shortage.

e. Informal lounges utilized by the forward infantry battalions have not as yet been formalized. Two lounges in the Phu Bai enclave were formalized 17 December 1965, the remaining informal lounges at Phu Bai are to be formalized in April upon arrival from Okinawa of the Division Area Auditor.



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8. Provost Marshal

a. A second Dog Platoon consisting of 1 Officer and 41 Enlisted with dogs was joined from Fort Benning, Georgia on 3 March 1966. It is anticipated that training will be completed within thirty days and Dog platoons will be ready for operational assignment.

b. Military Police posts were established on 14 March 1966 at the I Corps Tourane River Bridge with the mission of controlling U. S. Forces traffic. The posts are combined Traffic Control Points with Military Police and ARVN Sentries on a 24 hour basis.

c. Joint patrols were initiated 8 March 1966 with Vietnamese National Police and Marine Military Police. Areas covered: Hoa Phat Village, Dason Village in vicinity of 7th Engineers and Route 1B.

d. Condition YELLOW was set 17 March 1966. Military Police vehicular patrols increased with augmented vehicles and personnel.

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- (9) Close Combat. Not applicable
- (10) Fire Support and Fire Coordination (FSCC). 2d Battalion, 12th Marines direct support of 9th Marines.

(a) Artillery Fire Missions.

| <u>Type Mission</u>    | <u>No. Missions</u> | <u>Rounds Fired</u> |
|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Targets of Opportunity | 18                  | 983                 |

(b) 81mm Mortar Fire Missions.

|                           |                |           |     |
|---------------------------|----------------|-----------|-----|
| 12 Targets of Opportunity | 13 Registering | Illum     | H&I |
| 549 Med                   | 12 Hel         | 346 Illum | 476 |
| 200 WP                    | 14 WP          |           |     |
|                           | 5 HEM          |           |     |

- (c) Targets were enemy small arms or enemy mortars. All missions had outstanding effect on target.

(11) Logistics.

- (a) Water trucks supporting the infantry battalions will not deliver shower or drinking water past Mieu Dong on Highway 1. This means that the company has to haul the water themselves, taking a good part of the day due to distance from water point.
- (b) The use of paper plates, cups, and plastic utensils will be a great help in alleviating the problems of feeding hot chow to 8 or 9 Marines standing guard at bridges etc. At the present time transporting boiling hot water in order to clean mess facilities properly has been a problem. Marines have complained of Diarrhea and stomach cramps which we believe is attributed to the lack of cleanliness of their individual mess gear.
- (c) The following items of individual equipment, required by Marines in combat are in short supply at FLSG and are out in this Battalion:

|                   |                 |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| M-14 pouches      | Belt Suspenders |
| Camouflage covers | Helmets         |
| M-14 blets        | Bayonets        |
| Knapsacks         | Canteen Cups    |
| Blankets          | Mess Kits       |
| Air Mattresses    | Scabbards       |

- (d) When a battalion has one or more of its companies involved in an operation for a period in excess of 3 days, plans should be made to resupply individual clothing on an as required basis. This Battalion has just finished Operation KING in which individual clothing was required daily. We had a M-422 making daily trips to FLSG in Kind Issue Section,

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in order to meet the companies requirements. This delayed the resupply of individual clothing and as a result hampered operation in the field.

(12) Air Defense. Not applicable

(13) Close Air Support.

(a) Close Air Support.

Missions - 4

Aircraft - 2 F4B, 8 UH-1E

Ordinance Expended - 8 Napalm, 72 2.75 FFAR, 7.62

Remarks - Ordinance on target.

(b) Logistics

Missions - 19

Aircraft utilized - 35 UH-34's

Type Cargo - MCI, ammo, water

Time Utilized - 30 hours

(c) Reconnaissance

Missions - 2

Personnel carried - 3

Time Utilized - 3 hours

Number of Aircraft - 4

(d) Troop Lift

Missions - 4

Personnel Lifted - 530

Time Utilized - 2-5 hours

Number of Aircraft - 32 UH-34's.

(14) Medical Support. The Battalion Aid Station treated approximately 1,250 Vietnamese in the people to people sick call. Approximately 933 Marines were treated for minor ailments.

(15) Chaplain Support. Mass was offered and Protestant coverage for the Battalion CP and rifle companies at the convenience of each unit. Memorial Services were held, Catholic and Protestant in the respective companies concerned.

Visits to the village of An Trac were made weekly, serving the needs of the villagers there with confessions and Mass. Lectures were initiated on the Religions of Vietnam giving them to new replacements as they report to the Battalion CP.

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- (16) Civil Affairs. During the month of March, 2d Bn, 9th Marines distributed the following items in accordance with the civil affairs program: 1,234 bars of soap, 38 sewing kits, 900 lbs of rice, 1300 lbs of wheat, 1000 lbs of cornmeal, 1200 lbs of bulgar, 25 bibles, 164 lbs of clothing, 300 school kits, 3200 pieces candy, 50 canisters of salt, 75 bars bubble bath, 66 boxes chicken gravy mix, 169 toys, 4 gallons salad oil, 4 boxes of macaroni.

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INTELLIGENCE

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1. Operation UTAH. This operation was conducted from 4 to 7 March in the area northwest of Quang Ngai City. Exploitation of captured documents and interrogation of captives confirmed that elements of the 1st VC Regiment and the 21st (AKA 36th) NVA Regiment were engaged by Task Force DELTA during the operation. This confirmed previous reports of the movement, from Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces, of these regiments. One captive also stated that the 195th NVA AA Battalion was located in northern Quang Ngai Province. The tactics utilized by the enemy forces during the engagement with elements (at least two battalions) of the 21st NVA Regiment are considered significant. This unit conducted a determined defense from an extensive trench and tunnel system. The NVA force was well armed, well trained and possessed excellent camouflage and fire discipline. In addition, these troops did not hesitate to move from their fortified positions to counterattack in force when they felt it advantageous to do so. The final cumulative VC losses inflicted by the Marines in this operation were 358 KIA, 325 possible KIA, 68 WIA and 4 VCC. 17 CHICOM AK-56 assault rifles and 6 CHICOM RPD, type 56, light machine guns of the new weapons family were included in the 45 weapons captured. The small number of weapons captured in comparison to the large number of VC killed, demonstrates both the training and the emphasis of clearing the battle field by the NVA unit.

2. Operation TEXAS. This operation was conducted from 20 to 25 March in the area northwest of Quang Ngai City. Task Force Delta, conducting a search and destroy operation in conjunction with ARVN forces, engaged elements of the 1st VC Regiment and the 21st (AKA 36th) NVA Regiment. Screening of captured documents and interrogation of VCC indicated the presence of the 60th Battalion, 90th Battalion, T.119 Mortar Company, T.121 Recoilless Rifle Company, T.123 Engineer Unit, T.125 Transportation Unit and T.240 Dispensary Unit of the 1st VC Regiment, the 11th Battalion of the 21st NVA Regiment and the 130th Engineer Company of MR-V in the enemy force encountered. Marines once again encountered an enemy who chose to defend from a fortified position, this time a village. The VC exhibited excellent fire discipline and allowed friendly troops to advance within close range before opening fire. A stubborn three hour VC defense was conducted in Phuoc Dinh Hamlet (BS 5183) prior to breaking of contact by the Viet Cong. Cumulative VC losses inflicted by Marines were 283 KIA, 281 possible KIA and 2 VCC. 22 weapons were captured including one 60MM mortar, and two B-40 rocket launchers.

3. Operation KINGS. This operation was conducted from 19 to 27 March in the southern sector of the Danang TAOR. 9th Marines units conducted a search and destroy operation resulting in cumulative VC losses of 60 KIA and 53 possible KIA. On 25 March at 0030, Company "E", 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was attacked by an estimated two VC companies supported by 60MM mortars. The attack was repulsed and the VC broke contact after receiving heavy casualties (43 KIA and 40 possible KIA). Subsequent exploitation of captured documents identified the VC force as elements of or possibly the entire R.20 Battalion.

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This battalion is the same unit that attacked Company "A", 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on Hill 22 on 30 October 1965. The tactics employed, time of attack, diversionary attacks on adjacent positions, length of the attack and concentration of the attack on one sector of the Marine positions are similar in both attacks. One new innovation was the use of water buffalos to screen the movements of the VC in this attack. It is noted that this is the only battalion in the Danang area that has engaged Marine units since their arrival in South Vietnam. Although numerous other battalions have been reported, some by agents, some by captured documents and others by VCC, the R.20 remains the only battalion confirmed by combat engagement with Marine units within the Danang TAOR.

4. Operation OREGON. This operation was conducted from 20 to 23 March. An estimated battalion of VC defended a strongly fortified village in vicinity (YD 555433) in northeastern Thua Thien Province on 20 and 21 March. The village was surrounded by barbed wire and mine fields and defended with 60MM and 81MM mortars, recoilless rifles and automatic weapons up to .50 caliber. VC bunkers encountered in the area were constructed of clay, ~~stone~~ and rock, and were strong enough to withstand air strikes. The largest bunker had outer dimensions of 25' X 20' X 6' with an interior that measured 15' X 10' X 3'. Bunkers were camouflaged by building straw Vietnamese houses over them to mask their appearance. VCC interrogations revealed that enemy units engaged during the operation were the 802D Battalion (AKA K2), a confirmed unit normally operating in this area, and two new units, the K.500 Battalion and the K.05 Company. Neither the K.500 and K.05 are accepted by order of battle at present, but the VCC statements are sufficient to direct attention to possible newly formed or infiltrated organizations. The final cumulative VC losses inflicted by Marines were 81 KIA, 36 possible KIA and 8 VCC.

5. Operation ALABAMA. This operation was conducted from 29 to 30 March in the southeastern sector of the Danang TAOR. This battalion search and destroy operation, was conducted by the 9th Marines, resulted in cumulative VC losses of 4 KIA and 2 possible KIA. No items of intelligence significance were generated by this operation since enemy contact was desultory.

6. New and sophisticated propaganda leaflets were found by USMC units in both Quang Ngai and Quang Nam Provinces. Marines engaged in Operation TEXAS found two types of leaflets new to this command. The content of the leaflets, printed in excellent English with a professional format, exhorted the serviceman to reject the war and cited "Nation Wide" anti war demonstrations in the U.S., hardships and jeopardizing family happiness by serving the interests of the "Munitions Makers" was stressed in one leaflet. Marines in the Danang TAOR also found a leaflet, apparently issued by the same agency, which contained entreaties to demand peace and withdrawal, avoid useless death, sympathize with the struggle of the Vietnamese people and refuse to carry out orders. A reproduction of a petition against the draft, issued by Phillip Abbot Luce of

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New York City was printed on the reverse of this leaflet. The VC utilization of internal American events coupled with the smooth format utilized represent a new phase of VC psychological warfare in this area.

7. During the month of March several significant changes occurred in the enemy order of battle. The 21st (AKA 36th) NVA Regiment, elements and possibly the entire 1st VC Regiment and the 195th NVA AA Battalion moved to Quang Ngai Province. The 95B NVA Regiment, with its 4th, 5th and 6th Battalions, was confirmed as an operating unit in Thua Thien Province. The 810th VC Battalion was upgraded from probable to confirmed and the 812th Battalion was added, as probable, to the enemy strength in Quang Tri Province.

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OPERATIONS

1. General. The tempo of operations continued to increase during the month of March as a total of 12,230 offensive actions were conducted resulting in 732 contacts with the VC. Weather conditions were dry and generally favorable to offensive operations. The Division conducted a total of six major operations during the month. These were operations UTAH, OREGON, TEXAS, KINGS, INDIANA and ALABAMA. A summary of these operations follows:

a. UTAH. Operation UTAH was a search and destroy operation conducted in close coordination with ARVN units. Task Force Delta, under the command of Brigadier General PLATT, was the command and control headquarters for this operation. Subordinate units consisted of 1/7 (-), 2/7 (-), 3/1(-) and 3/11. In addition, the First ARVN Airborne Battalion conducted operations in conjunction with Marine units during the operation. The operation was conducted during the period 040900H to 071825H March 1966 in the vicinity of SON CHAU VILLAGE, QUANG NGAI Province (BS 5684). D-Day was executed on 4 March with only light resistance being encountered by the Marines. However, the ARVN Airborne Battalion became heavily engaged and the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines was ordered to its assistance. During the next several hours elements of 2/7 were heavily engaged by an estimated two main force VC battalions. During the next three days search and destroy operations were conducted by all units with enemy resistance varying from light to heavy. The Commander's Analysis of Operation UTAH concerning significant features and highlights of the Operation follows:

(1) The most significant feature of Operation UTAH, as compared with previous operations conducted by Task Force Delta, was the nature of the enemy engaged and the manner in which he fought. Previous Task Force Delta operations had encountered primarily local force and some elements of main force Viet Cong units whose primary tactics involved the employment of long range sniping and harassing fires, and a marked unwillingness to engage Marines in fixed combat. As a result of these "harass and withdraw" tactics, the units of Task Force Delta have developed counter tactics stressing rapid, aggressive pursuit to fix and engage these VC. During Operation UTAH the enemy encountered was a regiment of the North Vietnamese Army, well armed and equipped, well trained, and willing to engage the Marine and ARVN forces from their strongly fortified and excellently camouflaged defensive positions. In addition, these highly disciplined troops did not hesitate to move from their prepared positions to counterattack in force whenever and wherever they felt it advantageous to do so. Upon initial contact with this strongly entrenched and determined enemy, the aggressiveness of the Marine units proved to be somewhat of a hindrance to their effectiveness, for the speed with which they established close contact limited the effectiveness of supporting arms. After these initial engagements, upon trying to withdraw to allow the necessary room for supporting arms fires, the counterattacks of the Viet Cong again closed the contact to the point where supporting arms were hampered. This feature of Operation UTAH emphasized the importance of two aspects of the Vietnamese environment. The first of these is the continuous necessity for accurate intelligence and proper employment of scouting and security



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elements in the movement to contact. Utilization of these means not only ensures rapid exploitation of the type of contacts encountered in previous operations, but also provides sufficient warning of a well-defended position to be able to utilize full strength of supporting fires before fully engaging the enemy. The second of these points is the necessity, once closely engaged with an enemy force, to be able to quickly withdraw, employ supporting arms, and reengage to avoid losing contact.

(2) This operation can serve as an outstanding example of the benefits to be derived from a close working relationship between the U.S. field commanders and the U. S. Advisors to ARVN units. In two separate instances the 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion ran into situations in which they were receiving heavy pressure from the Viet Cong forces. In both cases, without prior coordination and without ever meeting face-to-face with the Marine commanders involved, the advisors were able to arrange supporting attacks by the adjacent Marine battalions which relieved the pressure from the ARVN Battalion. The TFD staff and the staff and advisors of the 2d Infantry Division, ARVN, were collocated during the operation. Planning and coordination measures resulting from the close proximity of the staff and Commanders were excellent. In order to obtain the same close coordination during future joint USMC-ARVN operations, it is considered essential that the Command Posts of ARVN and USMC units involved should be collocated and planning and intelligence functions be adjacently operated.

(3) During this operation the five gallon plastic water cans were used on a trial basis. The results of the test were considered excellent since they were light, easy to handle and inexpensive.

(4) Results of Operation UTAH were:

|                     |            |                    |                   |                       |
|---------------------|------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Friendly Casualties | <u>KIA</u> | <u>DOW</u>         | <u>WIA</u>        | <u>WIA (NON-EVAC)</u> |
|                     | 97         | 1                  | 229               | 49                    |
| Enemy Casualties    | <u>KIA</u> | <u>KIA (POSS)</u>  | <u>WIA (POSS)</u> |                       |
|                     | 364        | 332                | 67                |                       |
|                     | <u>VCC</u> | <u>VC RALLIERS</u> | <u>VCS</u>        |                       |
|                     | 4          | 1                  | 34                |                       |

b. OREGON. Operation OREGON was a Battalion (-)(Rein) search and destroy operation conducted in the Phong Dien Districts, Quang Tri Province area bounded by (YD 5127, YD 6439) during the period of 200815H to 231100H March 1966. Colonel T. F. FISHER was the Commander of Task Group FoxTrot, the command and control Headquarters. Subordinate units consisted of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (-)(Rein) with artillery, air, naval gun-fire and local PF units from Phong Dien Districts. Artillery and naval gun fires were employed exten-

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sively throughout the operation and provided very effective support to the ground units. Division snipers were also employed during this operation and accounted for eight of 31 confirmed kills on the 20th. VC were effectively engaged by the snipers at ranges up to 600 meters. The following are highlights of the operation:

(1) Operation OREGON was developed on the basis of information from normally reliable sources that a VC battalion was operating within the OREGON area.

(2) Psychological operations included the use of leaflets to explain the presence of Marine forces to the local population and surrender leaflets to disrupt and destroy enemy morale. Psychological operations also included the maximum utilization of village chiefs to accompany Marine forces and openly demonstrate the close GVN - USMC relationship. Medical attention provided the local people by battalion doctors and corpsmen also contributed to establishing warm relations between Marines and the local people. One hundred and forty Vietnamese people were treated by the medical personnel on OREGON and liaison established with two local priests who brought people for medical treatment and furnished intelligence information on the movement of the VC.

(3) Results of Operation OREGON were:

|                     |            |            |            |
|---------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Friendly casualties | <u>KIA</u> | <u>DOW</u> | <u>WIA</u> |
|                     | 10         | 1          | 45         |

|                  |            |                   |            |
|------------------|------------|-------------------|------------|
| Enemy casualties | <u>KIA</u> | <u>KIA (POSS)</u> | <u>WIA</u> |
|                  | 48         | 40                | 8 Captured |

|  |                   |            |            |
|--|-------------------|------------|------------|
|  | <u>WIA (POSS)</u> | <u>VCC</u> | <u>VCS</u> |
|  | 50                | 2          | 31         |

c. TEXAS. Operation TEXAS was a search and destroy operation conducted in BINH SON and SON TINH (BS 5992) Districts of QUANG NGAI Province. The command headquarters was Task Force Delta under the Command of Brigadier General ENGLISH. Subordinate units consisted of 3/7 (-)(Rein), 2/4(-)(Rein), 3/1(-)(Rein) and 3/11(-)(Rein). The 1st Marine Air Wing provided air support during the entire operation. The operation commenced at 200930H and terminated at 251915H March 1966. The operation commenced initially with a mission assigned to 7th Marines to conduct a joint search and destroy operation with the 5th Airborne Battalion, ARVN, and one battalion (-)(Rein), 7th Marines for the purpose of re-occupying the government outpost of AN HOA (BS 474864) which had been over run during the night of 18-19 March. This mission was successfully completed on D-Day (20 March 1966) by the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. The mission became, and remained for the duration of the operation, a joint ARVN/USMC search and destroy operation in the SONG TINH District. The Commanders Analysis of the operation, which follows contains significant features and highlights of the operation.

(1) As in Operation UTAH the most significant feature of Operation TEXAS was the nature of the opposition encountered and the type and

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extent of their fortification. The three most significant engagements of the operation took place in fortified hamlets, emphasizing the experiences gained from recent operations that indicate the VC are more likely to defend the populated low-lying areas rather than adopting the classical concept of defense from prominent "high ground" terrain. Within these fortified hamlets the Viet Cong have demonstrated a highly developed ability to construct the elaborate trenchworks, tunnel systems and underground bunkers and command posts able to withstand the effects of all the ordnance normally employed by Marine Aviation and Artillery units against them. In addition, these main force units have exhibited a high degree of proficiency in the planning and execution of protective defensive fires, allowing friendly units to close to a range which limits the effectiveness of friendly supporting arms, and then engaging them with well-planned small arms, mortar, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fires. It is imperative that all Marine units be made aware of these capabilities of the Viet Cong, and that they remain equally prepared to engage this type of activity as well as the sniping, booby trapping, and harassing tactics employed by the local force guerrillas.

(2) One of the most gratifying aspects of Operation TEXAS was the manner in which the battalions from two regiments were committed to the operation on very short notice, with a minimum of detailed planning, and yet experienced only minor problems in the functions of command and control, administration and logistics. This success can be largely attributed to the fact that all of these units had previously operated together under Task Force Delta and the manner in which all functions were performed was familiar to all participating units.

(3) There were only two significant problems encountered in the field of communications. The first of these was the overcrowding of the artillery conduct of fire nets caused by the necessity to use the PRC-25 radio, and the artillery battalion's shortage of these radios. The second was the inadequacy of their command net to handle logistic support requests and routine reports. The PRC-47 is a large, heavy radio that is virtually impossible to operate while on the move. In addition, the relatively short battery life of the BB451 creates an additional logistical burden. These factors combined to make utilization of this equipment erratic and an unnecessary hardship to the personnel carrying these radios.

(4) Operation TEXAS again demonstrated the value of collocating the command post during a combined USMC/ARVN operation. With the forward CP of the 2d Infantry Division, ARVN only a few meters from the Task Force CP the mutual cooperation and coordination of effort between the two forces was accomplished with an absolute minimum of confusion and lost time.

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(5) Results of Operation TEXAS were:

|                     |            |            |            |
|---------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Friendly casualties | <u>KIA</u> | <u>DOW</u> | <u>WIA</u> |
|                     | 47         | 2          | 212        |

|                  |            |                   |            |                   |
|------------------|------------|-------------------|------------|-------------------|
| Enemy casualties | <u>KIA</u> | <u>KIA (POSS)</u> | <u>KBA</u> | <u>KBA (POSS)</u> |
|                  | 283        | 281               | 122        | 148               |

|            |            |
|------------|------------|
| <u>VCC</u> | <u>VCS</u> |
| 2          | 49         |

d. KINGS. Operation KINGS was a battalion sized search and destroy operation conducted in the southern portion of the Division TAOR in QUANG NAM Province. The purposes of the operation were to relieve enemy pressure on the ARVN outposts along route 14 and to extend the area of influence and operations south of the major rivers of THU BON and KY LAM. Initially the operation commenced with 2/9 as the control headquarters on 190700H. On 231556H. March 3/3 assumed responsibility for Operation KINGS until it terminated on 280800H March 1966. In the course of the operation a total of eight companies were employed, although not more than four were committed at any one time.

(1) Results of Operation KINGS were as follows:

|                     |            |            |            |
|---------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Friendly casualties | <u>KIA</u> | <u>DOW</u> | <u>WIA</u> |
|                     | 6          | 12         | 60         |

|                  |            |                   |                   |            |
|------------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------|
| Enemy casualties | <u>KIA</u> | <u>KIA (POSS)</u> | <u>WIA (POSS)</u> | <u>VCS</u> |
|                  | 58         | 83                | 18                | 45         |

e. INDIANA. Operation INDIANA was a search and destroy operation conducted in conjunction with ARVN units in the vicinity of THO LOC (BS 5477). This operation was under the command and control of Headquarters, 7th Marines. Subordinate units consisted of 1/7(-), 2/7, 3/11. The operation commenced at 281427H. Operational control was transferred to CG, 1st Marine Division at 291500H. March.

(1) Results of Operation INDIANA were:

|                     |            |            |                         |
|---------------------|------------|------------|-------------------------|
| Friendly casualties | <u>KIA</u> | <u>WIA</u> | <u>WIA (NON BATTLE)</u> |
|                     | 11         | 55         | 1                       |

WEAPONS CAPTURED  
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|                  |            |                   |            |            |
|------------------|------------|-------------------|------------|------------|
| Enemy casualties | <u>KIA</u> | <u>KIA (POSS)</u> | <u>VCC</u> | <u>VCS</u> |
|                  | 69         | 160               | 1          | 5          |

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f. ALABAMA. Operation ALABAMA was a search and destroy operation conducted by 3d Bn, 9th Marines (-) in DIEN BAN District, QUANG NAM Province during the period 290745H to 301340H. The operation was terminated early due to almost negative contact with the enemy.

(1) Results of Operation ALABAMA were:

Friendly casualties  $\frac{\text{WIA}}{4}$

Enemy casualties  $\frac{\text{KIA}}{4}$   $\frac{\text{KIA (POSS)}}{2}$

2. Small Unit Operations. The following were significant small unit operations conducted during the month:

a. Co M, 3d Bn, 9th Marines. Two OTTERS were returning from resupplying Co L when they were attacked by approximately 12 VC in the vicinity of BT 095685 at 211850H. A Co M squad patrol in the vicinity of BT 091682 heard the firefight and attacked in the direction of the VC. Five additional squads with tanks were dispatched to the scene of action. Enemy casualties were seven KIA (BC) and five KIA (POSS). In addition, two CHICOM SMG's one M-14 rifle, one sniper rifle with grenade launcher and five CHICOM grenades were captured. Marine casualties were one DOW and six WIA.

b. 2d Bn, 1st Marines. At 020400H the Combined Action Company sighted an unknown number of VC at YD 955085 and the enemy were brought under intensive small arms fire. A subsequent search of the area revealed six VC KIA and the following equipment: One U.S. Carbine, three K-50 SMG's, one K-50 modified, two 1/2 pound blocks of TNT, five VC hand grenades, two CHICOM concussion grenades, 300 rds SMG ammo, several magazine pouches, cartridge belts, clothing and a tool kit for a Russian heavy machine gun. There were no friendly casualties.

3. A total of four truck convoys were executed on Highway #1 from Da Nang to Phu Bai and return. One convoy was executed between Da Nang and Task Force Delta CP and TAM KY (BS 3022). These convoys, under the code name of ROUGH RIDER, were executed without major incident. Two rounds of small arms fire was received by one of the convoys but no damage or casualties were incurred.

4. On 1 March 1966 the TAOR in Phu Bai was expanded in the NE and SE corners.

5. 1/1 moved from Da Nang to Phu Bai on 1 March 1966. On 28 March 1966 the 4th Marines (-) completed movement from Chu Lai to Phu Bai and assumed operational control of the Phu Bai TAOR. The 1st Battalion (-), 4th Marines deployed from Chu Lai to Phu Bai on 31 March 1966. BLT 3/4 arrived in country at Phu Bai on 190700H March 1966 after completing a two month training cycle in Okinawa under the Intra-theater BLT Rotation program.

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6. Employment of the scout sniper teams continued and on 19 March the first formal scout sniper platoon was graduated. This platoon became organic to the 3d Marines.

7. Indicative of the VC employment of mines, booby traps, and extensive field fortifications are the following figures concerning enemy fortifications and ordnance destroyed by the 3d Engineer Battalion during March:

ORDNANCE AND FORTIFICATIONS  
DESTROYED DURING MARCH

|                                |                 |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| Box Mine                       | 1               |
| M-79 Dud                       | 14              |
| Rifle Grenades                 | 11              |
| 37mm Round                     | 1               |
| Trench line                    | 810             |
| Cratering Charge               | 1               |
| 8" How Duds                    | 2               |
| M-79 B.T. Round                | 1               |
| Smoke Grenades                 | 15              |
| Blasting Caps                  | 2               |
| Rounds 7.62 Ammo               | 42              |
| C-4 Boosters                   | 6               |
| Boobytrapped Grenades (US)     | 16              |
| Boobytrapped Grenades (CHICOM) | 4               |
| Grenade Duds (US)              | 17              |
| Grenade Duds (CHICOM)          | 35              |
| Bunkers                        | 91              |
| Caves                          | 108             |
| Tunnels                        | 67              |
| Punji Traps                    | 3               |
| 155mm Dud                      | 1               |
| Spider Holes                   | 33              |
| 3.5 Duds                       | 5               |
| Fence Line                     | 300             |
| Gates                          | <del>754</del>  |
| Treeline                       | <del>1180</del> |
| 105mm Duds                     | 6               |
| 105mm Boobytrap                | 1               |
| 60mm Duds                      | 17              |
| 81mm Duds                      | 12              |
| 81mm Boobytrap                 | 1               |
| Shaped Charge                  | 1               |
| LAW - M-72                     | 2               |
| Claymore Dud                   | 1               |
| BT 106mm Round                 | 1               |
| Dud 106mm Round                | 1               |

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8. The COUNTY FAIR concept was originally tested on a pilot basis in February. The concept was refined and established as a standard type operation for Division units. COUNTY FAIR is a USMC/GVN coordinated operation specifically designed to destroy VC influence and to introduce GVN influence in isolated hamlets and villages. USMC units cordon a village or community which is then searched by GVN forces. The villagers are evacuated to a central location where they are interrogated, fed, processed for identification and exposed to propaganda lectures. While this is being accomplished other GVN forces conduct a detailed search of the village or community for hidden tunnels, food, munition caches and hiding VC. This technique has proven very successful in each instance where the concept has been properly executed. A total of four COUNTY FAIR operations were conducted by the 9th Marines during March with the following results: 9 VC KIA, 8 VCC, 24 VCS and 2 ARVN deserters apprehended.

A VC document captured by a Marine Patrol provides a Viet Cong evaluation of COUNTY FAIR operations. The document, as translated, stated "At 0200 on 7 March 1966 2 combined forces of U.S. and GVN military personnel numbering approximately 600 men launched a search operation in a hamlet of "H" Village (DONG SON hamlet, AT 995676). The US and GVN forces displaced the villagers to a general area where our cadre were isolated from them. Some of our cadre and guerrilla fighters were forced to emerge from their hiding places in tunnels so as to contact (meld with) the people. As a consequence, five of our men were killed by the U.S. and GVN soldiers. This should serve as a lesson (warning) to all of us. The enemy may conduct this same type of operation in the future in other areas. This warning must be disseminated to all other villages. Water and food stocks adequate for a period of three to five days must be prepared. It is also necessary that our forces resist the efforts of the enemy to surround the hamlet and as quick as possible escape the encirclement."

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## TRAINING

a. Students attended off-shore courses as follows:

## 2. INTRA DIVISION TRAINING

3. Construction of six classrooms for expansion of the Mine Warfare School and establishment of Division Schools system has been approved and construction will commence in the near future.

4. In accordance with Force Order 1730.3 courses in Religion of Vietnam commenced during the month.

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DECLASSIFIED

COMBAT AIR SUPPORT  
MARCH 1966

1. Significant Events

a. Operation Utah began on 4 March with the lift of 440 ARVN Troops into an unsecure landing zone at BS 543833. Twenty UH-34's from MAG-36 escorted by 8 A-4 and F-4 type aircraft and 4 armed UH-1E's accomplished the lift in spite of heavy 50 caliber, small arms, and automatic weapons fire. One of the escorting UH-1E's was shot down and 2 A-4's were scrambled to protect the crew who were later picked up by a UH-34. Approximately 20 minutes later, an F-4 covering the landing zone was hit by heavy 50 caliber fire. The pilot turned toward Chu-Lai, but the crew was forced to eject over water. Within 30 minutes the pilot and radar operator were picked up by 2 UH-34's from Chu-Lai. At the completion of the ARVN lift, a total of 36 UH-34's carried 665 Marines of 2/7 into the same zone. Eleven aircraft were hit and 7 crew members wounded. One UH-34 was forced down near the zone with 3 rounds in the fuel tank. The crew was immediately evacuated, but the aircraft was later repaired and flown to Ky Ha. By 1500, 12 UH-34's from MAG-16 augmented MAG-36 forces and lifted 2 companies and a command group from 3/1 to a landing zone in the operation area without incident. Resupply and med-evacs through the night concluded the first day of the operation. The 5th, 6th, and 7th of March saw continuous logistic, med-evac, and close air support. Heavy anti-aircraft fire, including air-bursting ordnance, was prevalent throughout Utah. Retraction began on the 7th with 24 UH-34's lifting 588 Marines of 3/1 to the Chu-Lai airfield. An additional 181 personnel of 1/7 and 2/7 were lifted to their battalion areas without incident. When Operation Utah concluded on 8 March, the First Marine Aircraft Wing accounted for 267 fixed wing sorties which dropped 233 tons of ordnance, and 2100 helicopter sorties that transported over 2200 troops and 171 tons of cargo.

b. On 9 March, Marine Air went to the assistance of the U. S. Army and Vietnamese personnel at the besieged Special Forces Camp of A Shau. Two UH-34's from HMM-263 launched at 1515H on a med-evac mission and landed in the compound with one aircraft being incapacitated by ground fire. The crew was recovered by the wingman and returned to Marble Mountain. In spite of extremely adverse weather conditions on the 10th, a force of UH-34's escorted by armed UH-1E's retracted 69 personnel from A Shau. Fixed wing aircraft provided close air support totaling 92 sorties, one of which cost an A-4 and pilot. Three UH-34's and one helicopter gunner were also lost. By 1840H, word was received that all friendly personnel had been evacuated by air or had left the camp on foot.

c. Operation Oregon began on 20 March with 16 UH-34's and 2 UH-1E's lifting 450 Marines from Phu-Bai to the operating area. Later that afternoon, 180 additional troops were lifted into the area and 30 WIA's were evacuated while MAG-11 F-8's and F-4's provided close air support for the ground forces 23 miles Northwest of Phu-Bai. Troop lifts, resupply, med-evac, and close air support were conducted until the operation came to a close on 24 March with the return by helicopter of 1400 troops to Phu-Bai.

2. New Developments. The first CH-46's of HMM-164 arrived in country on 8 March. Joining MAG-16 at Marble Mountain, the new squadrons' CH-46's boast approximately twice the lift capability of the UH-34.

3. Problem Areas. No new problems were encountered during the month of March.

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## LOGISTICS

1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS -

a. During the month of March, logistics inspections of Division units were completed.

b. The 3d Engineer Battalion continues to precut timber for bunker kits and these are being provided to Division units with engineer personnel assisting in the emplacement. The following is a recapitulation of bunkers to date:

| <u>Size</u> | <u>#Cut</u> | <u># issued</u> | <u>Balance on hand</u> | <u># constructed</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| 20'X30'X8'  | 36          | 33              | 3                      | 17                   |
| 12'X24'X8'  | 144         | 74              | 70                     | 52                   |
| 8'X12'X8'   | 86          | 20              | 66                     | 11                   |
| 8'X8'X8'    | 225         | 155             | 70                     | 101                  |
| TOTAL       | 491         | 282             | 209                    | 181                  |

c. The Red Ball program is continuing to function. At the end of this reporting period 39 separate items are on Red Ball.

d. CRITIPAC number 4 has been received by Division units. Although units are not receiving all they ask for the CRITIPAC continues to aid the supply status of the Division.

e. Approximately 1,000 plastic water cans have been issued to units, priority to Infantry and Reconnaissance units. An additional 3,000 are being procured. This water can costs less than half the price of metal cans, weighs only one pound as compared to five pounds for the metal can and gives every indication of being fully acceptable for use in Vietnam.

f. Disposable mess gear is being issued in small quantities to infantry units located away from adequate mess facilities or adequate water in order that they might be served at least one hot meal per day. Units have been requested to report acceptability and suitability by 1 May.

g. Three M48A3 tanks were disabled by mines but repaired. One LVTP5 hit mine and Coded X. One M48A3 tank was submerged and evacuated.

h. Two M53 155 guns were received on the R&E program.

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i. Dental items being requisitioned have become more available during this reporting period. Supply blocks and re-supply blocks are being brought up to T/O as items become available.

j. The 3d Dental Company "People-to-People" Dental program was expanded to include eleven more villages within the Danang area.

k. "D" Medical Company, 1st Medical Battalion arrived in Danang and was redesignated "B" Medical Company, 3d Medical Battalion. "B" Medical Company was chopped to 1st Medical Battalion.

2. Problem areas.

a. There are 604 items presently on the problem items listing published by FLSG. Of this total 401 have been on the listing four consecutive months or longer.

b. During the latter part of March demonstrations by Vietnamese civilians delayed unloading and loading operations in Hue and Danang.

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COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

a. During this reporting period the 1st Marine Division assumed operational control of the CHU LAI Tactical Area of Responsibility. Headquarters, 4th Marine Regiment displaced to the CHU BAI Tactical Area of Responsibility. The realignment of communication means between Headquarters, 3d Marine Division at Damang and Headquarters, 4th Marines was made with a minimum of disruption to previously installed facilities.

2. PROBLEM AREA

a. No significant problem areas were encountered during this reporting period.

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## CHAPLAIN

1. As of 1 March 1966, 40 chaplains were serving in the 3d Marine Division. Two chaplains returned to CONUS during March and one reported for duty. 12 chaplains were shipped to the 1st Marine Division with the ending of the month, leaving a total of 29 chaplains in the 3d Marine Division as the month of March closed.

2. Chaplains of the 3d Marine Division reported the following number of Divine Services and total number attending during March:

|          |     |            |        |
|----------|-----|------------|--------|
| Sundays  | 482 | Attendance | 12,232 |
| Weekdays | 451 | Attendance | 6,737  |

3. Chaplains participated in Operations as follows:

|                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| Operation Indiana:  | Chaplains Usenza, Hiskett and Malliett            |
| Operation Texas:    | Chaplains Epps and Swierenga                      |
| Operation Oregon:   | Chaplains Meedy and Handley                       |
| Operation New York: | Chaplain Handley                                  |
| Operation Utah:     | Chaplains Swierenga, Hiskett, Usenza and Leeffler |

4. Chaplains continued to maintain liaison with Buddhist, CAO DAI, Protestant, and Catholic religious leaders. Lectures on the history, beliefs, and practices of Vietnam's religions were delivered by chaplains to 3d Marine Division personnel.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

1. G-5 Staff Section: Civil Affairs/Civic Action
2. Period Covered: 1-31 March 1966
3. Section on board strength: 3 Officers, 4 Enlisted

| <u>USMC</u>             | <u>RANK</u> | <u>MOS</u> |
|-------------------------|-------------|------------|
| <u>Officer/Enlisted</u> |             |            |
| 1                       | LtCol       | 0302       |
| 2                       | Capt        | 0302/0107  |
| 1                       | SSgt        | 0369       |
| 1                       | Sgt         | 0141       |
| 1                       | Cpl         | 0141       |
| 1                       | LCpl        | 3051       |

4. General

a. Documents published by this section and Civil Affairs situation reports submitted by subordinate commands are enclosed as follows:

- (1) Division Civil Affairs Newsletter Number 6
- (2) Division Order 5080.2A
- (3) Division Bulletin 5213 of 8 March 1966
- (4) Unit Civic Action SITREPS

5. Civil Affairsa. Objective

(1) The basic objective of the 3d Marine Division Civic Action Program continues to attempt to enhance distressed areas, strengthen the popular appeal of the government in the eyes of the Vietnamese people and to improve the image of the Republic Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNF).

b. Highlights(1) Governmental Functions

(a) Civil Government. There has been an increased effort this month to coordinate all Civic Action and Civil Affairs through the Civil Government up to and including District level. This point will continue to be emphasized in order to assist in achieving our Civil Affairs efforts.

(b) Public Education. 3d Tank Battalion assisted Phong Bao School (AT998706) in Hoa Tho Village by repairing the building which had been damaged by VC. In addition to the repair the battalion presented the school with two, one for each classroom, large maps of South Vietnam. On 11 March a reopening ceremony was held at the school. The Division Band entertained at the ceremony. Guests included Capt. Hoa, Hoa Vang District Chief, Lt. Col. Raphael, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Tank Battalion, and the guest of honor Colonel Simmons, who presented two Republic of Vietnam Flags to the school.

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On the evening of the same day, during a Psy Ops meeting held by the village chief of Hoa Tho Village, a VC terrorist squad attacked the school killing one person, injuring several others, and doing slight damage to the school building. The damages were repaired within four days by villagers and Marines and the incident was exploited fully for Psy Ops purposes. Another significant sidelight of this sequence concerns both Civil Government and Public Education and appears to be representative of problems with which Civil Affairs Officers necessary become involved. About the time that repairs were completed one of the teachers at the school reported to the Tank Battalion Civil Affairs Officer that she was not being paid. An investigation revealed that in this particular case the village chief was responsible for collecting a "student tax" from his villagers in order to pay the teacher. The Civil Affairs Officer contacted the village chief and remedied the situation. When this process has been repeated enough times it is expected that the village chiefs will learn to perform their duties in the proper manner, thus making some direct contribution to the achievement of our Civil Affairs objectives. In several areas USMC units are actually paying teachers with contributions from within the unit. While this is better than having no teacher it is far more desirable to persuade the appropriate level of government to perform their duty. CARE school kits continue to be distributed to schools throughout the Division TAOR.

(c) Labor. 3d Engineer Battalion continues to train laborers which that unit employs in minor engineer skills. Most of this training is "on the job" training instruction. This type of Civil Affairs project will in the long term produce highly desirable effects on the nation building process.

(d) Public Health

The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines have assisted with renovation of one building and construction of one light structure to be used as aid stations. Vietnamese nurses work with 2/3 Medical personnel at both locations.

There is also a program under consideration where by this battalion may gain 5 Vietnamese to render medical aid.

3d Engineer Battalion Marines and Vietnamese civilians constructed a dispensary in Da Mon 2 (BT 057729). The local officials made arrangements to staff the dispensary with a full time nurse, and basic medical supplies.

1st Battalion, 12th Marines is renovating a three room railroad terminal at Nam O (935835) to be used as a dispensary. It is expected that this dispensary will eventually be staffed by Vietnamese.

(e) Public Safety. The Combined Action Company operated by the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines continues to be one of the most effective programs for gaining the support and loyalty of the populace for the GVN. While the other programs are appreciated by the people, when conducted in a professional manner, the thing which they appear to desire and appreciate most is a secure environment in which to work and live.

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**(2) Economics Functions**

(a) Commerce and Industry. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines continue to inspire and assist in implementation of improvements of the market at AnTrac. There are plans in the offering to make this market the commercial center of the Southern portion of Hoa Vang District. 3d Tank Battalion is assisting Hoa Tho Village officials plan the construction and supervision of a market place in Phong Bao Hamlet. This plan includes the clearing of land, which is currently not in use, establishing market regulations for the operation of the market, and buildings for market stalls.

(b) Food and Agriculture. The 9th Marine Regiment is instrumental in assisting with control of the rice harvested within Hoa Vang District by making arrangements for two 2 1/2 ton trucks to be available to the District Chief to transport harvested rice.

3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 9th Marine Regiment assisted representatives from the U. S. Agency for International Development in coordinating a conference with farmers and local governmental officials at AnTrac regarding a proposed agricultural development program for AnTrac Hamlet. If the people of the hamlet agree to the proposal the project will be instituted, and will include:

Duck Raising

Rice, commercial fertilizer application to

Hog raising cooperative

Vegatable gardening with improved strains of seed, gardening methods

and the application of commercial fertilizer

It is the intention of the commands involved to assist with and encourage the program, but not become involved to such an extent that the removal of Marines would adversely effect the program.

**(3) Public Facilities**

(a) Public Works and Utilities. 3d Anti Tank Battalion assisted with renovation of Yen Bac Hamlet (AT 985708) and has induced the people to start a new well for the purpose of supporting a hamlet shower which is planned.

In Da Nam Hamlet (BT 057729) the 3d Engineer Battalion installed a culvert to improve drainage of living areas, and constructed a dock for the fishing boats of the hamlet.

**(4) Special Functions**

(a) Displaced Persons and Refugees. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and 3d Shore Party Battalion continued assistance to refugee camps in their area.



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A conference concerning coordination of assistance to refugees was held at this Headquarters. Conferees were the Division G-5, Representatives of the U. S. Agency for International Development, who have the primary responsibility for refugees, and a representative of III MAF. The USAID representatives explained that some refugee camps were obtaining assistance from several sources, resulting in massive over assistance while other refugee centers were in dire need of assistance. It was agreed that the USAID, Quang Nam Province, Refugee Representative would furnish III MAF with the location of all refugees in Quang Nam Province, and that USMC units would coordinate assistance for refugees located within the TAOR's. This is in no way intended to transfer the responsibility for the administration of the refugee program from USAID.

(b) Civil Information. The Civil Information program is based on the premise that having a well informed public is an important step in the "Nation Building" process. The 3d Marine Division's involvement in this area is in its infancy, and consists of inducing hamlet chiefs to have bulletin boards put up and assist them in obtaining informational material for the bulletin boards, and assisting the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in distributing periodicals. This month the 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion assisted the people of Cam Le (AT 014718) in construction of a bulletin board, and the 3d Anti-Tank Battalion helped the people of Yen Bao. Two hundred copies of "Nations Progress" a JUSPAO published monthly magazine directed toward the rural population, was distributed in hamlets throughout the Division's TAOR with favorable reception. The distribution of the magazines will be continued monthly, gradually increasing the number distributed. Additionally, JUSPAO has agreed to furnish worthwhile Saigon newspapers for distribution to the rural population. It is expected that this program will get underway during the month of April.

c. Programs

(1) Operation "Cleft Palate" Hare Lip

(a) Operation Cleft Palate/Hare Lip assisted two children during this reporting period. One sponsored by the 3d MT Battalion and the other by Headquarters 1st Marines. Both operations were conducted at the Naval Hospital in Saigon. Responsibility of post operative care will be that of the units requesting the service.

(2) MEDCAP

(a) MEDCAP continues to provide the high psychological impact desired. During the month of March MEDCAP teams treated a total of 51,865 Vietnamese civilians.

(3) DENCAP

(a) Dental care to the Vietnamese continues to expand each month and total procedures increase. Total teeth extracted during this period 3,072.

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Enclosure (1)

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(4) Handclasp

(a) Handclasp commodities continue to be augmented by donations from private individuals and groups. Total tonnage for the month was 5 tons.

(5) Foodstuff

(a) Catholic Relief Service (CRS) foodstuffs received and distributed during the reporting period include:

|              |            |
|--------------|------------|
| Bulgar wheat | 16,000 lbs |
| Corn Meal    | 20,000 lbs |
| Canned Milk  | 3 cases    |

(6) C.A.R.E.

(a) CARE commodities received this month consist of the following:

|                         |         |
|-------------------------|---------|
| School Kits             | 6536    |
| Physical Education Kits | 150     |
| Mason Kits              | 49      |
| Woodworking Kits        | 259     |
| Sewing Kits             | 3800    |
| Textile Packages        | 2700    |
| Salt                    | 50 bags |
| Rice                    | 60 bags |

(7) Toys

(a) A total of 8,000 lbs of miscellaneous toys were received from the 1st Marine Division Association and distributed to Division units during the month.

d. Construction Projects(1) Aid Stations

(a) Aid Stations were constructed at the following locations:

|          |                            |
|----------|----------------------------|
| (947700) | 2d Battalion, 3d Marines   |
| (943633) | 2d Battalion, 3d Marines   |
| (057729) | 3d Engineer Battalion      |
| (965761) | 3d Engineer Battalion      |
| (985708) | 3d Anti Tank Battalion     |
| (058734) | 1st Battalion, 9th Marines |

(2) Heads

(a) Heads were constructed at the following:

-30-

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Enclosure (1)

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- (057729) 3d Engineer Battalion 2 heads
- (052774) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
- (058734) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
- (056728) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

(3) Bridges

(a) One foot bridge was constructed by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at (BT 058734). One bridge was repaired by 1st Battalion, 11th Marines at (BT506069).

(4) Playgrounds

(a) Playgrounds were constructed at the following locations:

- (BT 593000) 1st Battalion, 7th Marines
- (BT 052744) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
- (AT 944644) 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
- (BT 057729) 3d Engineer Battalion

(5) Market Places

(a) Headquarters 7th Marines assisted in the construction of a market place at (500060) and 2d Battalion, 7th Marines assisted in construction of market place at (497053).

(6) Community Bulletin Boards

(a) Bulletin boards were constructed and set up at (014718) by 1st AmTrac Battalion and at (985708) by 3d Anti-Tank Battalion.

(7) Showers

(a) Showers were constructed at the following areas:

- (052744) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
- (BT 056728) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
- (058734) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
- (052744) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

(8) Church

(a) Two churches were repaired at (972662) by 3d Battalion, 3d Marines and another at (0071) by 3d MT Battalion.

(9) School Furniture

(a) School furniture was constructed and placed at the following areas:

- (965765) 3d Engineer Battalion
- (005705) 3d MT Battalion
- (925855) 1st Battalion, 3d Marines

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(10) Laundry and Wash Racks

(a) A Laundry Wash Rack was constructed at (BT 058734) by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.

(11) Wells

(a) A well was constructed at (985708) by 3rd Anti-Tank Battalion.

e. General Analysis

The Civil Affairs program within this command has developed much momentum, and the emphasis now is being placed on giving more direction to and refining the programs in order to help achieve the U. S. foreign policy objectives in this country which are to defeat the insurgency and to build a nation capable of sustaining itself without help from external resources. Each new area in which to cooperate with the GVN and contribute to the objectives summarized above are sought and gradually, such areas are found and exploited.

f. Monthly Recap of Civic Action

|   |        |
|---|--------|
| A. <u>Medical Assistance</u>              |        |
| No. female adults assisted                | 9,277  |
| No. male adults assisted                  | 8,962  |
| No. children under 18 assisted            | 33,223 |
| Total persons assisted                    | 51,865 |
| B. <u>Dental Assistance</u>               |        |
| No. of Examinations                       | 2,032  |
| No. of Extractions                        | 3,072  |
| No. of Fillings                           | 109    |
| Total persons assisted                    | 2,020  |
| C. <u>Personal Assistance</u>             |        |
| No. pounds of food distributed            | 41,073 |
| No. persons receiving food                | 28,121 |
| No. pounds of clothing distributed        | 6,804  |
| No. persons receiving clothing            | 8,636  |
| No. bars of soap distributed              | 39,484 |
| No. persons receiving soap                | 28,456 |
| D. <u>Evacuation Assistance</u>           |        |
| No. adults evacuated medically            | 108    |
| No. children under 18 evacuated medically | 40     |
| No. adults evacuated operationally        | 5      |
| No. children evacuated operationally      | 5      |
| E. <u>Contacts with local personnel</u>   |        |
| No. initial contacts                      | 616    |
| No. followup contacts                     | 4,118  |

3d Marine Division  
Command Chronology  
1 Mar to 31 Mar 1966  
List of Supporting Documents

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1. Div SitReps
2. Div Journal
3. Div FSCC Journal
4. Battle and Non Battle Casualties, Daily Report
5. VIP Visits to 3d MarDiv
6. ~~Div HistReps~~ *See FMFAC*
7. Order - Plans issued in Mar
8. Civil Affairs *(27 May 1966)*

UNITS COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

9. 1st Mar Reg
10. 3d Mar Reg
11. 4th Mar Reg
12. 9th Mar Reg
13. 12th Mar Reg
14. 11th Mar Reg
15. 3d TK Bn
16. 3d & 9th MT Bn
17. 3d SP Bn
18. 1st Amtrac Bn
19. 3d Recon Bn
20. 3d AT Bn
21. 3d Engr Bn
22. 3d Med Bn
23. Hq Bn 3d Mar Div
24. 3/1 Mar - Jan Command Chronology

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3rd Marine Division  
Command Chronology  
Mar 1966

Supporting Documents

|        |     |          |   |
|--------|-----|----------|---|
| Encl 1 | Msg | 010925 Z | Subj: Operation Plan 380-66   |
| 2      | Msg | 051135 Z | Subj: Activities of 2/4 in Operation Double Eagle   |
| 3      | Msg | 051200 Z | Subj: Operation Double Eagle Recap of Operations  |
| 4      | Msg | 051415 Z | Subj: Recap of Operation Utah by G-2 ADC (Rear)   |
| 5      | Rpt | 061500 Z | Subj: Operation Utah Information Sheet  |
| 6      | Msg | 121840 Z | Subj: Operation Alaska  |
| 7      | Msg | 151501 Z | Subj: Operation Order 381-66  |
| 8      | Ltr | 18 Mar   | Subj: Pursuit of Enemy Forces   |
| 9      | Msg | 181005 Z | Subj: Reconnaissance Operation Support, Operation Alaska  |
| 10     | Msg | 182338 Z | Subj: Operation Order 382-66  |
| 11     | Msg | 190751 Z | Subj: Change to my Operation Order 382-66   |
| 12     | Msg | 190904 Z | Subj: Operation Order 374-66 (Virginia)   |
| 13     | Msg | 201156 Z | Subj: 3/4 SITREP #1 Operation American Advisors   |
| 14     | Msg | 201330 Z | Subj: Division Operation Order 374-66 (Virginia)  |
| 15     | Msg | 201530 Z | Subj: Operation Order 376-66  |
| 16     | Msg | 220332 Z | Subj: Change to my Operation Order 366-66 (Alaska)  |
| 17     | Msg | 220855 Z | Subj: Changes to Operation Order 376-66   |
| 18     | Msg | 220910 Z | Subj: Operation Oregon  |
| 19     | Msg | 221355 Z | Subj: Termination of Operation Oregon   |
| 20     | Ltr | 26 Mar   | Subj: Pursuit of Enemy Forces w/Encl 1, CO, ADC<br>Command Group Letter 3:JLH:pam 3000 of 24 Mar 66;<br>Subj: Pursuit of Enemy Forces |
| 21     | Msg | 240718 Z | Subj: Operation Georgia   |
| 22     | Msg | 251456 Z | Subj: Planning Directive  |
| 23     | Msg | 260001 Z | Subj: Operation Alaska Arc Light Targets; & Changes to<br>my Operation Order 366-66 (Alaska). Handwritten                             |
| 24     | Msg | 260712 Z | Subj: Operation Orange  |
| 25     | Msg | 261408 Z | Subj: Operation Order 378-66  |
| 26     | Msg | 270445 Z | Subj: Operation Orange  |
| 27     | Msg | 270555 Z | Subj: Operation Orange  |
| 28     | Msg | 271310 Z | Subj: Operation Order 374-66 (Virginia)   |
| 29     | Msg | 271350 Z | Subj: Operation Order 383-66 (Operation Orange)   |
| 30     | Msg | 280053 Z | Subj: Annex A (Intelligence) to Division Operation<br>Order 383-66 (Orange)   |
| 31     | Msg | 280550 Z | Subj: CG III MAF Approves Operation Indiana   |
| 32     | Msg | 280645 Z | Subj: Operation Indiana   |
| 33     | Msg | 280726 Z | Subj: Alert Forces  |
| 34     | Msg | 280727 Z | Subj: Operation Indiana   |
| 35     | Msg | 281255 Z | Subj: Scout Dog Teams   |
| 36     | Msg | 281400Z  | Subj: Operation Indiana   |
| 37     | Msg | 281412 Z | Subj: Operation Orange  |
| 38     | Msg | 281505 Z | Subj: Operation Order 384-66 (Operation Indiana)  |
| 39     | Msg | 282125 Z | Subj: G-3 Journal Entry #5 SITREP   |
| 40     | Msg | 290057 Z | Subj: SITREP  |
| 41     | Msg | 290656 Z | Subj: Operation Indiana   |
| 42     | Msg | 290841 Z | Subj: Dam Preservation (Operation Orange)   |
| 43     | Msg | 300516 Z | Subj: Change #1 to Division Operation Plan 380-66   |
| 44     | Msg | 310602 Z | Subj: OPCON Co C, 1/4   |
| 45     | Msg | 310603 Z | Subj: Movement Co D, 1/4 & H&S 1/4 (Rear)   |

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Encl #46 Msg 040700Z Task Force Delta Subj: Special SITREP #1  
#47 Msg 041130Z ADC Group, Chu Lai Subj: Special SITREP#2  
#48 Msg 041645Z ADC Group, Chu Lai Subj: Special SITREP #3  
#49 Msg 042102Z ADC Group, Chu Lai Subj: Special SITREP #4  
#50 Msg 050400Z ADC Group, Chu Lai Subj: Special SITREP #5  
#51 Msg 060930Z Task Force Delta Subj: SITREP #10  
#52 Msg 061605Z Task Force Delta Subj: Special SITREP #11

**SECRET**

DRAFTER 3/BFC/WET  
 SEC 0-3 PHONE SHOVE-9  
 CWO \_\_\_\_\_

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE 114705Z MAR 66

FM CG, THIRD MARDIV  
 TO ADC CMO GRUP, CHU LAI  
 INFO THIRD MARDIV  
 CG, III MAF  
 CG, FMAW  
 FLSC  
 NAV COM CMD, DA NANG

//SECRET//

OPERATION PLAN 380-66

A. III MAF OPN PLAN 106-66 (DOUBLE TIME) (NOTAL)

1. SITUATION.A. ENEMY FORCES. TO BE PUBLISHED AND ISUMS AS ISSUED.B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) REFERENCE A.

(2) SEVENTH FLEET CONDUCTS: NAVAL AND AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST DRV AND VC FORCES; AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS ALONG RVN COAST; AND PROVIDES NGF AND AIR SUPPORT TO THIRD MARDIV ON REQUEST.

(3) FMAW PROVIDES OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT, ANTI AIR WARFARE, SERVICE SUPPORT, AERIAL RECON, AND CONTROL OF ASSIGNED MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT.

(4) U. S. ARMY VIET NAM CONTINUES OPNS AGAINST VC/PAVN FORCES IN AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

(5) USAF PROVIDES AIRLIFT AND AERIAL RESUPPLY AS REQUESTED.

(6) FLSC PROVIDES SUPPLIES AND SERVICES AS REQUESTED.

(7) GVN ARMED FORCES CONTINUE OPNS AGAINST VC/PAVN FORCES IN AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

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**SECRET**C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. TO BE PUBLISHED.D. ASSUMPTIONS.

(1) I CTZ ENEMY SIT WILL REQUIRE EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE UP TO ONE INF REGT (-) (REIN) TO RELIEVE/REINFORCE COMMITTED UNITS AND/OR CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPNS IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED.

(2) ENEMY SIT IN RVN WILL EXIST REQUIRING ONE REIN INF BN CHOP TO COMUSMACV AS GENERAL RESERVE.

2. MISSION. THIRD MARDIV BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY UP TO ONE REIN INF REGT (-) IN I CTZ OR ONE REIN INF BN TO COMUSMACV AS GENERAL RESERVE BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS TO RELIEVE/REINFORCE COMMITTED UNITS OR CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPNS AS DIRECTED.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPN. UPON REQUEST, THIRD MARDIV PROVIDES ONE REIN INF REGT (-) OR ONE REIN INF BN BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED TASK.

B. ADC CMD CHU CHU LAI.

(1) MAINTAIN ONE REIN INF BN ON SIX HOUR ALERT STATUS, ONE RIFLE CO OF THIS BN ON TWO HOUR ALERT STATUS, READY FOR DEPLOYMENT BY AIR, MOTOR VEHICLE, FOOT, AMPHIB, OR ANY COMBINATION THEREOF.

(2) MAINTAIN ONE REGT COND GROUP ON TWELVE HOUR ALERT STATUS FOR DEPLOYMENT AS DIRECTED.

C. 1ST BN, 1ST MAR. REMAIN ON SIX HOUR ALERT STATUS, WITH ONE COMPANY ON TWO HOUR ALERT STATUS, READY FOR DEPLOYMENT BY AIR, MOTOR VEHICLE, FOOT, AMPHIB, OR ANY COMBINATION THEREOF.

D. 3D MARINES.

(1) MAINTAIN 1ST BN, 1ST MARINES RIFLE CO ON SIX HOUR ALERT STATUS.

(2) BE PREPARED TO CHOP CO TO PARENT ORGN ON ORDER.

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**SECRET**

- ALL DIVISION COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE NORMAL SUPPORT FOR ORON DEPLOYED, DEPENDENT ON MODE OF TRANSPORTATION.
  - F. COORD INST.
    - (1) THIS PLAN EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT, EXECUTION ON ORDER.
    - (2) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED BETWEEN III MAF PARTICIPATING UNITS.
    - (3) UNITS MAINTAIN UP TO DATE PERS AND EQUIP LOADING PLANS FOR AMPHIB, MOTOR VEHICLE, FIXED AND/OR ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT LIFTS.
    - (4) NOTIFY THIS HQ OF RIFLE COS ASSIGNED TWO HOUR ALERT STATUS AND CHANGES AS OCCURRING.
    - (5) SUBMIT SPOT REPORTS AS OCCURRING AND SPECIAL SITREPS AS OF 06; 12; 18; AND 24 HUNDRED W/IN TWO HOURS TO THIS HQ ON EXECUTION.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. TO BE PUBLISHED.
- 6. CMD AND COMM-ELECT.
  - A. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. TO BE PUBLISHED.
  - B. CP. NOTIFY THIS HQ WHEN AND WHERE ESTABLISHED.
  - C. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. TO BE PUBLISHED WITH ORDER TO EXECUTE.

OP-4

RELEASED BY \_\_\_\_\_

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**SECRET**

DE 5825 NR 016

-T- CG THIRD MARDIV

ZNY EEEEE

O 051135Z

CG TASK FORCE DELTA

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO ZEN/CG TASK FORCE REAR

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

2/4 AT 051200 A MED EVAC HELO RECEIVED SMALL ARMS FIRE IN LZ

AT (MSCHRZ)

051240 2/4 MOVED INTO POSITION AT LOD 561739 TO 575789 AND BEGAN MOVING  
SUT.051301 SUDDEN DEATH CROSSED PHASE LINE 1 AT 570796. PROMINENCE B  
REMAINED AL TZ (FOCHRZ) AT DOWNED H-34.

05345 2/4 CROSSED PHASE LINE 2 (IJVXTG).

051430 2/4 REACHED PHASE LINE 3 AT (CNRFLJK) FOR EMERGENCY MED EVAC  
AT 051518

AT 051525 2/4 ORDERED TO HOLD UP AT PHASE LINE 3 UNTIL RED HAT UNITS

COW: 1697/1720

05

11 35

Encl 2

PAGE TWO 90F7 UNCLAS E F T O

CLEAR AREA. AT 051620 2/4 BEGAN SETTING IN PERMETER DEFENSE. CP LOCATED AT (CHEFID) NEGATIVE CONTACT AT PHASE LINE 3. DURING SEEP 2 VC KIA CONFIRMED 12 VC KIA POSSIBLE. AT 051716H UNKNOWN EXPLOSIVE EXPLODED AT 2/4 CP RESULTING IN 82PKIA 1 FRIENDLY AND (NM) FRIENDLY KIA. DIXIE DINER AT 0513157 ORDERED TO CONTINUE PRESENT PRESSURE AND BLOCK EAST. DIXIE DINER ALSO ASSUMED STATUS AS TASK FORCE RESERVE AT 1430 1 VC SURRENDERED TO DIXIE DINER BRAVO. NO CHANGE CP LOCATIONS SINCE LAST SIT REP. DIXIE DINER FOXTROT, GOLF, AND HOTEL CONDUCTED SEPARATE SWEEPS EAST TO FOL TO KEEP PRESSURE ON VV. ENCOUNTERED SNIPER FIRE, 2 ROUNDS 60MM MORTAR FIRE, AND GRENADES. 3 VC KIA CONFIRMED. CAVES UNCOVERED AT BS 553836 HAD 46 VC KIA BODY

COUNT COURTHOUSE, COURTHOUSE LIMA MADE CONTACT WITH ESTIMATED 30 VC VICINITY RED HAT 1 OBJECTIVE AT 051350H. VC WERE IN PREPARED POSITIONS AND HAD AREA HEAVILY MINED AND BOOBY TRAPPED. COURTHOUSE LIMA MOVED THROUGH AREA WITH RED HAT UNITS. COURTHOUSE MIKE MADE CONTACT VICINITY 555337, AT 051030H AND MAINTAINED CONTACT FOR 3 HOURS. WHEN COUNT HOUSE INDIA PASSED THROUGH COURTHOUSE MIKE AT 051330 AND CONTINUED ATTACK AGAINST ESTIMATED 1 VC COMPANY WHICH EMPLOYED 60MM MORTARS, 57MM RIFLES AND 50 CAL MACHINE GUNS, 2 VCS WERE CAPTURED. AT 051330 ALL 3 COURTHOUSE UNITS HEAVILY ENGAGED WITH RED HAT IN SUPPORT. COURTHOUSE

PAGE THREE 90F7 UNCLAS E F T O

COURTHOUSE FRIENDLY FRONT LINES EXTENDED FROM 550837 TO 570837 TO 570840. 051402 COURTHOUSE ORDERED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH VC UNTIL RED HAT ASSUMES CONTACT WITH VC. 1530 COURTHOUSE MAINTAINED CONTACT IN RED HAT ZONE OF ACTION AWAITING RED HAT UNITS TO PASS THROUGH AND PICK UP CONTACT WITH VC. AT 051730H COURTHOUSE PRESENTLY IS MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH VC UNTIL RED HAT PASSES THROUGH TOTAL VC CASUALTIES BY COURTHOUSE 82 VC KIA CONFIRMED 90

VC KIA POSSIBLE. COURTHOUSE PLANS TO CONSOLIDATE FORCES IN OWN ZONE OF ACTION WHEN POSSIBLE. PROMINENCE MOVED AT 051440 FROM ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY OF 550913 SOUTHQX LONG AXIS TO L TD LINE 58 TO BLOCKING POSITION. MOVING ALONG GRID LINE (WV) IN ZONE. LEADING ELEMENTS AT 051745 AT (AVJBTD)

LYRICAL MIKE HOLDING POSITIONS AS BLOCKING FORCE AT (XJHPZP) NO CONTACT RED HAT AT 051640 BEGAN MOVING OUT INTO OBJECTIVE NOVEMBER VICINITY (YXVSXT) TO PASS THROUGH COURT HOUSE UNITS

AGITATOR ALPHA-HOLDING BLOCKING POSITIONS AT (UWQCAV)  
BT

A - 3/2

TOR: 05/15302/MAN 66/FM 2

UC LZDXV00680 CU

DECLASSIFIED

DE 8825 32  
-T-CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZNY EEEEE  
PP 051200Z  
FM CG TASK FORCE DELTA  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT  
UNCLAS E F T O

1739

096 07/19252

FOR EME. MED EVAC AT 051518 AT 051525 "SD"  
ORDERED TO HOLD UP AT PHASE LINE THREE UNTIL RED HAT  
UNIT CLEAR AREA. AT 051620 "SD" BEGAN SETTING IN PERIMETER  
DEFENCE. CP LOCATED AT (CHBFID) NEG CONTACT AT PHASE LINE THREE  
DURING SWEEP 2V.C. KIA CONFIRMED 12V.C.  
KIA POSSIBLE AT 051716H UNKNOWN EXPLOSIVE EXPLODED AT "SD"  
CP RESULTING IN (EP) KIA FRIENDLY AND (NM) MIA. "DD" AT  
051357 ORDERED TO CONTINUE PRESENT PRESURE AND BLOCK EAST.  
"DD" ALSO ASSUMED STATUS AS TASK FORCE RESERVE. AT 1430 ONE VC  
SURRENDERED.  
TO DD "B" NO CHANGE CP LOCATED SICE LAST SIT-REP. DD"F"

PAGE TWO 90F7 UNCLAS E F T O

"G", AND "H" CONDUCTED SEPARATED SWEEP EAST TO FCL TO KEEP  
PRESURE ON VC. ENCOUNTERED SNIPER FIRE, 2 RDS 60 MM MORT. FIRE,,  
AND GRENADES. 3 VC KIA CONFIRMED. CAVES UNCOVERED AT  
DS 558836 HAD 46 VC KIA BODY COUNT. "CH", CH "L", MADE  
CONTACT WITH EST'D 30 VC VIC RED HAT ONE OBJECTIVE AT 051 050H.  
VC WERE IN PROPOSED POSITION AND HAD AREA HEAVILY MINED AND BOOBY  
TRAPPED. CH "L" MOVED THROUGH AREA WITH RED HAT UNIT.  
CH "M" MADECONTACT VIS 558837, AT 051030H AND MAINTAINED CONTACT  
FOR 3 HRS. WHEN CH "I" H PASSED THROUGH CH "M" AT 051330  
AT CONTINUED ATTACK AGAINST EST'D 1 VC COMPANY WHICH EMPLOYED  
60 MM MORT, 57 RR RIFLE AND 50 CO. MACHINE GUN.  
2 VCS WERE CAPTURED. AT 051330 ALL 3" CH" UNITS HEAVILY  
ENGAGED WITH RED HAT IN SUPPORT. "CH" FRIENDLY FRONT  
LINE EXTENDED FROM 558837 TO 570837 TO 570840.  
051402 CH ORDERED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH VC UNTIL  
RED HAT ASSUMED CONTACT WITH VC 1530 "CH" MAINTAIN CONTACT  
IN RED HAT ZONE OF ACTION AWAITING RED HAT UNITS TO  
PASS THROUGH AND PICK UP CONTACT WITH VC. AT 051730H CH "I"  
PRESENTLY MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH VC UNTIL REDHA PASSES THROUGH.;  
TOTAL VC CAS. BY CH 82 VC KIA CONFIRMED. 90 KIA POSSIBLE.  
CH PLANS TO CONSOLIDATE FORCES IN OWN ZONE OF ACTION  
WHEN POSSIBLE.

BT

A-312

For 05/17292/HNR 66/PLH/DTY e

C LINE FIVE PAGE ONE AA AT AB NEG TO RD (CHBFID) VIC (CGBFID)

KKKKKX

05 "ACTION COPY" 300

Encl 3

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DI 0305  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 051415Z  
FM ADC  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

#1749

C O N F I D E N T I A L

RECAP OF OPERATION UTAH AS MONITORED BY G-2 ADC (REAR) PERIOD ENDING  
051500H

AT 040910H, MAC-36 REPORTED ONE UNIE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BY INTENSE  
SA AND 50 CAL FIRING VIC (BT 538318).

A POSSIBLE VC BATTALION WAS REPORTEDLY LOCATED VIC (BT 5482).

AT APPROX 041223H, AN AIR BURST WAS OBSERVED 3,000 FEET IN THE AIR BY  
A UNIE.

2/7 REPORTED THAT GOLF CO HAD KILLED 4 VC IN THE VIC OF (BS 546829)

AT 041200H. THE FOUR VC WERE WEARING KHAKI UNIFORMS. THE COMPANY ALOSS

PAGE TWO 9087 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CAPTURED 2 VC PACKS AND 100 RDS OF 50 CAL AMMO. ALL WERE DESTROYED.

2/7 REPORTED AT 041400H THAT FOXTROT COMPANY HAD KILLED 2 VC VIC (BS  
543529).

AS OF 041600H, 2/7 REPORTED 10 VC HAD BEEN KILLED ; CIRCUMSTANCES UNK  
AT THE TIME. ONE CAPTURED SRS RIFLE WAS REPORTED AND ALSO THAT THE ARVN  
HAD CAPTURED A NVA SOLDIER. ARVN REPORTED A VC REGIMENT LOC (BS 500827)  
, (BS 578824) AND (BS 581824) . REGIMENT REPORTEDLY TAKEN UNDER FIRE  
BY ARVN ARTILLERY.

2/7 WAS IN HEAVY CONTACT WITH 2 VC BATTALIONS AND RECEIVING MORTAR AND  
57MM RR FIRE AT 041830H.

VC CASUALTIES AT 042215H, WERE 160 KIA (BODY COUNT) WITH 150 MIA  
ESTIMATED. ARVN REPORT OF VC CASUALTIES WERE 57 KIA (BODY COUNT) WITH 150

KIA

ESTIMATED.

ARVN REPORTEDLY HAVE CAPTURED UNKNOWN NUMBER OF 60 MM AM GUNS AND ONE  
12.7MM AA GUN.

3/1 REPORTED AT 041900H THEY FOUND A 3.4 MORTAR ROUND RIGGED AS  
AP MINE VIC ( BS 545857) WHICH WAS DESTROYED IN PLACE.

3/1 REPORTED AT 041630H, 3 VC MOVING NOTTH VIC (BS 555856) WITHOUT  
WPNS. FIRED 6 ROUNDS AFTER THEY DID NOT HALT AFTER CHALLENGING.

AT 041730H CO 4 3/1 FIRED 5 ROUNDS M-14 AT 4 VCS AT (BS 553856);  
WHEN THEY FAILED TO HALT UPON BEING CHALLENGED. NO HITS , VC ESCAPED

05

14

15

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Encl 4

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TO NORTH.  
BINH SON REPORTEDLY RECEIVED 15 ROUNDS 60MM MORTAR FIRE BETWEEN 050115  
AND 050215H FROM (BS 590935), (BS 590922) AND (BS 576915). ARTY

FIRE WITHOUT REPORT OF SURVEILLANCE.

VC CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES AS OF 050600H WERE REPORTED AS 110 KIA  
(BODY COUNT) 105-150 KIA (POSS) 75 MIA (ESTIMATED). NO CHANGE IN ARVN  
FIGURE AT THIS TIME.

AT 050350H, THE FIRST 2 WAVES OF 2/4 ARRIVED BY HELO VIC (BS 567794)  
RECEIVED SA FIRE.

2/4 REPORTED AT 050340H THAT 50 ROUNDS OF SA FIRE WERE REC VIC (BS  
567791) RETURNED 200 RDS SA AND MG FIRE. RESULTS UNK.

RECEIVED REPORT CONFIRMED BY DISTRICT CHIEF BINH SON THAT 1 VC  
BATTALION LOCATED (BS 597854), (BS 593853), (BS 595845), AND 1 GUERRILLA  
COMPANY HIDING AT (BS 6000842).

VC USING NET WITH GRASS FOR CONOFLAGE.

N COMPANY 3/1 REPORTED AT 050650H VIC (BS 568862) THAT THEY EXPLODED  
ONE ANTI PERSONNEL MINE TYPE UNK.

1 HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN BY SA FIRE AT 051008H VIC (BS 555789). CREW  
WAS RETRACTED WITH 2/4 PROVIDING SECURITY.

2/4 RECEIVED SA FIRE FROM VIC (BS 567791) AT APPROX 050900H.  
FIRE RETURNED BY SA, MG, 3.5RL M-79 AND 81MM MORTAR.

0-13 1974 90F7 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3/1 REPORTED AT 050715H THAT HELO RECEIVED SA FIRE FROM VIC (BS 655588)  
2/4 CAPTURED 1 FEMALE VCS WHO WAS CARRYING 2 PLASTIC GAS MASKS IN A  
SUITCASE VIC (BS 563793) AT 051230H.

3/1 ENGAGED IN HEAVY VC CONTACT VIC (BS 5485-5585-5685) AT 051345H.

N 2/4 KILLED 1 VC VIC (BS 558788) AT 051300H.

3/1 WAS HEAVILY ENGAGED WITH VC VIC (BS 578830-BS 572834) AT 051410H.

& 2/4 KILLED 6 VC (BODY COUNT) AND 12 KIA (POSS) VIC (BS 556791) AT  
051200H.

G 2/7 REPORTED 1 VCC SURRENDERED AT 051430H VIC (BS 556832). VCC STATED  
HIS UNIT, 7TH CO, 2ND BN, ARRIVED RVN FROM NVN IN NOVEMBER AND  
ARRIVED QUANG NGAI PROVINCE IN FEBRUARY.

1 HELO DOWNED BY FIRE AT APPROX 1600H VIC (BS 563841). SECURITY PROVIDED  
BY 3/1.

AT 051000H CUMULATIVE VC LOSSES WERE 117 (BODY COUNT) 162 VC KIA  
(POSS) 76 MIA (ESTIMATED) 4 VC CAPTIVES, 4 SKS RIFLES, 3 CHICOM  
ASSAULT RIFLES, 2 LMG'S.

TOTAL WEAPONS FOR OPERATION IS 25. 2 CHICOM GRENADES WERE ALSO CAPTURED.  
ARVN RPT 57 VC KIA (BODY COUNT) 150 KIA (EST).

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|                   |     |     |
|-------------------|-----|-----|
| L                 | 274 | 277 |
| KIA (CONFIRMED)   | 7   | 110 |
| MIA (POSSIBLE)    | 12  | 150 |
| VCC               |     | 5   |
| VCS               | 1   |     |
| MIA (POSSIBLE) AA |     | 156 |
| MPNS              |     | 25  |

ARVN  
57  
150

EQUIPMENT: 2 PLASTIC GAS MASKS

20 PACKS 20MM AM  
3.5 (DEST) 1-12.7 AA MG  
100RDS 50 CAL (DEST)

|         |                 |     |
|---------|-----------------|-----|
| TOTALS: | KIA (CONFIRMED) | 174 |
|         | KIA (POSSIBLE)  | 312 |
|         | MIA (POSSIBLE)  | 76  |
|         | VCC             | 5   |
|         | VCS             | 2   |
|         | WEAPONS         | 25  |

GP-4  
BT

A-2

TOR 05/18/82/ MAR 66/REDA/DTX 2

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

OPERATION UTAH INFORMATION SHEET

AS OF 1500, 6 MARCH 1966

On 2 March ARVN units made contact with VC in the hill area 7 miles NNE of Quang Ngai. Two VC were captured in this engagement. They stated they were members of the Demolition Co of the 36th NVA Regt and that their Regimental CP was located in the hamlet of Chau Nha (4) (BS 553828) 7 miles NW of Quang Ngai City. On 3 March another intelligence report was received indicating the possibility of a regimental CP in the same area. A plan was immediately developed to exploit this target by conducting a joint ARVN/USMC search and destroy operation through the Chau Nha area east to Highway 1 on 4 March with one ARVN Battalion and one USMC Company. Other forces were alerted to stand by for quick commitment in the event the target proved fruitful. At 040900 20 UH-34's and 4 armed UH-1E's of MAC-36 commenced the lift of the ARVN forces from Quang Ngai City to a landing zone (BS 544834) 1000 meters NW of Chau Nha (4). The landing was successful, but was met with extremely intense VC .50 cal MG, automatic weapons and small arms fire, which downed two UH-1E's and hit over half of the helicopters making the first landing. Ground fire also hit a Marine F4 covering the landing. The F4 turned towards Chu Lai, and the crew ejected over water and were rescued at 041000. In accordance with plans, at 041000 the 1st Marine Regiment alerted two companies as a reaction force under the operational control of 7th Marine Regiment. As the reports began to come in, Task

Encl 5

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Force Delta was reactivated and took over operational control. At 041035, 3dBn, 1st Marines, was alerted, and at 1135, the 1st Marines were directed to free all of 3/1 for commitment. During this time, the Battalion Command Group and three companies of 2/7 were organized to be lifted into the LZ. To expedite reaction capabilities, at 1130, 12 UH-34's from MAG-16 at Phu Bai were flown to Chu Lai to augment MAG-36 and to be employed by Task Force Delta, whose Headquarters had moved to Monastery Hill (Buddha Mtn)(BS 661756). At 041200, 2/7 commenced their lift into the original LZ, Co F in the leading aircraft. The lift of 2/7 was completed at 1305. During the lift one UH-34 received three hits and was forced down in the LZ. Eleven other helos were hit, and seven crew men wounded during the execution of this lift. During the lift of 2/7 and for five hours thereafter, the ARVN Airborne Bn and Marines in the LZ met heavy resistance in the form of mortar, small arms and 50 cal MG fire. Upon completion of the lift and consolidation of the LZ, the ARVN and Marines commenced an attack to the east and northeast. This attack was met with murderous fire from the VC, who tenaciously held prepared defensive positions. Companies F and G 2/7 were receiving heavy mortar and small arms fire from both flanks as well as the front. Forty-four air strikes and numerous artillery missions were employed to assist in the reduction of the VC positions. Near dusk VC fire moderated, but 2/7 remained in heavy contact until approximately 2100, when the VC disengaged. When all attempts to regain contact were unsuccessful, night defensive positions were established, intermingling ARVN and USMC forces. During the night several patrols, while attempting to reestablish contact, encountered small groups of VC attempting to exfiltrate the area.

While the lift of 2/7 was in progress, two Marine 155mm How (SP) Btrys moved to forward firing positions 7 KM northeast of the objective area. At 1500 two companies and the command group of 3/1 were lifted into a LZ approximately 3 KM north of the battle area. This lift was completed at 1550. In attempting to locate and fix the enemy, 3/1 had only light contact during the remainder of the day and finally established blocking positions to the north of the battle area. Plans were formulated and units positioned to completely surround the area in which the VC force was believed concentrated. During the night, to tighten the circle, ARVN 37th Rangers took up positions to the east of the enemy, while the ARVN 1st Bn, 5th Regt moved into the area to the northeast, 2/7 and the ARVN Airborne Bn remained west of the area. The day's action resulted in 110 VC KIA by Marines and 57 by ARVN as well as 300 estimated KIA. Friendly casualties were light. Also during the night the Hospital Ship REPOSE was underway from Da Nang to the objective area, arriving close off shore at 050245.

Enemy activity on the 5th commenced at 0530, when an estimated two VC Bns were reported to have launched an attack from the NE and NW on the ARVN ABN Bn positions.

At 050650 two UH-34's commenced the lift of an additional company (I) of 3/1 from Chu Lai into an area immediately behind 3/1's night positions. At 050830 3 UH-34's commenced the lift of 2/4 into the VINH LOC area (BS 495790), 6 miles WNW of Quang Ngai in order to seal off the southern escape route of the VC. Heavy fire was met in the LZ despite LZ preps by A4 and F4 aircraft. 2/4 consolidated and attacked to the north, leaving two platoons of B/1/7 that had been flown in to provide security for a UH-34, shot down during the 2/4 lift. During the attack to assume

blocking positions to the south of the enemy, 2/4 made contact with two groups of VC, one contact taking place at noon and another at 1306. These contacts resulted in 7 VC KIA and 12 possible KIA. The two platoons from B/1/7 providing security for the helo had several contacts, with small groups of VC during the same time period. One of these encounters resulted in 12 VC KIA.

By mid-morning 3/1 commenced a search and destroy operation to the south. At 1030 H/3/1 made contact with an estimated VC company armed with 60mm mortars, 57mm RR and 50 cal MG in the TRA BINH DONG (1) area. L/3/1 made contact with 30 VC in the same area. Reports indicate the enemy were wearing khaki uniforms and black berets. The VC facing L/3/1 were in well prepared defensive positions in an area heavily mined and booby trapped. By 1330 all three companies of 3/1 were heavily engaged as the fight was pushed to the VC. The 1st ABN Bde (ARVN) (another Bn had been lifted into the objective area at 1450) supported the 3/1 attack, passing through 3/1. By 1700 the enemy was enclosed in a box surrounded by 2/7, 3/1, 2/4, the 37th Ranger Battalion and the 1st Airborne Battalion. By 1800 all units in the objective area had ceased movement and had begun to establish night positions.

The second battalion, 7th Marines received sporadic small arms and mortar fire throughout the day as they conducted a search and destroy operation in the Chau Nha area. During the day tunnels were discovered containing 46 bodies. These tunnels were destroyed with demolitions.

During the night, commencing at 2255, B/1/7 guarding a downed helo, was subjected to repeated attacks by an estimated two VC companies supported by 60mm and 81mm mortars. These VC were reportedly clad in green

uniforms and camouflage helmets. An attempt was made to reinforce the two beleaguered platoons with a platoon from C/1/4 at 2310. The enemy fire in the landing zone was so intense that the helos could not land and the platoon was diverted to TF Delta CP. These attacks continued until 0430, when the VC broke contact, only to launch a pre-dawn attack an hour later. The other units conducted numerous patrols and ambushes in the objective area, but failed to make contact.

The ARVN ABN Bde was retracted on the morning of 6 March. Marine units commenced search and destroy operations throughout the objective area while the 1st Bn, 5th Regt (ARVN) and the 37th Ranger Bn (ARVN) continued to hold blocking positions to the east. These operations are being conducted so as to keep pressure on the surrounded VC forces in the TRA BINH DONG area while at the same time developing forces to exploit and pursue enemy targets.

Total VC casualties to date:

|     | <u>Confirmed</u> | <u>Possible</u> |
|-----|------------------|-----------------|
| KIA | 285              | 402             |
| WIA |                  | 65              |

There are several intelligence aspects of this operation, and the enemy encountered therein, that are worth special attention and summarization. The VCC captured on the 2d of March identified themselves as members of a Demolition Company of the 36th NVA Regiment. They said that there was a 33d Battalion (aka for 3d Battalion) of this regiment in the area. We have, of course, long been seeking this 36th Regiment, throughout Operation Harvest Moon and Double Eagle. These captives provided the initial tip on which CG, 2d ARVN Division, decided to move. The

information that they presented corresponded to very recent agent reports. The enemy engaged indeed displays the characteristics of a well-trained, regular force. He is fighting tenaciously, not giving up an inch of ground. He is well dug in, employing bunkers, caves, and tunnels to maximum advantage. Although most captured weapons have not arrived at the command post of Task Force Delta, evidence is that he possesses best and newest weapons available. These are from the new Chicom family of 7.62 caliber weapons. They include the Type 56 assault rifle, the semi-automatic carbine, and the light machine gun, Model RPD. In addition, several Chicom 12.7 Heavy Machine Guns have been captured, and one captive states that he is from an antiaircraft battalion. Uniforms are good and are standardized. Two types have been reported. One group has been wearing black berets and another is wearing camouflaged pith helmets. We conclude that we are opposed in one location, near the original helicopter landing zone, by an estimated two reinforced companies or a full battalion. In another location, in a fortified village complex, the enemy appears to be protecting a regimental command post with more battalions of this regiment. Our conclusion is that the intelligence received from the original two captives has brought us to the location of the command post of the 36th NVA Regiment. It is now surrounded. The enemy seems to know that he is surrounded and is determined to fight to the bitter end.

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VV MFD161  
ZNY SSSSS  
~~R 272328Z~~  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
~~P 121840Z~~  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

ON 11/208  
IN ALASKA FOLDER

SECRET 07947 FROM MACJ234

SUBJ: OPERATION ALASKA (C)

1. (Y) INFORMATION FORWARDED HERewith IS TO PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE IN THE AREA OF OPERATION ASASKA, IN CENTRAL QUANG NAM PROVINCE. THE FOLLOWING IS A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, AND DOES NOT IN ALL CASES AGREE WITH THE ACCEPTED ORDER OF BATTLE.
2. (S) ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS CONSISTS OF THE BELOW LISTED FORCES:

A. 303RD MAIN FORCE BN, STRENGTH 250, LOCATED VIC YC6030.

PAGE 2 RUNSMA 1681C SECRET

B. CHU DUNG MAIN FORCE BN, STRENGTH 290, LOCATED VIC AT 9538.

C. R-20 MAIN FORCE BN, STRENGTH 400, LOCATED VIC AT9354.

D. 5TH MAIN FORCE BN, STRENGTH UNK, CARRIED AS A POSSIBLE UNIT BY III MAF, LOCATED VIC AT8753.

E. 3RD BN, 5 TH REGT, STRENGTH 400, CARRIED AS A POSSIBLE UNIT IN III MAF OB, LOCATED VIC AT8734

F. EIGHT LOCAL FORCE COMPANIES, WITH A STRENGTH OF 925, AND LOCAL GUERRILLA AND SELF DEFENSE FORCES WITH A TOTAL STRENGTH OF 2500 ARE LOCATED IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE.

G. BINH SON TRANS MAIN FORCE BN, STRENGTH 240, LOCATED VIC YC6035.

3. (C) THE MOST RECENT SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ACTIVITIES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE INCLUDE:

A. AN AMBUSH OF A MARINE PLATOON ON 26 FEB (AT 867760). ON 21 FEB, VC FIRED 25 ROUNDS OF 60MM MORTAR ON 2ND BN, 12TH MARINE REGT (WT983671).

B. ON 22 FEB, VC ATTACKED BINH LONG BRIDGE (BT013568), AND FIRED 81MM MORTAR, 57 RR, GRENADES, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND SMALL ARMS ON THE 11TH RANGER BN (BT020590).

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MAR 28 1966

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3D MARINE DIVISIONPAGE 3 RUMSMA 16810 **SECRET**

THE MAJORITY OF THE ACTIVITY IN WUANG NAM PROVINCE HAS BEEN HARASSMENT OF USMC/ARVN PATROLS, LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT, AND TERRORISM OF VILLAGES AND HAMLETS, AND REFLECTS A CONTINUING VC EFFORT TO NULLIFY THE EFFECTS OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN PROGRESS IN THE AREA.

4. (C) ELEMENTS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION HAS SHOWN CONTINUED RESENTMENT TOWARD THE BOMBING AND ARTILLERY FIRE RESULTING FROM FRIENDLY OPERATIONS. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT THE PEOPLE FEEL THERE IS INSUFFICIENT COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL VIETNAMESE AND US OFFICIALS IN THE AREA. ADDITIONALLY, ELEMENTS OF THE BUDDHIST HEIRARCHY CONTINUE TO BE SENSITIVE TOWARD UNRESTRICTED WARFARE ON THE PART OF FRIENDLY AND ENEMY UNITS, PARTICULARLY NEAR BUDDHIST HOLY AREAS. THE RECENT REMOVAL OF LT GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI, COMMANDER, I CTZN MAY RESULT IN ADDITIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO ACCURATELY ASSESS THE IMPACT OF HIS RELIEF UPON THE POPULATION AND THE WAR EFFORT.

5. (S) THE ENEMY HAS THE FOLLOWING CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS:

A. TO ATTACK FRIENDLY UNITS OR POSITIONS IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA WITH A FORCE OF ONE REGIMENT, INFORCED WITH LOCAL

**SECRET**



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3D MARINE DIVISIONPAGE 4 RUMSMA 1681C S E C R E T  
FORCES AND GUERILLAS.

B. TO ATTACK AND HARASS HAMLETS AND VILLAGES THROUGHOUT THE AREA WITH BATTALION SIZED FORCES USING UP TO 122MM MORTARS.

C. TO DEFEND BASE AREAS AND SAFE HAVENS WITH A FORCE OF UP TO ONE REGIMENT.

D. TO CARRY OUT INCREASED HARASSMENT, INFILTRATION, AND SABOTAGE ATTEMPTS ON FRIENDLY BASE AREAS.

E. TO CONTINUE THE INCREASED TEMPO OF SABOTAGE ALONG ROUTE 1 SOUTH OF DA NANG.

F. TO WITHDRAW FORCES COVERTLY WHEN UNDER FRIENDLY MILITARY PRESSURE.

G. (C) PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION:

A. TO HARASS FRIENDLY UNITS STATIONED OR PATROLLING IN THE AREA, IN AN ATTEMPT TO TIE DOWN FRIENDLY UNITS, AND GAIN GREATER FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.

B. TO CONTINUE INCIDENTS OF HARASSMENT, TERRORISM AND PROPAGANDA IN THE HAMLETS AND VILLAGES THROUGHOUT THE AREA OF OPERATIONS IN AN ATTEMPT, TO NULLIFY THE USMC/ARVN PACIFICATION PROGRAM.

C. TO ATTACK ISOLATED GOVERNMENT POSITIONS AND DISTRICT

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 1681C S E C R E T

TOWNS, PARTICULARLY ALONG THE QUANG NAM-QUANG TIN BORDER.

D. TO CONTINUE INTERDICTION OF ROUTE 1 SOUTH OF DA NANG, IN ORDER TO RESTRICT OVERLAND MOVEMENT OF FRIENDLY TROOPS AND SUPPLIES. GP-3

BT

TOP 28/03407/MAR 66/MS

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A-3

Jm

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**SECRET**

DRAFTER 3/BFC/12  
 SEC 0-3 PHONE Shove-3  
 CWO                     

CCN                     PRIORITY 151501 Z MAR 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: 3D MARINES  
       3D RECON BN  
       12TH MARINES  
       3D ENGR BN  
       3DATT BN  
 INFO: CG III MAF  
       CG FMAW  
       THIRD MARDIV

//SECRET//

OPN ORDER 381-66

A. MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS SERIES L-701

B. MY OPN O 343-66

C. DIV O 02000.2C (COI)

TASK ORGN:

INF BN (REIN), 9TH MAR

RECON PLT, 3D RECON BN

ENGR PLT, 3D ENGR BN

AT PLT, 3D AT BN

1. SITUATIONA. ENEMY FORCES. SEE ANNEX B (INTEL) TO REF B AND ISUMS AS ISSUED.B. FRIENDLY FORCES. SEE REF B.C. ATTACHMENTS/DETACHMENTS. EFFECTIVE 0800H, D-1.

2. MISSION. THIRD MARDIV CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN  
 SOUTH CENTRAL QUANG NAM PROVINCE TO FIX AND DESTROY VIET CONG FORCES  
 LOCATED THEREIN.

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Encl # 7

3. EXECUTION.A. CONCEPT. - OMITTED.B. 9TH MARINES

(1) COMMENCING H-HOUR, D-DAY NLT 19 MAR 66 CONDUCT MOTOR/MECH MARCH TO OPERATING AREA (BT 070498 SW TO RR VIC BT 060480; SE RR BED INCLUSIVE TO BT 113427; NE ROAD INCLUSIVE TO BRIDGE BT 146457; N ALONG WEST BANK SONG LY LY TO BT 133504; W ALONG SOUTH BANK SONG BA REN TO BT 070498); CONDUCT OPERATIONS THEREIN TO SEARCH FOR AND DESTROY VIET CONG FORCES LOCATED.

C. 3D MT BN. PROVIDE MOTOR TRANSPORT SUPPORT REQUESTED/REQUIRED FOR DURATION OPERATION.

D. 12TH MARINES

(1) RENDER ARTILLERY SUPPORT FROM POSNS TO BE SELECTED AND OCCUPIED PRIOR TO D-DAY.

(2) ARTY DIR SUPT THIS OPN.

E. COORD INST.

(1) UNCLAS CODE NAME THIS OPN: "DUCHESS"

(2) RCA AUTH OPN AREA ONLY.

(3) H-HOUR AND D-DAY AS DESIG BY CO, 9TH MAR NLT 19 MAR 66.

(4) DIRLAUTH PARTICIPATING UNITS.

(5) ATTACHMENTS EFF: 1200H, D-1.

(6) FIRE SUPPORT COORD: REF B.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICSA. SUPPLY

(1) SUPPLY SOURCE - FILED FOR ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY.

(2) PRESCRIBED LOAD - IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADMINO 343-65.

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MAR 16 1966

(3) RESUPPLY - FROM FLSO AS REQUIRED.

B. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

(1) EVACUATION

(A) BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS AVAILABLE, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 06040.1, TO COMPANY C, 3D MEDICAL BATTALION.

(B) WEAPONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT WILL BE EVACUATED WITH CASUALTIES.

(2) HOSPITALIZATION. AS DETERMINED BY CO, 3D MEDICAL BN.

C. TRANSPORTATION. 3D MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION PROVIDES VEHICLE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

D. PERSONNEL.

(1) CASUALTY REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 3040.2A.

(2) COMMENCING D-1 SUBMIT PERSONNEL DAILY SUMMARY AS OF 2400H D-DAY BY 1200H FOLLOWING DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 1080.3.

(3) ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES.

(4) GRAVES REGISTRATION. KIA WILL BE EVACUATED THROUGH MEDICAL EVACUATION PRESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 4.B. ABOVE.

E. CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND RETURNEES/RALLIERS.

(1) VCC/VCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX B TO DIV OPNO 343-65.

(2) CAPTURED DOCUMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO P3800.1E AND ANNEX B, DIV OPNO 343-65.

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MAR 16 1966

(3) RETURNEES/RALLIERS - THOSE ELIGIBLE FOR CHIEU HOI STATUS WILL BE DELIVERED TO CHIEU HOI CENTER DANANG. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO EFFECT DELIVERY TO CHIEU HOI CENTER WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RALLY.

F. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT AS PRESCRIBED BY COMMANDER.

(2) ITEMS OF CAPTURED MATERIAL THAT CANNOT BE MADE SERVICEABLE OR EVACUATED WILL BE DESTROYED ON AUTHORITY THIS HEADQUARTERS. CAPTURED RICE WILL BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 03460.1.

(3) COMMANDERS WILL INSURE EVERY EFFORT IS EXERTED TO MAINTAIN WEAPONS IN SERVICEABLE CONDITION UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

(4) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PERSONAL AWARDS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 1650.1B AND SECNAV INSTR P1650.1C.

(5) CIVIL AFFAIRS - IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 5080.1.

5. COMO AND COMELECT.

A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (C) AND OTHER PERTINENT COMELECT DIRECTIVES.

B. COMO POSTS.

(1) 3D MARDIV - NO CHANGE

(2) 9TH MAR - NO CHANGE

(3) REIN INF BN REPT AS EST.

GP-4

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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/JRF/war  
3120.1  
18 March 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

0229 66

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, ADC Command Group, CHU LAI  
Subj: Pursuit of enemy forces  
Ref: (a) COMUSMACV 010235Z (Copy appended)

1. It is requested that reference (a) be analyzed by your command relative to pursuit of enemy forces.
2. Forward analysis of Operation UTAH exemplifying the principles set forth in reference (a) to reach this Headquarters prior to 25 March, 1966. The subject material will be used by the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force in forthcoming Seminar.

F. R. WILKINSON  
By direction

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Encl 8

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COMMUNICATION CENTER  
3D MARINE DIVISION

DRAFTER 3/RAR/af  
SEC G-3 PHONE Shove 3  
CWO E

CGN 1021

IMMEDIATE 181005Z MAR 66

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: CG III AF

// SECRET //

RECON OPN SUPT OPN ALASKA

A. 3D RECON BN OPN ORDER 11-66

1. 3D RECON BN CONDUCTING OPN IAW REF A (TO BE FORWARDED NLT 182000H). D-DAY  
20 MAR 66.

2. IT IS INTENDED TO USE TASK ELEMENT ECHO TO SCREEN AND ACT AS BLOCKING FORCE AT  
CONCLUSION ALASKA ARC LITE FROM VIC HILL 1078 (AT 8161) AND HILL 1025 (AT 7961)  
COMPLEX TO SUPPORT OPN ALASKA.

GP-4

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MAR 19 1966

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Encl 9

DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTER  
 SEC 9-3 PHONE SHOVE-3  
 CWO

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE 182338 MAR 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: 9TH MARINES  
 3D RECON BN  
 12TH MARINES  
 1ST ANTRAC BN  
 3D ENGR BN  
 1ST AT BN  
 3D AT BN  
 INFO: CG III MAF  
 CG PHAW  
 THIRD MARDIV

//SECRET//

OPERATION ORDER 382-66

- A. MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS SERIES I-701
- B. 3D MARDIV OFN O 343-65
- C. INCC O 003432.1B
- D. DIV O 02000.2C (COI)

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

TASK ORGANIZATION:

INF BN (-)(REIN) 9TH MARINES

INF BN (-) 9TH MARINES

CO B (-)(REIN), 1ST ANTRAC BN

CO B (-), 1ST ANTRAC BN

DET H&S CO 1ST ANTRAC BN

ARM AMPH PLT, 1ST ANTRAC BN

CO B (-), 3D AT BN

\_\_PLT, CO B, 3D ENGR BN

\_\_PLT, CO \_\_, 3D RECON BN

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

Encl # 10



1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY FORCES. SEE REF B AND ISUMS AS ISSUED.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) SEE REF (B)

C. ATTACHMENTS/DETACHMENTS: EFFECTIVE 0800 D-1

2. MISSION. 3D MAR DIV CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SOUTH CENTRAL QUANG NAM PROVINCE TO SEARCH FOR AND DESTROY VC FORCES LOCATED THEREIN, AND TO PROVIDE "GOLDEN FLEECE" AND/OR RURAL CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED OR REQUESTED. (OVERLAY PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED TO 9TH MARINES)

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OMITTED

B. 9TH MARINES.

(1) NLT 21MARCH CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN DESIGNATED AREA IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES TO SEARCH FOR AND DESTROY VC FORCES LOCATED THEREIN.

(2) PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE AREA BOUNDED BY (AT 9459) TO (AT 9759) TO (AT 9754) TO (AT 9454) INCLUSIVE.

C. 12TH MARINES. PRIORITY FIRES 9TH MARINES THIS OPERATION.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) UNCLASSIFIED CODENAME (KINGS).

(2) DIRECT LIAISON III MAF UNITS AUTHORIZED.

(3) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED 9TH MARINES AND QNSS. ALL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE EFFORT THROUGH QNSS.

(4) ALL OTHER LIAISON AUTHORIZED PARTICIPATING UNITS.

(5) RCA AUTHORIZED IN OPERATING AREA ONLY: SEE REF (C).

(6) REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (D).

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

## VC FORCES.

- (2) BE PREPARED TO COMMIT TASK GROUP CP AND ADDITIONAL REIN INF BN MINUS DEPENDENT ON DEVELOPED SITUATION.

C. COORD INST

- (1) UNCLAS OPN CODE NAME: VIRGINIA
- (2) RCA AUTH
- (3) DIRLAUTH PARTICIPATING III MAF UNITS, FIRST ARVN DIV AND DET C-1 5TH SPL FORCES.
- (4) TASK GRP FOXTROT DESIGNATE US CMDR AND NOTIFY THIS HQ INFO THREE PAF
- (5) MAXIMIZE EFFORT TO CAPTURE VC/PAVN PRISONERS ALIVE.

4. ADMIN AND LOGA. SUPPLY

- (1) AS DETERMINED BY TASK GROUP COMMANDER
- (2) SUBMIT SPECIAL AND EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS TO FLSU #2 INFO FLSG AND THIS HEADQUARTERS.

B. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- (1) IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES AND AS DIRECTED BY TO CMDR.

C. PERSONNEL

- (1) IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES.

D. CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND RETURNEES/RALLIERS

- (1) IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX B DIV OP ORDER 343-65 AND DIV O P3800.1E.

5. CMD AND COMM-ELECT

- A. COMM IAW DIV 02000.2C (COI).
- B. NOTIFY THIS HQ CP LOCATION AND TIME CP ESTABLISHED.
- C. CMD RELATIONSHIPS TO BE FURNISHED.

GP-4

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

(7) FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION.

(A) SEE REF (B).

(B) NGF: TO BE PUBLISHED.

(C) ARTILLERY ANNEX G - SEE REF (B).

(D) AIR IAW ANNEX F REF (B).

4. SAME.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

A. COMMUNICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (C) AND CURRENT COMMUNICATION DIRECTIVES.

B. COMMAND POSTS.

(1) 3D MAR DIV - NO CHANGE.

(2) 9TH MAR - NO CHANGE.

(3) REIN INF BN REPT AS EST.

GP-4

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DRAFTER 3/BFC/rle  
SEC G-3 PHONE Shove-3  
TRANS TOD \_\_\_\_\_  
CWO \_\_\_\_\_

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE 190751 MAR66

FM: CGCG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: 9TH MARINES  
3D RECON BN  
12TH MARINES  
1ST ANTRAC BN  
3D ENOR BN  
3D AT BN

INFO: CG III MAF  
CG FMAW  
THIRD MARDIV

// S E C R E T //

CHANGE TO MY OPN O 382-66

A. MY 182338Z

1. MAKE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO REF A:

A. DELETE PLT, 3D RECON BN UNDER TASK ORON.

B. IN PARA 3.B DELETE 21 MAR AND SUBSTITUTE 19 MAR THEREFOR.

GP-4

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MAR 19 1966

Encl # 1, 2, 3

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DRAFTER 3/BFC/AC  
 SEC G-3 PHONE             
 CWO           

CON           

IMMEDIATE 190904 MAR 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: TASK GRP FOXTROT  
 INFO: CG III MAF  
 THIRD MAR DIV  
 CG FMAW

// SECRET //

OPN ORDER 374-66 (VIRGINIA)

A. MY OPO 343-65

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY. REF A AND ISUMS AS ISSUED

B. REFUGEE

(1) REF A.

(2) FMAW PROVIDE AIRLIFT/RESUPPLY AS REQUESTED.

(3) DET C-1 5TH SPL FORCES OPERATING IN KHE SANH AREA.

(4) 1ST ARVN DIV FORCES DEPLOYED NORTHERN I CTZ

2. MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED THIRD MARDIV CONDUCTS INF BN MINUS REIN RECON  
 IN FORCE IN KHE SANH AREA.

3. EXECUTION. ON

A. CONCEPT. ON ORDER 3D MAR DIV DEPLOYS REIN INF BN MINUS TO SPL FORCES  
 CAMP KHE SANH FROM HUE-PHU BAI BE FIXED WND ROTARY WING A/C TO CONDUCT  
 LIMITED S/D OPNS AND TO RECON AREA W/IN 105MM RANGE OF KHE SANH.

B. TASK GROUP FOXTROT

(1) DEPLOY INF BN MINUS REIN W/105 MM BTRY MINUS AND 4.2 MORT BTRY  
 MINUS AND OTHER SUPT AS REQ WHEN DIRECTED BY FIXED AND ROTARY WING A/C TO  
 KHE SANH SPL FORCES CAMP TO CONDUCT S/D AND RECON OPNS TO LOCATE, FIX, AND DESTROY

**CONFIDENTIAL**MESSAGE FORM - CONFIDENTIAL  
34 MAR 67 - 2100/1

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 042

R 201156Z

FM COC THIRD MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

3/4 SITREP #1 OPN AMERICAN ADVISOPS A S OF 201700H

A. a/b

A. 3/4 CP YD 959139

I CO YD 975140

K CO YD 959139

I CO YD 985155

M CO YD 963167

B. K/3/4 AND I/3/4 CONDUCTED S & D \*MSN. I/3/4 AND M/3/4 SET UP  
BLOCKING PSNS

C. NONE

D. NONE

E. M & K/3/4 SET UP BLOCKING PSNS I/3/4 WILL CONTACT S & D FROM  
PRESENT PSN TO YD 96811EE 968167. I/3/4 CONDUCTEEE CONECT S & D  
FROM PRESENT PSN TO YD 980160. 3/4 WILL SET UP NIGHT DEF PSNS.

F. NEC

3 DIV J-117

BT

NNNN

20 11 56

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Encl 13

DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTER 3/BFC/AS  
SEC 0-3 PHONE Shove 3  
CWO \_\_\_\_\_

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE 20 1330 MAR 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: THIRD MARDIV  
IAC - 16  
INFO: CG III MAF  
CG PMAR

// SECRET //

DIV OPN C 374-66 (VIRGINIA)

AM BY 190904Z

1. ADD FOLLOWING AS ISA TASK ORDN TO REF A:

S ONE PARTY GROUP

MAJ BENSTEAD

HQ, CO A, 3D SP BN

1ST HST, CO A, 3D SP BN

DET, H AND S CO, 3D SP BN

DET, FLSU #2

DET, EOD

DET, SUPPLY CO

DET, AMMO CO

DET, MAINT CO

DET, HQ BN

DET, 3D ITT

DET, MP CO

DET, SENTRY DOG PLT

DET, MAG -16 (12CP AND TAIBS)

CP-4

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DRAFTER 3/BFC/pnc  
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3  
TRANS TOD \_\_\_\_\_  
CWO \_\_\_\_\_

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE 201530 MAR 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: TASK GROUP FOXTROT  
3D RECON BN  
INFO: CG III MAF  
CG FMAW

//SECRET//

OPN ORDER 376-66

A. DIV 0 02000.2C

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY.

(1) SEE ISUMS AS ISSUED.

(2) THE 4TH, 6TH, AND 8TH BNS, 95TH B REGT, 325TH B DIV RECENTLY REPORTED ASHAC AREA. THE 800TH, 802D AND 804TH MF BNS RECENTLY REPORTED APPROX 16 MILES W OF HUE.

B. FRIENDLY, CURRENT SITREPS.

2. MISSION. 3D MAR DIV CONDUCTS CONTINUOUS RECON/SURVEILLANCE OPNS IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE TO DETECT ENEMY ACTIVITY THREATENING HUE-PHU BAI.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. COMMENCING ON OR ABOUT 21 MAR 66, TG FOXTROT CONDUCTS RECON/SURVEILLANCE OF MAIN AVENUES OF APPROACH FROM WEST AND SOUTH INTO COASTAL PLAIN VIC HUE-PHU BAI.

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

MAR 20 1966

1/Bellow  
20-MAR 66

Encl #15

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B. TASK GROUP FOXTROT. CONDUCT CONTINUOUS RECON/SURVEILLANCE

OPNS W/IN FOLLOWING RZ'S:

- (1) ZONE ONE: (YD 5531) (YD 6423) (YD 5310) (YD 4318).
- (2) ZONE TWO: (YD 7415) (YD 7812) (YD 6902) (YD 6506).
- (3) ZONE THREE: (YD 8002) (YD 9002) (YC 9081) (YC 8081).

6. COORD INST.

- (1) EST DURATION THIS OPN TWO WEEKS. TERMINATE ON ORDER THIS HQ.
- (2) SIGNIFICANT SIGHTINGS/OCCURANCES BY SPOTREP TO THIS HQ.
- (3) DIRLAUTH AND DIRECTED WITH CG, 1ST ARVN DIV FOR AUTHORITY TO OPERATE BEYOND TAOR.
- (4) EEI'S:
  - (A) DETERMINE ENEMY LOCATION, STRENGTH, IDENTITY, DISPOSITION, AND ARMAMENT.
  - (B) DETERMINE LOCATION SUITABLE HLZ'S, DZ'S, ARTY FIRING POSNS.
  - (C) DETERMINE MAP ERRORS.
- (5) CO, 3D RECON BN ARRIVING YR POSN 21 MAR FOR CONSULTATION.
- (6) ONE ADDITIONAL RECON CO TO BE DEPLOYED BY AIR TO YR POSN.  
ETA 24 MAR 66.

4. ADMIN AND LOG. AS DETERMINED BY CO, TOP FROM FLSU.

5. CMD AND COMM ELECT.

A. LAW REF A.

B. REQUEST ADDITIONAL SUPT FROM THIS HQ.

GP-4

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DRAFTER 3/BFC/ac  
SEC G-3 PHONE Shove 3  
CWO \_\_\_\_\_

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTINE 220332 MAR 66

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: THIRD MARDIV  
INFO: CG ILL MAF  
CG FMAN  
FLC

// CONFIDENTIAL //

MY OPN ORDER 366p66 (ALASKA)

1. MAKE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO SUBJ OPN ORDER:

- A. PARA 2: DELETE "COMMENCING NLT 20 MARCH 1966;"
- B. PARA 3.E. (1) DELETE IN ENTIRETY AND SUBSTITUTE "D-DAY AND L-IGUR  
TO BE ANNOUNCED."

GP#4

RELEASED BY \_\_\_\_\_

MAR 22 1966

Encl-16

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DRAFTER 3/BFC/af  
SEC 0-3 PHONE Shove 3  
CWO \_\_\_\_\_

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE RZ-100 MAR 66

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: TASK GROUP FOXTROT  
3D RECON BN  
INFO: CG III MAF  
CG FFAW

// SECRET //

OPN ORDER 376-66

A. MY 201530Z

1. MAKE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO SUBJECT OPN ORDER:

DELETE PARA 3.B. AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFOR:

"B. TASK GROUP FOXTROT

(1) MAINTAIN READY ALERT FORCE TO REIN OR RETRACT RECON ELEMENTS  
COMMITTED.

(2) PREPOSITION ARTY TO MEET FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS; MAKE  
MAXIMUM USE OF ARTY RANGE CAPABILITIES WITHIN RECON ZONES;  
PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR ARTY PSNS; AND MINIMIZE DE-  
GRADATION OF ENCLAVE SECURITY.

(3) RECON ELEMENTS WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED BEYOND ARTY RANGE.

(4) COMMENCE CONTINUOUS RECON/SURVEILLANCE OPNS IN RZ'S TWO  
(YD 7415)(YD 7812)(YD 6902)(YD 6506) AND THREE (YD 8002)  
(YD 9002)(YD 9081)(YC 8081) ASAP AFTER REPSN ARTY.

(5) COMMENCE CONTINUOUS RECON/SURVEILLANCE OPNS IN RZ O E (YD 5531)  
(YD 6423)(YD 5310)(YD 4318) ASAP AFTER RECON ARTY AND SUPT  
1 OF 2

22 1966

Encl #17, CL

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**AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE.**

**2. PARA 3.C.(6) REF A PROVMAIN.**

**GP-4**

**RELEASED BY** \_\_\_\_\_

**2 OF 2**

**MAR 22 1966**

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COMMUNICATIONS CENTER  
3D MARINE DIVISION

DRAFTER 3/BFC/STX  
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3  
CWO H

COB 1259

IMMEDIATE 220910Z MAR 66

FM CG, 3D MAR DIV  
TO TASK GROUP FOXTROT  
INFO CG, 111 MAP  
CS, 3D MAR

312.1

HAS BEEN SENT

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPN OREGON

1. SUBJ OPN TO BE TERMINATED ON ORDER THIS HQ ONLY. SUBMIT RECOMMEN-  
DATIONS FOR TERMINATION WHEN DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

GP-4

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MAR 23 1966

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Encl 18

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COMMUNICATION CENTER  
3D MARINE DIVISION

38/22  
DRAFTER 3/PM/3M  
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 3  
TRANS TOD  
C.B. 100

CCN 1269

3121.1  
IMMEDIATE 22/355Z MAR 66

FROM: CG THIRD LANDV  
TO: CG III MAF  
INFO: TASK GROUP FOXTROT

//SECRET// -

TERMINATION OF OPH OREGON

file  
DESIRE TO TERMINATE OPH OREGON FIRST LIGHT 23 MAR AND RETURN TOF FORCES FROM  
OPERATING AREA TO PHU BAT ENCLAVE EARLIEST FOLLOWING TERMINATION OF OPNS. ALL  
OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. FIRST ARVN DIV CONCURS IN TERMINATION AND  
WITHDRAWAL OF USEC FORCES. FIRST ARVN DIV DESIRES TO PLACE OWN FORCES IN SAME  
AREA FOLLOWING TG FOXTROT WITHDRAWAL. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS  
IN TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES WILL BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. REQUEST  
CONCURRENCE EARLIEST TO PERMIT SCHEDULING OF LIFT OUT.

GP-4

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MAR 23 1966

SECRET

Encl 19

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO, San Francisco 96602

3/NLB/wmr  
3120.1  
26 March 1966

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Pursuit of Enemy Forces

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV 010235Z Mar66  
(b) CG, III MAF 130712Z Mar66

Encl: (1) CG, ALC Command Group ltr 3:JLH:pam 3000 of 24Mar66

1. Enclosure (1), an analysis of Operation UTAH related to the principles set forth in reference (a), is forwarded herewith in response to reference (b).

2. An analysis of Operation NEW YORK is presently being made. This analysis is expected to be completed by 28 March and will be forwarded at that time.

F. R. WILKINSON  
By direction

*endro*

DECLASSIFIED

3120.1

ADC COMMAND GROUP  
Headquarters Company, Fourth Marine Regiment  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3:JLH:pam  
3000  
24 March 1966

From: Commanding Officer, ADC Command Group  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
Subj: Pursuit of Enemy Forces  
Ref: (a) CC 3dMarDiv ltr 3120.1 dated 18 March 1966  
(b) COMUSMACV 010235Z March

1. Reference (a) requested an analysis of Operation Utah as related to the principles set forth in reference (b).

2. Operation Utah is a classic example of Marine capability to react rapidly in pursuit of VC forces.

Brigadier General PLATT, Assistant Division Commander/Task Force Delta Commander was first notified of VC activity in the future area of operation at 031705H March 1966, by the Senior U. S. Advisor to 2d ARVN Division (Col. JONES). Two North Vietnamese Army Engineers had been captured by the ARVN on 2 March. These prisoners gave the location of a North Vietnamese Regimental CP. This location corresponded with a SPAR report received by the ADC. Also at 031705H the ARVN requested 20 helicopters for use the following day. At 031708H General PLATT alerted Col. PEATROSS (CO, 7th Marines) to the impending situation. General PLATT then contacted the Chief of Staff, 3d Marine Division at 031715H and notified him of the requirements for 20 helicopters by the ARVN on 4 March. The Chief of Staff returned the General's call at 031830H and indicated the helicopter request was approved and that direct liaison was authorized with MAG-36. Commanding Officer, 7th Marines attended a joint conference in Quang Ngai at 031900H; returning at 032145H, where he set into motion the final stages of planning for the operation.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines was alerted at 031720H to prepare for departure to Quang Ngai on 4 March. At 032115H the Commanding Officer and his executive staff reported to the 7th Marine CP for a briefing, which ended at 032200H. The battalion published its Frag Order #2-66 by 040200H. At 040700H, Company E(-), 2/7, provided security for an artillery convoy to Binh Son. The remaining portion of 2/7, utilizing the same helicopters employed for the 1st ARVN Airborne Bn, moved to the battalion's helicopter landing zone at 040815H, with the lift commencing at 041040H. The first wave touched down in LZ Alfa at 041100H.



The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines was alerted to their impending commitment on Operation Utah at 041015H. The battalion established a helicopter pick-up zone at 041030H. Company K and one platoon of Company I of 3/1 were notified at 041200H of their mission as convoy security. Forty-five minutes later the convoy moved out. The battalion received a frag order at 041310H authorizing direct liaison with MAG-36. At 041500H the lift of the remainder of 3/1 began, and by 041815 the lift was completed.

The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was given a warning order at 042035H to prepare a battalion command group and two rifle companies for a helicopter assault early on 5 March. Frag Order 171-66 was received at 042230H assigning the battalion its mission. At 050800H the first elements of the battalion were lifted out. Leading elements of the battalion landed at 050830H, followed by the command group at 050845H, with the entire lift being completed at 051107H.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was alerted at 051030H for the commitment of a battalion command group in the area of operation. The command group moved by convoy from Chu Lai at 051145H. The battalion command group arrived in Binh Son at 051245H and at 051325H had OPCON of K Company 3/1 and E Company 2/7. Task Force Delta issued orders for the battalion to move from Binh Son overland into a blocking position. At 051410H the battalion began moving out. The quick response time is exemplified in the above discussions.

3. Although it is clearly recognized that the basic concept promulgated in reference (a) is "quick reaction", there can be segregated from the message at least ten "sub-principles" whose application will characterize successful operations. Reference (b) had not yet reached any of the Utah participants at the time the operations commenced. The correlation between events on Utah and the content of reference (a) is so good that an objective discussion would be in order at this time.

a. "VC continue to attack - - - usually against RF, PF, and isolated ARVN units". The 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion landed southwest of the reported VC units and commenced moving to the northwest at which time they met very stiff resistance and were attacked by VC forces. It was the effort of 2/7, which diverted and blunted the attack thus relieving pressure on the hard pressed Airborne Battalion.

During the early morning hours of D+1 an estimated two VC battalions hit the 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion. Three hours of close fighting followed in which, through the valiant efforts of the ARVN troops and the continuous defensive fires laid down by Marine artillery, the VC attack was broken. This artillery barrage was the most intensive fired thus far by Marine artillery in Vietnam. During a three hour period 1907 artillery rounds were fired.

b. "Engagement and pursuit of VC forces which reveal their presence by offensive action must be Priority #1 at all levels. Scheduled operations may be adjusted or delayed to accommodate quick reaction operations against lucrative VC targets." Utah became Priority #1 from the start with the ADC, the Regimental Commander closest to the action and all staff sections concerned.

Plans were formulated immediately and refined as more details became available. Operation Maine scheduled to be conducted by the 7th Marines, was immediately delayed.

c. "We must tighten up our liaison and communications with Vietnamese forces. Tactical unit commanders will establish direct communications with Vietnamese Division, Province, and Regional headquarters . . . and quick reaction procedures worked out."

This had been done in an extremely competent manner, at the highest levels General PLATT - General LAM - Colonel JONES, Colonel PEATROSS - Colonel JOHNS; 7th Marines liaison briefing weekly at the 2d ARVN Division CP; permanent Marine liaison officer at Quang Ngai and ARVN liaison at Chu Lai; an ARVN radio relay station in Chu Lai to name the most prominent. There is never any question of exchanging information only at Corps level, the information is exchanged through the many liaison channels interconnecting the Chu Lai Enclave and 2d ARVN Division headquarters.

d. "We do not have an independent mission."

Immediate response to the ARVN request for helicopter support was only the beginning of the cooperation and dual mission so vividly displayed throughout the operation. A joint CP was established just north of Quang Ngai to facilitate close cooperation and cut reaction time. The 2d ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company was under the operational control of 3/1 during most of the operation. Another outstanding example of working together was the quick response of 2/7 to the call for assistance by the 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion on D-Day.

e. "VC particularly vulnerable to pursuit."

VC habits present an unusual opportunity for the success of aggressively executed pursuit operations. Such operations must be characterized by great imagination and must utilize all the combined arms, including air.

The VC nearly always withdraw to the west or the nearest hills and heavily vegetated area. In order to prevent the VC from exfiltrating, a rectangle was formed and closed, with the driving forces moving toward the sea (east). All available supporting arms were utilized. Air was readily available and extensively used throughout the operation, but especially during the early stages. Artillery was quickly moved from Chu Lai to the area of operation and immediately began to support both Marine and ARVN forces.

f. "Commanders must not only plan for adequate immediate support, but must simultaneously issue necessary orders for the pursuit."

This is readily shown by the rapid and systematic deployment of Marine and ARVN forces. The original objective was to contain the VC, and to accomplish this four battalions were quickly deployed. Then more battalions were moved into the area to provide maneuver elements with which to exploit the situation.

g. "Fresh units should be thrown into the attack . . . However the unit under attack should begin its pursuit at first light."

A steady stream of fresh units were systematically alerted and committed to the operation as shown in the aforementioned chronology.

h. "Aerial surveillance should be intensified immediately."

Not only were aerial observers rushed to the area but TAC(A)s were placed on station immediately to pin-point targets. Almost continuous surveillance was maintained during daylight hours over the area of operation.

i. "Artillery and air strikes should be made against likely withdrawal routes and assembly areas whether or not VC are sighted, based upon tactical judgment of the commanders concerned."

Exceptionally good use was made of artillery and air during the entire operation and particularly during the early stages. Extensive use was made of artillery II and I's plus TPQ-10 air strikes at night on likely assembly areas and trail networks.

j. "This . . . tendency (on the part of the ground commanders, artillerymen and FAC's to withhold their fire power when enemy targets are not sighted) must be overcome in connection with pursuit operations . . . When he reveals his presence by an attack . . . at this time and immediately following the attack commanders on the ground and FAC's under specific instructions from commanders on the ground must apply heavy and sustained fire power against suspected withdrawal routes and assembly areas without hesitation . . . All commanders and troops must adopt the attitude of the hunter who is determined to find and kill the attacking VC force."

Air, artillery and organic indirect fire weapons of the battalions were used extensively once the VC revealed their position. Fire was directed not only at the attacking force but likely routes of withdrawal and assembly areas.

*for* *Se Martin*  
O. P. PEATROSS

**SECRET**COMMUNICATION CENTER  
3D MARINE DIVISION

VV HPC133  
ZNY 55505  
P 272326Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO 3D THIRD MARDIV  
P 240718Z  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO CG III MAF  
BT

**ACTION COPY**11263  
JMS

SECRET 09246 FROM MACJ234  
SUBJ: OPERATION GEORGIA (S)  
REF: COMUSMACV 121840Z MAR 1966

1. (C) WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE BELOW LISTED INFORMATION THE CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL QUANG NAM PROVINCE REMAINS IDENTICAL TO THAT CONTAINED IN THE ABOVE REFERENCE.
2. (S) DOCUMENT CAPTURED AFTER THE VC ATTACK ON BINH LONG BRIDGE (BT 013568) ON 22 FEB HAVE IDENTIFIED THE 70TH LF BN, PREVIOUSLY LOCATED IN NORTHEASTERN QUANG TIN PROVINCE, AS THE ATTACKING FORCE, AND PLACED THIS BATTALION WITH A STRENGTH OF 500

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3277C SECRET

IN THE AREA. ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS HAS CONSISTED OF NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF HARASSING SMALL ARMS AND MORTAR FIRE AGAINST MARINES, RVN UNITS AND DISTRICT TOWNS AND HAMLETS IN THE AREA, AND A MINOR ATTACK ON AN ARVN OP AT AT 947584 ON 17 MAR 66. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION WITHIN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS INCLUDE:

A. BASE AREAS: AT 885396, AT 958417, BT 064625, BT 160533, BT 130530, BT 130520.

B. RICE STORAGE AREAS: BT 153469, BT 130490, BT 130500, BT 144485, BT 021487, BT 005443, BT 001400, AT 800555, AT 801558, AT 808575, AT 955397, AT 958417, BT 050410.

C. TRAINING BASES: AT 805670, BT 594449.

GP-4  
BT

MAR 27 1966

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

MESSAGE FORM - SECRET

3d MarDiv - 2100/1

VV MFD446

OO RUMSMA RUMSVD

DE RUMNMF 802 0841456

ZNY SSSSS

O 251456Z 25-2250H

FM CG III MAF

TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

ZEN/FLC

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSVD/CMDR I CORPS ADV GRU

RUMSVD/DET C-1 5TH SPECIAL FORCES, DANANG

BT

S E C R E T

PLANNING DIRECTIVE

1. A SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF THUONG DUC (ZC 1554) HAS BEEN PROPOSED WITH AN UTMATE PURPOSE OF CLEARING THAT AREA OF VC IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CIDG CAMP. THE CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION HAS BEEN APPROVED BY CG I CORPS AND IS CONCURRED IN BY CG III MAF.

2.A. CG 3DMARDIV IS TASKED TO CONDUCT A SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN THE THUONG DUC-HA TAN (ZC 1554) AREA COMMENCING ASAP BUT NOT LATER. EXPECTED DURATION 3 DAYS.

PAGE TWO RUMNMF 802 S E C R E T

B. CG 1ST MAW IS TASKED TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED AIR SUPPORT FOR THIS OPERATION.

C. FLC PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

3. CG 3DMARDIV AUTHORIZED DIRECT LIAISON WITH DET C-1 5TH SPEC FOR.

4. CG 3DMARDIV SUBMIT PROPOSED OA TO THIS HQ SOONEST.

5. CODE NAME FOR OPN IS ORANGE.

GP-4

BT

STAFF PLANNING CONFERENCE

Copy to INSPECTOR

MALIN

MAR 26 1966

**SECRET**

Encl 22

IAW REF A  
 1. REQ FOLLOWING ALASKA ARC LIGHT TARGETS  
 BE REQUESTED FOR 260001Z RPT 260001Z MAR  
 MAR

WITH NO BOMBS RPT NO BOMBS AFTER 260030Z MAR  
 RPT AFTER 260030Z MAR:

A. QUANG NAM 4 (FINE SAND 1)

|           |     |           |
|-----------|-----|-----------|
| ZC 202634 | RPT | ZC 202634 |
| ZC 207636 | RPT | ZC 207636 |
| AT 809644 | RPT | AT 809644 |
| AT 803652 | RPT | AT 803652 |

B. QUANG NAM 5 (FINE SAND 2)

|           |               |
|-----------|---------------|
| ZC 178635 | RPT ZC 178635 |
| ZC 207635 | RPT ZC 207635 |
| ZC 207625 | RPT ZC 207625 |
| ZC 177625 | RPT ZC 177625 |

C. QUANG NAM 6 (FINE SAND 3)

|           |               |
|-----------|---------------|
| ZC 181634 | RPT ZC 181634 |
| ZC 177624 | RPT ZC 177624 |
| ZC 149636 | RPT ZC 149636 |
| ZC 154645 | RPT ZC 154645 |

D. QUANG NAM 7 (FINE SAND 4)

|           |               |
|-----------|---------------|
| ZC 155688 | RPT ZC 155688 |
| ZC 184692 | RPT ZC 184692 |
| ZC 186682 | RPT ZC 186682 |
| ZC 156678 | RPT ZC 156678 |

DECLASSIFIED

T-TYPE

DRAFTER 31 /  
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3  
TRANS TOD  
CWO

CCN

ROUTINE/PRIORITY OP IMMEDIATE FLASH 66

FM: CG, THIRD MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

INFO

TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL/UNCLASS

SUBJ:

REF COMMUNACV 111454Z MAR (S)

B.

C.

(OVER)

DECLASSIFIED

## 1. MAKE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO REF A:

A. DELETE FIRST BN (REIN), FIRST MARINES WHERE APPEARING AND SUBSTITUTE FIRST BN, FOURTH MARINES MINUS REIN THEREFOR, LTCOL SULLIVAN VICE LTCOL HATCH.

B. IN PARA 2 SUBSTITUTE 26 MARCH VICE 20 MARCH

C. IN PARA 3.A.:

(1) DELETE FIRST SENTENCE

(2) DELETE ALL AFTER (2C 1466) IN SECOND SENTENCE.

(3) DELETE THIRD SENTENCE

(4) DELETE "(PRIMARY SEARCH FORCE)"

(5) DELETE LAST SENTENCE.

D. IN PARA 3.B.:

(1) DELETE SUB-PARA (1)

(2) IN SUB-PARA (2) DELETE "ESTABLISH BASE CAMP"

E. IN PARA 3.E:

(1) DELETE SUB-PARAS (1) AND (2) AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFOR: "(1) D-DAY, L-HOUR DESIGNATED 261000H MARCH 1966"

F. IN PARA 5:

(1) CHANGE PARA 5B TO READ 1<sup>ST</sup> BN 4<sup>TH</sup> MARINES

(2) CHANGE SECOND LINE IN PARA 5B(1)(C) TO READ 1<sup>ST</sup> BN 4<sup>TH</sup> MARINES - PIED PIPER VICE 1<sup>ST</sup> BN 1<sup>ST</sup> MARINES

(3) CHANGE SECOND LINE IN PARA 5B(2)(C) TO READ 1<sup>ST</sup> BN 4<sup>TH</sup> MARINES - PIED PIPER LY60 VICE 1<sup>ST</sup> BN 1<sup>ST</sup> MARINES - PILSNER 6PBQ



DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTER 3/ /  
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3  
TRANS TOD \_\_\_\_\_  
CWO \_\_\_\_\_

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/OP IMMEDIATE/FLASH \_\_\_\_\_ 66

FM: CG, THIRD MARDIV

TO THIRD MAF DIV

CG FMAW

CG III MAF

INFO \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL/UNCLASS

SUBJ: CHANGE TO MY OPN O 366-66 (ALASKA)

REF MY OPN O 366-66

A. MY (NOTAL)

C. \_\_\_\_\_

(OVER)

DECLASSIFIED

(4) ADD FOLLOWING AS PARA 5C.

1<sup>ST</sup> BN 4<sup>TH</sup> MARINES USE FOLLOWING FREQS  
DURING OPERATION IN AND ADJACENT  
TO DANANG ENCLAVE:

|               |                         |                                    |
|---------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| BI MART COF   | D 213                   | 43.6                               |
| 106 RIFLE CMD | D 276                   | 41.2                               |
| Co A TAC      | D 261                   | 52.2                               |
| Co B TAC      | D 267                   | 53.4                               |
| Co C TAC      | D 253                   | 50.6                               |
| Co D TAC      | D <sup>206</sup><br>105 | <del>42.9</del><br><del>51.4</del> |

(4) ADD FOLLOWING AS PARA 5C.

1<sup>st</sup> BN 4<sup>th</sup> MARINES USE FOLLOWING FREQS  
DURING OPERATION IN AND ADJACENT  
TO DANANG ENCLAVE:

|               |            |           |               |
|---------------|------------|-----------|---------------|
| BI MORT COF   | D 213      | 43.6      | ok            |
| 106 RIFLE CMD | D 276      | 41.2      | ok            |
| Co A TAC      | D 261      | 52.2      | ok            |
| Co B TAC      | D 267      | 53.4      | ok            |
| Co C TAC      | D 253      | 50.6      | ok            |
| → Co D TAC    | D 185      | 39.4      | <del>At</del> |
| Co D TAC.     | ↑<br>D 206 | ↑<br>42.9 | ok            |

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 804  
 O 260712Z  
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV (COC)  
 TO COC III MAF  
 BT

S E C R E T

A. YOUR 251456Z OPN ORANGE OA

1. IAW REF A OPN ORANGE OA AS FOLLOWS:  
 CIRCLE W/RADIOS 3600 METERS CENTERED ON ZC 153541.  
 2. REQUEST CONFIRMATION ASAP.

3. ASSUMED CMD RELATIONSHIPS AS FOLLOWS:  
 UNILATERAL OPN UNDER CMD AND CONTROL 3D MAR DIV UNTIL SUCH TIME  
 USASPLFOR ADVISE CMDR ON GROUND THAT ALPHA DET W/CIDG CO CAPABLE  
 OF REQUIRED DEFENSE AT WHICH TIME 3D MAR DIV UNITS RELINQUISH CMD  
 AND CONTROL AND COMMENCE RETRACTION.

BT

KKKK

S

ANDMAT

DIV QSL YU 805 VICE 806  
 MAR 866 KK

AUB 260726

26 07 12 Z

Encl 24

DRAFTER 3/BFC/12a  
 SEC 0-3 PHONE Shove 3  
 CWO                     

CCN                     IMMEDIATE 26 1408 MAR 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO: CG III MAF  
       CG FMAW  
       FIC  
       FLSU, PHU BAI

MAR 26 1966

// SECRET //

OPN ORDER 378-66

- A. MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS SERIES L701
- B. 3D MARDIV OPN O 343-65
- C. DIV ORDER 06040.1
- D. DIV ORDER 02000.2C

TASK ORGN:4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)

COL SHERMAN

HQ CO (REIN), 4TH MAR

HQ CO, 4TH MAR

DET, HQ BN, 3D MARDIV

1ST BN (-), 1ST MAR

LTCOL HATCH

H&amp;S CO (-), 1ST BN, 1ST MAR

CO A, 1ST BN, 1ST MAR

CO B, 1ST BN, 1ST MAR

CO C, 1ST BN, 1ST MAR

2D BN, 1ST MAR

LTCOL HANAFIN

3D BN, 4TH MAR

LTCOL VALE

1ST BN (-), 4TH MAR

LTCOL SULLIVAN

FIN CMD GRU

CO A, 1ST BN, 4TH MAR

PAGE      OF      PAGES

Doc # 25

CO B, 1ST BN, 4TH MAR

3D BN (-)(REIN), 12TH MAR

LTCOL PAGE

HQ BTRY (REIN), 3D BN, 12TH MAR

BTRY I, 3D BN, 12TH MAR

BTRY C, 1ST BN, 12TH MAR

BTRY B, 1ST BN, 11TH MAR

107MM MORT BTRY, 1ST BN, 11TH MAR

BTRY E, 4TH BN, 12TH MAR

CO'S B AND D, 3D RECON BN

1. SITUATION:

A. ENEMY. ANNEX B (INTEL) TO REF B AND ISUMS AS ISSUED.

B. FRIENDLY.

(1) REF B.

(2) 1ST ARVN DIV CONDUCTS OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE OPNS IN THUA THIEN AND QUANG TRI PROVINCES (11TH DTA) TO DESTROY VC/PAVN FORCES AND PROTECT GVN INSTALLATIONS AND POPULATION CENTERS.

(3) FISO, PHU BAI PROVIDES SUPPLIES AND SERVICES AS REQUIRED.

2. MISSION. SEE REF B.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. SEE ANNEX C (CONCEPT) TO REF B.

B. 4TH MARINES (-)(REIN).

(1) OCCUPY AND DEFEND THE HUE-PHU BAI TAOR TO PROTECT AND DEFEND THE HUE-PHU BAI AIRFIELD, ANCILLARY FACILITIES, AND VITAL AREA. SEE APPENDIX 2 W/CHANGES TO ANNEX D (OPN OVERLAYS) TO REF B.

(2) CONDUCT UNILATERAL SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS W/IN ASSIGNED TAOR.

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

- A
- (3) CONDUCT VIGOROUS CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN ASSIGNED TAOR AND THOSE AREAS ASSIGNED FOR OPNS.
  - (4) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT UNILATERAL AND/OR COORDINATED OPNS W/RVNAT BEYOND THE TAOR AS DIRECTED BY THIS HQ.
  - (5) ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A RECON NETWORK AND CONDUCT COMBAT/RECON PATROLS IN ASSIGNED TAOR AND RECON ZONES.
  - (6) BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH, FUNCTION, AND OPERATE THE TASK FORCE DELTA HQ BY PROVIDING ORGANIC PERS AND EQUIP AUGMENTED AS REQ BY THIS HQ.
  - (7) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS:
    - (A) ONE RIFLE CO W/IN 4 HOUR NOTIFICATION.
    - (B) ONE REIN INF BN (MINUS ABOVE CO) W/IN 6 HOURS.
    - (C) ONE REGT CMD GRU AND ONE REIN INF BN W/IN 12 HOURS.
  - (8) ESTABLISH A MUTUALLY SUPPORTING REAR AREA DEFENSE W/IN ASSIGNED TAOR COORDINATING THE RESOURCES OF ALL TENANT ACTIVITIES THEREIN.
  - (9) MAINTAIN ONE REIN INF BN (-) OPERATING NORTH OF HUE UNODIR BY THIS HQ.

C. 3D ENGR BN.

- (1) ONE ENGR CO (REIN) G/S 4TH MAR.
- (2) PROVIDE COMBAT ENGR SUPT AND W/IN CAPABILITY DELIBERATE ENGR SUP AS REQUIRED BY 4TH MAR.

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

## (2) FOLLOWING FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED FOR INTERNAL USE:

|                           |      |       |
|---------------------------|------|-------|
| REGT CMD (P)              | 2492 | D-25  |
| (S)                       | 6345 | D-147 |
| REGT TAC #1 (P)           | 40.1 | D-371 |
| (S)                       | 47.2 | D-438 |
| REGT TAC #2 (P)           | 4344 | D-100 |
| (S)                       | 9827 | D-202 |
| TASK FORCE LOCAL SECURITY | 54.2 | D-492 |

## C. RADIO RELAY:

(1) ESTABLISH RADIO RELAY TERMINAL WITH AUGMENTINO DIV COMM CO

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AS FOLLOWS:

|      |      |                   |
|------|------|-------------------|
| CH 1 | C/U  | AFTERGLOW - SHOVE |
| CH 2 | S/U+ | S2 - 02           |
| CH 3 | S/U  | S3 - 03           |
| CH 4 | C/U  | AFTERGLOW - SHOVE |

SUPER IMPOSE TELETYPE THIS CHANNEL

## D. COMM CENTER AND CRYPTO

(1) ESTABLISH COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD FOR ALL MARINE UNITS PHU BAI.

E. TASK FORCE DELTA COMM: (FOLLOWS BY SEPARATE MSG).

GP-4

RELEASED BY \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES



D. 3D TANK BN.

(1) ONE TANK CO (REIN) D/S 4TH MARINES.

E. 3D AT BN.

(1) ONE AT CO (-)(REIN) D/S 4TH MARINES.

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE 280800H

(2) CO, 4TH MARINES DESIGNATED CIVIC ACTION AND BSY WAR COORDINATOR  
FOR USMC FORCES IN 11TH DFA.

(3) DIRLAUTH AND DIRECTED W/CO 1ST ARVN DIV.

(4) FIRE SUPT COORD.

(A) 4TH MAR RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRE SUPT COORD WITHIN HUE-PHU BAI  
TAOR AND RZ'S, AND FOR COORD OF SUPTING FIRES W/LOCAL OVN ARMED  
FORCES CMDR.

(B) NOF SUPT IAW ANNEX H (NOF SUPT) TO REF B.

(C) AIR SUPT IAW ANNEX F (AIR SUPT) TO REF B.

(5) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: REF B.

(6) REPORTS IAW DIV O 3100.1B.

4. ADMIN AND LOG. SEE ADMIN ORDER 343-65 AND REF C.5. CMD AND COMM-ELECT.

A. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE D.

B. RADIO:

(1) ENTER DIVISION TACTICAL NET #1 FREQ: (P) D27 3925  
(S) D4 2244

EMISSION: VOICE

CALL SIGN: THICK SKINNED/94P7

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

MAF DE DIV NR 8: 832

0-270445Z

FM THIRD MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL LG

SUBJ: OPN ORANGE

GP REQUEST PSY WAR TEAM TO SUPT SUBJ OPN.

2. IF APPROVED PSY WAR TEAM REPORT DIRECT TO CG 3RD MARINES.

BT

NNNN

DE DIV INT QSL INT QSL INT QSL INT QSL KKKK

DE MAF QSL UP NR 832 ZUR 27/0500Z K K K

27 0445

Encl 26

*800-8 out  
at 843  
on or about 3 April 66*

MAF DE DIV NR 835  
O 270555Z  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO CG VMIH MAF  
BT

S C K F I  
SUBJ: OPN ORANGE

1. THE SONG VU GIA ABOVE THE DAM LOCATED (ZC1251) PROVIDES WATER TO THE VIC E E VC FOR MANY PURPOSES.
2. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE DAM (ZC1251) BE DESTROYED TO DENY THE WATER TO THE VC. DURING OPN ORANGEM.

BT

*Disapproved  
28 Mar DMB*

MAF DE DIV INT QSL INT QSL INT QSL INT QSL  
DE MAF QSL UR NR 835 ZUS 27/0650Z K K F

*27 05 55*

*Encl 27*

DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTER 3/BFC/af  
SEC 0-3 PHONE Shove 3  
CVC \_\_\_\_\_

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE 271310 MAR 66

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: THIRD MARDIV  
INFO: CG III MAF  
CG FRAM  
FLSG  
FLC

// SECRET //

OPH ORDER 374-66 (VIRGINIA)

- A. MOPS: VIETNAM 1;50,000 AMS SERIES L701 SHEETS
- B. MY 190904Z
- C. MY OTO 343-65
- D. MY 201540Z
- E. MY 211445Z
- F. 3D MARDIV ORDER 02000.2C

CANCEL REF B

1. SITUATION

- A. ENEMY. ANNEX A (INTEL) TO BE ISSUED BY MSG
- B. FRIENDLY

(1) REF C

(2) FRAM PROVIDES AIRLIFT, RESUPPLY, MED EVAC, CAS AND AS LISTED  
REF C.

(3) USAF PROVIDE HEAVY LOGISTIC AIRLIFT AS REQUESTED.

(4) ARVN MILITARY/PARA-MILITARY FORCES IN THE SAME AREA:

(A) 1 CIDG RECON FLT

PAGE 1 OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

MAR 27 1966

28

DECLASSIFIED

- (B) 1 105MM HOW PLT
- (C) 2 CIDG COS
- (D) 1 LLOB UNIT (ARVN SPL FOR)
- (E) 1 INTERPRETER TM
- (F) ASSORTED MIKE FORCE AND CIVIL PERS (APPROX 45)

(5) USASF DET ARE ADVISORS TO UNITS IN (4) ABOVE.

2. MISSION. COMMENCING 5 APRIL 66, 3D MAR DIV DEPLOYS REIN INF BN MINUS TO CONDUCT S AND D AND RECON IN FORCE OPNS IN AND AROUND THE SANH AREA TO LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY VC FORCES AND ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF THE SANH SPL FOR CAMP VIC (XD 842425).

### 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. 3D MAR DIV AIRLIFTS ONE INF BN REIN W/ENGR SUPT AND ONE EACH 105MM HOW BTRY MINUS AND 107MM MORT BTRY MINUS BY FIXED AND ROTARY WING A/C ON 5 APRIL 66 FROM HUE-PHU-BAI TO USASF CAMP ~~THE~~ SANH TO CONDUCT S AND D AND RECON IN FORCE OPNS TO LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN OPN AREA CENTERED AT (XD 842425) AND A RADIUS OF 10 KM; ~~ASSISTS~~ IN THE DEFENSE OF SPLFOR CAMP AT THE SANH. EST DURATION OPN IS 10 DAYS.

### B. 4TH MARINES

(1) COMMENCING ON 5 APRIL 66 DEPLOY ONE INF BN MINUS REIN W/ONE 105MM HOW BTRY MINUS, ONE 107MM MORT BTRY MINUS, AND OTHER REQUIRED SUPPORTING UNITS BY FIXED AND ROTARY WING A/C TO THE SANH SPL FOR CAMP (XD 842425); ESTABLISH OPN BASE AND DEF POSNS IN COORDINATION W/USASF ADVISOR.

(2) CONDUCT S AND D AND RECON IN FORCE IN OPN AREA (CIRCLE CENTERED XD 842425 AND RADIUS 10 KM) TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY VC/PAVN FORCES LOCATED THEREIN.

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

MAR 27 1966

(3) BE PREPARED TO COMMIT TASK GROUP CP AND ADDITIONAL REIN INF BN MINUS DEPENDENT ON DEVELOPED SITUATION.

(4) PROVIDE ASST SECURITY UNIT IAW REF D AND E.

C. COORD INST

(1) DIRLAUTH AND ENCOURAGED W/CO, 1ST ARVN DIV AND DET C-1, 5TH SPL FOR, USA.

(2) RCA AUTH IN OPN AREA ONLY.

(3) CO, 4TH MAR DESIGNATE USMC CMR AND NOTIFY THIS HQ INFO THREE HAF.

(4) MAXIMIZE EFFORT TO CAPTURE VC/PAVN PRISONERS ALIVE.

(5) UNCLAS CODE NAME THIS OPN: VIRGINIA

4. ADMIN AND LOG

A. SUPPLY

(1) GENERAL - 3D SHORE PARTY BN ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A LOGISTIC SUPPORT AREA AT THE SONH COORD XD 842425.

(2) SUPPLY SOURCES - FLSG (A) AT DANANG AND FLSU AT PHU BAI FOR ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY.

(3) PRESCRIBED LOADS - AS PRESCRIBED BY TASK GROUP COMMANDER.

(4) SUBMIT SPECIAL AND EMERGENCY REQUESTS TO FLSU PHU BAI.

(5) DUMP LEVEL - AS DIRECTED BY TASK FORCE COMMANDER.

(6) RESUPPLY

(A) COMBAT UNITS - BY HELO FROM LSA

(B) LSA - BY HELO OR FIXED WING FROM FLSU OR FLSG (A).

B. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION - IAW CURRENT DIRECTIVES AND AS DIRECTED BY TASK GROUP CMDR.

C. PERSONNEL

(1) CASUALTY REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 3D MARDIVO 3040.2A.

page \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

MAR 27 1969

- (2) COMMERCING D-1 SUBMIT PERSONNEL WEEKLY SUMMARY (PWS) TO THIS HQTRS (SC-1) BY 1800 EACH FRIDAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH 3D MARDIVO 1380.3A.
- (3) ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES.
- (4) GRAVES REGISTRATION - HIA WILL BE EVAC THROUGH MED EVAC PRESCRIBED IN PARA 4.B. OF THIS ORDER.
- (5) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNIT OR PERSONAL AWARDS - IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 1650.1B AND PEPFACO 1650.1A.
- (6) CIVIL AFFAIRS - IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 50 0.1.

D. CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND DOCUMENTS

- (1) VCC AND VCS - IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX B TO DIV OPO 343-65.
- (2) CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO P3800.1 AND ANNEX B TO DIV OPO 343-65.

- E. (3) RETURNEES - THOSE ELIGIBLE FOR CHIEU HOI STATUS WILL BE DELIVERED TO CHIEU HOI CENTER DANANG. MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DELIVER WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RALLY.

E. MISCELLANEOUS

- (1) MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF HALIZONE/IODINE TABLETS FOR WATER.
- (2) UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT - AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDERS.
- (3) COMMANDERS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INSURE WEAPONS ARE MAINTAINED IN A SERVICEABLE CONDITION AT ALL TIMES.
- (4) CAPTURED MATERIALS WHICH CANNOT BE EVACUATED WILL BE DESTROYED AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDERS.
- (5) CAPTURED RICE WILL BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 03460.1. INSURE SUFFICIENT RICE BAGS ARE ON HAND FOR BAGGING.

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(6) TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF HELICOPTERS, INSURE THAT THOSE GOING  
OUT EACH MORNING TAKE NECESSARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

- A. COMH IAW DIV O 02000.2C (COI)
- B. NOTIFY THIS HQTRS CP LOCATION AND TIME CP ESTABLISHED.
- C. FORWARD COMH PLAN (AND CHARGES THERETO) IN SUPPORT OF THIS OPN  
TO THIS HQTRS (ATTN: CEO).
- D. CMD RELATIONSHIPS TO BE PUBLISHED.

OP-4

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CHAPTER 37/11W  
 SEC C-3 PHONE SHOVE 3  
 TRANS TOD \_\_\_\_\_  
 CNO \_\_\_\_\_

COR \_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE 271350 MAR66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO: CG III MAF  
 CG FMAA  
 FLC  
 FLAG ALPHA  
 DET C-1, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES, DA NANG

//S E C R E T//

OPERATION ORDER 383-66 (OWN CHANGE)

REF: A. MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS SERIES L701

B. 38 MARDIV OPNO 343-65

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

TASK ORGN

3D MARDIV

MAJGEN KYLE

3D MAR

COL FISHER

INF BN (-) (REIN)

INF BN (-)

4.2 MORT BTRY

PLT, ENGR CO, 3D ENGR BN

DET, HQT, 3D SF BN

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY. TO BE ISSUED BY MSG AS ANNEX A (INTEL)

B. FRIENDLY.

(1) SEE REF B

(2) USASF ESTABLISH SPL FOR CAMP VIC THUONG DUC VIC (ZC 1594) DURING

PAGE \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES

Encl = 29

MAR 26 1966

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PERIOD 3-7 APRIL 1966.

(3) CIDG PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR USE AS GUIDES, INTERROGATORS, BASIS 2/CO.

(4) US ARMY AVIATION ELEMENTS AVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY AIRLIFT/RESUPPLY.

(5) FMAF PROVIDES AIRLIFT, RESUPPLY, MED EVAC AND GAS AS REQUESTED.

(6) 707TH RF CO VIC (ZC 144532) OPERATES UNDER CONTROL DISTRICT CHIEF.

(7) USA SPL FOR PROVIDE AIRTEL W/COM TO IEF BN CONDUCTING OPN ORANGE.

2. MISSION. 3D MARINEV CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS IN THE THUONG DUC - HA TAN AREA TO SUPPORT THE INITIAL INSTALLATION OF CIDG CAMP, AND PROVIDES FIRE CLEARING AND SECURITY FOR USA SPL FOR AS REQUIRED.

### 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. COMMENCING L-HOUR, D-DAY ONE REIN INF BN MINUS CONDUCTS HELIBORNE ASSAULT VIC THUONG DUC AIRSTRIP (ZC 153541); CONDUCT MINE-SWEEP OPNS; ESTABLISH OPERATIONAL BASE VIC (ZC 152542); CONDUCT S AND D OPNS IN AREA W/RADIUS 3600 METERS CENTERED AT (ZC 153541); PROVIDE TACTICAL SECURITY TO CONSTRUCTION OF CIDG CAMP AND AIRSTRIP UNTIL CAMP ESTABLISHED AND CAPABLE OF SELF DEFENSE. EST DURATION OPN IS 18 DAYS.

#### B. 3D MARINES

- (1) COMMENCING L-HOUR, D-DAY, CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT VIC THUONG DUC (ZC 153541) TO ESTABLISH OPN BASE.
- (2) CONDUCT MINE SWEEP OPNS, VIC AIRSTRIP AND AS REQUIRED BY USASPLFOR.
- (3) CONDUCT S AND D OPNS IN OPERATION AREA.
- (4) PROVIDE TACTICAL SECURITY TO CONSTRUCTION OF CIDG CAMP AND AIRSTRIP.
- (5) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY REPT CMD GUN ON 4 HOUR ALERT.
- (6) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON OF 9TH MAR INF BN CMD GUN AND TWO RIFLE COS AS MOBILE RESERVE.
- (7) BE PREPARED TO RELINQUISH CMD AND CONTROL OF OPERATION AREA AND TO COMPLY FOR RETRACTION ON ORDER THIS HQ.

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MAR 27 1966

C. 9TH MARINES

- (1) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ONE RIFLE CO ON 2 HOUR ALERT AND INF BN AND GRU W/ONE RIFLE CO ON 4 HOUR ALERT TO BE COMMITTED WHEN DIRECTED BY THIS HQ.
- (2) NOTIFY THIS HQ UNITS DESIGNATED AND CHANGES AS OCCURRING.

D. CACHED UNIT

- (1) L-HOUR AS DESIGNATED BY CO 3D MARINES.
- (2) D-DAY: 1 APRIL 1966.
- (3) ROK AUTH IS OPR AREA ONLY.
- (4) OPR AREA IS CIRCLE W/RADIUS 3600 METERS CENTERED AT (ZG 153541).
- (5) DIRLAUTH AND DIRECTED BETWEEN PARTICIPATING UNITS AND DET C-1, 5TH SPL FOR, DA NANG, TEL FALCON 6279.
- (6) REPORTS IAN DIV C 3100.1B AND SPL SITREPS AT 06; 12; 18; AND 24 HOURS TO INCLUDE:
  - (A) CO LOCATIONS AT END PERIOD.
  - (B) BRIEF SUMMARY OF ACTIONS.
  - (C) ENEMY CONTACTS CITING TIME, PLACE, EST EN FORCE, RESULTS.
  - (D) OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.
  - (E) BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INTENTIONS.
  - (F) TASK ORGN EFFECTIVE 0800H, D-1.
  - (G) NOTIFY THIS HQ WHEN CHIX CAMP ESTABLISHED, CAPABLE OF SELF DEFENSE, AND SENIOR USASPLFOR OFFICER INDICATES HE IS READY TO ASSUME CONTROL.

MAR 27 1966

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICSA. SUPPLY

(1) GENERAL - \_\_\_\_\_ BN 3D MARINES ESTABLISH A SUPPLY DUMP WITH A WATER POINT IN VIC OF AIR STRIP AT COORD ZC1554.

(2) SUPPLY SOURCES - FLSG (A) FOR ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY.

(3) PRESCRIBED LOADS - AS PRESCRIBED BY UNIT COMMANDER

(4) DUMP LEVEL

CLASS I - 4 DAYS

CLASS II - AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDER

CLASS III - AS REQUIRED

CLASS IV - NONE

CLASS V - 4 DAYS

(5) RESUPPLY

(A) COMBAT UNITS - BY HELO FROM SUPPLY DUMP.

(B) SUPPLY DUMP - BY HELO/FIXED WINGS FROM FLSG (A).

B. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

(1) GENERAL - \_\_\_\_\_ BN 3D MARINES ESTABLISH BATTALION AID STATION AT SUPPLY DUMP COORD ZC1554 WITH 10 DAY INITIAL MEDICAL SUPPLY BLOCK.

(2) EVACUATION

(A) BY HELO DIRECT TO CO "C", 3D MED BN.

(B) HEAD INJURIES DIRECT TO NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY HOSPITAL, DANANG EAST.

(3) HOSPITALIZATION - AS DIRECTED BY COMMANDING OFFICER COMPANY "C", 3D MED BN.

C. PERSONNEL

(1) CASUALTY REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 3D MAR DIV 3040.2A.

**RETURN TO DIV**  
**G-3 FILES**

MAR 27 1966

- (2) COMMENCING D-1 SUBMIT PERSONNEL WEEKLY SUMMARY(PWS) TO THIS H.Q.TRS (SC-1) BY 1800 EACH FRIDAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH 3D MARDIVO 1380.3A.
- (3) ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES.
- (4) GRAVES REGISTRATION - KIA WILL BE EVACUATED THROUGH MEDICAL EVAC PRESCRIBED IN PARA 4.B OF THIS ORDER.
- (5) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNIT OR PERSONAL AWARDS - IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 1650.1B AND FMPPACO 1650.1A.
- (6) CIVIL AFFAIRS - IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 5080.1.

D. CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND DOCUMENTS

- (1) VCC AND VCS - IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX B TO DIV OPO 343-65.
- (2) CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIV O P 3800.1 AND ANNEX B TO DIV OP O 343-65.
- (3) RETRUNEES - THOSE ELIGIBLE FOR CHIEU HOI STATUS WILL BE DELIVERED TO CHIEU HOI CENTER DANANG. MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DELIVER WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RALLY.
- (4) CAPTURED MATERIALS WHICH CANNOT BE EVACUATED WILL BE DESTROYED AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDERS.
- (5) CAPTURED RICE WILL BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 03460.1. INSURE SUFFICIENT REE BAGS ARE ON HAND FOR BAGGING.
- (6) TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF HELICOPTERS, INSURE THAT THOSE GOING OUT EACH MORNING TAKE NECESSARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

- A. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (C) AND CURRENT COMM DIRECTIVES.
- B. COMMAND POSTS: INFORM THIS H.Q.TRS WHERE AND WHEN ESTABLISHED.
- C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

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MAR 27 1966

- (1) ASSIGNED BATTALION BE PREPARED TO ENTER, ON ORDER, DIVISION  
TAC NET #2.

|     | <u>FREQ</u> | <u>DESIGNATOR</u> |
|-----|-------------|-------------------|
| (P) | 43.1        | D-208             |
| (S) | 45.9        | D-231             |

- (2) DIRECT LIAISON DIRECTED WITH DET, C-1 5TH SPECIAL FORCES TO COORD  
ESTABLISHMENT OF COMM BETWEEN SPECIAL FORCES UNITS AND MARINE UNITS  
PARTICIPATING IN OPERATION. ADVISE THIS HEADQUARTERS OF ARRANGEMENTS  
MADE. INCLUDE INFO AS TO FREQUENCIES AND CALL SIGNS.

- (3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND AUTHENTICATION - (AUTHORIZED FOR USE BY U.S. UNITS  
ONLY)

- (A) AUTHENTICATION - KAA-60  
(B) NUMBER CODE - KAC -138  
(C) OPERATION BREVITY CODE - KAC - 140

- D. CMD RELATIONSHIPS. USMC CMDR OPCON IN OPN AREA UNTIL CMD AND CONTROL  
PASSED TO USASPL FOR ADVISOR ON ORDER THIS HQ.

GP-4

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MAR 27 1966

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3D MARINE DIVISION

160

100-443886-100

NOT QUOTE  
UNQUOTE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

350  
756 1004

TYPE 0-1, FILM 0-2, DATED

1972-1973 10-1-73

**HAS BEEN SENT**

11-000000

REF: A (INTERNAL) TO DIVISION 3 385-56 (CHARGE)

1. NAME: VENTNARI, 1:50,000; SEE 6701; SHEETS 6558 I, II, 6558, III, IV  
2. NAME: TUNO, 1:50,000; SEE 6701; SHEETS 6558 I, II, 6558, III, IV

B. DE 0 PHEOO, 3E

9. DTG 0230 543-65

1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

A. 44-38861-10

FOR CONF JETS ARE KEPT TO OPN IN OR NEAR CRT AREA;

0113

CSR

AREA/OPN

Q.14 IF 90 (0.76)

100

DATE 100 1980

Q. 17 LF 50

60

REGIONAL AND COUNTRY

20 000

500

THE GREAT BRITISH EMERALD

7.1.31 (7.85)

500

DUG DUG-DAY LOG TRAMP

DATE DUE

500

QUESTIONS DIST

### C. FINDINGS

(1) INFO DIVLD IN OPN TACT ROW IN RRB66 AND BY SUBSERQ NEGOT ACTIVE INDIC  
 PRESENCE OF VC IN UNK MRS IN MGN AREA N AND NE OF THURONG BUC. BELIEVED VC MAIN  
 CAMPS, SUP AND PROD AREAS AND HQ IN THIS REGION.

(2) ARVN AREAS SURROUNDING PHUONG DUC TO N, S, AND W PRESENT BN W/ASSN AREAS  
INFO WHICH UNITS COULD BE INFIL W/O DANGER OF DETECT. THERE IS NO EVID OF SUCH  
INFIL; HOWEVER OCCAS UNCONF AGT REFS STATE BN-SIZE UNITS IN AREA. 3-2 SEASON REPT  
ONE CO (POSS ELM R.20 BN) LOC VIC (20 1726); ALSO POL BN ACTYS IN AREA. 116

28

00

5 MAY 28 1966

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Encl 30

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- (A) ROLE BRGS/RAFFE CBS ON SONG YANG (ZC 1161).
- (B) BASE AREA/RICE STOR SITE VIC (ZC 195485).
- (C) WATS STOR SITE VIC (ZC 7948).
- (D) AA PSN (POSS .50 CAL) VIC (ZC 178538).
- (E) STAKED HLZ VIC (ZC 176539).
- (F) DONG PHUOC (1) FORTIF VIC (ZC 1655).
- (3) OTHER EN ACTVS: SEE APP 1 (EN ACTV OVLY) ISSUED SEPARATELY.

C. EN STR

## (1) IN OBJ AREA:

|                  |             |
|------------------|-------------|
| Q.14 LF CO       | 100         |
| Q.17 LF CO       | 70          |
| POSS ELM R.20 BN | 100         |
|                  | <u>270*</u> |

## (2) WITHIN REINF DISTANCE:

|               |              |
|---------------|--------------|
| R.20 BN       | 500          |
| 5TH BN (V.25) | 500          |
| CHU DUNG BN   | 500          |
|               | <u>1500*</u> |

\* TOTALS DO NOT INCL UNDETERMINED GUER STR IN OBJ/AJA AREAS.

D. EE CAPABILITIES

## (1) ENUMERATION

(A) CAP 1 - CONDUCT SMALL SCALE ATKS, AMBUSHES AND HARASS ACTS W/UP TO TWO COS AUGMTD BY LOCAL GUERS.

(B) CAP 2 - DEF W/UP TO TWO COS AUGMTD BY LOCAL GUERS.

(C) CAP 3 - REINF UNITS IN OBJ AREA W/UP TO TWO AND POSS THREE BNS.

(D) CAP 4 - WITHDRAW OR EXFIL FM OBJ AREA INTO SURROUNDING MTNS.

## (2) ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIO

(A) CAP 1 - TERRAIN, AREA KNOWLEDGE, TRNG, AND CONFIDENCE OF POPULATION FAVOR OFFENSIVE ACTIONS DESPITE SUPERIORITY OF FRDLY ARMS, PARTICULARLY, AGAINST RELATIVELY ISOLATED FRDLY ELMS. DISENGAGEMENT IS EXPECTED WHENEVER ALERTNESS AND

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SUPERIOR FIRE POWER OF FRODLY FORCES NULLIFY EFFECTS OF 3D MARINE DIVISION ATKS.

(B) CAP 2 - AREA KNOWLEDGE, KNOWN PREPARED POSITIONS, AND DESIRE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF PROBABLY COMBAT AND THEN SAFE AREAS FAVOR DEF. RUDIMENTARY COMBAT POWER MILITATE AGAINST SUSTAINED DEF OTHER THAN TO COVER UNIT WITHDRAWS FM AREA.

(C) CAP 3 - POSS IMPORTANCE OF AREA TO EN INFIL ACTVS, RELATIVE FREEDOM OF MVMT THRU CONTROLLED AREAS FM LOCS IN PROX TO OBJ AREA, AND DESIRE TO DEFEAT USMC FORCES FAVOR REINF ATTEMPT. IMPLIED LOSS OF COMBAT INITIATIVE W/ CONCOMITANT RISK OF DETECTION AND SUBJECTING TO PUNITIVE ACTIONS BY FRODLY FORCES SUPERIOR IN COMBAT POWER THRU MVMT AND MASSING OF UNITS MILITATE AGAINST REINF ACTION.

(D) CAP 4 - EFF EN INTEL, KNOWN TRANSITORY NATURE OF FRODLY OPNS AND SURVIVAL INSTINCTS OF INFERIOR UNITS FAVOR THIS CAP. EXFIL IS EXPECTED TO BE ONLY TO THE DEGREE NEC TO EVADE FRODLY ACTIONS. DENSITY OF VC-ORIENTED POPULATION MAY LIMIT NECESSITY FOR EXFILTRATION TO BLENDING W/LOCAL PEOPLE.

## 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA OF OPNS

A. WEATHER. SEE DAILY WEA FORECASTS AND WEA SUMS AS ISSUED IN INTSUMS. CRACKING PHENOMENON, W/ITS ADVERSE EFFECT ON AIR OPS, WILL DIMINISH IN AIR; HOWEVER, IT IS ESP NOTICEABLE IN MTN AREAS.

### CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA

|                             | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|-----------------------------|------------|------------|
| TEMP RECORD MAX             | 99         | 105        |
| TEMP MEAN MAX               | 81         | 86         |
| TEMP MEAN MONTHLY           | 77         | 80         |
| TEMP MEAN MIN               | 70         | 73         |
| TEMP RECORD MIN             | 59         | 62         |
| MEAN RELATIVE HUMIDITY      | 85         | 84         |
| PREVAIL SURFACE WIND DIR    | E AT 7 KTS |            |
| RECORD SURF WIND SPEED (KT) | 30         | 24         |
| PRECIP HIGHEST TOTAL        | 5.7        | 7.6        |
| MEAN MONTHLY (IN)           | 0.9        | 1.3        |
| LOWEST TOTAL (IN)           | 0.0        | 0.0        |
| 24-HR MAX (IN)              | 5.4        | 6.0        |
| MEAN DAYS W/PRECIP          | 4          | 5          |
| MEAN DAYS W/THUNDERSTORMS   | 1          | 5          |

### B. TERRAIN

(1) RDS, TRLS AND BRGS - SEE APP 2 (RDS, TRLS AND BRG OVLY) ISSUED SEPARATELY.

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(2) HIZ - AS DEPICTED IN REF A.

## 3. ESSENTIAL ELMS OF INFO

A. DETERM IF EN WILL ATK OUR FORCES IN OBJ AREA. IF SO, WHEN? WHERE? WITH WHAT FORCES?

B. DETERM IF EN WILL DEF IN OBJ AREA. IF SO, WHERE? WITH WHAT FORCES?

C. DETERM IF EN WILL RELINF THEIR FORCES IN OBJ AREA. IF SO, WHEN? WITH WHAT FORCES? THRU WHICH RTS?

D. DETERM EXTENT OF EN AA ACTV IN OBJ AREA. SPL ATTN TO TYPES AND LOC OF AA WEPS.

## E. OTHER INTEL REQMS:

(1) DETERM MSN, SPR, IDENTIF, LOC, ARMAMENT OF EN UNITS IN OBJ AREA.

(2) DETERM TYPE, LOC, CAPAC AND EXTENT OF VC FAGS IN OBJ AREA.

(3) DETERM LOC OF EN INFIL RTS THRU AREA, NO OF ALIEN RTS, WAY STA, AND ASSOC SIT FAGS.

## 4. RECON AND OBS MSNS

A. ORDERS TO SUBORD UNITS

(1) CONDUCT NORMAL UNIT RECON/OBS AS SET FORTH IN REF B.

(2) RIT INFO AS OBTAINED ON BEIS BY MOST XREDITIONS MEANS TO G-2.

(3) XREDITE RITS OF EN AA ACTVS TO INTEL OFF OF SPT AIR UNITS AND THIS HQ.

B. REQ TO HIGHER, AJA AND SPT UNITS(1) CG, III MAF

(A) PROVIDE, AS REQ, SPL AIR PHOTOS ON AREA OF OPNS.

(B) PROVIDE CURRENT AND PREDICTED WEA DATA THAT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OPN DURING PERIOD.

(C) PROVIDE, AS REQ, OVLY STUDIES ON TERRAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND EN FORTIF.

(2) CG, FMAW. PROVIDE OBS ACFT F/AIR RECON AND SURVEIL AS REQ.

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5. MEASURES F/HANDLING CAPTURED PERS, DOCS AND MATS

A. XIEDITE CAPTIVES FOUND BY ON-SPOT SCREEN TO BE VC/NVA TO DIVCOLLEPT

DANANG BY HELLO:

PRI I - VC OFF, ALL NVA PERS, KEY CADRE, FOREIGN ADV

PRI II - VC NCO, GUER LDR, ALL COMM PERS

PRI III- ALL OTHER VCC.

B. PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS W/APPROP GVN HQ WILL BE MADE TO ENSURE EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING/PROCESS OF VCS. RPT LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS ASAP TO G-2.

C. NO REPEAT NO OLD, ENFEEBLED PEOPLE OR WOMEN AND CHILDREN WILL BE APPREH AS VCS UNLESS CAUGHT IN OVERT ACT OF HOSTILITY THAT PHYSICALLY ENDANGERS FRDLY TRPS.

D. ALL PELS AND TAC UNITS WILL BE PROVIDED W/SUFFICIENT CAPTIVE TAGS SO THAT CAPTURE CIRCUMS MAY BE RECORDED THEREON FOR PERS, DOCS OR MATS. TRPS WILL NOT DEFACE ANY EN DOCS BY WRITING OR MARKING ON THEM IN ANY MANNER.

E. PERS EFFS, EXCEPT DANGEROUS IMPLEMENTS, WILL NOT BE SEPARATED FM THE PERSONS OF VCS DURING MVMF TO COLL P'S. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO RETURN PROMPTLY ALL PERS EFFS TAKEN FM CAPTIVES UPON SCREENING AND RELEASE AS NONCOMBATS. ARVN PERS WILL BE REQUIRED TO COOPERATE SCRUPULOUSLY IN THIS RESPECT.

F. SEE PARA 5 OF ANX B (INTEL) TO REF C FOR OTHER SPECIF INSTR.

6. MAPS, CHARTS AND PHOTOS

A. REF A IS TAC MAP F/THIS OPN; ADDL COPIES WILL BE PROVIDED BY THIS HQ ON REQ.

B. HALF TONE PHOTOS OF AREA OF OPN WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. SEE APP 2 (CI) TO ANX B (INTEL) TO REF C.

8. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION. SEE PARA 8 OF ANX B (INTEL) TO REF C.

GP-4

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

**SECRET**

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3D MARINE DIVISION

VV MFD188  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 280550Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
CG FIRST MAW

BT

**SECRET**

1. CG III MAF APPROVES OPERATION INDIANA AND DIRECTS YOU HOLD 2 CO BN FROM DANANG ON THREE HR ALERT FOR REINFORCEMENT OF CHU LAI OR PHU BAI.
  2. FOR CG 3D MARDIV: NOTIFY III MAF COC OF TASK ORD AND FORCES INVOLVED IN OPN INDIANA.
  3. FOR CG 1ST MAW: NOTIFY III MAF COC OF CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT MOVE OF 2 BN CO.
- GP-4

TO: 280600Z 3/MAR/66/RH  
NNNN

A-3

dm

280550Z MAR

5A

**SECRET**

Encl 31

1 PAF DE DIV3 NR 866

ZNY SSSSS

00 06EEEE

00 280645Z

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: OPN INDIANA

1. FIRST WAVE OF FIRST BN SEVENTH MARINES (-)

LADEEEEE LANDED 281427H AT (BS 563778) OPN INDIANA

OFFICIALLY COMMCEEE COMMCEEE COMMENCED SAME DATE AND TIME.

2. SEVENTH MARINES TACTICAL CMD POST CO-LOCATED

WITH TACTICAL CP SECOND ARVN DIV IN QUANG NGAI.

E33333

3. ARTY AND LSA LOCATED QUANG NGAI AIRFIELD.

BT

NNNN

DE PAF 08L UR NR 866 AT WIXPYTPZ KKKK

Encl 32

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DRAFTER 3/DVM/af  
SEC G-3 PHONE Shove 3  
CWU                     

CCN                     

IMMEDIATE 28p 726Z MAR 66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: CG 3D MAR

// SECRET //

ALERT FORCES

1. PLACE 2 CO BN ON THREE HOUR ALERT FOR REINFORCEMENT PHU BAI OR  
CHU LI. NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS UNIT ALERTED. RECOMMENDATION SUB-  
MITTED TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS TO POSTPONE OPERATION BRANGE IF ALERT  
BN COMMITTED.

GP-4

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End 38

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COMMUNICATIONS CENTER  
3D MARINE DIVISION

CON 284 290727

DRAFTER 3/DVM/B2  
SEC G-3 PHONE SIEVE 3  
CNO *gm*

SECURITY 284 290727 MAR 66

FM: CG THIRD MARINE  
TO: CG III MAF  
INFO: CG IMAH  
3D MAR

3/21/1

// SECRET //

*file*  
OPERATION INDIANA

A. CG III MAF 280550Z

1. IN ACCORDANCE REF A 2 CG BN PLACED ON THREE HOUR ALERT FOR REINFORCEMENT  
OF CHU LAI OR PHU BAI. PLEASE NOTE COMMITMENT THIS BN WILL REQUIRE  
POSTUREMENT OPERATION ORANGE.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION OPERATION INDIANA FOLLOWS:

7TH MAR (-)

1/7 (-)

3 USMC CO'S

1 ARVN CO

3/11 (-)

2 BTRYS (105MM)

ARTY AND LSA LOCATED QUANG NGAI AIR-FIELD.

28 07  
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6  
MAR 29 1966

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Encl 34

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MAF DE DIV NR 876  
P 281255Z  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO CG III MAF  
BT  
S E C R E T  
SLBJ: SCOUT DOG TEAMS  
1. REQUEST FOUR SCOUT DOG TEAMS BE ATTACHED 1ST BN 3RD MARINES  
ABOUT 3APR66 FOR OPERATION ORANGE.  
BT

NNNN  
DE DIV INT QSL INT QSL  
DE DIV INQ INT QSL INT QSL INT QSL INT QSL CIP CIP CIP  
DE DIV INT QSL MY 876 PLEASE I HAVE MORE TRAFF TO PABS  
;  
DE MAF QSL UR NR 876 ZUB 28/1324Z K K K

28

12

55

235

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DE DIV NR 878  
P 281400Z 01  
FM THIRD MAR DIV  
TO COC III MAF  
BT

S E C R E T

OPN INDIANA:  
ENEMY CONTACT CONTINUES SPOADIC. BONNIE HERO 6 MOVING CP TO AIRFIELD.  
BONNIE HERO Y AND SENIOR ARMY ADVISOR PRESENTLY FORMULATING PLANS  
FOR TOMORROW.  
BT

NNNN

DE MAF QSL UR NR 878 ZL B 28/1424 K KK

28 14 00

36

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**SECRET**

COMMUNICATION CENTER  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

DRAFTER 3/DVI/tiw  
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE .3  
TRANS TO   
CNC H

COM 1671

IMMEDIATE 281412Z MAR66

FROM: CG 3RD MARDIV  
TO: THIRD MARDIV  
INFO: CG 1ST MAF  
CG 2ND  
FLC  
FLBG ALPHA  
DET C-1, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES, DA NANG

//S E C R E T//

OPERATION ORANGE

~~REF~~ A. CG 3D MARDIV 271350Z MAR66

1. ADD FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH TO REFERENCE (A):

4.E. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

- (1) NORMAL CIVILIAN CONTROL MEASURES AUTHORIZED. CIVILIANS SHOULD NOT BE EVACUATED FROM OPERATION AREA EXCEPT AS TACTICAL NECESSITY DICTATES.
- (2) FOOD, SOAP AND MEDCAP SUPPLIES AVAIL ON REQUISITION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.
- (3) SUBMIT CA SITREPS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS BY 0800 DAILY. NEGATIVE REPORTS REQUIRED.

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RELEASED BY 12

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MAR 29 1966

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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET  
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

DRAFTER 3/DVM/pnc  
SEC G-3 PHONE SMOVE-3  
TRANS TO  
C O

CCN 1673

IMMEDIATE 281505Z MAR 66

FROM: CG, 3D MARDIV  
TO: 3D MARDIV  
INFO: CG, III MAF  
CG IMAW  
MSG

3121,1

//SECRET//

OPERATION ORDER 38144 (OPN INDIANA)

REF: (A) MAPS VIET NAM 1:50,000 ALS SERIES L-701, SHEETS

(B) 3D MARDIV OPN ORDER 343-65

(C) DO 02000.26

TIME ZONE HOTEL

TASK ORGANIZATION

3D MARDIV

MAJGEN KYLG

7TH MAR

COL PEATROSS

INF BN (-) (REIN)

INF BN (-) (REIN)

105MM HOW BTRY (-) (REIN)

105MM HOW BTRY (-) (REIN)

1. SITUATION.

A. INEX. SEE CURRENT INFO.

B. FRIENDLY.

(1) SEE REF (B)

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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3d MarDiv - 2100/1

(2) FEAN PROVIDES AIRLIFTS, RESUPPLY, MED EVAC, CAS AS REQUESTED.

(3) ARVN MILITARY/PARA MILITARY IN THE AREA OF OPNS.

2. MISSION. 3D MARDIV CONTINUES TO CONDUCT S/D OPN IN THE VIC THO LOC (BS 5477) TO LOCATE, FIX, AND DESTROY VC FORCES.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. 3D MARDIV CONTINUES TO CONDUCT S/D OPNS IN COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH 2D ARVN DIVISION FORCES.

B. 7TH FAR.

(1) CONTINUE TO CONDUCT S/D OPNS COORDINATED ON 28 MARCH IN AREA OF OPNS TO FIND, FIX, AND DESTROY VC FORCES LOCATED THEREIN.

(2) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY ONE ADDITIONAL INF BN (-) (REIN) AND ONE 105MM HOW BTRY TO AREA OF OPNS.

(3) NOTIFY THIS HQ OF SITES DESIGNATED AND CHANGES AS OCCURRING.

C. 105TH FAR.

(1) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ONE 105 HOW BTRY D/S 7TH FAR TO SEC OPNS.

(2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ONE ADDITIONAL 105 HOW BTRY TO SEC OPNS IN AREA.

D. COORD INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) RCA AUTHORIZED IN OPN AREA ONLY

(2) CONTINUE UNALSOBAND COORDINATION WITH 2D ARVN DIVISION.

(3) REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIV O 3100.1B AND SPECIAL CIRCUMS AT 05; 12; 18; AND 24 HOURS TO INCLUDE:

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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3d MarDiv - 2100/1

- (A) CO LOCATIONS
- (B) BRIEF SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
- (C) ENEMY CONTACTS, CITING TIME, PLACE, ENEMY FORCE, RESULTS
- (D) OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.
- (E) FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CASUALTIES.
- (F) PLANS.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SUPPLY.

- (1) GENERAL- 7TH MARINES ESTABLISH A SUPPLY DUMP WITH A WATER POINT IN VIC OF AIR STRIP AT QUANG NGAI CITY.
- (2) SUPPLY SOURCES- PLSG (B) FOR ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY.
- (3) PRIORITY LOADS- AS PRESCRIBED BY UNIT COMMANDER
- (4) DUMP LEVEL

|            |                               |
|------------|-------------------------------|
| CLASS I-   | 3 DAYS                        |
| CLASS II-  | AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDER |
| CLASS III- | AS REQUIRED                   |
| CLASS IV   | AS REQUIRED                   |
| CLASS V-   | 3- DAYS                       |
- (5) RESUPPLY
  - (A) COMBAT UNITS- BY HELO FROM SUPPLY DUMP
  - (B) SUPPLY DUMP- BY HELO/FIXED WING <sup>ROLL</sup> TRUCK CONVOY FROM PLSG (B).

B. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION- AS DIRECTED CO 7TH MARINESC. PERSONNEL

- (1) CASUALTY REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 3D MARDIVO 3900.22

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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- (2) COMMERCE D-3 SUBMIT PERSONNEL WEEKLY SUMMARY (PWS) TO THIS HEADQUARTERS (SC-3) BY 1300 EACH FRIDAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH 3D MARDIVO 1380.3A.
- (3) ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES.
- (4) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNIT OR PERSONAL AWARDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 1650.1B AND FEPPACO 1650.1A
- (5) CIVIL AFFAIRS - IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 5080.1.

**D. CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND DOCUMENTS**

- (1) VCC AND VCS- IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX B TO DIV OF O 343-65.
- (2) CAPTURED DOCUMENTS- IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO P3800.1 AND ANNEX B TO DIV OF O 343-65. NVA RETURNEES WILL BE DELIVERED TO CHIEU HOI DANANG.
- (3) RETURNEES- THOSE ELIGIBLE FOR CHIEU HOI STATUS WILL BE DELIVERED TO CHIEU HOI CENTER QUANG NGAI. NVA RETURNEES WILL BE DELIVERED TO CHIEU HOI DANANG.   
CENTER RAR  
A

**E. MISCELLANEOUS.**

- (1) MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF LOCAL WATER AND HALIZONE/IODINE TABLETS.
- (2) UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT - AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDERS.
- (3) COMMANDERS SHALL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INSURE WEAPONS ARE MAINTAINED IN A SERVICEABLE CONDITION AT ALL TIMES.
- (4) CAPTURED MATERIALS WHICH CANNOT BE EVACUATED WILL BE DESTROYED AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDERS.
- (5) CAPTURED RICH WILL BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 03460.1. INSURE SUFFICIENT RICH BAGS

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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3d MarDiv - 2100/1

AUX ON HAND FOR BAGGING.

(6) TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF HELICOPTERS, INSURE THAT THOSE GOING  
OUT EACH MORNING TAKE NECESSARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION.A. COMMUNICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (C) AND CURRENT COMMUNICA-  
TION DIRECTIVES.B. BE PREPARED TO ACTIVATE THE DIVISION COMMAND NET #2 (AN/TSC 15)  
ON ORDER.EMISSION: 3 VOICE, 1 TELETYPE (COVERED)  
60 WPM.Freq: 30 MARDIV T 5500 (P)  
2008 (S)  
7TH MARINES 6229 (P)  
2530 (S)

## STATIONS AND CALLS:

HQ 30 MARDIV

7TH MARINES

CHANNELIZATION AS DIRECTED BY NET CONTROL.

(ATTN: CEC)

MONROE (187L)

STARBOARD (680A)

C. INFORM THIS HEADQUARTERS OF COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATION AND  
CHANGES THERE TO.D. INSTALL A MINIMUM OF TWO (2) TRUNK LINES FROM 7TH MARINES AND CP  
TO U.S. ARMY QUANG TRIAT SWITCHBOARD.

GP-4

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*Miller Beck**5 of 5 PAGES*

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**SECRET**

I MAF DE DIV 3 NR 886

IZNY SSSSS

P 282125Z

FM G-3 THID MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

BT

. S E C R E T

G-3 JOURA

G-3 JOURNAL

J. NR 5 290155H FM PINCHITTER 3: WILL COMMIT 2/7 TO LXEEE L7

VIC 554796 AT 0900 & BTRY OF 4/11 TO FIRNIG PSN VIC 601717

READY F-EE TO FIRE BY 0830H.

H&I AND TPQ BOEE BLOCKS TO NW OF AREA TONIGHT. ARVN H&I TO S. 1

PLT 5TH ARVN WILL BOEEE BLOCK VIC 6084. 37 RANGES AND 4/4, TO ATK NW

FM 8030 PREVIOUSLY REPED 5TH ARVN AIRBORN

BN NOT PART OF OPN.

3/5 ARVN AND 2D RECON COMPANY TO ATK W FM PRES PSN VIC 5976

REPTD DAC EEE R

REPTD CAS 1/7 15 KIA AND 38 WIA. ARVN STRIKE CO 4 KIA & 20 WIA.

VC LOSSES 36 KBA, 70 KIA BY ARVN. CAPTURED EQUIPEMENT 3 CHICOM

RIFLES, 3 M-1'S, 1 HVY MG. 1 RUSSIAN RIFLE, 1 7.62MM WHEELED MG.

44 GRENS, 17 81MM RDS, 2 60MM RDS, 6 3.5 RDS. 1 STCHEL CHARGE.

BT

I MNNMAF DEID V3 INT QSL INT QSL INT QSL KKKK

FFFFF

DE MAF QSL UR NR 886 ZUB 28/2141Z K K K

28 21 215 Encl 39



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MAF DE DIV 3 NR 887  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO COC III MAF  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

A. 7TH MAR BS 606720, 1/7/A 1 PLT PLUS 81 MORT & 1/7 CP 563776. 1/7/X  
EEEEEE 1/7/C & D & ARVN STRIKE CO 556785. 1/7/B 564771, 3/5 ARVN 598  
785EEEEEE TOIUPN EUTH RANGER BNEEEEEEEEEEE 598760, 37TH RANGER BN  
600779.

B. AT 291400H 1/7 HELO LIFTED INTO VIC BS 6EE 565775, MOVE TO BLOCK  
FOR ARVN SWEEPING FM E. 1/7/B SECURED LZ FOLLOWED BY CO C 533EEE &  
STRIKE CO THEN CO D. BONNIE HERO CP, I & M BTRY MOVED TO AIRFIELD.

C. 1640 1/7/C SECURED LZ, SEEN 3 VC RUNNING INTO VILLAGE VINH TROC GS  
BS 5576EEE 5578. 1 PLT CO SEE C PURSUED VC, CAME UNDER INTENSE FIRE  
FM 30 CAL LIGHT MG & AUTO PEE WPNS & 8- MORT FIRE. REMAINING 2 PLTS  
ASSAULTED RIGHT FLANK. 15 WPNS CAPT, CO C WITHDREW TO CONSOLIDATE  
PNEE PSN. WITH D & STRIKE CO VIC 556785, CONTACT MAINTAINED UNTIL  
1940H. VC FORCE EST PROB 2 CO'S W/81 SUPT. VC UNIFORMS 50 PER CENT  
BLACK, 50 PERCENT GREY. UNIT UNK. BELIEVE TO BE ELEMENTS OF 1ST VC  
REGT. BEFORE NIGHTFALL PLTS CONDUCTED BY 1/7 TO VILL LOC BS 556567,  
NO CONTACT. HLO'S DID NOT REC GRND FIRE. NO OTHER ACTIVITY SINCE  
NIGHTFALL. SYSTEMATIC ARTY DESTROY MSNS ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN AN  
AREA BOUNDED BY BS 540780, 540800, 560800, 560780. 1 ARTY MSN OBS TO  
HAVE EXCELLENT EFFECT IN VIC 5578.

E. 2/7 TO S&D VINH TRIEE TROC VIL 4478. 2/7 WILL LAND IN VIC BS 5480,  
S&D TO S, 1 BTRY (-), 155 HOW WILL BE PRE POSITIONED BINH SON. 3/5  
(ARVN) S&D W&S OF 1/7.

37TH RANGERS S&D W&N OF 1/7, STRIKE CO TO REMAIN W/1/7. STRIKE ARTY  
SEE & TPQ'S TO CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT.

CAS- FR KIA - 15 WIA - 38

VC - CONF BY US - 40 KIA

CONF BY ARVN - 70 KIA

ILLED BY ARVN ARTY - 37EE 36 KIA

KIA EST 2-300

ARTY AND AIR PREVENTED MVONEEEE MOVEMENT INTO AREA IN ORDER TO MAKE  
COMP CAS EST.

WOPPPQ A WOPPEE 290001 - 290600 NO CHANGEEM

BT

KKKK

DIV DE M

DIV DE MAF QSL UR NR 887 ZUB 29/0057Z KKKL

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Enc 040

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COMMUNICATIONS CENTER  
3D MARINE DIVISION

HAS BEEN SENT

DRAFTER 3/DVM/WHY  
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3  
CWO       

CON 1629

IMMEDIATE 290656Z MAR 66

FM CG, THIRD MARDIV  
TO CG, III MAF  
INFO CG, 1ST MARDIV

//SECRET//

OPERATION INDIANA

A. CG, 3D MARDIV 281505Z MAR 66

1. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE RELEASED TO CG, 7TH MARINES:

QUOTE A. OPCON OPERATION INDIANA CHOPS TO CG, 1ST MARDIV AT 291500H.

B. PROVIDE CG, 3D MARDIV OP ORDER 384-66 (CG, 3D MARDIV 281505Z)  
UNLESS CHANGED BY CG, 1ST MARDIV.

C. SUBMIT REPORTS REQUIRED BY REF (A) TO CG, 1ST MARDIV EFFECTIVE  
291500H. UNQUOTE.

2. REF A. HAS BEEN READDRESSED TO CG, 1ST MARDIV.

GP.A

RELEASED BY J. McLean

MAR 29 1966

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Encl 4/1

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3D MARINE DIVISION

*Orange*

DRAFTER 3/JRF/wmr  
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3  
CWO                     

CCN 1715

PRIORITY 290841Z MAR 66

FM CG, THIRD MARDIV  
TO 3D MARINES  
INFO CG, III MAF

//SECRET//

DAM PRESERVATION (OPN ORANGE)

1. DESTRUCTION OF DAM AT GS (ZC 1251) NOT APPROVED.

GP-4

RELEASED BY *[Signature]*

29 HAS BEEN SENT

MAR 30 1966

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Encl 4

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DRAFTER 3/JRT/11  
 SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVN-3  
 TRANS TOD \_\_\_\_\_  
 CWO \_\_\_\_\_

CCN \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTINE 300516 MAR66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: FOURTH MARINES  
 NINTH MARINES  
 ADC CMD GROUP CHU LAI  
 THIRD MARINES  
 1ST BN, 1ST MARINES  
 INFO: CG III MAF  
 THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FMAW  
 FLC  
 NAVCOM CND, DA NANG

//S E C R E T//

CHANGE #1 TO DIV OPN PLAN 380-66

A. THIRD MARDIV OPN PLN 380-66

1. DELETE PARA 3 B AND INSERT IN LIEU THEREOF THE FOLLOWING:

"4TH MARINES"

- (1) MAINTAIN A REGTL COMD GROUP ON TWELVE HOUR ALERT STATUS FOR DEPLOYMENT AS DIRECTED.
- (2) MAINTAIN ONE REIN INF BN ON SIX HOUR ALERT STATUS, ONE RIFLE CO OF THIS BN ON TWO HOUR ALERT STATUS, READY FOR DEPLOYMENT BY AIR, MOTOR VEHICLE, FOOT, AMPHIB, OR ANY COMBINATION THEREOF.

2. DELETE SUB-PARA 3 C AND INSERT THE FOLLOWING IN LIEU THEREOF:

"9TH MARINES" MAINTAIN ONE INF BN REIN ON SIX HOUR ALERT STATUS, WITH ONE COMPANY ON TWO HOUR ALERT STATUS, READY FOR DEPLOYMENT BY AIR, MOTOR VEHICLE, FOOT, AMPHIB, OR ANY COMBINATION THEREOF.

3. DELETE SUB-PARA 3 D AND RELETTER 3 E AND 3 F AS 3 D AND 3 E.

OP-4

RELEASED BY \_\_\_\_\_

Encl #43 Ch

MAR 28 1966

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3d MarDiv - 2100/1

HAS BEEN SENT

DRAFTER 3/FRW/1966  
SEC PHONE  
CWO gm

CGH 1821

IMMEDIATE 3/0602Z MAR 66

FM CG, THIRD MARDEV  
TO THIRD MAR  
INFO NINTH MAR  
FOURTH MAR  
III MAF

//SECRET//

OPCON CO C, 1/4

A. CG, THIRD MARDEV 300310Z

1. IN ACCORDANCE REF A. CO C, 1/4 REPORTS YOUR OPCON UPON ARRIVAL DA NANG  
31 MAR. CO REMAINS YOUR OPCON UNTIL TERMINATION OPN ORANGE AT WHICH TIME  
PRESENT INTENTION CHOP OPCON TO NINTH MAR FOR OPN GEORGIA.

~~2. [REDACTED]~~

GP-4

44  
MAR 31 1966

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3d MarDiv - 2100/1

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DRAFTER 3/FW/WOF  
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3  
CWO jm

CCN 1822

IMMEDIATE 310603Z MAR 66

FM CG, THIRD MARDIV  
TO FOURTH MAR  
INFO III MAF  
//SECRET//

MOVEMENT CO D, 1/4 AND H&S 1/4 (REAR)

1. CO D, 1/4, WILL ARRIVE PHU BAI AIRFIELD BY FIXED WING ON 1 APR AND CHOPS YOUR OPCON UPON ARRIVAL. ETA TO BE FURNISHED.
2. H&S CO (REAR) WILL MOVE BY FIRST AVAILABLE SEA LIFT FROM CHU LAI TO DA NANG THENCE TO PHU BAI BY ROUGH RIDER; TIMES TO BE FURNISHED WHEN FIXED.

GP-4

31 06 03 39  
RELEASED BY [Signature]  
MAR 31 1966  
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Encl 4

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3D MARINE DIVISION**WATCH OFFICER**

ZNY SSSSS  
 00PP 040700Z  
 FM CG TASK FORCE DELTA  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 BT

**"ACTION COPY"****SECRET**

1. SPECIAL SITREP NR 1 AS OF 041443.
2. (A) THE ACTION BEGAN WHEN A HUIE WENT DOWN VICINITY (BS 538813) AT 030910H. THE HUIE RECEIVED INTENSE SMALL ARMS FIRE AND .50 CALIBER FIRED ON THE GROUND. THE LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT IS NEAR A REPORTED VC REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS OF UNKNOWN DESIGNATION. (B) AT 041000H 1ST MARINES WERE ALERTED TO PUT TWO COMPANIES ON A REACTION FORCE. OPCON WAS TO BE 7TH MARINES. CO L AND CO M OF 3/1 WERE PUT ON ALERT. AT 041035H 3/1 COMMAND GROUP WAS ALERTED. AT 041100H 1ST MARINES WERE NOTIFIED TO FREE ALL OF 3/1 FOR COMMITMENT. CO K

PAGE TWO 90F7 **SECRET**

MOVED FROM CHU LAI BY VTNOVY AT 041330H.

(C) AT 041155H WORD WAS RECEIVED FROM THE ARVN THAT THE 1YT ARVN AIRBORNE BN AND 37TH RANGER BN WILL BE COMMITTED TO THE OPERATION.

(D) 2/7 COMPLETED THEIR LIFT AT 041318H.

(E) HELOS THAT WENT IN WITH 1ST ARVN AIRBORNE BN WERE HIT BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE. FOUR GUNSHIPS WERE HIT BY POSSIBLY 12.7MM FIRE. ONE HUIE WENT DOWN BUT CREW RECOVERED.

TENTATIVELY 8 UH-34 HELOS

WERE HIT TAKING THE BN IN. ONE HUIE HKS DOWN AT (BT 5482) PLATOON OF CO G, 2/7 MOVING 59 5 3 8414-15.

(F) ARVN AIRBORNE BN IS RECEIVING MORTAR, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND .50 CALIBER FIRE.

THE BN HAS CAPTURED 2- 20MM WEAPONS VSQ

(G) MANY DEAD VC AND WEAPONS WERE REPORTED BY AIR AND ARTILLERY. NOT YET CONFIRMED.

FRIENDLY TROOPS MOVING TOWARD THE AREA.

(H) AT (BT 552838) THE VC COUNTER ATTACKED THE ARVN

ALL THREE COMPANIES.

OF 2/7 NEAR (BS 54 830) AT 041400H, PREPARING  
 TO ATTACK TO (BT 549835) IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARVN. 20MM AUTOMATIC  
 WEAPONS REPORTED VIC (BT 549835).

(I) 3/1 IS SCHEDULED TO LAND AT 041500H AT (BT 554875). MISSION IS TO

**"ACTION COPY"**

04

07

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9 Mar 66

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**SECRET**

Encl 46

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3D MARINE DIVISION**

THREE THREE ZERO SOUTH OF GRID LINE (BT 85).

(K) ARVN IS HEAVILY ENGAGED AT (SS 552835)

(L) 373TH RANGER BN WILL MOVE IN AND CLEAR THE EAST AS 3/1 BLOCKS TO THE NORTH.

(M) IT IS ESTIMATED THE VC HAVE ONE M.F. BM.

(N) 155 (SP) IS IN CONVOY MOVING TO THE SOUTH.

(O) CO G, 2/7 KILLED 4 VC " 041200H AT (BT 546829). THE VC WERE DRESSED IN KAKIE UNIFORMS. CO G CAPTURED 20 VC PACKS AND DESTROYED 100 ROUNDS OF .50 CALIBER AMMUN

ZION.

(P) CASUALTIES EVACUATED BY HELO AND TIME REQUEST WAS MADE. NO OTHER DETAILS.

(1) 2D ARVN DIV AT 041350 REQUEST EVAC FOR 20 U.EVM AND ARVN WIA AT (BT 552835).

(2) 2/7 AT 041345H REQUESTED EVAC FOR 5 WIA AND 1 KIA AT (SS 548833).

(3) 2/7 AT 041325 REQUESTED EVAC FOR 1 WIA AT (SS 54824).

BT

A-3/2

TO: 04/0850Z/MAR 66/DTX

**SECRET**



**SECRET**COMMUNICATION CENTER  
3D MARINE DIVISION

TPDE 187L ORV KK

DE S825 SENDING NR 034

CG III MAF  
ZNY SSSSS  
O P 041130Z  
FM ADC GROUP CHU LAI  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV

C C N - 1298-B

INFO CG III MAF

BT

S E C R E T

1. SPECIAL SITREP NR 2 FROM 041445H TO 041830H
2. (A) ON 03 MARCH VIETNAMESE UNITS MADE CONTACT WITH VC IN (BT 6784). 22 VC WERE KILLED;

N

2 VC WERE CAPTURED AND 7 WEAPONS WERE CAPTURED. THE TWO PRISONERS WERE NORTH VIETNAMESE ENGINEER TROOPS. THEY REPORTED THEIR REGIMENTAL C.P. WAS LOCATED NEAR (BS 558828).

(B) ON 4 MARCH 2/7 WAS TO ASSIST AN ARVN UNIT IN AN OPERATION IN THIS AREA.

(C) SEE SITREP NR 1 AS OF 041445H PARA 2 FOR INFORMATION ON HOW

PAGE TWO 90F7 S E C R E T

SITUATION DEVELOPED.

(D) AT 1600H, THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN 3/1 AND THE ARVN WAS CL 35. PRESENT ARVN POSITIONS ARE INTELINGLED WITH USMC POSITIONS.

(E) AT 1525H, COM, CO L AND COMMAND GP OF 3/1 WERE IN LZ (BS 555875) NEG ENEMY CONTACT.

(F) AS OF 1600H, TWO COMPANIES OF 2/7 WERE ON LINE ATTACKING EAST AND ENCOUNTERING VC S/A FIRE AND MORTARS FROM BOTH FLANKS. 2/7 CONDUCTED AIRSTRIKES AND ARTY MISSIONS ON TARGET.

1600H POSITIONS OF 2/7 WERE VIC (BS 555852)

(G) AS OF 1600H, 3/1 POSITIONS WERE VIC (BS 555875).

(H) ARVN CONTACT REMAINS MODERATE ONE CAPTURED SKS RIFLE AND NVA CAPTIVE HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO 2/7 FROM THE ARVN

(I) 1830H 2/7 IS IN EXTREMELY HEAVY CONTACT WITH ESTIMATED TWO VC BATTALIONS. MORTAR AND 57RR FIRE IS BEING RECEIVED. NO OTHER INFO AVAILABLE.

3. PLANS ARE BEING MADE TO ALERT A 3 CO BATTALION FOR POSSIBLE MOVEMENT INTO THE AREA TOMORROW.

GP-4

BT

A-3/2

TOR: 04/1207Z/MAR 68/07X WDC

NNNN

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**SECRET**  
Encl 47

**SECRET**COMMUNICATION CENTER  
3D MARINE DIVISION**ACTION COPY**

FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
INFO CG III MAF  
BT

S E C R E T

1. SPECIAL SITREP NR 3 AS OF 042400H.
2. (A) AT 041830H 2/7 WAS IN CONTACT WITH ESTIMATED TWO VC DNS. IN (BS 5583). CO L 3/1 WILL ASSIST 2/7.
- (B) AT 041930H THE CONVOY RETURNED FROM THE AREA OF OPERATION TO CHU LAI.
- (C) LOCATIONS:
  - (1) TASK FORCE DELTA C P WITH CO K, 3/1 AS SECURITY AT (BS 661756).
  - (2) 3/1 CP AND CO I (BS 553873), CO M FROM (BS 562856) TO (BS 580853) CO L FROM (BS 534855) TO (BS 543860).

PAGE TWO 90F7 S E C R E T

- (3) 2/7 LOCATED VICINITY (BS 558825).
- (4) 37TH ARVN RANGER BN (BS 605830) TO (BS 605815).
- (5) 1ST ARVN AIRBORNE BN VICINITY (BS 551838).
- (6) 1/5 ARVN BN AT (BS 610892) AND (BS 625849).
- (D) AT 042130H 2/7 REPORTED IN EXCESS OF 100 VC KIA AND IN EXCESS OF 150 VC WIA.
- (E) ARVN REPORTS 57 VC KIA BY BODY COUNT AND ESTIMATED 150 VC KIA.
- (F) CO L, 2/7 AT 041900H FOUND A 3.5 ROUND RIGGED AS AP MINE AT (BS 545857); DESTROYED IN PLACE.
- (G) AT 042317H A 17 TRUCK RESUPPLY CONVOY OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION LEFT CHU LAI FOR THE AREA OF OPERATION.
- (H) AT 041630H CO M FIRED SIX ROUNDS OF M-14 AT 3 UNARMED VC AT (BS 555856), MOVING NORTH. THE VC WERE CHALLENGED BUT FAILED TO HALT.
- (I) AT 041730H CO M, 3/1 FIRED FIVE ROUNDS OF M-14 AT 4 UNARMED VC AT (BS 553856) MOVING NORTH. THE VC WERE CHALLENGED BUT FAILED TO HALT.
- (J) AT 041243H 2/7 LIFTED INTO LZ TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH ADVANCE ELEMENTS OF 1ST AIRBORNE BN AND PURSUE CONTACT. INITIAL CONTACT WAS IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION. AT 041315H ATTACK WAS ORIGINATED IN EASTGLY DIRECTION. AT 041445H 3/1 WAS LIFTED INTO LZ (BS 553873). THERE ARE 2-155 BTRYS AT (BS 599912).

## 3. PLANS

- (A) 2/4 WILL EXECUTE A HELO ASSAULT VIC (BS 556788). DEPLY TO THE EAST AND EXECUTE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION NORTH IN ZONE FROM GRID

PAGE THREE 90F7 S E C R E T

LIME (BS 56) TO (BS 58) ENDING AT (BS 83). L-HOUR WILL BE AT 050830H 3/1 WILL APPROACH FROM OPPOSITE DIRECTION. 2/7 AND 1ST ARVN AIRBORNE WILL BLOCK FROM PRESENT POSITION AND 37TH RANGER BN WILL BLOCK ON OTHER SIDE.

(B) 7TH MARINES ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE UP TO A CO (-) (REIN) FOR CONVOY ESCORT.

(C) TWO CONVOYS WILL MOVE APPROXIMATELY 1000 ROUNDS OF 155MM TO TF D DURING TO NIGHT. FIRST CONVOY SHOULD LEAVE CHU LAI ABOUT 250130H BT

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**"ACTION COPY"**

C-3

S E C R E T

1. SPECIAL SITREP NR 4 AS OF 050400H

2. LOCATIONS:

✓ A) COMMAND GROUP, WITH CO K3:1 AS SECURITY, LOCATED (BS 661756).

B) 3/1 CP AND CO I LOCATED (BS 553873); CO L PLATOON POSITIONS (BS 536855), (BS 546856) AND (BS 550858); CO M HAS PLATOON POSITIONS (BS 553887), (BS 568857) AND (BS 5577861).

C) 2/7 IN 360 PERIMETER VIC (BS 554828) WITH CO F (BS 553830); CO H (BS 552828) AND CO G (BS 554828).

PAGE TWO 90F7 S E C R E T

D) BTRY K AND BTRY M3/11 LOCATED (BS 599912).

E) 37TH RANGERS IN BLOCKING POSITIONS ALONG RAILROAD FROM (BS 603828) TO (BS 605815).

F) ARVN AIRBORNE AT (BS 552837)

3. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

A) NO CONTACT OF FRIENDLY UNITS

B) 15 RDS 60 MM MORTAR FIRE RECEIVED AT BINH SON BETWEEN 050115H- 050210H. NO OTHER INFO AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

C) CONVOYS MENTIONED IN PARA 3C OF SITR REP NR 3 WERE COMBINED AND DEPARTED AT 050305H.

4. PLANS:

CONV WILL HOLD PRESENT POSITION AND SUPPORT BY FIRE. 2/4 WILL LAND BY HELO (BS 553792) AND DEPLOY EAST TO S AND D ASSIGNED ZONE BETWEEN GL 56 AND 58 TO 23. 3/1 WILL SHIFT EAST AND EXECUTE S AND D SOUTH IN ASSIGNED ZONE BETWEEN GL 56 AND 58 TO 23.

1/5 (ARVN) WILL SWEEP SW AND BLOCK FROM VIC (BS 583867) TO (BS 600848). 37 TH RANGERS WILL

PAGE THREE 90F7 S E C R E T

SWEEP WEST AND BLOCK VIC BS 5657. ARVN AIRBORNE WILL HOLD PRESENT POSITIONS AND SUPPORT BY FIRE.

BT

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for 04/2305Z/mar66/R/15TH MAR

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**ACTION COPY**

G-3

S E C R E T

1. UPECPAL SITREP NR 5 AS OF 052400H

2. LOKATIONS:

- ✓ A.. TFD COMMAND GROUP AND CO K, 3/1 AT (BS 661756)
- ✓ B.. BTRY K AND BTRY N LOCATED AT (BS 599912) 75 (9 3, 2/7 AS SECURITY
- ✓ K.. 2/7 POSITIONS UNCHANGED.
- D.. 2/4 MOVING EAST OUT ORILZ (BS 556788)
- ✓ E.. 3/1 CONDUCTING SEARCH AND DESTROY TO THE SOUTH.

-3. SUMMARY OF EVENTS.

A. 1ST MARINE REGT.

1. PROVIDING CO A 1/4 WITH FAC TEAM ON ONE HOUR ALERT IN LZ (BT

PAGE TWO 90F7 S E C R E T

A535164) AS REACTION FORCE.

2. PROVIDING 3D PLT. CO C, 1/4 WITH F.A.C. TEAM. F.O. TEAM.

MACHINE GUN AND ROCKET SQUAD

AT MAG -36 HELO PAD AS REACTION FORCE.

- ✓ 33; TWO COMPANIES FROM DANANG TO ARRIVE CHU LAI AND BE PLACED UNDER OPCON 1ST MAR

B. 3/1

1. TWO PLATS CO I WERE WIFTED FROM (BT1556052) TO (BS 553873)

THE LIFT BEGAN AT 050630 AND WAS COMPLETED AT 050730H.

2. CO M, 3/1 EXPLODED AN AP MINE AT 050650H AT (BS 568862) ONE MARINE WAS WOUNDED.

C. 2/4

1. AT 050820H THE LZ PREP (BS 556788) BEGAN FOR 2/4. AT 090335H THE 1ST WAVE LANDED.

2. 2/4 COMMAND GROUP AND CO H, 2/4 AT 050840H RECEIVED 50 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM (BS 561791). 8200 ROUNDS OF SMS) -4.

-FIRE WERE RETURNED WITH UNKNOWN RESULT.

3. A HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN BY SMALL ARMS FIRE UN 2/4'S

LZ AT 151000. THE CREW WAS RECOVERED AND 2/4 IS PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE HELICOPTER.

4. AT 051100H 2/4 LIFT COMPLETED. 2/4 MOVING FROM LA. TWO PLATOONS REMAINING IN LZ AS SECURITY FOR DOWNED HELICOPTER. FIVE KIAS TO BE AWED. EVACUATED; NO DETAILS AT THE PRESENT TIME CASUALTIES EVACUATED AT 051130H.

~GP-4

BT

A - 3 - 2

TO 05/0522Z/1000/DTX

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TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L H  
SITREP NR 10 PERIOD 061200-061800

C C N- 2520-23  
(4)

COURTHOUSE. NO CHANGE IN LOCATION OF CP COURTHOUSE KILO CLOSED CP AT 06115 AND DEPLOYED ON HIGH GROUND AROUND QP COURTHOUSE INDIA, LIMA AND MIKE BEGAN SEARCH AND CLEAR OF WESTERN PORTION OF TRI BINH DONGVILLIAGE COMPLEX VIC (BS 557838) AFTER AIR AND ARTY STRIKES EGEC WERE COMPLETED AT 061245. -5 061345 SWEEP CONTINUED WITH NEGATIVE CONTACT. FOUND 82MM MORTAR AND 60MM MORTAR BASE PLATE BOTH NEARLY DESTROYED. PYQIET SEARCH AND CLEAR COMPLETED NO CONTACT CAVE COMPLEX FOUND

PAGE TWO C O N F I D E N T I A L  
CONTAINING TYPEWRITER, MEDICAL MEMS AND DOCUMENTS. 300 METERS OF ENTRENCHMENTS AND WIRE FORTIFICATIONS FOUND AT 535839 TO 554834. S AND C WILL CONTINUE UNTIL 061700 UNIT WILL CONSOLIDATE AT CP AND ONE UNIT WILL CHOP TO PRONINCE. SUDDEN DEATH CONTINUED IT'S SWEEP MOVING SOUTH WEST TO LINK UP WITH PROMINENCE BRAVO. FOUND TUNNEL NETWORK VIC OF BS 55/ 796 AND AND 3 AA POSITIONS AT 061353 SUDDEN DEATH HELD UP AT GRID LINE 79 TO AWAIT MEDEVAC AND COMPLETION OF AIR STRIKE. AT 061435 H SUDDEN DEATH MOVED OUT TO SECURE HIGH GROUND AT (556788) AND WAS IN POSITION AT 061451. NEGATIVE ENEMY CONTACT. 3 M-79 JOBY TRAPS AND NUMEROUS DEFENSIVE POSITIONS FOUND THIS OB. AT 061400. SUDDEN DEATH HOTEL KILLED 2 VC RUNNING AWAY AT BS 557785. PROMINENCE BRAVO HAS JOINED SUDDEN DEATH TO DIG IN AT (TTXUHL AND CONDUCT PATROLLING. PROMINENCE. NO CHANGE. DIXIE DINER QLOSED SUDDEN DEATH'S OLD CP BX 061215H AND COMMENCED PATROLLING AT 061330. DIXIE DINER HOTEL UNCOVERED VC PACKS AND CLOTHING IN CAVE AT BS 571821 AND CAPTURED 1 VCS IN SAME AREA. DIXIE DINER WILL CONTINUE TO BOCK AND PATROL. DIXIE DINER CP

06 09 30

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end 51

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3D MARINE DIVISIONPAGE THREE C O N F I D E N T I A L  
LOCATED AT ? (569818)

RED HAT AT 061630 UNITS BEGAN MOVING OUR TO PASS THROUGH  
COURTHOUSE UNIT SEARCHING OBJ AREA AND CLOSE ON THEIR NEXT OBJ.  
ADDITIONAL ENTRY. COURTHOUSE MIKE WILL REMAIN IN OBJ AREA AT 555838.  
TO SEARCH TUNNEL COMPLEX UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING.  
COURTHOUSE INDIA AND MIKE WILL WITH DRAW FROM OBJ AREA AT 061815  
ON THE MORNING OF 7 MARCH COURTHOUSE WILL CHOP TO PRMINENCE.  
25

A-2-3

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~~00 061005Z~~~~FM CG TASK FORCE DELTA~~~~FM CG THIRD MARDIV~~~~INFO ZEN/TASK FORCE DELTA (REAR)~~~~TO CMC III MAF~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SPECIAL STIPED NR 11 (OPN UTAH) M 062400~~

1. PROMINENCE-NO CHANGE IN UNIT LOCATIONS. NEGATIVE ENEMY CONTACT.
2. SUDDEN DEATH-NO CHANGE IN UNIT LOCATIONS. AT 042106H CO "H" AMBUSH LOCATED VIC (BS 558788) ENCOUNTERED 10 VC. VC TAKEN UNDER FIRE RESULTING IN 4 VC KIA. ONE NON-EVAC USMC WIA.
3. COURTHOUSE-NO CHANGE IN CH CP. LOCATION CH "I" DEPLOYED IN PERIMETER FROM (BS 570848) TO (BS 570855) TO (BS 567888). CH "L" DEPLOYED IN PERIMETER FROM (BS 565854) TO (BS 568856) TO (BS 566856) TO (BS 564853). CH "M" DEPLOYED IN PERIMETER FROM (BS 564841) TO (BS 566841). PROVISIONAL RIFLE PLATOON DEPLOYED

PAGE TWO 90F7 C O N F I D E N T I A L

AS CP SECURITY. CH "L" AND "I" COMPLETED SEARCH OF OBJECTIVE AREA CENTERED VICINITY (BS 58838) AT APPROXIMATELY 061730H AND RETURNED TO PRESENT POSITION. CH "M" REMAIN IN OBJECTIVE AREA COMPLETING SEARCH OF HUGE CAVE COMPLEX VIC (BS 555838). CAVE COMPLEX IS WELL DEFINED AND WELL PREPARED TO CONTAIN ONE OVERHEAD BUNKER 35 FEET BY 15 FEET WITH ADJACENT INDIVIDUAL FIGHTING HOLES. - ~~5,8,7~~ 20 FEET DOWN SHAFT WHICH AT A MINIMUM HAVE A MAIN SHAFT OF 40 FEET AND SIDE SHAFTS OF 30 FEET. SOME OF WHICH ARE INTERCONNECTING. ADJACENT TO CAVE COMPLEX WAS EXTENSIVE WELL DEVELOPED TRENCH NETWORK. CH "M" REMAINS THAT POSITION AND WILL CONTINUE SEARCH OF CAVE COMPLEX AT FIRST LIGHT. CAVE WILL BE DESTROYED UPON COMPLETION OF SEARCH. SIGNIFICANT ITEMS FOUND DURING TODAY'S SEARCH BY CH INCLUDED ONE CHICOM LIGHT MACHINE GUN, ONE CHICOM SUBMACHINE GUN, ONE 81MM MORTAR. (DAMAGED), ONE 60MM MORTAR BASE PLAT, 40 CHICOM GRENADES, UMEROUS DOCUMENTS AND MATS.

4. DIXIE DINNER - NO CHANGE IN UNIT LOCATIONS. TWO VC RAN WHEN CHALLENGED ON CP PERIMETER AT 062145H. ONE VC KIA AND ONE VC CAPURED. ONE VCS RAN WHEN CHALLENGED ON CP PERIMETER AT 062200H. VCS WAS WOUNDED AND CAPTURED.

5. RED HAT UNITS MADE CONTACT ON OUTPOST LINE WITH APPROX 100 VC

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PAGE THREE 90F7 C O N F I D E N T I A L

IN VICINITY (BS 558838). AT 062300H.

6. LYRICAL "M" ~~AND PROCEED~~ UNIT LOCATIONS UNCHANGED. NEGATIVE ENEMY CONTACT.

7. ALIGATOR "A" UNIT LOCATION UNCHANGED. NEGATIVE ENEMY CONTACT. PLANS AND INTENTIONS.

(A) DIXIE DINER--CONTINUE SWEEPS IN ASSIGNED ZONE UNTIL 071200. AT THIS TIME COMMENCE MOVEMENT TO (BS 568580). MOVEMENT FROM THIS POINT ALONG TRAIL THROUGH LYRICAL MINE EAST TO RAILROAD AND PICKUP ON HIGHWAY NR 1 AT APPROX 071500H. RPT 071500H.

(B) SUDDEN DEATH--CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY IN AREA OF OPERATION AND SWEEP EAST TO (BS 600781). FOLLOW THIS TRAIL TO HIGHWAY NR 1 FOR PICKUP AT 071600H.

(C) COURTHOUSE--CONTINUE SEARCH IN TODAY'S OBJECTIVE AREA AT 071300H COMMENCE HELILIFT TO CHU-LAI. AT 070800H. CHOP COURTHOUSE LIMA TO PROMINENCE.

(D) PROMINENCE--PROCEED WESTWARD TO PICKUP REPOSITIONED COURTHOUSE LIMA. CONTINUE ON TO REDHAT CP. CONDUCT SWEEP TO WEST OF HILL AT (BS 552837) UPON COMPLETION AROUND 071600H HELILIFT TO CHU-LAI ARVN RECON COMPANY CHOP TO QUANG NGAI AT THIS TIME.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE-- A U-10 AIRCRAFT DROPPED 30,000 SAFE CONDUCT PASSES. 30,000 WARNINGS AGAINST FIRING AT AIRCRAFT, AND BROADCAST FOR FOUR HOURS. CHU HOI THEME IN NORTH VIETNAMESE AND CENTRAL VIETNAMESE DIALECT. THE AREA COVERED WAS BOUNDED BY LINE 86 RPT 86 TO THE NORTH. GRID LINE 78 RPT 78 TO THE SOUTH. GRID LINE 59 RPT 59 TO THE EAST. AND GRID LINE 54 RPT 54 TO THE WEST.

GP-4

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