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5/MCD/Tab

Ser 00827 66

25 JUL 1966

~~_____~~ (unclassified upon removal of enclosure 1)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 3d MarDiv ltr 3/DVM/clp over 5750.1
Ser: 00156-66 dtd 1Jun66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division for the Month
of April 1966 (U)

1. Forwarded.

M. C. Daley
M. C. DALEY
By direction

295 635

Historical
1 copy

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Ser:

0067666

9 Jun 1966

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~~_____~~ Unclassified when basic material is removed

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 3d MarDiv Command Chronology, April 1966


From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division for the month of
April 1966 (U)

1. Forwarded.


J. R. CHAISSON
By direction

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3D MARINE DIVISION

FMF (-) (REIN)

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COMMAND DIARY
for the month of
APRIL 1966

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
HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/DVM/clp
5750.1
Ser: 00156-66
1 June 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Command Chronology of the 3d Marine Division for the Month
of April 1966
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG FMFPac msg 251942Z Aug 1965
Encl: (a) 3d MarDiv Command Chronology for the period 1-30 April
1966 with supporting documents

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).


J. B. SWEENEY
Chief of Staff

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3d Marine Division
Command Chronology
1 Apr to 30 Apr 1966
List of Supporting Documents

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1. Div SitReps
2. Div Journal
3. Div PSOC Journal
4. Battle and Non Battle Casualties, Daily Reports
5. VIP Visits to 3dMarDiv
- ~~6. Div HistReps See FMFR~~
7. Order - Plans issued in Apr -
8. Civil Affairs

UNIT COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

9. HqBn, 3dMarDiv
10. 3d Mar Regt
11. 4th Mar Regt
12. 9th Mar Regt
13. 12th Mar Regt
14. 3d TK Bn
15. 3d & 9th MT Bn
16. 3d SP Bn
17. 1st AmTrec Bn
18. 3d Recon Bn
19. 3d AT Bn
20. 3d Engr Bn
21. 3d Med Bn
22. 1st Force Recon

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ORGANIZATION DATA

THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 APRIL 1966 TO 30 APRIL 1966

SUBMITTED MAY 1966

FROM THE DIVISION COMMAND POST BUNKER (AT 957751)

DANANG, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

COMMANDING GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL WOOD B KYLE, U. S. MARINE CORPS

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

BRIGADIER GENERAL LOWELL E. ENGLISH, U. S. MARINE CORPS

CHIEF OF STAFF

COLONEL LEO J. DULACKI, USMC

GENERAL STAFF

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 COLONEL ROBERT W. PORT, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 COLONEL GEORGE W. CARRINGTON, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3 COLONEL F. R. WILKINSON, JR, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4 COLONEL JAMES E. MC CLANAHAN, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD H. MACKEL, USMC

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMPTROLLER, COLONEL E. M. STIMSON, USMC

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SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Battalion	LtCol Robert J. PERRICH, USMC
3d Marine Regiment	Col Thell H. FISHER, USMC (1-15APR) Col H. A. HAYES, Jr. USMC (16-30APR)
4th Marine Regiment	Col Donald W. SHERMAN, USMC
9th Marine Regiment	Col Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC
12th Marine Regiment	Col James M. CALLENDER, USMC
3d Anti-Tank Battalion	LtCol Bruce A. HEFLIN, USMC
3d Engineer Battalion	LtCol Nicholas J. DENNIS, USMC
3d Medical Battalion	Cmdr Almon C. WILSON, (MC), USN
3d Motor Transport Battalion	Major Freddie J. BAKER, USMC
3d Reconnaissance Battalion	LtCol Roy R. VAN CLEVE, USMC
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion	LtCol William D. POMEROY, USMC
3d Tank Battalion	LtCol Milton L. RAPHAEL, USMC
3d Shore Party Battalion	Major John M. DEAN, USMC

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AVERAGE STRENGTH DURING APRIL

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
HqBn	158	1663
3d Marines	80	2156
4th Marines	152	4919
9th Marines	142	4062
12th Marines	188	2739
3d Recon Bn	35	582
3d AT Bn	22	474
3d Tk Bn	41	689
1st AmTrac Bn	33	773
3d MT Bn	23	348
3d Engr Bn	33	920
3d SP Bn	21	444
3d Med Bn	<u>2</u>	<u>134</u>
TOTAL	930	19903

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PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

1. Personnel and Administration

a. Casualties sustained during the month included: 58 KIA, 570 WIA, 9 DOW, 11 NBD, and 7 NBI.

b. During April 100 Officers and 1427 Enlisted personnel joined the Division. 140 Officers and 2058 Enlisted personnel were transferred by normal rotation; 20 Officers and 393 Enlisted personnel were transferred by service records. Of the April replacements, 4 Officers and 448 Enlisted arrived aboard the USNS Gordon on 4 April 1966. Due to the civil unrest occurring in the Danang area, they debarked at Tien Sha Beach and were ferried by helicopter to the Danang Air Base.

c. Awards presented: 575 Purple Hearts, 2 Silver Stars, 19 Bronze Stars, 43 Navy Commendation Medals, 44 Air Medals, 2 Legion of Merit Medals and 2 SecNav Commendations for Achievement. Recommendations for medals forwarded to FMFPac included: 16 Silver Stars, 49 Bronze Stars, 9 Air Medals, 3 Legion of Merit Medals and 1 Navy Cross.

d. Lists of those Staff NCOs selected for Warrant Officer and those Sergeants selected for the Second Lieutenant Temporary program were received during the month. Of the 600 Sergeants selected for 2ndLt (Temp), 35 were members of the 3d Marine Division. This selection list is in addition to 2320 SNCOs selected for 2ndLt during March of whom 125 were members of this Division. Of the 1300 SNCOs selected for Warrant Officer, 65 were members of the Division.

2. Field Exchanges

a. Rationing of potential black-market merchandise plus tobacco products was begun on 1 April 1966. MACV Form 333, a ration card, was distributed to all Regiments and separate battalions in sufficient time to permit distribution to the company level.

b. Several large orders of essential and luxury merchandise were shipped to Phu Bai. The 4th Marines exchange now has approximately 45 days supply of all essential items.

c. The Mobile exchange service to forward areas was increased by re-routing the mobile van to isolated and remote concentrations of troops. The units utilizing the service provide armed escorts as necessary.

d. Several large shipments of luxury type merchandise were received, e.g., stereo and other sound equipment, radios, cameras, projectors, watches, fans, refrigerators, and luggage. This merchandise was eagerly received by customers, resulting in sales approximately 25% higher than any previous recorded month in Vietnam. Sales for April in Division Branch Exchanges totaled approximately 3/4 million dollars.

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3. Special Services

a. General support to all Division units was continued throughout the month. No significant change occurred in fund property, however, total net worth continued to increase. Present status of the Recreation Fund is:

Appropriated Fund Balance	\$ 25,000.00
Non-appropriated Fund Balance	197,249.54

Recreation Equipment:

April Issues	\$ 14,273.52
April Receipts	10,849.21

Equipment on Order:

Appropriated Funds	\$ 95,411.36
Non-appropriated Funds	42,891.41

b. Due to a possible compromise of USAFI testing material, the entire educational testing program for the Division has been suspended. Resumption of testing is expected to take place early in May. Enrollments in individual correspondence courses increased slightly over the previous month.

c. A Yellow Alert condition has prevailed during most of the month, thus forcing cancellation of the Danny Kaye, Frank Rich, and James Drury shows. Resumption of this type of entertainment is expected during May.

d. The following numbers of Division personnel participated in the III MAF R&R program:

Okinawa	498
Saigon	45
Hong Kong	200
Bangkok	318
Taipei	51
Tokyo	301
Manila	90
Singapore	27

e. The Division MARS station continues to provide service to many Marines for radiograms and personal calls home. The station operates continuously but can only service phone-patch traffic several hours a day.

4. Informational Services

a. Press coverage of 3d Marine Division activities included 70 news and feature releases through the Command Information Bureau of the III Marine Amphibious Force. In addition a total of 613 hometown releases were sent to the Fleet Hometown News Center, Great Lakes, Ill.

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Enclosure (1)

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b. The most significant operational coverage during April included Operations Orange, Virginia, and Georgia.

c. Other coverage during the month included civil affairs programs, human interest stories, unique incidents throughout the 3d Marine Division and personal experiences of Marines involved in combat operations against the Viet Cong.

d. A total of 546 minutes of tape recorded air time was produced by the Radio-TV Section including 38 minutes for three recorded features, 36 minutes for eight interviews on Civic Action for KBAT Radio, San Antonio, Texas (special request), and 472 minutes for 135 hometown recorded interviews.

5. Postal

a. During April the Directory Section readdressed and forwarded approximately 2,023 pounds of airmail and 15,262 pounds of all other classes of mail, for a total of 17,285 pounds processed during the 30 day period.

b. The following figures represent pounds of U. S. mail received and dispatched from and to points out of country during April.

<u>TACR</u>	<u>Received</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Total</u>
Danang	495,917	181,988	677,905
Phu Bai	38,143	28,673	66,816
TOTAL	534,060	210,661	744,721

c. Letter mail was not received at Danang on three occasions and at Phu Bai on five occasions. The sporadic receipt of mail for this command has been the subject of correspondence and continued interest between the III Marine Amphibious Force and the U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

d. Personnel assigned to the postal section:

Beginning of period:	2 Off	101 Enl
End of period:	2 Off	97 Enl

6. Band

a. During April local village Civil Affairs concerts were re-established. The Band and Drum and Bugle Corps completed ten separate "people to people" concerts and nine military ceremonies in addition to the normal daily routine. On 27 April the Band was lifted by helicopter into the operation "Georgia" area approximately 20 miles south of Danang. Concerts in this area were given at a refugee center and for Marines participating in the operation.

b. The Band has been assigned the responsibility for a portion of the "sky-line" perimeter defense. This assignment as a separate guard unit with its own control and responsibility has facilitated scheduling of the band to the best interest of all concerned.

c. In accordance with directives received from higher authority, the Division Band will be airlifted to Okinawa on 15 May 1966 for a two month period. This TAD assignment to Okinawa will be rotated at two month intervals with the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing bands - thus affording Okinawa Marine units the services of a band on a continuing basis.

7. Division Clubs

a. During April the club system formalized seven Enlisted Clubs, four SNCO Clubs and one Officers' Club. The club system now has a total of 29 Enlisted, 23 SNCO and 9 Officers' Clubs.

b. The supply of beverages continues to be critical. Stocks are exhausted in some units. 47,000 cases of beverage are presently aboard ship in the Danang harbor awaiting unloading and distribution. This will constitute a 15 day supply for the Division. The Air Force Exchange system supply of all beverages is not sufficient to meet existing requirements and improvement is not expected until late in May.

8. Provost Marshal

a. April was marked by a period of civil unrest and disturbances in the City of Danang. In order to increase Military Police effectiveness in the city, 17 enlisted personnel of the Military Police Company were attached to the Armed Forces Police, Danang. 12 additional Military Police carried out the evacuation of approximately 200 civilians and 400 military personnel from Danang without serious incident.

b. A detail of nine Military Police attached to the 3d Shore Party Battalion took part in Operation Virginia and were established as part of a blocking force along the Cambodian border. Another detail of nine Military Police attached to the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines established a captive collection point during operation Georgia.

c. Teams from the Scout and Sentry Dog Platoons, attached to the Military Police Company, achieved operational readiness during April. Their utilization steadily increased on listening posts, search and clear operations, sentry posts and perimeter defense.

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INTELLIGENCE

1. Operation ORANGE. This operation was conducted from 1 to 11 April 1966, in the Thuong Duc area southwest of Da Nang. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines conducted a search and destroy operation in the area and engaged local guerilla forces. There was one report that a 321st Battalion was in the area, although there was no confirmation of this unit's presence during the conduct of the operation. Review of interrogation reports of captured VC and VCS and documents captured on Operation ORANGE failed to reveal any significant intelligence of VC operations in the area. Total enemy personnel losses for Operation ORANGE were 5 VC KIA (Confirmed), 61 VC KIA (Possible), 6 VCC and 54 VCS. Three individual weapons were captured and 15,650 pounds of rice were redistributed.

2. Small Unit Operations

a. Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was attacked by an estimated 150 to 175 VC at 160435H while located at (AT 979585). The VC used 57mm recoilless rifle, 60mm and 81mm mortar fire to support the attacking force. The VC were dressed in khaki and black uniforms. The VC broke contact at 160630H. Total enemy personnel losses resulting from this engagement were 12 VC KIA (Confirmed), and 63 VC KIA (Possible) with 6 weapons captured.

b. A Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines position at (AT 922791), was attacked by an estimated 45 VC. At 180145H, the VC penetrated the Battery position and attempted to destroy the artillery equipment located there. The skillfully executed attack indicated long time planning and preparations for the said attack, by a specially trained, demolitions qualified unit. The attackers were attired in shorts only and the almost total lack of personnel effects and documents indicate the extent of their preparations for the attack. In view of the routine accouterments captured it is felt that the significance of the seven assault rifles captured, lies in the special arming of this unit for its specialized mission. Total enemy personnel losses from the attack were 15 VC KIA (Confirmed), 5 VC KIA (Possible) and 7 weapons captured.

3. Summary. During April 1966 there were 789 VC initiated incidents. Total enemy personnel losses for the period are as follows:

<u>KIA (Conf)</u>	<u>KIA (Poss)</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>VCS</u>
230	150	33	266

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OPERATIONS

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1. General. The Division conducted a total of 12,678 offensive actions during the month of April resulting in 619 contacts with the enemy. Excellent weather conditions prevailed during the month and enhanced offensive operations. Two large scale operations were conducted. These were operations Orange and Virginia. A summary of these operations follows.

a. ORANGE. Operation Orange was a Battalion (-)(Rein) search and destroy/security operation in the THUONG DUC District, QUANG NAM Province (ZC 1353) during the period 010700H to 111835H April 1966. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R. R. DICKEY III was the command and control headquarters for this operation. The mission assigned was to conduct search and destroy operations in THUONG DUC TAN and to support the initial installation of a U.S. Special Forces CIDG camp in that area. The operation commenced with the commitment of three rifle companies plus the battalion command group and supporting artillery. Two additional rifle companies were committed to the operation, on 2-3 April, as enemy strength was considerably greater than had been anticipated. An additional two batteries of artillery were also lifted into the area of operations to provide added artillery support for the ground units. Operation Orange terminated on 111835H April 1966 upon the establishment of the U.S. Special Forces CIDG camp. Results of operation Orange were:

Friendly casualties:	<u>KIA</u> 18	<u>WIA</u> 91	
Enemy casualties:	<u>KIA</u> 50	<u>KBA</u> 7	<u>KIA (POSS)</u> 80
	<u>WIA (POSS)</u> 36		<u>VCC</u> 6
Weapons captured:	1 U.S. Rifle M-1903 2 Foreign Rifles (model unk)		

b. VIRGINIA. Operation Virginia was a Battalion (-)(Rein) search and destroy operation conducted in the KHE SANH area (XD 8441), QUANG TRI Province during the period 170800H April to 011200H May 1966. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Van D. BELL, Jr was the command and control headquarters for the operation. The mission assigned was to deploy to KHE SANH Special Forces outpost (XD 849418) by helicopter and fixed wing aircraft; establish an operational base and defensive positions in coordination with the U.S. Special Forces advisor and conduct search and destroy operations and reconnaissance

in force in the operating area to find, fix and destroy the enemy. Upon completion of operations in the KHE SANH area the Battalion conducted a reconnaissance in force along Route #9 from KHE SANH to DONG HA. Prior to Virginia intelligence reports indicated that there was considerable VC activity in this area of operations. Significantly, operation Virginia revealed little evidence to indicate that the VC used the area in any way. There were no friendly casualties and one VC KIA (possible) was reported.

2. Effects of Political Unrest. The political unrest which was experienced during the month of April did not significantly hamper unilateral operations by this Division. Operation Orange was conducted during the height of the unrest. Small unit actions in the DANANG area were curtailed somewhat due to the necessity of keeping a minimum of two companies on alert for rapid reaction to assist in protecting American lives and property if required. On 9 April 1966 the 2d Battalion 9th Marines, supported by helicopters, LVT's and landing craft evacuated all nonessential U.S. military and civilian personnel from the city of DANANG. The entire evacuation took approximately four hours and was effected without incident. Restrictions imposed on the use of roads required extensive use of helicopters for administrative and logistical runs during the period of civil unrest.

3. Small Unit Operations. The following significant small unit operations occurred during the month:

a. H Co, 2d Bn, 9th Marines. At 160405H Co H came under a heavy mortar and recoilless rifle attack in the vicinity of (AT 979585). The company received an estimated 150 rounds of 60mm and 81mm mortar fire and approximately 12 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle fire. Following the mortar and recoilless rifle attack, 150 to 175 well equipped VC assaulted the company position from the east with a heavy volume of small arms and machine gun fire. The attack was broken up by Co H and the VC withdrew and formed into small groups which drifted to the south and southwest of Co H's position. USMC casualties were 7 KIA and 37 WIA, most of which occurred as a result of detonation of friendly mortar ammunition which was hit by the enemy mortar and recoilless rifle attack. The VC suffered 12 KIA (BC). Six individual weapons and approximately 100 grenades were also captured. It was estimated that the attacking force consisted of two main force VC companies and one ~~Guerrilla~~ Company plus approximately 100 laborers for a total of 400 VC. Interrogation of local villagers indicated that the VC carried off approximately 63 bodies from the company H position indicating an additional 63 KIA (possible).

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b. Btry A, 1st Bn, 11th Marines. At approximately 180200H, Battery "A" located at AT 922791 was attacked by an estimated 45 or more VC. The VC attacked the position from the north, south and west sides simultaneously. The VC attack was well planned and coordinated. The VC were able to place satchel charges on or near three of the howitzers. One ready ammo bunker and one howitzer were destroyed. The VC were extricated from the position by close combat and suffered 13 KIA within the position plus an additional two KIA were found outside the perimeter. In addition the VC were observed dragging off an estimated five VC KIA (Possible). The VC maintained contact with the Marines until approximately 180530H. The following weapons were captured: Seven CHICOM AK-47 assault rifles, one Russian RPG-2 rocket launcher, fifty hand grenades, 4 demo charges and three rocket rounds. Friendly casualties, in addition to the howitzer and ammo bunker destroyed were 5 KIA, 1 DOW and 29 WIA.

c. Company E, 2d Bn, 3d Marines. At 271650H a platoon patrol from Company E was searching the village of AN MY (3) at AT 927608 when it was hit by heavy small arms fire. The patrol returned fire and called an artillery mission on the village. In the ensuing firefight the patrol inflicted 13 VC KIA's while it suffered 1 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIA.

4. A total of six truck convoys were executed on Highway #1 from DANANG to PHU BAI and return. The convoys were all executed without incident.

5. The 2d Bn, 4th Marines moved from CHU LAI to DANANG on 14 and 15 April. OPCON/ADCON was assigned to the 9th Marines and the 2d Bn, 4th Marines were assigned a sector of the 9th Marines TAOR.

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TRAINING1. OUT OF COUNTRY SCHOOLS

a. Students attended out of country schools as follows:

<u>SCHOOL</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>
Vietnamese Language Crs	Okinawa	1 OFF 4 ENL
Registered Pubs Crs	Yokosuka	4 OFF
Inf Wpns Repair Crs	Okinawa	5 ENL
CRYPTO Security Crs	Yokosuka	2 ENL
NUC Wpns Crs	Okinawa	3 ENL

b. Attendance of in-country schools are as follows:

<u>SCHOOL</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>
MACV/USOM Advisor Crs	Saigon	2 OFF

2. INTRA DIVISION TRAINING

a. 3d Engineer Battalion Mine Warfare School graduated 408 students on location and 426 students by contact teams. Two students attended the one day Generator Operators School.

b. 24 Division units made use of the Hoa Cam Range facility with 2807 personnel firing individual and crew served weapons. Range use was suspended during demonstrations and removal of advisors from Danang during the period of political unrest.

c. The Division Riot Control Agents Seminar was held on 22 April with 28 personnel in attendance. This seminar covered Riot Control Agents munitions and equipment including an instruction period on their characteristics and employment.

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COMBAT AIR SUPPORT

1. Significant Events.

a. Operation Orange began on 1 April with the lift of 680 troops and 185,000 pounds of cargo. Fixed wing support aircraft dropped 8.2 tons of ordnance and fired 1200 rounds of 20mm cannon. The second day saw increased anti-aircraft fire with 2 UH-1E's, 4 CH-46's, and 2 UH-34's receiving hits. One of the UH-34's was downed, but the crew was immediately evacuated by another aircraft. The other 7 damaged aircraft returned safely to Marble Mountain for repairs. Med-evac, resupply, close air support, and trooplift sorties continued throughout the operation with fixed-wing strikes accounting for over 150 structures and positions destroyed or damaged. MAG-11 and MAG-12 jets expended over 60 tons of bombs and napalm, 226 rockets, and 4700 rounds of 20mm during the operation. When Orange concluded on 11 April the First MAF, in addition to the fixed-wing sorties, had provided helicopter support which lifted 3,637 passengers and 1,004,925 pounds of cargo.

b. Political unrest in the city of Da Nang on the afternoon of the 7th of April necessitated the recall of MAG-16 helicopters not engaged in missions of an emergency nature. An evacuation force consisting of 10 UH-34's, 4 CH-46's and 2 UH-1E's was placed on a standby basis for the removal of U.S. personnel from Da Nang. On 9 April the evacuation force, augmented by 2 additional CH-46's and 1 UH-1E, lifted 2 companies of 2/9 into designated collection and pickup points to screen evacuees and provide security. A total of 324 U.S. personnel and 24,975 pounds of personal gear was helo-lifted from the city without incident.

c. Throughout Operation Virginia, 4 UH-34's and 2 UH-1E's at Khe Sanh and 6 UH-34's and 2 UH-1E's at Phu-Bai were placed on standby to provide rapid support when needed. On 19 April, 12 UH-34's escorted by 6 A-4's and 3 F-4's lifted 369 Marines and 34,000 pounds of cargo without incident. MAG-11 and MAG-12 aircraft flew direct air support missions, nightly under the control of the ASRT team at Phu-Bai. The afternoon of the 23rd, 681 troops and 26,000 pounds of cargo were retracted from the operation area and taken to Khe Sanh. Fixed-wing aircraft provided escort, but no enemy opposition was encountered. Med-evac, resupply, troop lifts and observation flights were provided by the standby aircraft at Khe Sanh and Phu-Bai. Operation Virginia continued into the month of May.

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d. Two UH-1E's escorted LVT's in the early stages of Operation Georgia as the First MAW provided air support. Aircraft on standby at An Hoa and Marble Mountain Air Facility minimized reaction time for med-evac, troop lift, and resupply missions. On the 21st of April, MAG-16 UH-34's and CH-37's carried 2 MK-87 radio jeeps, 193 passengers, 4300 pounds of cargo, and 20 med-evacs to An Hoa in support of the operation. One UH-1E, 6UH-34's, and 1 CH-37 were hit by ground fire on the 23d and 24th of April while lifting 197 troops and 16,000 pounds of cargo. No injuries were sustained and all aircraft returned safely. Small arms fire was again encountered by the helo's on the 26th, but 656 passengers were lifted with no hits taken. Helicopter sorties averaging 200 troops and 10,000 pounds of cargo daily continued to support operation Georgia as the operation moved into the month of May.

2. New Developments. None

3. Problem Areas. No new problems were encountered during the month of April.

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LOGISTICS1. Significant events

a. The 3d Engineer Battalion continues to provide pre-cut timber for bunker kits and these are being provided to Division units with engineer personnel assisting in the emplacement. The following is a recapitulation of bunkers to date:

SIZE	# CUT	# ISSUED	BALANCE ON HAND	# CONSTRUCTED
20'X30'X8'	36	33	3	19
12'X24'X8'	151	95	56	80
8'X12'X8'	124	40	84	15
8'X8'X8'	<u>305</u>	<u>174</u>	<u>131</u>	<u>108</u>
Total	616	342	274	222

b. The following projects have been added to the FY 67 military construction program for base development.

1. Helicopter landing pads.
2. Division Schools Complex.
3. Deployment of Infantry Battalion locations.

c. The Red Ball program has proven itself to be an efficient and most worthwhile program. At present, 63 separate items are on Red Ball which is an increase of 24 from the last command chronology.

d. CRITIPAK number 5 has been received by Division units. A total of 33 end items were removed from deadline as a result of this last CRITIPAK.

e. Efforts continued to eliminate excess within the division. To date these efforts have resulted in redistribution of \$46,000 worth of material and the elimination of local shortages within division units. Obligations held by FLSG are being continually reviewed in conjunction with this program and have been reduced as a result of redistribution within the division.

f. Initial test results on the acceptability and suitability of disposable mess gear indicates a continuing need for this item.

g. Two 105mm howitzers were lost as a result of enemy action. They were replaced with float weapons.

h. Six M30, 4.2" mortars were loaned to the First Marine Division as directed by III MAF.

i. One 81mm howitzer, SP, M53 and ten LVTP5A1's were received under the FY 66 R&E program.

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j. The FMFPAC contact instruction team for automotive test equipment spent twelve days instructing various units of the Division.

k. Where possible, emphasis is being placed on the use of fixed wing air craft, landing craft utility and armed truck convoys (code name: Rough Rider) for troop lifts and resupply missions, in an effort to reduce the heavy commitments of helicopters.

2. New Equipment

a. The Division received thirty, M1E1 line charges. To date none of these charges have been used.

3. Problem Areas

a. Cargo handling operations ceased in DaNang and Hue during periods of political unrest. Normal operations were resumed on 12 April 1966.

b. There are 655 items presently on the problem items listing published by FLSG. Of this total, 340 have been problem items for four consecutive months or longer.

c. The gas check obturator pad for the 155mm gun, M-53 has proved unsatisfactory. Neoprene gas check pads have been requested in lieu of present asbestos pads.

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COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS1. Significant Events

a. During this reporting period it was noted that the Communication-Electronics Material Readiness posture of the Division showed improvement. No significant equipment availability problems were encountered.

b. The results being received from the Radio Sets, AN/PRC-25 being extensively used by the Division continue to be highly satisfactory.

2. Problem Areas

a. No problem areas of consequence were experienced during this period.

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DIVISION CHAPLAIN

1. The month of April began with 29 Chaplains attached to the 3d Marine Division. Chaplain Muenzler was detached in April and rotated to CONUS. Chaplains Beach and Capodanno reported in to the Division, however Chaplain Capodanno was reassigned to the 1st Marine Division. Chaplain Swierenga returned to the rolls of the 3d Division with his battalion, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. Thus the month ended with 30 Chaplains serving in the Division. This total includes two chaplains who will be a part of FIC as of 1 May.

2. 3d Marine Division Chaplains conducted 401 Sunday Divine Services during April with an attendance of 14,973, and 495 weekday Services with 8900 attending. These figures include the eight Sunrise Services, four Protestant and four Catholic held simultaneously Easter morning in the outlying companies of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.

3. Chaplains participated in operations as follows:

Oranges: Chaplains Witt and Brannan

Virginias: Chaplains Scanlon, Moody, and Handley

Georgias: Chaplains Kahal, Dunks, Franklin, and Kenry

CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

1. General. Documents published by this section and civil affairs situation reports submitted by subordinate commands are enclosed as follows:

- a. Division Civil Affairs Newsletter Number 7.
- b. Unit Civic Action SITREPS.

2. Highlights.

a. Operation Golden Fleece. Golden Fleece Operation began 27 March and was terminated on 4 April. The source of the rice was in Hoa Phuong and Hoa Lon villages of Hoa Vang District with over 30,000 kilograms of rice harvested during this period. The rice was stored in Non Nuoc (BT 073703) for safekeeping. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines provided a company for security for harvesters and the 9th Marines furnished two 6 x 6 trucks which were used to haul the rice to storage. In addition, Chief Think of Hoa Hai village, directed his people to carry their harvest to Non Nuoc for storage. Over 1200 kilograms were stored under this system. The villagers are given receipts for the rice that is stored and can draw it out of Non Nuoc when needed. This system is intended to deprive the VC from collecting rice in the area.

b. County Fair Operations. During the period 19 April through 27 April the 9th Marines assisted the 51st ARVN Regiment in conducting 4 county fairs. These operations are concerned with rooting out the VC who have infiltrated the areas during the recent political unrest. These operations have had varying degrees of success with 49 VC KIA and 29 VCC for the 4 operations, including a VC hamlet Chief. The 9th Marines contributed 1850 lbs of rice, 35 cases of soup, 6 cases of candy, 800 magazines and assisted in Medical treatments for these operations.

c. Civil Government. The increased effort to coordinate all civic action and civil affairs projects through government leaders continues. This constant contact with the people instills confidence in their government officials.

d. Public Health. Many of the dispensaries that are in operation are being taken care of by corpsmen from various units. Vietnamese nurses have been requested from district, but in most cases there are not enough nurses to take care of all the dispensaries in operation. As a result the corpsmen are training Vietnamese volunteers to become nurses and eventually take over the dispensary.

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e. A Brown Dermatone instrument used in skin grafting operations was presented to the ARVN hospital at Duy Tan. This instrument was purchased by the people of the United States for the people of Vietnam, through a committee from Goldsboro, South Carolina "Reach the South Vietnamese People" who organized a national campaign to purchase this instrument and other needed supplies. Major Graham, a native of Goldsboro, made the presentation to Doctor Lam, the Commanding Officer of the ARVN Hospital.

f. The 1st Bn, 3d Marines pediatric Clinic has been expanded from 15 patients to 31. This shows a marked improvement of the attitude of the people concerning health standards. The parents are now willing to leave their children at the clinic rather than the old system of moving in the USOM hospital along with their sick. The custom of not trusting people outside their family to care for the sick is difficult to overcome, but as indicated by the rapid growth in the clinic much success has been accomplished in this field.

g. The dispensary that the 3d Engineer Battalion and Vietnamese civilians constructed in Da Son (BT 007729) has been experiencing much success since its opening. The average number of people treated daily is about 100. The 3d Engineer Battalion and Hoa Vang district health authorities are still trying to staff the dispensary with a full time nurse, but are experiencing difficulty in finding one. Due to the problems in finding a qualified nurse, the medical team is training 4 young local boys in first aid techniques and the boys are eager to assist in this type work. They currently are qualified to treat minor cuts, scrapes and burns. The people of the hamlet are quite proud of the structure and they clean the inside and outside regularly in order to keep it in good condition.

h. Labor. The 3d Engineer Battalion employs a working force of 210 Vietnamese nationals. These workers are acquiring skills as: carpenters, masons, electricians, welders, and mechanics. They are learning techniques of road construction, bridge construction, and building construction. These workers are learning very fast and appear anxious to qualify for higher ratings.

i. Agriculture. Dr. Cliburn, USAID agricultural advisor, and his replacement, Mr. Cook, conducted a survey of Yen Ban (AT 985708) to determine means of improving agricultural development. Results were:

(1) USAID will donate 2 tons of commercial fertilizer to improve their present crop.

(2) There are 40 to 50 acres of land that are under water at Yen Bac. USAID will provide fish to be raised commercially.

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(3) Two pig pens to be constructed and 4 or 5 American pigs to be purchased by Anti Tank Battalion, to show that pigs can be raised and sold for profit. One pen has already been completed.

j. U. S. and Vietnamese relations. Relations between the Vietnamese people and the U. S. Marines have improved considerably. A few examples are as follows:

(1) The Venerable Think Thank Huu visited the Civil Affairs Officer of Headquarters Battalion, to express his thanks to the officers and men for their assistance in the construction of the Hoa Phat orphanage. A gift of 20,000 piasters was donated to the Buddhist orphanage in Hoa Phat.

(2) Teachers and village chief of Hoa Thinh village were guests of 2nd Battalion, 3d Marines. Ceremonies were held at the battalion C.P. area and the guests were entertained by the division band.

(3) While Civil Affairs and Medical Aid teams were visiting the hamlet of Duong Son #1, they were greeted by Mr. Nhung (Hamlet Chief) and five school teachers. During the visit they were presented with a letter which was written by the students of the hamlet to a school in the United States. This letter will be translated and sent to Bennet Junior High, Columbus, Ohio.

(4) A letter was received from Mr. David E. Phillips, Director, Public Information Office, Willimantic State College, Willimantic, Connecticut. This letter was in regards to the adopting the village of An Trac by the city of Willimantic. News clippings and pictures showing the cities "An Trac Adopt" project were included in the letter.

k. Public Facilities.

(1) 3d Anti Tank Battalion completed a well in Yen Bac Hamlet (AT 985708) to be used for the purpose of supporting a hamlet shower which they have also constructed. At the present time little success has been made in getting the people to take showers.

(2) The 9th Marines have started work of constructing a well in An Luu Hamlet (BT 035678). The people of the hamlet are very enthusiastic about improving their water supply and are doing most of the work.

l. Civil Information.

(1) The civil information program is primarily designed to get the people well informed of current events throughout the area. This is being accomplished with the use of bulletin boards, posters, charts,

SECRET

magazines and newspapers. Over 6000 magazines were distributed throughout the 3d Marine Division area this last month.

(2) On 28 April the village of Thuy Phu (AT 912118) published a pilot newspaper. The paper was designed and written by the village information officer and reproduced by the 4th Marines. The village of Loc Bon (925106) has also instituted a weekly newspaper and has published two copies to date. The papers provide information on village policy, local civic action projects, and exploit propaganda opportunities.

3. Projects.

a. Construction and self help projects completed:

(1) Aid Station at Duyen Son (1) (943663) by 2nd Battalion, 3d Marines.

(2) One school repaired at Duyen Son (1) (AT 943663) by 2nd Battalion, 3d Marines.

(3) One church constructed at Duong Son (3) (AT 999670) by 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines.

(4) 40 school desks built and delivered to the school at Kim Lien (AT 925855) by 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.

(5) One blackboard built and delivered to school in Yen Bac (AT 985708) by 3d Anti Tank Battalion.

(6) One playground completed at Duyen Son (1) (AT 943663) by 2nd Battalion, 3d Marines.

(7) 200 meters of road constructed at An Trach (AT 975661) by 3d Battalion, 3d Marines.

(8) One pig sty completed at Yen Bac (AT 985708) by 3d Anti Tank Battalion.

(9) One head completed at Phu Loung (YD 865159) by 3d Battalion, 12th Marines.

b. English language classes:

(1) 3d Anti Tank Battalion held a total of 30 hours of English language classes with a total of 386 children in attendance at Yen Bac hamlet (AT 985708).

SECRET

(2) 1st Battalion, 3d Marines held a total of 8 hours of English language classes with a total of 201 adults and children in attendance at the following locations:

- (a) Chow Tarn Hamlet (AT 956784).
- (b) Tux Cu Hamlet (AT 955787).
- (c) Phuoc Quang Hamlet (AT 955787).
- (d) Kim Lien Hamlet (AT 925855).

(3) 2nd Battalion, 3d Marines held a total of 2 hours 45 minutes of English classes with a total of 174 adults and children in attendance at Da Son Hamlet (AT 963761).

4. General Analysis. The civil affairs program conducted by this command continues to expand and the emphasis is being placed on giving more direction in getting the Vietnamese people involved in our projects. Our goal is to help them build a nation capable of sustaining itself without help from external sources.

5. Monthly Recap of Civic Action.

a. <u>Medical Assistance.</u>	
No. femal adults assisted	5,620
No. male adults assisted	3,821
No. children under 18 assisted	19,578
Total persons assisted	29,019
b. <u>Dental Assistance.</u>	
No. of examinations	1,427
No. of extractions	881
No. of fillings	100
Total persons assisted	1,715
c. <u>Personal Assistance.</u>	
No. of pounds of food distributed	19,336
No. persons receiving food	8,982
No. pounds of clothing distributed	2,586
No. persons receiving clothing	3,895
No. bars of soap distributed	23,372
No. persons receiving soap	16,507
d. <u>Evacuation Assistance.</u>	
No. adults evacuated medically	23
No. children under 18 evacuated medically	36
No. adults evacuated operationally	34
No. children evacuated operationally	18
e. <u>Contacts with local personnel.</u>	
No. followup contacts	136

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3rd Marine Division
Command Chronology
Apr 1966

Supporting Documents

Encl 1	Msg	010130 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
2	Msg	010643 Z	Subj: Operation Virginia/Golden Fleece
3	Msg	010644 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
4	Msg	011030 Z	Subj: Operation Virginia
5	Ord	011200 Z	Subj: Operation Order 368-66 (Georgia)
6	Msg	011228 Z	Subj: Briefing for Operation Virginia
7	Msg	011228 Z	Subj: Operation Virginia
8	Msg	020200 Z	Subj: Relocation of CMR
9	Msg	020340 Z	Subj: Front Line Locations of Marines
10	Msg	020350 Z	Subj: G-3 Journal Entry #11, SITREP
11	Msg	020430 Z	Subj: G-3 Journal Entry #12, Location of Marines
12	Msg	020720 Z	Subj: Arclight, Operation Orange
13	Msg	020752 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
14	Msg	020810 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
15	Msg	020855 Z	Subj: G-3 Journal Entry #30, Operation Orange
16	Msg	021000 Z	Subj: Casualties, Operation Orange
17	Msg	021402 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
18	Msg	021950 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
19	Msg	030714 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
20	Msg	031503 Z	Subj: Operation Georgia
21	Msg	040533 Z	Subj: Change to Operation Order 382-66 (Operation Orange)
22	Msg	040644 Z	Subj: Change to Operation Order 374-66 (Virginia)
23	Ord	040800Z	Subj: Operation Order 385-66
24	Msg	041532 Z	Subj: Operation Virginia
25	Msg	050130 Z	Subj: Movement of Marines
26	Msg	050515 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
27	Msg	050903 Z	Subj: Destruction of Vehicle
28	Msg	050945 Z	Subj: G-3 Journal Entry #60, Operation Orange
29	Msg	050953 Z	Subj: Operation Orange 1700 Air Strike
30	Msg	051210 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
31	Msg	051400Z	Subj: Change to my Operation Order 368-66 (Georgia)
32	Ltr	06 Apr	Subj: Commander's Analysis, Techniques Utilized & Lessons Learned; Operation Double Eagle I & II, w/1 Encl: Subj: Commander's Analysis, Techniques Utilized & Lessons Learned
33	Msg	060030 Z	Subj: Operation Orange
34	Msg	060200 Z	Subj: Spot Report
35	Msg	060243 Z	Subj: Operation Orange Spot Report
36	Msg	070133 Z	Subj: Alert Units for Operation Orange
37	Msg	070239 Z	Subj: G-3 Journal Entry #21, Operation Orange Spot Report
38	Msg	070340 Z	Subj: G-3 Journal Entry #23, Operation Orange Spot Report
39	Msg	070440 Z	Subj: G-3 Journal Entry #30, Operation Orange Spot Report
40	Msg	070720 Z	Subj: G-3 Journal Entry #47, Operation Orange Spot Report
41	Msg	080700 Z	Subj: Change to my Operation Order 368-66 (Georgia)
42	Msg	081303 Z	Subj: Emergency Evacuation Operation Order 386-66
43	Msg	170100 Z	Subj: Operation Order 387-66
44	Msg	191110Z	Subj: Operation Osage Task Organization
45	Msg	230616 Z	Subj: Use of SLF
46	Msg	241210 Z	Subj: Use of SLF
47	Msg	251616 Z	Subj: Operation Osage
48	Msg	251727 Z	Subj: Operation Osage

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3rd Marine Division
Command Chronology
Apr 1966

Supporting Documents

Encl	49	Msg	251745	Z	Subj: Operation Osage
	50	Msg	252121	Z	Subj: Operation Osage
	51	Msg	260058	Z	Subj: Use of SLF
	52	Msg	260156	Z	Subj: Operation Osage
	53	Msg	270651	Z	Subj: Spot Report, Operation Osage
	54	Msg	270807	Z	Subj: Spot Report, Operation Osage
	55	Msg	270809	Z	Subj: Movement Through Operation Osage AOA & Request for NGFS
	56	Msg	281534	Z	Subj: Operation Osage
	57	Msg	290336	Z	Subj: Operation Osage Frag Order #2
	58	Msg	291014	Z	Subj: Operation Osage Flash Spot Report

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MAF DE DIV-3 NR 002

P 010130Z

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CAC III MAF

BT

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OPERATION ORANGE.

Z HOUR ON TIME. FIRST WAVE ON TIME. LZ PREP OF L7 CONDOR AT 0740 H.
SECOND WAVE IN AT 0858H. L7 AND ORG L. SECURED. BRIDGE AT (ZC 148537)
AND VILLAGE AT (ZC 150534) SECURED. D" / 1 / 1 NOW SWEEPING VILLAGE AT
(ZC 146548). NO CONTACT.

BT

KKKK

6-3 / W
6-30 / R
Omms / um

DIV DE MAF OSI YU 002

ZUB 010141Z

NEE

APRIL 66 K

01 01 30

Encl 8

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DIV DE MAF NR 426

PP 010643Z

FM III MAF COC

TO THIRD MARDIV

BT

SECRET

OPERATIONS VIRGINIA/ GOLDEN FLEECE:

A. ORAL REQ G-3 30 MARDIV

1. CG III MAF CONCURS IN YOUR REQUEST SUBMITTED BY REF A. FOR :

(A) AREA PARTICIPATION BY 1ST BN 4TH MARINES (4 COS.) IN
RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS IN AREA RECOMMENDED.

(B) EMPLOYMENT OF 3 RIFLE COMEE COS.

AND RECON PT IN OPN VA.

GP-4

BT

NNNNNNH

MAF DE DIV 3 OSI UR NR 426 ZUB 01/0648Z APRIL 66 AND ZBO-1 PPP

01 06 43

Encl 2

MAF DE DIV-3 NR 013

PP 010644Z

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

BT

OPERATION ORANGE

1. SENIOR AO ON DEBRIEFING FOLLOWING FLIGHTS OVER OPN ORAGNE REPORTS
SMALL GROUPS OF 5-10 VC OBSERVED FLEEING TO HIGHER GROUND AWAY FROM
USMC ACTIVITY. AIR STRIKES HAVE BEEN INITIATED.

BT

KKKK

DIV DE MAF QSL UR NR 013 ZUB 01/0654Z KKL

01 06 44

Encl 3

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**COMMUNICATION CENTER
3D MARINE DIVISION**

HAS BEEN SENT

CCN 040

DRAFTER 10/JEB/RP
SEC DIV GEO PHONE SHOVE 10
TRANS TOB
CWO gm

PRIORITY 011030Z APR 66

FM: CG THIRD MAR DIV
TO: ☒ FOURTH MAR
INFO: CG III MAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OP VIRGINIA

1. FOLLOWING FREQ ENGINEERED AND APPROVED FOR AN/TSC-15 OPERATIONS.

TRANS (P) M-131-5500 KCS (S) M-1-2008 KCS
REC (P) M-144-6229 KCS (S) M-28-2530 KCS
SPARES M-157-7378 KCS AND M-32-2616 KCS

2. RADIO RELAY FREQ ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS:

69.9 AND 61.1

GP-4

CCN 040

RELEASED BY HNF Wm. den Helder

PRIORITY 011030Z APR 66

011030

APR 2 1966

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 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, RVN
 Ser 0090-66
 011200Z April 1966

Operation Order 368-66 (GEORGIA)

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1: 50,000 AMS Series L-701, Sheets 6658 I,
 II, III and IV
 (b) 3d MarDiv Opn Order 343-65
 (c) 3d MarDiv O 02000.2C (COI)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:3d Marine Division

MajGen KYLE

9th Marines

Col SIMMONS

Inf Bn (Rein) (4 Rifle Co's)
 105 How Btry, 12th Marines
 Plt, Engr Co, 3d Engr Bn
 Two Plts, AmTrac Co, 1st AmTrac Bn
 Det, H&S Co, 1st AmTrac Bn
 1st Armed Amphibian Plt
 Plt, Recon Co, 3d Recon Bn

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence) and ISUMS as issued.b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Reference (b).

(2) FMAW provides helilift, med evac, and smoke and harassing
 agent dispensing capability in addition to support in re-
 ference (b).

(3) USAF provides airlift of artillery battery, supplies, and
 equipment as requested.

c. Attachments and detachments. Effective 0800H, D-1.

2. MISSION. Commencing no later than 10 April, 3d Marine Division
 deploys one reinforced infantry battalion in the AN HOA (AT 8745)
 DUY XYUEN (BT 0651) area to conduct offensive operations to destroy
 Viet Cong forces and installations located therein and open the
 area to GVN influence through "GOLDEN FLEECE" and rural reconstruction
 assistance.

290 732

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SECRET

3. EXECUTION.a. Concept of Operation.

- (1) Phase I: The reinforced infantry battalion, through utilization of helilift of troops, fixed wing lift of artillery and supplies, and LVT-Infantry surface movement, is established in an operational base vicinity (AT 8747). Estimated duration is 24 hours.
- (2) Phase II: The battalion operating area (Annex B, Operation Overlay) contains approximately 20 well defined company size TAOR's; one rifle company provides security for the operation base; three rifle companies are inserted into random company-size TAOR's for 2-4 days duration by helicopters, foot, or LVT to conduct search and destroy, "GOLDEN FLEECE," and/or rural construction operations as appropriate; companies redeployed to other random TAOR's until battalion operating area completely screened/searched and civic action within capability completed. Estimated duration is 18 days.
- (3) Phase III: Retraction of forces by air and surface movement. Estimated duration 36 hours.

b. 9th Marines (Rein).

- (1) Provide one Infantry Battalion (Rein) on D-Day to conduct helicopter and LVT-borne infantry movement, and airlift of artillery and supplies to establish operational base vicinity (AT 8747).
- (2) Conduct company-size search and destroy, "GOLDEN FLEECE," and/or rural construction operations as required in assigned operating area. (Annex B, Operation Overlay.)

c. 3d Motor Transport Battalion. Provide motor transport as requested and/or required to support this operation.d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Unclassified nickname for this operation: GEORGIA
- (2) D-Day as determined by Commanding Officer, 9th Marines, not later than 10 April 1966.
- (3) Employment of riot control agents authorized in operating area only.
- (4) Movement to objective area by helicopter, fixed wing aircraft, and LVT; return movement by same means.

SECRET

- (5) Include psychological warfare and civic action programs in conduct of operations.
- (6) Effect attachments and detachments 0800, D-1.
- (7) Fire Support Coordination.
 - (a) See Annexes E through H to reference (b).
 - (b) Establish operating area FSCC in operational base.
 - (c) Submit requests/requirements through this Headquarters.
- (8) Direct liaison between participating units authorized and encouraged.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.a. Supply.

- (1) Supply Sources - FLSG for all classes of supply.
- (2) Prescribed Loads - As directed by unit commanders
- (3) Resupply - _____ Battalion, 9th Marines (Rein) will establish a dump with 5 days all classes of supply vicinity operational base (AT 8747) and will be responsible for resupply from that point. Resupply will be by helicopter initially, and by LVT when feasible.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization.

- (1) Evacuation.
 - (a) By most expeditious means to Company "C", 3d Medical Battalion.
 - (b) Weapons and organizational equipment will be evacuated with casualties.
- (2) Hospitalization - As directed by Commanding Officer, Company "C", 3d Medical Battalion.

c. Personnel.

- (1) Casualty reporting in accordance with DivO 3040.2A.
- (2) Commencing D+1, submit Personnel Daily Summary as of 2400H on D-Day and by 1200H following day in accordance with DivO 1080.3.

SECRET

- (3) Routine administration in accordance with current directives.
- (4) Graves Registration - KIA will be evacuated through medical evacuation channels as prescribed in paragraph 4.b. above.

d. Captured Personnel and Documents.

- (1) VCC and VCS - In accordance with reference (b).
- (2) Captured Documents - In accordance with DivO P3800.1E and reference (b).
- (3) Returnees and Rallyers - These eligible for Chieu Hoi status will be delivered to Chieu Hoi Center Da Nang. Make every effort to deliver within 48 hours of rally.

e. Miscellaneous.

- (1) Uniform and equipment - as directed by unit commanders.
- (2) Commanders will make every effort to insure weapons are maintained in a serviceable condition at all times.
- (3) Make maximum use of local water and halizone/iodine tablets.
- (4) Recommendations for unit or personal awards - in accordance with DivO 1650.1B and FMFPacO 1650.1A.
- (5) Civil Affairs - in accordance with DivO 5080.1. and Annex C.
- (6) Captured materials which cannot be evacuated will be destroyed as directed by unit commanders.
- (7) Captured rice will be handled in accordance with Force/Naval Component Command/SAI Corps Order 03460.1A. Insure sufficient rice bags are on hand for bagging.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

- a. Communications in accordance with reference (c) and current communication directives.
- b. Activate Radio Nets as follows:
 - (1) Div Tact 2

Freq: 43.1 D-208 (P)
45.9 D-231 (S)

SECRET

Emission: Voice

Station and Calls:

Hq, 3d MarDiv	MONROE
3d Marines	STAKEOUT
9th Marines	PEEPSIGHT
12th Marines	MUSTER
3d Recon Bn	SCAT
2d Bn, 9th Marines	PARK GREEN

(2) Division Command Net

Freq: 4940 D-34 (P)
2154 D-2 (S)

Emission: Initial contact voice. Shift to RAT 60 wpm covered secret.

Station and Call:

Hq, 3d MarDiv	MONROE
2d Bn, 9th Marines	PARK GREEN

(3) Division Liaison Officer Net (If activated)

Freq: 3725 D-95 (P)
3844 D-96 (S)

Emission: Voice (USB)

Station and Call:

Hq, 3d MarDiv	MONROE
Div Liaison Officer	MONROE KILO
Comm Co, HqBn provide communication equipment and personnel as required.	

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL KYLE

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

A - Intelligence (~~To be issued~~) Added, SEC 291 249.

SECRET

B - Operation Overlay

C - Civil Affairs.

DISTRIBUTION:

CMC (AO3C)	2
CMCS (MCLFDC)	2
CG, FMFPAC	3
CG, III MAF	5
CG, 1ST MARDIV	3
Each Inf Rgt (except 9th Mar)	3
9th Mar	15
Each Inf Bn	1
12th Mar	10
Each Sep Bn	1
G-1	1
G-2	3
G-3	15
G-4	2
G-5	2
FSCG	2
DivAir	2
S&C	10

CMC
(A03C)

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3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, RVN
Ser: 00100-66
080800H April 1966

SECRET

Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Order 368-66 (GEORGIA)

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000; AMS Series L-70, Sheets 6658 I-IV
(b) Div OpO 343-65
(c) DivO P3800.1E

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. Enemy Strength and Disposition

(1) Location of VC units within the objective area:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Normal Operating Area</u>
5th Bn (aka V.25)	Prob	500	DUC DUC-DAI LOC Dist
Q.18 LF Co	Conf	<u>100</u>	DUC DUC Dist
		*600	

(2) Location of VC units outside objective area but capable of reinforcing within 12 hours:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Normal Operating Area</u>
R.20 Bn	Conf	500	Cen QUANG NAM Prov
70th Bn	Conf	500	S & Cen QUANG NAM Prov
CHU DUNG Bn	Conf	500	S QUANG NAM Prov
Q.13 LF Co	Conf	100	DUY XUYEN Dist
Q.14 LF Co	Conf	100	DAI LOC Dist
Q.17 LF Co	Conf	<u>60</u>	THUONG DUC Dist
		*1760	

* Totals do not include an unknown number of guerrillas operating throughout the area.

(3) Location of reported VC installations in objective area:

<u>Installation</u>	<u>Location</u>
Weapons Storage Area	AT 855527
Aid Station	AT 933493
Weapons Storage Area	ZC 795488

291 249

A-1

SECRET

SECRET

b. Recent Enemy Activities

- (1) See Appendix 1 (Enemy Activities Overlay).
- (2) During the month of March agent reports continued to indicate VC unit movements within the objective area. The highest concentration of activities was reported in the area within a 4000 meter radius of (AT 8753). Two separate reports (F/6) indicated a large VC labor force in the vicinity of (AT 855527) on 17 March.
- (3) Aerial observers reported improvements and/or new construction of fortifications within the area throughout March. Trenches, bunkers, automatic weapons and AA positions were reported during the month. AO's report receiving SA and AW fire in the area.
- (4) VC forces may be anticipated in the valley areas. Rice harvesting during the period will bring an increase in associated VC activities.

c. Enemy Capabilities(1) Enumeration

- (a) CAPABILITY 1 - Attack at the time and place of their choosing with one battalion and one company plus an unknown number of guerrillas.
- (b) CAPABILITY 2 - Defend at the time and place of their choosing with one battalion and one company plus an unknown number of guerrillas.
- (c) CAPABILITY 3 - Reinforce Capability 1 or 2 with three battalions and three companies.
- (d) CAPABILITY 4 - Conduct separately or in conjunction with Capability 1 or 2 small scale attacks or harassing guerrilla actions throughout the area.
- (e) CAPABILITY 5 - Withdraw from the area prior to or after commencement of friendly operations.

(2) Analysis and Discussion

- (a) CAPABILITY 1 - Indications favoring adoption of this capability are VC requirements to control important approach routes to the DA NANG TAOR, to maintain relative freedom of movement in this extensive food production area, and to gain prestige by demonstrating VC initiative in combat against the Americans. Proximity to a relatively secure base area with access to supplies facilitate meeting these requirements. The VC reluctance to

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mass against superior supporting arms and their comparative lack of supporting arms militate against adoption of this capability.

- (b) CAPABILITY 2 - Indications favoring adoption of this capability are extensive defensive positions prepared throughout the area, VC knowledge of the area, VC capability to gain knowledge of friendly operations in the area, VC prerogative of selecting time and place for defense, and the probability of defense required for vital installations. The reluctance of the VC to mass forces for a static defense, the VC lack of supporting arms and the VC doctrine of withdrawal before a superior force militate against adoption of this capability.
- (c) CAPABILITY 3 - Indications favoring adoption of this capability are VC forces readily available in the immediate area, VC control of the area allowing relative freedom of movement, covered ingress routes through mountains concealing movement, and the desire to inflict maximum casualties on U. S. forces in a VC dominated area. The reluctance of the VC to mass forces and their vulnerability to detection and subsequent employment of friendly supporting arms militate against adoption of this capability.
- (d) CAPABILITY 4 - Indications favoring adoption of this capability are basic VC tactics in maintaining an offensive posture against superior forces with minimum risk to concentrated friendly supporting fires and friendly tactical mobility. Resorting to guerrilla tactics would include widespread use of mines and booby-traps. Militating against this capability is the decrease of opportunities of widespread forces to score a decisive blow against friendly units.
- (e) CAPABILITY 5 - Indications favoring adoption of this capability are basic VC doctrine of withdrawal in the presence of a superior force, knowledge of the transient nature of friendly operations that renders loss of VC territory temporary at best, and conservation of combat strength in the face of superior friendly forces. The loss of control of a rice production area and stored supplies, denial of infiltration routes, and degradation of population control militate against implementing this capability. Withdrawal of units may be presaged, if circumstances warrant, by initial blending with the population and subsequent exfiltration.

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d. Probable Courses of Action

- (1) Against operations in the lowland areas, execute Capability 2 defending with elements of locally available forces from prepared positions, combined with Capability 4 when opportunities develop for harassing actions by adjacent elements not in contact.
- (2) Against operations in the mountainous areas, execute Capability 4.
- (3) Against operations threatening a vital area, execute Capability 2, coupled with Capability 3 in relieving pressure by reinforcing units striking at a time and place of their choosing in either a diversionary or main attack when chances of success are high.
- (4) Execution of Capability 5 may be implemented at any time in any area where tactical disadvantage is experienced or estimated. Withdrawal, however, is expected only to the degree necessary to avoid contact.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather

- (1) See daily weather forecasts and weather summaries as issued in INTSUMs.
- (2) Weather will favor the Viet Cong during periods of reduced visibility for movement within a familiar area and the use of areas of poor trafficability as obstacles to support their operations.

<u>Climatological Data</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>
Mean Max Temp	86	91
Mean Min Temp	73	76
Record Max Temp	105	102
Record Min Temp	62	71
Relative Humidity (%)	84	81
Mean Precipitation (in)	1.3	2.6
Highest Total (in)	7.6	16.6
Mean No of Days of Thunderstorms	5	11

b. Terrain

- (1) Relief, drainage and vegetation: See reference (a) and Appendix 2 (Terrain Overlay).
- (2) Helicopter landing zones: See Appendix 3 (Helicopter Landing Zones).
- (3) Roads and trails: See Appendix 4 (Roads and Trails Overlay).

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(4) Bridges: See Appendix 5 (Bridges Overlay).

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. EEI's

- (1) Determine if the enemy will attack our forces in objective area. If so, when, where, and in what strength?
- (2) Determine if the enemy will defend against our forces. If so, where and in what strength?
- (3) Determine if the enemy will reinforce their forces in objective area. If so, when, where, and in what strength?
- (4) Determine if the enemy will ambush friendly forces on routes to objective area. If so, where and with what forces?
- (5) Determine mission, strength, identity, location and armament of enemy forces in the objective area. Special attention to NVA units.
- (6) Determine types and quantity of heavy weapons within supporting distance of enemy forces in the objective area. Special attention to 120mm mortar and artillery.
- (7) Determine extent of enemy AA activity in objective area. Special attention to types and locations of AA weapons of 12.7mm or larger.
- (8) Determine extent, location and type of enemy field fortifications and obstacles including anti-helicopter obstacles in the objective area.
- (9) Determine condition of roads and bridges in and leading into objective area and feasibility of moving friendly forces over these roads.

b. Additional Intelligence Requirements

- (1) Determine location of enemy infiltration routes through area, degree of use, number of alternate routes, way stations and associated supporting facilities.
- (2) Determine location, capacity and extent of VC facilities in objective area. Special attention to camps, storage facilities, assembly and training sites.
- (3) Determine effects of weather on helicopter operations and aerial observation throughout period of operation.

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- (4) Report significant omissions/errors on tactical maps of the objective area.

4. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. Orders to Subordinate Units

- (1) Conduct normal unit reconnaissance and observation as set forth in reference (c).
- (2) Report information as obtained on EMI's and other intelligence requirements to Division G-2 by most expeditious means.
- (3) Make every effort to capture VC/NVA prisoners and expedite evacuation to Division Collection Point, DA NANG.

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent and Supporting Units

- (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
 - (a) Provide special aerial photography of objective area as requested.
 - (b) Provide current and predicted weather data that would adversely affect the operation during period of operation.
- (2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division: Provide order of battle information on all enemy activities, with emphasis on troop unit movements, that may affect the area of operation.
- (3) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing: Provide observation aircraft for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance as requested.

5. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL

- a. Expedite evacuation of captives to Division Collection Point DA NANG if found to be VC/NVA by on-the-spot screening.

Priority I - VC officers, all NVA personnel, key cadre, foreign advisors.
 Priority II - VC NCO's, guerrilla leaders, all communication personnel.
 Priority III - All other VCC.

- b. Make prior arrangements with appropriate ARVN and sector headquarters to ensure expeditious handling and processing of VCS through local district authorities. Report local arrangements to Division G-2 as soon as effected.

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- c. No old, enfeebled people or women and children will be apprehended as VCS unless caught in an overt act of hostility that physically endangers friendly troops.
 - d. All patrols and operational units will be provided sufficient capture tags so that capture circumstances can be properly recorded.
 - e. All captured documents will be expedited through channels to Division G-2. Personnel will be cautioned against defacing captured documents by writing or marking on them in any manner.
 - f. Personal effects and papers taken from VCS and VCC will be recorded on capture tags and accompany captives to collection points. Every effort will be made to ensure that these effects are promptly returned to all people cleared from VCS status. Capturing units will insist that ARVN authorities involved in processing cooperate fully.
 - g. See paragraph 5 of Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (c) for other specific instructions.
6. MAPS, CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS
- a. Reference (a) is the tactical map for this operation.
 - b. Additional copies of reference (a) will be provided upon request.
7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. See Appendix 2 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (c).
8. REPORTS. See paragraph 8 of reference (b).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL KYLE

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:











- 1 - Enemy Activities Overlay
- 2 - Terrain Overlay
- 3 - Helicopter Landing Zones
- 4 - Roads and Trails Overlay
- 5 - Bridges Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: (Same as Basic Order)

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3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, RVN
080800H Apr 1966












Appendix 3 (Helicopter Landing Zones) to Annex A (Intelligence) to
Operation Order 368-66 (GEORGIA)

<u>ZONE</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>SIZE(Ft)</u>	<u>SHAPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1.	AT856462	550 x 96		Paddy area at south end of narrow valley; south end of zone has three terraced paddies; no apparent obstacles.
2.	AT860461	90 x 90		Paddy at west end of narrow valley, surrounded by low hills; remainder of valley appears too narrow.
3.	AT858459	200 x 180		Paddy located approximately in center of valley, surrounded by low hills; three dikes appear to be only obstacles.
4.	AT860459	240 x 85		Paddy at east end of narrow valley, surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.
5.	AT867456	290 x 75		Paddy surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.
6.	AT864455	140 x 90		Area in northwest corner of large irregular shaped paddy, surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.
7.	AT863459	240 x 100		Paddy immediately west of new road; two main dikes appear to be only obstacles.
8.	AT866457	290 x 125		Paddy area between new road and small hill mass; no apparent obstacles.
9.	AT868458	150 x 125		Grass field between bend in river and low hill mass; low trees and brush along river bank and possible tomb in northwest corner appear to be only obstacles.
10.	AT872463	100 x 100		Hard packed open area immediately west of barracks type buildings in ARVN compound; no apparent obstacles other than buildings.

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
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<u>ZONE</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>SIZE (Ft)</u>	<u>SHAPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
11.	AT874463	250 x 85		Hard packed open area at junction of three roads in ARVN compound.
12.	AT875462	160 x 75		Hard packed earth and grass open area along road in ARVN compound; buildings on west side are only obstacles.
13.	AT874461	250 x 75		Hard packed open area immediately southwest of warehouse buildings; buildings appear to be only obstacles.
14.	AT873460	220 x 150		Grassy open area adjacent to road in ARVN compound; no apparent obstacles.
15.	AT874460	175 x 150		Open area of earth and grass; centered at triangular shaped road junction; no apparent obstacles.
16.	AT876458	100 x 100		Open area at end of land spit in lake; buildings on west side and low trees on other three sides appear to be only obstacles.
17.	AT877460	100 x 75		Open hard packed earth between low wall and building in ARVN compound.
18.	AT877459	230 x 140		Earth and grass area on slight rise at end of ARVN compound; no apparent obstacles.
19.	AT878462	300 x 200		Open area of earth and grass, enclosed by road complex; buildings situated on the west, north, and east boundaries; no apparent obstacles other than the buildings.
20.	AT879461	200 x 150		Hard packed earth area next to building in ARVN compound (appears to be a parking lot).
21.	AT901463	250 x 170		Paddy area at entrance to small valley surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.

A-3-2

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<u>ZONE</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>SIZE (Ft)</u>	<u>SHAPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
22.	AT903462	200 x 90		Paddy area in center of valley surrounded by low hills; rest of valley appears too narrow; no apparent obstacles.
23.	AT906466	170 x 100		Paddy area in valley surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.
24.	AT909461	260 x 110		Paddy area surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.
25.	AT902460	125 x 72		Crop area between river and low hills; hills on south and west sides appear to be only obstacles.
26.	AT902459	150 x 100		Grass and low brush area between river and low hills; low trees on east and south sides and low bushes in landing zone appear to be only obstacles.
27.	AT903459	100 x 85		Grass and low brush area between dry stream bed and low hills; hills on south end of landing zone appear to be only obstacles.
28.	AT910461	350 x 150		Paddy area surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.
29.	AT911461	350 x 90		Paddy area surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.
30.	AT912462	620 x 100		Paddy area surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.
31.	AT912469	540 x 170		Paddy area surrounded by low hills; only obstacles appear to be small wells in corners of some paddies.
32.	AT913463	200 x 100		Paddy area surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.
33.	AT914463	250 x 75		Paddy area surrounded by low hills; no apparent obstacles.

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




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<u>ZONE</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>SIZE (Ft)</u>	<u>SHAPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
34.	AT915466	200 x 150		Grass and low brush area on hill side; trees at west end of zone appear to be only obstacles.
35.	AT867466	450 x 300		Graded area adjacent to ARVN compound; no apparent obstacles.
36.	AT868466	450 x 75		Sandy area adjacent to ARVN compound; no apparent obstacles.
37.	AT869466	350 x 110		Open area adjacent to ARVN compound; no apparent obstacles.
38.	AT870466	360 x 140		Open area adjacent to ARVN compound between railroad track and drainage ditch; no apparent obstacles.
39.	AT885465	220 x 100		Low brush and dry crops; no apparent obstacles.
40.	AT894469	180 x 95		Graded area adjacent to abandoned ARVN outpost; no obstacles.
41.	AT899466	410 x 150		Paddies between three small hills and adjacent to river; other than hills there are no apparent obstacles.
42.	AT902467	350 x 75		Paddies between two small hills; other than the hills there are no apparent obstacles.
43.	AT900465	140 x 90		Paddies between two small hills; other than the hills there are no apparent obstacles.
44.	AT902469	220 x 100		Row crops and a few graves; area is slightly terraced; one tree situated at edge of zone 20 to 25 ft high.
45.	AT917473	250 x 90		Paddies between two hills; other than the hills, there are no apparent obstacles.
46.	AT923476	120 x 90		Low brush and dry crops at foot of hill along river bank.

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<u>ZONE</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>SIZE (Ft)</u>	<u>SHAPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
47.	AT864450	220 x 100		Paddy in valley between two ridges; no apparent obstacles.
48.	AT865451	275 x 75		Paddy in valley between two ridges; no apparent obstacles.
49.	AT865451	235 x 105		Paddy in valley between two ridges; no apparent obstacles.
50.	AT868452	500 x 300		Paddies in valley adjacent to road; no apparent obstacles.
51.	AT890454	250 x 175		Paddies in valley adjacent to reservoir; no apparent obstacles.
52.	AT897452	240 x 150		Paddies at foot of ridge; two trees situated in center of zone.
53.	AT903472	350 x 85		Road on top of small, grass covered ridge; no obstacles.
54.	AT902470	350 x 80		Area containing grass, crops, and low brush; situated between two small ridges adjacent to road.
55.	AT902469	250 x 108		Grass and low brush area on top of small knoll; no obstacles.
56.	AT877487	280 x 350		Dry crop area on small knoll; no apparent obstacles.
57.	AT873474	2800 x 220		Air strip under construction and surrounding area; composed of hard packed earth; no apparent obstacles.
58.	AT928449	420 x 95		Abandoned paddies in narrow draw with large knoll at east end; no apparent obstacles.
59.	AT924446	330 x 115		Abandoned paddies along stream with brush covered hill and trees at south end.
60.	AT921448	880 x 165		Abandoned paddies in draw along stream; no apparent obstacles.
61.	AT918449	155 x 90		Abandoned paddies in narrow draw to west of stream; no apparent obstacles.

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<u>ZONE</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>SIZE(Ft)</u>	<u>SHAPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
62.	AT916447	400 x 115		Abandoned paddies in narrow draw west of stream. No apparent obstacles.
63.	AT919446	140 x 120		Abandoned paddies in narrow draw west of stream with small knoll at southwest end.
64.	AT920442	260 x 120		Abandoned paddies in draw; surrounded by brush covered knolls.
65.	AT922443	300 x 130		Abandoned paddies in draw along stream with trees at southwest end.
66.	AT921442	310 x 140		Abandoned paddies in narrow draw along stream and adjacent to HLZ 64; no apparent obstacles.
67.	AT915442	300 x 115		Abandoned paddies at west end of narrow draw along stream with ridge line on northwest end.
68.	AT866451	500 x 210		Abandoned paddies west side of road; small trees at south end of HLZ; no other apparent obstacles.
69.	AT843427	215 x 115		Grassy plateau along SONG TINH YEN River; east side drops to river and west side bounded by brush covered hill. One 50 foot tree on south end of HLZ.
70.	AT804509	1400 x 250		Paddies in draw south of reservoir; no apparent obstacles.
71.	AT807516	2550 x 400		Paddies on southeast end of reservoir between two low brush covered ridges; no apparent obstacles
72.	AT832528	550 x 150		Grass covered ridge line with sparsely scattered brush; no apparent obstacles.
73.	AT799537	1700 x 250		Paddies between two brush covered ridges perpendicular to river; trees bisect southwest half of HLZ.
74.	AT819537	2650 x 1200		Paddies with four fingers extending between ridges, each finger averages 130 x 1200 feet; no apparent obstacles.
75.	AT823535	365 x 260		Grass covered ridge line with one leg extending south 900 feet x 100 feet and other leg extending east 900 feet x 100 feet. Foxholes throughout center and east-west leg of HLZ.

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<u>ZONE</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>SIZE (Ft)</u>	<u>SHAPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
76.	AT827537	250 x 100		Grass covered hilltop west of river; no apparent obstacles.
77.	AT824534	450 x 650 x 100		"L" shaped paddy with one leg extending east 650 feet x 150 feet and other leg extending south 450 feet x 90 feet, in draw.
78.	AT971501	200 x 200		Grassy flat between ridges; sparingly covered with scrub brush; two graves on east edge of HLZ.
79.	AT935486	280 x 155		Grassy knoll along trail south of abandoned railroad. No apparent obstacles.
80.	AT939483	350 x 110		Grass and brush flat east of trail; no apparent obstacles.
81.	AT946488	210 x 98		Paddy along stream between brush covered hills; two dikes bisect the HLZ.
82.	AT942484	610 x 150		Paddies along stream between brush covered ridges; no apparent obstacles.
83.	AT990500	95 x 95		Grassy flat south of stream bounded by ridge lines on the south, east, and west; no apparent obstacles.
84.	BT000504	230 x 115		Grassy flat west of stream with ridge line to the west; no apparent obstacles.
85.	BT001504	250 x 240		Dry crop (row crops) area on west bank of stream and adjacent to HLZ No. 84; no apparent obstacles.
86.	BT004475	660 x 450		Terraced rice paddies west of stream. Trees on northeast edge of HLZ.
87.	BT002475	925 x 375		Grassy area with scattered brush bisected by trail; no apparent obstacles.

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BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL KYLE.

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

TAB:

A - Helicopter Landing Zones Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Same as DivOpnO 368-66 (GEORGIA)

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3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, RVN
011200Z April 1966

Annex C (Civil Affairs) to Operation Order 368-66

Ref: (a) Map, South Vietnam, AMS Series L-701, Sheets 6658 I, II, III
and IV
(b) FOR/NCC/SAICORPS O 03460.1A

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. (See Operation Order 386-66)
2. MISSION. Assist in spreading GVN influence, strengthening the local friendly government, and establish good relations between the USMC units involved and the populace.
3. EXECUTION.
 - a. Concept of Operation.
 - (1) Civil Affairs activities will be coordinated through local officials, ARVN, RF, PF or other GVN agencies where possible.
 - (2) All CA tasks undertaken must lend themselves to quick completion and should cause the populace to identify with their legally constituted government. The most productive functional areas to work will probably be:
 - (a) Public Health (MEDCAP).
 - (b) Civil Information.
 - (c) Population and Resources Control.
 - b. Bn. 9th. Marines (Rein).
 - (1) Establish and maintain liaison with appointed District, Village and Hamlet officials and religious leaders.
 - (2) Evacuate captured food stores in accordance with reference (b).
 - (3) Where possible establish Civil Affairs program in the functional areas listed in subparagraph a.(2) above.
 - c. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Exercise every precaution to avoid unnecessary destruction of religious or cultural structures located within operational area.

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- (2) Properly safeguard and publicize the location of such religious or cultural structures located within or near operational base.
- (3) The destruction of dwellings, caches of food stuffs, and livestock, as a denial measure, must if possible, be left to the judgement of GVN authorities and RVNAF units, unless the tactical situation demands immediate action. In this instance the decision must rest with the senior U. S. tactical commander present. In any case such destruction should be left to RVNAF if at all possible.
- (4) When contact has been established with local GVN officials, arrangements for coordinated action in the following areas will be initiated:
 - (a) Procedures for informing GVN officials of locations and amount of food supplies and livestock discovered.
 - (b) Procedures, if necessary, for labor, packing, and materials and available transportation to permit the extraction of excess supplies and livestock.
 - (c) Procedures of the GVN to furnish receipts for supplies and livestock extracted when private ownership is claimed.
 - (d) Procedures for use of U. S. forces to furnish security elements during extraction operations.
 - (e) Procedures for an integrated effort in GVN dispensaries with MEDCAP teams.
 - (f) Enforcement of local population control, such as curfews, travel restriction, and regulations concerning the movement of foodstuffs etc.
 - (g) Procedures for assisting tactical refugees as required by the tactical situation.
 - (h) Procedures for civil information activities and psychological operations (Must be coordinated with local Vietnamese Information Service activities).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.a. Supply.

- (1) Civic Action Supplies will be requested through normal channels.

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- (2) It is anticipated that MEDCAP supplies and soap will be the primary Civic Action supplies needed; however, limited amounts of foodstuffs and clothing should be included for immediate temporary assistance to people made destitute by tactical operations.
- b. Reports. Reports will be submitted in accordance with current directives.
- c. Special Functions.
 - (1) Refugees. Local inhabitants will not be encouraged to leave their homes and become refugees. This does not preclude normal population control measures to avoid interference with tactical operations.
 - (2) Civil Information.
 - (a) Information concerning operations requiring civilian cooperation must be thoroughly disseminated.
 - (b) Current informational periodicals will be obtained through this Headquarters for distribution during the operation.
- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. Command and communications will be in accordance with paragraph 5 of the basic order.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL KYLE

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: (Same as Basic Order)

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COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
3D MARINE DIVISION
 DRAFTER 3/FHW/pnc
 SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3
 CWO gm

CCN 047PRIORITY 011229Z MAR 66

FROM: CG, THIRD MARDIV
 TO: FOURTH MARINES
 INFO: 3D MARINES
 4TH MARINES

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BRIEFING FOR OPNS VIRGINIA

1. CG DESIRES ALL FUTURE OPNS PRIOR TO EXECUTION BE BRIEFED IN DIV CONF ROOM. SUCH BRIEFINGS NORMALLY INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO FOLLOWING LISTED IN ORDER OF PRESENTATION FOR PURPOSES OF SHOWING DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING:

DIV G-3, PLANNING DIRECTIVE

DIV G-2, INTELLIGENCE EST

DIV G-3, DIV OP ORDER

DIV G-4, LOG CONCEPT

DIV G-5, CIV AFFAIRS CONCEPT

REGTL CO, REGTL CONCEPT

BN CO, BN OP ORDER

BN S-2, LOCAL INTELLIGENCE EST

BN S-3, BN CONCEPT OF OPNS

BN S-4, BN LOG CONCEPT

2. REQUEST YOU ADVISE THIS HDQTRS (ACOS G-3) YOUR RECOMMENDED TIME AND DATE FOR BRIEFING ON OPN VIRGINIA, BRIEFING PERSONNEL TO PARTICIPATE, AND TRAINING AID REQUIREMENTS, IF ANY.

GP-4

APR 2 1966

RELEASED BY NAV. MR. clarker**CONFIDENTIAL**

Encl 6

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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

DRAFTER 3/NLB/wmr
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3
CWO gm

CCN 046

PRIORITY 011228Z APR 66

FM CG, THIRD MARDIV
TO THIRD MARDIV
INFO CG, III MAF
CG, FMAW
FLC
FLSQ

HAS BEEN SENT

//**SECRET**//

OPN VIRGINIA

A. MY 271310Z MAR (OPN O 374-66)

B. MY 290840Z MAR

C. MY 281310Z MAR

1. THREE CO BN (REIN) CONCEPT FOR SUBJ OPN APPROVED.
2. IN ADDITION ADD ONE RECON PLT TO TASK ORGN.
3. REF B AND C PERTAIN AND REMAIN IN EFFECT.

GP-4

RELEASED BY D.V. Wmch

APR 2 1966

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K
 MAF DE DIV NR 28
 R 020200Z
 FM THIRD MARDIV
 TO III MAF

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF CMR

UNCOMINTEND ON 03 APR TO RELOCATE POE F E PRE SENT CMR AT NORTH
 END OF DANANG AIR FIELD TO POSITION AT (BT088672)

CMR POSITIONED ON SOUTH END OF AIRFIELD WILL REMAIN. CONSIDER
 THAT LIMITED 320 MIL BEAM CAPABILITY CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVELY
 EMPLOYED BY SUCH REPOSITIONING WITHOUT SACRIFICING ARE E E AIR
 BASE DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

BT

*At request of Col. Callender
 and his statement that
 General ~~XXXX~~ K4E had
 verbally approved
 during briefing on
 City matters 2 April.*

NNNN

DIV DE MAF AND OSL YU 028ZUR 020200Z

APRIL 66

K

AND MATE HAVE ONE FOR YU W

K

02 02 00

encl 8

MAF DE DIV NR 32
P 020340Z
FM THIRD MARDIV
TO III MAF

)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRONT LINE 1/1 D 1 PLT AT ZC (138518) 1 PLT AT ZC (191530)
1 PLT AT ZC (148538). CP AT ZC (153534). 1/3 D 1 PLT ON HILL
200. D 2 C TO AIRFIELD FOR SEC. D 2 A CHECKING CAVE AT ZC(160548)
D 2 A 1/3 E D 3 MOVING TO HAMLET (174546) D 1 B CHECKING AREA THAT
WAS NALPOMED AT 011030H. 1/3 D C P AT ZC (155548) 1/3 B
MOVING SW ON SOUTH BANK OF SONG WIGIA. SITREP FOLLOWS LATER.
1/3 CP REMAINS UNCHANGED SKATSNOP LOC AT (114519).
JOURNAL NR 10
BT

NNNN

DIV DE MAF QSL UR NR 32 ZIIB 02/0352Z KKL

02

0340

Encl 9

MAF DE DIV NR 33
P 020350Z
FM THIRD MARDIV
TO III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
1/3 B FRONT LINES (198540) AND ZC (194547) C D AT ZC(205546)
ONE VC KIA. 3 VC WIA 020743H AT ZC(203543). (3) USMC WIA MED EVAC.
JOURNAL NR 11
BT

NNNN

DIV DE MAF QSL YU 033ZUB 020410Z

APRIL 66 K

02 03 50

Encl 1

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 048

R 020810Z

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPERATION ORANGE

3/3 I WILL MAKE LIFT FM HILL 55 AT 1700H.

J NR 29

BT

KKKK

YESSEEEEEEEED

DIV DE MAF QSL UR NR 048 ZUB 02/0827Z KL

G-3	W
G-3A	H
Opns	W
Wtrc Ho	↓

02 08 10

Encl 14

DECLASSIFIED

DIV NR 36
P 020430Z
FM THIRD MARDIV
TO III M7
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1/1 U S IN DECKING PSN AT 2C(157530) 1/4 B CP DISPERSING. 1/3 B 3-

REC SPREADIC SA FIRE IN AHAMLET AT (2C 2004EF 200543)

J NR 12

BT

NNNN

DIV DE MAF OSL YU 036 ZUB 020440Z

APRIL 66

K

02 0430

Encl 10

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

REF ID: A64545

0 0757987

FM THIRD MARTIN (0-3)

100-443884-104

41

2011

STATE: ARIZONA OFF: 000000

FOR COL. #0017, REPORT NEW ARCHITECT ASAP WITHIN AREA COVERED BY
(AIR23594) (AIR41491) (AIR23411) AND (AIR23593)
NEW IARC 11/11/68 11:00 AM

NEW LABEL 1 - 100% (AIR DRIED) BHT (AIR DRIED)
 POSSIBLE - COULD BE FOR GIVEN TO APOLOGET TWO IN HAPPY VALLEY.

1000

$$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{2}$$

1st FIRM FORM TO R.A. (47439195)

Figure 1

FILED MAY 20 1966 FBI NEW YORK 100-329734-7 APRIL 66 K

02 07 20

Encl 12

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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

DRAFTER 3:FRW:af
SEC G-3 PHONE Shove 3
CWO 2

CCN 080

IMMEDIATE 020752Z APR 66

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: NINTH MARINES
INFO: THIRD MARINES
CG III MAF

312.1

// SECRET //

OPN ORANGE

A. THIRD MARDIV OPO

file
383-66
79-66
Nuga?

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY FOR IMMEDIATE HELI-
LIFT TO OPN ORANGE. UPON BECOMING AIRBORNE CHOP CO TO THIRD MARINES.

GP-4

RELEASED BY *H. V. McLaughlin*

5

HAS BEEN SENT

APR 3 1966

SECRET

Encl 13

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02

07

52

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 049
R 020055Z
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO CMC III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
G-3 JOURNAL ENTRY
J NR 30 - OPERATION ORANGE

AT 021212H 1/3 B ENCOUNTERED MORTAR AND SMALL AW FIRE FM HALEEE HAMLET
AT (ZC 194545) 1 PLT PINNED DOWN. A/S AND ARTY SILENCED MORT FIRE.
HOWEVER S/A CONTINUED. 1/3 B CONTINUED ADVANCE. NEE HOWEVER IT
WAS NOT EXPECTED TO ADVANCE BEYOND (ZC 180540) PRIOR TO DARKNESS. 1/1
D (-) WAS HELD LIFTED TO JOIN 1/3EE 1/1 PLT AT BLOCKING PSN VIC
(ZC 157530) AT 021437H TO ATK FM THAT POINT TO NE MAKE PHYSICAL CONTACT

WITH 1/3 B W/TWO CO'S COMMITTED TO S RACEEE BANK OF SON VU GIA. 1/3
REQUIRED 1 ADD FRR EEE RIFLE CO TO MAINTAIN SEC TO AIRFIELD AND 1/12 W

J NR 31 - OPERATION ORANGE

AT 1640 1/1 D GET HAS ENCOUNTERED WHAT IS DESCRIBED AS HVY SA FIRE
AT (ZC 160530).

BT
KKKK

DIV DE MAF AS
DIV DE MAF QSL YR 049 ZUB 02/0910Z AR

02 08 58

Encl 13

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 050
R 021000Z
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO CMC III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
CASUALTIES OPERATION ORANGE

1. TOTAL FRIENDLY CASUALTIES TAKEN DURING OPN ORANGE UP TO 021730H
ARE TWENTY NINE WIA AND TWO KIA. THREE WIA ON 01 APRIL. 2 KIA NAD
20 WIA PRIOR TO 021200 H AND 6 WIA SUBSEQUENTLY.

BT
KKKK

DE DIV CORRECT PRECEDENCE TO RD PRIORITY VIC E ROUTINE KKKK

DE MAF OSI UR NR 050 AT 02/1010Z KKKKKK

6-3 / 12
6-31 / 12
Cym 0 / 12

02 10 00

Encl 16

G-3	W
3A	R
OPNS	PO

MAF DE DIV NR 056
P 021402Z
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO CG III MAF
BT

SECRET

OPERATION ORANGE

1. VC CASUALTIES AS OF 022145H. KIA ELEVEN. KIA (POSSIBLE) TWENTY.
ESTIMATE ADDITIONAL FIVE VC KIA BY INFANTRY. TEN BY ARTY AND FIFTEEN
BY AIR.

2. INTENTION TO AREF AIRLIFT WHISKEY BATTERY TWO TWELVE WITH FOUR HOW-
TARS INTO OBJECTIVE AREA FIRST LIGHT 03 APRIL.

BT

KKKK

DE MAF QSL UR NR 056 . AT 02/1410Z KKKKK

02 14 02

Encl 17

CHAPTER 3172112
 SEC 0-3 PHONE 3000
 CWC

OCN 80

IMMEDIATE 021950 APR 66

FM: CG THIRD MARINE
 TO: NINTH MARINE
 INFO: THIRD MARINES
 CG III MAF

// SECRET //

OPN ORANGE

A. THIRD MARINE CTO 334-66

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY FOR IMMEDIATE RECALL
 LEFT TO OPN ORANGE. UPON BECOMING AIRBORNE CHOP GO TO THIRD MARINES.

OP-4

RELEASED BY _____

021950

Encl 18

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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

6-3
6-3A
Opus 0
P00

VV MFD373

ACTION COPY

*****FLASH*****

DE RUNSMF 479 0930714

ZNY SSSSS

Z 030714Z

FM CG III MAF

TO CG THIRD MARDIV -

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

BT

SECRET

OPN ORANGE

1. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV: REQUEST TO ALERT BN CMD GRU AND TWO COMPANIES FOURTH MARINES. NOT APPROVED DUE TO SITUATION IN NORTHER PROVINCES.

2. FOR CG FIRST MARDIV: PLACE BN CMD GRU PLUS TWO COMPANIES ON STANDBY FOR MOVE TO DANANG BY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. BN CMD GROUP AND ONE COMPANY ON TWO HOUR STANDBY REMAINING CO FOUR HOUR.

3. FOR CG FIRST MAW: REPORT CAPABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH LIFT ABOVE FORCE CHU LAI TO DANANG BY TELECON THIS HQ ASAP.

4. FOR ALL: DURLNOUTH ALL CONCERNED ABOVE OPERATION.

GP-4.

BT

#909/ser

44

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14

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3121,1

DRAFTER 3/FBN/clp
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 3
CWO H

CCN 154

PRIORITY 031503-Z APR 66

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG III MAF

HAS BEEN SENT

// **SECRET** //

OPN GEORGIA

A. CG III MAF MSG 291416Z (CLASS)

1. REF A APPLIES. UNCDIR^{R&R} THE EXECUTION DATE FOR OPN GEORGIA WILL BE
ADJUSTED TO NIT 20 APRIL. ✓

2. THIS REQUEST IS MADE TO PERMIT THE 9TH MAR TO CONSOLIDATE POSITIONS AS
APPROVED BY CG, III MAF.

GP-4

7
APR 4 1966

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03 15 03
5
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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

DRAFTER _____ EOS
SEC G-4 _____ SHOVE A
TRANS TOD _____
CWO _____

CCA: 185
PRIORITY 040533Z APR 66

FROM: CG, 3d MARDIV
TO: 3d MARDIV

INFO: CG, III MAF
CG, FIRST MAW
FLC
ELSC ALPHA
DET C-1, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES, DANANG

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER 382-66 (OPN ORANGE)

1. CG, THIRD MARDIV 272350Z MAR 66

2. AND THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH TO REFERENCE A.

4a(8) SUBMIT DAILY REPORT OF DUMP STATUS AS OF 1600 TO BEACH
THIS HQ MLT 2000. INCLUDE ANY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.

RELEASED BY JM McClanahan

04 05 33

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3d Mardiv - 2100/1DISPATCH 4/EDS/MLD
SEC G-1 HOME BUD
TRANS TO
CWOCCN: 199PRIORITY 040644Z APR 66FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIVINFO: CG III MAF
CG FMAN
FLC
FLSU**//SECRET//**

OPM ORDER 374-66 (VIRGINIA)

A. CG 3D MARDIV 271310Z MAR 66

1. ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH TO REFERENCE A

4A (7) REPORT DUMP LEVEL STATUS DAILY AS OF 1600 TO REACH
THIS HQ NTL 2000. INCLUDE ANY ASSISTANCE REQUIREDRELEASED BY cd BTD

04 06 44

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 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, RVN
 Ser 0093-66
 040800H April 1966

Operation Order 385-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 Series L-701, Sheets 6658 I, II, III and IV; 6659 I, II, III and IV; 6559 I, III and IV; 6560 II, III and IV; 6460 I and II
 (b) Div Op Order 343-65

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. See current ISUMS and special intelligence reports as issued.
- b. Friendly Forces. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. 3d Marine Division conducts operations to protect Vietnamese Nationals in the harvest of the rice crop during the main harvest seasons, to deny the VC valuable foodstuffs, stifle his control over the local populace, and aggravate the VC logistical problems.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operations. The most effective echelon to coordinate rice harvesting procedures is at the Infantry Regiment/District Chief, Infantry Battalion/Village Chief, and Infantry Company/Hamlet Chief levels thereby proving to the populace that Marine forces at all echelons are available to protect them against VC encroachment. No set harvesting pattern is applicable to all rice growing areas, however the following methods, tactics, and procedures will prevail:
 - (1) Whenever possible, respond to the request of Vietnamese authorities in establishing priorities, types of assistance, and extent of assistance.
 - (2) Patrols operating near the periphery of the TAOR coordinate patrol and ambush activities with local villagers to protect them while harvesting and transporting rice.
 - (3) Marine forces will cooperate and coordinate with ARVN/RF/PF forces in search and clear operations. Upon the conclusion of a search and clear operation, the Marine unit will establish outposts and ambushes to safeguard the rice harvesting area, while ARVN/RF/PF forces will escort the local

APR 5 1966

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Encl - 23

SECRET

populace to and from the rice fields to harvest crops.

- (4) Aggressive patrolling by Marine forces around the periphery of rice fields will be conducted to provide a screen of protection for local villagers, while RF/PF units guard rice storage areas.
 - (5) Marine and ARVN units should coordinate activities to patrol and ambush as appropriate to protect the local populace and rice storage areas.
 - (6) District and Village Chiefs should be encouraged to arrange for the transport of harvesting personnel and rice to safe areas by native bus, truck, or sampan. However, when such local means of transportation are not available, use of Marine aircraft and/or vehicles is authorized.
 - (7) Extended search and clear operations in the vicinity of rice harvest areas outside of the TAOR should be so planned as to permit sufficient time for Marine helicopters or vehicles to transport local villagers to the area of operations, harvest the rice crop, and then transport the rice and villagers back to a safe area.
- b. 4th Marines. Conduct operations for harvest protection within and in the vicinity of the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR and the CO BI THANH TAN operating area during the period that regional rice harvesting is in progress.
 - c. 3d Marines. Conduct operations for harvest protection within and in the vicinity of the DA NANG TAOR during the period that regional rice harvesting is in progress.
 - d. 9th Marines. Conduct operations for harvest protection within and in the vicinity of the DA NANG TAOR during the period regional rice harvest is in progress.
 - e. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) This plan provides for operations during the principal harvest seasons extending from late February to April and during the period September - October. Exact dates of harvesting should be obtained from local Vietnamese authorities.
 - (2) Direct liaison between participating units is authorized and encouraged.
 - (3) Report commencement and termination of harvest protection operations in or adjacent to TAORs. The termination report

SECRET

will include estimated tons harvested, rice storage methods, and attitude of local populace.

- (4) Include in each daily Situation Report a brief summary of the day's GOLDEN FLEECE II activities to include: estimated tons harvested, difficulties encountered, if any, attitude of the people and methods of transportation used for Vietnamese Nationals and/or rice.
 - (5) This order is effective for planning on receipt; execution will be during the principal harvest seasons at the direction of regimental commanders.
 - (6) Offensive operations will be conducted concurrently and will supersede GOLDEN FLEECE II on execution.
 - (7) Unclassified code name for this operation is GOLDEN FLEECE II.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. In accordance with AdminO 343-65
 5. COMMAND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.
 - a. Communications in accordance with Division Order 02000.2C (COI).
 - b. Request additional communications support from this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL KYLE

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

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00118-66

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3d Marine Division
DA NANG TAOR

281100 April 1966

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Annex A (Rice Growing Areas) to Operation Order 385-66

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS series L701

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. The following is a list, by priority, of the rice growing areas throughout the northern three provinces of RVN. The list was prepared in conjunction with the USAID Agricultural Advisor.

a. 1st Priority:

- (1) Southern portion of HOA VANG District, DAI LOC District, and DIEN BAN District.
- (2) Early Crop: Last week in February to middle of April.
- (3) Late Crop: 2d week in September to middle of October.

b. 2d Priority:

- (1) QUE SON District, and the valley area of DUC DUC.
- (2) Early Crop: 15 March to 15 April.
- (3) Late Crop: 15 September to 1 November.

c. 3d Priority:

- (1) HUONG TRA District, Southern PHONG DIEN, Northern TA TRACH River valley in NAM HOA.
- (2) Early Crop: 15 March to 15 April.
- (3) Late Crop: 15 August to 15 September.

d. 4th Priority:

- (1) BO DIEN River valley in CAM LO District.
- (2) Early Crop: 15 April to 15 June.
- (3) Late Crop: October.

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2. Appendix 1 (QNSS Overlay of Rice Harvest) to this annex contains recommended rice areas by priority in the DA NANG TAOR that require protection. The early crop is from late February to mid-April and the late crop is mid-September to mid-October.

3. Liaison with local officials should be made early enough prior to each rice harvesting season to enable effective protection to the harvesters and the rice and denial of the rice to VC forces

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL KYLE

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

Colonel U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

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9th Mar	9
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G-1	2
G-2	3
G-3	5
G-4	3
G-5	5
CEO	2
S&C	15
FSCC	2
DivAir	2

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III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

3121,1

DRAFTER 3/FRW/jlv
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 3
TRANS TOD _____
CWO gaa

CCN 234

IMMEDIATE 041530Z APR66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV
INFO: CG III MAF
CG FMAW
FLC
FLSU

//SECRET//

SUBJ: OPN VIRGINIA

REF A: MY OPN ORDER 374-66

1. DELAY REF A FOR MINIMUM OF 48 HOURS AND UNTIL DIRECTED TO EXECUTE BY THIS HQ

GP-4

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APR 5 1966

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P 050130Z

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CDC III MAF

BT

S E C R E T

1/3/P BEGAN LIFT FROM LZ NORTHWEST OF TAM HIEP AT 050805H.

LIFT COMPLETED AT 050840H.

BT

NNNN

CE MAF AND RMR YOUR NR 133

05 01 30 (CCCCCCCC)

Encl 25

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MAF DE DIV NR 143

ZNY SSSSS
R 050515Z
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO COC III MAF
E
X S E C R E T X
OPN ORANGE
1/3: 3/3/L DEST 2 BUNKERS AT ZC 129555.
BT

G-3	W
G-3A	1/2
OPNS	180
WATCHO	

NNNNN
DIV DE MAF

05 05 15

QSL NR NR 143

AT 05/0510Z

KKKKKK

5-1-26

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DECLASSIFIED

DIV-3 DE MAF NR ~~409777~~

7NY SSSSS

P 050903Z

FM III EEE

FM CG III MAF

TO CG 3D MARDIV

BT

S E D C R E T

REF YOUR TT MSG 050759Z. AUTHORITY FOR DESTRUCTION OF
SUBJECT VEHICLE GRANTED.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

MAF DE DI V 3 DSL UP NR 449 ZUP 05/0924 Z MAR EEE APR 66

05 09 03

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MAF DE DIV 3 NR 155

050945Z

MM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C-3 JOURNAL ENTRIES

OPERATION ORANGE

J NR 60 - 1/3: FORWARD ELEMENTS OF 1/3/B ARE NOW ON HILL 63 AT
ZC 096566.

J NR 61 - 1/3/D1: OBS 15 VC CARRYING AMMO BOXES AT 1455H INTO CAVE
AT ZC 209576. AREA MAINTAINED UNDER OBSERVATION BY 1/3/D1 AT PSN
ZC 211567. AIR STRIKE CALLED TO DEST CAVE. RESULTS TO FOLLOW.

J NR 62 - 1/3:AO RPTS AIR SREEE STRIKE FELL SHORT OF CAVE UNDER OBS-
ERVATION BY 1/3/D1. HAVE REQ ARMED HUFYS HELOS TO FIRE ROCKETS INTO
CAVE ENTRANCE TO INSURE COMPELETE DESTRUCTION

J NR 63 - 1/3: 3/3/I SWEPT THROUTEE THROUGH OBJ, DEST 31 TUNNELS. NOW
AT AFEE ZC 177547. 3/3/L DEST 2 CAVES AT ZC 128562. 1/3/B NOW AT
ZC 099559. 3/3/L DEST 2 TUNNELS AT ZC 132555.

BT

KKKKK

DIV DE MAF QSL YR NR 155 AT 05/0952Z APR KKK

05 09 45

8

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MAF DE DIV 3 NR 156

R 050953Z

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

PT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

G-3

OPERATION ORANGE 1700 AIR STRIKE

1ST AIR STRIKE QWAS OBSER AS VERY EFFECTIVE BY 1/3 D-1 2ND EXPLOSION
WAS OBSER W/LIGHT SMOKE - 2ND A/S HAS BEEN REQ TO HIT CAVE AGAIN.

P

KKKK

DIV DE MAF QSL YOR NR 156 AT 05/0954Z APR KKK

05 09 53

Encl 29

MAF DE DIV 161

R 0512100Z

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO COC III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPN ORANGE

A. 3/3/L NONCHNEEE NO CHANGE

1/3/CP NO CHANGE, 33/3/I PERIM AROUND CP (ZC177541), 13/EE 1/3/D CP NO
CHANGE, 1/3/D2&3 IN PERIM AROUND CP, 1/3/D1 AT ZC 208561, 1/3/B DEF-
ENSIVE AROUND CP AT ZC 096566), 1/1/D CP (ZC 183536), 1/1/D FRONT

LINESZC 180536-190539.

B. COTEF CONTINUED S&D OPNS IN ALL SEITTRS OF OPERATIONAL AREA.
CONDUCTED AIR STRIKE ON FORTIFIED PSNS AT ZC 107566. CONDUCTED 2 AIR
STRIKES ON CAVES IN SUPPORT OF 1/3/D1 WITH EXCELLENT COVERAGE OF
RESULTS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.

CC. NONE

D. NUMEROUS CAVES, TUNNELS & BUNKERS DEST IN ALL SECTTRS AT PREP-1
IOUSLY REPORTED.

F. ESTAB STRONG NITHEE NIGHT DEFENSIVEEEE DEFENSE, CONDUCT AMB
ACTIVITIES IN ALL SECTORS.

J NR 70

BT

KKKK

Q2

M

DIV DE MAF QSL YR MNR 161 AT 05/1212Z APR KK

05 12 10

Encl 30

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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

SENT

DRAFTER 3/HFC/jlw
SECQ-3 PHONE SHOVE-3
TRANS TOU
CWO e

CCN 281
PRIORITY 051400Z APR66

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV
INFO: CG III MAF
CG PHAN
FLC
FLSG ALPHA

3121.1

//SECRET//

MY OPN ORDER 368-66 (GEORGIA) *file*

1. MAKE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN SUBJ OPN ORDER PARAS 2 AND 3 D (2):

DELETE 10 APRIL 1966 AND INSERT 20 APRIL 1966 THEREFOR.

OR-4

RELEASED BY *Blunk*

\$ 7

05 / 14 00

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3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

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3430.1

Ser: 0096-66

6 April 1966

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From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Commander's Analysis, Techniques Utilized and Lessons Learned;
Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I and II.

Ref: (a) CG, TFD Combat After Action Report Ser. No. 005-16 of
15 March 1966.

Encl: (1) Commander's Analysis, Techniques Utilized and Lessons
Learned.

1. Enclosure (1) was compiled from reference (a) and is forwarded
for information. Comments concerning techniques utilized; and lessons
learned during this operation are desired. Submit comments to
reach this Headquarters by 22 April 1966.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of
enclosure (1).


F. R. WILKINSON
By direction

DISTRIBUTION: "D" & "G"

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SECRET

End 32

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1. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

a. The Viet Cong

(1) In analysis of DOUBLE EAGLE operations the single factor of most significance was the complete lack of contact with main force Viet Cong elements. With confirmed intelligence reports indicating that major Viet Cong forces were, in fact, located in both DOUBLE EAGLE operating areas, concepts were drawn to effectively engage those forces. Extensive security precautions were taken during both planning phases so as not to divulge Task Force Delta intentions. For both operations access to planning matters was limited to those with a bonafide need to know and all aspects were classified "Top Secret" until D-Day. For added security and to obtain surprise by the rapid redistribution of forces from Southern QUANG NGAI Province into the DOUBLE EAGLE II area west of TAM KY detailed planning was accomplished as late as possible, essentially on D-Day minus one. Once operations commenced, deployments were executed with great rapidity and with concerted attempts to achieve surprise. After operations were underway forces were frequently re-deployed on short notice over widespread areas. All of these steps were taken in the vain attempt to gain contact with main force Viet Cong elements.

(2) Interrogation of captured personnel indicates that the Viet Cong had knowledge of the time and place of attack for DOUBLE EAGLE I. The Viet Cong apparently believed that D-Day was to be 26 January, and accordingly, they reportedly withdrew from the objective area on 25 January. How the time and place of the attack was compromised is not known; however, the planning time for DOUBLE EAGLE I was somewhat lengthy, there was extensive message traffic pertaining to the operation, and of course, several naval and troop movements prior to D-Day. It is concluded that planning for operations in this environment must be executed quickly and under the most stringent security measures in order to achieve tactical surprise. In addition, consideration should be given to deception planning, oriented towards other areas to give the Viet Cong a false picture of where offensive operations are scheduled.

(3) After operations commenced west of TAM KY in DOUBLE EAGLE II, it was learned that the First Viet Cong Regiment, which intelligence had confirmed as being in that area, may have withdrawn as much as a month prior to Task Force Delta's arrival.

(4) Not only did major Viet Cong elements withdraw from the Eastern Sectors of both areas of operation, but these withdrawals were obviously deep and complete. They failed to appear anywhere in the nearly 500 square miles of territory in Southern QUANG NGAI Province and the 102 square miles in QUANG TIN Province in which the Task Force vigorously searched.

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The general pattern was that local force Viet Cong would surface and snipe at friendly elements, and if the friendly unit was small, the local forces would attack aggressively. Major units were not to be found. If they were present, they consistently refused combat with the Task Force.

(5) Task Force Delta Command Posts, Beach/Logistic Support Areas and Helicopter Group Airfields presented a static, lucrative target for the Viet Cong. Despite that potential for major Viet Cong attacks, the enemy declined to launch operations against these areas except for a squad size attack on the Task Force Command Post vicinity of TAM KY. It is evident that the Viet Cong continue to adhere to the technique of fighting at a time and place of their choosing and are not tempted to risk offensive action against lucrative but well defended targets.

b. Weather and Terrain

(1) In general, good weather prevailed during both DOUBLE EAGLE I and II favoring operations of the Task Force on land, from the sea, and in the air. However, rain, low cloud cover and reduced visibility occasionally did seriously hamper operations. The first difficult period was encountered on D-Day, extending through the morning of D+2 on DOUBLE EAGLE I when rain, low cloud cover, and high surf conditions seriously interfered with the landing of personnel, supplies, and equipment. On two other occasions bad weather forced the postponement of major helolifts of tactical units. In addition, helicopter lifts scheduled for early morning were frequently delayed until later morning or midday due to low clouds in the mountain areas. With such delays, little daylight time remained once troops were lifted into new areas. In this situation, enemy elements, if present, could have retracted during the ensuing night. Other than factors cited above, the weather presented no bar to the operations of Task Force Delta.

(2) Generally speaking, the terrain in both areas could be divided into two categories: relatively flat eastern sectors with mountainous areas to the West. In the coastal region of DOUBLE EAGLE I, numerous rivers, streams, and marshy areas seriously impeded foot and vehicular movements with almost total reliance on the helicopter for inland movement. In the mountain regions, numerous valleys, trails, and small, but useable, helicopter landing zones were encountered which facilitated movement of the Task Force elements. However, the dense jungle foliage, precipitous hills, and valley paddies often preclude rapid movement afoot.

c. Techniques utilized, lessons learned, and significant highlights

(1) Task Force Delta operated over a vast area in DOUBLE EAGLE I encompassing nearly 500 square miles of terrain.

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Seventeen battalion and nineteen company/battery helilifts were conducted, and three subsidiary amphibious landings in addition to the initial amphibious assault were made. In addition, thirteen battalion and four company major overland moves took place. The mobility afforded by the helicopter and the U. S. Navy amphibious forces was exploited to the maximum in covering such a large area with relatively small numbers of infantry and artillery. DOUBLE EAGLE II was conducted in a considerably smaller operating area. Nevertheless, in order to adequately search the area, reliance on helicopters for six battalion and eight company/battery helilifts was necessary.

(2) Related to the foregoing was the concept of utilizing reduced-size infantry battalions consisting of a Battalion Command Group, an 81mm mortar platoon, and two rifle companies (instead of the four rifle companies organic to a Marine infantry battalion). The result was light battalions containing the necessary command and control personnel and equipment, readily available fire support, and two maneuver elements. An additional rifle company or two was always available for reinforcement of the light battalion. Each of these light battalions had a Shore Fire Control Party and a Tactical Air Control Party with a forward Air Controller assigned to each rifle company. This concept gave the Task Force commander small, potent, tactical elements which could be quickly helilifted into areas of concern. In addition, this freed rifle companies for other essential missions, such as BSA/LSA security radio relay stations security, and artillery position protection. Further, tired companies could be replaced by fresh companies from within the Task Force resources.

(3) Artillery was used extensively with firing batteries being rapidly displaced inland by helicopter or laterally, in small boats and craft during DOUBLE EAGLE I and by truck during DOUBLE EAGLE II, in order to keep the deep-ranging infantry within artillery firing fans. The LVTH with its 105mm howitzers was invaluable in the DOUBLE EAGLE I environment. Forty seven artillery displacements/deployments were effected.

(4) Air-ground coordination reached a new high. During both DOUBLE EAGLE I and II, MAG-36, the helicopter group, deployed to the field and located itself adjacent to the Task Force Delta CP and the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) was positioned within the Task Force CP immediately adjacent to the Task Force Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). In addition, a Tactical Air Field Dispensing System (TAFDS) was installed within BSA/LSA areas. These deployments resulted in greater helicopter availability since refueling and minor maintenance were accomplished within the BSA/LSA precluding the requirements for aircraft to be out of the area for prolonged periods for servicing. Further, close coordination and exchange of information between the Task Force and the Air Wing elements were greatly facilitated by this side-to-side arrangement.

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The Task Force headquarters was provided with up to the minute knowledge of aircraft availability, both fixed and rotary wing, and the wing elements were constantly appraised of the location and progress of ground elements.

(5) The technique of designating specified UH-34 helicopters for logistic support of infantry units was utilized and proved tremendously successful. Two variations of the technique were employed. When a battalion was in a fast moving situation covering difficult terrain rapidly, two helicopters were assigned in direct support of that battalion to accomplish medical evacuation, resupply, evacuation of VC personnel, supplies, and equipment, and displacement of Marine personnel, supplies, and equipment. Logistic support for battalions in relatively static situations was provided by assigning direct support helicopters to the Shore Party Group Commander who thus had the means to deliver and pick-up. An Air Officer from MAG-36 was provided the Shore Party Group to assist in scheduling this helicopter logistic support. The technique of designating a specified number of helicopters for logistic support facilitated the combining of loads and permitted resupply to continue smoothly during periods of helicopter commitment to tactical lifts. On occasions the limited numbers of helicopters available in relation to higher priority requirements precluded full employment of this direct support helicopter logistic support concept.

(6) Extensive reconnaissance operations were conducted during both operations by the Provisional Reconnaissance Group. Their activities were of particular value while operating in the extensive area of DOUBLE EAGLE I. In that operation thirty-five, four man reconnaissance team OPs, five platoon and two company reconnaissance patrols made 153 significant sightings totaling 919 VC and 400 VCS. These sightings were an invaluable supplement in analyzing other intelligence furnished the Task Force. In addition, during DOUBLE EAGLE I, although reconnaissance personnel did not seek combat, they killed 42 VC and wounded 14 VC with small arms fire and by calling artillery and naval gunfire missions on appropriate sightings. Reconnaissance activities during DOUBLE EAGLE II made similar, although not as extensive, contributions to the intelligence efforts.

(7) Communications capability available to the Task Force was stretched to the absolute limit to support operational requirements. The AN/PRC-25 radio proved itself as a most reliable communication means frequently over distances of 15 to 20 miles.

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Operating over extended areas in rugged mountains, however, it was often necessary to establish radio relay sites in order to maintain contact with widely dispersed units. The establishment of these relay sites required diffusion of limited helicopter availability as well as provision for security elements. Two separate relay sites were frequently in use at the same time. Establishment of such positions could have been averted and more responsive communications effected if the Task Force had had an airborne radio relay capability. As the tempo of operations stepped up and additional stations were added to the Task Force Tactical Net this net became seriously overcrowded. A second tactical net was established and the stations were divided between the two nets according to the locations of the units. On two occasions a third tactical net at the Task Force level was established in order to provide direct uninterrupted communications with raiding forces. In DOUBLE EAGLE I the AN/TSC-15 (multi-channel mode of operation), in probably its first combat use, provided the Task Force communications with the 3d Marine Division with three voice channels and full-duplex (2-way simultaneous) teletype.

(8) It should be noted that the Task Force operated across a provincial boundary (QUANG NGAI - BINH DINH) which was also the I Corps -II Corps tactical boundary. Arrangements for this boundary crossing were easily arranged and smoothly effected despite the fact that such boundaries had previously been considered barriers to effective military operations. It is believed that a favorable precedent was established denying the Viet Cong a traditional sanctuary.

(9) Harmonious relations were maintained with the 2d Division, ARVN, throughout Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I and II. These relations were manifested by effective liaison, close cooperation and coordinated operations throughout. Particularly noteworthy was the assignment of two elements of the 2d Division under operational control of Task Force Delta during DOUBLE EAGLE I: the Division Reconnaissance Company on 13 January to conduct a pre-D-Day reconnaissance and the 2d Co, 3d Battalion, 4th Regiment, during the period 26 January - 15 February to seize and hold Hill 163 overlooking Red Beach. In addition, 2d Division, ARVN, elements conducted operations deep into the Task Force Delta assigned area by mutual agreement. Fire control lines and other coordination measures were easily arranged and meticulously observed by the 2d Division.

(10) During DOUBLE EAGLE I relations with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), U. S. Army, were likewise harmonious. Liaison officers were exchanged, liaison visits between Commanding Generals were frequent, and mutually supporting operations were quickly planned and executed.

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Illustrative of this cooperation was the provision of security for B Btry, 1/30, 1st Cavalry Division, by Co G, 2/4, Task Force Delta for a 6 day period during which the battery supported both 1st Cavalry Division and Task Force Delta.

(11) A considerable civic action effort was exerted. The primary activity centered around medical assistance which resulted in the treatment of over 6200 Vietnamese. Additionally, over 7200 persons were fed and over 400 refugees processed. A highpoint of the civic action program was the repair work on Highway #1 in Southern QUANG NGAI Province and on the TAM KY - TIEN PHOUC road by Task Force Delta engineers. Twenty-three miles of road to include ten bridges or bridge by-passes were repaired encompassing the filling of over a hundred road cuts and the destruction of many roadblocks. This tangible assistance, it is felt certain, made a deep impression on the local populace.

(12) Three B-52 strikes were flown during DOUBLE EAGLE I with adequate area coverage. However, due to extremely poor weather and the difficult accessibility of the area, exploitation could not be immediately launched but was accomplished later. This situation was anticipated by Task Force Delta and a request for a 24 hour postponement was submitted; however, the Task Force was informed that the strike could not be postponed. In view of the obvious advantages of immediate exploitation, it is strongly recommended that a "no-go" system be established for these strikes to enable the ground commander to request 24 hour postponements a minimum of twelve hours in advance.

(13) Other observations such as the requirement for Montagnard interpreters, unusual techniques utilized in unloading under high surf conditions, and the effects of psychological warfare operations are contained in appropriate enclosures to this report.

(14) Analysis of Operations DOUBLE EAGLE I and II could not be complete without pointing out the tremendous contributions made by supporting helicopter elements. Operating in such extensive areas of rugged terrain with overland mobility severely restricted, while at the same time faced with the requirement for rapid maneuvering of forces in attempting to get behind withdrawing Viet Cong, demanded absolute maximum effort from available helicopters. That effort was always forthcoming. In future operations of this nature Task Force Delta will require even greater helicopter support availability.

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SECRET2. INTELLIGENCEA. G-2 Statistics and Reports Unit

Discussion: To meet the extraordinary requirement for detailed statistics and information pertaining to enemy activity required by higher headquarters, a Statistics and Reports Unit was formed within the G-2 Section during DOUBLE EAGLE II. This unit was staffed by one officer and one staff noncommissioned officer with a clerk available as required. The unit functioned during the operation to maintain the detailed records to substantiate all statistics reported and to make all spot reports to higher headquarters. This relieved the Combat Intelligence unit of this burden and allowed it to concentrate on its primary function of developing useful intelligence for the Commanding General, his staff, and field commanders.

Recommendation: That in future operations of this type, a similar statistics and reports unit be organized within the G-2 Section to maintain statistical records and report to higher headquarters as required.

B. Spot Reports to Higher Headquarters

Discussion: The G-2 and G-3 Sections, Task Force Delta, were required to make continuous spot reports to higher headquarters throughout the operation. The format for each of these section's spot reports was identical. The result was that there was duplication of reports from the Task Force Headquarters to the next higher headquarters in which the same reports being received by the G-2 and G-3 from the same unit were being passed twice over the same line of communications. The G-2, in addition to receiving copies of the unit spot reports being made over the tactical net, received spot reports over the intelligence net. The latter were often more complete as they pertained to the enemy and enemy activity due to a time lag. The result was one that would tend to lead to confusion at the next higher headquarters since initial spot reports by the G-3 concerning the enemy were usually followed by a different version shortly thereafter as reported by the G-2. This was frequently the case where the G-3 got involved in spot reporting enemy losses. The G-2 kept close watch and count on enemy personnel and material losses whereas the G-3 did not. With such emphasis on statistics, it is imperative that reporting procedures not overcomplicate an already burdensome task.

Recommendation: That a complete review of spot reporting requirement be made and that a delineation be made in the reporting responsibilities of the G-2 and G-3 to reduce, wherever possible, duplication and overtaxing the communications links with next higher headquarters.

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C. Aerial Observation Aircraft Support

Discussion: During Phase I of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE it was found that USMC aircraft were not available to fly aerial observation missions in support of Task Force Delta. In the latter stages of Phase I and throughout Phase II fixed-wing aerial observation aircraft were requested from, and air observers flew, with the 220th Army Aviation Company.

Recommendation: That in future operations, a predetermined number of USMC aircraft be assigned with the sole mission of aerial reconnaissance or, lacking that, Army Aviation Units be requested to provide aircraft for visual aerial reconnaissance.

D. Refugee Collection Point

Discussion: A large number of refugees were evacuated during Phase II of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE. These local inhabitants should be screened by counterintelligence personnel for information concerning guerrilla forces and activity in the area from which they came. In addition, they should be screened against current Black-Grey-White lists. To facilitate such handling and not involve refugees with the handling of captives and suspects, a refugee collection point is required to ensure full screening and efficient disposition by the G-5.

Recommendation: That in future operations, a refugee collection point be established in close proximity to the field captive collection point.

E. Montagnard Interpreters

Discussion: At one point during Phase I of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE, Montagnard VC captives were taken and could not be interrogated since Task Force Delta had no assigned personnel who could speak the Montagnard tongue. These captives were subsequently turned over to the District Chief at BA TC for interrogation and ultimate disposition.

Recommendation: That the possibility of encountering Montagnard VC be anticipated when operations involve highland areas and that prior arrangements be made either through local Vietnamese officials or Special Forces units in the area of operations to obtain and use Montagnard interpreters as the need arises.

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3. Reconnaissance.

a. Terrain Limitations. Ground reconnaissance operations on Double Eagle I were highly successful. On Double Eagle II, the same techniques produced very moderate results. Several factors caused this. Clandestine ground reconnaissance required large areas of sparsely populated, heavily vegetated, preferably hilly or mountainous country. On Double Eagle I, these terrain features were present. On Double Eagle II, they were not. Future operations should plan ground reconnaissance accordingly.

b. Team Operations. Team (4-5 men) clandestine surveillance operations were used extensively, with 35 such elements being employed in the 28 days of reconnaissance operations during Double Eagle I. Maximum employment was 11 teams positioned and reporting at one time.

Of these 35 teams, 11 were retracted prematurely because of compromise or contact; 3 were retracted because of communications failure. Teams made 140 sightings totaling 897 Viet Cong/NVA. 26 artillery and naval gunfire missions were called and adjusted from these observation posts, resulting in 19 confirmed VC/NVA killed, and 22 possibly killed. Teams, which inadvertently found themselves in contact, killed 10 VC/NVA and wounded 5 others. Friendly casualties were 2 KIA and 3 WIA. Considering that this operation marked the first time that the Force Reconnaissance Company had utilized this technique to any extent, OP's established by that unit did very well.

This technique requires helicopter entry, quick helicopter retraction capability and exceptionally well-trained reconnaissance personnel to be fully successful. Additionally, teams positioned in response to current order of battle information, on carefully selected OP's, produce more results than teams broadcast as a screen just to cover the map. This is directed reconnaissance as opposed to area screen or "shotgun" methods. Teams used as a part of a wide intelligence screen, specifically to the south of BA TC, had significantly fewer sightings than those placed in response to order of battle information on probable enemy escape routes.

Personnel used on team operations must be above average in intelligence, products of thorough training in team techniques, and possess solid confidence in their own ability and complete faith in the ability of the command to react quickly enough to pull them out of difficult positions when they are encountered. If all precautions are taken, the target areas are wisely selected, and the command is capable of quick reinforcement or retraction in support of compromised teams, these operations can continue to be conducted with confidence and little cost. This cost seems to be far outweighed by the results achieved. This technique has been developed to a relatively high degree. Only the highlights are discussed above.

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c. Platoon Operations. Five platoon patrols (15-25 men) were conducted during Double Eagle I. Missions were: two - search for MIA's, two - area reconnaissance, one - prisoner capture. Eight VC/NVA were killed and 3 were wounded. The only significant sightings reported by these patrols were the results of contacts. Three of these patrols, (the area reconnaissance and the prisoner capture), were retracted prematurely because of enemy contacts, which they could not handle. Two USMC MIA's resulted from these actions. It appears obvious that a platoon is too large to move clandestinely and too small to take care of itself if hit. The results do not justify frequent use of this technique. The circumstances must be determinate, however. No squad patrols (7-10 men) were employed; however, it appears that the same objections apply to squads as to platoons.

d. Company Operations. Two company patrols were conducted on Double Eagle I. The mission of each was twofold: (1) area reconnaissance and (2) prisoner capture. Four enemy supply areas were discovered, containing a total of 5 tons of rice, 500 pounds of salt, 60 gallons of kerosene, 10 bolts of cloth, large quantities of uniforms and documents, and a small amount of medical supplies, including 20 vials of penicillin. One prisoner was captured, two VC were killed, and 3 were wounded. Friendly casualties were: 1 USMC WIA (slight).

The concept used for these operations was as follows: Two 14 man elements (each a platoon minus) were landed at two different zones 2000-3000 meters apart. They then moved over covered jungle routes to ambush sites. A larger 28 man element (1 platoon and a Company Command Group) was then landed at the third point of the triangle (3000-4000 meters away) and patrolled toward the two ambushes. Upon closing the smaller elements, the entire force would counter-march most of the axis of advance used initially by the largest force, using two routes, converging at a fourth landing zone for retraction.

With this concept, a 56 man (company(-)) element can completely cover a 7 grid square area in one day, being inserted early in the morning and retracted in the evening. As in team operations, this technique has been more highly developed than is indicated here. Again, results from these operations far outweighed costs and fully justify continuation of the method.

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4. Artillery.

a. First lesson learned is the very definite requirement for additional AN/PRC-25 radio sets in the D/S Artillery Battalions with the conditions under which this operation was conducted. That is, with infantry companies and battalions operating in mountainous, jungle-covered terrain, widely separated from their supporting artillery batteries, communications between the forward observer/liaison officer and the supporting artillery battery or battalion becomes extremely critical. In many instances, the only immediate support the infantry unit can expect in an emergency is that provided by heavy, accurate, and sustained artillery fire. The AN/PRC-9 radio does not provide the communications necessary, under the conditions outlined above, to secure and/or control adequate fire support. AN/PRC-25 radios, in sufficient number to enable each FO and LNO to operate with them, would greatly improve their communications capability.

b. The second lesson learned is a continuation of the same problem. Even with the AN/PRC-25, the FO with the infantry company, conducting wide ranging search and destroy operations in mountainous and jungle-covered terrain, can not, many times, talk to his supporting artillery unit. The same is true for the artillery LNO with the infantry battalion. This inability to communicate occurs most frequently during the hours of darkness. This, of course, is the most crucial time for the relatively small, isolated infantry company. The FO must have the capability of calling in and controlling the artillery defensive fires so necessary to the preservation of the infantry's position. This assurance of 24 hour positive communications is possible by employing airborne radio relay over the area of operations. The Provisional Artillery Group attempted to do this by using the artillery AO in an L-19 aircraft during the hours of darkness. This system had basic shortcomings, namely the inability of the AO to monitor more than one (1) artillery conduct of fire net at a time and the problems involved in trying to maintain a limited number of Army aircraft with Marine AO's over the area of operations during daylight hours and also use the same aircraft & AO's continuously throughout the night. As long as Marine infantry/artillery units are operating in the Republic of Viet Nam, some permanent, readily available, 24 hour a day, automatic, airborne radio-relay system is required to insure that, when critically needed, Marine artillery can provide the support the infantry has come to expect.

c. One other lesson learned was that the Marine direct support artillery battalion does not possess the number of personnel and/or radios to provide the large numbers of additional liaison and forward observer teams required for this type of operation. These requirements were met by utilizing personnel and equipment from other units in the artillery group and by requesting assistance from the artillery regiment. There is a definite need to anticipate the requirement for additional forward observers, liaison officers, and radios. The survey section was found to be an excellent source of personnel to carry out some of these requirements.

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5. Naval Gunfire.

a. Several times throughout the period of 28 January - 16 February it was necessary for the fire support ships to replenish and rearm. It was established that the optimum time for these evolutions was the period of late morning through the early afternoon. This is the period of minimum enemy activity and by dispatching one ship to replenish with the other ships remaining on fire support station, ample naval gunfire support capability was retained.

b. The second lesson learned is that it is essential from the standpoint of safety and fire support coordination that ships in the operating area providing NGF support for the Corps area Commander and who are not under the operational control of the Amphibious Task Force Commander, do not fire into the AOA/TAOR without prior clearance from the SACC and/or FSCC. In one instance on DOUBLE EAGLE I the fire support ship assigned to I Corps attempted to fire a mission into the TAOR without first clearing it with the FSCC.

6. Air

a. Air-Ground Coordination. Co-location of air elements and Task Force elements allows for greater cooperation, cross-exchange of information, and greater responsiveness resulting in more efficient operations.

b. Order of Battle Information. Wing elements must be kept constantly informed of both friendly and enemy orders of battle. When Wing elements are co-located with the Task Force, their operations and intelligence personnel can check the Task Force order of battle overlays and relay this information to their units immediately.

c. Air Request Communications Nets. Whenever possible, air requests must be forwarded over the air request nets, and not over other command, tactical, and intelligence nets. Use of other nets for air requests merely overloads those nets and puts an inherent delay into the air request system.

d. Forward Air-Controllers. Greater emphasis needs to be placed upon using the forward air controllers in the direction of close air support strikes thereby conserving the use of the Tactical Air Controllers (Airborne) capability. Commanders in all operations should insist upon forward air controllers taking part in aggressive combat patrols and that all personnel be instilled with the capabilities of air as a supporting arm.

e. Direct Support Helicopters. The concept of assigning a number of helicopters in direct support of the Shore Party Battalion insures most effective use of helicopters except when a battalion is operating independently of other battalions or when a battalion operation is greatly fragmented. Then some helicopters need to be assigned to the battalion as direct support aircraft for that battalion. This allows consolidation of air requests for maximum utilization of the aircraft.

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f. Restricted Fire Plans. The SAVAPLANF procedure continues to be the most effective way of coordinating helicopter operations and supporting arms; however, study should be continued to solve the many problems of fire support coordination centering around operating aircraft in a 360 degree hostile environment when supporting arms are necessary in all 360 degrees.

g. Preparation of Landing Zones. Often too much time is spent preparing landing zones for the arrival of helicopters. This extensive artillery and air preparation gives the enemy notice of an impending landing and allows him to leave the area untouched by anything other than the preparation fires. Future preparation of landing zones should consist of short intensive preparation fires before the landing and should be followed by continued preparation fires against surrounding and commanding terrain after the landing.

h. USMC Aerial Observation Capability. Presently, VMO squadrons can not provide adequate aerial observation capabilities and still provide escort, gunship, and TAC(A) capabilities to the Task Force. For future operations VMO squadrons should be augmented from other USMC, US Army, and USAF resources in order that the observation services may continue uninterrupted without interfering with escort, gunship, and TAC(A) capabilities.

i. Advance Party from the Helicopters. A small advance party from the helicopter MAG and the DASC should go ashore initially with the Task Force staff. This will allow them to observe the operation and grasp the situation prior to the arrival of their elements. Thereafter they may impart this knowledge of the situation to their elements as they come ashore and more readily assist these elements in entering the operation.

j. Helicopter landings. Helicopter landings are an exact science and must be planned as precise operations. Battalion commanders and helicopter personnel must coordinate all landings to insure timely and accurate lifting and landing of all personnel. Helicopter landings must be planned in the presence of the battalion (or unit) commanders, the helicopter flight leader, and the TAC(A). Such planning insures that all understand the landing zone, the preparation of that zone for landing, the timing of the operation, the exact size of the lift, and the manner for accomplishing the lift.

k. Airborne Radio Relay. A need exists for airborne radio relay of FM frequencies for artillery nets. Augmentation aircraft must be provided to give airborne radio relay capabilities.

l. Clandestine Reconnaissance Unit Insertions. Reconnaissance unit insertions which are clandestine in nature should be made during last light conditions and with low level approaches to the area of insertion. This provides the unit with the least chance of being observed by the enemy and gives them the best chance for evading initial contacts.

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m. TACP Radio Equipment. The radio equipment of the TACP is excellent both in quality and reliability, however it is too heavy. The PRC-47 radio with its single side band capability is too heavy to be manpacked in sustained operations. During DOUBLE EAGLE, its weight and size accounted for two casualties due to exhaustion. Until a suitable replacement is found, either the PRC-25 should be used to provide air request net capabilities or more personnel should be provided to pack the PRC-47.

n. Air Control. Lessons learned involving air control and directly effecting the Task Force were as follows:

(1) TACRON Control. The TACRON can not effectively and efficiently exercise positive control of helicopter operations if the helicopters come from both ship and shore resources. To correct this, the helicopters operating in the area should be assigned by the TACRON to direct support of the ashore units. In turn, the pilots, MAG representatives, and DASC representative with the Task Force staff should appraise the TACRON of each and every mission assigned to the helicopters.

(2) Air Control Passing Ashore. The DASC should not attempt to gain control of air operations during peak periods of operations. Rather air control should be planned to pass ashore during a forecast period of minimum operations i.e., late night or early morning.

(3) Reconstitution of On Station Aircraft. Aircraft on station must be reconstituted as early as possible after on station aircraft are committed to a target. Air controllers should attempt to foresee commitments of on station aircraft and start reconstitution before the aircraft are committed. When this is not possible, then reconstitution should be the first order of business after the commitment of on station aircraft.

o. Flexibility. The greatest lesson learned is that excellent air-ground relationships and coordination can provide flexibility to the commander and that this flexibility can be used to exploit the immediate situation. This is essential for success over the enemy.

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7. Communications.

a. Comment: The Task Force Tactical Net #1 frequently provided communications to eight tactical units which represented two or more independent and widely separated subordinate operations. The radio section of this headquarters was organized and equipped to maintain tactical communications with four infantry battalions and to provide one relay station for one net if required.

Discussion: The tactical situation generated the requirement to divide each battalion into two or more elements each capable of operating under the direct control of the Task Force Headquarters and to utilize reaction companies and platoons in special situations. Radio was the primary means of communication to these units. When rifle companies and platoons came under the operational control of the Task Force Headquarters, their parent battalions were usually unable to provide them with the appropriate radio capability to function as separate tactical units and the Task Force Headquarters had to provide the needed equipment. The nature of the terrain and distances encountered necessitated the operation of three relay stations at the same time in order to support the widely dispersed tactical situation. As a result of all of the above, the original T/O and T/E of the Radio Section was severely taxed to the point that at one time no readily available back-up capability existed and an equipment breakdown might have materially hampered the radio system for an unacceptably long period. The above mentioned relay stations were used initially on the Tactical Net #1. Consequently, most of the battalions were forced to pass their logistical and administrative messages as well as tactical messages over that net while the Command Net carried a relatively light load. The amount of tactical traffic alone on the Tactical Net was far too much for efficient operation.

Recommendations:

(a) That the T/O and T/E of any future headquarters with a mission similar to that of Task Force Delta's reflect the requirement for establishing two or more relay sites for at least two radio nets.

(b) That each infantry battalion of such a force be prepared to provide communications (radio) for two tactical Headquarters.

(c) That in future operations of the nature of DOUBLE EAGLE, the senior headquarters be prepared to operate at least two VHF (FM) tactical nets simultaneously in order to provide the command with the responsiveness and flexibility it must have in tactical communications. The headquarters should be prepared to provide a relay station on one of these nets.

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b. Comment: A multi channel radio link was established between the Headquarters of Task Force Delta and 3rd Marine Division Headquarters with the AN/TSC - 15.

Discussion: This radiolink provided three voice channels plus full duplex covered teletype service between the two Headquarters. About 10 per cent down time on the teletype circuit and 15 per cent on the voice circuits was experienced. Otherwise, the quality of the service obtained from this equipment was fair on the voice circuits and the teletype was excellent in spite of the fact that the operators had only limited experience with this new equipment in the mode of operation described above.

Recommendation: That more extensive use be made of the multi channel capability of the AN/TSC-15 in future operations and that practical training of AN/TSC-15 operators be correspondingly increased.

c. Comment: Headquarters Task Force Delta was frequently the only immediate source for replacement items of communications equipment for subordinate units.

Discussion: In many instances, the Task Force Delta Headquarters was the only source from which subordinate activities could receive immediately replacements for inoperable communication equipment.

Recommendation: That in future operations, the logistical agency responsible for supply and resupply of class II supplies include in its inventory a replacement pool of commonly used communication items amounting to 10 per cent of the combined T/E of the using units.

d. Comment: The concept of operations in Double Eagle was dependent upon receiving as rapidly as possible from subordinate units information of the enemy and passing such information to the subordinate units as required. Accordingly, the radio plan included a Task Force Intelligence Net and a Task Force Reconnaissance Net.

Discussion: Terrain encountered and lack of relay capability limited the number of active stations on the Intelligence Net to the Task Force Headquarters and only two battalions. Nevertheless, even this capability diverted a considerable amount of traffic from other overcrowded nets.

Recommendation: That a force which is assigned a mission similar to that of Task Force Delta's operate a complete Intelligence Net to include relay stations as required.

SECRET

e. Comment: This headquarters utilized VHF radio exclusively for command and tactical radio nets to subordinate units.

Discussion: Task Force Tactical Net #2 was designated as an HF net. However, it was at no time utilized because the subordinate units were seldom in situations wherein they could operate HF equipment at times when the second tactical net was required. An incidental benefit of this was the fact that the subordinate units had less requirement than anticipated for recharged batteries BB-451 which otherwise would have multiplied this ever present problem.

Recommendation: That in any future operation similar to Double Eagle command and tactical radio communications from battalions to the next senior headquarters be restricted to VHF.

f. Comment: The AN/PRC-25 proved to be a necessity for reliable communications down to the rifle company level.

Discussion: Due to the nature of terrain and vegetation encountered in Double Eagle a large proportion of tactical radio communications would have been impossible with any radio with capabilities less than that of the AN/PRC-25.

Recommendation: That in any operation similar to Double Eagle the following minimum allocations of AN/PRC-25's be made:

T. F./Regimental Headquarters	12
Each Battalion Headquarters	6
Each Rifle Company	1
Each Arty In Team	1
Each Recon Team	1
Shore Party Group	6

SECRET

8. Psychological Warfare

a. An interpreter/translator who speaks the same dialect as the people in the area of operations must be available to the Psy Ops officer to make recordings as needed. It was learned that if no other source is available, such a capability can usually be found in the Province Headquarters.

b. The psychological operations officer on an operation such as DOUBLE EAGLE should have pre-programmed propaganda for: areas in which friendly units are presently located; for areas where friendly units have moved through and no longer occupy; and for areas where enemy units are known to be. Propaganda is best not disseminated in areas where troops plan to move, as it could well be an indication to the enemy of friendly plans. Such indications to the enemy can best be avoided by close coordination between the disseminating agent and the unit on the ground. Such coordination is also valuable in putting the right propaganda in the right place at the right time for maximum effectiveness. Pre-programmed propaganda should be supplemented by a capability to rapidly produce and employ propaganda to exploit a suddenly arising psychological operation opportunity.

c. Ralliers should be interviewed for propaganda exploitation.

d. POW's suspects, refugees, and ralliers should be interrogated for propaganda feedback.

e. The psychological operations annex of the operation order should clearly indicate to subordinate units exactly what Psy Ops support is available. Subordinate units should request Psy Ops support as needed. Units should be constantly alert for opportunities to use Psy Ops.

f. Feedback from POW's, refugees, and ground units, indicated the following:

(1) The people do pickup leaflets. However, they must do it clandestinely for fear of VC reprisals. The VC attempt to destroy all leaflets. Many people in the area are unable to read and are not able to understand the leaflets. Some POW's had leaflets on their persons, but carried them only because the leaflets were attractively colored.

(2) The people hear the broadcasts and purport to believe them. However, the aerial broadcasts are difficult to hear from inside their huts, and VC require people to remain in their huts during broadcasts. The evening after broadcasts have been heard, VC hold counter-propaganda meetings for villagers.

SECRET

SECRET

(3) One rallier indicated that the broadcasted appeal to villagers, not to run from Marines in order to avoid being shot, was effective. Upon hearing the broadcast he claimed that he advised four other villagers not to run. All four were apprehended by Marines.

(4) A large number of people would welcome a chance to escape the VC. However, they fear VC reprisals.

(5) Many people are afraid of Americans, especially due to the language barrier. Refugees stated that if GVN troops accompanied the Americans others would be willing to come over to the GVN, understanding their intentions.

(6) Some people are afraid that the GVN would not feed, clothe, and shelter them. Hence, they would rather remain under the VC than move their families to areas where they could not take care of them.

(7) VC counter-propaganda consists of relating atrocities that Americans allegedly commit; i.e.: rape, beheading, looting, etc. "If the Americans win, VC say everyone will be 'H bombed'." The VC explain that the reason they retreat before the Marines is that the Marines are attacking with forces which are not big enough for the VC to attack. The VC are waiting for larger Marine units before smashing the Americans.

SECRET

SECRET

9. Civic Action.

a. Available transportation is mandatory for the carrying out of civil affairs projects. In each case supplies and personnel must be moved from the CP area to the hamlet or area of need.

b. The G-5 section consisted of only two officers and no enlisted. More personnel are required to adequately carry out the necessary programs and perform the clerical duties. Readily available interpreters are required.

c. MedCap gear should be packaged in smaller mount out boxes. It should be packaged so that individual boxes may be distributed to each participating unit when requested.

d. Each unit should take a minimum amount of MedCap supplies initially, and request further supplies as needed.

e. Further indoctrination of troops is necessary regarding the necessity of avoiding all unnecessary damage of trees, crops, and property belonging to the local people.

f. Medical aid is one of the most successful and practical methods of Civic Action during an operation. Each unit should plan for and have a capability to establish aid stations whenever the circumstances permit.

SECRET

10. Medical.

a. A preventive medicine service representative should accompany engineer personnel to the BSA/LSA site to make tests on the purity of all sources of water to be utilized for drinking or bathing. The shower in the Tam Ky LSA had to be closed for a period of three days because of contamination at the shower well.

b. Helo-pad locations for med-evacs should be at least 75 yards from the treatment area and precautions taken to prevent helos from landing closer.

c. Morale was greatly enhanced by the availability of hot soup and coffee in the BSA/LSA. Whenever casualties came in, this service was available for patients and medical personnel alike.

d. The Delta Medical Shock and Resuscitation Platoon, made up of one LCDR MC, two LT's, one LT MSC and fifteen hospital corpsmen, was found to be adequate for both phases of Operation DOUBLE EAGLE in treating a total of 651 patients. Augmentation medical personnel from 2/4 and 3/1 during DOUBLE EAGLE I were not fully utilized.

11. POW Collection & Interrogation.

a. No significant difficulties were encountered in the collection, retention, and evacuation of collectives.

b. It is strongly recommended that future operations include provision for an aluminum frame, accordion type shelter to be used by ITT personnel for interrogating collectives.

SECRET

12. LSA/BSA and Shore Party.

a. Helicopter Operations.

(1) Helicopters placed in direct support of the BSA/LSA provide the most efficient means of logistical support of operating units. This system is responsive to immediate demands, provides excellent communications and control, provides optimum aircraft utilization, and is by far the best means of supporting wide-spread, fast-moving tactical units. It must be recognized that this system of logistical support can be successful only if minimum numbers of aircraft are made available to the BSA/LSA Commander on a full-time basis.

(2) Air Liaison Officer: It is necessary to have an ALO in the Shore Party operations section when engaged in direct support helicopter operations. The ALO must have a system of communicating with the direct support aircraft and a hotline to the DASC. In this manner DASC can notify the ALO when and which aircraft are assigned or directed, and the ALO will have timely information on the status and location of the aircraft.

(3) Helicopter Pad Operations: Consideration must be given to the design and operation of the helo-pad in the BSA/LSA. The following are considered musts:

(a) A pad/cover approximately 150' X 150' suitable for helicopter landings on sandy terrain. (Note: Both "Harvest Moon" and "Double Eagle I" had LSA/BSA operating in loose sand.) This pad would protect the aircraft, personnel, and supplies from damage from sand.

(b) Facilities should be erected at the helo-pad wherein most of the operations can be controlled. Aircraft assignment cards should be made, resupply records should be kept, and ALO should have communications with the aircraft and DASC from this location.

b. Resupply Requests: Problems encountered with requests for resupply were:

(1) Incorrect coordinates were given on some messages. Some units were found to have used incorrect shackles sheets.

SECRET

(2) Requests for normal resupply should be submitted four hours prior to delivery time. This would allow adequate time for drawing and staging the requested supplies for delivery on an on-call basis and would insure more rapid processing of emergency requests which might arise during the day.

c. Supply/Maintenance.

(1) Medical supplies should be included as part of the landing force supplies and placed in the BSA/LSA dump. Medical supply personnel should be provided by the supply detachment.

(2) A shortage of rifle oil in small cans appears to exist. This same problem was encountered in "Harvest Moon." Action must be taken to insure availability of small cans of rifle oil for future operations such as this.

(3) The Comm-Elect maintenance float proved valuable for on-site exchange of inoperable items. The float should be expanded to include more AN/PRC-10 and PRC-47 radios, E-33 headsets, and AT-271 antennae.

13. Engineer.

a. Civic Action - The engineers can be effectively employed in civic action programs within the zone of operations by repairing roads and bridges. These actions are direct evidence to the people that we intend to give tangible assistance which can be lasting and meaningful.

b. Combat Support - The concept of providing additional on-call engineer support is particularly good on large operations such as DOUBLE EAGLE. On at least two occasions direct support was given to the infantry for combat engineer operations.

14. Handling of Captured Rice.

a. Bagging - The bagging and handling of captured rice on operation DOUBLE EAGLE I and II was a significant problem. In all cases where rice was found, infantry units were either held up, which delayed search and clear operations, or the rice had to be destroyed because of the tactical necessity of moving on. The destruction of rice is a waste which should be avoided if at all possible. The return of rice to the friendly populace represents an excellent opportunity for a psychological victory.

SECRET

Problem: Some method is needed for sewing or securing rice bags once bags are filled. A stop gap measure of using surveyed communication wire was used.

Solution: Heavy thread or string should be kept in the LSA for this purpose.

Problem: The use of Marines for bagging and handling rice is a waste of manpower. Additionally, the search and clear operations are slowed.

Solution: Civilian laborers could be hired and transported to the rice cache to handle the rice. Additionally, ARVN troops or Popular Force troops could provide security for the laborers, freeing Marines to continue on with the tactical movement.

Problem: Some method needs to be devised to bag rice faster.

Solution: A vacuum type blower could be devised to fill rice bags more rapidly.

15. Casualty reporting

a. Medical Points. That administrative casualty reporting be accomplished from the medical evacuation points.

b. Chaplains. That Chaplains be assigned to the Shore Party organization for location at the evacuation point.

WAF 10. DIV NR 175

050307

FM CG INDIAN MARGIV

10 05 111 AM

1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

REF. ORANGE.

1/3 260735H 1/3/01 INSTRUCTED TO DESTROY~~EE~~ DESTROY TRUCK WITH
AMMO AT HAND. ENGR'S ARE STANDING BY IN CASE THEY ARE NEEDED
TO FURTHER DESTROY VEH. 1/3/01 OBS 3 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS IN CAVE~~EE~~
CAVE TO 245575 YESTERDAY AND FELL THAT AMMO IS DESTROYED. 1/3/01 ALOR~~EE~~
ALSO LET 5-7 HRS. TO REACH CAVE FROM PRESENT POSITION. 1/3/01 ORDER TO
DESTROY TRUCK AND RETURN TO 1/3/01 POSITION.

2-1

Figure 1

REF ID: A66175 AT 07/23/07 KKKKKK

Encl 33

MAF DE DIV NR 179

P 060200H

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SPOT REPORT:

A. 1/3/D

D. 060705H

C. ZC 143550000 ZC143557

E. 1/3/02 ON SWEEP AT ABOVE COORD TRIPPED WIRE TO BOOBY TRAP. 1/3/02
REPS IT WAS A 105MM SHELL OR SIMILAR TYPE. 2 VC WERE KILLED BY SA FO
FLOWER WHILE FLEEING AREA.

F. 1/2/02 CHECKING AREA

G. 1

H. 1

I. 2

GP-4

BT

NNNN

06 02 00
DE MAF OSI UP NR 179 AT 06/02057

Encl 34

MAF DE DIV NR 181
 P 060243Z
 FM CG THIRD MADDIV
 TO CH III MAF
 PT

S E C R E T

OPEN ORANGE: 060920H:

1/3: AIR DROP WAS ON TRAFFIC TARGET, LANDED AT ZC 149537, WILL
 RECOVER.

1/3: TAI SAN WHERE FIVE 2 UNIDENTIFIED EXPLOSIONS OCCURED YESTERDAY
 AT ZC 149557 IN SAME LOC WHERE BOOBY TRAPS WAS DETEECTED TRAP WAS
 DETONATED THIS AM BY 1/3/D DEEE RESULTING IN 1KIA IFEE 1WIA.
 VICE EXPLOSION YESTERDAY PROBABLY CAUSED BY PREMATURE EXPLOSION

WHEN VC WERE PLANTING BOOBY TRAPS. PLT FM 1/3/D CHECKING AREA.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

DE HAF 060243Z NR 181 AT 06/0243Z KKKKK

06 02 43

Encl 35

SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1DRAFTER 3/BFC/pnc
SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE-3
CWO 31OCH 62IMPROV E 07 01.3.3 E APR 66FROM: 3d MARDIV
TO: NINTH MARINES
INFO: THIRD MARINES

//SECRET//

ALERT SITES FOR OCH ORANGE

A. MY OPR O 383-66

1. STAND DOWN ALERT SITES FOR SUBJ 19W REF A TO FOLLOWING:

ONE RIFLE COMPANY	4 BRS
BE CMD QSU AND	
ONE RIFLE CO	6 BRS

GP-4

RELEASED BY PSHmiff

07 01

33

39

APR 7 1966

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Encl 36

SECRET

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 219

R 070239Z

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CMC III MAF

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

G-3 JOURNAL ENTRY

J NR 21 - OPN ORANGE - 070910H

STAKE OUT - 6 ARRIVED ORANGE PNSEE PSNS: 1/1 D TOOK 7 VC UNDER FIRE, 2

KIA, 2 VCC NO WPN RECOVERED. VCC HAVE COMBAT EQUIPMENT (PSEE PACK) VC

HAD A GENEVA CONVENTION CARD OF MOSS, W.D., KIA OF 1/3 B OF 1ST DAY

OF OPN.

BT

KKKK

DIV DE MAR QSL YR 219 ZUP 07/03EEEEEEEE 07/0240Z AR

07

0239

Encl 37

G-3
C-3A
OPNS
WITCH 0

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 222
R 070340Z
FM CG THIRD MADDIV
TO COC III MAF
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

C-3 JOURNAL ENTRIES

J NR 23 - OPN ORANGE - 071000H

1/1/D FOUND 2 CAVES W/TOBACCO & RICE MC 102528 AT 070925H. 1/3/D DEST
CAVE AT ZC 162543 AT 0930H. 3/3/1 CAPTURED 1 VCS AT ZC 166591 RUNNING
ALONG TRAIL TO WEST. NO ID. NO WPN. WAS WEARING JACKET MADE IN HANOI.

J NR 24 - 071016H: RECON SNOOP LOC AT ZC 118535. PEEK AT 155563.
J NR 25 - 071040H: AIRSTRIKE CONDUCTED ON POSS VC TRNG CENTER ZC 192
529.

J NR 27 - OPN ORANGE - 071056H
3/3/L KVEWEE BLEW TUNNEL AT ZC 134555 & ZC 133555. 1 BUNKER AT ZC
134554. BLOWN W/RESULTING SECONDARY EXPLOSION.

J NR 28 - OPN ORANGE - 071115H
1/3: FOUND PHNJI TRAP IN TRENCH LINE AT ZC 133555. TRAP MADE OF SMALL
BOARD CBTHEE WITH 4" NAILS. BLEW A 5' SQUARE BUNKER ZC 133554. WAS
FOUND BY 3/3/L.

BT

KKKK

DIV DE MAF OSL YD 222 ZUR 07/0345Z. AR

C-3
C-3A
OPNS
B77
R

07 03 47

Encl 38

MAF DE DIV 3 NR 229
 O DEFF 070728Z
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO CMC III MAF
 DT

CONFIDENTIAL
 G-3 JOURNAL ENTRIES

J NR 47 - OPN ORANGE - 071405H

1/3: HAVE FURTHER INFO ON CAVES FOUND AT ZC 172546 BY 1/3/0. CAVE NR 1
 ENTRANCE 3 1/2' LEADING INTO CHAMBER 5' TALL X 10' SQUARE. REIN W/
 BAMBOO ALONG WALLS J4 POLES THICK. HAD 8"X8" CENTER BEAM. TOOK 45 LBS
 CA TO DESTROY. WAS EQUIPPED W/BEDS.

CAVE NR 2 - 3 LEVELS 3 1/2' J4 1/2' EQUIPPED W/BEDS. DEST W/50 LBS CJREE
 CA. HAVE DIAGRAM AND CAN SUBMIT AT END OF AFF OPN.

J NR 48 - OPN ORANGE - 071411H:

EXEYL BLEW BUNKER ZC 127555. VILLAGE AT ZC JJJJ426557 DAFE HAD TRENCH
 LINE 150' LONG FULL OF PUNJI STAKES & BARB WIRE. TRENCH WAS ON S.
 EDGE OF VIL. 3/3/L NOW AT ZC 177541.

DT
 KKKK

CG MAF OSL UP NR 229 AT 0730Z KK

07 07 28

MAF DE DIV. NR 223
R 070400Z
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO CMC III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

G-3 JOURNAL ENTRIES

J NR 30 - OPN ORANGE - 071127H

ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE HAS MAKEE MADE LUOD SPEAKER ANNOUNCEMENTS
TO VN NATIONALS IN OPN ORANGE AREA.

J NR 20EFE 29 - OPN ORANGE - 071130H

7C 132555 3/3/L FOUND MEDICAL GEAR & 2 BARB WIRE GATES.

J NR 31 - 90PM ORANGE - SITREP 070600-071200H

A. NO CHANGE

B. CONT S&D OPN IN ASSIGNED SECTOR, 1/3 ATK TIMH DONG TAHEE TAY.
(7C 172546). 1/3/D-1 AT (ZC 183548) 1/3/D-3 (ZC 173542), 1/3/D-2
ENTERED WILL FM SW, ATK COMMENCED 0900H. 1/1/D SWEEPING FOOT HILLS N
OF LAP-THUAN.

C. 2100H 3/3/1 IN AMP PSN AT "ZC 167536" KILLED 2 VC - CARRYING 25
LBS OF CORN EA. AT 0910H 1/1/D KILLED 2 VC & CAPTURED 1 VC. 1000H

1/1/D FOUND 2 CAVES W/RICE & TOBACCO AT (ZC 182528), CAVES DEST. 1/1/D
CAPT 1 VC 7C 166531.

DM MANY CAVES & BUNKERS, TRENCH LINE DEST. MED GEAR WAS FOUND BY 1/1
AT ZC 132555.

F. CONT S&D OPN IN ASSIGNED SECTOR

F. (FR) KIA 18, WIA 88, MIA 8 NON BATTLE 18

VC KIA 53, KIA (POSS) 99 WIA (POSS) 30, VCS 53, VCC 5

BT

KKKK

DE MAF OSL IIR NR 223

KKKKKK

0

0 7 04 40

Encl 39

G-3

I just want to
see 6 AM SITREP
unless something
significant.

25

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

DRAFTER 3/BFC/rlz
SEC G-3 PHONE Shove-3
TRANS TO
OWO

CGN 435

ROUTINE 080700Z APR 66

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV
INFO: CG III MAF
CG FMAW
PLC
FLSG (A)

312.1

// SECRET //

CHANGE TO MY OPN O 368-66 (GEORGIA)

A. MY OPN O 368-66

1. CHANGE REF A AS FOLLOWS:

A. UNDER 9TH MAR IN TASK ORGN ADD:

DST, SP BN

B. DELETE PARA 5 AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFOR:

"5.A. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF C AND CURRENT
COMMUNICATION DIRECTIVES.

B. SUBMIT COMMUNICATION PLAN AND CHARGES TO THIS HQ.

C. INFORM THIS HQ WHERE AND WHEN CP ESTABLISHED."

GP-4

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44

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Encl 41

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(3) ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES.

(4) GRAVES REGISTRATION KIA WILL BE EVACUATED THROUGH MEDEVAC CHANNELS.

(5) CIVIL AFFAIRS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 3D MARDIV ORDER 5030.1.

D. CAPTURED PERSONNEL.

(1) CAPTURED PERSONNEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX B TO DIV OPN O 343-65.

E. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDERS.

(2) GAS MASK AS REQUIRED.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

A. UNITS CHOP TO THIS HQ ON ORDER.

B. UNITS ARE DIRECTED TO ENTER DIV TAC NET NO 4:

FREQ 45.9 (P) D 231
46.1 (S) D 232

NORMAL UNIT CALL SIGNS IAW REF E

NET CONTROL: 3D MAR DIV

LOCATION: 3D MAR DIV CP (G-3)

CALL SIGN: MONROE

C. ASSIGNED TACTICAL UNITS BE PREPARED TO ENTER AND MONITOR MP

CPD NET ON ORDER:

FREQ: 43.9

CALL SIGN: SASSY

3D MARDIV HQ MONITORS CONTINUOUSLY ON EXECUTION.

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

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D. SUBMIT REQUESTS FOR COMB PERS AND EQUIP SUPT TO THIS HQ (ATTN: CMO).

GP-4

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PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

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SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1DRAFTER COC/BFC/11W
SEC G-3 PHONE 510V1-3
TRANS TOD
CWO *ABC**860*

INVOICE 170100Z APR66

PRO: CO THIRD MARDIV
TO: 1ST MFLB
INFO: CO III MAF
CO MAJ
1ST MFLB
1ST MFLB

//S E C R E T//

OPN ORDER 307-66

REF A: MY OPN O 343-65

B: MY OPN O 364-66 (SPARROW HAWK)

C: DIVO 02000.2D

1. SITUATIONA. ENEMY FORCES. SEE REF A AND ISSUES AS ISSUEDB. FRIENDLY FORCES:

(1) SEE REF A.

(2) PLAT PROVIDES HELICOPTERS TO CONDUCT HELILIFT OF ONE
MOBILE REACTION COMPANY ON ONE HOUR ALERT (DURING THE
PERIOD ONE HOUR PRIOR TO UNTIL ONE HOUR AND A HALF
AFTER FIRST LIGHT) TO AREA TO BE DESIGNATED.C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. NO CHANGE2. MISSION. FIELD COMMAND AND CONTROL ONE HOUR PRIOR TO THEIN THE EVENT OF ONE HOUR ALERT AREA OF ONE HOUR PRIOR TO THE
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGESCOPY _____ OF _____ COPIES APR 17 1966 **SECRET***Encl 43*

SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

LIGHT UNTIL ONE HOUR AND A HALF AFTER FIRST LIGHT, FOR DEPLOYMENT BY HELICOPTER TO ANY POINT IN OR ADJACENT TO THE DA NANG TAOR TO EXPLOIT CONTACTS AND/OR SIGHTINGS OF VIET CONG FORCES AND TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY SUCH ENEMY FORCES.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. ONE RIFLE CO REIN W/FAC AND FO TMS WILL BE PHYSICALLY LOCATED NEAR A LOADING POINT TO BE TRANSPORTED IN THE ALERT HELICOPTERS FOR EMPLOYMENT IN OR ADJACENT TO THE DA NANG TAOR DURING THE PERIOD ONE HOUR PRIOR TO UNTIL ONE HOUR AND A HALF AFTER FIRST LIGHT. THIS COMPANY MAY BE EMPLOYED TO COMPLEMENT AND/OR ADD TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPARROW HAWK IN REF B. THIS CONCEPT REQUIRES RAPID REACTION AND EXECUTION TO EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION.

B. NINTH MARINES

- (1) MAINTAIN ONE RIFLE CO REIN W/FAC AND FO TMS ON ONE HOUR ALERT FROM ONE HOUR PRIOR ~~5~~ TO FIRST LIGHT UNTIL ONE HOUR AND A HALF AFTER FIRST LIGHT, FOR IMMEDIATE EMPLOYMENT (UPON ARRIVAL OF HELICOPTERS) IN OR ADJACENT TO DA NANG TAOR TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES CONTACTED AND/OR SIGHTED.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO EMPLOY ALERT COMPANY TO EXPLOIT VIET CONG CONTACTS OR SIGHTINGS.
- (3) BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT OPERATIONS OF ALERT COMPANY WHEN ORDERED.

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

- (4) BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ALERT COMPANY FROM COMMITTED AREA.

C. THIRD MARINES

- (1) BE PREPARED TO EMPLOY ALERT COMPANY TO EXPLOIT VIET CONG CONTACTS OR SIGHTINGS.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT OPERATIONS OF ALERT COMPANY WHERE COMMITTED.
- (3) BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ALERT COMPANY FROM COMMITTED AREA.

D. TWELFTH MARINES

- (1) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT TO ALERT COMPANY WHEN COMMITTED.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE LANDING ZONE PREP FIRES ON CALL.

E. COORD INST

- (1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND EXECUTION ON ORDER THIS HQ.
- (2) DISSEMINATE ALL PARTICIPATING UNITS.
- (3) USMC UNITS WILL BRIEF CO CDR AND A/C PILOTS PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT.
- (4) REQUESTS TO EMPLOY ALERT COMPANY WILL BE MADE TO THIS HQ (COG).
- (5) ALERT COMPANY BE PREPARED TO EMPLOY AIR/GROUND ROA OPERATIONS.

F. ADDITIONAL COG

1. 350 42 15 0 343-65.

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES


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SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

- B. ALERT CO PERS EQUIPPED W/RCA GRENADES AND GAS MASKS.
5. CMD AND COMM-ELECT
- A. COMMUNICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (C) AND CURRENT COMMUNICATION DIRECTIVE.
- B. REQUESTS TO EMPLOY THE ALERT COMPANY WILL BE MADE TO THIS HQ (COC) VIA SOLE USER TELEPHONE (HOT LINE). IN THE EVENT TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS IS DISRUPTED SUBMIT REQUESTS VIA THE DIV TAG NET #2.
- C. CONTACT WITH THE ALERT COMPANY WILL BE MADE ON THE BATTALION TACTICAL NET OF BATTALION BEING SUPPORTED AS DEPICTED IN REFERENCE (C).

GP-4

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SECRET

SECRETMESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2**Return to CCC**D 140
OO RUMSMF RUMSD N
DE RUMFUAC 124 1191157ZNY SSSSS
O 191110Z
FM CTG 76.5
O RUMFCF/COMSEVENTHFLT
INFOZEN/CTG 79.5
ZEN/TG 76.5
RUMFCF/CTF 76
RAABOP/CTF 79
RUMSMF/CG III MAF
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMNNE/COMNAVFORV
RUMFCF/CTG 70.8
RUMD G/COMPHIBPAC
RUHLHL/COMINCPACFLT
RUHLBP/CG XMEPAC
RUMFCF/CTF 73
RUMSD N/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAW
RUHL HQ/COMINCPAC
RUMFCF/CTF 77
RUMFCF/CTG 115.3RUMFCF/CTF 72
RUMFCF/CTG 77.9
RUMFCF/CTG 70.4
RUMFCF/CTG 73.5RUMFKE/CTE 70.2.1.1
MFKB/CTF 15
RUMFA/CTU 73.1.2
RUECW/CNO
RUECEM/CMC
RUEKDA/JCS
E**SECRET**

1. OSAGE (U); 85430 4 DE AS OF 291030Z

WM TASK ORGANIZATION

A. TG 76.5 AMPHIBREADY GROUP CONSISTING OF PRINCETON (CTG 76.5.15

CTG 79

HMM 384, ELEMENTS OF BLT 1/5, BUM DET AND UDT DET EMB)
PICKKAY (ELEMENTS BLT 1/5 EMB), JOHN W. THOMASON (COMDESDIV 213
EMB) AND WALKER.

3. ACTIONS

A. TG 76.5 CONDUCTING SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RICE HARVEST
PROTECTION OPS IN PHULOC AREA, THUA THIEN PROVINCE, CTZ.

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PAGE TWO RUMFUAC 124 E C R E T

B. LANDING FORCE

1. ENEMY

A. UNITS IN CONTACT: CO "C" CNFIREFIGHT WITH VC IN LF
OBJ 5 VIC AU 8306.

B. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD

1. HEAVY SNIPER FIRE; S/A; AXW FIRE DIRECTED AGAINST
TROOPS AND HELOS FROM VIC AU 834058; AU 832075, AU 822035, AND FROM
RIDGE LINE IN LF OBJ 5. MINE DETONATED AT AU 8350YM. SIGNS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. VIC ZD 175062. POSSIBLE
CP AND SERIES OF FRESHLY DUG, WELL SPACED HOLES-POSSIBLY
PREPARATIONS FOR MINE FIELD.

2. CP LOCATIONS

A. CO "A" - AU 832049

B. CO "B" - ZD 817060

C. CO "C" - AU 822051

D. CO "D" - ZD 205025

E. 187 MM HOWTAR BTRY AND PRINCETON

3. OPERATIONS

A. CO "C" RECEIVED 1 KIA FROM SNIPER FIRE VIC BLT OBJ
14 (AU 827052). EST 2 SNIPERS. WHILE PURSUING SNIPERS A MINE,
PROBABLY COMMAND DETONATED, EXPLODED KILLING EST 6 MARINES AND
WOUNDING 9 VIC AU 835066.

PAGE THREE RUMFUAC 124 S E C R E T

B. HELOS OF HMM-364 WHILE EVACUATING CASUALTIES WERE
FRED ON BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FROM RIDGE LINE ON LF OBJ 5.C. CO'S "A", "B" SUND "D" WERE DIVERTED FROM THEIR
SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSIONS TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS AROUND
BASE OF LF OBJ 5. CO "C" WITHDREW TO AU 822051 AND CAS WAS CALLED IN
ON AREA (AU 833057-AU 831074). GP INM FROM "D" BTRY WERE FIRED AT
SUSPECTED SNIPER POSITIONS. 2 HIE'S AND AIR FORCE BIRD-DOG CONTROLLED
CAS. 2 F-8'S FIRED 1600 RDS OF 20MM, 2 F-4'S DROPPED FOUR 500 LB
TANKS OF NAPALM, SIX 250 LB FRAG BOMBS. 2 A-4S FIRED 12 ZUNI
ROCKETS, ALL STRIKE A/C FROM 1ST MAW. ENEMY CASUALTIES UNKNOWN.
DURING CAS IT IS SUSPECTED THAT VC FIRED WP MORTAR RDS ON BEACH
VIC AU 825058 TO DIVERT A/C TO STRIKE FRIENDLY POSITIONS. CO "C"
REC TWO MORE KIA BY SNIPER FIRE FROM BLT OBJ 15 VIC AU 829054. HMM
-364 CONDUCTING RESUPPLY FO AMMO AND WATER TO ALL CO'S.D. MED EVACS IN PROGRESS; CO, SLF DEPARTED LPH TO CONFER
WITH CO BLT.

E. HMM 364 STATISTICS

SORTIES - 94

PAX/TRPS - 14/34

TONS CARGO - 2

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PAGE FOUR RUMFUAC 124 S E C R E T

MED EVACS - 15

4 -/C IN COMMISSION - 14

F. CASUALTIES

1. DURING PERIOD

VC: UNK

FRIENDLY: KIA-8 (EST); WIA-7 (EST)

2. CUMULATIVE

VC: KIA-2; WIA-1; CAPTURED-0

FRIENDLY: KIA-8 (EST); WIA-7 (EST); MIA-0; CAP-0

G. INTENTIONS: BLT 1/5 TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS
AU 820063 TO AU 840050 TO SEAL OFF LF OBJ 5. SEARCH AND DESTROY
OPNS ON LF OBJ 5 AT FIRST LIGHT.

C. NGFS SHIPS PROVIDING AREA FIRE OMIGTS WITHIN LF OBJ 5.

D. CLOSE ACY700945 (PPRNUING UNTIL SUNSET).

4. INTENTIONS

A. CONTINUE SEARCH AND DESTROY AND ICE HARVEST PROTECTION
OPS WITHIN AOAB. DELAY TACTICAL WITHDRAWAL PENDING RESULTS OF SEARCH AND
DESTROY OPS IN LF OBJ 5.

C. PRINCETON, PICKAWAY NIGHT STEAM IN HELO TRANSPORT AREAS

PAGE FIVE RUMFUAC 124 S E C R E T

OFF AOA. ALAMO REMAIN AT PCS ANCHORAGE FMOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT
JOHN W. THOMASON AND WALKER PROVIDE NGFS IN AOA, PATROLLING TO
PREVENT VC EGRESS BY SEA.

D. UNREP TG 76.5 FROM SACRAMENTO AM 10 MAY. JOHN W. THOMASON
AND WALKER REPLENISHED 29 APRIL.

5. ACTIONS REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE.

GP-4

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191110Z

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VV MFD216
 *****ZZ MMSUL DDKUV DDKUAC MMSB YYNB YYNA
 DE DDKE 110 1130616
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 230616Z
 FM CG III MAF
 TO ZEN/COMUSMACV
 INFO MMSUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 YYNA/CG FMFPAC
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 DDKUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 MMSB/CTF SEVEN NINE
 DDKUAC/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 DDKUAC/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 /YNNB/CINCPACFLT
 H

SECRET

USE OF SLF (U)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 190552Z APR 66 (PASEP)

B. LFM 01/NWP 22(A)/FM 31-11

1. SITUATION

A. CG 3D MARDIV IN COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN DIV IS CONDUCTING GOLDEN FLEECE OPERATIONS IN THE CO BI THAN TAN AREA NORTHWEST OF HUE, RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE OPERATIONS (OPN VIRGINIA) FROM THE SPECIAL FORCES CAMP AT KHE SANH AND CLEARING/SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS (OPN GEORGIA) VIC AN HOA INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

PAGE TWO DDKE 10 SECRET

SOUTHWEST OF DANANG TAOR.

B. CONCURRENTLY, 1ST ARVN DIV IS PROPOSING A COORDINATED OPERATION IN THE PHU LOC AREA TO ELIMINATE LOCAL AND MAIN FORCE C ELEMENTS, SUPPRESS GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AND PROTECT THE RICE HARVEST.

C. 3D MARDIV FORCES ARE COMMITTED TO OPERATIONS WHICH COULD REQUIRE REINFORCEMENT THUS REDUCING CAPABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN A PHU LOC OPERATION IN THE REQUIRED TIME FRAME. SUCH A MISSION IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR THE ARG/SLF BECAUSE OF PROXIMITY TO COAST AND DESIRABILITY OF SURPRISE ATTACK.

2. FOLLOWING CONCEPT IS RECOMMENDED FOR PHU LOC:

A. UPON APPROVAL OF COMUSMACV AND COMSEVENTHFLT, AND WHEN DIRECTED BY III MAF, SLF LANDS IN LZ'S AND OVER BEACHES TO BE DESIGNATED AND CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RICE HARVEST PROTECTION OPERATIONS IN AN AREA CENTERED ON (ZD 125005) AND WITH A RADIUS EXTENDING THEREFROM TO A DISTANCE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BETWEEN CATEF AND CG III MAF.

B. FOLLOWING COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED:

APR 23 1966

(C) INITIAL LZ'S BEACHES AND AOA WILL BE AS AGREED UPON BETWEEN CATEF AND CG III MAF FOR COORDINATION PURPOSES WITH I CTZ.

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PAGE THREE DDKE 110 SECRET

- (2) FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT AVAIL FROM III MAF.
- (3) DIERLANTH CATF AND CG III MAF.
- (4) CG III MAF WILL COORDINATE WITH CG I CORPS.
1. FOLLOWING COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS RECOMMENDED:
 - (1) AMPHIBIOUS PHASE CONDUCTED IAW REF A.
 - (2) AT TERMINATION AMPHIBIOUS PHASE CLF CHO PS OPCON TO CG III MAF.
 - (3) UPON COMPLETION OF OPERATION OR WHEN DIRECTED BY CG III MAF IN COORDINATION WITH CATF NECESSARY CONTROLS WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE RETRACTION OF THE SLF.
 3. EXPECTED DURATION OF OPERATION: TO BE COMPLETED BY 1 MAY. FTER 1 MAY REMAIN I CORPS AREA UNTIL 10 MAY.
 4. REQUEST APPROVAL OF ABOVE FOR IMMEDIATE PLANNING. EXECUTION UPON RECEIVING APPROVAL COMUSMACV AND COMSEVENTHFLT AND WHEN DIRECTED BY CG III MAF.
 5. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF ERCA BY ARG/SLF WHILE OPERATING IN ICIZ.
 6. THIS ANSWERS REF A.

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BT

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MFD483

(O) RUMSME
 ZNY SSSSS Z OV RUABCL 506A
 ZXY-7
 LQA065VV BKA44TV PHY520VV MAH094
 3 RUABCL
 DE RUMSME 3323D 1114 1210
 ZNY SSSSS
 0241210Z
 RI COMUSMACV

TO RUEHHC/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEHHC/CINCPACFLT
 RUEHBP/NAIPAC
 RUEHDD/CORSEVEN HFLT
 ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMSME/CG FIRST MAR DIV
 RUABCL/CG THIRD MAR DIV
 RUABCL/CG FIRST MAR
 RUMFUV/CTF 76
 RUABAC/CTF 79
 RUMFUV/CTG 76.5
 RUMFUV/CTG 79.5

SECRET 14158 FROM. MACCOC122
 SUBJ: USE OF SLF CUB
 REF: III MAF MSG DTG 230616Z (VASEP)
 1. BY REF CG, III MAF PRESENTS CONCEPT OF PROPOSED
 OPERATION UTILIZING SLF.
 2. COMUSMACV CONCURS IN CONCEPT AND REQUEST CINCPAC
 APPROVE USE OF ARG/SLF FOR OPERATION AS OUTLINED IN REX.
 3. FOR CG, III MAF AND CTG 79.5. IF SLF PARTICIPATION IS
 APPROVED PERMISSION IS GRANTED TO EMPLOY RCA.

GP-4
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 APR 25 1966

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CAGE AND IS DERIVED FROM REFERENCE D.1
TASK ORGANIZATIONTG 76.5 AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP
(AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE)

CIG 76.5 (CATF)

TU 76.5.7 SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMMAND UNIT

CIG 71.5

TE 76.5.8.1 FLAGSHIP ELEMENT

CO, PRINCETON

TE 76.5.8.2 TACTICAL AIR CONTROL ELEMENT

OIC DET TACRON 11

TE 76.5.8.3 DECEPTION ELEMENT

OIC, UDT 21 DET "D"

TU 76.5.1 GUNFIRE SUPPORT AND SCREEN UNIT

OIC, BJUIWESTPAC DET "A"

SF USS TAYLOR (DD 468)
USS VALER (DD 517)

BCO, TAYLOR

TU 76.5.2 TRANSPORT UNIT

CIG 76.5

USS PRINCETON (LP 53)

USS ALAMO (LSD 333)

USS PICKAWAY (APA 222)

TE 76.5.2.1 BEACHMASTER ELEMENT

OIC, DET A-L BMU-1

TE 76.5.2.2 CONTROL ELEMENT

CO, ALAMO

TG 76.5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE

CIG 79.5 (CLF)

(LANDING

FORCES)

PAGE THREE RUMFAC 347 SECRET

A. B.T. 1/5

INT 384

1. SITUATION. CIG 71.5 HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO CONDUCT AMPHIB OP IN
PHU LOC AREA

1. (ZD FOOD). THIS OP TO BE CONDUCTED IN A DEDICATED

REF (C) EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN. OF ASSIGNED UNCLASS CODE NAME
CAGE.A. ENEMY FORCES. LF IN THE PHU LOC AREA INCLUDE 810BN, VIC
ZC0959P. EST STRENGTH 400. UNITS CAPABLE OF REINFORCING INCLUDE U/V

BN VIC

9000, K-41 MF CO VIC YD 8402 AND HUONG THUY CO (MF) VIC YD
8009, EST STRENGTH 445. GUERRILLA STRENGTH THUA THIEN PROVINCE EST
100 WITH EST HALF DEPLOYABLE TO AREA. ELEMENTS OF 95H "B" NVA REGT
MAY HAVE MOVED TO BO HU LOC DISTRICT.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) CG III MAF PROVIDES CAS, TAGCA) TAO AND HELO ESCORT.

(2) CO, RVN JUNK DIVISION IS PROVIDES SUPPORT AS DIRECTED.

(3) ARVN RF AND PY UNITS LOCATED WITHIN AOA. THESE UNITS
PROVIDE SECURITY TO COASTAL RTE 1 ANDALL REMAIN AT THEIR NORMAL
CAMP SITES AND ELEMENTS IN THE VIC OF THE HIGHWAY. PRINCIPAL UNITS
EQUIPPED WITH 100 MM HOW LOCATED AT ZD 0900 AND AT 832958.

(4) CG II PROVIDES CFP AND AIR SUPPORT AS REQUESTED.

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(C) CG 73 PROVIDES LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

(C) CG III MAF PROVIDES COORDINATION WITH CG I CORPS

2. ISSUE

CAYF CONDUCT AIRBORNE LANDING IN COORDINATION WITH AND WHEN REQUESTED BY CG III MAF IN LZ'S AND OVER BEACHES TO BE DESIGNATED IN PHU LOC AREA OF RVN IN ORDER ASSIST CG III MAF IN SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RICE HARVEST PROTECTION OPERATIONS.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT: WHEN DIRECTED, THE ARGOLF WILL MAKE COORD ASSAULT BY HELO AND LANDING CRAFT OVER WHITE BEACH ONE AND IN HLZ'S CROW AND HAWK, TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RICE HARVEST PROTECTION OPS. DURATION OF OPS EXPECTED TO BE ABOUT THREE DAYS, HQO B COMPLETED BY 1 MAY.

B. TO 76.5.0

(C) TO 76.5.0.1

(A) OPERATE AS DIRECTED IN CTO (G.5.

(B) CONTROL THE HELO SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT IAW ANNEX I.

(C) TO 76.5.0.2

(A) CONTROL AND COORD ALL FRIENDLY AIR OPS WITHIN AOA.

(B) ESTABLISH TAGC/TAGC.

(C) TO 76.5.0.3

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HOK

(A) OPERATE AS DIRECTED BY CTG 76.5.

(B) PROVIDE LIFEGUARDS IN BGC BOAT.

(4) TE 76.5.8278 OPERATE AS DIRECTED BY CTG 76.5.

C. TU 76.5.1

(1) SCREEN TU 76.5.2.

(2) PROVIDE NGF SUPPORT IAW ANNEX G.

D. TU 76.5.2 - OPERATE IAW REF F AND ANNEX I.

ZC. TE 76.5.2.1 - OPERATE AS DIRECTED BY CTG 76.5.

F. TE 76.5.2.2 - CONTROL THE SURFACE SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT IAW ANNEX I.

G. TG 76.5

(1) AT H-HOUR AND L-HOUR HND-D LXXU

NRN ASSAULT OVER BE

IES

AND IN HZ'S IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA.V

(2) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RICE HARVEST PROTECTION OPS.

(3) PASS ALL ARTY FIRE INFO TO SACC.

X. COORDINATING K

INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THIS ORDER EFF FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND EXECUTION WHEN DIRECTED.

(2) LAND AND SEA AOA DEFINED BY AN ARC OF 25 NM RADIUS TO SEAWARD AND 10 NM RADIUS INLAND, CENTERED AT ZD 125005. ARC SWINGSCK

CP-4

R

FOR: 20/06432/APR 66/1P/INTX

251616Z APR 66

C-3 GAY FSCL

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VV MFD 7624

OO RUMSMF

ZNY SSSSS ZOV RUABQL 711A

ZXY-15

A LQA461942ZCWP131

OO RUABQL

DE RUMFUAC 848 115 1640

ZNY SSSSS

O 25 1616Z

FM CTG SEVEN UX PT FIVE

HO ZEN/CG SEVAN NINE PT FIVE

ZENXTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

INFO RUABUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

ABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMSNF/CG III MAF

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

ORUVSXS/COMNAVFORV

RUMFUMB/CTG SEVEN ZERO VD EIGHT

RUMDGGXCOMPHIBPAC

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC

RUABUL/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMSMB/CG FIRST MARJIV

RUABQL/CG THIRD MAR DIV -

RUMNAW/CG FORSTHMAW

RUAPKA/NAVSECCGUACT KAMISEYA

RUMFCR/NAVC

MMSTA PHIL

MGCR/NAVCOMMSTA GUAN

RUAURAC/NAVCOMMSTA JAPAN

RUHL HQ/CINCPAC

RUMFUJ/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMFKB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PH TMREA

RUMQUE/CTF SEVEN TWO

RUMFUR/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT NINE

RUMXUR/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT FOUR

RUMXUAZ/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FOUR

RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE, PT ONE

RUMFKE/CLF ONE ONE FIVE

RUABQLVFMAPAC I MAC FWD

S

S

E

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS.

INLAND FROM ZD 0615 TO ZI 193863 THENCE FOLLOWING RIVER AND RIDGELINE

NORTHERLY TO THE QUANG NAM/THUA THIEN PROV. BOUNDARY; THENCE EASTERLY

ALONG THE BOUNDARY TO AT 8791; THENCE NORTHWESTLY TO AT 864955 AND

EASTERN ALONG SEABOARD TO COAST AT JY 898960. SEAWARD ARC SWINGS

BETWEEN LINE OF BEARING 008- DEGREES FROM ZD 060150 ANFSLPNE 6

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043 DEGREES T FROM AT 898960, EXTENDING 25 NM FROM EACH
JOINT.

(3) AIR AOA CONTROLLED BY CATF WILL BE AIR SPACE WITHIN 60 NM
RADIUS CIRCLE CENTERED AT ZD 1:005 FROM THE SURFACE TO 20,000 FT.

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(4) D-DAY TENTATIVELY 27 APRIL; H-HOCUPKZIEPH, L-HOZ 0630H.

(5) CRUISIMBU IAW REF F.

(6) RCA (VS AND CN) ONLY AUTHORIZED FOR USE. DOWN WIND HAZARD
TO NONAIDM DATANTS OUTSIDE THXRTARGET WILL BE MINIMIZED CONSISTENT
WITH TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS.

TY.

(7) PROTECTION MEASURES IN THE AOA IAW ANNEX J REF E.

(8) PUBLIC INFORMATION IAW ANNEX R REF C.

KOL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT P

W CINCPAC 280425Z POCT 65.

(10) TERMINATION OF OPERATION BY 1 MAY AS DIRECTED BY CATF.

HE (11) BRIDGES, TUNNELS, AND HIGHWAYS ARE NOT TO BE DESTROYED
UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY CATF.

EON (12) ALPSUNHS BE ALERT NOT TO INADVERTENTLY FIRE AT RTE 1
OR ADJACENT RR. FRIENDLY FORCES MAY TRANSIT AGA ON THESE THOROUGH-
FARES. ALL UNITS MUST BE ADVISED IN WHAT POPULAR AND REGIONAL FORCES ARE
OPERATING IN THE AOA.

(13) ALL SUPPORTING ARMS FIRE WILL BE OBSERVED UNDER THE
POSITIVE CONTROL OF GROUND OR AIR SPOTTERS. LANDING BEACH WHITE
ONE AND HLZ'S CROW AND HAWK WILL BE PREPARED BY AIR ONLY FROM
H/L-20 TO H/L-5.

4. ADMIN, LOGISTICS AND MEDICAL

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PAGE THREE RUMFUAC 848 S E C R E T
 BY DIVISION AND CAS EVAC TEAM EMBARKED PRINCETON. ALL CASES
 IN MESSAGE FOR PRINCETON.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

A. CATF AND CLF ENB PRINCETON.

B. WHEN THE LANDING FORCE IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND UPON
 RECOMMENDATION OF CATF, THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION WILL BE TERMINATED
 AND CLF WILL CHOP TO OPNSN CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED
 REPRESENTATIVE.

C. UPON TERMINATION OF THE OPERATION ASHORE THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK
 FORCE WILL BE RECONSTRUCTED AND A TACTICAL WITHDRAWAL CONDUCTED. THE
 FORCE TO BE WITHDRAWN WILL BE DEPLOYED TO AN AREA TO FACILITATE
 WITHDRAWAL. WITHDRAWAL DAY AND HOUR (W-HOUR) AND RELATED CONDITIONS
 WILL BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY THE CATF AND CG III MAF OR HIS
 DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE LANDING FO
 C ED

WILL BE PASSED TO THE CATF AT W-HOUR WHICH

WILL BE THE

SPECIFIC TIME THAT THE LANDING FORCE UNITS BEGIN THE FINAL TACTICAL
 MOVEMENT TO CLOSE ON DESIGNATED LANDING ZONES AND/OR BEACHES FOR
 WITHDRAWAL.

D. COMMUNICATIONS

ANNEXES HOTEL AND NOVEMBER OF REFERENCE (C)

PAGE FOUR RUMFUAC 848 S E C R E T
 AS MODIFIED HERE

N.
 (1) TASK GROUP ORESTES - CIRCUIT NIB. BE PREPARED FOR DUPLEX N
 ORESTES OPERATION
 O SIGNAL. IF ACTIVATED, CATF WILL TRANSMIT
 C10B, SHIP TRANSMIT ON NIB.

(2) REPLACE UIR FREQUENCY PLAN OF ANNEXES H AND NNSOF
 REFERENCE C WITH THE FOLLOWING:

CKT DE IG	USE	I	FRE	H	EMISSION	COLOR CODE
RH W-3	HR	ZAC	2422 KCS		3A3J	NA
-3	TAR/HR		SNPEI KCS		3A3J	NA
W-160	TATC		366.4 MCS	I	6A3	VIOLET
W-100	HI	TAD-4	SS		6A3	BLACK
W-144	N	HD-2	H		6A3	RED
W-111		TAO	N		6A3	GRAY
H-111		339 :9.9,	280.2 MCS		6A3	NA
H-12	SAR		364.2 MCS		6A3	MA

(3) FOLLOWING CIRCUITS MAY NOT REPEAT NOT BE USED UNDER ANY
 CIRCUMSTANCES WITHOUT PERMISSION OF III MAF/FAW: H-6, H-8, N-7B,
 N-9D, N-9G AND N-11A.

X. ANNEX C, F, G, H AND I TO BE ISSUED
 24-53)6.0

VP-40

H

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C-3

2576162/0026

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HFD 773

TO RUMSMF

ZNY SSSSS ZOV R UABQ. 715A

ZXY-9

CO RUABQ

DE RUMFUAC 846 15 1727

ZNY SSSSS

O 25 1727Z

FM VTG SEVEN SIX FT FIVE

TO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE FT FIVE

ZEN/VTG SEVEN SIX FT FIVE

RUABQ/VOM SEVEN HPLT

RUMFUW/CTF SEVEN S

COMM. NOTE: MSG AS REC'D,
WILL SVC ON REQUEST.

ABQ/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMSMF/CGI III MAP

RUVS'/COMNAVXOGV

RUMXUAS/CTG SEVEN ZERO VI EIGHT

RUABQ/VG THIRD MARDIVOC

RUMNAV/CG XIGST MAW

RUMFUW/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMFKBCTG ONE ONE FIVE FT THREE

H

SECRET

COVERATIGN GUAGE (U)

A. CTG 76.5 OPORD 325-66

1. THIS IS ANNEX C MY OPORD 325B-66.

2. INTELLIGENCE INST'S IAW REX A.

3. BEACHES

(A) WHITE BEACH ONE. LOCATED ON SOUTHWESTERN SHORES OF CYONSMAY BAY,

ENTERED ZD (176368) 16-19-2; N/188-32-40E. BEACH IN RF PORTION OF

W'S BEACH NR 4. FACING 039 DEGREE TRUE.0.

(B) WHITE BEACH TWO. LOCATED TO SW OF CAVE CHON MAY EAST (MUI CHON

VAGE TWO RUMFUAC 846 SECRET

MAY DONG), ENTERED AU 844043, 16-11APN/VIAPWAR PE. NBEAVH IS EXTREME

RF PORTION OF HIS BEACH NR 4, ACING 060 DEGREES TRUE.0

(C) BEACH STUDIES TO BE ISSUED SEP.

4. PLZS LOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) EAGLE (ZD 174068)0

(B) CROW (ZV 138975)0

(V2) HAWK (ZD 130007)

GP-4

H

APR 26 1966

TOA 25/04312/APR 66/12/177

25

17

33 5B

27

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Encl 48

SECRET

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Y 88357000 R UAB L 8822

Y-5

4468

R UABQ

RUMFUAC 849 (P 1000)

YIUSSSS

25 1745B0

CTGISEVEN SIXTE FIVE

WEN/TG SEVEN SI FT FIVE

W/KTG SEVENINIFET FIVE

FBIRUMFUW/CTF SEVEN SIX

RABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMFUAB/KTG SEVENSEED IT AIGHT

VMSMF/CG UII MAR

UAUBUL/KONSEVENZ HLT

RABQL/CG THIRD MAR DIV

W/CR FIRST MAR

RUMUAB/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

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OPERATION MSGAGE (U)

CTG 76.5 OPORD 328-66

THIS IS ANNEX HOTEL TO MY OPORDER 328B-66

ON AIR OPS IAL MY 328B-66 AND THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TO ANNEX

HOTEL TO REF A.

2. SUBSTITUTE CG FIRST MAR FOR CTF 77 WHERE APPEARING.

3. DELETE PARA 3X(1).

4. DELETE PARA WX(2). AOA IS DEFINED IN MY 328B-66.

5. H PARA 3X(9). CHANGE FREQ FROM 239.3 TO 366.4 MCS.

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NO FREE FIRE ZONES HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED.

DELETE TAB A TO APPEND IXH.

1 B TO APPEND IX I. SUBSTITUTE RED FOR BLACK AND VCOLET FOR GOLD
UNDER REPORT TO ON REF.

9. TAB B TO APPEND IX I. EVEC 82. CHANGE LF TO DAMANG SUBSTITUTE

1 C-11 FOR 2 UNIL.

10. TAB D TO APPEND IX I. DELETE NOTE 4.

11. APPEND IXHIII. DELETE PARAS 1, 2 AND 3.

12. APPEND IX III. FELETE TABIA. AIR COMM IAW MY 328B-66 FREQ PLAN
ANNEX N.

13. FOLLOWING INFO PERTINENT:

A. POINT HSUE 325DEC/26 NW DANANG TACAN.

B. SAR REFERENCE POINT IS WASFAY ZD 161:90.

GP-4

E

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25 1745Z APR 66

Encl 49

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VV W 945 80543AVV 115A922 CLAS 62

OO RUMSMF

ZNY SSSSS ZOU RUABQ 902A

ZXY 16

W L 8A643CN 1A885Z OPRX 84

OO RUABQ

DE RUMFUAC 887 152121

ZNY SSSSS

0252121Z 15FVA

FM CTG SEVEN NINE FIVE

TO ZEN/ELT ONE FIVE

ZEN/HVY THREE SIX FOUR

INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX FIVE

RUMSMF/CG III MAP

RUMFCF/CHC SEVEN ZERO FIVE

RUABQ/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMFCF/CTF SEVEN SIX

VUMSYA/COMUSL CV

RUHLBN/CG FIVE

RUMFCF/COMSEVENTH FL

RUHLH/COMINCPACFLT

RUHLH/COMINCPAC

RUMFCF/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMFKB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE FIVE

RUMNAW/CG FIRST FAW

SUABQ/VGT THIRD MAR DIV

ZEN/USS PRINCETON

RUMFCF/USS ALAMO

RUMFCF/USN PICKAWAY

RUMFCF/USS JOHN W. THOMAS JR

RUMFCF/USS WALKER

BT

SECRET SECTION ONE TO FOUR SECTIONS
OPERATION OSAGE (U)

. CTG 79.5 OPORDER 328-66

E. CONVENT HLT 25 893 62

C. CTG 76.5 OPORDER 328-66

RD. MAPS: AMS SERIES 701, SHEET NOS 6639 II, 6639 III, & IV, 6639 I & II

E. CTG 76. OPORD 3188ATN 25 1616Z

HIMEHYMNEV HTL N

THIS IS CHG UNH MSG FOUR HOPHY 1 PAC NHZ COMFUT OF OPNHYMNEV ANEV

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IS DERIVE

FROM REFS (B) AND (E).

TASK ORGANIZATION

CTG 79.5

N. ELT 1/5

HMN 54

ATTACHMENTS (SEE H PARA 10)

1. SITUATION.

A. WEATHER, ENEMY, TERRAIN, HYDRO, ASTRO AND TIDAL DATA.

(1) WEATHER: AREA LIES UNDER INFLUENCE OF N.E. MONSOON.
 DRY PERIOD FROM MAY-NOVEMBER. APRIL IS TRANSITION MONTH WITH SOME
 RAINFALL. MEAN AVG PRECIPITATION FOR APRIL IS 2.1 INCHES. AVG
 TEMP FOR PERIOD IS 82 DEGREES WITH HIGH HUMIDITY. CRACKIN WEATHER O
 OCCURS INFREQUENTLY, USUALLY DISAPPEARING BY LATE APRIL.

COWL ENEMY:

(A) MOST RECENT ACCEPTED COB FOR PHU LOC AREA INCLUDES
 BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:

- 1 ONEAM I CO V C AU 805053, EST STRENGTH 65
- 2 810TH LF BN VIC ZC 054023, EST STRENGTH 400
3. ELEMENTS OF 85TH REG (COWA) OPERATING IN THE PROVINCE.
 WHEREABOUTS UNK.

PAGE THREE RUMFAC 857 SECRET

(B) UNITS CAPABLE OF REINFORCING INCLUDE 1 U/II:8;8:
 4 -) 903; , IAL ILL RWGL PIS 00: IPSONGOL 20 CG 14 MPACV IN TO P8209, HESQ
 LTRZC 61H 100.12 ST ICIERRCLVD URENGH HUA ONCEY PROVINCE EST 19;0
 WITH HNA F AVAPABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT TO AREA.

HH (C) TERRAIN: CHARACTERIZED BY LOW FLAT RICE PADDY AREAS AND
 ISOLATED HILLS NEAR THE NZACHESUNGIVING WAY TO VERY RUGGED MOUNTAINOUS
 TERRAIN WITH 6,700 METERS. HIGHWAY NCHI RA S THROUGH THE FLAT AREA
 AND GENERALLY FOLLOW THE COAST LINE. IT IS A HARD SURFACED
 (BLACKTOP) ROAD PRESENTLY OPEN TO TRAFFIC. A LOOSE SURF

ROAD RUNS FROM PHU LOC TO BACH MA G (VIC 0591). CROSS COUNTRY

MOVEMENT IS RESTRICTED DUE TO THE EXTENSIVE PADDIES. HOWEVER, FOOT
 TROOPS COULD CROSS THE AREA WITH RELATIVE EASE. THE MOUNTAINOUS
 AREA IS COMPOSED OF VERY STEEP, DENSELY OVERGROWN HILLS AND
 MOUNTAINS. DOMINATING PEAKS ARE AT BACH MA (1448 METERS); LOC HIA
 ON THE RIGHT FLANK OF WHITE BEACH (92 METERS); NUI TRON TO THE
 SOUTHWEST OF WHITE BEACH (282 METERS); AND PHU GIA AT AU 8401
 (33 METERS).

NOW (4) HYDRO DATA

I I (A) WHITE BEACH - VIC ZD 170066

H (B) LENGTH - APPROX 3300 YDS ALL USEABLE

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(C) WIDTHS - 40 TO 200 YDS AT L.W.; 20 TO 100 HW.

(D) GRADIENTS - 1 ON 30 TO 1 ON 150 L.W. TO H.W. 1 ON
15 H.W. ZONE(E) APPROACHES - GENTLE TO MILD SHOREWARD TO 6 FT DEPTH
90-285 YDS OFF H.W. LINE. APPROACHES FLANKED BY ROCKY HEADLANDS.
BOTTOM IS SAND AND MID JN NEARSHORE APPROACH PARTLY OBSTRUCTED BY
SHIFING SANDBAR OFF RIVER MOUTH ON LEFT FL.(F) SURF - 4 FT OR GREATER
11 PERCENT OF TIME. NT ZONERANGE
RIS 2 FI HANGHOC COR SHONCA J JAG.SP N H H (G&V) FERAL AND MFORMNESS - SAND; FIRM IN WETTED AREA JV
SOFT WHERE DRY.(H) TERRAIN LINED LATELY BEHIND THE BEACH CONSIST OF
BRUSH COVERED DUNES EXTENDING APPROX 200 YDS INLAND BACKED BY A
FEW RICE PADDIES IN THE CENTER. FOUR HUNDRED YDS INLAND A F
RESTED.

MOUNTAINOUS

MPLEX EXTENDS FROM THE FLANKS OF THE BEACH IN A
CONCAVE PATTERN TO COMPLETELY ENCLOSE THE BEACH.(I) EXISTING AND COMMUNICATION TO HINTERLAND INVOLVE
CROSSING THIS MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN WITH EXCEPTION OF A TRAIL ON THE
LEFT FLANK.

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(5) ASTR

DATA

	DATE	BEN	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EENT	MOONRISE	MOONSET	NOON PHASE
AIR	27	0546	0621-	1906	194	1143	0020	NEW
JW1		054	86"4	1906	1946	124	0116	1S GTR
F	29	053	0626	1906	194	1347	0209	1S GTR
	30	0534	824	1907	1947	1449	0254	7C 14

(6) TIDA

DATA CHOM DAY 16 DER 20';, >-5., JAPI DER 01'E
LONG (HEIGHT IN F)

	DAE	TIME HIGH T	TIME LOW HT
OK	27	1500 4,3	2345 1.5
	28	1603 3.5	
	29		0052 1.5

B. FRIENDLY F
ICES.(7) CC III MAP PROVIDES:
(A) CAS, TAC (A) TA, HELIC
HER ECORT, AND AERIAL

ECONNAISANCE SUPPORT.

(8) OTHER UPPOH AS REQUESTED.

(2) CTG 7.5 PROVIDES TRANSPORT, NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND LOGISTIC
SUPPORT.

(3) REGIONAL

ROES:

C :994\$3,-3 UNITS
GP-4
H

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PG UQ

C R E T

(C) WIDTHS - 40 TO 200 YDS AT LW; 20 TO 100 HW.
(F) GRADIENTS - 1 ON 30 TO 1 ON 150 L.W. TO H.W. 110NNWBYLOT H.W.

ZONE

1 (C) APPROACHES - (; 5-) 3 59 .8)S 9432-4S TO 60FT DEPTM
 50-285 YDS OFF H.W. LINE. APPROACHES FLANKED BY ROCKY HEADLANDS.
 BOTTOM IS SAND AND MUD. NEARSHORE APPROACH PARTLY OBSTRUCTED BY
 23 & - .594 911 48;34 .975 9,131)01) -.75 (A
 S H H (FGL SURF - 4 FT OR GREATER 11 PERCENT OF TIME. TIDAL RANGE
 IS 2 FT AND OCCURS ONCE A DAY.

(C) MATERIAL AND THICKNESS - SAND; FIRM IN WETTED AREA;
 SOFT WHEN DRY.

(H) TERRAIN IMMEDIATELY BEHIND THE BEACH CONSISTS OF

BRUSH

COVERED DUNES EXTEND

TO APPROX 200 YDS INLAND BACKED BY A

ROW OF RICE PADDIES IN THE CENTER. FOUR HUNDRED YDS INLAND A FOREYOEED,

MOUNTAINOUS COMPLEX EXTENDS FROM THE FLANKS OF THE BEACH TO A

CONCAVE PATTERN NOT COMPLETELY ENCLOSE THE BEACH.

N (D) EXISTS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO INTERL

AND INVOLVE

CROSSING THIS MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN WITH EXCEPTION OF A TRAIL ON THE
 LEFT FLANK

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(5) ASLRO DATA

	DATE	BNMT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EENT	MOONRISE	MBTINSET	MOONVGASE
APR 27	0546	0626	1926	1946	1143	0020	913	EW
RM 28	0546	0626	0926	1946	1245	0116	1ST	TR
29	0536	0						
		6	190	1946	1347	-5	0289	1ST
30	0534	0624	1907	1947	14			

(6) 0219 1ST QTR

(6) TIDAL DATA CHON BAY 16 DEG 20'/9"-51, 103 DEG 01'E D
LONGSHEIGHT IN FZ)

	DATE	TIMESHIGH	TIME	LBL	HT
S	-7	1520	4.3877	2345	1.5
	28	1623	3.5		

HPPTW QMT

E. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) CG III MAF PROVIDES:

D (A) CAS, TAC (A)/TAO, HELICOPTER ESCORT AMJGPSOIAL
CONNAISSANCE SUPPORT.

(7) OTHER SUPPORT AS REQUESTED.

(2) CG 76.5 PROVID 54-, 0945, NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND LOGISTIC
SUPPORT. 9

(3) REGIONAL FOR CAS:

H COORD INATES UNIOS

C-4

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C-3 COPY FSCC
3551312 APR 60

NNNNV 0

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NFD800

CO RUMSMF
 ZNY SSSSS ZOV RUABQ 742
 ZXY-16
 W L 04516CP A074Z CMA27
 COIRUABQ
 DESRUAFUAC 858 ITWEEP
 ZNY SSSSS
 252121Z
 FM KTG SEVEN NINE FT FIVE
 TO ZEN/BLY ONE FIVE
 ZEN/HNM THREE SIX FOUR
 INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX FT FIVE
 RUMSMF/CG 110 MAF
 CUMFC/COG SEVEN ZERO FT EIGHT
 RUABO/CTG SEVEN NINE
 RUMFC/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC
 RUHFC/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUHLH/COMCINCPACLT
 RUHLHQ/COMCINCPAC
 RUHFC/CD SEVEN SEVEN
 RUMFKB/CTG ONE NINE FIVE FT THREE
 RUHNAV/CG FIRST MAW
 RUHQL/CG THIRD MAR DIV
 ZEN/USC PRINCETON
 RUMFC/USC ALAMO
 RUMFC/3/7 03: (-2-)
 47.1:1/USC JOHN W. THOMASON
 RUHFC/USC WALTER
 E

COMM. NOTE: THIS MSG AS REC'D,
 111 MAF COMM. GEN. HAS INITIATED
 SVC; CORCY WILL BE DIST. ON RECPT.

EXOD CLR E TUN SECTION TWO OF FOUR SETTIONS
 ZD 040025 922ND RELGNJL FORCES CO
 ZDZC
 CYUQ FLT REGIONAL FORCES
 11 RO AT 832998 911" 43GIONAL FORCESHUO
 ZD 196012 1 FLT REGIYL FORCES
 ZD 038124 955 REGIONAL FORCES CO
 ZD 097

1WG POPULAR FIVCS PLT
 ZD 14500 06W POPULAR FIVCES PLT
 ZD 8 95 007 120 POPULAR FOG S PLT (1 S0)
 H ZD 190002 122 POPULAR FORCES PLT (1 S0)
 HXASNZ PPY HQOP POPULAR FORCES PLT (PLT (-))
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PAGE TWO RUMFUC 858 S E C R E T

2D 0930077 115 POPULAR FORCES PL
 K 2D 12:010 112 PT PULAR FORCES PLT (1 SØ)
 2D 135012 112 POPULAR FORCES PLT (1 SØ)
 H 2D 147011, 112 POPULAR FORCEYIPLL (1 SØ)
 NH 2D 154009 112 POPULAR FORCES PLT
 2D 198010 112 PBPULAR FORCES PLT

GW A OPT HOW LOC AT PHI LOC SUB SEC HQRS ZD 035008

2 - 105 HOW MY GIA AT 832998

U.S. ADVISORY TEAM AM PHU

OC SUB SECOURERS ZD 035008

C. MAYOAKMENTS.

4S (18 ARVN LANG QUAL ADVISORS

N KOL XUONMAF FMAW) TWO

(3) 1ST DIV, ARVN LNO

2.1.1. MISSION, LANDING

UPHEOW KPMENCING AT HSND L HOU

S ON D-DAY

LJON IYJXTBWD HLZ'S TO CLXSVRYSEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS
AND PROVIDE RICE HARVEST PROTECTION IN PHU LOC

REA.

3. EXECUTION.

IAFVW PUK LASE

SUBJNR CE LANDS OY LANDING CRAFT OVER ASITE

BEACH AND HELICOPTER IN HLZ'S CROW AND HAWK TO CONDUCT SEARCH

AND

DESTROY OPERATIONS AND TO PROVIDE RICE HARVEST PROTECTION

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PAGE THREE RUNFUC 553 SECRET
IN THE PHU LOC AREA, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE PHU ILA (AU 8401),
NUI GIOMKAU 8307), LOC THUY (ZD 1605) HILL MASSESIANB THE AREA RY
SOUTTITH

JHAY REF. 18

7355139,

7; 24839:2,33 :

EM AND 20. WHEN

DIRECTED CONDUCT A TACTICAL WITHDRAWAL. OPERATIONS NOT EXPECTED
O EXCAED THNL FIDE IY PKUVPUNFLET

UHERD MAY97

7. ELT 1/5.

(1) COMMENCING AT H AND L HOUR D-DAY, LAND BY SURFACE AND O
HELICOPTER ASSAULT OVER WHITE BEACH ANB,) "S CROW AND HAWK TBF
CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY (M8) 2 81)!

?"-8- 1 & 2.

(-3

"9, 9453* :9,58,73 -55-:(59 :9,57:5 63

4: -, \$ 535496

9234-539, 8,)/ OBJ'S 3, 4, 5, & 6.

83 (3) PROVIDE RICE HARVEST PROTECTION.

(4) PROVIDE LN OFF TO PHU LOC DIST

CT HOURS D-1.

(5) ELT FSCC PASS ARTY FIRE INFO TO SACV.

S (6) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT A TACTICAL WITHDRAWAL ON ORDER

C. HMM 304

(1) PROVIDE TROOP LIFT, 0-348-) 43,9,, RESUPPLY, AND EVACUATIO

MISSIONS AS DIRECTED.

(2) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT LEAFLET DROPS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH
ALL LANDINGGV AS DIRECTED BY CLF.

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COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. (IAW REF A AND BELOW).

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34 Mar 66 2100Z ATION OVERLAY (ISSUED SEPARATELY).

(2) ON D-DAY AN AOA WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) AN

IS DEFINED BY AN ARC OF 25 NAUT MILES RADIUS TO
SSAWARD AND 12 MILES RADIUS INLAND, CENTERED AT ZD 125005. THE ARC
SWINGS INLAND FROM ZD 0615 TO ZC 193863 THENCE FOLLOWING RIVER AND
RIDGELINE NORTHERLY TO THE QUANG NAM/THUA THIEN PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY;
THENCE EASTERLY ALONG THE BOUNDARY TO AT 8791, THENCE NORTHERLY TO
AT 864955 DIRECTIONALLY ALONG THE SHOGE TO COAST AT AT 898960.
/3-2-:S -4: 623, & 735233 (0-18,3 91 73-48, & 008 DEGREES T FROM ZD
860150 AND A LINE OF 043 DEGREES T FROM AT 898960, EXTENDING
25 NAUT MILE FROM EACH POINT.

(1) AIR AOA 10NM RADIUS CIRCLE CENTERED AT ZD 125005 FROM

SU

FACE TO 20,000 FEET.

T

GNC) CAT F WILL COORD AND CONTROL ALL AIR, SEA, AND LEND
OPERATIONS WITHIN AOA(3) FIRE SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEXES D, G, AND H OF
A AND BELOW.

H KADHNGF ON CALL H-15 MINUTES.

I (BOCAS GC ST

TION COMEFYING Y-20STHROUGH D AGLIGHT

A

A

PAGE FICS RIMFUAC 553 SECRET

HOURS D-5-6.

(C) CAS REP OF AREAS ADJACENT HS 2 853 73-: 149.
-20 TO H-5.(D) CAS REP OF LZ GROW AND ADJACENT AREAS FROM L-20 TO
L-5.4

(4) ALL OPERATIONS CONDUCTED I

W NWP 22 (A).

(5) D-DAY TENTATIVELY 27 APR. H HOU 12630. L HOU 0630

(6) RCA (CN AND CF) ONLY APPROVED FOR USE. AGENT DM
9.858, & AGENT) WILL NOT BE USED NOG. ISSUED.

(7) PASSWORD AND COUNTERSIGN (ISSUED SEPARATELY)

(8) REPORTS IAW ANNEX U REF A EXCEPT AS MODIFIED FOR
CASUALTY REPORTING. (SEE PARA 4 BELOW)

(9) CODE NAME: OSAGE

(10) FIRES ZLL N

WBE DELIVERED ON RT SHR. 1 OR THE RR
ADJACENT TO EW GRID LINE 01 DUE TO POPULAR AND REGIONAL FORCES
TRANSITING AOA ON THESE ROUTE.

N

(11) ALL UMZTS MUST BE ADVISED THAT POPULAR AND REGIONAL
FOC3 -43 5-589, 3S 8, -9- (SEE PARA 1.B. (3) ABOVE)

(12) LANDING PLAN IAW ANNEX I REF A. BLT ZILL PREPARE DETAILED

PLANS.

CP-4

S

TOR: 26/0850Z / APR 66 / BP / NTA

C-3

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MFD882
 CO RUMSF
 ZNY SSSSS ZOV RUABQ 825A
 ZXY 16
 JOHN W
 W LQA571 CMH046
 CO RUABQ
 ZNY SSSSS ZD G RUABCM
 LQA530 AAAAAAA PIZ COMB962
 CO RUABQ
 ZNY SSSSS ZFM 1
 CZCCSB601ZCWPANWEM
 CZCWP232VV UAC859
 O
 RUABQ
 E RUMFUAC 829 QGQPPOT
 ZNY SSSSS
 0252121ZN
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 TO ZENXOLT ONE FIVE O
 LZEN/HMM HREE SIEESSS X FOUR O
 INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMSF/CG III MAF
 RUMFCF/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RUABQ/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMFCF/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV OGLXD UXL P/CG FMFPAC
 RUMFCF/COM SEVEN NINE
 RUHLH/C ZCPACR. T
 RUHLH/C INCPAC
 RUMFCF/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUMFKB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT THREE
 RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAW
 RUABQ/CG THIRD MAR DIV -
 DIV

COMM NOTE: MSG BEING SVC'D BY
 MAF, CORRECTED COPY TO FO

ZEN/USS PRINCE OF
 RUMFCF/USS ALAMO
 RUMFCF/KSS PICCWAY
 RUMFCF/USS JOHN W MONASON
 RUMFCF/USS WALKER

H
 SECRET SECTION THREE OF FOUR SECTIONS
 (1) AIR OPERATIONS.

(A) REF AND CONTROL PTS

1. SAR REF PT - PT MAY TAY -ZD 161092

2. A/C ENTRY AND EXIT PT, SUE 325 DEGREES/26NM

3. DANANG TACAN

3. HEL OPERATIONS PT - AUSTIN ZD110110

(B) FLZ'S

1. EAGLE - ZD 174468

2. CROW - ZC 138873

3. HAWK - ZD 174468

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PAGE TWO RUMFUAC 559 K E C R E T

(V) NAVNAMES - KSS (G) INCLIN. TAVAN CH. INCIDENT IU XP

I I

N (L) BAR SHIP IS USS PRINCETON

V (E) DEL O APPROACH AND RETIREMENT LANE

1, TEXAS - ADJUTANT TO CROW (170 DEGREES W 7.3 NM)

(14) WITHDRAWAL.

(A) ORDER CATF, SELF WILL CONDUCT TACT WITHDRAWAL BY
SUGFACE AND HELO MEANS FROM DESIGNATED BEACHES AND HLZ TO
PREVIOUSLY DESIGNATED SHIPPING.

(B) DETAILED WITHDRAWAL PLAN WILL BE DELETED BY BLT

(C) HOUR WILL BE DESIGNATED BY CATX AND CONFIRMED.

ADMIN AND LOG

A. IAW USGEX R TO REF A AS MODIFIED BELOW.

(1) ELT ESTABLISH T CLOG AND PCS AND LPH

(2) MED EVAC: LPH DESIGNATED CESC, INITIALLY ALL CASUALTIES
EVAC TO LPHV (3) CIVIL AFFAIRS: INCLUDE MED READINESS, DIST OF FOOD AND
MED SUPPLIES ASSIGNABLE.B. CASUALTY REPORTING CTG 79.5 CRCC ESTABLISHED AND LPH, BLT AND
HMM WILL SUBMIT COMBAT AND NON-COMBAT CASUALTY REPORTS TO CTG 79.5
IN CH N MOST EXPEDIENTIOUS MANNER. MESSAGE FORMAT, PEOF REPORTPAGE THREE RUMFUAC 559 S E C R E T
AND FREQUENCY AS SPARATELY DER BY CTO OMI

C C. PUB INFO IAW ANNEX V REF A.

CMD AND COM-ELECT.

A. REL BETWEEN CG III OAF AND SEVENTH FLT UNITS IAW JCS PUB

PARAS 32273 A

DHHEPWUO AND WWP 22 (A).

B9 CWD POSTE

(11) AFLOAT

CTG 79.5

USS PRINCETON

CTG 76.5

USS PRINCETON

ELT 1/5

USS PRINCETON

D F K HMM 364 USS PRINCETON

S (20) ASHORE: BGTFR FT CP LOC WHEN FESB.

COMMUNICATIONS IAW ANNEX N TO RDE A AS MODIFIED BELOW.

H (10) PU

A 3.5. (5) CRYPTOGRAPHIC - AED NEW SUZ PARA (B)

*XAC 140LL ZE AVAPQAEWE FOR USE BETWEEN BN CP AND LANDING FORCE
AND TRS.

(2) APPENDIX 1 (AIR FREQUENCIES)

MAKE FOLLOWING CHANGE:

NET

FREQ

COLTR CODE

TAC

2422

NA

TATC

266.4

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TAD 236.2
TAT 262.7
1 ID 328.2

BLACK
AY

RUUFUAC 859 SECRET

JXNKKOY

ONAL SND IX 31 (CR SVT OGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS)ARA IE. CHANGE
"00012" READ "0001H".

(4)NTAB B (FREQUENCY PLAN) TO APPENDIX 4 (RADIO PLAN)

THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

NET	H	FREQ	DESIGNATOR	EMISSION	POWER
CLF TAC NR 1	H	40.2 P	M-9	36F3	16W
	H	46.7 S	M-22	36F3	16W
CLF TAC NR 2		2675 KCS P M-33		3A3J/6A3	200W
		3143 KCS S M-25		8. 33J VXY3	200G
		1269 KCS S M-213		83A3XHAG	1 WPPW
		103.4 KCS S GN-9K		113A3J/6A3	WPPW
		21.6 MCS M1		36F3	16W
		22.5 MCS M-2		7F3	11W
		MEMO MCS M-3		36F3	16
UA X		25.7 MCS M		36F3	QYW 16W
		27.7 MCS OGAL		EYF	16W

PAGE FIVE RUUFUAC VO E E C R E T

SI	WEIOW	HEAU OJ	EYF3	QYW
XY 3.2 ERCS 0-6			36F3	16W
5300MY	M-8		36XHE	QYW
40.9 M-10	36F3	16W		
AQA DLTM-11 36F3	16W			
4199 4-12	36F3	(16W)		
41.7 M-13		836F3		16SI
41.7 M-13				E S41.7
42.3 S	M-15		EYF3	11W
42.7 M-17			36F3	16W
44.8 VAA00			363	16W
49.2 (10/2			EYF3	16W
HQ 50.2 MGALV			36F3	16
3900 7.74			EYNE	0 W
4613 7.93			AER/6A3	200W
43.7 M-15			3A3J/6A3	200W
			363	16W

9. CARM SIGNS (TAB B TOST PP 4 TO ANNEX D TONREF A) AND BELOW.

(1) PRINCETON - BIL LHOEN

OWL PICKAWAY - DEYBR OOK GOT F

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V MSA09J////////// FLASH TO FOLLOW //////////

MFD761

*****YZ DDKUAC DDKUV MMSU MMSB YYNA
 DE DDKE 322 116008
 ZNY SSSSS.
 Z 260058Z
 FM CG III MAF
 O MMSU/COMSEVENT HFLT
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO ZEN/COMUSMACV
 YYNA/CG FMFPAC
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 DDKUV/CTF 76
 MMSB/CTF 79
 DDKUAC/CTG 76.5
 DDKUAC/CTG 79.5

H

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USE OF SLF (U)

- A. CG III MAF 230616Z
 B. COMUSMACV 241501Z
 C. COMSEVENT HFLT 231110Z
 D. CINCPAC 242045Z (NOTAL)

1. REF A PRESENTED CONCEPT OF PROPOSED OPERATION UTILIZING SLF.
 2. FOR ALL:

- A. REF B, C AND D APPROVED REF A.
 B. CG I CORPS HAS APPROVED CONCEPT REF A AND HAS AUTHORIZED DIRECT

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APR 26 1966**SECRET**

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3d MarDiv - 2100/2PAGE TWO DDKE 322 S E C R E T
LN WITH CG 1ST ARVN DIV.

C. CG 1ST ARVN DIV AHS FURNISHED SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION BY PROVIDING INTERPRETERS, BRIEFING ON THE AREA OF OPERATION, A PF PLT AND NECESSARY CONTROL FEATURES TO INSURE SAFETY OF VN PERSONNEL RESIDING IN AREA OF OPERATIONS.

D. AIRSPACE RESERVATION HAS BEEN REQUESTED.

3. FOR COMSEVENTH FLT: FOLLOWING RECOMMENDED FOR INCLUSION IN INITIATING DIRECTIVE:

. D-DAY, 27 APRIL, ALTERNATE 28 APRIL; EXPECTED LENGTH OF OPERATION IS THREE DAYS.

B. AS AGREED BETWEEN CG III MAF AND CTG 76.5/79.5, AOA DEFINED BY AN ARC OF 25 NAUT MILES RADIUS TO SEAWARD AND 10 NAUT MILES RADIUS INLAND, CENTERED AT (ZD 125005) THE ARC SWINGS INLAND FROM (ZD 0613) TO (ZC 193863) THENCE FOLLOWING RIVER AND RICE LINE NORTHERLY TO THE QUANG NAM/THUA THIEN PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY; THENCE EASTERLY ALONG THE BOUNDARY TO (AT 8791), THENCE NORTHERLY TO (AT 864955) AND EASTERLY ALONG THE SHORELINE TO COAST AT (AT 898960). THE SEAWARD ARC SWINGS BETWEEN A LINE OF BEARING 028 DEGREES TRUE FROM (ZD 060130) AND A LINE OF BEARING 043 DEGREES TRUE FROM (ZD 898960). EXTENDING 25 NAUT MILES FROM EACH POINT.

PAGE THREE DDKE 322 S E C R E T

A. PROPOSED NAME OF OPERATION: "OSAGE" IN KEEPING WITH MACV DIRECTIVE REQUIRING USE OF STATE/COUNTY NAMES FOR OPERATIONS IN ICTZ.

B. FOLLOWING IS CLARIFICATION OF PARA 2(C) REF A:

THE CHOP OF OPCON OF SLF TO III MAF UPON TERMINATION AMPHIBIOUS PHASE PREDICATED ON POSSIBILITY OF A SITUATION DEVELOPING AS A RESULT OF ARG/SLF OPERATION IN WHICH III MAF FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE COMMITTED TO THE AREA.

4. FOR CG FMAN:
PROVIDE SUPPORT AS OUTLINED IN REF. A.

GP-4

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MFD 84EE

MFD 35E

OO RUMSMF

ZDG RUMB 4334M 1160120

ZNY SSSSS

IL B001VV QLA 777

OO RUMSMF

ZNY SSSSS ZOV RUABQL 777A

ZXY-8

P L QAS 8P 1A1 19Z CPPASA 0

OO RUABQL

DE RUMFJANOTR LWHOOYF PP

ZNY SSSSS

RK 26015 02

RM CTG SEVEN SIX FIVE

TO ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX FIVE

ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE FIVE

INFO RUMFCF/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF XSEVEN NINE

RUMFCF/CTG SEVEN ZERO FIVE EIGHT

RUMSMF/CG III MAF

RUMFCF/CONSEVEN MFLT

RUABQL/CG THIRD MARD IV

RUABQL/CG FIRST MAF

RUMFCF/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMFKB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE FIVE THREE

F

SECRET

OPERATION OSAGE (U)

REF A. CTG 76.5 OPORD 328-66

B. NO 15,551-50-29

THIS IS ANNEX GOLF TO MY OPORDER 328 B-66

1. NGF IAW MY 328B-66 AND THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TO ANNEX

GOLF TO REF A.

2. FIRE SUPPORT AREA BOUNDARIES FROM REF B ARE FSA I AU 880000, 900000, 366060 AND 845060. FSA II AU 810070, 820070, 200100 AND 190070. FSA III ZD 160100, 180100, 290153 AND 090135.

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PAGE TWO ENRUMFUAC 872 S E C R E T

3. INITIATIVE JICGNMENT

A. USS JOHN W. TNGF SON DD 76; IN FSA II CONTACT GLIMMER 26 CHARLIE CIRCUIT C-1 (3179 USB).

B. WALKER DD 517 IN FSA III CONTACT GLIMMER 26 CHARLIE ALPHA CIRCUIT C-3 (4301 USB).

C. NO FREE FIRE ZONES HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED.

D. IN DELETE PARA 3X(4). THERE WILL BE NO SCHEDULED BEACH OR HLZ REEF FIRES BY HNGFVR A SEPARATE HCBTHJF TARGET CONCENTRATIONS WILL BE ISSUED AS REQUIRED. BE PREPARED TO FIRE THESE MISSIONS ON CALL.

E. ALL NGF WILL BE OBSERVED FIRE UNDER THE POSITIVE CONTROL OF GROUND OR AIR SPOTTERS. SHIPS MAY CONDUCT DIRECT COUNTER BATTERY FIRE ONLY WHEN POSITIVE OF LOCATION OF ENEMY BATTERY. (FRIENDLY ARTY LOCATIONS WILL HAVE MUZZLE EXHAUSTS VISIBLE FROM SEAWARD).

F. BE ALERT TO AVOID INADVERTENT FIRE ON COASTAL ROUTE 1 OR THE

CENT RAILROAD. FRIENDLY FORCES MAY BE EXPECTED TO TRANSIT THE AREA OF THESE THOROUGHFARES.

G. HJRA 3X(7) (A). DELETE "DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS". ADD "VERBAL APPROVAL WILL BE OBTAINED FROM SACC/FSVC BEFORE FIRING MISSION".

H. DELETE PARA 3X(7) (B).

I. DELETE PARA 3X(11). THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER INDICATES REPETITIVE

BY

PAGE THREE RUMFUAC 872 S E C R E T

DISPLACEMENT OF LANDING FORCE UNITS. SHIPS WILL FIRE AS REQUESTED BY SUPPORTED UNIT SFCP.

1. DELETE PARA 5A AND 5B. COMMUNICATIONS IAW OTV 70.8 307-66

2. GUARD TAO NET DURING DAYLIGHT. BE PREPARED TO SHIFT TO C-2 (2324 USB) OR C-4 (223 USB). SACC, FSVC AND NGF SHIPS MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS GUARD ON NGF CONTROL NET C-1.

3. INITIAL PLAN HANGNAILS FOLLOW:

A. PLAN HANGNAIL NUMBER ONE. FROM ZD 105107 TO ZC 137977. FIVE HUNDRED. ALTITUDE 30. DECK 15. FROM 0615 TO 0930, 7 731(7) 349 14

B. 130205 TO ZC 137977.

C. PLAN HANGNAIL NUMBER TWO. FROM ZD 105107 TO ZD 130205. FIVE HUNDRED. ALTITUDE 30. DECK 15. FROM 0630 TO 1100.

G-4

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DE MAP NR 543
 OO UUMSSJ
 DE UUMSSJ 075 117651
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 270651Z
 FM III MAF COC
 TO UUMSSJ/MAFV CC
 3D MAPDIV

SECRET

COT REPORT

OPERATION OSAGE

1. ARVN DESIRES O-EMPLOY COMPANY TO
 SWEEP AREA BOUNDED BY ZD 1401, ZD 1601,
 ZC 1457, AND ZC 1697. ARVN CO. TO BE PUT IN
 BY TRUCKS VIA HWAY ONE AND WILL BE WITH-
 DRAWN BY TONIGHT. THIS MOVEMENT WAS APPROVED
 BY PAFCHMENT G-3.
 2. NO REPORTED CONTACT OR USMC MOVEMENT AT THIS TIME.

AF DE DIV GSI UR NR 543 AT 270739Z
 KKK

270651

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DE NAT NR 547

C

DE MAF

211 5555

C 270807Z

FM 111 MAF

TO ZEN/UMMSJ/MACV COC

INFO 21 MAFIN COC

BT

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SPOT REPORT

OPN OSAGE

1. HSL HOUR ON TIME.

2. FIRST WAVE 9 LVTP'S TOUCHED DOWN AT 262230Z.

3. FIRST WAVE 9 HELOS LANDED 262230Z.

4. NO ENEMY REPORTED AS OF 270600Z.

-4

AN

IT QSL GRU THIS .END RM

F DE DIV QSL UP NR 547 AT 27/0659Z

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3d MarDiv - 2100/1

TO: MAF 11 240

FROM: 11 117000Z
11 117000Z270809Z
FMCG III MAF
TO: DKUAC/CTG 7605
INFO: ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

- SECRET
- MOVEMENT THROUGH OPN OSAGE AOA AND REQUEST FOR NGFS
1. THIRD MARDIV HAS REQUIREMENT TO MOVE SUPPLIES AND EQUIP DANANG TO PHU BAI AND RETURN VIA MOTOR VEHICLE CONVOY OVER NATIONAL ROUTE NR ONE ON 28 APRIL 1966.
 2. REQ YOU COORDINATE MOVEMENT CONVOY THRU OPN OSAGE AOA OVER NATIONAL ROUTE NR ONE. NORTH BOUND ETA AOA VIC (AT 890954) 281031H AND ETD AOA VIC (YD 946005) 281030H. SOUTHBOUND ETV AOA VIC (YD 946005) 281420H AND ETD AOA VIC (AT 890954) 281030H.
 3. NEW BUT RELATED SUBJ: REQ NGFS TO SUPPORT MOTOR VEHICLE CONVOY

PAGE TWO DUKE 418 S-E C R-E T
FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED:

- A. PROVIDE NGFS TO USMC MOTOR CONVOY DANANG TO PHU BAI AND RETURN VIA ROUTE ONE.
- B. ONE DESTROYER
- C. VIC COORD (AT 9459)
- D. 281700H
- E. 12 HOURS
- F. TGTS OF OPPORTUNITY
- G. THIRD MARDIV
- H. SPOT NET PRIMARY 3224 KCS SECONDARY 5120 KCS O'LEARY
- 26 OSCAR/CHARLIE
- GF-4
- B1

NNNN

11 1 05L AND I HAVE OMEEEEEEE ONE MORE FOR YOU

11 1 05L 11 117000Z

27 08 09

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VV WFD383
OO RUMFUAC RUMNAV
DE RUMSMF 525 1181534
ZNY SSSSS
0281534Z
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMFUAC/CTG SEVEN SIX FT FIVE
INFO RUMFUAC/CTG SEVEN NINE FT FIVE
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMNAV/CG FIRST MAF

SECRET

OPERATION OSAGE (U)

A. YR 281152Z APR (TTY)

1. REF A REQUEST'S CONCURRENCE WITH PROPOSED WITH BAWAL OF SLF FROM
ON OSAGE ACA. TENTATIVE W-HOURS: 3000Z.
2. THIS HQ CONCURS
3. UNDERSTAND ARG/SLF WILL MAINTAIN 48-HOURS REACTION TIME TO DANANG/
CHULAI AREA IN SUPPORT I CTZ.

P-4

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CMFD529

PP RUMSDN RUMSF

DE RUMFUAC 106 1190336

ZNY SSSSS

P 290336Z

FM CTG SEVEN SIX FT FIVE

TO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE FT FIVE

ZEN/IG SEVEN SIX FT FIVE

INFO RUMSF/CG III MAF

RUMSDN/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMNAW/CG FMAV

E

SECRET

OPERATION OSAGE (U)

THIS IS FRAG ORDER NR 2 TO MY OPORDER 328B-66.

1. SITUATION. THIS FRAG ORDER PROVIDES INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 9L FROM THE PHUL C AREA. ALL EVOLUTIONS WILL BE TACTICAL, AND SUBJECT TO REVISION IN THE EVENT THE SITUATION SHOWS SO REQUIRES.

2. EXECUTION.

A. CTG 76.5 - EXERCISES OVERALL CONTROL OF THE WITHDRAWAL.

B. TE 76.5.2.1

1. PROVIDE HDCTO CONTROL HELD. 3E WITHDRAWAL.

PAGE TWO RUMFUAC 106 **SECRET**

2. BACKLOAD TROOPS AND EQUIP AS BEFORE PRE-D-DAY TRANSFERS.

3. OPERATE IN MIA-2.

4. INSURE SHORTEST HELD ROUTES TO IP CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY.

5. PROVIDE RETURN TRANS FOR ATTACHED ARVN AND US TROOPS.

C. TE 76.5.2.2 - CONTROL ALL AIR IN THE AOA.

D. TE 76.5.2.3 - PROVIDE LIFE GUARDS IN THE BGC BOAT.

E. TU 76.5.1

1. PROCEED NGF SUPPORT FOR WITHDRAWAL.

2. THOMASON ASSIGN FSA II.

3. WALKER ASSIGN FSA I.

F. TU 76.5.2 LESS PRINCETON.

1. ANCHOR IAW ANNEX IND IA.

2. PCS/SCS/BOAT HAVEN IAW ANNEX IND IA.

3. PICKAWAY PROVIDE SIX LCVF AND ONE LCM-6 TO PCS AT W-62.

4. BACKLOAD TROOPS AND EQUIP TO SAME SHIPS AS BEFORE PRE-D-DAY TRANSFERS, EXCEPT FINAL LCU BACKLOAD WILL REMAIN SAME AS FOR LANDING.

G. TE 76.5.2.1 - PROVIDE TWO MAN DETAIL ON WHITE BEACH ONE TO ASSIST SHORE PARTY WITH BOAT GUSOANCE AND SALVAGE.

H. CTG 79.5

1. PROVIDE SHORE PARTY TO ASSIST IN BACKLOADING.

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Encl 57

PAGE THREE R U I F U A C 1 0 6 S E C R E T

- ### X. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- XI THE KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL WITHDRAWAL IS RAPID MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE HZ'S AND BEACHES., IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT NO BUILDUPS BE PERMITTED IN THESE AREAS. AS SOON AS UNITS ARE READY TO WITHDRAW, CONTROL AGENCIES WILL INSURE THAT THERE IS TRANSPORTATION ON

G-4

Fig.

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OLLOW

MFD531

*****ZZ RUMSMF RUMSMB

IE RUMFUAC 11. 1191042

ZNY SSSSS

Z 291014Z

FM CTG 76.5

TO RUAUBL/C ON SEVENTH FLT

INFO RUMSMF/C G III NAF

RUMBL/CTF 79

RUMBL/C INCPACFLT

RUMBLBY/FMFPAC

RUMSMB/C G THIRD MAR DIV

RUMNAM/C G FMAW

RUMFUAC/CTG 70.8

RUMGUW/CTF 76

BT

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FLASH

OPN OSAGE

1. APPROX 1430H CO "C" WHILE CONDUCTING SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS
ON LF OBJ 5 WAS HIT BY MINE AND SR FIVE. HELOS ALSO RECEIVED SA
AND AM WPNS FIRE FROM RIDGE LINE ON OBJ 5. CO "C" SUFFERED APPROX
5X KIA AND 9 WIA. FLT REACTED IMMED AND POSITIONED OTHER THREE
COMPANIES LF OBJ 5 FR N AU 820264 TO AU 840250 TO SEAL OFF AREA AND
PREVENT EXFILTRATION.

2. INTEND TO EXTEND OSAGE TO CLEAR LF OBJ 5.

GP-4

BT

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NNNN

C-3

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291014Z APR 66

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