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# 3D MARINE DIVISION FMF (-) (REIN)



# COMMAND CHRONOLOGY for the month of **APRIL 1967**

67-5512

## HEADQUARTERS 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF FPO, San Francisco 96602

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3/IGA/das 3480/2 Ser: 003A14367 23 May 1967

### (UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE (1))

From: Comm

Commanding General

Tos

Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Via:

(1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 April 1967 to 30 April 1967

Ref:

(a) MOO 5750.2

(b) FMFPac0 5750.8


Encl: (1) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology (S)

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

A. D. CERECHENO Chief of Staff

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Copy of 25 copies



# HEADQUARTERS 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

#### COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 April 1967 to 30 April 1967

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## COASSTED

## PART I

## ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION	COMMANDER.	
Constitute and constitute Constit	MGen B. A. HOCHMUTH	1-30 Apr
3d Marine Division (-) (Rein)		_
Assistant Division Commander	EGen M. P. RYAN	1-30 Apr
SUBORDIN	IATE UNITS	
3d Marines	Col J. P. LANIGAN	1-30 Apr
4th Marines	Col R. H. THOMPSON	1-30 Apr
9th Marines	Col R. M. JENKINS	1-30 Apr
12th Marines	Col W. R. MORRISON	1-30 Apr
26th Marines	Col J. J. PADLEY	25-30 Apr
3d Bn <sub>s</sub> 3d Marines	LtCol G. WILDER	1-30 Apr
1st Bn, 4th Marines	LtCol T. J. WILLIS	1-30 Apr
2d Bn, 4th Marines	LtCol A. E. BENCH	1-30 Apr
3d Bn, Ath Marines	LtCol W. N. VEST	1-30 Apr
1st Bn, 9th Marines	Major D. J. FULHAM	1-30 Apr
2d Bn, 9th Marines	LtCol J. J. PEELER	1-30 Apr
3d Bn, 9th Marines	LtCol J. L. WILSON	1-30 Apr
1st ${ m Bn}_{\scriptscriptstyle S}$ 12th Marines	LtCol W. H. RICE	1-30 Apr
2d Bn, 12th Marines	LtCol W. L. GORE LtCol J. L. NORMAN	1-27 Apr 28-30 Apr
3d Bn <sub>9</sub> 12th Marines	LtCol J. L. MILES	1-30 Apr
4th Bn, 12th Marines	LtCol D. G. JONES Major L. G. SNYDER	1-6 Apr 7-30 Apr
1st Bn, 26th Marines	LtCol D. E. NEWTON	1-30 Apr
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LtCol J. M. CUMMINGS LtCol C. R. FIGARD	1-10 Apr 11-30 Apr
LtCol K. L. HOCH.	1-30 Apr
LtCol C. R. FIGARD Col J. R. STOCKMAN	1-10 Apr 11-30 Apr
LtCol A. R. BOWMAN	1-30 Apr
LtCol C. R. CASEY	1-30 Apr
LtCol J. H. REID, Jr.	1-30 Apr
Cdr J. T. VINCENT MC, USN	1-30 Apr
Major R. F. ARMSTRONG	1-30 Apr
Major C. N. DEZER Major J. R. A. REHFUS	1-13 Apr 14-30 Apr
LtCol D. E. MARCHETTE	1-30 Apr
Major V. L. SYLVESTER	1-30 Apr
Major D. R. TYER	1-30 Apr
LtCol R. L. MULFORD	1-30 Apr
Capt R. E. ROUSH	1-30 Apr
Major E. D. LITZENBERGER	1-30 Apr
Capt L. H. CORDONIER, DC, U	ISN 1-30 Apr
Col A. D. CEREGHINO	1-30 Apr
LtCol C. S. KIRCHMANN	1-30 Apr
LtCol L. C. SHEPHERD III	1-30 Apr
Col E. E. HAMMERBECK	1-30 Apr
	LtCol C. R. FIGARD  LtCol K. L. HOCH.  LtCol C. R. FIGARD  Col J. R. STOCKMAN  LtCol A. R. BOWMAN  LtCol C. R. CASEY  LtCol J. H. REID, Jr.  Cdr J. T. VINCENT MC, USN  Major R. F. ARMSTRONG  Major C. N. DEZER  Major J. R. A. REHFUS  LtCol D. E. MARCHETTE  Major V. L. SYLVESTER  Major D. R. TYER  LtCol R. L. MULFORD  Capt R. E. ROUSH  Major E. D. LITZENBERGER  Capt L. H. CORDONIER, DC, USA  Col A. D. CEREGHINO  LtCol C. S. KIRCHMANN  LtCol L. C. SHEPHERD III



Asst Chief of Staff, G-4	Col J. F	. MENTZER	1-:	30 Apr
Asst Chief of Staff, G-5	Col E. R	. MCCARTHY	1-1	30 Apr
Asst Chief of Staff, Comptroller	LtCol A.	A. MONTI	1-3	30 Apr
4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH				
	USM	****	USI	
	<u>off</u>	ENL	OFF	ENL
3d Marine Division (∞) (Rein)	1038 2	3,883	173	1085
3d Marines	16	264	3	4
4th Marines	18	257	2	4
9th Marines	17	215	1	3.
12th Marines	26	246	9	3
26th Marines	11	116	0	2
3d Bn <sub>9</sub> 3d Marines	<sup>-</sup> 38	1096	2	43
lst Bn, 4th Marines	33	1130	2	53
2d Bn, 4th Marines	40	1179	3	52
3d Bn, bth Marines	36	1016	3	53
1st Bn, 9th Marines	43	1272	3	55
2d Bm, 9th Marines	. 36	1197	1	53
3d Bm, 9th Marines	36	1205	3	52
1st Bn, 12th Marines	7171	. 669	1	13
2d Bn,, 12th Marines	37	630	1	11
3d Bn, 12th Marines	38	110	1	7
4th Bn, 12th Marines	<b>3</b> 8	898	0	18
1st Bn, 26th Marines	. 33	1177	3	52
2d Bn <sub>9</sub> 26th Marines	34	1208	3	53
3d Bn, 26th Marines	36	1192	3	<b>48</b>
· ,	<sub>k</sub> DEC	LASSIFIED	Encl	osure (1)

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	OT T	73777			
Hq Bn	188	2010	710	102	
lst AmTrac Bn	23	822	2	11	
3d AT Bn	24	407	0	8	
3d Engr Bn	25	930	2	11	
3d Med Bn	3	151	54	209	
3d MT Bn	13	354	0	5	
3d Recon Bn	29	590	. О	29	
3d SP Bn	22	508.	2	26	
3d Tank Bn	28	669	0	12	
9th MI Bn	111	419	1	7	
11th Engr Bn	47	1327	2	18	
let 8™ How Btry	7	163	0	1	
let 155 Gun Btry	5	156	0	3	
3d Dental Co	o	0	<b>2</b> 6	61	

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#### PART II

#### NARRATIVE SUMMARY

#### PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

### 1. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

- a. During the period 78 officers and 1010 enlisted personnel joined the Division. Personnel transferred by normal rotation included 109 officers and 950 enlisted. Personnel transferred by service records due to MedEvac were 11 officers and 358 enlisted. Other personnel transferred by service records included 3 officers and 22 enlisted.
- b. Award recommendations to FMFPac: 1 Medal of Honor, 4 Navy Crosses, 32 Silver Stars, 7 Legion of Merit Medals, 102 Bronze Stars, 7 Air Medals, 77 Navy Commendation Medals and 7 Secretary of the Navy Commendation for Achievement Medals. Approved by FMFPac: 4 Navy Crosses, 19 Silver Stars, 1 Legion of Merit Medal, 52 Bronze Stars, 8 Air Medals, 45 Navy Commendation Medals and 1 Secretary of the Navy Commendation for Achievement Medal. In addition, 824 Purple Hearts were presented.
- c. Casualties sustained during the month included: 128 KIA, 1037 WIA, 13 DOW, 11 NHD, 44 NHT and 2 MIA.
- d. Congressional Interest Cases: 118 cases processed, 70 cases completed, 18 cases pending and 26 cases readdressed to other commands.
- e. Discharges: 2 Hardship Discharges approved, 3 Hardship Discharges to CMC for decision, 2 Hardship Discharges pending and 5 Unsuitable Discharges approved.

### 2. EXCHANGE SERVICE

- a. The new Division Exchange was officially opened by Major General HOCHMUTH at 1300 hours 25 April 1967. This exchange is housed in a two Butler Building complex adjacent to the Division Post Office. The facility was stocked with a well rounded assortment of health and comfort, electronics and photographic merchandise. A new concessionaire was established, the Caribe Diamond Company, providing a full line of ladies and mens jewelry and watches.
- b. The Division Exchange service has been redesignated a Branch, consolidating accounts 1151-11 and 1151-18 into Branch 1010 of the A/AFES.
  - c. A total of 425 pallets of merchandise and 200 pallets of soft drinks have been received during April 1967. In addition, four conex boxes were shipped via rough rider to Dong Ha to assist the stock posture there.
    - d. Total sales for Branch 1010 amounted to \$446,876.55.



STREET BUILDING

#### 3. POSTAL

- a. During the period covered by this report, seven postal units were relocated to perform money order and stamp sales for organizations in this area. One postal unit remained inactive.
  - b. The units affected by this change are indicated below:
- (1) Units #2 and #4 were relocated from Danang to the Dong Ha area to provide mobile money order service.
- (2) Unit #3 was relocated from Danang to Dong Ha to provide mobile money order service.
- (3) Unit #5 was relocated from Danang to Dong Ha to provide money order and stamp sales in the 11th Engineer area as soon as a building is furnished.
- (4) Unit #7 was relocated from Danang to Fhu Bai to provide money order and stamp sales in the Headquarters, 4th Marines area.
- (5) Unit #8 was relocated from Danang to Phu Bai to provide money order and stamp sales in the FLSG-A area.
- (6) Unit #15 was relocated from Danang to Phu Bai to provide money order and stamp sales in the 3d Engineer area.
  - (7) Unit #13 remained inactive.
- c. The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this command received and dispatched during April 1967.

AREA	RECEIVED	DISPATCHED	TOTAL
Phu Bai	276,636	118,034	394,670
Dong Ha/Cam Lo	91,973	67,742	159,715
	368,609	185,776	554#385

d. During the month of April 1967, air letter mail was not received at Dong Ha on 8, 15, 23, 26, and 28 April 1967 and no mail was received on 24 April 1967. Phu Bai did not receive letter mail on 25 April 1967. However, this mail was received with the following days mail with the exception of Dong Ha mail for the 23d and 24th of April 1967. All backlogged mail for these two days was received on the day following none receipt.

#### 4. DIVISION CLUBS

a. No clubs were formalized.

PATER

b. Clubs closed

COM(O)

SNCO

ENL

FISU-2

None

FLSU-2

c. Estimated gross sales:

COM(O) SNCO Club \$ 15,500.00 98,997.00

ENL Club

197,140.00

\$311,637.00

#### d. Miscellaneous:

(1) During the month of April the below listed merchandise and furniture was shipped to the three northern Marine enclaves, in the amount indicated:

#### Dong Ha

Beer	200	pallets
Soda	100	pallets
Liquor	1	pallet
Bar Snacks	10	pallets
Furniture	10	palle ts
Beverage Cooler	2	each

#### Phu Bai

Beer	100 pallets
Soda	90 pallets
Liquor	4 pallets
Bar Snacks	5 pallets

#### Khe Sanh

Beer	6 pallets
Soda	6 pallets
Furniture	5 pallets

Beverage Cooler

3 each 2 Enl/1 SNCO

e. On 6 April the Central Clubs Officer was moved from Danang to the Phu Bai enclave. Personnel assigned to this office are Major D. E. MULLALLY Jr., the Division Clubs Officer, MSgt V. L. HUBBARD, the Division Clubs Operations Chief, SSgt D. C. COONEY Jr., the Phu Bai Enclave Chief, LCpl R. L. LOONEY, Clerk Typist.

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#### SECRET

- f. On 27 April 1961 the treasurer of the Enlisted Club, Sgt ZAJEC was wounded while on a liaison trip to the Dong Ha enclave. The warehouse at Dong Ha sustained fairly heavy damage to the walls and roof of the building from enemy rockets. Merchandise damage was light, with approximately 40 cases of beer damaged.
- g. On 27 April 1967 the Assistant Division Clubs Officer and the Area Auditor attended a meeting at FLC Headquarters in regards to the coming inventories and the subsequent transfer of FLC Clubs from the 3d Marine Division Clubs Systems to the FLC Clubs System. This transfer will take effect on 1 May 1967.

#### 5. INFORMATIONAL SERVICES

- a. The section continued press coverage of 3d Marine Division activities releasing 138 news, feature articles and photographs through the Force Information Office, III Marine Amphibious Force. Also, a total of 1,712 home town releases were sent to the Fleet Home Town News Center, Great Lakes, Illinois.
- b. A total of 68 civilian news correspondents visited the Phu Bai area during the month. A total of 118 newsmen visited the Dong Ha area.
- c. The Radio/TV section turned out a total of 1163 minutes and five seconds of tape recorded coverage in the month of April. This breaks down to autotal of 788 minutes on 197 Fleet Home Town News interviews and 330 minutes and five seconds on 23 features of 3d Marine Division personnel. There were three special requests for the Division Inspector that totaled 35 minutes.

#### 6. PROVOST MARSHAL

- a. Normal Military Police functions were performed on a continuing basis throughout the period, i. e., patrols and security watches.
- b. Nimeteen special escorts for distinguished guests and USO entertainers were conducted.
- c. In excess of 1,000 Vietnamese civilian employees are processed through the Phu Bai and Dong Ha offices daily.
- d. The city of Hue was inspected for blackmarket activities on 9 April. Some U. S. property and PX items are offered for sale and no increase of activity was noted. Of significance, however, is the rise in price of blackmarket items. This rise can be attributable to either a reduction of the amount of items for sale or an increase in the money available to be spent on the market.
- e. Vietnamese vehicles entering the Phu Bai Vital Area are checked for contraband by members of the Vietnamese Police. Marine Military Police passed out approximately 5,000 pieces of PsyOps literature daily to vehicle passengers while the National Police performed their checks.

Enclosure (1) SECRET

#### CTCDTT



- f. A new system of personal identification/work passes was instituted for the civilian employees. The new system provides for ready identification of specifically authorized personnel in regards to areas.
- g. On 17 April, the Provost Marshal was visited by Mr. XUAN, Assistant to the Director of National Police in Saigon. Mr. XUAN was interested in the completely integrated nature and mechanisms of the Provost Marshal's Office in hopes of developing similar type functions throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

#### 7. SPECIAL SERVICES

- a. Recreation Fund Activity
- (1) The Special Services Office, less the custodian and warehouse personnel, were moved to Phu Bai.
- (2) The custodian completed a buying trip to Okinawa. The following information concerning the trip is furnished:
- (a) 250 bundles of charcoal were purchased and shipped to the warehouse. This will be issued for unit parties.
- (b) 35,000 writing kits were shipped and received at the warehouse.
- (c) 10,000 writing portfolios were shipped and received at the warehouse.
- (d) 12,000 each of cups, plates, spoons, forks, and knives, were shipped and received at the warehouse.
  - (e) 50 Sony radios were shipped and received at the warehouse.
- (f) While on Okinawa, the custodian closed the account with the American Express Bank. An amount of \$21.00 was still on deposit. This was drawn out, and deposited in the Chase-Manhattan Bank in Saigon.
- \* (3) 120 cases of soda were provided for 2/26 on 9 April; and 40 cases of soda were provided for 2/4 on 11 April.
  - (4) 22,000 writing portfolios were received from Okinawa.
- (5) Twelve boxes of athletic supplies and 9 boxes of paperback books were received at the warehouse. This shipment included athletic sets, writing gear, and game kits.
- (6) The Special Services Officer completed a buying trip to Japan. Athletic equipment was purchased and shipped from Tachikawa, and arrived in Danang on 30 April 1967. This equipment included footballs, volleyballs, softball bats, catcher and fielder mitts, and inflators for the equipment.

- one

During this trip to Japan, the Special Services Officer discussed with five concerns the procurement of stationery, gifts, menus, and Christmas cards. Favorable quotations have been obtained on these items, with more detailed information expected by mail. A self-sealing air-letter in packet form with waterproof container and ball point pen can be manufactured in quantities of 30,000 sets for approximately \$.35.

- b. Division Education Program. All battalions were supplied with USAFI supply briefs. Five battalions were resupplied with educational material. The following tests were administered:
  - 14 College (CCT-GE) 50 High School GED
  - c. Special Entertainment
- (1) Henry Fonda visited units of the Division in the Phu Bai area on Monday 10 April 1967.
- (2) The Peter Palmer Show performed for FISG-A and the 3d Medical Battalion on 14 April.
- (3) The 3 res Musical Show entertained units in the Camp Carroll and Dong Ha areas on 17 April.
- (4) Brian Kelly, star of the TV series "Flipper", toured the Dong Ha area on a "handshaking tour".
- (5) The Mike Foster Show performed for units of the Division in the Dong Ha-Phu Bai areas 25 through 28 April.
  - d. Division participation in III MAF R&R Program

Place Visited	Number of Personnel
Bangkok Hong Kong Taipei Tokyo Singapore Manila Kuala Lumpur Okinawa Hawaii Penang	404 344 218 268 63 124 50 102 352

#### 8. BAND

a. A thirty-five piece section of the band left for a tour of Okinawa and Japan, 5 April 1967.



- b. The section of the band that remained in RVN performed regular colors formations and played several awards ceremonies, change of command ceremonies and honor guards.
- c. The section of the band remaining in RVN played several people-to-people-concerts, the most notable of which was the dedication of a new sports stadium and parade at Khe Sanh, 9 April 1967.

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Enclosure (1)

12



#### INTELLIGENCE

- 1. Operation PRAIRIE III commenced at 190001H March 1967 and terminated 192400H April 1967, with the following final totals:
  - a. Enemy Casualties:

 $\frac{\text{KIA}(\text{Conf})}{252} \qquad \frac{\text{KIA}(\text{Prob})}{255} \qquad \frac{\text{PW}(\text{VC})}{0} \qquad \frac{\text{PW}(\text{NVA})}{4}$ 

b. Weapons Captured:

Indiv Wpns CptrC. S. Wpns CptrTotal Wpns Cptr11711128

- 2. Operation PRAIRIE IV commenced at 200001H April 1967 with the following totals as of 302400H April 1967:
  - a. Enemy Casualties:

 $\frac{\text{KIA(Conf)}}{45} \qquad \frac{\text{KIA(Prob)}}{55} \qquad \frac{\text{PW(VC)}}{\text{O}} \qquad \frac{\text{PW(NVA)}}{\text{O}}$ 

b. Weapons Captured:

Indiv Wpns Cptr C. S. Wpns Cptr Total Wpns Cptr 32

- 3. Operation BEACON HILL KIA (Conf) and KIA (Prob) totals were adjusted to 438 KIA (Conf) and 419 KIA (Prob) vice 334 KIA (Conf) and 523 KIA (Prob), due to the discovery of 104 bodies on 24 April 1967.
- 4. Operation CHINOOK II terminated O42400H April with the following final totals:
  - a. Enemy Casualties:

 $\frac{\text{KIA(Conf)}}{10\text{h}} \qquad \frac{\text{KIA(Prob)}}{197} \qquad \frac{\text{PW(VC)}}{17} \qquad \frac{\text{PW(NVA)}}{5}$ 

b. Weapons Captured:

Indiv Wpns Cptr C. S. Wpns Cptr Total Wpns Cptr 28 2 30

5. Operation BIGHORN commenced O50001H April 1967 and terminated 212400H April 1967 with the following final totals:



KIA(Prob)

b. Weapons Captured:

C. S. Wpns Cptr Total Wpns Cptr 12

- 6. Operation SHAWNEE commenced 22000lH April 1967 with the following totals as of 302400H April 1967:
  - Enemy Casualties:

 $\frac{\text{KIA(Prob)}}{20} \qquad \frac{\text{PW(VC)}}{2}$ 

b. Weapons Captured:

Indiv Wpns Cptr C. S. Wpns Cptr Total Wpns Cptr 6

- 7. Operation BEACON STAR commenced 220001H April 1967 with the following totals as of 302400H April 1967:
  - Enemy Casualties:

b. Weapons Captured:

Indiv Wpns Cptr C. S. Wpns Cptr O

8. The 1st CI Team interrogated 20 persons during the month of April 1967. Seventeen were released as innocent civilians, two were Ralliers who were debriefed, and one was determined to be V.C. and subsequently delivered to 7th ITT. The Team continued to support Operation SHAWNEE with one Sub-Team composed of two enlisted and one interpreter. One Sub-Team is in support of Tiger Hotel CAC units in Phu Loc District, composed of one officer, one enlisted, and one interpreter. One enlisted member is working with the Special Branch, National Police, Hue City. The team has maintained liaison at district, village, and hamlet level in Huong Thuy, Phong Dien, Phu Loc, and Nam Hoa. Liaison continues with U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence and security agencies in Hue City.

DECLASSIFIED Enclosure (1)


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- 9. The 15th CI Team provided CI support to elements of the 1st Bn, 9th Marines on operations during the month of April 1967. The team has initiated three penetrations by indigenous sources. These were penetrations of V.C. controlled or semi-controlled areas in Cam Lo and Trieu Phong Districts. During April, the team prepared forty-three CI reports and twenty spot reports of counterintelligence nature. The team attended and presented intelligence briefings, exchanged reports and maintained liaison with U.S., ARVN, and GVN intelligence agencies within Quang Tri Province.
- 10. The 3d Interpreter Team, during the month of April 1967, processed 51 batches of captured documents, from which a total of 76 pages of translation was prepared. A total of 235 friendly/official documents were processed, from which 503 pages of translation were prepared. Members of the team at Phu Bai worked a total of 12.2 hours as interpreters in support of Marine units in the Phu Bai area. Members of the team supporting Operations CHINOOK, BIGHORN, and SHAWNEE worked a total of 33.5 hours for sick-bay, ITT, CIT, and G-5. Members in Dong Ha worked a total of 4 hours for CIT.
- 11. The 7th Interrogation-Translation Team supported Operation PRAIRIE III, BIGHORN, SHAWNEE, the Command Group at Khe Sanh, and 1st Bn, 4th Marines in the field. During April, the team processed 18 Detainees classifying them as follows:

PW(NVA)		5
PW(VC)	œ	6
Innocent Civilians	<del>dad</del>	1
ARVN	fi	2
ARVN Escapees from		
being captives of the en	<b>~</b>	2
Undetermined	<b>a</b> .	2

12. The Aerial Observation Section in Phu Bai flew 152 missions for a total of 200.1 hours; 23 missions were flown in USMC aircraft for a total of 38.6 hours, 129 missions were flown in U.S. Army aircraft for a total of 161.5 hours. The Aerial Observation Section at Dong Ha flew 129 missions for a total of 268.4 hours; 95 missions were flown in USMC aircraft for a total of 196.2 hours, 26 missions were flown in U.S. Army aircraft for a total of 52.7 hours; 8 missions were flown in USAF aircraft for a total of 33.5 hours.






#### **OPERATIONS**

- 1. GENERAL. The 3d Marine Division continued operations in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces of South Vietnam in accordance with assigned missions. Improved weather during April permitted significant increases in the range and scope of operations throughout the AOR. Division operations during the month were characterized by numerous heavy contacts and deployment of additional 3d Marine Division forces from the Danang OA to the 3d Marine Division AOR. The 1st Bn, 4th Marines rotated to RVN on 1 April to replace the 3d Bn, 4th Marines which departed for Okinawa on 6 April. The SLF was employed in the 3d Marine Division OA, landing in northern Thua Thien Province on 22 April.
- 2. PRAIRIE III. Operation PRAIRIE III continued with heavy contact, with enemy forces attempting to penetrate the PRAIRIE area from Con Thien south to Cam Lo and employing mortars and rockets in attacks against USMC positions. Repeated attacks against the Gio Linh artillery position by mortars and artillery were sustained with light friendly casualties. On 11 April the 1st Bn, 4th Marines, in conjunction with the 1lth Engr Bn commenced operations to clear the vegetation from a 200 meter wide strip running from Gio Linh to Con Thien. The enemy conducted numerous harassing attacks against the forces engaged in the clearing operations. On 12 April, the 9th Marines Headquarters deployed to Dong Ha and commenced preparations to assume responsibility for the eastern portion of the PRAIRIE OA. On 192400H April PRAIRIE III operation was terminated and the 3d MarDiv Forward CP was closed. Cumulative friendly casualties at the end of the operation were:

KIA WIA 56

3. PRAIRIE IV. Operation PRAIRIE IV commenced 200001H April with the same mission and OA as was assigned to Operation PRAIRIE III. Four infantry battalions and four artillery battalions were engaged in this major search and destroy operation. Several battalion size operations were conducted, and coordinated operations were executed with elements of the 1st ARVN Regt in the area south of Quang Tri in support of the RD Program. The operation continued throughout the month with enemy forces attempting to penetrate the PRAIRIE area to employ rockets and mortars against USMC positions and to penetrate the ARVN RD area. Repeated attacks by mortars and artillery against the Gio Linh position and forces engaged in clearing the strip from Gio Linh to Con Thien were sustained with light friendly casualties. Forces were employed to provide security for dredging operations in the Cua Viet River and for hydrographic survey operations. The 1st AmTrac Battalion deployed to the Cua Viet port facility on 23 April. Cumulative friendly casualties for Operation PRAIRIE IV as of 30 April were:

KIA WI 18 26



4. BEACON HILL I. Operation BEACON HILL I, in the area bordering the DMZ between Gio Linh and Con Thien, was terminated on 1 April. Cumulative friendly casualties for the operation were.

 $\frac{\text{KIA}}{26} \qquad \frac{\text{WIA}}{220}$ 

5. CHINOOK II. Operations in the CHINOOK area were limited to patrol and ambush actions due to the austerity of forces. Operations were characterized by frequent small unit contacts, sniper incidents, mines and booby traps. Operation CHINOOK II terminated on 4 April. Cumulative friendly casualties for the operation were:

KIA WIA


5. BIG HORN. Operation BIG HORN, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation, commenced 5 April in the Phong Dien coastal area and the Co Bi-Thanh Tan area of Thua Thien Province. The 4th Marine Regimental Headquarters was the control headquarters and conducted operations in coordination with the 1st ARVN Division. Heavy contact with the enemy forces was made on the 5th of April along the "Street Without Joy" resulting in 19 friendly KIA and 48 WIA. Operation BIG HORN terminated on 21 April 67. Total cumulative triendly casualties were:


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7. SHAWNEE. Operation SHAWNEE, a three battalion operation under control of the 1th Marines, commenced 22 April. Three infantry battalions and one reinforced artillery battalion were employed in conjunction with ARVN forces. The 2d Bn, 4th Marines and 2d Bn, 26th Marines were helolifted into enemy base area 114 to seek out and destroy the enemy and to destroy the enemy base structures. Very light contact has been made to date; the operation is continuing. Cumulative friendly casualties are:

KIA WIA

8. PHU BAI TAOR. The 3d Bn, 26th Marines remained the Phu Bai Defense Battalien. Company size search and destroy operations were conducted throughout the month, many in support of CAC's located in the Phu Loc District, the Troui River and Gia Le areas. Security operations in support of hydrographic and topographic surveys continued. Combined operations in support of the RD Program were conducted in the vicinity of the Phu Thu peninsula and the Gia Le area. Sparrow Hawk forces were launched three times during the month to provide security for downed helos. Headquarters of 3d AT Bn, 3d SP Bn, 3d Tank Bn and 3d Engineers established CP's in the Gia Le Area.





9. KHE SANH. Operations in the Khe Sanh area increased in tempo during the month. Due to heavy contacts in the vicinity of Hill 861 the SLF infantry battalion and artillery battery were deployed to Khe Sanh from the SHAWNEE OA on 26 April. On 28 April the 3d Marines commenced a battalion size search and destroy operation in the Hill 861 area. Heavy contact was being maintained at the close of April.

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### TRAINING HIGHLIGHTS

<b>A</b> .	IN COUNTRY SCHOOLS	LENGTH	LOCATION	OFF	ENL
В。	Vietnamese Lanaguage MACV/USCOM Advisor RECONDO Motion Picture Operator Basic Legal Clerk Land Mine Warfare & Demolition OUT OF COUNTRY SCHOOLS	30 Days 5 Days 3 Wks 2 Days 12 Days 3 Days	NHA Training III MAF Danang	0 2 0 0 0	4 0 2 6 14 120
	NCO Leadership CRPTO Comm Security RPS Custodian Basic Infantry Weapons Repair Basic Ammo Technician Vietnamese Language Embarkation Parachute Training SCUBA Military Justice Career Advisory	3 Wks 5 Days 5 Days 3 Wks 2 Wks 30 Days 3 Wks 3 Wks 1 Days 6 Days	Okinawa Okinawa Okinawa Okinawa Okinawa	0 2 6 0 0 10 0 11 0	10 1 0 1 4 7 8 4 1 0



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#### COMBAT AIR SUPPORT

#### 1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- a. Operation PRAIRIE III continued into the month of April with PRAIRIE IV commencing on 20 April. Fixed wing aircraft in support of PRAIRIE flew 223 sorties, expending 392.8 tons of ordnance. BDA was reported through FMAW channels. Helicopters flew 3,203 sorties, lifted 4,521 passengers and 309.7 tons of cargo.
- b. Operation CHINOOK ended 4 April. Within the inclusive period, fixed wing aircraft flew 9 sorties, expending 11.3 tons of ordnance. Helicopters flew 67 sorties, lifting 161 passengers and .2 tons of cargo.
- c. Operation BIG HORN commenced 5 April and ended 21 April. Within that period, fixed wing aircraft flew 36 sorties and expended 38.4 tons of ordname.
- d. Operation SHAWNEE began 22 April. For the period up to 30 April, fixed wing aircraft flew 49 sorties and expended 50.1 tons of ordnance. Helicopters flew 294 sorties, lifted 828 passengers and 18.8 tons of cargo.
- e. In the Khe Sanh area fixed wing aircraft flew 47 sorties with an expenditure of 69.5 tons of ordnance.
- f. There were 30 Arc Light strikes in Thua Thien Province and 20 strikes in the province of Quang Tri.
- 2. <u>NEW DEVELOPMENTS</u>. G.P. bombs equipped with "daisy cutters" can, in certain instances, assist in making or improving landing zones for helicopters.
- 3. PROBLEM AREAS. No new problem areas were encountered.





#### FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

#### 1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- a. On 15 April liaison was established with Project Delta representatives to arrive at coordination procedures to permit Delta and 1st Marine Air Wing operations simultaneously in the ASHAU Valley on a non-interference basis.
- b. A conference at III MAF was held on 17 April to study coordination between 7th Air Force operations and 12th Marines artillery firing into and beyond the DMZ. The main purpose was to find ways and means to eliminate excessive hold fires on artillery operations incurred by Air Force transiting the artillery impact area. No conclusions were developed.
- c. A defoliation project was requested in conjunction with Operation CUMBERLAND, the upgrading of Route 547 to ASHAU Valley.
- d. Naval Gunfire SOP Guidelines were drafted and promulgated to all ships on station and Naval Gunfire Liaison and Spot teams to ensure that all required information is exchanged between NGF Spotter and the firing ship.

#### 2. TARGETING

- a. <u>Artillery</u>. A total of 7249 long range, pre-planned targets were attacked during the month of April.
- b. <u>TPQ-10 Missions</u>. A total of 1792 targets were struck by TPQ-10 missions during the month.
- c. <u>Naval Gunfire</u>. There were nineteen days of destroyer support and four days of heavy cruiser support during the month. Thirty-seven missions were fired with a total expenditure of 179 rounds of 5 inch and 321 rounds of 8 inch ammunition.



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#### COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

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#### 1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- a. Comm Physical Security. In the 3d MarDiv CP communication security hardening program the major remaining requirement is for radio relay generator sandbagging. This will be accomplished as soon asbbags become available.
- b. Division Radio Relay System. A major re-engineering of the division radio relay system was effected during April to better accommodate mission changes and unit displacements. Principal reasons for this reengineering were the close-out of division (Forward) CP at Dong Ha and the increase of missions at Khe Sanh.
- c. 3d MarDiv AFRS Broadcast Station. On 3 April 1967, the 3d MarDiv activated a 50 watt broadcasting station at the Div CP, Phu Bai. This station rebroadcasts AFRS, Saigon and local announcements from 0600-2215 daily.
- d. Dong Ha 3d MarDiv MARS Station. The 3d MarDiv MARS Station NOEFA was displaced from Danang to Dong Ha. This station began working CONUS from Dong Ha on 12 April 1967. The station also provides back-up military phone patch service between 3d MarDiv CP Phu Bai and Dong Ha.
- e. MITE Technical Representative Visit. The technical representative from MITE Corporation (AN/TGC-14 Teletypewriters) visited various division units and held technician and operator OIT sessions. Additionally, division first and second echelon operator/technician courses were scheduled for 8-10 May 1967 at Phu Bai and 12-14 May 1967 at Dong Ha.
- f. Operation BEACON STAR. During Operation BEACON STAR, 3d MarDiv established a radio relay link between the Division CP and the SLF. This circuit was channellized to give direct access from Division COC to the USS PRINCETON via the beach terminal. A covered radio circuit (Voice) from Division COC to the USS PRINCETON was also established. Division entered III MAF Command Net #2 for secure Radio TTY with the USS PRINCETON.

#### g. Operation SHAWNEE:

- (1) A detachment of CommCo was assigned to the 4th Marines to augment 4th Marines organic communication capabilities.
- (2) A radio relay link between division and 4th Marines was programmed and team with equipment provided by III MAF was kept on standby. However, requirement for the relay did not develop.
- (3) An aerial radio retransmission facility was arranged to provide communication relay support during the initial phase of SHAWNEE.

22 10 13 1117

h. New Cable Installation. CommCo installed 25 pair cable between division CP and Gia Le complex. Eleven pair are allocated to Gia Le Units to supplement/back-up existing ten pair cable. Twelve pair are routed to Hill 180 to replace two TRC-27's and furnish additional channels to Hill 180. Replaced TRC-27's will be used for other requirements and back-up.

#### 2. PROBLEM AREAS

- a. The shortage of communication officers within 3d MarDiv continues. Effective 30 April 1967 the division was short 7 communication officers. During May the scheduled input less outgoing should leave the division short 4 communication officers on 1 June 1967.
- b. The shortage of KW-7 maintenance personnel 2822/2862 within 3d Marine Division remains acute. The division is presently operating at 24.5 per cent of manning level, with nine 2822's on hand (T/0 40) and three 2862's on hand (T/0 9). No relief is anticipated in the near future.
- c. Combat equipment deadline percentage for 3d Marine Division communication gear is excessively high and has been gradually increasing over the last three months. Primary reasons are lack of adequate spare parts and maintenance float items. Contributing factors are heavy usage under harsh environmental conditions and a shortage of skilled technicians in some areas.

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#### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

- 1. During the month of April, Psychological Operations objectives were:
  - a. Exploitation of VC and NVA battlefield losses.
  - b. Show of strength of Free World Forces.
  - c. Report VC activity.
  - d. Report mines and booby traps for a reward.
  - e. Support the Government of Vietnam.
  - f. Explain presence of USMC in Vietnam.
- · 2. The following represents a cross section of leaflet distribution:
- a. Chieu Hoi leaflets and safe conduct passes were distributed in support of:
- (1) Operation PRAIRIE III, PRAIRIE IV, CHINOOK II, BEACON STAR, BIG HORN, SHAWNEE, and the Phu Bai Area.
- b. Leaflets with the theme "Report VC activity" were distributed throughout the division's area of responsibility.
  - c. Mine reward leaflets were distributed throughout the Phu Bai area.
  - d. Recapitulation:

Theme	No. of Leaflets
(1) Chieu Hoi	10,295,000
(2) NVA	5,794,000
(3) Safe Conduct Passes	3,994,000
(4) Varied Themes	10,450,000

- e. In addition to aerial leaflet drops, there were 122,710 leaflets and JUSPAO newspapers hand distributed during the month. The leaflets covered the same general themes as the aircraft drops.
- 3. There were 27 hours 25 minutes of aerial broadcasts generally covering the same subject matter as the leaflets. 63 hours 55 minutes of ground broadcast were made covering the following themes:
  - a. The Government of Wietnam helps the people.

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- Allied and ARVN might.
- Government of Vietnam vs VC life.
- d. Rally Appeal.
- Cooperate with the Marines.
- Explanation of Allied presence in Vietnam.
- Appeals to individual VC by name.
- VC hinder the people by mining the roads.

#### 4. Feed Back:

- a. After a battle on 29 March an NVA soldier became separated from his unit. He wandered around the jungle with no purpose in mind. On 1 April he heard an aerial speaker broadcast and made his way to Van Kim, coordinates YD 150680. He told the villagers he wanted to rally and they assisted him in rallying to an ARVN unit.
  - b. On 24 April two VC rallied and gave the following information:
- (1) Have seen many leaflets but VC ordered them not to read leaflets. The leaflets were poison and would kill any person who touched them, according to VC propaganda.
- (2) Two members of their unit rallied the week before and that had a direct bearing on them rallying.
- (3) Ralliers feel ground and aerial broadcast are most effective means of conducting PsyOps.
- 5. Kit Carson Scout activities for April:
  - Three VC were identified.
  - 104 patrols were guided.
  - Six mines were located.
- d. Classes for 2/9 are being conducted on VC tactics and mine identication.
- 6. Movie Festivals, combined with ground speaker broadcasts are continuing in the CAC areas. Speaker teams have also accompanied MEDCAPS to give the people hygienic information. Because of the numerous mining incidents on principal highways a concerted effort has been expended offering rewards for mines located by the people.

#### 1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- a. Logistical requirements continued to increase during the month of April due to accelerated tactical commitments and movement of forces.
- (1) Rotation of BLT 1/4 and BLT 3/4 commenced on 1 April at Dong Ha via the Cua Viet River. BLT 3/4 completed embarkation on 6 April.
- (2) Movement of Danang based division units for Operation OREGON commenced on 9 April and continued throughout the month. The units redeployed were:

Hq 9th Mar C Co 3d Med Bn 3d Dental Co (-) 2/4 Co B (-) 3d Tk Bn 2/26 Co C (-) 3d AT Bn Co C (-) 3d Engr Bn 1st 8" How Btry (SP) L/4/12 Transp Co (-) 9th MT Bn 2/12 H&S Co & Co A (-) 1st AmTrac Bn B/1/13 Det H&S Co 3d SP Bn H/3/12

- (3) Operation BIGHORN ended on 21 April and Operation SHAWNEE commenced on 22 April. Operation BEACON STAR began on the same date. The LSA supporting operation BIGHORN was replaced by an LSU operated by FISG "A"/3d Service Battalion on 24 April. The LSU supported both Operation SHAWNEE and BEACON STAR.
- (4) On the 24th of April heavy contact was encountered at Khe Sanh and priority of support was shifted to that area.
- (5) 2/3 (-) was helo lifted from BEACON STAR to Phu Bai and then air lifted by C-130 to Khe Sanh on 26 April.
  - (6) RLT 26 (Hq) was air lifted from Okinawa to Phu Bai on 26 April.
- (7) On 27 April the remaining element of 2/3 and elements of 3/3, 3/9 and B Btry 1/12 were lifted from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh.
- (8) K Battery 1st Bn 13th Marines arrived at the mouth of the Cua Viet river on the 29th of April, relieved K Btry 1/12 in position, and K Btry 1/12 completed embarkation on 30 April.
- b. The Dong Ha airstrip was opened to all traffic on 8 April after three weeks of extensive repairs.
- c. On 8 April the 11th Engineer Battalion commenced clearing a 200 meter wide strip between Gio Linh and Con Thien. This work involved

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an average of 21 bulldozers a day and considerable mine clearance equipment. A substantial helicopter resupply effort was required to refuel tractors and supply the infantry and engineer units.

- d. During this period extensive rehabilitation work was accomplished on the alternate Division CP and the 9th Marines CP at Dong Ha by the 11th Engineers.
- Base development continued at Dong Ha and Phu Bai. Nine butler buildings have been completed to date. The artillery cantonment at Phu Bai is now complete with the exception of electrical wiring. Messhalls are being constructed for the 3d Motor Transport Battalion and the 3d Medical Battalion at Phu Bai. Work on the Medical facility at Dong Ha is continuing.
  - f. At the present time there are two items on "Red Ball".
  - g. Critipak was completed as per CG FMFPAC message 201813Z April 67.
- h. The Division Supply Economy Program reported a total of \$3,550,993 cancelled as of 15 Apr.1.
- The Military Standard Requisitioning and Procedures (Milstrip) was implemented on 23 April 1967.
- During the month of April the following ordnance, motor transport and engineer equipment sustained combat damage.

	· 7.	
TYPE	CAUSE OF DAMAGE	<u>DI SPOSITION</u>
105mm How 105mm How 105mm How 105mm How 105mm How 105mm How 105mm How	Enemy arty Mine damage	Repaired and returned to service ITI in progress
M50A1 M48A3 M48A3 M48A3 M48A3 M48A3 M48A3 M48A3 LVTP-5 LVTP-5	Wrecked (not a result of enemy action) Mine damage	Awaiting R & E Repaired (Dong Ha) Code X (Dong Ha) Repaired (Dong Ha) Awaiting repair (Dong Ha) Awaiting repair (Gio Linh) Combat Loss Repaired Repaired-Organizational Maintenance Code X  Enclosure I

DF	CI ACCIEIEN	
TYPE	CAUSE OF DAMAGE	DISPOSITION
detectuors, s	Catherine of the contract the section and	
LVTP-5	Mine damage	Code X
LVTP_5	Mine damage	Code R3
LVTP_5	Mine damage	Code Re
LVTP-5		⊕Code R4
LVTE_1	Mine damage	LTI performed; awaiting disposition
M-35	Mortar	Awaiting repairs
M-35	Mine *	Code X
M-35	Mine	Code X
M-35	Mine	Code X
N-35	140mm Rocket	Code X
M-35	Mortar	Awaiting repair
M-36	Accident generated by	
	enemy fire	Code X
M-36	140mm Rocket	Awaiting repairs
M-36	140mm Rocket	Awaiting regains
M-54	Mortar	Awaiting repairs
M-54	Mine	Code X
M-37	Mortar	Awaiting repairs
M-37	Mine	Code X
M-422A1	Mine	Code X
M-42241	140mm Rocket	Code X
M-42241	Mortar	Returned to service
M-170	140mm Rocket	Awaiting repair
(6) M-274A2		Code X
(3): M-107	Mortar	Repaired
M-101	Mortar	Awaiting repair
M-172 Low	Mine	Code X
bed:		e de la companya de
<b>TD-</b> 18	Mine	Returned to servicee
TD-18	$M_{ine}$	Evacuated to 4th echelon maintenance
<b>TD-</b> 18	Mine	Evacuated to 4th echelon maintenance

 $k_{\bullet}$  During this period the following sealifts were accomplished in support of the 3d Marine Division:

## (1) In support of Operation OREGON:

#### Danang to Phu Bai

DATE	UNIT	CRAFT	NO.PER	YEH/CARGO S/S/T
16 Apr 67 16 Apr 67 16 Apr 67 17 Apr 67	3d Plt, Co B, 3d TK Bn L Btry, 4th Bn, 12th Mar 2d Bn, 12th Marines H Btry, 3d Bn, 12th Mar	LCU LCU LCU	30 94 0 2	11 Veh/Cargo 384.80 48 Veh/Cargo 411.09 3 Veh/Cargo 58.62 1 Veh/Cargo 19.71 DECLASSIFIED

Constant			•	
DATE	UNIT	CRAFT NO PER	VEH/CARGO	<u>s/T</u>
19 Apr 67 22 Apr 67 15 Apr 67 15 Apr 67 15 Apr 67 19 Apr 67	3d Shore Party Bn 1st 8" How Btry (SP) 1st AmtracBn Co "C", 3d Engr Bn Hq 9th Mar (Rear) Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Mar Co B (-) 3d AmtracBn	LSD-7 1558 LCU 1169 LST-626 18 LST-626 121 LST-603 135 LST-825 292 LST-6011 69	42 Veh/Cargo 80 Veh/Cargo 3 Veh/Cargo 19 Veh/Cargo 56 Veh/Cargo 71 Veh/Cargo 23 Veh/Cargo	686.20 146.25 86.13 393.91 421.07
	H&S Co 1st Amtrac Bn  Co "A" 1st AmtracBn  Co #GU! Ze From Br	LST_630- 715 322 LST_488- 581-509 245 LST_581 11	55 Veh/Cargo 41 Veh/Cargo	994.09
26 Apr 67 26 Apr 67 (2)	Co "C" 3d Engr Bn Co "C" 3d AT Bn Resupply sealifts:	LST-581 32	1 Veh/Cargo 17 Veh/Cargo	89.07
. ,	Danang to Phu Bai 112		9379 S/T 5493 S/T	

- 1. During this period the following airlifts were accomplished in support of the 3d Marine Division:
  - (1) In support of Operation OREGON

#### Danang to Phu Bai

DATE	UNIT	PAXS	VEH/CARGO	WEIGHT (LBS)		
9 Apr 67 11 Apr 67 12 Apr 67 12 Apt 67 14 Apr 67 15 Apr 67	2dBn, 26th Marines 2dBn, 4th Marines 2dBn, 26th Marines 2dBn, 4th Marines 2dBn, 4th Marines Det "C" Co 3d EngrBn	929 930 28 0 19	29 Veh/Cargo 11 Veh/Cargo 20 Veh/Cargo 7 Veh/Cargo 27 Veh/Cargo 1 Veh/Cargo	246114 31920 10005 3 <b>3</b> 4000		
Chu Lai to Phu Bai						
II Apr 67	lst ReconBn	<b>5</b> 0	4 Veh/Cargo	27780		
Danang To Dong Ha						
12 Apr 67 21 Apr 67	9th Marines "C" Go 3d EngrBn	100	10 Veh/Cargo Cargo	76751 3500		

(2) Resupply support:

Danang to Dong Ha Via USAF C123's and C-130's

Class I

895,776 lbs.

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Class IV 752,237
Class IV 752,237
Class IV 146,008

Total 1,887,201 lbs.

#### Danang to Khe Sanh via USAF C-123's and C-130's

Class I 216,230
Class II 40,963
Class III 56,190
Class IV 33,835
Class V 905,562
Total 1,252,780

#### Danang to Phu Bai via USAF C-123's and C-130's

Class I 401,485
Class II 526,673
Class III 11,556
Class IV 180,724
Class V 98,133
Total 1,218,571

m. During this period the following armed convoys were accomplished in support of the 3d Marine Division:

## (1) (1) Danang to Phu Bai

	DATES	CONVOYS	NO.TRUCKS	PERSONNEL	CARGO S/T
	5 Apr 6 Apr	1' 1	70. 144	140 288	68 2224
<b>(</b> 2)	Phù Bai	to Dong H	<b>a</b> :		•
	20 Apr 21 Apr	n 1	8 <b>8</b> 67	235 154	185 116
(3)	Dong Ha	to Khe Sa	n <u>h</u>		
	2 Apr 20 Apr	1 11.	60; 47	310) 100	63 60
(4)	Dong Ha	to BIGHOR	Min &		
	3 Apr 11 Apr	1	91 90	860 610	70 140



#### (5) Dong Ha to Con Thien

8 Apr 1 89 250 350

Resupply by helicopter was used extensively during this period. In many cases, particulary the PRAIRIE AOR, helicopters provided the sole means of resupply.

- (1) Phu Bai area helicopters were used 24 days out of the month, for a total lift of 56 S/T.
- (2) BIGHORN / SHAWATE & helicopters were used 23 days out of the month for a total lift of 166 S/T.
- (3) PRAIRIE area helicopters were used 27 days of the month for a total lift of 591 S/T.

#### o. Test projects.

- (1) Rucksacks. Twenty rucksacks were received and 10 each were given to 3d Battalion, 26th Marines and to Recon Battalion for testing. Test reports were received on 25 April and forwarded to III MAF. Test results were uniformly favorable, with a strong recommendation that the straps be widened for greater comfort.
- (2) Ordnance Locator. Eight test items initially received. Sixteen were received later for a total of 24. They were issued as follows: 8-3d Battalion, 26th Marines; 4-11th Engineer Battalion; 4-3d Engineer Battalion and 8-4th Marines. Test reports are due at this Headquarters by 10 May 1967 and due to III MAF by 20 May 1967.
- (3) Folding Saws: Fifteen of these were sent to Recon Battalion for testing. Test report was submitted to this Headquarters on 20 April and results called to III MAF test project office on 20 April. Results: Folding saw is not suitable for use in this area. It was too light and bubged to bending and broakage.
- (4) Artillery Improved F.D.C. Technique and related Equipment. Test equipment has not yet arrived from MCLDC, Quantico. Test report due 6 months after receipt of test equipment.
- -(5) <u>Battlefield Electrically Cooled Water Coolers</u>. Test items not yet received. No due date on test report.
- (6) <u>Tunnel Destruction Weapons</u>. Test items not yet received. Report due 90 days after receipt of items.

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#### p. New Items of Equipment:

- (1) M-16 Rifles: All 1st increment rifles received and issued.
  All Infantry Battalions, Reconnaissance, Headquarters Company, 4th Marines, and Headquarters Company, 9th Marines have placed the rifles in service.
  Headquarters Company, 3d Marines has been delayed due to a parts shortage.
- (2) Scout Sniper Rifle: All Scout Sniper Rifles have been placed in service.
- (3) <u>Eimco Tractors</u>: Thirty-nine tractors in-country and on administrative deadline awaiting stocks of spare parts.
- q. Food Services. During the month of April the Division had 58 operational messes \*supported by 415 OF 33 personnel. Subsistance support provided Marine Corps and Naval personnel of this Division averaged 20,760 rations daily.
- r. During the month of April representatives of the G-4 Section and special staff conducted material maintenance inspections of the following units:

3d Battalion, 26th Marines 4th Battalion, 12th Marines

- s. Ordnance technical inspections were conducted at all organizations storing 81mm mortars or higher caliber ammunition during this period.
- t. The total ammunition expended for the month of April is listed on Tab. A.
- u. Plamning was completed and appropriate directives issued for Operation SHAWNEE and rotation of BLT 2/9 and BLT 1/3. Planning for the establishment of the A SHAU Valley Fire Support Base and the build-up of required supplies was also completed during this period. The initial concept and support requirements for the Fire Support Base were issued on 24 April.

#### 2. PROBLEM AREAS

- a. The problem of moving supplies from the LCU ramp at Dong Ha to FLSU #1 no longer exists now that 5 ton tractors and stake bed trailers of the Transport Company (-), 9th Motor Transport Battalion have been moved to Dong Ha.
- b. The conversion to the 360 computer by Force Logistics Command has caused a delay in reconciling Division records with Force Logistics Command records.

- c. The increased flow of supplies into the Phu Bai area has caused a backlog of material on hand for issue to Division units at FISG "A". The heavy operational commitment of transportation limits the Division's ability to clear FISG "A" RUC lines on a timely basis.
- d. Summer rotation of supply officers and staff NCO's will reduce the Division's supply efficiency until new personnel become familiar with operating procedures.

#### 3. SPECIAL OPERATIONS - OPERATIONS BIG HORN AND SHAWNEE

- a. The change in the status of the LSA at BIG HORN to an ISU for Operation SHAWNEE mentioned in paragraph l.a.(3) required an extensive build up of stock levels in all classes of supply and a heavy requirement for special engineering tools and equipment. Rapid response to these requirements materially assisted in the tactical operations.
- b. There were 43 armed convoys during the month of April between Phu Bai and the BIG HORN/SHAWNEE area. The average convoy had 36 vehicles transporting 235 passengers and 110 tons of cargo each day.




## TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED

						,		
ITEM	PRAIRIE III/IV	CHINDOK III	PHU BAI	KHE SANH	BIG HORN/ SHAWNEE	TATAL	AVERAGE DATLY EXPENDITURE RATE	
175HE	14, 684					14,684	490	
8 HOW HE	•	55	58		736	849	<b>2</b> 8	
105HE	82,168	<b>2</b> ,338	100,949	13,102	96بلوبلا	122,653	<b>100</b>	
107HE	2,692			•		<b>2</b> ,692	90	_
155 HOW H	5,865	194	1,052	623	3,198	1940.12	364	
155 GUN HE	<b>5</b>		2448			المليلا	15	
105 WP	2,549	158	33	1,223	440	و ميا	147	
1.05 Illum	624	31		65	278	1,229	h1.	
255 GUN 1	Aug		34	•		34	J.	
155 GUN WE	•		25			25	1	
155 HOW WE	215	42	16	69	125	476	16	
155 HOW II	lum 115		63	19	4/10/9	666	22	
3 107 Illum	<b>15</b> 4					1.5h	5	
] 107 WP	1.88			·	•	38£	6	
TOTAL RDS EXP	109,, 254	2,818	12,509	15,101	19,742	159 <sub>9</sub> 424	5 <sub>2</sub> 325	

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TAE A TO LOGISTICS
COMMAND CHROHOLOGY



### 1. RELOCATION OF POPULATION OF DMZ AREA

- a. During April, planning was begun by the GVN and OCO for the relocation of the populace of Trung Luong (DMZ) and upper Gio Linh Districts of Quang Tri province. Initial estimates were that the area contained 1379 families and 23,735 people and the plan called for them to be resettled in an area along Route #9 near Cam Lo District Headquarters.
- b. LtCol AM, Quang Tri Province Chief, was given responsibility for the move but a Task Force was organized under the leadership of Colonel NHIEU, I Corps Inspector General, assisted by Mr. James BULLINGTON, OCO. Eleven sub-committees were established, manned chiefly by province officials and their U. F. counterparts. The TF was told that DayDay for the move was 24 April but this was obviously unrealistic. On 26 April General THANG, Minister of Revolutionary Development, directed that the move be delayed until adequate preparations had been made at the resettlement site. He also limited settlement in the Cam Lo area to 2000 families. Since that date efforts have been directed toward moving material to Cam Lo and laying out, not a refugee area, but new homes, and farmland for those who are to be relocated. Plans for military support of the project are still being worked out.
- c. The G-5 section has menitored and participated in planning for the move and was deeply involved in supporting it by the end of the month. The division has provided a forward headquarters at Dong Ha for those coordinating the move and was housing three OCO personnel. Twenty five Marines from the 11th Engineers were assigned to operate OCO trucks and material handling equipment and to provide security over building materials and foodstuffs being stockpiled at Cam Lo. One officer and 12 enlisted from the 29th CA Company were also assigned to Dong Ha, Cam Lo and Gio Linh to assist in coordinating the move and to give assistance to the refugees.
- d. Preceding the official move was a voluntary movement of 283 families (1319 people) from the area of Gia Man hamlet (YD 220752) on 10 April. This was a well organized group led by a Catholic priest, Fr. CUA. By the end of the month 85 of these families were well established near Cam Lo District Headquarters. The G-5 representative, Dong Ha, assisted in the move and resettlement despite a shortage of transportation during the period.
- 2. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. The RD programs in Quang Tri and Thua Thien province suffered setbacks because of the deteriorating security situation during the month. The 6 April attack on Quang Tri and La Vang had a decided effect on the RD teams in Quang Tri province and the 17 April attack on the RD team at Duong Muong hamlet (YD 803252) was a blow to the program in Thua Thien. In this engagement three RD teams were finally engaged and the

Enclosure (1)

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casualties were high (23 KIA - 21 WIA). In an effort to assist with the RD advisory effort one Marine Officer has been assigned to work with CAS in Thua Thien and another is being sought for a similiar assignment in Quang Tri.

- 3. <u>ELECTIONS</u>. Village elections were held in both provinces on 16, 23, and 30 April. All elections were orderly and no unusual incidents occurred to mar the balloting. Increased patrolling by Marine units near the polling sites helped insure a degree of protection. Complete results are not yet available, but the indication is that at least 8 pof the electorate participated, in both provinces.
- LANG VEI BOMBING. On 23 April 1967 nine more survivors of the 2 March bombing of Lang Vei were returned to their homes by Air America transportation. Fifteen victims still remain in HUE Hospital. The G-5 section will continue to check on their progress. On 26 April personnel of the 1st AA Platoon, 29th CA Company revisited Lang Vei. The village is now 95% restored, and two buildings have been added, a dispensary and a school-house, constructed by the CB detachment from KHE SANH.

## 5. DIVISION CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

- a. A Division Civil Affairs Check List was completed for use by the Division Inspector. Plans were made for a better civic action reporting system and increased emphasis was placed on commodity and MEDCAP supply distribution.
- t. With the disbanding of the 3d Marine Division (FWD) CP the G-5 (FWD) was assigned as liaison to the GVN/OCO Task Force, responsible for support of the relocation of the DMZ area population (see below). Units formerly reporting to 3d Marine Division (FWD) will now make civil affairs reports directly to Division or via the 3d, 9th or 12th Marines.
- c. Plans were made for a scholarship program for qualified Vietnamese students in all Division AORs. A pilot program will get underway soon and the program should be fully implemented by September.
- d. The following military civic action projects were completed during April:

HAMLET	COORDINATES	PROJECT
Phous My Rhos Thach Ha Chau Van Ba Thung An Nong I	YD 959048 YD 041023 YD 937080 YD 125990 YD 124106	Pagoda Repair Well Two room school Well Two room school

e. On 27 April 1967 Captain C. CARLTON relieved Captain S. F. AUSTIN as Platoon Commander of the 1st AA Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Company, at Phu Bal.

- 6. AGRICULTURE. During the month of April a number of agricultural projects were undertaken. Working in conjunction with Combined Action Companies in Thua Thien Province, demonstration gardens were planted in Loc Son, Loc Dien, Loc Tri, Loc Thuy villages. The purpose of these demonstration gardens was to stimulate interest among the farmers in growing a variety of vegetables to supplement their diet and provide a source of secondary income. Assorted garden seeds were distributed to the farmers in the above villages. A Japanese rice threshing machine was demonstrated to farmers of Thon Phuoc An on 18 April 1967 and met immediate acceptance. Additional machines have been ordered for loan to farmers in both provinces.
- 7. PERSONAL RESPONSE. The Personal Response Contact Team, composed of GySgt COREY and 1stlt MATTINGLY, visited Division units at Khe Sanh, Dong Ha and Phu Bai during the month. Presentations of the basic Personal Response theme were made and discussions were conducted with elements of 1/9. 3/26, 3d Medical Battalion, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 2/h, Headquarters Battalion. 2/12, and the Combined Action Company. The Division Personal Response School was held on 2 and 3 April, with officers and Staff NCO's from each battalion and regiment attending. The program appears to be gaining increasing acceptance and to be having its desired effect, although this is, of course, difficult to measure.





### DIVISION CHAPLAIN

### 1. PERSONNEL

- a. The month of April 1967 began with 27 chaplains serving with the 3d Marine Division. Chaplain STEWART, 1/3 and Chaplain WILSON, 2/3 were with their units deployed to 9th MAB Okinawa. Chaplain KEARSLEY, HqBn, was TAD to FLSG "A". Four chaplains were with units OPCON, 1st Marine Division.
- b. No chaplain was rotated to CONUS during the month. Chaplain HEDWALL departed country with 3/4 for 9th MAB Okinawa.
- c. Chaplains URBANO, SWIFT, KEELEY AND STANIS reported from CONUS for duty with the 3d Marine Division during the month of April.
- d. Chaplain WILSON returned to country with 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. Chaplain BOILES, 2/26 and Chaplain DAVIS, 2/4 returned to OPCON 3d Marine Division for Operation SHAWNEE, Chaplain BORDEN, 1st AmTrac Battalion, and Chaplain RICARD, 9th Marines returned to OPCON 3d Marine Division for Operation PRAIRIE IV.
  - a. Assignments were as follows:

Chaplain SWIFT to 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
Chaplain SWIFT to 3d Engineer Battalion
Chaplain KEELEY to Headquarters Battalion, TAD to 4th Marines
Chaplain STANIS to 3d Battalion, 4th Marines

f. Reassignments were as follows:

Chaplain McPARTLAND to Headquarters Battalion Chaplain RYAN to "D" Medical Company

g. The month of April ended with 31 chaplains setting with the 3d Marine Division. Chaplain STEWART, 1/3 and Chaplain HEDWALL, 3/4 are with their units deployed to 9th MAB Okinawa. Chaplain KEARSLEY, HqBn is TAD to FLC. Chaplain MESCHKE, 1/26 is with his unit OPCON 1st Marine Division.

### 2. DIVINE SERVICES

- a. 3d Marine Division chaplains condited 296 Sunday Divine Services during April with an attendance of 10,908 and 344 weekday services with an attendance of 6,481.
- b. Jewish coverage was provided for Division personnel by a lay leader, Lt Larry FRIEDMAN, DC, USNR, 3d Dental Company.

- Chaplain KEARSLEY, TAD from 3d Marine Division to Force Logistic Support Group "A", continued to travel throughout 3d Marine Division TAORs providing Latter Day Saints religious coverage.
- d. Chaplain GEEZA, 1st Marine Division, offered Eastern Orthodox religious services at least once during the month in all 3d Marine Division. enclaves.
- e. Chaplain WESTLING, attached to "A" Company, 3d Medical Battalion, provided weekly Episcopal Holy Communion Services in the Division CP Chapel.

### 3. OPERATIONS

a. Chaplains participated in operations as follows:

PRAIRIE III: Chaplains AMMONS, COLLINS, ONES, AIMASY, HUSTIN, McPARTLAND, OLIVER, ONDO, RYAN, JOHNSON.

PRAIRIE IV: Chaplains \*ALMASY, AMMONS, BORDEN, HUSTIN,
JOHNSON TONES, LAVIN, OLIVER, ONDO, RICARD,
RYAN, URBANO:

BIG HORN: Chaplains BOLLES, DAVIS, KEELEY, McDERMOTT, SIMS.

SHAWNEE: Chaplains BOLLES, DAVIS, KEELEY, McDERMOTT, SIMS.

\* Wounded in action 27 April 1967, not requiring evacuation.

### 4. RELATED ACTIVITIES

- a. "Raisiously Based Customs in the Republic of Vietnam" lectures were delivered with regularity by 3 deprision Chaplains. A one-hour lecture on this subject is a standard part of the indoctrination of newly-joined personnel in practically all units. The Assistant Division Chaplain provides this lecture session as a standard part of the training cycle for Combined Action Company indoctrination classes and the Personal Response School, as well as the lecture session on Vietnamese Religions in the latter school.
- b. <u>Civic Action</u>. Chaplains reported such varied activities as distribution of food, candy, clothing, school supplies; assisting native churches, orphanages and hospitals; assistance in medical care program of Vietnamese villages; and the showing of films on personal hygiene and patriotion to the villagers near their unit's area.
- c. Chaplain McGONIGAL, attached to FMFPAC FORWARD, continued working with personnel of 3d Marine Division on the Personal Response Project.





# DIVISION SURGEON

# 1. PERSONNEL

a,	Division Surgeon: Captain L. C. ROHRS, MC, US	en
b.	Medical Officers on board at months end.	
	General Duty Medical Officers:	41
	Specialist Medical Officers	20
c.	Medical Officers Detached and Joined.	
	Detached:	Olı
	Joined:	03
	Medical Officers on Sick List:	01.
	Medical Officers of the 3d Marine Division assigned to 9th MAB:	15
	Medical Officers on TAD: (NSA and III MAF)	03
***	Medical Officers gained through BLT Rotation:	05
	Medical Officers lost through BLT Rotation transfer to 9th MAB:	05
d.	Medical Service Corps Officers on board at mon	this end.
	On board:	14
	Detached:	Ol
	Joineds	02
e.	Hospital Corpsmen on board at month's end.	
	On board:	946
	Detached:	29
	Corpsmen gained through BLT Rotation:	83
	Corpsmen lost through BLT Rotation to 9th MAB:	88
	During the middle of April the minimum/maximum on board strength was:	892/916

MINISTRACTION IS

Hospital Corpsmen deaths: KIA:

05


-Rospital Corpsmen WIA and evacuated out of country:

16

- f. The present Hospital Corpsman T/O of the Division was increased in April by addition of 12 Corpsmen to Reconnaissance Battalion for a new total of 973. There still was no allotment for the CAC program which in April required assignment of 30 Corpsmen.
- g. Results of promotion examinations conducted in February were announced in April. Of a total of 126 who took advancement examinations, thirty-five were advanced, 20 passed but were not advanced and 71 failed.
- h. In the course of preparing statistical data for CG, FMFPAC, minimum/maximum on board Hospital Corpsmen strength by month were computed. For future reference, it was elected to include this data in the April Command Chronology Report:

	1966	1967
JAN	1287/1330	925/961
FEB	1248/1327	901/946
MAR	1306/1332	911/946
APR	1062/1120	892/946
MAY	1019/1113	
JUN	965/1008	
JUL	949/959	
AUG	910/963	
SEP	808/965	
OCT	887/940	
HOV	920/1012	
DEC	950/991	

It is pertinent that through September the monthly authorized strength (manning level) from EPDOPAC was 936, and the T/O during this period was 995 (EPDOPAC msg 2220 \*5Z Jul 66). The requirement as indicated in a revision of the Nav Pers 576 submitted in September 1966 was 1019. In December the T/O and authorized strength became 958 because of transfer of several units to 1st Marine Division



and gain of the 11th Engineer Battalion. The current T/O was further increased in April to 973 because of needs for CAC, Recon and unprogramed losses, (CG, FMFPAC mag 182001Z Mar 67). A proposed increase of T/O to 1058 was recommended by FMFPAC to EPDOPAC.

### ADMINISTRATION

- a. A further proposed revision of the Navy Manpower Authorization for Hospital Corpsren of the Marine Division in response to CG, FMFPAC msg 250643Z March 1967 was submitted on 30 April requesting deletion of 11 Corpsmen and addition of 13C.
- b. In March a letter (16/WMS 1510) from CG, III MAF requested opinions concerning evaluation of and topics recommended for inclusion in the Field Medical Service School curricula. Comments were elicited from Medical Officers and Hospital Corpsmen of this Division. These were compiled and sent by speedletter to FMFPAC (16:LCR:bk 1510 dtd 20 April 1967).
- c. In response to an inquiry from the executive Secretary, Advisory Committee on FMF Medical Material Allowance an inquiry was conducted of medical personnel throughout the Division concerning the inclusion of Sponge. Absorbable Gelatin for use by Corpsmen in the field as a hemostatic agent. There was regrettably no uniform concensus, and it was recommended that the item be provided on a field clinical trial basis for RVN.
- d. During April the topic of laundry service and the critical problems associated with nonavailability except from MCB-62 was addressed in a message to CG, III MAF (3d MarDiv 250555Z April 1967) and (3d MarDiv 262301Z April 1967).
- e. On 12 April, Division Order 6100.1 was published to establish a program of weight control whereby military appearance might be enhanced and obesity eliminated from members of the command.

# 3. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE/SANITATION

- a. Division Order 6240.3 was promulgated on 11 April. This Order prescribed the processing procedures to be utilized in disinfection of locally procured fresh produce. In addition, it was determined that fresh produce was being procured from non-approved sources. This practice was stopped, Inspection by U. S. Army Veterinary Service will be conducted in the future and purchase will be condoned only from approved sources.
- b. As a consequence of a repeatedly unsatisfactory status and health hazard of the Phu Bai dump a letter reporting discrepancies was initiated to the Chief of Staff (16:LCR:bk of 29 April 1967).
- c. During the month of April a revision of the Division Order concerning water supply was prepared to provide additional information and added safeguards to the health of the command. This Division Order was published on 2 May 1967. Enclosure (1)


- d. A special inspection was conducted by the Division Preventive Medicine Section of the water point at Dong Ha and of 46 water trailers in Northern Division Area. All cultures except 7 were satisfactory.
- e. Additionally, with respect to water supply, the proposed Phu Bai interim water system, although lacking a filtration component and therefore not in accordance with the Navy Manual of Preventive Medicine (5-5, 5-6, 5-14 (3)) was accepted following a message from COMNACFORV Rep Danang (190631 April 67) which indicated that the Preventive Medicine Officer NavSuppAct Danang approved the system.
- f. Steps were taken in April as part of the over-all malaria control program to obtain aerial dispersion of insecticide to again recuest to PMU. NSA Danang vic CG, III MAF.
- g. Division Order 6240.2 concerning sanitary standards for ice was issued on 19 April 1967.
- h. During April the Division Preventive Medicine Section performed mosquito trapping, larviciding, night fogging, rat flea control and redent control programs. Cultures were performed by the bacteriology section on various excreta, water, and milk. Parsitologic exams were performed in indigenous food service workers and ten were found to have infections with Ascaris, Hookworm or both.

### 4. UNIT DISPLACEMENT


a. During April, as a consequence of unit deployments and tactical requirements the 1st clearing platoon of Company "C", 3d Medical Battalion was deployed to the SHAWNEE Operation Area, and the 2d Clearing platoon of Company "C", 3d Medical Battalion was deployed to Khe Sanh.

### 5. DISEASES

a. On 6 April 1967 an outbreak of diarrhea and vomiting affecting 125 of 900 personnel occurred in cantonment #3 at Phu Bai. Investigation studies were immediately initiated, Inspections were held by members of the Division Preventive Medicine Section and the Division Surgeon. It was ascertained that 76 of 77 had eaten fried chicken and 44 of 77 had eaten gravy. Refrigeration was lacking at the time in the mess hall. Initial cultures grew Staphylococcus Aureus from the gravy and initiatially this was suspected as a possible cause. Issuance and use of this gravy was withheld (0003112 April 67). Subsequently, repeated cultures both at PMS and at PMU Danang failed to incriminate the gravy and message 160817Z April authorized its use. Rectal swabs from 46 patients revealed growth of S, Aureus in 12, S. Epidermis in 30 and no growth in 4. Cultures of the chicken revealed growth of S. Aureus. was concluded that the outbreak was caused by the chicken which remained unrefrigerated for too long a period prior to cooking. Inspection of the mess hall and personnel thereof revealed a high degree of professional competence and observance of proper sanitation measures. ation has since been restored.



- b. In an effort to provide commanding officers with guidance concerning heat casualties and prevention of them, a message concerning this subject was sent on 9 April 1967. In addition, during latter April, IT Dasler from the Navy Medical Research Institute, Washington, visited this Division with proposals for use of a special unit (a component of the MUST) in the 3d Marine Division area for treating and monitoring heat casualties. This Officer and his team are currently conducting studies in Danang.
- c. In March the command was informed of the need to initiate influenza vaccinations of those who were not immunized in fall 1966. Prior communication from CINCPACELT indicated those in RVN did not require immunications in October 1966. Immediate steps were taken to obtain influenza vaccine which was accomplished by late April. A message was sent informing units to institute influenza vaccination for those requiring it. (CG, 3d MarDiv 300421Z April 1967).
- d. On 2 April the first report of a proven case of plague in the civilian populous in the vicinity of Ong and On Ko Villages in Phu Loc Province was received. Medical supplies were flown to the area and emergency medical treatment and evacuation were carried out. Patients were sent to Hue Provincial Hospital. The Province Preventive Medicine Official was contacted, and it was determined that Vietnamese vaccine was available. Corpsmen and Marines who had given mouth to mouth resuscitation to one victim were immediately begun on prophylaptic treatment. The Preventive Medicine Section immediately initiated steps to control the local epidemic by rodent and disease vector control measures. All CAC units were also inspected and special precautions and preventive measures instituted. By the end of April the local epidemic has subsided. No cases of Plague in Marine personnel occurred.
- e. Third Marine Division personnel admitted to the sick list by the Division Psychiatrist with psychiatric diagnosis numbered 36. Twenty-eight were evacuated, 9 were returned to duty, and a total of 95 outpatients were seen. There were 13 cases admitted for NP observation exclusive of the 38 admitted by the Division Psychiatrist with established psychiatric diagnoses.
- f. A total of 173 cases of illness classified under the category of venereal disease were reported in 3d Marine Division personnel during April. These were 149 cases of Gonorrhea and 24 cases of non-specific Urethritis. Forty-seven cases of Gonorrhea were acquired in RVN. 89 in R&R Centers and 13 in unspecified locations.
- g. For the month of April there were 163 non-hostile casualties admitted to the sick list. Of this group there were 51 Fever of Undetermined Origin, 36 cases of Gastroenteritis, 31 cases of Cellulitis and 16 cases of Heat Prostration.





### PART III

### SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 Apr 67 3d recon patrol at XD 918321 made contact with approximately 30 VC/NVA. Called CH-46's and HUIE's and extracted patrol. Results 2 KIA.

Ref: Journal entry #100

5 Apr 67 K/3/9 found weapons cache at YD 201389, 1-60mm mortar, 1-35 rocket launcher, 2 Russian rifles, 150 grenades, 20 Sten-guns, various ammo.

Ref: Journal entry #102 and 6 April entry #52.

1/9 in heavy contact with approximately 1 Co VC/NVA. Results 19 friendly KIA, 48 friendly WIA, 7 enemy KIA and 46 enemy probables.

Ref: Journal entry #113 and 6 April entries #5 and #79.

6 Apr 67 PK-17 attacked by estimated 2 VC companies.

Ref: Journal entries #32 and #43.

9 Apr 67 3/26 found 190 bags of corn, 100 lbs each at MD 843196.

Ref: Journal entry #104.

CAP P-1-B made contact with approximately 50 VC at YD 095593 resulting in 1 KIA and 9 probables.

Ref: Journal entry #155 and 10 April entry #29.

2/26 OpCon 3d MarDiv from 1st MarDiv.

10 Apr 67 3d Recon patrol made contact with estimated 2 squads of NVA at XD 988623. Results 5 KIA.

Ref: Journal entry #109.

CAC H-5 patrol encountered approximately one company of VC at bridge ZC 6h73h0. Results 2 KIA and 5 probables.

Ref: Journal entry #116.

11 Apr 67 Gen BOUKER visited Division.

2/4 OpCon 3d MarDiv from 1st MarDiv.

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# DECLASSIFIED

12 Apr 67 9th Marines OPCON 3d MarDiv from 1st MarDiv.

13 Apr 67 C-3D tanks spotted 14 VC in treeline at YD 585270. Tanks fired 15 rounds of 90mm and MG. Results 4 KIA.

Refs Journal entries #21 and \$26.

16 Apr 67 3/26 at YD 787110 was fired on from Pagoda, assaulted Pagoda with results of 1 KTA and 1 probable. Pagoda unharmed.

17 Apr 67 Gen CUSHMAN visited Division.

3d Dental Co OpCon 3d MarDiv from 1st MarDiv.

19 Apr 67 K/3/26 contacted 2 VC at YD 782098. Results 1 KIA.

Refs Journal entry #57.

A/1/4 at YD 162725 received heavy SA, AW and several mortar rounds. O/1/4 moved to reinforce and assaulted through positions. Enemy broke contact. Results 3 KIA

Refs Journal enteres #48 and #62.

2/12 OpCon 3d MarDiv from 1st MarDiv

20 Apr 67 F/2/4 spotted 8 VC at YD 381420 digging in ambush position and cutting camouflage. Patrol opened fire resulting in 4 KIA confirmed and 3 KIA probable.

Ref: Journal entry #72.

3d Recon patro bserved 5 NVA moving north on trail at XD 738465, called arty resulting in 4 KIA confirmed and 1 KIA probable.

Refs Journal entry #76.

21 Apr 67 3d Recon patrol made contact with 4 or 5 NVA at XD 879560 resulting in 1 KIA.

Ref: Journal entry #77.

3d Recon patrol made contact with estimated NVA platoon at YD 27735h resulting in 3 KTA confirmed and 4 KTA probable.

Refs Journal entry #79.

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22 Apr 67 3d Recon patrol observed 25-30 VC at YD 593233. Called Air Strikes resulting in 26 KTA.

Ref: Journal entry #79.

F/2/9 received sniper fire from YD 598260, one platoon crossed river and swept area resulting in 2 KIA.

Ref: Journal entry #83.

lst 8 inch How Btry OpCon 3d MarDiv from 1st MarDiv.

23 Apr 67 lst AmTrac Bn OpCon 3d MarDiv from 1st MarDiv.

24 Apr 67 3d Recon observed 1 boat at YD 191402 with 4 or 5 VC. Called arty and fired small arms. Boat was emptied with results unknown.

Ref: Journal entry #9.

A/1/4 at YD 156712 found 50 graves containing 104 NVA bodies in khaki uniforms. Bodies buried about 2 weeks.

Ref: Journal entry #93.

SOP Khe Sanh. At XD 803hhh hill 861 at 1100H an FO team and security was ambushed. Results h friendly KIA.

Ref: Journal entry #103.

25 Apr 67 B/1/9 Co Commander reports 3d Squad of 3d Platoon became separated and unable to regain contact.

Refs Journal entry #145.

B/1/9 reports contact with 4 enemy companies in 4 separate locations indicating an enemy force of 1 battalion.

Refs Journal entry #49.

26th Marines arrived in-country.

3d Force Recon Co OpCon 3d MarDiv.

27 Apr 67

3d Recon team at XD 714452 shot down in CH-46 when it was 20 feet off the deck on insertion. Team and crew members extracted. Results 7 friendly WIA.

Ref: Journal entry #104.

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28 Apr 67 Phu Bai vital area mortared at 280136H Apr 67.

Refs Journal entry #21

A/l/9 found 30 rocket: firing sites with 50 rockets at YD 358628.

Refs Journal entry #54.

30 Apr 67 H/2/3 engaged at XD 793446 by estimated platoon. Results 8 KIA confirmed and 15 probables.

Refs Journal entry #71

3d Recon at YD 514146 exchanged fire with 10 VC/NVA

resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA.

Refs Journal entry #78.

DECLASSIFIED

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### PART IV

### SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Division SitReps

2. Division Journal

3. Division FSCC Journal

4. Battle and Non Battle Casualties

VIP Visits

6. Orders/Plans

7. Messages

Photographs

9. Command Directory

### CHRONOLOGY OF SUPPORTING COMMANDS

Ath Marines Chronology

26th Marines Chronology

26th Marines Chronology

36 Bn, 36 Marines Chronology

1st Bn, 4th Marines Chronology

2d Bn, 4th Marines Chronology

3d Bn, 9th Marines Chronology

2d Bn, 9th Marines Chronology

3d Bn, 9th Marines Chronology

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### SECRET

1st Bn, 12th Marines Chronology

2d Bn, 12th Marines Chronology

3d Bn, 12th Marines Chronology

Vith Bn, 12th Marines Chronology

Vist Bn, 26th Marines Chronology

2d Bn, 26th Marines Chronology

V3d Bn, 26th Marines Chronology

√Hq Bn Chronology

Mst AmTrac Bn Chronology

Anti-Tank Bn Chronology

√3d Engr Bn Chronology

3d Med Bn Chronology

To MT Bn Chronology

3d Recon Bn Chronology

Wid SP Bn Chronology

3d Tank Bn Chronology

19th MT Bn Chronology

With Engr Bn Chronology

≥ 1st 80 How Btry Chronology

└─1st 155 Gun Btry Chronology

3d Dental Co Chronology

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Enclosure (1) SECRET

# JOURNAL

Disco Trees

April 1307

JOURNAL SHEETS

APRIL "67"

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3 now man Die

1 APR 67 TO

IN	TIME   OUT	"J" NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
	0740	ARTY	1	4/12: FIRE MISSION FOR RECON PATROL MUSTER II YD 7707 - SAV-A-PLANE 01-X.	HLB
	0840	ARTY	2	4/12: REQ CLEARANCE FOR G.S. 9202-7706-7806- TO RECT TANGO - REQ AC - PASS TO DUTY AO - GRIDS CLEARED RECON & 3/26 - SAV-A-PLANE 01-X NOTIFIED 4/12.	HIB
	1155	ARTY	3	4/12: FIRE MISSION FOR RECON PATROL MUSTER I YD 781089 - SAV-A-PLANE 01-X.	HLB
-	1550	AIR	4	1st MARDIV: REQ CLEARANCE FOR I CORPS G-3 AIR FOR TAC AIRSTRIKES FROM 020600H TO 021800H - G.S. 4126-4825-4229-4628 - DISAPPROVED BY FSCC NOTIFIED 1st MARDIV.	ньв
	1805	ARTY	5	ARVN AMERISHES; 842169-850168-843177-859176-808190-832239-791240-819183-803195-795194-788215-783211-789240-832238-911140-903122-786225-821181-824182-824225-825227-821212-827218- PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND GARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	HLB
	1830	ARTY	6	3/26: RECEIVED WIGHT HAI's,	RLVB
	2005	ARTY	7	FSCG: NIGHT HAI'S APPROVED - SAV-A-PLANE 01- X-V-Z - PASSED TO 4/12 & 3/26 (CAN 0530)	RLVB
	2025	ARTY	8	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 01-B COORD 980146-980138- 978155 - VC BN (CAN 2105)	RLVB
	2047	ARTY	9	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 01-C & D - NIGHT HAI'S (CAN 0500)	RL <b>V</b> B
	2104	ARTY	10	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 01-E COORD 837237 - VC MACHINE GUN FIRING (CAN 2109)	RLVB
And the second control of the second control					

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TIME	"J"	משכד	incidents, MSGS, orders	ACTION TAKEN
IN OUT (1130	NO ARTY	DTG 11	HRACE: BEQUEST SAV-A-PLANE TO FIRE DIV LONG RANGE TARGETS 1-5 OF TGT LIST 02-091 - APPROVED	·
4 404	ARTY	12	XA FAN APPLY  ARVN: FIRE MISSION VC EN 947194-965175-974166-	PH
1307			SAV-A-PLANE 02-A.  ARVN: REQUEST HEIN FIRES COORD 965175 - VC EN	PH PH
1309	ARIY	13 14	PSCC/LADYSHIP: CANCEL XA FAN	PH
1310 1329	ARTY	15	BRACE: CLEARED TO FIRE 965175 - SUGLLEYS FZ VT - SAV-A-PLANE 02-B	PH
1335	AFTY	16	BRACE: ROUNDS COMPLETE 965175	PH
1510	ARTY	17	ARVN: FIRE MISSION 833217 - VC IN OPEN - SAV-A-PLANE 02-D.	PH
1750	ARTY	18	ARVN: FIRE MISSION 777119-780120 - VC PLT - SAV-A-PLANE 02-E.	PH
1840	ARTY	19	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-856175-844177- 811187-820174-790240-833237-819184-803195-796194 786212-788241-833237-914144-906125-786224-821181 824225-825227-826218-824215-819224 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO GOC WATCH OFFICER.	нгв
1900	ARTY	20	3/26: RECEIVED 3/26 H&I's.	HLB
1949	ARTY	21	FSCC: ALL HAI'S ARE APPROVED AT THIS TIME - SAV-A-PLANE 03-X-Z-V - NOTIFIED 4/12-3/26.	HLB
0155	ARTY	22	HUE TOC: REQUISIC ARTY SUPPORT COORD YD 845235-837237-852234 - ARVN ARE FIRING AT THIS - PASSED TO 4/12 TO FIRE - MARINES DID NOT FIRE - HAD GUNSHIP IN AREA.	ELB
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TIME IN OUT	NO NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1000	ARTY	23	4/12: SAV-A-FLAME 03-X FOR DIV TOTS #13-20 (TIME 1100)	BLVB
1025	ARTY	24	4/12: SAV-A-PLANE 03-X COORD 879983 - REQUEST BY RECON - EXP 9H HE & 9G HE (CAN 1038)	RLYB
1225	ARTY	25	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 03-D COORD 833208 - VC IN OPEN (CAN 1330)	RLVB
1235	ARTT	26	LADYSHIP: SAV-A-PLANE 03-X COORD 858978 - PREP FIRE RECON.	RLVB
1340	ARTY	27	4/12: SAV-A-PLANE 03-X IMPACT ZONE A - FO SCHOOL (CAN 1700)	RLVB
1415	ARTY	28	4/12: SAV-A-PLANE 03-X FOR DIV TGTS 40-41-42- 43-44 - TGT LIST 2-091 (CAN 1430)	RLVB
1810	ARTY	<b>29</b>	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-857176-843174-810189-824176-789240-822240-819182-817184-801194-795194-783213-788217-788239-823241-913144-902122-904128-786225-821181-824182-824225825227-824219-821212 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND GARRIED TO GOO	PH
1905	ARTY	30	3/26: RECEIVED NIGHT HAI's.	PH
1905	ARTY	31	FSOC: BRACE PICK UP H&I's	PH
1910	ARTY	32	BRACE FDC/LADYSHIP: REQUEST EXTENSION ON DIV LONG RANGE TOT LIST 2-091 - TOTS 45-50 - APPROVED TO 032400H	PH
2110	ARTY	33	LADYBHIP: HAI 875984-869988-877973 - XA PAN APPLY	PH
2150	ARTY	34	3/26: FIRE MISSION ILLUMINATION 8815 - SAV-A-PLANE 03-G.	РН
2200	ARTY	<b>3</b> 5	ARVN: FIRE MISSION COORD 8424 - SAV-A-PLANE 03H	PH
2325	ARTY	36	COFFERDAM "A": REQUESTED CHECK FIRE IN HUT FANS FOR AIRCRAFT APPROACHING TO AVOID STORM.	PH

	IME	"J"			ACTION
IN	OUT	NO ,	DIG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	1330	ARTY	37	4/12: RE: CLEARANCE FOR TANCO BTRY TO TEST FIRE GUNS GRID 8103-8502-8901 - SAV-A-PLANE 04-X - CLEARED BY RECON & 3/26 - NOTIFIED 4/12.	HLB
	1715	ARTY	38	3/26: RECEIVED 3/26 H&I's.	HLB
	1807	ARTY	<b>39</b>	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-842177-807190-826177-787240-823241-818184-796193-786239-713139-786224-802196-781213-788218-904125-821181-824182-824225-824227-823214-821219-PASSED TO 3/26 AND HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	<b>RLV</b> B
	1915	ARTY	40	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 04-A-B FOR NIGHT H&I's	
			1 w	(CAN 0500)	RLYB
	1920	arty	41	FSCC: NIGHT HAI'S APPROVED - SAV-A-PLANE 04-X PASSED TO 4/12 & 3/26 (CAN 0500)	HL <b>V</b> B
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T27 4 /	E Yun	"J" NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
IN	TUC	IVO .			TENTAL
	1045	AHTY	42	ARVN: FIRE MISSION 7711-7811 - Plt VC - XB FAN APPLY	PH
	1107	ARTY	43	ARVN; END OF MISSION XB.	PH
	1320	ARTY	44	LADYSHIP/RECON: FIRE MISSION 879985 - XA FAN	PH
	1325	ARTY	45	LADYSHIP: END OF HISSION XA FAN	PH
	1640	ARTY	46	END OF MISSION FROM LADYSHIP	PH
	1650	ARTY	47	LADYSHIP: HEPLOT FOR ARVN 72621328	P <b>H</b>
	1727	ARTY	48	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-859176-843176- 816194-814186-816183-789241-833237-819183- 804194-793198-788217-781213-788240-908137- 906125-786224-821181-824225-825227-827218- 819224 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC	PH
	1800	ARTY	49	ARVN: FIRE MISSION COORD 854240 - SAV-A-PLANE 05-A.	PH
	1830	ARTY	50	SNIPER REPORT L-123 - 1 HIT AAV 6 MILES 108 RAD	PH
	1830	ARTY	51	3/26: RECEIVED NIGHT H&I's.	PH
	1855	ARTY	52	LADYSHIP: REQ SAV-A-PLANE FOR DIV TARGETS #18- 23 - SAV-A-PLANE 05-X.	HLB
	1915	ARTY	53	PSCC: ALL HAI'S ARE APPROVED AT THIS TIME - SAV-A-PLANE 05-Z-X-V - NOTIFIED 4/12 & 3/26.	HLB
	1950	ARTY	54	FSCC: REPORTED SNIPER FIRE VIC ZD 0110-0012- 0112-0111 - SENT TO HUE TOC.	PH
Commission of the state of the	2200	ARTY	55	3/26: ADD HAI'S FOR 3/26 YD 916067-918072- 917077-913077-915072-912067-897074-893086- WATCH OFFICER APPROVED - NOTIFIED 3/26	HLB
	0100	ARTY	56	SAV-A-PLANE 05-X.  HUE TOC: REQ USMC SPT PK-17 UNDER ATTACK GRID  640280-630271-633263-643277 - PASSED TO  AFTERGLOW	HLB

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T	ME	"J"			ACTION
IN	OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	0850	ARTY	57	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE O6-X FOR DIV TOTS #1-7 &	
				14-18 - STARTING AT NOON	RLVB
	1420	ARTY	58	3/26: SAV-A-PLANE O6-V FOR ADJ	RLVB
	1420	2333.4.4	20	J/20. DRI-A-I BANG OG-V FOR ADV	RLIAD
	1723	ARTY	59	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE O6-A COORD 748148 - CO OF VC	RLVB
	1815	ARTY	60	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-842177-806190-	
	(,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	Anti		826177-790238-832238-819182-793197-788240-	
				915118-786224-801194-782211-788217-907125-	
				842225-825227-821212-823212- PASSED TO 3/26 &	
				HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	HLB
ĺ	4005	1,770	<i>E</i> 4	TANTOTTE, TOTANTOCO TT BOT ACCORD CARCOL	
	1905	ARTY	61	LADYSHIP: PRIMNESS II HAI 988990-997982- NIGHT STICKER HAI 875993-884996-889982-873982-	
				PRIMESS FROM 062100 TO 070325 - NIGHT STICKER	
				I FROM 062135 TO 0530 - XA & Z FANS APPLY	PH
			<b>.</b>		
	1942	ARTY	62	MAS/GEN: HOCMUTH VISTITED PSCC - APPEARED	دومتر فوانية
				SATISTIED ON DEPARTURE.	PH
	2007	ARTY	63	FSCC: H&I ARTY & 81 APPROVED ALL FANS HOT -	
	±00 (		-/	2130 TO 0500 - INFORMED BRACE	PH
			_		
	2135	ARTY	64	RECON: REQ CANCELLATION TPQ LIST 1-096 TGTS	
				5-6-7 TO CLOSE. APPROVED - NOTIFIED DASC - DEVASTATE "G".	#15 <b>7</b> #
				APANCENTE "C".	PH
	2135	ARTY	65	FSCC: TO HUE TOC: H&I YD 723118-725120-	
1			_	768120-740140-745127- APPROVED BY RECON.	PH
	0000	A Server	c c	APPEN INSTITUTE NOW STREET STREET	
l	2220	ARTY	66	ARYN ADVISOR: RE-L SUPPORT FIRES COOED 773118- 775120-768120-740160-750140-745127.	To TI
				(1)140-100150-(40100-12014)-02151*	PH
	2235	ARTY	67	FSCC: APPROVED 740160-750140-745127 - INFORMED	
			•	BRACE.	PH
	AOUT	4 mmar	£ to	THE ACTS. THE COST METERS THAT WHITE ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ASSESSED.	
1	2255	ARTY	68	BRACE: END OF MISSION FOR ARVN - INFORMED HUE TOO.	7373
				200	PH
	0305	ARTY	<del>69</del>	3/26: FIRE MISSION ILLUMINATION 909171 -	
				SAV-A-PLANE 07-A.	PH
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IN	OUT .	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	0750	AIR	70	FSCC: REQ TO CANCELL ALL TPQ-10 TARGETS 1-097 AND ARTY TARGETS 1-095 - RECON PATROL INSERTION IN THAT AREA TODAY-NOTIFIED 4/12 & LANDSHARK "C"	HLB
	0925	ARTY	71	ARVN: FIRE MISSION MARKING ROUND YD 837207 - SAV-A-PLANE 07-B	HLB
	0945	ARTY	72	ARVN: FIRE MISSION 2 VC CO YD 920192-925194- 921187-925184 - SAV-A-PLANE 07-C.	HLB
	1025	ARTY	73	3/26: FIRE MISSION PRAC FIRE YD 796087- CLEARED BY RECON - SAV-A-PLANE 07-X.	HLB
	1805	ARTY	74	BRACE: FIRE MISSION RECON YD 774067 - SAV-A-PLANE 07-X.	HLB
	1810	ARTY	75	ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC IN OPEN YD 836211 - SAV-A-PLANE 07-D (CAN 1842)	HLB
	1820	ARTY	76	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-858178-844177-808190-824176-790239-828238-818184-802195-794196-788216-788239-829237-807138-904120-785224-824225-825227-823213-827218-PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	HLB
	1822	ARTY	77	BRACE: FIRE MISSION RECON YD 789081 - SAV-A-PLANE 07-X.	HLB
	1830	ARTY	78	3/26: RECEIVED 3/26 H&I	HLB
	1915	ARTY	<b>7</b> 9	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE O7-E-F - NIGHT H&I's (CAN 0500)	RL <b>V</b> B
	2135	ARTY	80	FSCC: NIGHT H&I'S APPROVED - SAV-A-PLANE 07-X- PASSED TO 3/26 & 4/12 (CAN 0500)	RLVB
	2145	ARTY	81	3/26: SAV-A-PLANE 07-Z COORD 854132 - 81 ILL (CAN 0500)	RL <b>V</b> B
	2305	ARTY	82	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 07-H COORD 9320-9715 - VC BN (CAN 2345)	RLVB
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TIME IN OUT	NO NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1155	ARTY	83	3/26: RECEIVED REQUEST FOR DIRECT FIRE FROM DRIVERS TEST FOR C-1/3 COORD 8810-8811 FROM 081400H TO 081600H - CLEARED WITH ARVN 081155H-INFORMED 3/26.	РН
	ARTY	34	DASC: CLEARANCE FOR PHOTO RECON XB FAN 1555- 1605	PH
1340	ARTY	85	LADYSHIP: REQUEST CLEARANCE TO FIRE TEST - GRID 8705 - INSERTION CANNOT FIRE.	PH
1425	ARTY	86	RECON: PRIMMESS I INSERTED - PRIMMESS II EXTRACTED - INFORMED BRACE.	РН
<b>14</b> 26	ARTY	87	DASC: CLEARED FOR LADYSHIP TO TEST FIRE IN COORD 006989 - INFORMED LADYSHIP.	РН
<b>表</b> 15	ARTY	88	LADYSHIP: FIRE MISSION - SPOTTER ROUNDS FOR PRIMNESS I - CLEAR.	PH
1530	ARTT	89	RECON: HEQUEST CLEARANCE FOR FIRE MISSION 605235 - APPROVED BY HUE TOO FOR 1 HOUR.	PH
1705	ARTY	90	LADYSHIP: RECON FIRE MISSION 789081 - REG XB FAN APPLY.	PĦ
1815	ARTY	91	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169850168-859174-849178- 810192-824179-890240-832238-821181-817184- 793196-788240-911135-786224-800194-783212- 785215-905126-902122-824225-825227-829230- 819224 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CAMPIED TO COC	PH
1830	ARTY	92	3/26: RECEIVED 3/26 HAI'S.	HLB
2015	ARTY	93	ARVN: REC SAV-A-PLANE FOR H&I'S YD 8025-8021- 9422-8626 - SAV-A-PLANE 08-A.	HLB
2025	ARTY	94	FSCC: ALL M&I'S ARE APPROVED AT THIS TIME - SAV-A-PLANE OB-X-V-Z - NOTIFIED 3/26 & 4/12.	HLB
2115	ARTY	95	ARVN: FIRE MISSION VC BN 1D 980146-980138- 983156 - SAV-A-PLANE 08-B.	HLB
2230	ARTY	96	ARYN: FIRE MISSION VC CO YD 824267-805258- SAV-A-PLANE 08-C.	HLB

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TIME	NO DI	eg	INCIDENTS. MS	GS. ORDERS	TAKEN
OUT OUT	NO DO	3/26: F1 YD 850100	INCIDENTS, MS( RE MISSION ARTY ) - SAV-A-PLANE (	ILL - SUS MOVE 09-X.	HLB
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T) IN	ME OUT	"J" NO	DTG	incidents, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
•••	0800	ARTY	97	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 09-A COORD 8321 - VC IN CONTACT (CAN 0830)	RLVB
	0853	ARTY	98	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 09-B COORD 836207 VC - (CAR 0905)	rl <b>v</b> b
	1055	AREX	99	4/12: SAV-A-PLANE 09-X COORD 873016-899012- SPOTTER HDS (CAN 1110)	RLVB
	11 <b>0</b> 0	ARTY	100	4/12: SAV-A-PLANE 09-X DIV TGTS FROM 1200H TO 1700H (CAN 1700)	RLVB
	1800	ARTY	101	3/26: SAV-A-PLANE 09-X FOR LADYSHIP TO THET FIRE TWIN 40's AZ 3500 - 1900H TO 1930H.	RLVB
	1830	arty	102	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-844177-807190- 822177-789239-832243-819183-803194-794195- 78221:-786217-789240-832244-910134-904125- 902122-786225-824225-823213-822215 - PASSED TO 3/26 AND HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	PH
	1900	ARTY	103	FSCC: RECEIVED NIGHT HAI's.	PH
	1900	ARTY	104	3/26: FIRE MISSION - HEAVY CONTACT COORD 844195 - SAV-A-PLANE 09-D.	PH
	1937	ARTY	105	3/26: SHIFTED FIRES TO 830197 FROM 844195	PH
	1935	ARTY	106	FSCC: HAI CLEARED FOR ARTY & 81 - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z - 09-E APPLY - 09-E TGT 50 - ALL SAV-A-PLANES CLEARED FROM 2130 TO 0500H	PH
		AHTI	107	3/26: AND OF MISSION 830197 - SAV-R-PLANE 09-D - HEMAIN IN EFFECT.	PH
		ARTY	108	BRACE: FDC REQUEST CANCELLATION OF HAI TOTS 36-40-50 - INFORMED 3/26.	PH
	2100	ARTY	109	DASC: CHECK FIRE 09-G	PH
	2110	ARTY	110	BRACE: NITE STICKER II H&I's 781089-778083-784077-789083-787084 CLEARED.	PH
	2130	ARTY	111	DASC: GO ON WITH HAI FIRE 09-G	PH
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	IME	пJп			ACTION
IN	OUT	NO	DTG	incidents, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	2330	ARTY	112	ANYN: FIRE MISSION ILLUM 7819 - VC HIT MINE FIELD - SAV-A-PLANE 09-I	PH
	0500	ARTY	113	FECC: CANCEL ALL SAV-A-PLANES	PH
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TIME	11]11			ACTION
IN OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
0915	ARTY	114	ARVN: FIRE MISSION VC IN OPEN YD 863196 - SAV-A-PLANE 10-A	HL.B
1010	ARTY	115	TANGO BTRT: REQ SAV-A-PLANE FOR SHOOT DIMO ROUND YD 764043-779053 - RECON CLEARED - NOTIFIED TANGO BRTY - SAV-A-PLANE 10-X.	HLB
1240	ARTY	116	3/26: REQ FOR SAV-A-PLANE FOR SHOOT YD 933034- FOR VIP - SAV-R-PLANE 10-X.	HLB
1445	arty	117	LADYSHIP: FIRE MISSION FOR RECON YD 677162- SAV-A-PLANE	HLB
1740	ARTY	<b>118</b>	ARVH AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-859176-842177- 826177-810188-790239-831237-819182-793197- 787240-812139-786224-800194-805192-782211- 788217-906125-824225-825227-824219-826218- 826220 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	HEB
1920	ARTY	119	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 10-X COORD 863087 - NIGHT DEF CONC (CAN 2000)	RLVB
1955	ARTY	120	ANVN: SAV-A-PLANE 10-D - NIGHT BAI'S (CAN 0500)	BLVB
2112	ARTY	121	PSCC: NIGHT HAI'S APPROVED - SAV-A-PLANE 10-X-V-Z - PASSED TO 3/26 & 4/12 (CAN 0500)	R <b>L</b> ▼B
2258	ARTY	122	LADYSHIP: SAV-A-PLANE 10-X DIV TOTS - TOT LIST 3-100.	RLVB
2305	ARTY	123	ARVN: SAV-a-PLANE 10-E COORD 778198 - VC ATTACKING (CAN 2350)	RLVB
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TIME	"Ј"			ACTION TAKEN
IN OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
0919	AETY	124	LADYSHIP: GUN OUT OF ACTION ALL DAY FOR A MAINT - RELAY 20 - GUN #4 ON 4600	PH
1030	ARTY	125	LADYSHIP: REQ CLEARANCE FOR DIV LONG RANGE TOTS LIST 3-100 - COMMENCING 1200 X FAN	PH
1200	ARTY	126	BRACE: X FAN HOT	PÄ
1240	ARTY	127	FSCC: CHECK FIRE X HOT FAN FOR MEDEVAC - INFORMED BRACE.	PH
1615	ARTY	128	RECON: AMBRIDGE PATROL EXTRACTED - INFORMED BRACE.	PH
1730	ARTY	129	RECON: WIGHTSTICKER II PATROL EXTRACTED.	PH
1730	ARTY	130	BRACE: FIRE MISSION CRID 8704 REG XA FAN APPLY	PH
1735	ARTY	131	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-858176-844177-808190-824176-790240-828238-821181-817184-800194-793197-783211-789239-829238-913140-905122-786225-824225-825227-824219-823213-827218 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO SHOVE COC	PH
1827	ARTY	132	3/26: FIRE MISSION RED COORD 850666-861075- 859068-861061 - X FAN APPLY	PH
1835	ARTY	133	3/26: FIRE MISSION-CAC UNIT IN CONTACT WITH 50 VC YD 824162 - CLEARED BY FSCC - SAV-A-PLANE 11-V	FLB
1950	ARTY	134	ARVN: FIRE MISSION - 2 PLTS VC VD 836202 - SAV-A-PLANE 11-A.	HLB
2042	ARTY	135	FSCC: ALL HAI'S ARE APPROVED AT THIS TIME - SAV-A-PLANES 11-Z-X-V - NOTIFIED 4/12 & 3/26	HLB
2210	ARTY	136	3/26: FIRE MISSION - SUS HOVEMENT YD 875064 SAV-A-PLANE 11-X.	HLB
2300	ARTY	137	3/26: FIRE MISSION - SUS MOVEMENT YD 88450975- SAV-A-PLANE 11-X.	HLB

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IN	OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
ı	0820	ARTY	138	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 12-A COORD 838210 - 1 CO.VC (CAN 0900)	RL <b>V</b> B
	0900	ARTY	139	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 12-B COORD 986156-977148- 979152 - 2 BN VO (CAN 1015)	RLVB
:	0915	ARTY	140	3/26: SAV-A-PLANE 12-X COORD 875064-883053- BUS VC POSITION (CAN 1000)	RLVB
	1035	ARTY	141	3/26: SAV-A-FLANE 12-X COORD 881056 - 1 VC IN OPEN (CAN 1045)	RLVB
	1120	ARTY	142	3/26: SAV-A-PLANE 12-X COORD 888085 - 4 VC IN OPEN (CAN 1145)	RLVB
	1145	ARTY	143	4/12: SAV-A-PLANE 12-X DIV TGTS - TGT LIST 3-100 (CAN 1800)	RLVB
	1700	ARTY	144	FSCC: RECEIVED 3/26 NIGHT HAI's.	ELVB
	1750	ARTY	145	ARVN ANBUSHES; 842169-850168-840170-811187- 824179-842179-792224-831237-818184-793197- 796240-914144-800194-783211-903128-786225- 821225-825227-824219-819229 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	RLVB
	1815	ARTY	146	PSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 12-D COORD 830220 - VC IN OPEN.	<b>RLV</b> B
	1820	ARTY	147	TOWER: CHECK FIRE 12-D - A IRCRAFT APPROACH LOW/FUEL	PH
	1900	ARTY	148	BRACE FDC: DIV TCTS FIRED AS OF 121900H - DIV TGT LIST 3-100 - NO. 28-29-30-41-42-43-44-45- 46-47-48-49-50 (1 RD 1550 HE EACH)	PH
	1912	ARTY	149	3/26: REQ NIGHT REC COORD 876072 - DEF FIRES X FAN APPLY - CLEARED.	PH
	1945	ARTY	150	FSCC: H&I ARTY & 81 FIRES CLEARED - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z APPLY - 2130-0500H.	PH
	2020	AIR	151	HUE TOC: REQ FOR TPQ-10 - VC REGT COORD 270570- 255475-267477-360450-355445-350460- FORWARDED TO SHOVE FORWARD FOR ACTION - M-1 746124.	PH
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12 APR 67 TO \_\_\_\_\_

TIME	யரா			ACTION
IN OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
2045	ARTY	152	3/26: N CO. NIGHT POSITIONS - N-1 746124 - N-2 747152 - N CP 736137.	PH
2105	ARTY	153	DASC: CHECK FIRE XB FAN	PH
2130	ARTY	154	DASC: CLEAR TO FIRE XB FAN	PH
∞35	ARTY	155	3/26: FIRE MISSION - ENEMY CONTACT COORD 914102 - CLEARED.	PH
0130	ARTY	156	3/26: DND OF MISSION 914102	PH
0300	ARTY	157	3/26: FIRE MITTON COORD 914102.	PH
0600	ARTY	158	3/26: FIRE MISSION ILLUM 825155 - PRIMROSE CLEAR.	PH
0700	AIR	159	ISHERWOOD BAILEY: REQ CLEARANCE FOR AIRSTRIKE ZC 166946 - 140600H TO 141800 - CLEARED BY HUE TOO SOT FRINDO.	PH
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T	CME	"Ј"			ACTION
IN	OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	1200	ARTY	160	3/26: Fire deep conc adj vid 885041 - Sav-a-plane 13-x.	HLB
	1210	ARTY	161	3/26: FIRE MISSION - HIGHT DENF CONC ADJ YD 905041 - SAV-A-PLANE 13-X.	HLB
	1235	ARTI	162	3/26: Fire Mission - 4 VC in open VD 915030 - SAV-A-PLANE 13-X.	MLB
	1750	ARTY	163	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-844176-858176- 810190-820176-790239-828237-819183-817184- 802194-794196-788211-784213-789239-837237- 914148-903126-786225-824225-825227-821216- 823217 - PASSED TO 3/26 AND HAND CARRIED TO COC	٠
	10%	ARTY	164	WATCH OFFICER.  ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 13-C - NIGHT HAI'S (CAN 0500)	HLB
	1930		·		
	1930	ARTY	165	FSCC: RECEIVED 3/26 NIGHT H&I'S.	RLVB
	2135	ARTY	166	FSCC: NIGHT HAI'S APPROVED - SAV-A-PLANE 13-X- V - PASSED TO 3/26 & 4/12 (CAN 0500)	RLVB
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T.	IME	11111			ACTION
IN		NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	0915	ARTY	167	BRACE FDC: HEQ SAV-A-PLANE FOR IMPACT "A" RECONSCHOOL - XB FAN APPLY	PH
	0925	ARTY	168	HRACE: REQ SAV-A-PLANE FOR DIV LONG RANGE TGT LIST 3-103 - XA FAN APPLY	PH
	0950	ARTY	169	ARYN: FIRE MISSION RECON BY FIRE COORD 835213 SAV-A-PLANE 14-B.	PH
	1030	ARTY	170	PSCC: TO LADYSHIP; CHECK FIRE LONG RANGE TOTS WHILE CHECKING ON AIRCRAFT IN AREA.	PH
	1035	ARTY	171	FSCC: TO LADYSHIP "GO ON"	PH
	1105	ARTY	172	ARVN: END OF MISSION 14-B.	PH
	1106	ARTY	173	DASC: CHNCK FIRE XB FAM (RECON INSERT)	PH
	1130	ARTY	174	ARVN: FIRE MISSION YD 842212- SAV-A-PLANE 14-C	PH
	1144	ARTY	175	DASC: CHECK FIRE XA FAN - OF RECON.	PH
	1200	ARTY	176	RECON: MUSTER I EXTRACTED - DONAHUE INSERTED - INFORMED BRACE FDC.	PH
	1220	ARTY	177	RECON: NITESTICKER II INSERTED - PRIMNESS I RETRACTED - INFORMED BRACE FDC.	PH
	1355	ARTY	178	FSCC: XB FAN-SCHOOL GO ON	PH
	1345	ARTY	179	RECON: FIRE MISSION 729092 - IB FAN APPLY - INFORMED 3/26 CLEARED	PH
	1450	ARTY	180	CLICK FDC: FIRE/CAP C/2/94th LAID READY TO FIRE (22795825) 141159H A21 - 5600 AND 2800	PH
	1515	ARTY	181	RECON: SPRINGWHEAT IS EXTRACTED - INFORMED BRACE.	PH
	1715	HGF	182	SAV-A-PLANE 14-E 160490-580410-729327-733328.	PH
	1745	ARTI	183	3/26: FIRE MESSION "KILO" 832065 - XB FAN APPLY	PH
	1805	ARTY	184	3/26: RECEIVED NIGHT HAI'S	PH

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		15715			ACTION
	ME OUT	"J" NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
TM	1925	ARTY	185	FSGC: ALL HAI'S ARE APPROVED AT THIS TIME - SAV-A-PLANE 14-X-Z-V	HLB
	2015	ARTY	186	ARVE: RIGHT AMBUSHES; 850168-842169-842177- 806195-824178-790240-835236-812184-793192- 786240-904125-904107-824225-825227-826218- 819224-800194-783216-785214-900173- PASSED TO 3/26 AND HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	HLB

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T) IN	IME   OUT	NO NO	DTG	incidents, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
	0720	ARTY	187	FSCG: SAV-A-PLANE 15-A COORD 848232 - VC IN OPEN (CAN 0900)	RLVB
	1220	ARTT	188	LADYSHIP: SAV-A-PLANE 15-X FOR PREP FIRE FOR RECON (CAN 1245)	RLYB
	1315	ARTY	189	3/26: SAV-A-PLANE 15-X FOR DIRECT FIRE SHCOOL	RLYB
CHECK CHECK	1745	ARTY	190	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 15-C COORD 8524 - 1 PLT VC	RLYB
	1800	ARTY	191	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 15-D COORD 805231 - VC	RLVB
	1840	ARTY	192	ARVE AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-858176-845177- 808190-823176-789239-838237-907140-819183- 802194-785215-783211-914140-905122-824225- 825227-824219-829219 - PASSED TO \$26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	рн
	1845	ARTY	193	3/26: RECEIVED NIGHT HAI'S	PH
	2015	ARTY	194	ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC MOVEMENT 841192- 845189 - 15-E APPLY	PH
	2019	ARTY	195	FSCC: HAI'S APPROVED 2130 TO 0500 - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z APPLY	PH
	2020	ARTY	196	ARVN: HAD OF MISSION 15-G.	PH
	2030	ARTY	197	DF 22: FIRE MISSION ILL 855140 - XB FAN APPLY	PH
	2130	ARTY	198	DASC: MED EVAC WEST GRID LINE 88 - CHECK FIRE 15-E.	PH
	2330	ARTY	199	DASC: MED EVAC COMPLETE - GO ON 15-E.	PH
	2345	ARTY	200	DASC: CHECK FIRE IN XZ FARS FOR FLARE SHIP - BRACE/DT 22.	PH
	0040	ARTY	201	DT 22: FIRE MISSION 868105 - XB FAN APPLY	PH
	0210	ARTY	202	IF 22: FIRE MISSION 88061656 ILL - SAV-A-PLANE 15-E - 15-I	РН
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MIT IN (	e Out	"J" NO	DTG_	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
*	1545	ARTY	203	LADYSHIP: FIRE MISSION FOR RECON PATROL NIGHTSTICKER I YD 838007 - SAV-A-PLANE 16-X.	HLB
	1750	ARTY	204	ARTH AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-850174-844177- 796183-825178-791243-823239-819182-817184- 800194-793197-786211-788240-913142-906125- 824225-825227-823213-819224- PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	HLB
	1845	arty	205	FSCC: RECEVIED 3/26 NIGHT HAI'S	RLVB
	1915	ARTY	206	ARVN: FIRE MISSION COORD 79952195 -15 VC IN OPEN - SAV-A-PLANE 16-A (CAN 1930)	BLAB
	1930	ARTY	207	FSCC: NIGHT HAI'S APPROVED - SAV-A-PLANE 16-X-V - PASS TO 3/26 & 4/12 (CAN 0500)	ELAB
	1952	ARTY	208	4/12: SAV-A-PLANE 16-X COORD 8300-8301-8400 FOR RECON (CAN 0500)	RLVB
	2030	ARTY	209	ARVH: SAV-A-PLANE 16-B NIGHT H&I'S (CAN 0500)	RLVB
	2030	ARTY	210	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 16-C NIGHT H&I COORD 926150 VC MORTAR POSITION (CAN 0500)	RLVB
	2227	ARTY	211	3/26: SAV-A-PLANE 16-D COORD 899154 - ILL VC CONTACT (GAN 2300)	RLVB
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	ME OUT	"J" NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
TM	001	NO	DIG	INCIDENTES, 12005, ORDERES	
	0825	arty	212	BRACE: SAV-A-PLANE FOR DIV TOTS LIST 3-106 - X FAN - 0825-1700	FH
	0900	ARTY	213	FSCC: CANCEL SAY-A-PLANE 17-A.	PH
	0945	ARTY	214	RECON: PRIMESS II INSERTED - INFORMED BRACE.	PH
	1355	ARTY	215	RECON: MUSTER II INSERTED - INFORMED BRACE.	PH
	1530	ARTY	216	RECON: EXTEND PRIMARSS II 1 CLICK EAST - INFORMED BRACE.	PH
	1645	ARTY	217	LADYSHIP: REQ PERMISSION TO FIRE TEST ROUND RETWEEN GRIDS 86-90 - NA FAN APPLY	PH
	1655	arty	218	LADYSHIP: END OF TEST ROUNDS.	PH
	1815	ARTY	219	ARYN: AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-858178-845176-807190-824176-789240-819214-821181-816185-800194-793197-787209-\$88240-914141-905124-824225-825227-821212-826220 - PASSED TO 3/26 AND HAND GARRIND TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	HLB
	2010	ARTY	220	PSCC: ALL HAI'S ARE APPROVED EXCEPT NOTED - SAV-A-PLANE 17-X-Z-V - NOTIFIED 4/12 & 3/26.	HLB
	2210	arty	221	3/26: FIRE MISSION 81 ILL - SUS MOVEMENT 892157 - SAV-A-PLANE 17-D.	HLB
	0225	ARTY	222	3/26: FIRE MISSION 81 ILL SUS MOVEMENT - SAV-A-PLANE 18-A.	HLB
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TI IN 1	ME OUT	NO NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
	0755	ARTY	223	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 18-X FOR DIV TOTS.	RLVB
	0845	ARTY	224	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 18-B COORD 8423 - VC CONTACT (CAN 1445)	RLVB
	1815	ARTY	225	3/26: RECEIVED NIGHT HAI'S	PH
	1818	ARTY	226	ARYN AMEUSHES; 842169-850168-842177-809195-823179-788240-923116-818184-793197-915143-801194-782221-905127-906118-824225-825227-826218-826219 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND GARRIED TO COC	PH
	1834	ARTY	227	FSCC: NIGHT BAI'S APPROVED 2130-0500 - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z APPLY - INFORMED HRACE/3/26	PH
	1920	ARTY	228	RECOM/LADYSHIP: DONAHUE II FIRE MISSION	PH .
	1920	ARTY	229	ARVN: FIRE MISSION 9123 - VC IN OPEN - 18-C APPLY	PH
	1937	ARTY	230	LADYSHIP: CANCEL SAV-A-PLANE XB	PH
	2203	ARTY	231	DASC: PHOTO RECON - X FAN CHECK FIRE - INFORMED BRACE FDC.	PH
	2228	ARTY	232	DT 22: REQUEST TO FIRE 1 RD ILL AT 868105 (APPROVED)	PH
, manual de la constant de la consta	2228	ARTY	233	FSCC: CANCEL CHECK FIRE X FAN	PH
	0010	arty	234	DASC: CHECK FIRE 18-C - XB - INFORMED 3/26 AND ARVN.	РН
	0110	ARTY	235	DASC: CANCEL CHECK FIRE 18-C XB	PH
	0312	RTY	236	DT 22: FIRE MISSION 838125 ILL - XB FAN	PH

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	IME OUT	"J" NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
	0930	ARTY	237	4/12: REQ CLEARANCE FOR CAL. SHOOT OR ID SQUARES YC 9699 - YD 9304 - CLEARED BY 3/26 & RECON - SAV-A-PLANE 19-X.	HLB
	1300	ARTY	238	FSCC: REQ SAV-A*PLANE FOR FO SCHOOL IN IMPACT AREA "A" - 3/26 HAS MADE ALL CLEARANCES - SAV-A-PLANE 19-X.	HLB
	1455	ARTY	239	ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CO. YD 865193-862195- CLEARED BY 3/26 - SAV-A-PLANE 19-A.	HLB
	1500	ARTY	240	ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CO. YD 809225 - SAV-A-PLANE 19-B.	ньв
	1510	ARTY	241	ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CO. YD 809225 - SAV-A-PLANE 19-C	HLB
	1835	ARTY	242	3/26: RECEIVED 3/26 H&I	нгв
:	1920	ARTY	243	ARVN: NIGHT AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-859174- 844177-808190-824176-788240-819183-800194- 793197-784211-787218-906149-905126-824225- 825271-823213-827218 - PASSED TO 3/26 AND HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	RLVB
	1930	ARTY	244	FSCC: SAV-A-FLANE 19-D FOR NIGHT H&I'S (CAN 0500)	RLVB
	1950	ARTY	245	FSCC: NIGHT HAI'S APPROVED - SAV-A-PLANE 19-X-V - PASSED TO -/26 & 4/12 (CAN 0500)	RLVB
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	IME	"J"			ACTION
IN	OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	0800	ARTY	246	DRIVERS TEST: FIRE MISSION 840050 - TEST FIRE ROCKET PLAN - X FAN APPLY	PH
	0810	ARTY	247	DRIVERS TEST: END OF MISSION X FAN	PH
	0845	ARTY	248	LADYSHIP/RECON: FIRE MISSION 705136 - SAV-A-PLANE 20-X-B	PH
	0915	ARTY	249	ARVN: FIRE MISSION 977144 - VC IN AREA - BAV-A-PLANE 20-A	PH
	0927	ARTY	250	TOWER: CHECK FIRE 20-A - INFORMED ARVN OF CHECK FIRE.	PH
	1000	ARTY	251	LADYSHIP: END OF MISSION 20-X-B	PH
	1010	ARTY	252	ARYN: CANCEL SAV-A-PLANE 20-A	PH
	1115	AIR	253	131 AVIATION CO: REQ CLEARANCE FOR AIR/GROUND RET FRACTICE TO 8504 201345H TO 201430H - CLEARED WITH 3/26 - INFORMED BRACE.	PH
	1155	ARTY	254	LADYSHIP: FIRE MISSION/CALIERATION IC 9699 - X-A FAN AFPLI - CLEARED WITH RECON.	PH
	1200	ARTY	255	CLICK: FIRE CAP - FLT 1/40th GRID 01244522 AZI 0400 READY 0900 - FLT W/3/12 GRID 186401 AZI 0800 READY 1110	PH
	1345	ARTY	256	BRACE FOC: IMPORMED LADYSHIP TO CHECK FIRE FOR AIR/GROUND RET TEST 1345	PH
	1445	ARTY	257	LADYSHIP: CALIBRATION VIC YD 7903 - CLEARED WITH RECON - 221 AVIATION CO.	PH
	1650	ARTY	258	RECON: STAIN SPOT EXTRACTED - INFORMED BRACE.	РП
	1655	AIR	<b>2</b> 59	HUE TOC: REQ TPQ-10 YD 574418-580412-590402- 906 BE TUA TIEN SECTOR CHIEF 18t ARVE G-2 - TOC HAS APPROVED CALL IF TPQ-10 COMES UP	PH
	1700	ARTY	260	BRACE/LADYSHIP: CANCEL X-B FAN	PH

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T: IN	IME OUT	"J" NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
	1807	ARTY	261	ARVN AMEUSHES; 842169-850168-840171-859177- 811187-786239-(FF) - 817184-793197-800194- 785207-785215(CAC) - 824225-825227-826218- 819224-(RF) - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC	PH
	2020	ARTY	262	FSCC: ALL HAI'S ARE APPROVED AT THIS TIME - SAV-A-PLANE 20-X-Z-V - NOTIFIED 4/12 & 3/26.	HLB
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TI IN 1	ME OUT	"J" NO	DTG	incidents, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
	0830	ARTY	263	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 21-X FOR DIV TGTS - TGT LIST 2-109 - #32-39 & 49-50 (0900 TO 1200H)	RLVB
	1150	ARTY	264	4/12: SAV-A-PLANE 21-X FOR CALIB COORD 861071- 855057.	BLVB
	1450	ARTY	<b>26</b> 5	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 21-B FOR NGF.	RLVB
	1930	ARTY	266	BRACE/FSCC: FIRE MISSION GRID 7014-7015- VC/NVA IN AREA - LADYSHIP FIRING 21-C	PH
	1930	ARTY	267	ERACE: END OF MISSION 21-C.	PH
	1950	ARTY	268	DRIVERS TEST 22: FIRE MISSION GRID 81351585 VC MOVEMENT - V FAN APPLY - INFORMED TOWER COFFERDAM "A"-DASC.	PH
	1955	ARTY	269	BRACE: GUN 4 AZI 3600 - GUN 5 BACK IN ACTION	PH
	2010	ARTY	270	ARVN AMBUSHES; 842169-850168-856176-844177-792197-809190-821181-900116-818184-900194-797197-796211-824225-825227-824219-826200-PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC	PH
	2020	ARTY	<b>271</b>	FSCC: HAI'S APPROVED EXCEPT 81 TCT 20 CHID 624155 - REMAINDER SAV-A-PLANES X-V-Z - 2130-0500 APPLY - INFORMED BRACE/DRIVERS TEST 22.	PH
	<b>204</b> 0	ARTY	272	DT 22: FIRE MISSION - 7 FLARE TYPE LIGHTS ORANGE IN COLOR BURNING APPROX. 7 SEC AT GRID 881065 - XA FAN APPLY	PH
	2100	arty	273	BRACE FDC: RECON EST'S 898009-894991.	PH
	0515	ARTY	274	DT 22: FIRE MISSION 900127 - SUS ENEMY MOVEMENT SAV-A-PLANE 21-Z APPLY.	PH
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TO ACTION пди TIME TAKEN DTG INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS IN OUT NO 0805 ARTY 275 3/26: REQ SAV-A-PLANE & CLEARANCE FOR CAL. SHOOT FOR "T" HTRY GRID SQUARES YD 6802 -8806 - 8802 CLEARED BY RECON SAV-A-PLANE 22-X HOTIFIED 3/26. HLB 276 0930 ARTY ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CO YD 833219 -HLB SAV-A-PLANE 22-A. 1655 ARTY 277 3/26: FIRE MISSION - SUS VO POSITION ID 836086 - SAY-A-PLAME 22-X. HLB. 278 1800 ARTY ARYN AMBUSHES; PF 842169-850168-842177-859176-811187-817181-786240- CAC 819183-800194-793197-784211- HF 824225-825227-819224-827218 -PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH HLB OFFICER. FSCC: RECEIVED 3/26 HAI'S. ARTY RLVB 1830 279 280 ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 22-D - NIGHT HAI'S (CAN 0500) 2005 ARTY RLYB 3/26: SAV-A-PLANE 22-E ILL COORD 8418 -ARTY 281 2010 MOVEMENT (CAN 2025) HLYB FSCC: NIGHT HAI'S APPROVED - SAV-A-PLANE 282 2030 ARTY 22-X-V (CAN 0500) RLVE 2100 NUF 283 NOF: SAV-A-PLANE 22-F - NIGHT HAI'S (CAN 2215) RLVB 284 PSCC: RECEIVED STREET CAR - INFORMED BRACE. RLVB 2218 ARTY 2400 ARTY 285 4/12: SAV-A-PLAME 22-0 ILL COORD 923149 -(CAN 0545) RLYB

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0725   ARTY   286   ARVN: FIRE MISSION - FREP FIRES 834211 - SAV-A-PLANE 23-A.   PH	T) IN	ME OUT	NO NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
DASC: CANCEL CHECK FIRE ON 23-A.   PH	711		11		ARVN: FIRE MISSION - PREP FIRES 834211 -	
0930 ARTY 289 ARVN: EDN OF MISSION 23-A.  1015 ARTY 290 ISHERWOOD: BAILEY: REQUEST TO SPRAY GRIDS ID 0661 - YD 0670 AT 1110 FROM I GORPS - GLEARED 1135.  PH  1200 ARTY 291 RECON: GREAT DIVIDE INSERTED - INFORMED BRACE FDC.  1215 AIR 292 ISHERWOOD BAILEY: REQUEST CLEARANCE ON TACTICAL ARBSTRIKE TOT COORD 58203000 FOR I CORPS - PASSED TO AFTERGLOW FOR CLEARANCE.  1455 AIR 293 FSCG: TO ISHERWOOD: BAILEY FROM AFTERGLOW 14 - NEGATIVE ON AIR STRIKE REQUEST GOORD 58203000.  PH  1745 ARTY 294 ARVN: AMBUSHES; PF 342169-850168-858176-810187-821181-786240-904114- CA 813182-800194-782212- RF 824225-825227-826218-PASSED TO 3/266 A HAND CARRIED TO SHOVE COC PH  1745 ARTY 295 3/26: RECEIVED FIGHT BEI'S.  PH  1830 ARTY 296 FSCG: Hai's CLEARED TCTS 2-4-5-6 CLEARED BY RECON - SAV-A-PLAKE X-V-Z APPLY - 2130 TO 0500.  PH  2045 ARTY 297 ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CO, YD 797214-		0800	ARTY	287	DASC: CHECK FIRE 23-A MED EVAC.	PH
1015 ARTY 290 ISHERWOOD: BAILEY; REQUEST TO SPRAY GRIDS ID 0661 - YD 0670 AT 1110 FROM I GORPS - GLEARED 1135.  1200 ARTY 291 RECON: GREAT DIVIDE INSERTED - INFORMED BRACE FDC.  1215 AIR 292 ISHERWOOD BAILEY: REQUEST CLEARANCE ON TACTICAL ARSTRIKE TOT COORD 58203000 FOR I CORPS - PASSED TO AFTERGLOW FOR CLEARANCE.  1455 AIR 293 FSCC: TO ISHERWOOD: BAILEY FROM AFTERGLOW 14 - NEGATIVE ON AIR STRIKE REQUEST GOORD 58203000.  1745 ARTY 294 AEVN: AMBUSHES; PF 842169-850168-858176-810167-821181-736240-904114-CA 813182-800194-782212-RF 824225-825227-826218-PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO SHOVE COC PH  1745 ARTY 295 3/26: RECEIVED BIGHT BRI'S.  PH  1830 ARTY 296 FSCC: HAI'S CLEARED TOTS 2-4-5-6 CLEARED BY RECON - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z APPLY - 2130 TO 0500. PH		0830	ARTY	288	DASC: CANCEL CHECK FIRE ON 23-A.	PH
### TD C661 - YD O670 AT 1110 FROM I GORPS CILBARED 1135.  #### PH  #### 1200 ARTY 291 RECON: GREAT DIVIDE INSERTED INFORMED BRACE FDC.  #### PH  #### 1215 AIR 292 ISHERWOOD BAILEY: REQUEST CLEARANCE ON TACTICAL ARESTRIKE TCT COORD 58203000 FOR I CORPS PASSED TO AFTERGLOW FOR CLEARANCE.  #### PH  #### PH  #### 1455 AIR 293 FSC: TO ISHERWOOD: BAILEY FROM AFTERGLOW 14 NEGATIVE ON AIR STRIKE REQUEST COORD 58203000.  #### PH  #### 1745 ARTY 294 ARVN: AMBUSHES; PF 842169-850168-858176-810187-821181-786240-904114- CA 813182-800194-782212- RF 824225-825227-826218-PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO SHOVE COC PH  ###################################		0930	ARTY	289	ARVN: EDN OF MISSION 23-A.	PH
### 1215 AIR 292 ISHERWOOD BAILEY: REQUEST CLEARANCE ON TACTICAL ARSTRIKE TGT COORD 58203000 FOR I CORPS - PASSED TO AFTERCIOW FOR CLEARANCE. PH 1455 AIR 293 FSCC: TO ISHERWOOD: BAILEY FROM AFTERCIOW 14 - NEGATIVE ON AIR STRIKE REQUEST COORD 58203000. PH 1745 ARTY 294 AEVN: AMBUSHES; PF 842169-850168-858176-810187-821181-786240-904114- CA 813182-800194-782212- RF 824225-825227-826218-PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO SHOVE COC PH 1745 ARTY 295 3/26: REGEIVED NIGHT B&I'S. PH 1830 ARTY 296 FSCC: B&I'S CLEARED TGTS 2-4-5-6 CLEARED BY RECON - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z APPLY - 2130 TO 0500. PH 2045 ARTY 297 ARVN: FIRE MESSION - VC CO. YD 797214-		1015	ARTY	290	ID 0661 - ID 0670 AT 1110 FROM I CORPS -	PH
TACT ICAL ARSTRIKE TCT COORD 58203000 FOR I CORPS - PASSED TO AFTERGLOW FOR CLEARANCE.  PH 1455 AIR 293 FSCC: TO ISHERWOOD: BAILEY FROM AFTERGLOW 14 - NEGATIVE ON AIR STRIKE REQUEST GOORD 58203000.  PH 1745 ARTY 294 ABVN: AMBUSHES; PF 842169-850168-858176-810187-821181-786240-904114- CA 813182-800194-782212- RF 824225-825227-826218-PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO SHOVE COC PH 1745 ARTY 295 3/26: RECEIVED NIGHT H&I'S.  PH 1830 ARTY 296 FSCC: H&I'S CLEARED TCTS 2-4-5-6 CLEARED BY RECON - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z APPLY - 2130 TO 0500. PH 2045 ARTY 297 ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CO. YD 797214-		1200	ARTI	291		PH
NEGATIVE ON AIR STRIKE REQUEST COORD   58203000.   PH		1215	AIR	292	TACTICAL AIRSTRIKE TOT COORD 58203000 FOR I	PH
810187-821181-786240-904114- CA 813182- 800194-782212- RF 824225-825227-826218- PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO SHOVE COC PH  1745 ARTY 295 3/26: RECEIVED NICHT B&I'S. PH  1830 ARTY 296 FSC: B&I'S CLEARED TGTS 2-4-5-6 CLEARED BY RECON - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z APPLY - 2130 TO 0500. PH  2045 ARTY 297 ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CO. YD 797214-	, . ==	1455	AIR	293	NEGATIVE ON AIR STRIKE REQUEST COORD	PH
1745 ARTY 295 3/26: RECEIVED NIGHT HAI'S.  1830 ARTY 296 FSCC: HAI'S CLEARED TGTS 2-4-5-6 CLEARED BY RECON - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z APPLY - 2130 TO 0500. PH  2045 ARTY 297 ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CO. YD 797214-		1745	ARTY	294	810187-821181-786240-904114- CA 813182- 800194-782212- RF 824225-825227-826218-	PH
RECON - SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z APPLY - 2130 TO 0500. PH  2045 ARTY 297 ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CO. YD 797214-		1745	ARTY	295		РН
		1830	ARTY	296		PH
		2045	ARTY	297		HLB
					·	

24 APR 67

TO.

TIME IN O		J"	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	action Taken
	0840 A	RTY	298	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 24-X FOR DIV TOTS.	HLVB
	)842 A	RTY	299	ARVH: SAV-A-PLANE 24-A COORD 860227 - VC ATTACKING (CAN 0900)	BLYB
	A 00064	RTY	300	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 24-B ON GALL FAN FOR OPERATION COORD 8226 TO 9026.	RLVB
	1030	RTY	301	LADYSHIP: SAV-A-PLANE 24-X COORD 732115 - REG CONC RECON (CAN 1052)	HLVB
	1750 A	RTI	<b>3</b> 02	ARVN AMEUSHES; PF 842169-850168-842177-859179- 805194-824179-767240- CAC 904116-813189-800194- 793197-785213-785214- RF 824225-825227-819224-8 827218 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC	рн
1	800 AI	RTY	303	FSCC: CHECK FIRE XA FOR AIRCRAFT.	PH
1	830	RTY	304	LADYSHIP:/HECON FIRE MISSION 813021-818022 - XA FAN APPLY - VC ATTACKING.	РН
	A	RTY	305	RECOM/FSCC: REQUEST ADDITIONAL ARTY FOR RECOM	PH
1	845 AF	RII	<b>3</b> 06	3/26: RECEIVED ARVN HAI'S.	PH
	AI	ZCY	307	LADYSHIP: CANCEL SAV-A-PLANE 24-X-A.	PH
	935 AI	et i	<b>3</b> 08	RECON: DONAHUE I EXTRACTED - INFORMED BRACE FDC.	PH
1	947	TT	369	FBCC: RECON PATROL/HELO CLEAR OF EXTRACTION AREA - BRACE TO FIRE 816021 - XA FAN.	PĦ
2	2005 AE	RTY	310	FSGC: ARTY AND 81 MORT HAI'S APPROVED - SAV-A-PLANE 24-C APPLY 26-35 - REMAINDER X-V-Z FANS APPLY FROM 2130-0500 - INFORMED BRACE - 3/26.	PH
2	030 AF	TT	311	LADYSHIP: GUN #4 LAID AZI 2400.	PH
		TY	312	FSCC: Z FAN IN EFFECT - INFORMED DASC/TOWER COFFERDAM "A".	рн
2	039 AF	RIY	313	DRIVERS TEST: CANCEL 24-Z - INFORMED TOWER/DASO	PH

24 APR 67

	ME	"Ј"			ACTION
IN	OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	2215	ARTY	314	DRIVERS TEST: FIRE MISSION - 100 VC 035006 - SAV-A-PLANE 24-Z APPLY.	PH
	0045	ARTY	<b>3</b> 15	DRIVERS TEST 22: FIRE MISSION 899155 - VC MOVEMENT ILLUM - SAV-A-PLANE 25-A.	PH
	0100	ARTY	<b>3</b> 16	BRACE: REQUEST PERMISSION TO UNLOAD 1 ED AT GRID 004017 - APPROVED.	PH
	0125	ARTY	317	Brown Ground: Firm Mission - Heavy Attack Coord 970054 - Informed Drivers Test 22/Brace - REQUESTED PRETEXT COME UP FM 45.5 FOR MISSION.	PH
	0230	ARTY	318	PRETEXT: END OF MISSION FOR BROWN GROUND - NEG SURV.	PH
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TIME	пјп	DMA	THAT TOWNS MORE ADDRESS.	ACTION TAKEN
IN OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	LAKEN
0845	ARTY	319	4/12: REQUEST SAV-A-PLANE FOR DIV TGTS 11-15 & 31-39 FROM 0845 TO 1200 - SAV-A-PLANE 25-X.	ндв
1040	ARTY	320	CLICK: FIRE CAP: D/2/12 YD 21675982 AZ FIRE 5600 LAYED AND READY TO FIRE.	HLB
1650	ARIY	321	3/26: SAV-A-PLANE 25-C COORD 950097 - 9 VC IN OPEN (CAN 1800)	RLVB
1720	ARTY	322	ARVN AMEUSHES; PF 842169-850168-844176-858176-811187-819174-815197-828175-822170-786240-903115- CAC 817184-819182-800194-793197-783212-786204- RF 824225-825207-823213-821216-PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFF.	HLB
1825	ARTY	323	3/26: RECEIVED 3/26 H&I'S.	HLB
2045	ARTY	324	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 25-E NIGHT HEI'S (CAN 0200)	RLVB
2050	ARTY	325	PSCC: NIGHT HAI'S APPROVED - PASSED TO 3/26 SAV-A-PLANE 25-X-V (CAN 0500)	RLVB
0650	ARTY	326	FSCC: SAV-A*PLANE 26-A COORD 8222-8221 - VC ATTACKING.	RL₹B
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26 APR 67 TO \_\_\_\_

 IME OUT	"J"	DTG	incidents, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
 0820	ARTY	327	TOWER: REQUEST CHECK FIRE 26-A.	PH
0822	ARTY	328	ARVM: CANCEL 26-A.	PH
0915	ARTY	329	ARVN: FIRE HISSION - VC ATTACKING COORD 972144 - SAV-A-PLANE 26-B.	PH
0937	ARTY	330	ARVE: END OF MISSION 26-B - 1 ENEMY KIA.	PH
1055	AIR	331	HUE TOC: REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR A LESTRIKE GRID YD 620094 - GLEARED WITH RECON.	PH
1315	ARTY	332	ARVN: FIRE MISSION - REQUEST REINFORCING FIRES AT GRID 8420 - VC BN.	ÞН
1345	ARTY	333	TOWER: REPORTS ON EAST END OF LANDING STRIP LANGE EXPL - REPORTED TO 3/26.	PН
1420	arty	334	ARVN: SURV OF REINFORCING MISSION 26-B - RETIMATED 40 KIA PROB - BLOOD & HUMAN PARTS IN THENCHES - VC BELIEVED TO HAVE EVACUATED BY SAMPANS.	PH
1455	ARTY	335	LADYSHIP: EXPENDING 1 RD AT YD 9000.	PH
1537	ARTY	336	3/26: FIRE MISSION XB - M/3 PLT HEAVY CONTACT APPROVED-WAIT.	PH
1550	ARTY	337	FSGC: MISSION FOR M/3 CRID 788115 - DISAPPROVED.	PH
1705	ATE	338	CLICK FSCC 14: REQUEST FOR AIRSTRIKE GRID XD 867623 FROM HUE TOC - APPROVED.	PH
1740	ARTT	339	ARVE AMBUSHES; PF 842169-850168-842177-860175- 838194-813183-817183-815187-788240-925118- CAC 818184-800194-793194-786212-786214-784215- EF 824225-825227-824219-826220 - PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC.	PH
1930	ARTY	340	FSCC: HAI'S ARE APPROVED AT 1930H THIS TIME SAV-A-PLANE 26-X-V-Z - NOTIFIED 3/26.	HLB
2045	ARTY	341	3/26: FIRE MISSION 81 ILL - SUS MOVEMENT YD 916166 - SAV-A-PLANE 26-N.	HLB

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27 APR 67

	IME 1	"J"			ACTION
LN	OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	1040	ARTY	342	FSCC: SAV-A-PLANE 27-XB - IMPACT ZONE "A" - FO SCHOOL (CAN 1300)	RLVB
	1645	ARTY	343	4/12: SAV-A-PLANE 27-Z FOR RECON HEG CONC (CAN 1800)	KTAB
	1730	ARTY	344	RECON: DONAHUE EXTRACTED - INFORMED BRACE FDC.	RLVB
	1740	ARTY	345	ARVN AMBUSHES; PF 842169-850168-844177-859176- 810194-798193-812179-820175-835175-824168- 818175-707240-905110 - CAC 813189-810194- 794196-782211 RF 824225-825227-819224-826218- PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO CCC.	PH
	1815	ARTY	346	3/26: RECEIVED NIGHT HAI'S.	PH
	1935	ARTY	347	FSCC: HAI'S CLEARED XVZ FANS APPLY 2130-0500.	PH
	1955	ARTY	<b>34</b> 8	ARVN: FIRE MISSION 975143 - VC PLT - 27-J.	PH
	2027	arty	<b>34</b> 9	DASC: CHECK FIRE 27-J	PH
	0130	ARTY	350	INCOMING MORTARS EXECUTED FAST FREIGHT.	PH
	0330	ARTY	351	C/M CHIDS 949129-953117-964112-964123 - CLEARED THRU SGT. FRENDL.	PH
	0405	ARTY	352	DT 22: FIRE MISSION 890113 LIGHTS IN AREA - CLEARED X FAM.	РН
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28 APR 67 TO \_\_\_\_

TI	ME	пјп			ACTION
	OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TAKEN
	1330 1840	ARTY	<b>353</b> 354	ARVN: FIRE MISSION - VC CONTACT VD 855235 - SAV-A-PLANE 28-A.  ARVN AMBUSHES; PF 842169-850168-842177-852176-	HLB
	·			810192-824179- CAC 813189-793197-800194- 785202-785203-784205-786204- HF 824225- 825227-821212-826220- PASSED TO 3/26 AND HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	ELB
	1820	ARTY	355	LATE ENTRY: 3/26: RECEIVED 3/26 HAI'S.	HLB
	1830	ARTY	356	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 28-C FOR HAI'S (CAN 0500)	RLVB
	1914	ARTY	357	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 28-D - VC IN OPEN - 2 CO. GOORD 8219-8319-8419 - (CAN 2000)	RLVB
	2015	arty	358	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 28-E COORD 9119-9218-9219 - VC EN (CAN 2035)	RLVB
	2017	ARTY	359	ARVN: SAV-A-FLANE 28-F COORD 8221 - VC MG 8321-8322 (CAN 2035)	BLAB
	2040	ARTY	<b>36</b> 0	FECC: NIGHT HAI'S APPROVED - PASSED SAV-A-PLANE TO 4/12 & 3/26 (CAN 0500)	BLAB
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29 APR 67 TO \_\_\_\_

_	ME	"J"	7770	TNATDENIES NOOS OPHERS	ACTION TAKEN
IN	OUT	NO	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	TMIN
	0843	ARTY	<b>3</b> 61	arvn: vine mission en mk - sav-a-plane 29-d.	PH
	0915	ARTY	362	HECOM/POLKDOT -07 WILL BE OPERATING VIC YC AREA 0915-1015 FROM ISHERWOOD.	PH
	1330	ARTY	363	BRACE READY TO COMMENCE DIRECT FIRING - INFORME) DASC CLEARED	) PH
	1338	ARTY	364	CHECK FIRING DELTA FAN FOR ARVN MED EVAC.	PH
	1425	ARTY	<del>36</del> 5	BRACE: END OF MISSION DIRECT FIRING.	PH
	1750	ARTY	<b>36</b> 6	DASC: CHECK PIRE DELTA FAN FOR MED EVAC - INFORMED ARVN.	PH
	1805	ARTY	367	MED EVAC COMPLETE - ARVN REQUEST DELTA FAN IN EFFECT - VC ATTACK.	PH
	1845	ARTY	<b>368</b>	ARVN AMBUSHES; PT 842169-850168-844177-859175- 796194-809194-821181-707239-895118-928139- CAC 818184-817184-800194-795196-786211-906216- 904118- RF 824225-825227-824219-827213 - PASSED TO 3/26 AND HAND CARRIED TO COC WATCH OFFICER.	нъв
	1850	ARTY	<del>36</del> 9	ARVN: FIRE MISSION - 1 VC CO. VD 945169 - SAV-A-FLAME 29-E.	HLB
;	19 <b>30</b>	ARTY	370	ARVN: REQ REIN FIRES FROM USING ID 945175 - NOTIFIED 4/12 "G" & "T".	HLB
	2145	ARTY	371	FSCC: ALL HAI'S ARE APPROVED AT THIS TIME - SAV-A-PLANES 29-X-Z - NOTIFIED 4/12 & 3/26.	нв
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30 APR 67

	IME I OUT	"J"	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
***	002	1.0	20 21 0		
	1000	ARTY	372	FSGC: SAV-A-PLANE 30-A FOR RECON REG CONC TO 678167 (CAN 1200)	RLVB
	1340	ARTY	373	LADYSHIP: SAV-A-PLANE 30-X FOR RECON REG CONC (CAN 1345)	HLVB
·- #:	1625	AREY	374	ARVN: SAV-A-PLANE 30-AB COORD 833227 - VC ATTACKING.	RL <b>V</b> B
	1632	ARTY	<b>3</b> 75	LADYSHIP: BAY-A-PLANE 30-XB FOR RECON REG CONC (CAN 1650)	RLVB
	1821	ARTY	376	ARVW AMBUSHES; PF 842169-850168-840171-809194-778242-905120-920120- CAC 818184-814185-803194-793197-786210-786215-905118-904127-784214-787215- HF 824225-825227-819224-826220-PASSED TO 3/26 & HAND CARRIED TO COC.	PH ·
	1855	ARTY	377	PSCG: CANCEL TPQ-10 TARGET LIST 1-120 - IMPO RECEIVED FROM AFTERGLOW 1835.	PH
	1940	ARTY	378	ARVN: FIRE MISSION 30-P.	PH
	1945	arty	<b>3</b> 79	RECON: DONAHUE II IN CONTACT - SAV-A-PLANE 30-Q - INFORMED ARVN FOR SUPPORT.	PH
	2007	ARTY	380	FSCC: HAI'S CLEARED EXCEPT ARTY TARGET #5 CANCELED BY RECOM - HEMAINDER SAV-A-PLANE X-V-Z FAN APPLY 2130-0500 - INFORMED BRACE/3/26.	РН
	2045	ARTY	381	BRACE: REQUEST PERMISSION TO COMMENCE 81 ILLUMINATION - PERMISSION GRANTED.	PH
	2150	ARTI	382	FSCC: REQUESTED FIRE MISSION VIC 585225- 585235-595225-595235 FOR RECON FROM AFTERGLOW 22.	PH
	0630	ARTY	383	AKVH: FIRE MISSIOF - VC ATTACK CRID VD 8222 SAV-A-PLANE 01-B.	PH

# 3 nd programs CASUALTIES

## BATTLE AND NON BATTLE CASUALTIES

Calalegia Carie

## HEADQUARTERS 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

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3040/3 SC-7/WKM/

(DATE)

#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001. TO 2400.

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HO DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	6	1	A	A	0		A		3
USMC ENL	7	15	i	ā	Ö	4	Ď	ĭ	25
USN OFF		0	Ö	ð	9	9	۵	6	
USN ENL	ø	1	•	ð	0	0	•	ß	¥
TOTAL	7	17	1	ð		Ò		'n	26

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO:	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	54	475	4	2		Ġ		76	- 《《食
USMC ENL	1325	9547	210	4	Ó		200大	607	71806
usn off	Ď	â	6	ð	- 6	Ö	٨		
USN ENL	48	486	6	8	8	8	0	*3	<u> </u>
TOTAL	1427	10516	221	4	۵	<b>A</b>	127	644	9 troks

#### REMARKS:

7 EIA from 2/4 (Decurred 30Har67)

1 DON from 3/9

5 Win from 2/4 (1 moverred 24Mar67, 2 conversed 26Mar67, 2 conversed 26Mar67)

1 Win from 1/26 (conversed 27Mar67)

1 Win from 2/9

1 Win from 3/26

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CG, 3d MarDiv


1 Wis from 3/3

1 BHI from 3/26 (securred 32Mar6?)

G-1, 3d MarDiv G-3, 3d MarDiv DivSurgeon

FILE

W. V. HASKET Hajor, V. S. Marine Sorpe Meserve Adjulant



3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

3040/3 sc-7/WKM/

#### FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(DATE)

HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, TO 2400, 2400

	T/T A	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	TILE INJURED	TOTAL
	KIA	WIR	- DO "	8	8	0	0	0	0
USMC OFF		1-2-	7	- 6	0	0	T.	3	19
USMC ENL	1		~	-	A	a	0	0	Ø
USN OFF	0	9	-	- <del></del>	-	ā	0	0	0
USN ENL	_0	9	9	9	<del>                                     </del>	n	Y	3	19
TOTAL	7	8	9	<u> </u>	<u> </u>			L	

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HOS	STILE	
	***** 4	1.1T A	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
	KIA	WIA	DOW #	2	4	6	6	1.6	338
USMC OFF		771 6		-			23)	600	11914
USMC ENL	1332	9555	210	**	*		<u> </u>	0	- 8
USN OFF	â	#	0	•	- 0	0	0		520
<u> </u>	44	4.54		0	9	9_	7		19/4/
USN ENL		1004	221	1	Ø	1	224	147	43/20/
ጥርጥ AT	ALL	14244	16.43.A.	<u> </u>					_

#### REMARKS:

1 EIA from 3/9
1 EIA from HoCo William (oncourred light)
1 EIA from 2/1 (3 occurred 3GHar67)
1 EIA from 3/26 (occurred 3GHar67)
1 HED from 2/12 (occurred light)
1 HIA from 3687 in (occurred 29Mar67)
3 WIA from 3687 in (occurred 1/pr67)
3 WIA from 36 Reson (occurred light)
5 WIA from 3/4
2 HEI from 3/4
2 HEI from 3/12 (occurred light)

Copy to: CG, FMFPAC CG, III MAF (2)

CG, III MAF (2)

G-1, 3d MarDiv

G-3, 3d MarDiv DivSurgeon

FILE

W. W. MASSKY Major, U. S. Mayine Corps Roserve Adjoint DECL RESTRICT

#### · HEADQUARTERS 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

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3040/3 SC-7/WKM/ 4 April 1967 (DATE)

#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 167 TO 2400, 167

	T/T A		DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
	KIA	WIA	DOW	LITH	OT TIL	1.17.13	DESTRUCTO		TOTAL
USMC OFF	8	2	0	Ģ	8	Ø	9	Ö	2
USMC ENL	1	56	1	0	Ø	0	0	2	54
USN OFF	Ð	8	0	٥	0	4	ð	0	ð
USN ENL	8	8	8	å	0	ð	5	0	6
TOTAL	i	58	1	Ø	0	0	0	8	62

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	,						37037 7707	707 T T T3	
	( )	į				1	NON-HO:	21.TTR	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	4.5	1077	*	â	0	<b>Q</b>	6	16	560
	1333	9604	211	4	0	4	209	60202	11967
USN OFF	6	8	0	0	0	Ø	0	0	9
USN ENL	48	492	6	Ó	6	ð	9	31	586
TOTAL	1435	20581	222	6	ė	4	224	649	13121

#### REMARKS:

1 KIA from 2/4 (cocurred )lHar67)

1.BOX from 3/3 (ecourred 2apr67, previously reported VIA 2486767)

3 Wis from 11th Mogr Da

1 WIA from Man

y Wil from 36 Mosen Dr (1 occurred lapto?)

A WIA from 1/26 (occurred 30Max67)

2 WIA from 2/4 (ecourred 30Mam67)

3 WIA from 34M Na (occurred 30Mare?)

3 WIA from lat Ambre Da (occurred lapro?)

1 WIA from 2/9 (occurred 24pr67)

32 WIA from 3/9 (1 occurred 284ax67, 12 occurred 29Max67, 19 occurred 30Max67)

2 MHI from lat 8" How Stry (excerred 26Mar6?)

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

FOR PERIOD OOO1, TO 2400, TO 2400,

	T/T A	UT A	TVOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	MON-HOS DEATHS		TOTAL
USMC OFF	KIA	WIA	DOW	PILA	OFIL	MID C	n	0	D
USMC ENL	<u> </u>	25	0	<u> </u>	Λ	ń		1	96
USN OFF	-	ń	ň		Ŏ		<u> </u>	<u>o</u>	
USN ENL	•	2	Ā	<u>o</u>			0		2
TOTAL	96	22	ا م	n.	Δ_	Ω	0	11	29

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

<del></del>							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		1,7217	8	9	0	Λ	&	16	\$60
USMC ENL	1 77 7	6420	211		<u> </u>	j	200	403	11993
USN OFF		4	<u> </u>	Č		Ŏ.	ó_	0	8_
JSN ENL	10	10)	Ā	Δ	Ω	Ō	9	37	583
CAL	11.95	10203	222	6	a.		221	450	13049

#### REMARKS:

1 If from 11th Aff A

lei dron in

3 all from 3d Recon fin

3 41/ from 1/26 (occurred 304467)

5 al from 3/26

3 al from 1/12

1 H1' from 1/13 (occurred 30 Mar67)

1 #4 # # 1/4

3 TA from 2/4 (occurred 31 Mar67)
1 WTA from 3/3 (occurred 25Mar67)
3 WTA from 2/2 (2 occurred 25Mar67)

2 HT! Drum 3/9

1 班I Irea 1/26 (occurred 2)mar67)

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001,540767 TO 2400,5407

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
USMC ENL	0	31	0	0	0	0	0	1	32
USN OFF	0	0	0	Û	0	Q	0	Q	Q
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	Q	0	6	•	1
TOTAL	0	33	0	0	Q	0	0	1	34

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO:	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		478	€	2	0	0	6	16	561
	1333	9660	211	4	O	4	209	604	12025
USN OFF	0	8	٥	0	Q	0	0	0	88
USN ENL	48	495	6	0	9	0	9	31	589
TOTAL	1435	10641	222	6	0	4	224	651	13183

#### REMARKS:

1 WIA from 3d Bogr

1 Mid from M An

1 WIA from 1/26 (occurred 340r67)

7 WIA from 3/3 (2 occurred 24Mar67, 3 eccurred 25Mar67, 2 occurred 26Mar67)

2 WIA from 3/26 (eccurred 440x67)

2 WIN from Boll (securred 440r67)

2 WIA from lat Amtrac Bn (occurred 21Feb67)

4 WIA from 1/9

3 WIA from 2/9

4 Wild from 3d Recon

4 WLA from 3/9

2 WIA from 1/12

1 FEI from 3/3

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3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 6007 TO 2400.640767

	I/T A	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS		TOTAL
	KIA	MTH	0	0	0	6	0	ð	0
USMC OFF		<u> </u>			6	6	ð	1	61
USMC ENL	11_	<u> </u>	9	- 3		8	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	00	C	0	1 9	-	ä	0	3
USN ENL	2	1 1	0	0	<u> </u>	9			éh.
TOT AT.	19	50	Ð	0	0	0	9	<u> </u>	

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO:	STILE	
	774	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
	KIA		- DOW-	*****		A	6	16	50
USMC OFF	5.54	478	3		<u> </u>	<u> </u>		Es.	12085
		9709	211	14.	1 0	4	209	902	¥50 05
USMC ENL	1.344	7.77			a	盎	n		8
USN OFF	9	8	0	0	<u> </u>	*			663
	7	Serie.	4	4	1 6	1 6	9	31	592
USN ENL	50	496	1			1	224	669	1 1227
TOT AT.	1448	10691	222	4	0		1 444	974	

#### REMARKS:

2 III from 155 Som Btry

9 KIA from 1/9 (occurred 540r6?)

1 KIA from 34 MT (occurred 54pr67)

1 XIA from 3/12 (securred 54pr67)

I VIA from My Ba

I WIL from lat Ambreo Ba (opourred lapr67)

10 WIA from 2/4 (1 occurred 17Feb67, 1 occurred 24pr67, 8 eccurred 30Mar67)

2 WIA from 1/26 (1 securred 34pr67, 1 securred 44pr67)

7 WIA from 2/9 (1 occurred 5 Apr67)

1 WIA from 1/12 (occurred hapre?)

I All thom 34 man po 2 WIA from 3d Recon En (occurred 5Apr67)

6 WIA from 4/12

17. WIA from 1/9 (16 eccurred 54pr67)

2 VIA from 155 dem Btry Copy to 174

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 74-67 TO 2400, 74-67

							NON-HO		
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	7	7	n	A	n	^	- A	A	2
USMC ENL	Ö	qui	2	a	A	ā	, ,	ĝ	ka
USN OFF	Ä	ñ	O	٥	A	Ď	0	A	'n
USN ENL	ħ	•	8	Α	٨	^			*
TOTAL	20	Ψ	2	Ô	o.	ă		Ż	<£

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	55	479	5	2	- 6	Ö	6	16	563
USMC ENL		9702	27.3	4	A	4	230	607	12133
USN OFF	6	8	Á	A	a	0	C	Ġ	A
USN ENL	50	499	6	Ø	0	6	0	41	595
TOTAL	1458	10728	224	6	0	4	225	654	13299

#### REMARKS:

1 FIA from 1/26 (eccurred 6Apr67)

1 IIA from 2/4 (occurred 5Apr67)

7 KIA from 1/9 (occurred 5apr67)

1 KIs from 3/12 (eccurred 5spr67)

1 DU from 1/9 (occurred 6Apr67, previously reported as VIA 19Nar67)

1 Dow from 4/12 (previously reported as WIA 64pr67)

1 PD from 3d Af In

32 #14 from 1/9 (30 occurred 54pr67, 1 occurred 64pr67)

2 WIA from 11th mgr an

3 WI & from 1/4

1 WIA from 34 Recon Bn

1 WIA from 2/4 (cocurred 244ar67)

1 mi from 4/12 (occurred 1 mr67)

1 Ed from in in (occurred 24pr67)

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 10 2400, 51, 67

	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	Λ	9	4						3
USMC ENL	9	23	4	ō					<u> </u>
USN OFF	A	ă_	ä				<u> </u>	0_	
USN ENL	6	2	n			e_	0		- 2
TOTAL	9	97		Ą					34

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HO DEATHS		TOTAL
USMC OFF		4.40	E	9	Λ	Λ		16	565
USMC ENL	7 766	6765	27 ju	Į,	<u> </u>	Ĭ.		611	18163-
USN OFF	A	À	A	A	Ä	۸			
USN ENL	<b>4</b> 0	563	Á			a		32	597
TOTAL	1460	10755	225			4	225	658	1333

#### REMARKS:

2 XIA from 1/9

1 DN from 1st Ambrac Sn (occurred 7Apr67)

3 WIA from 2/4 (I occurred \$40x67, 2 occurred \$40x67)

1 WIA from 1st Amtree Bn (eccurred 74pr67)

2 VIA from 2/26 (1 occurred 21 Nov66, 1 occurred 6 Apr67)

7 WIA from 4/12 (occurred 7apr67)

I WIA from 14 (occurred 26Har67)

t VIA from 1/9 (4 occurred 5Apr67)

5 WIA from 1/26 (3 occurred 5 pr67, 2 occurred 6 pr67)

1 WIA from 3d HT bn

1 VIA from 2/12

1 MHI from 1/9 (eccurred 7Apr67)

1 HHI from 4/12 (eccurred 74pr67)

1 MHI from 2/4 (securred 24pr67)

l HHI from 3d Recon Ra (occurred 25Mer67)

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 10 2400, 040-67

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS		TOTAL
USMC OFF		В	73	A	n	0	6	Δ.	0
USMC ENL	6	26		A	Ö		^	2	35
USN OFF	ė	0	ā	ō	Ö	<u>Ö</u>	<u> </u>	0	<u> </u>
USN ENL	n	3	à	a	a	_6	0	0	
TOTAL	6	27	1	n	Ó	0	<u> </u>	2	

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		483	5	2	9	0	6	16	565
USMC ENL	1361	9790	215	4	6	4	210	613	12197
USN OFF	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	Q	8
USN ENL	50	502	6	0	0	0	9	31	<b>59</b> 8
TOT AL	1466	10781	226	6	0	4	225	660	13368

#### REMARKS:

1 IIA from 3/26 3 KIA from 2/26 (occurred 7Apr67) 2 KIA from 2/4 (occurred Sapr67) 1 DOW from 1/26 (occurred hapro7 previously reported WIA Sapro7) 1 WIA from HgCo, Hafte 5 WIA from 1/26 (eccurred 840r67) 1 WIA from 2/4 (equired Sipr67) 7 WIA from High 3ddan 1 sig from 3/3 (occurred Sapr67) 1 114 from 3/26 2 FIA from 3/9 6 wis from 1/4 2 WIA from 2/26 (1 occurred bapr67, 1 occurred 7Apr67) 1 FIA from 1st Ambrac Bo (occurred 74pr67) 1 hal from 2/26 (occurred 740767)
1 hal from 3/9 (occurred 840767)
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Hejor, U. S. Marine Corps Beserve

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 104767TO 2400, 104767

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		1	0	Û	0	0	0	Ô	1
USMC ENL	À	15	0	0	Ð	0	2	0	21
USN OFF	0	0	Ð	0	0	Q	٥	0	00
USN ENL	0	1	٥	0	ð	0	Ò	Ö	1
TOTAL	A	17	O	0	0	Q	2	O	23

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE		
	KIA	WIA	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	
SMC OFF	-	482	5	2	0	0	6	16	566	
SMC ENL		9805	215	L	0	A.	212	612	12217	
SN OFF	O	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	ŧ.	
SN ENL	50	503	8	0	0	0	9	31	599	
OTAL	11.70	10798	226	6	0	4	227	659	13390	

#### REMARKS:

- 3 EIA from 2/4 (cocurred Sapr67)
- 1 KIA Drom 1/26 (occurred 9Apr67)
- 1 Min from 2/12 (occurred 31 Mar67)
- 1 HB from 11th mer (securred 9apr67, previously reported as HII on 27bar67)
- 1 WIA from lat Ambroe (secured 74pr67)
- 2 TIL Drom 1/9
- 2 WIA from 2/9
- A HIA from Highn (occurred 9Apr67)
- 2 HIA from 1/4
- 3 MLA from 9th MT (occurred 9Apr 67)
- 3 HIA from 3/26 (occurred 94pr67)

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 124pr67 TO 2400, 124pr67

							NON-HOS		
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
SMC OFF		0	0	0	0	Ō	2	8	
SMC ENL	*	26	U	U	U	U	¥	4	4.7
SN OFF	0	0	0	0	Ø	O	٥	0	ð
SN ENL	9	2	0	Ô	9	6	0	0	2
COTAL	2	28	0	O	0	0	0	2	32

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE		
	KIA	WIA	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	
USMC OFF	56	زقيا	5	2	0	6	6	16	>66	
USMC ENL	1369	y652	<b>Z17</b>	4	0	4	212	617	12275	
USN OFF	0	5	U	Q	U	U	9	0	8	
USN ENL	50	505	6	Ų	U	Ü	7	31	907	
TOTAL	1415	100Hg	679	\$	U	4	227	604	13452	

REMARKS:

1 KIA from 3d TK ba

3 WIA from 1/4 (2 occurred 22Mar67)

2 WIA from 3d TK Ba

7 WIA from 2/26 (2 securred 6Apr67, 2 securred 7Apr67, 1 securred 8Apr67

1 ecourred 9Apr67)

3 WIA from Ho Bm (occurred llaprof)

2 WIA from 1/26 (securred 94pr67) 6 WIA from 2/26 (securred 7Apr67)

3 wild from 2/4 (occurred Sapro7)

1 WIA from 2/9

1 VIA from 3d Recon

1 NHI from lat AmTrac Bn

1 MHI from 11th Engr Bn

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3040/3 SC-7/WKM/

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 174, 57 TO 2400, 174, 567

	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HO DEATHS		TOTAL
USMC OFF		7	n	А	n	0	n		11
USMC ENL		99	2	G	0	0_	0	3	30
USN OFF	à	Ġ.	A	4	n	a	<u> </u>		
USN ENL	٥	0	D	6	٥	a		<u> </u>	
TOTAL	3	23	2	Û	0_	a			

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		183	<	2	O	Ð	6	16_	567
USMC ENL	- 10	9626	217	h	Ó	L.	71.2	615	1226
USN OFF	5	A	0	0	9	0	0	Ø	
USN ENL	50	503	6	0	0	8	9	n	599
TOTAL	1473	10820	225	6	0	b	227	662	13120

#### REMARKS:

- 1 KIA from 3/26
- 1 KIA from 1/26 (occurred 10Apr67)
- 1 KIA from 2/4 (occurred SApro7)
- 1 DOW from 2/9
- 1 DOW from 3/3 (occurred 10Apr67, previously reported WIA 2Apr67) 4 WIA from 1/26 (occurred 30Mar67)
- 1 WIA from 1/4
- 5 WIA from 2/4 (3 occurred 31Mar67, 2 occurred 6Apr67)
  1 WIA from 1/13 (occurred 30Mar67)
  2 WIA from HqBm (occurred 9Apr67)

- 7 WIA from 1/12 (1 occurred 6 Apr67, 6 occurred 7Apr67)
- 1 WIA from Johnson (securred 10Apr67)
- 2 WIA from MATON
- 1 MHI from 1/26 (occurred 2 Mar67)
- 2 MHI from 3/26

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 1340-67

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		<u> </u>	0	0	n	0	0	0	O
USMC ENL	*2	10	ń	,	ń	n	n	),	3.7
USN OFF	_^_			^	Ò	۸	<u> </u>	0	c
USN ENL			Ä	Ď	ň	ň	Ň	ň	
TOTAL	2	10	Ň	<u> </u>			ō	),	77

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	MIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	CÁ		ĸ	9	n	n	6	16	568
USMC ENL		ORAS	237	1.	À	J.	212	691	12292
USN OFF	2	Ř	,	2.1	O	ō	O	0	å
USN ENL	rn	ÉOÉ	6	٥	0	Ω	Ó	ጎኘ	601
TOTAL	11.7R	70258	72Å	Ž	ñ	j,	227	668	13/69

#### REMARKS:

2 KIA from 3d TK En

1 KIA from 2/26 (securred 11Apr67)

1 WIA from 2/9

5 WIA from Hq Bn (1 occurred 270ct66)

1 WIA from 1/4 (occurred 12Apr67)

1 WIA from 2/26 (occurred 11Apr67)

1 wild from 3d TK-3n 1 Wid from 3/3

1 NHI from 3d Har (occurred 11Apr67)

1 HII from W12 (occurred liapro?)

2 MHI from 11th Engr Bn

W. W. MASSEY

Major, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve

Adjutant

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15 April 1967 (DATE)

HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001 . 14 -- 67 TO 2400 . 14 -- 67

	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	a	0	a	Α	0		m	٥	0
USMC ENL		12		ń		ñ	2	1	16
USN OFF	â	70	ā	Á	n.	ñ	ñ	ñ	O
USN ENL	À	ò	0	O	ñ	ñ	n	0	Ò
TOTAL	9	70	7	ñ	Ô	n	0	1	76

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HOSTILE		7) at .
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	56	183	K	2	a	۵	6	16	568
USMC ENL	137h	CR7	278	L <sub>a</sub>	O	h	21.2	622	12306
USN OFF	A	Ŕ	O	O	C	٥	0	0	6
USN ENL	KA	KOK	6	0	0	0	9	31	601
TOTAL	1)60	10870	229	6	0	l <sub>k</sub>	227	669	131.85

#### REMARKS:

1 KIA from 1/26 (13Apr67)

1 KIA from 3/3 (13Apró?)

1 DOW from 1/12

2 WIA from 2/9

1 WIA from 4/12 (13Apr67)

6 WILL from 3/3

3 WIA from 2/26

1 HHI from 1/12 (13Apr67)

W. W. MASSEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
\_\_Adjutant

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3040/3 SC-7/WKM/ 16 April 1967 (DATE)

#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 1540-5TO 2400, 1540-67

							NON-HO:			
	KIA	WIA	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	
USMC OFF	0	1	٥	0	0	0	0	Δ	1	
USMC ENL		30	1	ð	0	0	0	0	31	
USN OFF	9	0	0	ð	0	Ō	Ö	0	0	
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	
TOTAL	0	32	1	Ð	0	0	0	1	34	

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

		1					NON-HO	STILE		
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	
USMC OFF	28	484	5	2	0	0	6	16	569	
USMC ENL	1374	9903	219	4	Ö	4	212	622	12338	
USN OFF	0	8	0	- 0	0	0	8	0	88	
USN ENL	50	506	6	Ð	0	0	9	32	603	
TOTAL	1480	10901	230	6	0	4	227	670	13518	

#### REMARKS:

- 1 DOW from 2/26 (previously reported as WIA on lhapro?)
- 4 WIA from 1st Amtrac Bm (11Apr67)
- 6 WIA from 1/26 (4-10Apr67, 2-12Apr67)
- 12 WIA from 2/4 (14Apr67)
- 2 WIA from 1/9 (1-14Apr67)
- 4 WIA from 3/9
  - 3 WIA from 11th Engr An
- 1 MHI from 3/9
  - 1 WIA from 3d Engr Bn

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 164 m 67 TO 2400, 164 m 67

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS		TOTAL
USMC OFF	n.	2			A			0	2
USMC ENL	a	28	ă	ŏ	ŏ	<u> </u>	ŏ		32
USN OFF	0	0	ค	0	0	_0_	0	<u>.</u>	
USN ENL	0	1	0	<u> </u>	0	0			
TOTAL	0	97		<u></u>	n			l,	L 35

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HOSTILE		•
	KIA	AIW	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	56	1,86	ц	9	۸	Λ	6	-36-	<b>ビ</b> フコ
USMC ENL	1374	9931	219	4	Ö	<u>[i</u>	21.2	626	12370
USN OFF	0	8	0	0_	n	o	0		8
USN ENL	50	507	6	0	<u>,</u>		9	32	601
TOTAL	1480	10932	230	6	Ď	)a	227	671	73553

#### REMARKS:

8 WIA from 2/4

1 WIA from 2/26

4 WIA from 1/26 (1-10Apr67, 1-13Apr67, 2-14Apr67)

2 WIA from 3d Engr (15Apr67)

1 WIA from 9thMt (15Apr67)

3 WIA from 1/4 (15Apr67)

2 WIA from 3d TK Bm (13Apr67)

3 WIA from 1st Amtrac Bn (15Apr67)

1 WIA from 3d Recon Bn

6 WIA from 11th Engr Bn

1 NHI from 3/3 (15Apr67) 1 NHI from 2/4 (15Apr67)

1 NHI from HqCo 4th Mar (15Apr67)

1 NHI from 3/9

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#### HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

#### FOR PERIOD 0001, 174, 67 TO 2400, 174, 67

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	•	7	Α.	n	Λ	a		_0	2
USMC ENL	n	97	7	Ô	0	ò		1	23
USN OFF	Ö	n	n.	n_	Ō	-ō	ō		0
USN ENL	n	0	۸	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	0	0		0
TOTAL	4	22	j	Ď.	n	a		11	25

#### TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	<u> </u>						NON-HOSTILE		
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	67	1.A7	Κ.	9	0	Ó	6	16	573
USMC ENL	7.37	0051	ววก	],	0	Ĭ,	91.2	627	19399
USN OFF	ñ	R	n	ñ	n	o_	Δ	n_	88
USN ENL	50	507	6	0	0	<u></u>	9	36	601
TOTAL	1.81	10053	231	6	n	J.	927	675	13577

1 KIA from 3d Recon Bn (16Apr67)

REMARKS: 1 DOW from 1/4 (Previously reported WIA 11Apr67)

6 WIA from 1/26 (10Apr67)

1 WIA from Highn (5Apr67)

1 WIA from 1/4 (15Apr67) 3 WIA from 2/4 (16Apr67)

1 WIA from 2/9 (16Apr67)

1 WIA from 2/26 (16Apr67)

1 WIA from 9th Engr (26Jul66)

1 WIA from HoCo 9th Mar (13Apr67)

3 \*1A from 1/4 (1-16Apr67)

1 WIA from 1/9

3 WIA from 3d Recon

1 HHI from 3/3 (16Apr67)

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3040/3 SC-7/WKM/ 19 April 1967 (DATE)

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001,184,77 TO 2400,184,767

	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		^	0	Ω	n	a	0	0	<u></u>
USMC ENL	Y	a	Ö	А	ň				12
USN OFF	<u> </u>	Ö	Ô	Ä	Ġ	<u> </u>	^	0	0
USN ENL	^	n.	ň	ñ	ň	ň	<u> </u>		
TOTAL	1	8	9	à	ñ	ñ		1	12

## TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	57	1.87	ď	9	9	C	6	16.	573
USMC ENL		OCK?	922	Ĵı	Ġ	),	27.2	620	12):03
USN OFF	n	Ĥ	0	0	۸	A	n	0	8
USN ENL	ΚO	<b>507</b>		۸	â	0	<u> </u>	32	-60h
TOTAL	11.69	10060	233	Ā	ñ	1,	227	676	135E8

## REMARKS:

1 KIA from 1/26 (occurred 16Apr67)

1 DOW from 2/4 (eccurred 17Apr67 previously reported as WIA Sapr67)
1 DOW from 1/9 (securred 1Sapr67)

3 WIA from 1/26 (eccurred 16Apr 67)

1 WIA from 2/9 (securred 19 aro?)

1 MHI from 1/9 (occurred 17Apr67)

1 WIA from 1/4 (occurred 15Apr 67)

1 WIA from 3/26 (occurred 18 pro7)

2 WIA from Hig Bn (occurred 18Apr67)

H. W. MASCET

Major, U. S. Marine Corps Heserve Adjutant

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20 April 1967 (DATE)

## HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001, 1940-67 TO 2400, 1940-67

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		4		4	Α		ň	ñ	*
USMC ENL	3	*	Ö	0	6	ð	Ž	3	W
USN OFF			٥	Α	A	ð	0	٥	A
USN ENL	7	ď	a	á	D	0		a	ja.
TOTAL	4	N.K.	•	A	n	Ò	9	3	K.

## TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	MIA	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		ben	<b>4</b>	7	n	Λ	6	16	576
USMC ENL	1378	9907	222	<u>k</u>			214	631	12450
USN OFF		A	a		6		n.	a	Ä
USN ENL	67	610	6	n	A	a		32	MR
TOTAL	1486	11005	233	6	n	à	220	670	13642

## REMARKS:

- 1 XIA from 1/26 (ecourred 1840r67)
- 3 Kla from 1/4 (2 occurred 18apr67) 2 MED from 3dSPAs
- 1 VIA from 34ATAn (occurred Sepr67)
- 7 VIA from 11 th Bagran (4 occurred 184pr67)
- 37 #14 from 1/4 (9 occurred 18Apr67)
- 2 HHI from MSPBn
- 1 HEL from 1/12 (occurred 1840r67)

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# HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001 and TO 2400 and TO

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS	STILE INJURED	ПОМАТ
USMC OFF		9	<u> </u>	MILK.	OT LIC	PLL 13	DEMIIIO 6	A	TOTAL
USMC ENL	1	93	n	n	n	a	A	n	92
USN OFF	0	Ď	0		0	9			^
USN ENL	<u>.</u>		<u> </u>	0	<u> </u>	<u> </u>			i
TATOT	1	74		A	. 0	A	A	ō	34

## TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	57	49.2	•	2	O	a	6	λr	678
USMC ENL	1379	10028	222	Ł	8	-	274	AN 1	CAREF
USN OFF	0	â	ø		A	6	A	a	<b>A</b>
USN ENL	51	611	6	A	a	50	Ġ	32	Á/XO
TOTAL	1487	11039	233	4	à	À	220	ADO:	13.627

#### REMARKS:

1 KIA from 1/9 (occurred 19Apr67)
2 WIA from 1/26 (occurred 18Apr67)
29 WIA from 1/4 (# occurred 21Mar67, 2 sesured 22Mar67, 7 securred 23Mar67, 1 occurred 24Mar67, 9 occurred 25Mar67)

1 WIA from 11th Magrin (occurred 1840r67)

2 WIA from 1/9 (1 ensured 1969r 67, 1 eccurred 1949r 67)

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3040/3 SC-7/WKM 22 April 1967 (DATE)

# HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001. 214p. 67 TO 2400. 214p. 67

	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		,	6	- 2	0		2	9	
USMC ENL		À	ň		_ŏ_	_ <u>ŏ</u> _		0	11
USN OFF	*	,	-		0	-0-	<u> </u>	-0	
USN ENL	0	0	_ a_	<u> </u>	-		<del></del>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
TOTAL	-	120	L		_قا		1-2		12

# TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOM	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		.03		*	0	0	6	76_	579
USMC ENL	71	10027	720	î.	ñ	i,	215	637	12/.93
USN OFF	1380	40051	A	6	á	,	í,	n	A
USN ENL	-0-	£3.7	4	<u>^</u>	ň	n_	Ĉ.	32	609
TOTAL	7.4	77010	623	Á	ň	l.	230	679	13689
TOTAL	171.86	1 11010		<del></del>					

## REMARKS:

1 KIA from 2/9

1 Mill from 1/9

2 WIA from 1/26 (occurred 19Apr67)

2 WIA from 1/4 (securred 20Apr67)

1 WIA from 3d Tk 3m 5 WIA from 2/9

W. W. MASSET Major, U. S. Harine Corps Reserve Adjutant

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001, 224007TO 2400, 224767

			7011	307.4	ത്ത	мтс	NON-HOS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
	KIA	WIA	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEMILIO	1110 011111	TOTAL
USMC OFF	O	h	Ω	A	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		
USMC ENL	3	<b>4</b> 2	0	<u>n</u>	6				35
USN OFF	ā	n	ก	ń	a	<u> </u>			
USN ENL	Ω.	9	n	a	n	o o			
TOTAL	1	30	a	a	n	a			1.2

## TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	57	),07	ಕ್ಷ	9	n	6	6	- 76	583
USMC ENL	2382	30070	222	la	n	<u>,</u>	215	639	12528
USN OFF	0	8	0	Ó	0	n		0	8
USN ENL	51	513	6		0	<u>n</u>	<u> </u>	32	672
TOTAL	1489	11088	233	6	0	14	230	679	13730

REMARKS: 1 KIA from 3/26 (214pr67

2 WIL 2/9

3 WIA from 1/26 (21Apr67)

1 WIA from 1st 8" Howitser Btry (17Apr 67)

1 Wil from 11th Magr Ba

1 WIA from 3/26 (21Apr67)

1 WIA from 1/12 (20Apr67)

4 WIA from 3d Reson Bm (21Apr67)

4 WIA from HoBn (2 occurred 21Apró7)

1 WIA from 1/13 (23Dec66)

21 WILL from 1/4

1 NHI from HqCo 9th Har (21Apr67)

W. W. MASSEY Hajor, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Adjutant

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21, April 1967 (DATE)

HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001, 234, 67 TO 2400, 234, 67

	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	Λ	Ä	.0	۸	0		Δ		0
USMC ENL	Ä	21	Α.	A			<u> </u>		99
USN OFF	a		- 0	Λ.	a	Ä	ā		a
USN ENL	n		n		ñ	0			1
TOTAL	O	25	ñ	a	ō	ň	^	<u> </u>	36

## TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	57	197	Ç	9	α	O	6	76	er ka
USMC ENL	1381	10091	222	1,	Ŏ.	la la	215	623	12550
USN OFF	0	8	0	Ö	O_	ō	0	0	
USN ENL	53	577	6	Ö	- 0	0	9	32	615
TOTAL	1180	าาร์าร	932	Ă	ā	l <sub>a</sub>	330	690	3.2766

#### REMARKS:

2 WIA from 2/9 (1 occurred 22Apr67)

12 WIA from 1/4 (11 occurred 22Apr67)

1 WIA from Highn (22Apr67) 1 WIA from 1/9 (22Apr67)

A WIA from Holm (2 occurred 22Apr 67)

1 WIA from 2/4 (21Apr67)

3 WIA from 3/9

1 WIA from 3/26

1 NHI from 3/26 (22Apr-67)

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001, 2010-67TO 2400, 2400767

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	TILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		8	0	Ø	0	6	O.	Ġ	0
USMC ENL	Ö	6	0	a	٥	a	11		10
USN OFF	0	0	ð	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	6	Ð	0	Ö	0	11	3	10

# TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HOSTILE			
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	
USMC OFF	57	197	5	2	0	0	6	16	583	
USMC ENL	1381	10097	222	4	0	4	216	636	12560	
JSN OFF	0	8	O	0	0	0	0	0	8	
JSN ENL	51	517	- 6	0	0	Q	9	32	615	
TOTAL	11.89	11119	233	6	0	4	231	602	13766	

# REMARKS:

1 WHD from 3d AT Bu

2 WIA from 1/9 (1-5Har67)

2 WIA from 3d Tank Bn (23Apr67)

1 WIA from 2/9

1 WIA from 3d Engr Bn 1 NHI from 3d AT Bm

2 NHI from 3/9 (23Apr67)

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# HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001, 254pr67 TO 2400, 254pr67

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	TILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	Q	0	0	0	0	0	0	00	O.
USMC ENL	5	1,3	O.	0	0	O	2	2	Ęρ
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	ព	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ð	<u> </u>	
TOTAL	5	1:3	0	0	0	G	3	9	52

## TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	57	1.97	ς	2	0	Q	6	16_	<b>5</b> 83
USMC ENL		10140	222	4	٥	14	218	638	12612
USN OFF	0	8	0	O.	0	0	0	0	8
USN ENL	51	517	6	0	0	3	9	32	615
TOTAL	14,94	11162	233	6	0	4	233	686	13818

2 KIA from 1/9 (occurred 24Apr67)

REMARKS: 3 KIA from 11th Roge Bo

- 1 MHD from 3d AT Bn (24Apr67)
- 1 NATO from 3/12
- 1 WIA from 1/13 (160ct66)
- 8 WTA from 3/9 (1-24Apr67)
- 2 WIA from Hg?o 3d Mar
- 2 WIA from 2/9
- 8 WIA from 30 Recon Bn
- 13 WIA from 1/9 (24Apr67)
- 2 WIA from 3d Tank Bn (1-8Apr67 1-9Apr67)
- 1 WIA from 11th Engr Bn (24Apr67)
- 1 PHI from 3/3
- 1 NHI from 3/26
- 1 HIA from 1/26 (24Apr67)

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# HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001, 26400, 70 2400, 264007

	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	-
USMC ENL	÷	5,7	0	0	0	0	0	1	24
USN OFF	0	O	0	0	0	ð	0	0	Q
USN ENL	0	1	6	0	0	0	ð	٥	1
TOTAL	2	25	0	1	٥	Ö	0	1	29

## TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	T	T	T				NON-HO:	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	57	500	5	3	0	0	6	16	587
	1388	10161	222	4	0	4	218	639	12636
USN OFF	9	8	0	0	0	0	۵	ð	8
USN ENL	51	518	6	0	0	0	. 9	32	616
TOTAL	L496	11187	233	7	0	À.	233	:687	13847

## REMARKS:

1 HIA from 3d AT Bn (24Apr67)

1 KIA from 2/12 (RhApr67)

1 KIA from 1/9 (2hApr67)

4 WIA from lat Amtrac Bo

1 WIA from 3d MT Bu

2 WIA from 1/9 (1-2hApr 1-25Apr67)

2 WIA from 1/4

16 WIA from 11th Engr Bn (25Apr67)

1 WHI #: can 4/12 (25Apr67)

W. W. MASSEY Major, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Adjutant

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CG, 3d MarDiv

G-1, 3d MarDiv

G-3, 3d MarDiv

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3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

3040/3 SC-7/WKM/

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

28 April 1967 (DATE)

# HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001, 271 767 TO 2400, 274 767

							NON-HOS	STILE	
	KIA	AIW	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF		7	0	n	0	_0_	9		1
USMC ENL		70	Ω	Ō		0_		-0	96
USN OFF	0	Ô	n	0_		0	<u> </u>	0	
USN ENL	9	0	0_	0	_0_	0	<u> </u>		
TOTAL	27	77	0			0	11	<u> </u>	99

# TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
HISMC OFF		Son	e'	9	0	A	6	76	588
U.A. O O. A.	1h13	10271	222		n	I <sub>k</sub>	27.9	699	12732
USN OFF	1413	8	6	n	O.	O	0_	O	8
USN ENL	23	518	1 4	0	0	O	ė,	32	A18
	1523	11268	233	7	0	J <sub>1</sub>	23	687	13916

REMARKS: 16 KIA from 3/3 (7 occurred 25Apr67 9 occurred 26Apr67)

2 KIA from 1/h

1 XIA from 3/12

1 MHD from HoCo 4th Har

37 WIA from 3/3 (4 occurred E5Apr67) (32 occurred 26Apr67)

1 WIA from 9th HT Ba

1 WIA from 1/12 (occurred 2hApr67)

1 WIA from 2/9 (eccurred 26Apr67)

1 WIA from 3/9

6 WIA from 11th Engr Ba (1 occurred 25Apr67)

6 WIA from 3/26

3 WIA from 3d TK Bm (1 occurred 19Apr67)

2 WIA from 2/26 (eccurred 26Apr67)

9 WIA 1/A

3 WIA free 3d Secon Ba (1 occurred 25Apr67)

1 VIII from 1/9

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W. W. MASSET

Adjutant

Major, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve

3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

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3040/3 SC-7/WKM/ 25 ACTIL 1967 (DATE)

## HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001,28Apr67 TO 2400,25Apr67

							NON-HO:		
	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA.	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	0	16	ð	0	Ö	0	0	•	16
USMC ENL	1h	116	Ō	i.	Ö	Ö	0	٥	764
USN OFF	0	1	0	Ó	٥	Đ	Ó	٥	1
USN ENL	6	12	0	0	Ő	0	Ö	0	12
TOTAL	14	175	0	<u> </u>	0	0	6	e	193

# TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OF	57	517	5	3	0	0	6	16	9
USMC ENI	11:27	10377	222	8	9	14	219	639	19896
USN OFF	0	9	0	9	0	0	8	0	9
USN ENL	53	530	6	0	0	Ø	9	32	630
TOTAL	1537	111,33	233	11	Ö	4	234	687	1月139
	6 XIA	1/9 (2	-26Apr6	· 621	Apar67)				

REMARKS: 1 KM 34 Engr ha

5 ELA Bosco 9th Far

L HIA 3/3 (26Apr67)

3 MIX 2/9

II WIA Hope 9th Flar

5 HIA Highn (I-26Apr67)

7 WIA 3/3 (5-25Apr67, 1-25Apr67)

2 WIA 2/9

12 HIA 1/12

2 WIA 2/12

2 WIA 1/13

A WIA Lot Asstrac Bo

2h VIA 34 Escon Bn (1-22Apr67)

31 VIA 1/4 (29-271pr67)

1 WIA 9th MT Do

3 WIA 1/9 (2-274pr67, 1-19Mar67)

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8 WIA 11th Engr Bn (1-25Apr67, 7-27Apr67)

24 VIA 1/12 (22-27Agr67)

6 WIA 3/12

J WIA HOCO 25th Her

3 VILL 34 Hod In

15 VIA 1/86 (1-27Apr67)

9 WIA 3d Engr In

W. W. MASSET Major, U. S. Marine Corpe Reserve Adjutant

Sill

#### HEADQUARTERS

3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

3040/3 SC-7/WKM/

30 April 1967 (DĀTE)

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Max Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD 0001, 201-67 TO 2400, 201-67

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOS DEATHS	STILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	7	9	ð	n	۵	n.	n	<u> </u>	3
USMC ENL	A	77	A	ñ	C	O.			1.5
USN OFF	Δ	T a	Ġ	Ô	o	a	0	0	0
USN ENL	٥	Ģ	a	a	n	O	Ď	0	2
TOTAL	0	ki	Q	n	n	α	0	O	50

# TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	AIW	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	58	519	ξ,	2	0	0	6	16	606
USMC ENL		10111	222	6	0	Ì.	219	639	12939
USN OFF	۵	9	Ω	Ω	0	O	0	0	9
USN ENL	53	532	6	Ô	n	0	Ģ	32	632
TOTAL	1516	11)-71	233	A	٥	4	234	687	71186

## REMARKS:

- 1 KIA from 3d AT Bn (2hApr67 previously Ept se HIA)
- 2 KIA from 3/3 (20Apr67 previously Rpt as MIA)
- 2 XIA from 2/9
- 3 KIA from 1/9 (1-27Apr67, 2-2hApr67)
- I KIA from 2/12
- 1 WIA from 3d TK Bn (19Apr67)
- 5 WIA from 1/26 (2-25Apr67, 3-26Apr67) 2 WIA from 1/9 (1-27Apr67, 1-25Apr67)
- 2 WIA from 11th Engr Bn (27Apr 67)
- 2 WIA from 3d Engr Bn (28Apr67)
- 5 WIA from HgCo 9thHar (28Apró7)
- 1 WIA from 2/26
- 1 WIA from 3/3
- 1 WIA from Holin (28Apr67)
- topy to com 2/9
- CG, FMFPAC
- 15 WIA from L/12 (2+28Apr67) 5 WIA from 3d Recon Bu
- CG, III MAF (2)
- CG, 3d MarDiv
- G-1, 3d MarDiv
- G-3, 3d MarDiv
- DivSurgeon
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Major, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Adjutant

W. W. HASSEY





3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

3040/3

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SC-7/WKM/ 1 MAY 1967

(DATE)

HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

3d Mar Div 3040

# FOR PERIOD OOO1, MAPRO TO 2400, CAPRO

							NON-HO		
	KIA	WIA	DOW	AIM	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	O	r,	Ø	0	0	0	0	0	5
USMC ENL	2	52	ð	O	0	0	Q	0	华
USN OFF	0	O	O	Ö	O	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	Ö	K	0	Ö	0	0	0	0	5
TOTAL	2	65	0	0	0	0	0	0	6h

## TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

							NON-HO	STILE	
	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OF		524	K	2	Ö	Q	6	16	611
USMC EN		101:66	222	6	Ö	<u>lı</u>	21.9	639	12993
USN OFF	O	9	Q	0	0	Q	0	0	9
USN ENL	53	537	6	0	0	0	P	32	637
TOTAL	1548	11536	233	8	Q	4	234	667	14250

## REMARKS:

- 1 KIA from 1/12 (27Apr67)
- 1 KIA from 1/9 (21/Apr67)
- 20 WIA from 3/R (1-20apr67) 25 WIA from 1/9 (15-26Apr67, 2-28Apr67, 7-29Apr67)
- 2 WIA from 3d Recon Bn
- 1 WIA from 1/12 (27Apr67)
- 2 WIA from 2/12 (1-27Apr67)
- 1 WIA from 2/9

- 1 WLA from 3/3 (27Apr67)
- 1 WIA from 1/26 (29Apr67)

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1 WIA from 3/9 (25Apr67)

4 WIA from Hy Co 9TH Har (2-28Apr67, 2-30Apr67)

1 WIA from 3d TK Ha (27Apr67) 3 WIA from 3d Engr En (27Apr67)

W. W. MASSET

Hejor, U. S. Harine Corps Reserve Adjutant

# 5 VIP VISITS

30-CALAR DIV

VIP VISITS

Apr 1969

# H-ADQUANTERS

FPO San Francisco 96602

DivBul 5050 - 38/DGM/Jrr -13 Apr 1967

## DIVISION BULLETIN 5050

From: Commanding General To: Distribution List

Subja Major General Robert E. CUSHNAN, USMC, Orientation Tour, 17-22Apr67

Ref: (a) ICCN 5050 of 10Apr67

Enol: (1) Itinerary

(2) Responsibilities

- ?. Purpose. To publish an itinerary with pertinent instructions and responsibilities for the visit of Major General Gushman during the period 17-22 April 1967.
- z. Cancellation. DivBul 5050 W/Chat of 8Apr67.
- 3. Information
  - a. The official party will consist of:
  - b. The Project Officer is the Staff Secretary (Shove 38) where the beautiful to the staff of the beautiful to the staff of the staff of
- o. The itinerary set forth in englosure (1) is broad in scope and will be subject to changes due to weather, operational commitments, etc. Information as to changes will be published separately.
- d. Unit Commanders will attempt; insofer as is practicable, to meet the visiting party at the preceding stop and personally escent to their unit areas (i.e., on first day 1230, the MAG-16 representative will meet visiting party at 3d Recommisseance Battelion and escort to his unit area).
- 4. Action. All Commanders and Staff Officers listed in ancience (1) and (2) will take appropriate action to ensure an informative orientation visit by Major Geneval USENAN.
- 5. Solf-cancellation. 24 April 1967

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DISTRIBUTION: Somoial

22 TAD	TA COURSE	INTEGERAL AND	ORTENTATION	CCHETER F.
- 所及科   ] 代	BENEFICAL	LIMINIMAN	UTILLBLATION	

Monday, 17 April 1967	Colonel	HAMMERBECK -	Escort	Officer
5. These bits accessed and an experience of the control of the con	Colonel	MENTZER . Es	cort Of:	ficer

(Assigned escerts will mutually insure that one escort will be with MajGen CUSHMAN at all times unless otherwise noted herein)

*		
0830-0845	Arrival and Honors	CO, HqBn
0845-0900	Meet with Commanding General	CG®s Office
0900-1000	General Staff Orientation Briefing	Div Conf Room
1000-1010	Enroute Helo Pad	Ey Vehicle
1010-1025	Overfly Phu Bai	By Helo
1025-1110	Visit a CAC and 3/26 unit in field	By Helo(Escort should include OIC, CAC; CO, 3/26
7110-1130	Briefing by 3d Recon Battalion	CO, 3d Recon Bn
130-1230	Lunch with 3d Recon Battalion	CO, 3d Recon Bn
1230-1240	Enroute MAG-16	By Vehicle
1240-1300-	Visit MAG-16(Observe briefing of pilots for Recon insertion)	Senior MAG-16 Representative Phu Bai
1300-1355	Observe Recon Insertion	CO, 3d Recon Bn
1355-1400	Enroute 8th Radio Research Field Station - Commanding General will escort for this portion of the itinerary	By Vehicle
1400-1530	Visit/Tour 8th Radio Research Field Station	CO, 8th REFS
1530-1540	Enroute Division Command Post	By Vehicle
1540-1730	Free Time	
1735-1800	Meet with Staff at Commissioned Officers Mess	10 cm
1600-1900	Dinner with General Staff	CG's Mess Closed
1930-	Attend Commanding General's Special Briefing	CG's Office
	<u> </u>	

Div	Bul 5	050
4	April.	1967

Tuesday, 16 April 1967				
	Colonel	McCARTHY -	Escort	Officer

(Assigned escorts will mutually insure that one escort will be with MajGen CUSHMAN at all times unless otherwise moted herein)

				·
୍ଞ ୦୦୨୦୦	G-3/G-5 Orientation	Children Street Control of the Contr	Table To The Committee of the Committee	Div Conf Room
0900-0915	Enroute airfield	TOTAL TRANSPORT OF A COLUMN ASSESSMENT OF A C	·	By Vehicle
0915 <b>0945</b>	Flyover of ColCo causewa ramp enroute Hue Citadel	y, GolCo road, Hue		By Helo
0945-1100	Briefing/Visit 1st ARVN	Division		SA, 1stInfDiv
1100-1120	Enroute Province Headqua	rters		By Vehicle
1120-1220	Briefing Province Headqu	arters .	Miller 1 To 1970 Annual Control of the Control of t	e eligine d
122 <b>0-1</b> 230	Enroute MACV Compound	en e	. 4	By Vehicle
1230-1330	Lunch MACV Compound	And the second s	Maria I	
1330-1600	Tour of Hue	g state. The state of the state		By Vehicle
1600-1630	Enroute Div CP	And the second s	stefa est	By Helo
1630-1800	Free Time	programme of the state of the s	Lander of the state of	
1600-1830	Enroute Hue	The state of the s	than the second of the second	By Helo
1830-2030	Dinner Huong Giang Hotel Chief, Division Staff, V. CCO, and Advisors)	(Attendees: Province Letnamese Civilians,	And the second	
20302100	Enroute Phu Bai (Remain overnight in Phu Depart for Danang the fol- morning)	Base of the second of the seco	And the second s	By Helo

2 ENCLOSURE (1)

LivBu 5050 13 A.c.11 1967

Wednesday, 19 April 1967	At	III	Map	- ,	 
Thursday, 20 April 1967				Escort	

(Assigned escorts will mutually insure that one encort will be with MajGen CUSHMAN at all times unless otherwise noted herein)

0830-0930	Tour Phu Bai Base Area HQ Commandant By Vehicle
0930-1000	Enroute 4th Marines By Helo
1000-1130	Visit/Tour 4th Marines including visit Phons Dien Refugee Village District Chief By Vehicle
1130-1200	Enroute Dong Ha By Helo
1200-1300	Lunch at Dong Ha Ass't Div Comdr
1300-1330	Enroute Cua Viet River Facility, to include briefing By Helo
1330-1415	Visit Gio Linh (Include Fractice Mine in briefing)
1415-1430	Overfly DMZ to Con Thien By Helo
1430-1500	Visit Con Thien (Include CIDG Camp Plans in briefing)
1500-1520	Enroute Dong Ha By Helo
1520-1700	Free Time
1700-1800	Daily Tactical Briefing
1830-	Dinner, Selected Commanders
1.12.	

ENCLOSURE (1)

			DivBul 5050 13 April 1967
ATTIMENT AT	April 1967 Colonel CERIX Colonel MANT	HINO - Lacort Officer ER - Bacort Officer	
	idll be with	corts will mutually insure MajGen CUSHMAN at all tim	that one escort es unless otherwise
0500~0 <b>630</b> :	Enroute Camp Carroll		
053 <b>0-09</b> 30	Visit/Tour Camp Carroll		
0030~1000	Overfly Cua (D-5), Rockpi	ile, Ca Lu Outpost	By Helo
1000.4130		്ളത്ത് സ്വസ്ത്രിയും വിവന്നും വ	
1130-1200		Sententia	
•	the sales of the following area of the second of the second second	The contrastive streaments are an expensive statement and thus continued the court authorities is about	State of the second
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	serve en la reconstrucción de la construcción de la construcción de la construcción de la construcción de la c		and the second of the second o
		······································	ENCLOSURE (1)
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		The contract of the contract o	entropy of the second of the s

DivBil 5050 13 April 1967

# Seturday, 22 April 1967 Colonel McCARTHY - Escort Officer LtCol SHEPHERD - Escort Officer

(Assigned escorts will mutually insure that one escort will be with MajGen CUSHMAN at all times unless otherwise noted herin)

0830-	Arrive Dong Ha By Fixed Wing	
0830-0840	Enroute CAP P-4 By Helo	
0840-0910	Briefing/Tour CAP	
0910-0925	Enroute Quang Tri (MACV Compound) By Helo	
0925-1025	Meet Province Chief, Priefing by Sector Advisor/OCO Rep	
1025-1040	Enroute Trieu Phong District Headquarters By Helo	
1040-1125	Briefing at Trieu Phong. Visit RD Hamlet (Bin The)	
1125-1140	Enroute Quang Tri By Helo	
1140-1300	Lunch - Quang Tri with Province Chief, Sector Advisor or OCO Rep	
1300-1330	Enroute Dong Ha By Helo	
1330-1430	Air Force Tally Ho - Sky Spot Visit and Briefing	
1430+1500	Enroute Phu Bei	
1500-	Depart for Danang 19 444	

ENCLOSURE (1)

## RESPONSIBILITIES

- 1. Unit Commanders Coordinate visits to their respective units as set forth in enclosure (1).
- 2. ADC. Coordinate visits to northern operating areas and insure overnight accommodations as scheduled.
- 3. Division Air Officer Coordinate as required to insure the availability and scheduling of helicopter and fixed wing aircraft transportation to support the itinerary set forth in enclosure (1).
- 4. CEO Establish and coordinate such communications requirements as necessary to support the visit.
- 5. CO, Headquarters Battalion Provide for Honor Guard and plan honors ceremony as scheduled in enclosure (1). Coordinate as necessary to insure motor transport availability.
- 6. Provost Marshal Coordinate as necessary to insure escort and security for the Phu Bai portions of the itinerary set forth in enclosure (1).
- 7. Division Staff Officers designated as escorts in enclosure (1) will insure orderly and informative completion of their portions of the orientation tour.

ENCLOSUME (2)

186367

SECRET'

Ser: 005A10467

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

## BROCHURE

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT E. CUSHMAN

117-22 APRIL 1967

# COMMANDING GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL BRUNO A. HOCHMUTH

CHIEF OF STAFF	COLONEL ALEXANDER D. CERECHUNC
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1	litcol charles s. Kirchmann
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2	INCOL LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD III
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3	COLONEL EDWARD E. HAMMERBECK
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4	colonel john f. Memizer
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF. G-5	COLONEL EDWARD R. MCCARTHY

DOWNGRADE AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS? DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS.

# **DECLASSIFIED**

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# **DECLASSIFIED**

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## G-3 BRIEFING OUTLINE

- I. Introduction
- II. ARVN Forces in 11th DTA
- III. Basic Missions of 3d Marine Division
  - A. Search out and destroy NVA/VC Main Forces
  - B. Protect and defend Vital Base Areas and ancillary installations
  - C. Support GVN Revolutionary Development Campaign of 1967
- IV. Revolutionary Development Support by 3d Marine Division
- V. Forces Available to CG, 3d Marine Division
- VI. Current Dispositions
- VIII. Current and Projected Operations:

PRAIRIE III

BIG HORN

Phu Bai TAOR

Miscellaneous Operations

- VIII. Combined Action Program
  - IX. Summary

## G-3 BRIEFING NARRATIVE

General CUSHMAN, during the next few minutes I will set forth the disposition of forces of the 3d Marine Division (Rein) and the operations being conducted to counter the formidable enemy threat as briefed by the G-2.

I hasten to add that the 3d Marine Division is not alone in the Division Area of Responsibility which includes the two northern provinces. The 1st Infantry Division, ARVN, is present in the area. The Area of Responsibility of the ARVN Division is referred to as the 11th Division Tactical Area and corresponds to the 3d Marine Division Area of Responsibility.

Very close cooperation and coordination is maintained by the two divisions.

The ARVN Division consists of three infantry regiments of four battalions each, with total personnel about 12,000. In addition, within the two provinces there are the Provincal Forces (RF) which total about 5,000, and District Forces (PF), 7,500.

You will be briefed by the CG, 1st Infantry Division, ARVN during your visit with the 3d Marine Division.

General, the Division has many varied missions and tasks, but basically there are three, in simplest terms:

- A. To search out and destroy NVA and VC Main Forces and eliminate the guerrilla.
  - B. Protect and defend Vital Base Areas and ancillary installations.
  - C. Support the GVN Revolutionary Development Campaign of 1967.

The latter one is very important and has greatly affected the disposition and activities of the Division.

General, I know you are aware of the importance placed by the GVN and Free World Forces on this program. ARVN units and U. S. Military and Free World Forces have been directed to give maximum support to Revolutionary Development. The G-5 will explain in detail the status of the program and its ramifications, but I would like to point out the tactical implications and the effect upon the disposition of our infantry resources.

The two areas of primary Revolutionary Development effort are in the vicinity of Hue and Quang Tri. Our job is to keep the NVA and VC off the backs of the GVN so they can safely proceed with their Revolutionary Development pursuits.

Our initial support of the program consisted of relief of certain ARVN outpost by Marine units so the released ARVN units could return to their parent regiments on the coastal plain for Revolutionary Development Operations. We replaced ARVN units at Calu, Cua, Balong and took over certain ARVN responsibilities in the Khe Sanh area. As one can readily discern, this switch looked us into certain fixed positionswhich hamper our flexibility.

In addition, an infantry battalion of this Division was reassigned to 1st Marine Division for support of Revolutionary Development in the 1st Marine Division Area of Responsibility.

The current disposition of major units of the Division are as shown on this map:

MAP 1:250,000 shows dispositions as follows:

DANANG (3dMarDiv units OPCON 1stMarDiv)

BIM Slice of Combat/Combat Support Units

Minor Detachments of HqBn

## PHU BAI

Hq, 3d Marine Division

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

4th Battalion (-) (Rein), 12th Marines

#### BIG HORN

Hq, 4th Marines

2d Battalion, 4th Marines

2d Battalion, 9th Marines

2d Battalion (-), 26th Marines

3d Battalion (Rein), 12th Marines

#### PRAIRIE

Hq, 3d Marines

3d Battalion, 3d Marines

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

Hq, 9th Marines

1st Battalion, 4th Marines

1st Battalion (-), 9th Marines

12th Marines (-) (Rein)

1st Battalion, 12th Marines

2d Battalion (-), 12th Marines

2d Battalion, 94th Artillery (USA)

1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (USA)

1st Battalion, 44 ADA (USA)

## KHE SANH

Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

The artillery is disposed as shown on this map.

MAP 1:250,000 - Illustrates artillery dispositions as follows:

# PHU BAI

105MM How	6
155MM How(T)	4
155MM How(SP)	6
155MM Gun(SP)	3
8 inch(SP)	1
BIG HORN	
105MM How	18
155MM How(T)	5
8 inch(SP)	2

## PRAIRIE III

105MM How	18
105MM How (SP)	24
155MM How (SP)	12
175MM Gun (SP)	12:
107MM (HOWTAR)	6
4.2 inch Mortar	3
KHE SANH	
105MM How	6
155MM How	2
4.2 inch Mortar	1

The major current operation is PRAIRIE III located in northern Quang Tri Province. You will recall that this area has been the scene of many major engagements with infiltrating NVA Forces. HASTINGS, in this area, tapered off in late July 1966. PRAIRIE followed. Originally conceived as a regimental size effort, this concept did not persist. During August, the NVA again moved south of the DMZ in force - again our troop strength was increased to seven battalions in the north in order to counter the NVA move.

PRAIRIE II followed with decreased activity and at reduced infantry strength when infantry units were assigned to the CHINOOK operating area. (Now BIG HORN Operation).

Then again in late February, our reconnaissance effort detected southerly moves of the NVA resulting in the most recent operations wherein a total of five infantry battalions plus the SIF were committed.

At present, PRAIRIE III forces have been increased by Hq, 9th Marines and an additional infantry battalion plus normal reinforcing and supporting elements.

In addition, the Hq, 1st AmTracBn has been located in the Cua Viet area.

PRAIRIE III forces will continue to conduct intensive surveillance operations and spoiling attacks on enemy infiltration routes and lines of communication.

BIG HORN commenced on 5 April with a buildup of Marine Forces in the area. You will recall that this is the former CHINOOK operating area in which operations began on 19 Dec of last year. CHINOOK operations have consisted of Search and Destroy missions in the valley in this area plus two separate battalion sweeps through this area (Street Without Joy).

Operations in this area have been conducted not only to search out and destroy the VC main forces but to deny them entry and exit from this rich food producing area.

Recent operations have included clean out of the Co Bi - Thanh Tan valley and the hills to the SW. Plans are being formulated to move SW into the mountains and jungles to the reported VC Base Area #114 in this area.

The CHINOOK/BIG HORN Operations have been characterized by very close coordination and cooperation with ARVN Forces.

The vital area defense battalion in the Phu Bai area conducts screening operations around the vital area. In addition, S&D operations of company/platoon are conducted in the entire TAOR. Company size operations are also conducted in the vital Phu Loc District here to support the CAC in the area.

I would like to mention that in order to free the infantry battalion from the perimeter defense job, tenant organizations are charged with manning sectors of the perimeter but under the overall coordination of the resident infantry battalion. This permits heavy infantry patrolling out in the mortar belt.

In addition, this battalion is tapped for infantry protection for our motor convoys between Danang - Phu Bai - Dong Ha, provides miscellaneous security units of platoon to company size. These have consisted of guarding of hydrographic survey crews, CB road survey teams, to a major job recently completed of a survey of the proposed deep water port in the area northeast of Hue, in this area.

You have been briefed I'm sure on the Combined Action Program within III MAF. Our Division program at present is as follows:

## EXPLAIN CHART (TAB 1 HERETO)

The Division is aware of the value of the program and carefully selects and trains Marines and Corpsmen for assignment to a CAP. The first course for personnel to be assigned to the Combined Action Program was conducted beginning 28 November. Since that time 304 Marines and 15 Corpsmen have been school trained.

This chart (See TAB 2 hereto) is the syllabus of a recent course of seven day duration. Note the courses on Vietnamese culture, history, government, and language. We also ensure through this hour that the young Marine is very aware of the importance of his civic action responsibilities and his support of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program.

General. I have endeavored in this very short period to provide you with a feel for the operational picutre within the Division Area of Responsibility. I know you appreciate the size of this Area of Responsibility and the job involved to cover such an area with the forces available to General HOCHMUTH. The General has been given additional infantry assets which were sorely needed. His broad concept of employment of three regiments is: the utilization of a regiment in the western portion of northern Quang Tri Province with a boundary generally along NS GL 09 with Headquarters at Camp Carroll. A second regiment with its Headquarters at Dong Ha operating in eastern half of Quang Tri Province including the vital piedmont area here which leads from the southwest into the vital Quang Tri Revolutionary Development area in and around Quang Tri city. The third regiment located in Thuy Thien Province covering BIG HORN Area, Phu Bai TOAR and the several other areas of enemy concentrations in the southern portion of our AOR.

This concludes my portion of the briefing.

## COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM

The Combined Action Program commonly referred to as the CAC Program was initiated in the 3d Marine Division TAOR, in August 1965 with the mission of providing stability to cleared and semicleared villages and hamlets, train Popular Forces (PF) personnel and to effect a reduction of U. S. Marine and ARVN tactical units immobilized for area and population control purposes. The mission has since expanded to include, among others, assistance to GVN Revolutionary Development efforts.

It has been found that a Combined Action Platoon (CAP) composed of one T/O Marine Rifle squad, one U.S. Navy Corpsman and a Popular Force unit, composed of about 25 members native to the area, integrated into a single operational entity, are ideally suited to the performance of this mission.

Currently within the 3d Marine Division there are four companies (CAC) and twenty one platoons (CAPs) operating, with one company and three platoons in the Khe Sanh area, one company and four platoons in the Dong Ha - Cam Lo area and two companies with fourteen platoons positioned along thirty-four miles of National Highway #1 from the outskirts of Hue, south to the village of Thua Luu in Phu Loc District. Presently, the goal set for the end of calendar year 1967 is a total of five companies and thirty-nine platoons. This number may be increased.

Administrative and logistical support is provided by administrative sub-units of Headquarters Battalion. Operational control is exercised by the Commander of the unit in whose area the CAC is located.

Under study at the present time is a proposal to establish a Combined Action Battalion (CAB) to assume responsibility for training, administration, supply, activation and coordination of the planned expansion.

To date T/E items have been provided by draw down from incountry assets pending receipt of equipment on requisition against a CAC T/E. Expansion as proposed will necessitate a more direct issue of motor vehicles, water trailers, cooking equipment, T/A items and cantonment construction materials.

Personnel assigned to the Combined Action Program are predominantly volunteers with two to six months in-country and an RTD of not less than six months from date of assignment. Upon acceptance for the program they attend a nine day CAC orientation course at the Division Command Post prior to assignment to a CAP. The course includes classes in Vietnamese customs and traditions, Vietnamese language, artillery orientation and F.O. procedures, Civic Action, Revolutionary Development, sanitation

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and hygiene and other related basic military subjects. Since 28 November, a total of nine such classes have been conducted for 250 Marines and 14 Navy Corpsmen. A three day Mine Warefare and Booby Trap School is planned for April to be attended by Marines and their PF counterparts.

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## SNIPER PROGRAM

At the present time the three infantry regiments of the 3d Marine Division have scout sniper platoons. The organization within the Head-quarters Company of each regiment consists of the following:

- 1 Officer in Charge
- 1 NCO in Charge
- 1 RTE Armorer
- 3 Squad Leaders
- 3 Squads of 5 two-man teams

The Reconnaissance Battalion has no trained snipers; however, the battalion has received the allowance of Remington Model 700 rifles and training is being conducted.

The new weapons were recently distributed, with each infantry regiment receiving seventeen Model 700 Remingtons with Redfield scopes. Weapons were placed into service as snipers completed a two day course of instruction and familiarization firing conducted by Division G-3 Training Section at Dong Da Training Center, Phu Bai.

The Remington Rifle appears to be a decided improvement over the Model 70 Winchester and the M-1D and should result in improved sniper effectiveness.

On 22 April the 26th Marines Sniper Platoon will arrive in-country to replace the 4th Marines snipers. The 4th Marines Sniper Platoon will rotate to Okinawa for training and preparation for coming back into RVN later in the year.

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## G-3 PLANS

Following is a summary of the principal operational plans, which are currently being developed.

- a. PRACTICE NINE. Projected operations stem from a USMACV Requirements Plan of 26 January 1967 and will, when executed, have a significant impact upon 3d Marine Division operations and the Division Area of Responsibility. Preliminary preparations are being initiated by USMACV. Further description is omitted due to the plans security classification, TOP SECRET LIMDIS.
- b. RELIEF OF CIDG CAMPS. The 3d Marine Division has a mission of reacting to enemy attacks or threats of attacks on CIDG Camps at Lang Vei (6,000 meters southwest of Khe Sanh) and at Con Thien (in the process of being established). Plans provide for artillery support, air support and the deployment of troop units to destroy attacking forces.
- c. RELIEF OF LOW LEVEL GVN STRUCTURES. In accordance with the assigned mission, plans are being prepared, in coordination with the 1st Infantry Division, ARVN and Sector Commanders, for reaction forces to relieve District Headquarters, GVN outposts and Revolutionary Development Hamlets when under enemy ground attacks. Plans will provide for artillery support, air support and deployment of rapid reaction forces by helicopter of overland movement to counter and destroy attacking forces.
- d. SIF OPERATION (2-12 May 1967). ARG/SIF operations in the Vinh Loc and Phu Thu Districts of Thua Thien Province have been recommended and tentatively approved during the period 2-12 May 1967. Concept of operations envisions utilization of all assets of SIF to include surface and helo landings, followed by combined arms search and destroy operations to include extensive use of amtracs for coastal and river envelopments and patrols. Joint USMC and ARVN plans will be developed to cordon off operation area on boundaries between Phu Loc, Humong They and Phu Vang Districts.

# JOINT US/ARVN RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING

By agreement between the 1st Infantry Division, ARVN and the 3d Marine Division, the 3d Recommaissance Battalion began a period of training for the ARVN reconnaissance company on 6 February 1967.

One platoon from the ARVN reconnaissance company was located with the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. The 1st Platoon of Company A was assigned as host. The 1st Platoon of Company A went through the entire training cycle with their Vietnamese counterparts. They had the responsibility for assisting the Vietnamese troops in learning our methods and techniques of patrolling, along with other related subjects. The Marine and ARVN soldiers were trained together, billeted together and in all respects functioned as a single unit.

The syllabus of instruction is a seven week course. It includes map reading and land navigation, physical training, small arms familiarization, immediate action drills, ambuush and counterambush procedures, rubber boat training, helicoper training, utilization of close air support, artillery forward observer procedures, demolitions, mine and booby-trap warfare, and specifics of patrolling techniques. The majority of the instructors were provided by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, however, other units within the 3d Marine Division also provided instructors for specialized training, such as artillery adjustment and mine warfare.

Upon completion of the classroom-type instruction in the fourth week of training, one-day patrols consisting of approximately ten men each (50% Marines and 50% Vietnamese) were run in the Phu Bai area. Each man made two of these patrols. In the fifth week of training, two-day patrols were run by each combined Marine/Vietnamese patrol unit. The last two weeks were devoted to the "final-exam"...four-day patrols in reconnaissance zones beyond the Phu Bai TAOR. The training was completed on 4 April 1967. Another platoon from the ARVN reconnaissance company will go through the same training cycle in the near future.

Although the program was very successful, and was beneficial to both the Marines and ARVN, it did cause on platoon from the battalion to be non-effective for combat operations during most of the period when they were training their Vietnamese counterparts.

Marines who participated in the program were enthusiastic. They, although originally cast as the instructors, also learned from the Vietnamese. Nearly all of the Marines picked up a basic conversational knowledge of the Vietnamese language, and although there were interpreters assigned to the group, most of the Marines can now understand and be understood on their own. Conversely, some of the Vietnamese troops also gained a fair knowledge of English.

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In addition to the military success of the training program the men of the 3d Recommaissance Battalion have also gained a better understanding of the Vietnamese people and their cause.

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### ARTILLERY MISSIONS INTO DMZ/NVN

During a routine flight over the DMZ on 22 February 1967 an Air Force Forward Air Controller reported receiving automatic weapons fire from an estimated 3 - 5 AA positions at (YD 047808). A fire mission was processed by 2d Battalion, 94th Field Artillery Group at Camp J. J. Carroll. At 1332 the 175mm guns fired into the DMZ. The FAC reported that the automatic weapons firing ceased and that heavy damage was intelleted on the AA weapons. The incident was reported to COMUSMACOVI via CG, III MAF. On 23 February, Lieutenant General WALT was briefed on FAC sightings and enemy activity in the DMZ.

On 25 February, at 1943, authorization was received from COMUSMACV to fire into the DMZ and North Vietnam to the maximum range capability of weapons under operational control of the 3d Marine Division. Thus, Operation HIGHRISE became a reality.

The Composite Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W. RICE displaced to Gio Linh on 26 February to make maximum utilization of weapons capabilities and terrain available to the Division. The unit, consisting of four 175mm guns, six 105mm howitzers and three 90mm tanks has fired the greatest percentage of the missions into the DMZ/NVN. AA/AW positions and infiltration routes lead the list of targets in Operation HIGHRISE.

The following recapitulation of Operation HIGHRISE as of 112400H April 1967:

Total Missions:	<u>90MM</u>	105MM	155MM	<u>1751</u>	M TOT	AL
	297	599	37	1180	211	.3
Ammunition Expenditures 8		<u>90MM</u> 4623	<u>105MM</u> 12,110	<u>155MM</u> 380	<u>175MM</u> 17,681	<u>TOTAL</u> 34,794

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### AIR SUPPORT

Air support within the 3d Marine Division Area of Operations generally follows doctrinal roles and procedures. The principal peculiarity of incountry air support operations occurs as a result of widespread intermingling of enemy elements with civilian and friendly forces. There are no bomb lines. All airstrikes must be controlled as a close air support strike by a FAC, TAC(A), TPQ-10 or MSQ-77.

Coordination, consolidation of air support requests and actual control of both fixed wing and helicopters for the Division is accomplished through the naval aviators assigned to the Division. The T/O for this command authorizes 36 Naval Aviators, but due to the existing shortage only 30 are presently assigned. This reflects a reduction of one FAC per battalion as directed by CG, FMFPac. Additionally, air offices at Phu Bai, Dong Ha, and Khe Sanh are manned by the present personnel complement.

Marine aircraft to support the Division are assigned daily by the lst Marine Aircraft Wing. Fixed wing aircraft normally operate from two bases, Danang and Chu Lai, to provide helicopter escort and conduct air strikes within the Division's operating area. Approximately 50 aircraft conduct airstrikes during the day and 30 aircraft conduct TPQ-10 ordnance drops on 80 targets each night.

Air support by helicopters and observation aircraft presents a slightly different problem, since Division operating bases are located a distance of 40, 30 and 104 miles from the main bases of MAG-16 at Danang. Standard packages of helicopter and observation aircraft were established to eliminate some of the lost motion involved in moving aircraft between the main base at Danang and distant Division areas.

Normally, helicopter and conservation aircraft packages are located at Phu Bai, Dong Ha and Khe Sanh, and are composed of a variety of helicopters such as UHLE's, UH-34's, CH-46's, CH-37's and Ol observation aircraft. In total of 43 helicopters and five Ol's (3 USMC, 2 USA) are assigned daily to support the Division. Usually, on an average, six helicopters and one OlC aircraft will not be available during the day, either for mechanical problems or a shortage of available aircraft within the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Air support available to the Division from other than Marine sources consists of airstrikes by B-52 bombers, use of Army Ol's to supplement the almost non-existent Marine observation assets, USAF flare planes, transport and psychological warfare aircraft, and under unusual circumstances, augmentation of FMAW helicopter assets by Army helicopters.

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### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The 244th Psychologcial Operations Company (USA) provides support to the 3d Marine Division in the form of Combat Speaker Teams, Audio Visual Teams, Liaison Teams, leaflets, tape recordings and Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) newspapers.

Combat Speaker Teams are made up of two men with a loudspeaker and tape recorder. The equipment is man-transportable and can be used in a moving situation. The tape recorder can be attached to the speaker for broadcast purposes, or live broadcasts can be made. The maximum range of the speaker is 3,000 yards.

Audio Visual Teams consist of three men with a projector speaker, tape recorder and portable generator. The Audio Visual Team must be transported by vehicle and is normally used in static situations. It provides both entertainment and propaganda to the people.

Liaison Teams are presently located at the Division Headquarters and at the Dong Ha Combat Base. A liaison team requests required support, advises concerning the most effective means to employ Psychological Operations, and briefs pilots for leaflet drops.

All of the leaflet support received by the Division comes from the 244th Psychological Operations Company. The company has a printing capability which is supplemented by leaflet support from the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion in Saigon.

There is a standard list of tapes which are produced by the JUSPAO. All of the tapes produced by JUSPAO are rally appeal. Tapes are also produced locally to exploit local situations.

The 5th and the 9th Air Commando Squadrons (USAF) provide the needed aircraft support. This support comes in the form of U-10 aircraft which can only fly VFR and needs a minimum altitude of 3,000 feet, and C-47 aircraft which can fly IFR but must be able to see the target area. Both aircraft can drop leaflets and make aerial broadcasts.

The 3d Marine Division also has a ground/aircraft speaker capability. Each regiment has one speaker and tape recorder and the Division Headquarters has on speaker. The speaker is vehicle transportable with a maximum range of 4.000 yards on the ground.

A new program has been initiated called "The Kit Carson Scout". A Scout is a former VC who has rallied to the GVN and has volunteered for the program. Scouts normally work in teams of from two to five with

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rifle companies. Areas in which they can be used are to detect mines and booby traps, detect ambushes, locate ammunition and weapons caches and screen Vietnamese to identify VC. Employing former VC to assist Marine units moving through an area is not new, but employing them on a full time basis and making them part of the unit is. The program is too new to give an evaluation at the present time but appears to have great potential.

Operation "Leisurely Ride" is a program that has been in existence for three months. The program consists of distributing newspapers at check points by the Military Police. The Vietnamese newspaper is printed by JUSPAO with Vietnamese and world news. Approximately 14,000 newspapers are distributed every two weeks, and it has been enthusiastically received by the Vietnamese.

Operation "Homefront" is a program of face-to-face psychological operations. Currently approximately 39,000 newspapers are distributed every two weeks by the CAC's and the Audio Visual Teams.

During the month of March 22, 635,000 leaflets were dropped. Some of the themes used were:

- 1. Chieu Hoi a rally appeal to the NVA/VC asking them to join the GVN. The GVN promises to welcome them with open arms.
- 2. Lack of food directed toward the NVA/VC asking them why they do not have enough food.
- 3. Just cause of the GVN will win the NVA/VC are fighting for a lost cause; the only just cause is the one the GVN is fighting for.
- 4. Uselessness of dying for the VC the VC are wasting their lives dying for a lost cause.
- 5. Surrender instructions explains how an NVA/VC should go about surrendering.
- 6. Spring Reunion start the New Year off right by joining your family and the GVN. Make a clean and useful start to the New Year.

In addition, during the month of March 37 hours 20 minutes of ground broadcasts were made emphasizing the following themes:

- 1. Surrender Appeal
- 2. Surrender Instructions
- 3. Support the GVN

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There were 16 hours and 30 minutes of movies shown during the month which provided the Vietnamese with entertainment and information about their government. The movies were shown by the Audio Visual Team at the CAC locations and at MEDCAPS.

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### ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

The Commanding General, III MAF provides the Division with a team of one officer and three enlisted men to conduct the tape recorded interviews, under the direction of the Division History Officer.

Since its assignment in December 1966, the Division History Team has operated with the use of borrowed equipment. Portable field tape recorders have been on order since December, and it is anticipated that receipt of this equipment will greatly expand the program.

As the 3d Marine Division units are scattered throughout the Division Area of Responsibility, most must be reached by military aircraft. The Division Command Post, however, provides a limited source for taped interviews.

Actotal of 90 interviews have been conducted and forwarded to the Gommandant of the Marine Corps since the program began in December 1966: December - 7; January - 19; February - 27; March - 37.


Interview subjects have ranged from top-level briefings for the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific to small unit leaders and patrol members participating in action against the enemy. Some examples are:

- 1. Reconnaissance patrol leader's sighting of 1,000 Viet Cong on New Year's Eve.
- 2. A reconnaissance patrol which found a Viet Cong Prisoner of War Camp.
  - 3. Effects of monsoon on operations at Khe Sanh.
  - 4. Operations of the 1st 155mm Gun Battery.
  - 5. Battalion operations in Operation CHINOOK.
  - 6. Operations of HMM-163 and VMO-3.
  - 7. Regimental commander on Operation PRAIRIE.
  - 8. Operation of the Cua Viet fuel farm.
  - 9. B/1/9 at Khe Sanh.
  - 10. 1/9 in the Mekong Delta.
  - 11. Plateon and company ambushes.
  - 12. Use of intelligence leading to Operation HASTINGS.

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- 13. Mission, operations and security of the 3d Shore Party Battalion (Fwd).
  - 14. Rescue operations of a downed helicopter crew.
  - 15. Aircraft maintenance problems in Vietnam.
  - 16. Duties of an infantry battalion chaplain.
  - 17. New infantry platoon tactics developed during Operation CHINOOK.
  - 18. M/3/26 during Operation CHINOOK.

### 3d MARINE DIVISION COMBINED ACTION ORGANIZATION



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### PERSONNEL

PRESENT				PROJECTED	(CY 1967)	
USMC	USN	PF		USMC:	USN	PF
8/377	24	481	•	12/695	41	936

### CAC SCHOOL SYLLABUS

FIRST	DAY

0730-0820	Orientation Concept & Mission - Maj. Dennis
0830-0920	VN & Village Government - Capt. Yarbrough
0930-1020	Relation of Training to CAC Mission - Capt. Cazares
1030-1120	Orientation Standing Orders & Regulations -
	1stSgt Shinn
1300-1350	Sanitation & Hygiene - HN Condovani
1400-1450	Introduction to VN Language - Lt Duong
1500-1650	Map Reading (Marginal information, grid coordinates,
	thrust points) - GySgt Billups
1900-1950	Intelligence Cycle & Information Gathering
•	G-2 Guest
2000-2050	Civil Affairs & Civil Action, RD - G-5 Guest

### SECOND DAY

0730-0820	Map Reading (Scale & Distance) - GySgt Billups
0830-0920	Mines (Employment of Claymores) - NCO Mine Warfare
•	School
0930-1120	VN Language - Lt Duong
1300-1350	Administrative Time - 1stSgt Shinn
1400-1450	Scouting and Patrolling, Individual Security -
	Sgt Brown
1500-1550	Map Reading (Elevation & Relief) - SSgt Thompson
1600-1650	First Aid & Self Aid - HN Bunman
1900-1950	Open Time - NCOIC
2000-2050	Career Advisory - HoBn Career Advisory NCO

### THIRD DAY

0730-0820	Lensatic Compass - SSgt Thompson
0830-0920	Map Reading (Direction) - GySgt Billups
0930-1120	VN Language - Lt Duong
1300-1350	Immediate Action Drills - Sgt Ratliff
1400-1450	Immediate Action Drills - Sgt Ratliff
1500-1550	Scouting Patrolling Deception & Ambush - Sgt Brown
1600-1650	Administrative Time - 1stSgt Shinn
1900-2050	Map Reading (Overlays & Review) - Cpl Sanders

### FOURTH DAY

	Artillery Orientation - 12th Marines
1300-1350	FO Procedures - 12th Marines
1400-1650	FO Procedures - 12th Marines
1900-2050	Fata
	Intelligence Reports, etc CIT

### FIFTH DAY

0730-1650 Communications (Operations, Trouble Shooting, Care, PM, Records, Waterproofing, Antennae and Field Application of AN/PRC 10 and AN/PRC 25 - Radio Officer

1900-1950 Shackle Sheet & Radio Security Procedure - SSgt Mosey

2000-2050 Open Time - NCOIC

### SIXTH DAY

0730-1650 Communications - Radio Officer 1900-2050 Open Time - NCOIC

### SEVENTH DAY

0730-0920	CAC SOP - Capt. Cazares
0930-1020	VN Language Review - Lt Duong & Lt Duc
1300-1350	Administrative Time (Prepare for Graduation) - NCOIC
1400-1450	Intelligence VC Weapons - G-2
1500-1550	Religion Based Customs of VN - HqBn Chaplain
1600-1650	Graduation Address - Guest Speaker
1900-1950	Administrative Time - SSgt Williams
2000-2050	Administrative Time - NCOIC

### G-5 BRIEFING OUTLINE

- I. The Political Environment
  - A. Thua Thien Province essential data
  - B. Quang Tri Province essential data
- II. Revolutionary Development '67
  - A. The Plan
    - 1. Thua Thien
    - 2. Quang Tri
  - B. Progress to date
  - C. Marine Corps Support
- III. Civil Affairs/Civic Action in the 3d Marine Division
  - A. Designed to complement RD
- IV. Problem Areas
  - A. Pacification Progress Reporting
    - 1. Difficulty in obtaining data
  - B. Personnel
    - 1. Need for full time S-5's
  - C. Personal Response
    - 1. Pre-deployment indoctrination

### G-5 BRIEFING NARRATIVE

Good morning sir - to refresh your memory concerning the political environment in which the 3d Marine Division is operating, these two northern provinces of Thua and Quang Tri contain some 840,000 people (550,000 here in Thua Thien and 290,000 in Quang Tri). There are 17 districts, 164 villages and about 1,000 hamlets. The only cities of any appreciable size are the provincial capitals; Hue has a population of 104,000 and Quang Tri about 14,000. Ethnically the population is almost completely Vietnamese; the only non-Vietnamese of any significance are the two to twelve thousand Montangnards who inhabit the western portion of the provinces. 85% of the people are at least nominal Buddhists or a mixture of Buddhists and Confucianists; about 10% are Catholic, but this is a well organized minority; there are also a small number of Protestants and the Montagnards are chiefly Animists. The province chiefs are both ARVN officers, as are most of the District Chiefs, and most of the village and hamlet officials are appointed to the office. Hamlet and willage elections are currently being conducted and they will be held each weekend in different locations through June 11. You are, of course, acquainted with the political unrest that occurred here last spring. The effects are still evident and almost weekly there are alarms and executions about a resurgence of the "struggle". In addition the infighting between the major political parties in the area continues. The Dai Viet and VNQDD are conducting their own struggle for power and the interests of the provinces and the country appear to be secondary. With all this, we have been able to maintain good relations with the province leaders and with the district and village officials in our operating areas. We also work closely with their military and civilian counterparts.

The main interest in these provinces as in all others in Vietnam at this period, of course, is the Revolutionary Development program. In general, it can be said that in this province, Thua Thien, it is making very satisfactory progress while in Quang Tri it appears to be having problems.

Here in Thua Thien the targets are 24 real new life hamlets (or AP DOI MOI) located east and west of the city, and 10 other, so called consolidated hamlets, in these locations (indicate). On 15 January the two ARVN battalions assigned to RD protection began two weeks of clearing operations in the priority areas then took up station to screen against possible attacks on the RD teams. Behind them RF/PF units and national police took over their mission within the RD areas and on 1 February 18 fifty-nine man RD groups moved to their assigned hamlets. They spent the Tet holidays more or less shaking down (and lost the equivalent of one team in the process) but on 12 February 17 teams got down to work and have done very well thus far. Attendance is good and morale seems to be quite high. Organization and leadership has been excellent. LtCol KHOA, the province chief, has been the driving force behind RD and he has done a remarkable job.

The ARVN also deserves good marks for their participation. They appear to have accepted their responsibilities and are carrying out their mission. The VC have not as yet mounted large scale attacks in the RD areas but there has been a good deal of harassment and some assassinations. They have demonstrated their power in the fringe areas with attacks on the District Headquarters at Quang Dien, where the District Chief was killed, and at Phu Thu which was literally wiped out on 11 March. Then on 6 April the very effective commander of the 3rd Regiment, responsible for RD protection, was killed in the attack on PK 17.

In Quang Tri, the RD Plan is similar, with efforts directed into the densely populated rice-growing areas north and east of the province capital. Objectives are 24 New Life Hamlets, 17 Consolidated Hamlets and two others. called Constructed Hamlets. Two battalions have also been assigned RD protection here but they are oriented chiefly to the east and south and it is necessary to call upon other ARVN units and Marines when a threat develops from any other direction. There are 14 fifty-nine man teams which went into the hamlets on 3 February and others are in training. At last reports all were still in position but absenteeism is high and morale is poor. Security has been a real problem. While the assigned ARVN battalions have been doing satisfactory job, they cannot adequately protect the entire priority area. Within recent weeks six RD teams have been hit by VC units and, while casualties have not been extremely high, there is no question that the VC have had some effect in preventing the teams from fully carrying out their mission.

As for Marine support - other than relieving ARVN battalions for RD - we have monitored the programs closely, through formal devices such as the Province Joint Coordinating Council and, informally, by means of visits. Both provinces, understandably, have been intent on making this a GVN show as much as possible but they have called on us for help and we have given it readily. We have supplied transportation, temporary shelter and foodstuffs. We have provided medical teams in the RD areas; we are supplying wire for hamlet defense and assisting in the maintenance of engineering equipment. We have also been requested to furnish military advisors to RD Cadre Teams but our manpower situation does not permit this at present.

Out Civic Action Program is still designed to support RD by helping the districts and villages contiguous to RD priority areas, who this year are receiving relatevely less support from province. Most CAC's are sponsoring at least one OCO supported self-help projected and we have assigned each organization in this TAOR the responsibility for at least one village. Up north much of the support for the districts of Cam Lo and Huong Hoa comes from Marine units in those areas.

We believe we have three problem areas --- PACIFICATION REPORTING, PERSONNEL and PERSONAL RESPONSE.

We are required to furnish, monthly, a report on the pacification progress of villages located in areas in which we operate. This is the format on the report(TAB 2-A Pacification Progress Report Form). As you can see, it requires a good deal of detailed information about each village and assigns a weight to each item. The total apparently gives a rating of pacification progress. This bothers us a good deal because it is difficult for us to obtain accurate data and the report is only a best estimate on our part. In many cases the score does not represent the real situation. Additionally, there is at least an inference that we are engaged in pacification operations in those villages upon which we report. In most cases this is not true; we are merely providing a modicum of security and conducting some military civic action. We are not equipped, for example, to remove the VC infrastructure, the key element of any pacification operation, we understand that a great deal of credence is placed in this report and that it was the forerunner of the even more detailed hamlet evaluation report (TAB 2-B) which must now be completed every month by sub-sector and sector advisors. We recognize the pressures for quantifying this information but we hope that those at higher echelons are fully aware of the problems that are inherent in such an approach.

In the personnel area we are all in aggreement that in this war it is necessary to conduct an aggressive, intelligent, civil affairs/civic action program. This cannot be done satisfactorily, however, unless there are personnel assigned full time to these responsibilities. The contract study prepared in June 1966 for the G-1 at Headquarters Marine Corps ("The Role of Civil Affairs In Marine Coprs Operations") recommended full time civil affairs teams down to battalion level. This recommendation was included in our T/O study submitted in December. At present we are operating on a manning level of three officers and three enlisted, all at Division level. We do not believe that this is sufficient. Civil Affairs should not be a part-time job.

Personnel Response - We are pleased with the progress being made thus far on our "Personal Response" program. We believe that it is forcing our units to take another look at the job they are doing in indoctrinating their troops about the nature of this conflict and the increased role they can play in winning the so-called "other war". The program has brought to light, however, the distance we still have to go in pre-deployment indoctrination about Vietnam and the Vietnamese.

This completes the G-5 briefing, Sir, do you have any questions?

# INDICATORS USED IN ASSESSMENT OF PACIFICATION STATUS

1.	DES	truction of enemy units		POINTS
	a. b.	VC units destroyed or expelled Local defensive force established	TOTAL	15 <u>5</u> 20
2.	DES	TRUCTION OF ENEMY INFRASTRUCTURE		
	a. b. o. d. e.	Village census completed VC infrastructure destroyed Local intelligence net established Census grievance interviews comple Action completed on grievances	ted TOTAL	2 8 5 2 3 20
3.	AIE	TNAMESE ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY		
	a. b. c. d.	Defensive plan completed Defensive installation completed Security forces trained and in pla Communications net established	.ce TOTAL	2 3 12 3 20
4.	EST	ABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT		
	a. b. c. d. e. f.	Village chief and council in office Village chief residing in village Hamlet chiefs and councils in office Hamlet chiefs residing in hamlet Psy-ops and information program es Minimum social and administrative	.c <b>e</b> tablis	4 3 4 4 hed 3 2
5.	DEG	REE OF NEW LIFE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT		
	a. b. c. d.	Adequate public health program Adequate education facilities Adequate agricultural development Adequate transportation facilities Necessary markets established	TOTAL	4 4 4 20

### G-1 BRIEFING OUTLINE

### I. Introduction

- A. Briefing in three parts.
- B. To present the current personnel picture of 3d MarDiv.
- C. To explain the Troop Indoctrination Program employed by the 3d MarDiv.
  - D. To explain the Special Services Kit Project.

### II. Main Ideas

- A. Personnel picture.
- 1. The division is under strength in officers. This applies to everall officer strength, but in particular to Majors and Lieutenant Colonels.
- 2. The division is above manning level in enlisted personnel but all additional personnel are needed and completely utilized.
  - B. Troop indoctrination program.
- 1. The purpose of this program is to indoctrinate new personnel in their responsibilities in Vietnam.
  - 2. The program is presented in three catagories.
- 3. Numerous practical training aids are supplied to units to help present the program.
  - C. Special Services Kit Program.
- 1. It is necessary to supply all battalions of the division with special services equipment on a continuing basis.
- 2. It is not feasible for many battalions to requisition, store and issue special services equipment.
- 3. This project is designed to force feed expendable items to the units to provide some recreation and diversification for the troops.

### TIT. Conclusions

- A. The division needs to be brought up to strength in officers.
- B. The troop indoctrination program is proving beneficial and is repeated at quarterly intervals.

C. The Special Services Kit Project is beginning to ensure a regular and continuous flow of special services items to units in the field.

### G-1 BRIEFING NARRATIVE

General CUSHMAN, the G-1 presentation will cover three topics; the current personnel picture of the Division, the Troop Indoctrination Program, and our Special Services Kit Project.

CHART I (TAB 3-A) The division personnel status is excellent except for a shortage of officers and enlisted personnel in certain MOS's. The input of personnel through April appears to be more than known losses by attrition. The gaps in critical and short MOS's are presently being filled by personnel in related MOS's or personnel with particular talent. The enlisted personnel above manning level, are needed and completely utilized, particularly to offset non-effectives.

CHART II (TAB 3-B) In order to insure newly arrived Marines are prepared for their role in the Vietnam environment, an incountry Troop Indoctrination Program is employed. Division orders outline the program and require an initial briefing on arrival in-country, and quarterly review throughout the tour. Sample lesson plans are provided and the handouts displayed on the chart are made available for each unit to use in its indoctrination program.

CHART III (TAB 3-C) All division units have a requirement for special services equipment and supplies but it is not feasible for many battalions to requisition, store, and issue special services equipment. In order to insure all battalions receive such support on a continuing basis, a system of force feeding packaged items was developed. This chart shows samples of items that are included in a standard Special Services Kit that is intended for use by 65 persons. This project is beginning to ensure a regular and continuous flow of special services items to units in the field.

### PERSONNEL

	OFF ICEAS	ENLISTED	
TOTAL AUTH STRENGTH	1.031	19750	
TOTAL ON BOARD STRENGTH	980	22536	
% AUTH INFANTRY O/B	90.0	106.0	
% AUTH COMBAT SUPPORT O/B (Arty, Tk, AT, Recon)	90.1	110.5	
% AUTH SERVICE SUPPORT O/B (Engr, Amtrac, MT, SP, Med)	87.9	127.7	
% AUTH HQ BN O/B	118.0	132.8	
PROJECTED NET GAIN/LOSS APRIL 1967	<b>-</b> 18	+304	

# CHART II - TROOP INDOCTRINATION PROGRAM CHART

Examples of the following items are displayed on the charta

Applicable Division Orders

Lesson Plans

Hand Outs

Handbook for U. S. Forces in Vietnam

The Enemy In Your Hands

Nine Rules

Know Your Enemys The Viet Cong

Code of Conduct

Stars and Stripes

A Pocket Guide to Vietnam

Standing Orders, Rogers Rangers

Leatherneck, Fire Team Phrase Book

MAGV Phrase Book

### CHART III - SPECIAL SERVICES KIT CHART

Examples of the following items are displayed on the charts

Chinese Checkers Board

Cribbage Board

Playing Cards

Dice Cup with Dice

Writing Portfolio

Dominos

Peker Chips

Chess and Checker Set with Board

Paperback Book

## G-2 BR\_EFING OUTLIN

I. PURPOSE: To brief Major General CUSHMAN on the enemy situation in the 3d Marine Division AO to include the enemy's objectives and an estimate of the most probable enemy course of action during the next several months.

### II. MAIN IDEAS 8

- A. Enemy Objectives:
  - 1. To disrupt RD Program and elections
  - 2. To gain the initiative by dispersing and fixing U.S. forces
  - 3. To achieve a major victory and inflict heavy losses on U.S. and ARVN forces
- B. 6th Regiment and Main Force Battalions
  - 1. Actions until recently consisted of isolated attacks and acts of terrorism
  - 2. Increase in efforts to interdict traffic on Route 1
  - 3. 6 April attacks against ARVN installations
  - 4. Possible build-up for major action
- C. Enemy activity in the DMZ area
  - 1. Major encounters
  - 2. Attempts to achieve a significant victory by set-piece engagement to inflict heavy losses

### III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

- A. The enemy forces will make a major effort to convince the population of South Vietnam that the present government is unable to provide adequate security. Their objective will be the disruption of the 1967 HD Program and the election of a representative government.
- B. Seizure of an alequate supply of rice is an immediate aim of the enemy.
- C. Regular MVA units in the DMZ area will attempt to draw our forces into a set piece engagement in which they would hope to inflict heavy losses.
- Do. VC main force units will attempt to disrupt the RD Program by conducting diversionary attacks to draw UoSo forces away from positions screening the principal approaches to Hue and Quang Tricity from the VC mountain base areas. They will increase the frequency of isolated attacks against district headquarters, RD cadre, and other GVN installations.

- E. Local force guerrillas will increase their efforts to mine the roads and attack bridges to interdict the flow of traffic on routes 1 and 9.
- F. Finally, the overall enemy effort will be characterized by increased NVA support of VC units.

### G-2 BRIEFING NARRATIVE

The enemy considers the revolutionary development program the most serious threat to his current efforts to gain control of the population and his strategy is aimed at neutralizing the impact of this program. Additionally, he wishes to disrupt the GVN efforts to establish a representative government through the elections currently in progress.

In the 3d Marine Division area of operations, the RD program is concentrated around the population centers of Hue and Quang Tri. Here the ARVN forces were redeployed at the beginning of the year to provide close protection for the RD Cadres and the population centers. Employing aggressive sweeping operations, the U.S. Forces have established a protective screen behind which the South Vietnamese effort can be undertaken with a minimum of disruption by the VC. By conducting a number of widely separated operations, the enemy is attempting to gain the initiative by causing the U.S. to disperse and fix its forces at points distant to the population centers and, thereby, expose the RD Cadre and GVN installations to direct attack.

Until recently enemy activity south of Quang Tri City had been limited primarily to isolated attacks against bridges, district headquarters, and RD Cadre and acts of terrolism against the population at large. Since the advent of the dry season, NVA and main force battalions of the 800 series have stepped up their operations in the rice producing areas east of the mountains in anticipation of the harvest period which will commence shortly. The frequency of mining incidents along route 1 has risen sharply in recent weeks. During the early morning hours of 6 April several of the 800 series battalions, reinforced with sapper units, launched attacks against four ARVN installations between Quang Tri City and Hue which resulted in considerable damage. Currently, there are some indications that a sizeable build up by the enemy is developing in Thua Thien Province, however, it is still to early to assess the signifiance of these reports.

In the DMZ area the major threat remains the regular NVA Divisions - the 324B to the west and the 341st to the east.

During the last three months, the area north and northwest of Cam Lo has been the scene of significant enemy activity. Commencing on 27 February, a reinforced battalion of the 812th Regiment of the 324B Division was engaged by our forces. During the following weeks a series of engagements ensued with the remaining battalions of the 812th Regiment and possibly elements of the 341st Division. Despite an estimated loss of well over 1,000 KIA (Confirmed), the enemy has persisted in his attempts to draw friendly forces into an unfavorable encounter with the objective of inflicting heavy casualties. It would appear that this represents a major effort on the part of the enemy to achieve a significant victory which would undermine public support in the U.S., bolster enemy morale, and hopefully draw U.S. Forces away from the populated areas further to the south to expose the RD program to VC Main and Local Force units.

In summary, it is considered that the following points outline the enemy strategy for the two northern-most provinces during the months immediately ahead:

- 1. The enemy forces will make a major effort to convince the population of South Vietnam that the present government is unable to provide adequate security. Their objectives include disrupting the 1967 RD program and obstructing the election of a representative government.
- 2. Seizure of an adequate supply of rice is an immediate and essential requirement for the enemy.
  - 3. Regular NVA units in the IMZ area will continue their attempts to draw our forces into set-piece engagements in which they would hope to inflict heavy losses.
  - 4. VC Main Force units will continue their attemps to disrupt the RD program by conducting diversionary attacks to draw U. S. Forces away from positions screening the principal approaches to Hue and Quang Tri City from the VC mountain base areas. They will increase the frequency of isolated attacks against district headquarters, RD Cadre, and other GVN installations.
  - 5. Local Force guerrillas will increase their efforts to mine the roads and attack bridges to interdict the flow of traffic on routes % and 9.
  - 6. Finally, the overall enemy effort will be characterized by increased NVA support of VC units.

# 30 MARINE DIVISION (REIN) LOGISTICAL DATA

### INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Monsoon Sesson, and the resultant increase in transportation and distribution, the Division's Logistical posture continues to improve.

We utilize all types of transportation, these in varying degrees and combinations. In general, LST, LCU, Fixed Wing Air and some vehicles provide support from external sources to the Division's AOR. Distribution of supplies within the AOR is accomplished by vehicle and helicopter.

Logistic management within the Division receives continual and detailed command attention at all levels to insure the maintenance of an acute awareness of requirements for care and maintenance of supplies and equipment.

The following tables containing a variety of logistical data are designed to summarize the Division's current posture and to point out the status of significant areas of interests

NO.	TITLE
. 1	READINESS STATUS
2	3D MARDIV SUPPLY STATUS
3	DEADLINED COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT
4	TRANSPORTATION
5	CARGO MOVEMENT
6	AVERAGE MONTHLY RAINFALL
7	DISTR OF PRESENT ENGR EFFORT
8	AVERAGE MONTHLY POTABLE WATER PRODUCTION
9	3D MARDIV VEHICLE STATUS
10	initial issue multifuel vehicles
11	ARTILLERY TUBE STATUS

12	CIASS V ESPENDITURES MARCH & APRIL 1-10
13	CIASS V STATUS
14	REQUISITION HISTORY
15	REQUISITION PRIORITY UTILIZATION
16	EXCESSES, CANCELIATIONS AND DEFERRALS
17	MEDICAL STATISTICS
18	M-16 RIFLE DISTRIBUTION
19	R & E PROGRAM FY 67
20	CURRENT TEST ITEMS
21	MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MCON)

# READINESS STATUS


### AVAILABILITY SUPPLIES / EQUIPMENT

TYPE EN CATEGORY	INFANTRY	COMBAT SUPPORT	COMBAT SER SUPPORT
C-1	4	4	2
C-2	3	2	1
C-3			1
C-4			

	STATUS OF SUPPLY	Den <b>g h</b> a		PHU BAI		KHE SANH	
	ornio ex serrin	CBJUCTIVE	on hand	OPJECTIVE	or il m	OBJECTIVE	on hand
	CLASS I "C" SUNDRY PK	30	1 8 13 18	30	4 4 13 8	15	0 5 8 0
TAB	CLASS II	SAT <b>I</b> ST/C	_O? <b>Y</b>				
5 <b>! !!</b>	MOGAS CLASS III DINSEL	30	15 13	30	18 10	15	8
	CLASS IV	NO SIGNIMICANT CHANGS					
	105 MM 155 MM CL+SS V 8" 81 MM 175 MM	30	23 27 35 13 2569 IDS	30	33 24 18 21	15	14 46 Nit 17

THIRD MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

### DEADLINE COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT



ASS OF 10 APRIL 67

### TRANSPORTATION

### SEALIFT (LCU)

1. LCU - Total of 24 in use

3 1610 Class 6 1466 Class 15 501 Class

- 2. Transit Time Banang to Phu Bai/Hue 9 hrs.
  - Danang to Dong Ha 15 hrs.
- 3. Unloading Ramp Capacity 6 at Hus and 6 at Dong Ha (MHE availability is primary restriction)
- 4. Restrictions Small class of LCU used at Bong Ha (100 S/T max.) due to shallow water in river.

### STALIFT (IST)

LST's being utilized to transport supplies from Danang to Dong Ha (mouth of Cuz Viet River since 16 March 1967.

### ROADS AND BRIDGES

1 Road Mileage -

Danang to Phu Bai	62 Miles
Phu Bai to Hue	13 Miles
Hue to Big Horn QA"	13 Miles
BigHorn to Dong Ha	31 Miles
Daneng to Dong Ha	119 Miles
Dong He to Khe Sanh	50 Miles

2. Bridges

Danang to Dong Ha - 60 significant bridges (Route 1) Dong Ha to Khe Sanh - 27 significant bridges (Route 9)

3. Limitations - 9 limited to 48 tens or less (bypasses available)

### AIR (FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER)

1. C-430, C-423 and other types provide support to the 3d MarDiv AOR.

TAB 5-D

### 2. Normal Routes:

Banang to Phu Bai Danang to Bong Ha Banang to Khe Sanh Phu Bai to Dong Ha Phu Bai to Khe Sanh

### 3. AIRFIELDS

Location	Runway Length	,	Surface
Phu Bai	56001		Asphalt
Dong Ha	3400 *		AM-2 Matting
Khe Sanh	3900 <b>¹</b>		AM-2 Metting

4. Resupply by helicopter is utilized extensively, in many cases, they provided the sole means of support, i.e. Prairie AOR.

•	Phu Bsi		Chi nook		Prair	rie
	Days	Lift	Days:	Lift	Doys	<u>uft</u>
Feb	15	49 S/T	15	83 S/T	22	251 S/T
Mar	18:	26 S/T	16	41 S/T	28	777 S/T
	Phu E	<u>ei</u>	Big I		Predi	rie .
	Days	Lift.	Days	<u>Lift</u>	Days:	Lift
Apr 1 - 10	5	12 S/T	6	24 S/T	7	117 S/T

# CARGO MOVEMENT TO AND WITHIN 3D MARINE DIVISION AOR


TONNAGE DAILY	LCU	FIXED WING A/C	HELO	TRUCK ROUGH RIDER CONVOY
FEB	(16 DAYS)	(28 DAYS)	(24 DATS)	(25 DATS)
AVERACE	148 S/T	40 S/T	16 S/T	(61) 94 S/T
HIGH	568 S/T	234 S/T	46 S/T	(127) 167 S/T
LOW	32 S/T	5 S/T	1 S/T	(19) 13 S/T
TOTAL	2374 S/T	1120 S/T	384 S/T	2360 S/T
MAR	(22 DAYS)	(25 DAYS)	(22 DAIS)	(24 DAYS)
AVERACE	107 S/T	88 S/T	26 S/T	(14) 43 S/T
HIGH	190 S/T	306 S/T	52 S/T	(24) 81 S/T
LOW	36 S/T	2 S/T	4 S/T	(4) 10 S/T
TOTAL	1280 S/T	2208 S/T	579 S/T	1043 S/T
APR 1 = 10 AVERACE HIGH LOW TOTAL	(5 DAIS)	(9 DATS)	(7 DAYS)	(6 DATS)
	92 S/T	80 S/T	23 S/T	(13) 40 S/T
	180 S/T	28 S/T	39 S/T	(28) 84 S/T
	23 S/T	25 S/T	3 S/T	(5) 14 S/T
	460 S/T	724 S/T	161 S/T	(78) 242 S/T

TAB 5-1

As of 10 April 67

### AVERAGE MONTHLY RAINPALL

(QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES, RVN)



- AVERAGE PAST 9 YEARS
- ACTUAL 1966/67

TAB 5-0

### DISTRIBUTION OF PRESENT ENGINEER EFFORT (AS OF 10 APRIL 1967)

UNIT

PHU BAI

DONG HA

KHE SANH

MCB

MCB-62 (23-789) MCB-11\* (24-800) DET MCB-4 (0-6)

DET (MCB-5) (3-111)

\*MCB 11 GURRENTLY ARRIVING BY INCREMENT AT DONG HA. PROJECTED STRENGTH INDICATED.

FORCE ENGINEER UNIT

COMPANY, 11TH ENCR BN

11TH ENGINEER BN (-)

NONE

(6-188)°

(40=1130)

DIVISION ENGINEER UNIT

30 ENGINEER BN (=) (18-548)

COMPANY, 3D ENGR BN

DET, 30 ENGINEER BN (0-14)

DECLASSIFIED

(3-189)

REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL ENGINEER EFFORT

FORCE ENGR COMPANY

NONE

NONE

TAB 5-H

# AVERACE MONTHLY POTABLE WATER PRODUCTION DEC. MARCH (1000 GAIS)

	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL (1-1	<u>o)</u>
DONG HA	705	950	1, 105	1,580	625	ing The
CAMP CARROLL	400	360	370	375	165	
PHU BAI	490	595	875	1, 125	565	
khe sanh	100	200	145	160	5 <b>0</b>	
OTHER	230	105	260	350	170	
TOTAL	1,925	2,210	2,755	3,590	1,575	

# 3D MARINE DIVISION VEHICLE STATUS

As of 10 April 1967

VEHICLE TYPE	WOLLA HTUA	<u>0/H</u>	2DECH D/L	3DECH D/L	AVAIL
TRK, 2T M422A1 (MITE)	485	490	30	61	399
TRK, TT M36A1	111	715	2	9	104
TRK. TT HA70 AMB	39	<del>3</del> 3	0	Ø	<del>3</del> 8
TRK, IT M274A4 (MULS)	267	250	32	44	174
TRK, 3/4T M37, CARGO	153	143	7	12	124
TRK, 3/4T M43, AMB	21	13	0	<b>6</b> 8	18
TAK, 25T M35, CARGO	323	296	24	20	252
TRK, 22T M36, S/L CARC	62	59	1	16	42
TRE, 24T M49, FUEL	33	28	2	2	24
TRK, 22T M50, WATER	4	1	<b>.</b>	<b>Ø</b> .	1
TRK, 5T M51, DUMP	1.19	103	7	28	.68
TAK. 5T M52, TT	48	17	1	2	14
TRK, 5T M54, CARGO	132	163	. 2	13	148
TRK, 5T M62/543	_22	18	_3	_2	_13
RECAPITULATION	181	<del>1</del> 739	\$1.1	209	1419

### INITIAL ISSUE MURTIFUEL VEHICLES

As of 10 April 1967

VEHICLE TYPE

M-543A2 WRECKER

M-35A2C 21T CARGO 232 ALLOCATED 3D MARDIV

ALLOW 5 O/H FLC 0	96 96 96	2TH MAX 1/12 13 36 10 22	2/12	3/12 4/12 36 16
	DISTRIBUTION	UNIT		<b>THEN</b>
M-49A2C 21T REFUELER M-50A2 21T TANKER M-51A2 5T DUMP M-52A2 5T TRACTOR M-54A2C 5T CARGO	33 2 24 30 33	IAW DIV ALLOW DIV SPEC ALLOW 3D ENGR BN THAN CO, 9TH M 9TH MT BN		4TH QTR F167 4TH QTR F167 4TH QTR F167 4TH QTR F167 F1 68

IAW DIV ALLOW

HOTE8 CG III MAF PROVIDES CG FMFPAC CN 5 APR 67 PLANNED DISTRIBUTION BY RUC OF ALL MULTIPUM VEHICLES EXCEPT N=35A2C. TEIS ACTION ACCOM-PLISHED FOR PURPOSE OF POSITIONING REPLACEMENT PARTS.

22

### ARTILLERY TUBE STATUS

10 April 1967

WEA PCN	AVERAGE REMAINING TUBE LIFE (%)	PROJECTED TUBE REQUIREMENT (12 MOS)	CURRENT TUBE AVAILABILITY (RVN)
155mm How, Towad	<b>79</b>	3	0
155mm How, SP M105	<b>6</b> **	10	14
155mm Gun, SF N53	68	12	18
8" How, SP M55	82	0	0
105mm Hou	j*9	53	11 NOTE-1
MOMB 3			

NOTE-1

TAB 5-K

CO, MCSA Phila meg 2913572 Mar 67 to CO, MCSC Barstow requested shipment of 22 tubes 105mm How and 3 cannons 105mm How to FIC via priority 02 air transportation. Quantity of 26 tubes and 6 cannon to be shipped putarity 02 surface.

# TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED

MARCH 1967


DECLASSIFIED

ITEM	PRAIRIE III	CHINOOK II	PHU BAI	KHE SANH	TOTAL	AVERAGE DATLY EXPENDITURE RATE
175	15357		<del></del>	·	15357	495
8 How HE		479			479	15
105 HE	62071	13020	2091	8407	85589	2760
107 HE	2151	86	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	580	2817	90
155 How HE	13503	2133	1012	683	17331	559
155 Gun HE			378		378	12
105 WP	2762	652	74	601	4089	131
105 Illum	1106	387	202	<b>413</b>	2108	68
155 Gun Illum		<del></del>	97		97	3
155 Gun WP			<u> </u>		41	1
155 How WP	253	202	26	<u> 47</u>	528	16
155 How Illum	199	2	61		262	8
107 Illia	158				158	5
107 WP FOTAL	362			12	374	12
RDS EXP	97922	16961	3982	10743	129608	4180


TAB 5-L

TIEM	PRAIRIE III	CHINOOK III	PHU BAI	KHE SANH	BIG HORN	TOTAL		E DAILY ITURE RATE
175HE	5731		,			5731	636	
8 How HE		55	23		120	198	22	
105班	30702	2338	7956	1381	3028	45405	5045	
107AE	544					544	60	
155 How HE	2366	194	276	42	127	3005	<b>33</b> 3	
155 Gun HE			137	Months with a popular to the large to the second second		137	15	
105 WP	1002	158	1	152	248	1561	173	
105 Illum	266	31	140		30	475	52	
155 Gun Illum			11			11_	1	
155 Gan WP			3			3		
155 How WP	89	42	12	22	26	185	20	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
155 How Illum	66		7	15	408	496	55	
107 Illum	9					9	. 1	
107 WP	52					52	5	
TOTAL RDS EXP	40821	2818	8566	1620	3987	57812	6423	

TAB 5-L



REQUISITION PRIORITY UTILIZATION



# Requisition History and Priority Utilization

- Note: 1. February and March have been ommitted due to the conversion of the 140% computer system to the 360 computer at FLC, which prohibited machine time to compute requisition history for this periodo
  - 2. In view of the continued stress on supply discipline within this Division for actual requirements, it is anticipated that total requisitions for the month of February will be less than January. Further, March will decrease due to the conversion period, routing requisitions were held and not processed.
  - 3. At present, requisitions with a total monetary value of \$500.00 or more must be approved by the Division Supply Officer or his direct representative. A future change to the Division Supply SOP, will reflect this requirement.

# EXCESSES, CANCELLATIONS AND DEFERRALS

LINE ITEMS - MONEY VALUE

EXCESS 5437

\$ 829,743.49

CANCEL

\$2,721,249.70

5437

\$3,550,993.19

## UNITS NOT INCLUDED

1st Bn, 3d Marines 2nd Bn, 3d Marines

NOTE: 1. The statistics as indicated above are cumulative for the period I Jan 1967 - 12 Apr 1967.

- 2. Totals do not include the units listed. These units were in an SIF status or not in RVN.
- 3. Deferred requisitions for non-T/A Garrison property and construction material are not itemized. Requisitioning for this material will be held until the new fiscal year, except requirements which are urgent.

11 April 1967

# MEDICAL STATISTICS DERIVED FROM MEDICAL FACILITIES OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION

Hostile or Casualties of Battle are reported by the casualty reporting efficer of the Adjutant's Office. Non-hostile or disease caused non-effectiveness are reported by the Division Surgeon. The following are the number of non-hostile admissions to the sick list for the months stated:

Nov	791	Average	164/vk
Dec	839	Average	190/w/s
Jon	657	Averege	10A/WK
Feb	388	Average	97/wx
Mar	505	Average	126/wx

STATISTICS FROM THE FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES OF THE 3D MEDICAL BATTALION

At Thu Bais

Company "A" and Company "B" (-). This facility has approximately 184 beds. One ward of 10 beds has been allocated to the Civic Action Program and is used for the Victnemese patients. One ward of 10 beds has been specifically prepared for POW's. In preparation of these statistics the month of January was rillized.

Monthly Admissions: 378

Monthly Transfers/Evacuations: 184

Monthly Returned to Duty:: 153

Average Daily Census: 53

Average Monthly Outpatient Consultations: 1124 (Nov/Feb)

At Dong Has Company "D" (=) Rein. This facility has 30 beds. It is rigost exclusively utilized for essualty care with essualties derived from the northern operations areas. It is frequently sugmented by the hospital ship USS Repose/Sanctuary and 903d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron in achieving further evacuation and provisions of definitive care.

Monthly Admissions: 201
Monthly Transfers/Evacuations: 61
Monthly Returned to Duty: 121
Average Daily Census: 19
Average Monthly Outpatient Consultations: 707

In the realm of Civic Action, Company "A" at Phu Bai has an average daily impatient census of 12. The total number of Vietnamese outpatients seen monthly is 264.

# M-16 RIFLE DISTRIBUTION (FIRST INCREMENT)

The first increment of M-M6 rifle distribution arms all Infantry Battalions, Infantry Regimental Headquarters, Recon Battalion and CAC personnel with the new rifle.

As of 15 April, 97% of the personnel in these units whose T/O weapon is a rifle were armed with the M-16.

The Division is retaining sufficient M-II rifles to use as a mount for the infrared sniperscopes until such time as a night observation device is received which is compatible with the M-I6.

The Division also is retaining sufficient M-III rifles to issue to personnel being transferred in-country to units not yet equipped with the M-I6.

AS OF 10 APRIL 67

# REPLACEMENT AND EVACUATION PROGRAM FY 67

ITEM	QTI PI 67	ACCOMPLISHED
LVTP 5 (CMD)	<b>"</b>	3
M51 RECOVERY VEHICLE	. 4	
lvte-1	4	2
LVTP5A1	145	27
LVTR1A1	4	3
TANK M67 (FLAME)	4	1
ontos m50A1	18	9
TANK M48A1	<b>30</b>	17
N53 155MM GUN (SP)	4	9
M55 8 INCH HOW	3	2
M109 455MM BOV (SP)	3	2
AN/M4 COMPRESSOR	3	:
AN/MRC 63 RADIO	2	
AN/PRC 8 RADIO	4	
AN/MRC 62 RADIO	3	,
AN/GMC 1 RAWIN	•	

AS OF 10 APRIL 67

# CURRENT TEST ITEMS

- 1. RUCKSACKS (NYLON)
- 2. TUNNEL DESTRUCTION WEAPON

TEST ITES NOT YET ON HAND

3. ARTILLERY F. D. C. TECHNIQUE AND RELATED ITEMS TEST ITEMS NOT YET ON HAND

4. BOTTLE FED ELECTRIC COOLED WATER DISPENSERS

TEST ITEMS NOT YET ON HAND

- 5. ORDNANCE LOCATOR
- 6. FOLDING SAW

# MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MCON)

\_\_\_\_\_10 April 1967

1. Funded MCON Line Items, construction completed, underway, or programmed:

COST ESTIMATE (OOO)	LINE ITEM	DESCRIPTION	USE
76	C=024	Dispensary	25 Bed Hospital
63	C-026	Roads	3.5 Miles
204	C-28A	Shops and Covered Storage	14 Butler Type Buildings
127	C-0111	Div. Operating Facilities	4 Butler, 2 Quonset Disbursing, PX, Shops
40	C-129	Asphalt Hardstand	8,500 Sq. Yd.
60	C-145	Dental Clinic	Quonsets
200	<b>C-</b> 402	1 Bn. Cantonment	156 Huts, Messhall, Showers, Heads
140	C-403	1 Bn. Cantonment	129 Huts

2. The 67S MCON Program will provide the following facilities for the 3d Marine Division from the 1st 45 line items in priority that are to be funded in this program.

COST ESTIMATE (000)	LINE ITEM	DESCRIPTION	USE
685	c-408	Div Supt Fac	634 Standard huts 28 Showers 34 8 hole heads 8 500 man messhalls with hot water boilers
65	C-404	Maint Hardstands	2,333 SY concrete for tracked and wheeled vehicles 13,667 SY of asphalt parking for open storage and maint
15	C-405	Maint Hardstands	4,000 SY concrete hardstand for maint

TAB 5-U

280	C-418	Div Supt Fac	heads and showers
270	C∞lill	Cantonment Upgrading	Tin roof upgrading for strongbacks, 12,000 BTU heaters for showers and construction of burn type heads

#### COMMUNICATIONS

I. SUBJECT: Volume of teletype message traffic

II. FACTS: The volume of teletype traffic constantly increases. The following chart shows the month by month evidence of this increase since April 1966. (The temporary decline in October was caused by the displacement of the Division CP to Phu Bai with the simultaneous loss of OPCON of two infantry regiments. Slight decline in February 1967 due to a 28 day month.)?

APR66	16,381
MAY66	18,302
JUN66	18 ,939
JUL66	24,386
AUG66	25,858
SEP66	
oct66	
NOV66	
DEC66	25,730
JAN67	31,443
FEB67	30,997
MAR67	40,971

The foregoing chart relates only to teletype traffic within the divi-

sion but is indicative of conditions existing worldwide. CINPACFIF, FMFPac, III MAF and 3d Marine Division all have programs in force aimed at reducing message traffic volume.

#### III. DISCUSSION:

- A. There are many factors which tend to cause an increase in message volume. Some of these are:
  - 1. A message is simple to prepare.
- 2. A message is quickly delivered. (For example, the average time to deliver an immediate message from 3d Marine Division to FMFPAC is about 4 hours.)

- 3. A message is broadly distributed within the originator's command post (has been sent copies).
- 4. A message is distributed within the recipient's command post (standard distribution of incoming messages)  $_{\circ}$
- 5. A permanent record of the message is available in the originator's communication center and in the communication centers of all addressees.
- 6. Proof of delivery of a message is easy to obtain (communication center records).
- 7. Assurance of continuing active responsibility for delivery of a message is implicit in communication procedures.
  - 8. Message security is easy to achieve.

In all the above cases, the message originator looks on the communication system as a total service organization, providing him with transmission facilities, stenographic aids, security measures, and record keeping services.

- B. There are periodic directives and memos which are aimed at reducing the volume of electrical message traffic. To be effective these periodic directives must be continuously supervised. They provide for such measures as use of letters rather than messages, shortening message texts, abbreviating message grammar, and reducing the number of addressees. These directives cause some temporary reduction in total messages but create their own adverse side effects. They increase transmission time, obscure the full meaning of the communication, or exclude some addressees from receiving information. Even when these programs are successful they have only the effect of slowing, rather than reversing, the upward trend of message volume.
- C. Because of the convenience and surety of electrical transmission systems, and the penalties inherent in message reduction programs, we believe we should accept the fact that electrical message volume will continue to increase.
- D. CG, 3d MarDiv requires message originators to insure the need for electrical transmission before using such means. Much of the daily volume is required operation, personnel, or logistics reports for which regular procedures, including address list are specified. Some examples of these hard core messages are identified below:

10	Operational
----	-------------

,,,				Total
Type of Msg	Orig	Action Addee	Reporting Interval	Addees
Sitrep, 3dMarDiv Sitrep, Big Horn	3dMarDiv 4th Mar	III MAF CG, 3dMerDiv 6-2	Every 24 hours Every 6 hours	5 8

Type of Mag	Orig	Action Addee	Reporting Int	Total Addees
Sitrep, Prairie	Div (Fwd)	CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 6 hours	4
Sitrep, Khe Sanh	SOP	CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 24 Hours	2
Sitrep, ReconBn(Fwd)		d)CG,3dMarDiv	Every 24 hours	3
Sitrep, 12th Mar	12th Mar	CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 24 hours	2
Recon Plans Sum	SOP 3dMarD	ivCG,3dMarDiv	Every 24 hours	4
AirOpSum(Fwd)	Div (Fwd)	CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 24 hours	2
IntSum Prairie	Div (Fwd)	CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 12 hours	18
IntSum 3dMarDiv	CG, 3dMarD	ivIII MAF	Every 12 hours	13
Sitrep, 12Mar (Prairie)	12th Mar	CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 24 hours	12
Sitrep, 12thMar		CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 24 hours	3
(Highrise)				
	3dMarDiv	1st MAW	Every 24 hours	1
IntSum Tigerhound	SOP	CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 24 hours	1
Sitrep Prairie COC	Div COC	MAF COC	Every 6 hours	1
Sitrep Big Horn	Div COC	MAF COC	Every 6 hours	1
Sitrep Khe Sanh COC	Div COC	MAF COC	Every 24 hours	1
Sitrep Recon COC	Div COC	MAF COC	Every 24 hours	1
Intsum Khe Sanh	SOP	CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 24 hours	
Intsum Big Horn	4th Mar	CG, 3dMarDiv	Every 24 hours	6
Sitrep 3dMarDiv	Div COC	MAF COC	Every 24 hours	1
-				

# 2. Casualty messages:

			Report	Total
Type of Msg	rig	Action Addee	Interva	al Addees
Report of death-hostile CG	,3dMar	Divsecnav .	As requi	ired 18
Report of death-non-hostile	11	11	Ħ	14
Report of Naval death-hostile	11	Ħ	94	15
Report of Army death-hostile	11	CGUSARV &	H	5
Report of Naval injury hostile	18	SEC ARMY SECNAV	Ħ	8
Report of serious injury-hostil	.e . <sup>#</sup>	CMC	11	17
Report of casualty	10.	CMC	tt-	8
Report of Army casualty	Ħ	USARV	Ħ	5
Report of casualty evac	11	CMC & FMFPAC	Ħ	20

# 3. Other regular messages:

Frag Orders
Supply requisitions
Supply tracers
Personnel orders
WELREPS
GONGRIMTS
SPECINTS

E. With respect to incoming messages, on an average day CG, 3dMarDiv hears from about sixty commands or headquarters. A part of this traffic

is acted on at Division Headquarters but the majority requires further forwarding to subordinate units of the Division, thus directly adding to the intra-Division message volume.

- F. The possibility of lost or mishandled messages increases with volume. Volume is an obstacle to proper communication procedures and proper staff functioning. However desireable a reduction in volume would be, such reduction does not appear to be imminent. Under these conditions our best course is to insure that our communication physical plant is suited for operations in this environment.
- G. There are three principal areas in which action should now be taken in order to improve our message handling capability. Each is discussed below:
- 1. The basic teletype equipment organic in the Marine Division (AN/TGC-14 and related items) is not suited to the demands upon it. This equipment was designed with an eye toward its ruggedness, compactness, and waterproof qualities. It does not provide reliable operation at 100 words per minute (a normal requirement under present conditions), it does not provide a good ditto mat (for message reproduction), it has a high component failure rate, and its type face is difficult to read. In nearly every circuit we have replaced the AN/TGC-14 with Navy fixed plant equipment AN/UGC-6, provided through Naval sources.
- 2. The Division Communication Company staffs four separate communication centers of various sizes (Main CP, COC, Forward CP and SOP, Khe Sanh). Although the competence of communication center personnel is extremely high, they are too thinly spread. An appropriate manning level for communication center personnel would be approximately double the present T/O.
- 3. To handle its teletype traffic, the Division communication center keeps nine separate circuits in constant operation. This requires a complex technical control operation involving circuit terminations, power supplies, installation of teletype derivation and crypto equipment and maintenance of circuit quality. Many of the Marines involved in this work have a narrower qualification as teletype repairman, central office installers, or cable splicers, but not enough have overall experience as technical controllers.

# IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 8

- A. That improved and higher capacity teletype equipment be provided within the Marine Division.
- B. That the communication center and electronic technical personnel of the Division be substantially increased in number.

# V. ACTION BEING TAKEN 8.

A. Action by III MAF has resulted in our present holdings of five of the fixed plant teletype equipments AN/UGC-6.

B. CG, 3d Marine Division letter RCB/tgh of 25 December 1966 recommends, in part, a major increase in communication center personnel.

# VI ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

- A. Provision of additional high capacity teletype machinery for Marine Division use (total of 15 AN/UGC-6 equivalents needed) with eventual formal addition of this equipment to Tables of Equipment.
- B. Approval and implementation of communication company personnel increases recommended in 3d MarDiv letter 1/RCB/tgh of 25 December 1966.

# CURRENT PERSONNEL PICTURE

I. PURPOSE. To present current personnel status requirements and critical shortages.

# II. FACTS.

- a. As of 12 April 1967, the division strength was 992 officers and 22,647 enlisted. This is 40 officers short and 2,504 enlisted over the authorized manning level. The average strength for a Rifle Company is 4.7 officers and 203.6 enlisted.
- b. Although we are over manning level in enlisted personnel the following shortages do exist.

# Critical Shortages

MOS	MANNING LEVEL	ACTUAL	PERCENTILE
0122 0142 0239 0844 0846 0847 0848 2151 2533 2811 2822 2862 2867	26 19 27 263 36 20 97 17 415 22 34 9	4 100 100 20 10 61 9 205 10 10	15.6 5.2 74.0 38.0 55.5 50.0 62.8 52.9 45.4 29.3 33.3 21.2 50.0
0241 0431 2529 2531 2847 2861	5hortages 21 29 39 731 44 37	14 25 31 487 38 27 65	66.6 86.2 79.5 66.6 86.3 72.9 8%.6

c. Officer personnel outlook for the next two months is as follows:

		Known losses by attrition
April May June	Total	97 80 <u>65</u> 242
		Probable Input
April May June	TOTAL	81 110 25 216

d. Enlisted outlook for the next two months is as follows:

		Known losses by attrition
April		909
May		818
June		1071
- <b>u</b> -sc	TATOT	2798

# Probable Input

April	Approximately 1100 - 355 have reported as of 12 April 1967
Mav	Not known = cards not received

1. Information has been received that we will be receiving approximately 1100 enlisted replacements during April. 355 have reported as of 12 April 1967. No information has been received on incoming personnel for May.

# III. DISCUSSION:

a. The personnel status of the division is considered excellent except for the officer shortage and the enlisted personnel in short and critical MOSs as outlined in item II above.

# IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That this command be assigned officers to build the officer strength up to manning level.
- b. That personnel in the critical and short MOSs be programmed into the division as soon as possible.

### V. ACTION BEING TAKEN:

- a. Personnel in related MOSs or personnel with a particular talent are being utilized to fill gaps in critical or short MOSs where possible. An example is that personnel with MOSs 1391 and 3111 are not authorized in the division. Many of these personnel are used in artillery, supply and clerical billets, thus relieving personnel to fill the more critical or short MOSs.
- b. The Division Legal Officer has conducted a short Legal School for promising personnel in the above MOSs. Currently several of these are filling billets in the Legal Field.

# VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS:

a. None other than as described in the recommendations listed above.

# RESULTS OF T/O STUDY CONDUCTED IN DECEMBER

I. PURPOSE: Determination of manpower requirements in present environment. Results of December 1966 T/O Study.

### II. FACTS&

- a. Current T/0's do not provide sufficient manpower in ranks and skills necessary to conduct a long term campaign in the present environment.
- b. The Division completed a study of the current T/O's and submitted recommended changes to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to aid in establishment of personnel requirements that may more closely approach the specific needs during FY 1968.
- c. The study was conducted by an Ad-Hoc Committee at this Headquarters, using input obtained from the Division Staff and Special Staff, and from organic and attached units.
- d. The most significant recommended increases stem from the needs of staffs, combat support, and combat service support units for more staying power.

# III. DISCUSSION 8.

- a. Certain factors were significant in increasing our requirements:
  - . Participation in a long term land campaign.
- 2. Continuing requirement for operating a forward command post, including COC's and FSCC's. Since arrival of the Division Forward element in-country 6 May 1965, the Division has maintained some form of an additional separate command post continuously, except for the period 29 March 7 July 1966.
  - 3. Twenty-four hour a day operations on a sustained basis.
  - 4. A Division area of approximately 3,600 square miles.
  - 5. Large distances between units.
  - 6. Wide separation of logistic support areas.
  - 7. Poor land routes.
- 8. Intensified interest in both PSYOPS and Civic Action efforts as effective techniques in counter-guerrilla warfare.

- 9. A need for increased recomaissance effort and development of the proven capability of reconnaissance patrols to inflict casualties on insurgents through use of surveillance strike patrols.
- b. In the main, recommendations for personnel increases stem from the need of combat support and combat service support units for more staying power in this prolonged campaign.
- c. The areas in which substantial increases were recommended area
- 1. Addition of G-5 section to the Division Headquarters, and S-5 sections to regimental staffs. Addition of S-5 sections to all organic and attached battalions except direct support artillery battalions. The June 1966 report of Human Sciences Research, Inc. entitled "The Role of Civil Affairs in Marine Corps Operations" was used as a basis for composition of these staffs.
- 2. A variety of communications personnel mostly for operation of newly authorized, and more sophisticated and complex communications systems.
- 3. Administrative personnel to handle the increased volume of S&C material, increased message traffic, voluminous required reports, increased problems in mail handling, and operation of rear areas for widely dispersed units.
- 4. Staff NCO Career Advisors for each regiment and battalion, in accordance with CMC, FMFPac and Division policy of assigning adequate numbers of personnel on a primary duty basis.
- 5. Reconnaissance requirement for increased numbers of patrols. By adding a third squad to each reconnaissance platoon, the number of squad sized patrols can be increased from the present 24 to 36.
- 6. Postal service which requires additional clerks to handle mail for widely separated units.
- 7. A Clubs section to supervise an important morale function that currently operates 64 branches.
- 8. Addition of an exchange section to provide services throughout the Division.
- 9. Additional water supply personnel in the Engineer Battalion to operate equipment at remote locations.
- d. The counter-mortar radar section need not be manned, since the equipment is no longer available. The assumption was made that such equipment would not be made available in FY 1968.

- e. It is noted that the basic organization of the Rifle Company was sound and ideally suited for the current environment. Other combat unit T/O's were also basically sound with slight additions to their service support elements.
- IV. RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be given to manpower management that will provide:
- a. Assets in the ranks and skills needed in the current environment.
  - b. Assets needed for normal contingencies.

# V. ACTION BEING TAKEN 8.

a. Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific has requested authority to hold a manning level conference in April. A Division representative will attend this conference and present the requirements of this Division.

# VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS &

Same as paragraph IV above.

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# LAUNDRY AND SHOWER ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT STATUS

I. <u>PURPOSE</u>: To point out a problem the Division has had, and is having, in regards to personal hygiene caused by a shortage of bath units and laundry service and to solicit assistance in solving the problem.

II. FACTS: The Division is currently authorized 19 bath units in the T/E of which 16 are on hand. Two additional units are on hand in the 11th Engineer Battalion. The Division has no laundry units authorized and none on hand. Laundry service is the responsibility of the Force Logistic Command. Although separate and distinct units both laundry service and bath units relate to personal hygiene. Therefore, they will be treated together in this paper.

- a. Bath Units. Of the 16 bath units currently on hand, 3 are located in such a manner that they primarily service Force Logistic Command units. The remainder are located throughout the Division AOR, at such locations as Phu Bai (3), Dong Ha (1), Camp Carroll (1) and Khe Sanh (1). The locations are relatively static and most are operated only for short periods during the day because of the high rate of water consumption. There are no bath units at such outposts as Ba Long or Gio Linh. Facilities at such locations as Dong Ha and certain areas of Phu Bai are inadequate. During the majority of the monsoon season there were none at the CHINOOK area or Cam Lo.
- b. Laundry Units. Very little laundry service is currently provided by Force Logistic Command to the Division. Medical Battalion units at Dong Ha and Thu Bai fly necessary items to Danang to receive service. The remainder of the Division must depend upon local contractors who are marginal at best or each individual must do his own laundry to the best of his ability with the laundry supplies available. Fortunately the Post Exchange stocks good quantities of laundry soap, although this is small consolation to the infantryman out in the field for an extended period of time.

#### III DISCUSSION 8

a. Bath thits. Because of the lack of bath units, particularly during the past monsoon season when weather remained wet and relatively cold for long periods of time, taking a bath was for many personnel a necessary but chilling experience in as much as it had to be done out of a bucket or in a stream. For those where there inadequate or no shower facilities, troops in the field were usually continually wet and cold and, except for long ingrained habit, not inclined to bath in cold water. Hot showers for those personnel fortunate enough to have them, serve not only as a source of cleanliness but as a tremendous morale booster because it is also an opportunity to get warm. This was particularly true during the past season when tents were in short supply and few stoves were available.

b. Laundry service was non-existent for the majority of the Division personnel during the past monsoon season except for local contractual service at major combat bases. Infantry units in particular were soon reduced to having all their clothing soaked with no possibility of drying them or getting them clean. In many cases rather than carry around the wet clothing many would discard the clothing they were not wearing, thereby contributing to an already critical clothing shortage. There appears to be some hope for improvement in laundry service in the future. The Force Logistic Command has informed the Division that they are expecting to receive both commercial units from Japan and additional portable units. It is impossible to state how effective this support will be not knowing what the distribution and location on these units will be, however, this Division alone, based on its present tactical locations will require the services of at least 7 of these portable units outside major combat bases, plus the service required at the major bases.

Ideally, laundry units or certainly laundry service for units in the field should be co-located with a bath unit. Units then returning from the field to a combat base or battalion CP could strip, shower, pick up dry clothing and move on in a matter of an hour or so. Any system that would take care of a company a day or a platoon in a few hours would be sufficient.

#### IV. RECOMMENDATION 8

- a. That this Division be authorized an additional 10 bath units as a RVN special allowance.
- b. That Force Logistic Command be provided sufficient laundry capability to provide a minimum of at least one change of clothing weekly for all personnel and, where feasible, a change of dry socks daily. Such service to be provided on an exchange basis for units in the field. Two changes of clothing per week and a pair of clean dry socks daily would be desirable.

#### V. ACTION BEING TAKENS

- a. Request is being forwarded to Commanding General, III MAF requesting a special RVN allowance of 10 bath units.
- b. Request is being forwarded to Commanding General, III MAF for laundry service to be provided by Force Logistic Command.

# VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS:

- a. Approval of special allowance of bath units and provisions of the bath units.
- b. Approval of requests for provision of laundry service, as indicated above, and institution of a clothing exchange system for units in the field.

- PROBLEMS RELATED TO REPORTING OF EMERGENCY DEADLINING OF COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AT THE DIVISION LEVEL
  - I. PURPOSE: To recommend procedures to improve the Report of Deadlined Combat Essential Equipment in RVN.

#### II FACTS ≈

- a. Data for the DCE report for 3d Marine Division are received from two sources; 3d Marine Division and Force Logistic Command.
- b. Data processing personnel and equipment required for preparation of the DCE are organic to the FLC.
- c. The DCE combines statistical information concerning percentage of equipment deadlined with supply data on parts shortages and tracer action and with personnel data on skill shortages contributing to the deadline rate.
- d. The great majority of equipment deadlined for over two weeks in the 3d Marine Division is beyond the organizational maintenance ability of the Division to repair. In the reporting period 1-15 March 1967, 80% of the combat essential items on deadline were down for 3d or higher echelon repairs. A total of 552 items were deadlined; of these 444 required 3d echelon or higher maintenance, while 108 required organizational maintenance.

#### III DISCUSSION 8

- a. Under the current procedures, neither the Division nor the FLC has the means to assure the validity of the finished report, since it contains input data from both commands.
- b. Under the current procedures the Division is a customer of the FIC for data processing support. The Division may advise, but may not control either the programming or operation of the data processing effort.
- c. Spare parts deficiencies which are not corrected by normal supply action and result in deadlined combat essential equipment are nominated for Red Ball. Their inclusion in the DCE report adds to the bulk of the effort involved in preparing and analyzing the report at all levels without a commensurate advantage of giving useful information not already held. It is felt that effective means are available to commanders at all levels to identify and correct supply problems causing deadlining without including spare parts data in the DCE report. Similarly, normal command procedures recognize critical personnel shortages, and the inclusion of personnel data in the DCE report is not considered to be of significant value.

d. The low percentage of combat essential items deadlined for more than two weeks for organizational maintenance suggests that the emphasis on deadline reporting should be placed on 3d echelon and higher maintenance. The commander who has organic combat essential equipment deadlined has a measurable task which the deadlining affects and a staff and unit commanders who normally consider each piece of equipment as contributing to the accomplishment of the organization's mission. When an item remains on deadline within the organization for more than two weeks the commander frequently takes a personal interest in removing that item from deadline. The priority, tracer, and red ball systems are available as effective tools to assist him. The TOE report gives him information with which he is already intimately familiar.

On the other hand, the 3d echelon maintenance activity commander is presented with the serious problems of personnel skills, maintenance equipment, shop space, and uncommon parts; his attention is toward the system rather than toward the item. A report such as the DCE can be helpful to him in identifying and examining trends and identifying specific problem items.

## IV RECOMMENDATION 8

- a. Eliminate the requirement for reporting deadline items which require only organizational maintenance.
- b. Examine the use being made of the supply content (i.e., spare parts cards, tracer cards, reorder cards) and personnel content (MOS cards) of the report. If the data are not being used, eliminate them and concentrate on existing systems of priority, tracer, red ball, and personnel reporting.

#### V. ACTION BEING TAKENS

A noncommissioned officer with mechanized accounting experience has been assigned full time responsibility for collecting and analyzing unit reports, correcting key punch data sheets, delivering the data to the Force Logistic Command for conversion to machine format and machine processing, correcting audit runs, and making staff visits to Division units to instruct and assist. In order to maintain accurate on-hand density information, periodic reports of densities of all reportable items are required, and units report changes as they occur.

VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: See recommendations, paragraph IV above.

### TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS

I. <u>PURPOSE</u>: To show the scope/magnitude of transportation requirements and problems related thereto in providing logistical support to/for the Division.

## II. FACTS

- a. The means of transportation which support the 3d Marine Division are water (primarily LCU), air (fixed wing and helicopter) and motor vehicle (primarily Truck, M=35,  $2\frac{1}{2}$ T).
- b. Movement of supplies and personnel is dependent upon transportation means external to the 3d Marine Division while the bulk of supply distribution within the Division Area of Responsibility (AOR) is from the FIC supply point to the using unit by organic or attached motor transportation.
- c. Sensitivity to weather of all these transportation means has been a major problem in the supply distribution system.

### III. DISCUSSION8

Three types of transportation are utilized to move supplies/ cargo into the within the Division Area of Responsibility (AOR). These are LCU lift, aircraft (both fixed-wing and helicopter), and motor vehicle.

Cargo moved by LCU and Fixed Wing aircraft represents principally supplies moved into the ACR whereas helicopter and motor vehicle is the distribution within the ACR to the using units. While the LCU provides the greatest capability for moving cargo in large quantities it is a slow process. The sailing time from Danang to Hus is 9 hours and from Danang to Dong Ha is 15 hours. In addition, the LCU is particularly susceptible to bad weather, rough seas, flooding conditions in the rivers, and for security reasons must transit the rivers during daylight hours. At times and depending upon the availability an LSD has been used to transport LCU's and supplies/equipment to the mouth of the Cua Viet River where the LCU's are launched and shuttle cargo upstream to Dong This This method decreases the overall transit time considerably.

Fixed wing aircraft, in particular the C-130 with its heavy lift capability, has been the most reliable means of transportation. Aircraft has been susceptible to weather to a lesser degree than the LCU but numbers of aircraft are limited and weather remains a controlling factor.

Helicopters are used exclusively for intra-Division logistics transportation and then only on an emergency basis or when no other means are available.

Armed motor convoy provides the means for entry of some supplies into the Division AOR but compared to the total effort is insignificant. In addition, these convoys are susceptible to road conditions, bridge conditions (which are numerous), weather (from an air support viewpoint), and require considerable security. This method is used to best advantage when a requirement exists to move large numbers of vehicles.

The tonnages of cargo moved by the various transportation means into and within the Division Area of Responsibility are shown below for the months of January, February, and March 1967:

ANUARY			mero	TRÜCK
Days Lifted		FIXED WING 30 days	<u>HEIO</u> 26 days	25 days
Avg Day's Lift	131 S/T	47,184	30,815	36
Highest Day's Lift	290. S/T	143,081	153,340	80
Lowest Day's Lift	28 <b>S/T</b>	9,178	1,500	14
Total Lift 1	,840 S/T 1,	415,512	901,200	911
FEBRUARY				
Days Lifted	16 days	28 days	24 days	25 days
Avg Day's Lift	148 S/T	40 S/T	16 <b>S/T</b>	94 S/T
Highest Day's Lift	568	234	<b>4</b> 6	167
Lowest Day's Lift	32	5	1	13
Total Lift 2	,374	1,120	384	2,360
MARCH 1-25				
Days Lifted	12 days	25 days	22 days	24 days
Avg Day's Lift	107 S/T	86 <b>S/T</b>	26 <b>S/T</b>	43 S/T
Highest Day's Lift	190 S/T	306 S/T	52 S/T	81 S/T
Lowest Day's Lift	36 <b>S/T</b>	2 S/T	4 S/T	10 S/T
Total Lift	1,280 S/T	2,208 S/T	579 S/T	1,043 S/T

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: Allocation of additional transportation assets (LCU, Fixed Wing Aircraft) to support the 3d Marine Division

- V. ACTION BEING TAKEN: Continued effort to provide projected/ anticipated requirements to FIC in order to allow FIC longer reaction time before items become emergency or extremely high priority requirements.
- VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: Continued emphasis on movement of construction material under present conditions and stock piling of special monsoon requirements in the Division AOR to provide for interruptions in transportation.