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COI

CTG 79.4

Capt. *[Signature]*

HMM-263

BLT 1/3

BEAR

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BITE

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJ: COMMUNICATION OPER. ING INSTRUCTIONS (COI)

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UNIT

CTG 79.4

TG 79.4 (COLLECTIVE)

BLT 1/3

BLT 1/3 (COLLECTIVE)

"A" CO 1/3

"B" CO 1/3

"C" CO 1/3

"D" CO 1/3

SPARROW HAWK PLAT

"A" BTRY 1/12 (105 HOW)

"W" BTRY 2/12 (107 MORT)

ANTI-TANK

TANY'S

RECON

VOICE

DRUM BOY

PAGE CITY

LEASE BREAKER

GLAMOUR BOY

LEASE BREAKER ALFA

LEASE BREAKER BRAVO

LEASE BREAKER CHARLIE

LEASE BREAKER DELTA

LEASE BREAKER HAWK

CEDAR GROVE

BLUE REBEL

CROOKED MILE

MATURE TEACHER

MOON CLOUD

W

AC7F

JC8B

5HLN

SU3Q

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PAGE 1

UNIT

AMTRAC
ENGINEER
BEACHMASTER
SHORE PARTY
81 MM MORTAR
106 R R
HMM-263
L S U

TACLOG ALFA (IPH)
TACLOG BRAVO (IPD)
TACLOG CHARLIE (LSD)
TACLOG DELTA (LSD)
AIR OBSERVER

VOICE

OPTION HOLDER
ORANGE TEA
(BEACH COLOR) BEET
PIANO CHAIR
LEASE BREAKER WHISKEY
LEASE BREAKER TANGO
PANEL WALL
PICADILLY CIRCUS
LEASE BREAKER PRODUCT ALFA
LEASE BREAKER PRODUCT BRAVO
LEASE BREAKER PRODUCT CHARLIE
LEASE BREAKER PRODUCT DELTA
BEYOND

W

PAGE 2

UNIT

SACC
FSCC (BLT 1/3)
HDC
TACC
TADC
TACA
DASC
USS OKINAWA
USS SAINT PAUL
USS BOSTON
USS ELDORADO
USS DULUTH
USS HERMITAGE

VOICE CALL

PALLADIUM
LEASE BREAKER BAILEY
FAIRMONT
ICE PACK ALFA
JOY RIDE
PLAY BOY
LANDSHARK CHARLIE
GALLANT MAN
TORNADO
MAULER
DECANTER TANGO
FOUR WINDS
SUSANNA XRAY

W

NGKK
NBYM
NAWP
NWDB

PAGE 3

UNIT

USS SANCTUARY
USS REPOSE
USS POINT DEFIANCE
CTF 76
TF 76 (COLLECTIVE)
CTG 76.4
TG 76.4 (COLLECTIVE)
CG III MAF
CG 3RD MARDIV
3RD MARDIV (COLLECTIVE)
3RD MARDIV NET
DET 4 3RD MAF
DET 1/4
DET 2/4

VOICE CALL

SANCTUARY
REPOSE
TERESA BRAVO
ILLUSION
TARNISH
PALLADIUM
DEPRECIATE
FRANCHISE
SUDDEN DEATH
WARE HOUSE
ZOO KEEPER
SCAT
PERMISSION
RIDGE BEAM

C W

NXKF
NSTC
NHNM
C70G
H3SU
C3VM
J5MP
GY99
T878
7VUD
J70X
9QF7
LY60
HJ21

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UNIT

~~SET~~ 3/4

12TH MARINES

1/12

2/12

3/12

4/12

FSCC (PHU BAI)

FSCC (RLT-4)

CTG 79.4 LNO TO RLT-4

VOICE CALL

TODAY

PARKGREEN

MORTGAGE

PIED PIPER

POLISH

PRETEXT

SUDDEN DEATH BAILEY

SCAT BAILEY

DRUM BOY TWO FOUR

W

rZ4Y

Y14E

S39Q

2BRS

7PKT

Z32L

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TO EXPEDITE THE RAPID TRANSMISSION OF FREQUENTLY RECU LING
ITEMS AND REDUCE TRANSMISSION TIME, THE FOLLOWING BREVITY CODE
WILL BE UTILIZED.

ENCODE

THRUST POINTS

DANCING

WALL FLOWER

GYPSY

DOCTOR

DENTIST

HAWK

TIGERS

KLONDIKE

SPOOK

SNAKES

MEANING

POSITIONS

MOVING

SECURE

PATROL

INSERTION

EXTRACTION

REACTION FORCE

C A S

UH-1E (ARMED)

ILLUMINATION

LISTENING POSTS

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ENCODE

LIGHTING

BELL

BOOK

CANDLE

SALT

PEPPER

MOUSE TRAP

MEANING

AMBUSH

K I A

W I A

M I A

AMMUNITION

WATER

WITHDRAWAL

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<u>NET</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>NETS</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>DESIG</u>
SLF TAC # 1 (P)			39.75 MC	M-530
(S)			56.55 MC	M-807
SLF TAC # 2 (P)			9824 KC	M-311
(S)			3408 KC	M-333
BLT TAC # 1 (P)			35.95 MC	M-461
(S)			34.1 MC	T-20
BLT TAC # 2 (P)			60.85 MC	M-893
(S)			43.45 MC	M-598
"A" CO 1/3 TAC			37.85 MC	M-499
"B" CO 1/3 TAC			42.75 MC	M-585
"C" CO 1/3 TAC			57.85 MC	M-833
"D" CO 1/3 TAC			44.95 MC	M-634

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<u>NET</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>DESIG</u>
SPARROW HAWK	40.15 MC	M-530
81 MM MORTAR COF	45.55 MC	M-644
SP CONTROL/TACLOG	37.15 MC	M-489
TANK CMD	23.5 MC	M-375
ANTI-TANK CMD	26.5 MC	M-1346
ENGINEER CMD	36.45 MC	M-471
RECON CMD	44.25 MC	M-622
AMTRAC CMD	43.05 MC	M-591
LZ CONTROL (3RD MARDIV)	35.2 MC	M-442
HST LOGISTICS	30.3 MC	M-1116
ARTY/NGF AIR SPOT	46.9 MC	M-665
SFCP LOCAL	32.1 MC	M-1141
NGF CONTROL/SUPPORT	3825 KC	M-338 (N-9)
ARTY COMMAND/FD	45.2 MC	M-639

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<u>NET</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>DESIG</u>
SFC SPOT # 1	35.35 MC	N-10
SFC SPOT # 2	43.35 MC	M-596
ARTY COF # 1 ("A" BTRY 1/12)	37.6 MC	M-496
ARTY COF # 2 ("W" BTRY 2/12)	46.75 MC	M-662
TACP LOCAL	34.5 MC	T-21
HMM-263 SQUADRON TAC	40.4 MC	M-542
MED-EVAC	35.5 MC	M-448
AIR OBSERVER	33.3 MC	T-19
HD-1	326.6 MC	H-11
HD-2	368.2 MC	H-12
HD-3 (P)/TAO(S)	312.5 MC	H-13 SILVER
HELO COMMON/ARC-2	280.2 MC	
TAC (P)	5346 KC	H-1
TAR-1	41.2 MC	H-3

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<u>NET</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>DESI</u>
TAR-2/ARC-1/TACP LOCAL	43.5 MC	H-4
TATC (P)	350.6 MC	H-5 GOLD
TATC(S)/AG-2/TAD-2	315.4 MC	H-6 PURPLE
TAD/AC-1	326.2 MC	H-7 RED
LPH LAND/LAUNCH	330.6 MCS	H-19
S A R	364.2 MC	H-20
V H F GUARD	121.5 MC	
U H F GUARD	243.0 MC	
BOAT CONTROL	31.1 MC	N-8
BOAT COMMON	30.9 MC	M-1124 (N-7)
UDT RECON/BEACHMASTER COMMON	32.9 MC	T-18 (N-6)

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<u>NET</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>DESIG</u>
III MAF CMD # 2 (TTY ORESTES) (P)	2602 KC	M-31
(S)	8057 KC	M-182
3RD MARDIV NGF CONTROL	8630 KC	M-195
3RD MARDIV NGF SUPPORT	4314 KC	M-107
3RD MARDIV NGF SPOT # 1 (P)	41.0 MC	M-557
(S)	9942 KC	M-220
3RD MARDIV NGF SPOT # 2 (P)	49.2 MC	M-694
(S)	3396 KC	M-78
3RD MARDIV NGF SPOT # 3 (P)	42.9 MC	M-588
(S)	5120 KC	M-124
3RD MARDIV TAC # 1	2244 KC	M-15
3RD MARDIV TAC # 2 (P)	52.85 MC	M-742
(S)	53.85 MC	M-756

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<u>NET</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>D G</u>
RLT-4 TAC # 1 (P)	68.3 MC	M-1056
(S)	33.0 MC	M-428
RLT-4 TAC # 2 (P)	4344 KC	M-108
(S)	9827 KC	M-218
RLT-4 TACP	42.8 MC	M-586
RLT-4 CP SECURITY	53.2 MC	M-745
BLT -1/4 TAC # 1	2760 KC	M-38
BLT 1/4 TAC # 2	45.1 MC	M-637
BLT 2/4 TAC # 1	5123 KC	M-125
BLT 2/4 TAC # 2	48.2 MC	M-681
BLT 3/4 TAC # 1	5189 KC	M-129
BLT 3/4 TAC # 2	51.4 MC	M-723
12TH MAR COMMAND (P)	9300 KC	M-211
(S)	3320 KC	M-73

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NET

12TH MAR FIRE CONTROL

(P)

FREQUENCY

60.9 MC

DI 3

M-894

(S)

52.4 MC

M-737

12TH MAR REGT FIRE DIR # 2

39.65 MC

M-528

12TH MAR SPOT # 1

40.7 MC

M-547

12TH MAR SPOT # 2

58.8 MC

M-852

1/12 BN COMMAND

(P)

7418 KC

M-170

(S)

37.5 MC

M-494

1/12 BN FIRE DIRECTION

(P)

3224 KC

M-68

(S)

61.8 MC

M-914

2/12 BN COMMAND

(P)

3925 KC

M-91

(S)

34.4 MC

M-434

2/12 BN FIRE DIRECTION

(P)

54.4 MC

M-763

3/12 BN COMMAND

(P)

3522 KC

M-81

(S)

35.6 MC

M-450

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NET

3/12 BN FIRE DIRECTION

(P)

FREQUENCY

6935 KC

FIG

M-167

(S)

36.6 MC

M-474

4/12 BN COMMAND

(P)

7775 KC

M-176

(S)

39.95 MC

M-481

4/12 BN FIRE DIRECTION

(P)

3135 KC

M-58

(S)

38.4 MC

M-508

SLF ARTY LN

(P)

46.2 MC

M-657

(S)

7387 KC

T-7

LPD LAND/LAUNCH

334.6 MC

H-23

AREA TACP LOCAL

42.8 MC

M-586

HOSPITAL SHIP (APPROACH CONT)

312.2 MC

RADIO RELAY SLF "T"

56.7 MC

M-810

SLF "R"

64.9 MC

M-980

KAC

QX-5

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
3rd Marine Division
Command Chronology
May 1967

Annex 9
Supporting Documents

Encl 1	COI	May 1967	Subj: Communication Operating Instructions
2	Bro	May 1967	Subj: Visit of Lt Gen Victor H. Krulak, CG, FMFPAC.
3	Msg	010655 Z	Subj: Operation Cumberland
4	Msg	020400 Z	Subj: Operation Cumberland
5	Msg	021000 Z	Subj: Ashau Valley Fire Support Base
6	Msg	021223 Z	Subj: Continuation of Operation Shawnee
7	Msg	021235 Z	Subj: Continuation of Operation Shawnee
8	Msg	021352 Z	Subj: Staff Augmentation, Headquarters 3rd Marine Division
9	Msg	031619 Z	Subj: Ashau Valley Fire Support Base
10	Msg	050205 Z	Subj: Staff Augmentation, Headquarters , 3rd Marine Division
11	Msg	071300 Z	Subj: Ashau Valley Fire Support Base
12	Msg	071335 Z	Subj: Operation Cumberland
13	Msg	101407 Z	Subj: Operation Cumberland
14	Msg	110150 Z	Subj: Operation Cumberland
15	Msg	190646 Z	Subj: Unit Locations
16	Msg	211045 Z	Subj: Prairie IV Operations
17	Msg	231732 Z	Subj: Night Positions
18	Msg	290428 Z	Subj: Bear Bite NGFS
19	Msg	290655 Z	Subj: Concept of Operation, SLF ALPHA
20	Msg	291210 Z	Subj: Concept of Operations, SLF ALPHA
21	Msg	30 May	Subj: Operation Bear Bite
22	Msg	300954 Z	Subj: Operation Bear Bite
23	INT	31 May	Subj: 1st CIT/3rd Mar Div, Intelligence Estimate
24	Msg	310054 Z	Subj: Operation Bear Bite Frag Order #1
25	Msg	310400 Z	Subj: Bear Bite NGFS
26	Msg	311530 Z	Subj: Tired Float SITREP #J91
27	Msg	281601 Z	Subj: Bear Bite SITREP #1
28	Msg	192354 Z	Subj: Belt Tight SITREP #1
29	Msg	200314 Z	Subj: Belt Tight SITREP #2
30	Msg	210419 Z	Subj: Belt Tight SITREP #4
31	Msg	220339 Z	Subj: Belt Tight SITREP #6
32	Msg	221554 Z	Subj: Belt Tight/Hickory SITREP #7
33	Msg	230304 Z	Subj: Belt Tight/Hickory SITREP #8
34	Msg	231515 Z	Subj: Belt Tight/Hickory SITREP #9
35	Msg	240315 Z	Subj: Belt Tight/Hickory SITREP #10
36	Msg	250339 Z	Subj: Belt Tight/Hickory SITREP #12

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3D MARINE DIVISION



VIETNAM



VISIT OF
LTGEN VICTOR H. KRULAK
COMMANDING GENERAL
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
MAY 1967

Encl 2

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Ser: 005A12367

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

BROCHURE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL VICTOR H. KRULAK

SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE

~~6 MAY 1967~~

2 NOV 67

COMMANDING GENERAL

MAJOR GENERAL BRUNO A. HOCHMUTH

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL P. RYAN

CHIEF OF STAFF

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5

COLONEL ALEXANDER D. CEREGHINO

LTCOL CHARLES S. KIRCHMANN

LTCOL LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD III

COLONEL EDWARD E. HAMMERBECK

COLONEL JOHN F. MENTZER

COLONEL EDWARD R. MCCARTHY

DOWNGRADE AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS.

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G-3 BRIEFING OUTLINE
FOR CG FMFPAC

I. PURPOSE. To review current dispositions of Division units, combat operations in progress, and future plans.

II. MAIN IDEAS

A. Current Dispositions

1. Units remaining in Danang.
2. Phu Bai Combat Base.
3. SHAWNEE OA.
4. Dong Ha - PRAIRIE IV OA.
5. Khe Sanh.

B. Current and Projected Operations

1. Phu Bai TAOR.
2. SHAWNEE.
3. PRAIRIE IV.
4. SLF Operations.
5. Operation FIREBREAK

C. Status of 3d Marine Division CAC Program

1. Present 4 CAC Hq, with total of 22 CAPs.
2. Planned expansion.

III. SUMMARY: The return of 3d Marine Division Control of the 9th Marines (-) plus the regimental slice of supporting units has increased the Division capability to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. The availability of an SLF has further provided additional flexibility; however, the availability of total assets is still marginal when viewed in the light of increasing commitments including the two major jobs of opening and manning of the trace between Gio Linh and Con Thien and the upgrading of Highway 547 leading to the establishment of an artillery outpost to cover the A Chau Valley.

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NARRATIVE

G-3 BRIEFING FOR
CG FMFPAC, 6 MAY 1967

General KRULAK. The period since your last visit of 8 March has been characterized by an increased tempo of operations in the Division AOR. You will recall PRAIRIE II activity of late February and early March, north and northwest of Cam Lo, which had flared just prior to your last visit. This tempo continued on into PRAIRIE III when the SLF with BLT 1/4 landed in a timely fashion on the beaches east of Gio Linh and by helo west of Geo Linh.

Khe Sanh activity has varied from minor reconnaissance contacts to the outburst of activity in the middle of March when we reinforced Khe Sanh temporarily with an additional company. This lasted only a few days. Then very recently, Khe Sanh activity greatly increased, with the major contact with the enemy by platoons of B/1/9 on 24 April 1967.

CHINOOK followed by BIG HORN operations have varied in size due to requirements during the period to shift infantry assets north into the PRAIRIE area. We did, however, conduct a sweep with 1/9 (-) in the "STREET WITHOUT JOY" area and conduct a coordinated ARVN/USMC search and destroy operation through the Co Bi-Thanh Tan area and the immediate high ground to the southwest.

Operation OREGON was very welcome to the 3d Marine Division. The northerly orientation of U. S. Forces into I Corps area provided us with Headquarters, 9th Marines, two infantry battalion plus the regimental slice of reinforcing units. This enabled us to beef up our forces in certain areas of our AOR and proceed with desired plans.

Here is a brief look at our current dispositions (as of 2 May).

Map 1:250,00, showing major dispositions as follows:

DANANG (3d MarDiv units OPCON 1st MarDiv)

1stBn, 26th Marines plus a BLT slice of supporting elements.

PHU BAI

Hq, 3d Marine Division

RLT 26 (Fwd)

3dBn, 26th Marines

4thBn, 12th Marines

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GIA LE

3d Tank Bn

3d Engr Bn

3d AT Bn

3d SP Bn

SHAWNEE

Hq, 4th Marines

2dBn, 9th Marines

2dBn, 26th Marines

2dBn, 4th Marines

3dBn, 12th Marines

1st 8" How Btry

KHE SANH

2dBn, 3d Marines

3dBn (-), 3d Marines

Prov Arty Bn (Cmd Gp, 2 Btrys)

PRAIRIE IV

Hq, 3d Marines

3dBn, 9th Marines

3dBn (-), 3d Marines (Rear)

9th Marines

1stBn (-), 9th Marines

1stBn, 4th Marines

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12th Marines

1stBn, 12th Marines

2dBn (-), 12th Marines

2dBn, 94th Arty USA

1stBn, 40th Arty USA

1stBn, 44th ADA USA

GIO LINH

Composite Artillery Battalion

CUA VIET

1st Amtrac Battalion

Our artillery is disposed as shown on the Map: (As of 2 May)

Map 1:250,000, illustrates artillery dispositions as follows:

PHU BAI

6 105mm How (TD)

5 155mm How (TD)

6 155mm Gun (SP)

1-8 inch How (SP)

SHAWNEE

18 105mm How (TD)

4 155mm How (SP)

5 155mm How (TD)

5 8 inch How (SP)

KHE SANH

12 105mm How (TD)

2 155mm How (TD)

3 4.2 inch Mortar

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18 105mmHow (TD)
18 105mm How (SP)
11 155mm How (SP)
12 175mm Gun (SP)
5 107mm Howtar
2 4.2 inch Mortor
6 LVTH 6

CURRENT AND PROJECTED OPERATIONS:

PHU BAI. The vital area defense battalion continues to be charged with a multiplicity of tasks running from the major job of defense of the Phu Bai Vital Area to squad size security forces for hydrographic surveys in the area. This battalion capability is stretched to the maximum. In order to free it as much as possible from defense duties, tenant organizations are charged with manning sections of the perimeter, but under the overall coordination of the resident infantry battalion. This permits infantry patrolling in the mortar belt.

At present, one company is conducting a GOLDEN FLEECE operation, one company normally operates in the Phu Loc District, the third company operates in and around the Phu Bai area mainly in the Troui River and Gia Le areas. The fourth company is kept close to home base for many and varied tasks including ROUGH RIDER security, SPARROW HAWK force, and other miscellaneous tasks.

In response to a COMUSMACV requirement, this Division has been tasked to open Route 547 southwest of Hue for a distance of $9\frac{1}{2}$ miles past Nam Hoa District Headquarters. At that point an artillery fire support base will be established to deliver 175mm gun fires into the A Shau Valley. Subsequently, this route will be extended into the A Shau Valley to connect with Route 548.

To establish the fire support base within a 30 day period, it is estimated that two force engineer companies, a bridge platoon, and one infantry battalion with normal support is required. To extend the road into the A Shau Valley will require an additional reinforced infantry battalion for security.

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The project was initiated on 26 April, using available resources. The responsibility for securing the area and protecting the engineer effort has since been assigned to Headquarters, 26 Marines. The engineer mission has been assigned to the 3d Engineer Battalion, to be accomplished using primarily force engineer units made available by CG, III MAF. It is expected that the 175mm gun batteries to occupy the fire support base will be made available from external sources. Headquarters, 26th Marines, in addition, will plan for operations to locate and destroy VC Base Area 115 and for operations into the A Shau Valley when required forces are available.

SHAWNEE. This multi-battalion ARVN/USMC operation commenced on 22 April with the preparation phase during which artillery was staged forward in order to cover the deep helicopter penetration scheduled for the following day. In addition, fixed wing strikes were run to open up selected landing zones which had previously been hit by ARC LIGHT strikes.

On 23 April, five infantry battalions (3 ARVN and 2 USMC) were helolifted deep into the reported VC Base Area 114.

Only minor contacts have been made to date. The ARVN force uncovered, however, several large rice caches plus other caches of ammunition, clothing and communications equipment. The operation continues with search operations to discover the enemy base area or deny the existence of such an area.

PRAIRIE. PRAIRIE IV continues with extensive reconnaissance and infantry patrols in order to detect NVA/VC movement in the critical areas leading into vital installations.

The enemy has been very active in its harassing mortar, artillery and rocket attacks on Camp Carroll, Gio Linh and, very recently, the rocket attack on Dong Ha. These are evidence of the enemy capability in this line. The bulk of infantry assets in Northern Quang Tri are tied to fixed positions, thereby greatly reducing flexibility and capability to react in graduated strengths required in each specific situation. Static positions such as the outposts at BaLong, Cua and CaLu plus security for artillery position at Gio Linh, the Gio Linh - Con Thien Trace, Rockpile, and the Khe Gia Bridge account for almost three infantry battalions.

KHE SANH. The General is very aware of the enemy activity west of Khe Sanh airstrip which required heavy reinforcement of the rifle company at Khe Sanh. The bloody 24 April contact of two platoons of B/1/9 resulted in the present vicious encounter with a determined, tenacious North Vietnamese force estimated a heavily reinforced regiment. An enemy force which could only be driven out by sheer weight of supporting arms. The enemy was cleverly hidden and covered in well constructed bunkers and fighting holes, armed with excellent weapons, supported by mortars and heavy machine guns and determined to stay.

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SLF OPERATIONS. This Division has been fortunate in obtaining SLF's in the past. The General is aware of the timely and successful operations of the two SLF operations in Northern Quang Tri, DECKHOUSE IV, and recently, BEACON HILL I.

The 22 April SLF landing on the beaches of Huong Dien District was smoothly executed and was beginning to produce results in the Song O Lau area which separates Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces; however, the sudden flareup of activity in Khe Sanh required the air lift of the Battalion on 26 April into Khe Sanh.

This Division has requested the punch of the SLF for other areas within the 3d Division AOR. These areas are: A return to the Houng Dien area as mentioned above, the attack into the heavily VC infested area in the Phu Thu District, north and west of Phu Bai, and into the Phu Loc District in the southern portion of the AOR.

OPERATION FIREBREAK. This name has been informally used by this Headquarters for the operation conducted in the cutting and clearing of the 200 meter swath from Gio Linh to Con Thien. Engineers of the 11th Engineer Battalion, plus a small assist by ARVN engineers, did the clearing while being protected by Marines of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, reinforced by tanks and AmTracs.

Twenty-one USMC and 4 or 5 ARVN bulldozers were employed daily during the operation completing the original swath in 21 days. The trace is now being widened to 600 meters and a 500 meter strip is being cut around the Con Thien CIDG Camp. In addition, the first observation tower has been emplaced - the first of twelve to be installed. Manning and security requirements will require an infantry battalion headquarters plus three companies, one of which will be an ARVN rifle company which will be integrated into the organization assigned to the trace.

REACTION PLANS FOR RD PROTECTION

There are strong indications that the enemy will continue and increase attacks on low level government structures with the dual objective of destroying existing symbols of government and of disrupting the RD program. Many of these low level government activities possess a minimum capability for self-defense - and consequently require that we possess the capability for prompt reaction if we are to maintain the integrity of these government agencies and outposts, and if we are to inflict maximum damage to attacking forces

To meet this requirement, planning conferences have been held with the 1st Division, ARVN during March and April 1967, who in turn have contacted sector and sub-sector officials in order to gather data necessary to prepare plans and to execute relief operations.

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Basic agreements have been entered into by the two commands for the commitment of reaction forces, ARVN and/or USMC, in support of low-level GVN organizations and RD cadres. Districts have been divided, with primary responsibility for reaction being assigned either to USMC or to ARVN forces, depending upon location of friendly forces. The responsibility for reaction in these Districts has been further assigned to Regiments and/or Battalions of the Division based on their present locations.

Interim plans are operational at present, however, detailed information as to location, strength, composition, physical plant etc., of each of the Districts is being obtained from the 1st Division, the helicopter squadron has just completed HLZ surveys in Thua Thien Province, and the Division G-3 is preparing a "detailed" plan to support this requirement.

It is imperative that the symbol of government control be protected and if necessary, restored immediately to demonstrate the continuity and solidity of the Government of Vietnam. However, it is also necessary to be realistic. There must be a significant increase in the self-defense capability of these installations, to enable them to hold-out until relief forces arrive. Currently the reaction time for the required helicopter lift is two hours. It must also be recognized that committing a reaction force at night into these areas would be extremely difficult.

COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM

The General is very aware of the III MAF Combine Action Program and its present status and plan for future expansion.

The General's briefing book contains detailed information on the status of the Division's CAC Program and future plans for expansion. The worth of this program has been proven within this Division by the many fine contributions made by the CAC's not only in military security and protection provided to the hamlets and villages but in their Civic Action and RD contributions.

SUMMARY

The recent return to 3d Marine Division control of the 9th Marines (-) plus the regimental slice of supporting units has increased the Division capability to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. The availability of an SLF has further provided additional flexibility; however, the availability of total assets is still marginal when viewed in the light of increased enemy activity and the increasing commitments including the two major tasks of opening and manning of the trace between Gio Linh and Con Thien and the upgrading of Highway 547 leading to the establishment of an artillery outpost to cover the A Chau Valley.

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G-3 PLANS

Following is a summary of the principal operation plans which are currently being developed and/or are in initial phases of execution.

a. PRACTICE NINE. Projected operations stem from a USMACV Requirements Plan of 26 January 1967 and will, when executed, have a significant impact upon 3d Marine Division operations and the Division Area of Responsibility. Preliminary preparations are being initiated by USMACV. Further description is omitted due to the plan's security classification, TOP SECRET LIMDIS.

b. RELIEF OF CIDG CAMPS. The 3d Marine Division has a mission of reacting to enemy attacks or threats of attacks on CIDG Camps at Lang Vei (6,000 meters southwest of Khe Sanh) and at Con Thien (camp opened in late April 1967). Plan for relief of Lang Vei has been completed and promulgated; plan for Con Thien is being prepared. Plans provide for artillery support, air support and the deployment of troop units to destroy attacking forces.

c. RELIEF OF LOW LEVEL GVN STRUCTURES. Plans are being prepared, in coordination with the 1st Infantry Division, ARVN and Sector Commanders, for reaction forces to relieve District Headquarters, GVN outposts and Revolutionary Development Hamlets when under enemy ground attacks. Plans will provide for artillery support, air support and deployment of rapid reaction forces by helicopter or overland movement to counter and destroy attacking forces.

d. SLF OPERATIONS. In support of planned operations during summer months, the following SLF and/or multi-SLF operating areas were proposed.

(1) Quang Dien, Huong Dien and Phong Dien Districts of Thua Thien Province. Dependent on availability of forces, this operating area was to be enlarged to include portions of the Hai Lang National Forest.

(2) Phu Thu and Vinh Loc Districts of Thua Thien Province.

(3) Phu Loc District of Thua Thien Province.

(4) Hai Lang District of Quang Tri Province.

The above listed operating areas are well suited to capitalize upon the unique capabilities of the landing force. Intelligence also indicates that the recommended operating areas are critical areas in the enemy's summer campaign plans against the RD programs and are also the enemy's primary rice collection areas.

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Operation BEACON STAR, and SLF landing in Huong Dien District commenced on 22 April 1967. Phase II of BEACON STAR, a search and destroy operation to the southwest astride Song O Lau river, was cancelled on 26 April 1967 due to heavy contacts in the Khe Sanh area. Three companies and a battalion command group from BLT 2/3 were airlifted to Khe Sanh. The remainder of the SLF backloaded and proceeded to the Cua Viet river. The direct support artillery battery and fourth rifle company was off loaded and airlifted to Khe Sanh.

e. A SHAU FIRE SUPPORT BASE. In response to a USMACV requirement, the 3d Marine Division has been tasked to develop plans for establishment of a fire support base from which 175mm gun fires can be delivered into the A Shau Valley. The requirement includes opening Route 547 southwest from Hue a distance of about 22 kilometers, at which point the fire support base will be established, and subsequently extending this road into the A Shau Valley.

A plan for accomplishment has been prepared. It provides for initially upgrading the existing route to the minimum extend required to establish and support the fire support base. Subsequent operations would continue to improve the route, as well as extend it to connect with Route 548 in the A Shau Valley. Actions in accordance with the plan have been initiated, including air and ground reconnaissance and upgrading the route from Hue to the selected crossing site on the Song Huong near the Nam Hoa District Headquarters.

The requirements for security operations are expected to be extensive. This route is considered to be of importance to the enemy as a line of communication into Nam Hoa District and Hue and vicinity. Concomitantly, the execution of the plan will add significantly to the security and wellbeing of the populace in these areas and to the interdiction of enemy bases and lines of communication.

f. ELECTION PROTECTION PLAN. GVN village and hamlet elections are being conducted during the period 2 April to 16 June 1967 in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. The Division assists in the security of designated village/hamlet elections, in coordination with District Chiefs, by conducting patrol and ambush operations in areas contiguous to election locations. Date and location of elections are published to Division units on a weekly basis for compliance with published policy and guidance for US forces.

g. RICE PROTECTION PLAN. Golden Fleece operations are being conducted in Thua Thien Province during the period 15 April through 31 May 1967. Concept includes daylight patrol activity and night ambushes, and integration of CAC operations in designated areas. 3d Bn, 26th Marines is presently conducting company (rein) Golden Fleece operations in the Truoi Bridge area of Phu Loc District.

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~~SECRET~~ARTILLERY INTO DMZ & NVN

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During a routine flight over the DMZ on 22 February 1967 an Air Force Forward Controller reported receiving automatic weapons fire from an estimated 3-5 Anti-Aircraft positions at YD 047808. A fire mission was processed by 2d Battalion, 94th Field Artillery Group at Camp J. J. Carroll. At 1332 on 22 February, the 175 guns fired into the DMZ. The Forward Air Controller reported that the automatic weapons firing ceased and heavy damage was inflicted on the AA positions. The incident was reported to COMUSMACV via CG III MAF. On 23 February CG III MAF was briefed on Forward Air Controller sightings and enemy activity in the DMZ.

On 25 February, at 1943, authorization was received from COMUSMACV to fire into the DMZ and NVN to the maximum range capability of the weapons under operation control of the 3d Marine Division. Thus, Operation HIGHRISE, became a reality.

The Composite Artillery Battalion displaced to Gio Linh on 26 February to make maximum use of weapons capabilities and terrain available to the Division. The unit, consisting of four 175mm guns, six 105mm Howitzers, and later three 90mm Tanks fired the greatest percentage of missions into the DMZ/NVN. 155mm Howitzer fire is also used in Operation HIGHRISE, from batteries emplaced at Dong Ha and Cam Lo. AA/AW positions and infiltration routes lead the list of targets in Operation HIGHRISE.

Observation of the DMZ/NVN area is accomplished chiefly through use of 12th Marines' air observers. This plan has not been fully implemented due to the number of missions needed for observation around Gio Linh and Prairie area. Air observers from 12th Marines are presently using four US Army aircraft which are based at the Dong Ha airfield. Air Force and Marine observation aircraft are also used when available to obtain target information of this area.

Battle damage assessment of the DMZ/NVN area is accomplished through both visual means and photo imagery. Both indicate that artillery fire has been effective, with extensive cratering in many areas. Perhaps the best indication of effectiveness of this operation is the number of mortar and artillery attacks directed against Gio Linh.

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Following is a recap of Operation HIGHRISE as of 302400 April 1967:

	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>OBSERVED</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u> <u>UNOBSERVED</u>	<u>LEAFLETS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1.	90mm		365		365
2.	106mm		5		5
3.	105 mm	21	770	1	792
4.	155mm	8	78		86
5.	175mm	39	1556		1595

	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>LEAFLETS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1.	90mm	5696	458		6154
2.	106mm RR	48			48
3.	105mm	15,487	1379	1	16,867
4.	155mm	755	19		774
5.	175mm	24,315			24,315
TOTAL		46,301			48,158

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Fire Support Coordination For Project HIGHRISE (DMZ/NVA)

The enemy has reacted to Operation HIGHRISE by ^{ATTACKS} attacks on Gio Linh, Con Thien and Dong Ha, returning a large volume of mortar, artillery and rocket rounds. These actions tend to indicate that friendly artillery fires are achieving desired results. Despite the 48,000 plus rounds which have been fired since its inception, two factors are hampering an even more aggressive prosecution of this program: A recent restrictive ammunition supply rate and the preeminence of aircraft in the area. In the first instance, recent logistic restrictions dictate the number of targets that can be attacked daily. An allowed expenditure of 26 rounds per day per tube of 175mm guns established a maximum of 312 rounds, although the actual number fired in any 24 hour period is reduced in order to build a reserve to be used in emergencies. An average of 19 targets are engaged with 190 rounds. The target list contains in excess of 1100 targets to which additions are made with continued observation. Targets found undamaged after a mission are rescheduled. This artillery program is apparently in competition with the 7th Air Force whose aircraft operate daily and at night within the fire capability of the Gio Linh and Camp Carroll positions. Whenever aircraft penetrate this air space either the USAF ground control facility at night or the airborne controller during daylight hours declares an artillery cease fire. These periods have been as extensive as 8 hours. Coordination conferences with 620th Tactical Control Squadron, USAF, 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, USAF, and 7th Air Force Headquarters have been held and plans for additional conferences are being made to establish air corridors, programmed targeting, fire fans and other coordination procedures designed to permit attack simultaneously by air and artillery on a non-interference basis.

Fire Support Coordination for Project Delta Operations

On 13 April 1967, CG III MAF directed Delta Force operations in western Thua Thien Province from 17 April through 15 May under operational control of CG III MAF. After coordination with Detachment B-52 of 5th Special Forces and the 3d Marine Division FSCC, CG 3d Marine Division promulgated coordination measures with the intention to ensure that there would be a single agency designated to control fire support of Delta forces and forces which are operating in contiguous areas under OPCON of CG, 3dMarDiv. The measures included cancellation of those portions of Specified Strike Zones within the Delta Operational Area and forbade airstrikes, TPQ-10 controlled bombing or artillery fires to be placed in this zone without prior clearance of 3dMarDiv FSCC (Phu Bai). To permit maximum freedom for air strikes against targets of opportunity and to provide ground areas secure from air attack and artillery fire, daily liaison is effected with Detachment B-52.

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The Division Fire Support Coordinator, being provided with wing targets from FMAW G-3, establishes, in conjunction with B-52 representatives, a line embracing the essential elements of a tactical bomb line. The area cleared for FMAW air operations within Delta Operational Area is telephoned to the FMAW G-3 section in time to be included in the Wing Frag order for the next 24 hour period.

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~~SECRET~~Provisional 155mm Howitzer (Towed) Batteries

The 1st 155mm How Provisional Battery (TD) is presently participating in Operation SHAWNEE from a forward artillery position in the upper Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley. The 2d Provisional Battery is supporting operations in the Phu Bai TAOR. These employments highlight the two basic tenets on which the establishment of these units was predicated: flexibility of movement of artillery in operating areas where mobility restrictions exist and additional 155mm Howitzer support with a minimum outlay of material and personnel. Operations in Quang Tri Province with bridge weight restrictions have proved the utility of the towed 155mm Howitzer. In a general support role there has generally been a primary direction of fire which has minimized the need for 6400 mil traverse. In addition, a speed shift device is being fabricated and installed on these weapons which reduces by 1/3 the time to shift trails. Where certain key bridge weight limitations and river fords have precluded employment of self-propelled 155mm Howitzers, the towed versions displayed their versatility. The formation of these batteries and subsequent employment has not been without problems. Personnel and equipment were drawn from within the 12th Marine Battalions. Minimal numbers of O8 qualified personnel were augmented from occupational fields having a surplus. The concept of operation for these batteries did not envision frequent displacement. A greatly reduced motor transport capability was therefore provided. Subsequent operations have been accomplished through temporary assignment of augmenting motor transport and partial satelliting on local artillery units. Despite these limitations, the support rendered by these batteries has validated the decision to retain the weapons in-country. To maximize their mobility, field worthiness and tactical operations through assignment of a full T/O and T/E, formalization of the batteries as adjuncts to the present M109 equipped 155mm Howitzer battalion is considered to be in the best interests of artillery support to the 3d Marine Division.

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NAVAL GUNFIRE

The mobility and effectiveness of the Naval gun was again demonstrated recently when USS ST PAUL (CA-73) was repositioned from the Phu Loc area to the vicinity of the DMZ, a distance of 55 nautical miles, in less than three hours. ST PAUL's counterbattery fire assisted in effectively silencing artillery fire directed at Gio Linh.

The fact that ST PAUL was directed to leave her station in support of Gio Linh and engage in a SLF operation to the south once again stresses the point that additional major caliber gun ships must be made available to ground forces. While it is only conjecture, ST PAUL, from her position off the mouth of the Cua Viet river, could have continued to support both Gio Linh and Dong Ha and perhaps prevented ensuing bombardments of those two areas. It is strongly recommended that every possible effort be made to assign additional major caliber ships to support operations in RVN. There should be a capability of maintaining at least two ships on station in direct support of forces ashore.

Ships assigned northern sector I Corps continue to experience difficulty in obtaining accurate fires due to the lack of natural landmarks and the absence of installed aids to navigation. As a result, naval gunfire accuracy has, on occasion, been unacceptable for targets near populated areas.

The AN/TPN-7 radar beacon's history of poor reliability, the necessity of a secure operating area, and its poor mobility severely limits its use. It is recommended that FMFPac initiate immediate action to procure the interim SST-181 or AN/TPN-16 radar beacon. The reliability and mobility of this equipment will be a valuable asset to the NGF team in the field by making the very accurate "Point Oboe" method of gunfire control feasible. In addition, consideration should be given to increase the T/E to provide one beacon to each NGF team and four for Division NGLO allocation as navigational aids.

~~SECRET~~AIR SUPPORT

Air support within the 3d Marine Division Area of Operations generally follows doctrinal roles and procedures. The principal peculiarity of incountry air support operations occurs as a result of widespread intermingling of enemy elements with civilian and friendly forces. There are no bomb lines. All air strikes must be controlled as a close air support strike by a FAC, TAC (A), or TPQ-10.

Coordination, consolidation of air support requests, and actual control of both fixed wing and helicopters for the Division is accomplished through the Naval Aviators assigned to the Division. The Table of Organization for this command authorized 36 Naval Aviators, but due to the existing shortage only 30 are presently assigned. This reflects a reduction of one FAC per battalion as directed by CG, FMFPac. Additionally, air offices at Phu Bai, Dong Ha, and Khe Sanh are manned by the present complement of personnel.

Marine aircraft to support the Division are assigned daily by the First Marine Aircraft Wing. Fixed wing aircraft normally operate from two bases, Danang and Chu Lai, to provide helicopter escort and conduct air strikes within the Division's operating area. Approximately 50 aircraft conduct air strikes during the day and 30 aircraft conduct FPQ-10 ordnance drops on 80 targets each night. Air support by helicopters and observation aircraft presents a slightly different problem, since Division operating bases are located a distance of 30, 40 and 104 miles from the main base of MAG 16 at Danang. Standard packages of helicopter and observation aircraft packages are located at Phu Bai, Dong Ha and Khe Sanh, and are composed of a variety of helicopters such as UH1E's, UH-34's, CH-46's, CH-37's, and O1 observation aircraft. A total of 40 helicopters and 8 O1's (2 USMC, 6 USA, four of which are used exclusively for artillery observation missions) are assigned daily to support the Division. Usually, on an average, 6 helicopters and one O1C aircraft will not be available during the day either for mechanical problems or a shortage of available aircraft within the First Marine Aircraft Wing. Air support available to the Division from other than Marine sources consists of air strikes by B-52 bombers, use of Army O1's to supplement the almost non-existent Marine observation assets, USAF flare planes, transport and psychological warfare aircraft, and under unusual circumstances, augmentation of First Marine Aircraft Wing Helicopter assets by Army helicopter.

Presently, the Division area consists of approximately 3200 square miles, with aerial observation being the primary means used to detect enemy movement and positions. Additionally, missions such as TAC(A), convoy escort, control of supporting arms and coverage of units in the field must also be performed by these same aerial observers. This Division receives daily a total of 21 hours, 7 hours from USMC aircraft and 14 hours from U. S. Army aircraft, to fulfill all of the observation, TAC(A), control of supporting arms and convoy escort requirements within the operating area.

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Observation efforts totaling 1800 hours per month/60 per day are considered to be the minimum required to fulfill the existing commitments and still meet certain operational aircraft safety regulations, flying in pairs beyond friendly positions. While VMO has the assigned mission of observation within the Marine Corps, it is presently only a nominal assignment. Most of VMO's assets (75-80%) have been converted to gunships for escorting troop helicopters and providing suppressive fire to ground units when fixed wing aircraft cannot operate because of adverse weather. Missions of this type could probably be more adequately performed by an HMA, HML, or by providing VMO with a sufficient number of fixed and rotor winged aircraft to perform these missions as well as their designated mission.

Clearing LZ's With Air Strikes

Recently, VMO-3 conceived the idea of clearing LZ's in jungle areas by using bombs. Working in conjunction with the Division, VMO-3 has been controlling fixed wing aircraft strikes with the aircraft dropping G.P. Bombs configured with "daisy cutters", a 36-inch extension bar installed in the nose fuse of the bombs, to blow LZ's in areas where helicopters normally could not land. Figures (1) and (2) picture areas with vegetation 3 to 4 feet high that was easily opened up for use as an LZ using the method described above. Figures (3) and (4) show a hill-top opened for an LZ and figures (5) and (6) show a more heavily wooded area that would require engineering assistance in clearing before it would be usable as an LZ. We believe that, by carefully selecting areas where trees are not too large, an LZ may be blown with bombs and then cleared with the aid of the engineers. During operation SHAWNEE, this method was used. The LZ in figure (7) and (8) (not contained in all books) resulted from the effects of fixed wing air strikes using 500 and 1000 bombs with "daisy cutters". These zones were then expanded by engineers to permit large landing areas for the troop helicopters.

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ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

The Commanding General, III MAF, provides 3d Marine Division with a team of one officer and three enlisted to conduct tape recorded interviews under the direction of the Division Historical Officer.

Recently the Division purchased three Uher, model 4000, portable tape recorders. These lightweight, professional-quality machines are expected to permit considerable expansion of the program which heretofore was limited by equipment availability.

A total of 132 interviews have been conducted and forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps since the program began in December 1966: December -7; January -19; February - 27; March - 37; April - 42.

Interview subjects have ranged from top-level briefings for the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to small unit leaders and patrol members participating in action against the enemy. Some examples are:

- a. Recon patrol sighting 1,000 Viet Cong on New Years Eve.
- b. Recon patrol which found a Viet Cong Prisoner of War Camp.
- c. Effects of monsoon on operations at Khe Sanh.
- d. Operations of the 1st 155 gun battery.
- e. Battalion operations in Operation CHINOOK.
- f. Operations of HMM-163 and VMO-3.
- g. Rescue operations of a down helicopter crew.
- h. Aircraft maintenance problems in Vietnam.
- i. Regimental commander on Operation PRAIRIE I.
- j. Operation of the Cua Viet fuel farm.
- k. B-1-9 and Khe Sanh.
- l. 1stBn, 9th Marines in the Mekong Delta.
- m. Fire team ambush.
- n. Platoon ambush on enemy rice supply unit.
- o. Platoon and company ambushes.
- p. Use of intelligence leading to Operation HASTINGS.

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- q. Mission, operations and security of the 3d Shore Party Bn. (Fwd).
- r. Duties of an infantry battalion chaplain.
- s. New infantry platoon tactics developed during Operation CHINOOK.
- t. M-3-26 during operation CHINOOK I and II.
- u. A surrounded infantry platoon.
- v. An infantry company rescues a surrounded Marine platoon.
- w. Enemy ambush near Khe Sanh.
- x. Infantry company participation in Operation CHINOOK I.
- y. An infantry company on point during a battalion sweep.
- z. Platoon assault on an enemy village.
- aa. Two fire team leaders guide a company through a mine area.
- bb. Tactics and operation of an infantry platoon during Operation CHINOOK II.
- cc. Five-day company patrol led by a recon team.
- dd. A company command group overrun by enemy forces.
- ee. Battalion action resulting in an estimated 300 enemy killed.
- ff. A small unit provides security for down helicopters within the DMZ.
- gg. 3dMarDiv displacement from Danang to Phu Bai.
- hh. 3dBn, 26th Marines in Operation CHINOOK II.
- ii. A Combined Action Platoon night ambush.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The 244th Psychological Operations Company (USA) provides support to the 3d Marine Division in the form of Combat Speaker teams, Audio Visual teams, Liaison teams, leaflets, tape recordings and Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) newspapers.

The 5th and 9th Air Commando Squadron (USAF) provides required aircraft support. This support is provided in the form of U-10 aircraft which can only fly VFR and needs a minimum altitude of 3000 feet, and C-47 aircraft which can fly IFR but must be able to see the target area. Both aircraft can drop leaflets and make aerial broadcasts.

The 3d Marine Division also has a ground/aircraft speaker capability. Each regiment has one speaker and tape recorder, with the division CP having one speaker. The speaker is vehicle transportable with a maximum range of 4,000 yards on the ground.

Operation Leisurely Ride is a program that has been in existence for three months. The program consists of distribution newspapers at check points by the military police. The Vietnamese newspaper is printed by JUSPAO with Vietnamese and world news. The newspaper is distributed twice monthly and has been enthusiastically received by the Vietnamese. Approximately 14,000 newspapers are distributed every two weeks.

Operation Home Front is a program of face to face psychological operations. Currently every two weeks approximately 50,000 newspapers are distributed by CAC's and the Audio Visual teams.

The Kit Carson Scout program has been in existence for approximately one month. The scout is a former VC/NVA who has rallied to the GVN and has volunteered for the program. Scouts normally work in teams of from two to five with rifle companies. Areas in which they are used are: to detect mines and booby traps, detect ambushes, locate ammunition and weapons caches, screen Vietnamese encountered for VC, and conducting classes for Marines on identifying signs of VC mines, VC tactics and spotting VC ambush sites. Currently the 3d Marine Division has 10 Kit Carson scouts employed.

Accomplishments to date of the Kit Carson Scouts are:

- (1) 104 patrols guided.
- (2) 3 VC identified.
- (3) 5 mines located.
- (4) 1 command detonated 500 lb bomb located.
- (5) Classes for 2/9 on VC mines, tactics and ambushes.

Further arrangements have been made with the Chieu Hoi center in Hue for 28 Hoi Chanhs to commence training to be Kit Carson scouts.

In addition to the Kit Carson Scouts, the Division has used the Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) to act in scouting roles with the consent of the Thua Thien Province Chief. They have spotted ambushes, guided patrols, located mines, punji and booby traps and obtained intelligence information from the local populace. In addition they operated as an independent recon element and performed the same function as an attachment of USMC units.

During the month of April 30,183,000 psychological operation leaflets were dropped. Some of the themes used were:

Chieu Hoi - A rally appeal to the NVA/VC asking them to join the GVN. The GVN promises to welcome them with open arms.

Just cause of the GVN will win - The NVA/VC are fighting for a lost cause; the only just cause is the one the GVN is fighting for.

Uselessness of dying for the VC - The VC are wasting their lives dying for a lost cause.

Surrender instructions - Explains how an NVA/VC should surrender.

GVN offers a better life - Contrasts the life of a VC versus that of a useful citizen.

Mine Reward

VC Mines Kill Innocent People

In addition, during the month of April 27 hours 25 minutes of aerial broadcasts and 63 hours 55 minutes of ground broadcasts were made emphasizing the following themes:

Rally Appeal

GVN helps the people; improvement programs

Allied and ARVN might

VC/NVA use homes as shields

Report VC/NVA activity in your village

Reward program

A new life for a rallier

VC destroy private property and kill innocent people

Peace for the GVN

Hygienic information

There were 12 hours 50 minutes of movies shown during the month which provided the Vietnamese with entertainment and information about their government. The movies were shown by the audio visual teams at the CAC locations and at MEDCAPS.

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COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM

The Combined Action Program, commonly referred to as the CAC Program, was initiated in the 3d Marine Division TAOR in August 1965 with the mission of providing stability to cleared and semi-cleared villages and hamlets, training Popular Forces (PF) personnel, and effecting a reduction of U. S. Marine and ARVN tactical units immobilized for area and population control purposes. The mission has since expended to include, among other things, assistance to GVN Revolutionary Development efforts.

It has been found that a Combined Action Platoon (CAP) composed of one T/O Marine Rifle Squad, one U. S. Navy Corpsman and a Popular Force Unit, composed of about 25 members native to the area, integrated into a single operational entity, are ideally suited to the performance of this mission.

Currently within the 3d Marine Division there are four companies (CAC) and twenty two platoons (CAP) operating, with one company and three platoons in the Khe Sanh area (See Tab 1-A), one company and five platoons in the Dong Ha-Cam Lo-Cua Valley area (See Tab 1-B), and two companies with fourteen platoons positioned along thirty-four miles of National Route #1 from the outskirts of Hue, south to the Village of Thua Luu in Phu Loc District (See Tabs 1-C & 1-D). Presently, the goal set for the end of calendar year 1967 is a total of five companies and thirty-nine platoons. Presently 39 Marines and 2 USN Corpsmen are attending orientation training preparatory to activation of CAPs P-6 and P-7 in the Cam Lo area. Three additional classes are scheduled during May for the activation of CAPs P-8, P-9, and P-10 and the training of replacements for personnel losses through rotation (See Tab 1-E).

Administrative and logistical support is provided by administrative sub-units 4 and 5 of Headquarters Battalion. Operational control is exercised by the Commander of the Unit in whose area the CAC is located (See Tab 1-F).

Under study at the present time is a proposal to establish a Combined Action Battalion (CAB) to assume responsibility for training, administration, supply, activation and coordination of the proposed expansion.

To date T/E items have been provided by draw down from in-country assets, pending receipt of equipment on requisition against a CAC T/E. Expansion as proposed will necessitate a more direct issue of motor vehicles, water trailers, cooking equipment, T/A items and cantonment construction materials.

Personnel assigned to the Combined Action Program are predominantly volunteers with 60 to six months in-country and an RTD of not less than six months from date of assignment. Upon acceptance for the program they attend an eight day CAC Orientation course at the Division Command Post prior to assignment to a CAP. The course includes classes in Vietnamese customs and traditions, Vietnamese language, civic action, Revolutionary Development, sanitation and hygiene and other related basic military subjects. Since 28 November 1966, a total of 11 such classes have been conducted for 327 Marines and 17 Navy Corpsmen. A three day Mine Warfare

and Booby Trap school was conducted in April attended by 10 Marines and 7 Popular Forces (See Tab 1-F).

There is a lack of training publications for use by CAC Marines in training Popular Forces personnel. The need is magnified, since most Marines have an inadequate knowledge of the VN language. Publication, in Vietnamese, of a version of the Marine Guidebook would greatly facilitate and standardize Popular Forces training in the integrated platoons. It is recommended that Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific give appropriate consideration to preparation and publication of such a book.

No authoritative manual concerning customs and regulations for handling and display of the Vietnamese National Flag is on hand. Variations in practices exist from village to village. It is believed a manual or pamphlet on the subject, printed in Vietnamese, could prove helpful to the CAC's as well as to others. It could help promote pride and patriotic spirit and foster awareness and recognition of the symbol of government. It is recommended that publication of a pamphlet of this nature be considered at Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

JOINT US/ARVN RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING

By agreement between the 1st Infantry Division, ARVN and the 3d Marine Division, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion began a period of training for the ARVN reconnaissance company on 6 February 1967.

One platoon from the ARVN reconnaissance company was located with the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. The 1st Platoon of Company A was assigned as host and went through the entire training cycle with their Vietnamese counterparts. They had the responsibility for assisting Vietnamese troops in learning our methods and techniques of patrolling and related subjects. The Marines and ARVN soldiers were trained together, billeted together and in all respects became a single unit.

The syllabus of instruction was a seven week course. It included map reading and land navigation, physical training, small arms familiarization, immediate action drills, ambush and counter-ambush procedures, rubber boat training, helicopter training, utilization of aerial fire support, artillery forward observer procedures, demolitions, mine and booby-trap warfare, and specifics of patrolling techniques. The majority of the instructors were provided by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion; however, other units within the 3d Marine Division also provided instructors for specialized training, such as artillery adjustment and mine warfare.

Upon completion of the classroom-type instruction in the fourth weeks of training, one-day patrols consisting of approximately ten men each (50% Marines and 50% Vietnamese) were run in the Phu Bai area. Each man made two of these patrols. In the fifth week of training, two-day patrols were run by each combine Marine/Vietnamese patrol unit. The last two weeks were devoted to the "final-exam"...four-day patrols in reconnaissance zones beyond the Phu Bai TAOR. The training was completed on 4 April 1967. Another platoon from the ARVN reconnaissance company will go through the same training cycle in the near future.

The results of the program were first publicly exhibited in Operation SHAWNEE. Elements of the Vietnamese reconnaissance company trained by Marines were employed along with the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion in support of the joint US/ARVN attack on VC Base Area 114.

Although the program was very successful, and was beneficial to both the Marines and ARVN, it did cause one platoon from the battalion to be non-effective for combat operations during most of the period when they were training their Vietnamese counterparts.

Marines who participated in the program were enthusiastic. They, although originally cast as the instructors, also learned from the Vietnamese. Nearly all the Marines picked up a basic conversational knowledge of the Vietnamese language, and although there were

interpreters assigned to the group, most of the Marines can now understand and be understood on their own. Conversely, some of the Vietnamese troops also gained a fair knowledge of English.

In addition to the military success of the training program the men of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion have also gained a better understanding of the Vietnamese people and their cause.

COMBINED ACTION COMPANIES PERSONNEL STATUS

Current on board Strength

408

Projected Rotation losses by month

May	12	% of loss 2.9	
Jun	23	5.6	
Jul	25	6.1	
Aug	117	28.5	} 58.4
Sep	54	13.1	
Oct	69	16.8	
Nov	21	5.1	
Dec	32	7.8	

Number of personnel on board who have extended o/s tour

45

Number of personnel on board who have requested extension awaiting action

7

Number of awards presented CAC personnel

Bronze Star	1
Navy Commendation Medal	1
Purple Hearts	34


Number of personnel recommended for awards, action pending

Silver Star - Popular Force	1
Silver Star - Marine	1

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TAB 1-E

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COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM ORIENTATION SYLLABUSFIRST DAY

0730-0820 Orientation, Concept and Mission: Maj DENNIS
0830-0920 Relationship of Training to the Mission: Capt CAZARES
0930-1020 Vietnamese Nat'l Govt; US Agencies; RDs: Capt CAZARES
1030-1120 Vietnamese Language (1st Hour): LCpl HASSALL
1300-1450 Introduction to Mapping; Grid Coordinates; thrust
lines: SSgt THOMPSON
1500-1550 Rules and Regulations of Phu Bai: 1stSgt SHINN
1600-1650 Fire Arm Safety and Security: GySgt BILLUPS
1800-1900 Clothing and Equipment Inspection: SSgt THOMPSON

SECOND DAY

0730-0820 Mapping; Scale and Distance: SSgt THOMPSON
0830-0920 Administrative Time
0930-1120 Scouting and Patrolling: Sgt BROWN
1300-1350 Vietnamese Language (2nd Hour): LCpl HASSALL
1400-1450 Administrative Time
1500-1550 Career Advisory: SSgt TAYLOR
1600-1650 Mapping; Elevation and Relief: SSgt THOMPSON
1800-1900 Issue 782 Gear: Supply NCO

THIRD DAY

0730-0820 IA Drills: Sgt RATLIFF
0830-0920 Civic Action/Civil Affairs: G-5 Guest
0930-1020 Employment of Claymore Mines: Mine Warfare School Guest
1030-1120 Conduct of Ambushed: Sgt BROWN
1300-1350 Sanitation and Hygiene: HM3 CONDOJANI
1400-1550 Intelligence Gathering and Reporting: G-2 Guest
1600-1650 Lensetic Compass: GySgt BILLUPS
1800-1900 Rifle Inspection: Capt CAZARES

FOURTH DAY

0730-1120 Communications; Operations and Trouble Shooting the
AN/PRC 10 and AN/PRC 25 Radio Set
1300-1550 Radio Procedure; Radio Security; Shackles Sheets: SSgt MOSLEY
1600-1650 Mapping; Direction: SSgt THOMPSON

FIFTH DAY

0730-1650 Artillery Orientation and Forward Observers Procedures:
Guest, 12th Marines

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SIXTH DAY

0730-1120 Familiarization and Zeroing of the M16E1 Rifle: SSgt THOMPSON
1300-1450 Vietnamese Language (3rd & 4th Hour): LCpl HASSALL
1500-1550 Administrative Time
1600-1650 Clothing and Equipment Inspection: GySgt BILLUPS

SEVENTH DAY

0730-0820 Administrative Time
0830-0920 Intelligence Cycle: G-2 Guest
0930-1020 Intelligence: VC Weapons: Capt HALL
1030-1120 First Aid and Self Aid: HM3 STREITZ
1300-1450 Mapping; Overlays and Review: SSgt THOMPSON
1500-1550 Administrative Time
1600-1650 Vietnamese Language Review: LCpl HASSALL

EIGHTH DAY

0730-0920 CAC SOP: Capt CAZARES
0930-1020 Administrative Time
1030-1120 Personnel Inspection: Capt CAZARES
1300-1350 Religiously Based Customs in Vietnam: Guest Chaplain
1400-1450 Graduation: Guest
1500-1650 Preparation for Outposting

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COMBINED ACTION NCO INSTRUCTION

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Hours</u>
General Character of Vietnamese Society and Historical Setting	Inst's Notes	1
History of Vietnam	G-5 Notes	1
Religion in Vietnam	FMFPac/1 MAC FWD Pamphlet	1
Education and Family Makeup	Inst's Notes	1
Vietnamese Government Structure Hamlet to National level, Local Elections	DA 8 AM 550-40 Inst's Notes	1
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces	Handbook for U.S. Forces VN	1

CAP TRAINING PROGRAM FOR MAY

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Planning & Preparation of Patrols	FMFM 6-5	2
Briefing & Debriefing of Patrols	FMFM 6-5	2
Leadership Traits	FM 22-100	2
Leadership Principles	FM 22-100	2
Military Courtesy	Guidebook for Marines	2
Radio Trouble Shooting	Comm. Handout	2
Radio Procedure	Comm. Handout	2
First Aid & Self Aid	FM 21-4	2
Combat Formations	FMFM 6-5	2
MedEvac Procedures	Training Handout	2
Code of Conduct	MCI 03.3c	2

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During the month of April the following number of personnel attended the schools listed below.

<u>School</u>	<u>Marines</u>	<u>Popular Forces</u>
English Language	0	1
Vietnamese Language	7	0
Land Mine Warfare	10	7
NCO	13	0

During the month of May the following number of personnel are scheduled to attend the schools listed below.

<u>School</u>	<u>Marines</u>
Vietnamese Language	3
NCO	12

TAB 1-H

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G-5 BRIEFING OUTLINE
VISIT OF CG FMFPAC
6 May 1967

I. Purpose. To cover the status of Revolutionary Development in Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces; the Division Civil Affairs/Civic Action programs; and the Personal Response project.

II. Main Ideas:

A. Revolutionary Development

1. Program effected in both provinces by VC activity
2. Progress still difficult to measure
3. Assignment of Marine Officer/advisors

B. Division Civil Affairs/Civic Action

1. More awareness, more participation by Division units
2. Full time S-5's are still needed
3. Pacification reporting still a problem area
4. Division involvement in movement of DMZ populace

C. Personal Response Project

1. Appears to be having a significant effect

III. Summary and conclusions

A. RD outlook is somewhat darker

B. Division awareness/participation in Civil Affairs/Civic Action

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G-5 BRIEFING
CG FMF PAC - 6 MAY 1967

Good morning General ----- I'd like to cover briefly the status of revolutionary development in both provinces, the progress being made in our Civil Affairs/Civic Action programs and bring you up to date on Personal Response.

Revolutionary Development has suffered some setbacks since your last visit and prospects are not as bright as they were then.

In Thua Thien Province the program is still well run but the problem is security. The RD teams have been subjected to a good deal of VC harassment but the major blow was the attack on the team at Duong Muong Hamlet (YD 803252) on 17 April by a VC force of battalion size. Three teams were finally involved and the RD casualties alone were 23 KIA and 21 WIA. The incident also disclosed the fact that the teams in that area had not been sleeping in the hamlets because of their concern about security. Since then the teams have been reassigned and reorganized and the total number is now 16. This compares with the 18 that began the program on 1 February. By the measuring standard we discussed last time - Project Suspense Dates - the program still is on schedule. All 21 projects were completed on 31 March. Realistically, however, there seems to be little question that in achieving the more indefinable aims of RD the program in this province has fallen behind its timetable.

In Quang Tri, where the program has been behind schedule from the start, security is also the major problem. In March there were attacks on six RD teams. The teams did not receive much VC attention in April but the attack on 6 April on Quang Tri and La Vang had at least a psychological effect on the cadre. In addition, this incident, plus the forthcoming relocation of the DMZ populace, has diverted attention and resources away from the RD priority area, to its detriment. At present the RD groups are at about 60-70% of authorized strength and have accomplished very few projects in the hamlets. Security, however, is the major problem. The ARVN battalions assigned the task have worked hard but two in each province is not enough to do the job.

As for direct Marine support ---- We have responded readily to most requests for assistance. We have supplied transportation, moved material and foodstuffs, furnished hamlet defense materials and provided MedCap teams in RD areas. This week two of our officers were assigned to OCO to assist in the cadre advisory effort, one to each province. This should not only reinforce a weak area but should give us better information about the actual situation in the hamlets.

DIVISION CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION ---- Despite the many Division commitments there appears to be a greater awareness of the necessity for an active, aggressive, Civil Affairs/Civic Action program on the part of most units. All three infantry regiments and the artillery regiment now have full time civil affairs officers. Many of the battalions would like to do the same but they cannot afford to. The quality of these part-time officers has been good but the turnover rate has been high. We hope that our T/O recommendation for a Civil Affairs Section for Division, Regiments and Battalions will soon be approved and put into effect.

PACIFICATION PROGRESS REPORTING continues to be a problem. We have become convinced that the present system gives a distorted picture of the

level of security and that the hamlet, rather than the village, should be the political unit on which the report is based. In this area, particularly, there is a wide variation among hamlets within a village. While the MACV "Hamlet Evaluation Report" admittedly has many weaknesses, we believe that if all those making parallel submissions could get behind a single report, such as the "Hamlet Evaluation Report", or a modification thereof, it would be a more reliable and useful tool.

MOVEMENT OF THE DMZ POPULATION ---- The removal of the population of Truong Luong and upper Gio Linh Districts in Quang Tri, while admittedly a GVN/OCO responsibility, nevertheless concerns us greatly and we are doing everything possible to see that it is carried out successfully. Our efforts have been directed to augmenting OCO's somewhat limited capability by supplying vehicles and drivers, heavy equipment operators, and maintenance and security personnel. Thus far we have two officers and 32 enlisted working on plans and preparations for the move and more will be necessary once it has begun. Resettlement plans are progressing well, thus far, but many details must still be worked out to guarantee the success of the move itself.

PERSONAL RESPONSE ---- As you may know, personal response is run under the supervision of the G-5 in this Division. We believe we are making good headway. Next week we will hold our third meeting of the Personal Response Council, whose members include many of the General and Special Staff, plus the Executive Officers of all battalion and regimental sized units. We have just completed our fourth two-day school here at the CP with all units represented in the student body. Our Personal Response Contact Team now visited most units in the field and has held discussions, on position, with literally thousands of Marines from An Hoa to the Cua Viet. In general, the reaction has been favorable. The weakest groups, we feel, are the junior NCO's and company grade officers and we are pointing our future efforts at them.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ---- We wish we could say that RD is progressing favorably in this area but the fact is that it is not progressing as well as we had hoped it would. The major reason is inadequate security and this deficiency is not easily remedied because of the multiple commitments of the forces in the northern provinces. We are continuing to give the program all the support we possibly can and to complement it with a vigorous Civic Action program of our own. It is somewhat ironic that as we get more involved in the shooting war it seems that more and more of us are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of the so-called "other-war".

G-1 BRIEFING OUTLINE

I. PURPOSE

A. Briefing will cover 3 subjects.

1. Current Personnel status of the Division.
2. Effects of August rotation hump.
3. Division rotation policy.

II. MAIN IDEAS

A. Personnel picture (CHART 1 ON)

1. The Division is under strength in officers. This applies to overall officer strength, but we are particularly short of Majors and Major shortages are most noticeable in infantry, artillery and motor transport.

2. The Division is above manning level in enlisted personnel but all additional personnel are needed and completely utilized.

3. Compare authorized strength of infantry companies with current average strength of infantry companies in Division.

4. Shortages of electronics technicians and artillery fire control personnel continue to plague the Division.

CHART 1 OFF

B. Effects of August Rotation Hump.

1. The 3d Division has 196 officers and 3797 enlisted personnel with August rotation tour dates.

2. Infantry battalions have an average of 198 personnel in OF 03 with August RTD's.

3. July is a light rotation month with 50 officers and 800 enlisted scheduled to rotate.

4. Only 3 officers and 151 enlisted with August RTD have extended. We hope to double this number.

5. We are not accepting extensions which result in an August RTD and have spread August RTDs throught the Division.

C. Division Rotation Policy.

1. MCO 1300.8H states that the overseas unaccompanied tour is 13 months but it also implies (confirmed by messages) that no one may be transferred from his overseas organization until he is in the 13th calendar month of his tour.

2. Division policy is to attempt to assign a flight date as soon as possible after 12 months and 20 days.

3. Result is that the Marine gets to States within a few days plus or minus of 13 months.

4. We are not able to apply this policy to persons departing CONUS early in month, result is a double standard.

5. This has had poor effects on morale. (CHART 2 ON) Persons in 14th month February, March, April.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. The Division needs officers particularly Majors in infantry, artillery and motor transport.

B. The August rotation hump will have severe if temporary effects on Division combat capability. This could be partially offset by:

1. Programming an additional 500 Marines into Division in June and 1000 in July.

2. Rotate 25% of August rotatees during last half of July.

3. Informing this Division as far in advance as possible of the replacements programmed to fill August vacancies.

C. The effects of a double standard on Rotation Tour Dates could be cured by a CMC policy allowing order writing commanders authority to assign flight dates 12 months and 20 days after departure from CONUS.

G-1 BRIEFING NARRATIVE

Good morning General KRULAK:

For the first part of the G-1 briefing this morning I would like to review the current personnel situation and touch briefly on some soft spots in ranks and MOSs.

CHART 1 ON

There has been little change in our overall personnel situation since you were last here in March. This chart reflects our strength as of 2400, 4 May. We are currently about 8% above manning level in enlisted personnel and about 5% below manning level in officers.

Since the end of March our casualties have been 8 officers KIA, 83 WIA and 245 enlisted KIA, 1902 WIA and 5 MIA.

Despite the fact that we are above manning level we still have shortages in certain MOSs. For the most part these are highly skilled MOSs such as artillery fire control personnel and electronic maintenance people.

CHART 1 OFF

The message announcing your visit asked us to discuss the effect of the August rotation hump on us. They are severe. We have 196 officers and 3797 enlisted personnel with rotation tour dates in August. Infantry battalions have an average 198 personnel in OF 03 with August RTDs or about 20% of the infantry strength of the Division.

We have been able to do very little to help ourselves. We are moving August RTDs in order to spread the effects throughout the Division. We are not accepting extensions which result in an August RTD. So far 3 officers and 151 enlisted Marines with August RTDs have extended. We expect to at least double this figure but the effect of extensions will still be relatively small. We do have some recommendations which have been detailed for you in a position paper. July is a light rotation month with only 50 officers and 800 enlisted RTDs coming up during the month. Our recommendation is that an additional 500 Marines be programmed into the Division during June and 1000 in July. We then could rotate 25% of the August rotatees during the last half of July. This would result in spreading the impact over a longer period of time. Further we are going to need advance planning data at the earliest possible date.

The third and last subject we would like to discuss is the rotation policy. MCO 1300.8H states very simply that the unaccompanied overseas tour is 13 months but it also implies and this has been twice confirmed by messages from your headquarters that no one may be transferred from his overseas organization until he is in the 13th calendar month of his tour.

If the tour is actually to be 13 months give or take a day or so the Marine needs to commence travel on about 12 months and 20 days. So in effect we have a double standard of those who depart CONUS early in the month who will be in their 14th month before they begin travel and those who came out later who will have a 13 month tour portal to portal.

CHART 2 ON

To obviate the poor morale effects of a double standard we would like to have authority to detach Marines on or after 12 months and 20 days from their CONUS departure dates in accordance with the existing tactical situation.

CHART 2 OFF

In summary, sir, we think we are in good shape personnel wise. The August Rotation hump will have severe but temporary effects which we hope you can help us. Finally, we would like to have a more equitable policy established for the assignment of detachment dates.

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CHART 1

PERSONNEL

AS OF 2400 27 APRIL 1967

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
TOTAL AUTH STRENGTH	1031	19750
TOTAL ON BOARD STRENGTH	969	22387
% AUTH INFANTRY O/B	85.5	104.7
% AUTH COMBAT SUPPORT O/B (Arty, Tk, AT, Recon)	95.4	111.2
% AUTH SERVICE SUPPORT O/B (Engr, Amtrac, MT, SP, Med)	87.8	130.0
% AUTH HQ BN O/B	114.9	130.3
PROJECTED NET GAIN/LOSS APRIL 67	-18	+304

* UP TO DATE FIGURES WILL BE BRIEFED

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CHART 2

ROTATION IN 14TH MONTH

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Scheduled first 10 days of month	253	362	381
Flight Seats received for first 10 days	152	276	203
*Filled with priority assignments	65	55	36
Personnel going into 14th month	166	141	214

*EAS, By Dates, 30 day special leave take precedence over normal rotation

PRESENT EMERGENCY LEAVE POLICY

I. SUBJECT. Emergency LeaveII. FACTS

A. The Commands's current leave policy and necessary administrative instructions are contained in a Division Order, (Division Order 1050.3) which is distributed to company level.

B. The circumstances under which emergency leave is authorized are those outlined in subparagraph 9151.3c of the Personnel Manual. Policy and instructions outlined in FMFPac Order P1000.3E are incorporated.

C. During the past 6 months, the following numbers of emergency leaves were granted:

	<u>TAD</u>	<u>PCS</u>	
Nov	69	4	
Dec	57	15	
Jan	81	11	
Feb	72	7	
Mar	100	10	
Apr	61	16	
Totals	<u>440</u>	<u>63</u>	503

III. DISCUSSION

A. Current directives have proved adequate for administering the emergency leave program.

B. Unit commanders are authorized to approve emergency leave in appropriately verified cases involving death or imminent death of a member of the immediate family. All other cases are referred to Division Headquarters (G-1) for decision.

C. Personnel who meet the criteria for emergency leave:

1. If they have 121 days or more remaining on a normal tour, are granted an appropriate number of days emergency leave/TAD. The number of days leave depends on the individual's leave status and the reason for the leave. Generally, 15 days is authorized for cases involving death in the immediate family and up to 30 days is authorized for cases involving imminent death or other serious matters that may take time to attend to.

2. If they have 120 days or less remaining on normal tour, are issued emergency leave/PCS orders.

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D. Every effort is made to expedite movement of the individual to Danang for transportation. Personnel at the III MAF Transient Center and at the Marine Liaison Office, Kadena, expedite movement of emergency leave personnel to CONUS. The return trip is arranged by the Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Naval Station, Treasure Island.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that current FMFPac directives pertaining to emergency leave remain in effect.

V. ACTION BEING TAKEN. Leave policy is carried out in accordance with current CMC and FMFPac directives.

VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY. Continuation of current policy.

POSITION PAPERI. SUBJECT: August CONUS Rotation HumpII. FACTS:

A. Currently the division has 196 officers and 3797 enlisted personnel with August rotation tour dates. Included in this number are 10 officers and 296 enlisted personnel who joined this command with BLT 1/4.

B. BLT 2/9 is scheduled to depart this command in May67 and upon departure will have approximately 7 officers and 183 enlisted personnel with August RTDs.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. For continuity, combat efficiency and morale purposes it is not considered in the best interest to reassign members of BLT2/9 with August RTDs to other organizations within the division prior to their departure.

B. Based on the number of August RTDs that arrived in country with BLT 1/4, it is believed that the number going out with BLT 2/9 will not exceed the number returned to this command with BLT 1/3.

C. The large August Rotation Hump is attributed to the departure of BLTs 1/26 and 2/26 from CONUS during Jul66. BLT 1/26 departed CONUS on 9Jul66 with 64 officers and 1510 enlisted personnel. BLT 2/26 departed CONUS on 27Jul66 with approximately 60 officers and 1500 enlisted personnel. These two Battalions have been diluted and the August RTDs spread throughout the division. Further dilution is planned during May. See Appendix A for a breakdown by units of the August RTDs.

D. Presently, Infantry Battalions have an average of 198 personnel in OF 03 with August RTDs.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Incoming personnel. To fill the August vacancies it is recommended that in addition to the normal input for June and July, that an additional 500 personnel be programmed in during June and 1000 during July. This would help eliminate large rotation humps in the future.

B. Rotation of personnel. July is relatively a light rotation month with approximately 50 officers and 800 enlisted scheduled to rotate. It is recommended that 25% or approximately 1000 of the August rotatees that departed CONUS early in Jul66 be authorized to depart in July.

These personnel would not be rotated until all the normal July rotatees have departed and would not depart prior to the last half of the month. This would still require personnel to spend at least 12½ months overseas.

C. For planning purposes, it is recommended that this command be informed as far in advance as possible, the rank and MOS of replacements that will be programmed in to fill August vacancies.

V. ACTION BEING TAKEN:

A. As of 24 April this command had a total of 3 officers and 151 enlisted personnel with normal August RTDs that have extended their overseas tour. Special emphasis is being made to encourage personnel due to rotate in August to extend their overseas tour. At present, no estimate can be made as to the number that will extend.

B. No individual is being authorized to extend his overseas tour if the extension will result in a August RTD, unless unusual circumstances prevail.

C. Personnel with August RTDs have been spread throughout the division. Units that still contain large numbers of August RTDs will be further diluted during May. Appendix I contains a unit breakdown of August RTDs.

VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS:

A. Approval of the recommendations listed in paragraph IV above.

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APPENDIX A

August RTDs by Unit

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
HqBn	45	302
HqCo 3dMar	4	69
1/3 (BLT)		
2/3 (BLT)		
3/3	10	140
HqCo 4thMar	5	24
1/4	7	296
2/4	10	139
3/4 (BLT)		
HqCo 9thMar	6	21
1/9	4	151
2/9	6	193
3/9	9	328
1/26	11	317
2/26	10	329
3/26	3	236
HqBtry 12thMar	3	29
1/12	5	89
2/12	13	321
3/12	4	68
4/12	6	79
3d MT Bn	4	60
9th MT Bn	0	58
3d AT Bn	5	74
1st AmTracBn	3	95
3d Engr Bn	2	93
11th Engr Bn	2	15
3d Tank Bn	6	97
3d SP Bn	3	58
3d Recon Bn	10	89
3d Med Bn	0	27
Total	196	3797

APPENDIX A

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POSITION PAPER

I. SUBJECT: Overseas Tour

II. FACTS:

A. MCO 1300.8H, par 5.b(4) states:

For personnel attached to FMF units located in the Far East the overseas tour is 13 months, without dependents. Individuals serving a standard tour who depart the United States during any one month will normally arrive back in the United States in the first succeeding month of the next calendar year. Persons who rotate as members of stabilized units will rotate with their parent unit or as directed by higher authority. Rotation tour dates may be involuntarily extended to meet operational commitments when expiration of active service is not a critical factor.

B. CG FMFPAC messages 040118Z SEP66 & 142306Z SEP66 contain amplifying instructions and state that under no circumstances should personnel be rotated prior to the first day of the month of rotation without prior approval.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. Under the current rotation system there is an inequity in the rotation of personnel. An individual's rotation date is established as the first succeeding month of the next calendar year from the month the individual departs CONUS. If an individual departs CONUS during May 1966 his RPD would be June 1967. He cannot be rotated to CONUS prior to that month regardless of the day of the month he departed for overseas. If he departed CONUS on the 1st of the month the individual would be in his 14th month before he could possibly be returned to CONUS. By the same token, an individual who departs the last day of the month could, in accordance with current directives, be rotated the 1st day of his rotation month. This would make the individual spend just over 12 months overseas tour.

B. Many personnel who depart CONUS during the first 10 days of the month go into their 14th month before departing RVN. This does not allow time for travel or processing at Camp Butler. Most personnel who depart CONUS the last 20 days of the month can be returned to CONUS before completing their 13th month.

C. The following are examples of the number of personnel going into their 14th month before departing RVN during the past three months.

(1) February:

Scheduled to Rotate during first 10 days	253
Flight seats received for the first 10 days	152
* Filled with EAS, By dates, 30 day Spl Lv	65
Personnel going into their 14th month	166

(2) March

Scheduled to Rotate during first 10 days	362
Flight seats received for the first 10 days	276
* Filled with EAS, By dates, 30 day Spl Lv	55
Personnel going into their 14th month	141

(3) April

Scheduled to Rotate during first 10 days	381
Flight seats received for the first 10 days	203
* Filled with EAS, By dates, 30 day Spl Lv	36
Personnel going into their 14th month	214

* Have priority over normal RTDs

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That current directives be modified to allow personnel to depart for CONUS 12 months and 20 days from the date he began his overseas tour. This would allow 10 days for travel and processing at Camp Butler and would insure that all personnel are returned to CONUS prior to going into their 14th month. In addition, this would allow individuals returning to plan accordingly.

V. ACTION BEING TAKEN

A. Upon receipt, flights dates are allocated to units in such a manner that personnel can be detached as near the date they departed CONUS as possible.

B. Under the current rotation policy there is no action that can be taken to ensure personnel departing for overseas early in the month can be detached prior to going into their 14th month.

VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

Approval of recommendations contained in item IV above.

POSITION PAPERS

I. SUBJECT: Progress on expediting unit diary deliver.

II. FACTS:

A. The following total number of unit diaries were late during the month indicated below:

- (1) January - 77
- (2) February - 20
- (3) March - 12
- (4) April - 28

B. The late submission of unit diaries is spread throughout the division. Over a months period the average is less than one per battalion/regimental headquarters, except for the month of January.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. In March, action was taken to revise current instructions to direct the use of guard mail only when forwarding unit diaries to DPP #16. Guard mail couriers are dispatched from this headquarters twice a day to Dong Ha and once each day to Danang. Emphasis is continually placed on the prompt submission of the unit diary. Our current order on unit diary submission is attached as Appendix A. This headquarters receives a copy of all correspondence sent to a reporting unit by the Force Logistics Command informing the unit that a diary has not been received. When copies of these letters are received, a letter, signed by the Chief of Staff, is forwarded to the Battalion Commander directing him to submit to this headquarters the circumstances of the discrepancy. To date, all replies have stated that unit diaries were submitted and that a second copy has been resubmitted.

B. A decrease in the number of late unit diaries is indicated in paragraph II. The increase reflected for April was due to displacement of reporting units during this month.

IV. RECOMMENDATION: That monthly liaison visits by DPI personnel be made to units of this command as stated in CG FORLGGCOMB Msg 281830Z Mar67 and as directed by FMFPacO 1080.4A. To date these visits have not been made.

V. ACTION TAKEN: An additional guard mail run to Dong Ha commenced 23 April 1967. Staff visits are being made to individual units to discuss this problem. A letter, signed by the Chief of Staff, requiring circumstances causing failure to submit the copy of the diary to DPP #16 is being utilized when warranted.

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A conference, which included all Unit Adjutants, was held on 26 April. The importance of prompt diary submission was stressed.

VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: None

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

DivO 1080.5G
7/JRE/gdr
19 March 1967

DIVISION ORDER 1080.5G

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Unit Diary and Personnel Action Reports; instructions for
submission of

Ref: (a) MCO P5000.3
(b) MCO P1000.5
(c) DivO 1080.1
(d) AdminO FMFPac msg 080323Z Mar67 (NOTAL)

1. Purpose. To publish instructions for submission of Unit Diaries and Personnel Action Reports.

2. Cancellation. DivO 1080.5F

3. Background. References (a) and (b) contain instructions for the preparation and distribution of the Unit Diary. Reference (b) also specifies that when intermediate commands, such as the Division, require personnel data the Personnel Action Report (NAVMC 10543-PD) will be used in lieu of additional copies of the Unit Diary (NAVMC 970-PD). Since Data Processing Platoon #16 is assigned the responsibility for providing the 3d Marine Division data processing support for personnel management functions it is important that they receive an actual copy of the Unit Diary as specified in reference (c). Reference (c) provides reporting units with amplifying instructions for the preparation and submission of the Unit Diary.

4. Information. This headquarters has repeatedly emphasized the prompt submission of the Unit Diary copy to DPP #16 and the Personnel Action Report to the Division Post Office in an effort to reduce the time between preparation and receipt. Reference (d) reported that as a result of a study of time lapse between preparation of diaries and receipt by DPP #16 only 74 percent of the diaries were received within ten days after preparation; and only 26 percent of the diaries within five days after preparation. In an effort to reduce the time lapse between preparation of the Unit Diary/Personnel Action Report and receipt by DPP #16 and the Division Post Office, this headquarters requires the use of the Division Guard Mail System in lieu of Inter Country U. S. Mail. Presently this headquarters dispatches

APPENDIX "A"

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DivO 1080,5G
17 March 1967

couriers daily from Phu Bai to Danang and Dong Ha. These couriers deliver and return with guard mail the same day. Guard mail from Dong Ha will reach Danang the same day or the following morning. This system is currently more expeditious than Inter Country U. S. Mail.

5. Action

a. Reporting Units

(1) Unit Diary

(a) Reporting units which have Personnel Plates and associated equipment will prepare and distribute the Unit Diary in accordance with Section IV of reference (b) and this Order.

(b) Reporting units which cannot comply with reference (b) due to lack of equipment, parts or personnel plates shall prepare the Unit Diary in accordance with paragraph 16054 of reference (a) and paragraph 402 of reference (b). Units will submit an actual legible carbon copy of the Unit Diary to DPP #16.

(c) The copy of the Unit Diary for DPP #16 will be delivered to the nearest 3d Division Guard Mail Center on the date the diary is prepared or no later than the following day. The Unit Diary will be placed in a plain envelope with the words "GUARD MAIL" marked on the top of the envelope and addressed as follows:

Data Processing Platoon #16
H&SCo, Supply Battalion
1st Force Service Regiment/FLC

(2) Personnel Action Report (PAR)

(a) Each time a reporting unit prepares a Unit Diary it will also prepare a Personnel Action Report. The PAR will be numbered in the same sequence as the Unit Diary. Each item reported on the Unit Diary will be recorded on the PAR of the same date. The PAR will be prepared in accordance with paragraph 304 of reference (b). Attention will be given to ensure that adequate information is supplied. Each PAR will be authenticated. Authentication by enlisted personnel in this command is restricted to the First Sergeant or Administrative Chief of the reporting unit.

APPENDIX "A"

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17 March 1967

(b) The PAR will be delivered to the nearest 3d Division Guard Mail Center at the same time as the Unit Diary copy for DPP #16 of the same date. The guard mail envelope or a plain envelope will be addressed as follows:

Postal Officer (Code SC-7F)
3d Marine Division

(c) When Personnel Action Report Forms (NAFIC 10543-PD) are not available the PAR may be prepared on plain bond paper. The report will be prepared in the format and manner prescribed for the PAR.

b. Commanding Officer. Commanding Officers and Officers in Charge of reporting units will ensure that personnel preparing or monitoring personnel accounting documents comply with the contents of this Order and the instructions in reference (a), (b), and (c).

c. Addressees shall notify this Headquarters (Code SC-7E) of difficulties encountered in diary or PAR submissions.

s/s A. D. Cereghino
A. D. CEREGHINO
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "B" & "C"

APPENDIX "A"

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HEADQUARTERS
3rd Dental Company
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

STRENGTH

Personnel

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Allowance/on Board	Allowance/on Board
25 / 27	42 / 56

Clinics

<u>Dental Officers</u>		<u>Dental Officers</u>	
Dong Ha (2)	5	3d Engineers	1
Camp Carroll	1	Phu Bai (2)	7
Khe Sanh	1	DaNang (5)	6
4th Marines	1		

MISSION

1. Routine dental care for Marines
2. Preventative dental care for Marines
3. Treatment of Maxillo-Facial injuries
4. Collaborate with and assist Medical as required
5. Civic Action Program

ACTION (Fiscal year 1967)

1. Routine Dental Care (Ref: Chart I)

Marine Patient Sitzings - - - - -	37,000
Dental Procedures Performed - - - - -	102,000
2. Preventative Dentistry Care (Ref: Chart II)

Caries Preventative Treatments - - - - -	4,120
--	-------

Other Preventative Dentistry Treatments - - - - - 11,570
 Field-Type tooth brushes Distributed - - - - - 4,000
 Dental Care Kits Distributed - - - - - 1,500
 (3,600 on order)

Constructed caries Preventative clinics (6 sinks).

Set up full time caries preventative chairs in
 virtually all clinics.

3. Treatment of Maxillo-Facial Injuries

Traumatic Injury Cases Treatment - - - - - 120

4. Collaboration with and Assistance to Medical

Continuous liaison is maintained at all levels, and dental
 personnel assist in mass casualty situations whenever needed.

5. Civic Action (Ref: Chart III)

Vietnamese Treated - - - - - 12,000

Dental Procedures Performed - - - - - 27,000

Dental officers and technicians treat Vietnamese daily at
schools, orphanages, hospitals, hamlets and villages. Cleft

Lip/Palate corrective surgery program was initiated in
 February 1967.

Fifteen cases have been operated.

Set up dental clinic facilities in Children's Hospital, Red
 Beach. Visit weekly USAID Hospital DaNang. (V/N Trauma &
 tumor treated)

Train Vietnamese nurses as dental assistants.

Third Dental Company initiated action which was instrumental
 in the recent formation of an I Corps Dental Society.

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PROBLEM AREAS

SUPPLY

Supply delivery was grossly lagging early in the fiscal year.

The condition has improved considerably, commencing in November.

EQUIPMENT

Encore Unit (air-drive) Compressors are not holding up. Five of the twenty-three allocated are presently dead lined. An intensified preventative maintenance program has been instituted in accordance with recent FMFPAC instruction. Additional units (6) have been requested.

Routine Dental Care For Marines

Fiscal year 1967




Chart I

Preventative Dentistry Treatments

Fiscal year 1967




Chart II

Civic Action

Fiscal year 1967




Chart III

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ASSISTANT C/S, G-2 BRIEFING OUTLINE
FOR
CG, FMFPAC VISIT ON 6MAY 1967

I. PURPOSE: To update the CG FMFPAC on the enemy situation in the 3d Marine Division AO to include the enemy's objectives and an estimate of the most probable enemy course of action during the next two months.

II. MAIN IDEAS:

A. Enemy Objectives

1. To disrupt RD Program and elections.
2. To gain the initiative by dispersing and fixing U. S. Forces
3. To achieve a major victory and inflict heavy losses on U. S. and ARVN Forces

B. 6th Regiment and Main Force Battalions

1. Actions until recently consisted of isolated attacks and acts of terrorism
2. Increase in efforts to interdict traffic on Route 1
3. 6 April attacks against ARVN installations
4. Possible build-up for major action

C. Enemy activity in the DMZ area

1. Major encounters since 8 March 1967
2. Attempts to achieve a significant victory by set-piece engagement to inflict heavy losses

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:

A. The enemy forces will continue to make a major effort to convince the population of South Vietnam that the present government is unable to provide adequate security. Their objective will be the disruption of the 1967 RD Program and the election of a representative government.

B. Seizure of an adequate supply of rice is an immediate aim of the enemy.

C. Regular NVA units in the DMZ area will attempt to draw our forces into a set piece engagement in which they would hope to inflict heavy losses.

D. VC main force units will attempt, by conducting diversionary attacks, to draw U. S. forces away from positions screening the principal approaches to Hue and Quang Tri City from the VC mountain base areas. They will increase the frequency of isolated attacks against district headquarters, RD cadre, and other GVN installations.

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E. Local force guerrillas will increase their efforts to mine the roads and attack bridges to interdict the flow of traffic on routes 1 and 9.

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INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FOR CG, FMFPAC

At the time of the General's last visit - just after the conclusion of the monsoon period - the major enemy activity was focused on the east central portion of the DMZ front - to the northwest of Cam Lo and west of Con Thien. In a series of engagements occurring over a period of several weeks friendly forces engaged the various battalions of the 812th Regiment, 324B Division, and elements of the 31st Regiment, 341st Division. Through a series of sweep operations, U. S. and ARVN forces inflicted substantial losses upon each of these units. It was evident from these encounters that the enemy remained persistent in his efforts to draw friendly forces into a major engagement - preferably a set-piece battle at the time and place of his own choosing - with the objective of achieving a much needed major victory.

In conjunction with his efforts to achieve a victory on the battlefield, the enemy has increased the tempo and intensity of his attacks against the Revolutionary Development Cadre since the General's last visit. Within the past two months there have been 36 separate engagements within Thua Thien Province involving RD Cadre personnel. This compares to 10 attacks for the first two months of the year. This indicates the importance that the enemy attaches to his stated objective of disrupting this program and the difficulty of countering his efforts is quite evident.

Since the General's last visit, the local elections have been in progress and, in this area too, the enemy has been actively opposing the process of establishing a representative government. Numerous reports have been received of threats against those who choose to participate, and thus far 12 candidates in these two provinces have lost their lives at the hands of the VC since the beginning of the year.

Within the traditional operating area of the Northern Sub-Region - between Quang Tri City and Hai Van Pass - the actions of the 800 Series main force battalions has been limited primarily to isolated attacks and acts of terrorism against the population at large. The exception was the series of attacks on the night of 6 April when four major ARVN installations were simultaneously assaulted. The VC met with a degree of success in this endeavor to discredit the combat capability of the 1st ARVN Division and its capability to protect the population.

Coupled with his attacks against the RD Cadre and the ARVN protecting them, the local force VC and guerrillas have appreciably increased their use of mines and demolitions within the past two months to interdict the flow of traffic along Route 1.

Of immediate importance to the VC is the rice harvest which is currently in progress in this area. It appears that the 800 numbered battalions are operating predominately in the lowlands to the east of highway 1. The recent action against Base Area 1114 west of Hue has met with surprisingly little contact. However, the frequency of patrol contacts in the mountains to the southwest of Hue and especially in the Hai Lang Forest Reserve to the southwest of Quang Tri suggests a possible buildup of significant proportions threatening these two Province capitals.

Until recently, major encounters with enemy forces in the DMZ area were confined primarily to units of the 812th and 31st Regiments. The heavy fighting which commenced on 28 February extended intermittently through the month of March and has since subsided. Although there are indications that a major ground attack might be launched against the outposts at Gio Linh or Con Thien, heavy contacts since the last week of April suggest that the enemy has shifted his emphasis to the western extremity of the DMZ. To the northwest of Khe Sanh, the 3d Marines have engaged an enemy force estimated to be a reinforced regiment. The extent of field fortifications encountered, direction of approach, and unusually determined resistance offered by this force indicate that it is a first-line unit with the specific mission of attacking Khe Sanh rather than an infiltration cadre passing through the area. Here again, it would appear that the enemy is determined to achieve a major victory in his efforts to bolster the morale of his forces and adversely affect public opinion in the U. S.

It is considered that the following points will highlight the enemy strategy in the 3d Division Area throughout the remainder of the dry season:

1. The enemy forces will continue to make a major effort to convince the population of South Vietnam that the present government is unable to provide adequate security. Their objective will be the disruption of the 1967 RD Program and the election of a representative government.
2. Seizure of an adequate supply of rice is an immediate aim of the enemy.
3. Regular NVA units in the DMZ area will attempt to draw our forces into a set piece engagement in which they would hope to inflict heavy losses.
4. VC main force units will attempt, by conducting diversionary attacks, to draw U. S. forces away from positions screening the principal approaches to Hue and Quang Tri City from the VC mountain base areas. They will increase the frequency of isolated attacks against district headquarters, RD cadre, and other GVN installations.
5. Local force guerrillas will increase their efforts to mine the roads and attack bridges to interdict the flow of traffic on routes 1 and 9.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

I. GENERAL: The Production subsection of the G-2 Section has recently been established to provide for a more orderly processing and evaluation of information received and dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom. The Combat Intelligence officer has been designated the head of the subsection. The major change in the reorganization has been the addition of an Estimates Team to the Production Subsection.

II. ORGANIZATION: The organization of the Production Subsection is depicted below:



III. FUNCTIONING: The functions performed by each of the teams of the Production Subsection are as follows:

A. Estimates. Responsible for the preparation of intelligence estimates, terrain and hydrographic studies, astronomical and climatological data, area studies and other special projects.

B. Order of Battle. Responsible for the analysis and evaluation of order of battle information and the preparation of order of battle summaries and overlays. Records maintained include contacts, sightings and agent reports on 10,000 meter grid cards and unit folders on all confirmed enemy units.

C. Target Information. The Target Information Officer is responsible for the analysis and evaluation of all information received for the selection of targets for the Division Target List. Records maintained include installation cards and a history of targets struck.

D. Combat Operations Center. The Combat Operation Center function of the G-2 Section is supervised by the Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer. This Team is responsible for the processing of spot reports, maintenance of the G-2/G-3 Journal and the preparation of the Intelligence Summary. Records maintained include statistical data in regard to enemy casualties, weapons captured and classification of detainees.

IV. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE STUDIES:

A. During the past two months the Production Subsection has coordinated the completion of Special Intelligence Studies for planned operations in the following areas:

1. Phu Thu and Vinh Loc Districts. (For proposed SLF operating area)

2. VC Base Area 114. (Operation SHAWNEE currently in progress)

3. Hai Long National Forest area.

B. The Special Intelligence Studies were aimed at providing commanders down to the company level with a detailed summary of all available information in regard to weather, terrain, and enemy activity in the area of interest. The studies included the following:

1. Order of Battle summary which listed all confirmed and possible units in the study area, the estimated strength, combat effectiveness, accepted location and last firm report on location.

2. Summary of Weapons available to confirmed units in the study area.

3. An analysis of the weather and terrain in the study area.

4. Observation and contacts overlay which depicted all observation and contacts in the study area in the past two months.

5. Enemy Activity Overlay which depicted agent reports in the study area for the past two months.

6. Enemy Installation Overlay which depicted enemy installations as determined from aerial photography, captured enemy documents and interrogation reports.

7. Trail overlay which depicted trails as determined from maps, aerial photography, and reconnaissance operations.


8. Block Trace Overlay which depicted available aerial photography in the study area.

9. Large Scale Maps (1:25,000) were reproduced by the Division Reproduction Section and provided unit commanders for possible color contouring, briefing, or terrain study purposes.

V. FUTURE PLANS: At the present time the Production Section is in the process of preparing Special Intelligence Studies on VC Base Area 115 and Route 547 from Hue to A Chau Valley.

COLLECTION

1. GENERAL: The Collection Branch of the G-2 Section has recently been organized to provide for the coordination of the collection effort of the G-2 Section.
2. FUNCTIONING. The Collection Officer is responsible for, in addition to the coordination of Division collection assets, the establishment of effective liaison with the various agencies of the civilian and military intelligence community within the Division Tactical Area of Responsibility.
3. ORGANIZATION. The organization of the collection branch is as depicted below.



3D RECONNAISSANCE BN. OPERATIONS

During the month of April elements of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein) were operating out of three areas. Company B, and 3d Force Reconnaissance Company shared the load in the Phu Bai area operating in the coastal highlands from the Divisions Southern boundary north to the Hai Lang Forest area. Companies C and D operated out of Dong Ha and covered the area south through the Hai Lang Forest and west to the Khe Sanh area. Company A operated out of Khe Sanh and worked the area West to the Laotian border.

During the month these 8-9 man teams conducted 111 patrols averaging 4 days per patrol. The patrols made 115 sightings for a total of 1179 VC/NVA and resulting in 39 contacts, 103 fire missions of 4664 artillery rounds, and 22 air strikes. These actions resulted in 64 VC/NVA KIA (Conf.), 154 VC/NVA (Prob.), and one VC captured.

Enemy sightings during this period reveal him to be well armed and equipped. The enemy encountered have been well disciplined and organized. There was a significant increase in enemy sightings in the Hai Lang Forest area south of Quang Tri. Sighting and contacts have been of various sizes but groups of up to 50 VC/NVA have been encountered. Additionally, the recon zones southwest, and south of Hue have produced a significant increase in the number of sightings. In the Khe Sanh area the bulk of the recon patrols were operating to the west and north of Khe Sanh. In addition to the regular commitments in support of the Division, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion operated in general support of operations Big Horn, Prairie IV, and Shawnee.

The end of the month saw the arrival of three platoons and the Headquarters of the 3d Force Reconnaissance Company. The entire company of six platoons is now in country.

PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS

Several months ago, under the auspices of C.A.S. a group of Vietnamese were recruited in each Province for the primary purpose of targeting the VC infrastructure. They are capable of a secondary mission of conducting typical reconnaissance patrols.

The 3d Marine Division has participated in the program to the extent of furnishing an NCO in both Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. The NCO in practice has become the mainstay of the program. He plans and conducts the training program with the assistance of the Division. He is the Operations Officer, he plans and makes preparations for each mission. All of these are coordinated with Marine Operations.

In Thua Thien, the PRU makes its Headquarters in Hue. In Quang Tri Province the Headquarters is located in Quang Tri City. In both units the number of Vietnamese is approximately 70. In both units at the inception, an extensive six week training program was conducted with the "final exam" being conducted in the form of a four day patrol outside the protected perimeters.

The PRU program is financed and supplied through CAS and functions under the CAS representative and Province Chief.

The training program for both PRU units was detailed and thorough covering all of the subjects necessary for tactical operations in RVN. Emphasis was placed on map reading, land navigation and patrol techniques.

In the recent contacts made by the PRU personnel, we have found them to be clever at the selection of individual firing positions, ambushing and aggressive.

It is our feeling that they can be particularly effective against the VC infrastructure.

7TH ITT ACTIVITY

The 7th Interrogator-Translator Team has a permanent Headquarters Sub-Team at PHU BAI which conducts interrogations on wounded PW's captured by U. S. elements in the PHU BAI TAOR.

Another permanent sub-team provides a similar capability at the DONG HA combat base and, in addition, supports the 3d Marines and 9th Marines in the DMZ area.

A field sub-team has been maintained at the CO BI THANH TAN Operational area for the purpose of conducting initial interrogation which cover the immediate tactical situation.

One interrogator has been acting as a liaison and intelligence agent at the KHE SANH District Headquarters. With a French and Vietnamese language capability this interrogator has provided invaluable and varied support to both the District Chief and U. S. Marine Corps Area Commander.

During the period in consideration the 7th ITT has supported eleven operations as follows:

1. Operation Prairie I
 2. Operation Prairie II
 3. Operation Prairie III
 4. Operation Prairie IV
 5. Operation Chinook I
 6. Operation Chinook II
 7. Operation Big Horn
 8. Operation Beacon Hill
 9. Operation Beacon Star
 10. Operation Shawnee
 11. Operation Bright Light. (This operation consisted of one interrogator/translator accompanying a reconnaissance/raid patrol with a returnee who knew the location of a Viet Cong PW Camp containing U.S. Captives. The area was deep in enemy country beyond artillery support and in inclement weather. The camp was located but had been abandoned.)
- As a result of these operations, 37 PW's (NVA), 18 PW's (VC), 4 returnees, 9 civil defendants, 3 escapees and 1 NVA laborer were interrogated. More than 70 additional screenings were conducted on suspects and civilians.

When an NVA or VC is captured they are transported to the nearest field sub-team or combat base for initial interrogation and then sent to PHU BAI where they are interrogated more thoroughly and all SICR's that apply are fulfilled. Upon completion of interrogation, or when released by medical officers as fit to be released from hospital care, the PW is then transferred to II MAF collection point in DA NANG.

Some of the more informative interrogations produced the following:

- a. The strength and composition of 810th Battalion and the K-8 Battalion.
- b. An NVA Lieutenant gave the strength, composition, location, mission, and tactics of the 800th Battalion of the 6th NVA Regiment.
- c. An NVA Warrant Officer gave a large amount of detailed OOB on the 4th Battalion, 812th Regiment, 324B Division, such as attachments to the 4th Battalion, the 812th Regiment, and the 324B Division, radio and communication equipment, weapons, and the location of the 324B Division Headquarters across the DMZ .

The 7th ITT and 3d IT are presently hosting the ARVN 11th Military Intelligence Detachment which consists of five officers and seven staff sergeants that specialize in interrogation and document exploitation.

1ST COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TEAM

During the period 1 March to present, the 1st CIT continued support of Marine units throughout Thua Thien Province, with one Sub-Team deployed to Phu Loc District and one Sub-Team in support of Operation Big Horn. Three Sub-Teams operating from Phu Bai supported smaller operations, Phu Bai Combat Base and CAC Units from Truoi Bridge to Hue.

The Team continued support of CAC Units in Thua Thien Province and on occasions utilized them as reaction forces to check out information received and to act as security for CI Sub-Teams entering areas to interrogate or apprehend people.

One Sub-Team has the responsibility for the internal security of the Phu Bai Combat Base. This includes monitoring of indigenous employees, liaison with other intelligence organizations, interrogations of persons of CI interest, and talking to indigenous employees having information concerning the VC.

The Team maintains a Card File and Black List of all known VC in Thua Thien Province. Identifications have been established from the Black List during this period and with operations continuing, it is felt the Black List will develop into a more definite aid in the identification of VC and infrastructure.

The Team now has two full time paid informants and is knowingly servicing one paid informant of another organization. In addition, almost daily contact is maintained with U. S. and Vietnamese intelligence organizations in Thua Thien Province. Other intelligence is derived from one time informants.

In the future, the Team plans to continue to operate in practically the same manner as outlined in the foregoing. In addition, with the acquisition of operational control of 13 man PRU team, the team will commence implementation of abductions of infrastructure on information provided for the most part by Census Grievance, establishment of informant nets utilizing PRU members as agent handlers, and some selected reconnaissance missions.

PRU's are trained in Force Reconnaissance tactics and receive no training as agent handlers. It is planned for CI personnel to set up a school and to train the PRU's in Counterintelligence methods to include report writing, message deaddrops, espionage, informants, and agent handling.

A map with all reported acts of terrorism and sabotage since 1 January 1967 in Thua Thien Province is maintained at Team Headquarters. This map is further utilized at times to record VC sightings in certain areas of interest.

BRIEFING OUTLINE FOR LTGEN KRULAK1. Supply and Maintenance Support by FLC

- a. FLSG-A/3d Service Bn - Phu Bai
- b. FLSU-1 - DongHa
- c. LSA - Khe Sanh - FLSG-A
- d. LSA - Shawnee - FLSG-A assisted by 3d SP Bn (50 - 75 2½ Ton Trucks daily)

2. Location of Service Support Units

- a. 3d SP Bn - Phu Bai (Hq), SP Gru Co (-) Security to Bulk Fuel Farm, Col Co, assist w/MHE in Phu Bai area, assist in Shawnee LSA and Dong Ha ICU ramp. Provides HSTs to Inf. Bn.
 - b. 3d Engr Bn - Hq. Phu Bai - Companies and platoons general support regiments and battalions - combat engineer missions.
 - c. 11th Engr Bn - OPCON III MAF - Bn. (-) at Dong Ha, 1 Co. at Phu Bai Mission Route 9, Route 1 North of Dong Ha and Operation Firebreak 200m x 10,500m strip.
 - d. 3d MT Bn - Phu Bai 79 2½ Ton Trucks in process of being replaced with 96 multifuel - also supports Shawnee.
 - e. 9th MT Bn (-) - Dong Ha - heavy Class V requirement.
 - f. 3d Med Bn - Hq. Phu Bai
 - A MED - Phu Bai (114 Bed Holding Facility)
 - B MED - Cadre, portions deployed BLTs/SLF
 - C MED - Moving from Danang to Phu Bai
 - D MED - Dong Ha (30 Bed Holding Facility)
- Hospital Ship - On station according to III MAF schedule

3. Roads in AOR (LOC Route 1, Route 9)

Danang to Phu Bai - 62 miles

Phu Bai to Big Horn - 26 miles

Big Horn to Dong Ha - 31 miles

(60 Significant bridges)

57 miles

119 miles

Dong Ha to Khe Sanh - 50 miles

(27 Significant bridges)

4. Stockage Objectives

Dong Ha - 30 DOA all Classes

Phu Bai - 30 DOA all Classes

Khe Sanh - 15 DOA all Classes

Shawnee - 15 DOA all Classes

5. Supply Support

Hue/Phu Bai - NSA runs LCU Ramp use LCU, LSD and AKA. (LCU - 9 hrs)

Dong Ha - LCU (15 hrs), LST to mouth of Cua Viet.

Daily sea delivery average about 150+ S/T (increasing with use of LST to Dong Ha area).

Fixed Wing - Averages about 80 S/T daily (flying days).

Helicopters - Redistribute about 36 S/T daily (flying days).

Average expenditure 105, 155, 8" and 175mm 5000 - 5000 Rds daily. FLC can supply Cl V at the rate of 80 - 100 S/T per day to Dong Ha, 13 to 15 S/T per day to Khe Sanh and 30 to 50 S/T per day to Phu Bai.

M-16 Rifles - All Infantry Bns. and Recon Bn. equipped - still to be equipped Hq. 3d Mar. and 4th Mar. Overall percentages 96%.

6. Construction

MCON has provided only the equivalent of 7 Bn. areas out of 21 required. Troop housing, Div. CP and supporting facilities needed prior to next monsoon season. Problem areas appear to lie in release of 67(S) MCON (would provide a portion of this requirement).

7. Material Management Programs

a. Positive control of PRI 02 and PRI 05 requisitions and Div. Supply Officer approval of all requisitions in excess of \$500.00.

b. Excess and cancellation review as directed by CG FMFPac - Total dollar value of cancelled requisitions and excesses about \$3.5+ million.

Concludes Briefing - Questions.

G-4 BRIEFING NARRATIVE

Good morning General KRULAK, supply and maintenance support to the division by elements of the Force Logistic Command has improved considerably since your last visit. Significantly, increased transportation capability, such as LST to the mouth of the Cua Viet, as well as increased capability of FLSG-A and its subordinate elements have contributed to this improved posture.

As you know supply and maintenance support to the division is provided by FLSG-A/3d Service Battalion located here at Phu Bai, FLSU-1 located at Dong Ha. FLSG-A also operates Logistic Support Area (LSA) at Khe Sanh and in the SHAWNEE operating area. Khe Sanh still continues to be supplied almost exclusively by air while the LSA at SHAWNEE is resupplied by vehicle. Average resupply convoys run to about 50 2½ Ton trucks daily.

A few words on our service support units their location, and what they are doing.

3d Shore Party Bn - Headquarters located at Gia Le, nearby, with one SP Gru Co (=) at Col Co Beach providing security to the Bulk Fuel Farm located there. The remainder of the battalion is located at Dong Ha. Mission to operate the Dong Ha LCU Ramp, assist in the operation of the SHAWNEE LSA and provide HST's to the infantry battalion.

3d Engineer Bn - Headquarters located at Gia Le with its companies and platoons performing combat engineer missions in general support of the regiments and battalions.

11th Engineer Bn - This battalion operating in our area is OPCON to III MAF. It is located at Dong Ha with one company in the Phu Bai area. It is currently engaged in maintaining Route 9, Route 1 north of Dong Ha and clearing operations between CON THIEN and GIO LINH. In addition it has commenced work on initial phases of opening Route 547.

3d Motor Transport Bn - Located at Phu Bai, supports this area. Completely equipped with multi-fuel 2½ Ton trucks.

9th Motor Transport Bn - Located at Dong Ha, supports the PRAIRIE area and unloading operations at Dong Ha.

3d Medical Bn - Headquarters located at Phu Bai, operates a 144 bed holding facility here and 30 bed facility at Dong Ha. Of course, we are supported by a hospital ship, on station, according to III MAF schedule.

Of interest, General, is the maintenance of stockage objectives by FLSG-A. The division has established stockage objectives of 30 DOA for all classes of supply at Phu Bai and Dong Ha with 15 DOA at Khe Sanh and SHAWNEE. Because of operational requirements and continued heavy drawdowns these have never been met. However, a steady continuing upward trend towards these objectives can be noted. For example, we continue to average 5000 Rds. a day of 105, 155, 8" and 175 ammo. To support this as well as all other requirements we receive a daily average of 150-200 S/T by sea, and 75 S/T daily average by fixed wing air. In addition, we redistribute about 24 S/T daily by helicopter and 110 S/T daily by vehicle convoy. These details as well as many others are contained in various tables and charts in your book.

Our M-16 rifle program, first increment, is just about completed. All infantry Battalions and the reconnaissance battalion are equipped. Weapons are in the hands of the Headquarters of the 3d and 4th Marines but have not been placed in service because of non receipt of spare parts. We understand these are due for delivery momentarily.

A few words on construction General KRULAK. To date MCON has provided only the equivalent of 7 battalion areas out of the 21 required. Troop housing, a division CP building and other supporting facilities are needed prior to the next monsoon season. Though off to a slow start programs to support these requirements are starting to open up. However, we feel that continuous command attention will be required to insure timely implementation.

We know General KRULAK of your direct interest in our material management programs. The Division Supply Officer will address certain of our key programs immediately following this presentation.

General, do you have any questions?

POSITION PAPER

I. PURPOSE: To report current status of troop acceptability and evaluation of Dri-Slide.

II. FACTS:

A. Dri-Slide has received limited use in the 3d Marine Division.

B. SI (Supply Instruction) 9150-15/1 of 10 November provides information concerning this product.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. The supply instruction refers to lubricating oil, molybdenum disulfide. It does not use the commercial name, Dri-Slide. It is probable that many units did not realize that Dri-Slide was available in the Marine Corps Supply System until 26 February when the Division directed attention to the SI and informed all units that the product discussed was "Dri-Slide".

B. The limited information available at this time is that Dri-Slide is more effective than standard issue lubricating and preservative oil for use in the present environment. CG III MAF message 260800A February 67 to CG FMFPac stated that data available at that time showed enthusiastic acceptance of Dri-Slide.

IV. RECOMMENDATION: None.

V. ACTION BEING TAKEN: Third MarDiv units have been advised that Dri-Slide is available in the supply system and that initial indications are that it is an effective lubricant.

VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: None.

POSITION PAPER

I. PURPOSE: To provide current status of progress in introduction of the XM16E1 rifle and recovery/return of the M-14.

II. FACTS:

A. All first increment units have received the XM16E1 rifle in the required quantities.

B. All first increment units have placed the rifle in service with the exception of one regimental Headquarters Company, which has not yet received all required spare parts. Appropriate supply action is being taken to obtain parts.

C. Instructions for proper packing and turn-in of M-14 rifles have been published. Target date for completion of turn-in is 1 May.

D. Sufficient quantities of M-14 rifles are being returned for issue to individuals being transferred to units not equipped with the M-16, and to be used as mounts for the infrared sniper scope.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. No significant problems have been encountered either in the introduction of the M-16 or in the return of the M-14.

B. Some malfunctions of the M-16 have been reported. As of this time it appears that the weapon requires more attention to cleaning than the M-14.

IV. RECOMMENDATION: None.

V. ACTION BEING TAKEN:

A. Training manuals, "Do - Don't" sheets, and message traffic from this Headquarters stressing care and cleaning have been distributed.

B. A liaison team from this Headquarters with representatives of Division Ordnance and G-3 (Training) is visiting units armed with the M-16 to stress care and cleaning of the M-16 and make on the spot evaluation of problems encountered.

C. Authority has been requested to requisition twenty-five rifles for each second increment unit to commence training.

VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: None.

MONSOON REQUIREMENTS

I. PURPOSE: To provide information on action taken to date in preparation for the next monsoon season.

II. DISCUSSION: CG III MAF and CG Force Logistic Command have been informed in detail of the Division requirements for the next monsoon season.

A. CG 3dMarDiv letter, 4/GTB:jas 4400 of 30 March 1967 to CG Force Logistic Command provides requirements for individual items of clothing and equipment. It states requirements for items normally stocked, but subject to increased demand during the monsoon, and requirements for items not normally stocked. This letter recommended that specific quantities of certain items be positioned within FLSG-A and FLSU-1 prior to the beginning of the monsoon.

B. CG 3dMarDiv letter, 4/GTB:jas 4400 of 30 March 1967 to CG III MAF established requirements for Class II items other than clothing and individual equipment. This letter discussed the requirements for increased stockage of rifle cleaning materials, recommended a maintenance float for certain optical instruments, requested increased stockage of specified motor transport spare parts, requested procurement of silicone ointment MDX - 4056 (Dow Corning Corporation) as an effective deterrent to immersion foot, and recommended stockage of canvas preservative in increased quantity.

C. CG 3dMarDiv letter, 4/GTB:jas 4400 of 1 April 1967 provided additional requirements for the next monsoon for laundry and bath units, water pumps for vehicle cleaning, and tents and stoves for drying.

III. ACTION REQUIRED OF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND: Stock and position required items, prior to 1 October 1967. Positioning of stocks at Phu Bai and Dong Ha is essential: with the onset of the monsoon, transportation in - country becomes a significant bottleneck. Items which were needed at Dong Ha, Phu Bai, and Khe Sanh during the past monsoon season were sometimes in plentiful supply in RVN, but could not be moved expeditiously to the required supply support location.

SUPPLY OFFICER'S BRIEFING NARRATIVE

Good Morning General KRULAK. This chart (TAB 5-J-1) displays the trend of Third Division's requisitions for an eighteen month period. The trend has progressed from a high of 37,000 requisitions a month to a low of 9,000 requisitions or a 75% decrease in volume.

This chart (TAB 5-J-2) shows by percent how we utilized the various priorities for the same eighteen months.

The Pri 02's have hit a high of 8.5% and a low of 4.7% for an average of 5.2% per month.

The Pri 05's add up currently to 13% and; together the 02's and 05's equal less than 20% of the total.

Your recent letter of 4 April 1967 discussed the excessive use of Pri 02's. This division queried every account which had 6% or more of their requisitions as Pri 02.

The figures for the first two Battalions are too small for a valid statistic (TAB 5-K).

All the Battalions of the 12th Marines had a majority of their 02 requisitions for 782 gear-which had been approved by CG, 3d MarDiv letter of 21 January 1967.

3d Motor Transport's total for February was 638 rather than 255 as reported reference (a) Pac ltr. The 638 total included two companies (RUC 13652 and RUC 13635) which were detached from the parent unit in February. The revised percentage is 4%.

Headquarters Battalion reported a quantity of 32 requisitions for CAC's as approved by CG, 3dMarDiv and CG, FMFPac 060529Z. 81 requisitions were to remove combat essential items from deadline. One (1) was for disbursing forms and four (4) were cancelled.

Third Medical Battalion had a grand total of 1,298 for February 1967. In the Marine Organic supply there were 250 requisitions and 52 were Pri 02's. Forty-six (46) of the 52 were to build a deployment block for a collecting and clearing platoon embarking with 2/3. Four (4) were to make the hospital sanitary (paint in White) and one (1) was to remove an item from deadline.

On the Navy Medical Supply side of the account 1048 requisitions were submitted of which 859 were required for life saving drugs, surgical instruments, and equipment to complete a collecting and clearing medical block.

General KRULAK this Division has been on an active program of excesses since your inspector, Colonel TREADWELL visited here last November. This program was spruced up and enhanced by your message 131415Z March. The totals on this chart (TAB 5-L) are cumulative for all of the calendar year. It would be interesting to know how we stack up against the progress of the First Division.

The last chart (TAB 5-M) shows this Divisions participation in MUMMS school in Okinawa. Every account has had persons attending school and every account has given instruction to other.

1. CRITERIA FOR ASSIGNING PRIORITY 02

A priority 02 requisition must be approved and signed by the unit commander then delivered along with the 708 card to the Division Supply Office by unit supply officer, supply chief or competent supply personnel. Upon receipt at the Division Supply Office the requisition is screened to insure that it meets one of the following criteria:

A. Without item unit concerned is unable to perform assigned mission and such condition is imminent.

B. Required for immediate installation on or repair of combat-essential to the operation of combat essential weapons and equipment.

C. Required for immediate end-use in direct support equipment essential to the operation of combat essential weapons and equipment.

D. Directed by higher headquarters.

E. When it is determined that the priority 02 requisition meets the proper criteria the requisition is approved and forwarded to the appropriate FLSG/FLSU for further supply action.

2. REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS

Review of requirements is accomplished in a number of ways. A continual review is made of each item as issue of receipt action takes place. Also the supply officer is required to reconcile his records with each customer on a monthly basis. This insures that the items required by the customer are on requisition as well as determining those items no longer required.

Another method for reviewing requirements is review of allowance lists. Reconciliation of allowance lists between the supply officer and the responsible officer is required on a monthly basis in order to insure that allowances are being properly maintained.

Quarterly reconciliation takes place between the supply officer and supply source. This gives us our best opportunity to purify our supply records. We can make sure that all of our outstanding obligations are in fact valid. Also we can cancel those requisitions for material no longer required or already received.

3. EXCESS AND ROLL BACK PROGRAM

As a further review of requirements we require that inventory data be recomputed on a quarterly basis in lieu of every 6 months as required by current directives. This allows for a more orderly review of our recurring needs and makes it possible to isolate excesses before they become a problem. Excesses are reported and redistributed to where a need exists with the remainder being turned into the supporting FLSG/FLSU.

An important result of the quarterly recomputation of inventory control data is the cancellation of requisitions for material no longer required and the routine requisitioning of material required to fill requisitioning objectives.

4. See Tab 5-K for requisition history for period November 1965 to April 30, 1967.

5. At present, the requisitions with a total monetary value of \$500.00 or more must be approved by the Division Supply Officer or his direct representative. A future change to the Division Supply SOP, will reflect this requirement.

LAUNDRY SERVICE IN SUPPORT OF MEDICAL FACILITIES OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION

A critical need exists for a laundry for linens required in surgery and patient care at the Medical Battalion at Phu Bai. Linens, drapes, and gowns used in surgery presently are being washed by corpsmen at the MCB-62 laundry. These facilities are taxed maximally; the equipment is old, and breakdowns are frequent. Nevertheless, the Command relies solely on MCB-62 for laundry support since no USMC laundry capability exists at Phu Bai. Past requests for a laundry resulted in the provision of a commercial washer and dryer, but regrettably these were inoperable because of specific power requirements and water pressure.

Although the laundry situation at Dong Ha also poses a problem, it is less critical in that a washer and dryer are existent and operable. Unfortunately the machinery is old and replacement parts are unavailable. Breakdowns have occurred, but ingenuity has kept this unit functioning to the present.

Although the requirement for laundry facilities are critical for the medical units, there is a continuing requirement for laundry of individual and organization clothing as well. This topic was the subject of a letter to CG, FMFPAC on 1 April 1967. (CG 3dMarDiv ltr 4/GTB:jas 4400)

Improvement in laundry service was the subject of action when CG, FMFPAC directed procurement of commercial washers and dryers for the Force Logistic Command as a interim measure. At the time CG, FMFPAC stated "not only are the present units outmoded and overage, but depleted stocks of repair parts have compounded existing problems to such an extent that repair in some cases has to be accomplished with locally manufactured substandard parts". While the procurement of commercial machines was to serve as an interim measure until replacement of the outdated equipment was accomplished, no replacement items have been provided to the 3d Marine Division. This lack of laundry service has been listed as a significant problem in each monthly logistic summary since October 1966.

If the present support being provided by MCB-62 at Phu Bai were to fail, there would be no adequate or practical method of laundering surgical linens. A failure of the Dong Ha laundry did occur in the past. At that time, laundry facilities of ships off shore (Princeton, Canberra and Repose) were utilized. Linens were also flown on available aircraft to DaNang for laundering at FLC and then returned by air to Dong Ha. Every possible alternate has been considered or utilized, and immediate assistance is being requested.

LOGISTICS REPORTING

I. PURPOSE: To provide information on logistics reporting systems within the 3d Marine Division.

II. DISCUSSION:

A. Significant logistics reports required by higher headquarters are the Logistic Summary, monthly to CG III MAF (copy to CG FMFPAC), Logistic Status, every two months to CG FMFPAC, Report of Deadlined Combat Essential Equipment, every two weeks to CG FMFPAC and CMC, and the supply and equipment portions of OPSTAT reports. Other logistics reports pertaining to specific fields, i.e., supply, communications, motor transport, ordnance and engineer contain information which complements the summaries listed above.

B. Both the Logistic Summary and Deadline Combat Essential Equipment Reports are action documents. The former report is consolidated by the special staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 from input provided by all Division organizations. In the process of analyzing unit reports, the staff recommends action to be taken to rectify problem areas before they become widespread. In addition, the report provides a means for advising CG III MAF and CG FMFPAC of potential problem areas, or "early warning" reporting, and a means of summarizing logistic accomplishments and problem areas which have been addressed in separate correspondence. Examples of areas which have been treated in recent Logistic Summaries are maintenance support by the supporting FLSG, significant shortages of specific items of supply, the effect of transportation on logistic readiness, and the effect of deadlined equipment on units and missions. The Deadlined Combat Essential Equipment Report is examined in detail by the special staff, and emphasis is directed toward correcting unfavorable trends.

C. Since considerable reliance is placed on the Logistic Summary and Deadlined Combat Essential Equipment reports at the Division level, all required action is taken to secure accurate input from reporting units, including staff visits to assist the unit and to secure opinions and recommendations for improved reporting. When input fails to meet the required standards, commanders are informed immediately, and corrective action is directed. TAB A is representative of written action taken when required to emphasize the importance of complete logistic reporting within Division units.

D. It is felt that existing logistic reporting systems are adequate in the current situation, and that information copies of Logistic Summary Reports not being submitted to CG FMFPAC (starting with the March report) should prove valuable in alerting FMFPAC to potential problem areas. Further, this report provides a view of logistics at the end of the pipeline, where the true effectiveness of logistic systems must be measured.

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

4:AL:feg

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding Officer, _____

Subj: Improvement in Logistics Reporting

Ref: (a) DivO 4000.6A
(b) CG 3dMarDiv msg 201321Z Mar67

1. The Logistics Summary Report (LOGSUM) required from your organization monthly is used extensively by this Headquarters to identify problem areas and trends and to direct the attention of the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force and the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific to significant logistics considerations. Much of the information contained in your report is consolidated with that of all other reporting units to allow this Headquarters to analyze problem areas based on complete data for all Division units.
2. It is mandatory that your report be complete and accurate, and that it be submitted in the prescribed format. In order to assist all Division organizations in submitting complete and accurate reports, the Division Order requiring the report (reference (a)) was revised and republished on 9 March. This order shows the prescribed format in enclosure (1) and provides an example of a completed report in enclosure (2).
3. In addition to the basic instructions contained in reference (a) this Headquarters published special requirements by message each month, for inclusion in the LOGSUM, concerning problem items or logistics considerations of particular interest. Reference (b) supplemented the basic order for the March reporting period.
4. The degree of accuracy and attention to detail shown in your LOGSUMS are indicators of your Command interest in logistics. The LOGSUM is your opportunity to inform this Headquarters of significant logistics accomplishments and problems on a regular basis.
5. Procedures for delivery of the Logistic Summary Report are provided in paragraph 4.c. of reference (a). Your March report was delivered by guard mail and did not reach this Headquarters until 9 April. It was due 31 March.

6. The format for the March Logistic Summary submitted by (Organization Addressed) is incorrect, and it is apparent that neither reference (a) nor reference (b) was used in preparing the report.

7. It is requested that action be taken to assure that future Logistic Summary reports are submitted in the manner required, on time, and in the proper format.

HOSPITAL CORPSMEN SHORTAGES

A perennial issue of concern with which the Division has been confronted is that of Hospital Corpsmen shortages. This shortage is primarily one of decreased total on board strength, although on occasion, shortages in specific specialty ratings has occurred.

Table 1 provides an indication of the minimum/maximum on board Hospital Corpsmen strength during each month from January 1967 to 1 April 1967.

TABLE 1

JAN . . . 925/961

FEB . . . 901/946

MAR . . . 911/946

APR . . . 892/946

It is pertinent that even prior to dispersal of the 3d Marine Division at which time the 7th Engineer Battalion, 5th Communication Battalion and 1st Military Police Battalion were still attached to this Division, the manning level (Navy Manpower Authorization) was on 936 and the T/O 995. (EPDOPAC 222045Z July). At that time, had all requirements been satisfied, there would have been a need for 1019 Corpsmen.

In September 1966, because of the disparity between the on board strength and the required strength, a revised Navy Manpower Authorization (NAVPERS 576/OPNAV1000.2) was submitted via FMFPac to CNO for an increase in allotment to 1010.

In addition assistance was sought from FMFPac and corrective remedial action ensued; however, a shortage once again developed as is evident from table 1.

By January 1967, following detachment of several units and the addition of others, a strength (T/O) of 961 was required. While this number of on board personnel was achieved during January, corpsmen shortages still existed. This was the result of an increasing requirement for corpsmen in CAC units, an increased need for corpsmen in the Reconnaissance Battalion because of squad size or smaller unit deployment, and a lack of input for unprogramed casualty losses. Additionally, despite the fact that the Division was not maintained at T/O strength, it was necessary to man outgoing BLT's at T/O strength. Corpsmen were also being delayed administratively in Okinawa further contributing to existent in-country shortages. Moreover, on board strength predicted from the Personnel Accounting Machine Installation (BuPers Report 1080-14) were invariably below actual strength as shown, in part, by table 2, which negated input of needed corpsmen by EPDO PAC.

TABLE 2

Actual on board strength vs. predicted strength

	<u>On Board Strength</u>	<u>Projected Strength</u>	
		FM:FMFPAC MSG 031047Z/MAR 67	FM:BuPers Report 1080-14
1 FEB. . 927			1011
1 MAR. . 946		1012	1065
1 APR. . 920		1012	1064
1 MAY.		989	1070
1 JUN.		934	1042

As a consequence, assistance was again sought in February and favorable action followed with an immediate input of fifty corpsmen from FMFPac resources. Notwithstanding from March to mid April a deficit of corpsmen was again present. Action by FMFPac though ameliorating this shortage did not correct it entirely. Personal action of the FMFPac Surgeon resulted in an eradication of the administrative delay on Okinawa and a prompt arrival of corpsmen in country. In addition CG, FMFPac recommended to EPDOPAC that an increase of corpsmen be allotted to this Division to compensate for the Reconnaissance Battalion needs, unprogramed losses, and the CAC Program. While this is not reflected in the predicted on board strength as shown in table 2, if EPDOPAC favorably responds to the recommendation of CG, FMFPac a revised strength of 1058 will ensue.

PROBLEMS RELATED TO REPORTING OF EMERGENCY DEADLINING OF COMBAT
ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AT THE DIVISION LEVEL

I. PURPOSE: To recommend procedures to improve the Report of Deadlined Combat Essential Equipment in RVN.

II. FACTS:

A. Data for the DCE report for 3d Marine Division are received from two sources; 3d Marine Division and Force Logistic Command.

B. Data processing personnel and equipment required for preparation of the DCE are organic to the FLC.

C. The DCE combines statistical information concerning percentages of equipment deadlined with supply data on parts shortages and tracer action and with personnel data on skill shortages contributing to the deadline rate.

D. The great majority of equipment deadlined for over two weeks in the 3d Marine Division is beyond the organization maintenance ability of the Division to repair. In the reporting period 1-15 April 1967, 79% of the combat essential items on deadline were down for 3d or higher echelon repairs. A total of 566 items were deadlined; of these 449 required 3d echelon or higher maintenance, while 117 required organizational maintenance.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. Under the current procedures, neither the Division nor the FLC has the means to assure the validity of the finished report, since it contains input data from both commands.

B. Under the current procedures the Division is a customer of the FLC for data processing support. The Division may advise, but may not control either the programming or operation of the data processing effort.

C. Spare parts deficiencies which are not corrected by normal supply action and result in deadlined combat essential equipment are nominated for Red Ball. Their inclusion in the DCE report adds to the bulk of the effort involved in preparing and analyzing the report at all levels without a commensurate advantage of giving useful information not already held. It is felt that effective means are available to commanders at all levels to identify and correct supply problems causing deadlining without including spare parts data in the DCE report. Similarly, normal command procedures recognize critical personnel shortages, and the inclusion of personnel data in the DCE report is not considered to be of significant value.

D. Supply Support Policies.

1. Issue of body armor to rotating BLT's on Okinawa to cover T/E deficiencies and replace unserviceable assets is a sound policy and should be continued.

2. The most significant problem from the point of view of the unit commander has been sporadic availability of sufficient quantity and sizes in the FLSG storage location supporting his battalion. Since only T/E quantities may be held (No operating stocks are permitted) one for one exchange is mandatory. When body armor is not immediately available, no exchange takes place, and unserviceable body armor remains on the backs of troops instead of being introduced into the rehabilitation cycle.

DECLASSIFIED

BODY ARMOR

I. PURPOSE: To provide current information on the status of body armor in the 3d Marine Division.

II. DISCUSSION:

A. Background.

1. On 23 January 1967 CG III MAF provided information to CG FMFPac concerning a shortage of body armor and advising CG FMFPac that as much as 25% of body armor in the hands of troops might be unserviceable. Since that time, in-country assets have been increased by air shipment and the body armor rehabilitation program has been expanded.

2. CG 3dMarDiv was assigned a turn-in quota of 500 upper torso body armor per week and advised that one for one replacement would be available if requested. The Division requested replacement on this basis and assigned quotas to Division units. These quotas were met when one for one replacement was available.

B. Assets and Requirements.

1. T/E for all Division units is 22,281 including rotating BLT's.

2. Serviceable body armor upper torso on hand. 17,891 (Does not include three rotational BLT's)

3. Unserviceable body armor upper torso on hand. 458 (Does not include three rotational BLT's)

4. Average monthly demand rate upper torso. 592 (Does not include three rotational BLT's)

5. Serviceable body armor lower torso on hand. 8167 (Does not include three rotational BLT's)

6. Unserviceable body armor lower torso on hand. 146 (Does not include three rotational BLT's)

7. Average monthly demand rate lower torso. 15 (Does not include three rotational BLT's)

C. Allowances.

1. Allowance of lower torso body armor are adequate. While excesses exist in terms of actual use of the lower torso armor, there is no significant problem with this item.

2. CG, 3dMarDiv, CG III MAF, and CG FMFPac have requested interim authority to requisition in excess of current T/E to allow each individual in infantry, reconnaissance, anti-tank, and engineer battalion to be issued upper torso body armor.

3. CG III MAF is conducting a review of allowances for upper torso body armor. This Division has recommended an allowance of one per individual.

D. The low percentage of combat essential items deadlined for more than two weeks for organizational maintenance suggests that the emphasis on deadline reporting should be placed on 3d echelon and higher maintenance. The commander who has organic combat essential equipment deadlined has a measureable task which the deadlining affects and a staff and unit commanders who normally consider each piece of equipment as contributing to the accomplishment of the organization's mission. When an item remain on deadline within the organization for more than two weeks the commander frequently takes a personal interest in removing that item from deadline. The priority, tracer, and red ball systems are available as effective tools to assist him. The DCE report gives him information with which he is already intimately familiar.

On the other hand, the 3d echelon maintenance activity commander is presented with the serious problems of personnel skills, maintenance equipment, shop space, and uncommon parts; his attention is toward the system rather than toward the item. A report such as the DCE can be helpful to him in identifying and examining trends and identifying specific problem items.

IV. RECOMMENDATION:

A. Eliminate the requirement for reporting deadline items which require only organization maintenance.

B. Examine the use being made of the supply content (i.e., spare parts cards, tracer cards, recorder cards) and personnel content (MOS cards) of the report. If the data are not being used, eliminate them and concentrate on existing systems of priority, tracer, red ball, and personnel reporting. In this respect it is noted that the advance copy of FMFPacO 4000.13C distributed at the 8th Periodic Logistics Conference deletes the requirement for most of the supply content of the report. This will result in a significant saving in time and make the report more useful. However, spare parts cards are still required and unless positive action is taken by CG, FMFPac or CMC as a result of the information provided by the spare parts cards, these too should be deleted.

V. ACTION BEING TAKEN: A noncommissioned officer with mechanized accounting experience has been assigned full time responsibility for collecting and analyzing unit reports, correcting key punch data sheets, delivering the data to the Force Logistic Command for conversion to machine format and machine processing, correcting audit runs, and making staff visits to Division units to instruct and assist. In order to maintain accurate on-hand density information, periodic reports of densities of all reportable items are required, and units report changes as they occur.

VI. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS: See recommendations paragraph IV above.

BILLETING FOR COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS (CAPs)Problem:

Frequently sites selected for activation of CAPs either have no billeting facilities for Popular Forces personnel and/or U. S. Marine personnel assigned to that location.

Facts:

Current SOPs provide that, "The Marine element must be administered and supported through Marine channels although it will billet and live with the PF elements. Shelter and living accommodations which may not be available from GVN sources will be provided." To date this requirement has been met by on-site construction of three pre-fabricated tropical huts and one half-tropical hut per CAP by Engineer or Mobile Construction Battalion personnel from on hand assets to include one two-hole head, a single shower stall framework, one mess table and a food storage cabinet. The method used to date has severely taxed Division materials and funding assets and in view of the proposed expansion of the Combined Action Program presents an increasing need beyond current availability of material assets and funds allotted.

Discussion:

It is well known that the Popular Forces soldier receives a very low rate of pay and seldom attains more than token prestige locally. It has been found that construction of pre-fabricated huts at CAP sites in sufficient quantity to house both U. S. Marines and Popular Forces personnel expedites and enhances the integration of the PFs and Marines and further that like billeting increases the standing of the PF in the community.

Recommendation:

It is therefore recommended that funding be provided for from Fleet Marine Force Pacific assets rather than Division O&M funds for future construction at CAP sites of the necessary facilities.

T/E ITEMS FOR COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS/COMPANIES
(CAPs/CACs)

Problems:

In view of the proposed expansion of the Combined Action Program a definite need exists for a source of T/E items such as motor vehicles, water trailers, 7.62 M-60 machine guns, etc. in sufficient quantities on hand, to alleviate the necessity of assessing requirements on other Marine Corps units in-country assets pending receipt of requisitioned items.

Facts:

Acquisition of T/E requirements to date by the method of assessing other units has resulted in a dilution of those units' organizational assets and frequently resulted in receipt of some equipment in marginal operating condition or non-receipt of vitally necessary items such as AN/PRC 25 radios and 7.62 M-60 machineguns.

Discussion:

Proposed expansion of Combined Action units at an accelerated pace will necessitate a source of T/E items readily available in a satisfactory operating condition to meet this need without the undue delay and wasted effort involved in past procedures. Acquisition by assessment on other units and return of the interim acquired items to the original owner upon receipt of requisitioned items results in a duplication of effort inconsistent with economical and progressive expansion of this new phase of the overall war effort.

Recommendation:

It is therefore recommended that adequate quantities of T/E items required for the activation of future CACs and CAPs be provided from Fleet Marine Force Pacific stock levels and prepositioned in-country for expeditious issue as required.

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G-4 DIVISION
HQ, 3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

LOGISTICAL DATA

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LOCATION OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS

1. 3d Shore Party Bn - Phu Bai (HQTRS). SP Group Co (-) Security to Bulk Fuel Farm at Col Co, provides MHE in Phu Bai area, augments FLSG-A operation LSA Shawnee area, and provides HSTS as required by tactical units.
2. 3d Engr Bn - HQ Phu Bai. In general support. Priority of effort in support Shawnee Operation.
3. 11th Engr Bn - OPCON III MAF Bn (-) at Dong Ha. Missions (1) Operation Fire Break clearing 200m X 10,500m strip; maintenance Route 9 and Route 1 north of Dong Ha.
4. 3d MT Bn - HQ Phu Bai. 96 multifuel 2½ ton trucks recieved in April. Supports Shawnee Operation by daily resupply hauls.
5. 9th MT Bn(-) - HQ Dong Ha. 47 2½ ton, 56 5 ton trucks and 6 TRAC/34 12 ton trailer support of Dong Ha area. Major mission is Class V movement from ramp to ASP. One Truck Platoon attached to 3d MT Bn in Phu Bai.
6. 3d Med Bn (-) - HQ Phu Bai.
 - a. A Med - Phu Bai (114 bed holding facility)
 - b. B Med - Cadre, portion deployed BLTs/SLF.
 - c. C Med - Operation Shawnee and Khe Contingency.
 - d. D Med - Dong Ha (30 bed holding facility).

Hospital Ships - Repose or Sanctuary on station according to III MAF schedule.

TAB 5-A

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TAB 5-B

3D MARINE DIVISION
SUPPLY STATUS

As of 1 May 1967

STATUS OF SUPPLY	DONG HA		PHU BAI		KHE SANH	
	OBJECTIVE	ON HAND	OBJECTIVE	ON HAND	OBJECTIVE	ON HAND
CLASS I "A" "B" "C" SUNDRY PK.	30	1 18 10 12	30	6 19 9 5	15	0 4 10 0
CLASS II	SATISFACTORY					
CLASS III MOGAS DIESEL	30	18 12	30	10 5	15	13 18
CLASS IV	NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES					
CLASS V 105 MM 155 MM 8" 81 MM 175MM	30	26 76 24 25 11,188 RDS	30	13 69 34 5	15	1 44 NR 19

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AS OF 24 APRIL 1967

TRANSPORTATION1. SEALIFT

a. Number & Class:	<u>LCU</u> 3 - 1610 6 - 1466 15 - 501 <u>24</u>	<u>LST</u> 3 - 542
Total		
b. Transit Time From Danang to:	Phu Bai/Hue 9 hrs. Dong Ha 15 hrs. Cua Viet	8 to 10 hrs.
c. Ramp Capacity:	Hue 6 Dong Ha 6 Cua Viet	2
d. Restrictions:	MHE available. Dong Ha limited to 100 S/T Max, due to river depth.	Dredged area can support only 1-LST at this time.

2. ROADS AND BRIDGES

	<u>Road Miles</u>	<u>Avg RR Travel Time</u>	<u>Significant Bridges*</u>
a. Danang to Phu Bai	62	4 1/2 hrs.	
Phu Bai to Hue	13	1/2 hr.	
Hue to Shawnee OA	13	1 hrs.	
Shawnee to Dong Ha	31	2 hrs.	
Danang to Dong Ha	119	8 hrs.	60, Route #1
Dong Ha to Khe Sanh	50	3 hrs.	27, Route #9

* 9 bridges limited to 18 tons or less (By passes available)

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3. AIR

a. Normal resupply aircraft utilized:

Fixed Wing - C-130, C-123

Helo - CH-46, CH-37, H-34

b. Airfields:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>RUNWAY LENGTH</u>	<u>SURFACE</u>
Phu Bai	5600'	Asphalt
Dong Ha	3400'	Am-2 Matting
Khe Sanh	3900'	Am-2 Matting

c. Normal Routes:

<u>Originates</u>	<u>Destinations</u>
Danang	Phu Bai Dong Ha Khe Sanh
Phu Bai	Dong Ha Khe Sanh

d. Resupply by helicopter is utilized extensively, in many cases, they provided the sole means of support, i.e. Prairie AOR.

	<u>Phu Bai</u>		<u>Chinook/Big Horn Shawnee</u>		<u>Prairie</u>	
	<u>Days</u>	<u>Lifts</u>	<u>Days</u>	<u>Lifts</u>	<u>Days</u>	<u>Lifts</u>
Feb	15	49 S/T	15	83 S/T	22	251 S/T
Mar	18	26 S/T	16	41 S/T	28	777 S/T
Apr 1-24	19	45 S/T	17	83 S/T	21	459 S/T

TAB 5-C

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TAB 5-D

CARGO MOVEMENT TO AND WITHIN
3D MARINE DIVISION AOR

TONNAGE DAILY	LCU	LST	FIXED WING A/C	HELO	TRUCK ROUGH RIDER CONVOY
<u>FEB</u> AVERAGE HIGH LOW TOTAL	(16 DAYS) 148 S/T 568 S/T 32 S/T 2374 S/T		(28 DAYS) 40 S/T 234 S/T 5 S/T 1120 S/T	(24 DAYS) 16 S/T 46 S/T 1 S/T 384 S/T	(24 DAYS) (18) 54 S/T (31) 96 S/T (6) 13 S/T (432) 1287 S/T
<u>MAR</u> AVERAGE HIGH LOW TOTAL	(18 DAYS) 100 S/T 190 S/T 36 S/T 1797 S/T	(5 DAYS) 781 S/T 1451 S/T 325 S/T 3904 S/T	(31 DAYS) 89 S/T 306 S/T 2 S/T 2677 S/T	(28 DAYS) 30 S/T 100 S/T 4 S/T 844 S/T	(30 DAYS) (14) 46 S/T (24) 81 S/T (4) 10 S/T (421) 1366 S/T
<u>APR</u> AVERAGE HIGH LOW TOTAL	(17 DAYS) 164 S/T 682 S/T 23 S/T 2783 S/T	(7 DAYS) 1123 S/T 2435 S/T 141 S/T 7863 S/T	(30 DAYS) 73 S/T 228 S/T 25 S/T 2203 S/T	(29 DAYS) 24 S/T 54 S/T 3 S/T 708 S/T	(23 DAYS) (36) 110 S/T (87) 257 S/T (5) 14 S/T (820) 2543 S/T

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TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED

MARCH 1967

ITEM	PRAIRIE III	CHINOOK II	PHU BAI	KHE SANH	TOTAL	AVERAGE DAILY EXPENDITURE RATE
175 HE	15,357				15,357	495
8 HOW HE		479			479	15
105 HE	62,071	13,020	2,091	8,407	85,589	2,760
107 HE	2,151	86		580	2,817	90
155 HOW HE	13,503	2,133	1,012	683	17,331	559
155 GUN HE			378		378	12
105 WP	2,762	652	74	601	4,089	131
105 Illum	1,106	387	202	413	2,108	68
155 GUN Illum			97		97	3
155 GUN WP			41		41	1
155 HOW WP	253	202	26	47	528	16
155 HOW Illum	199	2	61		262	8
107 Illum	158				158	5
107 WP	362			12	374	12
TOTAL RDS EXP	97,922	16,961	3,982	10,743	129,608	4,180

AVERAGE DAILY TONNAGE EXPENDED - 160 TONS

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TAB 5-E

TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED

ITEM						April 1967	
	PRAIRIE III/IV	CHINOOK	PHU BAI	KHE SANH	BIG HORN/ SHANNEE	TOTAL	AVERAGE DAILY EXPENDITURE RATE
175HE	14,684					14,684	490
8 HOW HE		55	58		736	849	28
105HE	82,168	2,388	10,549	13,102	14,496	122,653	4098
107HE	2,692					2,692	90
155 HOW HE	5,865	194	1,052	623	3,198	10,932	364
155 GUN HE			448			448	15
105 WP	2,549	158	33	1,223	440	4,403	147
105 Illum	624	31	231	65	278	1,229	41
155 GUN Illum			34			34	1
155 GUN WP			25			25	1
155 HOW WP	215	42	16	69	125	467	16
155 HOW Illum	115		63	19	469	666	22
107 Illum	154					154	5
107 WP	188					188	6
TOTAL RDS EXP	109,254	2,818	12,509	15,101	19,742	159,424	5,325

AVERAGE DAILY TONNAGE EXPENDED - 210 TONS

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THIRD MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

DEADLINED COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

		1 JAN	15 JAN	1 FEB	15 FEB	1 MAR	15 MAR	1 APR	15 APR
COMM/ELECT	NR. DEADLINED	185	166	145	199	197	215	222	223
	%	3.0	2.6	2.9	4.6	4.5	5.0	5.0	5.1
ENGR	NR. DEADLINED	35	27	26	35	41	41	42	43
	%	8.0	6.3	6.1	8.5	10.0	9.0	9.4	10.6
MT	NR. DEADLINED	217	172	146	204	188	226	220	221
	%	8.0	7.7	6.5	9.7	8.8	11.0	10.5	10.6
ORD	NR. DEADLINED	45	54	46	63	54	72	76	79
	%	2.3	2.3	2.2	3.0	2.0	3.0	3.6	3.9
TOTAL	NR. DEADLINED	482	419	363	501	480	554	560	566
	%	4.3	3.8	3.7	5.6	5.3	6.0	6.2	6.3


- NOTES: 1. A Special Review of on hand Density of Combat Essential Equipment was conducted by all Division units between 15 Jan and 1 Feb. The new densities (primarily increases) reflected in 1 Feb statistics influence the lower deadline rates for the period ending 1 Feb.
2. A special review of items on third echelon deadline was conducted with FLSC-A between 1 Feb and 15 Feb. An increased number of items deadlined were picked up as a result of this review.

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TAB 5-G

THIRD MARINE DIVISION (REIN)
DEADLINE COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT
(PERCENTAGES)

As of 16 April 1967



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REPLACEMENT AND EVACUATION PROGRAM

- I. PURPOSE: To provide the current status of the R&E Program for FY-67.
- II. DISCUSSION: The following table shows equipment planned for R&E FY-67 and equipment received as of 1 May:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PLANNED QTY FY-67</u>	<u>ACCOMPLISHED AS OF 1 MAY</u>
LVTP 5 (CMD)	7	3
M51 RECOVERY VEHICLE	4	0
LVTE-1	4	2
LVTP5A1	145	33
LVTR1A1	4	3
TANK M67 (FLAME)	4	1
ONTOS M50A1	18	17
TANK M48A1	30	19
M53 155MM GUN (SP)	4	1
M55 8 INCH HOW	3	2
M109 155MM HOW (SP)	3	2
AN/M4 COMPRESSOR	3	0
AN/MRC 63 RADIO	2	0
AN/MRC 62 RADIO	3	0
AN/GMC 1 RAWIN	1	0

TAB 5-H

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TURN-IN OF CONEX CONTAINERS

I. PURPOSE: To provide current information on the progress of the program established for turn-in of conex containers.

II. DISCUSSION:

a. III MAF Order 4030.1 dated 12 January 1967 established policy and procedures for the turn-in of conex containers.

b. Conex containers previously had been authorized for use as temporary storage facilities. Due to this usage a critical storage now exists for use in shipping U. S. Mail and highly pilferable items to and from CONUS.

c. Turn-in of all conex containers is to be completed by 31 July 1967. A quota of quantity ten (10) per month has been established for the Third Marine Division.


d. Turn-in quotas have been established by this Headquarters for all Division units holding conex containers. Turn-in dates and designation of turn-in points are established. As of 1 May 1964 conex containers had been turned in, of a total of 236 on hand in the Division.

e. Completion project date of 31 July 1967 will be met.

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TAB 5-J-1

REQN HISTORY




* To 25 April 1967

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TAB 5-J-2

PRIORITY UTILIZATION



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EXCESSIVE USE OF PRIORITY O2 REQUISITIONS

Ref: (a) CG, FMFPac ltr 21D/MLP over 4235 of 4 April 1967 (NOTAL)

1. Reference (a) furnished information that certain units of this Division had submitted an excessive number of pri O2 requisitions during the month of February 1967. For purposes of this information sheet, the following units which totalled 6% or more of their requisitions as pri O2 have been charted as "excessive" in their use of pri O2.

Unit	O2 Req's	Total Req's	%
1/3	9	14	64.3 (1)
3/9	2	3	66.6 (1)
1/12	18	100	18.0 (2)
2/12	48	515	9.3 (2)
3/12	12	175	6.9 (2)
3d M.T.	23	255	9.0 (3)
Hq Bn	118	969	12.2 (4)
3d Med	661	783	84.4 (5)

Footnotes:

(1) The sample is not large enough to provide a valid statistic.

(2) The majority of the pri O2's in each case of the 12th Marines was for 782 gear and was approved to be requisitioned O2 by CG, 3d MarDiv ltr 21:GCS; 21 Jan 67.

(3) 3d Motor Transport Battalion's total requisitions for Feb 67 was 638 rather than 255 as reported by ref (a). The 638 total includes two companies (RUC 13652 and RUC 13653) which were detached from the parent unit in Feb. The revised percentage is 4 percent.

(4) Headquarters Battalion reported a quantity of thirty-two (32) requisitions were for Combined Action Companies and approved in 3d MarDiv message 190755Z Feb and CG, FMFPac 060529Z Dec; eighty one (81) requisitions were to remove combat essential items from deadline; one (1) was for urgently needed disbursing forms, and four (4) were cancelled.

(5) The 3d Medical Battalion actually submitted a grand total of 1,298 requisitions for Feb 67. Within a medical battalion there are two supply functions:

a. Marine Organic Supply submitted 250 requisitions of which fifty-two (52) were pri O2. Forty-six (46) of these pri O2's were required to build a deployment block for a collecting and clearing platoon embarking with BLT 2/3. Four (4) were required to maintain the hospital in a sanitary condition and one (1) to remove a combat essential item from deadline.

TAB 5-K

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b. In the Navy Medical Supply Section one thousand and forty-eight (1,048) requisitions were submitted. Of which 859 were required for life saving drugs, surgical instruments, and equipment to complete a collecting and clearing company medical block.

(6) Summarizing the past eighteen (18) months, this Division has steadily progressed from a high of thirty-seven thousand (37,000) requisitions a month to a current low of nine thousand (9000) or a 75% drop. For the same eighteen (18) months the pri 02 requisitions as reported by Force Logistics Command, hit a high of 8.5% and a low of 4.7% for an average of 5.2% per month. This average falls below the arbitrary 6.0% criteria of being "excessive" for purposes of this report. The current system of monitoring pri 02 requisitions at Division level will continue.

TAB 5-K

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5-L

EXCESS AND CANCELLATIONS

	TOTAL CXL'S	TOTAL EXCESS	EXCESS LINE ITEM	TOTAL VALUE OF CXL'S & EXCESS
DONG HA	1,469,460.65	336,528.14	2917	1,805,988.79
PHU BAI	*289,608.14 749,374.75	*131,332.38 300,818.29	1694	*420,940.52 1,050,193.04
DANANG	212,806.16	61,064.68	858	273,870.84

5,469

*289,608.14
2,431,641.56
(TOTAL VALUE OF CANCELLATIONS RPT'D)
(TO DATE)

*131,332.38
698,411.11
(TOTAL VALUE OF EXCESS TO DATE)

* ASA

*420,940.52
3,130,052.67
(TOTAL VALUE OF CANCELLATIONS AND
(EXCESS TO DATE)

15 April 1967

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13340	4/12	NO ASA	12,030.00	NO ASA		12,030.00
		22,694.26	2,644.38	5,262.43		30,601.07
13400	3D ENG		165,061.00	NO ASA		165,061.00
		3,842.69	251,384.03	8,108.16		263,334.88
13550	3D SP	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		18,527.60	NO INCR	2,868.00		21,395.60
13650	3D MT		32,050.00	NO ASA		32,050.00
		24,922.54	15,435.55	3,858.73		44,216.82
13700	3D RECON	NO ASA	NO ASA	38,750.90		38,750.90
		1,535.53	9,063.79	733.18		11,332.50
13730	3D AT	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		77,025.00	NO INCR	8,467.58		85,492.58
15160	1/26	259.00	NO ASA	8,607.00		8,866.00
		NO SFA	71.01	627.00		698.01
15170	2/26	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		3,929.95	NO INCR	2,028.31		5,958.26
15180	3/26	4,025.94	1,769.20	523.48		6,318.62
		14,999.93	3,066.95	53,200.06		71,266.94
21246	1ST 155	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		3,737.33	4,501.78	3,269.94		11,509.05
21270	1ST 8 INCH	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		1,404.47	NO INCR	NO INCR		1,404.47
21380	11TH ENG	NO ASA	1,728.53	NO ASA		1,728.53
		1,035,943.13	158,042.33	35,114.62		1,229,100.08
21430	3D TANK	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		137,075.52	6,489.96	94,450.32		238,015.80
21800	1ST AMTRAC	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		8,305.52	13,897.83	24,981.42		47,184.77
28020	9TH MOT	NO ASA	NO ASA	7,872.20		7,872.00
		2,295.54	NO INCR	9,184.00		11,479.54
43010	SUB UNIT	2 NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		NO SFA	3,870.82	NO INCR		3,870.82
TOTAL ASA		92,463.96	338,676.73	218,637.36		649,778.05
TOTAL SFA		1,691,644.37	673,655.67	601,060.66		2,966,360.70

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RUC	UNIT	CANCEL	CANCEL	EXCESS	NO LINE ITEMS	TOTAL VALUE EXCESSES AN CANCELLATIONS
13001.	HQBN	22,694.00	NO ASA	89,000.00		111,694.00
		81,476.64	NO INCR	64,026.22		145,502.86
13020	3D MED	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		20,766.10	NO INCR	1,485.86		22,251.96
13101	HQ 3D MAR	NO ASA	8,417.10	7,307.08		15,724.18
		5,360.13	NO INCR	8,210.54		13,570.67
13110	1/3	O/C				
13120	2/3	O/C				
13130	3/3	NO ASA	NO ASA	236.00		236.00
		2,794.49	NO INCR	105,700.08		108,494.57
13151	HQ 4TH	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		9,321.68	NO INCR	39,017.62		48,339.30
13160	1/4	NO ASA	45,915.90	NO ASA		45,915.90
		NO SFA	1,551.46	NO INCR		1,551.46
13170	2/4	53,411.22	NO ASA	44,101.33		97,512.55
		102,108.13	7,840.23	35,105.55		145,053.91
13180	3/4	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		4,065.80	67,225.00	NO INCR		71,290.80
13201	HQ 9TH	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		9,121.88	670.49	530.00		10,322.37
13210	1/9	199.00	NO ASA	2,253.00		2,452.00
		11,091.00	1,669.07	632.03		13,392.10
13220	2/9	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		11,326.68	132.71	24,970.37		36,429.76
13230	3/9	7,430.00	19,727.00	14,113.77		41,270.77
		44,511.93	64,626.46	26,990.26		135,928.65
13301	HQ 12TH	4,444.80	NO ASA	1,094.60		5,479.40
		NO SFA	NO INCR	2,069.20		2,069.20
13310	1/12	NO ASA	NO ASA	1,780.00		1,780.00
		18,359.08	17,399.37	7,183.74		42,942.19
13320	2/12	NO ASA	NO ASA	NO ASA		NO ASA
		2,120.89	NO INCR	NO INCR		2,120.89
13330	3/12	NO ASA	51,978.00	3,058.00		55,036.00
		13,180.93	44,072.45	32,985.44		90,238.82

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5 - M

RUC	UNIT	No. OF PERS ATT'D MUMMS SCHOOL	MILSTRIP TRNG HRS
13340	4/12	3	12
13400	3D ENGR BN	4	18
13550	3D SP BN	7	6
13650	3D MT BN	8	7
13700	3D RECON BN	5	16
13730	3D AT BN	10	6
15160	1/26	3	22
15170	2/26	3	6
15180	3/26	3	29
21246	1ST 155MM GUN BTRY	1	12
21270	1ST 8" HOW BTRY	1	12
21380	11TH ENGR BN	1	16
21430	3D TANK BN	9	10
21800	1ST AMTRAC BN	9	5
28020	9TH MT BN	2	3
43010	SUB UNIT #2	1	17

Recap: Number of Division Personnel Who Have
 Attended MUMMS School: -131-
 Hours of MILSTRIP Training Conducted 401
 As of: 4 Apr 1967

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MUMMS
(M. C. Unified Material Mgmt System)
Milstrip Training Program

RUC	UNIT	NO. OF PEPS ATT'D MUMMS SCHOOL	MILSTRIP TRNG HRS
13001	HQ BN	22	12
13020	3D MED BN	3	0
13101	HQ 3D MAR	2	14
13110	1/3	0/c	0/c
13120	2/3	0/c	0/c
13130	3/3	4	10
13151	HQ 4TH MAR	6	33
13160	1/4	3	20
13170	2/4	2	15
13180	3/4	6	12
13201	HQ 9TH MAR	3	13
13210	1/9	2	8
13220	2/9	4	14
13230	3/9	0	8
13301	HQ 12TH MAR	3	12
13310	1/12	2	12
13320	2/12	9	15
13330	3/12	1	6

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TAB 5-N

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DISTRIBUTION OF PRESENT ENGINEER EFFORT
(AS OF 10 APRIL 1967)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DONG HA</u>	<u>KHE SANH</u>
MCB	MCB-62 (24-779)	MCB-11* (24-800) DET (MCB-5) (3-151)	DET MCB-4 (1-18)
*MCB LL CURRENTLY ARRIVING BY INCREMENT AT DONG HA. PROJECTED STRENGTH INDICATED.			
FORCE ENGINEER UNIT	COMPANY, 11TH ENGR (8-212)	11TH ENGINEER BN(-) (36-1114)	NONE
DIVISION ENGINEER UNIT	3D ENGINEER BN (-) (920-537)	"A"&"C" COMPANY, 3D ENGR (6-396)	DET, 3D ENGINEER BN (0-10)

REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL ENGINEER EFFORT

FORCE ENGR COMPANY	NONE	NONE
MCB		

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TAB 5-N

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT DEADLINE STATUS
(April 1967)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>AVERAGE DEADLINE</u>
Tractor TD-18	61	64	14
Tractor TD-15	45	27	12
Tractor M-64	39	39	39*
Tractor MRS-100	19	16	4
Crane, Mobile	10	10	1
Crane, Tracked	22	15	2
Grader, 550	12	7	2
Scooploader TL-16	10	9	5
Truck, Dump, M-51	114	108	25
Generator 60 KW	27	26	13
Generator 30 KW	36	18	8
Generator 20 KW	39	39	12
Forklift, 6,000 lb	12	12	2
Forklift, 3,000 lb	8	6	3
Water Purification Units	40	23	5

*M-64 Tractor administratively deadlined awaiting accessories and spare parts. (New item of equipment)

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TAB 5-0

AVERAGE MONTHLY POTABLE WATER PRODUCTIONDEC-APRIL (1000 GALS)

	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL (1-25)</u>
DONG HA	705	950	1,105	1,580	1,475
CAMP CARROLL	400	360	370	375	390
PHU BAI	490	595	875	1,125	1,525
KHE SANH	100	200	145	160	190
OTHER	<u>230</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>350</u>	<u>510</u>
TOTAL	1,925	2,210	2,755	3,590	4,090

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CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS-PHU BAI/DONG HA

The information contained in the following appendices is an updating on construction projects in the Phu Bai/Dong Ha areas. Included are projects currently under construction, projects funded but not programmed, and those projects expected to be funded with FY67S MCON funds.

APPENDIX A - Phu Bai Vertical Construction Priority List

APPENDIX B - Phu Bai Horizontal Construction Priority List

APPENDIX C - Projects to be Programmed - Phu Bai

APPENDIX D - FY 67S MCON Projects Expected to be Funded for
3d MarDiv

APPENDIX E - FY 67S MCON Projects Expected to be Funded for
other than the 3d MarDiv for the Phu Bai area

APPENDIX F - Dong Ha construction projects

In summary the six division cantonments in Phu Bai have been under construction since July 1966 and are still not complete. The first line item alone, expected to be approved in the FY 67S MCON funding, equals five cantonments. Based on the above, estimates indicate that even with the addition of a third MCB in this area the essential construction will not be completed before the next monsoon season begins.

TAB 5-P

DECLASSIFIED

MCB-62

PHU BAI VERTICAL CONSTRUCTION PRIORITY LIST

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>EXPECTED COMPLETION</u>
1.	DIV	Cantonment (4th)	Bn Cant	UNK
2.	131AvCo U.S.Army	Mess Hall (500)	7000 SF	UNK
3.	8th RRFS U.S.Army	Antenna (85% comp)		UNK
4.	DIV	Water Supply & Treatment	61,000 LM	1 June 1967
5.	FLSG-A	Truck Auto Maint	12,000 SF	1 May 1967
6.	FLSG-A	Elec Comm Maint	2,000 SF	1 May 1967
7.	FLSG-A	Admin Bldg & Security Fence Data Processing Bldg	10,600 SF 10,000 LF Fence	15 May 1967
8.	FLSG-A	Electrical Source	2,330 KV	ASAP
9.	FLSG-A	Electrical Distribution	45,000 LY	ASAP
10.	DIV	3d Med Bn (2d Addtn)	6 quonsets	UNK
11.	DIV	Cantonment (5th)	Bn Cant	UNK
12.	DIV	RF Bldgs (4) (Shops)	16,000 SF	July
13.	FLSG-A	Community Fac & Misc Maint	30,000 SF	1 Aug 1967
14.	DIV	Wells	2 Wells	UNK
15.	DIV	RF Bldgs (4) (Shops)	16,000 SF	UNK
16.	DIV	95 Sea Huts	95 Tin roofs	1 June 1967
17.	DIV	Galley (4/12)	250 MN	15 May 1967
18.	DIV	RF Bldgs (9)	36,000 SF	1 Aug 1967
19.	8th RRFS U.S.Army	Antenna Field	2-747 Ant	15 April 1967
20.	DIV	Mess Halls (2)(250 MN)	7,000 SF	1 July 1967
21.	131AvCo U.S.Army	15 Troops Billets	7,680 SF	15 June 1967
22.	FLSG-A	Security Fence & Fire Station	1,600 SF	1 July 1967

APPENDIX A

TAB 5-P

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<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>EXPECTED COMPLETION</u>
23.	8th RRFS U.S.Army	GP Warehouse & Cold Storage		UNK
24.	DIV	Dental Clinic & Photo Repro	4,800 SF	15 July 1967
25.	MAW	Mess Hall Addition	2,400 SF	UNK
26.	MAW	Sea Huts (12)	12 Tin Roofs	UNK
27.	8th RRFS U.S.Army	BOQ		UNK
28.	131AvCo U.S.Army	Hangar, Maint Bldg & Para Loft	16,000 SF 4 Tower	UNK
29.	131AvCo U.S.Army	Motor Maint. Bldg		UNK
30.	FLSG-A	Bakery	2,880 SF	1 July 1967
31.	37 SigBn U.S.Army	Dial Central	4,000 SF	1 May 1967
32.	DIV	RF Buildings	72,000	1 Aug 1967
33.	FLSG-A	Dental Clinic/Disp (3 quonsets)	2,880	15 July 1967
34.	FLSG-A	Bulk Fuel Storage & Distribution	132,000 Gal	UNK
35.	FLSG-A	POL/RDY Fuel Storage	126,000 Gal	UNK
36.	8th RRFS U.S.Army	Motor Pool Paving & Veh Maint Shop		UNK
37.	131AvCo U.S.Army	Quonset Huts (4)	3,840 SF	UNK
38.	131AvCo U.S.Army	Dispensary & Dental Clinic	1,920 SF	UNK
39.	FLSG-A	Ice Plant & Utilities	24,000 SF	UNK
40.	DIV	Cantonment (R&R)	10,240 SF Huts	UNK

APPENDIX A

TAB 5-P

DECLASSIFIED

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MCB-62

PHU BAI HORIZONTAL CONSTRUCTION PRIORITY LIST

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>EXPECTED COMPLETION</u>
1.	MAW	Helicopter Apron	75,000 SY	UNK
2.	MAW	Stabilized Area F/SUP	45,000 SF	1 May 1967
3.	MAW	TAFDS BERMS	160,000 Gal	UNK
4.	MAW	Access Roads	1/2 mile	1 July 1967
5.	DIV	Road Maintenance	Cantonment Roads	Continuous
6.	NSA	Col Co Ramp/Road Main	Maintenance	Continuous
7.	NSA	Hue LCU Ramp	Resurface	ASAP
8.	FLSG-A	Open Storage	23,000 SY	1 June 1967
9.	FLSG-A	Roads & Bridges	26,000 SY DEST	1 July 1967
10.	FLSG-A	Drainage	6500 LF	1 July 1967
11.	131AvCo U.S. Army	Taxiway	12,000 SF	15 July 1967
12.	131AvCo U.S. Army	Aprons	23,750 SY	15 July 1967
13.	37SigBn U.S. Army	Land Fill	15,000 CY	1 Aug 1967
14.	MAW	Refueling Pad	13,000 SF	1 July 1967
15.	131AvCo U.S. Army	Roads	1/2 mile	1 Aug 1967

TAB 5-P

APPENDIX B

DECLASSIFIED

PROJECTS TO BE PROGRAMMED, PHU BAI

	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Constr Agcy</u>
1.	3d MarDiv	5th Cantonment	Bn Cant	MCB 62
2.	MAW	MAG Cantonment	MAG 163 VMO	MCB 62
3.	3d MarDiv	Watch Towers	6 - 50 ft.	MCB 62
4.	FLSG-A	Data Processing Bldg.	4,000 SF	MCB 62
5.	3d MarDiv	Wells	2	MCB 62
6.	8th RRFS	BOQ		MCB 62
7.	FLSG-A	Dairy Plant	20,000 SF	MCB 62
8.	3d MarDiv	Amphitheatre	1,000 seat	MCB 62
9.	3d MarDiv	Troop Laundermats	2,685 SF	MCB 62
10.	3d MarDiv	Volley Ball/Basketball	8 Courts	MCB 62
11.	3d MarDiv	Softball fields w/Cyclone Fence	6	MCB 62
12.	3d MarDiv	Chapel	20,485 SF	MCB 62
13.	3d MarDiv	Recreation Facility	12,000 SF	MCB 62
14.	3d MarDiv	Special Services Bldg.	4,000 SF	MCB 62
15.	3d MarDiv	Golf Driving Range	Bldg. 512 SF	MCB 62
16.	3d MarDiv	Tennis Courts	4 Courts	MCB 62
17.	3d MarDiv	Skeet Trap Range	1 Standard	MCB 62
18.	3d MarDiv	Gym/Auditorium	12,800 SF	MCB 62
19.	3d MarDiv	Clubs Office & Storage	4,000 SF	MCB 62
20.	3d MarDiv	Staff NCO Club	To be designed	MCB 62
21.	3d MarDiv	Officer's Club	To be designed	MCB 62
22.	3d MarDiv & FLSG-A	Road Construction, Cantonment & Access	31.1 miles	MCB 62

APPENDIX C

TAB 5-P

DECLASSIFIED

	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Constr Agcy</u>
23.	MAW	Repair and Rehabilitation Phu Bai runway	SBST	MCB 62
24.	3d MarDiv	Asphalt Parking area Air Freight	10,080 SF DBST	MCB 62
25.	NSA	Construct Col Co road	50,000 SY Fill	MCB 3
26.	NSA	Hue by-pass road	4,000 m	MCB 3
27.	NSA	Bulk Fuel Facility Hue	150,000 Gal/Day	MCB 3
28.	NSA	Tan My Port	4-LST Port	MCB 3
29.	3d MarDiv	Admin C.P.	46,636 SF	3d EngrBn
30.	3d MarDiv	General's Quarters	1,380 SF	3d EngrBn
31.	3d MarDiv	Guest House	1,380 SF	3d EngrBn
32.	3d MarDiv	General's Mess	3,199 SF	3d EngrBn
33.	3d MarDiv	4th Marines Strongbacks	60	3d EngrBn
34.	3d MarDiv	Bunker Construction	180	3d EngrBn
35.	3d MarDiv	Combat Support	3 ltr Companies	3d EngrBn
36.	3d MarDiv	Office & Passenger Terminal	3,000 SF	C-11 Engr
37.	FLSG-A	ASP	Ammo 3d MarDiv	C-11 Engr

APPENDIX C

TAB 5-P

DECLASSIFIED

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FY 67S MCON Projects
expected to be funded
3d MarDiv

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Description of Project</u>
18	Div Supt. Facility \$865,000 634 standard 16x32 huts 28 showers w/128,000 BTU oil fired boilers 34 standard 8 hole heads 8 messhalls (500 man) w/128,000 BTU oil fired boilers, garbage shack, grease pit and dry stores building 4 standard 16x32 Admin Bldgs All supporting utilities
25	Combat vehicle organizational maintenance hardstands \$202,000 2,333 SY of concrete hardstand for maintenance of tracked and wheeled vehicles for 3d Mar Div (Rein) Construct 13,667 SY of asphalt parking and open storage for maintenance of wheeled vehicles 3d Mar Div (Rein)
27	Combat Vehicle maintenance hardstand Construct 4,000 SY of concrete hardstand for maintenance of tracked and wheeled vehicles
44	Division Support Facilities \$280,000 Construct 233 standard 16x32' billeting hutments 11 showers w/128,000 BTU oil fired boilers 14 standard 8 hole heads 3 Messhalls (500 man) w/128,000 BTU oil fired boilers, garbage shacks, grease pits and dry stores buildings 2 standard 16x32 Admin Bldgs All supporting utilities

44 additional Troop Housing Improvements 270,000

Improve hut frames, decking, siding and footings

Construct quonset latrines w/boilers

Construct wood framed concrete deck shower facilities

Provide supporting utilities and ground improvements to include sewage, water, and electrical distribution systems

Pave internal command post roads and muster areas

APPENDIX D

TAB 5-P

FY67S MCON PROJECTS EXPECTED TO BE FUNDED FOR OTHER THAN
3D MARDIV FOR THE PHU BAI AREA

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT</u>	<u>CWE (000)</u>
5	FLSG-A	Facilities Phu Bai	340
15	FLSG-A	Ammo Supply Point Bunkers	250
24	FLSG-A	Ice Plant	100
29	MAW	Helo MAG Fac.	1,260
31	FLSG-A	Roads	367
39	FLSG-A	Electric System	382

APPENDIX E

TAB 5-P

DECLASSIFIED

DONG HA CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

<u>Item</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Constr Agcy</u>
1.	CG, III MAF	Up Grade Rte 9 to Class 60 - Dong Ha to Khe Sanh	58 miles 29 bridges	11th Engr Bn
2.	CG, III MAF	Provide water distribution Dong Ha	75,000 Gal/day	-do-
3.	CG, III MAF	Maintain Rte 9, Dong Ha to Rockpile	20 miles	-do-
4.	CG, III MAF	Maintain & Improve Rte 558	5 miles	-do-
5.	CG, III MAF	Provide camp maintenance, Dong Ha		-do-
6.	CG, III MAF	Construct cantonment fac- ilities Dong Ha	2-500 man Messhalls 194 Strongbacks 182 Tropical Huts 36 Heads	-do-
7.	CG, III MAF	Construct tent decks, heads galley and strongbacks at Camp Carroll		-do-
8.	CG, III MAF	Construct and maintain roads Dong Ha Combat Base	12 miles	-do-
9.	CG, III MAF	Improvement and maintenance of camp roads at Camp Carroll	3 miles	-do-
10.	CG, III MAF	Upgrade Rte 1 to Class 60, Dong Ha to Gio Linh	8 miles 5 bridges	-do-
11.	CG, III MAF	Construct firebreak, Gio Linh to Con Thien	10,000 meters	-do-
12.	CG, III MAF	Operate and maintain camp utilities		-do-
13.	CG, III MAF	Maintain and Improve Rte 561	6 miles	-do-
14.	CG, III MAF	Construct bunkers, Dong Ha		-do-
15.	CG, III MAF	Construct LST/LCU Ramp, Cua Viet		MCB 5
16.	CG, III MAF	Construct Towers, Dong Ha, Camp Carroll, Firebreak	24 Towers	MCB 5
17.	CG, III MAF	Construct Medical Facility, Dong Ha	6 quonsets	MCB 5

APPENDIX F

TAB-5-P

DECLASSIFIED

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Scope</u>	<u>Constr Agcy</u>
18.	CG, III MAF	Airfield Maintenance, Dong Ha		MCB 5
19.	CG, III MAF	Upgrade Rte 1 to Class 60, Dong Ha to Quang Tri	10 miles	MCB 11
20.	CG, III MAF	Practice 9 Project		11th EngrBn MCB 11

APPENDIX F

TAB- 5-P

DECLASSIFIED

STATUS OF MAJOR ORDNANCE ITEMS

27 April 1967

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ON-HAND</u>	<u>DEADLINED, DAILY AVER.</u>
M48A3	53	50	9 NOTE-1
M67	9	9	3
M51	7	6	0
M50A1	45	42	6
LVTP-5 (CMD)	9	8	0
LVTP-5	100	81	9
LVTE-1	8	8	1
LVTR-1	3	3	0
LVTH-6	6	6	0
105MM H, TOW	48	48	4 NOTE-2
4.2" MORTAR	6	6	2
107MM HOWTAR	6	6	1
155MM H, TOW	12	12	1
155MM H, SP	18	18	2
155MM G, SP	6	6	1
8" HOW, SP	6	6	1
105MM H, SP	18	18	2
175MM G, SP	12	12	1

NOTE-1

Average daily deadline high due to mine damage of 5 M48A3 tanks.

NOTE-2

CG, III MAF msg 201108Z Mar 67 to CG, FMFPac requested action be initiated to provide immediate tube and breech mechanism requirements on priority basis by direct shipment to RVN.

TAB 5-Q

ARTILLERY TUBE STATUS

27 April 1967

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>AVERAGE REMAINING TUBE LIFE (%)</u>	<u>PROJECTED TUBE REQUIREMENT (12 MOS)</u>	<u>CURRENT TUBE AVAILABILITY (RVN)</u>
155mm How, Towed ML114	53	6	0
155mm How, SP ML09	50	21	12
155mm Gun, SP M53	67	17	18
8 th How, SP M55	25	6	0
105mm How	62.6	66	0 NOTE-1

NOTE-1

CG, MCSA Phila msg 291357Z Mar 67 to CG, MCSC Barstow requested shipment of 22 tubes 105mm How and 3 cannons 105mm How to FLC via priority 02 air transportation. Quantity of 26 tubes and 6 cannon to be shipped priority 02 surface. CG III MAF msg to CMC, 220600Z Apr 67 requested priority 01 air shipment of tubes and cannon assy directed for air delivery by the above 291357Z Mar 67.

TAB 5-R

DECLASSIFIED

3D MARINE DIVISION VEHICLE AVERAGE DAILY STATUS FOR APRIL

<u>VEHICLE TYPE</u>	<u>AUTH ALLOW</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>2D ECH D/L</u>	<u>3D ECH D/L</u>	<u>AVAIL</u>
TRK, 1/4T M422A1 (MITE)	485	489	16	63	410
TRK, 1/4T M38A1	111	115	3	3	109
TRK, M170 AMB	39	38	0	1	37
TRK, 1/2T M274A1 (MULE)	267	247	19	35	193
TRK, 3/4T M37 CARGO	171	121	7	10	104
TRK, 3/4T M43 AMB	21	18	0	0	18
TRK, 2 1/2T M35 CARGO	279	277	5	20	252
TRK, 2 1/2T M36 S/L CARGO	62	60	0	6	54
TRK, 2 1/2T M49 FUEL	33	28	0	0	28
TRK, 2 1/2T M50 WATER	1	1	0	1	0
TRK, 5T M51 DUMP	108	104	0	15	89
TRK, 5T M52 TT	47	25	1	2	22
TRK, 5T M54 CARGO	132	159	2	6	151
TRK, 5T M62/543	<u>22</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>19</u>
RECAPITULATION	1778	1702	53	163	1486

TAB 5-S

DECLASSIFIED

INITIAL ISSUE MULTIFUEL VEHICLES

VEHICLE TYPEM-35A2C 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T CARGO

284 ALLOCATED TO 3D MARDIV

	<u>3D MT BN</u>	<u>HQ 12TH MAR</u>	<u>1/12</u>	<u>2/12</u>
ALLOW	96	13	36	36
O/H UNIT	96	13	10	35
O/H FLC	0	0	26	0

CG FMFPac msg 120523Z Apr67 established planned distribution of multifuel vehicles.

	<u>THIRD MARDIV</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>WHEN</u>
M-49A2C 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T REFUELER	21	IAW DIV ALLOW	4th QTR FY67
M-51A2 5T DUMP	23	3D ENGR BN	4th QTR FY67
M-52A2 5T TRACTOR	3	3D ENGR BN	4th QTR FY67
M-54A2C 5T CARGO	33	9TH MT BN	FY 68
	6	3D ENGR BN	FY 68
M-543A2 WRECKER	22	IAW DIV ALLOW	FY 68

TAB 5-T

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CARRIER CARGO AMPHIBIOUS, TRACKED M-76

1. 3dMarDiv allocated 15.

2. Status:

<u>O/H</u>	<u>ORG D/L</u>	<u>3D ECH D/L</u>
15	7*	2

* Replacement tracks required. Additional 2 M-76's held FLSG-A Float.

3. Subject vehicles or replacement vehicles required for support of operations during next monsoon season.

4. Informal information received indicates 30 M-76's to be shipped to WESTPAC from MCSC, Albany, Georgia. Replacement vehicle M-116 (T116E1) estimated to be available period December 1967 - March 1968. (CG FMFPac msg 202201Z Mar67).

TAB- 5-U

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MEDICAL STATISTICSA. Casualty Admissions to the Sick List

Casualties admitted to the sick list are categorized into those derived from battle inflicted wounds or "Hostile" casualties and those resultant from illness and non battle induced injury or "Non-hostile" casualties. Hostile casualties are reported by the Casualty Reporting Officer of the Adjutant's Office, whereas non-hostile casualties are reported by the Division Surgeon. Statistics concerning non-hostile casualties are derived from review of daily reports of admission to the sick list from all units of the Division. The following are the monthly number of non-hostile admissions to the sick list:

Nov 1966 - 791
 Dec 1966 - 839
 Jan 1967 - 657
 Feb 1967 - 388
 Mar 1967 - 566
 Apr 1967 - 252 (1st 18 days)

It is of interest that the diseases most frequently causing non-hostile casualties have tended to be remarkably uniform throughout the period that this information has been gathered. These diseases are: Gastro-enteritis, Fevers (Of unspecified cause), Neuropsychiatric Complaints, Cellulitis (local streptococcal infection of the skin and subcutaneous tissues secondary to local abrasions, lacerations or fungal infections of the feet), Muscle Sprains, and dependent upon environmental conditions, Heat Exhaustion, Wet Foot Injury (Immersion Foot), Upper Respiratory Infection, and lastly, miscellaneous injuries, broken bones and non-hostile wounds. These diseases do not occur in any order of frequency, but they invariably comprise 40% of the total.

B. Statistics from the Collecting and Clearing Companies of the 3d Medical Battalion

At Phu Bai: Company "A" and Company "B" (-). This facility has approximately 114 beds. One ward of 10 beds has been allocated to the Civic Action Program and is used for Vietnamese patients. One ward of 10 beds has been specifically prepared for POW's. In preparation of these statistics the month of March was used.

Monthly Admissions: 450
 Monthly Transfers/Evacuations: 230
 Monthly Returned to Duty: 354
 Average Daily Census: 70
 Monthly Outpatients Consultations: 780

At Dong Ha: Company "D" (-) Rein. This facility has 30 beds. It is almost exclusively utilized for casualty care with casualties derived from the northern operations areas. It is frequently augmented by the hospital ship USS REPOSE/SANCTUARY and 903d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron in achieving further evacuation and provision of definitive care.

Monthly Admissions: 197
 Monthly Transfers/Evacuations: 75
 Monthly Returned to Duty: 110
 Average Daily Census: 18
 Monthly Outpatient Consultations: 1480

C. Malaria in 3d Marine Division

In I Corps, personnel having confirmed Malaria are hospitalized either at NSA Station Hospital, DaNang, or aboard the Hospital Ship. This fact makes it possible to acquire accurate information about each individual being admitted for Malaria. Because data is tabulated by unit, it is possible to determine the incidence of Malaria solely in the 3d Marine Division. With the cooperation of PMU, NSA, and the Hospital in USS REPOSE, an accurate determination of confirmed cases of Malaria solely in the 3d Marine Division is obtainable. Comparison of the numbers of proven cases solely in the 3d Marine Division personnel between 1966 and 1967 reveals the following:

	1966	1967
Jan	17	07
Feb	29	04
Mar	22	08
Apr	54	--

The decrease in number of cases could be attributed to many factors, but the late persistence of the monsoon rains would seem to be the primary one. A vigorous antimalarial campaign has already been initiated in the 3d Marine Division and the results of this hopefully will become evident in the future.

D. Neuropsychiatric Statistics

As noted previously, neuropsychiatric illness constitutes a comparatively common cause for admissions to the sick list. Information concerning outpatient treatments and disposition further provides an indication of the significance of this category of disease. The following information is presented for the first three months of this year:

	Outpatients	Admissions	Evacuated	Return to Duty
Jan	29	28	19	15
Feb	75	44	26	42
Mar	115	39	18	93

These data are only for 3d Marine Division personnel and do not reflect the total psychiatric work load. Included, are 3d Marine Division personnel who were operationally attached to the 1st Marine Division. "Evacuated" and "Returned to Duty" do not equal the "Admissions" category, for the daily NP census of hospitalized personnel is too variable and those evacuated prior to being held 24 hours cannot be counted as admissions.

DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTER 3/JUN/67
SEC 0-3 PHONE DRIVE COV
CWO

PRIORITY 010655 MAY 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV
INFO: CG III MAF
CG FLC
CG PHAW
CG FIRST ARVN DIV
ELEVENTH ENGR BN
FLSG "A"

//SECRET//

OPERATION CUMBERLAND

A. THIRD MARDIV OPO 22-67

1. REF A REPAIRS ADDRES DELETE 26TH MAR THROUGHOUT AND SUBSTITUTE 4TH MAR.
2. EXECUTE REF A AS MODIFIED BY THIS MSG.
3. D-DAY DESIGNATED 3 JUN 67.

GP-4

CCN


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DE Y14E AND ZDK NR 305

ZNY SSSSS
TO 020400Z MAY 67
FM TWELFTH MARINES
TO CG THIRD MARDIV
THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
INFO FOURTH BN TWELFTH MARINES

G-3

SECRET

OPERATION CUMBERLAND (U)

A. CG THIRD MARDIV OPO 22-67

B. CG THIRD MARDIV 310655Z (PAGEP)

C. CG THIRD MARDIV 260516Z MAY

1. THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES TAKE PARA 3E OF REF A AND REF B FOR ACTION

2. DIRMOUTH WITH FOURTH BN TWELFTH MARINES FOR PURPOSE OF OBTAINING

(S) OF REF A AND BRIEF ON PREVIOUS PLANS. FOR SUPPORT OPERATION CUMBERLAND.

3. ADVISE THIS HQ OF ANY REQUIRED ASSETS TO SUV THCS OPERATION IAW ANNEX E OF REF A.

4. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV: IN VIEW OF REF B REQUEST ADVISE STATUS OF REF C.

GP-4

BT

020400 Z

A-G-3, COE, cpy CEO, S/S, ade TP

NNNN

SECRET

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J
XMRXL ZCZC MFD 044IUTZCZC MFD 044
00 RUMHFL
DE RUMHMF 109 1221000
ZNY SSSSS

O P 021000Z MAY 67
FM CG III MAF
TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/NINTH ENGR BN
ZEN/ C CO ELEVENTH ENGR BN
INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMHFL/CG FLC
ZEN/ELEVENTH ENGR BN
ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
BT

SECRET

ASHAU VALLEY FIRE SUPPORT BASE

A. CG 3D MARDIV 240130Z APR 67 (PASEP)

B. 3D MARDIV COC 301215Z APR (NOTAL)

C. CG III MAF 131448Z APR (NOTAL)

1. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV, CONCEPT PROPOSED REF A FOR PHASE I AND
PHASE II OPNS APPROVED FOR EXECUTION AS SCHEDULED. PHASE III
OPNS REMAIN UNDER STUDY THIS HQS.

A. ASSET SITUATION. III MAF WILL PROVIDE ONE FORCE ENGR CO AND
ONE BRIDGE PLAT TO SUPPORT PHASE I AND PHASE II OPNS. TACTICAL

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 109 **SECRET**

FERRIES SHOULD BE UTILIZED ON SONG HUONG RIVER, IN LIEU OF
PROPOSED CLASS 25 FLOATING BRIDGE, UNTIL OBJECTIVE AREA IS
REACHED AND BRIDGE ASSETS REMAINING ARE KNOWN. ANY ADDITIONAL
ENGR SUPPORT REQUIRED MUST BE PROVIDED FROM ORGANIC RESOURCES.
INFANTRY FORCES REQUESTED MUST PRESENTLY BE PROVIDED FROM CUR-
RENT THIRD MARDIV ASSETS. 175MM GUN ASSETS WILL BE PROVIDED BY
III MAF FROM AN EXTERNAL SOURCE.

B. VERBAL CLEARANCE OBTAINED FROM CG I CORPS FOR AREA OF OPER-
ATIONS REQUESTED REF (B). REF (C) WILL BE REVISED ACCORDINGLY.
USO CONFIRMATION WILL FOLLOW. REAL ESTATE ACQUISITION NOT RE-
QUIRED. DIRLAUTH CG 1ST ARVN DIV.

2. FOR 9TH ENGR BN, BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY UP TO ONE CO (REIN)
TO PHU BAI TACR OPCON THIS HQS TO PROVIDE GENERAL SUPPORT 3RD
MARDIV DURING CONDUCT OPNS OUTLINED REF (A).

3. FOR C CO 11TH ENGR BN, PROVIDE ENGR/BRIDGING SUPPORT RE-
QUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH TASKS OUTLINED PHASE I AND PHASE II REF A.

OP-4

BT

SECRET

DRAFTER 3/HHS/dec
 SEC C-3 PHONE SHOVE 203
 CWO

immediate
 PRIORITY 02/2232 MAY 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: FOURTH MARINES

//SECRET//

CONTINUATION OF OPERATION SHAWNEE

1. CONCEPT FOR CONTINUATION OF OPERATION SHAWNEE IN HAY LANG FOREST AREA IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. D-DAY - 7 MAY.

B. D-3. UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS 2D BN, 14TH MAR WILL COMMENCE WESTERNLY MOVEMENT FROM VIC COORD YD 415276.

C. D-2

(1) 2D BN, 14TH MAR WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS AND WILL BE PREPARED AT FIRST LIGHT TO ATTACK AND SEIZE OBJ 2 (COORD YD 345290). UPON SEIZURE, 2D BN, 14TH MAR WILL COMMENCE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION TO NE.

(2) RADIO RETRANSMISSION FACILITY WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON HILL 222 (YD 393327).

(3) DET, 2D BN, 26TH MARINES WILL ASSUME DEFENSE OF 14TH MAR CP AND SUPPORT BASE COMPLEX, HILL 51 OUTPOST, AND RADIO RELAY SITE ON HILL 222.

D. D-DAY

(1) 2D BN, 9TH MAR WILL BE HELICOPTED FROM LZ ROBIN (YD 553328) TO LZ EAGLE (YD 266336) AND ATTACK AND SEIZE OBJ 1 (YD 289331) AND UPON SEIZURE WILL COMMENCE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION TO NE.

(2) ARTILLERY WILL DISPLACE TO VIC YD 379393.

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

encl 6

- B. D-1. ARVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE WILL BE HELILIFTED FROM LZ ROBIN
TO LZ MAGIE AND MOVE TO ASSIGNED OA AND CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS.
2. OPERATIONS OVERLAY BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

GP-1

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DRAFTER VHS/422
 SEC G-3 PHONE SHOE 203
 CWO _____

PRIORITY 212357 MAY 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: FOURTH MARINES
 INFO: CG FIRST MAW
 TWELFTH MARINES
 THIRD RECON BN
 TWO SIX MARINES

//SECRET//

CONTINUATION OF OPERATION SHAWNEE

A. YOUR 011400Z MAY 67 NOTAL/PASBP

1. CONCEPT SET FORTH REF A APPROVED HOWEVER SHAWNEE FORCES WILL BE REDUCED BY REDEPLOYMENT ON 5 MAY OF 2D BN (-), 26TH MARINES (LESS TWO REIN COMPANIES AND BRAVO OMD GRP) AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS TO BE DESIGNATED SEPARATELY. THE REMAINDER OF 2D BN, 26TH MARINES WILL BE REDEPLOYED FROM SHAWNEE AREA ABOUT 12 MAY.

GP-4

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 021352Z MAY 67
 HQ 3RD MARDIV
 HQ 3RD MARDIV

G-3 CMA.
 G-3A Advanced
 copy
 Plans

G-4

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN LINDIS
 THIS IS A PRACTICE NINE MESSAGE, CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/LINDIS
 STAFF AUGMENTATION, HQ THIRD MARDIV
 PLANNING IS CURRENTLY BEING ACCOMPLISHED LEADING TO A COMBINED
 STRONG POINT/OBSTACLE SYSTEM SOUTH OF THE DMZ. UNDER CURRENT
 GUIDELINES THE FORCES FOR EXECUTION OF THE US CONTRIBUTION WILL BE
 THE USMC REGT. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS TASK WILL CLOSELY APPROXIMATE
 PRACTICE

SWINE TASKS DEVELOPED IN DEC66 WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE
 LINEAR OBSTACLE WHICH HAS BEEN SCALED DOWN TO 15-18 KM.
 IF MARINE CORPS FORCES ARE TASKED WITH INITIAL RESPONSIBILI-
 TIES FOR PRACTICE NINE INSTALLATION, YOUR COMMAND WILL BE ASSIGNED
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXECUTION.
 USING THE PRACTICE NINE PLAN YOU NOW HOLD AS A BASIS FOR DETER-
 MINATION, REQUEST YOU PROVIDE PRIOR TO 5 MAY 67 RANK AND MOS BREAKDOWN
 FOR AN INCREASE OF THIRTEEN PERSONNEL (OFF AND ENL) TO YOUR HQ AS-
 SIGNED WITH THIS ADDITIONAL MISSION. PERSONNEL WOULD BE REQUESTED

UNCLASSIFIED 129 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN LINDIS
 AVAILABLE JUL 67.

021352 Z

LINDIS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

IF FORWARDED TO FOREIGN NATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 2

DRAFTER 3/HAS/tjh
 SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 3
 CWO

PRIORITY 03/6/19 MAY 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: TWO SIX MARINES
 THIRD ENGR BN
 ELEVENTH ENGR BN

//S E C R E T//

A SHAU VALLEY FIRE SUPPORT BASE

A. YOUR 172346Z APR 67 NOTAL/PASEP

B. MY 240139Z APR 67 NOTAL/PASEP

C. YOUR 021000Z MAY 67 PASEP

1. MY OP O 22-67 (OPERATION CUMBERLAND) WILL BE DISTRIBUTED 4 MAY. IT WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO REF A AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONCEPT SET FORTH REF B AND INFO OBTAINED THROUGH STAFF LIAISON.

2. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS COMMENCED IAW REF A AND B ON 27 APRIL. REQUIRED UP-GRADING OF ROUTE FROM ROUTE 1 TO SELECTED CROSSING SITE VIC (YD 756114) SHOULD BE COMPLETED 3 MAY. FERRY SITE W/RAFTS SHOULD BE COMPLETED 4 MAY.

3. SECURITY MISSION ASSIGNED HQ, 26TH MARINES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED USING 1ST BN, 26TH MARINES AND REQUIRED COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS. ENGINEERS EFFORT WILL CONTINUE CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY AVAILABLE, WITH FULL SCALE OPERATIONS COMMENCING UPON COMPLETION OF 1ST BN, 26TH MARINES MOVEMENT TO THIS AREA.

4. REF A INDICATED THAT THIS HQ WOULD BE ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUBJECT PROJECT. THEREFORE, REQUEST C CO, 11TH ENGR BN BE ASSIGNED OPCON THIS DIVISION IN LIEU OF SUPPORT ROLE CONTAINED REF C.

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

Encl 9

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5. REF B STATED REQUIREMENT FOR LSA IN OPERATING AREA TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS. ACTION ON THIS REQUIREMENT NOT INDICATED REF C., REQUEST ADVISE.

6. NEW BUT RELATED SUBJECT. THE PRACTICAL RESULT OF ASSIGNING C CO, 11TH ENGR BN TO THIS OPERATION IS TO ELIMINATE THE AREA ENGINEER SUPPORT FOR THIS DIVISION IN THE PHU PAI AREA. THEREFORE, REQUEST REDEPLOYMENT OF COMPANY FROM 9TH ENGR BN BE EXPEDITED.

GP-4

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NOT RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

FROM: CG THIRD MAJORITY
TO: CG III HAF

STAFF AUGMENTATION, NO. 30 MAR 64

1. HOUR 021352Z MAY 67

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN DPM 4 AND STAFF PAPER 1

WITH YOUR HQ, THE FOLLOWING STAFF AUGMENTATION IS RECOMMENDED:

THIS HQ IN CONNECTION WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF PRACTICE HERE:

0-15 8-60

1960

7210

ASSY PLANS 0

1000 9910 880 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 2400 2500 2600 2700 2800 2900 3000 3100 3200 3300 3400 3500 3600 3700 3800 3900 4000 4100 4200 4300 4400 4500 4600 4700 4800 4900 5000 5100 5200 5300 5400 5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 6700 6800 6900 7000 7100 7200 7300 7400 7500 7600 7700 7800 7900 8000 8100 8200 8300 8400 8500 8600 8700 8800 8900 9000 9100 9200 9300 9400 9500 9600 9700 9800 9900 10000

4910 482 1213 0

DATE: 11/11/69 PAGE: 0001

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Journal of Management Studies, 19(6), 701-718.

100-443887-1000

1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085 2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 2104 2105 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 2153 2154 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 2197 2198 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 2205 2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211 2212 2213 2214 2215

DATE: 11/11/2010 11:00 AM

1. The first group of people who are not in the labor force are those who are not in the labor force because they are not in the labor force. This group is the largest group of people who are not in the labor force.

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the *Agaricus bisporus* spores on the growth of *Agaricus bisporus* and *Agaricus bisporus* spores on the growth of *Agaricus bisporus* spores.

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2020 MFD 513
 PP RUMHDL
 DE RUMHMF 458 1271300
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 071300Z MAY 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/NINTH ENGR BN
 INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 REINFL/CG FLC
 ZEN/ELEVENTH ENGR BN
 ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
 BT

S E C R E T

ASPAU VALLEY FIRE SUPPORT BASE

A. CG 3D MARDIV 031619Z MAY (NOTAL)

1. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV, REF A REFERS.

A. ENGINEER CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS ICTZ MAKE IT NECESSARY THIS
 HQS RETAIN OPERATIONAL CONTROL "C" CO, 11TH ENGINEERS. EMPLOYMENT
 OF ENGR UNITS IN SUPPORT ROLL HAS PROVEN SATISFACTORY IN THE PAST.
 B. QUESTION RAISED PARA 5 REF A RESOLVED INFORMALLY BY III MAF AND
 THIRD MARDIV G-4 STAFF ACTION.
 C. SUBMIT LISTING OF CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY
 TO THIS HQS.

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 458 S E C R E T

2. FOR NINTH ENGR BN. DEPLOY ONE CO (-) (REIN) TO PHU BAI TAOR
 OPCON THIS HQS TO CLOSE PHU BAI ASAP. TASK ORGANIZE COMPANY PRIOR-
 ARILY FOR VERTICAL CONSTRUCTION IN SUPPORT OF III MAF REQUIREMENTS.
 REPORT INITIAL MOVEMENT THIS HQS. DIRLAUTH CG, 3D MARDIV.
 GP-4
 BT

BT

07/0728/MAY 67/Bin/MAF

A - 3/COE ste land M

MAR to chg Annex A to 22-67

1A

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
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by 101407Z*

DRAFTED 3/JUN/67
SEC G-3 PHONE SEVTE CPO
CWO

PRIORITY 071335Z MAY 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: TWENTY SIX MARINES *Yaman*
TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD RECON BN
FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ADA
THIRD ENGR BN
THIRD SP BN
THIRD TK BN
HQ BN
ELEVENTH ENGR
INFO: CG III MAF
THIRD MARDIV
CG FLC
PLSG A
CG DMAN
CG FIRST INF DIV ARVN



*Task org
May Day*

SINAGAS COG	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>Wor</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>B</i>
DOPO	<i>n day</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	

//SECRET//

OPERATION GIMBERLAND

A. THIRD MARDIV CPO 22-67

1. EXECUTE EFF A. D-DAY DESIGNATED 20 MAY 1967.

2. FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS ARE DIRECTED EFF 9 MAY 1967.

A. 3D SP BN PROVIDE JET SP BN (LSA/HST) AND SECTION AMTRAC (161VTC, 161VTC-1)

B. 3D TK BN PROVIDE PLAT TANKS DS.

C. HQ BN PROVIDE SUB TM 1ST CIT. *HIT*

GP-4

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
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DRAFTER 3/JH/jrh
 SEC -2 FROM SLOVE 3
 CHJ

IMMEDIATE 101407Z MAY 67

FROM: CG THIRD MAR DIV
 TO: TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 TWELFTH MAR
 THIRD RECON BN
 FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ADA
 THIRD ENGR BN
 THIRD SP BN
 THIRD TK BN
 HQ BN
 ELEVENTH MAR
 INFO: CG III MAF
 THIRD MAR DIV
 CG FLC
 FLSC A
 CG FMAW
 CG FIRST INF DIV ARVN



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OPERATION CUMBERLAND

A. CG 3D MAR DIV MSG 071335Z MAY 67

1. CANCEL REF (A).

GP-1

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ACTION	

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
all below

RELEASED BY ~~LT COL. H. E. MCKINNEY~~

DRAFTED BY H. E. MCKINNEY

PRIORITY 1101

FROM: TWO SIX MAR
TO: FIRST BN, TWO SIX MAR
CO C, ELEVENTH ENGR BN
THIRD SP BN
FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MAR
DELTA BTRY FIRST BN ADA AW, FOUR FOUR ARTY
FIRST CIT
SEVENTH ITT
INFO: CG THIRD MAR DIV
CG FIRST MAW
THIRD RECON BN
THIRD ENGR BN
ELEVENTH ENGR BN
TWELFTH MAR
MAG ONE SIX
THIRD BN, TWO SIX MAR
FIRST BN ADA AW, FOUR FOUR ARTY
NINTH KAB
THIRD MT BN
THIRD TK BN



SECRET

SUBJ: OPERATION CUMBERLAND

REF: (A) CG THIRD MARDIV 101407Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)
(B) MY 081150Z MAY 67

1. IAW REF A, CANCEL REF B.

GP-4

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
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
100 AS FOLLOWS

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AND NR 13 AND 14
 1962 MAY 67
 MARINES
 THIRD MARDIV
 MARDIV (REAR)
 NINTH MARINES
 BN THIRD MARINES
 BN NINTH MARINES
 BN TWELFTH MARINES
 A THIRD AT BN
 B THIRD TK BN
 BN NINTY FOURTH ARTY USA
 C FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY USA

SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 LOCATION:
 CO 3D MAR (YD066543)
 BA LONG (YD163397)
 1/3/9 (-) (YD166403)
 1/3/12 (YD166403)

WO Q32U S E C R E T
 C/1/44 ARTY USA (YD063551)
 5 (XD983544) W/PLT 1/3/3
 1/3/3 (-) (XD979568) W/PPB (XD967564)
 1/3 W/RF 123 (YD011458)
 1/3 (XD979545)
 (REAR) (YD063551)
 1/3/9 (-) W/RF 122 (YD094514)
 1/3/3 (-) (YD063551)
 PLT 1/3/3 (YD026562)
 CAC PLT NR 5 (YD097527)
 BA LONG NR 1 (YD157418), NR 2 (YD167394), NR 3
 (YD060555), AND NR 4 (YD158390); ROCKPILE (XD978559), NORTH HILL
 (YD060555), HILL 250 (YD069555), HILL 110 (YD065451), HILL 290
 (YD066502), HILL 55 (YD027563).
 SUMMARY OF OPNS:
 1. 1/3

(1) 1/3/3 SQD PTL IN GS (XD9656) (XD9657) IN GS
 (2) 1/3/3 SQD PTL IN GS (XD9654) (XD9655) (XD9656) (XD9657) (XD9658) (XD9659) (XD9660) (XD9661) (XD9662) (XD9663) (XD9664) (XD9665) (XD9666) (XD9667) (XD9668) (XD9669) (XD9670) (XD9671) (XD9672) (XD9673) (XD9674) (XD9675) (XD9676) (XD9677) (XD9678) (XD9679) (XD9680) (XD9681) (XD9682) (XD9683) (XD9684) (XD9685) (XD9686) (XD9687) (XD9688) (XD9689) (XD9690) (XD9691) (XD9692) (XD9693) (XD9694) (XD9695) (XD9696) (XD9697) (XD9698) (XD9699) (XD9700) (XD9701) (XD9702) (XD9703) (XD9704) (XD9705) (XD9706) (XD9707) (XD9708) (XD9709) (XD9710) (XD9711) (XD9712) (XD9713) (XD9714) (XD9715) (XD9716) (XD9717) (XD9718) (XD9719) (XD9720) (XD9721) (XD9722) (XD9723) (XD9724) (XD9725) (XD9726) (XD9727) (XD9728) (XD9729) (XD9730) (XD9731) (XD9732) (XD9733) (XD9734) (XD9735) (XD9736) (XD9737) (XD9738) (XD9739) (XD9740) (XD9741) (XD9742) (XD9743) (XD9744) (XD9745) (XD9746) (XD9747) (XD9748) (XD9749) (XD9750) (XD9751) (XD9752) (XD9753) (XD9754) (XD9755) (XD9756) (XD9757) (XD9758) (XD9759) (XD9760) (XD9761) (XD9762) (XD9763) (XD9764) (XD9765) (XD9766) (XD9767) (XD9768) (XD9769) (XD9770) (XD9771) (XD9772) (XD9773) (XD9774) (XD9775) (XD9776) (XD9777) (XD9778) (XD9779) (XD9780) (XD9781) (XD9782) (XD9783) (XD9784) (XD9785) (XD9786) (XD9787) (XD9788) (XD9789) (XD9790) (XD9791) (XD9792) (XD9793) (XD9794) (XD9795) (XD9796) (XD9797) (XD9798) (XD9799) (XD9800) (XD9801) (XD9802) (XD9803) (XD9804) (XD9805) (XD9806) (XD9807) (XD9808) (XD9809) (XD9810) (XD9811) (XD9812) (XD9813) (XD9814) (XD9815) (XD9816) (XD9817) (XD9818) (XD9819) (XD9820) (XD9821) (XD9822) (XD9823) (XD9824) (XD9825) (XD9826) (XD9827) (XD9828) (XD9829) (XD9830) (XD9831) (XD9832) (XD9833) (XD9834) (XD9835) (XD9836) (XD9837) (XD9838) (XD9839) (XD9840) (XD9841) (XD9842) (XD9843) (XD9844) (XD9845) (XD9846) (XD9847) (XD9848) (XD9849) (XD9850) (XD9851) (XD9852) (XD9853) (XD9854) (XD9855) (XD9856) (XD9857) (XD9858) (XD9859) (XD9860) (XD9861) (XD9862) (XD9863) (XD9864) (XD9865) (XD9866) (XD9867) (XD9868) (XD9869) (XD9870) (XD9871) (XD9872) (XD9873) (XD9874) (XD9875) (XD9876) (XD9877) (XD9878) (XD9879) (XD9880) (XD9881) (XD9882) (XD9883) (XD9884) (XD9885) (XD9886) (XD9887) (XD9888) (XD9889) (XD9890) (XD9891) (XD9892) (XD9893) (XD9894) (XD9895) (XD9896) (XD9897) (XD9898) (XD9899) (XD9900) (XD9901) (XD9902) (XD9903) (XD9904) (XD9905) (XD9906) (XD9907) (XD9908) (XD9909) (XD9910) (XD9911) (XD9912) (XD9913) (XD9914) (XD9915) (XD9916) (XD9917) (XD9918) (XD9919) (XD9920) (XD9921) (XD9922) (XD9923) (XD9924) (XD9925) (XD9926) (XD9927) (XD9928) (XD9929) (XD9930) (XD9931) (XD9932) (XD9933) (XD9934) (XD9935) (XD9936) (XD9937) (XD9938) (XD9939) (XD9940) (XD9941) (XD9942) (XD9943) (XD9944) (XD9945) (XD9946) (XD9947) (XD9948) (XD9949) (XD9950) (XD9951) (XD9952) (XD9953) (XD9954) (XD9955) (XD9956) (XD9957) (XD9958) (XD9959) (XD9960) (XD9961) (XD9962) (XD9963) (XD9964) (XD9965) (XD9966) (XD9967) (XD9968) (XD9969) (XD9970) (XD9971) (XD9972) (XD9973) (XD9974) (XD9975) (XD9976) (XD9977) (XD9978) (XD9979) (XD9980) (XD9981) (XD9982) (XD9983) (XD9984) (XD9985) (XD9986) (XD9987) (XD9988) (XD9989) (XD9990) (XD9991) (XD9992) (XD9993) (XD9994) (XD9995) (XD9996) (XD9997) (XD9998) (XD9999)

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PAGE THREE 0920 SECRET

(1) M/3/3 SQD PTL IN GS (XD9751) (XD9652) (XD9752)
 (2) (YD9653) (XD9753) (XD9853) (XD9854).

(1) L/3/9 2 SQD PTL IN GS (YD0750) (YD0850) (YD0950)
 (2) (YD0851) (YD0951), IN GS (YD0951) (YD1051) (YD0952)
 (3) (YD1053) (YD1153) (YD1253) (YD1354).

(2) L/3/3 SQD PTL IN GS (YD0155) (YD0255) (YD0156)
 (3) (YD0355) (YD0455) (YD0555).

(1) M/3/3 2 SQD PTL IN GS (YD0354) (YD0454) (YD0554)
 (2) (YD0654) (YD0754) (YD0854) (YD0954) (YD0656) (YD0756).

NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES: 1/3/9 1 USMC MED EVAC GUN SHOT
 KNEE. REF PARA 4.C.

ENEMY CONTACT: NONE

OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

LATE ENTRY 211030H M/3/3 PTL (XD961526) LOC FOOT PRINTS

ENEMY APPROX ONE HOUR OLD HEADING SOUTH. PTL CONDUCTED SEARCH
 W/NEG RESULTS.

211100H PLT L/3/3 AND ENGR BRIDGE/SWEEP TMS DEPARTED.

WENT WEST ALONG ROUTE 9 TO SWEEP ROAD AND INSTALL BRIDGE VIC

PAGE FOUR 0920 SECRET

092019) FOR ROUGH RIDER SCHEDULE 22 MAY.

211200H L/3/9 OF NR 1 (YD158417) 1 MARINE WOUNDED IN
 ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE OF M-16. SUBJECT MED EVAC. INVESTIGATION
 APPROPRIATE. RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED BY ADMIN CHANNELS.

211200H RF CO 256 COMPLETED DISPLACEMENT FROM BA LONG.

PLANS: MAINTAIN PRESENT PSN. CONDUCT PTL AND AMB IN ASSIGNED

PLANS: MAINTAIN PRESENT PSN. CONDUCT PTL AND AMB IN ASSIGNED

PLANS: MAINTAIN PRESENT PSN. CONDUCT PTL AND AMB IN ASSIGNED

PLANS:

CUMULATIVE LOSSES:

A. FRIENDLY

- (1) 6 KIA (1-3D MAR, 3-11TH ENGR, 2-USA)
- (2) 60 MIA (31-3D MAR, 25-11TH ENGR, 4 USA)
- (3) 0 MIA

B. ENEMY

- (1) 8 KIA (C), 22 KIA (P)
- (2) 21 DETAINEES (2 UNCLASSIFIED (1 VCS)
- (3) 0 PW (NVA), 1 PW (VC), 0 RET (NVA), 1 RET (VC),

CIVIL DEPENDENTS, 17 INNOCENT CIVILIANS

- (4) INDIV WPNS 9, CREW SERVED WPNS 0, TOTAL 9

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PAGE FIVE 092U S E C R E T

1. ARVN/USMC OPNS: NONE
8. RECOVERY OF US MATERIAL: NONE
9. SCOUT-SNIPER TMS: 3D MAR EMPLOYED 13 TMS:
 - A. 3 TMS W/CAC PLT NR 5
 - B. 3 TMS W/3/9
 - C. 7 TMS W/HQ 3D MAR
 - D. NEG REPORT

OPN HICKORY

SITREP NR 8 AS 211800H

1. UNIT LOCATIONS

CMP CRP 3/9 (-) (YD102640)

L/3/9 (YD100641) TO (YD101645)

K/3/9 (YD101645) TO (YD104644)

M/3/9 (YD104644) TO (YD100641)

2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL CMP GRP AND M/3/9 MOVED FROM NIGHT
 PSN TO PRESENT PSN. ARTY FIRED 7 MISSIONS APPROX 250 RDS. 3 FIXED
 WING AIR STRIKES. 4 ROTTERY WING STRIKES. 2 AO MISSIONS AND MED
 RESUPPLY MISSION. 3/9 UNITS ENCOUNTERED SPORADIC TO NVY AUTO.
 AND MORTAR FIRE. FROM ENEMY SIZE OF INDIVIDUAL SNIPER TO SMALL
 UNIT PROBES AND AMBUSHES. CAPTURED MATERIAL. FORWARDED

PAGE SIX 092U S E C R E T

TO G-2.

3. ENEMY CONTACT:

A. 211240H 3/9 CP (YD101640) ON DEPARTURE OF SECOND MED EVAC
 HELO. 3/9 CP AND LZ RECEIVED S/A, AUTO WPNS, FIRE AND 10 RDS MORTAR
 FIRE. 3/9 MOVED UNITS INTO DEF PSN. HUE GUN SHIP ON STATION. AIR
 SPACE CLEARED TO SOUTH AND ARTY MISSION FIRED.

B. 211330H M/3/9 (YD101640) SWEEP WHILE MOVING THROUGH
 LINE. MADE CONTACT W/ENEMY. RECEIVED NVY S/A AND AUTO WPNS,
 AND MORTAR FIRE PINNING ELEMENT DOWN. PLT OF M/3/9 MOVED TO ASSIST
 SWEEP ELEMENT. UNIT WITH DREW AND FIXING A/C AND HUE GUN SHIP
 PROVIDED SUPPORT. M/3/9 WILL CONTINUE SWEEP AFTER AIR STRIKES
 ARE COMPLETED. RESULTS 7 USMC KIA.

C. 211625H 3/9 CP (YD101640) RECEIVED 6 ADDITION MORTAR
 AND SNIPER FIRE.

4. OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

A. 211120H K/3/9 AND L/3/9 LINK UP VIC (YD014544). M/3/9
 CONTINUE MOVEMENT TO AREA.

B. 211205H (YD101640) 3/9 CMD GRP CLOSED W/M/3/9.

CUMULATIVE LOSSES AND CAPTURED MATERIAL AT THIS TIME IS -27 USMC
 KIA. 73 USMC KIA, 1 USMC MIA, 36 EN KIA (C), 8 EN KIA (P), 1

BT

FOR 21/4047/MAY 67/3MAY/2

A-6-3/COE

CFC/CF/5/ST

TP

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A circular clock face with numbers 1 through 12. In the center, there is a rectangular stamp that reads "RECEIVED" in a bold, serif font, with "A.M." written below it in a smaller font. The clock face is slightly tilted.

C. 211443H MED EVAC OF 4/3/9 PERSONNEL COMPLETED. 3D MAR
 AND REPORTED 72 VIA MED EVAC AT THIS TIME FOR 3/9 (-).
 D. 211530H MED EVAC OF ALL CASUALTIES FOR 3/9 (-) COMPLETED.

E. 211525H MED EVAC M/3/9 CASUALTIES COMPLETED.
F. 211545H 3/9 REPORTED 3 ADDITIONAL MIA NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. TOTAL OF MIA IS 4.
G. 211717H 3/9 - (C) SITREP REPORTED CUMULATIVES CASUALTIES AS LISTED IN PARA 6.
H. PLANS: MAINTAIN AND DEFEND PRESENT PSN. THROUGH THE NIGHT. SATURATE AREA WITH AIR AND ARTY THROUGH OUT THE NIGHT.
I. CUMULATIVE LOSSES:
A. FRIENDLY
(1) 27 KIA
(2) 96 MIA
(3) 4 MIA
B. ENEMY
(1) 43 KIA (C) 25 KIA (P)
(2) 0 DETAINEES
(3) 0 PW (NVA) 0 PW (VC) 0 RET (NVA) 0 RET (VC)
C. CIVILIAN DEFENDENTS 0 INNOCENT CIVILIANS
(4) INDIVIDUAL WPNS, 15 CREW SERVED WPNS 2. TOTAL 17.

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A. G. 3/1000 *app.* C. 10. 4/5, 4/5

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NIGHT POSITIONS -23 MAY

1. OPERATION HICKORY

1/9 CP YD 115702

A/1/9 YD 115702

O/1/9 YD 115702

C/1/9 YD 123687

2/9 CP YD 136671

H/2/9 YD 136671

E/2/9 YD 136671

E/2/9 YD 1366,6

E/2/9 YD 136656

1/6 ALL UNITS YD 146614

2/26 CP YD 096745

E/2/26 YD 094496

F/2/26 YD 115721

G/2/26 YD 095713

H/2/26 YD 104,22

I/2/26 YD 139742

E/2/26 YD 131740

F/2/26 YD 135,44

G/2/26 YD 145736

H/2/26 YD 144736

I/2/26 YD 091726

J/2/26 YD 092726

K/2/26 YD 085726

L/2/26 YD 083,30

M/2/26 YD 084740

IF 21 YD 137715

1/2 BN YD 137718

2/2 BN YD 217732

3/2 BN YD 237715

4/2 CP YD 101638

L/3/9 YD 098442

K/3/9 YD 105645

CO/2/9 YD 106643

Z. OPERATION BEAU CHANGER

1/2 CP YD 209231

A/1/9 YD 211712

B/1/9 YD 209231

C/1/9 YD 211712

2. NIGHT POSITIONS

1. ABN YD 190712

2. ABN YD 190712

3. ABN YD 190712

4. ABN YD 190712

5. ABN YD 190712


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7. ABN YD 190712


8. ABN YD 190712

9. ABN YD 190712

10. ABN YD 190712

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VZCZCVP A90100ZVA 3138V FMA923

PP RUHHVP

DE RUHNUAM 024 1490428

ZNY 00000

P 000428Z MAY 67

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

TO RUHQUAQ/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

INFO RUHHMF/CG III MAF

RUHQUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHQCF/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUHHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUHFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

BT

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DEAR BITE WAPS (U)

1. COMSEVENTHFLT 270914Z MAY 1967

IN TENTATIVE PLANS FOR SUPPORT OF L/F SCHEME OF MANEUVERS

WSSS OF REQUIRE ONE 5"/54DD IN DIRECT SUPPORT BLT 1/3.

SMB) OPERATION TO BE CONDUCTED ABT 2-12 JUN VICINITY

10-400 44-22-50E 14N REF A. DESIRE DD ON STATION BY 020000H.

WILL CONFIRM WHEN FIRM.

2. PRESENT PLANS INDICATE THAT AOA WILL EXTEND MAXIMUM OF

PAGE TWO RUHNUAM 024 SECRET

10000 METERS INLAND.

3. IF 5"/54DD NOT AVAILABLE ENTIRE PERIOD, REQUIREMENTS COULD
 BE MET BY MEANS EITHER 5"/38 OR 5"/54 DURING INITIAL STAGES
 OF BATTLE. PLUS ONE DAYS, THEN SHIFTING TO 5"/54 DD ABOUT
 4. PLUM 4.

BT-1 000000Z JUN 67

000000Z MAY 67/10000


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CONCEPT OF OPERATION, BLF ALFA

1. CONCEPT OF OPERATION TO 79.4 ON OR ABOUT 2 JUNE 67
2. TO 79.4 WILL LAND IN AREA BOUNDED APPROXIMATELY 6 KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH WEST AND 7 KILOMETERS SOUTH EAST OF THE HAI LANG AND PHONG DIEN DISTRICT BOUNDARY AND BOUNDED TO THE SOUTH WEST BY THE RIVER SONG O LAU AND SONG GIANG AND TO THE SOUTH EAST BY THE CHINA SEA.
3. TO 79.4 WILL CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN AREA OF OPERATIONS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY VC/NVA FORCES, INTERDICT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND TO PROVIDE BLOCKING POSITIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1ST ARVN DIVISION OPERATIONS IN THE HAI LANG DISTRICT.
4. EMPHASIS WILL BE CENTERED IN THE PHONG DIEN AREA VICINITY SONG O LAU RIVER WHERE VC/NVA ACTIVITY SUPPORTS ATTACKS ON RD PROGRAM.
5. 4TH MARINES WILL ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS ASTRIDE SONG GIANG AND SONG O LAU RIVERS EAST OF ROUTE 1 UTILIZING THEIR COMBAT POWER TO EXPLOIT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY AND TO PREVENT ENEMY FROM WITHDRAWAL TO THE NORTH WEST.
6. ON ORDER, 4TH MARINES WILL ASSUME OPCON BLT 1/3 AND CONTINUE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN GENERAL AREA OF OPERATIONS TO LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN THE PHONG DIEN AND HAI LANG DISTRICT AREA OF OPERATIONS

SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

101-200

29/0700Z/MAY 67/PWC

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
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30 MAY 67

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30 MAY 67

30 MAY 67

30 MAY 67

//COMM NOTE//

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SECRET OF OPERATIONS, SLF ALFA

THE FOLLOWING DATA IS SUBMITTED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IN CON-
JUNCTION WITH AMPHIBIOUS OP UTILIZING SLF ALFA ON OR ABT 2 JUN 67.

AREA OF OPERATIONS: AREA BOUNDED BY COORD (YD 508554) SOUTHEAST
TO COAST TO (YD597487), BY A LINE SOUTHWEST TO SONG L LAU (YD516
2, LINE NORTHWEST ALONG SONG O LAU/SONG O GIANG COORD (YD452435),
EAST TO COORD (YD508554).

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DE RUMHMF 2109 SECRET

SLF ALFA CONDUCT S AND D OPS IN AO TO LOCATE AND DESTROY VC/NVA
FORCES, INTERDICT EN LOC'S AND PROVIDE BLOCKING PSNS IN CONJUNCTION

WITH ARVN DIV OPS IN HAI LANG DIST.

EMPHASIS TO BE IN THE PONG DIEN AREA VIC SONG O LAU RIVER

AND VC/NVA ACTIVITY SPTS ATKS ON RD PROGRAM.

30TH MAR TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING PSNS ASTRIDE SONG GIANG AND SONG
RIVER EAST OF RT 1 TO EXPLOIT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY AND TO
PREPARE FOR WITHDRAWAL TO NORTHWEST.

30TH MAR AND BLY 1/3 CONTINUE S AND D OPS IN AO TO LOCATE, FIX

AND DESTROY EN FORCES IN PHUONG DIEN AND HAI LANG DISTRICTS IN AO.

PLANNERS REPORT TO 3D MARDIV CP EARLIEST 30 MAY FOR FORMULATION

OF PLANS.

21/2002-1 MAY 67/17/1005

C. C. - 3/100 - 1 copy & 2/5/5, CEO T.P.

29

SECRET

End 20

18

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NAVAL MESSAGE

OPNAV FORM 2110-28B (REV. 3-61)

S/N 0107-705-4200

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(when filled in)

RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY		PHONE EXT. NR.	PAGE	PAGES		
COL/REEL JAMES A. GILLO, JR.		MAJOR TAYLOR, JR.		614	1	OF 1		
DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY				
30 MAY 1967								
MESSAGE NR.	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION			XXXX			
		INFO			XXXX			

FROM: CTC SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

TO: RLE ONE SEVEN THREE
RLE T G SIX THREE

INFO: CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
COMUSMACV
CG MACV
COMUSMACV
COMUSMACVFLT
CG III MACV
CG THIRD MAR DIV
CG FIRST MAR
COMNAVFORV
CTC SEVEN SIX
CTC SEVEN NINE
CTC ONE ONE FIVE
CTC SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTC SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
CG FOURTH MAR DIV
CTC SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
CTC ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
USC OFTANAM
USC OFTANAM
USC OFTANAM
USC OFTANAM

*Bear Bite
File*

SECRET

CG SEVEN BEAR BITE

1. MORS: AMES BIRDS 7014 SHEETS 6442 I, II, III, AND IV

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(1) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

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				ACTION			
				INFO			
						PRIORITY	ROUTINE DEFERRED

(2) **ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION**
THE ENEMY

- (A) **DETERMINE IF ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT TO**
REINFORCE OR EXPILTRATE THEIR UNITS IN THE
AOA. IF SO, WHERE AND WHEN?
- (B) **DETERMINE IF THE ENEMY WILL EMPLOY MINES**
AND SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES. IF SO, WHERE
WILL THE MAJORITY BE LOCATED?
- (C) **DETERMINE IF THE ENEMY IS USING OUR AOA AS**
A SUPPLY BASE. IF SO, WHERE ARE HIS CASQUES
LOCATED?
- (D) **DETERMINE IF THE ENEMY HAS ARTILLERY AND**
MORTARS AVAILABLE TO HIS FORCES IN THE AOA.
IF SO, WHERE AND IN WHAT STRENGTH?

(3) **MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS,**
AND EQUIPMENT.

- (A) **CAPTURED PERSONNEL WILL BE SURVEILLED BY THE**
RLT. VCS AND POWS WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE

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			INFO						

SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

2. MISSION

SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA LANDS AND ATTACKS AT H AND L HOURS ON D-DAY TO CONDUCT THOROUGH AND DELIBERATE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FORCE BEACHHEAD. UPON COMPLETION OF THE MISSION OR WHEN ORDERED, EXECUTES ^{AN} AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL OR SUCH OTHER MISSION AS DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. OPERATION BEAR BITE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THREE PHASES.

- (1) THE INITIAL PHASE WILL INVOLVE LANDING BY HELICOPTER AND WATERBORNE MEANS IN DESIGNATED LANDING ZONES AND ACROSS THE DESIGNATED LANDING BEACH TO ESTABLISH THE LANDING FORCE ASHORE. ARTILLERY, MORTAR, AND TRACKED VEHICLE UNITS WILL BE LANDED ACROSS THE BEACH.

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				INFO						

- (2) THE SECOND PHASE WILL CONSIST OF THOROUGH SEARCH^R AND DESTROY MISSIONS ORIENTED TO THE WEST AND NORTH IN SECTORS IV AND VI TOWARDS BLOCKING POSITIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE 4TH MARINES AND ARVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE. THE FORCE LANDED BY WATERBORNE MEANS WILL CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSIONS IN SECTORS I AND II. (OPERATIONS OVERLAY).
- (3) THE THIRD PHASE WILL CONSIST OF AN AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL OR CONDUCT OF OTHER ASSIGNED MISSIONS WHEN ORDERED. TO BE ACCOMPLISHED ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

B. WLT 1/3

- (1) COMMENCING AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY, LAND ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ONE COMPANY BY WATERBORNE ASSAULT OVER ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ BEACH. SEIZE AND SECURE L F OBJECTIVE A. UNCOVER POSITIONS AND ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR ARTILLERY UNITS AND A LIMITED BSA. ON ORDER CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN ~~SECTORS~~ SECTORS I AND II.

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		ACTION				
		INFO				

- (2) COMMENCING AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY, LAND ONE COMPANY BY HELICOPTER IN LZ STARLING. SEIZE AND SECURE THE LANDING ZONE. COMMENCE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTOR V. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTORS VI AND VII ON ORDER.
- (3) UPON COMPLETION OF LANDING IN LZ STARLING, ONE COMPANY LAND BY HELICOPTER IN LZ BLUEJAY. SEIZE AND SECURE THE LANDING ZONE, COMMENCE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTOR VI. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTORS V AND VII ON ORDER.
- (4) ON ORDER, LAND ONE COMPANY BY HELICOPTER IN LZ PARTRIDGE. SEIZE AND SECURE THE LANDING ZONE. CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTOR IV. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTOR III.

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				ACTION					
				INFO					

(5) ESTABLISH A RIFLE PLATOON SIZED SPARROW HAWK
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

FORCE AS DIRECTED BY REF B ABOARD THE LPH.

~~XX~~

(6) ON ORDER, CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS OR ADMINISTRATIVE
~~MOVING READY~~
 WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FORCE BEACHHEAD, AS DIRECTED.

C. REF 263

(1) PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT IAW ANNEX C REF A AND BLT
 LANDING PLAN.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) REF B.
- (2) OPERATIONS OVERLAY (ISSUED SEPARATELY) (NOTAL).
- (3) MAP GRID DESIGNATOR IS YANKEE DELTA.
- (4) AOA ESTAB AS FOLLOWS. FM YD 512551 SOUTHWEST TO
 THE SONG O GIANG RIVER YD 492474 THEN ALONG THE
 EASTERN BANK OF THE SONG O GIANG TO JUNG SONG O
 GIANG AND SONG O LAU RIVER YD 474422 THENCE TO
 YD 481421 THEN GENERALLY ALONG LINE TO YD 520359
 THEN NORTHEAST TO YD 551391 THEN GENERALLY ALONG
 A LINE TO THE COAST AT YD 613474. BEACHED AOA

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CENTERED AT YD 565513 AND EXTENDING 25 KM. AIR AOA:

0 - 25000 FEET MSL OVER THE AOA AND TUNNELS FOR
PASSAGE OF CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC WILL BE PROHIBITED
BY NOTAM AS DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

(5) USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS IS AUTHORIZED FOR
TACTICAL OPERATIONS WITHIN THE AOA. DOWNING
HAZARD TO NONCOMBATANTS WILL BE MINIMIZED
CONSISTENT WITH TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS.

(6) D-DAY - 2 JUNE; L-HOUR - 0700; H-HOUR - 0700

(7) FIRE SUPPORT COORDIN. FOR IAW ANNEX F TO REF B
AND THE FOLLOWING:

(A) FRIENDLY FORCES.

1. SEE OPERATIONS OVERLAY.

(B) DELETE PARA 3.6 AND SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:

FIRE-ARRANGEMENT ON CALL FIDES ON BEACH AND HELI-
COPTER LANDING ZONES WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CLP
FOR COORDINATION WITH CATE.

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				INFO							

(C) 4TH MAR ESCO WILL BE LOCATED AT YD 547320.

NECESSARY COORDINATION WITH THE ARVN AND 3RD MAR DIV ESCO WILL BE EFFECTED THROUGH 4TH MAR ESCO. SELF LNO WILL BE CO-LOCATED WITH THE 4TH MAR ESCO (CALL SIGN DRUM BOY 70). REQ-UNITS FOR REINFORCING FIRES FROM 4TH MAR ARVN ASSETS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO DB 70 ON THE PSC LE NET.

(D) FIRES MEETING THE NECESSARY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MAY BE DELIVERED WITHIN THE ACA. FIRES, WHICH ARE TO BE DELIVERED INTO OR ACROSS OTHER HOSTILE ZONE OF ACTION WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE 4TH MAR (DRUM BOY 70) FOR CLEARANCE.

(E) NO REPEAT NO FREE FIRE AREA EXISTS WITHIN THE ACA. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ANNEX E) WILL BE STRICTLY ADHERED TO AND AS AMPLIFIED HEREIN.

(F) SAVE-A-PLANE INFORMATION WILL BE EXCHANGED WITH

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PHU HAI BASS (LANDSHARK CHARLIE). INFORMATION ON SAVE-A-PLANE CAN BE OBTAINED FROM HHC/TACC ON HD, TAD, AND TAR/TAC NETS.

- (G) ARTILLERY UNITS OPERATING WITHIN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO LANDING ZONES WILL ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE LANDING ZONE CONTROL ELEMENT AND WILL NOTIFY LZ CONTROL OF ALL FIRING ON A TIMELY BASIS.
- (H) A TACTICAL BOUNDARY WILL NOT BE ESTABLISHED.
- (I) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF WILL BE LOCATED AT SAOC.
- (J) OBSERVED ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE MAY BE DIRECTED AGAINST TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE AOA/TAC/OA WHICH ARE CLEARLY DEFINED AS HOSTILE WITHOUT OBTAINING PROVINCE CHIEF, DISTRICT CHIEF, SECTOR COMMANDER OR SUBSECTOR COMMANDER APPROVAL.
- (K) APPROPRIATE PROVINCE CHIEF, DISTRICT CHIEF,

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~~SECTION COMMANDER OR SUBSECTION COMMANDER~~

CLEARANCE IS REQUIRED BEFORE DIRECTING FIRE

ON TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY NOT CLEARLY DEFINED

AS HOSTILE.

- (1) ANY MISSION FALLING WITHIN 500 METERS OF SELF
BOUNDARIES WILL BE FORWARDED TO 4TH MARINE
BSCC FOR CLEARANCE.

- (2) SAVE-A-PLAN WARNING WILL BE SUBMITTED TO
PRU BAI BSCC IN THE FOLLOWING FIVE PART
FORMAT.

- 1 LOCATION OF FRIEND ELEMENTS (GRID SQUARES).
- 2 LOCATION OF TARGET (GRID SQUARE).
- 3 TIME COMMENCE FIRE.
- 4 TIME END OF MISSION.
- 5 MAKE-UP OF DATA.

EXAMPLE: SAVE-A-PLAN 30-1 A5404 24705

01200 D1230 25000 FT.

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		INFO					

(N) ~~SAVE-A-PLANE~~ WILL BE UTILIZED FOR ALL MISSIONS (DAY AND NIGHT) EXCEPT HAI FIRES. IN THE CASE OF NIGHT HAI FIRES A RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE NIGHTS FIRING WHEN THE MAXIMUM ORDNATE APPROACHES OR EXCEEDS 15,000FT. IN THIS EVENT SEPARATE ~~SAVE-A-PLANES~~ WILL BE PUBLISHED.

~~IN~~ (8) ARTILLERY IAW ANNEX H TO REF B AND THE FOLLOWING:

- (A) FRIENDLY FORCES, 3/12 (TIERCE).
- (B) A DAILY REPORT OF THE NUMBER OF 105 MM AND 107 MM RDS FIRED BY COMBAT R AND TYPE WILL BE ^B SUBMITTED TO SACG/FECC PRIOR TO 1400 EFFECTIVE FOR THE 24 HRS ENDING AT 1200.
- (C) REQUEST FOR SUPPORTING FIRES WILL BE SUBMITTED TO 4TH MARINES FECC (DPM 807 70).
- (D) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ANNEX E) WILL BE STRICTLY ADHERED TO IN THE DELIVERY OF ARTILLERY FIRES.

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		INFO					

(9) NAVAL CONFIRE IAW ANNEX H AND THE FOLLOWING:

(A) TASK ORGANIZATION - USS BIGELOW (DD 942),

D/S ALT 1/3.

(B) PRE/H-HOUR FIRED ON LANDING BEACHES AND

LANDING ZONES WILL BE PREPLANNED ON CALL.

(C) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ANNEX E) WILL BE

STRICTLY ADHERED TO IN THE DELIVERY OF BCF.

(10) REPORTS IAW ANNEX J REF B.

(11) CODE NAME OF OPN IS BEAR HITE.

(12) LANDING PLAN IAW ANNEX D REF B.

(13) CENTERED BLUE BEACH COORDINATES YD 565513.

(14) CENTERED LC COORDINATES:

PRIMARY

PARTRIDGE - 489465

STARLING - 519445

BLUEJAY - 524429

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PARROT - 511415

CANARY - 473439

HUMMINGBIRD - 497442

GROUSE - 506402

(15) REFERENCE POINTS:

<u>DAY</u>	<u>GRID</u>	<u>CODE</u>
D-1	5151	FLASH
D+1	5650	FRUIT
D+2	4849	BANKS
D+3	5448	MORTYER
D+4	5947	SPORTS
D+5	5047	DAYS
D+6	5246	DOGS
D+7	4845	TREES
D+8	5644	BOATS
D+9	5043	BOYS
D+10	5340	GIRLS

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ABOVE REFERENCE POINTS ARE EFFECTIVE COMMENCING

H/L HOUR D-DAY, AND WILL CHANGE DAILY 2400H, I.E.,

D+1 CODE EFFECTIVE 0001H.

(16) AIR OPED LAM ANNEX G REF B AND ANNEX H REF C.

~~REF~~(17) HELIO LANDING DIAGRAM TO BE ISSUED BY BLT AN
PORTION OF LANDING PLAN.

(18) REF B.

(19) SELF WILL PROVIDE LN O FOR BLT 1/3 TO BLT 2/4.

ALSO LN O TO 4TH MARINES FGCC. CALL SIGN AS PER
COI.

(20) AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL.

(A) REF 22(A)

(B) SELF PREPARES DETAILED PLAN

(C) CODE NAME - MOBILE TRAP

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A. AIRMAN AND LOGISTICS

A. AIRMAN AND LOGISTIC INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED HEREIN APPLY

EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW:

(1) SUPPLIES

- (A) COMMENCING 1 JULY 1 SUPPLIES WILL BECOME AVAILABLE FOR CLASSES I, III, IV AND V FROM THE LSA ESTABLISHED BY THE FOURTH MARINE.
- ONLY LIMITED CLASS II SUPPLIES SUCH AS BATTERIES, SALT TABLETS, HALIZONE TABLETS AND OTHER EXPENDABLES WILL BE AVAILABLE AT THE LSA.

(B) TAG-LOG

1. ALL 1/3 ESTABLISH TAG-LOG GROUPS ABOARD OF LHA-4, DULUTH, 3 MINUTE AND PT DEFIANCE (HEREINAFTER WHEN PT DEFIANCE RELIEVED).
 2. PT DEFIANCE DESIGNATED FOR UNTIL 1 JULY 1968.
- 40-10-10 THEN DULUTH UNTIL TERMINATION

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OF OPERATION

(C) RESUPPLY

FROM LSA AT FOURTH MARINES

1 ~~XXXXX/XXXXXXXXXX~~ COMMENCING DPLUS ONE. FIRST REQUESTS TO BE MADE
EVENING D-DAY.2 BLT 1/3 ESTABLISH LNO LIAISON AT LSA
PRIOR TO D-DAY. GUARD BLT TAC-LOG NET
COMMENCING H MINUTE 60 MINUTES.3 RESUPPLY REQUESTS DIRECT FROM BLT TO
LNO LIAISON AT LSA FOURTH MARINES OVER
TAC-LOG NET.4 ALL RESUPPLY TO BE DELIVERED BY HELICOPTER
TO BLT CP. UNIT DISTRIBUTION BY HELO
DIRECT FROM BLT CP WHEN PRACTICAL. REQUEST
TAC-LOG THROUGH TAC-LOG.5 EMERGENCY RESUPPLY ^{ITEMS,} CLAIM II ITEMS NOT
AVAILABLE FROM LSA, AND MAY BE ^{TO BE (OR MORE)} OBTAINED FROM ANDDISTRIBUTION:
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			ACTION							
			INFO							

SHIPS AS APPROPRIATE. REQUEST THROUGH TAG-LOG.

~~(REDACTED)~~

4 PRIMARY HELO SUPPORT FROM OKINAWA. NEAREST ALTERNATE
REFUELING POINTS PHU BAI AND/OR DONG HA.

(D) TAG-LOG REPORT DAILY BY 2000H AS OF 1800H QTY SUPPLIES (ALL
CLASSES) ISSUED HLT FROM SHIPS. INDICATE LFORM/OTHER SUPPLIES
SEPARATE FROM HLT STOCKS. FOR AMMO ISSUES REPORT QTY BY SHIP,
DORMAC AND HOKEN.

(E) CAPTURED PARASUTTS WILL BE REPORTED TO CTC 79.4 IMMEDIATELY.
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE ISSUED.

(2) EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

(A)

~~(REDACTED)~~ EVACUATION.

- 1 OKINAWA DESIGNATED CREW
- 2 ALL KIA'S TO OKINAWA.
- 3 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HELOS IN LZ USING LZ CONTROL NET M442
FREQ 35.2. ALTERNATE IS TAGP LOCAL NET T-21 FREQ 34.5.
- 4 LOST AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS ARE EVACUATED

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			ACTION						
			INFO						

5TH CANTON, TO OKINAWA.

(b) 5 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES TO RVN HOSPITAL QUANG TRI.
RETRICALIZATION. AS REQUESTED BY CECO.

(C) CASUALTY REPORTING.

1 SELF-ASSESSMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR CASUALTY REPORTING.

2 CASUALTY LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES AS APPOINTED AT ALPA AND
PHU HAI TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON MIA EVAC FOR FORWARDING
TO TC 79.4 CROC ON OKINAWA. JACS LIAISON WILL COORDINATE
RECEIVING MIA'S FROM OKINAWA AND FORWARDING OF DATA TO FIRST
MED BN GRAVES REGISTRATION.

3 CASUALTY CASES OF PERSONNEL - ITH MINOR HOSTILE AND NON-
HOSTILE - WOUNDS AND INJURIES, 1 - REPORTED TO DPM - WITHOUT
EVAC, - WILL BE SUBMITTED TO TC 79.4 JCRC FOR REPORTING.

(3) CIVIC ACTION. MINIMAL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM ANTICIPATED PROVIDED TACTICAL SITUATION DICTATES. FORD CAP PROGRAM AND ELIMINATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE RULE MATERIAL. RECOMMENDED.

(4) L.O. TALL GROUP 79.4 PHOTO/JOURNAL 7 WILL ACCOMPANY THE BLP

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NAVAL MESSAGE

OPNAV FORM 2110-28B (REV. 3-61)

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				ACTION					
				INFO					
				OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		PRIORITY		ROUTINE	
								DEFERRED	

(5) SERVICE

- (A) AUTHORITY GRANTED TO DRAW FROM LUNCH/OWNERS ACCOUNTS, CLOTHING BLACK AND LNU REPAIR BLACK COMMUNICATING D PLUS ORG. ISSUE ONLY WHEN COMBAT ESSENTIAL.
- (B) LIMITED MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE THROUGH LNU ORGANIC TO AIT. REQUEST THROUGH TAG-LOG.
- (C) OKINAWA PROVIDES 451 BT Y CHARGER SERVICE.

5. CMD AND CONTINGENT

A. CMD POST

(1) AFLOAT

CTG 76.4	USS OKINAWA
CT 79.4	USS OKINAWA
BLT 1/3	USS OKINAWA
BSF 263	USS OKINAWA

(2) AIRBORNE REPORT LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.

B. COMMUNICATIONS. IA: ANNEX L REF B AND COL/BREVITY CXL 5 (ISSU 7 SEP).


C. CMD

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SECRET

VEOZCVPA204MMZVA 860

YVV MEA 886VV UAN392

RUMHVP

RUMZGFM 042 1500954NH

ZNY SSSSS

000954Z MAY 67

CG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHMF/CG III MAF

RUP/CG THIRD MARDIV

CG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

SECRET

SECTION BEAR BITE

TAC REQUIRED

1. 2 VMA/VMFA ON STATION D-DAY AT H/L-15 TO RELIEVE ON STATION
H/L PLUS 180.2. 2 VMA/VMFA ON CONDITION III (15 MINUTES) FROM H/L PLUS
THILL TERMINATION OF OPERATION.D-DAY TENTATIVELY ESTD 2 JUNE, H/L HOUR 0700H. D-DAY AND H/L
WILL BE CONFIRMED.

REQUEST POLFIRMATION ASAP.

30/17 3721 MAY 67/12-3

300954

G-3, COE copy C EO, Ade TC

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1stCIT/3dMarDiv
Phu Bai, SVN

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 31 MAY 1967

MAP REFERENCE: AMS Series L 7014 and L 7015

ENCLOSURES: (1) NVA/VC incidents for month of May 1967
(2) Reported NVA/LF/MF unit locations during the month of May 1967

1. MISSION. At the present time the Viet Cong are concentrating their efforts on rice collection and regaining lost territory. By increasing mortar and mining activity, the Viet Cong hope to contain American and ARVN forces, putting us on the defensive with perimeters and leaving the rural farm areas open for them to exploit. This also gives them the opportunity to operate more freely in the villages to regain or retain the support of the people, by choice or force.

2. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Composition. 122d Regiment (AKA 6th Regiment, 56th Regiment, 106th Regiment, Yen The Regiment, and Nam Tien Regiment), 1st Regional Force. This Regiment is responsible for area D.8, which consists of Phu Thu, Phu Vang, Phu Loc, Vinh Loc and Huong Thuy Districts. Units of the 122d Regiment and their areas of responsibility are as follows:

- 032d Bn (AKA: 202dBn, 402dBn, 804thBn) - This Battalion has the responsibility for Huong Thuy (D) and is supported by the A204/SC mortar company.

- 034thBn (AKA: 404thBn, 604thBn, 808thBn) - This Battalion has the responsibility for Phu Thu (D) and Phu Vang (D) and is supported by the AZ02/SC mortar company.

- 036thBn (AKA: 606thBn, 806thBn, 810thBn) - This Battalion has the responsibility of the Phu Loc (D) and Vinh Loc (D) and is supported by the AZ06/SC mortar company.

- Other units of the 122d (area of responsibility unknown) are:

- A.11 Assault Company
- A.22 or A.12 Assault Company
- Grey Tiger Unit #57 - reportedly was separate and had been operating in Phu Thu (D), but has just joined the 122d Regiment. Also reported as "heavy gun" unit. Strength of about 300 men.

- Sabotage Company
- Intelligence Platoon
- Song Lo Junk Fleet
- Commo-Liaison Platoon

- Weapons as of 1 April 1967:

- 140mm Rockets - 10 (to be turned over to K-400 Company during May)

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1stCIT/3dMarDiv
Phu BaiINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 31 MAY 1967

- 57mm RR (ChiCom) - 14
- 82mm Mortars (ChiCom) - 16
- 81mm Mortars (ChiCom) - 18
- 60mm Mortars (ChiCom) - 35
- B-40's (Czech) - 24
- 50 cal. MG (Russian) - 28
- 30 cal. MG (Russian) - 26
- BAR's (Russian) - 42
- AR 24's (ChiCom) - 43
- K-44 (ChiCom) - 52
- TK-50 (ChiCom) - 58
- AK-47 (Russian) - 54

- Also units have individual weapons.

- Strength as of 5 May 1967:

- 032dBn - 1,140
- 034thBn - 1,158
- 036thBn - 1,210
- AZ02 Mortar Company - 265
- AZ04 Mortar Company - 248
- AZ06 Mortar Company - 277
- A.11/A.22 Assault Company - 345
- Sabotage Company - 244
- Song Lo Junk Fleet - 73
- Grey Tiger #57 - 300

Intelligence Apparatus:

- Agents: K-11, K.22, K.33 (Phu Bai), K.44, K.55, K.66 (VOA), K-77 (VOF)
- Systems: ZQM and QXM (nfi)

- Regimental Headquarters is located in a one (1) km tunnel. Entrances at vicinity of Dong Gi sub-hamlet (YD872237) and Quang Xuyen (H) Market Place (YD886247).

- K-400 Company: This company is supposedly now to have 122mm Rockets and 140mm Rockets in support of the 122d Regiment and 420th Regiment in Thua Thien (P).

- 420th NVA Regiment (AKA: 555thRegt, 602dRegt, Truong Chinh Regiment, Lau Thuy Regiment) 99th NVA Division.

- This Regiment is responsible for area D.7, which consists of Nam Hoa (D), Phong Dien (D), Huong Tra (D), Quang Dien (D) and Huong Dien (D).

- This unit infiltrated into Thua Thien (P) during May 1967.

- Units that are known are the 292d Battalion, 393d Battalion and 494thBn.

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1stCIT/3dMarDiv
Phu BaiINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 31 MAY 1967

- This Regiment is to work in conjunction with the 122d Regiment.
- As of April 1967, the 122d and 420th Regiments were to be part of the 551st Division.
- Recent reports have stated that the 802dBn and 804thBn, 6thRegt, have linked together to form the 808thBn, 6thRegt.
- Recent reports indicate that the 122d and the 420th Regiments are to be re-trained in the forth coming dry season in the use of new types of weapons. Will organize an anti-aircraft unit and will prepare anti-tank defenses prior to an all out attack in the future.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

- The enemy is presently capable of launching ground attacks on CAC units, RD Teams, District Headquarters etc. These potential ground attacks could be supported by a large assortment of rockets and mortars, enabling them to cause considerable damage. In addition, they have proven that they can mine the highway and destroy bridges from the Hue City to Danang areas almost at will.

- Bridges are especially susceptible because of increasing reports concerning "Frogman" training and NVA Engineer companies with demolition capabilities. A large scale attack on an installation such as Phu Bai would be possible if enemy forces in this area were consolidated and could obtain logistical support, specifically mortar and rocket ammunition.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

- One (1) North Vietnamese Army (NVA)/Viet Cong (VC) Division (-) is presently located in Thua Thien Province.

- One (1) Regiment (+) is located between Hue City and Quang Nam Province. This Regiment (+) is composed of Main Force/Local Force and North Vietnamese units. Although crew served weapons such as rockets and mortars are organic to this regiment, approximately one-third (1/3) of the local force units do not have a sufficient supply of ammunition.

- If the enemy plans on launching a full scale rocket and mortar attack within the province, it is possible that a ground attack may be launched on key districts and installations to complete their spring/summer campaign.

- There has been a noticeable increase in enemy truck traffic in the vicinity of the Laotian border. Because of this, it is possible that there are large amounts of supplies and troops presently located in the South western jungle area of Nam Hoa District.

- Since 152mm Howitzers have been used north of Dong Ha, it is possible that these weapons have been brought in Southwest Nam Hoa (D) over the Laotian border.

- It has been reported in the past that there has been heavy troop movement through Nam Hoa (D) from Quang Tri (P) to Phu Loc (D). In addition to being an infiltration area, it is very probable that there are many production centers and supply drums in this area.

- Reports indicate that the 122d Regiment and the 6th Regiment are one

1stCIT/3dMarDiv
Phu Bai

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 31 MAY 1967

and the same. It has also been indicated that units of this regiment change their designation each time they move to a new area.

5. COMMENTS:

- The information reported herein was obtained through the resources of the following agencies: Census Grievance Committee, National Police, ARVN Sector, (Thua Thien), S-2 Sector (USA, Thua Thien), and the 1st Counterintelligence Team.

- Enclosure (1) denotes for informational purposes NVA/VC incidents during the month of May 1967.

- Enclosure (2) contains a listing of reported locations for specific NVA/MF/LF units during May 1967

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















VC/NVA INCIDENTS FOR MONTH OF MAY 1967

	Ambushes	Attacks (Large)	Attacks (Small)	Assassinations	Harassment (Hamlet)	Harassment (Fire)	Kidnapping	Mines	Sabotage	Propaganda	AA Fire
PHONG DIEN		2	1	3(1)	2	13		5			1
QUANG DIEN	1	1				3	1(1)	2			
HUONG DIEN		1		1(1)		2					
HUONG THUY				3(3)	2	5		2			
HUONG TRA			1			3	4(7)	2			
NAM HOA				1(1)		2		1			1
PHU LOC			3	1(1)		4		13			
PHU VANG							1(2)				
PHU THU			1	1(1)		4	1(2)	2			
VINH LOC		NONE									

Numbers in parentheses indicate actual number of persons involved

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REPORTED NVA/LF/MF UNITS LOCATION DURING THE MONTH OF MAY 1967

UNIT DESIGNATION	COORDINATES	UNIT DESIGNATION	COORDINATES
C 118 	ZC 1595	800 I 	YD 5942
802 	ZC 0591	806 I 	YD 5942
804 III 	YD 9615	806 II 	YD 5343
C 117 	YD 8824	806 III 	YD 5343
C 116 	YD 8420	C 113 	YD 5147
C 119 	YD 7812	800 	YD 6022
C 114 	YD 7230	800 II 	YD 6022
K 105 	YD 7230	800 IV 	YD 6022
K 106  810	YD 6333	6th Regt 	YD 4821
K 107  810	YD 7230	806 	YD 4326
K 109  810	YD 7230	806 IV 	YD 4326
C 115 	YD 6520	804 IV 	Phu Loc (?)
800 III 	YD 5942	AZ04 (122Regt)	YD 7813
804 I 	YD 8720		


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COC

0310054Z MAY 67
 71 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 20 ZEN/FLT ONE SLANT THREE
 ZEN/HMM TWO SIX THREE
 INFO RUHHNQA/
 AZW 333

687-71, ((:8,:0-:1)5
 47.-/COMUSMACV
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC
 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUHHMF/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV
 RUMHAW/CGIFIRST MAW
 RUMFKB/COMNAFGRV
 ZEN/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUABJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMHPA/CO FORTH MARINES
 RUMFKB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR



TWGE TWO RUABJG 006 S E C R Z T
 RUMGJAG/CTG SEVEN ZERO EIGHT
 RUMFKB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 IT

S H E C R E T

OPERATION HEAR BITE (U) SECTION ONE OF THREE

A. MAPS: AMS SERIES 7014 SHEETS 6442 I, II, III, AND IV

B. CTG 79.4 CPLAN 120A-67

C. CTG 76.4 OP ORDER 309-67

D. COMSEVENTHFLT 270914Z MAY 67 (INITIATING DPR)

E. 3RD MARHDIV OP ORDER 29-67 2 (S) (NOTAL)

F. CTG 79.4 INTELL ESTH (NOTAL)

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

SCOPE: THIS IS CTG 79.4 FRAG ORDER ONEHYOPPLEMENTING REF A FOR
 CONDUCTING OPERATION HEAR BITE. IT IS DERIVED FROM REFS B, C,
 AND D. ANNEX A (OPERATIONS OVERLAY) (ISSUED SEPARATELY) (NOTAL)
 TASK ORGANIZATION

CTG 79.4

FLT ONE SLANT THREE
 HMM TWO SIX THREE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUABUM 006 SECRET

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES

(1) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

(2) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

(A) DETERMINE IF THE ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT TO REINFORCE OR INFILTRATE THEIR UNITS IN THE AOA. IF SO, WHERE AND WHEN?

(B) DETERMINE IF THE ENEMY WILL EMPLOY MINES AND SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES. IF SO, WHERE WILL THE MAJORITY BE LOCATED?

(C) DETERMINE IF THE ENEMY IS USING OUR AOA AS A SUPPLY BASE. IF SO, WHERE ARE HIS CACHES LOCATED?

(D) DETERMINE IF THE ENEMY HAS ARTILLERY AND MORTARS AVAILABLE TO HIS FORCES IN THE AOA. IF SO, WHERE AND IN WHAT STRENGTH?

(3) MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND EQUIPMENT.

(A) CAPTURED PERSONNEL WILL BE SCREENED BY THE 4TH MARS. VCS AND POWS WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE 4TH MARINES CP.

(B) CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, WILL BE DIRECTED TO THIS HQ.

PAGE FOUR RUABUM 006 SECRET

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) "IN-COUNTRY" SUPPORTED COMMAND PROVIDES INTELLIGENCE OF AOA AND REQUIRED LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

(2) CG FIRST MAW PROVIDES CAS AND OTHER AIR SUPPORT AS REQUESTED.

(3) 1ST DEN DIVISION CONDUCTS COORDINATED OPERATION WITH AIRBORNE TASK FORCE NORTH OF THE AOA.

(4) 4TH MARINES (MITUIDOXREIN) CONDUCTS BLOCKING OPERATIONS WEST AND SOUTH OF THE AOA.

(5) US SEVENTH FLEET PROVIDES NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. ED

GOYWP C1

HE FIVE PT ONE PROVIDES MARKET TIME SUPPORT, 76178436. (

2. MISSION

SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA LANDS AND ATTACKS AT H AND L HOURS ON D-DAY TO CONDUCT THOROUGH AND DELIBERATE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FORCE BEACHHEAD. UPON COMPLETION OF THE

EED

MISSION OR

IF ORDERED, EXECUTES AN AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL OR OTHER MISSION AS DIRECTED BY CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

SECRET

SECRET

EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. OPERATION BEAR BITE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THREE PHASES.

(1) THE INITIAL PHASE WILL INVOLVE LANDING BY HELIBORNE AND WATERBORNE MEANS IN DESIGNATED LANDING ZONES AND ACROSS THE DESIGNATED LANDING BEACH TO ESTABLISH THE LANDING FORCE ASHORE. ARTILLERY, HOWTAR, AND CRACKED VEHICLE UNITS WPG. BE LANDED ACROSS THE BEACH.

(2) THE SECOND PHASE WILL CONSIST OF THOROUGH SEARCH AND COMMISSIONS ORPENTED TO THE WEST AND NORTH INHYZCOORS IV, ANDHVI TTWARD SHBGCKING POSITIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE 4TH BATTALIONS AND ARVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE, THE FORCE LANDED BY HELIBORNE MEANS WILL CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSIONS IN SECTORS I AND II. (OPERATIONS OVERLAY).

(3) THE THIRD PHASE WILL CONSIST OF AN AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL OR CONDUCT OF OTHER ASSIGNED MISSIONS TO BE COMPLETED WHEN ORDERED.

ELT 1/3

(1) COMMENCING AT H HOUR ON D-DAY, LAND ONE COMPANY BY HELIBORNE ASSAULT OVER BLUE BEACH. SEIZE AND SECURE LPH.

SIX RUABUM 006 SECRET

RECEIVEHW. UNCOVER POSITIONS AND ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR ARTILLERY UNITS AND A LIMITED BSA. ON ORDER CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTORS I AND II.

(2) COMMENCING AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY, LAND ONE COMPANY BY HELICOPTER IN LZ STARLING. SEIZE AND SECURE THE LANDING ZONE. COMMENCE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTOR V. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTORS VI AND VII ON ORDER.

(3) UPON COMPLETION OF LANDING IN LZ STARLING, LAND ONE COMPANY BY HELICOPTER IN LZ BLUEJAY. SEIZE AND SECURE THE LANDING ZONE, COMMENCE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTOR VI. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTORS V AND VII ON ORDER.

(4) ON ORDER, LAND ONE COMPANY BY HELICOPTER IN LZ BLUEJAY. SEIZE AND SECURE THE LANDING ZONE. CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTOR IV. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SECTOR III.

(5) ESTABLISH A RIFLE PLATOON SIZED SPARROW HAWK FORCE AS ORDERED BY REF B ABOARD THE LPH.

(6) ON ORDER, CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS OR ADMINISTRATIVE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE SEVEN RUABUM 006 S E C R E T
 WITHDRAWN 149. 5 3 194:3 73-: 3-S, AS DIRECTED.

G. HMM 263

(1) PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT IAWHANNEX G REF A AND ELT LANDING

PLAN.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) REF B.

(2) OPERATIONS OVERLAY (ISSUED SEPARATELY) (NOTAL).

(3) MAP GRID DESIGNATOR IS YANKEE DELTA. (

(4) ACA ESTAB AS FOLLOWS. FM YD 512551 SOUTHWEST TO THE
 SONG O GIANG RIVER YD 452474 THEN ALONG THE EASTERN BANK OF THE
 SONG O GIANG TO JUNC SONG O GIANG AND SONG O LAU RIVERS YD
 474422 THENCE TO YD 481421 THEN GENERALLY ALONG LINE TO YD 520359
 THEN NORTHEAST TO YD 551391 THEN GENERALLY ALONG A LINE TO THE
 COAST AT YD 613474. SEAWARD AC-CENTERED AT YD 565513 AND EXTENDS
 25 KM. AIR ACA: 0 - 25000 FEET MSL OVER THE ACA, TUNNELS FOR
 PASSAGE OF CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC WILL BE PROMULGATED BY NOTAM AS
 DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV.

BT

0300593/5067/Dec/DOB
 C-3/000, copy CEO, Adc *md*

SECRET

SECRET

TO: WASHDC

TK00013Z KA 222

FM: JAGM 025 1510131

INFO: JAGM 025

SUBJECT: MAY 67

RE: SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RE: SEVEN ONE SLANT THREE

RE: TWO SIX THREE

INFO: RUMHHQA/CINCPAC

INFO: PACAF/CINCPACFLT

INFO: CINUSMACV

INFO: FMFPAC

INFO: COMPHIBPAC

INFO: COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO: III MAF

INFO: THIRD MAR DIV

INFO: PIR

MAW

INFO: COMNAVFORV

INFO: SEVEN SIX


INFO: SEVEN NINE

INFO: SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

INFO: FOURTH MARINES

INFO: ONE ONE FIVE

INFO: SEVEN SIX PT FOUR



FM: JAGM 025 WS E C R T S E C R E T

RE: SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

INFO: ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

INFO: SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

SUBJECT:

RE: BEAR BITE (KU) FINAL SECTION OF THREE

(2) EMPHASIZE INDIVIDUAL DISPERSION.

INFO: AND LOGISTICS

ADMIN LOGISTIC INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REF B APPLY EXCEPT

AS NOTED BELOW:

(1) SUPPLIES

(A) COMMENCING D PLUS 1 SUPPLIES WILL BECOME AVAILABLE

ASSETS I, III, IV AND V FR

ESTABLISHED BY THE

FOURTH MARINES. ONLY LIMITED CLASS II SUPPLIES SUCH AS BAY ERIES,

CIGARS, HALIZONE TAPS AND OTHER EXPENDABLES WILL BE

AVAILABLE AT THE LSA.

CINCPAC-LOG

INFO: 1 FLT 143 ESTABLISH TAG-LOG GROUPS ABOARD OKINAWA,

REARMOBILE AND PT DEFIANCE (HERMITAGE WHEN PT DEFIANCE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUABDJN 025 S E C R E T

2 PT DEFIANCE DESIGNATED PCS UNTIL D PLUS TWO THEN
 RESUME UNTIL TERMINATION OF OPERATION

(C) RESUPPLY

1 FROM LSA AT FOURTH MARINES COMMENCING

B PLUS

THE FIRST REQUESTS TO BE MADE EVENING D-DAY.

2 BLT 1/3 STABLISH LSU LIAISON AT LSA PRIOR TO
 D-DAY. GUARD BLT TAC-LOG RE COMMENCING H MINUS 60 MINUTES.

3 RESUPPLY REQUESTS DIRECT FROM BLT TO LSU LIAISON
 AT LSA FOURTH MARINES OVER TAC-LOG NET.

4 ALL RESUPPLY TO BE DELIVERED BY HELICOPTER TO

BLT CP. UNIT DISTRIBUTION BY HELO DIRECT FROM BLT CP WHEN
 POSSIBLE. REQUEST HELO THROUGH TAC-LOG.

5 EMERGENCY RESUPPLY ITEMS, CLASS II ITEMS NOT
 AVAILABLE FROM LSA, AND WA-

ER TO BE DELIVERED FROM ARG SHIPS
 IF APPROPRIATE. REQUEST THROUGH TAC-LOG.

6 PRIMARY HELO SUPPORT FROM OKINAWA. NEAREST ALTERNATE
 REFUELING POINTS PHU BAI AND/OR DONG HA.

(C) TAC-LOG REPORT DAILY BY 2000H AS OF 1800H QTY
 OF ALL CLASSES ISSUED BLT FROM SHIPS. INDICATE LFORM/OPRES
 SEPARATE FROM BLT STOCKS. FOR AMMO ISSUES REPORT QTY BY

SECRET

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NAME'S REGISTRATION.

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SECRETPAGE FIVE RUAUBJM 025 **SECRET**3 CASUALTY CARDS OF PERSONNEL WITH MINOR HOSTILE AND
NON-HOSTILE WOUNDS AND INJURIES, IF RE

URNED TO DUTY WITHOUT

EVAC, WILL BE SUBMITTED TO TG 79.4 CRCC FOR REPORTING.

(3) CIVIC ACTION. MINIMAL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM ANTICIPATED
PROVIDED TACTICAL SITUATION DICTATES. MED CAP PROGRAM AND
DISTRIBUTION HANDCLASP/SLF HELP MATERIALS RECOMMENDED.(4) ISOJ TASK GROUP 79.4 PHOTO/JOURNALIST WILL ACCOMPANY
THE ELT ASHORE WITH COMPANY AS DESIGNATED.

(5) SERVICE

(A) AUTHORITY GRANTED TO DRAW FROM LFORM/OPRES ASSETS,
CLOTHING BLOCK AND LSU REPAIR BLOCK COMMENCING D PLUS ONE.
ISSUE ONLY AZEN COMBAT ESSENTIAL.

(B) LIMITED MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE TH

ON U

LSU ORGANIC TO ELT. REQUEST THROUGH TAC-LOG.

(C) OKINAWA PROVIDES 451 BTRY CHARGER SERVICE.

B. CMD AND COMM-ELC

A. CMD POS

(1) AFLOAT

CTG 76.4

USS OKINAWA

CTG 79.4

USS OKINAWA

PAGE SIX RUAUBJM 025 **SECRET**

BLT 1/3

USS OKINAWA

HMM 263

USS OKINAWA

(2) ASHORE: REPORT LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.

C. COMMUNICATION. IAW ANNEX L REF B AND COL/BREVIY CODE
(ISSUED SEP).

CP-4

BT

FOR 01/ 1202Z 21 JUL 67 IT FOC5 310045Z

C- G-3, CAC, copy CFO, S/S, Ade TP


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FF 631

RUMHVP
 RUAUBJM 024 1510400
 NY SSSSS
 P 310400Z MAY 67
 M CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 TO ZEN/TG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUMFCF/USS BIGELOW
 INFO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 CTF SEVEN SIX
 BQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 KB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 KB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 SA/COMUSMACV
 KB/COMNAVFORV
 BLT ONE SLANT THREE
 USS ELDORADO
 RA/CINCPACFLT
 CG III MAF
 CTG SEVEN THREE
 CTG SEVEN SEVEN
 CG THIRD MARDI
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE



COC

TWO RUAUBJM 024 S E C R E T
 RAQ/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RAQ/CT FIRST MZW

S E C R E T

- 1. BITE NGFS (U)
- 2. INDEX G NY (ORD 309-67).
- 3. PS: AMS SERIES L7014, SHEETS 6442I, 6442II, 6542III.
- 4. PS IAW REF B AND D AS MOD BELOW:
- A. FSA'S AS FOLS:
 - 1. FSA I YD 4268 TO TPJR TO 5670 TO 5062 TO 4268
 - 2. FSA II YI 6449 TO 7462 TO 7553 TO 7342 TO 6447
- B. BIGELOW DIRECT SUPPORT OF SLF ALFA. ALL NGF WILL BE PRE-PLANNED
 OR OR CALL TGTS OF OPPORTUNITY. PRE-PLANNED TGT NUMBERS AND
 MINUTES TO BE PROM BY MSG.
- C. H/L HY SKED 020700H JUN, TO BE CONFIRMED. CENTER BLUE BEACH
 YD 564513
- D. NGF SLP TAKE INITIAL STATION IN FSA II AT H MINUS ONE
- E. COORDINATING INSTS:
- F. DIRECT COUNTER BTRY FIRE AUTH IF ENEMY FIRE ENDANGERS NGF SHIP.

13

TIFY DATE OF ACTIONS ASAP

B, MANEUVER OU OF FSA AS RQRD, CONSISTENT WITH SAFE NAV, TO OBTAIN

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Encl 25

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PAGE THREE RUAUBJM 024 S E C R E T
FAVORABLE GUN TGT LINE. KEEP CATF ADVISED

C. FOL THRUST (REFERENCE) POINTS WILL BE USED BY L/F TO SESIG
FRIENDLY FRONT LINES/POSITS. READ IN THREE COLS:

DAY	GRID COORD	THRUST POINT (GENERIC TERMS)
D-DAY	YD 5151	FISH
D PLUS 1	YD 5650	FRUIT
D PLUS 2	YD 4849	RANKS
D PLUS 3	YD 5448	MONTHS
D PLUS 4	YD 5947	SPORTS
D PLUS 5	YD 5047	DAYS
D PLUS 6	YD 5346	DOGS
D PLUS 7	YD 4845	TREES
D PLUS 8	YD 5644	BOATS
D PLUS 9	YD 5043	BOYS
D PLUS 10	YD 5340	GIRLS

EXAMPLE D PLUS 10:

QUOTE: ALICE RIGHT 1 PT 5, DOWN PT 2, UNQUOTE MEANS 1500 METERS
EAST AND 200 METERS SOUTH FROM YD 5340, NEW DAY AT 0001H.

D. NGF SHIP MAKE OWN REARM ARRANGEMENTS. INFORM CATF BY UNODIR
E. NAV AIDS MINIMAL UNLESS RADAR BEACON OPERATING VICINITY GRID

PAGE FOUR RUAUBJM 024 S E C R E T
YD 547320. WILL ADVISE

F. RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING ARMS WILL REMAIN
WITH CATF DURING INITIAL STAGES OF OPERATION. WHEN MUTUALLY
AGREED, COORD RESPONSIBILITY WILL SHIFT TO CLF. RESPONSIBILITY WILL
BE RE-SHIFTED TO CATF FOR WITHDRAWAL PHASE, IF REQD. CATF WILL ADVISE
NGF SHIP VIA CKIN9.

5. ALL NGFS MISSIONS REQUIRE APPROVAL OF CATF (CLF WHEN CONTROL SHIFTS
PRIOR TO FIRING. APPROVAL NORMALLY VIA CKT N9. CATF WILL MONITOR CKT
N10 AND N13.

6. REPORTS IAW REF B.

7. COMMUNICATIONS: IAW ANNEX N AND FOL MOD:

A. CIRCUITS

(1) NGF CONTROL	N9	3825 KCF
(2) NGF SPOT	N10	35.35 MCS
(3) TAO SPOT	H13	312.5 MCS (BUTTON SILVER)

B. NGF SHIP GUARD N9 AND N10 GUARD H13 *6:9..3,:8,2)-2 AND THEREAFTER
DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.

C. ESTAB COMM WITH TACC, (ICEPAC ALFA), AT L-2. BE PREPARED TO TALK
OR AIR SPOTTER

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PAGE FIVE RUAUBJM 024 S E C R E T

D. CALL SIGNS: CTG 76.4 SACC (PALLADIUM), DLT 1/3 SPOT TEAM
(LEASEBREAKER 26 CHARLIE), NGLO (LEASEBREAKER 26 OSCAR).
TAO SPOTTER (---- PLAYBOY).

E. AUTHENTICATION (ZULU TIME): KAA 60. COULE CODE (ZU
U TIME):

KAL 138 THESE PUBS APPLY FOR TRANSMISSIONS TO, FROM, OR BETWEEN
NAVAL UNITS

SP-4

ST

TOR 0101202/Jan 67/Des/DOB

C - 63/COC

STANDARD

3/10/108

N

N

N


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RUV VPM116436VVVVVVV KAG931VV HU GA523
 RUMNVP
 DE RUMS GA J512R 1570200
 NZNY SSSSS
 311530Z MAY 67
 FM C J DET 1B-52 5TH SFGA
 T ZEN/CO 5TH SR A NHA TRANG
 ZEN/CG III MAF DANANG
 ZEN/CO CO C 5TH SFGA DANANG
 ZEN/CO X

11B-52 55TH SFGA NHA TRANG
 ZEN/CO DET B-55 5TH SFGA SAPV N
 ZEN/CO DET B-50 5TH SFGA NHA TRANG
 RUMNVP/CG 3RD MAR DIV PHU DAI
 ZEN/J2 MACVI AICON
 ZEN/J3 MACV SAIGON
 ZEN/DSA I CORPS DANANG
 ZEN/CS 1ST MAF ADDA NANG
 ZEN/CS 5TH SSFGA NHA TRANG ATTN: CB SECTION



S E C R E T

TIRED FLOAT SITREP NR J91

PERIOD COVERED: 311200H MAY 67 THRU 312400H MAY 67

1.

PAST: A. RANGER CO NR 2 MADE CONTACT WITH ESTIMATED ENEMY
 SQUAD DTG 311743H MAY COORD Y1703022 RESULTING IN ONE RANGER KIA.

PAGE TWO UM IEE 569 S E C R E T
 (REF SP T REPORT NR J90)

B. RECON TM 10 AND RECON TM 11 NOT INFILTRATED
 IS SCHEDULED DUE TO EXTRACTION OF RANGER VIA (REF SPOTREP NR J90).
 C. TASK FORCE 13 CLOSED FOR DTG 312030 INSPECTION
 TO DETERMINE

STATUS OF EQUIPMENT AND ACCOUNT FOR PERSONNEL
 COORDINATION AND PLANNING FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS CONTINUED.

D. SEARCH FOR MIA WO WR ELESKI CONTINUED.
 87 PRESENTLY RANGER CO NR 2 PREPARES FOR EXTRACTION DTG 010700.
 JUNE 67.

FUTURE: A. EXTRWG RANGER CO NR 2.

D. RECON TM 11
 10 INFILTRATES LAST LIGHT 01 JUNE 67.

7 CA VRECON TM NR 11 INFILTRATES LAST LIGHT 2 JUNE
 D. SEARCH FOR MIA WO WR ELESKI TO CONTINUE
 E. TASK FORCE 13 WILL CONTINUE PREPARATION FOR

OPERATIONS:

X B: N CHANGE.

3. STATUS OF PERSONNEL NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

USF 17

2355 JST (NR NIA)

INTERP 3

CIG-112 13-AM-15

4. STATUS OF AIRCRAFT NO CHANGE (EXCEPT 3513:)

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encl 26

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RECAP 28 ST PERATIONS T DATE

TK TASKS S RTIES HOURS
 SLICKS HH J698 1757 861 PLUS J15
 GINS J345 606 608 " 05

AMN EXPENDED

J MAY T TAL T DATE
 1.62MM J4,250 404,114
 2.75IN .22 6,832
 1,974

575. TAC AIR:
 57 PREPLAMIED
 ARCLIGHTIST

REQUESTED: 54
 FL WN:

REQUESTED: ,41

FL WN: 19
 IMMEDIATE: 93
 C MENS SKYXK TS

RED B EZERS

REQUESTED: 8

REQUESTED: 190

PAGE 4 RUMS GA 612R S E C R E T
 VFL WN: 17

FL WN: 142

DIAL TAC AIR

REQUESNID: , 126
 FL WN: : 301

DAILY FLIGHTS

A. PREPLAN VIC C RD YQ652642, FRESH FOXHOLE, CANCELLED DE
 TO LAPP F AIRCRAFT 194

GROUND ABORT

C. C M5AT SKYSPOT VICPN

DEA: 08150, NVALBIV UAC AREA, 2 EAS

NO TARGET AT 0735, 4 CRATERS N TARGET MANY CRATERS IN TAC ET

H. IMMEDIATE VIC C RD YQ700920, APR CAP MEDEVAC, 2 EBS ON TAC ET

7 T J857, N RDNANCE EXPENDED.

DOWNGRADED T C NFIDENTIAL 31 MAY JI

S E C R E T

SET

FOR 06/0620 / JUNE 67 / JAM / DCS


A - G - 3, COC copy CFO, St ade TO

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O 281601Z MAY 67
 FM TG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 TO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 INFCRUHHHQA/CINCPAC
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC
 UNHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
 RBQL/CG FMFPAC KFWO)
 RUMFKB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 RUMPCF/CTG, SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTHAF
 RUMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
 RUMFUAP/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE



UMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 RUABJJC/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUABJJC/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMFUV/CTF SEEN SIX

PAGE 2 J

NEUAM 109 S E C R E T
 RUABQL/CTFSEVEN NINE
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMFKB/COMNAVFORV
 RUMHOF/CG III MAF
 TEN/TG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 TEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 RUMUAQ/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RUMHLA/CG FIRS MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T

EAR BITE SITREP NR 1 AS OF 281600Z MAY 67 (U)

1. AMPHIB READY GROUP ALFA COMPOSITION: OKINAWAN DULUTH,
 POINT DEFIANCE, SEMINOLE, TACRON 11 DET A, UDT 11 DET E,
 BJU DET N, BMU-1 DETC-1, ACDIV 12, CTG 79.4, HMM 263 BLT 1/3,
 AND SURGICAL TEAM NR 10

2. ACTIONS:

A. RECEIVED COMSEVENTHFLT 273914Z MAY 67 INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR PLANNING FOR OPERATION BEAR BITE.

B. STEAMING IN HOLDING AREA OFF I CTZ IN 24 HOUR READINESS POSTURE.

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PAGE THREE RUMEDAM 109 S E C R E T

C. USS WHITFIELD CTY COMPLETED OFFLOAD AND PROCEEDED ON DUTY ASSIGNED.

D. USS SEMINOLE COMPLETED LOADING AND JOINED THE TG IN THE HOLDING AREA. TWO LCM-6 AD CREWS FROM ACDIV 12 RECEIVED FROM TG 76.5 MOISTED TO THE RAIL.

E. USS BAYFIELD OFFLOADED, BUT TG 76.4 COMPLETED, PROCEEDED ON DUTY ASSIGNED.

F. USS DULUTH JOINED TG 76.4 AND COMMENCED LOADING SLF PERSONNEL

CARGO AND VEHICLES, AT DANANG.

3. INTENTIONS:

A. USS OKINAWA OFFLOAD UNSERVICEABLE L FORM AND DEAD LINED EQUIPMENT AND LOAD REPLACEMENT L FORM AND EQUIPMENT COMMENCING MOPIPPH AT DAANG.

B. USS POINT DEFIANCE OFFLOAD DEADLIED EQUIPMENT AND LOAD REPLACEMENTS COMMENCING 300800H AT DANANG.

C. TG 76.4 UNREP AOE, ON 30 MAY AND AF ON 31 MAY.

D. TG 76.4 REMAIN IN HOLDING AREA.

E. CONTINUAWPLANNING FOR OPERATION DEAR BITE.

SP-4

BT

28/6012

for 50/074010/01/05/05

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
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MHHNVV MUZCZCVPA 194MMZUA 010EAKCB 184KB 053PZA506ZCPPX833
 00 RUMHVP
 00 RUAUBJC 230 1400014
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 192554 MAY 67
 FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 TO RUMHNL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMFUAQ/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 ZEN/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUARSL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMFKB/COMNAVFORV
 RUMHND/CG III MAF
 RUHHMGA/CINCPAC
 RUMHRA/CINCPACFLO
 RUMJMSA/COMPHIBPAC
 RUMHFWA/CG FMFPAC
 RUARSL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 RUMFKB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 RUMFRE/CTE SEVEN ZERO POMYOT VIP P.03
 AT 144/152 3:3, 5 433 05 18:3
 47.1/CDR 7TH AIR FORCE
 RUMEC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE



PAGE TWO RUAUBJC 230 S E C RNA/
 247.17-9/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN THREE
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MAR DIV
 RUMFRN/CG FIRST MAR
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 ZEN/CTG SEVENSUXNE PT FOUR
 ZKOPATG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 BT

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BELT NIGHT SITREP NR 1 AS OF 192500Z MAY 67 (U)

1. CDR CONSISTING OF CTG 76.5, PRINCETON, MONTICELLO, OGDEN,
 TACON DET, COMBAT DET, UDT DET, AND SURGICAL TEAM, SLF, CONSIS-
 TING OF CTG 79.5, BALT 2/3, HMM 164, BMT, AND BAV DET, UNDER OPOON
 1. CDR HADDOV. ELIZABETH PROVIDED COMM SUPPORT.

2. CDR OF TRAVEL EAST OF GUA VIET SUPPORTING OPO BELT

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PAGE THREE RUAUBJC 230 S E C R E T
LNU TO DONG HA ON 19 MAY.

- C. CTF 76 AND CTF 79 VISITED FLAGSHIP.
- D. CHOPPED BJU DET TO CTG 79.5 AT 192100Z TO PROVIDE PSYOPS SUPPORT AND ASSIST IN POPULATION EVACUATION.
- E. ISSUED MSG ORDER TO SHIPS FOR LANDING SLF.
- F. CHOPPED SLF O III MAF AS COMPONENTS PASSED HIGHWATER MARK AS MUTUALLY AGREED UPON WITH CG III MAF AND APPROVED BY COMSEVENTHFLT CHOP OF SLF EFFECTIVE 192300Z. CG III MAF SIMULTANEOUSLY CHOPPED SLF TO CG THIRD MARDIV.
- G. L-HOUR SKED FOR 200700H FIRST WAVE OF HELOS TOUCHED DOWN AT 5714H IN LZ PARROT (YD 144775) IN THE DMZ. TOUCHDOWN DELAYED DUE PREP FIRES CONTINUING IN LZ. INSERTION OF BN 2/3 IS A COMBAT LANDING IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF OPN HICKORY, ALREADY IN PROGRESS, AND WITHIN THIRD MARDIV TAOR; INITIAL WAVE RCVD LIGHT S/A FIRE FM NORTH SIDE OF SONG BEN HAI WHEN DEPARTING LZ.

C. INTENTIONS:

- A. CG 76.5 CONTINUE DIRECT SUPPORT OF OPN BELT TIGHT/HICKORY.
- B. CONTINUE LANDING BN 2/3 FROM PRINCETON AND OGDEN TO LZ

DATA: CTF

4. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE.

OP-6 15091 JUNE 67

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KCCZCNPDA174MNZVA 12PVV KCC585VV ZRCB84ZCPZA563ZCNPR886
 RUMKVP
 RUAUBJC 243 1400353
 DT 88888
 0 88888Z MAY 67
 00 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 08 47.27//COMSEVENTHFLT
 INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMGUAG/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 ZEN/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABQL//CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMFKB/COMNAVFORV
 RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUWJNSA//COMPHIBPAC
 RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUHAGL/CG FMKHAC (FWD)
 RUMPRB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 RUMPRE/CTE SEVEN ZERO VT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
 RUMPRC/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 RUHAGL/CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE
 RUHREC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PTHUNE



PAGE TWO RUAUBJC 243 S E C R E T

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUHHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMFKN/CG FIRST MAW
 12P/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 12P/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 12P/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

SECRET

BELT TIGHT/REP NR 2 AS OF 200200Z MAY 67 (U)

1. TASK ORGANIZATION: NO CHANGE.

2. ACTIONS

A. TG 76.5

(C) OPERATING SE OF CUA VIET SUPPORTING OPN BELT TIGHT/HPYKORY

(C) LANDING TANK PLATOON TO DONG HA BY LCU AND LCM-8'S.

II. LANDING FORCE

1. LANDING LOCATIONS

2. LANDING SITES

3. LANDING ZONES

YD 145 775

LFD-5 LANDING BY HELO TO LZ MOCKING BIRD

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PAGE THREE RUABJJC 243 S E C R E T

M (C) F/2/3

YD 145 775

T (D) G/2/3

GPD-5 (LANDING BY HELO TO LZ MOCKING BIRD

(E) H/2/3

YD 145 775

(F) OPERATIONS

(A) CONCEPT OF OPERATION WAS TO LAND BLT 2/3 BY HELO IN LZ
PARROT (YD 145 775) ALT LZ MOCKING BIRD (YD 133 771) SEIZE 3DDIV OPJS
(YD 126 776) AND 3 (YD 133 772) THEN ON ORDER CONDUCT SEARCH AND CLEAR

OPNS TO THE SOUTH. ALL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARE TO BE EVACUATED BY
HELO TO CAN LO.

(B) AT 0714H FIRST WAVE (6A/7C) OF H/2/3 LANDED BY HELO IN

PARROT (YD 145 775) NO FIRE ON ENTERING ZONE, LAST A/7C LEAVING ZONE
RECEIVED S/A FIRE. SECOND WAVE (6 A/7C) LANDED AT 0754H IN LZ PARROT
NO FIRE. THIRD WAVE (11 A/7C) ARRIVED ALQZONE 0827H. 4 A/7C, COMPLETING
H/2/3 LIFT, LANDED; REMAINING 7 A/7C: 7, 813 59)-, 8 DUE HEAVY MORTAR
AND S/A FIRE FROM AREA NORTH OF BEN HAI RIVER AND WEST OF LZ MOCKING
BIRD (YD 133771). CAS AND ARTY CALLED ON AREA. 7 A/7C RETURNED TO SHIP

REFUELED AND WERE JOINED BY ADDITIONAL 3 A/7C. 4TH WAVE (16 A/7C) WITH
7 A/7C IN LZ PARROT AT 0814H, RECEIVED LIGHT S/A FIRE FROM NORTH OF BEN

HAI RIVER

5 FIFTH WAVE (11 A/7C) COMPLETING F/2/3 AND ALPHA AND ORP IN

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PAGE FOUR RUAUBJC 243 S E C R E T

(C) DUE HEAVY FIRE LZ'S PARROT AND MOCKING BIRD A SECOND ALT
LZ WAS DESIGNATED. LZ SPARROW (YD 146 765).

(D) SLF RPT OPCON CG 3DMARDIVV 200700H, CHOPPED B/1/12 TO CG
12THMAR AT SAME TIME. TKPLT WILL CHOP TO 3DTKBN UPON ARRIVAL DONG HAI
A 7
201400H.

(3) CASUALTIES

(1) DURING PERIOD

USMC: NONE

ENEMY: NONE

(2) CUMULATIVE

USMC: NONE

ENEMY: NONE

3. INTENTIONS

A. TO 76.5

(1) CONTINUE SUPPORT OF BELT TIGHT/HICKORY.

(2) CONTINUE OFFLOADING TANK PLT AND OTHER EQUIPMENT/SUPPLIES 2

REQUIRED.

(3) SUBMIT REGULAR SITREPS AS OF 0200Z AND 1400Z DAILY.

B. SLF CONTINUE HELO LANDING OF BLT 2/3

4. ACTIONS REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE

GP-4 (C) 1 JUNE 67

BT

T52

201 103721 MAY 07/1/67

201/LOC

Standard


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E;; -8-478PAA887ZCHPB171

OO RUMHVP
DE RUAUBJC 315 1410425
ZNY SSSSS
O 210419Z MAY 67
FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
TO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
INFO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
COMDRA/CINCPACFLT
COMUSIA/COMPHIBPAC
COMHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
COMABOL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
COMFKB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
RUMSBJ//CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE
RUMEC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
OEWMEKE//CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
RUAUBUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMFKM/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
RUMFQ/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
RUMFU/CTF SEVEN SIX

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PAGE TWO RUAUBJC 315 S E C R E T

RUABSL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUABMA/COMUSMACV

RUABFB/COMNAVFORV

RUABMF/CG III MAF

ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

BT

S E C R E T

HICKORY/BELT TIGHT SITREP NR4 AS OF 210200Z MAY 67(U)

1. TASK ORGANIZATION: NO CHANGE

2. ACTIONS

A. TG 76.5

(1) OPERATING SE OF CUA VIET SUPPORTING OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT

(2) TWO LCM-8'S RETURNED TO MONTICELLO FROM DONG HA.

B. LANDING FORCE

(1) UNIT LOCATION: NO CHANGE

(2) OPERATIONS

((A) ALL UNITS ESTABLISHED NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND
AMBUSHES. UNITS RECEIVED LIGHT PROBES FM EAST.

PAGE THREE RUAUBJC 315 S E C R E T

(B) TACTICAL NETS ARE HEAVY WITH OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC.

SITREPS/SPOTREPS ARE MOSTLY LATE RPTS. WILL SUBMIT INFO NEXT SITREP.

(3) CASUALTIES

(1) DURING PERIOD

USMC: NONE

ENEMY: NONE

((2) CUMULATIVE

USMC: 2 KIA 12 WIA

ENEMY: TO BE DETERMINED

3. INTENTIONS:

A. TG 76.5 CONTINUE SUPPORTING OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

B. CAPT F.H. O'BRIEN TO RELIEVE CAPT. T.T. SHEPPARD JR., AS CG
HYPHOCEN AT 211300H.

4. ACTIONS REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE

GP-4 (C) 1 JUNE 67

BT

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C - G-1/COC a/c CEO, s/s, c/s G-2 TP


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 0007 SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 0000GUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 0000ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 0000UAQ/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 0000VY/CTF SEVEN SIX
 0000CL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 0000A/COMUSMACV
 0000B/COMNAVFORV
 0000TF/CG III MAF
 0000QA/CINCPAC
 0000RA/CINCPACFLT
 0000SA/COMPHIBPAC
 0000HA/CG FMFPAC
 0000L/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 0000B/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 0000E/IBE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
 0000R/CLG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 0000J/CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE
 0000C/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE



0000 TWO RUABJC 410 S E C R E T
 0000E/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 0000Z/CTF SEVEN THREE
 0000P/CG THIRD MARDIV
 0000A/CG FIRST MARDIV
 0000N/CG FIRST MAW
 0000CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 0000CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 0000TG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

S E C R E T
 HICKORY/BELT TIGHT SITREP NR 6 AS OF 220220Z MAY 67 (U)
 TASK ORGANIZATION: NO CHANGE
 ACTIONS
 A. TG 76.5

- (1) OPERATING SE OF CUA VIET SUPPORTING OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.
- (2) TOM GREEN COUNTY CHOPPED TO CTG 76.5 EFFECTIVE 201200Z IN COMPLIANCE WITH CTG 76 SKED CHANGE.
- (3) BETWEEN 201840H AND 2000H PRINCETON RCVD 69 MEDEVACS, INCLUDING 39 USMC AND 17 RVN MARINES WOUNDED. 127 MEDEVACS PRESENTLY

22

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THREE RUAUBJC 410 S E C R E T

BOARD.

LANDING FORCE

(1) UNIT LOCATION: BLT 2/3 IS MOVING AND CONDUCTING SERPCH AND
OPERATIONS TOWARD GRID LINE YD 74

(2) OPERATIONS:

(A) ALL UNITS ESTABLISHED NIGHT DEFENSIVE AND AMBUSH
POSITIONS. FIRED EXTENSIVE H&I'S WITH ORGANIC WEAPONS.(B) AT 220050 E/2/3 PERIMETER WAS PROBED VIC YD 132773 BY
NVA. PERIMETER FIRED ON ENEMY WHICH RESULTED IN 1 NVA KIA B/C.

(3) CASUALTIES

(A) DURING PERIOD

USMC: NONE

ENEMY: 1 KIA B/C

(B) CUMULATIVE

USMC: 12 KIA 56 WIA

ENEMY: 14 KIA B/C 23 PROB

REMARKS:

TG 76.5

(1) CONTINUE SUPPOJRING OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

(2) SEND 2 LCM-6 TO DONG HA TO TRANSPORT CARGO TO ARG SHIPPING.

FOUR RUAUBJC 410 S E C R E T

1. SLF CONDUCT SEARCH AND CLEAR OPN SOUTH TO GRID LINE 74.

ACTIONS REQUIRED XE HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE

(C) 1 JUNE 67

22/23/1790/MAY/67/1762/125

220339Z

C-6-3/loc eff CFO TP

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RR

(1) OPERATING SE OF CUA IET SUPPORTING OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.
(2) PRINCETON PROVIDED 569 GALL AVGAS, 5827 GAL JP-5, 13 CASES
FRUIT AND 46 CASES FRUIT JUICE.
(3) TWO LCM-6'S MOVED TO DONG HA, WILL RON, AND TRANSPORT
TO ARRSIPPING TOMORROW.
(4) PRINCETON RCVD 4 KIA, 43 MIA JND 63 NON-COMBAZ INJANY

SECRET

B. LANDING FORCE
KQL UNILLOCATION

(A) 2/3 CP	YD 137 743
(B) E/2/3	YD 128 747
(C) F/2/3	YD 140 753
(D) G/2/3	Y 133 7148
(E) H/2/3	YD 128 746

(A) ALL UNITS CONDUCTED SEARCH AND CLEAR OPNS TO THE SOUTH REACHED THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS WITH NEATIVE CONTACT.

(B) EARLIER SITREP EJURONEOUSLY REPORTED 5 GALLON OF MORPHINE. REPT SHOULD HAVE READ SEERAL VILES OF MORPHINE ALONG WITH OTHER MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN A GALLON CAN.

(A) DURING PERIOD

USMC : NONE

ENEMY: NONE

(B) CUMULATIVE

USMC: 12 KIA 56 MIA

ENEMY: 22 1A B/C 23 KFA PROB

XXAS NOTED EARLIER CROWDED NETS MAKE REPORTING LATE. THESE
CUMULATIVE ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE CORRECT. ENCOUNTERS EX-

PLAINING THE ADDITION WILL BE SUBMITTED WHEN RECEIVED.)

INTENTIONS

A. TG 76.5

(1) CONTINUE SUPPORT OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

2) PRINCETON REFUEL JP-5 AND NSFO FM CHIPOLA.

B. 2/3 WILL HOLD IN THE SAME GENERAL POSITIONS 23 MAY, AND CONDUCT ROUTINE PATROLS IAW U. S. POLICY FOR BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY.

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE.

1 JUN 67

10/29/00 543/ MAY 01/00 61/00

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C-6-3/02 off CFB T.P.


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O 230304Z MAY 67
 FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 TO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMGUAQ/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMFKB/COMNAVFORV
 RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUJMSA/COMPHIBPAC
 RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 RUMFKB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 RUMFKE/CTF SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE
 RUMEC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

Coe



23

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Encl 33

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PAGE TWO RUAUBJC 469 S E C R E T

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMFKN/CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 ZEN/TG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 BT

S E C R E T

HICKORY/BELT TIGHT SITREP NR8 AS OF 230207Z MAY 67 (U)

VUI. TASK ORGANIZATION: NO CHANGE.

2. ACTIONS.

A. T2P UYMT

(1) OPERATING SE OF CUA VIET SUPPORTING OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

(2) PRINCETON REFUELED FM CHIPOLA.

B. LANDING FORCE.

(1) UNIT LOCATION: NO CHANGE

(2) OPERATIONS

(A) ALL UNITS ESTABLISHED NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND AMBUSHES. AT 2105H 2/3 CP RECEIVED 4 RDS INCOMING ARTY FIRE F

PAGE THREE RUAUBJC 469 S E C R E T

AZ 3600. NO CASUALTIES.

(B) 2/3 IS HOLDING IN PRESENT POSITIONS. CONDUCTING ROUTE PATROLS IAW U.S. POLICY FOR BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY. PLAN TO MOVE ON SEARCH & CLEAR OPNS TO THE SOUTH IN NEW TAOR. NEW TAOR IS AREA FM 120740 TO 150710 TO 150630 TO 180630 TO 180700 TO 150740 TO 120740. ALL COORD YD.

(3) CASUALTIES

(A) DURING PERIOD

USMC: NONE

ENEMY: NONE

(B) CUMULATIVE

USMC: 12 KIA 56 WIA

ENEMY: 22 KIA B/C 23 KIA PROB

3. INTENTIONS: TG 76.5 CONTINUE SUPPORT OF OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

4. ACTIONS REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE

GP-4 (C) 1 JUNE 67

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
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DD RUMHVP
 E RUABJJC 513 1431525
 NY SSSSS
 231515Z MAY 67
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 TO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 JMGUAG/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 JNFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 JNBQL/CTF SEVEN NINNE
 JMSMA/COMUSMACV
 JNFBZ/COMNAVFORV
 JNHMF/CG III MAF
 JNHHQA/CINCPAC
 JNHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 JNMSSA/CGMHPHBPAC
 JNHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 JNBQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 JNFRB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 JNFKC/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONEE PT ONE
 JNFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 JNFCJ/CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE
 JNFCJ/CTU SEVEN ZERO PPT SEVEN PT ONE

VPA 1774

COC



USE TWO RUABJJC 513 S E C R E T
 JMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

JMFUZZBCTF SEVEN THREE
 JMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 JMHHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 JMFKN/CG FIRST MAW
 JEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 JEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 JEN/CTG SEVEN SIXX PT FIVE

S E C R E T

HICKORY/BELT TIGHT SITREP NR9 AS OF 231400Z MAY 67 (U)
 TASK ORGANIZATION: NO CHANGE

ACTIONS

A. TC 76.5

(1) OPERATING SE OF CUUA VIET SUPPORTINGG OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT

(2) PRINCETON PROVIDED 347 GAL AVGAS, 3711 GAL JP-5, AND 5 GAL AVLUBE.

(3) CATAMOUNT DELIVERED 2 LCM-8'S FROM ACDIV 12 IN EXCHANGE FOR 2 LCM-8'S BELONGING TO ARG.

(4) REPOSITIONED VEHICLES AND CARGO FM PRINCETON, TO TOM

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THREE RUAUBJC 513 S E C R E T

GREEN COUNTY, WHO WILL ACT AS "SEA TAIL" FOR ARG.

(5) TEN WIAA AND 20 NON-COMBAT INJURIES WERE MEDEVACED TO PRINCE

DURING 24 HOUR PERIOD ENDING 231300H. TOTAL MEDEVACS TO DATE 266; PRESENTLY ON BOARD 130.

LANDING FORCE

(1) UNIT LOCATION: UNITS MOVING TO NEW POSITIONS.

(2) OPERATIONS

(A) AT 1210H A PATROL FROM H/2/3 RECEIVED 3 RDS 60 MM MGR

A/W AND S/A FIRE. FIRE WAS RETURNED WITH AA/W S/A. 81MM AND 120MM MORTAR. INCOMING FIRE CEASED. ENCOUNTER RESULTED IN 11 WIA.

(B) AT 1200H A PATROL FROM H/2/3 UNCOVERED AIRPLANE WRECK

AT 131748. ATTACHED I.D. PLATE SHOWS BUNO 1334466. WRECKAGE HAS

20MM GUNS AND ROCKETS THAT COULD BE SALVAGED BUT WOULD TAKE A LARGE WORKING PARTY AND MUCH TIME. PATROL WAS DIRECTED DESTROY

EVERYTHING

(C) 2/3 CHOPPED TO 9TH MARINES EFFECTIVE 231600H.

(3) CASUALTIES

(A) DURING PERIOD

USMC: 11 WIA

FOUR RUAUBJC 513 S E C C R E T

ENEMY: UNKNOWN

(B) CUMULATIVE

USMC: 12 KIA 67 WIA

ENEMY KIA: 23 B/C, 23 PROB

REMARKS:

1. TG 76.5 CONTINUE SUPPORT OFF OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

2. 2/3 TO RELOCATE CP'S AFTER DARK TO AVOID POSSIBLE ENEMY

MORTAR/ARTY ATTACK.

3. ACTIONS REQUIRED BY H

HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE

(C) 1 JUNE 67

FOR 24/0052/MAY 67/DES/DOB

23/5/56

-3/COC, copy CEO

cm

FOUR RUAUBJC

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CVPA248ACB 770FAA556ZCPPX799

OO RUMHVP

DE RUAUBJC 532 1440320

ZNY SSSSS

O 240315Z MAY 67

FM CTG ESEVEN SIX PT FIVE

TO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMQUAQ/CTG SEVEEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMFKB/COMNAVFORV

RUMHMF/CG III MAF

RUMHHQA/CINCPAC

RUMHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUMJMSA/COMPHIBPAC

RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC

RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)


RUMFKB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE

RUMEC/CTTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE



LOC

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Encl 35

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1. TWO RUAUBJC 532/ 5: 4 3 5
2. 173/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMFKN/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FMRR
ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
ZEN/TG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

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HICKORY/BELT TIGHT SITREP NR 10 ASS OF 240200Z MAY 67 (U)

1. TASK ORGANIZATION: NO CHANGE

2. ACTIONS

A. TG 76..5

(1) OPERATING SE OF CUA VIET SUPPORTING OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

(2) TWO LLCM-6'S TRANSPORTED CARGO FM DONG HA TO ARG SHIPPING.

B. LANDING FORCE

(1) UNIT LOCATION: ALL UNITS MOVING.

(2) OPERATIONS:

(A) ALL UNITS ARE CONDUCTING SEARCH AND VTEAR OPNS TO

UNCLASSIFIED

1. THREE RUAUBJC 532/ 5: 4 3 5
2. SOUTH.

(B) (LATE REPT) AT 231210 G CO AT YD1135733 RCVD 60MM
MORTAR, AA/W AND S/A FIRE. RETURNED FIRE W/81MM MORTAR, A/W, AND
ARTY. 1 EN KIA (C) 6 EN KIA (P)

(3) CASUALTIES

(A) DURING PERIOD

USMC: NONE

ENEMY: 1 KIA B/C 6 KIA PROB

(B) CUMULATIVE

USMC: 12 KIA 67 VIA

ENEMY: 24 KIA B/C 28 KIA PROB

3. INTENTIONS: TG 76..5 CONTINUE SUPPORT OF OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

4. ACTIONS REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE.

5. P-4 (C) 1 JUNE 667

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DE RUAUBJC 584 1450340

ZNY SSSSS

O 250335Z MAY 67

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

TO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMGUAQ/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

EN/CTF SEVEN SIX

UABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

UMSMA/COMUSMACV

UMFKB/COMNAVFORV

UMHMF/CG III MAF

UMHHQA/CINCPAC

UMHBRA/CINCPACFTT

UMJMSA/COMPHIBPAC

UMHMA/CG FMFPAC

UABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)


UMFKB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

UMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PPT ONE PT ONE

UMFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

SGSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE

MEC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE



UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO RUAUBJC 584 S E

UMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

UMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

UMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

UMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

UMFKN/CG FIRST MAW

EN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

EN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

EN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

EN/COMPHIBRON NINE

SECRET

HICKORY/BELT TIGHT SITREP NR 12 AS OF 250200Z MAY 67 (U)

TASK ORGANIZATION: NO CHANGE

ACTIONS

A. TG 76.5

(1) OPERATING GISE OF CUA VIET SUPPORTING OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

(2) TOM GREEN COUNTY RPTD BAMBOO STAKES AND FISH NETS FOULING
ER PORT SHAFT. UDT PRESENTLY WORKING TO REMOVE.

(3) PRINCETON COMMENCED ADMIN OFFLOAD OF FLT 2/3 EQUIPMENT AND
ATTACHMENTS.

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DECLASSIFIED

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PAGE THREE RUABJC 584 S E C C R E T

KRL RECOMMENDED THAT OPN BELT TIGHT BE TERMINATED EFFECTIVE 250800Z.

B. LANDING FORCE

(1) 2/3 IS CONDUCTING SEARCH AND CLEAR OPNS WITHIN THEIR ASSIGNED TAOR, MOVING TO THE SOUTH.
EM INTENTIONS

A. TG 76.5 CONTINUE SUPPORTING OPN HICKORY/BELT TIGHT.

B. CONTINUE ADMIN OFFLOAD FM PRINCETON OF ELT 2/3 EQUIPMENT AND THOSE ATTACHMENTS REQUESTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV. COMMENCE OFFLOAD FM MONTICELLO AND OGDEN.

KDW BCLKJXRQOEIXEAOKPQWFXOMXPSRHYC
FM HMM-16

UNCLASSIFIED

FLLS EIGHT A/C DETACHMENT WITH CREWS AND APPROPRIATE MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TO MARBLE MOUNTAIN TO AUGMENT MAG-16 DURING 2 WEEK LPH TRANSFER/UPKEEP PERIOD AT SUBIC.

A. ACTIONS REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: COMSEVENTHFLT TERMINAE OPN BELT TIGHT.

OP-4 (C) 1 JUNE 67

BT 25

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