

MAT

Ban số : 11/15
 Ban chỉ huy Khu 11/QT.
 Tr. Trần-Cao-Van Hue
 09180CH tháng 10/1967
 LS-135

KE-HOACH HÀNH-QUAN LAM-SON 135

Tham chiếu : bản đồ tỷ lệ 1/50.000

1. TÌNH HÌNH :

a. Dịch : phụ bản A tình-báo.

b. Bản :

- (1) Trung-Đoan 1 TQLC/HK hành quân phối hợp với SD1/BB.
- (2) SD3/TQLC/HK sẵn sàng yểm trợ cho các đơn vị hành-quân

c. Tang phai và xuất phai : Không.

2. NHIỆM VỤ :

To chue hành quân phối hợp với TQLC/HK tìm diệt địch tại vùng rừng núi Tây-Nam LAVANG. Thời gian hành quân đủ từ 05 ngày , kể từ ngày N.

3. THI HÀNH :

a. Quan niệm hành quân :

(1) Từ N đến N+2 :

-Ngày N lúc giờ H trực-thang-van Tiểu-Đoan 9 Du và Đại-đội Hào-Bao từ LAVANG xuống bãi đáp BUZZARD tung quân hoạt động lúc soát diệt địch trong khu vực II, và Tiểu-đoan của Trung-Đoan 1 Bộ-binh xuất phát từ LAVANG hoạt động lúc soát chặn diệt địch từ LAVANG đến giáp tuyến PLUM.

(2) Từ N+3 đến N+4 :

-Tiểu-Đoan 9 Du và Đại-đội Hào-Bao phối hợp với Tiểu-đoan của Trung-Đoan 1 TQLC/HK hoạt động lúc soát từ tuyến PLUM ra LAVANG.

b. Trung-Đoan 1 Bộ-Binh :

- (1) Được tang phai Tiểu-Đoan 9 Du và Đại-đội Hào-Bao , to chue hành quân tìm diệt địch trong khu vực II.
- (2) Phối hợp chặt chẽ với Trung-Đoan 1/TQLCHK để trao đổi tin tức và hỗ trợ yểm trợ khi cần.
- (3) Phối hợp với Pháo-binh/TQLCHK để to chue bao vây Pháo-binh Việt-Nam tại vị trí đặt súng.
- (4) Phối hợp với TK/Quang-Tri để tránh ngộ nhận với các đơn vị yểm trợ XDNT tại vùng tây LAVANG.

c. Tiểu-Đoan 9 Du :

-Tang phai Trung-Đoan 1 Bộ-Binh suốt thời gian hành-quân.

d. Đại-Đội Hào-Bao :

-Tang phai Trung-Đoan 1 Bộ-Binh suốt thời gian hành-quân.

-KH.1-

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g. Pháo-Binh :

- (1) Pháo-đội 105/TD11PB yem tro truoc vi hanh quan.
- (2) Pháo-đội 155/TD34PB yem tro truoc vi hanh quan.
- (3) Phoi hop de nghi Pháo-binh/TQLCHK tang cuong hoa luc khi can.
- (4) Phu ban C ke-hoach Hoa-yem.

f. Không-quan :

- (1) L19/VN bao vung hanh quan suot ngay.
- (2) Không-quan Hoa-Ky do SD3/TQLCHK dieu dong yem tro truoc-tiep hanh quan theo yau cau cua Trung-Doan 1 Bo-Binh.
- (3) Truo-thang vo-trang cua TQLC/HK san sang yem tro theo don xin.
- (4) SD3/TQLCHK yem tro phuong tien truo-thang-van, tan thuong va tai tiep te cho cac don vi hanh quan theo don xin cua BCH/Trung-doan 1 Bo-Binh va ban don bai dap.

g. Công-Binh :

Tieu-doan 63 Kien-tao tang phai 1 Trung-đoi Công-binh cho cho Tieu-doan 11 Pháo-Binh suot thoi gian hanh quan de yem tro Pháo-binh di chuyen vao vi tri dat sung.

h. Tru bi :

- (1) Tieu-doan 7 Du tai CS/17.
- (2) San sang duoc truo-thang-van vao vung hanh quan theo lenh Su-Doan.
- (3) Ngoai cac hoat dong an ninh xa gan ban dem cua don-vi, ban ngay phai o tinh trang ung chien co the len quan do bo truo-thang sau khi duoc lenh 30 phut dong ho.

i. Huan thi phoi hop :

- (1) Dia diem len quan truo-thang-van tai LAVANG co the thay doi va se duoc xac dinh sau, khi SD3/TQLCHK xac nhan vi tri chinh xac.
- (2) Truong hop thoi tiet xau gio H duoc dinh hoan tung gio mot va ngay N duoc doi lai ngay ke tiep se xac nhan sau.
- (3) De de dang phoi hop Trung-doan 1 Bo-Binh trao doi vi-quan lien lao dat canh BCH/hanh-quan va si-quan lien lao ben canh cac don vi hanh quan cung chung ranh gioi voi TQLC/HK.
- (4) De thuan tien phoi hop va co the yem tro mau chong, BCH/Trung-Doan 1 Bo-Binh can dong sat canh BCH/Trung-Doan 1/TQLCHK.
- (5) Luu y luc soat ky cac khe suoi de tim cac kho tang bi mat va co so don tru giao lien dich trong vung hanh quan.
- (6) Luu y de phong dich phuc kich, ban tia va phao kich nhut la ban dem.
- (7) Xu dung toi da hoa luc không-quan va pháo-binh moi khi tiep dich va co the ba n don vao cac muc tieu nghi ngo co dich truoc khi tien quan den.
- (8) Chuan bi nhung phuong tien ca nhan nhu giay dua, ao mua poncho de vuot khe suoi truong hop muc lut chay manh.
- (9) Dem theo dung cu công-binh ca nhan de to chuc vi tri phong thu vung chao moi khi dung quan.
- (10) Cac don vi duoc tu do dieu quan theo quan niem cua don vi cho phu hop voi hoan canh, va dia the, nhung phai trinh ke-hoach ve BTL/SD1/P3 truoc khi di hanh.
- (11) Lenh di chuyen cac don vi tu vi tri dong quan den diem len quan se xac dinh sau.
- (12) Ngay N gio H se xac nhan bang cong dien sau.

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4. QUAN TRI & TIẾP VAN :

Ap dụng theo the thao tiếp-van thông thường.

5. CHI HUY & TRUYỀN TIN :

a. Chi huy :

- (1) Bộ Tư-Lệnh Sư-Đoàn 1 Bộ-Binh tại HUE.
- (2) Bộ Chỉ-huy Trung-Đoàn 1 Bộ-Binh tại LAVANG.

b. Truyền-tin :

Ap dụng các lệnh truyền-tin đã phổ biến.

Báo nhận .-

NGO-QUANG-T RUONG
Chuan-tuong Luo-Quan

KÝ-TÊN VÀ ĐÓNG DẤU

Phu ban :


- A--Tỉnh báo.
- B--Thau-minh-đo H/Q.
- C--Ke-hoach Hoa-yem.

Pho bien :

| | |
|----------------------|------------|
| -Tung-doan 1 Bộ-Binh | b/s 02/15. |
| -Tieu-doan 9 Nhay Du | - 03/15. |
| -Tieu-doan 7 Nhay Du | - 04/15. |
| -BTM/SD1/BB : P2 | - 05/15. |
| P4 | - 06/15. |
| PB | - 07/15. |
| TT | - 08/15. |
| TTHQ | - 09/15. |
| MAOV | - 10/15. |
| -BTL/SD3/TQLCH/P3 | - 11/15. |
| -BTL/QDI/VIOT : P3 | - 12/15. |
| TTHQ | - 13/15. |
| -BTL/SD/Du/HQ/P3 | - 14/15. |
| -Ho so P3/SD1/BB | -01+15/15. |

PHU BAN

THẢO-TA NGO-VAN-CHUNG
Tham-Mu Phó Hành-Quản Tiếp-Van
KIỂM-TRUNG PHÒNG 3/SD
TỔNG-TS PHU-BAN
BỘ CHAM-ANH
TỔNG-TS PHU-BAN
TỔNG-TS PHU-BAN



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... AUNI LUV VPA886A 392VV MCC65 7VV ULB5 21

*** ZZ RUMHVP

DE RUMGUL 0718 2822216

ZNY SSSSS

E 092216Z OCT 67

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUMFTJ/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

INFO RUMFTJ/CTG SEVEN NINE YWXMHD KTW

RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CF SEVEN NINE

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

RUMGCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMGUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMFUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMHMF/CG III MAF

RUMHHQA/CINCPAC

RUMHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUMJMSA/COMPHIBPAC

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV



G-3
COC

PAGE TWO RUMGUL 0718 S E C R E T

RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC

RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)

RUMVHD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMGCR/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

RUMSBJ/CMR 7TH AIR FORCE

JUMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

RUMGCR/CTU SECONJTERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMGCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

RUMFT/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO

BT

S E C R E T

BASTION HILL (U)

1. EXECUTE 10 OCT.

GP-4

BT

TCE/09/2309/00767/4m/005

693/COC

copy 22 B

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-R- 092305H

GOLD REPORT

FMO DE TCC

To: 320 MAR DIV. COC

1. NAME OF OPERATION

2. DTG AND DURATION IN DAYS

LS 135

170800H 5 DAYS

3. CONTROL HQ'S

1ST REGT.

4. FRIENDLY UNITS

9 ABN BN, 2/1 BN, BP CO. 11TH ARTY

5. AREA OF OPERATION

YD 3250, 3650, 2639, 3339

(GIVE 4 CORNERS IN 4 DIGITS COORDS)

3. DIRECTION OF FRIENDLY MOVEMENT

☒ A. NORTH

C. EAST

E. NORTHEAST

G. SOUTHEAST

B. SOUTH

D. WEST

F. NORTHWEST

H. SOUTHWEST

7. TYPE OF OPERATION

☒ A. AIRMOBILE

B. CLEARING

C. COMBINED (USMC, ARVN)

D. REACTION TO VC INITIATED ACTION

E. EXCHANGE OF UNITS

DESIGNATION

8. ENEMY FORCE

XXXXXXXXXX

9 MAIN FORCE REGT.

9. UNIT FREQUENCY AND CALL SIGN

O/S A5

10. DTG REPORT RECEIVED

N/A

11. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL MAKING REPORT

O/S 7

12. REMARKS

NEG

F. HIGH ROAD CLEARING

G. SECURING

☒ H. SEARCH AND DESTROY

I. REINFORCEMENT

J. SATURATION PATROL

TOP

2309H/9 Oct. 67 / RPS / DIV / 1048

Encl 8

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

496167

3/VLS/gtp
5213
Ser: 003A19367
10 October 1967

SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Review and Written Summary of Activities in Support of
III MAF Campaign Plan 1-67

Ref: (a) III MAF Msg 301348Z Sep 67

Encl: (1) III MAF Campaign Plan 1-67 Summary 3d Quarter, CY 67

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.



W. H. CUENIN
Chief of Staff

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

Copy No. 16 of 20 copies
~~SECRET~~

Encl 19

DECLASSIFIED

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SECTIONS

- I. ENEMY SITUATION
- II. FRIENDLY SITUATION
- III. MILITARY SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
- IV. DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALIZATION OF VC/NVA MAIN FORCES AND BASES
- V. DEFENSE OF BORDERS AND INTERDICTION OF KNOWN LAND AND SEA INFIL-
TRATION ROUTES
- VI. SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF MILITARY AREAS AND INSTALLATIONS
- VII. IDENTIFICATION AND ELIMINATION OF THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE
- VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
- IX. LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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SECTION I

ENEMY SITUATION

1. ENEMY STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

a. The enemy's efforts are directed toward politically and militarily organizing the populous in order to regain losses from his manpower base and to expand his control over the people. The GVN Revolutionary Development Program has hampered his military and civilian proselyting and propaganda efforts. The Presidential elections in September demonstrated that he has had limited success. In excess of 80% of the registered voters in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces cast ballots in these elections despite extensive propaganda and terrorist activities directed toward keeping the people from the polls.

b. Aggressive USMC and 1st ARVN Division operations against the Main Force battalions, particularly during July, reduced the enemy's ability to provide significant military support to the NFL and local forces. Subsequent operations by the SLF's uncovered large caches of rice and other food and supplies. These activities have resulted in causing a significant shortage of food in the Main Force units particularly the 6th NVA Regiment and in the battalions that operate in the Phu Thu and Phu Loc areas. There appears to be a shortage of medical supplies and medical care throughout the Tri Thien-Hue Military Region.

c. Intense NVA activity in the DMZ area appears to be directed toward drawing 3d Marine Division units into conflict in that area so that the Main Force units can disrupt the RD program, destroy ARVN, RF, and PF and eliminate the RVN administrative apparatus. In the DMZ the enemy has continued his "creeping in" tactics against Marine units at Con Thien and has actively engaged Con Thien, Gio Linh, Dong Ha and Camp Carroll with heavy artillery and rockets as well as with mortars; he has increased his efforts to interdict Rte 9. The enemy hopes not only to tie down our forces but to inflict major casualties upon us. Additionally, it is evident that he feels that he must achieve a major victory to bolster NVA posture and flagging VC morale.

d. As the monsoons approach, the Main Force units are desperately trying to obtain rice. The degree of their needs is evidenced by the increased taxes being levied on the population, often requiring the people to turn over 50% of their rice. This demonstrates effectively, the extent of the shortage since they are willing to place this burden on the people at a time when their primary goal is to regain control of the populous.

2. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ENEMY CONTACTS

a. Activity in the DMZ area included Operation BUFFALO and Operation HICKORY II in the Trace - DMZ area. The enemy increased their use of large caliber artillery and also increased the number of rocket and mortar

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attacks against friendly units located South of the DMZ. The enemy began using H and I type fire against selected targets rather than a large number of rounds during a short period of time. Indications are that a greater number of enemy missions are observed fire. Friendly units at Con Thien received intense mortar, rocket and artillery fire with approximately 780 rounds received 25Sep67. Mortar rounds containing propaganda leaflets were used against friendly units at Con Thien.

b. Along the "Street without Joy" combined SLF and ARVN units in July made contact with an estimated four (4) Main Force Battalions. The Main Force Battalions had moved into the area to enlarge their area of operations and increase their activities in the area. They failed in their objective due to the actions of friendly units. A large amount of rice was captured by friendly units thus depriving the enemy of needed food.

c. There are several indications that a new division is being formed from existing units located in Southern Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Of significance was the change of designation of the Northern Front to the Tri Thien-Hue Military Region. During this period the 804B Battalion was formed in the Phu Loc area. All enemy units in Thua Thien Province have the primary mission to gather and transport rice to storage areas to support a Monsoon Season offensive. A secondary mission is the harassment and interdiction of friendly lines of communication. There were isolated incidents of attack against Revolutionary Development Teams, District Headquarters and ARVN units. In Thua Thien Province the enemy has increased his forces to a Regiment plus two Battalions. Terrorist activity during the election period was held to a minimum due to the alertness and quick action of friendly units.

3. ENEMY LOSSES FOR THE QUARTER

a. Enemy losses in the DMZ area

| | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| BELT DRIVE KIA (Conf) 11 | KIA (Prob) 25 | 26Aug-1Sep Wpns 10 |
| ARDMORE KIA (Conf) 109 | KIA (Prob) 205 | 17Jul-30Sep Wpns 10 |
| KINGFISHER KIA (Conf) 1041 | KIA (Prob) 1792 | 16Jul-30Sep Wpns 126 |
| BUFFALO KIA (Conf) 1103 | KIA (Prob) 513 | 2-14Jul Wpns 99 |

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| | | |
|---|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| <u>CIMARRON</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 28 | KIA (Prob) 55 | 1-2 Jul Wpns 0 |
| <u>CROCKETT</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 17 | KIA (Prob) 52 | 1-16 Jul Wpns 4 |
| <u>HICKORY II</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 57 | KIA (Prob) 23 | 14-16 Jul Wpns 19 |
| b. Enemy Losses in the Lowlands and Base Areas | | |
| <u>BEACON POINT</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 2 | KIA (Prob) 1 | 1-3 Sep Wpns 0 |
| <u>RUSH</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 1 | KIA (Prob) 8 | 5-9 Aug Wpns 0 |
| <u>BEACON GUIDE</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 10 | KIA (Prob) 42 | 1-9 Jul Wpns 3 |
| <u>CHOCTAW</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 10 | KIA (Prob) 42 | 1-9 Jul Wpns 3 |
| <u>CUMBERLAND</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 8 | KIA (Prob) 13 | 1 Jul-15 Sep Wpns 2 |
| <u>FREMONT</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 115 | KIA (Prob) 226 | 10 Jul-30 Sep Wpns 32 |
| <u>RED BAIT TAOR</u> <u>KIA (Conf)</u> 87 | KIA (Prob) 195 | 1 Jul-30 Sep Wpns 46 |

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SECTION II
FRIENDLY SITUATION

1. FORCES ASSIGNED

a. 3d Marine Division (-)(Rein)

(1) During the 3d Quarter FY 1967, the 3d Marine Division was deployed in Northern I Corps with all units located in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. At the end of the quarter, forces were assigned to operation areas as follows:

(a) Operation KINGFISHER AO. North Central Quang Tri. Forces were assigned to the 3d Marines and 9th Marines AO's.

(b) Gio Linh AO. Northern Quang Tri. Under OPCON of the 12th Marines.

(c) Cua Viet AO. Northeastern Quang Tri. Under OPCON of the 1st AmTrac Battalion.

(d) Operation FREMONT AO. Northern Thua Thien. Under OPCON of the 4th Marines.

(e) Operation ARDMORE. Northwestern Quang Tri. Under OPCON of the 26th Marines.

(f) Phu Bai AO. Southern Thua Thien. Under OPCON of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines.

(g) Nam Hoa AO. Southern Thua Thien. Under OPCON of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines.

(h) Quang Tri Airfield AO. Southern Quang Tri. Under control of the 4th Marines.

(2) The 3d Marine Division was reinforced with the following units:

26th Marines (-)(Rein)

2d Bn (-)(Rein) 94th Arty (USA)(175MM Gun (SP))

1st Bn, 40th Arty (USA)(105MM How (SP))

8th Bn, 4th Arty (-)(USA)(175MM Gun (SP))

1st Bn (-)(Rein), 13th Marines

1st 155MM Gun Btry

1st Prov 155MM How Btry

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2d Prov 155MM How Btry

Btry "B", 2d Bn, 26th Arty (USA)(175MM Gun (SP))

1st 8" How Btry (-)(Rein)

1st Plt, 5th 155MM Gun Btry

1st Bn (Rein), ADA AW (SP), 44th Arty (USA)(M-42)

Plt, 1st Armored Amphib Trac Co, FMF

1st Amtrac Bn, FMF

9th Mt Bn, FMF

3d Force Recon Co, FMF

1st Plt, 29th CA Co (USA)

7th Plt, 29th CA Co (USA)

Det, A101, 5th S& Grd (USA)

3d Dental Co, FMF

3d ITT

7th ITT, FMF

9th IT

1st CIT, FMF

1st SSCT, FMF

17th ITT

11th IT

15th ITT

15th CIT

Btry "G" 65th Arty (USA)(M-55)

1st SL Btry, FMF (20" SL)

Det, 235th CMR (USA)(AN/TPQ-4A)

Det, MC-4-1 CMR (AN/TPQ-4A)

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Det, 8th TAB 26th Arty (USA)(AN/MPQ-10)

Det, 238th GMR (USA)(AN/MPQ-1A)

11th Engr Bn, FMF (ADCON ONLY)

b. Friendly Forces

(1) ARVN FORCES. 1st Infantry Division ARVN, with Headquarters at Hue, conducted operations and supported the Revolutionary Development program in 11th DTG, which consists of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Three battalions were in support of Revolutionary Development in Quang Tri City and three in vicinity of Hue. Operational forces consisted of one battalion in Quang Dien, one in La Vang, one at PK-17, one at Gio Linh and three at Dong Ha. One Battalion was maintained in a training status. In addition, one troop of armored cavalry was located at An Cua, one at PK-17 and one at La Vang. The Black Panther Company and the Recon Company were maintained as Division Reserve in Hue.

(2) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing conducted counterinsurgency operations within ICTZ; provided fixed and rotary wing aircraft for all-weather air support of 3d Marine Division forces, with Helicopter Detachments located at Phu Bai, Dong Ha, and Khe Sanh.

(3) Force Logistic Command. Force Logistic Command through its subordinate units was the primary source for all classes of supply and higher echelon services and maintenance for the 3d Marine Division. Force Logistic Support Group Alpha is located at Phu Bai with logistic support units deployed to the Dong Ha, and Khe Sanh areas.

(4) OTHERS

- (a) US Seventh Fleet
- (b) US Naval Forces, VN
- (c) VNN
- (d) 7th AF
- (e) VNAF
- (f) MACV Advisory Groups
- (g) 10th Political Warfare Bn, ARVN
- (h) 244th PsyOps Co, USA
- (i) Det, C-1, 5th SF Group
- (j) CIDG

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(k) RF/PF

2. DISPOSITION OF FORCES

a. The 3d Marine Division command post was located in the Phu Bai vital area. One infantry battalion and one artillery battalion provided security for the vital area and conducted operations in the Phu Bai TAOR.

b. The ADC, 3d Marine Division, was located at the Dong Ha Base Defense Complex to coordinate activities of all forces in the area and to carry out such other duties as the Commanding General directed. In addition to organic 3d Marine Division units, the 9th Motor Transport Battalion (-) and the 11th Engineer Battalion were deployed in the Dong Ha area.

c. The 9th Marine Regimental Headquarters was located at Dong Ha Combat Base. The regiment participated in Operations CIMARRON, BUFFALO, HICKORY II and KINGFISHER. Elements of the Regiment were deployed at Gio Linh, Con Thien, Cam Lo and Ba Long. Forces at Ba Long were redeployed and the fortifications destroyed on 14 September 1967.

d. The 3d Marine Regimental Headquarters was located at Camp Carroll. The regiment participated in Operations CIMARRON, BUFFALO, HICKORY II and KINGFISHER. Elements of the regiment were deployed at Thon Son Lam, The Rockpile, D-5 Outpost and Ca Lu.

e. The 26th Marine Regimental Headquarters was located at Khe Sanh and the regimental commander exercised operational control over 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and other combat and combat support units. The regiment participated in Operations CROCKETT and ARDMORE. Elements of the regiment were deployed at Hill 881 and Hill 861.

f. The 4th Marine Regimental Headquarters was located at Camp Evans (Phong Dien). The regiment participated in Operations CHOCTAW and FREMONT. 1st Battalion, 4th Marines provided security for the engineer effort and the forward fire support base in Operation CUMBERLAND. 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (-) participated in Operation RUSH in the Phu Loc area.

g. The 12th Marine Regimental Headquarters was located at Dong Ha Combat Base. Elements of the regiment were located in support of the infantry battalions at Phu Bai, Camp Evans, CUMBERLAND, Dong Ha, Con Thien, Camp Carroll, Thon Son Lam and Khe Sanh. Units participated in all major operations conducted in the Division TAOR.

h. The Composite Artillery Battalion, with one rifle company, was located at Gio Linh.

i. Headquarters of the 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Anti-Tank Battalion, 3d Engineer Battalion and 3d Shore Party Battalion were located at Gia Le Combat Base, northwest of the Phu Bai vital area. One company of 3d Shore Party Battalion remains in the vicinity of Col Co causeway (YD 845322).

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j. Headquarters of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was located at the mouth of the Cau Viet River. The battalion was responsible for its own TAOR along the coast north and south from the river.

3. OPERATIONS

a. Major Operations

(1) CIMARRON. Operation CIMARRON commenced on 1 June 1967 and continued through 2 July 1967. Only two days of the operation are included in this report. These two days were characterized by continuous, heavy ground contact and heavy incoming mortar and artillery fire. This activity was concentrated in the Con Thien area and was a prelude to the heavy activity that characterized Operation BUFFALO, the successor to Operation CIMARRON. The CIMARRON area of operations was in northern Quang Tri Province and the major units involved were the Third Marines and the Ninth Marines.

Cumulative casualties at the end of the operation were:

| | | |
|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| Friendly: | 38 KIA | 420 WIA |
| Enemy: | 245 KIA (C) | 338 KIA (P) |
| Weapons: | 0 | |

(2) CHOCTAW. Operation CHOCTAW continued through 9 July 1967 with ~~mine~~ ~~heavy~~ contact. Incoming sniper fire and mine and booby trap incidents characterized the activity during the period. The area of operations centered around the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley in northern Thua Thien Province and the Fourth Marines was the Major control Headquarters.

Cumulative casualties at the end of the operation were:

| | | |
|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| Friendly: | 18 KIA | 153 WIA |
| Enemy: | 160 KIA (C) | 287 KIA (P) |
| Weapons: | 34 | |

(3) CROCKETT. Operation CROCKETT was a multi-battalion operation conducted in the Khe Sanh area in northwestern Quang Tri Province. The objective of Operation CROCKETT was to detect and destroy enemy units attempting to infiltrate into and through the Khe Sanh area of operations. The Twenty-Sixth Marines acted as the control Headquarters for the operation with the Commanding Officer, Twenty-Sixth Marines, as Senior Officer present, Third Marine Division/CG III MAF Representative. Two infantry battalions, the First and the Third battalions of the Twenty-Sixth Marines, supported by three batteries of artillery, were the major units involved. Contact was light throughout the period. Numerous company-sized search and destroy operations were conducted and numerous indications of enemy activity were found. These included abandoned harbor sites, bunkers, complexes and rocket launcher positions. Abandoned enemy clothing and ~~equipment~~ ~~was~~ also found frequently. Reconnaissance teams often made sightings of small-sized enemy units by day and heard movement at night.

Operation CROCKETT terminated on 16 July 1967 and cumulative casualties at the end of the operation were:

| | | | |
|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------|
| Friendly: | 52 KIA | 255 WIA | 1 MIA |
| Enemy: | 206 KIA (C) | 417 KIA (P) | |
| Weapons: | 26 | | |

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(4) CUMBERLAND. Operation CUMBERLAND was continuing at the beginning of the quarter. Its initial objective was the upgrading of route #578 from the city of Hue to its intersection with route #54R in the A Shau Valley. An interim objective was the establishment of a forward fire support base in the vicinity of YD 605805. At the beginning of the period a pioneer class road had been completed as far as the forward fire support base and construction had been started at the base itself. Tactical operations were under the control of the Fourth Marines and the First Battalion, Fourth Marines were deployed in the operating area to provide security for the engineer units at work there. On 7 July 1967, Operation CUMBERLAND was suspended to allow for the deployment of the First Battalion, Fourth Marines (-) in Operation BUFFALO in response to increased enemy activity in that area. Company "A", First Battalion, Fourth Marines remained in the CUMBERLAND area to provide security for those facilities that had been established. Operation CUMBERLAND resumed on 17 July 1967 with the return of the First Battalion, Fourth Marines to the area. Operation CUMBERLAND continued throughout the month of July with very minor contact.

Commencing 30 July 1967, the First Field Artillery Group began displacing forward to provide support for Operation CLOUD, scheduled to commence on 5 August 1967. Operation CLOUD was to involve the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines and selected ARVN units in a 48 hour Helicopter-Borne raid in the A Shau Valley. Operation CLOUD, however, was cancelled on 4 August 1967. Coincident with preparations, contact with the enemy began to build up to the point where contact was frequent although invariably minor. The contact was in the nature of sightings of small numbers of enemy troops, small arms and RPG attacks on resupply convoys and sniper attacks on engineer road sweeps. These contacts continued throughout the duration of the operation.

With the cancellation of Operation CLOUD, the withdrawal of the artillery and other units began. This was phased to allow for the expenditure of large amounts of ammunition on position. All major elements were out by 15 September 1967 and Operation CUMBERLAND terminated on that date. One company remained to provide security to engineer facilities in Nam Hoa area.

Cumulative casualties at the end of the operation were:

| | | |
|-----------|----------|-----------|
| Friendly: | 5 KIA | 55 WIA |
| Enemy: | 8 KIA(C) | 13 KIA(P) |
| Weapons: | 0 | |

(5) BUFFALO. Operation BUFFALO commenced on 2 July 1967 as the successor to Operation CIMARRON. Initially, it utilized the same forces as its predecessor. As it began, the First Battalion, Ninth Marines was heavily engaged with two NVA Battalions. This initial engagement involved heavy ground contact in the Con Thien area and the extensive use of supporting arms by both friendly and enemy forces. The First Battalion, Ninth Marines estimated that it received 500 rounds of enemy 82mm mortar fire. A sharp increase in enemy artillery fire was also reported in Gio Linh, Cua Viet and Dong Ha areas, during this encounter. In response to the threat posed by this major contact, the First Battalion, Third Marines and the Second Battalion, Third Marines were lifted into the BUFFALO operating area by helicopter on 3 and 4 July respectively. These battalions began operating

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ation FREMONT shifted toward the approaching national election. Efforts were directed toward maintaining the security of National Route One and toward protecting the civilian populace from the enemy's interference. During this period, Special Landing Force Bravo conducted an amphibious landing in the area north of the "Street without Joy". This landing was made under the operational control of the III Marine Amphibious Force. Upon completion of the amphibious landing, the Second Battalion, Third Marines moved inland toward the Hai Lang National Forest and came under OPCON of the Fourth Marines. Special Landing Force Alfa made an amphibious landing in the "Street without Joy" area and, upon completion of the amphibious phase, OPCON of the First Battalion, Third Marines, passed to the Fourth Marines and continued operations on the "Street". Both of these operations were intended to relieve pressure on GVN Forces in the area while the elections were in progress. Contact during these operations was light. With the completion of the elections and the departure of the Special Landing Forces, activities within the Fourth Marines AO remained normal until 12 September when the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines was displaced north to relieve the Third Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines in the Cam Lo area. The Third Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines replaced the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, in the FREMONT AO. With the termination of Operation CUMBERLAND on 15 September, the First Battalion, Fourth Marines, was added to the forces assigned to Operation FREMONT. Two companies of this Battalion were almost immediately detached to provide security for the construction of a new airfield just north of Quang Tri City. Similarly, a company of the Third Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines was detached from its parent organization to provide security for construction work in the Nam Hoa area. Coincidental with this organizational change there was a slight increase in the number and size of the contacts made in the area. This generally coincided with an increase in activity throughout the Division area. On 28 September, one company of the First Battalion, Fourth Marines, operating in conjunction with Regional and Popular Forces, conducted a Country Fair in the Ap Uu Thuong. This Country Fair was well received by the Vietnamese civilian populace and was generally considered to be a successful operation. On 29 September, elements of both Battalions operated in conjunction with the First ARVN Division in Lam Son 132. The American units provided blocking forces in the vicinity of My Giang while ARVN forces operated in the "Street without Joy" area.

Cumulative casualties at the end of the period were:

| | |
|-----------|-----------------------------|
| Friendly: | 15 KIA and 230 WIA |
| Enemy: | 115 KIA (C) and 226 KIA (P) |
| Weapons: | 32 |

(3) KINGFISHER. Operation KINGFISHER, the successor to Operation HICKORY I, commenced 161601H July 1967. Composition of forces and area of operations was the same as for HICKORY II. There were two significant contacts during July. A unit of 3/3 while on a road sweep, made contact with an estimated enemy Battalion along Route 9, west of Ca Lu in order to ambush a truck convoy enroute to Khe Sanh. The ambush site extended into the 9th Marines TAOR. The contact was violent and continuous with the enemy holding in position. A battalion sweep was conducted west from Ca Lu along Route 9 dislodging the enemy from the dominant terrain. This was in conjunction with a battalion (-) sweep conducted east along Route 9 from Khe Sanh by the 26th Marines. On 28 July, within 9th Marines TAOR, a battalion (Main) conducted a spoiling attack into the southern portion of the DMZ.

The attack moved north from Con Thien into the DMZ. Contact was light and sporadic. Numerous unmanned enemy positions were discovered and destroyed. On reaching the Ben Hai River the battalion turned and moved South.

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along the same axis the movement north. On leaving the southern boundary of the DMZ, elements of the battalion came under intense attack. The enemy was deployed in good defensive positions employing artillery and mortar fires. Upon reinforcement of friendly units under attack, the enemy broke contact. There was extensive use of supporting arms to suppress enemy artillery fires and destroy defensive positions.

The month of August began with only minor enemy contact. The 9th Marines with three battalions and the 3d Marines with two battalions were the major units involved. The 9th Marines were reinforced with two companies and a command group from 3d Bn, 26th Marines during the latter part of the month. The 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion operated in an infantry role in the east-ern part of the KINGFISHER area. Ground action was light during the early part of the month with the largest part of the activity involving artillery attacks on Gio Linh, Con Thien, Cua Viet and Dong Ha. Air Strikes, controlled by aerial observers were conducted against enemy positions and troop concentrations. ARC light strikes were conducted in the DMZ. Numerous minor contacts were made by reconnaissance teams. Activity began to pick up around the 18th of the month with a number of small contacts in the area between Con Thien and Cam Lo. On the 20th the enemy ambushed a resupply convoy moving south along Highway 9 between Thon Son Lam and Ca Lu. This contact developed into an intense fire fight. Close air support was used with good results. Final results of the contact included 109 enemy KIA (C) and 305 KIA (P). Forces were sent into the area to exploit the contact which remained heavy in the area for the next four or five days. Contacts throughout the KINGFISHER area attacks on Gio Linh, Con Thien, Cua Viet and Dong Ha steadily increased in intensity as the elections scheduled for 3 September 1967, approached. On 28 August 1967, the 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion captured 51 enemy rockets in position and ready for firing on Dong Ha. Activity in the KINGFISHER area during the month of September was characterized by increased combat in the area between Con Thien and Cam Lo. During the early part of the month this was generally close combat between moving UMC units and firmly entrenched enemy units of large size. Contact was normally initiated by enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire. This was often followed by accurate enemy mortar fire, artillery fire and, on occasion, heavy rocket fire. Marine units returned fire and called in supporting arms. The majority of enemy casualties were caused by Marine Close Air Support. During the latter half of the month, the enemy tactics shifted toward heavy mortar, artillery and rocket attacks on stationary positions such as Con Thien, Dong Ha, Gio Linh and Camp Carroll. These attacks reached such an intensity that Con Thien, for example frequently received more than 1,000 rounds of incoming per day.

These tactics were countered by heavy artillery attacks, close air and ARC light strikes on suspected enemy positions. These attacks proved successful because the volume of the enemy attacks fell off markedly following the twenty-fifth of the month. On the seventh of September, a resupply convoy from Thon Son Lam to Ca Lu was ambushed by a enemy force estimated to be of battalion size. Relief forces were dispatched from Thon Son Lam and the convoy returned to Thon Son Lam.

Cumulative casualties at the end of the period were:

| | |
|-----------|------------------------------|
| Friendly: | 285 KIA and 2788 WIA |
| Enemy: | 1041 KIA (C) and 1792 KIA(P) |
| Weapons: | 127 |

(9) ARDMORE. Operation ARDMORE commenced on 17 July and continued throughout the period. It was an extension of Operation CROCKETT and involved the same force, AO and Missions. Contacts were significant during the month of July, decreased slightly during August and decreased even more during the

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month of September. The largest contact of the period was initiated by Company "B", First Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines and Company "M", Third Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines on 21 July. This contact occurred along Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. A number of units from the Twenty-Sixth Marines and the neighboring Third Marines were thrown into the contact. The enemy was entrenched in strong defensive positions and it soon became evident that their intention had been to ambush the Rough Rider convoy that was due along the road shortly after the contact was initiated. All other contacts during the period were with small-sized enemy units. The majority of these involved reconnaissance patrols.

Cumulative casualties at the end of the period were:

Friendly: 9 KIA and 38 WIA
 Enemy: 109 KIA(C) and 205 KIA(P)
 Weapons: 10

(10) BEACON GUIDE. Operation BEACON GUIDE was conducted by SLF ALFA commencing on 21 July 1967. The initial landing was made by helicopter and water-borne means in Phu Loc District. Elements of the SLF operated in Phu Loc for a period of approximately five days with no significant contact. SLF units were then helolifted from Phu Loc District to Phu Tu district to conduct operations in conjunction with the Second Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines. These operations also met with no significant contact. Backloading of the special landing force was accomplished on 30 July, 1967 without incident.

Cumulative casualties at the end of the period were:

Friendly: 0 KIA 5 WIA
 Enemy: 0 KIA(C) 3 KIA(P)
 Weapons: None

(11) RUSH: Operation RUSH was conducted with the forces assembled in the Phu Bai TAOR for Operation CLOUD. It was a search and destroy operation conducted against suspected enemy base camps to the southeast of the Phu Bai TAOR. Participating units included a command group from the Fourth Marines, the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines (-), two companies of the Second Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines, elements of the First ARVN Division and normal supporting arms. These units made only minor contacts with small groups of enemy. These contacts were characterized by light small arms and automatic weapons fire, hand grenades and occasional booby traps. An enemy harboring site and hospital were discovered and destroyed. Operation RUSH was terminated on 9 August 1967.

Cumulative casualties at the end of the period were:

Friendly: 2 KIA and 24 WIA
 Enemy: 1 KIA(C) and 8 KIA(P)
 Weapons: None

(12) BEACON POINT. Operation BEACON POINT commenced on 1 September 1967. It was an amphibious operation conducted by Special Landing Force Bravo in the "Street without Joy" area. The landing was conducted without opposition except for some minor and essentially inconsequential harrassing fire against incoming helicopters. The major helicopter-borne forces landed well inland in the "Street without Joy" area and swept southwest toward Route One. Sporadic small arms fire, including automatic weapons, characterized the majority of the small number of contacts made. Sniper fire and command detonated mines were also encountered. On the Third of September, OPCON of the Second

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Battalion, Third Marines, the major ground element of the Special Landing Force, was passed from the Special Landing Force to the Fourth Marines, and its activities were absorbed in Operation FREMONT.

Cumulative casualties at the end of the operation were:

Friendly: 1 KIA and 21 WIA
 Enemy: 2 KIA(G) and 1 KIA(P)
 Weapons: None

b. Other operating areas

(1) Phu Bai TAOR. The 2d Battalion, 26th Marines was the Phu Bai defense battalion throughout the quarter. During July, one two-company search and destroy operation was conducted in Phu Thu. Numerous company and platoon-size operations were conducted in the TAOR. There were a total of 12 small unit contacts in the Phu Bai area and the Sparrow Hawk was launched once during the period. In August, Company and platoon size search and destroy operations were conducted in Huong Thuy and Phu Loc districts as well as extensive patrol and ambush activities. Only minor contact resulted. Forces were also provided for security of convoys and MCB units working on Rte 1. On 1 September, the Phu Bai Vital Area received an estimated 90 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 4 KIA's and 52 WIA's. Small unit search and destroy operations, patrols and ambushes characterized operations during September. Particular effort was made to interdict VC rice supply routes from the coast into the mountains in the southern portion of the TAOR. Frequent minor contacts with small enemy units occurred throughout the latter part of September. Company and platoon size units also worked in conjunction with Navy PRB (Patrol Boat River) units in Operation "GREEN WAVE" in the Dam Can Hai. PBR's inserted ambushes and patrols via the waterways but with limited success due to shallow water and noise of boat engines. On 17 September, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines assumed OPCON of L/3/26 providing security for the bridge and rock crusher in the Nam Hoa area upon the termination of Operation CUMBERLAND. Continued support and coordination with CAC units was provided throughout the quarter.

(2) Reconnaissance Zones

(a) During the 3d Quarter CY 1967, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein) conducted 372 patrols in the reconnaissance zones of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The patrols made 328 individual sightings totalling 2316 VC/NVA. There were 91 contacts with the enemy resulting in 198 VC/NVA KIA(Conf), 391 VC/NVA(Prob), and one NVA soldier captured. One enemy weapon was captured. Many sampans were also destroyed during this period by artillery fire. Friendly casualties were 10 KIA, 93 WIA, 1 MIA, and 1 Kit Carson Scout WIA.

(b) During this period 3d Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein) participated in support of Operations CHOCTAW, CROCKETT, CUMBERLAND, CIMARRON, ARDMORE, FREMONT, KINGFISHER, HICKORY II, BEACON BUIDE, BUFFALO, LIBERTY, RUSH and CLOUD (Recon Portion).

(c) Directed ground reconnaissance operations were conducted in the general areas of the enemy base areas listed in reference (a). In addition, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion was directed to reconnoiter the Hai Lang Forest area (YD 3238) and the Da Krong River Valley (YD 0535). The Battalion also operated in the area southwest of Hue and Phu Bai (YD 6006

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and YD 8487) towards the Ashau Valley (preparations of Operation CLOUD).

(d) At the end of the reporting period, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion was task organized as follows:

PHU BAI

Task Organizations

Headquarters 3d Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein)

H&S Company

Company A

Company C

DONG HA

Task Organizations

3d Force Reconnaissance Company

Company D.

KHE SANH

Task Organizations

Company B (Rein) (OPCON 26th Marines)

c. Supporting Operations (See par 2d, section IX)

(1) Rough Riders

(2) Miscellaneous Operations. The Division was tasked to provide security for the following miscellaneous operations during the quarter:

(a) Hydrographic survey team, Phu Loc and Quang Dien Districts.

(b) Topographic survey team, Phu Loc, Quang Dien and Gue Viet areas.

(c) Col CO area dredging and test boring operations.

(d) Radio Relay team, Hill 840.

Security for these operations was conducted primarily with combat support and service support units and elements of 2d Battalion, 26th Marines. A total of 550 Platoon days were expended on these missions.

d. Operational Statistics

(1) Battalion days of operation

714 - Search and Destroy

200 - Security

5 - Reserve

(2) Artillery Support

(a) Ammunition Expended (rounds)

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| MONTH | 105H | 4.2 | 155H | 155G | 175G | 8" H | 90mm |
|-------|---------|--------|--------|------|--------|------|------|
| Jul - | 119,320 | 27,370 | 26,120 | 1768 | 10,217 | 3019 | 2584 |
| Aug - | 167,424 | 11,034 | 24,721 | 3179 | 20,183 | 2970 | 2188 |
| Sep - | 106,747 | 10,741 | 20,196 | 3026 | 21,891 | 4143 | 811 |

TOTAL = 393,491 = 49,145 = 71,037 = 7,973 = 52,291 = 10,132 = 5,583

Total Expenditure: 589,652 Rounds

(b) Missions Fired

| OBS | UNOBS | H&I |
|---------|--------|--------|
| 3162 | 5297 | 31,343 |
| 3441 | 8908 | 25,352 |
| 2872 | 8379 | 22,043 |
| TOTALS: | | |
| 9,475 | 22,584 | 78,738 |

Total Missions: 110,797

(3) Naval Gunfire Support. During this period, there was a sharp increase in naval gunfire support, firing an average of 1,705 missions and 11,364 rounds (929,112 pounds) monthly.

(a) Expenditure/Missions Fired

| MONTH | MISSIONS | ROUNDS | WEIGHT |
|-----------|----------|--------|-----------|
| JULY | 1847 | 12,768 | 1,159,707 |
| AUGUST | 1537 | 10,055 | 679,714 |
| SEPTEMBER | 1732 | 11,269 | 947,916 |
| TOTALS | 5116 | 34,092 | 2,787,337 |

(b) Ship Support

| MONTH | TYPE | DAYS ON STATION |
|-------|-----------------|-----------------|
| JULY | 5"/38 Destroyer | 10 |
| | 5"/54 Destroyer | 32 |
| | 6"/47 Cruiser | 9 |
| | 8"/55 Cruiser | 10 |

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| <u>MONTH</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>DAYS ON STATION</u> |
|---------------|-----------------|------------------------|
| AUGUST | 5"/38 Destroyer | 14 |
| | 5"/54 Destroyer | 33 |
| | 8"/55 Cruiser | 2 |
| SEPTEMBER | 5"/38 Destroyer | 4 |
| | 5"/54 Destroyer | 39 |
| | 8"/55 Cruiser | 7 |
| <u>TOTALS</u> | 5"/38 Destroyer | 28 |
| | 5"/54 Destroyer | 104 |
| | 6"/47 Cruiser | 9 |
| | 8"/55 Cruiser | 19 |

(4) Air SupportJuly:

B-52 Strikes - 32

Air Support Operations (FW) - Sorties flown - 2,660
 Ordnance expended - 5,375 tons

Air Support Operations (Helo) - Sorties flown - 5,993
 PAX - 4,216
 Cargo - 1,047 tons

August:

B-52 Strikes - 42

Air Support Operations (FW) - Sorties flown - 1,920
 Ordnance expended - 3,589 tons

Air Support Operations (Helo) - Sorties flown - 1,471
 PAX - 1,569
 Cargo - 912 tons

September:

B-52 Strikes - 76

Air Support Operations (FW) - Sorties flown - 3,672
 Ordnance expended - 4,454 tons

Air Support Operations (Helo) - Sorties flown - 1,864
 PAX - 1,392
 Cargo - 730 tons

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Quarterly Totals:

B-52 Strikes - 150

Air Support Operations (FW) - Sorties flown - 8,252
 Ordnance expended - 13,418 tons

Air Support Operations (Helo) - Sorties flown - 9,328
 PAX - 7,177
 Cargo - 2,689

(5) Personnel Casualties. Hostile and non-hostile casualties for this period were:

| | <u>KIA</u> | <u>WIA</u> | <u>DOW</u> | <u>MIA</u> | <u>CPTR</u> | <u>MIS</u> | <u>NON-HOSTILE</u> | | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------|
| | | | | | | | <u>DEATHS</u> | <u>INJURED</u> | |
| USMC OFF | 25 | 184 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 214 |
| USMC ENL | 486 | 4358 | 42 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 159 | 5069 |
| USN OFF | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| USN ENL | 30 | 222 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 256 |
| TOTAL | 541 | 4773 | 43 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 163 | 5548 |

e. Planned Operations(1) RD Plans

(a) The 3d Marine Division will continue to operate outside the RD priority areas, supporting the ARVN Forces on an as required basis. By keeping the major LOC's open and providing a buffer against large infiltration of NVA/VC forces into the RD area it is hoped a secure area will be available in which the RD program can function. A total of 4 USMC officers, 1 in RD billet, and 1 in G-5/CORDS Liaison billet, each in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, are working full time in assisting the Senior Province Advisors (CORDS) in coordinating the military C/A effort in support of the RD program.

(b) Aid to refugees appears to be another way in which 3d Marine Division will continue to help expand GVN influence outside the RD priority areas. Latest GVN figures as of 23 September 1967 for the two northern provinces are:

| <u>PROVINCE</u> | <u>TEMPORARY REFUGEES</u> | <u>SCATTERED REFUGEES</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|
| Quang Tri | 48,927 | 2,073 | 51,000 |
| Thua Thien | 23,645 | 2,350 | 25,995 |

Transportation of commodities, self help projects, employment at USMC installations, and development of cottage industries are currently in progress and will continue to be encouraged.

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(c) Friendly combat operations in the Thua Thien Province during the third quarter relieved pressure in RD areas. RD progress is slow due to the emphasis given the elections in September. 7 RD Cadre have moved to second semester locations. Operation CUMBERLAND in Nam Hoa and Operation BEACON GUIDE in Phu Loc and Phu Thu were significant. An ARVN Operation LAM SON 87 in Phong Dien eradicated another VC stronghold in the "Street Without Joy" area. With the advent of the monsoon season, operations of this nature will be necessarily be curtailed, but active patrolling and aerial reconnaissance will be employed to discover movements in these areas.

(d) In Quang Tri Province, preparation for elections likewise slowed the RD effort. 3d Marine Division units are almost exclusively committed to field operations in the area north of Route #9 and DMZ area during the quarter. The construction of the new Quang Tri airfield and the resultant Marine security forces in the Sand Dunes area (YD 3155) should improve the security situation in the RD priority areas. The Quang Tri RD Campaign Headquarters is located east across the river from this site. A VC attack in August on this RD Headquarters slowed progress of the program during September. All RD teams in Quang Tri will have moved to their second semester hamlets by the end of September. This program at present is two months behind schedule and as a result objectives of the program for the second semester are being modified.

(2) Rice Harvest and Protection Plan. It is planned to make units available for rice harvest protection when operational commitments permit and when such assistance is requested by province or districts. Senior Province Advisors of CORDS in both provinces have submitted overlays depicting rice growing areas to 11 MAF. 3d Marine Division will use these in their planning and coordination with local GVN officials. Civic Action efforts will continue to stress development of secure storage sites and a receipt system so that effort expended in GOLDEN FLEECE operations will not be wasted.

(3) Named Operations to be Conducted

(a) Operation DOUGLAS, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation reinforced with appropriate combat and combat service support elements and regimental control headquarters. To be conducted north and west of Route 9, south of GL-XD 52, east of GL-XD 87 with particular attention to Hill complexes 490 (GS 9449), 492 (GS 9249) and trails running north and south from these terrain features. Estimated duration of 5-6 days. Date of operation unknown at this time.

(b) Operation MEDINA, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation reinforced with appropriate combat and combat service support elements and regimental headquarters to control and coordinate operation with similar and concurrent ARVN operations anticipated in an adjacent area. To be conducted in the Hai Lang National Forest Province encompassed by GL's - YD 41 to the north, 37 to the east, 36 to the south, and 29 to the west. To be commenced during October.

(c) Operation HOWARD, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation reinforced with appropriate combat support elements and a regimental control headquarters. To be conducted in the area north of GL YD 61, east of

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YD 04, south of YD 68, and west of YD 10 with particular attention to the area and routes of approach about the "Three Sisters" (GS-YD 0765); Hill 162 (GS-YD 0763); Hill 124 (GS-YD 0762); and through "Helicopter Valley" (GS-YD 0565). Estimated duration of operation unknown at this time.

(d) Operation GRANITE, a multibattalion search and destroy operation reinforced with appropriate combat and combat service support elements and a regimental headquarters to control and to coordinate with similar and concurrent ARVN operations anticipated in an adjacent area. To be conducted in Enemy Base Area 114 within the area bounded by the line YD 370160 - YD 545160; from YD 545160 NE along the Song Bo River to National Route 1; North along National Route 1 to Thua Thien Province border; and west along Thua Thien Province border to GL YD 37; and south to GL YD 370160. Estimated duration of 4-5 days. Date of operation unknown at this time.

(5) Special Landing Force Operations. Present planned operations envision continued utilization of SLF BRAVO in Operation KINGFISHER and the employment of SLF ALPHA in Operation MEDINA.

f. Major Areas of Command Interest

(1) Dispersion of forces to protect a fixed installations, causing a decreased tactical capability and increasing logistics requirements and efforts.

(2) Preparation for oncoming monsoon season to ensure efficiency of forces and sufficiency of supplies and materiel.

(3) Concentration of efforts to complete portions of anti-infiltration system within the established time frame prior to the monsoon season.

(4) Limited availability of forces with which to support the Revolutionary Development Plan.

h. Recommendations

(1) Provide additional availability of observation and command/control aircraft.

(2) Provide additional means to locate and destroy/neutralize enemy mortars, artillery, and rockets.

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SECTION III

MILITARY SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

1. DIRECT SUPPORT OF PROVINCIAL RD ACTIVITIES

a. Combined Operations with ARVN and Provincial Military Forces in RD Priority Areas.

(1) Specific Accomplishments, Achievements and Status of Implementation. During the quarter the 1st ARVN Division continued to support the RD areas with 3 ARVN battalions in each province while the 3d Marine Division increased their activities in districts adjacent to the RD priority areas. In Thua Thien Province the continuation of Operation CUMBERLAND in Nam Hoa District shielded the westerly approach to the RD priority areas of Huong Tra and Huong Thuy District RD areas. Operation BEACON GUIDE during July in Phu Loc and Phu Thu Districts helped establish government control in these areas and provided limited protection to southern approaches to the RD priority areas. Additional SLF operations in Quang Dien, Phong Dien and Huong Dien Districts and the ARVN Operation LAM SON 87 served to protect the northern approach to the Thua Thien RD areas. In Quang Tri Province these same operations tended to interdict VC/NVA infiltration into Quang Tri RD priority areas. Constant patrolling by 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion area near the mouth of the Cua Viet River aided in the protection of the northern approach to Quang Tri RD area. The establishment of the new Quang Tri airfield at (YD 3155) and the added U.S. security forces should serve to interdict one of the major east-west infiltration routes of the VC into this same area.

(2) Qualitative Summary Analysis of Force Expended. The offensive operations and active patrolling of Marine units mentioned above had a decisive effect on the RD situation in these provinces. The RD program, however, remains behind schedule due to setbacks during March and April 1967. Modified RD plans for second semester hamlets in the program are now being published, and it is believed these goals will be accomplished. Security was not the only reason, however, that the RD plan was behind schedule. The emphasis given to elections, lack of commodities, concentration on the DMZ refugee movement and inefficiency in organizing the program were partially responsible for the RD teams not moving to the second semester hamlets until late August or early September. Excellent leadership and relative security of Thua Thien Province has continued to provide the impetus for the program in this province and surpasses the progress in Quang Tri.

(3) Significant Problems Encountered During the Quarter. Political problems involving the DAI VIET Party threaten to stop all work during election time in Thua Thien Province and seriously hindered the Quang Tri program during September. The unfortunate death of the RD Control Chief

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of Quang Tri, Captain BACH VAN CAN, in a mining incident on Route #9 on 11 August also had political implications since he was a member of the DAI VIET Party. Accusations and counter-accusations were made during the election campaigns between military and RD Cadre in both provinces. These problems, however, seem to be subdued and the programs are returning to even keel. The real test of the RD Program is approaching in the next few months. It remains to be seen if the government will provide effective provincial follow-up services to the first semester hamlets. To date the program has provided the people with their first positive dealings with the GVN for some time and continued effort is necessary to ensure that it continues.

(4) Significant Problems Encountered During the Quarter, Recommendations for Improvements. The greatest single factor which should improve security in the Quang Tri RD areas is the establishment of the airfield at (YD 3155) and the resultant USMC security forces. This area has continually been an infiltration route by the VC into the area. Numerous mining incidents along Route #1 and the attack on the Quang Tri RD Campaign Headquarters in August were both a result of VC freedom of movement in this area. The elimination of the VC infrastructure by the GVN should receive increased attention in both provinces.

(5) Future Plans. To continue to conduct operations near RD areas whenever forces can be made available.

b. Civic Action Activities in RD Areas

(1) Specific Accomplishments, Achievements and Status of Implementation. During this quarter the 3d Marine Division has continued to furnish logistics help to CORDS and GVN organization. Transportation of commodities has been one of the major contributions. On the periphery of the RD priority areas, Division units have continued to expand the civic action program and further expose the people to the GVN. Active MEDCAP and DENCAP have treated an average 48,250 people a month in the two provinces. Defensive materials have continued to be furnished for RD hamlets and District Headquarters. USMC units assisted the Vietnamese Social Welfare Service in repairing and compensating the 70 families of Luong Am and Phuong Gia Hamlets who were left homeless as a result of the ASP explosion at Dong Ha on 3 September. The 3d Marine Division Vietnamese Scholarship program was instituted during the quarter to assist needy local students in pursuing their education opportunities. Food for work programs continued to provide a means of self-support for refugees and other people around U.S. installations. A brick factory at CAM LO refugee camp was completed during the quarter and this also has been operated for the employment of refugees.

(2) Qualitative Summary Analysis of Force Expended. The 3d Marine Division Vietnamese Scholarship Program is presently only functioning in Thua Thien Province but active plans are being made to expand it to Quang Tri Province. At present 67 students are receiving benefits in the form of

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books, lodging, uniforms or tuition aid. The brick factory, food for work programs, are a temporary measure to assist the refugee until crops can be planted and they can again become self-sufficient. Units are encouraging certain talented Vietnamese people to assist in the MEDCAP and DENCAP projects so that a base for the general improvement of sanitation and personal hygiene can be established in the hamlet. The motivating force behind our civic action program continues to be one which will help make the people aware of the GVN.

(3) Significant Problems Encountered During the Quarter. The shortage of tin and cement has seriously hindered the Division Civic Action program as well as RD teams' work in both provinces. Grave removal from U.S. installations continues to be a problem in both provinces. The people continue to be reluctant to move the graves since in some cases they haven't been paid for graves removed in 1966. The problem of transportation of civilian commodities into Khe Sanh has increased due to NVA activity along Route #9 during this period. In effect all air transportation into and out of Khe Sanh has been reduced because of weather conditions. Lack of rain during July and August will effect the rice crop this year, and in several cases cholera outbreaks occurred in the area most severely affected by the water shortage. Transportation continues to be a problem area in regards to the movements of CORDS and GVN refugee supplies. Refugees continue to be a liability instead of an asset to the GVN. Apathy on the part of GVN officials and the lack of a definite program have resulted in confusion and ill feelings of the people who are uprooted from their homes and moved to government controlled areas.

(4) Recommendations for Improvements. The CORDS organization needs to ascertain the minimum requirement for transportation and manpower and obtain the necessary civilian support to accomplish the mission. The 3d Marine Division thus far, has been able to support the program, but the tactical situation may restrict this support in the near future. A vigorous program to aid and assist refugees to establish them as useful, self-sufficient citizens is needed by the CORDS organization. 3d Marine Division has requested a re-evaluation of the civilians in the Khe Sanh area.

(5) Future Plans. The new Quang Tri airfield, expansion of Dong Ha Ramp, and dredging operations at Col Co Beach will provide the GVN permanent installations for the support of their economy when this conflict is over. Expansion of the cottage industries program will receive increased emphasis in the Division Civic Action Program.

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SECTION IV

DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALIZATION OF VC/NVA MAIN FORCES AND BASE AREAS

1. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

a. Tactical Operations

(1) The following is a list of major operations in which heavy contact was established with enemy Main Force units of battalion size or larger.

| <u>Operation</u> | <u>Date</u> | <u>Unit Engaged</u> |
|------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| BEACON GUIDE | 21 July- 30 Jul | K-4B Bn |
| RUSH | 5 Aug - 9 Aug | 804th Bn |
| BELT DRIVE | 26 Aug - 1 Sep | 800th Bn |
| BEACON POINT | 1 Sep - 3 Sep | 6th NVA Regt units |
| PHU BAI | 1 Jul - 30 Sep | 804th Bn |
| FREMONT | 10 Jul - 30 Sep | 6th NVA Regt units |

(2) No operations were conducted against enemy base areas.

b. Redonnaissance Operations

(1) Reconnaissance operations and resultant statistics are described in Section II.

(2) There has been active ground reconnaissance conducted not only in enemy base areas listed in III MAF Campaign Plan 1-67, but also in areas in which other intelligence sources have indicated ground activity.

c. Supporting Air Operations

(1) An active ARC LIGHT and radar controlled bombing program has been carried out in the past 3 months. Reports from prisoners and ralliers indicate that these bombing programs have had an adverse effect on enemy personnel and equipment as well as morale.

(2) The TPQ program statistics:

| | |
|-----------|---------------|
| JULY | 791 Strikes |
| AUGUST | 998 Strikes |
| SEPTEMBER | 417 Strikes |
| | 2,206 Strikes |

(3) ARC LIGHT Strikes have been carried out in the following areas:

| | <u>JULY</u> | <u>AUGUST</u> | <u>SEPTEMBER</u> |
|----------|-------------|---------------|------------------|
| Khe Sanh | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| DMZ | 1 | 27 | 84 |

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| | <u>JULY</u> | <u>AUGUST</u> | <u>SEPTEMBER</u> |
|---------------|-------------|---------------|------------------|
| A Shau Valley | 19 | 13 | 6 |
| Base Area 114 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| Base Area 101 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| | <u>27</u> | <u>13</u> | <u>90</u> |

d. Statistical Data

(1) Enemy casualty figures from operations in which contact was made with Main Force units are used to assess unit strengths.

| <u>Operation</u> | <u>KIA(CONF)</u> | <u>KIA(PROB)</u> | <u>WEAPONS</u> |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| BEACON GUIDE | 10 | 42 | 3 |
| RUSH | 1 | 8 | 0 |
| BELT DRIVE | 11 | 25 | 10 |
| BEACON POINT | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| PHU BAI | 87 | 195 | 46 |
| FREMONT | <u>115</u> | <u>226</u> | <u>32</u> |
| | <u>226</u> | <u>289</u> | <u>91</u> |

2. QUALITATIVE SUMMARY ANALYSIS

a. Tactical Operations

(1) Summary of tactical operations is continued in Section II and in paragraph 1 above.

b. Reconnaissance Operations

(1) Summary of reconnaissance operations is continued in Section II.

c. Supporting Air Operations

(1) Accurate BDA is based on aerial photography and ground exploitation both of which are limited. PW's and ralliers also provide information on results of air support. From these sources it has been determined that extensive damage has been done to enemy personnel, equipment and supplies as well as installations and LOC's. However, the relatively limited use of ARC LIGHTS against the Main Force unit and Base Areas in relation to the DMZ suggests that the effect during this quarter is not as extensive in the previous three months.

d. Supporting Artillery Operations

(1) Specific results are not readily available and preclude accurate analysis. It should be noted that PW's and ralliers hold artillery and air in the same light.

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e. Intelligence

✓ (1) Indications received from intelligence sources, including combat intelligence, prisoner, ralliers, documents, and agent reports tend to confirm that the Main Force units were punished severely during the previous quarter and while USMC operations did not account for as many enemy casualties as in the previous quarter, ARVN operations against Main Force units were very successful. The bulk of Marine contact has been with NVA forces in the DMZ area. It is significant that as a result of aggressive operations against the Main Force units by USMC forces and ARVN, working in close cooperation, the enemy is understrength and is suffering from a severe shortage of food and medical supplies. At the present time, all Main Force units are engaged in the collection and transportation of rice to their safe areas in preparation for the monsoons.

3. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

✓ a. Previously, both ground and air reconnaissance efforts were hampered because of limited assets to provide detailed deep reconnaissance. While the problem is not completely solved, corrective action has been taken by expanding the reconnaissance battalion tables of organization to include additional patrolling assets.

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SECTION V

DEFENSE OF BORDERS AND INTERDICTION OF KNOWN LAND AND SEA INFILTRATION ROUTES

1. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

a. All operations conducted during the period have had, in part, the objective of interdiction of overland infiltration routes into or through the designated operation areas. See Section II for a description of these operations and plans for their continuation.

b. Operation HIGHRISE, artillery fire missions on valid military targets in the DMZ and North Vietnam, continued during the 3d Quarter, FY 1967.

c. The forward artillery base, established by Operation CUMBERLAND, fired missions on valid military targets in the A Shau Valley.

d. Construction commenced on Strong Point Patrol Bases, Base Areas and Combat Operating Bases in Northern Quang Tri Province in support of anti-infiltration and intrusion detection systems. Initial unit cadres received training in the installation, operation and maintenance of sensor and surveillance devices for future employment within these systems. Training of cadres is continuing.

e. A heavy schedule of strikes by Marine aircraft and Air Force ARC LIGHT operations was aimed at interdicting enemy infiltrations throughout the Northern ICTZ and in particular, the A Shau Valley. At the end of the quarter, priority of air missions went to areas around Con Thien and the DMZ with the main purpose of relieving pressure on ground units but with the secondary effect of interdicting infiltration routes.

2. QUALITATIVE SUMMARY ANALYSIS

a. Friendly operations have hindered enemy infiltrations and have exacted casualties. A large percentage of the air strikes and artillery fire described in Section II have been directed toward the interdiction of enemy infiltration routes. Despite these measures and named operations, enemy infiltration does continue, particularly between the mountainous base areas and the coastal region.

✓ b. Infiltration from NVN into SVN has decreased during the latter part of this quarter. The bulk of infiltration is directed toward replacements for the units that are presently operating in the DMZ area.

✓ c. Infiltration from Laos into South Vietnam in the Khe Sanh area during the first part of this quarter was heavy. However, during the latter portion it appears to have decreased. Weather restrictions have hampered friendly visual reconnaissance of this area for the past month. It is estimated that infiltration is continuing at light rate.

✓ d. Hai Lang agent reports, recon patrol reports, and documents indicate a moderate flow of troops moving Southeast through the Hai Lang National Forest area into Thua Thien. These troops are replacements/reinforcements for the Main Force Battalions presently operating in Thua Thien. This is a decrease compared to infiltration in the first and second quarters.

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✓e. In the Alouai-A Shau Valley area during the first quarter, infiltration was heavy due to the necessity of replacing the heavy losses sustained by the Main Force units during this period. During this quarter infiltration has decreased from moderate to light and will probably continue to be light until the termination of the monsoon season. It appears that resupply is the main concern as the monsoon approaches. Significantly, during this quarter, infiltration into Thua Thien via Nam Hoa from A Shau was expanded. Prior to this it appeared that almost all infiltration through A Shau was directed toward reinforcing and resupplying units to the South of the 3d MarDiv AOR.

3. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS

- a. Insufficiency of friendly troop density to achieve desired degree of saturation patrolling to properly effect interdiction.
- b. Limited availability of observation type aircraft which in turn limits the simultaneous coverage of known and suspected infiltration routes.
- c. Insufficient number of boats to patrol known water LOC's and rice routes.

4. RECOMMENDATION

Continuing efforts be made to alleviate force deficiencies indicated above and in Section II.

5. FUTURE PLANS

Continuing effort is being made to keep constant pressure on the enemy through all means available to this Division and to maintain this pressure through the monsoon season. Continuing and proposed operations are outlined briefly in Section II, and all are directed in part to the defense of borders and interdiction of known enemy routes of infiltration. As resources, time, and weather permit, additional operations will be planned.

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SECTION VI

SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF MILITARY AREAS AND INSTALLATIONS

1. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

a. During the period, the 3d Marine Division provided the security and defense of the following military areas and installations:

(1) Phu Bai Combat Base. This base area includes the 3d Marine Division command post, an infantry battalion, an artillery battalion, Navy mobile construction battalion, an element of the Force Logistic Command, the 8th Radio Research Field Station, the Hue-Phu Bai Airfield with Marine Corps and U. S. Army Aviation Elements, and a number of combat support and combat service support units. The defense is provided by tenant units and one infantry battalion. Coordination and control of perimeter defensive measures is vested in the base defense coordinator.

(2) Col Co Causeway (YD 843322). This area includes a POL receiving and storage site and a detachment of Naval Support Activities, which performs mine sweeping and river control from the mouth of the Song Huong River to the city of Hue. Construction of a port facility and covered storage area is underway. Security for the area is provided by elements of the 3d Shore Party Battalion and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

(3) Gia Le Combat Base (YD 830150). This area houses certain combat and combat service support units of the Division, Headquarters of 32d NCR and a Navy Mobile Construction Battalion. Security is provided by tenant units under the control of CO, 3d Tank Battalion who has been designated installation coordinator.

(4) Dong Ha Combat Base (YD 242598). This base area includes the command posts of the 9th Marines and 12th Marines, an infantry battalion, artillery batteries, and elements of the Force Logistic Command, an airfield with Marine Corps, Army and Air Force Aviation elements, an Air Force radar control installation, and the combat support and combat service support units which support operations throughout Northern Quang Tri Province. The base defense is provided by tenant units and is controlled by a Base Defense Coordinator.

(5) Cua Viet POL Site (YD 342693). This area includes a receiving and storage site for POL, an LST Ramp, and a Detachment from Naval Support Activities, which provides mine sweeping and river control from the mouth of the Cua Viet to Dong Ha. Security for the area is provided by the 1st Amtrac Bn (-)(Rein).

(6) Gio Linh Artillery Outpost (YD 214742). This Fire Support Base located in Northeastern Quang Tri Province houses artillery units tasked with the mission of developing artillery fire into the DMZ and North Vietnam in support of Operation HIGHRISE. The outpost is defended by tenant units and an attached rifle company (Rein). Presently this outpost is the eastward extent of the obstacle/barrier system being constructed.

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(7) Con Thien Outpost (YD 116701). This outpost is manned by Marine ground and artillery units as the western terminus of the Gio Linh-Con Thien cleared strip. This terrain feature dominates most of the area overlooking the DMZ forward of the Con Thien-Gio Linh complex. Forces deployed here are under OPCON of the 9th Marines.

(8) Camp Carroll (YD 063548). This combat base houses the 3d Marines Regimental Headquarters, one infantry battalion, supporting artillery units, and other combat and combat support units. Headquarters 3d Marines, from this position, controls operations in the western Operation KINGFISHER AO. The Camp is defended by one infantry battalion and tenant units.

(9) D-5 Base (Cua Valley) (YD 097517). This patrol base provides security for the populated area of the Cua Valley and is now wholly defended by a combined action platoon. The CAC platoon patrols the surrounding area maintaining security in the Cua Valley Area.

(10) Ba Long Outpost (YD 158399). This patrol base was deactivated during the quarter. All USMC forces (one rifle company and one 107mm mortar battery) were redeployed in the Third MarDiv AO on 14 September 1967.

(11) Ca Lu Outpost (YD 010458). This patrol base provides security and denies access to VC/NVA forces along Route 9. During July and August 1967, Ca Lu Outpost provided the necessary USMC elements to defeat an NVA attempt to occupy a portion of the terrain dominating Route 9 in two separate, strong contacts. The outpost is defended by a Marine rifle company (Rein). Ca Lu Outpost provides security and denies access to the western approaches of the Ba Long Valley.

(12) Thon Son Lam Outpost (YD 989550). An infantry battalion (-) and supporting artillery are positioned at this combat base. From this position, these units provide security for Route 9 and the western approaches to Quang Tri Province from the north into Cam Lo and Dong Ha. This outpost is defended by tenant units.

(13) Khe Sanh (YD 849417). This base includes an airfield with Marine Corps and Air Force activities. Headquarters, 26th Marines with one infantry battalion and supporting artillery are presently located in this area. They provide security for the airfield, base camp, and are conducting Operation ARDMORE in the Khe Sanh AO.

2. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

a. Employment of Infantry Assets. The requirement to defend designated military areas and installations results in a diversion of infantry troops from more productive missions. Maximum use has been made of tenant units, other than infantry, to defend the installation perimeters.

b. Adequacy of Security. During the period, number of NVA initiated ground attacks on Con Thien, and Cam Lo have required additional security in the way of increased infantry support. The forces employed throughout the 3d Marine Division TAOR, to defend vital areas, are considered the absolute minimum to effectively counter enemy capabilities. There must continue to be a capability to rapidly reinforce each of these locations.

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3. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

a. The increased volume of NVA artillery fire against the areas of Con Thien, Gio Linh, and Cam Lo has necessitated increased rotation of units defending these areas in order that the defending forces maintain a continued alertness and a capability for rapid reaction to ground attack.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS. Procedures be established to retain the Division at its manning level even during periods of high casualty rates.

5. FUTURE PLANS

a. The security and defense operations listed in paragraph 1 (above) will be continued.

b. The defense areas at Cua Viet and Dong Ha will be increased as additional units and facilities can be added in support of the strongpoint construction project.

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SECTION VII

IDENTIFICATION AND ELIMINATION OF THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE

1. SPECIFIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION INCLUDING STATISTICAL DATA FOR THE QUARTER

a. The 1st and 15th Counterintelligence Teams under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF have continued to update from documents, interrogation reports and other official correspondence received from various U. S. and ARVN sources and the card file index identifying members of the VC infrastructure.

b. The assistance of District, village and Hamlet Chiefs, in addition to members of the National Police in screening detainees suspected of being VC infrastructure has proven to be a valuable asset towards identifying and eliminating the VC infrastructure.

c. The use of Chieu Hoi's, when possible, who wish to demonstrate their desires to cooperate with the Government of Vietnam (GVN), have added to the overall effort.

2. QUALITATIVE SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF EFFORT EXPENDED

a. During the period from 1 July to 30 September 1967, a total of 178 detainees have been screened/interrogated. Of this total, 20 have been identified as VC infrastructure.

b. The program utilizing Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) Teams in Quang Tri Province has realized success in collecting information of both intelligence and counterintelligence interest. To date, the overall evaluation of this program is satisfactory.

c. The stationing of a man in the city of Hue with the Special Branch, National Police to coordinate the collection, processing and dissemination of information of an intelligence interest with the 12 agencies operating in the Hue-Phu Bai area has proven, to date, to be of value to the counterintelligence effort.

3. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE QUARTER

a. The Major problem area encountered, as in the past quarter, is the actual locating of members of the VC infrastructure once such members have been identified. This is due, primarily, to the reluctance of the local populace of a village or hamlet, that is controlled by the VC at any given time, to identify infrastructure personnel for fear of reprisal.

b. In contrast to paragraph 2b above, the utilization of the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) Teams in Thua Thien Province has not been successful owing to internal organization problems.

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4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS

a. That the PRU Program be revised to allow the use of PRU personnel for counterintelligence operational assignments. This would require PRU personnel to be assigned to a Counterintelligence Team for an indefinite period of time to allow for special training for the particular assignment.

5. FUTURE PLANS

a. To continue to intensify efforts directed towards the recruitment of informants with specific emphasis placed upon VC infrastructure.

b. To contact the Senior Advisor for the PRU Program to establish a suitable working situation for the utilization of PRU personnel in Thua Thien Province.

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SECTION VIII

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. ACHIEVEMENTS AND STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

a. Statistical data

(1) The following number of leaflets were dropped from aircraft:

| | |
|-------------------------|------------|
| (a) Chieu Hoi | 59,128,000 |
| (b) NVA | 18,087,000 |
| (c) Safe Conduct Passes | 18,025,000 |
| (d) Rewards | 1,284,000 |
| (e) Varied Themes | 24,331,000 |

(2) There were 290 hours and 10 minutes of aerial broadcasts covering the same basic themes as the leaflet drops.

(3) There were 370 hours and 55 minutes of ground broadcast and 235 hours and 40 minutes of waterborne broadcast.

(4) There were 51 hours of movies shown.

(5) Hand distribution of leaflets, posters and JUSPAO newspapers totaled 437,093.

b. Specific achievements

(1) One hundred-ninety-eight (198) VC/NVA rallied through the Chieu Hoi program in Thua Thien Province and Quang Tri Province.

(2) A formal Kit Carson Scout (KCS) school was established and 34 scouts were graduated from the school.

(a) Scouts were assigned to 3d MarDiv units as follows:

| | |
|-----------|---------------------------|
| 3d MarDiv | 1 (Instructor KCS School) |
| 3/3 | 3 |
| 1/4 | 4 |
| 1/9 | 4 |
| 2/9 | 3 |

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| | |
|-------------|---|
| 3/9 | 3 |
| 2/26 | 5 |
| 3/26 | 4 |
| 1st AmTracs | 2 |
| 3d Recon Bn | 3 |
| CAC P-2 | 1 |
| CAC P-5 | 1 |

(b) The Kit Carson Scout program has been very effective and the individual scouts have earned the respect and trust of the Marines for whom they have worked. Four (4) scouts were wounded in action while on patrols with Marine units. The Scouts have participated in 315 patrols and are responsible for saving many Marine lives by exposing ambushes, locating mines and booby-traps and locating ammunition caches.

(c) Kit Carson Scout Le Van Thuy was involved in a heroic incident while serving with 1/9. During a mortar attack a Marine scout was wounded. Le Van Thuy left his position of safety during the attack, pulled the Marine back to his hole, dressed the Marine in body armor, and insured his medical evacuation. Le Van Thuy has been recommended for a Cross of Gallantry for this act of heroism.

(3) All named operations and regimental TAOR's were supported with Psychological Operations as well as the Phu Bai TAOR, the Recon zones and the A Shau Valley.

(4) Waterborne operations were very successful in Quang Tri Province with Coastal Group 11 and in Thua Thien Province with Coastal Group 12. Chieu Hoi, Curfew and Support GVN themes were broadcast for a total of 235 hours and 40 minutes.

(5) A special leaflet offering a 25,000 \$VN reward for information leading to the capture or destruction of enemy artillery that had shelled the Dong Ha Combat Base was dropped on 30 July northwest of Dong Ha.

(6) The NVA campaign was supported with NVA oriented leaflet drops throughout both northern provinces with emphasis on Quang Tri Province. In addition, rally appeals and Safe Conduct Passes were distributed throughout probable NVA locations stressing the fact that NVA personnel are also welcome in the Chieu Hoi Program. The 804th NVA Battalion has been heavily targeted in the Phu Bai TAOR with night harassment, aerial broadcast and leaflet drops.

(7) A new rocket rewards leaflet offering a 100,000 \$VN reward for information leading to the capture or destruction of enemy rockets and launchers was widely distributed in Quang Tri Province. A new general rewards leaflet was also distributed in both Quang Tri and Thua Thien Province.

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(8) Armed Propaganda Teams were used successfully by 3d Division units.

(a) Ten Armed Propaganda Team personnel were attached to 1/3 for Operation BEACON POINT, 1-5 Sep 1967. The Team's efforts resulted in two (2) VC killed, eight (8) VC captured and two (2) VC ralliers.

(b) An Armed Propaganda Team was established in Quang Tri Province. A 3d Marine Division liaison team located at Quang Tri has worked effectively with the team.

(9) The Province Cultural Drama Teams have been invaluable during the County Fairs conducted by 3d Marine Division units. In addition to their performances they have assisted with the organization of family groups and the distribution of food and supplies.

2. QUALITATIVE SUMMARY ANALYSIS

a. The NVA/VC efforts to discourage the reading of leaflets has continued.

b. The wife of a VC soldier rallied to Coastal Group 12 in July 1967. She gave waterborne broadcasts as the deciding factor for her rallying.

c. The extensive targeting effort on the 804th NVA/VC Battalion produced eight ralliers including an NVA 1st Lt and an NVA Sgt. All the ralliers stated that the leaflets and aerial broadcasts had influenced them to rally.

d. A rallier from the Phu Loc subsector (ZC 1698) reported that leaflets are effective because whenever his unit had leaflets dropped on them they would immediately move to another position for fear that they had been discovered. This created a secondary effect of lowering morale as the troops had little or no time to rest.

e. The effectiveness of the Thua Thien APT which supported Operation BEACON POINT is noted in specific achievements (par 1a(8) above).

f. The Kit Carson Scout program has been widely accepted and the participation in 315 patrols and their value to the Marine units has been highly praised by all the commanders for whom they have worked.

3. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

a. The NVA shelled the Con Thien area with propaganda leaflets on three occasions during the last week in September. The delivery of counter leaflets was prevented by the monsoon rains. The intensity of artillery, Naval Gunfire and rocket fire in the DMZ and Northern Quang Tri area has also prevented effective aerial PsyOps missions.

b. Quick reaction to possible PsyOps opportunities is precluded by the unavailability of helicopters and the limited number of HB (combat speaker team) and POET (PsyOp Exploitation Team) Teams.

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c. Leaflets in sufficient quantity and with the desired theme are often not available to the requesting units.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Action should be taken to acquire propaganda leaflets shells in the supply system. Artillery delivery of propaganda leaflets would not be affected by adverse weather or other restrictions that are inherent in aerial delivery.

b. An additional HB team should be assigned to Quang Tri Province.

c. A sufficient supply of leaflets with varied themes should be printed and stored for immediate use.

5. FUTURE PLANS

a. Future plans include the improvement of aerial dissemination of leaflets and broadcast in Quang Tri Province.

b. Special emphasis will be placed on increased hand distribution of leaflets during the monsoon season.

c. All possible means of psychological operations will be continued and will be improved to support specific operations and to exploit tactical situations.

d. The Armed Propaganda Teams in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces will be employed more frequently with Marine units.

e. Two additional Kit Carson Scout Schools are planned for the next quarter. The eventual goal of the 3d Marine Division is to have two qualified Kit Carson Scouts deployed with each rifle company in the Division.

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LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

1. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

a. General

(1) The period covered by this report was characterized by large movements of units, supplies, and equipment by both air and surface means. The increased tempo of operations in the Division area has placed a high priority on improvement of the Hue and Dong Ha LCU ramp facilities.

(2) Extensive planning for the 1967-68 Monsoon Season was undertaken, resulting in submission to higher headquarters of the Division's requirements for supplies and equipment for the coming season. Planning guidance, requisitioning instructions and material allocations were published to unit commanders.

b. Specific achievements during the period

(1) Engineer

(a) During this quarter the major effort of the 11th Engineer Battalion was expended in the implementation of DYE MARKER Projects. DYE MARKER base areas, A-4 and C-2, were improved and strengthened. Fifty-one large bunkers were built at these positions and minefields were installed. Route 561, the only line of communication with the outposts at Con Thien, C-2 and Cam Lo, was improved throughout the period. Between Route 9 and just north of the Cam Lo River the road was surfaced with rock and sealed with asphalt. The bridge across the Cam Lo River was upgraded to Class 60. Road improvement has been hampered in September by heavy rains that closed Route 561 north of C-2 for much of the month and inundated the Cam Lo bridge several times. A September re-evaluation of DYE MARKER resulted in the publishing of a new Operation Plan and Administrative Plan reflecting a considerably changed concept.

(b) The maintenance of Route 9 from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh is a responsibility of the 11th Engineer Battalion. Despite continued enemy interdiction, the road has been kept open to Class 60 traffic to Thon Son Lam by replacing destroyed bridges and improving bypasses. Between Thon Son Lam and Khe Sanh the road was opened several times during July and August for resupply convoys to Khe Sanh.

(c) Elements of the 3d and 11th Engineer Battalions pioneered a road along the path of RVN Route 547 to a fire support base that was cleared from the jungle 17 kilometers west of the Song Huong in Nam Hoa District. As the operation progressed, a 765' floating bridge was installed across the Song Huong River near Nam Hoa and the road was continually improved and maintained to accommodate daily resupply convoys.

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(d) In late September the Division Staff relocated to the new 3d Marine Division Command Post at Phu Bai. The new facility, including a large administrative building and quarters for the Commanding General and his senior staff, has been completed with the exception of two large communications bunkers.

(e) Considerable progress was made during the last quarter in the construction of living facilities for 3d Marine Division personnel. Funds for the FY 67 MCON program were released in early July. Construction of the items funded in this program, including cantonments and recreational facilities at Phu Bai/Gia Le, is now 45% complete. The advanced Base Functional Component Program is providing cantonments at the forward operating bases with construction underway at Camp Evans, Dong Ha and Cua Viet.

(2) Communications - Electronics

(a) Radio Relay channel miles were increased from 3919 to 4309 miles.

(b) Multipair cable channel miles were increased from 1061 to 1885 miles.

(c) 3d Marine Division has 48 operational voice/teletype circuits on the Integrated Wideband Communications System.

(d) A secure voice radio circuit has been established between Combat Operations Center, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Combat Operations Center, 3d Marine Division.

(e) A secure voice/teletype system is being installed between 3d Marine Division Combat Operations Center and USAF Nakhon Phanom Thailand and will become operational on 1 October 1967.

(f) Communications Support Company (-), 7th Communications Battalion, operates the Dong Ha Combat Base Communications Center, and area toll switchboard (MTC-1), servicing all units in the Dong Ha Area.

(g) Hardening and dispersal of Communication facilities were continued throughout the 3d Marine Division area of operations.

(h) All Division units were visited by a Communications - Electronics Contact Team.

(i) Division wide Communications - Electronics schools were held on waterproofing and unit preventive maintenance for telephone/teletypewriter equipment.

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(3) Embarkation

(a) Required repairs at the Khe Sanh airfield precludes the use of C-130 and C-123 aircraft for resupply missions. US Air Force C7A aircraft (Caribou) have been used to assist in resupply of units at the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

(b) A total of 3,448,710 lbs of supplies was air dropped (parachute) to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the quarter.

(c) The US Air Force Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System, LAPES, was used successfully to deliver construction material for airfield repair at Khe Sanh.

(d) Naval Support Activity, Danang, has assumed control of the operation of the Dong Ha LCU Ramp. In addition to controlling the operation of the Dong Ha Ramp, NSA is providing personnel and material handling equipment to increase cargo movement across the ramp site.

(4) Motor Transport

(a) 3d and 9th Motor Transport Battalions traveled 692,904 miles transporting 82,025 short tons of cargo and 224,639 personnel.

(b) Motor Transport battalions maintained an operational readiness status of 92 percent.

(c) Division Motor Transport Section inspected 13 units during the quarter.

(d) The 515th Light Transport Company, 543d Medium Transport Company and 556th Medium Transport Squad (-) POL, US Army units, have been attached to the Division to support DYE MARKER and Quang Tri airfield construction.

(5) Ordnance

(a) Division Ordnance and FLSU-1 personnel conducted inspection visits to Dong Ha Combat Base and units operating in the area to improve ammunition storage.

(b) Technical inspections of Division units were conducted and assistance provided where necessary.

(c) An M-16 maintenance instruction team from III MAF visited the Division in July. The team contacted ordnance personnel at all levels, assisting in the inspection and repair of weapons.

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(d) Six M110 8" Self-propelled Howitzers have been received, replacing the M55 Self-propelled Howitzers. The in-service date for the M110 Howitzers was 24 September.

(6) Supply

(a) As of 31 August 1967 the excesses and cancellation program has resulted in \$9,755,237.41 in cancellations and \$2,262,971.29 in excesses returned to supporting supply activities.

(b) All requisitions for monsoon requirements were submitted to the Commanding General, Force Logistic Command. Units in the Khe Sanh Combat Base area received priority of shipment and have received rainsuits and fighting hole covers. The remainder of the Third Division units will receive monsoon material on receipt of sufficient assets at FLC.

(c) Through intensified efforts and close coordination with supporting supply activities, shortages of M-16 rifle cleaning gear, jungle boots, lightweight utilities, cushion-sole socks and lumber were alleviated to some extent.

(d) In anticipation of the impending GAO visit, which was subsequently cancelled, all units of this command were visited by Supply Management teams. These visits were in addition to the Commanding General's inspections, and the routine visits of the Supply Management teams which continue throughout the year. Particular emphasis was placed on computing requirements, maintaining stock record cards and disposal of excesses.

(e) This command initiated the use of Supply Early Warning messages whereby supporting activities and higher headquarters were advised of potential problem areas.

(7) Medical

(a) On 8 July, "D" Company, 3d Medical Battalion relocated within the Dong Ha Combat Base. "D" Company has a 60 bed capacity and 4 operating suites.

(b) On 28 July, MUST Unit #2 was received at "A" Company, 3d Medical Battalion. The MUST unit was erected and is operating an additional 40 beds and 2 operating suites.

(c) There are 29 Hospital Corpsmen attached to the CAG Program who treated 29,740 civilian patients in the MEDCAP Program.

(d) Aerial insecticide spraying was accomplished in MAG-16 area at Dong Ha on 17 July after the Division Preventive Medicine Section noted malaria producing mosquitoes.

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(e) OpBud project 10 for 1st quarter FY-68 was started and Requisition Obligation Authority was mailed to each unit for ordering of Medical/Dental Supplies.

(f) Division Order 6230.1B (Malaria, Control and Prevention) was updated and submitted for printing on 17 September.

(g) The Division Surgeon's Office was relocated from B-10, Cantonment 1 to the new Command Post south of Cantonment 4 on 21 September.

(8) Dental

(a) The dental facility at Camp Evans was installed on a more permanent basis when a tropical hut was built. Previously, a Dental/Surgical Van provided the care in that area. The scope of activities was increased by the assignment of two Dental Officers and three technicians, resulting in a more complete operative care and carries preventive treatment.

(b) The Dong Ha facility, located at the "D" Med site, was relocated into new buildings. On 21 September a second building was added to increase the scope of care available. The clinic now offers complete operative care and limited Prosthetic appliance care, a service previously not available at that clinic.

(c) The "Operation Circuit Rider" concept in Mobile Combat Dental Support was expanded. Expansion of the concept has brought dental care to units which would otherwise have been denied care due to operational commitments and distance. Dates and areas visited are as follows:

1967 Col Co Island, Cua Viet, Rockpile, Cam Lo: 19 Jun-19 Jul

Operation CUMBERLAND: 29 Jul- 1 Aug 1967

Rockpile: 22 Aug - 7 Sep 1967

Col Co Islands: 11 Sep - 22 Sep 1967

(d) Based on personnel statistics obtained by liaison with G-1 and the results of the initial Circuit Rider visit to Cua Viet, the decision to install a Dental/Surgical Van at that site was made. As of 14 September 1967, the trailer was installed. Care is now available, offering operative and carries prevention treatment. One Dental Officer and two technicians staff the Van.

(e) As of 25 September a total of 12,524 military patients were treated resulting in 38,056 procedures being performed.

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(f) A continuous Civic Action Program is in effect. As of 25 September a total of 4,077 civilian patients were treated resulting in 13,037 procedures being performed.

(9) Other

(a) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force approved a table of equipment for the Combined Action Group Headquarters and directed this Division to requisition all required items.

(b) A special allowance of 4-60mm and 2-81mm mortars was approved for the 1st Amphibious Battalion to assist the battalion in accomplishing its security mission at the mouth of the Cua Viet River.

(c) The 9th Periodic FMFPac Logistics Conference was held on Okinawa during the latter part of July. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 attended as the Division representative.

(d) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, participated in a conference at Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force on 17 August. The purpose of the conference was to firm up requirements for the 1967-68 monsoon season.

2. SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL DATA

a. Sealifts:

| | | |
|-------------------|-----------|------------|
| Danang to Hue | 436 LCU'S | 45,191 S/T |
| | 1 AKA | 2,598 S/T |
| Danang to Dong Ha | 383 LCU'S | 60,608 S/T |
| | 30 LST'S | 16,850 S/T |

b. Airlifts:

| | |
|--------------------|----------------|
| Danang to Phu Bai | 5,553,271 lbs |
| Danang to Dong Ha | 10,317,435 lbs |
| Danang to Khe Sanh | 11,613,030 lbs |

c. Airdrops:

| | |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Danang to Khe Sanh | 2,723,972 lbs |
|--------------------|---------------|

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d. Armed Convoys (Motor Vehicle Rough Riders)

| | <u>Convoys</u> | <u>No Trucks</u> | <u>Pers</u> | <u>Cargo S/T</u> |
|----------------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|
| Phu Bai - Dong Ha | 18 | 1,004 | 3,563 | 1,367 |
| Dong Ha - Lang Vei | 6 | 348 | 1,404 | 405 |
| Phu Bai - Quang Tri | 2 | 84 | 172 | 40 |
| Dong Ha - Khe Sanh | 7 | 350 | 809 | 515 |
| Dong Ha - Camp Evans | 6 | 212 | 730 | 250 |
| Camp Evans - Cam Lo | <u>4</u> | <u>180</u> | <u>1,621</u> | <u>325</u> |
| Total | 43 | 2,178 | 8,299 | 2,902 |

e. Resupply Convoys (Road Runners)

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Phu Bai - Camp Evans | 78 | 3,496 | 11,528 | 4,600 |
| Phu Bai - CUMBERLAND | <u>81</u> | <u>2,617</u> | <u>7,497</u> | <u>3,231</u> |
| Total | 159 | 6,113 | 19,025 | 7,831 |

3. QUALITATIVE SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF EFFORT EXPENDED

a. Engineer. The 11th Engineer Battalion provided Force engineer support to the Division and the 3d Engineer Battalion provided combat engineer support. In August the 32d Naval Construction Regiment was activated in Phu Bai/Gia Le and assumed control of the three Naval Mobile Construction Battalions supporting the Division. These forces have been augmented during the quarter by detachments from four other NMCB's.

b. Communication-Electronics. A major effort by Communication-Electronics personnel was directed toward improving the physical security and dispersion of Division communication facilities and improving unit level maintenance.

c. Motor Transport. Armed convoys (Rough Rider) continue to augment other modes of transportation. The heavy rains in the northern portion of the TAOR during the middle of September have made the roads to Khe Sanh, Gio Linh and Con Thien often impassable for trucks. To assist in resupplying the northern combat bases, infantry regiments will be augmented with the M76 "Otter". The 9th Marines are presently utilizing 10 "Otters" and augmentation will be provided to the remaining infantry regiments in the near future.

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d. Maintenance. Short supply of replacement parts for accomplishment of both 2d and 3d echelon maintenance continues to hamper the overall maintenance effort of the Division. The Direct Exchange program which should, in theory, reduce deadline time, has in fact not appreciably alleviated this problem. The shortage of spare parts precludes the availability of exchange items. Building of covered working spaces and increased availability of electrical power has provided Division units with improved shop facilities. Increased emphasis is being placed on 1st and 2d echelon maintenance in conjunction with visits to the field by maintenance assistance teams. Continued liaison with Force Logistic Command has been maintained in an effort to purify the information contained in the Deadlined Combat Essential Equipment Report.

e. Supply. Through the efforts expended as outlined in paragraph 1.b(6), many problem areas previously encountered in obtaining supplies and equipment were alleviated or eliminated. Optimism in these areas, however, must be tempered with caution in view of the need for a continuous and even flow of supplies to insure that former problem areas do not become a problem again.

f. Medical. The total medical program was accomplished with insufficient medical personnel. Due to rotation of hospital corpsmen, Division assets of medical personnel were brought below T/O and a message for additional personnel was submitted to FMFPac to establish a new manning level. Directives previously holding personnel assigned to the Special Landing Force for 13 months were rescinded, shortening the tour to 12 months. This reduction in tour time increased the workload of remaining personnel necessitating a request for 50 additional medical personnel to satisfy requirements of the Division.

g. Dental. The monthly dental service reports consistently show that dental procedures per operator in 3d Dental Company greatly exceed those in most dental facilities. However, the overall effectiveness is considerably less than it should be due to delays in improvements, interruptions from enemy action, faulty equipment, poor access to troops in remote areas, and adverse weather and climate. The great amount of dental treatment is provided to men of the Division due to the hard work and perseverance of the dental personnel providing the treatment. At the same time, the effort is not always directed to the right men, at the right place, at the right time. In some areas many non-essential procedures are carried out because a dental officer is available; in other areas, there are Marines in serious need without benefit of dental care.

4. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE QUARTER

a. Engineer

(1) The beginning of rains in September has had a serious effect on road construction and other earthwork. Heavy flooding in mid-September

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washed out roads and bridges in the Dong Ha area, closing Route 1, both north and south of Dong Ha and seriously damaging the vital Cam Lo Bridge on Route 561.

(2) Enemy and flood destruction of bridges and culverts along with the impassability of fords and bypasses due to heavy rains, place new and greater demands on the tactical bridging available to the Division. There is insufficient bridging available to replace many of the major bridges in the TAOR should they be destroyed.

(3) The shortage of repair parts for all types of engineer equipment continues to hamper the engineer battalions in the performance of their mission.

(4) A shortage of construction materials, particularly lumber of all sizes, and electrical wire, has prevented the accomplishing of many needed tasks. In September both engineer battalions began to receive much badly needed lumber, but for most of the quarter there was no lumber available for any but the most urgent tasks.

(5) The Division has insufficient generators to provide necessary electrical power. Many battalions are operating with generators only large enough to support vital needs. On several occasions the deadlining of generators caused battalions to be without power for several days until a replacement generator could be obtained.

b. Communications-Electronics. Primary problem areas were in shortages of critical accessories and spare parts for C/E equipment, specifically PRC-25 accessories and modules, planar triodes for the TRC-27B, monoblocs for BB-451 batteries and Communication Center supplies.

c. Embarkation. Flooded conditions at the Dong Ha ramp have greatly impaired the offloading of LCU's.

d. Motor Transport

(1) The Direct Exchange program for motor vehicle repairable components is ineffective. The non-availability of rebuilt components i.e. starters, generators, distributors, brake cylinders, etc; seriously hamper 2d echelon maintenance.

(2) The 3d echelon deadline at FLSU-1 and FLSG-A is continually growing. The primary problems are shortage of M422A1 repair parts/components and LDS-465 engine repair parts/components.

e. Ordnance

(1) Continuing shortages of repair parts for ordnance items.

(2) Lack of cleaning equipment for the M16A1 rifle.

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(3) Lack of adequate maintenance facilities and equipment in the Dong Ha area.

f. Supply

(1) Although certain chronic areas of shortages were alleviated as stated in paragraph 3e., there remain many areas which require immediate and constant attention. Shortages of repair parts, automotive batteries, tires and tubes, the inability of the direct exchange program to function as intended and the long turn around time on 3d and 4th echelon maintenance has seriously impaired units maintenance capabilities and caused excessive and lengthy deadline within this Division.

(2) At the present time a large backlog of material and equipment is awaiting shipment at FLC. The transportation problem takes on added significance when viewed in light of the approaching monsoon season. Although transportation is available, weather conditions preclude movement of aircraft and vehicular traffic. Included in the supplies awaiting transportation at FLC are such urgently required items as PRC-25 parts and accessories, electrolyte and typewriters.

g. Medical

(1) One problem encountered was the lack of medical supplies by the using units. MEDCAP supplies are low, with none received in the last 45 days.

(2) It was found that most medical supplies were available but not issued expeditiously by FLSU-1 or FLSG-A. Also the requests for supplies were improperly completed and DD Form 1348 was rejected by the machine.

(3) Timely receipt of Hospital Corps personnel replacement is not occurring.

(4) Due to heavy combat losses and early rotation dates, critical Hospital Corps personnel shortages exist.

h. Dental. Few base camps have had sufficient electric power to support even the smallest dental unit. The T/E PF-75 generator is inadequate. The total rating for one dental unit is approximately 30 amps and requires at least a 5 KW generator for independent power.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS

a. That continued efforts by external activities be made to insure availability of all supplies, with emphasis on those items which are in chronic short supply. Particular attention should be given to the requirement to provide ample transportation from supply sources to this TAOR.

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b. That vigorous action be taken to insure that the Direct Exchange Program functions as intended.

c. That the medical supply system be monitored and improved as necessary to insure that requests for medical supplies are expeditiously processed, filled and delivered.

d. That a new manning level be established for the medical department and additional personnel be provided.

e. That essential dental treatment be completed in CONUS or Okinawa on all Marines prior to their assignment to RVN.

6. FUTURE PLANS

a. Engineer

(1) The Division expects to expand the major portion of its engineer capability to support DYE MARKER, including the upgrading and maintenance of lines of communication vital to the project.

(2) Construction of cantonments under the MCON and Advanced Base Functional Components Program will continue throughout the Division.

b. Communication-Electronics

(1) Construction and activation of a new, larger, Division Communication Center (4th quarter, CY 67).

(2) Installation and activation of AUTOSEVOCOM (1st quarter, CY 68).

(3) Installation and activation of AUTODIN (early CY 68).

(4) Receipt and installation of an AN/TCC-28, 600 lines, tactical dial system (4th quarter, CY 67).

(5) Construction of a transmitter site to service 3d Marine Division CP, Phu Bai (4th quarter, CY 67).

c. Embarkation. Four LST ramps are under construction at Hue. These ramps are scheduled for completion in the near future.

d. Motor Transport. To establish within the Division an accountability and inventory control system of motor transport equipment by using Electronic Machine Accounting Procedures.

e. Supply. To monitor the needs of this command insuring that supporting activities are constantly aware of stated requirements and abreast of the total supply situation in this TAOR.

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f. Dental

(1) Formulate and implement a program for providing earlier, more comprehensive dental treatment of Marines arriving in-country, in order to eliminate those serious conditions present which have a high potential for becoming acute when the man is not available to dental facilities.

(2) Reconstitute as many mount-out blocks as possible in order to be prepared for future deployment. This can be accomplished in part, by installation of excess garrison dental equipment which is becoming more available from other Naval Dental facilities.

(3) Install three mobile dental vans in more remote locations in the Division TAOR when base camp facilities become adequate.

(4) Expand scope of care offered to Camp Carroll and Khe Sanh by installing one additional Dental Officer and one technician at each facility.

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| G-2 W.O. | <i>F</i> |
| DCPO | <i>W</i> |
| APD | <i>W</i> |
| ACTION | <i>MEDINA</i> |

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
FIRST WAVE OF BLT 1/3 (A) TOUCHED DOWN LZ HAWK YD 386454 AT
100326H. NO ENEMY CONTACTS.

GP-4

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| G-2 W.O. | <i>F</i> |
| DGPO | <i>✓</i> |
| APD | <i>✓</i> |
| ACTION | <i>✓</i> |

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MAJOR KUNG*

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OPCON OF BLT 1/3 (MINUS). BASTION HILL (U)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 091120Z OCT 67

B. CG III MAF 090002Z OCT 67

1. OPCON BLT 1/3 MINUS PASSED TO CG III MAF AS OF 100826H.

2. CTG 79.4 CONCURS.

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

2/EJM/mts
3802
12 Oct 1967


MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
To: Chief of Staff

Subj: Memorandum: The Threat to Phu Bai Combat Base

Encl: (1) Subject memorandum

1. Enclosure (1) has been prepared by the G-2 Section and is provided for your information.


E. J. MILLER

C-2

A real fine job.

Rec. Kelly paper map showing
prior routes incidents etc. & be
ready to summarize this report
for CG on 13th.



Also make sure Col Richardson
+ 2/3L see this



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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

2/RDK/rb
3800
12 Oct 1967

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MEMORANDUM

From: Plans and Estimates Officer
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Subj: The Threat to Phu Bai Combat Base

Ref: (a) 1st CIT report 1CIT/032(R)/67
(b) 1st CI Team Limited Physical Security Survey of
Phu Bai Combat Base dtd 1Sep67

1. Background. On 14 August 1967, Tran Cho rallied to the SVN Government at Loc An Village, Phu Loc District. In the course of his interrogation, reported in reference (a), he described his unit as a 900 man force which had recently received newly infiltrated troops. His unit was located in the Troui Mountain region of Phu Loc District, with the mission of conducting extensive preparations for an attack to be staged against Phu Bai Combat Base during October 1967. This enemy force, identified by Cho as the 109th Battalion (formerly the 804th Battalion) allegedly was composed of 4 companies armed with the standard issue of infantry weapons for an NVA/VC light infantry force. Specifically, this unit was to conduct reconnaissance of Phu Bai Base in the intervening time and drill the soldiers on the details of the attack through the employment of a sand table model of the USMC installation. This unit is carried by our Order of Battle as the 804th Battalion, but the size is considerably smaller. The timing of the report is consistent with the probable required lead time for an infiltration force assignment of mission.

2. Recent Enemy Activity. Extensive enemy movements have been reported in the past few weeks in the adjacent districts of Nam Hoa, Phu Vang, Phu Thu, and Phu Loc. Agent reports passed to the 1st CI Team tell of continual troop deployments:

a. 30 September. An agent report, evaluated O-6, spelled out a detailed plan of the 122d Regiment for three subordinate units; the 202 Engineer Company, the H-6 Mortar Company, and

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the B-55 Assault Company to conduct a two-phased operation during October as follows:

1-7 October

The engineer company is to destroy all bridges connecting with Highway #14 (Route 545)

The H-6 Mortar Company is to harass US/ARVN positions along National Route #1 from the Nong River (YD 966104) to Da Boc Pass (ZD 055027). Other targets are the Phu Loc and Nam Hoa District Headquarters and CAP 6/9.

8-15 October

Conduct a combined attack against the Phu Bai Combat Base and/or Thua Thien District Headquarters.

The 42nd Sapper Battalion of the 122nd Regiment is to coordinate the attack. Ammunition caches have allegedly been established at Bao Vinh (YD 937068) and Nam Phu Can (YD 958041) protected by a security force based at Phuoc My (YD 961048).

b. 5 October. Another agent report, rated C-3, repeated portions of the above report. It identified the exact attack period on Phu Bai as 14-15 October. Specifically it detailed a unit movement in the early evening of 13 October from a secret base camp to Da Nai Hill (YD 854105), with two platoons setting up a security type ambush in the vicinity of (YD 922109). An aid station is to be located in An Cu (YD 904092). The attack will expend 500 U/I rounds of ammunition.

c. 6 October. A C-3 report noted the C-2 Company would mortar Phu Bai Combat Base on 15 October, the anniversary of "Troui Day". This day commemorates a VC who attempted to assassinate Secretary of Defense MacNamara.

d. 7 October. A C-3 report disclosed enemy forces deploying from Kinh Tac (YD 933143) to the banks of the Dai Giang River where they are preparing trenches, across from Hoa Da Dong (YD 913179).

e. 8 October. An attack date of 1 November was predicted in a report which foretold the use of four battalions supported by the K-4 Rocket Company (122 and 140mm Rockets) which would hit Phu Bai Base from three directions. Again, the mention of a sand table model was noted. The significance of the

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1 November is the SVN remembrance of the overthrow of the Diem Regime in 1963 and the occasion of the inauguration of president-elect Thieu this year.

f. 9 October. Additional details of the movement to a position across from Hoa Da Dong was reported with a C-3 evaluation. This information identified the 4th Company, 116 H-3 Battalion relocating from Nguyet Bieu #1 (YD 785134) to Loi Nong (YD 847195). From that locale, it would use 35 boats to travel down the Dai Giang River to a position in the vicinity of (YD 906167) from which it would mortar Phu Bai Base. The 1/8 Company was tasked to depart Vinh Lai on 11 October for Hoa Da Dong to assist in the mortar attack. A ground assault was to take place against the perimeter with automatic weapons and small arms fire being employed to reduce U. S. counter-mortar fire.

g. 7 October. A 1st CI Team report noted that the following attacks have taken place since 1 October as predicted by earlier agent reports.

(a) Da Bac Culvert destroyed on 1 October at ZD 063107

(b) CAP H-1 bridge destroyed at YD 927104 on 3 October

(c) Bridge adjacent to CAP A-3 position at YD 913117 destroyed.

In addition an attack was staged on ARVN forces in Hue City on 3 October.

3. Previous attacks on Phu Bai. The possibility of an attack on Phu Bai Combat Base has remained a constant threat since the creation of the base. The last attack which was a two-night series, occurred in conjunction with the September Presidential Election. This attack had been forecast in a series of agent reports for several weeks prior to the occurrence. With the preponderance of reports suddenly emerging that predict another attempt, attention is certainly merited.

a. Many of the Base's 934 civilian employees are possibly VC or sympathizers and are well aware of our vulnerabilities and may in fact have assisted during the previous attacks.

4. Diversionsary Tactic. The rise of incidents is noteworthy in the southern portion of the Division Area of Responsibility. The heavy losses incurred by the enemy in the Eastern DMZ through air, artillery and ground engagements dictates the

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return to the favorite enemy tactic of creating a diversionary action in a relatively quiet sector to draw off allied pressure in the area of enemy defeats. (He must readily recognize the vulnerability of USMC installations in the southern sector when international new agencies repeatedly publish accounts of our major force deployment in the region immediately above Dong Ha Combat Base).

5. Phu Bai Defenses. As noted in reference (b), certain sectors of the Phu Bai Combat Base are relatively weak in defense. The northern check point where National Route #1 enters the base is barricaded by only a single roll of concertina wire. It is secured by three marines armed with M-16 rifles. A M-42 self-propelled Twin 40mm weapon provides backup fire power. The southern check point barricade is constructed of 4x4 lumber and barbed wire - however it only reaches halfway across the highway.

6. Goals. An attack on Phu Bai Base would have two major goals.

a. A propaganda value demonstrating the vulnerability of the foreign military powers to VC/NVA attacks at a time of the enemy's choosing.

b. When combined with increased acts of aggression in the southern sector of the Division AOR it would seem to force a requirement for redeployment of some of the forces now located in the Eastern DMZ to security roles in the protection of permanent installations and LOC's.

7. Phu Bai Objectives. In order of highest priority, the following segments of Phu Bai Base, should command the attention of an attacking force:

a. The MAG-16 Complex along the northeastern flank of the base. Damage to helicopters would limit observation, reduce the reinforcement capability, and provide a severe blow to the logistical distribution picture.

b. The ASP. The destruction of which would reduce the fire support capability of this installation and place an additional strain on the already overtaxed logistical system.

c. The Artillery Base neutralization would reduce the danger of H&I fires; increase the vulnerability of CAP's and allied installations in the adjacent area; deprive our recon of artillery support, and hamper the defense of the whole Phu Bai Combat Base.

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d. The fuel farm destruction would provide a limiting factor to overland resupply and troop movements.

e. The Division CP heavy damage would create a major propaganda victory for the VC/NVA. While the removal of key Officers and Staff NCO as casualties would cause some initial internal difficulties, the separate location of the ADC and a nucleus of an alternate CP at Dong Ha would provide for instant assumption of command and control responsibilities.

8. Enemy Tactics. The primary tactics described in the agent reports to be employed in an attack on the base are:

a. From three directions. Troop movements down the Dai Giang River to the vicinity of Hoa Da Dong would be one direction. An attack from the southwest by elements of the 804th Battalion located in the Troui Mountain area is another. The delivery of a supporting mortar/rocket attack from the mountains west of the base would provide the third direction.

b. The ground assault (if employed) would be logically aimed at the following locations:

(1) Helo Parking area

(2) ASP

(3) Fuel farm

c. Entry points for ground assaults are:

(1) North and south National Route #1 checkpoints

(2) Perimeter in the vicinity of the water point

(3) CAP gate in the wire north east of the airfield.

9. Conclusions

a. The likelihood of rocket/mortar attack on Phu Bai Combat Base in the immediate future is highly probable.

b. The employment of mortars/rockets would be the most logical means of attacking Phu Bai Combat Base to gain the maximum effect with the minimum risk.

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c. Any ground assault would be an extremely costly affair for the enemy, to be conducted with the realization that only a minimum number of troops would evade capture and/or death.

d. Restrictions on friendly fire support because of the proximity of friendly troops and government-oriented villages would aid the enemy effort.

10. Recommendation

Appropriate operational measures should be implemented to provide early warning of an attack and deter the enemy forces.

Very Respectfully

R. D. KELLEY

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1. 010020H: Enemy fired on bridge from ZD 115014
2. 010840H: Puffs of smoke sighted from suspected enemy mortar position at ZC 101989. Phu Loc received incoming at same time.
3. 010920H: Received 30 rds mortar and 6 rds 57mm RR fire, 300 rds 50 cal. 40 rds SAF at ZD 095007
4. 012055H: 5 VC walked into ambush set up at YD 966043
5. 011815H: Vehicle received AMF from unknown size unit at YD 824182
6. 020845H: Mine sweep discovered 2 mines at ZD 060020
7. 021130H: Observed 2 sampans at YD 730101. Both camouflaged
8. 021930H: Received SA and AMF at YD 747135
9. 021700H: Team observed 5 and then 7 VC at YD 710139
10. 021945H: Engaged approx 30 VC at YD 952060
11. 030200H: CAC H-6 received 5 rds 60mm mortar, 20 rds SAF at ZD 139009
12. 032345H: Fired on 4 enemy at YD 912115
13. 040315H: Bridge at YD 926103 on Highway # 1 80% destroyed
14. 041255H: Team observed 12 VC at YD 773061
15. 050100H: Received 5 rds SAF and 1 grenade at ZD 087007
16. 050945H: Team observed 20 NVA lead by a VC moving N on trail at YD 793069
17. 052315H: Med Evac helo received 5-10 rds of SAF and crashed via YD 902120
18. 052220H: Ambush sprung on 3 VC at YD 909110
19. 052220H: Patrol exchanged fire with 7-10 VC at YD 905098
20. 060245H: Bridge at YD 913117 was blown
21. 060830H: Team observed 5 VC at YD 911058
22. 061030H: Recon team came under fire from unknown number of enemy at YD 912058
23. 062200H: 12 VC walked into ambush site at YD 914105
24. 062300H: Spotted 7 VC at YD 909149
25. 070300H: Approx 100 VC spotted moving N. by NW at YD 924081
26. 071530H: AO reported ARVN company being hit by est Co. to Bn of VC at YD 990178

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27. 072125H: Observed 5 VC and received approx 20 rds SAF at YD 963057
28. 071920H: RF Company made contact with est VC company at YD990178 & YD 985182
29. 071550H: 4th and 2nd ARVN Regt made contact with est VC Bn at YD 973196
30. 080730H: Point man found explosive device with trip wires at YD 931061
31. 081115H: Team observed 15-20 NVA/VC digging fortified position at YD 854061
32. 082030H: PF on bridge saw 2 people in water. PF fired and received SAF from across river at YD 934085
33. 082050H: Bridge security made contact with unknown number of enemy at ZD 153040
34. 090115H: VC fired on PF compound at ZD 041023
35. 090800H: Observed 3 VC apparently policing area ta YD 851063
36. 091120H: Spotted 3 NVA heading toward Hill 618 at YD 774081
37. 100252H: Bridge blown at ZD 137011 (50% destroyed)
38. 100020H: Patrol fired on 4 VC at YD 844157
39. 100805H: Culvert blown at ZD 167011
40. 101050H: Bridge at ZD 152011 received 3 mortar rds. Found 4 mortar positions at ZD 143001
41. 101220H: Team spotted 4-6 VC at YD 735157
42. 701753H: AO spotted boat loaded with what appeared to be ammo boxes at YD 925150
43. 101900H: Patrol spotted 4 VC at YD 895100
44. 102120H: Patrol spotted 3 VC at ZD 086014
45. 102300H: Vc fired on Chieu Hoi Village at YD 851169

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12 OCT 64

PBR

DATE OF REPORT 1990 C O M F I D E N T I A L
 NAME AND POSITION VC DAN CAU HAY. THIS MSG ADDRESSES EVALUATION
 OF SECURITY FOR OPS 1 C2.
 VC DAN CAU HAY REVEALED THAT THIS AREA IS
 UNPROTECTED PER OPSO AREA WAS UNPRODUCTIVE 1
 TOGETHER WITH TRAFFIC OR VC AC

OPERATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN LOSS OF PER AND CREW TO MORE ALERT
DETECTION OF FISH NETS AND WEIRS. FURTHER RESTRICTS
WILL MAKE BASE LOCATION NOT POSSIBLE WITHIN DAM CAU HAI
AND BASE CHANGE AT CG13. LOCATION AT CG12 APPEARS INFRACTICAL
DUE TO INABILITY TO COMPLETE TRANSIT VIA TUNNEL. REPEATED
ATTEMPTS TO RELOCATE.

... DIA MET WITH IMMEDIATE VIOLENCE AND
... ALTHOUGH NAVIGATIONAL PROBLEMS WERE
... TRAFFIC WAS NOTED ASIDE FROM FISHING
... WAS HEAVY AND WELL DIRECTED. ON SCENE COMMANDER

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1004 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 SUFFICIENT DEPTH OF RELATIVELY SECURE BANKS, AND SUFFICIENT SEAROOM FOR MANEUVERABILITY. NEITHER CONDITION WAS MET.
 ESPECIALLY IN THE FERRY POSITIONS LINE SOUTH BANK CUA DAI AND
 DELETED PORT OF YATONG. THIS AREA UNSATISFACTORY FOR PER. 5.
 6. PATROLS IN TRUONG GIANG WERE UNPRODUCTIVE AND UNEVENTFUL
 DESPITE PROLONGED ARRIVAL.

7. RETURN TO DUTY CAN BE

WAS DELAYED BY HEAVY SEAS. ONLY ONE
 PATROL WAS CONDUCTED DUE HEAVY SURF AT CG13. FISHERMEN APPEARED
 SUSPICIOUS OF THE RETURN. UNABLE TO SUSTAIN OPS DUE DAMAGE TO
 BOATS IN THE CUA DAI.

8. WITHIN 100Z NORTH 1 CTZ OPS 5 OF 10 PER ARE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
 ONLY DUE TO DETERIORATION OF BATTLE DAMAGE.

9. RECOMMEND OPS IN 1 CTZ NOT BE INITIATED FOR
 PROLONGED PERIODS.

10. NAVIGATION CHANNELS WITHIN 100Z WATERWAYS EXCESSIVELY
 RESTRICTED IN SPEED AND MANEUVERABILITY.

11. INTENSE GROUND THREAT PRECLUDES PROPER WATERWAY TRAFFIC
 CONTROL BY PER.

12. WATERWAY SITUATION NOTED PARA 6 PRECLUDES SUSTAINED OPS.
 SOME WATERWAY INFRASTRUCTURE ARE NOT CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THIS

1004 C O N F I D E N T I A L

NAVIGATION CHANNELS.

13. RECOMMEND PER HAVE RELATIVELY LIGHT WATERBORNE TRAFFIC COMPARED
 TO HONG KONG. STRONGLY BELIEVE PER CAN BE USED FOR MORE
 PRODUCTIVELY IN SUPPORT OF MACV MISSION IN IV CTZ. PLANS FOR EXPANDED
 OPS IN IV CTZ INCLUDE ALL PRESENTLY ASSIGNED/PROGRAMMED PER.

14. FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT PACV OR AIR BOATS USE BE
 CONSIDERED FOR IV CTZ OPS. SUGGEST EITHER MAY BE MORE
 SUITABLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT THAT EXISTS.

15. SEVERAL GREEN HAVES UNITS REVEALS FURTHER INFO OF
 IMPORTANCE. WILL SUBMIT IN SUBSEQUENT MSG

1004
 1004


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DE MAF NR 169 169

ZNY CCCCC
P 120059Z OCT 67
FM III MAF COC
TO THIRD MARDIV COC
FIRST MARDIV COC
AMERICAL DOV TOC
BT

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PBR OPERATIONS

A. CTF 116 030620Z OCT67 (PASEP)

B. CG 1ST MARDIV 042245Z OCT67 NOTAL

1. REF A PEFERS. REQUEST COMMENTS ON RECENT PBR OPERATIONS CONDUCTED WITHIN YOUR TAOR'S BY 15 OCT67.

2. FOR 1ST MARDIV. RECOGNIZE INFO PROVIDED REF B PARTIALLY ANSWERS PARAGRAPH ONE. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO DEEMED APPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF REF A.

GP-4

BT

Tor 12 0940H JH Z
Action: COC
Normal

#65

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
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End 24

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SECRET
 DRAFTER 3/MAK/STP
 SEC 0-3 PHONE SHOVE 223
 CWO *WOM*
IMMEDIATE *121259* OCT 67
 FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: FOURTH MARINES
 FIRST MARINES (-)(REIN)
 TWELFTH MARINES
 THIRD RECON BN
 THIRD ENGINEER BN
 INFO: CG III MAF ✓
 CG FIRST LAW
 THIRD SHORE PARTY BN


| | |
|------------------|------------|
| SHOVE CQC | |
| CP CHIEF | <i>1</i> |
| G-3 W.O. | <i>ghf</i> |
| G-2 W.O. | <i>ghf</i> |
| DCRO | <i>ghf</i> |
| APO | <i>ghf</i> |
| ACTION | <i>ghf</i> |

To Granite Folder

//SECRET//

OPERATION GRANITE UPDATE/WARNING ORDER

- A. CG THIRD MARDIV 070207Z AUG 67
- B. CG THIRD MARDIV 181313Z AUG 67
- C. CG THIRD MARDIV 230757Z SEP 67
- D. THIRD MARDIV LOI 1-67
- E. THIRD MARDIV 0 PLOCCD
- F. THIRD MARDIV 0 P0000.2F
- G. THIRD MARDIV 0 P2000.4C
- 1. BACKGROUND

REFERENCES (A), (B), AND (C) PROVIDE PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION GRANITE. ANTICIPATE OPERATION WILL COMMENCE 24 OCTOBER 1967. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE SUPPLEMENTED AS SHOWN HEREIN:

- 2. INTELLIGENCE. DETAILED INTELLIGENCE UPDATE OBJECTIVE AREA BEING PREPARED FOR DELIVERY EARLIEST.
- 3. MISSION. COMMENCING ON OR ABOUT 24 OCTOBER 1967, FOURTH MARINES (-)(REIN), IN COOPERATION/COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN DIVISION FORCES, CONDUCTS COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE DESIGNATED AO IN ORDER TO CAPTURE/DESTROY ENEMY LOGISTIC CACHES, INSTALLATIONS, AND EQUIPMENT; OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE; AND TO KILL OR CAPTURE ENEMY ENCOUNTERED.

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

SECRET*Encl 25*

SECRET

TO: AREA OF OPERATION: ENEMY FROM AREA 22, TUA THIE PROVINCE, VICINITY HILL 674 (YD 5121). SPECIFIC BOUNDARIES OF OBJECTIVE AREA WILL BE BASED UPON TACTICAL COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATION AFTER COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN DIVISION AND ENEMY SITUATION DEVELOPED DURING INTELLIGENCE UPDATE.

5. FORCE ALLOCATION

- A. TWO MARINE BATTALIONS (REIN)
- B. ANTICIPATE TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WILL PARTICIPATE IN SIMILAR OPERATION IN ADJACENT AREA.
- C. AIR SUPPORT AS REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE.
- D. SUPPORTING COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FROM 3D MARDIV ASSETS AS REQUIRED.

6. EXECUTION

- A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (SEE 4TH MARINES OPLAN WHEN PUBLISHED).
- B. FOURTH MARINES
 - (1) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS
 - (2) PREPARE CONCEPT AND OPERATION PLAN FOR REVIEW BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.
 - (3) SUBMIT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS WITH EMPHASIS ON D-DAY, FIRST WAVE HELICOPTER LIFT EARLIEST.
 - (4) ESTABLISH LIAISON 1ST ARVN DIVISION FOR COORDINATION/CO-OPERATION DURING OPERATION.
 - (5) ASSUME (CON BLT 1/3 (-) AND SECURITY FORCES QUANG TRI AF (1/4 (+)) FORCES ON ORDER.
- C. FIRST MARINES (-)(REIN)
 - (1) CHOP 1ST BN, 3D MARINES TO 4TH MARINES UPON COMPLETION OPERATION MEDINA.
 - (2) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY SECURITY QUANG TRI AIR FACILITY UPON WITHDRAWAL CURRENT SECURITY ELEMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT

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BY ETC. DURING DURING OPERATION GRANITE

D. 12TH MARINES. PROVIDE ARTILLERY SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.E. 3D RECON BN. GENERAL SUPPORT WITH PRIORITY OF EFFORT TO 4TH MARINES DURING OPERATION GRANITE.F. 3D ENGINEER BN. GENERAL SUPPORT, BE PREPARED FOR MAXIMUM DEMOLITION EFFORT IN SUPPORT 4TH MARINES.G. ALL OTHERS. PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.H. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) D-DAY O/A 24 OCTOBER 1967

(2) L-HOUR TBA 4TH MARINES

(3) CDA AUTHORIZED

(4) MAXIMUM USE OF SUPPORTING AREA PREPARATION FIRES, WITH EMPHASIS ON OBSERVED FIRE AND PREPARATION FIRES IN VALLEYS AND ALONG STREAMS.

(5) ESTIMATED DURATION OF OPERATIONS 5-6 DAYS.

(6) UNCLASSIFIED CODE NAME IS GRANITE

(7) EMPHASIS ON COORDINATED, DELIBERATE, LIMITED OBJECTIVE ADVANCE.

(8) DIRLAUTH ALCON

7. ADMIN/LOGISTICS. IAW REFERENCES (D) AND (E).8. COMAND/COM-ELEC

A. COM-ELEC IAW REFERENCES (F) AND (G).

B. COMAND RELATIONSHIP WITH 1ST ARVN DIVISION IS ONE OF COOPERATION/COORDINATION.

GP-4

CC# 1493

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W H Curran

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DRAFTER 3/NAK/CDS
 SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 203
 CWO W. W. H. H.

PRIORITY 13/105 OCT 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: THIRD MARDIV

PLANS

//CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN//

VIETNAMESE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS

RVN

THE SUBJECT

1. THE ~~VIETNAMESE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES~~ WILL HOLD ~~NATIONWIDE~~ ELECTIONS ON
 ON A NATIONWIDE BASIS
 22 OCTOBER 1967 ~~TO ELECT REPRESENTATIVES TO THE~~
~~HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES~~.

2. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE ENEMY FORCES IN THE THIRD MARDIV AO WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DISRUPT AND DISCREDIT THIS ELECTION IN THE EYES OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE ENEMY WILL EMPLOY BOTH TERROR AND PROPAGANDA IN INCREASING INTENSITY DURING THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION. IN ADDITION THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING EFFORT TO DISCREDIT THE ELECTIONS AS RIGGED OR U.S. DOMINATED.

3. THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE ELECTIONS DEPENDS TO A LARGE EXTENT ON THE SECURITY PROVIDED BY THE RVNAF DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD AND THE SPIRIT WITH WHICH THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ELECTING THEIR GOVERNMENT.

4. ACTIONS BY U.S. FORCES IN THIRD MARDIV AO DURING THIS ELECTION PERIOD MUST ASSIST THE RVNAF FORCES IN MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE POPULATED AREAS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THE PEOPLE TO VOTE FREELY WITHOUT FEAR OF ENEMY REPRISAL. AT THE SAME TIME IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OPERATIONS AND ACTIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PREVENT ACCESS TO THE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONS

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GVN/RVNAF WHILE PRECLUDING ANY ~~INTERFERENCE~~ OF U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE ELECTION PROCEEDINGS. U.S. SUPPORT, THEREFORE, MUST BE RESTRICTED TO OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY BASE AREAS AND INTERDICTION AND DENIAL OF ROUTES OF ENTRY INTO POPULATED AREAS.

5. IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE A FEELING OF U.S. INFLUENCE, THE PRESENCE OF UNIFORMED U.S. FORCES AND VEHICLES IN OR NEAR ~~POLLING AREAS~~ ^{POLLING} AREAS WILL BE PROHIBITED ON 22 OCTOBER 1967 AND WILL BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM DURING THE PERIOD 18 OCTOBER TO 23 OCTOBER

~~1967~~

6. OPERATION ORDER 55-67 (OPERATION LIBERTY II) ASSIGNED MISSIONS AND TASKS TO UNITS OF THE 3D MARDIV IN SUPPORT OF THIS POLICY.

7. COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS WILL ENSURE THAT ALL HANDS ARE INFORMED OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE ELECTIONS TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. IT WILL BE STRESSED THAT THE CONDUCT OF INDIVIDUAL MARINES MUST REFLECT THE POSITION AS STATED ABOVE, AND ALL U.S. ACTIVITY (PATROLS, VEHICLE RUNS^(P)) SHOULD AVOID POPULATED AREAS DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD. IN ADDITION, COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE WITH LOCAL RVNAF COMMANDERS AND GVN OFFICERS TO ENSURE THAT LOCAL RESTRICTIONS SUCH AS CURFEW, ETC., ARE STRICTLY ADHERED TO DURING HIS PERIOD.

GP-4

CCN

1591

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W.H. Chenin

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

528367

2/OOB/r1b
3821
Ser: 02A283-67
15 Oct 1967

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From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List


Subj: Quarterly Enemy Order of Battle Summary

Encl: (1) Order of Battle Chart

1. Enclosure (1) summarizes enemy Order of Battle in the 3d Marine Division area of responsibility.

2. Updating of this summary will be published in the PERINTREP. Significant changes which require more rapid dissemination will be issued by separate messages.

3. Addressees are requested to furnish this Headquarters with information they may obtain to improve or modify this summary.


E. J. MILLER
By direction

DISTRIBUTION: "D" PLUS

III MAF (1)
1st MARDIV (1)
1st MAW (1)
NCR-32 (4)
VMO-3 (1)
G-2 Rep Dong Ha (2)
G-2 Rep Khe Sanh (2)
1st CTF (1)
15th CTF (1)
15th ITT (1)
1st ITT (1)
17th ITT (1)

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
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Encl 27

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UNIT

806th BN

AKA2nd Infil Bn
K-6
Le Loi
D-10
80 T BnLBN41290 Bk
Di Hai
1596 Br Di
HaiWPNS (NC-TYPE)3x81MM Mortar
6x60MM Mortar
3xHMG
3x75MM RR
3x57MM RR
4x890's
12x840's
29xAutomatic riflesPERSONALITIESCO-NGUYEN XUAN
XO-CAPT THANH

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12A

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ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 15 Oct 1967

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

| UNIT | TYPE | CAT | ESTIMATED STR | COMBAT EFFECT | ACCEPTED LOCATION | LAST REPORT | DATE |
|----------------|------|-----------|---------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|---------|
| 341st Division | NVA | C | 7,100 | Unknown | Vinh Linh SS | | |
| Div Hq's | NVA | C | 150 | -do- | YD 0993 | | |
| Div Hq's Spt | NVA | C | 1,850 | -do- | E. Vinh Linh SS | | |
| 31st Regiment | NVA | C | 1,622 | -do- | E. DMZ/Vinh Linh SS | Gio Linh(D) | 19May67 |
| Regt Hq's | NVA | C | 200 | -do- | -do- | Vinh LinhSS | 13May67 |
| 1st Bn | NVA | C | 422 | -do- | -do- | -do- | -do- |
| 2d Bn | NVA | C | 500 | -do- | -do- | Gio Linh(D) | 19May67 |
| 3d Bn | NVA | C | 500 | -do- | -do- | YD 1070 | 13Mar67 |
| 270 Regiment | NVA | C | 1,700 | -do- | -do- | Nghe An(P)(?) | -do- |
| Regt Hq's | NVA | C | 200 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 4th Bn | NVA | C | 500 | -do- | -do- | | 21Oct66 |
| 5th Bn | NVA | C | 500 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 6th Bn | NVA | C | 500 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 33d Regiment | NVA | Prob | 1,700 | -do- | Unknown | YD1775 | 20Dec66 |
| Regt Hq's | NVA | Prob | 200 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 7th Bn | NVA | Prob | 500 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 8th Bn | NVA | Prob | 500 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 9th Bn | NVA | Prob | 500 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 344th Regiment | NVA | Poss/Rptd | Unk | -do- | -do- | XD950702 | 20Mar67 |
| 271st Regiment | NVA | Rptd | Unk | -do- | -do- | XD950702 | 20Mar67 |
| 324B Division | NVA | C | 8,360 | Good | DMZ/Vinh Linh SS | | 12Jul67 |
| Div Hq's | NVA | C | 110 | Good | -do- | | 12Jul67 |
| Div Hq's Spt | NVA | C | 1,290 | -do- | -do- | | 12Jul67 |
| 803d Regiment | NVA | C | 1,600 | Fair | DMZ | YD0780 | 1Aug67 |
| Regt Hq's | NVA | C | 250 | -do- | -do- | YD0778 | 1Aug67 |
| 1st Bn | NVA | C | 450 | -do- | -do- | XD991612 | |
| 2d Bn | NVA | C | 450 | -do- | -do- | YD0873 | 1Aug67 |
| 3d Bn | NVA | C | 450 | -do- | -do- | YD0872 | 1Aug67 |

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| UNIT | CAT | CAT | ESTIMATED STR CMBT EFFECT | ACCEPTED LOC | LAST REPT | DATE |
|------------------|-----|------|---------------------------|--------------|------------------|---------|
| 812th Regt | NVA | C | 1,380 | Fair | 3KmRadius-YD1871 | 18May67 |
| Regt Hq's | NVA | C | 280 | -do- | YD1871 | 18Jul67 |
| 4th Bn | NVA | C | 260 | Poor | Unk | 11Sep67 |
| 5th Bn | NVA | C | 520 | Fair | -do- | 15Jul67 |
| 6th Bn | NVA | C | 520 | Fair | -do- | 11Sep67 |
| 90th Regt | NVA | C | 1,840 | Good | XD9772 | 8May67 |
| Regt Hq's | NVA | C | 280 | Good | XD9772 | 25Apr67 |
| 7th Bn | NVA | C | 520 | Good | XD9970 | 8Oct67 |
| 8th Bn | NVA | C | 520 | Good | YD1575 | 10Oct66 |
| 9th Bn | NVA | C | 520 | Good | XD9769 | 16Sep66 |
| 12 AT Bn | NVA | Poss | 200 | Unk | DMZ | 31Mar67 |
| 13 Arty Bn | NVA | C | 200 | -do- | DMZ | |
| 14 AA Bn | NVA | C | 200 | -do- | DMZ | 1Mar67 |
| 15 Engr Bn | NVA | C | 280 | -do- | DMZ | 20Jul66 |
| 16 Signal Bn | NVA | C | 200 | -do- | DMZ | |
| 17 Trans Bn | NVA | Poss | 300 | -do- | DMZ | |
| 19 Med Bn | NVA | C | 200 | Unk | DMZ | |
| 808th Bn | NVA | C | 300 | Fair | YD3858 | 28Sep67 |
| 325C Div | NVA | Prob | 11,241 | Good | YD0575 | 1May67 |
| 95C Regt & Sprt | NVA | C | 2,000 | -do- | Khe Sanh | 7Jun67 |
| 4th Bn | NVA | C | 400 | -do- | -do- | -do- |
| 5th Bn | NVA | C | 400 | -do- | -do- | -do- |
| 6th Bn | NVA | C | 400 | Unk | -do- | -do- |
| 29th Regt & Sprt | NVA | Prob | 2,000 | Fair | XD8883 | 12May67 |
| 7th Bn | NVA | -do- | 400 | -do- | Unk | 3Aug67 |
| 8th Bn | NVA | -do- | 250 | Unk | XD8648 | 18Aug67 |
| 9th Bn | NVA | -do- | 300 | Good | Unk | 3Aug67 |
| 101D Regt | NVA | Poss | 1,800 | Unk | YD0368 | |
| 5th Regt | NVA | Prob | 2,200 | Good | Hai Lang | |
| 11th Co | NVA | -do- | 134 | Unk | -do- | |

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| UNIT | TYPE | CAT | ESTIMATED STR | COMBAT EFFECT | ACCEPTED LOC | LAST REPT | DATE |
|----------------------------|------|------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|---------|
| 12th Co | NVA | Prob | 117 | Unk | Hai Lang | Hai Lang | |
| 13th Co | NVA | -do- | 106 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 14th Co | NVA | -do- | 82 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 15th Co | NVA | -do- | 112 | -do- | -do- | | |
| 416th Bn/5th Regt | NVA | C | 541 | Good | YD3130 | Hai Lang | |
| 31st Bn | NVA | Poss | 200 | Good | Trieu Phong | | |
| 814 Bn | IF | C | 300 | Fair | YD3636 | YD4657 | 10Oct67 |
| H.99 Co | IF | C | 80 | Fair | YD4251 | Hai Lang | Jul67 |
| Trieu Phong Co | IF | C | 90 | Fair | YD3859 | YD2245 | 25Sep67 |
| Cam Lo Co | IF | C | 60 | Fair | YD1058 | YD851 | 7May67 |
| K.400 Co | IF | C | 120 | Fair | YD2774 | YD3172 | 17Feb67 |
| Gio Linh Co | IF | C | 50 | Fair | YD2570 | | |
| Van An Arty Regt | NVA | Po | Unk | | Vinh Linh | Vinh Linh | 28Aug67 |
| Regt Hq | NVA | Po | Unk | | -do- | -do- | 28Aug67 |
| 4th Bn | NVA | Po | Unk | | YD2567 | -do- | 28Aug67 |
| <u>THUA THIEN PROVINCE</u> | | | | | | | |
| Tri-Thien Mil Reg | NVA | C | 150 | Unk | YD4324 | | 5Aug67 |
| C-11 Intell Co | NVA | C | 105 | -do- | NW NAM HOA | YD514420 | 21Jun67 |
| C-12 Sapper Co | NVA | C | 100 | -do- | -do- | | 25Jun67 |
| C-13 Comm Co | NVA | C | 150 | -do- | -do- | | -do- |
| C-14 Engr Co | NVA | C | 140 | -do- | -do- | | -do- |
| C-15 AA Co | NVA | C | 80 | -do- | -do- | | 21Jun67 |
| C-16 Mort Co | NVA | C | 70 | -do- | -do- | | 3Jul67 |
| C-17 RR Co | NVA | C | 90 | -do- | -do- | | 25Jun67 |
| 6th Regt | NVA | C | 1,050 | Fair | Thua Thien(P) | YD4821 | 25Jun67 |
| Regt Hq's | NVA | C | 300 | Unk | NW NAM HOA | YD4724 | 6Aug67 |
| 800th Bn | MF | C | 300 | Fair | Phong Dien(B) | | 25Jul67 |
| 806th Bn | MF | C | 300 | Fair | Phong Dien(D) | YD5044 | 25Sep67 |
| 802d Bn | NVA | C | 300 | Fair | | YD3427 | 7Oct67 |
| 804th Bn | MF | C | 300 | Fair | | YD8723 | 30Jul67 |
| K4B Bn | MF | C | 350 | Good | Phu Loc(D) | A08100 | 28Aug67 |

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| UNIT | TYPE | CAT | EST STRENGTH | CMET EFFECT | ACCPY LOC | LAST REPORT | DATE |
|----------|------|-----|--------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------|
| 810th Bn | MF | C | 350 | Fair | YD5712 | Nam Hoa | 28Aug67 |
| C.113 Co | IF | C | 60 | Fair | Phong Dien | YD5345 | 22Apr67 |
| C.114 Co | IF | C | 70 | Fair | Quang Dien(D) | YD5729 | 20Jul'7 |
| C.115 Co | IF | C | 80 | Fair | Houng Tra | YD6527 | 16Jul67 |
| C.116 Co | IF | C | 70 | Fair | Phu Thu | YD8420 | 16Jul67 |
| C.117 Co | IF | C | 50 | Fair | Phu Thu | YD8921 | 8Jun67 |
| C.118 Co | IF | C | 60 | Fair | Phu Loc | Phu Loc | 10Oct67 |
| C.119 Co | IF | C | 100 | Unk | Nam Hoa | YD7111 | 5Oct66 |

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COVER DESIGNATIONS
PERSONALITIES AND WEAPONS

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>AKA</u> | <u>LEN</u> | <u>WEPS (NO TYPE)</u> | <u>PERSONALITIES</u> |
|----------------|--|--|-----------------------|--|
| 341st Div Hq's | E-341; Hong; Guu Long; K101 | 31442XB | UNK | CO Luong THINH XO Capt TRAN VAN LAI DEP CMDR-Col Nguyen Quoc Tri PO-Col Nguyen Hong Dao CofS-ItCol Cao LONG CofPol-ItCol LUU CofRear Service-Maj HUNG |
| 31st Regt Hq's | Song Hong Quyet THANG E-31 Red River Hong Ha | 314450K 31445XB 31450SB 31450XB | UNK | CO-Col Nguyen Ngoc HUNG XO-Sr Captain HOANG PO-Col Nguyen TRUNG APO-Col AN C GEN STAFF-SR Capt LE Trng Cadre-SR Capt CHI CofRear Ser-IP Capt HAI Prop Trng-SR Capt NGUYEN Tan CUNG CofArty-SR Capt HO Log Off-SR Capt THAI |

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| UNIT | AKA | IRN | WENS | PERSONALITIES |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Bn | H-1 Hwy Fire Bn K101, Song Hong Unit 527 | 31443XB | Unk | CO-SR Capt Nguyen Van LAN XO-Capt Tran Van LAI APO-Capt Tran Ha THEAN Staff Chief-TAY Trng Cadre-It DUC Adj- Lt NAM Med Off-Cpl Le Ngoc HUONG |
| 2nd Bn | H-2 (Infantry Bn) K102 Song Huong | 31450 31451 31452 31453 31454 | Unk 81mm Mtrs Unk 82mm Mtrs Unk MG's Unk AR's Unk CXC Unk B-40's Unk B-90's | CO- SR Capt AN XO- WO THINH |
| 3rd Bn | H-3 (AA Bn) K103 | 31455XB 31456XB 31457XB 31458XB 31459XB | Unk | XO- WO NHI |
| 32nd Regt | Song THAO 270th Regt | | Unk | CO-Major TINH PO-Major QUE |
| 4th Bn | Unk | 31445XB | Unk | Unk |
| 5th Bn | Unk | 32445 | Unk | Unk |

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| UNIT | AKA | LBN | WEAPONS (NO-TYPE) | PERSONALITIES |
|----------------|---|---------------------------------|---|---|
| 6th Bn | UNK | UNK | UNK | UNK |
| 33rd Regt | UNK | UNK | UNK | UNK |
| 7th Bn | UNK | UNK | UNK | UNK |
| 8th Bn | UNK | UNK | UNK | UNK |
| 9th Bn | UNK | UNK | UNK | PO-Maj TRANG |
| 34th Arty Regt | UNK | UNK | UNK | CofS-Capt BINH |
| 271st Regt | UNK | UNK | UNK | CO-Maj LUONG PO-Maj SAU DOAN |
| 324B Div | 312 Div (?) 307 Div (?) 137 Div (?) Cong Troung Y5 330th Pde (?) Con Truong Long Nong Truong Agri- cultural site 1 May 4th Div Mot Thing Nam | 51441 FT 31.655 to 31.659 | UNK-82mm MORT UNK-75mm RR UNK-60mm MORT UNK-12.7 AA MG UNK-MG | CG-Gen. Tran DO XO-Chu Van DOI PO-Nguyen Tien LOI |
| 803rd Regt | Cuu Long 1st Regt 330 Bde Cong Trung-2 Song Huong Cua Tung | UNK | UNK-82mm Mort UNK-75mm RR UNK-60mm Mort UNK-12.7 AA UNK-MG | CO-Maj Vo THIET XO-DUYET PO-Maj THUNG |

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| UNIT | AKA | LBN | WPNS (NO & TYPE) | PERSONALITIES |
|------------|--|---|--|--|
| 1st Bn | T-1 Bn K-1 Bn | UNK | UNK | UNK |
| 2nd Bn | T-2 Bn K-2 Bn | UNK | UNK | CO - TUONG |
| 3rd Bn | T-3 Bn K-3 Bn | UNK UNK | UNK UNK | CO - Captain Tran CAN XO - Captain Nguyen Than AN |
| 812th Regt | Thu Bon 2d Regt Cong Truong 1 May Regt 4th Regt Ba Vi | UNK UNK | UNK-82mm Mort UNK-75mm RR UNK-60mm Mort UNK-57mm RR UNK-12.7mm AA MG UNK-MG | CO - LtCol Nguyen Minh HE XO - MINH |
| 4th Bn | K-4 Cuu Long Bn | 31620 RT 31621 RT 31622 31623 31624 | | CO - Nguyen Ktuong XO - Bui Dinh PHONG |
| 5th Bn | K-5 Cong Huong Bn | 31720 | | CO - Nguyen Van PHONG (PHUNG) FO - Lt Nguyen Van Bich |
| 6th Bn | K-6 Bn D-6 Bn Thu Bon Bn Cuu Long Bn | 31820 | UNK | CO - CAO Xuan Hai XO - Captain |

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| UNIT | AKA | LBN | WNS (NO TYPE) | PERSONALITIES |
|----------------|---|------|---|--|
| 90th Regt | 3rd Regt Song Huong Song Chu Long Cua Viet Cuu Long | 5330 | UNK-82mm Mort UNK-75mm RR UNK-60mm Mort UNK-12.7 AA MG UNK-MG | CO-THIEP XO-CUONG PO-Capt VANGH |
| 7th Bn | K-7 D-7 | UNK | UNK | CO - Vu Van XUAN XO - LY PO - Le Van XUAN |
| 8th Bn | K-8 108th Bn D-8 | UNK | | CO-Capt Do Thanh TAM XO-Capt Le LONG PO-SR Capt TROUNG |
| 9th Bn | K-9 D-9 | UNK | | CO-Capt Nguyen Thien HUNG XO-Capt HEAN PO-Lt LONG |
| 12th AT Bn | UNK | UNK | 12x82mm RR | UNK |
| 13th ARTY Bn | UNK | UNK | 12x120mm Mort | UNK |
| 14th AA Bn | UNK | UNK | 16x37mm AA Guns | UNK |
| 15th Engr Bn | UNK | UNK | 18x7.62mm IMG | CO-Luu Van MAN |
| 16th Signal Bn | UNK | UNK | UNK | CO-Capt LOI XO-SR Lt TAI |

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| UNIT | AKA | LBN | WPNs (NO-TYPE) | PERSONALITIES |
|----------------|---|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| 808th Bn | V-8 8th Bn 2d Prov Force 9th Ind Bn | 1708TQ Bac Nam 41338 EQ 41.436 | 4x80mm Mort 2x75mm RR 8x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 3xMG's | CO-Van XUAN CO-SANH |
| Hai Lang Co | H 99 5th Co | 1685 TQ | 1xMg 9xAR | CO-Luong Yon FO-TUNG |
| Trieu Phong Co | V-50 20-H H-02 V-51 V-20 20th Dist Force | 1681 TQ | UNK | CO-Luong Nguyen LAM XO-Thi Bong AN |
| Cam Lo Co | P-2 O-305 O5 C-106 | 1689 TQ | UNK | CO-NGHIA |
| K-400 | 4001 5th CO | 41344FQ 41346FQ | 3x60mm Mort 2xB40 | CO Lt. DAN |
| Glo Linh Co | P-4 Q-6 Q-306 | 1683TQ | 3x60mm Mort 2xB-40 6xBAR UNK MAT 49 UNK K-50 UNK K-44 | UNK |
| Van An Regt | | | UNK-140mm Rkts UNK-120mm Mort | |

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| UNIT | AKA | IBN | WEPS (NO. TYPE) | PERSONALITIES |
|-------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Tri Thien Mil Reg | Tri Thien Sector North Div Hq Phan Khu Bac K-500 Di Hai N. Front | 41000FM 41300FM Di Hai 41.116FM | UNK | CG-CHUONG XO-NGUYEN VAN THU PO-Le Truong |
| C-11 Recon Co | 11th Co Intell Co | UNK | 74-K-50 18-K-44 | CO-Lt Nguyen Nam Truc XO-Lt Nguyen Them |
| C-12 Sapper Co | 12th Co | Q-72,700 Bac Do | Unk K-50 | CO-SR Lt Long XO-HUNG |
| C-13 Comm Co | 13th Co | UNK | UNK | CO-HUNG |
| C-14 Engr Co | 14th Co | Q-90,700 Bac Do | UNK | CO-LUAN |
| C-15 AA Co | 15th Co Bach Danh PK 12 Ly 404C | 1515 BK | 4x12.7mm HMG 5xK-44 | CO-Nguyen Kim Luog XO-SAM PO-Khanh |
| C-16 Mort Co | 16th Co 82mm Mort Co | UNK | 9x81mm Mort 20xK-50 9xBAR 45xK-44 | CO-SR Capt Long PO-Capt Quang |

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| UNIT | AKA | IBN | WNS (NO-TYPE) | PERSONALITIES |
|--------------|---|--|---|---------------------------------|
| C-17 RR Co | 17th Co | UNK | 4x75 RR 3x57 RR | CO-Lt Ba PO-Lt Buong |
| 6th NVA Regt | Cong Truong 6 6th Worksite Ham Ty | UNK | UNK | CO-Mai Cuong XO-Capt AN |
| 800th Bn | K 1 1st Bn L-1 | 1520 Q40,700st 1520 A Bk Hai Q42,700st 1510 Q44,700st 1530 Q46,700st 1540 V.500 D1 Hai Q48,700st | 9x81/82mm Mort 8x60mm Mort 3x57 RR 8x890 9x840 6xMG 4x75 RR | CO-Nguyen Xuan XO-Capt Thanh |

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| UNIT | AKA | IRN | WEAPONS (NO-TYPE) | PERSONALITIES |
|-------------|---|--|---|-----------------------------------|
| K4B | K 2 Van Troi Bn C 2 3d Bn 804B 802nd | Q52,700 Bac Do 1522 Bk Di Hai | 4x81x82mm Mort 12x60mm Mort 2x75mm RR 3x57mm RR 6xAA MG 6xB-90 | CO- THANH (?) |
| 804th Bn | K-44 | 1.504 | 2x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 4xAA 4xRR 8xB-40 1xB-90 | CO- UYEN XO- LONG PO- CHIEU |
| 802nd Bn | 1st Bn, 9th Regt | UNK | UNK | UNK |
| 810th Bn | K-10 | 1852 Bac Ha 42-442 | 3x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3xRR 18xAR 3xMG | CO- Lt Vo THONG XO- DUNG |
| C-114 IF Co | Quang Dien Co D-3 P-15 3d Co | 1847 Bac Ha | 2x60mm Mort 9xAR | CO-THUAN XO-TINH PO-THUAN |
| C-115 IF Co | Huong Tra Co D-2 X-3 X-5 P-16 KQ-30 | UNK | 2x60mm Mort 2xHMG 6xAR UNK-SMG UNK-KLL | CO- Le Ngoc BACH PO- SON |

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| UNIT | AKA | LEB | WEAPONS (NO-TYPE) | PERSONALITIES |
|------------------|---|-----|---|----------------------------|
| C-116 LF Co | Huong Thuy Co | UNK | 2x60mm Mort UNK-VG UNK-K-44 4xAR | CO-Cat X'AN |
| C-117 LF Co | Phu Thu Vang Armed Co D-7 P-18 | UNK | 2x60mm Mort UNK-.30 Cal MG 4xAR 10xSMG UNKxK-50 | CO-SON XO-THU PO-SAM |
| C-118 LF Co | Phu Loc Co D-5 X-18 | UNK | UNK-60mm Mort(?) UNK-AR(?) UNK-SMG(?) | UNK |
| C-119 LF Co | Nam Hoa Co D-6 | UNK | UNK-60mm Mort | UNK |
| 325 "C" Division | Song Cau Long | UNK | UNK | CG-Mai Huu Cong |
| 95th Regt | Nhat Le 2d Regt | UNK | UNK | CO-Tran Dinh Chan |
| 29th Regt | 3d Regt Kien Giang 13th Regt | UNK | 1x120mm Mort 3x81mm Mort 3x60mm Mort | CO-Ha Van Hue |

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| UNIT | AKA | LBN | WEAPONS (NO-TYPE) | PERSONALITIES |
|--------------------|---|----------------------------|---|---|
| 101st "D" Regt | 1st Regt Song Lam | UNK | UNK | PO-Nguyen Tinh THONG |
| 5th Regt | 9th Regt | 6333 | 142xK-54 19xRP56 12x75RR 460xCKC 51xBL0 5x12.7mm HMG 523xAK-47 12xK-53 17x60mm Mort 18x82mm Mort | |
| 416th Bn, 5th Regt | K416th Bn Doan 416 3rd Bn, 9th Regt | 31490 (OK) | 24xK 54 139xAK-47 109xCKC 27xRPD 18xBL0 | 6xRP46 6x60mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 4xLMG 2xRR |
| 814th Bn | K-14 | UNK | 2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort 2x57RR 1xBL0 2xMG | CO-THANH XO-SAM |
| 31st Bn | T-2 | P.O. BOX T-2 KQ25 (NVN) | 27xBL0 139xAK-47 18xPistols 81xMAT-49 | CO-Ho Dinh QUI XO-Bui Van KINH PO-Vu Ngoc HA Asst PO-Bui Ngan Phan |

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

C-Confirmed
Prob-Probable
Poss-Possible
NVA-North Vietnamese Army
MF-Main Force
LF-Local Force
AKA-Also Known As
LBN-Letter Box Number
NVN-North Vietnam

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ESTIMATE OF ENEMY MILITIA FORCES

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

| | |
|-------------------------|-------|
| 1. Trung Luong District | 175 |
| 2. Gio Linh District | 460 |
| 3. Cam Lo District | 423 |
| 4. Trieu Phong District | 1,060 |
| 5. Hai Lang District | 1,065 |
| 6. Huong Hoa District | 345 |
| 7. Ba Long District | 370 |
| 8. Mai Linh | 200 |

TOTAL QUANG TRI PROVINCE 4,098

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

| | |
|------------------------|-----|
| 1. Huong Dien District | 325 |
| 2. Phong Dien District | 250 |
| 3. Nam Hoa District | 400 |
| 4. Quang Dien District | 500 |
| 5. Huong Tra District | 475 |
| 6. Phu Vang District | 540 |
| 7. Huong Thuy District | 418 |
| 8. Phu Thu District | 355 |
| 9. Vinh Loc District | 290 |
| 10. Phu Loc District | 395 |

TOTAL THUA THIEN PROVINCE 3,892

GRAND TOTAL QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN PROVINCE --- - 7,990

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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are undernourished has declined from 1.1 billion to 800 million. The number of people who are malnourished has declined from 1.5 billion to 1 billion. The number of people who are obese has increased from 100 million to 300 million. The number of people who are overweight has increased from 100 million to 300 million. The number of people who are obese and overweight has increased from 100 million to 300 million. The number of people who are obese and overweight has increased from 100 million to 300 million.

REF ID: A66001

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to increase to 1.7 billion by the year 2015.

75. 2

511

SECRET

Encl 28

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUNNMF 1380 S E C R E T

| | | |
|-------|--|-------|
| M 600 | RKT HEAT 3.5" | 72 |
| M 602 | RK SMOKE UP 3.5" | 72 |
| M 143 | MINE AP M18A1 | 24 |
| M 306 | SIG ILLUM HAND RED STAR CLUSTER | 72 |
| M 307 | SIG ILLUM HAND WHITE STAR CLUSTER | 72 |
| M 311 | SIG ILLUM HAND RED STAR CLUSTER PARA | 144 |
| M 312 | SIG ILLUM HA D WHITE STAR CLUSTER PARA | 144 |
| M 314 | SIG ILLUM HAND GREEN STAR CLUSTER PARA | 144 |
| M 495 | FLARE SURFACE TRIP M49 | 32 |
| M 532 | CHG DEMO BLK TNT 1 LB | 200 |
| M 130 | CAP BLASTING ELECT | 50 |
| M 131 | CAP BLASTING SPEC NON-ELECT | 200 |
| M 420 | CHG DEMO SHAPED 15 LB | 2 |
| M 455 | CORD DETONATING PRIMACORD | 1,000 |
| M 670 | FUZE BLASTING TIME | 500 |
| M 76 | CHG DEMO ASSY M37 | 16 |
| M 766 | IGNITER TIME BLASTING FUZE M2 | 100 |

B. PACKAGE NO TWO

(1) CLASS I

MCI 47 CASES

PAGE FOUR RUNNMF 1380 S E C R E T

PRISONER 2 CASES

(2) CLASS II

MALAZONE TABLETS

MALARIA PILLS

MEDICAL BATTLE DRESSING

NYLON LITTERS

BATTERIES BA-386

BATTERIES BA-30

(3) CLASS V

DODAC

A 071

A 068

A 127

A 130

A 475

B 568

B 626

B 630

B 630

NOMEN

5.56MM BALL

5.56MM TRACER

7.62MM LINKED

7.62MM BALL

CAL .45 BALL

40MM W/F PD

60MM HE

60MM SMOKE UP

60MM SMOKE UP

30 BTL (30 EA)

1 BTL (500 EA)

2 EA

3 EA

12 EA

50 EA

QTY

5,040

1,440

2,400

840

2,000

360

40

8

50

SECRET

SECRET

| | | |
|-----------|--|-----|
| PAGE FIVE | RUMHNF 1330 S E C R E T | |
| 0824 | GRN HAND RIOT CS 1 | 50 |
| 0835 | GRN HAND SMK WP | 16 |
| 0848 | GRN HAND SMK GREEN | 16 |
| 0849 | GRN HAND SMK YELLOW | 16 |
| 0855 | EKT 66MM HEAT | 30 |
| 0870 | EKT HEAT 3.5" | 18 |
| 0882 | EKT SMOKE WP 3.5" | 18 |
| 0143 | NINE AP M16A1 | 6 |
| 0326 | SIG ILLUM HAND RED STAR CLUSTER | 36 |
| 0327 | SIG ILLUM HAND WHITE STAR CLUSTER | 36 |
| 0311 | SIG ILLUM HAND RED STAR CLUSTER PARA | 36 |
| 0312 | SIG ILLUM HAND WHITE STAR CLUSTER PARA | 36 |
| 0314 | SIG ILLUM HAND GREEN S IR CLUSTER PARA | 36 |
| 0495 | FLARE SURFACE TRIP M49 | 16 |
| 0832 | CHG DEMO ILK TNT 1 LB | 50 |
| 0130 | CAP BLASTING ELECT | 18 |
| 0131 | CAP BLASTING SPEC NON-ELECT | 50 |
| 0420 | CHG DEMO SHAPED 15 LB | 2 |
| 0455 | CORD DETONATING PRIMACORD | 250 |
| 0670 | FUSE BLASTING TIME | 125 |

PAGE SIX RUMHNF 1330 S E C R E T

0756 CHG DEMO ASSY M37

0766 IGNITER TIME BLASTING FUSE M2

2. FOR CG FORLOCHD

A. PREPARE ABOVE PACKAGES AND STAGE FOR LOADING AT DNG AIR BASE SITE DESIGNATED BY CG, FIRST MAW.

B. PROVIDE AIR DELIVERY UNIT TO CG, FIRST MAW FOR EXECUTION OF FIXED WING AIRDROP ON ORDER.

C. UPON EXECUTION OF AIRDROP, RECONSTITUTE SIMILAR PACKAGES FOR POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL ON CALL MISSIONS.

3. FOR CG, FIRST MAW:

A. DESIGNATE STAGING AREA AT DNG AIR BASE FOR LOADING.

B. ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH CG, FORLOCHD FOR PLANNING AIRDROP ON ORDER, PROVIDE AIRCRAFT AND DELIVER DESIGNATED CARGO TO DESIGNATED DROP ZONE.

4. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV: SUBMIT REQUEST FOR AIRDROP TO THIS HQ BY MOS EXPEDITIONARY MEANS (PARACH 458/459 OR DNG 63.14). SUBMIT ONLY FOLLOWING OF AIR DELIVERY REQUEST FORM, APPENDIX A, REF A.

DELTA: DROP TIME

ECHOS DROP ZONE CHART NUMBER

BT

TO: HAF/01/15/427/007/09

SECRET

SECRET

VV MFP144
 DE RUMHNF 1381 2830916
 ZNY 83888
 P 150916Z OCT 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV —
 CG FIRST MAF
 CG FORLOGCMD
 BT

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 FOXTROT; DROP ZONE COORD
 GOLF; CONTROLLER FREQUENCIES; PRIMARY/ALTERNATE
 HOTEL; CALL SIGNS
 JULIET; DROP ZONE MARKINGS
 (1) PANEL COLOR/PATTERN
 (2) SMOKE COLOR
 (3) PYROTECHNICS COLOR
 MIKE; REMARKS

3
 CAC

5A

SECRET

SECRET

PRIORITY

151129

OCT

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: FOURTH MARINES

//SECRET//

COUNTY FAIR

A. FORORD 3121.3

1. LAW REF A IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIRD MARDIV BE PERMITTED TO EXECUTE
 COUNTY FAIR 25OCT67.

A. TARGET AREA AP PHO MINH/AP HINH SI (YD 607290).

B. PARTICIPATING UNITS: 3D BN 26TH MAR OPCON 4TH MAR (ONE RIFLE CO),
 ONE RF CO, AND ONE PF PLAT.

C. SECURITY PLANS SUBSEQUENT TO COUNTY FAIR: RE/PF PATROLS AND AIRBORNE
 ACTIVITIES.

D. REASON FOR SELECTION:

(1) HAMLET SELECTED CONTIGUOUS TO AREA UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

(2) CURRENT ~~RETEL~~ ILTEL INDICATES EVIDENCE OF VC ACTIVITY.

(3) THE AREA IS CAPABLE OF BEING PHYSICALLY CORDONED TO PREVENT
 VC INFILTRATION.

(4) HAMLET SELECTED IN COORDINATION AND WITH APPROVAL OF DISTRICT
 AND PROVINCE CHIEF.

(5) COORDINATION HAS BEEN EFFECTED WITH SR PROVINCE ADVISOR.

2. THIS COUNTY FAIR OPN WILL BE NUMBERED 4-4.

3. PSYOPS ASSISTANCE IS PLANNED.

OP-4

CCN

1872

RELEASED BY

[Signature]
 1515471

SECRET

Encl 29

CONFIDENTIAL


DRAFTER 3/DLY/ktp
 SEC C-3 PHONE SHOVE GJC
 CTR CDM

PRIORITY 151231 OCT 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG III MAF

//CONFIDENTIAL//

PBR
 PBR OPERATIONS



A. CTF ONE ONE SIX 080630Z OCT 67

B. III MAF CMC 120059Z OCT 67

1. REF A RECOMMENDED PBR OPERATIONS NOT BE INITIATED IN 1CTZ. REF B REQUESTED COMMENTS ON REF A.

2. THIS COMMAND AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN PBR OPERATIONS DAN CAU HAI. HOWEVER THIS COMMAND DOES NOT CONCUR WITH RECOMMENDATION MADE REF A.

3. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS RECEIVED INDICATE THAT VERY PRESENCE OF PBR'S IN DAN CAU HAI HAD SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON ENEMY OPERATIONS. ENEMY WAS REQUIRED TO MOVE PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES OVERLAND SERIOUSLY SLOWING THE MOVEMENTS.

4. BELIEVE THAT DIFFICULTIES MENTIONED REF A CAN BE OVERCOME AS PBR CREWS GAIN EXPERIENCE OPERATING IN DAN CAU HAI WATERS. ~~ENEMY WILL BE FORCED TO MOVE PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES OVERLAND SERIOUSLY SLOWING THE MOVEMENTS.~~

GP-4

CCN

1903

RELEASED BY XLR

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 30

SECRET

DE T87, AND H/W NR 003 003 003

ZNY SSSS
 O 170100Z OCT 67
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO ZEN/FIRST MARINES
 ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
 ZEN/NINTH MARINES
 ZEN/TWELFTH MARINES

BT

S E C R E T

A. MY 131100Z OCT 67 (OPO 55-67; OP LIBERTY II)

1. REFERENCE 1 IS MODIFIED HEREIN AS FOLLOWS:

A. FIRST MARINES: PARA 3 DELTA (4): DELETE ALL AFTER WORD VICINITY AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFOR (YD 421479)

B. FOURTH MARINES: ADD NEW SUB PARA E. (4) TO READ: COORDINATE WITH FIRST MARINES ON BOUNDARY VICINITY (YD 421479)

2. IN ADDITION, IN PREPARATION OF OPERATION LIBERTY II,
 FIRST MARINES CHOP OPCON OF COMMAND GROUP AND TWO COMPANIES
 FIRST BATTALION FOURTH MARINES NOW PROVIDING SECURITY QUANG
 TRI AIRFIELD TO FOURTH MARINES AT 181200H OCT 67. WHISKEY BTRY (-)
 1/13 REMAINS PRESENT POSN OPCON TWELFTH MARINES. FIRST MARINES
 CONTINUES RESPONSIBILITY OF SECURITY QUANG TRI AIRFIELD.

PAGE TWO RUMHVP S E C R E T

3. FIRST MARINES BE PREPARED TO CHOP OPCON BLT 1/3 (-) TO FOURTH MARINES 181200H OCT 67.

GP-4

BT

UNNN

SECRET

Encl 31

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET


MEDINA

59

DE DIV AND NF 950
ZNY SSSCC
O 170325Z OCT 67
FM COC THIRD MAF
TO COC III MAF
BT

SECRET
OPN MEDINA

1. PRESS EMBARGO ON OP MEDINA IS LIFTED. 170800Z OCT 67
GP-4
BT



NNNN

6

17

SECRET

Encl 32

28

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DRAFTER 3/WAK/WLK
 SEC G-3 PHONE SHOVE 203
 CWO 8

IMMEDIATE

171129Z

OCT 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG III MAF

INFO: SECOND BATTALION, TWENTY-SEVEN MAR
 SECOND BATTALION, THIRD MAR
 TWELFTH MAR
 THIRD RECON BN
 THIRD ENGINEER BN
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG FIRST MAW
 FLAG "A"

//SECRET//

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (OPERATION BATH)

- A. 3D MARDIV OP ORDER 55-67
- B. OPERATIONS OVERLAY (BASED ON NEED TO HAVE BASIS)
1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FURNISHED CONCERNING PROPOSED OPERATION BATH.
2. INTELLIGENCE. SEPARATE MESSAGE
3. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

A. UPON COMPLETION OF OPERATION LIBERTY II, REFERENCE (A), THIRD MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN) WILL COMMENCE OPERATIONS IN AREAS ADJACENT PHU BAI BASE VITAL AREA.

B. FORCES COMMITTED WILL INCLUDE TWO REINFORCED INFANTRY BATTALIONS, (2ND BN, 26TH MARINES AND 2ND BN, 3D MARINES), RVN PROVINCIAL FORCES AND APPROPRIATE COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS.

C. ONE BATTALION WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS WITHIN ZONE II TO CLEAR AREA OF ENEMY THREAT TO PHU BAI BASE FROM UNPOPULATED AREAS EAST, SOUTH AND WEST, PROTECT LOC ROUTE 1 IN PHU LOC AREA, AND INTERDICT ENEMY LOCs FROM MOUNTAIN

BASED ON GOOD AND RECRUITMENT WITHIN UNPOPULATED LOC AREA.

SECRET

Encl 3

SECRET

D. A SECOND BATTALION, WILL CONDUCT COMBINED OPERATIONS WITH RVN PROVINCIAL FORCES IN ZONE I TO CLEAR AREA OF ENEMY THREAT WITHIN POPULATED AREAS TO THE EAST, NORTH AND WEST OF THE PHU BAI BASE. MARINE FORCES WILL PROVIDE SECURITY SCREEN AND SUPERVISE RVN PROVINCIAL FORCES DURING SEARCH OF POPULATED AREAS.

E. BATTALIONS WILL CONDUCT INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS WITHIN ASSIGNED ZONES. HOWEVER, COORDINATION AS REQUIRED WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AT DIVISION LEVEL, AND BATTALIONS WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST ONE ANOTHER SHOULD THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN EITHER ZONE REQUIRE.

F. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WILL SUPPORT TACTICAL OPERATIONS AS PRACTICAL.

4. MISSION. 3D MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) WILL CONDUCT DELIBERATE SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS; LIMITED OBJECTIVE SPOILING ATTACKS; AGGRESSIVE COMBAT AND RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS; AND AMBUSHES UTILIZING TWO REINFORCED INFANTRY BATTALIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH RVN PROVINCIAL FORCES TO CLEAR THE AREA AROUND THE PHU BAI VITAL BASE AREA, TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND CACHES, OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE AND SEEK OUT VC/NVA SYMPATHIZERS IN THE VICINITY OF THE PHU BAI BASE, IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO ATTACK THE BASE BY OBSERVED INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS AND HIT AND RUN RAIDS USING SIGNIFICANT SIZE RAIDING FORCES.

5. AREA OF OPERATIONS. AREA ENCLOSED BY LINE SOUTH ALONG NS GL YD 78 TO INTERSECTION GL YC 7887, THENCE EAST ALONG GL YC 87 TO INTERSECTION GL ZC 7187, THENCE NORTH ALONG GL ZC 11 TO INTERSECTION DAM CAI HAI COAST LINE, THENCE WEST ALONG COAST LINE DAM CAI HAI TO MOUTH OF SONG CONG QUAN, NORTH-
SONG
WEST ALONG SOUTH BANK OF SONG CONG QUAN, SONG HA TA, GAING AND SONG LOI
HONG TO NS GL YD 78.

6. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

A. D-DAY-24 OCTOBER 1967

SECRET

SECRET

- B. H-HOUR-TBA
- C. ESTIMATED DURATION 24-31 OCTOBER 1967
- D. UNCLASSIFIED CODE NAME IS BATH
- E. TARE-ZONE I AND II. REFERENCE (B)

7. REQUEST CG III MAP:

A. OBTAIN CLEARANCE FOR AREA SHOWN PARA. 5 ABOVE. AREA PURPOSELY ENLARGED BEYOND ACTUAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DECEPTION. ACTUAL OPERATION AREA AS SHOWN REFERENCE (B). COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN DIVISION HAS BEEN EFFECTED.

B. APPROVE CODE NAME BATH FOR PROPOSED OPERATION.

GP-4

OCN

2172


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W.H. Cramer

SECRET

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FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV
INFO: CG III MAF
CG FIRST MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
FLSG "A"
FIRST ARVN DIV



//SECRET//

REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATION LIBERTY II

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 131103Z OCT.67 (OPD 55.67)

1. CANCEL PARA 3M (5) & PARA 5 B (3) REF A.

2. SUBSTITUTE APPLICABLE PARA AS FOLLOWS:

3M (5). SUBMIT 24 HR SITREPS DAILY TO COINCIDE WITH 1800 SITREP.
RPT TO INCLUDE SHORT RESUME OF DAYS LIBERTY II ACTIONS & PLANS
FOR NEXT 24 HRS.

3. THIS HQ WILL MAKE ANY FOLLOW UP REPORT REQ BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

GROUP - 1.

CCN

2381

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Encl 34

SECRET

DRAFTED

SEC 0-3 PHO

CWO

KME

IMMEDIATE 19 06 55z OCT 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: THIRD MARINES (-) (REIN)
 TWELFTH MARINES (-) (REIN)
 THIRD RECON BN
 THIRD ENGINEER BN
 THIRD SHORE PARTY BN
 FLSC (A)

INFO: CG III MAF
 CG FIRST MAF
 ADC THIRD MARDIV (DIOB)
 NINTH MARINES
 TWENTY-SIXTH MARINES (-) (REIN)
 PSOC FWD

//SECRET//

PLANNING DIRECTIVE, OPERATION MLK

A. 3RD MARDIV SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY 20-67

B. 3RD MARDIV IOI 1-67

C. 3RD MARDIV O P40016.1D

1. INTELLIGENCE.

a. REFERENCE (A). UPDATE TO BE PUBLISHED IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

b. CURRENT INTSUMS AND PERINTREPS

2. MISSION. ON ORDER, ON OR ABOUT 1 NOVEMBER 1967 THIRD MARINES (-) (REIN) CONDUCTS MULTI-BATTALION OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACKS, AMBUSHES, AND COMBAT AND RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS IN THE DESIGNATED AREA OF OPERATION IN ORDER TO CAPTURE/DESTROY ENEMY LOGISTIC CACHES, INSTALLATIONS, AND MATERIEL; DISRUPT COMMAND HEADQUARTER FUNCTIONS; OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE, AND TO KILL OR CAPTURE ENEMY ENCOUNTERED.

3. AREA OF OPERATION. NORTHWEST QUANG TRI PROVINCE WITHIN AREA BOUNDED BY LINE DRAWN FROM GIS XD 8963, THENCE SOUTH TO XD 8951, THENCE EAST TO YD 0051, THENCE NORTH TO YD 0063, THENCE WEST TO XD 8963.

4. FORCE ALLOCATION.

G 40 / *Qye*
 G 2 / *Qye*
 AIBU / *Qye*
 CEO / *Qye*
 OPR / *Qye*

1st Lt Harper's Copy
Folder

SECRET

Encl 35

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- a. TWO REINFORCED INFANTRY BATTALIONS.
- b. AIR SUPPORT AS REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE.
- c. COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED FROM 3D MARDIV ASSETS.

5. THIRD MARINES (-)(REIN).

- a. DESIGNATED AS CONTROL HEADQUARTERS FOR OPERATION ELK.
- b. PREPARE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND SUPPORTING PLAN FOR MULTI-BATTALION OPERATION IN DESIGNATED AREA OF OPERATION. SUBMIT FOR REVIEW BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. ADVISE WHEN PRESENTATION THIS HEADQUARTERS IS DESIRED.
- c. SUBMIT DETAILED COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, BEYOND ORGANIC CAPABILITIES, TO THIS HEADQUARTERS EARLIEST; RECOMMEND PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON EARLY SUBMISSION OF ANTICIPATED AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE ESTIMATE OF D-DAY FIRST WAVE HELICOPTER LIFT REQUIREMENT.
- d. BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON ADDITIONAL INFANTRY BATTALION TO BE PROVIDED FOR PERIOD OF OPERATION ELK.

- e. ON ORDER, COMMENCE COMBAT OPERATIONS, OPERATION ELK.

6. THIRTEENTH MARINES (-)(REIN). GENERAL SUPPORT

7. THIRD RECON BN.

- a. GENERAL SUPPORT
- b. COORDINATE AND CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE OF DESIGNATED AREA OF OPERATIONS AS REQUESTED BY THIRD MARINES.

- c. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT FLANK SECURITY/SCREENING OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH OPERATION ELK.

8. THIRD ENGINEER BN. GENERAL SUPPORT.

9. ALL OTHER. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUESTED BY 3D MARINES.

10. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

- a. D-DAY ON OR ABOUT 1 NOVEMBER 1967
 - b. H-HOUR, L-HOUR AS ESTABLISHED BY 3D MARINES TBA
 - c. ESTIMATED DURATION OF OPERATION 1-10 NOVEMBER 1967
 - d. UNCLASSIFIED CODE NAME IS OPERATION ELK.
 - e. EXPLOIT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS POTENTIAL WHENEVER PRACTICAL.
 - f. DIRLAUTH ALCON
11. LOGISTICS. LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES (B) AND (C).
- GP-4

CCN

2439

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W.H. Curran

DIST. C-3

STAND

SECRET

GRANITE FOLDER

For the RECORD

201445H OCT 67

OPERATION GRANITE

1. ARVN PARTICIPATION DESIGNATED

LAMSON 140

2. FORCES ASSIGNED

2/3, 4/3, 5th ABN, Recon Co

6 105 mm How

4 155 mm How.

Above Info Rec'd from MAJ. REYNOLDS
ARVN LNO.

Encl 36

SECRET

| | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| SHOVE COC | |
| OP CHIEF | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| C-3 W.O. | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| G-2 W.O. | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| DCPO | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| APPO | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| ACTION | |

Medina file

DE MAF AND MATS NF 299 299

JY ANXXXX

ZNY SSSSS
 P 201451Z OCT 67
 FM III MAF COC
 TO THIRD MARDIV COC
 INFO FIRST MARDIV COC
 BT
 S E C R E T
 TERMINATION OP MEDINA
 A. CG 3D MARDIV 220555Z OCT 67
 1. REQ CONTAINED REF A APPD.
 GP-4
 BT

NORM

20

SECRET

Encl 37

SECRET

OO: 2817

E.L.D. 211503Z OCT 67

FR: CG T.I.R.D. DIV
 TO: CG FIRST
 INFO: CG III F
 CO I.R. INGRU ONE SIX
 CO I.R. INGRU THREE SIX

//S E C R E T //

AIR SUPT REQUISITEMENTS OPN GRANITE

| | |
|-------------------------------|------------|
| DEPT | 11.117.4ch |
| SECT | DIV |
| CR | |
| STOVE CUC | |
| CP CHIEF | T |
| G-3 W.O. | ✓ |
| G-2 W.O. | ✓ |
| DOPO | ✓ |
| APG | ✓ |
| ACTION <i>Creative Center</i> | |

1. FOLLOWING DETAILS ARE PERTINENT TO AIR REQUIREMENTS FOR OPN GRANITE

A. D-DAY - 24 OCT 67.

B. L-HR - 0730H.

C. LIFT APPROX 840 MARINES FR CAMP EVANS (YD 534310) TO LZ BUZZARD (YD 4642

D. L-HR PLUS FOUR LIFT APPROX 1,100 ARVN FR YD 652281 TO LZ ENRIKE (YD 535

E. D PLUS ONE LIFT APPROX 650 ARVN FR YD 652281 TO LZ ROBIN (YD 595244).
L-HR - 0730H.

F. 200-MIN MIN WAVE ALL LIFTS.

G. REQ 2,000 LBS DAISSY-CUTTERS FOR PREP OF LZ BUZZARD AND LEAGLE TO
ENRIKE LZ'S.

H. REQ 500 LB DAISSY-CUTTERS TO PREP LZ ROBIN.

I. REQ MIN PREP 40-MIN ALL LZ'S.


J. REQ TAC(A) COORDINATE LZ PREPS.

K. REQ PW ON STA OUR ALL INSERTIONS.

L. TWO (2) H-34'S W/TWO (2) UH-1E'S DURING DAYLIGHT HRS FOR MED-EVAC AND
SUPPLY SUPT FR LSA AT CAMP EVANS. REQ ORDN BE LOCATED AT CAMP EVANS
FOR RE-ARMING UH-1E.

M. NORMAL NIGHT MED-EVAC

N. REQ AD ON STA SUNRISE TO SUNSET DURATION OF OPN.



PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

Encl 38

SECRET

- Q. REQ FLARE-SHIP ON STA AND GUN-SHIP ON CALL DUR HRS OF DARKNESS.
- P. ONE (1) ~~ON-IE~~ ^{HAC} ON-IE FOR REPT CMDR AND CONTROL ELEMENT DUR EARLY PORTION OF OPN.
- Q. OPNS AREA IS CHARACTERIZED BY STEEP TERRAIN - HEAVY CANOPY.
- R. REQ ADDITIONAL FUEL SYSTEM (TAFOS) OR FUEL TRUCKS ~~BEING~~ ^{FURNISHED} TO ALLOW SIMULTANEOUS REFUELING CAPABILITY FOR SIX (6) HELICOPTERS.

GP-4

Dist A.20

Stand, 100 B

LT. Long

E


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SECRET

DATE: 3/11/78
 SEC. G-3 PHONE: 310713
 G-3 ROOM

PRIORITY 224611Z OCT67

FROM: CG THIRD MANDIV
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: THIRD MANDIV
 CG FIRST MANDIV
 CG FIRST MAF
 CG VIC

**SUBVE**OP CHIEF WG-3 W.O. QG-2 W.O. A

DOPD

APO +ACTION PLANNING G-3

//SECRET//

PLANNED/PROPOSED OPERATIONS-NOVEMBER 1967

A. CG III MAF 090628Z SEP67

1. BN AND LARGER SCALE OP FOR NOV67 ARE LISTED IN TWO CATEGORIES; PLANNED OPS NOW IN PROGRESS, AND PROPOSED SPECIAL OPS TO BE CONDUCTED DURING NOV IF THE WEATHER, TACTICAL SITUATION AND FORCE AVAILABILITY PERMIT.

2. PLANNING DIRECTIVES HAVE OR WILL BE PROMULGATED SO THAT PLANNING FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS MAY COMMENCE AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICAL TIME.

A. PLANNED OPERATIONS NOW IN PROGRESS(1) KINGFISHER

(A) TWO REGIMENTS (3D MARINES AND 9TH MARINES)

(B) FIVE INFANTRY BATTALIONS

(C) SURVEILLANCE, SCREENING, SEARCH AND DESTROY/SWEEP AND CLEAR

OPERATIONS; SECURITY FOR COMBAT BASES, LOCS AND OUTPOSTS; CONSTRUCTION AND SUPPORT OF ANTI-INFILTRATION SYSTEM; AND SUPPORT OF RD PROGRAM.

(D) A. B. THINH QUANG TRI PROVINCE

(E) COMMENCED: 16 JULY UPON TERMINATION OF OPERATION BICKORY II

(F) DURATION: INDEFINITE

(2) FREMONT

(A) ONE REGIMENT (4TH MARINES)

(B) ONE TO TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS

(C) SEARCH AND DESTROY; INTERDICTION OF ENEMY LOCS; SECURITY FOR

COMBAT BASES, LOCS, AND OUTPOSTS; SUPPORT OF RD PROGRAM.

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Encl 39

SECRET

(d) SOUTHERN QUANG TRI/NORTHERN THUA THIEN PROVINCES

(e) COMMENCED: 10 JULY 1967; TERMINATION INDEFINITE

(3) ARDMORE **SCOTLAND**

(a) REGIMENT (-)(26TH MARINES)

(b) ONE TO TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS (REINF)

(c) SURVEILLANCE; SORTING AND RECONNAISSANCE; SECURITY FOR COMBAT BASE, LOGS AND OUTPOSTS; COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTION FOR ACTIVITIES IN KHE SANH AO.

(d) WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE

(e) COMMENCED: 17 JULY 1967; TERMINATION INDEFINITE

(4) OSCEOLA **Remain Same**

(a) REGIMENT (-)(REINF)(1ST MARINES (-))

(b) TWO MARINE BATTALIONS

(c) SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN TAOR AND BERRY BASE AREA 101; INTERDICT ENEMY LOGS AND DENY ENEMY ACCESS INTO POPULATED AND PRODUCE COASTAL AREAS; MAINTAIN AND DEFEND COMBAT BASE IN TAOR; SUPPORTS CVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

(d) SOUTH AND EAST OF QUANG TRI CITY AND BERRY BASE AREA 101 IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE

(e) COMMENCED: 201800H, OCTOBER 1967; TERMINATION INDEFINITE

(5) LIBERTY II

(a) 3D MAR DIV (-)(REINF)

(b) 3D MAR DIV (-)(REINF) IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1ST ARVN DIVISION CONDUCTS COMBAT (OPERATION MEDINA) AND SECURITY OPERATIONS FOR RVN NATIONAL ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

(c) 3D MAR DIV TAOR

(d) COMMENCED 11 OCTOBER 1967

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SECRET

(c) ESTIMATE TERMINATION ON OR ABOUT 23 OCTOBER 1967.

(6) GRABITE

(a) REGIMENT (-)(REINF) (4th MARINES (-))

(b) MULTI-BATTALION OPERATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1ST ARVN

DIVISION.

(c) SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION; LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACK;
COMBAT AND RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS WITHIN ENEMY BASE AREA 114.

(d) THUA THIEN PROVINCE

(e) SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE ²⁶ OCTOBER 1967.

(f) ESTIMATE TERMINATION ON OR ABOUT 31 OCTOBER 1967.

(7) DYE MARKER

(a) THIRD MARDIV (-)(REINF)

(b) FORCES AS REQUIRED

(c) ORGANIZE, CONSTRUCT AND OCCUPY ANTI-INFILTRATION
TO INTERDICT/PREVENT ENEMY INFILTRATION/INVASION OF ENEMY BASES
PORTION OF THIRD MARDIV TAOR (QUANG TRI PROVINCE).

(d) QUANG TRI PROVINCE

(e) COMMENCED: 12 APRIL 1967

(f) DURATION: FINAL COMPLETION DATE INDEFINITE, ATTENDING
COMPLETE PROGRAMMED INSTALLATIONS ~~ON AS S ON THE~~
AS THE ARMY SITUATION, WEATHER AND CURRENT COMMITMENTS PERMIT.

(8) PHU BAI VITAL AREA DEFENSE (PHU BAI TAOR) *Romin*

(a) BATTALION (REINF) (SECOND BATTALION, TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION)

(b) ONE INFANTRY BATTALION

(c) CONDUCT SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS AND SEARCH FOR
AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ACC ROUTE 1 AND LAO HOA BRIDGE TO ENEMY
RECONNAISSANCE AND INTERDICTION ENEMY BASES

SECRET

SECRET

(b) COMMENCED: UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF THE VITAL AREA.

(c) DURATION: INDEFINITE

3. PROPOSED SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED DURING NOVEMBER 15
AND DEPEND UPON CURRENT COMMITMENTS AND THE WEATHER PERMIT. (REF-
AND PARAGRAPH 10.0, REFERENCE (A) REFERS)

(1) OPERATION NORTHWEST OF THE ROCK PILE (OPERATION **ELK**)

(a) NORTHWEST QUANG TRI PROVINCE WITHIN AREA BOUNDED BY LINE
XD 8963, THENCE SOUTH TO ²⁶XD 8951, THENCE EAST TO YD 0054,
THENCE WEST TO XD 8963.

(b) TWO REINFORCED INFANTRY BATTALIONS REINFORCED WITH
COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. SEARCH AND DESTROY;
LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACK, RECONnaissance IN FORCE OPERATIONS.

(c) COMMENCE: D-DAY ON OR ABOUT 1 NOVEMBER 1967.

(d) DURATION: ESTIMATE 10 DAYS; 1-10 NOVEMBER 1967.

(e) ESTIMATE PEAK HELICOPTER LIFT REQUIREMENTS ON D-DAY AND
FINAL DAY OF OPERATIONS AS 250 PERSONNEL.

(2) OPERATION NORTH AND WEST OF ROUTE #9 (OPERATION **DOUGLAS**)

(a) NORTH AND WEST OF ROUTE #9, SOUTH OF GL-XD 51, EAST OF
WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO HILL COMPLEXES 490 (GS 9449),

(b) AND TRAILS RUNNING NORTH AND SOUTH FROM THESE TERRAIN

(c) BATTALION SEARCH AND DESTROY; LIMITED OBJECTIVE.
OPERATION REINFORCED WITH APPROPRIATE COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE
SUPPORT ELEMENTS.

(d) COMMENCE: D-DAY ON OR ABOUT 15 NOVEMBER 1967.

(e) DURATION: ESTIMATE 10 DAYS, 15-25 NOVEMBER 1967.

(f) ESTIMATE PEAK HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS ON D-DAY AND FINAL

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DAY OF OPERATION WILL BE THE FIRST DAY 250-300 PERSONNEL.

(3) ARG/SLP OPERATIONS (THIRD ARDIV TOR). AS AVAILABLE, AND
DEPENDENT UPON TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS, ARG/SLP WILL BE REQUESTED TO CONDUCT
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS/SPECIAL OPERATIONS ASHORE IN CONNECTION WITH
FORCES ORGANIC TO THE THIRD ARDIV.

GP-4

Dist: 6-3 standard

CCN 2883

RELEASED BY *W.H.C.*

SECRET



LEST YOU FORGET...

Got it Down!

22/415 OCT →

1./4th MAR S-3 CALLED
RE: STATUS of COUNTY FAIR
4-4 (4th MAR P 141345Z)
desire to hold SAME LOCATION
on 26 OCT.

2./ G-3 App'd / DO NOT INFO
MAF.

3./ D-Day + ²⁶ 0800 oct op
Granite Resked.
#

General Lithographing & Printing Co.

402 KISHWAUKEE STREET • ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS 61110
 TELEPHONE 815/963-4805

0

SECRET



IMMEDIATE

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG III MAF
 FIRST MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 INFO: ADC THIRD MARDIV
 FIRST ARVN DIV

//SECRET//

OPERATIONS

A. FIRST MARINES P21100Z OCT67 (NOTAL)

B. III MAF COC 211547Z OCT67 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQ AUTH TO CONDUCT ONE DAY S&D OP IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARVN FORCES ON 25OCT67.

2. REF B REQ DELAY OF OPERATION GRANITE IN VIEW HELO SPT REQUIREMENT FIRST MARDIV OPN KNOX. ACCORDINGLY, OPERATION GRANITE D.LAYED UNTIL 26OCT67.

3. FOR FIRST MARINES:

A. PERGHA TO CONDUCT OPS PER REF A HOWEVER, REQUIRE CMD GRP & TWO COMPANIES TO BE ESTABLISHED VIC YD 5234 NLT 261600H OCT67

B. COORDINATE WITH FOURTH MARINES ON EXACT LOCATION.

C. CHOP CMD GRP & TWO COMPANIES TO FOURTH MARINES ON ARR AT LOCATION.

4. FOR FOURTH MARINES:

A. TAKE PARA 2 ABOVE FOR ACTION.

B. COORDINATE PARA 3 WITH FIRST MARINES. ASSUME OPCON OF CMD GRP & TWO COMPANIES ON ARR YOUR AO. MISSION IS TO ACT AS BLOCKING/AMBUSH FORCE.

| | |
|-----------|-------------------|
| SHOVE COC | |
| OP CHIEF | <i>[initials]</i> |
| G-3 W.O. | <i>[initials]</i> |
| G-2 W.O. | <i>[initials]</i> |
| DOPD | <i>[initials]</i> |
| APO | <i>[initials]</i> |
| ACTION | <i>[initials]</i> |

Grumpy open account

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

Encl 41

SECRET

5. FOR TWELFTH MARINES:

A. PASS OPCON W BTRY (-) 1/13 FROM 1/11 TO 3/12 EFF 250900N OCT67.

hmt B. DIRECT MOVEMENT FROM QUANG TRI AIR FIELD TO CAMP EVANS IAW 3A

ABOVE.

6. FOR ALL:

A. DIRINAUTH ALCON.

B. RPT CHOP TIMES THIS HQ.

GP-4

COM

2947

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UHC

Dut: G-3/coc

copy stand B


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PAGE 2

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CONFIDENTIAL

*CF
Folger*



DE MAF AND NR 347 347 347

ZNY CCCCC

P 230315Z OCT 67

FM III MAF COC

TO THIRD MARDIV COC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

COUNTY FAIR

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 151129Z OCT67

1. REF A APPROVED. COORDINATE WITH SENIOR PROVINCE ADVISOR.

DIRLAUTH.

GP-4

BT

TOR: 23 13 36 H Oct 16/67

Action: COC

23
UNNU
MA DE DE AND QSL AT THIS TIME

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Encl 2

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Folder*

ARW H/W NR 367

ZNY 55555

P 230600Z OCT 67

FM 3RD MARDIV COC

TO 111 MWF COC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

APPA CLNC.

A) CG THIRD MAR DIV 221631Z

IT IS REQUESTED THAT FOURTH MARINES AO BE EXTENDED FOR PERIOD
OF 20 DAYS COMMENCING 25 OCT FOR OPERATION GRANITE AS FOLLOWS:
FROM YD 3719 SOUTH ALONG GL YD 37 TO EAST-WEST GL YD 10 ALONG
GL YD 10 TO NORTH-SOUTH GL YD 68. NORTH ALONG GL 68 TO RT 554
(YD 68622) NORTHWEST ALONG RT 554 TO INTERSECTION SONG BO RIVER
AND PRESENT BOUNDARY 4TH MAR. (YD 604256)

GP-4

BT

#162

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL*Encl 43*

SECRET**SHOVE COC**OP CHIEF *[initials]*G-3 W.O. *[initials]*G-2 W.O. *[initials]*

DOPD

APO

ACTION

GRANITE

V

/FA979QKA-112

FTD 153

OO RUMHVP

DE RUMFIJM 006 2980124

ZNY SSSSS

O 250125Z OCT 67

PM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHAW/MAG THREE SIX

BT

SECRET

A. 1ST MAW 230705 OCT 67

1. RECEIPT OF REF ACKNOWLEDGED. M

2. IF D-DAY SCHEDULED FOR 26 OCT 67 TG 79.4 WILL PROVIDE 12 UH-34 HELOS.

3. HMM-163 REPRESENTATIVE WILL ATTEND FLIGHT LEADER BRIEF 251400H AT HMM-362 READY ROOM, VNU BAI.


GP-4V

BT

*FOR DS/OCT 67/m/PCS/0846**C-G3/COC**CEO/AIRO**gr**8*

DNF

*25**25***SECRET***Encl 44*

SECRET*GRANITE*

AND NR 389...389

XX
 OO UMSA
 DE UMSA 1996 2981411
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 251411Z OCT 67
 FM III MAF COC
 TO UMSA/COMUSMACV COC
 INFO THIRD MARDIV COC
 FIRST MAW OPS
 FIRST MARDIV COC
 ZEN/PLC
 BT

SECRET

CONCEPT OF GRANITE

1. CONCEPT 4TH MARINES CONDUCTS S&D OPN VIC HILL 674 IN ENEMY BASE AREA 114 WITH ONE BN MAKING HELIBORNE ASSAULT AND ONE BN ATTACKING ON FOOT. 1ST ARVN DIV CONDUCTS CONCLTE THREE BN S&D OPERATION IN ADJACENT AREA TO THE EAST AND SOUTH, WITH 3 BN HELIBORNE ASSAULT.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

4TH MARINES (-) (REINF)

BLT 1/3

1ST BN (-) 4TH MAR

3. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 4TH MARINES

4. AREA OF OPERATIONS: ENEMY BASE AREA 114, TUA THIEN PROV.

5. 1-HOUR, D-DAY 260630H OCT 67

6. ESTIMATED DURATION: 5-6 DAYS.

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BT

TOR 252345 H
Action 6-3
normal

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
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SECRET*Encl 45*

COCA

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
DE DIV AND QSL AT T115TIMT

5
Torz 264345 H JAF
Action: Coc
Normal

25

SECRET

Encl 46

SECRETIMMEDIATE 280417Z OCT 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARINES (-)(REINF)
TWELFTH MARINES (-)(REINF)
THIRD RECON BN
THIRD ENGINEER BN
THIRD SHORE PARTY BN
FLSG (A)

INFO: CG III MAF
CG FIRST MAW
ADC THIRD MARDIV (DHCB)
NINTH MARINES
TWENTY-SIXTH MARINES (-)(REINF)
FSOC FWD

//SECRET//

INDEFINITE POSTPONEMENT, OPERATION ELK.

A. CG 3D MARDIV 190655Z OCT 67

1. REFERENCE (A) REFERS. OPERATION ELK POSTPONED INDEFINITELY.

GP-4

/

| | |
|-----------|-----|
| SHOVE CDS | |
| CP CHIEF | ✓ |
| G-3 W.O. | ✓ |
| G-2 W.O. | C |
| DCPO | |
| APO | ✓ |
| ACTION | ELK |

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CON 3626

Dist: G-3

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Encl 47

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Misc



V VV MFP340
 DE RUMINF 2840 302151Z
 ZNY 88035
 R 291512Z OCT 67
 FM CG III MAF SA I CORPS
 INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV ✓
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMINF/CG FOTLOGCMD
 RUMINF/CGA 3 CORPS
 R 261045Z OCT 67
 FM COMNAVFORV
 TO CTF ONE ONE SIX
 INFO COMUSMACV
 CG III MAF
 COMNAVFORVFACT DNG
 FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV
 COMNAVFORV FIVE
 B

S E C R E T
 PBR OPERATIONS IN I CTZ (U)
 A. COMNAVFORV 310101Z AUG 67
 B. CTF ONE ONE SIX 030620Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMINF 2847 S E C R E T

1. REF A DIRECTED DEPLOYMENT OF LST AND ONE SECTION OF PBR TO ICTZ FOR LIMITED PERIOD TO EVALUATE PBR PERFORMANCE IN THAT AREA. REF B REPORTED EXPERIENCE GAINED IN OPERATION GREENWAVE IN ICTZ. AND CONCLUDED THAT PBR CAN BE USED MORE PRODUCTIVELY IN SUPPORT OF MACV MISSION IN IV CTZ THAN IN ICTZ.
2. COMNAVFORV RECOGNIZES THAT MANY NEW PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN PBR OPERATION IN I CTZ AND CONSIDERS, ON THE BASIS OF OPERATION GREENWAVE EXPERIENCE, THE NEITHER CUA DAI NOR TRUONG GIANG ARE CURRENTLY SUITABLE FOR PBR OPERATIONS, THE FORMER BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVELY RESTRICTED WATERWAY AND INTENSE ENEMY ACTIVITY AGAINST UNARMED BOATS, THE LATTER BECAUSE OF A LACK OF WATERBORNE ACTIVITY.
3. HOWEVER, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE CAU HAI BAY, DAN THUY TU AREA MAY HOPEFULLY BE OVERCOME WITH ADDITIONAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE. FURTHERMORE INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THIS AREA IS A LUCRATIVE ONE FOR INTERDICTION OF VC WATERBORNE LOCS.
4. IN VIEW OF PARA 3 ABOVE INTEND CONTINUE WITH PLANS TO LOCATE ONE MOBILE BASE WITH 10 PBR VICINITY TAN MY AREA FOR CONTINUATION OF EVALUATION OF PATROLS IN THE CUA HAI

16

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Encl 48

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHMMF 2847 S E C R E T

DAY/DAN THUY TU AREA. ANTICIPATE MOBILE BASE WILL CLOSE
IN-COUNTRY ABOUT 28 NOV AND THAT BOATS WILL BE READY TO
OPERATE ABOUT 18 DEC.

5. DETERMINATION CONCERNING POSSIBLE FUTURE RELOCATION
OF BASE AND PBR SECTION WILL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE
PENDING MORE EXTENDED OPERATIONS THAN WERE POSSIBLE IN OPERATION
GREENWAVE.

GP-4

BT

TOR 12924 960267/0/MF
C- 3/000 STAND RM

NNNN

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

2/RDK/1a
3800/3
30 Oct 1967

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Flooding in I CTZ

Encl: CG, III MAF ltr 2IC/HHH/dwh, Ser: 3800/3 dtd 17Oct67 (Same Subj)

1. To assist the Distribution List in operational planning, enclosure (1) is forwarded.

2. As the flood warning and tropical storm warnings mentioned in paragraph 3, of enclosure (1) are received, they will be disseminated by message/telephone.

E. J. Miller

E. J. MILLER

By direction

Distribution:

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| CG, 3d MarDiv | (1) |
| ADC | (1) |
| CO, 1st Mar | (1) |
| CO, 3d Mar | (1) |
| CO, 4th Mar | (1) |
| CO, 9th Mar | (1) |
| CO, 12th Mar | (1) |
| CO, 26th Mar | (1) |
| CO, SLF Alpha (79.4) | (3) |
| CO, SLF Bravo (79.5) | (3) |
| CO, MAF -36 | (1) |
| CO, 1st AM TRAC Bn | (1) |
| CO, 3d Eng Bn | (1) |
| CO, 11th Eng Bn | (1) |
| CO, 3d Tank Bn | (1) |
| CO, 9th MT Bn | (1) |
| Base Coordinator DHCB | (1) |
| Base Coordinator PBCE | (1) |
| Ge3 (Plans) | (1) |
| Ge4 | (1) |
| Div Air Officer | (1) |
| Div Engineer | (2) |
| Div Mortar Transport | (1) |

Encl 49

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

2IC/HHR/dwh
3800/3

17 OCT 1967

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force/I Corps Coordinator
To: Distribution List

Subj: Flooding in I CTZ

Encl: (1) Overlay of flooding in I CTZ

1. The attached overlay and empirical data was prepared by Detachment 14, 30th Weather Squadron, based on data obtained from meteorological and river records, newspaper accounts, and interviews with eyewitnesses. The overlay graphically depicts two areas of flooding.

a. The area shown within both the cross-hatched and unshaded portions of the overlay represents the extent of the extreme flooding caused by typhoons Iris and Joan in November 1964. This flood was the worst on record for I CTZ.

b. The area indicated by the shaded portion is the region of potential local flooding which may occur at various times throughout the flood season.

2. A summary of data relating to flooding follows:

a. Empirical evidence indicates that rainfall in excess of two inches per day will result in local flooding within a twenty-four hour period. It is anticipated this will occur on an average of four days each month in October and November.

b. Flooding can be expected to some degree at least once during the months of October, November, and December in all potential flood areas.

c. Tropical disturbances which pass within 100 miles or less of I CTZ could cause greater than local flooding.

3. This Command will issue flood warnings and tropical storm warnings in message form to all US Units, I CTZ.


KENNETH G. HOUGHTON
By direction


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1. As the monsoon season approaches with the attendant heavy rains, reduced visibility, and adverse weather conditions, less reliance can be placed on the use of air support. The need arises for a program to limit the enemy troop and supply movement during the daylight hours.
2. To compensate for this reduced capability, a plan known as "FOG PLAN" increased daytime harassing and interdiction by artillery during periods of adverse weather conditions, will be formulated.
3. Effective 1 September, all units will institute, on a daily basis, "FOG PLAN". In addition to artillery targets, these plans may include targets normally assigned to air, but for reasons of adverse weather cannot be accomplished.

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CONCEPT OF OPERATION KENTUCKY

1. CONCEPT. THIRD MARDIV (3-4) (ARVN) CONDUCTS REGIMENTAL S&D OPNS, INFILTRATION AND VC ACTIVITIES, SUPPORTS VC ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN HOANG TRI PROVINCE; DEFENDS DONG HA COMBAT BASE, AIRFIELD AND MILITARY FACILITIES WITH MINIMUM INFANTRY FORCES AND MAINTAINS ONE BATTALY UNITS; MAINTAINS AND DEFENDS GIO LINH ARTILLERY BATTAL; MAINTAINS NATIONAL BNS ONE AND NINE; CONDUCTS SURVEILLANCE AND BORDERING OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON LONG RANGE PATROLS; CONDUCTS SPECIAL ATTACKS TO DESTROY ENEMY INFILTRATION AND PREVENTS INGRESS BY ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS INTO RU AREAS; MAKES MAXIMUM USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS, GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR TO ATTACK SELECTED AND SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITIONS.

²⁰ 08. 2 00443 2502 S E C E E Y

2. THE PROPOSITION

FD-302 (Rev. 1-25-60)

THE CHINESE CIGARETTES

573 MAR 13 1965

NO RECORD IN () FRIENDS

12 MAR 1961 (PENN)

20 00 (-) (SEIN), 12TH MAR

CONFIDENTIAL

137 144 147 149 150

8111 BN (1), 8111 ARFF (1000)

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40 100 50

55

40 AUGUST 1997

50 33 24

20 DEC 91

574 575 576

10-10-1964

1/2 AREA OF 0-451 FROM STARTING POINT AT YD 035527 FOLLOW STREAM SOUTH TO YD 032460 THEN SOUTH ON N-S GL 03 TO STREAM AT YD 030641.

708: 3/17/78 Oct 15/82
Action: 200

3/

SECRET

Encl 50

DECLASSIFIED

15 Oct 77

SECRET

PAGE 3 UNSEC 2002 S E C R E T


FOLLOW STREAM SOUTHEAST TO YD 190603 THEN SOUTH ON N-S GL 10 TO
 YD 190689 THEN ON A LINE TO YD 188845 THEN SOUTHEAST ON STREAM
 TO SONG VINH PHUOC RIVER AT YD 188924 THEN NORTH EAST ON SONG VINH
 PHUOC RIVER TO RAILROAD TRACKS AT YD 274577 THEN NORTHWEST ON RR
 TRACKS TO INTERSECTION ROUTE 9 AT YD 253607 THEN WEST ON ROUTE 9
 TO KINH GIANG RIVER AT YD 198901 THEN NORTHWEST ON RIVER TO
 YD 170545 THEN NORTH ON N-S GL 17 TO YD 1773 THEN ON A LINE
 TO YD 213744 THEN SOUTH ON ROUTE 1 TO YD 215729 THEN ON A LINE
 THROUGH THE FOLLOWING GRID CIRCUMVENTING GIO LINH OUTPOST:
 YD 220724, YD 220726, YD 220728, YD 220730, YD 220732, YD 220734
 CIRONG POINT A-2 THEN FOLLOW ROUTE 1 TO SOUTHERN BOY DMZ, THEN WEST
 IN SOUTHERN BOY DMZ TO START POINT AT YD 185657.

4. 8-DAY 14-HOUR 240000H NOV67.
 5. EST DURATION: INDEFINITE.

SP-4

61

SECRET

SECRET

NUMBER 2-02 371007
BY 8810

371007Z OCT 67
FM 111 MAF 000
TO DUMSE/MAAF 000
INFO THIRD MARDIV 000
PMAR 000
FIRST MARDIV 000
BT

OKN
Scotland
S E C R E T

CONCEPT OF OPA SCOTLAND

1. CONCEPT: SOP 3D MARDIV/111 MAF REP, KHE SANH CONDUCTS REGIMENTAL SIZE OPERATION IN AO; DEFENDS AIRFIELD AND BASE AREA WITH MINIMUM FORCES AND MAXIMUM USE OF OBSTACLES AND SUPPORTING FIRES; CONDUCTS COMBAT PATROLS TO DETECT AND DESTROY ENEMY INFILTRATING AO; SECURES AND MAINTAINS LOC'S; MAINTAINS ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE.

2. PL TASK ORGANIZATION

SOP 3D MARDIV/111 MAF REP, KHE SANH

25TH MAR (-), (REIN)

DET. HQ CO, 24TH MAR

DET. HQ BN, 30 MAR

SUB UNITS R 1, HQ 3D MARDIV

PAGE TWO DUMSEA 2800 S E C R E T

SUB TM, 7TH ATT, PAF

1ST BN, 9TH MAR

DET, 3D SP

1ST PLT, CO C, 3D ENGR BN

1ST BN (-), (REIN) 13TH MAR

CO D (-), 3D AT BN

3RD PLT, CO B, 3RD IN BN

CO B, 3D RECON BN

2D CLEARING PLT, COC, 3D MED BN

DET A-101, 5TH SF GRP, USA

SEC, 5TH G, 65TH ARTY, USA

3D PLT (-), CO A, 3D SP BN

CO A, 3D SP BN

DET, CO B, 3D SP BN

B. CONTROL HQ, 3D MARDIV/111 MAF REP, KHE SANH

3. AREA OF DUMSE FROM THE DMZ SOUTH ALONG GL 5 TO GL 49 SAST TO GL 95 SOUTH TO GL 49 SAST ALONG GL 49 TO GL 95 SOUTH ON GL 95 TO DA KRONG RIVER SE ALONG DA KRONG RIVER TO YD004352 THEN SOUTHWEST ALONG RIVER TO YD998855 THEN SOUTH ALONG RIVER TO YD004302 THEN SOUTH TO LAOTIAN BORDER AT YD004302. BOUNDARY THEN FOLLOWS LAOTIAN BORDER ON THE SOUTH

#134

PAGE THREE DUMSEA 2800 S E C R E T

AND WEST TO THE DMZ AND EAST ALONG DMZ TO INTERSECTION WITH N-S CL 85.

1. D-DAY, 11 HOUR, 010021K NOV 67

5. 1ST DURATION: INDEFINITE.

6-4

BT


31

SECRET

SECRET

OPN

Nurke



DE MAF NR 499 499 499

OO UUMSE
 DE UUMSEA 2408 3030821
 ZNY SS888
 O 310821Z OCT 67
 FM III MAF GOC
 TO UUMSE/MAOV GOC
 INFO THIRD MARDIV GOC
 FMAW OPS
 FIRST MARDIV GOC
 BT

SECRET

CONCEPT OPERATION NEOSHO

1. CONCEPT: THIRD MARDIV (REIN) CONDUCTS REGT (-) (REIN) SIZED OPNS
 IN PHONG DIEN DISTRICT, THUA THIEN PROVINCE LOCATES AND DESTROYS
 NVA/VC FORCES, INTERDICTION ENEMY LOG'S AND DENIES ENEMY ACCESS INTO
 POPULATED AND FOOD-PRODUCING COASTAL AREAS.

2. U. TASK ORGANIZATION

3D MARDIV (-) (REIN)
 HQ BN (-) (REIN)
 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)
 HQ CO (-)
 1ST BN (-), 4TH MAR
 3D BN (-), 26TH MAR

#145

PAGE TWO UUMSEA 2008 **SECRET**

3D BN (-) (REIN), 12TH MAR

1ST BN, 44TH ARTY (USA)

3D SP BN

2D MT BN

3D AT BN

3D ~~ARTY~~ BN.

3D TK BN

3D MED BN

B. CONTROL HQ: 3D MARDIV

C. AREA OF OPNS: SAME AS FREMONT WHICH TERMINATES 312400H OCT 67

D. D-DAY H-HOUR: 010001H NOV 67

E. SST DURATION: INDEFINITE

GP-A

BT

750 31 1932H Oct 16/2

3/

SECRET

encl 52

21

SECRET*Planning
Guidance*

NNNNXK 2 VV MPP531
PP RUMHIC
DE RUMHIC 3008 3240824
ZNY SSSSS

P 312824Z OCT 67
FM CG III MAF
TO ZEN/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV ✓
ZEN/CG FMAV
ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/CG FORLOGCND
RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV
BT

SECRET

PLANNED MAJOR OPNS NOV 67

1. FOL REPORT OF PLANNED OPS FOR NOV 67 IS SUBMITTED

A. (1) KENTUCKY (FORMERLY PART OF KINGFISHER)

(2) THIRD MARDIV

(3) ONE REGIMENT, NINTH MARINES

(4) S&D, SURVEILLANCE, SCREENING, DEF COMBAT BASE AND LOC'S
SPOILING ATKS AGAINST NVA/VC

(5) NORTH CENTRAL QUANG TRI PROVINCE

(6) 1 NOV UPON TERM OPN KINGFISHER. DURATION-INDEF,

B. LANCASTER (FORMERLY PART OF KINGFISHER)

PAGE TWO RUMHIC 3008 **SECRET**

(2) THIRD MARDIV

(3) ONE REGIMENT, THIRD MARINES

(4) S&D, SURVEILLANCE, SCREENING, DEF COMBAT BASE AND LOC'S,
SPOILING ATKS AGAINST NVA/VC

(5) NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE

(6) 1 NOV UPON TERM OPN KINGFISHER. DURATION-INDEF

C. (1) NEOSHO (FORMERLY FREMONT)

(2) THIRD MARDIV

(3) TWO BNS, 4TH MARINES

(4) S&D, INTERDICT ENEMY LOC'S, DENY ACCESS TO POPULATED COASTAL AREA

(5) THUA THIEN PROVINCE, PHONG DIEN DISTRICT

(6) 1 NOV 67, UPON TERM OPN FREMONT. DURATION-INDEF

D. (1) SCOTLAND (FORMERLY ARDMORE)

(2) THIRD MARDIV


(3) ONE BN, 26TH MARINES

(4) S&D, SURVEILLANCE, SCREENING, DEF COMBAT BASE, VITAL INSTALL-
ATIONS, LOC'S

(5) WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE

(6) 1 NOV 67 UPON TERMINATION ARDMORE. DUR-INDEF.

E. (1) OSHO (PART OF OPN FREMONT)

**SECRET**

Encl 53

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHMF 3008 S E C R E T

- (2) THIRD MARDIV
- (3) REGIMENT (-) FIRST MARINES TWO BNS
- (4) S&D, DEFEND COMBAT BASE, LOC'S, DENY ENEMY ACCESS INTO POP, COASTAL AREAS
- (5) QUANG TRI PROVINCE/GUANG TRI CITY
- (6) COMMENCED 201800H OCT 67. DURATION-INDEF
- F. (1) DYEMARKER
- (2) THIRD MARDIV
- (3) FORCES AS REQUIRED. ALL OPNS LISTED ABOVE HAVE MISSION TO SUPPORT DYEMARKER AS REQUIRED.
- (4) CONSTRUCT ANTI INFILTRATION SYSTEM
- (5) NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE
- (6) COMMENCED 12APR67. DURATION-INDEF
- G. (1) PHU BAI VITAL AREA DEFENSE
- (2) THIRD MARDIV
- (3) ONE BN, 26TH MARINES
- (4) SEARCH&CLEAR, EMPHASIS ON PHU LOC AREA, SECURITY RTE ONE
- (5) THUA THIEN PROV
- (6) COMMENCED ON ORDER DURING NOV, SST DUR-INDEF
- H. (1) ELE

PAGE FOUR RUMHMF 3008 S E C R E T

- (2) THIRD MARDIV
- (3) TWO BN
- (4) S&D, LIMITED OBJ ATK, RECON IN FORCE
- (5) NW QUANG TRI PROVINCE. NW ROCKPILE.
- (6) COMMENCE ABOUT 1 NOV 67. EST DUR-10 DAYS
- I. (1) DOUGLAS
- (2) THIRD MARDIV
- (3) MULTI-BN
- (4) S&D, LIMITED OBJ ATK
- (5) QUANG TRI PROVINCE
- (6) COMMENCE ABOUT 15NOV67. EST DUR-10 DAYS
- J. (1) NAVAJO
- (2) FIRST MARDIV
- (3) ONE BN 7TH MARINES
- (4) S&D IN TAOR
- (5) EAST CENTRAL QUANG NAM PROVINCE
- (6) 22 NOV 67 EST DUR 5-10 DAYS
- K. (1) DANANG VITAL AREA DEFENSE
- (2) FIRST MARDIV
- (3) ONE BN 7TH MARINES, 7TH MARINES (-)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMMF 3008 S E C R E T

(4) S&D, RECON, EMPHASIS ON ROCKET BELT AND SECURITY OF LOC'S
 (5) QUANG NAM PROVINCE
 (6) 1 NOV 67 EST DUR-INDEF

L. (1) WHEELER

(2) AMERICAL DIV

(3) MULTI-BN 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV

(4) S&D (EMPHASIS ON TIEN PHUOC AREA) SECURITY LOC'S

(5) NE QUANG TIN PROVINCE

(6) CONTINUING. EST DURATION-INDEF

M. (1) WALLOWA

(2) AMERICAL DIV

(3) MULTI-BN (3RD BDE 1ST ACD)

(4) S&D (EMPHASIS Hiep Duc-Que Son Valley) SECURITY LOC'S

(5) SE QUANG NAM/NE QUANG TIN PROV

(6) CONTINUING. EST DURATION-INDEF

GF-4

BT


708/11/1810/00707 MIS MAF
C. 3/600 *STAND* *ZMC*

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JRM

3480/5



DE32Y6 AND NR 13

ZNY SSSSS

P 311103Z OCT 67

FM SOP THIRD MARDIV/III MAF REP KHE SANH

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

ZEN/ALL UNITS KHE SANH

ZEN/DET A-101, FIFTH SFGP USA

BT

SECRET

A. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 290825Z OCT 67

1. ALL UNITS KHE SANH CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION. OPERATION ARDMORE TERMINATES 312359H OCT 1967 AND OPERATION SCOTLAND COMMENCES 010001H NOV 1967. SEE REF (A).

2. SOP KHE SANH/III MAF REP DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATION SCOTLAND TO BE PROMULGATED ASAP.

GP-4

BT

TOR 31/1315Z/OCT 67/Y6C/JH

B7COC


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COC

037

SECRET

Encl 54

SECRET**MEDINA**

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
AIG FOUR SIX ONE
INFO RUMWHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
RIMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
RIMFT/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO
RIMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

SECRET

B STI N HILL SITREP NUMBER ONE AS OF 100300H5 OCT 67

1 AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP ALFA COMPOSITION NO CHANGE

2 ACTIONS

A. ARG/SLF ALFA

(1) 101602H0 CTF 76, RADM BURKE, ARRIVED ONBD FF FOR VISIT.
DEPARTED 1801H0.(2) 101651H4 COMSEVENTHFLT, VADM HYLAND, ARRIVED ONBD FF FOR
VISIT TO CTG 76.4/79.4. DEPARTED 1757H0.
IA PQJ RECEIVED III M

GQ

ZQUEST FOR LANDING OF BLT 1/3 TO SUPPORT
OPERATION MEDINA IN QUANG TRI AREA. DTG 090002Z1 OCT 67.PAGE TWO RUMFTJM 003 **SECRET**(4) REQUESTED HELO AUG OF FOUR UH-1E (ARMED), ON UH-1E (UNARMED),
AND TWO CH-53 HEAVY LIFT.(5) RECEIVED COMSEVENTHFLT INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATION
BASTION HILL, DTG 091120Z3 OCT 67.(6) CTG 76.4 REPORTED READY FOR OPERATION BASTION HILL WITH
1-HOUR OF 100800H9 OCT. DTG 091718Z6 OCT.(7) 0640H SIGNALLED LAND THE HELOBORNE LANDING FORCE AT 100800H9,
TO THE TASK GROUP.(8) 0715H3 THREE UH-1E (ARMED) REQUESTED BRIEFED IN THE AIR
AND STAGED TO USS DULUTH.(9) 0739H9 FIRST WAVE OF SEVEN COMBAT LOADED UH-34 LIFTED OFF
USS OKINAWA ENR LZ HAWK COORD YD393455/9(10) 0826H6 FIRST WAVE UH-34 LANDED IN LZ. LZ IN SECURE AREA,
NO OPPOSITION. LATE DUE TO NO SECURITY TROOPS IN LZ AND LZ NOT MARKED.(11) 0820H0 WAVE TWO OF EIGHT UH-34 LIFTED OFF LPH ENR LZ.
EGRPN DECK UNTIL LZ MARKED.

C. INTENTIONS

A. ARG/SLF ALFA

(1) CONTINUE TO LAND BLT 1/3 IN LZ HAWK COORD YD393455/9
AND THE HOWITZER BTRY TO LANDING FLD AT COORD YD339504/4PAGE THREE RUMFTJM 003 **SECRET**

(2) SUPPORT BLT 1/3 ASHORE.

B. ARG ALFA

(1) REMAIN UNDERWAY IN HOLDING AREA OFF CUA VIET.

GP-4

BT

To: 10/0750/00467/Am/DCS


C-6-3/100 Copy CEO B

SECRET

Encl 55

CONFIDENTIAL

MEDINA



NNNNVV VPB173ZVA 162VV FCA111VV FTB163VV PJM055

00 RUMHVP

DE RUMFTJM 037 2830530

ZNY CCCCC

U 100530Z OCT 67

FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF (COC)

INFO RUMHVP/THIRD MARDIV

BT

CONFIDENTIALSPECIAL SITREP NR 1 OVQRATION BASTION HILL/MEDINA
FROM 100740H TO 101200H OCT 67

1. UNIT LOCATIONS:

A. CTG GKOMR A USS OKINAWA

B. HMM 163 - USS OKINAWA

2. SUMMARY: BLT 1/3 (-) COMMENCED LANDING IN LZ HAWK VIC YD
386446 AT 100826H OCT 67. AS OF 1200H, COMPANIES C, D, LEAD
ELEMENTS OF A, AND TWO 105MM HOWS WERE ASHORE.

3. CONTACTS:

A. NONE

4. CASUALTIES:

A. DURING PERIOD
NONEB. CUMULATIVE:
NONE

5. INTENTIONS:

A. CTG 79.4 CONTINUE TO LAND REMAINDER OF A CO, B CO, A BTRY
1/12 AND ALPHA CMD GROUP BY HELICOPTER. LAND MT PLT BY LANDING
CRAFT AS SOON AS WEATHER PERMITS.

GP 4

BT


70R: 10/0748Z/DCS^B/

C-9-70COC

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 56

30



| | |
|-----------|-------------------------------------|
| SHOVE COC | |
| OP CHIEF | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| C-3 W.O. | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| C-2 W.O. | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| DCPO | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| APO | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| ACTION | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

VV VPB46300ZVA 279VV FCA663VV SX148VV DDKA487VV FTB198VV J

055

M

PP RUMHVP

DE RUMFTJM 060 2831130

ZNY CCCCC

P 101126Z OCT 67

FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF (COIT)

INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECIAL SITREP NR 2 OPERATION BASTION HILL/MEDINA FROM 101-, 1H
TO 101800H OCT 67 (U)

1. UNIT LOCATIONS:

A. CTG 79.4 - USS OKINAWA

B. HMM 163 - USS OKINAWA

2. SUMMARY: HELICOPTER BORNE LANDING OF BLT 1/3(A) COMPLETED
AT 101645H.

3. CONTACTS: NONE

4. CASUALTIES:

A. DURING PERIOD

USMC NONE

ENEMY NONE

B. CUMULATIVE

USMC NONE

ENEMY NONE

PAGE TWO RUMFTJM 060 C O N F I D E N T I A L

5. INTENTIONS: CTG 79.4 CONTINUE TO SUPPORT BLT 1/3 AS REQUIRED.
LAND MT PLAT BY LANDING CRAFT AS SOON AS WEATHER PERMITS. MAINTAIN
TWENTY FOUR HOUR EMERGENCY MED EVAC CAPABILITY.

GP-4

BT

TOR 11/1412/OCT67/SLB/DCS-B

C-3/10


CONFIDENTIAL

26 Encl 57

CONFIDENTIAL

KVV VPA258CHC594EVV VPA218VA 637CA360FT C274VV
 PP RUMHVP
 DE RUMFTJM 07
 2831612
 ZNY CCCCC

P 101612 OCT 67
 RM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO RUMHVP/CG III MAF (COC)
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT



G-3
 COC

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 SPECIAL SIT REP NR 3 OPERATION BASTION HILL/MEDINA FROM 101801H
 TO 102400H OCT 67 (U)

1. UNIT LOCATI
 NS:

- A. CTG 79.4 USS OKINAWA (LPH-3).
 B. HMM-163 USS OKINAWA (LPH-3).
 2. SUMMARY: A BTRY, 1ST BN, 12TH MARINES OF BLT 73, LED BY
 HELICOPTER WITH THREE 103MM HOW AND 448 RDS AEXTABLISHED SLF
 LIAISON NET BETWEEN CTG 79.4, 1ST MARINES CP, BLT 1/3 ALFA
 COMMAND GROUP, AND MED REP LIAISON TEAM AT DONG HA FOR LIAISON, MED
 EVAC, AND CASUALTY REPORTING. ONE HELICOPTER EXPERIENCED ENGINE
 FAILURE, MADE A FORCED LANDING IN THE LZ, AND WAS LIFTED BACK
 ABOARD THE USS OKINAWA BY CH-53. ANOTHER WAS DISABLED FOR A SHORT
 PERIOD WHEN A HYDRAULIC LINE WAS SEVERED BY AN ACCIDENTAL
 DISCARGE OF A WEAPON BY AN EMBARKED MARINE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS ON THE

PAGE TWO RUMFTJM 079 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**
 DECK OF THE USS DULUTH (LPD-6) AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT.

3. CONTACTS: NONE
 4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE
 5. CASUALTIES:

A. DURING PERIOD
 NONE

B. CUMULATIVE
 NONE

6. INTENTIONS LAND MT PLAT BY LANDING CRAFT AS SOON AS WEATHER
 PERMITS. MAINTAIN TWENTY FOUR HOUR EMERGENCY MED EVAC CAPABILITY
 AND SLF LIAISON NET. CONTINUE TO SUPPORT BLT 1/3 AS REQUIRED.

GP-4
 BT

TOP/11/0030/0070/1000/003

C-0-3/CO

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12
 Encl 58

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CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN



MS

RHVV VPB/28ZVA 757 FCA427FTB234VV TJM083

PP RUMHVP
DE RUMFIJM 089 2832235
ZNY CCCCC

P-102235Z OCT 67
FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
TO RUMHMF/CG III NAF (COC)
INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

G-3/
COC

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL SIT REP NR 4 OPERATION BASTION HILL/MEDINA FROM 110001H
TO 110600H OCT 67 (U)

1. UNIT LOCATIONS: NO CHANGE.
2. SUMMARY: MAINTAINED COMMUNICATIONS WITH 1ST MARINES, BLT 1/3
AND TG 79.4 MED REP TEAM AT DONG HA. AT 0540H LAUNCHED TWO
EMERGENCY MED EVAC HELO'S IN RESPONSE TO BLT 1/3 REQUEST.
3. CONTACTS: NONE.
4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE

A. CAMEX DURING PERIOD

NONE

B. CUMULATIVE

NONE

6. INTENTIONS: LAND MY PLAT BY LANDING CRAFT AS SOON AS WEATHER
PERMITS. MAINTAIN TWENTY FOUR HOUR EMERGENCY MED EVAC CAPABILITY
AND SLF LIAISON NET. CONTINUE TO SUPPORT BLT 1/3 AS REQUIRED.

GP-4

BT

FOR: 11/01022/DCS/ [Signature]

A- G-3/COC copy GEO [Signature]

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

35
Encl 59

CONFIDENTIAL**SHOVE COC**OP CHIEF *T*G-3 W.O. *JN 7*G-2 W.O. *JN 7*DORO *JS*APO *JS*ACTION *MEDINA*

NNNNVV VPA38ZVA 029VV FCA5 62VV FTC392VV

PP RUMHVP

DE RUMFTJM 236 2342530

ZNY CCCCC

P 110530Z OCT 67

FM CTG SEVEN NINE P T FOUR

TO RUMHVP/CG III MAF (COC)

INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

CONFIDENTIALSPECIAL SITREP NR 5 OPERATION BASTION HILL/MEDINA FROM 110601H
TO 111200H OCT 67 (U)

1. UNIT LOCATIONS: NO CHANGE

2. SUMMARY: MAINTAINED COMMUNICATIONS WITH 1ST MARINES, BLT
1/3 AND TG 79.4 MED REP TEAM AT DONG HA. HMM-163 MAINTAINING
TWO UH340'S ON CONDITION III MED EVAC CORRECTION TO SPECIAL
SITREP NR. 3 PARA 2 FIRST SENTENCE, FOUR VICE THREE 105-MM HOWS
LANDED 10 OCT (ONE REQUIRES THIRD ECHELON INSPECTION/MAINTENANCE).

3. CONTACTS: NONE

4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE

5. CASUALTIES:

A. DURING PERIOD

USMC

KIA 3

AGE TWO RUMFTJM 236 **CONFIDENTIAL**

WIA 6

B. CUMULATIVE

USMC

KIA 3

WIA 6

C. INTENTIONS: LAND MT PLATOON WITH REMAINDER OF BASIC ALLOWANCE
OF ARTY AMMUNITION, WEATHER AND TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITTING.
CONTINUE TO SUPPORT BLT 1/3 AS REQUIRED.4. UUDIR FUTURE REPORTS FROM CTG 79.4 WILL BE INCLUDED IN CTG
79.4 PERIODIC REPORTS.

GP-4

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

REPORT

FIGURE 1. DEATHS AND CONFIDENTIALITY. DEATHS DURING ACTIVE CASUALTIES TOTALS ARE REPORTED.

[illegible][illegible]

1. *St. John's wort*

0-3/000

CEO

KAC

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Medina

EWVV VFA3782VA 347 FCA219VV TJM076

03 RUMHVP

05 RUMFTJM 077 285 1428

ZNY CCCCC

ZOC

RUMFT ZOK FFN

RUMFCR ZON2 -T- COMUSMACV GUNLINE

O 121428Z OCT 67

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

TO AIG FOUR SIX ONE

INFO RUMVHE/CTG ONE ONE SIVE PT ONE

RUMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

RUMFT/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO

RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

BASTION HILL/MEDINA/LAM SON 135 SITREP NUMBER 6 AS OF 121200Z 6

OCT 67 (U)

1. AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP ALFA COMPOSITION: NO CHANGE

2. SXACTIONS

A. ARG/219 WQFA

(1) REMAINED IN SUPPORT OF OPS ASHOR

(2) WEATHER HAD NO SIGNIFICANT IMPJPK ON ARG OPS.

(3) COMPLETED OFFLOAD OF REQUIRED ELEMS OF MT PLT AT DONG

HA VIA CUA VIET; UTILIZED TWO PRVVOYS AND COMPLETED BY 1420H7.

B. AC

HVLFa

PAGE TWO RUMFTJM 077 CONFIDENTIAL

(1) USS OKINAWA CASUALTY EVACUATION SHIP FOR ARG/SLF ALFA AND

BLT 1/3 SUMMARY:

12 OCT TOTALS

OPERATION TOTALS

ADMITTED

12

21

DISCHARGED

5

6

TRANSFERRED

2

2

REMAINING IN SICKBAY

13

--

C. SLF ALFA

(1) UNIT LOCATIONS:

A. CTG 79.4 USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)

B. HMM-163 USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)

(2) SUMMARY: MAINTAINED COMMUNICATIONS WITH 1ST MARINES, BLT 1/3 AND TG 79.4 MED REP TEAM AT DONG HAM HMM-163 MAINTAINED TWO UH-34D'S ON CONDITION III MED EVAC FOR SUPPORT OF BLT 1/3 EVACUATING ONE KIA AND 3 WIA. LANDED REMAINDER OF TRUCK PLATOON AT DONG HA RAMP.

(3) CONTACTS: AT 120945H OCT, ONE HELICOPTER FROM HMM-163 IN

VIA 0378518 RECEIVED -9 POUNDS AWF FROM ONE VC/NVA

WEARING CAMOUFLAGED CLOTHING (POSSIBLE UNIFORMS) WHO

WAS IN VIC OF 3-4 OTHER V's WHO WERE HARVESTING RICE.

1200 1200 ABOVE GROUND LEVEL AND 95 KTS. NEG HIG

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PAGE THREE RUMFTJM 077 C O N F I D E N T I A L

NEG RETURN FIRE.

- (4) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: YMM-163 PROVED EMERGENCY MED EVAC TO 1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES EVACUATING ONE KIA AND 8 WIA'S TO USS OKINAWA AND 6 AIA'S TO USS REPOSE.

(5) CASUALTIES:

A. DURING PERIOD (ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED BY 1ST MARINES).

| | |
|-------|------------|
| USMC | ENEMY |
| KIA 1 | KIA (CONF) |
| WIA 3 | KIA (PROB) |
| | DET 2 |
| | PW |

B. CUMULATIVE

| | |
|--------|--------------|
| USMC | ENEMY |
| KIA 9 | KIA (CONF) 6 |
| WIA W5 | KIA (PROB) |
| | DET 2 |
| | PW 3 |

3. INTENTIONS

A. ARG/SLF ALFA

PAGE FOUR RUMFTJM 077 C O N F I D E N T I A L

- (1) REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPS ASHORE IN SUPPORT OF IN-COUNTRY OPERATION MEDINA AND LAM SON 135 (ARVN).

- (2) MAINTAIN TWENTY-FOUR HOUR MEDEVAC CAPABILITY.

B. ARG ALFA

- (1) REMAIN UNDERWAY IN HOLDING AREA OFF CUA VIET.

- (2) USS DELUTH SAIL TO DANANG 13 OCT WITH BLT ROTATEES AND TO PICKUP BLT REPLACEMENTS AND SUPPLIES; AND TG FREIGHT AND SUPPLIES.

- (3) USS OKINAWA AO UNREP FROM USS CIPOLA 13 OCT.

C. SLF ALFA

- (1) MAINTAIN TWENTY-FOUR HOUR SLF LIAISON COMMUNICATIONS.

GP-4

BT

FOR 12/19/45/2006/115025


C 3/000

CEO

ICM

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RLUSZVV VPA74M00A 9750 FCA2121V
 00 RUMHVP
 DE RUMFTJM 013 285 18
 ZNY CCCCC
 ZOC
 RUMFT ZOK FFN
 RUMFCR ZON2 -T- COMSMACV GUN
 O 120218Z OCT 67
 FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT
 TO AIG FOUR SIX ONE
 INFO RUMVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
 RUMZCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
 ZEN/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 BT



MEDINA

| |
|-----------------------------|
| SHOVE COC |
| OP CHIEF <i>a</i> |
| G-3 W.O. <i>a</i> |
| G-2 W.O. <i>a</i> |
| DOPO <i>a</i> |
| APO <i>a</i> |
| ACTION <i>MEDINA</i> |

CONFIDENTIAL

EASTION HILL/MEDINA/LAM SON 135 SITREP NUMBER 5 AS OF 120000Z3 OCT 67 (U)

1. AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP ALFA COMPOSITION: NO CHANGZ
2. ACTIONS

A. ARG/SLF ALFA

(1) REMAINED IN SUPPORT OF OPS ASHORE.

(2) WEATHER HAD NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON ARG OPS. NIGHT MEDEVAC MISSION REQD IFR OVERLAND DUE LOW STRATUS.

B. ARG ALFA

(1) USS OKIINAWA, FLAGSHIP FOR ARG ALFA, CTG 79.4 AND HMM 163 EMBARKED.

A. GENERAL: 0535 H3 LAUNCHED ENRG MEDEVAC FLT. 0630H9

PAGE TWO RUMFTJM 013 CONFIDENTIAL
 COMMENCED LAUNCH OF A TOTAL OF 16 ACFT TO FORM FLIGHT TOTALING 44 SKED HELOS, FROM ONE ARMY AND FIVE MARINE SQUADS PARTICIPATING IN OPNS WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES IN ASSAULT OPS ASHORE. 2125H8 RECOVERED LAST ACFT. MAINTAINED READY DECK WITH TWO UH-34 ON COMD III ALERT THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT.

B. ACTIVITY: HELOED LIFTED IN VERTICAL ASSAULT 462 TROOPS POINT TO POINT ASHORE LANDING ELEMENTS OF FIRST AND SECOND BNS FIRST MARINES IN OPN MEDINA LZ AND ELEMENTS OF FIRST ARVN DIV RIEN (MINUS) IN OPNS LAM SON 135 LZ. (OPN MOUNTED IN COORDINATION WITH OPN MEDINA) TRANNS 15 ADMIN PAX. RECEIVED EIGHT KIA'S ONED AND TRANS TWO TO DANANG. DISPENSED 4,550 GALS AVGAS, 154 GALS LUBE OIL.

(2) USS DULUTH: ACTED AS PCS FOR CUA VIET ASSAULT CRAFT TRANSIT, LOADED AND DISPATCHED TWO CONVOYS TO DONGHHA RAMP IAW CTG 76.4 OPORD 314-67. CONVOY NR ONE RETURNED 1750H3 AND CONVOY NR TWO AT 1925H7. MOPIX AND STILL PICS OBTAINED DURING LCM8 LOADING AND RIVER TRANSIT AITH CONVOY NR ONE.

(3) USS WINSTON: LOADED AND DISPATCHED SIX LCM6 AND ONE LCM3 TO PCS FOR RIVER TRANSIT, PROVIDED HEAVY SALVAGE BOAT FOR TRANSIT.
 (4) USS BULL GROVE: LOADED AND DISPATCHED ONE LCM6 FOR OFFENSE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RUMFTJM 013 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TRANSIT. CIC, ACDIV THIRTEEN DET OSCAR ACTED AS SXZ G
WACJRVME 7F ALFA

(1) UNIT LOCATIONS:

A. CIG 79.4 USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)

B. HMM-163 USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)

(2) SUMMARY: MAINTAINED COMMUNICATIONS WITH 1ST MARINES,
BLT 1/3 AND TGH 79.4 MED REP TEAM AT DONG HA. HMM-163 MAINTAINED
TWO UH-34'S ON CONDITION III MED EVAC FOR SUPPORT OF BLT 1/3.

(3) CONTACTS: NONE

(4) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: AT 112352H, HMM-163 LAUNCHED TWO
UH-34'S TO RECOVER ONE EMERGENCY AND TWO PRIORITY MED EVACS FROM
OO C, BLT 1/3 POSITION. MED EVACS WERE EVACUATED TO THE USS OKINAWA

KVTL CASUALTIES:

A. DURING PERIOD (ENEMY CASUALTIES TOTALS ARE
REPORTED BY 1ST MARINES)

| USMC | ENEMY |
|-------|----------------|
| KIA 0 | KIA (CONF) 2 |
| WIA 3 | KIA (PROBAB) 1 |
| | DET 2 |
| | PW 2 |

B. CUMULATIVE

PAGE FOUR RUMFTJM 013 C O N F I D E N T I A L

| USMC | ENEMY |
|--------|--------------|
| KIA 8 | KIA (CONF) 6 |
| WIA 19 | KIA (PROB) |

| | |
|-----|---|
| DET | 2 |
| PW | 3 |

3. INTENTIONS

A. ARG/SLF ALFA

(1) COMPLETE LANDING OF REQUIRED ELEMS OF MT PLT AT DONG
HA.

(2) REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF SLF OPS ASHORE IN SUPPORT OF
IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS MEDINA AND LAM SON 13 (ARVN).

(3) MAINTAIN TWENTY-FOUR HOUR EMERG MEDEVAC CAPABILITY.

B. ARG ALFA

(1) REMAIN IN UNDERWAY IN HOLDING AREA OFF CUA VIET.

(2) USS DULUTH SAIL TO DANANG 13 OCT WITH BLT ROTATEES
AND TO PICKUP BLT REPLACEMENTS AND SUPPLIES, AND TG FREIGHT

(3) USS OKINAWA AO UNREP FROM USS CHIPOLA 13 OCT.

C. SLF ALFA

(1) MAINTAIN TWENTY-FOUR HOUR SLF LIAISON COMMUNICATIONS.

GP-4

for 12/100181 OCT 67/T/PC

C-3/PC

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CONFIDENTIAL*Medina*

WVV VPB073ZVA 021VV MCE046VV NMD207VV AXE056VV TJH000
 00 RUMHVP
 DE RUMFIJM 005 2870140
 ZNY CCCCC
 ZOC
 RUMFT ZOK FFN
 RUMFCR ZON2 -T7 COMUSMACV GUNLINE
 O 140140Z OCT 67
 FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 TO AIG FOUR SIX ONE
 INFO RUMNVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONEG

COMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

RUMFT/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 BASTION HILL/MEDINA/LAM SON 135 SITREP NUMBER 9 AS OF 140000Z
 OCT 67 (U)

1. AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP ALFA COMPOSITION: NO CHANGE
2. ACTIONS

A. ARG/SLF ALFA

- (1) REMAINED IN SUPPORT OF OPS ASHORE.
- (2) WEATHER HAD NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON ARG OPS.

B. ARG ALFA

- (1) USS DULUTH SAILED TO DANANG; WITH BLT ROTATEES.
- (2) USS OKINAWA, FLAGSHIP FOR ARG; ALFA, CTG 79.4 AND WMM 163 EMBARKED.

PAGE TWO RUMFIJM 005 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

X --. GENERAL: 122350H LAUNCHED TWO COND III MEDEVAC HELOS
 OTO SUPPORT FIRST MAR FROM DONG HA. 130121H LAUNCHED
 TWO COND III MEDEVAC HELOS ON EMERG; MEDEVAC. 0440H
 FIRST MAR MEDEVAC HELOS RETURNED TO REFUEL AND PICKUP
 STOKES LITTERS. 0730H COMMENCED LAUNCH OF TOTAL OF
 TWELVE ACFT PARTICIPATING IN ASSAULT OPS ASHORE. AO
 UNREP 1655 H6-1805 H4. USS DULUTH ASSUMED MEDEVAC GUARD
 DURING UNREP. RECOVERED LAST ACFT AT 2013H6. MAINTAINED
 READY DECK AND TWO COND III MEDEVAC ACFT THROUGHOUT
 THE NIGHT. NR ONE BOILER OOC TO INSPECT WATERSIDES.

L ETC 190800H OCT.

B. ACTIVITY: HELO LIFTED 36 TROOPS AND 3.2 TONS OF CGO
 PO QT TO POINT ASHORE. HELOED 33 ADKIN PAX. TRANS
 TWO KIA LR DANANG. TRANS 31 PAX BY BOAT. DISPENSED:
 2,341 GALS AVGAS, 50 GALS LUBE OIL.

C. USS OKINAWA HELO: 1, NNN LAUNCHED FOR TG FORMATION
 PICTURES BY MOPIX TEAM THEN FLEW SUPPORT MISSION WITH
 ONE TRIP TO DANANG LIFTING ELEVEN PAX AND 700 LBS OF
 MAIL (OVERFLOW CARRIED BY WMM 163 CHASE HELO). COMPLET
 ED FOUR PT SIX BLT HRS WITH SEVEN FLD AND SEVEN SHIP

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- (3) USS DULUTH: ASSUMED MEDEVAC COMM GUARD AND HELO READY DECK DURING USS OKINAWA UNREP. RECEIVED THREE AMBULATORY MEDEVAC PATIENTS. L/L THREE UH71E AND SIX UH-34 FOR MEDEVAC/MAIL/PERS. DISPENSED 1,600 LBS AVG'S, AND 2,250 LBS JP75. SAILED TO DANANG HARBOR AND ANCHORED TO OFFLOAD BLT ROTATEES AND LOAD BLT REPLACEMENT PERS/SUPPLIES.

CJL SLF ALFA

(1) UNIT LOCATIONS

- A. CTG 79.4 USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)
B. HMM7163 USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)

- (2) SUMMARY: MAINTAINED COMMUNICATIONS WITH FIRST MARINES, BLT 1/3 AND TG 79.4 MED REP TEAM AT DONG HA. HMM-163 MAINTAINED TWO UH74D'S ON CONDITION III MED EVAC FOR SUPPORT OF BLT 1/3.

- (3) CONTACTS: NONE

- (4) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE

- (5) CASUALTIES: (ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED BY 1ST MARINES)

PAGE FOUR RUMFTJM 005 C O N F I D E N T I A L

A. DURING PERIOD

| | | |
|-------|------------|---|
| USMC | ENEMY | |
| KIA 0 | KIA (CONF) | 0 |
| WIA 0 | KIA (PROB) | 0 |
| | DET | 0 |
| | PW | 0 |

B. CUMULATIVE

| | | |
|--------|------------|----|
| USMC | ENEMY | |
| KIA 9 | KIA (CONF) | 7 |
| WIA 27 | KIA (PROB) | 10 |
| | DET | 2 |
| | PW | 3 |

3. INTENTIONS

A. ARG/SLF ALFA

- (1) REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPS ASHORE IN SUPPORT OF IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS MEDINA AND LAM SON 135 (ARVN).

- (2) MAINTJ

N TWENTYFOUR HOUR MEDEVAC CAPABILITY.

B. ARG ALFA

- (1) REMAIN UNDERWAY IN HOLDING AREA OFF CUA VIET.
(2) USSNDULUTH LOAD TO FREIGHT AND SUPPLIES, AND CONDUCT

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ARE F

9XARUMFIJM 005 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 LIAISON WITH NSA DANANG REGARDING ARG: ALFA WET WELL AVAIL-
 ABILITY/PROCEDURES, AND RETURN TO HOLDING AREA. UPON
 RETURN DIST BLT PER/SUPPLIES AND TG; MATERIALS.
 (3) USS BELLE GROVE MAKE PREP TO HOST ROGER WARD/JIM SHELTON
 SHOW, SAIL TO DANANG 15 OCT FOR PICKUP.

C. SLF ALFA

(1) MAINTAIN TWENTY-FOUR HOUR SLF LIAISON COMMUNICATIONS.

to R/14/0724/OCT 67 RM 1003

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