

1. Task Organization 3/12

G/3/12

2nd Prov. Bty

Plat 1st Prov. Bty

I/3/12 when Strong
fire or completed

3. Unable to provide answers

4. Unable to provide - AD
No Free fire zone
no no fire zone

5. FSCC Coordinator
Dong Ha


6. Remain Same

ORDERS/PLANS
FOR MONTH OF DECEMBER
1967

Encl 1	Msg	141740 Z	Subj: Frag Order, Operation Checkers
2	Rpt	20 Dec	Subj: Change #1 to 4th Marines Operation Order 100-67, w/1 Encl, New Insert, Annex G (Air Defense)
3	Msg	200355 Z	Subj: Annex H to Operation Order 310-68
4	Msg	200611 Z	Subj: Frag Order for Operation Fortress Ridge
5	Msg	240712 Z	Subj: Annex N to Operation Order 311-68
6	Msg	241433 Z	Subj: Frag Order for Operation Badger Tooth
7	Msg	250525 Z	Subj: Annex H to Operation Order for Operation Badger Tooth
8	Msg	260505 Z	Subj: ARC Bravo Readiness SITREP #197
9	Msg	281310 Z	Subj: SLF Bravo SITREP
10	Ord	310900 H	Subj: Operation Order 61-67
11	Msg	151059Z	Subj: Frag Order 162-67 (Operation Checkers)
12	Msg	290837Z	Subj: Operation Order 58-67 (Lancaster)
13	Msg	291223Z	Subj: Frag Order 62-67 Redeployment of Forces (Operation Checkers)

DECLASSIFIED

Checkers.



GVVV VPB4292VA 386 LFA785

OO RUMHVP

DE RUMHFL 1224 3481740

ZNY SSSSS

ZOC

O 141746Z DEC "7

FM CG FORLOGCOMD

TO ZEN7FORLOGCOMD

INFO RUMHFM7CG FMFPAC (L 0280)

RUMMWAA7CG III MAF

RUMHLA7CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVP7CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHAW7CG FIRST MAW

RUMHIB7CG SECOND BDE ROKMC

RUMHNA7CMDR NSA DNG

RUMHNA7CMDR CB

RUMMWAA/CO SUB AREA CMD DNG

BT

FRAG ORDER

1. FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND CONTINUES SUPPORT OF ALL ELEMENTS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.

2. MISSION

(S) SUPPLY BATTALION

"1) ON 26DEC"7 COMMENCE SUPPORT OF ROKMC ELEMENTS LOCATED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

14

17

40

Encl 1

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO RUMHFL 1224 [REDACTED]
 IN QUANG NAM PROV NCE9 PROVIDE UNIT DISTRIBUTION TO LSA ESTAB-
 LISHED BY ELEMENTS OF 2F BDE ROK' MC) VICINITY OF HOI AN

'2) CONTINUE SUPPORT OF ELEMENTS III MAF LOCATED QUANG NAM
 PROV NCE

ED MAINTEN

CE BATTALION

(1) ON 20DEC'77 COMMENCE SUPPORT OF ROK' MC) ELEMENTS LOCATED
 QUANG NAM PROV NCE

(2) ON 20DEC'77 COMMENCE THIRD ECHELON SUPPORT MC UNITS III
 MAF LOCATED CHU LAI AREA. CONCEPT OF CONTACT TEAM AND EVACUATION
 OF EQUIPMENTS TO SHOPS LOCATED DANANG

'3) CONTINUE 2D ECHELON SUPPORT III MAF MC ELEMENTS LOCATED
 QUANG NAM PROV NCE.

(4) CONTINUE FIELD MAINT SUPPORT ALL MC ELEMENTS III MAF

CS FLSG ALPHA

'1) ON 30DEC67 SUPPORT MC ELEMENTS III MAF LOCATED THUA
 THIEN PROV NCE AND ELEMENTS LOCATED TAOR OPN SCOTLANDS

(2) CONTINUE PRESENT SUPPORT OF USA, USAF AND USN UNITS
 LOCATED IN SAME AREAS

(3) ON 30DEC'77 DISESTABLISH FLSU NR 2 DONG HA

D FLSG BRAVO

141740Z DEC 67

C-1100

000 092.4

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PAGE THREE RUMHFL 2224 [REDACTED]

'1) ON 20DEC'77 DEPLOY ADVANCE ECHELON TO DONG HA COMBAT BASES

(2) ON 01DEC'77 RELOCATE FLSG B FROM CHU LAI TO DONG HA4N
 MISSION4 PROV DE SUPPORT TO III MAF ELEMENTS LOCATED QUANG TRI
 PROV NCE LESS TAOR FOR OPN SCOTLAND.

'3) ON 30DEC'77 DERACH SUPPLY CO REINFORCED TO REMAIN CHU LAI
 AS INDEPENDENT FLC ELEMENT. H

ED SUPPLY COH'REINFD CHU LAI - COMMENCING 30DEC67 PROVIDE CL
 V (1) SUPPORT ST MAW ELEMENTS CHU LAI: 3F ECH MT MAINT SUPT TO 9TH
 ENG BNK CONTINUE OPERATION RSA AND EFFECT ECONOMIC DRAW DOWN

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD WARD IV

PAGE THREE RUYSUAE 052 S E C R E T
OPERATION FORTRESS RIDGE. (U)

A. MY OPLAN 120A(A)-67

1. AIR OPERATIONS IAW ANNEX HOTEL OF REF A AS MODIFIED BELOW:

A. MAPS: 1:50,000 SERIES L7014 SHEETS 6442 I, IV, 6443 III.

B. DISREGARD PARA 3X(7). INSERT NEW PARA AS FOLLOWS: DURING THE AMPHIBIOUS PHASE OF THE OPERATION, CATF WILL CONTROL ALL AIR TRAFFIC WITHIN THE AOA THROUGH THE TACC AFLOAT. CONTROL OF AIR WILL BE PASSED ASHORE TO THE DASC PLUTO CRAT ONE, WHEN DIRECTED BY CATF. AFTER CONTROL OF AIR IS PASSED ASHORE THE TACC AFLOAT WILL REVERT TO A TACC.

C. ADD NEW PARA 3X(15): AIRCRAFT DESIRING TO TRANSIT OR OPERATE WITHIN THE AOA MUST CONTACT THE TACC, ICEPACK BRAVO, ON THE APPROPRIATE TACC NETS OR UHF GUARD NET FOR CLEARANCE. IF AIRCRAFT ARE UNABLE TO CONTACT THE TACC, THEY WILL CIRCUMNAVIGATE THE AOA. NOTE: FREE TRANSIT AREAS EXIST ABOVE 14,000 FEET MSL IN THE LANDWARD AOA AND ABOVE 5000 FEET MSL IN SEAWARD AOA.

D. ADD NEW PARA 3X(16): AFTER CONTROL IS PASSED ASHORE THE TACC, THROUGH THE DDC IN LPH-8 WILL CONTROL HELOS IN SUPPORT OF BLT ASHORE.

2. APPENDIX I AIRCRAFT SCHEDULES

A. PARA 7, THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE APPLICABLE:

(1) SAR REFERENCE PT, DONG HA TACAN CH 10.

PAGE FOUR RUYSUAE 052 S E C R E T

(2) ORBIT/ENTRY PT JANICE 060/12 CH 10S

B. PARA 10. NAVAIDS, READ IN THREE COLUMNS:

NAME	CHAN/FREQ	I.D.
DONG HA TACAN	10S	DMZ
LPH TACAN	3S	BC
LPH-8 LF HOMER	408	BC
LPH-8 UHF HOMER	266.6	BC

C. TAB A NOT APPLICABLE

D. TAB B D-DAY AIRCRAFT SCHEDULE

READ IN 3 COLUMNS

EVT	MISSION	PROVIDED BY	NO.	MODEL	ENTRY PT	NMIES
00	LZ PREP	FMAW	2	VMA/VMF D-20 D-5 D-2	L-40 PT JANICE	10, 12 1, 2, 3
01	OBS	FMAW	AS REQ	SMOKS D-21	L-15 PT JANICE	10, 15 1, 2
02	CAS	FMAW	2	VMA/VMF MIXED	L PH JANICE PLUS	10, 11 1, 2, 3

SECRET

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARCH

PAGE FIVE RUYSUAE 052 S E C R E T


01 1400/CAC	SLF	1 UN-1E UNARMED	30 LPH-8	7
05 1400	SLF	2 UN-1E ROCKETS	40 LPH-8	7
06 1400	SLF	2 UN-1E ROCKETS	1 HR	7
			10	
			COMP LPH-8	7
1400 TROOP LPH	SLF	6 CH-46A GUNS	1 HR	
			10	
			COMP LPH-8	7

- E. TAB D: GENERAL AIR SCHEDULE NOTES: (1) NOTES 1 THRU 9 CONTAINED (3) REF A.,
- (2) NOTE 10: EVENTS 50 AND 51, 52 CONTACT 1 EPACK BRAVO ON GOLD BRAVO 212.2 REPEAT 212.2 OR VIOLET BRAVO 289.8 REPEAT 289.8.
- (3) NOTE 11: EVENT 53 RELIEVE ON STATION TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR DIVERSION TO SECONDARY TARGETS UNTIL L PLUS 150.
- (4) NOTE 12: EVENT 50 RELIEVE ON STATION EVERY 20 MINUTES (4 SECTIONS)
- (5) NOTE 13: LAY SMOKE ONLY ON ORDER OF CLF
2. APPENDIX II. AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT.
- A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIRST NAV ARMAMENT CODE.
3. APPENDIX III COMMUNICATIONS:
- A. IAR ANNEX NOVEMBER AND AS FOLLOWS: READ IN FOUR COLUMNS:

PAGE SIX RUYSUAE 052 S E C R E T

REF	FREQ	COLOR	CIRCUIT DESIG.
1400 (P)	312.2	GOLD B	H-5
AC-119G(S)	289.8	VIOLET B	H-6
AC-219G	356.2	PURPLE B	H-7
AR 100	3307		H-3/M948
TAC	2422		H-1
ID-1	326.6	MARCON B	H-11
ID-2	251.4	COPPER B	H-12
ID-3/LZ CONTROL/TAR(S)	40.4	PINK B	H-13
1/1	334.6	IVORY B	H-19
SHOSHELL	4171		M-64.7
TAR-1	42.5		M-18
8-4			
14			

SECRET



NNNNKV VPA 882VA 100CB770VV UA 2061Z
 OO RUMHVP
 DE RWYSUAE 067 340611
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 200611Z DEC 67 ZYO RUYSCH
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 TO ZEN/SLT THREE SLANT ONE
 ZEN/MARMEDELHON TWO SIX TWO DET ALPHA
 INFO RU HBRA/CINCPACSGT
 RUHHEMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRSTHAW
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 ZEN/ITG SEVE SIX PT FIVE
 RUMFUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RUMFCR/CTHUYEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 TWMNVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
 RUMSAL/SA I CORPS
 ZEN/USS VALLEY FORGE
 ZEN/USS NAVARR

SHAVE COC
 OP CHIEF
 G-3 W.O.
 G-2 W.O.
 DOPD
 APO
 ACTION

TOR/2015

*Fortress Ridge
 File
 done*

PAOZ TWO RUYSUAE 067 S E C R E H
 ZEN/USS ALAMO
 ZEN/USS WINDHAM COUNTY
 ZEN/USS VERNON CMUNTY
 RUMHVP/FIRST ANTRAC BYN
 RUMHVP/SECOND PH FPRS ARMD AMPHCO
 BT

SHE C R EHT HHH SECTION ONE OF TWO
 FRAG ORDER FOR OPSRATON FORTRESS RIDGETRUU)
 A. COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 101-67
 B. CTG 79.5 OPLAN 120A-67
 C. COMSEVE THFLT 191304Z DEC 67
 D. CTG 79.5 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMAE ISSUED SEP
 E. CTG 79.5 COP R BPQYAYU
 F. MAPS AHS, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, SERIES L 7014 YHZETS 6342 I AND
 6442 I AND IV.
 TIME ZONE HOTEL
 TASK ORG
 SLF
 SLT 3/1
 DE ALPHA HMM WYVW

SECRET

20 200611Z DEC @-G-31COC 06 Standard JT

Encl 4

PAGE THREE RUYSUAE 067 S E C R E T

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES

1. EN ACTIVITY HAS SLIGHTLY INCREASED IN THE LAST 15 DAYS WITH COMPANY SIXTEEN UNITS BEING USED TO A GREATER EXTENT. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASED AMOUNT OF HARRASSING, HEAVY WEAPONS FIRE. THE HFORCSS WITH THE AOA CONSISTS OF THE 2ND BN, 303 NVA REGT, K. 400 LF COY AND A 1ST VC NF BN. ESTIMATED STRENGTH IS POSSIBLE 900 PERSONNEL.

2. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

A. FORWARD ANY UNIFORMS WITH POCKET FLAPS OR COLLARS WHICH SHOWS ANY ARMS, NUMBERS OR LETTERS OUTSIDE OR INSIDE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS

B. DETERMINE IF THE HQ ANPH TH NAVA REGT IS LOCATED WITHIN THE AOA. IF YES, WHERE AND P.M. - 5 543, 25.

C. DETERMINE IF TRACKED VEHICLES CAN OPERATE IN THE SANDY AREA BEHIND THE DUNE LINE.

D. FRIENDLY FORCES: 194 32548 PUTION OF GR AND FORCES OPERATING IN

THE AOA SEE OPERATIONS OVERLAY (ISSUED SEP)

(1) AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (TG 76.5) CONDUCTS AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

FOR THE PURPOSE

OF ESTABLISHING AND SUPPORTING THE LANDING FORCES ASHORE.

(2) CG III MASH

PROVIDES INTERPRETER SUPPORT

SECRET

PAGE FOUR RUYSUAE 067 S E C R E T

(3) CG FIRST MAW PROVIDES CAS.

(4) CTG 115.1 PROVIDES MARKET TIME SUPPORT.

(5) CTG 70.3 PROVIDES NGF SUPPORT.

(6) 12TH MARINES PR

PROVIDES GENERAL SUPPORT AND REINFORCING ARTY FIRES FROM POSITIONS AT DONG HA AND GIO LINH.

(29) 2D PLT, 1ST ARMD ANH CO, 1 D/S OF BLT 3/1 INITIALLY REVERTS TO B/S UPON LANDING OF ORGANIZATION.

(9) 1ST AM TRAC BN PROVIDES GUIDES FOR MOVEMENT OF TROOPS THROUGH FRIENDLY VILLAGES.

2. MISSION. SLF CONDUCTS AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE TO LOCATE AND CAPTURE/DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND ROCKET/LOGISTIC CACHES, OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE AND BE PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE WITH OTHER FORCES AS AGREED UPON WITH CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

ARMED EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. ON D-DAY HELICOPTERS BORNE AND WATER BORNE ASSAULT IN GIO LINH DISTRICT, QUANG TRI PROVINCE. THIS OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED IN FOUR PHASES.

(1) PHASE I. A RAPID BUILD UP OF THE LF ASHORE AND AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT BY ALL UNITS TO SECURE LF OBJECTIVES.

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUYSUAE 067 S S ITRTE T

(2) PHASE II. CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION WITHIN THE PRIMARY AREA OF INTEREST TO CAPTURE/DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND ROCKETS/LOGISTIC CACHE AND OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE.

(3) PHASE III. BE PREPARED FOR EMPLOYMENT AROUND THE A-3 POSITION BETWEEN CONTHIEN AND GPO LINH.

(4) PHASE IV. WHEN DIRECTED CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL.

B. ELT 3/1

(1) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY LAND BY LVT'S OVER RED BEACH AND LA EP G CRAFT OVER PURPLE BEACH ORANGE BEACH AND BLUE BEACH.

(2) AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY LAND BY HELO INTO LZS ROBIN EAGLE AND HAWK. 7" SEIZE LANDING FORCE OBJECTIVES 1, 3 AND 4.

(4) CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE AREA OF PRIMARY INTEREST.

(5) DESIGNATE A SPARROW HAWK PLATOON NOT TO BE COMMITTED WITHOUT APPROVAL OF SLF COMMANDER.

(6) MAXIMUM USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS.

(7) BE PREPARED FOR EMPLOYMENT AROUND THE A-3 POSITION BETWEEN CONTHIEN AND GPO LINH.

(8) CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL.

C. HDET ALPHA HMM 262

SECRET

PAGE SIX RUYSUAE 067 S E C R E T

(1) PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT IAW LANDING PLAN.

(2) PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT FOR SPARR

W HAWK PLATOON.

(3) PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT FOR C&C, MEDEVAC, AND RESUPPLY.

(4) PROVIDE ADDITIONAL HELO SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

D. COORD INSTRUCTION

(1) OF TCMEE NAME FORTRESS RIDGE

(2) D-DAY 21 DEC 67 (TO BE CONFIRMED).

(3) H-HOUR 0930H, L-TOW

AA

AAA

A (TO BE CONFIRMED).

(4) UNOSIR RCA AUTHORIZED MINIMIZE DOWNWIND HAZARD TO NON-COMBATANTS OUTSIDE OF TGT AREA CONSISTENT WITH MISSION.

(5) REPORTY IAW ANNEX KHRES B.

(6) SYC IAW A NEXHY REF B.

(7) PASS WORDS AND COUNTER SIGNS (TO BE ISSUED).

(8) TRUST POINTS

(A) CITIES 2874

(B) TREES 3071N

(C) SLOWERS 2768

(D) MONTHS K3472

(9) GRID DESIGNATOR: YANKEE DELTA

(10) PEXPS TO MAX EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH TACTICAL SITUATION.

SECRET

PAGE SEVEN RUYSUAE 067 S E C R E T

(11) LANDI G PLAN IAW ANNEX I REF B. BLT 3/1 PREPARE DETAILED PLAN.

(12) OPNS OVERLAY (ISSUED SEP) (NOTAL).

(13) AIRHOPNS IAW ANNEX G REF B.

(14) WOA FOR THE OPERATION IS THAT LAND AREA ENCOMPASSED BY THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OS THE DMZ FR

MMHE SEA AES TO (YD243753) HHENCE

A STRAIGHT LINE TO ROAD JUNCTION AT HIGHWAY NR ONE (YD 217718) THENCE SOUTH ALONG HIGHWAY NR ONE TO ROAD JUNCTION (YD224630) THE EE EAST TO THE SEA AL

NO GRID LINE YD 63. THE SEA WARD AOA ISTHAT AREA

DESCRIBD BY A LLNE EXTENEFG ORHWARD ALONG THE COAST FROM THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ TO THE MMQTH OF THE SONG BEN HAP, N

THE CEHEASTWARD THREZ MILES FROM THE MOUTH OF

SONG BEN HAI TO (YD 310521) THENCE NORTHWARD ALONG THE THREE MILE

LIMIT TO (YD EQPOQL OFF CAP LAY, THENCE ON A LINE 070 DEG TRUE TO

THE INTER SECTION OF A 20 MILE ARC STRUCK FROM (YE3422701) AND

EXTINDG YOUTHWARD TO GRID LINE YD 63, THENCE WEST ALONG GRID

LINEHYD 63 TO THE COASTBM HHE AREA WITHIN 3 MILES OF HON ON

ITYZXULUDEDHFROM THE AOA. THE AIR SPACE ABOVE THE AOA FR

K SURFACE

TO 25,200 FT MSL SHALL BE INNLUDED I THE AOA. A FREE TRANSIT AREA

FOR AIRCRZFT WILL EXIST ABOVE ,000 FT IN SEA WARD AOA ANVD ABOVE 11,200 FT IN THE LANDWARD AOA.

GP-2

BT

SECRET

N NH

YWT

EVV VPA872ZVA 1030VV NMF920 AXC082VVH UAE039

OO RUHVP
 DE RUYSUAE 067 3540611
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 200611Z DEC 67 ZYO RUYSOR
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 TO ZE /BLT THREE SLANT ONE
 ZEN/MARMEDELRON TWO SIX TWO DET ALPHA
 I FO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUHNNAA/CG III MAF
 RUMNAV/CG FIRSTHMAW
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMFUV/CTST SEVEN SIX
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMFLAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT YPGHT PT NPNE
 RUMVNE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
 RUMSAL/SA I CORPS
 ZEN/USS VALLEY FORCE
 ZEN/USS NAVARRO

TOR/201540/DCS

SECRET

OOL

PAGE TWOHRUYSUAE 067 S E C R E T
 ZEN/USS ALAMO
 ZEN/QSS WINDHAM COUNTY
 ZEN/USS VERNON COUNTY
 RUMHVP/FIRST ANTRAC BYN
 RUMHVP/SECOND PH FIRSTTARD ANPHCO

BT

SECRET

HT

HTSINAL SECTION OF TWO

(15) BEACH COORD

TA) BLUE 344699

(B) RED HT 328715

(C) PURPLE 305678

H (D) ORANGE 340700

(16) LZ COORD

HT (A) ROBIN H 293716

(B) HAWK 295730

H (C) EAGLE HBA

(17) LF OBJ

(A) OBJ 1 302738

(B) OBJ UV JSEPUWO

(C) OBJ 3 H712704

HHH(D) OBJ 4 285689

SECRET

8

CFO

PAGE THREE RUYSUAE 061HSHE C R E T

(1) AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL

(A) IAW NWP 22(A)

(JB) SLF WILL PREPARE DETAILED PLAN.

2. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SEE ANNEX J TO REF

F. BLT 3/1 ESTABLISH TACHLOG ABOARD LPH AND TACLOG DET'S ON APA, LCVES EACH LST AND THE LSA ASHORE.

C. BLT 3/1 WILL LAND WITH FOLLOWING PRESCRIBED LOAD

(1) CLASS I - 3 MCI

(2) CLASS II - AS REQUIRED

(3) CLASS III - FULL TANKS PLUS 5 GAL CA MOCAS PER VEHICLE

(4) CLASS IV - AS REQUIRED

(5) CLASS V - BA

D. THE LPH IS CECS. ALL BLT 3/1 CASUALTIES WILL BE EVAC TO PPH. SLF WILL BE CROC.

E. LSA IS LOCATED AT FLU ONE AT DONG HA COMBAT BASE

F. CIVILIAN AND ARVN MED EVAC TO LSA FOR INITIAL TREATMENT, FURTHER EVAC TBA.

G. POW'S HO LPH FOR INITIAL INTERROGATION. N

H. ENEMY MED EVAC TO LSA, FURTHER EVAC TBA

SECRET

PAGE FOUR RUYSUAE 067 S E C R E T

P. H REFUGEES TO LSA

J. CAPTURED FOOD AND MATERIAL TO LSA

K. LPH WILL PROVIDE H451 BTRY INARGE SERVICE.

L. MISC

(1) SP PLT(-) REPORT TO OPS OFFICER IN LSA FOR COORDINATION

W OS

RESUPPLY

(2) BLT 3/1 WILL PROVIDE 350 WATER CANS AT LSA

(3) ALL CAPTURED WPNS WILL BE TAGGED AND TURNED IN TO TYOF ASAP.

(4) BLT 3/1 WILL ASSIGN S-1 LIAISON PERSONNEL A "A" MED AT DONG HA COMBAT BASE FOR CASUALTY REPORTING CONTROL.

(5) BLT 3/1 INSURE ALL PERSONAL PROPERTY AND EQUIP IS STOWED IN POOLCKERS/SEABAGS AND PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.

(6) BLT 3/1 PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SUPPLIES COMING AND EQUIP REMAINING ABOARD S IPS.

(7) REPORT EXPENDITURES OF ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLIES EZWBV NLT 2000.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

A. COMM - ELECT IAW ANNEX L OPT

B. EXCEP AS MODIFIED BELOW.

(1) ACTIVATE ALL COMM NETS H-60MIN

(2) PARA 3F (3) AUTHP LIZION AND CODEY. CURRENT EDITION KAC.QY WILL BE USED FOR AUTHENTICATION AND NUMERICAL CODES. KAC PXTB11

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUYSUAE 067 S E I X R E T

BE USED FOR ENCRYPTION ON UNSECURE VOICE CIRCUITS.

(3) MODIFY APPENDIXES 1,2 AND BR OF REF E TO REFLECT INFMR-
NATION CONTAINED IN REF E.

(4) USE EFFECTIVE KAK 3245 FOR COVERED CIRCUITS

(5) DISREGARD APPE SIX 5 OF REF B.

B. COMMAND POSTS

(1) AFLOAT - USS VALLEY FORGE

(2) ASHORE - REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED.

GP-4

BT

SECRET


DECLASSIFIED

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

BALGAR
700h



VV VPBS71A 569A189V FTA697V UAE004

OO RUMHVP

DE RUYSUAE 089 3580730

ZNY SSSSS ZFD

RUMFC-I-USS WHEI STONE

IG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUYSOR ZOK FFM

O 240712Z DEC 67 ZYO RUYSOR

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

TO RUMFOR/IG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMFOR/USS WHEI STONE

RUYSOR/USS ARLINGTON

RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

INFO RUMHHQA/CINCPAC

RUMHGRA/CINCPACFLT

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUAUSUL/COM SEVENTHFLT

RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTHAF

RUMHFM/CG FMFPAC

RUMHWA/CG III MAF

RUMHAW/CG UMILA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUABCL/CG FMFPAC (PMD)

ZEN/ELT THREE SLANT ONE

ZEN/MARMEHEL/ON TWO SIX TWO DET ALFA

YOB/250208/B

240724/DEC

C-63/acc

0700

SECRET

Encls

DECLASSIFIED

10
12

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE TWO RUYSUAE 089 S E C R E T
 RUMSB/COMNAVFORV
 RUMJMSA/COMPHIBPAC
 RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUAUBA/CTG SEVEN SIX PT EIGHT
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUAUDB/CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE
 RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUAUBU/CTF SEVEN THREE
 RUMFOR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 RUMVND/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 RUMVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
 RUMFUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RUMFOR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 RUAUDD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT NINE
 RUMFRE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO ONE PT ONE
 ET

S E C R E T

ANNEX NOVEMBER MY OPORD 311-66 (U)

A. CTG 76.5 OPLAN 120A(A)-67 (CH-4)

B. MY 151545Z DEC 67

1. COMM FOR PENDING OPERATION BADGER TOOTH IAW REF A AS MODIFIED
 BY REF B MCOMM PLAN FOR RECENT OPERATION (FORTRESS RIDGE) AND
 FURTHER MODIFIED HEREIN. WINDHAM CTY ENSURE REF B PASSED TO
 WHAISTONE UPON RELIEF.

2. FREQ PLAN EFFECTIVE 250400Z DEC 67 AS PER REF B EXCEPT FOLLOWING
 CKTS:

N7	35.7M	VICE	35.6M
10A	37.3M	VICE	45.0M
10B	65.65M	VICE	35.0M
H3A	10195K	AS TAR	(P)
3B	35.8M	AS TAR	(S)
H5	314.2M	VICE	312.2M
H6	277.2M	VICE	269.6M
H7	309.2M	VICE	356.2M
H13	32.9M	VICE	40.4M

CP-4
 ET

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SECRETVV VPA 0552VA 111111 MCC527 0139
DO RUMRVP COMM CNTR THIRD MARDIV

DE RUHHMOC0065 3590000

ZNY SSSSS

DE RUYSUAE 176 3581433

ZNY SSSSS

RUMFCR--CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUYSR ZOK FPN

O 241433Z DEC 67 ZYO RUYSR

FM CTG SEVZN NINE PT FIVE

TO ZEN/ELT THREE SLANT ONE

RUA EP O/HMM TWO SIX TWO

INF O RUHHBRA/C INCPACFLT

RUHHFMA/C G FMFPAC

RUMSMA/C OMUSMACV

RUA UBUL/C OMSEVENTHFLT

RUMWAA/C G III MAF

RUMHA/C G FIRST MAW

RUMHVP/C G THIRD MARDIV

RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUA BQL/CTF SEVE NINE

ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMFUA/CTG SEVEN ZER

PT EIGHT


RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZSNO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUMHVE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

RUMHVP/SA I CORPS

ZE JKUSS VALLEY FORGE

ZEN/USS NAVARRO



PAGE TWO RUYSUAE 176 S E C R E T

ZENUSS ALAMO

ZEN/USS WINDHAM COUNTY

ZEN/USS VERNON COUNTY

RUMHVP/FOURTH MAR

BT

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

FRAG ORDER FOR OPERATION BADGER TOOTH

A. COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 101-67

B. CTG 79.5 OPLAN 120A-67

C. COMSEVENTHFLT 24012Z DEC 67

D. CTG 79.5 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ISSUED SEP

E. CTG 7

F. G OI SER 017-67

G. MAPS AMS, VIENAM, 1:50,000, SERIES L7014 SHEETS

H. 6442 I AND II.

I. TIME ZONE HOTEL

J. TASK ORG

K. SLF

L. BLT 3/1

M. DET ALPHA RMW 262

N. SITUATION

241137 DEC

C- 6-3100

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THIRD MARDIV.

PAGE THREE RUYSUAE 176 S E C R E T

ENEMY FORCES: HOSTILE FORCES IN THE AREA OF INTEREST CONSISTS OF ELEMENTS OF THE FOLLOWING UNITS: C. 113(LF) CO; 800TH (MP) BN; 802ND (NVA) BN AND THE 416TH BN. THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THESE UNITS IS ESTIMATED TO BE 1200 PERSONNEL. THE ENEMY HAS SEVERAL ROUTES TO AND THROUGH THE RICE GROWING LANDS IN THE AOA WHICH ARE USED FOR MOVING RICE. THESE ROUTES CONVERGE IN THE AREA ALONG THE SONG O LAU, ALSO CALLED THE MY CHANH RIVER. THIS AREA IS HEAVILY POPULATED AND AT LEAST SYMPATHETIC TO THE HOSTILE FORCES, EITHER FROM FEAR OR POLITICAL BELIEF. DURING THE RECENT PAST THE ENEMY HAS ENDEAVORED TO SEVER FRIENDLY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS WHILE MAINTAINING HIS ABILITY TO MOVE RICE BOUGHT AND/OR CONFISCATED IN THE AREA. DETAILED RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITY WILL BE FOUND

ATSUMS AND THE INTE

AGENCY ESTIMATE FOR OPERATION BADGERH
DOOTH.D

B. FRIENDLY FORCES FOR DISTRIBUTION OF GROUND FORCES OPERATING IN THE AOA. SEE OPERATIONS OVERLAY. (ISSUED SEP)

(1) AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (TG 76.5) CONDUCTS AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING AND SUPPORTING THE LANDING FORCE ASHORE.

(2) CG III MAF PROVIDE INTERPRETER SUPP

PAGE FOUR RUYSUAE 176 S E C R E T

(3) CG FIRST MAF PROVIDES CAS.

(4) CTG 115.1 PROVIDES MARKET TIME SUPPORT.

(5) CTG 70.6 PROVIDES NGF SUPPORT.

(6) 4TH MARINES PROVIDES BLOCKING FORCE AT AP LVONG (YD 51636), TUNNEL CLEARING TEAMS, MINE DETECTION TEAMS AND RIVER RECON TEAMS.

(7) FIRST ARVN DIV PROVIDES BLOCKING FORCES AS REQUESTED.

(8) 3D BN 12TH MAR PROVIDES REIN ARTY SUPPORT AS REQUESTED.

D. MISSION. SLF CONDUCTS AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES TO DESTROY/CAPTURE ENEMY FORCES AND LOGISTIC CACHES, DISRUPT ENEMY ROUTES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLY, OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE AND BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SUCH OTHER OPERATIONS AS AGREED UPON WITH CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

E. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. ON D-DAY SLF CONDUCTS A HELICOPTER BORNE AND WATER BORNE ULT IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES I CTZ, RVN. THIS OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED IN FOUR PHASES.

(1) PHASE I. A RAPID BUILD UP OF THE LF ASHORE.

(2) PHASE II. S&D OPERATION CONDUCTING A RIVER CROSSING AND SECURING OF OBJECTIVE 1.

(3) PHASE III. BE PREPARED FOR SUCH OTHER OPERATIONS AS MAY

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THIRD MARDIV

PAGE FIVE RUYSUAE 176 S E C R E T

BE AGREED UPON WITH CG III MAF OR THIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

(4) PHASE IV. WHEN DIRECTED CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL.

B. BLT 3/1

(1) AT 0800H ON D-DAY C/1/11 LANDS BY CH-53 HELICOPTERS AT CAMP EVANS.

(2) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY LAND BY LVTS OVER GREEN BEACH.

(3) SECURE LZ FINCH.

(4) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY LAND BY HELICOPTER IN LZ FINCH.

(5) SECURE LF OBJECTIVE 1.

(6) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED ZONE.

(7) DESIGNATE A SPARROW HAWK PLATOON NOT TO BE COMMITTED

WITHOUT APPR

VAL OF SLF COMMA DER.

(8) BE PREPARED FOR SUCH OTHER OPERATIONS AS MAY BE AGREED UPON WITH CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

(9) WHEN DIRECTED CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL.

C. DE ALPHA HMM 262

(1) PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT IAW LANDING PLAN.

(2) PROVIDE HELO SUPP

RT FOR SPARROW HAWK PLATOON.

(3) PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT FOR C&C, MEDEVAC, AND RESUPPLY.

(4) PROVIDE SUCH OTHER HELO SUPPORT AS DIRECTED.

PAGE SIX RUYSUAE 176 S E C R E T

D. COORD INSHKL

LKON

(1) OPN CODE NAME BADGERTOOTH.

(2) D-DAY 26 DECHG. (TO BE CONFIRMED)

(3) H-HOUR 1100H, L-HOUR - UPON SECURING LZ FINCH. (TO BE CONFIRMED)

(4) UNODIR RCA AUTHORIZED, MINIMIZE DOW WIND HAZARD TO NON COMBATANTS OUTSIDE OF TGT AREA CONSISTENT WITH MISSION.

(5) REP

RS IAW A NEX K REF B.

(6) FSC IAW A NEX S REF B.

(1) PASSWORDS AND COUNTER SIGNS (TO BE ISSUED).

(8) TRUST POINTS

(A) ACTORS

5252

(B) DAYS

5649

(C) CARS

4847

(D) GIRL

5446

(9) GRID DESIGNATOR: YANKEE DELTA

(10) PSYOPS TO MAX EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH TACTICAL SITUATION.

(11) LANDING PLAN IAW ANNEX I REF B. BLT 3/1 PREPARE DE-

TAILED PLAN.

(12) OPNS OVERLAY (ISSUED SEP)

(NOTAL).

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE SEVEN RUYSUAE 176 S E C R E T

(13) AIR OPNS IAW A NEX G REF B.

(14) AOA FOR THE OPERATION IS THAT LAND AREA ENCOMPASSED BY A LINE DRAWN FROM THE COAST AT YD 00486 THRU YD 570430 THRU YD 480430 THRU YD 350510 TO THE COAST AT YD 500560. THE SEAWARD AOA IS THAT AREA E COMPASSED BY A LINE DRAWN FROM THE COAST AT YD 380663 SEAWARD TO YD 638800, THEN TO YD 868615, THEN TERMINATING AT THE COAST AT YD 470377. THE AIR SPACE ABOVE THE AOA FROM SURFACE TO 25,000 FT MSL SHALL BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE CONTROL AREA. A FREE TRANSIT AREA EXISTS ABOVE THE 15,000 FT MSL OVER THE LANDWARD

AOA A D 5,000 FT ABOVE THE SEAWARD AOA.

(15) BEACH COORD - GREEN 54

525

(16) LZ COORD - TYINCH 524488

(17) LF OBJ - ONE 502460

(18) CAMP EVANS COORD - 236325

(19) AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL

(A) IAW NUP 22(A)

(B) SELF WILL PREPARE DETAILED PLAN.

(20) RULE OF ENGAGEMENT IAWS

NEX H REF B.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SEE ANNEX J TO REF B

B. FLT 3/1 ESTABLISH TAC LOG ABOARD LPH AND TACLOG DET'S ON

BT

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00 RUMHVP
 DE RUYSUAE 176 358 **COMM CNTR**
 ZNY SSSSS
 RUMFOR-T-CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 RUYSOR ZOK FFN
 O 241433Z DEC 67 ZYO RUYSOR
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 TO ZEN/BLT THREE SLANT ONE
 RUABPO/HMM TWO SIX TWO
 INFO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMFUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RUMFOR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 RUMVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
 RUMHVP/SA I CORPS
 ZEN/USS VALLEY FORGE
 ZEN/USS NAVARRO

FCAL72

FIC589

UAE061

THIRD MARDIV

TOR/250230/B

NONE

PAGE TWO RUYSUAE 176 S E C R E T

ZEN/USS ALAMO

ZEN/USS WINDHAM COUNTY

ZEN/USS VERNON COUNTY

RUMHVP/FOURTH MAR

BT

S E C R E T SECTION TWO OF TWO SECTIONS

APA, LSD, EACH LST AND THDDJL D DORE.

C. BLT 361 WILL LAND WITH FOLLOWING PRESCRIBED LOAD.

(1) CLASS I - 3 MCI

(2) CLASS II - AS REQUIRED

(3) CLASS III - FULL TANKS PLUS 5 GAL CAN MO GAS PER

VEHICLE

(4) CLASS IV - AS REQUIRED

(5) CLASS V - BA

D. THE LPH IS CECS. ALL BLT 3/1 CASUALTIES WILL BE EVAC TO LPH. SLF WILL BE CRCC.

E. LSA IS LOCATED AT CAMP EVANS.

F. CIVILIAN AND ARVN MED EVAC TO LSA FOR INITIAL TREATMENT, FURTHER EVAC IBA.

G. POW'S TO LPH FOR INITIAL INTEROGATION, THENCE TO LSA.

H. ENEMY MED EVAC TO LSA, FURTHER EVAC IBA.

I. REFUGEES TO MY CHANH, CO CAG.

J. CAPTURED FOOD AND MATERIAL TO LSA.

K. LPH WILL PROVIDE 451 BTRY CHARGE SERVICE.

L. MISC.

(1) SP DET (PLT CMDR PLUS COMM DET) REPORT TO OPS OFFICER

241433Z DEC C-6-3/LOC

CEO JF

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9

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE THREE RUYSUAE 176 S E C R E T
IN LSA FOR COORDINATION OF RESUPPLY

(2) ALL CAPTURED WPNS WILL BE TAGGED AND TURNED IN TO
SELF ASAP.

(3) BLT 3/1 WILL ASSIGN S-1/SUPPLY LIAISON PERSONNEL
AT "A" MED AT PHU BAI FOR CASUALTY REPORTING CONTROL.

(4) BLT 3/1 INSURE ALL PERSONAL PROPERTY AND EQUIP IS
STORED IN FOOTLOCKERS/SEA BAGS AND PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.

(5) BLT 3/1 PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SUPPLIES CLOTHING AND EQUIP
REMAINING ABOARD SHIPS.

(6) REPORT EXPENDITURES OF ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLIES DAILY
AT 2000.

3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

A. COMM - ELECT IAW ANNEX L OF REF B EXCEPT AS MODIFIED
BELOW.

(1) ACTIVATE ALL COMM NETS H-60 MIN.

(2) PARA 3F(3) AUTHENTICATION AND CODES. CURRENT EDITION
KAC CX WILL BE USED FOR AUTHENTICATION AND NUMERICAL CODES.
KAC PX WILL BE USED FOR ENCRYPTION ON UNSECURE VOICE CIRCUITS.

(3) MODIFY APPENDIXES 1, 2 AND 4 TO REFLECT INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN REF E.

PAGE FOUR RUYSUAE 176 S E C R E T

(4) USS EFFECTIVE EDITION KAKA 3245 FOR COVERED CIRCUITS.

(5) DISREGARD APPENDIX 5.

B. COMMAND POSTS

(1) AFLOAT - USS VALLEY FORGE

(2) ASHORE - REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED

GP-4

BT

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
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THIRD MARDIV

VV VPB558ZVA 684 HUV NCA407XE695UV UAE023
 OO RUMHVP
 DE RUYSUAE 060 3590525
 ZNY SSSSS
 RUYSOR ZOK PFN



250525Z DEC 67 ZYO RUYSOR
 FR CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 TO ZEN/TG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMHAW/MARAIRGRU ONE ONE
 RUMHAW/MARAIRGRU ONE TWO
 RUMHAW/MARAIRGRU ONE THREE
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMFUV/USS MT MCKINLEY
 INFO RUHHHQA/CINCLC
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTHAF
 RUHREMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUBGL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 ZEN/BLT THREE SLANT ONE
 RUMHNB/MASS TWO (DASC DONG HA)

3
 COL
 A180

PAGE TWO RUYSUAE 060 S E C R E T
 ZEN/MARMED HELRON TWO SIX TWO DET ALFA
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV
 RUAUB/MARAIRGRU ONE FIVE
 RUMHVP/MASS TWO (DASC PHU BAI)
 BT

S E C R E T

THIS IS NY HOTEL ANNEX TO CTG 76.5 OPORDISEQQAYI AIR OPERATION FOR
 OPERATION BADGER TOOTH (U)

A. NY OPLAN 120A (A)-67

1. AIR OPERATIONS IAW ANNEX HOTEL OF REF A AS MODIFIED BELOW

A. NAPS 1:50,000 SERIES 7014 SHEETS 6442, I, II, III, IV 6542
 III

B. DISREGARD PARA 3X(7) INSERT NEW PARA AS FOLLOWS. DURING THE
 INITIAL PHASE OF THE OPERATION, CATF WILL CONTR
 ALL AIR TRAFFIC

WITHIN THE AOA THROUGH THE TACC AFLOAT, CONTROL OF AIR WILL BE
 PASSED ASHORE TO DASC, FLUTOCRAT TWO OR FLUTOCRAT ONE AS APPLIC

WHEN DIRECTED BY CATF, AFTER CONTROL OF AIR IS PASSED ASHORE THE TACC
 AFLOAT WILL REVERT TO A TADC.

C. ADD NEW PARAGRAPH 3X(15): AIRCRAFT DESIRING TO TRANSIT THE
 AOA MUST CONTACT THE TACC, ICEPACK BRAVO ON THE APPROPRIATE TACC

250525Z DEC 67

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE THREE RUYSUAE 060 S E C
DE TGY

NETS OR UHF GUARD NET FOR CLEARANCE. IF AIRCRAFT ARE UNABLE TO CONTACT THE TACC THEY WILL CIRCUMNAVIGATE THE AOA. NOTE: FREE TRANSIT AREAS EXIST ABOVE 14,000 FEET MSL IN THE LANDWARD AOA AND ABOVE 5,000 FEET MSL IN THE SEAWARD AOA.

D. ADD NEW PARA 3X(16): AFTER CONTROL IS PASSED ASHORE HELOS WILL CHECK IN WITH PLUTOCRAT I OR PLUTOCRAT II AS APPLICABLE WHEN CROSSING THE BEACH.

FOR SAVA PLANE INFORMATION

2. APPENDIX I AIRCRAFT SCHEDULES

A. PARA 7 THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE APPLICABLE:

(1) SAR REFERENCE POINT QUANG TRI TACAN CH 103

(2) ORBIT/ENTRY POINT JUDY 090/10 CH 103

B. PARA 10 NAVAIDS READ IN 3 COLUMNS

NAME	CHAN/FREQ	LIJD.
QUANG TRI TACAN	CH-103	
LPH-8 TACAN	CH-36	BC
LPH-8 LF HOMER	JRPI	DC
LPH-8 UHF HOMER	266.6	BC

C. TAB A NOT APPLICABLE

D. TAB B (D-DAY AIR SCHEDULE READ IN EIGHT COLUMNS)

PAGE FOUR RUYSUAE 060 S E C R E T

EVT	MISSION	PROVIDED DY	NO/MODEL ORD AC	OS	ENGY NOTES IT
100	TROOP LIFT SUPPORT	FNAW	2 CH-53 GUNS	H-180 KTO COMPLETE	LSD-33 7,10, 11,12
80	TAO/C&C	SLF	1 UH-1B NONE	H-30 TO (59 :9.0	LPH-8 7,12
85	TACA	KSLF	4 UH-1B ROCKET	SH-15 TO (:9.0	LPH-8 7,12
101	TROOP LIFT	SLF	6 CH-46 GUNS	L-15 TO (:9.0	LPT-8 7,73

(3. GENERAL AIR SCHEDULE NOTES: (1) NOTES 1-9 CONTAINED IN REF

A. (2) NOTE 10: EVENT 100 PRE POSITION OF ARTILPTRY FROM LSD TO VICINITY OF CAMP EVANS, SPECIFIC GRID COORDINATES WILL BE GIVEN ABOARD BEARCAT BY SLF AT BRIEF. (3) NOTE 11: HELOS CONTACT LSD 04 HD-2, BUTTON COPPER FREQ 251.4 CALL SIGN DITTY BOX ALPHA. (4) NOTE 12: H HOUR 261100H DEC 67, (5) NOTE 13: L HOUR TO BE SIGNALLED.

5. APPENDIX II AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT

A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH FNAW ARMAMENT CODE

6. APPENDIX III COMMUNICATIONS

A. IAW ANNEX NOVEMBER AND AS FOLLOWS READ IN FOUR COLUMNS:

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SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE FIVE RUYSUAL 060 SECRET

NET

CSII DESIG

TAT C(P)

AC-1/TAT C(S)

AC-2/ARC

ID-1

ID-2/HEL O COMMON

TAR (P)

TAR (S)/HR

ID-3/LZ CTR

TAC

DASC L IASON(P)

CROSSTELL

-SS- :) 6-9, (S)

L/L

TACF LOCAL

CP-4

FREQ

COLOR

CC

314.2

GOLD B

H-5

277.2

VIOLET B

H-6

EPOMW

PURPLE B

H-7

3-6.6

MAROON B

H-11

251.4

COPPER B

H-12

'10,195

H-3A

35.8

(-3B/M551

32.9

PINK B

H-13

2422

(-1

5564

M-886

4171

6.-847

43.5

YELLOW

M-165

344.6

IVORY B

WH-19

39.6

M-423

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

NNNNVV VPA416ZVA 546 FCA587VV FID 97IVV UAE 023

PP RUMHVP

DE RUSAE 072 3 6085 15

ZNY SSSSS

P 2605 05 DDEC 67 ZYORUYSOR

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PI FIVE

TO A13SFOUR SIX ONE

RUHQ/FLEWEACEN GUAM

BT

SECRET

ARG BRAVO READINESS SHIP NR 197 FOR PERIOD 25 1201L TO 260000Z 8 DEC 67.

1. ARG BR 00 COMPOSITION: ADD WHEISTONE (LSD-27)

2. ACTIONS:

A. TG 76.5 COMPLETED LOADING ARG/SLF AMMO AND SUPPLIES IN DANANG HARBOR AND STEAMED TO BADGER TOOTH AOA.

B. WHEISTONE (LSD-27) REPORTED FOR DUTY WITH TG 76.5 AT 251900H7.

C. VALLEY FORGE UNDERWAY AT 260050H3 UPON COMPLETION LOADING AMMO.

D. AT 260900H7 ADM J.W. KELLY, CHIEF OF NAVY CHAPLAINS, DEPARTED VALLEY FORGE BY HELO FOR IWO JIMA (LPH-2).

3. COMMENTS: A. WEATHER SUMMARY FOR PERIOD - SCATTERED BROKEN LOW AND MIDDLE CLOUDS. CEILING 2000-3500 FT. VISIBILITY 5-7

Q.

PAGE TWO RUSAE 072 SECRET

WILDS WITH SURFACE HAZE. SURFACE WINDS VARIABLE 3-15 KNOTS. SEAS EASTERLY 3-5 FEET. TEMPERATURE RANGE 71-75 DEGREES F.

B. ADM KELLY RON VALLEY FORGE AFTER DELIVERING MESSAGE AT CHRISTMAS NIGHT SERVICE FOR SHIP CREW AND EMBARKED MARINES. ADM KELLY HAD BREAKFAST WITH CREW, COFFEE IN THE WARDROOM AND VISITED SICKBAY PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR IWO JIMA AT 0900H9.

4. INTENTIONS:

A. EXECUTE OPERATION BADGER TOOTH AS SCHEDULED ON 26 DEC.

5. ACTIONS REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE.

GP-4

BT

260505Z DEC 67

G-3/LOC


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FILE OF DATE NR 001 3021x

247 00000

2470102 DEC 67

2470102 SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

TO 16 THIRD MARDIV

10050

10050 FOURTH MARINES

24

CONFIDENTIAL

10050 SITREP PERIOD 240600H TO 241000H

10050 UNIT LOCATIONS

(1) C/S/1, 1/S/1, TA PLT, AMTRAC PLT	YD 547521
(2) K/S/1	YD 530525
(3) L/S/1	YD 526520
(4) M/S/1	YD 525525
(5) W/S/1	YD 547521
(6) C/S/1	YD 466392

10050 OPERATIONS

(1) FIXED WING AIR STRIKES WERE RUN ON TARGET (YD 539527) FROM 0730H TO 1015H. AIRCRAFT RECEIVED A/W FIRE FROM TARGET WHILE CONDUCTING MISSION. BDA AS FOLLOWS: 21 STRUCTURES DESTROYED, 10 STRUCTURES DAMAGED AND 6 BUNKERS DESTROYED.

(2) AT 0900H AMTRAC PLT SENT BACK TO USS ALAMO FOR REFUELING AND RETURNED TO THE BEACH.

(3) AT 1000H 1, K/S/1 MOVED AGAINST TARGET AND RECEIVED SPORADIC SNIPER FIRE AS THEY ENTERED THE VILLAGE. INITIAL SEARCH PRODUCED ENEMY DOCUMENTS, EQUIPMENT AND DEAD. ONE NVA WOUNDED STATED THAT THE 116TH NVA BN OCCUPIED THE VILLAGE DURING 27TH DEC AND LEFT BY BOAT THAT EVENING, LEAVING A SQUAD TO DELAY THE MARINES. INFORMATION NOT CONFIRMED. THIS MAN LATER DIED OF HIS WOUNDS. A DETAILED

Encl 9

PAGE TWO Y41C 38210 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. NVA/VC FOUND DURING THE INITIAL SEARCH OF THE AREA. IN ADDITION
3 VCS WERE FOUND.

(C) CASUALTIES

(1) DURING PERIOD

USMC - NONE

ENEMY - 1 KIA (BC) NVA

(2) CUMULATIVE

USMC - 40 KIA (NOTE)

01 KIA (NOTE)

ENEMY - 24 KIA (BC) VC (NOTE)

3 KIA (BC) NVA (NOTE)

1 KIA (PROB) VC

(D) INTENTIONS

ALF BRAVO

(1) TO ESTABLISH NIGHT AND AMPUSH POSITIONS AROUND TARGET.

(2) CONTINUE SEARCH OF OBJECTIVE AFTER FIRST LIGHT.

(3) CONTINUE S&D OPERATIONS TO THE NW ALONG COASTLINE.

(NOTE) FIGURES ADJUSTED AS A RESULT OF SEARCH OF AREA

LT

2210 H / 28 DEC 67 / RLU / MAF CMD#

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CG

31 MAR DIV
54268

File

Copy No. of Copies
4th Marine Regiment
Camp EVANS, RVN
20 December 1967

Change No 1 to 4th Marines Op Order 100-67

Ref: (a) 4th Mar Op Ord 100-67

Encl: (1) New insert, Annex G (Air Defense)

1. Make the following changes to reference (a):

a. Insert pages G-1 and G-2 (enclosure (1)) hereto.

b. On page 5, under Annex F, add "G-Air Defense".

4TH MARINES (REIN)
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 Camp EVANS, RVN
 20 December 1967

ANNEX G (Air Defense) to Operation Order 100-67

Ref: (a) DivO P2000.2 (COI)
 (b) DivO P2000.4 (COMMSOP)

Time Zone: H

1. Situation

- a. Enemy Forces. See current PERINTREPS and INTSUMS
- b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 1st MAW participates in the air defense effort of mainland Sea Air Defense Region from assigned bases and such other locations as may be directed by higher authority.

(2) 3d MarDiv (Rein) conducts active and passive air defense measures against enemy aircraft positively identified as being in the process of attacking friendly installations, personnel or facilities.

(3) 2d Plat (Rein) Btry D 1st Bn 44th Arty (USA) provides an active air defense means when notified that air attack is imminent.

(a) Sect Btry G 1st Bn 65th Arty (USA) provides reinforcing fires to Btry D 1st Bn 44th Arty.

c. Attachments and detachments. In execution of this Annex all supporting Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units revert to operational control of parent units.

2. Mission. 4th Marines (-) (Rein) conduct passive air defense measures against enemy aircraft positively identified as being in the process of attacking friendly installations, personnel or facilities.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. The primary role of ADA units supporting the 4th Marine Regiment will be that of ground combat support; however, active air defense measures will be carried out by ADA units as conditions demand. All other units will effect passive air defense measures in the event of enemy air attack.

b. Hq Co and units OPCON to the 4th Marines, other than ADA, effect passive air defense measures in the event of attack by enemy aircraft or other airborne objects.

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c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) All units establish an audible alert system (i.e. loudspeaker, siren etc.) for air defense warning and prepare defensive positions as necessary.

(2) ADA alert conditions (applicable to ADA units, included as information only).

<u>SITUATION</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS</u>
No air threat	WHITE	STANDBY	WEAPONS TIGHT
Stand-to or loss of comm	RED	BATTLE STATIONS	WEAPONS TIGHT
Air attack imminent	RED	BATTLE STATIONS	WEAPONS TIGHT
Hostile act	RED	BATTLE STATIONS	WEAPONS FREE

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Administrative Order 100-67.


b. ADA unit logistics SOP.

5. Command and Communications-Electronics.

a. References (a) and (b) and 4th Marines COI.

b. ADA units SOP and SOI.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL DICK



G. M. McCain
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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 3d Marine Division (Rein)
 Phu Bai, Vietnam
 310900 Dec 1967

Operation Order 61-67

Ref: (a) Maps; Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS Series: L 7014 Sheets
 6342: I, II, III, IV; 6442 I, II, III, IV
 (b) CG III MAF OpOrd 13-67
 (c) CG III MAF AdminOrd 13-67
 (d) 3d MarDiv AdminOrd 61-67
 (e) 3d MarDiv Opn Plan 45-67
 (f) 3d MarDiv Opn Plan 48-67

Time Zone: H

Task Organization

3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF	MajGen TOMPKINS
9th Marines (-)(Rein)	Col SMITH
3d Marines (-)(Rein)	Col LO PRETE
1st AmTracBn (-)(Rein)	LtCol TONER
26th Marines (-)(Rein)	Col LOWNDS
4th Marines (-)(Rein)	Col DICK
1st Marines (-)(Rein)	Col ING
12th Marines (-)(Rein)	Col SCHICK
3d Shore Party Bn (-)(Rein)	LtCol QUINN
3d Tank Bn (-)(Rein)	LtCol CHAPMAN
3d Engineer Bn (-)(Rein)	LtCol PERRIN
9th Motor Transport Bn	Maj STANLEY

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex C (Intelligence) to Operation Order 13-67
- (2) See current Intelligence INTSUMS and PERINTREPS

b. Friendly Forces

(1) III MAF in coordination/cooperation with Commanding General I Corps provides required support to establish an area defense and to organize, establish and operate an anti-infiltration system in northern Quang Tri Province.

(2) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provides close/direct air support to 3d MarDiv during construction and operation of linear obstacle/strong point system; conducts air operations as directed to destroy infiltrating enemy forces and to protect friendly installations and LOCs; provides fixed/rotary wing support as

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required for logistic resupply, medical evacuation, aerial reconnaissance and command and control; is prepared to furnish fixed/rotary wing support to ARVN forces when requested.

(3) 11th Engineer Battalion in direct support.

(4) 1st ARVN Division constructs/occupies portion of obstacle system as described in ref (b).

(5) Cdmr 7th AF provides support ARCLIGHT and defoliation missions and other missions as requested. Coordinates with Commanding General III MAF to assure minimum interference between forces.

(6) COMNAVFOR develops port facilities, provides engineer assistance, naval gunfire and other logistical support within capabilities, as requested.

(7) CTU 70.8.9 provides naval gunfire support. See Annex C (Fire Support).

(8) DCG, USARV will support with construction and transportation as required.

(9) DSA, I Corps provides liaison as required and requested.

2. Mission

In coordination with 1st ARVN Division establish an area defense to include organization, construction and occupation of a strong point/obstacle system, strong point/patrol bases and forward operating bases in accordance with assigned schedule, see Appendix 2 (construction target dates) to Annex B (concept of operations) to Ref (b); conduct anti-infiltration operations in northern Quang Tri Province to include support of strong point/patrol bases, forward operating bases and battalion combat operating bases. Within the limitation of enemy activity, weather, and on site material availability, extend combat operating bases westward along Route #9, see Annex A (Operation Overlay); provide reinforcements, as required/requested on an interim basis to 1st ARVN Division to man/assist in operation/employment of sensor and surveillance equipment until appropriate skill level is attained by ARVN units; deliver close offensive and defensive fires, support the combat outpost with deep supporting fires, isolate the battlefield and counter enemy mortar, rocket and artillery fires; conduct training to qualify and maintain the skill level of personnel in the installation and the use of devices and equipment associated with the surveillance component of the anti-infiltration system.

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3. Execution

a. Concept of operations: See Annex B (Concept of Operations).

b. 9th Marines (-)(Rein)

(1) Establish an area defense in AO.

(2) Establish an anti-infiltration system in AO.

(3) With 11th Engineer Battalion in general support construct positions A-4, C-2, C-3, C-3A and LOCs in zone.

(4) Organize and defend positions C-2, C-3, C-3A and, until relieved by ARVN, organize and defend A-4. Be prepared to organize and defend other positions as directed.

(5) Provide reinforcements, as an interim measure as required/requested to 1st ARVN Division in operation/employment of sensor and surveillance equipment until adequate skill level is acquired by ARVN units.

(6) Provide sensor training to units manning the surveillance component. Request assistance as required.

(7) Conduct operations as appropriate in support of the anti-infiltration system.

c. 3d Marines (-)(Rein)

(1) Establish an area defense in AO.

(2) Establish an anti-infiltration system in AO. When directed select a specific location for Site A-5 and the subsequent position for C-3.

(3) Select the specific site for COB vicinity Ca Lu.

(4) With engineer support as required/requested organize, construct and defend the COB vicinity Ca Lu, and LOCs in zone.

(5) With engineer support as required/requested construct and defend A-5 and the subsequent position for C-3 and LOCs in zone. Conduct operations as appropriate in support of the anti-infiltration system.

(6) Be prepared to assist in security operations during construction of anti-infiltration system in 9th Marines and 26th Marines AO.

d. 1st AmTrac Battalion (-)(Rein)

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(1) Organize and construct position C-4, in conjunction with 11th Engineers in general support.

(2) Provide transportation for personnel, supplies and equipment from vicinity Cua Viet base during construction of positions A-1 and C-4.

(3) Organize and defend position C-4.

e. 26th Marines

(1) Establish an area defense in A0.

(2) Establish an anti-infiltration system in A0. When directed select specific locations for combat operating bases vicinity Lang Ruau and Khe Sanh.

(3) With engineer support as required/requested organize, construct and defend the COBs at Lang Ruau and Khe Sanh.

(4) Be prepared to conduct security operations to safeguard LOCs, in A0.

(5) Conduct security operations as appropriate in support of the anti-infiltration system.

(6) Be prepared to assist in security operations during construction of anti-infiltration system in 3d Marines A0.

f. 4th Marines (-)(Rein). Be prepared to reinforce security effort for the anti-infiltration system within Division A0. Be prepared to assume the mission of any of the other units.


g. 1st Marines (-)(Rein). Be prepared to reinforce security effort for the area defense and anti-infiltration system within Division A0, while under operational control 3d Marine Division.

h. 12th Marines (-)(Rein).

(1) Direct support, normal. See Annex C (Fire Support).

(2) General support/reinforcing with priority of fires to 9th Marines initially and then on order shifting as necessary to follow the progress of uncovering/construction efforts as they shift westward.

(3) Occupy and develop firing positions at forward operating bases and COBs with mixed light, medium and heavy artillery as appropriate to support uncovering, construction and security of the anti-infiltration system.



(4) Establish mutually agreeable fire support procedures through cooperation/coordination with 1st ARVN Division representatives.

i. 3d Shore Party Battalion (-)(Rein)

(1) Establish LSA for unloading, handling of heavy construction equipment and cargo, and establishment of a Class IV dump on north shore, vicinity of the mouth of the Cua Viet River.

(2) General Support.

j. 3d Tank Battalion (-)(Rein). General Support.

k. 3d Reconnaissance Battalion (-)(Rein). General Support.

l. 3d Engineer Battalion (-)(Rein)

(1) Be prepared to assist 11th Engineer Battalion.

(2) General Support.

m. 9th Motor Transport Battalion (Rein). General Support.

n. Coordinating Instructions

(1) This order is effective upon receipt and supersedes ref (e) and (f).

(2) Direct liaison is authorized at all levels.

(3) Construction schedules shown in reference (b) may be accelerated as enemy situation, weather and on-site availability of material permits.

(4) Operations and procedures peculiar to Dye Marker are covered in Annex H.

(5) Surveillance and sensor training will be conducted in accordance with Annex G (Training), to reference (b), as assigned by Annex D (Communications-Electronics), to this operation order.

4. Administration and Logistics.

Ref (d).

5. Command and Communications-Electronics.

a. Annex D (Communications-Electronics)

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b. Command Posts

(1) Initially no change; subsequent TBA.

(2) Units relocating in support of this order report CP location, when established.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL TOMPKINS

W. H. Cuenin

W. H. CUENIN
Colonel U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex I (Distribution) to Operation Plan 61-67

ANNEXES:

- ✓A. Operation Overlay
- ✓B. Concept of Operations
- ✓C. Fire Support
- ✓D. Communications-Electronics
- ✓E. Psychological Operations
- ✓F. Sensor Surveillance System
- ✓G. Evaluation
- ✓H. Operations and Procedures Peculiar to Dye Marker
- ✓I. Distribution

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Annex B (Concept of Operations) to operation order 61-67

1. Mission. Basic Order.

2. Concept

a. The mission directs the establishment of an area defense and the construction, organization and defense of an anti-infiltration system. The latter will consist of the following components:

- (1) Linear obstacles component.
- (2) Surveillance component.
- (3) Obstacle support component.
- (4) Combat Operating Base component.

See Annex B (concept of operations) to ref (b) of Basic Order. Both the linear obstacles and surveillance component serve the purpose of impeding enemy infiltration, canalizing his movement, early detection of his approach and/or infiltration attempts, and providing an ancillary means of target acquisition. Vital parts of these components is the series of squad-sized observation posts with detection and forward observer capability. Inherent in the mission of these observation posts is visual and electronic (sensor readout) detection of enemy infiltration and rapid response by fires of supporting arms and/or maneuver elements. The strong point/patrol bases and forward operating bases, manned in battalion strength provide defense in depth and a rapid reaction capability in support of the area defense. Active and aggressive patrolling complements the systems.

b. The terrain west of position A-5, is known as the Defile area. This ground is not conducive to the effective use of a linear obstacle system. However, certain classic avenues of approach exist in this area. These avenues will be selectively sown with electronic surveillance equipment (sensors) to provide detection of infiltration and/or target acquisition. Readout will be made by airborne means, roving patrols and fixed readout positions. A series of combat operating bases to support active and aggressive patrolling, provide depth to the area defense and to protect LOCs is required for this portion of the area defense. These will be established westward from A-5.

B-1

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c. Concomitant with the mission of detection of enemy infiltration is the rapid destruction of enemy infiltrators through the use of supporting arms and maneuver elements. Thus the anti-infiltration system and its electronic component are not considered to be the method of inhibiting infiltration but are to be considered as being an efficient and advanced means of detection and target acquisition. The area defense is the primary method of inhibiting infiltration.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL TOMPKINS

W. H. Cuenin

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Annex C (Fire Support) to Operation Order 61-67

Ref: (a) CG III MAF Op Ord 13-67
(b) FMFM 3-4
(c) FMFM 7-4
(d) FMFM 7-1 (Draft)
(e) CG 3d MarDiv LOI 1-67
(f) CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Op O 303-67

Time Zone: H

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex C (Intelligence) to ref (a).
- (2) Current Intelligence Estimates, INTSUMS and PERINTREPS

b. Friendly Forces. III MAF Operation Order 13-67.

2. Mission.

CG 3d MarDiv, with forces assigned and in coordination with adjacent ARVN units, establishes an area defense, conducts anti-infiltration operations in northern Quang Tri Province and destroys enemy in zone. With all fire support means available, delivers close offensive and defensive fires and counters enemy mortars, rockets and artillery fires.

3. Concept of Operations

a. Fire Support Coordination will be conducted in accordance with procedures outlined in references (b), (c), and (d).

b. Fire Support Coordination. The 3d MarDiv FSCC (Dong Ha) will exercise overall responsibility for planning and coordination.

c. Request for 7th AF aircraft in support of 3d MarDiv will be submitted to the 3d MarDiv FSCC (Dong Ha).

d. Positive means of coordination between ARVN FSCC and 3d MarDiv FSCC (Dong Ha) will be established and maintained on a mutually agreeable basis.

C-1

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e. Air support will be provided by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as directed by Annex D (Fire Support Plan) of ref (d). Requests will follow guideline of ref (e), operational guidance on use and limitations will be obtained from ref (e) and (f).

f. Naval gunfire support units as provided by CTU 70.8.9.

4. Target Information

a. Target List: To be published

b. Restricted Targets

(1) Preserve Religious, Cultural, Medical, School, and Public Utility installations.

(2) Specific restricted targets will be found in the target list.

5. Aircraft Safety

a. Air Sentries and Lookouts

(1) Air Sentries will be positioned at artillery firing units and on NGF support ships, and will check fire when friendly aircraft are endangered.

(2) Artillery Forward Observers, Naval Gunfire Spotters, and Forward Air Controllers will check fire when it appears that the trajectories of artillery and naval gunfire will endanger friendly aircraft.

b. Restrictive Fire Plans. As a safety measure for friendly aircraft on air support missions, a restrictive fire plan may be imposed which establishes a three-dimensional area that is reasonably safe from friendly, surface-delivered fires. Restrictive fire plans should be used only when the risk to friendly aircraft is sufficiently great to justify the attendant loss of surface-delivered fire support.

c. Flak Suppression Fires. These fires will be planned to a maximum extent to protect aircraft from ground fires.

d. Save-A-Plane Plan. This plan is a safety measure for friendly aircraft that establishes air space danger areas for artillery firing.

6. Safety of Ground Forces

The use of supporting arms must be cleared by the commander into whose AO the fires will be delivered.

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7. Command and Communications-Electronics

a. Annex D (Communications-Electronics)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL TOMPKINS

W. H. Cuenin

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Chief of Staff

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Appendixes:

- ✓1. Artillery

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Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Fire Support) to 3d MarDiv
 Operation Order

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (G) 1501 NE 48-16 1:250,000
 (b) 3d MarDiv COI
 (c) 12th Marines Order P3000.10 SOP

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Tab A (Task Organization)

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Annex C (Intelligence) to III MAF Operation Order
 13-67

(2) Current ISUM and PRITSUM

b. Friendly Forces. III MAF Operation Order 13-67

2. Mission

Provide normal direct support to maneuver elements of the division. Provide General Support/Reinforcing fires to the force as a whole with priority of fires to the 9th Marines. On order, shift to support of the uncovering of construction sites. Occupy and develop positions within the FOBs/COBs with the proper mix, as appropriate, to support uncovering, construction and security of the system. Establish mutually agreeable fire support coordination procedures with the ARVN.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Artillery Employment

(1) In each of the FOB/COBs a minimum of one 105mm How Battery will be emplaced.

(2) Considering the enemy's strength, armament, and disposition (See Appendix 1, Enemy Disposition and Arty Fire Capability Overlay, to Annex C, Intelligence, to III MAF Operation Order 13-67), general support artillery will be positioned across the Division Zone of Action in order to prosecute an active counter battery program.

C-1-1

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(3) In order to meet the increased threat of infiltration in the western sector of the Division's Zone of Action, as the sites in the eastern sector harden, General Support artillery will be positioned so as to support this increasing threat. (See Appendix 2, Enemy Infiltration Routes, to Annex C, Intelligence, to III MAF Operation Order 13-67).

(4) General Support artillery will be positioned to provide continued support of Operation HIGHRISE. The nature of the targets and the range at which these targets must be engaged necessitate the employment of General Support artillery. To support operations other than Dye Marker, General Support artillery will be positioned such that the units at Quang Tri can be supported from the same positions as supports Operation Dye Marker/HIGHRISE.

(5) Artillery will be positioned so that the reconnaissance effort throughout the Division Zone of Action can be supported from the positions supporting Operation Dye Marker.

(6) With the width of the Division Zone of Action, an Artillery Headquarters capable of assuming tactical fire direction of a slice of General Support Artillery will be emplaced in the western sector of the Division Zone of Action.

(7) General Support Artillery will be positioned so that the range capability can be exploited in reducing the enemy combat efficiency and mobility in and north of the DMZ by the employment of long range H&I fires.

(8) The above concept of employment will provide for General Support/Reinforcing fires which coupled with the fires of the Direct Support Battalions will allow for isolation of any portion of the battlefield, cut routes of infiltration, provide a density of fires such that the enemy will be forced to deploy prior to reaching the FEBA and support operations forward of the line of FOB/COBs.

b. 1st Bn (-)(Rein) 12th Marines

1st Bn (-)(Rein) 12th Marines
Sect, 2d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry

(1) Direct Support 3d Marines

(2) Position Areas: Tab A (Task Organization), Zone of Fires, Zone of Action 3d Marines

c. 2nd Bn (Rein) 12th Marines

2nd Bn (Rein) 12th Marines

Btry W 1st Bn 12th Marines
 Det Sect 1, 2nd Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry
 Det Sect 1, 2nd Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry
 Det Sect 1, 3d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry
 Det Sect 1, 3d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry

(1) Direct Support 9th Marines

(2) Position Areas: **Tab A** (Task Organization), Zone of Fires, Zone of Action 9th Marines.

d. 3d Bn (-)(Rein) 12th Marines

3d Bn (-)(Rein) 12th Marines
 Provisional Btry (-)(Rein)
 Plt 5th 155mm Gun Btry
 Sect 2, 3d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry

(1) Direct Support 4th Marines

(2) Position Areas. **Tab A**, (Task Organization), Zone of Fires, Zone of Action 4th Marines.

e. 4th Bn (Rein) 12th Marines

4th Bn 12th Marines
 Btry K 4th Bn 13th Marines
 Det Sect 3, 3d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry

(1) General Support/Assign one Btry to reinforce 2d Bn 12th Marines

(2) Position Areas: **Tab A**, (Task Organization), Zone of Fires, Zone of Action 3d MarDiv.

f. 1st Bn (Rein) 13th Marines

1st Bn 13th Marines
 Provisional Battery (-)

(1) Direct Support RLT 26

(2) Position Areas: **Tab A**, (Task Organization), Zone of Fires, Zone of Action RLT 26.

g. 108th Arty Group (USA)

HQ & HQ Btry
 1st Bn 40th Arty
 2nd Bn 94th Arty
 8th Bn 4th Arty

Btry C, 2d Bn, 26th Arty

(1) General Support, assign one Btry (Rein), 1st Bn 40th Arty, as direct support 1st ARVN Division, one Btry, 1st Bn 40th Arty, reinforce 1/12.

(2) Position Areas: **Tab A, (Task Organization), Zone of Fires, Zone of Action 3d MarDiv.**

(3) Provide Target Acquisition and Processing Support

h. 1st 8" How Btry (Rein)

1st 8" How Btry

(1) General Support/Reinforce 2/12

(2) Position Areas: **Tab A, (Task Organization), Zone of Fires, Zone of Action 3d MarDiv.**

i. 2d Plt Armd Amphib Co. 1st Amphib Trac Bn

(1) Reinforce 2/12

(2) Position Areas: **Tab A, (Task Organization), Zone of Fires, Zone of Action 2/12.**

j. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Position Areas and Fire Capabilities Report when established.

(2) Registrations: No restrictions

(3) Survey: Tab B (Survey)

(4) Concentration Numbers: Ref (c)

(5) Counter Battery Policy: Active

(6) Counter Mortar Policy: Active

(7) Metrological Data furnished by HQ 12th Marines, 2nd Bn 94th Arty and 8th Bn 4th Arty at least three times daily.

(8) Air observation: Two AO's on station over Division Zone of Action from dawn until dusk daily. AO's check in with DASC after getting airborne.

4. Administration and Logistics

C-1-4

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a. 3d MarDiv Administrative Order 61-67

b. Available Supply Rate

4.2 inch mortars	26
105mm How (TD)	61.9
155mm Gun	9
155mm How	31.7
8" How	-19.5
175mm Gun	26
105mm How (U.S. Army)	36

5. Command and Communication-Electronics

a. Communication-Electronics: Annex D (Communications-Electronics) to 3d MarDiv Operation Order 61-67.

b. Units relocating in support of this order report CP locations when established.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL TOMPKINS



W. H. CUENIN
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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Tabs:

- ✓A. Task Organization
- ✓B. Survey
- ✓C. Survey Information

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Tab A (Task Organization) to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C
(Fire Support) to 3d MarDiv Operations Order 61-67.

12th Marines (-)(Rein)

Dong Ha

Headquarters Battery
108th Arty Group (USA)

Dong Ha

1st Bn 40th Arty

Dong Ha

Headquarters Battery

Dong Ha

Serv Btry

Dong Ha

Btry _____ (Rein)

C-1 (8 tubes)

Btry _____ (-)

Dong Ha

Btry _____

Thon Son Lam

2d Bn 94th Arty

Camp Carroll

Headquarters Battery

Camp Carroll

Serv Btry

Dong Ha

Btry _____

Camp Carroll

Btry _____

Camp Carroll

Btry _____

Khe Sanh

8th Bn 4th Arty

Headquarters

Dong Ha

Serv Btry

Dong Ha

Btry _____

C-3

Btry _____

C-1

Btry C, 2nd Bn, 26th Arty

1st 8" How Btry (Rein)

Plt C-1, Plt C-2, Plt C-3

1st 8" How Btry

1st Searchlight Btry

Det MC 4-1 CMR

Det MC 10-1 CBR

Det MC 10-2 CBR

1st Bn (-)(Rein) 12th Marines

Headquarters Battery

Camp Carroll

Btry _____

Camp Carroll

Btry _____

Ca Lu

Sect, 2d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry

2nd Bn (Rein) 12th Marines

Headquarters Btry

Dong Ha

Btry _____

C-3

Btry _____

C-2

Btry _____

C-2

W Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Mar

A-4

C-1-A-1

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W Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar 3 tubes A-5, 3 tubes C-4
Sect 2, 1st Searchlight Btry
Det Sect 1, 2d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry
Det Sect 1, 2d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry
Det Sect 1, 3d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry
Det Sect 1, 3d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry

Quang Tri

Headquarters Battery
Btry G
Btry I
Provisional Battery (-)
Plt 5th 155mm Gun Btry

4th Bn (Rein) 12th Marines

Headquarters Battery
Btry _____ Camp Carroll
Btry _____ Thon Son Lam
Btry _____ Ca Lu
Btry K/4/13 C-2
Det Sect 3, 3d Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry

Khe Sanh

Headquarters Battery
Btry _____
Btry _____
Btry _____
W Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar
Provisional Btry (-)

Bong Kha
(3 tubes Bong Kha, 3 tubes
Khe Sanh)

Cau Viet

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL TOMPKINS

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SURVEY TAB

Tab B to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Fire Support) to
3d MarDiv OP Order 61-67

Ref: (a) Maps: 1:50,000 Vietnam, Sheet No. 6242 IV, 63421 IV,
63421, 6442 IV, 6242 III, 6342 II, 6442 III. 1:250,000
Vietnam, Sheet No. NE 48-16
(b) Regt. Order 03570.1 W/ch 1
(c) FM 6-2

Encl: (1) Survey Information

Time Zone: H

1. Situation

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex C to III MAF Operation Order 13-67
- b. Friendly Forces. III MAF Operation Order 13-67

2. Mission. The Regimental Survey Officer will provide second, third and fourth order control to all FOB/COBs shown on enclosure (2).

3. Execution. Battalion survey teams will conduct Battalion level surveys in their respective area of operation to include but not be limited to the following:

- a. Battalion Survey Control Points
- b. Battery Position Area Surveys
- c. Connection Area Survey
- d. Target Area Survey
- e. Area of Operation Control Survey

4. Control. Control will be provided in the Battalion area of operation in accordance with ref (b). Battalion Survey Control Point information will be forwarded to the Regimental Survey Information Center to include accuracies in accordance with ref (b) and (c). Starting control will be carried from Regimental SCP's in accordance with encl (1) of this

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TAB. Control will be established, recorded and reported in accordance with ref (b).

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Enclosures: (1) Survey Information

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Enclosure (1) (Survey Information) to Tab B (Survey) to Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex C (Fire Support).

SURVEY INFORMATION

The following survey information is available and will be used to establish control in areas of operation.

<u>Area of Operation See Encl (1)</u>	<u>Control Available See Ref (b)</u>
C-4	Section I, IX
A-1	" I, IX
A-2	" I
A-3	" VIII, IX
A-4	" I, VIII, II
A-5	" I, VIII, II
C-1	" I, II, VIII
C-2	" I, II, VIII
C-3	" I, II, VIII
VI	" I, II, VIII
COB I	" I, III
COB II	" III, V
COB III	" V, VI
COB IV	" VI, VII
COB V	" VII

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310900 Dec 1967

Annex D (Communications-Electronics) to OpO 61-67

Ref: (a) III MAF OpO 13-67
(b) III MAF AdminO 13-67 Annex (H)
(c) 3d MarDivO P02000.2F (COI)
(d) 3d MarDivO P2000.4G (COMM SOP)

Time Zone: H

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

(1) See Annex C (Intelligence) to ref (a).

b. Friendly Forces

(1) See OpO 61-67.

(2) Higher headquarters/adjacent headquarters missions:
See reference (a), Annex E.

(3) All maintenance of Dye Marker communications-electronics/sensor equipment above organizational level will be performed by FLSU-1 Electronic Maintenance Shop in accordance with reference (b).

2. Mission

a. To provide Communications-Electronics support for OpO 61-67.

3. Execution

a. Communications Company, Headquarters Battalion

(1) Install and operate inter-division radio relay communications as required to support this order.

(2) Install and operate teletypewriter equipment as required to support this order.

(3) Operate and maintain Phu Bai terminal for DCS circuits KEG-1 and STD-5.

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(4) Provide extension to Khe Sanh for circuit established by COMUSMACV message 011025Z/Dec67.

(a) Channel routing will be via 3d Marine Division TRC-97.

(b) Insure cable interconnects between Phu Bai DCS terminal and 3d Marine Division, Phu Bai TRC-97.

(c) Extend cable from Khe Sanh TRC-97 to local subscriber.

(5) Operate and maintain circuit established by COMUSMACV message 000025Z/Dec 67.

b. Sub Unit #2, Headquarters Battalion, Dong Ha Combat Base

(1) Conduct surveillance and sensor training in accordance with Annex G (Training) to reference (a).

(2) Maintain records and charts of communications-electronics/sensor training of Division Dye Marker units.

(3) Monitor Division Dye Marker On-The-Job-Training. Furnish contact training teams when requested.

c. 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 3d Marines, 9th Marines and 26th Marines

(1) In accordance with reference (a), Annex F (Sensor Surveillance) to Basic Order, be responsible for the following units under operational control in respective Areas of Operation:

(a) Drawing from FLSU-1 of all Dye Marker Communications-Electronics/Sensor equipment as approved by Division Communication-Electronics Officer.

(b) Issuing to units under operational control as required.

(c) Supervision of operation and maintenance of the equipment.

(d) Supervision of Communications-Electronics/Sensor on-the-job-training as required.

(e) Insuring that strict control and accountability of all Dye Marker Communication-Electronics/Sensor equipment is maintained.

d. Coordinating Instructions

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Annex E (Psychological Operations) to Operation Order 61-67

Ref: (a) Annex H (Psychological Operations) to CG III MAF
 Op Ord 13-67
 (b) Div0 P3000.1E

Time Zone: H

1. Situation

This Annex contains guidance for conducting psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of 3d Marine Division anti-infiltration operations in northern Quang Tri Province.

a. Enemy Forces

(1) See Annex C (Intelligence) to III MAF Operation Order 13-67.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) See reference (a).

(2) 7th PSYOP Battalion, U.S. Army, provides design, production, storage and dissemination of PsyOp media based upon guidance contained in reference (a).

(3) Detachment B, 7th PsyOp Battalion, in direct support of 3d Marine Division, provides:

(a) Liaison with 7th PsyOp Bn and Flight "A" 9th Air Commando Squadron (ACS) for production and aerial delivery of PsyOp media.

(b) Audio-visual, ground broadcast, and psychological operations exploitation teams within capability.

(4) 1st ARVN Division provides for PsyOp support to ARVN units as required.

(5) Senior Province Advisor, Quang Tri in coordination with local military Forces and Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) representatives.

(a) Conducts PsyOp aimed primarily at the refugees and other civilian population of Quang Tri Province.

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(b) Arranges for use of Armed Propaganda Teams (APT), Cultural Drama Teams (CDT) and radio broadcasts as available.

2. Mission. 3d Marine Division conducts psychological operations within area of operations to emphasize to VC/NVA forces the futility of combat against the strength of GVN/FWMAF, to counter communist propaganda and to assure the Vietnamese civilians that the anti-infiltration operation by GVN and U.S. Forces is necessary to defeat the enemy and halt infiltration of enemy forces.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Annex B (Concept of Operations)

(2) See reference (a).

b. Infantry Regiments and 1st AmTrac Battalion (Rein)

(1) Conduct extensive psychological operations within assigned AO using guidance contained in reference (a).

c. 12th Marines. Be prepared to support psychological operations using 105mm leaflet rounds as required.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) See references (a) and (b).

(2) Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) will be used in support of psychological operations to the maximum extent practical.

(3) Maximum use will be made of assigned ground broadcast capabilities.

(4) Emphasis will be placed on rapid exploitation of targets of opportunity.

(5) A special PSYOP support report, annotated with the code name Dye Marker will be submitted monthly. The report will contain statistical data on propaganda material disseminated by each media and a narrative summary of psychological operations effectiveness in support of this order. The report will reach this headquarters by 1600H on the 3rd of the month.

4. Administration and Logistics. Administration Order 61-67.

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(1) Communications-Electronics in accordance with references (c) and (d).

(2) All units will evacuate unserviceable Dye Marker communications-electronics/sensor equipment to FLSU-1 for repair/exchange as indicated. Additional Dye Marker equipment when authorized by Division Communications-Electronics Officer will be drawn from FLSU-1.

(3) Dye Marker units will conduct on-the-job-training as required.

(4) Dye Marker Communications-Electronics/Sensor equipment will be permanently marked "972".

(5) Strict control and accountability procedures will be maintained on all Dye Marker Communications-Electronics/Sensor equipment.

(6) Requests for assistance or allowances in excess of the BOM (Appendix 1 to Annex G of reference (a)) will be forwarded to this headquarters (SC-10).

(7) Communications required between U.S. and ARVN units will be the responsibility of the U.S. unit concerned.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. See Administrative Order 61-67.

b. Emergency communications-electronics/sensor and surveillance requirements will be submitted to this headquarters (SC-10).

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5. Command and Communications. See basic order.

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Annex F (Sensor Surveillance System) to Operation Order 61-67

Time Zone: H

Ref: (a) Annex I to III Marine Amphibious Force Operation
 Order 13-67
 (b) Instruction Manual for Intrusion Detection System
 (IM 11-5895-593-15)

1. Sensor Surveillance System will be installed and operated by 3d Marine Division in accordance with reference (a) and as amplified in this Annex.
2. Installation of sensors will be done by a task organized team of trained individuals under cognizance of Division Communication-Electronics Officer. Engineering/labor assistance will be provided as required by the tactical commander.
3. Once sensors are properly installed responsibility for operation will revert to the unit assigned that sector.
4. Placement of sensors in the trace will be in accordance with reference (b) as modified by the sector commander and approved by higher authority. Division Engineer Officer and Division Communication-Electronics Officer will provide technical advice and assistance as required.
5. Placement of sensors adjacent to sites will be controlled by the site commander. The Division Communication-Electronics Officer will provide a contact team to advise on siting and assist in installation.
6. Implacced sensors which become inoperable will be replaced under the technical guidance and supervision of a Division Contact Team.
7. Division Communication-Electronics Officer will provide advice and assistance to the 1st ARVN Division as requested.

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Annex G (Evaluation) to operation order 61-67

Ref: (a) III MAF Operation Order 13-67 (Annex K)
(b) III MAF Admin Order 13-67 (Annex I)

1. Annex to be published upon publication of references (a) and (b).

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Annex H (Operations and Procedures Peculiar to Dye Marker) to
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DSA, I Corps	5	3d Anti Tank Bn	2
1st ARVN Div	3	1st Amtrac Bn	2
CG, FLC	5	3d Recon Bn	2
FLSG-A	3	3d EngrBn	4
COMUSMACV	4	3d MT Bn	2
CG, FMFPac	3	9th MT Bn	2
CHOPAC	1	3d SP Bn	4
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Administrative Order 61-67 to accompany Operation Order 61-67 (U)

Ref: (a) III MAF/SA I Corps Administrative Order 13-67
(b) III MAF/SA I Corps Operation Order 13-67
(c) 3d Marine Division Operation Order 61-67
(d) 3d Marine Division LOI 1-67
(e) DivO P6000.4D (SOP for Medical)
(f) DivO P4000.1D (SOP-4)

Time Zone: H

1. SUPPLY

a. General

(1) This order sets forth the logistic procedures and responsibilities, to certain subordinate commands, which are related to the installation, operation and maintenance of the anti-infiltration system.

(2) The supply maintenance, engineering service support and disposal action of those materials required in and provided for in references (a), (b) and (c) are specifically covered in this order.

(3) Commander, Naval Support Activity (COMNAVSUPPACT) is tasked by reference (a) with the responsibility to receive, stage and store Project 972 materiel in Danang. Upon the request of CG Force Logistic Command (FLC), COMNAVSUPPACT will transship 972 project materiel to FLSU-1 Dong Ha and/or Class IV Supply Dump Cua Viet.

(4) Standing operating procedures are set forth in reference (f).

b. Supplies and Equipment Available

(1) Supply Sources

(a) COMNAVSUPPACT Danang. See reference (a).

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(b) Commanding General, Force Logistic Command is tasked by reference (a) with the responsibility of maintaining suitable stock levels of programmed materiel at FLSU-1 and Cua Viet Dump to ensure timely availability to meet construction schedule as established in Annex C (Engineer).

(c) FLSU-1 is the primary source of supply for 3d Marine Division units and attachments for all classes of supply.

(d) CL IV Supply Dump Cua Viet is the supply source for 972 material for A-1 and C-4.

(2) Prescribed Loads. In accordance with reference (d) and as prescribed by Units Commanders.

(3) Levels of Supply

(a) Units - In accordance with reference (d).

(b) FLSU-1 - In accordance with reference (d).

(c) Project 972 materiel to meet construction schedule established by Annex C (Engineer).

(4) Water. 11th Engineer Battalion will provide water points as directed. Tentatively one each will be dug at A-4, C-2, and C-4. Where feasible natural water sources will be used in conjunction with water purification units.

(5) Ammunition

(a) Infantry Units - Maintain BA plus 5 DOA.

(b) Artillery Units - Maintain on position BA plus 10 DOA as prescribed by current regulations.

(c) FLSU-1 - Maintains 10 DOA for artillery, mortars, tanks, anti-tank weapons and mines; 30 DOA for all other Class V.

c. Control and Distribution

(1) CO 3d Shore Party Battalion will establish and control a Class IV dump for staging Project 972 materiel at Cua Viet and provide unit distribution for 3d MarDiv (C-4) and ARVN Forces (A-1).

(2) FIC will control and issue all Project 972 materiel from LSA Dong Ha and will maintain strict accountability for all Project 972 materiel received and issued at both Cua Viet and Dong Ha.

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(3) CO 3d Shore Party Battalion will coordinate activities of representatives from 3d MarDiv, NAVSUPACT, FLC, 1st Amtrac Bn, 11th Engr Bn, and U. S. Army Advisors with appropriate ARVN units to ensure receiving, accounting, and issuing of Project 972 materiel to using units from Cua Viet Class IV dump. ARVN command will draw directly from Cua Viet.

(4) All supply transactions for Project 972 materiel will be accomplished on request for issue or turn-in (DD Form 1150).

(a) Units maintain the construction schedule in Annex C and submit materiel requirements at least 24 hours in advance of time required.

(b) Materiel requirements for ARVN forces will be submitted by ARVN forces directly to FLSU-1.

(5) All Project 972 materiel will be receipted for only by those personnel designated in writing to FLSU-1 from the 11th Engineer Battalion and ARNV forces.

(6) Supply point distribution will be in effect at FLSU-1 for 3d MarDiv and ARVN forces. Unit distribution will be established at Cua Viet for A-1 and C-4 due to the lack of an existing road network.

(7) Vehicular transportation will be controlled by the tactical commander using direct support/orgainc units for supply point distribution.

(8) Unit distribution at Cua Viet will be under the supervision and control of CO, 1st Amtrac Bn.

(9) Aerial Delivery. On approval of the CO 3d MarDiv on an emergency basis only.

(10) Construction forces requiring materiels and/or equipment in excess of those quantities allocated by site must obtain approval from this Headquarters prior to issue by FLC.

(11) The Project Officer for Project 972 will maintain cognizance of the quantities of materiel requisitioned by subordinate units to insure quantities are not in excess of individual site allocation (See Annex D, Reference (a)).

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. Evacuation. In accordance with reference (e) the 3d Medical Battalion facility at Dong Ha will serve as the primary evacuation center for all casualties. No casualties will be evacuated directly from the field to offshore facilities.

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b. Hospitalization. The casualty evacuation control officer of Company D, 3d Medical Battalion at Dong Ha will control further evacuation of casualties, when necessary, to definitive care facilities in RVN or to AHS or LPHs offshore.

3. TRANSPORTATION

a. Truck. Regimental Commanders will coordinate the movement of materiel by the 9th Motor Transport Battalion for materiel issued at FLSU-1 to all construction points (Strong points, observation posts, base areas and linear obstacles) within their areas of responsibility.

b. CO, 1st AmTrac Bn will coordinate the movement of all LVT transportation of supplies from Cua Viet to A-1 and C-4.

c. All units supply from Cua Viet other than by LVT, will be organized and controlled by CO 3d Shore Party Battalion.

d. Helicopter. In accordance with reference (d).

e. Terminals and Facilities

(1) Ports - See Annex F to reference (a).

(2) Airfields - See Annex F to reference (a).

4. SERVICE

a. Functions

(1) Construction. See Annex C (Engineer).

(2) Maintenance. See reference (d).

(3) Storage. See reference (d)

(4) Salvage. See reference (d).

(5) Civil Affairs:

(a) See Annex E.

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b. Assignment of Responsibilities

(1) 9th Marine Regiment

- (a) See reference (c), Annex A and C.
- (b) Assume overall responsibilities of construction and defensive effort, and coordinate action of all assigned units within sector.
- (c) Select specific sites for location of any new sites within sector and submit recommendations to CG 3d MarDiv for approval.
- (d) Determine specific sites and orientation of bunkers within the directed base areas.
- (e) Select specific sites for gaps through linear obstacle system; on site battalion will select lanes through the linear obstacle system.
- (f) Accomplish Project 972 tasks in sector as directed.

(2) 3d Marine Regiment. Same as 4.b.(1) (a)-(f).(3) 4th Marine Regiment. Same as 4.b.(1) (a)-(f).(4) 26th Marine Regiment. Same as 4.b.(1) (a)-(f).(5) 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Same as 4.b.(1) (a)-(f).

- (a) Assume responsibility as Tactical Commander of the C-4 area.
- (b) Assume responsibility for all LVT movement of 972 materiel from Gua Viet to A-1 and C-4.

(6) 3d Engineer Battalion. General Support, accomplish tasks as directed.(7) 11th Engineer Battalion

- (a) In general support of 3d Marine Division.
- (b) Construct A-3 as directed.
- (c) Upgrade Route 561 from Cam Lo to Con Thien to CL 60 one way all weather.

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(d) Be prepared on order to reopen Route 9 to traffic, upgrade to Class 60 all weather one way from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh.

(e) Construct Route 566 as CL 60 one way all weather from Route 1 to A-3 and extend to Route 561.

(f) Perform additional base construction and road improvement as directed.

(g) Provide technical/material assistance to 1st ARVN Division as directed.

(8) 9th Motor Transport Battalion. General support.

(a) Accomplish assigned tasks augmented by U. S. Army transportation units.

(9) 3d Shore Party Battalion (Rein). General support.

(a) Establish, maintain and control, with appropriate augmentation, a CL IV Supply Dump on the north bank of the Cua Viet River for those positions to be completed in that vicinity.

(b) Provide Shore Party Teams for landing supplies across the beach as may be directed.

(10) Coordinating Instructions

(a) This Order cancels 3d Marine Division Administrative Plan 48-67 to accompany 3d Marine Division Operation Plan 48-67.

5. PERSONNEL

a. In accordance with reference (d).

6. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Special Reports. See Annex H.

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Annexes:

- ✓A - Administrative Overlay.
- ✓B - Concept of Logistic Support.
- ✓C - Engineer.
- ✓D - Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation.
- ✓E - Civil Affairs.
- ✓F - Informational Services.
- ✓G - Historical Services.
- ✓H - Reports.

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Annex B (Concept of Logistic Support) to 3d MarDiv Admin Order 61-67

Ref: (a) III MAF Operation Order 13-67
 (b) III MAF Administrative Order 13-67
 (c) 3d MarDiv Operation Order 61-67
 (d) DivO Ph000.1B (SOP 4)

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION

a. Basic Mission. See reference (c).

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Period 1. 15 Dec 1967 to 15 July 1968

(a) Position materiels in Northeastern Quang Tri Province to support construction of positions A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, C-1, C-2, C-3 and designated COB's. Upgrade Route 561 from Cam Lo to Con Thien to Class 60 on way all weather. Maintain Route 9 as an all weather class 60 one way road from Dong Ha to Cam Lo and be prepared to upgrade to class 60 all weather one way from Than Son Lam to Khe Sanh. Route 566 to be upgraded to class 60 all weather one way from vicinity Gio Linh to A-3. Construct Route 566 from Route 561 to A-3.

(b) A Class IV storage dump will be established at Cua Viet to support construction A-1 and C-4. COMNAVSUPPACT is tasked by reference (b) with responsibility to stage and store Project 972 material at Danang and to transship to Cua Viet and Dong Ha. FLSU-1 will receipt and account for Project 972 materiel off-loaded at Dong Ha and Cua Viet. CO, 11th Engineer Battalion, or his certified representative and certified representatives of the 1st ARVN Division are authorized to draw Project 972 material from FLSU-1. The Class IV Supply Dump at Cua Viet will be organized and controlled by 3d Shore Party Battalion. CO, 1st AmTrac Bn will be responsible for safe storage of materiel on LVT's and for movement of supplies to A-1 and C-4.

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c. General Considerations

- (1) CG, Force Logistic Command is tasked by reference (b) with maintaining adequate levels of supplies at Dong Ha and Cua Viet to meet schedule established by Annex C (Engineer).
- (2) FLSU-1 will provide Supply Point Distribution at Dong Ha.
- (3) Class IV Supply Dump Cua Viet will provide Unit Distribution to C-4.
- (4) Routine maintenance will be in accordance with reference (d).
- (5) Maintenance of all sensor equipment will be accomplished by FIC in accordance with Annex H of reference (b).
- (6) Location principal support agencies. See Annex A (Administrative Overlay).

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Annex C (Engineer) to 3d Marine Division Administrative Order 61-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam AMS Series L7014 Scale 1:50,000
 (b) CG III MAF Admin Order 13-67
 (c) CG III MAF/SA I Corps Operation Order 13-67
 (d) CG 3d MarDiv Operation Order 61-67
 (e) 3d MarDiv LOI 1-67
 (f) 3d MarDivO P3120.3B
 (g) FM 20-32

Time Zone: H

Task Organization. 3d Marine Division Operation Order 49-67

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Current intelligence estimates, intelligence summaries and periodic intelligence reports, reference (c) and (d).

b. Friendly Forces. 3d Marine Division Operation Order 61-67 and III MAF/SA I Corps Operation Order 13-67.

2. MISSION. Construct facilities and perform required engineer support tasks to support reference (d). Coordinate and be prepared to provide assistance to ARVN forces in the accomplishment of their missions and responsibilities as assigned by references (b) and (c), as directed. See Annex A (Administrative Overlay) to this order for locations of construction sites and roads.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Engineer Operations. Appendix 1 (Concept of Construction) to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).

b. Assignment of Tasks

(1) 9th Marine Regiment. With the 11th Engineer Battalion in general support performs all horizontal and vertical construction in their area of responsibility as outlined in reference (b), the assigned mission, this annex and Appendix 1 (Concept of Construction).

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(2) 3d Marine Regiment. With the 11th Engineer Battalion in general support performs all horizontal and vertical construction in their area of responsibility as outlined in reference (b), the assigned mission, this Annex and Appendix 1 (Concept of Construction).

(3) 26th Marine Regiment. As directed, with the 11th Engineer Battalion in general support, perform designated horizontal and vertical construction in their area of responsibility as outlined in reference (b), the assigned mission, this Annex and Appendix 1 (Concept of Construction).

(4) 1st Amtrac Battalion. With a Company (Rein) from 11th Engineer Battalion construct base area C-4.

(5) 4th Marine Regiment. Be prepared to assume the mission of any of the other units.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) As directed by CO, 9th Marines, 11th Engineer Battalion performs supporting engineer tasks as required by reference (e).

(2) In accordance with reference (c), the CG, I Corps is responsible for the construction of facilities located within the ARVN area of responsibility. However, the 11th Engineer Battalion will be prepared to assist ARVN units in coordination, construction and logistical support as directed by this Headquarters.

(3) The 3d Naval Construction Brigade is responsible for repair and maintenance of Route 1 from Dong Ha to Gio Linh and Route 9 from Route 1 to Ca Lu.

(4) Roads and Bridges. In accordance with Appendix I (Concept of Construction) and Appendix 2 (Road Plan) to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).

(5) Mines and Minefields. In accordance with Appendix 3 (Minefields) to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).

(6) Linear Obstacle. In accordance with Appendix 4 (Linear Obstacle) to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).

(7) Construction Priorities. In accordance with Appendix 5 (Construction) to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).

(8) Construction Schedule. In accordance with Appendix 6 (Construction Schedule) to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).

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(9) Quality Control. In accordance with Appendix 7 (Quality Control) to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).

(10) Construction Progress Report. In accordance with Appendix 8 (Construction Progress Report) to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. 3d Marine Division Administrative Order 61-67.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS. Reference (c) and (d).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL TOMPKINS



W. H. CUENIN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Concept of Construction See Appendix 1 to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).
- 2 - Road Plan see Appendix 2 to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).
- 3 - Minefields See Appendix 3 to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).
- 4 - Linear Obstacle - See Appendix 1 to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).
- 5 - Construction Priorities - See Appendix 5 to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).
- 6 - Construction Schedule - See Appendix 6 to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).
- 7 - Quality Control - See Appendix 7 to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).
- 8 - Construction Progress Report - See Appendix 8 to Annex C (Engineer) to reference (b).
- ✓ 9 - Interior Bunker Design.

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Appendix 9 (Interior Bunker Design) to Annex C (Engineer) to 3d MarDiv
Administrative Order 61-67

Time Zone: H

1. PURPOSE. To promulgate a standard design and equipping for the interior of living bunkers at all Project 972 positions.
2. BACKGROUND. This plan provides for the construction of bunks, working tables, benches and provision of certain Special Services troop comfort and morale items for each USMC living bunker at positions A-4, C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4 and Ca Lu.
3. PLAN
 - a. Construction will be accomplished by the tenant units, with supervision and technical assistance provided by available Engineer personnel.
 - b. Materiels for the construction of the interior of living bunkers will not be provided from 972 assets, but will come from organic Division lumber stocks.
 - c. Construction of the bunker interiors will conform to the plan contained in Tab A to this Appendix. Regimental commanders will submit requests for materiels for all living bunkers within their areas of responsibility directly to the 3d Engineer Battalion.
 - d. A list of the Special Services troop comfort and morale items for each bunker is contained in Tab B to this Appendix.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL TOMPKINS



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TABS

- ✓A - Interior Bunker Design and Bill of Materiels
- ✓B - Special Services Comfort/Morale Items

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
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
Tab A (Interior Bunker Design and Bill of Materials) to Appendix 9
 (Interior Bunker Design) to Annex C (Engineer) to 3d MarDiv
 Administrative Order 61-67



MATERIALS:

2"x6"x16' - 21 pcs
 2"x4"x12' - 18 pcs
 4"x4"x7' - 24 pcs
 1/2" Plywood - 18 sheets


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
TOP VIEW

NOTE:

① 3 TIERED BUNKS
 2'-7" x 7'-0"



FRONT VIEW




END VIEW

SCALE: 1/16" = 1'-0"

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


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
TABLE

2"x6"x6' - 4 pcs Top
 2"x4"x6' - 3 pcs Frame and Back
 2"x4"x1'6 3/4" - 2 pcs Frame
 2"x4"x2'6" - 2 pcs Supports


TOP VIEW



FRONT ELEVATION



SIDE ELEVATION




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
BENCH

2"x6"x6' - 2 pcs Seat
 2"x4"x6' - 3 pcs Frame and Back Braces
 2"x4"x1'6 3/4" - 2 pcs Frame
 2"x4"x4'11" - 2 pcs Leg Braces

TOP VIEW



FRONT ELEVATION



SIDE ELEVATION

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL TOMPKINS

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Tab B (Special Services Comfort/Morale Items) to Appendix 9 (Interior Bunker Design) to Annex C (Engineer) to 3d MarDiv Administrative Order 61-67.

1. PLAN. The following is a list of the Special Services comfort/morale items that will be provided for USMC living bunkers at positions A-4, C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, and Ca Lu.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
A-4	36 sets	Furniture (Table, 4 chairs)
C-1	18 sets	Furniture (Table, 4 chairs)
	18	Battery powered TV sets
C-2	54 sets	Furniture (Table, 4 chairs)
C-3	39 sets	Furniture (Table, 4 chairs)
	39	Battery powered TV sets
C-4	19 sets	Furniture (Table, 4 chairs)
Ca Lu	19 sets	Furniture (Table, 4 chairs)
	19	Battery powered TV sets

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Annex D (Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation) to Administrative Order 61-67

Ref: (a) CG, III MAF Admin Order 13-67

Time Zone: H

1. PURPOSE. To promulgate plans, individual bills of materiel, facilities allocation and other materiel allocation information necessary for effective development and control of construction for the anti-infiltration system.

2. GENERAL

a. The bills of materiel for facilities have been calculated using a 10% waste factor and 25% combatloss factor. This apparent abundance of materiels in no way relieves commanders or construction agencies of the responsibility for sound management procedures.

b. The plans, bills of materiels and construction guidelines are contained in Appendices 1 through 6 to this Annex.

c. A recapitulation of the distribution of Project 972 facilities to each of the sites is contained in Appendix 7.

d. A summary of total Project 972 bills of materiel for the development of each site with the supporting road network is contained in Appendix 8 (Materiel Allocation). The Tabs to Appendix 8 should be used by responsible agencies for materiel issue control. Responsible agencies may authorize a maximum of 10% excess of the authorized bill of materiels for any particular site without the approval of CG, III MAF. Requests for issue in excess of the 10% limit must contain justification for all materiels over and above the stipulated quantities.

e. Plans for second generation structures will be published as they become available.

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APPENDICES:

- 1 - Bunkers - See Appendix 1 (Bunker Design) to Annex D (Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation) to reference (a).
- 2 - Wire Obstacles - See Appendix 2 (Wire Obstacles) to Annex D (Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation) to reference (a).
- 3 - Minefields - See Appendix 3 (Minefields) to Annex D (Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation) to reference (a).
- 4 - Gun Pads - See Appendix 4 (Gun Pads) to Annex D (Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation) to reference (a).
- 5 - Towers - See Appendix 5 (Towers) to Annex D (Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation) to reference (a).
- 6 - Foxhole Cover - See Appendix 6 (Foxhole Cover) to Annex D (Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation) to reference (a).
- 7 - Facilities Allocation - See Appendix 7 (Facilities Allocation) to Annex D (Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation) to reference (a).
- 8 - Materiel Allocation - See Appendix 8 (Materiel Allocation) to Annex D (Construction Plans/Materiel Allocation) to reference (a).

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Annex E (Civil Affairs) to 3d MarDiv Administrative Order 61-67

Ref: (a) III MAF/SA I Corps Administrative Order 13-67
 (b) 3d Marine Division Operation Order 61-67
 (c) 3d Marine Division LOI 1-67
 (d) Division Order 5830.1E

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. -- Reference (b).
- b. Friendly Forces. -- Reference (b).
- c. Attachment and Detachments. -- Reference (b).
- d. Assumptions. -- Reference (a).

2. MISSION

The 3d Marine Division, in coordination with GVN and U. S. Agencies, will conduct civil affairs activities in the areas of construction of strong points/patrol bases and forward operating bases to minimize the effects of the construction operations to the civilian populace, and to elicit favorable reaction from the people in order to facilitate accomplishment of the operational mission.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. -- Reference (a).
- b. 9th Marines
 - (1) See Reference (a).
 - (2) Institute civilian population control measures.
 - (3) Provide temporary refugee handling and logistical support as necessary.
 - (4) Continue the conduct of intensive civic action programs.

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(5) Avoid the generation of new refugees whenever possible.

c. 3d Marines

(1) See reference (a).

(2) Provide temporary refugee handling and logistical support as necessary.

(3) Continue the conduct of intensive civic action programs.

d. 4th Marines

(1) See reference (a).

(2) Be prepared to provide temporary refugee handling and logistical support.

(3) Be prepared to assume responsibility for the continuation of civic action programs in the construction operational areas.

(4) Insure that continuity of the civil affairs effort is maintained upon assumption of a new CAAOR.

e. 12th Marines

(1) See reference (a).

(2) Continue the conduct of intensive civic action programs.

f. 1st AA Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Company (-) Rein

(1) Continue primary mission of coordinating civil affairs functions as G-5 Representative at 3d Marine Division Forward Command Post, DMCB.

(2) Direct support, 9th Marines.

(3) Provide technical advice and support in the functional areas of Public Safety, Public Health, Food and Agriculture and Graves Removal to all 3d MarDiv units in the area of operations.

g. Coordinating Instructions

(1) See reference (a).

(2) For assistance required from GVN and CORDS officials on Province or higher level, address requests to this Headquarters (Attn: G-5).

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICSa. Reports

- (1) See reference (c).
- (2) Submit Serious Incident Reports in accordance with reference (d).

b. Governmental Functions

- (1) See references (a) and (c).
- (2) Civil Government. All civil affairs activities will be coordinated through appropriate levels of civilian government and U. S. Agencies and will be designed to enhance the position of the GVN.
- (3) Public Safety. Reference (c).
- (4) Public Health. Commanders will take steps necessary to protect the health of their military forces, prevent undue suffering and distress, and will assist in Vietnamese public health matters.

- (5) Public Welfare. Reference (c).

- (6) Public Education. Reference (c).

c. Economic Functions. -- Reference (c).d. Public Facilities. -- Reference (c).e. Special Functions.

- (1) Refugees. Assist in organizing refugee camps where needed. In all such cases, liaison will be made with the CORDS refugee representative. Render necessary public relief assistance, and encourage refugee camps to become self supporting.

- (2) Civil Information. Conduct vigorous civil information campaigns to gain the support of population for all civic action activities.

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(3) Art, Monuments and Archives

(a) Maximum protection to arts, monuments and archives consistent with the military mission is directed.

(b) Special consideration to preservation of graves and cemeteries is directed.

(4) Religious Affairs

(a) Maximum respect for customs, traditions, and desires of civilian population will be accorded.

(b) The use of churches and religious institutions for military purposes is prohibited.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 61-67.

b. Command Posts.

(1) 3d MarDiv. -- No change.

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Annex F (Informational Services) to Administrative Order 61-67

Ref: (a) CG, 3d MarDiv msg 250637Z Aug 67
(b) COMUSMACV msg 091115Z Sep 67

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

a. This annex contains instruction regarding release of information to the news media during Operation Project 972.

2. BACKGROUND

a. Reference (a) states that news media are becoming more and more interested in Operation Project 972 and are asking many questions on the project. Reference (a) further states that news media are not restricted from visiting the operational area and observing work in progress.

3. INSTRUCTIONS

a. Reference (b) provided the following guidance:

(1) Restrictions placed on discussion of Operation Project 972 have been imposed by higher headquarters and those restrictions are specific and clear.

(2) No member of this command, officer, enlisted or civilian will discuss this matter in any way with members of the news media or any unauthorized person.

4. SUMMARY

a. Questions by news media representatives involving any facet of Operation Project 972 will be answered with the following statement: "I'm sorry but the information you seek is classified and I am not authorized to divulge it." Persistent press queries may be referred to CG, 3d MarDiv.

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b. Any instance of irritation or possible unfavorable press coverage by members of the news media will be passed to the Division ISO (3d MarDiv 41) by the most expeditious means.

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Annex G (Historical Record) to Administrative Order 61-67

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

a. This Annex provides instructions for the documentation of Project 972 for Historical Record purposes.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. The Division ISO has overall responsibility for historical documentation of Project 972. He will keep a running documentary account, updated weekly, until the operation is secured.

b. Commanders of all units involved will notify the Division ISO of significant events which occur during the operation that are of historical value.

c. The Division G-3 will provide a set of prints of all ground photography taken of construction and views of the barrier to the Division ISO.

d. The Division G-2 will provide one set of all aerial photographs taken of the barrier to the Division ISO.

e. The Project Officer (Project 972) will insure that the Division ISO is informed of all important conferences held on Project 972.

3. FORMAT

a. Format to be used in compiling the Historical Record of Project 972 is as follows:

- (1) Part I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
- (2) Part II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- (3) Part III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- (4) Part IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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Annex H (Report) to 3d Marine Division Administrative Order 61-67

Time Zone: H

1. PROGRESS/PROBLEMS REPORT

a. Submitted to: CG, 3d MarDiv FWD, DHCB

b. Submitted by:

- (1) CO, 9th Marines
- (2) CO, 3d Marines
- (3) CO, 1st Amtrac Bn
- (4) CO, 11th Engineer Bn
- (5) CO, 4th Marines (when directed)
- (6) CO, 26th Marines (when directed)

c. Period of Report. 1800-1800 Daily

d. Time due

- (1) AT 3d MarDiv FWD, DHCB 0800 daily for preceeding day.

e. Format

(1) For each Strong Point/Patrol Base, Base Area and Combat Operating Base submit the following information:

(a) Line Numbers for Strong Point/Patrol Bases, Forward Operating Bases and Combat Operating Bases:

<u>LINE NBR</u>	<u>SITE</u>
1	A-1
2	A-2
3	A-3
4	A-4
5	A-5

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<u>LINE NBR</u>	<u>LINE</u>
6	C-1
7	C-2
8	C-3
9	C-4
10	Ca Lu
11	Lang RU'OU
12	Tan Son Lam
13	Camp Carroll
14	Khe Sanh

(b) Construction Items for Strong Points/Patrol Bases, Forward Operating Bases and Combat Operating Bases.

A2 - Number of bunkers completed (accumulative)
 A3 - Number of bunkers under construction
 B2 - Meters of Warning fence completed (accumulative)
 C2 - Meters of Double Apron fence completed (accumulative)
 D2 - Meters of Concertina/Barbed Steel Tape completed (accumulative)
 E2 - Meters of Trenches completed (accumulative) - submit upon special request only
 F2 - Meters of mine field completed (accumulative)
 G2 - Gun Pads completed (accumulative)
 H2 - Number of Towers completed (accumulative), by type (Wood or Metal) and Height

(c) Line Numbers for Roads:

<u>LINE NBR</u>	<u>ROAD SECTION</u>
20	Route #1 - Dong Ha to Gio Linh
21	Route #9 - Dong Ha to Laos Border
22	Route #561 - Route #9 to Site A-4
23	Access Road - Site C-4 to Site A-1
24	Access Road - Site A-1 to Route #1
25	Access Road - Site #1 to Site A-3
26	Access Road - Site A-3 to Route #561
27	Access Road - Route #561 to Site A-5

(d) Construction Items for Road Construction:

C - Meters cleared (accumulative)
 D - Meters subbase (accumulative)
 E - Meters Base Course (accumulative)
 F - Meters Surface Course (accumulative)
 G - Meters Asphalt (accumulative)

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(e) Line Numbers for Linear Obstacle Sections:

<u>LINE NBR</u>	<u>LINEAR OBSTACLE SECTION</u>
40	Sea to Site A-1
41	Site A-1 to Site A-2
42	Site A-2 to Site A-3
43	Site A-3 to Site A-4
44	Site A-4 to Site A-5

(f) Construction Items for Linear Obstacle:

A2 - Linear Meter cleared (accumulative)
 B3 - Number of Observation Posts under Construction
 C2 - Meters of Minefield completed (accumulative)
 D2 - Meters of Warning Fence completed (accumulative)
 E2 - Meters of Barbed Steel Tape completed (Observation Posts excluded) (accumulative)
 F2 - Meters of Apron Fence completed (Observation Posts excluded) (accumulative)

(2) Identify any problems or difficulties which significantly effect construction progress.

(3) An example of this report is as follows:

THIS IS A DYE MARKER MESSAGE
 DAILY CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS REPORT AS OF 151800H DEC 67

1. REPORT FOLLOWS

LINE NBR

7. A2-10; A3-22; B2-2000; C2-2300; D2-3000; F2-3050; G2-0;
 H2-2 (WOOD, 21 FT)

22. C-3900; D-3900; E-2400; F-2000; G-0

44. CONSTRUCTION NOT COMMENCED

2. PROBLEMS

A. INSUFFICIENT SHELL CASINGS ON SITE FOR INSTALLING BLAST LAYER ON BUNKERS

B. ACCESS ROAD TO A-5 IMPASSABLE

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f. Special Instructions

(1) Bunkers at each site will be reported as completed only when bunker frame and protective cover are in place and ready for occupancy. When only the frame is completed it will be reported as under construction.

(2) For each sensor system installation submit the following information:

<u>Designate Base at Which Installed</u>	<u>Type Sensor</u>	<u>AZ From Base</u>	<u>Distance From Base</u>
--	--------------------	---------------------	---------------------------

2. RESOURCES REPORT

a. Submitted to: CG, 3d MarDiv (Attn: Comptroller)

b. Submitted by:

- (1) CO, Ninth Marines
- (2) CO, Twelfth Marines
- (3) CO, First Amtrac Bn
- (4) CO, Ninth MT Bn
- (5) CO, Third Tank Bn
- (6) CO, Third SP Bn
- (7) CO, Third Engr Bn
- (8) Other tactical commanders when directed

c. Period of Report. ~~0000~~ Tuesday to 2400 Monday, weekly.

d. Time Due. At Third MarDiv Hqtrs by ~~0800~~, Tuesday for period ending 2400 the preceeding evening.

e. Format

(1) Personnel

(a) Construction labor (Total should be the average daily number of personnel involved).

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(b) Security (Total should be the average daily number of personnel involved).

(2) Equipment (Other than weapons)

(Item) (Hours of Operation)

(3) Consumable construction supplies (Funded with O&M, MC funds).

(Item) (Cement, Lumber, etc.) (Cost)

(4) TAD (Funded with O&M, MC funds).
(Cost) (Time)

(5) Losses

(a) Personnel

1. KIA
2. WIA
3. DOW
4. NHI
5. NHD

(b) Equipment (By type) (Only Combat-Essential items included in deadline reports submitted IAW FMFPac Order 4000.13C).

1. Number Coded H.

2. Estimated cost of repair of those not Coded H.

f. Special Instructions

(1) The following assumptions apply:

(a) Dong Ha, Camp Carroll and Con Thien were occupied prior to Dye Marker and would continue so if Dye Marker was not implemented. Cam Lo artillery positions required to support Con Thien independent of Dye Marker.

(b) Marine Corps presence at Con Thien will require maintenance and up grading MSR West from Dong Ha along Route 9 and North to Con Thien on Route 561.

(c) Continued occupation Con Thien, Cam Lo artillery position and Camp Carroll would require hardening and increased habitability of positions.

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(d) Occupation Camp Carroll and previously occupied positions as far West as Khe Sanh would require maintenance and up grading MSR westward to Khe Sanh.

(e) Enemy presence and continued infiltration in area North Route 9 would require continuing sweeps, search and destroy operations, additional security and area and local security to existing installations.

(2) Based on the above assumptions all subject reports will be formulated IAW the following:

(a) Chargeable (Report this)

1. Trace clearing - All local security and Engineer effort.
2. A-1 - Any assistance rendered ARVN in security, construction effort, building access roads and movement of materials to site.
3. A-3 - All local security, construction effort, and building access road from Route 1.
4. Local security and construction access road from A-4 to A-3.
5. C-1 - Any assistance rendered ARVN in security, construction effort and building access road and all security and construction effort for USMC portion.
6. C-2 - All local security and construction effort.
7. C-4 - All local security, construction effort, access roads and movement materials to site.

(b) Non-Chargeable (Do not report this)

1. Maintenance and up grading of Route 1, Route 9 and construction of Route 561 - local security and construction effort.
2. A-2 - All security and construction effort.
3. A-4 - All security and construction effort.
4. C-3 - (Cam Lo Artillery position) - All security and construction effort.
5. Search and destroy operations and road clearing or security operations along Route 9 and 561.

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(3) Only man days and casualties of units employed in efforts described in F.(2)(a) above are chargeable to Dye Marker. Only those WIA's who are wounded and evacuated to a BAS or higher medical facility will be reported.

(4) Guidelines in F.(2)(a) above are applicable to all reports beginning with reporting period 7-13 November 1967.

(5) Resources of Eleventh Engineer Battalion will be reported directly to III MAF, and will not be included in other unit reports.

3. MINE FIELD INITIATION REPORT. Initiation of mine field reports will be submitted in accordance with DivO P3120.3B.

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT REPORT. See Annex E to 3d MarDiv Operation Order 61-67.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL TOMPKINS



W. H. CUENIN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex I (Distribution) to 3d MarDiv Operation Order 61-67

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H-7

PAGE 35 OF 35 PAGES

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
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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

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 P 15105Z DEC 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/FIFTH MAR
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 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
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 RUMHWH/SA I CORPS ADV GROUP
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S E C R E T
 FRAGO 162-67 (OPERATION CHECKERS)



TOR/151443/05

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ACTION

CHECKERS

FILE
 boundary order
 from 1st Mar Div.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1754 **S E C R E T**

TASK ORGAN
 1ST BN (REIN) FIFTH MAR
 1ST BN FIFTH MAR
 ENG PLAT (REIN) 1ST ENG BN
 TRUCK PLAT 1ST MT BN
 CLEARING PLAT 1ST MED BN
 DET WST 1ST SP BN
 DET RADIO RELAY 7TH COMM BN

1. SITUATION

- A. EN FORCES. CURRENT INTSUMS AND PERINTREPS.
 B. FIRENDLY FORCES

(1) FIRST MAW PROVIDES CAS AND HELO SUPPORT.

(2) THIRD MARDIV, FIRST ARVN DIV AND RF UNITS OPERATE IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE.

(3) DISTRICT PF AND CAP UNITS LOCATED IN ASSIGNED OPERATING AREA.

C. ATTACHMENTS. SEE TASK ORGAN. ALL ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE ON ORDER THIS HQ.

2. 1ST MARDIV EXPANDS ITS OPERATIONAL AREA NORTHWARD ALONG THE LITTORAL OF THUA THIEN PROVINCE RELOCATING UNITS AS NECESSARY TO

151059Z DEC 67

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1754 S E C R E T

PROVIDE FORCES AND EXERCISE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORD IN THE INCREASED AO.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. THE 1ST MARDIV REALIGNS AND EXPANDS ITS AO ALONG THE TRACE OF NATIONAL RTE ONE NORTH FROM THE VICINITY OF HAI VAN PASS ALONG THE LITTORAL OF THUA THIEN PROVINCE. THE FIFTH MAR WILL INITIATE THE DIVISION AO EXPANSION BY DISPLACING THE 1ST BN (PEIN) 5TH MAR FROM THEIR PRESENT TAOR TO AN AREA OF OPERATIONS VIC PHU LOC (ZC 015083) AND RELIEVE CO E, 2D BN 7TH MAR.

B. FIFTH MAR.

(1) WHEN DIRECTED O/A 26 DEC 67 COMMENCE DISPLACEMENT OF 1ST BN (PEIN) 5TH MAR TO PHU LOC AO.

(2) NOTIFY THIS HQ BY MSG WHEN RELIEVING BN, POK MC ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE OF 1ST BN 5TH MAR TAOR.

(3) ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE OF PHU LOC AO UPON ARRIVAL IN AREA; RELIEVE CO E 2D BN 7TH MARINES

(4) BE PREPARED TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY OR CAPTURE EN FORCES AND MATERIEL IN AO.

(5) PROVIDE SECURITY IN AO WITH PRIORITY TO NATIONAL RTE 1 AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1754 S E C R E T

(6) ESTABLISH LIAISON/COORD WITH DISTINCT HQ, ARVN FORCES AND CAPS IN AO.

(7) PREPARE REACTION PLANS FOR PHU LOC DIST HQ AND CAPS WITHIN AO.

C. SEVENTH MAR

(1) UPON RELIEF OF CO E 2D BN 7TH MAR BY BOST BN 5TH MAR RETURN CO TO 7TH MAR TAOR.

D. ELEVENTH MAR

(1) ASSIGN ARTY BTRY GROUP CONSISTING OF 1 BTRY 105MM HOW AND 1 BTRY 155MM HOW DIRECT SUPPORT 1ST BN BKREINO FIFTH MAR.

E. COORD INST.

H (1) TASK ORGAN EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY FOR PLANNING.
SGAI (2) DIRLAUTH WITH THIRD MARDIV UNITS, ARVN FORCES AND STRICT HQ WITHIN DESIGNATED AOCM

(3) PHI LOC AO FOR 01ST BN 5TH MAR EXTENDS FROM G

T 962914

WEST ALONG PHU LOC - HOA VANG DISTRICT BOUNDARY TO AT 813924 THENCE SOUTH TO AT 801898 TO ZC 190915 TO ZC 180925 THENCE WEST ALONG PHU LOC - HIEU DUC DISTRICT BOUNDARY TO ZC 078927 TO ZC 073926 TO TC 060917 TO ZC 045914 TO ZC 040900 TO ZC 030901 TO ZC 020903 TO ZC 018902 TO ZC 006911 TO YC 993903 TO YC 977922 TO YC 970940V THENCE

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 1754 S E C R E T

NORTH ALONG N GRIDLINE BOU TO YD 970007 ALONG THE EAST BANK OF SONG TRUOI TO YD 992075 TO ZD 018094 TO ZD 030080 TO ZD 059091 TO ZD 108082 TO ZD 125104.

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
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FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: THIRD MARDIV
 INFO: CG III MAF
 COMSEVENTHFLT
 CG I CORPS
 CG FIRST MAW
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG FLC
 CG FIRST ARVN DIV
 FLSG "A"



SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF H

G-3 W.O. 7

G-2 W.O. C

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ACTION MEMORANDUMS

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OPERATION ORDER 56-67 (LANCASTER) w/ch-1

- A. DIV OP ORDER 2-67 (SPARROW HAWK)
- B. DIV OP ORDER 42-67 (KINGFISHER)
- C. DIV OP ORDER 35-67 (REACTION FORCE FOR RD PROTECTION)
- D. DIV LOI 1-67
- E. DIV O P4000.1D
- F. DIV O P4400.22C
- G. DIV O P2000.4C
- H. DIV O P02000.2F

TASK ORGANIZATION

C. 3D MARDIV (-)(REIN)

HQ BN (-)(REIN)

3D MAR (-)(REIN)

(INFANTRY FORCES ASSIGNED DTS OF EXECUTION)

3D RECON BN (-)(REIN)

12TH MAR (-)(REIN)

1ST BN, 12TH MAR (-)(REIN)

HQ, 1/12

MAJ GEN HOCHMUTH

COL LO PRETZ

MAJ BELL

COL SCHICK

SECRET

G/1/12

I/1/12

K/4/12

B/1/40

2D BN, 94TH ARTY (USA)

HQ/2/94

A/2/94

B/2/49

C/2/49

1ST BN (-)(REIN); ADA AW (SP), 44TH ARTY (USA)3D TANK BN —3D AT BN3D ENGR BN3D SP BN3D MED BN9TH MT BN

LTCOL MERULA

LTCOL CHAPMAN

LTCOL MCCAIN

LTCOL MCCUTCHAN

LTCOL QUINN

CJDR BROWN

MAJ STANLEY

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT INTUSMS, PERINTREPS, AND SIR'S.B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) III MAF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH I ARVN CORPS, CONDUCTS SUSTAINED, COORDINATED, UNILATERAL OR COMBINED GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS TO DESTROY VC/NVA MAIN AND GUERRILLA FORCES LOCATED IN ICTZ.

(2) 1ST MARDIV CONDUCTS SUSTAINED, COORDINATED UNILATERAL OR COMBINED GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ICTZ.

(3) 1ST MAW PROVIDES AIR CONTROL AND AIRFIELD OPERATIONS FACILITIES AND FIXED AND ROTARY WING ALL WEATHER, AIRCRAFT SUPPORT.

PAGE 2 OF 8 PAGES**SECRET**

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(4) FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND (FLSU-1) PROVIDE SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY.

(5) 7TH AF AND VNAF PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS AND AIR DEFENSE OF RVN.

(6) FIRST DIVISION, ARVN, CONDUCTS OPERATIONS AND SUPPORTS THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN THE 11TH DTA.

(7) QUANG TRI PROVINCE HQ PROVIDES RF SUPPORT AND DEFENDS VITAL AREAS.

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. S E TASK ORGANIZATION

2. MISSION

3D INF DIV (-) (REIN) UNITS IN LANCASTER OPERATING AREA
- CONDUCT REGIMENTAL SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS; DEFEND
COMBAT BASE AREA, AND OTHER VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN OA;
MAINTAIN COMBAT BASES IN CONJUNCTION WITH RF UNITS AT DESIGNATED LOCATIONS; OPEN AND SECURE LINKS OF COMMUNICATION WITHIN OA; MAINTAIN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SCREENING OPERATIONS AND SPOILING ATTACKS AGAINST NVA/VC FORCES; AND SUPPORT GVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) CAMPAIGN PLAN 1967.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(1) OPERATING AREA AND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY IS AS FOLLOWS: LEFT BOUND BY STARTS AT ^{XD} 8566 ALONG NORTH-SOUTH GL 85 TO EAST-WEST GL 48 TO NORTH-SOUTH GL 90 SOUTH TO XD GL 43 EAST TO NORTH-SOUTH GL 95 TO THE DA KRONG RIVER, FOLLOW DA KRONG RIVER SOUTHEAST TO YD 091333. FOLLOW

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THAT TO RIVER KHE TA LAO AT YD 104329 THENCE ALONG RHE TA
 LAO RIVE R TO YD 1532. FOLLOW EAST-WEST YD GL 32 TO NORTH-
 SOUTH GL 21 NORTH TO ROAD AT YD ²¹⁰⁴⁵⁷210447; FOLLOW ROAD WEST TO YD
 1946 THENCE ALONG GL 19 NORTH TO STREAM AT YD 190505. FOLLOW
 STREAM NORTH-NORTHWEST TO SONG VINH PHUOC RIVER AT YD 1852.
 THEN NORTH WEST ALONG RIVER TO YD 130544, THEN FOLLOW A STRAIGHT
 LINE DRAWN TO YD ¹²⁵⁵⁶⁰118558. FOLLOW ROAD TO YD 115577. THEN ALONG
 A STRAIGHT LINE DRAWN TO YD 100585, THEN ALONG NORTH-SOUTH GL
 10 TO YD 100604, FOLLOW STR AM NORTHWEST TO YD 080614 THEN
 ALONG NORTH-SOUTH GL 08 TO YD 080661. FOLLOW STREAM NORTH TO
 SOUTHERN BOUNDARY DMZ IS THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OPERATION
 LANCASTER TO START POINT AT ^{XD}2D 8566.

(2) THIS DIVISION WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN NORTH RN
 QUANG TRI PROVINCE COMMENCING 010001H NOV 67 WITH REGIMENTAL
 SIZED FORCES TO COUNTER NVA INFILTRATION AND VC ACTIVITIES
 AND TO SUPPORT RD ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA.

(3) CAMP CARROLL WILL BE DEFENDED WITH MINIMUM IN-
 FANTRY FORCES AND FULL USE OF TENANT UNITS.

(4) A COMBAT OUTPOST WILL BE MAINTAINED IN THE VICIN-
 ITY CA LU TO DETECT AND DESTROY NVA/VC FORCES IN THAT AREA.

(5) MAINTENANCE OF NATIONAL ROUTE #9 AND OTHER SURFACE
 LOG'S FOR DSR WILL BE EMPHASIZED THROUGHOUT OA.

(6) SURVEILLANCE, SCREENING OPERATIONS AND SPOILING
 ATTACKS WILL BE CONDUCTED TO DETECT AND DESTROY ENEMY INFIL-
 TRATION AND PREVENT INCURSION BY NVA/VC MAIN FORCE UNITS IN-
 TO AREAS SELECTED FOR RD ACTIVITIES.

(7) INTENSIVE RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS WILL BE CON-
 DUCTED THROUGHOUT THE OA WITH EMPHASIS ON LONG RANGE PATROLS.

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(8) MAXIMUM USE WILL BE MADE OF SUPPORTING ARMS, BOTH GROUND AND AIR, TO ATTACK DETECTED AND SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITIONS.

B. 3D MARINES (-) (REIN)

(1) PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN OA.

(2) MAINTAIN COMBAT BASE AT CA LU.

(3) MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA PERSONNEL.

(4) MAINTAIN SECURITY OF ROUTE#9 IN ASSIGNED OA, ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION AND UPGRADING EFFORT.

(5) MAINTAIN SPARROW HAWK PLATOON IN RES A.

(6) CONDUCT EXTENSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

C. 3D RECON BN (-) (REIN)

(1) G/S; PROVIDE LIAISON PARTY WITH 3D MARINES REGIMENT.

(2) COORDINATE ALL RECON INSERTIONS/EXTRACTIONS, FIRE SUPPORT AND USE OF REACTION FORCES WITH APPROPRIATE INFANTRY CO COMMANDER.

D. 12TH MARINES (-) (REIN)

(1) PROVIDE D/S ARTILLERY AS REQUIRED

(2) PROVIDE G/S REINFORCING FORCES AS REQUIRED

(3) PROVIDE ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO 3D RECON BN PATROLS: DISPLACE ARTILLERY AS NECESSARY.

(4) PROVIDE SEARCH LIGHT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

E. 1ST BN ADA BN (REIN), 11TH ARTY. PROVIDE ONE ADA BN BATTERY REINFORCED WITH ONE ADA REG SEC D/S 3D MAR.

F. 3D TANK BN. PROVIDE ONE COMPANY (-) REINFORCED WITH PLANE SEC D/S 3D MARINES

PAGE 5 OF 8 PAGES

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4. 3D AT BN. PROVIDE PLT (REIN) D/S 3D MARINES.

H. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) REF B CANCELLED EFFECTIVE 3124000CT67.
- (2) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND FOR
Y OPERATIONS, 010001H NOV 67.
- (3) OPERATION CODE NAME- LANCASTER.
- (4) DIRLAUTH ALCON
- (5) COORDINATE OPERATIONS WITH RVNAF UNITS AND DISTRICT
Y LEVEL OFFICIALS IN OA AND AOR.
- (6) IF BOUNDARIES ARE ASSIGNED WITHIN DESIGNATED OA FOR
OPERATIONS OF SUBORDINATES, SUPPORTING AND ADJACENT UNITS, COORDINATE
OPERATING AREA WITH RVNAF AND OTHER FIAF AS APPROPRIATE.
- (7) COORDINATE RECON INSERTIONS/EXTRACTIONS AND FIRE SUPPORT
AND PROVIDE REACTION FORCES FOR RECON EXTRACTION AND/OR EXPLOITATION
OF RECON CONTACTS.
- (8) PROVIDE REACTION FORCES TO COUNTER ENEMY ATTACKS ON LOW-
LEVEL GVN STRUCTURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE C.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SUPPLY

- (1) GENERAL-IAW REF D, E, AND F.
- (2) 1ST IAW PROVIDE FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT AS
REQUIRED.
- (3) SUPPLY SOURCE -FLSU-1 DONG HA
- (4) PRESCRIBED LOADS- AS PRESCRIBED BY UNIT COMMANDERS.
- (5) STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES (FLSU-1)

PAGE 6 OF 8 PAGES

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(A) CLASS I

NCI- 30 DAYS

B - 15 DAYS

A - 7 DAYS

TRIOXANE - 30 DAYS

(B) CLASS II

30 DAYS

(C) CLASS III

30 DAYS

(D) CLASS IV

AS REQUIRED

(E) CLASS V

5 DOA FOR 60MM AND ABOVE

5 DOA FOR MINES

5 DOA FOR ANTI TANK AMMO

30 DOA FOR ALL OTHERS

(6) CONTROL AND DISTRIBUTION

(A) SUPPLY POINT DISTRIBUTION FOR ALL UNITS.

(B) AERIAL DELIVERY FOR EMERGENCY ONLY ON APPROVAL OF
COMMANDING GENERAL.Y (C) HST-1^LSE WILL BE MAINTAINED VICINITY DONG HA AIRFIELD.

3. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

(1) EVACUATE TO CO D 3D MEDICAL BN DONG HA. FURTHER
EVACUATION AS DIRECTED BY CO D 3D MEDICAL BN.(2) ARVN CASUALTIES - EVACUATE TO PROVINCIAL HOSPITAL
AT QUANG TRI OR HUE.PAGE 7 OF 8 PAGES**SECRET**

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C. TRANSPORTATION

- (1) TRUCK AND AIR - TO BE SCHEDULED AS REQUIRED.
- (2) 9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BN IN GENERAL SUPPORT WITH PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

D. SERVICES

- (1) IAW REF D.
- (2) CONSTRUCTION REQUESTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THIS HQ.
- (3) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT PLSU-1 LIMITED TO 3D SCHEDULE.
- (4) SALVAGE IAW REF D.
- (5) COMBAT SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES
 - (A) 3D ENGR BN - PROVIDE ONE ENGR COMPANY IN GENERAL SUPPORT
 - (B) 3D SP BN - GENERAL SUPPORT
 - (C) 3D MED BN - PROVIDE ONE C&C COMPANY IN GENERAL SUPPORT.
 - (D) 9TH MT BN - GENERAL SUPPORT

E. PERSONNEL

- (1) IAW CURRENT DIRECTIVES AND REF D.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

- A. COMMUNICATIONS - IAW REF G AND H.
- B. COMMAND POST. REPORT ANY CHANGE IN CP LOCATION

GP-4

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3 - Standard + Engr


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THE NORTHWARD MOVEMENT OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION, CONDUCTS PHASED DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES TO THE DMZ AREA IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE COMMAND AND COMBAT CAPABILITIES IN THE DIVISION AS ESTABLISHED UPON ADJUSTMENT OF THE CURRENT THIRD AND FIRST MARINE DIVISIONAL BOUNDARY.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

(1) THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION WILL COMMENCE DISPLACEMENT OF SELECTED FORCES AND DESIGNATED MAJOR COMMAND POSTS DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN JANUARY 1968.

(2) RELOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS, COMBAT, AND COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS WILL BE PHASED TO INSURE CONTINUOUS COMMAND AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY OF THE DIVISION AND WILL, WHERE REQUIRED, BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH THE MOVEMENT OF FIRST MARINE DIVISION UNITS DESIGNATED TO RELIEVE 3D MARINE DIVISION UNITS OF CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES.

(3) IT IS ENVISIONED THAT INITIAL DISPLACEMENT WILL BE BY ECHELON AND LIMITED TO DESIGNATED PERSONNEL AND REQUIRED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FROM HEADQUARTERS BATTALION, DESIGNATED REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BATTALION, 26TH MARINES, AND ELEMENTS OF THE 3D RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION, AND THE 4TH BATTALION, 12TH MARINES.

(4) THE COMMANDING GENERAL AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE G-2, G-3 STAFF SECTIONS WILL DISPLACE TO JONG HA AND OCCUPY EXISTING FACILITIES ON AN INTERIM BASIS. THE REMAINDER OF THE HEADQUARTERS WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT FROM PRESENT LOCATIONS AT PHU BAI UNTIL ADEQUATE FACILITIES ARE COMPLETED AT A PERMANENT DIVISION COMMAND POST INSTALLATION IN THE VICINITY OF QUANG TRI. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT

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NEW FACILITY WILL BE READY FOR OCCUPANCY DURING THE SUMMER OF 1968.

(5) DISPLACEMENT TO THE DMZ AREA OF THE 2ND BATTALION, 26TH MARINES, ELEMENTS OF THE 3D RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION AND DESIGNATED ARTILLERY UNITS CURRENTLY LOCATED IN THAT PORTION OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AO THAT WILL, UPON ADJUSTMENT OF THE BOUNDARY, BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION, WILL BE COMPLETED DURING JANUARY 1968.

(6) DISPLACEMENT OR RELOCATION OF OTHER SIGNIFICANT SIZED 3D MARINE DIVISION COMBAT OR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS FROM THE PHU BAI ^{AREA} AND REALIGNMENT OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY BATTALIONS TO COINCIDE WITH SHIFTS OF REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS IS NOT CONTEMPLATED DURING THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

B. HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

(1) BE PREPARED TO COORDINATE DISPLACEMENT, BY ECHELON, OF DESIGNATED COMMAND POST PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FROM PHU BAI TO DONG HA.

(2) PROVIDE SECURE STORAGE AT PHU BAI FOR PERSONNEL EFFECTS NOT REQUIRED BY PERSONNEL MOVED TO DONG HA.

(3) COORDINATE RELOCATION OF PERSONNEL AND COMMAND POST EQUIPMENT MOVED FROM DONG HA TO PHU BAI.

(4) PROMULGATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR MOVEMENT OF THE COMMAND GROUP, DESIGNATED STAFF SECTIONS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FROM PHU BAI TO DONG HA.

(5) CONTINUE PLANNING FOR DISPLACEMENT OF THE DIVISION COMMAND POST FROM DONG HA, PHU BAI TO QUANG TRI.

C. FOURTH MARINES

WHEN DIRECTED 1 JANUARY 1968 PAGE 2

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THIRD MARDIV

1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES TO 1ST MARINES AT QUANG TRI.
BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON 1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
UPON ARRIVAL CAMP EVANS FROM QUANG TRI SAME PERIOD.

(2) BE PREPARED O/A 17 JANUARY 1968 TO COMMENCE
DISPLACEMENT OF REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS FROM CAMP EVANS
TO CAMP CARROLL. COORDINATE DISPLACEMENT BY ECHELON
TO ENSURE ADEQUATE FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE AND
SUPPORT FIRST ECHELON HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT 1ST MARINES DUE
TO ARRIVE CAMP EVANS FROM QUANG TRI SAME PERIOD.

PLAN MOVEMENT OF

(3) FOLLOWING ELEMENTS IN DIRECT SUPPORT/OPCON
4TH MARINES ~~WILL BE DISPLACED~~ TO QUANG TRI TO SUPPORT 3D
MARINES; MOVEMENT TO TAKE PLACE DURING PERIOD 17-27 JAN 68.

(A) 8TH AA PLT 29TH CA CO

(B) DET COMM CO, HQ BN, 3D MARDIV

(C) CO B, 3D ENG BN

(D) CO A (-), 3D SP BN

(E) 2ND PLT, CO B, 3D MT BN

(F) DET 3D RECON BN

(G) DET 15TH ITT

(H) DET 244TH PSYOPS (USA)

(I) 2D PLT (-) BTRY D, 1ST BN 44TH ARTY

(4) DEVELOP PLANNING TO COMPLETE DISPLACEMENT AND
CLOSE CAMP CARROLL BY 27 JANUARY 1968.

(5) ON 20 JAN 1968, ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR
LANCASTER AO AND MISSION ASSIGNED REFERENCE (A).

D. THIRD MARINES

(1) BE PREPARED O/A 17 JANUARY 1968 TO COMMENCE
DISPLACEMENT OF REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS FROM CAMP CARROLL TO

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THIRD MARDIV

QUANG TRI. COORDINATE DISPLACEMENT BY ECHELON TO INSURE ADEQUATE FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE AND SUPPORT FIRST ECHELON HEADQUARTERS 4TH MARINES DUE TO ARRIVE CAMP CARROLL FROM CAMP EVANS SAME PERIOD.

(2) ASSUME OPCON SUPPORT ELEMENTS SHOWN SUBPARA 3.C.(3) ABOVE UPON THEIR ARRIVAL QUANG TRI FROM CAMP EVANS.

(3) DEVELOP PLANNING TO COMPLETE DISPLACEMENT AND CLOSE QUANG TRI BY 27 JANUARY 1968.

(4) ON 20 JAN 1968, ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR OSCEOLA AO AND MISSION ASSIGNED REFERENCE (B).

E. FIRST MARINES.

(1) WHEN DIRECTED O/A 8 JANUARY 1968, PASS OPCON 1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES TO 4TH MARINES AT CAMP EVANS. BE

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THIRD MARDIV

PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES UPON ARRIVAL QUANG TRI FROM CAMP EVANS SAME PERIOD.

(2) BE PREPARED O/A 17 JANUARY 1968, TO COMMENCE DISPLACEMENT OF REGIMENTAL COMMAND POST FROM QUANG TRI TO CAMP EVANS. COORDINATE DISPLACEMENT BY ECHELON TO ENSURE ADEQUATE FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE AND SUPPORT FIRST ECHELON HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT 3D MARINES DUE TO ARRIVE QUANG TRI FROM CAMP CARROLL SAME PERIOD.

(3) ~~DEVELOP~~ PLAN ~~TO~~ TO COMPLETE DISPLACEMENT AND CLOSE CAMP EVANS BY 27 JANUARY 1968.

ON 20 JAN 1968

(4) ~~ASSUME~~, ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEOSHO AO AND MISSION ASSIGNED REFERENCE ^C(E).

F. 12TH MARINES.

(1) WHEN DIRECTED ON OR ABOUT 12 JANUARY 1968
COORDINATE DISPLACEMENT 4TH BATTALION, 12TH MARINES ^{(-)(RENG)} LESS
ELEMENTS DESIGNATED TO PASS OPCON 1ST MARINE DIVISION,
FROM CURRENT POSITION PHU BAI TAOR TO NEW OR INTERIM POSITION
AREAS VICINITY OF DMZ. REFERENCE D REFERS.

(2) WHEN DIRECTED ON OR ABOUT 21 JANUARY 1968
COORDINATE DISPLACEMENT 3D BATTALION, 12TH MARINES, LESS
ELEMENTS DESIGNATED TO PASS OPCON 1ST MARINE DIVISION, FROM
CURRENT POSITION VICINITY CAMP EVANS TO QUANG TRI TO SUPPORT
OF 3D MARINES.

(3) COORDINATE EXCHANGE BETWEEN 3D BATTALION, 12TH
AND 1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES TO ENSURE CONTINUOUS ARTILLERY
SUPPORT OF INFANTRY AT QUANG TRI AND CAMP EVANS.

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THIRD MARDIV

G. 2ND BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

(1) BE PREPARED, ON OR ABOUT 10 JANUARY, 1968, AND WHEN RELIEVED BY 2ND BATTALION, 5TH MARINES, TO COMMENCE DISPLACEMENT FROM PHU BAI TAOR TO DMZ AREA TO CARRY OUT MISSION TO BE ASSIGNED.

(2) COORDINATE TRANSFER ~~OF RESPONSIBILITY~~ ^{RESPONSIBILITY} FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROCEDURES AND LIAISON WITH CAG AND ARVN FORCES PECULIAR TO THE PHU BAI TAOR, TO 5TH MARINES.

(3) ~~REMIT~~ PLAN ~~TO~~ TO COMPLETE DISPLACEMENT WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER COMMENCEMENT.

H. 3D RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION

(1) BE PREPARED, ON OR ABOUT 9 JANUARY 1968, TO DISPLACE THE BATTALION COMMAND GROUP FROM PHU BAI TO DONG HA.

(2) UPON RELIEF, AND WHEN ACTUALLY AGREEABLE TO RELIEVING 1ST MARINE DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE UNITS, ^{OR OF BATTALION} COMMENCE DISPLACEMENT REMAINING ~~RECONNAISSANCE COMPANIES~~ FROM PHU BAI AREA TO QUANG TRI.

I. 9TH MARINES

(1) WHEN DIRECTED, ON OR ABOUT 22 JANUARY, 1968, PASS OPCON 2ND BATTALION, 1ST MARINES TO REGIMENT ^{AL} COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR NEOSHO AO.

(2) COORDINATE RELIEF AT CON THIEN TO ALLOW 2ND BATTALION, 1ST MARINES TO MOVE DIRECTLY FROM CURRENT POSITION TO CAMP EVANS.

J. THIRD MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION. BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT SURFACE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH DISPLACEMENTS.

K. BASE COORDINATORS PHU BAI TAOR, HA, GIA, LE

ASSISTANT COMMANDER QUANG TRI

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THIRD MARDIV

(1) COORDINATE ALLOCATION OF FACILITIES IN RESPECTIVE AREAS TO FULFILL REQUIREMENTS GENERATED BY DISPLACEMENT OR RELOCATION OF UNITS.

(2) WHERE APPLICABLE, COORDINATE TRANSFER OF FACILITIES FROM 3D MARINE DIVISION TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION.

~~NOTE~~

(3) IN ALL CASES, INSURE THAT AREAS VACATED ARE INSPECTED FOR POLICE AND SERVICEABILITY AT A TIME SUFFICIENT TO CORRECT DISCREPANCIES NOTED PRIOR TO OCCUPANCY BY RECEIVING UNIT.

L. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) WHEN DIRECTED, FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE DISPLACEMENT TO DONG HA, THE 3D MARINE DIVISION COMMAND POST WILL BE OPENED AT ^{THAT} ~~THE~~ LOCATION SIMULTANEOUS WITH REDESIGNATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS ~~SUPPORT~~ ELEMENTS AT PHU BAI AS 3D MARINE DIVISION REAR.

(2) DISPLACEMENT OF REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS WILL BE LIMITED TO HEADQUARTERS COMPANY PERSONNEL AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS DESIGNATED TO MOVE. ~~REMARKS~~ EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO REDUCE MOVEMENT OF SUPPORTING/ATTACHED UNITS NOT REQUIRED IN THE NEW LOCATION, NOR WILL AN ATTEMPT BE MADE TO MAINTAIN HISTORICAL SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS DISRUPTED BY THE DISPLACEMENT.

(3) DISPLACEMENT OF ALL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS WILL BE ECHELONED TO ENSURE A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN EXCHANGE OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE RESIDENT COMMANDER TO THE ARRIVING COMMANDER. ~~ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSITION TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO DISPLACEMENT~~

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(4) COMMANDERS RETAIN RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CURRENTLY ASSIGNED MISSIONS UNTIL RELIEVED BY DESIGNATED RELIEF.

(5) ANTICIPATE NEW INTERIM BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE 3D MARINE AND 1ST MARINE DIVISION, GENERALLY ALONG PERFUME RIVER LINE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (E) ON OR ABOUT 12 JANUARY 1968.

(6) UPON ASSUPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR A NEW REGIMENTAL AO, COMMANDERS WILL REVIEW REFERENCE (F) TO DETERMINE RESPONSIBILITIES RELATIVE TO OPERATION DYE MARKER.

(7) BATTALION REARS LOCATED IN PHU BAI WILL BE MAINTAINED AFTER PARENT UNIT DISPLACES.

(8) REPORT TIME OF RELIEF BY 1ST MARINE DIVISION UNITS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

(9) DIRLAUTH

4. ADMINISTRATION-LOGISTICS. TO BE ISSUED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. NO CHANGE

B. COMMUNICATIONS.

(1) ALL INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS WILL OPERATE CONTINUOUSLY AT EACH COMMAND POST SITE DURING THE MOVEMENT PERIOD. TOWARD THIS END, ORGANIC EQUIPMENT MAY BE LEFT IN PLACE UNTIL MOVEMENT COMPLETED.

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(2) SPECIFIC DETAILS WILL BE PASSED DURING
SCHEDULED CONFERENCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY MESSAGE.

C. COMMAND POSTS. REPORT OPENING AND CLOSING OF
COMMAND POSTS EFFECTED BY DISPLACEMENTS TO THIS HEAD-
QUARTERS.

G-4

G-3

G-4/G-1/CCO/COC

DPB

CCN

RELEASED BY *W.H. Quinn*

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3rd Marine Division
Command Chronology
Dec 1967

Supporting Documents

Encl 1	Msg	051525 Z	Subj: Task Organization
2	Pln	6 Dec 67	Subj: Handwritten Plan of Operation Lam Son 156, w/Plan in Vietnamese Language, Translation
3	Msg	060842 Z	Subj: Relocation of Medival Facilities, Operation Checkers
4	Int	071100 H	Subj: Intelligence Estimate of the Situation in the Area Between Khe Sanh & Ca Lu
5	Ltr	8 Dec 67	Subj: Letter from 17th Interrogation Translation Team, Subj: Report of Results of Special Information Team, w/8 Encls
7	Msg	11 Dec	Subj: Operation Lam Son #158, w/1 Encl, Overlay
8	Ltr	14 Dec	Subj: Letter from 1st Infantry Division Advisory Detachment, Subj: VC/NVA Sapper Units & Tactics, w/1 Encl, Discussion of Subject
6	Msg	090706 Z	Subj: Relocation of Communication Facilities
9	Msg	170505 Z	Subj: Attack by Fire, Cua Viet
10	Int	142200 H	Subj: Intelligence Estimate Base Area 101
11	Pln	18 Dec	Subj: Handwritten Translation, Typed, & Original in Vietnamese Language, Subj: Plan of Operations Lam Son 162
12	Mem	19 Dec	Subj: Memorandum for Record, dated 13 Dec 67, Agenda Items/ Questions for Pre-Planning Conference Regards Relocation of 4th Marines from Camp Evans Area, w/7 Encls & Handwritten Noted
13	Msg	190551 Z	Subj: Request Area Clearance for Planned Amphibious Operation
14	Msg	190559 Z	Subj: Operation Checkers Proposed Boundary
15	Mem	20 Dec	Subj: Memorandum for Record, Subj: PBR Conference
16	Msg	200843 Z	Subj: Operation Fortress Ridge D-Day
17	Msg	201440 Z	Subj: Operation Checkers Artillery Planning Guidance
18	Msg	201640 Z	Subj: Operation Fortress Ridge Execute
19	Msg	202215 Z	Subj: Operation Fortress Ridge H-Hour
20	Rpt	21 Dec	Subj: Letter from CG, 3rd Mar Div, Ser: 3800, Subj: Special Information Team, Report of Results of Interviews, w/1 Encl, Subj: Report of Special Information Team
21	Msg	221153 Z	Subj: Clearing & Filling Requirement
22	Msg	221319 Z	Subj: Employment BLT 3/1
23	Msg	231357 Z	Subj: Concept, Operation Muscatine
24	Msg	240126 Z	Subj: Operation Badger Tooth Initiating Directive
25	Msg	240914 Z	Subj: Operation Badger Tooth, Execute
26	Msg	241230 Z	Subj: Air Support for Amphibious Operation Badger Tooth Commencing on D-Day
27	Msg	250353 Z	Subj: Following Action Directed
28	Msg	250448 Z	Subj: D-Day & Conformation of Operation Badger Tooth H-Hour
29	Msg	250801 Z	Subj: Concept Amphibious Operation ARG/SLF "B"
30	Msg	251621 Z	Subj: Area Clearance
31	Msg	26 Dec	Subj: ARVN Postal Message, Operational Area, Handwritten & in Vietnamese Language, w/1 Encl, Overlay
32	Msg	262010 Z	Subj: SLF "B" SITREP
33	Msg	270743 Z	Subj: Flaeship Request
34	Msg	280534 Z	Subj: Change to Operation Badger Tooth Operation Order
35	Msg	281434 Z	Subj: Operation Checkers

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
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3rd Marine Division
Command Chronology
Dec 1967

Supporting Documents

Encl	36	Msg	290355 Z	Subj: Operation Badger Tooth Increase in Casualties
	37	Msg	290445 Z	Subj: Employment BLT 3/1
	38	Msg	290555 Z	Subj: Operation Badger Tooth Report
	39	Msg	300245 Z	Subj: Fire Support Used on Operation Badger Tooth
	40	Msg	300643 Z	Subj: Operation Badger Tooth Weather Forecast
	41	Msg	301434 Z	Subj: Spot Report #10, Operation Badger Tooth
	42	Msg	301635 Z	Subj: Operation Badger Tooth Report, Final Section of 2 Parts
	43	Msg	310845 Z	Subj: Operation Badger Tooth Weather & Withdrawal
	44	Msg	31 Dec	Subj: Boundary Change
	45	Msg	260330Z	Subj: Badger Tooth SITREP #1
	46	Msg	260455Z	Subj: Badger Tooth SITREP #2
	47	Msg	261336Z	Subj: Badger Tooth SITREP #3
	48	Msg	271615Z	Subj: Badger Tooth SITREP #5
	49	Msg	281436Z	Subj: Badger Tooth SITREP #7
	50	Msg	291407Z	Subj: Badger Tooth SITREP #9
	51	Msg	291945Z	Subj: Operation Badger Tooth SITREP
	52	Msg	292121Z	Subj: SITREP #1-67, Operation Badger Tooth
	53	Msg	292246Z	Subj: SITREP #09, Operation Badger Tooth
	54	Msg	300316Z	Subj: Badger Tooth SITREP #10
	55	Msg	301335Z	Subj: Operation Badger Tooth SITREP #5
	56	Msg	301935Z	Subj: SITREP #5 (Supplement), Operation Badger Tooth
	57	Msg	301950Z	Subj: SITREP #6, Operation Badger Tooth
	58	Msg	301950Z	Subj: SITREP #6, Operation Badger Tooth
	59	Msg	310005Z	Subj: SITREP #07, Operation Badger Tooth
	60	Msg	310307Z	Subj: Badger Tooth SITREP #12
	61	Rpt	311304Z	Subj: Spot Report #11, Operation Badger Tooth
	62	Msg	311450Z	Subj: Badger Tooth SITREP #13
	63	Msg	010010Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Newton SITREP #20
	64	Msg	020041Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #21
	65	Msg	021242Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #23
	66	Msg	030003Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #24
	67	Msg	041217Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #27
	68	Msg	050003Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #28
	69	Msg	051130Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #29
	70	Msg	071259Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #33
	71	Msg	170041Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #52
	72	Msg	190040Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #56
	73	Msg	200026Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #58
	74	Msg	220030Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP #62
	75	Msg	261230Z	Subj: Ballistic Arch/Kentucky SITREP # 71
	76	Msg	221438Z	Subj: Fortress Ridge SITREP #5
	77	Mem	Dec 67	Subj: Enemy Situation, Etc, Handwritten & Typed Papers
	78	Rpt	Dec 67	Subj: Operations & Training
	79	Msg	290427Z	Subj: Concept Amphibious Operation ARG/SLF Bravo (CTG 79.5/76.)

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IMMEDIATE 051525 DEC 67

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG III MAF
 THIRD MARDIV
 INFO: CG FIRST MARDIV
 FLSC-A

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TASK ORGANIZATION

A. III MAF ORDER 5213.2

1. IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED STRENGTHS
 INCLUDED:

UNIT	WPNS	STATION	STRENGTH
HQBN (-)(REIN)		PHU BAI	
HQCO (-)			136-520
SERVCO (-)			12-235
SERVCO (-)			12-233
DET III MAF			0-02
COMM CO (-)(REIN)			11-329
COMM CO (-)			11-317
DET 5TH COMBN			0-12
LP CO (-)			4-88
DET HQBN		DONG HA	
SUB UNIT #2			43-180
DET HQCO			9-24
DET LFCCO			1-41
DET COMACO			0-10
DET HQBN			
DET HQCO			

DRAFTER

OP CHIEF

SEC

G-3

CWO

G-2 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPO

APO

ACTION

Task org file

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DANANG

Encl 1

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DET COMMCO		1-00
DET MPCO		0-01
DET HQBN	HUE	
DET HQCO		4-0
DET COMMCO		0-3
DET MPCO		0-11
DET HQBN	QUANG TRI	
DET HQCO		3-5
DET MPCO		0-11
DET HQBN	GIA LE	
DET HQCO		0-4
DET HQBN	CAMP EVANS	
DET HQCO		0-8
DET COMMCO		0-6
DET HQBN	CUA VIET	
DET HQCO		0-2
DET COMMCO		0-4
DET HQBN	PHU LOC	
DET HQCO		2-2
DET HQBN	CAMP CARROLL	
DET COMMCO		0-9
DET HQBN	CAM LO	
DET HQCO		0-3
DET HQBN	CIO LINH	
DET COMMCO		0-2
1ST CIT (-)	PHU BAI	2-9
DET 1ST CIT	PHU LOC	1-1
DET 1ST CIT	HUE	1-0

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15TH CIT (-)	DONG HA	1-8
DET 15TH CIT	CAM LO	0-2
DET 15TH CIT	CUA VIET	0-1
7TH ITT (-)	DONG HA	2-4
DET 7TH ITT	PHU BAI	1-1
DET 7TH ITT	CAMP CARROLL	0-1
DET 7TH ITT	CUA VIET	0-1
DET 7TH ITT	DANANG	0-1
15TH ITT (-)	PHU BAI	2-2
DET 15TH ITT	QUANG TRI	1-2
DET 15TH ITT	KHE SANH	1-2
17TH ITT (-)	PHU BAI	3-4
DET 17TH ITT	PHU LOC	1-1
DET 17TH ITT	CAM LO	0-1
3RD IT	PHU BAI	0-2
9TH ITT (-)	PHU BAI	1-4
DET 9TH IT	QUANG TRI	0-1
11TH IT (-)	PHU BAI	1-4
DET 11TH IT	CAMP EVANS	0-1
1ST SSCT	PHU BAI	1-8
7TH PLT 29TH CACO (USA)	PHU BAI	2-7
2D BN 26TH MAR	PHU BAI	44-1197
H&SCO (-)		
DET 3D MP BN 3D MAR DIV		
DET HQCO SCOUT SNIPER PLT HQCO 26TH MAR		
CO E (-)(REIN)		
CO F (REIN)		
2D PLT CO E		

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CO G (REIN)

DET 3D MPBN 3D MARDIV

CO H (REIN)

CO B 1ST BN 9TH MAR (REIN)

DET 3D ENGR BN

3D RECONBN (-)(REIN)

PHU BAI 21-408

H&SCO

CO A

CO D

CO C

DONG HA 4-75

3D FORCE RECON CO

11-151

3D ATBN (-)

GIA LE 25-333

H&SCO

CO B (REAR)

(6M50A1)

GIA LE

PLT CO B

(4M50A1)

NAM HOA

CO C

(16M50A1)

GIA LE

PLT CO C

(5M50A1)

CON THIEN

3D TANK BN (-)

PHU BAI 37-537

H&SCO (-)

(2-M48A3)

(3-M67A2)

CO B (-)(REIN)

(8-M48A3)

CAMP CARROLL

(3-M67A2)

(1-M51VTR)

CO C

(16-M48A3)

PHONG DIEN

(1-M51VTR)

CO A (REIN)

(18-M48A3)

DONG HA

(3-M67A2)

DET H&SCO

(1-M51VTR)

SECRET

SECRET

1ST AMTRACBN

CAU VIET

38-839

H&SCO

10-LVTP-5

3-LVTP-5CMD

1-LVTR-1

4-LVTE-1

CO A

33-LVTP-5

1-LVTP-5CMD

1-LVTR-1

CO B (-)

29-LVTP-5

3-LVTP-5CMD

1-LVTR-1

2D PLT CO B

3-LVTP-5

CAM LO

4TH PLT CO B

3-LVTP-5

CON THIEN

DET CO B

11-LVTP-5

QUANG TRI

1-LVTP-5CMD

CO F 2D BN 4TH MAR

CAU VIET

4-166

3D ENCR BN

PHU BAI

34-556

H&SCO (-)

ENCR SPT CO

CO A (REIN)

DONG HA

CO B (REIN)

CAMP EVANS

CO C (-)(REIN)

DONG HA

3D SP BN

PHU BAI

24-374

H&SCO (-)

CO B (-)(REIN)

2D PLT CO B (REIN)

QUANG TRI

1ST PLT CO B 1ST AMTRAC BN

CO C (REIN)

DONG HA

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CO A (-) (REIN)	CAMP EVANS	
4TH MAR (-) (REIN)	CAMP EVANS	
HQCO (-)		21-190
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DET H&SCO	CAMP CARROLL	0-10
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DET H&SCO	QUANG TRI	0-11
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CO A		
CO B		
CO C		
515TH TRANS CO		

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3D MEDBN (-)(REIN)

PHU BAI

44-294

H&SCO (-) ATTACHED M.O.S.T. #2

CO A

CO B

CO C (-)

1ST CLEARING PLT (REIN) CO D 5TH MEDBN

CO D (REIN)

DONG HA

12-57

3D DENTAL CO

PHU BAI

3D MAR (REIN)

CAMP CARROLL

HQCO 3D MAR

21-192

DET DIV COMM CO

0-06

DET 5TH COMM. CO

0-03

3/9

THON SON LAM 41-1012

H&SCO

CO I (-)

D-5

1 PLT CO I

KHE GIA BRIDGE

CO K

CAMP CARROLL

CO L

CA LU

CO M

THON SON LAM

9TH MARINES

DONG HA

HQCO

18-197

1ST BN 1ST MAR

H&SCO

A-4

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CO A

A-4

5-177

CO B

A-4

5-213

CO C

A-4

3-142

CO D

A-4

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3D BN (-) 3D MAR

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DET 7TH COMM BN		0-03
DET DIV POSTAL		0-05

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DET DIV PHOTO		0=02
DET DIV EXCHANGE		0=05
1STBN 26TH MAR (REIN)		43=1176
DET 2D PLT (=) CO A 3D SP BN		0=04
1STBN (-)(REIN) 13TH MAR		
HQBTRY 1STBN 13TH MAR		17=146
BTRY A 1STBN 13TH MAR	6=105H(TD)	8=106
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DET 2D PROV 155 HOW BTRY	1=155H(TD)	
BTRY C 1STBN 13TH MAR	6=105H(TD)	3=102
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DET 1ST PROV 155 HOW BTRY	1=155H(TD)	
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CO B 3D RECON BN		5=112
CO A (-) 3D ATBN	10=M50A1	3=55
SUB UNIT #5 HQBN 3D LARDIV		6=44
2D PLT (=) CO A 3D SP BN		1=12
3D PLT CO B 3D TANK BN	(5=M48A3)	1=20
2D CLR PLT CO C 3D MEDBN		1=10
SECT BTRY G 65TH ARTY (USA)	2=M55	0=09
LT SECT BTRY A 1STEN 44TH ARTY (USA)	2=M42	1=10
DET A=101 5TH S.F. GRP (USA)		3=12
DET H&SCO 3D MTBN		0=09
DET CO A 9TH MTBN		0=04
DET CO B 9TH MT BN		0=02
1ST MAR (-)(REIN)		

~~SECRET~~

QUANG TRI

~~SECRET~~

HQCO		22-222
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DET 1ST 8" HOW	1-8" M55 (SP)	
DET 5TH 155 ^{GUN} BTRY	1-155 (SP)	
3D PLT CO A 3D TANK BN	4-90 MTKS)	

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250TH CMR DET (USA) 1-AN/MPQ-4A

CO K 3DBN 3D MAR

SECT 1 2D PLT 1ST SL BTRY 2-20" SL

DET SOUND PLT 2D BN 26TH ARTY (USA)- 1-GRB

108TH FAG (USA)

DONG HA

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DET RADAR 8/26 (USA) 1-AN/MPQ-10A DONG HA

1STBN (-)(REIN) 40TH ARTY (USA)

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DET BTRY A 1STBN 40TH ARTY (USA)-1-105H(SP)

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238TH CMR DET (USA) 1-AN/MPQ-4A

239TH CMR DET (USA) 1-AN/MPQ-4A

240TH CMR DET (USA) 1-AN/MPQ-4A

2D BN 94TH ARTY (USA) +

38-477

HQ BTRY 2D BN 94TH ARTY (USA)

CAMP CARROLL

SVC BTRY 2D BN 94TH ARTY (USA)

DONG HA

BTRY A 2D BN 94TH ARTY (USA) 4-175G(SP) CAMP CARROLL

BTRY B 2DBN 94TH ARTY (USA) 4-175G(SP)

BTRY C (-) 2DBN 94TH ARTY (USA) 2-175G(SP)

SECRET

PLT BTRY C 2DBN 94TH ARTY (USA) 2-175G(SP)

8THBN (-) 4TH ARTY (USA)

DONG HA

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SECRET

SVC BTRY 8THBN 4TH ARTY (USA)

BTRY A 8THBN 4TH ARTY (USA) 4-175G(SP)

BTRY C 8THBN 4TH ARTY (USA) 4-175G(SP)

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BTRY A 1STBN 11TH MAR 6-105(TD)

BTRY B 1STBN 11TH MAR 6-105(TD)

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1STBN (-)(REIN) 12TH MAR

CAMP CARROLL 51-667

HQ BTRY 1STBN 12TH MAR

BTRY C 1STBN 12TH MAR 6-105(TD)

BTRY B 1ST 40TH ARTY(USA) 4-105(SP) THON SON LAM

BTRY I 3DBN 12TH MAR 6-105(TS) CAMP CARROLL

BTRY K 4THBN 12TH MAR 6-155(SP)

W BTRY (-) 1STBN 12TH MAR 2-107HOWTAR CA LU

SEC 2 2D PLT 1ST SL BTRY 1-20" SL CAMP CARROLL

2DBN (-)(REIN) 12TH MAR

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HQ BTRY 2DBN 12TH MAR

DONG HA

BTRY D 2DBN 12TH MAR 6-105(TD) CAM LO

BTRY E 2DBN 12TH MAR 6-105(TD) CON THIEN

BTRY F 2DBN 12TH MAR 6-105(TD) C-2

BTRY A 1STBN 12TH MAR 6-105(TD) C-2

W BTRY 2DBN 12TH MAR 6-4.2" MORT CAM LO

W BTRY 3DBN 12TH MAR 6-4.2" MORT CON THIEN

2D PLT 1ST ARMED AMPHIBCO 6-LVTH-6 CAU VIET

BTRY K (-) 4THBN 13TH MAR 4-155H(SP) C-2

PLT BTRY K 4TH BN 13TH MAR 2-155H(SP) DONG HA

BTRY M (-) 4THBN 12TH MAR 4-155H(SP)

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DET SEC 1 3RD PLT 1ST SL BTRY 1-20" SL	CAU VIET	
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BTRY H 3 RD BN 12TH MAR 6-105(TD)		
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2ND PROV 155HOW BTRY (-) 4-155H(TD)		
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BTRY B 1ST BN 13TH MAR 6-105(TD)		
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1ST 155 GUN BTRY 6-155G(SP)		
DET SEC 3 3RD PLT 1ST SL BTRY 1-20" SL		
1ST BN (-) (REIN) ADA AW(SP) 44TH ARTY (USA)		
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2 SECT 4-M42	GIO LINH	
2 SECT 4-M42	QUANG TRI	
B/1/44 (-) 6-M42	DONG HA	
1 SON		

SECRET

SECRET

HQ BTRY

SVC BTRY

BTRY A

BTRY B

BTRY C

DET BTRY C

(4-175 GUN(SP))

(2-175 GUN(SP))

(2-175 GUN(SP))

(2-175 GUN(SP))

DONG HA

CAMP CARROLL

THUAT SOE LAN

COMBINED NAM

1ST BATT

HQ BTRY

BTRY B 2ND BN 26TH ARTY (USA)

PLT BTRY L 14TH BN 12TH MAR

(4-175 GUN(SP))

(2-155 GUN(SP))

8TH BN, 14TH ARTY (-) (USA)

HQ BTRY

SVC BTRY

BTRY A

BTRY C 2ND BN, 94TH ARTY (USA)

(4-175 GUN(SP))

(4-175 GUN(SP))

DONG HA

1ST BN (-) (REIN), ADA AW(SP) 14TH ARTY (USA)

DONG HA

HQ BTRY

A/1/44 (-)

B/1/44 (-)

C/1/44 (-)

D/1/44 (-)

2 SECT A/1/44

2 SECT B/1/44

1 SQD B/1/44

1 SECT B/1/44

1 SQD C/1/44

1 SECT C/1/44

3 SQD C/1/44

(7-M42)

(7-M42)

(10-M42)

(12-M42)

(7-M42)

(4-M42)

(1-M42)

(2-M42)

(1-M42)

(2-M42)

(3-M42)

CAMP CARROLL

PHU BAI

GIO LINH

CAM LO

QUANG TRI

CON THIEN

KHE GIO

CA LU

THUAT SOE LAN

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1SECT	2-M42	CON THIEN
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1 SQD	1-M42	KHE GIO BRIDGE
1 SECT	2-M42	CA LU
2 SECT	4-M42	ROCKPILE
1 SECT	2-M42	THON SON LAH
D/1/44	8-M42	PHU BAI
1 SECT	2-M42	NAM HOA
2 SECT	4-M42	CAMP EVANS
1 SECT	2-M42	GIA LE
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3 SQDS	2-M55	CAMP CARROLL
1 SECT	3-M55	PHU BAI
3 SQDS	3-M55	CAMP EVANS
3 SQDS	3-M55	CON THIEN

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G-2 W.O.

RETAIN MEDICAL UNITS IN
ESSENTIAL THAT EXISTING

APOL HOLD MINIMUM NEW
EAPOL DISPOSITION AND

ACTION TRI PROVINCE

A. CG III MAF 150730Z NOV 67 (NOTAL)

1. REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR RELOCATION CERTAIN MEDICAL UNITS IN CONNECTION WITH REDEPLOYMENT OF REF A. ESSENTIAL THAT EXISTING MEDFACILITIES CONTINUE TO BE UTILIZED TO HOLD MINIMUM NEW CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS. FOLLOWING EVALUATION DISPOSITION AND FACILITY UTILIZATION FORESEEN.

A6. ALL THIRD MED BN IN NEW THIRD MARDIV ~~AC~~ QUANG TRI PROVINCE
UTILIZING EXISTING DONG HA FACILITY, MUST UNIT (S) AND
ADDITIONAL NEW FACILITIES AS REQUIRED.

B. ELEMENTS FIRST MED BN WITH FIRST FORHOSPCO ATTACHED, IN BOTH DANANG AND PHU BAI AREAS UTILIZING PRESENT FIRST AND THIRD MED BN FACILITIES.

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 0546 S E C R E T

2. REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR RELEASE PERMANENT FACILITIES NOW OCCUPIED BY FIRST FORHOSPCO TO USARV, SAP. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS EARLY RELEASE AND TO ACCOMPLISH EXCHANGE OF FACILITIES BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD MED BNS. FOLLOWING PLAN FOR RELOCATIONS PROPOSED.

A. FIRST FORHOSPCO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE PERMANENT CHU LAI FACILITIES TO USARV. CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN CHU LAI AREA TO CAPACITY MUST NR 1. RELOCATE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO FIRST MED BN IN DANANG. UTILIZING TENTS AS REQUIRED FOR BILLETING.

B. FIRST FORMOSPCO RELEASE MUST NR1 WHEN REQUIRED BY THIRD MED BN FOR INITIAL RELOCATION ELEMENTS FIRST MED BN OCCUPY VACTED PHU BAI FACILITY AND REMAINDER FIRST FORMOSPCO MOVE TO FIRST MED BN FACILITY AT DANANG.

3. PLAN REQUIRES THE COORDINATE USE OF PHU BAI MED FACILITY BY FIRST AND THIRD MED BNS UNTIL THIRD MED BN COMPLETES EVENTUAL MOVE TO QUANG TRI PROVINCE.

4. ADDEES REQUESTED TO COORDINATE ON PROPOSED PLAN AND SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THIS HQS. INCLUDE MINIMUM NEW FACILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

5. FOR FIRST MARDIV. REQ ADVISE EARLIEST DATE FOR TRANSFER

PAGE THREE RUMMWAA 0546 S E C R E T
HOSPITAL FACILITIES AT CHU LAI TO USARV.

GP-4.

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Encl 3

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DECLASSIFIED3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
Phu Bai, Thua Thien Province
VietnamSer:
071100H December 1967

Intelligence Estimate of the situation in the area between Khe Sanh and Ca Lu

References: (a) Maps, Vietnam AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6342II and 6342III
(b) Special Intelligence Study 20-67 (Central DMZ)
(c) Special Intelligence Study 8-67 (Khe Sanh)Enclosures: (1) Order of Battle
(2) Weather

1. MISSION. To explore the enemy capabilities in the area bordered on the south by Route # 9, on the east by Ca Lu, on the north by XD-YD 60, and on the west by Khe Sanh in light of possible friendly construction efforts along Route # 9.

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. Characteristics of the area of operation (see references (b) and (c)). Reference (c) includes the area south of Khe Sanh.

b. Enemy Military Situation (See enclosure (1))

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Attack

(1) To attack construction/security forces along Route # 9 with up to battalion size force supported by 60mm and 80mm mortars.

(2) To mount a coordinated multi-battalion ground attack against Khe Sanh, Ca Lu or Lang Vei.

b. Defend

(1) To defend at a time of his choosing with forces up to 1 regiment in strength.

c. Reinforce

(1) To reinforce with up to two regiments within 48 hours.

d. Withdraw

(1) To withdraw all or part of his forces to sanctuaries in Laos or heavily forested areas between Khe Sanh and the eastern DMZ.

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c. Harass

(1) To conduct small scale attacks, mining, ambushes, and harassment of friendly construction and security forces anywhere along Route # 9.

4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Capability a.

(1) Because of the enemy's familiarity with the terrain, he can be expected to attack any friendly forces of company size or smaller.

(2) By concurrently attacking Khe Sanh by fire and ground forces during an attack on construction forces along Route # 9 the enemy could hamper our ability to employ reaction forces. Likewise attacks on Lang Vei or Ca Lu could also divert attention from attacks in another sector.

b. Capability b.

(1) The enemy will defend only if he is encountered by surprise in his base camps, otherwise he will withdraw and disperse.

c. Capability c.

(1) The enemy is capable of reinforcing the 8th Battalion 29th Regiment with the 95C Regiment located in Laos in 24 to 36 hours; and by the 812th Regiment unlocated but believed to be somewhere southwest of Con Thien. This is not likely to occur unless the enemy decides to launch a multi-battalion attack on Khe Sanh, Ca Lu or Lang Vei.

d. Capability d.

(1) If the enemy considers it necessary or advantageous, he can withdraw to Laos to regroup, resupply and retrain. Areas north of Khe Sanh and south of the DMZ also afford covered and concealed areas.

e. Capability e.

(1) Extensive use of mines, booby traps, sniping and ambushes would be suitable to the enemy in this area because of the nature of terrain, and it is in keeping with the enemy's tactics of inflicting maximum casualties with minimum losses.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The enemy's most probable courses of action to counter or interfere with construction efforts along Route # 9 in order of probability are as follows:

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a. Course of Action 1. To harass the friendly forces (Capability e) with the intent of keeping Route # 9 from being repaired and to inflict casualties.

b. Course of Action 2. To mount up to a battalion sized attack (Capability a) supported by 60-82mm mortars on Lang Vei, Ca Lu, or construction/security forces along Route # 9. Such an attack against battalion or larger size units is not likely. Attacks by mortar fire alone is likely against construction/security forces, Khe Sanh, Lang Vei and Ca Lu.

c. Course of Action 3. To reinforce with up to two regiments is not likely unless the enemy decides to launch a major attack against Khe Sanh or Lang Vei in hopes of gaining a spectacular victory.

d. In conjunction with the above courses of action the enemy can be expected to defend only when absolutely necessary and to withdraw as the situation dictates.

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ORDER OF BATTLE

There are 2 known NVA units presently held in the Khe Sanh area, they are the 8th Battalion of the 29th Regiment and the 95C Regiment.

The 8th Battalion 29th Regiment is presently held at (XD 8547). This information was received from a PW report dated 28 June 1967. This is not normally the 8th Battalion's area of operation. They were withdrawn from the Con Thien area for a rest and to regroup. There have been no reports of them since that time.

CMIC report # 06-007-67 dated 14 July 1967 gives the area of operation for the 95C Regiment as Khe Sanh to the Laotian border. They arrived in this area in May 1967 where they had a fierce clash with U. S. units and withdrew to Laos (XD 6147). There have been no further reports on activity of this Regiment.

There are very few reports received from this area. Reports recently received indicated that the area is being used as an infiltration route from Laos to the A Shau Valley area. There are many heavily used trails in the vicinity of (XD 7631) and some reports of troops moving southeasterly along this area.

An ARVN report # 2081R237 of 28 November 1967 states that an unidentified NVA battalion deployed on line from (XD 7631) to (XD 8657).

On 30 November 1967 Recon Debrief # 169-67 placed a small group of 10 VC at (XD 7444).

There have been no further reports of enemy activity in the area of interest.

Enclosure (1)
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WEATHER

During the month of December, the Republic of Vietnam is completely under the influence of the northeast monsoon. The Siberian high pressure center continues to intensify, pushing cold dry air southward. As the cold, dry air flows southward, it is gradually heated by contact with the warmer China coast and waters of the South China Sea. Over water, the polar air merges with warm moist tropical air from the western Pacific and arrives over the Republic of Vietnam much warmer and more moist than when it left the continent. However, compared to the May to October southwest monsoon, the northeast monsoon is relatively cool and dry. The cooling trend continues showing a drop from November temperatures. The mean temperatures in the northern portion of RVN is in the high 60's. In open areas on still nights, cold air may collect in ~~valleys~~ or small narrow ravines to cause an appreciable temperature difference within the space of a few feet. These areas frequently can be recognized by early ground fog formation. The relative humidity is high throughout RVN, resulting in conditions favorable for mildew, corrosion and decay of susceptible items. The highest daily humidity values occur during the early morning hours and after rain showers, and the lowest occur during midafternoon. Most precipitation falls from afternoon and evening showers or thunderstorms. Showers are generally intense but short in duration. The mean number of days with precipitation is 10 days in the area of interest. The mean precipitation for the month is 6 inches with a maximum of 20 inches and a minimum of 1.0 inches. During December 1 or 2 thunderstorm days can be expected. Visibility of 1 to 3 miles is common in early morning fog in valleys of northern mountains. Showers and thunderstorms reduce visibility to less than 5 miles for brief periods, and in more intense storms, to less than 1 mile. Visibility greater than 12 miles is not common anywhere.

Enclosure (2)

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17TH INTERROGATION TRANSLATION TEAM
Headquarters, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

RLB:jeh
3800
8 Dec 1967

From: Team Commander
To: Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
Subj: Special Information Team; report of results of

Ref: (a) Verbal instructions from ACoFS G-2 of 27Nov67
(b) MACV Booklet, Mines and Boobytraps used by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, Nov 1965
(c) MACV Booklet, VC/NVA Mine Indicators, 29 May 1967

Encl: (1) Question guide for Special Information Team
(2) Drawing of Mines/indicators
(3) Drawing of Mines/indicators
(4) Drawing of Mines/indicators
(5) Drawing of Mines/indicators
(6) Drawing of Mines/indicators
(7) Drawing of Mines/indicators
(8) Drawing of Mines/indicators

1. As requested by reference (a), from 28 November to 3 December 1967, a Special Information Team, headed by Master Sergeant Manuel MANCILLAS, 17th Interrogation Translation Team and consisting of the following members: Staff Sergeant James E. HASKINS, 17th Interrogation Translation Team, Staff Sergeant Edward V. EVANS, G-3 3d Marine Division, Historical Branch, Lance Corporal Bruce BUSH, 3d Engineer Battalion, 3d Marine Division, and Staff Sergeant Doan Ngoc HONG, Interpreter from the 17th Interrogation Translation Team, visited the areas listed below to conduct interviews with the Kit Carson Scouts of the areas to update and broaden our knowledge of VC/NVA Mine and boobytraps:

First Marine Regiment - Quang Tri
Fourth Marine Regiment - Camp Evans
Second Battalion, 26th Marine Regiment - Phu Bai Combat Base

2. Enclosure (1) guided the team on the type of questions to be asked and the information sought.

3. The team conducted interviews with the below named Kit Carson Scouts. These interviews were taped by Staff Sergeant EVANS for submission to Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Oral History Branch. A copy of these tapes are on file at the office of the 17th Interrogation Translation Team.

NGUYEN VIEN - Former member of the North Vietnamese Army

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LE VAN THUY - Former Viet Cong from La Duy Area.
THAI VIET HAN - Former Viet Cong from Ba Long Area.
NGUYEN XUAN LANG - Former Viet Cong from Loc Son
LE KHIEN - Former Viet Cong from Phu Thu Area.
BONG - Former Viet Cong from Dung Lam Area.
LOI - Former member of the North Vietnamese Army
TRAN HAO - Former member of the North Vietnamese Army
NGUYEN GIA - Former Viet Cong from Nam Dong Area.
LAI KE - Former Viet Cong from C-117 Company

4. The following information was obtained from the Kit Carson Scouts:

a. NGUYEN VIEN: Vien knew of little useful information concerning any indicators of mines or boobytraps; however, he mentioned that the North Vietnamese did not employ boobytraps in their base areas, but left the task to the local Viet Cong, who would then serve as guides in the area. He stated that the favorite trip wire of the Viet Cong in the jungle was the bamboo vine which would blend well with the surroundings. VIEN's knowledge of mines is limited but he did recognize the Chinese Claymore Type Mine and the Chinese Anti-Personnel and Anti-Tank Mine #8. He stated that the Claymore is used while in a defensive position. The Claymore is suspended from trees and command detonated. The #8 Mine is the favorite of the North Vietnamese unit with which he served. This mine is emplaced and often boobytrapped. A hand grenade is placed over the mine and when the grenade is removed the mine is detonated by a pull release device.

b. LE VAN THUY and THAI VIET HAN: Indications of mines/boobytraps mentioned by THUY and HAN are: (1): On a trail or road the Viet Cong place a sign with the words "Nguy Hiem" (Danger!). The side of the road opposite the sign is usually mined. Distances from the sign to the mines are not constant. NOTE: Several Scouts mentioned that the sign method was one method of channeling Marines into the mined area itself, however, they also mentioned the sign may be boobytrapped. See drawing #1, enclosure (2). The trails in the area may have an indicator made with several rocks laid in a straight line. This will indicate a mine to either side of the rocks. See Drawing #2, enclosure (2). The way to pass this obstacle is to walk directly over the rocks. (2): In an area that is friendly to the Viet Cong a mine will be placed within the center of a triangle made of rocks. See drawing #3, enclosure (2). (3): HAN and THUY said that in the Gio Linh area the Bamboo Rectangle Marker is a prominent indicator of mines and punji pits. See pages 12 and 13 of reference (c). (4): HAN referred to the Bamboo Tripod Marker, Page 14 of reference (c), by saying that it is common to the jungle area of Ca Lu. (5): Each said that because Marines often pick fruit along the march, the Viet Cong have begun to boobytrap fruit trees. When a fruit is picked it pulls the device exploding it. (6): Both HAN and THUY mentioned that punji pits were boobytrapped. When the punji stakes are removed the grenade is detonated. (7): HAN mentioned that the Viet Cong use the Cartridge Trap (Page 159 of reference (b)). One change is made - instead of using a rifle cartridge they use an M-79 round. (8): A boobytrap common to the La Duy area is the punji pit with a grenade hole. See drawing #1,

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enclosure (3). This device which inflicts casualties along the trail is attached through the use of an underground tunnel to the punji pit. If a man falls into the pit the wire is pulled setting off the grenade.

c. NGUYEN LANG and LE KHIEN: (1): LANG stated that in an area friendly to the Viet Cong a sign "Nguy Hiem" could indicate an area of mines. In populated areas the mines are in the immediate vicinity of the sign; however, if the area is unpopulated or if the area contains Marines, the mines would be on the opposite side of the trail to the sign, and at a distance down the road. The signs might also be booby-trapped if found in an unpopulated area. (2): One of the indicators used that both have seen is a marker made of three pieces of bamboo with the mine placed on either side of the bamboo. See drawing #2, enclosure (3). (3): Both LANG and KHIEN have seen the Viet Cong use the Marine's desire for souvenirs. Knowing this desire they boobytrap their (Viet Cong) flags. See drawing #1, enclosure (4). (4): A broken tree might indicate a mined area in the immediate direction of the fall of the main tree. See drawing #2, enclosure (4). (5): KHIEN stated that many villages had the gates to the village boobytrapped. Sides of the trail are lined with punji pits and boobytraps. As the gate is opened tripping one grenade, Marines would move off the road and consequently into punji pits or tripping other boobytraps. (6): Both LANG and KHIEN have used the "Cartridge Trap". This is described on page 159 of reference (b). (7): Grenades suspended in trees, with a trip wire to achieve an airburst effect were commonly used in LANG's and KHIEN's areas, Loc Son and Phu Thu.

d. BONG and LOI: (1): Many ruses are commonly used by the Viet Cong, but according to the opinions of BONG and LOI a favorite deception is the roping off a given area with signs imprinted with the words "Nguy Hiem". The signs serve as bluffers to the Marine activity in the area. Inside this danger area the Viet Cong have fashioned "Safe areas". It is assumed that at intervals the Viet Cong also booby trap the signs to keep the Marines guessing. See drawing #3, enclosure (4). (2): Viet Cong sympathizers will often use the "Broken Tree Sign" to show the Viet Cong whether or not the Marines are in an area. See drawing #1, enclosure (5). If the tree, selected at random much like call signs, but known to all, has a branch broken (but not completely) it indicates that the Marines are in the area. If the branch is completely broken off it indicates that the Marines have gone and that the area is safe. (3): A bamboo stake lying across the trail usually indicates a mine/boobytrap or punji pit from three to ten meters ahead. See drawing #2, enclosure (5). (4): Various signs with "X" marked thereon indicate a restricted mine/boobytrapped area ahead. See drawing #3, enclosure (5). The "X" is usually red in color.

e. HAO: (1): Indicators used in HAO's area include the following devices: On trails the Viet Cong draw arrows to indicate mined areas ahead.

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They will also use two earthen mounds, four inches in height to indicate a mined area ahead. See drawing #1, enclosure (6). (2): At trail junctions the Viet Cong use arrows made of bamboo to indicate safe trails, with the other trails being mined. The tail of the arrow is the indicator. If the arrow has no tail, the trails to the left and right are mined, the one to the front is safe. If the right tail section is missing, the safe trail is to the right, the front and left being mined. If the left tail section is missing, the mined trails are to the right and front, the left trail is safe. See drawing #2, enclosure (6). Mines: (1): HAO described a "Mosquito Mine" unknown to members of the team and not found in reference (b). Said mine is described in drawing #1, enclosure (7). HAO stated if the Viet Cong have the time they often boobytrap the bodies of their fallen comrades. They use hand grenades with pull wires attached to the body and the grenade. Ruses: (1): HAO indicated that the Viet Cong make punji pits or mine particular areas, then with rocks they spell out words such as "Ho Chi Minh" or "Die Marine". When these words are found by Marines the natural impulse is to kick the rocks away, and when they do this they either detonate the mine or fall into the pit. See drawing #2, enclosure (7).

f. NGUYEN GIA and LAI KE: Indicators: (1): GIA described a marker placed where trails junctioned. The marker, made of bamboo and shaped like an arrow is placed on a tree and is pointed to the trail that is mined. The distance from the marker to the mined area is usually 30 meters. See drawing #3, enclosure (7). (2): GIA also described an indicator of bamboo placed across the trail. See drawing #2, enclosure (5). Boobytraps: (1): Both men agreed that when the Viet Cong leave their areas they boobytrap the doors to their homes. They usually use a hidden wire and a hand grenade. (2): The Viet Cong boobytrap branches at the entrance to their village. When the branch is moved the device explodes.

g. There is a consensus among the scouts that the Viet Cong use the Chinese Hand Grenade, the American M-26 and Mk-2 hand grenades for the majority of their boobytraps. Homemade mines are common when the logistical support for supplying the TNT or plastic explosive is available, and the area is favorable. All scouts agreed that dud artillery rounds, bombs, and smaller dud munitions are excellent for boobytraps and are employed to the fullest extent. One special type boobytrap discovered to be in use in the Quang Tri and Phong Dien areas was the "Grenade-Stick-Can" type. As the stick holding the pre-positioned grenade and can is moved the grenade falls from the can. The pin is removed prior to placement in the can. The spoon of the grenade is held closed by the lip of the can. Any movement of the can, however slight, causes the grenade to explode. See drawing #1, enclosure (8).

h. All scouts were emphatic that at night NO indicators for mined areas, boobytraps or punji pits can be seen. This is the time of most mine/booby-trap incidents.

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5. Additional information as received by this team, will be forwarded for inclusion in this report. If enclosed information is considered new or important it is recommended that same be forwarded to appropriate commands for inclusion in necessary reports.

R. L. Brown
R. L. BROWN

Copy to:
3d Engineer Bn

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QUESTION GUIDE

The following are requirements on mines and booby traps. The information is restricted to that which might be gleaned from Kit Carson Scouts in the Fourth Marines (Phong Dien), First Marines (Quang Tri) and the Second Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines TAOR's.

1. Provide all available information on mines and booby traps within respective tactical areas of responsibility to include:

a. Locations (Exact or suspected).

(1) Types of areas usually mined or booby trapped and, conversely, the types of areas not usually mined or booby trapped and the reasons for such a determination.

b. Initiating Actions: Release devices regardless of how obvious, primitive or unimportant they seem to be, i.e., all means of triggering mines or booby traps known or suspected to be used in one's respective area---differentiate the known means from the suspected means.

c. Types of Mines or Booby Traps, Method of Employment and Detection.

(1) Include types which are usually employed solely against the individual Marine (Anti-Personnel) and those specified for vehicular movement (Anti-Tank). Also include types known which serve both anti-personnel and anti-tank functions.

(2) Include suspicious indications which might readily serve to guide the individual Marine to immediately detect types and areas employed.

(3) Include tricks or characteristics unusual in nature which might be likely lures or enticements to the Marine's curiosity.

(a) Include those of obstacles, souvenirs, building areas, vehicles and/or personnel used to trigger these devices.

(4) Include ways in which or by which the indigenous personnel are made aware of the existing mines or booby traps.

(a) Which of the ways can easily be read or made known to the individual Marine, e.g. Stick breaking or placement, rock arrangements regardless of its primitiveness or guessed unimportance.

(5) Include any places which may be unmentioned here which might seem important to the Kit Carson Scout however unsequential it might seem.

Enclosure (1)

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DRAWING #1

Sign reading Nguy Hiem (Danger!)
Sign may be boobytrapped



Mined area

DRAWING #2

Series of rocks in straight line
(Safe zone directly over the rocks)

Mines may be at either side of rocks, or both sides.

DRAWING #3

ROCKS SHAPED LIKE A TRIANGLE


TRAIL IS HEAVILY TRAVELED BY
POPULACE FRIENDLY TO VIET CONG

Mine in center of triangle


Enclosure (2)

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
DRAWING #1



SIDE VIEW




DRAWING #2



Enclosure (3)

DRAWING #1


FLAG BOOBYTRAP



DRAWING #2

MAIN FALL OF TREE POINTS IN DIRECTION OF MINES

MINED AREA



DRAWING #3



SIGNS CIRCLE HILL SAYING "NGUY HIEM"

VC SAFE AREA WITH TUNNEL COMPLEX




Enclosure (4)


DRAWING #1



DRAWING #2





DRAWING #3






Enclosure (5)

DRAWING #1




DRAWING #2



Enclosure (6)


VIET CONG MOSQUITO MINE

DRAWING #1



FOR USE IN GRASSY AREAS ANTI-PERSONNEL

DRAWING #2



DRAWING #3




FORMER VIET CONG HAVE STATED THAT
SOMETIMES SIGNAL IS REVERSED WITH THE
MINES IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF THE
ARROW

Enclosure (7)


DECLASSIFIED

Drawing #1



Enclosure (8)

DECLASSIFIED



SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	T
G-3 W.O.	Rum
G-2 W.O.	R/B
DCPO	
APD	

VPA512ZVA 473MCA518 1253
 RE RUMHVP
 DE RUHMFMA1535 3430706
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 090706Z DEC 67
 JDM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TORUMWAA/CG III MAF
 INFO RAMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV (W027)

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV (R014)

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW (P036)
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD (B022)
 RUHHLHA/NAVSEEAPAC
 RUMKNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DNG
 RUMHNA/COM THIRD NCB
 BT

SECRET
 RELOCAT

ON OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES (U)

A. CG III MAF 010014Z/NOV67 NOTAL

1. FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO REF A:

A. NAVSEEAPAC REPRESENTATIVES AT A CONFERENCE CONVENED AT HQ FMFPAC ON 30NOV67 ADVISED OF POSSIBLE/FORTHCOMING PRIORITY ENGINEERING AND INSTALLATION PROJECTS RESULTING FROM REDEPLOYMENT OF III MAF FORCES. CEOS FROM III MAF, FIRST MARDIV, FORLOGCMD AND FIRST MAW ATTENDED CONFERENCE. IN ADDITION TO NAVSEE-

PAGE 2 RUHMFMA 1535 SECRET
 APAC AND HQ FMFPAC REPS.

B. SUBMISSION OF SUBJ REQUIREMENTS, WHEN KNOWN, SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO ITA DNG WITH INFO COPIES TO CG FMFPAC AND NAVSEEABE PAC. RELATIVE PRIORITY

ES OF PROJEKTS SHOULD BE STATED WHEN POSSIBLE. FOREGOING PROCEDURES CONCURRED IN BY ALL CONFEREES.

GP-4

25

TOR: 09/1845Z/DEC/67/B.DCS

C-CEO

S/S, G-3, COC, G-1-R

89

07

806

IMMEDIATE

POSTAL MESSAGE

KIN

FROM 1st INFANTRY DIVISION 0-3
TO: 2ND AIRBORNE TASK FORCE

- 3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE
- 7TH AIRBORNE CAVALRY SQUADRON
- 1ST DIV STAFF (ART, SIGNAL, CG)
- 3/7 AVO TROOP
INFO: 3RD USMC DIV HQ
- 1ST DIV HQ 02, 100, MACV



Text ref 2155/213/1/K.

1. As of 120000H Dec until further order, the 2nd Airborne Task Force will coordinate with local security forces to perform long term missions in the areas as designated in the attached overlay. Operations to be conducted by the Task Force is named LAM SWN 153 in order to currently get reports.
2. Completion of forces consists of entire organic units of the 2nd Airborne Task Force.
 3. Concept and missions
 - a. To conduct short term operations, daily search patrols, raids and set up ambushes in the designated areas to search and destroy the enemy, deny movement or infiltration of the Viet Cong into the areas of responsibility, detect and destroy all caches, logistics points and guerrillas in the area.
 - b. To closely coordinate with the 3rd Infantry Regiment (All 10 vital areas). Thus the on sector and UH1C go with the regional paramilitary forces in order to prevent from identification.
 - c. To daily from 1800H to 0600H place under the employment of 3rd Infantry Regiment 1 Airborne Company at Truong Han Tho camp to strengthen the security of PL 17 area and be prepared for instant deployment as needed.
 4. During the duration of operation LAM SWN 153, the 2nd Airborne Task Force can employ the 3/7 AVO Troop for reinforcement according to the plan of the Task Force and requirements of situation but must be cleared with the 1st Division Headquarters prior to any deployment.
 5. The Airborne "C" Battery at PL 17 provides direct support for the 2nd Airborne Task Force. The 2nd Artillery unit at Chung Binh and Pho Trach reinforce fire power on requests.

Thus the on sector places under the command of 2nd Airborne Task Force all RF/PF units in the operational area of this Task Force for convenient deployment and coordination as needed.

The 2nd Airborne Task Force makes plans for daily activities or short term joint operations in the designated areas and submit these to the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters (03 153). Results of action taken and locations of

KIN

Encl 4

KIN

subordinate units are reported daily to the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters at 1700H.

8. The 1st Infantry Division staff offices and sections provide supports on tactics, fire power, logistics, engineer, intelligence information, communications and techniques for these units on requests from the 2nd Airborne Task Force.
9. This postal message supersedes and rescinds previous issued correspondences related to activities of the 2nd Airborne Task Force.
10. Report of action taken is required, AND.

DISTRIBUTION:

AF0.4395, 11 Dec 1967

LTC TRAN VAN CAM
chief of staff
signed and sealed

KIN

06/15.

!!
plan of operation LAMSON 156

Reference: map scale 1:50000.

Forces organization.

1. General command: 1st ARVN Div/Hqs.
 2. 2nd ARVN Regt: 2nd Regt Hq.
- 3 infantry Bns.
- 2/7 APC Bn.
 3. USMC: 9th Marines.
 4. ARTILLERY: one Combined Artillery Bn (US and VN)
 5. Reserve: one Airborne Bn.
-

1. Situation:

- a. Enemy: see the monthly general information.
- b. Friendly: NON-change.
- c. Reinforcement: none.

2. Mission: search and destroy operation in the area as ANNEX B (operation overlay) for 2 days from D day.

3. Execution:

a) Concepts

(1) Conduct maximum bombing on the targets either inside or outside the operation area since ~~D-1~~ D-1

Encl 2

- (2) on Dday, at H hour, depart from Highway #1, operate on 3 general axis to occupy targets A, B and C and bombing-lines #1 and 2.
- (3) The reserve force will be ready to reinforce the operation.
- (4) Annex B operation overlay.

b. 2nd ARVN Regt.:

- (1) ~~will be reinforced~~ will be reinforced by an Airborne Bn. and 2/7 APC Bn since ~~since~~ D-1
- (2) Coordinate with the US 9th Marine Regt to conduct operation in the area.
- (3) Coordinate with the concerning units to maneuver troops ^{exactly} ~~with~~ with the ~~coordination~~ ^{rate} of bombing on each bombing line to avoid misrecognition.
- (4) Search carefully and destroy the enemy installation, stores in the operation area.

c. 2nd Airborne Battle group: Reinforce one airborne Bn for the 2nd Regt in the operation since ~~since~~ D-1

d. 7th Cavalry Regt.: Reinforce 2/7 APC Bn for the 2nd Regt in the operation since ~~since~~ D-1

e. Engineer: order will be given later.

f. Artillery:

- (1) Make the special air-fire support plan.
- (2) Coordinate with US artillery to decide mission,

(3)

and exchange liaison officer and F.O.

(3) Annex C Artillery Support.

g. Air Forces:

- (1) Apply organic means of the plan of air support for the border area to support the operation if required.
- (2) US Airforces will reinforce fire support when requested.
- (3) VN Airforces in DA-NANG will reinforce fire support when required.
- Annex D, air support.

h. Reserve Force

- (1) will be ready to reinforce the operation unit.
- (2) responsible to conduct security for the road from Highway #1 to the limit of 2nd Regt and USMC.

i. Combined instruction:

- (1) Each unit's commander freely maneuver troops in the ^{area of} responsibility, but, he will report the plan to 1st Div/Hq before execution.
- (2) Movement of the units to the line of departure will be planned by the 2nd Regt.
- (3) Use maximum fire and bombardment before approaching to each bombing line. During operation, bomb ~~the~~ continuously on the

(4)

free fire zone as in the special air support plan of Division's artillery.

(4) In order to avoid misrecognition, each unit must coordinate tightly with the other units ~~before~~ need to fire at near the limit of ~~activity~~ each one's responsible area.

(5) Units must always change the station points, locate far away from the people and at the special terrain to avoid enemy mortar or surprise-attack.

(6) The reinforcement units must report to the 2nd Regt in D-1.

(7) 2nd Regt report detail plan to 1st ARVN Div HQ in D-1.

(8) D day and H hour will be confirmed later.

4. Logistics and administration: applied as usual.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Signal: apply monthly special communication order.

b. Command: - 1st ARVN Div Forwarded CP at C1.
- 2nd Regt CP at A2.

(S) ~~Brig~~ Gen. NGO - QUANG - TRUONG

copied by

Maj: NGO in CHUNG
G-3 chief.

MẬT

KẾ HOẠCH HÀNH QUÂN LAM SƠN 156

Bản số : 06 / 15
 Bộ Tư-lệnh Khu 11/0
 Trại Trần-Đạo-Vân H
 06160CH. tháng 12/19
 LS.156

Tham chiếu : Bản đồ tỷ lệ 1/50.000

TỔ CHỨC LỰC LƯỢNG :1. CHỈ HUY TỔNG QUÁT :

-BOH/CH/8+JBR/4110T.

2. TRUNG ĐOÀN 2 BỘ BINH :

-BOH/Trung-Đoàn 2 Bộ-binh.
 -3 Tiểu-đoàn Bộ-binh trực thuộc.
 -Chi-đoàn 2/7 T.Q.V.

3. TQLC/HCA K :

-Đo Trung-đoàn 9/TQLCEN An Định.

4. PHẠO BINH :

-1 Tiểu-đoàn Pháo-binh hỗn hợp Việt/Lý.

6. TRƯ B :

-1 Tiểu-đoàn Nhảy Dù.

1. TÌNH HÌNH :

- a. Định : Xem bản tổng hợp tin tức hàng tháng.
 b. Biến : Không thay đổi.
 c. Tăng phái và rút phái : Không.

2. NHIỆM VỤ :

Tổ chức hành quân tìm diệt địch trong khu vực
ân định ở phụ bản B (thâu mình đồ hành quân)
thời gian dự trù 2 ngày kể từ ngày N.

3. THỰC HÀNH :

a. Quan niệm :

- (1) Xử dụng tối đa không-quân oanh-kích tiếp liệu có
mục tiêu trong cũng như ngoài khu vực hành quân
kể từ N-1.
- (2) Lúc ngày N giờ H xuất phát từ QL/1 hành quân tại
3 trục tổng quát tiến chiếm mục tiêu A, B, C ở
từng bom tuyến 1 và 2.
- (3) Lực lượng trừ bị sẵn sàng tăng viện oanh kích quô
c.
- (4) Phụ bản B thâu mình đồ hành quân.

b. Trung-đoàn 2 Bộ-Binh :

- (1) Tăng phái 1 Tiểu-đoàn Nhảy Dù và Chi-đoàn
2/7/TQV kể từ ngày N-1.
- (2) Phối hợp với Trung-đoàn 9/TQV tổ chức hành quân
trong khu vực ân định.
- (3) Phối hợp chặt chẽ với các đơn-vị liên hệ tổ chức
điều quân kết hợp đúng với nhịp độ không-quân oanh
kích tiếp liệu dự trù ở từng bom tuyến một để
tránh ngộ nhận.
- (4) Lực soát kỹ và phá hủy tất cả các cơ-sở tổ chức
giao liên tiếp-vận, trạm đóng quân, kho tàng địch
trong khu vực hành quân.

c. Chiến-đoàn 2 Nhảy Dù :

Tăng phái 1 Tiểu-đoàn Nhảy Dù cho Trung-đoàn 2
Bộ-binh suốt thời gian hành quân kể từ ngày N-1.

d. Thiết-đoàn 7 Kỳ-Binh :

Tăng phái Chi-đoàn 2/7/TQV cho Trung-đoàn 2 Bộ-
Binh suốt thời gian hành quân kể từ ngày N-1.

e. Công-Binh :

Sẽ có chỉ thị riêng sau.

f. Pháo-Binh :

- (1) Thiết lập kế-hoạch hỏa-lực khôn-trợ đặc biệt.
- (2) Phối hợp với Pháo-binh Hoa-lý để thiết kế, phân
nhiệm và trao đổi sĩ-quan liên-lạc, sĩ-quan
tiền-gắt cần thiết.
- (3) Phụ bản C kế-hoạch Pháo-yểm.

g. Không-quân :

- (1) Xử dụng các phương tiện có hữu hiệu kế-hoạch không-trở-giới-tuyến để bao vùng yểm-trở theo nhu cầu.
- (2) Không-quân Hoa-Kỳ tăng cường hỏa lực theo yêu cầu.
- (3) Không-quân Việt-Nam tại xa-băng sẵn sàng tăng cường theo nhu cầu.

Phụ bản kế-hoạch không-yểm.

h. Trữ bị :

- (1) Sẵn sàng tăng viện các đơn-vị hành quân.
- (2) Tránh nhiệm bạo võ truơu Tinh-lộ từ QL/1 đến ranh giới Trung-đoàn 2 Bộ-Binh và Tập-đoàn.

i. Huấn thị phối hợp :

- (1) Chỉ-huy hành quân được tự do di chuyển quân theo quyền-nhiệm của đơn vị trong khu vực ấn định nhưng phải lệ trình kế-hoạch về BCH/QT/S&I/K&LOT trước khi thi hành.
- (2) Kế-hoạch vận-chuyển các đơn-vị hành quân từ vị-trí đồn trú đến vùng xuất phát do Trung-đoàn 2 Bộ-Binh thiết kế.
- (3) Xử dụng tối đa hỏa lực không-quân và pháo-binh trước khi tiến quân đến từng bom tuyền một. Suốt thời gian hành quân áp dụng kế-hoạch oanh-kích liên tục ở vùng oanh-kích tự do theo kế-hoạch không-trở-giới-biệt của Pháo-binh Sư-đoàn.
- (4) Tránh ngộ nhận các đơn-vị hành quân xử dụng ranh giới hoạt động như tuyền tác-xạ và bom tuyền như giai đoạn tuyền và tuyền tác-xạ. Mỗi lần cần xử dụng hỏa-lực ở tiếp cận tuyền hay phải phối hợp ngang chặt chẽ với đơn-vị ban trước khi khai hỏa.
- (5) Luôn luôn thay đổi điểm dừng quân, tránh xa làng mạc và các đặc điểm địa hình dễ phòng địch pháo-kích mạnh mẽ hoặc tấn-kích bất thình.
- (6) Các đơn-vị tăng phải phải trình diện Trung-đoàn 2 Bộ-Binh nội chiểu K-1.
- (7) Trung-đoàn 2 Bộ-Binh lệ trình kế-hoạch chi tiết về BTL/S&IBB/K&LOT (P3/TTHQ) nội ngày K-1.
- (8) Ngày K giờ H sẽ xác nhận sau.

4. QUÂN TRI và TIẾP VAN : Áp dụng phương thức thông thường.


5. CHI HUY và THUẬN TIN:

- a. Truyền-tin : Áp dụng đặc lệnh truyền-tin bằng thẳng.
- b. Chỉ-huy : -BCH/QT/S&IUB tại Q1.
-BCH/TRD2/ BB tại A2.

Báo nhận.

NGO-QUANG-TRUONG
Chuẩn-tiến, Ngạc-giáo

PHÓ MÃ :
TRƯỞNG NGO-VAN-CHUNG (Ấn ký)
TRƯỞNG KIỂM TRƯỞNG P3/S&IBB.



LAI

Phổ biến :

-Trung-đoàn 2 Bộ-binh	b, s	02, 15.
-Trung-đoàn 9/TQLCHK	-	03, 15.
-BTL/QĐL/VLOT (P3	-	04, 15.
(TTHQ	-	02, 15.
-BTL/SĐ3/TQLQ/HK	-	05, 15.
-BTM/SĐ1/BB (P2	-	07, 15.
(PB	-	08, 15.
(TT	-	09, 15.
(P4	-	10, 15.
(TTHQ	-	11, 15.
(MACV	-	12, 15.
(Hộ sơ	-	01-15, 15.
-Chiến-đoàn 2 Nhảy Dù	-	13, 15.
-Đơn vị trú bị	-	14, 15.

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ADVISORY DETACHMENT
APO 96258

MACTN-HUB

14 December 1967

SUBJECT: VC/NVA Sapper Units and Tactics

TO: See Distribution

1(U) Forwarded for your information is a discussion of VC/NVA sapper units reported operating in the 11th DTA and the tactics that they normally use.

2(U) Information for this study was obtained from captured enemy personnel and documents, ralliers and ARVN and US publications.

3.) Deputy Province Advisors and commanding officers of subordinate elements are to forward any additional information pertaining to this subject to SA, 1st Infantry Division Advisory Detachment, ATTN: G2 Advisor.


FOR THE SENIOR ADVISOR:

DISTRIBUTION:

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as


R. S. MIJARES
CPT, AGC
Admin Officer

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APO 96258

MACTN-HUB

VC/NVA Sapper
Units and Tactics

I. (C) INTRODUCTION

A. (U) The purpose of this study is to provide comprehensive information pertaining to VC/NVA sapper units currently operating or suspected to be operating in the 11th Division Tactical Area.

B. (U) A NVA or VC sapper unit is a military or para-military element specially trained in the use of explosives, mines and booby traps and in the neutralization of same.

C. (C) The use of sappers throughout South Vietnam is not new. Many local force units and sabotage cells are trained in the use of satchel charges, mines, booby traps and other type explosives. However, the increase in the number and size of reported sapper trained units in the 11th DTA as well as the emphasis on training personnel in all units in sapper tactics and techniques indicate new and increased interest in this tactical modus operandi. For example - a captured enemy document directed all local force companies and VC district headquarters to send two men to a sapper training course. These men upon completion of their training, were to serve as instructors and organizers of sapper cells in each unit.

II. (C) DISCUSSION

A. (U) Mission:

1 (U) Precede the enemy infantry in the attack of an installation, breaching the barriers (barbed wire fences, minefields, bunkers, etc.) located along the selected penetration approaches.

2 (U) Sabotage, terrorism, under water demolitions including bridge destruction and mining of waterways, and interdiction of lines of communication;

B. (C) Organization: Sapper units' organization and equipment depends on their location, headquarters to which subordinated, and characteristics of prospective targets. At district level in the 11th DTA sappers operate scattered in squad size units (7-10 men) subordinate to the VC district chief and their armament consists of one (1) B40 rocket launcher, automatic weapons, and explosives. At times these squads employ unexploded artillery shells or bombs, recovered from the battlefield.

1 (U) The following sapper units have been identified in Quang Tri Province:

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a. The 31st Sapper Battalion, AKA T-2, is a unit which reportedly participated in the attack on Ngo Xa on 20 May 1967. The normal operational area is believed to be the Dong Ha, Cua Viet River and Quang Tri City area. The subordination of this unit is not certain but it probably originated from elements of the 304th NVA Division and may be either attached or under operational control of the 5th Regiment. The unit has reportedly operated with the 416th NVA Battalion.

b. The 10th Sapper Battalion was identified by 2 captives taken during the 12 August attack on Trieu Phong District HQ and PRU compound. The battalion is reportedly composed of the former C-10 Sapper Company of the Quang Tri Province Unit, and the 10th Sapper element which infiltrated on 10 June 1967 with the 423rd Infiltration Group. The battalion may be subordinate to the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region. The unit base area as reported by the captives is in the National Forest situated on the Thua Thien-Quang Tri border. The unit will apparently be operating in both Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces as the situation dictates. Latest reported activity of this unit was 1 October 1967 attack on Hai Lang District HQ. No other information is available to confirm the existence of this unit. At present the estimate of the G2 1st Division is that the T-2, T-10, and 31st Battalions are the same.

2(C) The following sapper units have been identified in Thua Thien Province:

a. The 12th Sapper Battalion is an unconfirmed unit first identified on 13 August 1967 when one of its members was captured during the attack on Huong Dien Subsector HQ. The 12th Sapper Battalion was reportedly formed in August 1967 from the 12th Sapper Company which was subordinate to the Tri-Thien Military Region. At this time no hard intelligence is available on this unit. Its existence is accepted as probable but the possibility that it could be the same as the 31st or T-2 or T-10, can not be ignored.

b. The Hue City Unit (AKA H-1), commanded by LTC Mot, has three sapper companies (36 men each); the "Co Be" A, B, and C which normally operate in the Hue City, Phu Vang and Huong Thuy District areas. Co Be "B" has been identified as operating in southern Thua Thien Province in the past and is probably the sapper unit which assisted the K4B Battalion in the 3 July IALC convoy ambush. Other elements of this sapper unit were responsible for the attack on the Huong Giang Hotel in Hue in late May. The latest captive from this unit (captured 1 October 1967 during the attack on the 7th Cav Compound) reveals that the entire unit is based in mountains southwest of Nam Hoa Subsector HQ.

c. The most recently identified sapper unit within the 11th DTA is the C.24 Sapper Company, 9th NVA Regiment, reported by two ralliers and one captive to have infiltrated SVN, arriving in Hai Lang Mountain area around the end of August. The C.24 Sapper Company with the 19th Engineer Company are reported to have left the Regimental HQ area and infiltrated on south to the area south of Phu Loc Subsector to reinforce the 4th Regiment. This unit has not been identified in any contacts to date. However, the use of under water demolitions in that subsector increased during October and November. The presence of this unconfirmed company in the (cont on next page)

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Phu Loc area is significant in that the Hue City Sapper Unit formerly reported to have operated in this area, no longer has to travel wide distances to support operations and gives the yet unconfirmed 4th Regiment an organic sapper element.

C. (C) Sapper Tactics

1 (C) Sappers normally operate in squad size units (7-10 men), and are assigned a specific mission within a sector. Sapper Squads can at times temporarily organize into larger units for operations in support of an attack against a major installation or target. Sapper operations are preceded by a strong espionage effort to collect complete information on the target. Sapper operations include a wide variety of activities like; terrorism by detonation of explosives close to homes or persons placing of booby traps in desks and vehicles, destruction of bridges and attacking and destroying major installations. These activities may be carried out as separate sapper operations or in support of infantry forces.

2 (U) A typical sapper supported infantry attack normally follows the following pattern:

- a. Approach of outer perimeter by sappers while infantry and supporting weapons wait in concealed positions.
- b. Sapper penetration of barbed wire by spreading, lifting or cutting it, by climbing it using straw mats or ladders, or by destroying it with bangalore torpedos or satchel charges.
- c. Sapper penetration of minefields by destroying or neutralizing it (mines could be marked or deactivated).
- d. Sapper attack against bunkers, crew served weapons or strong points.
- e. Infantry attack
- f. After infantry attack commences, sappers either depart or remain to cover infantry withdrawal.

3. (C) Use of waterborne demolitions: Sapper attempts against bridges have disclosed preference for floating rafts to deliver explosives. Such explosives are usually command detonated by a sapper who accompanies the raft and who leaves the raft just prior to detonation. Such rafts have been discovered containing unexploded bombs, artillery shells and plastic explosive. Scuba type equipment discovered by the Lang Co Bridge after a sapper attempt, and information provided by agents, ralliers and POW's, indicate that the enemy in the 11th DIA is developing an underwater demolition capability.

4. (C) When used in convoy ambushes the sappers normally detonate charges at both ends and at various places in the middle of the line of vehicles to stop movement, prevent withdrawal and sectionalize the convoy. They place booby traps and mines along the road to kill those who run away from the ambush and to delay counter ambush forces.

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5. (C) Use of females: Interrogation of POW's have disclosed the organization of a female sapper unit in the city of Hue. Reports state that the members of this unit operate disguised as students with the mission of conducting terrorist activity. The existence of this unit has not been confirmed but recent attempts against government vehicles (3 incidents during period 1-20 November 1967) could be the result of this unit's efforts.

6. (C) MAT BOC Tactic: A rallier stated that a sapper attack is normally preceded by a 3-man bangalore torpedo team (called MAT BOC). This team reconnoiters the fences and minefield of targets and attempts to mark or deactivate the mines, booby traps, and trip wires located along selected avenues of approach. Just before the VC infantry starts their attack, the MAT BOC team clears the avenues of approach utilizing bangalore torpedos.

7. (C) Mortar Imitation Tactic: Forces supporting sapper attacks will fire mortars into target areas to force the defenders to take cover. Just before the attack the mortars will be shifted or lifted and the sappers will start detonating plastic explosive in an attempt to fool the defenders into keeping their heads down believing that the mortar attack is continuing.

8. (C) Sandtables: The VC always attempt to construct a mock-up model of the various defenses in the target. They collect as much information as they can on the installation and rehearse every phase of the attack until every sapper knows exactly what to do.

D. (C) Patterns in Sapper Tactics: The following always characterize an attack by sappers.

1(C) Intensive surveillance: For this purpose the enemy unit planning the operation utilizes civilians (soldiers, relatives, workers, etc) and penetration agents placed among the military to obtain the required information to sandtable the target and conduct rehearsals.

2(U) Approach by stealth: Every element attempts to approach the target in the utmost secrecy to achieve surprise.

3(C) Speed, initiative and flexibility: Sappers always attempt to accomplish their mission in the minimum of time, to exploit defenders' weaknesses and initial disorganization. Their organization and armament is adapted to the characteristics of the target.

4(C) Damage assessment: Conducted as soon as possible after the attack. It is performed by the same agents who conducted the initial surveillance.

III(U) CONCLUSION

A. Sapper organization and tactics are oriented toward the accomplishment of their mission before adequate reaction by defenders can be mustered. The emphasis put by the enemy in the organization and training of sapper units and the utilization of these elements in support of infantry attacks is indicative of their reliance on sappers and their tactics.

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IV. (C) RECOMMENDATION

A. (C) Actions required to prevent or defeat a sapper attack vary with the characteristics and location of each installation. The following recommendations are offered as possible considerations when planning actions against sapper activity.

1(C) Know your defenses: During the attack against Coastal Group 16 the sappers entered through an area where the advisors had been erroneously told that mines were emplaced.

2(U) Vary your defensive barriers (locations of claymores, bunkers manned, internal wire) often but without establishing a pattern. This will hamper the VC efforts to sandtable your installation.

3(U) Limit the movement of non-military personnel within your installation and around your perimeter.

4(U) Avoid using non-military personnel when changing or making improvements in defenses.

5(U) Vary ambush sites, positioning of listening posts, and patrol route but avoid establishing a pattern. Do not disclose ambush or patrol plans until you can isolate all those to whom plans will be disclosed.

6(U) Deploy interior wire fences with the objective of sectionalizing your installation into self-defending, inter-supporting cells.

7(U) Build overhead cover for all bunkers to enable soldiers to keep their heads up during mortar attacks.

8(U) Acquire the capability of illuminating your perimeter and do so at random during the night.

9(U) Utilize a random system of inspecting installations and sentinals. Inspect frequently.

10(O) Recruit informants among the persons residing in vicinity of your installation. These informants can be integrated in your early warning belt, but do not rely on them as a sole early warning means.

11(U) If the area being defended is approachable by water, consider the following:


a. Establish controls on water traffic during all hours (include actual physical searches of both boats and passengers).

b. Position observation and listening posts distant enough from the defended area to offer timely reaction to floating rafts and personnel approaching by boat or from the shoreline.

c. Construction of underwater barriers and early warning systems.

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2. LVTH-6 AT CUA VIET FIRED 216 RDS 105MM HOW AT SUSPECTED ENEMY
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3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
Phu Bai, Thua Thien Province
Vietnam

Ser: 02A35167
142200H December 1967

Intelligence Estimate Base Area 101

Reference: (a) Map Vietnam, AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6442III
(b) Special Intelligence Study 22-67 (Base Area 101)

1. **MISSION.** To provide a current estimate of enemy capabilities and possible courses of action in the Base Area 101 vicinity.

2. ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation

(1) Military Geography

(a) Topography. See enclosure (2) of reference (b).

(b) Climate and Weather

1. **Existing Situation.** During December, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) is completely under the influence of the northeast monsoon. A cooling trend continues with a 3 to 4 degree drop from November values.

2. **Northeast Monsoon.** In general, during night-time hours, clear to scattered low clouds can be expected over western mountains and scattered to broken low clouds elsewhere. Except over western mountains broken cumulus with ceilings from 2,000 to 3,000 feet can be expected during afternoons. Periods of fog and light rain or drizzle (crachin weather) appear over coastal and delta regions with the onset (October) of the northeast monsoon. They are most frequent during December and disappear by April. Stratus ceilings are generally about 1500 feet and visibilities are occasionally less than 2 miles. Ceilings usually dissipate by late morning, but they can persist through the day. Crachins can penetrate inland valleys, where ceilings and visibilities can be below 500 feet and less than 1 mile. Crachins occur during nights and early mornings.

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(2) Transportation. See Reference (b).

b. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Strength. There are 3 confirmed units currently operating in the Base Area 101 vicinity. These are elements of the 9th NVA Regiment (also known as the 5th Regiment), the 808th NVA Battalion and the Hai Lang Local Force VC Company. However, a significant volume of infiltration has occurred over the past several months into this base area. Some of these units/personnel may have continued to the south and others may have been used for replacements to depleted forces of the Tri Thien Hue Front. In either event it is estimated that at least several additional battalions, and possibly an understrength regiment, have reinforced previously confirmed units in Base Area 101.

(2) Composition. See enclosure (1) of reference (b). (Note the Trieu Phong Local Force Company is currently known as the Hai Lang Local Force Company.)

(3) Locations and Dispositions. See enclosure (1) of reference (b) which is valid with the following exceptions. The 814th Battalion, 9th NVA Regiment, is estimated to have returned to the coastal plain for operations in both Hai Lang and Trieu Phong Districts. The last identifiable contact with this battalion occurred on 20-22 October 1967 in its usual coastal operating area. Subsequent to this contact the 814th Battalion withdrew to Base Area 101 to refit, retrain and regroup. Sufficient time has probably now elapsed to accomplish the foregoing. The 808th VC Battalion has relocated to the vicinity of YD 3039; subordinate companies are dispersed within the Street Without Joy area.

(4) Movement and Activities

(a) Annex A and Tab A provide graphic presentations of recent enemy activity in Base Area 101.

(b) Indications obtained by the Airborne Personnel Detector on 9 December 1967 reveal numbers of personnel dispersed throughout the Base Area. See Tab B for detailed readout.

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(5) Logistics. See enclosure (1) of reference (b).

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES (Enumeration)

a. Attack

(1) To attack Quang Tri City, Quang Tri Airstrip, and/or Hai Lang District Headquarters in up to multi-battalion strength supported by 60 and 82mm mortars, and by 57 and 75mm recoilless rifle fires.

(2) To attack small friendly units, such as CAP's, RF and PF outposts, RD Teams and USMC units in up to battalion strength.

b. Interdiction

(1) To attempt to interdict and isolate portions of National Route # 1 by sabotaging bridges and culverts and by increased mining activity.

c. Reinforce

(1) The enemy is capable of deploying units in Base Area 114 as reinforcements for Base Area 104 forces, and vice versa, in order to launch up to regimental size coordinated attacks against friendly installations in the vicinity.

d. Increase of Forces/Replacement of Depleted Units and Personnel.

(1) The enemy can continue to increase his forces in this base area. It should be noted that units in Base Area 104 are subordinate to the Tri Thien Hue MR located in Base Area 114. It has long been estimated that the Tri Thien Hue MR forces would evolve into a new light division. Tri Thien Hue forces are currently at division equivalent size under a centralized command and control structure conducting decentralized operations.

(2) The enemy is entirely capable of continuing to infiltrate replacement personnel with which to replenish depleted units.

(3) In addition, the enemy is capable of improving his logistic installations, facilities and caches within this base area to support additional combat and combat support units.

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a. Harassment

(1) Independently or in conjunction with capabilities a. and b. the enemy can conduct ambushes, terrorist and sabotage activities throughout the area with a view toward increasing his control over the local populace.

4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIESa. Attack Capability

(1) Indications that favor the adoption of this capability are those that relate to the enemy's need for a significant victory; the fact that he previously successfully raided Quang Tri City; and his intimate knowledge of the area and the disposition and strength of friendly forces therein. However, it is estimated that the enemy will not initiate large scale offensive activity until the post NE monsoon period when he should be at operational strength and have completed the integration and training of new and replacement units into his anticipated force structure.

b. Interdiction Capability

(1) The enemy is capable of interdicting National Route # 1 at will; however, he currently seldom attempts to seriously disrupt traffic in the area; traffic over this route provides a source of VC revenue. In addition, significant amounts of rice and other supplies transported by indigenous personnel over the route probably fall into enemy hands as a result of taxation or confiscation. Indications are, however, that the enemy is increasing his efforts to regain control over the local populace by bolstering the infrastructure and his local forces. One complementary method toward attaining this objective is to increase operations against National Route # 1 to isolate hamlets, villages and districts thus interrupting normal commerce and forcing the people's dependence upon the Viet Cong.

c. Reinforcing Capability

(1) Although the enemy has the capability to shift forces from Base Area 114 to Base Area 101 and vice versa this is not considered likely. Enemy units usually operate only in long time operational areas utilizing local logistic bases. In order to reinforce a unit in another area long range repositioning, or the organization of additional supply caches, etc., is necessary.

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d. Capability for increasing forces/replacement of depleted units and personnel

(1) As in the past the enemy is taking advantage of the NE monsoon period to bring his units up to strength, to introduce new units, to retrain, and to improve and expand his fixed installations and supply caches. In conjunction with these efforts he can be expected to be active to the extent of continuing to attempt to counter our reconnaissance efforts, to disguise his intentions and to launch small scale attacks against RF, PF and particularly isolated U. S. positions and RD Cadre who present obstacles toward accomplishment of his principal objectives - the people and food. Such attacks are also designed to attrite friendly forces with little risk of enemy loss.

e. Harassment Capability

(1) Harassment can be expected to continue in the form of attacks by fire, localized attacks on small units, sabotage, terrorism, sniping, booby trapping, mining, and ambushes. Such actions serve two purposes. First, they can occupy a significant number of friendly forces with only a minimum probable risk of loss for the enemy. Second, by employing the foregoing tactics the enemy generates propaganda and attempts to demonstrate to the people that the GVN cannot provide them security.

5. CONCLUSIONSa. Enemy Capability in Relative Probability of Adoption

(1) The enemy will probably continue to increase, integrate and train his forces (Capability d) and conduct harassment activities during the NE monsoon period (Capability e) in order to attempt to divert friendly attention from Base Area 101 and to tie down FWMA Forces in selected areas.

(2) If the enemy detects a significant increase in friendly military use of National Route # 1 or if he decides the time is right to attempt to isolate the area between Hue and Quang Tri City he can increase his activities against National Route # 1 (Capability b).

(3) Although reinforcing Base Area 101 units with forces from Base Area 114 (Capability a) is not likely based on observations of past enemy operational patterns it remains a possibility if the enemy chooses to launch coordinated attacks (Capability a) or raids against Quang Tri Airstrip, Quang Tri City, or Hai Lang District Headquarters.

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(4) However, in view of the enemy's current and anticipated development, he has the capability to go over to an offensive posture rapidly, and to conduct simultaneous, multiple coordinated operations over a wide area.

E. J. Miller
 referred to paragraph of memorandum to E. J. MILLER

ANNEX A - Observations and Contacts

TAB A - Overlay of ANNEX A

TAB B - Overlay of APD Contacts dated 9 December 1967

Distribution: Special

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
 Downgraded after 12 years
 DOD DIR 5200.10___

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3rd Marine Division (REIN) FMF
Phu Bai, Thua Thien Province
Vietnam
142200H December, 1967

Annex A to Intelligence Estimate, Base Area 101

OBSERVATIONS AND CONTACTS

1. 12Oct C/1/1 Rec'd SAF at YD 325365
2. 12Oct B/1/1 Rec'd SAF at YD 321367
3. 12Oct C/1/1 Rec'd SAF and AWF at YD 325370
4. 12Oct D/1/3 Rec'd AWF and Mort at YD 353452
5. 12Oct O/1/3 Rec'd Mort at YD 364420
6. 13Oct D/1/3 Observed 25-30 VC at YD 329452
7. 14Oct Rec'd SAF at YD 323368
8. 17Oct Recon rec'd SAF at YD 368362
9. 17Oct B/1/3 Observed 40 VC at YD 385446
10. 1Nov C/1/1 Tripped boobytrap at YD 299465 - 9WIA
11. 8Nov F/2/1 Made contact with 4-6 En at YD 327468-318463
12. 10Nov Mine detonated at YD 308457 resulting in 2WIA
13. 15Nov Made contact with 6-10 VC at YD 373457
14. 15Nov Marine tripped explosive device at YD 354465
15. 15Nov F/2/1 Found 60mm Rd rigged at YD 313458
16. 17Nov Recon made contact with 25-30 En at YD 276415
17. 19Nov Found unknown type explosive at YD 356445
18. 19Nov Found rigged 105 Rd at YD 304439
19. 19Nov Found rigged 105 Rd at YD 364439
20. 19Nov Found rigged 105 Rd and 3 homemade devices at YD 363444
21. 20Nov Found rigged 105 Rd at YD 365445
22. 20Nov Found 10lb explosive rigged at YD 302455
23. 20Nov Found 155mm and 81mm canaster's filled w/explosives and rigged at YD 304449
24. 21Nov Found Chicom grenade rigged at YD 323446
25. 23Nov 4/2 Detonated mine at YD 325440
26. 23Nov Detonated box type explosive at YD 340473-3KIA, 1WIA
27. 26Nov Found grenade w/trip wire at YD 353455
28. 27Nov Tripped Chicom grenade at YD 353455 - 3WIA
29. 29Nov Found Z-10 mine w/trip wire at YD 354437
30. 29Nov Found homemade mine at YD 360444
31. 29Nov Found Z-10 mine at YD 355465
32. 29Nov Found Z-10 mine w/trip wire at YD 354437

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