


DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3rd Marine Division  
Messages Etc  
Mar 1968

#1	Rpt	Mar 1968	III MAF	Subj: Rough Input to Quarterly Report of Activities in Support of III MAF Campaign Plan
#2	Rpt	Mar 1968	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex A (Deception Plan to Operation Order 8-68
#3	Rpt	Mar 1968	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Handwritten Journal of Incidents Reported by River Security
#4	Jnl	Mar 1968	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Operation Lancaster, 4th Marines, Journal. Hand writ
#5	Rpt	1 Mar 68	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Report of Logistic Assets & Plans for Movement of Certain Units of the 3rd Marine Division (Rear) from Phu Bai to the Dong Ha-Quang Tri Areas
#6	Msg	010001Z	26th Marine	Subj: OPCON
#7	Msg	010102Z	III MAF DaNang	Subj: Hostile Fire at Cua Viet Ramp
#8	Msg	010346Z	III MAF DaNang	Subj: Operational Requirements Dong Ha Supply River Security Group
#9	Msg	010400Z	III MAF DaNang	Subj: Designated Operations
#10	Msg	010430Z	26th Marines	Subj: Point of Impact Khe Sanh DZ
#11	Msg	010521Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Personal for Gen. Anderson from Gen. Tompkins on Aircraft Cover for Khe Sanh during Daylight Hours
#12	Msg	010730Z	CTF Clearwater	Subj: Annex B to Task Force Clearwater Operation Order #1-68
#13	Msg	010820Z	3rd Mar Div COC	Subj: Trench Destruction
#14	Msg	010923Z	CTF Clearwater	Subj: Shift of CTF Clear A Post
#15	Msg	010945Z	TAF TAIC TSN RVN	Subj: Request for Spooky Aircraft
#16	Msg	010955Z	CTF Clearwater	Subj: Change 2 to Task Force Clearwater Operation Order #1-68
#17	Msg	011050Z	12th Marines	Subj: Minimize Considered OPCON & Support
#18	Msg	011230Z	III MAF DaNang	Subj: Voice Call Sign Assignment
#19	Msg	011338Z	Cdr Dong Ha Supply River Security Group	Subj: Clearwater OPSUM 1 Mar68
#20	Msg	011434Z	III MAF DaNang	Subj: Helicopter Support
#21	Msg	011508Z	III MAF DaNang	Subj: Security of Cua Viet Lock
#22	Msg	012134Z	26th Marines	Subj: Air Support Request
#23	Msg	012230Z	3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav	Subj: Ground Commander's SITREP
#24	Rpt	2 Mar	3rd Mar Div	Subj: The "All-Out Attack"
#25	Rpt	Unknown	3rd Mar Div	Subj: NVA/VC Tactics
#26	Rpt	Unknown	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Investigation of an Enemy Critical Point
#27	Rpt	Unknown	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Missions to be Performed in Carrying out the 11 N. L. H. Criteria
#28	Mem	2 Mar	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Quang Tri Development, Progress for Period 24 Feb-1 Mar 68
#29	Mem	2 Mar	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Responsibilities of Headquarters Battalion
#30	Msg	020244Z	III MAF DaNang	Subj: Air Strikes Khe Sanh Area
#31	Msg	020346Z	III MAF DaNang	Subj: Authority to Deploy CS Munitions
#32	Msg	020351Z	III MAF DaNang	Subj: Protection Airlift Aircrafts
#33	Msg	020404Z	3rd Marines (Fwd)	Subj: OPCON
#34	Msg	020428Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Designated Operations
#35	Msg	021202Z	26th Marines	Subj: Long Delay Bombs
#36	Msg	021402Z	Dong Ha Supply River Security Group	Subj: Convoy Protection
#37	Msg	021512Z	26th Marines	Subj: Sensor Placement
#38	Msg	022114Z	26th Marines	Subj: Air Support Request
#39	Mem	3 Mar	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Ref A III MAF Msg, Comments on
#40	Mem	3 Mar	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Proposed Displacement Schedule
#41	Mem	3 Mar	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Quang Tri Development, Progress Report for the Period 25 Feb-2 Mar 68

DECLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

#42 Msg 3 Mar 68 11th DTA Hqs Subj: Position of 1st Air Cavalry Brigade  
 #43 Owl 3 Mar 68 Unknown Subj: Overlay  
 #44 Msg 030405Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Annex C to CTF Clearwater Operation Order #1-68  
 #45 Msg 030430Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Hue Supply River Operations  
 #46 Msg 030440Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Rotation of Units  
 #47 Msg 031010Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Directed Operation  
 #48 Msg 031031Z III MAF Subj: Recommended Targets In Khe Sanh Area to be Struck with Incendiary Munitions  
 #49 Msg 031414Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #50 Msg 031450Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Comments to Amplify Ref A Contents & are Considered Minimum Requirements  
 #51 Msg 031501Z 4th Marines Subj: Change #1 for Frag Order 04 Mar 68  
 #52 Mem 4 Mar 68 3rd Mar Div Subj: Displacement of Headquarters Battalion  
 #53 Msg 040201Z 3rd Mar Div COC Subj: Recommended Targets in Khe Sanh Area to be Struck with Incendiary Munitions  
 #54 Msg 040114Z 26th Marines Subj: Air Support Request  
 #55 Msg 040200Z Dong Ha Supply River Security Group Subj: CO Clearwater Spot Report 1-3/1/Cua Viet  
 #56 Msg 040250Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Rotation of Units  
 #57 Msg 040310Z CF Clearwater Subj: Convoy Transit Cua Viet to Dong Ha  
 #58 Msg 040340Z PSAD Dong Ha/Cua Viet Subj: Request all Programmed 1ST's for Cua Viet be Held at DaNang  
 #59 Msg 040628Z Dong Ha Supply River Security Group Subj: Clearwater Spot Report 1-3/2/Cua Viet  
 #60 Msg 040715Z 3rd Mar Div COC Subj: Request for GBU Ordnance  
 #61 Msg 041342Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Cloud Seeding to Increase Visibility KSCB  
 #62 Msg 041700Z CTF Clearwater Subj: OPSUM Cua Viet River 04 Mar 68  
 #63 Msg 050226Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Release of Information on Enemy Attacks  
 #64 Msg 050506Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Clearance & Security of Route 9 for Convoys & for Airfield Construction  
 #65 Msg 050550Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Resupply of Khe Sanh  
 #66 Msg 050608Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Cua Viet River Operations 05 Mar 68  
 #67 Msg 050630Z 9th Marines Subj: Chop OPCON 1/3  
 #68 Msg 050816Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Naval Hazards/Convoy Groundings Cua Viet River  
 #69 Msg 051205Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Annex C to CTF Clearwater Operation Order 1-68  
 #70 Msg 060218Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Recon Assets  
 #71 Msg 060342Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Khe Sanh Village  
 #72 Msg 060500Z 3rd SP Bn Subj: OPCON Co "D" 3rd SPBn  
 #73 Msg 060622Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Quick Reaction Force for Security of River Locations  
 #74 Msg 060718Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Task Organization  
 #75 Msg 061220Z III MAF DaNang Subj: MRF Assets to ICTZ  
 #76 Msg 061222Z III MAF DaNang Subj: MRF Assets to ICTZ  
 #77 Msg 061538Z III MAF Subj: Aerial Resupply of Khe Sanh  
 #78 Msg 070135Z 9th MAF Subj: Fire Team Assault Boats for Riverine Employment  
 #79 Msg 071002Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: 101 RR Support for CTF Clearwater  
 #80 Msg 071654Z 26th Marines Subj: Seismic Intrusion Device, RPS 1 (SID)  
 #81 Msg 080342Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Khe Sanh Village  
 #82 Msg 080620Z 3rd Mar Div COC Subj: Quick Run Force for Security of Cua Viet  
 #83 Msg 080806Z 3rd Marines Subj: Curfew Cua Viet Recommendations  
 #84 Msg 080841Z 4th Marines Subj: OPCON  
 #85 Msg 081110Z 26th Marines Subj: Artillery Reinforcement  
 #86 Msg 081142Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Fire Team Assault Boats for Riverline Employment  
 #87 Msg 081435Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Cua Viet Supply River Operation

DECLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

#88 Msg 081440Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Khe Sanh Village  
 #89 Msg 081446Z 26th Marines Subj: Standard Frag Change Air Craft Support KSCB  
 #90 Msg 081550Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Opening & Security of Route 9 & Construction of Airfields  
 #91 Msg 081600Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Firefly Coverage on Cua Viet  
 #92 Msg 081620Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Employment of Gunship II in Close Support Khe Sanh Part I for III MAF G-3 Air  
 #93 Msg 081710Z 3rd Mar Div COC Subj: Photo Hot Items & Targets  
 #94 Pln 081800H 1st Air Cavalry Division Subj: Operation Plan 01-68 (Pegasus)  
 #95 Msg 090134Z Btry G(SLHO 29th Artillery DaNang) Subj: Searchlight Locations  
 #96 Msg 090235Z 3rd Mar Div COC Subj: Quick Run Force for Security of Cua Viet Location, Readdress of Message  
 #97 Msg 090311Z 3rd Mar Div COC Subj: Aerial Resupply of Khe Sanh  
 #98 Msg 090756Z III MAF Subj: 515th Transportation Co, USArmy  
 #99 Msg 090855Z CTF Clearwater Subj: 24 Hour Operations Perfume/Cua Viet Rivers  
 #100 Msg 091105Z Hue Supply River Security Group Subj: Clearwater OPSUM 09 Mar 68  
 #101 Msg 091456Z III MAF Subj: Establishment of Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV)  
 #102 Mem 10 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Quang Tri Development, Progress Report for the Period 3-9 Mar 68  
 #103 Not 10 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Handwritten Note on Troops Moved  
 #104 Msg 100249Z 4th Marines Subj: Chops & OPCON M3/4  
 #105 Msg 100600Z III MAF COC Subj: Request ASAP All Available Info on Situation & Circumstances at Cua Viet  
 #106 Msg 100615Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Communications Guard  
 #107 Msg 100617Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Enemy Artillery Attack Cua Viet on 10 Mar 68  
 #108 Msg 100622Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Fire Team Assault Boats for Riverline Employment  
 #109 Msg 100640Z CG PCV Phu Bai RVN Subj: Operational Control of Units in PCV AOR  
 #110 Msg 100844Z CTG 76.4 Subj: ARG/SLF Spot SITREP as of 100800Z Mar 68  
 #111 Msg 101215Z 1st AMTRAC Bn Subj: Damage Suffered by the Bulk Fuel Detachment at Cua Viet during the Fire of 10 Mar 68  
 #112 Msg 101430Z CG PCV Subj: Meeting  
 #113 Msg 101456Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Enemy Artillery Attack NSAD Cua Viet 10 Mar 68  
 #114 Msg 101551Z 26th Marines Subj: Aerial Resupply of Khe Sanh  
 #115 Msg 102300Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Acknowledges Receipt of Message on Meeting  
 #116 Msg 110117Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Establishment of Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV)  
 #117 Msg 110136Z 1st AMTRAC Bn Subj: OPCON 1st Platoon Co "B" 1st AMTRAC Bn  
 #118 Msg 110620Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #119 Msg 110622Z 3rd Marines Subj: OPCON  
 #120 Msg 111624Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Reporting for Duty  
 #121 Msg 112354Z III MAF DaNang Subj: MRF Assets I Corps  
 #122 Mem 12 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Quang Tri Development, Progress Report for Period 2-8 Mar -68  
 #123 Mem 12 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Status of Medical Facility, QTCB as of 11 Mar 68  
 #124 Mem 12 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Handwritten Quang Tri Progress Report  
 #125 Mem 12 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Administrative Instructions  
 #126 Msg 120710Z CTF Clearwater Subj: QBR Patrol Boat Requirements Cua Viet River Operations  
 #127 Msg 120932Z CTG 79.4 Subj: Relocation of W/3/12 & W/2/11  
 #128 Msg 121306Z Com 7th Fleet Subj: Operation Fortress Attack Termination  
 #129 Msg 121330Z CTG 79.5 Subj: Exchange W/3/13 & W/2/11  
 #130 Msg 130257Z CTF Clearwater NSAD Cua Viet Subj: Cua Viet River Navigational Problem  
 #131 Msg 130258Z CTF Clearwater Cua Viet Subj: Flamethrower Operations Cua Viet River  
 #132 Msg 130700Z III MAF Subj: Ammunition Storage Point Quang Tri  
 #133 Msg 130702Z III MAF Subj: Ammunition Storage Point Quang Tri  
 #134 Msg 131316Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Fire Team Assault Boats for Riverline Employment

DECLASSIFIED



## DECLASSIFIED

#135 Msg 131420Z CG PCV Hue Phu Bai Subj: Cua Viet River Curfew  
 #136 Msg 140355Z 3rd Marines Subj: Security Cua Viet Location  
 #137 Msg 140700Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Mining Counter Measures Cua Viet River  
 #138 Msg 140725Z 3rd Marines Subj: Truck Support Operation Napoleon/Saline  
 #139 Msg 140916Z III MAF DaNang Subj OPCON 515th Transportation Company  
 #140 Msg 141016Z FORLOGCOMD Subj: 515th Transportation Company USArmy  
 #141 Msg 141036Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Command & Communications Final Section of 2  
 #142 Msg 141105Z Hue Supply River Security Group Subj: Clearwater OPSUM 14 Mar 68  
 #143 Msg 141430Z Dong Ha Supply River Security Group NSAD Cua Viet Subj: OPSUM 14 Mar  
 #144 Msg 141436Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Task Force Clearwater Operation Order #2-68  
 #145 Msg 141550Z 3rd Marines Subj: Thrust Points  
 #146 Msg 141900Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Annex A to CTF Clearwater Operation Order 2-68  
 #147 Msg 142055Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Annex B to CTF Clearwater Operation Order 2-68  
 #148 Msg 142095Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Annex B to CTF Clearwater Operation Order 2-68  
 #149 Msg 142143Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Annex C to CTF Clearwater Operation Order 2-68  
 #150 Msg 150546Z III MAF Subj: Deployment of Unit  
 #151 Msg 150620Z 26th Marines Subj: Aerial Resupply of Khe Sanh  
 #152 Msg 150940Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Cua Viet River Curfew  
 #153 Msg 151446Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON 515th Transportation Company, US Army  
 #154 Msg 152005Z 12th Marines Subj: OPCON Artillery  
 #155 Mem 16 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Quang Tri ASP  
 #156 Mem 16 Mar Quang Tri Base Defense Coordinator, 3rd Mar Div Subj: Quang Tri  
 Defense Personnel Requirement  
 #157 Jnl 16 Mar UASAC Subj: Handwritten Journal Entry on Enemy Rocket Positions  
 #158 Cht 16 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Chart of 3rd Marine Division Facilities  
 #159 Msg 160008Z III MAF Subj: Additional Marine Corps Battalions  
 #160 Msg 160532Z IAF DaNang Subj: Employment of Unit  
 #161 Msg 160637Z PCV PHB RVN Subj: Retention of Smoke Platoon  
 #162 Msg 161100Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #163 Msg 161315Z 4th Marines Subj: Chop OPCON  
 #164 Msg 161320Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Security Cua Viet Location  
 #165 Msg 161420Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Units Located in Khe Sanh Combat Base  
 #166 Msg 161528Z Dong Ha River Security Group NSAD Cua Viet Subj: OPSUM 16 Mar 68  
 #167 Mem 17 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Quang Tri Development, Progress for Period  
 9-15 Mar 68  
 #168 Rpt 17 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Report on Operation Checkers-Final Phase  
 #169 Rpt 17 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Equipment Moved  
 #170 Mem 17 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Quang Tri Development, Progress Report for the  
 Period 10-16 Mar 68  
 #171 Rpt 172230H 3rd Mar Div Subj: Handwritten Report on Intelligence from  
 Intelligence Sources in Quang Tri City  
 #172 Rpt 17 Mar 3rd Mar Div Handwritten Report On TET Tension & Negotiations  
 #173 Ltr 17 Mar NFL Subj: Handwritten Letter in Vietnamese Language, with  
 Translation on Picking up of Dead Bodies from Battlefield  
 #174 Msg 170312Z III MAF Subj: Unit Deployment  
 #175 Msg 171145Z CDR Hue Supply River Security Group Subj: Water OPSUM 17 Mar 68  
 #176 Msg 171401Z 3rd Mar Div COC Subj: Operation Napoleon/Saline SITREP #59  
 #177 Msg 171550Z CG Prov Corps V Subj: Change of OPCON 1st Brigade 1st ABN Div  
 #178 Mem 18 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Staff Visit Phu Bai, 17 Mar 68  
 #179 Mem 18 Mar 3rd Mar Div Subj: Stress Importance of Base Defense Task  
 #180 LOI 18 Mar III MAF Subj: Letter of Instruction (LOI 18-68)

DECLASSIFIED

*For 2:1*  
*rough input to Quarterly Report*  
*"activities in support*  
 ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION *of III MAF Campaign*  
*fallen*

## A. ENEMY SITUATION

*Mar 68*

## 1. ENEMY STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

(A) THE ENEMY'S MILITARY EFFORT CONTINUES TO BE DIRECTED TOWARD GAINING POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE PEOPLE AND THE RICE. DESCRIPTION OF RD PROGRAMS, COORDINATED COUNTRY WIDE ATTACKS ON POPULATION CENTERS AND ENCROACHMENT ON ALLIED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS CHARACTERIZED THE ENEMY'S GOALS DURING THIS QUARTER.

(B) THE FIRST WEEKS OF JANUARY WERE HIGHLIGHTED IN THE 3RD MARDIV AO BY A MASSIVE BUILD UP ~~THE~~ OF TROOPS AND THREAT TO ~~KHE SANH~~ KHE SANH COMBAT BASE. (HEAVY ATTACKS BY FIRE AND THE BEGINNING OF A TRENCH/TUNNEL COMPLEX AROUND KSCB) *occurred in early Feb* WERE THE MAJOR ENEMY ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE LAST WEEK OF JANUARY WHEN A MAJOR INFILTRATION EFFORT BEGAN IN THE EASTERN AND CENTRAL DMZ AREA.

(C) THE 320TH DIVISION MOVED FROM VINH LINH SPECIAL ZONE INTO THE AREA IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF ROUTE 9 BETWEEN CAM LO AND THE ROCKPILE WHERE IT CONDUCTED AN AMBUSH OF A CONVOY, 25-27 JANUARY, RESULTING IN A TWO DAY CONTACT AND A REGIMENTAL ATTACK ON CAM LO DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS ON 2 FEB.

*Encl 1* ✓

ALSO DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY THREE REGIMENTS FROM THE SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN DMZ INFILTRATED TO THE COASTAL PL IN TO REINFORCE EXISTING UNITS IN THE REGION OF QUANG TRI CITY AND HUE.

(D) FROM MID FEBRUARY UNTIL MID MARCH ACTIVITY WAS LIGHT IN LEATHERNECK SQUARE. MOST GROUND ACTIVITY WAS IN THE WESTERN MOUNTAINS WHERE THE TWO DIVISIONS ENCIRCLING KSCB GRADUALLY CONCENTRATED THEIR FORCES MORE CLOSELY TO THE PERIMETER TO PRESENT A GREATER THREAT AND TO LESSEN THEIR LOSSES FROM ALLIED BOMBING AND ARTILLERY. <sup>6 FEB</sup> AND THE USFV CAMP AT LANG VEI WAS COMPLETELY OVERRUN AND CAPTURED WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF ARMORED VEHICLES *more comment on armor.* INTO THE ENEMY'S DEPLOYED WEAPONS INVENTORY. THE OTHER MAJOR AREA OF GROUND ACTIVITY DURING MID FEBRUARY TO MID MARCH CAME IN THE FORM OF GREATLY INCREASED EFFORTS BY THE ENEMY TO INTERDICT FRIENDLY LOC'S, THE CUA VIET RIVER IN PARTICULAR. ALSO DURING THIS PERIOD, REPORTS OF ENEMY ARMOR IN THE CENTRAL AND COASTAL DMZ AND THE BA LONG VALLEY WERE NOTED, SUGGESTING POSSIBLE FURTHER EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOR.

(E) FROM APPROXIMATELY MID MARCH UNTIL THE END OF THE QUARTER, ENEMY MOVEMENT AND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND MEN INCREASED IN THE BA LONG VALLEY ~~WATER~~ AND ALONG THE COASTAL PL IN, PRESUMABLY TO REPOSITION FORCES AND MATERIAL FOR A SECOND PHASE OF THE WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE

WHICH BEGAN WITH THE BUILD UP AROUND KSCB AND THE COUNTRY WIDE, COORDINATED, RIPPLE TYPE ATTACKS ON POPULATION CENTERS IN JANUARY.

(F) AT THE END OF THE QUARTER ONE OF THE TWO DIVISIONS AROUND KHE SANH APPEARS TO HAVE GRADUALLY DISPERSED WESTWARD INTO LAOS LEAVING THE OTHER DIVISION DEPLOYED, WITH SUPPORTING ARMS, TO MAINTAIN A REDUCED, BUT STILL POTENT, THREAT TO KSCB. IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN AREAS OF THE AO THE ENEMY HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE HIS INTERDICTION OF LOC'S, HIS HEAVY INFILTRATION AND BUILDUP OF FORCES, HIS ENCROACHMENT ON ALLIED BASES, AND HIS PREPARATIONS TO ENTER PHASE TWO OF HIS WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE.

## 2. ENEMY LOSSES

A. COMBINED ENEMY LOSSES FOR THE QUARTER IN THE 3D MARDIV AO WERE 3932(1JAN-28MAR) KIA'S.

To: G-3 Ops  
From: COC WO

Subj: Incidents Reported by River Security

1. 181030H - PBR hit by underwater explosion (J 18-3)
2. 191305H - Sweep boat threw grenades at C-RAT box in river, see explosions (J 19-4)
3. 200811H - LCMS-8 hit a mine (J 20-3)
4. 241830H - PBR had underwater explosion 25 FT astern. (J 24-6)
5. 270945H - Skimmer boat took 2 sniper rounds (J 27-3)
6. 010146H - LCPL obs. 3 people; fired on them (J 01-1)
7. 012010H - LCPL obs. 3 people; fired on them; 1 secondary (J 01-6)

DECLASSIFIED

8. 021936H. LCPL also 2 people; need 45 rds.  
SAF

Very Resp.  
J.A. Casey

DECLASSIFIED

Operation Hammer 4th main

F 2/9 1131 072571 rec'd 7 rds 82mm (WIA(e)  
1 WIA(M)

K/2/4 1015 147521 search + destroy found  
various complexes and gear 24 fortified  
bunkers and 11 huts and 9 fighting holes  
bunkers destroyed.

M/2/1 1110 138521 found 30 fighting holes  
destroyed same

K/2/1 1130 148152 found 4 bunkers 12-82mm  
rds 2-60mm rds 2 RPG rds some  
documents + 782 gear

F 2/9 1445 072571 rec'd 1 rd 82mm negas

G/2/9 1515 2 rds 82mm

F/2/9 1545 20 rds 82mm

End 4

Task Force Kilo

6/2/4 1050 YD262704 rec'd sporadic sniper fire  
 rec'd SAF 2 WIA(E) 3 KIA(E) 2 PW (one later died)

3/5 car 1220 YD233723 rec'd 30 rds unk type  
 only neg cas/damage

2/5 car 1220 YD238722 tank det/explo device  
 left track blown off neg cas

2/4 ECO 0900 found various NVA equipment and  
 ordnance. 50-82mm rds / 49-60mm rds / 20  
 chem grenades / 1 helmet + pack

Dong Ha

1135 - LCU Ramp / 2nd Down CP / Dong Ha ville  
 approx 13 rds unpacked - neg cas/dam



## AO Reports

XD 858407 - spotted several # NVA and bunkers - saw one flight F/W 1 KBA 50M trench line destroyed.

XD 875415 - saw one flight of F/W destroying 2 bunkers and 25M of trench

XD 795443 obs mortar bunker pens - saw 5 flights of F/W uncovered 20 additional fighting holes fighting holes destroyed 1 mortar pen damaged.

## DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco 96602

1 March 1968

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4  
To: Chief of Staff

Subj: Report of logistic assets and plans for movement of certain units of the 3d Marine Division (Rear) from Phu Bai to the Dong Ha-Quang Tri areas

1. The following vehicle assets are available for the movement from Phu Bai to Quang Tri:

<u>M-35 (2½ Ton)</u>	<u>M-54 (5 Ton)</u>	<u>Semi (12 Ton)</u>
73	3	2

2. The following personnel are located in the Phu Bai/Gia Le complex:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
3d Engineer Battalion	12	65
3d Tank Battalion	7	52
3d Shore Party Battalion	4	36
Headquarters Battalion	105	632

3. The following is an estimate of vehicle requirements by unit:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u># VEHICLES REQUIRED</u>	
3d Engineer Battalion	500	200-Lumber, 100 concertina 200-General Equip & Pers.
3d Shore Party Battalion	60	
3d Tank Battalion	95	
Headquarters Battalion	<u>300</u>	
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>955</b>

Encl 5

DECLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

4. The following is the proposed time schedule to complete the move:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>NO OF VEHICLES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1 March	Vehicles 3dMTBn				
2 March	Div Hq 3dEngBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	6 39/2	General Equip
3 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
4 March	Pre Load				
5 March	3dEngBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	General Equip
6 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
7 March	Pre Load				
8 March	3dTkBn 3dEngBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	53-Tanks 40-3dEng Gen Equip
9 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
10 March	Pre Load				
11 March	3dTkBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	51-3dSPBn 42-3dTkBn
12 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
13 March	Pre Load				
14 March	HqBn 3dSPBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	81-HqBn 9-3dSPBn
15 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
16 March	Pre Load				
17 March	HqBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	
18 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
19 March	Pre Load				
20 March	HqBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	
21 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
22 March	Pre Load				

DECLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>NO OF VEHICLES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
23 March	HqBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	27-HqBn
24 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
25 March	Pre Load				
26 March	3dEngBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	Lumber
27 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
28 March	Pre Load				
29 March	3dEngBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	Lumber
30 March	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
31 March	Pre Load				
1 Apr	3dEngBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	Lumber/Wire
2 Apr	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
3 Apr	Pre Load				
4 Apr	3dEngBn 3/12 3dReconBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	11-3dEng Lumber/Wire 60-3/12 4-3dReconBn
5 Apr	Return	Quang Tri	Phu Bai		
6 Apr	Pre Load				
7 Apr	3dMTBn	Phu Bai	Quang Tri	73/5	


5. The above schedule includes movement of all of the 3d Engineer Battalion and the rear echelons of 3d Battalion 12th Marines and 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Any increase in the availability of vehicles will proportionately decrease the time required to complete the move.

6. In the event the security platoon cannot be provided from resources in Dong Ha/Quang Tri it will have to be provided by Headquarters Battalion.

G. W. TROXLER

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

*SHOVE*  
OF CHIEF  
COO *CO*  
CO. *KIB*  
ACTION *FLON*

2 NY SSSSS  
O 12001Z MAR 68  
FM TWO SIX MARINES  
TO FIRO AIR CAV DIV  
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

BT  
~~SECRET~~

OPCON  
REF A. 1ST ACD OPERO 01-68(PEGASUS)  
B. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 25 1045Z MAR 68  
1. IAW F A AND B, 26TH MAR (REIN) REPORTS OPCON TO 1ST ACD AT  
310300H.  
GP-4  
BT

4-3

4-4/2000 CEN

NNNN


00

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED



VV WFA  
 PP RUMWP  
 DE RUMWAA 3106 0611338  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 011330Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 INFO RUMWP CG THIRD MARDIV -  
 P 011022Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF DANANG  
 TO COMPTIEORSEVENTHFLT  
 INFO COMSEVENTHFLT  
 CIG SEVEN SIX PT EIGHT  
 NSA DNG  
 CTF COM FASE ONE NSA DNG  
 BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HOSTILE FIRE AT CUA VIET RAMP

A. ADMINO COMPTIEORSEVENTHFLT 230554Z FEB 68 (N GIAL)

B. CG THIRD MARDIV 271740Z FEB 68 (PASEP)

1. ALL OF US ASHORE SHARE FULLY YOUR CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF YOUR MEN AND SHIPS AT CUA VIET RAMP WHERE THEY MUST FACE THE HAZARD OF ENEMY ARTILLERY FIRE, WITH NO MEANS TO RETALIATE.
2. THE WEATHER IN RECENT WEEKS HAS LIMITED SERIOUSLY OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT OBSERVED ARTILLERY AND NGF. AT THE SAME TIME, CEILINGS HAVE

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 3106  
 GENERALLY BEEN TOO LOW TO PERMIT FIXED WING STRIKES BY OTHER THAN TPQ-10 CONTROL. FLEETING BREAKS IN THE WEATHER HAVE PERMITTED ALL TOO FEW VISUAL STRIKES AGAINST HARD TARGETS. I KNOW YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE PROBLEM WE HAVE IN PINPOINTING GUNS. NEVERTHELESS, WHEN WE DO GET A BREAK IN THE WEATHER, WE TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF VFR CONDITIONS TO PUNISH THE ENEMY JUST AS HARD AS POSSIBLE. I BELIEVE THE ACCOUNT CONTAINED IN REF B OF WHAT WE WERE ABLE TO DO IN A SINGLE DAY OF CLEAR SKIES WILL INTEREST YOU. YOU MAY BE SURE THAT WE EAGERLY AWAIT MORE DAYS OF SUCH GOOD HUNTING.

3. WITH RESPECT TO REDUCING/ELIMINATING THE ARTILLERY THREAT TO CUA VIET, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT DMZ AREA AO'S/FAC'S CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORT ON FINDING AND ADJUSTING FIRES TO DESTROY ARTILLERY POSITIONS WITHIN RANGE OF CUA VIET.

CF-4

BT

SHOVE GOC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O. C

G-2 W.O. V

DOPD

APO

ACTION

CTF Clearwater

3

CG/CS/CEO

RAE


UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 7

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



SHOVE  
 OP CHIEF  
 G-3 W.O.  
 G-2 W.O.  
 DOPD  
 APO  
 ACTION  
 HHS. DUAR  
 Clearwater

AVV VPC636 MFA938  
 PP RUMHVP  
 ZNY SSSSS ZOV RUMWAA

for 011310ZC

PP RUMHNB RUMSBB  
 DE RUMWAA 0027 0610346  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 010346Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF DANANG  
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 INFO RUMHNA/CTF CLEARWATER  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHVB/CDR HUE SUPPLY

RIVER SECURITY GROUP

UNHNS/NSAD TAN MY  
 BT

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP

A. CTF CLEARWATER 260245Z FEB 68

1. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV:

REQUEST YOU PROVIDE ADDITIONAL 106MM RM AND CREW REQUESTED PARA 2D REF A.

2. FOR COMNAVSUPPACT DNG: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE .50 CAL MGS/EQUIP REQUESTED PARA 2B REF A.

3. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

GP-4  
 BT

01/3

02 03

CEO


43

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED



SHOVE CAC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APO

ACTION

Napoleon/Saline

DE MAF AND MATE I WILL ZDK NR 17 AFTER THE TWO MESHS I HAVE TO SEND  
TO YOU NOW XV OK MATEY HERE IS NR 18

OO RUMHLA RUMSMA  
DE RUMWAA 0028 0610408,  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 010408Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF DANANG  
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUMHMA/DEPCOMUSMACV FWD  
BT

*for com # 987*  
*CO*

## DESIGNATED OPERATIONS

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 2907830Z FEB 68 (NOTAL)

1. OPERATION SALINE II DESIGNATED BY REF A IS DISAPPROVED AS A NAMED OPERATION.

2. REQUEST OPERATIONS NAPOLEON AND SALINE BE COMBINED AND REPORTED AS OPERATION NAPOLEON/SALINE.

GP-4

BT


A-G 2, G 3, cor, CEO

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED



SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

////////////////////FLASH TO FOLLOW////////////////////////////////////

ZNY SSSSS

000007 010521Z MAR 58

FM THIRD MARDIV COC

TO FIRST MAW COC

BT

#123

PERSONAL FOR GEN. ANDERSON FROM GEN. TOMPKINS.  
 PER OUR CONVERSATION I UNDERSTAND THAT U WILL  
 PROVIDE CONTINUOUS COVER OF THE KHE SANH DURING  
 DAYLIGHT HOURS ACFT EQUIPPED WITH ZUNI RHTS FOR  
 PURPOSES OF IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY TANKS. YOU MENTIONED  
 THAT WITH THIS CAPABILITY. MY 14 SUGGESTS THAT F8 ACFT  
 CAN CARRY BOTH ZUNI AND BOMBS WITHOUT DECREASING BOMB LOAD.  
 IF U CONCUR, WILL DIRECT 26TH MAIRNES TO PROVIDE TGTS FOR  
 F8 ACFT SO ARMED UPON FIRST REPORTING ON STATION TO DELIVER BOMBS  
 SO THAT HIS ON-STATION TIME WITH ZUNI AND 20MM CAN BE PROPORTIONATELY  
 INCREASED.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

01

05

21

Encl 11

DECLASSIFIED


**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

UNCLASSIFIED

PP RU MHVP  
 DE RU MIN 025B 0611035  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 010730Z MAR 68  
 FM CTF CLEAR WATER  
 TO RU MWAA /CG III MAF  
 RU MHNA /COMNA VSUPPACT DANANG  
 INFO RU MSMA /COMUSMACV  
 RU MHMB /COMUSMACV FWD  
 RU MSBB /COMNA VFORV  
 RU MSAL /CDR SEVENTH AF SG  
 RU MHLA /CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RU MHVP /CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RU MHAA /CG FIRST AIR CAV  
 RU MHAW /CG FIRST MAW  
 RU MHLA /CG TF XRAY  
 RU MHVH /HUE CITY COORD  
 RU MHNA /COMTHIRD NCB  
 RU MHVH /DSA I CORPS  
 RU MHVH /SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 RU MIN /ASAD CUA VIET  
 RU MIN /ASAD TAN MY  
 RU MHWE /FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR

**SHOVE CQC**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APO

ACTION

C-6-3

COCG-2-4/CG/C/S/CEO

PAGE 2 RU MIN 025B  
 RU MHWE /CT ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
 BT

ANNEX B (LOGISTIC CRAFT OPERATION AND PATROL /MINSWEEPING SUPPORT  
 FOR PERFUME RIVER OPERATIONS) TO CTF CLEAR WATER OPERATION ORDER 1-68

A. CTFW 250525Z FEB 68

B. CTFW 261000Z FEB 68

1. PURPOSE. THIS ANNEX PROVIDES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE PERFUME RIVER BETWEEN NSAD TAN MY AND HUE RAMP WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND AVAILABILITY OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ALLOWS FOR A SHIFT FROM PREPLANNED CONVOY OPERATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL CRAFT OR GROUPS OF CRAFT DISPATCH AS REQUIRED.

2. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND. LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSITING THE PERFUME RIVER WILL BE CHOPPED FROM NSAD TAN MY TO CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP UP ON COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSIT. PER PATROLS AND MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS UNDER THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE GROUP.

3. FUNCTIONS AND TASKS.

A. THE FUNCTION OF THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP IS TO PROVIDE A CONTINUAL, UNINTERRUPTED TRANSIT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE PERFUME R.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

Encl 12

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 3 RUMNH 0258 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THIRD MARDIV  
RIVER.

THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP WILL:

(1) PROVIDE CONTINUOUS PER PATROLS AND MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS ON THE PERFUME RIVER BETWEEN NSAD TAN MY AND HUE RAMP DURING HOURS WHEN LOGISTIC CRAFT ARE TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(2) PROVIDE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT AND/OR OTHER ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED BY TRANSITING LOGISTIC CRAFT.

(3) ARRANGE FOR AND COORDINATE SUPPORTING AIR AND ARTILLERY FIRE WHEN NEEDED.

(4) PROVIDE BRIEFINGS AS TO TACTICAL SITUATION AND LOCATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES TO CRAFT MASTERS/COXSWAINS OF LOGISTIC AND SECURITY CRAFT TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(5) MAINTAIN COMPLETE INFORMATION AS TO LOGISTIC CRAFT MOVEMENTS ON THE PERFUME RIVER DURING TRANSIT AND ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AS REPORTED BY LOGISTIC CRAFT TO RIVER SECURITY UNITS ON PATROL.

(6) EXERCISE NET CONTROL OF THE LOGISTIC CRAFT FREQUENCY THRU RIVER SECURITY UNITS ON PATROL.

(7) DESIGNATE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE CRAFT OPERATIONS DURING TRANSIT AND DIRECT THEIR EMPLOYMENT.

B. THE FUNCTION OF OIC NSAD TAN MY WILL BE TO RECEIVE, SUPPORT

PAGE 4 RUMNH 0258 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AND SAIL AS DIRECTED BY THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP ASSIGNED LOGISTIC CRAFT BETWEEN THE MOUTH OF THE PERFUME RIVER AND HUE RAMP. OIC NSAD TAN MY.

(1) PROVIDES MINE SWEEPING BOATS, CREWS, AND SWEEP GEAR TO THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP.

(2) CONDUCTS SALVAGE OPERATIONS AS NECESSARY.

(3) PROVIDES PRC 25/77 RADIOS AND FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT TO ALL LOGISTIC AND MINE SWEEPING CRAFT TRANSITING THE PERFUME RIVER.

C. CRAFT MASTERS/COXSWAINS OF LOGISTIC CRAFT WILL:

(1) BRIEF THEIR RESPECTIVE CREWS PRIOR TO TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(2) MAINTAIN FIRE DISCIPLINE AND CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE OF THEIR CRAFT.

(3) DIRECT THE DEFENSIVE FIRE OF THEIR CRAFT. IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER ORDERS FROM RIVER SECURITY UNITS OPERATING IN COMPANY THEY WILL ONLY FIRE WHEN FIRED UPON AND CEASE FIRING EITHER WHEN HOSTILE FIRE ON THEIR CRAFT CEASES OR WHEN IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT THEIR FIRE ENDANGERS FRIENDLY FORCES.

(4) WHEN FIRED UPON OR COGNIZANT OF OTHER ENEMY THREAT PROMPTLY NOTIFY RIVER SECURITY UNITS OF THEIR LOCATION AND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT.

4. WHEN DIRECTED, THIS ANNEX WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE FOR MOVEMENT OF


PAGE 5 RUMNH 0258 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
LOGISTIC ON THE PERFUME RIVER.

GP -4  
BT

**UNCLASSIFIED****CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



ZNY SSSE

0000Z 110000Z MAR 64

FM THIRD WARDEN COO

TO III MAF COO

BT

TRENCH DESTRUCTION

1. INFO JUST RECD FM III MAF REVEALS THAT USAF (SAC) 1 SEC FUZE IS AVAIL FOR M-117 (D26) BOMB. THIS FUZE PERMITS PENETRATION TO APPROX SIXTEEN(16) FT BEFORE DETONATION. BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE EXCELLENT WPN FOR TRENCH DESTRUCTION REF A.

2. REQ AVAILABILITY OF THIS FUZE TO 1ST MAF.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

DE DTU ANDMATE INT OS. INT OSL MY FLISH

SMOVE GOC	
CD CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
ECPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
AFQ	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

UNCLASSIFIED

01


08

20

Encl 13

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



ZVA 646VV DMBL 56

PP RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 034B 0611036  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 010928Z MAR 68  
 FM CTF CLEAR WATER  
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMELA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV-  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMHMB/COMUSMACV FWD  
 RUMSBE/COMNAVFORV SGN  
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF SGN  
 RUMELA/CG TF XRAY  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHNA/COMTHIRD NCB  
 RUMHVR/DSA I CORPS  
 RUMHVR/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 RUMHN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY  
 RUMHVR/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR  
 RUMHVR/CTG ONE ONE FIVE ET ONE

OP CTF

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

G-2

PAGE 2 RUMHN 034B 0611036

SHIFT OF CTF CLEAR A POST (U)

A. CTF CLEAR WATER OPORD 1-68 W/CH 1

1. EFFECTIVE 020400Z CTF CLEAR WATER COMMAND POST WILL

SHIFT FROM TAN MY YD816330 TO CUA VIET YD340698. CHANGE

PARA 6A(3) REF (A) ACCORDINGLY.

2. ADDRESS ALL MSG TRAFFIC QUOTE CTF CLEAR WATER NSA DET

DONG HA/CUA VIET UNQUOTE.

3. REQ MSGS ADDRESSED TO CTF CLEAR WATER INCLUDE CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER

SECURITY GROUP PER MOBILE BASE ONE AND CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER

SECURITY GROUP NSA DONG HA/CUA VIET AS INFO ADDRESSEES.

EP-A

BT


UNCLASSIFIED

01/3/coc  
 09

28  
 Encl 14

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



SHOVE

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

ECPD

APO

ACTION

MMMITVV KC B33ZCZC SAAUEPRA 58  
 OO RU MIVP  
 DE RU MSAR 220610955  
 ZNY SSSS  
 Z 0010945Z MAR 68  
 FM AF TAIC TSN RVN  
 TO RU MSAR /FLT A 4TH ACS DANANG  
 RU MSAR /FLT A 9TH ACS DANANG  
 RU MSAR /1 DASC DANANG  
 INFO RU MSAR B/1 ACW NHA TRANG  
 RU MSAR /CG III MAF DANA G  
 RU MIVP /CG I IRD MARDIV  
 BT

TACPWH,  
 SUBJECT: U) REQUEST FOR SPOCKY AIRCRAFT  
 REFERENCE CG III MAF MESSAGE 29/1534Z FEB 68 (S), SUBJECT: REQUEST  
 FOR SPOCKY AIRCRAFT.  
 1. (S) CG THIRD MARDIV HAS URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR SPOCKY SUPPORT  
 TO HOSE DOWN GROWING ENEMY TRENCH SYSTEM AT KHE SA H.  
 2. GUNSHIP/FLARESHIP ALERT FRA G, CHANGE I DATED 9 FEB 68,  
 SPOCKY 11 AND 12 ARE ASSIGNED AIRBORNE ALERT AT KHE SANH.  
 3. (S) IT IS DIRECTED THAT THE SEAIRCRAFT PROVIDE THE SUPPORT  
 REQUESTED AS A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY WITH WEATHER BEING  
 THE ONLY LIMITING FACTOR.

PAGE 2 RU MSAR

GP -4

BT

FLASH UNCLASSIFIED


Encl 15

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



UNCLASSIFIED

PP RUMHVP  
DE RUMHN 027B 0611231  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 010955Z MAR 68  
FM CTF CLEARWATER  
TO RUMMAA CG III MAF  
RUMHLA CG FIRST MARDIV  
RUMHVP CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMMAA CG FIRST AIR CAV  
RUMHAW CG FIRST MAW  
INFO RUMSMA COMUSMACV  
RUMHMB COMUSMACV FWD  
RUMSBB COMNAVFORV  
RUMSAL CDR SE WTH

F SGN  
RUMHLA CG TF YRAY  
RUMHNA COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
RUMHNA COMTHIRD NCF  
RUMHWA DSA I CORPS  
RUMHWA SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
RUMHNSAD CUA VIET  
RUMHNSAD TAN MY  
RUMHWE FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR  
RUMHWE CIG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

SHOVELOS  
OP CHIEF  
G-3 W.O.  
G-2 W.O.  
DOPD  
APO  
ACTION  
Clear Water

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 2 RUMHN 027B C O N F I D E N T I A L

BI  
C O N F I D E N T I A L  
CHANGE 2 TO IF CLEARWATER OP-ORD 1-68 (U)  
A. MY 250525Z FEB 68  
B. MY 291345Z FEB 68  
1. CHANGE PARA 6A (3) REF A TO DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY  
GROUP CUA VIET YD 340698.

GP -4

GA 6-3

coc/a/4/cg/ds/ceo

55


Encl 16

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



SHOVE	
OP CHIEF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
G-3 W.O.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
G-2 W.O.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DPO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
APD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ACTION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OPCON	

ZN SSSSS  
 O 011050Z FEB 68  
 FM TWELFTH MARINES  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 INFO THIRD MARINES  
 FIRST AMTRAC BN  
 BT

01 MAR  
 # 08

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED  
 A. CG THIRD MARDIVB291658Z FEB 68  
 1. IAW REF A ASSUMED OPCON OF "C" BTRY FIRST BN ELEVENTH  
 MARINES, MORTAR BTRY SECOND BN ELEVENTH MARINES AT 010000H MAR 68.  
 2. FOR THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES:  
 A. EFFECTIVE 010800H MAR 68 ASSUME OPCON OF "C" BTRY FIRST BN ELEVENTH  
 MARINES, MORTAR BTRY SECOND BN ELEVENTH MARINES, DET MORTAR BTRY  
 FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES, FIRST PLT FIRST ARMD AMPHIB CO.  
 B. CONTINUE DIRECT SUPPORT OF THIRD MARINES VICINITY QUANG TRI  
 FROM PRESENT POSITIONS WITH ORGANIC BATTERIES. PROVIDE DIRECT  
 SUPPORT OF THIRD MARINES FOR OPERATION SALINE II WITH ASSETS PASSED  
 YOUR OPCON ABOVE.  
 GP-4  
 BT

A-G2 CDC G3 FSIC CEO (Z)

NNNN

01 10 505


UNCLASSIFIED



CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



PT 0043

RR RU MH VP  
DE RUMWAA 0097 0611250  
ZNY CCCCC

R 011250Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF DNG  
INFO RUMLA CG FIRST MARDIV  
RU MH VP CG THIRD MARDIV  
RU MH MB CG FIRST AIRCAV DIV  
RU MH FL CG FOR LOG CMD  
RU MH LA TASK FORCE X RAY  
RU MH WH DANANG SUPPORT CMD  
R 290151Z FEB 68  
FM COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
TO CINCPACFLT  
INFO CG III MAF  
COMNAVFORV  
BT

SHOVE ONE

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPO

APO

ACTION

CLEARWATER

UNCLASSIFIED

VOICE CALL SIGN ASSIGNMENT (U)

AC. MY 210611Z DEC 67

1. SPARE CALL SIGNS LISTED REF A ASSIGNED AS FOLS, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

CTF CLEAR WATER "ESTEEM" IF CLEAR WATER "GOOD WILL"

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0097

CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIV SEC GRP "TARTHLO NEW"

DONG HA SUPPLY RIV SEC GRP "GRAIN"

ESCORT COMMANDER "CONFESSION" ESCORT UNITS "GLAZE"

CONVOY COMMANDER "EPISODE" CONVOY UNITS "CLIMBER"

STAFF COMMUNICATIONS "JOLSON"

2. DUE TO INCREASE TEMPO OF OPERATIONS AND REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL CIRCUITS, REQ ADDITIONAL 20 CAL SIGNS BE ASSIGNED. WILL ADVISE USACT WHEN ASSIGNED.

GP -4

BT

2

3/001000 10G /cs

RPE

01

UNCLASSIFIED

50

Encl 18

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

**UNCLASSIFIED**

VVV

EYHF DE DONG NR 009/01

ZNY CCCCC

P 011338Z MAR 68

FM CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP

TO CTF CLEAR WATER

INFO CG THIRD MAF

CG THIRD MARDIV

COMNAVFORV

COMNAV SUPPACT DANANG

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV

CG TF XRAY

FIRST FORCE LOGISTICAL COMMAND

FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR

DSA I CORPS

HUE COORDINATOR

SA FIRST ARVN DIV

CG FIRST MAW

COMUSMACV FORWARD

NSA DET IAN MY

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C- COC

6-1-2-3-CEO



SHOVE COC	
CB CHIEF	
G-3/W.O.	
G-2 W.O.	
DOPD	
APO	
ACTION	

PAGE TWO DONG

CLEAR WATER OPSUM 1 MAR 68 (U)

1. THE FIRST CONVOY OF THE DAY CONSISTING OF 1 YFU, 6 LCM-8, AND 1 AMMI BARGE ESCORTED BY 2 LCM-6 MINE SWEEP BOATS AND 2 LCPL'S WITH 2 USMC GUNSHIPS PROVIDING AIR COVER, GOT UNDERWAY FROM CUA VIET AT 0800H. AT 0935H A MINE DETONATED CLOSE ABOARD LCM-6 NR 6 MINE SWEEP BOAT. COMMENCED W/AT FIRE INTO ADJACENT NORTH BANK BUT CEASED DUE TO LOCAL FRIENDLY TROOPS IN AREA BEHIND MINING SITE. AT 1005H LCM-6 NR 6 TOOK 2 NEAR MISSES FROM NORTH BANK BY RECOILLESS RIFLE. FIRE NOT RETURNED DUE TO PROXIMITY OF FRIENDLY TROOPS. CONVOY ARR DONG HA AT 1030H WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT AND COMMENCED OFFLOAD.
2. THE SECOND CONVOY CONSISTING OF 5 YFU'S, ESCORTED BY 2 LCM-6'S, 2 LCPL'S AND 2 USMC GUNSHIPS DEPARTED DONG HA AT 1100H. ARR CUA VIET W/O INCIDENT.
3. THE THIRD CONVOY CONSISTING OF 2 LCU'S, 3 YFU'S, 2 LCM-8'S ESCORTED BY 2 LCM-6'S MINE SWEEP BOATS AND 2 LCPL'S DEPARTED CUA VIET AT 1415H. 2 USMC GUNSHIPS SUPPORTING LOCAL BLT SWEEP WERE AVAILABLE IF NEEDED. AT 1500H AN LCM-8 ACCOMPANIED BY A PUSHER BOAT WAS COMING OUT OF BEN NGU CANAL INTO THE CUA VIET RIVER AFTER INSERTING A TANK IN SUPPORT OF A LOCAL FRIENDLY TROOP SWEEP, AS THE LEAD BOATS OF THE CONVOY WERE PASSING, A MINE WAS DETONATED DIRECTLY UNDER THE LCM-8'S

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE DONG

CONNING FLAT. 3 USN WIA ON LCM-8 AND 3 USN WIA ON PUSHER BOAT. LCM-8 TOOK 2 SAMPANS UNDER FIRE THAT HAD BEEN OBSERVED DETONATING MINE. 2 LCPL'S PURSUED SAMPANS. 3 VC KIA (PC) 3 VC KIA (PROB) AND 1 VC CAPTURED. AT 1615H, LCU NR 1494 REPORTED 2 NEAR MISSES BY RECOILLESS RIFLE. LAUNCH SITE WAS OBSERVED AND CALLED IN TO USMC GUNSHIPS WHICH TOOK IT UNDER FIRE. AT 1645H CONVOY ARRIVED DONG HA WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

4. AT 1730H CONVOY NR 40 CONSISTING OF 1 LCU, 1 YFU, 8 LCM'S AND 2 AMMI BARGES GOT UNDERWAY FROM DONG HA ESCORTED BY 2 LCM-6 MINE SWEEP BOATS, 2 LCPL'S WITH AIR COVER AVAILABLE FROM 2 USMC GUNSHIPS. CONVOY ARR CUA VIET W/O INCIDENT AT 1930H.
5. CARGO MOVED 1 MAR 68  
TO DONG HA  
723.7 ST  
93M GAL POL PRODUCTS  
TO CUA VIET  
NONE
6. INTENSE SHORE BOMBARDMENT, ARTY STRIKES, FIXED WING AND HELO STRIKES ALONG NW AND SW OF CUA VIET RIVER IN VICINITY OF KNOWN RECOILLESS

PAGE FOUR DONG

SITES HAVE GREATLY REDUCED ENEMY ACTIVITY. FRIENDLY TROOPS SWEEP AREA IN VICINITY AND ARE HOLDING AREA S BUNK OPPOSITE MINING SITE

7. WEATHER - LOW CEILING IN MORNING; CLEARING LATE MORNING AND EARLY AFTERNOON; LOWERING LATE AFTERNOON.


GP -4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED



ZNY SSSSS  
O 011434Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF DNG  
TO RUMHAW/CG FMAW  
RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
INFO RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
RUMHMA/DEPCOMUSMACV FWD  
RUMHLA/CG TASK FORCE XRAY  
RUMHNB/CTF CLEARWATER PBR ONE  
RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS  
RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DNG  
BT

## HELICOPTER SUPPORT

- A. CG III MAF 202336Z FEB 68  
B. CG III MAF 231512Z FEB 68 NOTAL  
C. CG III MAF 261352Z FEB 68 NOTAL

1. REF A DIRECTED CERTAIN MEASURES TO INCREASE HELICOPTER SUPPORT

C- G-3/AIRO

G-2/CG/CG/CI/CSO

(A)

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0118

TO ARVN FORCES AT

YUE CITADEL. HUE HAS BEEN SECURED ANDURA/GUNSHIP

ALERT MAQUIROXENTS ARE TERMINATED.

2. PERFUMASRIVER INTERDICTION BY ENEMY FORCES CONTINUES TO DISRUPT BOAT TRAFFIC AND HAMPER CRITICAL INUPPLY EFFORT. US/ARVN FORCES ARE SWEEPING BOTH RIVER BANKS. INTERDICTION OF BOAT CONVOYS ON CUA VIET RIVER AND ATTACKS ON DONG HA PORT FACILITIES ARE TAKING TOLL OF LANDING CRAFT FLEET AND REDUCING TONNAGE OF ESSENTIAL MATERIAL URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR HIGH TEMPO OF COMBAT OPNS.

3. FOR CG FMAW: CONTINUE GUNSHIP ESCORT ON PERFUME AND CUA VIET RIVERS IN SUPPORT TASK FORCE CLEARWATER AS ASSIGNED REFS B & C, COORDINATE WITH FIRST AIR CARVDNUAEZ K VMGCIMQSGAELMFJNJ ATK6 DIV:

A. REQUEST YOU REMAIN RESPONSIVE TO ARVN REQUESTS HUE CITY AREA TO SUPPORT RIVER CLEARING OPNS AND NEUTRALIZATION OF ENEMY IN AREA.

B. REQUEST YOU SHARE GUNSHIP ESCORT OF BOAT CONVOYS ON CUA VIET AND COORDINATE WITH FMAW. TONNAGE CARRIED TO DONG HA BY BOAT ESSENTIALLY EVENLY DIVIDED 1ST AIR CAV/3D MARDIV. TOTAL REQUIREMENT IS FOUR GUNSHIPS CONTINUOUSLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. REPORT FOR BRIEFING CTF CLEARWATER, CALL SIGN ESTEEM/PISTOL PETE, 38.8NC FM, COORD YD 816330, (HELO PAD ATOP MOBILE BARGE).

PAGE THREE RUMWAA 0118 ~~SECRET~~

5. DIRLAUTH ALCON,

GP-1  
BT

01

14


3 9

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 20

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED



A 737IV MFA 969

OO RUMHVP

DE RUMWAA 0123 361150Z

ZNY SSSSS

O 011500Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO RUMHVP/CG CLEARWATER

RUMINA/COMNAVSUPACT DNG

RUMHVP/ASNA I C ORPS DTG 115.1

BT

SECURITY OF CUA VIET L.C.

A. THIRD MARDIV C.C. 290930Z FEB 68

B. CG III MAF 181400Z FEB 68

C. CG III MAF 181406Z FEB 68

1. FOLLOWING PROVIDED AS INTERIM REPLY REF A:

A. RAG FORCE MENTIONED PARA 2P REF B AND PARA 1C. REF C HAS FOLLOWING MAJOR ORGANIC ITEMS OF EQUIP:

ITEM

ARMAMENT

(1) ONE LCM (COMMANDMENT)

TWO 20MM SINGLE

(2) ONE MONITOR

ONE 40MM SINGLE

TWO 20MM SINGLE

ONE 50 CAL MG

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0125

(3) FIVE LCM-6

ONE 81MM MORTAR

THREE 20MM SINGLE

(4) SIX LCM-7

TWO 50 CAL MG

ONE 20MM SINGLE

(5) SIX SICAN (VEDETTE)

THREE 30 CAL MG

ONE 50 CAL MG

THREE 30 CAL MG

2. IF PROVIDED, RAG FORCE SHOULD SATISFY FIRE SPT RQMT CITED REF A. THIS HQ HAS NOT RECEIVED REPLY TO REF B. WILL ADVISE WHEN REPLY RECEIVED.

2. RELATED SUBJECT:

A. IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST MENTIONED PARA 1B REF C. CG I C ORPS DIRECTED VN NAVY (ICIZ NAVY COMMAND) ON 26 FEB 68 TO: INCREASE RIVER PATROLS ON CUA VIET AND HUONG (HUE) RIVERS; TIGHTLY CONTROL CIVILIAN BOAT MOVEMENT; PROVIDE SECURITY FOR LOGISTICAL RIVER CRAFT; AND APPREHEND ALL MOVEMENT DURING CURFEW HOURS. FOREGOING EFFORTS ARE TO BE COORDINATED WITH 11TH DTA.

B. SUGGEST YOU COORDINATE WITH CTF CLEARWATER TO INSURE USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN SECURITY OF CUA VIET L.C.

CP-4

BT

SHOVE COC

OP. CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APOG

ACTION

Clearwater

UNCLASSIFIED

2-A  
ST

11-62

AIR

200

CEO ~~Z~~

SHOVE COB  
OP CHIEF  
G-3 W.O.  
G-2 W.O.  
DCPO  
APO  
ACTION

66

# FLASH


01

21

34 UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 22

DECLASSIFIED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				<div style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">UNCLASSIFIED</div> <div style="margin-top: 10px; text-align: center;"> <h1 style="margin: 0;">SHOVE COC</h1> <h2 style="margin: 0;">OF CHIEF</h2> <p style="margin: 0;">G-3 W.O.</p> <p style="margin: 0;">G-2 W.O.</p> <p style="margin: 0;">DCPO</p> <p style="margin: 0;">APO</p> <p style="margin: 0;">ACTION</p> </div>	
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
PRECEDENCE					
ACTION					
PRIORITY				DTG	
INFO				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
<p>FROM: 00, 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV, DONG HA, RVN</p> <p>TO: COC, 3D MAR DIV, DONG HA, RVN</p> <p>CG, 5TH INF DIV, BEARCAT, RVN</p> <p>CITE</p> <p>SUBJECT: GROUND COMMANDER'S DAILY SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)</p> <p>FOR PERIOD 010001H TO 012400H MAR 68 (U)</p> <p>1. (C) OPERATIONS SUMMARY</p> <p>A. GENERAL:</p> <p>(1) 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV: REMAINED OPCON TO 3D MAR DIV. CP REAR LOC VIC YD224589. FORWARD CP LOC VIC YD219675.</p> <p>(2) HHT, 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV: PROVISIONAL SCOUT SECTION FURNISHED TWO TRACKS AS ESCORT FOR LOG CONVOY TO B TRP AND C TRP FORWARD PSN. THEY ALSO PROVIDED TWO TRACKS FOR SECURITY OF SQDN FORWARD CP.</p> <p>(3) TRP A, 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV: REMAINED OPCON TO 101ST ABN DIV. TRP A RECEIVED AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF SMALL ARMS FIRE AT YD614086 RESULTING IN ONE INDIV WOUNDED. DELAYED ENTRY: ON 31 MAR 68 A MEDIC ATTACHED TO A TRP WAS WOUNDED AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE SMALL ARMS FIRE VIC YD 614086. DETAILS UNKNOWN.</p> <p>(4) TRP B, 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV: SEIZED OBJ ELM VIC YD191736.</p> <p>TRP B RON LOC YD195733.</p>					
DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE	
	JAMES P. ZOELLER, 1LT, Armor Duty Officer				
				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
				JAMES P. ZOELLER, 1LT, Armor, Duty Officer	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS	

DD FORM 173

NOV 63

UNCLASSIFIED

MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

PPC-Japan

encl 23

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY	
ACTION PRIORITY		ZOEHLER, Duty Officer		ZOEHLER, Duty Officer	
INFO				PHONE	
<p>(5) TRP C, 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV: REMAINED OPCON TO 2D REGT (ARVN). REMAINED AT IT'S PRESENT LOC AT OBJ KILO VIC YD245722. AT 0821H VIC YD245708, AN APC FROM 1ST PLT (C-15) HIT A PRESSURE TYPE MINE BLOWING OFF THE LEFT REAR ROAD WHEEL AND DAMAGING THE IDLER WHEEL. THERE WERE THREE (3) INDIV INJURED. AT 1405H VIC YD238717, AN APC FROM 1ST PLT (C-12) HIT A PRESSURE TYPE MINE BLOWING OFF THE 2D AND 3D ROAD WHEELS ON THE LEFT SIDE. THERE WAS ONE INDIV SLIGHTLY INJURED. AT 1917H VIC YD242718, C TRP VTR (C-82) HIT A PRESSURE TYPE MINE RESULTING IN THE RIGHT TRACK, 2D ROAD WHEEL AND ROAD WHEEL ARM BEING BLOWN OFF. THERE WERE NO INDIV INJURED. ONE INDIV PREVIOUSLY LISTED AS WHA ON 30 MAR 68 DIED OF WOUNDS TODAY.</p> <p>(6) TRP D, 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV: REMAINED OPCON TO 3D BDE, 9TH INF DIV. AERO SCOUT SECTION FURNISHED FOUR OH-23 C&amp;C SHIPS TO SQDN HQ.</p> <p>(7) CO C, 2/34 ARMOR: 3D PLT REMAINED OPCON TO C TRP, 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV. C CO(-), 2/34 ARMOR CONTINUED SECURITY OF SQDN FORWARD CP VIC YD219675.</p> <p>(8) A/1-502 ABN: REMAINED OPCON TO 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV. 1ST FT OPCON TO TRP B. A CO(-) SEIZED OBJ FIR VIC YD208744 AT 0820H.</p> <p>E. CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYOPS: NONE</p> <p>C. MAJOR UNIT ACTION: NONE</p> <p>D. SMALL UNIT ACTION: NONE</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2			
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
GP-4				UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

PFC-Japan

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE	
ACTION PRIORITY		ZOBELIER, Duty Officer	ZOBELIER, Duty Officer		
INFO					
<p>2. (U) LOSSES: US: KHA 1 (SEE 1A(5) ABOVE)  </p> <p>MHA 0</p> <p>MHA 5 (SEE 1A(3) ABOVE)  </p> <p>NVA/VC: C</p> <p>3. (C) PLANS SUMMARY: A TRP REMAINS OPCON TO 101ST ABN DIV. PLANS FOR REMAINDER OF 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV TO BE DETERMINED.</p> <p>4. (U) COORDINATION AND LIAISON: CONTINUED WITH 3D MAR DIV, 1ST, 40TH ARTY, AND 2D REGT (ARVN).</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3			
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
GP-4				UNCLASSIFIED	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 53 WHICH WILL BE USED.

PPC-Japan

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL #2-21114R68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

X 5  
MINUS G2

THE "ALL-OUT ATTACK"

(U) The following is a full translation of a captured enemy document which contains information on the continuation of the "all-out attack." This document was captured in February, 1968 in South Vietnam by 2/60 Inf, 3/9 U.S. Inf Div. The document was received at the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) on 23 Feb 68 and was summarized under CDEC Document Log Number 02-1961-68, in CDEC Bulletin Number 9724, dated 23 Feb 68.

(C) The full text of IR 6-027-1465-68 follows:

(Page 1 of Original Text)

CIRCULAR

FROM COSVN CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

AND

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF SVNLA HEADQUARTERS

Concerning preliminary assessment of the situation on the evening of 31 January (1968), the COSVN Current Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee of SVNLA Headquarters held a meeting to assess the situation and bring out specific matters related to leadership and guidance to be disseminated to, and implemented by, addressees.

1. We have launched simultaneous and timely attacks on almost all towns and cities, district seats, sectors and (enemy) military bases as planned. Generally speaking, achievements were scored at the first step. In areas where offensive and uprising were closely coordinated or where the three-pronged attacks in mountainous and lowland areas were comparatively coordinated, more achievements were attained. Within a short

UNCLASSIFIED

GROUP-4  
AUTOMATICALLY  
DECLASSIFIED 12YRS

Encl 24

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

period of time we succeeded in paralyzing the puppet government administration from central to local echelons, and confusing the US command channels. We succeeded in wearing down and destroying an important enemy element, many headquarters of the puppet troops and a large quantity of war facilities. Timely and accurate fire was directed on main objectives. The attack was extremely fierce. The COSVN Current Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee of the SVNLA Headquarters considered this achievement as a very great one. It is the first achievement that has an extremely important significance. It gains revolutionary pride for the masses and places us in a position to advance and to attain greater achievements in both military and political fields. It enables us to make greater efforts to continue to attack (the enemy) and to be resolute to attain the final victory. We have beaten the enemy accurately and successfully. The Current Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee of the SVNLA Headquarters warmly cite and commend all cadre, party and group members of all echelons, within and outside the army, and all cadre and troops within the armed forces. However, we still have the following shortcomings and weaknesses: We failed to seize a number of primary objectives and to completely destroy mobile and defensive units of the enemy. We also failed to hold the occupied areas. In the political field we failed to motivate the people to stage uprisings and break the enemy oppressive control. In cities, as well as in rural areas and areas temporarily occupied by the enemy, the troop proselyting activities by the masses were not conducted on a broad front and the propaganda mission was not carried out in a timely and continuous manner. Signal, liaison and reporting in some areas, especially

2  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the signal liaison and command in the direction of the immediate objectives of the SVNLA Headquarters and of regions, were extremely slow and not closely coordinated, etc. . . . (Sic).

2. Enemy: Although he had taken precautionary measures, he was surprised strategically and suffered heavy losses in strength and equipment. The puppet command agencies, installations and government administration of central echelon were paralyzed. His troops were driven into disorder. The US troops were put on the defensive. They became confused and demoralized. However, since we did not succeed in completely destroying the enemy of his mobile and defensive units at the very start, nor did we closely coordinate offensive with uprising and troop proselyting, the enemy still resisted and his units were not disrupted into pieces.

(Page 2 of Original Text)

If, in the coming days, we fail to quickly motivate a large and powerful force of the masses to stand up against the enemy in time and if we fail to concentrate our armed forces to attack them continuously, they will certainly recover their strength and counterattack us more strongly. Not only will it limit our victories, it will create new difficulties.

3. Based on the resolution of the Polit Bureau and the development of the situation during the past two days, the COSVN Current Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee of the Liberation Army Headquarters would like to call the attention of the Region (Party) Committees, Military Region (Party) Committee and Party Committee level agencies to the following basic problems:

A. It is imperative to be fully aware of the fact that the

3  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1556B  
general offensive and general uprising, which are directed against an enemy with an army of more than 1,200,000 stubborn, reactionary and well equipped soldiers, is a strategic offensive phase covering many military campaigns and uprisings in the local areas to break off all the enemy's counterattacks and is an extremely fierce struggle. Only when we succeed in destroying the entire puppet army and government, neutralizing the actual political and military support of the Americans and annihilating a large portion of the US allied forces, thus depriving them of all war facilities and crushing their attempt to invade (our country), can we drive them into total defeat and achieve the final victory. At present the victories that we have gained in the first step (of our struggle) show that we are now powerful and the enemy is on the decline. Our fierce attacks are bringing them nearer to the danger of a bitter defeat. Consequently, we are quite able to successfully achieve our plan. However, while preparing and implementing this plan, we have committed many errors and shortcomings as mentioned above. We cannot yet, therefore, achieve total victory in a short period. Our cadre, armed forces and people must be well prepared mentally, ideologically and materially to fight resolutely under all circumstances in order to achieve total victory. These preparations must be made during a period of 3 or 4 months as mentioned in COSVN's directive to the Region (Party) Committees.

B. It merits mentioning again that the concerned committees must thoroughly understand the guidelines of the general offensive and general uprising outlined as follows: There must be coordination between the three-prong (attack), the three strategic areas, the urban areas and

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the surrounding rural areas. In the city the armed and political forces outside must coordinate closely with the (revolutionary) forces inside. These forces must coordinate with each other throughout the general battlefield and in the local area. Combat activities must always be accompanied by the development and building up of forces (VC). There must be close coordination of our activities in military, political and diplomatic fields.

C. The concerned committees are required once again to fully understand the basic principle of the general offensive and general uprising which is set down as follows: Concentrate the largest military and political forces in the most logical way; direct the most fierce attack against the major strategic objectives; resolutely conduct continuous attacks against the vulnerable points on the US and puppet troops; and launch decisive attacks against key positions in order to gain decisive victories in areas where we (VC) must win. Realize methods of achieving victories minute after minute and hour after hour. Know how to develop the achieve victories and resolutely counter and break off the enemy's counterattacks. Pursue the enemy to the end in order to gain the greatest victories.

4. Considering the basic problems mentioned above and the situation during the past three days, the (garbled word) good results can be achieved by the concerned committees in the days to come.

(Page 3 of Original Text)

A. We must continue to make everybody fully understand the policy, guidelines and mission of the party. On this basis, we must incessantly heighten our determination to gain the greatest victory, permanently strengthen our will to fight the enemy continuously and to fight a protracted war. We must know how to foster and heighten the enthusiastic

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

revolutionary spirit of the masses. We must resolutely overcome such weak points as flinching at difficulties, being hesitant in attacking the enemy, becoming puzzled before a complicated situation or being overconfident before certain victories, etc. . . . (sic). During this period, we must increase political tasks and build up a firm determination to accomplish important missions.

B. We must resolutely concentrate our forces on specific targets and rapidly take advantage of the victories which we have just gained. We must continuously attack the enemy without allowing him to rest and to have time for reorganization. We must attack him repeatedly (in some disputed areas, we must attack him three or four times and not withdraw when finding it difficult to defeat him after the first attack). We must be resolute to completely destroy all major objectives which we have not yet been able to liquidate. We must destroy every mobile and organic unit of the puppet troops, closely pursue them and use troop proselyting (in conjunction with military action) to rapidly disrupt every major puppet unit of regiment size or division size. We must resolutely defend the objectives which we have seized and must be prepared to repel any enemy counterattack. In regards to US troops, we should attack him if we have a well prepared attack plan. When they counterattack us, we must be determined to annihilate them. When they shrink back, we must mainly use artillery, mortars, and sappers to attack them, surround them and snipe at them in order to annihilate or wear them down. We must not use Main Force (units) to attack them in order to avoid casualties. At the same time, we must step up enemy proselyting activities to neutralize and confuse them.

Hoe?

ARIN  
Main Fgt -  
Too much  
FwF FwF power

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. We must continuously destroy and repeatedly attack (enemy) ✓  
bases, airfields, harbors, artillery positions, depots and strategic lines  
of communication to such a degree that the enemy can no longer use them.

D. The military offensive must be closely coordinated with  
the people's uprising. We must rapidly and resolutely motivate the people  
in towns and cities to take the streets (demonstration). We must arm the  
people and bring rural people into towns and cities, thus turning them into  
a rising political movement in order to break the oppressive control of  
the enemy at local areas and to overthrow the central puppet government. We  
must continue to pursue the enemy and completely annihilate him, not allow-  
ing him to counterattack. We must step up the troop proselyting movement  
of the people to the utmost in order to disintegrate every major enemy unit  
and to incite military revolt among his troops. We must also intensify enemy  
proselyting activities in all aspects and with any facilities available.

*never before*

E. To strengthen our firm proselyting in towns and cities,  
we must rapidly and widely motivate the local population to act in coordi-  
nation with the (military) offensive and uprising in towns and cities in  
order to seize the entire rural area and the remaining district capitals,  
which still remain under the enemy's oppressive control.

F. We must rapidly motivate the people to rise up in con-  
junction with the military offensive to liberate densely populated areas  
along lines of communication and to neutralize, completely destroy and con-  
trol important lines of communication.

(Page 4 of Original Text)

G. Armed and political forces must be developed quickly.

7  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The strongest effort should be made to insure that "the progress we make in one day is equal to that made in one year." The armed forces must be developed as fast as possible to solve the personnel problems in local areas. The number of cadre must be developed as quickly as the situation requires. Quickly strengthen the administrative organization at the basic units, the people's political organizations, the party and group organizations, etc. . . . . (sic).

*shortages here too*  
*Real transfer at basic level*

H. Take every opportunity to recruit as many civilian laborers as possible and successfully complete the activation of the transportation branch and the units assigned the duty of transporting weapons and ammunition. Emphasis must be placed on immediate objectives to be sure that our troops can launch continuous counterattacks. The party committees must assign a capable committee member to be in charge of the above missions. Be sure that the policy dealing with the treatment of wounded and dead soldiers and the handling of US and RVN prisoners of war is successfully carried out.

I. Successively step up propaganda activities to meet the requirements of the plan to motivate millions of people to hold demonstrations. Step up activities to meet the requirements of the troop proselyting plan. Try to the utmost to take over the government and protect it. Immediately popularize the successive victories in the various areas. Heighten the victorious prestige of the people in large cities and be ready to respond to the second front (phase) when it is activated in Saigon. In other cities already occupied by us, we must establish an alliance of national (struggle) and peace (seeking) forces in local areas so that they

8  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

can be combined when the central organization officially comes into being.

J. Be sure that newly liberated areas in the country and cities are successfully consolidated. Quickly activate armed and political forces; form administrative organizations of different echelons; intensify defense and combat activities; have the people establish an air defense system and motivate the people to be ready for action against enemy counterattacks.

K. Make timely improvement of the methods of guidance and command. Presently, we must concentrate the capabilities and resourcefulness of the masses to settle the changing situation. They must fully understand our immediate objectives and closely coordinate our main and secondary objectives. Follow up the situation every minute and disseminate our victories every moment. In all situations, especially in difficult ones, we must demonstrate persistence, readiness, calmness, intelligence and accuracy in our leadership activities. Division of work must be proper. Leadership must be thorough. Key missions must be fully understood and inflexibility must be avoided. Signal and liaison activities must be immediately improved to meet the requirements of the reporting procedures and especially to maintain contact with immediate objectives and between various regions and COSVN or the Military Affairs Committee, so that directives can be given promptly and without interruption. The Region Party Committees and Military Region Party Committees must make the various echelons fully aware of the above; work out a plan of future activities; devise a method of leadership and submit reports to the COSVN Current Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee of the Liberation Army Headquarters.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1 February 1968

FOR THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE MILITARY AFFAIRS  
COMMITTEE OF NAM TROUNG (COSVN):

(Signed)

BAY HONG

End of Translation

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

## NVA/VC TACTICS

## Introduction

In the initial phases of the war, the NVA had many experienced cadre who had successfully employed a hit and run technique against the French. Also, the enemy conducted set piece battles and operations of attrition. At the present time the enemy still employs the above techniques and will usually remain in contact when one of two situations arise. First, the enemy will remain and fight when his withdrawal route is blocked by the attacking force or supporting arms. Second, the enemy will remain in contact when the situation appears favorable. If in a favorable situation, the enemy will sometimes attempt to exploit the contact by reinforcing with up to battalion size forces. This report will cover the tactics employed by the NVA in Northern I Corps and is divided into five major categories.

## Pre-Operation Requirements

## A. Reconnaissance

The enemy initiates all operations usually only after a detailed reconnaissance of the objective area has been conducted. The NVA employs reconnaissance companies in small groups of personnel posing as civilians and in some cases as Allied Forces. The purpose of the Reconnaissance is to obtain information on the terrain, the indigenous population, and the opposing forces.

In regard to terrain, the enemy makes detailed sketches of all key terrain features. The study will include stream beds, rivers, hills, roads, and concealed areas. Ground reconnaissance is a major factor for any operation. Usually when terrain permits, the NVA have set a pattern of using the stream beds as the avenues of approach. Ground reconnaissance will therefore include detailed scaled drawings of the surrounding area.

Also of importance in the reconnaissance effort is the attitude of the indigenous population as to whether they will support the Communist attack or the Allied Forces. Usually, the team will locate sympathizers and exploit these people for further information and usually force them to provide forced labor and food. Finally, the reconnaissance team although it is very rare, may have the additional mission of locating replacements for their ranks. These replacements may be volunteers or they may be forced into NVA service.

Finally, the strength and the disposition of the opposing forces will be determined. This reconnaissance will be conducted over a period of time and will include patterns and locations of day and night security forces and patrols.

Also included in the reconnaissance will be locations of automatic and crew served weapons, command bunkers and communications centers; in other words these positions will be priority targets during the attack. The enemy will also note any patterns set by the defenders as to when they are the most vulnerable and what time patrols depart and return including their size. The enemy will sometimes try to infiltrate the

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 25

perimeter posing as a member of the defending force or as an indigenous worker. Finally, he uses his sapper elements to probe positions from which he tries to determine the depth of the defense and perimeter weaknesses.

The enemy reconnaissance program can be conducted over long periods of time. The enemy has demonstrated the uneasy use of patience.

#### B. Command and Control

From his analysis of the reconnaissance, the enemy plans for all anticipated courses of action that could develop on the battle field. From the probable course of action the NVA develop the appropriate and sometimes rigid pre-planned control measures. This system is often so rigid that it limits tactical initiative. Because of the detailed planning and control, no elaborate control measures are required except to follow pre-determined responses to anticipated situations.

The enemy attempts to thoroughly rehearse for an operation beginning with models of the objectives and finishing with rehearsals on similar terrain. During the rehearsal phase, officers and soldiers are thoroughly conditioned and indoctrinated in every aspect of the attack so that each person knows exactly what his mission is. Usually, so thoroughly is the rehearsal phase, that once the attack is initiated no commands are necessary other than to respond to a different course of action. Inherent NVA rigidity in planning operations has led to confusion when an unanticipated situation has arisen.

### Offensive Operations

#### A. Attacks on Fixed Installations

When the enemy conducts an attack on a fixed installation, he relies heavily on sapper teams to maintain the momentum and determine the success of the attack. The assault may follow several tactical patterns.

First, the enemy may employ preparatory fires on the objective in the early morning between 0200 to 0400. Preparatory fires will be gradual and increase as the time for the ground assault nears. Usually the enemy will employ recoilless rifle fire and artillery fire if these are available as well as mortar fires. As the mortar fire progresses toward the center of the perimeter, sappers move to destroy security bunkers and protective wire. It should be noted that sappers empty small charges with in the perimeter to deceive the defenders that preparatory fires are continuing resulting in personnel being caught unaware in their positions and bunkers so that some observation is mandatory.

The NVA hope that the defenders will not maintain usual observation of the wire and the sappers can successfully plant destructive charges. Once the obstacles are neutralized the enemy attack has a good chance of success. Infantry follow sapper units in accordance with the attack plan. Usually sappers will then accompany the infantry destroying gun emplacements and command bunkers while they add to the confusion.

Second, the NVA may employ the infantry to initiate the assault with sapper elements following intrase. The momentum of the attack will be maintained by the infantry while the sappers perform preplanned neutralization destruction missions again adding to the confusion. This type of attack is usually employed only when the infantry unit has a limited sapper capability.

Finally, the enemy may initiate an attack by surprise without the use of preparatory fire. When this tactic is employed, the enemy will move into the attack position during the hours of darkness in small groups of varied size or smaller. This technique reduces the element of detection.

UNCLASSIFIED

the NVA will employ supporting arms to include mortar, recoilless rifle and artillery fire.

Generally, the enemy recently initiates his attacks against defensive positions just before light and ceases the attack just after sunrise. Therefore, the ground attack will commence approximately at 0500 and end at approximately 0730 when the enemy will break contact unless fixed. This type of attack reduces the use of air power and requires extensive use of supporting arms. The enemy employs a modified version of a non-supported non-illuminated attack.

#### B. Use of Supporting Arms

The enemy does employ mortars and machine guns heavily in support of infantry. Usually preparatory fires will begin in the early morning about 0200 and last until the time of attack. The enemy employs supporting arms just forward of the assaulting forces. Not only will the NVA employ mortars and machine guns but also rockets, recoilless rifles and artillery if these are available.

Lately the enemy has reduced the intensity of his night preparatory fires and has initiated supported daylight attacks. This is a new procedure and advantageous since it forces the defenders to use their supporting arms in a selected which permits the maneuver of other units with freedom from attack by supporting arms.

The enemy employs recoilless rifle fires which are organic to each battalion, to reduce command bunkers, gun positions and crew served weapons positions. Armor, if present, is first priority. The NVA displace supporting weapons forward by echelon usually following the breaching of outer defenses in the attack.

On other occasions, the NVA will employ supporting arms in attacks by fire only. They may also have pre-planned fires in support and then withdraw them immediately after the assault is initiated. Because of the increasing trend for fighting in conventional warfare, the NVA are increasing the use of supporting arms.

#### C. Patrol Tactics

The enemy does extensive security patrolling and combat patrolling with the ambush. The enemy is a master of the ambush. There are several principle tactics employed by the NVA. NVA ambushes are usually baited.

All the ambushes are pre-planned in great detail usually initiated in the most favorable terrain featuring good cover and concealment and where least expected. If the terrain does not offer mutual concealment the enemy will compensate by building mutually supporting spider holes and low shellouted bunkers difficult to observe except at short range. The ambush is initiated in the following manner.

A small group of one or two will deploy forward of the actual area and act as bait by sniping at the approaching force. The sniper fire alerts those NVA in the main ambush and draws the allied forces into the killing zone. Once the force enters the zone, the ambush is initiated concentrating on the lead element. The purpose of the covering fire is to inflict casualties on the units attempting to recover their dead and wounded. The enemy sometimes covers these casualties by fire.

Another technique is to allow the lead element to pass through the ambush and direct the fire on the center of the force and against the command group. This technique used to reduce a unit piecemeal with minimum NVA casualties. If a unit tries to withdraw from the killing zone, the enemy will initiate pre-registered mortar fire on them trying to block their withdrawal.

DECLASSIFIED

The best defense against the ambush is to remain well dispersed and whenever possible to avoid column formations. A double point and flank security are also useful in preventing ambushes. In likely ambush areas, selective reconnaissance by fire has proven effective.

The enemy mainly employs the horseshoe ambush and will ambush a unit that sets a pattern which can be taken advantage of or allows its guard to drop. The enemy is patient and willing to remain in concealed covered positions for extended periods.

#### Defensive Operations

The NVA usually establish harbor sites or base camps in an area near water since it is a food requirement and offers some protection from high angle of fire weapons. The defensive positions are usually 360° perimeter built in depth. The degree will have an inner perimeter as well as an outer perimeter. Defensive positions are normally supported by mortars in the secondary inner perimeter or mutually supporting bunker and trench complexes.

Defensive positions consist of low shillouted bunkers with small apertures. Each bunker is manned by three men or one NVA cell. Three cells equal a squad including the squad leader. The bunkers are well constructed of logs, bamboo, and dirt carefully camouflaged. The bunkers offer good protection from mortars fire and indirect fire. Bunkers have been noted occasionally in a north-south defense making them most vulnerable from an east-west attack. The bunkers usually take advantage of natural approaches, trails and the best terrain.

When terrain permits the enemy will occupy a reverse slope defense and in a few instances a forward slope. Also the bunker complex may be located along well used trails thereby increasing the opportunity to serve as carefully concealed ambush positions.

Since the bunkers are very low to the ground they are hard to reduce with a rocket launcher and are best reduced by neutralizing one bunker at a time and containing the enemy with fire and maneuvering small units. Napalm prep has produced good results.

#### Withdrawal

The enemy plans withdrawals both from offensive and defensive operations in the same manner. At first the NVA will displace their support by echelon while the infantry will try to contain the friendly force. Once the displacement is achieved, the infantry with sappers units will conduct a retrograde by leaps and bounds. The sappers may plant mines or booby traps to impede the pursuing force. Also small groups of snipers will be left to further impede the pursuing force.

Once the major unit has broken contact the enemy disappears into small groups who follow different routes to a predetermined rally point. This dispersion makes the enemy difficult to pursue by fire or ground forces except when movement is channelized. The enemy must be contained once contact is made by blocking withdrawal routes.

## Notable Trends

The enemy has recently conducted assaults against defensive positions in the early morning using the hours of darkness to cover his movement. Lately, the NVA have employed day light assaults against defensive positions. Also he will prefer to make contact until the hours of darkness when he breaks contact, disperses into small groups and withdraws under cover of darkness.

In the early phases of the war, the enemy would not initiate contact with a friendly unit allowing them to gain a feeling of security or to set a pattern. Once a unit became lax or set a pattern the enemy would strike at the force with a good chance of success. The enemy must be detected in his positions because he will initiate the action only when he is well prepared. The NVA desire to make contact on a battlefield of his choice and on one that favors his tactics, techniques and support weapons.



PRODINVESTIGATION OF AN ENEMY CRITICAL POINT

Requested - When <sup>ASSIGNED THE</sup> ~~received as a~~ mission <sup>FOR</sup> ~~an~~ operation, observe the situation with high spirit, getting good results, complete consideration.

- Block the enemy by situation observation.

- (1) Terrain around
- (2) Obstacles and installations
- (3) Construction of house interior.
- (4) Defensive measures and day and night watch regulations
- (5) Strength, element, weapons, communication
- (6) Officer's and E.M.'s morale

005  
T10  
Plans

SITUATION

Important meaning; is a task in the whole operational area concerning our occupation.

In the area where our activities are accomplished well, the rotation of troops and unit will be better.

Tasks were discovered by badly organized activity.

#### I. To be completely familiar with terrain situation.

Should have complete records about villages, the terrain around; where the roads come from, where the automobile station, bicycle, passengers, find out what they have in boats while transporting on the river.

How many seats they have, what kind of ground resources.

Traffic laws and how the people charge each other.

The people's living conditions? WHAT <sup>are</sup> their occupations?

Revolutionary spirit? Their customs?

Knowing enemy situation? Name of that position? What are the regulations of that position.

Secret enemy, inform man, suspects, oppression system; knowing whole ARVN dependents, government employees, try to find out where they live, make contact. <sup>ALL</sup> ~~with~~ ~~known~~ with military proselyting, village secret police, underground element) classification of ARVN, government employees such as 11 DPA, ARVN, RF, Special Forces.

Another side, Division Headquarters, Regiment Hqs, especially 1st Regiment, 2nd, 3rd, and American 3rd Division, Quang Tri sector, Thua Thien, field police such as 333, 222. Political side - provincial administration, provincial Buddhist organization, Buddhist Institute, Student Organization.

Objective is central organization, Headquarters, record keeper, typist, important organizations. Using any method and conventional plot to convince them.

After finding those people out, progress directly or indirectly.

People pertaining to HUE city, QUANG TRI, DONG HA, their occupation and living conditions.

#### II. CITY SITUATION

Communication or installation is trained to know well the city situation in order to have good results, serving as requesting <sup>ed by the</sup> of organization, headquarters intelligence office.

- (1) Terrain of city, boundary of city, district

(2) Are there many streets? Their names? Which one is crowded? Deserted? One way streets? How many chess square areas? House numbers at both ends of streets., Odd, even number?

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 26

- instruct the liaison using dead letter box.

(3) About the water way, where is the source of the rivers? where do they flow to? Ships? Boats? Transports on the river?

Ferry landings deep? Shallow? Big? Small?

(4) Are there any markets? Their names? How big? Their location? Market ground resource gathering and dismissing time? Bus station?

(5) Means of transportation

(6) National police, military police check points, secret police, security police check points.

(7) Military posts, their names; their strength & disposition.

- Where is the location of the military, security and administrative offices; air field and storage.

- The area of high ranking officers, government employees.

(8) Public park, site, public hotel.

(9) Situation of the people after demonstrations.

(Be cautious: Item #6, 7, 8, and 10 are important. Mission is to collect the documents of the enemy and the people).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: No Item #10 is shown in the original document.

#### HOW TO USE "DEAD" LETTER BOX.

1. "Dead" Letter Box is a method that<sup>is</sup> usually used in the Intelligence Service. It is a good and valuable means of communication. It also preserves secrecy because the messengers would not know each other. It is difficult for the enemy to discover our personnel. The "Dead" letter box is a simple method of tactical intelligence.

#### DEAD LETTER BOX LOCATION REQUIREMENTS:

1. Safety area, enemy observed area, no enemy security or intelligence services, non-populated area.

2. Well recognized location.

3. Favorable area for the messengers who take and get their mail.

4. Two different ways to go and come back.

5. Dead letter box to provide ease of observation.

NOTE: The above stated points (#1, 2, and 3) are very important.

#### DESCRIPTION OF A DEAD LETTER BOX.

To describe accurately, clearly and briefly the place where the letter box is set up.

1. The direction, from A to B.

2. Recognize places (e.g. Churches, bridges, etc.)
3. Use anything to set up the letter box (box, can, jade to describe the color.
4. How to receive mail from the dead letter box, guidance of messenger, from A to B point. How to get mail (standing or sitting, using left or right hand)
5. To place signs or pass words at dead letter box.
6. To prevent enemy observation.
7. To make up a story to talk with the people or enemy who you meet on the way.

SIZE OF THE LETTER BOX

Small, medium, big

Use the big size to put radios, demolition charges or other large objects.  
Prearrange the schedule of pickup.  
Set up signal before and after ~~the~~ making pickup from the letter box.

MISSIONS TO BE PERFORMED IN CARRYING  
OUT THE 11 N.L.H. CRITERIA

FILE

CRITERION 1EXTERMINATION OF STAY-BEHIND COMMUNISTS

1. a : Make an organizational chart of the VC infra-structures in every hamlet, to include the following data:
- (1) Labor Party
  - (2) South VN Liberation Front
  - (3) Administrative agencies
  - (4) Military organizations
1. b : Compile data concerning the biography and activities of the staybehind VC in those organizations.
1. c : Make a list of the full-time VC born in the very hamlet and compile all data pertaining to their biography and activities,
1. d : Check all families that have VC sympathizers or other members who follow the VC.
1. e : Call on, arrest or destroy the VC mentioned in 1. b and 1. c (in an ambush raid or patrol...) and capture all their weapons. Take them to the local authorities.
1. g : Isolate the families mentioned in 1. d to prevent the liaison between them the VC.
1. h : Discover, use or destroy all the covert fortifications of the VC such as shelters, communicating trenches or information stations...
1. i : Draw plan of the hamlet, pay attention to the houses, fortifications and other critical features of terrain.
1. k : Make inventory of all resources and man-power in hamlets. Establish the family-census cards.
1. l : Coordinate with the local authorities in establishing the regulations for the movement of resources, man-power, in day-time as well as in night-time, stipulating the curfew and organizing the check-points and checking teams.
1. m : Implant the C/G cadres in every hamlet to follow up the VC infrastructures.
- / —

Encl 27

CRITERION 2

## EXTERMINATION OF THE VILLAGE BULLIES

2a/- Make a list of those who are denounced as bullies by one or more individuals in the hamlet.

2b/- Make investigation to affirm or deny the accusation and acquire more useful information.

- Establish dossiers and consider carefully the relations among the defendants and among the plaintiffs in hamlets and higher levels.

- Come to the conclusion that:

- (1) the defendant is innocent
- (2) the defendant is unjustly accused
- (3) the defendant has committed minor offense
- (4) the defendant has committed major offense

If we do not come to any conclusion we should make another investigation for further information.

If we can't because the investigation is not within our competence, then forwards complete dossiers to Higher authority.

2c/- Should the accused be considered innocent and should the plaintiff be sincere and honest, we ought to bring the injustice to light, that is we ought to explain clearly to the plaintiff in order to avoid any misunderstanding.

If the accused is considered innocent and further, the plaintiff has made false statement, the slander will be investigated. We should tactfully correct those who have uttered slander about somebody on their own account, otherwise, forward the complete dossiers to Provincial Command, with one copy to the Central authority.

In case the defendant commits minor offense and the plaintiff only requests the former be warned, we should help him to recognize his faults.

If the accused commits major offense, we should forward the complete dossiers to Provincial Command with one copy to Central authority, for disciplinary action or for trial, and inter-teams and Special commissioner from Central authority should be reminded to pay attention to these people whenever they participate in the activities of the Group.

In case the solution of the responsible official is not made in time or not satisfactory, the Group leader concerned will bring this case in the periodical meeting with the central authority.

2d/- Implant C/G Cadres in every hamlet to take follow-up action on our infrastructures.

CRITERION 3DISPELLING OF RANCOUR - BUILDING OF A NEW SPIRIT

3.a: Reconciling disagreements and resentments between individuals families and groups. The difference in privileges, political parties, localities, religions and languages may cause disagreements and resentments. Any kind of the latter should be reconciled, whether they be present or future disagreements and resentments. Help from the Provincial Command should be asked in case we are unable to reconcile them.

3.b: Motivating in such a way that there is mutual aid between families, lineages and hamlets in their farm work (exchange and rotation of work), in their community development work as well as in the reconstructional activities after any natural disaster, typhoon or flood.

3.c: Helping the hamlet R.D. Committee organize one or two days of collective activities per month, gathering the majority of hamlet people in an area. Each mass group's program of activity should depend on the circumstances. But in general, it may be as follows:

(1) Conferences:

- a.- Singing of the national anthem - Trooping the colors. Commemoration of dead heroes.
- b.- Election of presidium.
- c.- Reports on R.D. activities which have been performed since last conference
- Criticism - Examination - Observation on good points and shortcomings.
- d.- Study of monthly magazines of directives which have just been received.
- e.- Hearing of special broadcasts about R.D. activities. Discussion.
- g.- Plans for activities in the next month (11 criteria)
- h.- Comments - Distribution of work.

(2) Community Development Activities:

Community Development Activities of one or many planned missions. Comments and distribution of work: new missions or repairs of what has been done in former missions.

(3) Military, Sport and Music Trainings:

- (a) Military training - Repair of combat fortifications and practice of alert.
- (b) Training or competitions of ping-pong, badminton, volley-ball, soccer.....
- (c) Training of march in review.
- (d) Singing and theatrical performances practice.
- (e) Training of shouting slogans.

3.d: Motivating the neighbouring RD Committees in such a way that there are competitions of community development, military, sport and music trainings between hamlets.

3.e: Motivating and helping refugee families return to their villages.

3.g: Motivating and helping families the members of which follow the VC call on them to come back to our sides.

3.h: Motivating qualified and reputable elements to stand as candidates for leading positions in administrative organizations and people's ones. Organizing or helping organize any elections so that there are real freedom and justice in them.

3.i: Encouraging the people's participation in conferences for the expression of ideas criticism and distribution of work. Everybody has the right to express his own ideas as well as the <sup>right</sup> to participate in any conferences. In conferences, people's rights must not be infringed by any authority. And nobody can use money to get into someone's good graces in conferences or to avoid participating in them.

3.k: Motivating pupils' parents to better educate their children. At the same time training young children in such a way that they know to take off their hats, to bow their heads, to politely inquire their elders whenever they meet them. Young children should also be taught not to ask for money, for candies when seeing someone, and they should respect themselves and be proud of being Vietnamese young children.

3.l: Motivating young men who can make both ends meet to stay in their village for the protection of it instead of going to work in towns for their money.

3.m: Motivating young men to be moderate in their alcohol drinking and to eliminate gambling.

3.n: Motivating young girls not to wear sex-appeal clothes and not to earn their living by prostituting themselves. Helping the authorities to eliminate open of dishonored brothers.

3.o: Motivating bookshops not to buy or sell obscene books or magazines.

3.p: Motivating as many young men and girls as possible to participate in "national language popularization" and "mass education" classes. Teaching them how to read, how to write; Giving them lessons about Vietnamese History, Geography, Language and Customs.

3.q: Motivating everybody to use the Vietnamese language in speaking, writing and singing. Motivating shop-owners to write Vietnamese in the advertisements and the sign-boards of their shops. Popularizing the National Anthem as well as patriotic and healthy songs. Preventing crazy and obscene music as well as dances.

3.r: Motivating the Hamlet RD Committee and the village administrative committee to build temples, to name roads and installations, to compose heave-hoes and folk songs for the adoration of local heroes..

3.s: Motivating the concerned families to simply organize their festivals, marriage ceremonies as well as funerals and to diminish the expenditures for these events.

3.t: Motivating the Hamlet RD Committee to organize main ceremonies in the hamlet as mentioned in (3.c)

3.u: Motivating the people to get rid of their beliefs in ghosts, demons, sorcerers, mediums and the burning of votive papers. Motivating the people to use machines, medicines and scientific farming methods.

3.v: Motivating young men who reach the age of military service to enlist themselves.

3.x: Motivating young men and girls to participate, in great number and wholeheartedly, in popular groups' activities.

3.y: Motivating families which owe tax to the government or money to the Agricultural Credit Office to pay their taxes and money at fixed time. Helping families which are entitled to Government aid to early receive it.

C R I T E R I O N 4ORGANIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC, MASS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS.

4.a: Searching, establishing contacts with, organizing, training and testing a number of qualified and reputable elements for leading positions in administrative and people's organizations.

4.b: Organizing cells then groups of RD Young Men, Young Girls, RD Youngsters and associations such as Farmers' Associations.

4.c: Organizing the election of the Hamlet R.D. Committee. The Committee components should be flexible, depending on the locality. In principle, the Committee should include 1 Chairman, 1 Vice Chairman, 1 Member in charge of Military affairs, one for Culture, one for Public Health, one for Agriculture and one for Reconstruction.

4.d: Helping the Hamlet R.D. Committee organize one or two days of collective activities per month for the groups to hold conferences, to study political and military subjects, to play games and music and to carry out their community development, activities (Mission 3.c)

Guiding and sponsoring the groups' activities till an undetermined future.

4.e: Motivating and guiding the Hamlet R.D. Committee to draw up a hamlet constitution to fix the hamlet regulations and also the punishment measures applicable to those who do not respect those regulations. The hamlet regulations should report the RD spirit and especially the new spirit mentioned in Criterion 3. The hamlet regulations should not be contrary to the national laws.

4.g: Helping local authorities organize elections of Hamlet Councils, Village People Representatives Committees.

Motivating qualified and reputable men to stand as candidates.

Motivating the people, as many as possible, to go to vote.

4.h: If asked, helping the District train the elected administrative personnel.

4.i: Organizing ceremonies of hamlet constitution promulgation and of the Hamlet Council's and the Hamlet RD Committee's cathtaking. They will pledge to be absolutely honourable and economical, to decidedly serve their people, regardless of any difficulties as well as miseries.



CRITERION 5ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE TO FIGHT AGAINST THE V.C.

5. a : Finding out, contacting with, organizing, training and testing some elements having capability and prestige to assume the command in various organizations of People's struggle against the V.C.

5. b : Forming combat family cells, warning cells, liaisons cells, firstaid cells..... Organizing combat inter-families and combat sections.

5.c : Guiding the above-mentioned cells to study military and political combat orders, setting up defense works and obstacles, studying positions and procedure of setting obstacles.

5.d : Helping hamlet R.D. Committee organize criticism sessions, assigning hamlet inhabitants to clear bushes and fencing village and hamlet with barbed wire bombooc trees, tamarind, cactus.....

5.e : Guiding combat family cells, in practice, holding at least one criticism session every month.

5.g : Organizing liaison system (radio, commo-liaison, fire signal) between hamlet and village, groups, neighboring military units and district.

5.h : Finding out, establishing contact with, training and testing some male and female Youths having ability and prestige to arm them in the future.

5.i : Organizing active cells then R.D. Armed Youths.

5.k : Giving military training to active cells, guiding them in studying orders and setting up defense works and obstacles.

5.l : Guiding the above mentioned cells practicing self-criticism meetings at least twice a month.

5.m : Requesting provincial authorities for arming those cells.

5.n : Guiding those cells in work so as to enable them to score many achievements. The guidance should be continuous till an undetermined future.

5.p : Requesting provincial authorities for helping RD Armed Youths being killed or wounded by the V.C. (Death gratuity: 10,000\$, seriously wounded: 4,000\$ slightly wounded: 2,000\$) urging RD Committee and Village Administrative Committee to name some streets and public installations after those fighters for rememorances.

5.q : Urging and helping scattered families move inside the hamlet. Movement must be made voluntarily, without Gov't allowances or indemnities. Thus, they should be moved within the range of 1,000 meters only.

5.r : Urging enthusiasts and qualified youths to join R.D. group or Popular Forces if its members required for the village are not adequate.

CRITERION 6ERADICATION OF ILLITERACY

6.a : Identifying and making a list of illiterate people from 10 to 45 years old or those reading and writing are too bad, number of students in the current year and that planned for the next one, the number and present status of classes and places that can be used as classrooms, number of teachers or individuals that can be urged or recruited as teachers.

6.b : Organizing classes for "propagating national language" and those for "popular education". The former give lessons in reading and writing; the latter give lessons in history, geography, language and V.N. customs. These classes also deal with various topics mentioned in Item "Tasks to be carried out to meet criterion 3's requirements": "Eradication of hatred and resentment to bring about a new spirit". Urging male and female educated youths to voluntarily serve as teachers and persuading hamlet youths to attend those classes. Requesting provincial authorities for granting 19,000\$ to every New Life Hamlet as fixed for its expenses.

6.c : Reading and commenting on monthly magazines during communal meetings. (task 3.c.)

6.d : Helping hamlet R.D. Committee organize criticism sessions, assignments of work, build and repair classrooms. Urging parents of students to send them to school. Requesting provincial authorities for the distribution of 85,000\$, 75 bags of cement and 80 iron sheets as fixed for each classroom. Each New Life Hamlet could build as many as 5 classrooms, each having at least one teacher. Reporting immediately to provincial authorities and requesting for their intervention when those classes, due to any reason, stop their activities.

CRITERION 7WAR ON DISEASES

7a/- Inducement of families into sanitary lodging, eating and clothing: They should learn to get sound nourishing food, boiled water, to keep away from flies, mosquitoes, dirt and trashes; to like aerated orderly dwellings instead of obscure slum houses, to take to baths, clean clothes and daily gyms. Each household be provided with a well kept latrine, tidy clean kitchen and a trash pit. Fly proof meat safes and mosquito nets be of common use in every house.

7.b : Motivation of hamlet R.D. Councils and Sub-hamlet chiefs to afford potable waterwells and sewage system to every sub-hamlet: The Province are requested to cover these expenses in the form of "Autonomous budget". Each project will be provided with approx 50,000\$ and materials.

7.c : Assistance to R.D. Councils in self-criticism, work distributions, construction and repair of small hospitals, maternity wards. The Provinces are requested to allot the provision reserved for Small Hospitals and Maternity wards

that includes 220,000, 175 bags of cement and 153 sheets of corrugated iron. Every hospital and Maternity hospital can have a rural nurse and laborer. Lying-in women and patients be induced to come to hospitals and maternity wards. The province be reported right away on any interruption of activity for an immediate intervention.

7.d : Motivation and inducement of R.D. Councils and Admin-Committee in hamlets to organize night shifts of tri-wheeled scooters for patients to districts and provinces.

## C R I T E R I O N 8

### LAND REFORMS

8.a : Encouragement, assistance favoring the making of tenancy leases to replace verbal agreements and renewing of expired leases; We have now 3 categories of leases: A, B and C. Leases of category A deal with relations between lessors and tenants in regard of cultivated lands; leases of category B with uncultivated lands; leases of category C with uncultivated lands whose owners are absent and replaced by village Administrative Committees.

8.b : Encouragement, assistance to farmers to put into application their leases especially in regard of rents that are stipulated by the government to rate from 15% to 25% of the main crop in the year.

8.c : Vulgarization and explanation of GVN's decisions on the collection of arrears owed by farmers during periods of insecurity. This means land owners are not allowed to claim for rents during years while the zones of rented fields were considered by local authorities as insecure zones, i.e., while owners were exempted from agrarian taxes.

8.d : Assistance to Farmers' Associations to make a list of abandoned fields of all private and juridic persons and suggest the Village Admin-Committee to have them immediatly exploited.

8.e : Assistance to Farmers' Associations to hold criticism sessions and determine meritorious individuals for recommendation to village Admin-Committees.

(1) In land-distributions, priorities be given to RD fighters and meritorious persons in the reconstruction and defense of villages and hamlets.

(2) Free distribution of lands and fields be put into effect instead of invitation for bids.

8.g : Assistance to Farmers' Associations to request for village Admin-Committees settlement of tenancy alternations caused by previous Reds' distribution of land.

8.h : Assistance to Farmers' Associations to request for village Admin-Committees settlement of illegal occupancies of public properties.

8.i : Assistance to Farmers' Associations and Village Admin. Committees to reconcile agrarian conflicts.

8.k : Assistance to village Admin. Committees in issuances of land titles to purchasers of expropriated fields.

## CRITERION 2

AGRICULTURE AND HANDICRAFT DEVELOPMENT

9a/- Help to Farmers' Associations to turn out Sections for Agric., hydraulics, Crop works, Animal husbandry, fisheries and small industry according to local economic activities.

9b/- Coordination of Agric. cadres already on special assignment in intergroups guide and help Farmers' Associations in launching campaigns to improve rice productivities, minor crops, animal raising or fisheries in line with local conditions as follows:

(1) Build up or repair of hydraulic works : dykes, dams, sluices, canals, drains and sewers etc...

(2) Distribute, lend or sell at low cost :

- a. Chemical fertilizers
- b. Rice seedlings, seeds cereals, plants, animals
- c. Feeding and housing materials for home beasts
- d. Chemicals and drugs for plant and beast protection
- e. Farming equipment : motor plows, pumps and sprayers

(3) Grant NACO loans

(4) Set up demonstration centers and training courses in modern technics.

Each NLH's Farmers Association is entitled, in principle, to the following operational loans from the GVN : 60,000\$ of seed and seedlings - 40 breeding pigs (25,000\$) Or 640 chicks (150\$) - 1000\$ of building materials or 4 bags of cement for pig-sty construction - 500\$ of Materials for poultry houses - 300\$ of Feed of all kinds for each pig - 20\$ of feed for each chick - 10,000\$ of plant protection on chemicals for home beasts a lot of water pumps (10,000\$/each) a lot of sprayers (2,000\$/each).

Moreover each NLH can set up 2 Animal husbandry demonstration centers and 2 Crop demonstration centers (each former center has right to 6,000\$ of loans in breeding animals and feeds for 6 months - each latter center can have a loan of 2 (2,000\$).

Provincial Agric. Services or Animals Husbandry Services are provided with allowances for 2 crop training sessions and 2 animal husbandry training sessions in each NLH during 1967.

Poor farmers can have easily NACO loans (with RD cadres' proposal and RD group leaders' approvals) for crop growing if they promise to observe the technical instructions of Agric.-cadres and to pay back on time.

9c/- Request to RD provincial command to intervene with the Provincial government for provision of implementation needs.

9d/- Motivation of Prov. Gov. to carry out hydraulic programs under the management of "State agents" and the RD Provincial Command; with participation of mass-group thru clear and fair time keeping and attendance systems.

9e/- Help to Farmers' Associations to hold criticism for bringing up active farmers with technical abilities in competitive campaigns for improvements of rice, minor crops, animal husbandry, fisheries in line with local conditions.

9g/- Assistance to Agric. Cadres to set up, guide and manage demonstration centers.

- 9H : Help to Agric. Cadres to train proposed farmers in demonstration centers.
- 9J : Recommendation of farmers for NACO Loans.
- 9K : Assistance to Agric. Cadres to make with proposed farmers leases with the following main conditions :
- (1) NACO loans can be only used on farming activities (growing main crop or minor crops.
  - (2) Distributions, loans and low cost purchases concern only fertilizers, breeding species, feeds, housing materials for beasts, drugs, crops and animal protection chemicals, farming tools.
  - (3) Participation in training courses and strict observation of technical instructions.
  - (4) Diligent crop work
  - (5) Timely return of loans in commodities
  - (6) " " " " in cash
- 9L : Assistance to Agric. Cadres in guidance of Agric. campaigns and rotation of the farming equipment among borrowers.
- 9M : Assistance to Agric. Cadres :
- (1) In getting back NACO loans in cash and in commodities.
  - (2) In organizing the 2nd wave of campaigns.
- 9N : Motivation of Farmers Assistance to organize handicraft trainings in knitting, embroidery, weaving, sewing, hat making etc... for farmers to carry out after crop time (In handicraft NLH's, Farmers' Associations have to materials loans, provisions of technical improvements and electrifications).

### C R I T E R I O N 10

#### DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LIAISON NETWORK

IOa/- Assist the hamlet RD Committee in making plan of developing the roads net in hamlets. This plan should include at least the following :

- (1) Build or repair a main road traversing through the public buildings in hamlet. This road should be wide and solid enough for vehicle traffic up to class 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ t.
- (2) Build or repair a number of secondary roads, linking hamlets with the main road. Those roads should be only wide enough for "trilam" circulation.
- (3) Build or repair a number of trails, linking inter-houses with secondary roads. These trails are just passable for bicycles.

- (4) Build or repair bridges and culverts and markets.

- (5) Implant road signs fixing authorized types of vehicles along the roads

IOb/- Assist the hamlet RD Committee in commenting on the distribution of works for the community projects mentioned in (2) (3) (4) (5) above.

Request Provincial authority to financially support the "Self-help Projects". Each projects is estimated at 50,000\$ plus a quantity of materials.

IOc/- Request Provincial authority to approve the Project "en Regie" (under state management) referred to (1) above. Help the RD Committee and the people's bodies assure fair control over the pay roster of local employees.

10d/- Take steps with Provincial authority to sell "trilam" and radio sets on hire purchases basis and set up post-stations and information stations. Assist the Hamlet Council and the RD Committee in organizing public criticism on the purchasing to assure fairness.

### C R I T E R I O N 11

#### SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR SOLDIERS

11a/- Make a list of those who actively participate in the revolutionary development. Maneuver the RD Committee to command the individuals recommended as RD soldiers. This list will be confirmed every year, by October, during a meeting of all people in hamlets.

11b/- Maneuver the RD Committee to highlight the RD soldiers during meetings, festivals or other collective activities.

11c/- Maneuver the village Administrative Committee and the Farmers' Association to organize a public session discussing about the land to be granted to the RD Soldiers.

11d/- Maneuver the RD Committee and the Village Council to organize a public session commenting on the precedence to be given to the RD Soldiers to receive government aid and the agricultural credit loans.

11e/- Take steps with the Provincial Authority to give aid to the dependents of the late RD Soldiers.

11g/- Maneuver the hamlet RD Committee to give realistic aid to the orphans and widows of the RD Soldiers. Advise the Village Administrative Committee to give roads and installations the names of the late RD Soldiers in memory of their heroic deeds.

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

15:RHH:wba  
2 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADC

From: Division Engineer

Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress for period 24 Feb through 1 Mar 1968

Ref: (a) DSAG ltr to CG, III MAF, AVCA-QN-DN-EN, 16Feb68  
(b) CG, 3dMarDiv ltr to CG, III MAF, 15:RHH:wba, 29Feb68  
(c) CG, III MAF ltr to ComNavForV Rep (Base Development) 15/jek 11010, 26Feb68  
(d) CG, 3dMarDiv ltr to CG, III MAF, 15:RHH:dwg, 10Feb68  
(e) CG, 3dMarDiv ltr to CG, III MAF, 15:RHH:dwg, 12Feb68

1. The following transpired during the report period.

a. The Danang Sub-Area Command by reference (a) requested a site within the Quang Tri area for use by the Army's 1st Logistical Command for an FSA. The request was coordinated by the QTCB Coordinator and was concured with by reference (b) with one exception. A 75m X 200m site within the requested area was retained for use by the 3d Marine Division PMO, CIT and ITT compound.

b. Reference (c) assigned a priority of 2.5 to the temporary water distribution system requested in reference (d) and a priority of 2.6 to the construction of 2-500 man messhalls requested in reference (e). It was requested that ComNavForV Rep (Base Development) task 3d NCB with the responsibility for providing these facilities as soon as shipping permits. Since materials for 1-500 man messhall was on hand in Dong Ha preliminary site preparation began 1 March 1968. The pipe necessary for the construction of the temporary water distribution system is in Danang and construction will begin as soon as shipping is available. In the meantime it is planned to haul water from a water point to be established by the 3d Engineer Battalion.

Encl 28

c. Second increment construction of 100 Sea Huts and 1-500 man messhall began on 1 March 1968. The allocation of assets is as follows:

MCB - 7 Sea Huts  
 FLSG-B - 25 Sea Huts  
 3dMarDiv - 68 Sea Huts, 1-500 man messhall

d. The allocation of total 3d Marine Division assets, including 1st increment construction, is as follows:

	<u>Sea Huts</u>	<u>500 Man Messhalls</u>
3d Tank Cantonment	20	
3d MTBn Cantonment	36	
3d SP Cantonment	10	
3d EngrBn Cantonment	15	
HqBn Cantonment	87	1
TOTAL	168	1

2. Both 1st and 2nd increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

a. Horizontal. No work during this report period. Ground has been too wet to work and MCB-10 has been fully committed to construct the Army beach road project south of Quang Tri City.

b. Vertical.

	<u>Sea Huts Completed</u>	<u>Sea Huts Under Const</u>	<u>% Complete 1st &amp; 2nd Increment</u>
3d Tank Cantonment	20	0	100%
3d MTBn Cantonment	36	0	100%
3d SPBn Cantonment	0	2	10%
3d EngrBn Cantonment	0	2	7%
HqBn Cantonment	15	20	29%

c. Burn-Out Heads. 6 completed out of 26 - 23% complete.

Very respectfully,

*R. C. Mc Gurchan*  
 R. C. MC GURCHAN



DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

4/RLJ/jet  
4000  
2 Mar 1968

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Staff

Subj: Responsibilities of Headquarters Battalion

1. Headquarters Battalion retains the following responsibilities in the Pau Bai area. The target date for turning these over to Task Force X-Ray or MACV is shown beside the responsibility. The dates are approximate and will vary with the speed of displacement of this Battalion.


A. Reaction Company	8 March
B. Officer and Enlisted Clubs	25 March
C. Post Office	23 March
D. Post Exchange	10 March
E. Mess Hall #4	25 March
F. Officers' Billeting	25 March
G. IRO	25 March
H. Maintenance of Cantonment #4	25 March

A. I. THOMAS

Encl 29

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED



PP RUAUBUL RUMHAW RUMHMA RUMHMA RUMHMA  
DE RUMWAA 0147 0620Z  
ZNY SSSSS  
P020244Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF DANANG  
TO RUMSBJ/SEVENTH AF TSN AF  
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUMHMA/DEP COMUSMACV  
RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTH FLT  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF  
BT

*check*  
C/EF  
C/O  
C/CO  
C/PO  
APO  
ACTION *Scotland*

~~SECRET~~  
AIR STRIKES KHE SANH AREA (U)

- A. COMUSMACV 290415Z FEB 68
1. REF A DIRECTED CDR 7TH AF AND CG III MAF TAKE IMMEDIATE JOINT ACTION TO REVIEW CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOP PLANS TO PROVIDE FULL SUPPORT TO THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE COMMANDER BY ALL TACTICAL AIR ELEMENTS OF III MAF AND 7TH AF.
  2. IN CONTINUATION AND EXTENSION OF PREVIOUS PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL LIAISON AND IN RESPONSE TO REF A, A CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT HQ 7TH AF ON 1 MAR 1968. ATTENDEES INCLUDED DGEN BOLT, DIR COMBAT OPS 7TH AF, (GEN KELLER, AWC FMAW, COLONEL

C-6-3

COC/ARO/CG/CIS/CEO *(A)*

- PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0147 0620Z MAR 68
- DICK, C/S 3RD MARDIV, AND CAPT BARROW 7TH FLT LNO TO 7TH AF. THEY RECOGNIZED THE SIGNIFICANT COORDINATION OF EFFORTS WHICH ALREADY HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, AND DETERMINED TO BUILD ON THESE IN KEEPING WITH THE TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST 2-3 DAYS.
3. ACCORDINGLY, AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSION AND IN ORDER TO INSURE RESPONSIVE MAXIMIZATION OF TACTICAL AIR EFFORT AT KHE SANH, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CONFEREES PROPOSE:
- A. TO PROVIDE, BY INTERRELATED SCHEDULING BETWEEN MARINES, 7TH AF, AND TF-77, 4 FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES EVERY 15 MINUTES TO THE KHE SANH DASC BETWEEN 0700-1900 DAILY.
  - B. SIMILARLY, TO PROVIDE 2 FIGHTER/ATTACK A/C EVERY 15 MINUTES TO KHE SANH DASC BETWEEN 1900-0700 DAILY.
  - C. FIGHTER/ATTACK A/C WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THESE NUMBERS FOR EITHER NIGHT OR ALL-WEATHER RADAR CONTROLLED BOMBING, OR DAY VISUAL ATTACKS.
  - D. TO CONTINUE PROVISION OF ORDNANCE LOADING IN VOLUME AND TYPES RESPONSIVE TO THE VARYING REQUIREMENTS OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE COMMANDER, WITH EMPHASIS AS APPROPRIATE TO DESTRUCTION/INTERDICTION OF ENEMY ENTRENCHING EFFORT.
  - E. TO CONTINUE THE PROVISION OF ON-CALL SURGE CAPABILITY

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED  
*74*  
*encl 30*

02

02

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE RUMWAA 0147 [REDACTED]  
 SUPPORT BY ALERT AND DIVERT AIRCRAFT TO AUGMENT THE SCHEDULED  
 SUPPORT DESCRIBED ABOVE AND PARTICULARLY DURING FAVORABLE WEATHER  
 AND AS FAC'S EFFECTIVELY CAN CONTROL.  
 F. TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FAC SUPPORT AS THE GROUND COMMANDER  
 MAY REQUIRE IN ORDER TO EMPLOY THE MAXIMUM TACTICAL AIR EFFORT  
 DURING GOOD WEATHER PERIODS WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE KHE SANH VICINITY.  
 G. TO EXPAND MARINE TAC(A) A/C AS REQUIRED FOR ADDITIONAL  
 CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR EFFORT.  
 H. TO BE RESPONSIVE TO KHE SANH COMBAT BASE COMMANDER, AS  
 A MATTER OF PRIORITY, TO SUPPORT QUICK-THRUST TANK-INFANTRY  
 SORTIES AIMED AT DESTROYING CLOSE-IN ENEMY ENTRENCHMENTS. IN  
 THIS CONNECTION PRIOR PLANNING SHOULD OCCUR AS PRACTICABLE TO  
 ENSURE GREATEST INTEGRATION OF AIR EFFORT WITH THE GROUND  
 SCHEME OF MANEUVER.  
 I. TO CONTINUE AND EXTEND AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE FIXED  
 WING AND HELO FIRE SUPPRESSION SUPPORT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH  
 ARTILLERY, IN COORDINATED PROTECTION OF APPROACH LANES TO  
 KHE SANH AIRFIELD.  
 4. I FULLY SUPPORT THESE PROPOSALS TO ASSURE THAT THE KHE SANH  
 COMBAT BASE COMMANDER HAS THE MAXIMUM WEIGHT OF AERIAL WEAPONRY.

PAGE FOUR RUMWAA 014 [REDACTED]  
 AVAILABLE, AS A PART OF OUR JOINT EFFORT TO BREAK THE ENEMY'S  
 BACK IN NW ICIZ. ADDITIONALLY, I PROPOSE THE CONTINUE TO BE  
 SUBJECTED TO TIMELY REVIEW IN KEEPING WITH THE TACTICAL SITUATION  
 IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE FORMIDABLE CAPABILITIES OF TACTICAL  
 AVIATION ARE CONSISTENTLY AND RESPONSIVELY APPLIED. TO THIS  
 PURPOSE I RECOMMEND HOLDING A PERIODIC (OR AD HOC SHOULD SPECIAL  
 OCCASION ARISE) JOINT REVIEW SIMILAR TO THAT ACCOMPLISHED TODAY.  
 5. YOUR CONCURRENCE/COMMENT ON FOREGOING REQUESTED.

GP-4  
 BT

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FM TWENTY SIXTH MAR COC  
TO THIRD MARDIV COC  
BT

AIR SUPPORT KHE SANH AO

A. CG THIRD MARDIV COC 021403Z MAR 68

B. CG III MAF 020244Z MAR 68

C. MY 102230Z FEB 68

D. MY 130500Z FEB 68

E. MY 170410Z FEB 68

F. MY 251450Z FEB 68

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A) AND (B) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED.

A. THE ABILITY TO "SURGE" AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY AS OUTLINED IN PARA E OF REF (B) IS A MATTER OF VITAL CONCERN TO THIS COMMAND. THE ABILITY TO SURGE AIRCRAFT AT DAY OR NIGHT UP TO THIS POINT HAS NOT BEEN REALIZED. IF THE SYSTEM ENVISIONED IS TO WORK, ALL PARTIES MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO OUR NEEDS AS RELAYED THROUGH THE KHE SANH DASC.

B. IN ADDITION TO THE AIRCRAFT NOTED IN PARA 3 OF REF (C), AMPLIFIED IN REF (D) AND RESTATED IN REF (E), ANY METHOD WHICH WILL INCREASE OUR CAPABILITY OF DESTROYING A MOVING TARGET AT NIGHT MUST BE

PAGE TWO 32Y6

FULLY EXPLOITED. EMPLOYMENT OF SLAR AIRCRAFT AND OBSERVERS WITH NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICES HAVE PROVEN EFFECTIVE IN THE DETECTION AND DESTRUCTION OF TRACKED VEHICLES BECAUSE OF THE TANK THREAT IN THIS AO

THESE AIR CRAFT MUST BE ON STATION CONSTANTLY.

C. THIS HEADQUARTERS SHOULD HAVE A "BACKUP" CAPABILITY TO UTILIZE THE AF ASRT (MILKY). IN SUCH CASES TARGETS HAVE PRIORITIES WOULD BE ASSIGNED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

D. AFTER STUDY OF PARA (F) OF REF (B), A REVIEW OF THE FAC CAPABILITY IS BEING MADE. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE HILL OUTPOSTS OF KSCB ONE OR MORE ADDITIONAL TEAMS MAY BE DESIRED. THE ADDITIONAL FAC'S AND TAC(A)'S WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT WHICH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE SURGE.

E. ALTHOUGH REF (B) DID NOT ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF ALL AIR SUPPORT ROLES IT PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNE TIME TO DIRECT ATTENTION TO THESE AREAS. AERIAL RESUPPLY (BY AIR DROP) SHOULD NOT BE "FORCE FED" AS A GENERAL RULE BUT RESERVED FOR TIMES WHEN AIR LANDED RESUPPLY IS PRECLUDED. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES AS THEY EXIST, AT PRESENT AND WITH THE MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT ON HAND A REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR TEN AIRCRAFT PER DAY FOR AIR LANDED RESUPPLY. THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF MAXIMUM AVAILABILITY ON SHORT NOTICE OF AC-47 GUNSHIPS AND FLARESHIPS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

F. A REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR QUICK-RUN IMMEDIATE READOUT FOR AERIAL PHOTOS WITH A CAPABILITY TO IDENTIFY TARGETS AND ADDITIONALLY TO BE PROPERLY UTILIZE AIR SUPPORT IN THE DESTRUCTION OF TRENCH LINE AND BUNKER COMPLEXES.


2. SUBJECT TO FOREGOING COMMENTS CONCUR WITH REF A.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SMOVE COO

SP CHIEF

S-1 W.O.

S-2 W.O.

SPO

APO

ACTION

CTF

Clearwater

NNNN VV MFPI 22  
 DE RUMWAA 0161 0620324  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 020324Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF DANANG  
 TO RUMHNA/CTF CLEAR WATER NSA DET DONG HA/CUA VIET  
 INFO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHLA/CT TF XRAY  
 RUMHNA/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GRP  
 RUMHNA/CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GRP  
 BT

TOR/021811/AF

~~SECRET~~ LUE

## AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY CS MUNITIONS

A. FORCE/SA I CORPS ORDER 03440.7

1. UNDER PROVISIONS OF PARA 4C REF A YOU ARE DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY CS AGAINST ACTIVE ENEMY EMPLACEMENTS AS NECESSARY IN PERFORMANCE OF YOUR MISSION. YOU MAY DELEGATE THIS AUTHORITY TO YOUR RIVER SECURITY GRP/CONVOY/ESCORT COMMANDERS, AT YOUR DISCRETION.

GP-4

BT

3

CG/CS/CEO

RAD


02

03

24  
 UNCLASSIFIED  
 Encl 31

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



PP RUMHVP  
DE RUMWAA 0149 062035  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 02035Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF DANANG  
TO RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN RVN  
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUMHMA/DEPCOMUSMACV FWD  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
RUMHVP/TWENTY SIXTH MARINES  
BT

## PROTECTION AIRLIFT AIRCRAFTS.

- A. 7TH AF 251725Z FEB 68 (NOTAL)
- B. 7TH AF 270428Z FEB 68 (NOTAL)
- C. 7TH AF 291140Z FEB 68 (NOTAL)
- D. 7TH AF 291440Z FEB 68 (NOTAL)
- E. 7TH AF 011300Z MAR 68

1. REF A SOLICITED SUGGESTION TO IMPROVE COORDINATION BETWEEN AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT AND HELO GUNSHIPS AT KHE SANH. REF B ADVISED TRANSPORTS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE SA/AV FIRE ON APPROACHES TO KHE SANH AND REQUESTED IF FURTHER ASSISTANCE WAS REQUIRED. REF C

C-6-3

COC/AIRO/CG/CS/CEO

(A)

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0149 S

AND D CONTAIN MEASURES INITIATED BY 7TH AF TO FURTHER REDUCE SA/AV THREAT TO AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT.

2. THE MOST EFFECTIVE SUPPRESSION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BY FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT ON STATION UNDER CONTROL OF TAC(A)/FAC, PLUS PASSED FRIENDLY SUPPRESSIVE FIRE BY GROUND FORCES WHEN AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT ENTER THE KHE SANH APPROACH PATTERN. COORDINATION AND INITIATION OF THESE FIRES ARE EFFECTED THROUGH LIAISON BETWEEN TOWER, FSCC, AND GROUND OBSERVER/DIRECTOR. IN SUITABLE WEATHER, UPON NOTIFICATION OF SCHEDULED ARRIVAL OF FIRST AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT AN O-1/O-2 AIRCRAFT IS MAINTAINED AIRBORNE IN THE APPROACH CORRIDOR WITH FIXED-WING STRIKE AIRCRAFT. ALL ON TOWER FREQ. GROUND OBSERVER REPORTS INDICATE THIS MARKEDLY REDUCES ENEMY FIRE. ADDITIONALLY, KNOWN AND SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITIONS WITHIN AREA OF POTENTIAL THREAT TO APPROACH AND DEPARTURE ROUTE ARE TARGETED ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

3. SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY FIRE KHE SANH TRAFFIC PATTERN DEPENDENT UPON EFFECTIVENESS AF/NAVY/USMC FIXED-WING AND SUPPORTING GROUND ELEMENTS ATTACK ON TARGETS, AS DEVELOPED. ENEMY EMPLOYMENT OF CAMOUFLAGE, COVER, AND CONCEALMENT COMPLICATES LATTER ACTION. HOWEVER, IMPROVED WEATHER WILL

*Chuck*

CHUCK  
OP CHIEF  
TOR/02035Z  
DEF 2 W.O.  
BCFO  
APO  
ACTION

*MAAC*  
*P*  
*RKC*  
*H*  
*Katkins*

*may spray  
put this into  
other H's  
mags.*

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

56 End 32

**SECRET****UNCLASSIFIED**PAGE THREE RUMWAA 0149 ~~SECRET~~

ENHANCE DETECTION AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS FIRING ON  
AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT.

A. WHEN UX UNSUITABLE FOR VISUAL ATTACK, TPQ-10 STRIKES A  
DELIVERED ALONG APPROACH LANE AND INCREASED SUPPRESSIVE FIRE  
ARE CONDUCTED BY GROUND FORCES. THESE EFFORTS ARE AUGMENTED  
OF HELO GUNSHIPS AGAINST SA/AV WITH FLEETING AND POINT TYPE FIRE  
SUPPRESSION WHEN WEATHER CONDITIONS PERMIT.

B. IN SUMMARY, SUPPRESSION OF THE AA THREAT AT KHE SANH IS A  
MATTER OF LOCATING AND ATTACKING ARTFULLY CONCEALED AND SKILL-  
FULLY PROTECTED WEAPONS. IT IS SIMILAR TO THE PROBLEMS OF LOCATING  
AND DESTROYING ARTILLERY NORTH OF THE DMZ, OR MORTAR AND ROCKET  
POSITIONS AROUND MAJOR AIR AND LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS ELSEWHERE.  
WE SHALL CONTINUE URGENT ATTENTION TO THEIR SUPPRESSION AND FINAL  
DESTRUCTION AND WILL APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUING ASSISTANCE.


GP-4

BT

**UNCLASSIFIED**

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



EYHF DE DONG NR 015/0  
 UIIA 351-T NJG  
 NJG-T-  
 SNY 58355  
 O 02040Z MAR 68  
 FM THIRD MARINES FWD  
 TO CG THIRD MAR DIV  
 INFO ELT THREE SLANT ONE  
 FIRST BN THIRD MARINES  
 ZEN FIRST AMTRAC BN  
 THIRD MARINES  
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 COMNAVSUPACT DANANG  
 BT

SUBJ: OPC ON

A, CG 3RD DIV MSG 29035Z FEB 68

1. IAW REF A AND EFF 290600H FEB 68 THIRD MARINES ASSUMED OPC ON OF  
 ELT 3/1(-), 1ST BN (-) 3D MARINES, AND 1ST AMTRAC BN (-) (RE INF).  
 OPSTAT AND TASK ORG SUBMITTED SEPARATELY.

OP-4

BT

A-6-3/00e

STAND/comm



SHOVE CUC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

Routed

Return to

W.O.

UNCLASSIFIED


End 33



DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



DRAFTER 3/HMA/003  
SEC G-3 PROS 31 MARDIV COC  
CWO

IMMEDIATE 020428 ZMAR68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: THIRD MARINES  
INFO: CG III MAF  
FIRST AMTRAC BN  
BLT THREE SLANT ONE  
THIRD MARDIV  
FLSG BRAVO  
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
COM NSA DNG

42

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DOPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>Napoleon</i>

DESIGNATED OPERATIONS

A. MY OPO 292310ZFEB68 (OPO 5-68)

B. MY 290830ZFEB68

1. DELETE THE WORDS SALINE II WHEREVER THEY APPEAR REF 1 & B AND INSERT THEREIN NAPOLEON/SALINE.

2. DELETE PARA 3 OF REF C IN ITS ENTIRETY AND INSERT AS FOLLOWS "3.

CUMULATIVE TOTALS FOR SALINE AND NAPOLEON WILL BE COMBINED AND CARRIED FWD AS CUMULATIVE TOTALS FOR NAPOLEON/SALINE."

3. ALL REFERENCES TO TERM/SUSPENSION & COMMENCEMENT REF A & B ARE TO BE DISREGARDED.

GP-4

CCN 082

REL BY *[Signature]*

02 G-3

04


06/CS/CEG *[Signature]*

UNCLASSIFIED  
*[Signature]*  
Encl 34

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



SHOVE CAC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>Scotland</i>

*[Handwritten mark resembling a stylized '8' or 'C']*

DE 32Y6 AND WATS TERE WITH MY NR 37

ZNY SSSSS

3 301000Z MAR 63

FM TWENTY SIXTH MAP

TO 03 THIRD MARDIV

BT

*108.405/1107/26mm*

AR

LONG DELAY BOMBS

1. VYOR 210000Z FEB 63

2. III VAF CAC 271637Z FEB 63

3. IN REPLY TO REF 4 AND IN VIEW OF INFO CONTAINED REF LONG DELAY BOMBS WITH CHEMICAL FUZZS NOT DESIRED IN OP SCOTLAND AT THIS TIME.

GP-

BT

A. AIRD

G-3, CAC, CG, C/S, CEO

021202

UNCLASSIFIED  
SECRET

Encl 35


**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

**UNCLASSIFIED**

W VV MFP268  
 OO RUMHAW RUMHFL RUMHLA RUMHMA RUMHMB RUMHVN RUMHVA RUMHVB  
 DE RUMHN 046B 0621716  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 021402Z MAR 68  
 FM CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMWAA/CG III MAR REGT  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHLA/CG TF XRAY  
 RUMHFL/FIRST FORCE LOGISTICAL COMMAND  
 RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR  
 RUMHVN/DSA I CORPS  
 RUMHVN/HUE COORDINATOR  
 RUMHVN/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHNA/COMUSMACV FWD  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY  
 BT

**SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPO

APO

ACTION

C-6-2

G-3-4-COC-

PAGE 2 RUMHN 046B

1. THE FIRST CONVOY OF THE DAY, CONSISTING OF FIVE LCM-8'S AND TWO AMMI BARGES, DEPARTED CUA VIET AT 0800H ESCORTED BY TWO LCM76 MINESWEEPERS AND TWO LCPL'S. ARRIVED AT DONG HA AT 1000H WITHOUT INCIDENT.

2. THE SECOND CONVOY, CONSISTING OF TWO LCM-8'S, ONE LCU AND 4 YFU'S DEPARTED DONG HA AT 1200H ESCORTED BY TWO LCM76 MINESWEEPERS AND TWO LCPL'S. AFTER TRANSIT MINESWEEPER M77 FOUND APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY FIVE FEET OF TWO CONDUCTOR WIRE WITH TWO BLASTING CAPS ATTACHED FOULED IN THE SWEEP GEAR. ORIGINAL LOCATION OF WIRE IN RIVER IS UNKNOWN. NO INCIDENTS OCCURRED DURING TRANSIT.

3. THE THIRD CONVOY, CONSISTING OF TWO LCU'S, THREE YFU'S, AND FOUR LCM-6 MINESWEEPERS DEPARTED CUA VIET AT 1300H. AT 1420H A RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRED TWO ROUNDS AT MINESWEEPER THAT MISSED AND IMPACTED BETWEEN THE LEAD LCPL AND THE MINESWEEPER. NO CASUALTIES OR MATERIAL DAMAGE INCURRED. ARTILLERY WAS CALLED IN ON THE AREA WHICH HAS BEEN THE SITE OF SEVERAL SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. AT 1610H ARRIVED AT DONG HA WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENTS.

4. THE FOURTH CONVOY, CONSISTING OF ONE LCU, ONE YFU, TWO AMMI BARGES, AND EIGHT LCM-8'S, ESCORTED BY TWO LCPL'S AND ONE LCM-6

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 2 RUMHN 046B ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MINESWEEPER DEPARTED DONG HA AT 1600H. CONVOY ARRIVED CUA VIET AT  
1815H WITHOUT INCIDENT.

5. CARGO MOVED 2 MAR 68  
TO DONG HA

923.7

180M GAL POL PRODUCTS  
TO CUA VIET

NONE

6. TIMELY ARTILLERY SUPPORT ON KNOWN RECOILLESS RIFLE SITES AIDED  
IN PREVENTING ENEMY ACTIVITY.

7. WEATHER - MORNING THRU LATE AFTERNOON; CIELING FROM 200 FT TO  
50 FT, RAINING WITH WINDS INCREASING IN STRENGTH TO ABOUT 40 KTS  
BY LATE AFTERNOON, MUCH MANUEVERING DIFFICULTY EXPERIENCED BY  
LCU/YFU'S DUE TO HIGH WINDS.

GP74

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE 32Y6 ~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY OF RESEEDING BE GIVEN TO INFILTRATION ROUTES ENTERING AO VICINITY XD 6648 FOLLOWING STREAM SE TO XD 7544, ANOTHER ENTERIN AO VICINITY XD 6553 FOLLOWING STREAM SE TO JUNCTION WITH RAO QUAN RIVER VICINITY XD 7949 AND ALONG THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF RAO QUAN RIVER.

C. RECOMMEND HIGHEST PRIORITY IN EMPLACEMENT OF NEW STRINGS AND RESEEDING BE GIVEN TO PROVIDE DETECTION OF ARMOR, OTHER AREAS LISTED IN RELATIVE ORDER OF PRIORITY.

2. ONLY DISSATISFACTION WITH SYSTEM TO DATE IS INABILITY TO ASSIMILATE A FEELING OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBSEQUENT SEQUENCES TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER SEVERAL BODIES OF TROOPS, OR A SINGLE BODY ON THE MOVE IS INDICATED. THIS POINT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH III MAF LNO, IFANKP WHO WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INTERPRETATION WHICH SHOULD IMPROVE THE OVERALL PRODUCT.

GP -4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

SHOVE CUC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DGPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>Scotland</i>

DE DIV AND MATE PLS TO      ZDK UR LAST      KKK  
 DE 32Y6 AND NR 48      47      47      47

ZNY 585555  
 022114Z FEB 68  
 FM TWENTY SIXTH MARINES  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO FIRST MAW  
 BT

ADVANCE  
 ROUTED

SUBJ: AIR SUPPORT REQUEST  
 1. IT IS REQUESTED THAT R THE KHE SANH 6 COMBAT BASE BE  
 PROVIDED WITH TEN (10) CBU FLIGHTS PER NIGHT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.  
 GP-4  
 BT

3/AIR2

coe/ceo  
*[Signature]*

02

21

UNCLASSIFIED  
 14  
 SECRET  
 Encl 38

HEADQUARTERS  
3D MARINE DIVISION FMF



## MEMORANDUM

FOR

SUBJ:

Flash.

From: C. J. 3d Marine Div

To: 26 74 Mar

A. 020244Z MAR 65  
cc. III MAR

1. Request cancellation  
on ref A as a  
matter of urgency.

021408Z

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 39

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

4/RLJ/jct  
4000  
3 Mar 1968

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Staff

Subj: Proposed Displacement Schedule

1. The proposed displacement schedule for the Headquarters Battalion is as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Trucks</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
5 Mar 1968	Hq Co	3	
"	Serv Co	8	Mess equipment for 200 men
"	MP Co	13	
"	Div Eng	3	
"	CEO	2	(29)
8 Mar 1968	C/S	3	
"	Serv Co	3	MT- 4 M-35 plus $\frac{1}{2}$ of M-422 & M-37
"	Serv Co	2	Mess equipment and water buf-faloes
"	Legal	8	
"	Compt	4	
"	Club Gear	5	Furniture for messes
"	G-5	3	(28)
11th Mar 1968	G-1	24	
"	Hq Co	3	(27) Co CP including supply
14th Mar 1968	G-1	23	
"	Serv Co	4	(27) Co CP including supply
17th Mar 1968	Serv Co	6	Close-out camp Maint.
"	Serv Co	6	Turn over Mess #4
"	Hq Co	6	Move Bn Hq forward
"	Div Med	2	
"	Auditor	2	(22)
20th Mar 1968	Hq Co	2	Close out BOQ
"	Comm	2	Begin to close out Comm
"	Dental	11	
"	Clubs	12	(27)



DECLASSIFIED

23d Mar 1968	G-3 (Dong Ha)	10	
"	Disbursing (Dong Ha)	13	
"	Comm	4	(27)
26th Mar 1968	Any Other		Final Sweep of Head- quarters Battalion

*A. I. Thomas*  
A. I. THOMAS

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

JEG:gab  
3 Mar 1968

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress report for the period  
25 February - 2 March 1968

1. The following transpired during the report period.

a. The Danang Sub-Area Command, by letter to CG III MAF of 16 February 1968, requested a site within the Quang Tri area for use by the Army's 1st Logistical Command for an FSA. <sup>(Forward Support Area)</sup> The request was referred to 3dMarDiv and was, with one exception, concurred in by 3dMarDiv letter of 29 February 1968. A 75m X 200m site within the requested area was retained for use by the 3dMarDiv PMO, CIT and ITT.

b. CG III MAF by letter to COMNAVFORVREP (Base Development) of 26 February 1968 assigned a priority of 2.5 to the temporary water distribution system and a priority of 2.6 to the construction of two 500 man messhalls requested by 3dMarDiv. (Priority 2 items in the master list are 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Hangers/Maintenance Facilities/Tactical Air Crew Quarters (under construction) and the 3d Medical Battalion Facilities.) CG III MAF requested that COMNAVFORVREP (Base Development) task 3d NCB with the responsibility for providing the water distribution system and messhalls as soon as shipping permits. Since materials for one 500 man messhall were on hand in Dong Ha, preliminary site preparation began 1 March 1968. The pipe necessary for the construction of the temporary water distribution system is in Danang and construction will begin as soon as shipping is available. In the meantime it is planned to haul water from a water point to be established by the 3d Engineer Battalion.

c. Second increment construction of 100 SEA Huts and one 500 man messhall began on 1 March 1968. The allocation of assets is as follows:

MCB	7 SEA Huts
FLSG-B	25 SEA Huts
3dMarDiv	68 SEA Huts; one 500 man messhall

d. The allocation of total 3d Marine Division assets, including 1st increment construction, is as follows:

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

JEG:gab  
3 Mar 1968

Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress report for the period  
25 February - 2 March 1968

	<u>SEA Huts</u>	<u>500 Man Messhalls</u>
3d Tank Cantonment	20	
3d MTBn Cantonment	36	
3d SP Cantonment	10	
3d EngrBn Cantonment	15	
HqBn Cantonment	87	1
TOTAL	168	1

e. Both 1st and 2nd increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

(1) Horizontal. No work during this report period. Ground has been too wet to work and MCB-10 has been fully committed to construct the Army beach road project south of Quang Tri City.

(2) Vertical

	<u>SEA Huts Completed</u>	<u>SEA Huts Under Const</u>	<u>% Complete 1st &amp; 2nd Increment</u>
3d Tank Cantonment	20	0	100%
3d MTBn Cantonment	36	0	100%
3d SPBn Cantonment	0	2	10%
3d EngrBn Cantonment	0	2	7%
HqBn Cantonment	15	20	29%

(3) Burn-Out Heads. 6 completed out of 26 - 23% completed.

f. Route #1 from Phu Bai to Quang Tri was declared open for convoy use on 29 February and a sixty vehicle convoy (3dMarDiv and Task Force I-RAY) moved south from Dong Ha on that date. The first lift of 3dMarDiv Rear and separate battalions moved forward to Quang Tri/Dong Ha on 2 March. The convoy consisted of 58 cargo vehicles (11 for FLSG-A), 24 cargo trailers and 22 command/security vehicles. The majority of the vehicles were assigned to transport the Engineer Battalion Headquarters and essential engineer equipment (water purification, etc.). Five officers and 65 enlisted from the Engineer Battalion moved forward to Quang Tri. The first echelon of Headquarters Battalion was also moved; consisting of 7 officers and 17 enlisted from G-4. The move forward will continue on a regular basis for the next six weeks. It is planned to move a convoy north and unload on a given day, move the convoy south on the following day, conduct PM on the vehicles and load on the third day,

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~JEG:gab  
3 Mar 1968

Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress report for the period  
25 February - 2 March 1968

and again move north on the forth day. It is believed that this schedule can be sustained over the prolonged period required for the entire move. The Headquarters of 3d Engineer Battalion, 3d Tank Battalion and 3d Shore Party Battalion will move generally in that order. Some vehicles in each convoy will be assigned to Headquarters Battalion to echelon forward the Division Staff Sections and the Headquarters Battalion. The Chief of Staff Section is scheduled to move to Quang Tri on 8 March and the ADC on about 10 March. Operating sections and personnel of the separate battalion headquarters, Division Staff, and Headquarters Battalion should complete the move to Quang Tri by approximately 15-17 March. The balance of organizational supplies and heavy equipment; in particular Engineer Battalion lumber, wire, etc.; will continue to move forward until completion about 10-15 April. Movement schedules will be contingent on the tactical situation, road conditions, and continued availability of vehicles. The entire move is tailored to:

- (1) Maintain continuity of essential functions.
- (2) Build up personnel strength in Quang Tri as rapidly as practicable.
- (3) Completely close out all 3d Marine Division functions in the Phu Bai area in an orderly fashion. We will continue to maintain a supply/embark section in Phu Bai as long as FISC-A continues to support Khe Sanh.

Very respectfully,

J. E. GLICK

UNCLASSIFIED

3 MAR

## WORKING PAPERS

M A T  
POSTAL MESSAGE

IMMEDIATE

FROM: 11TH BTA HEADQUARTERS 03  
 TO: QUANG TRI SECTOR  
 - 1ST INF REGIMENT  
 - 2ND INF REGIMENT  
 - DIV STAFF (G2, ARTY, TOC)  
 INFO: 1ST US AIR CAVALRY DIV HEADQUARTERS  
 - 1ST DIV MACV

Text nrt 181/K11CT/3/1/M.

REFERENCE: Radio message nrt 252/30/1/M dated 20 Jan 68 from  
 the Corps Tactical Zone Headquarters.

FIRST: The Corps Tactical Zone 1 Headquarters approves to allow  
 the 1st US Air Cavalry Brigade to come and operate at  
 the mountainous areas of Hai Lang and Hai Linh districts  
 of Quang Tri province from 21 Jan 68 until further order.  
 See attached overlay.

SECOND: To prevent from misidentification, addressees will  
 discontinue all Infantry, Air and Artillery activities at  
 the indicated areas during the duration of operation of the  
 US Air Cavalry Base Brigade.

THIRD: This message is made for confirmation. END.

DISTRIBUTION:

AFG-4895, 23 Jan 1968

LTC TRAN VAN CAM  
 chief of staff  
 signed and sealed

WORKING PAPERS

Encl 42


SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

DE 32Y6 AND ZUJ FOR NR S THREE AND FOUR

TZTL

OO RUMHVP  
DE RUMHVP 006 0610430  
ZNY SSSSS  
C 010430Z MARCH  
FM TWO SIX MARINES  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT



SHOVE CAC	
OP CHIEF	
G-3 W.O.	
G-3 W.O.	
DCPO	
APD	
ACTION	

SUBJ: POINT OF IMPACT KHE SANH DZ

REF: A. CG II MAF DANANG

B. TWO SIX MAR 080130Z FEB68

C. TWO SIX MAR 151420Z FEB68

1. REF A REQUESTED VERIFICATION OF DESIRED PI (POINT OF IMPACT) FOR KHE SANH DROP ZONE ESTABLISHED AT XD833421 BY REF P.  
2. REF C WAS A REPORT OF AIR DROPS CONDUCTED ON 14 AND 15 FEBRUARY WHICH ALSO INCLUDED A REQUEST TO CHANGE THE AIRCRAFT HEADING FROM AN AZIMUTH 270 DEGREES TO 284 DEGREES. THIS CHANGE IN HEADING WAS REQUESTED TO PREVENT THE DROPS FROM LANDING IN A SECTION OF THE PERIMETER PROTECTIVE WIRE CONSTRUCTED AFTER THE DROP ZONE PI WAS INITIALLY LOCATED.

3. IN ORDER TO VERIFY THE DESIRED PI THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED.

A. CENTER OF DZ (PI) XD83224231

B. DISTANCE FROM EAST END OF RUNWAY TO PI-2620 METERS

C. AZIMUTH FROM EAST END OF RUNWAY TO PI-284 DEGREES

PAGE TWO RUMHVP

D. ALTITUDE OF CENTER OF DZ (PI) 1574 FEET

E. COORDINATES OF DROP ZONE

(1) NORTH - XD83034268

(2) EAST - XD83404231

(3) SOUTH - XD83394207

(4) WEST - XD82744226

F. LENGTH OF DZ THROUGH PI IS 550 METERS

G. WIDTH OF DZ THROUGH PI IS 300 METERS

GP-4 A-1100/030

BT

B-3-4-CEO

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

DE 32Y 6 AND. DATE HERE

B

ZNY SSSSS

O: 21512Z MAR 68

FM TWENTY SIXTH MAR

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

SENSOR EMPLACEMENT

A. MY MSG 261520Z JAN 68

B. MY MSG 041137Z FEB 68

C. TFANKP MSG 291000H FEB 68

I. THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED TO PROVIDE AMPLIFICATION TO REF A AND B AND TO ASSIST IN PREPARATION OF REPLY TO REF C.

AC. DISCUSSION (NEW AREAS)

(1) AREAS WEST OF KHE SANH COMBAT BASE TO LOCATION BORDER NORTH OF ROUT NINE AFFORD ACCESS TO BOTH TANKS AND TROOPS FROM MAJOR RESUPPLY AND STAGING AREAS VICINITY XD 6738. LIKELY ROUTES FOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC ARE:

(A) NORTH ALONG TRAIL FROM XD 7237 TO XD 7441, EAST TO XD 7461, THEN TO KHE SANH COMBAT BASE.

(B) ON OR ALONG ROUTE NINE TO XD 8036 OR XD 8137 THEN NORTH TO JOIN ROUTE MENTIONED PARA (1) A. VICINITY XD 7341 OR XD 8041, THEN

A-G-3

G-2/COC/CEO/ENGA

PAGE TWO 32Y 6

TO KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

(C) PHOTO REPORTS INDICATE TRACKED ACTIVITY ALONG XE PCN RIVER FROM XD 7723 TO XD 7834, THEN TO ROUTE NINE.


(2) FROM EAST ROUTE NINE AND THE RAO QUAN AND DA KONG RIVER VALLEYS PROVIDES ACCESS TO PERSONNEL AND TRACKED VEHICLES. A GENT REPORTS INDICATE THIS TO BE AXIS OF ADVANCE FOR ARMOR ATTACK AGAINST KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

(3) TRAILS AND STREAM BEDS ENTERING AC FROM THE NE ALONG BOTH SIDES OF HILL 862 (XD 8243). CURRENTLY EMPLOYED SENSORS HAVE GIVEN ASSESSMENTS IN AREA BOUNDED BY XD 800460/800470/820470/820460. DURING LATE JAN AND EARLY FEB THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF MOVEMENT FROM THE NORTH THROUGH THE VALLEY GENERALLY FOLLOWING GRID LINE 78. THIS HAS CEASED. THIS GIVES RISE TO THE ASSUMPTION THAT TRAIL NETWORK MENTIONED ABOVE IS BEING UTILIZED.

(4) FOR MAJOR TRAIL FROM SOUTH GENERALLY FOLLOWING GRID LINES 88 AND 89 TO THE NORTH INDICATES HEAVY USE FROM AREA GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS 304TH DIVISION HQ.

(5) AOS AND PHOTOS INDICATE MOVEMENT ALONG NUMEROUS TRAILS BETWEEN GRID LINES 80 AND 85 NORTH OF GRID LINE 27.

N. CURRENT SENSOR ALIGNMENT QUITE SATISFACTORY. DESIRE



SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Adv	<i>[Signature]</i>
ROU	<i>[Signature]</i>
APG	<i>[Signature]</i>
COC	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

WV VPB507CHA87(CHA87ZVW/65WV) NHB055VW NHA088VV AF347  
 PP RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 024B 0631209  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 030405Z MAR 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET  
 INFO RUMHN/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP PBR MOBILE BASE ONE  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMHME/DEP COMUSMACV FWD  
 RUMSBB/COMAVFORV  
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHMA/CG FIRST MARIV  
 RUMHMA/FIRST AIR CAF DIV  
 RUMHM  
 /CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHLA/CG IF XRAY  
 RUMHNA/COM THIRD NCB  
 RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS  
 RUMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET/DONG HA  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY/HUE

A-6-3

code-2/4/CG/CL5/CEO

PAGE 2 RUMHN 024B  
 RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVONVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
 ZEN/CO THIRD MARINE REGIMENT  
 RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUHHBRA/COMSER VPAC  
 RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUYSUAK/CTF SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUHGUA/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 BT

ANNEX C (LOGISTIC CRAFT OPERATION AND SECURITY PAROL BOAT/  
 MINEWEEDING SUPPORT FOR CUA VIET RIVER OPERATIONS) TO CTF CLEAR-  
 WATER OPERATION ORDER 1-68 (U)

- A. CTF CLEARWATER 250525Z FEB 68
- B. CTF CLEARWATER 261000Z FEB 68
- C. CTF CLEARWATER 291345Z FEB 68
- D. CTF CLEARWATER 010730Z MAR 68
- E. CTF CLEARWATER 010955Z MAR 68

1. PURPOSE: THIS ANNEX PROVIDES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND  
 CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE CUA VIET RIVER BETWEEN

03

04

 UNCLASSIFIED  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 Encl 44



**CONFIDENTIAL****UNCLASSIFIED**

PAGE 3 RUMHN 024B C [REDACTED]  
 NSAD CUA VIET AND DONG HA RAMP WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND  
 AVAILABILITY OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ALLOW FOR A SHIFT FROM PREPLANNED  
 CONVOY OPERATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL CRAFT OR GROUPS OF CRAFT DISPATCHED  
 AS REQUIRED.

2. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND: LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSITING THE CUA VIET  
 RIVER WILL BE CHOPPED FROM NSAD DONG HA/CUA VIET TO CDR DONG HA SUPPLY  
 RIVER SECURITY GROUP UPON COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSIT. SECURITY BOAT PATROL  
 AND MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS  
 UNDER THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP.

3. FUNCTIONS AND TASKS:

A. THE FUNCTION OF THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP IS TO PROVIDE FOR  
 CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED TRANSIT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE CUA  
 VIET RIVER BETWEEN NSAD CUA VIET AND DONG HA RAMP.

THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP WILL:

- (1) PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY BOAT PATROLS AND MINE SWEEPING  
 OPERATIONS ON THE CUA VIET RIVER BETWEEN NSAD CUA VIET AND  
 DONG HA RAMP DURING HOURS WHEN LOGISTIC CRAFT ARE TRANSITING  
 THE RIVER.
- (2) PROVIDE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT AND/OR OTHER ASSISTANCE AS  
 REQUIRED BY TRANSITING LOGISTIC CRAFT.

PAGE 4 RUMHN 024B C [REDACTED]

(3) ARRANGE FOR AND COORDINATE SUPPORTING AIR COVER AND  
 ARTILLERY FIRE AS REQUIRED.

(4) PROVIDE BRIEFINGS AS TO TACTICAL SITUATION, LOCATION OF  
 FRIENDLY FORCES, AND FIRE DISCIPLINE TO CRAFT MASTERS/  
 COXAINS OF LOGISTIC AND SECURITY CRAFT TRANSITING THE RIVER.

L (5) MAINTAIN COMPLETE INFORMATION AS TO LOGISTIC CRAFT/SECURITY  
 CRAFT/MINE SWEEP BOATS MOVEMENTS ON THE RIVER DURING TRANSIT  
 AND ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.

(6) EXERCISE NET CONTROL OF THE LOGISTIC CRAFT/SECURITY BOAT/  
 MINE SWEEP BOATS FREQUENCY DURING TRANSIT.

(7) DESIGNATE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE CRAFT OPERATIONS  
 DURING TRANSIT AND DIRECT THEIR EMPLOYMENT. DISABLED CRAFT  
 WILL BE BEACHED OR TAKEN IN TOW TO ENSURE THE CHANNEL IS  
 NOT BLOCKED.

B. THE FUNCTION OF OIC DONG  
 HA/CUA VIET WILL BE TO RECEIVE  
 SUPPORT AND SAIL AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER RIVER  
 SECURITY GROUP ASSIGNED LOGISTIC CRAFT BETWEEN CUA VIET  
 AND DONG HA RAMP. OIC DONG HA/CUA VIET:

- (1) PROVIDES ESCORT CRAFT, CREWS, AND SWEEP GEAR TO THE  
 RIVER SECURITY GROUP.

**UNCLASSIFIED****CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- /REPAIR DAMAGED CRAFT
- (3) PROVIDE PRC 25/77 RAD OS AND FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT TO LOGISTIC CRAFT, SECURITY BOATS, MINE SWEEPING BOATS TRANSMITTING THE RIVER.
- C. CRAFTMASTERS/COXSWAINS OF LOGISTIC CRAFT, SECURITY BOATS AND MINE SWEEPING BOATS WILL:
- (1) BRIEF THEIR RESPECTIVE CREWS PRIOR TO TRANSMITTING THE RIVER.
  - (2) MAINTAIN FIRE DISCIPLINE AND CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE OF THEIR CRAFT.
  - (3) DIRECT THE DEFENSIVE FIRE OF THEIR CRAFT, IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER ORDERS FROM THE RIVER SECURITY UNITS OPERATING IN COMPANY. THEY WILL ONLY FIRE WHEN FIRED UPON AND CEASE FIRING EITHER WHEN HOSTILE FIRE ON THEIR CRAFT CEASES OR WHEN IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT THEIR FIRE ENDANGERS FRIENDLY FORCES.
  - (4) WHEN FIRED UPON OR COGNIZANT OF OTHER ENEMY THREAT PROMPTLY NOTIFY RIVER SECURITY UNITS OF THEIR LOCATION AND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT.

PAGE 6 RUMHN 024B ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHEN DIRECTED, THIS ANNEX WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE FOR MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE CUA VIET RIVER.

GP-4

H

NN NN


**UNCLASSIFIED**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

000000P  
 IE RUMHN 021B 062000Z MAR 68  
 ZNY CCCC  
 0 030430Z MAR 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER NSAD  
 TO RUMHN/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD  
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMH/P/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHIA/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMHMB/COMUSMACV FWD  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHLA/CG IF XRAY  
 RUMHNA/COMNAV SUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHNA/COMTHREE NCB  
 RUMH/H/DSA I CORPS  
 RUMH/H/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 MAEN/CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY



GROUP PERIODIC BASE ONE	
CHIEF	<i>[initials]</i>
OP CHIEF	<i>[initials]</i>
TOP	<i>[initials]</i>
6-2 W.O.	<i>[initials]</i>
DCPO	<i>[initials]</i>
ACTION	<i>[initials]</i>
Return	<i>[initials]</i>

*Clearwater*

PAGE 2 RUMHN 021B  
 RUMH/H/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR  
 RUMH/H/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
 RUMH/G/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMH/RA/COMSERVPAC  
 RUMH/KRP/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUMH/SUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUMH/GUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 ZEN/COMTHIRD MARINE REGT  
 H

HUE SUPPLY RIVER OPS:

- A. CTF CLEARWATER OPORD 1-68 WITH ANNEX A/B.
1. IN VIEW FRIENDLY FORCES NOW CONTROL PER FUME RIVER BANKS AND LACK OF INCIDENTS PAST THREE DAYSEXECUTE AT YOUR DISCRETION ANNEX B REF A.
2. MAINTAIN MINIMUM TWO NINE SWEEP CRAFT AND 4 LPBR PATROL CONTINUOUSLY DURING OPERATION.
3. INDURE FIRM FIRE DISCIPLINE ALL LOGISTIC CRAFT, MINE SWEEPS AND PER PATROLS.
4. IN THE EVENT CRAFT ARE ATTACKED BY R/R, ROCKETS OR

3

*COC/2/4/CG/CS/CEO*

PAGE 3 RUMHN 021B  
 MINING IMMEDIATELY REVERT TO CONVOY OPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX A OF REF A.

5. RESTRICT OPS TO DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY.


CP-4

H

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



DRAFTER 3/JOE/PLV  
SEC 3 PHONETIC DIV COG  
CWO

PRIORITY 030446 68 MAR

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: THIRD MARINES  
FOURTH MARINES  
CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FOUR  
CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE  
INFO: CG III MAF  
NINTH MARINES  
TWELFTH MARINES  
FIRST AMTRAC BN  
THIRD TANK BN

**CHOVE**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

CGPO

APD

ACTION

SLF

CL  
G-3

ROTATION OF UNITS

1. EFFECTIVE 4 MARCH COMMENCE ROTATION OF 3/1 AND 2/4 LAW FOLLOWING SCHEDULE:

A. 4 MARCH - 2 COMPANIES 2/4 RELIEVE 2 COMPANIES 3/1 IN PLACE

B. 5 MARCH - 2 COMPANIES AND COMMAND GROUP 2/4 RELIEVE REMAINDER

OF 3/1 IN PLACE

2. 3/1 REPLACE 2/4 IN SAME RELATIVE POSITIONS IN FOURTH MAR AO

3. SUPPORTING UNITS BOTH BLTS REMAIN UNDER PRESENT OPCON

4. FOURTH MAR SUBMIT HELO REQUIREMENTS FOR LIFT TO THIS HQ.

5. FOR CTG 79.4 & CTG 79.5 REQ YOU PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT FOR THIS MOVE

AS REQUESTED.

6. Report Chop Times this Hq.

8. DIRLAUTH ALCON

GP-4

CON

107

RELEASED BY

*[Signature]*

G-3

CG/CS/CSO  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

Encl 46

DECLASSIFIED

**SECRET**DRAFT  
THIRD MARCH 1968  
CWO

COMM CNTR  
THREATS  
FROM: CG THIRTEEN DIV  
TO: FOURTH MARINES  
NINTH MARINES  
INFO: 15TH MARINES  
14TH MARINES & BITE

2 MAR 68

CP CHIEF  
G-3 WOOD  
G-2 WOOD  
CCPO  
AFO  
ACTION

LAUBASTER II

## DIRECTED OPERATION

1. INFO INDICATES ELEMENTS OF 27TH INDEPENDENT BN W/ ~~15TH~~ <sup>14TH</sup> MARINES, PROBABLE LOCAL FORCE COMPANIES TO BE LOCATED IN VIC AREA BOUNDED BY YD 1253 TO YD 1553 TO YD 1549 TO YD 1249.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 14TH MARINES CONDUCT COMPANY-SIZED COMBAT PATROL FROM CAMP CARROLL TO FLD, ATTACK AND DESTROY ENEMY IN OBJECTIVE AREA. <sup>9TH MARINES CHOPS TO 4TH AR TO</sup> ~~14TH~~ COMPANY ESTABLISHES BLOCKING POSITION TO PREVENT ENEMY EXFILTRATION. <sup>2 LONE</sup> ADDITIONAL COMPANY TO BE AVAILABLE ON 1 HOUR ALERT FOR HELILIFT TO EXFILTRATE OR TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITION. ESTIMATED DURATION OF OPERATION - 2 DAYS.

## 3. FORCES AVAILABLE:

A. 14TH MARINES: ONE COMPANY, AND COMPANY L/M NT AS REQUIRED.  
B. 9TH MARINES: ONE COMPANY, PLUS ADDITIONAL COMPANY ON 1 HOUR ALERT.

4. DEDUPLICATION. SUBMIT DETAILED PLANS AND SPECIAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS THIS HQ ASAP.

5. D-DAY AND H-HOUR AS SOON AS TACTICALLY FEASIBLE.

GP-4

G-3

CON

142

RELEASED BY

eg/cd/ced/oc  
SJR  
10 Apr 68

03


UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

UNCLASSIFIED



UYLVWCKNYXW FKB VV MFP321  
 OO RUMSMA RUMSEJ  
 DE RUMWAA 262 0631031  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 031031Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSEJ/CDR 7AF ISN RVN  
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAM  
 BT

SHOVE COC	
COPIES	1
G-3 W.O.	1
G-2 W.O.	1
DCPO	1
TO	1
APD	1
ACTION	

1. CG THIRD MARDIV HAS RECOMMENDED TARGETS IN THE KHE SANH AREA TO BE STRUCK WITH INCENDIARY MUNITIONS CAPABLE OF AREA COVERAGE AND SUFFICIENT HEAT GENERATION TO IGNITE LIVE FOILAGE/CAMOUFLAGE MATERIAL.  
 2. REQUEST THE FOLLOWING TGTS BE STRUCK ASAP DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS BY B-57 ACFT WITH M-36 INCENDIARY BOMB CLUSTERS, TO EXPOSE THE TRENCH SYSTEM FOR AIR/ARTY ATTACK.

A. XD 800410 RPT XD 800410  
 XD 814396 RPT XD 814396  
 XD 807417 RPT XD 807417  
 XD 822403 RPT XD 822403

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 262  
 B. XD 814396 RPT XD 814396  
 XD 828382 RPT XD 828382  
 XD 822403 RPT XD 822403  
 XD 836388 RPT XD 836388

GP-4  
 BT

3

AIRO/FSCC/12/CG/CS/C  
 RA

NNNN

03

**SECRET**

Encl 48

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

458  
 DRAFTER 13/085/AD  
 SEC 1. PHONE 3D MARDIV COC  
 CWO 1 RAD

PRIORITY 031414 ZMAR68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: HQBN ZEN  
 THIRD SP BN ZEN  
 FIRST AMTRAC BN ZEN  
 INFO: CG III MAP RUMWAA  
 CG FIRST MARDIV RUMHLA  
 CG TEXRAY RUMHLA

OPCON

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 291230ZFEB68

1. IAW REF A THIS HQ ASSUMES OPCON FROM FIRST MARDIV OF FOL UNITS EFF  
 291600HFEB68:

DET HQ BN, THIRD MAR DIV

CO B (-) THIRD SP BN

FIRST PLAT CO B FIRST AMTRAC BN

2. THIS HQ PASSES OPCON SUBJ UNITS SAME DTG TO PARENT COMDS. PARENT COMDS.  
 REPORT ASSUMPTION OF OPCON SUBJ UNITS THIS HQ.

GP-4

CCN 145REL BY M. V. Palatka

3

2/COG/CG/CS/CSO  
 RAD

UNCLASSIFIED


Encl 49

DECLASSIFIED

ZNY SSSSS  
O 031450Z MAR 68  
FM THIRD MAR DIV COC  
TO III MAF COC  
INFO CO 26TH MAR  
FMAW COC  
BT

~~SECRET~~

AIR STRIKES KHE SANH AREA  
A. CG III MAF MSG 020244Z MAR 68.  
PASS TO LTGEN CUSHMAN



1. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AMPLIFY THE CONTENTS OF REF "A" AND ARE CONSIDERED MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS:

A. THE ABILITY TO SURGE ACFT AVAILABILITY AS OUTLINED PARA 3.E., REF "A" MUST BE GIVEN HIGHEST PRIORITY AND REALIZED BY ALL CONTROL AGENCIES (TADC, KHE SANH DASC, AND ABCCC) IN ORDER THAT THE SURGE IS PROMPT AND IMMEDIATE IN RESPONSE TO KSCB CMDR.

B. THE ATK ACFT SORTIE AVAILABILITY CONTAINED PARA 3.A AND 3.P, MUST BE AUGMENTED W/SUF AGA AMTI STYSTEMS ACFT AND OV-1SLAR EQUIPED ACFT AND ANY OTHER TYPE WPNS STYSTEMS W/TH CAPABILITY TO ATK AND DESTROY MOVING TGTS AT NIGHT AND DUR DAYLIGHT HRS OF INCLEMENT WEATHER. THE EN RESUP CAPABILITY DUR DARKNESS AND INCLEMENT WEATHER MUST BE HALTED. IT IS RECOM THAT CG III MAF GIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO PROVIDING AVAIL AGA AMTI AND OV-1 SLAR ACFT IN SUPT OF KHE SANH.

C. KHE SANH IS COMPLETELY DEPENDENT UPON KHE SANH ASRT FOR ALL.

SHOVE C  
GP CHIEF H  
G-3 W.O. C  
G-2 W.O. y  
DCPO y  
APO H  
ACTION Scotland

UNCLASSIFIED

03 14 - 50

Encl 50

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WEATHER AIR SUPT. DONG HA ASRT AND MILKY USAF MSQ ARE AVAIL FOR EMERG BACKUP W/REDUCED CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF INCREASED RANGE. BOTH BACKUP RADAR BOMBING SYSTEMS ARE DEPENDENT, BECAUSE OF RANGE, UPON BEACON-EQUIPPED ACFT. TO COVER THE CONTINGENCY OF KHE SANH ASRT BEING A COMBAT CASUALTY RECOM THAT 1ST MAW INITIATE A SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES FOR DONG HA ASRT TO ASSUME PERIODIC TPQ COVERAGE OF KHE SANH TO PERMIT FULL EVALUATION OF DONG HA CAPABILITIES, PROVIDE MAINT TIME FOR KHE SANH ASRT, AND PERMIT TRNG FOR EASY TRANSITION OF ASRT RESPONSIBILITIES. IT IS ALSO RECOM THAT AGA ACFT CONDUCT SUF OFFSET BOMBING ATKS TO ENSURE CAPABILITY USING GRUMMAN BEACON AS BACKUP FOR KHE SANH ASRT. IN ADDITION, RECOM THAT MILKY MSQ CONDUCT FULL EVALUATION W/TAC ACFT SAME AS ABOVE W/ABCC PASSING 26TH MAR TGTS AND THAT 7TH AF EXPEDITE INSTALLATION OF MSQ PROGRAMMED FOR DONG HA.

D. THIS HQ HAS INITIATED ACTION THRU THE I CORPS VASCO TO PROVIDE FIVE (5) OBS/COVEY ACFT ON-STA CONTINUOUSLY DUR DAYLIGHT HRS TO COVER KHE SANH. IT IS REALIZED HOWEVER THAT THIS MAY BE INFUF DUR PEAK PRDS OF OPNS W/GOOD WEATHER. IT IS THEREFORE RECOM THAT TWO (2) ADDITIONAL COVEY ACFT BE ON CALL FOR DIVERT OR SCRAMBLE TO COVER THIS CONTINGENCY.

E. REGARDING LOGISTICAL SUPT ACFT, IT IS RECOM THAT AIR LANDED RESUP BE EMPLOYED WHENEVER FEASIBLE. THIS TYPE DELIVERY FACILITATES MORE EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING AND STORAGE AND REQUIRES LESS MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIP.

F. CONSIDERING THE ENEMY'S PROPENSITY TO WORK AND ATK AT NIGHT, IT IS RECOM THAT A C-47 GUNSHIP PLUS A KC-130/C-117/C-47 FLARE SHIP BE ON-STA CONTINUOUSLY DUR THE HRS OF DARKNESS.

G. THE REQUIREMENT FOR IMMEDIATE IMAGERY PI READOUT OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY TO IDENTIFY TGTS AND ADDITIONALLY TO ANALYZE TRENCH LINE AND BUNKER COMPLEXES FOR TARGETING AT THE MOST STRATEGIC AND VULNERABLE POSITION REMAINS A CONTINUAL REQUIREMENT. THIS HQ WILL PROCESS AND HOLD K-28 PHOTOGRAPHY AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSS AND PASS TARGETING INFO TO 26TH MAR FSCC. IT IS RECOM THAT III MAF CONTINUE TO EXPEDITE SPOT RPTS OF LUCRATIVE TGTS DEPICTED FR 1ST MAW AND 7TH AF PHOTOGRAPHY.

2. SUBJ TO FOREGOING COMMENTS CONCUR W/REF "A" AND BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE EPITOMY OF INTER-SERVICE COORDINATION AND COOPERATION TO COMBAT THE DIFFICULT BUT CONQUERABLE TASK BEFORE US.

3. MAJ GEN TOMPKINS SENDS.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

*[Handwritten marks: checkmarks and initials]*

*open & Keep Track*

UNCLASSIFIED

*W.O.*

DE 9077 H/W MU RN 011

CPRLG

CHY 00000

O R 031601Z MAR 65

FM FOURTH MAR

*+ OR/03/035/4TH/MAR/11*

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

ZEN/SECOND BN NINTH MAT

ZEN/THIRD BN NINTH MAR

BLT TWO SLANT FOUR

ZEN/STRY C FIRST BN FOURTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)

ZEN/CO B THIRD TK BN

ZEN/SECOND PLAT CO A THIRD ENG BN

INFO ZEN/FIRST BN TWELFTH MAR

*CO*

BLT THREE SLANT ONE

BT

PRAG ORD FOR 04 MAR 68 CHANGE ONE

A. 4TH MAR 030610Z MAR 68

1. CG 3RD MARDIV EXCHANGES BLT'S 2/4 AND 3/1 BY HELICOPTER ON 4 AND 5 MAR 68.

2. ON 4 MARCH 4 TH MAR EXCHANGES H/2/4 AND DESIGNATED CO 3/1 AT CA.

3. ON 4 MARCH 2/9 EXCHANGES DESIGNATED COMPANY WITH G/2/4 AT

(YD 074574): 4TH MARINES THEN EXCHANGES G/2/4 WITH DESIGNATED CO 3/1 AT CAMP CARROLL.

4. ALL OTHER PROVISIONS REF (A) REMAIN THE SAME.

GP-4

BT

*03*

*16*

*100/000 PAR*

*01*

*6*

*Encl 51*

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

ADC

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO San Francisco, 96602

4/RLJ/jet  
4000  
4 Mar 1968

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Staff

Subj: Displacement of Headquarters Battalion

1. The following is a revised schedule for the displacement of Headquarters Battalion:

Date	Section	Trucks	Remarks
5 Mar 1968	MP Co	9	
"	Serv Co	8	Mess equipment for 200 men
"	Hq Co	3	Co Cmdr
"	Div Engr	3	Entire Section
"	Col THOMAS	2	
"	CEO	2	To Dong Ha

Total:

8 Mar 1968	C/S	3	
"	MP Co	4	Remainder of Co
"	Legal	8	Entire section
"	Hq Co	5	Co CP
"	Serv Co	2	Mess equipment & water buffalos
"	Serv Co	1	Part of MT Sec: 4 M35 plus M422 & M37
"	Club gear	5	For separate messes

Total:

11 Mar 1968	G-1	23	
"	Serv Co	2	MT parts & equipment
"	G-5	3	

28

Total:

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 52

4/RLJ/jct  
4 Mar 1968

Date	Section	Trucks	Remarks
14 Mar 68	G-1	20	
"	CG's Mess	3	
"	Serv Co	2	
→ [n	Compt.	4	Co CP & Supply

Total:

17 Mar 68	Hq Co	2	Bn S-1 & Bn Legal
"	FAS	8	Entire section
"	<del>Div Med</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Entire section</del>
"	Bn Supply	10	Records & armory
"	Auditor	2	To Dong Ha
"	15th ITT	2	
"	G-1	4	

Total:

20 Mar 68	Serv Co	3	Remainder of MT
"	Serv Co	6	Close out Bn Maint
"	Serv Co	6	Close & turn over Mess #4
"	Hq Co	4	Bn S-3/4 & close BOQ
"	Comm	2	Begin to close Comm
"	Bn Supply	5	
"	Serv Co	2	Bn Special Services

Total:

23 Mar 68	Dental	11
"	Div Clubs	12
"	Bn Supply	5

Total:

26 Mar 68	G-3	10
"	Disbursing	13
"	Bn Supply	2

Total:

29 Mar 68	Band	7
"	Comm	4
"	Bn Supply	14

2


4/RLJ/jet  
4 Mar 1968

<u>Date</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Trucks</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Total (29 Mar 1968):			
1 Apr 68	G-2	2	Map section
"	Div MT	1	Entire section
"	Div Embark	2	Entire section
"	Div Supply	4	Entire section
"	<del>Comp</del> ME 1)	5	Entire section

Total:

*A. I. Thomas*  
A. I. THOMAS

DECLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DOPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>

//////////////////// FLASH TO FOLLOW //////////////////////

ZNY EEEEE  
\*\*\*\*\*Z 040201C\* -4 68

FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
TO TWO SIX MARINES

BT  
UNCLAS E F T O

1. COC COMM PLEASE READDRESS CG III MAF MSG 031031 Z MAR 68  
AS INDICATED ABOVE.

ZNY SSSSS

C 031031Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMSBJ/CDR 7AF TSN RVN

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

SEA/CG FIRST MAW

1. CG THIRD MARDIV HAS RECOMMENDED TGTS IN THE KHE SANH AREA TO BE  
STRUCK WITH INCENDARY MUNITIONS CAPABLE OF AREA COVERAGE AND  
SUFFICIENT HEAT GENERATION TO IGNITE LIVE FOILAGE/CAMOUFLAGUE  
MATERIAL.

2. REQUEST THE FOLLOWING TGTS BE STRUCK ASAP DURING DAYLIGHT  
HOURS BY B-57 ACFT WITH M-36 INCENDARY BOMB CLUSTERS, TO  
EXPOSE THE TRENCH SYSTEM FOR AIP/ARTY ATTACK.

A. XD 800410 RPT XD 800410  
XD 814396 RPT XD 814396  
XD 807417 RPT XD 807417  
XD 822403 RPT XD 822403

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 262

B. XD 814396 RPT XD 814396  
XD 828382 RPT XD 828382  
XD 822402 RPT XD 822402  
XD 836388 RPT XD 836388

GP-4  
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

04


02

01 Encl 53

DECLASSIFIED

### THIRD MARDIV

UNCLASSIFIED



## ACTION

BI 3

G-3/AIR2

ADVANCE ROUTED

# ASH


600/150

14. *End*

**SECRETED**

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



RVNE  
OMGTGYT  
GUHCOO ZEBANB,9

KB  
QIVV NHA788  
\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUMHVP  
DE RUMHN 012B 0640349  
ZNY CCCCC  
Z 040220Z MAR 68  
FM CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SEC GRU  
TO RUMHNB/CTF CLEAR WATER

SHOVE	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DOPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APD	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>Clearwater</i>

INFO RUMHVP/THIRD MARDIV  
RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
RUMHWA/CG III MAF  
ZEN/CO. THIRD MARINE REGIMENT  
RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUMHMA/COMUSMACV FWD  
RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
RUMHNB/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SEC GP (PBR MOBILE BASE 1)  
RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AF  
RUMHNB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
RUMHLA/CT TF XRAY  
RUMHMA/COMTHIRD CB BN  
RUMHVH/DASA I CORPS  
RUMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
RUMHNB/NSAD TAN MY  
ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET  
RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO RUMHN 011B  
RUMNVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
ZEN/CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SAC GP  
RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
RUHNBRA/COMSERVPAC  
RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX  
RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
RUHGUA/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
BT

- COCLEARWATER SPOTREP 1-3/1/CUA VIET  
1. 040700H CONVOY FM CUA VIET TO DONG HA. CONVOY CDR LT HOOPER.  
2. OBSERVED WIRE STRUNG ACROSS HIEU GIANG RIVER FM YD267624 TO YD266627

CONVOY STOPPED IN THACH HAN RIVER VIC YD268635 WHILE GUNSHIPS ARE FIRING IN BARRICADE AREA. WILL CALL IN ARTY WHEN CONVOY IS CLEAR. INTELLIGENCE ALSO REPORTED ENEMY PERSONNEL SEEN CARRYING UNKNOWN ITEMS TOWARD RIVER BANK AT YD255622. CONSIDER ENTIRE HIEU GIANG RIVER HOSTILE FM MOUTH TO YD250622. CONVOY CONDUCTED H/I FIRE INTO PRVIOUS AMBUSH SITED AT YD265645 WITH NO FIRE RETURNED.  
3. 040945H

PAGE THREE RUMHN 012B  
4. YD267627  
5. 041100H  
GP-4  
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

04

02

20


Enc 55

DECLASSIFIED



**SECRET**

THIRD MARDIV



UNCLASSIFIED

SHOVE

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

DRAFTER

ACTION

SEC

G-3

GWO

3D MARDIV GOC

PRIORITY 440256 MAR 68FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: NINTH MARINESINFO: TWELFTH MARINES  
PLSG "B"

NOTATION OF UNITS

8 MAR

1. ON ~~2/1~~ EFFECT RELINE OF 2/1 IN PLACE WITH 1/4, ONE  
COMPANY AT A TIME.

2. A FOUR COMPANY BATTALION MUST BE MAINTAINED AT CON THIEN.

CON

161

RELEASED BY

A.L. Michael

73

cg/cs/ceolece

JF

16

56

**SECRET**

End 56

**CONFIDENTIAL**

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 811B 064030 COMM CNTR  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 Z 040310Z MAR 68  
 FM CF CLEARWAER  
 TO RUMHVP/THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACTDANANG

UMMWAA/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CO. THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

L  
 U SBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RU SMA/COMUSM CV  
 RUMHMA/COMUSMACV FWD  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RU HNB/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SEC GP (PBR MOBILE BASE)  
 RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHLA/CT TF XRAY  
 RUMHMA/COMTHIRD CB B  
 RU HVH/DASA I CORPS  
 RUNHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 RU HNB/NSAD TAN MY  
 ZENGXNSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV

G-3

RECEIVED  
 OF CHIEF  
 G-3 W.O.  
 G-2 W.O.  
 DCPD  
 APO  
 ACTION

Clear water

PAGE TWO RUMHN 011B 064030  
 RUMNVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
 ZF /CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SAC GP  
 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMHBRA/COMSERVPAC  
 RUMFRP/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUMGUA/CE SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 BT

UNCLASSIFIED

CONVOY TRANSIT CUA VIE TO DONG HA  
 4 MAR 68

1. CONVOY HELD YP AT YD 268635 AT 84104H. OBSTRUCTION STRUNG ACROSS RIVER YD 267624 TO YD 266627. NVA TROOPS OBS BOTH SIDES OF RIVER EXTENDING TOWARD DONG HA. SUSPECT ENEMY CROSSING POINT AND ATTEMPTING TO REVENT CONVOY FROM TRANSITING RIVER TO DONG HA
2. RETRUNING CONVOY TO CUA VIET.
3. REQ MAX EFFORT TO CLEAR AREA WITH ARTILLERY /NAVAL GUN FIRE/FIXED WING STRIKES AND THEM TROUP SWEEP.
4. WILL HOLD CONVOYS CUA VIET UNTIL AREA IN QUESTION IS CLEAR.
5. LATE INTELL 841100H CONVOY CDR HAS OBSERVED NVA TROOPS AT POSITION


FLASH

PAGE THREE RU HN 811B/COMNAVFORV  
 YD 260645 SETTING UP MORARS/ROCKET POSITIONS. HELD OBSERVED NVA TROOPS AT YD 04YEYEP. THESE REPORTS ARE VISUAL REPEA VISUAL SIGHTING

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED



CP CHIEF

C-3 W.O.

C-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

COU

8

2

\*

CLEARWATER

VV VPA352VV KHA000 RUMHUP  
 DE RUMHUP 0218 0640323  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 040340Z MAR 68  
 FM NSAD DONGHA/CUA VIET  
 TO RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPACT DANANG  
 INFO RUMHNA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHUP/CG 3RD MARDIV

TR 1040 900 MAR 68/MS A

1. ALL PROGRAMMED LST'S FOR CUA VIET BE HELD AT DANANG  
 2. VIET RAMP 90 PERCENT STAGED UNIT MOVES/CARGO. RIVER PRESENTLY  
 BLOCKED AT YD 267 624 TO YD 268 627 BY BARRICADE ACROSS RIVER.  
 NO TRAFFIC POSSIBLE UNTIL SIT RESOLVED. NO ETC ON CLEARING BARRICADE.  
 3. NVA/VC SIGHTED ON RIVER BANK VIC OF BARRICADE.  
 4. SUGGEST HELO CARGO SHUTTLE BE INITIATED BETWEEN CUA VIET AND INLAND  
 SUPPLY POINTS UNTIL SITUATION CLEARS.

GP-4

BT

A-3


CG/CS/CO/CSO

0403

40

Encl 58

UNCLASSIFIED



CC CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

0-270.

0000

APO

## ACTION

00 RUMHVP

DE RUMHN 055B 0641454

NY CCCCC

0 046YE8Z MAR 68

FM CDR DONG HA SUPPLY FIVER SEC GRU

TO RUMHN/CTF CLEAR WATER

INFO RUMHVP/CG III MARDIV

RUHHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANA NG

RUMHN/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIV SEC GRU PBR MOBILE BASE ONE

RUNSMA/COMSUMA/V

RUMHMD/COMUSMA CV FWD

NUMBER/COM NAME FOR V

PHYSAL/CDE SEVENTH AF

UNCLAS//:G FIRST MAW

IMFLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUM H/P/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUNHMA/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV

RUMMLA/CG TF XRAY

RUMHVP/COM THIRD CB BN

RUMIN H/DSA I CORPS

RUMW H/SA FIRST ARVN DIV

RUMHN/NSA DET TAN MY/HUE

RUMBLE/HE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR

6-3

04

06-~~Under DFG~~

**UNIDENTIFIED**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 2 RUMHN 055B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 RUMWHE/CG 115.5  
 RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINE REGT  
 RUMHUL/COMSEVENTH FLT  
 RUMHBRA/COMSERVPAC  
 RUMFKRP/CTF 76  
 RUYSUAK/CTG 76.4  
 RUMGUAH/CTG 76.5  
 BT

NEARWATER SPOTREP 1-3/2/ CUA VIET  
 PRPIPPH2 CONVOY FM CUA VIET TO DONG HA. CONVOY CDR LT HOOPER.  
 AS CONVOY APPROACHED YD 277/651 CONVOY CDR. WAS INFORMED BY BASE  
 SECURITY, DONG HA THAT NVA HAD BEEN OBSERVED MOVING INTO AREA YD  
 255/625 AND HAD APPARENTLY STRUNG WIRE ACROSS CHANNEL AT THAT POINT.  
 AT 040930H6 SWEEP BOAT U WAS DIRECTED TO POSIT. DESCRIBES BARRIER  
 RUNNING FROM BANK TO BANK AND MADE OF BAMBOO. HELO STRIKES  
 APPARENTLY LEFT BARRIER INTACT; NO SECONDARIES OBSERVED. HELO FLEW  
 OVER AREA IN QUESTION AND ADVISED BARRIER LOCATED CLOSER TO YD  
 255/624 AND OBSERVED NO TROOPS IN AREA. AT 041110H7 CONVOY LOCATED  
 AT ENTRANCE TO BO DIEU RIVER, RECEIVED 3 VOLLEYS OF MORTAR IN WATER

PAGE 3 RUMHN 055B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 ON NW BANK OF CHANNEL. TOTAL OF 15 ROUNDS OBSERVED, WALKING FROM EAST  
 TO WEST. AT 041150H1 CRAFT MASTER OF LCU 1575 OBSERVED APPROX 20  
 PEOPLE IN BLACK DRESS MOVING WHAT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE TUBES OR  
 MORTARS EAST TOWARD VILLAGE AT YD 258/645. AT THIS POINT CONVOY WAS  
 ORDERED TO RETURN TO CUA VIET DUE TO MORTAR THREAT AND BARRICADE  
 OBSTRUCTION AT COORDS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED. ON WAY BACK SUPPRESSIVE  
 FIRE PUT IN FREE FIRE ZONE YD 268/640 TO YD 272/650. NO FURTHER  
 INCIDENTS TO CONVOY. CONVOY ARRIVED CUA VIET 041220H9

3. P41100H6  
 4. YD267/627  
 5. CLOSED  
 GP-4  
 BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ZNY SSSSS.

000007Z 040715Z MAR 68

FM THIRD MARDIV COC

TO FMAW COC

INFO: TWO SIX MARINES COC

BT


REQ FOR CBU ORDNANCE

A. TWO SIX MARINES MSG 012134Z MAR 68

1. REQ CHANGE CBU ORDNANCE REQUIREMENTS IN REF A, TO FOUR (4) CBU  
FLIGHTS PER NIGHT AND ONE (1) FLIGHT ON CALL FROM 2400H-0600H  
PER NIGHT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

GP-4

BT



SHOVE COC

GP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

SCPO

APD

ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED


04 07 15

Encl 60

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

FLASH



UNCLASSIFIED

SHOW COC

CP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

VV MFP431

0000ZZ RUMHPB RUMHVP

DE RUMWAA 0452 0641342

ZNY SSSSS

Z 041342Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHVP/TWO SIX MARINES

INFO RUMHPB/THREE ONE ONE AIR COMMANDO SQUADRON DANANG

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

BT

NOFORN

CLOUD SEEDING TO INCREASE VISIBILITY KSCB

1. JCS HAS TASKED 311TH AIR COMMANDO SQUADRON WITH EVALUATION OF CLOUD SEEDING AS MEANS OF INCREASING VISIBILITY ENTIRE DEFENSE PERIMETER OF MAIN BASE AREA. PREDICTED WEATHER CONDITIONS AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY DICTATE THIS EVALUATION BE MADE ON 5 MAR 68.
2. PROPER EVALUATION NECESSITATES COMPILATION VISIBILITY OBSERVATIONS FROM SEVERAL VANTAGE POINTS. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO ENSURE ACCUMULATION OF THIS DATA, CONSISTENT WITH TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
3. SGT MARTINEZ USAF, PROJECT METEOROLOGIST, IS PRESENTLY AT KHE SANH. HE SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO BRIEF SELECTED OBSERVATION POSTS ON DETAILS OF REQUIRED REPORTING. SGT MARTINEZ WILL COLLECT DATA SUBSEQUENT TO TEST PERIOD FOR FORWARDING.

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0452 S [REDACTED] NOFORN

4. AT ABOUT 050730H MAR 68 PROJECT AIRCRAFT (CALL SIGN "MOTOR POOL") WILL CONTACT KSCB GCA TO INFORM OF MINUTES UNTIL H-HOUR. OBSERVATION POSTS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. AT H HOUR OBSERVATION OF VISIBILITY WILL BE MADE AND AT EACH 5 MINUTE PERIOD OF ONE HOUR THEREAFTER. CHANGES IN VISIBILITY SHOULD BE RECORDED IN METERS WHEN POSSIBLE.
5. TWO C-123 AIRCRAFT WILL BE ENGAGED IN SEEDING OPERATION; ESTIMATED DURATION APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES. NO HAZARD TO EXPOSED PERSONNEL.

6. IN EVENT OF CLEAR WEATHER PROJECT WILL BE POSTPONED.

GP-4

BT

APO

3/00/00/ RAO  
CS/CG

FLASH


UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



WLVV VPA733ZVA 174VV NHA103  
 OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 007B 0650114  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 041700Z MAR 68  
 FM CTF CLEAR WATER  
 TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA SUPP RIV SEC GP/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE SUPP SEC GP PBR MOBILE BASE ONE  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMHMA/COMUSMACV FWD  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMSBI/CDR 7TH AF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHLA/CG TF XRAY  
 RUMHNA/COMTHIRD NCB BN  
 RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS  
 RUMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET/DONG HA  
 ZEN/NSAD TAN MY/HUE

FOR 051340

1. THE FIRST CONVOY OF THE DAY, CONSISTING OF TWO LCU'S, NINE  
 LCM-8'S AND TWO ANMI BARGES DEPARTED CUA VIET AT 040800H2 ESCORTED BY  
 TWO LCM-6 SWEEP BOATS AND TWO LCPL PATROL BOATS. TWO USJL NSHIPS  
 WERE PROVIDED FOR AIR COVER DURING TRANSIT. AT COORDS YD 282/652  
 WRECKAGE OF LCPL-27 WAS FOUND IN CHANNEL WITH ONE KIA. SIX OTHER CREW  
 MEMBERS PRESENTLY MIA. SWEEP BOATS APPROACHED COORDS YD 254/622 A  
 BAMBOO BARRIER WAS OBS OBSTRUCTING CHANNEL STRUNG FROM BANK TO BANK.  
 HELO GUNSHIPS IN COMPANY ORDERED TO PUT STRIKE INTO BARRIER. NEGATIVE

ACTION  
 CLEARWATER

PAGE TWO RUMHN 007B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV

RUMNVHD/CG 115.1

ZEN/CO THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMHBRA/COMSERVPAC

RUMFKRP/CTG 76

RUYSUAK/CTG 76.4

RUMGUAE/CTG 76.5

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPSUM CUA VIET RIVER 4 MAR 68 (U)

1. THE FIRST CONVOY OF THE DAY, CONSISTING OF TWO LCU'S, NINE  
 LCM-8'S AND TWO ANMI BARGES DEPARTED CUA VIET AT 040800H2 ESCORTED BY  
 TWO LCM-6 SWEEP BOATS AND TWO LCPL PATROL BOATS. TWO USJL NSHIPS  
 WERE PROVIDED FOR AIR COVER DURING TRANSIT. AT COORDS YD 282/652  
 WRECKAGE OF LCPL-27 WAS FOUND IN CHANNEL WITH ONE KIA. SIX OTHER CREW  
 MEMBERS PRESENTLY MIA. SWEEP BOATS APPROACHED COORDS YD 254/622 A  
 BAMBOO BARRIER WAS OBS OBSTRUCTING CHANNEL STRUNG FROM BANK TO BANK.  
 HELO GUNSHIPS IN COMPANY ORDERED TO PUT STRIKE INTO BARRIER. NEGATIVE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

Encl 62



**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE THREE DONG C O N F I D E N T I A L

SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS NOTED AND BARRIER STILL INTACT AFTER STRIKE. AT 041110H7 CONVOY LOCATED AT ENTRANCE TO BO DIEN RIVER AND RECEIVED THREE VOLLEYS OF 15 SHELLS OF MORTER FIRE IN WATER ON NORTH WEST BANK. NEG CASUALTIES OR MAT DAMAGE INCURRED. DURING MORTER ATTACK CRAFTMASTER OF LCU 1575 REPORTED SEEING APPROX 22 BLACK CLAD PERSONNEL MOVING WHAT APPEARED TO BE TUBES OR MORTERS EAST TOWARD VILLAGE AT COORDS. YD 258/645. AT 041115H2 CONVOY CDR WAS ORDERED TO RETURN CONVOY TO CUA VIET DUE TO MORTER THREAT AND BARRICADE OBSTRUCTION IN CHANNEL. DURING RETURN TRANSIT PATROL BOAT INVESTIGATED WRECKAGE OF LCPL-27 AND RECOVERED KIA. CONVOY ARRIVED CUA VIET 041220H9.

2. AIR STRIKES WERE CALLED IN ON BARRIER AND AT 041410H2 SECOND CONVOY CONSISTING OF FIVE LCU'S, EIGHT LCM-8'S AND TWO AMMI BARUA VIET AT 041430H2. THE CONVOY WAS ESCORTED BY TWO LCM-6 SWEEP BOATS AND TWO LCPL PATROL BOATS. TWO USMC GUNSHIPS PROVIDED AIR COVER DURING TRANSIT. WD BB

OUTH BANK BO DIEM BARRIER TO FORM SECURITY PERIMETER. AS SWEEP BOATS ARRIVED AT BARRIER OBSTRUCTION PARA 1, THREE GRENADES WERE OBSERVED ATTACHED TO BARRIER. UDT PERS EMBARKED ATTACHED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES TO BARRIER BUT COULD NOT CLEAR CHANNEL DUE TO DUD

PAGE FOUR DONG C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHARGES ON THREE OUT OF FOUR ATTEMPTS. AT 041722H6 LCU 1575 WAS MINED COORDS YD 78; *NEG PER* CASUALTIES. SLIGHT DAMAGE TO PORT ENGINE, MINOR FLOODING. AT 041745H1 MINE SWEEP BOAT RAMMED THRU BARRIER, TOWING SWEEP GEAR ASTERN DRAGGING OBSTRUCTION CLEAR. AT 041750H7 A SECOND BARRIER IN RIVER OBS AT COORDS YD *BAD CLEAR 285 AME TRACTS* AS FIRST ONE ENCOUNTERED. CONVOY ARRIVED DONG HA RAMP 041800H3 WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

3. AT 041835H1 CONVOY CONSISTING OF THREE LCU, ONE LCM-8 DEPARTED DONG HA RAMP ESCORTED BY TWO LCM-6 SWEEP BOATS AND TWO LCPL PATROL BOATS. TWO USMC GUNSHIPS PROVIDED AIR COVER DURING TRANSIT UNTIL DUSK. AT 041904H8 LCU 1534 MINED COORDS YD 267/648. TWELVE KIA, SIX MEDEVACED TO DONG HA. COND UNK. SIX WITH MINOR INJURED ON BOARD FOR ATME NE CUA VIET. MAT CASUALTIES TO LCU 6534

EXTENSIVE, TAKEN UNDER TOW. BLAST THREW 3/4 TON TRUCK OFF LCU. DUE TO PREVIOUS MINING POSIT, DECISION MADE TO PROCEED TO CUA VIET WITH LCU IN TOW VICE VERSA AND RETURN TO DONG HA. WITH MUCH DIFFICULTY DUE TO MAT CASUALTIES, GROUNDINGS AND DARKNESS, CONVOY ARR CUA VIET 042135H5.

4. CARGO MOVV

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

CONFIDENTIAL

A. TO DONG HA

1. 724.7 S/T

2. 170 M GAL POL

5. MINING TODAY APPEARS TO BE COMMAND DETONATED FROM SHORE.

6. INTENTIONS FCXM AN OBSERVATION AIRC

AFT WILL SWEEP RIVER

DONG HA TO CUA VIET, PAYING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO BARRIER AREA  
YD 254662. AT 0730 2 MINE SWEEP CRAFT AND 2 PATROL BOATS WITH GUNSHIP  
COVER WILL PROCEED TO YD 268269 AND THOROUGHLY SWEEP AREA FROM YD 254/

622 ZM ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO WIDEN GAP THROUGH BARRIERS.  
ELEMENTS OF 3RD MARINE REG WILL LAND TROOPS ALONG SOUTH BANK OF BO  
DIEM RIVER AND IF APPROVED LAND TROOPS ON NORTH BANK. THESE TROOPS  
WILL SECURE BANKS FROM APPROXIMATELY YD 268628 TO YD 253622.

IF MINE SWEEP OPS SUCCESSFUL WILL BRING CONVOY OUT OF DONG HA AND  
PROCEED TO CUA VIET. ANOTHER CONVOY WILL THEN BE DISPATCHED TO DONG  
HA.

GP-4

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

8001 EZAX VV MFP432

PP RUMSMA

DE RUMWAA 0501

ZUR UUUUU

P 050226Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF DAMAS

TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST ARDSV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD ARDSV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST ARDSV

RUMHFL/CG FORLOGC

RUMHIC/CG AMERICA

EO 08/CG FIRST AIR C

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPACT

RUMHNA/COM THIRD NCB

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV SAIGON

BT

UNCLAS

ATTN: COMUSMACV (MACOI)

SUBJ: RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON ENEMY ATTACKS

OT(ATTENTION INFORMATION OFFICERS)

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY IWWJLEASE MZ INFORMATION ABOUT ENEMY ATTACKS AGAINST FIXED U.S. POSITIONS WILL BE COUCHED IN ONLY THE MOST GENERAL TERMS. THIS IS TO DENY THE ENEMY THE USE OF NEW

RELEASES AS ADJUSTMENT INFORMATION.

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 0505 UNCLAS

2. EXACT TIME OF ATTACK, NUMBER OF INCOMING ROUNDS, SPECIFIC TARGETS HIT, EXACT NUMBER CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE WILL BE TREATED AS OFFICIAL USE ONLY AND NOT, REPEAT NOT BE RELEASED.

3. RELEASES OF ATTACKS AGAINST FIXED U.S. POSITIONS AND INSTALLATIONS WILL BE STATED IN TERMS SUCH AS, QUOTE, EARLY THIS MORNING THE MARBLE MT. AIR FACILITY RECEIVED ABOUT 40 ROUNDS OF 122MM ROCKET FIRE. DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES WERE DESCRIBED AS LIGHT. END QUOTE.

4. CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE WILL BE DESCRIBED AS EITHER LIGHT, MODERATE OR HEAVY. IT WILL BE UP TO THE AUTHORITY RESPONDING TO QUERIES, OR RELEASING THE INFORMATION TO DECIDE WHICH TERM APPLIES, BUT IT SHOULD BE THE BEST POSSIBLE JUDGMENT.

5. THE NEW GROUND RULES ARE ALSO BINDING UPON CIVILIAN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES. IN THE EVENT A REPORTER IS IN A POSITION TO OBSERVE ACTUAL DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES, HE SHOULD BE REMINDED OF THE FOREGOING.

6. IT IS REALIZED THAT SEVERAL QUESTIONS ARE RAISED BY THE ABOVE GUIDANCE, AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THE FORTHCOMING MACV GUIDANCE WILL CLARIFY THEM. IN THE MEANTIME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE III MAF INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER.

BT

05


02

STAD

6

Encl 63

SECRET

IMMEDIATE 050508 5 MAR 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARINE  
TO: FOURTH MARINES  
ELEVENTH ENGINEERS

//SECRET//

A. CG III MAP 040516Z MAR 68 (PAGED)...

1. FOR 4TH MAR:

A. IAW REF A BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO CLEAR ROUTE 9 FROM THON SON LON TO CA LU AND TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT SECURITY ALONG THAT PORTION OF ROUTE 9 TO ENSURE THE PASSAGE OF CONVOYS.

B. THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE SECURITY DURING AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION IS UNDER DISCUSSION WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGE.

2. FOR 11TH ENGR BN:

IAW WITH REF A BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO ASSIST IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A C7A AIRSTRIP AT CA LU.

CCN 228RELEASED BY A. R. Mulia

G-3


05

05

eg/cs/ceoc/ceo

06 8 Mar 68

SECRET  
Encl 64



DE DIV AND NR

ZNY SSSSS  
O 050550Z MAR 65  
FM THIRD MARDIV COO  
TO TWO SIX MARINES  
BT

SECRET  
RESUPPLY OF KHE SANH

A. CG III MAF 040612Z MAR 65

1. REQ YOU PROVIDE THIS HQ NLT 7 MARCH WITH INFORMATION REQUESTED  
REF A.

GP-4

BT

#704

*Secret*

NNNN

SHOVE C	
OP CHIEF	<i>A</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>P</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>G</i>
CGPO	<i>P</i>
APO	<i>H</i>
ACTION	<i>Scotland</i>

05

05

50

Encl 65

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

NNNNVV VPC43CVVZVA 145

/////////////////COMMENT FOLLOWS ///THIRD/MARDIV////////

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUMHVP RUMHVP  
DE RUMHN 017B 0650529

ZNY CCCCC

Z 050608Z MAR 68 ZFD



FM CTF CLEAR WATER

TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

INFO RUMHNA/COMNAV SUPPACT DANANG

ZEN CDR DONG HA SUPP RIV SEC GP NSAD CUA VIET

RUMHNB/CDR HUE SUPP SEC GP PERIMOBILE B



DEASE ONE

6-2

TOR

APO

ADMON

*Handwritten:* 6/20/PCS  
CLEAR WATER

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUHMD/COMUSMACV FWD

RU SBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMSAL/CDR 7TH AF

RUMHLA/CG FIRS MARDIV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHMA/CG FIRST AER CAV DIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHLA/CG TF XRAY

RUMHVP/C

DEOM THIRD CB BN

RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS

RUMHVH/SA FIRS ARVN DIV

ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET/DONG HA

RUMHNB/NSAD TAN MY/HUE

RUMVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV

*Handwritten:* G-3

*Handwritten:* 4-2/ene/eed/cq/ce

PAGE 2 RUMHN 017B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMVHE/CG 113.1

ZEN CO

DE THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMHBRA/COMSERVPAC

RUMFKRP/CTF 76

RUYSUAK/CTG 76.4

RUHGUA/CTG 76.5

RUMHVP/COM 3RD MARINE REG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CUA VIET RIVER OPS 5 MAR 68

1. CONV

DEOY ATTACKED BY R/R FIRE 1223H 1240H FROM YD 257633 NORTH  
BANK HIEU GIANG RIVER YFU 64 HIT IN CONN. 5 USN WIA, TWO SERIOUS.

CONVOY CDR LT BARRY W. HOOPER, WIA CRITICAL.

2. ONLY ONE CONVOY CDR AVAILABLE

E FOR OPS.

3

63. 4 MAR OPS CASUALTIES INCLUDED TWO CRAFT MINED WITH 1 KIA, 6 MIA,  
12 WIA.

4. CONVOY OPS CEASED UNTIL FRIENDLY TROOPS HAVE OCCUPIED NORTH  
BAMC HIEU GIA RIVER YD 255623 TO YD 272650.


**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

*Handwritten:* Encl 66

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



SHOVE	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DOPD	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

*COV*

*GUNNY-OPCON*

*no action required*

ZNY SSSSS

ZNY SSSSS  
 OP IMMEDIATE PRIORITY  
 FM FIRST BN THIRD MAR  
 TO NINTH MAR  
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 THIRD MAR  
 BT  
 SECRET  
 CHOP OPCON 1/3 REAR TO NINTH MARINES EFFECTIVE 050700H  
 MARCH 68  
 GP-4  
 BT

05 06 30 7 MAR 68

*(33)*

*TOR/COUR  
234*

*G-3*

*CG/CS/CEED/COE*  
*[Signature]*


NNNN

0506306

SECRET  
Encl 67

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL



SHOVE COC  
 OP CHIEF ☒  
 G-3 W.O. ☒  
 G-2 W.O. ☒  
 CPO ☒  
 APO ☒  
 ACTION ☒  
*Clearwater*

COC

NNNWV VPA83IZVA 721VV NHB074

PP RUMHVP

DE RUMHN 047BM0551456

ZNY CCCCC

P 050816Z MAR 68

FM CTF CLEAR WATER

TO RUMHNA/VJMNASUPPACT DANANG

INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMSBB/CONNAVFORC

RUMHNP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHN/NSAD DONG HA/CUA VIET

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

NAV HAZARDS/CONVOY GROUNDINGS CUA VIET RIVER (U)

1. COMPOUNDING THE SECURITY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING CONVOY TRANSITS CUA VIET RIVER IS THE EXTREMELY LOW WATER IN THE CHANNEL. SANDBARS VISIBLE AT COORDS YD291655, YD282/653, YD268/639 AND YD267/625. TOTAL OF TEN GROUNDINGS BY LOGISTIC/ESCORT/PATROL CRAFT IN LAST TWO CONVOYS INCREASING TRANSIT TIME AND AFFECTING SECURITY AND LOGISTIC MISSION.

2. PRESENT SITUATION PRECLUDES USE OF PIPE DREDGE. REQ UDT SURVEY BE CONDUCTED AND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO USING EXPLOSIVE CHARGES TO BLOW CHANNEL CLEAR.

3. OIC NSAD CUA VIET CONCURS WITH RECOMMENDATION PARA 2.RR

3

2/000/1/000 RAO

PAGE 2 RUMHN 14

CONFIDENTIAL

GP-4

BT

NNNWV

ME

05


08

16

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 68



**CONFIDENTIAL**

LZVA 802  
L NHB210  
PP RUMHVP  
DE RUMHN 02  
B 0631205

ZNYICCCC  
P 030

05Z MAR 68 ZFD

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

ZEN/CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GRO P NSAD CUA VIET

INFO RUMHN/DCDR HUE SUPPLZ RIVER SECURITY GROUP PB MOBILE

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMHMB/DEP COMUSMACV FWD

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF

RUMHMA/CG FIRST MA

IV

RUMHMA/FIRST AIR CAF DIV

RUMHMA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHLA/CG TF XRAY

UMHNA/COM THIRD NCR

RUMNVH/DSA I CORPS

RUMNVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV

ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET/DONG HA

RUMHN/NSAD TAN MYWXHUE

G-3

ADC

G-2/COO/CG/CS/CEO

280

PAGE 2 RUMHN 024B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY

RUMNVHE/COG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

ZEN/CO THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

RUMGULWXCOMSEVENTHFLT

RUMHRA/COMSER VPAC

RUMFKRP/COFSEV SEVEN SIX

RUYSUAK/COF SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUMGUA/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX C (LOGISTIC CRAFT OPERATION AND SECURITY PATRO BOAT/

MINESWEEPING SUPPORT FOR CUA VIET RIVER OPERATIONS) TO CTF CEA-

WATER OPERATION ORDER 1-68 (U)

A. CTF CLEARWATER 250525Z FEB 68

B. CTF CLEARWATER 261000Z FEB 68

C. CTF CLEARWATER 251345Z FEB 68

D. CTF CLEARWATER 010730Z MAR 68

D. CTF CLEARWATER 010955Z MAR YI

1. PURPOSE: THIS ANNEX PROVIDES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE CUA VIET RIVER, ET

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Encl 69

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 3 RUMHN 024B C O N F I D E N T I A L

NSAD CUA VIET AND DONG HA RAMP WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND AVAILABILITY OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ALLOWS FOR A SHIFT FROM PREPARED CONVOY OPERATION TO INDIVIDUAL CRAFT OR GROUPS OF CRAFT DISPATCHED AS REQUIRED.

2. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND: LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSITING THE CUA VIET RIVER WILL BE CHOPPED FROM NSAD DONG HA/CUA VIET TO DONG HA SUPPLY

RIVER SECURITY GROUP UPON COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSIT. SECURITY BOAT PATROLS

AND MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS UNDER THE COMMAND CONTROL OF THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP.

### 3. FUNCTIONS AND TASKS:

A. THE FUNCTION OF THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP IS TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED TRANSIT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE CUA VIET RIVER BETWEEN NSAD CUA VIET AND DONG HA RAMP.

THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP WILL:

- (1) PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY BOAT PATROLS AND MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS ON THE CUA VIET RIVER BETWEEN NSAD CUA VIET AND DONG HA RAMP DURING HOURS WHEN LOGISTIC CRAFT ARE TRANSITING THE RIVER.
- (2) PROVIDE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT AND/OR OTHER ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED BY TRANSITING LOGISTIC CRAFT.

PAGE 4 RUMHN 024B C O N F I D E N T I A L

3) ARRANGE FOR AND COORDINATE SUPPORTING AIR COVER AND ARTILLERY FIRE AS REQUIRED.

- 4) PROVIDE BRIEFINGS AS TO TACTICAL SITUATION, LOCATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES, AND FIRE DISCIPLINE TO CRAFT MASTER/COXAINS OF LOGISTIC AND SECURITY CRAFT TRANSITING THE RIVER.
- (2) MAINTAIN COMPLETE INFORMATION AS TO LOGISTIC CRAFT/SECURITY CRAFT/MINE SWEEP BOATS MOVEMENTS ON THE RIVER DURING TRANSIT AND ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.
- 6) EXERCISE NET CONTROL OF THE LOGISTIC CRAFT/SECURITY BOAT/MINE SWEEP BOATS FREQUENCY DURING TRANSIT.
- (7) DESIGNATE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE CRAFT OPERATIONS DURING TRANSIT AND DIRECT THEIR EMPLOYMENT. DISBLED CRAFT WILL BE BEACHED OR TAKEN IN TOW TO ENSURE THE CHANNELS NOT BLOCKED.

B. THE FUNCTION OF OIC DONG HA/CUA VIET WILL BE TO RECEIVE SUPPORT AND SAIL AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER RIVER SECURITY GROUP ASSIGNED LOGISTIC CRAFT BETWEEN CUA VIET

AND DONG HA RAMP. OIC DONG HA/CUA VIET:

- 1) PROVIDES ESCORT CRAFT, CREWS, AND SWEEP GEAR TO THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 5 RUMHN 024B C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 2) CONDUCT SALVAGE OPERATIONS AS NECESSARY TO RECOVER /REPAIR DAMAGED CRAFT.
- (3) PROVIDE PRC 25/77 RADIOS AND FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT TO ALL LOGISTIC CRAFT, SECURITY BOATS AND MINE SWEEPING BOATS TRANSITING THE RIVER.
- C. CRAFTMASTERS/COXSWAINS OF LOGISTIC CRAFT, SECURITY BOATS AND MINE SWEEPING BOATS WILL:
  - 1) BRIEF THEIR RESPECTIVE CREWS PRIOR TO TRANSITING THE RIVER.
  - 2) MAINTAIN FIRE DISCIPLINE AND CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE OF THEIR CRAFT.
  - 3) DIRECT THE DEFENSIVE FIRE OF THEIR CRAFT, IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER ORDERS FROM THE RIVER SECURITY UNITS OPERATING IN COMPANY. THEY WILL ONLY FIRE WHEN FIRED UPON AND CEASE FIRING EITHER WHEN HOSTILE FIRE ON THE R CRAFT CEASES OR WHEN IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT THE FIRE ENDANGERS FRIENDLY FORCES.
  - 4) WHEN FIRED UPON OR COGNIZANT OF OTHER ENEMY THREAT PROMPTLY NOTIFY RIVER SECURITY UNITS OF THEIR LOCATION AND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT.

PAGE 6 RUMHN 024B C O N F I D E N T I A L


WHEN DIRECTED, THIS ANNEX WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE FOR MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE KUA VIET RIVER.

GP-4  
BT

NNNN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET



SHOVE CO.	
OP CHIEF	<i>[initials]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[initials]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[initials]</i>
DCPO	<i>[initials]</i>
APD	<i>[initials]</i>
ACTION	<i>OPCON</i>

DRAFTED *3/HAH/ds*  
 SEC G-3 FROM 2ND MARDIV COC  
 CWO *[initials]*

INTERMEDIATE *060218* 2 MAR 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG IIX MAF  
 INFO: CG NINTH MAB  
 CG FMOPAC  
 THIRD RECON BN

//SECRET//

RECON ASSETS

1. "B" CO THIRD RECON BN RETURNED ~~CG~~ THIRD RECON BN. 20 Feb.
2. UNODIN THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON "B" CO THIRD RECON BN 200900H  
 FEB69 & PASSES SAME TO THIRD RECON BN SAME DTC.

GP-4

COH *284*

RELEASED BY *A.R. Mulcaugh*

G-3


*CG/CS/COEL/CEO*

*[initials]* 8

06

02

1 ~~SECRET~~ and 70



# STOVE

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DO PRO

APR

# ACTION

# FLASH

QSW T  
Q VV MFP 742  
.....ZZ RUMHVP  
DE RUMMWAA 0863 0680342  
ZNY SSSSS  
Z 080342Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF DANANG  
O RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
FM 071130Z MAR 68  
FM 7AF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN  
TO COMUSMACV  
INFO III MAF DANANG AB RVN  
CINCPACAF  
BT


~~SECRET~~

1  
SUBJECT: KHE SANH VILLAGE (U)  
(S) IN VIEW INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS HEADQUARTERS INDICATING  
PERSISTENT ENEMY ACTIVITY IN KHE SANH VILLAGE, RECOMMEND THE  
VILLAGE BE DECLARED A FREE FIRE AREA AND THAT AIR STRIKES BE USED  
TO DESTROY REMINING STRUCTURES WHICH PROVIDE CONCEALMENT AND  
SHELTER.

4  
5

**SECRET**  
Encl. 7

SECRET



PRIORITY 06540 Z MAR68

FROM: THIRD SPBN

TO: CG, THIRD MARDIV

SECRET

OPCON

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 031114ZMAR68

1. CW REF A THIS HQ ASSUMES OPCON OF CO B (-) THIRD SPBN REF 291000 FEB68.

GP-1

BT

DRAFTER J. N. Hossilis  
J. N. HOSSILIS, GYSGT USMC  
THIRD SPBN 3

RELEASED J. W. Quinn  
J. W. QUINN, LT COL USMC  
THIRD SPBN 6

DIVISION RELEASER \_\_\_\_\_

3D MORE PARTY BE CON \_\_\_\_\_

G-3 COC


STANDARD / COMM

06

05

006  
SECRET  
Encl 72

SECRET



JMWAVE CAC  
 OP CHIEF *H*  
 G-3 W.O. *P*  
 G-2 W.O. *y*  
 DOPD  
 APO *H*  
 ACTION *clear water*

727 VV MFP591  
 OO RUMHNB  
 DE RUMMWAA 0660 0660622  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 060622Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF DANANG  
 TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 INFO RUMHNA/CTF CLEAR WATER NSA DET DONG HA/CUA VIET  
 RUMHNB/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER GROUP P&R MOBILE BASE ONE  
 RUMHNB/CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSA DONG HA/  
 CUA VIET

TOR 1061051/MAF  
*we have*

BT  
 S E C R E T  
 QUICK REACTION FORCE FOR SECURITY OF RIVER LOC'S  
 1. URGENCY OF REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT RIVER LOC'S DICTATES  
 NEED FOR IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE PLATOON SIZE REACTION FORCES  
 TO COUNTER ENEMY INTERDICTION OF RIVER LOGISTIC TRAFFIC.  
 2. FOR CG FIRST MARDIV: PROVIDE PLATOON SIZE QUICK REACTION  
 FORCE ON 15 MIN ALERT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS TO COUNTER  
 ENEMY INTERDICTION PERFUME RIVER.  
 3. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV: PROVIDE PLATOON SIZE QUICK REACTION  
 FORCE ON 15 MIN ALERT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS TO COUNTER ENEMY

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 0660 S E C R E T  
 INTERDICTION CUA VIET RIVER.  
 4. FOR CG FIRST MAW: PROVIDE HELO LIFT/GUNSHIP SUPPORT ON 15  
 MINUTE ALERT TO LIFT REACTION FORCES PARA 2 AND ABOVE. SPARROW  
 HAWK SYSTEM SATISFACTORY PROVIDING ALERT CRITERION ASSURED.  
 5. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

GP-4  
 BT

3 cod/2/cg/cs/ceo RAO

NNNN

06

06

2 <sup>6</sup> SECRET  
 Encl 73

**SECRET**

DRAFTER 3/HMB/TVD  
 SEC G-3 PHONE 3 MARDIV GOC  
 GWO

PRIORITY/ROUTINE 060718 MAR68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG III MAF

INFO: CG FIRST MARDIV  
 FLSC-A  
 THIRD MARDIV

//SECRET//

TASK ORGANIZATION

A. III MAF ORDER 5213.2

1. IAW REF A, THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED, PERSONNEL STRENGTH INCLUDED:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>STRENGTHS</u>
HQBN(-)(REIN)		
HQCO(-)	PHU BAI	82-495
SERVCO(-)		18-218
MPCO(-)		5-96
DET HQBN	TF ROBBIE	
DET COMMCO		1-14
DET HQBN	FLSC	
DET HQCO		8-1
DET HQBN	KHE SANH	
DET HQCO		8-3
DET COMMCO		8-6
DET HQBN	DANANG	
DET HQCO		8-1
DET MPCO		8-1
DET HQBN	III MAF	
DET HQCO		8-09

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

**SECRET**

-15TH IFF(-)

DET 15TH IFF

17TH IFF(-)

DET 17TH IFF

3D IT(-)

9TH IT(-)

DET 9TH IT

11TH IT(-)

DET 11TH IT

1ST SSCT

PIIU(-)

DET PIIU

3D MARINES

3D MAR(-)(REIN)

HQCO 3D MAR(-)

DET HQCO HQBN

DET COMCO HQBN

DET 2ND(-) 3D MAR

H&amp;S CO

CO A

CO C

CO D

DET 2/4(-)(REIN)

H&amp;S CO(-)(REIN)

DET HQ BTRY 12TH MAR

DET BTRY H 3/12

DET 3D PLE CO A 3D MT BN

DET 1ST SQD MP PLE HQ 9TH MAR

DET 2D PLE CO B 3D ENGINE BN

PHU BAI 3-4

QUANG TRI 1-2

PHU BAI 2-3

DUE SANH 1-3

DONG HA 2-4

CAMP CARROLL 1-3

QUANG TRI 3-2

DONG HA 1-3

QUANG TRI 3-3

DONG HA 1-13

DANANG 2-16

DONG HA 3-1

CUA VIET

23-239

3-5

3-6

CUA VIET

18-298

4-232

5-234

5-231

CUA VIET

14-238

1-1

1-12

3-4

3-2

3-43

3-14

**SECRET**

SECRET

DET 1ST PLT CO B 3D SP BN	1-12
DET HQ CO 9TH MAB	1-0
DET COMM SPT CO 9TH MAB	0-4
1ST PLT CO D 3D RECON BN	1-10
DET C&C CO B 3D MED BN	<del>1-10</del>
CO E	5-158
CO F	6-170
1ST AMTRAC BN(-)(REIN)	CUA VIET
H&S CO (10 LVTP-5)	17-294
(3 LVTP-5 CMD)	
(1 LVTR-1)	
(4 LVTE-1)	
CO A(-) (36 LVTP-5)	6-226
(2- LVTP-5 CMD)	
(1- LVTR-1)	
CO B(-) (25-LVTP-5)	6-220
(2- LVTP-5 CMD)	
(1-LVTR-1)	
CO B(REIN) 1/3	C-4 5-208
3D MAR (REAR)	
DET 3D MAR	<del>1-10</del>
DET 3D ENGR BN	5-186
DET 3D TK BN	4-111
DET 3D SP BN	2-55
DET HQ BN	1-49
DET MPCO HQ BN	1-55
4TH MAR(-) (REIN)	CAMP CARROLL
HQ CO(-)	22-209
BLT 3/1	KHE GIA BN
H&S CO(REIN)	17-332

44-124

SECRET

**SECRET**

CO I

CO K

CO L

CO M

7-146

6-146

4-161

CA LU 7-135

UNK

2D BN 9TH MAR

H&amp;S CO

CO E

CO F

CO G

CO H

CO G BMT 2/4

DET CO B 3D TK BN

CAMP CARROLL

20-320

3-221

4-208

6-211

5-215

5-194

0-8

3D BN (REIN) 9TH MAR

H&amp;S CO(-)(REIN)

DET 2D PLE CO A 3D ENGR BN

DET 11TH ENGR BN

DET CO A 9TH MT BN

DET H&amp;S CO

CO I

CO K

CO L

CO M

CO H BMT 2/4

PLE CO B 3D TK BN (3-M48A3)

CO A, 9TH MTBN

DET H&amp;S CO 3D MT BN (7M76)

2D PLE(-) CO A 3D ENGR BN

CO B(-) 3D TK BN (2-M48A3)  
(1 M51 VTR)

THON SON LAM 15-216

0-5

0-1

0-2

CA LU 6-129

6-213

5-232

THON SON LAM 5-214

6-208

CA LU 5-176

THON SON LAM 1-13

CAMP CARROLL 3-31

0-10

1-30

2-59

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

DET HQ CO HQ BN	CAMP CARROLL 0-9
DET COMM CO HQ BN	0-12
DET SERV CO HQ BN	0-2
DET 3D RECON	0-5
5TH PLT 1ST RAD BN	1-18
9TH M A(-)(REIN)	
HQCO 9TH MAR	DONG HA 20-220
2ND BN 1ST MAR	A-4
H&S CO	10-140
CO E	4-146
CO F	4-142
CO G	5-151
CO H	5-153
3D BN 3D MAR	
H&S CO	A-3
CO I	18-342
CO K	5-191
CO L	5-231
CO M	6-205
CO "C" 1/4	6-199
1ST BN 4TH MAR	GIO LINH 6-214
H&S CO	C-2
CO A	18-323
CO B	C-2 BR 6-211
CO D	C-2 6-208
	C-2BR 6-208

6-14

**SECRET**

SECRET

3D BN 4TH MAR

C-3

H&amp;S CO

18-281

CO I

5-201

CO K

CAP-P-3 6-205

CO L

CAM LO DIST HQ 6-215

CO M

C-3BR 5-211

CO B 9TH MTBN

DONG HL 4-82

26TH MAR (REIN)

KHE SANH

HQ CO (-) (REIN)

21-164

DET 5TH COMBN

0-3

DET 7TH COMBN

0-3

DET DIV POSTAL

0-3

DET DIV PHOTO

0-4

DET DIV EXCHANGE

0-3

1ST BN 26TH MAR (REIN)

H&amp;S CO

20-339

CO A

5-110

CO B

6-214

CO C

5-215

CO D

6-213

2D BN 26TH MAR (-) (REIN)

H&amp;S CO

20-305

CO F

6-205

CO G

6-214

CO H

5-206

SECRET

**SECRET**

## 3D BN 26TH MAR(RLIN)

H&S CO	17-310
CO I	6-220
CO K	6-214
CO L	5-199
CO M	4-196
CO B 2/26	5-217

## 1ST BN 9TH MAR

H&S CO	16-355
CO A	6-198
CO B	6-192
CO C	6-202
CO D	6-192

## 1ST BN 13TH MAR(RLIN)

HQBTMY	13-128
BTRY A (6-105(TD))	10-126
BTRY B (6-105(TD))	4-119
BTRY C (6-105(TD))	8-130
BTRY W (6-4.2 MORT)	4-86

1ST PROV 155HOWBTRY(RLIN)(6-155N(TD))	3-92
---------------------------------------	------

DET 236TH FLDARTY(USA)	0-8
------------------------	-----

AT CO(-) 3D TANK BN (10-M50A2)	4-82
--------------------------------	------

CO A(-) 3D SPBN	2-74
-----------------	------

3DPLT CO B 3D TANKBN(5-M48A3)	2-22
-------------------------------	------

2D CLR PTC COG 3D MEDBN	4-25
-------------------------	------

SECT BTRY G 65TH ARTY(USA)(2-M55)	0-7
-----------------------------------	-----

1ST SECT BTRY A 1/44 ARTY(USA)(2-M42)	2-9
---------------------------------------	-----

DET CO C 3D MEDBN	0-10
-------------------	------

8-14

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

DET CO B 9TH ATBN	C-1
DET HAS CO 3D ATBN(9-M76)	C-15
CO B(REIN) 3D RECON BN	
CO B	2-70
3D PIET CO D	1-19
1ST PIET CO A 5TH RECON	0-8
12TH MAR(-)(REIN)	DONG HA
HQBTTRY(REIN)	33-276
2350MR DET(USA)(1AN/MPQ-4A)	C-1
250TH CMR DET(USA)(1-AN/MPQ-4A) GIO LINH	
108TH FAG(USA)	DONG HA
1ST BN(-)(REIN) 40TH ARTY(USA)	
HQBTTRY	39-109
SVC BTTRY	5-79
BTTRY A (6-105H(SP))	6-88
DET BTTRY B (1-105(SP))	UNK
BTTRY C (6-105H(SP))	C-1 6-90
2D BN (REIN) 94TH ARTY(USA) CAMP CARROLL	
HQBTTRY	17-124
SVC BTTRY	DONG HA 5-94
BTTRY A (4-175GUNS)	THON SON LAI 3-90
BTTRY B (4-175GUNS)	CAMP CARROLL 5-88
BTTRY C (4-175GUNS)	3-90
BTTRY A 8THBN 4THARTY(4-175GUNS)	3-90
8THBN(-) 4TH ARTY	DONG HA
HQBTTRY	21-137
SVC BTTRY	5-76
BTTRY C (4-175GUNS) C-1	3-90
BTTRY C 2D TAB 26TH ARTY(USA)	DONG HA 11-230
DET SOUND PIET 2/26 (1-GNR) GIO LINH	

~~SECRET~~



**SECRET**

DET SOUND FLT 2/26 (1-GRB) CON THLEN  
 DET RADAR FLT 2/26 (1-AN/MPQ-10A)  
 DET RADAR FLT 2/26 (1-AN/MPQ-10A) DONG HA  
 DET MC 10-2 (1-AN/MPQ-10A) CAMP CARROLL  
 DET MC 10-3 (1-AN/MPQ-10A) C-1  
 1ST 8" HOWBTRY CAM LO 8-185  
 FLT 1ST8" (2-8"(M-110)) C-1  
 FLT 1ST8" (2-8"(M-110)) C-2  
 FLT 1ST8" (2-8"(M-110)) CAM LO  
 1ST SL BTRY(-) DONG HA 6-90  
 DET 2D SEC 1STFLT (1-20" SL)  
 DET 2D SEC 1STFLT (1-20" SL) GUA VIET  
 1ST BN(-)(MAIN) 12TH MAR CAMP CARROLL  
 HQBTRY 1/12 15-138  
 BTRY A (6-105(TD)) 17-106  
 BTRY C (6-105(TD)) 7-107  
 W BTRY(-) 1/12 (2-107 <sup>HOWTAR</sup> ~~HOWTAR~~) CA LU 3-86  
 BTRY B(-) 1/40TH (USA)(5-105(SP)) ROCK PILE 6-91  
 BTRY K 4/12 (6-155H(SP)) CAMP CARROLL 4-95  
 239 CWR DET(USA) (1-AN/MPQ-4A)  
 DET 2D SEC 2D FLT 1ST SL BTRY(1-20" SL)  
 W BTRY 3/12 (6-107 H WEARS) 4-56  
 2D BN(MAIN) 12TH MAR DONG HA  
 HQ BTRY 15-148  
 BTRY D (6-105H(TD)) CAM LO 7-103  
 BTRY E (6-105H(TD)) C-2 8-101  
 BTRY F (6-105H(TD)) C-2 8-105  
 W BTRY 2/12 (6-107HOWEARS) CON THLEN 2-74  
 BTRY H 3/12 (6-105H(TD)) DONG HA 7-100

10-14

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

BTRY K 4/13(6-155H(SP))	C-2	4-95
245 C&R DET(USA)(1-AN/MPQ-4A)		
DET MC 4-1 (1-AN/MPQ-4A)	CON THINE	
DET 2D PLT 1STSL BTRY(1-20 <sup>th</sup> SL)	CAM LO	
3D BN(-)(K&IN) 12TH MAR	QUANG TRI	
HQ BTRY		17-116
BTRY G (6-105(TD))		7-110
2D PROV 155BTRY(-)(1-155H(TD))		3-86
BTRY I 3/12 (6-105(TD))	QUANG TRI	8-100
240TH C&R DET(USA)(1-AN/MPQ-4A)		
BTRY G 1/11 (6-105H(TD))		9-136
W BTRY 2/11 (6-107 HOWITERS)		3-102
DET W BTRY 1/12 (3-107 HOWITERS)	C-4	
1ST PLT 1STAMAD AMPHIB CO. (6-LVTH-6) CUA VIET		
4THBN(-)(RELI) 12THMAR	DONG HA	
HQBTRY		12-141
BTRY M (6-155H(SP))		5-96
BTRY L(-)(6-155H(SP))		5-94
PLT BTRY L (2-155H(SP))	C-1	
3D TX BN(-)		37-605
H&S CO (-) (1-M67A2)	PHU BAI	
DET H&S CO	QUANG TRI	
CO A(K&IN)	DONG HA	8-163
CO A (15-M48A3)		
DET H&S CO (1-M67A2)		
2D PLT CO A 5TH ATBN (0-4150)		
1ST PLT AT CO, 3D T&BN (5-M50)		

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

CO B(-)(REIN)

CAMP CARROLL 3-78

CO E(-)(8-M48A3)

(1-M51VTR)

DET CO "C" 3D TKBW(1-M48A3)

CO "C"(-)(REIN)

CAM LO 5-101

(TF ROBBIE)

(8-M48A3)

CO "C"(-)(1-M51VTR)

DET H&amp;S CO (3-M67A3)

DET CO A (2-M48A3)

SEC 2D FLT CO "C" (2-M48A3) GUA VIET

0-10

3D FLT CO "C" (4M48A3)

DONG HA 1-17

3D RECON BN(-)(REIN)

DET H&amp;S CO

DONG HA 3-45

CO "C"

5-100

3D FORCE RECON CO

10-144

H&amp;S CO (-)

QUANG THAI 10-151

CO A

3-106

CO D (-)

HOW FAH

3-90

CO E

5-137

3D ENGR BN

H&amp;S CO(-)

PHU BAI 14-114

ENGR SPT CO(-)

6-155

CO A (REIN)

DONG HA 5-155

CO B (REIN)

QUANG THAI 6-100

CO C (REIN)

DONG HA 4-136

3D SPBN

DET H&amp;S CO

DONG HA 7-55

CO C (REIN)

3-60

DET H&amp;S CO

0-33

DET CO A

0-10

0-3

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

DET HAS CO	QUANG TRI	1-53
DET HAS CO		0-32
2D PLT(REIN) CO B	CUA VIET	1-15
DET HAS CO		0-4
HAS CO(-)	PHU BAI	7-56
CO B(-)(REIN)		2-47
1ST PLT CO B 1ST AMTRAC BN (5-LVT5)		1-85
4TH PLT COA 1ST AMTRAC BN (4-LVT 5)		1-14
(1-LVT5 CMD)		
3D MEDBN(-)(REIN)	PHU BAI	53-297
HAS CO(-) ATTACHED TO A-U.S.T. #2 & 17-LIT		
A CO		
B CO		
C CO (-)		
2D CIR PLT A CO 5TH MEDBN		
D CO(REIN)	DONG HA	10-63
3D DENTAL CO	PHU BAI	27-55
3D MTBN (HQ)	PHU BAI	
HAS CO(-) (8-M76 OFFERS)		7-105
CO A(-)		3-60
CO B(-)		3-57
CO "C"(-)		2-65
DET 2D PLT CO "C" 9TH MTBN		0-2
DET HAS CO (7-M76 OFFERS)	QUANG TRI	0-10
1ST PLT(-) CO A		1-19
DET HAS CO (2-M76)	DONG HA	0-2
DET 1ST, 2ND HQ PLT CO B	CAM LO	1-20
DET HAS CO (6-M76 OFFERS)		0-10
DET HAS CO (7-M76 OFFERS) 12-112	CAMP CARROLL	0-11

**SECRET**

SECRET

9TH MTBN(-)(REIN)

DONG HA

H&amp;S CO

8-61

GO "C"

3-84

TRANS CO

4-85

515TH TRANS CO(-)(USA)

4-130

1ST BN 44TH ARTY(USA)

BTRY A (6-M42)

DONG HA

(2-M42)

GIO LINH

(2-M42)

KHE SANH

(3-M42)

QUANG TRI

(2-M42)

A-3

BTRY B (4-M42)

DONG HA

(4-M42)

CAM LO

(1-M42)

CON THIEN

(1-M42)

QUANG TRI (M.CV)

(2-M42)

G-1

(2-M42)

TF ROBBIE

BTRY C 1/44 (2-M42)

CAMP CARROLL

(2-M42)

CALU

(4-M42)

THON SON LAI

BTRY G/65TH ARTY (1-M55)

CON THIEN

(2-M55)

CAMP CARROLL

(2-M55)

KHE SANH

(2-M55)

CAM LO

(2-M55)

TF ROBBIE

(6-M55)

DONG HA

G-3

CCN


294

RELEASED BY

14-14

SECRET

SECRET



UXETTSZYUW RUMMWAA0700 0661220-SSSS--RUAUBUL RUMFKRB RUMFKRE  
RUMFKRF RUMFKRP RUMHNB RUMHVH RUMSEB RUMSLC RUMSLT RUMSMA  
RUMSVA RUYSUAE.

ZNY SSSSS

O 061220Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF DANANG

TO RUMSEB/COMNAVFORV

RUMHNB/CTF CLEARWATER

RUYSUAE/USS GUNSTON HALL

RUYSUAE/USS COLONIAL/

INFO RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSMA/MACV TMA

RUMSLC/FIRST LOG COMMAND

RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN

RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUYSUAE/USS ALAMO

RUYSUAE/USS COMSTOCK

RUMHMA/DEP COMUSMACV FWD

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DNG

RUMHVH/CG SUPPORT COMMAND DNG PROV

RUMSVA/US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON

RUMSLT/CO FOURTH TC

RUMFKRE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

SHOVE	COC
OP CHIEF	
G-3 W.O.	
G-2 W.O.	
DCPO	
AFO	
ACTION	

*Clearwater*

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 0700 SECRET

RUMFKRB/CONSTOSTOV

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: MRF ASSETS TO ICTZ (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 051015Z MAR 68 (PASEP)

B. CTF SEVEN SIX 051514Z MAR 68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REFERS. CUA VIET DESIGNATED DESTINATION FIRST LIFT. TAN

MY DESIGNATED DESTINATION SECOND LIFT.

2. ABOVE DESTINATIONS CONCURRED IN BY CTF CLEARWATER.

3. FOR GUNSTON HALL AND COLONIAL. THIS CONSTITUTES REPLY REF B.

GP-4

BT

3 COC/2/4/106/CS/CF0  
RAO

06

12


SECRET

20

End 72

**SECRET**

NNNN VV MFP113  
DE RUMMWAA 069. 0661222  
ZNY 0661222



0661222Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF DANANG  
INFO RUMMWAA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
JMMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
0651010Z MAR 68  
FM COMNAVFORV  
TO COMUSMACV  
CG III MAF  
INFO COMNAVTHFLT  
MACV THA  
FIRST LOG COMMAND  
CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
CTF SEVEN SIX  
USS COLMBL  
USS ALABAMA  
USS CONROCK  
DEP COMUSMACV FWD  
COMNAVOPACT DANANG  
CTF CLEARWATER  
CG SUPPORT COMMAND DNG PROV

SHOVE

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

*Handwritten:* 19  
*Handwritten:* Clearwater

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 061: SECRET  
US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SAIGON  
CG FOURTH TC  
CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP PER MODALE BRIG ONE  
DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSA DONG HA/CUA VIET  
US ARMY TERMINAL VUNG TAU/DELTA

**SECRET**

REF ABBEY TO ICTZ (U)

1. COMUSMACV 031115Z MAR 68 (NOTAL)

2. COMNAVFORV 041112Z MAR 68

3. COMUSMACV 041815Z MAR 68

1. REF A REQUESTED DEPLOYMENT OF ELEMENTS OF ONE RIVER ASSAULT  
DIVISION TO ICTZ BY QUICKEST MEANS. REFS B AND C REQUESTED SEALIFT  
FOR MAF CRAFT.

2. NUMBERS OF CRAFT AND ULTIMATE OPERATION INDICATE A TWO LSD LIFT  
WITH TWO MONITORS AND FIVE ATC'S PER LIFT, FIVE OFF AND  
SIXTY ENL ACCOMPANY EACH LIFT. DESTINATION LIFTS TAN MY AND CUA VIET.  
(OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS COUNSEL MAINTAINING INTEGRITY

PAGE THREE RUMMWAA 0699S SECRET

OF EACH OF THE TWO GROUPS.

EM REQUEST EMBARKATION NHA BE VIE VUNG TAU DUE HEAVY WEATHER. ARRIVAL  
OF CRAFT WILL BE ADJUSTED TO CONFORM TO LIFTIN UNIT SCHEDULE.

4. FOR CG III MAF: REQUEST DESIGNATE DESTINATION FIRST LIFT.

GP-4  
BT

**SECRET**


06

12

22

End 76

SECRET



BFKB 0 VV MFP671  
DE RUMMWAA 0729 0661538  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 061538Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

S E C R E T

AERIAL RESUPPLY OF KHE SANH

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 050948Z MAR 68

B. CG III MAF 130232Z FEB 68

C. CG III MAF 131204Z FEB 68

1. REF A ADVISED OF SHORTFALL IN RESUPPLY OF KHE SANH DURING FEB BASED ON ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS.
2. REF B AND C ESTABLISHED PLAN FOR DELIVERY OF REQUIRED TONNAGE INCLUDING REQUEST THIS HQ BE ADVISED OF MHE AND MT REQUIREMENTS BEYOND ORGANIC CAPABILITY.
3. SINCE 14 FEB UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE/DESTRUCTION RATE TO AIRCRAFT HAS DECIATED TERMINATION OF AIRLANDED DELIVERY OF MATERIAL WHICH CAN BE AIRDROPPED.
4. SINCE AIR DROP INITIATED AS PRINCIPLE MEANS OF RESUPPLY ON 14 FEB TEN DROPS PER DAY HAS BEEN MAX ACCEPTED BY 26TH MARINES. DURING THE PERIOD 14 FEB TO 29 FEB TEN DROPS DAY COMMITMENT HAS BEEN FULFILLED

A- AIRO

STAND/CG/C/S

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 0729 S E C R E T  
EXCEPT FOR FIVE DAYS.

14 FEB 7 DROPS DELAYED DUE TO ARC LIGHT (6 DROPS).

15 FEB 7 DZ NOT SECURE UNTIL 1100 AND CLOSED BY 26TH MARINES AT 1600 DUE TO SATURATION OF DZ AFTER 5 DROPS.

16 FEB 7 DZ CLOSED BY 26TH MARINES AFTER 7 DROPS DUE TO SATURATION.

27 FEB 7 DZ CLOSED BY 26TH MARINES AFTER 9 DROPS DUE TO SATURATION.

25 FEB ONLY DROPS DUE DZ NOT SECURED UNTIL 1030.

5. RECORDS OF THIS HQ INDICATE NO APPRECIABLE DECREASE IN STOCK STATUS OF CLASS I, III AND V DURING THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY. THE STATUS OF MORTAR AND ARTILLERY HE AMMO AS OF THE 1ST AND 29TH FEB AS FOLLOWS:  
ALL ITEMS WERE ABOVE 20 DOA ON BOTH 1 FEB AND 2 FEB FOR ALL ITEMS EXCEPT 05 WAS 16 DOA ON BOTH DATES. 90MM WAS 16 DOA ON 1 FEB AND 155MM WAS 16 DOA ON 29 FEB.

6. REQUEST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASING RESUPPLY AS APPROPRIATE. NUMBER OF CDS DROPS BASED ON YOUR REQUEST AND CAN BE INCREASED TO ANY NUMBER DESIRED. MT AND MHE ASSISTANCE IN ACCORDANCE REF B. REQUEST ADVISE.

061538

SECRET

Encl 77



MCC 991

NNNN 318-332CIRAG78

LP BOMHVP

DESRUABQL 305B 267863

ZNY 88888

P 070135Z MARCH

FM 9TH MAB

TO RUMHFM/CG FMFPAC

RUMHFM/CG FMFPAC

RUMHFM/CG FMFPAC

RUMHFM/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET

FIRE TEAM ASSAULT BOATS FOR RIVERINE EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. TO SEVEN NINESPT FOUR 051320Z MARCH (TOTAL)

B. CHCLFDS LTR 46/48/AC/IVE OF 19OCT67(TOTAL)

1. REF A RECOMMENDED THAT CONSIDERATION BE

GIVEN TO ASSIGNMENT OF THE FIRE TEAM ASSAULT BOATS (FTAB)

AND RELATED EQUIPMENT TO SLF ALFA FOR SUBSEQUENT DEPLOYMENT

WITH BLT 2/4 IN THE CUA VIET AREA OF OPERATIONS.

THIS AREA APPEARS TO OFFER IDEAL ENVIRONMENT FOR COMBAT UTILIZATION

FOR THIS IMPORTANT RIVERINE ITEM. REF FURTHER STATED THAT CUA VIET

RIVER TRAFFIC CURRENTLY BEING SUBJECTED TO COMMAND DETONATED MINES,

PAGE TWO RUABQL 305B SECRET

OBSERVED LARGE CALIBER MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE AND RE

DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS FROM THE BANKS. LATEST TACTIC IS

REPLACEMENT OF BAMBOO FENCE ACROSS MAIN CHANNEL OF

RIVER LACED WITH GRENADES AND POSSIBLY OTHER EXPLOSIVES

AS MAJOR OBSTACLE TO CONVOY TRAFFIC TO EHC. THE LATEST

ENEMY EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE CUA VIET RIVER INDICATES

THE HIGH IMPORTANCE HEREPLACES ON THIS LINE OF COMMUNICATION.

THE FTAB COULD BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED BY THEMSELVES TO COMBAT

SOME OF THE ABOVE, EITHER IN PATROLLING MISSION OR HIGH SPEED

WATER-BORNE REACTION FORCE OR IN ASSISTING IN CLEARING OF LOCATED RIVER

OBSTACLES.

2. 9TH MAB CURRENTLY HAS IN ITS INVENTORY PLASTIC ASSAULT

BOATS (PABS) FOR SLF UTILIZATION. LTCOL CARRARA, PRESENTLY TAD HERE

WAS PROJECT OFFICER AT MCIVDC TO EVALUATE VARIOUS SMALL BOATS AND

DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM DESIGN BOAT OR FAMILY OF BOATS FOR MARINE

CORPS UNITS. AT QUANTICO HIS GROUP STUDIED THE REPORTS ON THE BECKHOUSE

SERIES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS WHICH INDICATED THAT THESE PLASTIC BOATS

POSSESS LIMITED CAPABILITY. WERE POORLY CONSTRUCTED, AND ARE SUNKABLE.

AS A RESULT OF THIS STUDY AND FURTHER EVALUATION AT MCIVDC, A REPORT

WAS SUBMITTED TO CMC THAT THE PABS WERE NOT SUITABLE AS A MEMBER

PAGE THREE RUABQL 315B SECRET

OF THE FAMILY OF ASSAULT BOATS FOR MARINE CORPS UNITS

AND THAT FURTHER PURCHASE BE TERMINATED. UTILIZATION OF

THESE PABS BY THE SLFS OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS HAS

BEEN NEGLIGIBLE.

3. CONSISTENT WITH A PORTION OF OUR MISSION, 9TH MAB WAS TASKED BY

REF A AND HAS COMPLETED TEST PROCEDURES FOR TROOP TESTS

OF THE FTAB FOR RIVERINE OPERATIONS. THE TESTS WERE CONDUCTED

AT OKINAWA AND SUBIC BAY WITH SUCCESSFUL RESULTS. FINAL

REPORT REQUIRED BY REF A IS CURRENTLY BEING PREPARED AND

WILL BE SUBMITTED VIA FMFPAC HQ PRIOR TO 1 APR 68. REF B FURTHER

INDICATES THAT FINAL DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE BOATS AND

MOTORS WILL BE FURNISHED UPON COMPLETION OF TESTING.

4. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE PABS ARE

SUITABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE TASK AT HAND. IT IS THEREFORE

RECOMMENDED THAT ACTION BE INITIATED TO CAUSE ASSIGNMENT OF FTAB AND

MOTORS PRESENTLY ON OKINAWA TO 9TH MAB FOR SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT

WITH SLFS AS REQUIRED. THIS HQ IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE SLFS WITH

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR A BRIEF TRAINING/ INDOCTRINATION

PROGRAM OF NECESSARY PERSONNEL PRIOR TO COMBAT USE. LTCOL

CARRARA IS AVAILABLE TO HEAD NINESPTAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

PAGE FOUR RUABQL 315B SECRET

TEAM TO CONDUCT TRAINING IN COUNTRY, OR IF THAT IS NOT FEASIBLE,

SUBIC. IN ADDITION, ASSAULT BOATS AND RELATED TEST EQUIPMENT

PLUS PERSONNEL CAN BE AIR LIFTED BY ONE C-130 DIRECT TO THE

TRAINING SITE SELECTED FOR DELIVERY TO SLFFAS DESIGNATED.

SP-4

BT

NNNN


DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DRAFTIER 3/BMH/t.jr  
SIC 3 PHONE 3D MARDIV COG

IMMEDIATE 071002 MAR 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: CG III MAF  
INFO: CTF CLEARWATER



*copy [unclear]*

//SECRET//

106 RR SUPPORT FOR CTF CLEARWATER

A. CG III MAF 010346Z MAR 68

1. REF A REQUESTED THIS COMMAND TO PROVIDE TWO 106MM AND CREWS TO CTF CLEARWATER.
2. DUE TO THE RECENT DEPLOYMENT OF TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS ALONG BOTH BANKS OF THE CUA VIET RIVER, BELIEVE REQUIREMENT FOR THESE WEAPONS AND CREWS NO LONGER EXISTS.
3. CTF CLEARWATER CONCURS NO REQUIREMENT FOR WEAPONS AT THIS TIME.

GP-4

CCH 363

G-3

SHOV  
OP CHIEF  
G-3 W.O.  
G-2 W.O.  
DCPO  
APO  
ACTION

RELEASED BY


*M. V. Paltas*  
*Roc/fcc/cg/d/s/ceo (P)*  
*Clearwater*

**SECRET**

Encl 79

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL



W.O.  
2 W.O.  
APO  
APO  
ACTION

DE 32Y 6 AND MATE HERE WITH MY NR 006..006.... ACTION

Heath

ZNY CCCCC

R 071654Z MAR 68

FM TWO SIX MAR DIV

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

A. THIRD MARDIV 051606Z MAR 68

B. TWO SIX MAR 201100Z FEB 68

SEISMIC INTRUSION DEVICE, RPS 1 (SID)

1. IAW REF A FOLLOWING SUBMITTED.

A. STATUS OF SIDS REPORTED REF B. 30 SERVICABLE SIDS CURRENTLY ON HAND.

B. ALL AVAILABLE UNITS EMPLOYED IN LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH TO DETECT MVT AND ALONG FRIENDLY TRENCH LINES IN VIC OF KNOWN EN EARTHWORKS TO DETECT INDICATIONS OF TUNNELING IN CONJUNCTION WITH TRENCHWORKS.

C. WITH EXPERIENCED OPERATIONS SIDS HAVE PROVEN USEFUL AS INDICATORS OF MOVEMENT, HOWEVER, AMOUNT OF ARTY (BOTH INCOMING AND OUTGOING) AND AIR STRIKES LIMITS OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS IN DETECTION OF DIGGING. MODIFIED VERSION PROVIDED BY LT COL CESAR, MACV, HAVE PROVEN TOO SENSITIVE TO EXTERNAL NOISE TO GIVE A FIRM IDENTIFICATION OF DIGGING.

EVALUATION CONTINUES BY FOB-3. INSTANCES OF EN CUTTING WOES TO AND REMOVING GEO PHONES HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

D. IN ADDITION TO THOSE CURRENTLY IN FLSCA THIRTY ADDITIONAL GEO PHONES COULD BE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED.

GP-4

BT

A-CEO

6-23-002-A140

(R)

07

16

5


4

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 80

Scotland

# FLASH



JCR 108045-127

Admission  
\$100.00

BT

A- 6-3/c/c

8/17/c/c/p-00/c/c/e/s 12

08

03

4 ~~SECRET~~ *encl 8*

DECLASSIFIED

NOV  
22X 0000  
O 080037Z MAR 68  
FM THIRD MARDIV COG  
TO FIRST MAW COG  
INFO THIRD MARINES  
BT



MOVE  
OF CHIEF  
3-3 W.O.  
3-3 W.O.  
3-3 W.O.  
3-3 W.O.

SECRET  
QUICK RUN FORCE FOR SECURITY OF CUA VIET  
A. CG III MAF 060622Z MAR 68  
B. 1ST MAW 303 OP PLAN

1. URGENT OF REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT CUA VIET LOC DICTATES NEED FOR  
QUICK RUN PLATOON-SIZED FORCE TO BE HELD LIFTED INTO CUA VIET  
RIVER LOCALES TO COUNTER ENEMY INTERDICTION EFFORTS. OPERATION "C" REQ  
TWO (2) CH-46'S AND TWO (2) UH-1E GUNSHIPS ON 15-MINUTE NOTICE. ANG IF  
ON CALL OF 3RD MARINES. ABOVE HELICOPTER IN ADDITION TO FERRON MARK  
REQUIRED BY REF "B".

GP-4  
BT


*Clear water*

080630

DECLASSIFIED

Encl 82

CONFIDENTIAL



SHOVE CAC

OP CHIEF *H*G-3 W.O. *c*G-2 W.O. *1*

DCPO

APO *H*ACTION *Clear water*

ZRRE WITH MY NUMBER 003

MSG AAAAA

TT

ZNY VCCCC

P 000802Z MAR 68

FM THIRD MARINES

TO CG THIRD MAGDIV

INFO CTG CLEARWATER MSA DET DONG HA/CUA VIET

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ CURFEW CUA VIET RECOMMENDATIONS

A. COL DIC RADIO VATCH TO COL HULL PURRTH MAR 68

1. IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED.

2. GENERAL. AT VRESENT THER IS AN ANNOUNCED VURFEW CUA VIET RIVER, DUSK TO DAWN. CURFEW NOT VRESENTLY ENFORCED BY US ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN USMV ON SHORE TAKING UNDER FIRE AND MOVING TRAFFIC SIGHTED, AND CONVOY CRAXT FIRING WARNING SHOTU AT SANPANS ATTEMPTING TO VASS AHEAD OF CONVOY. NO USN CRAFT HAVE PATGOLLED AA NIGHT DUE TO PRESENT ENEMY SITUATION AND LIMITED LOGISTICAL TXPE ASSETSM VN NAVY/JUNK FLEET DOES NOT PATROL INLAND WATERWAYS DUE TO PRESENT MISSION.

3. ASSETS: (A) 3D MARINES UNITS CAN CURRENTLY BE POSITIONED AT CMOKE POINTS ALONG VUA VIET DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS ARMED WITH IW AND CSW'S. LATER, DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ALSO. (B)

08

08

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 83

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE TWO 0920 U N C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 USN DOES NOT CURRENTLY POSSESS SUFFICIENT BOATS FOR CONSTANT  
 PATROLLING CUA VIET. 4 PATROL CRAFT CURRENTLY ON STATION  
 WITH 2 MORE REQUESTED. ON RECEIPT OF VRAFT REQUESTED,  
 PRESENT PLANS CALL FOR 4 PATROL CRAFT ON CUA VIET EITHER  
 IN CONVOYS OR WHEN OUT OF CONVOY MODE WILL PATROL RIVER  
 CONTINUOUSLY.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS: (A) NEW CURFEW HOURS BE DISSEMINATED  
 BY GVN AS CUA VIET CLOSED DAY AND NIGHT EXCEPT FOR TWO 1 1/2  
 HOUR PERIODS FOLLOWING FIRST LIGHT AND PRIOR TO SUNSET. (NOTE,  
 THIS WILL ALLOW FISHERMAN TO PROCEED AND RETURN TO SEA IN  
 THE AM AND RETURN HOME PM).  
 (B) THIS INFORMATION BE DISSEMINATED BY GVN AND US PSY OPS  
 TEAMS BY LEAFLETS AND BROADCASTS.  
 (C) FISHERMAN BE ESCORTED BY VN NATIONAL MARITIME POLICE  
 TO MOUTH OF VUA VIET IN AM DURING 1 XW HOUR PERIOD AND REPEAT  
 ON PM RETURN. (NOTE: NATJ MARITIME POLICE ASSETS NOT  
 CURRENTLY AVAILABLE).  
 (D) ALL US PATROL CRAFT BE AUGMENTED WITH ONE NAT'L  
 VOLUNTEER.

(E) HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS EQUIPPED FOR DAY AND NIGHT OPERATIONS

3 COC/214/CG/CS/ADG/CEO

PAGE THREE 0920 U N C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 BE PROVIDED. CURRENT GUNSHIPS USMV & USA ) USED FOR ESCORTING  
 CONVOYS CAN BE USED DURING DAYLIGHT. (NOTE: DELTA CURFEW  
 EXPERIENCE HAS PROVEN DAY AND NIGHT GUNSHIPS INCLUDING FLARE  
 SHIPS AS AN IDEAL REACTION ASSET).

(F) ALL OF THE ABOVE BE COORDINATED AT THE 1 CORVUS AND  
 PROVINCE CHIEF LEVELS. (NOTE: DELTA EXPERIENCE AGAIN HAS  
 PROVEN THAT COORDINATION IS REQUIRED FROM TOP TO BOTTOM).  
 (G) FAST ARMED PATROL BOATS BE ALLOCATED TO CTF CLEARWATER  
 FOR SURFACE PATROLLING.

5. IF CURFEW IS ENFORCED BY US FORCES, ZONING AND AREAS  
 OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE DEVELOPED IN DETAIL BY 3D MAR AND  
 CTF CLEARWATER.


6. CTF CLEARWATER CONCURS IN THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS.

GV-4

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET



SHOVE

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APO

ACTION

J

mb

r

K

OPCON

CO

AND H/W Y NR 19C T1  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P R 080841Z MARCH 68  
 FROM FOURTH MAR  
 TO NINTH MAR  
 ZEN/ SECOND BN NINTH MAR  
 INFO: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

SECRET

1. FOURTH MARINES ASSUMED OPCON M/3/4 AT 1000H FROM NINTH MARINES.
2. FOURTH MARINES CHOPPED M/3/4 OPCON TO SECOND BN NINTH MAR AT 1100H.

GP-4

BT

C. G-3

COC/CEO B

TH  
70R/082015/4MAR/19

A8


08

47 14  
SECRET  
Encl 84



SECRET

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APD	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>



TO  
 OTTOOOTTMMMM  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 081110Z MAR 68  
 FM TWO SIX MARINES  
 TO CG THIRD MAIDIV  
 INFO TWELVE MARINES  
 BT

SECRET

ARTILLERY REINFORCEMENT

1. MAJORITY OF INCOMING ENEMY ROUNDS BEING DELIVERED FROM WEAPONS AT RANGE IN EXCESS 20,000 METERS FROM KSCB. THESE PSNS SE OF OF CO ROC AND NW LANG PELO (XD6640). NVA HAVE POSITIONED THEIR ARTILLERY BEYOND MAX RANGE OF BOTH 105/155 AT THIS LOCATION, AND 175'S LOCATED THON SON LAM AND CAMP CARROLL.

2. PRESENCE OF AIR OBSERVERS AND RESPONSIVENESS OF ASRT HAS MINIMIZED ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT PROLONGED ARTY/RKT ATTACKS DURING GOOD WEATHER. IF ASRT WERE DAMAGED AND WEATHER PROHIBITED AO COVERAGE, OUR ABILITY TO ATTACK THESE TGTS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DEGRADED.

3. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE IN PROCURING 105/155 RKT-ASSISTED PROJ (RAPROUND)

GP-4  
 BT

COC


FSCC/3/CG/CS/ADCL/CC

08

11

10

SECRET  
Encl 85

~~SECRET~~

COC

SHOVE	NOV 12 1967
OP CHIEF	0700
G-3 W.O.	0700
G-2 W.O.	0700
DOPO	0700
APD	0700
ACTION	0700

VV MFP785  
 DE RUMMWAA 0930 0681142  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 081142Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

SECRET

FIRE TEAM ASSAULT BOATS (FTAB) FOR RIVERLINE EMPLOYMENT

A. CG NINTH MAB 070135Z MAR 68

1. REQUEST COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING USE OF FTAB'S  
 IN CUA VIET RIVER AREA AS PROPOSED REF A.

GP74  
 BT

Clear water  
 TOR/082010/MHT

3

coc/cc/csl/abckeo  
 01/02

NNNN


08

11

6

~~SECRET~~

Encl 86

[illegible]

SHOVE  
OP CHIEF  
G-3 W.O.  
G-2 W.O.  
DCPO  
APO  
ACTION  
Return to W.O.

Q-35 2 RLM 0568 U O N F L B E W T I A L  
THRUWHE/FLEET -CORREL ZONE ADV

[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CUA VIET SUPPLY RIVER OP CD

CUA VIET SUPPLY RIVER UP CG  
A. CTF CLEARWATER OF-ORD 1216 WITH ANNEX A/B/C  
CUA VIET SUPPLY RIVER UP CG

A. CTF CLEARWATER, OF-ORD 1218 WITH ANNEX 2507C  
1. IN VIEW FRIENDLY FORCES NOW OCCUPYING CUA VIET RIVER BANKS,  
AND LACK OF INCIDENTS 6-8 MAR, EXECUTE AT YOUR DISCRETION ANNEX  
C REF A.

C-6-2

COC-2-4-CG/c/s-CEO

PAGE 5 RETURN OF SB C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. MAINTAIN MINIMUM FOUR SWEEP BOATS AND FOUR LOPL PATROL CRAFT CONTINUOUSLY DURING OPERATIONS.

CONTINUOUSLY DURING OPERATIONS. LOGISTIC CRAFT, MINE SWEEPS  
2. INSURE FIRM FIRE DISCIPLINE ALL  
AND LOG. FORMS, CRAFT. BY B-1, B-2 OR MINING IMMEDIATE

AND LOGS, PERMANENT, CORRECTION, ARE ATTACHED BY REF. 250 OR MINING IMMEDIATELY REPLY TO COMNAV OPS INM ANNEX A REF A.

2. ~~PHOTOGRAPH~~ OIS TO DRAUGHT HOUSE ONLY.

14

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

FLASH

CNOVE COC	
OP/SHIEF	H
G-3 W.O.	C
G-2 W.O.	Y
DRAFTED 123:554 kth	
SEC ARC-LIGHT PH 3D LARDIV/23	
CNO	
ACTION <i>Heathland</i>	

CG 438

FLASH 081440Z 3 MAR 68

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG III MAF RUMMWA

//SECRET//

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG 080342Z MAR 68

SUBJ: KHE SANH VILLAGE

1. KHE SANH VILLAGE IS IN FACT A FREE FIRE AREA.
2. EITHER THE ENTIRE OR MAJOR PORTIONS OF KHE SANH VILLAGE LOCATED VICINITY COORDINATES 10 846361 WERE INCLUDED IN ARC LIGHT STRIKES ON 27 FEB, 29 FEB, TWICE ON 1 MAR AND TWICE ON 5 MAR.
3. KHE SANH VILLAGE AREA IS UNDER CONTINUING AIR OBSERVATION AND HOSTILE TGTS ARE ATTACKED BY ARTY AND/OR AIR UPON DETECTION.
4. DESTRUCTION OF REMAINING STRUCTURES WILL BE UNDERTAKEN CONSISTENT WITH AIR STRIKE RESOURCES NOT ASSIGNED ELSEWHERE IN KHE SANH AREA AGAINST TROOPS OR LUCRATIVE OR OF A HIGHER PRIORITY IN THE FIRE POWER DEFENSE OF THE KHE SANH AREA.

GP-4

081415Z

ARC Light

3/COG/CG/CS/CEO  
ADC

FLASH

SECRET-4

Encl 88


*RJP*  
~~CONF~~ 081446H FROM: 26TH MARINES  
 TO: CG, 3RD MARDIV

STANDARD FRAG CHANGE, AIR CRAFT SUPPORT KSCB.

1. LUCRATIVE TGTS AVAILABLE AT NIGHT WHICH COULD BEST  
 BE HIT BY CBU-24 OR CBU-29. REQ 4 A/C ON NIGHTLY STAND-BY  
 FRAG CARRY CBU-24 OR CBU-29, UFN.

GP-4

1525/08MAR68/T 77/DIV KY-8




<b>SHOVE CGC</b>	
CP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>P</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DOPO	<i>P</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

*08*

*14*

*46*

*Encl 89*

**SECRET**

DRAFTER 3/AIM/8s  
 SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV G-3  
 CWO *QMC*

IMMEDIATE *08155*

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: FOURTH MAR *ZEN*  
 ELEVENTH ~~ENGR~~ ENGINEERS BN *ZEN*

//SECRET//

- A. CG 3D MARDIV 050506Z MAR68  
 B. FOURTH MARINES 061448Z MAR68  
 C. CG III MAF 040516Z MAR68 (PASEP)  
 1. REF A, B, AND C REFTR.  
 2. FOR FOURTH MARINES:

A. ON 9 MAR68 OPEN ROUTE 9 FROM THON SON LAM TO CA LU.

B. BE PREPARED TO KEEP ROUTE 9 OPEN TO CA LU AND PROVIDE SECURITY

TO 11TH ENGR BN DURING REPAIRS TO ROUTE 9.

C. BY 12 MAR68 BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CONSTRUCTION  
 OF AIRSTRIPE AT CA LU.

D. AUTH GRANTED TO REDUCE FORCES AT CA LU TO DEGREE NECESSARY  
 TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION.

3. FOR ELEVENTH ENGINEERS:

A. REQUEST IMMEDIATE REPAIR ROUTE 9 FROM THON SON LAM TO CA LU  
 AND BE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF AIRSTRIPE AT CA LU  
 COMMENCING 12MAR68.

GP-4


CCN *445*RELEASED BY *A R. McLaughlin**2/coc/cg/cas/ceo/ADC*

RHO

3

*08**15**50***SECRET***Mar 68*  
*Encl 90*

SECRET



SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

did Third Maw  
get Rel A?

NNNN VV MFP7870TTSZYUW RUMMWAA0962 0681604-SSSS7-RUMNHVE RUMNVHE RUMHV  
ZNY SSSSS

060100Z FEB 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

INFO RUMNHVE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

RUMHVP/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GRP

RUMHVP/CTF CLEARWATER

RUMHVN/DSA I CORPS

RUMNHVE/SA COASTAL GROUP ONE ONE

RUMHNA/NSAD CUA VIET

BT

SECRET

FIREFLY COVERAGE ON CUA VIET

A. COMQASMACV 210105Z FEB 68. PASEP

1. ENEMY INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY ACTIVITY ON CUA VIET RIVER SYSTEM REQUIRES CONCERTED ATTACK EFFORT. EMPLOYMENT OF FIREFLY TEAM (ONE LIGHT AND TWO GUNSHIPS) AT NIGHT IS CONSIDERED EXCELLENT MEANS OF DISRUPTING ENEMY MOVEMENT.

2. YHR CG THIRD MARDIV:

REQUEST YOU COORDINATE WITH ALL ADDRES

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 0500 SECRET

AND EMPLOY FIREFLY IN CUA VIET NIGHTS OF 9 AND 10 MARCH 68. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE CONTAINED REF A. PSY WAR OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED.

FOR CG FIRST MAW: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE FIREFLY TEAM 9 AND 10 MARCH FOR OPERATIONS DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS AS FEASIBLE.

GP 4

BT


3 2/cod4/cg/cs/adc/cec  
ROR

08

16

SECRET  
encl 91

SECRET



YLEFK VV MFP789  
DE RUMMWAA 0965 068162Z  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 081620Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF DNG  
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
INFO RUMHVP/TWENTY SIXTH MARINES  
O 071205Z MAR 68  
FM 7AF TACC TSN RVN  
TO DET 214 KM NHA TRANG  
III MAF DANANG  
INFO 14 ACW NHA TRANG  
ABCCC UDORN  
BT

SECRET TACPS

SUBJECT: EMPLOYMENT OF GUNSHIP II IN CLOSE SUPPORT X KHE SANH (C)  
PART I FOR III MAF G 3 AIR

A. (C) TO BRING AN ADDED ELEMENT OF AIR POWER TO BEAR ON THE  
ENEMY FORCES AROUND KHE SANH OUR GUNSHIP II AIRCRAFT IS AVAILABLE  
FOR EMERGENCY NIGHT/WEATHER SUPPORT.

B. (C) TO DARE THE USE OF ONE OF SEVERAL ADVERSE WEATHER  
CONDITIONS 6 PORTABLE BATTERY OPERATED BEACONS AND CHARGING  
UNITS WERE AIR LIFTED INTO KHE SANH BY A GUNSHIP II CREW MEMBER.

A- G-3/A1A0

FSCC/CO2/G-2/CG/PLS/CEO

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 0965 SECRET

HE WAS TO EXPLAIN THE OPERATION OF THE BEACONS, EMPLACE THEM TO  
PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDERS DESIRED FIELDS OF FIRE AND CHECK THE  
LOCATIONS WITH DRY/WET FIRING RUNS. HE BECAME A CASUALTY SHORTLY  
AFTER ARRIVAL AND WAS EVACUATED, LEAVING THE BEACONS.

C. (C) THE ABSENCE OF ANOTHER CREW MEMBER QUALIFIED TO BRIEF  
THE OPERATION WOULD JEOPARDIZE CONDUCT OF THE MISSION. THEREFORE,  
REQUEST IN COORDINATION WITH OUR 7AF ALSO YOUR HQ ARRANGE FOR AN  
OFFICER/NGO TO PROCEED TO DET 2, 614 ACW, UBOH THAILAND FOR ONE  
DAY BRIEFING ON GROUND ACTIONS NECESSARY TO DERIVE MAX EFFECTIVE  
CLOSE SUPPORT FROM GUNSHIP II. THE SYSTEMS ENGINEER/PILOT. MAJOR  
TERRY, IS PREPARED TO BRIEF YOUR REPRESENTATIVE.

D. (C) AFTER THERE PRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN BRIEFED HE WILL BE  
ABLE TO INSTALL AND OPERATE THE BEACONS AND ADJUST AS NECESSARY TO  
CORRECT FIELDS OF FIRE.

E. (C) ONCE THE BEACONS ARE CHECKED A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF FIRE  
POWER WILL HAVE BEEN ADDED THAT IS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN  
REPULSING ASSAULT FORCES.

F. (C) THE CAPABILITIES OF THIS WEAPONS SYSTEM HAVE BEEN  
TESTED IN AN EXHAUSTIVE COMBAT EMPLOYMENT TEST PROGRAM IN  
VIETNAM AND LAOS. FOR YOUR INFORMATION A BRIEF EXPLANATION

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	
G-3 W.O.	
G-2 W.O.	MB
DOPD	
APD	
ACTION	Scotland

08

16

SECRET  
20  
Encl 92



PAGE THREE RUMMWAA 0965 S E C R E T  
CAPABILITIES WILL BE FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

PART II XR DET 2, 14 ACW.

A. (U) IN CONJUNCTION WITH ORIENTATION BRIEFING ARRANGE WITH MARINE REPRESENTATIVE TO CHECK FIELDS OF FIRE BY LIGHT AND/OR LIVE FIRING RUNS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER EMPLACEMENT.

B. (C) COORDINATION WITH ABCCC PRIOR TO ENTERING NIAGARA AREA OF OPERATIONS. EXPECT HKDOFF TO CARSTAIRS II FOR CONTROL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF KHE SANH.

PART III FOR ABCCC.

A. (S) N/A

B. (S) AFTER INITIAL CHECK FLIGHTS ON GROUND BEACON INSTALLATIONS GUNSHIP II WILL BE CALL WHENEVER AIRBORNE. ITS GUNS ARE VERY EFFECTIVE AGAINST TROOPS IN THE OPEN AS IN A DIRECT ASSULT. ITS SENSORS CAN LOCATE THE HOT BARRELS OF FIRING ARTILLERY PIECES AND FIRE CAN BE ACCURATELY CONCENTRATED ON THEM. HOWEVER, IT OMIS NOT TO BE USED FOR ROUTINE CAP OR NERAL HARRASSMENT FIRING.

GP 40

BT

SECRET

ZNY CCCCC

ZZ 081710Z MAR68  
FM 3RD MARDIV COC  
TO TWO SIX MARINES  
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

PHOTO HT ITEM 2311

ITEM COORD

1 XD98999452

2 XD98839469 TO

XS98809490

TOT: 071 20

DESCRIPTION

MED. AA POSIT ON

UPPLIE

PHOTO HOT ITEM 2315 DATE FLOWN: 7 MAR68

ITEM COORD. DESCRIPTION

1 XD888997 20 BOXES OF UPPLIES IN PIT

2 XD888999 13 POL DRUMS IN PIT

3 XD8 6998 7 POL DRUMS IN PIT

4 XD884999 20 BOXES OF SUPPLIES 1 PIT W/10 MORE BOXES

5 XD882998 20 POL DRUMS IN PIT W/30 BOXES N PIT

50 FT NE OF POL DRUMS

6 XD846986 AW SITE, UNOCCUPIED

PHOTO HOT ITEM 2316 TOT: 071550

ITEM COORD DESCRIPTION

1 YD 033836 SA-2 MISSILE TRANSPORTER AND MISSILE (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED)

2 XD 98859493 SA TRANSPORTER WITHOUT ISSLE (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED)

3 XD 9701909 SA-2 TRA SPORTER WITHOU MISSILE (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED)

I.R. IPIR

MSN: 5766 DATE FLOWN: 7 MAR68 TOT: 2200

TGT: 1 095R 0 0/0 COVER

IT097R 0 0/0 COVER

ITEM COORD DESCRIPTION

1 XC864983 6 HOT RETURNS NEAR STREAM

2 XC86 978 5 HOT RETURNS GROUPED IN BRUSH

3 XC864977 10 HOT RETURNS IN BRUSH

4 XD867860 3 HOT RETURNS IN JUNGLE

5 XD863397 2 HOT RETURNS I JUNGLE

6 XD802467 2 HOT RETRUNS IN VILLAGE

7 XD798483 6 HOT RETURNS IN CLEAR AREA

8 XD805357 1 HOT RETURN IN JUNGLE

9 XD809359 10 HOT RETURNS SCATTERED IN JUNGLE

10 XD807361 7 HOT RETURNS IN JUNGLE

MS :5765 TOT:1900

TGT: IT088R 65 0/0 COVER

IT089 100 0/0 COVER

IT090R 0 0/0 COVER

IT091R 0 0/0 COVER

ITEM COORD DESCRIPTION

1 X 741449 20 FIRES IN JUNGLE


2 XD643482 6 FIRES IN JUNGLE

3 XD700360 1 FIRE IN VILLAGE

4 XD700384 6 FIRES I JUNGLE

P-4

BT



SHOVE

CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

CCFO

APO

ACTION

Handwritten signature and initials over a grid.

08

17

10

Encl 93

148268

S-916-68

COPY 17 OF 44 COPIES  
Hq 1ST AIR CAV DIVCAMP EVANS (YD536320), RVN  
081800 March 68

JKS

OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) R1 (U)

Reference: a. Maps: RVN 1:50,000; Series 6342 I-IV; 6442 I-IV; 6542 III.

b. SECRET Message, FM: CG III MAF, DTG 251428Z January 1968;

Subject: Contingency Planning.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A

## 1. (S) SITUATION

## a. Enemy Forces:

(1) Annex B (Intelligence)

(2) Current INTSUM

## b. Friendly Forces:

(1) Corps Vietnam Provisional assumes control of US Forces north of PHU BAI o/a 15 Mar 68 and in coordination with 1st ARVN Div continues operations to destroy VC/NVA forces and extend GVN control over RVN.

(2) 3d Mar Div continues operations in sector north of 1st ACD from KHE SANH to GIO LICH/CUA VIET.

(3) 101st ABN Div conducts operations south of 1st ACD vic HUE and HUE/THU BAI.

(4) 1st ARVN Div continues operations in current area of interest.

(5) 7th AF and 1st MAW continue to provide close air, tactical airlift and PSYOPS support.

c. Attachments and Detachments: Task ~~Organization~~

## d. Assumptions:

(1) Highway 1 will remain trafficable and secure for logistical convoys from DA NANG to DONG HA.

(2) Route 9 from DONG HA to CA LU will be trafficable, swept for ✓

THIS OPLAN REGRADED  
CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
AFTER EXECUTION

SECRET

Encl 94

**SECRET**

OPLAN 01-68 (PAGSUS) RI (U)

mines and secured by non-divisional resources. ✓

- (3) The logistical facilities at UTAH BEACH and GUN VILIT will remain operational. ✓
- (4) Camp Evans, LZ Betty and LZ Sharon will be retained as helicopter laager areas and combat support sites for 1st ACD.
- (5) 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry will become OPCOM to 1st ACD on or about 15 March.
- (6) An engineer battalion will be available to assist 1st ACD in construction of CA LU Airfield, FSE/FSa Facility at CA LU, and open CA LU/KHE SANH Highway as required. ✓

2. (S) MISSION: On order 1st ACD moves to and conducts offensive operations vicinity KHE SANH to relieve KHE SANH Combat Base, open Highway 9 and destroy enemy forces in the assigned area of operations.

3. (S) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations:

- (1) Fires: Annex D (Fire Support).
- (2) Maneuver: On order the 1st ACD moves by combination of combat assault, airlift and ground convoy to establish fire bases and conduct offensive operations on axis CA LU/KHE SANH to relieve 26th Marine Regiment at KHE SANH. The lead bde (2d Bde) commences movement on D-Day with one infantry battalion and three artillery batteries to vic CA LU (YD 013452). On D+1 two additional bn's combat assault west of CA LU vic XD 925447 and XD 956396 to establish fire bases. The following bde (3d Bde) will combat assault 3 Bn's on D+2 to establish fire bases vic XD 845348 and XD 887382. The remaining bde (1st Bde) will continue operations in JEB STUART AC and be prepared to move to vic KHE SANH on order.

b. 1st Bde, 1st ACD

- (1) Continue security of LZ Betty and LZ Sharon.
- (2) Secure logistical facility at UTAH BEACH and SKYKING AVE from HAI LANG to UTAH BEACH.
- (3) On order, assume OPCOM of Camp Evans base defense battalion and continue security of Camp Evans.
- (4) On order, assume OPCOM of 3d Squadron 5th Cavalry.
- (5) On order, and upon relief of missions (1), (2), and (3) above move to and conduct offensive operations vicinity KHE SANH.

**SECRET**

SECRET

OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) RI (U)

c. 2d Bde, 1st ACD:

- (1) On D-Day airlift one infantry battalion and one 105 BS Btry to secure fire base and engineer/Seabee airfield construction party and conduct offensive operations vic CA LU (YD 013452).
- (2) On D-Day airlift Bde TAC CP to CA LU.
- (3) Coordinate with 11th AVN GP and Div Arty to airlift one 155 Btry to CA LU on D-Day.
- (4) On D+1 air assault two battalions to conduct offensive operations and establish fire bases vic XD 925447 and XD 956396.
- (5) On order, secure engineer work parties repairing road from CA LU to KHE SANH.

d. 3d Bde, 1st ACD:

- (1) On D+2 combat assault 3 battalions and supporting artillery vic XD 887382 and XD 845348 to secure fire bases and conduct offensive operations.
- (2) On D+2 airlift Bde TAC CP to vic XD 887382.

e. 1-9 Cav:

- (1) General Support.
- (2) Be prepared to continue operations in JLE STUART AO with one troop.

f. Div Arty: General Support.

g. 8th Engr Bn:

- (1) General Support.
- (2) In conjunction with Naval Construction Battalion, be prepared to construct C7A strip, to be upgraded to C-123 strip, at CA LU.
- (3) Be prepared to restore KHE SANH airstrip to C-130 capability as required.
- (4) Assist in preparation of fire bases, CP's and logistical facilities as required.
- (5) On order, commence repair of road from CA LU to KHE SANH.

h. 11th Avn Gp: General support.

i. 13th Sig Bn: General support.

j. 545th MP Co: General support.

SECRET

OPLAN 01-68 (PACASUS) RI (U)

**SECRET**

## k. DISCOM:

- (1) Displace elements as appropriate to support two or three brigades of 3 battalions each from CA LU and or Camp Carroll.
- (2) On order, establish refuel/rearm points vic CA LU.

## l. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) This plan effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.
- (2) Direct liaison authorized; conduct minimum essential reconnaissance.

4. (S) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Annex H, to 1st ACD OPLAN 01-68 RI.

5. (S) COMBAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal: Current SOI and SSI in effect.

b. Command:

- (1) Div FWD CP displaces in phased movement on D-Day and D+1 to CA LU.
- (2) Div Rear remains at Camp Evans.

acknowledge

TOLSON  
MG

## ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Ops Overlay
- D - Fire Support
- E - Army Aviation
- F - Engineer
- G - Signal
- H - Administration and Logistics
- I - Movement Priorities
- M - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex x (Distribution)

OFFICIAL:

ROSS  
G3**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES  
HQ, 1ST AIR CAV DIV  
CAMP EVANS (YD536320), RVN  
081800H March 1968  
JKS

ANNEX A to OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) RI (U)

TASK ORGANIZATION: (Effective upon commitment of Bde TF; Bn's to be designated)

1st Bde, 1st ACD

\_\_\_\_\_ Cav

\_\_\_\_\_ Cav

\_\_\_\_\_ Cav

2-19 Arty (DS)

\_\_\_\_\_ Arty (105)

\_\_\_\_\_ Arty (105)

\_\_\_\_\_ Arty (105)

6/33 Arty (105)

A Co, 8 Engr (DS)

Plt, 545th MP Co

2 Sqds, 25th Plt (Scout Dog)

Det Pathfinders

3 LRRP Tms

Tm, 13th Sig Bn

Tm, IPW/CI 191 MID

Tm, 245th PsyOps Co

Tm, 5th Weather Sqdn

3d Bde, 1st ACD

\_\_\_\_\_ Cav

\_\_\_\_\_ Cav

\_\_\_\_\_ Cav

1-21 Arty (DS)

\_\_\_\_\_ Arty (105)

\_\_\_\_\_ Arty (105)

\_\_\_\_\_ Arty (105)

1/30 Arty (155)

C Co, 8 Engr (DS)

Plt, 545th MP Co

2 Sqds, 34th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

Det Pathfinders

3 LRRF Tms

Tm, 13th Sig Bn

Tm, IPW/CI 191 MID

Tm, 245th PsyOps Co

Tm, 5th Weather Sqdn

THIS OPLAN REGRADED  
CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
AFTER EXECUTION

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

ANNEX A to OFLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) RI (U) (Cont)

2d Bde, 1st ACD       Cav       Cav       Cav

1-77 Arty (DS)

       Arty (105)       Arty (105)       Arty (105)

1/30 Arty (155)

B 1/83 Arty (8")

B Co, 8th Engr (DS)

Flt, 545th MP Co

Sqd, 25th Inf Flt (Scout Dog)

Det Pathfinders

3 LRRP Tms

Tn, 13th Sig Bn

Tn, IIW/CI 191 MID

Tn, 245th PsyOps Co

Tn, 5th Weather Sqdn

DIV ARTY

HQ Btry

E Btry, 82d Arty (AVN) (-)

2-20 Arty

(-) (155 How)

1-30 Arty

6-33 Arty (-) (105 How)

C/3-18 (8" How)

5th MAAR Btry (PROV) (155G/8" How)

2d Flt (+)/D/1-44 (ADA) (AW) (8 M42, 7  
M55)

Flt/C/4-60 (ADA) (AW) (4 M42, 4 M55)

2d Flt/B/29 SLT (4 SLTS)

Flt/G/29 SLT (4 SLTS)

SECRET



DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

ANNEX A to OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) RI (U) (Cont)

DIV TROOPS

HHC, 1ST ACD (-)

1-9 Cav Sqdn (-)

8th Engr Bn (-)

11th Avn Gp (-)

Det, 5th Weather Sqdn

13th Sig Bn (-)

371st RR Co

545th MF Co (-)

191 MI Det (-)

184th Cml Plat (-)

Co E, 52d Inf (LRR) (-)

Spt Cnd (-)


478th Avn Co (Hvy Hel)

Acknowledge:

TOLSON  
MG

DISTRIBUTION: Same as basic Oplan.

OFFICIAL:



ROSS  
G3

SECRET

A-3

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

COPY \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ COPIES  
HQ, 1ST AIR CAV DIV  
CAMP EVANS (YD 536320), RVN  
081800 March 1968  
JKS

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) RI (U)

REFERENCES: (1) CG, III MAF msg (S) - 36468, 251428Z Jan 68, Subj: Contingency Planning (U)

(2) Maps SOUTH VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L 7014; Sheets 6342 I, II, III, IV; 6442 III, IV.

1. (S) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Current III MAF PERINTREP.
- b. Current 1st ACD INTSUMS.
- c. Current 3d Marine Division INTSUMS.
- d. Current Situation.

(1) The enemy has recently intensified his offensive action against the KHE SANH Combat Base (XD 849417). On 8 Feb 68 elements of the 101st D NVA Regiment, supported by 9 PT 76 amphibious tanks, overran the Special Forces outpost at LANG VEI (XD 793362) and subsequently seized the village of KHE SANH (XD 864377) further to the east. On 23 Feb 68 the KHE SANH Combat Base received a record total of 1,000 rounds of artillery and 308 mortar rounds. On 29 Feb long attack trenches were found near the eastern portion of the perimeter at KHE SANH. On 1 and 2 March, the enemy conducted sizable night probing attacks. Daily attacks by artillery and mortar fire have occurred since the middle of January.

(2) The enemy force is composed of two divisions. The 304th NVA Division has 3 regiments deployed to the south and southwest of KHE SANH: the 66th NVA Regiment (XD 9039), the 57th NVA Regiment (XD 8429), and the 9th NVA Regiment (XD 8131). The 325C NVA Division (-) has two regiments deployed to the west and north of KHE SANH: 95C NVA Regiment (XD 7947), and the 101 D NVA Regiment (XD 8138). The 29th Regiment, normally organic to the 325C Division, moved to Hue for the TET offensive. The 68th Artillery Regiment (XD 8437) supports the 304th NVA Division from firing positions located south and southwest of KHE SANH. The 3d Bn of the 164th Artillery Regiment supports the 325C NVA Division from positions north of KHE SANH (XD 7542). Additionally, 152mm supporting artillery is reported vicinity XD 7632 in LAOS. Numerous antiaircraft artillery positions ring the KHE SANH Combat Base.

(3) Many unidentified enemy units have been reported to the west of the combat base near the Laotian border possibly conducting resupply activities from LAOS east toward KHE SANH. The 308th NVA Division is reported north of KHE SANH

THIS OPLAN REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL  
30 DAYS AFTER EXECUTION

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) RI (U)

vicinity of the DMZ. An additional unidentified regiment is located vicinity XD 9258 northeast of KHE SANH.

## 2. (S) EEI AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS:

## a. EEI

(1) What are present strengths, dispositions, identifications, and missions of all enemy forces in the area of interest?

(2) Where, when, and with what size force will the enemy attack?

(3) What artillery units are in the area? What infantry units are supported by the various artillery units? What is the source and availability of artillery ammunition? Where are the enemy artillery positions located?

(4) What antiaircraft weapons, by type and number, does the enemy have in the area? Where are antiaircraft positions located?

## b. OIR

(1) What is the enemy armor capability in the area of interest?

(2) What is the enemy capability for close air support in the area?

## 3. (S) ORDERS AND REQUEST FOR INFORMATION:

## a. Orders to Attached and Subordinate Units.

All units report, as obtained, items satisfying EEI/OIR.

## b. Requests to Higher and Adjacent Units.

(1) III MAF. Request information satisfying EEI/OIR and information concerning new enemy units infiltrating through the DMZ or from the West.

(2) 3D Mar Div. Request information satisfying EEI/OIR.

## 4. (C) MISCELLANEOUS.

Counterintelligence. Information concerning operations planning will be protected and released only to authorized individuals on need-to-know basis.

Acknowledge.

TOLSON  
MG

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPLAN 01-68

OFFICIAL:

Richardson  
RICHARDSON  
G2

SECRET

**SECRET**

COPY - OF - COPIES  
 1ST AIR CAV DIV  
 CAMP EVANS (YD536320) RVN  
 081800 Feb 68  
 JKS

ANNEX D (Fire Support) TO OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) RI (U)

References: Basic OPLAN and ANNEX A (Task Organization)

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces.

Enemy forces are capable of conducting artillery, mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket attacks in zone.

b. Friendly Forces:

(1) Air Support provided by 7th Air Force and 1st MAW.

(2) Artillery

(a) 1st Air Cav Div Arty (-) augmented with:

- 1 6/33 Arty (105)
- 2 1/30 Arty (155)
- 3 B/1/83 Arty (8")
- 4 5th Mar Btry (Prov) (Reinf) (155G/8"H)
- 5 2d Plt (+) D/1/44 (ADA) (AW)
- 6 Plt C/4/60 (ADA) (AW)
- 7 2d Plt B/29 Arty (SLT)
- 8 Plt G/29 Arty (SLT)

(b) 108th Arty Gp augments fires of 1st ACD Arty (-) with heavy artillery currently in position at THON SON LAM (Rock Pile) and Camp Carroll.

(c) 3d Mar Div passes control of 1/13 Marine Arty to 1st ACD Arty (-) on order III MAF.

2. (U) MISSION: Provide continuous, responsive fire support to 1st ACD maneuver elements.

THIS OPLAN REGRADED  
 CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
 AFTER EXECUTION

**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE \_\_\_ OF \_\_\_ PAGES

## 3. (S) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations. Air Force FAC's and TACP's and artillery elements will deploy with 1st ACD maneuver elements to provide continuous, responsive fire support.

b. Air Support. Air support consists of close air support, illumination and reconnaissance missions from TAC, and heavy bombardment missions from SAC. Close air support missions may be either FAC-controlled or combat proof. Priority of close air support established by Division G-3 Air. Request for preplanned FAC and combat proof missions will be submitted in accordance with 1st ACD SOP. Requests for immediate close air support will be submitted to the Division TACP and on receipt of clearance will be submitted to the supporting DASC. TACP's will be located at Division Fwd CP and each brigade CP.

## c. Artillery Support.

(1) General. Artillery support will be provided to deployed maneuver forces. Habitual association between maneuver battalions and direct support batteries will normally be maintained. Fire bases as required will be established and secured by the maneuver battalions.

## (2) Organization for Combat.

(a) 2/19 Arty: DS, 1st Bde; o/o deploys with 1st Bde to vicinity LZ CALU or KHE SANH. Prepare to receive OPCON of one btry, 6/33 Arty on D-Day to provide direct support of 3/5 Cav.

(b) 1/21 Arty (+): DS, 3d Bde; o/o deploys with 3d Bde to vicinity CALU and/or KHE SANH. Prepare to receive OPCON of one btry, 1/30 Arty on D-Day.

(c) 1/77 Arty (+): DS, 2d Bde; o/o deploys with 2d Bde to vicinity CALU. Prepare to receive OPCON of B/1/83 Arty and one btry, 1/30 Arty on D-1.

(d) 2/20 Arty: GS; Reinf 2/19 Arty w/1 btry.

(e) 6/33 Arty: Reinf 2/19 Arty. Prepare to release OPCON of one battery to 2/19 Arty on order.

(f) 1/30 Arty (+): Reinf 2/19 Arty. Prepare to release OPCON of one medium battery to 1/21 Arty on D-Day and one medium battery and B/1/83 to 1/77 Arty on D-1.

(g) E/82 Arty: GS

(h) 2d Plt (+) D/1/44 Arty (ADA) (AW): GS

(i) Plt C/4/60 Arty (ADA) (AW): GS

~~SECRET~~

PAGE \_\_\_ OF \_\_\_ PAGES

(j) 2d Flt B/29 Arty (SLF): GS

(k) Flt G/29 Arty (SLF): GS

## d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Organization for Combat. 1st ACD Arty will publish detailed task organization by separate frag order.

## (2) Fire Planning.

(a) Div Arty Targeting Section will move on D-1 to 3d MAR DIV FSCC DONG HA to continue targeting.

(b) Submit initial artillery fire plan to Hq, 1st ACD Arty NLF 1500 hours daily. Submit additions ASAP.

(c) DS Bn S-2's contact FSCC targeting daily.

## (3) Fire Control

(a) When possible use common registration points.

(b) Illumination will be provided initially by artillery, replaced by flare aircraft ASAP.

(4) No napalm on LZ preparation.

## (5) Safety.

(a) Emergency cancellation of fire in clear text.

(b) Units post air watch to insure safety of friendly aircraft.

(c) Report all artillery fires and airstrikes to brigade air advisory stations.

(d) Friendly units mark positions with smoke/flares on request.

(6) DS arty bns establish and maintain communications/liason with RVN districts in AO and adjacent units to insure rapid clearance of fires.

## 4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. Basic OPLAN

b. ASR as published. Submit request to exceed ASR to 1st ACD Arty S-3.

c. Ammunition: 1st ACD Circular 23-1, 1 Mar 66.

d. Units make maximum use of backhaul capability of resupply aircraft to remove ammo residue.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

e. Aerial resupply on call.

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal.

(1) Current SOI in effect.

(2) Direct voice circuit between 1st ACD FSCC and 3d Marine Div FSCC required.

(3) Direct voice circuit(s) between 1st ACD Div TACP and supporting DASC(s) required.

(4) Secure communication between 1st ACD FSC element at Camp Carroll and 1st ACD (Cp Evans) and 3d Mar Div required from D-1 to D+1.

b. Command.

(1) 1st ACD establishes a Fire Support Coordination element at Camp Carroll (collocated with FDC, 2/94 Arty) on D-1 for initial control and coordination of fire support in 1st ACD AO.

(2) 1st ACD Arty CP displaces with 1st ACD CP.

(3) FSCC located with DFOC.

(4) Succession of command: SOP.

TOLSON

MG

OFFICIAL:

ROSS

G-3

## APPENDICES:

1. Air Fire Plan (TBP)
2. Arty Fire Plan (TBP)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ Copies  
HQ, 1st Air Cav Div  
Camp Evans (YD536320), RVN  
081800 March 1968  
JKS

ANNEX E (Army Aviation) to OPLAN 01-68 PEGASUS RI

REFERENCES: Basic OPLAN

1. (C) SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces: OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) RI
- b. Friendly Forces: OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) RI
- c. Attachments and detachments. 11th Avn Gp continues to provide aviation support for Operation JEB STUART.

2. (S) MISSION. 11th Avn Gp provides necessary aviation support for 1st ACD deployment of three (3) Bdes and supporting elements to conduct offensive operations in vicinity KHE SANH, to open Hwy 9 and to destroy enemy forces in assigned AO.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of operation, OPLAN 01-68 RI
- b. 11th Avn Gp.
  - (1) Continue to provide tactical and logistical aviation support for Operation JEB STUART as required.
  - (2) On order, provide aviation support to combat assault, combat and combat support units vicinity CA LU as required.
  - (3) On order, provide aviation support to airlift and/or combat assault, combat and combat support units vic KHE SANH as required. (See Appendix 1, Aviation Support for Deployment Schedule.)
  - (4) On order, provide tactical and logistical aviation support to 1st ACD elements conducting operations vicinity KHE SANH.
  - (5) Establish NDB and radar facilities at CA LU.
- c. Div Arty. 1st Air Cav Div TAC SOP.
- d. 1/9th Cav. 1st Air Cav Div TAC SOP.
- e. DISCOM. Establish and maintain aircraft refuel and rearm point vicinity CA LU. Minimum requirements:

SECRET

THIS OPLAN REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL  
30 DAYS AFTER EXECUTION

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET

ANNEX E (Army Aviation) to OPLAN 01-68 PEGASUS RI (cont)

- (1) Eight (8) nozzle refuel point for UH-1 (Slick).
- (2) Four (4) nozzle refuel/rearm point for UH-1 (Gun) and AH-1G.

- (3) Four (4) nozzle refuel point for CH-47.

- (4) Two (2) nozzle refuel point for OH-13.

f. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Air traffic control.

- (a) Establish ATC facilities.

- (b) Appendix 2 (Air Traffic Control) to Annex E will be published upon arrival within area of operation.

- (2) Current flying program as outlined in msg UNCLAS AVAV 03614, dtd 091727 Dec 65 remains in effect.

- (3) Aviation support will be programmed to assure a minimum of two (2) hours daylight organizational maintenance performed on aircraft per day.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Div TAC SOP.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

- a. Signal: Current SOI and SSI in effect.

- b. Command: Div TAC SOP.

APPENDICES:

- 1 - Deployment Schedule
- 2 - Air Traffic Control (TBP)

TOLSON  
MG

OFFICIAL:

*Qass*  
ROSS  
G3

SECRET

THIS OPLAN REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL  
30 DAYS AFTER EXECUTION

# SECRET

## APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E (ARMY AVIATION), TO 1ST ACD OPLAN, DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE (TENTATIVE)

DAY	UNIT	FROM	TO	SORTIES/TYPE A/C	CAPABILITY or by A/C	COMMENTS
D-?	Hvy Engr Eqmt	Vic Betty/ Sharon	Vic CA LU	___/___	W/in normal Capability	Note 1
D-1	Lead Bde	Asgn fr AO	Vic PEDRO	___/___	W/in normal Capability	Note 2
D Day	1 Inf Bn	Vic Pedro	Vic CA LU	60/UH-1 2/CH-47	Total: 60/UH-1 24/CH-47 6/CH-54	Sortie turn around time: 45 min
	1 105 Arty Btry			13/CH-47		
	1 155 Arty Btry			6/CH-47 6/CH-54		
	1 8" Arty Btry					Move by Convoy
	1 Bde tac CP 13th Sig Bn (-) Adv Parties -HHC 1st ACD			3/CH-47 ___/CH-47 ___/CH-47		Note 3
D+1	2 Inf Bns	Vic Pedro	Vic CA LU	120/UH-1 4/CH-47	Total: 120/UH-1 30/CH-47	Sortie turn around time: 50 min Note 4
	2 105 Arty Btry HHC 1st ACD (DIOC)			26/CH-47 5/CH-47 2/CH-54 (PODS)		
D+2	3 Inf Bns	Vic Pedro	Vic S of KHE SANH	180/UH-1 6/CH-47		Sortie turn around time:
	3 105 Arty Btry	Vic Betty/ Sharon	Vic S of KHE SANH	39/CH-47		1 hr

# SECRET

THIS OPLAN DOWNGRADED CONFIDENTIAL  
30 DAYS AFTER EXECUTION

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

# SECRET

## APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E (ARMY AVIATION), TO 1ST ACD OPLAN, DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE (TENTATIVE) (CONT.)

DAY	UNIT	FROM	TO	SORTIES/TYPE A/C	CAPABILITY or by A/C	COMMENTS
D+2 (cont)	1 155 Arty Btry	Vic Betty/ Sharon	Vic S of KHE SANH	6/CH-47 6/CH-54	Total: 180/UH-1 54/CH-47 6/CH-54	
	1 Bde tac CP	Vic Evans	Vic S of KHE SANH	3/CH-47		Note 5
D+2/3	1 Div Tac CP	Vic Evans	Vic CA LU KHE SANH	___/CH-47 ___/CH-54	Total: ___/CH-47 ___/CH-54	Note 6
D+?	1 Bde	Jeb Stuart AO	Vic S of KHE SANH	___/UH-1 ___/CH-47 ___/CH-54	W/in Capability	Note 6

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

# SECRET

THIS OPLAN DOWNGRADED CONFIDENTIAL  
30 DAYS AFTER EXECUTION

SECRET

## NOTES:

## EFFECT ON DIVISION'S AIRCRAFT ASSETS

1. Movement of engineer eqmt prior to D day, plus some quantity of troops: no detrimental affect.

2. Movement of troops on D-1 in preparation for D day; maximum use of ground transport, road march by units; limited lift required; some lift may be used to relocate artillery.

3. Moving units on D day; commit 30 UH-1's - slicks can deposit the one bn in two turn arounds in 1+30: 6 CH-47's can complete move in 3 hrs + delay time for assaulting secty forces: 3 CH-54's can complete move in 1+30: estimate Div will have 50% A/C for commitment. This leaves approx 30 MR UH-1's, 16 CH-47's and no CH-54's to accomplish other missions during the lift. Additionally, A/C used will be available after the lift is complete.

4. Moving units on D+1 day; commit 30 UH-1's - slicks can complete move in four turn arounds or 3 hrs 40 min: 6 CH-47's can complete the move in 5 turn arounds or 4 hrs 10 min (or 8 in 3 hrs 40 min): approx 30 UH-1's, 16 CH-47's and all CH-54's will be available for other missions. Additionally, A/C used will be available after the lift is complete.

5. Moving units on D+2 day; commit 30 UH-1's - slicks can complete move in 6 hrs (this may be unacceptable). Max effort will be 60 UH-1's to complete move in 3 hrs: commit a minimum of 9 CH-47's to complete move in 6 hrs. (arty on ground in 5 hrs): 3 CH-54's will complete move in two hours. Approx 30, or 0 (zero) UH-1's will be avail to spt other divisional elements: 12-13 CH-47's avail: no CH-54's until after mission is complete.

6. Div CP move in phases beginning on D or D+1 W/signal elements, followed by G2/3 plus on D+1 or D+2, followed by other elements on D+2 to D+?. Divisions assets can handle the CP move excepting a critical log problem whereby max effort of lift may be diverted to airlifting logistics.

SECRET

THIS OPLAN REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL  
30 DAYS AFTER EXECUTION

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES  
HQ, 1ST AIR CAV DIV  
CAMP EVANS (YD 536320), RVN  
100000L March 1968

JKS

ANNEX F (Engineer) to OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) R-I (U)

REFERENCES: Basic OPLAN

1. (S) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. ANNEX B (Intelligence), OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) R-I.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Task Organization.

(2) III MAF provides non-divisional engineer support for 1st ACD operation by:

(a) Assisting in mine sweeps in JEB STUART AO.

(b) Repairing and maintaining highway from DONG HA to CA LU for class 32 traffic.

(c) Accomplishing mine sweeps of highway from DONG HA to CA LU as required.

(d) Providing a non-divisional engineer battalion OPCON to 1st ACD for performing the following tasks:

1. Construction of type II C7A airfield (expandable to type II C-123 if required) vic of CA LU (YD 013455).

2. Construction of FSE/FSA complex vic of CA LU (YD 013455).

3. On order, providing engineer support necessary to open highway from CA LU to KHE SANH.

4. Accomplishing engineer tasks beyond capability of 8th Engr Bn.

2. (S) MISSION

8th Engr Bn units support 1st ACD elements during operations to relieve KHE SANH, open highway from CA LU to KHE SANH, and destroy enemy forces in assigned AO.

F-1

SECRET

THIS OPLAN REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
AFTER EXECUTION

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

## 3. (S) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations: 8th Engr Bn, during operations by 1st ACD to relieve KHE SANH;

(1) Provides normal combat support of 1st ACD elements with priority of effort to committed forces;

(2) Coordinates construction of a type II C7A airfield (expandable to type II, C-123 if required) and FSE/FSA complex, and opening highway from CA LU to KHE SANH by non-divisional engineer units OPCON to 1st ACD.

b. 8th Engr Bn

(1) On order, construct a type II C7A airfield and FSE/FSA vic CA LU (YD 013455).

(2) On order, expands C7A airfield to a type II, C-123 airfield.

(3) Supports the relief operations for KHE SANH under varying conditions:

(a) For a two Bde operation, provide minimum of two engineer companies with equipment sections in support of 1st ACD units at vic KHE SANH.

(b) For a three Bde operation, provide battalion (-) in support of 1st ACD vic KHE SANH, and minimal engineer effort at Camp Evans as required.

(4) On order, perform engineer tasks required to open highway CA LU to KHE SANH.

(5) Coordinate assignment of engineer tasks for OPCON units.

c. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Engineer work lines as directed by III MAF.

(2) All engineer units OPCON to 1st ACD submit daily SITREP to Division Engineer, 1st ACD, prior to 1800 hours daily.

(3) Division Engineer, 1st ACD, coordinates all engineer units OPCON to 1st ACD.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. ANNEX H (Administration & Logistics), OPLAN 01-68 (FAGASUS) R-I.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Current SOI in effect.
- b. Division Engineer CP vic 1st ACD CP.

Acknowledge.

TOLSON  
MG

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPLAN

OFFICIAL:

ROSS  
G3

SECRET

F-3

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES  
HQ 1ST AIR CAV DIV  
CAMP EVANS (1/D536320) RVN  
081830H MARCH 1968

ANNEX G (Signal) to OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) (RI) (U)

REFERENCE: Basic OPLAN

1. (S) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces: Annex B, Basic OPLAN

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Basic OPLAN

(2) 1st Mar Div, 5th Communications Battalion and 459th Signal Battalion continue support at Camp Evans and provide long lines communications capability for 1st ACD elements which remain in the JEB STUART AO.

(3) Upon establishment of 1st ACD TAC CP at CALU, III MAF will be requested to provide long line circuits between the Division TAC CP and Division Base (Camp Evans), and between Division TAC CP and support elements in the III MAF AO.

(4) D Company, 36th Signal Battalion and the AN MHE Signal Coordinator (41st Signal Battalion) continue to provide support in the DAZZLEM AO as required.

2. (U) MISSION

Division installs, operates and maintains communications in support of OPLAN PEGASUS (revised).

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. See Basic OPLAN.

b. Upon receipt of orders to implement OPLAN

PEGASUS:

(1) Deploying brigades will deploy with all essential communications equipment.

(2) 13th Signal Battalion will provide to the deploying brigade;

SECRET

THIS OPLAN REGRADED  
CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
AFTER EXECUTION AR

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET

ANNEX G (Signal) to OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) (RI) (U)

(a) One AM HF SSB radio for each brigade to use in the division Delta-4 net as required, reverts to Delta-3 back up when not required.

(b) One AM HF SSB radio for each brigade to use in the division Delta-3 net.

(c) One AM HF SSB radio for use by the FSE supporting each deployed brigade.

(d) One AN/MRC-112 radio to terminate VHF radio-telephone and teletype circuits, to each brigade not collocated with Division TAC CP.

(3) 13th Signal Battalion provides radios and operating personnel for the following at Division TAC CP:

(a) AM Radio: Delta-3 (NCS), Delta-4 (NCS) and Delta-10 (NCS) nets. One AM HF SSB radio for use by FSCC element at Camp Carroll D-1 through D+1 inclusive, to enter Div Arty RATT net.

(b) FM Radio: Delta-1 (NCS), Delta-2 (NCS), FSCC, and ALO stations. Secure voice capability will be provided between FSC element (CP Carroll) and 3rd Mar Div D-1 through D+1 incl.

(c) Relays.

(1) Airborne relay when required. Minimum of 4 hour notification required.

(2) Ground relays to be established as required.

(d) Air Courier. The division air courier will make one round trip daily between the Division TAC CP and major subordinate commands not collocated with the Division TAC CP, using OH-6 and/or UH-1 helicopters. Daily air courier service will be provided between the JEB STUART and DAZZLEM AO's using C-7A aircraft.

c. Coordinating Instructions:

SECRET

THIS OPLAN REGRADED  
CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
AFTER EXECUTION AR

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

ANNEX G (Signal) to OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS (RI) (U)

- (1) Wire. Tac SOP
- (2) Special Forces callwords and frequencies: SOI.
- (3) Division Air Courier schedule (Appendix I).
- (4) Points of Origin Codes (Appendix II).

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

- a. Basic OPLAN
- b. Request for airborne relay to DSO.

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal

- (1) Current SOI index in effect.
- (2) Frequencies and callwords current for 26th Marine Regiment continue in use, confirming SOI item will be published.

- (3) Pyrotechnics as published (20 OCT 67).

- b. Command. DSO at Division TAC CP.

Acknowledge.

TOLSON  
MG

APPENDICES

- 1. Courier Sched (TBP)
- 2. Points of Origin (TBP)

OFFICIAL

ROSS  
G3

SECRET

THIS OPLAN REGRADED  
CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
AFTER EXECUTION AR

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Cop.            of            Copies  
 HQ, 1st Air Cav Div  
 Camp Evans (YD 536320), RVN  
081800 March 1968

ANNEX H (Administration and Logistics) to OPLAN 01-68 (PEGASUS) R1 (U)

REFERENCE: Map, Vietnam 1:50,000; Series L7014; sheets 6342 I, II, III, IV  
 6442 III, IV.

1. (S) GENERAL.

a. 1st Log Cmd (USASUPCOM - DSC) will operate an FSA at CA LU providing supply point distribution, support and services. Primary means of resupply will be from DONG HA and UTAH BEACH with land LOC over Highway 1 and Highway 9 to CA LU. In the event of emergency, limited resupply would be accomplished by air drop and by use of organic aviation resources. FSA will provide water, laundry, bath, graves registration services, MHE, and DS Maintenance for non-organic units.

b. DISCOM will establish and operate an FSE at CA LU and will provide unit distribution of all classes of supply as required.

c. In the event that a third brigade is deployed into the area and locates at a base other than CA LU, 1st Log Cmd will be requested to collocate an FSA with the brigade, DISCOM will operate an FSE collocated with the FSA.

2. (S) MATERIAL AND SERVICES.

a. Supply

(1) Class I

(a) All units deploy with 3 days rations.

(b) Unit distribution from FSA/FSE

(2) Class II & IV

(a) All units deploy with PLL.

(b) Barrier material will be issued by FSA/FSE.

(3) Class III

(a) All units deploy with 5 days supply of oil and lubricants.

SECRET

THIS OPLAN REGRADED  
 CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
 AFTER EXECUTION

SECRET

(b) FSE establish storage capacity for fuel as follows:

JP-4	120,000 gal
AVGAS	20,000 gal
MOGAS	20,000 gal
DF-2	20,000 gal

(c) FSE establish A/C refuel point

8	JP-4 points for UH-1D/H's
4	JP-4 points for UH-1B/C's (gunships)
2	JP-4 points for CH-47's (2 nozzles ea)
2	AVGAS points for OH-13's

(d) Units establish and operate refuel points as required.

(4) Class V

(a) All units deploy with basic load.

(b) FSE establish and operate sling out facility to sling out ammunition to forward fire bases.

(c) FSA establish ASP and maintain a 5 day stockage objective for all types of ammunition. The required daily minimums of artillery ammunition available for immediate delivery are as follows:

	<u>105mm</u> (rds)	<u>155mm</u> (rds)	<u>8 in</u> (rds)	<u>2.75 in</u> (rds)	<u>STON</u>
D-day	2700	1300	600	3000	344
D+1	6300	600	200	1000	277
D+2	10,800	2400	200	1000	547
D+2 & subq	5400	1200	200	1000	295

NOTE: The ability to meet the requirements listed above is contingent on the land LOC remaining open.

(5) Resupply

(a) Submit all requests to FSE.

(b) Program requirements a minimum of 24 hours in advance.

(6) Water - Water point will be established and operated by FSA in CA LU.

b. Transportation.

(1) Existing Facilities.

(a) Highway 1 - open from DA NANG to DONG HA

SECRET

SECRET

- (b) Highway 9 - Open from DONG HA to CA LU
- (c) DONG HA Air Facility
- (d) QUANG TRI Air Facility
- (e) LA VANG Army Airfield
- (f) KHE SANH Air Facility
- (g) CUA VIET - DONG HA Port Facility
- (h) UTAH BEACH - Over the beach port facility
- (i) TAN MY - HUE Port Facility
- (j) TAN MY - HUE POL Pipeline

(2) Planned Facilities.

- (a) CA LU Army Airfield - C7A Type I initially to be improved to C-123 Type I.
  - (b) Camp Evans Army Airfield - C7A type II initially to be improved to C-130 Type I.
  - (c) Highway 9 - Open from CA LU to KHE SANH
- (3) Transportation support available in northern ICTZ.
- (a) 57th Transportation Co (light trucks).
  - (b) 464th Transportation Co (medium trucks).
  - (c) 363d Transportation Co (light trucks).

(4) Courier and Air Freight Service - 7th AF will be requested to provide one squadron of C7A's to provide courier and air freight services between CA LU, Camp Evans, LA VANG, and PHU BAI once the C7A strip is completed at CA LU.

c. Services

- (1) Laundry and bath located vic CA LU FSA.
- (2) Graves Registration located vic CA LU FSA
- (3) EOD Team available through FSE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(4) Evacuation of captured material through FSE

(5) Maintenance

(a) DS maintenance available through FSE

(b) DS back up and GS maintenance through FSA, coordination through FSE.

(6) Aircraft maintenance. 15th TC Bn Headquarters and A Co displace from Red Beach to Phu Bai on order. B Co displace from Red Beach to Quang Tri on order. C and D Co's remain at PHU BAI and Camp Evans respectively.

3. (S) Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization.

a. A clearing company with 2 Med Evac ships and 1 Dust Off Ship will deploy with each brigade and will collocate with the brigade base.

b. Back up medical support will continue to be provided by the 3d Marine Medical Battalion until such time as the 44th Medical Brigade MASH facilities, vic PHU BAI and QUANG TRI Airfield become operational.

4. (S) Personnel Data to Support Contingency Plan.

a. Maintenance of unit strengths.

(1) Strength reporting. Major subordinate headquarters, separate organic battalions, companies, attached and assigned units will report strength figures to G-1. Reporting period is 0001 to 2400 hours daily. Reports will be transmitted by the most expeditious electronic means so as to arrive NLT 0300 hours.

(2) Replacements. Replacements will be received at Division Base Bravo (Camp Radcliff) and processed by CO Pers Svcs Bn (Prov). Upon completion of training, replacements will be moved forward under AG control to PHU BAI and brigade bases where they will be released to major subordinate units.

(3) MOS Replacements. Priority of replacement in critical MOS fields will be determined based upon programmed and unprogrammed losses. Maneuver Bn Strength will be monitored to maintain a balance of required infantry MOS's.

(4) Rated Officer Replacements. Division manning level strength is 90% of authorized strength.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

## b. Personnel Management.

(1) Civilian Personnel. Civilian labor is authorized for projects outside of base camps only. Payment for all Vietnamese laborers will be in piasters. Projects will be approved by G-1 prior to the hire of any civilian labor.

(2) Prisoners of War. No change in current procedures for the handling and evacuation of Prisoners of War. Division PW cage will be located at Camp Evans.

## c. Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(1) Mail. APO 96490 is located at PHU BAI. Postal units will be located with each brigade and at Camp Evans and will receive mail for units located in their vicinity. Units will pick up mail at the postal unit.

(2) Finance. Contact teams will visit forward locations from the 14th to the 20th of each month to process pay actions and complaints. Additional assistance is available through the forward finance section located at Camp Evans.

## (3) R&amp;R.

(a) In-Country. R&R quotas for China Beach R&R Center DA NANG will be published.

(b) Out-of-Country. R&R quotas for out-of-country locations will continue to be in effect.

(4) Awards and Decorations. Impact awards should be forwarded to the Chief of Staff's Office for presentation within 48 hours of the act for which the award is recommended. Follow-up action on impact and normal awards will be sent to AG for further processing.

## d. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(1) Courts Martial. SJA facilities will be available at Camp Evans. Normal processing of court martial cases will be followed.

(2) Off Limits. All Vietnamese villages are off limits except in the conduct of tactical operations and official business.

e. Miscellaneous. Identification Cards and Tags will be carried by all personnel. Boots will be marked. Security of personal effects of all casualties will be emphasized.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

5. (U) Civil Affairs. Omitted.

GP-4

TOLSON  
MG

DISTRIBUTION:  
Same as OPLAN 01-68

OFFICIAL:

*Vaughn*  
VAUGHN  
GL

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



Secret

COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES  
 HQ 1ST AIR CAV DIV  
 CAMP EVANS (YD 536320), RVN  
 081800H March 1968  
 JKS

ANNEX I (Movement Priority) to OPLAN 01-68 (Pegasus) R-I (U)

1. (S) This annex contains the movement priority for elements of the 1st ACD to move from present location to vic of KHE SANH and CA LU.

2. (U) All infantry companies will move by UH-1. Selected units may reposition by CH-47 in JEB STUART AO to assume pick up posture.

3. (S) Division TAC CP will move by echelon utilizing combination of organic air and land LOC.

4. (S) Movement Priority:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MODE</u>
D-? 8th Engr Bn (Selected Equipment)	CH 54
FSE/FSA	Convoy
D DAY One Infantry Battalion	UH-1/CH 47
One 105 DS Arty Brty	CH 47
One 155 Arty Brty	CH 47/CH 54
One 8" Arty Brty (SP)	Convoy
2d Bde TAC CP	CH 47
13th Sig Bn (-)	CH 47/Convoy
Advance Parties:	
Div Arty	CH 47/Convoy
8th Engr Bn	CH 47/Convoy
545th MP Co	CH 47/Convoy
Hq & Hq Co 1st ACD	CH 47/Convoy

THIS OPLAN REGRADED  
 CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
 AFTER EXECUTION

Secret

~~SECRET~~

## Advance parties (Cont)

11th Avn Gp	CH 47/Convoy
DISCOM	CH 47/Convoy
D+1 Two Infantry Battalions	UH-1
Two Artillery Batteries (DS 105)	CH 47
1st ACD DTOC (-)	CH 47/CH 54 (PODS)
Hq & Hq Co (-) 1st ACD	CH 47/Convoy
13th Sig Bn (-)	Convoy
Hq Div Arty	CH 47/Convoy
545th MP Co (-)	Convoy
8th Engr Bn	Convoy
DISCOM (as required)	Convoy
D+2 Three Infantry Battalions	UH-1
Three 105 Batteries	CH 47
One 155 Battery	CH 54/CH 47
Hq & Hq Co (-) 1st ACD	Convoy
11th Avn Gp	Convoy
191 MI DET	Convoy
DET, 5th Weather Sqdn	Convoy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Y OF COPIES  
HQ, 1ST AIR CAV DIV  
CAMP EVANS (YD 536320), RVN  
081800H March 1968  
JKS

ANNEX X (Distribution) TO OPLAN 01-68 PEGASUS R-I (U)

Chief of Staff	1	8th ENGR BN	2
G-1	1	13th SIG BN	1
G-2	2	1-9 CAV	2
G-3	3	ALO	1
G-4	1	DISCOM	2
G-5	1	AG FILES	5
1st BDE	2	CG III MAF	1
2d BDE	2	CG CORPS VIETNAM PROVISIONAL	1
3d BDE	2	CG 3d MAR DIV	1
DIV AINTY	3	191 MI DET	1
11th AVN GP	3	DIV SSO	1
PMO	1	545 MP CO	1

Acknowledge.

TOLSON  
MG

DISTRIBUTION: Same as basic

TOTAL NO OF COPIES 41

OFFICIAL:

  
ROSS  
G3


THIS OPLAN REGRADED  
CONFIDENTIAL 30 DAYS  
AFTER EXECUTION

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION



V VPC520 ALA834

RR RUMHVP

DE RUMHLA 1393 0690134

ZNY CCCCC

R 090134Z MAR 68

FM BHRY G (SLH0 TWENTY NINTH ARTY DNG

TO RUMHVP/FIRST BN (AW)(SP) FORTY FORH ARTY ZHA

INFO ZEN/ ELEVENTH MAR

RU MWAA/III MAF DBG

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

AHN: S-3

SUBJECT SEARCHLIGHT LOCATION

EPOR

1. THE FOPLOWING SEARCHLIGHT LOCATIONS ARE CURRENT AS OF 081800  
MAR 68:

SECTION

LOCATION	SECTION	LOCATION	SECTION	LOCATION	SECTION	LOCATION
1-1	YD882138	2-1	AT970620	3-1	AT900470	
1-1A	YD535324	2-1A	-DO-	3-1A	COMBAT LOSS	
1-2	BS 65961	2-2	AT877577	3-2	BS818312	
1-2A	BT 43013	2-2A	-DO-	3-2A	RS728848	
1-3	YD525324	2-3	YD633273	3-3	BS566878	
1-3A	AT928842	2-3A	YD833272	3-3A	BS868318	
1-4	YD882138	2-4	AT934663	3-4	BH113371	
1-4A	-DO-	2-4A	-DO-	3-4A	BT026340	
1-5	BTW12842	2-5	A924692	3-5	BT128452	

PAGE TWO RUMHLA13

3 CO H F I D E N T I A L

1-5A BT396146 2-A

1-6 ZC885965 2-6

1-6A A928842 2-6A

AT892823

COMBAT LOSS

BH069710

3-5A

3-6

3-6A

BT468068

BS752435

BT128452

2. THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE C ANGE IN LOCATI

N OF SECTION 2-3

AND 2-3A ON 6 MAR 68 AND SECTION 1-3 ON 4 MAR 68 AND SECTION 1-1

AND 1-6 ON 8 MAR 68.

GP-4

BT

3

4/F300/CEO

RFE

09

01


38

Encl 95

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

ZNY SSSSS  
O 090235Z MAR 68  
FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
TO III MAF COC  
BT



SECRET

1. COG COMM READDRESS THIRD MARDIV COC MSG 0806 02Z MAR 68.  
QUICK RUN FORCE FOR SECURITY OF CUA VIET LOC

A. CG III MAF 060622Z MAR 68

B. 1ST MAW 303 OP PLAN

1. URGENT OF REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT CUA VIET LOC DICTATES NEED FOR  
QUICK RUN PLATOON SIZED FCCE TO BE HELD LIFTED INTO CUA VIET  
RIVER LOALS TO COUNTER EN INTERDICTION EFFORTS. AVION A, REQ  
TWO (2) CH-46'S AND TWO (2) UH-83 GUNSHIP ON 1 - MIN ALERT AT QANG TR  
ON CALL OF 3RD MARINES. ABOVE HELO FORCE IN ADDITION TO SPARROW HAWK  
REQUIRED BY REF B.

GP-4

BT

*clear water*

NNNN

09 02 35-


Encl 96

DECLASSIFIED

DE DIV W TH NR 7 274.....274

Z Y EEEEE  
O 090311Z MAR 68  
F TH RD MARDIV COC  
TO TWO SIX MAR NES COC  
BT

CLA E F T O  
AERIAL RESUPPLY OF HE SANH  
A. CG III MAF M G 061538Z MAR 68 (PASEP)  
1. EQ YOUR REC MMENDATIONS REF "A" ASA.  
G -4  
BT



MOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APD	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

NN N

09


03

11

Encl 97

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>A</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>C</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>G</i>
DCPO	<i>A</i>
APD	<i>A</i>
ACTION	

*Gr. of has*  
*4/1*

*Copy to G-4*  
*APD - prepare memo*  
*TOR/091912/MAF*  
*CD*

GGAL VV MFP 506  
DE RUMWAA 1040 06.0756  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 090756Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD  
BT

SECRET

- 515TH TRANSPORTATION CO (-), USA  
A. CG III MAF 230530Z SEP 67  
B. ADMINO III MAF 241340Z SEP 67  
C. CG THIRD MARDIV 101550Z JAN 68 (NOTAL)  
1. REFS A AND B ASSIGNED 515TH TRANSPORTATION CO, USA TO CG THIRD MARDIV. REF C PASSED OPCON 3D PLI, 515TH TRANSPORTATION CO TO III MAF EFFECTIVE 12JAN68.  
2. OPCON 515TH TRANSPORTATION CO (-) TO BE PASSED TO FLC TO MEET INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR CARGO CLEARANCE OF TRANSPORTATION TERMINALS NORTHERN I CORPS.  
3. FOR CG FLC. REQUEST ADVISE RECOMMENDED DATE FOR RECEIPT OPCON SUBJ UNIT AND AREA OF PLANNED EMPLOYMENT.  
4. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV. PREPARE TO PASS OPCON SUBJ UNIT TO CG FLC ON ORDER THIS HQ.

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 1040 SECRET  
5. DIR LN ALCON.  
GP-4  
BT

3.

*coc/2/cg/5/adc/ced*  
*PRD*


09

07

56 SECRET

*end 98*

DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

00 RUMHIP  
 DE R UMHN 0115 069085Z  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 090855Z MAR 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHAA/CG III MAR  
 INFO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMSMA/CG COMUSMACV SFWD  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHFL/CG FORLTGCMD  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHNB/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP PBR MOBILE BASE ONE  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHNB/NSAD TAN MY  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINE REGIMENT.

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L S V C

ZUI RUMHN 004R 0681620 O 080955Z MAR 68 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FIRST AIRCAV DIV TAKE FORNFIRST TIME ALL OTHERS CORRECT INFO TT BT  
 DE RUMHN 004R 0681620

**SHOVE COC**  
 OP CHIEF *[Signature]*  
 G-3 W.O. *[Signature]*  
 G-2 W.O. *[Signature]*  
 DCPD  
 APO *[Signature]*  
 ACTION *Clearwater-*

PAGE 2 RUMHN 004B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 ZNY CCCCC

O 080955Z MAR 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHAA/CG IIIMAF  
 INFO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMSMA/CG COMUSMACV SWD  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHSL/CG FORLOGCMD  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHNB/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP PER MOB-LE BASE ONE  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHNB/NSAD TAN MY  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

24 HOURS OPS PERFUME/CUA VIET RIVERS  
 A. CG III MAF 030400Z MAR 68 NOTAL

C. 3

*coc/2/4/ce/cjs/ced***CONFIDENTIAL***Encl 99*



**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 3 RUMHN 004B C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. CONFERENCE CG III MAF/COMNAVSUPACT DANANG/CTF CLEARWATER 6 MAR 68  
C. MY 250525Z FEB 68 NOTAL

1. 231 W

## AQ COMMENTS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TWO FOUR 24) HOUR  
OPSICUA VIET/PERFUME RIVERS. REF B INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS ON TWO  
FOUR 24) HOUR OPS ON THE RIVDRS AND DISPOSITION NEW MRF ASSETS OF  
FOUR MONITORS AND TEN ATC'S. THIS MSG CONFIRMS RESULTS OF CONFERENCE  
AND EXPANDS ON NECESSARY ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR FUTURE OPS.

## -2. RIVER SECURITY

## PERFUME/CUA VIET RIVERS:

A. PERFUME RIVERS OPS HAVE DISCONTINUED CONVOY MODE SINCE 3 MAR AND  
OPERATING IAW ANNEX B REF C. ALLOWING INDIVIDUAL OR GROUPS OF CRAFT TO  
TRANSIT THROUGH A MINE SWEEP/PATROLLED RIVDR DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS  
ONLY.

B. TWO SEPRATE CONVOY UNITS ARE PRESENTLY OPERATING SIMULTANEOUSLY  
ON THE CUA VIET RIVDR IAW ANNEX A OF REF C. GROUND OPS ON BOTH SIDES  
OF THE RIVER PRESENTLY PRECLUDES SHIFTING INTO INDEPENDENT TRANSITS  
AT THIS TIME. WHEN RIVDRS BANKS HAVE BEEN SECURED BY GROUND FORCES,  
PLAN TO SHIFT TO OPS IAW ANNEX C OF REF C WITH INDIVIDUAL CRAFT  
TRANSITING SA MINE SWEEP/PATROLLED RIVER DURING DAYLIGHT  
HOURS ONLY.

3. THE FOLLOWING FORCES ARE EITHER PRESENTLY AVAILABLE OR WILL BE

PAGE 4 RUMHN 004B C O N F I D E N T I A L

AVAILABLE BY 11 MAR 68 TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO TRANSITING LOGISTIC  
CRAFT:

## A. PERFUME RIVDR:

TWO MONITORS

FIVE ATC MINESWEEP CRAFT

THREE LCM-6 MINESWEEP CRAFT

TEN RIVDR PATROL BOATS (PBR)

ARMED HELO SUPPORT

106 R/R PLUS CREW

FIXED WING STRIKES, AS REQUIRED

GROUND FORCES TO SECURE RIVER BANKS

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

## B. CUA VIET RIVER:

TWO MONITORS

FIVE ATC MINESWEEP CRAFT

FOUR LCPL PATROL BOATS (ARMED)

FOUR LCM-6 MINESWEEP CRAFT

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

FIXED WING STRIKES, AS REQUIRED

GROUND FORCES TO SECURE RIVDR BANKS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 5 RUMHN 004B C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SUBMITTED TO ENHANCE SECURITY AND SUSTAIN INCREASED LOGISTICAL LIFT OPS.

## A. PERFUME RIVDR:

- (1) LIGHTED NAVAIDS TAN MY CHANNEL ENTRANCE TO ENABLE LCM/LST'S TO ENTER AND DEPART SEAWARD.
- (2) LIGHTED NAVAIDS AS REQUIRED ON RIVER TO CONDUCT NIGHT OPS WHEN NECESSARY
- (3) RETENTION TWO 155 MM HOWITZER AT TAN MY
- (4) EXPAND ARMED HELO SUPPORT TO DAY AND NIGHT OPS, EITHER ON REACTION STANDBY OR AIRBORNE AS REQUIRED
- (5) OBS ACFT PATROL OVER RIVDR DURING DAYLIGHT PERIODS WHEN HELO'S ARE NOT AIRBORNE.
- (6) FLARESHIPS FOR NIGHT CURFEW ENFORCEMENT
- (7) CURFEW ON RIVDR

WAS MAINTAIN REQUIRED NUMBER OF LCM-S CRAFT FOR CARGO TRANSIT TAN MY/HUE AFTER LST OPS COMMENCE

- (9) CONTINUE TO KEEP RIVER BANKS SECURE WITH GROUND FORCES

## B. CUA VIET

## RIVER:

- (1) PROVIDE LIGHTED NAVAIDS FULL LENGTH OF RIVDR NAVAIDS ARE LOCATED AT NSAD CUA VIET AND WILL BE INSTALLED LOCALLY

PAGE 6 RUMHN 004B C O N F I D E N T I A L

(2) DREDGE OR BLAST CLEAR EXISTING SAND BARS IN RIVER CHANNEL LOGISTIC CRAFT HAVE ENCOUNTERED NUMEROUS GROUNDINGS DURING DAY AND NIGHT TRANSITS. THIS HAS BEEN SUBJECT OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH COMNAVSUPACT DANANG. WATER LEVEL IS PRESENTLY VERY LOW IN RIVER. A TEAM FROM NSA DANANG IS PRESENTLY SURVEYING RIVDR AND WILL BLAST EXISTING SAND BARS IN CHANNEL. RECOMMEND DREDGING ENTIRE RIVER WHEN BANKS ARE SECURED BY GROUND FORCES.

- (3) INCREASE NUMBER OF LCPL PATROL BOATS TO SIX ADDITIONAL BOATS NEEDED FOR CURFEW ENFORCEMENT ON RIVER.

- (4) EXPAND ARMED HELO SUPPORT TO DAY AND NIGHT ON REACTION STANDBY OR AIRBORNE.

- (5) FLARESHIPS FOR NIGHT CURFEW ENFORCEMENTS.

- (6) OBS ACFT PATROL OVER RIVER DURING PERIODS WHEN HELOS ARE NOT AIRBORNE

- (7) CURFEW ON RIVER. (THIS HAS BEEN SUBJECT OF COORDINATION WITH CG THIRD LMAR DIVN CO THIRD MARINES AND ORIG)

- (8) CURFEW ON RIVDR. (THIS HAS BEEN SUBJECT OF COORDINATION WITH CG THIRD MAR DIV, CO THIRD MARINES AND ORIG)

- (9) MAINTAIN REQUIRED NUMBER OF LCM-S CRAFT FOR CARGO TRANSIT CUA VIET/DONG HA. MANY OF ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS CAN BE COORDINATED LOCALLY AT CUA VIET AND TAN MY.

## 5. TWENTY FOUR HOUR RIVDR OPS:

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 7 RUMNN 004B C O N F I D E N T I A L

A. THOUGH POSSIBLE, INCREASING LOGISTIC OPS ON THE RIVERS IT INCLUDE NIGHT OPS (24 HRS PER DAY) AT THIS TIME PRESENTS SEVERAL PROBLEM AREAS:

(1) REDUCES AVAILABILITY OF CRAFT FOR PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE OF KEEL CRAFT BECOMES MORE VULNERABLE TO ATTACKS AT NIGHT AND INCREASES POSSIBILITY OF CRAFT BEING SUNK AND BLOCKING THE CHANNEL.

B. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT NORMAL OPS BE CONDUCTED FROM ONE HOUR BEFORE SUNRISE TO ONE HOUR AFTER SUNSET IAW ANNEX B REF C FOR PERFUME RIVER AND ANNEX C REF C FOR CUA VIET RIVER WHEN RIVERS BANKS ARE SECURED. THIS INDEPENDENT TRANSIT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT IN CONTINUOUSLY MINESWEEP AND PATROLLED RIVER SHOULD PROVIDE REQUIRED AMOUNT OF CARGO IT HUE/DONG HA IN A COMPARATIVELY SECURE ENVIRONMENT.

C. FOR COMBAT EMERGENCY CARGO, NIGHT CONVOY OPS COULD BE CONDUCTED IF REQUIRED.

GPWAR

BT

GP-4

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

112ZVA 587VV

PP RUMHP

DE RUMHN 022B 0691240

NY EEEEE

P 091105Z MAR 68

FM CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP

TO RUMHN/CTF CLEAR WATER

INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPAT DANANG

RUMSMA/COMUSACV

RUMHMB/COMUSMACV FWD

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF

RUMHLA/CG FIS MARDIV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHLA/CG TF XRAY

RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB BN

RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS

UMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV

RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY

RUMHN/NSAD CUA VIET

RUMVHE/FIRST CA5-) "9,3 \$; 894



SHOVE CAC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

RETURN TO

WATCH NCO for  
FILING

0-23 2 RUMHN 022B UCLAE E F T O

RUMHVP/THIRD MARINE REG

RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHHERA/COMSERVPAC

RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUYSUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUYSUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NNE

RUMFCR/COMRIVFLOT NE

RUMSBB/MSTSO VIETNAM

BT

UCLAS E F O

CLEARWAE OPSM 09 .AR (U)

1. OPERATIONS CONTINUE IAW PLAN B. ALL CRAFT  
TRANSITED W/O INCIDENT.2. 02ST GENERAL CARGO/146ST SPECIAL CARGO/50M GAL JP-4/20M  
GAL MOGAS/20M GAL DIESEL.

3. ALL CARGO ARRIVING NSAD TAN MY TRANSPORTED TO HUE.

BT

C. G-3

COC/2/4/CE/CIS/CEB B


09

11

05

Encl 100

CONFIDENTIAL



OTTCZYUW RUMMWAA1086 0691456-CCCC--RUABQL RUAUBUL RUHFMA  
RUMFKRP RUMHGK RUMHVH RUMHMB RUMSBJ RUMSBH RUMSVA RUMSMA.  
ZNY CCCCC

0 091456Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHVH/CG PROV CORPS VN

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV

RUMSBH/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV

RUMHVP/CTF CLEAR WATER

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AF

RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH

RUMHVH/CG I CORPS

RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHGK/CG SECOND ROKMC BDE

G-3/AIRL

ADC

CS/KG/COE/CEO

SHAVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DOPD	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 1086 C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMHFL/CG FLC

RUMHNA/COMNAV SUPPACT DNG

RUMHVH/CG USASPTCMD DNG

RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS

RUMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV

RUMHVP/ELEVENTH ENGR BN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ESTABLISHMENT OF PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM (PCV)

A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJ 321 DTD 3MAR68, SUBJ: LOI-ROLE AND MISSIONS  
OF PROV CORPS V (S) NOTAL

B. CG III MAF 291244Z FEB 68 (NOTAL)

C. CG III MAF 281300Z FEB 68 (NOTAL)

D. CG III MAF 060510Z MAR 68 (NOTAL)

E. III MAF FORCE ORDER P03121.5 (GROUND AND AIR OPNS SOP) (NOTAL)

F. III MAF LOI 18-68 (PROV CORPS V) (TO BE ISSUED)

1. REF A PROVIDES FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF PCV APPROXIMATELY 10MAR68  
TO EXERCISE OPCON OF GROUND TACTICAL UNITS IN QUANG TRI AND THUA  
THIEN PROVINCES NORTH OF BOUNDARY TO BE DESIGNATED IN THUA THIEN  
PROVINCE.

09

14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RUMMWAA 1086 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 2. PROV CORPS V IS ESTABLISHED 101200H MAR68 UNDER OPCON OF CG III  
 MAF. LGEN W.B. ROSSON USA ASSUMES DUTIES AS CG PCV SAME DTG.  
 3. FOR CG THIRD MARDIV, CG 1ST AIRCAVDIV, CG 101ST ABN DIV, AND  
 CTF CLEAR WATER; REPORT TO CG PCV FOR OPCON WITH ALL ORGANIC AND  
 ATTACHED FOROPCON FORCES EFFECTIVE 101200H MAR68. DIVISIONS  
 SUBMIT REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B.  
 4. FOR CG PCV AND CG THIRD MARDIV. ELEMENTS OF SLF ALFA AND SLF BRAVO  
 WILL BE RELEASED ON ORDER TO CG III MAF TO ENABLE RECONSTITUTION  
 OR ARG/SLF ALFA (CTG 76.4/79.4 AND ARG/SLG BRAVO (CTG 76.5/79.5).  
 5. FOR CG PCV. SOUTHERN BOUNDARY YOUR CORPS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY  
 WITHIN SVN IS AS ESTABLISHED BY REFS C AND D CONDUCT OPERATIONS  
 IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFS E AND F. SUBMIT REPORTS AS PRESCRIBED BY  
 REF B.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

**HEADQUARTERS**  
**3d Marine Division (Rein), FME**  
**WFO San Francisco 96602**

JEU:gab  
 10 Mar 1968

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL**

**Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress report for the period**  
**3 - 9 March 1968**

1. The following transpired during the report period.

a. CG 3dMarDiv message requested shipment of 155 bunkers (8 ft by 8 ft) and 16 observation towers (50 ft) for perimeter defense at Quang Tri.

b. First and second increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

(1) Horizontal. MCB-10 is still heavily engaged on the Hai Lang road project. The 11th Engineer Battalion has provided equipment and operators for road work at Quang Tri. Work continues on the main access road parallel to the railroad tracks with fill approximately 40% completed. Pioneer roads have been constructed into all cantonments with two unimproved access roads from Route #1 completed.

(2) Vertical

(a) Excavation for Base Defense and COC bunkers completed. Construction of the 18' x 12' bunker will start about 12 March 1968.

(b) Site preparation for the 500 man messhall continues with grading and footing excavation underway.

(c) The status of SEA Hut construction is as follows:

<u>CANTONMENT</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>UNDER CONSTRUCTION</u>	<u>% COMPLETE</u>
3dFtBn	20	0	100%
3dMTBn	36	0	100%
3dSPBn	1	1	15%
3dEngBn	0	1	7%
HqBn	43	4	52%

(d) 16 of 26 heads are completed (62%).

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Encl 102*

CONFIDENTIAL

JEG:gab  
10 Mar 1968

Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress report for the period  
3 - 9 March 1968

8. The move forward of Division Headquarters, Headquarters Battalion, and elements of the separate battalions continues. The percent displaced forward as of 9 March is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>SUPPLIES</u>
3dInfBn	98%	99%	65%
3dEngBn	90%	90%	20%
3dSPBn	80%	80%	20%
3dMTBn	33%	33%	0%
HqBn	59%	51%	50%

During the period of 2 - 8 March an additional 32 officers and 317 enlisted were moved into Quang Tri from the above units. Colonel THOMAS has taken over as Quang Tri Base Coordinator and the Chief of Staff is now located at Quang Tri. During the coming week the move forward will continue as planned. Additional Staff Sections to include the ADC, G-1, and G-5 will relocate in Quang Tri. No specific problems are foreseen at this time.

Very respectfully,

J. E. GLICK



TROOPS MOVED FROM: PHU BAI/GIA LU  
TO: QUANG TRI/DHCB

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	SP	TH	HQBN	ENGR
1ST MOVE 2 MAR	12	88	0/2	0/4	7/17	5/65

2ND MOVE 5 MARCH	9	146	0	5/65	4/57	0/24
---------------------	---	-----	---	------	------	------

3RD MOVE 8 MARCH	18	100	0	2/24	13/46	3/30
---------------------	----	-----	---	------	-------	------

TOTALS	39	334	0/2	2/89	24/120	8/119
--------	----	-----	-----	------	--------	-------

Encl 103

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

*CDC*

ZNY SSSSS  
O R 100249Z MAR 68  
FM FOURTH MARINES  
TO NINTH MARINES  
ZEN/SECOND BN NINTH MAR  
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

S E C R E T

1. 4TH MARINES CHOPS M/3/4 OPCON FROM 2/9 TO 9TH MARINES 100900H  
MAR 68.

GP-4

BT

*TOR 1190745 14TH MAR /#*

*3*

*S. Stone RAG*  
*COM US COM*

*10*

*02*

SECRET

*Encl 104*

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DATA  
DE 0003W NR  
22100000Z  
FM: III MAF COC  
TO: 3RD DIV COC  
CRAC  
BT

CONFIDENTIAL CITE: 0150  
REQUEST ASAP ALL AVAILABLE INFO ON  
SITUATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AT CU, VIET, PARTICULARLY  
SITUATION JUST PRIOR TO INCOMING.

BT  
100015Z

TOR / 10/0630Z  
RECD / ZIL

See CTF CLEARW. 12  
Mys to III MAF

encl 105

DECLASSIFIED

5AWA  
 DE 003W NR  
 ZZ100600Z  
 FM: III MAF COC  
 TO: 3RD DIV COC  
 GRNC  
 ET

C O N F I D E N T I A L CITE: 0159  
 REQUEST ASAP ALL AVAILABLE INFO ON  
 SITUATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AT CUA VIET, PARTICULARLY  
 SITUATION JUST PRIOR TO INCOMING


BT  
 100615Z

TOR / 10/0630Z  
 RECD / ZIL

SEE CTF CLEARW. IR  
 MYPE to III MAF

encl 105

SECRET

**FLASH**

ZNY SSSSS

Z 150617Z MAR '68

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO CG III MAF

COMNAVSUPACT DANANG

INFO COMUSMACV

COMUSMACV FWD

COMNAVFORVIET

CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FORCE LOGISTIC CMD

CG FIRST AIR CAV

CG FIRST LOG CMD

CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP

BT

SECRET

ENEMY ARTILLERY ATTACK CUA VIET 10 MAR '68

1. AT ABOUT 100745H ENEMY ARTILLERY ATTACKED THE NSA DET CUA VIET RAMP AND BASE CAMP. FIRST ROUND EXPLODED NEAR AMMO STACKED ON RAMP AND DESTINED FOR THIRD MARINE REG, CUA VIET SPORADIC ATTACK APPEARED TO LAST ABOUT ONE HOUR. SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS FROM BURNING AMMO ON RAMP CONTINUES AS OF 10 30H, SCATTERING ROUNDS THROUGHOUT CAMP AREA. FIRES CONTINUE THROUGHOUT AREA AND SPREADING INTO CAMP.

D

PAGE TWO 002U SECRET

2. THE INITIAL ESTIMATE OF DAMAG INCLUDES:

A. LOGISTIC CARGO STACKED ON RAMP DESTROYED FIRE CONTINUES  
 B. POL FARM ON FIRE - SAME BLADDERS STILL UNTOUCHED, BUT ENDANGERED

C. COMMUNICATIONS VANS DESTROYED.

D. ONE THIRD OF CAMP ON FIRE.

3. FIRE FIGHTING PARTY CONTINUES TO FIGHT FIRE.

4. FIRST CONVOY OF 8 LOADED CRAFT PLUS RIVER ASSULT SQUADRON 11 BOATS WERE ENROUTE DONG HA AND NOT DAMAGED CARGO CRAFT LOCATED CUA VIET EVACUATED.

5. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES 2 KIA, 17 WIA - MUSTER BEING TAKEN.

6. LST USS TREDALE UP RIVER AND ONE YOG AND ONE AOG ON STATION OUTSIDE CUA VIET.

7. IN ORDER TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS E-RILEST RECOMMEND FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. USING ALL AVAILABLE LCU'S DELIVER CARGO FROM DANANG DIRECT DONG HA SECURITY GROUP WILL ESCORT CRAFT CUA VIET TO DONG HA.

3

2/00/14/06/05/00/4DC RAC

**FLASH****SECRET**

Encl 107

SECRET

PAGE THREE 0920 SECRET

B. DISPATCH LST'S TO CUIEVVIET POSITIONING AT LEAST TWO FORKLIFTS PLUS ROOM TO WORK IN FRONT OF EACH LOAD, WILL MARRY LCU-8 BOATS TO LST RAMPS.

C. HPRGVIJAHOMZ WDDITWPR PALHYOG. RAQUIRED W TOTWL OF 1

AOG AND 2 YOG'S ON STATION CONTINUOUSLY.

D. SEVEN RT FORKLIFTS

E. BULLDOZER TO CLEAR RAMP WHEN FEASIBLE.

F. REPLACEMENT FUEL BAGS, PUMPING EQUIPMENT AND HOSE.

G. REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL - WILL ADVISE RATES.

H. BERTHING MATERIAL INCLUDING TENT FOR 100 PERSONS

I. C RATIONS FOR 250 PERSONS FOR 10 DAYS.

J. FOR CG III MAF: REQUEST RIVER ASSAULT SQUADRON 11 ASSETS DESTINED FOR TAN MY BE DIVERTED TO CUA VIET.

K. OIC NSA DET CUA VIET CONCURS WITH DAMAGE ESTIMATE AND REQUIREMENTS FOR RESUMING OPERATIONS.

KT 9-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER 3/CVJ/WLK  
 SEC G-3 1001 1001 203  
 CWO

PRIORITY 100622 Z MAR

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG III MAF HUMMUM

INFO: THIRD MARINES ZFN

//SECRET//

FIRE TEAM ASSAULT BOATS FOR RIVERINE EMPLOYMENT

A. CG III MAF 031142Z MAR 68 NOTAL

B. CG NINTH MAB 070135Z MAR 68 NOTAL

1. LAW REF A COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATIVE TO FTAB'S ARE  
 HEREWITH SUBMITTED. REF B REFERS.

A. RECOMMEND THAT FTAB AND MOTORS BE ASSIGNED TO THIRD MARDIV FOR  
 SUBSEQUENT USE ON THE CUA VLET. INITIAL ASSIGNMENT OF BOATS TO BE TO  
 3D MARINES FOR OPERATIONS VICINITY OF CUA VLET.

B. SUCH ASSIGNMENT WILL PERMIT OPERATIONAL EVALUATION BETWEEN FTAB  
 AND MULTI PURPOSE BARGE PRESENTLY IN USE.

C. RECOMMEND TRAINING BE CONDUCTED IN 3D MARINES AO.

GP-4

SHOVE

CP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

CCN

1376

RELEASED BY

*[Signature]*

APD

ACTION

*[Signature]*  
 3450

3

2KOC/CG/CS/ATC/CEO  
 RAO

10

06

22

7

Encl 108  
 SECRET

00 RUMHVP  
ZNY CCCCC ZOV RRUMHMA

RMA7897  
0

00 RUMHMB RUMHN RUMSMA RUMHAW RUMMWAA RUMSAV RUMSVA RUMHVH  
RUSRT RUMHVP RUMNGRA RUMHFL RUMSFF RUMNGR  
DE RUMHMA 072 0700710  
ZNY CCCCC

0 P 100640Z MAR 68

FM CG PCV PHU BAI RVN

TO RUMHMB/CG 1ST CAV DIV (AM) CP EVANS

ZEN/CG 101ST ABN RWV (ADV) (COURIER)

RUMHVP/CG 3RD MAR DIV DONG HA RVN

RUMHN/CDR TF CLEAR WATER

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV SGN RVN

RUMHAW/CG 1ST MAW

RUMMWAA/CG III MAF DNG RVN

RUMSAW/CDR 7TH AF TSN RVN

RUMSVA/CG USARV LBN RVN

RUMHVH/DSA 1 CTZ

RUMSRT/CG 1ST SIG BDE LBN RVN

RUMHVP/CG 11TH ENGR BN

RUMNGRA/CG 18TH ENG BDE LBN RVN

RUMHFL/CG FLC

RUMSVA/CG 1ST AVN BDE LBN RVN

RUMHVH/COMNAVSUPPACT DNG RVN

RUMSFF/CG 11 FFV LBN RVN

RUMNGR/CG 5TH SFG NHA RVN



SHOVE

OP CHIEF

C-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

PCPO

APC

ACTION

*Handwritten notes:*  
12/45  
X  
How do we submit  
now! O.PCON

PAGE TWO RUMHMA 072 C O N F I D E N T I A L

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 00204 FROM G3 OPS

SUBJ: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF UNITS IN PCV AOR (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MSG, DTG 091215Z MAR 68 (S). (NOTAL)

B. III MAF MSG, DTG 091456Z MAR 68 (C).

1. (C) BY REF B ABOVE, THIS HQ ASSUMES OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE 1ST ACD, 3D MAR DIV, 101ST ABN DIV, TF CLEAR WATER AND ALL ATTACHED FOR OPCON FORCES, EFFECTIVE 101201H MAR 68.

2. (C) NON-DIVISIONAL COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS LOCATED IN THE PCV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL CONTINUE PRESENT MISSIONS.

3. (C) UNITS OPCON TO PCV WILL CONTINUE TO SUBMIT ARC LIGHT NOMINATIONS TO CG, III MAF IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PROCEDURES UNTIL ABOUT 31 MARCH WHEN THIS HQ EXPECTS TO HAVE DEVELOPED AN ADEQUATE ARC LIGHT CAPABILITY. UPON DIRECTION, UNITS OPCON TO PCV WILL SUBMIT ARC LIGHT NOMINATIONS TO THIS HQ WHICH WILL PROCESS AND FORWARD TO CG, III MAF AS APPROPRIATE.

4. (C) CURRNT ASSIGNED MISSIONS AND BOUNDARIES REMAIN IN EFFECT.

GP-4

BT

3

2/000/AIRO/CEO RAC

10

06


40

CONFIDENTIAL

encl 109



CONFIDENTIAL



SHOVE

OP CHIEF *H*G-3 W.O. *P*G-2 W.O. *ms*

DOPD

APO

ACTION *ms*

OO RUMHVP  
 ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUMHN  
 RUMHVP717NSAD DONG HA/COA VIET

CTF CLEARWATER

RUMHLA7T-CG ELEVEN

VV HNA405ZVA 2 2VVV

FCA9.3VV

URK044

OO RUMHNA RUMHNB

DE RUYEUAK 040 0700:13

ZNY CCCCC

ZOC

RUYECR ZOK FFM

RUMHVP ZONE 1 UUMSEE MACV COC

COMUSMACV GUNLINE

TG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

O 100844Z MAR 68 ZYO RUYE

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

TO AIG FOUR SIX ONE

INFO RUMHNA/CG ELEVEN

RUMHVP/THIRD MARINES

RUMHVP/FOURTH MARINES

RUMHVP/NINTH MARINES

RUMFCR/USSS IREDELL CTY

RUMHNB/CTF CLEARWATER

RUMHVP/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

RUMFCR/US NEWPORT NEWS

RUMHVP/FIRST AMTRAC BN

RUMHVP/THIRD ENGINEERS

RUMHNB/NSA DET COA VIET

RUMHVP/1053 TRUCK COMPANY U.S. ARMY

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

ARG/SLF ALFA SPOT SITREP AS OOF 100800Z MAR 68 (U)

Re MY 100642Z MAR 68 NOTAL

1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

*Return to W NCO for file*  
*Clear water*  
*70011102511 MAR 68*

10

08

44

Encl 110

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE TWO RUEUAK 040 C O N F I D E N T I A L

## A. IREDELL CTY AMPLIFYING REPORTS INDICATE:

(1) FIRST INCOMING FIRE OBSERVED BY IREDELL CTY TO LAND IN CENTER OF AMMO STAGING AREA AT CVRM RAMP AT 100753H6 MAR. FURTHER REPORTED FIRST ROUND AT DEAD CENTER IN AMMO STAGING AREA WITH TWO TO THREE ADDITIONAL INCOMING ROUNDS AT/ABOUT 120800H9 MAR.

(2) AT PRESENT TIME 121600H7, IREDELL CTY REPORTS NO ADDITIONAL FIRE BEING RECEIVED CVRM.

(3) NEWPORTT NEWS OPERATING IN GENERAL AREA.

## 2. COMMENT:

A. CASUALTIES RECEIVED TO DATE FROM EXPLOSION AT CVRM:

## (1) RECEIVED AT CLEVELAND:

KIA: NONE

WIA(SERIOUS): TWO

1 FROM AALAMO (MEDEVAC TO IWO JIMA)

1 FROM CLEVELAND (MEDEVAC TO HOSPITAL)

WIA(MINOR): SIX

1 FROM CLEVELAND

2 FROM ALAMO

1 FROM ACDIV 13 DET N

1 FROM LCU 1492.

*coc*

*1/2/3/CEO*

PAGE THREE RUEUAK 040 C O N F I D E N T I A L

## (2) RECEIVED AT IWO JIMA:

KIA: ONE

1 FROM NSAD CUA VIET

WIA(SERIOUS): NONE

WIA(MINOR): TWENTY ONE TOTAL

2 FROM LST 839

4 FROM LCU 1498

1 FROM USMC PT ARDEN

3 FROM FIRST AMTRAC BN

1 FROM LPD 77

2 FROM RD ENGINEERS

3 FROM NSAD CUA VIET

1 FROM 1098 TRUCK CO.

1 FROM LSD 433

## 3. INTENTIONS:

A. IDENTIFY CASUALTIES RECEIVED IN TASK GROUP 76.4 SHIPS BY SEPARATE MSG TO INDIVIDUAL PARENT COMMANDS.

B. TG 76.4 SHIPS REMAIN IN VICINITY CUA VIET AREA.

C. CONTINUE ALL ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF CVRM AUTHORITIES.

D. CTG 76.4 TO RETURN STAFF LIAISON OFFICERS ASHORE TO CONTINUE


**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE FOUR RUYEUAK 040 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
TO MAINTAIN DIRECT LIAISON AND COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN TG 76.4  
AND CVRM AUTHORITIES.  
E. MAINTAIN DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH CTG 115.1 AND IREDELL CTY.  
F. SUBMIT ADDITIONAL SPOT SITREPS AS APPROPRIATE.  
4. ACTION REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY: NONE.

GP74  
BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

<b>SHOVE CAC</b>	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>MB</i>
DGPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APD	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION <i>Clear water</i>	

ZNY CCCCC  
 O 101215Z MAR 68  
 FM FIRST AMTRAC BN  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV (ATTN:G-4)  
 FLSG BRAVO  
 INFO THIRD MARINES  
 BT

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

THE FOLLOWING DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED BY THE BULK FUEL DETACHMENT AT  
 CUA VIET DURING THE FIRE OF 10 MAR 68  
 DESTROYED :

(FORTY SEVEN) TEN THOUSAND GALLON BLADDERS  
 (SIX) MULTI GATE VALVES  
 TWO (THREE HUNDRED FIFTY GPN PUMPS  
 (SEVEN) SPIDER MANIFOLDES  
 TWO HUNDRED SIXTY FOOT SECTIONS FOUR INCH LINE  
 (SIXTY FOUR) TWENTY FIVE FOOT SECTIONS FOUR INCH LINE  
 (TWENTY) E/-7ACC TYPE  
 (TWENTY) /Y'S/-TCA TYPE  
 (EIGHTEEN -) RIFLES (DIFFERENT TYPES)  
 (FOUR) HE--60(13 &'S  
 (ONE) .50 CAL MG

*A-64*

*G-2-3-CAC-CEO*

*(A)*

SEE TWO 0920 C O N F I D E N T I A L G  
 ALL HUTS LOSS ALL PERSONAL GEAR TOTAL LOSS  
 COMPLETELY OUT OF FIREFIGHT EQUIPT NO PUMP CAPABILITY AT TH-S T-ME.  
 HAVE TWO TY THOUSAND GALLONS "A" GAS FORTY THOUSAND GALLONS DIESEL FUE  
 RECOMMEND PASS TO FLC  
 GP-4  
 BT

*10*

*12*

*15*

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
*Encl 111*

*TOR/1525 2*  
*RTT EB*

PTC NR NR  
101430Z  
CG PCV  
CTX CLZARWATER


CONFIDENTIAL CITE C-0005

SUBJ: MEETING(U)  
REQUIRE COMMANDER TASK FOR CE CLEARWATER AND TASK FORCE  
OPERATIONS OFFICER AT CAMP EVANS 111000H MARCH.  
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

1437Z

*Clearwater*

*Encl 112*

**SECRET**

ZNY 15555  
 G 101456Z MAR 68  
 FM CTR CLEARWATER  
 TO CG III MAF  
 INFO COMNASUPPACT DANANG  
 COMUSMACV  
 COMUSMACV FWD  
 COMNAVFORV  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 CG FORCE LOGISTIC CMD  
 CG FIRST AIR CAV  
 CG FIRST LOGISTIC CMD  
 CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 BT

**SECRET**

ENEMY ARTILLERY ATTACK NSAD CUA VIET 10 MR 68

A. MY 100610Z MAR 68

1. REF A REFERS THE FOL DAMAGE HAS BEEN ITEMIZED:  
 A. ALL CARGO ON RAMP DESTROYED, CLASS ALFA FIRE CONTINUES ON RAMP.  
 B. POL HEAVILY DAMAGED  
 C. COMMUNICATION VANS DESTROYED  
 D. ELECTRICAL WORKSHOP, QUONSET HUT, ADMIN BUILD, COMMAND POST

**C. 3****COC/2/4/CG/CK/CEB**AGE TWO Q92U **SECRET**

AND GALLEY DESTROYED

E. SEVEN HOUCHES DESTROYED, ALL OTHERS HEAVILY DAMAGED.

2. CASUALTY TO NSAD CUA VIET PERS INCLUDE ONE KIA, SEVENTEEN

F756.

3. PARTY FROM NSA DANANG ARR CUA VIET TO SURVEY DAMAGE AND ESTIMATE

REQUIREMENTS FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMENENT REPAIRS.

4. CARGO DELIVERY TO DONG HA WILL CONTINUE TOMORROW. NSA  
 DET CUA VIET INTENDS TO OFFLOAD CARGO FROM LST VIA RAMP/CRAKE  
 TOS FUEL WILL BE TRANSFERRED FROM YOG AND AOG TO

FUEL TANKS

5. NO CRAFT HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. NO RIVER ASSULT CASUALTIES  
 TO BOATS PERS 33 HOWEVER MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY HAS BEEN  
 REDUCED TO THOSE ORGANIC TO THE CRAFT.

6. FINAL REPORT

GP-3

BT

**SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPO

APO

ACTION

*Clearwater*  
*10*

**10****14****56****SECRET***Encl 113*

SECRET


E WITH MY NR 33 333 3 33

SCOTLAND

NY 68555

101551Z MAR 68  
 TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV

TOR 10/1735 Z/ 6514

Advise  
Routed

SECRET

AERIAL RESUPPLY OF KHE SANH

A. CG III MAF 061538Z MAR 68

B. THIRD MARDIV COC 000311Z MAR 68

1. IAW REF A AND B FOL INFO IS PROVIDED.

A. RECOMMEND NUMBER OF AIR DROPS BE INCREASED TO FIFTEEN PER DAY.

B. MT AND MHE ARE ADEQUATE, BUT EACH OF THE SIX FORKLIFTS AND NINE TRUCKS OPERATIONAL ARE CRITICAL TO THE OPERATION OF LOADING IN THE AND UNLOADING IN THE DUMPS.

C. REPAIR PARTS, ESPECIALLY TUBES AND TIRES, ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF MT AND MHE EQUIPMENT ON HAND.

D. QUALIFIED MECHANICS TO INCLUDE LSU 3RD ECHELON MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY ARE REQUIRED AND MUST BE MAINTAINED.

E. TIMELINESS OF AIR DROPS IS CRUCIAL TO RECOVERY OPERATION. WHENEVER POSSIBLE THE FIRST DROP SHOULD BE ON THE GROUND BY 0730 WITH SUCCEEDING DROPS AT FIFTEEN MINUTE INTERVALS UNTIL 0900. THEREAFTER INTERVAL EVERY THIRTY MINUTES WITH LAST DROP ON THE GROUND AT 1300.

A-COC/AIRO

B-3-4-CEO



TO 32Y6 SECRET

1. AGAIN RECOMMEND GROUND CONTROL TEAM UNDER GUIDANCE OF USAF MISSION COMMANDER BE AUTHORIZED SOME CONTROL OVER AIRCRAFT TO IMPROVE ACCURACY OF DROPS IN ORDER TO PREVENT LOSSES OF CARGO TO THE ENEMY, DESTRUCTION OF FRIENDLY POSITIONS, FORTIFICATIONS, MINEFIELDS AND TO PREVENT DANGER TO THE LIVES OF FRIENDLY PERSONNEL.

2. FOR INFORMATION THE DZ BEGAN TAKING INCOMING ROUNDS OF MORTAR AND ARTILLERY ON 9 AND 10 MARCH.

3. THIS HQ WILL KEEP DIVISION INFORMED OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MHE, TRUCKS, AND PERSONNEL AND REPAIR PARTS AS THE SITUATION DICTATES.

4. PARACHUTE AND LAPES EQUIPMENT IS BEING RECOVERED AND RETROGRADED SATISFACTORILY. HOWEVER PARACHUTE LOSSES DUE TO NONRECOVERABLE TROPS, IN PROTECTIVE WIRE, TREES AND OTHER OBSTACLES APPEAR TO BE EXCESSIVE.

GP-4

BT

3

10

15

SECRET  
Encl 1/4


CONF R 102320H  
FM: CTF CLEARWATER  
TO :CG PCV

CTF CLEARWATER ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT  
MSG. CONCERNING 111000H CONFERENCE AT  
CAMP EVANS. HAVING DIFFICULTY SECURING  
DEFINATE TRANSPORTATION DUE RECEIPT ABOVE  
MSG 102155H. IF HELD TRANSPORTATION IS  
AVAILABLE FROM CAMP EVANS, PLEASE ADVISE  
ASAP

2330H / 10 MAR 68 / GWS / DIU K48

Encl 115



**CONFIDENTIAL****SHOVE**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

*OPEN**COU*

ZNY CCCCC  
 P 110117Z MAR 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO CG PROVCORPS VN  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 IG THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 CG 101 ABN DIV  
 COMUSMACV  
 CDR 7TH AF  
 CG USARV LONGG BINH  
 CG I CORPS  
 CG FMPAC  
 COMSEVE THFLT  
 CTF 76  
 CTF -79  
 COMNAVFORV  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 CG AMERICAL DIV  
 CG FIRST MAW  
 CG SECOND ROKMC BDE

PAGE TWO 0920 C O F I D E N T I A L  
 COMNAV SUPPACT DANANG  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY  
 GROUP  
 CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY

TROOP  
 BT

C O F I D E N T I A L

ESTABLISHMENT F PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM (PCV)

A. CG III MAF 091456Z MAR 68 NOIAL

1. REPORTING FOR DUTY IAWW REF A 33-GP-2

BT

*C. 3/AIRD**OH hell!**ABC/45/CG/COC/CD***CONFIDENTIAL***Encl 116*

**CONFIDENTIAL**



*COC*

NUMBER: ".F  
K9A V  
DE 092U AND HERE WITH MY NUMBER 04 MS3

*TOR 11/7/44 → E-400X*

ZNY CCCCC  
P 11013Z MAR 63  
FM FIRST AMTRAC BN  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT  
CONFIDENTIAL  
A. 031414Z MAR 63  
1. IAW REY A ASSUMED OPCON FIRST PLAT CO "B" 1ST AMTRAC  
BN FRO E1ST MARDIV EFF 191600H FEB 63.  
GP-4  
BT

*A. 3*

*4/COC/CEO*

NNNNQUMFEN

*0*


*1*

*36*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*encl 117*

SECRET



SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

*[Large handwritten 'C' over the bottom of the table]*

3660  
11

DRAFTER 3/HMH/CLD  
 SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV COC  
 CWO 8

IMMEDIATE 110620 ZMAR68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG PCV RUMHIVH  
 INFO: CG III MAF RUMHIVH  
 CTF 79 RUABYL  
 CTF 76 RUMFUV  
 THIRD MARDIV ZEN

//SECRET//

OPCON

A. CG III MAF 091456ZMAR68

1. VAW REF A, THIRD MARDIV, WITH ALL ~~ORGANIC~~ <sup>ORGANIC</sup> AND ATTACHED FOROPCON FORCES,  
 REPORTS FOR OPCON EFFECTIVE 101200ZMAR68.

GP-4

CCN 5-76REL BY *[Signature]*


A G-3

COC/4/CEO

20 SECRET  
 Encl 118

SECRET


RECEIVED  
G-3 FILES



NOITON

2508463Z 97 3447-97 2-19Z OK  
DE 392U AND HERE WITH MY NUMBER 17 M 553

NOITON



ENVY SSSSS  
O 110622Z MAR 63  
FM THIRD MARINES  
TO THIRD TANK BN  
THIRD ENGR BN

*TO R 11/27-1/8/63*

THIRD MARDIV  
INFOC6THIRD MARDIV

BT  
SECRET

A. 7CG 37D MARDIV MSG 290943Z JAN 68  
CG 3D MARDIV OP ORDER 6-63.

ELEMENTS OF PROVISIONAL DESEVE BN ASSIG ED OPCOV 3D MAR  
BY RES A ARE CHOPPED TO PARENT UNITS ESPECTIVE 131113H MAR 63.  
REF B RESERS  
GP-4  
BT

*1/3/comm*


*U*

*06*

*224*

SECRET

*Encl 119*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COC

<b>SHOVE COC</b>	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DDPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APD	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<b>OPCON</b>

DRAFTER 3/AM/STW  
 SEC G-3PHONE 3D MARDIV 3  
 CWO *[Signature]*

OH Boy

IMMEDIATE 11 1624 MAR68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG PCV  
 INFO: CG III MAF

//CONFIDENTIAL//

A. CG III MAF DTG 091456Z MAR68

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE A, I HAVE HONOR OF REPORTING TO YOU  
 FOR DUTY AS OF 101200H MAR68.

GP-4

CCN 591 RELEASED BY *[Signature]*

6-3

COC/CG/CD/CEG (A)

11

16

24

Encl 120

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

TOR/140 214 DCS A



PP RUMINP  
 ZNY SSSSS ZOV RUMFKRF  
 ZXY-2  
 VV DJKA992CZCSAA318ZVA 357 VV  
 PP RUMFKRF  
 DE RUMWAA 6; 64 0712354  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 112354Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 TO RUMHVP/CTF CLEARWATER  
 INFO RUMFKRF/158,2,3 9,3 3;3, 05 529  
 17.147/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
 RUMSBB/COMNAV FORV

BT

SECRET

MRF ASSET I CORPS

A.CTF 117 MSG 080310Z MAR 68 (SAME SUBJ).

1. REQUEST DETAILED INFORMATION IDENTIFYING M-112-1 AND TYPE  
 FLAME THROWER RECHARGING UNIT RETURNED AND PROPOSED LOCATION  
 OF CHARGING UNIT.

2. AS REQUESTED BY REF A, II MAF WILL ASSIST IN FILLING REQUIRE-  
 MENT BY FURNISHING RECHARGING UNIT AND/OR DIRECTING SUPPORT IF  
 EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE.

GP-4

BT

A. 3

COC/2/4/CG/45/CEO<sup>B</sup>

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>C</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>MB</i>
DCPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>CLEARWATER</i>
	<i>Folder</i>

NNNNNN

SECRET

Encl 121

## DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

15:RHH:wba  
12 Mar 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADC

From: Division Engineer

Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress for period 2-8Mar68

Ref: (a) CG, 3dMarDiv TSFC Request #92

1. The following occurred during the report period.

a. Reference (a) requested 155-8'X8'X8' TSFC Bunkers and 16-50' TSFC Observation Towers for the perimeter defense at Quang Tri Combat Base.

b. Both 1st and 2d increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

(1) Horizontal - MCB-10 is still heavily engaged in the Army Beach road project south of Quang Tri City, however, 11th Engineer Battalion has provided equipment and operators to continue the road program. Work continues on the main access road parallel to the railroad track with the fill approximately 40% complete. Pioneer roads have been constructed into all cantonments with two unimproved access roads from Highway #1 completed.

(2) Vertical - Excavation of the Base Defense COC in the Headquarters Battalion area has been completed and construction of an 18'X24' bunker will begin approximately 12 March. Site preparation of the 500 man messhall continues with grading and footing excavation underway. The status of Sea Hut Construction is as follows:

	Sea Huts Completed	Sea Huts Under Construction	% Complete 1st & 2d Increment
3dTkBn Cantonment	20	0	100%
3dMTBn Cantonment	36	0	100%
3dSPBn Cantonment	1	1	15%
3dEngrBn Cantonment	0	1	7%
HqBn Cantonment	43	4	52%

(3) Burn-Out Heads - 16 completed out of 26 62% complete.

Very respectfully,

*R C McCutchan*

R. C. MC CUTCHAN

DECLASSIFIED

Encl 122

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

15:RHH:wba  
12 Mar 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADC

From: Division Engineer Officer

Subj: Status of Medical Facility, QTCE as of 11 March 1968

1. First increment construction consisting of the following has been approved and materials are in Dong Ha:

- a. Triage
- b. SICU - Surgical Intensive Care Unit (6 OR's, 1 PreOp and Central Supply)
- c. X-Ray Building
- d. Medical Supply Building (Butler)

2. Work accomplished to date:

- a. Site preparation and layout only.

3. Foundations will be poured Wednesday 13 March with estimated completion date for 1st increment constructions 1 April 1968.

Very respectfully,

*R C McCutchan*  
R. C. MC CUTCHAN

*Encl 123*

DECLASSIFIED



Quang Tri Progress Report

- ① Building Progress on SEA huts - Occupation of huts.
- ② update and approval of construction plans (Master Plan and Cantonment plans)
- ③ Approval of Messhall (s) for construction
- ④ Approval of heads & utensils?
- ⑤ Status of Medical Facility - Has design been approved -  
shipment of materials.
- ⑥ Discussions with III MAF for location of additional  
units - Air Cav, Army surgical Hosp, Air Force TPR, DCS  
Comm terminal, 26th <sup>Army</sup> Log Sup Cmp.
- ⑦ Any new developments on establishment of  
water point, electrical system,

✓ ① Water

✓ ② Electricity

③ Design of bunker

④ Minimum facilities for senior staff members (203 SEA huts  
1 Sea Hut for Mess (none)  
2 Bldgs in inner circle (none))

⑤ Mess Hall

⑥ 2d Mess bunker

⑦

⑧ Link on Const - ~~continued~~

Encl 124

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division Troops(Rear)  
APO San Francisco, 96602

AW/arg  
12 Mar 68

MEMORANDUM

From: Officer in Charge Division Troops(Rear)  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Administrative Instructions

Ref: (a) Div Pul 5400 dtd 17 Jan 68  
(b) Div O P3040.38

1. Purpose To publish administrative instruction and information for 3d Marine Division Troops (Rear), Phu Bai.

2. Background Reference (a) established a Division Troops (Rear) for rear echelons of Division Units located at Phu Bai. The planned departure of Headquarters Battalion from the Phu Bai Area will necessitate relocation and some reorganization of the remainder of the 3d Marine Division remaining at Phu Bai.

3. Action The following administrative instructions are in effect this date for all Sections/Units, 3d Marine Division Troops(Rear), Phu Bai:

a. Casualty Reporting The Officer or Staff Noncommissioned officer in Charge of the Unit's Rear will:

- (1) Maintain a log of permanent personnel and transient personnel.
- (2) Insure currency of this record on a daily basis.
- (3) Provide adequate protection for service record books of these personnel.
- (4) Report casualties direct to the Division Casualty Officer in accordance with appendix A of reference (b).

b. Postal Service All mail will continue to come into the present units and will be forwarded direct to the Rears here at Phu Bai.

c. Chaplain Task Force X-Ray chaplains will provide counseling and religious services for all 3d Marine Division Troops(Rear).

Encl 125

GJ/arg  
12 Mar 68

d. Billeting

(1) Officers: Permanent Officers will be billeted in HQ seahuts; 027, 028, 029. Seahut 018 will be for transient officers. All Officer billeting will be accomplished by the OIC, 3d Division Troops(Rear).

(2) Staff NCO's. Permanent Staff NCO's will be billeted in seahuts A6, A7, and A8. Transient Staff NCO's will be billeted in A9. All Staff NCO's will be billeted by the NCOIC, Division Troops(Rear).

Enlisted. Enlisted personnel will be billeted by each OIC(Rear) within assigned areas listed in sub-paragraph 3. e. below:

e. Areas and Facilities The following areas and facilities are assigned this date:

OIC, 1/26(Rear) A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D-2, D-3 and warehouse #15.

OIC, 2/26(Rear) A-3, A-4, A-5, B-3, B-4, B-5, C-3, C-4, D-4 and warehouse #16.

OIC, 3/26(Rear) B-6, B-7, B-8, C-6, C-7, C-8, D-6, D-7 and warehouse #18 and 19.

OIC, Hq Bn(Rear) Seahuts, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, B-9, B-10, B-11, C-9, C-10, C-11, D-8, D-9, D-10, D-11 and shower room L-5, warehouse #12(G-5 Supply). Building 12A and Warehouse #13(Liv-Clubs), C.Hut #2(Liv Photo), C.Hut #3(Liv Repro).


NCOIC 3d Recon Bn. (Rear) Warehouse #11.

f. Pay Pay records for all 3d Marine Division personnel remaining at Phu Bai will be retained by a detachment of the Division Disbursing Office at Phu Bai. All units/sections are requested to notify this office and the Disbursing Officer of personnel scheduled to remain at Phu Bai.

g. Medical Sick Call for all 3d Marine Division Troops (Rear) will be conducted in seahut #3-5 by 2/26(Rear) BSA.

h. Messing All Officers and enlisted will subsist in Army Phu Bai mess hall located in Cantonment #4. Units are requested to provide cooks and messmen as follows:

	<u>Cooks</u>	<u>Messmen</u>
Hq Bn(Rear)	1	3
1/26(Rear)	1	1
2/26(Rear)	1	1
3/26(Rear)	1	1


  
G. W. WARD

G-5/arg  
12 Mar 68

Distribution:

→ CC 3d Mar Div	OIC 2/26(Rear)
CC Hq Bn	" 3/26(Rear)
CC 26th Mar	Div Clubs O
CC 1/26	" Special Service O
CC 2/26	" G-4
CC 3/26	" C-3(Photo)
CC 3d Recon Bn	" G-1(Repro.)
OIC Hq Bn(Rear)	" G-5(Supply)
" 1/26(Rear)	" Disb O
	3d Recon Bn(Rear)

SECRET



107 5555  
 0 122710Z MAR 68  
 04 07F CLEARWATER  
 CG PROV CORPS VIET

UNPO C III MAR  
 1004VFORV  
 NONVAUSUOACT DANANG  
 AG THURD MAROV  
 KTF 116

SECRET  
 CBP PATROL BOAT REQUIREMENTS CAN  
 BE RIVER OPS (K).

A. CG PROV CORPS VIET BRIEFING  
 EVANS 11 MAR 68 VOIAL  
 1. THE YAGNUDE OF LOGISTICAL  
 THROUGH- OUT TAN MYZHE AND CUA  
 SET/DONG HA TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS  
 DURING 1968 A WILL REQUIRE  
 ENHANCED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT  
 OPERATIONS INCLUDING NIGHT OPS.

100/

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
PO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>Clearwater</i>

G-3

ALC

G-2/G-3/G-4/G-5/G-6/G-7/G-8/G-9/G-10/G-11/G-12/G-13/G-14/G-15/G-16/G-17/G-18/G-19/G-20/G-21/G-22/G-23/G-24/G-25/G-26/G-27/G-28/G-29/G-30/G-31/G-32/G-33/G-34/G-35/G-36/G-37/G-38/G-39/G-40/G-41/G-42/G-43/G-44/G-45/G-46/G-47/G-48/G-49/G-50/G-51/G-52/G-53/G-54/G-55/G-56/G-57/G-58/G-59/G-60/G-61/G-62/G-63/G-64/G-65/G-66/G-67/G-68/G-69/G-70/G-71/G-72/G-73/G-74/G-75/G-76/G-77/G-78/G-79/G-80/G-81/G-82/G-83/G-84/G-85/G-86/G-87/G-88/G-89/G-90/G-91/G-92/G-93/G-94/G-95/G-96/G-97/G-98/G-99/G-100

PAGE TWO SECRET  
 TO ENSURE SUCCESS THIS TYPE  
 OPERATIONS. CONTINUED TROOP SECURED  
 RIVER BANKS ON THE PERFUME/KHA VUET  
 JIVERS WILL BE REQUIRED / IN ADDITION,  
 CONTINUOUS ARMED PATROL BOAT PATROLS  
 TASKED TO ENFORCE VIETNAMESE JUNK/  
 SANPAN CURFEW ON THE RIVERS WILL  
 BE NECESSARY TO REDUCE TO A MINIMUM  
 THE THREAT OF JUNK/SANPAN PLANTED  
 NARROW CHANNEL ON THE  
 KHA VUET RIVER IS PARTICULARLY  
 SUSCEPTIBLE TO BEING BLOCKED BY  
 SUNKEN CRAFT.  
 2. 4 SECTION (13BOATS) OF GAME WARDEN  
 PATROL BOATS (PBR'S) ARE ASSIGNED TO CLEARWATER ON  
 THE PERFUME RIVER FOR CONTINUOUS  
 PATROLS. THESE PATROL BOATS ARE  
 MAINTAINED / PERSONNEL SUPPORTED  
 BY A NON-SELFPROPELLED AND  
 ESPECIALLY DESIGNED PBR MOBILE BASE  
 LOCATED AT TAN MY.

3. PATROL BOAT (PBR) IS AVAILABLE FOR  
 T. CL. AND RET. AND...  
 12 07

SECRET  
 Encl 126 10

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE SECRET  
 THUS TYPE BOAT AND NUMBERS AVAILABLE  
 ARE INADEQUATE TO PERFORM PATROL  
 DUTIES IN THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT  
 FOUND ON THE CUA VIET RIVER


4. A REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR A SECTION  
 (12BOATS) OF PBR'S TO OPERATE ON  
 THE CUA VUEZ RIVER. FREQUENT ENEMY  
 ARTILLERY ATTACKS CUA VIET/DONG HA  
 RECLUDES ESTABLISHING A FIXED  
 PBR MAINTENANCE SUPPORT BASE  
 THESE AREAS. INSTEAD A MOBILE BASE  
 (MST2 CAPABLE OF REMAINING SEASIDE  
 AT MOUTH OF CUA VIET CHANNEL  
 WOULD BE REQUIRED PBR'S CAN  
 OPERATE FROM THE LST, SEA CONDITIONS  
 PERMITTING OR SUPPORT PBR'S  
 CUA VIET HARBOR AND RETURN  
 SEASIDE DURING HIGH SURF CONDITIONS.

PAGE FOUR SECRET  
 5. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF  
 KEEPING THE CUA VIET WATER LOC  
 OPEN IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT  
 CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO TEMPORARILY  
 ASSIGNING A GAME WARDEN PBR  
 SUPPORT LST WITH ONE SECTION  
 (12PBR'S) TO TASK FORCE CLEARWATER  
 TO ARRIVE CUA VIET ABOUT 23 MARCH  
 63.

2-3  
 BT

SECRET

SECRET



SHOVE CUC	
OP CHIEF	<i>A</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>C</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>✓</i>
DCFO	
ARO	<i>✓</i>
ACTION	<i>OPCON</i>

00 RUMHVP  
 DE RUYEUAK 060 0720932  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 G 120932Z MAR 68 ZYO RUYE  
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR  
 TO RUMHVP/THIRD MAR —  
 RUMHVP/FOURTH MAR —  
 RUMHVP/TWELFTH MAR —  
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV —  
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 ZEN/USS IWO JIMA  
 ZEN/BLT THREE SLANT ONE  
 RUMHVP/BLT TWO SLANT FOUR —  
 ZEN/HMM THREE SIX THREE  
 BT

SECRET

RELATION OF W/3/12 AND W/2/11(S)

A. CTG 79.4 120516Z MAR 68

1. REF A ADVISED OF DELAY IN SKED LIFT 121200H MAR 68.
2. IN VIEW OF PLANNED TACTICAL OPNY. GE. MAR 68 CO THIRD MAR IS RECOMMENDING TO CO TWELFTH MAR THAT EXCHANGE ARMWXHOWTAR BTRY

PAGE TWO RYEUAK 060 SECRET  
 BE DELAYED.

3. HMM-363 SKED OFFLOAD 14 MAREREFOR, THIS TASK GROUP WILL BE  
 UNABLE TO PROVIDE HELOS FOR MOVE.

GP-4

BT

12

09

AIRO/4/CEO *MA*  
 3 SECRET  
 Encl 127

~~SECRET~~

DE RUHGUL 0623 0721306

ZNY SSSSS

P 121306Z MAR 68 ZYO RUHGCS

FM ADMINO COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUENAAA/CNO

RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUYSUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMFKRXXCTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV

RUMNVHD/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

RUMFKRF/FIRST AMTRAC BN


RUMFVJF/NINTH MARINES

RUMFCR/TU SEVEN SEVEN PT SEVEN PT TWO

RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC

RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

COC

642-3-FSCC  
FORTRESS  
ATTACK

PAGE TWO RUHGUL 0623 SECRET

RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)

RUMNVHD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMSBJ/COMDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE

RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUYSOR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO

RUMFKRF/BLT 2/4

RUMFKRF/THIRD MARINES

RUAUBUS/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT THREE

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MAR DIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUYSUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUYSUAE/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

RUMFCR/TU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMFKRE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

RUMHNA/COMNAV SUPPACT DANANG

RUMHVPX FOURTH MARINES

RUMFCR/CTF CLEARWATER

PAGE THREE RUHGUL 0623 SECRET

BT

SECRET

CTE 70.2.1.1 PASS ADVANCED COPY TO COMUSMACV

OPERATION FORTRESS ATTACK (U)

1. FOR CTG 76.4: TERMINATE OPERATION FORTRESS ATTACK 141200H.


2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME FORTRESS

GP-4

BT



SECRET



SHOVE COC

CP CHIEF *H*G-3 W.O. *E*G-2 W.O. *E*DORO *E*APO *H*ACTION *P*

Change over of  
"W" Batteries W/2/12  
W/2/11

Not accomplished yet.  
Have train msg  
in O P con file.  
*SH*

Y  
00 RUMHVP  
DE RUYEUAE 174 0721330  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 12/330Z MAR 68 ZYO RUYE  
FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
TO RUMHVP/TWELFTH MARINES  
INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
RUYEUAK/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR  
RUMHVP/THIRD MARINES  
RUMHVP/FOURTH MARINES  
RUMHVP/FLSG B

BT

SECRET

EXCHANGE W/3/12 AND W/2/11

A. CTG 79.4 120932Z MAR 68

B. CGSJHYD MARDIV 111252Z MAR 68

1. IN VIEW REF A AND UNOPR BY CG THIRD MARDIV CTG 79.5 WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT REQUESTED REF B

2. REQUEST CONTACT CTG 79.5 (GREEN GLADE) ON FREQ 55.00 OR 61.45 FOR COORDINATION OF LIFT

GP-4

BT


COC

3/4/CEO APO

NNNN

SECRET

Encl 129



DE Q92U AND MY NR 14 14 14

FM CTF CLEARWATER NSAD CUA VIET  
TO COMNAV SUPPACT DANANG  
INFO CG PROV CORPS VIET (PCMD)  
CG III MAF  
CG THIRD MARDIV  
COMNAVFORV  
ZEN/NSA DET CUA VIET

ST  
C O N F I D E N T I A L  
CUA VIET RIVER NAVIGATIONAL PROBLEM (U)  
1. ESTIMATE WATER LEVEL CUA VIET RIVER HAS FALLEN 13 INCHES  
SINCE 27 FEB 63.. NUMEROUS SANDBARS ARE NOW PRESENT BETWEEN CUA VI  
T  
AND DONG HA. TRANSITING  
LOGISTIC/SECURITY CRAFT ARE CONTINUING TO RUN  
AGROUND AND HAMPERING OPS.  
2. REQ CONTINUED EFFORT BE MADE TO BLAST SANDBARS AND  
DREDGE THE FULL LENGTH OF THE CHANVEL  
AT THE EARLIEST OPPERTUNITY.  
3. NAVIGATION AIDS SCHEDULED FOR PLACEMENT IN CUA VEIT RIVER  
WERE DESTROYED IN FORE 10 MAR. REQ REPLACEMENTS  
BE FORWARDED TO CUA VIET.


Page 4

**DECLASSIFIED**

Encl-130

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL



0/130258Z

FM: CTF CLEARWATER CUA VIET

TO: CG, PROV CORPS VIET (PCV)

INFO: CG, III MAF

CG, 3RD MAR DIV

CG, 1ST AIR CAV DIV

COMNAVFORV

CTF ONE ONE SEVEN

ZEN CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP

NSAD CUA VIET

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

FLAMETHROWER OPERATIONS CUA VIET RIVER (C)

1. PRESENTLY PLANNING 3 POTENTIAL RIVER BANK AMBUSH SITE BURN OPERATIONS ON CUA VIET RIVER. CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP HAS 2 FLAMETHROWERS ORGANIC TO ASSIGNED MONITOR CRAFT.
2. REQUEST ASSISTANCE AND TEMPORARY ACQUIRING FLAME SERVICE UNIT (M1A1) AND M4 MIXER AT CUA VIET. TRAINED PERSONNEL AVAILABLE LOCALLY.

GP-5

BT

1533H/13MAR68/101/DIV

SHOVE COL

CP CHIEF *AB*G-2 W.O. *C*G-2 W.O. *MB*DCFO *S*HQA *X*

ACTION

*request augmented  
by Province Chief  
13 March 68*

*3d Man informal  
G-3: suggest we talk to  
Mr. Brewer about this  
to get his assistance.*

13

02

58

Encl 131

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

*S/S*

PP RUMHVP  
 DE RUMMWAA 1575 0730700  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 130700Z MAR68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIETNAM  
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHVH/CG USA CUPT CMD DNG  
 RUMHFL/CG USA CUPT CMD DNG  
 RUFHFL/CG FORLOGCMD  
 RUMHNA/COM THREE NCB  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVFORV REP DNG  
 RUMHVL/GLSG BRAVO  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

AMMUNITION STORAGE POINT, QUANG TRI

A. CG USASUPCOM DNG PROV RVN 3-005-C AVCO DNG DTG 050700Z MAR68  
 (PASEP)

B. CG USASUPCOM DNG PROV RVN AVCA-DN-GO 3-015-S DTG 080900Z MAR68  
 (NOTAL)

1. REF A AND B REFER.

2. CLASS V STORAGE IN QUANG TRI-DONG HA FOR 15 DOA FOR ARMY CMDS  
 IN AREA AND THIRD MARDIV (LESS 26TH MARINES) PLS IW DOA FOR UNITS  
 SUPPORTED FROM CAMP EVANS (3 DOA STORED AT CAMP EVANS) REQUIRES

PAGE TWO RUMMWAA 1575 C O N F I D E N T I A L

FACILITIES FOR 15,413 S/T. COMBINED CAPACITIES DONG HA NAD QUANG  
 TRI ASP'S 7,000 S/T. IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR 8,500 S/T  
 ADDITIONAL STORAGE FACILITIES.

3. A 9,000 S/T CAPACITY ASP PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED FOR QUANG TRI.  
 SITE CENTERED APPROX YD295525. CONSIDER FEASIBLE SOLUTION PRESENT  
 REQUIREMENT TO CONSTRUCT INITIAL TEMPORARY STORAGE FACILITY ON SITE  
 AND IN ACCORDANCE PLANNED LAYOUT OF PERMANENT ASSP. THEN TO  
 UPGRADE TO PERMANENT ASP WHILE IN PARTIAL USE. PLAN REQUIRES EX  
 TENSION QUANG TRI PERIMETER APPROX 2,000 METERS TO WEST TO PROVIDE  
 SECURITY ASP SITE.

4. REQUEST ADVISE ASAP FEASIBILITY ABOVE PLAN INCLUDING PROVIDING  
 REQUIRED SECURITY. IF NOT CONCURRED IN REQUEST RECOMMENDED ALTER-  
 NATE PLAN.

5. FOR THIRD MARDIV. REQUEST FURNISH SITE PLAN ASP TO DE CEN ASAP  
 GP-4

**CONFIDENTIAL***Mar 68**Encl 132*

# DIVORDSECT

V HCB2370ZVA 179VV MFB 481  
PF RUMHV

DE RUMMAA 1574 733702

ZNY CCCCC

P 133702Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF

INFO RUMHNA/COMNAVFORV REP DANANG

RUMHNA /COM THIRD NCB

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD

RUMHFL/FLSC BRAVO

P 030700Z MAR 68

FM CG USASUPCOM DNG PROV RVN

TO CG III MAF DNG RVN

INFO DSAC DNG RVN

TWO SIXTH GS GP DONG HA RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CITE 3-025-C AVCA DNG -EN FOR EN INEER

SUBJECT: AMMUNITION STORAGE POINT, QUANG TRI

1. (C) AMMUNITION STORA E CAPACITY TO MEET ARMY REQUIREMENTS IN QUANG TRI AREA IS 8049 TONS BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

A. 15DAY STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE FOR UNIT SUPPORTED FORM QUANG TRI 4031 S/T.

B. 12 DAY STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE FOR UNITS SUPPORTED FORM CAMP EVANS

PAGE TWO RUMMAA 1574 C O N F I D E N T I A L

(3 DAYS STORED AT CAMP EVANS, 12 DAYS AT QUANG TRI)-4013 S/T.

WM KC) REQUEST ACTION BE TAKEN TO CONSTRUCT BY 1 APRIL 1968 8

STANDARD 5 PAD AMMUNITION STORA E MODULES AT QUANG TRI ASP. SPECI -

FICATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. ALL BEAMS 1" FEET MINIMUM HEIGHT, 3 FEET WIDTH AT TOP WITH NATURAL SLOPE TO GROUND LEVEL. BEAMS COVERED WITH T-17 MEMBRANE OR FENEPRIE TO PREVENT EROSION. BEAMS EXTEND OUTWARD 10 FEET BEYOND EDGE OF PAD ON OPEN END.


B. PADS TO BE 50FEET BY 50FEET COVERED WITH M8A1 MATTING. 6 FEET DISTANCE FROM EDGE OF PADS TO FOOT OF BEAMS. INTERIOR SIDE OF PAD 8 INCHES HIGHER THAN OPEN END FOR DRAINAGE.

C. MINIMUM DISTANCE FORM EDGE OF PAD TO EDGE OF PAD IN ADJACENT MODULES TO BE 200FEET. MINIMUM DISTANCE FROM EDGE OF PAD TO EDGE OF PAD OF ADJACENT PADS IN SAME MODULE TO BE 50FEET.

D. SUGGEST LAYOUT WPLL BE COORDINATED BY THE ENGINEER, USAS-UPCOM, DNG (PROV) WITH FORCE ENGINEER III MAF

GP -4

BT




TITLE	INT.
Ord Off.	M
Ammo Off.	46
Ord Chief	
Maint Chief	
Ammo Chief	WSP
Ammo Tech	RAB RSC
S&C	
Sup Clerk	
Remarks:	

LOG # 7010

FILE

130702Z



**SECRET****SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DGPO

APO

ACTION

*Logistics*

VV AAP206PTT SZ YUW RUMWAA1621 0731316-SSSS--RUABQL RUH

ZNY SSSSS

P 131316Z MAR 68

FM CG III MAF DANANG

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB

BT

**SECRET**

FIRE TEAM ASSUALT BOATS (FTAB) FOR RIVERINE EMPLOYMENT

A. CG 9TH MAB 070135Z MAR68

1. REF A WAS PASSED TO CG THIRD MARDIV FOR COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING USE OF FTAB'S IN CUA-VIET RIVER AREA AS PROPOSED REF A.

2. BASED ON RESPONSE FROM CG 3D MARDIV RECOMMEND THAT FTAB'S AND MOTORS BE ASSIGNED TO D MARDIV FOR SUBSEQUENT USE ON CUA VIET RIVER. 3D MARDIV PREPARED TO RECEIVE NINE MAN TECHNICAL TRNG TEAM AND CONDUCT TRNG IN THIRD MARINE AO.

3. USE OF FTAB'S BY THIRD MARDIV WILL PROVIDE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF PERMITTING OPERATIONAL EVALUATION BETWEEN FTAB AND MULTIPURPOSE BARGES NOW BEING EMPLOYED BY III MAF MARINE UNITS.

GP-4

BT

G-3

*col/col/col/col/col**SG*

13

AD@ 13

16 **SECRET***Encl 134*

NN NN

CONFIDENTIAL



VNNVU VPB88400ZVA 105

PP RUMHVP RUMHVP  
DE RUMHA 054 0731935

ZNR UUUUU

P 131400Z MAR 68

FM CG PCV HUE PHU BAI

TO /3, /CG III MAF DA NANG

INFO RU ISMA/COMUSMACV SAIGON

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV SAIGON

RUMSAR/CDR 7 AF SAIGON

RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV CONG PA

ZEN/CG 1ST ACD CP EVANS

RUMHVP/TF CLEARWATER

C O N F I D E N T I A L 00256 FROM AVII-GCO

SUBJ: CUA VIET RIVER CURFEW(C)

1. (C) CG 3RD MAR DIV HAS RECOMMENDED THAT PRESENT CURFEW ON CUA VIET RIVER WHICH EXTENDS DAILY FROM 1600 TO 0800 HOURS FOLLOWING DAY BE MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

A. THAT CUA VIET RIVER BE CLOSED BOTH DAY AND NIGHT TO ALL CIVILIAN TRAFFIC EXCEPT 2 AND 1/2 HOURS AT FIRST LIGHT AND 2 AND 1/2 HOURS PRIOR TO SUNSET. THIS WOULD ALLOW LOCAL FISHERMEN TIME TO MOVE DURING THESE PERIODS.

B. LOCAL FISHERMEN BE ESCORTED TO AND FROM MOUTH OF CUA VIE DURING FREE TRANSIT PERIODS.

1. (C) TO MAKE THE CURFEW MORE EFFECTIVE, CG, 3D MAR DIV

PAGE (2) TWO UUMHMA 053 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
RECOMMENDS THAT THE FOLLOWSING MEASURES ALSO BE IMPLEMENTED:

A. US AND GVN PSOPS ANNOUNCES THE CURFEW AND PUNISHMENTS FOR VIOLATION BY LEAFLET AND BROADCASTS.

B. CTF CLEARWATER BE PROVIDED SUFFICIENT ARMED PATROL BOATS TO IMPROVE SURFACE PATROL CAPABILITY.

C. US/GVN CHECK POINTS BE ESTABLISHED TO REDUCE PATROL REQUIREMENTS.

D. PROVIDE ADEQUATE HUN SHIP SUPPORT TO SUPPORT PATROL OPERATIONS.

E. TAKE UNDER FIRE ALL INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT NOT MILITARY DURING NON TRANSIT HOURS DAY OR NIGHT.

3. (C) THIS HEADQUARTERS CONCURS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROPOSED CURFEW HOURS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVING PRESENT CURFEW.

4. RECOMMEND YOUR HEADQUARTERS GAIN VVN APPROVAL THROUGH CG I CORPS.


GP 4  
BT

13

1 400/01/02/03/04/05/06/07/08/09/10/11/12/13/14/15/16/17/18/19/20

Encl 135

CONFIDENTIAL



SHOVE CO.	
OP CHIEF	<i>H</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>C</i>
G-2	<i>Wb</i>
DCPO	
APO	<i>H</i>
ACTION	<i>Clearwater</i>
	<i>Folded</i>

*Keep this handy*  
*H*

ZNY CCCCC  
O 140355Z MAR 63  
FM THIRD MARINES  
TO CG THIRD MARINE DIV  
INFO CTF CLEARWATER RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
BT

*TOR 14/0418/3MHR*

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY CUA VIET LOCATION

1. COMMANDER RIVER SECURITY GROUP HAS REQUESTED PERMISSION TO CLEAR RIVER BANKS OF CERTAIN AREAS OF THICK FOLIAGE AND BRUSH WHICH SCREEN EXCELLENT AMBUSH SITES. THE AREAS IN QUESTION ARE:

FROM (YD 272633) TO (YD 272631)

FROM (YD 23 652) TO (YD 277647)

FROM (YD 267623) TO (YD 256623)

2. REQUEST TO QUANG TRI PROVINCE FOR PERMISSION TO BURN THESE AREAS WAS DENIED ON 13 MARCH 1963. ON 14 MARCH, 3D MARINE DIVISION G-2 RELATED INFO RECEIVED INDICATES INCREASED MINING EFFORTS BY CIVILIAN CRAFT ON CUA VIET. AT 140723H MARCH 1963 AN ARMORED PATROL CRAFT WAS SUNK AT (YD 267633) BY A LARGE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE BELIEVED TO BE COMMAND DETONATED FROM THE

PAGE TWO Q92U CONFIDENTIAL  
BANK IN THE VICINITY OF GIA DO.

3. PERMISSION IS REQUESTED TO CLEAR BY BURNING AREAS MENTIONED ABOVE. FURTHER, PERMISSION REQUESTED TO CLOSE CUA VIET TO ALL SAMPAV TRAFFIC EXCEPT WHEN UNDER ESCORT AND FOLLOWING SEARCH BY VN NATIONAL MARITIME POLICE. MY 030306Z MARCH 1963 REFERS. IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION ABOVE MEASURES RECOMMENDED.

4. CTF CLEARWATER CONCURS IN ABOVE.

GP-4  
BT

*A.3*

*coe/2/4/ce/ys/coo B*

*14*

*03*

*55*




**SECRET**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

00 RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 029B 0740835  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 140700Z MAR 68 6666666668  
 FM CTF CLEAR WATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VICT  
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMKVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMA/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMSBJ/CG ONE ZERO ONE AIR BORNE DIV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSVV/COF ONE ONE SDVDN  
 RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX  
 BT

**SHOVE**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCFO

**ACTION**CLEARWATER  
Folded**SECRET**

MINING COUNTER MEASURES CUA VIET RIVDR (C)

- A. CDR DONG HA RIVDR SECURITY GROUP 140245Z MAR 68
- B. COM THIRD MARINE REG 080806Z MAR 68 NOTAL
- C. CTF CLEARWATER 120710Z MAR 68 NOTAL
1. REF A REPORTED LOSS AT 140719H AF ATC (T-112-7) MINESWEEPER TO APPROX 500 LB MINE.

G-3 ADC

G-2/G-3/CO/CA/CS/CEO

PAGE 2 RUMHN 029B **SECRET**

2. SINCE 12 MAR 68 HAVD BEEN EMPLOYING 6-8 ATC AND 2 LCM-6 SWEEP BOATS SWEEPING CONTINUOUSLY 0600 TO 2000. MODIFIED FIREFLY MISSIONS USING FGARESHIPS AND TWO ARMED HELO'S CONDUCT RANDOM MISSION 2000H TO 0400H.
3. REF B, A JOINT MSG WITH SRD MARINE RDG, REQUESTED NEW CURFEW HOURS BE APPROVD FOR CUA VIET RIVDR; RIVDR TO BE CLOSED DAY AND NIGHT EXCEPT FOR 2 HOUR PERIODS DAILY 0700-0900 AND 1500-1700. 2 HRS WILL ALLOW FISHERMEN TO PROCEED TO SEA IN THE AM AND RETURN HOME PM. IN ADDITION IT WAS REQUESTED THAT NAT'L MARITIME POLICE PROVIDE ESCORT.
4. RDF C REQUESTED ONE SECTION (10) PATROL RIVDR BOATS (PBR'S) BASED ON GAME WARDEN LST BE ASSIGNED CUA VIET FOR CONTINUOUS PATROL AND CURFEW ENFORCEMENT.
5. ACTION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.
  - A. REQUEST APPROVAL OF 24 HOUR CURFEW OF ENGAGDMENT TO BE OBTAINED SOONEST. IN ADDITION, REQUEST RULES OF ENGAGDMENT TO BE EMPLOYED. CG THIRD MARDIV ALSO WORKING ON THIS REQUEST.
  - B. REQUEST APPROVAL AND ASSIGNMENT PBR SECTION WITH SUPPORT SHIPS TO TF CLEAR WATER EARLIEST.
6. INTELLIGENCE REPORT RECEIVED BY THIRD MARINE REG FROM 2ND ARVN

PAGE 3 RUMHN 029B **SECRET**

DIV INDICATES A MAJOR NVA EFFORT IS UNDERWAY CUA VIET.


-4

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

00 Encl 137

SECRET



SHOVE COC	
CP CHIEF	<i>K</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>C</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>C</i>
DCPO	
PO	
ACTION	<i>Har Napoleon</i>

0  
EDE Q92U AND MATE HERE WITH  
MY NR 5...5.....5.....

ZNY SSSSS  
P 140725Z MAR 68  
FM: THIRD MARINES  
TO: CG THIRD MARDIV (SCI-4)  
INFO: THIRD MT BN  
NINTH MT BN  
BT

*TOR/14/2103/MAR 68 3RD MAR*


SECRET  
TRUCK SUPPORT OPERATION NAPOLEON/SALINE ..  
A. CG 3D MARDIV 12331Z MAR 68 (S)  
B. CG 3D MARDIV 29231Z MAR 68 (S)  
C. CG 3D MARDIV 12331Z MAR 68 (S)  
1. REF A RELIEVED PLAT CO A, 3D MT BN FROM D/S MISSION 3D MARINES.  
REF B PLACED 9TH MT BN IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF SUBJ OPERATION.  
REF C ASSIGNED CO THIRD MARINES AS CAMP COORDINATOR CUA VIET  
RIVER AREA.  
2. 3D MARINES NOW IN DIRE NEED OF TRUCK SUPPORT FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT  
AND MAINTENANCE OF CAMP FACILITIES. REQUEST ONE PLAT TRUCKS BE  
PLACED IN D/S 3D MARINES AND TRANSPORTED TO CUA VIET ASAP.

GP-4  
BT

*A-G-4  
14*

*G-3-CEO-COC  
07*

*6*  
*SECRET*  
*25*  
*Encl 138*



# Save

OP CHIEF

Q-3 W O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

AP0

ACTION

TOR/14/16 23 MAR 68/OCS-D

SECRET

B. TELCON III WAF G-4 AND FLC G-3 OF 14 MAR 68

2. OPCON 515TH TRANS (CO)(-) PASSED TO FLC EFFECTIVE 16MAR68.

4. DIRLAUTH ALCON

१५५

6-15


ADD

an/csl/csol/coe

**SECRET**

Encl. 139

SECRET



COC

opcom

M  
G

VI VPB23400ZVA 621VV LFA639  
PP RU HVP

DE RUMNFI 1372 0741016

ZNY SSSSS

P 141016Z MAR 68

FM CG FORLOGCOMD

TO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

INFO RUHHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

SECRET

515TH TRANSPORTATION CO (-) USA

A. CG III MAF 090756Z MAR 68

1. REF A REFERS.

2. DLC PREPARED TO ACCEPT OPCON ASAP OF 515TH TRANSPORTATION CO (-).  
PLAN TO ASSIGN TO FLSC-ALHA FOR CARGO CLEARANCE OF TRA

PORTATION

TERMINALS IN THE PH AI TAOR.

GP-4

BT

T 00/142215UAC/PCS-B


STAND

10 P

Encl 140

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



SHORE COC	
CP CDR	<i>A</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>C</i>
G-2 W.C.	<i>W</i>
ECPO	<i>*</i>
WFO	<i>*</i>
ACTION	<i>CLEARWATER</i>

100E

ZNY CCCCC  
 O 14136Z MAR 68 ZEL  
 FM CTP CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMMA/CG PROVCORPS VIETNAM  
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 INFO ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP PBR MOBILE BASE ONE  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHWP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHNA/COMNAV SUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB BN  
 RUMHVH/DSA I CORPS  
 RUMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY  
 RUMWHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV

TUR/162315

14-3

 Da-2/6-4/coa/cg/cg  
 CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE TWO RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHMBRA/COMSERVPAC

RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUYEUAK/CTG

VEN SIX PT FOUR

RUYEUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUYEUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUMSBB/COMRIVFLOT ONE

RUMSBB/MSTSO VIETNAM

RUMHFL/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMAND

RUMNPR/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV

RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG VINH

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L (FINAL SECTION OF TWO)

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

A. COMMAND POSTS

(1) CTF CLEAR WATER IS CUA VIET YD 340698

4.

PAGE THREE RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

(2) HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP TAN MY YD 816330

(3) DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP CUA VIET YD 340698

B. COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS.

(1) ADDRESS MESSAGE TRAFFIC TO CTF CLEAR WATER NSAD CUA VIET

(2) VOICA CALL SIGN

UNIT

COMMAND

COLLECTIVE  
GOODWILL

A. CTF CLEARWATER

ESTEEM

7. CDR HUE RIVER

SECURITY GROUP (CRD-55) DISBAND "J"

HUE RIVER

SECURITY GROUP NOC PISTOL PETE

CONVOY COMMANDER HUE

CHIEF

TEAM

RIVER

ESCORT COMMANDER HUE

PISTOL PETE A THRU I PISTOL PETJGA  
THRU I (1)

RIVER

NSA DET TAN MY

ABOLITION

NSAREP HUE

JUNCTION

CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE FOUR RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

(CDR RIVER ASSAULT  
SQUAD ELEVEN)

CTU 117.2.4

DONG HA

SECURITY GROUP NOC BACARDI "T"

CONVOY COMMANDER DONG

HA RIVER

CONVOY NO. 1

CONVOY NO. 2

ESCORT COMMANDER DONG HA

RIVER

CONVOY NO. 1

CONVOY NO. 2

NSA DET CUA VIET

NSA REP DONG HA

NSA REP DONG HA

(ALTERNATE)

ABOMINATE

CHEHIST

BACARDI "T"

EPISODE

SUCCESS

COFESSION

TRAFFIC COP

CLIPPING

DAMON

SSDAMON CONTROL

CRINKLE  
BOLD MERCHANTGLIMMER  
SUCCESS "A"GLAZE  
TRAFFIC COP "A"

(3) VOICE RADIO FREQUENCIES.

(A) HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP

1. TAC NET

56.9(FM) ALT 67.7(FM)

PAGE FIVE RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. GUARD NETS

3. HELO CONTROL NET

(B) DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP

TAC NET

LOG NET

HELO NET

THIRD MARINE REGEEMENT

(4) VOICE COUPLE CODES KAC 183 AND KAC 138

SA FIRST ARVN TAC NET

THUY THIEN SECTOR TAC NET

38.8(FM) 2 3, :9,549)8,&amp;

HELOS ONLY


62.60(FM) ALT 37.6(FM)

70.3(FM)

36.8(FM)

75.3(FM)

GP-4  
BT**CONFIDENTIAL**



*CPL*

ZVA 988UV NHB279  
 PP RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 011B 0750515  
 ZNY EEEEE  
 P 141105Z MAR 68  
 FM CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 TO RUMHN/CTF CLEAWATER  
 INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRDMARDIV  
 RUMHMA/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRSTMAV  
 RUMHLA/CG TF XRAY  
 RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB BN  
 RUMHVV/DSA I CORPS  
 RUMHVV/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY  
 RUMHN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DOPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
PC	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

PAGE 2 RUMHN 011B UNCLAS E F T O  
 RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINE REG  
 RUMHUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMHDBA/COMSERVPAC  
 RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUYSUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUYSUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 RUMFKRE/COMRIVFLOT ONE  
 RUMSBB/MST SO VIETNAM  
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O  
 CLEAR WATER OPSUM 14 MARCH 68  
 1. OPS CONT IAW HLAN B. ALL CRAFT TRANSITED W/O INCIDENT  
 2. 755 S/T 60 M GAL JP-4/40M GALS MOGAS/40M GALS DIESEL  
 3. ALL CARGO ARRIVING TAN MY TRANS TO HUE.  
 BT

*94* *11* *G2/G-4/COC/CEO/CG/CS* *05* *[Signature]*

*Encl 142*



**CONFIDENTIAL**

EKVV VPB868ZVA 817VV NHA885MTT  
 PP RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 035B 8750715  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 141430Z MAR 68ZFD  
 FM CDR DONG HA SUPPLY RIVER

SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA


TO ZEN/CTG CLEARWATER  
 INFO CUMMWA/CG III MAP  
 RUNHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET (01)  
 BMS A/COMUSNUCV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

UMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHMA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THRIE MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB BN  
 CRUMHVHDSA I CORPS  
 RUMHVH/SA DIRST ARVN DIV  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET /CONG HA  
 RU KN/NSAD TAN MY/HUE  
 RU NV E/FIRST COASTAL ZONE  
 RUMVNE/CG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

UMHVP/CO THIRD MARINE REG  
 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

G-3

G-2/G-4/000000/CG/CS



SHOVE COG	
OP CHIEF	SCD
G-3 W.O.	OC
G-2 W.O.	
DGPQ	
PO	
ADISSAN	

PAGE TWO RUNHN 035B C O N F I D E N T I A L

UMHBRA/COMSERVPAC  
 RUMFKRP/CTG SEVEN SIX  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP MOBILE BASE ONE  
 RUMMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUYSUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RUMFUE/CTG SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUYSUAD/CG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 RUMSBB/COMRIVFLOT ONE  
 RUMSBB/MSTO VIETNAM  
 RUMFHE/CG FORCE LOGISTICS COMD

UMSBJ/CG ONE ZERO ONE ARN DIV  
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH  
 CBT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPUM 14 MARC

II. FOLL CRAFT REMAINDR DONG HA RAMP

DEFLADING AFTER 1800H 13 MARC

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Encl 1113

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMNN 835B C O N F I D E N T I A L

A. TWO LCU'S

B. THREE LCM-8'S

CONVOY CONSISTING OF NINE LCM-8'S  
 DEPARTED CUA VIET AT 0640H ESCORTED  
 BY THREE MONITORS, ONE ATC SWEEP  
 BOATS AND TWO LCM-6 SWEEP BOYS. CONVOY  
 ARRIVED DONG HA RAMP 0750H AND RETURN  
 CONVOY CONSIST OF TWO LCU'S AND THREE  
 LCM-8'S DEPARTED DONG HA AT 0800H AND  
 ARRIVED CUA VIET 0810H CARGO  
 SHUTTLE ETR REMAINDER OF DAY.

ONE LCU, FOUR LCM-8'S, AND  
 SEVEN BARGES REMAINED DONG HA FOR OFFLOAD  
 TC-112-7 WHILE MINE SWEEPING FOR CONVOY  
 TO DONG HA LAS FLIPPED UPSIDE DOWN BY  
 ESTIMATED 5000

CONTACT MI 5 AT 0719H

RESULTING ONE USN KIA, THREE

USN KIA, AND THREE USN MIA,

TC-112-7 WAS RIGHTED AT 1458H AND PARTIALLY BEACHED FIRE  
 EXTENSIVE UNDERWATER HULL DAMAGE WITH BOBSECTION SEVERED FROM

PAGE FOUR RUMNN 835B C O N F I D E N T I A L

TC-112-7 APPEARS TO BE A TOTAL LOSS. TWENTY MILLIMETER CANNON  
 LOST AS RESULT OF DETONATION

TWO FIFTY CALIBER MACHINE

TEAMS AND TWO VRC-6'S SALVAGED. TROOPS ON BOTH BANKS SURVIVED IN R  
 SECURITY; SALVAGED AND DIVING OPS TO CONTINUE AM15 MARCH.

AT 1048 NSAD CUA VIET RECEIVED TWELVE TO  
 FOURTEEN ROUNDS ON 1 COMMING 140MM ROCKET WHICH WALKED  
 ACROSS RIVER 1 TO SAND RAMP LOADING AREA. TWO USN KIA  
 DIRECT SER

NO MATERIAL DAMAGE.

CARGO COVER 14 MARCH TO DONG HA

A. QPRY S/T

B. 1603 MA/

C. POP: 60M DIESEL, 120M JP-4, 30M NOGAS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RUMHN 022B 0750330

ZNY CCCCC

O 141436Z MAR 68

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPS VIET

RUMWAA/CG III MAF

INFO ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET

RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP PBR MOBILE BASE ONE

RUMSMA/COMUSNACV

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHMB/CG FIRS AIR CAV DIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB 3N

RUMHVH/DASA I CORPS

RUMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV

ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET

RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY

RUNNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV

T.O. 161915 MAR 68

ACTION

Clearwater  
DOC

PAGE TWO RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMHBRA/COMSERVPAC

RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUYSUAK/CTG SEVE SIX PT FOUR

RUYSUAE/SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUYSUAD/CTG SEVEN ZE

O PT EIGHT

RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUMSBB/COMRIVFLOT ONE

RUMSBB/MSTSO VIET NAM

RUMHFL/CG FORCE LOGISTIC POMAND

RUMSBJ/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV

RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG VINH

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

TASK FORCE CLEARWATER OPORDER 2-68(U)

A. COMMUSMACV FWD 20145Z FSO 68 HOTEL

B. CG III MAF 231512Z FEB 68 NOT

C. CG III MAF 29146Z MAR 68 HOTEL

C-6-3

G-2-COC-CG-C/S-CEO

Encl 144  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

D. CTF CLEARWATER 250525Z FEB 68 NOTAL  
 E. CTF CLEARWATER 261000Z FEB 68 NOTAL  
 F. CTF CLEARWATER 010730Z MAR 68 NOTAL  
 G. CTF CLEARWATER 030405Z MAR 68 NOTAL  
 H. CTF CLEARWATER 120711Z MAR 68 NOTAL

1. REFS D THRU G CANCELLED

2. TASK ORGANIZATION, TASK FORCE CLEARWATER

A. HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP

(1) COMRIVDIV FIVE FIVE

RIVSEC FIVE TWO ONE

(2) NSA DANANG MINESWEEPS

(3) NSA DANANG LIGHTERAGE

(WHEN CHOPPED FOR CONVOY MOVEMENT)

B. DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP

(1) CDR RIVER ASSAULT SQUAD ELEVEN/CTG 117.2  
ELEMENTS OF RIVER ASSAULT ELEVEN

(2) NSA DANANG MINESWEEPS

(3) NSA DANANG PATROL CRAFT

**CRAFT ASSIGNED**

10 PBR'S

4 LCM-YQGS

LCU'S/YFU'S/

LCM-8'S

YBE MONITORS

1 CCB (MONITOR)

9 ATC'S

4 LCM-6'S

4 LCPL'S (MK4)

PAGE FOUR RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

(4) NSA DANANG LIGHTERAGE

(WHEN CHOPPED FOR CONVOY MOVEMENT)

3. SITUATION. FORCES ENGAGED IN COMBAT ICTZ REQUIRE NAVAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT AVAILABLE OVER PERFUME AND CUA VIET RIVER LOC'S.

INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY THESE RIVERS SINCE TET OFFENSIVE WARRANTS SPECIFIC ACTION TO ASSURE COORDINATION OF RIVER LOGISTIC MOVEMENTS AND PROTECTION OF CRAFT AND PERSONNEL.

A. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT INTSUM AND PERI TREPS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) CG PROVCORPS VIET EXERCISES OPCON OF TF CLEARWATER IN ORDER TO COORDINATE LOGISTIC ACTIVITY ON HUE AND CUA VIET RIVER LOC'S.

(2) CG 1ST ARVN DIV PROVIDES FIRING CLEARANCES, COORDINATES HELO GUNSHIPS SUPPORT WHEN REQUESTED, PROVIDES FRIENDLY AND ENEMY SITUATION

REPORTS FOR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP.

(3) CG FIRST MARDIV PROVIDES STAFF AUGMENTATION.

(4) CG THIRD MARDIV PROVIDES DIRECT FIRE WEAPON, NAVAL GUNFIRE, ANKVD ARTILLERY SUPPORT, THRU CO. THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

(5) CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV PROVIDES ARMEZ HELICOPTER AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

(6) CG FIRST MAW PROVIDES ARMED HU-1 SUPPORT FOR CONVOY

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE FIVE RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

TRANSIT HUE AND CUA VIET RIVERS.

(7) NSA DET TAN MY AND NSA DET CUA VIET RECEIVE LOG CRAFT, FORM CONVOYS, AND PROVIDES BASE SUPPORT, MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AND SALVAGE OPNS.

(8) CG GOQPQ AIRBORNE DIV PROVIDES DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

(9) COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG PROVIDES STAFF AUGMENTATION AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT;

4 MISSION. TASK FORCE CLEAR WATER WILL EXPEDITE AND IMPROVE NAVAL SUPPLY TO COMBAT FORCES IN NORTHERN ICTZ BY EXERCISING OVERALL COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES CONCERNING MOVEMENT AND PROTECTION OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE PERFUME RIVER AND CUA VIET LOCS.

## 5. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. TF CLEAR WATER EMPLOYS TWO RIVER SECURITY GROUPS (RSG) TO COORDINATE LOGISTIC MOVEMENTS AND PROTECT CRAFT AND PERSONNEL.

RSG'S CONDUCT AND CONTROL CONVOYS OF LOGISTIC CRAFT, EMPLOY COMBINED ARMS SUPPORT FOR THE PROTECTION OF LOGISTIC CRAFT, AND PROVIDE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE SERVICES

PAGE SIX RUMHN 822B C O N F I D E N T I A L

## B. HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP

(1) RECEIVE AND INSTRUCT CONVOYS FORMED AT TAN MY BY NSA DET TAN MY.

(2) CONDUCT MINE SWEEP OPS AS REQUIRED TO INSURE RIVER TRANSIT.

(3) CONDUCT AND CONTROL CONVOY MOVEMENT.

(4) ENFORCE FIRE DISCIPLINE DURING CONVOY MOVEMENT.

(5) PLAN, COORDINATE AND CONTROL USE OF ARTILLERY, HELICOPTER GUNSHIP AND FIXED WING SUPPORT.

(6) COORDINATE ALL FIRES WITH FRIENDLY UNITS.

(7) ENFORCE CURFEW REGULATIONS ON PERFUME RIVER WITH AVAIL FORCES

## C. DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP

(1) RECEIVE AND INSTRUCT CONVOYS FORMED AT CUA VIET BY NSA DET CUA VIET.

(2) CONDUCT MINE SWEEP OPS AS REQUIRED.

(3) CONDUCT AND CONTROL CONVOY MOVEMENT.

(4) ENFORCE FIRE DISCIPLINE DURING CONVOY MOVEMENT.

(5) PLAN, COORDINATE AND CONTROL USE OF ARTILLERY, HELICOPTER

GUNSHIPS AND FIXED WING SUPPORT

(6) COORDINATE ALL FIRE THRU FRIENDLY UNITS.

(7) PROVIDE RESCUE SERVICE FOR CONVOYS.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE SEVEN RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

(8) CONDUCT EMERGENCY SALVAGE OPERATIONS.

(9) ENFORCE CURFEW REGULATIONS ON CUA VIET RIVER WITHAVIL

FORCES.

## D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) DIRLAUTH SUPPORTING COMDS.

(2) SALVAGE OPERATIONS WILL BE LIMITED TO EMERGENCY ACTIONS REQUIRED TO INSURE A CLEAR CHANNEL.

(3) CRAFT MASTERS WILL BE BRIEFED THOROUGHLY ON PROPOSED MOVEMENTS AND THE NECESSITY FOR STRICT FIRE DISCIPLINE.

## 6. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SUBMIT REPORTS IAW DIRECTIVES OF HIGHER HQ COPY TO CTFCW.

(1) SPOTREPS AS OCCURRING. ACTION THIS HQ, INFO ADDEES IAW REF H

(2) OPSUMS DAILY UPON COMPLETION OF OPERATIONS. ACTION THIS HQ, INFO ADDEES IAW REF H

B. PERSONAL ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT THRU NORMAL ADMINISTRATION CHANNELS.

C. LOGISTIC SUPPORT ALL CLASSES NSA DANANG.

D. BASE SUPPORT FOR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP IS NUA

DET TAN MY AND PBR MOBILE BASE ONE.

FOR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP IS NSA DET CUA VIET.

PAGE EIGHT RUMHN 022B C O N F I D E N T I A L

## 7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

## A. COMMAND POSTS

(1) CTF CLEAR WATER IS CUA VIET YD 340698

(2) HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP TAN MY YD 816330

(3) DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP CUA VIET YD 340698

## B. COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS.

(1) ADDRESS MESSAGE TRAFFIC TO CTF CLEAR WATER NSAD CUA VIET

(2) VOICEMAIL SIGN

UNIT

COMMAND  
ESTEEMCOLLECTIVE  
GOODWILL

A. CTF CLEARWATER

B. CDR HUE RIVER

SECURITY GROUP (CRD-55) DISBAND "J"

HUE RIVER

SECURITY GROUP NOC PISTOL PETE

CONVOY COMMANDER. HUE

RIVER

CHIEF

TEAM

ESCORT COMMANDER HUE  
RIVERPISTOL PETE A THRU I PISTOL PETE A  
THRU I**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE NINE RUMHN 822B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 NSA DET TAN MY ABOLITION  
 NSAREP HUE JUUNCTION

CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 (CDR RIVER ASSAULT  
 SQUAD ELEVEN) ABOMINATE

CTU 117.2.4  
 DONG HA

CHEHIST

CRINKL  
 E  
 BOLD MERCHANT

SECURITY GROUP NOC BACARDI "T"  
 CONVOY POMMANDER DONG  
 HA RIVER

CONVOY NO.1 EPISODE  
 CONVOS NO. 2 SUCCESS  
 ESCORT COMMANDER DONG HA  
 RIVER

GLIMMER  
 SUCCESS "A"

CONVOY NO.1 COFESSION  
 CONVOY NO. 2 TRAFFIC COP  
 NSA EET CUA VIET CLIPPING  
 NSA REP DONG HA DAMON  
 NSA REP DONG HA

GLAZE  
 TRAFFIC COP "A"

(ALTERNATE) SSDAMON CONTROL

PAGE TEN RUMHN 822B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 (3) VOICE RADIO FREQUENCIES.

(A) HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP

KS 1. TAC NET  
 2. GUARD NETS

3. HELO CONTROL NET

56.9(FM) ALT 67.7(FM)  
 SA FIRST ARVN TAC NET  
 THUY THIEN SECTOR TAC NET  
 38.8(FM) WHEN CONTROLLING  
 HELOS ONLY

(B) DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP

TAC NET  
 LOG NET

62.60(FM) ALT 37 6(FM)  
 70.0(FM)

HELO NET


THIRD MARINE REGEMENT

36.8(FM)  
 75.3(FM)

(4) VOICE COUPLE CODES KAC 183 AND KAC 138

GP-4  
 BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

00 RUYEUAK  
 DE RUMHVP 2659D 0741550  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 141550Z MAR 68  
 FM THIRD MAR  
 TO ZEN/BLT TWO SLANT FOUR  
 ZEN/FIRST AMTRAC BN  
 ZEN/FIRST BNTHIRD MAR  
 ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR  
 INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEN/CTF CLEARWATER  
 ZEN/NINTH MAR  
 RUYEUAK/CTG 79.4  
 ZEN/SENIOR ADVISOR QUANG TRI SECTOR  
 BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SUBJ; THRUST POINTS

1. THE FOLLOWING THRUSTPTS WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN THE NAPOLEON/  
 SALINE AO AT 150601H MAR 68; 2467 TREES, 2563 RANKS, 2768 BOYS,  
 2864 RIVER, 2871 AUTOMOBILES, 2976 CIGARETTES, 3069 CITIES, 3164  
 FRUITS, 3266 BIRDS, 3362 STAKS, 3470 MOVIE STARS, 3564 CLOTHING,  
 3768 FURNITURE, 3865 MONTHS.

BT

6-3

ca/csl/ese/ede

NNNN

14 15 50

Encl 145  
**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

ZNY CCCCC  
 O 141900Z MAR 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPS VIET  
 RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
 INFO ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP PBR MOBLIE BASE ONE  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CO FIRST MAW  
 RUMHNA/COMNAV SUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB BN  
 RUMHWH/DASA I CORPS  
 RUMHWH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY  
 RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV

**SHOVE COC**

OP 0.1

OP 0.2

OP 0.3

OP 0.4

OP 0.5

**ACTION**

PAGE TWO RUMHN 023B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINE REGIMENT  
 RUMHUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMHBRA/COMSERVPAC  
 RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUYEUAE/CTG SEVEN PT FIVE  
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUYSUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 RUMSBB/COMRIVFLOT ONE  
 RUMSBB/MSTSO VIETNAM  
 RUMHFT/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND  
 RUMSBJ/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV  
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX A. (CONVOY ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION) TO CTF CLEAR WATER  
 OPORD 2-68(U)

A. CTECH 141436Z MAR 68 (C)

1. PURPOSE: THIS ANNEX PROVIDES FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMHN 023B C O N F I D E N T I A L

OF ARMED NAVAL CONVOYS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN UNINTERRUPTED MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON WATER LOC'S IN ICIZ PURSUANT TO REF (A).

2. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND. CONVOYS WILL CONSIST OF AN EXCORT UNIT AND A MOVEMENT UNIT. A DESIGNATED CONVOY COMMANDER WILL COMMAND BOTH UNITS. THE ESCORT UNIT WILL BE CONTROLLED BY AN ESCORT COMMANDER AND WILL BE ORGANIZED INTO A MINE SWEEP ELEMENT AND A FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT. THE MOVEMENT UNIT WILL BE ONTROLLED BY THE CONVOY COMMANDER.

3. FUNCTIONS AND TASKS.

A. THE FUNCTION OF THE ESCORT UNIT IS TO PROVIDE FOR THE SUFTERRUPTED TRANSIT OF THE MOVEMENT UNIT. THE ESCORT UNIT WILL:

1. SWEEP THE RIVER CHANNEL PRECEEDING EACH TRANSIT.
2. PROVIDE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT BY MEANS OF PATROL CRAFT AND MONITORS AS REQUIRED.

(3) CONTROL AND COORDINATE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND FIXED WING STRIKES.

(4) CONTROL AND COORDINATE ARTILLERY AND NAVAL HUNFIRE SUPPORT.

B. THE FUNCTION OF THE MOVEMENT UNIT IS TO DELIVER CARGO TO ITS ULTIMATE DESTINATION WITOUT DELAY.

THE MOVEMENT UNIT WILL:

- (1) PROVIDE DEFENSIVE FIRES FROM ORGANIC WEAPONS AS DIRECTED.

PAGE FOUR RUMHN 023B C O N F I D E N T I A L

(2) PROVIDE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE SERVICES AS DIRECTED.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES

A. THE CONVOY COMMANDER WILL:

- (1) PROVIDE FOR THE DETAILED ORGANIZATION OF THE CONVOY.
- (2) RECIEVE AND CONTROL THE CONVOY AFTER IT HAS BEEN FORMED BY THE LOCAL NSA DET.
- (3) PROVIDE BRIEFING AND INSTRUCTION FOR THE ESCORT COMMANDER AND CRAFT MASTERS.
- (4) PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS MOVEMENT OF THE CONVOY TO ITS DESTINATION
- (5) EMPLOY THE ESCORT UNIT THROUGH THE ESCORT COMMANDER TO OBTAIN UNINTERRUPTED MOVEMENT OF THE CONVOY.
- (6) DIRECT THE MOVEMENT OF THE MOVEMENT UNIT.
- (7) DESIGNATE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE CRAFT FOR THE CONVOY AND DIRECT THEIR EMPLOYMENT.
- (8) ENFORCE FIRE DISIPLINE IN THE CONVOY.
- (9) EXERCISE NET CONTROL.
- (10) PROVIDE FOR THE TREATMENT CARE AND EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES.

B. THE ESCORT COMMANDER WILL:

- (1) PROVIDE A SWEPT CHANNEL FOR EACH CONVOY TRANSIT.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE FIVE RUMHN 023B C O N F I D E N T I A L

- (2) PLAN COORDINATE AND DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT FOR THE CONVOY AS DIRECTED.
  - (3) DIRECT THE MANEUVERS FOR THE ESCORT UNIT.
  - (4) ENFORCE FIRE DISCIPLINE IN THE ESCORT UNIT.
  - (5) EXERCISE NET CONTROL OF THE ESCORT UNIT
  - (C) CRAFT MASTERS CHOPPED TO CTF CLEAR WATER WILL:
    - (1) TAKE ACTION TO OBTAIN CURRENT INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION AND CONVOY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CONVOY COMMANDER PRIOR TO TRANSITING THE PERFUME OR CUA VIET RIVERS.
    - (2) BRIEF THEIR CREWS ON THE ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION AND INSTRUCT THEM ON RULES FOR ENGAGEMENT BEFORE THEY BEGIN MOVEMENT ON THE PERFUME OR CUA IVET RIVERS.
    - (3) BE IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO THE ORDERS OF THE CONVOY COMMANDER, HIS SUCCESSOR IN COMMAND, ADN, IN EMERGENCIES OF THE ESCORT COMMANDER.
    - (4) PERFORM RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED.
    - (5) ENFORCE FIRE DISCIPLINE IN THEIR CRAFT.
    - (6) OBSERVE AND ENFORCE COMMUNICATIONS DISCIPLINE IN THEIR CRAFTS.
5. SUCCESSION TO COMMAND. IN THE EVENT COMMANDERS OR THEIR SUCCESSORS

PAGE SIX RUMHN 023B C O N F I D E N T I A L

BECOME UNABLE TO COMMAND, COMMAND WILL PASS IN THE FMZLOWING ORDER:

- (A) IN THE CONVOY, FROM THE CONVOY COMMANDER TO THE ESCORT COMMANDER TO THE CRAFT MASTERS/BOAT CAPTAIN OF PATROL CRAFT IN THE ORDER OF SENIORITY.
  - (B) IN THE ESCORT UNIT, FROM THE ESCORT COMMANDER TO THE PATROL CRAFT MASTERS/BOAT CAPTAINS IN ORDER OF SENIORITY.
  - (C) IN INDIVIDUAL CRAFT, FROM THE CRAFT MASTER/BOAT CAPTAIN TO SUBORDIMATES IN THE ORDER DESIGNATED BY THE CRAFT MASTER.
6. RULES FOR INGAGEMENT. THE ESCORT UNIT WILL PROVIDE SUPPRESSIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE FIRES AS DIRECTED TO INSURE THE UNINTERRUPTED MOVEMENT OF THE CONVOY. OTHER CRAFT WILL FIRE ONLY IN DEFENSE OF THEIR OWN CRAFT, AS DIRECTED BY THE CONVOY COMMANDER.
- A. FIRE WULL BE PLACED NEAR THE KNOWN LOCATIONS OF FRIENDLY FORCES ONLY ON ORDERS OF THE CONVOY COMMANDER.
  - B. CRAFT MASTERS/BOAT CAPTAINS IN PATROL CRAFT AND ASSAULT CRAFTMONITORS WILL CONVUCT FIRING ON ORDERS OF THE ESCORT COMMANDER.
  - C. CRAFT MASTERS IN LOGISTIC CRAFT. WILL DIRECT THE DEFENSIVE FIRES OF THEIR CRAFT. THEY WILL COMMENCE FIREING KWHEN THEY ARE FIRED UPON. THEY WILL CEASE FIRING EITHER WHEN HOSTILE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE SEVEN RUMHN 023B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 FIRE ON THEIR CRAFT CEASES OR WHEN IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT  
 THEIR FIRE ENDANGERS FRIENDLY FORCES.

7. SIGNALS

- A. APPROPRIATE RECOGNITION SIGNALS WILL BE DISPLAYED ON CRAFT IN WHICH THE CONVOY COMMANDERS AND THE ESCORT COMMANDERS ARE EMBARDED. AND ON ALL RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT
- B. THE CONVOY COMMANDER WILL DESIGNATE A PYROTECHNIC DEVICE AND A SIGNAL FLARE FOR USE AS EMERGENCY CEASE FIRE SIGNALS.

8. MINIMUM BRIEFING AND INSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS. NO CONVOY OR CRAFT CHOPPED TO CTF CLEAR WATER WILL TRANSIT PERFUME OR CUA VIET RIVEES UNTIL CRAFT MASTERS AND CREWS HAVE BEEN BRIEFED/INSTRUCTED ON THE FOLLOWING MATTERS.

- A. ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION
- B. CONVOY ORGANIZATION, RECOGNITION SIGNALS AND SUCCESSION TO COMMAND
- C. RULES FOR ENGAGEMENT AND FIRE DISCIPLINE.
- D. EMERGENCY CEASE FIRE SIGNALS.
- E. TACTICS TO BE EMPLOYED.
- F. RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE PROCEDURES.

GP-4  
 BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

NNNNVV VPC339MMZVA 927ACA333ZVA 6A0VV VHA194VV VHC728V CKR351

OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 017B 0750435  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 142055Z MAR 68 ZEL ZFD  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPS VIETNAM  
 RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
 INFO ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP PBR MOBILE BASE ONE  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMSAL/CLR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAU  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB BN  
 RUMHVP/3SA I CORPS  
 RUMHVP/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY  
 RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV



PAGE TWO RUMHN 017B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARINE REGIMENT  
 RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUHHBRA/COMSERVPAC  
 RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUYEWAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUYEUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUYEUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMFCR/CTU ZEVEN ZERP PT EIGHT NINE  
 RUMSBB/COMRIVFLOT ONE  
 RUMSBB/MSTSO VIETNAM  
 RUMHFL/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND  
 RUMNPR/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV  
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX B (LOGISTIC CRAFT OPERATION AND PATROL/MINESWEEPING SUPPORT  
 FOR PERFUME RIVER OPERATIONS) TO CTF CLEARWATER OPERATION ORDER 2-68  
 A, CTFCW 141436Z MAR 68

1. PURPOSE: THIS ANNEX PROVIDES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMHN 0170 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE PERFUME RIVER BETWEEN NSAD TAN MY AND HUE RAMP WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND AVAILABILITY OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ALLOWS FOR A SHIFT FROM PREPLANNED CONVOY OPERATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL CRAFT OR GROUPS OF CRAFT DISPATCHED AS REQUIRED.

2. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND: LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSITING THE PERFUME RIVER WILL BE CHOPPED FROM NSAD TAN MY TO CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP UPON COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSIT. PER PATROLS AND MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS UNDER THE NKMMAND AND THE CONTROL OF THE GROUP.

3. 17:589, -.3 5-(:

A. THE FUNCTION OF THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP IS TO PROVIDE A CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED TRANSIT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE PERFUME RIVER.

THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP WILL:

(1) PROVIDE CONTINUOUS PER PATROLS AND MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS ON THE PERFUME RIVER BETWEEN NSAD TAN MY AND HUE RAMP DURING HOURS WHEN LOGISTIC CRAFT ARE TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(2) PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT AND OR OTHER ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED BY TRANSITING LOGISTIC CRAFT.

(3) ARRANGE FOR AND COORDINATE SUPPORTING AIR AND ARTILLERY

PAGE FOUR RUMHN 0170 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FIRE WHEN NEEDED.

(4) PROVIDE BRIEFINGS AS TO TACTICAL SITUATION AND LOCATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES TO CRAFT MASTERS/COXSWAINS OF LOGISTIC AND SECURITY CRAFT PRIOR TO TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(5) MAINTAIN COMPLETE INFORMATION AS TO LOGISTIC CRAFT MOVEMENTS ON THE PERFUME RIVER DURING TRANSITING AND ANY PROBLEMS INCOUNTED AS REPORTED BY LOGISTIC CRAFT TO RIVER SECURITY UNITS ON PATROLS

(6) EXRCISE NET CONTROL OF THE LOGISTIC CRAFT FREQUENCY THRU RIVER SECURITY UNITS ON PATROL.

(7) DESIGNATE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE CRAFT OPERATIONS DURING TRANSIT AND DIRECT THEIR EMPLOYMENT. DISABLED CRAFT WILL BE BEACHED OR TAKEN IN TOW TO ENSURE THE CHANNEL IS NOT BLOCKED.

B. THE FUNCTION OF OIC NSAD TAN MY WILL BE TO RECIEVE, SUPPORT AND SAIL AS DIRECTED BY THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP ASSIGNED LOGISTIC CRAFT BETWEEN THE MOUTH OF THE PERFUME RIVER AND HUE RAMP. OIC NSAD TAN MY.

(1) PROVIDES MINESWEEPING BOATS, CREWS, AND SWEEP GEAR TO THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP.

(2) CONDUCTS SALVAGE IPERATIONS AS NECESSARY TO RECOVER/REPAIR DAMAGED CRAFT.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE FIVE RUMNN 017B C O N F I D E N T I A L

(3) PROVIDES PRC 25/77 RADIOS AND FREQUENZ ASSIGNMENT TO ALL LOGISTIC AND MINESWEEPING CRAFT TRANSITING THE PERFUME RIVER.

C. CRAFT MASTERS/COXSWAINS OF LOGISTIC CRAFT WILL:

(1) BRIEF THEIR RESPECTIVE CREWS PRIOR TO TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(2) MAINTAIN FIER DISCIPLINE AND CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE OF THEIR CRAFT.

(3) DIRECT THE DEFENSIVE FIRE OF THEIR CRAFT. IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER ORDERS FROM RIVER SECURITY UNITS OPERATING IN COMPANY THEY WILL ONLY FIRE WHEN FIRED UPON AND CEASE FIRING EITHER WHEN HOSTILE FIRE ON THEIR CRAFT CEASES OR WHEN IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT THEIR FIRING ENDANGERS FRIENDLY FORCES.

(4) WHEN FIRED UPON OR COGNIZANT OF OTHER ENEMY THREAT PROMPTLY NOTIFY RIVER SECURITY UNITS OF THEIR LOCATION AND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT.


(5) WHEN DIRECTED, THIS ANNEX WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE FOR MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC ON THE PERFUME RIVER.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

3 W.O.

2 W.O.

CPO

4PO

ACTION

ZNY CCCCC

O 142095Z MAR 68 ZEL ZFD

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIETNAM

RUMMWAA/CG III MAF

INFO ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET

RUMHVN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP PBR MOBILE BASE ONE

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB BN

RUMHVN/DSA I CORPS

PIFHVN/SA FIRST ARVN DIV

ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET

RUMHVN/NSAD TAN MY

RUMNVH/FIRST COASTAL ZONE AV

PAGE TWO RUMHVN 017B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

RUMHUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMHBA/COMSERVPAC

RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUYEUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUYEUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUYEUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMFCR/CTU ZEVEN ZERP PT EIGHT NINE

RUMSBB/COMRIVFLOT ONE

RUMSBB/MSTSO VIETNAM

RUMHFL/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

RUMNPR/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV

RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX B (LOGISTIC CRAFT OPERATION AND PATROL/MINESWEEPING SUPPORT FOR PERFUME RIVER OPERATIONS) TO CTF CLEAR WATER OPERATION ORDER 2-68

A. CTFOW 141436Z MAR 68

1. PURPOSE: THIS ANNEX PROVIDES FOR THE ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND



**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMHN 017B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE PERFUME RIVER BETWEEN  
 NSAD TAN MY AND HUE RAMP WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND AVAILABILITY  
 OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ALLOWS FOR A SHIFT FROM PREPLANNED CONVOY OPERATIONS  
 TO INDIVIDUAL CRAFT OR GROUPS OF CRAFT DISPATCHED AS REQUIRED.

2. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND: LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSITING THE PERFUME  
 RIVER WILL BE CHOPPED FROM NSAD TAN MY TO CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY  
 GROUP UPON COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSIT. PBR PATROLS AND MINESWEEPING  
 OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS UNDER THE COMMAND  
 AND THE CONTROL OF THE GROUP.

3. FUNCTIONS AND TASKS:

A. THE FUNCTION OF THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP IS TO PROVIDE A  
 CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED TRANSIT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE PERFUME  
 RIVER.

THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP WILL:

(1) PROVIDE CONTINUOUS PBR PATROLS AND MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS  
 ON THE PERFUME RIVER BETWEEN NSAD TAN MY AND HUE RAMP DURING HOURS  
 WHEN LOGISTIC CRAFT ARE TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(2) PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT AND OTHER ASSISTANCE AS  
 REQUIRED BY TRANSITING LOGISTIC CRAFT

(3) ARRANGE FOR AND COORDINATE SUPPORTING AIR AND ARTILLERY

PAGE FOUR RUMHN 017B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 FIRE WHEN NEEDED.

(4) PROVIDE BRIEFINGS AS TO TACTICAL SITUATION AND LOCATION OF  
 FRIENDLY FORCES TO CRAFT MASTERS/COXSWAINS OF LOGISTIC AND SECURITY  
 CRAFT PRIOR TO TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(5) MAINTAIN COMPLETE INFORMATION AS TO LOGISTIC CRAFT MOVEMENTS  
 ON THE PERFUME RIVER DURING TRANSITING AND ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AS  
 REPORTED BY LOGISTIC CRAFT TO RIVER SECURITY UNITS ON PATROLS

(6) EXERCISE NET CONTROL OF THE LOGISTIC CRAFT FREQUENCY  
 THROUGH RIVER SECURITY UNITS ON PATROL.

(7) DESIGNATE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE CRAFT OPERATIONS  
 DURING T H 85 -, \$ 8843:5 5 384 3.0)96.3,5. DISABLED CRAFT WILL BE  
 BEACHED OR TAKEN IN TOW TO ENSURE THE CHANNEL IS NOT BLOCKED.

B. THE FUNCTION OF OIC NSAD TAN MY WILL BE TO RECEIVE, SUPPORT  
 AND SAIL AS DIRECTED BY THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP ASSIGNED LOGISTIC  
 CRAFT BETWEEN THE MOUTH OF THE PERFUME RIVER AND HUE RAMP. OIC NSAD  
 TAN MY.

(1) PROVIDES MINESWEEPING BOATS, CREWS, AND SWEEP GEAR TO  
 THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP.

(2) CONDUCTS SALVAGE OPERATIONS AS NECESSARY TO RECOVER/REPAIR  
 DAMAGED CRAFT.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE FIVE RUMPN 0175 C O N F I D E N T I A L

(3) PROVIDES PRC 25/77 RADIOS AND FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT TO ALL LOGISTIC AND MINESWEEPING CRAFT TRANSITING THE PERFUME RIVER.

C. CRAFT MASTERS/COXSWAINS OF LOGISTIC CRAFT WILL:

(1) BRIEF THEIR RESPECTIVE CREWS PRIOR TO TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(2) MAINTAIN FIER DISCIPLINE AND CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE OF THEIR CRAFT.

(3) DIRECT THE DEFENSIVE FIRE OF THEIR CRAFT. IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER ORDERS FROM RIVER SECURITY UNITS OPERATING IN COMPANY THEY WILL ONLY FIRE WHEN FIRED UPON AND CEASE FIRING EITHER WHEN HOSTILE FIRE ON THEIR CRAFT CEASES OR WHEN IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT THEIR FIRING ENDANGERS FRIENDLY FORCES.

(4) WHEN FIRED UPON OR COGNIZANT OF OTHER ENEMY THREAT PROMPTLY NOTIFY RIVER SECURITY UNITS OF THEIR LOCATION AND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT.

(5) WHEN DIRECTED, THIS ANNEX WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE FOR MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC ON THE PERFUME RIVER.

GP-4

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SHOVE**

CP CHIEF

G-3 S.O.


G-2 H.C.

DSPD

APO

**ACTION**

*Handwritten: e, VB, 20, Clearwater*



VV NHA213  
 OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 018B 0760440  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 142143Z MAR 68  
 CFM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPS VIET  
 RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 INFO ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP PBC MOBILA BASE ONE  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMSALXCDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB BN  
 CRUMHVHDXDASA I CORPS  
 RUMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 ZEN/NSAD CHU VIET  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY  
 RUMNVHEXFIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV

*Handwritten: COS*

PAGE 2 RUMHN 018B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINE REGIMENT

RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMHBRA/COMSERVPAC

RUMFKRP/CTF 76

RUYSUAK/CTG 76.4

RUYSUAE/CTG 76.5

RUMFUE/CTF 77

RUYSUAD/CTG 70.8

RUMFCR/CTU 70.8.9

RUMSBB/COMRIVFLOT ONE

RUMSBB/MSTSO VIETNAM

RUMHFL/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

RUMJBJ/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV

RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG GINH

ZT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX C LOGISTIC CRAFT OPERATION AND SECURITY PATROL BOAT/MINESWEEPING  
 SUPPORT FOR CUA VIET RIVER OPERATIONS TO CTF CLEARWATER OPERATION

OCDER 2-68/20

A. 145136Z MAR 68

*Handwritten: 21*

*Handwritten: 100/2/4/6/8/10/12/14/16/18/20/22/24*

*Handwritten: 43*

*Handwritten: End 149*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

WPAGE 3 RUMHN PQIB C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. PURPOSE: THIS ANNEX PROVIDED FOR THE ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE CUA VIET RIVER BETWEEN NSAD CUA VIET AND DONG HA RAMP WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND AVAILABILITY OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ALLOWS FOR A SHIFT FROM PREPLANNED CONVOY OPERATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL CRAFT OR GROUPS OF CRAFT DISPATCHED AS REQUIRED.

2. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND: LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSITING THE CUA VIET RIVER WILL BE CHOPPED FROM NSAD DONG HA/CUA VIET TO CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP UPON COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSIT SECURITY BOAT PATROLS AND MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS UNDER THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP.

3. FUNCTIONS AND TASKS:

CA. THE FUNCTION OF THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP IS TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED TRANSIT OF LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE CUA VIET RIVER BETWEEN NSAD CUA VIET AND DONG HA RAMP. THE RIVER SECURITY GROUP WILL:

(1) PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY BOAT PATROLS AND MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS ON THE CUA VIET RIVER BETWEEN NSAD CUA VIET AND DONG HA RAMP DURING HOURS WHEN LOGISTIC CRAFT ARE TRANSITING THE RIVER.

PAGE 4 RUMHN 018B C O N F I D E N T I A L

(2) PROVIDE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT AND/OR OTHER ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED BY TRANSITING LOGISTIC CRAFT.

(3) ARRANGE FOR AND COORDINATE SUPPORTING AIR COVER AND ARTILLERY FIRE AS REQUIRED.

(4) PROVIDE BRIEFINGS AS TO TACTICAL SITUATION, LOCATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES, A DISCIPLINE TO CRAFT MASTERS/ COXAINS OF LOGISTIC AND SECURITY CRAFT TRANSITING THE RIVER.

(5) MAINTAIN COMPLETE INFORMATION AS TO LOGISTIC CRAFT/SECURITY CRAFT/MINE SWEEP BOATS MOVEMENTS ON THE RIVER DURING TRANSIT AND ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.

(6) EXERCISE NET CONTROL OF THE LOGISTIC CRAFT/SECURITY BOAT/MINE SWEEP BOATS EMERGENCY DURING TRANSIT

(7) DESIGNATE RESCUE AND EMERGENCY SALVAGE CRAFT OPERATIONS DURING TRANSIT AND DIRECT THEIR EMPLOYMENT

B. DISABLED CRAFT

WILL BE BEACHED OR TAKEN IN TOW TO ENSURE THE CHANNEL IS NOT BLOCKED. THE FUNCTION OF OIC DONG HA/CUA VIET WILL BE TO RECEIVE SUPPORT AND SAIL AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER RIVER SECURITY GROUP ASSIGNED LOGISTIC CRAFT BETWEEN CUA VIET AND DONG HA RAMP. OIC DONG HA/CUA VIET:

(1) PROVIDES ESCORT CRAFT, CUES, AND SWEEP GEAR TO THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAVE 5 CUMHN 018B C O N F I D E N T I A L

RIVER SECURITY GROUP AS REQUIRED

(2) CONDUCT SALVAGE OPERATIONS AS NECESSARY TO RECOVER/  
REPAIR DAMAGED CRAFT.

(3) PROVIDE PRC 25/77 RADIOS AND FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT OF  
ALL LOGISTIC CRAFT, SECURITY BOATS AND THE KWEEPINUSSH BOATS TRANSIT  
ING THE RIVER.

C. CRAFTMASTERS/COXSWAINS OF LOGISTIC CRAFT, SECURITY  
BOATS AND MINE SWEEPING BOATS WILL:

(2) BRIEF THEIR RESPECTIVE CREWS PRIOR TO TRANSITING THE RIVER.  
(2) MAINTAIN FIRE DISCIPLINE AND CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE ON THEIR CRAFT.  
(3) DIRECT THE DEFENSIVE FIRE OF THEIR CRAFT, IN THE ABSENCE  
OF OTHER ORDERS FROM THE RIVER SECURITY UNITS  
OPERATING IN COMPANY. THEY WILL ONLY FIRE WHEN FIRED  
UPON AND CEASE FIRING EITHER WHEN HOSTILE FIRE ON THEIR

C CRAFT CEASES OR WHEN IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT EITHER  
FIRE ENDANGERS FRIENDLY FORCES.

(4) WHEN FIRED UPON OR COGNIZANT OF OTHER ENEMY THREAT  
PROMPTLY NOTIFY RIVER SECURITY UNITS OF THEIR LOCATION  
AND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT.

4. WHEN DIRECTED, THIS ANNEX WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE FOR MOVEMENT OF


PAGE 6 CUMHN PQIB C O N F I D E N T I A L  
LOGISTIC CRAFT ON THE CUA VIET RIVER.

GP-4

8BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET



SHOVE	DEC
OP CHIEF	<i>K</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>C</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>Y</i>
DOPD	<i>K</i>
APO	<i>K</i>
ACTION	<i>open</i>

INFO

ZNY SSSSS  
 O 150546Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG PCV  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 CG USA SPT CMD DNG  
 COMUSMACV  
 USARV L BN  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FIRST ACD  
 CG ONE ZERO FIRST ABN DIV  
 CG FLC  
 COMNAVSUPPACT DNG  
 BT

SECRET

DEPLOYMENT OF UNIT (U)

A. CG PCV 141038Z MAR 68 (PASEP) (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQUESTS 2ND BN 34TH ARMOR(-) BE DEPLOYED TO DONG HA ASAP  
 TO SUPPORT PCV OPNS BEGINNING 1 APRIL.

FOR CG FIRST MARDIV:

2. DEPLOY 2ND BN 34TH ARMOR(-) BE SEA TO DONG HA O/A 17 MAR. PASS  
 OPCON TO CG III MAF ON DEPARTURE DANANG. ADVISE EFFECTIVE DTG.

FOR CG PCV:

3. ASSUME OPCON 2ND BN 34TH ARMOR(-) UPON ARRIVAL DONG HA. ADVISE  
 EFFECTIVE DTG OPCON ASSUMED.

FOR CG USA SPT COMD:

4. REQUEST THAT MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT/ FACILITIES BE PRO-  
 GRAMMED TO SUPPORT THEIR DEPLOYMENT.

GP-4


*C - G-3/COE**2/4/C/S/CG/CEO**15 05**46**Encl 150*

SECRET

**SECRET**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

**RETURN TO COC****SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF

C-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

BOPD

ACTION

SCOTLAND

AND MATR HERE WITH MX NRS 14

&amp;

15

OK - Air - Self

XZXXZZ

ZNY SSSSS

P 150620Z MAR 68.

FM TWENTY SIXTH MAR

TO CG THIRD MAR DIV

XT

SECRET

AERIAL RESUPPLY OF KHE SANH

A. MY 131744Z MAR 68

B. MY 110726Z FEB 68

1. REFERECNES A AND B EXPLAINED THE NEED FOR AND REQUESTED AN ADDITIONAL ASRT AT KHE SANH.

2. YESTERDAY (14MAR68) THE GCA UNIT AT KHE SANH WAS INOPERATIVE REQUIRING THE USE OF THE ASRT TEAM FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE AERIAL RESUPPLY ROLE. AGAIN THE ASRT CONTROLLED DROPS WERE MUCH MORE ACCURATE THAN EITHER VISUAL OR GCA CONTROLLED DROPS. THE PROBLEM AS STATED PREVIOUSLY IN REF A, IS THAT A GAP IS PRODUCED IN OUR DEFENSIVE POSTURE WITH THE ELIMINATION OF BOMBING MISSIONS WHILE AIR DROPS ARE IN PROGRESS. BETWEEN 140931H AND 141502H ONLY THREE BOMBING MISSIONS WERE RUN WHILE 13 PARA-DROPS WERE CONDUCTED.

3. IT IS AGAIN REQUESTED THAT REFS A AND B BE REVIEWED FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

GP-4

BT

A-AIRO



G-3-4-COC-CEP

①

15

**SECRET**

20



31

SS/CG/CS/000/CEC

**SECRET**

End 152



**SECRET****SHOVE COG**

OP CHIEF


G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APO

ACTION

**7**  
*C*  
*W**AB**X**OPCON Folder*  
*1514462*

DRAFTER 3/CBS/ds  
 SEC G-3 PHONE 3D HADIV COG  
 CWO *B*

PRIORITY 2 MAR 68

FROM: CG THIRD HADIV  
 TO: CG FORLOGCMD  
 NINTH MT BN  
 INFO: CG PCV  
 CG III MAF  
 THIRD MT BN

//SECRET//

OPCON 515TH TRANSPORTATION CO (-), USA

A. CG III MAF 090956Z MAR 68 (NOTAL)

B. CG III MAF 140916Z MAR 68 (NOTAL)

1. FOR NINTH MT BN - IAW REF A & B CHOP OPCON 515TH TRANSPORTATION  
 CO (-), USA TO THIS HQ EFFECTIVE 161200H MAR 68.

2. UNODER THIS HQ ASSUMES AND CHOPS OPCON SUBJ CO TO CG FORLOGCMD  
 SAME DTG.

GP-4

OCC 818

A. G-3

RELEASED BY

*M. J. Palatas*  
*4/COG/MTD/CEO B*

*G-3*  
*G-4*  
*COG*  
*MTD*  
*Kto*  
*B1137*  
*179*  
*ADH*  
*Cond*


**COG****15****14****9**  
**46****SECRET**

153

**SECRET**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



SHOVE COC	
OF CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
CO. NO.	<i>[Signature]</i>
CO. NO.	<i>[Signature]</i>
CO. NO.	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

*OPCON has  
copy.  
copy to FSIC  
show this  
to FSIC.*

ZNY SSSSS  
O 152005Z MAR 68  
FM TWELFTH MARINES  
TO FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES  
ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES  
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

SECRET

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 111252Z MAR 68

1. FOR FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES PASS OPCON W/3/12 TO THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES AS OF 151730H. ASSUME OPCON W/2/11 DTG.

2. FOR THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINE PASS OPCON W/2/11 TO FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES AS OF 151730H. ASSUME OPCON W/3/12 SAME DTG.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

STAND/COMM

Encl 154

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

16 March 1968

MEMORANDUM

From: Chief of Staff, 3d Marine Division  
To: Chief of Staff, Provisional Corps Vietnam

Subj: Quang Tri ASP

Ref: (a) CG III MAF 130700Z Mar 68

Encl: (1) Master Site Plan Quang Tri Complex  
(2) Overlay of Quang Tri Complex: Pictomap 1:50,000  
AMS Sheets 6442 IVS and 6442 IIIN

1. The following information is provided in response to reference (a).
2. Commanding General, 3d Marine Division is charged with coordinating development of the Quang Tri complex, including the ASP. Design of the ASP was to be accomplished by COMNAVFORV (Base Development) to satisfy the requirements established by FLC and to fit the existing terrain.
3. In planning for the Quang Tri Complex the ASP was sited in relation to the proposed cantonment and Division CP to conform with the required safety distance criteria. The overall master development plan for the Quang Tri complex was approved by the Commanding General, III MAF Base Development Board on 23 January 1968. In forwarding the approved development plan to COMNAVFORV on 3 February, Commanding General, III MAF recommended priority #10 of ten items for horizontal construction.
4. The existing design of the ASP, as shown on enclosure (1), is schematic only and was done without benefit of a topographic survey. MCB-10 has been tasked with providing a topographic map of the area selected for the ASP (Hill 22). The estimated completion date of this survey is 22 March 1968. 3d Marine Division has been informed that it will require approximately three days for COMNAVFORV (Base Development) to redesign the ASP based on the topographic survey. The estimated date of completion is 1 April 1968.
5. As shown on enclosure (1), the ASP, considered as a separate entity, is approximately 4300 meters in circumference. By coincidence, if the current perimeter were extended to encompass the proposed ASP site, it would require enlargement of the current 8000 meter perimeter by an additional 4300 meters.

Encl 155

DECLASSIFIED

6. Enclosure (2) is also provided to show the relationship of the proposed ASP site to that area of the Quang Tri Complex already under development.

W. H. CUENIN  
Col USMC

DECLASSIFIED

## HEADQUARTERS

Quang Tri Base Defense Coordinator  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

LEB/crh  
16 March 1968

MEMORANDUM

From: Quang Tri Base Defense Coordinator  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division  
Subj: Quang Tri Defense Personnel Requirement

1. The Quang Tri perimeter is approximately eight thousand (8000) meters in circumference. It is manned by one hundred eighty-four (184) men during daylight hours, and by five hundred eighty-three (583) personnel after 1830 hours. These figures do not include the command bunker personnel located in each sector such as the Sector Commander, watch NCO's, or communications personnel. The present perimeter is divided into seven (7) sectors. Each sector is required to provide a minimum of one (1) listening post, ambush, or a patrol during the hours of darkness. These figures are not included in the above. The units within each sector are required to provide a reaction force to establish a blocking position and or conduct a counterattack in case of a penetration of the perimeter. These forces vary in strength but normally includes all remaining personnel not performing some other task.
2. A quotient of one (1) bunker every forty (40) meters, one man per bunker during daylight hours and three (3) men per bunker during hours of darkness is used as a planning factor for requesting material and personnel to defend the perimeter. However, these figures will vary with the terrain, combat situation, and personnel available.
3. The proposed ASP is forty three hundred (4300) meters in circumference. The proposed site encompasses Hill 22 and numerous gulleys and ravines. It is worthy of note that by extending the SW portion of the present perimeter to include the proposed ASP, the total additional terrain still remains at approximately forty three hundred (4300) meters. This would take advantage of the best defensive terrain available and still have a single perimeter for ease of command and control purposes.
4. It is considered that approximately 350-400 additional personnel, or two rifle companies, will be required to adequately defend the proposed ASP (4300 meters).

Very respectfully,

*A. I. Thomas*  
A. I. THOMAS  
COL USMC

Encl 156

JOURNAL  
1-16 MAR 68

From: Maj Wakefield VASAC  
To: Chief AO

JP  
Poss to go  
Tio / W  
OB 2

1. Reported rocket positions from ARUN G-2

- a. 17 rocket positions at YD 288655
- b. 34 " " at YD 261796

40 15467833 - 30 RKT PSWS - 1PK - 15 more

Encl 157

3d Marine Division Facilities  
Phu Bai

17 Mar 1968

1 Apr 1968

(planned)

**PRESENT**  
CANTONMENT

**AFTER HQ BN CLEARS PHU BAI**  
CANTONMENT

GWN/arg

16 Mar 68

	1	2	3	4	total	1	2	3	4	TOTAL
SEAHUTS	90		10	<del>73</del> 103					37	37
WAREHOUSE	2		9		11	2		8		10
STAFF NCO CLUB		1			1					
EM CLUB		1			1					
OFFICE BLDG			1		1			1		1
BOQ (SEAHUTS)				28	28					
O' CLUB				1	1					
MESSHALL				1	1					
Q. HUT				4	4					
TOTAL BLDGS	22	2	20	<del>107</del> 151	<del>103</del> 151	2		9	37	48


	GIA		LEE		
	3d Eng Bn		3d Tank Bn		3d Shore Party
SEAHUTS	11 1/2		4		8
WAREHOUSE	3		1		2
OFFICER CLUB			1		
STAFF CLUB			1		
TOTAL BLDGS	14 1/2		7		5
					26 1/2

**ABOVE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE Billeting & STORAGE  
FOR 3D MOTORS AND 3D MED BN.**

Enclosure (4)

(4) encl 158

SECRET



UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION

OPCON

NNNV VPA350ZVA 657VV MFB854  
 OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMWAA 1899 0760058  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 1600

Z MAR 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PCV  
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHWP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST ACD CAMP EVANS  
 BT

~~SECRET~~  
 ADDITIONAL MARINE CORPS BATTALIONS

- A. CG PCV 00271 FROM AV11-GCO DTG 150240Z MAR 68
1. REF A REQ 2 FIRST MARDIV BNS BE DEPLOYED WITH ULTIMATE OPCON TO A REGTL HQ FROM THIRD MARDIV.
  2. CONSIDER ALL THIRD MARDIV REGTL HQ FULLY COMMITTED AND UNAVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN PLANNED OPN.
  3. INTENTION THIS HQ TO DEPLOY AND PASS OPCON OF MARINE REGT(REINF) LESS 1 BN (REIN) FROM FIRST MARDIV TO PARTICIPATE IN OPN. A THIRD MARINE BN(REINF) CAN BE PROVIDED FROM FORCES CURRENTLY UNDER YOUR OPCON.
  4. FOR CG FIRST MAR: REQ YOU DESIGNATE REGTL HQ AND PARTICIPATE IN


PAGE TWO RUMWAA 1899 ~~SECRET~~  
 JOINT PLANNING SCHEDULED BY PARA 3B, REF A.  
 5. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

GP-4  
 BT



~~SECRET~~

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[initials]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[initials]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[initials]</i>
DCPO	<i>[initials]</i>
APO	<i>[initials]</i>
ACTION	<i>[initials]</i>



COC

VV

89ZVA 175BMB068 VV

AAD195

00 RUMHVP  
 DE RUMWAA 1945 0760532  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 160532Z MAR 8  
 FM CG IAF DNG  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVH/CG USA SPT CMD DNG:  
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LBN  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOG COMD  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVEUPPACT DNG  
 BT

~~SECRET~~

DEPLOYMENT OF UNIT

A. CG III MAF 150546Z MAR 68

1. AMMEND PARAS 2 AND 3 OF REF A BY CHANGING UNIT DESIGNATION TO  
 READ QUOTE COMPANY C, 2ND BN, 34TH ARMOR END QUOTE.

GP-4

BT

TOR/161555 MAR 68/DCS-D

G-3


G-2/EOC/CS/CS/SS  
*[signature]*  
 13

NNNN

16

05

UNCLASSIFIED  
*[signature]*  
 Encl 160



S F 000000 00303 FROM AVII-GCO

SUBJ: RETENTION OF SMOKE PLATOON (U)

REF: ILLI MAF MSG DTG 151552Z MAR 68 (C)

1. (S) PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN I CORPS INCLUDE OPENING RTE 9 FROM CALU TO KHE SANH, LIMITED OPERATIONS ALONG ROUTE 547, AND OPERATIONS IN THE CON THIEN - GIO LINH AREA. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE SMOKE GENERATOR PLATOON WOULD BE USEFUL TO MINIMIZE ENEMY OBSERVED FIRES OF THE TACTICAL MOVES INVOLVED IN THESE OPERATIONS AS WELL AS ENGINEER WORK ON ROADS, BRIDGES, AND WATERWAYS.

2. (C) REQUEST ACTION BE INITIATED TO RETAIN PLATOON OF 25TH  
CHEMICAL SMOKE GENERATOR COMPANY THROUGH AUGUST 68.

OP-4

BT

Q-5

92/00/00/00/00/00

# HIN

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET



SHOVE: 00C  
 OP CHIEF  
 G-3  
 DRAFTED 3/CBS/01  
 SEC G-3 PHONE  
 DOWB  
 APO  
 ACTION  
 H  
 Opcor 2001

IMMEDIATE 161100Z MAR68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG PROV CORPS  
 FOURTH MAR 267  
 INFO: CG FIRST CAV DIV  
 CG III MAF

OPCON

A. CG PROV CORPS 151350Z MAR68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A DIRECTS DEPLOYMENT OF ONE COMPANY FROM 1ST CAV DIV TO CA LU AIR STRIP FOR AIR STRIP CONSTRUCTION SECURITY.
2. UNODIR C G THIRD MAR DIV ASSUMES OPCON C TROOP 1/12 FROM CG 1ST CAV DIV AT 161500H AND PASSES OPCON SUB J UNIT TO 4TH MARINES, SAME DTG.
3. FOR FOURTH MARINES. ASSUME OPCON SUBJ UNIT SAME DTG. PROVIDE NECESSARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AS REQUESTED WITHIN YR CAPABILITY.

GP-4

CCN

854

RELEASED BY

A.L. McLean Jr.

A.3

ADC

CG/CS/COC/CEO


16 11 00 9

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

OPCON FILE



VATYZ

102/161735Z MAR 68  
4 MAR

ZNY SSSSS  
O R 161315Z MAR 68  
FM FOURTH MAR  
TO BLT THREE SLANT ONE  
ZEN/SECOND BN NINTH MAR  
ZEN/THIRD BN NINTH MAR  
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

1. 2/9 CHOP OPCON L/3/1 TO 3/9 EFFECTIVE 161500H MAR 68.
2. 3/9 ASSUME OPCON L/3/1 161500H MAR 68.

GP-4  
BT

C-6-3/COC

6-2-1-Adj-Comm

16  
NNNN


13

DECLASSIFIED

6  
UNCLASSIFIED  
encl

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



DRAFTER 3/CWJ/WLK  
SAC G-3 PHONE 3DM DIV 203  
CWO

PRIORITY

161320Z

2 MAR 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO: THIRD MARINES

INFO: CTF CLEARWATER RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
SPA QUANG TRI

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CUA VIET LOCATION

A. THIRD MARINES 110355Z MAR 68

B. CG III MAF 150910Z MAR 68 (PASE P)

1. ARRANGEMENTS COMPLETED WITH PROVINCE CHIEF TO BURN AND/OR REMOVE BUILDINGS, VEGETATION ALONG EAST BANK OF CUA VIET FROM YD 272628 TO YD 280648 AS PER RAF (A).

2. <sup>ACTIVITY OF</sup> LOCAL INHABITANTS ~~WILL BE~~ LIMITED TO FARMING AREAS ADJACENT TO RIVER BANK SUBJECT TO VACATING AREA AND NOTIFYING AUTH UPON ARRIVAL NVN/VC. NON COMPLIANCE WILL RESULT IN THEIR BEING TAKEN UNDER FIRE.

RECOMMEND LIAISON PERSONNEL BE PROVIDED TO DISTRICT CHIEF FOR COORDINATION.

3. RAF (B) ESTABLISHED NEW CONTROLS FOR SAMPAH TRAFFIC ON CUA VIET RIVER.

GP-1

G-3

G-2/COE/CG/CS/CEO

CCN


865

RELEASED BY

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



IMMEDIATE

161420Z

Z MARCH

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO: CG III MAF RUMMWA  
 INFO: CG FORLOGCMB RUMHFL  
 FLSC "B" 212

12 MAR 69  
 ONE/3D MARDIV COG

CGC  
 Tosh

AF Oregon  
 ACTION

UNITS LOCATED IN KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

A. YE 081506Z MAR69

1. FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IAW REF A:

A. USMC FORCES READ IN THREE COLUMNS:

UNIT IDENTIFICATION	UNIT STRENGTH		WEAPONS DENSITY
	USMC	USN	
○ HQ CO, 26TH MAR	20-163	1-6	166-M-16
DET, 5TH COMM BN	0-3		24-M-11
DET, 7TH COMM BN	0-3		33-45 PISTOL
✓ DET, 3D DIV POSTAL	0-3		4-M-60
✓ DET, 3D DIV PHOTO	0-4		6-12G SHOTGUN
✓ DET, 3D DIV EXCHANGE	0-3		7-M40 SNIPER RIFLE

○ 1ST BN, 26TH MAR

HAS CO	20-339	1-43	806-M-16
A CO	5-110		239-45 PISTOL
B CO	6-214		22-M-60
C CO	5-215		29-M-79
D CO	6-213		5-50 CAL MG
			9-60MM MORTAR
			7-81MM MORTAR
			8-100MM RR

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

10/1/202

UNIT IDENTIFICATION	UNIT STRENGTH		WEAPONS DENSITY
	USMC	USN	
			14-12G SHOTGUN
			2-FLAME THROWER
			3-MOD
			19-SID
			24-STARLETTE SCOPE

## 6 2D BN, 26TH MAR

H&S CO	20-305	2-58	1049-M-16
E CO	5-217		249-45 PISTOL
F CO	6-205		28-M-60
G CO	6-214		36-M-79
H CO	5-206		1-50 CAL MG
			12-60MM MORTAR
			8-104MM RR
			17-12G SHOTGUN
			1-FLAME THROWER

## O 3D BN, 26TH MAR

H&S CO	17-310	2-37	909-M-16
I CO	6-220		24-M-14
K CO	6-214		230-45 PISTOL
L CO	5-199		37-M-60
M CO	4-196		47-M-79
			16-50 CAL MG
			16-60MM MORTAR
			6-81MM MORTAR
			8-104MM RR
			36-305 ART LGHR

UNCLASSIFIED  
SECRET

SECRET

UNIT IDENTIFICATION	UNIT STRENGTH		WEAPONS DENSITY
	USMC	USN	
			15-12G SHOTGUN
			10-FLAME THROWERS
			2-107MM (M-30)
			3-105MM HOW
			6-MOD
			16-SID
			33-STARLIGHT SCOPE
0 1ST BN, 9TH MAR			
H&S CO	16-355	2-42	862-M-16
CO A	6-198		170-45 PISTOL
CO B	6-192		31-M-60
CO C	6-202		31-M-79
CO D	6-192		2-50 CAL MG
			10-60MM MORTAR
			7-81MM MORTAR
			18-3.5 RKT LCNR
			7-106MM RR
			16-12G SHOTGUN
			10-SID
			17-STARLIGHT SCOPES
0 1ST BN, 13TH MAR			
HQ BTRY	13-128	1-11	474-M16
A BTRY	10-126		153-M-14
B BTRY	4-119		153-M-15 CAL PISTOL
C BTRY	8-130		22-M-60
W BTRY	4-77		22-50 CAL MG
PROV 155 BTRY (REIN)	3-92		5-107MM (M-30)

UNCLASSIFIED



SECRET

D/s DET 238TH FA (USA) C-8 (US ARMY)

10-107MM (HOWTAR)

19-105MM HOW TWD

6-155MM HOW TWD

✓ O AT CO (-), 3D TANK BN 2-71

33-M-16

41-45 PISTOL

2-M-60

10-30 CAL MG

1-50 CAL MG

58-106MM BR

10-45 CAL SMG

✓ O A CO (-) 3D SPBN 2-74

59-M-16

9-45 PISTOL

2-M-79

✓ O 3D PLT, B CO, 3D TK BN 2-22

5-90MM GUN TANK M48A3

21-45 PISTOL

5-30 CAL MG

5-50 CAL MG

5-45CAL MG

✓ O 2D CLR PNT, G CO 3D MED BN 4-16

15-M-16

1-M-14

5-45 PISTOL

O SEC, G BTRY, 65TH ARTY (USA)  
O-7(USA)

2-M-55

7-M-16

O SEC, A BTRY, 1/44 ARTY (USA)

UNCLASSIFIED  
SECRET

SECRET

UNIT IDENTIFICATION

USMC

+ USN

WEAPONS DENSITY

✓ DET, C CO 3D MT BN 0-10

✓ DET, B CO 9TH MT BN 0-1

✓ DET, H&amp;S CO 3D MT BN 0-14

NOTED B CO (REIN) 3D RECON BN

BN CO 2-78

3D PLT D CO 1-19

1ST PLT A CO 5TH RON 0-8

1-45 PISTOL

8-M-16

2-M-60

10-M-16

1-M-16

14-M-16

1-M79

4-50 CAL MG  
97-M-16

2-M-14

3-45 PISTOL

4-M-60

9-M-79

2-50 CAL MG

2-STARLIGHT SCOPE

## B. ADDITIONAL US FORCES IN DIRECT OR GENERAL SUPPORT OF 26TH MARINES

✓ NOTED DET 1ST SEARCH LIGHT BTRY 1-13 (USMC)

DET 3D ENGR BN 5-71 (USMC)

13-M-16

66-M-16

1-M-14

7-45 PISTOL

5-M-60

SUB UNIT #1 FLSC "A" 1-53 (USMC)

53-M-16

1-45 PISTOL

1-M-60

DET VMGR-152

0-4 (USMC)

2-M-14

1-45 PISTOL

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DET MAG-36	0-14 (USMC)	1-45 CAL SMG
		11-M-16
DET MATCU-62	1-8 (USMC)	2-45 CAL PISTOL
		6-M-14
DET WERS-17	0-3 (USMC)	3-45 PISTOL
		3-M-14
DET MWCS-1	0-4 (USMC)	2-45 PISTOL
DET HAMS-36	1-1 (USMC)	4-M-14
		1-M-14
		1-45 PISTOL
DET "B" MASS-3 (ASNAT)	7-29 (USMC)	30-M-14
		9-45 CAL PISTOL
		1-M-60
		2-M-79
		1-45 SMG
DET 20TH TASS	2-3	3-M-16
		2-38 CAL REVOLVER
15TH/8TH AERIAL PORT SQDN	2-15	15-M-16
		238 CAL REVOLVER
1ST MOBILE UNIT	0-4	4-M-16
DET SMOKE PLT (USA)	1-7 (USA)	7-M-16
		1-45 PISTOL
DET "B" CBMU 301	1-34 (USN)	27-M-16
		8-45 CAL PISTOL
		2-M-60
		4-12G SHOTGUN
DET 3D DENTAL CO	1-1 (USN)	1-M-16
		1-45 PISTOL

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

<u>UNIT IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>UNIT STRENGTH</u>	<u>WEAPONS DENSITY</u>
	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
DET 37TH SIGNAL BN (USA)	1-7 (USA)	6-M-16 1-45 PISTOL 2-M-60 1-M-79
C. ARVN FORCES/USSF		
FOB 3	1-2 (USMC)	210-M-16
	0-3 (USN)	82-45 PISTOL
	20-105 (USA)	18-M-60
	2-455 (ARVN)	56-M-79
CAG "0" CAG-3	1-31 (USMC)	13-30 CAL MG 17-60MM MORTAR 3-81MM MORTAR 4-3.5 RKT LGHE 1-107MM (M-30) 9-45 CAL SMG 20-30 CAL CARBINE (M-1) 5-90MM RR 15-BAR 1-9MM PISTOL 1-K-1 CARBINE 5-SNIPER RIFLE (M-40) 1-STARLIGHT SCOPE 255-30 CAL CARBINE, MZ 2 2-METASCOPE

Not True

37TH RANGIER BN (ARVN)

2-3 (USA)

287-M-16

14-435 (ARVN)

60

**UNCLASSIFIED****SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

21-M-79

10-30 CAL MG

1-50 CAL MG

4-60MM MORTAR

1-106MM RR

1-57MM RR

GP-4

CCF

872

RELEASED BY

*[Handwritten signature]*


G-3

G-2/COE/CAL/CS/SS/CEO

*[Handwritten signature]*

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

<b>SHOVE COC</b>	
OP CHIEF	<i>[initials]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[initials]</i>
G-2 W.	<i>[initials]</i>
DCPO	<i>[initials]</i>
APD	<i>[initials]</i>
ACTION	<i>[initials]</i>

ZNY CCCCC  
 O 161528Z MAR 68  
 FM CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP NSAD CUA VIET  
 TO ZEN/ CF CLEARWATER  
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVSORV  
 RU HNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RU SAL/CDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RU HNA/COM THREE NCB  
 RUMHVH/DASA I CORPS  
 RUMHVH/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 ZEN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY  
 RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADV  
 VUMNVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
 RUMHVP/THIRD MARINE REG  
 RUMHUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

C-3-3

COC-4-CG-C/S-LEO

PAGE 2 RUMHN 066B C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 RUHHBRA/COMSERVPAC  
 RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP PBR MOBILE BASE ONE  
 RUMHMA/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUYEUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUYEUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RU FUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUYEUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 RUMFKRF/COMRIVSLOT ONE  
 RUMSBB/MSTSO VIETNAM  
 RUMHFL/CG FLC  
 RU NPR/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV  
 RUMSVA/CG USARV LONG BINH  
 BT

OPSUM 16 MAR 68

A. CTF CLEARWATER 141436Z (CTF CLEARWATER OPORD 2-68)

1. FOLL CRAFT REMAINED AT DONG HA RAMP OFFLOADING AFTER 161800H.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 3 RUMHN 066B C O N F I D E N T I A L

- A. ONE LCU/ONE YFU
- B. TWO LCM-8'S
- C. TWO AMMI BARGES
- 2. OPS CONTINUED IAW ANNEX C REF A
- 3. ALL CRAFT TRANSITED WITHOUT INCIDENT
- 4. CARGO MOVED 16 MAR 68 AS OF 1800H
  - E. 2460.2 S/T CUA VIET TO DONG HA
  - B. 2186.8 M/T CUA VIET TO DONG HA
  - C. 379.9 S/T BACKLOAD TO CUA VIET
  - D. 903.3 M/T BACKLOAD TO CUA VIET
  - E. POL: 40 MGAL DIESEL, 100MGAL JP-4,  
51 MGAL MOGAS, 20 MGAL AVGAS

GP-4  
BT**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

15:RHH:wba  
17 Mar 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADC

From: Division Engineer

Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress for period 9-15Mar68

Ref: (a) Public Works, Work Request TMD-131-68, 15Mar68

1. The following occurred during the report period.

a. Reference (a) requested a 16'X32' Garbage shed with concrete slab and loading docks be constructed adjacent to Route 1. It will serve as a central garbage and trash collection point for the Quang Tri complex. It is planned to have units haul their garbage to this central point where it will be picked up by a civilian contractor and hauled away.

b. 1st and 2d increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

(1) Horizontal - 11th Engineer Battalion continues to provide equipment and operators for the road work at Quang Tri. The fill on the main access road parallel to the railroad track is completed and the culvert is in place. No work has been done on the existing pioneer roads into the cantonment or on the two unimproved access roads from Route 1 since MCB-10 is still engaged in higher priority work. Work on the HcBn access road and CP parking lot will begin during next report period.

(2) Vertical -

a. Base Defense Bunker - The Base Defense Bunker structure has been completed and backfill is approximately 70% complete. Work continues on interior wiring, sandbag reveting, and remaining backfill.

b. HcBn Messhall - Footings have been poured for the messhall foundation and roof trusses have been fabricated. Slab will be poured 17 or 18 March.

c. 3dMed Facility - A section of the Triage Building slab has been poured and forms have been laid for two quonsets. The Medical Supply Butler building has been fabricated and erection will commence during next report period.



d. Cantonments - The status of STA Hut construction is as follows:

<u>Cantonment</u>	<u>Comp</u>	<u>Under Const</u>	<u>1st &amp; 2d Increment % Complete</u>
3dTkBn	20	0	100%
3dMTBn	36	0	100%
3dSPBn	1	1	15%
3dLngrBn	0	1	7%
HqBn	48	6	63%

Very respectfully,

*R C McCutchan*  
R. C. MC CUTCHAN

## OPERATION CHECKERS - FINAL PHASE

17 March 1968

1. The final phase of Operation Checkers in moving the last of the Division elements from the Phu Bai/Gia Le Areas to Dong Ha/Quang Tri Areas commenced on 2 Mar 68 by Rough Rider Convoy. The Rough Rider Convoy will complete 36% of the total move, as of this date.

2. The breakdown of task vehicles by Rough Rider Convoys follows:

	<u>TASK VEHICLES</u>	<u>TASK TRLS</u>	<u>SEMI TRLS</u>
2 Mar 68	47	24	3
5 Mar 68	67	48	8
8 Mar 68	73	47	7
11 Mar 68	54	39	6
14 Mar 68	55	42	7
17 Mar 68	<u>56</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>6</u>
Total	352	235	37

3. Breakdown by units is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TO BE MOVED TRK LOADS</u>	<u>*HAS BEEN MOVED TRK LOADS</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE COMPLETED</u>
Hq Bn	447	221	49%
3d Engr Bn	800	175	22%
3d Tank Bn	95	103	99%
3d SP Bn	60	46	77%
3d Bn 12th Mar	20	7	35%
2d Bn 1st Mar	120	9	7%
3d MT Bn	<u>100</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>34%</u>
Total	1642	595	36%

\*Based on 2 Trl loads equaling 1 Trk load and 1 Semi equaling 4 Trk loads.

Enclosure (1)

(1) Encl 168

## % EQUIPMENT MOVED

As of 17 March 68

	<u>EQUIP</u>	<u>SUPPLIES</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
TANKS	100	98	98
ENGR	35	25	90
SP BN	95	40	90
3D MT	33	0	33
HQ BN	66	50	73

Enclosure (2)

Encl 189

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

JEG:gab  
17 Mar 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress report for the period  
10-16 March 1968

1. The following was accomplished during the report period:

a. On 15 March 1968 a work request was submitted to Public Works for a 16' X 32' Garbage shed with concrete slab and loading docks be constructed adjacent to Route #1. It will serve as a central garbage and trash collection point for the Quang Tri complex. It is planned to have units haul their garbage to this central point where it will be picked up by a civilian contractor and hauled away.

b. 1st and 2nd increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

(1) Horizontal - The fill on the main access road parallel to the railroad track is completed and the culvert is in place. No work has been done on the existing pioneer roads into the cantonment areas or on the two unimproved access roads from Route #1 since MCB-10 is still engaged in higher priority work. Work on the HqBn access road and CP parking lot will begin during next report period.

(2) Vertical -

(a) Base Defense Bunker - The Base Defense Bunker structure has been completed and backfill is approximately 70% complete. Work continues on interior wiring, sandbag reveting, and remaining backfill.

(b) HqBn Messhall - Footings have been poured for the messhall foundation and roof trusses have been fabricated. Slab will be poured 17 or 18 March.

(c) 3dMed Facility - A section of the Triage Building slab has been poured and forms have been laid for two quonsets. The Medical Supply Butler building has been fabricated and erection will commence during next report period.

e. Cantonments - Occupying units have continued erection of tents for personnel shelters and working spaces. Personnel protective emplacements are being dug adjacent to living and working spaces as

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

JEG:gab  
17 Mar 1968

Subj: Quang Tri Development, progress report for the period  
10-16 March 1968

personnel move into the cantonment areas. Five additional SEA huts have been completed in the Division CP area for administrative purposes.

d. An additional 14 officers and 116 enlisted moved forward from Phu Bai to Quang Tri during the week. The G-1, G-5, and ADC sections plus additional elements of Headquarters Battalion became operational at Quang Tri. 3dMarDiv message announced closing of 3dMarDiv CP (Rear) at Phu Bai and opening at Quang Tri as of 141410H March 1968. Figures on personnel now located at Quang Tri are as follows:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Marines	249	2,524
Navy	27	669
Army	48	297
Air Force	<u>2</u>	<u>37</u>
Total	326	3,527

\*3dMarDiv Marine strength is 124 officers and 1,825 enlisted.

Very respectfully,

J. E. GLICK

UNCLASSIFIED

Plan 7  
11

DTG 172230 MAR

Intel Rpt from Intel source in Quang Tri City

On informant who was ex-VC, has brother who is an NVA Bn Cdr and a sister who also provides info gave the 1st Bde, 1st Air Cav much info on caches & says he will point them out on the ground or air.

An agency in Quang Tri (?) said they believe the informant to be a high level intel source who has 'inside' contacts w/ the NVA/VC. This agency(?) gave the info A-1 eval. The informant predicted the FET offensive & he's also turned in 4 NVA political leaders to GVN. The informant was very coop: He states general offensive in approx 2 months - along Hwy 9, Dong Ha, Cua Viet & S. along Hwy 1 to Quang Tri Air Strip, La Vang & likewise attack on Khe Sanh & the Mekong Delta. Danang Harbor will be taken & 4 days after the start of the offensive the road from QT to Danang will be heavily mined. 15,000 men will initiate the attack along RT 9 & another 15,000 will be committed to Khe Sanh. 10 Bns. of an elite force are in NVN preparing. The M-16/7000 wire will be destroyed with an armored division & shelling. Gnd. troops will receive gnd. & air support. Negotiations will commence following the attack & occupation.

Encl 171

H This attests to the fact that hindsight is better than foresight. S

Plans

The period preceding TET is traditionally one of tension. NVA/VC resupply and replacement was conducted with some success during the Christmas and Western New Year ~~at~~ truce periods. At the present time enemy units in the 30 NAR DA AO are at manning level and some are at full strength. It must be assumed that they have supplies and ammunition to last until the TET truce period during which they can replenish their losses.

It is evident that the NFL cannot win a military victory and a political victory ~~can be~~ ~~significant~~ is their goal. This can be achieved through negotiation. Negotiation must be conducted from a position of strength. Unrest in the U.S. over the Vietnam War and the impending <sup>Presidential</sup> elections provides the LAO DONG Party with an historical precedent. France was in much the same position <sup>as the US appears to be now</sup> in 1954 prior to the partition in 1954. At that time Ho Chi Minh gained the victory at Dien Bien Phu and was able to negotiate from a position of power. P.W.'s, documents and agent rpts, both high and low level, indicate the possibility of negotiations in March or April <sup>inter</sup> ~~next~~ year. Nat'l news media have pointed out the less rigid policy of Hanoi's latest communique.

Encl 172

negotiations. To complete the cycle, it appears evident that Hanoi requires a victory of significance to ~~the~~ gain a <sup>point</sup> ~~place~~ of power from which to enter negotiations. While a major victory against a significant installation or area such as Germany would provide this, it is not likely that it would be successful and the losses the enemy would suffer are prohibitive. It is reasonable then that to increase war weariness in the U.S. ~~the~~ a significant victory could be gained through attrition <sup>of</sup> ~~against~~ U.S. forces.

To ~~meet this~~ accomplish this task and to remove the people from GVN control and influence with <sup>minimal losses</sup> ~~to himself~~ to himself a series of attacks throughout the area ~~seen~~ directed against lines of communications, Combined Action units, district and sub sector headquarters, and school targets in major population areas ~~with points~~ are indicated.

In addition, ~~in order to~~ <sup>advised</sup> following ~~previous~~ <sup>by</sup> ~~indicated~~ course of action, the enemy does not normally put all of his "eggs in one basket." In keeping with this, the period between the western New Year and TET provides a time to examine the success of this program and have a built in period <sup>during TET</sup> when he can re-supply and refurbish his units in preparation for a continuation of the same program.



From: Liberation Troops, Northern QUANG TRI

To: Americans in Northern QUANG TRI

PsyOps

RUM

G-2

After the fighting with the liberation troops at North of cam LO (BA THUNG) on 4 MAR 68, the Americans lost and now still left their dead bodies in the battle.

But, according to the tolerant policy of the SVN. NLF, we permit you to come there to pick up your dead comrades, but you must obey the following measures:

- 1 - Not more than 1 Company to come there (No Vietnamese troops or civilian).
- 2 - Helicopters maybe authorized, but not more than 3 every landing.
- 3 - Don't carry weapons (even in helicopters), each <sup>must</sup> carry white flags or wear white band (also for helicopters).
- 4 - you must come from exact way and direction stipulated.
- 5 - Authorized period to come there to pick up dead bodies is from 1000H to 1300H on 10 MAR 68.

If you do not carry out exactly the above stipulations or have betray actions, the liberation troops will strictly punish you.

Encl 173

Thông báo cho quân đội Mỹ  
đóng ở Bãi Quang trị tất

Trong trận giao chiến với Quân giải phóng miền Nam Việt Nam tại Bãi Cam Lộ (Ba Thung) ngày 4 - tháng 3 năm 1968 quân đội Mỹ đã thua, hiện còn bỏ lại binh khí và đồ quân dụng nhiều.

Do chính sách nhân đạo của Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền Nam Việt Nam Quân giải phóng Bãi Quang trị cho phép quân đội Mỹ được đến lấy các đồ vật và chôn cất, nhưng phải theo đúng những qui định sau đây:

- 1/ Số người đi lấy các đồ vật không được quá một đại đội (Cần dùng thuốc dẫn hoặc binh sĩ người Việt).
- 2/ Có thể dùng máy bay trực thăng, nhưng mỗi lần hạ cánh không được quá 3 chiếc.
- 3/ Khi đi không được mang theo vũ khí, kể cả vũ khí trên máy bay, có cờ trắng hoặc băng trắng trên cánh tay phải của mỗi người, máy bay cũng phải có cờ trắng.
- 4/ Phải đi đúng đường, hướng và đến đúng vị trí qui định.

5/ Thời gian được phép lấy các đồ vật từ 10 giờ đến 13 giờ ngày 10/3/1968.

Kể không chấp hành đúng qui định hoặc có hành động phản trắc, Quân giải phóng cũng quyết trừng trị.

Quân giải phóng miền Nam V.N

Thông báo cho quân đồn Mỹ  
đồng ở Bắc Quảng-trị Việt

Trong trận giao chiến với Quân giải phóng miền Nam Việt-nam tại Bắc Cam-lô (Ba-thưng) ngày 4 tháng 3 năm 1968 quân đồn Mỹ đã thua, hiện còn bỏ xác binh sĩ và đồ quân lạc chiến trường.

Do chính sách nhân đạo của Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền Nam Việt-nam, Quân giải phóng Bắc Quảng-trị cho phép quân đồn Mỹ được đến lấy xác đồng đội về chôn cất, nhưng phải theo đúng những qui định sau đây:


- 1/ Sĩ quân đi lấy xác không được qua một đại đội (Cấm dừng thường dân hoặc binh sĩ người Việt)
- 2/ Có thể dùng máy bay trực thăng, nhưng mỗi lần hạ cánh không được quá 3 phút.
- 3/ Khi đi không được mang theo vũ khí kể cả vũ khí trên máy bay, có cờ trắng hoặc băng trắng trên cánh tay phải của mỗi người, máy bay cũng phải có cờ trắng.
- 4/ Phải đi đúng đường và hướng, đến đúng vị trí đã qui định.
- 5/ Được giao được phép lấy xác từ 10 giờ đến 13 giờ ngày 10/3/1968.

Nếu không chấp hành đúng qui định hoặc có hành động phản trắc Quân giải phóng quyết trừng trị.

Quân giải phóng Miền Nam Việt Nam

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED



*Start file on Army  
TKC and armored car  
unit.  
dig out past page  
Traffic Same Subj.  
3/5(-) TKC Co etc  
H*

ORVPB085MMZVA 689 MFA771  
OO RUMHVP  
DE RUMWAA 2014 0770312  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 170312Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VN  
RUMGLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
RU HVH/CG USA SPT CMD DNG  
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUMDA/CG USARV LBN  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
UMHMB/CG FIRST ACD  
RUMSBH/CG ONE ZERO FIRST ABN DIV  
RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD  
RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPACT  
BT

## UNIT DEPLOYMENT (U)

- A. CG PCV 00235 55& 120930Z MAR 68 (PASEP)
- B. CG III MAF 150546Z MAR 68
- C. CG III MAF 160532Z MAR 68
- 1. REF A, RCVD 161500H MAR 68, REQ 3/5 AC SQDN AND ATTACHED TNK CO BE DEPLOYED PCV AREA WITH HQ 3/5, 2 ACTRPS, AND TNK CO PROGRAMMED

PAGE TWO RUMWAA 2014 ~~SECRET~~  
FOR THIRD MARDIV AND REMAINNNING AC TRP SOR 101ST ABN DIV. REFS B AND C DIRECTED DEPLOYMENT CO C 2D/34TH ARMOR TO DONG HA.


- 2. FOR CG FIRST MARDIV:
- A. DTPLOY 1 AC TRP(-) BY SEA TO HUE O/A 19MARCH. PASS OPCON TO CG III MAF ON DEPARTURE DNG; ADVISE EFFECTIVE DTG.
- B. DEPLOY 3/5(-) BY SEA TO DONG HA BEGINNING O/A 23MARCH. PASS OPCON TO CG III MAF ON DEPARTURE DANANG; ADVISE EFFECTIVE DTG.
- 3. FOR CG PCV: ASSUME OPCON ELMS 3/5 AC SQDN UON AGRIVAL HUE/DONG HA. ADVISE EFFECTIVEIDTG'S.
- 4. FOR CG USA SPT CMD DNG: REQ MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT/FACILITIES BE PROGRAMMED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYED FORCES.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

VV NHB936T  
 PP RUMHVP RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 028B 0771935  
 ZNY EEEEE  
 P 171145Z MAR 68  
 FM CDR HUE SUPPLY RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 TO RUMHN/CTF CLEARWATER  
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPACT DANANG  
 RUMSMB/COMUSMACV  
 RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS  
 RUMSBB/MBM NAVFORV  
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHMA/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHLA/CG TF XRAY  
 RUMHVP/CDR THIRD CB BN  
 RUMHVV/DSA I CORPS  
 RUMHVV/SA FIRST ARVN DIV  
 RUMHN/NSAD TAN MY  
 RUMHN/NSAD CUA VIET  
 RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR



SHOVE CDR  
 OP CHIEF  
 G-3 W.O.  
 G-2 W.O.  
 DOPD  
 APO  
 ACTION

CDV

PAGE TWO RUMHN 028B UNCLAS E F T O  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARINE REG  
 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMHBRA/COMSERVPAC  
 RUMFKRP/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUYSUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUYSUAE/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUYSUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 RUMFKRF/COMRIVFLOT ONE  
 RUMSBB/MSTSO VIETNAM

BT  
 UNCLAS E F T O  
 CLEA

WATER OPSUM 17 MAR 68

1. OPS CONT IAW PLAN B. ALL CRAFT TRANS W/O INCIDENT
2. 50 ST/30M GALS MUGAS
3. ALL CARGO ARRIVING TAN MY TRANS TO HUE
4. ONE AMMI BARGE AND HOSES AND PUMP FROM M-925 DAMAGED DURING  
 EARLY MORNING FIRE AT LCU RAMP HUE. ALL EXCEPT PUMP NOW BACK  
 IN SERVICE.

BT

C193

1/CPC-2-4-CG-CEC (A)


UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

VV P H490...490

DO DUNSEM DUMSE  
 D P H-5 385 0771935  
 ZAY CCCCC  
 O 171401Z M R 68  
 FM THIRD M RDIV COC  
 TO PCV TOC  
 INFO III M F COC  
 COMUS M CV

BT



*Confidential*  
 #36

OPN N POLEON/S LINE SITREP 59 FM 170621-171220H M R 68.

1. LOC: S M  
 2. SUM OF OPNS: B CO 1ST MTR C BN CONDUCTED SWEEPS IN SOUTHERN P RT OF SSIGNED AO. LL OTHER UNIS CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE PTLS AND OPS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AO.

3. CONTACTS: NONE

4. SIG EV NTS:

REF TO MY SITREP 57 P R 45: I 170630H B CO, 1ST ANTLACS MB OBSVD 2 PERSONS RUNNING IN RE OF THE EXPOSED 105MM RDS. FIRED S. NO WOUNDED 1 8-10 YR OLD BOY. THE OTHER PERSON WAS THE BOYS FATHER. THE BOY WAS GIVEN MED TREATMENT BOTH WERE MED TO QU NT TRI. 105MM RDS WERE BLOWN IN PLACE.

5. PL NS: B CO 1ST MTR C BN CONDUCTING SWEEP IN THE SOUTHERN P RT OF SSIGNED O. LL OTHR UNITS CONDUCTING AGGRESSIVE PLS NS OPS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AO'S.

6. CUM LOSSES:

FR: 155 KI, 683 WI MED, 197 WI MIONR, 3 MI.

N: 883 NV KI, 36 NV POW, 57 VC KIA, 3 VC POW, 170 DET, 53 INN CIV

178 IWC, 77CSWC.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

C-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO


APD

ACTION

*WAPOL EON*  
*01*  
*SALINE*  
*Encl 176*

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPO

IPO

ACTION

Plat  
opcon file

LOC

TOR/192143/DCSC

NNNNO

AIV VPC528ZVA 172BMA792VV RMA796

OO RUMHVP

DE RUMHMA 295 0771528

ZNY SSSSS

O 171552Z MAR 68

FM CG PROV CORPS V

TO ZEN/CG 1ST ACD

ZEN/CG 101ST ABN DIV

ZEN-1/CG TF X-RAY

ZEN-1/CO PROJECT DELTA

RUMMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSVA/CG USARV

RUMHVP/CG 3RD MAR DIV

RUMHLA/CG 1ST MAR DIV

BT

00325 FROM: AVII-GCO.

SUBJ: CHANGE OF OPCON 1 BDE 101ST ABN DIV.

1. EFFECTIVE 130322H MAR OPCON OF 1ST BDE 101ST ABN DIV PASSES FROM CG 1ST ACD TO CG 101ST ABN DIV.

2. BOUNDARY BETWEEN 1ST ACD AND 101ST ABN DIV ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS:

FROM PRESENT JEB STUART AO BOUNDARY AT YD470085 SOUTH TO HILL TOP AT 55465263, SW TO HILL 812 AT YD457047, SOUTH TO STREAM

PAGE TWO RUMHMA 29

YD452019, SOUTH ALONG KHE CA TO YC455996, SSE TO KHA TA LI YC482958, SE ALONG KHE TA ITO STREAM RAO NAI, SOUTH ALONG STREAM TO LAOS BORDER YC583793.

3. DELTA AO, OPERATION SAMURAI REMAINS UNCHANGEABLE.

ACKNOWLEDGE: TOC 53

CG 1ST ACD

CG 101ST ABN DIV

CG PROJECT DELTA

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

G-4/COE/CEOC/CG 9

Encl 177

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

18 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (A&L)  
To: Assistant Division Commander (A&L) *JG*  
Via: Chief of Staff *WTC*

Subj: Staff Visit Phu Bai, 17 March 1968

*Thanks. I have pulled some of references for my working file. Note question on / a*  
*JG*

1. The undersigned made a staff visit to Phu Bai on 17 March 1968 to meet with representatives of the Division (Rear) still in the Phu Bai Complex. The following topics were discussed.

*To be known if they arrived Phu Bai*  
*JG*  
a. Air Conditioners. The Headquarters Commandant of PCV advised that the 13 air conditioners arrived in Saigon. Air is being fragged for 18 March to move the air conditioners to Phu Bai. Upon arrival they will be turned over to LtCol GRANNEY for further transportation to Quang Tri.

b. Division Surgeon. I met with Captain CRUFT to discuss the planned movement of the 3d MedBn and it's MUST Unit to Quang Tri. At the present time the 1st MedBn (1st Division) plans to have their MUST unit up and in operation by 1 April. When this unit is in operation 3d MedBn can start planning to phase it's units into Quang Tri by increments. However, there are certain basic facilities which Captain CRUFT feels should be in being before any phasing out of Phu Bai takes place. These are: Triage; X-Ray; Operating Rooms and the Intensive Care Ward. Unless there are overriding practical reasons for moving the MUST unit earlier, Captain CRUFT recommends we not move it out of Phu Bai until the basic facilities mentioned above are in being. The Seabees have advised the Surgeon this will be approximately 1 May. Captain CRUFT will visit the Quang Tri CP on 19 March for further discussion on this subject.

c. 3d MT Bn. The 3d MT Bn has about 10% of it's 105 cargo handling trucks on deadline. Of the 105 it possesses, 45 are attached to units in the forward area, (15 at Khe Sanh, 15 with the 3d Marines and 15 with TF Robbie and the CAM LO area). Of the 60 odd vehicles available in the Phu Bai area, 3d MT Bn can only muster between 33-40 trucks for convoy runs to Quang Tri, the remaining trucks being used for housekeeping details or are on deadline. Steps are now being taken by the G-4 to recapture the 15 trucks assigned to the 3d Marines, replacing them with OTTERS, and returning the platoon to 3d Mt Bn. When this is accomplished 3d Mt Bn will be able to increase the size of the

Encl 178



convoys by 10-15 additional cargo trucks, thereby accelerating the move of the Division to the Quang Tri area. The sum of the problem is that 3d MT Bn needs more trucks.

d. 1/26, 2/26 and 3/26 Rears. A meeting was held with representatives of the three rears to determine the magnitude of moving the rears from Phu Bai to Quang Tri. All three units are capable of moving on 48 hours notice but will need an allocation of tentage to settle in this area. The following depicts the requirements of each battalion to make the move:

* Permanent Personnel	1/26 10	2/26 21	3/26 22
Trucks Required	40	75	70
Overall Tentage requirements	25	35	25
OH currently in Bns	0	35	4
Tentage to be provided at QT	25	0	21
Organic Vehicles making move	9(5 D/L)	15(3 D/L)	3

\* Figure does not include transients to move on any given day. Normally, total for 3 Bns averages 60-100. On day of move transients will be added to the permanent personnel figures.

It was concluded at the meeting that the best time for moving these rears would be sometime between the 1 - 15 April. By that time the move of most of the essential personnel and equipment required by the Division at Quang Tri will be completed.

A paper is being prepared by the Deputy C/S covering the immediate and long range plans for moving the ~~26th Marines~~ ALL Bn Rears to the Quang Tri area. Paper should be completed within a week.

E. LtCol GRANEY (G-4) As of 17 March, 36% of the Division move has been completed. Breakdown by units is attached as enclosure (1). It should be noted that these figures do not include the supplies and equipment in the G-5 Warehouse, Special Services gear, Reproduction, Photo Lab and supplies and equipment for Division Clubs. As a ballpark figure, an additional 350 truck loads will be required. It was agreed that this equipment will be sent up on an "on call" basis when adequate storage and facilities are available in the Quang Tri area.

Percentage of equipment moved by unit is depicted in enclosure (2).

Enclosure (3) is a memorandum that Asst C/S G-4 has put out to stop pilferage on the convoys.

Enclosure (4) portrays the facilities presently occupied by the 3d Division in Phu Bai and those which will still be occupied once HqBn has vacated the area.

Enclosure (5) lists the number of vehicles that were in the convoy for 17 March.

LtCol GRANEY advised that III MAF G-4 is initiating action to have the Army 57th Truck Co, Dong Ha area, placed under the control of FLSG-Bravo. If accomplished, this will release 9th MtBn trucks working the ramp and will improve greatly our truck posture in the 3d Division.

In general the movement north is running smoothly. Major WARD and LtCol GRANEY are experiencing no major problems and are getting excellent cooperation from all hands. However, due to the magnitude of the move and some slippage to date, it is not anticipated the move will be completed until late April.

Respectfully,

  
F. I. FENTON, Jr.

- Enclosures (1) Operation Checkers - Final Phase  
(2) Equipment Moved Percentage  
(3) Memo on Security of Property on Convoys  
(4) 3d MarDiv Facilities Phu Bai  
(5) Convoy for 17 March

18 Mar 68

1. Called everyone to stress importance of our basic ~~mission~~ defense task.

What I have to say won't take long because it is straight forward and simple to understand. It's a matter of survival. We have a real threat around us and frankly I don't think we are ready for it.

Every person on this base has a primary job <sup>and a backup</sup> but he can't do it if the base is overrun so first priority is making sure that this base is secure.

We don't have any security forces assigned for the primary purpose of defending the base so it is up to the tenant units to do it. Every officer and man on this base plays a part.

We have a <sup>Base</sup> defense coordinator, Al Thomas, but he can't defend the base by himself. He is just what the name implies - a coordinator.

We have the base broken down into sectors for defense and have sector commanders assigned. The sector commanders are personally responsible for the defense of their sectors. This means insuring that first class positions are prepared, that the positions are manned, that the people assigned know what their job is and how to do it, that they are properly supervised and inspected regularly. Blockhouse positions must be prepared & personnel assigned.

Every man in room ought to know  
where he goes and what he is to do in case of  
attack.

Disorientation is the key to success - We have  
to release first during daylight then at  
night. If we have mass confusion  
we lost.

Defect sector and unit commander. To  
require every officer and staff NCO to be  
familiar with their sector defense plan.  
They have to go and work with the lines  
in their sector - know where the primary  
positions are and the blocking positions.  
Change upon subordinate with the  
construction, maintenance and patrolling  
these positions - require them to inspect  
them daily.

Gen Tompkins

Wanted to let the general know

and inspection for them all

~~Don't know~~

Referred to in all

Thomas area of concern -

~~the fact that it is a~~

about this.

~~not to~~

Will take a few people off of

their primary defense task & will initiate unit's other

than 3d Marine Div. I have had no objection and all

with cooperation, but did want general to know. I feel this

essential and something we have to do.

FILE 5000

183168

**SECRET**Copy 52 of 110 Copies  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
DANANG, VIETNAMSer: **00106468**

18 MAR 1968

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Provisional Corps, Vietnam

Subj: Letter of Instruction (LOI 18-68) (U)

- Ref: (a) Maps: (1) Indochina and Thailand, JOG (G) Series 1501; Scale 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1 and ND 49-5  
(2) Vietnam, AMS Series L7014, Scale 1:50,000
- (b) ForBul 005440 (III MAF Task Org/Troop List (Current Month)
  - (c) ForO P03121.5 (SOP for Ground and Air Operations)
  - (d) RVNAF JCS/MACV Combined Campaign Plan (Current Month)
  - (e) I ARVN Corps/III MAF Combined Campaign Plan (Current Half Year)
  - (f) III MAF OpO 13-67
  - (g) COMUSMACV ltr MACJ 321 of 3Mar68, Subj: Letter of Instruction - Role and Missions of Provisional Corps Vietnam (S)
  - (h) ForO 3121.4 (SOP for Combined Action Program)
  - (i) ForO 3410.1 (SOP for Psychological Operations)
  - (j) MACV Dir 10-4
  - (k) ICCI 5402.7 (Establishment of Zone Coordinator, for the Northern Sector, ICTZ)
  - (l) CG, III MAF msg 281300Z Feb68
  - (m) COMUSMACV ltr MACVJOO of 7Mar68 (S), Subj: Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets
  - (n) For/SA I CorpsO 5213.2 (Operational Reports Required)
  - (o) CG III MAF 291244Z Feb68
  - (p) ICCI 5080.4 (Civic Action and Revolutionary Development Reporting)
  - (q) ICCI 5080.3 (Organization and Logistic Support of Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP Teams)
  - (r) MACV Dir 701-9
  - (s) ForO P4000.5 (SOP for Logistics)
  - (t) ICCI 5560.6 (Highway Traffic Regulations)
  - (u) NAVFORVREPDNGINST 11011.1 (Real Estate Procedures, Rent Free Acquisition)
  - (v) NAVFORVREPDNGINST 11011.2 (Right of way Clearance for Upgrading Land Lines of Communication)
  - (w) NAVFORVREPDNGINST 11011.3 (Real Estate Leasing Procedure)
  - (x) MACV Dir 10-11
  - (y) ForO P02000.1 (III MAF COMPLAN)

Task Organization: As published in reference (b) and modifications thereto.

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
Declassified after 12 years.

**SECRET**  
UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 180

SECRET

**SECRET**

## 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Current Intelligence Estimates, Intelligence Summaries and Periodic Reports.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) GVN and RVNAF, paragraph 203 of reference (c).

(2) US and FVMA Forces in I Corps Tactical Zone, paragraph 204 of reference (c). Mission assignments for the following major commands are issued in separate LOI's:

- (a) 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
- (b) 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
- (c) Americal Division
- (d) 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (-)
- (e) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
- (f) 2nd Brigade, ROKMC

(3) LOI's currently in effect for 3d Marine Division and 1st Cavalry Division (AM) will remain in effect until modified or superseded by CG, PCV LOI's to these units.

## 2. MISSION

III MAF conducts military operations in ICTZ in support of, and in coordination with, CG, I ARVN Corps in order to assist the GVN to defeat the VC/NVA and to extend control throughout Region I.

## 3. EXECUTION

a. Concept. CG III MAF employs assigned forces in ICTZ in accordance with references (c), (d) and (e) and in coordination with CG, I ARVN Corps and US/FVMAF commanders to:

(1) Defend the RVN border areas along the DMZ and the border with Laos to include:

- (a) Containment and anti-invasion operations.
- (b) Development and maintenance of the Strong Point/Obstacle System and operations in the Defile Area as set forth in reference (f).

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

**SECRET**

(c) Location and interdiction of enemy infiltration from NVN and Laos into ICTZ.

(2) Locate and destroy enemy forces, bases and logistic systems within ICTZ.

(3) Provide security for areas, installations and IOC's of economic, political and military significance in agreement with CG, I ARVN Corps.

(4) Assist RVNAF in support of revolutionary development and pacification within capabilities to include:

(a) Provisions for territorial security in areas undergoing revolutionary development.

(b) Elimination of the VC infrastructure and the VC tax collection system.

(c) Denying the enemy the use of resources from the national economy.

(d) Military civic action activities.

(e) Cooperation with and temporary support of refugee authorities.

(5) Conduct psychological operations in support of GVN and US/FMNAF objectives.

b. Tasks. Provisional Corps, Vietnam in coordination with ARVN/III MAF/FMNAF commanders and in accordance with reference (e) and (g) will:

(1) Locate and destroy enemy forces, bases, and logistic installations in assigned areas.

(2) Defend in assigned area against enemy incursions across the D'Z and Laotian border.

(3) Develop and maintain the Strong Point/Obstacle System and conduct operations in the Defile Area in accordance with reference (f).

(4) Locate and interdict routes of infiltration in assigned areas.

(5) Defend principal military installations, and other areas, installations, and IOC's of political, economic and military importance in assigned areas.

(6) Conduct surveillance and reconnaissance in assigned area

**SECRET**

SECRET

**SECRET**

and perform such additional reconnaissance tasks as may be assigned by this headquarters.

(7) Provide security in coordination with NMCP units in area, for dredges and for the NMCP construction efforts in the Gua Viet and Col Co/Tan My areas, and for the NMCP construction effort in opening and upgrading Routes One and Nine and Hai Lang Beach Road.

(8) Provide security for logistics craft in the navigable inland waterways.

(9) Assist RVNAF, as requested and appropriate, in support of revolutionary development and pacification (see reference (e)) to include:

(a) Provisions for security in areas undergoing revolutionary development.

(b) Elimination of the VC infrastructure and the VC tax collection system, with special emphasis on a coordinated intelligence effort with ARVN forces and GVN civil authorities.

(c) Denying the enemy the use of resources from the national economy.

(d) Military civic action activities as appropriate.

(e) Cooperation with and temporary support of refugee authorities, as required, when refugees are generated by military operations.

(10) Provide supporting fires and be prepared to provide a reaction force, in accordance with reference (h), for Combined Action Platoons within assigned area.

(11) Be prepared on 12 hours notice to provide one reinforced infantry battalion for employment anywhere in the RVN. In the event the foregoing battalion is committed, be prepared, on an additional 12 hours notice, to provide the remainder of a regimental (brigade) size force anywhere in the RVN.

(12) Conduct psychological operations in support of GVN and US/FRVAF objectives in accordance with references (e) and (i).

(13) Perform duties as Zone Coordinator for assigned area in accordance with references (j) and (k).

(14) Be prepared to provide Marine BLT for SIF rotation as directed by this headquarters.

**SECRET**  
UNCLASSIFIED



SECRET

SECRET

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Plan and conduct ground and air operations in accordance with the instructions in reference (c) in area as defined by ref (1) and modifications thereto.

(2) Reference (d) constitutes the basic planning guidance to CG, I ARVN Corps and CG III MAF and is promulgated annually by RVNAF JGS and COMUSMACV. That plan is supported by semiannual combined campaign plans (reference (e)) produced by CG III MAF.

(3) Request TAOR's and areas of operation from this headquarters in order for coordination to be effected with CG, I Corps.

(4) Submit requests for employment of SLF in accordance with reference (c).

(5) Tactical Air Support in RVN is managed centrally by DEPCOMUSMACV for Air (Cdr 7AF).

(6) In accordance with reference (m) close air support of all elements of PCV is provided through the Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS) and designated Direct Air Support Centers (DASC's). Close air support of Marine units will be provided by aircraft of the First Marine Aircraft Wing whenever practicable.

(7) CG, PCV is authorized direct liaison and coordination with CG, 1st ARVN Division. Matters requiring approval of CG, I ARVN Corps or of RVNAF JGS will be forwarded via this headquarters.

(8) Reports in accordance with references (n) and (o).

(9) Civic action and revolutionary development reporting will be in accordance with reference (p). MEDCAP reporting will be in accordance with reference (q).

(10) 3d Marine Division, 101st Airborne Division and 1st Air Cavalry Division are authorized to continue communications with CG USARV or CG FMFPAC/CG III MAF as appropriate with respect to logistic, administration, technical, training, and other matters of uniservice interest as heretofore authorized.

(11) This letter is effective upon receipt.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Administration. In accordance with appropriate service and component command regulations and instructions.

b. Logistics

(1) Logistics support will be provided by appropriate service support commands except as otherwise provided for by agreement or

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

**SECRET**

assignment as to common servicing in accordance with reference (r).

(2) Logistical reports will be submitted in accordance with reference (s).

(3) Reference (t) applies to movement of organic motor transport and requirements for support of convoys passing through assigned areas.

(4) Real estate matters in accordance with references (u), (v) and (w). Coordination of real estate acquisition and allocation is vested in COMNAVFORV as set forth in reference (x).

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. Communication-Electronic in accordance with reference (y).

### b. Command Relationships

(1) CG III MAF exercises operational control of PCV and remaining units in ICTZ as listed in reference (b).


(2) CG PCV exercises operational control of US ground tactical units and designated combat support and combat service support elements within assigned area in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

(3) Units assigned to CG, PCV and non-divisional combat support and combat service support elements which will support PCV are shown in reference (b).

(4) Command relationships existing in ICTZ are shown schematically in Annex A.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT REQUESTED

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUSHMAN



E. E. ANDERSON  
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

ANNEX

### A (COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS)

DISTRIBUTION: CINCPAC (2)  
COMUSMACV (2)  
CG FMFPAC (2)  
CINCUSARPAC (2)

**DECLASSIFIED**

*Top  
Who?  
See?  
Do we or  
P*

~~SECRET~~**SECRET**~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

CINCPACFLT (2)  
COMSEVENTHFLT (2)  
CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
CTF 79 (2)  
CTF 76 (2)  
CDR 7TH AF (2)  
COMNAVFORV (2)  
CG USARV (5)  
CG PROV CORPS V (12)  
CG I FFORCEV (5)  
CG II FFORCEV (2)  
CG 1ST MARDIV (5)  
CG 3D MARDIV (5)  
CG AMERICAL DIV (5)  
CG 1ST CAV DIV(AM) (5)  
CG 1ST MAW (5)  
CG FLC (5)  
CG 1ST LOG CMD (5)  
CO CO C 5TH SF(ABN) (3)  
DSA, I CORPS (2)  
COMNAVFORV REP DNG (2)  
COMNAVSUPPACT DNG (2)  
COM 3D NCB (3)  
HQ, III MAF (2)  
CG 2D ROKMC BDE (5)  
CG 101ST AFN DIV (5)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

**DECLASSIFIED**



**UNCLASSIFIED SECRET**

00000000 LIAISON

\*\*\*\*\* OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE