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PART I  
MESSAGES, ETC

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## 3rd Marine Division

Messages, Etc

May 1968

#1 Msg 010500Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Change of Command  
 #2 Msg 010500Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Change of Command  
 #3 Msg 011241Z Prov Corps V Phu Bai Subj: Revised Boundaries  
 #4 Msg 011443Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #5 Msg 011445Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Assumes & Passes OPCON  
 #6 Mem 02 May 3rd Mar Div Subj: PCV Operation Plan 6-68 (Rice Denial)  
 #7 Msg 301410Z CG PCV Phu Bai Subj: Frag Order Operation Plan 6-68 (Rice Denial)  
 #8 Ltr 02 May 3rd Mar Div Subj: Helicopter Assault Operations w/1 Encl, Staff  
 Study, Increased Utilization of Helicopterborne  
 Exploitation Forces  
 #9 Msg 020245Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Magnetic Influence Mine Cua Viet River  
 #10 Msg 020250Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Spot Report 01-02 May 68  
 #11 Msg 020251Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Magnetic Influences Mine Cua Viet River  
 #12 Msg 020925Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Mine SITREP Cua Viet River  
 #13 Msg 021712Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet SITREP  
 #14 Rpt 03 May 3rd Mar Div Subj: Report of Task Organization  
 #15 Msg 030535Z Task Force Hotel Subj: Terminated Offensive Sweep Conducted Frag  
 Order 3-68  
 #16 Msg 030600Z Task Force Hotel Subj: Frag Order 4-68  
 #17 Msg 031410Z Task Force Hotel Subj: Police of Khe Sanh Base  
 #18 Msg 040410Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Readdress of Task Force Hotel Message of 270412 Apr  
 #19 Msg 040505Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet SITREP, 6 Hour  
 #20 Msg 040750Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Annex A Revised to 3rd Mar Div Operation Order  
 11-68 (Scotland II)  
 #21 Erf 04 May 3rd Mar Div Subj: Brief on Attack Objectives  
 #22 Msg 040835Z Task Force Hotel Subj: Frag Order 5-68  
 #23 Msg 041055Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet 6 Hour SITREP 04 May 68  
 #24 Msg 041500Z BLT 2/4 Subj: Report of Captured Lost Radios  
 #25 Msg 042240Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet 6 Hour SITREP  
 #26 Mem 05 May 3rd Mar Div Subj: Quang Tri Development, Progress for Period  
 27 Apr-3 May 68  
 #27 Mem 05 May 3rd Mar Div Subj: Quang Tri Development, Progress for Period  
 28 Apr-4 May 68  
 #28 Msg 050120Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #29 Msg 050550Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet 6 Hour SITREP 05 May 68  
 #30 Msg 051220Z Prov Corps V Phu Bai Subj: Aviation Support for 2nd Brigade, 1st ACD  
 #31 Msg 051340Z Task Force Hotel Subj: OPCON of Forces  
 #32 Msg 051555Z Task Force Hotel Subj: Deployment Force  
 #33 Msg 051635Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Magnetic/Acoustic Influence Mines  
 #34 Msg 051640Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet 6 Hour SITREP  
 #35 Msg 052255Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #36 Msg 060231Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #37 Msg 060232Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #38 Msg 060233Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #39 Msg 060343Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Augmentation for 26th Marines  
 #40 Msg 061142Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet 6 Hour SITREP 06 May 68  
 #41 Msg 061400Z 3rd Marines Subj: Casualty & Incidents, Final Section of II  
 #42 Msg 061635Z Task Force Hotel Subj: 1st Marine Offensive Sweep of Hill 881  
 #43 Msg 061715Z CTF Clearwater Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet 6 Hour SITREP 06 May 68  
 #44 Msg 070640Z Task Force Hotel Subj: Frag Order 8-68  
 #45 Msg 071015Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Deployment of Forces  
 #46 Msg 071017Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON  
 #47 Msg 071256Z Task Force Hotel Subj: OPCON  
 #48 Msg 071354Z III MAF DaNang Subj: Area of Operations

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#49	Pln	8 May 68	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Operation Brief on PCV Operation Plan 6-68 (Rice Denial)
#50	Msg	080155Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Operation Order 17-68 (Leatherneck Square-Ne Quang Tri) Phase I
#51	Msg	080420Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Logistical Support Concept for 2nd Brigade, 1st ACD, Dong Ha Area
#52	Msg	080653Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Change #1 to Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 11-68 & Scotland II)
#53	Msg	080755Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: OPCON
#54	Msg	080905Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: OPCON
#55	Msg	080907Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Correction to Operation Order 17-68
#56	Msg	080909Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: OPCON
#57	Mem	09 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Rice Denial Coordination Committee
#58	Ltr	09 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Combined Rice Denial Coordinating Committee
#59	Msg	090157Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Operation Plan 6-68 (Rice Denial)
#60	Msg	090600Z	CTF Clearwater	Subj: Battle for Control of the Cua Viet River
#61	Msg	091415Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: OPCON
#62	Msg	091545Z	CO 2nd Brigade, 1 ACD, Dong Ha, RVN	Subj: Periodic Operations Report
#63	Msg	091601Z	CTF Clearwater	Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet 6 Hour SITREP 09 May 68
#64	Mem	10 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Assignment of Headquarters Commandant & Administrative Control of Sub Unit 2
#65	Brf	10 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Action Brief on Appointing Order
#66	Ltr	11 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Appointment as Chairman, Quang Tri Province Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee
#67	Ltr	09 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Combined Rice Denial Coordination Committee
#68	Mem	10 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Beginning Tomorrow the KBA will be Included in the KIA Figure
#69	Rpt	10 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Casualty Figures
#70	Msg	100203Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: OPCON
#71	Msg	100415Z	CG Prov Corps V Phu Bai	Subj: Unit Deployment
#72	Msg	100515Z	CTF Clearwater	Subj: NSAD Cua Viet Received Enemy Artillery & Boat Incident
#73	Msg	101325Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: OPCON
#74	Msg	101422Z	CG Prov Corps V Phu Bai	Subj: Temporary Boundary Change
#75	Msg	101440Z	3rd Mar Div COC	Subj: Notification of Intent to Initiate Major Operation
#76	Msg	101730Z	CO 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cav Div, Dong Ha, RVN	Subj: Periodic Operations Report 09-10 May 68
#77	Msg	102300Z	CTF Clearwater	Subj: Clearwater Cua Viet 6 Hour SITREP 11 May 68
#78	Mem	11 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Visit by PCV Rep Concerning Rice Denial Operation
#79	Ltr	11 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Appointment as Chairman, Quang Tri Province Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee
#80	Msg	114823Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: OPCON
#81	Mem	111150H	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Operation Concordia Square Repair of Route 1
#82	Msg	111305Z	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Rotation Armored Amphibious Platoons
#83	Msg	111940Z	CO 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cav Div, Dong Ha, RVN	Subj: Periodic Operations Report 11 May 68
#84	Mem	12 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Quang Tri Development; Progress for Period 4-10 May 68
#85	Mem	12 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Quang Tri Development; Progress for Period 5-11 May 68
#86	Msg	120937Z	CG Prov Corps V Phu Bai	Subj: Unit Deployment
#87	Msg	121940Z	Co 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cav Div, Dong Ha, RVN	Subj: Periodic Operations Report 11-12 May 68
#88	Mem	13 May	3rd Mar Div	Subj: Rice Denial Operations

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IMMEDIATE 010564 MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D LARDIV  
TO: 3D LARDIV  
INFO: CG ILLAF  
CG PCV  
CG 1ST ACD

//IMMEDIATE// (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)  
CHANGE OF COM AND

1. EFFECTIVE 011200H MAY 1968 B G N C. W. HOFFMAN USMC  
RELINQUISHED GEN J. E. GLICK USMC AS CO TF HOTEL.

DRAPPE	3D LARDIV
SEC 6-3	3D LARDIV
CWO	3D LARDIV
OP CHIEF	<i>H</i>
G-3 W O.	<i>P</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>OV</i>
DOPD	<i>Q</i>
APO	<i>X</i>
ACTION	<i>3pm/</i>

*SCOTLAND II*

CP-4

CCN 0014

RELEASED BY

*[Signature]*

G-3

STAND/CG *[Signature]*

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*00 May 68*  
*Encl 1*

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DRAFTED 3/ALL/JSF  
SEC G-3 PHONE 3D LARDIV  
CWO *gfr*

IMMEDIATE 010564 MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D LARDIV  
TO: 3D LARDIV  
INFO: CG IIIAF  
CG PCV  
CG 1ST ACD

//IMMEDIATE// (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

CHANGE OF COLL AND

1. EFFECTIVE 011200H MAY 1968 B GEN C. W. HOFFMAN USMC  
RELI W D B GEN J. E. GLICK USMC AS CG TF HOTEL.

GP-4

CCN 0014

RELEASED BY *[Signature]*

G-3

TF Hotel  
File

STAND/CG *[Signature]*


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*NOVE 000*  
*W*  
*H*  
*NO Clearance*  
**TOR** / 011525/p

TEXIG MATE UR RUGHT THAT LAST MSG WAS 621777YWQMMM HERE IS 622

HVP 622EBYWKT KSYZZZ62X  
 OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHMA 181 1221255  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 011241Z MAY 68  
 FM CG PROV CORPS V PHB  
 TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH  
 RUMHMB/CG 1ST ACD CPE  
 ZEN/CG III MAF DNG  
 BT

~~S. P. 2-68~~ AVII-GCO 01232  
 SUBJ: REVISED BOUNDARIES (U)  
 REF: A. FRAG ORDER 2-68 30 APR 68  
 B. OPORD 3-68 APR 68

1. (S) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BOUNDARY BETWEEN 3D MAR DIV AND 1ST ACD, DIRECTED IN REF A, FROM YD392466 SE TO YD428437 IS DELETED.  
 2. (S) DIVISION BOUNDARY IS THIS AREA IS AS ESTABLISHED INOPORD 3-68(REF B) FROM YD383450 SE PARALLEL TO RAILROAD TRACK TO YD 420428.

GP-4  
 BT

*G-3*

*STAND/CG*

*6112*

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

REF ID: A66 011443

FROM: CG 3D FA DIV  
 TO: CG PCV  
 CG 10TH AIR CAV DIV USA  
 3D MARDIV  
 INFO: CG TIL HIF  
 3D MARDIV

OPCON

1. CG 3D MARDIV ASSIGNED OPCON 3/21 OF 1968 TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 30  
 01900H MAY 68 AND PASSED OPCON TO 10TH AIR CAV DIV.

GP-4

REF ID: A66 011443

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DRAFTER 3/RNB/jsr  
SEC G-3 PHONE 3D LARDIV SOC  
CWO *SJR*

PRIORITY *011445* MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D LARDIV  
TO: TF HOTEL  
9TH LAR  
3/4

*RGR*

*copy sent*

*SJR*

- 114445*
- A. 9TH LAR 200700Z APR 68 (NOTAL)
1. CG 3D LARDIV ASSUMES OPCON *L3/4* AT 201201H APR 68  
AND PASSES OPCON *L3/4* TO TF HOTEL AT 201202H APR 68.

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CCN *0068*

RELEASED BY

*A R Madsen*

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TF Hotel  
FILE

*9-2/000/cn SJR*

*R*

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*Encl 5*

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3P/ALM/wlk  
2 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Subject: PCV OPLAN 6-68 (Rice Denial)

Ref: (a) PCV 301410Z Apr 68 (OPLAN 6-68)

1. The reference directs implementation of PCV Rice Denial plan which is to be published. The message sets forth the PCV Mission and Concept of Operations, and tasks 3d MarDiv to coordinate all rice denial operations in the Quang Tri Province.

2. Rice denial operations are conducted in 4 phases. Phase I commences 1 May 1968, Phase II commences 16 May, Phase III commences 1 June and Phase IV lasts from 16 June through 30 June.

3. During Phases I & II, 1st ARVN Div provides security to civilian rice collection effort. U.S. operations in AO will be coordinated with ARVN/GVN officials. A Combined Rice Denial Committee is to be established at Province and District level - instruction to be published. During Phase III patrolling is intensified and in Phase IV offensive operations commence.

4. Action.

- a. On receipt of instructions relating to formation of Province/District Committees, 3d MarDiv will provide representation and chair/coordinate meeting. (Liaison has been made with PCV.)
- b. A planning directive is now being drafted in preparation for operations in Hai Lang National Forest (Base Area 101) during period 16-30 June. ✓

Very Respectfully submitted,

*A. L. Michaux, Jr.*  
A. L. MICHAUX, JR.

End 6

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ZNY SSSSS  
O 3:14 10Z APR 68  
F

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M CG PCV

VNB

TO RUMHMB/CG 1ST ACD CVE  
RUMHVV/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH  
RUMHMB/CG 1; 1ST ABN DIV CEE  
RUMHNB/CG TF CLEARWATER CVT  
CG 10TH ARTY GP PHB  
CNFO RUMWAA/CG IIC MAF DNG  
RUMHVV/SA 1ST ARVN DIV HUE  
ZEN/TF X-RAY PHB

BT

S F ~~REDACTED~~ 01214 FROM: AVII-GCP.~~REF: FRAG ORDER OVLAN 6-68 (RICE DENIAL) (U)~~

REF: RCCE DENIAL CONFERENCES 16 APR 68 HUE & 18 APR 68 QUANG TRC.  
1. (S) THIS MSG DIRECTS IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE C OF PCV RICE DENIAL PLAN, TO BE PULISHED.

2. (S) MISSION: PCV CONDUCTS OFFENSIVE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH 1ST ARVN DIV TO DENY THE ENEMY RICE, SEEKS OUT AND DESTROYS HIS RICE GATHERING FORCES AND RETURNS TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL THE AREA RICE WHICH THE ENEMY HAS COLLECTED.

Q-3

PAGE 2 RUMHMA : 02 ~~REDACTED~~  
3. (S) EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. VCV CONDUCTS A FOUR-PHASE RICE DENIAL OPERATION WITH DIVISIONS OPERATING IN ASSIGNED AO'S AND IN COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN DIVISION, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT OFFICERS THROUGH COMBINED RCCE DENIAL COMMITTEES. OPERATION DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 CONTINUES AS PLANNED.

(1) PHASE I (1-15 MAY): CONDUCT OPERATIONS WITHIN CAPABILITIES IN PRESEN AO'S TO PREVENT ENEMY ENTRY INTO AND EXIT FROM RICE PRODUCING AREAS.

(2) PHASE II (16-31 MAY): CONDUCT SATURATION PATROLLING AND AMBUSHES OUTSIDE THE RICE PRODUCING AREAS TO PREVENT ENEMY ACCESS TO THE RICE. AMBUSHES AND PATROLS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN UNSECURED RICE AREA DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN.

(3) PHASE III (1-15 JUN): CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN IN THE COASTAL AREAS TO DESTROY THE ENEMY'S RCCE GATHERING FORCES AND TO CONFISCATE ENEMY COLLECTED RICE.

(4) PHASE IV (16-30 JUN): ON ORDER, CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH ARVN ON BASE AREAS.

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B. 3D MAR DIV: COORDINATE ALL RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS IN QUANG TRC PROVINCE.

C. 101ST ABN DCV: COORDINATE LL RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE.

D. 1ST ACD: SUPPORT SRICE DENIAL OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED AO IN COORDINATION WITH 3D MAR DCV AND 101ST ABN DIV

E. COORDINATION G INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) PHASE I COMMENCES 1 MAY 68.

(2) DURING PHASES I AND II, 1ST ARVN DIV VLANS TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO THE CIVILIAN RICE COLLECTION EFFORTS IN HIGH-RICE PRODUCING, UNSECURED AREA. US OPERATIONS IN THESE AREAS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH RVN AND GVN OFFICIALS.

(3) MAXIMUM USE OF SENSORS, NIGHT VISION DEVICES, RADAR AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE MEANS IS ENCOURAGED.

(4) COMBINED RICE DENIAL COMMITTEE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVEL TO INCLUDE US MILITARY, ARVN AND GVN REPRESENTATION. INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THESE COMMITTEES TO BE PUBLISHED.

(5) AO'S WILL BE ADJUSTED BY THOS HQS AS FORCES ARE RELEASED FROM CURRENT OPERATIONS.

(6) COVY OF ARVN RICE DENIAL OVERLAY BEING FORWARDED BY COURIER.

4. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE TOC 53.

GP-4

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G-3 ROUTING SLIP

DATE 4 May 68 COPY(IES) 3SUBJ HELICOPTER ASSAULT  
OPERATIONSUNIT ROUTE ACTION INIT

G-3 \_\_\_\_\_

G-3A 1 726G-P 2 I PG-STRNG 4 ✓OPN OFC 3 ✓ 2

PSYOPS \_\_\_\_\_

DIV AIR 5 ✓ ✓FSCC/NGF 6 ✓ ✓OPN CHIEF 8 ✓

ADJUT CHIEF \_\_\_\_\_

S&amp;C \_\_\_\_\_

FILE/DESTROY \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS May I see again afterwaiting pleaseWm. H. H. H.Wm. H. H. H.

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

349668

6/CJR/bjw

006A12368

2 May 1968

Copy 12 of 35 copies

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(Declassified upon removal of Enclosure (1))

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Subj: Helicopter Assault Operations  
Ref: (a) CG, III MAF Memo "Helicopter Assault Operations"  
Encl: (1) Staff Study, Increased Utilization of Helicopterborne Exploitation Forces

1. In accordance with reference (a) a study group was appointed to conduct an extensive analysis of the problem of how to increase the use of helicopters in the employment of exploitation forces. A senior, experienced ground force commander was appointed chairman of the study panel with a senior special staff officer (aviation), a reconnaissance battalion commander, a former infantry battalion commander and other experienced field grade special staff officers as members. The results of this study group are contained in enclosure (1) and forwarded.
2. The study panel concluded that current air-ground planning for pre-planned helicopterborne operations in accordance with established doctrine is satisfactory. It was also concluded, however, that reaction to quick responsiveness as envisioned in the use of exploitation forces establishes a requirement for closer continuous planning between air and ground forces. For this reason it is suggested that an ad hoc group consisting of senior commanders and staff officers from all Marine Corps commands within III MAF be formed to develop air-ground procedures for the use of helicopters

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in exploitation operations throughout ICTZ. It is envisioned that the two Marine Divisions and the 1st Marine Air Wing would subsequently initiate appropriate and common procedures based on standards established by the III MAF designated study group.

3. Annex A to enclosure (1) summarizes a concept for increased employment of helicopterborne exploitation forces by this Division.

*R. McC. Tompkins*  
R. McC. TOMPKINS

## Group-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years

## Distribution: (Special)

CG III MAF - 1  
CG 3MarDiv - 1  
CG TF EOTEL - 1  
CofS - 5  
CofS (fwd) - 1  
G-1 - 1  
G-2 - 1  
G-3 - 3  
G-4 - 1  
G-5 - 1  
Air - 1  
CFO - 1  
Regiments - 1  
11thEngr - 1  
S&C - 1  
1stAmTrac - 1  
3dEngr - 1  
3dMed - 1  
3dMT - 1  
3dRecon - 1  
3dSP - 1  
3dTank - 1  
9thMT - 1

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

Subject: Increased Utilization of Helicopterborne Exploitation Forces

1. PROBLEM To develop a concept for the increased utilization of helicopters in employment of 3d Marine Division exploitation forces.
2. ASSUMPTIONS
  - a. The current organization and disposition of the Division will not change appreciably.
  - b. The enemy situation in the Division Area of Operation will not change significantly.
  - c. That basic Marine Corps doctrine of helicopterborne operations remains valid and is applicable.
  - d. Current disposition of artillery within the Division AO will not change significantly.
  - e. Naval gunfire support ships will continue to be assigned in support of the Division.
3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
  - a. The current Division mission and tactical disposition inhibits to a degree the size and response time of exploitation forces.
  - b. The Division has a requirement for the employment of exploitation forces.

Encl (1)

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- c. Currently, the Division has a plan to initiate a platoon-size exploitation force.
- d. The use of helicopterborne forces for tactical exploitation within the Division area has been limited not only in incidents of utilization but in magnitude of forces as well.
- e. Opportunities to exploit with helicopterborne forces are short-lived; once undertaken they lend themselves to a progressive build-up of forces.
- f. There is a requirement for further air-ground planning in the employment of helicopterborne exploitation forces.
- g. There are sufficient 1st Marine Aircraft Wing helicopter assets and sufficient 7th Air Force fixed wing strike assets to support exploitation forces.
- h. The 1st MAW/7th AF Air Control System is capable of massing total assets with sufficient rapidity to meet foreseeable requirements.
- i. Current disposition of artillery is capable of providing support in over 95% of the Division area.
- j. Mobility and economy of force are essential factors in the employment of helicopterborne exploitation forces.
- k. During the assault phase of helicopterborne exploitation operations, utilization of restrictive fire plans, as opposed to save-a-planes, is the more effective means of providing aircraft safety and integrated fire support.

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1. Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force has established the priority of helicopter employment to be tactical before logistical.
  - m. The impetus of logistics support in the Division is supply point distribution.
  - n. Logistics support facilities located in the Division area provide a responsive and flexible system in support of Division forces.
  - o. On-position levels of Class I and V supplies are adequate to permit rapid movement on short notice of Division exploitation forces.
  - p. Unit distribution by helicopter is frequently employed.
  - q. There is a requirement for maintaining prepackaged emergency supplies for fixed wing air drops.
  - r. The Division is assigned insufficient number of compatible VHF-FM radio frequencies to provide adequate communications for helicopterborne operations.
4. DISCUSSION
- a. Disposition of Forces
    - (1) The mission of the 3d Marine Division as set forth in the 3d Marine Division Letter of Instruction 1-67, is partially stated as follows: "3d Marine Division, Reinforced, FMF, defends vital areas, airfields and ancillary facilities, and defends or participates in the defense of other designated U. S. and GVN critical installations-----".

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In keeping with that portion of the mission which requires defense of other designated U. S. and GVN critical installations, III Marine Amphibious Force Operation Plan 11-67 dated 20 June 1967 tasks 3d Marine Division to construct, occupy and defend certain fixed positions along the northern portion of the Division area of operations extending from the eastern limit at CUA VIET to the western flank at KHE SANH. A total of 14 battalion and company-size positions in the form of 5 strong point patrol bases, 4 forward operation bases, and 5 combat operating bases are included in the fixed position/DYEMARKER "defile" plan. Other fixed positions are required to be manned to protect lines of communication to these positions. Examples of these requirements are the CAM LO River Bridge position of one rifle company reinforced and the C-2 Bridge position which requires a minimum of two rifle companies reinforced. These positions provide security along Route 561 leading to the battalion size DYEMARKER position designated A-4 (CON THIEN). These fixed positions must be manned and they limit the mobility of the force manning them. Forces removed from these positions for an exploitation mission must be replaced with other forces or the Division must accept an element of risk by not manning them at all, or limiting the size of the replacement or remaining force to a token size.

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(2) Recently, Provisional Corps Vietnam conducted a study to determine the number, size, and locations of major patrol bases to be retained along the DYEMARKER Strong Point Obstacle System. (PCV Staff Study dtd 18 April 1968). Two pertinent conclusions discussed by the study were, (1) that the mission of the strong-point obstacle system would be modified from one of position defense by battalion size units to one of a combat outpost line mobile defense; (2) reduction of static forces now positioned along the strong point line may be reduced at one or more locations if the ability to reinforce quickly is maintained and a mobile reserve is readily available. Review of the study by 3d Marine Division shows that a reduction of positions would be a net saving of one Marine battalion. This battalion would then be available for exploitation purposes without the encumbrance of having it tied to a fixed position. This would also reduce reaction time by not requiring relief forces. The current overall trend as shown in the study to rely on mobile reserves is compatible to fielding larger exploitation forces. Curtailment of available mobile forces, however, is mandatory as long as certain fixed positions and the protection of lines of communication to them are requirements which must be met.

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(5) Marine Corps doctrine as set forth in FMFM 8-2, Operations Against Guerrilla Units, states that reaction forces should operate from combat bases. Combat bases are not static installations, but rather they are moved as often as is necessary for security purposes, always remaining within effective striking range of enemy forces. The availability of 3d Marine Division units to operate from combat bases is curtailed by fixed position requirement. As this requirement is lessened, closer adherence to established doctrine will be conducive to fielding more and larger exploitation forces from combat bases.

b. Analysis of Force Dispositions

- (1) KHE SANH AREA: Based on the requirement to maintain forces in the KHE SANH area, the enemy situation in that area and the disposition of Marine forces which consist of one infantry regiment plus one infantry battalion, a helicopterborne exploitation force of battalion size or larger is not available except for utilization within the KHE SANH operating area. Unless the enemy situation changes or the requirement to hold forces in the KHE SANH area is denigrated, it is considered that a very grave risk would be involved in diverting any battalion or larger size force from this area of operation.

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(2) Camp Carroll, Thon Son Lam, Ca Lu Area. Marine forces assigned within this area consist of a regimental headquarters and four infantry battalions. They have the responsibility, in addition to blocking infiltration and destroying the enemy, of providing protection for a primary Division line of communication (Route 9) for a distance of 19.3 miles, as well as security for fire support bases at Camp Carroll, Thon Son Lam and Ca Lu and a Division logistic support unit at Landing Zone Stud. The requirement to maintain forces at KHE SANH has a direct bearing on the missions assigned forces in this area as far as keeping Route 9 line of communication open is concerned. Although enemy contact in this area has remained relatively light, the enemy's capability to interdict Route 9 and to attack facilities remains high. Considering this and the size of the area, it will not be feasible to employ helicopterborne exploitation forces from this area without a considerable reduction in the defense capabilities within the area.

(3) Dong Ha, Cam Lo, Con Thien, Gio Linh area. This area is situated astride three main lines of communications: Routes 1, 561 (north-south), and Route 9 (east-west). It is a major enemy infiltration route south and encompasses a populated, rice-producing agricultural area. Included within this area

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are the Division's largest fire and logistic support bases.

Marine forces assigned to this area of operation consist of one regimental headquarters, three infantry battalions, and the Division reserve mobile armored task force. Enemy actions have traditionally consisted of artillery, rocket and mortar fire against friendly installations in addition to ground contacts. Enemy activity in this area during the last 30 days has been relatively light, but the enemy maintains his capability to increase his actions. It is considered that a helicopterborne exploitation force of battalion-size or larger deployed from this area would involve a considerable risk.

- (4) CUA VIET Area. This area is situated astride the main line of communication from off-shore supply shipping, the Cua Viet River LOC inland to the Dong Ha ramp. Over 90% of all Division supplies pass along this route. To the north and south it is a heavily populated, normally prosperous rice-producing and fishing area. Marine forces assigned consist of one regimental headquarters and two infantry battalions. The enemy has been consistently active throughout the area employing ground forces with artillery and rocket fire support. It is considered that removal of a unit of battalion size for exploitation purposes outside of the area of operation might

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easily lead to temporary loss of this import LOC. The use of a battalion or smaller force for exploitation purposes within the area of operation during day or night is however, considered practicable and realistic.

- (5) Quang Tri, Wunder Beach Area. This, the eastern flank of Quang Tri Province, is a rich, highly populated, rice-producing, politically important sector. The city of Quang Tri is the largest population center within the Division operating area and is located adjacent to the main north-south line of communication, Route 1. To deny enemy movement in this area, protect lines of communications, Route 1, parallel pipelines, the Hai Lang road and provide security for the logistical support area at Wunder Beach, Quang Tri Airfield complex and Hardcore fire support base, Marine forces consisting of a regimental headquarters and two infantry battalions have been assigned. Enemy action in this area has remained moderate; but his capability to launch artillery and rocket fire and conduct ground operations of major consequence remains high. Any size force committed for exploitation purposes outside of the operational area would place in jeopardy security of many vital installations and centers of population.

c. The Enemy Situation.

- (1) 3d Marine Division is opposed by an enemy comprised of Viet Cong irregular and hardcore units and North Vietnamese regular

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forces. These forces have increased significantly in size within the Division area during the first months of 1968. He continues to infiltrate personnel and units around our static defenses as well as continuing pressure against fixed positions by increasing his artillery and rocket fire while maintaining the capability to mass numerically superior forces at given points throughout the Division area. The enemy has the capability to continue to replace his losses rapidly. The enemy maintains the ability of moving close to Division fixed positions to collect intelligence. Based on his reconnaissance and intelligence collection he chooses an objective which suits his purpose and means. His meticulous logistical and tactical preparation, his disposition of forces and the option to attack at times and places of his choosing have been demonstrated. Detailed rehearsal for attack, adherence to the principles of surprise, maneuver, mass, security, economy of forces -- are all characteristic of the enemy's operations. When he is allowed to prepare without interference, he attacks and withdraws with celerity. As has always been the case, the VC/NVA move with relative ease throughout the Division AO. His ultimate objective is the control over rice, people, and the government in the area.

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There are an estimated 40,000 North Vietnamese regular and VC local force troops comprising the total threat to the 3d Marine Division. These forces do not invariably use conventional tactics, but rather employ guerrilla warfare tactics, seldom defending terrain and favoring withdrawal or escape rather than direct confrontation.

d. Marine Corps Doctrine

- (1) Marine Corps doctrine against guerrilla forces is based upon experience and theory. There is no pat solution to the problem of defeating guerrillas. Variations in methods of operation are required for and must be applied to each new situation. Still, the traditional principles of war must be considered in planning and execution. The most rigidly applied principle is the offensive: constant pressure must be maintained on the guerrilla force. Mobility can be achieved by well trained, fast moving, unburdened infantry and, of course, by the use of helicopters. In general there are four types of combat operations normally conducted against guerrilla forces: Denial operations, harassing operations, reaction operations, and elimination operations. The latter two levy specific requirements for readily available mobile forces with helicopterborne troops ideally suited to accomplish the mission. When a guerrilla force is located, the

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reaction force, located at a combat base, deploys rapidly to engage and destroy the guerrilla force. If the enemy cannot be contained and destroyed, mobile reinforcements pursue to envelop and block. Mobility is provided by helicopters, ground vehicles and by accelerated foot movement. If guerrilla forces are not destroyed through denial and harassing operations and reaction operations are forced into situations requiring much larger forces, then elimination operations must be considered. Elimination operations require a much larger force than the guerrilla force. The elimination force must be adequate in size to contain the guerrilla force. Encirclement of guerrilla forces offers by far the greatest possibility for fixing or containing them and achieving decisive results. The tactic of encirclement requires a preponderance of highly mobile forces.

e. Small Unit Exploitation Forces

- (1) Force Order P03121.5, Standing Operating Procedures for Ground and Air Operations, dated 10 November 1967, names and describes two types of small units to be used as exploitation forces. These are code named the SPARROW HAWK and BALD EAGLE. They are defined as follows:

SPARROW HAWK: A reinforced squad on immediate alert within each infantry battalion prepared for helicopterborne employment

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as a separate maneuver element to exploit fleeting tactical opportunities.

BALD EAGLE: A reinforced rifle company on immediate alert within each infantry regiment prepared for helicopterborne employment as a separate maneuver element to exploit fleeting tactical opportunities. No further referral or requirement to these specific type units are made in existing Force Orders.

- (2) 3d Marine Division Operation Order 2-67 (SPARROW HAWK) specifies that designated combat bases will maintain a reinforced rifle platoon on 30 minute alert during daylight hours, prepared for immediate deployment by helicopter in order to engage and destroy enemy forces contacted or sighted, provide security for designated installations or aircraft, or reinforce units in contact or threatened by enemy forces. It also specifies that 1st Marine Aircraft Wing will maintain three CH-46 and two UH-1E helicopters on strip alert for support of the SPARROW HAWK force. Currently, helicopter support consisting of two CH-46 and two UH-1E (Gun Ships) is being maintained by Marine Aircraft Group 39 at QUANG TRI on strip alert for SPARROW HAWK support. The order differs in definition of a SPARROW HAWK by the readiness of a platoon (reinforced) in lieu of a squad (reinforced). Otherwise the order is valid and is written within Force Order definition. Reaction time for a platoon

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(reinforced) SPARROW HAWK has been approximately one to three hours from the time of aircraft launch until the time troops and aircraft are launched. Time loss occurs because alert aircraft and troops are not located in proximity to each other.

3d Marine Division Letter of Instruction 1-67 (Annex F to Appendix 3) delineates helicopter support requirements for the lifting of one reinforced rifle platoon on condition IV(30 minute) alert. Provision is made in the 3d Marine Division SPARROW HAWK order that if a force larger than a platoon reinforced is required, aircraft requirements will be met by insertion of forces in waves or by priority diversion of helicopters from other missions. The scope of the order is suitably tailored to meet the requirements of a small unit exploitation force up to and including a company reinforced size. It provides minimum planning requirements for units providing the forces and simple execution instructions for the implementing force. The order states that the senior ground commander of either the exploitation force or supported unit is in command. A larger size helicopterborne force of battalion or regimental size would require considerably more planning guidance and definitive command and control procedures than the present order affords.

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## Limited Use of Exploitation Forces

- (1) A review of the combat after-action reports of major Division units reveals that significant helicopterborne forces have been used for tactical exploitation on only two occasions. Operation ALLEGHENY, conducted during August 1966 by the 2nd Battalion, 3d Marines, resulted from an initial sighting of a VC training camp by a reconnaissance patrol which was progressively reinforced by a reconnaissance platoon, a rifle company and, eventually, another rifle company and a battalion command group. Although the number of enemy kills was small the operation had a major effect on the VC effort in the QUANG NAM area. Operation MALLARD conducted in the DAI LOC District of QUANG NAM during January 1966 involved a battalion-sized helicopterborne force exploiting an arclight strike. Lasting seven days, the operation netted a total of 21 VC. Although there have been numerous other occasions when helicopterborne forces have conducted operations against the enemy, these operations were largely preplanned rather than a response to initial success. Even in the employment of SPARROW HAWK forces, the emphasis has been on emergency defensive or protective response. During the past six months, the SPARROW HAWK force has been committed ten times, all of which were defensive or protective in nature. The causative factors are both numerous and varied, the major ones being: paucity of available forces,

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lack of information upon which to base a decision to exploit.

- (2) It is obvious that in the current environment the spirit of the offense is rapidly being regained and it is imperative that the Division and its supporting forces be prepared for quick reaction/exploitation against fleeting targets of opportunity presented by the enemy. Procedures which provide for rapid evaluation and response must be honed to a sharp edge and those that hinder or delay must be eliminated.
- (3) One major consideration is the level of command where the decision to commit the available helicopterborne reaction force is made. Now the decision to commit the SPARROW HAWK Platoon of any of the separate regiments is retained at Division level. This assures a high level evaluation of considerations bearing on the exploitation but it degrades rapid reaction to the opportunity to exploit by the commander who first observes and assesses the situation.
- (4) The lack of information upon which to base a decision to exploit is also critical. Since we are opposed primarily by first-class, regular troops who are well disciplined and equipped, acting on incomplete information could be disastrous. When the sighting or contact is made by major infantry units in contact there is normally no difficulty in assessing the situation. It is where small infantry combat patrols and

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surveillance units make such sightings and contacts that often the information is incomplete. Their limited ability to test the enemy's strength and their concentration on survival becomes paramount. There is a definite need for a ready response force which is helicopter transportable to test and evaluate the situation prior to the investment of major forces. This force must be easy to extract as well as to insert. Such a force is currently under study by the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division. It is patterned after the light infantry platoon of the Cavalry Squadron (Blue Platoon) of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

g. Progressive Massing of Forces

- (1) The ability to take maximum advantage of success in combat is a prerequisite to successful operations in the field. This is particularly true in the present environment found in the Division AO where friendly forces are opposed by both main force VC and regular NVA troops. The enemy has demonstrated a definite ability to withdraw from any action that proves disadvantageous to him into areas where physical pursuit would require the employment of major friendly forces. His withdrawals usually take place behind a relatively thin covering force over multiple routes of egress. Experience has shown however, that these routes are readily susceptible to cutting

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by well-placed friendly forces if they can be rapidly moved into position. The helicopter has proved to be highly effective vehicle for the rapid movement and regrouping of forces and supplies in such exploitation operations.

- (2) 1st Air Cavalry Division experience shows that to a large degree the enemy kills, prisoners captured and material destroyed results from rapid helicopterborne exploitation of sightings and contacts with the enemy. When the enemy is out of his prepared positions and moving, he is particularly susceptible to both ground action and attack by fire.
- (3) The experience of the 1st Air Cavalry Division has also been that once an evaluation can be made of the situation by the people on ground, the course of events usually allows for a rapid yet orderly buildup of forces sufficient to bring this action to a successful conclusion. The key has been the immediate and violent introduction of ground forces and fire at points where the enemy is least prepared. The size of these forces has proven less important than the speed with which they are introduced.
- (4) The 1st Air Cavalry Division maintains a posture for such immediate exploitation by imposing on its subordinate units a requirement to maintain a Ready Reaction Force (RRF).  
Normally a platoon serves as RRF for a company; a company

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serves as RRF for a battalion; and a battalion is the RRF for the Division. The platoon and company size RRFs are the most frequently committed. Sufficient helicopter lift resources are set aside or positioned to pick up elements of the RRF and move it to the location required. Normally, a company on RRF keeps one platoon on 15-minute alert and the remainder of the company (-) on one-hour alert. The RRF monitors the activities of the unit it serves, makes as detailed plans as the situation permits and even though continuing to operate, it remains adjacent to suitable loading zones.

- (5) The decision to exploit, or "pile on" as it is called, is made at the lowest level controlling the troop assets. If the lift resources are not set aside, they are immediately recalled to the loading zone where the flight leader is briefed with the RRF Commander or when time is critical, they are both briefed in the air enroute to the landing zone. In view of the speed with which the RRF can react, normal radio communications security is often suspended in the interest of quick response.
- (6) Many of the enemy sightings and contacts exploited by the Cavalry Division are made by its organic reconnaissance elements: the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and the Air

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Cavalry Squadron. When this occurs, the initial evaluation of the situation is made by a light infantry platoon (Blue Platoon) which is organic to the Cavalry Squadron. If the decision is made to exploit and upon introduction of the infantry RRF, the Blue Platoon is extracted for subsequent employment elsewhere. This ability to evaluate the situation without the introduction of major forces has proved particularly effective.

- (7) Although rapid and positive response is absolutely necessary for successful exploitation operations, it is also apparent that the exploiting force must have depth to be completely successful. The mustering of available assets must be progressive both in time and in size of forces. At present the requirements imposed on the subordinate units of the Division for reaction/exploitation forces only extend to platoon strength which is a severe limitation on rapid helicopter exploitation of any but minor contacts. Correspondingly, it is essential that provisions be made for regroupment of helicopter assets operating within the Division A0 to allow for maximum buildup of troops committed to the exploitation.
- (8) One has only to look at the size of the Division A0 and the volume of work to be accomplished on a day-to-day basis to realize that it is neither practical nor economical to keep large ground forces and numbers of helicopters on an on-call

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basis only. Therefore both must be ready at all times to respond to a short notice call for employment as reaction/exploitation forces.

h. Joint Planning Requirements

- (1) The record shows that this Division has made extensive use of helicopters in its day-to-day operations and, with few exceptions, these operations have been successful. The recent operations at KHE SANH are an example. Most of the requirements imposed on the helicopters have been logistical in nature due to the wide separation of units and the difficulty of maintaining surface lines of communications against enemy interdiction, and as a result, have not required major detailed planning between the Division and the Wing helicopter units. The normal channels of request from the Division Air Officer to the Wing Operations Officer, although hampered by distance and electronic communications difficulty, have kept abreast of the requirements.
- (2) When major tactical operations which include helicopterborne forces (battalion or larger) are planned, a planning staff has been made available by the Wing to assist the troop commander in his planning. This assures complete integration of effort between the lifting unit and the lifted unit. When this has been done, there has been little difficulty in

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attaining success. Operations HASTINGS, HICKORY, and MEDINA are examples of such integrated effort.

- (3) In the area of rapid reaction/exploitation helicopterborne forces there are indications that there is insufficient joint planning between the helicopter and the troop units to ensure smooth, expeditious and effective execution. General locations of designated reaction forces are not known to the helicopter flight leaders, and type, number and capacity of aircraft are not known to the troop commander until the two are married up at the loading zone. These are but minor examples of the problems which tend to degrade readiness to exploit when the opportunity presents itself.
- (4) There is indication that the air control agencies operating in the Division AO do not have complete control of helicopters working therein. In turn there is evidence to indicate that Division units theoretically designated as reaction forces are not identified, prepared, and positioned where they can meet the requirements imposed upon them. Such lack of coordination between the ground unit and the helicopter unit is incompatible with the need for speed and integrated effort in the execution of a helicopterborne assault.

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(5) Considerations in solving these problems are:

- (a) The periodic formation of a joint task force of Division and Wing personnel to review procedures and planning involved with helicopterborne reaction/exploitation forces. The principal advantage is that no additional personnel requirements imposed on either unit. The principal disadvantage is the obvious lack of continuity of the task force.
- (b) By the assignment of an officer(s) on temporary duty to the Division Staff from the helicopter unit providing the principal support to the Division with the task of providing a direct line of communications between the two and assisting the Operations Officer in updating directives and plans dealing with the employment of helicopters. The principal advantage is the continuity offered. The disadvantage is the additional personnel requirement imposed on available helicopter pilots.
- (c) By the assignment of a helicopter unit of the Wing in direct support of the Division and the resultant effect of having the helicopter unit receive its tasks from the Division. The principal advantage is a direct line of command communication. The disadvantage is the parcelling out of the very limited Wing helicopter assets and the loss of centralized control.

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(6) The best solution to this aspect of the problem should above all else provide the system and means that allow the Division to destroy or capture the enemy and his material within its AO.

1. Air Assets

- (1) General. When discussing the adequacy of aircraft assets the requirements of the ground units and the tactical situation must be meticulously analyzed. Considering helicopters, the requirements of the numbers of troops and supplies to be lifted, the size of the landing zones, i.e., how many helicopter aircraft can be accommodated in the selected zones, the rate of troop build-up desired, and the number of troops that can be accumulated in the pick-up zones in a timely manner. Considering fixed-wing strike aircraft consideration must include requirements for landing zone construction protection landing zone preparation, helicopter escort for fire suppression, and close air support to the helicopterborne force once it is committed to the attack.
- (2) First Marine Aircraft Wing provides the helicopter assets. These assets are distributed throughout ICTZ into three Marine aircraft groups as follows plus two squadrons located aboard LPH's in the Special Landing Forces (SLF):

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1stMAW Helicopter Assets

MAG-16 located at MARBLE MOUNTAIN consist of the following  
Squandrons and types of aircraft:

H&amp;MS-16/UH-34D

HMH-463/CH-53

HMM-265/CH-46A

VMO-2/UH-1E

HMM-361/UH-34D

MAG-36 located at PHU BAI contains the following Squandrons  
and types of aircraft:

H&amp;MS-36/UH-34D

HMM-364/CH-46D

HMM-165/CH-46A

VMO-3/UH-1E

HMM-362/UH-34D

MAG-39 located at QUANG TRI contains the following Squandrons  
and types of aircraft:

HMM-163/UH-34D

HMM-262/CH-46A and CH-46D

VMO-6/UH-1E

A SLF aboard the Iwo Jima has a UH-34D squandron aboard.

A SLF aboard the Valley Forge has a CH-46D squandron aboard.

A H&MS squadron has from two to ten UH-34D helicopters.

A HMM squadron aircraft allowance is 24 UH-34D or 24 CH-46  
helicopters.

A HMM squadron allowance is 37 CH-53 helicopters.

A VMO squadron aircraft allowance is 24 UH-1E helicopters, 20

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gunships, and four slicks.

Helicopter Capabilities: (The below figures are based upon an 86-degree F day sea-level altitude, with helicopters being capable of hovering out of ground effect (HOGE)).

UH-1E Slick - Carries 1,100-pounds or five passengers; Nav-Aids: Tacan and ADF; communications: VHF and FM.

UH-1E Gunship - Carries two pilots, two gunners, and 3000-rounds of 7.62mm and fourteen 2.75 rockets.

UH-34D - Carries 1,500 to 1,800-pounds, or seven to nine passengers, Nav-Aids: Tacan and ADF, communications: VHF and FM, and HF.

CH-46A - Carries 2,500 to 3,000-pounds or thirteen to fifteen passengers. Nav-Aids: Tacan and ADF, communications: UHF and FM.

CH-46D - Carries 3,500 to 4,000-pounds or seventeen to twenty passengers.

CH-53 - Carries approximately 8,500-pounds or 42 passengers, Nav-Aids: Tacan and ADF; communications VHF, FM, and HF.

CH-53 (Hot) - Carries 12,500-pounds.

The CH-46 and the UH-34 are the helicopters primarily used in the assault waves. The UH-53, because of its larger size and limited maneuver-ability, is used primarily in follow-on helo waves when the zone is considered secure. The UH-1E aircraft,

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because of their limited load capacities, are used primarily for Command Control (C & C) aircraft or for gunships for close helo escort and small-arms fire suppression.

- (3) Helicopter Lift Capabilities. Helicopter lift capabilities are dependent upon the number of aircraft assigned, aircraft availability, and the temperature and altitude of the landing zone. Assuming that the naval aircraft procurement and aircraft pool assets are available to keep the 1st MAW at the number of aircraft allowed, the following lift capabilities are available to the Division. This is also based upon an average aircraft availability rate:

<u>Type Acft</u>	<u>A/C Allow</u>	<u>% Avail</u>	<u>No. Acft Avail</u>	<u>Troop Cap.</u>	<u>Troop Lift</u>
UH-1E	72	66	48	_____	_____
CH-53	37	60	22	35	770
CH-46	120	62	74	18	1,322
UH-34	96	64	61	7	427
Totals	325		205		2,519

Based upon the March 1968 average figures where aircraft lost through combat attrition and spare part deficiencies has decreased both the number of aircraft assigned and the availability, the following lift capabilities are realized:

<u>Type Acft</u>	<u>Acft Allow</u>	<u>No. Assigned</u>	<u>No. On-hand</u>	<u>% Avail</u>	<u>No. Acft Avail</u>	<u>Troop Cap.</u>	<u>Troop Lift</u>
CH-53	37	37	24	34	8	35	280
CH-46	120	119	71	62	44	18	792

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Type Acft	Acft Allow	No. Assigned	No. On-hand	%Avail	No. Acft Avail	Troop Cap.	Troop Lift
UH-34	96	86	68	64	44	7	308
		242	163		96		1,380

## j. Air Control System

- (1) The air control system employed by the 7th AF to control fixed-wing aircraft is a system that parallels the Marine Corps System. It is headed by a Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) with subordinate tactical air direction center (TADC) and Combat Reporting Points. The 1stMAW Air Control unit "Vice Squad" constitutes a TADC within this system. This tactical air control system is supplemented by a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) at each Marine Division and one at PCV Headquarters.
- (2) These air control agencies are considered completely capable of diverting airborne strike aircraft and scrambling on-call aircraft in sufficient response time to fulfill this Division's fixed-wing strike aircraft requirements in support of an exploitation force.
- (3) The 1stMAW air control system is also the same system that controls the helicopter assets within ICTZ. This is accomplished primarily through the helicopter directors in the TADC and DASC. This control is impeded by the type radio equipment employed in the helicopter which is FM and VHF type. This

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line-of-sight equipment is very easily incapacitated by terrain masks between the transmitting station and the normally low-flying helicopter. Control is also aggravated by the requirement for the helicopter to constantly switch frequencies as it traverses from sector to sector; thus losing radio contact with the controlling DASC or TADC. The foregoing control procedures apply to the control of helicopters under the control of a specified DASC or TADC. When a requirement exists to divert helicopters from one Division sector to another Division sector, the primary means available is single-user, land line-to-radio type equipment. Each DASC and TADC are interconnected with this capability.

- (4) Considering equipment limitations and terrain characteristics deficiencies, plus the assurance that each aircraft is constantly monitoring the TADC/DASC frequencies, it is envisioned that helicopters can be massed in a given sector within the maximum flying time of the furthest operating point. For example, in this Division's AOC the farthest point is the KHE SANH area, which is approximately thirty nautical miles or approximately twenty minutes flying time plus about ten minutes to divert if halfway between, or thirty minutes total. The recall system would envision using land-line, VHF and FM radios, plus having the first aircraft notified to climb to altitude to broadcast

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the recall to ensure that line of sight deficiencies are overcome as much as possible. Given the typical helicopter aircraft operating day in this Division of approximately four CH-53's, fourteen CH-46's and ten UH-34's, the Division would realize a troop lift capability of approximately 462 troops.

- (5) Given another half-hour to one hour to rally the helicopter aircraft based at Phu Bai and two hours to rally the helicopter aircraft at Marble Mountain the full lift capability and the support helicopters of the 1stMAW could be realized. This does not indicate that these helicopters could be committed into the assault but is merely addressing the time and space factors of rallying the helicopter assets and massing them at a pick-up point(s). This is also assuming that radio contact is established with all aircraft within fifteen minutes of the initial recall and approval from higher authority was almost instantaneous.

k. Supporting Arms

- (1) In helicopterborne exploitation operations, the major reliance for fire support will be placed on artillery and air.
- (2) The current disposition of direct and general support artillery units within the Division AO facilitates delivery of fires in more than ninety-five percent of the Division AO.
- (3) As discussed previously, no significant change in disposition of 3d Marine Division Forces is anticipated.



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- (4) The artillery is deployed to support the ground forces.

No significant change in the disposition of the artillery is anticipated.

- (5) Should an exploitation force be committed to an area which has only general support coverage, consideration must be given to provide a heavier volume of fire through pre-planned displacement of direct support weapons or additional general support weapons to established artillery bases on short notice. Displacement of the 4.2-inch mortar, 105mm howitzer, and 155mm howitzer (Towed) would not be dependent upon secure lines of communication. The external lift capability of the CH-46 and CH-53 would allow rapid displacement.
- (6) An alternate course of action is to assign direct support artillery as part of the task organization of the exploitation force. This course of action is highly undesirable and is not recommended except when the present disposition or preplanned displacement could not provide the required support. The former course of action takes advantage of established, secure firing positions and pre-staged ammunition resources, enhances the overall mobility of the exploitation force, and if required, allows flexibility in providing fire support to Division units other than the exploitation force. The latter

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course of action increases helicopter requirements and adds significantly to the initial and followup logistics requirements. Security of the weapons may also dictate additional troop use if a secure firing position is not readily available.

- (7) To provide for continuous fires in support of the overall scheme of maneuver of the exploitation force and to facilitate movement of aircraft without causing undue danger to the aircraft, certain control measures must be instituted. Restrictive fire plans and save-a-planes accomplish this end. A save-a-plane applies to fires from a specific point to a specific target. A restrictive fire plan applies to the fires of all weapons whose trajectories pass through the restrictive fire plan corridor enroute to any number of targets. To avoid excessive time delays in overflying subordinate unit areas of operation, the FSCC at the next higher headquarters should establish and disseminate restrictive fire plans. This will allow a relative degree of safety within the restrictive fire plan corridor and eliminates the requirement for aircraft to check in with the FSCC of individual areas of operation in which the restrictive fire plan applies. A save-a-plane also provides for a relative degree of aircraft safety in that the aircraft will be routed around the danger

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area or the artillery mission will be placed in check fire status to allow safe passage. This coordination, however, cannot be effected unless the aircraft, upon entering the area, checks in with the unit FSOC of the area concerned. This, coupled with possible aircraft re-routing, introduces time delays when time is a critical factor during the assault phase of helicopterborne operations. If the aircraft is permitted safe passage by stopping the artillery fires, the supported unit could be placed in a tenuous situation through loss of fire support at a critical time. In a comparison of the two control measures a restrictive fire plan allows advance coordination and enhances compliance with time schedules during the assault phase. A save-a-plane does not allow advance coordination and introduces time delays.

- (9) The geographical location of a target within the 3d Marine Division AO does not materially affect the ability of air to attack the target.
- (10) Naval gunfire capability covers approximately 20,000 meters inland from the coastline. This constitutes a maximum of twenty percent coverage of the Division AO and can be used in areas of exploitation where it can be brought to bear. It is anticipated that naval gunfire support of the 3d Marine Division will continue in accordance with current practices.

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This support has been consistently available over the past several months. The type ships assigned include a minimum of one 5-inch/38 and one 5-inch/54 destroyer. During February 1968 this support was augmented with an 8-inch cruiser. Naval gunfire liaison officers on the staffs at Provisional Corps Vietnam and the III Marine Amphibious Force indicate that every effort will be made to maintain current support.

# 1. Logistics

- (1) Supply installations should be dispersed throughout the objective area to provide a responsive and flexible system of support. There are two major logistic support facilities within the Division AO. FLSC-B is located at Dong Ha and an LSU is located at LZ Stud between THON SON LAM and CA LU.
- (2) Classes and levels of supply maintained by the LSU at LZ Stud are as follows:

Class I	MCI - 10 DOS
	R - 1 DOS
	S - 5 DOS
Class III(W)	MOGAS - 20,000 gal
	Diesel - 20,000 gal
	Grease & Oil - 10 DOS
	Drummed MOGAS & Diesel - 5 DOS
	Encl (1)
34	SECRET

SECRET

Class III(A)	AVGAS - 10,000 gal
	JP - 4 - 130,000 gal
Class IV (initial stockage)	Sand Bags - 500,000
	Concertina - 1,000 sleeves
	Pickets (varied) - 224,000
Class V	10 DOA

Classes and levels of supply at FLSG-B are as follows:

Class I	MCI - 30 DOS
	S - 15 DOS
	R - 7 DOS
Class II	30 DOS
Class III	30 DOS
Class IV	As required
Class V	60mm & above 5 DOA
	Mines 5 DOA
	Anti Tank 5 DOA
	All other 30 DOA

(3) Units at THON SON LAM, CA LU and KHE SANH are supported from the supply point at LZ Stud (about 10,000 troops). Units at DONG HA, CAMP CARROLL, QUANG TRI and CUA VIET, are supported from the supply point at FLSG-B (about 36,000 troops). These two facilities are centrally located in relation to the forces

Encl (1)

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SECRET

they are tasked to support and are capable of reacting rapidly to the immediate needs of these units.

- (4) Stockage objectives maintained by infantry regiments vary based upon the situation. As a norm however, the infantry units located at combat operating bases have been authorized a stockage objective of 10 DOS class I and a Basic Allowance plus 10 DOA of class V. Actual stocks on hand will fluctuate, but experience has shown that there will always be from 4 to 7 days on hand at all times. Artillery units are required to maintain a Basic Allowance plus 5 DOA class V on position. In addition to the operating stocks on position, there are Class III fuel farms located throughout the area of operation. These have been established at Cua Viet, Quang Tri, and Camp Carroll. This is consistent with the tactical requirement for mobility and flexibility since the established supply levels include a reserve to ensure operation if the supply system temporarily fails or is otherwise restricted.
- (5) The impetus of logistic support is supply point distribution which requires the supported units to draw supplies from Dong Ha and the LSU at LZ Stud respectively; however, frequent replenishment of units by helicopter from the major support facilities (unit distribution) has been and continues to be essential because:

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- (a) Long lines of surface communication interdicted by enemy forces result in reduced movement of supplies by motor vehicle.
- (b) Certain road nets lack integrity because friendly forces are often limited to the extent to which sweep and security operations can be conducted. Route 1 north of Dong Ha, Route 561, Route 9, A-3, and A-4 are faced with this problem.
- (c) Trafficability off main arteries precludes the use of trucks into certain positions. Units located in the Napoleon-Saline AO (A-1 and C-4) are faced with this problem

For these reasons logistic missions conducted by helicopter have been significant. For example, during the period 12-22 December 1967, over 837 short tons of material were moved in support of DYEMARKER. Through the first quarter of this calendar year, approximately 2,800 sorties have been flown by helicopter to logistically support units within the Division. As of 15 April 1968, however, DYEMARKER support is no longer required and recent offensive operations in Leatherneck Square and along Route 9 have caused some reduction in helicopter support.

SECRET

- (6) The present disposition of units and the frequent need for distribution to remote areas will continue to place requirements on the helicopter for logistic support in the Division AO. Helicopters will be used to the maximum in logistic support of the exploitation force; heavy commitments to troop lifts or limitations to the landing zone could possibly limit the use of helicopters. Delivery of supplies can be augmented on an emergency basis by air drop from fixed wing aircraft should the need arise.

m. Communications

- (1) Communications required for helicopterborne operations primarily depend upon radio. The radio net required to control the landings of helicopters is the landing zone control or the troop tactical net of the unit involved. This is accomplished on a VHF-FM radio frequency. The radio set AN/ARC-44 in the helicopters and the radio set AN/PRC-25 used by the troops on the ground are compatible.
- (2) There are 220 compatible VHF-FM radio frequencies which can be utilized by current air/ground radio equipment. III MAF has been assigned 124 of these 220 frequencies for use throughout the I Corps area. Of these 124, Provisional Corps, Vietnam has been assigned 92 frequencies. Provisional Corps, Vietnam has in turn assigned these frequencies as follows:



SECRET

(a) 3d Marine Division

5- as sole user (not authorized for use by units in Northern ICTZ)

26- on a shared basis with the 101st Airborne Division

17- on a shared basis with the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Air Cavalry Division

48- total

(b) 1st Air Cavalry Division

4- as sole user (not authorized for use by other units in northern ICTZ)

32- on a shared basis with other units in ICTZ, but are not authorized for use by 3d Marine Division or the 101st Airborne Division

17- on a shared basis with the 3d Marine Division and 101st Airborne Division

53- total

(c) 101st Airborne Division

8- as sole user (not authorized for use by other units in northern ICTZ)

26- on a shared basis with the 3d Marine Division

17- on a shared basis with the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Air Cavalry Division

51- total

Encl (1)

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SECRET

The above assignment results in a decrease in discrete frequencies for all units and an increase in frequencies to be mutually shared between 3d Marine Division, 1st Air Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division. Interference can be expected any time that units of any of these three headquarters use these frequencies when transmitting from an aircraft, and many times when used from ground stations.

- (3) The few frequencies which are currently assigned to the Division are used extensively by reconnaissance teams, tactical air control parties, naval gunfire and artillery air spotters, air observers, liaison, medical evacuation, convoy control, HSTs for logistics support and by combined action groups in the Division AO. Infantry battalions are not currently assigned any of these frequencies. Only two frequencies are available for landing zone control. The infantry battalions have, in addition to the AN/PRC-25, the AN/PRC-41 which has VHF compatibility and can be used for air/ground communications; however, monoblocks for the batteries have been critical, are currently critical and no relief can be expected in the foreseeable future. Additionally the heavy weight of batteries and requirement for recharging (additional weight and generator requirement) supply does not lend itself to helicopterborne operations.
- (4) Another VHF radio, which is compatible for air/ground communications is the radio set AN/PRC-93. This is a hand-held radio

Encl (1)

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SECRET

capable of operating on one preset voice channel. All infantry battalions and the reconnaissance battalion of this Division have recently received these radios and are presently evaluating them for use by forward air controllers in directing fixed wing aircraft, reconnaissance insertions and extractions, emergency air/ground communications and other uses.

#### 5. CONCLUSIONS

- a. That there is a requirement for exploitation forces of varying sizes and structures from which the Division commander may opt.
- b. That the SPARROW HAWK Platoon does not adequately meet the requirement for this assortment of options.
- c. That although the current enemy situation and the missions assigned the Division restrict the availability of exploitation forces there are sufficient forces available for this purpose. The decision to launch integral battalion-size or larger helicopterborne exploitation forces will introduce a risk that must be considered in light of current enemy dispositions and capabilities.
- d. That there is a need for closer integration of planning effort between the 1stMAW and the 3dMarDiv relating to helicopter employment.
- e. That there are sufficient helicopter assets within the 1stMAW to support this Division's plans for the employment of helicopterborne exploitation forces.
- f. That there are sufficient fixed-wing strike assets to support the

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aforementioned helicopterborne force.

- g. That based upon the premise that the exploitation force would be committed to the attack in increasing size increments, i.e. first a platoon, with planning time for the commitment of a company, followed by another interval before battalion and larger size elements could be accumulated into pick-up zones, it is concluded that the current Air Control System is capable of massing available helo and fixed wing assets in a time interval that is compatible with the requirements of the ground elements to mass the exploitation force.
- h. That current disposition of artillery within the 3dMarDiv AO can support increased utilization of helicopterborne exploitation forces.
- i. That displacement of direct support artillery and the 155mm howitzer M1A2 (towed) is not dependent upon secure lines of surface communications.
- j. That restrictive fire plans are more conducive than save-a-planes to the integration of fire support and aircraft safety.
- k. That the location of logistics support installations, current supply stockage objectives and on-position unit supplies are adequate to insure rapid movement on short notice for Division exploitation forces.
- l. That a requirement exists for maintaining preplanned emergency supplies

SECRET

for fixed wing air drops in support of Division exploitation forces.

- m. That more compatible VHF-FM frequencies are required to insure adequate communications for 3d Marine Division helicopterborne operations.
- n. That Annex A provides a concept for the increased utilization of helicopterborne exploitation forces.

#### 6. ACTION RECOMMENDED

- a. That restrictive fire plans be instituted during periods of heavy aircraft utilization, such as during the assault phase of a helicopterborne operation, and that save-a-planes be instituted during periods of reduced helicopter utilization.
- b. That no additional logistic support installations be established within the Division Area of Operation to support Division helicopterborne exploitation forces.
- c. That stockage objectives as established by current instructions remain the same.
- d. That prepackaged units of emergency supply be established as follows:
  - (1) Force Logistic Command, Da Nang, for fixed wing air drop.
    - (a) Infantry Battalion
      - 1 Class I - - 3 DOS
      - 2 Class V - - 3 DOA
  - (2) FLSG-B, Dong Ha, for external lift by helicopter:
    - (a) Rifle Company

Encl (1)

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1 Class - 3 DOS2 Class - 3 DOA

- e. That a minimum of 12 additional sole user compatible VHF-FM frequencies be assigned to the 3d Marine Division for use by exploitation forces.
- f. That the radio set AN/PRC-93 be evaluated for use in controlling helicopters in and out of landing zones.
- g. That the concept for increased use of helicopters in the employment of exploitation forces contained in Annex A to this study be approved and forwarded to CG, III MAF.

## RECOMMENDATION

	<u>Approved</u>	<u>Disapproved</u>
6a	<u>Approved</u>	_____
6b	<u>Approved</u>	_____
6c	<u>Approved</u>	_____
6d	<u>Approved</u>	_____
6e	<u>Approved</u>	_____
6f	<u>Approved</u>	_____
6g	<u>Approved</u>	_____

ANNEX A: CONCEPT FOR THE INCREASED EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERBORNE EXPLOITATION FORCES BY THE 3D MARINE DIVISION.

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## ANNEX A: CONCEPT FOR THE INCREASED EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERBORNE

## EXPLOITATION FORCES BY THE 3D MARINE DIVISION.

1. Background. The premise upon which this concept is based is the rapid assembly of appropriately sized and configured forces, both ground and air, at the time necessary to maximize the exploitation of intelligence and tactical success on the battlefield. As they manifestly must be, economy of force and acceptance of reasonable risks are integral parts of this tactical doctrine.
2. Available Forces. In keeping with the fundamental principle of maintaining a reserve, each tactical unit of this Division must provide a predesignated subordinate unit in a reasonable degree of readiness to be so employed. The characteristics of the helicopter allow the rapid massing of forces over relatively great distances and at places of our own choosing. Accordingly, these reserve units must be oriented for movement by helicopter. The ultimate condition desired is to have available to the Division Commander a regimental-size force with sufficient combat support and combat service support to maintain it in the field for short periods of time. As a practical matter, this force must be assembled from Division-wide resources. At a minimum, each infantry battalion of the Division will have one rifle company, with its attached artillery forward observer team, on one-hour alert, and one of the platoons of that company on 30-minute alert for employment as helicopterborne reaction/exploitation purposes. Each infantry regiment will designate a battalion command

Annex A to  
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group including its FSCG on two-hour alert for command and control of multiple companies, when deployed. Where practicable the requirement for companies and a battalion command group within the infantry regiments will be met from a single battalion in the interest of maintaining tactical integrity. Multi-battalion forces will be controlled by regimental command groups formed by the regiment in whose area of operations the majority of the forces are committed or as designated by the Division Commander. Combat support and combat service support units will maintain appropriate elements on similar standby alert readiness in order to facilitate task organizing. Effective liaison must be established by appropriate Division staff members with elements of the 1stMAW to ensure that sufficient helicopter lift capability and its attendant air support is made available to introduce the reaction/exploitation forces in a tactically sound manner.

3. Employment of Forces. The available forces outlined above may be employed anywhere in the Division area of operations by accepting an element of risk based upon current intelligence. It is therefore incumbent upon every unit commander to maintain an awareness of operations in other tactical areas of the Division and to keep his subordinate leaders adequately informed.
4. Command and Control. In the interest of taking advantage of each valid opportunity to exploit with helicopterborne forces, the authority to make the decision to do so must be retained at the lowest practicable

Annex A to  
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command level. At the same time, it is imperative that at such time as the decision to exploit is made, higher headquarters be informed to ensure that: the decision is sound from an overall point-of-view; and, sufficient force in depth is available, allowing for assembly of aviation assets with which to support the exploitation. When the exploitation force is introduced into the action, command will normally be retained by the commander who requested the decision to exploit. He will be relieved at such time by a commander senior not only in the normal chain of command but in the magnitude of forces committed to the phased buildup. To provide continuity in planning and preparedness between the Division and the helicopter units directed to support exploitation forces, a cadre staff at Division level consisting of at least one ground officer and one officer from the principal supporting helicopter unit is envisioned. It is to be the duties of these personnel to perform concurrent and parallel planning on a regular basis and under the continuing mandate to make timely changes. This would reduce the burden on both aviation and ground commanders and would ensure that plans are current. Upon decision to commit exploitation forces this staff would join the commander of the ground force and assist him and the supporting helicopter commander in final coordination.

5. Support. All possible support for helicopterborne exploitation forces will be prearranged, including fire support, logistics and

Annex A to  
Encl (1)

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communications. The emphasis will be placed upon speed of response, dependability of support and flexibility of employment.

a. Aviation Support

- (1) Helicopters. Adequate helicopter lift capability must be maintained through assignment of limited strip alert aircraft and a rapid recall system based upon realistic time requirements. Strip alert requirements will consist of three CH-46 and two UH-1E gun ships for 30-minutes reaction time requirements allowing the immediate insertion of a platoon size helicopterborne force. Time requirements for a company (reinforced) size unit will be 1 hour with the requirement of five to eight CH-46 helicopters and two UH-1E gun ships. A battalion-size unit would be allowed four hours with the requirement for a minimum of ten CH-46, or the equivalent in load carrying capability, and four UH-1E. A regimental-size force will be alerted on 12-hour notice. Helicopter support requirements will be a minimum of ten CH-46 or the equivalent in load-carrying capability with immediate backup of ten additional CH-46 and appropriate UH-1E gun ship coverage.
- (2) Fired Wing. Normal strip alert and in-flight diversions will provide 30-60 minute capability for landing zone construction and preparations and other initial requirements. Greater time requirements will allow for normal requests through existing communication nets.

Annex A to  
Encl (1)


SECRET

SECRET

- b. Artillery. The current disposition of artillery assets and volume of fire support allows at least medium caliber coverage of 95% of the Division area of operations without displacement. Where possible, exploitation forces will be covered by in-place artillery. Where battalion or larger sized forces are used and a need exists for light artillery, heavy mortars and light artillery will be helicopter-lifted into the area of operations. The difficulty of providing security for the artillery and the heavy logistic burden of ammunition resupply must be considered in this regard.
- c. Logistics. Emphasis will be placed on the carrying of only combat essential supplies. Individual loads must be kept light and resupply retained at a minimum. Pre-staged packages of combat essential supplies will be placed in the several logistic support units throughout the Division area in cargo nets or assembled to be put in cargo nets as the situation requires. Logistic support will be oriented toward the employment of helicopters.
- d. Communications. Ground communications for reaction/exploitation forces must be preplanned where possible, but in any case will be based on organic equipment and established channels. Due to the high probability of employing forces from Division-wide assets, the communications plan must be as simple as possible. Aviation communications must also provide for centralized control and quick response.

Annex A to  
Encl (1)

SECRET

**SECRET**

DE RUMHN 015B 1230313

ZNY SSSSS

Z 020245Z MAY 68

FM CTF CLEARWATER

INFO RUMHVP/CG 3RD MAR DIV

RUMHVP/CDR 3RD MARINES

Z 020155Z MAY 68

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO CG PROV CORPS VIET

COMNAVFORV

INFO CG III MAF

CNO

NOC WHITE OAK MD

COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

CTF ONE ONE SIX

CTF ONE ONE SEVEN

EODGRUFAC

BT

**S E C R E T**

MAGNETIC INFLUENCE MINE CUA VIET RIVER (S)

A. CTF CLEARWATER 012120Z NOTAL

B. CTF CLEARWATER 020115Z NOTAL

SHOVE CGC  
 OP CHIEF  
 C-3 W  
 G-2 10B  
 DCPD  
 WPO  
 ACTION

0235  
 PA  
 CLEARWATER

PAGE TWO RUMHN 015B **S E C R E T**

1. NAVY EOD TEAM HAS RECOVERED TWO MAGNETIC INFLDANCE MINES IN CUA VIET RIVER. REF A AND B REFERS. MINES NOW AT CUA VIET.

2. THE DESCRIPTION OF MINES FOLLOWS:

A. MAGNETIC INDUCTIONS FIRING MECH.

B. CONTAINS SEARCH COIL 3 1/2 FT TO 4 FT IN LENGTH, RUNNING FULL LENGTH OF EXPLOSIVE.

C. TUBULAR BOOSTER, RUNS FULL LENGTH OF EXPLOSIVE HOUSING/

D. CONTAINS PRESSED FITTED EXPLOSIVE BLOCKS WHICH APPEAR TO BE TNT.

E. FIRING MECH APPEARS TO BE STANDARD USED IN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE MINES.

F. APPROX FIVE FEET IN LENGTH.

G. ABOUT 600 POUND IN WEIGHT.

H. EXPLOSIVE HOUSING IS RELATIVELY CRUDELY MADE.

ABOVE DESCRIPTION IS BASED UPON INITIAL EXAMINATION OF MINES.

3. NVA WERE IN PROCESS OF BUILDING UP AT LEAST FIVE MINES WHEN INTERDICTED BY PATROL CRAFT. REF A REFERS. APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TRANSPORTED INTO AREA IN SEPARATE PIECES, THAT IS, FIRING MECH, EXPLOSIVE BLOCKS, SEARCH COIL AND BOOSTER AND EXPLOSIVE HOUSING AND BATTERIES. RM FOR COMNAVFORV.

**FLASH**

020.3

02 CG/10/2

**SECRET**

encl 9

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMHN 015B S E C R E T

- A. REQUEST MINE EXPERT TO BE FLOWN TO CUA VIET EARLIEST.
  - B. IF INFLUENCE MINE COUNTERMEASURES SWEEP BOATS AND GEAR  
AVAIL REQUEST DISPATCH TO CUA VIET EARLIEST. THIS CONFIRMS  
TELCON TO NSA DANANG FOR RELAY.
  - 5. PRESENT INTENTIONS, USING NAVY EOD TEAM, PLAN ON USING TWO  
SKINNERS TO MAKE CU  
NARY SWEEP OF RIVER BOTTOM. IF JECTS  
CONTACTED WILL DIVE AND IDENTIFY.
  - 6. RIVER CLOSED TO LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSIT FROM YD 2765 TO  
DONG MD.
- GP-4  
BT

NNNNW

**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL



DE RUMHN 025B 1230350  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 020250Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 025B 1230350  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 020250Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CDR THIRD MARINES  
 Z O 012120Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO CG PROV CORPS VIET  
 INFO COMNAVFORV  
 COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SPOTREP 01-2 MAY 68 (C)

1. AT 020230H PATROL BOAT NR24 OBSERVED VIA INFRA RED LIGHT PEOPLE ON BANK AT YD B-258 128 CRAFT ILLUMINATED WITH WHITE LIGHT AND OBSERVED ABOUT 30 PERSONNEL, ABOUT 25 WERE NVA IN FULL BATTLE DRESS AND 5 IN BLACK SUITS THAT APPEARED TO BE WET. NEARBY SEVERAL BASKET BOATS WERE OBSERVED. ENEMY WERE IMMEDIATELY TAKEN UNDER FIRE WITH M-79 TO AVOID FIRING INTO FRIENDLY LINES BEYOND LOCATIGN. TWO ENEMY WERE SEEN TO FALL AS THEY FLED TO THE NORTHWEST AND DISAPPEARED.

2. PATROL BOAT 24 WAS JOINED BY PATROL BOATS 21 AND 28. AREA AGAIN WAS

G-2/coe

G-3/CG 588

PAGE TWO RUMHN 025B CONFIDENTIAL

ILLUMINATED WITH WHITE LIGHT REVEALING 5 LARGE OBJECTS EACH ABOUT 6 FEET IN LENGTH, 1. FOOT IN DIA AND SHAPED LIKE A PENCIL. THESE OBJECTS WERE TAKEN UNDER FIRE RESULTING IN A LARGE EXPLOSION WITH 40 FOOT FIRE BALL AND SEVERAL SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.

3. AT 020315H WHILE CONTINUING SEARCH OF BANK WITH WHITE LIGHT OBSERVED A BLUE 5 GAL CAN AND ARTILLERY SHELL SHAPED GRAY OBJECT. AT 264 626. UNABLE TO SET FIRE. AT POSITION YD 266 627 LOCATED 4 BLUE 5 GAL CANS AT HOSIT YD 264 626. OBJECTS TAKEN UNDER FIRE AND CAUGHT FIRE. FIRE CONTINUED TO BURN AT 0415H.

4. PATROL BOATS CONTINUED TO PATROL AND AT 020430H POSIT YD 266 627, OBSERVED LARGE GROUP OF NVA IN OPEN. TAKEN UNDER M-79 FIRE, PERSONNEL FLED INTO CORNFIELD. ENY CASU UNK. HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM ENEMY. UNABLE TO RETURN FIRE WITH MG'S DUE FRIENDLIES IN IMMEDIATE AREA.

AT 020500H COMMENCING TO RAIN REDUCING VISABILITY TO 100 YDS.

5. PATROLICRAFT CONTINUING TO PATROL IC AREA.

6. CLOSED

GP-4

BT

020250

CONFIDENTIAL

encl 10

**SECRET****FLASH**

XPBVVA VPC275VVZVA 138

////////////////////FLASH FOLLOWS ACTION

VV NHB749

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUMHVPA

DE RUMHN 024B 1230355

ZNY SSSSS

Z 020251ZMAY 68

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF

RUENAAA/CNO

RUEBBHA/NOC WHITE OAK MD

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX

RUMSBB/CUT ONE ONE SEVEN

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHVP/COMMAN DER THIRD MARINES

RUHHBNA/EODGRUPAC

BT

S E C R E T

MAGNETIC INFLUENCESMINE CUA VIAZ RCLER (S)

A. CTF CLEARWATER 020155Z MAY 68

1. DETAILED INSPECTION OF MINES REVEALS THAT ONE COMPLETE MINE AND THREE FOURTHS OF ANOTHER RECOVERED. MINE IS COMPOSED OF THREE MAJOR SECTIONS: INDUCTIONS FIRING MECH; CENTER SECTION FLANGED ON BOTH ENDS;

PAGE TWO RUMHN 024B S E C R E T

AND FORWARD SECTION. FORWARD AND CENTER SECTION CONTAIN EXPLOSIVES.

TOTAL LENGTH OF MINE APPROXIMATELY SEVEN AND ONE HALF FEET. ONE

FIRING MECH HAS FOLLOWING NUMBERS: PY-538-4-65-6/0. NUMBERS

ARE EXTERNAL ON REAR OF FIRING MECH. OTHER FIRING MECH CHARRED BY FIRE. ONE BATTERY HAS RUSSIAN WRITING. OTHER BATTERY BADLY BURNED/

2. AT 020959H TWO MORE SUSPECTED MINES SIGHTED AT YD 260624.

GP-4

BT


G3

CG/STAND

0202

**SECRET**

Encl 11

**SECRET****SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF

C-3 W.O.

C-2 W.O.

ACTION

NNNNVV VVV VPB 197MMZVA 540VV NHA387

00 RUMHVP

DE RUMHN 044B 1231105

ZNY SSSSS

O P 020925Z MAY 63

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI

INFO RUMMWUA/CG III MAF

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUMHVP/CDR THIRD MAR

RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN

RUMNHVH/NILO QUANG TRI

ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP

RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP

BT

**SECRET**

MINE SITREP CUA VIET RIVER (S)

A. CTF CLEARWATER 020710Z

1. NAVY EOD COMPLETED BOTTOM SWEEP SUSPECTED AREAS. LOCATED ONE INTACT MINE AT YD 260 624 WELL CLEAR OF CHANNEL. CEK A REFERS. ONE ADDITIONAL MINE LOCATED IN SLOUGH 30 YARDS EAST OF FIRST MINE. APPEARED TO BE COMPLETE MINE. SECURITY VUACBS PLACE ON SITE. WILL ATTEMPT TO RECOVER 3 MAY AT LOW TIDE. A TOTAL OF FOUR MINES HAVE BEEN LOCATED. TWO RECOVERED AND PRESENTLY AT CUA VIET.
2. CUA VIET RIVER OPEN TO LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSIT AT 021535H.

GP-4

BT

a-3

a-4/a-2/000/ca

NNNN

02


0

7

**SECRET**

Encl 126





*Clearwater*

*CONFIDENTIAL*

OO RUMHVP  
DE RUMHN 0628 1231922  
ZNY CCCCC  
O P 021712Z MAY 68  
FM CTF CLEARWATER  
TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
RUMHVP/CO THIRD MAR  
RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
RUMNHVH/NILO QUANG TRI  
ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
BT

*Tor / 051530Z  
028-B*

*CONFIDENTIAL*

CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 021800H-022400H (U)

1. AT 021935H RSG PATROL AT YD254622 RECEIVED S/A FIRE FROM VIC YD 254624. NEG CAS. PATROL DID NOT RETURN FIRE DUE TO PROXIMITY TO FRIENDLY UNIT. AT 022058H RSG PATROL AT 259623 RECEIVED S/A AND MORTAR FIRE FROM UNK LOCATION LANDING 50 METERS, OFF STERN. AS MORTAR FIRE WAS BEING ADJUSTED, PATRO MANEUVERED AT BEST SPEED FROM DANGER AREA. AT 022115H, RSG HITROCEIVED RPG FROM VIC 248627. RPG MISSED PATROL. RETURNED FIRE WITH M-60 MG, AND CALLED ARZY MIS ON. AT 022258H RSG PATROL USING INFRA RED SEARCHLIGHT OBSERVED TWO MEN VIC 266634, OPENED FIRE WITH .50 CAL MGJM RESULTS UNK. AT 022311H, NSAD CUA VIET RECEIVED APPROX 12 RDS UNK ARTY. NEG CAS.

EG DAMAGE. AT 022355H NSAD CUA VIET RECEIVED 2 RDS UNK ARTY. NEG CAS. NEG DAMAGE.

2. LOGISTIC CRAFT AT DONG HA 30 PERCENT UNLOADEDPM

3. DONG HA RIVER SEC

ITY GROUP CONTINUES NIGHT PATROLS AS PER MY 021200H-021800H SITREP.

4. LOGISTIC/SECURITY CRAFT DISPERSAL: NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT

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*COC 2/3/15CC/4/CG*

*Encl 13*

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/ALM/glp  
3120/3  
Ser: 003A12468  
3 May 1968

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Provisional Corps, Vietnam  
Subj: Task Organization; report of  
Ref: (a) PCV TOC msg 220730Z Apr68

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted, personnel strengths included.

UNIT	STATION	STRENGTH
Hq Bn (-) (Rein)	Quang Tri	
HqCo (-)		103/499
SerCo (-)		4/144
MP Co (-)		4/95
Det Comm Co		1/35
Det, HqBn	Phu Bai	
Det, SerCo		3/41
Det, HqBn	Dong Ha	
Det HqCo		3/6
Det SerCo		13/88
Det MP Co		1/32
Comm Co		12/317
SU #2		116/302
Det, Hq Bn	Khe Sanh	
Det, Hq Co		0/1
Det, Comm Co		0/6
Det, Hq Bn	Danang	
Det, Hq Co		0/2
Det, Hq Bn	Danang (III MAF)	
Det, Hq Co		3/49
Det, Ser Co		0/7
Det, Comm Co		0/2
Det, SU#2		0/1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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End 14

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Det, Hq Bn Det Ser Co	Hue	0/1
Det, Hq Bn Det Comm Co	Cua Viet	0/3
Det, Hq Bn Det Comm Co	Camp Carroll	0/3
Det, Hq Bn Det Comm Co	Thon Son Lam	0/3
Det, Hq Bn Det, Hq Co Det, Ser Co Det, SU #2	Okinawa	0/2 0/1 2/3
Det, Hq Bn Det Hq Co	Quang Tri	0/7
Det, Hq Bn Det Comm Co	C-3	0/3
Det, Hq Bn Det Comm Co	Cam Lo	1/14
Det, Hq Bn Det Comm Co Det MP Co	Ca Lu	0/6 0/9
Task Force Hotel Hq Hq Co Hotel	Khe Sanh	22/51
1st Mar (-) (Rein) Hq Co	Khe Sanh	17/217
1st Bn, 1st Mar H&S Co Co A Co B Co C Co D	Khe Sanh	17/324 4/183 4/171 4/181 4/169
2d Bn, 1st Mar H&S Co Co E Co F Co G Co H	Khe Sanh	14/294 4/190 4/195 5/180 5/193

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2d Bn, 3rd Mar	Khe Sanh	17/309
H&S Co		6/189
Co E		3/185
Co F		3/196
Co G		4/193
Co H		
3d Bn, 4th Mar	Khe Sanh	16/312
H&S Co		5/182
Co I		4/184
Co K		5/180
Co L		3/174
Co M		
1st Bn, 11th Mar	Khe Sanh	18/172
Hq Btry		7/108
A Btry	(6 105H)	9/94
B Btry, 1st BN 12th Mar	(6 105H)	8/128
G Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar	(6 105H)	3/102
W Btry, 1st Bn, 11th Mar	(6 155H)	0/20
W Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar	(5 4.2 Mort)	
	(1 107 Howtar)	
Det 238 Field Arty (USA)		0/6
Prov Mech Co (9-M48A3) (10 M50A1)	Khe Sanh	5/100
AT Co (-) (Rein) 3d Tk Bn		1/25
3d Plt, Co A, 3d Tk Bn	Co B	1/25
3d Plt, Co B, 3d Tk Bn	Co C	1/29
Co A (-) 1st SP Bn	Co A (-) 1st SP Bn	3/51
1st Plt, Co B, 3d SP Bn		1/25
Co A (-) 1st MT Bn		1/22
Co A 1st Engr Bn		2/4
Det 3d ITT		
2d BDE, 1st ACD (USA)	Khe Sanh	26/153
Hq&Hq Co		13/76
1st Bn, 5th Cav	Khe Sanh	6/118
Hq&Hq Co		4/121
A Co		6/123
B Co		3/118
C Co		
D Co		
2d Bn, 5th Cav	Khe Sanh	19/65
Hq&Hq Co		1/119
Co A		1/129
Co B		5/113
Co C		4/122
Co D		

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1st Bn 77th Arty (USA) (DS)		
Hq Btry		6/25
A Btry (6 105H)		6/69
B Btry (6 105H)		8/81
A Btry, 130th Arty (USA) (6 155H)		3/114
3d Mar (-) (Rein)	Cua Viet	
Hq Co 3d Mar		18/229
BLT 2/4 (-) (Rein)	Cua Viet	
H&S Co (-) (Rein)		17/317
Det Hq Btry, 12 Mar		1/3
Det 3d Dental Co		1/1
Det 1st Plt 9th MAB		0/2
Det Btry H, 3/12		1/12
Det Hq Co 9th MAB		2/24
Det Comm Supt Co 9th MAB		0/4
Det, C&C, Co D, 5th Med Bn		3/33
Det, FLC		0/5
Co E		5/141
Co F		6/165
Co G		5/149
Co H		5/160
1st Plt Co A, 5th Tk Bn (4 M48A3)		0/22
1st Plt Co A, 3rd Recon Bn		1/20
1st Plt, Co B 3d SP Bn		1/35
3d Plt Co C, 3d INF Bn		1/34
4th Plt Co B, 1st AMTRAC		1/21
(10 LVTP-5)		
(1 LVTP-5 CMD)		
1st Bn (-), 3d Mar	Cua Viet	
H&S Co		15/282
Co A		5/188
Co B		4/193
Co C		5/185
1st AMTRAC Bn (-) (Rein)	Cua Viet	
H&S Co (10 LVTP-5)		15/290
(3 LVTP-5 CMD)		
(1 LVTR-1)		
(3 LVTR-1)		
Co A (-) (40 LVTP-5)	Cua Viet	6/211
(22 LVTP-5 CMD)		
(1 LVTR-1)		

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Co B (-) (31 LVTP-5) (2 LVTP-5 CMD) (1 LVTR-1)	Gua Viet	6/220
Co D (Rein) 1st Bn 3d Mar	Ca-4 1st	3/154
4th Mar (-) (Rein)		
Hq Co (-)	Camp Carroll	18/236
Co C 9th MT Bn		3/41
2d Bn 9th Mar (Rein)	Ca Lu	
H&S Co (-)		11/259
Co E		5/145
Det Hq Co, 4th Mar (SNIPERS)		0/2
Co F		5/173
Det Hq Co 4th Mar (SNIPERS)		0/2
Co G		6/137
Det Hq Co 4th Mar (SNIPERS)		0/2
CMD Grp "B" 3rd Bn 9th Mar	Thon Son Lam	
Hq Co		19/344
Co I		5/176
Co F, 2d Bn, 26th Mar		4/203
Det Hq Co 4th Mar (SNIPERS)		0/4
BLT 3/1 (-) (Rein)	Ca Lu	
H&S Co (-)		2/233
Co I		4/105
Co K		4/105
Co L		6/130
Co M		2/105
2nd Bn (-) (Rein) 26th Mar	Camp Carroll	
H&S Co		18/358
Co E		5/192
Co G		6/196
Co H		3/176
Det Hq Co 4th Mar (SNIPERS)		0/4
9th Mar (-) (Rein)		
Hq Co 9th Mar	Dong Ha	19/202
Co B 9th MT		4/77
1st Bn, 9th Mar		
H&S Co	C-2	
Co A	C-3	15/285
Co B	C-3A	4/197
Co C	C-2	5/186
Co D	Cam Lo	4/197
Co K (-), 3/3	C-3	5/183
	C-2	5/118

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3d Bn 3d Mar (-), (Rein)	C-3	
H&S Co		17/294
Co I		5/191
Co L		6/184
Co M		4/190
1st Bn, 4th Mar (Rein)		
H&S Co	A-4	18/397
Co A		6/196
Co B	A-4A	5/198
Co C	C-2A	6/194
Plt Co K, 3/3	C-2A	1/42
Co D	A-4	6/194
3d Bn (-), 9th Mar	C-3	
H&S Co (-)		20/366
Co K		6/202
Co L		5/124
Co M		6/207
26th Mar (-) (Rein)	Quang Tri	
Hq Co 26th Mar		19/206
1st Bn 26th Mar	Quang Tri	
H&S Co		24/351
Co A		5/202
Co B		5/238
Co C		5/215
Co D		6/200
3d Bn, 26th Mar	Quang Tri	
H&S Co		19/334
Co I		5/211
Co K		4/200
Co L		5/192
Co M		4/190
3d Sqdn, 5th Armd Cav (ND)	Quang Tri	
Hq Troop		17/180
B Troop		5/148
C Troop		4/155
D Troop		3/4
Co C, 2d Bn 34th Armd		5/84
Det 15th Engr		0/5

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12th Mar (-) (Rein)	Dong Ha	34/283
Hq Btry (Rein)		
Det MC 10-2 (1 AN/MPQ 10A)	A-2	
Det MC 10-3 (1 AN/MPQ 10A)	C-2	
1st Search Light Btry (-)	Dong Ha	4/97
1st Plt (-) 1st SLT (1 23" SLT)		
2d Plt (-) 1st SLT (1 60" SLT)		
		(1 23" SLT)
1st Bn (-) (Rein), 12th Mar	Camp Carroll	
Hq Btry		12/147
Btry A (6 105 How)		8/110
Btry C (6 105 How)	Ca Lu	8/111
Btry B, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (6 105 Howtar)		6/105
Mort Btry 1st Bn 13th Mar (6 107 Howtar)		4/78
1st Prov 155 How Btry (4 155 How)		3/98
Mort Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar	Camp Carroll	3/66
	(6 107 Howtar)	
Btry K, 4th Bn, 12th Mar (5 105 How SP)		5/91
2d Bn (Rein) 12th Mar	Dong Ha	
Hq Btry		14/141
Btry D (6 105 How)	C-3	8/104
Btry E (6 105 How)	C-2	8/108
Btry F (6 105 How)	C-2	7/107
Mort Btry (6 107 How)	A-4	3/68
Mort Btry 1st Bn, 12th Mar	A-3	3/72
	(2 107 How)	
Btry K, 4th Bn, 13 Mar	C-2	4/93
	(6 155 How SP)	
Det MC 4-1 (1 AN/MPQ-4A)	A-4	
Det 2d Plt, 1st SLT (1 30" SLT)		
Det 2d Plt, 1st SLT (1 20" SLT)	C-3	
3d Bn, (-) (Rein), 12th Mar	Cua Viet	
Hq Btry		15/128
Btry I (6 105 How)	Quang Tri	7/113
Btry C 1st Bn, 11th Mar (6 105 How)	Cua Viet	9/136
1st Plt, 1st Armd Amphib Co (6 LVTH-6)		
Mort Btry, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (6 107 How)		3/102
Plt, Mort Btry 1st Bn 12th Mar	C-4	
	(2 107 How)	
2d Prov 155 How Btry (-) (2 155 How)	Quang Tri	1/41
4th Bn (-), 12th Mar	Dong Ha	
Hq Btry		12/142
Btry L(-) (4 155 How SP)		6/92
Plt Btry L (2 155 How SP)	C-1	
Btry M (6 155 How SP)	Dong Ha	4/91

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1st Bn, (-) 13th Mar	Quang Tri	13/128
Hq Btry		
Btry A (6 105 How)	LZ Hard Core	9/117
Btry C (6 105 How)	LZ Sparrow	6/105
3d Tank Bn (-) (Rein)	Quang Tri	
H&S Co (-)		21/257
Co A (Rein) (16 M48A3)	Dong Ha	8/177
<u>2d Plt, Co A, 5th AT Bn (5-150)</u>		
Det H&S Co, (4-M67A2)		
Det, 1st Plt Co A, 3d AT Bn (1 M50)		
Co B (-) (Rein) (11 M48A3)	Camp Carroll	3/125
(1 M51VTR)		
Det H&S, Co (1 M67A2)		
Co C (-)	Quang Tri	4/116
Task Unit (TF Robbie)	Cam Lo	
Det Co C (9 M48A3)		
(1 M51VTR)		
Det Co A (5 M48A3)		
(2 M67A2)		
Det H&S Co (2-M48A3)		
Det Co B (2-M67A2)		
Det Co C (2 M48A3)	Cua Viet	
Det H&S Co (1 M51VTR)	Dong Ha	
3d Recon Bn (Rein)	Quang Tri	
H&S Co		8/146
Det H&S Co	Dong Ha	3/28
Co A	Quang Tri	3/98
Co B		3/97
Co C		4/93
Co D		3/75
Co E		4/119
3d Force Recon Co		3/131
Det 3d For Recon Co	Khe Sanh	1/12
3d Engr Bn (Rein)	Quang Tri	
H&S Co (-)		11/113
Det H&S Co	Phu Bai	0/2
Engr Spt Co (-)	Quang Tri	5/189
Det Eng Spt Co	Phu Bai	1/12
Det Eng Spt Co	Dong Ha	0/4
Det Eng Spt Co	Ca Lu	0/2
Det Eng Spt Co	Thon Son Lam	0/3
Det Eng Spt Co	Gio Linh	0/1
Det Eng Spt Co	Camp Carroll	0/6
Det Eng Spt Co	Con Thien.	0/1
Det Eng Spt Co	Cau Viet	0/2
Det Eng Spt Co	Cam Lo	0/5
Det Eng Spt Co	LZ Stud	0/2
Det Eng Spt Co	Wunder Beach	0/2

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Co A (Rein) 3d Engr Bn	Dong Ha	2/90
Det Co A, 3d Engr Bn	Camp Carroll	2/31
Det Co A, 3d Engr Bn	Thon Son Lam	1/30
Co B (Rein), 3d Engr Bn	Cua Viet	5/106
Det, Co B, 3d Engr Bn	Quang Tri	1/34
Det, Co B, 3d Engr Bn	Hai Lang	0/10
Co C (Rein), 3d Engr Bn	Dong Ha	5/68
Det, Co C, 3d Engr Bn	Con Thien	0/10
Det, Co C, 3d Engr Bn	C-2	0/10
Det, Co C, 3d Engr Bn	Cam Lo	1/23
Det, Co C, 3d Engr Bn	A-3	0/12
Det, Co C, 3d Engr Bn	C-4	0/2
3d SP Bn	Quang Tri	
H&S Co (-)		11/187
Det H&S Co	Khe Sanh	0/10
Det H&S Co	Cua Viet	0/5
Co A (-) (Rein)	Quang Tri	2/43
Det H&S Co		0/17
Det Co B		1/13
Det Co A	Khe Sanh	0/10
Co B (-) (Rein)	Ca Lu	3/33
Det H&S Co		0/14
Det Co A		0/3
Det Co B	Cua Viet	1/15
Det Co B	Thon Son Lam	0/4
Co C (-) (Rein)	Dong Ha	3/57
Det H&S Co		0/29
Det Co C	Thon Son Lam	0/3
3d Medical Bn (-) (Rein)	Phu Bai	41/271
H&S Co (-) (Rein) (Attached M.U.S.T. 2 and 17th ITT)		
Co A	Quang Tri	15/67
Co B	Phu Bai	
Co C	Dong Ha	18/68
Co D (Rein)		
3d Motor Transport (Rein)	Quang Tri	
H&S Co (-)		7/73
Det Otter Plt, H&S Co (13 M76)		1/14
Co A (-)		4/70
Co B (-)		4/41
Co C		4/85

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3d Dental Co

Quang Tri

27/40

9th Motor Transport Bn

Dong Ha

M&S Co

7/66

Co A

3/76

Transportation Co

3/81

*F. D. Chapman*

F. D. CHAPMAN

By direction

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Plans  
TF HOTEL FILE ✓  
B

V S

DE 5825X AND MATE HERE IS YR NR 04.....04..04 AGAIN

ZNY SSSS  
O 030535Z MAY 68  
FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
TO RUHHVP/CG 3D MARDIV  
INFO ZEN/1ST MAR  
ZEN/2D BDE 1ST ACD  
BT

TOP/030605/MAY 68  
1st MAR 87

Q-3/

S E C R E T

1. AT 030910H TERMINATED OFFENSIVE SWEEP CONDUCTED IAW MY  
FRAG 3-68. RESPECTIVE UNITS RETURNING TO ASSIGNED AO'S.  
2. OPERATION ALONG RIDGELINE HILL 1015 EAST SOUTHEAST TO  
HILL 297 PROPOSED FOR 7 MAY POSTPONED. INTEND CONDUCT  
RECON IN FORCE TO WESTNORTHWEST OF KHE SANH VIC XD 7143  
CONCEPT, SCHEME, AND FIRE PLAN FOLLOW LATER.

GP-4  
BT

Q-3

G-2/coe/ca

JH

P

SECRET

Encl 15

V

SECRET

INFORMED 1500 4 MAY  
THIS ORN POSTPONED -

KWMPKIGH/W MY MESSAGE NO 05  
TF HOTEL PLANNING CAN BY 881N BY 7 MAY  
WILL CALL ON DETAILS.

EE

OO RUMHVP

DE RUMHVP 364A 1240000

ZNY SSSSS

O 030600Z MAY 68

FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

TO ZEN/CO 1ST MAR

ZEN/CO 2D BDE 1ST ACD

INFO RUMHVP/CG 3D MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T

FRAG ORDER 4-68

1. COMMENCING ABOUT 5 MAY, TF HOTEL CONDUCTS DEEP RECON IN FORCE IN AREA BOUNDED BY LAOS BORDER, EW GRID LINE 44, NS GRID LINE 80 AND ROUTE 9. LZ'S AND FIRE BASES SELECTED TO FACILITATE MISSION WILL BE OCCUPIED ONLY LONG ENOUGH TO GAIN INFO OF ENEMY STRENGTH AND PATTERN OF ACTIVITY. INITIAL PENETRATION SHOULD BE RELATIVELY DEEP BUT NO CLOSER THAN 2 KM EAST OF LOATIAN BORDER; SUBSEQUENT MOVES SHOULD GENERALLY BE FROM WEST TO EAST.
2. 1ST MARINES. DEVELOP PLAN FOR RECON IN FORCE EASTWARD FROM GENERAL VIC XD 7143 - 7144 TO INCLUDE SCHEME OF MANEUVER AND FIRE PLAN.
3. 2BDE. DEVELOP PLAN TO SCREEN WITHIN YOUR ASSIGNED AREA 1ST MARINES SOUTH FLANK IN GENERAL AREA CO PUT XD 789382 TO

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 364A S E C R E T

HILL 400 XD 746375. BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE 1ST MARINES WITH SUPPORTING FIRES AND TO INITIATE OTHER ACTIONS AS DIRECTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS

4. COORDINATING GUIDANCE

A. PRESENT BOUNDARY 1ST MAR/2BDE REMAINS VALID.

B. DO NOT PLAN TO OUTPOST OR OTHERWISE PERMANENTLY HOLD ANY SPECIFIC TERRAIN FEATURE IN WESTERN PART OF OBJECTIVE AREA.

C. CONCEPTS SHOULD PERMIT EXPLOITATION IF OPPORTUNITY DEVELOPS.

D. PLANNING CONFERENCE THIS HQ 041000H MAY68.

GP-4

BT



TF Hotel  
File

9-3

9-2/000/00 888

03

NNNC

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SECRET

Encl 16

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*P/An*  
*TF Hotel File*  
*gr*

RR RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHVP 0410A 1241410  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 R 031410Z MAY 68  
 FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
 TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MARDIV  
 BT

*FOR/031353/MAY68*  
*15 MAY 68*

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 POLICE OF KHE SANH BASE

A. CG TF HOTEL 290330Z APR 68  
 B. CG TF HOTEL 280527Z APR 68

1. EFFORTS TO POLICE THE KHE SANH COMMAND POST AREA  
 CONTINUE AND PROGRESS IS BEING MADE. THIS IS A REPORT OF  
 CURRENT STATUS. TO DATE WE HAVE TAKEN THE FOLLOWING STEPS:  
 A. COUNTED TENANTS, IDENTIFIED UNITS, LOCATED THEIR  
 WORKING AREAS, AND ESTABLISHED AN ORDERLY SYSTEM OF  
 COMMUNICATION WITH THEM.  
 B. ASSIGNED AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ISSUED  
 INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING POLICE OF AREAS.  
 C. ISSUED WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING PRIORITY OF  
 EFFORT, PLACING HEALTH HAZARDS AND UNEXPLODED AMMO AT THE  
 TOP OF THE LIST.  
 D. DEVISED A GRADING SYSTEM SO THAT PROGRESS CAN BE

*Q-3*

*STAND/CG*

*Egr*

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 0410A C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 MEASURED.

E. REQUESTED PREVENTIVE MEDICINE ASSISTANCE (REF A).  
 F. CONDUCTED REGULAR INSPECTION AND MEETINGS WITH  
 TENANT OFFICERS OR NCOS IN CHARGE.  
 G. REQUIRED WORKING PARTIES WITH TRUCKS DAILY.  
 2. TO DATE WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THE FOLLOWING:  
 A. REMOVED OR DISPOSED OF APPROX 8 TONS OF EXPLOSIVES.  
 B. LOCATED AND SCHEDULED FOR REMOVAL APPROX 8 MORE  
 TONS OF EXPLOSIVES.  
 C. COLLECTED AND DISPOSED OF APPROX 140 TRUCK LOADS  
 OF DEBRIS.  
 D. RETROGRADED 174 TRUCK LOADS OF MATERIAL FROM THE  
 KHE SANH COMMAND POST AREA.  
 3. DESPITE THIS EFFORT AND EVIDENCE OF MEASUREABLE PROGRESS,  
 THE APPEARANCE OF KHE SANH HAS IMPROVED ONLY SLIGHTLY.  
 FURTHER, THERE ARE LARGE AREAS OF ACCUMULATED DEBRIS AND  
 AMMO OR EXPLOSIVES INSIDE THE PERIMETER WHERE NO ONE LIVES  
 OR WORKS. THOSE AREAS NOW COMPRISE ROUGHLY TWO-THIRDS OF  
 THE TOTAL AREA. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT APPROX 6,000 MAN HOURS,  
 100 TRUCK HOURS. AND 220 DOZER HOURS WILL BE NEEDED

*P*

*Encl 17*

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PAGE THREE RUMHVP 0410A C O N F I D E N T I A L  
POLICE THIS AREA.

4. AT PRESENT THERE ARE FEW AVAILABLE PERSONNEL AMONG TENANT DETACHMENTS WHO CAN REASONABLE BE USED FOR POLICE. PARENT UNITS HAVE PROPERLY CUT PERSONNEL IN KHE SANH DETACHMENTS TO THE BAREST MINIMUM. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED OFTEN MAN WATCHES OR FUNCTIONAL BILLETS THAT PROVIDE ESSENTIAL COMBAT SUPPORT LIKE DASC, RADIO BATTALION, AND COMMUNICATIONS. THE 7 LSU AND SHORE PARTY PERSONNEL, WHO MAKE UP THE BULK OF THE TANANTS, ARE WORKING FULL TIME PREPARING RETRUGRADE CARGO AND SENDING OUR REMAINING SUPPLIES TO HILL POSITIONS. LSU AND SHORE PARTY PERSONNEL ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART SOON.

5. THE 1ST MAR AND SUPPORTING UNITS CONSTITUTE A MORE REALISTIC SOURCE OF WORKING PARTIES, BUT THEY ARE APPROPRIATELY DEVOTING THEIR ENERGIES TO COMBAT ASSIGNMENTS. AS CITED IN REF B, THE REGT IS ALREADY OPERATING WITH SHORTAGES OF ENGINEERS AND SHORE PARTY PERSONNEL.

6. IN SUMMARY THE PRESENT TACTICAL SITUATION AND PERSONNEL LEVELS PERMIT ONLY SLOW OVERALL PROGRESS IN POLICING THE AREA. HOWEVER, ON THE AVERAGE, TWO WORKING PARTIES OF 10 MARINE EACH ARE BEING EMPLOYED DAILY. IT IS ANTICIPATED

PAGE FOUR RUMHVP 0410A C O N F I D E N T I A L

THAT THE CAMP WILL BE BROUGHT TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF SANITATION BY 10 MAY; THAT ALL EXCEPT SMALL UNDISCOVERED AMTS OF AMMO WILL BE CLEARED BY 10 MAY; AND THAT INHABITED AREAS WILL BE CLEARED OF MAJOR UNSIGHTLY STRUCTURES OR DEBRIS BY 17 MAY. UNINHABITED AREAS WILL CONTINUE TO POSE A PROBLEM FOR A LONGER PERIOD AS WILL WRECKED AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES AND HEAVY EQUIP.

7. CG 888 MAF AND CG PCV HAV BOTH INDICATED INTEREST IN CLEANING UP KHE SANH.

GP-4

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TF Hotel

17

P/Dr

GR

DRAFTER 3/FDG/ivb  
SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV 3  
CWO TRAC

IMMEDIATE 040410 2 MAY68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: USA MORTUARY TAN SON NHUT/

//UNCLASS//INFO//

COMM CNTR READDRESS CG TASK FORCE HOTEL MSG 270412Z APR68 AS INDICATED ABOVE.

CG TASK FORCE HOTEL MSG 270412Z APR68 HIGHER CLASS.

CON 0253

RELEASED BY

W. Chapman

3 ONLY


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⤴

Encl 18

DECLASSIFIED





SHOVE

OF CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.C.

DCPO

PO

ACTION

P

de

B

H. Charles C

SECRET

NNNNKAVV VPBT9ZVA 240ZCZCHA925

CG CUMHVP

DE RUMHN 014B 125064G

ZNY SSSSS

O P 040505Z MAY 68

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO CUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI

INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR BIV

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR

CUMSEB/CTF ONE ONE SIX

ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP

RUMHN/CDR HUE CIVER SECUCITY VROUP

BT

SECRET

CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 040600H - 041200H MAY (U)

1. OPENED RIVER TO LOGISTIC CRAFT AT 040715H. ALL CRAFT TRANSITTED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

2. CIVER SECTION 543 WITH FIVE PBR'S ARRIVER CUA VIET 040830H.

CTG 70.5 EMBARKED IN EPPING FORREST, AND MINE COUNTERMEASURE OFFICER FROM STAFF COMNAVFORV ARRIVER 040845H.

3. PLAN TO EMPLOY TWO MSL MAGNETIC INFLUENCE MINE SWEEPERS FROM EPPING FORREST 5 MAY FOR ONE TRANSIT OF RIVER, CUA VIET TO BONG HA TO DEVELOP OPS PROCEDURE FOR THEIR USE OF REQUIRED.


SP-4

ono

SECRET  
15/3/CA. 040830H

SECRET

G-3 12 Copies



FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
 TO: CG TF HOTEL  
 INFO: CG III MAF  
 CG PCV  
 CG 1ST MAF  
 CG 1ST MARDIV  
 CG 1ST ACD 231  
 CG FLC  
 1ST MARINES  
 26TH MARINES  
 11TH ENGR BN  
 3D MARDIV

Z MAY 68

DRAFTER 3/MVP/wlk  
 SECTION 3 PHONE 403  
 CWO

CHIEF

S-1

S-2

DOP

AF-0

ACTION

SCOTLAND II

//SECRET//

ANNEX A (REVISED) TO 3D MARDIV OPORD 11-68 (SCOTLAND II)(U)

A. 3D MARDIV 150300Z APR 68 (OPORD 11-68 SCOTLAND II)(U)

B. 3D MARDIV 121400Z APR 68 (ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPORD 11-68 SCOTLAND II)(U)

1. 3D MARDIV (-)(REIN)

TF HOTEL

1ST MAR (REIN)

HQ CO 1ST MAR  
 1ST BN 1ST MAR  
 2D BN 1ST MAR  
 2D BN 3D MAR  
 3D BN 4TH MAR

1ST BN 11TH MAR

PROV MECH CO

MGEN TOMPKINS

BGEN HOFFMAN

COL HUGHES

LT COL GRAVEL  
 LT COL DUNCAN  
 LT COL DAVIS  
 LT COL BOURNE

LT COL HUGHES

04/12 COPIES 07

STAND/CG  
 25  
 SECRET-1 Encl 20

SECRET

1ST PIR CO B 3D SP BN

2D BDE (-) 1ST ACD

1ST BN 5TH CAV

2D BN 5TH CAV

1ST BN 77TH ARTY USA

COL KINNAB USA

1LT COL JORDAN

1LT COL LEARY

1LT COL WHITE

## 2. ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES IN G/S TF HOTEL:

SU-2 FLSG (LSU)

DET HQ BN 3D MARDIV

DET 1ST RDO BN

DET MASS-3

DET MAT CU-62

DET VIAGR-152

DET WERS-17

DET HAMS-29

DET HAMS-1

DET 3D FORRECON

DET GBNU 301 (USN)

SEC BTRY C 1/144TH ARTY (USA)

SEC BTRY G 65TH ARTY (USA)

FOB-3 (USA)

DET 37TH SIGNAL BN (USA)

DET 19TH AERIAL PORT SQDN (USAF)

DET 1ST MOBILE UNIT (USAF)

OTHER, INDIGENOUS: FOB-3 HAS 328 INDIGENOUS PERS.

## 3. THIS UPDATES REF A AND SUPERSEDES &amp; CANCELS REF B.

GP-4

CCW

0279

RELEASED BY

A. R. McLaughlin

SECRET

BRIEF

1. D-DAY ATK BY 2 COS IS  
BASICALLY EXPANDED DTA. THEY  
WILL BLOCK AT OBJTS 3 AND 5  
HOLDING THOSE PSNS OVERNIGHT.
2. 4 CO BN (2/1) BY HELO TO 881 N.  
ON D+1, WILL SEARCH OUT AREA.  
EXTRACT ON D+2 OR D+3 EITHER HELO  
OR OVERLAND.
3. 2/3 WILL COVER RT#9 AND KS PERIMETER.
4. A. OBJECTIVES FOR CO FROM 881 S
  1. 764441
  2. 758446
  3. 779441
- B. OBJECTIVES FOR CO FROM 861
  4. 798442
  5. 788 445
- C. OBJECTIVES FOR 2/1
  - L2 BLUEJAY (881 N) 776456
  6. 773450
  7. 764460
  8. 764463

Encl 21

TF Hotel  
File

P/AND

de

TF  
Hotel  
file  
LLB

DE S825X AND MAT MY NR 011.....011

A  
00 RUMHVP  
DE RUMHVP 483A 1250835  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 040835Z MAY 68  
FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
TO ZEN/1ST MARINES  
ZEN/2D BDE 1ST AIRCAVDIV  
INFO RUMHVP/CG 3D MARDIV  
BT

SECRET

FRAG ORDER 5-68

A. CG IF HOTEL 030600Z

1. POSSIBLE INDEFINITELY OPNS DESCRIBED REF A (MY FRAG O 4-68 (ATK WEST))  
2. FOR 1ST MAR. CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPNS NLT 7MAY TO CLEAR  
ENEMY FROM VIC HILL 881 NORTH. CONTINUE PLANNING OPN DESCRIBED  
REF A.

3. FOR 2D BDE. CONDUCT RECON IN FORCE GENERAL VIC LANG UP  
(XD 792268) TO COMMENCE ON OR ABOUT 7MAY. Not applicable.

GP-4

BT

POSTPONE?  
TOR 134/120/MAY 68  
1ST MARDIV

MAIN NOTE: CORRECTED  
COPY DESTROY ALL  
PREVIOUS COPIES

G-3

G-2/000/00 SFR


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Encl 22



SHOVE	
OF CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCPO	
APD	<i>[Signature]</i>
FOR ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

VV VPA246VV NHB991

OO RUMHVP

DE RUMHN 025B 1251216

ZNY CCCCC

O P 041055Z MAY 68 ZFD

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPS VIET PHU BAI

INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMHVP/THIRD MAR

RUMHVP/CG THIRD URDIV

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN

RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX

RUMHVN/NILO QUANG TRI

RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP

ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 041200H-041300H MAY (U2)

1. RIVER SECURITY GROUP AND LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSITTED RIVER WITHOUT INCIDENT. IN VICINITY YD 306 677 AT 041300H A CHILD ON RIVER BANK MOTIONED SECURITY CRAFT TOWARDS BANK AND TURNED OVER FOUR U.S. CLAYMORE MINES. CLAYMORES IN POSSESSION NAVY

PAGE2 RUMHN 025B C O N F I D E N T I A L

EOD.

2. CARGO THROUGHOUT DONG HA 4 MAY 1021 S/T GENERAL CARGO AFD 270.000 GAL POL.

3. HINTEND INSTITUTE PBR RIVER PATROLS 5 MAY.

4. DURING NIGHT NORMAL SECURITY PATROLS WILL BE CONDUCTED WITH DISPERSAL PLANHIN EFFECT.

GP-40

BT

041055Z

COC

1/2/3/CG RAB  
CONFIDENTIAL


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10

55

Encl 23

CONFIDENTIAL



DE 187L AND MY NR 14.....14.....

OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUYSUAK 110 1251500  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 041500Z MAY 68 YO RUYS  
 FM BLT TWO ILANT FOUR  
 TO RUMWAA CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMHVP CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RJABQ C3 NINTH MAB  
 ZEN CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR  
 RUMHVP THIRD MARINES  
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF CAPTURED LOST RADIOS (Q)

A. III MAF O OP2000.1B, PARA 505

1. IAW REF A, THE FOL RPT IS SUBMITTED:

A. AN PRC-25; QTY 7; SERNO'S 1054, 1059, 4565, 7792, 16614,  
 17474, 18594; AND 14 BA-386'S.

B. ONE RADIO CAPTURED (SERNO'S UNKNOWN), OTHERS LOST, POSSIBLY  
 RECOVERED BY E EMY FORCES.

C. 2 MAY 68

D. DAI DO VILLAGE (YD 253628)

E. ALL RADIOS PRESUMED TO BE OPERATIVE.

F. NONE AT PRESENT.

PAGE TWO RUYSUAK

POP CONFIDENTIAL

G. THREE RADIOS (SERNO 1054, 1059, 18594) OPERATING ON  
 63.15 MHZ; ONE (SERNO 16614) OPERATING ON 0.75 MHZ; OTHERS  
 OPERATING ON UNKNOWN FREQUENCIES.

2. THIS BN PLANS TO SHIFT FRE UENCIES ON NETS WHICH IT CONTROLS  
 ASAP PENDING ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES FROM HIGHER  
 HDQTRS.

GP-4

BT

G-2

STAND/CG

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 24

**SECRET**

<b>SHOVE CUB</b>	
CP CHIEF	<i>[initials]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[initials]</i>
G-2 W.C.	<i>[initials]</i>
DCPO	<i>[initials]</i>
APD	<i>[initials]</i>
ACTION	<i>[initials]</i>



JPKVLVV VPA855ZVA 009ZCZCHA094  
 00 RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 036B 1252250  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O P 042240Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHQA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINES  
 RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
 RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT FIVE  
 RUMHVH/NILO QUANG TRI  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 BT

*TOK 050633*

*PC  
S  
A*

*[Large handwritten mark]*

**SECRET**  
 CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 050001H - 050600H MAY (U)  
 1. NIGHT RIVER SECURITY PATROLS REPORTED NO ENEMY INCIDENTS.  
 2. AT 050545H COMMENCED SWEEP OF RIVER FROM CUA VIET TO DONG HA.  
 INTEND OPEN RIVER TO LOGISTIC CRAFT UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION

**SECRET**

PAGE TWO RUMHN 036B **SECRET**  
 OF SWEEP.

3. TWO MRL MAGNETIC INFLUENCE MINESWEEPERS COMMENCED SWEEP CUA VIET  
 TO DONG HA AT 050545H.

GP-4  
 BT

*04 200*

*221113100 40 10*  
*Encl 25*



*3T file*

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FPF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

15:RHH:wbe  
5 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

From: Division Engineer Officer

Subj: Quang Tri Development; progress for period 27Apr-3May68

1. The following was accomplished during the report period:

a. The following Marine and Naval Construction Forces were engaged on projects for the 3d Marine Division during this report period:

(1) 3d Engineer Battalion - Establishing water treatment and distribution system, constructing HqEn officers' shower, HqEn officers' pot shack, enlargement of ADC's shower to accommodate a washer and dryer, and construction of 26th Marine Regimental COC.

(2) MCE-5 - Vertical and horizontal construction of two 500 man messhalls.

(3) MCE-10 - Vertical and horizontal construction of all cantonments including 3d Medical Battalion.

b. 1st and 2d increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

(1) Horizontal - Maintenance continues on all access roads from Highway 1 into the cantonments. New interior roads completed during the report period include road into Headquarters Company, 26th Marine Regimental area and access road through 3d Medical Battalion area. Work continues on the interior road to Headquarters Battalion messhall.

(2) Vertical

(a) HqEn Messhall - Complete except for installation of ranges. Fabrication of stove pipe should be completed next week.

(b) 3d Hq En Messhall - Pouring of concrete delayed due to equipment breakdown. No time was lost since efforts were turned to fabricating roof trusses and precutting framing materials. Concrete will be poured next week with framing to follow.

*Encl 26*

(c) Water Point - Completed. Both potable and non-potable water is being dispensed from the truck fill station. Distribution lines to HqBn are operational. Work continues on additional branch distribution lines and connections.

(d) 3d Medical Facility - The following buildings are structurally complete. Interior wiring and/or plumbing continues.

- (1) Orthopedic
- (2) Shock and Debridement
- (3) Laboratory
- (4) X-Ray

The following buildings are essentially complete:

- (1) OR's and Pre Op
- (2) SICU
- (3) Medical Supply
- (4) Triage

Construction of the following buildings is underway:

- (1) Laundry - Roof to be applied next week.
- (2) Patients Galley - Foundation poured, framing next week.

(e) Post Office - Complete except for exterior wiring. 18th Surgical Hospital has agreed to provide electrical power and lines will be erected next week.

(f) Chapel - No work during this report period. 3d Engineer Battalion has been tasked and will apply tin roof when construction forces are available.

(g) HqBn Officers Shower, "O" Club Pot Shack, and ADC Shower Extension - Slab has been poured and framing erected. Work continues.

(h) 26th Marines' COG - 80% complete. Internal wiring and backfilling continuing.

(i) Canteen - The status of SEA Hut construction is as follows:

<u>Cantonment</u>	<u>Complete</u>	<u>Under Const</u>	<u>Total Planned</u>	<u>% Complete</u>
3d Tank Bn	20	0	20	100%
3d MT Bn	36	0	36	100%
3d SP Bn	8	0	8	100%
3d Engr Bn	8	0	8	100%
3d Recon Bn	4	0	4	100%
3d Med Bn	5	0	55	100%
HqBn	81	6	87	96%
FLSG-B	0	0	25	0%
MCB	7	0	7	100%
Total	169	6	200	85%

Very respectfully,

R. C. MC OUTCHAN

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

38/RMJ/plw  
5 May 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Subj: Quang Tri Development; progress for period  
28Apr - 4May68

1. The following was accomplished during the report period:

a. 1st and 2d increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

(1) Horizontal - Maintenance continues on all access roads from Highway 1 into the cantonments. New interior roads completed during the report period include road into Headquarters Company, 26th Marines area and access road through 3d Medical Battalion area. Work continues on the interior road to Headquarters Battalion messhall.

(2) Vertical

(a) HqBn Messhall - Completed except for installation of ranges. Fabrication of stove pipe should be completed next week.

(b) 3d MT Bn Messhall - Pouring of concrete delayed due to equipment breakdown. No time was lost since efforts were turned to fabricating roof trusses and precutting framing materials. Concrete will be poured next week with framing to follow.

(c) Water Point - Completed. Both potable and non-potable water is being dispensed from the truck fill station. Distribution lines to HqBn are operational. Work continues on additional branch distribution lines and connections.

(d) 3d Medical Facility - The following buildings are structurally complete. Interior wiring and/or plumbing continues:

- 1 Orthopedic
- 2 Shock and Debridement
- 3 Laboratory
- 4 X-Ray

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 27

The following buildings are essentially complete:

- 1 OR's and Pro Op
- 2 SICU
- 3 Medical Supply
- 4 Triage

Construction of the following buildings is underway:

- 1 Laundry - Roof to be applied next week.
  - 2 Patients Galley - Foundation poured, framing next week.
- (e) Post Office - Complete except for exterior wiring. 18th Surgical Hospital has agreed to provide electrical power and lines will be erected next week.
- (f) Chapel - No work during this report period. 3d Engineer Battalion has been tasked and will apply tin roof when construction forces are available.
- (g) HqBn Officers Shower, "O" Club Pot Shack, and ADC Shower Extension - Slab has been poured and framing erected. Work continues.
- (h) 26th Marines' COC - 80% complete. Internal wiring and backfilling continuing.
- (i) Cantonments - The status of SEA Hut construction remains at 88% completed; no change from last report. Latest information on strongbacking of 170 tents is that 3d Naval Construction Brigade will task one of the MCB's in the near future.
- (j) Base Defense - 26th LogSuptGrp is still moving into new area. Work on wire and defensive fortifications is continuing throughout the Base. 1stBn 13th Marines has taken over fire support of QTCB. Two additional flash towers are being erected: one on northern edge of perimeter in 3d TKBn area; one in Southwest portion of perimeter in the defensive positions of 3d MTBn. LtCol WATCHER has assumed duties as Ass't Base Defense Coordinator and Colonel FENTON has relieved Colonel THOMAS as Base Defense Coordinator and Base Coordinator, QTCB.
- (k) Graves Removal - On 1 May, the Quang Tri Province Chief gave authorization for removal of the 500 graves in the S.E. portion of the perimeter. On 2 May, work began. Approximately 35% (135) were moved by 4 May.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL


2. Figures on personnel in QTCB as of 3 May are:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
*Marine	376	4458
*Navy	56	940
Army	92	921
Air Force	6	100
	<u>530</u>	<u>6419</u>

Grand Total = <sup>6949</sup>~~6419~~

\*3d MarDiv strength (MarCorp and Navy) is 219 officers and 3288 enlisted. This increase represents 24 Navy Officers and 195 Navy Enlisted not previously carried in 3d MarDiv figures. Additionally, in the 3d MarDiv there was a decrease of 2 Marine Officers and an increase of 67 Marine Enlisted.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
 TO: CG TF HOTEL  
 CTF ROBBIE  
 INFO: 1ST MARINES  
 9TH MARINES

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON I&M 3/4 FROM TF HOTEL 041751H  
 MAY 68 AND PASSES SAME TO TF ROBBIE SALE DTG.

GP-4

CCN 0373

RELEASED BY

W. Chapman

3


CG/2/1/Comm B.

SHOVG	
DRAFTER	ALH/187
SEC 3	PHONE DEV 000
CWC	CHIEF
C-3 W.O.	
C-2 W.O.	
DCFO	
WFO	
ACTION	<u>apcm 2</u>

05012 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

encl 28

SECRET



SHOVE COC

RECEIVED

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ACTION

Clearwater

00 RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 022B 1260559  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O P 050550Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV  
 RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINES  
 RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
 RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT FIVE  
 RUMHVH/NILO QUANG TRI  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVZR SECURITY GROUP

5

SECRET

CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 050600H-051200H MAY (U)

1. RIVER OPENED TO LOGISTIC CRAFT AT 050730H. MSL MINE SWEEPERS  
 COMPLETED SWEEP OF RIVER TO DONG HA AT THAT TIME. CHILDREN ALONG  
 RIVER BANK CONTINUED TURNING OVER SA AMMO (U.S.) TO RIVER SECURITY  
 CRAFT.

PAGE TWO RUMHN 022B SECRET

2. NAVY EOD TEAM LOCATED TWO COMPLETELY ASSEMBLED MINES CACHED  
 IN SMALL CREEK VIC YD 256 624. WILL CONTINUE SEARCH IN AREA.

GP-4

BT

050550Z MAY 68



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1/2/3/CA JPR

NNNN



**SECRET**

MACV JOINT MESSAGE FORM			RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER			LOCAL DISTRIBUTION		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET CHIEF</b>						C/S <b>X3-6</b>	SJS	HIST <b>X7</b>
TYPE MSG BOOK MULTI SINGLE						J1	J2	CIIS
TYPE TRANSMISSION TO INFO						J3	J4	
ELECTRICAL TO INFO						J5	J6	
AIR MAIL						GORDS	NAO	
COURIER PRECEDENCE						AFGP	NAVFORV	
ACTION TO: ROUTINE			AG			OICG		
INFO			AMEMB			PM		
<p><b>DTG</b> 051220Z APR 68</p> <p>TO: CG 1 ACD CP EVANS (COURIER) 10-18</p> <p>CG 3D MARDIV DA NANG (COURIER) 12-21</p> <p>FROM: AVII-AV</p> <p>Subj: Avn Support for 2d Bde, 1 ACD (U)</p> <p>Ref: a. CG 1 ACD 170417Z Apr 68 (S)</p> <p>b. CG III MAF 191626Z Apr 68 (S)</p> <p>1. (S) Ref a requested Avn support of 2d Bde, 1 ACD from PCV resources.</p> <p>2. (S) Ref b directed the requested support be provided on a mission basis from the resources of the 1 MAW.</p> <p>3. (S) 1 MAW support of the 2d Bde, 1 ACD was terminated 1 May by III MAF. The 1 ACD will resume aviation support of the 2d Bde from Div resources eff immediately. This support should include slicks and guns for reaction force, plus necessary logistical support aircraft.</p> <p>Gr-4</p>			DCA SAM			SJA		
			CH			SOG		
			COC			SURG		
			COMB			TMA	DCPG LNO	
			COMPT			TNG	MACMA	
			DOD SPEC REP			USAID		
			FWMAO			USARV		
			HC			IFFVINO		
			IG			IIPFVINO		
			MACSA			IIMAFINO		
JUSPAO			5TH SF LNO					
MACDC			7TH AF					
MACOI			PROTOCOL					
MACPD			Aviation (A) 1-2					
TYPED NAME, TITLE, PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL			SIGNATURE					
EDDIE L. FORD LTC, GS Aviation Officer AVII-AV 2965								
			TYPED NAME AND TITLE					
			L. H. SCHWEITER, BG, USA Chief of Staff					
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			PAGE NO			NO OF PAGES		
<b>SECRET</b>			1			1		
16 Nov 67			MACV Staff Memorandum 109-10			Encl 30		

~~Plans~~

gr 17

TF Hotel File

CONFIDENTIAL

-O- 051340 Z MAY 68  
FROM: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
TO: CG, 3RD MAR DIV

CONF

RP

- OPCON OF FORCES (U)
1. CG TF HOTEL ASSUMED OPCON 1/5 2ND BRIGADE, 1ST ACT EFFECTIVE 05269 H MAY 68.
  2. CG TF HOTEL PASSES OPCON 1/5 2ND BRIGADE 1ST ACT AT 051630H TO CG 3RD MAR DIV

GP-4

3(12 copies) 1/2/05/4/16 RAO

TOR 0022 H/06 may 68/09/DIV KY-8

CONFIDENTIAL

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P

Encl 31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TF Hotel

plan epe

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12

OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHVP 0661A 1261555  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 051555Z MAY 68  
 FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
 TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MARDIV  
 INFO ZEN/1ST MARINES  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 DEPLOYMENT FORCE (U)

1. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL PASSES OPCON I/3/4 AND M/3/4 TO  
 CG 3D MARDIV 041751H.

GP-4

BT

G-3

4-2/000/cg

P

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

00 RUMHVP

050B 12

ZNY SSSSS

0 051635Z MAY 68 ZFG

FM CTF CLEARWATER

TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

INFO RUENAAA/CNO

ORUMUHFA/COMUSMACV

RUMMWAA/CG III MAF

RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUWJNUA/COMMINPAC

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT FIVE

RUMFCR/USS EPPING FORREST

IZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECGRP

RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVSECGRP

RUMHVN/NILO QUANG TRI


RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHVP/THIRD MARINES

RUMNVHE/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR

RUEDMGA/NAVMINDEFLAB

RUYNBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT



ACTION

*Clearwater*

PAGE 2 RUMHN 050B S E C R E T

RUENAAA/NAVINTCOM

RUEAFJA/DIA

RUEAFAA/NAVSTIC

RUMSBB/COMNAVSUPPACT SGN

BT

S E C R E T

MAGNETIC/ACOUSTIC INFLUENCE MINES (S)

INTSUM 12-68

A. CTF CLEARWATER 050740Z MAY 68 NOTAL

B. CTF CLEARWATER 031400Z MAY 68 NOTAL

C. CTF CLEARWATER 020115Z MAY 68 NOTAL

D. CTF CLEARWATER 020251Z MAY 68 NOTAL

1. SGT NGUYEN TRONG THON, NVA, 2ND CELL, 2ND PLT, 4TH CO, 126TH REGT, CHIEU HOI RALLIER, REF A, INTERROGATED BY CLEARWATER INTEL OFF AND EOD OFF 05 MAY, PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFO.

2. NGUYEN WAS MEMBER OF FOUR MAN UNIT ASSEMBLING TWO MINES FOR EMPLACEMENT IN CUA VIET RIVER WHEN DETECTED BY RIVER PATROL BOAT AT 020230H AND FORCED TO FLEE HIS POSITION. (REF B). OTHER MINE WAS BEING ASSEMBLED APPROX 15 METERS FROM HIS POSITION. HIS POSITION WAS DETERMINED TO BE YD 268628 VICE MY LOC VILLAGE YD305680 AS REPORTED BY REF A.

051635

2

ENR 1000/66

05163510

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**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUMHN 050B S E C R E T

3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MINE DETERMINED IT TO BE CYLINDRICAL SHAPED INFLUENCE MINE AS REPORTED BY REFS C AND D VICE TRIANGULAR AS REPORTED BY REF A. NGUYEN STATED THAT MINE IS ACOUSTIC AS WELL AS MAGNETIC.

4. NGUYEN'S UNIT CROSSED THE BEN HAI AT YD 2380 AND PROCEEDED ON FOOT TO THUY BAN YD 2472 AND FURTHER PROCEEDED ON FOOT TO THUY KHE YD 2478 AND ON TH LAI AN YD 2472 WHERE THEY WERE GUIDED BY LOCAL VC TO PLACE OF ASSEMBLY. THE MINES WERE TRANSPORTED IN COMPONENT PARTS BY HIS UNIT AND 20 CARRIDNS FROM BASE AREA NEAR QUANG BINH, NVN, TO ASSEMBLY POINT ON CUA VIET RIVER.

5. NGUYEN STATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY HOW MANY MINES HAD BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE AREA PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL. HE HEARD THAT ONE OR TWO DAYS BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL ANOTHER TWO MINES HAD BEEN EMPLACED.

1 VHE STATED THAT THE MINES ARE NOT CACHED BUT ARE ASSEMBLED AND PLACED UPON ARRIVAL AT DESTINATION. HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE SAME TYPE MINES WERE USED TO SINK 23 BOATS ON CUA VIET RIVER.

6. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO HAN ELICITED FROM NHUYEN THRU PREVIOUS INTERROGATIONS BY 7TH AND 15TH ITT, USMC. THE 126TH REGT IS AN INDEPENDENT REGT RECENTLY EVRMD WITH THE MISSION OF DISRUPTING AND DESTROYING ALLIED RIVER TRAFFIC WITH THE USE OF MINES AND OTHER

PAGE 4 RUMHN 050B S E C R E T

EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. THE 126TH REGT BASE AREA IS LOCATED IN THE AREA OF VINH TU (V) VINH LINH (D) NVN (COORD UNK). THE FOUR CO'S OF THE 126TH REGT STAY IN 126TH REGT BASE AREA EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE ASSIGNED A SPECIAL MISSION. THE MISSION OF NGUYEN'S CO WAS TO MOVE TO CUA VIET RIVER WITH MINE. THE UNIT WAS TO AWAIT WORD FROM 15-17 MAN RECON ELEMENT LOCATED IN CUA VIET AREA. THE RECON ELEMENT UTILIZE LOCAL GUERRILLAS AS MESSENGERS TO PASS WORD TO NGUYENS CO. REGARDING SPECIFIC BOAT TARGETS (PRIMARY TARGET, WEAPONS THAT ARE INTENDED FOR USE IN KHE SANH AREA). UPON RECEIVING WORD OF A TARGET, NGUYEN'S CO PLACES MINE IN RIVER AND THEN DEPARTS THE AREA FOR 126TH REGT BASE AREA TO AWAIT A NEW MISSION. RESULTS OF MISSION ARE PAYYED FROM RECON LOCATION UP THE COAST TO 126TH REGT BASE USING LOCAL GUERRILLAS AS MESSENGERS. MEMBERS OF 126TH REGT ARE TO RECEIVE SCHOOLING ON USE OF ROCKET DVICE THAT CAN BE FIRED AT SHIPS WHILE MOVING. (DETAILS UNKNOWN).

7. NGUYEN ALSO CONFIRMED THAT HIS REGT USES THE B-40 ROCKET ON CUA VIET RIVER TRAFFIC.

8. COMMENTS: NGUYEN WAS VERY COOPERATIVE AND FREELY PROVIDED INFO ON HIS UNIT AND HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE MINES USED. HE READILY AGREED TO FURTHER INTERVIEW AND VISIT TO LOCATION OF RIVER WHERE MINES WERE LOCATED. TO BE ACCOMPLISHED 6 MAY. HIS INFO REGARDING MINES WAS BAS-

PAGE 5 RUMHN 050B S E C R E T

ICALLY SUBSTANTIATED BY LOCAL EOD EXAMINATION OF SIX MINES RECOVERED. INFO ON B-40 ROCKET USE PROBABLY TRUE. CLEARWATER INTEL OFFICER RECOVERED B-40 LAUNCHER AND TWO B-40 ROCKETS ON 5 MSP IN REEDS MOUTH OF CREEK YD 256625.


GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

00 RUMHVP  
DE RUMHN 048B 126174  
ZNY CCCCC  
O P 051640Z MAY 680  
FM CT CLEARWATER  
TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMHNA/COMNAVSQPPACT DANANG  
RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINES  
RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX  
RUMNHVH/NILO QUANG TRI  
ZEN/QBR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
BT



SHOVE  
OP CHIEF  
G-2 W.O.  
G-2 W.C.  
DCPO  
PO  
ACTION  
CLEARWATER

CONFIDENTIAL

CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 051800H-052400H MAY (U)

1. BETWEEN 052110H AND 052120H NSAD CUA VIET RECEIVED 20HRDS  
ESTIMATED 130MM ARTY. NEG PERS CAS/MATL DAMAGE UNKNOWN  
THIS TIME.

2. LATE ENTRIES:

PAGE 2 RUMHN 048B CONFIDENTIAL

A. HCDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP, EMBARKED IN MONITOR  
(M-112-2), HPWTROLLING RIVER AT 051530H OBSERVED APPROX-00LIMATELY "0 NVA  
N UNIFORM NEAR CREEK VIC YD 249 649  
RUNNING IN THE OPEN. THE ENEMY WAS IMMEDIATELY ENGAGED  
WITH MORTAR FIRE. AO IN AREA SUPPORTING 1ST  
BN. 3RD MAR PROMPTLY ADJUSTED AND CALLED FIRE FOR EFFECT.  
MONITOR CONTINUED FIRE IN SUPPORT OF MARINE GROUND  
FORCES FOR 1 1/2 HOURS EXPENDING 84 RDS 81MM MORTAR.  
ENEMY CAS UNK. FIRENDLY CAS NONE.

B. AT 051130H PATROG CRAFT (T-112211) WAS HAILED TO BANK IN  
VIC YD 306 680.- VIETNAMZSE CHILDREN TURNED OVER ONE 57MMO  
RR CANISTER, SIX M-79 GRENADES, HAND ONE FUSED CLAYMORE  
MINE (ALL U.S. MWDE). HCOASTAL GROUP 11 JUNK FORCE AND  
MARINES WILL CONDUCT SEARCH OF AREA 6H MAY.

3. DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP CONTINUES NIGHT PATROLS AS  
PER MY 051200H - 051800H SITREP.

GP-4  
BT

051640Z

COC

112/3/CG  
CONFIDENTIAL


05

16

40

Encl 34

DECLASSIFIED



IMMEDIATE 052255ZMAY68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: CG 101 ABN DIV/RUMMB.  
26TH MARINES  
INFO: CG III MAF/RUMWAA  
CG 1CV/RUMMA  
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV/RUMMB

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON C(-)/2/34 USA FROM 26TH MAR 041445H MAY68  
AND PASSES SAME TO CG 101 ABN DIV 041446H MAY68.
2. 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON A/3/5 ARMD CAV USA FROM CG 101 ABN DIV 051730H  
MAY68 AND PASSES SAME TO 26TH MARINES 051731H MAY68.
3. FOR 26TH MARINES

REPORT ASSUMPTION OPCON AND CHOP TIMES THIS HQ.

GP-4

CCN

0480

RELEASED BY

W. Chapman

G-3

STAND/C9


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CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED



SHOVE COC  
 CP CHIEF  
 G-2 W.O.  
 G-2 R.O.  
 DCPD

ACTION

DRAFTER 6/WHID/owh

SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV COC

CWO

IMMEDIATE 060231Z ZMAY68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
 TO: CG TF HOTEL /ZEN  
 INFO: CG III MAF / Rummwaa  
 CG PCV /ZEN

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. 3D MARDIV ASSUMED OPCOM 1/5 CAV, 2D BDE, 1ST ACD FROM  
 TF HOTEL EFF 051630H MAY68.

GP-4

CCN

0495

RELEASED BY

Whipman


43

STAND/CG off

060231Z/CONFIDENTIAL

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SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

C-3 V.O.

C-2 V.O.

DRAFTER 3/WHD/DWL

SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV COC

CWO-3

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE 060232Z MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: TF ROBBIE /ZEN  
26TH MARS /ZEN  
INFO: CG III MAF /Rummwaa  
CG PCV /ZEN

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON 'B' TRP 3/5 CAV 2D BDE  
1ST ACD FR 26TH MARS 051630H MAY 68 AND PASSES SAME  
TO TF ROBBIE SAME DTG.

CP-4.

CCN 0494

RELEASED BY W. Chapman


CONFIDENTIAL  
STAND/CG JGR

4-3

06 02 32

Encl 37

**CONFIDENTIAL**



DRAFTER 3/WHB/bwh  
 SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV COC  
 CWO [Signature]

IMMEDIATE 060233Z MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
 TO: TF ROBBIE  
 3 MARS C  
 INFO: 3DBN 4TH MARS

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON CO 'I' & 'M', 3/4 FROM TF ROBBIE, EFF 051530H AND PASSES OPCON TO 3D MARS EFF SAME DTG.

GP-4

CCN 0493

RELEASED BY [Signature]

43

STAND/CG SPSR

06

02

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
 Encl 38

~~SECRET~~

P/An

DRAFTER 3/FDG/gfw  
 SEC G-3 PHONE 3D LARDIV  
 CWO *[Signature]*

IMMEDIATE 060343 ZMAY68

FROM: CG, 3D LARDIV  
 TO: 26TH LAR  
 3D MTBN  
 12TH MAR  
 INFO: 17TH ITT

//SECRET//

AMCUMENTATION FOR 26TH LAR

A. 26TH LAR 280302Z APR68

1. FOR 26TH LAR:

THIS CONSTITUTES REPLY TO PROPOSAL CONTAINED REF A. <sup>SIX</sup>  
 SENTRY DOG TEALS <sup>HAVE BEEN</sup> FURNISHED

2. FOR 12TH MAR:

A. ASSION DET SMT BTRY D/S 26TH LAR

B. SUPPLEMENT NGF SPOT TH, 1/13 TO PROVIDE NGF SUPPORT TO  
 26TH LAR

3. FOR 3D MTBN: ATTACH DET HAS CO (6 OTTERS) TO 26TH LAR

4. FOLLOWING PROPOSED SPT DISAPPROVED FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. PLT AMTRACS - ASSETS NOT PRESENTLY AVAILABLE. PROPOSAL  
 WILL BE RECONSIDERED IF ADDITIONAL ASSETS BECOME AVAILABLE.

B. DET ITT - 17TH ITT PRESENTLY LOCATED QUANG TRI ASSIGNED  
 MISSION G/S 3D LARDIV, AVAILABLE 26TH LAR ON REQUEST

5. AN/PPS-6 AND NOD-IT-1-S ON HAND ARE DYELARKER ASSETS AND  
 ASSIGNED ONLY TO DYELARKER PSNS. REQUEST HAS BEEN SUBMITTED  
 TO HIGHER HQ FOR 6 AN/PPS-6 AND 4 NOD AS A SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR  
 26TH LAR.

4-3

*[Signature]*

STAND/CA

*[Signature]*~~SECRET~~ 128

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6. FOR ALL:

A. DIRL AUTH ALCON

B. REPORT CHOP TIMES THIS HQ

GP-4

CCN

0498

RELEASED BY

*P.L. Miller*

See

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DECLASSIFIED



DE RUMHN 041B 0271304  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 061142Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
 INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARINES  
 RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
 RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 BT

*SP*  
*TOK/06/18/2001*  
*Character*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 061200H-061800H MAY (U)

1. NSAD CUA VIET RECEIVED APPROX 60 RDS ESTIMATED 152 MM ARTY AT 1215H. YOG LOCATED IN CUA VIET TURNING BASIN BRACKETED BY INCOMING RDS. NEG USN PERS CAS/MATL DAMAGE.

2. RIVER SECURITY GROUP FORCES CONTINUED PROVIDING BLOCKING FORCE FOR FRIENDLY TROOPS ENGAGING NVA VIC MY LOC VILLAGE COORD YD 306 680.

061142Z MAY 68

*oe*

*1/2/3/ca*

PAGE TWO RUMHN 041B C O N F I D E N T I A L

ATC (T-112-1) IN VICINITY MY LOC VILLAGE OBTAINED 402 RDS 5.56 MM O AMMO AND 6 RDS 40 MM GRENADES FROM CHILDREN ON BEACH AT 1625H. CHILDREN NEICTED PRESENCE OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMO IN AREA.

3. TWO LCU AND ONE LCM-8 WILL CONTINUE OFFLOAD AT DONG HA DURING NIGHT. TOTAL CARGO THROUGH PNT AT DONG HAU 6 MAY EYW S/T GENERAL, 913 S/T AMMO, AND 210,000 G45 JOL.

4. DISPOSITION OF RIVER SECURITY FORCES AND LOGISTIC CRAFT DURING NIGHT.

N. TWO ATC AND ONE LCPL YD 318 683 RIVER MOUTH.

B. LCPL IN VIC YD 307 678

C. LCPL IN VIC YD 257 623

D. LCPL IN VIC YD 267 638

E. LCPL YD 318 683 - YD 273 651

F. LCPL YD 273 651 - YD 243 612

G. PBR YD 318 683 - YD 294 655

H. PBR YD 294 655 - YD 267 628


I. PBR YD 268 638 - YD 243 612

J. ALL REMAINING CRAFT DISPERSED ALONG RIVER FROM YD 330 695 TO RIVER MOUTH.

GP-4

PAGE THREE RUMHN 041B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL Encl 40



CHIEF

W.O.

W.O.

W.O.

W.O.

W.O.

8p

NAP/SALINE

.....1.....10.....10.....01.....

ZNY CCCCC  
O 061400Z MAY68  
FM 3D MAR  
TO CG 3D MARDIV  
INFO 9TH MAR  
122TH MAR  
ZEN/1ST AMTRAC BN (ATTN: S-2)  
1ST BN 3D MAR  
2D BN 4 TH MAR  
15TH CIT  
ZEN/ 3DBN 21ST INF 196TH LIGHT INF BDE USA  
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL FINAL SECTION OF II  
35 KIA'S WERE REPORTED YESTERDAY AND ADDED TO CUMULATIVE  
TOTALS. RES: ADD 20 NVA KIA TO TODAYS CUMULATIVE TOTALS.  
B. 050940H TO 051135H 3/21 WHILE SWEEPING NHI HA  
VIC YD270705 FND AN ADDITIONAL 9 KIA AND 8 IWC WHICH  
WERE NOT REPORTED YESTERDAY. RES: 9 NVA KIA AND 8 IWC.  
C. 051000H TO 051800H IN HAMLETS IN VIC YD249649,  
YD243651 YD239657 AND YD256646 1/3'S CONTACTS RESULTED  
IN 145 NVA KIA. RES: 145 NVA KIA.  
D. 051500H NVA SHOT DOWN A CH-46 HELICOPTER VIC  
YD242645, WHICH WAS IN PROCESS OF LANDING M AND I 3/4  
AT 1/3 PSN.  
GEP-4  
BT

061400

2 3/COO/CG

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26

Hbl Bindell

Plotted and  
presented  
TF Hotel file  
GLANS *[initials]*

OO RUMHVP  
DE RUMHVP 856A 127163Z  
ZNY SSSSS

061635Z MAY 68

FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MARDIV

INFO ZEN/1ST MARINES

BT

SECRET

1ST MAR OFFENSIVE SWEEP OF HILL 881 (N) (C)

1. CONCEPT OF OPS. ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR, 070700H, 1ST MAR WILL CONDUCT AN OFFENSIVE SWEEP ON HILL 881(N), XD 776456. ONE BN(--) WILL ATTK FR PRESENT PSNS, HILL 88-(S), VIC XD 778438 AND HILL 861 VIC XD 802443 TOWARDS HILL 881 (N). INTERMED OBJS ARE: FOR UNITS ON 881(S), OBJ (1) VIC XD 764441, OBJ (2) VIC XD 758446, AND OBJ (3) VIC XD 779441. FOR UNIT ON HILL 861 OBJ (4) VIC XD 798442 AND OBJ (5) VIC XD 788445. ESTAB BLOCKING PSNS AT OBJ (3) AND (5) TO SUPPORT ONE HELIBORNE ASSLT BN ON D PLUS 1, L-HOUR 1000Z LANDING AT LZ BLUEJAY, HILL 881(N) VIC XD 777457. FM LZ BLUEJAY ESTAB COMBAT BASE AND COMMENCE EXTENSIVE SEARCH OPS THROUGH-OUT HILL 881 (N), OBJS (6) XD 773452, (7)

TOR/061910/MAY68

1st MAR 87

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 856A C O N F I D E N T I A L

XD 764450, AND (8) XD 769458. OTHER UNITS CONTINUE PRESENT MISSIONS IN ASSGN AO'S. DURATION OF OPS APPROX 2 DASY.

2. COORDINATION AND FIRE SUPPORT. AIR/ARTY PREP ALL INTEL TGTS, H&I FIRES IN OBJ AREAS, RTES, AND TRAILS FM D-3 TO D-DAY. AERIAL OBS ON STATION DUR HOURS OF LIGHT FM D-3 THROUGHOUT OPS. ARTY DELIVER SMOKE ON REQ, FIXED WING SMOKE ON STATION AT L HOUR, TWO "MINI ARC LIGHTS"

(A-6 TPO 10 CONTROL STRIKES WITH ALL AVAIL ARTY TOT) FIRED AT L-2 HOURS ON D PLUS 1 ON 881 (N). PREP OF LZ BLUEJAY L-90 MIN TO L-60 MIN BY ARTY, L-60 MIN TO L HOUR BY AIR. TAC (A) UH1E GUN PLATFORM AND FIXED WING ESCORT FOR HELO LIFT. HELO REQUIREMENTS ARE MINIMUM 8 CH-46 FOR ASSLT UNITS. NO DISPLACEMENTS OF ARTY REQUIRED, CS MUNITIONS TO BE AT 881 (S). BOUNDARIES ARE INITIAL FIRE COORDINATION LINES.

GP-4

BT


4-3

4-2/00/CA *[initials]*

061635Z MAY 68

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



SAFVVV VPA241YXYXMMZVA 856QXJVV C NMB981

00 RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 056B 1271824  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 061715Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
 INFO RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 YWMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPACT DANANG  
 RUVG/;QMLTHIRD MARINES  
 RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
 RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX  
 RUMHVN/NILO QUANG TRI  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 BT

SHOVE

OP CHIEF

G-3 W O.

G-2 W O.

DCCO

ACTION

7  
 2305  
 Dec 5/4  
 Chamber

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 061800H - 062400H (C)

1. BETWEEN 2205H AND 2243H PATROL CRAFT OBSERVED 4-6 RDS ARTY IMPACT ON RIVER BANKIPHVIC YD 295 673. NEG CAS
2. 1ST AMTRAC BN REPORTED USMC SQUAD AMBUSH AT YD 323 697 ENGAGED ESTIMATED TWO PLATOONS NVA AT 2230H. AMBUSH REPORTED 7 NVA KIA. ENEMY

PAGE TWO RUMHN 0XXXXOYB C O N F I D E N T I A L

FLEEING TO NORTH. 1ST AMTRAC BN AGAIN REPORTED PF ENGAGED  
 ESTIMATED VC PLATOON AT YD 340 672. ENEMY FLEEING TO SOUTH. RESULTS  
 UNK.

3. LCPL NIGHT PATROL OBSERVED SANPAN MOVING FROM SOUTH TO NORTH  
 BANK IN LONG HUEI GIANG IN VIC YD 267 625 AT 2345H. PBR CALLED  
 IN TO ASSIST. SANPAN EVADED INTO CANAL YD 269 620 PRIOR ARRIVAL  
 PBR AND MAN RAN INTO HOUSE ON RIVER BANK. SANPAN NOT TAKEN UNDER  
 FIRE DUE TO DISTANCE AND SHALLOW WATER. COMMENT. PATROL CRAFT  
 HZVE REPORTED THREE INCIDENTS OF SUSPICIOUS MOVEVINT ON RIVEYLBANKS  
 BETWEEN 2000H-2400H.

4. DUE TO SUSPICIOUS MOVEMENT ON RIVER BANKS AND PROBING ACTION BY  
 ENEMY BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH OF CUA VIET HAVE MOVED LOGISTIC CRAFT  
 TO SEAFRONT OF LUWLVZO FOR REMAINDER OF NIGHT.

GP-4  
BT

ZZ

Encl 43



PLAN

EPR

MA. L. A.

SECRET

00 RUMHVP  
DE RUMHVP 981A 1280640  
ZNY SSSSS

0 070640Z MAY 68  
FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
TO ZEN/1ST MARINES  
IN RUMHVP/CG 3D MARDIV  
BT

S E C R E T

FRAG P 8-68 (U)

AC. CG 3D MARDIV OP 0 11-68

1. 2D BDE 1ST ACD COMPLETES DEPARTURE FROM SCOTLAND II AO  
APPROX 071800H MAY68. RETRUNE OF 2D BDE AND / OR TWO COMPLANINES  
3D BN 4TH MAR NOT KNOWN THIS TIME.

2. EFFECTIVE 071800H MAY68 ASSUME TACTICAL CONTROL OF  
2D BDE 1ST ACD PORTION OF SCOTLAND II AO WHILE CONTINUING  
PRESENTLY ASSIGNED MISSIONS AND TASKS. BOUNDARY BETWEEN  
1ST MAR AND 2D BDE SHOWN IN OVERLAY PASSED WITH MY FRAG 0  
6-68 IS SUSPENDED SAME DTG. ACCORDINGLY, YOUR NEW AO IS  
THE ENTIRE SCOTLAND II AO AS DESCRIBED IN REF A.

3. MISSIONS AND TASKS ASSIGNED YOU FOLLOW:

A. MISSION. 1ST MAR CONDUCTS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO  
DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, EQUIP, SUPPLIES, AND PSNS WITHIN AO.

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 981A S E C R E T

MAINTAIN COMBAT OUTPOSTS ON HILLS 881 (S), 861, 471, AND 950.  
PROVIDE FOR DEFENSE OF KSB, MAINTAIN REACTION FORCE IN RESPONSE  
TO RECON INSERTS AND CONVOYS, CONDUCT AND PROVIDE  
SECURITY FOR LOGISTICS CONVOYS TO AND FROM KHE SANH TO LZ  
STUD IN SUPPORT OF TF HOTEL, AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR RTE 9, AND  
BRIDGES WITHIN ASSIGNED AO.

GP-4  
BT

070640Z

3

2/000/CG RABO

SECRET

Encl 44

DRAFTER 3/PCF/rlbSEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV COGCWO RAA**CONFIDENTIAL**IMMEDIATE 071015 ZMAY68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
 TO: 9TH MARINES  
 26TH MARINES

//CONFIDENTIAL//

## DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

1. 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON 1/26 (-) (LESS A CO) FROM 26TH MAR  
 071400Z MAY68 AND PASSES SAME TO 9TH MARINES. **SAME DTG**
2. 3D MARDIV PASSES OPCON B TRP 3/5 ARMD CAV TO 26TH MARINES EFF  
 071200Z MAY68.

GP-4


COG 4592REL BY W Chapman

3

Stand/CG RPO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IDENTIA2

Encl 45



SHOVE COC	
OP TIME	
G-5 W	0
G-2	0
CCP	
CPD	
ACTION	<u>opcom</u>

*Handwritten: 7*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IMMEDIATE 071017Z MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: 3D MARINES  
INFO: CG TF HOTEL

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCOM

1. 3D MARDIV PASSES OPCON 1/5, 2D BDE, 1ST AGD TO 3D MARINES EFF 061715H MAY 68.

G24

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CCN 0593

RELEASED BY W. Chapman

07

10 (12 copies)

Standard/CG  
MAD  
Encl 46

**CONFIDENTIAL**

/:

DE S 82 5 AND NR 17 17 17 17

OO RUMHVP

DE RUMHVP 1004A 1281256

ZNY CCCCC

O 071256Z MAY 68

FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MARDIV

INFO ZEN/1ST MARINES

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPCON (U)

TASK FORCE HOTEL PASSES OPCON 2D BDE 1ST ACD TO CG 3D MARDIV  
EFFECTIVE 071830H MAY 68.

GP-4

BT

071256

3(12 copies)

COMM CO/2/COMMCON  
CEO/CG/4/1

ROR


NNNN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Encl 47

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Q F U VV AA6948  
 PP RUMHMB  
 DE RUMWAA0891 1281354  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P R 071354Z MAY 68  
 FM CG III MAF DANANG  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI  
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA  
 RUMHMB/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV GIA LE  
 RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV CAMP EVANS  
 BT

**SHOVE**

CP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOD

ACTION

Area Clearance

FOLD 2/2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AREA OF OPNS (AO) (U)

1. IN SEPARATE ACTIONS, CG ICTZ HAS APPR AO'S AND TAOR'S MAKING AVAIL FOR US FORCES GROUND OPNS ALMOST ENTIRE LAND MASS INCL IN THUA THIEN/QUANG TRI PVNCS--I.E., PCV TAOI.
2. WITH CONTINUING OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND REDISTRIBUTION OF FORCES, PROBLEM OF PROPER COORDINATION INVOLVING PRECISE AO BOUNDARIES, TIME LIMITS OF AO'S AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR AREAS APPROACHING UNMANAGEABLE PROPORTIONS.
3. PROPOSE, THEREFORE, THAT A PCV AO BE ESTAB TO INCL ALL AREA WITHIN PCV TAOI, SAVE THAT PORTION OF PHU BAI TAOR WHICH FALLS WITHIN IT, IMMEDIATE HUE CITY AREA, AND AREA IN VICINITY OF NAPOLEON/SALINE AO CURRENTLY CONTROLLED BY 2ND ARVN REGT.

PAGE TWO RUMWAA0891 **CONFIDENTIAL**

4. SHOULD YOU CONCUR IN THIS PROPOSAL, BOUNDARIES OF PCV AO CAN BE COORD BETWEEN PCV AND 11TH DTA AND THEN FWD THIS HQ FOR SUBM TO CG ICTZ FOR FORMAL APPR.
5. SUCH ARRANGEMENT WILL PERMIT RENEWING ENTIRE AO ONCE EACH SIXTY DAYS RATHER THAN RENEWING SEPARATE AO'S EVERY SEVERAL DAYS (PCV TAOI CURRENTLY INCL TEN SEPARATE CLEARED AREAS PLUS PART OF ELEVENTH AND PORTION OF PHU BAI TAOR) AND WILL FACILITATE YOUR DIRECT ASSIGNMENT OF INDIVIDUAL AO'S FOR OPNS WITHIN YOUR TAOI.
6. IT WILL STILL BE NECESSARY TO RPT DIV BOUNDARIES AND AO'S OF SEPARATE OPNS IN ORDER TO ENSURE PROPER COORD SUPPORTING ARMS. HOWEVER ESTAB OF THE PCV AO SHOULD REDUCE THE COORD PROBLEM.
7. REF THIS HQ WILL BE AVAIL TO MEET WITH YOUR REP TO WORK OUT DETAILS AT TIME AND PLACE DESIGNATED BY YOU.

GP-4

BT

071354Z MAY 68

G-3

STANDING OFF

NNNNV

07

13

54

Encl 48

SECRET

3P/MVP/wlk  
8 May 1968OPLAN BRIEF

Subj: PCV OPLAN 6-68 (Rice Denial) (S&amp;C #2096-68)

1. BACKGROUND. PCV mission is to conduct offensive and security operations in coordination and cooperation with 1st ARVN Div and GVN agencies to deny the enemy rice, to seek out and destroy his rice gathering forces, and to return to government control that rice which the enemy has collected.

2. DISCUSSION.

a. Operations to be conducted in four (4) phases:

Phase I (1-15 May) - Operations within capabilities in present AO to deny enemy access to rice producing areas.

Phase II (16-31 May) - Saturation patrolling and ambushes outside rice producing areas. Night patrols and ambushes in unsecure areas.

Phase III (1-15 June) - Offensive operations in coordination with ARVN in coastal areas to destroy rice gathering forces.

Phase IV (16-30 June) - Offensive operations in coordination with ARVN in Base Areas 101 and 114.

b. 3d MarDiv (Rein) is tasked to:

- (1) Be prepared to release 2d Bde, 1st ACD; 3d Bn, 21st Inf, 196th Lt Inf to 1st ACD on order.
- (2) Coordinate all U.S. rice denial ops in Quang Tri Province.
- (3) Establish Combined Rice Denial Coordination Committee in conjunction with 2d ARVN Regt and Quang Tri Province Chief.
- (4) Be prepared, on order, to conduct offensive operations in Base Area 101.

c. Requires a supporting plan by 12 May. (Ours is out. PCV up Major LANGACRE says it fits the bill).

d. Draft proposal of planning guidance for Base Area 101 prepared by G-3 Plans.

*Emcl 49*

SECRET

- e. Annex B - PsyOps should be reviewed by PsyOps O. 3d MarDiv is tasked to coordinate PsyOp effort in Quang Tri Province.
  - f. G-5 (Civil Affairs Personnel), in Annex C are tasked to ensure that only worthwhile civic action projects which meet the needs of people are undertaken.
  - g. Annex E provides guidance relative to formations of committees. Draft letter has been prepared and is attached.
3. Follow through action to be taken.
- a. Liaison effected with Quang Tri Province Chief, and Senior Advisor earliest practicable time.
  - b. Recommend a date for the 1st meeting of the Quang Tri Province Rice Denial Committee.
  - c. Invite attention of cognizant staff sections to pertinent portions of PCV order.

*M. V. Palatas*  
M. V. PALATAS  
LtCol USMC  
Plans Officer

~~SECRET~~  
**FLASH**DRAFTER 5E/MVP/wlk  
SECTION 5 PHONE 203  
CWO [Signature]

FLASH TO ACTION ADDRES

IMMEDIATE TO INFO ADDRES

FLASH/IMMEDIATE 080155 Z MAY 68

(FLASH TO ACTION)

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: 3D MAR

9TH MAR

3D RECON BN

2D BDE, 1ST (CD) CHIEF

2D ARVN REGT

12TH MAR

INFO: CG III MAF

CG PCV

CG 1ST ARVN DIV

CG 1ST ACD

CG 1ST MAW

CG FLC

FLSG - BRAVO

11TH ENGR BN

3D MARDIV

ACTION

CONCORDIA SQUARE

G-2

G-4

CEO

AIR

FSC

//SECRET//

OPORD 17-68 (LEATHERNECK SQUARE - NE QUANG TRI) PHASE I

REF: A. MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 A/S SERIES L 7014, SHEETS 6342 I AND 6442 IV.

B. MY 050020Z MAY 68 (S) (OPORD 16-68 LEATHERNECK SQUARE).

C. 3D MARDIV LOI 1-67 (NOTAL)

D. MY 270620Z APR 68 (OPORD 13-68 RICE) (NOTAL)

E. 3D MARDIV O P2000.4C (COMM SOP) (NOTAL)

F. 3D MARDIV O P02000.2F (COI) (NOTAL)

1

0-38 (12 COPIES)

STANLEY [Signature]  
SECRETEncl 24  
50



SECRET

TASK ORGANIZATION

3D MARDIV (REIN)

3D MAR (-) (REIN)  
 9TH MAR (REIN)  
 2D BDE (-), 1ST ACD  
 12TH MAR (-) (REIN)  
 3D RECON BN (-) (REIN)  
 TF ROBBIE

MGEN TOMPKINS

COL HULL  
 COL SMITH  
 COL MACKINNON  
 COL SCHICK  
 LTCOL KENT  
 COL ROBICHAUD

1. SITUATION.A. ENEMY FORCES.

- (1) MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE 320TH NVA DIVISION, REINFORCED WITH THE 2D AND 3D BNS OF THE 27TH IND REGT, HAVE MOVED INTO NE QUANG TRI PROVINCE, IN STRENGTH, TO INTERDICT LOC'S, TO ATTEMPT TO TIE DOWN, ISOLATE AND ATTRACT FRIENDLY FORCES IN POSITIONS ON AND NORTH OF HTE #9, AND TO CONDUCT LOCAL OBJECTIVE ATTACKS IN ATTEMPTS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR ASSIGNED MISSION.

- (2) SEE CURRENT INTSUMS AND PERINTREPS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES. NO CHANGE, EXCEPT:

- (1) 2D ARVN REGIMENT, IN COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH 3D MARDIV IN ADJACENT AO, CONTINUES TO CONDUCT OPERATION IN AO, TO ENGAGE AND ANNIHILATE OR CAPTURE ENEMY PERSONNEL, LOCATE AND DESTROY HIS INSTALLATIONS AND TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY HIS SUPPLIES, MATERIAL AND MUNITIONS.

2. MISSION.

(REIN)  
 3D MARDIV, CONTINUES TO EXECUTE ASSIGNED TASKS THROUGHOUT AO AND, IN COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH 2D ARVN REGIMENT, CONDUCTS COMBINED/ JOINT OPERATIONS IN NORTHEASTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE IN ORDER TO LOCATE, KILL OR CAPTURE ENEMY PERSONNEL, LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS AND DESTROY OR CAPTURE HIS SUPPLIES, MATERIAL AND MUNITIONS.

G-3 (12 COPIES)

SECRET

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

B. 3D MAR (-)(REIN).

- C. 9TH MAR (REIN).

- D. 2D BDE (-), 1ST AGD.

- E. 12TH MARINES. (-) (REIN).

- (1) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE D/S, G/S AND REINFORCING FIRES THROUGHOUT AO WITH PRIORITY OF FIRES TO OPERATIONS IN NE QUANG TRI/LEATHERNECK SQUARE.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON OF SUPPORTING ARMY ELEMENTS OF 2D BDE (-). 1ST ACD ON ORDER.

**SECRET**F. 3D RECON BN (-) (R-1N).

- (1) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE RECON SUPPORT THROUGHOUT AO.
- (2) CONDUCT PRIORITY SCREENING OPERATIONS IN 9TH MARINES' AO, WEST OF RUE #561.

G. TF ROBBIE.

- (1) BE PREPARED TO REIN/ATTACK/COUNTERATTACK IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

H. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) AREA OF OPNS: GENERALLY, ON THE NORTH BY THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF DMZ, ON THE EAST BY THE SOUTH CHINA SEA; ON THE SOUTH ALONG A LINE FROM 410638 WEST TO 274577 FOLLOWING SONG VINH PHUOC WEST TO 204541 FOLLOWING ROAD N TO 200560; WEST TO NS 08 CL AND NORTH TO DMZ. (SEE OPN OVERLAY - PASEP).
- (2) REQUEST COMBAT SUPPORT AND/OR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED, THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.
- (3) THIS SUPERSEDES AND CANCELS REF B.
- (4) DIRLAUTH ALCON.
- (5) D-DAY: 8 MAY 68; H-HOUR: TO BE ANNOUNCED.
- (6) 2D BDE (-) 1ST ACD AO DESIGNATION: "CONCORDIA SQUARE".

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

SEE REFS (C) AND (D). LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CONCEPT FOR 2D BDE, 1ST ACD, DONG HA AREA PUBLISHED SEPARATELY.

**SECRET**

SECRET

5. COLL AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

A. PROVISIONS OF REFS E AND F ARE EFFECTIVE.

B. TACTICAL RADIO.

- (1) 3D MARDIV (REIN). NO CHANGE. (BEACHBOY)
- (2) 3D MAR (-) (REIN). NO CHANGE. (FIRE RAIDER)
- (3) 9TH MAR (REIN). NO CHANGE. (DRAKE POOL)
- (4) 2D BDE, 1ST ACD. (BRIGHT LIGHTNING) ENTER 3D MARDIV TAC #2.  
FOLLOWING INTERNAL FREQ NOTED FOR INFO ALCON:

<u>NET</u>	<u>FREQ</u>
CMD/OPNS	61.65
OPNS/INTELL	58.05P
	66.70S

- (5) 12TH MAR (-) (REIN). NO CHANGE. (AMERICAN BEAUTY)
- (6) 3D RECON BN<sup>(REIN)</sup> NO CHANGE. (AIR MENDED)

C. TACTICAL WIRE.

- (1) 3D MARDIV<sup>(REIN)</sup> UNITS. NO CHANGE.
- (2) 2D BDE<sup>(REIN)</sup> 1ST ACD EMPLOY EXISTING EXTERNAL TAC WIRE SYSTEM TO  
THIS DIV. FOLLOWING EXTERNAL WIRE SYSTEM  
NOTED FOR INFO OF ALL CONCERNED:

2 - COMMON USER, 2D BDE<sup>(REIN)</sup> 1ST ACD (SILVER) / 3D MARDIV<sup>(REIN)</sup>  
 1 - 2D BDE TOC / 3D MARDIV FSCC HOT LINE.  
 1 - 2D BDE TOC / 3D MARDIV<sup>(REIN)</sup> COC HOT LINE.  
 (REIN)

D. FIRE SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS.

- (1) 2D BDE<sup>(REIN)</sup> 1ST ACD UTILIZE FSCC HOTLINE AS PRIMARY GS ARTY SOURCE.  
ALTERNATE IS WITH 12TH MAR (AMERICAN BEAUTY) ON REGT FD #2,  
(54.45).

SECRET

SECRET

(2) 2D BDE (-) 1ST ACD UTILIZE FSCC HOTLINE AS PRIMARY TAC AIR SUPPORT SOURCE. ALTERNATE IS DONG HA DASC (PLUTO CRAT ONE) ON HD/TAR #4, (43.5 YELLOW).

(3) ALL OTHERS: NO CHANGE.

E. <u>COMMAND POSTS.</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>
(1) 3D MARDIV (REIN)	DONG HA	MGEN TOMPKINS
(2) 2D BDE (-) 1ST ACD	DONG HA (INIT)	COL MACKINNON
(3) OTHERS: NO CHANGE		
(4) REPORT NEW CP LOCATIONS.		


ANNEX - A (OPERATION OVERLAY) ( PASEP ) ( NOTAL )

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

CCN

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RELEASED BY




SECRET

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

080820 Z MAY 68

FM: CG 3D MANDING  
 TO: 2D BDE 1ST ACD  
 INFO: CG III MAF  
 CG PCV  
 CG 1ST ACD  
 CG 1ST MAW  
 CG USASUPCOM DANANG  
 CG FLC  
 CG TASK FORCE HOTEL  
 FLSG-BRAVO  
 26TH GSG  
 MAG-39  
 12TH MAR  
 9TH MAR  
 3D RECON BN  
 BASE COORDINATOR DONG HA  
 BASE COORDINATOR QUANG TRI



DRAFTED: L/MB/RDC	
SECTION: 3D ARDIV	
OP CHIEF	
G-3 W.O.	G-3 MB
G-2 W.O.	OR AIO
DCPO	5-42d Bde
ARO	JTH
ACTION, Concordia Square Folder	
Start	

SECRET

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CONCEPT FOR 2D BDE, 1ST ACD, DONG HA AREA

## 1. MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION

A. MISSION - TO BE PUBLISHED

B. CONCEPT - THE 2D BDE 1ST ACD WILL OPERATE IN OR AROUND THE DONG HA, COMBAT BASE, AND WILL BE LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED FROM FLSG-BRAVO, DONG HA.

## 2. SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONCEPT OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

SUCH 2D BDE FORCES THAT ARE ESTABLISHED IN OR AROUND DONG HA COMBAT BASE WILL RECEIVE CLASS I, III, IV (FORTIFICATION) AND V SUPPORT FROM FLSG-BRAVO, DONG HA. 2D BDE LOGISTICAL TRAIN WILL BE MOVED FROM LZ STUD TO DONG HA.

## 3. STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES, FLSG-BRAVO, DONG HA

ADEQUATE STOCKS OF ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY ARE ON HAND AT FLSG-BRAVO, DONG HA.

## 4. PLAN OF OPERATION FOR SUPPORT

A. CANTONEMENTS, DONG HA - AS AVAILABLE AND PROVIDED BY BASE COORDINATOR, DONG HA COMBAT BASE.

B. REFUELING/REARMING - 2D BDE HELICOPTERS WILL UTILIZE REFUELING/REARMING FACILITIES AT QUANG TRI THAT WERE PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED FOR ARMY UNITS.

SECRET

SECRET

AVGAS FOR ~~THREE~~ H-13 OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE AT DONG HA AIRFIELD.

G. LZ STUD RETROGRADE - NO SUPPLIES/EQUIPMENT FROM LZ STUD WILL BE RETROGRADED TO DONG HA WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 2D BDE GOFRAV AMMUNITION AND ORGANIC SUPPLIES/EQUIPMENT.

18 D. LZ'S - LZ ~~STUD~~ <sup>Pigeon</sup> TO THE 12TH MAR AREA AND LZ RECON, DONG HA, IN THE 3D RECON BN AREA ARE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY THE 2D BDE AS SLING OUT POINTS.

E. TRANSPORTATION -

1. TRUCK - IT IS ESTIMATED THAT IT WILL REQUIRE 17, 2 1/2 TON AND 8, 12 TON TRUCKS TO RETROGRADE THE REQUIRED ORGANIC SUPPLIES/EQUIPMENT OF THE 2D BDE FROM LZ STUD TO DONG HA. FLSG-BRAVO RESUPPLY TRUCKS TO LZ STUD WILL BE UTILIZED FOR THE RETROGRADE OF 2D BDE SUPPLIES/EQUIPMENT TO DONG HA COMBAT BASE. TRANSPORTATION TO HAUL 2D BDE AMMUNITION FROM THE DONG HA ASP TO GUN POSITIONS IN DONG HA WILL BE ARRANGED BY THE 12TH MAR.

2. HELICOPTERS - LOGISTICAL HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR THE 2D BDE IS TO BE PROVIDED BY THE 1ST ACD.

F. MAINTENANCE SUPPORT - SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT SHALL BE PROVIDED BY PARENT SERVICE THROUGH AUGMENTATION AND/OR INTER-SERVICE AGREEMENTS.

G. ARMY AUGMENTATION - SUCH ARMY EQUIPMENT/PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION AS IS DEEMED NECESSARY BY FLSG-BRAVO WILL BE REQUESTED FROM THE 26TH GSG, QUANG TRI.

GP-4

CGN

0672

RELEASED BY

*[Signature]*

TIME

1030

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER 3P/MVP/WLK  
SECTION 3 PHONE 203  
GWO RAID

PRIORITY 080653 Z MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: CG TF HOTEL  
INFO: CG III MAF  
CG PCV  
CG 1ST MAW  
CG 1ST MARDIV  
CG 1ST ACD  
CG FLC  
1ST MAR  
11TH ENGR BN  
3D MARDIV

TF Hotel  
FILE

G-2 R  
G-4 see  
G-30ps Hunt

//SECRET//

~~GRABATE A TO ANNEX A (TASK ONE) TO OPORD 11-68 (SCOTLAND III) (U)~~

A. MY 040750Z MAY 68

1. CHANGE REF A AS FOLLOWS:

A. DELETE: 1ST PLT CO B 3D SP BN

B. ADD AFTER PROV TECH CO:

"CO A (-) 1ST SP BN  
CO A (-) 1ST MT BN  
CO A 1ST ENGR BN  
DET ITT\*  
DET CO B 3D SP BN (1ST)  
DET CO A 3D ENGR BN"

GP-4

CCN 0676

RELEASED BY


Whelman

TIME

3 strands RAID

SECRET





FILE  
COC

CHIEF

0.000000

15

70

**ACTION**

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE 080755Z-MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: CG TF HOTEL  
2D BDE, 1ST ACD  
INFO: CG PCV  
CG 1ST ACD

DRAFT EN 3/10/41/10P  
SEC 3 PHONE 3D MARDIV COO  
CWO

~~one hand~~  
~~free~~ ~~Rev~~

**//CONFIDENTIAL//**

OF CON

1. CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON 2D EDE 1ST ACD W/ 2D BN 5TH CAV, <sup>B</sup>~~A~~ AND <sup>C</sup>~~B~~  
BATTERY <sup>1ST</sup> 40TH/77TH AND A BATTERY 1/30 FROM CG TF HOTEL REF C71850H MAY 68.

2. BDN CP AT DONG HA.

GP-4

CEN 0686

RELEASED BY

28/1/1941

5/24/66 PPD  
CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 5.3



3NDV6 COC	
CP CHIEF	<i>H</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>BM</i>
G-2 Y.O.	<i>W</i>
DCPO	
WFO	<i>X</i>
ACTION	<i>opcon</i> <i>2</i>

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE *080905* MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
 TO: 3D MARINES  
 9TH MARINES  
 INFO: CG TF HOTEL


// CONFIDENTIAL //

OPCON

1. 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON CO'S I & M 3/4 FROM 3D MARINES EFF 081400H MAY 68  
 2. PASS<sup>65</sup> SAME TO 9TH MARINES SAME DEC.

P-4

ON *0630*REL BY *206 Chapman**Stand/CG RAE*CONFIDENTIAL *Encl 54*



SHOVE ONE	
CP CHIEF	<i>HK</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>W</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>W</i>
DCPO	
APO	<i>X</i>
ACTION	

*COC*

DRAFTER IOF/AAJ/TJB  
SEC CEO PHONE 10  
CWO *RCS*

PRIORITY *080947* Z MAY68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: 3D MAR  
9TH MAR  
3D RECON BN  
2D ARVN REGT  
12TH MAR

*SECRET*

S E C R E T

CORRECTION TO OPORD 17-68

CG 3D MARDIV 080155Z MAY68

1. PARA 5.B.(4) OF REF A CORRECTED AS FOLLOWS:

NET  
CMD/OPNS  
OPNS/INTELL

FREQ  
61.65  
58.50 (P)  
66.70 (S)

MAKE DESIG  
M-469  
M-477  
M-1022

GP-4

CCN *4691* RELEASED BY *Jim Cunningham* TIME 08 1640 H MAY68

*CEB* *stand 16*

*08*

*09*

*SECRET* *May 68*  
*Encl 55*

DECLASSIFIED

**SECRET**  
IMMEDIATE 080909 MAY 68  
FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: 3D MARINES  
INFO: CG PCV  
CG 1ST ACD  
9TH MARINES

DRAFTER 3/FDC/  
SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV 3  
GWO (RSC)

//SECRET//

OPCON

1. CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON 1STEN 9TH CAV FROM 3D MARINES

EFF 091515H MAY 68 AND PASSES SAME TO 2D BDE, 1ST ACD EFF SAME

DTG.

GP-4

CCN 0692

REL BY

*W. Chapman*

3 Stand/CG

**SECRET**

080909

13  
Encl 56

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
3D MARINE DIVISION FMF



G-3 **MEMORANDUM**

FOR

*CH Fred*

*5/9/68*

SUBJ:

*Rec Demol Coordination  
Committee*

1. Recommend CH  
signature of attached -
2. Recommend G-5  
act as chairman  
of committee for  
C.G.

*V. R.*

*Lud*

*(G-2 & G-3 would  
furnish other 2 reps.)*

*Encl 57*

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3/MVF/wlk  
9 May 1968  
5420

Ser 003A1368

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Combined Rice Denial Coordination Committee

Ref: (a) CG PCV OPlan 6-68 (Rice Denial) (U)  
(b) My 270620Z Apr 68 (OpOrd 13-68)

1. Reference (a) promulgates CG PCV operation plan for rice denial operations in the PCV Tactical Area of Responsibility. This plan, in part, tasked this command to coordinate all U.S. rice denial operations in Quang Tri Province and directed the establishment of a Combined Rice Denial Coordination Sub-Committee in conjunction with 1st & 2d ARVN Regts and the Quang Tri Province Chief.

2. Accordingly, in compliance with this plan, the Quang Tri sub-committee is hereby formed with proposed membership as follows:

ARVN/GVN

1st ARVN Regt (2)  
2d ARVN Regt (2)  
Office of the Province Chief (2)  
Others GVN Reps as Required

U. S. MILITARY

3d MarDiv (3)  
PSA, Quang Tri (2)  
Rep TF Clearwater (1)  
Rep 1st ACD (1)

3. The first meeting of the Quang Tri sub-committee will be held during May at a time and place to be announced by the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein).

*R. McC. Tompkins*  
R. McC. TOMPKINS

DISTRIBUTION: CG III MAF (1)  
CG PCV (2)  
CG 1st ARVN Div (1)  
CG 1st ACD (1)  
GO's All Units W/Membership (2)  
Commander TF Clearwater (1)  
File (10)

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

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Encl 58

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTER 3P/MVP/wlk  
SECTION 3 PHONE 203  
CWO [Signature]

ROUTINE 090157 Z MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: CG PCV (COURIER)

//UNCLAS//EFTO//

~~OPLAN 6-68 (RICE DENIAL)~~ (U)

1. SUBJECT OPLAN ACKNOWLEDGED.

PCV 6-68  
File

CIN 0744

REL BY [Signature]

43

STAND/CG [Signature]

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 59


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DECLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



CHIEF  
 CO. *[Signature]*  
 G-2 H.Q.  
 DCP  
 ACTION *[Signature]* **NAD/SAL**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

NNNNVV VPA013ZVA GRYQCTCH

279

PP RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 010B 1300635  
 TNY CCCCC  
 P 090600Z MAY 68  
 NM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINES  
 INFO RUMHAW/CG FMFPAC  
 RUMMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVNORV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAIFUPPACT DANANG  
 BT

*to 11020510*

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
 BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE CUA VIET RIVER (U)  
 1. THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF TASK FORC CLEARWATR, OPERATING ON THE CUA VIET RIVER LBC, JOIN MESIN EXPRESSING OUR GREAT ADMIRATION TO THE MARINES AND SOLDIRS ASSIGNED TO THE 3RD MARINES IN THEIR GALLANT DEFENSE OF TH LAFD AREAS ADJACNT TO THE RIVER URING THE PERIOD 30 APRIL TO 8 MAY.  
 2. THE DEMONSTRATED AGRSSIVENESS IN CARRYING THE BATTLE TO THE ENEMY AND INFLECTING MASSIV CASUALTIES ON A NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR FORCE RESULTED IN KEEPING THE LOGISTIC LIFE LINE OPEN TO N30HA

P  
 G TWO RUMHN010B C *[Redacted]*  
 AND GREATLY ASSISTED US IN PROTECTING CRAFT ON THE RIVER.  
 3. TO YOU AND YOUR MEN PLEASE ACCEPT OUR APVPC

WELL DONE" CAPT G. W. SMITH U. S. N. TION FOR A

GP-4  
BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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*Encl 60*




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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



SHOVE COC	
GP CHIEF	<i>[initials]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[initials]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[initials]</i>
DCPO	<i>[initials]</i>
PO	<i>[initials]</i>
ACTION	<i>[initials]</i>

UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFTER 3/HMS/RLD  
SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV COG  
CWO R/KC

IMMEDIATE 491415 ZMAY68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: 2ND BDE, 1ST ACD  
12TH MARINES  
INFO: CG PCV  
CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV

*FSEC*  
*[signature]*

OPCON

A. MY 090755ZMAY68

*B. C 1st*

1. 3D MARDIV PASSES OPCON BTRY'S ~~3A~~ AND ~~3B~~ *11TH* ARTY AND BTRY

A 1ST/30TH ARTY TO 12TH MARINES EFF 090800ZMAY68.

GP-4

COE 4819

REL BY *[signature]*

*3 Stand/CO R/KC*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Encl 61

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM ONTR

THIRD MAR DIV

**SHOVE CTS**

OP CHIEF


G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

*Enclosed Square***UNCLASSIFIED**

DKOT

DE L745

O 091545Z

VM: CO, 2D BDE, 1 ACD, DONG HA, RVN

TO: CG, 3 D MARINE DIV, DONG, HA, RVN

INFO: CG, 1ST ACD, LZ EVANS, RVN

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT: PERIODIC OPERATIONS REPORT 081800  
TO 091800 MAY PART II OF II PARTS

## UNIT LOCATIONS:

UNIT	LZ NAME	COORD
2D BDE	DONG HA	
1-5 CAV	C-1	
A		YD 237678
B		YD 237678
C		YD 237678
D		YD 237678
2-5 CAV	DONG HA	
A		YD 242700
B		YD 230695
C		YD 226693
D		YD 242700

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BT

NNNN

091545Z MAY 68

G-3

G-2/COO/CG

*Signature*

DKOT

CORRECTIO

1-9 EN

**UNCLASSIFIED****CONFIDENTIAL**

45


Encl 62

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

**UNCLASSIFIED**

P CHIEF  
O.  
O.

ACTION

*clearwater*

NNNNAVV VPA910ZVA 898 ~~898889~~  
 OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 029B 1301709  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 091601Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
 INFO RUMWAA/CG III MAF  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/THIRD MARINES  
 RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX  
 RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
 RUMFKRF/COMRIVRON ELEVEN  
 RUMHVN/NILO QUANG TRI  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 BT

*TCR / 16*  
*1009*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 091800H-092400H MAY 68 (U)  
 1. BETWEEN 092100H AND 092125H, NSAD CUA VIET RECEIVED APPROX  
 45-50 RDS ESTIMATED 152MM ARTY. NEG PERS CAS/MATL DAMAGE TO  
 BE ASSESSED AT FIRST LIGHT.

PAGE TWO RUMHN 029B ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 2. CONTINUING NIGHT RIVER PATROLS IAW MY 091200H-091800H  
 SITREP.

GP-4

BT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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Encl 63

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

38/WHC/skb  
10 May 1968

MEMORANDUM

For: Commanding General

Subj: Assignment of Headquarters Commandant and Administrative control of Sub Unit #2

1. With Colonel WILSON now assigned to the 1st Marine Division we need to assign a Commanding Officer for Headquarters Battalion. LtCol VOZELLA (recently promoted) the current Headquarters Battalion Executive Officer cannot, in my opinion, carry the job. He is eager and willing but lacks the background experience for the job. (He's a reserve on active duty)
2. Lieutenant Colonel CRYAN coming out of 2/9 on the 12th is slated for Ground Safety Officer but I believe Colonel DAZE can wear two hats for a while longer. CRYAN, however, is junior to DEPTULA (Commanding Officer Sub Unit #2) and therefore his assignment as Commanding Officer Headquarters Battalion would be, at the least awkward. This can be solved by making DEPTULA Commanding Officer Headquarters Battalion and CRYAN Commanding Officer Sub Unit #2.
3. At the same time we can eliminate an administrative vestige from the period when the Division C.P. was split between Phu Bai and Dong Ha. At that time Sub Unit #2 was established as a separate reporting unit. Now, with Quang Tri so close to Dong Ha Headquarters Battalion can, at less personnel expense, administer Headquarters Battalion at both Dong Ha and Quang Tri. The designation Sub Unit #2 will be retained for mailing purposes. CRYAN would act as Headquarters Commandant (Fwd).
4. It is therefore recommended:
  - a. That LtCol DEPTULA be assigned as C.O. Headquarters Battalion.

Encl 4

b. That LtCol CRYAN be designated as Headquarters Commandant (Fwd).

c. That Headquarters Battalion resume the administration of all Headquarters Battalion personnel.

Very Respectfully

W. H. CUENIN  
Colonel, USMC  
Chief of Staff


	Approved	Disapproved
Recommendation a.	_____	_____
b.	_____	_____
c.	_____	_____

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ACTION BRIEF

10 May 1968

- Purpose. To promulgate an appointing order, establishing the Chairmanship of the Quang Tri Combined Rice Denial Coordination Sub-Committee.
- Background. PCV OpOrd 6-68 (Rice Denial) tasks CG 3d MarDiv (rein) to coordinate all U.S. rice denial operations in Quang Tri Province. This OpOrd also directs the establishment of a Combined Rice Denial Coordination Committee.
- Discussion. CG 3d MarDiv established the Quang Tri Province Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee in 3d MarDiv ltr to Distr List, ser: 3/MVP/wlk 5420 003A13168. The attached proposed letter assigns Colonel J. E. LOPRETE 016204/9906 USMC (G-5) as Chairman of the committee.
- Recommendation:
1. That the attached letter be promulgated.
  2. That Colonel LOPRETE be notified, by phone, of his appointment.
  3. That S&C files be directed to provide Col LOPRETE (ACofS G-5) a copy of ref (a).

  
M. V. PALATAS  
LtCol USMC  
Action Officer

Encl 65

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/ALM/mvp  
5420  
11 May 1968

From: Commanding General  
To: Colonel J. E. LOPRETE 016204/9906 USMC  
Subj: Appointment as Chairman, Quang Tri Province Combined Rice  
Denial Sub-Committee

Ref: (a) CG 3d MarDiv ltr to Distr List, ser: 3/MVP/wlk 5420  
CG3A13168 of 9 May 1968  
(b) CG 3d MarDiv OPOED 13-68 (Rice Denial)  
(c) PCV OPOED 6-68 (Rice Denial) (SAC #2096-68)  
(d) Appendix 3 to Annex P of 3d MarDiv LOI 1-67

1. Reference (a) establishes the Quang Tri Province Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee. This committee, in its membership, has representation from local provincial government, ARVN units, advisory personnel and U.S. military forces.
2. You are hereby appointed as Chairman of the Quang Tri Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee and you will act as the direct representative of the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) in matters pertaining to rice denial operations.
3. The sub-committee will meet on your call, the first such meeting to be held in the Quang Tri area prior to 18 May 1968. Subsequent meetings will be held thereafter on a weekly basis. You are requested to submit a weekly report of progress to CG 3d MarDiv (Rein) as of 1600 each Friday, so long as rice denial operations are in effect.
4. Your attention is invited to references (b), (c) and (d) as they relate to rice denial operations in general.

Wm. L. DICK  
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)

Encl 66

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3/MVP/vlk  
9 May 1968  
5420

Set 003A1368

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Combined Rice Denial Coordination Committee

Ref: (a) CG PCV OPlan 6-68 (Rice Denial) (U)  
(b) My 270620Z Apr 68 (OpOrd 13-68)

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2. Accordingly, in compliance with this plan, the Quang Tri sub-committee is hereby formed with proposed membership as follows:

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U. S. MILITARY

1st ARVN Regt (2)  
2d ARVN Regt (2)  
Office of the Province Chief (2)  
Others GVN Reps as Required

3d MarDiv (3)  
PSA, Quang Tri (2)  
Rep TF Clearwater (1)  
Rep 1st ACD (1)

3. The first meeting of the Quang Tri sub-committee will be held during May at a time and place to be announced by the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein).

*R. McC. Tompkins*  
R. McC. TOMPKINS

DISTRIBUTION: CG III MAF (1)  
CG PCV (2)  
CG 1st ARVN Div (1)  
CG 1st ACD (1)  
CO's All Units W/Membership (2)  
Commander TF Clearwater (1)  
File (10)

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HEADQUARTERS  
3D MARINE DIVISION FMF



9-3 MEMORANDUM

FOR

*CG*

*5/10/68*

SUBJ:

*KBA*

*Beginning tomorrow  
the KBA will be  
included in the  
KIA figure.*

*V. R.*

*Lud*

*Encl 68*

I. CASUALTY FIGURES FOR CONTACT ON 29 APRIL INVOLVING D/1/9 AND TASK FORCE ROBBIE:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
4	19	6	7	32	0	0	0

(1) On 2 April a platoon from 1/9 recovered six (6) of the seven (7) MIA's listed above. Add 6 KIA and delete 6 MIA

(2) Final casualties of D/1/9 and TASK FORCE ROBBIE

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
10	19	6	1	32	0	0	0

II. CASUALTY FIGURES FOR CONTACT ON 30 APRIL, 1 MAY, 2 MAY, and 3 MAY INVOLVING 3/9 (-):

30 APRIL:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
20	72	0	2	41	5	0	4

...NOTE 021200sitrep reported 2 MIA's erroneously delete 2xMIAXE  
1 MIA

TOTAL 379 (\*) CASUALTIES 30 APRIL:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
20	72	0	1	41	5	0	4

1 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
8	32	0	0	25	1	1	2

2 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
1	0	0	0	27	25	6	4

## DECLASSIFIED

3/9 (-) con't.

3 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3

TOTAL CASUALTIES 3/9 (-) 30 APRIL-2400 3 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
29	104	0	1	93	34	7	13

## III.

CASUALTY FIGURES FOR CONTACT ON 30 APRIL, 1 MAY, 2 MAY, AND 3 MAY INVOLVING 2/4 (REIN)

30 APRIL:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
12	92	0	2	89	0	1	0	9

1 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
12	56	3	0	62	34	13	0	12

NOTE: delete 2 MIA's prev. reported Both found unharmed

2 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
52	86	3	0	242	9	5	3	20

3 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
3	22	0	0	1	2	2	1	0

DECLASSIFIED

2/4 (REIN) con't.

TOTAL CASUALTIES 2/4 (REIN) 30 APRIL- 2400 3 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
79	256	6	0	394	45	21	4	41

IV.

CASUALTY FIGURES FOR CONTACT ON 2MAY AND 3 MAY INVOLVING THE 3rd of the 21st LIGHT INFANTRY:

2 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
9	14	5	4	19	0	0	0	0

3 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
5	10	7	0	67	0	0	0	0

NOTE: delete 4 MIA'S prev. reported all found and re-classified as KIA'S ADD 4 KIA'S

NOTE: ADD 2 chieu hoi's

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TOTAL CASUALTIES 3rd of the 21st LIGHT INFANTRY 2 MAY - 2400v 3 MAY:

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
14	24	12	0	86	0	0	0	0

PLUS 2 CHIEU HOI'S (NVA RETURNEE'S)

V.

TOTAL CASUALTIES FROM 29 APRIL TO 2400 3 MAY INVOLVING ~~2/4~~ 2/4 (-)  
2/4 (REIN) TASK FORCE ROBBIE AND THE 3rd of the 21st LIGHT INFANTRY

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
132	403	24	2	605	79	28	17	41	2

VI. TOTAL CAS FROM 29 APRIL TO 2400 4 MAY, ~~INVOLVING ALL DIV ELEMENTS:~~ <sup>1/3, 2/4, 3/2, 3/4, 1/2 TFR</sup>

<del>131</del>	<del>442</del>	46	0	676	103	34	19	41	2
139	412	40		527	10	5			
149	476	46		527	3127				
				848					

as of 2400 5 MAY

## DECLASSIFIED

CASUALTIES FOR 3/9(\*) FROM 040001 - 042400 MAY 68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	CSWC	POW	KBA	IWC
#	6	0	0	17	0	0	10	2

NOTE: The two previous MIA'S from D/1/9 and 3/9(-) were found by 3/9. RESULTS: Add two KIA'S, delete two MIA'S. As of 042400 there are no MIA'S remaining for the 3/9 and D/1/9 contact.

CASUALTIES FOR 3/21 USA FROM 040001 - 042400 MAY 68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
2	11	5	0	59	4	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 1/3 FROM 040001 - 042400 MAY 68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWE	CSWC	POW	KBA
1	5	0	0	1	1	3	0	7

CASUALTIES FOR 2/4 FROM 040001 - 042400 MAY 68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
1	0	0	0	29	0	0	0	0

NOTE: The additional KIA(C) are from the notebook of the Bn CO who was keeping a running total of enemy losses. The 29 were not previously reported.

TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR 3/9(-), 1/3, 2/4 and 3/21 USA FROM 040001-042400 MAY 68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
7	22	5	0	106	5	3	0	17

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TOTAL CASUALTIES FROM 29 APRIL TO 042400 MAY 68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
139	425	29	0	711	83	31	17	58	2

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CASUALTIES FOR 3/21 USA FROM 05001-052400 MAY 68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
0	0	0	0	47	12	0	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 1/3 FROM 050001-052400

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KB A	CHIEU HOI
10	64	26	0	151	3	0	0	20	0

CASUALTIES FOR 3/21 AND 1/3 FROM 050001 - 052400 MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
10	64	26	0	198	15	0	0	20	0

CASUALTIES FOR 3/9, 2/4, 1/3, AND 3/21 FROM 29 APRIL TO 052400 MAY 68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
149	489	55	0	909	78	<del>31</del> 31	17	78	2

Set Syllaged

7	10	9	10	100	55	18	3	5	
156	499	64	10	1009	133	47	20	83	2

7 May

→ KIA 156

WIA(E) 500

WIA(M) 64

MIA (8)

KIA(C) 1029

IWC 141

CSWC 48

POW 20

KBA 83

CHIEU HOI 2

NOTE - 2 MIA's previously reported reclassified as IWC(C), 1 in good shape, 1 in bad shape.



## DECLASSIFIED

## CASUALTIES FOR 3D MARINES FROM 06001-062400H MAY 1968

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
19	12	16	10	190	74	17	3	27

1. NOTE: THE 10 MIA'S ARE FROM 3/21 USA.

2. NOTE: 114 NVA(C) INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE FIGURE ARE A RESULT OF A THOROUGH DEBRIEFING OF CO CMDRS WHO WERE EVACUATED DURING THE CONTACT ON 2 MAY. THE 114 NVA KIA(C) ARE INCLUDED ON DIVISION TOTALS

## CASUALTIES FOR 3/3 FROM 06001-062400H MAY 1968

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0

## CASUALTIES FOR 3D MARINES, 3/3 FROM 06001-062400H MAY 1968

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
19	12	16	10	192	74	17	3	27	0

## CASUALTIES FROM 29 APRIL 062400H MAY 1968

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
168	501	71	10	1101	152	48	20	105	2

7 May

0	1	0	0	20	6	1	0	0	0
TOTAL	502	71	8	1121	158	49	20	105	2

Note: 2 MIA's returned to 3/21 report 1 readjusted as WIA(E) other in good health  
delete 2 MIA's add 1 WIA(E)

8 May

0	1	0	0	22	0	0	3	0	0
TOTAL	503	71	8	1143	158	49	23	105	2

8 May

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## DECLASSIFIED

CASUALTIES FOR 1/3 FROM 070001-072400H MAY

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
0	0	0	0	9	8	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 3/21 USA FROM 070001-072400H MAY

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
0	1	0	0	80	0	0	0	0

NOTE: OF THE PREVIOUS MIA'S REPORTED BY 3/21 2 WERE FOUND. 1 WAS MED  
EVACED, 1 WAS UNHARMED. RESULTS DELETE 2 MIA

CASUALTIES FOR 3/3 FROM 010001-072400H MAY

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	MIA	KIA	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
0	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0

TOTALS FOR 3/3, 1/3, AND 3/21(USA) FROM 070001-072400H

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(G)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
0	3	1	0	89	9	0	1	0	

TOTALS FROM 29 APRIL - 072400 MAY 68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(G)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
168	504	72	8	1190	161	48	21	105	

NOTE: 8 MIA'S ARE STILL REMAINING FROM 3/21 ACTION ON 6 MAY

DECLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

CASUALTIES FOR 1/3 FROM 080001-082400H MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 3/21(USA) FROM 080001-082400H MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

NOTE: THE 10 MIA 'S REPORTED BY 3/21 ON 6MAY HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO 14 MIA'S, AS OF 081800H 11 BODIES WERE RECOVERED ON A SWEEP BY 3/21. TWO OF THE MIA'S WERE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AS FOUND ON 7 MAY. RESULTS: DELETE 11 MIA, ADD 11 KIA. AS OF 082400H. 1 MIA REMAINS UNACCOUNTED FOR.

CASUALTIES FOR 3/3 FROM 080001-082400H MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
9	34	0	0	22	2	1	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 1/26 FROM 080001-082400H MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA(C)	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CASUALTIES FOR 1/5 FROM 080001-082400H MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 3/3, 1/3, 1/26, 3/21(USA) AND 1/5(USA) FROM 080001-082400H MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
21	37	3	0	44	2	1	0	0

CASUALTIES FROM 29APRIL68 - 082400H MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA	CHIEU HOI
189	541	75	1	1234	163	49	21	105	2

NOTE: THE 1 MIA REMAINING IS FROM 3/21 CONTACT ON 6MAY68

*Casualties from spot reports - 9 May*

KIA	WIA(e)	WIA(m)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
23	54	3	3	47	20	-	2

*Casualties from 29 Apr 68 - 2400 9 May 68*

KIA	WIA(e)	WIA(m)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	KBA
212	595	78	4	1281	183	49	23	105

*clin  
Hoi  
2*

*EWK*

## DECLASSIFIED

CASUALTY FIGURES FOR 9MAY68 FROM 090001-092400H

CASUALTIES FOR 1/26

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
9	16	0	0	5	1	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 3/3

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
0	0	0	0	17	22	1	0

CASUALTIES FOR 1/3

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
0	0	0	0	16	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 3/21 USA

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 2/4

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 2/5 USA

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
16	49	0	3	84	1	0	0

DECLASSIFIED

BATTLE FOR DONG HA

TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR 09MAY68 FROM 090001-092400H

IA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW
25	65	4	3	122	24	1	0

TOTAL CASUALTIES FROM 29APRIL TO 092400H MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	(KBA)	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	CHIEU HOI
214	606	79	4	(105)	1461	187	50	21	2

107th TAMP TOTAL CAS

1	2	14	-3	(51)	349	94	29	3	-
---	---	----	----	------	-----	----	----	---	---

TOTAL CUM AS OF 2400 107th TAMP (info for Sp. Reports)

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	(KBA)	KIA(C)	IWC	CSWC	POW	CHIEU HOI
215	608	93	1	(156)	1810	181	79	24	2

DWTF

DECLASSIFIED

CASUALTY FIGURES FROM 100001 TO 102400 MAY68

CASUALTIES FOR 3/3

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)(KBA)	IWC	CSWC	POW	CHIEU HOI
0	2	0	0	2 (0)	2	2	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 1/26

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)(KBA)	IWC	CSWC	POW	CHIEU HOI
0	0	0	0	1 (0)	5	4	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 2/4

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)(KBA)	IWC	CSWC	POW	CHIEU HOI
0	0	0	0	0 (0)	0	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 1/3

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)(KBA)	IWC	CSWC	POW	CHIEU HOI
0	0	0	0	0 (0)	0	0	0	0

CASUALTIES FOR 3/21 USA

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)(KBA)	IWC	CSWC	POW	CHIEU HOI
1	15	16	0	159 (25)	35	18	0	0

DECLASSIFIED

## CASUALTIES FOR 2/5 USA

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)(KBA)	IWC	CSWG	POW	CHIEU HOI
3	1	0	0	108 (0)	51	11	3	0

NOTE: ALL OF 2/5 MIA'S PREVIOUSLY REPORT ON 09MAY68 WERE FOUND. RESULTS  
DELETE 3 MIA'S ADD 3 KIA'S.

## TOTAL CASUALTIES FROM 100001-102400 MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)(KBA)	IWC	CSWG	POW	CHIEU HOI
4	18	16	0	<del>271</del> (25) 220	<del>156</del> 93	<del>29</del> 35	3	0

## TOTAL CASUALTIES FROM 29APRIL TO 102400H MAY68

KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(M)	MIA	KIA(C)(KBA)	IWC	CSWG	POW	CHIEU HOI
218	624	95	1	<del>1731</del> (130) 1731	<del>286</del> 286	<del>8</del> 85	24	2

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DRAFT ~~SECRET~~ /RAC/rfw  
SEC 3 PHONE 3D MARDIV  
CWO

IMMEDIATE 100203 ZMAY68

FROM: CG, 3D MARDIV  
TO: CG TF HOTEL  
2ND BDE, 1ST ACD  
INFO: CG, PCV  
CG, 1ST ACD

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPCON

A. CG 3D MARDIV MSG 080755Z MAY68

1. REF A IS MODIFIED TO READ:

CG, 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON 2ND BDE, 1ST ACD WITH 2ND BN 5TH CAV,  
B AND C BATTERY 1ST/77TH AND A BATTERY 1ST/30.

2. ALL OTHER PROVISIONS REMAIN IN EFFECT.

GP-4

CCN

0890

RELEASED BY

J. Chapman

G-3

STAND/CG

J. Chapman

UNCLASSIFIED

10


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Encl 70

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FLASH



UNCLASSIFIED

SHOVE COC

CP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

CCPO

APO

ACTION

NAPOLEON/SALING

NOTE Para 4/Part III

Pass Copy to G-3

\*\*\*\*\*ZZRUMHVP

DE RUMHMA 508 1310430

ZNY SSSSS

Z 100415Z MAY 68

FM CG PROV CORPS V PHB

TO RUMHMB /CG 101ST ABN DIV CEE

RUMHMB/CG 1ST ACD CPE

RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH

INFT ZEN/CG III MAF DNG

ZEN/CG AMERICAL DIVV CHL

BT

01443 AVII-GCO

SUBJ: UNIT DEPLOYMENT(U)

THIS MSG IN III PARTS. PART I FOR CG 101ST.

1. (S) REQUEST THAT YOU ASSEMBLE THE 2D BN, 1ST INF, 196TH LIB FOR MOVEMENT BY AIR FROM THE PHU BAI AIRFIELD TO KHAM DUC ASAP. THE BATTALION ADVANCE PARTY MUST ALSO MOVE ASAP. TENTATIVELY 101330H MAY 68 UNIT TO BE PREPARED FOR COMBAT ACTION UPON ARRIVAL KHAM CUC. ORGANIC ARTY SUPPORT MUST ACCOMPANY 2/1ST INF.

2. (C) RRELINQUISH OPCON OF 2/1ST INF UPON DEPARTURE YOUR AO. PART II FOR CG 1ST ACD.

3. (S) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY THE 196TH LIB(-) TO CHU LAI ON ORDER. THE BDE IS TO MOVE WITH ALL ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT AND BASIC LOAD AND WILL REJOIN AMERICAL DIVISION.

PAGE 2 RUMHMA 508

PART III FOR CG 3D MAR DIV

4. (S) BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO DEPLOY THE 3D BN, 21ST INF TO CHU LAI AS SOON AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN YOUR AREA WILL PERMIT.

GP-4

100415Z MAY 68


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**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



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ACTION

Clearwater

AECQVLOJNHVV VPC558ZVA 429ZCZCHA566  
 OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 021B 1310610  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 100515Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV  
 RUMINA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARINES  
 RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX  
 RUMFARF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
 RUMSEB/COMRIVRON ELEVEN  
 RUMHVA/NILO QUANG TRI  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HA RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 RUMHN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY  
 BT

TOR / 10  
 C 0903Z

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
1. NSAD CUA VIET RECEIVED APPROX 30 RDS UNK CAL. ARTY BETWEEN 0545H AND 0640H NEG PERS CAS. MINOR DAMAGE TO ONE LIVING HUT.
  2. OPENED RIVER TO LOGISTIC CRAFT AT 0700H. ALL LOGISTIC CRAFT TRANSITTED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

PAGE TWO RUMHN021B ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. A LARGE OPEN SANPAN APPARENTLY OVERLOADED WITH VIETNAMESE FROM VILLAGE COORD YD 317 682 SWAMPED IN CUA VIET RIVER IN VIC YD 312 682 AT 0740H. RIVER SECURITY CRAFT ASSISTED IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. IT HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED AS YET IF ANY PASSENGERS ARE MISSING. VNN COASTAL GROUP 11 PERSONNEL ARE ASSISTING IN DETERMINING NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ON CRAFT AT TIME OF CAPSIZING. INVESTIGATION IS BEING CONDUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH COASTAL GROUP 11 TO DETERMINE CAUSE OF CAPSIZING.

GP-4  
 BT

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2/3/COX CO  
 5

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Encl 72

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



*8*

**UNCLASSIFIED**

DRAFTER 3/H. [unclear]  
SEC 3 PHONE        DIV COC  
CWO       

IMMEDIATE 10 1325Z MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: CG 1ST ACD  
12TH MARINES  
INFO: CG III MAF  
CG PCV  
196TH LIB (-) CPE

*coe / Hunt  
fsec / [unclear]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPCON

CG PCV 080152Z MAY 68

1. 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCOM D BTRY, 3D BN, 82D ARTY ETC  
09/830 H MAY 68 AND PASSES OPCOM TO 12 TH MARINES 09/831 H  
MAY 68.

GP-4

CCN 0944

RELEASED BY W. Chapman

3 (12 copies) 5 and / CG 4/11

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TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

TYPE TRANSMISSION

TO

INFO

ELECTRICAL

AIR MAIL

COURIER

X

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION TO: IMMEDIATE

INFO PRIORITY

DTG

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

S/S

SJS

HIST

J1

J2

GIIB

J3

J4

J5

J6

CORDS

NAG

AFPO

NAVFORV

AG

OICC

AMEMB

PM

DCA SAM

SJA

CH

SOB

COC

SURG

COMB

TMA

DCPG

LNO

COMPT

TNG

MACMA

DOD SPEC REP

USAID

FWMAO

USARV

HC

IPFVINO

IG

IIPFVINO

MACSA

IIMAFINO

JUSPAO

5TH SF LNO

MACDC

7TH AF

MACOI

PROTOCOL

MACPD

DASCV

ARTY

X 1

X 4

FROM: ~~XXXXXXXX~~ CG PROV CORPS V PHE

TO: CG 101ST ABN DIV CEE (COURIER) 3

CG 1ST ACD GPE (COURIER) 2

INFO: CG III MAF DNG (COURIER) 5

CG 3D MAR DIV DGH (COURIER) 10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 01457 AVII-GCO

Subj: Temp Boundary Change (U)

1. (C) The boundary between 1st ACD and 101st Abn Div is temporarily changed as follows: From present boundary at YD560455, South along the NS GL 56 to 560390, East along the EW GL 39 to 570390 and present boundary.

2. (U) The above change is effective from 101200H May to 121800H May 68.

Acknowledge TOC 34.

GP-4.

TYPED NAME, TITLE, PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL  
JAMES W. REVELS  
MAJ, GS  
AVII-GCO/2961

RELEASE

SIGNATURE

Robert E. Baden

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

ROBERT E. BADEN, COL, GS  
ACoRS, G3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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COPY NO

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OO HUNSEM  
 DE DUMRVP 2443C 131144Z  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 101440Z MAY 68  
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC  
 TO HUNSEM/PCV TOC (ATTN G-3 OPS)  
 BT

UNCLASSIFIED

A. REF COMMAND MSG CG THIRD MARDIV, DTG 101355Z MAY 68  
 NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO INITIATE MAJOR OPERATION

A. FOR O 03121.5

B. MY 000155Z MAY 68 (OPORD 17-68)

1. IAW REF A 3D MARDIV (REIN) INTENDS TO CONDUCT A MAJOR UNIT  
 OPERATION AS PART OF CURRENT OPERATIONS IN LEATHERNECK  
 SQUARE - NE QUANG TRI AREA.

2. FOL INFO SUBMITTED:

A. AO DESIGNATION FOR 2D BDE (-) 1ST ACD: CONCORDIA SQUARE

B. BACKGROUND.

(1) ENEMY ACTIVITY SINCE 29 APR 68, REACHED A DEGREE OF  
 INTENSITY THAT REQUIRED THE APPLICATION OF ADDITIONAL FORCE  
 TO RESTORE THE SITUATION AND AREA TO FVMAF CONTROL AND  
 INFLUENCE IN LEATHERNECK SQUARE - NE QUANG TRI. INTELLIGENCE,  
 ENEMY ACTIVITY, AND COMBAT ACTION INDICATES THE PRESENCE OF  
 TWO OR MORE NVA REGIMENTS IN AND ADJACENT TO THE DESIGNATED  
 AREA OF OPERATION.

(2) 3D MARDIV (REIN) CONTINUES TO ATTACK IN LEATHERNECK SQUARE  
 AREA AND THAT PORTION OF THE AO NORTH OF THE CUA VIET RIVER  
 IN ORDER TO LOCATE, KILL, OR CAPTURE ENEMY PERSONNEL, LOCATE  
 AND DESTROY HIS FORTIFICATIONS AND TO CAPTURE AND/OR DESTROY  
 HIS SUPPLIES, MATERIALS AND MUNITIONS.

(3) 2D ARVN REGT REDUCES IT'S AO IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE ITS  
 FORCED AGAINST THE ENEMY.

C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: A BRIGADE(-) OF THE 1ST ACD CONDUCTS  
 ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED AO TO LOCATE, KILL, OR CAPTURE  
 ENEMY PERSONNEL, DESTROY HIS INSTALLATIONS, AND CAPTURE OR  
 DESTROY HIS SUPPLIES, MATERIAL AND MUNITIONS. AS A MATTER OF  
 PRIORITY, THE BRIGADE SECURES AND MAINTAINS OPEN THAT PART OF  
 ROUTE NRI IN ITS AO.

D. TASK ORGANIZATION:

2D BDE(-), 1ST ACD

1 BN 5TH CAV

2D BN 5TH CAV

COL MACKINNON

LTCOL JORDAN

LTCOL LEARY

NOTE: 2D BDE(-) 1ST ACD UNDER OPCON 3D MARDIV EFF. 071830H MAY 68

E. AREA OF OPERATIONS. THAT AREA OF LEATHERNECK SQUARE BOUNDED BY  
 YD 220630, YD 260625, YD 248753, AND YD 200758. AREA HAS BEEN  
 COORDINATED WITH 2D ARVN REGT AND 1ST ARVN DIV. (SEE ANNEX A  
 TO REF B).

F. D-DAY 8 MAY 68. H-HOUR 090001 MAY 68

G. ESTIMATED DURATION - 6 DAYS.

GP-4

BT

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



UNCLASSIFIED

SHOVE CUE

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.C.

DCPO

PO

ACTION

*Handwritten:* ahead in square  
map man

ANDMATE HERE I AM WITH MY ZDK

06

M

00 T87L

DE UUMSHKB 006 1291740

ZNY CCCCC

O 101730Z MAY 68

FM CO 2D BDE 1ST AIR CAV DIV DONG HA RVN

TO CG 3D MARINE DIV DONG HA RVN

INFO CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV LZ EVANS RVN

BT

~~C O E L E N T I A~~

SUBJECT: PERIODIC OPERATIONS REPORT 091800

TO 101800 MAY

UNIT LOCATIONS

UNIT

LZ NAME

COOR

2D BDE

DONG HA

1-5 CAV

C-1

A

YD 238678

B

YD 238678

C

YD 238661

D

YD 238678

2-5 CAV

DONG HA

A

YD 238695

B

YD 230708

C

YD 230708

D

YD 238695

BT


101730Z

*Handwritten:* 00P/12/3/20 00P/8

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Encl 76



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MOVE CCC  
 CP CHIEF L  
 G-3 W.O. P  
 G-2 W.O. VE  
 DCPD  
 APO H  
 ACTION Clearwater

OO RUMHVP  
 DE RUMHN 047B 1320037  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O P 102300Z MAY 68  
 FM CTF CLEARWATER  
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS VIET PHU BAI  
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMHVP/CO THIRD MARINES  
 RUMFKRF/CTF ONE ONE SEVEN  
 RUMSBB/CTF ONE ONE SIX  
 RUMFKRF/COMRIVRON ELEVEN  
 RUMHVH/NILO QUANG TRI  
 ZEN/CDR DONG HAS RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 RUMFN/CDR HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 BT

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CLEARWATER CUA VIET SITREP 110001H-110600H MAY (U)  
 1. RIVER SECURITY CRAFT AT 102105H OBSERVED SWIMMER CROSSING  
 CHANNEL FROM NORTH TO SOUTH AND EVADING DOWN TRIBUTARY STREAM  
 LEADING SOUTH IN VIC YD 293654. UNABLE TO TAKE SWIMMER UNDER  
 FIRE DUE PROX. OF FRIENDLY TROOPS. NAVY EOD TEAM DISPATCHED TO  
 AREA AT 110530H TO CONDUCT CATENARY SWEEP OF RIVER BOTTOM  
 BETWEEN YD 286656 YD 294656. WHEN DETERMINED AREA MINE  
 FREE WILL OPEN RIVER TO LOGISTIC TRAFFIC.

GP-4  
BT

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*Handwritten: Please return*  
3P/MVP/wlk  
11 May 1968  
*Handwritten: 206*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Visit by PCV Rep concerning Rice Denial operations.

1. Maj LONGACRE (USA) and Maj WITA (USMC) from PCV G-3 Plans Section visited this Headquarters today. The purpose of their visit was:

- a. To find out how we are progressing on rice denial operations.
- b. To inquire as to our future rice denial plans.

2. An open discussion relating to rice denial matters was held in the G-3 conference room with the following officers in attendance:

- a. Colonel LOPRETE - A/C of S, G-5
- b. LtCol PALATAS - Asst G-3 Plans
- c. Major ROVEGNO - Asst G-3 PsyOps O
- d. Major LONGACRE - Asst G-3 Plans O
- e. Major WITA - Asst G-3 Plans O
- f. Capt BRENNAN - Asst G-5

3. LtCol PALATAS provided background on current and planned rice denial operations in 3d MarDiv AO and attendees were shown a copy of CG 3d MarDiv letter establishing the Combined Rice Denial Coordination Committee for Quang Tri Province.


4. Colonel LOPRETE, as CG 3d MarDiv representative and Chairman of the Quang Tri Combined Rice Denial Coordination Committee expressed his desire to hold the first meeting of the committee on or about the 17th of May. A message would be sent by Colonel LOPRETE to all concerned. G-5 further made it known that more than 50 thrashers were procured for use in Quang Tri Province in assisting in the rice harvest.

5. Maj LONGACRE indicated that 3d MarDiv has progressed further than any other unit in PCV in this regard. He further revealed the currently proposed boundary changes would not change 3d MarDiv responsibilities for rice denial operations in Quang Tri Province; if boundary changes were made, 1st ACD would be required to have representation on 3d MarDiv rice denial committee.

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6. In spite of boundary changes, Phase IV operations would still be conducted in Base Area 101. The operations would be conducted by 1st ACD elements. However, in all probability, PCV will task 3d MarDiv to provide screening elements in the northern approaches to Base Area 101 for the duration of operations.

7. Maj ROVEGNO, 3d MarDiv PsyOps Officer indicated that his section is aware of the significance of PsyOps in rice denial and that all possible support will be provided.

  
M. V. PALATAS  
Lt Col USMC  
G-3 Plans O

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/ALM/mvp  
5420  
11 May 1968

From: Commanding General  
To: Colonel J. E. LOPRETE 016204/9906 USMC

Subj: Appointment as Chairman, Quang Tri Province Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee

Ref: (a) CG 3d MarDiv ltr to Distr List, ser: 3/MVP/wlk 5420  
OOJA13168 of 9 May 1968  
(b) CG 3d MarDiv OPORD 13-68 (Rice Denial)  
(c) PCV OPORD 6-68 (Rice Denial)(S&C #2096-68)  
(d) Appendix 3 to Annex P of 3d MarDiv LOI 1-67

1. Reference (a) establishes the Quang Tri Province Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee. This committee, in its membership, has representation from local provincial government, ARVN units, advisory personnel and U.S. military forces.
2. You are hereby appointed as Chairman of the Quang Tri Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee and you will act as the direct representative of the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) in matters pertaining to rice denial operations.
3. The sub-committee will meet on your call, the first such meeting to be held in the Quang Tri area prior to 18 May 1968. Subsequent meetings will be held thereafter on a weekly basis. You are requested to submit a weekly report of progress to CG 3d MarDiv (Rein) as of 1600 each Friday, so long as rice denial operations are in effect.
4. Your attention is invited to references (b), (c) and (d) as they relate to rice denial operations in general.

Wm. L. HICK  
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)

Encl 79

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



**UNCLASSIFIED**

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	
DCPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>
DRAFTER	3/PDE/bwh
SEC G-3 PHONE	3D MARDIV COC
CWO	<i>[Signature]</i>

IMMEDIATE 110823 ZMAY68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: TF ROBBIE  
3D TKN  
INFO: 2D BDE 1ST ACD

OPCON

1. FOR TF ROBBIE

A. CHOP 1 PLT TKS (5-48) TO 3D MARDIV EFF 110800H MAY68.

2. FOR 3D TKN

A. ASSUME OPCON 1 PLT TKS (5-48) SAME DTG.

B. ASSIGN PLT TKS D/S 2D BDE 1ST ACD SAME DTG.

GP=4

CCN 1053

RELEASED BY *[Signature]*

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11150 H

file in  
Concordia Square  
H

## Memorandum for the Record

Check into the difficulty of getting Route One repaired north of Dong Ha bridge in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade. Cui Cao AO reveals that while Lt Colonel Davis had been informed to have the repair party at the north end of Dong Ha bridge at 110900H to pick up ARVN security in fact remained on the south side of the bridge.

Lt Colonel Davis had been authorized direct liaison with 11<sup>th</sup> Eng Bn to coordinate the sweep team which 11<sup>th</sup> Eng Bn was providing. Maj Tharpe 11<sup>th</sup> Eng. S-3 says no time was set up for the sweep team in his conversation with Lt Colonel Davis yesterday. The sweep team had been standing by at 11<sup>th</sup> Eng ready to go since 0730.

Sea Bear, sweep team and Arvon security were linked up and moving about one mile north of Dong Ha at approximately 1045H.


Respy  
J. J. Donnelly  
Encl 81

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



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SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCFO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

DRAMTER 3/FDC/ist  
SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV  
CWO *[Signature]*

IMMEDIATE 111305Z MAY 68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV  
TO: 3D MARINES

//CONFIDENTIAL//

ROTATION ARMD AMPH PITS

A. CG III MAF 101596Z MAY 68

1. REF A YOURS FOR ACTION.

2. INFO THIS HQ EFF DTG PASS/ASSUME OPCON SUBJ PITS.

GP-4

CCN 1491


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SHOVE COE  
 GP CHIEF *[initials]*  
 G-3 W.O. *[initials]*  
 G-2 W.O. *[initials]*  
 DCPD *[initials]*  
 PO *[initials]*  
 ACTION *[initials]*

09

00 T87L  
 DE UUMSHKB 0081332000  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 111940Z MAY 68  
 FM CG 2D BDE 1ST AIR CAV DIV DONG HA RVN  
 TO CG 3D MARDIV DONG HA RVN  
 INFO CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV LZ EVANS RVN  
 BT  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L PAT TWP OF TWO PRIS  
 SUBJECT: PERIODIC OPERATIONS REPORT 111800-121800 MAY  
 UNIT LOCATIONS

UNIT	LZ NAME	COORD
2D BDE	DONG HA	
1-5 CAV	C-1	
A		YD237673
B		YD 237673
C		CYD225662
D		YD237673
2-5 CAV	C-1	
A		YD245686
B		YD249698
C		YD249698
D		YD245686
BT		

*TOP/122345Z/1st AIR CAV*

G-3

a-1/a-2/coe/co

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17

19

48 Encl 83

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

15:RHH:wba  
12 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

From: Division Engineer

Subj: Quang Tri Development; progress for period 4 May -  
10 May 1968

1. The following was accomplished during the report period:

a. The following Marine and Naval Construction Forces were engaged on projects for the 3d Marine Division during the report period:

(1) 3d Engineer Battalion. Operation of Water Point, construction of HqBn Officer's shower, HqBn Officer's Mess Pot Shack, enlargement of ADC's shower to accomodate a washer and dryer, construction of 26th Marines regimental COC Bunker, construction of 1stBn, 13th Marines FDC Bunker, construction of 3dBn, 26th Marines COC, and construction of two observation towers for Base Defense.

(2) MCB-5. Vertical construction of two 500 man messhalls.

(3) MCB-10/11. Vertical and horizontal construction of all cantonments including 3d Medical Battalion.

b. 1st and 2d increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

(1) Horizontal - Maintenance continues on all existing access and interior cantonment roads. New construction limited to 3d Med Bn interior roads. Progress slowed during this report period due to relief of MCB-10 by MCB-11. MCB-11 estimate becoming fully operational by 15 May 1968.

(2) Vertical

(a) HqBn Messhall - complete

(b) 3d MTBn Messhall - Roof trusses fabricated framing precut, and concrete slab 30% complete. Completion of concrete work and framing planned for next week.

(c) Water Point - Completed. Average of 65,000 gallons of potable and 19,000 gallons of non-potable water being dispensed per day.

*Encl 84*



(d) 3d Medical Facility - Due to change over of resident NMCB's, the status of construction within the 3d Medical Facility remains essentially the same as last report.

(e) Post Office - No change from last report.

(f) Chapel - No change from last report.

(g) HqBn Officers Shower, O'Club Pot Shack, and ADC Shower Extension - Structurally complete, work continuing on drainage system.

(h) 26th Marines COC - Complete.

(i) 1stBn, 13th Marines FDC - Structurally complete, work continuing on internal wiring and backfill.

(j) 3dBn, 26th Marines COC - Site preparation underway. Erection of bunker during next report period.

(k) Base Defense Observation Towers - South tower complete, work continuing on northern site.

(l) Cantonments - The status of SEA Hut construction remains the same as last report.

c. The following 3d increment of construction is imminent:

(1) 170 Strongbacks for Tents - 3d NCB has been tasked, job order to resident NMCB pending.

(2) 35 Burn-out heads - MCB-11 has been tasked and construction will commence upon arrival of MCB-11 work forces.

(3) 10 Standard Showers - 3d NCB has been tasked, job order to resident NMCB pending.

(4) HqBn Interim Power Distribution System - 3d NCB has been tasked, job order to resident NMCB pending.

Very respectfully,

*R. C. MC CUTCHAN*  
R. C. MC CUTCHAN

*GT Folder  
SS office*

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
FPO San Francisco 96602

38/RMJ/plw  
12 May 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Subj: Quang Tri Development; progress for period  
5 - 11 May 1968

1. The following was accomplished during the report period:

a. 1st and 2d increment construction continues with the following work accomplished:

(1) Horizontal - Maintenance continues on all existing access and interior cantonment roads. New construction limited to 3d MedBn interior roads. Progress slowed during this report period due to relief of MCB-10 by MCB-11. Estimate that MCB-11 will be fully operational by 15 May 68.

(2) Vertical:

(a) HqBn Messhall - Completed and in operation.

(b) 3d MTBn Messhall - Roof trusses fabricated, framing precut and the concrete slab is 30% complete. Completion of concrete work and framing is planned for next week.

(c) Water Point - Completed. Average of 65,000 gallons of potable and 19,000 gallons of non-potable water are being dispensed daily.

(d) 3d MedBn Facility - No change from last week due to changeover of Mobile Construction Battalions.

(e) Post Office and Chapel - No change from last report.

(f) HqBn Officers' Shower, O'Club Pot Shack, ADC Shower Extension - All structurally complete. Work continues on the drainage system.

(g) 26th Marines COC - Completed.

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(g) ~~26th Marines COC - Completed.~~

(h) 1stBn 13th MAR FDC - Structurally Complete.  
Work continuing on internal wiring and backfill.

(i) 3DBn 26th MAR COC - Site preparation underway; erection of bunker during next report period.

(j) Cantonments - Status of SEAHUTS remains same.

b. 3d increment construction. Job orders to MCB-11 are still pending on the 170 strongbacks for tents, 35 burnout heads, 10 standard showers and for the HqBn Interim Power Distribution System.

## 2. Base Defense:

a. The selected graves in the SE portion of the QTCB perimeter have been removed. Work on defensive fortifications continues with one observation tower completed and the other (northern site) planned for completion this week. Additionally, 16 metal, fifty foot towers are awaiting transportation from Danang to be placed around the perimeter.

b. Registration fires in conjunction with 26th Marines are being fired this week for the overall coordinated defense of QTCB and Operation Rice.

c. During the past week, several corn fields on the eastern edge of the perimeter near SEABRES and MAG-39 were removed after prior coordination between G-5 and Province Chief. Local people were allowed several days to harvest the fields before engineer equipment came in to clear fields of fire. New perimeter wire is being placed there and new bunkers are being built.

d. A new garbage dump is being built at the southern edge of QTCB. A road has already been built into the site. As soon as the wire is extended beyond the site, the dump will be opened, thus restricting local populace from uncontrolled access to the residue.

e. New Units - The 15th Collecting and Clearing Company, U. S. Army, in support of the 1st AC Div(M), has been sited within QTCB.

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3. Strength figures on personnel in QTCB for 11 May are:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
*USMC	<u>389</u>	<u>4415</u>
*USN	52	866
USA	99	805
USAF	<u>15</u>	<u>108</u>
Total	<u>555</u>	<u>6194</u>

Grand Total = 6749


\* Total 3d MarDiv strength (Marine Corps and Navy) is 225 officers and 3122 enlisted.

Very Respectfully,

W. H. CUENIN  
Chief of Staff

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FLASH

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UP ON	<i>P</i>
0-3 W.O.	
0-3 W.O.	<i>cc</i>
DOPO	
APO	<i>A</i>
ACTION	<i>NAD/SALINE</i>

U&OVV VPC994VVZVA 9200MA 933

\*\*\*\*\*2Z RUMHVP

DE RUMHMB 058 1330940

ZNY SSSSS

Z O 120937Z MAY 68

FM CG PROV CORPS V PHB

TO CG 1ST ACD CPE

RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH

INFO ZENI/CG III MAF DNG

RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL

ZENI/CO 196TH LIB CPE

BT

S F ~~SECRET~~ 01486 AVII-GCO

SUBJ: UNIT DEPLOYMENT (U)

REF: A. PCV MSG DTG 100415Z MAY 68 (S)

B. III MAF MSG DTG 110612Z MAAY 68 (S)

THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS. PART I FOR CG 1ST ACD.

1. NS) DEPLOY THE 196TH LIB (-) TO LZ BALDY TO CLOSE ON 13 MAY 68, WITH ALL COMBAT EQUIP MENT AND ARTY SUPPORT.

2. (C) PASS OPCON TO CG AMERICAL DIV UPON ARRIVAL LZ BALDY. PART II FOR CG 3 D MAR DIV.

3. (S) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY 3/21ST INF TO LZ BALDY O 48 HOUR NOTICE. UNIT TO DEPLOY WITH ALL ORGANIC EQUIPMENT AND ARTY SUPPORT. PASS OPCON TO CG AMERICAL DIV ON ORDER.

ACKNOWLEDGE TOC 34.

GP-4.

BT

*PCR/12*  
*12/12/68*

*3*

*2/COC/4*

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

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*12*

*09*

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DE UUMSHKB 008 1332000

ZNY CCCCC

O 121940Z MAY 68

FM CO 2, ND BDE 1ST AIR CAV DIV DONG HA RVN

TO CG 3D MARDIV DONG HA RVN

INFO CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV LZ EVANS RVN

BT

SUBJECT ; PERIODIC OPERATIONS REPORT 111800 TO 121800 MAY

1. (C) OPERATIONS SUMMARY: THE BLACKHORSE BDE CONT OPERATIONS

CONCORDIA SQUARE WITH 2 BNS, 1-5 &amp; 2-5 CAVS

A. 1-5 CAV : A,B,D1-5 CONT OPERATIONS IN YESTERDAYS

CONTACT AREA DIRECTING IN ARTY, ARA, GUNSHIPS ND A/A. ARA EN-  
GAGED AN ENEMY FORCE VIC YD245670 RESULTING IN 14 NVA KIA. A1-9  
CAV IN SUPPORT OF 1-5 CAV ENGAGED AREA RESULTING IN 1 NVA KIA,  
1 AK-50 DESTROYED, SPOTTED 6 NVA KBA. A SWEEP OF THE AREA RE-  
SULTED IN FINDING 26 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47, 1 AK-50, 1 HG, 1B-40 RD,

9-3

G-2 COO/CA SGC

PAGE TWO UUMSHKB 008 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

300 RDS SA AMMO, 2 HGS. ALSO FD THE 2 MIAS FROM YESTEDAY  
(KIAS). WHILE MAKING A CS RUN, AN OH-13 HELICOPTER FROM BDE  
SCOUTS WAS SHOT DOWN VIC YD243668 RESULTING IN 2 KIA. C1-5  
COND SCTY OF HWY 1. TODAYS LOSSES: FRDLY: 4KIA (2WERE  
MIA); EN 47 NVA KIA, 4 SA, 2 C/S WPNS, 300 RDS SA AMMO, 2  
HGS.

B. 2-5 CAV: A&D 2-5 MADE CONTACT WITH ESTIMATED NVA  
COMPANY 200M FROM FOB, RESULTING IN 2 US WIA (EVAC), ENGAGED  
WITH SA, ARTY, ARA AND ORGANICS. BOTH COMPNIES CONDUCTED A  
SWEEP OF THE AREA VIC YD245685 RESULTING IN 8 NVA KIA, 3 PWS,  
5 AK-47S, 3 SKS AND 1 82MM MORTAR BY D2/5. B2-5 EST AMBUSH  
VIC YD 247705 RESULTING IN 1 NVA KIA, COND S&C OPNS TO THE NE  
ESTABLISHING HEAVY CONTACT WITH UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE VIC  
YD248742. C2-5 EST AMBUSH VIC YD 235706 RESULTING IN 2 NVA KIA,  
1 AK-47. 1 SKS. AT 1030H MOVED TO THE NE TO REINFORCE B2-5, ARTY AND  
RA

WERE CALLED INTO THE N FIRM BODY COUNT AVAILIABLE AT THIS  
TIME. FRDLY CASUALTIES WERE 2KIA, 37 WIA (EVAC), 1 MIA FROM  
B2-5 AND 8 WIA (EVAC), FROM C2-5. TODAYS LOSSES: 2 KIA  
47 WIA, 1 MIA. EN 21 NVA KIAN9 PW, 25SA, & 1C&S WPN.

PAGE THREE UUMSHKB 008

2 (C) TODAYS LOSSES. FRDLY: 6 KIA, 47 WIA, 1 MIA. EN: 68 NVA  
KIA, 0 PWS, 29SA, 3 C/S WPNS, 300 RDS SA AMMO, 2 HGS

(C) PLANS SUMMARY; THE 2D BDE CONT OPNS WITH W XNS, 1-5 CAV,  
2-5 CAV. BOTH BNS WILL COND OPNS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AOS  
AM 1-5 CAV: A&D 1-5 COND S&C OPNS TO THE S. B1-5 CON A SERCH  
OF THECONTACT AREA. C1-5 CONT SECTY HWY 1

B. 2-5 CAV A,B,C2-5 WILL CONDUCT LOCAL PATROLS, AND NIGHT AMBUSHES  
C2-5 WILL COND LOCAL PATROLS. ARTY ANS AS WILL BE DIRECTED INTO  
THE CONACT AREA

4. (C) 2D BDE TOTALS: FRDLY: 24 KIA, 116 WIA, 1 MIA. EN: 261  
NVA KIA, 13PWS, 15 DET, 91 SA WPNS, 14 C/S WPNS, 4 C/S  
RDS, 460 RDS SA AMMO, 11 HGS

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12

19

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13 May 1968

MEMORANDUM for the G-5

Subj: Rice Denial Operations

1. In order to provide you with a more comprehensive background on 3d MarDiv Rice Denial operations, I am enclosing the following:

- a. Copy of 3d MarDiv OPORD 13-68, w/action brief.
- b. Copy of 9th Mar ltr containing request by U.S. Advisor, Cam Lo sub-sector for a security force to provide protection for the local populace.
- c. Copy of Brief of PCV OPLAN 6-68.
- d. Copy of CG ltr to Col LOPRETE regarding designation as Chairman, Quang Tri Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee.
- e. Memo for the record regarding 11 May meeting at 3d MarDiv.
- f. Copy of Quang Tri Sector - April - May Harvest Plan, w/enclosures of materiel needs and transportation rqr.
- g. Other info considered pertinent will be provided as it becomes available.

2. This office will provide all possible assistance within operational capabilities to support rice denial operations.

Very respectfully,

M. V. PALATAS  
LtCol USMC

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