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3RD MARDIV MESSAGES, ETC PART 2 JUNE 1968

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#92 Msg 130844Z CG PCV Phu Bai Subj: Phase Down of Khe Sanh Combat Base
 #93 Msg 130904Z CG PCV Phu Bai Subj: Security for Dredging Operations on the Cua Viet River
 #94 Msg 130945Z CG PCV Phu Bai Subj: Temporary Boundary Change
 #95 Msg 131520Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Realignment of Forces
 #96 Msg 140115Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Construction of Artillery Support Bases
 #97 Msg 140516Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: OPCON
 #98 Msg 141530Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Manning Cua Viet Observation Towers
 #99 Msg 150046Z BLT 2/4 Subj: Deadline Combat Essential Equipment
 #100 Msg 150257Z CTG 76.5 Subj: ARG Bravo Readiness SITREP #18
 #101 Msg 150740Z Task Force Hotel Subj: 175mm Guns
 #102 Msg 151330Z Task Force Hotel Subj: Evacuation & Destruction of Khe Sanh Base & Subsequent Operations
 #103 Msg 151426Z III MAF DaNang Subj: BLT Rotation
 #104 Msg 151510Z Task Force Hotel Subj: Planning Directive for Multi-Regiment Operations in Lancaster II Area of Operations
 #105 Msg 160148Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Personnel & Equipment, Provisional 155mm Howitzer (Towed) Artillery Battery
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 #109 Msg 170555Z CG PCV Phu Bai Subj: Extension of SICR
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 #119 Msg 170829Z III MAF DaNang Subj: LVTP-5 Augmentation for 3rd AMTRAC Bn
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 #124 Msg 201034Z 3rd Mar Div Subj: Security for Dredging Operations
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#176 Msg 300645Z 3rd Mar Div COC Subj: Arc Light

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
#179 Msg 301800Z CG PCV FWD Dong Ha Subj: Arc Light Operation Thor

#180 Doc June 68 Air Cavalry Div. Subj: SITREPS, INTSUMS, After Action Reports, Etc
Filed Sep

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

DRAFTER 3/JAD/zld
SEC G-3 PHONE DIV COC
CWO 78

IMMEDIATE

171146

ZJUN68

FROM: CG 3D MARDIV
TO: 3D MARDIV

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OPCON MESSAGES

1. IN ORDER TO KEEP MESSAGE TRAFFIC TO A MINIMUM ALL MES-
SAGES CONCERNING CHANGE OF OPCON OF UNITS BETWEEN REGIMENTS
AND TASK FORCES WILL BE ~~SENT~~ ^{PUBLISHED} BY THIS HQ.
2. INTRA-REGIMENT CHANGES OF OPCON WILL BE REPORTED BY
VOICE COMMUNICATIONS TO THIS HQ.

GP-4

CCN

1635

REL BY

Whapman

G-3 (12 copies)

Stand 48/

MOVE COC
GP CHIEF
C-3 W.O.
G-2 W.O.
DCPO
ACTION
Reports

171146 Z Jun 68

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Encl III

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COMM CNTR

DRAFTER 3/11/68

THIRD MARDIV
SEC G-3 PHONE DIV COC

CWO

JUN 19 AM

IMMEDIATE 180140 Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV
THIRD MARINES
INFO: CG III MAF
CG PCV
THIRD MARDIV

OPCON

1. EFFECTIVE 171540H JUN68, CG THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON OF A/1/8 FROM 3D MARINES AND PASSES A/1/8 TO OPCON CG 1ST ACD SAME DTG.
2. EFFECTIVE 171530H JUN68, CG THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON OF DTRP/1/9TH CAV FROM CG 1ST ACD AND PASSES OPCON DTRP/1/9TH CAV TO 3D MARINES SAME DTG.
3. FOR CG 1ST ACD:

REQUEST THIS HQ BE INFORMED OF FUTURE UNIT ROTATIONS TO/FROM 3D MARINES PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

GP-4

CCN

1672

RELEASED BY

W. Chapman

180140Z JUN68 A-G-3/12 cop)

1/4 Jmz

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
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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



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WAVE COG	
CG CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
COC O.	
G-2 M.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
POPO	
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

DRAFTER 3/JAD/11E

SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV COG

CWO *[Signature]*

IMMEDIATE 180142 Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG T F HOTEL
INFO: THIRD MARDIV

OPCON

1. EFFECTIVE 171600H JUNE 68, CG 3D MAR DIV ASSUMES OPCON OF 2/4 FROM CG TF HOTEL AND SAME DTG ASSIGNS 2/4 OPCON 9TH MARINES.

GP-4

CCN 1673

RELEASED BY *[Signature]*

180142 Z JUN 68 A-G-3

1/4 JWG

18

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JUN

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

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OP LIEF
 G-COC
 DCPD
 APC
 ACTION

Scotland II*Operation Charles*

KKE
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 180640Z JUN 68
 FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV
 INFO CO FIRST MARINES
 BT

A. 3D MARDIV OPNPLAN 22-68

1. REF A REQUIRES THAT ALL UNSERVICEABLE GRADE 3 AMMO BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO EVACUATION OF KSB. THERE IS AN ESTIMATED 120 TONS OF UNSERVICEABLE GRADE 3 BURIED IN AN AREA SOUTH OF AIRSTRIP AT APPROXIMATELY THE 1400° MARK ON RUNWAY FROM EASTERN APPROACH. CONSIDER IT UNSAFE AND IMPRACTICAL TO ATTEMPT TO REMOVE. WHEN BLOWN, ESTIMATE A CRATER 130 FT X 300 FT X 50 FT DEEP TO RESULT IN ADDITION TO DESTRUCTION OF THAT PORTION OF RUNWAY CONTIGUOUS TO BLAST SITE.

2. UNORDIR INTEND TO MAKE THIS FOD SHOT THE FINAL ACT IN RETROGRADE/DESTRUCTION OF KSB.

GP-4

BT

180640Z JUN 68

G-3 (12 copies)

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3rd MA 2912 Buck Tag # 436468

3D MARINE DIVISION FMF (-) (REIN)



CRITIQUE SCOTLAND II CAMPAIGN (SOUTH OF KHE SANH) 2-19 JUNE 1968

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PREFACE

In the combat environment of rapidly changing situations, and of day-to-day operations that capture interest and attention to the exclusion of the "old news" of yesterday's actions, there is a tendency to forget, ignore or fail to examine experience recently gained. Thus, it cannot be profitably applied to future undertakings.

Task Force Hotel, commanded by Brigadier General C.W. HOFFMAN, USMC, was charged with developing plans for an operation in Scotland II area of operations to the south of Khe Sanh Base, an area which had not been previously penetrated by major combat units. The size and duration of the operation were deliberately flexible. Although objectives were prescribed, the execution and scheme of maneuver were to be dependent upon the enemy's reactions. To gain the capability of projecting combat units into distant objectives required assaults and subsequent supply support totally dependent on helicopters. It was also necessary for artillery fire support bases to be selected, seized, developed and utilized to extend the umbrella of artillery fire in conjunction with extensive use of fixed wing air support.

To insure that the experience of this unique operation (which at times involved two regiments -- seven infantry battalions -- 2½ 105mm plus one 155mm batteries lifted to hill top fire bases) was not lost, I requested that a critique of this campaign be held. General HOFFMAN, his staff, the commanders and their staffs from the 1st and 4th Marines, and Brigadier General HILL, Assistant Wing Commander, 1st MAW, all contributed to a most worthwhile presentation and exchange of information. The critique was held at LZ Stud on 25 June, within six days of the termination of the operation. It is noteworthy that during the critique LZ Stud received 48 rounds of incoming rockets -- which while imparting only minor damage to the logistic area did serve as an unexpected motivating factor. The results of the critique are consolidated here in booklet form so that the lessons learned will not be limited to those present at the critique. They will be incorporated into planning and execution of future operations.

R. G. Davis
R. G. DAVIS

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SCOPE OF OPERATION (CG TASK FORCE HOTEL)

The enemy's pattern of activity during the month of May focused repeatedly on the area south of Route 9, particularly that segment between Bong Kho and Ku Pac. The pattern took shape from a variety of intelligence inputs and from a series of spirited engagements fought between 1st Marines' elements and determined enemy units that came from the south toward Route 9. The enemy paid dearly for these exploratory efforts, losing several hundred soldiers within sight of Route 9. These bitter actions also produced solid proof that the enemy had introduced at least one new regiment in the Khe Sanh area -- the 102d Regiment of the 308th Division. This fresh unit added to the old resident 304th Division brought enemy infantry strength to at least 12 battalions. Further, it looked as if the full dozen might be deployed south of Route 9.

Obviously the enemy commander intended to choke off Route 9, isolate Khe Sanh, again make the base a sandbag island in a hostile sea. Just as surely, we had to upset the enemy's calculations, throw him off balance, chop up his forces.

To this end, Task Force Hotel directed the 1st Marines to prepare a concept for a multi-battalion action designed to get behind the enemy and destroy him. The 1st Marines concept called for helicopter assaults by two battalions about 6,000 meters south of Route 9. The 1st Marines named the Landing Zones Robin and Loon, these being dominant terrain from which assault battalions could move northward against a block provided by a third participating battalion. We later dubbed this phase of the action "Robin North".

Even as this concept took shape, CG 3d Marine Division focused additional attention on a new enemy road leading from Laos across the far southern extremity of the Scotland II area of operations. This incomplete road deserved exploration and inspection to determine its exact trace, capacity and use. Such a search promised to find defense forces, construction troops and valuable caches. Task Force Hotel directed the 4th Marines to develop a concept for this penetration of the deep south, a phase subsequently called Robin South. Everyone recognized that Robin South would require establishment of advanced fire bases from which to project artillery support of our helo-borne forces. Robin and Loon seemed logical sites for such fire bases.

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The 4th Marines established 15 objectives in the Robin South area. These provided suitable alternative targets for battalion assaults with final choices depending on later intelligence and on enemy reactions to our incursion.

Forces available to Task Force Hotel included seven and one-half infantry battalions supported by 6 105mm howitzer batteries, 2 155mm howitzer batteries, an 8 inch howitzer platoon and a 175mm gun platoon.

The Task Force also enjoyed a high priority on helicopter and fixed wing assets.

Task Force Hotel allocated a preponderance of resources to the 1st Marines for the Robin North action and to the 4th Marines for the Robin South action.

Among the many challenges we faced in a campaign of this magnitude, one loomed much larger than the others. I refer to the challenge of sustaining a widely dispersed task force in an active combat environment exclusively by helicopters. If we could meet this challenge, we believed we could take the others in stride. For we knew at the outset, and we confirmed during the action, that a Marine infantry battalion -- adequately supported -- can operate successfully anywhere in South Vietnam.

We launched Robin North on 2 June and concluded Robin South 17 days later. During the course of the action, our choice of Loon as a site for a fire support base proved unfortunate since enemy artillery from CoRoc quickly registered on it and chased us out. This development required us to select a new fire base, and Torch later proved a sound choice.

The Robin North and South actions, though far from being perfect in planning or execution, deserve to be judged as tactically, logistically and psychologically successful. This critique will indicate why we feel justified in this evaluation and will identify as many shortcomings and suggested corrective measures as possible. As usual, we find it much easier to identify the shortcomings of others rather than those of ourselves.

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I OPERATIONS

My comments will address the planning, the execution of Robin North, execution of Robin South, tactics/techniques used, air/ground coordination, artillery fire bases, problems encountered and some lessons learned.

A. Planning

The over-all concept of the multi-battalion operation south of KSB was based on two thoughts:

(1) That the objective area selected was occupied in strength, and that the E-W road was a major infiltration route.

(2) That by moving in heliborne attack into targets far south of KSB we would trap the enemy.

The plan developed by CG TF Hotel was two phased, with the 1st Marines conducting Robin North and the 4th Marines conducting Robin South. The concept visualized two infantry battalions helilifted into separate LZ's then pushing north into blocking positions established by another battalion. A fourth battalion was earmarked as reserve.

This concept was turned over to 1st Marines to work out the scheme of maneuver and plan for fire support.

After the 1st Marines seized the two LZ's and prior to their pushing north, the plan called for one company from the 4th Marines to helilift into each of the same LZ's, and develop them into fire bases for subsequent 4th Marines offensive operations. The initial concept for Robin South called for 3 battalions to be helilifted into LZ's near the enemy road. This concept was turned over to the 4th Marines to develop the scheme of maneuver and plan for fire support.

The schematic identifies the objective area, the 1st Marines zone of action, the firebases planned, and the 4th Marines zone of action. 1913

B. Robin North

After an extensive prep on LZ Robin (XD 911334) by artillery, CAS, TPQ's, and a nearby arclight, 1/1 landed at 021200H June 1968, unopposed. CO 1st Marines decided to land 2/4 on LZ Robin due to inability of aircraft to

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burn the wet elephant grass on LZ Loon. Elements of 2/3 were already in blocking positions in the vicinity of XD 874382. On D+1 after added prep, 2/4 helilifted into LZ Loon (XD 876334) but the lift was halted twice due to enemy fire. After dropping the first wave, helicopters received fire from the north. Later, troops in the LZ began receiving S/A fire. Heavy A/S and artillery were called in to neutralize the area. A warning of what was to come occurred at 1345H, when 7 rounds of unknown type artillery fire impacted in the LZ from a westerly origin. The following day, D+2, F/2/4 in LZ Loon, was attacked by an estimated company of NVA. The NVA left 34 KIA's on the field. B/1/1, moving from LZ Robin, secured obj #1 unopposed. On D+3, 5 arclights were dropped south of LZ's Loon and Robin. C/1/1, moving on obj #5, started a fight with an estimated platoon. They pulled back to use air and artillery, planning to assault it on D+4 after additional prep fires. C and D/1/4, still securing LZ Loon, protected engineer efforts developing the fire-base. C/1/4 received artillery fire from CoRoc on D+3 resulting in 9 KIA and 3 WIA (Evac). It appeared then that Loon's exposed slopes might be untenable. Subsequent action on Loon will be covered later. On D+4, 2/4 took obj #6 and 1/1 took obj #5 unopposed. On D+6, 2/4 was helilifted into obj #8 (XD 864361). 2/4 suffered 29 WIA (Evac) on this objective from artillery fire; they killed 7 NVA. On D+7, elements of 2/4 on objective #8 were attacked by an NVA battalion. Results of this action were 12 NVA/KIA, friendly casualties were 7 KIA and 41 WIA (Evac). On D+8, 2/4 continued searching the vicinity of obj #8 and on D+9 was helilifted into obj #10, landing unopposed after a prep. On 12 June, Phase I was concluded with 92 NVA/KIA and 3 POW's. Friendly casualties were 16 KIA and 130 WIA (Evac). 2/4 moved to KSB as 4th Marines reserve; 1/1 moved to hill positions to make 3/4 available to 4th Marines.

C. Robin South

D-Day for Robin South, 6 June, was D+4 of the basic operation. C and D/1/4 near LZ Loon received an attack from an NVA battalion. After the ground attack had subsided, the two companies received heavy artillery from CoRoc. In the afternoon it was decided the position was untenable, since engineer equipment could not freely move about and stocks of arty ammo would offer too lucrative a target. All personnel were withdrawn by 1900H. An Army bulldozer and backhoe were left in the zone as were eight bodies previously staged for evacuation. Heavy S/A fire was directed at helicopters lifting out

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the units, resulting in one CH-46 being shot down with 11 aboard. Overall results were 24 friendly KIA's and 37 WIA (Evac). Enemy losses were 154 NVA/KIA. The same day, D-Day (D+4), 3/9 was helilifted into an area southeast of obj #3 (XD 942292) one kilometer from Laos, killed 1 NVA and captured 5 road workers. On D+1 (D+5), 1/4 was helilifted into obj #2 (XD 905280) and received some light sniper fire. 3/9 searching towards obj #3, killed 2 NVA and captured 4, suffering 1 Marine KIA and 1 WIA (Evac). On D+1 (D+5), 1/4 was helilifted from LZ Stud into the vicinity of XD 911279, to develop a new firebase for support of the 4th Marines deeper moves south. The new firebase was designated Torch. On D+2 (D+6), 1/4 and 3/9 searched their respective AO's finding evidence of continued road work and many bunkers and fighting holes, evidently used by laborers and soldiers. On D+3 (D+7), C/1/12 was helilifted into LZ Torch from LZ Robin. On this date, 1/4 and 3/9 continued to search their areas. On D+4 (D+8), 3/9 captured 7 POW's and elements of 1/4 found a large cultivated field with potatoes and other crops. On D+5 (D+9), A/1/4 and C/1/12 at LZ Torch, (XD 911278), received a heavy ground attack from an estimated NVA company. The attack commenced at 0215H, supported by mortars. After receiving sporadic fire all day, the contact ended at 2130H. Results were 28 NVA/KIA, friendlies were 14 KIA and 113 WIA (Evac). Majority of casualties were caused by mortar fire striking the bald hill. After a heavy prep with 8 inch howitzers, plus TPQ's, 3/4 landed and commenced to search toward obj #4, going opcon to 4th Marines on liftoff. Arclights requested on this area were not received but a substantial CAS and TPQ prep was conducted. 3/4 searched the area and made contact with small units of NVA; subsequent contacts consisted of small arms fire fights. On D+6 (D+10), T/1/11 was helilifted from KSB to LZ Robin. 3/9, continuing to search their area, found a cache at XD 925304, consisting of 400 lbs clothing, rain gear, 20 pairs of jungle boots, 250 lbs rice, 150 lbs TNT, 1000 feet Det cord and assorted engineering tools. Near XD 928298 3/9 also found a large culvert and approximately 300 lbs of TNT. They used 250 lbs of it to blow the culvert and 50 lbs to blow a hole in the road. On D+7 (D+11), 3/4 killed 2 NVA; 3/9 captured 3 POW's while continuing a search in the OA. On D+8 (D+12), 2/4 went opcon to the 4th Marines by way of a heliborne attack into obj #10 (XD 847237), in the vicinity of the E-W road. They captured a Russian 1½ ton truck and a motor driven arc welder which were destroyed since it was not tactically sound for the unit to loiter as long as it was required for heavy helos to arrive. 3/9, at

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XD 904255, found 12 graves with 1 NVA in each. They also found, alongside the road, 500 bunkers, and 400 lbs of ammonium nitrate. A stone bridge at XD 897260 was blown with captured explosives. On D+9 (D+13), 3/4, in the vicinity of obj #14, after being helilifted from the Lang Hole area on 12 June, received a predawn attack by an estimated NVA battalion. At 1530H, 3/4 policed up the battlefield and counted 186 NVA/KIA, and 7 POW's. They lost 16 KIA, 1 MIA, and 58 WIA (Evac). 2/4, searching their area, found a multi-battalion harbor site, a 6 wheeled, 5 ton truck, containing heavy repair equipment and a two ton truck with a machine shop mounted on the back. They also killed 6 NVA with artillery fire and evacuated the vehicles.

On D+10 (D+14), 3/4, operating near XD 880267, found 21 NVA/KIA. 3/9 found a hospital site at XD 902252 consisting of two large bunkers with operating tables and considerable evidence of recent casualties. On D+11 (D+15), 3/9 (-) and C/1/4 returned to LZ Loon, recovered the bodies, the two pieces of Army equipment, located and searched the CH-46 wreckage, evacuating all bodies and equipment without friendly losses. On D+12 (D+16), 3/4 was attacked by an NVA force of battalion or larger. At 1330H, they searched the battlefield and found 130 NVA/KIA. Friendly losses were 11 KIA and 30 WIA (Evac). Total results for Robin South were: 604 NVA/KIA, 48 POW/detainees; friendly losses were: 77 KIA, 286 WIA (Evac) and 20 WIA NE. During Robin South, contact frequently occurred in the pre-dawn hours. Large quantities of equipment, clothing, and construction materials were captured. The enemy road had been developed extensively in certain sections. All installations and sites found were destroyed. Damage to the road included two bridges blown (at XD 916292 and XD 899280), four culverts blown (at XD 928297, XD 902234, XD 901232, and XD 899280), cratering by shaped charges at six locations (XD 880225, XD 927290, XD 907227, XD 908228, XD 909226, and XD 928296), 25 meters of rock slide (at XD 901236), one road crossing destroyed (at XD 872227), and craters in the road caused by a long string of snakeye bombs.

Tactics/Techniques Employed

The basic tactics were to employ the vertical envelopment of Marine Corps doctrine and for all battalions to maintain flexibility. The mission of finding, fixing, and killing the enemy stressed the use of supporting arms as the best method of breaking a

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tenacious enemy prior to assault. During the operation a substantial reconnaissance effort was exerted. UH1E gunships from VMO-6 provided air recon capability. Army helos of A Troop, 1st of the 9th, 1st AirCavDiv, aided in Robin North. They reported each morning to TFH G-2 and received a brief. After completing morning missions, they returned for debrief, and then briefed on their afternoon mission returning around 1700 to again be debriefed. The ground reconnaissance capability was provided by 3d Force Recon, who proved invaluable. On one occasion, a standard four man team was inserted deep in the Scotland II AO, near the Laotian border, to determine enemy presence and LZ availability of obj #10. They accomplished their mission by not only locating one LZ but also finding a second LZ offering defilade from CoRoc. A substantial psyops effort was mounted before and during the operation using both loudspeakers and leaflet drops. Good coverage was reported by troops in the field, but we did not receive the immediate results we had anticipated, since only two Hoi Chanh's were taken. A residual impact no doubt continues. During the helilifts, aircraft laid smoke to screen enemy observation.

The operation reaffirmed that Marine Corps tactics are sound and the air/ground team has the mobility to exploit the enemy's slowness to react.

Air and Ground Coordination

Helicopter operations require planning down to the most minute detail. Therefore, prior to helilifts, we conducted briefs with face to face planning by the squadron and bn. leaders involved. Where possible the VMO-6 recon pilots also participated, and on one occasion it was possible for the keyhole recon patrol leader, extracted a few hours earlier from the objective area, to participate. This joint planning by pilots and troop commanders assures safety, speed, and unity of effort.

Selection of Fire Support Bases

In selecting a fire support base to be supported by helicopters, many aspects are governed by the capabilities of the choppers. The site must accommodate large transport helos, be suitable for the emplacement of artillery pieces, and accept large quantities of Class V. If possible, it should be in defilade from known or suspected enemy artillery positions. In selecting our two initial

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firebases, they met most criteria with the exception of LZ Loon which offered slopes to enemy artillery positions at CoRoc. (vic WD 741317).

Problems Encountered/Lessons Learned

1. One of the first problems encountered was moving troops into the objective area, while still conducting Drumfire II, (a massive artillery raid on CoRoc by 175mm in LZ Hawk). This was solved by scheduling choppers around the gun target line. It was noted that the concussion from 175mm guns blew the windows out of CH-46s landing near the battery.

2. Provide adequate forces for mass and shock.
Solution: man the hill positions around Khe Sanh with scaled down forces and maintain active recon measures.

3. Avoid sending large numbers of helos to units not participating in the operation. Solution: stockpile sufficient supplies to sustain the hill positions during the operation, so a minimum amount of resupply would be required.

4. The scheduling and receipt of arclights proved disappointing. It had been planned to drop three strings of arclights in an east to west axis, each supporting successive moves southward. 13 were requested by CG 3d MarDiv and 43 were requested by CG TF Hotel. Notwithstanding active interest by CG PCV, only 16 were received. Lesson learned: priorities in SE Asia may preempt scheduled arclights; therefore the success of an operation should never depend on delivery of arclights. When scheduled, the schedule is inflexible.

5. There was tremendous reliance on aerial observers for delivery of both artillery fires and air strikes. When struggling through elephant grass to get one's bearings, an A.O. is invaluable. When good vantage points are gained however, maximum use should be made of artillery FO's and forward air controllers. This releases A.O.'s for counterbattery and V. R. work, maintains the skills of the ground units in adjusting and controlling their own fires and permits the Commander to dictate the rate and type of firepower brought to bear.

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UNITS EMPLOYED

PHASE I (ROBIN NORTH)

INFANTRY	ARTILLERY	AIR
1st Marines	T/1/11*	1st Marine Aircraft Wing (CAS).
1/1	I/3/12	Helo support from VM0-6,
2/4	B/1/12	MAG-36, and MAG-39 and
2/3	A/1/11	hooks/cranes of 1st AirCavDiv.
1/3 (-)	W/1/11	From D-1 until D+4, an air
	G/3/12	recon capability was provided
	Plt 1st 8"	by A Troop, 1st of the 9th,
	How Btry	1st AirCavDiv. Fixed wing
	B/2/94	strikes by 1st MAW and some
	(USA)	USAF and USN a/c.
	L/4/12	
		* 6 Towed 155mm How

PHASE II (ROBIN SOUTH)

4th Marines	A/1/12	Same as above
1/4	C/1/12	
3/4	T/1/11*	
1/3 (-)	Plt F/2/12	
3/9	Plt 1st 8"	
2/4	Plt A/1/94	
		* 6 Towed 155mm How

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COMMENTS BY 1ST MARINES (-)(REIN)

OPERATIONS

1. Planning. Following the receipt of a verbal warning order on 25 May 68 from CG, Task Force Hotel to plan an offensive operation in the area generally south of Route 9 within the Scotland II Area of Operations, 1st Marines prepared a concept of operations for a helicopter-borne assault with one battalion and a subsequent attack by this battalion towards a battalion blocking force positioned immediately south of Route 9. On 26 May, this concept was submitted to the Commanding General Task Force Hotel, approval received, and detailed planning commenced. Plans included not only the tactical scheme of maneuver but the redistribution of forces in defense of Khe Sanh Base to free the forces necessary to execute the assigned mission.

Late on 26 May, 1st Marines Frag Order 88-68 was issued setting forth the requirements of movement of forces throughout the Combat Bases and Combat Outposts surrounding Khe Sanh Base to free one battalion for the operation. The blocking battalion was assigned the mission to establish a mobile block in addition to continuing its normal assigned responsibility for the security of Route 9.

On 29 May, the operation was expanded by the Commanding General to a four battalion operation, two helicopter-borne battalions, one blocking battalion, and one reserve battalion. The reserve battalion remained under the control of Task Force Hotel to be committed as required. In response to this increase in forces, 1st Marines Frag Order 89-68 was issued on 29 May 68.

A change in the scheme of maneuver now called for two battalions to be helilifted on D-Day, one to LZ Robin and the second to follow into LZ Loon. Both would attack north towards the blocking force.

D-Day was ultimately delayed from 30 May to 2 June due to the insufficient preparation of the landing zones caused by extremely wet vegetation and the delay in receiving one of the maneuver battalions as a result of heavy commitment in another area of the 3d Division AO.

2. Tactics Employed. The tactics employed by the 1st Marines generally followed the basic doctrine of heli-

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copter assaults. However, terrain difference in the two battalion's zones of action required a slightly different method of attack. Initially, due to the inability to properly prepare LZ Loon, both battalions were landed in LZ Robin. On D plus one, prep of Loon was completed, and as originally planned, one battalion conducted a helicopterborne assault into LZ Loon. As has been pointed out by the G-3 of Task Force Hotel, Loon soon became the object of attention by the gunners of CoRoc and its value was questionable. As a tactical landing zone to be seized and abandoned as the attack progressed, however, it presented no difficulties.

The assault into each of these landing zones was planned to be preceded by three days of extensive air and artillery prep. The delay in D-Day extended this period to five days and included both extensive use of artillery and air, CAS, TPQ's and arclights. As also has been stressed, the arclight support was considerably less than requested with 1st Marines receiving five prior to D-Day, all in the vicinity of LZ Robin. Intelligence targets and proposed objectives were also included in the extensive five day prep fires of artillery and direct air support.

The maneuver of the two battalions was characterized by the absence of significant contact as well as employment of slightly different tactics for each. The battalion attacking from Robin advanced entirely overland as the terrain from the landing zone to the blocking force was one large ridge decreasing in elevation from Robin to Route 9.

The battalion at Loon, however, was forced to attack cross compartment and a series of tactical helilifts were utilized to move the unit to each successive objective.

3. Type of Units. Only infantry battalions reinforced with combat engineers, helicopter support teams, and scout sniper teams were employed in this operation. Of course, all the artillery assets of the Regiment and the Task Force were employed to their fullest extent as well as any available air. The Reconnaissance assets of Task Force Hotel were employed along the flanks of the objective area.

4. Air and Ground Coordination. The abundance of current and active targets in Scotland II area of operations has resulted in the Regimental and Battalion FSCC's, FAC's

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and forward observers gaining valuable experience in coordinated use of air and artillery. No difficulties were experienced during the operation. At one time although only two to three thousand meters separated the three battalions, air and artillery were coordinated to such an extent to allow full support of each during the same time.

5. Lessons Learned. Although 1st Marines had little contact with enemy forces during the operation, two important lessons were derived from the overall results.

a. The delay in the execution of the initial D-Day which occurred after the extensive prep had begun resulted in a total of five days prep. Five days of prep fires is excessive in that it obviously indicates intentions to the enemy force and allows him sufficient time to withdraw to safe areas. The concept of two or three days of heavy prep in a larger objective area is excellent particularly in an area such as Scotland II where heavy bunker complexes are prevalent. Once the area prep has commenced it must be continued to be of any value at all, but any excessively long delay in beginning the operation jeopardizes the opportunity to exploit the benefits of the fire support. D-Day, therefore, must be considered less flexible in an operation where heavy prep fires and air support are employed over a long period whereas helicopterborne operations utilizing short preps can be adjusted without consequence.

b. Although somewhat of an administrative burden, the policy of staging 106 Recoilless Rifles to be helilifted nightly into defensive positions is an extremely valuable asset. During this operation each battalion staged 106 Recoilless Rifles with crews at their rear CP's and had them delivered to the final positions prior to dark. As necessary these weapons were returned to the rear during the day to await the final night positions. In some cases they were retained at Battalion Command Posts to support the attacking companies. The value of this weapon in the field far exceeds the administrative burden resulting from daily helilifts. This fact was significantly illustrated when one battalion made extensive use of the "Bee Hive" capability of the 106 to assist in repelling a well coordinated NVA night attack.

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COMMENTS BY 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)

OPERATIONS

1. The concept for Robin South was a multi-battalion, 3 step operation utilizing fire support bases and heli-borne assault deep into enemy territory. The assigned missions were to locate and destroy enemy elements within the AO; to locate enemy supply caches and engineer equipment; and to interdict the enemy road within the AO.

Step I was the activity of 3/9 and 1/4 in the vicinity of LZ Torch and that portion of the road extending to the northwest.

Step II was considerably reduced as compared to the original concept and involved only 3/4 landing south of Lang Hole. It had been planned to make a quick strike towards the enemy supply cache area but when the battalion was landed approximately 1200 meters to the south a small contact developed and the push north into Lang Hole became an impossibility within the desired time frame.

2. Consequently, after 1½ days 3/4 was helilifted into objective 14 to trigger Step III. It is significant to note that this decision proved especially profitable as 3/4 killed nearly 350 enemy in this objective area in two major actions. 3/9 moved overland -- another departure from the original plan calling for helilift towards objective 15 and subsequently operated along the road, working in a southerly direction towards an advancing 2/4.

3. 2/4 was landed just southeast of objective 10 and moved along the axis of the road. Heavy brush and bamboo somewhat restricted designed movement and limited the battalion to the area adjacent to the road. On the 17th 2/4 did run company sized patrols 3,000 meters south of the road.

4. The statistics of the operation have been made a matter of record and are indicative of significant damage done to enemy forces. It is significant that the entire road within the AO was covered and that over 40 cuts were made by engineers and infantrymen, utilizing various methods including extensive use of enemy explosives.

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5. Once again it was evident that the low ground was the enemy operating area and it was in this type terrain that the majority of caches, equipment and prisoners were located.


6. It was also again obvious that continuous movement is necessary to confuse, disrupt, and eventually fix the enemy. The fact that he chose to task organize a force to attack 3/4 when it was already light in the early morning attests to his confusion and inability to predict what the Marines next maneuver might be.

7. A particular bright spot in the operation was the smooth execution of all assault landings. Detailed planning conferences with both the Battalion and Squadron Commanders present were held prior to each lift. The coordination of heavy artillery and fixed wing prep and choice of exact LZ's were discussed and V/R's were conducted. Detailed planning and adequate briefing of all participants were prime factors contributing to the success of these landings and consequently to the success of the entire operation.

8. The mobile fire support base system was highly effective in providing artillery support for all maneuver battalions. Although the Robin North portion of the operation could be supported from existing static artillery positions at Khe Sanh Base and LZ Hawk, the southernmost objective of Robin South was 20KM from these positions. The progressive establishment of fire support bases southward in the objective area at LZ's Robin and Torch extended the direct support artillery fan to cover the entire maneuver area in and beyond all objectives.

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II INTELLIGENCE

A. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

1. All available collection means were employed during the 2-18 June period and provided invaluable data to analyze the magnitude of enemy forces opposing friendly forces in the Scotland II AO.

2. The best example of correlating the various sources of information was the manner in which the 102nd Regiment and then the 88th Regiment of the 308th NVA Division were identified. The two Hoi Chanh's who surrendered to Marine units at Khe Sanh on 31 May and 1 June were the first indications of new forces being introduced into the Khe Sanh area. Previous comments on enemy contacts from friendly units suggested that these enemy units were either replacements or in fact new units because their conduct was marked by their shouting slogans and extreme aggressiveness. Subsequent police of the battlefield revealed substantiating documents and information to confirm the presence of new enemy forces. Of significant importance was the introduction of luminous unit identification tags for night movement. Two different patterns of tags were found and confirmed the presence of two of the three infantry regiments of the 308th Division.

B. ALLOCATION OF TASKS

1. The various sources and collection means that will be covered are as follows:

- (a) Airborne collection devices
 - (1) Airborne personnel detector
 - (2) IR and SLAR
 - (3) Photography
- (b) Prisoners
- (c) Captured documents and material
- (d) Aerial observation
- (e) Ground reconnaissance
- (f) Sensors

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2. Airborne collection devices:

(a) Airborne Personnel Detector. On 30 May two APD missions were requested from the 3d Marine Division and the missions were scheduled. The APD helicopter flew the first of these missions but the helicopter developed mechanical problems and the second mission was aborted. Three additional APD missions were requested. On a 5 June mission heavy enemy ground fire killed the APD operator and damaged the APD helicopter. In effect the APD was out of action for the entire operation.

(b) IR and SLAR. On 3 June Task Force Hotel submitted a new IR and SLAR mission for coverage of the Scotland II AO. Liaison with 3d Marine Division resulted in cancellation of the old IR and SLAR targets and formulation of a new plan for coverage. During the period of the operation 4 IR and 14 SLAR reports were received. Targets were passed to FSCC and the respective regiments. Ninety per cent of the 3d Marine Division IR and SLAR assets were shifted to the Scotland II AO.

(c) Aerial Photography.

(1) Task Force Hotel submitted five photo requests; one included a request of 13 different mosaics. Available photography was delivered to the regiments. Complete photo coverage of the Scotland II AO was not available in the 3d Marine Division photo library. Only two photo missions requesting photography were delivered during the operation, one of which was pinpoint photos taken by an AO and delivered within 72 hours of receipt of the request.

(2) As invaluable as the mosaics would be to unit commanders as a map substitute, the time frame was much too condensed to permit a request to be processed in time to be delivered to the requesting unit. The short planning period did not permit a sufficient lead time to obtain the requested photo missions. If photo mosaics of the entire 3d Marine Division AO were on hand at a higher headquarters, specific areas requested could be photographed and forwarded. In most cases, mosaics made of photographs even three months old would still be acceptable.

(3) One night photo was requested along Route 9 between Lang Vei and the Laotian border to determine whether or not this is an enemy LOC. No

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readout has been furnished Task Force Hotel as of this date.

3. Prisoners

(a) Both friendly regiments had their own ITT sub-teams. A sub-team from the 3d ITT supported the 1st Marines, and a sub-team from the 17th ITT supported the 4th Marines. These units are to be commended for providing timely and accurate interrogations. Information from these reports was immediately passed on to concerned units. Follow-up interrogations were provided by the 7th ITT at DONG HA.

(b) The enemy prisoners and returnees provided invaluable information that held the key to identifying recently introduced enemy units. First the 102d Regiment, then the 88th Regiment and finally the 36th Regiment of the 308th NVA Division, were identified by PWs. 11 prisoners were captured from the 83rd Engineer Regiment. These prisoners had knowledge of their own unit as well as other unit dispositions, combat efficiency, state of morale, status of supplies and their unit's missions.

(c) The wide separation of units and the periodic non-availability of aircraft complicated the evacuation of prisoners. Problems were encountered in escorting prisoners to KSB for initial interrogation and also in further escort to the Division collection point at Dong Ha. Capturing units provided escorts for PW's to KSB. In some instances escorts understandably returned to their parent units as soon as the prisoners were delivered to Khe Sanh. Upon completion of interrogation, difficulties were encountered in finding further escorts to Dong Ha. Likewise this headquarters was not kept adequately informed as to the disposition of prisoners by capturing units. In one instance three PW's were reportedly sent to "D" Med in Dong Ha. Subsequently they were reported to have been turned over to ARVN channels. An untimely delay was encountered in interrogation because the capturing unit did not notify this headquarters as to the correct disposition of the three prisoners.

4. Captured Documents and Material

(a) During the conduct of this portion of the operation, 12 batches of documents were captured totalling more than 532 pages. While the bulk of the documents found were of negligible value, important intelligence

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was gained from spot reports as well as complete translations. The 38th Regiment was mentioned in one of the documents found after a police of the battlefield. This was the first document found in this area to substantiate the 38th Regiment presence in the KS area. Also the presence of the 36th Regiment in the KS area was substantiated by captured documents.

(b) One problem encountered was the failure to properly tag captured documents. The DTG, coordinates, capturing unit and circumstances of capture must be included on all captured documents. In some instances documents were not tagged at all causing an increase in the administrative communication burden to the command and a lapse of time in evaluating and disseminating the information. In one case, personnel of the capturing unit wrote and marked directly on the captured documents causing confusion as to the original content.

(c) Aside from capturing the normal weapons and items of individual equipment, three vehicles were captured. A truck and motor driven arc welder were destroyed in place; however, another truck with an elaborate machine shop mounted on its bed was evacuated to KSB where it was reassembled.

5. Aerial Observation

(a) Aerial recon support for the operation was initially provided by Alpha Troop, 1st of the 9th until assumed by VMO-6 employing two gunships. Pre-flight briefing and post-flight debriefing were performed at Khe Sanh twice daily. It is desirable to have the same AO conduct VR of the same area daily in order to more readily note changes related to enemy activity and locate new targets. This was not accomplished due to the lack of AO's at division and other priorities. The same pilots were used daily and pilot participation in the debrief complemented the AO's debrief and compensated for not having the same AO. Each mission flown reported new targets which were fed to FSCC immediately after debrief.

(b) On June 16, the mission flown by the AO was a route recon of the new road and to confirm reported information as to the length, width, number and location of bridge, culverts, fills and corduroy sections. A message reporting specific data on the road was sent to 3d Marine Division.

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6. Ground Reconnaissance

(a) Third Force Recon Company conducted 12 patrols during this period. Six patrols were conducted north of Route 9 permitting an economy of friendly forces occupying the hill positions. It was their particular mission to act as a screening force for infiltration to KSB and the surrounding hill positions.

(b) Of the six patrols south of Route 9, there were 3 priority extracts and one emergency extract. Two patrols were delayed because of weather. One patrol was aborted due to non-availability of aircraft. Another mission was aborted due to ground fire received during the approach to the LZ.

7. Sensors

(a) The sensor program in the Scotland II AO proved to be an essential part of the G-2 Intelligence Collection Program. Sensor readings were used to plan:

- (1) Photo missions
- (2) IR and SLAR missions
- (3) APD missions
- (4) Reconnaissance Zones, both ground and aerial.

In addition, sensor readings were used to detect early warning of enemy infiltration and acquire targets.

(b) During Robin South operations, 4 recon patrols were planned in the Scotland AO based on sensor activations.

(c) Detection of enemy infiltration was limited to early warning and oriented to the west and northwest, with only 2 strings seeded to the south. More strings would have facilitated targeting of enemy movements and detecting his movements within the immediate KS area. 16 hand emplaced sensors were seeded by 3d Force Recon teams to augment the aerial delivered devices.

C. REPORTS. Permission was granted to the 4th Marines to submit handwritten INTSUMs so as not to tie up the TACT NET. Likewise timely receipt of the 1st Marines INTSUM was noted. Information for the Task Force INTSUM

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was obtained by COC Spot Reports. Although this resulted in a few delayed entries it proved quite workable in producing timely INTSUMS. Hard copies of the TFH daily INTSUM were delivered to the 1st and 4th Marines.

D. LESSONS LEARNED.

1. Photograph requirements should be levied as early as possible in the planning stages to insure delivery.

2. An operation of this magnitude necessitates the establishment of a Task Force Collection Point for PWs.

3. A MP detachment attached to Task Force Headquarters will be required to provide security for the Task Force PW collection compound and to properly escort PW's to the division collection point.

4. Friendly units policing the battlefield for documents and material provide a source for otherwise uncollectable information.

5. Use of sensor readouts proved to be an aid in planning tasks for other collection assets.

6. Helicopters should make fake inserts prior to and after actual insertion of recon teams and should stay in close proximity to insertion point until team reports that they are secure. Aircraft should not remain over the zone for an extended period of time and thus compromise of recon team's position.

7. Fixed wing aircraft such as flareships and Spooky can be utilized as a radio relay when AO's are not available, as was done when Knife Boy Recon Patrol lost communications.

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COMMENTS BY 1ST MARINES (-)(REIN)

INTELLIGENCE

1. Collection and Analysis.

A. Augmented by ITT, regiment has an excellent capability to collect and analyze combat intelligence. In the operation just completed, POW's and documents:

(1) Provided Order of Battle information on the 308th Division not available from any other intelligence source at any level.

(2) Revealed that the 308th Division was specifically oriented for night operations.

(3) Indicated that elements of the 308th were targeted against U.S. personnel landed in LZ's as a specific mission separate from any larger NVA objectives in the area.

(4) Suggested that the average NVA trooper was aware of artillery support available to his unit if required. Certainly the value of ITT support to regiments and battalions was confirmed more fully in this operation.

B. Photography.

(1) Timely photography to the Robin North portion of the operation was not available.

(2) In the absence of adequate photography, the provision of more helicopters for VR by battalion and company commanders is mandatory.

(3) IR and SLAR were extremely useful in indicating the depth of enemy dispositions in the immediate area of interest. It should be noted that in addition to the immediate area of operation, First Marines retained a residual responsibility for the rest of the Scotland II AO. IR and SLAR were requested and obtained, allowing us to cover our "back door", so to speak.

C. APD was of no value in the Robin North area. A mission west of Khe Sanh Base in this period, however, provided useful target information in an area where our defenses had been somewhat thinned to make resources available on operation.

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D. HLZ's: Available listings of HLZ's in the Scotland II AO are meager. No HLZ's in the Robin North portion of the AO were listed. No aerial photography was available. Accordingly, map analysis, aerial observers and commander's VR were necessary for LZ selections, and extensive LZ prep was required. The development of a more comprehensive HLZ listing is obviously essential.

E. Weather forecasts are an important aspect of the intelligence collection effort. We need an agency tasked not only with collection, but also timely dissemination of the information.

2. Sensor Devices:

A. While not of direct value to the operation, sensor devices throughout the Scotland II AO permitted some surveillance of areas to which troops were not committed.

B. At present, lead time for emplacement of sensor devices would preclude their employment during operations as rapidly conceived and executed as this one. The imagination, however, is stimulated by the possibility of future sensor assets being earmarked for support of such operations and available for employment on short notice.

C. Retention of PPS's, NOD's etc. on hill positions rather than their introduction into the operation was opted to add to the surveillance capability of the thinned-out lines of the static positions.

3. Lessons Learned. POW's and observation of enemy operating methods indicated that NVA observe helicopter movements carefully. Helicopter supported positions are then closely reconnoitered, and subsequently are attacked. The attacks generally come at night. Those which have come as late as dawn were probably launched at that time because the approach march took longer than anticipated. Firebases should expect to be attacked within 36 hours of insertion. NVA artillery is a fact of life in the Scotland AO and should be expected at any position which remains fixed for 24 hours or more. If reaction forces can be introduced into the area of the night attacks so that contact can be maintained a heavy toll of the enemy can be expected. The NVA battalion must break contact within a few hours because of its relatively meager ammo/supply. Some means of reacting

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to maintain contact once joined will inevitably lead to heavy NVA losses. The danger of ambush during such pursuit must of course be considered.

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COMMENTS BY 1ST MARINES (-)(REIN)

PERSONNEL

1. Casualty Reporting. Normal casualty reporting procedures are suited to air mobile operations with the provision that special attention must be paid to the accounting for KIA in view of the rapid movement which characterizes this type operation. Identification statements should be accomplished on the spot if at all possible and enclosed in the body bag because of the difficulty of subsequently locating and transporting witnesses. In other operations the evacuation chain can be fairly well fixed. However, in this type operation, because of the rapid movement and the necessity to make maximum use of available helicopter assets, the normal evacuation chain may be bypassed in favor of "any appropriate facility." It is therefore recommended that units provide for liaison personnel to be present at all facilities to which casualties might be evacuated. As with any rapid moving situation where units make a succession of helicopter movements, positive control over personnel in the form of "head counts" and musters by name is mandatory. A positive means of reporting all personnel "not present" at the end of each day, and each helicopter movement, to the unit rear, is a must to permit matching with information flowing in the casualty reporting chain.

2. Replacements. Air mobile operations are generally planned for a fixed number of days. In view of the rapid movement involved and predictable time frame, unit, rather than individual replacement, appears more desirable if the force posture permits. In any event, individual replacements should be made only in critical billets since assimilation of new personnel in a moving, constant contact situation can weaken rather than strengthen unit effectiveness.

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COMMENTS BY 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)

INTELLIGENCE

1. Delay in Submission of Intsums. The tactical net was in constant use and as a result it was decided to pass lengthy intsums by personal delivery basis. As such intsums are merely summaries of prior spot reports, it is felt this arrangement facilitated radio communications and created no secondary problems.
2. POW's. It is noted that a Montagnard translation capability was not available though the Regimental Headquarters had two assigned interpreters and an attached ITT team. With respect to the evacuation of captured personnel from Battalions or from the Regimental Command Post after interrogation, it was never felt that this matter was within control of the regiment.
3. Document Passage. Delivery of documents and captured weapons to aircrew personnel is considered to be a most insecure method of effecting passage. In one specific instance weapons and documents were passed to a crewman for delivery to Khe Sanh. The documents, less the captured weapons, were delivered at Dong Ha. It is felt that couriers must be used even though this may deprive the sending unit of their services for several days.
4. Continuing Intelligence Acquisition. Robin South demonstrated the extreme desirability of making helicopters available to tactical units for local air reconnaissance and intelligence acquisition flights. There was a distinct scarcity of this support at company and battalion level.
5. Radio Monitoring. The results obtained by 3d Bn, 4th Marines in intercepting low level traffic in the field is worthy of particular comment and deserving of note.

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III LOGISTICS

A. HELICOPTER RESUPPLY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

Helicopter resupply operations during the early stages of Scotland II consisted of providing all classes of supply to one regiment (1st Marines) with units in the field and manning fixed hill positions. Included in this effort was the resupply of Khe Sanh Base and its tenant units. Source of supply for classes I, III, IV and V was LSU, LZ Stud. Class II source was FLSG-B, Dong Ha. In accomplishing this a daily average of 200,000 pounds of cargo was lifted by CH-46 and 2 CH-53 aircraft made available for logistic flights.

The introduction of a second regiment, the 4th Marines, into the operation placed a severe strain on the capability of the LSA, LZ Stud. Resupply efforts increased to a point where, during the height of the operation, an average of nearly 400,000 pounds of cargo was delivered to 14 locations daily. This was accomplished by 6 to 10 CH-46 and 1 to 3 CH-53 logistic aircraft. During this peak period an average of 137 resupply lifts were made daily.

As previously stated, the resupply of 2 regiments from LSA, LZ Stud severely strained that unit's capability, and problems in coordination between the using regiments and the LSA arose. This problem area was solved by establishing a Task Force Hotel liaison officer at LZ Stud to coordinate the units, the LSA, and to work in conjunction with the Division Logistics representative. This rapidly smoothed operations and aided in realizing the maximum benefit of the facility and the support available. In addition, Task Force Hotel established a procedure whereby the two regiments submitted their lift requirements in pounds to the Task Force Hotel G-4, who in turn fragged sufficient aircraft to move the cargo. This resulted in more effective use of available helicopter assets.

A significant problem, even more serious than the lack of sufficient helicopters, was acute and continuous shortage of cargo nets, especially those for the CH-53 aircraft. This problem, while never completely solved, was eased considerably by sending one logistic CH-46 on a net sweep at the start of each flying day and by regularly reminding the helicopter support teams to expedite the return of nets and slings. A record keeping system established by the Task Force Liaison

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Officer at LZ Stud made possible quick identification of the position retaining the most nets and expedited their recovery.

Dominant lesson learned was that conducting helo-resupply of two regiments whose units are widely separated throughout the AO requires a coordinator/liaison officer from the senior headquarters. This was demonstrated by the increased efficiency of helo-resupply after the assignment of a Task Force representative at LZ Stud.

B. MEDICAL EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL

Evacuation of casualties was accomplished by helicopter directly from the field to Co "D", 3d Medical Bn at Dong Ha in accordance with established procedures. Those cases requiring stabilization were evacuated to the 1st Marines regimental aid station at Khe Sanh and later transferred to Dong Ha.

On only one occasion did a problem within this area arise. The 1st Bn, 4th Marines heavy enemy contact at LZ Loon resulted in the evacuation of casualties in considerable number to Khe Sanh Base. This was caused by the unusually large number of personnel requiring evacuation in a short period of time, the distance to Dong Ha with resulting loss of helicopters and the fact that an emergency extract of 2 companies was being carried out concurrently. Provisions had been made for casualties requiring stabilization to be evacuated to the aid station at LZ Stud in the event Khe Sanh was under enemy fire.

C. SURFACE RESUPPLY

Resupply of Khe Sanh Base by surface during Robin North and Robin South consisted of 4 convoys to LZ Stud and back in the same day, and one convoy from LZ Stud. These convoys, averaging 26 trucks each, were not considered to be a success, although they did augment helo resupply operations. Factors contributing to this lack of success were the shortage of vehicles available for cargo hauling, enemy interdiction of Route 9, and the effect of weather on the MSR.

The Motor Transport situation of the 1st Marines and tenant units of Khe Sanh Base was such that the maximum number of vehicles capable of traversing the MSR never exceeded thirty. The high deadline rate of vehicles was

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due to the shortage of 2nd Echelon spare parts, the lack of an accessible 3rd Echelon maintenance facility and combat damage.

Resupply by convoy rapidly reached the point of diminishing returns. A convoy of 26 vehicles required, at a minimum, six to eight trucks for security, and the pay load of the cargo hauling vehicles did not justify the personnel risk and commitment, the detailed arrangement of security forces, and exposure to enemy action of existing Motor Transport assets.

Dominant lesson learned was that to derive maximum benefit from surface resupply, adequate Motor Transport must be available and relatively free movement on the MSR must be insured.

D. ADEQUACY OF CLASS V LIFTED TO VARIOUS POSITIONS

Class V lifted to the various positions was sufficient throughout the operation. However, artillery ammunition at Khe Sanh became critically low on several occasions. This situation was rectified by fixed wing airlift by Air Force C-130 aircraft.

At the start of the operation, emphasis was placed on the build up of class V stocks on the hill positions. These positions were built up to and maintained at 5 DOA or more throughout the operation.

Firebases were stocked with a prepositioned package of artillery ammunition prior to the arrival of the guns. This provided the batteries ready ammunition for fire missions and reduced the resupply requirements. Resupply was routine, requiring only sufficient input to maintain the level of the prepositioned package.

E. LEAD TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRLIFTED RESUPPLY

Lead time requirements for helilift resupply presented no problems. The aircraft were fragged in the afternoon for the following day's lift.

Fixed wing resupply of Khe Sanh Base required too long a lead time. A message request for resupply of artillery ammunition received no response for nearly a week. This delay resulted in a combat emergency delivery by speed off load of fixed wing aircraft. We considered this length of time between request and delivery to be unsatisfactory.

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COMMENTS BY 1ST MARINES (-)(REIN)

LOGISTICS

1. Helo Resupply Procedures and Techniques. The LSA concept is well suited to airmobile concept operations. However, positive communications from the using unit to the LSA or to a central logistics control must be assured, since "on position" inventories cannot be allowed to grow so large as to become a retrograde problem if the unit is to be shifted to a new position. Conversely the requirement to keep "on position" inventories small, places a "quick reaction" resupply requirement on the LSA, and this can only be met with positive communications.

In calculating the requirements for nets to support an operation it is felt that in the future these requirements be calculated with a 50% allowance for time lost in recovering them out of resupply points. Also, since resupply to the same location during operations of this nature will be the exception rather than the rule, the scheduling of separate lifts to collect nets would appear to be worthy of consideration in future operations.

2. Medical Evacuation of Personnel. Medical evacuation of personnel during this portion of Scotland II was light from the 1st Marines AO and posed no unusual problems.

3. Surface Resupply. Surface resupply had been a secondary means of resupply to LZ Hawk and Khe Sanh Base prior to the commencement of this phase of the operation and continued as such until the abandonment of convoys after the ambush of 9 June.

4. Adequacy of Class V. Class V will always be a problem in air mobile operations. It is doubtful that in any multiple operations with artillery fire bases established off land lines of communication, helicopter assets will be available to meet all Class V resupply demands. At the commencement of the 2-18 June phase of Scotland II CH-46 and CH-53 lifts of Class V to LZ Hawk and Khe Sanh were averaging approximately 190,000 lbs per day. This adequately maintained Class V stocks at these positions. With the establishment of additional firebases in the southern sector of the AO, this rate of resupply was slowed to approximately half the former rate as helicopters and nets were diverted to support the additional firebases. Class V stocks rapidly

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diminished under the impact of less resupply and increased firing activity in response to the operations. Class V requirements were met in this instance by an emergency fixed wing lift of 105mm and 155mm to Khe Sanh with part of the 105mm then being taken to LZ Hawk by trucks. From this experience it is recommended that alternate methods of resupply of Class V to established firebases be included in future plans for airmobile operations.

5. Lead Time Requirements for Airlifted Resupply.

Lead time requirements for air lifted resupply were primarily affected by the need for positive communications, as covered at the start of this portion of the brief.

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COMMENTS BY 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)

LOGISTICS

1. From 8-18 June the 4th Marines moved 1,574,190 lbs of supplies by helicopters in support of operation Robin South. CH-46 and CH-53 A/C were employed on the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 16th of June. A total of 133,540 lbs of pre-staged supplies requested by the 4th Marines were not moved. This was caused by an absence of A/C for a portion of time during each day. This absence usually occurred during the period 1230-1400. The procedure of assigning A/C to work the LSA and not for particular missions was the most advantageous to the logistical effort and was directly responsible for moving the vast amount of supplies that were required in the course of this operation.
2. As artillery was extensively employed, the pre-staging of Class V for these units at LZ's Robin and Torch was a definite advantage. These units consumed 927,718 lbs of Class V in support of the operations. The opening of LZ's Robin and Torch to CH-53's was a definite factor in keeping these units adequately supplied.
3. A continuing problem of A/C dropping supplies into the wrong zone, and the return of nets to the LSA, could best be solved by the A/C checking in with the 14 of the Regt. The pilots would then be turned over to the Bn to procure supplies. The Bn 14 would turn the A/C over to the HST in the zone, who in turn would direct the load to a particular area within the zone. Upon the A/C releasing its load, it in turn would pick up the old nets and return them in addition to other equipment or men to the LSA. This can best be accomplished if the pilots are in contact with the HST/14's. Along these lines it is advantageous to each unit to have trained HST personnel. As Shore Party Bn does not have the resources to support this, the units will have to designate/train their own teams.
4. The lack of Class II and medical supplies at LZ Stud caused a time lag in the response to requests by wing units. This was not a big problem during this operation but could become a major factor if the operation were for a period substantially longer than Robin South. The area of most concern was in batteries and weapon cleaning gear.

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5. The requirement for lightweight water containers was once again pointed out in the course of this operation. The six gallon plastic container, when available, enables the receiving unit to move after they have been resupplied with water. When resupplied with water cans, the unit is anchored to its immediate area until the empty cans are evacuated.

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing Auxiliary Headquarters
Quang Tri Combat Base
FPO San Francisco 96602

24 June 1968

From: Assistant Wing Commander
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (REIN)
Subj: Critique of Operations Scotland, Phase I, II
and III

Ref: (a) 3d Div Memo of 18 June 1968

1. In compliance with reference (a) the following is submitted:

a. Item: Communications

(1) Problem: The assigned FM frequencies are congested because of administrative traffic being passed on the air net.

Recommendation: That all administrative traffic be passed on administrative nets.

(2) Problem: Units do not monitor the assigned frequencies.

Recommendation: Ensure that units are advised of helo resupply times and that the nets are guarded in accordance with the Communication Plan. The greatest area in need of improvement is with Artillery Units.

(3) Problem: Secure communications requirements to avert transmitting vital information to the enemy on troop disposition, strength, tactical plans, resupply information, etc.

Recommendation: That troop lifts not be briefed in the air, (e.g. move from LZ Robin to Loon), and that communications between the DASC, S-3 and S-4 to the LSA and other agencies not divulge the size and nature of lifts until secure communications can be established between these units.

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(4) Problem: Tactical units were not always alert on communications nets or did not always have nets working when helo operations were inbound to their zones.

Recommendation: That the LSA and Tactical Units in LZ's maintain close liaison and alertness when movement is being initiated in and out of LZ's.

(5) Problem: Land line communications between the DASC-LSA; between the Khe Sanh DASC/ASRT and Dong Ha DASC/ASRT; between DASC and TADC; between DASC and supporting helo groups were not satisfactory.

Recommendation: That real time secure communications be established as a matter of urgent priority between the above units to ensure effective helo control and utilization.

(6) Problem: Development of a communication plan for multi-bn helo operations.

Recommendation: That for operations of this magnitude, where a large amount of air and ground communications will be utilized, a detailed communications plan should be worked out and published in advance.

b. Item: DASC Operations

(1) Problem: Accurate and timely SAVAPLANE information was not always broadcast. This appeared to result from a lack of coordination between the FDC and Khe Sanh DASC. Many times the first notification that the helicopters had of artillery firing was when the guns fired or the rounds detonated beneath or near the helo. Communications with the DASC frequently revealed that the DASC had no knowledge of the artillery.

Recommendation: Closer coordination between the DASC and the FDC be instituted so that all SAVAPLANE information will be accurate and timely. In this regard, it is also mandatory that whenever possible, the FDC and DASC be co-located back to back.

(2) Problem: The DASC is an air control agency only of the 1st MAW; responsive to the 1st MAW TADC for air control of helos and fixed wing aircraft. The DASC cannot assume operations control over aircraft or give directions to aircraft except as provided by competent authority, e.g. CG TF Hotel or his authorized represent-

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ative.

Recommendation: That the authorized representative of the ground force coordinating the operation have a helo-fragger (officer) from the S-3 office available in the DASC to provide directions and instructions to the HD of the DASC on employment and utilization of helos fraggged to the ground force commander. The foregoing also applies to employment of a fixed wing (officer) for fixed wing aircraft employment.

(3) Problem: The Khe Sanh DASC was not capable of performing all the necessary functions of a brigade size operations.

Recommendation: In a brigade, multi-bn size operation requiring employment of an inordinate number of aircraft, the DASC must conduct certain planning before the operations begins to ensure that it has the complete capability in comm and personnel to handle all air operations efficiently and effectively.

c. Item: LSA

(1) Problem: LSA too small. Helos discharging or embarking passengers prevented cargo pickups and when cargo hookups were in progress, they prevented staging and preparation of additional supplies.

Recommendation: That all LSA's be established with the idea of accomodating passenger and cargo traffic simultaneously. It is expected that a zone of 600' X 250' would be adequate.

(2) Problem: A shortage of nets and slings for CH-53 helicopters substantially constricted the flow of supplies from the LSA.

Recommendation: That additional slings and nets be procured. That units in the field be provided an organized plan for net retrieval.

(3) Problem: The LSA radio net was overloaded. One common frequency for the LSA, HST and DASC, caused gross overloading of the assigned frequency.

Recommendation: That the LSA be given a separate frequency to utilize for LSA operations.

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(4) Problem: Over fragging helos to LSA when equipment/supplies are not available or ready for pickup.

Recommendation: That S-3 or the helo fragger in the DASC maintain contact with the LSA and the Helo Group(s) and only dispatch helos to the LSA when lifts are available for movement.

(5) Problem: More efficient and effective organization, training and operations by helicopter support teams (HST's) is urgently required.

Recommendation: That HST's be organized, trained, equipped and conduct operations in accordance with Marine Corps doctrine outlined in FMFM 4-3. (Implementation of this recommendation is one of the vital keys to our future success in helo operations).

(6) Problem: Close liaison and good, rapid communications were required with the DASC, helo fragger, S-4 etc.

Recommendation: That a senior officer, well versed in LSA operations be placed in charge of the LSA and maintain hourly contact with the above agencies. Further, that these officers conduct close liaison and planning before the operation to ensure that all vital elements of the plan for effective helo operations can be assured.

(7) Problem: Effective retrieval of helo slings and nets from LZ's to the LSA.

Recommendation: That the OIC, LSA develop a plan for control of all nets and slings. This plan to include the ways and means of returning slings and nets rapidly from LZ's to the LSA for early pre-staging of external loads.

(8) Problem: Proper stowage of water cans or open cargo for external lifts.

Recommendation: Many external lifts of water were lost enroute to LZ's due to improper stowage of the water cans for net pickup. Leak proof cans must be used or the current metal water cans must be stacked on pallets for external pickup so the cans do not tilt on pickup and water is not lost enroute to the LZ.

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(9) Problem: Requirements for resupply by helo.

Recommendation: That supported units make their resupply by helo known the day before or early on the day of resupply so the supplies can be staged early and moved during the day and prior to late in the evening or at night. Many emergency night resupply problems could be avoided, and more efficient utilization of helicopters could be obtained. This is the key to efficient and effective resupply operations by helo:

- (1) Supported Unit: State requirements early to the LSA.
- (2) LSA: Prestage rapidly and advise the DASC.
- (3) DASC: Direct Helo's to LSA for movement.
- (4) LSA: Rapid retrieval of nets and slings.

d. Item: Landing Zones and sites are not adequately supervised.

(1) Problem: Landing Zones are not being policed of debris to prevent damage to the helicopter when a landing is attempted. Whether the debris is caused by accumulated trash or the material left even from the breaking down of the pallets, a constant program of policing the area must be maintained.

Recommendation: That supervisory personnel insure that the LZ's are maintained in proper police.

(2) Problem: LZ Directors and landing sites are seldom marked and are extremely hard to identify.

Recommendation: That directors be specifically identified by a colored shirt or an air panel wrapped around them and that sites be marked with panels. Hand signals should be utilized as prescribed in FMFM 3-3.

(3) Problem: Congested LZ's were commonplace due to the amount of supplies being hauled in, and the slowness of the HST in clearing out the previous lifts.

Recommendation: That if the HST is operating in a minimum size LZ, every effort be made to clear out

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the previous lifts ASAP.

(4) Problem: Personnel loitering in the helicopter approach and departure routes and in the landing site. In the case of a dropped pallet or an aircraft malfunction necessitating immediate landing, personnel are unnecessarily exposing themselves to injury or death. Unnecessary delay results in the landing when personnel obstruct the landing sites.

Recommendation: That all personnel be re-briefed on the potential hazards of being underneath the helicopter flight path.

e. Helo Groups and Squadrons Operations

(1) Problem: An operation order for this operation was not received by the Helicopter Group.

Recommendation: That the supporting helicopter group be included in the distribution list for the Operation Order.

(2) Problem: Lack of brief on operations plans and scheme of maneuver for participating aviation units.

Recommendation: That the supporting group maintain close liaison with the supported force and ensure that plans and operations are known and passed to all concerned.

(3) Problem: Primary and alternate refueling points were not always near the LSA or area of operations.

Recommendation: That the primary refueling point be maintained by the supporting helo groups near the LSA or area of operations.

(4) Problem: Effective utilization of available helicopters.

Recommendation: That before fragging for helicopters, detailed planning and analysis of lift requirements be made. Close management of the helo assets throughout the day must be assured to obtain effective utilization of helos. That helos not be fragged for missions that can be accomplished effectively by motor vehicle or foot movement.

(5) Problem: Replacement of "down" helos.

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Recommendation: That flight leaders notify the supporting helo groups immediately and request a replacement helo be launched to replace the "down" helo in the flight.

(6) Problem: Control of helos fragged to the supported unit.

Recommendation: That flight leaders not check out of the area of operations and return to base unless specifically authorized by the helo fragger in the DASC.

(7) Problem: Use of the helo haven.

Recommendation: That once troops are committed to an operation which can only be supported by helos, consideration be given to using the helo haven and ensuring that a minimum number of helos will be available the next day for continued operations.

(8) Problem: Requirement for planning and prebriefing of helo assaults.

Recommendation: That before a helo assault is conducted, the battalion CO, helo flight leader, UH1E gun leader, TAC(A), S-2, path finders, etc. assemble for a briefing of the lift. That where possible recent photos of the LZ's be utilized and that the battalion CO and helo flight leader personally recon the LZ's. That primary and alternate approach and retirement routes and LZ's be decided.

(9) Problem: Aerial recon of the objective and operating area to obtain enemy installations and movement.

Recommendation: That a firm aerial recon plan be initiated in coordination with the S-2. This plan to ensure the best available and current intelligence on enemy disposition before helo assaults, and detect enemy movements throughout the area of helo operations.

(10) Problem: Responsiveness of helos from the SLF.

Recommendation: That liaison be initiated with the SLF by the supporting helo unit to ensure responsiveness of the helos from the SLF.

(11) Problem: Helicopter loading of 10 men in a

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pickup zone exceeded the limitations established by the pilots as to passengers or weight of cargo for the CH-46A. This constitutes a dangerous safety-to-flight situation.

Recommendation: That the loading units be made aware that the number of passengers and/or weight given by the pilot is the maximum that can be safely embarked.

f. Planning Requirements for Helo Assets.

(1) Problem: Early, detailed planning requirements.

Recommendation: That when multi-battalion size helo operations are to be conducted, advance planning be conducted to determine the feasibility of helo support and to determine if the helicopter assets will be available from III MAF allocations.

g. Compliance with III MAF Aircraft Allocations.

(1) Problem: 1st MAF capability to meet stated helo requirements.

Recommendation: That once III MAF helo allocations have been made for an operation, the 1st MAF helo resources be made available to meet these obligations.

h. Fixed Wing Operations.

(1) Problem: Insufficiency of O1 aircraft.

Recommendation: That the 1st MAF expedite action to provide additional O1 aircraft in support of the 3d MarDiv.

(2) Problem: Optimum suppressive fires for road recon and helo assault escort.

Recommendation: That greater use be made of the TA4F and A1 aircraft with forward firing ordnance in the helo escort and road recon role.

(3) Problem: Maximum safety in use of CAS with friendly troops.

Recommendation: FAC's and pilots exercise greater precautions in use of CAS when at or near the vicinity of friendly troops to avoid the unfortunate incident that occurred during this operation.

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i. Summary. This was a useful and productive operation, the first all-helicopter operation of its size in Vietnam. Many of the mistakes made in this operation have been made before in developing our Marine Corps helo assault doctrine. They would not have been made this time with more detailed and coordinated planning and closer adherence to our established doctrine. While this operation was highly successful, much lost motion was experienced. In future operations of this nature we can and must:

- (1) Plan more effectively.
- (2) Follow established doctrine.

With the foregoing accomplishments future operations will be more successful and productive.

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IV AIR OPERATIONS

A. HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

1. Summary

During Operation Scotland II supporting helicopters transported 6,164,374 pounds of cargo and 18,767 combat troops. Daily averages were 334,940 pounds of cargo and 963 combat troops.

The logistic support was accomplished by 4 to 10 CH-46D helicopters and 1 to 3 CH-53 helicopters daily. The resupply loads were staged at LZ Stud and transported externally to the various company and battalion positions throughout the AO.

Four H-34 aircraft were utilized for medevac and utility missions. When available, 2 aircraft were assigned in direct support of each regiment.

UH1E gunships were utilized to escort the resupply aircraft to the drop zones and to provide cover for convoys traveling Route 9 between Khe Sanh and LZ Stud.

Tactical assault missions were fraggged according to the size of the assault unit, distance to the LZ, characteristics of the LZ and minimum first wave requirements. The number of transport aircraft utilized on tactical assaults ranged from 4 to 12. Assault missions were escorted by UH1E gunships.

Visual airborne reconnaissance was provided by a flight of 2 UH1E gunships with an AO on board. They were assigned specific recon tasks on a daily basis at the direction of the Task Force G-2.

Insertions and extractions of Division recon teams were performed during the period.

2. Logistic Resupply

a. An inadequate supply of cargo nets and helicopter slings was on hand to permit efficient and expeditious flow of resupply from the LSA at Stud. An attendant problem was the difficulty encountered in retrieving the nets and slings from the supported elements. The problem was partially alleviated by sending helicopters on frequent "net sweeps" and by continually directing ground unit attention toward freeing their nets and

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preparing them for return by any available helicopter. This action did not completely solve the problem, however, and the fact remains that a considerable amount of valuable helicopter time was lost as a result.

b. Communications: Logistic resupply was conducted on the 1st Marines LZ common frequency. LSA control (Dagmar B), all 12th Marine units and all aircraft working resupply were communicating on this net. The result was delay and confusion due to the badly overcrowded net. At the outset of the operation an attempt was made at dividing the LSA into 2 separate factions, i.e. an adjacent but separate LSA for each regiment. This alleviates the comm problem but it was judged an unacceptable solution from a logistic standpoint. The solution to this problem lies in providing the LSA with an air/ground radio capability on a frequency separate from that of any supported element.

c. There was insufficient consideration given to priority of cargo transported from the LSA, resulting in the generation of "emergency" resupply requests. The water and combat essential ammunition and other critical supplies should be the first to be transported so that in the event of inclement weather or lack of helicopter availability the supported units would not immediately be in an emergency status.

3. Tactical Assault

The tactical assaults for the most part went smoothly. It can only be re-emphasized that a briefing of the assault element commanders with the helicopter transport flight leader and the gunship leader is the key to a successful heliborne assault. Time factors in the pace of this operation made these briefings difficult to organize, however the benefits far outweigh the inconvenience.

With the 4th Marines regiment headquarters located at LZ Robin many difficulties were encountered in supporting these operations due primarily to lack of adequate communications. The commander and key members of his staff had to be transported back and forth from Khe Sanh on an almost daily basis. The program to gain maximum utilization from the helicopters does not readily absorb requests for responsive and timely transportation in and about the AO. As a consequence, the 4th Marines commander and staff lost many valuable hours waiting for helicopter transportation.

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An inadequate number of aircraft were available for CLC, VR and admin runs for each unit. This situation was further aggravated by late/non arrival of the H-34s fragged for this purpose. Admittedly, H-34s are a poor platform for VR, but UH1E (slick) aircraft in the number required simply do not exist. To utilize CH-46s for administrative and utility missions is inconsistent with proper aircraft utilization.

The provisioning of adequate secure communication channels would permit more effective representation at the Task Force Headquarters by the liaison officer assigned and would be appropriate resolution to this problem.

Attendant to the foregoing is the fact that the regiments were sometimes late in submitting their requests for helicopter support to the Task Force. This causes a chain of delay which finally results in the supporting unit (MAG-35) receiving the commitment at a very late hour - not affording them the opportunity to make alternate arrangements if they do not have the assets immediately on hand to fulfill the request.

Late arrival of aircraft occurs only rarely when the aircraft have been requested sufficiently in advance and when assets are readily available. Unforeseen circumstances such as aircraft reverting to "down" status prior to take off, or delays encountered in a preceeding mission are, for the most part, unavoidable. Every effort is directed toward keeping these delays at a minimum. (It is my personal opinion that the number of times aircraft are late for a mission is roughly equal to the number of times the supported unit is not ready when the aircraft arrive. I reiterate, this is a personal opinion - undoubtedly shaded by some degree of bias.)

4. Miscellaneous:

a. Savaplanes: Considering the number of aircraft operating at any given time in the AO the problem of providing saveaplane information looms large. It appears that pilots have come to rely on the DASC as the source of complete S.A.P. information and were continually reporting fire in areas cleared by DASC. DASC were able to maintain S.A.P. information provided by 1st Marines on land line communications, but 4th Marines - not being collocated had to provide S.A.P. in their A.O. directly to the aircraft. It is most desirable that complete S.A.P. information be made available through one agency.

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b. Reconnaissance. The problem with recon support occurs when the teams request emergency extractions. This comes to pass with unseemly regularity. Aircraft to perform the extraction are taken from the most readily available assets on hand. This causes a loss of 2 gunships and 2 CH-46s for at least an hour. Obviously the limited air assets will not permit establishment of a standby capability solely for the purpose of recon extracts. Therefore, it appears this problem will be minimized only in direct proportion to the minimizations of employing recon teams in the field.

c. Landing Zone Police. On several occasions helicopter pilots reported to the DASC that various landing zones were in a poor state of police and that flying debris was becoming an increasing hazard to flight in and around the zones. Preliminary indications are that flying debris was at best a contributing factor to the helicopter crash which occurred on 19 June at LZ Turkey. In any case it is imperative that religious attention and close command supervision be directed toward eliminating this extremely hazardous condition.

5. Lessons Learned

a. That the magnitude and pace of this operation often times taxed helicopter assets to the point that none were left for contingencies which could have arisen from heavy contact.

b. That a requirement exists for the supported elements to have adequate representation/communications with the Task Force staff.

c. That 2 regiments cannot be logistically supported with 120 CH-46 nets and 35 CH-53 nets without frequent and costly delays in order to return nets and slings to the LSA.

d. That police of landing zones must be enforced to prevent damage to aircraft and injury to both flight crews and troops on the ground.

e. That thorough and timely briefing with assault element leaders and flight leaders ensures a smooth and efficient operation.

f. Finally - from this operation it was learned that a battalion can be helolifted to an objective within a 10 mile radius in from 2½ to 3 hours - utilizing 8

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CH-46 aircraft. Also that to sustain a pace of 1 battalion lift per day and to resupply all participating units almost exclusively by helicopter requires an average of 18 CH-46s, 2 CH-53s and 6 UH1E gunships per day.

It is anticipated that the helicopter utilization data developed in Scotland II will prove an accurate planning guide for future operations of a similar nature.

B. FIXED WING OPERATIONS

1. Summary

A total of 1,118 CAS sorties were flown in support of operations expending 1740.5 tons of ordnance. TPQ operations both day and night totalled 235 sorties expending 438.9 tons of ordnance. BDA by A/O reports follows:

KBA	94	Structures	8
Secondary explosions	64	AW	21
Fires	5	AAA	6
Mortars	17	Fighting holes	33
RRTS	6	Bridges	3
Bunkers	380	Roadcuts	14
Trench	130M	Caves	2
Arty	2		

Fixed wing commitments were met with a 70% weekly frag that varied very little and specific daily requirements that totaled 30% of TF Hotel air allocation. Any commitments not covered by the weekly and daily frags were filled by scrambles from hot pad assets at DaNang and Chu Lai. There were only few instances of air not available when hot pads were depleted and those for only 30 minutes at maximum. The filling of air requirements from hot pad assets actually makes the single manager concept appear to be satisfactory. The best day of the operation totaled 106 sorties which is slightly more than 4 flights per hour for a 12 hour period. The maximum capacity was never reached.

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The only changes required to accomplish the mission was close scrutiny of the daily and weekly frag when received. Depending on the weather, amount of contact and type of ordnance required, the scramble flights, both numbers and times, could almost be predicted.

2. Problems and Solutions

a. Late requests for preplanned air required constant phone calls from TF to Div to Wing to readjust requirements. Weekly frag remained the same, daily frag was required at Division by 1200.

Solution (a). Late requests for air support were changed by phone calls or if too late for that they were covered by hot pad scrambles.

b. Efficient use of fixed wing aircraft during operations is directly related to the availability of observation aircraft. This applies especially to Marine Fingerprint aircraft and observers when troops are in close contact. The amount of controllers airborne is directly related to the amount of fixed wing sorties that can be effectively used during combat operations. Observer aircraft over the CoRoc area was also a continuous problem. They were requested everyday for all daylight hours, however, very seldom were they on station continuously. All operations within Scotland II AO were continuously under threat from heavy artillery at CoRoc without any retaliating means except air strikes.

Solution (b). Fingerprint A/C did outstanding work in supporting entire operation. Working with as little as 3 A/C during some periods there was always at least one AO on station during daylight. Prior to particular operations commencing "Fingerprint" A/C would land and pick up overlay and brief of pending operation enabling them to be thoroughly familiar with operations.

The CoRoc problem remains continuous in nature. The reluctance of the enemy to expose his artillery positions in presence of observation aircraft makes it imperative that such A/C be continuously stationed in that area. No dependable coverage was experienced during the operation. Normally the day began without coverage and a LL call to 1st MAW TADC requesting coverage.

c. Close proximity of units at times presented coordination problems. Simultaneous air strikes in close proximity and normal artillery support for units in

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contact required close coordination with FSCC. Due to physical separation of FSCC and DASC this did present a problem at times.

Solution (c). Close proximity of operations required close coordination with G-3 to preclude simultaneous operations by regiments. Sequential operations were worked out and coordination problems were reduced. Future plans are for FSCC and DASC to be colocated which will reduce arty coordination problems.

3. Lessons Learned

a. Coordination, briefing and adequate planning time is required for a smooth execution of plans. Some phases of the operation seemed to depend more on an element of luck than skill in their execution.

b. Early arrival of air on station proved profitable after night attacks. If troops in close contact at first light, gunships used in close while fixed wing begin closing off retreat routes and working towards the friendlies.

c. When units not in actual contact, and advancing, most efficient use of fixed wing was to attack probable bunker complex's AW sites, and mortar positions in front of troops. If sufficient air was used in this manner, enemy had little time to prepare for coordinated night attack.

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COMMENTS BY 1ST MARINES (-)(REIN)

AIR OPERATIONS

1. HELICOPTER UTILIZATION. Intra-regimental passenger and supply movement during this operation presented a problem. The logistic helicopters were properly programmed by the Shore Party and therefore were not responsive to regimental requirements. The solution to this problem would be to schedule a section of CH-46's as regimental working aircraft at a specified time daily. The requirement for a C and C aircraft, responsive to the regimental commander, is another must for airmobile operations. This aircraft should be available at all times and would be used for C and C, VR, terrain analysis and other needs vital to the planning and execution of helicopterborne operations. While the aircraft would be controlled by the regimental commander, it would also be responsive to the needs of the battalion commander for the purposes.

2. HELICOPTER AVAILABILITY. Based on the assets available, helicopter availability was generally outstanding and is a tribute to the pilots and maintenance crews of MAG-39. The problem encountered was UH-34 time on station during the initial phase of the operation, due to the requirement to refuel at Dong Ha or Quang Tri. The establishment of an AvGas TAFDS at LZ Stud alleviated this problem. This brings up an important helicopter utilization factor. The early installation of a TAFDS in close proximity to the LSA should be a must in the planning for future operations. In addition, the LSA should be established as far forward as practicable.

3. TYPES OF HELOS FOR SPECIFIC MISSIONS. The CH-46D appears to be an ideal assault aircraft. In lifts over an appreciable distance some thought should be given to moving the troops to a nearby secure LZ by CH-53 and transferring them to CH-46's for the final assault phase. The UH-34 aircraft, while satisfactory for light cargo and passenger shuttle, is otherwise unsuitable for VR and C and C missions due to its limited visibility and pilot to passenger communications. The UH-1E appears to be ideally suited to this mission.

4. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. Although VMO-6 did an outstanding job in filling VR mission requirements from their limited pilot and aircraft assets, we feel that a minimum requirement exists for three aircraft on station in an operation of this size. One aircraft to

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work for each maneuvering regiment to observe its rear, flanks and front and to prep future objectives. The third aircraft would recon the rocket and arty belt and interdict enemy lines of communication.

5. FIXED WING. While the single management system has managed to fill the bill with respect to quantity of sorties requested, it has not been responsive to requests for specific ordnance which vary in accordance with rapidly changing tactical and meteorological conditions.

6. LESSONS LEARNED.

a. There is a necessity for greater coordination between air and ground commanders prior to assaults. Initially, the ground commander should take a VR with a qualified helo representative to select tentative LZ's. This will give the ground commander better insight into the problems he may encounter in moving from the LZ area and would allow the air representative to make an intelligent estimate of LZ construction requirements, approach and retirement lanes and number of aircraft to be effectively utilized. Once the LZ's are constructed another VR should be made by the ground commander, the TAC(A) and the helo commander. At this time tactics would be discussed and actual landing sites picked. This overfly should be followed by a thorough briefing for communication and control procedures.

b. We found the most effective LZ prep to be an air prep followed by an artillery prep just prior to L Hour. This allows the gunship TAC(A) to control the air prep on and around the LZ and still provides for sufficient time for refuelling prior to his covering the assault. Placing the artillery prep last provides flexibility in that it can be shortened or extended at will to meet a flux in L Hour. The TAC(A) can cut off the artillery at will when he is ready to put the first wave into the zone. We utilize a final volley of willie peter or smoke to provide a visual signal that the final salvo has been fired. In addition a positive cease fire, tubes clear is given over the radio.

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COMMENTS BY 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)

AIR OPERATIONS

1. Item: Helicopter approach and retirement corridors should be designated and disseminated provided the ground scheme of maneuver will permit.

Discussion: The designation and use of corridors, dependent on aircraft checking in with the senior TACP, will preclude unnecessary curtailment of artillery fires and provide for optimum control of transient aircraft. Corridors do present definite air target areas; however, the increase in positive control, and safety of aircraft from friendly fires would seem to outweigh this disadvantage.

2. Item: All aircraft must check into and out of the operating area with the senior TACP in the AO.

Discussion: In many cases aircraft informed by DASC to contact the regimental TACP for clearance into the area, arrived at various LZ's well within the AO, without obtaining clearance. This endangered aircraft and caused numerous artillery check fires.

3. Item: Each battalion operating in the field should be provided with a discreet FM frequency for LZ control and a secondary TACP frequency for special operations (helo lifts, air strikes, etc.).

Discussion: The present procedure of assigning one common regimental/battalion TACP frequency for all air operations within the regiment, including the HST's at various LZ's, creates an unusable garbled net.

4. Item: Aircraft commanders of logistic lift aircraft must know specifically what their cargo is and the unit identification of user.

Discussion: In some cases cargo was delivered to various LZ's partly because it was ammunition, but the wrong calibre, or food but the wrong unit. If specifics of cargo composition and unit identification are passed to the regimental TACP by aircraft entering the AO, orderly handoff to the battalions can be effected.

5. Item: Regimental TACP's should work directly with the area DASC.

Discussion: The generation of an intermediate

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communication relay position net physically located within the DASC creates unavoidable delays in responsiveness. Higher command and control might well be accomplished by monitoring of the DASC/regimental net without termination short of the DASC.

6. Item: Visual reconnaissance overflights were scarce to not obtainable.

Discussion: The regimental commander went without VR overflights on numerous desired occasions. Battalion and company level overflights were not available. Two CH-34 type aircraft should be provided the regiment daily for VR purposes.

7. Item: Sufficient helicopter transport must be provided to accomplish resupply during daylight hours.

Discussion: On one occasion it became necessary to continue resupply operations during the late evening in order to complete normal priority water, ammo and food delivery that had not been completed during the day. The total days logistic resupply was of the same priority but due to the quantity and disposition of various using units, overtaxed available air transport units, necessitating nite resupply.

8. Final Item: During Phase II of Scotland II 1,119,750 of CAS and 257,250 of TPQ ordnance was dropped (better than 1 and 1/4 million) by 425 sorties of fixed wing A/C. Air accounted for 72 KBA's. On the 14th of June, 87 CAS/TQP sorties were flown in support of one regiment - a record number.

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V ARTILLERY/FSC

A. ARTILLERY SUPPORT IN MULTIPLE LANDING ZONES. The support available to maneuver elements operating from multiple landing zones is greatly increased by the positioning of artillery in these zones and operating under the firebase concept. The first problem to be addressed in this area involves the timely reconnaissance and selection of these positions, which must be accomplished by the artillery battery/battalion commander well in advance of occupation. Visual reconnaissance by artillery personnel in conjunction with the infantry commander enables both to become familiar with key terrain and perimeter defense problems in advance of the assault and occupation. Discussion of the tactics and techniques of establishing fire support bases and the subsequent support of multiple landing zones and infantry operations, is an area which belongs to the unit commanders who participated in the operation.

B. COUNTER-BATTERY REQUIREMENTS. Counter-battery efforts have been virtually ineffective. Throughout the "seige" of January - March, and in subsequent operations of Scotland II, the NVA have presented a highly effective counter-surveillance screen utilizing camouflage, frequent movement and anti-aircraft fires to deny observation in Laos. Experience gained during operations since January has shown that observation posts, crater analysis, photo reconnaissance and detailed map inspection of likely positions have failed to uncover NVA artillery locations. Our best weapon against the artillery threat continues to be constant aerial surveillance of the area southwest of CoRoc Mountain. General DAVIS and General HOFFMAN are acutely aware of the shortage of observation aircraft in this regard. To augment our rather meager observation assets, we have requested Air Force FAC's to remain on station and assist us in locating enemy artillery. It has been shown that the presence of observers is not in itself enough to detect hostile artillery, however, much can be done to assist our AO's.

There were numerous reports of active artillery received from maneuvering units throughout the operation. Only in a few cases, however, were these reports accompanied by azimuths or general directions. The cry of "artillery from CoRoc" does little to augment the data on suspected enemy positions held by the FSCC. However, azimuths from FO's or infantry commanders combined with azimuths from crater analysis at Khe Sanh Base will provide intersections which considerably narrow the areas

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of suspected activity. Units in the field must provide continuous updated information on suspected enemy artillery locations. This information, when combined with known data from other sources will greatly assist the counter-battery effort, and reduce casualties. During forthcoming operations, all FO's and LZ security personnel should be instructed on flash and sound techniques for locating enemy artillery. The 12th Marines Counter-battery Information Center can assist in this respect. During the last six months, voluminous data has been collected from every source currently available in the northern I Corps area that pertains to hostile artillery. Flash bases have been established the southern DMZ, and counter-mortar radars strategically placed at fixed installations.

C. AIR/ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION. If one lesson was learned during Scotland I, it was that air and artillery could be employed simultaneously in the attack of targets providing proper fire support coordination procedures were followed. During subsequent operations in Scotland II, these procedures continued to work effectively. For example, a helo approach and retirement lane was effectively used by aircraft servicing LZ Robin and LZ Torch since helos were passed east of firebase Hawk and continued south-eastward of the Hawk-to-target gun target lines.

Likewise, 175mm guns continued missions without checkfire by careful attention to their maximum ordinate and the altitude/course of TPQ aircraft which were safely passed at 18,000 feet for preplanned strikes without loss of 175mm gun support.

To assist the FSCC in performing its mission, direct communications with 3d Marine Division FSCC and 9th Marines FSCC were installed. In addition an artillery position map, a TPQ map and a Master Savaplane map were maintained. The FSCC received very timely requests from both regiments. This greatly facilitated the planning of the general support artillery and TPQ's. TPQ's and artillery fires can be combined or used in conjunction with one another to maximize fire support at a given time and place. This was proven time and time again.

D. LESSONS LEARNED

1. Requests for helicopter support of advanced artillery firebases must be made well in advance of

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anticipated operations and must include details of HST coordination, number of personnel involved, number of external lifts and other details required for complete coordination.

2. The employment of extensive camouflage and anti-aircraft in defense of enemy artillery positions require constant surveillance on the part of all personnel. The presence of aerial observers is in itself a great deterrent to hostile artillery.

3. Crater analysis and azimuths from units in the field provide valuable information, which combined with data held by the FSCC and G-2, assists in the location of enemy artillery positions.

4. Experienced artillery observers operating with Air Force forward air controllers provide a valuable means of locating and attacking hostile artillery and rocket positions.

5. The establishment of restrictive fire plans, helicopter approach and retirement lanes, and other positive control measures should be utilized whenever possible. These measures, if promulgated to air and ground fire support agencies in advance, would positively solve almost all of the fire support coordination problems which existed during Scotland II.

6. The complexity of fire support coordination is increased as units operate in radio fringe areas. Fire support must be coordinated on the lowest level possible to insure troop and aircraft safety. The Regimental and Battalion FSCC's are best suited to perform this task, and must be given a larger share of this responsibility.

7. Final clearance for air and artillery missions rests with the supported infantry unit. Priorities for prep fires, TPQ's, and H&I fires must be established by the ground commander. Final clearance authority must rest with the FSCC.

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COMMENTS BY 1ST MARINES (-) (REIN)

ARTILLERY/FSC

1. SUPPORT IN MULTIPLE LZ OPERATIONS. Assaults into LZ's Robin and Loon were preceded by 5 days of air and artillery strikes on all known or suspected targets which might affect operations in and around the LZ's. D Day preparation included fixed wing air strikes from L minus 90 to L minus 30, artillery preparation from L minus 30 to L hour, and suppressive fires on suspected artillery positions and suspected OP's from L hour to completion of the lift. This method had proved effective in this operation.
2. ESTABLISHMENT OF FIRE SUPPORT BASES. The selection of fire support bases was not applicable to the 1st Marines for this operation as the deepest penetration was to the initial LZ's which were within the fire capability of existing artillery positions.
3. COUNTER BATTERY REQUIREMENTS. The limited effectiveness of target acquisition means for counter-battery fire continued to be a problem in this operation as it has on previous operations in the Khe Sanh area. Even with air observers, either Marines or Air Force, on station when incoming was being received, they have, with few exceptions, been unable to spot enemy artillery positions. Ground observation has also been ineffective, being limited to sightings of smoke drifting over the rim of CoRoc ridge or to rough azimuths to the sound of weapons firing. Increased efforts at crater analysis have thus far produced no confirmed targets. Continuing efforts are being made to improve our target acquisition capability. In the meantime, we will continue to base counter-battery targeting (except for direct sightings) on a combination of crater analysis and terrain analysis in the target area.
4. AIR/ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION. Standard fire support coordination procedures were utilized within the regiment and no major problems encountered. Heavy helicopter traffic into and out of LZ's Robin and Torch did cause an occasional delay in missions fired from LZ Hawk to the south. This delay was not excessive and no contact or line missions were affected. The abundance of current and active targets in the Scotland II area of operations has resulted in the Regimental and Battalion FSCC's, FAC's, and forward observers gaining valuable experience in the coordinated use of air and artillery.

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As a result of this experience no difficulties were encountered during the operation, although, at times, only two to three thousand meters separated the battalions. Air and artillery were coordinated to permit maximum use of the capabilities of each during the same period.

5. LESSONS LEARNED. There were no new lessons learned during this operation, but several were re-emphasized.

a. Adequate preparation of LZ and operation area with supporting arms paves the way for the infantry units making the assault.

b. Every available means must be utilized to acquire counter-battery targets.

c. Standard fire support coordination procedures work well when the personnel employing them have some coordinating experience under their belts.

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COMMENTS BY 4TH MARINES (-)(REIN)

ARTILLERY/FSCC

1. Artillery fire support from multiple firebases was not unique in itself, the uniqueness was the method by which the firebases (LZ's) were established totally by helo. The major lesson learned was that for a firebase to survive, preoccupation construction must be accomplished. This is of particular importance if the firebase is within enemy artillery range. No difficulties relative to the establishment or operations of the firebase were encountered that were not solved on the ground at the time by the commanders involved.
2. During multi-regiment operations with more than one direct support artillery battalion participating, a need exists for a common artillery headquarters for operational control of artillery units. The FSCC is not staffed for nor is it the appropriate agency to handle such things as requests for reinforcing fires. During the operation, the necessity for the FSCC to, in fact, function as tactical FDC caused a loss in responsiveness, which would have been greater if it were not for the personal attention given to this area by the fire support coordinator of Task Force Hotel and the commanders involved.
3. In that all the counter-battery assets were retained under either 3d MarDiv or Task Force Hotel control, no comment can be made relative to the effectiveness of the counter-battery program. Air/artillery fire support coordination experienced no difficulties that were of such magnitude as to at any time deny the infantry adequate fire from some source. The difficulties encountered would be minimized with a closer adherence to basic doctrine, i.e. stricter control of the use of helo approach and retirement lanes, directing fixed wing attacks perpendicular to the gun target lines. Artillery averaged six hours per day in "check fire" due to air. "Check fires" will never be eliminated completely, but this amount of time can be reduced. It is with pride that it is noted of the 13,381 105mm rounds and 2,103 155mm rounds heli-lifted in and fired from the two firebases, not one round fired resulted in a friendly casualty. Fire support from deep inserted firebases is no different in its application than any other, except in the method of insertion and the total reliance on the helo for its massive logistic needs. Close and continuous command attention must be given to the logistics situation, especially as relates to Class V, if success is to be realized.

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4. Again this operation pointed out most vividly that aggressive application of basic doctrine relative to fire support, be it gunnery, fire support and coordination, or close air support will produce results.

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VI COMMUNICATIONS

A. SUMMARY

During the conduct of the recent operations Task Force Hotel was co-located with the 1st Marine Regiment. All communications to the 1st Marines was via land line telephone.

That communication which was established with the 4th Marines was on the whole satisfactory. Communications consisted of one source radio circuit. It is questionable as to whether or not that was a sufficient amount of communications. On all future operations in addition to a secure voice circuit, there will be at least four channel radio relay to each of the regiments from the Task Force.

B. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS1. Overcrowding of the Landing Zone Common Net

Problem. During the latter stages of Robin South, it became apparent that the Landing Zone Common Net of the 1st Marines was heavily overcrowded.

Solution. The 4th Marines were advised to start using their own LZ common net. During this period, however, the 4th Marines were in contact, and the issue was not pressed, as the operation was scheduled to finish up in a matter of three days after this problem became obvious.

Lesson Learned. The above problem was due to the fact that most of the battalions of the 4th Marines passed thru and were opcon to the 1st Marines, as they were committed to the Scotland II AO. As part of the 1st Marines they used the 1st Marines LZ Common Net. Subsequently as the battalions were phased over to the 4th Marines, they continued to use the established and functioning LZ Common of the 1st Marines for re-supply, helo ops, etc.

Recommended Future Action. That in future operations, where battalions phase from OpCon of one regiment to another, those battalions will be directed to some up on the LZ Common of the regiment they are chopped to.

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2. Initiating a Task Force FSCC Radio Net

Problem. During the recent operations the Task Force FSCC became convinced that monitoring the Fire Direction nets of supporting artillery battalions was less than an optimum method of coordinating fire support.

Solution. The Task Force is setting up a FSCC net to better coordinate supporting fires of the Task Force.

Lesson Learned. That it is much better for the Task Force to have a coordination net that coordinates, rather than monitors, the technical and tactical Fire Direction nets of the supporting artillery battalions.

Recommended Future Action. In all future operations the Task Force Hotel FSCC will have a Task Force FSCC net, in lieu of monitoring the artillery battalions' Fire Direction Nets.

3. Additional Equipment for an Artillery Battalion FDC

Problem. During the early stages of the operation Robin North it became apparent that the FDC of 1/11 lacked radio equipment. The shortage was caused by additional batteries from the 12th Marines being assigned to 1/11. The critical area was that 1/11 did not have enough radio assets to monitor the conduct of fire nets of the additional batteries.

Solution. Additional radios were borrowed from 3d MarDiv.

Lesson Learned. When it becomes known that a unit will be monitoring more than the usual number of radio nets, then additional assets should be procured prior to the commencement of the operation.

Recommended Future Action. Obtain additional equipment prior to the operation beginning.

4. Violations of Voice Communication Security. During all stages of the operations, a lack of voice communication security was noted. This problem was particularly evident on the air ground nets.

Solution. A real solution has not yet been

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found. However, a message as sent to all units to remind them of voice communication security. (See CG TFH 110940Z Jun 68).

Lesson Learned. That valuable tactical information can be obtained by listening to our radio nets.

Recommended Future Action. Thorough indoctrination of all radio users on voice communication security, particularly just prior to operations.

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COMMENTS BY 1ST MARINES (-)(REIN)

COMMUNICATIONS

1. SPECIAL PROCEDURES. The communications of the 1st Marines during Phase I of the Scotland II Campaign consisted of two main systems, namely one for the assaulting battalions and one for the area security and blocking battalions. The former required an all portable and highly mobile capability, while the fixed and semi-fixed battalions utilized additional heavier transportable equipment to provide telephone and secure speech radio communications. Up to six infantry battalions were under the operational control of the regiment during the conduct of the operation, which required a slight expansion of the communication system plus particular attention being given to radio net discipline. Special techniques employed that have become routine within the 1st Marines for heliborne assaults were use of the TACP Local Secondary frequency for the Helicopter assault Radio Net, and a separate LZ Common intended to be used exclusively within the regiment for resupply at all HST locations down to the company level. Additionally, the TACP Local Secondary frequency was utilized to provide a backup TACP net when the action became heavy in several of the battalion areas of operation. Extensive ground controlled close air strikes were employed, utilizing the new test UHF radio, the AN/PRC-93, for communication with the strike aircraft. To ensure positive communication throughout the duration of the operation, each battalion was required to carry a minimum of two RC-292 antennas and pay particular attention to the communication aspects of terrain in the selection of their CP locations.

2. COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE OPERATION WERE:

a. Poor communication security on voice radio nets, primarily on the TACP Local and LZ Common. Valuable tactical information was divulged in conversations between ground stations, air observers, and the resupply helicopters. The regiment issued a cautionary message to all 1st Marine units, and requested TF Hotel to inform the Airwing of the problem so as to minimize compromise of tactical information by air observers and helicopter pilots. TF Hotel then issued a message to both regiments, info 1st Wing in an attempt to stem the flow of sensitive tactical information over voice radio circuits. Additional improvement can still be obtained by proper indoctrination of pilots and aerial observers working with the regiment.

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b. Congested Air-Support Nets. Upon the entry of the 4th Marines into the Scotland II AO, several of the 4th Marines battalions who had been under the operational control of the 1st Marines continued to use the 1st Marines LZ Common Net, and occasionally the TACP Local Net. This caused confusion and congestion on the 1st Marines nets. The solution, of course, is to provide each regiment engaged in operations requiring extensive air support, frequencies enough to permit operation of the additional nets utilized by 1st Marines, as discussed earlier.

c. Artillery Communications. The artillery communication of the regiment became totally saturated with the increased number of infantry battalions and direct support batteries during the latter stages of Phase I. It is essential that each infantry battalion engaged have a clear Battery Conduct of Fire Net. This problem was ultimately solved when Task Force Hotel provided the artillery battalion additional radios sufficient so that each battalion engaged could have its own Battery Conduct of Fire Net.

3. LESSONS LEARNED

a. Aerial observers and pilots participating in an operation should be pre-briefed on the tactical situation, friendly disposition of troops, and current operational plans. This then precludes the necessity for discussing these matters in the clear over voice radio circuits.

b. When engaged in an operation requiring extensive air support, two additional radio nets are necessary for the conduct of the operation: These are named, within the 1st Marine Regiment, the Helicopter Force Assault Net and the Landing Zone Common Net.

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COMMENTS BY 4TH MARINES (-)(REIN)

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Planning Guidance for the operation was to travel as light as possible and yet carry out the assigned mission of the regiment. Radio communications was declared as the primary means of communication. A total of 6 infantry and air nets were established which included a KY-8 capability on the tactical nets.

2. The availability of CH-53 helicopters to move the AN/MRC 110 radio jeep and power supply for the KY-8 covered was very critical. The delay in moving the AN/MRC-110 from Khe Sanh to LZ Robin for almost two days caused some difficulty in initially maintaining a covered capability on the one (1) TF Hotel tactical net. If a covered capability is directed, the lifting of the AN/MRC-110 and the fuel resupply of this vehicle should receive a high priority. In one case it took 2 days before a resupply of fuel was received.

3. A division wide call sign and frequency change, promulgated without the knowledge of some of the units, caused undue problems during the last day of the operation. It is recommended that division wide Call Sign and Frequency changes be made before or after any large operation. In one case a unit was in heavy contact with the enemy and could not change.

4. One unit had some difficulty in establishing direct communications with the regiment due to the non-availability of long range antennas (RC-292). It is recommended that all units insure that their plans call for all necessary communication equipment to carry out their assigned mission.

5. Voice Radio Relay equipment would have eliminated a considerable amount of the traffic that went out over tactical circuits.

It is recommended that the new multiple equipment associated with the AN/PRC-25 be made available as soon as possible. This component is easily transportable, battery-operated and is less cumbersome than the AN/MRC-62 and the AN IRC-27 radio relay equipment.

6. All battalions under the operational control of the 1st Marines remained on the 1st Marines Landing Zone Common Net.

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It is recommended that all regiments be assigned a separate frequency for usage on a Regimental LZ Common Net, this frequency to be other than the TACP frequency.

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ADDENDUM:

Comments by Commanding Officer 4th Marines

1. Rather than try to cover all items across the board, I will confine my remarks to the following subjects:

Fire Base

Intelligence

Tactics

The Parent Regiment

2. FIRE BASE. "Robin South" confirmed that fire base techniques are well within the operational scope of the Marine Corps, both conceptually and doctrinally. There are, of course, modifications which must be made in our operations and logistics. The latter points up the need for "prepackaging" of supplies and equipment earmarked for the fire base. Standard units of materials need to be staged, to include hand tools, field fortifications, bunker materials and other items standard to this type of operation. Small dozers and backhoes, helicopter transportable, should be included in the Marine Corps inventory to eliminate reliance on Army lift. Experience will improve our ability to manage the fire base concept. "Robin South" gave us a running start.

3. INTELLIGENCE. There never seemed to be a systematic application of intelligence means at anytime during the operation. As a commander I felt frustrated in any attempt to base tactical decisions on hard intelligence. Fast readouts of photo, SLAR, IR, and sensors were not available. POW's were long delayed in the evacuation chain, resulting in their information being of little except historical value. VR for commanders at all levels was nearly non existent. Timeliness must be the key to future intelligence gathering in future operations of this type. While it is easy to fault intelligence as being too little and too late, a definite and special need for improvement is apparent at all levels of command.

4. TACTICS. Except for fire bases, the tactics employed in "Robin South" are similar to those used successfully in operations by the 4th Marines against the 27th Independent Regiment southeast of Camp Carroll. Two basic principles are: keep on the move, and make full use of supporting fires.

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5. THE PARENT REGIMENT. To my knowledge, this was the first opportunity for the 4th Marines to operate as a "Regiment" in the last 18 months. An indefinable but inherent sense of pride and esprit seems to develop when the regiment operates as an entity. The separate parts add up to the greater whole. This is, of course, true of other regiments too. The long range application of this practice can result in greater efficiency and standardization. It is known that this is the intent division wide - and I hope it comes to pass.

6. LOGISTICS. For "logistics" read "helicopters", for in this type of operation there is no substitute or alternative. Much has been said today about the helicopter in its supporting role. My general observation is that it excelled in the surge effort but sometimes fell short on the routine efforts. In summary, the entire effort was a fine display of air-ground teamwork.

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SUMMARY BY MAJOR GENERAL DAVIS

I consider the critique just held an essential part of the operation. I shall confine my remarks primarily to its impact on future operations.

The point of sufficient planning time was emphasized by many. Recognizing the advantages of lengthy planning time, we must also understand that operations must retain maximum flexibility, reacting swiftly to a detected or developing enemy situation. Normally, extensive planning time will be the exception rather than the rule. We must develop SOP's for this type of operation and support; when the opportunity presents itself to hit the enemy hard, we must be ready to deploy and operate with a minimum of "paper preparation."

As we develop and refine techniques for these operations, our constant goal must be to improve our efficiency. I have already observed this objective being achieved in the latter stages of the just completed operation. Basically, we must strive to get the job done better with fewer assets.

Our concept is sound in view of current enemy tactics. We do not want to be in a position to attack uphill against a well dug-in, well camouflaged enemy who, under these conditions, could hold up and inflict casualties on up to one of our battalions with one of his platoons. Instead we must follow closely on the heels of heavy LZ preparatory fires, insert our helicopterborne force on or near the tops of hills and attack down these hills along multiple routes. On several occasions this practice caused the enemy to vacate positions that would have been extremely difficult and costly to assault.

I had and still have misgivings about certain of our capabilities to conduct operations of this sort. An ability to make a close air reconnaissance of our area of operations in order to select the best possible LZ's, free from significant enemy presence and enemy observed fires, and free from physical obstacles is absolutely mandatory. We must avoid situations where our troop-loaded helicopters are first to test the route and the LZ. We must have one responsible officer able to say confidently based on scouting operations that the LZ is clear, and that there is a safe way in and out for the helicopters. Who that officer is to be -- possibly a VMO Commander -- has yet to be determined.

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Another area for improvement is in the development of the fire support bases. Currently we don't move quickly enough in readying these bases for the artillery batteries. Engineering development requires heavy equipment -- which is helicopter transportable. Gun pits plus portable bunkers for command and control and overhead cover for infantry and artillery troops are needed, all within the first day. Ammunition storage must be defiladed and dispersed. The artillery should be in place and firing by dark on D-Day. We must continue to rely on the Army helicopter "crane" particularly in the high altitude mountainous areas, for the insertion of heavy engineer equipment and medium artillery.

Delay in troop landing following preparation fires and delay in establishing fire support bases sacrifices our most valuable commodity in operations of this sort: Shock Effect! We must develop and standardize techniques and procedures that insure the rapid and efficient concentration of men and materials to fully exploit our technological advantages over the enemy.

Looking forward to new but similar operations, I add these random comments:

(1) Efforts are being made through command channels to insure a greater responsiveness of arclights (massive air activities) which complement the scheme of maneuver. Progress is being made.

(2) In view of the current enemy situation and considering his limited capabilities, we can afford to be bold. There is no need to withhold a reserve battalion in each regiment -- all battalions can be committed. We have the ability to extract the forces least engaged and employ them where needed. In an unusual situation, forces can be requested from outside our AO. The more units initially employed the greater our shock action on the enemy and reduction of his routes of escape.

(3) Commanders must pay particular attention to the location of friendly artillery and the ability to detect and counter enemy artillery. Can our artillery be emplaced at existing static positions prior to the operation? Where does artillery have to be inserted? Will the 4.2 inch mortar battery, with its mobility and comparatively minimal site development requirement, do the support job for us in selected fire support bases? Or, will we require the range capability of 105mm or 155mm

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batteries? Can artillery be on a flank to minimize coordination problems with helicopters? Has counter-mortar radar been requested to scan danger areas? Do we have adequate on-station aerial surveillance? Are we using the latest of our available detection devices (sound systems, Mithras Fire Watch)?

Looking back on the Scotland II June campaign, I consider it a magnificent success. The air and ground effort was truly outstanding -- both elements being especially responsive to short notice employment. I commend Gen HOFFMAN and his staff, the commanders and staffs of the 1st and 4th Marines, Gen HILL and the 1st MAW, the artillery units from the 12th Marines and all other participants for their contribution to the success of this operation. Thank you also for your preparation and presentation of this critique. Due to this exchange of information, I know subsequent operations will be even better.

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/LRB/wlk
18 June 68

DIVISION MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List (Special)

Subj: Critique of Scotland II Campaign

Encl: (1) Critique Schedule

1. Purpose. To conduct a critique on the Scotland II Campaign in order to profit by experience gained and to thereby improve techniques for future operations. Specifically, to present and discuss lessons learned during the past operation, to identify problem areas and strong points, to further develop procedures and techniques for air mobile operations, and to facilitate an interchange of information.


2. Background. From 2-18 June, TF Hotel conducted operations south of Route #9 in the Scotland II Campaign involving extensive helicopter troop lift, the establishment of forward fire support bases, and the logistical support of up to two regiments conducting simultaneous operations.

3. Action.

- a. Commanding General, Task Force Hotel, his staff and representatives from regiments that were in the operation are requested to participate in the critique generally covering the topics and following the schedule outlined in enclosure (1).
- b. Representatives of the Commanding General, 1st MAW are requested to participate in the critique as outlined in enclosure (1).
- c. The time and place of the critique will be announced by separate message.
- d. It is requested that briefers prepare written versions of presentations for consolidation and subsequent publication.

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4. Self-Cancellation. 30 June 1968



Wm. L. DICK
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)

DISTRIBUTION:

Each Person or Staff Billet Cited in Enclosure (1).

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CRITIQUE SCHEDULE

0900-0905	Deputy C/S (Plans): Critique Coordinator Introduction
0905-0915	CG, TF Hotel Scope of Operation
0915-0925	TF Hotel Staff <u>Operations:</u> Planning; Tactics Employed; Use of Forces; Size; Type Units; Air and Ground Coordination; Selection of Fire Support Bases.
0925-0935	Regt Comment: 1st and 4th Marines: Operations
0935-0950	TF Hotel Staff <u>Intelligence:</u> Collection and Analysis; Allocation of Tasks; Recon- naissance; Processing of Information; Speed, Timeli- ness and Application of Intelligence by Operating Units; Use of AO Assets; POW, Document and Material Exploitations; Use and Availability of Sensor Devices.
0950-1000	Regt Comment: 1st and 4th Marines: Intelligence
1000-1005	TF Hotel Staff <u>Personnel:</u> Casualty Reporting; Replace- ments
1005-1010	Regt Comment: 1st and 4th Marines: Personnel
1010-1025	TF Hotel Staff <u>Logistics:</u> Helo Resupply Procedures and Techniques; Medical Evacuation of Personnel; Surface Resupply (including security); Adequacy of Class V Lifted to Various Positions; Lead Time Requirements for Airlifted Resupply.

Enclosure (1)

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1025-1035 Regt Comment: 1st and 4th Marines:
Logistics

1035-1045 Break

1045-1055 AWC, 1st MAW Scope of Air Operations

1055-1110 TF Hotel Staff Air Operations:
Helicopter Utilization;
Helicopter Availability;
Types of Helicopters for
Specific Missions; VR
Aircraft; Fixed Wing.

1110-1120 Regt Comment: 1st and 4th Marines:
Air Operations

1120-1130 TF Hotel Staff/12th Marines Artillery/FSC:
Support in
Multiple LZ
Operations;
Establishment
of Fire Support
Bases; Counter-
battery Require-
ments; Air/Arty
Fire Support
Coordination.

1130-1140 Regt Comment: 1st and 4th Marines:
Artillery/FSC

1140-1145 TF Hotel Staff Communications:
Problems/Solutions

1145-1150 Regt Comment: 1st and 4th Marines:
Communications

1150-1215 Division Staff: Question, Answer, Discussion:
G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, AirO,
FSCC, CEO.

Additional attendees invited: COs and S-3s of 3d and
9th Marines, COs of
separate Bns, 3d MarDiv.

Enclosure (1)

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THIRD MARDIV



Handwritten notes and stamps:

RECEIVED
 10 JUN 68
 ACTION
 Should be
 6-4
 Copy to South
 Opn Charlie

PP RUMHFL
 DE RUMHVP 708A 1710401
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P 190401Z JUN 68
 FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
 TO ZEN/CG 3D MARDIV
 INFO ZEN/1ST MARINES
 RUMHFL/FLSG-BRAVO
 BT

190542/1ST MAR/10

SECRET
 RETROGRADE MOVEMENT KHE SANH BASE
 A. 3D MARDIV OP-PLAN 20-68

1. REF (A) PROVIDES INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE RETROGRADE/DESTRUCTION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT, DEPENDING UPON WHETHER THE ITEM CAN BE ECONOMICALLY SALVAGED.

2. THIS COMMAND DOES NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY TRAINED PERSONNEL TO MAKE THIS DETERMINATION, THEREFORE IT IS REQUESTED THAT CONTACT TEAMS BE PROVIDED ASAP TO IDENTIFY AND MARK EQUIPMENT/MATERIAL SUITABLE FOR RETROGRADE AND REPAIR.

3. COMMODITY AREAS IN WHICH TEAMS ARE REQUESTED ARE:

- | | |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| A. ORDNANCE | C. COMM - ELECT |
| B. MOTOR TRANSPORT | D. ENGINEER |

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 D 192335Z JUN 63
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC
 TO UUMSEA/III MAF COC
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LVT ASSETS

1. YR 300901Z MAY 63

2. LVT ASSETS AS SHOWN BELOW:

READ IN FOUR COLUMNS:

BEH	OH	OP	DL
000	7	6	11
005	84	69	15
001	3	1	2
00R	3	3	0

3. LVT'S CURRENTLY ARE USED FOR USMC COMBAT PATROLS CUA VIET JONES CREEK, SOUTH OF CUA VIET ON SHORE LINE. NORTH TO C-4, NHI HA (VIC YD 271703). THEY ARE USE AS LOGISTIC VEHICLES FOR UNITS DEPLOYED ALONG JONES CREEK, NHI HA, AND VILLE AREA DAI O (VIC YD 255623). FURTHER PROVIDE MEANS OF COVERED MEDEVAC TO SECURE ZONES FOR HELO MEDEVAC.

BT

BT


4. FORMAT LINE TEN SHOULD READ:

000 7 6 1

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SHOVE COC
 CP CHIEF
 G-3 W.O.
 G-2 W.O.
 DCPD
 APO
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LVT folder



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ZNR UUUUU
P 300901Z MAY 68
FM III MAF COC
TO UUMHVP/THIRD MARDIV COC
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UNCLAS

LVT-5 OPERATIONAL STATUS

9. REQUEST PRESENT STATUS OF LVT'S OPCON 3D MARDIV TO INCLUDE
OPERATIONAL STATUS AND CURRENT EMPLOYMENT.
BT

TO R 310200H May 1968
COC

Other
COC

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>C</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>N</i>
CCPO	
APD	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>No p/sal</i>

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
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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



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P 170829Z JUN 68
FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
LVTP-5 AUGMENTATION FOR 3D AMTRAC BN
A. CG 3D MARDIV 281239Z MAY 68
B. CG III MAF 3000901Z MAY 68
1. REF A REQUESTED LVT PLT THAT WAS FURNISHED TO 3D AMTRAC BN
IN OCT67 BE RETURNED TO 1ST AMTRAC BN. REF B REQUESTED
OPERATIONAL STATUS OF LVT AND CURRENT EMPLOYMENT.
2. ANSAAR TO REF A IS HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL ANSWER TO REF B IS
RECEIVED.

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) MAF
FPO San Francisco 96604

3/GCC/wlk
20 Jun 68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-3

From: G-3 Plans
To: G-3

Subj: Report of June 20th Meeting of the Quang Tri Province
Combined Rice Denial Sub-Committee

1. The undersigned attended the subject meeting as the G-3 representative for the 3d MarDiv rice denial operations.
2. In attendance were representatives from PCV, 1st Air Cav Div, Task Force Clearwater, MAG, Quang Tri Sector, and 3d MarDiv. Vietnamese attendance was quite high with the Commander Quang Tri Sector present.
3. Major HILL, USA, an advisor to the Quang Tri Sector, presented to the committee final figures on rice denial operations. These figures for districts within the province are as follows:

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>RICE TO BE HARVESTED</u>	<u>RICE HARVESTED</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>RICE PLACED IN SECURE STORAGE</u>
Cam Lo	1000T	962T	96%	950T
Gio Linh	1000T	700T	70%	500T
Tru Phong	7000T	6970T	99.5%	4870T
Mai Linh	2000T	1890T	94.5%	1650T
Hai Lan	6306T	6273T	97%	5106T
TOTAL	17,306T	16,795T	97%	13,076

Rice placed in secure storage does not account for the rice given to each farmer as their own. It was reported also that rice caches in the Hai Lan area are being found and that probably they will continue to be found for some time.

4. The Committee Chairman, Colonel LOPRETE, reported that the rice harvested to date completes this seasons rice harvest and that the figures presented by Major HILL represent the final rice denial operation figures. Colonel LOPRETE emphasized the need for committee action for the small rice harvest commencing this September as well as early action by the committee for the 1969 rice harvest. It was emphasized

that the 1968 rice harvest was considerably more successful than ones conducted in previous years. Success was contributed to the U.S.-ARVN rice denial operations.

5. The committee was adjourned with instructions that no further meetings should be called until approximately the first week in August.

Respectfully submitted,



G. C. COOK
LtCol USMC
Asst Plans Officer

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DRAFTER 3P/255/WIC
SECTION 3P PHONE 203
THIRD MARDIV CWO

IMMEDIATE 260804 Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOURTH AIR DIV, TSN
(ATTN: TAC OPNS)
INFO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
CG FIRST MAW
CG PCV

//SECRET//

UNIT MOVEMENT

1. INTENTION THIS HQ TO ADOPT A COMPLETELY MOBILE POSTURE
IN KHE SA.H AREA. STATIC DEFENSE PSNS WILL BE DESTROYED AND
COMBAT BASE ABANDONED. TENANT UNITS ARE REQUESTED TO RELOCATE

AS SOON AS CONVENIENT BUT NLT 27 JUNE 1968. IN NEAR FUTURE
TASK FORCE HOTEL STAFF WILL MOVE TO LZ STUD AREA FROM ~~WHICH~~

FUTURE OFFENSIVE OPNS IN KHE SANH AREA WILL BE DIRECTED.

THERE IS ^{NO} REQUIREMENT FOR ^{YOUR DETACHMENT} ~~AT LZ STUD.~~

~~FOR THE ASSIGNED CONTROL ELEMENTS.~~

~~FOR THE ASSIGNED CONTROL ELEMENTS.~~

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RP Davis

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FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO ZEN/CG 3D MARDIV
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SUMMARY OF RECOVERY OPERATIONS AAT LZ LOON 17 JUNE '68

1. 3D BN 9THMAR (2) WAS ASSIGNED THE MISSION OF RECOVERING THE BODIES IN AA CH-46 WHICH CRASHED AND BURNED ON 6 JUNE VIC LZ LOON (XD 876334), OF EVACUATING EIGHT BODIES OF 1STBN 4THMAR WHO HAD BEEN KILLED IN ACTION AT LZ LOON ON 6 JUNE AND OF RECOVERING TWO PIECES OF U.S. ARMY ENGINEER EQUIPMENT DAMAGED DURING THE HEAVY CONTACT IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF ROBIN SOUTH.

2. ATTACHED TO 34421 WAS COMPANY C, 1STBN 4THMAR. THIS ORGANIZATION KNEW THE GROUND BEST. AA HELIBORNE ASSAULT WAAS CONDUCTED ON LZ LOON AT 170900H WITH COMPANY C, 1STBN 4THMAR LANDING FIRST, FOLLOWED BY COMPANY L, M, AND I, AND THE CP GROUP OF 3/9. AN EXTENSIVE TPO, QAS AND AR Y PREP PRECEDED THE ATTACK.

3. COMPANY C SECURED THE ZONE AND MOVED TO THE LOCATION

200920Z JUN 68 A-G-3

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 760 CONFIDENTIAL

OF THE DOWNED HELICOPTER. THE HELICOPTER WHICH HAD CRASHED WITH ELEVEN ABOARD HAD BURNED TO THE GROUND AND ONLY A FEW CHARRED REMAINS COULD BE EXTRACTED. THE EXTREME HEAT OF THE HELICOPTER FIRE DESTROYED ALMOST ALL EVIDENCE OF HUMAN REMAINS. ALL PIECES OF BODIES WERE EXTRACTED, TAGGED, AND PLACED IN BODY BAGS. EIGHT OTHER BODIES WHICH HAD BEEN READY FOR EVAC DURING THE HEIGHT OF FIGHTING ON 6 JUNE WERE RECOVERED AND A THOROUGH SEARCH WAAS MADE OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA BY ALL UNITS. TOTAL RECOVERED WERE EIGHT COMPLETE BODIES AND THREE BODY BAGS FILLED WITH PARTIAL REMAINS.

4. NONE NVA BODIES WERE FOUND IN GROVES ON THE HILL PLUS MUCH NVA 782 EQUIPMENT SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE AREA. FOUR SLING LOADS WERE EXTRACTED FROM LZ LOON. ONE SLING LOAD OF WATER CANS, A SLING LOAD OF USMC 782 AND TOOLS, A PALLET OF 60MM MORTAR AMMUNITION, AND ONE SLING LOAD OF RAMMINS. NONE OF THIS HAD BEEN BOOBYTRAPPED BY THE ENEMY. ALL SLING LOADS EXTRACTED WERE TAKEN TO LZ STUD.

5. CG 1ST AIRCAVDIV SENT LTCOP HENRY TO LZ LOON TO CHECK
K

PAGE THREE RUMHVP 760 CONFIDENTIAL

HIS BULLDOZER AND BACKHOE. WE EVACUATED BOTH THESE ITEMS VIA U.S. ARMY CRANE. HE DECIDED TO LEAVE THE DOZER'S BLADE AT LZ LOON DUE TO EXTENSIVE DAMAGE.

6. THE HILL WAS EVACUATED BY 171515H JUNE 1968 WITH NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES ON THE BATTALION OPERATION THAT DAY.

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200920Z JUN 68

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THIRD MARDIV

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O 200923Z JUN 68

FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

TO ZEN/CG 3D MARDIV

BT

SECRET

1. THE NEW ROAD IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE SCOTLAND II AO COMMENCES ON THE EAST BANK OF THE XE PON RIVER AT XD76237. IT IS AN EXTENSION OF A ROAD LEADING OFF RTE 92 IN LASOS. THE RIVER CROSSING APPEARS TO BE AN UNDERWATER ROCK CAUSEWAY. THE ROAD RUNS ALMOST DUE EAST FOR 14.2 KILOMETERS AS IT GENERALLY FOLLOWS OLD TRAILS UNTIL IT SWINGS NORTH AT XD900227. IT CONTINUES IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION FOR 8.4 KILOMETERS ALONG OLD TRAILS AND ALONG THE BANKS OF CREEKS TO XD 916296 WHERE IT AGAIN SWINGS EAST FOR APPROXIMATELY 2.8 KILOMETERS TO

OMEERS TO

XD9426 AT WHICH POINT THE ROAD ABRUPTLY ENDS. THE TOTAL LENGTH OF THE ROAD, EAST OF XE PON RIVER, IS 25.4 KILOMETERS AND THE REPORTED WIDTH VARIES FROM 5 TO 6 METERS. NUMEROUS WELL TRAVELED FEEDER TRAILS ARE NOTED THROUGHTOUT THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE ROAD.

200923Z JUN 68 A G-2

G-3/KOC

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 757 SECRET

NUMEROUS FOOTTRAILS, VARYING IN LENGTH FROM 40 TO 200 METERS, PARALLEL THE ROAD.

A. VEHICLE TURN AROUND POINTS/TRUCK PARKS ARE LOCATED AT:

XD787233	DAIRWEO
XD811232	XD851241
XD818232	XD857238
XD815233	XD868228
XD836238(TWO WAY BY PASS)	XD874227
XD800232	XD900-28

B. TWO FORDS ARE LOCATED AT:
XD806237 XD859237

C. THE FILLS/CORDUROYS AND CULVERTS ARE THE MOST CRITICAL POINTS ALONG THE ROAD:

(1). FILLS AT THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES:

XD857230	XD894226
XD805231	XDAIOWWU
XD882227	

(2). CORDUROYS AT:

XD812232	XD858237
----------	----------

SECRET

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THIRD MARDIV

PAGE THREE RUMHP 757 S E C R E T

(3). CULVERTS AT:

XD816233

XD828238

D. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TRACKED AND WHEELED VEHICLES UP TO 30 TONS COULD BE SUPPORTED ON THIS ROAD.
 2. PERMANENT DENIAL OF THE USE OF THE ROAD TO THE ENEMY ALONG ITS EXISTING ROUTE IS IMPACTFUL. CRATERING AND DESTRUCTION OF FILLS/CO

DU

OYSWOU

D HA

EL

AS THE SURROUNDING AREA OFFERS EASY BY PASS FOR SUCH DESTROYED AREAS, AND REPAIRS COULD BE MADE WITH MINIMUM DELAY. MINING THE ROAD PROPER WITH AIR DELIVERED MINES WILL HARRASS THE ENEMY, BUT WILL HAVE LITTLE PERMANENT EFFECT IN DEPRIVING USE OF THE ROAD.

3. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT, WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRIENDLY FORCES FROM THE VICINITY OF THE ROAD, AIR DELIVERED ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES (M-36 DESTRUCTORS) AND GRAVEL BE SEEDED. SENSOR STRINGS BEGINNING AT THE XE PON RIVER WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION AS TO THE ENEMY'S USE OF THE ROAD. SURVEILLANCE OF THE ROAD SHOULD INFORM US WHEN THE ENEMY RESUMES CONSTRUCTION AND WHERE THE ROAD IS DESTINED TO LEAD.

PAGE FOUR RUMHVP 757 S E C R E T

OS GAS WILL BE REQUESTED TO BE DELIVERED WHEN SENSORS INDICATE THAT ENEMY HAS RESUMED ACTIVITY IN THE AREA.

GP-4

BT


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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



MOVE CAC
 CHIEF _____
 S-3 W.O. _____
 C.O.C. _____
 DCPD _____
 WPO _____
 ACTION NAP/SAL

DRAFTER 3/HMH/litSEC G-3 PHONE DIV CCGCWO SRyIMMEDIATE 201034 Z JUN68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: THIRD MARINES
 INFO: CTF CLEARWATER 004413

//CONFIDENTIAL//

SECURITY FOR DREDGING OPS

A. CG PCV 130904 Z JUNE 1968

1. REF A READDRESSSED TO YOU FOR YOUR ACTION.
2. REPORT ANY REQUESTED CHANGES TO PRESENT POSTURE FOR APPROVAL THIS HQ.

GP-4

CCN 1855RELEASED BY J. L. MuckeSTAND SRy

G-3

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STRENGTH REPORT FOR
QUANG TRI AREA

21 June 1968

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	OFFICERS				STAFF				E-5 & BELOW			
	MC	USN	USA	USAF	MC	USN	USA	US/USAF	MC	USN	USA	USAF
Hq Bn	106	7			85	4			221	21		
3d MT Bn	14				20	2			195	12		
3d SP Bn	15	1			24	1			194	10		
3d TK Bn	13				26	2			217	6		
1 Recon Bn	24	1			32	2			467	45		
3d Engr Bn	17	3			22	2			251	10		
5th ITT	2				2				2			
7th CIT	2		1		5				3		1	
FLSG-B	1				2				37	1		
VMGR-152					1				1			
MAG-39	173	4			129	3			915	10		
1/3 Rear	5	1			13	4			218	8		
3/12 Rear	6				6				91	5		
1/26 Rear	2				6				68	2		
2/26 Rear	6	1			13	3			110	13		
3/26 Rear	1				9	1			50	2		
Hq 26th Mar Rear	1								7			
2/9 Rear	3				6				76	10		
3/9 Rear	4	1			17	1			199	5		
1/13 Rear	2				3				23	1		
"W" Btry	4				2				57	1		
1 MP Bn	4				5				82			
3d Dental Co.		8				6				15		
3d Med Bn		4				6			22	22		2
MCB-11		24			1	83				655		
CBMU-301		1				6				34		
1st Air Cav			1								2	
1st FltCo "A" 44th FA			1					1			34	
507th MACV TMA								1			3	
588th Signal Co			7					16			88	
18th Surgical			39					14			76	
26th GenSupGrp			36					61			507	
Skyspot O.L. 25				6								59
15th Aerial Port										9		

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end
125

1st Mobile Comm Grp
 5th TAC
 Forward Air Controllers

OFFICERS				STAFF				E-5 & BELOW			
USMC	USN	USA	USAF	MC	USN	USA	USAF	MC	USN	USA	USAF
			1				4				16
			1				1				8
			11				2				12
405	56	85	19	429	126	93	7	3506	888	711	106

USA 85
 USN 56
 USMC 405
 USAF 19
565

USA 804
 USN 1014
 USMC 3935
 USAF 113
5866

GRAND TOTAL
 6431=

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DECLASSIFIED

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CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



CHIEF OF
C-3 W O
CO
ACTION

Clearwater

BY 115 Z BYWTKSBYWSZTTZVA 290VV NHA653

RR RUMHVP
DE RUMHN 033B UEQPER
ZNY CCCCC
R 210930Z JUN 68
FM CTF CLEARWATER
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF
INFO RUMHMA/CG PVC PHU BAI
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

451/22

UMHVP/CO THIRD MARINES
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

N IONAL POLICE ON CUA VIET RIVER (U)

1. REQ ACTION BE INITIATED TO PROVIDE NATIONAL POLICEMEN TO ACCOMPANY PA ROLS CUA VIET RIVER AND ADJACENT VILLAGES FROM DONG HA TO RIVER MOUTH. PRO VC/NVA SENTIMENT AMONG THE LOCAL POPLUACE, ESPECIALLY IN XU N KHANH VI LAGE (YD 317696), NECESSITATES MORE THROUGH POLICING THAN CAN BE PROVIDED BY US FORCES.

2. PROVISION OF NATIONAL POLICEMEN TO RIDE PATROL CRAFT ON THE RIVER AND TO WORK WITH USMC/VNN SWEEP TEAMS WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO LOGISTIC TRAFFIC ON THIS VITAL LOC.

3. SIMI AR PROGRAM ON PERFUME RIVER VERY SUCESSFUL

GP-4

BT

210930Z JUN 68 G-3

Stand 900

21

CONFIDENTIAL

30

Encl 126

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

CWO

GDP

IMMEDIATE 210932 Z JUN68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG FIRST ACD
 THIRD MARINES
 INFO: CG PCV

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. EFFECTIVE 200730HJUN68, CG THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON
 OF A TRP 3D BN 5TH CAV FROM THIRD MARINES AND SAME DTG PASSES
 A TRP 3D BN 5TH CAV TO 1ST ACD.

2. EFFECTIVE 200730HJUN68, CG THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON
 OF C TRP 3D BN 5TH CAV FROM 1ST ACD AND SAME DTG PASSES
 OPCON THAT UNIT TO THIRD MARINES.

GP-4

GCN

2000

G-3(12 copies)

RELEASED BY

A. L. Mickey
 Stand GDP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

DRAFTER JAD/gln
SEC G-3 PHONE DIV COG
CWO THIRD MARDIVIMMEDIATE 210934 Z JUN68FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. EFF 191130H JUN68, CG THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON OF
2/9, 1/4, 2/4 AND 1/12 AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON OF THESE
UNITS TO CG TF HOTEL.

2. EFF 191130H JUN68 RESPONSIBILITY FOR SCOTLAND II AO
EXTENDED PASSES TO CG TF HOTEL. NEW BOUNDARY AS FOLLOWS:
FM DMZ SOUTH ON XD N/S LINE 85 TO XD850506 THEN SOUTHEAST
TO XD857500, EAST ON 50 EW GL TO A POINT 088500 THEN ALONG
A LINE ROUGHLY 500METERS WEST & PARALLEL TO RTE 558 TO A POINT ^{AT} YD
110470 THEN SOUTH ALONG THE THIRD MARDIV/FIRST AIR CAV BDY AND
SOUTHWEST TO THE LAOTIAN BORDER AT YD007280.

GP-4

CCN 2001REL BY A.L. McLean

G-3 (12 copies)

Standby

21

09

34

JUN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

DATE 3/WHD/jvp
SEC G-3 PHONE DIV COC
CWO

IMMEDIATE

211410

Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
FOURTH MARINESRECEIVED
22 JUN AM

//SECRET//

OPERATIONAL REPORTS

A. CG 3D MARDIV 070325Z JUN68

1. REF A PASSED RESPONSIBILITY FOR LANCASTER II AO TO 9TH MARINES.
REQUIRED 4TH MARINES TO SUBMIT SPEC REPS AND REQUIRED CG TASK FORCE
HOTEL TO SUBMIT THESE SPEC REPS TO THIS HQ SEPARATELY. *Lancaster II*2. PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF REF A, WHICH REQUIRED THESE SPEC REPS,
ARE CANCELLED EFF 201200H JUN68

GP-4

CCN

2042

G-3

REL BY

A. L. Michael

Standard

*SS**COC**16***SECRET**

211410Z Jun 68

Encl 129

SECRETDR
SECTION
CWO

FLASH

2COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

2 JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG PCV**FLASH**

//SECRET//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROSSON FROM LTJEN DAVIS
OPERATIONS AT KHE SANH

1. BACKGROUND. ON 31 MARCH 1968, OPERATION PEGASUS COMMENCED WITH USMC AND USA FORCES ATTACKING ALONG ROUTE #9 WEST FROM CA LU TOWARD KHE SANH. BY 15 APRIL, THE SEIGE OF KHE SANH HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY LIFTED AND OPN PEGASUS WAS TERMINATED. FAVORABLE WEATHER HAD PERMITTED FULL EXPLOITATION OF OUR COMPLETE AIR SUPERIORITY WHILE AGGRESSIVE AND MOBILE ARMY AND MARINE FORCES CLEARED THE HILLS SURROUNDING KHE SANH BASE, KILLING AND CAPTURING THE ENEMY, FINDING AND DESTROYING HIS SUPPLY CACHES AND FORTIFICATIONS. OPN SCOTLAND II COMMENCED ON 15 APRIL AND CONTINUES AT PRESENT.
2. FORCE LEVELS. OPN PEGASUS INCLUDED 7 USMC BNS, 8 ARMY BNS AND 3 ARVN BNS. THESE FORCES WERE IMMEDIATELY PHASED DOWN AT THE TERMINATION OF THE PEGASUS OPN. OPN SCOTLAND II COMMENCED WITH 2 ARMY BNS AND 4 MARINE BNS UNDER ~~TF~~ TF HOTEL (INITIALLY TF GLICK) CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST NVA FORCES IN THE AREA.

A-C-3 ONLY

1

FLASH

220200 Z Jun 68

SECRET

Encl 130

SECRET

IN MAY A MAJOR THREAT TO THE COASTAL COLON OF THE
 DIV AO WAS MET BY A DRAW-DOWN ON KHE SANH FORCES. THE ACD
 COMM CNTR THIRD MARDIV
 BRIGADE WAS COMMITTED AND DID NOT RETURN TO KHE SANH. 4 USMC
 BNS CONDUCTED OPNS AT KHE SANH UNTIL EARLY JUNE. IN JUNE A
 MAJOR OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE
 SCOTLAND II AO. TWO REGIMENTS WITH SEVEN BNS PARTICIPATED IN
 OPNS TO SELK OUT AND DESTROY THE ENEMY IN AREAS WHICH PREVIOUSLY
 HAD NOT BEEN PENETRATED BY FRIENDLY FORCES. ARTILLERY SUPPORT
 WAS COMMENSURATELY INCREASED AND FIRE SUPPORT BASES WERE
 ESTABLISHED. THESE OPNS WERE COMPLETED IN MID JUNE. 4 USMC
 BNS REMAIN IN THE KHE SANH AREA. ADDITIONAL BNS ALONG ROUTE #9
 WEST OF CA LU IN THE LANCASTER II AO SERVE TO AUGMENT THE
 ROAD SECURITY AND SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR THE REPOSITIONING OF
 FORCES. UPON COMPLETION OF THE TRANSITION TO A COMPLETELY
 MOBILE POSTURE, TWO BNS WILL REMAIN IN THE KHE SANH AREA.

3. EXTENT OF OPNS.

- A. DURING THE PAST 2½ MONTHS, OPERATIONS HAVE EXTENDED
 NORTH TO HILL 950 (XD 843456) AND JUST BEYOND HILL
 881N (XD 775458), SOME 9000 METERS FROM KSB. OPERATIONS
 EXTENDED WEST TO VICINITY LANG VEI (XD 793360) OVER
 8000 METERS FROM KSB AND WITHIN 2000 METERS OF THE
 LAOTIAN BORDER. TO THE SOUTH OPERATIONS EXTENDED TO
 XD 910265, ABOUT 17,000 METERS FROM KSB AND WITHIN
 4000 METERS OF THE LAOTIAN BORDER IN THAT DIRECTION.
- B. ADDITIONALLY, RECON PATROLS OPERATE WITHIN THE AREA
 BOUNDED BY XD 6958, XD 6652, XD 7729, XD 8523, XD 9930,

SECRET

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XD 9837, XD 904, XD 1871, IMMEDIATE ADVISORY TO
 THE LAOTIAN BORDER AND AT THIRD MARCH 23,000 METERS
 NORTHWEST FROM KSB.

C. AS THE MOBILE POSTURE IS ATTAINED, EFFORTS WILL BE
 MADE TO DENY THE ENEMY FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT THROUGH
 SURVEILLANCE AND INTERDICTION OF KNOWN ROAD NETS,
 AND THROUGH EMPLOYMENT OF GRAVEL MINES, SENSORS AND
 TEMPORARY OBSTACLES DESIGNATED TO CANALIZE THE ENEMY
 INTO AREAS THAT PERMIT MAXIMUM USE OF OUR SUPPORTING
 ARMS.

4. CASUALTIES. DURING THE PERIOD 1 APRIL UNTIL MID JUNE
 CASUALTIES INCURRED AND INFLICTED IN THE KHE SANH AREA WERE
 AS FOLLOWS:

		<u>U.S.</u>	<u>ARVN</u>
FRIENDLY:	KIA	431	33
	WIA	2313	187
ENEMY:	KIA	3097	
	POW	54	
	IWC	1047	
	CSWC	349	

GP-4

CCN

2052

REL BY

*A. L. Milner Jr.***SECRET**

THIRD MARDIV

N
OO RUMHVP

HDE RUMHMA 168 174033Z
ZNY SSSSS
O 220303Z JUN 68
FM CG PCV PHB
TO RUMUGR/CG III MAF DNG
INFO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN
RUMUFKA/CG 7TH AF SGN
RUMUHFA/COMNAVEFORV
RUHGUL/COM 7TH FLEET
RUMHVP/CG 3RD MAR DIV DGH
RUMHAW/CG 1ST MAW DNG
BT

SECRET 04075 AVII-CS

SUBJECT: VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO HQ PCV, 1400 HOURS 2162,3 1968

REF: FOR SA I CORPS 0 5050.4 OF 1 APR 68

1. (C) PRESENT:

USMACV: 7TH AF:
COMUSMACV DIR, TACC
DEPCOFS, J 3RD MAR DIV:
DEPCOFS, J CG
CHINFO 7TH FLT:
1ST MAW: REP, 7TH FLT

PCV:
CG
DCG
COFS

III MAF:
DEP CG (USA)
DEP CG (USMC)
DC/S (OPNS)
AC/S, G3
AC/S, G4

PAGE TWO UMMMA 168 S E C R E T
AWC REP. DET C

2. (U) DISCUSSIONS:

MAJOR SUBJECTS DISCUSSED ARE TITLED AND OUTLINED IN FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:

3. (S): KSCB PHASE DOWN:

A. COMUSMACV MADE AN OPENING STATEMENT SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: HE DESIRED THAT CG PCV PREPARE A SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS IN THE KHE SAHN AREA SINCE 1 APRIL 68. THIS SUMMARY SHOULD INCLUDE THE EXTENT OF OUR CONTINUING OPERATIONS NORTH, SOUTH, EAST AND WEST OF THE COMBAT BASE ITSELF. IT SHOULD INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT STATISTICS INDICATING THE OVERALL RESULTS OF THESE CONTINUING OPERATIONS. COMUSMACV THEN ASKED CG 3RD MAR DIV TO OUTLINE HIS PLAN FOR THE PHASE DOWN OF FORCES CURRENTLY OPERATING IN THE KHE SAHN AREA.

B. CO, 3RD MAR DIV RESPONDED BY OUTLINING PRESENT DISPOSITIONS, DISPOSITIONS DURING AN INTERMEDIATE PHASE, AND A FINAL POSTURE TO BE ACHIEVED EARLY IN JULY. HE STATED THAT HIS GOAL IN REGARD TO RETROGRADE OF EQUIPMENT WAS TO HAVE ALL NON-HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES REMOVED BY THE 25TH OF JUNE. HE INDICATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY OF SOME SLIPPAGE IN MEETING THIS DATE. A MAJOR CONCERN IS THE QUESTION OF LANDING STRIP MATTING. REMOVAL OF THE

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE THREE RUMHMA 168 S E C R E T
 MATTING WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL DAYS. BRIDGING ON ROUTE 9 WILL BE RECOVERED AND USE OF THE ROAD TERMINATED WHEN THE PHASE DOWN IS COMPLETE

C. THE FINAL POSTURE WILL POSTPON TWO BATTALIONS OPERATING TO THE WEST AND SOUTHWEST OF THE STUO-CA LL AREA. ECONOMY OF FORCE MEASURES MAY REDUCE THIS FORCE TO ONE BATTALION FOR GIVEN PERIODS OF TIME IN ORDER TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR MOBILE OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE IN THE 3RD DIVISION AO. HIS CONCEPT FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS IN THE KHE SANH AREA CALLS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO FIRE BASES POSITIONED NORTH AND SOUTH OF ROUTE 9 TO SUPPORT MOBILE, HELICOPTJ SUPPLIED UNITS OPERATING TO THE NORTH, WEST AND SOUTH. THESE FIRE BASES WILL BE EMPLOYED EXTENSIVELY. THEIR OPERATIONS WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO A ROAD DENIAL PLAN IN THE SALIENT SOUTH OF KHE SANH WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE USE OF SENSORS. GRAVEL BARRIERS WILL ALSO BE EMPLOYED WITH GAPS PLANNED TO PERMIT PASSAGE OF LONG RANGE PATROLS.

D. COMUSMACV APPROVED THE PLAN AND AUTHORIZED CG PCV TO PROCEED WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

E. CG PCV DISCUSSED THE EXPYOTPCE OF APPROXIMATELY 120 TONS OF

PAGE FOUR RUMHMA 168 S E C R E T
 RETROGRADE CATEGORY AMMUNITION BURIED ON THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE EAST END OF THE RUNWAY. FOLLOWING A DISCUSSION COMUSMACV AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE BLOWN IN PLACE. BASED ON ENGINEER ESTIMATES, RUNWAY MATTING WILL BE REMOVED TO THE POINT WHERE CRATERING WILL BE EXPECTED FROM THE DETONATION. OTHERWISE, RUNWAY MATTING WILL NOT BE REMOVED.

4. (S) OPERATION THOR:

A. COMUSMACV INQUIRED AS TO THE PROGRESS BEING MADE BY THE PLANNING GROUP NOW IN SESSION.

B. CG, PCV OUTLINED THE EVENTS OF THE MORNING PLANNING SESSION, AND THE STATUS OF PLAN DEVELOPMENT. HE THEN CALLED UPON THE DCG TO GIVE A REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE FORMED TO CONSIDER COMMAND AND COORDINATION MATTERS.

C. DCG REPORTED THAT THE BASIC REFERENCE HAD BEEN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-1 WHICH DEFINES THE EXISTING FORWARD BOMB LINE AND THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATED LINE. THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAD AGREED THAT THE LINES AS PRESENTLY DRAWN ARE APPROPRIATE AND ADEQUATE FOR PHASE I OF OPERATION THOR; FOR PHASE II AND III, HOWEVER, THE FORWARD BOMB LINE SHOULD BE REPOSITIONED TO COINCIDE WITH THE PRESENTLY DEFINED WEST AND NORTH BOUNDARIES OF THE CMLS. UPON COMMENCEMENT OF PHASE IV THE FORWARD BOMB LINE SHOULD REVERT TO THE PRESENT TRACE. DIRECTOR, 7TH AF TACC CONCURRED

SECRET

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE FIVE RUMHMA 168 S E C R E T
IN PRINCIPLE BUT RESERVED COMMITMENT UNTIL AFTER CONSULTATION WITH
CG, 7TH AF.

D. COMUSMACV INDICATED THAT THIS MATTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH
CG, 7TH AF UPON RETURN TO SAIGON, AND THAT APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE WOULD
FOLLOW.

E. IT WAS REPORTED THAT NO OTHER SUBCOMMITTEE HAD ENCOUNTERED
SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES AND THAT RESOLUTION OF THIS RECOMMENDATION
WAS THE ONLY MATTER REQUIRING COMMAND ATTENTION AT THIS TIME.

F. COMUSMACV INDICATED THAT FOR THOR PLANNING PURPOSES THE SORTIE
RATE FOR ARC LIGHTS WILL REMAIN 1800 PER MONTH. THIS IS NORMALLY
60 PER DAY, BUT THERE CAN BE "SURGE EFFORTS". HOWEVER, REDUCED RATES
MUST BE ACCEPTED FOR A TIME THEREAFTER.

HM KC) RELATIONSHIPS WITH NEWS MEDIA: RECAP OF DISCUSSION AND
GUIDANCE ISSUED WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGE.

GP-4

BT

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

FLASH

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APD

ACTION

Operation Charlie

ZNY SSSSS

Z 0 220425Z JUN 68

FM ZEN/TASK FORCE HOTEL COC

TO ZEN/THIRD MARDIV COC

TUR / 220530Z / 1ST MAR / 42

FOR COL DICK

ROL MSG SENT IN ADVANCE NORMAL RELEASE

FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

SECRET

SEVERAL NEWSMEN ARRIVED KSB 221015H WITH CIB REP.

ONE OR TWO DESIRE REMAAIN FEW DAAYS. PHOTOGRAPHING AND VISUAL OBSERVATIONS OF EVACUATION EFFORTS ARE OBVIOUS.

UNODIR INTEND REPLY QUOTE NO COMMENT END QUOTE TO

ALLHQUESTIONS RELATING TO EVAC/DESTRUCTION PLAN.

THREAT OF NEWSNEN VIOLATING GROUND RULES PARTICULARLY

STRONG CONSIDERING NEWS IMPACT INVOLVED BASIC

SSSUE.

GP-4

BT

Z 0 220425Z JUN

A-3

COC [signature]

22

04 25

FLASH

Encl 132

SECRET

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SECRET

COMM CNTR

DRAFTED BY:MS/NEW
THIRD MARDIV
TRANS TO:
CWO *gdp*IMMEDIATE 720958Z JUN 68FROM: CG 3D MARDIV
TO: 3D MARINES

//SECRET//

A. IF HOTEL MSG 201400Z JUN 68 (PASEP)

1. REQ YOU TAKE SUBPARAGRAPHS 2G, 2H, 2I, 2J, 2K, 2L, 2Q, 3A,
AND 3C OF REF A FOR ACTION IN SC FAR AS POSSIBLE.2. BASIC ~~REF A~~ INFO SHOULD REACH THIS HQS NLT 27 JUN 68 FOR
REPRODUCTION.

3. REQ ADVISE THIS HQS BY TELECON AVAILABILITY REQ INFO ASAP.

CCN 2097 RELEASED BY Spout

TIME

1510 22 JUN 68

G-2

Stand *gdp***SECRET**

Encl 133

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCFO

APO

ACTION

DRAFTER

3/WHD/jvp

SEC G-3

PHONE

DIV CCG

CWO

IMMEDIATE 230540 Z JUN68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
 HQ BN, THIRD MARDIV

//SECRET//

OPCON

1. CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON F AND H/2/3 WITH "B" CMD GRP
 EFF 201900H JUN68 AND PASSES SAME TO HQ BN EFF SAME DTG FOR
 SECURITY OF QUANG TRI ASP AND, AS AVAILABLE, TO ASSIST IN THE
 DEFENSE OF QTCB.

GP-4

CON 2137

REL BY

W Chapman

A-G-3

23

05

stand JG3

40

JUN

Encl 134

SECRET

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Copy of
3d Marine Division (Marine)
Da Nang, Quang Nam Province,
Vietnam
24 June 1968

TERRAIN STUDY OF THE NAPOLKON/SAI LUNG AREA

Ref: (a) 3d Mar Div SIS 20-67 (Central DMZ) (C)
(b) Maps: Vietnam AMS Series L7014, 1:50,000, Sheet 6442 IV

Encl: (1) Road and Trail overlay
(2) Infiltration Route overlay
(3) Trafficability overlay

1. General. The study area consists of coastal lowlands and delta plains and is divided into four segments. These segments are generally aligned with the coast and parallel on another. They progress inland from gently rolling sand beaches and dunes, to a low area of rice cultivation, to a flat sandy plain with no significant relief and finally to another narrow strip of rice cultivation immediately adjacent to National Highway #1. The boundaries for this study area are indicated on inclosure (1).

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

a. Relief. The study area from the Gulf of Tonkin inland to 4 kilometers is characterized by flat to gently rolling sand beaches with some steep sand dunes. Ground slopes are normally less than 10 percent and elevations are less than 10 meters. A dune strip rises toward the northwest forming a ridge with an average elevation of 20 meters from YD265760 to YD305705. Immediately adjacent to and west of the dune area is a low area of rice cultivation which averages 3 kilometers in width paralleling the dune area. This area consists of poorly drained areas of rice cultivation with elevations to 5 meters. The most prominent relief features are dikes that are commonly 0.5 to 2.0 meters high and 0.5 to 2.5 meters wide. Locally, the ground is rough and dissected by streams with steep banks, canals, and irrigation and drainage ditches. Further inland, from the foregoing area, terrain changes to a sandy plain with a width of 2 kilometers. This plain is virtually flat and interlaced with sporadic low areas that contain standing water. To the west and adjacent to National Highway #1 another strip of riceland extends inland for about 1,000 meters; it's characteristics are similar to the rice producing area described above. The most prominent terrain feature in the study area has an elevation of 46 meters (Hill 46) YD214743.

b. Drainage. Except for the sand dune area in the east (YD265760 to YD305705) most of the coastal plain is poorly drained and is subject to seasonal inundation. Principle drainage is provided by the Ben Hai, in the DMZ, and the Cua Viet Rivers; the waters of both are sluggish and flow eastward. The Ben Ngu (Jones' Creek YD2571) drains the ricelands between the Gulf of Tonkin and National Highway #1, and flows from northwest to southeast connecting the Ben Hai and Cua Viet Rivers. The Ben Ngu River is located approximately 6 kilometers inland and parallels the coast. Within the study area all rivers are navigable by small craft.

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c. Vegetation. Rice cultivation is the primary form of vegetation in the coastal lowlands. Along the coast, sand dunes are either barren or covered with clumps of dune grass. The coastal lowlands are open, seasonally inundated fields surrounded by dikes which are often lined with hedgerows. Individual rice paddies are commonly 400 to 4000 square meters in area. The remainder of the coastal lowland plains evidence grassland and brushwood and some thickets and undergrowth.

d. Surface Material. Sand dune areas are soft when wet but drain rapidly leaving the area saturated for only short periods of time during local rainstorms. In contrast, the ricelands are continuously wet and frequently flooded. Paddy soil is relatively firm when moist but soft and miry when wet.

e. Cultural Features. The study area contains villages and hamlets generally located along National Highway #1 and rivers traversing the area. Indigenous personnel are primarily engaged in rice cultivation.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

a. Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation and fields of fire are generally good to fair limited only by the spine of the sand dunes which parallel the coast and hedgerows surrounding the villages and rice paddies.

b. Cover and Concealment. The study area affords very little concealment from aerial observation. Sand dunes paralleling the coastline afford good cover from flat trajectory fire and fair concealment from ground observation. In riceland areas, maturing crops offer some concealment from ground observation.

c. Obstacles.

(1) Foot movement is slow in the soft sand and through maturing paddy.

(2) Tracked vehicles will usually be restricted by soft and miry paddy soil and numerous dikes and ditches.

(3) Rivers, streams, and canals are usually too deep to be forded by foot troops, wheeled vehicles, and tanks. Of particular note is the Ben Ngu River (YD2571, Jones' Creek) which presents a major barrier to lateral troop and vehicular movement. The river banks are gradual slopes and can be easily traversed by LVTP-5's.

4. KEY TERRAIN FEATURES

- a. Ben Hai River
- b. Ben Ngu River
- c. Cua Viet River

d. Higher terrain in the dunes area (YD2575 and YD2674) dominates surrounding areas and commands approaches into the northern hamlets bounded by the Ben Ngu River and the Gulf of Tonkin.

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
5. AVENUE OF APPROACH

a. In the study area, the network of navigable canals, streams and rivers affords the best means of approach.

Page 3 of 3 pages

SECRET

COMM CNTR



SHOVE

THIRD MARDIV

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DPO

APO

ACTION

8
COC
H
Thor

H

A2V VPA4901801

PP RUMHVP

ZNY SSSSS

PTTSZYUW RUMUGRA3331 1760814-SSSS--RUMHMA RUMHVP.

ZNY SSSSS

P R 240814Z JUN 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHB

INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: PSYOP SUPPORT FOR OPERATION "THOR" (U)

REF: A. CG, PCV MSG DTG 220950Z JUN 68

B. FORCE ORDER 3410.1B

1. (S) YOUR REQUEST REF A FOR MAXIMUM PSYOP SUPPORT TO EXPLOIT EFFECT OF MASSED FIREPOWER TO BE EMPLOYED IN OPERATION "THOR" APPROVED. III MAF PSYOPS RESOURCES PREPARED SUPPORT YOUR REQUIREMENTS.

2. (C) AS RESULT FORCE PSYOP OFFICER AND PSYOP OFFICE PCV, DISCUSSION, 7TH PSYOP BN HAS DEVELOPER THREE LEAFLETS AND WILL PRODUCE MINIMUM 15 MILLION LEAFLETS EXPLOITING TWO MUTUALLY AGREED THEMES (FIRE POWER, SAVE YOURSELF). ANTICIPATE TOTAL PRODUCTION COMPLETED NLT 1 JULY.

3. (S) MACV AUTHORITY FOR DELIVERY OUT OF COUNTRY TARGETS IN SUPPORT OPERATION "THOR" OBTAINED BY TELECON. SPECIFIC DETAILS FOR DISSEMINATION AND TOT SHOULD BE REQUESTED ACCORD REF B.

GP-4

BT P R 240814Z JUN 68

SECRET

240814Z JUN 68

2/3 2/3
 6
 Encl 136

SECRET

COMM1.CNTR

DRAFTER
THIRDS MARDIV
CWO3P/LRB/jvp
PHONE 203

24 69541 Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG TF HOTEL
 THIRD MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 HQ BN, THIRD MARDIV, QTCE
 TWELFTH MARINES
 FIRST AMTRAC BN
 INFO: THIRD MARDIV (MINUS ACTION ADEES)
 CG PCV

//SECRET//

CONCEPT OF OPNS: 3D MARINES IN LEATHERNECK SQUARE

1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY: THERE ARE INCREASED INDICATIONS OF ENEMY
 PRESENCE IN LEATHERNECK SQUARE. SEE PERINTREPS AND
 CURRENT INTSUMS.

B. FRIENDLY: NO CHANGE

2. MISSION. 3D MARDIV CONDUCTS OPNS IN LEATHERNECK SQUARE
 TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY THE ENEMY, AND FIND AND DESTROY HIS
 FORTIFICATIONS/INSTALLATIONS/SUPPLIES.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPNS: ONE REGT WITH THREE BNS CONDUCTS
 OPNS WITHIN A DELINEATED AREA OF LEATHERNECK SQUARE/
 KENTUCKY AO. COMBINED HELICOPTERBORNE AND GROUND OPNS
 WILL BE DESIGNED TO SEEK OUT AND FIX THE ENEMY, CORDON
 OFF THE ENEMY, DESTROY HIM BY SUPPORTING FIRES, AND

G-3

FLASH STAND

SECRET

SECRET

THEN SEARCH OUT AREA FOR POWS/WEPS AND EQUIP/SUPPLIES/
 COMM CNTR THIRD MARDIV
 FORTIFICATIONS OR POCKETS OF RESISTANCE.

B. 3D MARINES.

- (1) BE PREPARED TO RELINQUISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR NAPOLEON/
SALINE AO TO 1ST AMTRAC BN.
- (2) PLAN AND CONDUCT OPNS AS DESCRIBED IN DELINEATED AREA
OF LEATHERNECK SQUARE.
- (3) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON OF 1/3 (-) (3 COS) AND 2/3.
- (4) PASS OPCON ONE CO 1/3 TO FIRST AMTRAC BN FOR SECURITY
AT MAI XA THI.

C. 9TH MARINES.

- (1) ON ORDER, RELINQUISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELINEATED
OPERATION AREA OF KENTUCKY AO TO 3D MARINES.
- (2) ON ORDER, CHOP 1/3 (-) (3 COS) TO 3D MARINES. BE
PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON OF TWO COS FROM TF HOTEL.
- (3) ON ORDER CHOP ONE CO OF 1/9 TO HQ BN, 3D MARDIV, QTCB.
- (4) PROVIDE ROUTE #1 CONVOY SECURITY WITH REMAINING CO OF
1/3.
- (5) CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION.

D. TF HOTEL.

- (1) ON ORDER CHOP TWO COS TO 9TH MAR.
- (2) ON ORDER, CHOP 2/3 (-) (2 COS) TO 3d MARINES.
- (3) CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION.

SECRET

SECRETE. HQ BN, 3D MARDIV, QTCB ~~COM CITE~~ THIRD MARDIV

(1) ON ORDER, CHOP TWO COS OF 2/3 TO 3D MAR. BE
PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON OF ONE CO OF 1/9.

(2) CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION.

F. 12TH MARINES.

(1) ENSURE ADEQUATE ARTY SUPPORT FOR OPNS.

G. 1ST AMTRAC BN.

(1) ON ORDER ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR NAPOLEON/
SALINE AO.

(2) ON ORDER ASSUME OPCON ONE CO 1/3 FOR SECURITY
MAI XA THI ON OR ABOUT 25 JUNE 68.

H. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) AREA OF 3D MARINES OPN. SEE OVERLAY PASEP.

(2) FORCES AVAILABLE FOR 3D MARINES OPN: ONE REGT
OF THREE BNS.

(3) D-DAY: TENTATIVELY 26 JUNE 68.

(4) DURATION OF OPN: ESTIMATE 3 DAYS

(5) PLAN AND CONDUCT OPNS IAW GUIDELINES MY 220525Z
MAY68.

(6) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

I. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. NO CHANGE.J. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. NO CHANGE.


GP-4

GCN 2201

REL BY

*W. Chapman***SECRET**

SECRET



THIRD MARDIV

CP CITEF

G-3 W O

G-2 W O

DCPO

APO

ACTION

ZNY SS SSS

P 241030Z JUN 68 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN

INFO RUHHQA/CINCPAC

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUYNBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUHGCR/COMPHIBPAC

RQVGZVXVQG PROV CORPS V CP HOCHMUTH

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD DNG

RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV CAMP EVANS

RUMHMB/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV GIA LE

RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI

RUYNBJA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUHGCR/CTG SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE OKI

RUYSUAC/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

241030Z JUN 68

G-3

STAND

SJR

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA3383 S E C R E T

RUMFUA/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUYSUAC/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUMFUA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUHGCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

BT

S E C R E T

PROPOSED ARG/SLF SCHEDULE FIRST QTR FY 69 (U)

A. CINCPAC 270421Z APR 68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A DIRECTED REHABILITATION ROTATION TO SUBIC BAY WITH SLF EMBARKED BE RESUMED NO LATER THAN 1 JULY EXCLUDING OVERRIDING REQUIREMENT FOR RETENTION OF SLF'S ASHORE.

2. SLF BRAVO (BLT 2/7) EMBARKED 15-16 JUNE AND HAS PROCEEDED TO SUBIC BAY.

3. UNODIR, OR UNLESS TACTICAL SITUATION ASHORE PRECLUDES, INTEND EMBARK SLF ALFA MID JULY UPON RETURN OF ARG ALFA FROM SUBIC REHAB.

4. TO PROVIDE ADVANCE INFO TO ALCON, THE FOLLOWING ARG/SLF SCHEDULE IS PROPOSED. THE EXTENSION BEYOND 30SEP IS INCLUDED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY. THIS PROPOSED SCHEDULE HAS BEEN

COORDINATED IN COORDINATION WITH ARG/SLF SCHEDULE

encl 138

241030Z JUN 68

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA3383 S E C R E T

A. ARG/SLF ALFA (CTG 76.4/79.4)

1/21 JUL BLT OPCON THIRD MARDIV

10-21 JUL ARG ENR/UPKP SUBIC

15 JUL-THIRD MARDIV COMMENCE FORM NEW BLT IN-COUNTRY.

22-29 JUL (B/L R/H) DANANG

30 JUL-12 AUG AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT

3-17 AUG (B/L R/H) AT SEA

18-31 AUG AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT

1-2 SEP ARG/SLF ENR SUBIC

5-19 SEP ARG/SLF UPKP/REHAB/TRNG SUBIC

20-21 SEP ENR RVN

22 SEP-5 OCT AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT

B. ARG/SLF BRAVO (CTG 76.5/79.5)

1-3 JUL TRNG SUBIC

4-5 JUL ENR RVN

6 JUL TRIPOLI RELIEVE VALLEY FORGE AS CTG 76.5/79.5
FLAGSHIP.

7-19 JUL AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT

20-24 JUL (B/L R/H) AT SEA

25 JUL-7 AUG AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT

PAGE FOUR RUMUGRA3383 S E C R E T

8-13 AUG (B/L R/H) DANANG

14-31 AUG AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT 14-15 AUG

19 AUG OFFLOAD HMM 265

20-31 AUG ARG ENR/UPKP SUBIC

1-5 SEP (B/L R/H) AT SEA

1 SEP LOAD HMM 265

6-19 SEP AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT

20-25 SEP (B/L R/H) DANANG

26 SEP-8 OCT AVAIL SPECOPS III MAF, ARG IN SUPPORT

REQUEST APPROVAL OF SCHEDULE PROPOSED PARA 4.

SECRET

FLASH

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

RECEIVED
 241350Z JUN 68
 DE RUMHMA 467 1762358
 ZNY 35595
 Z 241350Z JUN 68
 FM CV PCV
 TO RUMHVP/CG3D MAR DIV DGH
 INFO RUMHVP/CO 108TH ARTY GP DGH
 RUMHNB/CO 1ST BN 83D ARTY CEE
 BT

SECRET AVII-AT 04140

SUBJ:ARTILLERY MOVEMENT SCHEDULE "THOR" (U)

1. (S) REQUEST THIS HEADQUARTERS BE ADVISED BY ELECTRICAL MEANS OF
 PLAN TO SCHEDULE MOVEMENT WITHIN YOUR AREA OF THE FOLLOWING
 IN OPERATION THOR:

4TH BN 12TH MAR

K BTRY, 4TH BN 13TH MAR

1ST 8" HOW BTRY

2D BN 94TH ARTY (IN COORDINATION W/108TH GP)

1ST BN 83D ARTY (IN COORDINATION W/CO 1/83 ARTY)

2. (S) BTRY A, 1ST BN 83D ARTY WILL MOVE BY LAND FROM LZ JANE,
 AND WILL ARRIVE DONG HA AT 021300H JUL 68. BTRY B&C 1ST BN 83D
 ARTY WILL MOVE BY SEA AND WILL ARRIVE ON THE NORTH BANK OF THE QUA
 VIET AT DONG HA AT 021200H JUL 68.

241350Z JUN 68 A-COC

G-3 2703

PAGE 2 RUMHMA 467 SECRET

3. (U) REQUEST REPLY INCLUDE:

A DEPARTURE LOCATION

B DEPARTURE TIME (LOCAL).

C ROUTES

D DESTINATION

E ETA AT DESTINATION (LOCAL).

F SECURITY

NOTE MOVEMENT SCHEDULE FOR 1ST BN 83D ARTY WILL BE BASED ON
 DEPARTURE FROM DONG HA.

4. (S) SECURITY AND MOVEMENT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD PRECLUDE UN-
 SCHEDULED HALTS THAT WOULD EXPOSE THE BATTERIES TO ENEMY FIRE. ALL
 BATTERIES MUST BE IN POSITION AND READY TO FIRE BY NIGHTFALL ON 2
 JULY 1968.

5. (U) REQUEST REPLY INDICATE THE ESTIMATED SCHEDULE AND CAPACITY
 OF RESUPPLY CONVOYS THAT 3D MAR DIV WILL BE PREPARED TO SECURE DURING
 THE PERIOD D&2 TO D&6 TO ALL OF THE THOR FSB'S

6. (U) REQUEST REPLY BE TRANSMITTED IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO ARRIVE AT
 THIS HEADQUARTERS NO LATER THAN 261200H JUN 68.

7. (U) DIRECT COORDINATION BETWEEN ADDRESSEES IS AUTHORIZED.


GP-4

241350Z Jun 68

SECRET

FLASH

Encl 139

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

MOVE COC

P CHIEF

W O.

W O.

POPO

270505/4/69 MON

Thor

ADVV/12 VP 10020ZVA 306G (E)
 PP RUMHVA
 ZNH SSSSS
 PTTSYYYY RUMUGRA3382 1761720-SSSS--RUMHAW RUMHMA-RUMHMB RUMHVP.
 ZNY SSSSS ZFD RUMUGRA
 P 241720Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
 TO RUMUFA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN RVN
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF DNG RVN
 INFO RUMHFA/COMUSMACV SGN RVN
 RUMHMA/CG PROVCORPS V PHO NOUL/;:OMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH RVN
 RUMHGR/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUMHBJA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PHEIGHT
 RUMHGR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 RUMHAW/TWO FOUR FIVE SAC DNG RVN
 RUMHAW/VMCJ ONE DNG RVN
 RUMHMB/DASC VICTOR PHB RVN
 RUMHMA/DET FOUR FIVE FIRST MI BN (ARS) PHB RVN
 BT

SECRET

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT OF OPERATION THOR (U)

A. COMUSMACV 211415Z JUN 68 (NOTAL)

B. ADMINO III MAF 220054Z JUN 68 (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUMUG

A3382 **SECRET**

MACV ATT : MACJ211 7TH AF ATTN: DOCR-1/J2 TASE
 PART I-FOR 7TH AF

1. THE FOLLOWING MSN REQUESTS ARE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION THOR AS SET FORTH BY REF A. REF B REQUESTS THAT VMCJ-1 BE DESIGNATED TO FLY ALL III MAF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION THOR. A. REQ NO. IM392AF
1. OPERATION THOR 2. VERTICAL/SPLIT VERTICAL/HAP
3. 1:8,000 NEGATIVE SCALE 4. YD0068-2877-0070-2879
5. I,K,L FOR CONTINUOUS TARGET DEVELOPMENT AND BDA.
6. 1 DIA POS 1 DUP NEG TO 45TH MID, 1 DIA POS TO PIIC, III MAF.
7. B TO MACV FOR CICV CIIB R211, 7AF FOR DOCR-1/J2 TASE DISB, DIPS, CG III MAF, CG PCV, CG 3RD MARDIV, CTG 70.8 AND CTU 70.8.9 D TO 45TH MID.
- E. HOT REPORT: PRIMARY MEANS BY COVERED TTY CIRCUITS TO PCV/FSCC (108TH ARTY GRP. DONG HA): BACK UP BY VOICE AND EFFECTIVE SERIES OF JO AUTHENTICATION CODES.
8. I 9. SEE REMARKS 10. UNTIL TERMINATION OF THOR
11. NO
12. TO BE FLOWN ON D-3 AND D-1 AT ANYTIME OF DAY. TO BE FLOWN ON D-DAY AND DAILY THERE AFTER AT MID AFTERNOON UNTIL THE OPERATION TERMINATES.

P 241720Z JUN

SECRET

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA3382 S E C R E T

B. REQ NO. IM393AF 1-3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. YD0070-2879-0072-2887.
5-12 SAME.

C. REQ NO. IM394AF 1-3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. YD0072-2881-0074-2883.
5-12 SAME.

D. REQ NO. IM395AF 1-3 SAME AS IM 0007-2883-0076-2885.
5-12 SAME.

E. REQ NO. IM396AF 1-3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. YD0076-2885-0078-2887.
5-12 SAME.

F. REQ NO. IM397AF 1
3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. YD0078-2887-0080-2889.
5-12 SAME.

G. REQ NO. IM398AF 1-3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. YD0080-2889-0082-2891.
5-12 SAME.

H. REQ NO. IM399AF 1-3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. YD0082-2891-0084-2893.
5-12 SAME.

I. REQ NO. IM400AF 1-3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. YD0084-2893-0086-2895.
5-12 SAME.

J. REQ NO. IM401AF 1-3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. YD0086-2895-0088-2897.
5-12; -.3.

K. REQ NO. IM402AF 1-3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. YD0088-2897-0090-2899.
5-12 SAME.

PAGE FOUR RUMUGRA3382 S E C R E T

L. REQ NO. IM403AF 1-3 SAME AS IM392AF. 4. HD0090-2899-0092-2801.
2-15 SAME.

M. REQ NO. IM404AF 1. OPERATION THOR 2. PHOTO VERT/SPLIT VERT/HAP
3. 1:8,000 NEGATIVE SCALE 4. YD000680-000920-002685-002925.
5. K,L FOR CONTINUOUS TARGET DEVELOPMENT AND BDA.
6. 1 DIA POS 1 DUP NEG TO 45TH MID. 1 DIA POS TO PIIC III MAF.
7. B TO III MAF, PCV, 3RD MARDIV, MACV AND 7TH AF. D TO 45TH MID.
8. ON CALL 9. AS REQUIRED 10. N/A 11. NO
12. THIS MISSION IS NOT TO BE FLOWN UNTIL SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY
PHONE. PREPLANNED TO PROVIDE FOR GN-CALL COVE

REQUIREMENTS MAY AGE OF THOR AREA AS
EVELOP DURING OPERATIONAL PERIOD.

N. REQ NO. IM405AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD002685-002925-004692-
004932. 5-12 SAME

O. REQ NO. IM406AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD004692-004932-006700-
006940. 5-12 SAME

P. REQ NO. IM407AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD006700-006940-008705-
008950. 5-12 SAME

Q. REQ NO. IM408AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD008705-008950-100712-
100957. 5-12 SAME

R. REQ NO. IM409AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD100

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SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PAGE FIVE RUMUGRA3382 S E C R E T

120962. 5-12 SAME
 S. REQ NO. IM410AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD120720-120962-140725-140970. 5-12 SAME.
 T. REQ NO. IM411AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD140725-140970-160732-160960. 5-12 SAME
 U. REQ NO. IM412AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD160732-160960-180740-180948. 5-12 SAME
 V. REQ NO. IM413AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD180740-180948-200745-200935. 5-12 SAME
 X. REQ NO. IM414AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. HD200745-200935-220750-220925. 5-12 SAME
 Y. REQ NO. IM415AF 1-3 SAME AS IM404AF. 4. YD220750-220925-240758-240910. 5-12 SAME
 2. REQUEST VMCJ-1 MAINTAIN ONE AIRCRAFT ON 45 MINUTE ALERT FROM D-DAY TO D PLUS 6. REQUEST STANDARD CONFIGURATION TO INCLUDE PHOTO-FLASH CARTRIDGES DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS. IN THE EVENT THE ALERT AIRCRAFT IS LAUNCHED, REQUEST THE ALERT BE RECONSTITUTED WITHIN TWO HOURS. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ANTICIPATE A MAXIMUM OF FOUR SORTIES DAILY UNLAUNCHED FROM ALERT STATUS.
 3. IT IS FURTHER REQUESTED THAT BLUE TREE RECONNAISSANCE AGAINST

PAGE SIX RUMUGRA3382 S E C R E T

TARGETS XNK-473 THROUGH 476 AND IN-COUNTRY RECONNAISSANCE TARGETS IZ0400A THROUGH 407A BE SUSPENDED FOR THE OPERATIONAL PERIOD D-5 TO D PLUS 6.

PART II-FOR FMAW

4. REQUEST 245TH SAC BE TASKED FOR SLAR COVERAGE OF TH AREA BOUNDED BY YD2577-XD7064-XD7084-YD1497. ALL MOVING TARGETS IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA WILL BE REPORTED TO DONG HA DASC/FSCC BY IN-FLIGHT REPORTS.
 A. EEI FOR THIS MISSION IS TO DETECT ANY MOVEMENT BY ARMOR OR ARTILLERY BY THE ENEMY, DURING DARKNESS OCCASIONED BY THE IMPACT OF BOMBARDMENT RESULTING FROM OPERATION THOR.
 B. THIS IS A PRIORITY II MISSION AND WILL SUPERSEDE IN-COUNTRY RECONNAISSANCE PLAN TARGET IZ801LS AND IM237LS, IF A LIMITATION OF ASSETS NECESSITATES.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

CHIEF

DRAFTER

ATTN: deh

SEC (DVT/AT)

PHONE 2330 MARDIV 14

CWO

G-2 V.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

Scotland II

CCN 2267

IMMED 250008 Z JUN 68

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG PCV PHB
 INFO: CG III MAF

//SECRET//

OPERATIONAL DISCREPANCY RPT

1. ON 24 JUN 68 1220H KHE SANH DASC RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM A GRND UNIT FOR IMMEDIATE AIR SUPT. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIP CONFIRMED LOCATION OF NVA/VC CONCENTRATION.

2. KHE SANH DASC INITIATED A REQUEST FOR FIVE (5) FLTS OF ACFT CONFIGURED WITH HIGH DRAG BOMBS AND NAPALM FROM DASC "V", AT 1225H. THE

DASC "V" DUTY OFF INFORMED KHE SANH DASC THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNREASONABLE. ^{QUOTE}

3. AT APPROX 1500H TWO (2) FLTS OF UNEXPECTED ACFT ARRIVED IN THE TGT AREA. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THESE FLTS WERE SENT IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST SUBMITTED TWO AND ONE HALF HRS EARLIER.

4. THE GRND UNIT WHICH HAD REQUESTED THE IMMEDIATE SUPT WAS UNDER MORTAR ATTACK AND UNABLE TO CONTROL THE STRIKE. THE OPPORTUNITY TO HIT A LUCRATIVE TGT WAS LOST.

5. REQUEST PROCEDURES BE REVIEWED

REL BY

R.H. Davis

GP-4

-A1RO

STAND JMB

250008Z Jun 68

SECRET

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

RECEIVED
23 JUN 68

000
MOVE COL

CHIEF

W.O.

W.O.

CPO

O

ACTION

NAP/SAL

NNNNAAAAEE

HVP 998...998...998

*****ZZ RUMHVP RUMHMB

DE RUMHMA 500 1770652

ZNY SSSSS

Z 250648Z JUN 68

FM COMUSMACV CG PCV PHB

TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH

RUMHMB/CG 1ST ACD CES

BT

SECRET AVII-GCO 04150

SUBJECT: UNIT DEPLOYMENT (U)

THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS. PART I FOR CG 3D MAR DIV.

1. (S) RETURN OPCON OF C/3/5 CAV AND D/1/9 CAV TO CG 1ST ACD SO AS TO ARRIVE NLT 270800H JUN

PART II FOR CG 1ST ACD.

2. (S) ASSUME OPCON OF ABOVE UNITS UPON ARRIVAL YOUR AC

GP-4

BT

250648Z JUN 68

A. G-3 (12 copies)

FLASH

4 G-1/C-4
Encl 142

SECRET

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

DRAFTER 3P/LRB/wlk
SECTION 3P PHONE 203
CWO 300

IMMEDIATE 250814 2 JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG TF HOTEL
FIRST MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
INFO: THIRD MARDIV (MINUS ACTION ADDRESSES)

//CONFIDENTIAL//

DISPOSITION OF FORCES

A. MY 221534Z JUN 68

1. IN IMPLEMENTING REF A, FOLLOWING DISPOSITIONS WILL BE EFFECTED:

- A. TF HOTEL WILL COLLOCATE AT LZ STUD WITH 4TH MARINES.
- B. TF HOTEL WILL RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR SCOTLAND II AO EXTENDED WITH 4TH MARINES AND 3 ORGANIC BNS. TWO BNS CONDUCT OPNS FROM FIRE SUPPORT BASES WEST TOWARD KHE SANH WITH ONE BN PROVIDING SECURITY TO LZ STUD AND CA LU. WHEN DIV RESERVE BN LOCATED AT LZ STUD, IT WILL BE USED WITHIN STUD PERIMETER, PREPARED FOR SHORT NOTICE EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN DIV AO.
- C. TF HOTEL BE PREPARED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR LANCASTER II AO AND OPCON OF UNITS THEREIN, ON ORDER.
- D. UPON COMPLETION OF PHASE DOWN KSB AND TRANSITION TO MOBILE POSTURE, 1ST MARINES WITH 1/1 AND 2/1 BE

CONFIDENTIAL

250814Z JUN 68

DECLASSIFIED

Stand

Encl 143

CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

PREPARED TO DISPLACE TO EASTERN PORTION OF DIV AO
AND ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR NAPOLEON/SALINE AO.

E. FIRE SUPPORT BASES WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT LZ CATES
(ONE 105MM BTRY, ONE 155 BTRY) AND LZ MIKE (ONE 105MM
BTRY).

2. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- A. SCOTLAND II AO EXTENDED INCLUDES LZ STUD AND CA LU
AND PORTION OF LANCASTER SOUTH OF 50 EW GL.
- B. BNS OPERATING WEST TOWARD KHE SANH FROM FIRE SUPPORT
BASES WILL REMAIN WITHIN D/S ARTY RANGE OF THESE
BASES.
- C. BNS AND FIRE SUPPORT BASES WEST OF CA LU AFTER MOBILE
POSTURE ATTAINED WILL BE HELICOPTER SUPPORTED. ENSURE
HST TEAMS ASSIGNED AS NECESSARY.
- D. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

GP-4

CCN

2279

REL BY

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

DRAFTER 3/JAD/bwh
SEC G-3 PHONE DIV COC
CWO

IMMEDIATE 250816 Z JUN68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG PCV *2100 MA*
INFO: CTF CLEARWATER *RUM 1105*

//CONFIDENTIAL//

A. CTF CLEARWATER 260010Z MAY68

B. CG PCV 071401Z JUN68

C. CTF CLEARWATER 191115Z MAR68

1. REF A REQUESTED, WITHOUT PRIOR LIAISON WITH THIS DIVI-
SION, THAT MARINES MAN TWO TOWERS BUILT ALONG THE CUA VIET
AT THE REQUEST OF CTF CLEARWATER.

2. REF B DIRECTED THIS DIV TO TAKE STEPS TO MAN THESE
TOWERS. AS WORK PROGRESSED TOWARD A SYSTEM FOR MANNING
THESE TWO TOWERS SEVERAL FACTS CAME TO LIGHT:

A. THAT THE RESIDENT MARINE REGIMENT HAD CONCURRED
IN REF C, THE CTF CLEARWATER REQUEST THAT THE TOWERS BE
CONSTRUCTED, WITH THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT NSAD PER-
SONNEL WOULD MAN THE TOWERS.

B. THAT CTF CLEARWATER HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED THE
TOWERS TO ASSIST IN CONTROLLING TRAFFIC ON THE RIVER.

C. THAT THE RESIDENT MARINE REGIMENT HAS NO REQUIRE-
MENT FOR OR ADVANTAGE TO BE GAINED BY MANNING THESE TOWERS.
THIS HAS BEEN DETERMINED BY PHYSICAL INSPECTION AND ACTIVE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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Stand G.D.

Encl 144

CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

OBSERVATION FROM THESE TOWERS.

3. THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTING THE TOWERS WAS TO CONTROL TRAFFIC ON THE RIVER. IF CTF CLEARWATER DOES NOT REQUIRE THE TOWERS FOR THIS PURPOSE IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THEY BE REMOVED ~~AND~~ ^{SINCE} THEY ARE OF NO VALUE TO THE 3D MARINE DIVISION.

GP-4

CCN 2278RELEASED BY *[Signature]*PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

DRAFTER 3/JAD/11t

SEC 4.3 PHONE DIV COS

CWO

CHIEF

3-3 W.O.

3-2 W.O.

DCPO

DO

IMMEDIATE 250900 ZJUN68FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON AND AO CHANGES

A. 3D MARDIV OVERLAY DATED 24 JUN 1968 (PASEP)

1. FOR CG TF HOTEL: ON 25 JUN MOVE TWO RIFLE COMPANIES TO CAMP CARROLL/TSL/ROCKPILE AREA TO CLOSE PRIOR TO 251200H. COS WILL BECOME OPCON 9TH MAR "B" CMD GP.

2. FOR 3D MARINES: EFFECTIVE 251200H JUN 68 PASS CONTROL OF NAPOLEON/SALINE AO TO 1ST AMTRAC BN. EFFECTIVE SAME DTG ASSUME CONTROL OF ASSIGNED AO IN LEATHERNECK SQUARE. (OVERLAY PASEP).

3. FOR 9TH MARINES: ON 25 JUNE MOVE L/3/3 TO MAI XA THI AND PASS OPCON TO CG THIRD MARDIV. SAME DATE MOVE ONE RIFLE CO 1/9 TO QTCB. MISSION TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ASP CONSTRUCTION. ASSIGN ONE RIFLE COMPANY 1/9 MISSION OF PROVIDING SECURITY AND SWEEP ROUTE ONE TO A-2. 25 JUNE MOVE ONE RIFLE CO. 1/3 TO MAI XA THI TO BE PASSED OPCON 1ST AMTRAC BN IN NAPOLEON/SALINE.

4. FOR 1ST AMTRAC BN: ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR NAPOLEON/SALINE AO 25 1200H JUN. ASSUME OPCON ONE CO 1/3 ON ARRIVAL MAI XA THI.

5. FOR HQ BN: MOVE 2 RIFLE COS 2/3 FROM QTCB TO PLACE DESIGNATED BY CO 2/3 ON 25 JUNE. ASSUME OPCON 1/9 CO ON ARR.

6. FOR ALL: REPORT RECOMMENDED CHOP TIMES TO 3D MARDIV COS BY TELEPHONE, DIRLN AUTH ALCON.






GB-41

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

72

MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER		LOCAL DISTRIBUTION		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T				<div style="text-align: center;">    </div>		C/S 4-7 X	SJS	HIST
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			J1	J2 X8	CHB
Type Transmission	To	Info	J3 A (3)			J4 X9		
Electrical			J5			J6 X10		
Air Mofl			ACTIV			NAV		
Courier	X	X						
PRECEDENCE						AFGP	NAVFORV	
ACTION TO: IMMEDIATE						AG	OICC	
INFO: IMMEDIATE						AMEMB	PM	
<div style="display: flex;"> <div style="flex: 1;">  </div> <div style="flex: 2;"> <p>FROM: CG PCV PBE</p> <p>CG 1 ACD CES (COURIER) 16</p> <p>CG 3 MAR DIV DGH (COURIER) 17-26</p> <p>COMUSMACV SGN (COURIER) 27-36</p> <p>CG USARV LBN (COURIER) 37-46</p> <p>CG III MAF DNG (COURIER) 47-66</p> <p>CG 101 ABN DIV CEE (COURIER) 67-69</p> <p>S E C R E T AVII-GCP 04157</p> <p>Subj: PCV Posture Jun - Sep 68 (U)</p> <p>Ref: a. PCV (S) msg, Subj: PCV Posture Jun - Sep 68 (U)</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">DTG 311134Z May 68 NOTAL</p> <p>b. PCV (S) msg, Subj: Stationing of Units (U) DTG</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">110551Z Jun 68 NOTAL</p> <p>(S) The following changes have been made in the original concept and guidance outlined in the above references:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">a. Ref a, para 3d(1)(e): The Khe Sanh Combat Base will be inactivated and neutralized in early July; however, two battalions reinforced will remain in the vic of the Khe Sanh Plateau, one</p> </div> </div>				CBPAC	SJA			
				CH	SOG			
				COC	SURG			
				COMB STUDES	TMA			
				COMPT	TNG			
				DOD SPEC REP	USAID			
				FWMAO	USARV			
				HC	IFFVLNO			
				IG	II FFVLNO			
				JRATA	III MAFLNO			
JUSPAO	5TH SF LNO							
MACDC	7TH AF							
MACOI								
MACPD	Arty X11-13							
	Avn X15							
<div style="display: flex;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <p>DR A F T E R</p> </div> <div style="flex: 2;"> <p>TYPED NAME TITLE PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL</p> <p>DAVID H. LONGACRE MAJ, GS AVII-GCP/2650</p> </div> <div style="flex: 1;"> <p>R E L E A S E R</p> </div> <div style="flex: 2;"> <p>SIGNATURE</p>  <p>TYPED NAME AND TITLE</p> <p>J. F. DONAHOE, COL, USMC Acting Chief of Staff</p> </div> </div>				<p>PAGE No. 1</p> <p>No. OF PAGES 2</p>		COPY No. 21		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T								

MACV FORM 297 (APR 66)
(MACAG -AM)

SECRET

25 11 30 Z Jul 68

DECLASSIFIED

PCV 888-68

5289 Encl 146

DECLASSIFIED

MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM CONTINUATION SHEET	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		
<p>north and one south of Route 9. The Khe Sanh base area will be with- in the normal operating area of these battalions. Two fire bases will be established to support their operations.</p> <p>b. Ref b, sub-para a(1): Brigade-size base at LZ Jane will be reduced to a company-size patrol base and a new brigade-size base established in the vicinity of coordinates YD 445400.</p> <p>GP-4.</p>			DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	OFFICE SYMBOL AVII-GCP	PAGE NO. 2	NR. OF PAGES 2

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL**SHOVE COC**FLASH 251520

Z JUNE 68 OP CHIEF

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV

TO: CG PCV

INFO: 108TH FA GRP

CGTF HOTEL


//CONFIDENTIAL // 12th MAR

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

PO



175MM GUNS(SP).

1. IN VIEW OF CONTINUING ENEMY ARTILLERY FIRE FM CO REQ, REQUEST THAT

B BTRY 2ND BN 94TH ARTY(SP)(3 TUBES) BE RETAINED LZ HAWK UNTIL EARLY

MORNING 29 JUNE 68.

2. ROUTE 9 REMAINS OPEN AND SECURE. FORESEE NO PROBLEM IN MOVING SUBJECT

BATTERY 29 JUNE 68.

GP-4

CCN 2360

RELEASED BY:

A. L. McLean Jr.
Stand By

G-3


FLASH

251520 Z June 68
CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 147

CONFIDENTIAL


3D MARINE DIVISION



251720 2 JUN 68
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG TF HOTEL
 TWELFTH MARINES

INFO: THIRD MARDIV

CONFIDENTIAL//



1. EFFECTIVE 220900H, CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMED OPCON OF BTRY
 G/1/12 FROM CG TF HOTEL AND SAME DTG PASSED OPCON TO 12TH
 MARINES.

2. EFFECTIVE 2209 00H, CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMED OPCON OF H/2/12
 FROM 12TH MARINES AND SAME DTG PASSED OPCON TO CG TF HOTEL.

GP-4

CGN 2365

REL BY

J. Bluforn

G-3 (12 copies)

Stand

CGC

25 17 20 JUN

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 148

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

15:RHH:jkc
26 Jun 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

From: Division Engineer Officer

Subj: Quang Tri Development; progress for period 18Jun68 to 24Jun68

1. The following was accomplished during the report period.

a. The following Marine and Naval construction forces were engaged on projects for the 3d Marine Division during the report period.

(1) 3d Engineer Battalion. Operation of water point, installation of electrical lines to 3d Recon Bn, construction of 3d Engineer Battalion COC, and construction of combination pot shack and garbage house for SNCO Mess, Hq Bn.

(2) MCB-5. Vertical construction of 2d 500 man messhall.

(3) MCB-11. Vertical and horizontal construction of all cantonments including 3d Med Bn and permanent ASP.

b. 1st and 2d increment construction continues, but as in previous reports progress remains limited due to lack of construction materials. The following work has been accomplished.

(1) Horizontal. Maintenance continues on all existing access and interior cantonment roads. Work continues on 3d Med Bn Helipad and the permanent ASP. No new roads have been started.

(2) Vertical

(a) Water Point. Producing average of 81,000 gals potable water and 5,800 gals non potable water per day.

(b) 3d Recon Bn Wiring. Complete.

(c) 3d Engr Bn COC. Structurally complete, interior wiring and backfilling underway.

(d) SNCO Mess Pot/Garbage House. Slab cured and framing essentially complete. Application of siding and roof planned during next period.

Encl 149

DECLASSIFIED

(e) 3d Mt Bn Messhall. Minor interior plumbing work continuing. Crews temporarily recalled to DHGB to repair damages caused by ASP explosion.

(f) 3d Med Bn Facility. Installation of air conditioning system awaiting arrival of materials. Sewage lines to service existing facilities 90% complete, oxidation pond will be formed during next period. An 8" raw water line from the NMCB-11 water source to the 3d Engr Bn water treatment site is complete and in operation. The existing 4" raw water line will be relocated to provide a potable water line from treatment site to 3d Med Bn. Work continuing on erection of poles for power distribution system, awaiting arrival of wire, hardware and transformers.

(g) Permanent ASP. Work continuing on 1st 5 berms, matting placed in first 4 berms (19 cells). A 6th berm is being formed.

(h) Cantonments. The status of SEA Hut construction remains the same except in FLSG-B area. The status in FLSG-B and revised totals are as follows:

<u>CANTONMENT</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>UNDER CONST</u>	<u>TOTAL PLANNED</u>	<u>PER CENT COMPLETE</u>
FLSG-B	25	0	25	100%
TOTAL	200	0	200	100%

c. The following 3d increment of construction continues with the following work accomplished.

(1) 170 Strongbacks

<u>CANTONMENT</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>UNDER CONST</u>	<u>TOTAL PLANNED</u>	<u>PER CENT COMPLETE</u>
Hq Bn	10	15	30	58%
3d SP Bn	0	0	10	0
3d Engr Bn	10	0	10	100%
3d Recon Bn	0	0	19	0
3d Tank Bn	0	0 6	9	0 30%
3d Med Bn	0	0	10	0
3d Den Co	0	0	3	0
Bn Rears	0	0	49	0
3d Bn/12th Mar	0	0	7	0
1st Bn/13th Mar	0	0	6	0
Unassigned	0	0	17	0
TOTAL	20	15 21	170	16%

(2) 10 Showers

<u>CANTONMENT</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>UNDER CONST</u>	<u>TOTAL PLANNED</u>	<u>PER CENT COMPLETE</u>
Hq Bn	0	0	2	0
3d Tank Bn	0	0	1	0
3d Mt Bn	0	0	1	0
3d SP Bn	0	0	1	0
3d Engr Bn	0	0	1	0
3d Recon Bn	0	0	1	0
3d Med Bn	0	0	1	0
Unassigned	0	0	2	0
TOTAL	0	0	10	0

(3) Hq Bn, Interim Power Distribution. No work this period, work will commence upon completion of 3d Med Bn wiring anticipated in approximately two weeks. Awaiting arrival of additional materials.

(4) Field Mess Pot Shacks and Galley Decks

<u>CANTONMENT</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>UNDER CONST</u>	<u>TOTAL PLANNED</u>	<u>PER CENT COMPLETE</u>
3d Bn/12th Mar	0	0	1	0
Hq Bn, SNCO Mess	0	1	1	50%
3d Tank Bn	0	0	1	0
"I" Btry	0	0	1	0
3d SP Bn	0	0	1	0
3d Recon Bn	0	0	1	0
1st Bn/3d Mar	0	0	1	0
3d Bn/26th Mar	0	0	1	0
3d Bn/9th Mar	0	0	1	0
3d Med Bn	0	0	1	0
3d Engr Bn	0	0	1	0
1st Bn/13th Mar	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	0	1	12	4%

R. C. Mc Cutchan
R. C. MC CUTCHAN

Copy to:
Base Fao Coord, QTCB

SECRET



IMMEDIATE 260130Z JUN68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG TF HOTEL
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 INFO: CG III MAF
 CG PCV
 ELEVENTH ENGR BN
 THIRD MARDIV (LESS ACTION ADDRES)

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

CWO

ACTION

ACTION

//SECRET//

OPN THOR SECURITY

A. CG PCV 240418Z JUN68 (OPO 15-68 THOR) NOTAL

1. REF A DIRECTS A 4 PHASE COMBINED SUPPORTING ARMS ATTACK ON
 ENEMY ARTY FORCES IN THE CAP MUI LAY AREA. ^{CERTAIN} ALLIED SECURITY
 TASKS ARE LEVIED ON 3D MARDIV IN SPG OPERATION THOR IN ADDITION
 TO PROVISION OF ARTY & ~~ARTY~~ C & C ASSETS.

2. FOR 9TH MARINES:

A. PROVIDE LOCAL & AREA SECURITY TO OPN THOR ARTY PSNS
 EST IN OR ADJ TO A-3, A-4, C-2, & C-3.

B. PROVIDE ROAD SWEEP & ROUTE SECURITY FOR MOVEMENT OF
 ENGR EQUIP, ARTY AMMO, ARTY PERS & EQUIP TO PSNS PARA 2A
 ABOVE AND TO ARVN POSITIONS C-1 & A-2.

C. BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON REMAINDER 3/9 TO ASSIST
 ACCOMPLISHMENT ASSIGNED TASKS.

3. FOR CG TF HOTEL:

BE PREPARED TO CHOP REMAINDER OF 3/9 TO 9TH MAR IAW PAR A
 ABOVE 0/A29JUNE68.

SECRET

Encl 150

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

4. FOR 12TH MARINES

A. COORDINATE ARTY AMMO, ARTY PERS & EQUIP MOVES WITH
9TH MARINES.

5. FOR ALL:

A. D-DAY = 1JUL68. PREPARATION COMMENCES D-7 & CONTINUES
THRU D+6.

B. C.O. 12TH MAR DESIGNATED PROJECT OFF. OPN THOR.

C. 2D ARVN REGT PLANS TO CONDUCT CONCURRENT SECURITY
ADJACENT TO A-2 AND C-1.

GP-4

CGN

2637

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
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DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTER 3P/WMC/lsr
SEC 3P PHONE 203
CWO

PRIORITY 260340 Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
INFO: CG PCV
CG FIRST MAW
FIRST MARINES
FOURTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES



//UNCLAS/E F T O//

1. THE OPERATIONS OF TASK FORCE HOTEL AND SUBORDINATE REGIMENTS DURING THE PERIOD 2-19 JUNE 1968 SOUTH OF KHE SANH COMBAT BASE HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF DEEP PERSONAL PRIDE AND SATISFACTION AS A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THE MOBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.

2. THE SKILLFUL PLANNING AND ADROIT MANEUVERING OF FORCES BY TASK FORCE HOTEL AND THE AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT OF THE ASSAULT BY THE FIRST AND FOURTH MARINES AND THEIR SUPPORTING UNITS, AIR AND GROUND, HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SEARCHING OUT THE ENEMY AND INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES, IN BOTH MEN AND MATERIALS, UPON HIM.

3. PLEASE CONVEY TO ALL OFFICERS AND MEN OF TASK FORCE HOTEL AND THE UNITS SUPPORTING THE TASK FORCE MY HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS FOR A JOB WELL DONE. MGEN DAVIS SENDS

CCN

2475

RELEASED BY

RH Davis

A-G-3

260340 Z Jun 68

std 973
Encl 151

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

DRAFTER 2/JAD/152
SEC 4-3 PHONE 2D MARDIV CCC
CNOFLASH 260440 JUNE 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV

TO: CG PCV

INFO: CG III MAF

Amended 106TH ARTY GP

FIRST BN EIGHTY THIRD ARTY CEE

//CONFIDENTIAL//

ARTILLERY MOVEMENT SCHEDULE "THOR" (U)

CG PCV 241350Z JUN 68.

1. IN REPLY TO REF A THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE IS
SUBMITTED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES:

UNIT	DEPARTURE LOCATION	DEPARTURE TIME (D+1)	ROUTE	DESTINATION	ETA (D+1) DESTINATION
✓K/4/13	C-2	1000	RT 561	A-4	1100
✓M/4/12*	DONG HA	1000	RTS 9/1	A-2	1130
✓1ST 8"*	C-3	1000	RTS 561/9/1	A-3	1230
✓A/2/94	CAMP CARROLL	1000	RT 9	DONG HA	1200
✓K/4/12	CAMP CARROLL	1100	RTS 9/561	A-4	1330
✓E/2/94	CAMP CARROLL	1200	RTS 9/561	C-3	1330
✓L/4/12	DONG HA	1200	RTS 9/1	A-3	1330
✓A/1/83	DONG HA	1300	RTS 9/561	A-4	1500
✓G/2/94	CAMP CARROLL	1400	RT 9	DONG HA	1600
✓E/1/83	DONG HA	1300	RT 1	A-2	1430
✓G/1/83	DONG HA	1400	RT 1	A-2	1530

*PLATOONS AT C-1 WILL JOIN BATTERIES AS CONVOYS PASS C-1.

2. UNITS OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION WILL PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MOVEMENTS ON ROUTES 1, 9, 561 AND 566.

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260440Z June 68

Encl 152

CONFIDENTIAL

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

3. SECURITY FOR SUPPLY CONTROL DURING THE PERIOD
 E PLUS 4 TO E PLUS 6 WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE DIV.
 SCHEDULES AND QUANTITIES OF MATERIALS TO BE
 IMPORTED IN THE PERIOD OF 1 MONTH SUPPLY
 AND ANNOTATE THE SECTION

07-4

COMM 215

RECEIVED 11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3D MARINE DIVISION

SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APO

ACTION

SLF OPS

O 260639Z JUN68

FM CG PCV PHB

TO CG FIRST ACD CES (COURIER)

CG 101ST ABN DIV CEE (COURIER)

CG 3D MAR DIV DGH (COURIER)

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: SPECIAL LANDING FORCE (SLF) (UTILIZATION OF SLF IN FUTURE OPERATIONS). (C)

REF: III MAF MSG DTG 191104Z JUN68(C)

1. (C) REQUEST ADDRESSES SUBMIT TO THIS HQ (ATTN: AVII-GCP)
 NLT 4 JUL68 RECOMMENDATIONS ON POSSIBLE USE OF SLF INDIV AG'S
 TO INCLUDE AMPHIBIOUS OBJ AREA, DURATION AND BRIEF CONCEPT OF
 OPERATION.

2. (C) NEGATIVE REPORTS ARE REQUIRED.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

260639Z Jun 68
CONFIDENTIAL


Encl 153

SECRET

SEC G-3 PHON DIV LOC

THIRD MARDIV
CWC

IMMEDIATE



FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG TF HOTEL
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 INFO: CG III MAF
 CG PCV
 ELEVENTH ENGR BN
 THIRD MARDIV (LESS ACTION ADVISE)

//SECRET//

OPN THOR SECURITY

A. CG PCV 240418Z JUN68 (OPO 15-68 THOR) NOTAL

1. REF A DIRECTS A 4 PHASE COMBINED SUPPORTING ARMS ATTACK ON
 ENEMY ARTY FORCES IN THE CAP MUI LAY AREA. ^{CERTAIN} ALLIED SECURITY
 TASKS ARE LEVIED ON 3D MARDIV IN SPG OPERATION THOR IN ADDITION
 TO PROVISION OF ARTY & ~~ARTY~~ C & C ASSETS.

2. FOR 9TH MARINES:

A. PROVIDE LOCAL & AREA SECURITY TO OPN THOR ARTY PSNS
 EST IN OR ADJ TO A-3, A-4, C-2, & C-3.

B. PROVIDE ROAD SWEEP & ROUTE SECURITY FOR MOVEMENT OF
 ENGR EQUIP, ARTY AMMO, ARTY PERS & EQUIP TO PSNS PARA 2A
 ABOVE AND TO ARVN POSITIONS C-1 & A-2.

C. BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPCON REMAINDER 3/9 TO ASSIST
 ACCOMPLISHMENT ASSIGNED TASKS.

3. FOR CG TF HOTEL:

BE PREPARED TO CHOP REMAINDER OF 3/9 TO 9TH MAR IAW PAR A 2
 ABOVE. 9/A29JUNE68.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

A-G-3

SECRET

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Encl 154

260750Z Jun 68
 5/2nd 9th 14

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

4. FOR 12TH MARINES

A. COORDINATE ARTY AMMO, ARTY PERS & EQUIP MOVES WITH
9TH MARINES.

5. FOR ALL:

A. D-DAY = 1JUL68. PREPARATION COMMENCES D-7 & CONTINUES
THRU D+6.

B. C.O. 12TH MAR DESIGNATED PROJECT OFF. OPN THOR.

C. 2D ARVN REGT PLANS TO CONDUCT CONCURRENT SECURITY
ADJACENT TO A-2 AND C-1.

GP-4

CCN


2637

RELEASED BY

*A. L. Mulvaney***SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL



DRAFTER
3D MARINE DIVISION
SEC 7-3
CWO

3/JAD/17
COC

IMMEDIATE 2609 Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. EFFECTIVE 250900H CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMED OPCON OF B/1/9 FROM 9TH MARINES AND SAME DTG PASSED OPCON TO HQ BN.
2. EFFECTIVE 250930H CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMED OPCON OF 3/9 (-) FROM CG TF HOTEL AND SAME DTG PASSED OPCON TO 9TH MARINES.
3. EFFECTIVE 251600H, CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON A/1/3 FROM 9TH MARINES AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON TO 1ST AMTRAC BN.
4. EFFECTIVE 251630H CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON L/3/3 FROM 9TH MARINES AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON TO 3D MARINES.
5. EFFECTIVE 250930H CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON OF COS F AND H 2/3 FROM HQ BN AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON TO 9TH MARINES.
6. EFFECTIVE 251200H, CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON 2/3 FROM 9TH MARINES AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON TO 3D MARINES.
7. EFFECTIVE 241600H, CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON OF B/1/12 FROM CG TF HOTEL AND PASSES SAME TO 12TH MARINES SAME DTG.

GP-4

CCN 2396

REL BY

W. Chapman

G-3 (12 COPIES)
26

09 50
CONFIDENTIAL

STAND

JUN

Encl 155

DECLASSIFIED



SHOVE COL	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
APD	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	SCOTLAND II
980415/17/989	

NNNNAKVV VPB989Y
 PP RUMHMA RUMHVP
 ZNR UUUUU
 PTTUZYUW RUMUGRA3824 1790406-UUUU--RUMHMA RUMHVP
 ZNR UUUUU
 P 270406 JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
 TO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI RVN
 NFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV DONG HA RVN
 BT

UNCLAS

R1. THE FOLLOWING IS ISSUED TO PRESS 0930 27 JUNE 68 BY MACV OFFICE OF INFORMATION: QUOTE-MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS. SUBJ: INACTIVATION OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE. THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE IN WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE IS BEING INACTIVATED EFFECTIVE 27 JUNE 1968. THIS SETP IS BEING TAKEN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS. THERE HAVE BEEN TWO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE MILITARY SITUATION IN VIETNAM SINCE EARLY THIS YEAR-AN INCREASE IN FRIENDLY STRENGTH, MOBILITY, AND FIRE POWER, AND AN INCREASE IN THE ENEMY THREAT DUE TO BOTH A GREATER FLOW OF REPLACEMENTS AND A CHANGE IN HIS TACTICS. IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A NET INCREASE IN THE ENEMY'S STRENGTH. IN JANUARY, THE ENEMY HAD AT LEAST THE EQUIVALENT OF SIX DIVISIONS, TODAY HE HAS AT LEAST THE EQUIVALENT OF EIGHT. THIS GIVES HIM THE CAPABILITY OF MOUNTING SEVERAL SIZEABLE ATTACKS CONCURRENTLY. TO MEET THIS SIGNIFICANTLY

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA3824 UNCLAS

INCREASED THREAT, FRIENDLY FORCES MUST MAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF THEIR SUPERIOR FIRE POWER AND MOBILITY. MOBILE FORCES, TIED TO NO SPECIFIC TERRAIN, MUST BE USED TO THE UTMOST TO ATTACK, INTERCEPT, REINFORCE OR TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS MOST APPROPRIATE TO MEET THE ENEMY THREATS. THEREFORE, WE HAVE DECIDED TO CONTINUE THE MOBILE POSTURE WE ADOPTED IN WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE WITH OPERATION PEGASUS IN APRIL. THIS DECISION MAKES THE OPERATION OF THE BASE AT KHE SANH UNNECESSARY. FOR SECURITY REASONS WE CANNOT DIVULGE THE DETAILS OF PRECISELY HOW WE ARE DEPLOYING OUR FORCES OR HOW WE WILL UTILIZE THE ADDITIONAL MANEUVERABILITY WE WILL GAIN BY INACTIVATION OF THE BASE-UNQUOTE.

2. MACOI SAYS QUOTE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ARE NOW USABLE UNQUOTE.

BT

P 270406Z JUN

C-1(180)

STANDARD

270406Z JUN 68

Encl 156

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3D MARINE DIVISION

DRAFTER 3/JAD/bwh
SEC G-3 PHONE 3D DIV COC
CWO 98/

IMMEDIATE 270920 Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MAR DIV
TO: CG PCV

//CONFIDENTIAL//

- A. YR 250820Z
- B. MY 250816Z
- C. YR 071401Z

1. IN REPLY REF A, REF B ADVISED STATUS REF C.

GP-4

CGN 2493

G-3

RELEASED BY W. Chapman

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-3 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G-2 W.O.	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
LPO	<i>[Signature]</i>
ACTION	<i>[Signature]</i>

Stand 98/

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DRAFTER 3/JAD/1vp
SEC G-3 PHONE DIV COC

3D MARINE DIVISION WFO



IMMEDIATE 271350 Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG PCV
CG FIRST ACD

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. EFFECTIVE 2708⁰⁰ CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON OF 271350
CAV AND CO C, 3D BN, 5TH ARMORED AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON
THESE UNITS TO CG, 1ST ACD.

GP-4

CCN 2514

G-3(12 copies)

REL BY [Signature]

SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	<u>[Signature]</u>
G-3 WFO	<u>[Signature]</u>
G-2 WFO	<u>[Signature]</u>
DUFG	<u>[Signature]</u>
4PO	<u>[Signature]</u>
ACTION	<u>[Signature]</u>
	<u>Gpcem</u>

Stand-40

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13 50

JUN

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Copy _____ of _____ copies
 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
 Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province
 Vietnam
 28 June 1968

TERRAIN STUDY OF THE KENTUCKY AO

Ref: (a) 3d Mar Div SIS 6-67 (C)
 (b) MAPS: Vietnam AMS Series L7014, 1:50,000
 Sheets 6342 I and II, 6442 III and IV

Encl: (1) Helicopter Landing Zones overlay
 (2) Infiltration Routes overlay
 (3) Roads and Trails overlay
 (4) Trafficability overlay

1. General. Boundaries of the study area are indicated on Enclosure (1). Two distinctive topographical regions are represented within this area; (1) Lowland plains: below the DMZ the study area is characterized by lowland plains covering approximately 7 square kilometers of open meadows and pasture lands. Below this area is a lateral belt approximately 5 kilometers in width which narrows to approximately 3 kilometers and turns north adjacent to the eastern boundary. It extends to the DMZ. This area is light undergrowth forest characterized by discontinuous canopy with numerous openings to the forest floor. To the south another area of lowland plains prevails consisting principally of rice paddies to approximately 3.5 kilometers north of Route 9. (2) The remainder of the AO below Route 9 consists of rolling plains and low hills.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

a. Relief. In lowland plains areas, ground slopes are generally less than 10 percent and elevations average about 30 meters. Rolling plains from 30 to 50 meters elevation dominate the lower portion of the study below Route 9. Low hills that sometimes exceed 50 meters occur in the southern and northwestern area.

b. Drainage. The principal drainage media is the Ben Hai River in the DMZ, the Hieu Giang (Cua Viet) and the Vinh Phuoc River, all flow in a easterly direction. The Hieu Giang River (Cua Viet) is navigable by LCM and small river craft, although passage is difficult in places at low water. In the western portion of the study area, mountain streams flow in a southerly direction and usually are too shallow for river craft but are navigable by small sampans with a draft ranging from 10 to 18 inches.

c. Vegetation. Rice constitutes the principal lowland vegetation in addition to grasslands, occasional elephant grass, brushwood, and clear undergrowth forestation.

Most prevalent in the area of rolling plains and low hills are dense undergrowth forests with interspersed brushwood and scattered single canopy from 10 to 20 feet in height particularly along the larger stream valleys. Undergrowth is predominately impenetrable by foot troops and conventional

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vehicles except along trails and roads. Tanks can slowly clear paths through the forestation in areas of rolling plains. Brushwood areas consist of moderate growth which does not usually exceed 2 meters in height. Forestation provides good cover for infiltration and staging activity.

d. Surface Material. Soil is firm when moist but soft and miry when wet. Toward the headwaters of streams, bottoms are gravel and stream beds contain large boulders. Base material is a composition of granite, slate, and quartzite rock in the low hill areas. Exposed rock is frequent in upper slopes and drainage defiles.

e. Cultural Features. The population in the study area is located in two general locations; (1) Cam Lo and (2) a portion of Cua Valley located in the southwestern section of the AO in the vicinity of Route 558.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

a. Observation and Fields of Fire.

(1) Observation is good in lowland areas except where broken by hedgerows and stands of brushwood. At higher elevations, consisting of rolling plains and low hills, observation is limited due to secondary undergrowth.

(2) Fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons are good in the plains and along principal river valleys but rapidly become poor in canopy covered areas. Observation for the conduct of indirect fires is reduced in effectiveness due to canopy cover.

b. Cover and Concealment. In lowlands, cover is localized to irrigation ditches, rice paddy dikes, streams and river banks. Moving into forested areas, concealment from aerial and direct observation becomes better with some cover provided by the underbrush and canopy. Concealment in areas of dense undergrowth forests is excellent and fair in valleys.

c. Obstacles. In the lowlands, foot movement through rice paddies is impeded and channelized along dikes in the rainy season. Tracked and wheeled vehicles can traverse these areas only with difficulty. Rivers, streams and canals are usually too deep to be forded by foot troops and tanks except during the dry Summer months. In rolling plains and areas of low hills, undergrowth and dense vegetation usually restricts movement to existing trails.

4. KEY TERRAIN

- a. Bench Mark 158 at Y 116701
- b. Hill 46 at YD108603
- c. Hill 35 at YD203591
- d. Hill 82 at YD112487

STRENGTH REPORT FOR
QUANG TRI AREA

28 June 1968

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	OFFICERS				STAFF				E-5 and Below			
	MC	USN	USA	USAF	MC	USN	USA	USAF	MC	USN	USA	USAF
Hq Bn	84	7			100	6			516	2		
3d MT Bn	14				21	1			190	8		
3d SP Bn	15	1			22	1			201	13		
3d TK Bn	19				27	2			209	17		
3d Recon Bn	22	1			34	2			476	33		
3d Engr Bn	15	2			19	2			248	7		
15th ITT	1				2				2			
7th CIT	2				5				3		1	
FLSG-B	2				5				62	1		
VMGR-152					1				1			
MAG-39	171	4			127	3			927	10		
1/3 Rear	4				13	3			238	10		
3/12 Rear	5				8				99	5		
1/26 Rear	3				7				78	2		
2/26 Rear	6				10	3			102	8		
3/26 Rear	3				9	1			50	4		
Hq 26th Mar Rear	1								6			
2/9 Rear	3				11				82	10		
3/9 Rear	7	1			16	1			193	5		
1/13 Rear	1				3				18	1		
"W" Btry	4				2				57	1		
3d MP Bn	5				7				158			
3d Dental Co		8				6				15		
3d MED Bn		4			1	7			23	18		2
MCB-11		24			1	79				632		
CBMU-301		1				6				31		
1st Air Cav			1								2	
1st PltCo "A" 44th FA			1				2				35	
507th MACV TMA							1				4	
588th Signal Co			7				14				96	
18th Surgical		35				14				78		
26th GenSupGrp			67				79				998	
Skyspot O.L. 25				6				6				50
15th Aerial Port											3	9

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Encl
160

	OFFICERS				STAFF				E-5 And Below			
	MC	USN	USA	USAF	MC	USN	USA	USAF	MC	USN	USA	USAF
1st Mobile Comm Grp				1				4				17
5th TAC				1				1				9
Forward Air Controllers				11				4				10
	387	88	76	19	451	137	96	15	3975	911	1139	97

USA 76
 USN 88
 USMC 387
 USAF 19
570

USA 1235
 USN 1048
 USMC 4426
 USAF 112
7232

GRAND TOTAL
 7802

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3D MARINE DIVISION

DE DIV AND NR 242

00 UUMSEA UUMSE
 DE UUMHVP 9740C 1800107
 ZNY CCCCC
 PCV TOC -T- III MAF COC
 O 280107Z JUN 68
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC
 TO UUMSEY/PCV TOC
 INFO UUMSEA/III MAF COC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR MAJOR EVANS, PCV-3 FROM MAJ DONNELLY 3RD MARDIV ASST OPNS O
 TELECON MAJ EVANS/MAJ DONNELLY 280815H JUN 68
 O. CTF CLEARWATER 260010Z MAY 68
 B. CG PCV 071401Z JUN 68

O. CTF CLEARWATER 191115Z MAR 68

O. REF A REQUESTED, WITHOUT PRIOR LIAISON WITH THIS DIVISION
 THAT MARINES MAN TWO TOWERS BUILT ALONG THE CUA VIET
 AT THE REQUEST OF CTF CLEARWATER.

O. REF B DIRECTED THIS DIV TO TAKE STEPS TO MAN THESE
 TOWERS. AS WORK PROGRESSED TOWARD A SYSTEM FOR MANNING
 THESE TWO TOWERS SEVERAL FACTS CAME TO LIGHT.

O. THAT THE RESIDENT MARINE REGIMENT HAD CONCURRED
 IN REF C, THE CTF CLEARWATER REQUEST THAT THE TOWERS BE
 CONSTRUCTED, WITH THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT NSAD
 PERSONNEL WOULD MAN THE TOWERS.

PAGE TWO UUMHVP 9740C C O N F I D E N T I A L

O. THAT CTF CLEARWATER HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED THE
 TOWERS TO ASSIST IN CONTROLLING TRAFFIC ON THE RIVER.

O. THAT THE RESIDENT MARINE REGIMENT HAS NO REQUIRE-
 MENTS FOR OR ADVANTAGE TO BE GAINED BY MANNING THESE TOWERS.
 THIS HAS BEEN DETERMINED BY PHYSICAL INSPECTION AND ACTIVE
 OBSERVATION FROM THESE TOWERS.

O. THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTING THE TOWERS HAS TO CONTROL
 TRAFFIC ON THE RIVER. & CTF CLEARWATER DOES NOT REQUIRE
 THE TOWERS FOR THIS PURPOSE IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THEY
 BE REMOVED AS THEY ARE OF NO VALUE TO THE 3RD MARDIV.

GP-4
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DRAFT

DRAFTER 3: JAD:
SEC 3 PHONE DIV COC
DWO

OUT

~~DEFINITE/URGENT/IMMEDIATE/FLASH~~ 68

TO: 30MAR DIV COC

PCV TOC

INFO:

978740

HAS BEEN SENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL/CONFIDENTIAL/UNCLASSIFIED~~
FOR MAT EVANS, PCV-3 FROM MAT DONNELLY 30MAR DW ASST OPNG O

INFO:

- (A)
- (B)
- (C)
- (D)

TELECON MAT EVANS / MAT DONNELLY 280815H JUN

Attachment OWT 150816Z

J. A. Donnelly

Encl 162

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

DATE 280402 Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG PCV
 COMNAVSUPACT

//SECRET//

MORTAR INCIDENT

A. YOUR 171240Z JUN 68

1. INFORMATION AVAILABLE THIS DIVISION IS THAT NO 81MM MORTARS
 UNDER THE CONTROL OF 3D MARINES ^{WERE} FIRED WITHIN RANGE OF LOPL
 MARK IV ON WHICH 81MM MORTAR FRAGMENTS WERE FOUND.

2. ONLY TUBES WITHIN RANGE (FOUR BELONGING TO 3/3) WERE
 LOCATED YD 282669 LAID ON AZIMUTH OF 4800 MILS FOR CP DEFENSE.
 THESE MORTARS WERE NOT FIRED DURING THE NIGHT OF 8-9 JUNE.
 THIS INFO WAS PASSED TO CTF CLEARWATER.

3. IN ADDITION, NO FIRES WERE CLEARED INTO 3D MARINES AO FOR
 OUTSIDE FWMAP.

4. NOT UNUSUAL FOR ENEMY TO USE 81MM MORTAR AMMO IN THEIR
 82MM TUBES. UNABLE TO DETERMINE WITH CERTAINTY THAT FIRE
 WAS FROM ENEMY SOURCE. IT IS CERTAIN HOWEVER THAT NO MORTARS
 UNDER THE CONTROL OF 3D MARDIV WERE FIRED WITHIN RANGE OF THE
 LOPL WHICH WAS HIT ON THE NIGHT OF 8-9 JUNE.

GP-4

CCN 2550

REL BY

BB Chapman

G-3

c/s / G-1 / LEG

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3D MARINE DIVISION

DRAFTER 3/JAD/11t

SEC G-3 PHONE DIV CQC

CWO [Signature]

IMMEDIATE 280448 ZJUN68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV

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OPCON

1. EFFECTIVE 271000H, ^{CG} 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON C/1/4 FROM CG TF HOTEL AND SAME DTG PASSED THAT UNIT TO OPCON 9TH MARINES.
2. EFFECTIVE 271600H CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON C/1/9 FROM 9TH MARINES AND SAME DTG PASSED OPCON THAT UNIT TO 1ST AMTRAG BN.

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CGN 2555

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
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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



DRAFTER 3P/LRB/wlk
SECTION 3P PHONE 203
CWO

Z JUN 68

FROM: 00 THIRD MARDIV
CG TF HOTEL
FIRST MARINES
FOURTH MARINES
THIRD MARINES
NINTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
FIRST AMTRAC BN

INFO: THIRD MARDIV (MINUS ACTION ADEES)

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DISPOSITION OF INF FORCES

A. MY 250814Z JUN 68

1. REF A IS AMPLIFIED BY THIS MSG.

2. CURRENT POSTURE DURING KSB PHASE DOWN AND PREPARATION
FOR OPN THOR:

A. SCOTLAND II AO: 1ST MARINES WITH 1/1, 2/1, 3/4,
3/9 ~~1-1-2 COS~~.

B. SCOTLAND II AO EXTENSION: 4TH MARINES WITH 1/4 (-)
(3 COS), 2/4, 2/9.

C. TF HOTEL CONTINUES RESPONSIBILITY FOR A & B ABOVE,
COLLOCATED AT LZ STUD WITH 4TH MARINES.

D. LANCASTER II AO: 9TH MARINES BRAVO WITH 2 COS ~~1/9~~,
~~1-1-2 COS~~ AND ONE CO OF 1/4.

SHOVE LOC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APD

ACTION

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THIRD MARDIV (30) AND PUSMA

~~(14 AND 15)~~
~~(30 AND 31)~~
 THE TWO BNS AT CA LU, LZ STUD, TSL, KHE CHIA AND
 CAMP CARROLL. 1ST MARINES CONDUCTS OPNS WEST AND
 NORTHWEST OF LZ STUD AND TSL. CO OF 1/4 ~~AND 1/5~~
 IN LANCASTER AO RETURNS TO PARENT EN.

B. TF HOTEL RETAINS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SCOTLAND II
~~(24 AND 34)~~
 EXTENDED WITH TWO BNS WEST OF CA LU IN MOBILE POSTURE.

C. 1ST MARINES AND 2/1 TO NAPOLEON/SALINE AO. REGT
 HQ LOCATED AT CUA VIET, ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR AO
 AND OPCON OF 1ST AMTRAC BN. 2/1 TO MAI XA THI VICINITY.
 ONE CO OF 2/1 TO QUANG TRI RELIEVING CO OF ~~1/3~~ ^{1/3} FOR
 CHOP TO PARENT BN. ONE CO OF 2/1 PREPARED TO RELIEVE
 CO OF 1/9 IN CUA VALLEY IF A USMC CO STILL REQUIRED
 THERE. ~~1/3~~ ^{1/3} IN NAPOLEON/SALINE AO.
 RETURNS TO PARENT ~~2/3~~ ^{REGT.} 3D MARINES (REAR) VACATES CUA
 VIET AND DISPLACES TO CAMP CARROLL.

D. UNITS MOVE TO ASSIGNED AO'S, FOR MULTI-REGT OPN
 CONCURRENT WITH AND EXTENDING BEYOND OPN THOR.
 CONCEPT OF OPNS W/OVERLAY PASEP.

- (1) 3D MARINES WITH THREE BNS, 1/3, 2/3, AND 3/3, IN
 NORTHEAST COASTAL AO.
- (2) 2D ARVN REGT IN RTE #1 AO EXTENDED INTO EASTERN
 PORTION OF LEATHERNECK SQUARE.
- (3) 9TH MARINES WITH FOUR BNS: 2/26 (STATIC PSNS),
 1/9, 2/9, 3/9 IN REMAINDER OF KENTUCKY AO. ALSO

CONDUCTS SECURITY FOR OPN THOR PSNS AND ROUTE
 SECURITY AS REQUIRED

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THIRD MARDIV

- E. KENTUCKY AO: 9TH MARINES WITH 2/26 AT DUEL BLADE PSNS, ONE CO 1/9 AT DONG HA FOR OPN THOR CONVOY AND ROUTE SECURITY AND ONE CO 1/9 AT COA VALLEY.
- F. SPECIFIED AREA OF OPNS WITHIN KENTUCKY AO: 3D MARINES WITH ~~1/3~~ 2/3^{NO} 3/3.
- G. NAPOLEON/SALINE AO: AMTRAC BN WITH ~~1/3~~ ^{1/3(-)(3 COS).} ~~1/3~~
- H. HQ BN, QTCE: ONE CO ~~1/3~~ 1/3

3. INTERIM PERIOD, KSB PHASE DOWN NOT COMPLETED, OPN THOR SECURITY REQUIREMENT EXISTS (APPROX 29 JUNE - 3 JULY):

- A. 3D MARINES CHOPS 3/3 TO 9TH MARINES, FOR USE IN SECURITY TO ARTY PSNS OUTSIDE CURRENT STATIC DEFENSE PSNS, AND TO ASSIST IN CONVOY PROTECTION FROM RTE #1 TO A-3.
- B. 3D MARINES CONTINUE OPNS IN SPECIFIED PORTION OF KENTUCKY AO WITH REDUCED FORCES.
- C. 3D MARINES WILL REGAIN OPCON OF 3/3 AS 3/9 AND 2/9 BECOME AVAILABLE FROM EFFECT OF COMPLETION OF KSB PHASE DOWN.

4. AS KSB PHASE DOWN IS COMPLETED AND OPN THOR CONTINUES, MULTI-REGT OPM IS ALSO INITIATED (APPROX 3-12 JULY).

- A. 1ST HOTEL A ~~1/3~~ ^{1/3} RE-OPNED FOR LACASIER AO FROM 9TH MARINES BRAVO AND OPCON OF 1/1. ~~1/3~~

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THIRD MARDIV

5. SUBSEQUENT TO MULTI-REGT OPN IN KENTUCKY AO AND COASTAL AREA, TF HOTEL WITH 2 REGTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH A REGT FROM THE 1ST ARVN DIV, CONDUCTS OPNS IN THE NORTHERN LANCASTER AO. CONCEPT OF OPNS PASEP. TF HOTEL CURRENTLY CONDUCTING DETAILED PLANNING. 3D MARINES WITH 1/3, 2/3, 3/3 AND 9TH MARINES WITH 1/9, 2/9, 3/9 CONDUCT OPNS. REMAINING DISPOSITIONS AS IN PREVIOUS TIME PERIOD.

GP-4

CCN

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REL BY

RH Davis

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
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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

3P/WMC/WLK
SECTION 3P PHONE 203
CWO



IMMEDIATE

280748

Z JUN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARINES
NINTH MARINES
INFO: THIRD MARDIV
FIRST ARVN DIV
SECOND ARVN REGT

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: MULTI-REGT OPN NORTHEASTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE

A. MAP: VIETNAM; SERIES L7014 SHEETS 6442 IV AND 6342 I

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

TASK ORGANIZATION

1ST ARVN DIVISION

2D ARVN REGT

MANEUVER FORCE - 3 BNS PROPOSED

3D MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN)

9TH MARINES

MANEUVER FORCES - 3 BNS (1/9, 2/9, 3/9 ~~REIN~~)

3D MARINES

MANEUVER FORCE - 3 BNS (1/3, 2/3, 3/3 ~~REIN~~)

3D RECON BN

SCREENING FORCES - AS REQUIRED

1. MISSION.

3D MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), IN CONJUNCTION WITH UNITS OF 1ST ARVN DIVISION, CONDUCTS A COMBINED AND COORDINATED ATTACK IN THE NORTHEAST PORTION OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE TO

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DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE DESIGNATED
OBJECTIVE AREA.

2. CONCEPT.

280748

A. 3D MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN), IN CONJUNCTION WITH
UNITS OF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION, CONDUCTS A COMBINED,
COORDINATED ATTACK IN THE NORTHEAST PORTION OF QUANG
TRI PROVINCE. THE OPERATIONS WILL COMMENCE DURING
~~THE LATER STAGES OF~~ OPERATION THOR, A MASSIVE AIR,
NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND ARTILLERY ATTACK ON ENEMY FORCES
AND ARTILLERY POSITIONS IN AND AROUND THE DMZ, (ON OR
ABOUT D+2 $\frac{1}{2}$ OF OPERATION THOR) AND WILL IN ITSELF
UTILIZE EXTENSIVE AIR, ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE
ASSETS.

B. COMMENCING AT H-HOUR, 9TH MARINES, 3D MARINES AND
2D ARVN REGIMENT, CONDUCT COMBINED AND COORDINATED
OPERATIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF OPERATION
(SEE OVERLAY PASEP) TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY ENEMY
FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA.

OPERATIONS ARE TO BE CONDUCTED IN THREE PHASES IAW
THE FOLLOWING TIME FRAME:

PHASE I (D+2 AND D+3) OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE
GENERAL LINE A-2, A-3, A-4 IN THE 9TH
MARINES AND 2D ARVN OPERATING AREAS, AND THE
75 EAST WEST GRID LINE IN THE 3D MARINES
AREA.

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PHASE II (D+4 TO D+7 (APPROX)) OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE GENERAL LINE A-2, A-3, A-4 AND SOUTH OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.

PHASE III (D+8 TO D+11 (APPROX)) OPERATIONS DIRECTED TOWARD A THOROUGH SEARCH FOR AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS BETWEEN THE GENERAL LINE A-2, A-3, A-4 AND THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE OPERATING AREAS (CAM LO - CUA VIET RIVERS).

C. SCREENING FORCES WILL BE INSERTED ALONG THE WESTERN AND SOUTHERN BOUNDARIES TO DENY THE ENEMY ANY EGRESS TO THE WEST OR SOUTH.

D. RESERVE. THE DIVISION RESERVE FOR THIS OPERATION WILL CONSIST OF THE LEAST COMMITTED MANEUVER BATTALION.

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) 3D AND 9TH MARINES DEVELOP SCHEME OF MANEUVER FOR ATTACK IN RESPECTIVE ZONES OF OPERATION. DIRLAUTH WITH 2D ARVN REGT. SUBMIT PLANS TO THIS HQ FOR APPROVAL ^{EARLIEST.}
- (2) COUNTER MORTAR RADAR AND OTHER ARTILLERY/MORTAR SUPPRESSION TECHNIQUES WILL BE EMPLOYED TO THE UTMOST.
- (3) D-DAY OPERATION THOR O/A 1 JULY 1968
- (4) DURATION OF OPN: ESTIMATE 5-8 DAYS

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

- (5) AREA OF OPERATIONS: THE OBJECTIVE AREA WILL CONSIST OF THE AREA BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE DMZ, ON THE EAST BY THE GULF OF TONKIN, ON THE SOUTH BY THE CAM LO AND CUA VIET RIVERS, AND TO THE WEST GENERALLY ALONG THE NORTH/SOUTH GRID LINE 08. THREE REGT ZONES OF OPERATIONS AS DEPICTED. SEE OVERLAY PASEP.
- (6) REGIMENTS BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY BATTALION AS DIVISION RESERVE ANYWHERE IN DIVISION AO ON SHORT NOTICE.

GP-4

CCN

2572

REL BY

RFD Davis

4


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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



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CO W.O.	
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COPO	
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ACTION	

Thor

QK
 OO RUMHVP
 YDE RUMHMA 838 1800835
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 280810Z JUN 68
 FMCG PCV PHB
 TO RUMHMB/CG 1ST ACD CES
 RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH
 RUMHMB/CG 101ST ABN DIV CEE
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DNG
 BT

28/281135/PCU/145

SECRET AVII-GCAV 04229
 SUBJ: TACTICAL AIR WUPPORT FOR COMING WEEKS (U)
 1. (S) BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY TACTICAL AIR REQUIREMENTS FOR OPER
 ATION THOR, A MASSIVE ARTILLERY, AIR
 FYRLNGF OPERATION DESIGNED
 TO DESTROY EMENY ARTILLERY IN THE CAP MUI LAY JOY

THE DMZ ADDRESSEES CAN EXPECT TO RECEIVE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN
 NORMAL TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, BOTH PREPLANNED AND IMMEDIATE, FURING
 THE PERIOD 1-7 JULY. REQUEST S FOR TACTICAL AIR DURING THE
 PERIOD SPECIFIED SHOULD BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND IF POSSIBLE
 TARGETS ENGAGED WITH ALLTERNATE MEANS TO INSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE
 UTILIZATION OF REMAINING TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES.
 2. (S) ADDITIONALLY, IN VIEW OF THE EXPECTED LACK OF AIRCRAFT
 AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE SCRAMBLE FURING THIS PERIOD, ADDRESSEES

PAGE 2 RUMHMA 838 SECRET
 SHOULD EXPECT THAT SOME PREPLANNED TACTICAL AIR MAY BE DIVERTED TO
 VALID HIGH PRIORITY TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS WITHING THE CORPS.
 GP-4 *280810Z JUN 68* *G-3/AIRO*

BT

280810Z Jun 68

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
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*Stand
ADP*

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IMMEDIATE

29050

ZJUN68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. EFFECTIVE 281730H, CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON K AND L COS 3/9 FROM 9TH MARINES AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON THOSE UNITS TO CG TF HOTEL.
2. EFFECTIVE 281400H, CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON 1/3 WITH COS B AND C FROM 3D MARINES AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON THAT UNIT TO 1ST AMTRAC BN UNTIL RETURN OF 3D MAR ^{CP} TO CUA VIET.
3. EFFECTIVE 281500H, CG 3D MAR ASSUMES OPCON COS 1/3 AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON THAT UNIT TO HQ BN LOCATED AT QUANG TRI COMBAT BASE.

GP-4

CCN 2666

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*W Chapman**Stand*

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
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THIRD MARDIV



DRAFTER 3/JAD
SEC G-3 PHONE 3D MARDIV
CWO

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IMMEDIATE 290600 Z JUN68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPCON

1. EFFECTIVE 281330H JUN68 CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON OF CO D 1/9 FROM HQ BN AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON THAT UNIT TO 9TH MARINES.
2. EFFECTIVE 28 1330H JUN68, CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON CO C 1/9 FROM 1ST AMTRAC BN AND SAME DTG PASSES OPCON THAT UNIT TO 9TH MARINES.

GP-4

CCN 2663

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W. Chapman

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JUN

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SECRET

FLASH 290800 Z JUN 68
 RECEIVED
 COMM CNTR
 FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG TF HOTEL
 NINTH MARINES
 THIRD MARINES
 INFO: TWELFTH MARINES

THIRD MARDIV
 DRAFTER G-3/HMH/100
 SEC G-3 PHONE DIV COG
 CWO 11.0100

//SECRET//

OPCON AND AO REASSIGNMENTS

1. EFF 291200H CG 3D MARDIV PASSES RESPONSIBILITY FOR MODIFIED LANCASTER II AO TO CG TF HOTEL. NINTH MARINES RELIEVED SAME DTG.
2. LANCASTER AO & TF HOTEL/NINTH MARINES BOUNDARY AS CURRENTLY SHOWN EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW: FROM A POINT ON THE EXISTING BDRY AT YD 099540 EAST ALONG GL YD 54 TO YD 130540 THENCE SOUTH ALONG GL YD 13 TO YD 130490 THENCE WEST ALONG GL 49 TO THE CURRENT BDRY AGAIN AT YD 088490.
3. FOR CG TF HOTEL:
 - A. ASSUME OPCON OF 1/9 (-) (LESS "A" CO) & C/1/4 EFF 291200H.
 - B. RELOCATE 4TH MARINES REAR FROM CAMP CARROLL TO A LOCATION ACCEPTABLE TO YOU & 4TH MARINES. SEE PARA 5 BELOW.
 - C. CAMP CARROLL COMPLEX TO BE RUN BY A BN YOUR ASSETS.
 - D. COMMENCE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING LANCASTER EFF 291200H.

CARRY FWD CUMULATIVE TOTALS.
4. FOR 9TH MARINES:
 - A. CHOP 1/9 (-) & C/1/4 IAW PARA 3A ABOVE.
 - B. RETURN CMD GRP B YOUR AO UPON RELIEF BY ~~UNIT~~ UNIT TF HOTEL.

G-3

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

290800Z JUN 68

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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

5. FOR 3D MARINES: YOU ARE AUTH TO COMMENCE MOVEMENT 3D MARINES
REAR TO CAMP CARROLL EFF 30 ^JJUNE 68.

GP-4

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REL BY

A. L. McHenry Jr.

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
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THIRD MARDIV

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

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ACTION

*Operation Charlie
Scotland IT*

ZURAGNAN

NR019.....109.....10.....019

ZNY SSSSS

O 290920Z JUN68

FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO ZEN

& FIRST MARINES

ZEN/TWELFTH MARINES

EZ

010330/TFH/19

ARTILLERY SUPPORT KHE SANH BASE

1. REQUEST L/4/12 AND 8 INCH PLATOON REMAIN IN SUPPORT
UNTIL EVACUATION KHE SANH BASEYKOMPLETE ON OR ABOUT
4JUL68.

2. INCREASED ARTILLERY AND MORTAR ATTACKS ON FIRST
MARINES UNITS AND GROUND CONTACT VICINITY FOXTROT RIDGE
INDICATED INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN KHE SANH AREA.
DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY UNITS NOT CONSIDERED FULLY
CAPABLE OF ENGAGING ENEMY WITH REQQ

RED VOLUME OF FIRE

AT MAXIMUM POSSIBLE RANGE.

GP-4

BT

290920Z JUNE 68

G-3

STAND OFF

NNNN

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Encl 171

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SHOVE COC

GP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCFO

PO

[Handwritten signatures and initials]
Opcon

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DRAFTER 3/JAD/1sr
 SEC 3 PHONE DIV COC
 CWO [Signature]

IMMEDIATE 291426 JUNE 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: THIRD MARDIV

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OPCON

1. EFFECTIVE 291200H JUN 68, CG 3D MARDIV ASSUMES
 OPCON K/4/12 AND D/2/12 FROM 12TH MARINES AND SAME DTG
 PASSES SAME CG TF HOTEL.

GP-4

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29

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26

JUN


THIRD MARDIV COMM CNTR

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3D MARINE DIVISION



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W.O.	<i>92</i>
COPO	
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ACTION	<i>THOR</i>

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HVP 393

OO RUMHVPEDZOV RUMHMA

N

OO RUMHMA

ZNY SSSSS ZFD RUMUGRA

OTTSZYUW RUMUGRA5294 1820314-SSSS--RUMHMA RUMUFKA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 300314Z JUN 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN

RUYNBJA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

INFO RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHB

RUHQUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMFUK/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO

RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS FWD DGH

BT

~~SECRET~~

OPERATION THOR


A. CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT 280542Z JUN 68

1. REF A REQUESTS THAT 7TH AF AND III MAF INCLUDE AIR STRIKES AGAINST TIGER ISLAND IN TARGETING PLANS FOR PHASES I AND III OPERATION THOR.

2. TIGER ISLAND FALLS OUTSIDE AREA DESIGNATED FOR OPN THOR THUS TARGETING SOLELY UNDER COGNIZANCE 7TH AF.

3. FOR CDR 7TH AF. REQUEST YOU TAKE REF A FOR ACTION. GP-4 BT

*THOR/021010Z/PCU/393**O 300314Z JUN 68 300314Z, June 68**G-2/3/02/02***SECRET**

SECRET

THIRD MARDIV

 DRAFTER 3P/LRB/WLK
 SECTION 3P PHONE 203
 CWO *W*

 IMMEDIATE
 FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: CG FMFPAC
 CG PCV
 CG NINTH MAB

(0021)

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BLT ROTATION

- A. CG III MAF 151426Z JUN 68 (NOTAL)
 B. CG III MAF 241030Z JUN 68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A DIRECTS 3D MARDIV COMMENCE ACTIVATION BLT IN-COUNTRY FOR RELIEF OF BLT 2/4. RECOMMEND ALL FUTURE BLTS BE DESIGNATED FROM 26TH MARINES THUS MAINTAINING CONTINUITY OF OTHER BNS WITH PARENT REGT.

2. PARA 3 OF REF B STATES INTENTION TO EMBARK SLF ALFA IN MID JULY. CONSIDER THAT PRESENT TACTICAL SITUATION PRECLUDES SUCH PLAN. CONTINUED PRESENCE OF 2/4 IN MOBILE POSTURE IN SENSITIVE SCOTLAND II AO UNDER PARENT REGT CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL. RECOMMEND DEACTIVATION OF BLT 2/4 WITHOUT RE-EMBARKATION.

GP-4

G-3 (plano)

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REL. BY

W
[Signature]

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SHOVE CO

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOF-0



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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

FLASH

*****ZZ RUMHVP
 DE RUMHAW 053W 182041
 ZNT SSSSS
 Z 300640Z JUN 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUMHVP/TASK FORCE HOTEL
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARNIV
 ZEN/NAG ONE ONE
 RUMHAW/ONE TWO
 RUMHAW/ONE THREE
 ZEN/MACG ONE EIGHT
 INFO RUMHAW/MACS FOUR
 ZEN/MASS TWO
 RUMHAW/MASS THREE
 BT

101/300729/

TASK FORCE HOTEL PASS TO MASS-3 DET -2 (STUD) (DASC)
 THIRD MARDIV PASS TO MASS TWO DET ONE (DONG HA) DASC
 OPERATION THOR FIRE SUPPORT AREAS
 A. CONFERENCE SAME SUBJECT UDORN AB 27JUN68
 1. IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING OPERATION THOR FIRE SUPPORT AREAS
 ARE DESIGNATED:
 A. AREA TANGO: FROM YD120900 DUE EAST TO COAST, (YD255900)

PAGE TWO RUMHAW 053W
 SOUTH DOWN COAST TO SONG BEN HAI (YD251822), WEST ALONG SONG BEN
 HAI TO RT 1A (YD188808), NORTH UP TO RT 1A TO START (YD120900).
 B. AREA UNIFORM: FROM SONG DEN HAI (YD188807), EAST ALONG
 SONG BEN HAI TO COAST (YD251822), SOUTH ALONG COAST TO SOUTHERN
 BOUNDARY OF DMZ (YD281773), WEST ALONG SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF DMZ
 TO RT 1A (YD206760), NORTH ALONG RT 1A TO START (YD188807).
 C. AREA VICTOR: FROM YD000900, DUE EAST TO RT 1A (YD119900),
 SOUTH ALONG RT 1A TO YANKEE DELTA 160848, TO YD 156846, WEST ALONG
 BEN XE TO YD043830, DUE WEST TO YD000830, DUE NORTH TO START
 (YD000900).
 D. AREA WHISKEY: START YD080854, EAST ALONG BEN XE TO
 YD156846, TO YD160848, SOUTH ALONG RT 1A TO YD193789, WEST ALONG
 SONG BEN HAI TO YD080761, DUE NORTH TO START (YD080854).
 E. AREA X-RAY: START YD080761, EAST ALONG SONG BEN HAI TO
 YD193789, SOUTH ALONG RT 1A TO YD206760, WEST ALONG SOUTHERN
 BOUNDARY OF DMZ TO YD080708, NORTH TO YD 080731, NORTH ALONG SONG
 BEN HAI TO START (YD080761).
 F. AREA YANKEE: START YD000830, DUE EAST TO YD043830, EAST
 ALONG BEN XE TO YD080854, DUE SOUTH TO YD080761, SOUTH WEST
 ALONG SONG BEN HAI TO YD000900, DUE NORTH TO START (YD000900).

FLASH**SECRET**

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End 175

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THIRD MARDIV

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PAGE THREE RUMHAW 053W [REDACTED]

1. AREA ZULU: YD000701, EAST ALONG SONG BEN HAI TO YD080731, DUE SOUTH TO YD080708, SOUTH WEST ALONG SOUTHERN DMZ BORDER TO YD000660, DUE NORTH TO START (YD000701).

2. ALL FLIGHT LEADERS/CONTROLLERS WILL BE AWARE OF ABOVE AREAS PRIOR TO PARTICIPATION IN OP THOR.

3. AREAS ARE DESIG AS A MEANS OF CONTROLLING SIMULTANEOUS AIR, ARTY AND NGF STRIKES IN OPERATION THOR. FLIGHT LEADERS WILL BE COUTIONED BY ABCCC OR FAC CONTROL WHEN ARTY OR NGF IS BEING CONDUCTED IN AREAS ADJACENT TO THEIR ASSIGNED STRIKE AREA.

GP-4

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
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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

*****ZZ UUMSEA UUMSEM
DE UUMHVP 9738C 330645
ZNY SSSSS
PCV TOC -T- III MAF COC
*****ZZ 30645Z JUN 68
FM 3RD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSEM PCV TOC
INFO UUMSEA/III MAF COC
BT



SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

AFCPO

APO

ACTION

ARC LIGHT

A. CG PCV MSG 330325Z JUNE 68

1. IAW REFERENCE A ALL TARGETS NORTH OF THE BEN HAI ARE GRANTED
CLEARANCE/CONCURRENCE UNTIL 100800H JULY 68. THERE ARE NO USMC
OR ARVN TROOPS WITHIN THREE KILOMETERS OF THE TARGET BOXES.

2. D-2 TARGET INFORMATION:

A. ALL STRUCTURES AND HUTS SOUTH OF THE SONG BEN HAI HAVE BEEN
ABANDONED, DESTROYED OR CONVERTED TO VC/NVA USE. NONCOMBATANTS
WERE REMOVED TO RESETTLEMENT VILLES VICINITY OF CAN LO AND GIO
LIU SEVERAL MONTHS AGO.

B. CLOSEST MARINE POSITIONS TO THE TARGETS ARE LOCATED AT A-1
(YD 270733), A-2 (YD 214744), --3 (YD 173722) AND A-4 (YD 114700).

C. THERE ARE NO RELIGIOUS SHRINES OR NATIONAL MONUMENTS WITHIN
1 KM OF TARGETS BOXES SOUTH OF THE SONG BEN HAI.

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300645Z Jun 68


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THIRD MARDIV

**SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF

3-3 W.O.

3-2 W.O.

COPO

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VV VPA473ZVA 8381217

VO RUMHVP

ZNY SSSSS

O TSZYUW RUMUHFA5258 1821135-SSSS--RUMHAW RUMHVP RUMHLA RUMHMA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 101118Z JUN 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

INFO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUMHIL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHHIMA/CG FMFPAC

RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC

RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHU BAI

RUMHLI/CG FIRST MARDIV DANANG

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DANANG

RUMGCR/CTF 76

RUABQL/CTF 79

RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DANANG

BT

18831

SUBJ: ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT (U)

REF: CG, III MAF DTG 241030Z JUN 68 (S)

1. (S) REF PROPOSES AN ARG/SLF SCHEDULE FOR THE MONTHS OF JULY, AUG AND SEP UTILIZING THE CURRENT MODIFIED ROTATION PLAN.

PAGE 2 RUMUHFA 5258

(U) THIS HEADQUARTERS RECOMMENDS CONCURRENCE WITH SCHEDULE ESTABLISHED BY REF. GP-4

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3D MARINE DIVISION DRAFTER: 3P/LRP/WLK
SECTION: 3P/PHONE
CWO: C. Z. W.O.

IMMEDIATE

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Z JUN 68


2 W.O.

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG PCV (ATTN: A VII - GOF)
INFO: CG III MAF - CG FMF PAC
CG NINTH MAB

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE

A. CG III MAF 191104Z JUN 68

B. CG PCV 260639Z JUN 68



ACT
FIS
copy to Planning
9/1/68

1. REFS (A) AND (E) REQUEST EVALUATION OF FUTURE OPNS TO DETERMINE IF LUCRATIVE TGTS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF SLF'S COULD BE DEVELOPED.
2. AS RECOGNIZED BY REF (A), LUCRATIVE TGTS ARE OFTEN RAPIDLY DEVELOPED AND REQUIRE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE RAPID REACTION FORCES.
3. THE POSITIONING OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE SLF'S JUST OFFSHORE FROM THE 3D MARDIV AO DURING MAJOR OPNS DESIGNED TO SEEK OUT THE ENEMY OFFERS THE POTENTIAL OF EXPLOITING ENEMY CONTACTS AFTER DETECTING HIS PRESENCE. 3D MARDIV WILL CONDUCT TWO MULTI-REGT OPNS DURING JULY; ONE IN NORTHEASTERN QUANG TRI BETWEEN THE DMZ AND THE CAM LO RIVER IN KENTUCKY AO AND EAST TO THE COAST FROM APPROX 3-12 JULY. THE OTHER WILL BE IN NORTHERN LANCASTER AO IN LATE JULY. THE PRESENCE OF AN SLF AS

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301430Z JUN 68

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AN AVAILABLE HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE RAPID REACTION AFLOAT
3D MARINE DIVISION
RESERVE DURING THESE PERIODS WOULD ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF
REF (A).

4. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR OVER-THE-BEACH AMPHIBIOUS OR VERTICAL ASSAULT WITH OPERATIONS ASHORE IN AN AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA SHOULD PRESENT ITSELF IN LATE AUGUST. ON OR ABOUT 24 AUG, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT 1ST MARINES WILL RETURN TO 1ST MARDIV FROM 3D MARDIV. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO REPLACE THE 1ST MARINES AS THEY DEPART FROM THE NAPOLEON/SALINE AO. A FOLLOW ON CONSIDERATION IS THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN INFANTRY ELEMENTS IN THAT AO THROUGHOUT THE MONSOON SEASON. THE AVAILABILITY IN AUGUST OF 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV TO 3D MARDIV IS OFFSET BY THE LIKELY EXPANSION OF THE DIV AO TO INCLUDE THE BA LONG RIVER VALLEY AND QUANG TRI VICINITY. THE TERRAIN IN THIS AREA IS WELL SUITED TO THE 1ST BDE'S CAPABILITIES.

5. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT ONE OR BOTH OF THE ARGS/SLFS UNDER 9TH MAB OPCON CONDUCT OVER-THE-BEACH AND HELICOPTER-BORNE ASSAULTS INTO THE NAPOLEON/SALINE COASTAL AO, AND SUBSEQUENT OPNS ASHORE, FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST 3 WEEKS, COMMENCING ON OR ABOUT 23 AUG. AS OPPOSED TO PREVIOUS SLF COMMITMENTS, OPCON OF THE SLFS WOULD NOT PASS TO 3D MARDIV. THE NAPOLEON/SALINE AO WOULD BE THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA; ATF CDR AND LF CDR RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD REMAIN CONSISTENT WITH AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE.

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6. MISSION/CONCEPT OF OPS: ONE OR BOTH SLEFS CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OR HELICOPTER-BORNE LANDING IN NAPOLEON/SALINE AO. SUBSEQUENTLY CONDUCT OPNS TO COUNTER NVA INFILTRATION AND VC ACTIVITIES, TO ESTABLISH SURVEILLANCE AND SCREENING CAPABILITY, TO DETECT AND DESTROY ENEMY INFILTRATING UNITS AND TO PREVENT INCURSION INTO THE AO BY NVA/VC MAIN FORCE UNITS. OPERATIONS ARE FURTHER DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR THE CUA VIET PORT FACILITY, TO INSURE UNINTERRUPTED PASSAGE OF SHIPPING ON CUA VIET RIVER AND TO DENY ENEMY ACCESS TO ROCKET POSITIONS ORIENTED AGAINST DONG HA AND QUANG TRI WITHIN THE AO. ACTIVE COMMAND OF FORCES ASHORE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED FROM AFLOAT OR SHORE CP'S.

GP-4

GCN

~~50~~ 2783

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
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COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



ZZ UUMSEA UUMSEM UUMHVP UUMSE UUMSAR
 DE UUMSDG 0004 18219Z
 ZNY SSSSE
 Z 301800Z
 FM CG PCV FWDHHA RVN
 TO UUMSEA/COC III MAF DNG
 UUMSEM/COC PCV PHB
 INFO UUMHVP/COC 3RD MAR DIV DHA
 UUMSE/COMUSMACV MACV J2-88
 UUMSE/CICV MACV J2-88
 UUMSAR/ 7TH AF TACC SAIGON TSN
 BT

SHOVE COC

OP CHIEF

G-3 W O

G-2 W O

DCPO

APO

ACTION

CITE S1003

SUBJ: ARC LIGHT-OPERATION THOR

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING TARGETS LISTED IN ORDER OF PRIORITY
 ARE NOMINATED FOR THE PERIOD 032400Z TO 42400Z.

A. PA30-223 QT5213

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHEETS: 6343 II

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

YD039 878

YD 043 898

YD 049 877

YD 053 897

PAGE TWO CITE S 1003 UUMSDG

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE

PHOTO MISSION ON 29 JUNE REVEALED 5 (FIVE) 57MM AA GUNS WITH RADAR;

4 (FOUR) 37MM AA GUNS; 5 (FIVE) AA POSITIONS AND AN AMMO STORAGE AREA.

B. PA30-218 QT5208

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHEETS: 6343 II

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

YD 019 852

YD 029 851

YD 016 832

YD 026 831

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE:

FOUR (4) PHOTO MISSIONS FROM 6 JUNE TO 28 JUNE HAVE REVEALED
 45 AA POSITIONS, 14 OF WHICH WERE PROBABLY OCCUPIED ON 25 JUNE. TWO (2)

ARTY POSITIONS AND ONE (1) VEHICLE PARK WERE ALSO REVEALED.

C. PA 30-224 QT 5214

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHEETS: 6343 II

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

YD 020 884

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YD 030 904

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE:

PHOTO MISSIONS ON 28 AND 29 JUNE REVEALED FIVE (5) 57MM AA GUNS WITH RADAR; FOUR (4) 37MM AA GUNS; FIVE (5) AA POSITIONS, AND AN AMMO STORAGE AREA.

D. PA20-182 QT5174

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHEETS: 6343 II

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

YD 006 851

YD 015 845

YD 016 868

YD 025 864

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE:

PHOTO MISSIONS PERFORMED ON 18 AND 23 JUNE REVEALED FIVE (5) OCCUPIED 37MM AA POSITIONS; ONE (1) UNOCCUPIED AA POSITION; EIGHT (8) ARTY POSITIONS, AND TWO (2) TRUCK PARKS.

E. PA 30-216 QT 5206

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHEETS: 6443 III

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

YD 246 853

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YD 246 873

YD 256 853

YD 256 873

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE: PHOTO MISSIONS PERFORMED FROM 9 TO 28 JUNE HAVE REVEALED FOUR (4) COASTAL DEFENSE SITES, AN ARTY POSITION AND AN AA POSITION

F. PA 30-219 QT 5209

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHEETS: 6443 III

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

YD 194 880

YD 194 900

YD 204 880

YD 204 900

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE: PHOTO MISSIONS PERFORMED BETWEEN 30 MAY AND 5 JUNE REVEALED THIRTEEN (13) AA POSITIONS, SIX (6) ARTY POSITIONS, ONE (1) POSSIBLE 100MM GUN, AND ONE (1) UNOCCUPIED SAM SITE.

G. PA 30-225

15 5215

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHEETS: 6443 III

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

YD 105 859

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YD 104 819

YD 113 840

YD 114 820

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE: PHOTO MISSIONS ON 26 AND 28 JUNE REVEALED NINETEEN (19) AA POSITIONS, A 130MM MORTAR POSITION, AND ONE (1) 100MM G

N

H. PA30-220 QT 5210

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHEETS: 6342 I

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

XD 985 740

XD 989 760

XD 994 738

D 998 757

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE: PHOTO MISSIONS ON 19 AND 28 JUNE REVEALED FOUR (4) NEWLY CONSTRUCTED ARTY POSITIONS AND FIVE (5) NEW AA POSITIONS.

I. PA 30-207 QT 5197

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHE TS: 6343 II

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

YD 103 878

YD 106 858

YD 113 880

PAGE SIX [REDACTED] CITE S1003 UUMSDG

YD 115 860

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE: PHOTO MISSIONS PERFORMED DURING MAY AND JUNE HAVE REVEALED 45 AA POSITIONS, FIVE (5) ARTY POSITIONS, AND A VEHICLE REVETMENT.

J. PA30-222 QT 5212

(1) MAP SERIES: L-7014 SHEETS: 6343 II

(2) UTM COORDINATES:

YD 000820

YD 007 814

YD 013 835

YD 020 829

(3) TARGET INTELLIGENCE: PHO O MISSIONS PERFORMED BETWEEN 30 MAY AND 8 JUNE HAVE REVEALED SIX (6) HEAVY MACHINE GUN POSITIONS, FIVE (5) OCCUPIED ON 28 JUNE; TWENTY-EIGHT (28) AA POSITIONS, TWO (2) ARTY POSITIONS

ONE (1) TRUCK PARK, AND FOUR (4) SUPPLY REVETMENTS.

2. (S) THESE TARGETS ARE VALID UNTIL 002400Z JULY 68.

3. (S) DESIRED TOT: 032400Z JULY 68.

4. (S) THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY SITES OR WITHIN THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF THE TARGET BOXES. THERE ARE NO KNOWN NONCOMBATANTS, RELIGIOUS SHRINES OR NATIONAL MONUMENTS IN OR WITHIN ON (1) KILOMETER

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OF THE TARGET BOXES. NEAREST FRIENDLIES ARE LOCATED BELOW THE
SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.
5. (S) EXPLOITATION: NONE SCHEDULED
6. (S) REQUEST 7TH AF PHOTO COVERAGE TO DETERMINE BDA ON ALL
NOMINATIONS, ONE SET OF PRINTS TO BE FORWARDED THIS HEADQUARTERS.
7. (S) REQUEST CG III MAF CONFIRM VALIDITY OF GVN CLEARANCE ARE
FORWARD TO MACCOC-8 WITH [REDACTED] CG PCV ARC [REDACTED]

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