

Aug 1961

3RD MARINE DIVISION COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 101a

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10/10/1997
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3/3/97

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3D MARDIV S&C FILE
BT# 607068

3D MARINE DIVISION

FMF (-) (REIN)



COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

for the month of

AUG 1968

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 3d MarDiv ltr 3/PDL/glp over
3480/2 Ser: 003A27068 of 16Oct68

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for Period 1-31 August 1968 (U)

1. Forwarded.

2. The following documents, listed as supporting documents to the subject chronology, were not included in the materials forwarded to this headquarters:

- a. Division SitReps 5-8, 11-18, 23, 27 and 30.
- b. Tabs A, B, C, D and E to 9th Marines command chronology.
- c. 2d Battalion, 26th Marines command chronology. *ATTACH TO 9TH MAB*
- d. Tabs A-F to 3d Battalion, 26th Marines command chronology.
- e. 1st Marines command chronology *as 1st Mar Div ltr 3d Mar Div 1 Aug*

3. By copy hereof, Commanding General, 3d Marine Division is requested to provide the missing documents.

W. E. Deeds
W. E. DEEDS
By direction

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CG, 3d MarDiv

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PIAST ENDORSEMENT on CG 3dMarDiv ltr 3/PDL/glp over 3480/2
Serno: 003A27068 dtd 16Oct68

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 August 1968 (U)

1. Forwarded.

Marion C. Dalby
MARION C. DALBY
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/PDL/glp
3480/2
SerNo: 003A27068
18 Oct 1968

[REDACTED] (unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed)

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 August 1968 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8

Encl: (1) 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF Command Chronology
for August 1968 (U)

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),
enclosure (1) is submitted.

R. G. Davis
R. G. DAVIS

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 August 1968 to 31 August 1968

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Commanding General, 3d MarDiv (Rein)	MGen R. G. DAVIS	1-31 Aug
Assistant Division Commander (CG TF HOTEL)	BGen C. W. HOFFMAN	1-21 Aug
Assistant Division Commander (CG TF HOTEL)	BGen W. C. CHIP	22-31 Aug
Assistant Division Commander	BGen F. E. GARRETSON	26-31 Aug

SUBORDINATE UNITS

3d Marine Regiment	Col R. L. MICHAEL JR.	1-31 Aug
4th Marine Regiment	Col E. J. MILLER	1-31 Aug
9th Marine Regiment	Col R. H. BARROW	1-31 Aug
12th Marine Regiment	Col P. J. MULRONEY	1-31 Aug
26th Marine Regiment	Col B. F. MYERS Col C. W. HUNTER	1-11 Aug 12-31 Aug
1stBn, 3d Marines	LtCol C. V. JARMAN LtCol R. B. TWOHEY	1-9 Aug 10-31 Aug
3dBn, 3d Marines	LtCol W. H. BATES	1-31 Aug
1stBn, 4th Marines	LtCol T. H. GALBRAITH	1-31 Aug
2dBn, 4th Marines	LtCol L. A. RANN	1-31 Aug
3dBn, 4th Marines	LtCol F. L. BOURNE JR.	1-31 Aug
1stBn, 9th Marines	LtCol F. X. COLLETON	1-31 Aug
2dBn, 9th Marines	LtCol F. S. KNIGHT	1-31 Aug
3dBn, 9th Marines	LtCol E. J. LA MONTAGNE	1-31 Aug
1stBn, 12th Marines	Major D. J. CAPINAS	1-10 Aug

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2dBn, 12th Marines

LtCol E. L. WHISMAN 11-31 Aug

LtCol R. D. DUNWELL 1-5 Aug
 LtCol J. SCOPPA JR. 6-31 Aug

3dBn, 12th Marines

LtCol E. D. FOXWORTH JR. 1-31 Aug

4thBn, 12th Marines

Major B. F. STWEART 1-31 Aug

1stBn, 26th Marines

Major W. T. COOK 1-31 Aug

2dBn, 26th Marines

LtCol T. OWENS 1-13 Aug
 LtCol W. F. SPARKS 14-31 Aug

3dBn, 26th Marines

Major R. R. BLAIR 1-3 Aug
 LtCol J. W. P. ROBERTSON 4-31 Aug

Hq Bn

LtCol E. A. DEPTULA 1-14 Aug
 Major G. F. KURTH 15-31 Aug

1st Amtrac Bn

LtCol G. F. MEYERS 1-31 Aug

3d Engr Bn

Major R. S. KROLAK 1-31 Aug

3d MED Bn

CDR B. K. SLEMONS 1-31 Aug

3d MT Bn

Major B. W. ADAMS 1-31 Aug

3d Recon Bn

LtCol D. R. BERG 1-31 Aug

3d SP Bn

LtCol R. A. SULIK 1-31 Aug

3d Tank Bn

Major C. J. SAMUELSEN 1-16 Aug
 LtCol G. E. HAYWARD 17-31 Aug

9th MT Bn

Major R. KULAK 1-31 Aug

11th Engr Bn

LtCol V. A. PERRY 1-3 Aug
 LtCol R. C. EVANS 4-31 Aug

1st 8" HOW Battery

Major F. I. CAPIN 1-15 Aug
 Capt P. L. TOWNSEND 16-31 Aug

3d Dental Company

Capt T. D. STEPHENSON 1-31 Aug

1st Searchlight Battery

Capt W. K. LAW 1-31 Aug

3 ENCLOSURE (1)
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5th 155 GUN Battery

Major E. B. BEALL	1-6 Aug
Capt T. W. STEELE	7-8 Aug
Major W. M. STEPHENS	9-31 Aug

1st Marine Regiment

Col R. T. DWYER JR. 1-14 Aug

1stBn, 13th Marines

Col R. G. LAUFFER 15-31 A

LtCol A. NOVAK 1-31 Aug

2. LOCATION

1-31 August - Dong Ha, Republic of Vietnam

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Chief of Staff	Col J. E. LO PRETE	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Col L. R. DAZE	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Col M. SPARK	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col P. D. LAFOND	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col E. E. CAMPORINI	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	LtCol R. B. THOMPSON	1-31 Aug
Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller	LtCol H. E. WOLD	1-4 Aug
	LtCol E. W. BAILEY	5-31 Aug
Division Inspector	Col H. MAYER	1-31 Aug

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
3d Marine Division (-) (Rein)	1400	26,296	171	1453
3d Marine Regiment	16	195	2	3
4th Marine Regiment	16	198	2	3
9th Marine Regiment	19	197	1	4

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	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
	<u>OFF</u> <u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u> <u>ENL</u>
12th Marine Regiment	25 226	9 5
26th Marine Regiment	16 212	1 4
1stBn, 3d Marines	34 1049	2 49
3dBn, 3d Marines	33 1009	2 55
1stBn, 4th Marines	37 1092	2 61
2dBn, 4th Marines	37 1005	2 65
3dBn, 4th Marines	33 1037	2 52
1stBn, 9th Marines	38 1038	2 51
2dBn, 9th Marines	36 1056	2 57
3dBn, 9th Marines	34 1073	2 46
1stBn, 12th Marines	50 587	2 16
2dBn, 12th Marines	41 629	1 12
3dBn, 12th Marines	45 689	2 17
4thBn, 12th Marines	23 447	0 9
1stBn, 26th Marines	34 1033	2 55
2dBn, 26th Marines	55 1485	8 74
3dBn, 26th Marines	31 1107	2 56
Hq Bn	252 1053	9 28
1st Amtrac Bn	24 765	2 25
3d Engr Bn	27 770	2 13
3d MED Bn	3 133	67 324
3d MT Bn	14 373	0 7

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	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
3d Recon Bn	31	681	1	48
3d SP Bn	20	460	2	21
3d Tank Bn	38	690	1	19
9th MT Bn	20	391	2	8
11th Engr Bn	39	969	4	26
1st 8" HOW Battery	8	180	0	5
3d Dental Company	0	3	25	44
1st Searchlight Battery	3	95	0	2
5th 155 GUN Battery	10	190	0	4
1st Marine Regiment	109	3247	10	169
1stBn, 13th Marines	49	842	3	16

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PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Personnel Administration

a. During the month of August 1968, 270 officers and 2,748 enlisted personnel joined the Division. One hundred and twenty-three officers and 1,104 enlisted personnel were transferred by normal rotation. Thirteen officers and 691 enlisted personnel were transferred by service records while sick due to being MEDEVAC. Transfers within WESTPAC command included 22 officers and 30 enlisted.

b. Awards. Awards recommendations submitted to FMFPac included four Navy Cross Medals, 45 Silver Star Medals, 16 Legion of Merit Medals, two Navy and Marine Corps Medals, 171 Bronze Star Medals, 11 Air Medals, 123 Navy Commendation Medals and 55 Navy Achievement Medals. Awards returned approved from FMFPac included one Navy Cross Medal, 41 Silver Star Medals, five Legion of Merit Medals, five Navy and Marine Corps Medals, 170 Bronze Star Medals, 114 Navy Commendation Medals, and 74 Navy Achievement Medals. Additionally 1,145 Purple Heart Medals were awarded.

c. Casualties. Casualties during the month were 76 KIA, 571 WIA, 13 DOW, 12 NHD, 21 NHI.

d. Congressional Interest Cases. One hundred and seventy-seven new cases were received, 143 cases completed, 60 cases pending and 26 cases were readdressed to other commands.

e. Welfare Reports. One hundred and thirteen welfare reports were completed, four hardship discharges were forwarded to CMC for decision, one unsuitable discharge disapproved, six unsuitable discharges approved and one misconduct discharge was disapproved.

f. Administrative Assistance Team. During the month over 90 hours were spent assisting separate units by visits to their unit or unit members visiting this office, approximately 3,500 unit diaries and 110 monthly personnel rosters were screened.

g. Reproduction. The Reproduction Section at Quang Tri received 361 job requests totalling 698,980 printed copies. The Sub-Section at Dong Ha received 126 job requests totalling 454,846 printed copies.

h. Industrial Relations. IRO continued to relieve Marines in non-combat billets by providing a continuous supply of filled sandbags. Marines have been relieved in the Army-Air Force Exchange by initiating the utilization of three civilian women to aid in stocking counters and hopefully to take over the tasks of cashier. Marines have also been relieved in the Exchange Warehouse and Clubs Warehouse in Dong Ha by civilian personnel.

2. Exchange Services

- a. Sales for the month of August 1968 totaled \$692,819.25. The monthly inventory totaled \$1,047,863.77.
- b. The exchange received 951 pallets of general merchandise, soda and electronic equipment from the Danang Depot.
- c. A new Exchange Annex is now open at 3d Medical Battalion at Quang Tri.
- d. The Exchange Officer attended the III MAF Exchange Council meeting on 13 August and 29 August. Discussed was the allocation of "JAKOR" merchandise from the Army-Air Force Exchange Depot at Danang. The meeting resulted in an increased allocation for the 3d Marine Division Exchange, to be based on sales.

3. Information Services

- a. During the month 3,055 written FHTN releases and 196 tape recorded FHTN radio interviews were prepared and forwarded to Fleet Home Town News Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. In addition 86 sync/sound motion pictures interviews were forwarded to CMC. A total of 106 news and feature articles were also prepared and forwarded to CIB, III MAF for release and further dissemination.
- b. The ISO Radio/TV section produced and forwarded to CMC 16 tape recorded radio features and five sync/sound motion picture features.
- c. ISO personnel provided support (briefings, escorts, transportation, and billeting) to 50 civilian news media representatives who visited this Division's TAOR.
- d. ISO's combat artist forwarded to CMC 76 pieces of combat art, including water color, pen, pencil and charcoal sketches, as the Division's contribution to the Marine Corps Combat Art Program.

4. Special Services

- a. Under the "Criti-Pak" program the following items were issued: three criti-paks, 1,000 writing kits and 1,000 paperbacked books.
- b. Under the free beer and soda program 316 cases of beer and 195 cases of soda were issued.
- c. During the month the Education Section administered 214 High School GED and 43 College (CCT-GE) tests.
- d. The Dong Ha MARS station transmitted 1,179 messages and phone patches, of these there were 243 no answer or busy phone patches. One hundred and twenty-six messages and phone patches were received.

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e. On 28 August a contract for the construction for an amphitheater at Quang Tri Combat Base was signed with the Le Thi Mai Construction Company, Hue. Construction will commence on 6 September and should be completed in about two weeks.

5. Division Band

a. During the month of August the Division Band played at ten different occasions. Change of command ceremonies were played for 3d Medical Battalion, MAG-39, Headquarters Battalion, MCB-7, and 3d Shore Party Battalion. Two People to People concerts were played in Quang Tri City. An anniversary celebration was played for the Quang Tri Hospital. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines were serenaded upon returning from the field. The Division Band Combo played for the Quang Tri City hospital.

6. Division Postal

a. The following figures represent poundage of U. S. Mail received and dispatched during the month of August:

<u>AREA</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>DISPATCHED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Quang Tri/Dong Ha	649,724	226,594	876,318

b. Fourteen Unit Post Offices continue to furnish all phases of postal services to all units of this Division. Currently Unit Post Offices are located at Dong Ha, Ca Lu, Camp Carroll, Phu Bai and Quang Tri. Mobile money order units were made available to organizations in the field when requested.

7. Provost Marshal

a. The patrols on Highway #1 have been increased. The 1st of the 5th established two joint patrols and an ARVN MP began accompanying the Highway Patrol to aid in control of ARVN vehicles. Also an MP has been assigned to ride with the Division Roadmaster at Quang Tri Combat Base. Two joint Marine and Army Military Police patrols have been established to patrol between Dong Ha and Cam Lo.

b. A total of 633 traffic citations were issued during the month of August. Three hundred and eighty-nine were moving traffic violations. Vehicles impounded for exceeding the posted 10 mile per hour speed limit were 131. A total of twelve vehicle accidents were investigated. Two deaths and four injuries were reported, the consolidated property damage was \$4,335.00. Seventy-three military police reports were initiated.

c. During the month 51 persons were detained and processed as follows:

Prisoners of War	-	17
Civil Defendants	-	2
Innocent Civilians	-	19
Returnees	-	2
Unclassified	-	11
TOTAL		51

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d. Liaison was made with the 504th Military Police Company, 16th Military Police Group in regard to prisoner chasing. The 504th MP Company will chase the majority of the prisoner from 18th Surgical Hospital and 3d Medical Battalion facilities to III MAF Brig in Danang.

e. A raid was conducted by military police and National Policeman in the Dong Ha vicinity and Highway #1 south from Dong Ha. The major items confiscated were cigarettes, liquor, and sundry packages.

8. Career Advisory

a. The following reenlistment results were obtained during the month of August:

<u>First Term</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Total</u>
2.7%	77%	17%

b. The following are the statistics for the period 2 August through 29 August for the Division Out-of-Country R&R Program:

<u>Quotas</u>	<u>Usage</u>	<u>Usage Percentage</u>
2067	1928	93.2%

9. Legal

a. During the month of August the office of the Staff Judge Advocate tried two General Courts-Martial cases and reviewed 25 Special and 20 Summary Courts-Martial. Ten teams were provided to serve as Defense and Government Counsel and Investigating Officers in Article 32 investigations. Nine teams were provided to battalions within the Division to serve as trial and defense counsel for Special Courts-Martial cases. Three battalion legal offices were inspected.

b. The legal assistance officer handled 88 cases during the month of August.

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DIVISION CHAPLAINA. PERSONNEL

The month of August ended with a total of 29 chaplains aboard. Of these Chaplain ZANDSTRA, 2nd Bn, 26th Marines is SLF, ADCON/OPCON to 9th MAB. Chaplain BERG, 1st Bn, 26th Marines and Chaplain HENSLEY, 3rd Bn, 26th Marines are OPCON to the 1st Marine Division. Chaplain RUTHERFORD is ADCON/OPCON to the 1st Marine Division.

The following chaplains reported for duty during the month of August and were assigned to designated units of the 3d Marine Division:

CDR M. J. DOERMANN, CHC, USN, 449271/4100, assigned on 2 August to HQ Bn, 3d Mar Div.
 LT R. HENSLEY, CHC, USNR, 724373/4105, assigned on 2 August to 3d Bn, 26th Marines.
 LT J. D. ALLEN, CHC, USNR, 673823/4105, assigned on 3 August to 3d Bn, 9th Marines.
 LT J. A. ZANDSTRA, CHC, USNR, 700528/4105, assigned on 3 August to 2nd Bn, 26th Marines.
 LT G. B. HUMMER, CHC, USNR, 721472/4105, assigned on 23 August to 3d Tank Bn.
 LCDR V. E. BERG, CHC, USN, 634505/4100, assigned on 24 August to 1st Bn, 26th Marines.

On 4 August CDR H. E. PHILLIPS, CHC, USN, 618007/4100 was rotated to a new assignment in CONUS.

The following reassignments were made during the month of August:

Chaplain FOUNTAIN, 3d Bn, 9th Marines to 3d Recon Bn on 8 August
 Chaplain HAMPTON, 3d Bn, 26th Marines to 3d Shore Party Bn on 9 August
 Chaplain BROCK, "D" Med to 11th Eng Bn on 16 August

B. DIVINE SERVICES

3d Marine Division chaplains conducted 285 Sunday Divine Services during the month of August with an attendance of 7,659. Weekday services numbered 305 with a total attendance of 4,941.

14 Memorial services were held with an attendance of 672.

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Chaplain BRESLAU, USA, provided Jewish coverage in the Quang Tri/Dong Ha areas.

Latter Day Saints services were conducted weekly by lay leaders in Quang Tri and Dong Ha.

C. OPERATIONS

During August chaplains participated in the following operations:

LANCASTER:	Chaplains BLACK, HUBBLE, BOND, WEAVER, FRANKLIN, FOUNTAIN, ALLEN, MIGNONE, BEDINGFIELD
SCOTLAND II:	Chaplains BLACK, HUBBLE, BOND, WEAVER, FRANKLIN, FOUNTAIN, ALLEN, MIGNONE, BEDINGFIELD, TURNER, WILLARD
KENTUCKY:	Chaplains FRANKLIN, MIGNONE, ALLEN, WEAVER
NAPOLÉON/SALINE:	Chaplains NCAULIFFE, ZANDSTRA

The Division Chaplain, usually in company of the Division Commander, visited chaplains of the Division during the operations listed above.

D. RELATED ACTIVITIES

1. The Division Chaplain held 3 weekly chaplains' meetings at Quang Tri with a total of 41 chaplains attending.

2. On 6 August a Day of Retreat for chaplains was arranged at Quang Tri by the Division Chaplain. Chaplain BORECZKY, Assistant Division Chaplain, conducted the conferences. Nineteen chaplains attended.

3. Civic Action

- a) Leadership lectures on indigenous religions were given by chaplains on 19 occasions with 414 attending.
- b) A donation of \$250.00 from each Chapel Fund was made to Thich Tinh Binh, Head Buddhist Bonze of the Quang Tri Province, to be used for the poor and needy.
- c) A donation of \$1,250.00 from the Protestant Chapel Fund and \$750.00 from the Catholic Chapel Fund was made to the new 3d Marine Division Children's Hospital.

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G-2

PRODUCTION BRANCH

1. Sub-units of the Production Branch, Plans and Estimates, OOB and TIO, continued to provide intelligence to units attached to the 3d Marine Division. Changes in personnel were made as follows:

LtCol J. M. BOE (Production Officer) rotated to CONUS

Lt R. A. SERGO (OOB Officer) reassigned to 3d Recon Battalion

Lt M. P. GALASKY (Plans and Estimates Officer) reassigned as OOB Officer

Captain R. A. MARTIN joined from CONUS and assigned as Production Officer

WO J. F. GUENTHER joined from CONUS and assigned as Plans and Estimates Officer

2. Plans and Estimates Unit: During the month of August this section prepared PERINTREP 14-68 and Hand-outs and "Packages" consisting of OOB, Roads and Trails Overlays, HLZ Overlays and Enemy Installations List for dissemination to regiments and battalions to assist in planning and conducting operations. A weather study for the Northeast monsoon was prepared and distributed to all units of the 3d Marine Division. This weather study included a month by month statistical presentation of average temperature, rainfall, and trafficability as well as a list of helpful hints for the individual marine. In addition a checklist for enemy body search team was prepared and distributed to all units.

3. Order of Battle Section: The Order of Battle Section continued to produce tactical intelligence for the 3d Marine Division AO and other areas of interest. Intelligence information was disseminated via the Daily Intelligence Summary, nightly intelligence briefings, weekly briefings to the Chief of Staff and to Advisory Team Four, Quang Tri Sector. In addition, a weekly OOB update was disseminated to subordinate, higher and adjacent Headquarters. Special briefings were presented to Major General DRAKE, Deputy CG XXIV Corps; BGen POTTS, G-2 USARPAC and subordinate units of the division desiring data on specific areas of interest.

4. Target Intelligence Unit: Maintained statistical overlays of Emerging Targets, 4A & Secondary Explosions, Anti-Rocket, and Arc Light, locations. Data was disseminated to adjacent, subordinate, and higher headquarters. 1550 new targets were added to the enemy installations list during August. These targets were located throughout the Division AO and adjacent areas of interest. Thirty-two Arc Light Strikes were nominated by 3d Marine Division and of these 19 were struck, mainly north of and in the DMZ and in the Nui Tia Phong area west of the Rockpile.

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COLLECTIONS BRANCH

1. During August 1968, the Collections Branch received, processed and disseminated 614 agent reports from the following agencies: 525th Military Intelligence Group; Provincial Reconnaissance Unit; Census Grievance Center; National Police Special Branch; 7th Counterintelligence Team and 15th Counterintelligence Team; In addition, numerous intelligence inputs were received from Military Advisory Command, Vietnam; III Marine Amphibious Force; XXIV Corps; Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam; 1st Marine Division; 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile); 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); Combined Materiel Exploitation Center; I Corps Advisory Group; Task Force Hotel; Task Force Clearwater; 3d Reconnaissance Battalion; and regiments and separate battalions of the 3d Marine Division. The number of detainee reports received by Collection during August totaled 237, of which 88 were captured in August and 149 were detainees captured prior to August. There were eight detainees and one Chieu Hoi captured by the 3d Marine Division during August.

2. The Airborne Personnel Detector (Sniffer) was employed on nine missions during August. The APD pilot was briefed by the Collections Officer prior to each mission and subsequently debriefed. The extremely indicative and timely information obtained was disseminated to Division units, the Division Fire Support Coordination Center, and G-2 Productions Branch.

3. During August, Collections Branch gave an orientation brief on war trophies for Force Logistics Support Group Bravo. The Brief consisted of identification, registration and various methods of transporting war trophies back to CONUS. Hand-outs were prepared and distributed to those attending the brief in order to assist them in identifying and handling all war trophies.

4. The Collections Branch continued maintaining liaison with Quang Tri City throughout the month of August through First Lieutenant W. A. BROWN, the G-2 Representative in Quang Tri.

5. Aerial Observer Unit.

a. During August 1968, the Division Aerial Observers flew 478 missions for a total of 1151.1 flight hours. The AO's directed 456 airstrikes, 84 artillery, eight NGF and 11 photo missions. Enemy losses included: 68 confirmed kills, 339 bunkers destroyed, 19 structures destroyed, ten artillery pieces destroyed or damaged, 95 secondary fires or explosions, and over 700 meters of trench line destroyed.

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b. During August, First Lieutenant Fred TOMASELLO was wounded in action and med-evaced to CONUS. There were two additions to the section: First Lieutenant Elmer L. THOMAS joining on 3 August and First Lieutenant David L. COMBS on 20 August.

6. Photo Imagery Interpretation Unit. During August 1968, the PIIU submitted 17 aerial reconnaissance requests to XXIV Corps of which 13 were completed, two were cancelled and two are pending. PIIU received 36 sets of aerial photo prints during August, of which 33 were distributed to appropriate units of the 3d Marine Division. Three were held for basic coverage of the 3d Marine Division TAOR. In addition, PIIU received 357 photo imagery interpretation reports, all of which were distributed to division units.

7. Counterintelligence Team.

a. 7th Counterintelligence Team. During August, the 7th Counterintelligence Team continued to support the division and continued to provide counterintelligence coverage of Trieu Phong, Mai Linh, and Hai Lang Districts of Quang Tri Province. The 7th CIT provided the 3d Marine Division with 33 Counterintelligence Information Reports and 14 Spot Reports.

b. 15th Counterintelligence Team. During August, the 15th Counterintelligence Team continued to support the division and continued source operations in northern Quang Tri Province. The team submitted 74 Counterintelligence Information Reports and five Spot Reports. In addition, the team continued to maintain liaison with Vietnamese Government Officials, and American Advisors in Quang Tri Province, as well as the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). During August, Warrant Officer R. S. COLLINS was reassigned to 2d Counterintelligence Team, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

8. Interrogator-Translator Team.

a. 7th Interrogator-Translator Team. During August 1968, the 7th ITT provided support for Operations Kentucky, Lancaster II, Napoleon/Saline, Scotland II, Furniture and Proud Hunter. Direct support was provided for the 9th Marines and Task Force Hotel. The team processed 25 detainees of which the following classification was made; four NVA PW's, three VC PW's, one Returnee, and 17 Innocent Civilians.

b. 15th Interrogator-Translator Team. During August 1968, the 15th ITT continued to provide support to the 3d Marine Division, the 26th Marines, and the 18th Surgical Hospital. Team members participated in operations Napoleon/Saline and Lancaster II. During August, the team processed seven detainees, all being PW/NVA.

c. 17th Interrogator-Translator Team. During August 1968, the 17th ITT continued to provide support to Headquarters, 3d Marine Division, 4th Marines, 26th Marines, XXIV Corps and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Team members participated in operations Scotland II and Lancaster II. A total of 28 interrogation reports were submitted to the division.

9. Interpreter Teams.

a. 3d Interpreter Team. During August 1968, the 3d IT continued to operate the Division Document Translation Center. The Document Translation Center processed 56 batches of captured documents from which a total of 808 documents were screened, summarized or fully translated. In addition, a total of 30 friendly documents were processed resulting in 40 pages of translation.

b. 9th Interpreter Team. During August 1968, the 9th IT continued to provide direct support to Task Force Hotel. The team also supported operations Lancaster II and Scotland II. Captain CORBE, the team commander rotated to CONUS during the month.

c. 11th Interpreter Team. During the month of August, the 11th IT continued to provide support to G-3 Psyops, 3d Marine Division by operating the Kit Carson School and the Division G-5 by supervising Vietnamese Nationals employed by G-5.

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

1. During the month of August 1968 the following personnel were transferred:

LtCol J. M. ROE	Assistant G-2/Production Officer
1stLt J. R. MATKOWSKI	Admin Officer
1stLtD. M. WHITING	COC Watch Officer
1stLt J. C. MCKENNA	ASO
1stLt R. A. SERGO	OOB Officer
1stLt F. TOMASELLO	AO (MED-Evac)
WO R. S. COLLINS	SCI Officer
SSgt J. E. BAKER	Productions
SSgt L. A. WU	OOB Analyst
SSgt F. H. DALTON	OOB Analyst (Med-Evac)
Sgt C. A. KLUMPP	SCI
Cpl R. ELDRIDGE	Target Intelligence Man

2. During the month of August, the following personnel were joined:

LtCol J. S. KYLE	Assistant G-2
Capt R. A. MARTIN	Production Officer

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1stLt D.D. COMBS

1stLt E. L. THOMAS

1stLt D. M. TELEP

1stLt H. D. PERKINS

WO R. M. CONLEY

WO J. F. GUENTHER

Gysgt R. C. KUNSAITIS

SSgt D. I. DIEFFENBACHER

LCpl R. L. BOLDUC

PFC W. A. STRAIGHT

AO

AO

COC Watch Officer

SCI Officer (TAD from 7th CIT)

ASO

Plans and Estimates Officer

TAD to 15th ITT

OOB Analyst

Collections

DRAFTSMAN

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ENEMY LOSSES FOR AUGUST

OPERATION	KIA	DEF	PW (NVA)	PW (VC)	RET (NVA)	RET (VC)	CIV DEF	DEF CIV	INC	USMC	REL AFMS
NAPOLEON/SALINE	199	15	0	0	0	0	0	5	7	1	8
KENTUCKY	234	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	52	7	59
LANG STER	201	13	3	0	0	0	0	0	65	12	77
SCOTLAND	60	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	32	11	43
TOTALS	694	39	6	0	0	0	0	5	156	31	187

ENCLOSURE (1)

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GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION

1. ORGANIZATION:

- a. Strength of the section remains at the manning level.

Personnel Losses

CONNOLLY, A.M. Cpl 2288092/2511 Rotated CONUS 25 Aug 68

Projected Losses

HUDSON, J.E.	Maj	076400/0302/ 0210/0805	Flight Date 14 Sept 68
COLLINS, J.L.	GySgt	1492432/0369	Flight Date 5 Sept 68
WELLS, C.J.	Sgt	2312280/5931	Flight Date 26 Sept 68
RAGANS, L.A.	Cpl	2099529/0311	Flight Date 26 Sept 68

Personnel Gains

HIGGS, Donald J. GySgt 1176544/0239 Joined 9 Aug 68

2. ADMINISTRATION:

a. A conference to discuss the accountability and positive control procedures for handling DUEL BLADE equipment was held 27 August. All unit accountable officers were present as were representatives of G-4, Ordnance, and Supply of the Division Staff. Also in attendance were representatives of III MAF and FLSG Bravo. At the meeting guidance was promulgated on procedures to be followed as a prelude to a Division Order on this subject.

b. The revised DEFILE Plan was prepared and submitted to higher headquarters on 12 August.

c. The final evaluation of MITHRAS FIREWATCH was submitted to III MAF on 30 August.

3. TRAINING:

a. Two periods of formal instruction were presented during the reporting period. A short course on PPS-5 and PPS-6 radar was conducted 24-25 August for 12 personnel of the First Brigade of the Fifth Infantry Division (Mechanized). The normal eight day Ground Surveillance Equipment Operators Course convened at 0800 26 August with thirteen students including four from First Brigade Fifth Infantry Division (Mechanized) in attendance.

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b. Three demonstrations of Ground Surveillance Equipment were presented during the period: One at Task Force Hotel for the Commanding General and Staff; one to Commanding Officer and staff of Third Shore Party at Quang Tri, and one to the Commanding Officer and staff of the First Marines at Dong Ha.

c. A contact team was sent to LZ Shepherd for PSR-1 demonstration for Commanding Officers, Second and Third Battalions, Fourth Marines.

d. On 4 August, a training team instructed personnel on Hill 950 on use of the PSR-1, MICROTAL, and HANDSIDS. Two HANDSIDS were emplaced and a readout station established at Hill 950. (XD 8445)

e. On 14 August the Maintenance Officer and two enlisted instructors went to Ocean View (XD 2965) to emplace an IID and PSR-1. IID would not function where installed and was removed.

f. 21 August a training team revisited Hill 950 and replaced two A type MICROTAL.

g. A two man training team spent 48 hours at Con Thien instructing personnel of First Brigade Fifth Infantry Division (Mechanized) on operation of the MICROTAL readout station.

3. LIAISON:

a. During the reporting period the following liaison visits were conducted by personnel of the Third Marine Division Ground Surveillance Section:

(1) Ground Surveillance Officer and Assistant visited III MAF on 6 August to discuss the revision of the DEFILE Plan.

(2) Maintenance Officer and one enlisted went to Ca Lu to discuss a plan for utilizing IGLOO WHITE sensors with Commanding Officer and staff of Fourth Marines.

(3) Ground Surveillance Officer and Assistant went to Con Thien to observe a test by HAVE FEAR. Test was postponed due to weather.

(4) On 30-31 August, the Ground Surveillance Officer visited III MAF to discuss the line sensor program, final evaluation of the MITRAS FIREWATCH Project, and other pertinent matters concerning sensors.

b. Visits by representatives of other Headquarters and distinguished guests:

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(1) On 9 August LtCol COMINSKI and LtCol CRAVENS from XXIV Corps visited the Ground Surveillance Section to discuss rewriting of the DEFILE Plan.

(2) On 13 August Dr. E.B. McHILLIAN Senior Science Advisor, LtCol CESAR and LtCol BANKS U.S. Army visited Con Thien to observe the HAVE FEAR and FIREWATCH operations. On the 14th of August, the above mentioned personnel were given a briefing on Third Marine Division Ground Surveillance procedures.

(3) On 22 August, Executive Officer and S-4 from the First Brigade Fifth Infantry Division visited to discuss DUEL BLADE equipment and training of operators. Also on 22 August, Commanding Officer and S-3 of First Amtrac Battalion visited to discuss 972 equipment.

(4) On 23 August Lieutenant BOELLINGER from FLSG Bravo visited to discuss DUEL BLADE equipment, particularly proper accounting procedures for dedicated DUEL BLADE equipment.

(5) On 27 August Dr. GUNTHER (GS-15 Equiv) from Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico was accompanied to A -4 to observe the HAVE FEAR operations. Improved technical equipment was installed.

5. EQUIPMENT:

a. During the reporting period the following special projects were undertaken.

(1) On 17 August, a U.S. Air Force Man Pack Radar Team of 13 personnel was established at Con Thien with the mission of tracking UFO's reported to be operating in the vicinity of the DMZ.

(2) The 1 kilowatt Xenon Searchlight which was used in conjunction with the HAVE FEAR project. (July Command Chronology) was returned to CONUS for repair. Searchlights that are compatible with NOD, have been requested through research and development channels as a SPEED requirement.

(3) On 30 August HAVE FEAR terminated operations at Con Thien.

6. COLLECTIONS AND REPORTING:

a. AN/TPS-25: All three radars were inoperational during the reporting period.

b. MITHRAS FIREWATCH: During the month of August 141 targets were acquired, of which 43 were fired on.

c. AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-6: Five targets were acquired. All five were

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fired upon. Emphasis is placed on a report of 50 to 100 troops and vehicles on 6 August. Artillery was fired and a TPQ strike was also run on this target with unobserved results.

d. AN/TVS-4 NOD: 11 Observations were made with the NOD. All were fired upon with unknown results.

e. AN/PVS-2 Starlight Scope: Four observations were made by the Starlight scope. Arty missions were fired on one report and small arms and M-79 were used on two others with unknown results.

f. MSS-3 Searchlight Vehicles: There were no reported targets acquired by the MSS-3 searchlight vehicles during the reporting period.

g. HANDSID: During period 20-26 August MICROTAL station on Hill 950 identified 54 targets, 51 were fired upon.

h. IGLOO WHITE SENSORS: Approximately 500 Spotlight Reports (including Terminal Reports) were received by division units during the month. Approximately 50 fire missions were fired in immediate response. Numerous other missions were fired in areas of high sensor activations as H&I fire and preparatory fires for operations in the vicinity of the sensor strings.

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OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL. The month of August was characterized by heavy pressure being placed on the enemy in the central and eastern portions of the Division AO. The enemy for his part positioned himself in the central DMZ threatening the Camp Carroll - Rockpile area as well as Cam Lo District. Attacks made by the 3d Marines and 9th Marines in Lancaster into the Mitters Ridge complex north of Camp Carroll, stopped the enemy threat as he turned back to the heavily fortified area northwest of the Rockpile. In the east in mid-month Co A, 3d Tank Battalion supporting a 2d ARVN Regiment operations into the DMZ killed 140 NVA in a single day engagement. Later a 1st Marines cordon operation in Leatherneck Square netted 65 NVA killed. Marine and U.S. Army tanks supporting a 2/1 foray into the DMZ above Con Thien killed 53. All told, during the month enemy losses of 694 confirmed killed, four prisoners taken and over two hundred weapons captured served to slow the enemy considerably in any planned rapid advance.

The 1st Marines with 1/1 and 2/1 as well as their supporting elements deployed from the Division AO late in August to return to the 1st Marine Division in Danang. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry (Mech) USA came under operational control of the Division late in the month and assumed responsibility for the Kentucky and Napoleon/Saline Operations.

2. NAPOLÉON/SALINE. Operations by the 1st Marines and 1st Amtrac Battalion continued through the month characterized by several brief sharp clashes and a foray into the DMZ by a Marine tank Company in support of the 2d ARVN Regiment. The first significant contact occurred on the 2d when several squads of NVA attacked the forward naval gunfire observation post, Oceanview. Supported by Marine tanks, amtracs and naval gunfire the enemy was driven off leaving 8 NVA dead on the field while one Marine was killed. Later the same day, a platoon of NVA spotted in the same area was taken under fire by artillery and naval gunfire which resulted in two additional kills.

On 9 August, BLT 2/26 completed embarkation at Cua Viet on Special Landing Force shipping for amphibious training prior to being assigned for operations. Later in the month the SLF assumed control of a portion of the Napoleon/Saline AO from 19 to 22 August.

On 15 August, Co A, 3d Tank Battalion supported an ARVN 2d Regiment attack into the DMZ above A-1. In a day long engagement which saw the friendly forces drive to the Ben Hai river, the Marine tankers were credited with 140 NVA KIA Confirmed, with no casualties of their own. Two tanks were damaged by mines.

1st Amtrac Battalion assumed control of the Napoleon/Saline AO under the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Mech on 26 August. Co C, 3d Tank Battalion, a platoon of Ontos and an Amphibian Howitzer platoon remained after the redeployment of the 1st Marines to Danang.

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Casualties for the month were:

FR KIA	16	EN KIA(C)	199
WIA(E)	111	POW	1
WIA(M)	20	IWC	47
		CSWC	4

3. KENTUCKY. During the first 20 days of August contact in this AO was limited to minor squad size encounters. On the 20th, 2/1 made a helicopter assault into the DMZ northwest of Con Thien to search for indications of enemy helicopter activities reported in that area. The assault was preceded by an extensive artillery and air preparation and only one small contact developed with 1 NVA KIA resulting. Marine and U.S. Army tanks supporting 2/1 from hill 56 at the southern edge of the DMZ, engaged a company of NVA, killing 18.

On 25 August, a recon team developed a contact in the eastern portion of Leatherneck Square. D/1/1 was rapidly inserted to exploit the contact and acquired contact immediately. B/1/1, already in the square, moved early the following morning to block enemy escape to the northwest. 3/9 and then 1/3 were helo lifted in to cordon the enemy force. Elements of the 1st Bde 5th Infantry tanks and mechanized infantry helped close the cordon. Extensive artillery fires were used to reduce the enemy force and when 1/1 searched the area on the 27th, a total of 53 NVA dead and large quantities of web equipment were found. In addition, 18 individual and 13 crew served weapons were captured.

On 27 August, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved to Dong Ha and Quang Tri with their supporting units in preparation for movement to Danang.

Soon after the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Mech assumed control of the Kentucky AO, at noon on the 26th, another large contact was developed by them. Co D, 1st Battalion 11th Infantry, operating north of Con Thien, discovered a new bunker complex one kilometer north of their base. In a 7 1/2 hour battle which saw extensive use of artillery, air and tanks, the company killed 65 NVA and captured 19 individual weapons with friendly losses of 2 killed and 24 wounded, six of whom were treated and returned to duty.

Casualties for the month were:

FR KIA	18	EN KIA(C)	234
WIA(E)	105	IWC	52
WIA(M)	102	CSWC	17

4. OPERATION LANCASTER. Operation Lancaster continued throughout the month with no significant contacts occurring in the first two weeks. On the 15th, F/2/3 engaged an estimated 2 Co's of NVA northwest of Cam Lo with minor casualties, while netting 4 NVA KIA(C), 10 IWC and 2 CSWC. On 16

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August, Co's B, C & D 1/3 commenced helolifts into the area of F/2/3's contact and soon engaged the enemy. Friendly casualties for the day were 4 KIA, 72 WIA(E). Enemy casualties were 10 NVA KIA(C). On 17 August, the 9th Marines moved into the Lancaster AO from the east to push elements of the NVA 64th Regiment away from Cam Lo. On 19 August M/3/9 engaged an NVA Co in a 4 hour contact resulting in 3 Marines killed, 14 wounded, 38 NVA KIA(C), 2 POW's, 6 IWC and 2 CSWC. During the remainder of the month, there were sporadic small unit contacts with minor casualties suffered by friendly units.

Casualties for the month were.

FR KIA	43	EN KIA(C)	201
WIA(E)	205	POW	3
WIA(M)	21	IWC	55
		CSWC	12

5. SCOTLAND. In operation Scotland contacts were infrequent and of small scale throughout August. The month began with the 4th Marines operating principally out of Fire Support Bases Shepherd and Cates, and the 9th Marines operating out of Ca Lu and Vandegrift Combat Base with some forays into the Cua and Ba Long Valleys. Forces scheduled to conduct major operations in the Ba Long and Da Krong valleys were diverted to Lancaster to exploit 3d Marines contacts northwest of Cam Lo.

The 16th of August marked changes in the Scotland forces as FSB Holcomb on the northern edge of the Ba Long Valley was closed down and the 9th Marines began consolidating at Vandegrift Combat Base to prepare for operations in the Lancaster II area. 4th Marines continued extensive patrolling operations over the central Scotland AO with 1st Bn 4th Marines assuming principal responsibility for operations in the immediate areas of Vandegrift Combat Base and Ca Lu. 2d Bn 4th Marines operated out of FSB Cates and 3d Bn 4th Marines operated out of FSB Shepherd.

Toward the latter part of the month, the 2d Bn 9th Marines shifted operations to Lancaster II, and 3d Bn 4th Marines began preparations for future operations in the northern portion of Scotland.

Casualties for the month were.

FR KIA	23	EN KIA(C)	60
WIA(E)	168	POW	0
WIA(M)	13	IWC	32
		CSWC	11

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY - PERIOD COVERED - 1 - 31 AUGUST 1968

TRAINING

A. FORMAL SCHOOLS. Division units utilized formal schools as indicated during the period to supplement on-the-job training and locally conducted training as follows;

1. IN-COUNTRY SCHOOLS

<u>SCHOOL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE		8
MACCORDS ADVISOR ORIENTATION	3	
PERSONAL RESPONSE	30	1504
RECONDO		11
REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS	5	
KY 28/38 MAINT TRAINING		4
BASIC ORGANIC SUPPLY ACCOUNTING	3	10
AN/PPS-6 GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR	2	14
CABLE SPLICERS		1
SNCO LEADERSHIP INDOCTRINATION		19
MOTION PICTURE OPERATOR		7

2. OUT OF COUNTRY SCHOOLS

<u>SCHOOL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
INFANTRY WEAPONS REPAIR		16
BASIC AMMO TECH		16
SCUBA	2	10
EMBARKATION		12
NCO LEADERSHIP		42
COM SEC/CRYPTO		4
CAREER ADVISORY		6
AO EJECTION SEAT & PRESSURIZATION TRAINING	3	
SPECIAL WEAPONS TRAINING	4	9

B. INFORMAL SCHOOLS. On-the-job training and contact team instruction continued to be the primary means of accomplishment of technical training within the Division. Contact instruction teams included: M16 Rifle Contact Team, Personal Response Contact Team, and the Mobile Training Contact Team (assisting 1st ARVN Division).

C. KIT CARSON SCOUT SCHOOL. A formal school is conducted by this Command for Kit Carson Scouts to train former VC as scouts for use within this Command. This school is conducted on a continuing basis.

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. During the month August the Psychological Operations objectives were:

- a. Support Chieu Hoi Program.
- b. Exploit VC/NVA battlefield losses.
- c. Lower VC/NVA morale.
- d. Reduce mining and booby trap incidents.
- e. Induce reporting VC activity.
- f. Discredit VC/NVA.
- g. Instill good health habits in the people.
- h. Encourage support of GVN.
- i. Support rewards program.

2. Psychological Operations supported all named operations and Regimental TAOR's. The DMZ and area above Thon Son Lam were also targeted regularly.

3. The following leaflets by type were delivered by aerial leaflet drops:

<u>Type</u>	<u>No. of Leaflets</u>
a. Chieu Hoi	14,368,400
b. NVA	17,055,000
c. Rewards	6,884,000
d. Others	2,196,000

4. There were 43 hours and 55 minutes of aerial broadcasts covering the same basic themes in the same general areas as the leaflet drops.

5. There were 241 hours and 30 minutes of ground broadcast in support of the 4th Marines, 9th Marines, 3d Marines and Task Force Hotel in Quang Tri Province. General themes

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were: Vietnamese music, MEDCAP instructions, Surrender, Support GVN, Good Health, and Mine and General Weapons reward.

6. There were 11 movies shown for 7 hours. Theme used was: Pro GVN.

7. There were 400 posters and Free South newspapers distributed in Quang Tri Province.

8. Forty-six VC/NVA rallied through the Chieu Hoi Program in Quang Tri Province.

9. There are 73 Kit Carson Scouts employed by the Division. 3rd Marine Division scouts participated on 235 patrols this month and discovered 50 mines and booby traps.

10. The Quang Tri Armed Propaganda Teams were deployed throughout the 3rd Marine Division AO with CAG units and 2nd ARVN's. The APT's are being used to conduct face to face propaganda, identify VC, gather intelligence information, and security for Quang Tri City.

11. This month ground broadcast teams have been on four operations with 3d Marines and 4th Marines.

12. The NVA campaign was supported with NVA oriented leaflet drops throughout Quang Tri Province. In addition, Rally and Surrender Appeals and Safe Conduct Passes were air dropped on known NVA locations and infiltration routes.

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AUGUST 19681. Significant Events

a. During this period, fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft flew a total of 2,752 sorties expending 5,880.2-tons of ordnance in support of the Third Marine Division in its area of operations. Out of 26,734 sorties, 47,523 passengers were transported by helicopter along with 6,774.0-tons of cargo being delivered.

b. Of the above totals, 1,017 fixed-wing sorties delivered 2,492.5-tons of ordnance on selected targets in the Dong Ha and demilitarized zone area in support of Operations KENTUCKY, LANCASTER II and NAPOLEON/SALINE. Rotary-wing aircraft in these same areas transported 11,483 passengers and 1,533.63-tons of cargo in support of the same operations.

c. Operation SCOTLAND II in the Vandegrift Combat Base area was supported by 1,237 fixed-wing fighter and attack sorties. These sorties delivered 3,102.5-tons of ordnance on selected targets within this area of operation. Helicopters lifted 34,583 passengers and 5,871.74-tons of cargo and supplies to fire support bases and outpost positions in the western portion of the Third Marine Division area of operations.

d. Two-hundred-and-ten (210) B-52 ARC LIGHT aircraft struck thirty-five (35) targets with 5,250-tons of ordnance being expended in support of the Third Marine Division.

2. New Developments. None.

3. Problem Areas. None.

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FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

1. COMMAND EMPHASIS:

a. This month again there was continuing stress on improving the accuracy and timeliness of supporting ground operations with supporting arms.

b. Exploitation of Arc Light strikes by ground operation near and through the target rectangles was accomplished by 2 ground operations this month. One was in the Scotland AO while the second was in the DMZ area north of Con Thien. There are still some areas in need of refinement when employing this type of support, i.e. time required to obtain necessary targets and obtaining complete and accurate RDA's.

2. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

a. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>% CHANGE JULY-AUG</u>
ARC LIGHT (tons)	4,050	4,050	6,600	5,250	-20%
AIR (tons)	7,244	7,089	8,979	5,595	-38%
ARTY (rds)	319,035	197,700	223,137	225,442	+ 1%
NGF (rds)	52,785	32,258	47,950	27,249	-44%

b. DISTRIBUTION OF FIRES

(1) The decrease in supporting arms expenditures this month was due to the decrease in enemy activity in the Division AO.

(2) 39% of all missions reported to FSIC were observed. This includes air, artillery, and NGF missions less night defensive fires.

(3) Though NGF had a 44% decrease in ammo expenditure from July, it was a 270% increase over their August 1967 expenditure. 86% of their expenditure was in and north of the DMZ while 43% of their expenditure was observed. The decrease in ammo expenditure is due to the fact that only one destroyer was on station as NGFS during most of the month.

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(4) 55% of the Arc Light tonage was in support of the two ground operations; the one in the Scotland AO and the other in the DMZ north of Con Thien.

(5) A total of 82 enemy artillery pieces were destroyed or damaged by all supporting arms this month; 54% claimed by artillery, 34% by air, and 12% by NGF.

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COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Command Post Communications

a. Forward elements of the Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 5th Division (Mechanized) relocated to Dong Ha as the Brigade assumed responsibility for the Kentucky and Napoleon/Saline AO's. Initial circuit requirements for the Brigade forward CP at Dong Ha have been fulfilled using Brigade organic equipment and existing facilities. Personnel of the Brigade began operating one Radio Relay link between C-3 and Dong Ha. Division personnel are operating other links to Con Thien, C-2 and Qua Viet in the Brigades' Areas of Responsibility.

b. Installation of AUTOSEVOCOM was completed during August. Various agencies of STRATCOMM conducted inspections and acceptance tests on the equipment and installation. Additional tests are scheduled pending final systems inspection and certification for operation.

2. New Equipment

a. Additional dial telephone service was extended to units at Dong Ha using the dial telephone system, TCC-28. Units cutover to dial service during August were: FLSC-B, 9th Motor Transport Bn, 11th Engineer Battalion, 1st Battalion 44th Artillery and 108th Artillery Group.

b. Operational evaluation of the PRC-77/KY-38 continued during the month with excellent results. Appropriate reports have been forwarded to Headquarters III MAF.

3. Functional Areas

a. Communication Center. Near capacity operations continued with the Communication Center processing 65,291 messages during August.

b. Wire. Wire construction continued throughout the base as the wire platoon assumed responsibility for all internal cable at Dong Ha. New distribution systems were installed for subscribers to the TCC-28. A new 10 X 24 bunker was completed in the CP area to house the main frame and provide shelter for a permanent frame watch and trouble shooter.

c. Radio Relay. Radio Relay operations include:

(1) MRC-62 4 links

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(2) TRC-27 3 links

(3) TRC-97 3 links

d. Maintenance. Radio Relay continued to experience high deadline in AN/TRC-27 and components. Generators continue to be problem items due to high usage; deadlines exist with the PU-301, PE-75 and PU-278. Two MRC-62 were received from the FY-68 R&E Program.

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LOGISTICS

1. Significant Eventsa. General

(1) On 29 August 1968, Colonels CAMPORINI, GOGGIN, G-4, and EUBANKS, Supply, attended the monthly Logistics conference held by Force Logistics Command at Danang.

(2) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 and the Special Staff Sections under the cognizance of the G-4 made over 150 staff visits to Division units.

(3) During the Commanding General's Technical inspections, the G-4, Motor Transport, Engineer, Embarkation, Supply, and Ordnance Officers inspected the 3d Motor Transport Battalion, Headquarters Battalion, and 1st Battalion, 9th Marines during the month of August.

(4) Lieutenant Colonel B. K. PETERSON was assigned to the Division Supply Section to be the relief for F. J. Mc DONALD as the Assistant Division Supply Officer.

(5) The 3d Medical Battalion opened the Quang Tri Hospital on 16 August 1968.

(6) Colonel William F. GOGGIN was assigned to the Division G-4 Section to be the relief of Colonel E. E. CAMPORINI. Further, Majors HARRIS and SMALDONE were assigned to the Division G-4.

(7) Headquarters Company, 4th Marines supply office and warehouse were destroyed by enemy artillery fire on 26 August 1968. All supplies in storage were destroyed. Expedited Supply action has been taken to reconstitute these losses.

b. Combat Damage. During the month of August the following major items of equipment sustained combat damage:

<u>TYPE EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>SER NO</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
LVTE-I	106003	Mine	Repairs in Progress
M48A3	202115	Mine	Repairs in Progress
M48A3	202128	RPG	Destroyed
M48A3	202142	RPG	Destroyed
M48A3	202005	Submerged	Destroyed
M48A3	202043	Submerged	Destroyed
M48A3	202063	Mine	Repairs in Progress
M48A3	209226	Mine	Repairs in Progress
M48A3	202076	Artillery	Destroyed

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c. Truck Convoys. During the month of August:

(1) The 9th Motor Transport Battalion drove 35,727 miles transporting 19,212 personnel and 13,970 short tons of cargo.

(2) The 3d Motor Transport Battalion drove 31,469 miles transporting 23,500 personnel and 2,263 short tons of cargo.

(3) Fifty resupply convoys were initiated in the 3d Marine Division's AO with an average of 36 vehicles, transporting 118 personnel and 231 short tons of cargo.

d. Embarkation

(1) On 1 August 1968: 3d Medical Battalion moved from Phu Bai to Quang Tri via C-130. BLT 2/4 commenced offloading.

(2) On 5 August 1968: Offload of BLT 2/4 completed. Commenced embarking BLT 2/26 at Dong Ha ramp.

(3) On 9 August 1968: Completed embarking BLT 2/26.

(4) On 17 August 1968: K/4/13 was transported to Phu Bai by LCU/YFU and trucks.

(5) On 20 August 1968: 2/1 was moved from Dong Ha to Mai Ka Thi by LCM-8's.

(6) On 23 August 1968: Commenced moving the 1st Marine Regiment from Quang Tri/Dong Ha to Danang by land, sea, and air.

(7) On 24 August 1968: The 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery (USA) was transported from Dong Ha to Cua Viet by YFU.

(8) On 25 August 1968: "C" Company, 3d Tank Battalion was moved from Dong Ha to Mai Ka Thi via LCM-8's.

(9) On 28 August 1968: Completed the moved of the 1st Marine Regiment to Danang.

(10) On 30 August 1968: 180 personnel of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry (MECH) USA, was relocated from Dong Ha to Cua Viet by LCM-8's.

Sea lifts: Danang to Dong Ha - 173 LCU/YFU's	29,629.7 S/T
18 LST's	12,397.2 S/T
39 Fuel barges	9,360.0 S/T
	<u>51,386.9 S/T</u>

Air lifts: Danang to Dong Ha via C-130&C-123	1,470.1 S/T
Danang to Quang Tri via C-130&C-123	134.0 S/T
	<u>1,604.1 S/T</u>

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e. Food Services. During the month of August 1968 the 3d Marine Division Food Services Program consisted of 45 operational messes supported by 3611 personnel, OF 33. Of the total messes in operation, 21 are semi-permanent field messes housed in TFSC structures and the remaining 24 are temporary field messes. Subsistence support provided Army, Navy and Marine Corps personnel of this command averaged 37,500 rations daily. Approximately 33% of the total rations fed daily consisted of Meal, Combat, Individual and approximately 67% were subsisted on Expeditionary Force Menu. The Expeditionary Force Menu is based on MCO F10110.17, Chapter 4, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Menu (Tropic) and both perishable and non-perishable components are utilized. The Meal, Combat, Individual with appropriate supplements, is utilized only where operational requirements preclude serving Expeditionary Force Menu.

f. Supply. The overall supply support received by the 3d Marine Division was satisfactory, nevertheless, some items became or continued to be critical. Critical/Short supply items are discussed in paragraph 2.

2. Problem Areas

a. General

(1) The most significant supply problem in the Division is the lack of receipt of T/E shortages in a timely manner. This lack of response in particular the Engineering items, has caused the 3d and 11th Engineer Battalions and the 3d Shore Party Battalion to be in a degraded CREQP status.

(2) The lack of 2nd Echelon repair/component parts continues to cause a high deadline rate in tracked vehicles and motor transport items.

(3) Shortages in clothing, that is, socks, lightweight jungle utilities, and utility covers was experienced by Division units.

(4) T/E deficiencies in typewriters, coupled with a high deadline rate has a demeaning effect on the administration capabilities of Division units.

(5) Gas masks all sizes, continues to be critical throughout the Division.

(6) The shortage of starters for the M274A2 (MULE), has created an unacceptable deadline rate in infantry battalions.

b. Services. The turn around for laundry continues to improve, however, at times, the time frame is excessive due to the deadline of laundry units.

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Division units have been tasked to issue one set of dry jungle utilities a day to troops, therefore, laundry facilities must be increased in the Division's AO. The receipt of ice at Quang Tri and Vandegrift Combat Bases has been marginal.

d. The shortage of 2nd Echelon repair/component parts, in addition to the high deadline rate in field maintenance facilities is the most acute maintenance problem confronting the Division. The time frame in which items of equipment are returned from field maintenance facilities, to the user is not responsive enough to meet the requirements of this Division.

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DIVISION ENGINEER

1. The 3d Marine Division received engineer support from one Division and one Force Engineer Battalion and two Naval Mobile Construction Battalions during the month of August. Maintenance and utilities support was also provided by CBMU-301 at Dong Ha, Quang Tri, Cua Viet and Vandegrift Combat Bases. Map coordinates below are taken from MAP: Vietnam, AIS Series L7014, Sheets 6442IV, 6442III, 6442II, and 6342I. Major engineer projects included:

a. Maintenance/Upgrading of Route #1. Route #1 remained open to traffic within the Division AO during August. Asphalt laying between Dong Ha and Quang Tri is anticipated to begin during September.

b. Maintenance/Upgrading of Route #9. The MCCE-7 continued to maintain Route #9 between Dong Ha and Vandegrift Combat Base. The road was straightened in several places with much rilling and cutting accomplished. Upgrade was continued with portions of the road widened and much crushed rock added to build up the subject grade. The estimated completion date for the upgrading remains 1 October 1968.

c. Maintenance of Route #561. The 11th Engineer Battalion continued to maintain Route #561 during the month.

d. Bridges and Culverts. Bridge rebuilding where necessary will be completed in September on Route #9 for monsoons and anticipated traffic increase. Construction of abutments for M-6 bridge at YD130674 (C-2 washout) is 75% complete.

2. Sequential Listing of Significant Events

a. 3 August - Additional LZ at LZ Cates was completed (XD927437)
Additional LZ at LZ Shepherd was completed (XD934410)
Additional LZ at Vandegrift Combat Base for 4th Marines was completed (XD985485)

b. 6 August - LZ on Dong Ha Mountain was completed (YD18594)

c. 19 August - Commenced construction at Fire Support Base LeJeune (XD960536)

d. 31 August - Commenced construction at Fire Support Base Sandy (XD912563)

3. Engineer Vehicles Damaged Due to Enemy Action. None.

4. Military Construction

a. Completed one (1) 40'x28' wooden helipad at the Rockpile.

b. Four (4) ASP berms completed at Vandegrift Combat Base by 11th Engineers.

c. Bunker construction of various sizes continued by 11th Engineers.

d. Pre-fab enclosed heads construction continues.

e. Limited miscellaneous construction and road repairs were completed at Quang Tri Combat Base by 3d Engineers.

5. Base Development

a. Construction in the Division AO, with a few exceptions, was limited to BER construction of heads, showers, messhalls and troop billets.

b. DHCB: Renovation of the Dong Ha ASP is about 50% complete. Two perimeter observation towers were erected.

c. QTCB: The first increment of the ASP and the second increment of the 3d Med Bn Surgical Facility were completed. Work started on the access road to Camp Red Devil (1st Bde, 5th Inf Div).

d. Vandegrift FOB: Perimeter clearing operations continued, the new ASP is about 80% complete, and the medical bunkers were completed. Due to lack of assets for living bunkers, construction was started on strongbacks for the Vandegrift/Ca Lu area.

6. Combat Operations

a. Total number of minesweeps conducted visual/deliberate - 590.

b. Total meters covered on minesweeps visual/deliberate Route #1 50,000 meters; Route #9-350,000 meters; other 1,502,500 meters.

c. Mines and Booby Traps Destroyed

2 - 100 lb bomb	29 - 155mm
9 - 250 lb bomb	12 - 175mm
9 - 500 lb bomb	38 - ChiCom Claymore
212 - M-79	2 - ChiCom 60mm
8 - 57mm	766 - ChiCom TNT
704 - 60mm	1 - ChiCom AT Mine
24 - 61mm	386 - ChiCom Grenade
40 - 75mm	10 - ChiCom Home Made Bn
79 - 81mm	11 - ChiCom N/Elec Caps
1242 - 82mm	15 - 3.5 Rockets
115 - 105mm	2 - AP Mines
4 - 106mm	4 - AT Mines
42 - 107 Rocket	46 - 60mm Fuzes
12 - 120mm	3 - 60mm detonators
1 - 122 Rocket	216 - M-26
28 - 140mm Rocket	8 - M-18

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11 - 2.75 Rockets
 7 - Pineapple Grenades
 2 - CS Grenades
 96 - 82mm Detonaters
 20 - AK-47 Mags
 2 - 4.2mm
 6 - 5" Rockets
 4 - 8" Rockets
 177 - RPG
 134 - M-72
 18 - Rifle Grenade
 1 - 25lb Strip Charge

26 - Flares
 420 - 92mm Fuzes
 11 - RPG Boosters
 48 - 82mm Firing device
 2 - Russian AT Mines
 13 cans - 82mm Boosters
 2 - 8" Howitzer
 14 - LAAW's
 500 - RPD rds
 9 - DH-10 Claymore
 1 - NVA Dir Mine
 1 - 20lb French Mine

d. Tunnels destroyed. 3

e. Enemy Facilities Destroyed

630 bunkers of various sizes
 3 wells
 1 - 30' bridge
 3 spider holes

f. Engineers in Combat Support Role

(1) Shore Party Battalion operated LZ's at Cao Doi, Vandegrift, Dong Ha and provided HST support to 9th Marines, 3d Marines, 4th Marines and 12th Marines. Security for the LCU ramp at Dong Ha.

(2) Combat Engineer Support furnished:

3d Engineer Battalion:

1stPlt, Co "A" - Support of 26th Mar oper Houston AO
 2dPlt, Co "A" - Support of 4th Mar, Vandegrift Combat Base
 3dPlt, Co "A" - Support of 4th Mar, Ca Lu
 1stSqd, 3dPlt, Co "A" - Support of 2/4 at LZ Gates PSB
 1stPlt, Co "B" - Support of 1/3 at Rockpile
 2dPlt, Co "B" - Support of 3d Mar Rear, Camp Carroll
 3dPlt, Co "B" - Support of 3/3 oper Lancaster II AO
 1stPlt, Co "C" - Support of 1/9 TAOR
 2dPlt, Co "C" - Support of 2/9 TAOR
 3dPlt, Co "C" - Support of 3/9 TAOR

g. Water Production

<u>Location</u>	<u>Potable</u>	<u>Non-Potable</u>
Quang Tri	5,155,000	613,700
Dong Ha	170,000	18,000
Hig John	87,000	

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Cua Viet 285,600
 C-4 28,800
 Cam Lo 596,000
 C-2 Bridge 194,500
 A-3 98,000
 Camp Carroll 412,500 30,000
 Rockpile 119,500 301,500
 Vandegrift 635,000 70,000
 LZ Gates 28,000

TOTAL 3d Engr Bn 7,869,900 1,033,200
 TOTAL 11th Engr Bn DGH 3,949,980 2,392,900

7. Duel Blade. Primary effort during August involved installation of hardened fighting bunkers at the A and C sites. Progress to date is as follows:

<u>SITE</u>	<u>NUMBER PROGRAMMED</u>	<u>NUMBER IN PROGRESS</u>	<u>NUMBER COMPLETE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
A-1 (ARVN)	77	63	0	
A-2 (ARVN)	100	19	0	
C-1 (ARVN)	200	0	135	132 Have chain link installed
A-3 (USA)	66	0	66	18 have chain link installed
A-4 (USA)	85	0	85	32 have chain link installed
C-2 (USA)	105	0	105	
C-3 (USA)	71	0	0	
C-4 (USA/USMC)	75	0	0	
Ca Lu (USMC)	130	0	0	
Camp Carroll(USMC)	80	0	0	
Thon Son Lam(USMC)	128	0	0	
Vandegrift	108	0	0	Bunker movement to site has commenced

Second generation (armco plate steel arch concrete end walled) bunkers began arriving in country. First Bde, Fifth Inf Div (Mech) assumed responsibilities for Duel Blade sites A-3, A-4, C-2, C-3 and C-4 (C-4 with 1st AmTracs). The Ca Lu site remained under USMC control along with "planned" Duel Blade sites Camp Carroll, Thon Son Lam and Vandegrift.

Two basic plans were submitted to higher headquarters (1) installation of linear obstacle and A-5 on five days notice (2) upgrading of all existing Duel Blade sites plus Camp Carroll, Thon Son Lam and Vandegrift to second generation full Duel Blade status based on new

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manning/policy concepts. Two briefings were held explaining this Divisions plans to higher headquarters.

The tower at A-2 was completed. A well at A-2 was sunk by MCB-7 and drilling is taking place at A-4 with a rig at A-1.

Problems incurred during the month include halting of chain link fence installation until the exact position of fighting bunkers is determined by higher headquarters. Fighting bunkers have been flooding due to the large entrance way water-proofing areas. The need exists for more sandbags/culvert/revetment material to reduce entrance way areas and or equipment trenchers for drainage ditches. Longer pickets are needed to increase the chain link usage capability (fences so low to ground that must shoot through not under them). Second generation living and functional bunker design must have entrances similar to the first generation to prevent monsoon flooding. If the bunker remains as designed to date the same problems will result as are now occurring with present second generation fighting bunkers. Due to enemy incoming and general inaccessibility of sites, A-3 and A-1 had experienced some fighting bunker material shortages through pilfering and combat loss.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS1. Revolutionary Development

a. Pacification progress continued uninterrupted in Quang Tri Province during the month of August, as evidenced by a high rate of ralliers under the Chieu Hoi Program. RF/PF Forces improved markedly under the guidance of MAT Teams and CAP Units, and conducted daily operations against VC/NVA in all districts. Significant progress was made in improving Self-Defense Forces in all districts. An increase in operations against the VC infrastructure resulted in 73 VC killed, captured or neutralized.

b. RD activities continued at the pace set in July. To expedite economic revival of the countryside, a meeting was held between PSA and selected CORDS staff members and Vietnamese and Chinese businessmen from Quang Tri City. Problems discussed were how to stimulate free enterprise into organizing small business and industries. A 4-T training program for local leaders was held in August to stimulate interest in the 4-T program. Established 4-T clubs were revitalized and showed promise of expansion. Other RD activities included the construction of several hamlet schools, and the repair of 31 schools damaged by war, the construction of 3 maternity dispensaries, a MILPHAP-sponsored program to upgrade local medicine, and the near completion of two large irrigation systems which will serve some 15,000 people.

c. A continuous problem has been the maintenance of the efficiency rating of the RD Cadre program. The disciplinary campaign began by the RD Chief in July resulted in improved morale and esprit de corps in August. Reduction of the attrition rate is a major goal. All RD groups continue to remain in the New Life Hamlets at night.

2. Division Civil Affairs Activitiesa. Agriculture

(1) Vegetable project in Cua Valley. The 1st AA Platoon assisted the Provincial Agriculture Advisor and the Refugee Agriculture Advisor for I Corps in establishing a vegetable project for the Brou in Cua Valley. Seed and fertilizer for 500 families were delivered during August. The Brou were trained in efficient vegetable techniques. Vegetable crops, including sweet potatoes, corn, cabbage and beans will provide a more diverse and nutritious diet for the Brou.

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(2) Brou Assistance. Eleven water buffalo and seven head of cattle were purchased by G-5 from 26th Marines' TARP Funds donated for the Brou. This livestock was presented to Brou leaders in the Cua Valley by G-5 on 17 August 1968. In addition, 2,000 pairs of thongs, sent by the people of Phoenix, Arizona, were presented at the same time. G-5 furnished 160,000 \$VN to buy 176 sheets of plywood to finish the new Brou Dispensary in the Cua Valley.

b. Scholarship Program. A second draft of the scholarship survey is being prepared by the 1st AA Platoon to include information on primary and secondary schools.

c. Personal Response Program.

(1) Two Personal Response Courses were held during August. The 17th Personal Response Course held on 3 August 1968 consisted of 5½ hours of instruction to 5 SNCOs and 24 NCOs. The 18th Personal Response Course, held on 15-16 August 1968, included a tour of Quang Tri City and consisted of 9½ hours of instruction; 12 officers, including 2 field grade, and 17 SNCOs attended this Course. A Cultural Drama Team presentation was held on 3 August 1968 for students of the PR Course in conjunction with personnel of Headquarters Battalion. 225 members of Headquarters Battalion as well as students of the 17th PR Course enjoyed the show.

(2) A total of 22 hours of field instruction was presented by the Personal Response SNCO during the month of August to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech); 4th CAG; 1st Bn, 1st Marines; "D" Med and the SNCO Leadership School. A total of 15 officers, 16 SNCOs and 1,442 enlisted attended these presentations.

d. MedCaps/DentCaps. A total of 10,198 VN civilians were treated by 3d Marine Division units at MedCaps and Dent-Caps during the month of August.

e. High Tea for Buddhist Bonze. On 8 August 1968, the Commanding General hosted a tea for the Buddhist Leader of Quang Tri Province, the Venerable Thich Thien Binh. The Commanding General presented to the Venerable, 59,000 \$VN from the Chapel Funds to assist Buddhist Refugees and a personal gift of a Polaroid camera and film. In addition, G-5 delivered 3 truck loads of scrap lumber between 4-15 August to the Venerable to be used to aid 300 Buddhist refugees in Cam Lo District.

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f. Mid-Autumn Festival. This Children's Festival will be celebrated 5-7 October. G-5 has requisitioned 40,000 toys and favors from III MAF. Coordination is being made with Province and District officials on planned celebrations. A Division Bulletin to give 3d Marine Division units guidance for participating in these celebrations has been prepared.

g. Sai Hamlet. On 10 August 1968, G-5 provided 150 engineer stakes to PMO for transport to Sai Hamlet. The engineer stakes are to improve the hamlet's defenses. The residents of Sai Hamlet have provided the 3d Marine Division PMO with valuable intelligence in the past.

3. Civic Action Projects

a. 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital (Dong Ha Facility). On 1 September 1968, the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital (Dong Ha Facility) was formally dedicated and opened in ceremonies at Dong Ha. Portions of the "D" Med facility were converted to use as a temporary children's hospital until completion of the permanent facility at Quang Tri Combat Base in the Spring of 1969. The Children's Hospital at Dong Ha is now fully functional, with a Vietnamese staff of twenty personnel, including nine nurses. By 7 September the hospital had eleven children patients, and had treated a total of 89 out-patients in 7 days.

b. Dong Ha City Hospital. The repairs by the Vietnamese contractor on G-5's initial 70,500 \$VN contract have been completed. A second contract of over 75,000 \$VN for the next phase of repairs and renovation has been negotiated. Medical officers at DHCB are setting up a schedule of visits by doctors to insure that at least one doctor is present at the hospital to treat patients each day of the week. MCB-7 is presently installing a large capacity water pump, plumbing and electrical wiring for the hospital.

c. Children's Clinic. The Engineering Officer, 8th AA Platoon, has drawn up a detailed blueprint plan and Bill of Materials for the clinic. The plan is presently being evaluated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 prior to submission to the Quang Tri Province Chief for approval by the GVN.

d. Repair Projects. G-5 is contracting for various types of substantial repairs and refurbishments at Bo De Buddhist School, Mai Linh Dispensary and Trieu Phong High School. In addition, G-5 has provided wages for refugee workers to repair a water front in Trieu Phong District and a fish

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pond in Mai Linh District.

e. Cua Viet School. Engineers from CBMU-301 completed a detailed blueprint and Bill of Materials for the proposed school. CORDS has been asked for materials they can furnish. Other materials will be purchased with AIK Funds. The project is being supervised locally by the S-5, 1st Am Trac Bn.

f. Dong Ha Trash Project. Base Coordinator, DHCB, has asked G-5 to check into the feasibility of trash removal from DHCB trash dump by a VN contractor. The contractor would remove all trash from the dump at no cost to the Marine Corps and, with the profit from his contract obtained by selling reusable items of trash, collect trash throughout Dong Ha City as a free public service. A VN contractor was contacted through the Dong Ha District Chief and is extremely eager to obtain such a contract under the terms specified by 3d Marine Division. The details of the proposed contract are being prepared by G-5 for presentation to the DHCB Base Coordinator.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1968

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DIVISION SURGEON1. PERSONNEL:

- a. Division Surgeon: CAPT G. E. WIRE, Jr., MC, USN
- b. Medical Administrative Officer: CDR J. W. GUINN, MSC USN
- c. Medical Officers on board at months end 65
 - (1) General Duty Medical Officers 32
 - (2) Specialist Medical Officers 33
- d. Medical Officers detached and joined
 - (1) Detached 22
 - (2) Joined 18
 - (3) TAD Under Treatment 1
- e. Medical Service Corps Officers on board at months end 14
 - (1) Detached 0
 - (2) Joined 1
- f. Navy Nurse Corps Officers on board at months end 2

(None were detached or joined.)
- g. Chaplain Corps Officers on board at months end 27
 - (1) Detached 6
 - (2) Joined 3
- h. Other Naval Officers on board at months end 12
 - (1) Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers 11
 - (2) Judge Advocate General Officers 1

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- i. Hospital Corpsmen on board at months end 1983
- | | |
|---|------------------|
| (1) Detached | <u>85</u> |
| (2) Joined | <u>127</u> |
| (3) Minimum/maximum on board strength | <u>1066/1101</u> |
| (4) Casualties | |
| (a) KIA | <u>2</u> |
| (b) WIA & evacuated out of RVN | <u>21</u> |
| (c) Twice wounded & evacuated
out of RVN | <u>0</u> |
| (d) No Hospital Corpsmen are MIA or DOW. | |

Note: It has been noted that previous months figures pertaining to on board strengths for Medical Officers and Chaplain Corps Officers have been inaccurate. The above figures denote the true on board counts.

2. ADMINISTRATION:

- a. The Division Surgeon, CAPT G. E. WIRE, MC USN was promoted to his present rank effective 2 August 1968.
- b. The 3d Medical Battalion Hospital at Quang Tri was opened and became operational at 0800, 16 August 1968.

3. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE/SANITATION:

Malaria discipline surveys indicate a greater command interest in malaria discipline, however the number of patients who do not take their chemoprophylaxis regularly has not changed appreciably (45-50%) over previous percentages. More units now use the roster to control ingestion, and insect repellent is being used with slightly greater frequency. The Preventive Medicine Section now conducts all malaria and FUD interviews of patients admitted through 3d Medical Battalion except for those who are Med-Evaced out as soon as they arrive. The highland areas continue to be the principal locale for malaria infection with units operating in the "bush" being hardest hit.

During environmental sanitation surveys, more emphasis has been placed on drainage problems because of the approaching monsoon. No significant food-borne illness epidemics occurred.

The program for PPD testing of indigenous employees was reinstituted. Thus far approximately 20-25% have been read as positive. After the initial 400-500 are completed, the (+) will be x-rayed.

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4. DISEASE:

a. Third Marine Division personnel admitted to the Sick List by the Division Psychiatrist with a psychiatric diagnosis were 19. A total of 160 patients were seen, 40 were evacuated, 103 were returned to duty, 18 were recommended for administrative discharges, and 4 remain on the sick list.

b. A total of 81 cases of illness classified under the category of venereal disease were reported in the 3d Marine Division during the month of August. There were 72 cases of gonorrhea, 9 cases of non-specific urethritis, no cases of chancroid or syphilis.

c. There were 103 cases of confirmed malaria.

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The 3d Dental Company provides dental support throughout the TAOR of the 3d Marine Division to the personnel of the division. In addition it provides prosthetic dental treatment to navy personnel of the MCB units in the TAOR. A dental facility has been constructed and is operational with the 3d Medical Battalion Hospital at Quang Tri Combat Base. Both company oral surgeons have been assigned to this facility. The company once again has a cleft lip/palate capability to aid in the civic action program. A major dental facility is to be constructed in the Quang Tri Battalions rear area when adequate electric power is made available. Dental prosthetic care is provided at the Quang Tri CP clinic and the "D" Medical Company facility at Dong Ha Combat Base. The bunkered dental facility at Cam Lo Hill was disestablished on 25 August when the AO was taken over by U. S. Army elements. Company personnel are available to provide assistance in the care of mass casualties. Assistance to Graves Registration is provided in identification of the dead. The MEDCAP/DENT-CAP civic action program continues to expand in scope, with programs in the Cua Viet, Dai Hao, Dong Ha, Quang Tri and Cam Lo areas. The dental personnel at "D" Medical Company will provide support to the new Marine Memorial Children's Hospital at Dong Ha.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 Aug C/1/1 at 184711 patrol found 2 NVA bodies in bomb crater. Results: 2 NVA KIA(C)
Journal entry # 46

2 Aug BLT 2/26 assumed OPCON of B/1/1 from 12th Marines
BLT 2/26 assumed OPCON of W/1/12 from 12th Marines
12th Marines assumed OPCON of 5th Bn 4th Arty Mech from 1st Bn 5th Bde (Mech)
1st Marines assumed OPCON of A/1/3 from T F HOTEL
3d Recon Bn assumed OPCON of Co A 3d Recon Bn from 1st Marines
3d Recon assumed OPCON of 3d Force Recon Co from FTF

3 Aug 1st Marines assumed OPCON of 2/9 (-) from T F HOTEL

4 Aug E/2/9 at 188663 made contact with 4 NVA; after contact found 3 NVA/KIA(C) and 1 ChiCom radio. Results: 3 NVA/KIA(C)
Journal entry # 64 & 83

5 Aug H/2/9 at 180643 found 1 NVA/KIA(C); body approx 1 month old. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)
Journal entry # 68
H/2/9 at 189655 found 1 NVA/KIA(C). Body approx 1 month old. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)
Journal entry # 85

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F/2/9 at 173675 observed 30 NVA.
Engaged NVA with SAF, Arty, mortars
and air strikes; Enemy broke contact.
Results: 11 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 113 & 62

6 Aug

1/1 at 175720 observed fire msn on NVA in
open. Observed NVA body lying in field.
Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 83

7 Aug

3d Recon team at XD 975564 observed 4
NVA/VC in a tree line; called fire msn.
Results: 1 NVA/VC KIA(C)

Journal entry # 115

8 Aug

Div AO at 130743 ran 2 Air strikes on
assembly area, fired 1 Arty mission, 2
bunkers destroyed, 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 54

G/2/1 at 256671 found remains of 1 NVA
body. 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 78

G/2/1 at 264688 found one fresh grave,
1 NVA/KIA(C) in grave.

Journal entry # 83

9 Aug

I/3/3 at 079638 found 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 94

I/3/3 at 087613 found 3 NVA/KIA(C) killed
by Arty.

Journal entry # 95

10 Aug

Div AO at 147682 ran air strike on bunker
complex. Results: 4 VC/NVA KIA(C)

Journal entry # 47

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12 Aug

C/1/4 at 923483 spotted 1 NVA in open; Fired on NVA with SAF; Recon by fire of area. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 56

Recon team at 940611 made contact with small NVA force. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 63

F/2/9 at 965508 called Arty on 1 NVA crossing stream. 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 67

13 Aug

Div AO at 161775 observed 3 NVA crossing Ben Hai; called for 3 Huey gunships. Results: 3 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 56

14 Aug

Recon team at 078638 observed 2 NVA walking down trail. Made contact with NVA. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 104

15 Aug

1st Marines assumed OPCON of 1/9 (-) from T F HOTEL

3d Marines assumed OPCON of A/1/3 from 1st Marines

H/2/3 at 077623 received enemy fire from north; engaged enemy with heavy SAF and AMF; Results: 15 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 39

I/3/4 at 891376 observed 3 NVA at 892370; 8 NVA at 892374; engaged enemy with small arms and Arty. Results: 3 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 49

H/2/3 at 088618 spotted NVA heading down slope of objective; opened fire on enemy; enemy returned fire. Results: 15 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 51

53

ENCLOSURE (1)

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16 Aug

I/3/3 at 092599 found 2 dead NVA.
2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 68

I/3/3 at 092671 found 3 NVA bodies
killed by arty. 3 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 105

1/3 at 047635 received unk no. 60mm
mortar fire from enemy psn. 1/3
called in Arty, air and utilized
organic wpns; Results: 10 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 108

17 Aug

I/3/4 at 196376 1 NVA killed by
Arty. 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 33

I/3/4 at 096375 discovered 1 NVA body
killed by artillery. 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 55

18 Aug

3/9 at 052648 found 2 graves with
markers, 2 bodies in each. 4 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 53

D/1/3 at 054626 spotted NVA in open;
called Arty, air and 81mm mission.
Results: 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 62

I/3/3 at 090622 spotted plt size
NVA ambush; fired 60mm and Arty.
Results: 3 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 91

19 Aug

1st Marines assumed OPCON of Co's
G and H of "A" Cnd GP from 2/9

D/1/3 at 054626 made contact with plt
size NVA force; also spotted several
NVA in open. Results: 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 9

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Recon team 101 at 928608 made contact with 3 NVA; called in Gunships. 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 14

F/2/1 at 110745 spotted 2 NVA with packs; Unit opened up with small arms and automatic weapons. Results: 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 58

3/9 at 058668 made contact with est Co size NVA unit; contact lasted 4 hours. Results; 38 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 105

B/1/3 at 040628 found 12 fresh graves; dug up graves, found 1 body in each; results: 12 NVA/KIA (C)

Journal entry # 119

20 Aug

T F HOTEL assumed OPCON of 2/9 Cmd Gp Co's G, H and F from 1st Marines

M/3/9 at 056668 while sweeping area found 1 NVA body. 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 68

H/6/2/9 at 144733 made contact with 2 squads to a Plt; received small arms, automatic weapons fire; RPG's, mortars and 130mm Arty. Called in Air, Arty and tanks. Results: 20 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 85

21 Aug

M/3/3 at XO 979589 made contact with est squad of NVA; received fire with organic weapons. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 44

1/3 at 037634 found 2 graves. dug up graves, found 2 NVA in uniform. 2 NVA/KIA (C)

Journal entry # 63

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22 Aug

1st Marines assumed OPCON of Co B
1stBn, 11th Inf (USA) from 1st BDE
5th Inf

Recon team 1-2 at XD 924533 observed
15 NVA; team initiated SAF on enemy.
Results: 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 74

I/3/9 at 047677 found 1 dead NVA in
bunker complex, along with numerous
weapons, rice and documents.
1 NVA/KIA

Journal entry # 53

23 Aug

L/3/4 at 883351 found 1 NVA body.
No gear or documents on body.
Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 75

24 Aug

K/3/4 at 002370 patrol stopped when
they observed a bundle of fresh cut
grass; at that time enemy ambush
opened up 50 meters in front; est
squad size ambush. Reported 5 NVA
moving SE. Pulled back and called Arty
mission. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 42

Div AO at YD 191755 ran 1 Air Strike
on bunker complex and NVA. Results:
6 bunkers destroyed, 2 NVA/KBA(C)

Journal entry # 83

25 Aug

1st Marines assumed OPCON of 3/9 (-)
from T F HOTEL

1st Marines assumed OPCON of 1/9
from 3d Marines

Div AO at YD 192695 ran 2 Air Strikes
and 3 Huey Gunships on NVA in treeline.
Results: 1 sec expl & 2 NVA/KBA(C)

56

ENCLOSURE (1)

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26 Aug

At YD 192692 Div A0 ran 1 Air Strike on NVA in treeline. Results:
1 NVA/KBA(C) Total Results: 3 NVA/
KBA(C)

Journal entry # 86

C/1/1 at 192700 attempted to pass thru CORDON; fired S/A, M-79 and 60mm mortars. Results: 6 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 22

C/1/1 at 192700 12 NVA attempted to break thru CORDON using S/A & gren. Returned S/A, M-79 and 60mm mortar. Results: 4 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 35

1/1 at 116700 OP-2 spotted approx 15 NVA in open; fired 2 rds WP & 44 firecracker 105mm rds. Results: 5 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 42

D/3/9 at 195695 after Recon by fire unit search area & found 2 NVA/KIA(C) Will bring equip in. Continue search of area; captured 10 82mm mortar rds, 1 RPG & 1 50 cal machine gun. Results: 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 61

C/1/1 at 193700 at approx 260115H 6-10 NVA were taken under fire; later increase to 15 NVA; lost sight and broke contact. At 260935H two squads sent to search area. Found 13 NVA/KIA(C), 6 IWC, 1 CSWC, 2 AK-50 2 AK-47, 2 SKS, 1 B-40 launcher, 33 gren, large supply of ammo, sleeping gear, cooking equip and large supply of rice. Results: 13 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 62

57

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Div AO at XD 856464 estimated 5 to 10 NVA observed from hill 3 1015 Ran 2 Air Strikes. 1 large secondary fire. Appears to be rocket mortars as fire was white phosphorus type smoke. At XD 855464 ran 1 Air Strike on suspected mortar position. Negative BDA. At XD 835430, supplies left on road. 1 large box 3'x3'x3', numerous small ones in area. Fired 1 Arty mission. Adjusted onto target, turned mission over to F/2/3. Results: 2 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 67

F/2/4 at 844455 observed 2 NVA moving into treeline; AO ran FW. Results: 2NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 76

A/1/4 at 881362 while moving onto obj 3 found 1 NVA body estimated 3 weeks old, 2 ChiCom grenades; buried body & dest ChiComs. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 89

I/3/9 at 095695 found 1/7.62 HMG, 3 RPD Machine Guns & 4 AK-47. All dest by FW, also found 1 NVA body. Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 122

27 Aug

T F HOTEL assumed OPCON of 3/9 (-) from 1st BDE 5th Inf

3d Marines assumed OPCON of K/3/9 from 1st BDE 5th Inf

1/4 at 887355-887346-878348-888357-875353-878356-880355 heard rounds being dropped into tubes; impact 400m to E.; these were followed by 2 rounds SAF & 2 rounds RPG landing inside wire; observed groups of 2-5 NVA. Counter mortar msn, 105 & 155mm Arty were fired on enemy psns. Also ran FW. Results: 9 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 7

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28 Aug

T F HOTEL assumed OPCON of K/3/9
from 3d Marines

3d Marines assumed OPCON of 1/3 (-)
from 1st of the 5th Inf

3d Marines assumed OPCON of 2/26
from XXIV Corps

L/3/3 at 971600 position made contact
with 1 NVA, killed same; continued
search & found 2 RPG-2 and 7 rounds.
Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 89

29 Aug

1st ACD assumed OPCON of A/1/9 AirCav
from 3d Marine Division

30 Aug

M/3/3 at 965608 made contact with 6
NVA; took under fire with small arms.
Results: 1 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 31

3d Recon at 961579 had 8 contacts with
enemy resulting in 8 NVA/KIA(C), Arty
fired 326 rounds resulting in 4 KIA(C),
Air dest caves & killed 2 enemy. Caves
large enough for tanks, many tunnels in
area. Total Results: 14 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 56

31 Aug

Div AO at XD 243795 ran A/S on bunker
complex; 2 structures dest, 8 bunkers
dest & 1 wpns psn damaged. At YD
270786 fired NGF on bunkers; 1 bunker
dest. At following grids took heavy
SAF, 239768-236764. Results:
7 NVA/KIA(C)

Journal entry # 78

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PART IVSUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- ✓ 1. Division SitReps *of 1182-5 1188-1195, 1200, 1204, 1207 NIF*
- ✓ 2. Division Journal
- ✓ 3. Battle and Non Battle Casualties
- ✓ 4. VIP Visits
- ✓ 5. Orders/Plans
- ✓ 6. Photographs

CHRONOLOGY OF SUPPORTING COMMANDS

- ✓ 3d Marines Chronology
- ✓ 4th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 9th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 12th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 1stBn, 3d Marines Chronology
- ✓ 3dBn, 3d Marines Chronology
- ✓ 1stBn, 4th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 2dBn, 4th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 3dBn, 4th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 1stBn, 9th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 2dBn, 9th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 3dBn, 9th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 1stBn, 12th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 2dBn, 12th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 3dBn, 12th Marines Chronology

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- ✓ 4thBn, 12th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 1stBn, 26th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 2dBn, 26th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 3dBn, 26th Marines Chronology
- ✓ HqBn Chronology
- ✓ 1st Amtrac Bn Chronology
- ✓ 3d Engr Bn Chronology
- ✓ 3d MED Chronology
- ✓ 3d MT Bn Chronology
- ✓ 3d Recon Bn Chronology
- ✓ 3d SP Bn Chronology
- ✓ 3d Tank Bn Chronology
- ✓ 9th MT BN Chronology
- ✓ 11th Engr Bn Chronology (submitted direct to CMC)
- ✓ 1st 8" HOW Battery Chronology
- ✓ 3d Dental Co Chronology
- ✓ 1st Searchlight Battery Chronology
- ✓ 26th Marines Chronology
- ✓ 1st Marines Chronology

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BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1968

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3040.3
SC-7/HBL/ML
3 August 1968
(Date)

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 1 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
USMC ENL	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	(3)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
TOTAL	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	7	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	123	18	3	0	0	12	33	348
USMC ENL	3032	2730	434	19	0	13	347	1107	7305
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	189	1445	14	0	0	0	21	43	1772
TOTAL	4015	3025	454	18	0	13	380	1203	9025

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 1 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

† MARINE PR MIA TO KIA

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Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3040.3
SC-7/HBL/ ajm
7 Aug 1968
(Date)

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 2 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	(3)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	(1)
TOTAL	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	2	13	(4)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1235	16	3	0	0	22	36	1474
USMC ENL	3052	27572	421	15	0	13	367	1188	33210
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	290	1007	10	0	0	0	21	43	1725
TOTAL	4016	30290	451	18	0	13	380	1267	36138

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (NONE)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 2 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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7 Aug 1968
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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 3 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	7	(3)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	7	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1235	25	5	0	0	21	30	2017
USMC ENL	3052	27576	1224	25	0	23	368	1189	33217
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	290	2007	24	0	0	0	22	43	2715
TOTAL	4016	30295	1271	30	0	23	381	1260	36145

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 3 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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7 Aug 1968
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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 4 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	2	8	(1)
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	10	(1)
TOTAL										

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	2137	26	15	0	13	218	220	2476
USMC ENL	3653	27582	121	0	0	13	218	220	32005
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	390	1117	21	0	0	0	22	43	1725
TOTAL	4027	30303	154	15	0	13	352	2863	36555

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 4 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTB	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2100, 5 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	(13)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	1	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	(13)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1237	16	3	0	0	12	36	1476
USMC ENL	3654	27595	424	15	0	13	948	1180	33239
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1418	14	0	0	0	21	43	1716
TOTAL	4018	30317	454	18	0	13	981	1269	36770

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2100, 5 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORTFOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 6 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	* (WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
USMC ENL	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	1	6	(2)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	1	7	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL
							DEATHS	INJURED	
USMC OFF	172	1238	16	3	0	0	12	36	1477
USMC ENL	2651	27598	121	15	0	13	350	1191	33215
USN OFF	2	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	29
USN ENL	190	1118	11	0	0	0	21	13	1716
TOTAL	3015	30321	148	18	0	13	383	1270	36477

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (LIT 2A)FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 6 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE		TOTAL	(WIAE)
							DEATHS	INJURED		
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
USMC ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. H. YALE
Captain
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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3040.3
SC-7/MBL/cjm
10 August 1968
(Date)

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 7 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
USMC ENL	2	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	(2)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	2	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	272	1239	16	3	0	0	12	36	2178
USMC ENL	3056	27608	121	15	0	13	350	1191	33257
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1116	11	0	0	0	21	13	1716
TOTAL	4020	30332	154	18	0	13	383	1270	36190

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (B1F 2/4)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 7 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	(2)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 8 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
USMC ENL	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	(3)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	1	6	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1239	14	3	0	0	13	36	1179
USMC ENL	3056	27612	424	15	0	13	350	1192	33262
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	11178	11	0	0	0	21	13	1216
TOTAL	4020	30336	454	18	0	13	384	1271	36966

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (DET 2/4)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 8 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	(4)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 9 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	WIAE
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	(2)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	(2)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	WIAE
USMC OFF	172	1239	10	3	0	0	13	30	1417	
USMC ENL	3050	27615	424	15	0	13	350	1192	33265	
USN OFF	2	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	
USN ENL	190	1448	14	0	0	0	21	43	1716	
TOTAL	4020	30339	454	18	0	13	384	1271	36192	

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (BLT 2/4)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 9 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	WIAE
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	1	10	1	0	0	0	0	0	12	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 10 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0
TOTAL	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1239	18	3	0	0	13	36	1179
USMC ENL	3858	27615	424	15	0	13	350	1192	33265
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1158	11	0	0	0	21	43	1726
TOTAL	4020	30449	454	18	0	13	384	1271	26509

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 10 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 11 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	7	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	(4)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
TOTAL	0	7	0	0	0	0	2	0	9	(4)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1230	16	3	0	0	13	36	1479
USMC ENL	2656	27682	121	15	0	13	351	1292	33879
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1158	11	0	0	0	82	15	1727
TOTAL	1020	30356	154	18	0	13	386	1272	36528

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (WIT 24)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 11 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
USMC ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 12 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	1	18	(8)
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	19	0	0	0	0	0	1	20	(9)
TOTAL										

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	27639	124	15	0	13	352	1293	33891
USMC ENL	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN OFF	190	1458	14	0	0	0	82	43	1787
USN ENL	1020	30375	454	18	0	13	386	1272	36538
TOTAL									

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 12 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 13 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	(1)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	(1)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1241	16	3	0	0	13	36	2461
USMC ENL	3656	27610	424	15	0	13	352	1193	33293
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1458	14	0	0	0	22	43	1727
TOTAL	4020	30376	454	18	0	13	387	1272	36540

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 13 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 14 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
USMC ENL	2	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	(5)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	2	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	(6)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1212	16	3	0	0	13	36	1482
USMC ENL	3658	2769	121	15	0	13	352	1193	33301
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1458	11	0	0	0	22	13	1727
TOTAL	4022	30386	154	18	0	13	387	1272	36552

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 14 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 15 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
USMC ENL	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	(3)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
TOTAL	2	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1213	16	3	0	0	13	36	1453
USMC ENL	3660	27655	121	15	0	13	352	1193	33312
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1160	11	0	0	0	22	13	1729
TOTAL	4024	30395	151	18	0	13	387	1272	36563

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 15 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 16 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1243	16	3	0	0	13	36	1483
USMC ENL	3660	27656	124	15	0	13	352	1193	33013
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1160	11	0	0	0	22	43	1729
TOTAL	4024	30326	151	18	0	13	387	1272	36564

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 15 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 17 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1243	16	3	0	0	13	36	3183
USMC ENL	3680	27658	424	15	0	13	352	1193	33313
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1460	11	0	0	0	22	43	1729
TOTAL	4024	30396	451	18	0	13	387	1272	36541

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 17 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

C. R. YALE
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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 19 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	6	(2)
USMC ENL	3	79	0	0	0	0	0	6	88	(69)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
TOTAL	3	87	0	0	0	0	0	8	98	(75)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	172	1249	16	3	0	0	13	38	1491
USMC ENL	2668	27713	126	15	0	13	351	1200	33119
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	190	1165	11	0	0	0	22	13	1731
TOTAL	4032	30911	156	18	0	13	389	1281	36683

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 19 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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FPO San Francisco 96602

3040.3
SC-7/HBL/cjm
23 August 1968
(Date)

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 20 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	(1)
USMC ENL	13	17	1	0	0	0	0	1	32	(13)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	(1)
TOTAL	15	19	1	0	0	0	0	1	36	(15)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	173	1250	16	3	0	0	13	38	1493
USMC ENL	3681	27760	127	15	0	13	351	1201	33451
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	191	1166	11	0	0	0	22	13	1736
TOTAL	4047	30513	157	18	0	13	389	1282	36719

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 20 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 21 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
USMC ENL	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	1	18	(23)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	1	19	(24)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	173	1251	16	3	0	0	13	38	1494
USMC ENL	3621	27607	127	15	0	13	354	1202	32639
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	197	1166	11	0	0	0	22	14	1737
TOTAL	4017	30561	157	18	0	13	389	1264	36769

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 21 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYHOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORTFOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 24 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	2	12	1	0	0	0	1	0	16	(8)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	2	12	1	0	0	0	1	0	16	(8)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	173	1254	16	3	0	0	13	38	1497
USMC ENL	3693	27860	432	15	0	13	355	1202	33970
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	191	1166	14	0	0	0	22	44	1737
TOTAL	4059	30617	462	18	0	13	390	1284	36013

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 24 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 25 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	(3)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	(3)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	173	1254	16	3	0	0	13	38	1497
USMC ENL	3693	27863	433	15	0	13	355	1208	33574
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	191	1466	14	0	0	0	22	44	1737
TOTAL	4059	30620	463	18	0	13	390	1284	36847

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 25 Aug 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 26 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(2)
USMC ENL	1	75	2	0	0	0	1	2	81	(17)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(1)
TOTAL	1	80	2	0	0	0	1	2	86	(50)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	173	1258	16	3	0	0	13	38	1501
USMC ENL	3691	27938	135	15	0	13	356	1201	33655
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	191	1167	11	0	0	0	22	11	1738
TOTAL	4060	30700	165	18	0	13	391	1286	36933

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 26 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 27 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	*(WIAE)
USMC OFF	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	(1)
USMC ENL	3	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	(27)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	4	34	0	0	0	0	1	0	39	(28)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	174	1259	16	3	0	0	14	38	1504
USMC ENL	3697	27971	135	15	0	13	156	1204	33691
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	191	1167	14	0	0	0	22	44	1738
TOTAL	4064	30734	165	18	0	13	392	1286	36973

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 27 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 28 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	WIAE
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	(2)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	(2)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	274	1259	16	3	0	0	24	38	1504
USMC ENL	3698	87973	435	15	0	13	356	1204	22694
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	192	1167	24	0	0	0	82	44	1738
TOTAL	4065	30736	465	18	0	13	392	1286	36975

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 28 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	WIAE
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, ~~29 August 1968~~

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF										
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	26	39	2	0	0	0	0	0	67	(23)
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	26	69	2	0	0	0	0	0	97	(23)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF									
USMC ENL	275	2239	26	3	0	0	24	30	2563
USN OFF	3724	20032	437	13	0	13	356	1201	33783
USN ENL	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
TOTAL	4001	30799	463	16	0	13	382	1231	37066

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (~~None~~)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, ~~29 August 1968~~

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF										
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 30 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
USMC ENL	0	23	1	0	0	0	0	0	24	(16)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	25	1	0	0	0	0	0	26	(16)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	174	1261	16	3	0	0	11	38	1503
USMC ENL	3724	28055	438	15	0	13	358	1204	33805
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	191	1171	11	0	0	0	22	44	1742
TOTAL	4091	30824	465	18	0	13	392	1286	37092

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 30 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	DEATHS	NON-HOSTILE INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTY REPORT

FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 31 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	* (WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
USMC ENL	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	(10)
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	0	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	(10)

TOTAL HOSTILE AND NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL
USMC OFF	174	1262	16	3	0	0	11	38	1507
USMC ENL	3724	28072	438	15	0	13	356	1204	33822
USN OFF	2	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
USN ENL	191	1472	11	0	0	0	22	111	1743
TOTAL	4091	30843	468	18	0	13	392	1286	37111

UNITS OPCON TO 3D MARDIV (None)FOR PERIOD 0001 TO 2400, 31 August 1968

	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	CPTR	MIS	NON-HOSTILE DEATHS	INJURED	TOTAL	(WIAE)
USMC OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMC ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA OFF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA ENL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* WIAE'S ARE INCLUDED IN WIA'S

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3D MARINE DIVISION VIP VISITS FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1968

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
DRAFTER 138/281/52
SEC STAFF SEC PHONE DHI 8
CWO

PRIORITY 240650 Z JUL 68
3D MARINE DIVISION

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: THIRD MARDIV
INFO: III MAF
T.F. CLEARWATER
FLSG BRAVO
MAG-39

//S E C R E T //

1. CMC WILL VISIT THIRD MARDIV ON 7 AUGUST 1968. ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS:



- 0845 - ARR DONG HA
- 0855 - ENR LZ STUD
- 0910 - ARR LZ STUD VISIT TF HOTEL AND 4TH MAR
- 0940 - ENR AND VISIT LZ CATES
- 1010 - ENR AND VISIT OP 950
- 1030 - ENR AND VISIT 9TH MAR (BALONG JUMP CP)
- 1105 - ENR AND VISIT 3D MAR
- 1140 - ENR AND VISIT A-4
- 1200 - ENR AND VISIT DIV CP FWD. WORKING LUNCH AT CG MESS AND DRIVE THROUGH FLSG-B MAINT AREA
- 1330 - ENR AND VISIT QUANG TRI (DIV CP REAR, AND 3D RECON BN). CO HQ BN PROVIDE VEHICLE TRANS FROM DIV CP REAR
- 1410 - ENR AND VISIT MAG-39 (VIA HELICOPTER)
- 1430 - DEPART QUANG TRI (MAG-39)

2. ORGANIZATIONS TO BE VISITED WILL PREPARE SCHEDULES AND SUBMIT TO THIS HQ ASAP. SCHEDULES FOR LZ STUD, LZ CATES, 9TH MAR, 3D MAR.

RECON BN AND MAG-39 WILL INCLUDE BRIEF PRESENTATION OF AWARDS CEREMONIES. SIZE OF FORMATIONS WILL BE MINIMAL.

GP-4

CCN 2036 RELEASED BY J. E. Lohie TIME

S/S

STAND BY

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RNNNAVY/ YPC667ZVA 279

3D MARINE DIVISION

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RR RUMHVP

ZNY CCCCC

RTTCZYUW RUMUGRA1844 1961136-CCCC--RUMHVP RUMHMB RUMHAW RUMH LA

RUMHIC RUMHVT.

ZNY CCCCC

R 141136Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH

RUMHMB/CG FIRST CAVDIV AM

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG

RUMHMB/CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRCAV CP EAGLE

RUMH LA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG

RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL

RUMHVT/CG DNG SPT CMD

RUMHMPA/CG FORLOGCMD DNG

RUMHFGA/COM THIRD NCB DNG

RUMHFGA/CNSA DNG

RUMHVN/OSA I CORPS DNG

RUMHBP/CO THREE SIX

RUMHBP/SIX TFW DNG

P 130705Z JUL 68 ZFF-6

FM COMUSMACV

TO CG III MAF

COMUSMACVNAI

CG PROV CORPS

CG I FFORCEV

CG II FFORCEV

SA IV CORPS

DSA III CORPS

DET 2 620TH TCS

II DASC

COMDR 65RD CSG

63RD BDO TUOC PLK

1ST SIG BDE

BT

CONFIDENTIAL 20213

SUBJ: MACV CALL WORD (U)

1. (C) GEN L.F. CHAPMAN CMC, WILL VISIT VIETNAM DURING THE
 PERIOD 3 AUG - 9 AUG 68. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY THROUGH 10 JUL 68. ALL
 REFERENCE TO THE ITINERARY OF GEN CHAPMAN WILL BE BY MACV CALL WORD

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 1844 CONFIDENTIAL
 NORTHWEST.

2. (U) DISSEMINATE TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AS NECESSARY. GP-4
 BT 141136Z JUL 68

A-S/S

STAND

SCM

141136
CONFIDENTIAL

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3D MARINE DIVISION

ZNY CCCCC

P 100332Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF DANANG

INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA

RUMHMB/CG FIRST AIR CAV DIV PHU BAI

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF DANANG

RUMHMB/CG ONE ZERO ONE AIR CAV DIV GIA LE

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DANANG

RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI

RUMHVT/CG DNG SPT CND DANANG

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCMD DANANG

RUMUFGA/COM THIRD NCB DANANG

RUMUFGA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

RUMHVM/DSA ICORPS DANANG

RUMHPB/THREE SIX SIX TFW DANANG

P 090224Z JUL 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO CG III MAF

COMUSMACVTHAI

CGPROV CORPS

CG I FFORCEV

CG II FFORCEV

SA IV CORPS

DSA III CORPS

DET 2 620TH TCS

II DASC

COMDR 63RD CSG

63RD BDO TUOC PLK

1ST SIG BDE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 19695

SUBJ: MACV CALL WORD (U)

1. (C) THE FOLLOWING NAMED DISTINGUISHED VISITORS WILL VISIT VIETNAM DURING THE PERIODS INDICATED. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UNTIL ONE DAY AFTER VISITORS DEPART FROM VIETNAM. ALL REFERENCE TO THEIR

100332Z JUL 68

S/S

STAND

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 1257 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ITINERARIES WILL BE BY THE FOLLOWING MACV CALL WORDS (READ IN THREE COLUMNS).

NAME OF V

SITOR
TITLE

DATES OF VISIT

MACV CALL WORD

LTC J.K. LAGELLE
DIR OF DCPG

22 JUL-26 JUL

MACV MONITOR OFF
TELEPHONE NO
SILVERSTICK
LTC NESMITH
2021/2955

GEN R.E. HAINES
CINCUSARPAC DESIGNEE

24 AUG-27 AUG


GRAND
CPT PAHLAND
2121/2955

2. (U) DISSEMINATE TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AS NECESSARY. GP-4

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3D MARINE DIVISION



725

**COC
PLANS**

ZNY CCCCC
P 240102Z JUN 68 ZYT-2
FM ADMINO III MAF DNG
TO RUMHLA/CG FORST MARDIV
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
RUMHAN/CG FIRST MAW DNG
RUMPLMP/CG FORLOGCMD DNG
BT

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CMC WESTPAC VISIT (U)
A. CMC 221651Z JUN68 (P/SEP)
1. REF A ANNOUNCED CMC TENTATIVE PLANS TO VISIT WESTPAC
DURING AUGUST 1968 AND REQUESTED SPECIFIC TOPICS ON WHICH
DISCUSSION IS ANTICIPATED WITH CMC DURING VISIT.
2. THIS HQTRS WILL CONSOLIDATE ~~WATER~~ ~~TOPICS~~ TOPICS TO BE SUBMITTED
IMPERATIVE THAT TITLES OF SPECIFIC TOPICS BE SUBMITTED TO
THIS HQTRS BY MSG TO ARRIVE NLT 261200H JUN68.
CP-4

24

240102Z

JUN

01
H-5/5**CONFIDENTIAL**

STA-10D

02

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- 1 17 July - 4 Aug 1968 Subj: Task Force Hotel Critique, Lancaster II July Action
- 2 071252Z Subj: Assignment of Heavy Cruisers NGFS to DMZ Area
- 3 151550Z Subj: Warning Order
- 4 170735Z Subj: Raid
- 5 191815Z Subj: DMZ Operation Update
- 6 200800Z Subj: Concept of Operations Western Kentucky AO
- 7 231030Z Subj: Operation Order 27-68(Sparrow Hawk)
- 8 251715Z Subj: Update on Leatherneck Square Operations
- 9 260300Z Subj: Deployment of 1st Marines to DaNang
- 10 260530Z Subj: AO Responsibility
- 11 26 Aug Subj: 3rd Marine Division Letter, Subj: Infantry Company Operations
in Northern Quang Tri Province, W/15 Encls
- 12 30 Aug Subj: 3rd Marine Division Letter, Subj: Infantry Company Operations
in Northern Quang Tri Province
- 13 7 Aug Subj: Terrain Study of Scotland II AO
- 14 181200Z Subj: Proud Hunter SITREP #1
- 15 181400Z Subj: Proud Hunter SITREP #1 Addendum
- 16 190055Z Subj: Proud Hunter SITREP #2
- 17 191253Z Subj: SITREP #7, Operation Proud Hunter

3D MARINE DIVISION ORDERS/PLANS FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1968

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TASK FORCE HOTEL

**LANCASTER JULY
ACTION
17 JULY — 4 AUGUST**

CRITIQUE

CRITIQUE
LANCASTER II "JULY ACTION"

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
BY

CG, TASK FORCE HOTEL

Today with your help we will analyze the Lancaster II "July Action" to determine what we did right and what we did wrong, what we did well and what we did poorly. Predictably, we will reflect both extremes.

Planning for the "July Action" commenced on 13 June when we received General DAVIS' warning order. Command interest in the area north and northwest of Camp Carroll was stimulated by persistent reports of enemy activity there, the most persuasive items being the reports of reconnaissance teams, which almost invariably made contacts. Further, we knew that the enemy had long enjoyed uncontested control over most of the area.

Early guidance told us that the necessary forces and resources to carry out the mission would be available during July. Thus, for want of a better name, we dubbed it the "July Action."

Forces available included two Marine infantry regiments -- the 3d and 9th Marines, the customary artillery units from the 12th Marines, and the 2d ARVN Regiment.

We presented our Task Force concept here on 5 July and gained General DAVIS' approval.

We initially planned a 16 July D-Day, following on the heels of a series of arclights. But on 15 July we learned that our arclight targets were deficient in intelligence justification and had been disapproved. Later our hopes were revived when PCV suggested we "slip" D-Day 24 hours in order to receive 10 arclights. We postponed our D-Day to 17 July but received no arclights in our area of operations. Through heavy application of tactical air and artillery, we sought to make up for the missing arclights.

Our "July Action" scheme of maneuver was one of quick area saturation, placing forces at a variety of locations -- including three battalions near the DMZ -- with plans to upset the enemy quickly and decisively.

The 9th Marines' zone included a wide swath of piedmont from the DMZ to Route 9. The 3d Marines' zone embraced the rugged National Forest Reserve area including Dong Ha Mountains and Mutters Ridge. The 2d ARVN Regiments zone lay west and northwest of the Rock Pile through a maze of valleys and sheer ridgelines.

The 9th Marines developed most of the enemy contact and accounted for most of the 311 NVA killed during the Lancaster July Action.

The 3d Marines opened a series of HLZs in the nearly impenetrable jungle near the DMZ, along Mutter's Ridge and on the slopes of Dong Ha Mountain. The regiment also found the two phantom 75mm pack howitzers that had plagued Camp Carroll for nearly a year.

The ARVN Regiment proved that it could operate with equal competence in the mountains as it has in coastal areas. The unit functioned efficiently as a part of the Task Force Hotel team, covering their assigned area carefully. Here again we opened valuable LZs for probable future use.

At the conclusion of the first phase of the "July Action" we turned our attention to one main corridor that remained to be searched: The upper Cam Lo River Valley. Our intelligence caused us to expect to find much enemy activity there. In a move notable for its speed and audacity, the 3d Marines established Fire Support Base Joan (6 105mm howitzers and 3 155mm howitzers), Fire Support Base Margo (6 105mm howitzers) and LZ Becky.

All three locations were operational in short order.

But the enemy chose to avoid contact and we therefore cannot point at statistics to prove the value of the effort. Nevertheless, in penetrating this corridor, we demonstrated our ability to do so, and we opened up a half dozen new sites for future LZs and FSBs. We regard this as an important fringe benefit of such actions.

The Lancaster July Action convinced us that, although we knew a lot about how to prepare LZs in difficult terrain, we still had much to learn. We immediately set about improving our techniques and methods for selecting and developing LZs and FSBs in rugged terrain. We will say more about this during the course of our critique.

Today's speakers will include the Task Force Hotel G-3, G-2, G-4, Air Officer, Fire Support Coordinator, and CEO. Regimental Commanders of the 3d Marines, 9th Marines and 12th Marines will also make some observations. I will be followed by Major DONOVAN, Task Force G-3.

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LANCASTER II JULY ACTION
I. OPERATIONS

On 13 June CG Task Force Hotel received a concept of operations from CG 3d MarDiv to conduct a multi-regiment operation in the Lancaster II AO. The forces available were: 3d Marines, 9th Marines, and two battalions of 2d ARVN Regt. The discussion that follows elaborates on planning, coordination, execution, and lessons learned.

A. PLANNING

Based on guidance received, two courses of action were developed. In each, a helo/ground attack was considered and zones of action depicted. The courses of action were passed on to the USMC Regiments for consideration. The 2d ARVN Regiment was occupied with another operation but was fully briefed and given an opportunity to develop its own scheme later.

Additional guidance was received from CG 3d MarDiv and the north to south axis of advance was adopted as the primary course of action.

The scheme of maneuver was developed with regiments in helo/ground attack from the DMZ southward. One battalion sealed off the eastern boundary of the objective area by a series of blocking positions. Certain supportability factors needed detailed planning: Helicopter, logistics and artillery.

(1) Efficient use of all available helicopters was a major concern. Time tables were developed to provide for smooth assault and helo approach and retirement lanes were planned to expedite daily resupply traffic.

(2) Timely and sufficient resupply would result only by budgeting helicopters and planning tight control at the ISA.

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(3) Prime concern was the positioning of the artillery batteries so maximum fire support was available without impeding traffic.

Another important facet of our planning was frequent conferences. Several were conducted to gain mutual understanding by all participants. MAG-39 and other 1st Marine Air Wing representatives were active members on the majority of the conferences, and also visited almost daily to keep in close touch with the plans as they developed. Pilots and ground commanders made numerous visual reconnaissances of objective areas so each would be familiar with the terrain. 3d Marine Regt and Bn Co's made 32 VR's. 9th Marines made 28. The most difficult task was to prepare helicopter LZ's in thick canopy. The 2d ARVN Regiment changed from a heliborne assault plan to ground attack because they could not find HLZ. The 3d Marines also modified their plan because of difficulty in finding HLZ.

B. COORDINATION

(1) For helo assaults into air prepped HLZ's, a detailed brief was held by the Regiment, Bn staff, VMO-6 and squadron flight leaders. These members made an over flight of proposed zones so all parties were agreed. Then there was a debrief after the VR. An important member, the Division AO, was not at first included but after some lessons were learned he was included in these coordination conferences.

(2) Attempts were made to incorporate 2d ARVN representatives in the various staff sections for coordination. Only one ARVN officer was available and he observed in the FSCC/DASC.

(3) ARVN objectives were alphabetized. 9th Marines were even numbered and 3d Marines were odd numbered.

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C. EXCERPT

The Lancaster July Action commenced on 17 July 1968, D Day had been 16 July and no day for arslights which never were received. Six Battalions attacked the northern position of Lancaster II AO on D-Day.

1. 3/9 was helilifted into LZ Sparrow YD 060660.
2. 2/9 was helilifted into LZ Wren YD 050650.
3. 1/9 walked into a blocking position vicinity YD 095650.
4. 1st and 3rd Battalions 2d ARVN moved by foot into vicinity YD 092550 and YD 092575.

5. 2/3 was helilifted into LZ Falcon YD 037641.

At 110745H, 3/9 completed their helilift into LZ Sparrow. E/3/9 at 1105H in the vicinity of YD 045656, made contact with an estimated NVA company. Initially they received heavy S/A fire and 45 rounds of 60mm mortar. They returned fire with organic weapons, artillery and called in air strikes. Other elements of 3/9 moved up and were engaged at 1115H; heavy contact continued until 1500H, then subsided. Results of the contact were 38 NVA/KIA, friendly losses were 7 KIA and 28 WIA (EVAC).

(1) B/1/9, vicinity of YD 090655, at 1410H, received 10 rounds of 82mm mortars resulting in 1 WIA (EVAC), the company commander. Then at 1722H, vicinity YD 090655, B/1/9 received 7 rounds of 82mm mortars resulting in 3 KIA and 3 WIA (EVAC).

(2) A/1/9, at 1420H, vicinity of YD 087650, received 4 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 3 WIA (EVAC) and 1 KIA.

A recon team (Alexander) acting as pathfinders for the 2d Bn 3rd Marines was located in LZ Falcon. At 1142H, at YD 035640 they made contact with an estimated 15-20 NVA and received S/A fire, grenades and mortars. Recon returned to LZ and had 4 WIA (EVAC). Air strikes by A-4's and F-4's from

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MAG 11 and 12 killed an additional 11 NVA. 2/3 continued with their plan to land at LZ Falcon and were all in the LZ at 1500H. The companies moved out to the west and at 1900H, E/2/3, vicinity YD 022639 received 20 rounds of 60mm mortars resulting in 2 KIA. 1 hour for 2/3 had been delayed in order to make extra preps.

The 2nd ARVN Regiment made no contact for the day.

D-1, 18 July. Contacts were light for Third Marines and Ninth Marines reported no contacts. At 1010H, 1/3 helilifted into its alternate LZ, Crow since LZ Gull was not considered ready. An NVA FO was spotted by elements of G/2/3 at 1530H, vicinity of YD 024648, the NVA was killed by a sniper team with the company. At 1735H, M/3/9 in the vicinity of YD 046656, found 60 lbs of TNT, five DH-10 mines and 13 NVA/KIA.

During the afternoon of 18 July, vicinity of YD 900550, 1st Battalion 2d ARVN, found many foxholes, enough for 1 NVA company and many laetian cigarette butts. The area appeared to have been occupied in the last two days. 3rd Marines moved K/3/3 (rein) into LZ Cardinal at 1945H, to get a foothold on further operations west.

D-2, 19 July. No contact was reported for this day as the units continued search of their ZOA. 3/3 (-) was helilifted into LZ Dressed at 0930H. At 191000H, F/2/9, at YD 054679, found 11 graves with one NVA in each. The bodies were badly decomposed. At 1230H, D/1/3, in the vicinity of YD 015616, found 1 NVA skeleton. Then at 1913H, L/3/9, in the vicinity of YD 038649, found 8 graves with 2 NVA bodies in each. The bodies were badly decomposed.

At 191830H, I/3/3, in the vicinity of YD 028599, found 6 bunkers, one having a false bottom. Parts for a 75mm pack howitzer: One elevation mechanism, 2 wheels, 4 batteries and one pair of Russian field glasses (8X30) with case were found.

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At 191630H, K/3/9, at YD 142654, found another NVA body. By dark on D+2, distribution of forces was as shown on this acetate.

D+3, 20 July. At 201000H, vicinity of YD 027602, I/3/3 found two disassembled 75mm pack howitzers and 26 rounds. D/1/3 at 1200H, vicinity of YD 016613, found 1 SKS rifle and the remains of one NVA. H/2/3, vicinity of YD 005645, spotted 11 NVA in the open and fired an artillery mission resulting in 6 NVA/KIA. The lack of enough AO's was now very evident.

At 201130H, G/2/9 in the vicinity of YD 053687 engaged an estimated NVA company in bunkers. The lead platoon of G/2/9 made contact and was pinned down by an enemy force that maneuvered to the west and brought fire to bear on the platoon. Friendly and enemy forces were in such close proximity, supporting arms could not be used initially. The platoon pulled back and conducted artillery missions and A/S. Results at this time were 1 KIA, 2 MIA and 11 WIA (EVAC). At 1600H, a squad from G/2/9, moved up and recovered the two MIA's who were found to be KIA. A total of 32 NVA were KIA, 3 NVA/KIA by ground forces and total friendly losses were 3 KIA and 12 WIA (EVAC). At 0800H, I/3/9, vicinity of YD 042655, found 3 NVA bodies who had been killed by S/A and shrapnel 3 to 4 days before. At 1530H, A/1/9 at YD 070653, received 15 rounds of 82mm mortars resulting in 1 KIA and 1 WIA (EVAC), both Kit Carson Scouts.

D+4, 21 July. Elements of 2/9 at 1330H, vicinity of YD 052685, received 6 rounds of 82mm mortars resulting in 1 KIA and 9 WIA (EVAC). At 1440H, F/2/9 spotted 35 NVA at YD 055689, moving west. They engaged them with S/A, 81mm, artillery fire and A/S. Results were 23 NVA/KIA and 10 killed by artillery fire. This contact prompted the Regimental Commander to ask permission to enter the DMZ area to pursue the NVA. This request

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was forwarded by CG TF Hotel and CG 3d MarDiv. Higher authority was advised of Division Commander's intention to enter DMZ, south of Ben Hai and for less than 48 hours, if the situation so dictated. The occasion to enter the DMZ did not persist. At 0735H, K/3/9, at YD 038659, found 2 NVA bodies 4-5 days old. Other elements from 2/9, at 1050H in the vicinity of YD 060675, found 4 NVA killed by S/A, 3 AK-47's, 2 gas masks, 15 chicom grenades and assorted 782 gear and documents. L/3/9 at YD 038648 found 10 120mm mortar rounds and at YD 033649, they found 52 122mm rocket rounds. I/9 in the vicinity of YD 063668 found 20 rounds of 107mm rockets. G/2/9 at YD 054686, found one NVA/KIA by S/A.

~~D+5~~ 22 July. At 221110H, F/2/9, vicinity of YD 059688, while searching the area of contact of 21 July found 5 NVA/KIA, ten weapons, 52 packs, 41 gas masks, 30 canteens, and assorted 782 gear. By dark on D+5, disposition of friendly forces was as shown on this acetate.

~~D+6~~ 23 July. During the day, 2/9 helilifted into LZ Carol, YD 056619 and 3/9 helilifted into LZ Red YD 081606, both landings were unopposed. At 1730H, I/9 vicinity of YD 051642, captured one wounded NVA. There was no contact in the 3rd Marines AO.

~~D+7~~ 24 July. There was no contact reported. At 1150H, K/3/9, at YD 039612 found 19 graves approximately 24 hours old with one NVA in each. Then at 1215H, Kilo found 1 NVA helmet, 1 basket of rice, 3 RPG rounds, 260 rounds 82mm, 25 rounds of 60mm and 3 DH-10 mines. E/2/9, at YD 052625, found 96 graves approximately 2-4 months old, containing one body each. The graves were marked with aluminum signs. At 1500H, K/3/9, at YD 079623, had 5 Marines WIA (EVAC) and 1 WIANE from a surprise explosive device.

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L/3/9 had a Marine detonate a surprise explosive device at XD 080597 resulting in 2 WIA (EVAC). 1/9 helilifted to VCB to relieve 1/4 of security of VCB and Ca Lu so that 1/4 could prepare for Canton II. Six 105 howitzers were helilifted into FSB Joan.

D+8, 25 July. There were no significant events in the objective area. 2/3 helilifted to Thon Son Lam. And 2d ARVN Regt ended their part of Lancaster July Action by helilifting into assigned objectives in the Canton II Action which 4th Marines already had underway.

D+9 26 July. There were no significant developments as the units continued to search their AO's. By dark on D+9, disposition of friendly forces was as shown on this acetate.

D+10, 27 July. No contact was reported, the action was highlighted by helilifts of 1/3 and two companies of 3/3 into LZ's Becky, XD 858614 and LZ Margo XD 901609 in the northwestern portion of the Cam Le River Valley. Six flights of F/W prepped LZ Becky and 4 flights of F/W prepped LZ Margo. Both landings were unopposed. The 9th Marines continued to find many abandoned fortified areas.

D+11, 28 July. At 0711H, two Marines from 3/3 were WIA (EVAC) when they detonated a surprise explosive device vicinity of XD 900610. Then at 1415H, a patrol from L/3/3, in the vicinity of XD 900615, detonated one U.S. type M-14 mine resulting in 3 WIA (EVAC). 2/9 displaced to Quang Tri for the S.U.R.E. Program. At 1845H, C/1/12 was lifted into FSB Margo.

D+12, 29 July. Two Marines from A/1/3 at 0300H, in the vicinity XD 854614 were WIA when they exchanged fire with one NVA outside the perimeter. L/3/3 had one Marine detonate a U.S. type AP mine resulting in 1 WIA (EVAC). 3/9 displaced to VCB and participated in the S.U.R.E. Program.

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D+13, 30 July. There were no significant events as the 3rd Marines continued to search their Zone of Action.

D+14, 31 July. 1/9 completed search operations and was helilifted to VCB. Ninth Marines were phased out of the Lancaster July Action on this date to prepare for the Ba Long operation.

D+17, 1 August. D+18, 2 August. There were no significant events on either of these dates.

D+19, 3 August. Lancaster July Action came to close when opoon of 3rd Marines was passed to CG 3d MarDiv.

The cumulative casualties and equipment/supplies captured or destroyed are as shown on this chart.

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>	
KIA	26	KIA	311
WIA (EVAC)	136	POW	1
WIANE	22	DET	1

Captured items included: 18 individual weapons, 7 crew served weapons 1084 bunkers destroyed, 1377 arty/rocket/mortar rounds captured/destroyed, 5138 small arms rounds, captured/destroyed, 6,350 pounds of rice captured, 30 mines or booby traps, 199 grenades, 2,260 pounds of explosive. Of special interest were two 75mm pack how which had plagued Camp Carroll for some time. The 2d ARVN Regiment had no casualties or contact in the Lancaster July Action.

D. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/LESSONS LEARNED

1. Our most essential lesson learned came early in this operation. Initially the Division AO's, who act as FAC (A), were not included in HLZ briefings and planning. This caused confusion in prepping a selected HLZ as AO's were not sure of exact locations. It is most difficult to relate

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grid coordinates to terrain that is seared by craters, heavily vegetated and spider webbed by small streams not shown on the map. A wrong area was prepped and consequently 2/3 had to land in a 9th Marines HLZ requiring boundary changes. Solution: In planning a helicopter assault, the following CO's or representatives must be present: Bn Cdr, helicopter Squadron Cdr, Division AO, gunship flight leader and Regimental CO. After briefing the scheme of maneuver, all parties make a VR picking the exact ground and then relate it to the map. In this way, each representative can point out problems that must be solved. The infantry commander states whether it meets his tactical desires. The helicopter flight commander can be sure he has proper landing and departure clearances. The Division AO can recommend the amount of A/S required and finally the gunships are aware of how to lead transport helicopters to the HLZ.

2. Do not plan on elements of two different regiments landing in HLZ's in close proximity to each other or near Regimental boundaries. The fire support problem will persist as flight patterns or artillery missions mask the other units during the critical phase of helo assault. If HLZ's are hard to find, first locate suitable HLZ's, then make the boundaries.

3. When operating near the DMZ, a code word should be designated if a Bn/Regt commander anticipates the need to enter the DMZ. In this way, requests can be passed by uncovered means to gain approval.

4. Marines can and have blasted HLZ and artillery positions out of canopied forests considered unsuitable. Tremendous air ordnance was required to start the zone and a big field engineer task was needed to clear the trees and make it useable. A close coordination with the 1st MAW greatly

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helped in fast development of these zones. These techniques have already been applied to Canton II and Ba Long. This concludes G-3 comments.

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UNITS EMPLOYED

3D MARINES (REIN)

- 1ST BN 3D MARINES
- 2ND BN 3D MARINES
- 3D BN 3D MARINES
- 3D BN 12TH MARINES (REIN)

9TH MARINES

- 1ST BN 9TH MARINES
- 2ND BN 9TH MARINES
- 3D BN 9TH MARINES
- 2ND BN 12TH MARINES
- PLT APC'S FROM 2ND ARVN

2ND ARVN REGIMENT

- 1ST BN 2ND ARVN
- 3D BN 2ND ARVN
- D/S ARTILLERY BATTERY

G/S ARTILLERY

- 4TH BN 12TH MARINES
- BRAVO PLATOON 1ST 8" HOW. BTRY.
- 1ST 155 PROVISIONAL GUN BTRY (-) (2
- 155 GUNS; 2 8" HOWITZERS)
- BRAVO BATTERY, 2ND BATTALION, 94TH FIELD ARTY.

DIVISION A0'S

- VMC-6
- MAG 39 - 36
- MAG 11, 12, AND 13

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II INTELLIGENCE

A. GENERAL.

1. The area of operation encompassed terrain utilized by the enemy for over a year with minimum friendly interference. He was therefore able to construct and maintain elaborate base areas to support transient infiltration groups and operational combat units. The most recent occupants of the area were major elements of the 320th AVA Division, 164th Artillery Regiment, and the 27th Independent Regiment.

Early in the planning for this action, it was concluded that timely coordination of the collection effort and positive dissemination of information was mandatory to its success. Therefore, additional emphasis was placed on those facets by endeavoring to establish daily contact liaison between the Task Force Hotel G-2 Staff and the units participating in the action. In addition, a daily special intelligence summary covering only the area of the action was disseminated, a summary which accentuated that day's collected information in that area. These two means of dissemination proved to be the keys to the successes enjoyed by the intelligence effort.

B. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

1. In support of the Lancaster II July Action, the following intelligence sources were utilized:

- a. Aerial photography
- b. Infra-red (Airborne)

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- c. Aerial observation.
- d. Sensor devices.
- e. Prisoners of war.
- f. Captured documents and equipment
- g. Ground reconnaissance.

2. Aerial photography.

a. Vertical photographic coverage was provided each regiment for pre-D-day planning. In addition, forward-firing oblique photography of pre-selected landing zones was provided prior to D-day.

b. During the action, ten additional photographic missions were flown in the AO with immediate supplementary readouts provided to the Task Force regiments. These readouts were valuable in their identification of the locations of enemy facilities and fortifications.

c. On three or four occasions, photography of that area immediately forward of occupied phase lines was attempted. Each of these three missions had to be aborted, however, because ground troops were in contact and it was inadvisable to effect check fires. The fourth attempt succeeded by prohibiting the firing of VT-fused shells.

3. Infra-red (Airborne). Infra-red (Airborne) was employed to assess enemy strengths and dispositions and therefore to provide targeting information. During the course of the action, ten infra-red reports were received, interpreted, and exploited.

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k. Aerial observation. Aerial reconnaissance was conducted from UH1E, OH1E and T41F aircraft. The aircraft provided extensive reconnaissance both of the AO and of the enemy artillery belt north of the DMZ. Air assets were employed for HLL selection, surveillance, and target acquisition. Briefs and debriefs of crews of fixed-wing aircraft were completed over the DASC communications nets, a system which proved to be adequate under the circumstances. Rotary wing aircraft were briefed and debriefed daily at VCB. These contact briefs were supplemented by passing developing intelligence information and requests over the DASC nets to the aircraft while they were on station.

5. Sensor devices. Use was made of previously-emplaced sensors in the upper Cam Lo River Valley for target acquisition and for estimating the enemy's use of this terrain corridor. Three additional sensor strings of three sensors each were employed by reconnaissance teams in the northeast corner of the AO. These devices were monitored on the 15th of July and the information provided was exploited by artillery fire. Because the devices became hypersensitive, however, further readouts were not made.

6. Prisoners of war.

a. Interrogation support was provided by attaching one interrogation-translation subteam to each operating regiment. One additional subteam was located at VCB.

b. Only one prisoner was captured during the action, and therefore the true potential of the Task Force PW exploit-

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tation capability was not realized.

7. Captured documents and equipment. The action resulted in the capture of significant amounts of enemy equipment and munitions. Included in the captures were two 75mm pack howitzers and 255 surface-to-surface rockets. Documents captured were of minimal number, but those captured substantiated the use of the AO by the 27th Independent Regiment and the 320th NVA Division.

8. Ground Reconnaissance. 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company and 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion were called upon to execute 39 patrols in support of the action. These patrols did not restrict themselves to the classic surveillance mission historically associated with reconnaissance units, but also assumed missions involving pathfinding, stay-behind, recon screen, and the covert emplacement of sensor devices.

a. During the planning phase, it was estimated that a sizeable force occupied the northeast corner of the AO, and that this area was serving as a principle enemy north-south access route. In order to confirm this estimate and provide a pre-D-day and post-D-day monitoring capability of the three main trails, three sensor insertion missions were scheduled. Two teams were inserted by helicopter on the 11th of July (vic YD0065 and YD0365). A third team walked to their sensor placement site (vic YD0665) from C-2 on 12 July. The center team of the three sighted the enemy during sensor emplacement and drew heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire (including

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.50 cal. machine gun fire on extraction). The other two teams observed positive indications of enemy use of their respective areas. Notwithstanding the possibility of enemy interdiction, all sensor devices were emplaced and the teams extracted without sustaining any friendly casualties.

b. At 170930 July, reconnaissance team "Alexander" was inserted into LZ Falcon (vic YD 035640) to act as pathfinders for a helicopter landing by 2/3. Contact was made with an estimated 15 - 20 NVA. As a result of the discovery of the enemy's presence, the landing was delayed so that additional preparation fires could be placed on the enemy positions. The assault landing was carried out without friendly casualties, although a number of helicopters did receive ground fire.

c. In order to provide surveillance and a fire direction capability to the rear of friendly forces as they moved south, two reconnaissance teams were inserted (vic YD057665 and YD041662) on 21 July. Recon teams remained in this area until 25 July. During that time, they made four sightings of enemy troops moving south, and conducted fire missions to break up enemy formations.

d. Two recon teams were inserted on 18 July to act as a screening force for engineers during the construction of LZ Cardinal (vic XD939611). One team was emplaced to the north, the other to the south of the zone. During the evening of 18 July, recon team "Bulldozer" (the southernmost team) detected enemy soldiers moving toward them. The team directed

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supporting arms on these formations, and no further interference resulted that evening. A search of the area the morning of the 19th revealed blood trails and bits of black pyjamas. During this incident and thereafter, work continued uninterrupted on LZ Cardinal.

C. DISSEMINATION. In order to ensure the timely exploitation of intelligence information, the following means were employed in addition to those previously discussed:

1. Daily INTSUM's were sent electrically and by special courier.
2. Spot reports were transmitted by land line and by radio.
3. Daily formal briefings were presented to the Commanding General, Task Force Hotel and his staff.
4. As requested, special briefings were presented to other interested parties.

D. LESSONS LEARNED.

1. Photographic needs should be expressed as early as possible in the planning stage to ensure delivery on a timely basis.
2. Prisoners of war and documents are of inestimable value and the lack of them during an operation deprives all units of needed information. A concerted effort must be made by all units to obtain these sources.
3. Timely dissemination of information is at least as important as any other phase of the intelligence cycle. The transmission duplication of this information is desirable to ensure receipt by the using unit.

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III LOGISTICS

A. HELICOPTER RESUPPLY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

The goal of the logistics system during the Lancaster II (July) action, was to provide the required supplies to the units at the time and place requested.

STATISTICS FOR LANCASTER II JULY

Total lifts 1,721
 CH46 1,361
 CH53 350
 Most lifts per day 146 on 22 July
 Average CH46 lifts per day 75.5
 Average CH53 lifts per day 19.4
 Total weight 5,362,180 lbs
 Average weight per day 297,899 lbs
 Most weight one day, 465,000 lbs on 24 July

This in no way taxed the LSA which has the capability to handle in excess of 500,000 lbs daily.

During this action, 16 different units both Infantry and Artillery, were resupplied by helicopter from the LSA at Vandegrift Combat Base. The helicopter resupply effort was time oriented to provide supplies when requested by the unit. The coordination necessary to accomplish this type resupply is complicated but must be done to allow ground commanders to complete tactical moves as planned.

During the first three days of the operation a lack of coordination, late establishment of priorities and slow reaction to potential problem areas caused reduced helicopter resupply support, particularly the return of nets, this was caused by an incomplete schedule, helicopters arriving late for the resupply mission and communication difficulties. By D+3 these

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problems were essentially solved.

As the operation progressed techniques were developed which resulted in the establishment of a Logistics Operation center at the LSA which materially improved Logistic Support to units in the field. An SOP to standardize procedures at the LOC was prepared and a draft copy is attached. The SOP provides for the greatest degree of flexibility in logistic support by coordinating unit representatives in the LOC, supply status at LSU, the Shore Party operating the LSA and aircraft support available to the logistic mission.

It is recommended that in future operations an LOC be established at the LSA and that it function in accordance with the proposed SOP.

B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/LESSONS LEARNED.

Problems such as police of LZs, inadequate preparation of LZs and radio net discipline are of a continuing nature and require constant command attention. These areas created some concern but were kept within manageable proportions.

On several occasions communication between helicopters and helicopter support teams was difficult to establish.

It is recommended that battalion representatives at the LSA contact units to notify HSTs that aircraft are enroute and to be prepared to contact the aircraft. Additionally the LOC prepares a daily pilot information sheet which contains LZ coordinates, name, frequency and call signs for the days resupply operations. This typed paper is handed to each pilot on his first mission of the day at the LSA. The tower radio operator is then able to inform pilots of their destination by coordinates, call sign and frequency simply by saying

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the line number of the unit to which the lift is going. As an example if a load of MCI is programed for a certain battalion, He might say to the pilot "one load of Class I for line 6". The pilot looks at his paper and easily identifies his destination.

Although the Task Force Hotel Communication Officer will address this subject in greater detail the importance of designating a regimental LZ common net cannot be over emphasized. Each regiment must have its own LZ common net and the LSA must have a separate net to control aircraft in the LSA.

As previously stated our goal is to provide the required supplies to the unit in the field at the time and place requested. It is realized that units cannot forecast all of their needs but the large number of late afternoon add-on requests caused considerable difficulties as the sun went down. The LOC will maintain the flexibility to respond to these requirements but the greater the lead time for resupply the smoother the system will work. However, there was no deadline imposed on units for add-on requests. Requests were accepted as late as 1800 for delivery that day. As a result there were no emergency resupply requests during Lancaster II July which testifies to the flexibility of the LOC concept.

It is recommended that units estimate and plan logistic resupply requirements to minimize late add on requests.

It is interesting to note that toward the end of the operation most units were receiving hot chow, cold milk and cold

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drinks daily. Some of these desirable items were delivered even though we had the added logistics load of the 4th Marines on Canton II overlapping with Lancaster II.

A shortage of water cans initially caused minor resupply problems. Division G-4 made 10,000 plastic water containers available at Vandegrift Combat Base. These containers materially improved the ability to resupply units with water in a timely manner.

It is recommended that units requisition sufficient water cans to maintain their authorized allowance. That plastic water containers of the 2½ gallon and 6 gallon type be available as a substitute item.

We must be prepared to utilize resupply means other than helicopters. In one instance two companies of first battalion Ninth Marines were resupplied by APC towing Army ammo trailers. These trailers are of sturdier construction than ours with a lower and heavier suspension system giving them more stability for rough terrain. They can be towed by any heavy prime mover in our inventory including tanks, 6X6 trucks or dozers. Future planning must consider all methods of resupply.

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Three separate and distinct types of resupply were encountered during this action. The first type required resupply to battalions moving from night defensive positions to objectives which were reached in the late afternoon. This operation required early morning resupply and retrieval of nets to enable the battalion to move on schedule. When the objective was secured and an LZ prepared the late afternoon resupply was commenced. During the period these operations were conducted, helicopter requirements were greatest in the early morning and late afternoon; reduced during midday. Figure 1. illustrates helicopter requirements to support a battalion on the move for a normal days operation. Note that the battalions have scheduled resupply for 0700 - 0900 and 1500 - 1600. It should also be noted that this operation was conducted during extremely hot weather.

The second situation provided resupply to units that developed a base of operations containing an LZ. During these operations helicopter resupply leveled out, resulting in a continuous resupply schedule throughout the day. Frequently these units established OP's in terrain that required small unit resupply, resulting in as many as seven different LZ locations.

The third situation was the initial supply of a fire support base, 18-23 CH53 lifts were required. Daily resupply to the artillery positions averaged seven CH53 lifts.

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Based on statistics accumulated during the July action the following planning factors have been developed which apply when aircraft operate in less than a 10 mile turn around distance.

1. A battalion on the move requires an average of 10 CH46 lifts per day. These lifts must be scheduled early in the morning and late in the afternoon so as not to adversely effect the tactical situation. It requires two CH46 aircraft per battalion to accomplish this resupply.

2. Units that utilize a fixed LZ for a period of time require an average of 8 CH46 lifts per day delivered at any time. Two CH46's can deliver this cargo in approximately one hour.

3. Fire support bases require 18-23 CH53 lifts the first day and an average of seven CH53 lifts per day thereafter. Each aircraft has the capability of delivering four lifts per hour.

ENGINEER

A. CONSTRUCTION OF FIRE SUPPORT BASES

During the period of 17 July to 3 August 1968, two fire support bases were built. FSB Joan and FSB Margo by the Third Marines.

FSB Joan was built in a small valley where vegetation consisted mainly of tall grass and bushes. The Engineer effort was provided by Bravo Co. 3d Engineer Bn. A TD-6

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Dozer was sent by Task Force Hotel to do the necessary excavation. Because of the light vegetation, the engineering effort went smoothly and the base was constructed easily in two days. For a fire direction center Task Force Hotel supplied an 8X8 foot prefabricated bunker.

FSB Margo was built in rolling hill terrain with gun positions at the base and sides of a hill. The vegetation consisted mainly of bamboo and grass on the site with trees around the position. The engineer effort was provided by Bravo Co., 3d Engineer Bn. All gun positions and ammo pits were dug by hand using demolitions (C-4) to loosen the earth. The only trees cut were those masking the fire of the guns. The position was completed in 24 hours using 38 engineers, hand tools and demolitions. There were no major engineer problems encountered during the construction.

Throughout the AO many landing zones were cut by infantry battalions. Task Force Hotel sent a team of engineers to the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 2nd ARVN Regiment to construct landing zones for a troop lift. At these zones some difficulty was encountered with the size of the trees and the density of the forest. All work was done with demolitions and hand tools. Each zone was completed in 24 hours.

B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

The major problem encountered at the ARVN landing zones was the size and hardness of the trees which had to be blown. More demolitions than estimated had to be employed for effectiveness. Difficulty in securing the charges to the trees was

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
met because of the solidness and shape of the TNT blocks and the lack of binding material. This was remedied by taking strips of green bamboo and using them to secure charges. Coil strip charges would have been more effective because of their cohesive sides and the rapidity with which they can be employed.

C. LESSONS LEARNED

When clearing trees in a dense forest area engineers should carry enough string, rope or other suitable binding material to aid in setting demolitions, especially when using TNT. When estimating demolitions for the larger trees common to the Lancaster AO, special consideration should be given to the type and hardness of the wood to be blown.

25

Figure 1



LANCASTER II JULY ACTION III AIR

A. GENERAL

1. The main characteristic of this operation from the standpoint of air was the requirement for close coordination and planning between air and ground. This requirement was met in that numerous meetings, briefings, and joint planning conferences were held with appropriate representatives present.

B. FIXED WING OPERATIONS

1. Fixed Wing air support was adequate and responsive altho the single management concept has reduced its flexibility. "Add on" air must come from the hot pad and this of course limits the choice of ordnance.

2. A brief summary of fixed wing operations is as follows: A total of 781 close air support sorties were flown in support of Lancaster July Action covering 10 assault landings, and expending 1189 tons of ordnance. TPQ operations both day and night totaled 167 sorties expending 395 tons of ordnance. The following BDA is reported:

KSA	67
Secondary explosions	21
Fires	12
Bunkers	104
Caves	1
Rocket sites	62
Structures	11
AA positions	1
Fighting holes	12
Mortar positions	3
Road cuts	1
Trench line	475 meters

3. The greatest single limiting factor in Lancaster July Action from an air standpoint was the shortage of observation aircraft. The reason for this shortage was aircraft availability. This problem can only be rectified by the acquisition of adequate spare parts and replacement aircraft.

4. Task Force Hotel had requested a substantial series of arelight missions prior to D-day. These requests however, were denied. Fortunately through experience gained during a previous operation, Robin North and South, the Scheme of Maneuver in Lancaster July was not tied to the arelight. Consequently, by substituting organic supporting arms and hot pad air, adverse effects from not receiving planned arelight were minimized.

5. One noteworthy problem with regard to fixed wing air is the requirement to submit requests by 1200 on the day prior. This places an unrealistic handicap on the ground commander, particularly during a highly

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mobile operation that requires instant reaction. In many cases plans are not even finalized until very late in the day.

C. HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

1. By and large the helicopter side of the picture worked very well. As previously mentioned by the G-4, helicopters conducted over 1700 lifts transporting more than 4.8 million pounds of supplies and equipment. The daily average of cargo transported during Lancaster July was 268,000 lbs. It is significant to note that simultaneously with supporting Lancaster July involving of course the 3rd, 9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment, Task Force Hotel also supported the 4th Marines, Canton II, and two fire support bases.

2. The most important factor in the success of this operation was the technique of asset management used by Task Force Hotel. All assets were controlled and dispatched at the Task Force level.

D. LESSONS LEARNED

1. Lessons were learned throughout the operation. The most significant was the need for a CH-46 and UH1E gun medevac package, assigned to and controlled by the Task Force in support of the operation. During the first days of Lancaster July a request was received for the evacuation of an emergency case and several priorities. Unfortunately because of battle damage there were no available aircraft for this mission under the Task Force's control. The request was forwarded to Dong Ha in accordance with standing procedures. The regular medevac package had just been dispatched on another medevac and the result was a substantial delay of over 3 hours and 40 minutes. Steps were taken immediately to acquire and position a medevac package at VCB. This procedure commenced the following day.

2. The concept of a roving gun package was another lesson learned. This provides for two airborne UH1E Gun ships in the Task Force Hotel area to be used as required. It eliminates the need to "chain" a section of guns to a specific mission which might not require their services all of the time. This gun package is always in communication with the DASC and may be dispatched by the DASC upon the authority of CG Task Force Hotel or his designated representative.

3. The establishment of a ZIPPO Team is a major step toward addressing the problem of landing zone preparation. We saw the need for it in Lancaster July. It has since been developed, and proved to be very valuable in the initial phases of Scotland II Bravo. The ZIPPO (zone Improvement/Preparation Projects) consist of one helicopter assault flight leader, one UH1E pilot qualified as a TAC(A), one C-1 pilot and one A-1, the senior member being assigned as ZIPPO. The purpose of the team is to proceed as an integral package to brief with the supported unit. The ZIPPO is qualified to represent air with regard to the selection.

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evaluation, preparation and/or improvement of potential landing zones and fire support basis. It is identified as a team and will be assigned to a unit or area as appropriate throughout the completion of the assigned task to include the heliborne assault if such is the case. This concept provides for continuity throughout the duration of the mission.

E. COMMENTS

1. Maximum utilization is an essential factor in asset management. This requires that aircraft "deadhead" time be kept to a minimum. This can be achieved by coordination through the logistical channels wherein return loads (empty water cans etc.) are programmed to coincide with incoming resupply.
2. The problem of reduced production as a result of aircraft availability and/or weather is ever present. While this problem cannot be accurately predicted it can however be anticipated and plans made accordingly. A seemingly vigorous and adequate resupply program can suddenly grind to a sickening halt as a result of poor weather or lack of aircraft. To lessen the impact, all units should assign strict priorities to each load with the idea that possibly three or four loads may be the sum total received. The Task Force G-4 has initiated a "wave" or "round robin" supply cycle to allow each unit to get at least one load prior to starting the second wave. This is flexible to respond realistically to the overall needs of the deployed unit.

F. PROBLEM

1. It is desirable for aircraft to be able to check in with one control agency and receive complete instructions and clearances. This however, is not always possible due to unexpected communication failures and delays. The DASC is an air control agency that comes under the direction of the Commanding General, 1st MAW. As such, it is governed in its operations by certain regulations. This agency did however, deviate from its normal procedures with regard to low and slow flying aircraft during Lancaster July. This deviation permitted the handing off of helicopters and O-1's to the Regimental FSCC's for clearance control with regard to savaplanes.
2. There were still instances wherein flights failed to RIO with the DASC. This results in complete inability on the part of the DASC to maintain an account of aircraft under their control. It is recommended that without exception all flights RIO with the controlling DASC. In cases where direct communications is not possible due to terrain etc., reports should be relayed. Additionally the DASC must be informed whenever the posture of the flight changes.

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V ARTILLERY/FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

A. Artillery Support. Fires provided by Direct Support and General Support Artillery were considered to be highly satisfactory. Artillery units were able to support the scheme of maneuver adequately from the positions utilized. No major problems were experienced.

B. Counterbattery and Counter mortar Requirements. Ground units reported incoming artillery on only one occasion. Counterbattery fires were delivered on the suspected hostile artillery position under observation of an aerial observer.

Active enemy mortar positions were successfully engaged by organic mortars and direct support artillery.

The employment of extensive artillery suppression fires (Pre-emptive) during the operation may have contributed significantly to the enemy's failure to employ his artillery to a greater degree. It is again, the case of our not being able to evaluate our efforts through this type of artillery suppression. The fact that the enemy did not shoot more indicates that the plan may have been successful.

C. Fire Support Coordination

1. General. The employment of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft in great numbers, combined with the requirement for extensive artillery fires raised anticipations that the fire support coordination during the Lancaster July Action would be a continuing problem.

In an effort to minimize the coordination problems, several conferences were held with the participating ground units, aerial observers, and helicopter transport units.

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Through these detailed discussions, methods were decided upon which were considered to best alleviate the coordination problems. It is felt that these conferences were extremely beneficial.

2. Air/Artillery. Lancaster July Action showed a marked increase in the successful simultaneous attack of targets by air and artillery. Additionally, with exceptions, check fires were considered to be minimal throughout the operation. Contributing factors were considered to be the detailed coordination effected at regiment and battalion level and the effective control of attack aircraft by the ground units through airborne controllers.

The coordination of artillery and rotary wing aircraft showed a marked improvement over previous operations of this magnitude. The standard doctrine of helicopter approach and retirement lanes and restrictive fire plans was utilized. As agreed upon by the the commanders of the infantry units, artillery units, and helicopter transport units, a plan was developed.

This provided for a continuous and smooth flow of helicopters with relative safety while the artillery units maintained the required support to the maneuver elements.

Additionally, the approach and retirement lanes gave a vital assist to DASC and regimental GLO's in the control of resupply and medevac aircraft.

An overall factor which contributed to air/artillery coordination was the co-location of the Task Force FSCC and DASC. The co-location significantly reduced time delays and enabled the FSCC and DASC to better understand each other's procedures and inherent problems.

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One incident that received previous discussion was related to the close proximity of 3d and 9th Marine units and dubious unit locations in difficult terrain during the initial stages of the operation. This was solved through re-orientation of attack aircraft flight patterns and increased distance between the concerned units.

3. Coordination with the 2d ARVN Regiment. Coordination of artillery fire and air support with the 2d ARVN Regiment produced no problems that warrant discussion.

D. Communications. FSCC communications proved to be unsatisfactory too frequently. This occurred in spite of continued efforts by Task Force Communication personnel.

When total FSCC communication failures occur it is necessary that the regiments be prepared to assume lateral coordination and clearance responsibilities. Additionally, the regiments must have cognizance or control of all aircraft operating in the regiment's zone of action to allow the total coordinating process to continue.

Prior to commencement of the Lancaster July Action, measures were taken to provide the regiments with lateral coordination and clearance authority and control of aircraft operating within the regiments' zone of action.

This system proved to be highly efficient and permitted uninterrupted air and artillery support to the maneuvering units during communications breakdowns at the Task Force level.

K. Lessons Learned

1. In large scale operations, approach and retirement lanes and restrictive fire plans positively reduce coordination problems.

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2. Coordination of artillery and air is enhanced through the co-location of the FACC and DASC.

3. Regiments must have cognizance or control of all aircraft operating in support of the regiment to allow a flexible coordination system.

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VI COMMUNICATIONS

A. SUMMARY

In an effort to apply those communications lessons learned from previous operations, the following three radio nets were established, in addition to normal tactical radio nets.

(1) A Landing Zone Common net was assigned to each of the regiments

(2) A Helicopter Assault Frequency was assigned to each of the regiments.

(3) A Logistical Support area common frequency was assigned to the LSA so that all helicopters knew what frequency to contact the LSA on. The purpose of these (3) nets is to spread out all traffic to helicopters and keep nets uncluttered.

Communications from Vandegrift Combat Base is a challenge due to the terrain that surrounds the base. As a step to correcting the problem of broadcasting out of the valley, a twenty-five (25) pair cable has been installed from the top of Signal Hill, to the main command bunker of the Task Force. On this cable is carried both VHF and UHF radio traffic plus radio relay. Both air and ground portions of the Task Force are currently employing this cable facility.

B. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

1. Problem. It became apparent just prior to the commencement of the Lancaster July Action that the air nets were not as efficient as could be.

Solution. A Task Force Tactical Air Request net was initiated by the Task Force FSOC. Stations on this net were the Task Force FSOC, the 3rd Marines FSOC, and the 9th Marines FSOC.

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This net was used in lieu of the Task Force monitoring the TACP net of each of the regiments.

2. Problem. Due to an unusually high percentage of down time on radio relay, the Task Force Tactical net became overcrowded with various types of traffic which needed to be passed.

Solution. To overcome this overcrowding, additional equipment was obtained by the Task Force, so that in future operations, if for any reason radio relay goes down, or becomes overcrowded, all necessary traffic can be passed on a circuit that parallels the Task Force tactical net. To accomplish this the Task Force will activate both its primary and alternate frequencies on the Task Force tactical net.

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FINAL COMMENTS
CG, TASK FORCE HOTEL

I would like to comment briefly on three topics: fire support coordination, logistics and preparation of LZs and Fire Support Bases.

With respect to fire support coordination, we created a noteworthy problem by using an LZ close to the boundary between the Marine regiments. While I have some dandy alibis that explain how we got ourselves into this difficult situation, I will resist the temptation to make excuses and observe that, having created an awkward fire support coordination situation, we unscrambled our mess rapidly. With this one sour note, the remainder of our fire support coordination was sweet harmony. We maintained this harmony while moving 4.8 million pounds of supplies in 1711 helicopter sorties, while executing 10 battalion-size helicopter assaults while delivering 10,000 tons of bombs and rockets in 781 close air support sorties, and while firing 48,809 rounds of artillery. And all this activity occurred in an area of about five by eleven nautical miles.

Next, logistics: Describing the "July Action" supply operations tells an important but incomplete story of the logistics effort at Vandegrift Combat Base. For while supplies flowed by helicopter to the 3d Marines, 9th Marines, and 2d ARVN Regiment, they also continued to flow -- on a slightly reduced scale -- to the 4th Marines and to the two big firebases at Cates and Shepherd. I make this point to emphasize the capability at Vandegrift of our Logistics Operations Center to manage and our ISA to handle the logistics support of 10 or 11 deployed infantry battalions and associated artillery. The 3d Marine Division has a tremendous asset in Vandegrift Combat Base. We have not seriously strained its capability even when moving over half a million pounds per day.

Finally on preparation of LZs and Fire Support Bases: the "July Action" taught us that, with effort and energy properly focused on a selected location, we can prepare LZs, build FSB's, virtually anywhere. The tougher the terrain, the more vital the systematic application of resources. But we now reject the notion that there are areas too difficult to conquer.

When we commenced our "July Action" planning, our experience with LZ's in the target area ranged from unimpressive to undetectable. Today we claim intimate knowledge of a substantial number (OVERLAY of LZ's and FSB's). Without fanfare, we now can launch combat forces at many points throughout the area.

Our action also reminded the enemy that he has no safe havens and, in destroying many of his bunkers and caches, we complicated his buildup in the area. Most important, perhaps, our pioneering greatly facilitated our return whenever we choose.

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HEADQUARTERS

Task Force Hotel

3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Vandegrift Combat Base

OBJ: Standing Operating Procedures for Task Force Hotel
Logistic Operation Center

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Force Hotel
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Vandegrift Combat Base

T/F/H O PH400.1
DCB/jnk

TASK FORCE HOTEL ORDER PH400.1

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedures for Task Force Hotel
Logistic Operation Center

Encl: (1) Locator Sheet

1. Purpose. To establish procedures which will provide for the timely resupply of units from Vandegrift Combat Base.

2. Background. The Task Force Hotel Logistic Operation Center provides a coordination center where units being resupplied from Vandegrift Combat Base may maintain their logistic Resupply Sections. Facilities for units to install both radio and telephone communications are available. Task Force Hotel G-4 maintains a watch officer in the LOC who has communications available to co-ordinate the activities of unit S-4 representatives, Task Force Hotel Air Officer, Shore Party, LSC, and Division G-4 representatives at Vandegrift Combat Base.

3. Action. Units under the operational control of Task Force Hotel will comply with the instruction contained herein for re-supply from Vandegrift Combat Base.

4. Recommendations. Comments and recommendations for improvement of this SOP are invited.

5. Certification. Reviewed and approved this date.

DISTRIBUTION:

M. C. DALBY

Chief of Staff

RECORD OF CHANGES

Log completed change action as indicated.

<u>Change Number</u>	<u>Date of Change</u>	<u>Date Received</u>	<u>Date Entered</u>	<u>Signature of person Entering change</u>
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LOCATOR SHEET

Subj: Standing Operating Procedures for Task Force Hotel Logistic Operation center.

Location:

(Indicate the location(s) of the copy(ies) of this publication)

Enclosure (1)

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SECTION I

101. GENERAL. Units under the operational control of Task Force Hotel must be prepared to utilize helicopter resupply while engaged in field operations. The Task Force Hotel Logistic Operations Center functions as a co-ordination point for unit logistic representatives, aircraft allocation, supply status and logistic support area capabilities. In order to implement effective helicopter supply, it is essential that each unit have a complete knowledge of the procedures outlined in this SOP.

102. RESPONSIBILITY.

1. It is the responsibility of the unit commander to ensure that requests for routine helicopter resupply are forwarded to the Task Force Hotel G-4 in the LOC by 1600 the day prior to the resupply requirements.

2. The Task Force Hotel G-4 represents the Commanding General in all matters relating to Helicopter resupply. This includes coordination and liaison with the Air Officer, LSU, the Shore Party Company operating the LSA, and unit logistic representatives. The G-4 will advise the Air Officer of lift requirements and recommend the number and types of aircraft to be employed in the following days resupply operations.

SECTION II

201. TASK FORCE HOTEL LOGISTIC OPERATIONS CENTER. The Logistic Operations Center (LOC) is located at the Logistic Support area (LSA) at Vandegrift Combat Base. Task Force Hotel G-4 will maintain a watch officer at the LOC to coordinate the helicopter resupply of units under the operational control of Task Force Hotel.

202. COMMUNICATIONS. Task Force Hotel will maintain a radio net linking the LOC with Vandegrift LASC and the Air Operations Center. An additional radio net with LSA tower, transmitted into the LOC via speaker will enable battalion representatives to advise battalions that aircraft are enroute to their respective LZ's. Trunk lines will be available to LSA and Hotel switch boards (units must provide instruments for lines within the LOC bunker). A "hot line" will be available between the LOC and LSA tower for coordinating instructions.

203. REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION S-4 REPRESENTATIVES. Each regimental and battalion being supplied from Vandegrift LSA must maintain an S-4 representative in the LOC to co-ordinate resupply between the LSA and battalions in the field. Adequate communication between representatives and battalions in the field is mandatory. Each representative must monitor his net in order to ascertain and disseminate the following information:

- (1) LZ condition (Clear, ready to receive aircraft).
- (2) HST on net and correct frequency.
- (3) Correct coordinates, call sign and frequency of LZ HST.
- (4) Notify battalion that supplies are enroute to LZ.

204. PRIORITIES.

1. Priorities will be established and governed by the following:

a. Emergency Resupply: Requires immediate delivery without which the mission can not be accomplished and loss of life would probably result. The request must be approved by the regimental commander, in the case of separate battalions by the battalion commander, or by the regimental commander exercising operational control.

b. Priority resupply: The LOC watch officer will schedule priority resupply as soon as possible consistent with other resupply schedules.

c. Routine resupply: Resupply requests for the next day will be scheduled and dispatched as requested consistent with aircraft availability, emergency and priority requests and weather conditions.

205. REQUESTS.

1. Requests will be submitted to the LOC watch officer no later than 1600 on the day prior to the date of the requested resupply, utilizing the format contained in appendix A, figure 1. The frequencies, call signs and coordinates submitted must be correct to reduce delay in resupply delivery. Frequencies must not exceed 51.90 MHz. Frequencies for air ground communications must be in .1 MHz steps. For example the frequency 56.95 is not compatible with current aircraft radios.

2. Emergency or priority resupply requests may be submitted at any time utilizing the add-on request format contained in appendix A figure 2.

3. When cargo has been staged, netted and slung, unit representatives will submit an illustrated listing of lifts in the format contained in appendix A figure 3.

4. Cancellations will be accepted at anytime. Cargo that has been staged prior to cancellation should be promptly removed from the LSA.

206. STAGING CARGO.

1. Supplies being helicopter lifted from the LSA must be staged in lanes designated by the (Shore Party) Officer in Charge of LSA operations at least four hours prior to scheduled resupply. In the case of lifts scheduled prior to 2200, supplies will be staged in nets and/or cabled before 2200 on the day prior to the scheduled lift. Water cans, containers and supplies returned to the LSA from battalion positions will be removed from the LSA ramp as expeditiously as possible to eliminate the possibility of injury to personnel or damage to aircraft.

2. Units requesting helicopter lifts from positions other than a designated LSA will be responsible for the timely staging, netting and slinging of cargo from such positions.

3. All nets, slings, and cables will be promptly returned to the LSA to insure continuity of operations.

4. CH46 lifts will not exceed 2,400lbs. CH53 lifts will not exceed 8,000lbs.

207. LSA/SHORE PARTY.

1. The Shore Party company commander is responsible for the operation of the LSA.

2. The LSA is divided into pad A and B. Each pad has eight staging lanes which will be assigned to units resupplying from the LSA. The layout of Vandegrift LSA is illustrated in appendix A figure 4.

3. Unit representatives will avoid contacting shore party personnel in the LSA tower. Requests concerning lifts will be submitted to the LOC watch officer.

4. The shore party Landing Zone OIC at the LSA is responsible for inspection of loads in nets and slings and will advise battalion representatives of discrepancies.

208. MONITORING.

1. The LOC will monitor, by radio, operations at the LSA and will forward information to the LSA tower concerning emergency, priority, add-ons or changes in daily scheduled lifts.

2. The G-4 will provide, daily, to the LSA a consolidated schedule of resupply lifts in the format contained in appendix A figure 5.

3. The LOC will maintain a status board displaying the following information:

- a. Aircraft availability
- b. Cargo staged
- c. Cargo netted and/or slung
- d. Lifts completed/lifts remaining

This information will be obtained from the shore party LSA tower radio net monitored in the LOC.

4. The LOC will provide daily to pilots flagged for the resupply mission a sheet showing LZ coordinates, call sign, frequency. This facilitates passing destination information to aircraft without compromise. A sample format is illustrated in appendix A figure 6.

209. INCOMPLETE MISSIONS. Any mission that cannot be completed due to non-availability of aircraft or below minimum flight conditions will be rescheduled by the LOC.

SECTION III

301. GENERAL

1. In planning for helicopter resupply missions, unit commanders should take into consideration the possibility that once the resupply mission commences, the mission may be stopped and the aircraft diverted should a higher precedence emergency arise. In addition, full consideration should be given to the below listed factors.

a. Loss of lift capability during hot weather.

b. Vulnerability of the helicopter to ground fire necessitating secure landing zones and the immediate surrounding area.

c. Possibility of having to wave off a helicopter from the landing zone to preclude its loss to enemy ground fire.

SECTION IV

401. CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT. Unit G-4 sections in the field should determine the logistic requirements and submit them to unit S-4 representatives at LSA Vandegrift Combat Base by 1500 daily. Unit representatives at Vandegrift Combat Base may draw Class I, III, IV and V supplies at LSA Vandegrift Combat Base. Class II must be drawn at Dong Ha and transported to Vandegrift Combat Base by vehicle in convoy. 3d Marine Division G-4 Forward at Vandegrift Combat Base, will assist unit S-4 representatives with motor transport requirements to move supplies from LSA to the LSA.

Shore Party personnel at the LSA will designate staging areas and provide news, airdrop and cables for cargo lifts. Helicopter resupply requests and staging reports are explained in Section II of this SOP and should be submitted to the Task Force Hotel G-4 watch officer at the LSA.

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4-73

Figure 4. Format of resupply request

DATE

UNIT	LOCATION	COORDINATES	CALL SIGN	FREQ	NUMBER OF LIFTS REQUESTED	SCHEDULED TIME FOR LIFTS
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9	9	9	9
10	10	10	10	10	10	10
11	11	11	11	11	11	11
12	12	12	12	12	12	12
13	13	13	13	13	13	13
14	14	14	14	14	14	14
15	15	15	15	15	15	15
16	16	16	16	16	16	16
17	17	17	17	17	17	17
18	18	18	18	18	18	18
19	19	19	19	19	19	19
20	20	20	20	20	20	20
21	21	21	21	21	21	21
22	22	22	22	22	22	22
23	23	23	23	23	23	23
24	24	24	24	24	24	24
25	25	25	25	25	25	25
26	26	26	26	26	26	26
27	27	27	27	27	27	27
28	28	28	28	28	28	28
29	29	29	29	29	29	29
30	30	30	30	30	30	30
31	31	31	31	31	31	31
32	32	32	32	32	32	32
33	33	33	33	33	33	33
34	34	34	34	34	34	34
35	35	35	35	35	35	35
36	36	36	36	36	36	36
37	37	37	37	37	37	37
38	38	38	38	38	38	38
39	39	39	39	39	39	39
40	40	40	40	40	40	40
41	41	41	41	41	41	41
42	42	42	42	42	42	42
43	43	43	43	43	43	43
44	44	44	44	44	44	44
45	45	45	45	45	45	45
46	46	46	46	46	46	46
47	47	47	47	47	47	47
48	48	48	48	48	48	48
49	49	49	49	49	49	49
50	50	50	50	50	50	50
51	51	51	51	51	51	51
52	52	52	52	52	52	52
53	53	53	53	53	53	53
54	54	54	54	54	54	54
55	55	55	55	55	55	55
56	56	56	56	56	56	56
57	57	57	57	57	57	57
58	58	58	58	58	58	58
59	59	59	59	59	59	59
60	60	60	60	60	60	60
61	61	61	61	61	61	61
62	62	62	62	62	62	62
63	63	63	63	63	63	63
64	64	64	64	64	64	64
65	65	65	65	65</		

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Figure 2: Format of Add On/Cancellation request

<u>ADD ON REQUEST</u>		<u>DATE</u>		<u>FREQUENCY</u>	
<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>TIME REQUESTED</u>	<u>TIME READY</u>	<u>TIME LIFTED</u>
<u>ROUTINE</u>	<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>EMERGENCY</u>	<u>REASON FOR REQUEST</u>		

☒ ADD ON REQUEST




FIGURE 4

DATE

<u>TIME</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OUTGOING</u>	<u>RETURN</u>	<u>CHARGE</u>
0700				
0800				
0900				
1000				
1100				
1200				
1300				
1400				
1500				
1600				
1700				

53 LIFTS

Figure 5: Format of daily scheduled lifts

DATE _____

<u>LINE #</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT CALL SIGN</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
---------------	-------------	-----------------------	------------------	--------------------	-----------------

Figure 6: Format of pilots daily LS call sign/frequency information sheet

DRAFTER 323:COL. MUNN:kt
 SEC ABC LIGHT PH 3D MARDIV 323
 CWO

CCN

PRIORITY 071352 Z AUGUST 68

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV DGH
 TO: CG PROV CORPS V PHB
 INFO: CG III MAF DNG
 OTU 70.8.9
 OTG 70.8

//C O N F I D E N T I A L //

SUBJ: ASSIGNMENT OF HEAVY CRUISER NGFS TO DMZ AREA

1. DURING THE PAST WEEK A SHARP INCREASE HAS OCCURRED IN FREQUENCY AND INTENSITY OF ATTACKS BY ARTILLERY FIRE AGAINST THE CUA VIET PORT FACILITIES AND BUEL BLADE POSITIONS IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ. THESE ATTACKS TOGETHER WITH STRONG INDICATIONS OF A MAJOR OFFENSIVE TO BE LAUNCHED FROM THE DMZ AREA, MAKE IT IMPERATIVE THAT A RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE COUNTERBATTERY CAPABILITY BE MAINTAINED IN THE DMZ AREA. ADDITIONALLY, THE FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM TO "OPN THOR" OF DETECTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE NVA ARTILLERY CAPABILITY HAS BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL TO DATE RESULTING IN SEVERAL ARTILLERY WEAPONS DESTROYED AND/OR DAMAGED. HEAVY CALIBER ARTILLERY AND NGF GUNS, HAVE PLAYED A DOMINANT ROLE IN ACHIEVING THIS SUCCESS.

2. THE DEPARTURE OF THE USS BOSTON, FROM THIS AREA ON 4 AUG 68 WITHOUT REPLACEMENT BY A SIMILAR HEAVY CALIBER NAVAL GUN CAPABILITY HAS CREATED A GAP IN THE COUNTERBATTERY POSTURE IN THE DMZ AREA. ALTHOUGH A 5"/54 DESTROYER WAS ASSIGNED AS A REPLACEMENT FOR THE CRUISER, IT DOES NOT POSSESS THE LONGER RANGE AND DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT OF THE HEAVY CALIBER NAVAL GUN.

3. ACCORDINGLY IT IS REQUESTED THAT A CA/CAG BE ASSIGNED AS A NGFS IN SUPPORT OF 3D MARDIV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-4

RELEASED BY

07


17

52

SECRETCHAPTER 172/210
SEC 0-3 PHONE DIV 161

FLASH 157550 2AUG68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV 3D MARINE DIVISION
 TO: CG 4TH MARS 1ST MAR IN
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 THIRD TANK BN

**SHOVE**

CHIEF

G-7 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

//SECRET//
 WARNING ORDER
 PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. SIGNS OF RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE EASTERN DMZ REGION PARTICULARLY NORTH OF CON THIEN, HAVE INCLUDED THE REPEATED SIGHTING OF LOW, SLOW MOVING LIGHTS DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS WHICH COULD WELL EMANATE FROM ENEMY HELICOPTERS OR VTOL AIRCRAFT. THE ENEMY MIGHT WELL BE USING AIRCRAFT TO RESUPPLY FORWARD POSITIONS WITH HIGH PRIORITY CARGO SUCH AS AMMUNITION AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES OR CONDUCTING MED EVACS AFTER OUR TECHNIQUES. OF VITAL INTEREST TO THIS DIVISION IS THE GATHERING OF ON THE SPOT INTELLIGENCE IN THE AREAS IN WHICH FREQUENT SIGHTING OF LIGHTS INDICATE POSSIBLE ENEMY LZ'S. NO LESS IMPORTANT IS THE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORCES, ARTILLERY AND SUPPLIES WHICH MIGHT BE FOUND IN THE AREA.

2. CONCEPT: TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SHOCK ACTION FROM AT LEAST 6 ARC LIGHT STRIKES WITHIN THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE AREA, CENTERED ON YD 1174, A HELICOPTER FORCE OF BATTALION STRENGTH LANDS IMMEDIATELY IN THE VICINITY TO SEARCH OUT PROBABLE ENEMY LANDING SITES AND EVIDENCE OF HELICOPTERS, TO DETERMINE WHAT PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES OR EQUIPMENT ARE LOCATED NEARBY; TO EXPLOIT PLANNED ARC LIGHT STRIKES; TO TAKE PRISONERS IF POSSIBLE AND TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND EQUIPMENT.

FLASH**SECRET**

Aug 68

SECRET

1ST
 4TH MARINES WITH ONE BATTALION MAKES AN EARLY MORNING HELI-
 ASSAULT INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA.

BORNE, EFFECTIVE ON OR AROUND 180000H. ROUND CONTACT GAINED.

3D MARINE DIVISION
 THE PRINCIPAL AREA OF INTEREST IS BETWEEN NS GL 10 AND NS
 GL 15 IN THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE PMDL. SITES AT WHICH AIRBORNE
 LIGHTS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED TO TOUCH DOWN ARE CENTERED ON YD
 1174 IN THE VICINITY OF TRUNG SON. SOUTH BOUNDARY OF 1ST
 MARINES AO FOR THIS OPERATION EW GL 72. COMBAT SUPPORT
 WILL CONSIST OF TRADITIONAL D/S ARTILLERY BATTERIES PLUS
 8" HOWITZERS AT FORWARD POSITIONS TO PROVIDE PRECISION DES-
 TRUCT/COUNTERBATTERY FIRES. AIR PREPARATION WILL CONSIST
 OF UP TO TEN ARC LIGHT STRIKES OR SIXTY FIXED WING STRIKE
 SORTIES. DURING OPERATIONS CONTINUAL AO COVERAGE WILL BE
 PROVIDED MANEUVERING BATTALIONS WITH ADDITIONAL NORMAL AO
 COVERAGE OF ENEMY ARTILLERY POSITIONS NORTH OF THE DMZ.
 FIXED WING SORTIES DURING OPERATION IAW NORMAL PROCEDURES.
 M48 GUN TANKS AVAILABLE FOR LIMITED MOVEMENT TOWARD OBJECTIVE
 AREA AND DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT FROM STATIC POSITIONS.

3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES D-DAY IS 18 AUGUST. DURATION
 OF OPERATION ONE DAY.

B. VR FLIGHTS OVER OBJECTIVE AREA TO BE LIMITED TO
 ABSOLUTE MINIMUM TO PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF INTENTIONS.

C. ARC LIGHT STRIKES ARE BEING REQUESTED AS FOLLOWS:
 H-HOUR SHOULD BE PLANNED ACCORDINGLY IN ORDER TO TAKE AD-
 VANTAGE OF THE SHOCK ACTION. PREFERRED TOT - 180530H TO
 180800H; 1ST ALT - 180001H TO 180600H; 2D ALT - 171700H TO
 172030H FOUR STRIKES. 180530H TO 180800H SIX STRIKES IN
 THE PRIMARY OBJ AREA (YD 5208 YD 5303).

SECRET

PAGES

SECRET

1. ACTION.

~~As 86 IN HOTEL: PASS C/CON 9TH MARINES (-) ONE BAT-~~
~~TALION TO CG THIRD MABD BARRING 27000TH AUG 66.~~

¹⁵⁷
 A. 9TH MARINES: PREPARE PLANS TO EXECUTE HELIBORNE ASSAULT INTO OBJECTIVE AREA TO DETERMINE NATURE ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AREA, ENEMY INTENTIONS, TAKE PRISONERS AND TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND EQUIPMENT.

B. 12TH MARINES: DISPLACE TRADITIONAL D/S BATTERIES TO SUPPORT ^{1.5L} 9TH MARINES OPERATIONS IN DMZ. DISPLACE OR MAINTAIN IN FORWARD POSITIONS AVAILABLE 8" HOWITZERS TO PROVIDE NECESSARY PRECISION DESTRUCTION/COUNTERBATTERY FIRES IN SUPPORT OF ^{2.2L} 9TH MARINES. PRIORITY OF 8" FIRES TO MANEUVERING ^{2.2L} ELEMENTS 9TH MARINES.

C. 3D TANK BN: PROVIDE M48 GUN TANKS SUPPORT TO ^{1ST} 9TH MARINES ON REQUEST FROM VANTAGE POSITIONS WHICH CAN BE REACHED THROUGH TRAFFICABLE TERRAIN.

D. G-3 BRIEFING/PLANNING STAFF AVAILABLE TO ASSIST ^{1.5L} 9TH MARINES IF DESIRED.

GP.4

CCN _____

REL BY

P. D. SeFord

G-3

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

3D MARINE DIVISION

**SHOVE COC**OP CHIEF *[Signature]*G-3 W.O. *[Signature]*G-2 W.O. *[Signature]*DCPO *[Signature]*

APO

ACTION *[Signature]**Kentucky*

VV HVP 243

*****ZZ RUMHVP

Z

DE RUMLBPA 016 230737

ZNY SSSSS

Z O 170735Z AUG 68

FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB

TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF D&G

RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV D&G

INFO RUMLBPR/CTF CLEARWATER CVT

BT

S E C R E T AVII-GCO 05136

SUBJ:RAID

REF:CG3D MAR DIV MSG DTG 161750Z AUG 68(NOTAL) (S)

PART I FOR ALL.

1. (S) CONFIRMING CONVERSATION BETWEEN CG III MAF AND CG XXIV CORPS AT 171440H AUG 68, PLAN OUTLINED IN PARA 4, REF MSG, IS APPROVED.

PART II FOR CG III MAF

2. (S) REQUEST OPCON OF BLT 2/203E PASSED IMMEDIATELY TO CG 3D MAR DIV TO RELIEVE 2/1 MARINES IN NAPOLEON/SALINE AO.

3. (C) REQUEST DIRLAUTH BETWEEN CTG 76.4/79.4 AND CG 3D MAR DIV.

PART III FOR CG 3D MAR DIV.

4. (S) CONFIRMING FONECON BETWEEN COL GORDON, XXIV CORPS, AND LTC OWENS, 3D MAR DIV, AT 171450H AUG 68, PROCEED WITH PLAN OUTLINED

170735Z AUG

A-G-8

2/COC

PAGE TWO RUMLBPA 016S E C R E T

IN PARAG, REF MSG

P-1

BT

SECRET

170735Z Aug 68

CONFIDENTIAL

3D MARINE DIVISION

Kentucky

FM 191815Z AUGUST 63
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSEM/XXIV CORPS COC
PASS TO CG XXIV CORPS

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DMZ OPN UPDATE

AT 0855H B/1/1 W/ USMC AND USA TANK UNITS
MOVED INTO PSN AT HILL 56 YD 141732
IN ORDER TO SUP THE OPN OF
2/1 IN A HELO ASSAULT INTO THE
2DMZ TO CONFIRM A DENY THE PESSURE OF
EN HELO ACT Y THERE AT . ARCLIGHTS
WERE DELIVERED IN SUP OF OPN
W/" BEING DELIVERED ON 18 AUG
AND 5 ON 19 AUG. THE LAST ACRLIGHT WAS
DELIVERED 190322H AND 2/1 LIFTED INTO THE
INSERTION LZ'S AT 0904. WITH THE TOTAL
LIFT BEING COMPLETD AT 0917. A TOTAL
OF 20 CH-46 AIRCRAFT WERE USED TO CONDUCT
THE TOOP LIFT. INITIAL LIFTS RECD AW
FIRE SOUTH OF DMZ AT 0910H
2/1 CONSOLIDATED INPSN AT INIITAL
LZ AND PREPARED TO JUMP OF TO SEIZE
THREE SITS OF OBJ. TWO HVQ WERE
SPTD W/PACKS BUT NO WPNS. TEY
WEE TAKEN UNDER FIRE AND KILLED AS THE
SAME TIME 10 PARTIALLY DESTD BUNKER
WERE LOC. SUBSEQ ONE CASE 140MM RKTS WERE DISCOV

THE OVERHEAD COVERED BY 2° OF DIRT.
FM 0945H TO 1115H B/1/1 AND THE MAIN
ELEM IN THE 56 AREA WERE SUBJECTED
TO CONTINUOUS LIGHT CONTACT 360 DEGREES AROUND
THEIR LOC. CONCUNENTLY AT 1022H AN AO
SPTD ANESTM 40 NVA WEST OF THE
INSERTION LZ. AIR STRIKES WERE CONDUCTED
ON THESE TGS.

AT 1135H B/1/1 STD TO RECD ARTY
AND MORT FIRE SUSTAINING 1 KIA DD 10
WIA FIVE OF WHOM WERE EVAC. AT 1140
2/1 COMMENCED MVT TO THEIR OBJ

AT 1730H AN F4 CONDUCTING CAS MSNS WAS HIT BY AA FIRE FM 172738 AND C
CRASHED AT 108729 PILOT AND CREW RECD SAFELY.
DURING THE PERIOD OMVT THRUUGHT

THE SERIOES OF OBJ 2/1 UNCOUNTED NO
EN OPNS AND SECURED EACH
SERIES OF OBJ IN SUCESSION.

AT 1900H 2/1 INDICATE FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT
CHANGES IN THE GENERAL AREA
OF 108729 AND 108729 TO THE WEST AND
WEST.

191815Z AUG 63

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3D MARINE DIVISION

CO'S AND A COMMAND GRP WERE HELD
LIFTED INTO L'S IN THE 0970 GRID SQ
IN AN ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF ANY EN ATTEMPT
TO LEAVE THE AREA OF SIGHTINGS. AT 1630 2/9
RECD 7 RND'S OF 75MM PAKC HOW
W/NEG CAS

AT 1740H 2/1 COMMENCED EXTRA ACTION
OPNS AND AT THIS TIME INITIAL FOR CH-46'S
INTO LZ RECD HITS FM CLAYMORE MINES
AND 82MM MORT RND'S RIGGED AS MINES. ONE
CH46 WAS DEST'D THE OTHER ATTACKS INITIALLY
DAMAGED MANAGED TO EXTRACT FM THE LZ.
THREWERE 3 CREWMEMERS AND 1

MARINE INFANTRY MAN KILLED AS THE CRASH SITE,
AND 2 PILOTS WOUNDED. W/ NVA

KIA CNF DURING CONTACTS IN THE LZ AREA.

EXTRACTION OPNS CONT UNTIL

CAS G AND H WERE LIFTED OUT TO A-4.

AS THAT TIME EXTRA ACTION OPNS LIMITED
DUE TO FADING LIGHT. COS E AND F AND THE
CMG RRP 2/1 HAVE CONSOLIDATED

IN THE VIC OF LX 3 EXTRACTION D143753
FOR THE NIGHT TO MOVE OUT FM THE DMZ BY

FOOT MARCH AT FIRST LIGHT 20 AUG.

INITIAL DEBRIEF OF UNITS EXTRACTED

RECD THAT EXTENSIVE FRONT DAMAGE WAS

OBS IN RELATION TO TERRAIN WITH NO OBSERVABLE

KBA DUE TO ARCLIGHTS AN ACTIONALLY REPORT INDICATE

THAT THERE ARE MANY POTENTIAL LZ SITES THROUGHOUT

THE ARE BUT NO EVIDENCE OF CURRENT OR

PAST USE BY AIRCRAFT.

THE FOLL RECAPITULATION OF

CAS REFLECTS LATEST SPO REPORT

INFO AND DEBRIEF OF PARTICIPATING

FM ALL UNIT COMMANDERS AND REFLECT ONLY.

THE DMZ OPN AND SUP FORCES.

NR: 5 KIA, 13 W/ MED, 11 WIA MINOR

ENEMY

23 KIA.

ORDNANCE CAPTURED

10SE 140MM RKTS

UPON COMPLETION OF EXTRACTION OPNS ON 20 AUG

AND COM DEBRIEF OF UNIT COMMANDERS AND

BN COMMANDER AND COMPLETE FINAL UPDATE

WILL BE SUBMITTED.

GP-4

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETDRAFTER 3/JAD/ST
SEA G-3 PHONE RM 180

20/PP 200800 30 AUG 68 DIVISION

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
 INFO: THIRD MARDIV

//SECRET//

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WESTERN KENTUCKY AO

1. CONCEPT: 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONDUCTS A HELICOPTER-
 BORNE AND MECHANIZED ATTACK INTO WESTERN KENTUCKY AO WITH
 ONE INFANTRY BN AND ONE MECHANIZED BN SUPPORTED BY TANKS TO
 SEEK OUT AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIP-
 MENT; TO TAKE PRISONERS; AND TO GAIN INTELLIGENCE OF ENEMY
 DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH.

2. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. SUBMIT DETAILED PLAN FOR CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN
 WESTERN KENTUCKY AO BY 2 SEP 1968.

B. PLAN FOR RELIEF OF FORCES TO BE COMMITTED, BY MARINE
 UNITS.


C. OPERATION TO BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD 5 TO 10
 SEPTEMBER. EXPECTED DURATION THREE DAYS.

D. LANDING ZONES IN OBJ AREA:

(1) LZ LARK	058677
(2) LZ WREN	062663
(3) LZ FLORIDA	067655
(4) LZ SPARROW	050648

E. DIVISION OBJECTIVES: CHARLIE
 FOXTROT
 OSCAR
 BRAVO

058666
 047635
 043646 (HILL 208)
 GC 0263-0264 (NVA BASE
 (CAMP))



PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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3D MARINE DIVISION

F. SUBMIT HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS FOR TROOPLIFT
AND RESUPPLY FOR THREE DAY OPERATION AND HELICOPTER EX.
TRACTION.

copy
G. LIMIT VR TO MINIMUM REQUIRED FOR LZ SELECTION, TO
AVOID TELEGRAPHING OPERATION.

H. MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS.

GP-4.

CCN 3345

REL BY *G. M. Ayer***SECRET**

SECRET



3D MARINE DIVISION

71-1007-10 2360 2 AUG 68

PLANT CC LINDEN HARBOR
RICE WIND MARSHIV
M SO-ICRAVO
LARGE CC RIE MAT
CC XEE COMPS
CC IMAN
CC POLMOGORD
CC FIRST AIR DIV DIV

0-869-975

OPERATION ORDER 87-61 (SPARROW HAWK)

RE: VIETNAM, AND SERIES L7014, SHEETS 6342 I, II, III,
6342 I, II, III AND IV 1:50,000

1. 20 MARCH 1961

20 MERIDIAN GEO 2000.2 (COI)

U.S. OPERATIONS FORCES CURRENTLY ASSIGNED:

4-73509

A. TAXAL FORCES, CURRENT INTSUNS AND PERINTREPS.

F. STURDY POINTS.

(U) ARVN GOES VS VIETNAM CONDUCTS COMBAT OPERATIONS

IN BORDERLINE POSITION OF ICTZ IN CONJUNCTION WITH
 2. COSEPI AND OTHER INMAP.

(2) 10TH AF PROVIDES TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, TACTICAL AIRLIFT AND PSYOPS IN IOTZ.

(1) 1ST MAW PROVIDES AIR CONTROL, AIRFIELD OPERATIONS
FACILITIES, FLYED AND ROTARY WING SUPPORT.

23 10 30 x 446

A-3 (12 copies)

Recd.

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(4) 1ST AGD CONTINUES OPERATIONS IN AO ADJACENT TO
3D MARDIV.

3D MARINE DIVISION

(5) 1ST ARVN DIV CONDUCTS COMBINED/COORDINATED
OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH 3D MARDIV AND
OTHER FVMAF.

(6) FLC (FLSQ-BRavo) PROVIDES SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE
SUPPORT FOR MARINE UNITS..

(7) 26TH GEN SUPT GROUP USA PROVIDES SUPPLY AND
MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR ATTACHED USA UNITS.

(8) 1ST MAW MAINTAINS FOUR OH-46 (OR SUFFICIENT A/C
TO MAKE A SIMULTANEOUS LEFT OF THE FORCES LISTED
IN PARAGRAPH 3.D.(7) BELOW AND TWO UH-1E (ARMED)
AS ALERT AIRCRAFT FOR SUPPORT OF THE SPARROW HAWK
FORCE.

2. MISSION

3D MARINE DIVISION MAINTAINS REINFORCED RIFLE PLATOONS
(SPARROW HAWK) AT DESIGNATED COMBAT BASES OR AO'S, ON 30
MINUTE ALERT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS AND ON 1 HOUR STANDEY
DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS, PREPARED FOR IMMEDIATE
DEPLOYMENT BY HELICOPTER IN ORDER TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY
ENEMY FORCES, PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DESIGNATED INSTALLATIONS
OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT, OR REINFORCE UNITS IN CONTACT OR
THREATENED BY ENEMY FORCES.

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1. EXECUTION

3D MARINE DIVISION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. THE SPARROW HAWK PROVIDES AN IMMEDIATE REACTION FORCE OF A REINFORCED PLATOON CAPABLE OF LANDING BY HELICOPTER TO EXPLOIT CONTACTS WITH ENEMY FORCES, TO REINFORCE UNITS IN CONTACT WITH OR THREATENED BY ENEMY FORCES OR TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR KEY INSTALLATIONS OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT.

B. NAPOLEON/SALINE, KENTUCKY, LANCASTER AND SCOTLAND AO COMMANDERS:

(1) MAINTAIN ONE REINFORCED RIFLE PLATOON ON 30 MINUTE ALERT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS AND ON 1 HOUR STANDBY DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS. PARA 3.D.(§) (SPARROW HAWK PROOP LIST.)

(2) UPON COMMITMENT OF THE SPARROW HAWK FORCE, IMMEDIATELY RECONSTITUTE THE SPARROW HAWK.

(3) MAINTAIN TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE FOR IMMEDIATE MOVEMENT OF SPARROW HAWK TO THE HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE.

C. NOTICE TRANSPORT BATTALION.

(1) PROVIDE THREE TRUCKS, 2 1/2 T, 6X6, WHEN REQUIRED, TO EACH INFANTRY REGIMENT AND DESIGNATED INFANTRY BATTALION, IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO MOVE THE SPARROW HAWK TO THE HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE.

(2) ON ORDER, PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TRANSPORTATION TO MOVE FORCES.

SECRET

SECRETD. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) SPARROW HAWK IS DESIGNATED AS A DESIGNATED RIFLE
 3D MARINE DIVISION
 PLATOON REINFORCED CAPABLE OF RESPONDING ON
 SHORT NOTICE TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES,
 PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DESIGNATED INSTALLATIONS
 OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT, OR REINFORCE UNITS IN CONFLICT
 OR THREATENED BY ENEMY FORCES. IT WILL BE
 COMPOSED OF THE FOLLOWING:
- (A) ONE FULL STRENGTH RIFLE PLATOON.
 - (B) ONE MACHINE GUN SQUAD.
 - (C) ONE ARTILLERY FO TEAM.
 - (D) ONE FAC TEAM.
 - (E) ONE ENGINEER TEAM, WITH DEMOLITION CAPABILITY,
 WHEN AVAILABLE.
 - (F) THE FORCE WILL CONSIST OF AT LEAST 50 AND
 NOT MORE THAN 60 MEN.
- (2) THIS ORDER IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT AND SUPERSEDES
 3D MAR DIV OPC 2-67.
- (3) THE SENIOR OFFICER PRESENT IN THE 3D MAR DIV COC
 WILL IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF A REQUEST FOR
 SPARROW HAWK TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION IN THE
 SEQUENCE SHOWN:
- (A) ORDER THE HELICOPTERS IN SUPPORT OF SPARROW
 HAWK TO BE LAUNCHED.
 - (B) NOTIFY THE A/C OF S, G-3 OR HIS ASSISTANT
 WHO WILL OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR COMMITMENT FROM

SECRET

SECRET

THE COMMANDING GENERAL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE,
 THE DIRECTOR, 3D MARINE DIVISION, WILL
 BE MADE BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, OR THE A/C OF
 H, G-3 IN THAT ORDER.

- (C) ALERT TROOP UNIT OF SPARROW HAWK AND PROVIDE
 THOSE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION AS
 AVAILABLE FOR EXECUTING SPARROW HAWK
 OPERATION.
- (D) PASS TO MAC-39 AND 1ST MAJ THROUGH DABO4
 - (1) TROOP UNIT DESIGNATED AND NUMBER OF
 PERSONNEL TO BE HELICOPTER LIFTED.
 - (2) GRID COORDINATES AND LZ RADIO FREQUENCY
 PICK UP.
 - (3) ESTIMATE OF TIME TROOPS WILL BE READY.
- (4) THE TYPICAL ELEMENTS OF SPARROW HAWK WILL BE
 COMMANDED BY AN OFFICER.
- (5) THE SPARROW HAWK UNIT COMMANDER WILL BE BRIEFED
 BY THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. PRIOR TO
 LAUNCH THE SPARROW HAWK COMMANDER WILL BRIEF
 THE HELICOPTER FLIGHT LEADER AT A SITE DESIGNATED
 BY THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. THE BRIEFING
 WILL INCLUDE:
 - (A) LANDING ZONE COORDINATES AND DESCRIPTION OF
 LANDING ZONE IF AVAILABLE.
 - (B) ESTIMATES OF LANDING ZONE WEATHER AT HRL.

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(C) ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENT FOR:

- 3D MARINE DIVISION
- (1) LANDING ZONE PREP.
 - (2) GUNSHIP ESCORT.
 - (3) FIXED WING SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.
 1. CAS (DAY/NIGHT).
 2. FLARE SHIP SUPPORT.
 3. SPOOKY/SUPER SPOOKY REQUIREMENT.

(D) RECOMMENDATIONS ON HELO APPROACH AND RETIREMENT ROUTE.

(6) IN THE EVENT THAT THE SPARROW HAWK BACK UP FORCE IS ALSO LAUNCHED, IT WILL CONSIST OF:

- (A) ~~ONE FULL STRENGTH~~ ^{TWO} RIFLE PLATOONS.
- (B) ~~ONE~~ MACHINE GUN SQUAD *AS REQUIRED*
- (C) A CONTROL GROUP CONSISTING OF A COMPANY HEADQUARTERS (-).
- (D) IF THIS FORCE DOES NOT UTILIZE ALL AVAILABLE HELICOPTER LIFT CAPABILITY, THE COMPANY COMMANDER MAY INCLUDE SUCH REINFORCING ELEMENTS, EQUIPMENT AND/OR SUPPLIES AS HE DEEMS APPROPRIATE UP TO THE FULL HELICOPTER LIFT CAPABILITY.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SEE REFERENCE (B).

SECRET

SECRET5. **COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS**

3D MARINE DIVISION

A. **COMMUNICATIONS.**

- (1) REFERENCE (C).
- (2) PRIOR TO LAUNCHING, THE SPARROW HAWK COMMANDER AND THE HELICOPTER FLIGHT LEADER WILL BE BRIEFED ON FREQUENCIES AND CALL SIGNS TO BE GUARDED ENROUTE TO AND AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA, AS WELL AS THE CALL SIGNS OF ALL UNITS IN THE AO.
- (3) WHEN OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF A RECONNAISSANCE TEAM, THE SPARROW HAWK FORCE WILL UTILIZE THE RECONNAISSANCE UNIT PRIMARY NET.

B. **COMMAND.**

- (1) THE SPARROW HAWK COMMANDER WILL BE DESIGNATED BY THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. THE SPARROW HAWK COMMANDER OR THE SUPPORTED UNIT COMMANDER, WHICHEVER IS SENIOR, WILL ASSUME OVERALL COMMAND IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA.
- (2) WHEN EMPLOYMENT OF SPARROW HAWK IS APPROVED, THE FORCE WILL BE CONTROLLED AND SUPPORTED BY THE COMMANDER OF THE AO IN WHICH IT IS COMMITTED. THE AO COMMANDER IS AUTHORIZED TO TERMINATE THE EMPLOYMENT UPON COMPLETION OF THE MISSION OR AT HIS DISCRETION.

GP-4

CON 1758

REL BY

S. D. Sanford

SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL



DE DIV AND NR 130

3D MARINE DIVISION

//////////////////FLASH HANDLE AS FAST AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE//////////////////

Kentucky

ZZ UUNSEA UUNSEM
DE UUMHVP 232C 2331715
ZNY CCCCC
XXIV CORPS -T- III MAF COC
*****ZZZZZ 251715Z AUG 68
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUNSEM/XXIV CORPS
INFO UUNSEA/III MAF COC
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UPDATE ON LEATHERNECK SQUARE OPNS - 251630H - 252420H AUG 68.
WITH THE LIFT OF 1/3 INTO AN LZ JUST SOUTH OF A-3 AT 1800H,
THE MAJOR UNIT'S WERE IN PLACE FORMING A CORDON AROUND
THE ENEMY UNIT CENTERED ON YD 190695. 1/3 MOVED SOUTH TO POSIT
VIC YD 162710 TO YD 187100. C/1/1 REMAINED ON THE N E CORNER OF
CORDON VIC 195693. BACKED UP BY ONE RIFLE COMPANY OF THE 2ND
ARVN REGT.

ON THE EAST THE 3RD BN 9TH MARINES ALONG ALZ BLOCKS ENEMY LOCATIONS
TO HWY 1 AND THE SAND DUNES BACKED UP ARVN POSITIONS AT C-1.
TO THE SOUTH OF THE ENEMY ARE A/1/1, A/1/61 (RECH), A/1/77
ARMOR AND D/1/1 WHICH WAS THE INITIAL EXPLOITATION FORCE ENTERED
ON THE EVENING OF THE 24TH. THE 1ST OF THE 5TH UNIT
STRETCH ALONG THE SOUTH AND PARTIALLY UP THE WEST
OF THE TRAP ALONG THE 16 GRID LINE WHERE B/1/1 WHICH
MOVED RAPIDLY OVERLAND THIS MORNING FROM NIGHT POSITIONS, FORMED
THE WESTERN ANCHOR. ARTY FIRED ARE PLOTTED TO FILL AREAS NOT
PHYSICALLY COVERED BY TROOPS.

UNTIL MIDNIGHT THE ENEMY HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT
TO BREAK THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN BLOCKING FORCES WAS STILLED BY
MORTS AND ARTY FIRING BY THE MARINES AND THE ARVN UNITS.
NO ADDITIONAL CAS HAVE BEEN LISTED SINCE MY 251630H AUG 68.
GP-4

BT

NRND

251715Z Aug 68
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SECRET

DRAFTED 3/1/68

SEC 083

PHONE

DIV 104

CWO

IMMEDIATE 260300 240068



30 MARINE DIVISION

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
CG XXIV CORPS
CG III MAF
FIRST MARDIV
THIRD MARDIV

RECEIVED
26 AUG 68

11/11/68

MOVEMENT OF FIRST MARINES TO DANANG

A. CG III MAF 200016Z AUG 68

B. CG THIRD MARDIV 231202Z AUG 68

1. REF A⁷ PRESCRIBES⁷ PHASING OF 1ST MARINES FROM THIRD MARDIV

DIV AO TO DANANG, REF B IS THE THIRD MARDIV'S RE-DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF REF A.

2. REF B SCHEDULED THE RE-DEPLOYMENT OF HQ 1ST MARINES ON 26 AUGUST AND THE MOVEMENT OF 1/1 TO BEGIN FROM QUANG TRI AIRFIELD 270800H. CHANGE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE NAPOLEON/SALINE AND KENTUCKY AO'S FROM 1ST MARINES TO 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) WAS SCHEDULED FOR 261200H.

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT ENEMY CONTACT BEGAN LATE AFTERNOON 24 AUGUST WHEN A RECON TEAM REQUESTED SPARROW HAWK INSERTION IN THE LEATHERNECK SQUARE AREA VIC YD 182682.

THIS INITIAL CONTACT INCREASED IN INTENSITY ON THE MORNING OF 25 AUGUST. BY PM 25 AUGUST FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE 10 KIA, 60 WIA, AND 3 HELICOPTERS DOWNED. AT THIS TIME THREE BATTALIONS 1/1, 1/3, AND 3/9(-) ARE CLOSING A CORDON AROUND THE ENEMY FORCES, EST TO BE OF AT LEAST BN STRENGTH. FORCE IS

SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) AND AN ARVN UNIT. 1/1 IS TOTALLY COMMITTED AND THE FIRST MARINES ARE CONTROLLING THE OPERATION.

SHOVE CUC

CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

Kentucky

260 **SECRET** Aug 68

SECRET

3D MARINE DIVISION

PRIMA FURE EXTRACTIO

OF 1/1 AND THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS WOULD JEOPARDIZE
THE POTENTIAL SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION.

DEPARTURE
1. IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT THE

OF 1/1 AND THE 1ST MARINES HQS BE DELAYED

OP 1 271300HAUG.
GP-1

CON

1966

REL BY

J. N. Seabed

G-3

STAND 4

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

30 MARINE DIVISION

**SHOVE COC**OP CHIEF *[Signature]*G-3 W.O. *[Signature]*G-2 W.O. *[Signature]*DCPO *[Signature]*DRAFTER *[Signature]*

SEC G-3

CWO

PHONE DEP COC 180

ACTIONIMMEDIATE 26 23 Z AUG 68

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: FIRST MARINES
 INFO: FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV MECH
 CG XXIV CORPS
 CG III MAF
 THIRD MARDIV
 (MINUS ACTION ADDRES)

1 copy Nap Sal
1 copy Kentucky

//SECRET//

AO RESPONSIBILITY

1. EFFECTIVE 261200N CG THIRD MARDIV RELIEVES FIRST
 MARINES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR NAPOLTON/SALINE AND
 KENTUCKY AO'S AND AT SAME DTG ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY
 TO FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH).

GP-4

CCN 1980RELEASED BY *[Signature]*

G-3

4/2/COC *[Signature]*

26 0530Z Aug 68

SECRET*79*

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3P/JEN/rml
26 Aug 68

From: Commanding General
To: Third Marine Division

Subj: Infantry Company Operations in Northern Quang Tri
Province

Ref: (a) CG 3d MarDiv 220525Z May 68 (Continuity file)

1. Background.

a. The mobile posture of the 3d Marine Division has resulted in sustained pressure on enemy forces, has fragmented enemy units of significant size, and may have influenced the enemy to avoid concentrating large units within reach of the Division's combat power. Therefore, enemy forces remaining within the Division AO present suitable targets for company size operations providing instructions disseminated by reference (a) are followed and these operations are executed with aggressiveness and imagination.

b. The size of the Division AO relative to the forces available preclude the density of coverage desired if all operations are battalion size or larger. Numerous coordinated infantry company operations will increase coverage to an acceptable level. Thereby denying the enemy sanctuary anywhere in the AO that can be reached by company patrols working under the protection of supporting arms. These patrols will also discourage him from developing extensive logistic bases and resupply caches close to his areas of operation.

Any tactic which denies the enemy sanctuary-physical or psychological for rest, resupply and security, will enhance the effectiveness of future operations by the Division.

2. Policy.

a. Regimental and battalion commanders will orient their thinking and staff planning toward infantry company operations to find and fix enemy forces within their AO's. Even though an operation is planned at the battalion level, it need not necessarily be executed by the battalion as a single unit. Companies should be given specific objectives within a portion of the battalion AO and encouraged and permitted to operate independently within established guidelines.

b. Night operations by company sized forces will be emphasized.

c. Company operations will be supported by all available supporting arms. Plans will include provisions for immediate reinforcement when a significant contact is made.

d. Ground surveillance will be supplemented by aerial, sensor, and other surveillance means to locate and evaluate targets for company operations.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. Infantry companies will conduct extensive patrols to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary within the Division AO, and to find and fix his forces for destruction by supporting arms and reinforcing elements.

b. Infantry Regiment will:

(1) Develop and implement plans which allow the battalions to utilize company patrol operations in their area of operations.

(2) Provide for rehabilitation of the battalions during the monsoon season.

(3) Designate reaction forces prepared to exploit, by fire and maneuver, contact developed by company operations.

c. Infantry Battalion: Develop and implement plans for company patrol operations in areas of operation. These plans should provide for;

(1) Operation of two or more companies with an mutual supporting reinforcing distances of each other.

(2) Immediate reaction plans that reflect the current terrain and weather. Operation plans developed for response in the Leatherneck square area are not going to be meaningful during the monsoon in the Da Krong Valley.

(3) Assignment of operating areas oriented to terrain rather than to grid lines, and offering two or more prospective company patrol bases to allow for frequent shifts to new bases.

(4) The immediate commitment of reinforcing and supporting forces to fix and annihilate the enemy when found.

(5) The use of all available intelligence gathering agencies and equipment to select areas suitable for company operations.

(6) Regular rotation of companies from the field during the monsoon season.

(7) Alternate fire support plans not dependent upon CAS when weather restricts or prohibits fixed wing or helo support.

(8) Reinforcement of companies with 81mm Mort and 106mm RR when logistically and physically feasible.

d. Rifle Companies. Listed below are tactics that have proven successful for companies in the past. This list is not all inclusive. Since the majority of contacts in the Division AO involve NVA forces, there tactics are oriented toward these forces.

(1) Patrol Bases.

(a) Patrol bases should be selected to provide for:

1. Optimum support of patrols by weapons organic/attached to or in support of the company.
2. Minimum avenues of approach for enemy forces.
3. Minimum areas masked to friendly supporting fires.

specific (b) Patrol bases should be approached and occupied as unobtrusively as possible; if company travels by helo, initial in the LZ the Co should clear the LZ quickly, keep will dispersed, and move to the base by preplanned routes. If the company travels by foot, base should be occupied during reduced visibility whenever possible.

(c) Troops must dig in and defensive ^cfor~~e~~s must be registered immediately upon occupation of the patrol base. Leaders must be alert to prevent personnel from taking time out to eat or rest until the position is developed for protection of personnel.

(d) Adequate positions ~~can~~ be prepared quickly if each Marine carries 15-20 empty sandbags to the base camp.

(e) Indiscriminate booby trapping avenues of approach will not normally be effective, as this tactic tends to cause more casualties among subsequent friendly patrols than among the NVA. Taut-wire trip flares can, however, be highly effective.

(f) The NVA will seldom give advance warning of attack, and will usually attack at night. Indicators are registration of mortars during daylight hours and the approach of sappers after dark. Enemy operating near the patrol base should be taken under fire by indirect fire weapon, preferably by those not physically located with the company. Direct fire weapons should be employed only to repel assaults or to engage hard targets where time or the enemy's proximity will not allow use of indirect fire weapons.

(g) Companies should shift patrol bases frequently and preferably during periods of reduced visibility to avoid attacks by fire.

(2) Patrols.

(a) Patrols must have the capability to call for and adjust supporting fires, both artillery and air.

(b) Scout dogs and/or Kit Carson Scouts should be utilized whenever available.

(c) Patrols should be assigned limited objectives, and should remain within supporting/reinforcing distances of the patrol base. A detailed search of a small area travelling cross-country is usually both safer and more productive than a cursory search of a large area. Use of trails and natural avenues of approach should be avoided whenever possible.

(d) The emplacement of taut-wire trip flares by patrols along avenues of approach remote from or not observable by personnel manning night positions at the patrol base will enhance the security of the base by impeding or giving early warning of enemy approach. These flares can also serve to trigger "remote" ambushes; e.g. a command detonated claymore mine covering the trip flare, or a trip flare emplaced at a pre-registered 106mm rifle impact point.

(3) Movement to contact.

(a) Companies and platoons should move in two or more mutually supporting columns. Well travelled trails should be avoided, especially in draws, unless the force using them is preceded by an alert advance party.

(b) As the company or platoon advances, supporting arms should be registered at frequent intervals, normally 500 meters in front of and on the flanks of the patrol. Marking rounds are useful as navigation rounds.

(c) When maneuvering toward a suspected enemy position, an approach from the upwind side will allow effective use of RCA and smoke.

(d) Small groups (2-5) of NVA observed fleeing in advance of a maneuvering unit normally should not be physically pursued, as NVA forces frequently used this tactic to lure small units into the killing zones of ambushes. Pursuit by accurate, well aimed small arms fire will accomplish desired results.

(e) Reconnaissance by fire should be employed whenever the presence of the enemy is suspected.

(4) Contact.

(a) Companies, platoons will conduct operations to find and fix the enemy, but will not close with or physically assault heavily defended, fixed positions prior to detailed preparation fire of the objective.

(b) When contact is made all available means, fire support and blocking forces, will be brought to bear to fix the enemy and seal off avenues of escape.

(c) The unit commander will make an immediate estimate of the enemy force and inform the next higher echelon as to location, size and disposition of the enemy. This information will be used to introduce additional cordon forces and alert appropriate additional supporting arms agencies.

(d) Selective insertion of mobile forces into defensible terrain that disrupts enemy movement often causes the enemy to attack. If the position is properly prepared and supporting arms fully exploited, this becomes the most desirable type.

(e) Units should be ready to mark friendly and enemy positions just prior to arrival of close air support. Means available include front line panels, colored smoke and white phosphorus projectiles.

(f) When the location and extent of the enemy position is established and the cordon is in position, the initial assault of a fixed position will be accomplished by a massive, coordinated application of appropriate supporting arms. Helo gunships should be employed against enemy personnel in the open; however, these gunships have little effect on bunkers. Unnecessary use of helo gunships invariably result in an unacceptable cessation of artillery fires.

(g) Upon completion of the assault by fire, infantry units will follow up with a methodical search and destroy operation with the objectives of destroying/capturing enemy positions, material and personnel.

(h) Indications of an enemy capability to offer a determined defense will be justification for repetition of an assault by fire.

(5) Logistics.

(a) Medevac/emergency resupply landing zones should be established so as to provide cover from enemy fire for helicopters as well as providing for minimum interference with supporting arms fire. Supporting artillery and fixed wing resupply helicopters are in the area. Provisions should be made to fix the enemy with organic weapons M-79's, LAAWS, 106mm recoilless rifles, automatic weapons until artillery fire is resumed.

(b) Alternate methods of supply and resupply, and transport of troops must be planned when weather prohibits use of helicopters. Otters and armored personnel carriers (APC) have been used with excellent success. Prior planning will insure availability of these items.

(c) To support the mobile company a detailed and coordinated logistical support plan must be worked into a normal daily resupply effort. Each company operating from the battalion will have to be specific in the amount and item needed. To transport these supplies of limited amount, the H-34 or another of the smaller helicopters can be used for resupply when available. The distribution point will in most cases be at the battalion operating base. The prime consideration in this logistic effort has to be to give the company what it needs, where it needs, and at the time it needs it.

R.G. DAVIS

Major General
U.S. Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION: "A"
Copy to; Task Force Hotel (3)

DECLASSIFIED

10A/HMO/tjb
3000
10 August 1968

From: Communication-Electronics Officer
To: Commanding General (ATTN: G-3 Admin)

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

Ref: (a) CG ltr 3/WAK/slp over 3000 dtd 5Aug68.

1. In accordance with reference (a) a Negative Report is submitted on the subject.



LAURENCE H. WOODS

DECLASSIFIED

Action Brief

Problem: Discussion comments per Commanding General's note.

Discussion: For each of the question marks on the mat there is a general discussion on the enclosed paper. The exceptions to this is the question marks for para 3. d. (3) (c) page 5. and 3.d. (4) (I)page 6. Both of these subparagraph have been changed to clarify the meaning.

Recommendations: That the suggested answers be reviewed for comments.

J. E. MEAD

MAJOR USMC

- Para. 3.b.(2) "Provide for rehabilitation of battalions..."
Change this sentence to read "Provide assistance as necessary for rehabilitation of the battalions during the monsoon season."
- Para 3.c.(1) "Operations of two or more companies within mutually supporting/reinforcing distance..." The point here is to have the companies patrol their assigned areas so that if necessary a company could be reinforced by another company within a short period of time.
- Para. 3.c.(6) "Regular rotation of companies from the field during the monsoon." This is in effect what is being done presently. The emphasis here is to ensure that the rotation occurs with some degree of prior planning.
- *Para. 3.d.(2) (c) Add new paragraph.
- Para. 3.d.(3) (a) "Companies and platoons should move in two or more mutually supporting columns. ..." Too many times companies have a tendency to move overland by a single trail with little, if any, flank security. Unless a word of caution is given the advance party and measures taken to keep them alert on trails disaster can readily take over a tactical column.
- Para. 3.d.(3) (c) Change para to read
"When maneuvering toward a suspected enemy position an approach down wind towards the enemy will allow effective use of RCA and smoke.
- Para. 3.d.(4) (f) Change the last two sentences to read
"Helo gunships should be employed against enemy personnel in the open. Tanks and direct fire support weapons should be employed against bunkers and dugged in positions. A proper balance between all supporting arms will permit continuous fire support without an unacceptable cessation of fire.
- *Para. 3.d.(2) (c) "Use of trails and nature avenues of approach should be avoided whenever possible." The enemy recognizes that it is only human nature to take the easiest route. Thus he is most likely to set his booby traps, ambushes and fields of fire along trails and natural avenues of approach.

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Force Hotel
Vandegrift Combat Base

Plans
3/RLJ/tas

3000

22 August 1968

From: Commanding General, Task Force Hotel
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Attn G-3)

Subj: Infantry Company Tactics

Ref: (a) CG 3rd MarDiv ltr 3/WAK/glp over 3000 of 5 August 1968.

1. In response to ref (a), the following comments are submitted for your consideration. These comments reflect opinions of officers who have had experience in the field working under this concept.

a. Para 1 (b). Patrol bases should be occupied at dusk or at night. If a unit remains in a patrol base during the day it should be moved in the evening even if it is only 300 meters.

b. Para 1 (c). LP's should be placed well forward of a selected position prior to digging in. This provides security while the company is working. When registering night defensive fires, attempt to fire additional artillery in the general area so positions will not be disclosed.

c. Para 1 (d). It is not advisable to carry sand bags to the field. Troops have enough to carry and added weight should be food or ammunition. Lives are saved by digging in, not constructing on top of the ground.

d. Para 1 (f). If the NVA is going to make a concerted attack on a position he will normally prep the area with mortars/rockets/artillery. He follows right behind the prep with his ground attack.

e. Para 2 (d). When employing claymores with trip flares, they must be kept under observation and fire. The NVA is very adept in disarming or rotating the claymores. It is very doubtful that 106 RR will be employed in this concept. They restrict movement of the infantry as they are normally mounted on mules. They are very hard to manpack.

f. 3 (d). To pursue small groups of NVA, a good technique is to fire mortars and/or artillery into the nearest tree lines or about 100-500 meters down a trail. If the NVA is attempting to lead a unit into an ambush it is normally located in these areas.

g. 5 (a). Sufficient supplies should be carried for three (3) days except in emergencies. Time is wasted by daily resupply and positions or movement are given away by daily resupply.

2. A variety of terrain faces units in 3rd MarDiv. These principles should act as a guideline but certain freedoms should be granted to the Battalion Commanders so he can make decisions based on terrain and situation.

W. Donovan
W. DONOVAN

By direction

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HEADQUARTERS

4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FIF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/RWA/clp
3100
21 Aug 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: G-3 Admin)

Subj: Infantry Company Operations


Ref: (a) CG 3dMarDiv ltr 3/WAK/elp over 3000 of 5Aug68

1. Reference (a) requested recommendations and comments concerning the Infantry Company Operations Draft. In addition to the comments contained herein, each Battalion of the Fourth Marines will reply separately.
2. This Regiment has maintained a mobile posture in the Scotland II AO since June and has employed many of the principles outlined in the Draft. Third Battalion, Fourth Marines has almost continuously maintained three Company Operating Bases on a mobile, frequently displacing, rotating basis. Second Battalion, Fourth Marines has established company bases on key terrain throughout the area of primary interest. First Battalion, Fourth Marines made excellent use of the concept during the CANTON I and CANTON II actions.
3. The Draft as written is generally satisfactory. The following constructive comments are offered:
 - a. Para 1(b). Companies can not operate "anywhere in the AO". The fan of existing artillery has created areas of primary interest where the majority of COB's are established. To operate "anywhere in the AO" requires additional FSB's and operations of Battalion size and larger. ✓
 - b. Para 2(c) and Para 3(b)(1)(a). Reinforcement plans and optimum distances between companies demand more amplification than "immediate" and "mutual supporting". Terrain, weather, mode of transportation available, reserve forces designated, and many other factors influence reinforcement plans. Reinforcement in Leatherneck Square in the summer and in the Dakrong Valley in the monsoon, are quite different issues.
 - c. Para 3(c)(1)(c). Leaders must expedite development of the defensive position. Food and rest may help rather than retard this effort. ✓
 - d. Para 3(c)(4)(b). Blocking forces are of questionable value in canopy and rugged terrain. Maximum use of supporting arms to seal avenues of escape is an especially sound tactic. Selective insertion of mobile forces into defensible terrain that disrupts enemy movement often causes the enemy to attack. If the position is properly prepared and supporting arms fully exploited, this becomes the most desirable type contact to inflict maximum losses on the enemy. However, to push against a block is often a futile waste of two ✓

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forces. Hammer and anvil tactics have proven generally non-productive.

4. It is also recommended that the tone of the Policy Paper be slightly modified to allow the Battalion Commander to retain the prerogative of choice in employment of his companies. The present paragraph 3(b) is not consistent with the policy as stated in 2(a).


R. W. AUSTIN
By direction

HEADQUARTERS
9th Marines
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3/RDW:jjm
3000
18 Aug 68

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Rein), FMF
(Attn: G-3)
Subj: Infantry Company Operations

Ref: (a) CG, Third Mar Div Draft of Proposed Policy Paper,
Infantry Company Operations in Northern Quang
Tri Province.

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following comments
are submitted.

a. General

(1) The policy paper relates primarily to the coastal
plain/marginal piedmont area. This type of activity can
be conducted in jungle/mountainous type terrain but with
different problems. It is considered these differences should
be addressed.

b. Execution

(1) Paragraph 3 of Ref (a) is directive in nature
while this paper is designed as policy/guide document.

(2) Paragraph 3 of Ref (a) excludes the Infantry
battalion and should exclude Regiment as well. The paper
should not task.

c. Patrol bases

(1) The paper continuously stresses the need for
foot mobility and rapid movement while speaking about the
various uses for the 106mm recoilless rifle. These points
are inconsistent.

(2) Patrol bases must provide clear fields of fire
with good visibility a minimum of hand grenade range from the
proposed defensive positions.

(3) Close proximity to good water supply - minimize
resupply problems.

3000
18 Aug 68

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

(4) Do not receive resupply or medevac aircraft in an LZ within the defensive perimeter. The securing of an LZ outside the perimeter is more difficult but when located within the range of NVA artillery the deception is worth the extra security effort.

(5) Select a difficult area for an enemy FO to pinpoint and adjust fire. i.e. an area surrounded by trees which prevent an FO from observing the impact of his rounds.

(6) Maximum utilization of claymores. Carry at least one per fire team. One trip flare per man. One 60mm round per man. One machete per man.

(7) Maximum utilization of starlight scopes.

(8) Mandatory practice of good noise and light discipline.

d. Patrols

(1) Patrols use regimental snipers to maximum.

(2) Scout dogs are effective only when walking point.

(3) Where possible don't burden the patrol leader with an inflexible time schedule. Patience, a virtue of the enemy, must be practiced.

(4) Drop off units during patrol. Good employment for Regimental snipers or insert method for reconnaissance teams.

(5) Utilize Task Organized Killer Team patrols to find and fix enemy. Company should be able to field two such patrols and then react when contact established. Suggested TO. 14 men

1. Team ldr (Lt/SSgt)
2. Radio Op
3. FO (Arty or 81)
4. Radio Op
5. TACP Op

6. MG Team (2 men)
7. Fire Team (4 men)
8. Snipers (2 men)
9. Corpsman

e. Movement to Contact

(1) Be careful not to allow your prep fires to indicate the intended patrol route. Use preps not on programmed route to vary pattern.

(2) When utilizing WP in determining unit location don't develop pattern of shooting your next objective. Shoot to the flanks and resect for patrols exact location.

(3) Never turn down an AO. He is invaluable in guiding your movement and alerting you to the enemies location and maneuvers.

3000
18 Aug 68


Subj: Infantry Company Operations

f. Contact

(1) During the assault by fire phase ensure good coverage of the enemies flanks and rear to prevent his disengaging or reinforcing.

(2) Enemy along the DMZ has frequently during heavy contacts immediately attempted to flank the Marine unit. Protect your flanks with artillery or gunships.

(3) Company commanders must keep battalion informed; however, battalion must shoulder the load of developing the formal reports during the period of contact.


J.B. KNOTTS
By direction

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/KEF/rew
3000
18 Aug 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Reinf) FMF

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

Ref: (a) CG, 3d Mar Div ltr 3/WAK/glp, 3000 of 5 Aug 1968.

1. The following comments are submitted concerning enclosure (1) to reference (a).

a. Recommend that the title be changed from "Infantry Company Operations" to "Rifle Company Operations".

b. Change para 3b to 3c, "Infantry Battalion."

c. Add as a new para 3b:

"3b Infantry Regiment

(1) Develop and implement plans which allow the battalions to utilize company patrol operations in their area of operations. ✓

(2) Provide for rehabilitation of the battalions during the monsoon season.

(3) Designate reaction forces prepared to exploit, by fire and maneuver, contact developed by company operations."

d. Add para 5c as follows:

"The use of 5-day Long Range Rations (LRR) would greatly reduce the need for helicopter resupply. During the monsoon season there is normally sufficient water available to make the use of LRR practicable. Sufficient stocks should be obtained to support the many rifle company operations. With an adequate natural water supply, the use of LRR would significantly reduce the amount and frequency of resupply required by helicopter." *disregard.*

R. L. Michael Jr.
R. L. MICHAEL JR.

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
HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 4th Marines
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/CWM/rkj
3000
17 August 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Infantry Company Operations
Ref: (a) CG, 3d MarDiv ltr 3/WAK/glp over 3000 dated 5
August 1968

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following comment
is submitted:

- (a) Carrying 20 sandbags per man was found to be highly
advantageous in that it was sufficient to construct
an efficient fighting hole rather than provide just
minimum cover.


F. L. BOURNE, JR.

Copy to: 4th Marines

*2 Sept
CO Ops file*

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HEADQUARTERS
11th Engineer Battalion
3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/RM/gmj
3100
17 Aug 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF, FPO San
Francisco 96602 (AOefs G-3 Admin)

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

Ref: (a) CG, 3rd MarDiv Ltr 3/WAK/gly over 3000 of 5 Aug 1968.

1. Reference (a) outlines the proposed policy for the employment of Infantry Companies within the Division's AO, and requests comments to include recommended additions or deletions.

2. The policy set forth in reference (a) outlines aggressive offensive action based on sound tactical decisions. The implementation of company size operations should deny the enemy vital staging and rest centers that he now inhabits. Continuous widespread small unit operations will keep the enemy off balance and on the defensive. This command is in full support of the implementation of the proposed policies and recommends no changes or deletions.

V. A. Perry
V. A. PERRY

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/JCM/jks
3000

AUG 15 1968

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

Ref: (a) CG, 3dMarDiv ltr 3/WAK/glp over 3000 of 5 Aug 1968; Same subj
(b) MCO P5215.1C

Encl: (1) Listing of Administrative Errors

1. Reference (a) has been reviewed and appears to contain information and guidance which is relatively permanent in nature insofar as this Division is concerned. Reference (b) specifically provides that written communications of a directive nature shall be published as an Order or Bulletin in The Marine Corps Directives System and it is therefore recommended that reference (b) be redrafted as a Division Order.

2. Reference (a) contains numerous clerical and administrative errors which should be corrected prior to promulgation as a Division Order. Enclosure (1) lists such errors.

L. R. Daze
L. R. DAZE

DECLASSIFIED

Listing of Administrative Errors

1. Page 1, on the "From:" line, delete "3d Marine Division". ✓
2. Page 1, reference line, enter "(a)" between "Ref:" and "CG". ✓
3. Page 2, paragraph 3a, the sentence "Infantry companies..... reinforcing elements." should be moved up 2 lines. The format of paragraph 3c is correct and should be followed in paragraph 3a. ✓
4. Page 2, paragraph 3a, line 3, de-struc-tion, incorrect hyphenation. ✓
5. Page 2, paragraph 3b and 3b(1) should be combined. Further paragraph (a) thru (g) will become (1) thru (7) respectively. ✓
6. Page 5, paragraph 3c(4)(g), line 2, repetition is misspelled. ✓
7. Signature Section. Since this is a policy paper it should be signed by the Commanding General as "By direction" is not authorized for matters of policy. ✓
8. Spaces are missing between the following words:
Paragraph 3b(1)(c), line 2, annihilate the
Paragraph 3c(3)(d), line 1, NVA observed.
9. Distribution "C" gives each battalion 1 copy yet the subject is Infantry Company Operation. Recommend Distribution be changed to "A".

ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco 96602


48/EWB/jaw
3000
15 Aug 1968

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Admin)

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

Ref: (a) CG 3d Mar Div ltr 3/WAK/glp over 3000 of
5 Aug 1968

1. In accordance with the request contained in reference (a), a negative report is hereby submitted.


J. H. GRIFFITH

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DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
9th Motor Transport Battalion
3d Marine Division (Rein) FIF
APO San Francisco 96602

DL:lw
3000
13 Aug 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Attn G-3 admin)

Subj: Infantry Company operations

Ref: (a) 3d MarDiv ltr 3/4K/rlp 3000 of 3 Aug 68

1. In compliance with reference (a), a negative report is submitted.


T. PASKEWICH
By direction

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Engineer Battalion
3d Marine Division (REIN) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/LEM/jcs
11 August 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (REIN) FMF (ATTN: G-3 Admin)
Subj: Infantry Company Operation

Ref: (a) CG 3d MarDiv ltr 3/WAK/glp over 3000 dtd 5 Aug 1968

1. In accordance with reference (a), a negative report is submitted.

L. E. Miller
L. E. MILLER
By direction

1st Mar
3d Mar ✓
4th Mar ✓
9th Mar
12th Mar
1st AMTrac
3d TK
3d Eng ✓
11th Eng ✓
3d MT
9th MT ✓
3d SP
3d Med
3d Rcn
HQ Bn

G-1 ✓
G-2
G-4 ✓
CEO ✓
Compt ✓

Neg
Replies

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

4/WFG/vc
3000
11 AUG 1968

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Admin)

Subj: Infantry Company Operations (Logistics Paragraph)

Ref: (a) CG ltr 3/WAK/glp over 3000 dtd 5Aug68 Subj: Infantry Company Operations

1. In accordance with ref (a) the following recommendation is made.
2. Change paragraph 3.c.(5) to read as follows:

"(5) Logistics.

(a) The present concept of operations will require the company commander to be more detailed and specific when requesting resupply. In most cases, resupply will be by helicopter. Battalions will be responsible for overall supervision of the company resupply, i.e., drawing supplies from the supply point and staging them by company at the appropriate sling out point.

(b) Prior planning and timely requests will eliminate most logistics problems. In their request for resupply a unit will provide for the recovery of nets, slings, and water cans so as to facilitate effective future resupply.

(c) Alternate methods of resupply medevac and transportation of troops must be planned contingent upon weather conditions. In the past when weather prevented the use of helicopters, Otters were used with excellent results. Prior planning will insure the availability of such items.

(d) Company commanders should be aware of the composition and the availability of the 'OnCall Airdrop Packages' listed in Annex Q, Appendix 7 to LOI 1-67. These packages are available on six (6) hour notice, should no other resupply method be available.

[This annex equipment have been stuffed.]

[Signature]
EDWARD E. CAMPORINI
By direction

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

1792
1/18/68
3/WAK/glp
3000
5 Aug 1968

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
To: Distribution List

Subj: Infantry Company Operations

Encl: (1) Draft of Proposed Policy Paper, Infantry Company
Operations in Northern Quang Tri Province

1. Enclosure (1) is being routed for review and comment prior to publication as a Division Policy Paper.
2. Addressees are requested to forward comments to include recommended additions and deletions to G-3 (Admin) by 20 August 1968.
3. Negative reports are requested.

P. D. Lafond
P. D. LAFOND
By direction

DISTRIBUTIONS: "C"
Copy to: Task Force Hotel (3)

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/WAK/jar
4 Aug 1968

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
To: 3d Marine Division

Subj: Infantry Company Operations in northern Quang Tri
Province (Draft)

Ref: CG 3d MarDiv 220525Z May 68 (Continuity file)

1. Background.

a. The mobile posture of the 3d Marine Division has resulted in sustained pressure on enemy forces, has fragmented enemy units of significant size, and may have influenced the enemy to avoid concentrating large units within reach of the Division's combat power. Therefore, enemy forces remaining within the Division AO present suitable targets for company size operations providing instructions disseminated by reference (a) are followed and these operations are executed with aggressiveness and imagination.

b. The size of the Division AO relative to the forces available preclude the density of coverage desired if all operations are battalion size or larger. Numerous coordinated infantry company operations will increase coverage to an acceptable level and thereby deny the enemy sanctuary anywhere in the AO, as well as discouraging him from developing extensive logistic bases and resupply caches close to his areas of operation. Any tactic which denies the enemy sanctuary-physical or psychological-for rest, resupply and security, will enhance the effectiveness of future operations by the Division.

2. Policy.

a. Regimental and battalion commanders will orient their thinking and staff planning toward infantry company operations to find and fix enemy forces within their AO's. Even though an operation is planned at the battalion level, it need not necessarily be executed by the battalion as a single unit. Companies should be given specific objectives within a portion of the battalion AO and encouraged and permitted to operate independently within established guidelines.

b. Night operations by company sized forces will be emphasized.

ENCLOSURE (1)

c. Company operations will be supported by all available supporting arms. Plans will include provisions for immediate reinforcement when a significant contact is made.

d. Ground surveillance will be supplemented by aerial, sensor, and other surveillance means to locate and evaluate targets for company operations.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations.

Infantry companies will conduct extensive patrols to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary within the Division AO, and to find and fix his forces for destruction by supporting arms and reinforcing elements.

b. Infantry Regiments.

(1) Develop and implement plans for company patrol operations in areas of operation. These plans should provide for:

(a) Operation of two or more companies within mutual supporting/reinforcing distance of each other.

(b) Assignment of operating areas oriented to terrain rather than to grid lines, and offering two or more prospective company patrol bases to allow for frequent shifts to new bases.

(c) The immediate commitment of reinforcing and supporting forces to fix and annihilate the enemy when found.

(d) The use of all available intelligence gathering agencies and equipment to select areas suitable for company operations.

(e) Regular rotation of companies from the field during the monsoon season.

(f) Alternate fire support plans not dependent upon CAS when weather restricts or prohibits fixed wing or helo support.

(g) Reinforcement of companies with 81mm Mort and 106mm RR when logistically feasible.

c. Rifle Companies. Listed below are tactics that have proven successful for companies in the past. The list is not all inclusive. Since the majority of contacts in the Division AO involve NVA forces, these tactics are oriented toward these forces.

(1) Patrol Bases.

(a) Patrol bases should be selected to provide for:

1. Optimum support of patrols by weapons organic/attached to or in support of the company.

2. Minimum avenues of approach for enemy forces.

3. Minimum areas masked to friendly supporting fires.

(b) Patrol bases should be approached and occupied as unobtrusively as possible; if company travels by helo, initial LZ should be some distance from patrol base. On touchdowns in the LZ the Co should clear the LZ quickly, keep well dispersed, and move to the base by preplanned routes. If the company travels by foot, base should be occupied during reduced visibility whenever possible.

(c) Troops must dig in and defensive fires must be registered immediately upon occupation of the patrol base. Leaders must be alert to prevent personnel from taking time out to eat or rest until the position is developed for protection of personnel.

(d) Adequate positions can be prepared more quickly if each Marine carries 5-10 empty sandbags to the base camp.

(e) Indiscriminate booby trapping avenues of approach will not normally be effective, as this tactic tends to cause more casualties among subsequent friendly patrols than among the NVA. Taut-wire trip flares can, however, be highly effective.

(f) The NVA will seldom give advance warning of attack, and will usually attack at night. Indicators are registration of mortars during daylight hours and the approach of sappers after dark. Enemy operating near the patrol base should be taken under fire by indirect fire weapon, preferably by those not physically located with the company. Direct fire weapons should be employed only to repel assaults or to engage hard targets where time or the enemy's proximity will not allow use of indirect fire weapons.

(g) Companies should shift patrol bases frequently and preferably during periods of reduced visibility to avoid attacks by fire.

(2) Patrols.

(a) Patrols must have the capability to call for and adjust supporting fires, both artillery and air.

(b) Scout dogs and/or Kit Carson Scouts should be utilized whenever available.

(c) Patrols should be assigned limited objectives, and should remain within supporting/reinforcing distance of the patrol base. A detailed search of a small area travelling cross-country is usually both safer and more productive than a cursory search of a large area. Use of trails and natural avenues of approach should be avoided whenever possible.

(d) The emplacement of taut-wire trip flares by patrols along avenues of approach remote from or not observable by personnel manning night positions at the patrol base will enhance the security of the base by impeding or giving early warning of enemy approach. These flares can also serve to trigger "remote" ambushes; e.g. a command detonated claymore mine covering the trip flare, or a trip flare emplaced at a pre-registered 106mm rifle impact point.

(3) Movement to contact.

(a) Companies and platoons should move in two or more mutually supporting columns. Well travelled trails should be avoided, especially in draws, unless the force using them is preceded by an alert advance party.

(b) As the company or platoon advances, supporting arms should be registered at frequent intervals, normally 500 meters in front of and on the flanks of the patrol. Marking rounds are useful as navigation rounds.

(c) When maneuvering toward a suspected enemy position, an approach from the upwind side will allow effective use of RCA and smoke.

(d) Small groups (2-5) of NVA observed fleeing in advance of a maneuvering unit normally should not be physically pursued, as NVA forces frequently use this tactic to lure small units into the killing zones or ambushes. Pursuit by accurate, well aimed small arms fire will accomplish desired results.

(e) Reconnaissance by fire should be employed whenever the presence of the enemy is suspected.

(4) Contact.

(a) Companies/platoons will conduct operations to find and fix the enemy, but will not close with or physically assault heavily defended, fixed positions prior to detailed preparation of the objective.

(b) When contact is made all available means, fire support and blocking forces, will be brought to bear to fix the enemy and seal off all avenues of escape.

(c) The unit commander will make an immediate estimate of the enemy force and inform the next higher echelon as to location, size and disposition of the enemy. This information will be used to introduce additional cordon forces and alert appropriate additional supporting arms agencies.

(d) Units should be ready to mark friendly and enemy positions just prior to arrival of close air support. Means available include front line panels, colored smoke and white phosphorus projectiles.

(e) When the location and extent of the enemy position is established and the cordon is in position, the initial assault of a fixed position will be accomplished by a massive, coordinated application of appropriate supporting arms. Helo gunships should be employed against enemy personnel in the open; however these gunships have little effect in bunkers. Unnecessary use of helo gunships invariably result in an unacceptable cessation of artillery fires.

(f) Upon completion of the assault by fire, infantry units will follow up with a methodical search and destroy operation with the objectives of destroying/capturing enemy positions and material and personnel.

(g) Indications of an enemy capability to offer a determined defense will be justification for repetition of an assault by fire.

(5) Logistics.

(a) Medevac/emergency resupply landing zones should be established so as to provide cover from enemy fire for helicopters as well as providing for minimum interference with supporting arms fire. Supporting artillery and fixed wing aircraft will normally be masked and restricted while medevac/resupply helicopters are in the area. Provisions should be made to fix the enemy with organic weapons - M-79's, LAWS, 106mm recoilless rifles, automatic weapons until artillery fire is resumed.


(b) Alternate methods of supply and resupply, and transport of troops must be planned when weather prohibits use of helicopters. Otters and armored personnel carriers (APC) have been used with excellent success. Prior planning will insure availability of these items.

P. D. LAFOND
By direction

DISTRIBUTION: "C"
Copy to: Task Force Hotel (3)



HEADQUARTERS
3D MARINE DIVISION FMF



COMMANDING GENERAL'S MEMO

FOR AC/S, G-3

20 July 1968

SUBJ: Company Operations

1. As I recall, we had some general paper published about company level operations. In my field visits I find that battalion level operations mentality still exists in most instances.
2. Please design for publication a Division Policy paper which will further direct attention to company size operations.
3. Check out a draft with the Regimental Commanders prior to publication.

R. G. Davis
R. G. DAVIS

*Co Opns
File*

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WZ
JMK
24 Jul 1968

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
To: Operations Officer
Plans Officer
Fire Support Coordinator

1. This Section has been tasked to prepare a Policy Paper designated to direct commanders attention to company size operations.
2. A draft is enclosed for your comments to include recommended additions, deletions and change in format. The formalized Division level draft will be routed to regimental commanders for review before publication.

W. A. Kluckman
W. A. KLUCKMAN
By direction

Joe/Buc
Any Comments

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From: Commanding General
To: Third Marine Division

Subj: Company Size Operations

Ref: (a) CG 3d MarDiv 220525Z May68

1. Background.

a. The ^{Division's} mobile posture and sustained pressure on enemy forces have fragmented known enemy units of significant size, and may have influenced the enemy to not concentrate large units within reach of the Division's capability. It follows then, that enemy forces remaining within the Division A0 present suitable targets for company size operations provided instructions disseminated by reference (a) are followed and expanded with imagination and aggressive execution.

b. Geographic parameters of the Division A0 and forces available preclude the density of coverage desired if all operations conducted are battalion size and larger. Numerous, coordinated company size operations will, however, increase the degree of coverage to an acceptable level and thereby deny the enemy a sanctuary anywhere within the Division A0. In turn, the enemy may be less prone to develop extensive logistic bases and resupply caches in close proximity to his area of operations. Any action which denies the enemy a sanctuary for rest, resupply, security - ^{PHYSICAL} ~~physical~~ and ^{psychological} ~~psychological~~ - will enhance the effectiveness of future operations by the Division.

2. Policy

a. Regimental and battalion commanders will orient their thinking and staff planning to seek out and maximize opportunities for company size operations within their AO's.

Particular emphasis should be given to designation of company objectives for attack immediately after touch down in an LZ during tactical movements. This will foster rapid movement out of an area invariably subjected to enemy mortar and rockets attack.

b. Maximum intelligence efforts and employment of target acquisition devices to include radar, night and daytime observation devices and sensors will be exercised to locate and evaluate targets appropriate for company operations.

c. Night operations and small unit command, logistics and tactical responsibilities will be emphasized.

d. Company level operations will be supported by all available supporting arms. Planning will include provisions for immediate reinforcement when a significant contact is made.

3. Execution.

a. Companies will conduct patrols and operations to find and fix enemy forces, but will not close with and physically assault heavily defended fixed positions prior to preparation by supporting arms.

b. Once an enemy position is located, the enemy will be fixed, cordon operations will be commenced immediately, and

additional forces and supporting arms will be committed as expeditiously as possible to reinforce the cordon effort.

c. When the cordon is in position the initial assault of a fixed enemy position will be accomplished by a massive, coordinated application of all available supporting arms.

d. Upon completion of the assault by fire, infantry units will follow up with a methodical search and destroy operation to finalize destruction/capture of enemy positions material and personnel.

MATE-

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3P/JEM/glp

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27 Aug 1968

28 Aug 1968

From: Commanding General
To: ~~Third Marine Division~~ *DISTRIBUTION LIST*

Subj: Infantry Company Operations in northern Quang Tri Province

Ref: (a) CG 3d MarDiv msg 220525Z May68 (Continuity file)

1. Background.

a. The mobile posture of the 3d Marine Division has resulted in sustained pressure on enemy forces ^{IT} has fragmented enemy units of significant size, and may have influenced the enemy to avoid concentrating large units within reach of the Division's combat power. Therefore, enemy forces remaining within the Division AO present suitable targets for company size operations, ^{provided the} ~~providing~~ instructions disseminated by reference (a) are followed, ^{that} ~~and~~ these operations are executed with aggressiveness and imagination.

b. The size of the Division AO, relative to the forces available, precludes the density of coverage desired if all operations ^{were to be} ~~are~~ battalion size or larger. ^{However,} ~~Numerous~~, coordinated infantry company operations will increase coverage to an acceptable level and will deny the enemy sanctuary ~~anywhere in the AO that can be reached by company patrols operating under the protection of supporting arms.~~ ^{operating} These patrols will also discourage him from developing extensive logistic bases and

resupply caches close to his areas of operation. Any tactic which denies the enemy sanctuary-physical or psychological-for rest, resupply and security, will enhance the effectiveness of future operations by the Division.

2. Policy.

a. Regimental and battalion commanders will orient their thinking and staff planning toward infantry company operations to find and fix enemy forces within their AO's. Even though an operation is planned at the battalion level, it need not necessarily be executed by the battalion as a single unit. Companies should be given specific objectives within a portion of the battalion AO and ^{PERMITTED} ~~encouraged~~ and ^{ENCOURAGED} ~~permitted~~ to operate independently within established guidelines.

b. Night operations by company sized forces will be emphasized.

c. Company operations will be supported by all available supporting arms. Plans will include provisions for immediate reinforcement when a significant contact is made.

d. Ground surveillance will be supplemented by aerial, sensor, and other surveillance means to locate and evaluate targets for company operations.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. Infantry companies will conduct extensive patrols to deny the enemy freedom of movement and sanctuary within the Division AO, and to find and fix his forces for destruction by supporting arms and

reinforcing elements.

b. Infantry Regiments and 1st Bde will:

(1) Develop and implement plans which allow the battalions to use company patrol operations in their area of operations.

(2) Provide for rehabilitation of the battalions during the monsoon season.

(3) Designate reaction forces prepared to exploit, by fire and maneuver, contact developed by company operations.

c. Infantry Battalion⁵ Develop and implement plans for company patrol operations. These plans should provide for:

(1) Operations of two or more companies within mutually supporting/reinforcing distance of each other.

(2) Immediate reaction plans that reflect the current terrain and weather. (Operation plans developed for response in the Leatherneck Square area ^{will} are not ~~going to~~ be meaningful during the monsoon in the Da Krong Valley)

(3) Assignment of operating areas oriented to terrain rather than to grid lines, and offering two or more prospective company patrol bases to allow for frequent shifts to new bases.

(4) The immediate commitment of reinforcing and supporting forces to fix and annihilate the enemy when found.

(5) The use of all available intelligence gathering agencies and equipment to select areas suitable for company operations.

(6) Regular rotation of companies from the field during the monsoon season.

(7) Alternate fire support plans, not dependent upon CAS, when weather restricts or prohibits fixed wing or helo support.

(8) Reinforcement of companies with 81mm mortars and 106mm RR's when logistically and physically feasible.

d. Rifle Companies. Listed below are tactics that have proven successful for companies in the past. This list is not all inclusive. Since the majority of contacts in the Division AO involve NVA forces, these tactics are oriented toward those forces.

(1) Patrol Bases.

(a) Patrol bases should be selected to provide for:

1. Optimum support of patrols by weapons organic, attached to, or in support of the company.

2. Minimum avenues of approach for enemy forces.

3. Minimum areas masked to friendly supporting fires.

(b) Patrol bases should be approached and occupied as unobtrusively as possible; if company travels by helo, initial LZ should be some distance from patrol base. On touchdowns in the LZ the Co^{company} should clear the LZ quickly, ^{Remain} keep well dispersed, and move to the base by preplanned routes. If the company travels by foot, bases should be

occupied during ^{periods of} reduced visibility whenever possible.

(c) Troops must dig in and defensive fires must be registered immediately upon occupation of the patrol base. Leaders must be alert to prevent personnel from taking time out to eat or rest until the position is developed for protection of personnel.

(d) Adequate positions can be prepared quickly if each Marine carries 15-20 empty sandbags to the base camp.

(e) Indiscriminate booby trapping ^{of} avenues of approach will not normally be effective, as this tactic tends to cause more casualties among subsequent friendly patrols than among the NVA. Taut-wire trip flares can, however, be highly effective.

(f) The NVA will seldom give advance warning of attack and will usually attack at night. Indicators are registration of mortars during daylight hours and the approach of sappers after dark. Enemy operating near the patrol base should be taken under fire by indirect fire weapons, ^{preferably} ~~preferably~~ by those not physically located with the company. Direct fire weapons should be employed only to repel assaults or to engage hard targets where time or the enemy's proximity will not allow use of indirect fire weapons.

(g) Companies should shift patrol bases frequently and ^{preferably} ~~preferably~~ during periods of reduced visibility to avoid attacks by fire.

(2) Patrols.

(a) Patrols must have the capability to call for and adjust supporting fires, both artillery and air.

(b) Scout dogs and/or Kit Carson Scouts should be used whenever available.

(c) Patrols should be assigned limited objectives, and should remain within supporting/reinforcing distances of the patrol base. A detailed search of a small area travelling cross-country is usually both safer and more productive than a cursory search of a large area. Use of trails and natural avenues of approach should be avoided whenever possible.

(d) The emplacement of taut-wire trip flares by patrols along avenues of approach remote from or not observable by personnel manning night positions at the patrol base will enhance the security of the base by impeding or giving early warning of enemy approach. These flares can also serve to trigger "remote" ambushes; e.g. a command detonated claymore mine covering the trip flare, or a trip detonated claymore mine covering the trip flare, or a trip flare emplaced at a pre-registered 106mm rifle impact point.

(3) Movement to contact.

(a) Companies and platoons should move in two or more mutually supporting columns. Well travelled trails should be avoided, especially in draws, unless the force using them is preceded by an alert advance party.

(b) As the company or platoon advances, supporting arms should be registered at frequent intervals, normally 500 meters in front of and on the flanks of the patrol. Marking rounds are useful as navigation rounds.

(c) When maneuvering toward a suspected enemy position, an approach from the up wind side will allow effective use of RCA and smoke.

(d) Small groups (2-5) of NVA observed fleeing in advance of a maneuvering unit normally should not be physically pursued, as NVA forces frequently used this tactic to lure small units into the killing zones of ambushes. Pursuit by accurate, well aimed small arms fire will accomplish desired results.

(e) Reconnaissance by fire should be employed whenever the presence of the enemy is suspected.

(4) Contact.

(a) Companies ^{and} platoons will conduct operations to find and fix the enemy, but will not close with or physically assault heavily defended, fixed positions prior to detailed preparatory fires on the objective.

(b) When contact is made all available means, fire support and blocking forces, will be brought to bear to fix the enemy and seal off avenues of escape.

(c) The unit commander will make an immediate estimate of the enemy force and inform the next higher echelon as to location, size and disposition of the enemy. This information will be used to introduce additional cordon

forces and alert appropriate additional supporting arms agencies.

(d) Selective insertion of mobile forces into defensive terrain that disrupts enemy movement often causes the enemy to attack. If the position is properly prepared and supporting arms fully exploited, this becomes the most desirable type. *contact that the enemy attacking a*
was unexpected location, possibly in front

(e) Units should be ready to mark friendly and enemy positions just prior to arrival of close air support. Means available include front line panels, colored smoke and white phosphorus projectiles.

(f) When the location and extent of the enemy position is established and the cordon is in position, the initial assault of a fixed position will be accomplished by a massive, coordinated application of appropriate supporting arms. Helo gunships should be employed against enemy personnel in the open; however, these gunships have little effect on bunkers. Indiscriminate use of helo gunships invariably results in an unacceptable cessation of artillery fires.

(g) Upon completion of the assault by fire, infantry units will follow up with a methodical search and destroy operation with the objectives destroying/capturing enemy positions, materiel and personnel.

(h) Indications of an enemy capability to offer a determined defense will be justification for repetition of an assault by fire.

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3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
DONG HA, QUANG TRI PROVINCE,
VIETNAM

Ser:

7 August 1968

TERRAIN STUDY OF SCOTLAND II AO

Ref: (a) 3d Mar Div 515 8-67 and 11-67
(b) Maps: Vietnam AMS Series L7014, 1:50,000 Sheets 6342 II, III
IV, LAOS AMS Series L7015, 1:50,000 Sheets 6341 I and IV.

Ref: (1) Helicopter Landing Zones overlay
(2) Roads and Trails overlay
(3) Trafficability overlay

1. General. Boundaries of the study area are indicated on Enclosure (1). The heart of the study area is the Khe Sanh Valley, which is surrounded on all sides by mountains varying in elevation from 457 meters, Xom Cham at XD 8541, to 1739 meters at XD 8354.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA.

a. Relief. The study area is mountainous and highly dissected by numerous perennial and intermittent streams. Khe Sanh Valley is located in the north central section. This valley is aligned on a northwest-southeast axis and joins the Quang Tri and Da Krong River Valleys at a common juncture at XD 9240. The Da Krong Valley runs in a meandering path toward the southeast and exits the study area at XD 9936. Relief is extremely rugged in the northern and eastern portions of the study area and progressively diminishes toward a rolling plateau with isolated areas of high relief in the southern corner of Vietnam. A sharply delineated scarp, which rises to an elevated tableland in LAOS, generally parallels the Vietnam border along the southwestern and southern boundaries of the study area. The majority of the slopes in the AO are generally between 40 and 60 percent and are often 100 percent. The only regions characterized by gentle slopes are the northern-southern entrance of the Khe Sanh Valley; the immediate area bordering Route 9 west of the former Combat Base, and elevated plains in the vicinity of XD 8420.

b. Drainage. Drainage runoff is into the RAO QUAN River which transports the entire Khe Sanh Valley drainage flow and exits the southeastern portion of the area at XD 9040. Drainage in the northeast is provided by the QUANG TRI River which flows into the Gulf of Tonkin. All other drainage flows into the X'e Pene River (XD 7833) which flows north and west on the VIETNAM-LAOS border before exiting the study area at XD 6937. The entire study area is interlaced with numerous perennial and intermittent streams. It is of significance that intermittent streams rapidly empty during dry periods. They retain water only for short periods immediately following rainfall.

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c. Vegetation.

(1) Villages are generally covered with elephant grass and the twelve feet in height and low brush. Small areas in the immediate vicinity of villages are utilized for rice and "truck" crops. A rubber plantation is located in the southern portion of Khe Sanh Valley at XD 859595. A broad band of elephant grass covers the study area from XD 6646 to XD 8830. In addition, bamboo thickets and dense jungle are prevalent in the southwest portion of the area.

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(2) Mountains are covered by dense broadleaf evergreen forestation with interspersed areas of pine and deciduous trees. Tree height increases with elevation. Heights average 75 to 90 feet with some ranging to 150 feet. Canopy is generally continuous with more than 25 percent of the ground covered by 2 to 4 layers of canopy. Trees have shallow roots. Trunks are commonly straight and average 0.3 meters in diameter, increasing somewhat in higher elevations. Trees are commonly 2 to 3 meters apart. In inaccessible areas of heavy canopy, the sun rarely reaches the forest floor. In formerly cleared areas of shifting cultivation subsequently abandoned, extremely dense undergrowth is encountered; spiny rattans, full bushes, vines and briars are interwound around trees or between bushes making penetration difficult.

d. Surface Materials.

(1) Soils consist of sand, silt and clay mixtures. Surface soils are silty sand, silt and clay. Deep deposits of clayey soils are found on the broad alluvium plains of the river valleys. The soil is generally suited as fill.

(2) Rock. Base materials consist of granite, slate and quartzite rock in the mountains. These bed materials underlie relatively shallow soils on the upper slopes, but are progressively buried deeper under alluvium (clay, silt, sand, gravel, or similar detrital material deposited by running water) deposits in basins. Exposed rock is evidenced on the upper slopes and in drainage defiles.

e. Cultural Features.

(1) Currently, the local population is small and widely dispersed. Indigenous personnel are predominantly MONTAGNARDS of the BRU tribe.

(2) Village-type rural hamlets are located along National Route 9. The majority of these hamlets indicated on current maps are either abandoned or destroyed. New life hamlets were previously located in the vicinity of the former Special Forces Camp at LANG VEI (XD 7943) and the former KHE SANH Combat Base (XD 840410).

3. Military Aspects of The Area.

a. Observation and Fields of Fire.

(1) Long range observation is poor throughout the area due to dense undergrowth and difficult highly dissected terrain; however personnel traversing Route 9 can be observed from many preselected vantage points. Short range observation is limited for the same reason.

(2) Fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons are seriously curtailed. High trajectory weapons have good fields of fire in the northern and eastern portions of the study area which decrease rapidly toward the mountains. Heavy canopy and steep slopes can be expected to impair the effects obtained by supporting arms against targets in mountainous terrain.

b. Cover and Concealment. Excellent cover and concealment throughout most of the area limits the effectiveness of friendly surveillance. Excellent cover and concealment provides both friendly and enemy forces with covered approaches to attack positions.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~c. Obstacles.

(1) Natural. Vegetation and relief in the area make it unsuitable for cross country movement by troops and vehicles except on existing roads, trails and natural corridors such as along streams and rivers.

4. Key Terrain.

- a. Hill 1739 at XD 831546
- b. Dong Pa Thien Hill 1371 at XD 814519
- c. Dong Tri Hill 1015 at XD 854454 (overlooking Khe Sanh)
- d. Hill 950 at XD 844456 (overlooking Khe Sanh)
- e. Hill 832 at XD 874447 (overlooking Khe Sanh)
- f. Hill 689 at XD 803409
- g. Hill 471 at XD 846394 (overlooking Khe Sanh)
- h. Hill 881S at XD 777438
- i. Hill 881N at XD 774458
- j. Hill 861 at XD 803443
- k. Hill 691 at XD 927443
- l. Hill 587 at XD 901359
- m. Hill 843 at XD 897328
- n. Hill 663 at XD 828321
- o. Hill 527 at XD 789383
- p. Hill 728 at XD 730416
- q. Hill 632 at XD 828483
- r. Hill 926 at XD 755489



Michael SPANK
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