

3D MARDIV S&C FILE
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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

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From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Via: (1) Commanding General, XXIV Corps
 (2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (LANCASTER II)

Ref: (a) MACV Dir 335-8
 (b) Maps, Vietnam AMS Series L7014, 1:50,000 Sheets 6342 I, II, III, IV, and 6442 III, IV
 (c) Maps, Vietnam AMS Series L7014, 1:100,000 Sheets 6342 and 6442
 (d) CG, 3d Marine Division Op Ord 58-67

Encl: ✓(1) Development of Fire Support Bases
 ✓(2) Overlay, boundary changes during Operation LANCASTER II (21 January - 16 August)
 ✓(3) Overlay, boundary changes during Operation LANCASTER II (24 August - 23 October)
 ✓(4) Overlay of principal FSB's and LZ's in AO
 ✓(5) LANCASTER II subordinate unit Combat After Action Reports

1. CODE NAME: LANCASTER II
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 210001H Jan 68 - 232400H Nov 68.
3. LOCATION: QUANG TRI PROVINCE, Republic of Vietnam.
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Commanding General: MGen R. McC. TOMPKINS 21 Jan - 20 May
 MGen R. G. DAVIS 21 May - 23 Nov

5. TASK ORGANIZATION

Control Headquarters varied among the 3d Marine Division's three regiments and Task Force Hotel. The control headquarters and subordinate units were as follows:

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS:
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A. 4th Marines

Col Wm. L. DICK	21 Jan - 25 Feb
Col E. J. MILLER	26 Feb - 25 May

SUBORDINATE UNITS

1. 2/9	LtCol Wm. M. CRYAN	21 Jan - 14 May
	LtCol F. S. KNIGHT	15 May - 25 May
2. 3/9	LtCol G. C. COOK	21 Jan - 23 Feb
	LtCol E. J. LAMONTAGNE	24 Feb - 30 Apr
"B" Cmd Grp	Major T. J. POWER	1 May - 25 May
3. 3/4	LtCol L. R. BENDELL	24 Jan - 17 Feb
4. BLT 2/4 (-)	LtCol W. WEISE	31 Jan - 5 Mar
5. BLT 3/1 (-)	LtCol M. McGUOWN	5 Mar - 25 May
6. 3rd Squadron (-)		
(Rein) 5th Air Cav	LtCol H. J. BARTLEY	10 Apr - 15 Apr
7. 2/26	LtCol F. J. HEATH	18 Apr - 25 May

B. Task Force Hotel

BGen C. W. HOFFMAN	25 May - 6 Jun
	29 Jun - 3 Aug
	17 Aug - 21 Aug
BGen W. C. CHIP	22 Aug - 24 Aug
	4 Sep - 17 Sep
BGen F. E. GARRETSON	18 Sep - 24 Sep

SUBORDINATE UNITS

1. 4th Marines	Col E. J. MILLER	25 May - 6 Jun
		29 Jun - 10 Jul
a. 2/9	LtCol F. S. KNIGHT	25 May - 26 May
		31 May - 6 Jun
		29 Jun - 30 Jun
b. 3/9	LtCol E. J. LAMONTAGNE	4 Jun - 6 Jun
"B" Cmd Grp	Major T. J. POWER	25 May - 28 May
c. 3/4	LtCol F. L. BOURNE JR.	4 Jun - 5 Jun
		6 Jul - 10 Jul
d. BLT 2/4 (-)	LtCol W. WEISE	1 Jun - 2 Jun
		29 Jun - 10 Jul
e. BLT 3/1 (-)	LtCol M. McMUOWN	25 May - 3 Jun
f. 2/26	LtCol F. J. HEATH	26 May - 27 May
g. 1/4	LtCol J. R. MACLEAN	27 May - 3 Jun
		5 Jun - 6 Jun
	LtCol T. H. GALEPRAITH	29 Jun - 9 Jul
h. 1/9	LtCol M. V. PALATAS	2 Jun - 6 Jun
		29 Jun - 30 Jun

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i. 1/3	LtCol C. V. JARMAN	5 Jun - 6 Jun
j. 1/1	LtCol A. VANWINKLE	9 Jul - 10 Jul
		6 Jul - 10 Jul
2. 9th Marines	Col R. H. BARROW	16 Jul - 20 Jul
		17 Aug - 24 Aug
		4 Sep - 24 Sep
a. 1/9	LtCol M. V. PALATAS	16 Jul - 17 Jul
	LtCol F. X. COLLETON	18 Jul - 24 Jul
		17 Aug - 24 Aug
		4 Sep - 24 Sep
b. 2/9	LtCol E. S. KNIGHT	16 Jul - 28 Jul
		17 Aug - 22 Aug
		4 Sep - 15 Sep
	Major R. E. SISLEY	15 Sep - 24 Sep
c. 3/9	LtCol E. J. LAMONTAGNE	16 Jul - 29 Jul
		17 Aug - 24 Aug
		4 Sep - 24 Sep
d. 2/26	LtCol F. J. WEATH	16 Jul
	LtCol W. F. SPARKS	16 Sep - 24 Sep
e. 1/4	LtCol I. H. GALBRAITH	16 Sep - 23 Sep
f. 2/3	LtCol J. K. DAVIS	18 Sep - 22 Sep
	LtCol B. T. CHEN	23 Sep
g. TF Mike	Major J. P. SODERS	16 Jul - 29 Jul
h. 1/A, 3d MT BN	Capt K. P. FLOOD	16 Jul - 29 Jul
		17 Aug - 24 Aug
		4 Sep - 24 Sep
3. 3rd Marines	Col M. A. HULL	10 Jul - 14 Jul
	LtCol V. R. STUART	15 Jul - 3 Aug
	Col R. L. MICHAEL	17 Aug - 24 Aug
		4 Sep - 24 Sep
a. 1/3	LtCol C. V. JARMAN	10 Jul - 3 Aug
	LtCol R. B. TWOHEY	17 Aug - 24 Aug
		4 Sep - 24 Sep
b. 2/3	LtCol J. K. DAVIS	10 Jul - 3 Aug
		17 Aug - 24 Aug
		4 Sep - 18 Sep
	LtCol B. T. CHEN	24 Sep
c. 3/3	LtCol J. W. MARSH	10 Jul - 20 Jul
	LtCol W. H. BATES	28 Jul - 3 Aug
		17 Aug - 24 Aug
		4 Sep - 24 Sep
d. 1/1	LtCol A. VANWINKLE	14 Jul - 26 Jul
e. 2/26	LtCol W. F. SPARKS	4 Sep - 15 Sep
f. 1/9	LtCol F. X. COLLETON	12 Sep - 15 Sep
C. <u>9th Marines</u>		
Col R. B. SMITH		6 Jun - 29 Jun

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SUBORDINATE UNITS

1. 1/9	LtCol M. V. PALATAS	6 Jun - 29 Jun
2. 2/26	LtCol F. J. HEATH	6 Jun - 29 Jun
3. 2/9	LtCol F. S. KNIGHT	6 Jun - 19 Jun
4. 1/3	LtCol C. V. JARMAN	6 Jun - 25 Jun
5. 2/4	LtCol L. A. RANN	17 Jun - 19 Jun
6. 2/3	LtCol J. K. DAVIS	23 Jun - 25 Jun
7. 3/9	LtCol E. J. LAMONTAGNE	25 Jun - 28 Jun
8. 9th MtBn, "B" Co	LtCol C. E. DEARNELY	6 Jun - 15 Jun
9. 3rd MtBn, 2/A	Capt R. R. PANZER	15 Jun - 29 Jun
10. TF Mike	Major B. M. MACLAREN	6 Jun - 29 Jun
11. "L" 3/3	Lt R. E. LOGAN	14 Jun - 25 Jun
12. "C" 1/4	Capt W. P. NEGRON	27 Jun - 29 Jun

D. 3rd Marines

Col R. L. MICHAEL JR.	3 Aug - 16 Aug
	25 Aug - 3 Sep
	25 Sep - 8 Nov
Col M. M. SPARK	9 Nov - 23 Nov

SUBORDINATE UNITS

1. 1/3	LtCol C. V. JARMAN	3 Aug - 8 Aug
	LtCol R. B. TWOHEY	9 Aug - 16 Aug
		25 Aug - 3 Sep
		25 Sep - 23 Nov
2. 2/3	LtCol J. K. DAVIS	3 Aug - 16 Aug
		25 Aug - 3 Sep
	LtCol B. T. CHEN	25 Sep - 1 Oct
		9 Oct - 23 Nov
3. 3/3	LtCol W. H. BATES	3 Aug - 16 Aug
		25 Aug - 3 Sep
		25 Sep - 23 Nov
4. 2/9	LtCol F. S. KNIGHT	15 Aug - 16 Aug
5. 2/26	LtCol W. F. SPARKS	28 Aug - 3 Sep
		1 Oct - 16 Oct
6. 1/4	LtCol I. H. GALBRAITH	25 Sep - 1 Oct
7. 1/9	LtCol G. W. SMITH	13 Nov - 17 Nov

6. SUPPORTING FORCESA. Artillery Support

The 12th Marines provided direct and general artillery support either from their own organic units, attached units or units under their operational control. The commanding officers during the period for the 12th Regiment were:

Col E. S. SCHICK JR.	21 Jan - 21 May
LtCol W. A. KLUCKMAN	22 May - 4 Jul
Col P. J. MULRONEY	5 Jul - 23 Nov

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January

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
"A" Btry 1/12	Camp Carroll
"C" Btry 1/12	CC
"K" Btry 4/12	CC
"B" Btry 2/94	CC
"C" Btry 2/94	CC
239th CMR (DET) (USA)	CC
Det 2nd Sec, 1st plt, 1st S.L.Btry	CC
"A" Btry 8/4	CC
Det Btry "C" 8/4	CC
Btry "A" (-) 1/40	Thon Son Lam
"A" Btry 2/94	TSL
Mortar Btry (-) 1/12	Ca Lu

DISPLACEMENTS

2 FEB: Mort Btry 3/12 displaced to CC

11 FEB: Det, Btry "C" 8/4 displaced from CC

24 FEB: Btry "A" (-) 1/40 displaced from TSL
Btry "B" (-) 1/40 displaced from TSL

29 FEB: 2nd Sec, 1st plt, 1st SL Btry displaced from CC

11 MAR: Det, 1st plt, 1st SL Btry displaced from CC

9 MAR: Btry "A" 2/94 displaced to CC
Btry "A" 8/4 displaced to TSL

12 MAR: Det, 1st plt, 1st SL Btry displaced from CC

15 MAR: Mort Btry 3/12 displaced from CC
Mort Btry 2/11 displaced to CC

29 MAR: Mort Btry (-) 1/12 displaced from Ca Lu

12 APR: Btry "A" 2/94 displaced from CC
Btry "B" 2/94 displaced from CC
Btry "C" 2/94 displaced from CC
Btry "A" 8/4 displaced from TSL
239th CMR Det (USA) displaced from CC

24 APR: Btry "C" 1/12 displaced to Ca Lu

28 APR: Btry "B" 1/13 displaced to Ca Lu
Mort Btry 1/13 displaced to Ca Lu
1st Prov 155 How Btry displaced to Ca Lu

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6 MAY: Btry "B" 1/13 displaced from Ca Lu
 12 MAY: Mort btry 2/11 displaced to Ca Lu
 13 MAY: Mort Btry 1/13 displaced to CC
 17 MAY: 1st Prov 155 How Btry displaced from Ca Lu
 31 MAY: Btry "B" (-) 1/40 displaced from TSL
 1 JUN: Btry "D" 2/12 displaced to CC
 2 JUN: Btry "E" 2/12 displaced to Ca Lu
 5 JUN: Btry "E" 2/12 displaced from Ca Lu
 Btry "A" 1/12 displaced from CC
 6 JUN: Btry "D" 2/12 displaced from CC
 Btry "K" 4/12 displaced from CC
 17 JUN: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to Ca Lu
 19 JUN: Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to Ca Lu
 Btry "E" 2/12 displaced to Ca Lu
 22 JUN: Btry "H" 3/12 displaced to Ca Lu
 24 JUN: Btry "B" 1/12 displaced from Ca Lu
 25 JUN: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced from Ca Lu
 Btry "C" 1/12 displaced from Ca Lu
 29 JUN: Btry "D" 2/12 displaced to CC
 Btry "K" 4/12 displaced to CC
 8 JUL: Btry "K" 4/12 (-) displaced to Thon Son Lam
 Btry "H" 3/12 displaced from Ca Lu
 12 JUL: Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to CC
 Btry "C" 1/12 displaced to Ca Lu
 13 JUL: Btry "M" 4/12 displaced to TSL
 14 JUL: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to CC
 Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to TSL
 Btry "C" 1/12 displaced to CC
 Mort Btry 1/12 displaced to CC
 Mort Btry 3/12 displaced to CC
 1st 8" How Btry displaced to TSL

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18 JUL: Btry "B" 1/11 displaced to CC

23 JUL: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to LZ JOAN
Mort Btry 1/12 displaced from CC

25 JUL: Btry "B" 1/11 displaced from CC

26 JUL: Det, 2nd Prov 155mm How Btry displaced to LZ JOAN

28 JUL: Btry "C" 1/12 displaced to LZ MARGO

1 AUG: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to CC
Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to CC
Btry "C" 1/12 displaced to CC
Btry "F" 2/12 located at D-5
Mort Btry (-) 3/12 displaced from CC

3 AUG: 2nd Prov 155mm How Btry displaced to CC

4 AUG: Btry "F" 2/12 displaced from D-5
2nd Prov 155mm How Btry displaced from CC

6 AUG: Btry "E" 2/12 displaced to D-5

9 AUG: Btry "C" 1/12 displaced to Cam Lo District Hqs

11 AUG: Btry "E" 2/12 displaced from D-5
Btry "K" 4/12 (-) displaced to CC

12 AUG: Btry "C" 1/12 displaced to CC

16 AUG: Btry "D" 2/12 displaced to Hwy 9, CC Road

17 AUG: Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to Hwy 9, CC Road
Btry "B" 5/4 displaced to CC

20 AUG: Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to TSL

21 AUG: Btry "B" 5/4 displaced from CC

24 AUG: Btry "F" 2/12 displaced to TSL
Mort Btry (-) 2/12 displaced to TSL
Btry "A" 1/12 displaced from CC

25 AUG: Btry "D" 2/12 displaced from Hwy 9, CC Road

27 AUG: Btry "E" 2/12 displaced to TSL

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28 AUG: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to CC
Mort Btry 1/12 displaced to D-5

30 AUG: 1st Prov 155mm How Btry displaced to CC

3 SEP: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to Thon Son Lam
Btry "D" 2/12 displaced to FSB BLACK
Btry "E" 2/12 displaced to FSB SANDY
Det Btry "W" 2/12 displaced to FSB BLACK

4 SEP: Btry "B" 1/13 displaced to CC

7 SEP: Mort Btry 1/12 displaced to CC

10 SEP: Btry "K" 1/12 displaced to Thon Son Lam

11 SEP: 1st Prov 155mm How Btry displaced from CC

12 SEP: Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to FSB BIRD

13 SEP: Btry "B" 1/13 displaced to FSB BIRD
Btry "F" 2/12 displaced from TSL

14 SEP: Det Btry "W" 2/12 displaced from FSB BLACK

15 SEP: Btry "F" 2/12 displaced to FSB WINCHESTER
Mort Btry (-) 4/12 displaced to Vandegrift

16 SEP: Btry "D" 2/12 displaced to FSB WINCHESTER
2nd Prov 155mm How Btry displaced to FSB WINCHESTER

17 SEP: Det "L" Btry 4/12 displaced to CC

18 SEP: 1st Prov 155mm How Btry displaced to FSB BIRD

23 SEP: 1st Prov 155mm How Btry displaced from FSB BIRD

26 SEP: Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to FSB PETE
Btry "K" 4/12 displaced to CC
1st Prov 155mm How Btry displaced to FSB PETE

30 SEP: Btry "D" 2/12 displaced from FSB WINCHESTER

1 OCT: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to TSL
Btry "L" 4/12 displaced to TSL
Btry "E" 2/12 displaced to CC

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3 OCT: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to FSB MAC
Btry "B" 1/13 displaced to Thon Son Lam

5 OCT: Btry "L" 4/12 displaced from TSL
Btry "E" 2/12 displaced from CC
Btry "D" 2/12 displaced to Ca Lu

6 OCT: Btry "M" 4/12 displaced to ROCKPILE
Mort Btry 1/12 displaced from CC

9 OCT: Btry "B" 1/13 displaced to FSB MAC
Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to FSB WINCHESTER
5th Prov 155mm Guns displaced to ROCKPILE

12 OCT: Btry "F" 2/12 displaced to CC

16 OCT: Btry "C" 1/12 displaced to FSB CATAPULT

23 OCT: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to CC
1st Prov 155mm How displaced to Ca Lu

24 OCT: Btry "F" 2/12 displaced from CC
Btry "E" 2/12 displaced to Ca Lu
108th Field Arty & 1st 8" How Btry displaced from ROCKPILE

1 NOV: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to Thon Son Lam
Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to CC
Btry "L" 4/12 displaced to TSL

11 NOV: Mort Btry (-) 3/12 displaced to CC

12 NOV: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to TSL

13 NOV: Btry "B" 1/12 displaced to Mai Loc
Mort Btry (-) 3/12 displaced to Mai Loc

14 NOV: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced to FSB MACK

16 NOV: Mort Btry (-) 3/12 displaced from Mai Loc

20 NOV: Btry "A" 1/12 displaced from FSB MACK

21 NOV: Btry "B" 1/12 displaced from Mai Loc
Btry "L" 4/12 displaced from TSL

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ARTILLERY
MISSIONS FIREDARTILLERY
AMMUNITION EXPENDED

	<u>Observed</u>	<u>Unobserved</u>	<u>H&I's</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>105mm</u>	<u>107mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>8"*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
JANUARY	350	683	761	1,794	1,906	507	3,227	-	5,640
FEBRUARY	1,071	1,422	2,877	4,370	30,116	4,247	4,545	-	38,908
MARCH	757	1,074	1,693	3,524	18,035	3,224	3,823	-	25,082
APRIL	886	964	2,617	4,467	23,268	3,207	1,954	-	28,423
MAY	936	1,208	1,966	4,110	30,807	6,041	3,377	-	40,377
JUNE	537	693	636	1,866	25,680	2,622	114	-	28,416
JULY	667	UNK.	UNK.	2,174	28,919	1,939	1,204	-	32,062
AUGUST	913	570	1,206	2,689	42,775	158	-	-	42,937
SEPTEMBER	740	1,449	1,335	3,524	78,097	4,598	4,354	-	88,049
OCTOBER	1,042	418	984	2,444	26,703	265	13,300	645	40,913
NOVEMBER	621	645	890	2,156	32,975	684	4,763	590	39,012
TOTAL	8,520	9,127+	14,969+	33,118	339,281	27,492	40,661	1,215	409,819

*And 155mm Gun

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B. Air Support

During Lancaster II, air support was provided by the 1st Marine Air Wing, the 7th Air Force and U.S. Army units. Helicopter support was provided by MAG-16, MAG-36, and MAG-39. Fixed wing support came from MAG-11, MAG-12, and MAG-13, as well as from 7th Air Force units.

The types of missions were command and control, resupply, medical evacuation, observation, photo reconnaissance, illumination, psychological warfare, troop and logistical lifts, Arc Light strikes, as well as close air support, both conventional and radar controlled.

(1) Close Air Support

In February, 15 flights of fixed wing air strikes were run on enemy targets; in March, 27 flights; in April, 68 flights; and in May, 69 flights. AN/TPQ 10 radar controlled bombing support was:

	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY
Requested	584	286	429	161
Received	220	105	147	59
Tonnage	601	271	458	148

From June through November, air support included:

	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
FW SORT	118	587	405	603	1144	134
FW TONS	295	982	757	972	243	225

Arc light missions in support: One (1) in Jan; two (2) in February; seven (7) in June; five (5) in August; and six (6) in September.

(2) Helicopter Support

Because of expanded mobile operations in the northern portion of the AO, which required extensive helicopter resupply, helicopter support was greatly increased in July. Helicopter passenger and cargo (tons) support is as follows:

	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
HELO PAX	4	2,300	4,000	1,124	6,873
HELO CAR	51	175	1,376	45	380
	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
HELO PAX	18,257	28,022	26,981	17,466	10,018
HELO CAR	1,506	1,765	2,695	3,694	878

C. Tanks and Anti-Tank Support

Tank support was provided by "B" Company, 3rd Tank Battalion throughout the Lancaster II Operation. In February they were augmented by "A" Company, 3d Tank Battalion.

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Tanks provided 90mm H&I fires, escorts for morning mine sweeps and daily convoys, and also supported infantry operations on and around Route #9 including the Rockpile area. Company commanders during this period were:

Company A	Capt C. L. SALE	1 Feb - 29 Feb
Company B	Capt D. W. KENT	21 Jan - 24 Jan
	Capt C. W. REINKE	25 Jan - 31 Jan
	" "	1 Mar - 25 Jul
	1stLt J. T. MILLER	26 Jul - 23 Nov

On 25 August, 1st and 2nd Platoons, "A" Company, 3rd Anti-tanks were chopped to Co "B", 3rd Tank Battalion. Sweeps around the Rockpile area were in coordination with infantry, tanks and ontos.

D. Other Support

UNIT	CO	DATES
3rd Recon Bn	LtCol W. D. KENT	21 Jan - 11 Jul
	LtCol D. R. BERG	12 Jul - 23 Nov
3rd Med Bn	Cmdr R. A. BROWN	21 Jan - 3 Jul
	Cmdr B. K. SLEMMONS	1 Aug - 23 Nov
3rd SP Bn	LtCol J. W. QUINN	21 Jan - 10 May
	LtCol R. A. SULIK	11 May - 5 Oct
	Major E. J. GODFREY	6 Oct - 23 Nov
3rd Dental Co	Capt T. D. MAHONEY	21 Jan - 21 Jul
	Capt T. D. STEVENSON	30 Jul - 23 Nov
3rd Engr Bn	LtCol J. W. PERRIN	21 Jan - 6 Mar
	Major R. S. KROLAK	2 Mar - 1 Sep
	LtCol W. C. PERSAC	2 Oct - 23 Nov
11th Engr Bn	LtCol V. A. PERRY	21 Jan - 3 Aug
	LtCol R. C. EVANS	4 Aug - 23 Nov
9th MT Bn	Major J. R. STANLEY	21 Jan - 27 Jul
	Major R. KRULAK	28 Jul - 1 Oct
	LtCol J. R. FOX	2 Oct - 13 Nov
	LtCol L. J. TREMBLAY	14 Nov - 23 Nov

For additional information see Section #12 "Administrative Matters".

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7. INTELLIGENCEA. Sources of Intelligence

1. Intelligence sources included aerial photography, aerial observation, IR, SLAR, URS, APD, Adside, ACOUBUOY and ground sensors such as HANDSID. Other non-technical sources were POW's, Hoi Chanh's, captured documents, supplies and equipment, and ground recon, used for surveillance, screening and some sensor emplacement.

B. Enemy Situation

January and February

During this period, the 320th NVA Division employed their 48th and 52nd Regiments in attacks along Route #9. Their 64th Regiment was held in reserve. Prisoners captured during 24 Jan - 27 Jan, and attacks on the Cam Lo District Headquarters in late January substantiated this intelligence. The 8th Battalion, 29th Regiment operated west of Route #9 between the Rockpile and Ca Lu.

Artillery support for the 320th Division came from the 164th Artillery Regiment. The status of the 54th Artillery Regiment, organic to the 320th Division, remained unknown.

March and April

Contact lessened as the 64th Regiment operated northwest of A-4 in the southern DMZ, and the 48th and 52nd Regiments operated north of the central DMZ.

Artillery support came from all NVA artillery regiments in and north of the DMZ probably in a combined artillery command.

South of Camp Carroll the 27th Independent Battalion operated, utilizing ambushes, mines and mortar attacks. A secondary function was to serve as guides through their area.

It was believed that the village of Thon Doc Kinh, south of Camp Carroll harbored a local force company. Later intelligence substantiated its existence and the possibility that it may be part of the 27th Battalion. An operation beginning 16 April against the 27th Battalion base camp in the Rao Vinh Valley resulted in over 400 bunkers and 25 observation towers destroyed though no contact with the enemy was made.

April, May and June

Reconnaissance experts and electronic surveillance devices indicated the continuing transit through the southern portion of the AO by unidentified enemy units. No large scale ground attacks were attempted though incoming rockets, artillery and mortars continued.

July

Intelligence indicated the presence of one unidentified NVA

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battalion, one unidentified artillery and anti-aircraft battalion and numerous enemy supplies, bunkers, and positions in the northern portion of the Lancaster II AO.

Lancaster II July action was intended to "spoil" future operations of the 320th NVN Division by destroying their prepositioned supplies and prepared positions. Targets were also the unidentified artillery/anti-aircraft and infantry battalions.

As the operation commenced on 17 July, the 3rd and 9th Marines, and two battalions of the 2nd ARVN Regiment began finding large amounts of munitions, supplies and large bunker complexes. As the 3rd Marines swept Dong Ha Mountain and 2 ridges to the North, the enemy withdrew either north or west, most probably north, leaving behind only a small delaying force to hinder movement. One find on Lancaster II July was two 75mm Pack Howitzers captured on Dong Ha Mountain which had been used to fire on Camp Carroll.

August

The 64th Regiment and 52nd Regiment began appearing in early August. There were indications that the 48th Regiment was being held in reserve probably north of the Ben Hai River. As the month progressed, units in the area north of Camp Carroll/Rockpile made contact with elements of the 7th, 8th and 9th Battalions of the 64th Regiment. Also the 52nd Regiment was found to have three battalions, the 4th, 5th and 6th. Intelligence showed the 54th NVA Artillery Regiment in support.

September

In the beginning of the month two battalions of the 52nd Regiment were known to be operating along and south of the DMZ north-west of the Rockpile. The 64th Regiment operated in the east in the vicinity of A-4. The location of the 48th Regiment, 320th Division and one battalion of each the 52nd and 64th Regiments was unknown. The Nui Tia Pong hill mass was suspected to harbor extensive infiltration and staging facilities.

As Lancaster II Trousdale North commenced the enemy chose not to defend in strength. He chose, rather, to sacrifice installations and material rather than expose large formations to the effect of massed combat power. His defense consisted primarily of delaying action by small units with liberal and effective use of command detonated DH-10 mines. These mines initiated a large percentage of contacts. Restrictive terrain, dense forest and narrow precipitous ridgelines, favored their employment. Mortars were the enemy's primary supporting arm. By mid-month accumulating intelligence indicated an extensive NVA base camp along the southern edge of the DMZ. There was additional evidence that he was employing vehicles south of the Ben Hai River. The suspected base area was conveniently located along an extensive high speed trail system extending from North Vietnam to Base Area 101. Portions of this system

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also ran east to west, generally paralleling the DMZ, providing lateral LOCs for units deployed south of the Ben Hai. The trail network had bamboo rails, log steps up steep slopes and way stations, stores, hospitals and bunker complexes every 8 hours walking distance. The NVA had very few maps of the area; what few they had were rough hand-drawn sketches. They relied heavily on guides and extensive trail markers. Porters normally remained hidden during the day and carried supplies and munitions at night.

Elements of the 48th Regiment were confirmed south of the DMZ. At least two battalions of this regiment were in contact with the 3rd Marines to the east of the Regimental AO. Documents discovered on Nui Tia Pong suggested the presence of the 8th and 9th Battalions, 29th Regiment, 325th Division. This was not substantiated by corroborating evidence. The documents may have been left by these units while earlier transiting the infiltration route.

At the onset of Lancaster II Trousdale, the enemy had 6 known battalions committed south of the Ben Hai. As the operation continued the command and control elements of the 320th Division and significant portions of the 52nd Regiment moved probably northward across the Ben Hai and westward. Significant stores of food and munitions were time and again abandoned. One battalion continued to operate in the vicinity of Nui Ba Loa but by the end of the month had left that area apparently moving westward following trails south of Nui Tia Pong.

The September action resulted in marked damage to enemy monsoon plans as well as to major infiltration, staging, training, medical and command/control facilities. This damage was compounded by the enemy's inability to quickly react and adjust his plans to a new situation. While the enemy did suffer significant personnel losses, two battalion equivalents, he apparently had not as yet introduced into the area those forces intended to conduct monsoon operations. Many of the bunker complexes were empty and devoid of significant debris normally associated with rapid withdrawal. Large stores of food and munitions and one large cache of new individual weapons were probably prepositioned for use by follow-on units. Medical stores discovered were indicative of modern and sophisticated medicines available to the enemy. However, the loss of substantial amounts of medical supplies, as well as treatment facilities added to the existing situation of a generally primitive evacuation/treatment system. POW interrogations suggested that a large percentage of enemy units consisted of fresh troops with but a few months service. Their morale was initially high. They were well equipped and fed but had limited training and lacked experience. They were, however, well dug in and well camouflaged. They used the terrain much to their advantage with the use of DH-10 mines.

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October and November

In the early part of the month, the enemy continued delaying tactics along Route #1022S in the DMZ, to cover withdrawal north across the Ben Hai River of ground elements of the 320th NVA Division and an unidentified artillery unit.

Route #1022S was discovered by visual aerial reconnaissance and verified by aerial photography during September. Running through the DMZ from XD 964677 to XD 980685, it crossed into North Vietnam over underwater bridges. Along this road the 52nd Regiment occupied a series of blocking positions up to the 8th of October. By 9 October the enemy had withdrawn across the Ben Hai River.

Along Route #1022S, five artillery positions were discovered. The guns had been withdrawn north, but 680 rounds of 152mm, 90mm and 85mm artillery were found. The gun sites and suspected command center were encircled with prepared mortar pits. It was noted that the majority of these positions were located to the rear and flanks of both the command center and gun pits. The mortar crews would fire, move immediately to a new position and resume firing.

On 7 October, a Soviet made 6 cylinder diesel, full track prime mover was found at XD 988689. The vehicle was partially burned, and appeared to have been hit by a 105mm round. There was a winch on the front bumper similar to those found on U.S. 2½ ton trucks. On the rear, a coupling device for pulling an artillery piece was found.

On 12 October, a destroyed amphibian tractor at XD 997698 was found. It had a 12 cylinder diesel engine with a winch on the rear. From the middle of October to the termination of Lancaster II, enemy activity was insignificant.

C. Terrain Analysis

Characteristics of the terrain in Lancaster II AO are conveniently divided into two parts. The first portion is roughly defined as the area north of the ridge line on which Camp J. J. Carroll and OP 250 are situated, across the Cam Lo River.

This entire area is generally rugged, being composed of hills in the eastern half and mountains further west. Prominent in the area is a ridgeline running generally east to west on the northern side of the Cam Lo River on to where Dong Ha vic (YD 0259) and Gong Ma vic (YD 475585) Mountains are located. This entire ridgeline affords the enemy excellent observation of Route #9 and a limited view of the Camp Carroll Plateau; it should be noted that the latter is the most prominent land mass in the operating area south of the Cam Lo River.

Vegetation in this northern portion of the AO is typified by double and triple canopy trees and accompanying undergrowth. While this type of vegetation offers excellent cover and concealment to

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the enemy forces in the area, it greatly impedes movement and will channelize both friendly and enemy forces onto the trails running through the area.

Friendly access to this northern portion of the operating area is restricted to foot traffic because of the Cam Lo River which flows through the area from (YD 100597). In periods of prolonged inclement weather, this river will be a formidable obstacle even for foot troops. Also, of significance is Route #9 which runs in close proximity to and on the south side of the Cam Lo River and serves as the principle friendly avenue of approach into the operating area.

The second distinct portion of the operating area is that area south of Camp Carroll on the western side of Route #558 frequently referred to as the Cua Valley. This area is predominantly flat abandoned farm land, and is comprised of open fields and rice paddies with only sparse treelines and hedgerows to hamper observation from the Camp Carroll Plateau. While this type of terrain is prone to easy movement, cover and concealment is poor and troops are easily channelized by the many irregular rice patties. Significant in this area is the extensive village complex adjacent to Route #558, the largest of which is Thon Doc Kinh Resettlement Village Vic (YD 0952). Friendly avenues of approach into the area are provided by Route #558, an unpaved single lane secondary road running south from Route #9, and the secondary road running south of Camp J. J. Carroll Plateau; there is also an east-west road intersecting Route #558 at the Doc Kinh Resettlement Village that provides access into the western extreme of the Cua Valley.

D. Weather

The principal effects of weather were the fog, low ceiling clouds and rain that inhibited air activity.

Early morning fog and low ceiling lasted from January through May, let up during warmer months then again became a problem in late August on. For instance, the average ceiling was 5000-6000 feet during the warm month of June; while a cooler month, April, was 2000-3000 feet during the day and 500-1000 feet at night. Visibility throughout the period averaged about 5.5 miles.

Rainfall was below average totaling 4" in January, 3" in February and tapering off to occasional showers in April and May. In June there were occasional thundershowers, by August rains in the first half of the month were heavy though less so the latter half and on into September. On 13 October, a tropical storm interrupted lines of communication, and washed away both the Khe Gia and Cam Lo bridges. Winds usually averaged 7 knots, though in August they averaged 25 knots and in October during the tropical storm they reached 50 knots.

Temperatures generally became cooler from January to February

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then progressively warmed up until June, remained constant through July and in August began to cool off. February's average was 65°, June's average was 87.5°, and in August the average was 80°. It was common to have high's of 105° in June and July, and low's of 50° in February.

8. MISSION

Initially, the Regiment responsible for the Lancaster II AO was required to:

- (1) Conduct search and destroy operations in AO;
- (2) Defend combat bases and other vital installations in AO;
- (3) Maintain combat bases in conjunction with RF units, in designated locations;
- (4) Open and secure lines of communication within AO;
- (5) Maintain active ground surveillance and screening operations and spoiling attacks against NVA/VC forces; and
- (6) Support GVN RD Campaign Plan 1967.

Other missions assigned in subsequent months were:

- (1) Maintain a Sparrow Hawk platoon as a division reaction force; and
- (2) Prepare contingency plans for coordinated multi-regimental operations in Lancaster II AO.

Task Force Hotel when assigned operational control of forces in the Lancaster II AO was ordered to: Prepare plans for and conduct major operations in the Lancaster II AO with up to two regiments.

9. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

Initially, two to three battalions were employed operating principally from fixed combat bases at (1) Camp Carroll, (2) vicinity of Thon Son Lam/Rockpile area and (3) Ca Lu. Air, artillery, tanks, 40mm (SP) (AW), and .50 caliber truck-mounted M55's were in support. The major effort during the first few months was devoted to preventing NVA/VC forces from interdicting Route #9 between Cam Lo, Camp Carroll, Ca Lu and Thon Son Lam. Company size, preplanned, search and destroy operations and small unit activities including scout dog patrols and night ambushes were conducted. In March, search and destroy operations became multi-company size.

In July, the concept of operations changed to a more mobile posture. Base defense forces were reduced to company strengths permitting larger size forces to operate in the field. The use of extensive, long range reconnaissance patrols provided the means to explore every

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indication of enemy activity. Numerous landing zones were created by air and artillery fire on hilltops or razorback ridges and recon teams quickly inserted. In the cases of previously prepared LZ's, aerial observers and aerial photography gave evidence of mines or booby-traps. Suspected mined LZ's were prepped before the recon teams were inserted. Teams were normally 4 to 6 men, when out of range of supporting artillery fire, and 8 to 10 men, if within range. The concept of the larger teams use was that they could, and would be reinforced if necessary. They were allowed to initiate contact. The smaller teams by their size, if engaged, would withdraw quickly. Reconnaissance was their primary and only mission.

When recon units indicated the presence of significant enemy forces or supplies, friendly forces were massed and emphasis placed on "preparing the battlefield". Landing zones were secured on narrow ridges, easily defensible, then with engineers support, made into fire support bases normally 8000 meters apart and mutually supporting. Light artillery was then prepositioned in these bases.

Extensive prep fires, including Arc Light missions to provide maximum shock and destructive effect, preceded a rapid (sometimes multi-regimental (Marine-ARVN) insertion of helicopter borne infantry, which cut off enemy reinforcement, resupply and escape routes. Because of the artillery umbrella available, forces operated usually in one of two ways:

(1) Each company operated independently under a protective fan of artillery in an assigned AO of 2000 to 3000 meters on each side based around an LZ, and patrols conducted detailed searches until the AO had been thoroughly covered and the company subsequently was heli-lifted to another LZ; or

(2) Battalions leap frogged companies over one another along narrow razorback ridgelines building new LZ's as they moved. In the interim, patrols thoroughly searched out the fingers and draws on each side of the ridgeline.

In both methods of operation, the construction of numerous LZ's provided facilities for helicopter resupply, reinforcement and medevac of casualties. Additionally, the LZ's allowed the Division to regularly insert reconnaissance patrols to maintain surveillance of the area and should enemy forces have returned, rapid mass deployment was practical.

10. EXECUTION

21 Jan: In accordance with Third Marine Division Operation Order 58-67, Operation Lancaster commenced when the 4th Marines assumed responsibility for the former Lancaster area of operations and relocated to Camp Carroll (YD 066543). Major forces available: 2/9 and 3/9.

23 Jan: During the night at 2135H, E/2/9 received small arms fire at YD 102510 which resulted in 2 WIA.

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24 Jan: Major efforts by the NVA to interdict Route #9 and inflict casualties through attacks by fire on Camp Carroll began. At 1340H, an artillery, resupply convoy, composed of a jeep and 2 heavy trucks enroute from Dong Ha to Camp Carroll, was ambushed at YD 060569 with small arms, mortar and recoilless rifle fire. All the vehicles were damaged. A reaction force of one platoon, two tanks and two dusters, moving east toward the ambush, were also pinned down at YD 075572, until 1830H. They then proceeded to Cam Lo District Headquarters. One tank and both dusters were damaged. A relief convoy from Dong Ha reached the ambush site at 1900H and began evacuating the casualties. To further reinforce the unit in the ambush, 3/4 (-) was chopped to the 4th Marines and M/3/4 was helilifted from 15,000 meters away at YD 149692, to Camp Carroll and Hill 250. At 1900H, M/3/4 commenced moving toward the ambush site. At 2300H, upon learning that all WIA's had been medevaced, M/3/4 set in at YD 074564. Results: 6 KIA, 28 WIA and 8 NVA/KIA. Major forces available: 2/9, 3/9 and 3/4 (-).

25 Jan: At 0630H, M/3/4 moved a platoon to the high ground at YD 074574, and the remaining platoons began sweeping the road from east to west. At 0915H, M/3/4 received small arms fire at YD 073572, from an estimated 25 NVA. They returned fire. Results: 2 KIA, 2 WIA, 3 NVA/KIA and one 7.62 MG captured. At 1314H, M/3/4 received 6 rounds incoming 82mm mortar and sporadic sniper fire at YD 075572. Results: 11 WIA. At 1649H, at YD 074569, M/3/4 received 3 additional incoming mortar rounds resulting in 6 WIA. By 1900H, I/3/4 and L/3/4 had joined M/3/4 and established a three company, 360° perimeter.

26 Jan: The 4th Marines were to deploy on both sides of the river south of grid line 59. However, when at 0845H, an explosion destroyed the bridge at YD 074572, all units were advised to remain south of the river. Sweeping operations commenced. At 1025H, I/3/4 sighted 12 NVA in the open at YD 072531. A subsequent artillery mission resulted in 2 NVA/KIA, 1 NVA POW, and assorted captured gear. At 1550H, L/3/4, at YD 074563, made contact with a small element of an NVA patrol. Results were 4 WIA, 6 NVA/KIA and 4 IWC. At 1715H, 1/4, while approaching Camp Carroll from the SW, received automatic weapons fire from the SE. Results: 12 WIA and 1 NVA/KIA. At 2145H, at YD 095513, an LP from E/2/9 detonated two claymore mines, then received small arms fire, resulting in 1 WIA.

27 Jan: During the early morning hours, an enemy force infiltrated into M/3/4's area, presumably through the stream bed to the west of Mike's Hill (YD 974574) and other dry stream beds and gulleys to the north and east of the hills. At 0500H, an estimated NVA reinforced company began an assault on Mike's Hill. The attack lasted for four hours consisting of heavy automatic weapon, recoilless rifle, RPG rocket and sniper fire. Heavy artillery and 81mm mortar fire were called

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in and adjusted by "M" Company, while "I" Company from an adjacent hill, aided with observed 60mm mortar fire. At 0930H, "L" Company began moving toward a trail junction at YD 077571, where it could then sweep west to reestablish contact with an "M" Company ambush that was pinned down at YD 075573. "L" Company met with little resistance, linking up with "M" Company forces at the bridge. The terrain required "I" Company (-) to move across an open area, interspersed by thick hedgerows of brush. Heavy artillery fire was directed to cover the company's exposed left flank, across the river to the north. As "I" Company moved, it received fire on both flanks from well dug-in and camouflaged enemy positions. At 1310H, the reserve platoon of "I" Company was committed. A platoon from "L" Company also began moving west to assist "I" Company. By 1350H, the two platoons had made contact with "I" Company (-). A Huey gunship was particularly outstanding, landing near "I" Company casualties to determine enemy automatic positions and evacuating casualties well before any LZ was secure. At 1400H, the "I" Company reserve platoon, moving north to a stream bed west of Mike's Hill, was still encountering heavy enemy fire. At 1800H, "I" Company was chopped to "M" Company and the 3rd platoon of "M" Company was chopped to "L" Company. There were two night positions. Results of the day's activity: 21 KIA, 62 WIA, 131 NVA/KIA, 6 NVA (POW), 43 IWC and 19 CSW.

28 Jan: At 1427H, a large tunnel network was found at 1645H. 3/4 had moved to Camp Carroll and B-52 strikes were conducted in the area of contact of 27 Jan, at 1700H.

29 Jan: At 0730H, a platoon was helilifted to Dong Ha, where it supported a tank sweep west on Route #9, to the damaged bridge at YD 074572. The bridge was secured at 1110H, and a tank/infantry sweep began to clear the surrounding area. At 1140H, an 81mm mortar, short round, landed in L/3/4's position causing 2 WIA. During the sweep, 30 NVA bodies (previously reported) and 31 weapons were found. At 1515H, H/2/9 found two wounded NVA. Results: 2 NVA(POW). At 1530H, the bridge was trafficable and a huge convoy from Dong Ha began moving to relieve Camp Carroll.

30 Jan: At 1350H, Camp Carroll had 3 incoming 75mm rounds. At 1550H, a convoy truck detonated a mine at YD 045575, resulting in 1 WIA.

31 Jan: 2/4 was chopped to 4th Marines. At 1300H, M/3/4 found 17 NVA/KIA at YD 064567. At 1330H, 2/9 assumed 3/4's mission of road security in vicinity of YD 076574. At 1448H, a convoy received 3 incoming mortar rounds causing 1 KIA and 1 WIA. At 1645H, a recon team observed two NVA crawling toward them at YD 106529. They killed one NVA and captured one AK-47. Major forces available: 2/9, 3/9, 2/4 and 3/4 (-).

1 Feb: At 1430H, a vehicle from H/2/9 enroute to Dong Ha received 3 incoming mortar rounds, resulting in 3 WIA.

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2 Feb: At 1110H, Camp Carroll received 8 incoming artillery rounds. Results: 2 WIA. At 1154H, E/2/4 at YD 039559 observed enemy movement at YD 035584. Subsequent artillery missions resulted in 2 NVA/KIA. At 1405H, Camp Carroll received 5 incoming artillery rounds. Results: 3 WIA. At 1600H, G/2/4 at YD 068570 received 22-25 incoming artillery rounds. Counter battery fire and a search of the area resulted in 1 NVA/KIA, 17 friendly WIA and 1 IWC. At 1700H, E/2/9 at YD 089577 received fire from two squads of NVA on Hill 37, at YD 089578. An assault of Hill 37, following the artillery strikes, resulted in 1 KIA, 30 WIA, 11 NVA/KIA and 11 IWC. At 1720H, Camp Carroll was hit by 10 incoming artillery rounds resulting in 13 WIA. At 1735H, 81mm mortars were fired on enemy movement, resulting in 8 NVA/KIA.

3 Feb: At 0104H, Camp Carroll reported 3 incoming artillery rounds impacting outside its perimeter. At 0345H, Camp Carroll received 4 incoming artillery rounds. At 1140H, 2/9 at YD 074572 was hit by two incoming 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 5 WIA.

4 Feb: Camp Carroll was hit by 4 incoming rounds of artillery at 0550H. At 0925H, I/3/4 observed NVA blowing up a bridge at YD 042554. At 1400H, I/3/4, during the daily mine sweep, detonated an anti-personnel mine resulting in 2 WIA. At 1515H, Camp Carroll received 3 incoming artillery rounds resulting in 3 WIA. At 2010H, a platoon of E/2/4, at YD 050566, encountered an enemy force of unknown but superior size coming from the NE, just after artillery and mortar fires had been adjusted in that area. Results were: 2 KIA and 1 WIA.

5 Feb: At 0215H, an LP from E/2/9 at YD 089578 made contact with approximately 20 NVA. Withdrawing with 4 WIA the LP incurred 1 MIA. A squad sent to find the MIA encountered S/A and A/W fire. Results: 1 KIA and 9 WIA. At 0600H, fragments from grenade thrown from M/3/4's position atop Mike's Hill, resulted in 1 KIA and 1 WIA. At 0730H, a search for the MIA revealed 1 KIA, 9 NVA/KIA and 8 IWC. At 1246H, 3/9 at Thon Son Lam was hit by 14 rounds artillery, from XD 937535 or XD 937535. They returned 106mm recoilless rifle and artillery fire. Results: 2 KIA and 13 WIA. At 1310H, 2/9 at YD 078578 received 20 rounds artillery resulting in 1 KIA and 2 WIA. At 1500H, a 2/4 Marine at YD 042566 tripped an explosive device resulting in 2 WIA.

6 Feb: At 0140H, E/2/9 was firing at continuous movement outside their perimeter. At 0320H, three friendly, short rounds impacted in G/2/4's position at YD 074574 resulting in 2 WIA. E/2/9 found 2 NVA/KIA in a morning check outside their perimeter. At 0845H, 2/4 at YD 034557 sighted 15-20 NVA and called in artillery and mortar fire. Results: 13 NVA/KIA. At 1649H, E/2/9 received incoming mortar fire causing 2 WIA.

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7 Feb: At 1300H, E/2/4 at YD 026562 received S/A fire resulting in 3 WIA.

8 Feb: At 0215H, Camp Carroll was hit by 5 artillery rounds. At 1115H, Camp Carroll received another 4 incoming artillery rounds from a 5800 mil azimuth. Counter battery fire was called.

9 Feb: At 0100H, 2/4 at YD 033563 received 6 incoming grenades. At 0330H, 2/4 at YD 074574 received one incoming rocket. At 1045H, an E/2/4 squad patrol surprised a reinforced NVA platoon setting into an ambush position north of Route #9 at YD 047569. The NVA had wire communications with the north bank of the Cam Lo River and apparently were waiting for the convoy from Dong Ha. The firefight lasted until a reaction platoon reinforced 2/4's squad. Supporting arms were called in on the retreating enemy. Results: 5 USMC KIA, 4 USMC WIA, 12 NVA/KIA, 3 IWC and 1 CSWC. At 1050H, 3/9 received 5 incoming artillery rounds at YD 997556. At 1402H, 2/4 at YD 074574 received 5 incoming 82mm rounds. At 1432H, 2/4 received 5 more incoming 82mm rounds. At 1700H, Arc Light strikes hit in vicinity YD 043582.

11 Feb: At 1045H, a convoy to Dong Ha had one 175mm self-propelled gun detonate a mine at YD 092577. Results: 5 WIA. At 1530H, 2/9 received five incoming 82mm mortar rounds at YD 874574, also resulting in 5 WIA.

12 Feb: At 1045H, 2/9 at YD 088578 received eight rounds 82mm mortar, from vicinity YD 085594, resulting in 9 WIA. 60mm mortar, artillery and gunships counter fired. There were two secondary explosions. At 1745H, 2/9 at YD 074575 received ten rounds of incoming 82mm mortar resulting in 2 WIA. At 1800H, 2/4 at YD 071580 received two incoming 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 2 WIA.

13 Feb: By 1035H, 3/9 at Ca Lu had received 918 civilian refugees from the Khe Sanh area.

14 Feb: At 0945H, 3/9 at Ca Lu received another 200 refugees. At 1245H, 2/4 at YD 064568 was hit by 18 rounds of 82mm mortar. Counter mortar, artillery and tank fire was called. Results: 3 WIA.

15 Feb: At 1200H, K/3/9 at XD 988446 began to take heavy incoming mortar and rifle fire from an estimated enemy platoon at XD 985443. One platoon attacked the enemy while an aerial observer and UH-1E gunships aided from overhead. By 1235H, the platoon had consolidated the hill but medevac choppers were twice called in and each time took heavy fire. Four crewmen were wounded. Air strikes were called in, and at 1700H a platoon from I/3/9 reached the K/3/9 platoon and began moving back with the casualties to Ca Lu. As they moved, mortars and artillery fire helped cover their flanks. Results: 12 KIA and 93 WIA.

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16 Feb: At 0420H, K/3/9 with all casualties entered Ca Lu.

17 Feb: At 0300H, a grenade exploded in H/2/9's position. Results: 1 KIA and 2 WIA. At 0900H, a recon team at YD 072488 detonated an explosive device. Results: 4 WIA. At 1000H, twelve hundred refugees began moving from Ca Lu guided by National police. At 1630H, E/2/9 at YD 039568 received 5 incoming 82mm mortar rounds from vicinity YD 061592. Results: 4 WIA. During the day several units from 3/4 were operationally directed from the Lancaster II area of operations. Forces available: 2/9, 3/9 and 2/4.

18 Feb: At 0215H, a Republic of Vietnam Army unit at YD 096518 received 5 rounds incoming B-40 rockets. Results: 3 WIA. At 0900H, 165 refugees from Khe Sanh arrived at Ca Lu. All but 75 of the previous 1200 refugees had departed for Cam Lo. At 1015H, G/2/4 at YD 074572 received 33 rounds 82mm mortar. Results: 3 WIA. At 1015, G/2/4 at YD 074572 received 33 rounds 82mm mortar. Results: 2 WIA. At 1142H, G/2/4 was hit by another 9 rounds 82mm mortar. Results: 1 KIA and 1 WIA.

19 Feb: Between 1500H and 1700H, Camp Carroll received 75 rounds of mixed caliber rockets and artillery. Results: 4 KIA and 17 WIA. At 1515H, G/2/4 received eight 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 12 WIA. During the day, an AO adjusted fire missions on 2 bunkers and 5 NVA in the open at YD 043625. Results: 5 NVA/KIA. At 1735H, a recon team at YD 955538 made contact with an estimated 5-7 NVA. Results were 2 WIA. Camp Carroll received 5 rocket rounds between 2000H and 2100H.

20 Feb: At 0930H, Camp Carroll received 3 incoming mortar rounds resulting in 3 WIA. At 1040H, a convoy duster from Camp Carroll to Dong Ha detonated a mine at YD 074572. At 1525H, Camp Carroll received 5 incoming rocket rounds from a suspected enemy position at YD 066618. Counter artillery was fired. At 2110H, a squad size ambush of G/2/4 at YD 064568 was taken under fire from 4 enemy positions. They returned fire. A reaction force reached the ambush and also received fire from the same vicinity. Withdrawing, the area was then peppered with artillery and 81mm mortars. The ambush was then reinserted. Results: 1 KIA and 1 WIA.

21 Feb: At 1540H, Camp Carroll received 60-65 rounds incoming rockets, artillery and mortars, resulting in 12 WIA.

22 Feb: Camp Carroll received five incoming 75mm rocket rounds. G/2/4 received five incoming 82mm mortar rounds. At 1700H, a recon team walked into an enemy base camp, at YD 137548, estimated to be company size. The team was taken under fire. As the team moved into defensible positions a radio was damaged by small arms fire.

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23 Feb: At 1530H, G/2/4 received 8 unidentified rounds incoming resulting in 4 WIA. An E/2/4 platoon made contact during the day, resulting in 7 WIA at YD 053555.

25 Feb: Camp Carroll received 2-3 rounds incoming artillery.

26 Feb: Camp Carroll received 72 rounds incoming artillery.

28 Feb: At 1130H, a combined regional and popular force patrol at YD 093515 made contact with an estimated platoon of VC/NVA resulting in 2 WIA. At 1229H, a CH-46 helicopter was hit by ground fire and exploded on impact. Gunships were called on station and a reaction platoon committed. Results: 22 KIA and 1 WIA.

29 Feb: At 1015H, an air strike at YD 099631 resulted in 2 NVA/KIA, one rocket site destroyed and a large fire. At 1400H, an observed artillery mission in the area resulted in 3 NVA/KIA.

1 Mar: 3/9 provided security for Ca Lu, Thon Son Lam and Route #9. 2/9 and a platoon of 2/4 (-) provided security for Camp Carroll, and culverts and bridges on Route #9. All units conducted ambushes and patrols.

2 Mar: Camp Carroll received 35-37 rounds of possible 122mm and 130mm artillery. There were no casualties.

3 Mar: Camp Carroll received 3 rounds of 75mm and 20 rounds of 130mm artillery with negative casualties. F/2/4 at YD 027552 sighted 5 NVA and commenced small arms fire. They received one incoming grenade resulting in 1 WIA. E/2/9 had 1 WIA from 82mm incoming at YD 089579.

4 Mar: Camp Carroll received 7-9 rounds of 130mm and 75mm artillery resulting in 4 WIA. F/2/4 received one round of unidentified incoming at YD 026561 causing 6 WIA.

6 Mar: BLT 3/1 relieved 2/4. G/2/9 at YD 089579 received one 82mm round resulting in 7 WIA. Fixed wing aircraft destroyed a 50 cal. machine gun position at YD 052667 killing one NVA. F/2/9 found 2 NVA bodies 5-6 days old at YD 074574. Major forces: 2/9, 3/9 and BLT 3/1.

7 Mar: No significant events.

8 Mar: At 1112H, K/3/9 tripped a surprise explosive device at YD 990498 causing one KIA and one WIA. F/2/9 received seven incoming rounds in their positions at YD 077580 causing 4 WIA. At 1755H, a

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recon team made contact at YD 083526 with 10-12 NVA armed with automatic and semi-automatic weapons resulting in one WIA. As K/3/9 approached a bridge at YD 990249, two claymores detonated resulting in 1 KIA and 10 WIA. 2/9 (-) conducted a search and destroy operation south of Cam Lo.

9 Mar: At 0945H, a recon team made contact at YD 084520 resulting in 2 WIA. E/2/9 at YD 033537 was taken under fire by 60-70 NVA. Subsequent artillery fire and fixed wing air strikes resulted in 2 NVA/KIA. M/3/4 tripped a surprise explosive device at YD 137553 causing 3 WIA. F/2/9 located at YD 074574 received 2 rounds of 82mm resulting in 6 WIA.

10 Mar: E/2/9 at YD 138536 received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar causing 10 WIA. 3/9 began an operation which was to repair and open Route #9 between Thon Son Lam and Ca Lu. They worked with the 11th Engineers. At 1130H, a recon team captured an NVA/VC suspect at YD 147561.

11 Mar: F/2/9 at YD 072575 found 5 NVA bodies one to two weeks old.. F/2/9 received ten 82mm rounds in their position at YD 074572 causing 2 WIA. At 1300H, an 11th Engineers crane hit a mine resulting in 5 WIA. A recon team at YD 038540 received incoming grenades causing one WIA.

12 Mar: Route #9 was opened between Ca Lu and Thon Son Lam.

13 Mar: G/2/9 at YD 089579 received three 82mm rounds causing 3 WIA. At 1620H, a recon team at YD 153539, ambushed 4 NVA, resulting in 2 NVA/KIA and 2 NVA/POW.

14 Mar: At 1145H, a recon team tripped a surprise explosive device at YD 001544 resulting in 4 WIA. Camp Carroll received 25-30 rounds of 130mm artillery resulting in 1 KIA and 2 WIA. A recon team picked up one NVA/POW at YD 058428.

15 Mar: K/3/9 detonated a surprise explosive device at YD 978487 causing 1 WIA.

16 Mar: At 1600H, Camp Carroll received 130mm incoming artillery resulting in 1 KIA and 7 WIA.

17 Mar: No significant events.

18 Mar: A recon team received small arms fire at YD 131528 from 5-10 NVA resulting in 1 WIA.

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19 Mar: H/2/9 at YD 078546 received one sniper round causing 1 WIA. K/3/9 tripped a surprise explosive device at YD 970498 resulting in 7 WIA. A recon team made contact with 10 NVA. An artillery mission was called resulting in 1 NVA/KIA.

20 Mar: K/3/9 detonated a surprise explosive device at YD 970479, causing 2 WIA.

21 Mar: A recon team at YD 074528, received small arms fire which caused 1 WIA. Return fire killed 3 NVA. A Marine sniper at YD 071530, killed 3 NVA.

22 Mar: Two companies of 2/1 were chopped to 3/9 and assumed responsibility for Ca Lu airfield. K/3/1 received sniper fire from YD 041566 resulting in 2 WIA.

23 Mar: 3/1, during a road sweep at YD 045566, received small arms fire causing one engineer WIA. 3/9 at YD 002545 received 11 rounds of 122mm rockets. A 105mm bunker exploded resulting in 1 KIA and 11 WIA. G/2/1 at YD 995495 received two rounds of 82mm mortar causing 1 WIA.

24 Mar: A recon team observed 70-100 NVA/VC at YD 152522. The team received small arms fire causing 1 WIA. Their return fire killed one NVA.

25 Mar: A recon team observed 260 NVA at YD 128533. An artillery mission was fired for three hours resulting in 25 NVA/KIA and an estimated 100 NVA wounded.

26 Mar: H/2/1, at YD 005476, received two incoming grenades causing 1 WIA. H/2/9 at YD 073542 received 5 small arms sniper rounds resulting in no casualties. F/2/9 at YD 064571 received 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortar resulting in 1 WIA. 2/9 (-) conducted a search and destroy operation in the southwest portion of the 4th Marines AO.

27 Mar: 2/9 at YD 155540 received forty-two 60mm rounds resulting in 9 WIA.

28 Mar: Snipers at YD 073527 observed 75 people moving west. They moved to YD 072524 for better observation and received 20-30 rounds of small arms fire. Return fire resulted in one VC/KIA.

29 Mar: F/2/9 at YD 072571 received two 82mm rounds causing 3 WIA.

30 Mar: No significant events.

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31 Mar: At 1015H, F/2/9, at YD 072571, received 9 rounds of 107mm rockets causing 1 WIA. At 1110H, they received 3 more rounds of unknown size with no casualties. G/2/9 at YD 089578, received 3 rounds of incoming 107mm rockets causing 1 WIA. F/2/9, while sweeping a road at YD 044568, detonated a mine causing 3 WIA.

1 Apr: Of interest, Operation Pegasus began at Ca Lu following Route #9 to relieve Khe Sanh. At 1300H, F/2/9, at YD 072571, received 44 rounds of incoming 82mm mortar causing 11 WIA. At 1500H, an air strike was directed by an AO on an active mortar site at YD 066598. There was one secondary explosion. At 1545H, F/2/9, at YD 072571, received 13 rounds of 82mm from a suspected NVA position at YD 066592. Later, F/2/9 received still another 16 rounds incoming 82mm mortar.

2 Apr: During the day, 3/1 received 30 incoming 82mm mortar rounds.

3 Apr: At 1310H, 2/9, at YD 076581, found 4-6 bunkers, 30-40 chicom grenades, and 3-4 mines.

4 Apr: During the day two spider holes, a hut elevated above the ground and 26 bunkers were found in vicinity YD 147512. Incoming mortars and rockets totaled 40 rounds fired, principally at F/2/9's position at YD 079571. A VC base camp was found at YD 147514 at 1200H. NVA were sighted three times during the day by AO's and unit OP's. Also, at three different times, NVA walked up to company perimeters and threw grenades. Casualties were 2 WIA.

5 Apr: A recon team, at YD 047573, was fired upon by automatic weapons at 1605H. Another recon team engaged 3-7 NVA at YD 066561. Results were 1 KIA, 4 WIA and 4 NVA/KIA. At 1800H, 3/1 discovered 13 bunkers, three huts and a 50 ft. tower at YD 147522.

6 Apr: At 1045, E/2/9, during a helicopter insertion, received an unknown quantity of incoming 82mm mortar rounds. Results were 12 WIA. Air strikes, artillery and mortar, counter fire were called as the incoming mortar rounds became heavier. At 1545H, 2/9 was still receiving incoming mortar rounds though at a slower rate, so an extraction of casualties was begun under cover of smoke and suppressive fire. Results: 2 KIA, 1 ARVN KIA, and 8 WIA. More supporting missions were called in at YD 066587 as the incoming ceased. At 2305H, a 3/9 LP at XD 969549 heard movement to the NW. They checked the wire and found it cut in 12 places.

7 Apr: At 1155H, 1 round incoming in H/2/9's position resulted in 1 KIA and 7 WIA.

8 Apr: At 1130H, air strikes were directed on A/W positions at YD 068628. At 1450H, air strikes hit bunkers at YD 084598, resulting in 2 NVA/KIA.

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9 Apr: Air strikes were conducted, at 0830H, against NVA in the open, at YD 068607, resulting in 3 NVA/KIA. At 1015H, a recon team tripped a rigged 60mm round at YD 119491. Results: 3 WIA. In the afternoon air strikes were directed at YD 083599 and YD 075586 resulting in three secondary explosions.

10 Apr: Camp Carroll, at 0700H, received 1 round incoming artillery. Air strikes during the day were directed at YD 058639, YD 050636 and YD 050735, resulting in several bunkers destroyed and several secondary explosions.

11 Apr: At 0930H, 3/9 at XD 982545 received sporadic rifle fire from YD 033573. 81mm and 106mm fire were directed on the target. At 1135H, 3/9 at Thon Son Lam received 27 rounds of incoming artillery resulting in 10 WIA. 2/9, during a cordon and search in the afternoon at YD 095524, detained 3 VC/POW and 16 suspects.

12 Apr: The road sweep received sniper fire at 0730H, resulting in 1 WIA. Both Camp Carroll and 3/9 at Thon Son Lam received incoming artillery and rockets resulting in 2 WIA.

14 Apr: At 0745H, 3/9 at YD 071572 found four 75mm rockets and two 60mm rounds.

15 Apr: At 1247H, 3/9 at Thon Son Lam received 15 rounds incoming 122mm rockets from YD 930534. Results: 3 WIA. At 1700H, 3 NVA tossed chimcom's at a recon team at YD 022751. Results: 2 WIA. The recon team returned fire and called in gunships. Camp Carroll during the day received automatic weapons fire from YD 068544.

16 Apr: Camp Carroll received 5 incoming artillery rounds and two incoming grenades during the day. 3/9 at YD 988480 received 9 rounds 122mm rockets at 1540H. NVA were sighted at YD 208535, YD 209542 and YD 925572. Artillery fire was called in.

17 Apr: 3/9 received 18 rounds of estimated 122mm rockets from XD 895519 at 1322H. Results: 1 WIA. They returned fire with artillery, 106mm BR, tanks and 81mm mortars.

18 Apr: At 1600H, an airstrike was run at YD 076485, resulting in 2 secondary explosions.

19 Apr: At 1830H, a squad from G/2/9 was fired upon by an estimated two NVA platoons, while checking for anti-personnel mines on Bridge 28, at XD 956428. The NVA fire came from both sides of the river, but principally, from what later was known to be a reinforced bunker complex at XD 960433. L/3/1 nearby helped evacuate casualties. When two tanks and 2/G arrived at 1000H, the NVA increased their attack with extremely

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heavy, S/A, A/W, and sniper, mortar and RPG fire. Counter airstrikes, artillery and mortar fire were called in immediately. At 1200H, 3-5 trucks, traveling from Khe Sanh, were disabled as they tried to cross Bridge 28. At this time there were 14 KIA, 67 WIA, and 8 NVA/KIA. At 1815H, I/3/1 incurred 9 WIA from incoming mortars at XD 967432. At 2200H, three tanks, two dusters and 1/G arrived to reinforce those units trying to retrieve casualties from Bridge 28. 3/G arrived and began an attack on the bunker complex at XD 960433, under light provided by flare ships. As the attack continued, 3/G received extremely heavy fire. 1/G and 3/1, enroute to reinforce 3/G and evacuate their casualties, sustained an additional 6 KIA and 44 WIA. 2/26 assumed defense of Camp Carroll. Major forces: 2/9, 3/9, 3/1 and 2/26.

20 Apr: At 0720H a G/2/9 fire team sent to the high ground at XD 956429, to search for MIA's and act as an OP, received heavy fire and withdrew under suppressive tank fire. Results: 2 WIA. At 0900H, a platoon was sent to the area and also received heavy fire. Results: 5 WIA. At 1605H, a tank was disabled by a command detonated mine, after crossing Bridge 28. M/3/1, during the day, maneuvered through dense terrain toward the bunker complex at XD 957430. Approaching darkness caused "M" Company to set in at XD 956432.

21 Apr: At 0600H, prep fires of the objective at XD 956430 commenced, followed by G/2/9 moving into position at XD 957429, to act as a base of fire. M/3/1 again began to sweep toward its objective. At 0720H, G/2/9 received heavy, A/W fire. M/3/1, during the day, crossed the bridge at XD 956428 with the assistance of a smoke screen. Results: 1 KIA and 2 WIA.

22 Apr: At 0055H, M/3/1 fired at 1 NVA probing their lines. Results: 1 NVA/KIA. At 0500H, G/2/9 at XD 958482 heard movement and threw 1 grenade. Results: 1 NVA/WIA (POW). By 1030H, G/2/9 and M/3/1 had swept the bunker complex at YD 958480, resulting in numerous weapons and munitions captured, and 6 NVA/KIA. At 1615H, a M/3/1 platoon at XD 952428 received 6 rounds, incoming mortar, resulting in 4 WIA. At 1945H, M/3/1 at XD 952424 found an RPG rocket launcher and 3 NVA/KIA. Several weapons were captured. At 1630H, 2/26 at YD 089576 found 55 NVA/KIA in one grave, together with assorted documents. At 2115H, a 3/1 ambush at XD 967432 initiated contact. Withdrawing they received 3 chicom grenades. Results: 2 WIA.

23 Apr: During the day, a road sweep uncovered several mines and claymores rigged for detonation. At 1930H, I/3/1 at XD 956428 received 15-20 incoming 82mm rounds.

24 Apr: Two anti-tank mines were found on the road at XD 976435.

25 Apr: At 0830H, H/2/26 received sniper fire at YD 099525. They returned fire. At 1105H, 2/9, at YD 006861, received one incoming recoilless rifle round.

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26 Apr: M/3/1 heard movement around their lines, at XD 966430, and threw two grenades which caused one secondary explosion. Results: 2 WIA. At 0930H, Ca Lu received 5-7 incoming, 107mm rocket rounds resulting in 4 WIA. At 1022H, Camp Carroll received 5-7 incoming 130mm rounds resulting in 5 WIA. At 2115H, L/3/1 at XD 967432 initiated an ambush. While withdrawing toward their perimeter, they received 3 chicom grenades, resulting in 2 WIA. At 1228H, M/3/1, at XD 956429, received two unidentified short rounds. Results: 1 KIA and 4 WIA. At 1830H, M/3/1 and G/2/9 combined to sweep the area, encountering RPG, MG, and 82mm mortar fire. Results: 3 WIA and 13 NVA/KIA. Between 1035H and 1140H, Ca Lu and LZ Stud received 16 incoming rockets.

27 Apr: At 0930H, 3/9 at XD 969743 found elephant tracks approximately 2 weeks old. At 1030H, M/3/1 at XD 955428, with a section of B Company, 3rd Tanks, captured 1 NVA/POW and found 2 NVA/KIA. At 1611H, Camp Carroll received between forty and fifty 130mm rockets from YD 069635. One **rocket** exploded a fuel dump. Results were 2 WIA. Counter artillery was fired.

28 Apr: At 0623H, Camp Carroll received 7 incoming artillery rounds. At 0935H, F/2/6, at YD 068553, called in artillery on an observed bunker resulting in 1 NVA/KIA. I/3/1, on patrol during the morning, while approaching a bunker complex, was hit by command detonated mines, S/A, A/W, chicom grenades and 60mm mortar fire at XD 956447. The unit returned fire using **UH-1E** gunships in support. Contact was broken at 1230H. Results were 3 KIA, 14 WIA and 1 NVA/KIA. At 1130H, Camp Carroll received 2 rounds of 75mm artillery. During the day 2/26 found 13 NVA/KIA at YD 072575.

29 Apr: At 1000H, I/3/1 at YD 963454 received 40 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortars. The Company called in supporting fire then assaulted 10 NVA in foxholes. Results: 1 KIA, 3 WIA, and 4 NVA/KIA. The company later found a light machine gun, 60mm mortars and other ordnance. At 1600H, L/3/1, at YD 953455, was ambushed by claymore mines, .50 caliber fire, A/W and chicom grenades. Results: 5 WIA. Counter artillery resulted in 2 NVA/KIA.

30 Apr: At 0755H, an I/3/1 patrol, at XD 952453, made contact with an unknown size NVA force. Pulling back to call in artillery they received 60mm mortar fire causing 2 WIA. A subsequent TPQ resulted in a 60mm mortar destroyed, one large secondary explosion, and 7 NVA/KIA. A Huey gunship pilot in support was wounded. At 1830H, Camp Carroll received 2 rounds of 130mm artillery. Counter artillery was fired.

1 May: Between 1100H and 1530H, I/3/1 at XD 954451 received 25 artillery and rocket rounds. At 1400H, an AO reported 2 NVA digging fighting holes at XD 963418. He called in an artillery mission causing 1 NVA/KIA. At 1613H, 3/1 at YD 974436 discovered a tunnel 25 feet long with a room at the end 8'x5'x4'. At 1930H, 3/1 saw 3 NVA standing in a stream at XD 944428. 60mm and 81mm mortar missions were fired.

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2 May: At 1110H, a 3/1 patrol at XD 955430, discovered 2 NVA/KIA. At 1505H, Camp Carroll received 3 rounds artillery causing 12 WIA.

3 May: At 0645H, 3/1 at XD 997448 was hit by 6 incoming mortar rounds. At 1115H, Camp Carroll received six 82mm mortar rounds. Results: 4 WIA. Meanwhile, H/2/26 at YD 074574 received twenty rounds resulting in 4 WIA. Counter mortar and artillery were fired at YD 066589.

4 May: At 0820H, an AO observed NVA at YD 0666. A subsequent artillery mission resulted in 4 NVA/KIA. UH-1E gunships also fired at YD 0667 causing 2 NVA/KIA. At 1323H, Camp Carroll received 2 incoming 75mm rounds. At 1915H, an AO directed air strikes on rocket positions at YD 060664, resulting in 6 rocket launchers destroyed, one secondary explosion and 2 NVA/KIA.

5 May: At 0830H, H/2/26 at YD 073574, received three 82mm rounds from vicinity YD 061592, resulting in 3 WIA. At 1845H, air strikes were called in by an AO on rocket sites and bunkers at YD 065625. While making the runs, the aircraft received automatic weapons fire. Results: 1 NVA/KIA.

6 May: At 0740H, I/3/1, while sweeping in vicinity XD 985429, saw 2 NVA just above the road. The 2 NVA detonated three claymore mines, threw two chicom grenades and fled. Return fire and a search of the area produced negative results. There were 3 WIA incurred. Ca Lu had unidentified incoming at 1000H resulting in 1 KIA and 8 WIA. Camp Carroll received two incoming artillery rounds at 1045H causing 1 WIA. From 1045H to 1525H, 3 air strikes at vicinity YD 063628 resulted in 25 bunkers destroyed, several secondary explosions and 2 NVA/KIA. At 1300H, a helicopter blew burning trash along a slope at YD 965430, causing an unknown type of ordnance to explode. Results: 5 WIA. A short 105mm round hit YD 194419, at 1745H, causing 1 WIA.

7 May: Between 1140H and 1200H, air strikes were directed against a suspected enemy camp site at XD 925548 and suspected rocket sites at XD 915532. Results: 3 NVA/KIA.

8 May: At 1310H, Ca Lu had 8 WIA from 12 incoming 107mm rockets fired from XD 952472 and XD 957470.

9 May: At 0400H, one KIA and one WIA from 3/1 were caused by a premature detonation of a grenade at XD 954429. At 1100H, a recon team discovered an NVA/VC campsite at YD 055353. The team detained 15 persons (men, women, and children) and found two sets of NVA utilities, one U.S. blanket and one U.S. canteen. The detainees were extracted. A second air strike was directed at 1710H against a bunker complex at YD 053627. Camp Carroll received two incoming 130mm artillery rounds at 1805H. A Popular Forces/Regional Forces unit at 1845H reported an NVA location at YD 108520. An artillery mission was called. At 2045H, a recon team reported observing

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bright lights and hearing vehicle engines at YD 118465 and YD 135465. 1/12 fired artillery resulting in six secondary explosions.

10 May: At 0630H, Camp Carroll was hit by 2 rounds 75mm artillery. Results: 1 WIA. The regular engineer mine sweep, at 0710H, discovered 100 pounds of explosives under a culvert at YD 077571, set for command detonation. At 0930H, Camp Carroll received another two rounds of 75mm artillery. At 1630H, recon fired an artillery mission at four NVA hiding in a shelter at XD 950540. Results were 1 NVA/KIA and two secondary explosions. At 2000H, a Regional and Popular Force unit at D-5 (YD 094514) received incoming 82mm and automatic weapons fire. Counter artillery was fired in support.

11 May: The road sweep, at 0820H, received 30-40 rounds 82mm mortar resulting in 8 WIA. Artillery and mortar counter fire were called. At 0840H, 3 WIA were caused by fourteen, incoming 107mm and 122mm rockets from XD 919537. Counter fire included 106mm, artillery and 40mm. At 0955H, Ca Lu had six rounds incoming 107mm rockets. A counter mission was fired. Between 1200H and 1500H, air strikes were directed at XD 953475, XD 954474 and YD 058632. Results were one rocket site destroyed one rocket launcher burning, ten bunkers damaged, 2 secondary explosions and 1 NVA/KIA.

12 May: At 0945H, artillery was called in by an air observer on 3 rocket sites at YD 949469, causing 1 NVA/KIA.

13 May: At 0800H, a recon team trying to locate a previously, killed recon Marine, received fire at YD 0665594 resulting in 2 KIA and 2 WIA. At 1030H, a 30 man recon reaction force also was fired upon. Results: 1 WIA. At 1030H, an 11th Engineer bulldozer at XD 985440 hit a small frag mine. Results: 2 WIA. Between 1120H and 1430H, Camp Carroll received 9 rounds incoming, resulting in 2 WIA. Two Ch-46's were also damaged. At 1710H, a UH-34 was shot down at YD 125544 and burned.

14 May: The morning road sweep hit a mine resulting in 1 WIA. At 1300H, a recon unit called in artillery on 3 NVA at YD 355060. Camp Carroll received four incoming rounds at 1350H. LZ Stud at 1410H received one incoming artillery round. At 2035H, Regional and Popular Forces received 3 incoming 82mm rounds at YD 094514. Counter artillery was fired at YD 088512. At 2205H, 3/1 at YD 952428 received 3 rounds incoming artillery.

15 May: At 1000H, a platoon of 3/1 took NVA under fire at XD 968489. Only a bloody pack was found at the site. At 1130H, 3/1 at XD 955429 received 4 incoming RPG rounds from XD 956431.

16 May: At 0825H, a command detonated mine exploded along Route #9 resulting in 1 KIA and 1 WIA. At 0910H, 3/1 received 1 sniper round re-

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sulting in 1 WIA. At 1100H, a 3/1 patrol at XD 055434 received fire from two to four NVA. There was 1 KIA and 1 WIA. Artillery and air strikes were directed at XD 955439. At 1202H, Camp Carroll received two incoming 75mm rounds resulting in 2 WIA. Air strikes were directed on a bunker complex at YD 058584 at 1700H, and at 1345H, directed at bunker and rocket positions at YD 0666. At 2245H, a 2/9 squad exchanged S/A fire with NVA at YD 005470. Gunships and a flare ship arrived at 1155H. Several artillery and mortar missions were called in on the various NVA sighted running away.

17 May: At 0800H, 4th Marine snipers at YD 054435 received small arms fire while on patrol. Counter mortar fire was called in. At 0915H, 3 NVA at XD 953422 were fired at with mortars. At 0930H, a 3/1 patrol received and returned fire at XD 964445. A check of the area revealed 1 NVA/KIA. Two air strikes were run between 1020H and 1045H at YD 069593 and XD 9660. At 1135H, recon observed 1 NVA at XD 974415 and called in artillery. At 1530H, an air observer called in an air strike of ten 2000lb bombs at YD 066493. At 1800H, air strikes were directed by an air observer at YD 093486 resulting in 1 NVA/KIA. At 1810H, 2/9 at Ca Lu sighted a wooden platform atop a ridgeline at YD 033462. 81mm and twin 40mm fire destroyed the tower.

18 May: At 0930H, vehicles on Route #9 at XD 077435 received sniper fire resulting in 2 WIA. At 1000H, a recon team was hit by mortar and rifle fire at XD 882512. Supported by an AO and gunship, the team was extracted. Results: 3 KIA, 3 WIA and 1 MIA. At 1200H, a 2/26 patrol at YD 099600 received 4 rounds incoming 82mm. At 1330H, the patrol commenced crossing the river (YD 098596) and received both 82mm and semi-automatic rifle fire. Two marines were swept downstream as a base of fire was being set up. Artillery was called in at YD 092598. Results: 2 WIA and 2 MIA (later found to be 2 KIA). At 1330H, a 3/1 patrol while checking a bunker complex at XD 977448 received automatic weapons fire resulting in 2 WIA. The patrol pulled back and preped the area with 81mm mortar fire. Returning, they were fired on again. Results: 6 WIA. They pulled back a second time and called in artillery. At 2015H, a 2/26 patrol suffered 2 WIA from an engagement with 4 NVA at YD 098587.

19 May: A recon team at 1300H called in artillery on 2 NVA and a mortar position at YD 085599. Results: 1 NVA/KIA. Counter artillery was fired at 1410H, at YD 090598, resulting in 4 secondary explosions. Camp Carroll received one incoming round at 1440H. At 1530H, 3/1 patrol found a battalion size camp site and bunker complex at XD 959442. Sixty-six mortar and 13 RPG rounds were found.

20 May: At 0845H, twenty-one VC suspects were apprehended during a two-company ambush and cordon operation around YD 041445. Assorted medical supplies were also found. At 1100H, a RF/PF patrol was hit by a command detonated claymore mine resulting in 4 KIA and 4 WIA. Camp Carroll had

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incoming at 1525H. Another claymore mine was detonated at XD 968445 resulting in 5 WIA to 3/1.

21 May: At 1245H, a platoon from 3/1 at XD 956448 called in artillery fire on an apparent NVA bunker. When the artillery prep terminated, the platoon began receiving RPG and automatic weapons fire from the bunker. Artillery fires were again called in and adjusted by an air observer overhead. Twenty NVA were sighted scattering. A search of the area revealed assorted medical gear and gas masks. Results were 2 WIA. At 1620H, a recon team at YD 067413 exchanged fire with 10 NVA. Results: 2 WIA and 4 NVA/KIA. At 1410H, a second recon team at YD 066416 called in artillery fire. One short round resulted in 2 WIA. Sighting of NVA were made by three other recon teams at approximately 1850H in the area of XD 992513. Fire missions were called in.

22 May: Camp Carroll received approximately 40 rounds of incoming artillery during the morning resulting in 6 WIA. Between 1500H-1800H, air strikes were called in by 3/1 on an NVA force firing RPG's from Hill 512, vicinity XD 955450. Artillery and mortar fire were also called in. K/3/1, as they moved toward Hill 512, encountered automatic weapons and RPG fire. An assault on the hill resulted in 11 WIA, 3 NVA/KIA, one light machine gun captured and 2 IWC.

23 May: From 0630H to 0930H, Kilo Company 3/1 at XD 954451 received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar from XD 946448. Results: 5 WIA. Artillery and air strikes were called in on the target. At 1250H, 2/26 snipers sighted 50-60 NVA with packs at YD 051525. At 1645H, artillery was called in. Kilo Company 3/1 while on patrol received automatic weapon and RPG fire. Two claymores were also detonated. There were no casualties. Artillery was called in at XD 961448. As 3/1 moved toward XD 955450, sniper fire resulted in 1 WIA. Artillery fire again was called in.

24 May: Camp Carroll received several incoming artillery rounds at 1445H, resulting in 2 WIA. Counter artillery fired at YD 027597 and YD 037592 resulted in 7 secondary explosions. At 2000H, 2/26 found 5 NVA/KIA at YD 082575, amid 40 fighting holes. NVA were sighted three times between 2040H and 2250H, and fire missions called in.

25 May: At 0600H, a 3/1 patrol found 1 NVA/KIA and documents at XD 954451. At 1100H, artillery fire was called in by an AO on YD 030591 resulting in 1 NVA/KIA. At 1322H, Camp Carroll received four rounds incoming artillery. At 1400H, a 3/1 patrol exchanged fire with 5-6 NVA in a bunker complex at XD 958458. Results: 3 NVA/KIA. Documents were also found. From 2025H to 2200H, lights were observed at XD 950545 and YD 029239. Artillery fire was adjusted on both locations. TASK FORCE HOTEL ASSUMED LANCASTER II AO.

26 May: At 0553H, the muzzle blast from 175mm artillery at Thon Son Lam ignited powder causing a fire which destroyed the artillery piece and resulted in 11 WIA. Camp Carroll at 0905H received 5 rounds, incoming 75mm artillery, resulting in 5 WIA. Artillery missions fired from Camp Carroll at

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1530H resulted in 1 NVA/KIA at XD 952462. At 1600H, a 3/1 patrol was ambushed at XD 053454 by an unknown force using claymore mines. Artillery and mortar fire were called in. Results: 4 KIA and 3 WIA.

27 May: At 1300H, a 3/1 Marine at XD 943423, while disembarking from a vehicle, detonated an unknown explosive device. Results were 3 KIA and 12 WIA. Camp Carroll sighted lights at 2200H at YD 024594. An artillery mission resulted in one secondary explosion. 2/26 was relieved by 1/4. Forces: 2/9, 3/9, 1/4 and 3/1. 4TH MARINES ASSUMED LANCASTER II AO UNDER CPON AT YASK PERO HOTEL.

28 May: No significant events.

29 May: At 0945H, a 1/4 patrol exchanged fire with 2 NVA. As 81mm mortars were called in, 11 NVA fled to the north from YD 081586. At 1210H, 3/9 at 989557 received 6 unidentified rounds incoming. At 1250H, Camp Carroll received 6 rounds incoming artillery. Counter artillery was fired.

30 May: At 1015H, a 3/1 patrol found 14 bunkers at YD 7598. At 1215H, a 3/1 patrol found 1 NVA/KIA at XD 964449. A mine detonated at 1400H, at YD 065570, resulted in 1 WIA. 3/9 chopped out of AO. Forces: 2/9, 1/4 and 3/1.

31 May: 2/4, chopped to 4th Marines, set in at LZ Stud. At 0035H, 1/4 at YD 89578 received 2 rounds incoming 82mm and semi-automatic fire from YD 09258. They returned fire. At 1050H, 3/1 sustained 3 KIA and 2 WIA when a command detonated mine and automatic weapon fired on a platoon. At 1500H, the platoon was receiving incoming 60mm rounds and at 1600H it was receiving incoming 82mm rounds. Counter mortar and artillery were conducted by an AO above the site. At 1900H, another NVA mortar attack commenced as the platoon engaged several NVA in reinforced bunkers at XD 957455. Results were 6 KIA and 28 WIA. Major forces: 2/9, 1/4, 2/4 and 3/1.

1 Jun: At 0430H, M/3/1 at XD 961451 received incoming artillery which resulted in 1 KIA and 1 WIA. At 1401H, Camp Carroll received twenty incoming 122mm rockets. Results: 1 WIA.

2 Jun: At 1355H, F/2/9 at XD 955451 received 52 rounds incoming 60mm and 82mm mortar. There were no casualties. 1/4 was chopped OFCON out of the AO. Forces available: 2/9, 2/4 and 3/1.

3 Jun: At 0900H, the Route #9 road sweep at YD 062582 received 12 rounds 60mm mortar fired from YD 040585. Results: 3 WIA. At 1107H, a squad from 2/9 at YD 961454 was fired upon by 4 to 6 NVA. After 11 WIA were evacuated, artillery fire was called in. 1/9 relieved 3/1. Major forces: 1/9, 2/9 and 2/4.

5 Jun: At 0955H, twenty NVA were sighted by an AO at YD 069583. Artillery strikes resulted in 13 NVA/KIA. At 1400H, the bridge at YD 977435 was blown. The explosion resulted in 2 KIA and 5 WIA. At 1515H, a 4th

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Marine's convoy received two sniper rounds resulting in 1 WIA.

6 Jun: At 0115H, 2/9 observed movement outside their perimeter at YD 004454. They threw one grenade and were immediately fired upon in return. Results: 1 WIA. At 1240H, a USA ~~UH-1E~~ gunship crashed at YD 014454, resulting in 1 KIA and 3 WIA. 9TH MARINES ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR LANCASTER II AO.

7 Jun: Between 1500H and 1700H, LZ Stud received approximately 35 unknown artillery rounds which exploded four ammo dumps. Results: 10 WIA. At 1745H, a UH-34 helicopter crashed at YD 011451.

8 Jun: At 0715H, a recon team at YD 952523, sighting several NVA, called in a fire mission which resulted in 3 NVA/KIA.

9 Jun: At 1045H, two Seabee trucks burned from a mine explosion on Route #9 at YD 058567. No Casualties.

12 Jun: At 0820H, the regular road sweep at YD 064570 exploded a mine. Results: 3 WIA.

13 Jun: 3 WIA's resulted when one round friendly artillery landed inside 1/9's perimeter at YD 074574.

14 Jun: 2/4 to Scotland AO. Forces: 1/9 and 2/9.

15 Jun: At 0750H, the Route # 9 road sweep at XD 925434 was ambushed on both sides of the road. It received semi and automatic rifle fire plus sustaining several claymore mine blasts. Results: 4 KIA's and 4 WIA. At 0842H, F/2/9 made contact with an estimated 15-20 NVA in bunkers and fighting holes at YD 956454. Mortars, artillery and air support followed. Results: 1 KIA, 6 WIA and 1 NVA/KIA. At 1030H, 2/9 at XD 956447 received eight rounds 82mm mortar. Counter artillery was fired at XD 965464. A recon team called artillery fire in on 4 NVA at YD 022497 resulting in 4 NVA/KIA.

17 Jun: 1/3 chopped to 9th Marines. Forces: 1/9, 2/9 and 1/3.

18 Jun: Camp Carroll received 3 rounds incoming 75mm artillery. Counter artillery fired at YD 072512.

20 Jun: Camp Carroll received 3 rounds incoming 75mm artillery.

21 Jun: 1/9 set up cordon around Thon Doc Kinh. A RF/PF search of the village yielded 20 civilian without ID cards and 47 VC suspects. At 1945H, psychological operations in the cordon area were started by telling villagers that Marines would do them no harm. A reward system for VC personnel reported, and weapons and equipment turned in, was established.

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At 2000H, a 1/9 Marine tripped an explosive device, resulting in 1 WIA.

22 Jun: At 0220H, 1/9 observed 6 persons moving away from the village. They engaged the personnel with semi-automatic fire. One NVA was killed. Also one female NVA nurse, 1 AK-47, medical supplies and several documents were captured. At 0630H, 1/9 heard movement in front of their lines. An M-26 grenade was thrown resulting in 1 NVA/KIA. At 1245H, a truck at YD 060559 received several incoming Chicoms and S/A fire. Results: 3 WIA. During the day 1/9 held a MEDCAP for over 300 villagers.

23 Jun: The cordon operation was moved to Ton Ban Son. At 1530H, a detailed search was commenced by 1/9 together with popular and regional forces. A MEDCAP program was held during the day for over 100 villagers. At 2000H, a Marine tripped a surprise explosive device, resulting in 1 WIA.

24 Jun: At 1052H, 1 WIA resulted when a Marine tripped a booby-trapped 60mm mortar round. At 1337H, a recon team was taken under fire at YD 969580 resulting in 1 WIA.

26 Jun: At 0930H, Camp Carroll received 1 round 75mm pack howitzer. At 1600H, a vehicle on a convoy hit a mine. Results: 1 WIA. 1/4 relieved 1/3. Major forces: 1/9, 2/9 and 1/4.

27 Jun: At 1710H, Camp Carroll received 2 rounds of estimated 75mm pack howitzer.

28 Jun: At 1745H, B/1/9 found a camouflaged cave at YD 118537. Inside the cave were two bikes, 1 Chicom grenade and several documents.

29 Jun: At 1120H, Camp Carroll received 1 round believed to be 75mm pack howitzer. Counter artillery was fired. At 1200H, a Route #9 convoy, at YD 065571, received approximately 10-20 rounds of 82mm mortar, resulting in 1 WIA. TASK FORCE HOTEL/4TH MARINES ASSUMED LANCASTER II AO.

30 Jun: Camp Carroll received 4 rounds of suspected 75mm pack howitzer from a direction of 5800 mils between 0530H and 0940H. Counter battery fire was called.

1 Jul: At 0005H, a B/1/9 ambush at XD 117528 sustained 5 WIA from incoming mortar rounds. Initiating an ambush at 0100H, a unit from B/1/9 checked the area the following morning, at 0630H, and sighted 2 VC hiding in the bushes. One VC was wounded and captured, the other escaped. A large amount of equipment was found. At 1730H, a B/1/9 patrol at YD 119513 took 3 NVA under fire. Results: 1 NVA/KIA and several documents found.

2 Jul: At 0350H, G/2/4 at XD 956464 found an 82mm mortar pit and 10 rounds 82mm. At 1130H, G/2/4 at XD 956463 received several incoming Chicom grenades. They returned fire. Results: 2 NVA/KIA. At 2130H, Camp

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Carroll received two incoming sniper rounds from 100 meters outside the perimeter at YD 055584. Counter artillery was fired. At 2200H, A/1/9 at YD 982581 received S/A fire from vicinity XD 984532.

3 Jul: No significant events.

4 Jul: From 0745H to 0930H, Camp Carroll received 6 rounds 75mm pack howitzer from an unknown position. Results: 4 WIA. At 1700H, A/1/9, at vicinity XD 982531, called a fire mission on 6 NVA in the open, **resulting** in 2 NVA/KIA.

5 Jul: At 1130H, H/2/4 at YD 196847 received 23 rounds 82mm mortar as a helicopter approached. Results: 1 WIA.

6 Jul: At 1100H, 1/4 commenced a helilift from LZ Mike to LZ Stud. The lift was completed at 1130H. At 1230H, H/2/4 commenced a lift to XD 873429. At 1130H, M/3/4 and "B" command group lifted to LZ Mike. At 2025H, 1/9, at the Rockpile, observed blinking lights believed to be some type of signal at XD 986566 and XD 965567. A 90mm mission was fired. The lights went out. 2/9 chopped out of AO. **Major forces: 1/4 and 1/9.**

7 Jul: 1/9 chopped out of AO. Major force unit: 1/4.

8 Jul: At 0845H, a recon team while being inserted at XD 952593, observed 2 NVA and fired on them. There were 2 NVA/KIA.

9 Jul: At 0710H, an air observer adjusted two flights of fixed wing air strikes, destroying 8 enemy bunkers at XD 866378 and 15 enemy bunkers at XD 868378. At 0830H, K/3/4, at XD 879381, received eleven incoming 82mm mortar rounds from XD 879371 and XD 869367. At 0830H, an air observer adjusted air strikes on XD 879371, destroying 4 bunkers and 5 fighting holes. 1/3 chopped to 4th Marines. **Major force units: 1/3 and 1/4,**

10 Jul: At 1000H, a recon team came under heavy semi-automatic fire from an estimated 15-30 NVA wearing green utilities and hard hats. There were negative casualties. At 1715H, a second recon team at XD 963534 made contact with 20-25 NVA/VC resulting in 3 NVA/KIA. TASK/FORCE HOTEL ASSUMED OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF LANCASTER II AO. 2/3 moved into AO. Major forces in AO: 1/3, 2/3 and 1/4.

12 Jul: At 0900H, the 3rd Marines began saturation of Route #9 with OP's and other blocking positions in conjunction with a 9th Marine operation in their AO, to stop infiltration across Route #9. At 0900H, M/3/3 moved by helo to LZ Shepherd. At 1225H, 1/3/3 at YD 074576 took 30 rounds 60mm mortar fire from YD 062592, resulting in 4 WIA. An artillery mission silenced the mortars. At 1800H, 1/3/3 at YD 074576 found one 82mm mortar

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tube with bipod and base, one M-16, one 45 cal. pistol, 1 LAAW, eleven M-26 grenades, one CS grenade, 25 Chicom grenades, two smoke grenades, 1 PRC-93 radio, 1 PRC-25 radio, ten 82mm rounds, three hundred M-16 magazines, and 15 AK-47 magazines. At 1920H, a recon team at XD 967616 sighted 2 NVA in a tree line at XD 958607. An artillery mission resulted in 3 NVA/KIA. 3/3 relieved 1/4. Major forces available: 1/3, 2/3 and 3/3.

13 Jul: At 1230H, a unit from 3/3 at YD 068594 found 7 bunkers, assorted 782 gear, 13 chicom, ninety-two 82mm rounds, 300 AK-47 rounds, 20 cans increments, 82mm and several RPG rounds.

14 Jul: At 0758H, an AO sighted 4 NVA on motor cycles at XD 970750. Results of AO taking them under fire: 4 NVA/KIA. At 0800H, M/3/3 helilifted to Camp Carroll. Several artillery and mortars missions were called in during the morning on NVA sighted in the open. At 1645H, K/3/3 at YD 057588 found 75 bunkers used within two weeks. Also captured were 100 rounds 82mm, 35 frag grenades, 35 AK-47 rifles grenades, increments and fuzes, shovels and picks, 10 RPG rounds, 5800 rounds 7.62mm, 500 rounds .30 cal. link ammo, 100 chicom grenades, 3 NVA water cans, 2 NVA gas masks, 4 cooking pots and 500 pounds of rice.

17 Jul: LANCASTER JULY ACTION COMMENCED. D-Day had been 16 July, extended 1 day for Arc Lights which never were received. Six Battalions attacked the northern portion of Lancaster II AO on D Day.

1. 3/9 was helilifted into LZ Sparrow YD 0606660.
2. 2/9 was helilifted into LZ Wren YD 050650.
3. 1/9 walked into a blocking position vicinity YD 095650.
4. 1st and 3rd Battalions 2d ARVN moved by foot into vicinity XD 932537 and XD 952577.
5. 2/3 was helilifted into LZ Falcon YD 037641.

At 0745H, 3/9 completed their helilift into LZ Sparrow. K/3/9 at 1105H in the vicinity of YD 045656, made contact with an estimated NVA company. Initially they received heavy S/A fire and 45 rounds of 60mm mortars. They returned fire with organic weapons, artillery and called in air strikes. Other elements of 3/9 moved up and were engaged at 1115H; heavy contact continued until 1500H, then subsided. Results of the contact were 38 NVA/KIA. Friendly losses were 7 KIA and 28 WIA. B/1/9, vicinity of YD 087650, at 1410H, received 10 rounds of 82mm mortars resulting in 1 WIA, the company commander. Then at 1722H, vicinity YD 090645, B/1/9 received 7 rounds 82mm mortar resulting in 3 KIA and 8 WIA. A/1/9, at 1420H, vicinity of YD 087650, received four 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 5 WIA.

A recon team (Alexander) acting as pathfinders for the 2d Bn, 3rd Marines was inserted in LZ Falcon. At 1142H, at YD 035640, they made contact with an estimated 15-20 NVA and received S/A fire, grenades

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and mortars. Recon killed 10 NVA and sustained 4 WIA. Air strikes by A-1's and F-4's from MAG 11 and 12 killed an additional 11 NVA. 2/3 continued with their plan to land at LZ Falcon and were all in the LZ at 1500H. The companies moved out to the west and at 1900H, E/2/3, vicinity YD 022639, received 20 rounds of 60mm mortars resulting in 2 KIA and 1 WIA. 1 hour for 2/3 had been delayed in order to make extra preps. The 2nd ARVN Regiment made no contact for the day.

18 Jul: Contacts were light for Third Marines, and Ninth Marines reported no contacts. At 1010H, 1/3 helilifted into its alternate LZ, Crow, since LZ Gull was not considered ready. An NVA FO was sighted by elements of G/2/3 at 1530H, vicinity of YD 024648. The NVA was killed by a sniper team with the company. At 1735H, M/3/9, in the vicinity of YD 046656, found 60lbs of TNT, five DH-10 mines and 13 NVA/KIA. 3rd Marines moved K/3/3 (rein) into LZ Cardinal, at 1345H, to establish a foothold for future operations in the west.

19 Jul: No contact was reported for this day as the units continued a search of their ZOA. 3/3 (-) was helilifted into LZ Buzzard at 0930H. At 1000H, F/2/9, at YD 054679, found 11 graves with one NVA in each. The bodies were badly decomposed. At 1230H, D/1/3, in the vicinity of YD 015616, found 1 NVA skeleton. At 1630H, K/3/9 at YD 142654, found another NVA body. At 1830H, I/3/3, in the vicinity of YD 028599, found 6 bunkers, one having a false bottom, parts for a 75mm pack howitzer, one elevation mechanism, 2 wheels, 4 batteries and one pair of Russian field glasses (8x30) with case. Then at 1913H, L/3/9, in the vicinity of YD 038649, found 8 graves with 2 NVA bodies in each.

20 Jul: At 0200H, I/3/9, vicinity of YD 042655, found 3 NVA bodies at YD 070653 and received 15 rounds of 82mm mortars, resulting in 1 KIA and 1 WIA, both Kit Carson Scouts. At 1000H, vicinity of YD 027602, I/3/3 found two disassembled 75mm pack howitzers and 26 rounds. D/1/3 at 1200H, vicinity of YD 016613, found 1 SKS rifle and the remains of one NVA. H/2/3, vicinity of YD 005645, sighted 11 NVA in the open and fired an artillery mission resulting in 6 NVA/KIA. The lack of enough AO's was now very evident. At 1130H, G/2/9 in the vicinity of YD 053687 engaged an estimated NVA company in bunkers. The lead platoon of G/2/9 made contact and was pinned down by an enemy force that maneuvered to the west and brought fire to bear on the platoon. Friendly and enemy forces were in such close proximity, supporting arms could not be used initially. The platoon pulled back and conducted artillery missions and air strikes. Results at this time were 1 KIA, 2 MIA and 11 WIA. At 1600H, a squad from G/2/9, moved up and recovered the two MIA's who were found to be KIA's. A total of 32 NVA were KIA, 3 NVA/KIA by ground forces and total friendly losses were 3 KIA and 12 WIA.

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21 Jul: Elements of 2/9 at 1330H, vicinity of YD 052685, received 6 rounds of 82mm mortars resulting in 1 KIA and 9 WIA. At 1440H, E/2/9 sighted 35 NVA at YD 055689, moving west. They engaged them with S/A, 81mm, artillery fire and A/S. Results were 23 NVA/KIA and 10 killed by artillery fire. This contact prompted the Regimental Commander to ask permission to enter the DMZ area to pursue the NVA. This request was forwarded by CG TF Hotel and CG 3d MarDiv. Higher authority was advised of the Division Commander's intention to enter the DMZ, south of the Ben Hai, for less than 48 hours, if the situation so dictated. The requirement to enter the DMZ did not persist. At 0735H, K/3/9 at YD 038659, found 2 NVA bodies 4-5 days old. Other elements from 2/9, at 1050H in the vicinity of YD 060675, found 4 NVA killed by S/A fire, 3 AK-47's, 2 gas masks, 15 chicom grenades and assorted 782 gear and documents. L/3/9 found 52 122mm rocket rounds. 1/9 in the vicinity of YD 063668 found 20 rounds of 107mm rockets. G/2/9 at YD 054686, found one NVA/KIA by S/A fire.

22 Jul: At 1110H, F/2/9, vicinity of YD 059688, while searching the area of contact of 21 July, found 5 NVA/KIA, ten weapons, 52 packs, 41 gas masks, 30 canteens, and assorted 782 gear.

23 Jul: During the day, 2/9 helilifted into LZ Carol, YD 056619 and 3/9 helilifted into LZ Red, YD 081606. Both landings were unopposed. At 1730H, 1/9 vicinity of YD 051642, captured one wounded NVA. There was no contact in the 3rd Marines AO.

24 Jul: There was no contact reported. At 1150H, K/3/9, at YD 089612 found 19 graves approximately 24 hours old with one NVA in each. Then at 1215H, Kilo found 1 NVA helmet, 1 basket of rice, 3 RPG rounds, 260 rounds 82mm, 25 rounds of 60mm and 3 DH-10 mines. E/2/9, at YD 079625, found 96 graves approximately 2-4 months old, containing one body each. The graves were marked with aluminum signs. At 1500H, K/3/9, at YD 079623 had 6 WIA from a surprise explosive device. L/3/9 had a Marine detonate a surprise explosive device at YD 080597 resulting in 2 WIA. 1/9 helilifted to VCB to relieve 1/4 of security of VCB and Ca Lu. Six 105 Howitzers were helilifted into FSB Joan.

25 Jul: There were no significant events in the objective area. 2/3 helilifted to Thon Son Lam. And the 2nd ARVN Regt ended their part of Lancaster July Action by helilifting into assigned objectives in the Canton II Action which 4th Marines already had underway.

26 Jul: There were no significant developments as the units continued to search their AO's.

27 Jul: No contact was reported. The action was highlighted by heli-lifts of 1/3 and two companies of 3/3 into LZ Becky (XD 858614) and LZ Margo (XD 901609) in the northwestern portion of Cam Lo River Valley.

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Six flights of F/W prep'd LZ Becky and four flights of F/W prep'd LZ Margo. Both landings were unopposed. The 9th Marines continued to find many abandoned fortified areas.

28 Jul: At 0711H, two Marines from 3/3 were WIA when they detonated a surprise explosive device vicinity of XD 900610. Then at 1415H, a patrol from L/3/3, in the vicinity of XD 900615 detonated one U.S. type M-14 mine resulting in 3 WIA. 2/9 displaced to Quang Tri. At 1845H, C/1/12 was helilifted into FSB Margo.

29 Jul: Two Marines from A/1/3 at 0300H, in the vicinity XD 854614, were WIA when they exchanged fire with one NVA outside the perimeter. L/3/3 had one Marine detonate a U.S. type AP mine resulting in 1 WIA. 3/9 displaced to VCB.

30 Jul: There were no significant events as the 3rd Marines continued to search their Zone of Action.

1 Aug: At 1705H, 2/3 at Thon Son Lam received 20 rounds artillery resulting in 2 WIA.

3 Aug: LANCASTER II JULY ACTION TERMINATED WHEN THE 3RD MARINES UNDER OPCON OF 3RD MARDIV ASSUMED LANCASTER II AO.

The cumulative casualties and equipment/supplies captured or destroyed during Lancaster II July are as follows:

FRIENDLY	ENEMY
KIA 26	KIA 311
WIA 136	POW 1
WIA NE 22	DET 1

Captured items included: 18 individual weapons, 7 crew served weapons, 1084 bunkers destroyed, 1377 arty/rocket/mortar rounds captured/destroyed, 5138 small arms rounds, captured/destroyed, 6350 pounds of rice captured, 30 mines or booby traps, 199 grenades, 2260 pounds of explosive. Of special interest were two 75mm pack howitzers which had plagued Camp Carroll for some time. The 2d ARVN Regiment had no casualties or contact in the Lancaster July Action.

4 Aug: 3/3 began an operation Northwest of Cam Lo.

6 Aug: At 1130H, 3/3 found five 82mm mortar rounds, 5 lbs of TNT and 18 bunkers in vicinity YD 082624 and YD C77634. At 1450H, L/3/3 found 35 bunkers in vicinity YD 086613. A search of the bunkers revealed 168 rounds 82mm mortar, 98 rounds 60mm mortar, 18 chicom grenades, 3 anti-personnel mines, one hundred 82mm fuses, 100 increments, 100 half pound blocks of TNT, 35 blasting caps, 80 pounds of rice, 5 NVA picks, 3 E-tools, 2 pair wire cutters and medical supplies.

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7 Aug: At 0930H, I/3/3 found 35 bunkers, including two used for cooking facilities at YD 088628. Supplies and ordnance found included 32 rounds 82mm mortar, 29 rounds 60mm mortar, 8 RPG's, 12 E-tools, ponchos, canteens, picks, helmets, 5 gas masks, 450 pounds of rice, 60mm fuzes and increments, 2000 AK-47 rounds and medical supplies. At 0945H, L/3/3 found 10 bunkers at YD 094603. Also found were large medical bags, numerous bags of clothing, 3 sub-machineguns, 3 AK-47's, one U.S. M-1 rifle, 2 SKS rifles and 10 fire-cracker dud rounds. At 1150H, a recon team found 9 bunkers and 24 rounds of 82mm mortar at YD 092614. At 2015H, 3/3 (-) received 15 to 20 rounds of 82mm from YD 079633. Counter artillery was called in on the target.

8 Aug: At 1230H, L/3/3 found a duel bunker complex of 29 bunkers at YD 103614. The bunkers were 4x5x6 with log and earth overhead. Inside the bunkers, Lima Company found 4 rounds 60mm mortar, 3 U.S. Claymores, 2 A.T. mines, 1000 AK-47 rounds, 5 Chicoms grenades, ten M-33 grenades, two M-26 grenades, some clothing and documents. At 1300H, I/3/3 at YD 094629 found 29 bunkers and 3 cans 60mm increments, 5 cans 82mm increments, twenty-five 60mm fuzes, one 82mm bore swab, 250 rounds .30 cal linked and 1 set wire cutters, and 3 NVA/KIA by artillery. At 1600H, I/3/4 at YD 084627 found 20 bunkers and 17/82mm rounds, 10/60mm mortar rounds, seventeen 75RR rounds, 5 RPG rockets, 3 chicoms, 200 AK-47 rounds and assorted cooking supplies.

9 Aug: At 1200H, I/3/3 at YD 079633 found 11 bunkers plus one 120mm round, three 81mm rounds, one 82mm fuze, a pot, helmet, E-tool and 1 NVA/KIA from artillery. At 1550H, L/3/3 at YD 085635 found 15 bunkers, 6x5x4 with logs and earth overhead, four bunkers had false bottoms. Ordnance found included ten 120mm rockets, one 75mm round, one RPG, helmets, and rat traps. At 1620H, a recon team received 4 rounds of sniper fire from YD 946343. They moved to the top of the hill and saw 50-100 NVA in the valley. They said they smelled food being cooked and heard wood being chopped. A trail on the hill appeared well used. Gunships were called in and fired on the enemy. At 1945H, 3/3 received 15-20 rounds 60mm mortar fire from YD 064644, resulting in 8 WIA.

10 Aug: Between 1300H and 1500H, 30 bunkers were found at YD 075643, and YD 075627. They had not been used for several months. At 1910H, L/3/3 observed 10-15 NVA moving NW at YD 035655. Artillery and 81mm mortar fired with excellent target coverage.

12 Aug: At 1200H, a recon team made contact with a small NVA force at YD 940611. Results of the contact were 1 WIA and 2 NVA/KIA. 3/3 was helilifted to Camp Carroll and assumed the responsibility for Camp Carroll and Dong Ha Mountain.

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13 Aug: Delta and Bravo 1/3 conducted a heliborne assault on LZ Mac with negative contact. Charlie Company conducted a heliborne assault on LZ Amy and also had negative contact. At 1640H, B/1/3 found 28 old bunkers at XD 971621 and eight 82mm mortar rounds.

14 Aug: At 1215H, a recon team at YD 893587 made contact with a small NVA force. Results: 1 WIA. Another recon team at YD 1516H made contact resulting in 1 NVA/KIA. An AK-47 was captured together with several full NVA packs.

15 Aug: During the day, 1/3 helilifted from LZ Mac to LZ Dick with the assigned mission of cordon and search. 2/3 moved into blocking positions north of the Cam Lo River. At 1235H, 2/3, while moving to secure YD 077623, received fire from the North, vicinity YD 076625. They returned fire and continued moving, encountering many surprise firing devices of mortar rounds and chicom grenades. The results were 43 NVA/KIA, 13 WIA, 10 IWC and 2 CSWC. 3/3 moved to Dong Kio complex (YD 0558-YD 6659) in order to conduct cordon and search operations. 2/9 displaced to Camp Carroll, Thon Son Lam and the Khe Gio Bridge.

16 Aug: To expedite 2/3's contact the previous day, C/1/3 conducted a helilift to Hill 162 (YD 070636) during the morning. Immediately upon landing, C/1/3 began taking incoming 60mm mortars. B/1/3 and D/1/3 helilifted to YD 060634 and also received heavy mortar fire. These initial encounters resulted in 4 KIA, 82 WIA and 19 NVA/KIA. At 1612H, I/3/3, at YD 075595, found 6 NVA/KIA, 2 AK-47's, 100 AK-47 rounds, 2 chicom grenades, 20 pounds of rice and various documents. Vietnamese children turned in an M-16 rifle near Ca Lu and were rewarded with 500 dong.

17 Aug: It was apparent from intelligence and 1/3's contact that elements of the 64th Regiment were in this area. At 0001H, TASK FORCE HOTEL ASSUMED OPCON OF THE LANCASTER II AREA AND 3RD MARINES. OPERATION LANCASTER II (JUPITER) COMMENCED. 1/3 and 2/3 conducted search and destroy operations in 0763, 0667 and 6563 grid squares. 3/3 set up blocking positions in the 1060 and 0761 grid squares. 1/61 of the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division took over the responsibility of Camp Carroll and surrounding area. At 0920H, 3/9 helilifted from VCB to LZ Sparrow. At 1140H, 1/9 helilifted from VCB to LZ Sparrow. At 1500H, 2/9 chopped OPCON to Task Force Hotel and subsequently to 9th Marines, to take over VCB defense. TPQ's and heavy air strikes preceded the 9th Marine's helilift into their assigned areas.

18 Aug: At 0300H an E/2/3 LP, at YD 066606, observed 5 NVA moving along the ridgeline toward its position. They engaged the enemy with S/A fire wounding two. Artillery was subsequently called in. At 0825H, I/3/3 at YD 094619 came into contact with what appeared to be 1 NVA. A base of fire was laid down and the area searched afterwards. Results: 1 WIA.

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D/1/3 made contact near a bunker complex, at YD 054627, resulting in 3 WIA and 3 NVA/KIA. At 1130H, two Marine gunships fired, erroneously, in support at XD 835436, causing 2 KIA. At 1620H, a recon team at YD 928 608 made contact resulting in 3 NVA/KIA and 8 WIA. M/3/9 in the afternoon found 4 NVA/KIA at YD 0548. A CH-46 took battle damage at 1853H and set down at the Rockpile.

19 Aug: 3/3 moved to Thon Son Lam during the day. At 0630H, I/3/9, at YD 043643, received approximately 30 rounds of 60mm mortar from vicinity YD 038658. Suppressive counter fire was immediate. At 0715H, B/1/3, while on patrol, found 8 NVA packs at YD 047633. At 0800H, I/3/3 searched the area of the previous days contact, and found 26 RPG rounds, 15 rounds 60mm mortar, 300 rounds 7.62mm, 18 RPG boosters, 10 AP - mines and various clothing. At 1045H, M/3/9 moving toward their hill objective at YD 055661, was hit by an estimated two platoons of NVA with RPG's and A/W fire. Results: 1 KIA and 3 WIA. Pulling back they called in air and artillery strikes. By 1520H, Mike Company had spread out on line and with supporting arms moved up and across the hill objective. Contact continued, lasting 4 hours. Results: 2 KIA, 11 WIA, 44 NVA/KIA, 2 NVA/POW, 2 CSWC and 6 IWC. Numerous bloody bandages and trails to the NW were found. At 1100H, B/1/3 at YD 0490628 found 12 fresh NVA graves with a body in each grave. Results: 12 NVA/KIA. Also found were 10 rifle grenades, 119 RPG rounds, 97 RPG boosters, 25/60mm rounds, 1586 rounds of 82mm, 1026 boosters for 82mm, thirty-nine 120mm rockets, twenty-seven 75mm rockets, one hundred twenty-two 107mm rockets, 15,000 AK-47 rounds, a CP messhall, four 60mm mortar pits, 400 pounds of rice, five M-16 rifles, and 11 Chicom grenades. At 1600H, Mike Company called in artillery missions on 105 NVA in the open at YD 066670.

20 Aug: At 0700H, K/3/9 called in artillery on 1 NVA in the open at YD 068660. 3/3 commenced a foot march to a blocking position at YD 012606. At 1100H, A/1/3 at YD 047627 found 12 RPG rounds, 1 grenade launcher for 7.62mm, one 1944 carbine and one cleaning brush and swab for an unknown bore weapon. At 1230H, L/3 at YD 034631 found 30 bunkers, well constructed, plus one RPG and 7 rounds .50 cal rounds. At 1300H, recon called in air strikes. Following, M/3/3 swept the upper part of the area finding fighting holes, 20 pounds of rice and many trails at YD 978588. At 1700H, B/1/3 at YD 051627 found an enemy base camp possibly used as a regimental headquarters, 2 weeks old. A drainage and kitchen system had been constructed together with storage areas. Some antenna equipment was found. At 1920H, L/3/9 at YD 055645 found one grave with two NVA bodies in it. Results: 2 NVA/KIA.

21 Aug: At 1110H, B/1/1 at YD 051633 found 1 NVA/KIA buried in a trench. At 1325H, I/3/9 moving toward a hill objective at YD 051635, received semi-automatic fire. Air strikes and artillery were called on the hill objective. No casualties. By 1325H, 1/9 had helilifted to LZ's Junior, Vulture and Falcon unopposed. At 1530H, 1/3 at YD 037634 found 2 graves.

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Results: 2 NVA/KIA. At 1535H, 3/9 at YD 053665 received 15 rounds incoming artillery from a direction of 6100 mils. Negative casualties. At 1510H, a 1/9 CP at YD 032646 received approximately 15 rounds artillery, from a 20 degree direction. Results: 2 WIA. Air strikes returned fire. At 1650H, 1/3/9, reconing by fire toward their hill objective, received heavy fire from the entire hilltop. Shifting to two platoons on line, and aided by a heavy base of fire, 1/3/9 assaulted the hill. Thirty minutes later, the hill was consolidated. The results were 1 KIA, 4 WIA and 14 NVA/KIA. Found were 60 bunkers, clothes hanging out on lines, 19 full packs, 11 mosquito nets, 25 pounds of rice, 300 rounds 7.62mm, 6 grenades, one 60mm mortar tube, 7 AK-47 rifles and 1 SKS. Air strikes were called in on 40 NVA sighted running down the hill toward the north. At 1945H, 1/3/9 at YD 053675 received 10 rounds 60mm mortar from YD 096678. Counter mortar and artillery missions were fired. During the day air strikes expended 154,000 pounds of ordnance resulting in 41 secondary explosions.

22 Aug: At 0650H, 1/3/9 observed 1 NVA in front of their lines. Small arms were fired and the area searched. One full pack and several cans of .30 cal and 7.62mm ammo were found. At 0900H, M/3/9 at XD 053667 found fresh bunkers, 60 pounds of rice, 6 E-tools, 9 bowls of rice, 2 large cooking pots, wire clippers, 2 pounds of sugar, 500 rounds AK-47 and assorted clothing. At 0900H, a recon team, while moving up a hill at YD 924553, observed 2 NVA. Contact resulted in 2 NVA/KIA. At 1000H, 1/3/9 found 4 bunkers, 1 NVA/KIA, 2 AK-47's, 1 SKS barrel, 1 light machine gun, 75 pounds of rice, assorted documents, 7 RPG's, 1 mess hall and assorted cooking gear plus various clothing, picks and 782 gear. At 1145H, A/1/9 at YD 802 647 received 6 rounds sniper fire in 3 bursts from vic YD 027647. At 1200H, L/3/9 at YD 048670 found 25 fresh bunkers, 1 AK-47, 1 SKS, 913 AK-47 rounds, 12 RPG's and various other gear. At 1515H, D/1/3 at YD 039628 found 2 rocket sites. At 1545H, a patrol from B/1/9 made contact with an estimated NVA company at YD 008642. As casualties were being evacuated to the Company CP (YD 019643), the patrol became pinned down by the intensive .50 cal and 60mm fire. Air and napalm were used in support. Due to the approaching darkness and heavy volume of fire the patrol was unable to return to the company patrol base, and established a hasty perimeter at YD 013643. Artillery fires were used throughout the night. The results were 8 KIA's (7 not recovered yet), 24 WIA and 1 MIA.

23 Aug: At 0300H, a platoon from C/1/9 was dispatched to reinforce B/1/9. At 0900H, one platoon from B/1/9 moved east to assist 2/B. Air support was erroneously used and one bomb landed near the relief force resulting in 5 WIA including the company commander. At 1000H, C/1/9 had found one 82mm mortar tube. By this time, L/3/3 at XD 970597, had found 3 RPG's, 1 russian rifle, 3 packs, 4 medical kits, 1 set of NVA dog tags, 50 pounds of TNT, and 5 pounds of rice. At 1130H, A/1/3 at YD 074677 found a bunker complex. At 1630H, L/3/3 at YD 970599 found a 20 bunker complex, one

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billeting area having room for 300 troops, and one bunker with an earthen stove. At 1845H, D/1/9 at YD 0306590 received 14 rounds 82mm mortar resulting in 1 KIA.

24 Aug: At 0720H, B/1/9 at YD 026660 took approximately 15 rounds of 82mm mortar. Counter mortar was fired. At 0730H, D/1/9 resumed a move to join B/1/9. At 0730H, C/1/9 began to displace YD 035687. A/1/9 began to move to YD 023643. At 1130H, L/3/3 platoon patrol at XD 970599 found 7 bunkers. Inside were maps of Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Can Bien, and Mai Loc. At 1300H, TASK FORCE HOTEL CHOPPED THIRD MARINES TO 3RD MARINE DIVISION, ENDING LANCASTER II (JUPITER) OPERATIONS. At 1500H, elements of B/1/9 began to retrieve bodies from the contact of 22 August. At 1515H, B/1/9 received 3 incoming rounds 60mm mortar. Six counter mortar missions were fired. At 1600H, Company D's CP received 4 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an estimated NVA position at YD 005655. Several small secondaries were heard from counter mortar fire. Artillery fires were repeated, and at 1700H, a huge secondary, fire ball, 300 to 400 feet in the air was observed. All bodies were recovered. The MIA was found to be 1 KIA.

25 Aug: At 0855H, B/1/9 received one 82mm mortar from YD 019648. At 1000H, a troop lift began to helilift 1/9 back to Vandegrift. At 1010H, D/1/3 found three 122mm rounds and 43 rocket sites. At 1200H, B/1/9 and C/1/9, while boarding helicopters to depart, took 82mm fire each time a helicopter came in to land. An AO was called on station and artillery smoke was used to cover the landing of helicopters. A total of twenty-seven 82mm rounds were received causing 8 WIA. At 1200H, L/3/3 found a bunker complex at XD 970596. They found 2 NVA/KIA in graves. At 1310H, a squad from M/3/3 fired on 1 NVA, vicinity of XD 952603. They received S/A and A/W fire in return. They observed 1 NVA fall. At 1835H, Camp Carroll received 1 round 85mm artillery from an azimuth of 340 degrees.

26 Aug: At 1815H, a L/3/3 patrol at XD 970598 began receiving S/A fire. The fire was followed by a ground attack from an estimated 50 NVA. The attack was repulsed and the area swept. Results: 10 KIA, 34 WIA, and 5 NVA/KIA. Numerous weapons were captured. 3/3 received 11 rounds incoming artillery during the day. At 2145H, F/2/3 received 5 incoming chicom grenades, resulting in 1 WIA. At 2340H, M/3/3 sighted 15 to 20 NVA in the open at XD 954592. Artillery was called in.

27 Aug: At 1725H, E/2/3 received 8 rounds 152mm rockets from XD 973554. Counter artillery was called. At 1915H, Camp Carroll received approximately 10-12 rounds of 130mm artillery. Results were 5 KIA and 5 WIA. At 1945H, K/3/3 at XD 948583 received 15-20 rounds of 130mm artillery. At 2000H, a Vietnamese reported to H/2/3 that he observed 10 NVA in vicinity YD 068153. An 81mm mortar mission was fired on that target.

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28 Aug: At 1330H, L/3/3 made contact with one NVA, at XD 971600, resulting in 1 NVA/KIA and 1 WIA. Two RPG's were found. A recon team made contact at 2235H resulting in 8 NVA/KIA. OPERATION SWIFT PURSUIT BEGAN IN THE MAI LOC AREA WITH 2/26.

29 Aug: At 0500H, Camp Carroll received 4-6 rounds of incoming 130mm rounds. At 1300H, M/3/3 made contact with 6 NVA, at XD 964596, resulting in 1 WIA. Contact was brief, however, 66 NVA packs, 35 rounds 82mm mortar, 2 chicoms, and some small-arms ammunition were found.

30 Aug: 1/3 organized Task Force East and Task Force West with D and C companies and a platoon of Co B, 3rd Tank Battalion. At 1415H, H/3/3 platoon made contact with 6 NVA in vicinity XD 963604. 2 NVA/KIA and 1 AK-47 were found. At 1510H, B/1/3 at XD 970585 tripped a surprise firing device resulting in 1 WIA. At 1520H, B/1/3 in vicinity XD 978585 received 25 rounds of light artillery from the north. At 2125H, an F/2/3 LP sighted 15 NVA to the east. Artillery was called in and a search of the area the following day resulted in 4 NVA/KIA, 2 AK-47'S, 1 SKS, 7 chicom grenades, and numerous 782 gear.

31 Aug: F/2/3 sighted a column of NVA moving toward their position. Supporting fires resulted in 4 NVA/KIA and 3 weapons captured. 3/3 continued its search in the upper Cam Lo River Basin. At 1330H, 2/26 found a tunnel complex at YD 001514. A lack of proper equipment precluded a search. At 2310H, M/3/3 at XD 964603 made contact. The results were 6 NVA/KIA.

1 Sep: At 1730H, a platoon of 3/3 heard movement in vicinity XD 961599 and set up a hasty ambush. Contact was initiated with approximately 15 NVA. Results: 7 NVA/KIA.

2 Sep: At 1015H, B/1/3 commenced an assault on LZ Amy. One CH-46 was shot down from small arms and .50 cal fire. Results: 3 WIA. B Company was extracted and air and artillery strikes were called in on LZ Amy resulting in 18 NVA/KIA. At 1830H, K/3/3 at XD 952592 received approximately 334 rounds of 60mm mortar and 19 rounds of 130mm rockets. At 1915H, an ambush from 3/3 at XD 951599 initiated contact with 8 NVA traveling south down the river. At 1955H, Camp Carroll received approximately 16 rounds incoming 130mm rockets. At 2010H, 1/3 at YD 068555 received 6 rounds of incoming 60mm mortar from YD 083562.

3 Sep: At 0552H, 1/3 received 4 rounds of incoming light artillery. At 1105H, H/2/3 in vicinity YD 044585 received one 82mm round from YD 036543 resulting in 1 WIA. By 1430H, 1/3 had landed all troops in LZ Amy and LZ Mac. They received S/A fire but sustained no casualties. At 1845H, 1/3 at XD 965616 received 37 rounds incoming artillery and mortar resulting in 2 KIA and 2 WIA. Counter artillery and air were called. 2/3 at 1950H, received 2 rounds incoming artillery from YD 020640. 106 RR were counter

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fired. At 2045H, 1/3 at XD 983546 received 4 rounds incoming artillery. Results: 2 WIA. At 2120H, 3/3 broke off an attempted NVA assault on their perimeter during the afternoon. 3/3 received 172 rounds of incoming 60mm and 82mm mortar fire from XD 953615, 130 rounds artillery fired from 0400 mils, grenades, A/W, and S/A fire. Counter artillery and mortar fire resulted in 2 secondary explosions. Results: 2 WIA. At 2130H, Camp Carroll received 9 rounds of incoming 130mm rockets from YD 035775 and YD 020640.

4 Sep: At 0905H, 3/3 searched the area of the previous days contact and found 9 NVA/KIA, 1 CSW, and 13 IWC at 1000H. C/1/3 found one 12.7mm HMG-AAG. At 1200H, THE LANCASTER II AO WAS MODIFIED TO INCLUDE THE TROUSDALE AO. TASK FORCE HOTEL ASSUMED OPCON THIRD MARINES AND LANCASTER II AO. Within the Trousdale AO, 9th Marines were located at YD 906512, YD 900571, YD 900571, and YD 912562.

5 Sep: At 1245H, G/2/9 at YD 899537 found 2 NVA/KIA. At 1530H, G/2/9 found 1 AK-47 in a bunker complex at YD 878576.

6 Sep: At 1300H, L/3/3 at YD 955599 found one AK-47 with ammunition, pomcho and one NVA platoon commander's notebook.

7 Sep: At 0840H, 1/3 (-) commenced a helilift to LZ Mack at XD 967617. There was no contact. At 1100H, G/2/9 vicinity XD 876536 found a frame bunker 4x7x4 with 2 feet overhead. While destroying the bunker, a booby trap was tripped resulting in 1 KIA and 6 WIA. At 1204H, F/2/9 vicinity YD 893530 found two living bunkers (8'x16'x5') with bamboo decks and 2 feet of overhead (3 layers of 4' logs and dirt). A straw hut (8'x10'x6') was found containing 4 stoves 10 inches in diameter dug into the ground. A tree was marked "30 May 1968". At 1645H, A/1/3 at YD 95061 while patrolling sighted 2 NVA who opened fire with AK-47's. Results: 3 KIA.

8 Sep: At 0416H, A/1/3 vicinity YD 053621 made contact with an estimated enemy squad. The NVA opened fire with AK-47's and heavy machine guns. The firefight lasted 15 minutes. Results: 3 KIA. At 0445H, a large convoy was sighted at XD 903174. At 0535H, A/1/3 vicinity YD 953621 received two 81mm short rounds resulting in 1 KIA and 9 WIA. At 0755H, an AO confirmed 1 NVA/KIA from an air strike. At 1310H, H/2/9 vicinity XD 912562 received 10 unidentified rockets and 20 rounds of 82mm mortar. Results: 9 WIA. At 1430H, A/1/3 located at XD 952620, found 2 living bunkers, 2 pounds of rice and assorted 782 gear. At 1530H, L/3/3 at YD 953600 while on patrol found 2 AK-47's, 4 chicom grenades, 100 rounds AK-47 ammo, and numerous other gear. At 1730H, a recon team at XD 961528 exchanged fire with several NVA. At 1850H, H/2/9 at LZ Sandy received four incoming 107mm rounds from vicinity XD 872638. No casualties.

9 Sep: At 0850H, elements of 2/26 vicinity YD 078521 detonated a mine. Results: 11 WIA. At 0855H, A/1/3 was to helilift to a non-secured LZ at

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YD 953621. On attempting to land the helicopter they received small arms fire. Mortar and artillery strikes were called in on the LZ. At 0945H, a G/2/9 patrol at YD 873537 while moving down the trail, was hit by a command detonated mine and sniper fire. Results: 2 WIA. At 0950H, 3/9 commenced a helilift to non-secured LZ Winchester. The first wave made contact with an estimated enemy squad, and very quickly assaulted through to consolidate the LZ so that the lift was not impeded. Results: 2 NVA/KIA. At 1000H, F/2/9 at XD 865538 fired at an NVA 300 meters to the front. Several bunkers were subsequently found. At 1015H, B/1/9 at XD 877514 found 9 reinforced bunkers (6x3x4), 18 rounds 82mm, 1 RPG booster and 3 sets of mess gear. At 1045H, A/1/3 vicinity XD 952621 made contact with an unknown size force in trees and spider holes. Results: 2 KIA and 6 WIA. At 1130H, E/2/9 vicinity YD 885572 was hit by a command detonated mine. The point element returned fire. Results: 1 KIA and 1 WIA. Also at 1130H, K/3/9 having landed at LZ Winchester, was moving west to Tien when snipers initiated heavy semi-automatic fire. While calling in artillery and gunship supporting fires, an army gunship mistook them for the enemy. Results: 3 WIA. At 1200H, B/1/9 found a trail at XD 877579. Several huts were found with bags of rice along the trail, and numerous caves could be seen on Hill 844. At 1300H, L/3/3 at YD 938503 made contact with 3 NVA. Results were 2 KIA, 10 WIA, 3 NVA/KIA, one machinegun captured and 2 IWC. At 1400H, B/1/9 found what appeared to be a small base camp with huts located between XD 872522 and XD 873533. At 1405H, G/2/9 vicinity XD 868534 found 20 living bunkers about 1 month old and 20 A.T. mines. At 1500H, E/2/9 advanced to YD 885573 under close air support to recover 1 KIA reported at 1130H. Fire from XD 884573 resulted in 2 WIA. At 1520H, M/3/3 vicinity YD 965596 received mortar and S/A fire from XD 941604 resulting in 2 KIA and 34 WIA. At 1630H, B/1/3 vicinity XD 948620 made contact with 2 NVA in a bunker with AK-47's. Results: 1 KIA and 3 WIA. At 1655H, D/1/3 vicinity YD 948620 while moving through A/1/3, encountered sub-machinegun and light machinegun fire resulting in 3 KIA, 7 WIA and 12 NVA/KIA. At 1730H, L/3/3 at YD 952590 received 8 rounds 130mm incoming artillery. By 1800H, C/1/9 vicinity XD 880542 made contact with 2 NVA. No casualties. Also D/1/9 commenced sweeping a large base camp continually reconing by fire. After consolidating the area, 300 bunkers, (33 of which had been searched thus far), a hospital and CP, 200 sweat shirts, 40 blankets, 300 cans of gauze, 100 pounds of rocksalt, 2200 pounds of rice, Russian type C-rations, 1 case of rocket rounds, 10 vials of novocaine, 12 bottles of water purification tablets, 32 cases of 82mm mortars, 22 cases of .50 cal ammo, 37 anti-tank mines, 61 A.P. mines, 10 boxes TNT and 1500 rounds AK-47 ammo were found. By 1945H, K/3/9 at YD 896588 in contact since 1130H was still taking S/A and 60mm mortar fire from the entrenched enemy. Air strikes and artillery was continually called in the lower AO. Results: 5 KIA and 19 WIA. During the day the 1st Battalion of 9th Cavalry had contact on the lower AO of Lancaster II. Results: 2 KIA and 1 NVA/KIA.

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10 Sep: At 0150H, D/1/3 at YD 952610 received 3 incoming grenades in their perimeter resulting in 2 WIA. At 0150H, elements of the 1st ARVN Division reported NVA fired 10 rounds of B-40 rockets at Huong Hoa, resulting in 1 WIA. At 0300H, K/3/3 LP vicinity 943607 made contact with an undetermined NVA force. The LP received S/A fire, rifle grenades, and 3-5 automatic weapons fire resulting in 2 WIA. At 0730H, I/3/3 vicinity XD 937604 received S/A fire. Air and artillery were at first deemed not advisable due to the close proximity of bunkers to friendly troops. 82mm mortars began falling minutes later, however, and 60mm mortars were used to mark the target for subsequent airstrikes and gunships. Results after consolidation: 25 WIA, 1 NVA/POW, 2 TNC and 1 CSWC. At 0930H, M/3/3 received 30-35 rounds of estimated 82mm mortar resulting in 1 WIA. At 1100H, F/2/9 vicinity XD 856545 found a vacant camp site 2 days old on a trail leading to the southeast. A 25 bunker complex 200 meters up the trail contained 10 boxes of .50 cal ammo, 28 cases 82mm, 10 rounds 82mm mortar loose. At 1325H, a recon team at the Rockpile exchanged fire with two NVA. Results: 1 WIA. Also at 1325H, an F-4 was shot down by .50 cal fire from XD 940610. The pilot parachuted safely. At 1345H, B/1/3 at XD 945622 found 6 NVA/KIA. At 1515H, G/2/26, vicinity Thon Son Lam (XD 982545), received 12 rounds 75mm pack howitzer from vicinity XD 927547. Counter artillery was fired. At 1530H, B/1/9 vicinity XD 872523 found an abundant camp site on the river with 3 shelters built between trees and rocks. Found were 52 Chicago grenades, 94 rice sacks, 83 NVA belts, 1 nurse pack with Red Cross on it, one ID Tag with.....NguYen Duy Knoung, Col-K3, 3016168.....and 3 bloody battle dressings. At 1650H, M/3/3 vicinity XD 944603 received 41 rounds of 82mm mortar. At 1700H, B/1/3 vicinity XD 954625, encountered NVA in bunkers firing A/W and 60mm mortars. Bravo Company attacked, then the NVA counter attacked with a platoon (plus) from the north. The attack was repulsed and supporting arms were called in. Results: 4 KIA, 6 WIA, 13 NVA/KIA and 6 TNC. Also at 1200H, I/3/3 vicinity XD 937607 received 10 rounds 82mm mortar fire from an unknown position resulting in 2 WIA. At 1710H, a recon team vicinity YD 972644 reported enemy movement was very close. Airstrikes were conducted after the team's extraction. Results: 1 NVA/KIA. At 1740H, E/2/9 vicinity XD 883573 found approximately 20 bunkers, 1 claymore, 1 RPG round, clothing, 2 Chicago grenades, 3 rockets, cannisters and 1 NVA/KIA. At 1750H, A/2/9 continuing the search of 300 bunkers found 12 rounds 60mm mortars, 3200 pounds of rice, 2600 pounds of salt, documents and 782 gear. At 1800H, Camp Carroll received 11 rounds artillery resulting in 1 KIA and 2 WIA. At 1906H, an AO sighted a platoon of NVA in the open at XD 954645. Artillery missions were called in. At 2140H, G/2/26 vicinity XD 982545 received 5 rounds of incoming 75mm pack howitzer. Results: 6 KIA and 1 WIA. At 2345H, I/3 (rear) received 4 rounds incoming resulting in 1 KIA and 2 WIA.

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11 Sep: At 0110H, G/2/26 received 5 rounds of 130mm incoming. At 0430H, B/1/3 in vicinity YD 945625 received a heavy probe on their lines. Approximately 5-7 NVA from the west attacked with Chicom grenades and AWF and 4 NVA attacked from the north with two light machine guns. Both attacks were repulsed but two enemy machine guns were dug in and still active. Results: 2 KIA, 3 WIA and 1 NVA/KIA. At 0715H, G/2/26 received 3 rounds 130mm artillery. At 0930H, vicinity YD 882577, the point element of E/2/9 was taken under fire by a command detonated mine and automatic weapons. Results: 2 WIA. At 1125H, I/3/9 vicinity XD 909589 received 1 short round fired by K/4/12 resulting in 1 KIA. At 1230H, F/2/9 vicinity XD 885548 found 20 bunkers 7x7x4. 51 practice Chicom grenades found indicated it was a training area. By 1310H, B/1/9 and 1/9 CP had completed a lift to VCB. At 1319H, M/3/9 at XD 897588 found 2 DH-10 mines, 1 AK-47, 1 NVA gas mask, 1 NVA/KIA, sixteen 60mm fuzes and 14 rounds 60mm mortar. At 1500H, B/1/3 vicinity XD 944624 found 2 sites of NVA multiple graves. A check of the graves revealed 17 NVA/KIA. At 1700H, B/1/3 at YD 945625, while clearing their flanks, made heavy contact on the north and west with an estimated two platoons. The units moved against one another for the rest of the day. Results: 4 KIA, 19 WIA, 14 IWC, 3 CSWC and 18 NVA/KIA. At 1845H, 2/3 CP at YD 945624 received six 60mm mortar rounds resulting in 2 WIA. At 1930H, C/1/9 vicinity XD 879542 continued a search of a large bunker complex and found 201 rounds 81mm mortar, 7 rounds 75mm RR, 80 RPG-2 rounds, 30 RPG-7 rounds, 32 anti-tank mines, 120,000 rounds 7.62mm, 358 rounds 82mm, 8408 rounds 60mm mortar, 8 Chicom grenades, 47 cases of .50 cal, 70 fuzes for 60mm mortar, 1800 pounds of rice, 21 pounds of salt and 7 NVA/KIA.

12 Sep: At 0850H, M/3/9 vicinity YD 896594 found several fighting holes and writing on a tree interpreted to read in English "Food along the trail, continue along trail". At 0910H, I/3/9 at YD 891588 found 10 fighting holes 5x3x1 with a forked stake pointing 260 degrees. By 0924H, E/2/3 had completed a helilift to LZ Lee, where they found 8 heavy constructed bunkers and 1 AK-47. At 0950H, I/3/9 vicinity YD 887587, while observing air strikes, reported 50 secondary explosions. Additional air strikes were called in. At 1000H, TFH assumed opcon of 1/9(-) and passed opcon to 3d Marines the same day. At 1030H, 3/9 reported a large trail 3-4 feet wide leading to Hill 463. Also reported at XD 883584 were 6 bunkers, 6 huts and 10-15 large crates near the huts. At 1130H, F/2/9, vicinity XD 855546, found a new trail heading NE. At 1300H, L/3/9 vicinity XD 892526 was hit by a command detonated DH-10 mine and S/A fire. Results: 4 WIA. Also at this time, F/2/9 at XD 852549 exchanged fire with 2 NVA running up the trail after being hit by a command detonated mine. Results: 1 KIA and 1 WIA. By 1503H, C/1/3 had reached XD 947627. Also E/2/3 at YD 947267, while searching the previously reported bunker complex, found 24 additional bunkers and 4 NVA/KIA. At 1700H, F/2/3 at XD 943623 found one

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NVA/POW. By 1700H, L/3/3 at XD 895595 had broken contact with a reinforced NVA squad after being hit by a command detonated mine. Results: 2 KIA, 2 WIA and 2 NVA/KIA. At 2000H, M/3/9 vicinity XD 895595 found a box with NVA writing which read "32mm for HAM CO."

13 Sep: At 1040H, F/2/9 vicinity XD 850550 made contact with an estimated NVA squad in 3 bunkers. Artillery missions were called in on NVA escape routes. Results: 1 KIA and 3 WIA. At 1110H, 2/26 commenced a helilift to LZ Margo. At 1210H, E/2/3 vicinity YD 946626 found 50 rounds of 82mm mortar in a bunker. At 1300H, I/3/9 vicinity YD 886587 had 2 command detonated mines fired at them followed by sniper fire resulting in 4 WIA. E/2/9, vicinity YD 886544, found two bunkers, one a CP and one an armory bunker. In the bunkers were two M-16's, 13 SKS's, 2 AK-47's, 2 ammo tool cases, 2 Russian claymores, 29 grenades, 50 non-electric blasting caps, numerous medical supplies, and 3 boxes .50 cal ammo. At 1400H, I/3 near vicinity TSL received 5 rounds of 85mm incoming. At 1440H, F/2/3 vicinity YD 934628, received automatic weapons fire from the west. At 1545H, M/3/9 commenced helilift to Nui Tia Pong. At 1655H, I/3/9 vicinity YD 84585 found a bunker complex well built and very, very new. Found were 30 rounds 82mm, 3 cans of 82mm fuzes, 5 pounds of rice, and 12 NVA/KIA. At 1715H, L/3/9 vicinity XD 885584 found two 82mm mortar pits and 12 rounds 82mm. At 1940H, M/3/9 vicinity XD 894572 received 2 rounds mortar from an azimuth of 300 degrees. Results were 1 WIA.

14 Sep: A/1/9 checked area YD 031615 and found 5 NVA/KIA. At 0940, 2/26 YD 882617 observed 13 NVA with packs moving north. Artillery was called in. By 1100H, D/1/3 had completed a lift to TSL and 3/3 had relieved 1/9. At 1150H, the 1/3 rear at Thon Son Lam received 3 rounds of incoming artillery. At 1230H, E/2/9 vicinity XD 982552, while on patrol found 438 rounds 82mm, 5 rounds 57mm, 27 A.T. mines, 85 RPG-2 rounds, 64 RPG-7 rounds, 26 RPG-7 boosters, 5 rounds 122mm rockets with boosters, 171 rounds 60mm, 168 cases 12.7mm rounds (85 rounds per case) 675 pounds of TNT, 5,000 chicom blasting caps, 1000 time fuzes, 6 Russian grenades, and 2400 pounds of rice. At 1330H, F/2/3 vicinity 935643 found 2 fresh graves containing 2 NVA/KIA. At 1440H, 2/26 vicinity XD 898621 intercepted one NVA walking on the trail calling "chieu hoi". Results: 1 NVA/POW and 1 AK-47. At 1710H, I/3/3 vicinity YD 026562 received three rounds 82mm mortar from vicinity XD 905614. At 2024H, 2/26 heard movement toward their position from the valley on the SW. They observed 25 to 50 NVA in the valley, engaged them with semi-automatic fire. Results: 1 KIA and 1 WIA.

15 Sep: At 0710H, H/2/9 commenced a helilift to FSB Black. At 0730H, D/1/9 commenced a helilift to VCB. At 0820H, the 9th Marines CP commenced a helilift to LZ Winchester. At 0825H, I/3/9 vicinity YD 894585 found 1 can of 82mm fuzes. At 0900H, E/2/26 vicinity XD 906624 found freshly dug fighting holes and saw 1 NVA. The unit heard movement NE and NW of their position. Supporting arms were brought to bear around them. Two NVA/KIA were found as they continued moving in a NE direction. After moving 75 meters they were pinned down by A/W fire and grenades.

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By the end of the day results were 1 KIA, 6 WIA and 1 NVA/KIA. At 0930H, I/3/9 vicinity YD 894585 found two mortar pits. At 0945H, L/3/9 vicinity YD 884589 was hit by a command detonated mine and small arms. There were 1 KIA and 2 WIA. At 1055H, C/1/3 vicinity YD 946610 received mortar fire from a 300 degree azimuth. By 1115H, L/3/9 was continuing to receive heavy small arms fire from a reinforced platoon well dug in. They requested 106 V and air strikes. Results: 1 KIA and 5 WIA. At 1140H, L/3/9 sighted 12 NVA in the open. Small arms fire and air strikes resulted in 1 NVA/KIA. At 1245H, F/2/26 vicinity YD 882617 sighted 17 NVA. Adjusted air strikes resulted in 1 NVA/KIA. At 1715H, L/3/9 observed 12 NVA in the open. Subsequent fires resulted in 6 NVA/KIA. At 1815H, C/1/3 received 2 rounds 82mm from XD 984546. Results: 2 WIA. At the same time a G/2/3 patrol sighted two NVA on the southern side of the river from their position (YD 906607) and commenced fire. There were 2 NVA/KIA. By 1900H, L/3/9 broke contact and set up a night position at XD 884585. Results: 6 NVA/KIA. At 2025H, E/2/26, vicinity XD 905622, observed an estimated NVA platoon moving around their position. Night defensive fires were called. At 2100H, L/3/3 at Khe Gio Bridge received 22 rounds of 82mm. No casualties.

16 Sep: At 0910H, L/3/3 vicinity XD 955599 found 2 NVA/KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 RPG-7 launcher, 2 RPG rounds, 7 chicom grenades, 7 pairs of boots, 2 packs and 5 bottles of narcotics. At 0915H, a CH-46 crashed in 2/3's position at LZ Sierra. No fire or serious injuries. At 1230H, M/3/9 at YD 874575 sighted 5 NVA in the open. Artillery fire resulted in 3 NVA/KIA. At 1240H, K/3/9 vicinity YD 397547 found 1 M-2 carbine, 1 submachine gun, 3 chicom, 4 RPG rounds, 9 gas masks, 1 officer's pack, 2000 pounds of rice and assorted documents. At 1320H, L/3/9 at YD 882585 was hit by a command detonated claymore resulting in 2 WIA. A search of the area revealed 3 additional claymores. Ten minutes later L/3/9 received small arms fire from a bunker complex. After a prep fire, a ground assault resulted in 32 NVA/KIA. A search of the area revealed a 40 bunker complex. Inside the bunkers were 240 pounds of TNT, 165 A.T. mines, 300 DH-1C mines, 450 RPG rounds, 70 cases of 7.62mm ammo, 40 cases of .50 cal ammo, 26 cases of 12.7mm ammo, 4 cases 9mm pistol ammo, 900 rounds 82mm, 240 rifle grenades, 600 pounds of rice, 216 chicom grenades, assorted documents, 175 pounds of 782 gear, 1 NVA compass, 12 AK-47's, 75 SK-50's, and 2 machine guns. Seven storage bunkers were reported destroyed by direct hits from artillery or air. 14 NVA bodies were found along with many, many parts of bodies. At 1400H, E/2/9 vicinity XD 889544 found what appeared to be an indoctrination training center, including twelve bamboo huts with bunkers, two kitchens with large rice storage basins and water pipes through bamboo. Over 200 pages of paper documents were found plus 87 A.T. mines, 205 RPG-2 rounds, 109 RPG-7 rounds, 36 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle, 35 rounds 82mm recoilless rifle, 257 rounds 60mm mortar, 744 rounds 82mm mortar, 21 cans of increments, 4 cases 7.62mm, 1 case 7.62 link, 8 rounds M37-A2 82mm, new type mortar, 2300 pounds of salt, 10,000 pounds of rice and approximately 2500 feet of single strand communication wire. At 1445H, G/2/3, vicinity YD 932626, discovered a complex of 25 bunkers which appeared to be the Regimental CP. At 1615H, 2/26 vicinity XD 901601 began


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receiving incoming 82mm mortar fire from XD 906617, XD 900623, XD 899617, XD 882617. Every kind of fire was returned from S/A to air strikes. Approximately 25 NVA were observed moving east carrying a mortar tube at XD 906623. More air strikes were called in. 2/26 sustained over 214 rounds incoming which resulted in 25 KIA, 126 WIA and 27 NVA/KIA. All friendly casualties were from mortar incoming.

17 Sep: TROUSDALE NORTH ACTION COMMENCED BY 1/9 AND 1/4 HELILIFTING INTO LZ'S PACIFIC AND CANADA. At 1150H, A/1/9 vicinity XD 910684 sighted 20 NVA in the open at XD 909677. Artillery fire was called in. At 1200H, G/2/26 fired on 3 NVA at XD 897617. L/3/9, vicinity XD 879586, while searching a bunker complex found 480 RPG rounds, 350 DH-10 mines, 4000 pounds of TNT, 6000 pounds 7.62mm ammo and 1700 M-2 carbine ammo. E/2/9 at XD 889544 found 24 SKS rifles and 4900 pounds of rice. At 1209H, A/1/9 vicinity XD 913683 sighted 15 NVA in the open at XD 907673. They fired small arms, followed by artillery. A sweep of the area later uncovered 25 NVA/KIA. At 1335H, a UH-1E helicopter bound for LZ Winchester from VCB, hit a tree and crashed approximately 200 meters south of LZ Winchester. Casualties included Brig. Gen. CHIP, LtCol KNIGHT, aides, and 3 crew members. At 1338H, B/1/9, vicinity XD 9106, called in artillery on 4 NVA at XD 907676. Results: 4 NVA/KIA. At 1410H, A/1/9 on LZ Pacific fired small arms and artillery at 6 to 10 NVA in the open at XD 913683. Results were 2 NVA/KIA. Also a 1/9 sniper at YD 909684 observed 3 NVA crossing an open area on a trail. Sniper fire resulted in 1 NVA/KIA. At 1450H, 2/26 vicinity XD 901601, received 47 rounds of incoming 82mm mortars resulting in 3 WIA. At 1500H, a 1/9 CP at LZ Pacific called in air strikes on 25 NVA in the open, north of the Ben Hai River. Results: 25 NVA/KIA and several secondary explosions. At 1900H, 2/26 lines were probed by a squad size NVA unit following 13 rounds of 82mm incoming. Results: 1 KIA and 5 WIA. E/2/9 vicinity XD 889541 found 700 rounds 82mm, 67 claymores, 107 rounds 60mm, 297 RPG-7 rounds, 19 mines, 80 A.T. mines, two 122mm rockets, 560 rounds 7.62mm, 1700 pounds of TNT, 105 RPG-2 rounds, 150 sets of NVA utilities, and 20 bunkers. At 1915H, LZ Pacific received 15 rounds incoming mortar. Results: 5 WIA.

18 Sep: At 0900H, A/1/4 vicinity XD 947674 observed 2 NVA and opened fire with M-79's and M-60 machine guns. Thirty minutes later, 2 NVA were again sighted walking toward "A" Company's hasty ambush. S/A fire stunned one NVA, the other escaped. Results were 1 NVA/POW. At 1200H, F/2/26 at XD 909630 followed a trail that led to 2 NVA/KIA and 13 fighting holes. A search of the area revealed a much larger base camp extending well over several hundred meters. There were 25 well-fortified bunkers and 15 smaller ones, 5 bamboo huts containing 250 pounds of rice, 100 rounds AK-47 and several packs. At 1335H, vicinity XD 944623, an H/2/3 marine was checking the area in front of his position and detonated a pressure type firing device resulting in 1 WIA. At 1400, E/2/9 at XD 888546 found 839 rounds 82mm, 126 claymores, 222 rounds RPG-2, 253 rounds 50mm, 291 A.T. mines, 200 pounds of TNT, 45 rounds 60mm mortar, 8200 pounds of rice, and 4 radio batteries. By 1440H, L/3/9 at XD 879586 had found 828 rounds



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of 82mm, and 600 pounds of TNT. At 1500H, E/2/9 at XD 845532 found 15 fighting holes and 1 claymore set at every avenue of approach. At 1530H, M/3/3 commenced a helilift to LZ Pedro. At 1615H, G/2/3 at YD 935626 conducted a search of 16 bunkers and found 3000 rounds of .50 cal, 65 rounds of 82mm and 25 pounds of rice. At 1825H, I/3/9 at XD 879586 while moving toward a hill received fire from an estimated NVA squad with command detonated claymore mines, and automatic weapons fire. India Company pulled back and saturated the area with air strikes and artillery. With platoons on line, the company swept up and over the high ground meeting very light resistance. Results were 3 KIA, 5 WIA and 6 NVA/KIA. Due to darkness only a very light search was made but it revealed a large training camp with 25 huts, 50 bunkers, 50 fighting holes, and two bulletin boards. At this time 220 rounds/ 60mm mortar, 900 rounds of 7.62mm, 27 pounds of TNT, 4 A/P mines, 400 rounds 9mm, 1 RPG booster, 63 rounds 82mm, 60 blasting caps and assorted documents were found. At 1900H, 1/9 CP at XD 913679 received 25 rounds 82mm mortar. Air strikes destroyed one .50 cal and one 82mm mortar position accounting for 10 NVA/KIA. At 1905H, the 2/26 CP at LZ Margo received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar. During the night D/1/9 at XD 916667 received 8 chicom grenades. Also G/2/3 took several 82mm rounds.

19 Sep: At 0915H, G/2/3 moving toward their hill objective were hit by a command detonated mine and A/W fire at XD 924626. Mortar, artillery and air strikes were called in for support. Results were 4 KIA, 10 WIA and 4 NVA/KIA. At 1130H, a recon team at XD 012646 made contact with 5-6 NVA resulting in 1 KIA and 1 NVA/KIA. At 1210H, C/1/3 at TSL received 3 rounds of light artillery from YD 929540. At 1220H, I/3/9 vicinity XD 877587, found 4 supply huts, 7 living huts, 1 messhall, 600 rounds 82mm, 300 rounds 60mm mortar, ten 107mm rockets one 122mm rocket, 60,000 chicom grenades, 30 A.T. mines, 35 DH-10 mines, 600 blasting caps, 4000 rounds 7.62mm, 800 pounds of rice and 1600 pounds of TNT. Airstrikes during the day accounted for 4 NVA/KIA. At 1530H, B/1/4 vicinity XD 953669, found 30 bunkers, a small messhall, 400 pounds of rice, 2 water points, documents, and assorted other gear. At 1600H, G/2/26 at XD 879528 found 10 bunkers 6x4x5 with living hooches over them. Also found were 12 bipods, 7 base plates, 9 aiming stakes, 600 rounds AK-47, 200 AK-50 linked rounds, 60 rounds 60mm mortar, 5 RPG-2 rounds, and 50 rounds 81mm mortar rounds. I/3/9 reported additional findings at their position of 17 DH-10 mines, 64 A.T. mines, 500 pounds TNT, 552 rounds 60mm mortar, 900 rounds 82mm mortar, 24 rounds 75mm RR, 780 chicom grenades, 22 rounds 140mm rockets, 16 rounds 107mm rockets, 336 RPG rounds with boosters, 63 blasting caps and 1280 detonators. A/1/4, at XD 935660, discovered at this time 450 SKS-55's, 2 submachineguns, 1 light machine gun, 76 rounds of 82mm mortar, 168 rounds 81mm, 300,000 rounds AK-47, 200 Kilos of TNT, 64 claymores and 128 cases of .50 cal. At 1700H, 1/9 CP at XD 915665 received 20 rounds incoming 82mm mortar from XD 919693. Results: 11 WIA. Subsequent air

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strikes and artillery resulted in 10 NVA/KIA. At 1800H, C/1/3 at XD 938 663 had one NVA "Chieu Hoi" approach their position. He was evacuated. At 2105H, a CH-46 helicopter, at VCB to refuel, crashed when searchlights shined in the pilot's eyes. There were no injuries. At 2130H, E/2/26 at XD 897620. received a probe from an unknown size unit throwing Chicom grenades and firing RPG's, E Company returned fire. Also at 2145H, B/1/4 at XD 952667 received a probe with Chicom grenades and RPG's.

20 Sep: At 0002H, B/1/9 received 5 incoming chicom grenades. At 0050H, G/2/26 at YD 926625 detected movement near their position. After M-26 grenades were thrown, a search of the area revealed 1 NVA/KIA. At 0830H, a recon team detonated a booby trap at YD 082649 causing 3 WIA. At 0915H, an air strike on XD 905654 resulted in 2 NVA/KIA. At 1400H, I/3/9 still searching the training area base camp, found 140 bottles of penicillin, together with 4 large cases of assorted medical supplies, 34 rounds 122mm rockets, 39,240 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and 3 additional bunkers. At 1420H, F/2/3 at XD 922626 received S/A fire from XD 923626. After returning fire with small arms, artillery and gunships, the area was searched. Results: 6 NVA/KIA and 1 NVA/POW. At 1500H, G/2/9 at XD 880527 found 42 graves. Inside of each, there was one body. Results: 42 NVA/KIA. By 1630H, F/2/3 at XD 923626 had located 11 NVA/KIA and captured 27 rounds 82mm, 250 pounds of rice, 7 AK-47's, and 1 RPG. Over 100 bunkers had been found. At 1815H, F/2/3 at XD 923627 received A/W and S/A fire from all sides of their perimeter while a CH-46 was making a resupply run. Results: 1 WIA. At 2015H, "H", "E", and F/2/3, vicinity XD 938827, XD 925626 and XD 925626 respectively, received, probes on 30% of their lines with trip flares going off around the area. 30 rounds of 60mm were received. There were 15 WIA.

21 Sep: At 0500H, D/1/3 vicinity FSB Pete received one round incoming S/A fire which resulted in 1 WIA. At 1000H, K/3/3 at YD 948605 found an abandoned enemy flame thrower with "ROK S-3" written on it. The flame thrower was intact. Also found were six 120mm rockets, 9 boosters, 10 122mm rocket launchers, 20 DH-10 mines, 21 chicom grenades, 7 RPG rounds, 33 rounds 60mm mortar, 9 rounds 82mm, 11 gas masks, 48 fuzes 60mm, 24 shot gun shells, 8,800 rounds 7.62mm, 13 body bags, 200 pounds of rice, nine 120mm rockets with warheads, documents and 13 NVA/KIA. At 1245H, G/2/9 at XD 928676 found 15 rounds 75mm RR and 50 rounds 82mm mortar. At 1330H, a 1/9 CP vicinity YD 942661, found an NVA telephone similar to our TA-1 with markings of "B-2, 19th Bn, 320th Division". Also at 1330H, I/3/9 at YD 875601 found one NVA bunker 10'x8'x6' with a small additional bunker 4x4x6. Seven vats of medical gear, 2 operating gowns, 3 surgical towels, 8 cases of morphine, (10 bottles per case) 4 bottles of ether and 250 pounds of rice were found in the bunker. Also 3 graves revealed 13 NVA/KIA. At 1425H, H/2/9 at XD 908633 found 23 bunkers, 500 rounds .30 cal and 1 Chinese sub-machine gun. At 1500H, D/1/9 at XD 903660 found 5 large, fresh mud graves containing at least 24 bodies each. The graves were opened in order to estimate the number of bodies in each one. Results: 120 NVA/KIA. Documents were also found. At 1530H, A/1/4 found a base camp and training area together with 4 AK-47's, 3 SKS, 400 bandages, 400 leather

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rifle slings, 8 cases of 82mm mortars and 48 A.T. mines. At 1600H, E/2/3 at XD 926629 encountered S/A fire and heavy A/W fire from XD 925632 while searching a bunker system, resulting in 2 WIA. The fire was returned and the area swept. Found were 4 AK-47's, 6 NVA packs, and 10 NVA/KIA. Some documents were also found. At 1645H, C/1/9, at XD 982638, received A/W fire upon reaching the crest of the hill. Fire was returned and the area consolidated. Results were 1 KIA, 4 WIA and 1 NVA/KIA. At 1650H, G/2/26 at YD 891636 found 155 cases 82mm mortars, 50 cases of 60mm rounds, 100 cases demolitions, 2 can 7.62mm ammo, 110 cans .50 cal, 20 cases RPG-4's and 35 cases of mines. At 1700H, C/1/3 at XD 905660 found the remaining portion of a regimental size bunker and storage complex. Over 350 bunkers were found together with 3000 pounds of rice, 300 pounds of salt, 200 helmets, 100 packs and assorted documents. At 1800H, K/3/9 at XD 772590 found 25 chicom grenades, 12 DH-10 mines, 200 pounds of rice, 500 Soviet 7.62 long rounds, 2 large rolls of communication wire and assorted other gear.

22 Sep: At 0930H, A/1/9 at XD 910656 found a 55 bunker complex, ten of which were kitchens with assorted cooking materials. At 1200H, L/3/9 at YD 864591 was hit by a command detonated mine, chicom grenades and small arms fire. Fire was returned and artillery called in. Results: 5 WIA. At 1220H, an I/3/9 patrol just outside their own lines observed 2 NVA moving slowly toward them. At the same time the patrol heard movement on their flanks. The patrol fired and a search of the area revealed 2 NVA/KIA with 2 AK-47's. At 1330H, B/1/4 at YD 936658 found 27 reinforced bunkers, 1600 rounds .50 cal, 100 pounds of rice, and communication wire leading from bunker to bunker. At 1415H, a base camp was found at XD 891636 by E/2/26 consisting of 14 bamboo thatched huts (15'x25'), 1 kitchen, dispensary and head. Assorted gear was found along with 6 cases of TNT and 3 grave sites containing 8 NVA/KIA. At 1520H, F/2/3 found 1 NVA/KIA and 1 SKS. At 1700H, L/3/9 after an intense artillery prep of the area, swept through the enemy positions at XD 864591 finding parts of 2 NVA/KIA. At 1800H, E/2/3 at XD 924627 found 200 pounds of rice and 2 RPG rounds.

23 Sep: At 0800H, D/1/4 at XD 933658 found 95 rounds 75mm recoilless rifle. At 0920H, a 3/9 squad patrol at XD 862591, initiated contact with an estimated NVA squad and received approximately 40 rounds of incoming 60mm mortar from XD 852593. Results: 3 WIA. At 1130H, K/3/9 at XD 887603 after an artillery prep found parts of bodies from 6 NVA/KIA. At 1300H, 1/4 at XD 957676 observed 1 NVA pop up and opened fire causing 1 NVA/KIA. At 1500H, L/3/9 at XD 862592 searched the area and found 8 NVA/KIA. At 2400H, 2/9 was chopped to 9th Marines. Also 1/4 and 2/3 were chopped to 3rd Marines.

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25-30 Sep: On the 25th, a boundary change was made, which shifted the Trousdale AO, where 3/9 was operating, into the Scotland II AO. LAN-CASTER II TROUSDALE NORTH continued. There was, however, no enemy contact during this period. A sweep was conducted along the Cam Lo River Basin, and some munitions discovered but of very little quantity.

1 Oct: The month opened with the continuation of 1/3's two separate, but parallel axis sweep in the Mutter's Ridge area. Companies B and D advanced along Mutter's Ridge while A and C advanced parallel to them. 2/3 pushed further on their sweep operation SE along the Cam Lo River Basin toward Route #9. 1/4 continued to advance toward Route # 1022, a new road used by the NVA to move supplies and 152mm Guns across an underwater bridge in the Ben Hai River. At 1100H, 2/26 at XD 969679 began taking incoming 130mm artillery that continued throughout the afternoon. A total of 59 rounds were received. Later, G/2/26 made contact with 10 to 12 NVA resulting in 2 KIA, 11 WIA and 3 NVA/KIA. At 1150H, 2/3 chopped to Task Force Hotel.

2 Oct: At 1320H, a unit from G/2/26 made contact with NVA at YD 979688 resulting in 3 WIA and 5 NVA/KIA. Ten minutes later, 2/26 CP at YD 976702 received 12 rounds recoilless rifle fire. Counter artillery fire was fired. Between 2213H and 2230H, Camp Carroll received 4 incoming 130mm rounds artillery.

3 Oct: At 1530H, H/2/26 made contact with approximately 25 NVA in vicinity YD 882688. With two platoons up and one back, the hill was consolidated. Results: 14 WIA and 3 NVA/KIA. At 1800H, the attack resumed on an objective at YD 979688 after air strikes were run. Encountered were incoming 60mm, spider holes and machine gun fire. Results: 1 KIA, 2 WIA and 2 NVA/KIA.

5 Oct: No significant events.

6 Oct: At 1245H, 2/26 found a 152mm gun pit together with 305 rounds of 152mm increments, 1 box TNT, miscellaneous medical gear (Made in England) and documents.

7 Oct: At 1345H, E/2/26 received 12 rounds of 82mm from YD 997687, resulting in 2 WIA. At 1500H, A/1/3 received 4 rounds heavy caliber from YD 984194. At 1620, E/2/3 received mortar rounds from YD 993688. Results: 2 WIA. During the day, E/2/26 ran into a command detonated mine, and also received 2 rounds 130mm and 84 rounds 82mm mortar. At 1700H, H/2/26 found a heavy NVA track vehicle at YD 988689 capable of pulling an artillery piece.

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8 Oct: Both A/1/3 and E/2/26 received incoming 75mm RR and mortars during the day. Counter artillery resulted in 3 NVA/KIA. At 1400H, H/2/26 made contact with 20-30 NVA defending a hill at YD 988689. The NVA in spider holes and bunkers began to withdraw over the hill as 81mm mortars were called in. H/2/26 made contact with an estimated 2 NVA squads. A firefight following resulted in 1 KIA and 17 WIA. LANCASTER II TROUSDALE NORTH ended. The cumulative casualties and equipment/supplies captured or destroyed in LANCASTER II TROUSDALE and TROUSDALE NORTH are as follows:

FRIENDLY
KIA 102
WIA 511

ENEMY
KIA 608
POW 7

Captured items included: 607 individual weapons, 24 crew served weapons, 2,685 bunkers destroyed, 1,429,838 small arm rounds, 21,538 mortar rounds, 1,310 recoilless rifle rounds, 407 heavy rocket rounds, 3,936 RPG rounds, 4,876 mines, 12,917 grenades and 29,053 pounds of explosives. There were 72 huts and 2685 bunkers destroyed. Of special interest were 305,000 gauze bandages captured together with 500 bottles of penicillin, 150 bottles of streptomycin, 242 vials of vitamins and numerous other medical supplies.

9 Oct: At 0800H, 2/26 reported receiving 107 RR rounds from vicinity XD 993705. At 1145H, C and D/1/3 received an undetermined number of rounds of unknown caliber while moving from vicinity YD 011684, resulting in 1 KIA and 18 WIA.

10 Oct: At 1345H, E/2/3 made contact with 3 NVA on a trail at YD 849665. Results were 1 NVA/KIA. At 1000H, A/1/3 received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from XD 996650. Results: 5 WIA. At 1800H, H/2/26 passed through vicinity XD 998690 and found 17 NVA/KIA.

11 Oct: At 1230H, F/2/3 at YD 839666 captured 1 NVA/POW and 5 minutes later, made contact with 2 NVA, resulting in 2 NVA/KIA. At 1820H, A/1/3 received 3 rounds 60mm mortar from YD 010667. During the day, D/1/3 found 100 bunkers and 18 graves in vicinity YD 004689 and YD 006687. Results were 19 NVA/KIA.

12 Oct: At 1130H, H/2/3 made contact with 1 NVA at YD 852670. Results were 1 WIA. At 1245H, E/2/3 found 500 pounds of rice at YD 836620.

13 Oct: At 1125H, H/2/3 found 250 pounds of rice at YD 858673. At 1417H, C/1/3 found 40 bunkers at YD 992678, together with 140 pounds of rice, 8 cases of .50 cal and 5 chicom grenades. L/3/3, during the day, found 1 NVA/KIA at YD 970597. At 1730H, a Marine from G/2/26 was shot in the leg by some type of booby trap. Results: 1 WIA.

16 Oct: 2/26 chopped out of AO.

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17 Oct: During the day, D/1/3 found 333 rounds of 152mm from YD 993694 to YD 987686. Also found were 5700 rounds of 12.7mm and 10 rounds of 85mm.

20 Oct: At 1230H, D/1/3, in vicinity XD 986690, received 24 rounds of 130mm artillery. Results: 1 WIA.

21 Oct: At 0256H, 1/3 received 6 to 7 rounds of unknown caliber.

22 Oct: At 1330H, D/1/3 vicinity XD 983687, received 10 rounds 130mm artillery, resulting in 1 KIA and 3 WIA.

23 Oct: At 1345H, B/1/3 received sniper fire from YD 965626.

26 Oct: At 1545H, F/2/3 found 2 graves with 2 NVA/KIA at YD 126507.

27 Oct: At 0816H, a recon team received 1 round of sniper fire, in vicinity YD 099498, resulting in 1 WIA.

28 Oct: At 1240H, L/3/3 at YD 778606 came across a sick NVA in a hammock. He said his battalion left him behind and that their doctor had been killed earlier.

30 Oct: At 1545H, A/1/3 found 20 bunkers with 200 pounds of rice.

1 Nov: At 1315H, F/2/3 received incoming sniper fire, and at 1340H received S/A fire from YD 132522. Artillery was called in. At 1415H, F/2/3, at YD 130520, encountered 3 to 4 NVA in well camouflaged bunkers. One NVA/KIA resulted.

2 Nov: During the day, F and H/2/3 participated in a MEDCAP program with Popular and Regional Forces in the Cam Lo area. At 1320H, a recon team at YD 129519 was hit by a command detonated claymore mine, resulting in 1 KIA and 3 WIA.

5 Nov: At 0930H, a platoon from H/2/3, on a recon patrol at YD 095598, received sniper fire from across the river. There were no casualties. At 1400H, F/2/3 detonated a booby trap while on a combined operation with Popular and Regional Forces. Results were 2 USMC WIA and 3 ARVN WIA. At 1845H, 2nd platoon, 3rd Anti-tank Battalion, at YD 168585, received 25 rounds of S/A fire from a village at YD 178590.

6 Nov: At 0337H, 2/3, at YD 095595, received incoming 82mm rounds from the north. At 1300H, M/3/4 and K/3/9 were chopped to 3rd Marines. At 1400H, F/2/3, while moving through the bushes at YD 130530, detonated a surprise firing device, resulting in 5 WIA.

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7 Nov: At 1515H, a resupply convoy from 2/3 detonated an enemy explosive device, resulting in 5 WIA.

9 Nov: At 1530H, F/2/3 was informed by village chiefs that an NVA company of 83 men were at YD 123527 carrying a B-40 rocket launcher and 60mm mortars. Their mission (NVA) was to fire on Cam Lo. At 2305H, Camp Carroll received 5 rounds of 60mm mortars. At 2020H, a unit at YD 170586 was hit by fifteen 60mm mortars from YD 180575 and YD 168572. Artillery was called in.

10 Nov: At 0200H, E/2/3 at C-3 received twenty 82mm rounds. At 0215H, Cam Lo received approximately 50-60 rounds of 60mm mortars from YD 108 603. There was 1 KIA and 10 WIA. There were also numerous civilian casualties. Artillery was called in. At 0745H, an AO observed 10 NVA in the open, at YD 0764, moving north. Gunships were called in.

11 Nov: At 0740H, B/1/3 at YD 969617, received an estimated 7 rounds 60mm from YD 965626. Three hours later, B/1/3 received 30 incoming rounds of 82mm mortar from XD 946620. Six hours later, B/1/3 received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar from YD 946623. Artillery fire was called in after each attack.

12 Nov: At 1930H, B/1/3 received sporadic S/A fire from the east and west and, at 2103H, received 60mm mortar fire from YD 976616, resulting in 1 WIA.

13 Nov: A cordon was effected around Rao Vinh with E and F 2/3, L/3/3, I/3/4 and the 5th ARVN Battalion.

14 Nov: At 0900H, F/2/3, vicinity of YD 133514, tripped a surprise firing device causing 1 WIA. Then at 1030H, F/2/3 tripped an 81mm round rigged as a surprise firing device, at YD 122521, causing 3 WIA. At 1645H, an A/1/3 platoon received fire and grenades from NVA in vicinity YD 946623. The firefight lasted until 2000H. Results: 3 KIA, 17 WIA and 5 NVA/KIA.

15 Nov: At 0930H, a recon team observed 2 NVA moving north along a trail in vicinity YD 134503. They initiated contact resulting in 4 KIA, 4 WIA and 2 NVA/KIA. At 1725H, B/1/9 received S/A fire from a tree covered hill west of their position. At 1730H, C/1/9 received AK-47 fire on their position at YD 137470.

16 Nov: At 1715H, NVA detonated directional mines at C/1/3 as a firefight developed. Air and artillery support were subsequently called. Results were 1 WIA and 4 NVA/KIA. At 1730H, C/1/3 received 8 rounds of 60mm mortars from YD 937627.

17 Nov: At 1110H, a recon team initiated contact with 3 NVA moving south on a trail in vicinity YD 902611. Results were 1 NVA/KIA. At 1410H, C/1/3,

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in vicinity XD 937627, received 7 rounds 60mm mortar from YD 926627. At 1605H, while on the move in vicinity YD 128512, personnel from L/3/3 tripped a surprise firing device, resulting in 3 WIA. At 1915H, a frag grenade was thrown at a truck blowing a tire. There were 7 WIA.

18 Nov: At 1428H, C/1/3 at LZ Sierra received 5 incoming 60mm mortar rounds from YD 925621. One hour later they received another 5 rounds.

19 Nov: C/1/3 received 4 incoming rounds 60mm mortar from YD 943633. At 1730H, E/2/3 found 1 NVA/KIA at YD 140493. At 2105H, H/2/3 at YD 692599 received 10 to 12 rounds of 82mm mortar.

20 Nov: At 1200H, the point element of a road sweep detonated a plastic AP mine at YD 063570. There was 1 KIA and 1 WIA. At 1400H, while conducting a combined sweep in vicinity YD 090613, incoming A/W fire and 60mm mortars caused 1 KIA, 3 WIA and 2 NVA/KIA. Artillery was called in.

23 Nov: AT 2400H, OPERATION LANCASTER II TERMINATED

11. RESULTS

A. Casualties:

USMC LOSSES

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Totals
KIA	30	58	13	30	31	9	22	43	95	16	12	359
WIA (MED)	120	225	87	182	103	45	97	233	431	129	61	1713
WIA (MIN)	7	105	54	64	36	27	22	20	32	7	3	387

NVA LOSSES

KIA	169	85	55	130	48	15	380	178	597	125	19	1801
POW	9	-	2	1	-	2	-	3	7	3	-	27

In addition there was 1 ARVN/KIA, 15 VC/POW and 87 civilians killed (primarily in June from incoming artillery).

B. Captured weapons:

824 individual weapons
89 crew served weapons including two 75mm pack howitzers.

C. Captured munitions:

35,430 rockets/artillery/mortars
1,454,919 small arm rounds

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13,308 grenades
 4,949 mines
 32,982 pounds of explosives

In addition there were thousands of increments, fuzes, blasting caps and .50 cal rounds captured or destroyed

D. Captured food supplies:

11,811 pounds of salt
 50 pounds of flour
 40,322 pounds of rice

E. Captured medical supplies:

306,000 gauze bandages
 500 bottles, penicillin
 150 bottles, streptomycin
 500 tablets, aspirin
 242 vials, vitamins
 110 ampules, novacaine
 170 vials, morphine
 144 vials, atropine sulphate
 2 bottles, chloromycetin
 3 pouches, opium
 29 medical kits

F. Captured 782 gear:

Captured 782 gear included 253 packs, 266 helmets, 111 E-tools, 117 gas masks, 302 pistol belts, 217 utility sets, 201 sweat shirts, 400 leather rifle slings, 51 ponchos, 41 blankets, 1 compass, 2 sets of binoculars, maps, rat traps, canteens and sandals.

G. Miscellaneous:

There was 1 heavy tracked vehicle, 2 bicycles, 1 NVA telephone, 2500 feet of communication wire, 2 radios, and hundreds of documents captured. There were 5,521 bunkers and 77 huts destroyed.

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

A. Supply

(1) The primary source of supply from January through June in Operation Lancaster II was FLSG-B at Dong Ha. Helicopter resupply was routine during this period with the exception of seven emergency resupply missions in February, three in March, four in April, and three in May.

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(2) In June, July, and August, there was a shortage of field protective masks, flak jackets, and small size utilities. A shortage of water cans was also a problem.

(3) From August through October, Dong Ha remained the primary source of all classes of supply except Class V. Ammunition was stored at Quang Tri. In September, Vandegrift Combat Base had Class I, III, IV, and V supplies on hand.

(4) Normal helicopter resupply to battalions in the northern Lancaster II AO began during July from LZ Stud (later Vandegrift Combat Base). From a study of helicopter resupply during this period, it was found that within a ten mile radius:

(a) A battalion on the move required an average of ten CH-46 lifts per day. These lifts must be scheduled early in the morning and late in the afternoon as not to adversely effect the tactical situation. It required two CH-46 aircraft per battalion to accomplish this resupply.

(b) Units that utilized a fixed LZ for a period of time required an average of eight CH-46 lifts per day delivered at any time. Two CH-46's can deliver this cargo in approximately one hour.

(c) Fire support bases required 18-23 CH-53 lifts the first day and an average of seven CH-53 lifts per day thereafter. Each aircraft had the capability of delivering four lifts per hour.

(5) From August to November the most significant problems were shortage of 2nd Echelon repair/components parts for motor transport and communication equipment, and the high deadline rate due to a lack of field maintenance. Power Generators (20, 30, and 60kw, 60 cycle) had such a high deadline rate that only 37% of the generators on hand in the Division were operational.

B. Maintenance and Base Support

(1) The 3rd Engineer Battalion provided support throughout the operation. Water points were maintained at Camp Carroll and later Vandegrift Combat Base.

(2) The 11th Engineers provided electrical power and other facilities including showers, laundry, baker, and ice services, though these services were not always on a dependable basis. Sanitation problems existed at Camp Carroll in July due to inadequate head and shower facilities. The trash dump was a problem in August due to a lack of obtaining a serviceable tractor and blade.

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C. Hospitalization and Evacuation

(1) There were no major hospital or evacuation problems reported throughout Operation Lancaster II.

(2) Casualties were evacuated usually by helicopter, though deterred sometimes by weather.

(3) Casualties requiring treatment beyond organic Battalion Aid Station and Regimental Aid Station level were evacuated to Co "D" of the 3d Med Battalion until 16 August.

(4) From late August, serious cases were evacuated to 3d Med Bn Hospital at Quang Tri.

D. Transportation

(1) Direct and general motor transport support was provided throughout the operation on an as required basis from Division motor transport units.

(2) In January, Company "A", 9th MT Bn provided truck support including 4 trucks in general support and trucks "as required" for supply from Dong Ha. Company "C", 9th MT Bn took over truck support in April and was relieved by Company "A" in June.

(3) As multi-regimental helicopter operations began in July, 3rd MT Bn provided a truck platoon consisting of fifteen 2½ ton trucks, nine cargo trailers and one wrecker to haul troops and deliver large quantities of supplies to Camp Carroll and LZ Stud for helilift to the battalions in the field. 9th MT Bn continued to move personnel and material from Dong Ha to Vandegrift Combat Base. Further, 9th Motor Transport Battalion maintained one reinforced platoon of 15 trucks, and five truck tractor and trailers at Vandegrift Combat Base during July and August. Starting in September until November, 9th MT Bn maintained one company at Vandegrift Combat Base in general support of units operating at and from the base.

(4) Air transportation was provided by MAG-16, MAG-36 and MAG-39. Helicopters were used for resupply medical evacuation and troop lifts under routine and emergency conditions.

F. Communications

The 4th Marines movement to Camp Carroll during January was effected without any major problems. Two radio relay links with the 3rd Marine Division using organic AN/TRC-27 equipment was established. A link with the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh and 3/9 at Thon Son Lam and Phu Bai was estab-

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lished on existing AN/IRC-62 equipment. In alternate TRC-27 slot (8 channel) was established as a backup with the 3d Marine Division on 14 April.

(1) Lack of supply and maintenance support was a handicap. For instance, in February, of 82 major items of electronic communication equipment authorized for the 4th Marines, only 54 items were on hand. And of those 54 only 39 were operational. Eleven needed maintenance and four items needed spare parts. This lack of supply and maintenance support, although varying to a small degree, was apparent in each regiment and throughout the LANCASTER II operations. In July, HQ 3rd Marines reported numerous combat essential items being deadlined for long periods, some items for six months or more.

(2) Frequency management was a major difficulty throughout LANCASTER II. The 9th Marines, on nine occasions in June, had heavy interference from other U.S./Allied units requiring them to change their primary frequencies. In conducting heliborne field operations, the overloaded channels handicapped coordination.

(3) Another problem until August was the 400 cps power requirement on the TRC-27 which could not be provided with the PU-27 generator. TRC-97, a new 600 series of 400 cps generators (PU-670) were placed into service in August.

Of interest in July the PRC-77 and KY-38 were tested and gave excellent results over the KY-8. In August steps were being taken to increase their use.

13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES

A. A lift-off pad and techniques for its use were developed to allow for poor weather, helicopter availability, and the huge amounts of supplies that had to be delivered by air to units in the mountains.

Orders from battalions were called in to unit representatives sitting in bunkers just off the pad. The orders were logged and charted, the supplies acquired and staged on the proper lane painted on the pad in front of them. As the supplies were placed in the nets, they were charted by the tower operator.

Also, every morning, each resupply helicopter commander was given a prepared sheet listing all units by a line number, with the call sign, location and frequency so that as the helicopter approached the pad, the tower said to him: "I have a load for you to go to line #6; you'll find it on pad Alpha, lane #4." This was the extent of the transmission. A crew on the ground had the same information, hooked the net to the helicopter as he hovered, and from there the supplies were lifted by the helicopter.

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The representative called his unit and told them the supplies were en-route. When the helicopter arrived, the LZ was already cleared and smoke available. The net was dropped and the helicopter returned for another load. Helicopters flew continually, setting down only for chow, fuel, or crew relief. If threat of darkness or poor weather occurred, representatives at the pad coordinated in determining priorities to insure that the most urgent supplies were lifted out. The technique of the lift-off pad helped minimize the emergency resupplies that otherwise would have been needed.

B. Starlight scopes were increasingly used on ambushes, LP's and perimeter defense by infantry companies. Night Observation Devices (NOD's) and PP-56's were employed at major bases. In May, a 1/4 OP, using a NOD, observed a group of NVA moving along between the outer perimeter wire and an ambush/patrol. The patrol was alerted but due to pitch darkness was unable to see. The company commander was alerted and through the NOD was able to maneuver his troops into an advantageous position, where when artillery illumination was called, the ambush was sprung resulting in 7 NVA/KIA.

C. The use of "Chieu Hoi" Kit Carson Scouts doubled during the operation. The scouts were responsible for finding many mines, booby-traps and munitions caches. They sometimes were able to talk NVA/VC out of caves or tunnels. Many unit commanders did recommend that they be given more language training, however the Kit Carson Scout's successes are attested to by the fact that demand for them presently exceeds the supply.

D. High pinnacle, razorback ridge, fire support bases were developed in support of new mobile concepts of operation. (Seen Enclosure 12) Techniques using lightweight, helicopter portable tractors, chainsaws, and explosives were adapted to preparing a new area so that within 6 hours the first gun could be helilifted in and ready to fire.

E. Trench diggers were employed at major combat bases resulting in saving manpower.

15. COMMANDERS' COMMENTS

Operation Lancaster II was initiated as a long range operation designated to clear the NVA/VC forces from the mountainous areas that dominate the central portion of the Division AO and control freedom of movement along National Route 9. Opening National Route 9 would permit overland movement of men and supplies in large quantities to the U.S. forces at the Khe Sanh Combat Base thereby releasing helicopter assets for exploitation of the enemy's weaknesses and detailed destruction of his base camps and supply caches.

During the initial phase, the enemy's ability to interdict route 9 and impede the overland flow of supplies and equipment was blunted. Artillery and logistic support facilities were constructed to provide the necessary backup for the next phase of the operation; clearing the enemy from the central portion of the Division AO.

The progression from regaining control of the LOC to the systematic

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destruction of the enemy's forces, base camps, and supply caches was pressaged by the initiation of mobile helicopterborne assault operations. The concept of the mobile helicopterborne assault called for the establishment of landing zones and expansion of these landing zones into fire support bases at which artillery batteries would be positioned to provide protective/supporting fire for the infantry elements as they moved down the ridgelines seeking out the enemy's base camps and caches. Additional fire support bases would be constructed approximately 8000 meters apart, thereby providing a three thousand meter over-range to provide the necessary close-in counter-mortar fire to protect the Fire Support Base from enemy attack. The fire support bases provided mutually supporting artillery fire not only to the infantry elements operating under this protective fan but to the fire bases themselves. Infantry units were then able to maintain pressure on the enemy regardless of weather conditions and availability of air support.

As a result of this constant pressure, the Marine elements were able to force the enemy out of his base camps, uncover his supply caches, spoil his plans for counter-offensive operations and ultimately drive the enemy back across the Demilitarized Zone into North Vietnam. The effect of Operation Lancaster on the combat efficiency of the North Vietnamese forces was evidenced by the large numbers of caches that were uncovered that had been hastily abandoned by the enemy in his flight out of the area in the face of overwhelming fire power and rapidly moving infantry forces. By late October and early November the threat to the central portion of the Division AO and to National Route 9 was reduced to the point where freedom of movement of troops, supplies and equipment was unimpeded by the enemy's presence in the Northern Central portion of Quang Tri Province which consisted mainly of scattered screening and recon forces. These were attacked in detail by the Marine forces remaining in the area. With the elimination of the enemy threat to the central portion of the Division AO and Route 9 Lancaster II was terminated.

The landing zones and fire support bases developed during Operation Lancaster II provided a dividend effect for the Third Marine Division in that the vacated fire support bases and landing zones remain available for immediate re-occupancy with a minimum of preparation or engineer effort. These can be utilized to conduct normal operations, insert recon teams, or support large scale offensive operations in the event the NVA/VC initiate another major effort in this area from across the DMZ.

Wm R. Jones
WILLIAM R. JONES

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DEVELOPMENT OF FIRE SUPPORT BASES

The following discussion of the preparation and concept of the use of high pinnacle, razorback fire support bases, was extracted from an article prepared for the Marine Corps Gazette by Colonel Martin J. Sexton, presently Chief of Staff, 3rd Marine Division (Rein). The article describes specifically Fire Support Bases developed during Operation Scotland II though the concept also applies to Fire Support Bases constructed during Operation Lancaster II.

"A key to the fire base concept is the selection process. If it is carefully selected, thoroughly planned and rapidly constructed, the benefits are tremendous. Conversely, a hastily selected and poorly planned FSB will simply multiply difficulties. A "package", or "zipper" team, that has proved immensely satisfactory includes the infantry regimental commander, infantry battalion commander, artillery battalion commander, artillery battery commander, rifle company commander, communications officer and engineer officer. Hopefully the visual reconnaissance can be made from a HUEY or CH-46. Either "bird" affords excellent observation and is capable of carrying all personnel simultaneously. On the other hand, the UH-34 is a most difficult helicopter from which to execute a VR. After the required VR is accomplished, and the decision rendered, all personnel commence accelerated planning for the most expeditious construction of the fire base.

The type and nature of terrain is the next key factor in the construction process. For example, GURKHA, ALPINE and FULLER required little or no clearance of trees or brush. On the other hand, ARGONNE, NEVILLE, and RUSSELL presented a difficult initial clearing problem. The so-called "HURRICANE BOMB", or 10,000 pound jury-rigged aerial delivered bomb offers great promise, but it cannot be utilized on a small, precise terrain feature. The GCP is too great.

The initial preparations on ARGONNE were made by 250, and 500 pound bombs and daisy cutters. However, the terrain was so dense that a suitable LZ could not be prepared in this manner. Consequently, the infantry assault elements (a rifle company), reinforced with engineers and an artillery survey party were forced to land approximately 4000 meters from the prospective fire base site and moved to it on foot. This took an additional day, but it had to be done in such a manner. Upon arrival at the crest of Hill 1308, or what was to be known as FSB ARGONNE, the infantry immediately set out security. The engineer detachment (1 officer and 12 enlisted) made a rapid on-site survey for a LZ. A technique which has been utilized successfully is that of building the initial LZ on the military crest of the hill. In this way there will normally be less obstructions that have to be cleared, helicopter approach and retirement routes are better and artillery resupply is facilitated. However, in some situations it is not feasible to construct

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the high LZ initially. ARGONNE was such a case, and work initially commenced on an LZ down hill approximately 100 meters from the typographical crest. Two days later, when this LZ was being used by CH-46's for the first time, there was a loud explosion while the helicopter was hovering approximately 4-6 feet off the ground. A detailed search of the landing zone revealed a surprise explosive firing device that had been planted during the night by NVA. Fortunately, the helicopter was not damaged, and this incident graphically highlighted several tactical lessons. First, while working on an LZ it must be included within the night perimeter, in this instance it wasn't. Secondly, the higher LZ is generally preferable and normally offers more advantage than does one lower on the slopes.

Fire Support Base NEVILLE was purposefully selected for its relative inaccessibility. It rises to a peak elevation of 1105 meters, and is atop a narrow, rocky, razorback formation. The widest point on this fire base is barely 20 meters. The preparation of suitable LZs and firing positions for the 105mm battery posed unique problems. There was a considerable demolition effort involved, but a surprising amount of hand engineering effort (just plain pick and shovel work) took place. The construction of fighting positions and living spaces required a longer and more detailed effort. On the other hand, the requirements for man-made obstacles are less on this type of position. As a matter of fact the very physical limitations of FSB NEVILLE precluded the installation of extensive obstacles. The construction of FSBs RUSSELL and FULLER presented very similar problems. The terrain was precipitous and heavily wooded. The development of each base required essentially the following:

MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

- (1) One Case 450 Crawler Tractor.
- (2) One Case 580 Rubber Tire Tractor (Back Hoe).
- (3) Four Remington Chain Saws.
- (4) One Infantry Pioneer Chest.

MATERIALS EXPENDED

- (1) 1160 lbs of C-4.
- (2) 200 lbs of TNT
- (3) 15-151b Shape Charges.
- (4) 150 Bangalore Torpedoes.

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- (5) 5800 feet of det cord.
- (6) 300 feet of time fuse.
- (7) 850 non-electric blasting caps.
- (8) 55 electrical blasting caps.
- (9) 50 feet of line charges.
- (10) 35 gallons of chainsaw mixture.
- (11) 10 gallons of chainsaw oil.

The prolonged combat operations...provided an invaluable opportunity to develop certain tactical innovations and correlate planning factors which could be used as basic premises for future operations. Some of the most salient factors are as follows:

- (1) A technique of caching small quantities of MCI in proximity to FSBs which are to be closed was implemented.
- (2) Another technique which proved valuable was that of logistically surging supplies at the fire support bases to a level of approximately five days of supply -- especially in Class I and Class V (Infantry). By maintaining these consumable items netted at the FSBs it was possible to maintain daily resupply of companies operating from base camps at some distances from the FSB. This was not intended to develop competing LSAs, but to take advantage of those periods when visibility permitted helicopters to operate in the forward areas while the logistic supply area at Vandegrift Combat Base was "socked in". Such a situation is a unique circumstance which pertains in the Northwest portion of Quang Tri Province, and is illustrated by the conditions in the vicinity of FSBs GURKHA, ALPINE and ARGONNE.
- (3) The technique involved in closing out a fire support base should be planned in just as much detail and as thoroughly as the development of such a base. A basic decision is required concerning the degree of dismantling that will be implemented. For example, at GURKHA the tops of all bunkers were removed prior to departure, 3 of the 6 artillery firing positions were dismantled and efforts exerted to permit daily aerial observation of the position. On the other hand, the superior preparation and construction of positions at FSB SHEPHERD dictated that the base be left largely intact. Thus, the FSB was left virtually intact. As a matter of fact, upon departure, mock-up guns and "dummy" positions were

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developed in order to lend credence to a continual occupational status of the positions. An additional dozen manikins were dispersed throughout the FSB position; and periodically patrols check out the area, set ambushes and employed stay-behind squads to take advantage of the overall tactical situation.

(4) Another invaluable planning factor has been developed to assist with the planning, development and completion of LZs in the triple canopy which characterized this area. Assuming that a detailed VR has been made and prior planning has been complete, the following basic requirements permit opening of an LZ suitable for the internal receptions of a CH-46 within 24-72 hours of initiation.

(a) One (1) rifle platoon for security and to assist engineers.

(b) Ten (10) engineers equipped with 4 power saws, axes and a minimum of 650 lbs of demolitions.

(c) Air panels, smoke grenades and an integral HST.

(d) A minimum of 2 corpsmen.

(5) Still another technique associated with the development of LZs and FSBs is that of ensuring periodic aerial photographic coverage. It is desirable to photograph the preparations, development and completion of such areas (as well as the closing of same) principally for documentary purpose. This will then be available for "turnover" purposes, and/or to assist new units or organizations which may assume responsibility for the AO.

(6) Careful analysis of the time-space factor, insofar as ground movement is concerned, was instrumental in the development of useful and reliable planning factors. The following were determined:

First, movement for troops in the terrain of Northwest Quang Tri Province is limited to approximately 500 meters per four hours -- if it has rained for 24 or more hours. On the other hand, if the weather had been clear for over 24 hours, movement will generally vary from 2300 to 3300 meters. The exact distance is dependent upon the specific terrain and the physical condition of the unit concerned. (Both of these factors are, of course, based on no enemy contact).

The most significant factor occurring as a result of the foregoing described operations is considered to be that of the preparation of the large number of LZs and mutually supporting fire support bases. It is through the medium of such bases that the 3rd Marine Division (or any forces

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operating in the Northwest portion of Quang Tri Province) can at any time move strong forces into areas which the enemy heretofore considered his "own". Today, Free World Military Forces are conducting on a daily basis, combat operations throughout the Northwest portion of I Corps Area of Operations. These operations are characterized by mobility, flexibility and massive fire power. The success of such operations is dependent upon a number of factors -- availability of troop lift helicopters, resupply by heavy lift helicopters, fire support coordination and cooperation with ARVN Forces, detailed and continuing reconnaissance efforts -- to mention a few. Nevertheless, the fundamental ingredient for these successful operations is the Fire Support Base and the network of supporting landing zones. In truth, the 3rd Marine Division has "Opened up the West" in Quang Tri Province of the Republic of South Vietnam!".

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT
UNIT MORT

NAZ/SAL
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1/5TH MECH 9RDS/82MM
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A/1/8TH BTRY 12 RDS/82MM
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
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TO UUMSK/XXIV COPRS PHB
INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DAILY ATK BY FIRE REPRT
N INIT MORT
ACK 3RD TANK BN 60MM
BT

#79
CAS
15 RDS WP. NEG

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OO UUMSK UUMSQ

DE UUMSQD 7420 3152030Z

ZNY CCCCC

O 102030Z NOV 68

/FM THIRD MARIDVO COC GH

TO UUMSK/XXIV COPRPS TOC PHB

INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG

BT

C O N F I D E M T A I T L

DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT 1000;21-2400H NOV 68

UNIT ARTY MORTARS ROCKETS RR CAS

E/2/3 20RDS/82MM

NEG

2/3CP

50-60RDS/82MM

1KIA 10WIA (E)

C/1/3 16RDS/75MM

.3NEG

3/3

8RDS/122MM

4KIA

30WIA E

11WIA M

D/1/3

85MM

18RDS

122MM

MIXED

140MM

1KIA-3WIA E-2 WIA M

K/3/3


4RDS/60MM

1KIA-3WIA E

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MOVE COL

CHIEF

W.O.

W.O.

TO DUMSK DUMSO
 DE RUMHVP 67600 3161904
 CNY CCCCC
 LO 111904Z NOV 68
 FM THIRD MARDIV DGH
 TO DUMSK/XXIV CORPS PHB
 INFO DUMSOX/III MAF COC DNG
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL
 DAILY TRACK BY FIRE REPORT
 UNIT MORTARS

LANCASTER

8/1/73

82MM/30 RDS

8/1/73

60MM/19 RDS

SCOTLAND

7/3/79

60MM/29 RDS

KENTUCKY

1/3/73

60MM/55 RDS

BT

BT

#13

CAS


0

04

13

12 WIA MED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SHOVE DOC

OP CHIEF _____

G-7 W.O. _____

G-2 W.O. _____

DGPO _____

ARO _____

ACTION _____

CI UUMSK UUMSQ
 DL UUMSQD 786C 3171703Z
 ZN' CCCCC
 O 121703Z N
 FM 'HIRD MARDIV COC DG4
 TO UUMSK/XXI V CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO UUMSQ/III M AF COC DNG

BT

C O N Y I D E N T A I
 DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT
 UNIT MORTARS

A3

A BTRY 103TH 8" 10RDS/32MM

CASUALTIES

1 WIA E

LANCASTER

B/1/3

2RD /60MM

1 WIA E

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SHOVE COC
 OP CHIEF *[Signature]*
 G-2 W.O. *[Signature]*
 G-2 W.O. *[Signature]*
 DCPD
 PO
 ACTION

OO UUMSK UUMSO

DE UUMSO 819C 31317Z

ZNY CCCCC

O 31317Z NOV 68

FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORP S TOC PHB

INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC DNG

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT

UNIT

MORTARS

CASUALTIES

MAP/SAL

1ST OF THE 11TH

15RDS/32MM

9VIA (E)

1ST OF THE 77TH

4RDS/UNK DAI

NEG

RECYLARD

K23/9


00RDS/CONY

NEG

OP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**SHOVE CDC**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

XXIV CORPS -T- IIMAF CC
 OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 3510 3131630Z
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 141630Z NOV 68
 FM THIRD MARID VO COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT
 UNIT MORTARS
 LANCASTER: A/1/3 1RD/60MM
 GP-4
 BT

CASUALTIES
 NEG

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF T XXIV CORPS

#27
OO UUMSK UUMSQ
DE UUMSQD 892C 3201720
ZNY CCCCC
O 151720Z NOV 68
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT (150001H - 152400H NOV 68)

UNIT CASUALTIES

NAF/SAL

2/4


2 RDS UNKNOWN CAL

NEGATIVE

GP-4

BT

NNNN



SHOVE
OP CHIEF C
G-3 W.O.
G-2 W.O. JAK
DCPO
PO
ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED


CONFIDENTIAL

3 255/50MM NEGATIVE



SHOVE OUT
OP CHIEF
G-3 W.O.
G-2 W.O.
DCPO
APO
ACTION
FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

XNR 399.....399...

XNIV O COPR TO: T-III MAF COC

OO UUMSK UUMSO
 DE UUMSO 9690 3221725
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 171725Z NOV 63
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGM
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC DNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT (170001H - 172400H NOV 63)
 UNIT MORTARS CASUALTIES

LANCASTER

C/1/3

SCOTLAND

D/1/4

GP-4

BT

7 RDS/60MM

NEGATIVE

12 RDS/60MM

NEGATIVE

MOVE	C
CP CHIEF	
G-3 W.O.	
G-2 W.O.	
DCPO	
ARO	
ACTION	

24

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DE DIV 300 AND NR 430

XXIV CORPS TOC -T- III MAF COC

OO UUMSK UUMSO
 DE UUMSAD 0020 3231655
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 181655Z NOV 68
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORP TOC PWB
 INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC DNG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT:

UNIT

KENTUCKY

N/3/3

MORTARS

CASUALTIES

15RDS/60MM
 10RDS/82MM

NEG

NEG

C-2

15RDS/82MM

NEG

C-3

14RDS/82MM

NEG

LANCASTER


10RDS/60MM

NEG

C/1/3

GP-4

BT

**SHOVE COC**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APO

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF COG T XXIV CORPS TOC

OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 52C 3241720
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 191720Z NOV 68
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REGT (190021H - 192400H NOV 68)

UNIT

MORTARS

CASUALTIES

CAM LO DIST HQ

7/8 2MM

NEGATIVE

C/1/3

4/6 2MM

NEGATIVE

H/2/3

12/8 2MM

NEGATIVE

GP-2

BT

N AN NO



SHOVE CUC

OP CHIEF	
G-3 W.O.	
G-2 W.O.	
DCPO	
PO	
ACTION	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

XXIV CORPS TOC T III MAF COC

OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 0900 3251710
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 201710Z NOV 68
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC P4B
 INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT (2000014 - 20240004 NOV68)
 UNIT MORTARS CASUALTIES

KENTUCKY

I/3/3

H/2/3

SCOTLAND

D/1/4

GP-4

BT

12 RDS/82MM


18 RDS/60MM

20 RDS/60MM & 82MM

NEGATIVE

2 KIA, 3 WIA (7)

NEGATIVE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

DE DIV LOC AND NR 563
XXIV CORPS TOC -T- III MAF COC

OO UUMSK LUMSQ
DE UUMSQD 135C 3261600
ZNY CCCCC
O 211600Z NOV 68
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT (210001H TO 212400H NOV 68)
NEGATIVE REPORT

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 167C 3271645
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 221645Z NOV 68
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT (2

00014 - 2224004 NOV 68)

NEGATIVE REPORT

GP-4

BT

NNNN



SHOVE COC	
OP CHIEF	
C-3 W.O.	
C-4 W.O.	
DCI	
APO	
ACTION	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DE DIV COC AND WEL TDC DAZBLE

PLS TO INT DSL AGAIN

DE DIV COC AND NR GAB

XXIV CORPS TOC -T- III MAF COC

CO HUMSK HUMSO

DE HUMSO 1930 3261635

ZNY CCCCC

O 251635Z NOV 68

FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGM

TO HUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PWR

INFO HUMSO/III MAF COC GNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT (COSPAR) - 232400H NOV 68/

UNIT MORTARS 2480-17100

KENTUCKY

173/3 1730PM

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

231635Z

CONFIDENTIAL

XXIV CORPS TOC T III MAF COC

OO UUMSK UUMSQ

DE UUMSQD 2200 3291645

ZNY CCCCC

O 241645Z NOV 68

FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT (2400014 - 242400H NOV 68)

UNIT MORTARS CASUALTIES

WAP/SALINE

1/61 6RDS/60MM NEGATIVE

KENTUCKY

C-2 12 RDS/60MM NEGATIVE

K/3/3 15RDS/UNK NEGATIVE

GP-4

BT

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I E
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CONFIDENTIAL

XXIV CORPS TOC

XXIV CORPS TOC T III MAF COC

OO UUMSK UUMSO

DE UUMSOD 2530 3301645

ZNY CCCCC

O 251645Z NOV 68

FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHE

INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC DNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT (250000H 1 252400H NOV 68)

UNIT	MORTARS	RR	CASUALTIES
------	---------	----	------------

KENTUCKY

3RD RECON

4/82MM

3/UNK

NEGATIVE

1/3/3

5/60MM

NEGATIVE

SCOTLAND

L/3/4

50/60MM

NEGATIVE

GP-4

BT

(S)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAP CO

OO UUMSK UUMSO
DE UUMSD 284C 331161Z
ZNY CCCCC
O 261610Z NOV 68
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC DNG
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT 260001 - 262400H NOV 68

UNIT	MORTARS	CAS
3RD RECON TM	125/60MM	NEG
L/3/A	11/32MM	NEG
GP-4		
BT		

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DE DIV COC AND NR 800
XXIV CORPS TOC -T- III MAF CO

OO UUMSK UUMSQ
DE UUMSQD 325C 3321815
ZNY CCCCC
O 271815Z NOV 68
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT
UNIT MORTARS

(270001 - 272400H NOV 68)
CASUALTIES

NAP/SALINER

I/II

12RDS/82MM

1 WIA(M)

KENTUCKY

G/2/3

20RDS/82MM

1 KIA, 4 WIA(E)

UNK/RPG

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

NR 7828.....828...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L

OO UUMSQ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 344C 3331730

ZNY CCCCC

O 281730Z NOV 68

FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT 280001H-282400H NOV 68

UNIT

MORTARS

CASUALTIES

KENTUCKY

C-2

34 RDS/82MM

0

SCOTLAND

B/1/4

6 RDS/60MM

6 WIA(E)

GP-4

BT

QSL AT 291837Z NOV 68

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DE DIV COC WITH MY NR 869.....869.....869... ..869
XXIV CORPS -T- III MAF CO C

OO UUMSK UUMSQ

DE UUMSQD 378C 3341715

ZNY CCCCC

O 291715Z NOV 68

FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT 290001H-292400H NOV 68

UNIT MORTARS

CASUALTIES

NAP/SALINE

A/1/77

2 RDS/82MM

000

GP-4

BT

#20
UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DAILY ATTACK
BY FIRE
NOV 68

AND MATE HOW ABOUT A QSL FOR NR 898.....898.....898
XKKKKILT

DE DIV COC WITH MY NR 898MMMMMIOIMMMIOI

XXXIVCORPS -.T-III MAYUNEC AHX

OO UUMSK UUMSQ

DE UUMSQD 415C 3351740

ZNY CCGCC

O 301740Z NOV 68

FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE REPORT 300001H - 302400H NOV 68

NEGATIVE REPORT

GP-4

BT

#13

UNCLASSIFIED