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3D MARINE DIVISION

FMF (-) (REIN)

BOOT LEG

OPERATION PLAN

7-69

(CASEY GROVE)

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TAB 5A

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98369

Operation Plan 7-69 (CASEY GROVE)

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam: 1:50,000; Series L7014; Sheets 6341 I and IV; 6342 I, II, III, and IV; 6441 I, II, III, and IV.

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization. No Change.

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) XXIV Corps destroys NVA/VC forces in AO and prevents enemy capture, destruction or domination of Hue, Quang Tri and other populated areas.

(2) 1st ARVN Div continues missions in zone to include defense of Dong Ha and Quang Tri cities.

(3) 101st Abn Div (AM) destroys NVA/VC forces in zone, assists in defense of Hue, prepares to support 3d MarDiv counterattack and/or counterattacks to destroy enemy forces, supplies, and base areas.

(4) Artillery.

(a) 108th Arty GP G/S XXIV Corps conducts counterbattery fire and maintains maximum suppression of NVA AA weapons and supporting installations.

(b) 1st Bn, 44th Arty (-) G/S 3d MarDiv.

(5) 1st MAW and 7th AF provides air support to 3d MarDiv.

(6) 7th Fleet provides tactical air and NGF support to 3d MarDiv (3 NGF Ships).

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[redacted]

(7) TF Clearwater maintains access to the Cua Viet River.

(8) 11th Engr Bn G/S 3d MarDiv.

(9) FLSG-B provides supply and maintenance support 3d MarDiv.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) Option #1.

(a) Two ARG/SLF's on order.

(b) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv (2 Bns), on order.

(2) Option #2.

(a) Two ARG/SLF's, on order.

(b) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv (2 Bns), on order.

(3) Option #3.

(a) Two ARG/SLF's, on order.

(b) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv (2 Bns), on order.

(c) 173rd Abn Bde, on order.

d. Assumptions.

(1) Option #1.

(a) Enemy attacks across DMZ with up to four divisions supported by artillery, armor, and air.

(b) Enemy attack detected as forces cross the DMZ.

(c) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv available by D+6.

(2) Option #2. Enemy reinforces MRTTH forces with one Division through Laos and attacks east on the axis of advance A Shau Valley Route 547 toward Hue.

(3) Option #3.

(a) Enemy attacks south with multi-divisions across the DMZ on an axis of advance toward Quang Tri City.

(b) Enemy reinforces MRTTH forces with one Division through Laos and attacks east on an axis A Shau Valley - Route 547 toward Hue.

(c) Enemy attacks with multi-divisions from Cambodia toward Saigon.

(d) Enemy attack detected as forces cross the DMZ.

(e) Regt (-), 1st MarDiv (2 Bns) available by D+6.

2. MISSION

Third Marine Division (-) (Rein), in coordination and cooperation with ARVN forces, repels and destroys enemy attack north of Cam Lo and Cua Viet Rivers and west of 98 N-S grid lines; assists GVN in the defense of Dong Ha and Quang Tri Cities, and conducts counterattacks to destroy enemy forces, supplies, and base areas.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Annex A (Concept of Operations).

(2) Annex B (Fire Support).

b. Task Force Hotel.

(1) Conduct mobile defense in AO to prevent enemy penetration east of 98 N-S grid line and defend VCB, Ca Lu, and FSB Cates.

(2) Options #1 and #3. Be prepared to conduct regimental helicopterborne counterattack into southern half of DMZ west of A-4 and attack to the east, on order.

(3) Option #2. Be prepared to conduct regimental helicopterborne counterattack in accordance with Annex C (Counterattack Plan), on order.

(4) Be prepared to provide area for establishment of Project Delta FOB at VCB, on order.

(5) Be prepared to execute Op Plan 5-69, on order.

c. 9th Marines (Rein).

(1) Conduct mobile defense in AO to prevent enemy penetration south of Cam Lo River and defend ECB, Khe Gio Bridge, and FSB Fuller.

(2) Assist GVN forces in the defense of Mai Loc.

(3) Be prepared to execute 3d MarDiv OPlans 1-69, 4-69, and/or 9-69, on order.

(4) Be prepared to conduct counterattack in AO, on order.

d. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech).

(1) Maintain strong point defense of A-4 and C-2.

(2) Conduct mobile defense in AO to prevent enemy penetration south of the Cua Viet and Cam Lo Rivers.

(3) Assume Opcon SLF "B" which lands at or north of Cua Viet.

(4) Be prepared to assist ARVN forces in defense of populated coastal plain area in AO.

(5) Be prepared to conduct mechanized counter-attack to northeast or north of Cam Lo, on order.

(6) Be prepared to open and secure Wunder Beach, on order.

e. Regt (-) (Rein), 1st MarDiv.

(1) Prepare plans for Amphibious counterattack between C-4 and Hai River.

(2) Assume Opcon SLF "A", on order.

(3) Options #1 and #3.

(a) Conduct Amphibious counterattack on order.

(b) Assault west across southern half of DMZ.

(c) Be prepared to link-up with 1st Bde and/or 2d ARVN forces north of A-2.

(4) Option #2.

(a) Conduct airlift to Quang Tri airfield.

(b) Conduct mobile defense in AO.

f. SLF "A".

(1) Chop to Regt (-) (Rein), 1st MarDiv, on order.

(2) Be prepared to conduct amphibious landing, on order.

g. SLF "B".

(1) Conduct amphibious landing north of or at Cua Viet.

(2) Chop to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), on landing.

h. 12th Marines.

(1) Provide direct and general artillery support to 3d MarDiv.

(2) Be prepared to support counterattacks into southern DMZ and/or Da Krong Valley.

i. 3d Tank Bn.

(1) G/S 3d MarDiv.

(2) Be prepared to provide one company D/S TF Hotel on order.

(3) Be prepared to support 1st Bde counterattack on order.

j. 3d Recon Bn.

(1) G/S 3d MarDiv.

(2) Maintain maximum surveillance of DMZ and western portion of Division AO to locate enemy forces.

k. 3d Engr Bn. Continue present D/S and G/S missions.

l. Base Coordinator, DHCB.

(1) Take all measures to insure maximum preparedness for defense of Dong Ha Combat Base.

(2) Coordinate with 2d ARVN Regiment to insure mutual support in defense of Dong Ha City.

m. Base Coordinator, QTCB.

(1) Take all measures to insure maximum preparedness for defense of Quang Tri Combat Base.

(2) Option #3. Be prepared to provide for reception and billeting of 173rd Abn Bde, upon arrival Quang Tri airfield.

n. Reserve. 173rd Abn Bde. (Option #3 only).

(1) Conduct airlift to Quang Tri airfield.

(2) Be prepared to assist ARVN in defense of Quang Tri and/or Dong Ha Cities.

(3) Be prepared to conduct heliborne counterattack into Da Krong Valley in coordination with 101st Abn counterattack.

o. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Codenames.

(a) Option #1 - CASEY GROVE I

(b) Option #2 - CASEY GROVE II

(c) Option #3 - CASEY GROVE III

(2) Maximum employment of RCA, smoke, and non-explosive ordnance in built-up areas.

(3) Intensify reconnaissance and surveillance along known infiltration routes.

(4) Be prepared, on order, to execute OPlan 4-68 (Anti-Mechanized Plan).

(5) On order increase security for key bridges, ports, and airfields.

(6) Review and rehearse air and armor alert plans.

(7) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(8) Psychological operations Annex D. (Psychological Operations).

(9) Continue support of Pacification Development Program within capability.

(10) Maintain security of LOC's in cooperation with GVN forces.

(11) This plan effective for planning on receipt; execution on order.

(12) Project Delta employment. Annex E (Project Delta).

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS. Annex F (Administrative and Logistics).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal. Annex G (Communications).

b. Command. CP locations - No change.

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BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL DAVIS

J. R. Motelewski

J. R. MOTELEWSKI
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

A - Concept of Operations
B - Fire Support
C - Counterattack Plan (PASEP)
D - Psychological Operations
E - Project Delta
F - Administrative and Logistics
G - Communications
H - Distribution

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Annex A (Concept of Operations) to Op Plan 7-69 (CASEY GROVE).

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam: 1:100,000; Series L607; Sheets 6341, 6342, 6442, and 6441

Time Zone: Hotel

1. MISSION

Third MarDiv (-)(Rein), in coordination and cooperation with ARVN troops, repels and destroys enemy attack north of Cam Lo and Cua Viet Rivers and west of 98 N-S grid lines; assists GVN in defense of Dong Ha and Quang Tri Cities, and conducts counterattacks to destroy enemy forces, supplies, and base camps.

2. CONCEPT

a. 3d MarDiv conducts defense in three phases.

(1) Phase I: Preparatory phase. Enemy build-up north of DMZ and preparation for attack. 3d MarDiv continues current operations with increased emphasis on prudent intelligence watch, intensified reconnaissance and surveillance (including patrols, sensors, NCD, radar, aerial surveillance and employment of Delta Force); conducts preemption operations throughout AO; plans for increased artillery fires, NGF, and air support; increases security for key bridges, ports, and airfields; prepares for rapid repair or replacement of bridges, bypasses, and approaches and expansion and maintenance of logistics support as required.

(2) Phase 2. Defense. Employ additional forces provided by XXIV Corps, conduct aggressive mobile defense to disrupt and halt the enemy before he is able to reach the Cua Viet - Cam Lo Rivers. In coordination and cooperation with GVN forces, prevent the enemy from capturing, destroying or dominating populated areas.

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(3) Phase 3. Counteroffensive.

(a) Enemy attack has been slowed or stopped. Combined armor, helicopterborne and amphibious assaults are conducted to destroy enemy forces, supplies, and base camps, and prevent enemy survivors from withdrawing. into NVN/Laos.

(b) Appendix 1 (Option # 1 Operations Overlay).

(c) Appendix 2 (Option#2 Operations Overlay).

(d) Appendix 3 (Option #3 Operations Overlay).

b. Fire Support. Annex B (Fire Support).

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Annex B (Fire Support Plan) to Op Plan 7-69 (CASEY GROVE).

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000; Series L7014; Sheets 6431 I and IV; 6342 I, II, III, and IV; 6441 IV; 6442 I, II, III, and IV.
(b) 3d MarDiv ltr of Inst (LOI) 1-67 (S)
(c) Div O P3120.6A

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Air and Naval Gunfire Support.

(a) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provides fixed and rotary wing aircraft support and air control facilities.

(b) 7th Air Force provides direct and close air support.

(c) Naval Fire Support Group (TG 70.8.9) provides naval gunfire support.

(2) Artillery Support.

(a) 108th FA Gp (-) (Rein).

(b) 12th Marines (-) (Rein).

c. Attachments and Detachments. Current Artillery Task Organization Order.

2. MISSION

Supporting arms (artillery, air, and naval gunfire) support 3d MarDiv operations with conventional artillery,

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air, and naval gunfire.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Annex A (Concept of Operations).

b. Air Support. Annex F (Air Support) to reference (b).

c. Artillery Support.

(1) Annex G (Artillery) to reference (b).

(2) Current 12th Marines Task Organization Order.

(3) In order to support 3d MarDiv's mobile defensive operations throughout the Division AO, organic artillery units will be prepared to displace rapidly from currently occupied positions. Upon displacement to new positions, development and improvement of positions will be continuous.

(4) Artillery units will be prepared to support counterattacks into the southern DMZ and/or Da Krong Valley. Maximum use will be made of existing MSR's, fire support bases, and fire bases.

d. Naval Gunfire Support. Annex H (Naval Gunfire Support) to reference (b).

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Rules of Engagement. Annex F (Rules of Engagement) to reference (b).

(2) Fire Support Coordination. Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to reference (b), and reference (c).

(3) Target Information. Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to reference (b).

(4) Aircraft Safety.

(a) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to reference (b).

(b) Reference (c), pars 205 and 206.3.

(c) Coordination responsibilities in the area controlled by the AWCC.

1 All fires originating from or impacting in that portion of the Quang Tri-Dong Ha control area within the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) area of operations will be reported to Quang Tri Approach Control by 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech).

2 All other fires originating from and/or impacting in the Quang Tri-Dong Ha control area will be reported to Quang Tri Approach Control by the 3d MarDiv FSCC.

a All fires reported to either 3d MarDiv FSCC or 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) FSCE by ARVN units will be reported to Quang Tri Approach Control.

b Quang Tri Combat Base will report all 4.2" mortar fires originating within Quang Tri Combat Base to the 3d Marine Division FSCC.

c Dong Ha Combat Base COC will report all mortar fires originating within Dong Ha Combat Base to the 3d Marine Division FSCC.

3 Quang Tri Approach Control will request check fires from the 3d Marine Division FSCC and/or 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) FSCE as required according to the following priorities.

a Priority 1. Troops in contact and counter-mortar/mortar/artillery missions against active batteries.

b Priority 2. Aircraft in distress that can not be diverted. Medevac aircraft-emergency mission.

c Priority 3. Artillery fires on fleeting targets of opportunity.

d Priority 4. Air traffic operations under instrument conditions.

e Priority 5. Normal air traffic.

f Priority 6. All other artillery fire.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE and LOGISTICS. Annex F (Administrative and Logistics).

5. COMMAND and SIGNAL. Annex D (Communications) to reference (b).

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Annex D (Psychological Operations) to Op Plan 7-69 (CASEY GROVE).

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

(1) Option #1. The forces encountered will be primarily NVA units, relatively fresh, well trained and politically indoctrinated. The NVA defect or surrender for five motivating reasons: fear, hardship, nostalgia, loss of faith in final victory and disillusionment with the communist cause. Until the enemy advance is slowed or stopped, these motivating reasons will not become effective factors. Once the advance is stopped, the individual soldier becomes susceptable, particularly to appeals based on fear, hardship and disillusionment with the communist cause. Vulnerability of the NVA soldier to appeals to Chieu Hoi will have only limited effectiveness because of his political indoctrination, unit esprit and North Vietnamese origin. Appeals to become a POW will have a stronger effect since that appeal does not have the connotation of deserting his country (NVN) to support another (SVN). Appeals based on nostalgia and loss of faith in the communist cause will probably not be effective. Heavy losses, once inflicted, increase the enemy's vulnerability to appeals based on fear and hardship. Because of the cellular organization within the military structure, appeals to surrender or desert should be aimed at the individual soldier or his cell. Calls for surrender or desertion of larger units can be expected to be ineffective. Isolated individuals or units are most susceptable to all forms of propaganda. Dissemination of propaganda is most effective during periods of contact or during bombardment since the individual is less carefully scrutinized by the other members of his cell or his officers and can thus retrieve leaflets to read at his leisure or listen to broadcasts without interruption. Appeals based on a "hardline" (i.e. "Surrender or Die") will generally be counter productive in all

phases except during the final mop-up in the consolidation phase.

(2) Option #2. The forces encountered will be a mix of NVA/VC units. One Division of NVA will have essentially the same vulnerabilities as enumerated in Option #1, above, except that appeals based on hardship should be of greater effectiveness since their approach march is longer and probably more arduous than that of the forces in Option #1, above. The MRTTH forces are predominately NVA units that have been operating in SVN and/or Laos since TET 1968. The NVA portions of the MRTTH forces will have the same vulnerabilities as enumerated in Option #1, above, except that appeals based on hardship and nostalgia will have greater impact since they were hard hit during their 1968 TET offensive and have been away from NVA for an extended period. The incidence of malaria has created a peculiar vulnerability that can be used alone or coupled to appeals based on hardship. The VC units that may be a part of the MRTTH forces are suceptable to the same five motivating reasons listed in Option #1, above. All five reasons can be expected to have effect. As their offense slows, and the tempo of friendly military operations increases, the majority of these motivations are present, and there is usually a corresponding increase in susceptibility to Chieu Hoi appeals.

(3) Option #3. Same as Option #1, above, and Option #2, above.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 7th PSYOP Battalion, U.S. Army, will provide quick reaction leaflets and broadcast tape recordings.

(2) Flight "A", 9th Special Operations Squadron, U.S. Air Force, provides aerial support for leaflet dissemination and aerial broadcasts.

2. MISSION. Utilizing all PSYOP means available, produce the maximum number of NVA/VC defections and to erode the morale and combat effectiveness of NVA/VC units and personnel. In addition, conduct PSYOP to counter NVA/VC propaganda efforts.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. For purposes of PSYOP, the operation will be considered to be in three phases; defense against NVA/VC attack, counter offensive against NVA/VC units, and consolidation. During the initial defense phase, Division PSYOP, using organic and assigned supporting means, will conduct such PSYOP as required in the populated areas to offset the NVA/VC propaganda effort and to assist in refugee control. During the counter offensive phase, Regimental and Battalion PSYOP, as augmented from Division PSYOP will continue to counter NVA/VC propaganda and assist in refugee control. Division PSYOP will further provide assistance to unit PSYOP to achieve rapid response (leaflets, tape broadcasts, live broadcasts from rallies, etc.) to exploit situations. The objective of all PSYOP effort will be directed at:

(1) Reduction of the morale and combat effectiveness of NVA/VC units and personnel.

(2) Reduction of the effectiveness of NVA/VC propaganda efforts.

(3) Maintaining and strengthening of a Pro-GVN attitude by the local populace.

b. Division PSYOP. Provide assistance and advice on PSYOP matters as requested by subordinate units.

c. Detachment 2, 7th PSYOP Bn, U.S. Army. Provide two HE and three HB teams. HB teams must be prepared for heli-borne operations, aerial broadcasts from helicopter and vehicular broadcasts.

d. Coordination and Control.

(1) Requests for assistance will be forwarded via the normal chain of command to Division PSYOP by the most expeditious means.

(2) Division PSYOP will schedule leaflet dissimenations and aerial broadcasts for the entire Division AO.

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(3) Avoid "hardline" (i.e. "Surrender or Die") themes except during the final mop-up in the consolidation phase. Deviation from this guidance remains at the discretion of Regimental Commanders.

(4) Themes to be stressed to NVA/VC units.

(a) Strength of ARVN/US firepower.

(b) That the NVA is an aggressive invader of South Vietnam determined to impose foreign domination upon the people of South Vietnam.

(c) That NVA soldiers and Viet Cong who voluntarily surrender or return under the Chieu Hoi Program will be well treated by the GVN.

(5) Themes to be stressed to civil populace.

(a) That the GVN is the legitimate and rightful government of South Vietnam.

(b) That the NVA is an aggressive invader of South Vietnam determined to impose foreign domination upon the people of South Vietnam.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE and LOGISTICS. Annex F (Administrative and Logistics).

5. COMMAND and SIGNAL. Annex G (Communications).

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Annex E (Project Delta) to Op Plan 7-69

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

b. Friendly Forces. 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69.

(2) Project Delta Opcon 3d MarDiv.

2. MISSION

Third Marine Division (-) (Rein), in coordination and cooperation with ARVN forces, repels and destroys enemy attack north of Cam Lo and Cua Viet Rivers and west of 98 N-S grid lines; assists GVN in the defense of Dong Ha and Quang Tri Cities, and conducts counterattacks to destroy enemy forces, supplies, and base areas.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) 3d Mar Div Op Plan 7-69.

(2) 3d Mar Div deploys Project Delta in western portion of AO to conduct surveillance and long range, covert reconnaissance effort to interdict the enemy's major routes of infiltration from Laos along route 9, route 926, and his new road network in the northwestern portion of the AO.

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b. Regt's/Bde's. 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69

c. Project Delta.

(1) Establish FOB in 3d MarDiv AO.

(2) Conduct reconnaissance patrols in AO (Annex A (Concept of Operations) to Op Plan 7-69) to detect enemy infiltration from Laos into Division Area of Operations.

(3) Be prepared to provide guidance to reaction forces employed to exploit reconnaissance activities.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Task Force Hotel prepared to provide Bn reaction force to exploit Project Delta operations on six hour notice.

(2) DIRLAUTH CO, B-52 Det, 5th SFG and CG TF Hotel.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE and LOGISTICS. 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69.

5. COMMAND and SIGNAL. 3d MarDiv Op Plan 7-69.

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Annex G (Communications) to Operation Plan 7-69 (CASEY GROVE)

Ref: (a) 3d MarDivO P02000.2_ (NOTAL)
(b) 3d MarDivO P2000.4_ (NOTAL)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.

(2) The enemy has the capability to:

(a) Conduct electronics countermeasures.

(b) Conduct extensive wire tapping.

(c) Intercept HF, VHF, UHF, and microwave multi-channel radio and telephone signals.

(d) Insert deceptive traffic on uncovered wire or radio channels.

(e) Booby trap communications-electronics equipment prior to abandoning same.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) OPLAN 7-69 (CASEY GROVE) Command Posts.

(a) Locations

CG Third Marine Division (Rein)	Dong Ha
CG Task Force Hotel	Vandegrift
9th Marine Regiment	Vandegrift
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)	Quang Tri
Regiment (-) (Rein), 1st Marine Division	Danang
SLF "A"	Afloat
SLF "B"	Afloat
12th Marine Regiment	Dong Ha
3d Tank Battalion	Quang Tri
3d Recon Battalion	Quang Tri

3d Engineer Battalion	Quang Tri
Base Coordinator Dong Ha Combat Base	Dong Ha
Base Coordinator Quang Tri Combat Base	Quang Tri
173rd Airborne Brigade	LZ English (BS 878007)

(b) Movement. Organizations report location of new Command Posts installations when established.

2. MISSION

Communications-Electronics elements provide communication and electronics support for Third Marine Division (Rein) and attached and supporting units.

3. EXECUTION

a. Communication Company. Maintain and operate communication facilities to support the Third Marine Division Command Post and the Third Marine Division Command Post (Rear).

b. Task Force Hotel. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

c. 9th Marines. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

d. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech). Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

e. Regiment (-) (Rein), 1st Marine Division. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

f. SLF "A". Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

g. SLF "B". Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

h. 12th Marines. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

i. 3d Tank Battalion. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

j. 3d Engineer Battalion. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

k. Base Coordinator DHCB. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

l. Base Coordinator QTCB. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

m. 173rd Airborne Brigade. Maintain and operate communication facilities in support of operations in assigned AO and as directed.

n. Artillery communications. Annex B (Fire Support) and reference (a) also Appendix 1.

o. Naval Gunfire communications. Annex B (Fire Support), reference (a) and Appendix 1.

p. Air Support communications. Annex B (Fire Support), reference (a) and Appendix 1.

q. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Communication Center

(a) Communication and crypto guard for units adcon/opcon to 3d Marine Division provided by 3d Marine Division Communication Center Dong Ha.

(b) Cryptographic Instructions reference (a) and Appendix 1.

(c) Authentication in accordance with reference (a) and Appendix 1.

(2) Messenger Service. All units be prepared to employ fixed wing, helicopter, vehicle and foot messengers as required to insure expeditious passing of all traffic.

(3) Radio. Radio plan in reference (a) and Appendix 1. This plan is modified at various times according to changing frequency requirements and relocation of units. These changes are officially promulgated by message as the need arises. At all times, reference (a), as modified by message changes, is the appropriate radio plan source.

(4) Wire. Reference (b).

(5) Wire-Radio Relay. Reference (b). Disposition of Wire-Radio Relay resources will vary according to tactical situation of units, availability of equipment, and changing command arrangements. This disposition of resources will be directed by the

Headquarters to meet requirements as they arise.

(6) Visual. Reference (a).

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS

See Annex F (Administrative and Logistics)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL R. G. DAVIS

APPENDIXES:

1. Call Signs and Radio Frequency Plan. (To be issued)

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Acting Communications-Electronics Officer

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CG, 1st MAW	2	13,14
CG, FLC	1	15
CG, 9th MAB	3	16,17,18
MAG 39	2	19,20
TF Clearwater	1	21
11th Engr Bn	1	22
CG, 173rd Abn Bde	1	23
FLSG-Bravo	1	24
B-52 Det, 5th SFG	1	25
CG, TF Hotel	5	26,27,28,29,30
9th Marines	2	31,32
1st Bde, 5th Div (Mech)	3	33,34,35
12th Marines	3	36,37,38
3d Tank Bn	1	39
3d Engr Bn	1	40
3d Recon Bn	1	41
3d Shore Party	1	42
3d MT Bn	1	43
9th MT Bn	1	44
3d Med Bn	1	45
DHCB Coordinator	1	46
QTCB Coordinator	1	47
3d MarDiv		
Chief of Staff	1	48
AC/S, G-1	1	49
AC/S, G-2	2	50,51
AC/S, G-3	5	52,53,54,55,56
AC/S, G-4	3	57,58
AC/S, G-5	1	59

UNCLASSIFIED

CEO	1	60
AirO	1	61
Div Engr O	1	62
Div Arty O	1	63
FSC	1	64
NGF O	1	65
Emb O	1	66
File	5	67,68,69,70,71

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL DAVIS

DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution) to Op Plan 7-69

OFFICIAL:

F. R. KRAINCE
Colonel USMC
G-3

SECRET

DRAFTED BY: TCG/RAA
SEC 7 CIT PH 290
CWO PKS

(046)

PRIORITY 170312 MAR69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: COMUSMACV

INFO: CG III MAF
CG XXIV CORPS

SECRET/NOFORN/LIMDIS

MACV ATTN: J2RC

BRIGHTLIGHT (U)

A. CG III MAF/AREA COORD ICTZ MSG 131402Z APR68
B. 15TH ITT INTER RPT 17-69, CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 160553Z/MAR69

1. IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING RPT IS SUBMITTED:

A. REF B REPORTED THE SIGHTING OF AMERICAN PWS IN NVN, AND IS AMPLIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) SOURCE, DANG XUAN PHU (DANG XUAN FUS), PW FR SIXTH NVA REGT, STATED THAT HE OBSERVED TWO AMERICAN PILOTS APPROX TWENTY KM NW OF SAN (H) (COORD UNK), NAM TRUNG (V), NAM DAN (D), NGHE AN (P), NVN IN JUNE OR JULY 1967. BOTH PWS WERE DRESSED IN RED FLIGHT SUITS. SOURCE SAW THEM ONLY BRIEFLY, AND THE ONLY CHARACTERISTIC HE REMEMBERED WAS THAT ONE PW WAS AN UNUSUALLY TALL CAUCASIAN.

(2) IN NOV68, NEAR A DIRT RD NORTH OF THANH HOA CITY, THANH HOA (P), NVN, SOURCE STATED THAT HE OBSERVED TEN AMERICAN PWS THROUGH THE OPEN DOOR OF A PW COMPOUND WHICH WAS APPROX FIFTY METERS OFF THE RD. ALL PWS DRESSED IN GREEN PAJAMA-TYPE CLOTHING. SOURCE STATED COMPOUND WAS APPROX THIRTY METERS BY TEN METERS, SURROUNDED BY A CEMENT WALL FIVE METERS HIGH. TWO GUARDS WERE OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.

2. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE SIGHTING INFO CONTAINED IN REF B DIFFERS SLIGHTLY FROM THE SIGHTING INFO CONTAINED IN THIS MSG. SOURCE WAS UNDER HEAVY SEDATION DURING THIS INTERROGATION, WHICH PROBABLY EXPLAINS THIS VARIANCE. FOR THE SAME REASON, SOURCE WAS NOT SHOWN 525 MGP PHOTO ALBUM.

SOURCE EVAC TO NSA DANANG AT 161130H MAR69.

GP-4

CCN 1611 RELEASED BY _____ TIME _____ MAR69

7 CIT

SECRET

SECRET

G-3 PLANS ROUTING

Plans Off (1) _____
(2) WY
(3) _____
(4) _____

ZNY SSSSS
OTT SZYUW RUMLBFA2317 076ME15-SSSS--RUMHVP.
ZNY SSSSS
O 174 5ZZ MAR 69
FM CG XXIV CORPS PAO
TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DNG
INFO RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH
BT
S E C R E T AVII-GCO 41132
SUBJ: OPERATION MAJOR CRAGE (U)
REF: A. ARMCASSY VIENTIANE MSG DTG 150621Z MAR 69 (S), SUBJECT AS ABOVE.
B. CG III MAF MSG, DTG 161430Z MAR 69 UNCLAS EFTO, SUBJECT AS ABOVE.
1. (U) IAW REF B, THIS MESSAGE CONFIRMS INFORMATION PASSED BY SECURE PHONE IN ANSWER TO REF A.
2. (U) OPERATIONS SUCH AS THOSE DESCRIBED IN PARA 2, REF A, ARE BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF THIS HEADQUARTERS. THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS NO PLANS FOR SUCH OPERATIONS.
3. (S) REF PARA 3, REF A, ALL COMMANDERS WILL BE ENJOINED TO COMPLY WITH COMUSMACV MSG, DTG 122724Z FEB 69 (S) SUBJ: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - LAOS (U), WHICH IS EXPLICITLY CLEAR WITH RESPECT TO CROSSING THE BORDER.
BT-4
BT

171500/1602

SECRET

SECRET

Ø UB

UNXQD -T- MAG THREE NINE
ZNY SSSSS
O 171Ø3ØZ MAR 69 TOR 171125 TF Hotel 253 Run
FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
ZEN/NINTH MARINES
ZEN/7ØVANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR ((;8:)
TASK FORCE REMAGEN (1ST BN 77TH ARMOR)
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
TWELFTH MARINES
MAG ONE SIX
MAG THREE SIX
MAG THREE NINE
FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES
SECOND DD TWELIZH MARINES
ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD RECON BN
BT
S E C R E T
FRAG ORDER 75-69
A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 161540Z MAR 69.

PAGE TWO RUMHVP0348S E C R E T
1. THIRD MARINES
A. CONTINUE OPERATION MAINE CRAG.
B. PREPARE TO ASSUME OPCON OF TF
REMAGEN ON ORDER.
2. FOURTH MARINES. NO CHANGE FROM REF A.
3. NINTH MARINES. CONTINUE WITHDRAWAL FROM
DEWEY CANYON AO.
4. VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR(VIC)
CONTINUE SECURITY MISSION FOR KHE GIO BRIDGE,
ECB, SIGNAL, VCB AND CALU.
5. TASK FORCE REMAGEN. NO CHANGE FROM
REF A.
6. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. HELO MOVEMENTS
SCHEDULED FOR TF HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING
FORCES FOR 18 MAR 69 WILL BE PASEP.
GP-4
BT

SECRET

UB

CP
OO UUMSK UUMSO
DE UUMSOD 1043 0771730
ZNY CCCCC
O 171730Z MAR 69 TSA 172210 III MAF
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC
BT
C O N F I D E N TI A L FINAL SEC OF TWO
G. SMALL UNITS CONTACTS.

PROVINCE COOR	DATE TIME	ACTION SIZE/TYPE	FR UNIT LOSSES	EN UNIT LOSSES	INIT BY US/VC
XD 947624	152023H	CO DEF	M/3/A	UNK	VC
		REC'D 2 CHICOMS	NONE	NONE	
YD 156678	161600H	TVEC MOVMENT	B/3/5 UNK	UNK	VC
		HIT AT MINE	3 WIA(E)	NONE	
YD 238039	161800H	SQD COMBAT	A/1/9	UNK	US
			NONE	4 NVA KIA	
XD 829615	170900H	PLT COMBAT	G/2/4	UNK	US
			NONE	2 NVA KIA	
XD 827616	171125 H	CO DEF	G/2/4	UNK	VC
		12-60MM	NONE	NONE	
XD 827616	171220H	CO DEF	G/2/4	UNK	VC
		9-60MM	NONE	NONE	

PAGE TWO UUMSOD 1043 C O N F I D E N TI A L
H. PACIFICATION SUPPORT
1.PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.
A. K/3/3 CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS WITH RF/PF/CIDG IN MAI LOC TOAR.
B. I/3/3 CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS IN CAM LO DISTRICT.
C. TWP SQD OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.
D. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1ST &2ND ARVN REGT'S THROUGHOUT POPULATED COASTAL ARE.
2. DIRECT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (PIOCC) BY 3/3 DHCB, STCB, AND 1ST BDE 5TH INF(MECH)
3. TABULATION OF VILLAGE/HAMLET C&S DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE
BT-4

OPERATION DEWEY CANYON
22 JANUARY 69-18 MARCH 69

CONFIDENTIAL

	ITEM	PHYSICALLY CAPTURED	EVACUATED	DESTROYED BUT NOT CAPT	CAPT AND DESTROYED
KIA	1,617				
POW	5				
Detainees	8				
Chu Hoi	2				
Bunkers	1,000				
Structures	373				
IWC	1,223	1,223	958	0	265
CSWC	243	231	43	12	188
S/A Ammo	607,874	607,874	0	0	607,874
.50 Cal	17,598	17,598	0	0	17,598
12.7	65,126	65,126	0	0	65,126
20mm AA	920	920	0	0	920
23mm AA	3,636	3,636	0	0	3,636
37mm AA	23,730	23,730	2	0	23,728
75 Pack How	10	10	0	0	10
60mm Mortar	34,683	34,383	0	0	34,383
82mm Mortar	23,281	23,281	0	0	23,281
120mm Mortar	4,983	4,983	0	0	4,983
Unk Rds	65	65	0	0	65
85mm Arty	556	556	1	0	555
57mm RR	2,004	2,004	0	0	2,004
75mm RR	994	994	0	0	994
122mm Arty	7,287	7,287	0	0	7,287
122mm Rkt	770	770	0	0	770
140mm Rkt	257	257	0	0	257
RPG Rds	14,808	14,808	0	0	14,808
AT Mines	1,621	1,621	0	0	1,621
AP Mines	885	885	0	0	885
Claymores	444	444	0	0	444
Explosives	1,910½ lbs.	1,910½ lbs	0	0	1,910½ lbs
Blasting Caps	476	476	0	0	476
Fuses	1,212	1,212	0	0	1,212
Det Cord	1,950 Ft	1,950 Ft.	0	0	1,950 Ft.
Grenades	50,203	50,203	0	0	50,203
R/Grenades	10,226	10,226	0	0	10,226
Satchel	36	36	0	0	36
Rice	220,800 lbs	220,800 lbs	0	0	220,800 lbs
Wheat	705 lbs	705 lbs	0	0	705 lbs
Herbs	200 lbs	200 lbs	0	0	200 lbs
Lard	34 lbs	34 lbs	0	0	34 lbs
Sugar	12 lbs	12 lbs	0	0	12 lbs
Corn	863 lbs	863 lbs	0	0	863 lbs
Tobacco	210 lbs	210 lbs	0	0	210 lbs
Flour	50 lbs	50 lbs	0	0	50 lbs
Potatoes	6,690 lbs	6,690 lbs	0	0	6,690 lbs
Salt	4,045 lbs	4,045 lbs	0	0	4,045 lbs
Mix Vegetables	46 lbs	46 lbs	0	0	46 lbs

CONFIDENTIAL

ITEM	PHYSICALLY CAPTURED	EVACUATED	DESTROYED BUT NOT CAPT	CAPT AND DESTROYED
Soy Bean Oil	8 gal	8 gal	0	0	8 gal
Radios	5	5	5	0	0
Multiplexes	2	2	2	0	0
Switch Board	1	1	1	0	0
Field Phones	2	2	1	0	1
Comm Wire	600 ft	600 ft	0	0	600 ft
Pigs	88	13	0	75	0
Chicken	150	67	0	83	0
Goats	1	1	0	0	1
Water Buff	6	0	0	6	0
Movie Projector	1	1	1	0	0
Reels of Film	20	20	20	0	0
Loud Speakers	2	2	2	0	0
Amplifier	1	1	1	0	0
122mm Gun	12	6	2	6	4
85mm Gun	4	4	0	0	4
Tank Gun	1	0	0	1	0
75mm RR	1	1	1	0	0
57mm RR	23	23	8	0	15
60mm	12	12	2	0	10
82mm	13	13	5	0	8
120mm Mortar	1	1	0	0	1
.50 Cal	5	4	0	1	4
12.7 Gun	34	24	3	10	21
20mm	21	19	0	2	19
23mm	4	0	0	4	0
37mm	1	0	0	1	1
40mm	2	2	0	0	2
Trucks	66	31	0	35	31
Tractors	15	4	0	11	4
APC	3	0	0	3	0
Jeep	1	1	0	0	1
Prime Mover	6	6	0	0	6
Front Loader	1	1	0	0	1
Engines	3	3	0	0	3
Generators	3	3	1	0	2
Tractor Cab	1	1	0	0	1
Hyd Pump	2	2	0	0	2
Tires	18	18	0	0	18
Fuel	2,750 gal	2,750 gal	0	0	2,750 gal
Grease	370 gal	370 gal	0	0	370 gal
Fuel Drums Empty	397	397	0	0	397
Tool Kit	1	1	0	0	1
Bicycle Parts:					
Frames	108	108	0	0	108
Rims	228	228	0	0	228
Tires	2,176	2,176	0	0	2,176
Pumps	52	52	0	0	52

ITEM		PHYSICALLY CAPTURED	EVACUATED	DESTROYED BUT NOT CAPT	CAPT AND DESTROYED
Cmptl Bicycles	18	18	0	0	18
Air Compressor	1	1	0	0	1

KEEP COPY

OPERATION DEWEY CANYON
22 JANUARY 69-18 MARCH 69

KIA	1,613
POW	5
DETAINEE	8
CHU HOI	2
BUNKERS	1,000
STRUCTURES	373
IWC	1,223
CSWC	243
S/A AMMO	607,074
.50 CAL	17,598
12.7	65,126
20MM AA	920
23MM AA	3,635
37MM AA	23,730
75 PACK HOW	10
60MM MORTAR	34,685
82MM MORTAR	23,281
120MM MORTAR	4,903
UNK RDS	65
85MM ARTY	556
57MM RR	2,004
75MM RR	994
122MM ARTY	7,298
122MM ROCKET	770
140MM ROCKET	257
RPG RDS	14,808
AT MINES	1,621
AP MINES	885
CLAYMORES	444
EXPLOSIVES	1,910½ LBS
BLASTING CAPS	476
FUZES	1,212
DET CORD	1,950 FT
GRENADES	50,203
R/G GRENADES	10,226
SATCHEL	36
RICE	220,800
WHEAT	705 LBS
BEANS	200 "
LARD	34 "
SUGAR	12 "
CORN	863 "
TOBACCO	210 "
FLOUR	50 "
POTATORS	6,690 "
SALT	4,045 "

MIXED VEGETABLES	46	LBS
SOY BEAN OIL	8	GAL
RADIOS	5	
MULTIPLEXES	2	
SWITCH BOARD	1	
FIELD PHONES	2	
COMM WIRE	600	FT.

	ALIVE	DEAD
PIGS	213	75
CHICKEN	601	83
GOATS	1	
H_2O BUFF		1

MISCELLANEOUS GEAR

MOVIE PROJECTOR	1
REELS OF FILM	20
LOUD SPEAKERS	2
AMPLIFIER	1

ARTY	CAPT	DEST	DMG
122MM	6	5	1
85MM	4		
UNK		1	
75MM RR	1		
57MM RR	23		

MORTARS	CAPT
60MM	12
82MM	13
120MM	1

AA GUNS	CAPT	DEST	DMG
.50 CAL	4	1	
12.7	24	9	1
20MM	19	2	
23MM		4	
37MM		1	
40MM	4		

41

MOTOR TRANSPORT	CAPT	DESR	DAMD
TRUCKS	[illegible]	28	7
TRACTORS	4	10	1
APC		3	
JEEP	1		
PRIME MOVERS	6		
FRONT LOADERS	1		
ENGINES	3		
GENERATORS	3		
TRACTOR CAB	1		
HYD PUMP	2		
TIRES	10		
FUEL	2,750 GAL		
GREASE	370 "		
FUEL DRUMS EMPTY	397 "		
TOOL KIT	1		
BICYCLE PARTS:	108 FRAMES		
	228 RIMS		
	2176 TIRES		
	52 PUMPS		
	18 COMPLETE BICYCLES		
AIR COMPRESSOR	1		

BREAK DOWN OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED

PISTOLS, LUGERS	2
SKS'S	950
AK-47'S	161
TTSH-43	41
MAUSERS	6
RIG'S	18
M-1	1
M-16	1
MACHINE PISTOL	43

SECRET

(047)

DRAFTED BY: MAS/RKR
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWO PKS

IMMEDIATE 180058 Z MAR69

COPY TO: G-2
G-3
RECON REP
FSC
CIC

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN
TO: CG III MAF, DNG, RVN
INFO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN
CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN
CG FORLOGCMD, DNG, RVN
CG FIRST MAW, DNG, RVN
CG TF HOTEL, VCB, RVN
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH), QT, RVN
CG TF ALPHA, NKP, THAI
FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THIRD RECON WING, KORAT, THAI
FOURTH MARINES, VCB, RVN
THIRD MARINES, DGH, RVN
NINTH MARINES, VCB, RVN

S E C R E T/N O F O R N

DUFFEL BAG/DUEL BLADE OPREP-5 SER NO 011/11-17 MAR 69 (U)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

SECTION I. FOL DUFFEL BAG REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: VERY LIGHT ACTIVITY NOTED IN DUFFEL BAG SENSORS THIS WEEK. STRINGS 302 AND 305 WERE RECOVERED BEFORE SELF-DESTRUCTING;

NEW BATTERIES INSTALLED AND RELOCATED TO PROVIDE A MORE EFFECTIVE SCREEN ON APPROACHES TO QUANG TRI CITY.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: STRING 304 DETECTED ONE SQD SIZE TARGET WHICH WAS FIRED ON WITH 4.2 MORTARS AND 90MM TANK FIRE, NEGATIVE BDA.

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS: EN APPEARS TO BE PERIODICALLY TESTING APPROACHES TO QUANG TRI, AND UPON RECEIVING RAPID FIRE MISSION

RESPONSES TO HIS PROBES, WITHDRAWS.

B. INFLUENCE ON OPERATIONS: SENSORS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MEANS OF DETECTING EN MVT ON APPROACHES TO QUANG TRI CITY FROM

BASE AREA 101. THIS COVERAGE HAS PERMITTED 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (M) TO RELEASE FORCES FOR USE IN VICINITY OF A-4 AND LEATHERNECK SQUARE

WHERE HEAVY CASUALITIES HAVE BEEN INFLICTED ON ENEMY DURING PAST WEEK.

GSV CIC/2/3 PKS 2

SECRET

(1) TRAINING: NONE

(2) EMPLACEMENT: INCLEMENT WEATHER ONCE AGAIN PREVENTED THE INSERT OF RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS BY HELICOPTER INTO THE DMZ FOR SENSOR EMPLACEMENT. IN ADDITION HEAVY CONTACT WITH NVA FORCES ON 16 MAR POSTPONED THE INSERTION OF TWO SENSOR STRINGS NORTH OF CON THIEN. [redacted] CHANNEL 30 ASSETS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO REPLACE ALL 4 STRINGS THAT EXPIRED IN THE AREA READOUT BY A-4.

(3) READOUT VALIDITY: NONE

(4) RFI: NONE

(5) SERVICEABILITY: NONE

3. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: 15 HANDSID/MAGID, 5 ADSID, 1 ACOUBUOY.

4. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE SENSORS: 31 MINI/HANDSID, 13 MAGID, 14 ADSID, 6 ACOUBUOY, 1 PIRID.

5. (S) ACTIVE TFA CH-23 TONE CODES 16 THRU 19. ACTIVE 3D MARDIV CH-23 TONE CODES 03 AND 04.

GP-4

CCN 1176 RELEASED BY [signature] TIME 0855 H MAR69

FOR COMM CENTER: REQUEST XMIT TO TF ALPHA AND 553 RECON WING VIA KEG-1 CIRCUIT.

C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES: TWO COMPLETE STRINGS OF MINIHANDSIDS WERE RECOVERED AFTER APPROX 47 DAYS OPERATION AND REFURBISHED WITH NEW BATTERIES AND LOCATED ON OTHER TRAILS. THIS TECHNIQUE APPEARS TO BE ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE WHEREIN MECHANIZED VEHICLES ARE AVAL TO REACH THE AREA FOR RECOVERY WITH MINIMUM RISK TO PERSONNEL. ACOUBUOY ALSO RECOV RED BEFORE DESTRUCTION.

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS: NONE

3. (S) 8 ACTIVE STRINGS

4. (S) 23 MINI/HANDSIDS, 8 MAGIDS

SECTION II. FOL DUEL BLADE REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: SINCE LAST OPREP TFA SEEDED STRING 63133 WAS AIR DELIVERED IN NORTHERN PORTION OF PURPLE MARTIN AO CONSISTING OF 4 ACOUBUOYS. 4 HAND EMPLACED, [redacted] 4 ADSID, AND 3 ACOUBUOY STRINGS EXPIRED DURING THIS PERIOD. SENSOR READINGS IN CENTRAL PORTION OF DIV AO DIMED SOUTH OF DMZ CONTINUE TO SHOW HEAVY READINGS WITH STRING 124 ACQUIRING 18 TARGETS THIS WEEK WHILE STRING 119 ACQUIRED 22 TARGETS. BOTH AREAS HAVE BEEN SITE OF HEAVY ENEMY CONTACT DURING PAST WEEK.

2. MISSION SUMMARY: IN AKVN AO 6 TARGETS ACQUIRED WITH 400 ROUNDS MIXED ARTY/MTRS FIRED IN RESPONSE. 3D MARDIV AO STRINGS ACQUIRED 69 TARGETS WITH 351 MIXED 105/155 ARTY RDS FIRED IN RESPONSE. TFA SEEDED STRING 63211 ACQUIRED 7 TARGETS WITH 52 RDS 105 FIRED IN RESPONSE. ALL NEG BDA.

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS: EN APPEARS TO CONTINUE HIS INFILTRATIONS AND PROBINGS SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST FROM DMZ WITH SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS MADE WITH FRNDLY FORCES DURING PAST WEEK.

B. INFLUENCE ON OPERATIONS: AGGRESSIVE PATROLING AND FRNDLY SWEEPS MULTIPLIED DURING THIS WEEK IN RESPONSE TO EN PROBES AND ATTACKS BY FIRE.

C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES: NONE

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS:

CONFIDENTIAL

1,1ST

DE DIV AND MATS NR 485 485

OO UUMSK UUMSR
DE UUMSRD 1055 0770105
ZNY CCCCC
O 180105Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC [illegible]
INFO UUMSR/III MAF CGC [illegible]
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJ: FRIENDLY ORDER OF BATTLE (ATTN MAJ RAUSCH)
REF: (A) PCV TOC MSG 220730Z APR 68
1. IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED FOR PERIOD ENDING 172400H MAR 69.

UNIT	PROV	STAT	COOR	CONTROL
3RD MAR (-)	QUANG TRI	VCB	001433	TASK FORCE [illegible]
3/3 (-)	QUANG TRI	DGH	095570	1ST BDE 5TH [illegible]

GR-4
BT
[illegible]

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CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

3. (U) EFFECTIVE 191200H MAR [illegible] THE SUBJECT REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED BY 2100 DAILY IN THE BELOW FORMAT.
4. (C) FORMAT.
A. UNIT LOCATIONS: LIST THE LOCATION OF ALL UNITS DOWN TO THE COMPANY LEVEL PLATOON LOCATIONS WILL BE SHOWN SEPARATELY IF THE PLATOON

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1062 CONFIDENTIAL
IS ASSIGNED A SEPARATE MISSION FROM ITS PARENT COMPANY.
B. PLANS: LIST THE PLANS FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY DOWN TO COMPLANY LEVEL. PLATOONS WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY IF ASSIGNED A SEPARATE MISSION.
C. SCOUT SNIPERS: LIST SCOUT SNIPER TEAMS EMPLOYED BY EACH BATTALION INDICATING UNIT, NUMBER OF TEAMS AVAILABLE, C ,7,734 91 TEAMS EMPLOYED DURING THE DAY, NUMBER OF TEAMS EMPLOYED DURING

THE NIGHT AND RESULTS.
D. BUSHMASTERS: LIST ALL DAY AND NIGHT ACTIVITIES OF EACH BATTALION. WHEN USING OTHER THAN SECURE COMMUNICATIONS THE BELOW BREVITY CODE WILL BE USED TO REPORT BUSHMASTER ACTIVITIES:

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	FIRE TEAM		SQUAD		PLATOON		COMPANY	
	DAY	NIGHT	DAY	NIGHT	DAY	NIGHT	DAY	NIGHT
LP/OP	A	AA	C	CC				
AMBUSH	E	EE	U	X	Y	Z		
PATROLS (COMBAT)	V	VV	N	RR	P	Q		
RECON	FF	G	D	H	HH	O		
[illegible]	N	ZZ	KK	JJ	RR	BB		
[illegible]								

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SHOVL

OP CHIEF
G-2 W.O.
G-2 N.C.
DCPO
APO
ACTION

ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1067 0771000
ZNY SSSSS
Z 181000Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MAR DIV COC DMZ
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOCPHU
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC LSD
TWELFTH MARINES FDC
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ:SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1. ALL DMZ RECON PATROLS ARE CANCELLED UNTILL FURTHER NOTICE.
GP-4
BT
1067

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SECRET

Gen

ZNY SSSSS
P 181410Z MAR69
FM: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO: CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO: THIRD RECON BN
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
ZEN/NINTH MARINES
ZEN/THIRD MARINES
MAG THREE NINE
BT
S E C R E T
48 HOUR PLAN SUMMARY
1. INSERTIONS TOMORROW

TEAMS	DATES	R.Z. COORD	METHOD
DRAKE POOL	19-21	9870-0068	ALL HELO
IRON HAND	19-23	9965-0165	
PISTON ROD	19-21	7265-7463	
DESERT SANDS	19-21	7760-7958	
SAND BOX	19-21	8253-8451	
DANCY DAN	19-21	9055-9253	
CLOUDY SKY	19-21	6947-7145	
IDE MAR	19-21	8336-8531	
AMANDA	19-23	8136-8236	
124 D 69	19-21	9228-9127	
125 D 69	19-21	9432-9531	
126 D 69	19-21	8927-9026	
127 D 69	19-21	0043-0241	
128 D 69	19-21	0139-0337	

3. EXTRACTIONS TOMORROW:

TEAM	DATES	EX. COORD	METHOD
WABASH PANNER	15-19	TBA	ALL HELO
CANDY TUFT	15-19		
HARBOR QUEEN	15-19		

2. INSERTIONS NEXT DAY:

TEAM	DATES	R.Z. COORD	METHOD
130 D 69	20-24	9332-9530	ALL HELO
131 D 69	20-24	8032-8230	

2. B. EXTRACTIONS NEXT DAY: NONE.
GP-4
BT

Copy 1 of 5

SECRET

9

00 UUMSO
DZ UUMSOW 190W 077171Y
ZNY SSSSS
O 181718Z MAR 69
FM FIRST MAW COC
TO III MAF COC
THIRD MARDIV COC
NINTH MARINES
BT
S EHC R E T
THIRD MARDIV PASS TF HOTEL
A6 ARMED RECCE
1. MISSION 1059
2. TOT 2150
3. SYSTEMS UP
4. D45 NORTHWEST TO 16-30N
5. MOON BEAM DIRECTED 2 D8 ON UNKNOWN MOVERSHAT XD 640225.
2 D8 ON UNKNOWN NUMBER OF MOVERS AO XD 640205, AND 7 DW ON
UNKNOWN NUMBER OF MOVERS AT 580230 ALL HEADING NORTHWEST RESULT-
ING IN 1HSECONDARY FIRE
6. NO HARD TARGETS
7. N/A
8. NO OTHER OBSERVAOIONS

PAGE TWO UUMSO 190W S E C R E T
9. NO PROBLEMS WITH CONTROLLERS

A6 ARMED RECCE
1. MISSION 1061
2. TOT 2145-2220
3. SYSTEMS UP
4. ROUTE 922
5. MOONBEAM DIRECTED 22 D2 ON UNKNMWN NOMBER OF MOVERS
STOPPED AT 16-13N 106-41E AND 4 D8 ON UKNOWN NUMBER OF
MOVERS HEADING NORTH FROM 16-17N 106-40E RESULTING IN
A LARGE SECONDARY FIRE
6. 0 HARD TARGETS
7. N/A
8. RECEIVED 23MM FIRE FROM D45 NORTHEAST 3 1/2 MILES
9. NO PROBLEMS WITH CONTROLLERS
GP-4
BT

Copy 1 of 6

SECRET

00 UUMSK UUMSC
DE UUMSOD 1234 0781735
ZDY CCCCC
O 181735Z MAR 69 Tab 1 1920 40 11 MAF
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC
INFO UUMSC/III MAF COC
TASK FORCE HOTEL
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SEC OF TWO
B. 1ST BDE 5 TH INF MECH
(1) 1/11 NO CONTACT
(2) 1/61 AT 181740Z 5/3/61 VIC 914487 ELEMENT RAN INTO A/T MINE OF 5FD.
1 FR KIA 9 WIA(P)
(3) 1/77 NO CONTACT
(4) 3/5 CAV AT 181941 H B/3/5 VIC 163654 FND 2KNVA DEAD AND
2 AK-47'S. RES 9 NVA KIA 2 1WC

AT 181712 H 3/5 VIC 119509 REC'D SNIPER FIRE. RETURNED FIRE WITH DUSTERS
AND MG'S NEG RES
(5) A/4/12 CAV NO CONTACT
(6) 1STHAMTRAC BN NO CONTACT
C. FLSGP AT 121410H FLSGP CONVOY VIC YD 435561 ENROUTE FROM VCR TO
DGM REC'D 3RDS OF MORTAR FIRE UNK SIZE NEG DAMAGE
D. 3/4C AT 181610H 2/4C CONVOY ON RT 9, VIC 455565 REC'D MORTAR FIRE OF
UNK SIZE. CONVOY ENROUTE FM DGM TO ECB. NEG CAS OR DAMAGE.

PAGE TWO UUMSOD 1234 C O N F I D E N T I A L
E. 3RD RECON BN. SEE 3RD RECON BN 24 HR SITREP
F. ARTILLERY AND NAVL GUNFIRE SUPPORT SEE 12 TH MAR 24 HR SITREP
G. GENERAL LOW CLOUD COVER DURING EARLY MORNING HRS HAMPERED HELICOPTER
AND AO SORTIES. DURING LATEMORNING AND AFTERNOON THE WEATHER IMPROVED
ALLOWING SIGNIFICANT TROOP MOVEMENTS AND RESUPPLY TO BE ACCOMPLISHED
H. RECAP OF OPERATIONS

PATROLS		AMBUSHES		S&D		LIST	SCOUT		
UNIT	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT	CO	POST	SNIPER
3 RD MAR	DA	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	
	NA	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	
4TH MAR	DA	3	1	0	0	0	0	4	10
	NA		0	0	3	0		7	
9TH MAR	DA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26TH	DA	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	NA	0	3	0	0	0	0	6	0
1ST BDE	DA	6	8	0	3	0	5	3	2
5TH INF	NA	9	[illegible]	[illegible]	5	0	0	3	0
TOTAL	DA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0	5	[illegible]	[illegible]
		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0		[illegible]	[illegible]
		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	5	[illegible]	[illegible]

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I SMALL UNITS CONTACTS.

PROVINCE COOR	DATE TIME	ACTION SIZE/TYPE	FR UNIT LOSSES	EN UNIT LOSSES	UNIT BY US/VC
XD 828619	171910H	SWD AMB	G/2/4 NONE	UNK 1 NVA KIA	US
XD 879592	171910H	CO DEF	F/2/4 NONE	UNK 1 NVA KIA	US
A-4	172245H	CO DEF	M/3/3 NONE	UNK NONE	US
XD 823615	180230H	SWD AMB	G/2/4 NONE	UNK UNK	US
XD 871598	181143H	PLT PATROL	F/2/4 NONE	UNK NONE	VC
XD 821625	181145H	CO DEF	G/2/4 NONE	UNK NONE	VC
XD 959858	181215H	CO DEF	L/3/4 NONE	UNK NONE	VC
YD 835561	181410H	CONVOY MORTAR	FLSGB NONE	UNK NONE	VC
YD 855565	181610H	CONVOY MORTAR	8/40 NONE	UNK NONE	VC

YD 827562	181630H	COHDEF SNIPER	H/2/9 1 WIA(E)	UNK NONE	VC
YD 837577	181645H	CV DEF	G/2/9 NONE	UNK NONE	VC
YD 119189	181712H	CO DEF SNIPER	3/5 NONE	UNK NONE	VC
XD 914487	181740H	CO MOVEMENT MINE	P/1/61 1 FR KIA 9 WIA(E)	UNK NONE	VC
XD 947624	181955 H	CO DEF	K/3/4 NONE	UNK UNK	VC

J. PACIFICATION SUPPORT

1. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.

A. K/3/3 CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS WITH RD/PF/CIDG IN MAI LOC TOAP.

B. I/3/3 CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS IN CAM LO DISTRICT.

C. TWO SQD OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.

D. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1ST AND 2ND ARVN RESTS THROUGHOUT POPULATED COASTAL AREA.

E. CURRENT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROV/DOF (PIOCC) BY 1/8 DIRD, OTCS, AND 1ST BDE 5TH [illegible]

F. [illegible]

m

[illegible] COC
[illegible]

[illegible]
CONTINUE MARCH [illegible]
SEE CE EAST FORCE HOTEL
[illegible] MARINES
[illegible] MARINES
[illegible] MARINES
[illegible] INSTALLATION COORDINATOR (VICO)
[illegible] MARINE
[illegible] RAW
[illegible] FORCE [illegible] (1ST BN, 77 ARMOR)
[illegible] MARINES
[illegible] SEK
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] BY [illegible] MARINES
[illegible] BY [illegible] MARINES
[illegible] BY [illegible] MARINES
[illegible] RECON BN
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 26-68

[illegible] S E C R E T
[illegible] CC [illegible] FORCE [illegible] 17INSAZ MARSS
[illegible] THIRD MARINES, CONTINUE OPERATION [illegible]
[illegible] FOURTH MARINES, NO CHANGE FROM REF A.
[illegible]
[illegible] MARSS. CONTINUE REHABILITATION
[illegible] PREPARE FOR DEPLOYMENT ON ORDER.
[illegible] INSTALLATION COORDINATOR (VICO), NO
CHANGE FROM REF A.
[illegible] INSTRUCTIONS: HELO MOVEMENTS
[illegible] FOR TF HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING FORCES
FOR 19 MARSS [illegible] IN FOUR COLUMNS FROM LEFT TO
RIGHT: MISSION NUMBER, LINE DESIGNATION, EVENT
DESCRIPTION AND PLANNED EXECUTION TIMES.
[illegible] TF HOTEL COMM DET CE PAK AND
[illegible] EXTS FROM UCB LSA TO
[illegible]
[illegible] ALPHA [illegible] AND CIP

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PAGE THREE RUHMVP 0382 S E C R E T
FRMX VCB LSA TO LZ
T PARIS
401 ALPHA ONE/THREE (MINUS) 0800
(120 PAX) 149. QUANG TRI
LSA TO FSB SAIGON
401 BRAVO HELO ASSAULT BY AFTER
ALPHA/ONE/THREE (181 PAX) 401 A.
FROM VCB R/W TO LZPASSPORT
401 CHAPYIE CMD
P/ONE/THREE (123 PAX, AFTER
5 106RR J/MULES) FROM 401 B
PY VCB R/W TO LZ SAIGON/PARIS
401 DELTA HELO ASSAULT BY BRAVO/ONE/ AFTER
THREE (188 PZ) FROM KICB R/W 401 C
EC LZ TIGER (XD830233)
401 ECHO PLT/0600 /TWO/THRSE (15 PAX, AFTER
6 106RR W/MULES) FROM 401 DJ
VCBHIR/W TO LZ SAPVON
401 FOXTROT CMD GP/THIRD MARINES (38 PAX, 1400
1000 INT) FROM FSB
SNAPPER TO FSB SAIGON

PAGE FOUR RUHMVP 0382 S E C R E T
401 GOLF PLT/LIMA/THREE/NINE HUA 0830
(27PAX) FROM QICB LSA
TO VCB R/W
S-E
SBBT

OO UUMSQD
DE RUMLBPBM 1160 0771805
ZNY CCCCC
O 181800Z MAR 69
FM CO 1ST INF BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) QTR RVN
TO COC 3RD MAR DIV
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L CITE 1660 AVBL-C ATTN: G-3
SUBJ: SIX HOUR SITREP NO.72 1-5 MECH AO (181600-182400H) MAR 69.
A. UNIT LOCATIONS: A 3/5 YD 128710
B 3/5 YD 129699
1ST AND 3RD PLT: C2
ALL OTHERS: NO CHANGE.
B. SUMMARY OF LAST SIX HOURS: ALL UNITS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO FIXED LOCATIONS AND CONDUCT NIGHT ACTS.
C. ENEMY CONTACT: NONE
D. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: 181735H, XD914417 B 1-61 WHILE DIGGING IN FOR THE NIGHT DET A BOUNCING BETTY MINE (AP) RESULTING IN 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA (M) AND 7 US WIA (E).
E. PLANS FOR NEXT SIX HOURS: NO CHANGE FROM SITREP NO. 71.
F. CASUALTIES: ADD:
FRIENDLY: 1 KIA (US), 7 US WIA (E), 2 US WIA (M)
GP-4
DG
1160

Copy 1 of 5

mor

H
OO UUMSO
DE UUMSOW 192W 0771937
ZNY SSSSS
O 181937Z MAR 69
FM FIRST MAW COC
LTO III MAF COC
THIRD MARDIV COC
NINTH MARINES
BT
S E C R E T
THIRD MARDIV PASS TF HOTEL
A6 ARMED RECCE
1. MISSION 1067
2. TOT 0020
3. SYSTEMS UP
4. ROUTE [illegible]
5. NO MOVERS
L6. HARD TARGET TPO
9. MOONBEAM DIRECTED 12 D2 ON INTERDICTION POINT AT XD 89060080
WITH NO BDA
8. NO OTHER OBSERVATIONS
9. NO PROBLEMS WITH CONTROLLERS
GP-4
BT

Copy 1 of 6

SECRET

00 UUMAO
DE UUMSOW 193W 0772000
ZNY SSSSS
O 132000Z MAR 69
FM FIRST MAW COC
TO III MAF COC
THIRD MARDIV COC
NINTH MARINES
BT
S E C R E T
THIRD MARDIV PASS TF HOTEL
LA6 ARMED RECCE
1. MISSION 1075
2. TOT 0140-0215
3. SYSTEM UP
4. ROUTE 922, D4& TO 45
5. NO MOVERS
6. MOONBEAM CONTROLLER 22 D2 PANDED SNAKES ON AN INTERDICTION POINT
WT XD 89060080 WITH NO BDA
7. N/A
8. NO OTHER OBSERVATIONS
9. NO PROBLEMS WITH CONTROLLERS
GP-4
BT

TOR/III MAF/ 182110Z

Copy 1 of 1

SECRET

9

VR SKA N4...384...384...384...

OO UUMSQD UUMSEMA UUMSQD UUMSJEA RHUGUIN
DE UUEGK 1136 0790635
ZNY EEEEE
O 190600Z MAR 68 ZFF-6
FM XXIV CORPS TOC, CP HOCHMUIR
TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
INFO UUMSEMA/SA, 1ST ARVN DIV, HUE
UUMSQD/3RD MAR DIV COC, DGH
UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV DTOC, CEE
RUHGUIN/7th USS NEWPORT NEWS
BT
UNCLASSIFIED E F T O
SUBJ: FORECAST OF OPS REPORT WEEK OF 23 MAR- 29 MAR (U)
REF A. CG III MAF MSG DTG 160306Z JUN 68 (C).
B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 120910Z JUL 68 (C).
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, NEGATIVE REPORT IS SUBMITTED. PRESENT OPS CONTINUE IN XXIV CORPS AO.
BT

SECRET

DRAFTER 3/RED/lrb
SEC COC PHONE 3180
CWO

IMMEDIATE 190738 ZMAR69

COPY TO: C/S
COC
G-3
G-2
FSCC
EMBO
CEO

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV DGH
TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL LSD
1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)
3D RECON BN
INFO: 12TH MARINE REGT
3D MARINES
4TH MARINES
9TH MARINES

//SECRET//

SPECIAL DMZ OPERATIONS (S)

A. XXIV CORPS OP PLAN 12-69

1. (S) ON 17 AND 18 MARCH 69 THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF REFERENCE (A) CAUSED THE TEMPORARY CESSATION OF DMZ GROUND RECONNAISSANCE PATROLLING.

2. (S) EFFECTIVE 190800H MAR69 RESUME DMZ RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS.

3. (C) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS PERTINENT TO THESE RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES REMAIN UNCHANGED.

GP-4

CCN 1823 REL BY Morgan L. West DATE/TIME 191515 HMAR69

COC C/S 3/2/FSCC/EMBO/PKS CEO

Douglas Stirling

29

25

APO ACTION

SECRET

ZNY SSSSS
Z 191415Z MAR69
FM: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO: THIRD MARDIV COC DAG
BT
S E C R E T
REF: (A) 3D MARDIV 190450Z MAR69
1. DESIRED PRIORITIES AND COMMENTS AS FOLLOWS:
A. FIRST PRIORITY: QT 8427. WILL DELAY PURPLE MARTIN OPNS INTO VALLEY NORTH OF FSB ARGONNE UNTIL COMPLETION OF STRIKE. 24-HR DELAY THIS OPN ACCEPTABLE THIS COMMAND. IF NOT ACCOMPLISHED BY 210600H DESIRE CANCELLATION OF SUBJ. ARCLIGHT.
B. SECOND PRIORITY: QT 8456. WILL REQUIRE 24-HR NOTICE TO MOVE CO TO SAFE POINT. 4TH MAR WILL EXPLOIT ARCLIGHT.
C. THIRD PRIORITY. QT 8429. SAME REMARKS AS B. ABOVE.

PAGE TWO RUHMVP 0400 S E C R E T
D. ARCLIGHT AT QT 8472, TA-19-206, TA-19-207 NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THIS COMMAND. SUBJ STRIKES WOULD REQUIRE WITHDRAWAL OF SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF TROOPS IN CONTACT UNDER ENEMY OBSERVATION.
PAST EXPERIENCE HAS PROVEN THIS TACTIC TO BE EXTREMELY COSTLY IN FRIENDLY CASUALTIES THUS, RECOMMEND TGTS BE HELD IN ABEYANCE OR SHIFTS TO WEST.
2. IT IS THE COMMANDERS OBSERVATION THAT ARE PROPOSED TGTS LIE SOUTH OF THE DMZ. INTELLIGENCE GATHERED AT THIS COMMAND INDICATES THAT THE OPERATING BASES OF THE ENEMY LIE WITHIN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ, AND ARE RECOMMENDED AS BEING MORE LUCRATIVE TGTS FOR ARCLIGHT EXPENDITURE.
GP-4
BT

747

8

ZZ UUMSQ UUMSQD UUMSJEA UUMSEMA RUMLBPR RUHGUIN
DE UUMSK 1345 078 1642
ZNYY SSSSS
Z 0 191627Z MAR 69
FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB
TO UUMSQ/CG III MAF DNG
INFO UUMSQD/CG 3D MAR DIV DGN
UUMSJEA/CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEE
UUMSEMA/CG 1ST ARVN DIV HUE
RUMLBPR/IF CLEARWATER CVT
RUHGUIN/CTG 70.8
BT
S E C R E T AVII-GC
SUBJ: CHANGE TO COMMANDERS NARRATIVE FORCAST OF OPERATIONS FOR 20 MAR 69(U)
1. PARA 1 A. (1ST LINE) SHOULD BE CHANGED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
4TH MAR REGT: 1 CO OF 1/4 CA INTO FSB ARGONNE AS 1/4 MAR CONTINUES RIF IN OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN(NVA).
GP-4
BT
1345

TOP/XMV/RLS

8

CONFIDENTIAL

Z

ICA 059...059...059...059...059...

00 UUMSQD
DE RUMLBPBM 1176 0781650
ZNY CCCCC
O 191640Z MAR 69 TOR 191714 1/5
FM CO 1ST INF BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) QTR RVN
TO COC 3RD MAR DIV
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L CITE 1679 AVBL-C ATTN: G-3
SUBJ: SIX HOUR SITREP. NO. 75 1-5 MECH AO (191801-192400H) MAR 69.
A. UNIT LOCATIONS: TF 5-5: A: YD111682

B: YD132657
1B AND 3B: C2

B 1-9 (-): C2
1B 1-9: CAM LO
ALL OTHERS: NO CHANGE

B. SUMMARY OF LAST SIX HOURS: ALL UNITS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO FIXED LOCATIONS AND CONDUCT NIGHT ACTS.
C. ENEMY CONTACT: NONE
D. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE
E. PLANS FOR NEXT SIX HOURS: A 3-5 MOVES TO NORTHERN BOUNDARY AND IMPLACES GROUND SENSORS WITH A MARINE ELEMENT. B 3-5 STANDS DOWN AT C2. 1/B 1-9 CONDUCTS PATROLS IN AREA OF C2, 2/B 1-9 GOES TO A4 IN PREPARATION TO RELIEVE MARINE COMPANY TOMORROW.
F. CASUALTIES: NO CHANGE.
GP-4
BT
1176

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FT
RUMSOD [illegible] MAG THREE NINE
ZNY SSSSS
[illegible] 182202Z MAR 69 [illegible]
[illegible] TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
ZEN/NINTH MARINES
ZEN/SANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR [illegible]
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
[illegible] FIRST MAW
TWELFTH MARINES
MAG ONE SIX
MAG THREE SIX
MAG THREE NINE
FIRST BN TWO [illegible] MARINES
SECOND BN [illegible] MARINES
ZEN/[illegible] TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD RECON BN
BT
S E C R E T
MAG ORDER 7[illegible]
A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL [illegible]182252Z MAR 69

PAGE TWO RUMAVP5408 S E C R E T
1. THIRD MARINES: CONTINUE OPERATION
MAINE CRAG
2. FOURTH MARINES. NO CHANGE REF (A)
3. NINTH MARINES. NO CHANGE REF (A)
4. SANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR.
5. CHANGE REF (A)
6. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
A. INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY UNITS EMPLOYED WITH [illegible] THE VIC [illegible]
TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT TRAINING
DURING RESPITE FROM COMBAT OPERATIONS IN
THE FIELD.
B. HELO MOVEMENTS SCHEDULED FOR TF HOTEL
FORCES AND SUPPORTING FORCES FOR 28 MAR [illegible]
READ IN FOUR COLUMNS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT:
MISSION NUMBER, LINE DESIGNATION, EVENT DESCRIPTION
AND PLANNED EXECUTION TIMES:
[illegible] ALFA [illegible] HOTEL COMM DET [illegible] PAR [illegible]
[illegible] CHAG EXTD FROM [illegible]
LAA TO FSB SAIGON
[illegible]3 ALFA GOLF EXRAY/THREE/TWELVE [illegible]

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SECRET

Battery

SECRET

[illegible] FIVE RUN/UP[illegible] S E C R E T		
[illegible] INDIA	BIKE/THREE/THREE (1ST PAX) PROC CON TIEN TO FSB SAIGON	ON COMPLE[illegible] 401 HOTEL
401 JULIETT	40 [illegible] 6MM CASINES (35 PAX, [illegible] LZ CHAS INT AND 1 CHAS EXIT FROM FSB SHAFFER TO FSB SAIGON	ON COMPLETION 401 INDIA
401 KILO	[illegible] (MILUSS) AND BRAVO CMD GP/OMEX/FOUR (125 PAX, FOUR 105MM JR AND 5 MULES CHAS INT FROM [illegible] AIRFIELD TO LZ PARIS, 25 CHAS EXIT FROM VOR LEAL	ON COMPLETION 401 JULIETT
[illegible] LIMA	[illegible] CMD [illegible] (112 PAX) [illegible] SCHILT AIRFIELD TO FSB SAIGON	ON COMPLETION 401 KILO
[illegible]	6MM [illegible] (35 PAX AND [illegible] 6MM [illegible]	ON COMPLETION 401 LIMA
[illegible] SIX R.MEV/P2400 [illegible] AND 6 MULES [illegible] SCHILT AIRFIELD TO FSB SAIGON		
[illegible] NOVEMBER PLT OF KILO/[illegible] (98 PAX) FROM [illegible] TO FSB FULLER		ON COMPLETION 401 MIKE
401 OSCAR	PLT OF KILO/THREE/FOUR (98 PAX) FROM FSB FULLER TO SCHILT AIRFIELD	ON COMPLETION 401 NOVEMBER

[illegible]

00 UUMSQD
DE RUMLBPDM 1177 0782215
ZNY CCCCC
O 192213Z MAR 69 TOR/192232/Y5
FM HQ 1ST INF BDE 5TH INF DIV (M) QTR RVN
TO COC 3RD MAR DIV
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L CITE 1680 AVBL-C ATTN: G-3
SUBJ: SIX HR SITREP NO 77 1-5 MECH AO (100001-2000H) MAR 69.
A. UNIT LOCATIONS: NO CHANGE
B. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS: ALL UNITS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SECURITY
TO FIXED LOCATIONS AND CONDUCT NIGHT ACTS.
C. ENEMY CONTACT: NONE
E. PLANS FOR NEXT SIX HOURS: NO CHANGE FROM SITREP NO.75
F. CASUALTIES: NONE
BT
1177

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ZUCCAA4363
OO HUMSR HUMSJEA
DTG HUMSR 1048 [illegible]
ZNR UUUUU
O P [illegible] MAR 69
FM III MAF CDC
TO HUMSPLAT CORPS TOC
HUMSV/DIV CORPS TOC
HUMSOR/FIRST MARDIV
HUMSOM/FIRST MAW OPNS
HUMSOR/SECOND ROKMC BDE
HUMSAV/AMERICAL DIV TOC
INFO HUMSOD/THIRD MARDIV
HUMSJEA/USS ZERO ONE /BN DIV (AN)
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION II OF II
WITH SAF (ZT1599136) 5 KMS ESE OFLIEN PHUOC. RESULTS:
5 EN KIA WITH NO FRD CAS RPT'D. A HELO OF 176TH AVN
GP ADC'D BY AMF (BT1599125) 5 KMS ESE OF TIEN PHUOC
AND WAS FORCED TO LAND IN UNSECURE AREA. A/C WAS
TOTAL LOSS AND INFRE WERE 2 FRD KIA (7 EVAC). C/2/1
INF TRIED TO REACH A/C BUT WAS FIRED ON BY EST 50 NVA
WITHIN 700 METERS OF THE A/C (NO CAS). CO UNABLE TO
REACH A/C DUE TO NIGHTFALL BUT WILL ATTEMPT AGAIN THIS

PAGE TWO HUMSC 1048 C O N F I D E N T I A L
MORNING. ELSEWHERE 3 INCOMING INCIDENTS 10 SMALL CONTACTS, AND
2 MORT FIRES RPT'D. (CUM TOTALS: 38 EN KIA, 1 PW, 4 IWC AND
2 ROMC WITH 3 FRD KIA AND 56 WIA (29 EVAC).
(2) OPN GENEVA PARK: 3 INCOMING INCIDENTS AND
1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 EN KIA WITH 1

FRD KIA AND 18 WIA (4 EVAC).
(3) OPN RUSSELL REACH: 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D.
CUM TOTALS: 1 FRD WIA (EVAC).
(4) OPN IRON MOUNTAIN: LZ AMY (BS474525) 13
MILES W OF TONG BINH WAS ATK'D BY USEF USING SAF, RPG
FIRE, FRAG GRENADES AND SAPPERS. RESULTS: 5 EN KIA,
1 IWC AND 1 ROMC WITH 1 FRD KIA AND 11 WIA (EVAC).
W FIRED 82MM MORT RDS INTO SOL PHU HAMLET (BS557756)
[illegible] PHAN NGAI [illegible]. RESULTS: 1 CIV KIA AND
[illegible]. ELSEWHERE 1 INCOMING INCIDENT, 1 MINE INCIDENT
[illegible] SMALL CONTACTS RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 2 EN KIA, 2
[illegible] 1 ROMC WITH 3 FRD KIA AND 1 WIA (2? EVAC).
[illegible] AFGE DIV/FWD [illegible]
(6) FWD UNITS: 14 SMALL CONTACTS RPT'D.
[illegible]

40 FRD KIA AND 70 WIA.
(3) 5TH ARVN RZGT: OPN QUYET THANG 808 CONT'D WITH NO CONTACT OR CWS RPT'D.
(3) OPN QUYET THANG 24: CONT'D WITH 3 SMALL CONTACTS RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 FRD KIA AND 9 WIA.
(4) OPN QUYET THANG 458: RPT'D 1 MINE INCIDENT AND TERMINATED 191400H. FINAL CUM TOTALS: 2 FRDHKIA AND 2 WIA.
5. (C) CAP UNITS: IN A DELAYED RPT 181300H, CAP 2-4-2 ENGAGED A LARGE EN FORCE WITH SAF AND M-79'S (BT128570) 2.5 KMS W OF HOI AN. AO OBS APPROX 100 EN IN AREA. CAP'S SPT'D BY 2 A/S, 2X81MM MORT MSNS, GUNSHIPS AND A SWIFT BOAT. LATER IN AFTERNOON, AO RPT'DLSIGHTING 43 EN KIA. ACTION CONT'D THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. A SWEEP OF AREA NEXT MORNING REVEALED 16 HOUSES DEST BUT NO BODIES. CIV'S IN AREA STATED THERE WERE OVER 100 EN KIA AND WIA AND THAT LOCAL POPULACE HAD BEEN FORCED TO HAUL WOUNDED WEST DURING THE NIGHT. 3RD'S WLSO RPT'D MANY EN WPNS BURIED IN AREA. THE LOCAL DIOCC RPT'D AGENTS HADTCONFIRMED 19 EN KIA AND

13 EN WIA. (NOT I CLUDEDTIN CUM TOTALS). 8 VC SET FIRE TO 2 HOUSES IN A VIL 3 KMS NNE OF TAM KY (BT345295). A PLT FROM CZP 1-1-6 MOVED TO THE SCENE LAND ENGAGED THE VC WITH ORG WPNS. RESULTS: 5 EN KIA AND 2 IWC WITH NO FRD CAS RPT'D. CWCO 1-1 WAS INFORMED BY QUANG TIN PROV CHIEF THAT RF COMPOUND (BT340177) 6 KMS SE OF TAM KY HAD BEEN OVERRUN AND WAS HELD BY EN. CO REACTED WITH FORCE CONSISTING OF CAP'S 1-1-2 AND 1-1-3 PLUS PF'S FROM TAM KY DIST HQ. AS THEY APPROACHED COMPOUND THEY REC'D SAF. ARTY AND A/S LCALLED. SHORTLY AFTER 0900H THE FORCE ENGAGED EST 2 PLTS OF NVA. EN FLED. FORCE FND REMAINS OF 12 PERSONS IN COMPOUND. RESULTS 17 EN KIA, 3 IWC AND 2 CSWC WITH 2 PF KIA AND 3 PF WIA (MINOR). ELSEWHERE 5 SMALL CONTACTS WERE RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 32 EN KIA, 1 SPY, 5 DETS, 7 IWC AND 2 CSWC WITH NO FRD CAS RPT'D.
7. (C) SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES: CRT OPNS IN ICTZ RESULTED IN 375 EN KIA, 17 PW, 23 DETS AND 122 WPNS CAPT'D. ARVN FORCES ACCT'D FOR 143 EN KIA, 15 PW AND 52 WPNS CAPTJD; ARVN LOSSES WERE 25 KIA AND 142 WIA.

US AND FWMAF RPT'D A TOTAL OF 232 EN KIA, 2 PW, 23 DETS AND 78 WPNS CAPT'D; US AND FWMAF LOSSES WERE 38 KIA AND 953 WIA (152 EVAC).
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQ 1149 0791035
ZNY SSSSS
Z 201035Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC LDS
TWELFTH MARINES FDC DGH
BT

TOP/2012 43/OCY

SECRET
SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1. 3RD MARDIV
A. 1/5 TM WAINSCOT ENCOUNTERED LARGE BRUSH FIRE AND HAS NOT YET REACHED ASSIGNED RZ.
2. MLS-1
A. NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 21 MARCH 69
3. ARVN
A. TM SAMPLE CASE SCHEDULED TO EXIT DMZ 210800 MARCH 69.
GP-4
BT
1149

Copy 4 of 4 29

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER 3P/KEF/dae
SEC G-3P PH 3203
CWD

(048)

PRIORITY 201052 Z MAR69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
INFO: CG III MAF
COMSEVENTHFLT
TF 79
TG 79.5

BT

//SECRET//

REQUEST FOR SLF EMPLOYMENT (U)

1. (S) INCREASED ENEMY MORTAR AND SNIPING ATTACKS AGAINST VEHICLES TRAVELING ROUTE 9 BETWEEN DONG HA AND VANDEGRIFT COMBAT BASE; SAPPER AND MORTAR ATTACKS AGAINST FSB'S AND FIXED POSITIONS; AND RECENT CONTACTS BY FORCES OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF LZ'S MAC AND SIERRA INDICATE INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA NORTH OF DONG HA MOUNTAIN AND CAM LO.

2. (S) PRESENT COMMITMENT OF THIRD MARINE DIVISION FORCES TO OPERATIONS MAINE CRAG, PURPLE MARTIN, AND SURVEILLANCE OF THE DMZ LEAVES INSUFFICIENT FORCES FOR EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS IN THE AREA NORTH OF CAM LO.

3. (S) REQUEST EMPLOYMENT OF SLF IN AREA OF OPERATIONS BOUNDED ON WEST BY 00 N-S GRID, ON EAST BY 15 N-S GRID, ON SOUTH BY ROUTE 9 AND ON NORTH BY SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ. SLF WOULD CONDUCT A HELICOPTERBORNE ASSAULT INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA TO CONDUCT S/D OPERATION TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, FORTIFICATIONS AND SUPPLY CACHES IN THE AO.

3

SECRET

DURATION OF THE OPERATION WILL BE APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS.

4. (U) IF APPROVED, REQUEST DIRLAUTH WITH ARG/SLF TO COMMENCE DETAILED PLANNING.

GP-4

CCN 1961 REL BY P G Davis TIME ____ H MAR69

SECRET

DRAFTER 3P/KEF/dac
SEC G-3P PH 3203
CWO

049

PRIORITY 201054Z MAR69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
INFO: CG III MAF
COMSEVENTHFLT
TF 79
TG 79.5

BT

//SECRET//

REQUEST FOR SLF EMPLOYMENT (U)

1. (S) PRESENT COMMITMENTS OF THIRD MARDIV FORCES TO OPERATIONS MAINE CRAG, PURPLE MARTIN, AND SURVEILLANCE OF DMZ AND THE PLACING OF 1ST AMTRAC BN IN CADRE STATUS LEAVES MINIMAL FORCES AVAILABLE FOR SECURITY OF THE CUA VIET WATERWAYS AND REDUCES PATROLS AND AMBUSHES TO PREVENT ENEMY MINING ACTIVITY ALONG THE CUA VIET RIVER.

2. (C) NINE AGT RPTS SINCE 21 FEB 69 HAVE PLACED UNITS UP TO AND INCLUDING BN SIZE IN THE EASTERN AREA BELOW THE DMZ MOSTLY CONCENTRATED IN THE LAM XUAN (YD 2669), NHI HA (YD 2770), AND VINH QUANG (YD 2666) AREAS. SIX RPTS MENTIONED LAM XUAN (YD 2669) AS AN AMMO/RKT (122MM) CACHE SITE OR AN OCCUPIED AREA, AND TWO MENTIONED ARTY UNITS WITH 122MM RKT LAUNCHERS MOVING INTO OR LOCATED IN THESE AREAS. DONG HA AND CUA VIET ARE TO BE THE MAJOR TARGETS FOR SHELLING ATTACKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVEN MORTAR ATTACKS AND ONE COMPANY SIZE GD ATTACK INITIATED BY THE EN AGAINST FRIENDLY FORCES LOCATED BELOW THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ SINCE 22 FEB 69 AND SENSORS IN

SECRET

THIS AREA DETECTED APPROX 100 EN IN THE YD 2474 GRID ON THE 24TH OF FEB, AND EST TWO EN COMPANIES IN THE YD 2376 GRID ON 28 FEB ALONG WITH SEVERAL SMALLER DETECTIONS OF ENEMY MOVING THROUGH THE AREA. THE ARVN OBSD AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE IN THE VIC OF YD 2569 NEAR LAM XUAN. THIS AREA APPEARS TO BE A LUCRATIVE TARGET AS INDICATED BY THESE AGENT RPTS AND INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA, ALONG WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A STORAGE AREA/AMMO CACHE IN THE VIC OF LAM XUAN.

3. (S) REQUEST EMPLOYMENT OF SLF IN AREA OF OPERATIONS BOUNDED BY GRID COORDINATES YD 282770 TO 267763 TO 289735 TO 280720 TO 240667 ALONG STREAM TO CUA VIET TO SEA ALONG TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT BOUNDARY. SLF TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AND S/D OPNS IN AO TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, FORTIFICATIONS AND SUPPLY CACHES. DURATION OF OPERATION APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS.

4. (U) IF APPROVED, REQUEST DIRLAUTH WITH ARG/SLF TO COMMENCE DETAILED PLANNING.

5. THIS IS ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT FOR SLF USE GP-4 PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED IN AREA NORTH OF CAM LO.

CCN 1968 REL BY [signature] TIME _____ H MAR69

9

ZCZCEAA396 H
00 UUMS UUMSA
DE UUMSO 1068 0791455
ZNY SSSSS
UUMSK - T - UUMSJEA
O 201455Z MAR 69 TOR/1500/IIIMAF
FM III MAF COC
TO UUMS/MACV CMD CNTR DNG RVN
INFO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB RVN
UUMSOI/I CORPS TOC DNG RVN
UUMSOA/AMERICAL DIV TOC CHU LAI RVN
UUMSOW/FIRST MAW COC DNG RVN
UUMSOD/THIRD MARDIV COC DONG HA RVN
UUMSJEA/ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV TOC
UUMSA/I FFORCEV NHA RVN
ZEN/HORNHDASC RVN
ZEN/FMFPAC HAW
ZEN/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
BT
S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS
A. 1ST ARVNHDIV:
(1). 2D ARVN REGT (REINF): TF DUNG ASSUMES OPCON OF 1/2 ARVN AND CONTINUES PATROL AND RIF OPS
VIC A-1, A-2 AND OLD A-3 (NVA, VCLF). 3/2 ARVN (-) CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS SW OF LZ TORCH TOWARD LAOTION BORDER (NVA).

PAGE TWO UUMSO 1068 S E C R E T
2D ARVN REGT COMMAND ELEMENT, ONE CO OFL3/2 ARVN, ONZ BTRY ARVN ARTY AND SIX 81MM MORT AT LZ TORCH CONTINUE TO CONTROL AND SUPPORT ARVN FORCES IN OP MAINE CRAG (NVA). 4/2 ARVN (-) FIRS N AND W OF C-1 (NVA, VCLF).
(2). 1ST ARVN REGT (REINF): 1/1 ARVN (-) CONTINUES SEARCH OPS LIN MY CHANH AO (VCLF). 2/1 ARVN CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS NE OF LZ WAKE (YD255332) (NVA). 3/1 ARVN CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS N OF FSB DAVIS (NVA). 4/1 ARVN (-) CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS VIC FSB DAVIS WHILE ONE COMPANY PROVIDES SECURITY FOR (NVA) 1/11 ARVN CAV CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC LZ NANCY (VCLF).
(3). 3D ARVN REGT (REINF): 1/3 ARVN CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS SW OF HUE (VCMF, VCLF). 4/3 ARVN IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1/506 INF CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS ALONG SONG BO RIVER AND VIC OF FSB BASTOGNE (NVA, VCLF). 3/3 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS SW OF FSB TENNESSEE (NVA). 2/3 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS NE OF FSB SPEAR (NVA). 3/54 ARVN CAV CONTINUES HUE SECURITY MISSION. BLACK PANTHER CO AT PK17HCONTINUZS NIGHT PATROL OPS N OF FSB T-BONE (VCLF).
(4). 54TH ARVN REGT (-) CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH/CORDON OPS IN VINH LOC, HUONG TUY, PHU VANG AND PHU THU DISTRICTS (VCI, VCLF). 2/54 IN COORDINATION WITH 2/327 INF CONTINUES CORDON AND SEARCH OPS

7

SE OF PHU BAI AIRFIELD (VCI, VCLF).
(5). 7TH ARVN CAV TF: 2/7 ARVN CAV (REINF) AND 3/7 ARVN CAV (REINF) CONTINUE CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS VIC "STREET WITHOUT JOY" (VICN VCLF).
B. QUANG NAM: 51ST REGT WILL CONT CDT BN CLEARING OPNS WITHIN THE INDIVIDUAL AO'S. 1ST RNGR GP WILL CDT LE LOI IV, WITH 37TH AND 39TH RNGR BN CMTD. 21ST RNGR BN WILL REMAIN ON I CORPS SECURITY AND WILL REMAIN PREPARED FMR CONTINGENCY MISSIONS.
C. (C) 2ND ARVN DIVISION: WILL CONT CDT QUYET THANG [illegible], WITH 2/5 CMTD AND OTHER OPNS AS REPORTED IN PARA 4.
GP-4
BT
1068

NNNNC
GSO

ZNY SSSSS
P 201530Z MAR69 1915 TFH
FM: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO: CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO: THIRD RECON BN
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
ZEN/NINTH MARINES
MAG THREE NINE

BT
S E C R E T
48 HOUR PLAN SUMMARY
1. INSERTIONS TOMORROW

TEAMS	DATES	R.Z. COORD	METHOD
PISTON ROD	21-25	7265-7463	ALL HELO
SAND BOX	21-25	82-8451	
FANCY DAN	21-25	9055-9253	
DARING STAR	21-25	0043-0141	
HAY RIDE	21-25	0139-0237	
129 D 69	21-25	0332-0530	
131 D 69	21-25	8032-8230	

PAGE TWO RUHMVP 0432 S E C R E T

132 D 69	21-25	0835-1033	
133 D 69	21-25	1233-1431	

5. EXTRACTION TOMORROW:

TEAM	DATES	EX. COORD	METHOD
GODMOTHER	17-21	TBA	ALL HELO

2. INSERTIONS NEXT DAY:

TEAMS	DATES	R.ZM COORD	METHOD
134 D 69	22-26	1044-1242	ALL HELO
138 D 69	22-26	9168-9366	
140 D 69	22-26	8947-9145	
137 D 69	22-26	9762-9960	

2.B. EXTRACTIONS NEXT DAY:

TEAMS	DATES	EX. COORD	METHOD
BIG SHOT	19-22	TBA	HELO

GP-4
BT

Copy 5 of 5

SECRET

21 MAR 69

RUMHVP-T-THIRD MARDIV COC
RUMHVP-T-MAG THREE NINE

ZNY SSSSS
R 201850Z MAR69
FM: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO: ZEN/THIRD MARINES
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
ZEN/NINTH MARINES
INFO: CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
TWELFTH MARINES
MAG ONE SIX
MAG THREE SIX
MAG THREE NINE
FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES
SECOND BN TWELFH MARINES
ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD RECON BN
ZEN/VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR (VIC)
BT
S E C R E T
FRAG ORDER 78-69
1. THIRD MARINES. CONTINUE OPERATION MAINE CRAG

201850Z MAR69 C-3 2/COC

PAGE TWO RUHMVP 0434 S E C R E T
2. FOURTH MARINES
A. CONTINUE OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN
B. CONTINUE OPERATIONS FROM FSB ARGONNE, ALPINE, NEVILLE, RUSSELL AND FULLER.
C. 0430-43 TO ASSUME OPCON OF MIKE/THREE/THREE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN ON ORDER.
3. NINTH MARINES
A. CONTINUE REHABILITATION AND REDEPLOYMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANNING GUIDANCE.
B. CONTINUE SECURITY MISSION FOR KHE GIO BRIDGE, ECB, SIGNAL HILL, VCB AND CALU.
C. CONTINUE OPERATIONS FROM FSB CATES AND HILLS 691 AND 950.
4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: HELO MOVEMENTS SCHEDULED FOR TF HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING FORCES FOR 21 MAR69 (READ IN FOUR COLUMNS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: MISSION NUMBER, LINE DESIGNATION, EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PLANNED EXECUTION TIME):
[illegible]

82

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHMVP 0234 S E C R E T
CH46 EXT) FROM VCB LSA
TO FSB ARGONNE
303 ALPHA PLT 2ND PROV/ONE/TWELVE 1100
(25 PAX, 500LB CH46 INT,
16 CH53 EXT AND 2 CHTR EXT)
FROM FSB ALPINE TO FSB
ARGONNE
303 BRAVO DET 3RD TANK BN (1 CH54 ON CALL
EXT) FROM VCB LSA TO
LZ PARIS
303 CHARLIE DET 3RD TANK BN (1 CH54 ON CALL
EXT) FROM FSB SNAPPER TO
LZ PARIS
401 ALPHA MIKE/THREE/THREE (160 PAX) 0800
FROM VCB R/W TO FSB
ALPINE
401 BRAVO DET CP./ONE/FOUR (75 PAX) AFTER
FROM FSB ALPINE TO FSB 401 A.
ARGONNE.
401 CHARLIE [illegible] (25 PAX) AFTER

PAGE FOUR RUHMVP 0434 S E C R E T
FROM FSB ALPINE TO 401 B
FSB ARGONNE
401 DELTA CO/ONE/FOUR (180 PAX) AFTER
FROM FSB ALPINE TO 401 C
FSB ARGONNE.
401 ECHO HELO ASSAULT BY THIRD AFTER
BN/2ND ARVN (275 PAX) 401 D.
FROM VCB R/W TO LZ
QUEEN.
401 FOXTROT PLT/KILO/THREE/THREE AFTER
(50 PAX) FROM MAI 401 E
LOC TO FSB FULLER
401 GULF PLT/KILO/THREE/FOUR CONTINUOUS
(50 PAX) FROM FSB
FULLER TO VCB R/W
401 HOTEL CP/THIRD MARINES (35 PAX, AFTER
1000LB INT, 1-CH46 EXT) 401 G
FROM FSB SNAPPER TO
FSB SAIGON
401 INDIA BRAVO CMD/ONE/THREE AFTER

PAGE FIVE RUHMVP 0434 S E C R E T
(125 PAX, 4 106RR W/MULES 401 H
AND 5 MULES) FROM
VCB R/W TO LZ PARIS.
401 JULIETT PLT/LIMA/THREE/THREE AFTER
(43 PAX) FROM LZ SNAPPER 401 I
TO LZ DAVIS. (XD883241)
401 KILO PLT/106RR/TWO/THREE AFTER
(15 PAX, 6 106RR W/MULES) 401 J.
FROM VCB R/W TO
FSB SAIGON
401 LIMA 81SEC/FOXTROT/TWO/THREE AFTER
(15 PAX, 6 CH46 EXT) FROM 401 KM
FSB SAIGON TO LZ PARIS,
401 MIKE DET/THIRD TANK BN (10 PAX, ON CALL
3 CH46 EXT) FROM VCB W/303B
LSA TO LZ AT XD798231.
GP 4
NT

CRET

SHOW COC
OP CHIEF
G-3 NO
G-4 NO
DCSO
APO
ACTION

UUMSQD -T- MAG THREE NINE TOR/210950/FH/04/JRB
ZNY SSSSS
O 210915Z MAR 69
FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO ZEN/THIRD MAR
ZEN//FIFTH MAR
ZEN/NINTH MAR
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
TWELFTH MARINES
MAG ONE SIX
MAG THREE SIX
MAG THREE NINE
FIRST BN TWELFTH MAR
ZEN/SECOND BN TWELFTH MAR
ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR
THIRD RECON BN
ZEN/VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR (VIC)
BT
S E C R E T
A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 201850Z MAR 69
1. THIRD MARINES. CONTINUE OPERATION MAINE

210915Z MAR 69 C-3 2/COC P

PAGE TWO RUMHVP0448 S E C R E T
CRAG
2. FOURTH MARINES. NO CHANGE FROM REF A.
3. NINTH MARINES. NO CHANGE FROM REF A.
4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: HELO MOVEMENTS FOR TASK FORCE HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING FORCES FOR 22 MAR 69 WILL BE PASEP.
GP-4
BT

82

SECRET

SECRET

313

[illegible] UNCLASS
[illegible] UUUSOO 1155 PSA1046
[illegible] SSSSS
[illegible] 241842Z MAR 69
FM 3RD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSE/XXIV CORPS TOC PHR
[illegible] TASK FORCE HOTEL COC LSD
[illegible]TH MARINES FDC DGH
[illegible]
[illegible] S E C R E T
[illegible] SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
[illegible] 3RD MARDIV
A. [illegible] TF MAINSCOT HAS NOT YET ENTERED RZ
B. [illegible]RD RECON HAS NO TMS SCHEDULED FOR 22 MARCH 69.
[illegible] MLS-1
A. NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 22 MARCH 69
B. ARVN
A. TM SAMPLE CASE SCHEDULED TO EXIT DMZ 211800H MAR 69
B. TM ELITE ACTION SCHEDULED TO EXIT DMZ 221900H MARCH 69.
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 1SS

Top/Ø NAF-T-XXIV Corp 1
211805Z

A-1

SECRET

UB

TOP/21 29 20-2/24/587/

CO UUMSK UUMSO
DE UUMSOD 1208 0861900
ZNY CCCCC
O 211900Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS
INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC
TASK FORCE HOTEL
BT
C O N F I D E N TI A L FINAL SECTION OF TWO
(4) 3/5 CAV AT 211224 H B/3/5 VIC 093617 APV HIT UNK TYPE MINE, BLEW OF ROAD WHEELS AND ARMS PUT HOLE IN HULL. VECHILE EVAC'D RES 3 WIA(E) AT 211550 B/3/5 VIC 091619 APC HIT UNK TYPE MINE. VEHICLE NOT REPAIRABLE, RES 2 WIA(E) 1 WIA(M)
AT 211745H B/3/5 VIC 091619 VTR STRUCK UNK TYPE MINE. EVAC'D VTR TO RED DEVIL.
(5) A/4/12 CAV NO CONTACT
(6) 1ST AMTRAC BN
(LATE ENTRY) AT 202130H A CO 1 ST AMTRAC BN VIC 297694 AMB SPOTTED 5 EN. ENGAGED WITH SAF. SWEPT AREA WITH NEG RES
C. MCB- 52 AT 211215H MCB-52 QUARRY VIC 870578 REC'D 1 RD 75 MM RR AND APPROX 10 RD 82MM FIRE. CALLED ARTY AND 81MM MSN WITH UNK RESULTS SECURED QUARRY OPERATIONS.
D. FLSG B AT 211454 VCB CONVOY ONRTS GRID SQ 0657 REC'D UN NR 82MM RES2 WIA(M)

PAGE TWO UUMSOD 1209 C O N F I D EN TI A L
E. 3RD RECON BN. SEE 3RD RECON BN 24 HR SITREP.
F. ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE.
SUPPORT. SEE 12 TH MAR 24 HR SITREP.
G. GENERAL. EXCELLENT WEATHER ENHANCED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT DIVISION AO.
H. RECAP OF OPERATIONS

	PATROLS		AMBUSHES		S&D		OIST	SCOUT
UNIT	FT	SOD	PLT	FT	SOD	PLT	CO	POST	SNIPER
3RD MAR									
1/3	------- MAINE CRAG-------								
2/3	-------- MAINE CRAG--------								
3/3	DO	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
	NO	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	0
4TH MAR									
1/4	-------- PURPLE MARTIN								
2/4	DO	6	3	0	0	0	0	8	5
	NO	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	0
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

PAGE THREE UUMSOD 1209 C ON F I D E N TI A L
9TH MAR

1/9	D0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2/9	D0	9	4	0	0	0	0	3
	N0	0	0	0	3	0	0	14
3/9	D0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1
	N0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0

1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)

1/11	D0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	6
	N0	0	1	1	3	0	0	5	5
1/61	D0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N0	5	3	20	0	0	0	4	0
1/77	D0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
	N4	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
3/5	D0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

1ST MATRAC

	D1	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	5
	N0	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	6
OTCB	D0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N0	5	0	0	1	0	0	6	0
	T1	23	12	0	0	0	4	32	21
	N4	13	10	24	23	0	0	48	11
	T5	36	22	24	23	0	4	80	33

PAGE FOUR UUMSOD 1209 C O N F I D E N TI A L
I. SMALL UNITS CONTACTS.

PROVINCE CCOR	DATE TIME	ACTION SIZ/TYPE	FR UNIT LOSSES	EN UNIT LOSSES	INIT BY US/VC
XD 959653	180730H	PLT PATROL SFD	L/3/4 2 WIA(E)	UNK	VC
YD 019593	201630H	CO DEF INCOMING	K/3/4 1 WIA(E) 1 WIA(M)	UNK UNK	VC
YD 097694	202130H	SOD AMB	A/1ST AMTRAC BN(NONE)	UNK UNK	US
YD 035620	210630H	CO DEF INCOMING	L/3/3 NONE	UNK UNK	VC
YD 062566	210945H TO-211415H	CO DEF INCOMING	G/2/9 UNK 3 WIA(E)	UNK	VC
YD 018592	211000H	CO DEF INCOMING	K/3/4 NONE	UNK UNK	VC
YD 066602	211025H	CO DEF INCOMING	I/3/3 5 WIA(E) 1 WIA(M)	UNK UNK	VC
YD 018592	211045H	CO DEF INCOMING	K/3/4 NONE	UNK UNK	VC
YD 018592	211105H	DO DEF INCOMING	K/3/4 NONE	UNK UNK	VC
YD 0657	211145H	CONVOY INCOMING	FLSG B CONVOY	UNK UNK	

PAGE FIVE HUMSOD 1289 C O N F I D E N T I A L

YD 897578	211215H	INCOMING	MCB-53 NONE	UNK UNK	VC
YD 655617	211224H	MINE	B/3/5 3 WIA(E)	UNK NONE	VC
YD 883566	211530H	CO DEF	L/3/4 NONE	UNK UNK	US
YD 883615	211535H	CO DEF	I/3/3 NONE	UNK 3 NVA KIA	US
YD 881610	211550H	MINE	B/3/5 2 WIA(E) 1 WIA(M)	UNK NONE	VC
YD 885619	211645H	CO DEF INCOMING	C/2/4 NONE	UNK UNK	VC
YD 891610	211745H	MINE	B/3/5 NONE	UNK UNK	VC
YD 883613	211915H	CO DEF INCOMING	I/3/3 NONE	UNK UNK	VC
YD 464517	211920H	PLT AMB	A/1/61 NONE	UNK UNK	US

4. PACIFICATION SUPPORT

PAGE SIX HUMSOD 1289 C O N F I D E N T IA L

1. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.0
A. K/3/3CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS WITH RD/PF/CIDG IN NAI LOCY TOAR.
B. I/3/3 CONTINUES COMBINED OPNS IN CAM LOHDISTRICT.
C. TWO SOD OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE COHCONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.
D.4IST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)HCOMTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITHKIST AND
2ND ARVN REGT'S THROUGHOUT POPULATED COASTAL ARE.
E. DIRECT CO -ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (PIOCC) BY 3/3 BHUR, OTCB,ANDN
1ST BDE 1TH INF (MECH)
3. TABULATIOM OX VILLAGE/HAMLZT C&S DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE
GP-4
BT
1289

$3 77.. 1214 080339
ZNY CCCC
O 210330 MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGW
TO UUMSK/FIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO UUMSO/IX MAF COC DNG
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF TWO
(5) AT 211[illegible]H VIC FSB FULLER K 3/4 REC (4) 82MM MORTAR RDS. IMPACTING IN VIC OF XD 022590. 1 RD WAS NORTH OF POSITION. 81MM MORTAR MSN CALLED ON ENEMY XD 036586.
(6) AT [illegible]H VIC 043522 3RD RECON TM WAS BING INSERTED, 2 MEN WERE OFF THE BIRD WHEN THEY SPOTTED (3) NVA 20-30 METERS TO THEIR NORTH. TM MADE CONTACT WITH (7) NVA TO THE N AND NE WITH NO CASUALTIES ON EITHER SIDE. INSERT HELO LFT LZ AND GUNSHIPS EXPENDED ORDANCE ON ENEMY. INSERT HELO RETURNED FOR THE 2 MEN AND PICKED THEM UP. TAKING 2 HITS ON BIRD. ENEMY WERE WEARING KHAKI AND GREEN

UNINFORMS MISED. A CARTRIDGE BLET WAS OBSERVED NEAR THE TM MEMBERS BUT THEY WERE UNABLE TO RETRIEVE IT.
B. 9TH MARINES:

PAGE TWO UUMSOD 1214 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(1) AT 210945H VIC XD 062566 3 2/9 RECEIVED (9) 61MM MORTARS FROM VIC XD 045588. RETURNED FIRE WITH 81MM MORTARS.
(2) AT 211105H VIC XD 058566 G 2/9 RECEIVED (10) 61MM MORTAR RDS FROM /$055575. RETURNED FIRE WITH 81MM MORTARS.
(3) AT 211215H VIC XD 015367 3RD TECON AS INSERT HELO WAS APPROACHING INSERT COORDS. IT WAS UPON BY UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF ENEMY MISSION ABORTED, NO CASUALITIES:
(4) AT 211230H VIC XD 018428 3RD RECON TM OBSERVED 2 ENEMY WEARING GREEN UTILITIES AND CARRYING 5 CANTEENS APIECE 15 METERS TO THEIR NE. AS TM WAS TRYING TO CAPTURE ENEMY THEY HEARD MORE ENEMY TO THEIR NORTH. TM MOVED OUT OF AREA.
(5) AT 211415 VIC 056564 G 2/4 TOOK HEAVY 61MM MORTAR FIRE. FIRE HAS STOPPED AT PRESENT TIME.

RESULTS (3) FR WIAE
(6) AT 211515H VIC 092425 3RD RECON TM OBSERVED 3 ENEMY WALKING ON TRAIL THUGH

TREELINE. MOVING FROM EAST TO WEST. TM COULD NOT
OBSERVE UNIFORMS OR WEAPONS.
C. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)
1. 211140H YD 093617 - APC OF B 3-5 HIT AN AT MINE BLOWING OFF
ALL ROAD WHEELS AND ARMS ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE APC AND BOLWING
A HOLE IN THE HILL. APC BEING EVACUATED TO C2 AND IS TENTATIVELY
CLASSIFIED AS A COMBAT LOSS. RESULTS: 3 USA WIA(E).
2. 211350H, YD 072615 - ELEMENTS OF I 3-3 FOUND A 3-4 WEEK
OLD BUNKER COMPLEX CONSISTING OF 15 BUNK ERS 5'X6' AND 10 BUN-
KERS 10' X 8' INSIDE THE BUNKERS WERE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:
1 RPG RD, 22 60MM MORTAR RDS, 27 FUZES, 2 BELTS RPD AMMO, 2 HEL-
.35, 1 PONCHO, 2 ENTRENCHING TOOLS, 1 PICK AND 1 SAW, EQUIP
EVACUATED AND BUNKERS DESTROYED. RESULTS: ABOVE ITEMS CAPTURED.
3. 211530H, YD 091639 - APC OF B 3-5 HIT AT MINE BREAKING TRACK
AND BLOWING OFF TWO ROAD WHEELS ON ONE SIDE. APC BEING RECOVEDED
TO C2. RESULTS: 2 USA WIA(E), 1 USA WIA (M)
5. PLANS:
A. 4TH MARINES: UNITS CONTINUE TO CONDUCT COMBAT
OPNS IAW MSNS ASSIGNED.
B. 9TH MARINES: UNITS CONTINUE TO CONDUCT COMBAT

OPNS IAW MSNS ASSIGNED.
C. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)
1. TF 1-11: A CO(-)CONTINUES S/C N. OF LZ ANNE. B 1-77(-)
2/A 1-77 AND 2/A 1-11 MOVE TO LZ SHARON. 1/A 1--11 AND D CO (-)
SECURE LZ SHARON. ONE PLAT OF D 1-11 AND 3/B 1-77 SECURE THE
LAND CLEARING OPN WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO START 22 MAR 69 S. OF
LZ SHARON.
2. 1-61(-): A CO CONT SECURITY OF WUNDER BEACH, CONDUCTS PLAT
SIZE S/C OPNS ALONG "STREET" AREA S. OF WUNDER BEACH. C CO CON-
DUCTS PLAT SIZE S/C OPNS VIC BO BANG. SCOUT PLAT STANDS DOWN AT
LZ SHARON IN PREPARATION FOR AGI.
3. TF 1-77 A 1-77 CONT SECURITY OF MINESWEEPS AND BRIDGES ALONG
QL 1 VIC LZ NANCY. A 4-12 CONT S/C OPN VIC YD 4039, ESTABLISHES

NIGHT RECON SCREEN FROM YD 339408 TO YD 420400. B 1-11 CONT S/C
OPN VIC YD 3843.
4. TF 3-5 CAV: B TRP REVERTS OPCON TO 3-5 CAV EFF 220800H, A
TRP AND B TRP WITH 2 PLAT OF D 1-11 BEGIN S/D OPNS IN THE VALLEY NORTH
OF DONG HA MOUNTAIN. B 1-9 SECURES A4 THEN CHOPPED OPCON TO 1-9
MARINES ON 22 MAR AND MOVES TO CUA VIET FOR REHAB. C 1-9 CLOSED
C2 AT 1815 HRS OPCON TO 3-5 CAV FOR DEFENSE OF C2 TONIGHT

PAGE FIVE UUMSOD 1214 C O N F I D E N T I A L

5. 3-3 MARINES: I CO, K CO, & 3-3 HQS ARE CHOPPED OPCON TO ERD MARDIV EFF (TIME UNKNOWN) 22 MAR 69 FOR OPN S IN THE 3D MARDIV AO.

6. 1ST AMTRAC: A CO OPERATES FROM MY LOC, B CO OPERATES FROMC4 AND OCEAN VIEW. PRC OPERATES VIC XUAN KHANH. H&S PLAT OPERATES FROM DAI DO.

7. 1-9 MARINES: CHOPPED OPCON TO 1-5 MECH 2[illegible] [illegible] (TIME UNKNOWN). IN TURN GAINS OPCON OF B 1-9 AND C 1-9 AND HAS MSN OF SECURING KHE GIO BRIDGE, MAI LOC, CAM LO, C3 BRIDGE, C2 AND A4.

6. CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES: ADD (4) USMC WIA (E), (5) USA WIA (E), 1 USA WIA (M), (3) NVA KIA, (5) VC KIA, (1) POW, (3) IWC.

A. FRIENDLY

	USMC	USA	USN
KIA	45	8	0
WIA (E)	189	104	1
WIA (M)	21	18	1
MIA	0	0	0

B. ENEMY

	NVA	VC		
KIA	405	15	DET	79
POW	7	6	IWC	129
RET	0	1	CSWC	23

GP-4
BT
1214

SECRET

(314)

DRAFTED BY: AWB/AWB
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
GNO

PRIORITY 220237 Z MAR 69

COPY TO: G-2(CIC)
G-3
FSC
CIC
CCC

G3-4

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN
TO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN
INFO: CG III MAF, DNG, RVN
CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN
CG USASUPCO, CRB, RVN
CG TF HOTEL, VCB, RVN
THIRD MARINES, DGH, RVN
FOURTH MARINES, VCB, RVN
NINTH MARINES, VCB, RVN
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH), DT, RVN

SECRET

FOR CODE J3-04

SENSOR ACTIVATION/DEACTIVATION REPORT (C)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

1. (S) FOL SUBMITTED IAW REF A FOR STRING 111:
   A. TWO MINIHANDSIDS, ONE PIRID, ONE GSID
   B. 30/05, GSID
      30/06-22, MINIHANDSID/PIRID
      30/07, MINIHANDSID
   C. YD 09457110
      YD 09407115
      YD 09397118
   D. 171200 H MAR 69
   E. ALL SET FOR END OF BATTERY LIFE
   F. DESTRUCT ACTIVATED IN RECOVERABLE MODE
   G. SIXTEEN (DUEL BLADE)

2. (S) FOL SUBMITTED IAW REF A FOR STRING 114:
   A. THREE MINIHANDSIDS, ONE MAGID; ONE ACOUBUOY
   B. 30/04, MINIHANDSID
      30/03-21, MINIHANDSID/MAGID
      30/02, MINIHANDSID ; 23/08, ACOUBUOY
   C. YD 14007320
      YD 14007335
      YD 14007350

GSV 2/3/FSC/CIC/CCC

SECRET

D. 201400H MAR 69
E. ALL SET FOR END OF BATTERY LIFE
F. DESTRUCT ACTIVATED IN RECOVERABLE MODE
G. SEVENTEEN (DUAL BLADE)

3. (S) DELETE STRING 140
A. THREE HANDSIDS, ONE MAGID
B. 31/04, HANDSID
31/05-23, HANDSID/MAGID
31/25, HANDSID
C. YD 13205320
YD 13405320
YD 13405330
D. 8 JAN 69
E. 21 MAR 69
F. SEVEN (DUFFEL BAG)

4. (S) DELETE STRING 141
A. TWO HANDSIDS, ONE MAGID
B. 31/26, HANDSID
31/28-27, HANDSID/MAGID
C. YD 12905315
YD 12755313
D. 8 JAN 69
E. 21 MAR 69
F. SIX (DUFFEL BAG)

GP-4

CCN 2088 RELEASED BY M A Soper TIME 0910H MAR 69

315

DRAFTED BY: WWB/RKR
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWO

PRIORITY Z 20540 Z MAR69

COPY TO: G-2
G-3
RECON REP
FSC
COC
CIC
TIO

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG TF HOTEL
INFO: THIRD MARINES
FOURTH MARINES
NINTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH ARTY GROUP
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES
SECOND BN, TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD BN, TWELFTH MARINES
FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MARINES
FIRST BN, FORTIETH ARTY
FIFTH BN, FOURTH ARTY
FIRST BN, SEVENTY-SEVENTH ARMORED
FIRST BN, ELEVENTH INF
THIRD RECON BN
THIRD BN, FOURTH MARINES
FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES
THIRD SQUADRON, FIFTH MECH

G-3H

S E C R E T

SENSOR ACTIVITY BULLETIN, PERIOD ENDING 2400 22 MAR 69 (U)

A. CG 3D MARDIV 170020Z MAR69

1. (C) DELETE FOL SENSOR STRINGS FROM REF A: STRING 140, STRING 141.

2. (S) ADD FOL TO REF A:

STRING	CH/TONE CODE	KILL ZONE	TGT NO	READOUT SITE	TYPE TERRAIN
111	30/05,06-22,07	YD09507100 YD09377125	SD0111 SD1111	A-4	OPEN, EL GRASS
114	30/04,03-21,02; 23/08	YD14007310 YD14007360	SD0114 SD1114	A-4	OPEN, EL GRASS

GP-4

19

CCN 2116 RELEASED BY [signature] TIME 1315 H MAR69

G3V 2/3/REC REP/FSC/COC/CIC/TIO

SECRET

3 | 6

MAY

1:0

DE UUMSQD 1219 0810700
ZNY SSSSS
Z 220700Z MAR 69 Tod | 0734 | XXIV Corps |
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DOM
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PKB
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1. ARVN
A. TM BICKERTON ENTERED RZ, UL YD 2276 LR YD 2477 AT 211730H. TM

WILL EXIT 231700 MAR 69.
GP-4
BT
1219

1-A

SECRET

SECRET

317

DRAFTER 31/JMC/[illegible]
SEC AIR 36 MAADIV 3231
CWO

PRECEDENCE [illegible] 3 MAR69

TO: CG 36TH MARDIV DGH
CO: CG ARVN CORPS 1CR
INFO: CG III MAF DNC

//[illegible]//

SUBJ: [illegible]

1. REQUIRE A [illegible] INCP BY MAAG ASAP. THE FOLLOWING INFO IS THAT [illegible]
   A. [illegible]
   B. [illegible]
   C. [illegible] ARVN MARINE

GPD: CGB 2123 FIL BY [illegible]

G3H

SECRET

318

DRAFTER 108/WHB/TJB
SBO CEO PHONE 3266
C' O

ROUTING 220922 7 MAR69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG III MAF
INFO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

COPY TO: COMM CER

SECRET

AUTHORIZATION FOR TOP SECRET TRANSMISSION (U)

A. OPNAVINST C5510.90B PARA 5
B. CSPG-36 CHAP 1
C. OPNAVINST C5510.31

1. REQ AUTH TRANSMIT TOP SECRET TRAFFIC ON CKT 10001 BETWEEN THIRD MARDIV/TASK FORCE HOTEL.

2. KAK-2643 TO BE USED. AVAIL FOR USE BOTH COMMANDS.

3. REQUIREMENTS LISTED REF A, B, C, CERTIFIED.

4. OFF LINE NOT RECOMMENDED.

GP-4

CON 2122 RELEASED BY [signature] TIME 221700H MAR69

CEO COMM CUTR

6314

SECRET

319

ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1222 0811120
ZNY SSSSS

Z 221120Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC UCI

TWELFT MARINES FDC DGH
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1. 3RD MARDIV
A. 1/5 TM WAINSCOT CANCELLED 22 MARCH 69
B. 3RD RECON TM AMANDA SCHEDULED FOR 23 THRU 27 MARCH 69 INTO
RZ UL YD 9168 LR YD 9366
2. MLS -1
A. NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 23 MARCH 69
3. ARVN
A. TM ELITE ACTION EXITED DMZ AT 220950H MARCH

B. TM BIG ALICE ENTERED DMZ R Z UL YD 190778 LR YD 2079 AT
221000H. TM WILL REMAIN IN DMZ UNTIL 241000H MARCH 69.
SP-4
BT
1552

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
PRIORITY VPCG99EUA 1231SSS
TO RUMRUP
INFO SSSSS
COLLECTION RUMLEPS 2614 0611715-SSSS--RUMRUP.
ZYH SSSSS
O 221600Z MAR 69
FM CG XXIC CORPS PHB
TO C-THIRD MAR DIV DGN
O 150845Z MAR 69
FM HORN IN SC DNG
TO 7AF TACC TSN RUN
INFO CG III MAF
S-XXIV CORPS NUE PHB
CG I MAW DNG RUN
CG 3 MAR DIV DONG HA
ZE
S E C R E T JPCC O-HORN DASC
SUBJECT: ADJUSTMENT OF ICTZ BUFFER ZONES REF A: MSG-03165 Q MAR AND 7 AF MSG 2 1655 MAR 1968.
1. REFERENCE MESSAGES ESTABLISHED BUFFER ZONES IN CONJUNCTION WITH FRIENDLY FORCES OPERATING NEAR THE SVN/LAOTIAN BORDER. AS A RESULT OF THE TERMINATION OF OPERATION DEWEY CANYON, THE EXPANSION OF OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN/MAIN CRAG AND OPERATION MASS STRIKER, REQUEST THE BUFFER ZONES OUTLINED IN REFERENCE A & B BE CANCELLED AND NEW BUFFER ZONES AS INDICATED BELOW BE INITIATED. EFFECTIVE 2200K/20 MARCH. A. PURPLE MARTIN/MAINE CRAG. FROM LAOS/RVN

A-3

COC

PAGE 2 RUMLEPS 2614 S E C R E T
BORDER AT XD 656679 WESTWARD ALONG THE HOVA NAM O RIVER TO XD 610655 THENCE SOUTHWARD PARALLELING THE LAOS/SVN BORDER AT A DISTANCE OF 5 KMS TO XD 980 30 AND THENCE TO THE LAOS/SVN BORDER AT YD 010165.
B. MAS STRIKER. FROM THE RVN/LAOS BORDER AT YC 399860 TO YC 399810 AND PARALLELING THE BORDER AT A DISTANCE OF 5 KM TO YC 470720, THENCE EASTWARD TO INTERSECT THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONE SIERRA AT YC 526720

29

3

SECRET

SECRET

G-3 PLANS ROUTING

Plans Off (1) 187
File
Please [illegible] (2) 8
(3) ✓
(4)

IMMEDIATE 232130Z 2 JAN 68

FROM: CG THIRD MAR DIV FMF
TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHIL
INFO: CG III MAF DNG
CG 101ST ABN DIV CBG
CG 1ST MAW DNG
CG 1 ST ARVN DIV HUE
CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
//SECRET// 9TH MARINE REGT

P

(S) NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO CONDUCT MAJOR OPN [illegible]

A. FORO PO 3121.5 DTD 10 NOV 67
B. CG XXIV CORPS REG 525-1 OF 15 OCT 68
C. CG THIRD MAR DIV MSG 150230Z JAN 68

1. (U) PURSUANT TO REFERENCES (A), (B), AND (C) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED:

A. (S) OPERATION CODE NAME: DELAY CANYON

B. (S) BACKGROUND: THE OBJECTIVE AREA IS [illegible] AND LOGISTIC AREA FOR ENEMY PERSONNEL [illegible] THUA THIEN PROVINCE, AND QUANG NAM PROVINCE, [illegible] BASE AREA 611 IN LAOS, BASE AREA 101 SOUTHWEST OF QUANG TRI AND [illegible] OF HUE. HEAVY VEHICULAR TRAFFIC HAS BEEN RECORDED ALONG ROUTE 548 IN THE [illegible] PORTION OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA. A MAJOR ENGINEERING EFFORT IS ALSO [illegible] AREA, PARTICULARLY IN THE VICINITY OF TIGER MOUNTAIN (YD 055930). FINALLY, ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE INCIDENTS HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS.

C. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION WILL CONDUCT OPERATION DELAY CANYON AS A PHASED OPERATION.

PHASE 1: WITH FSB TUN TAVARO (YD [illegible]) [illegible] (YD 106268) WILL BE OPENED ON D-1 AND EXPANDED TO ACCOMMODATE A BATTALION [illegible]

10

SECRET

PHASE II: ENCOMPASSES THE [illegible] ASSAULT OF ONE [illegible] CONSTRUCTION, AND OCCUPATION OF A [illegible] WITHIN [illegible] SHIELD.

PHASE III: INCLUDES THE ASSAULT OF ONE INFANTRY [illegible], CONSTRUCTION AND OCCUPATION OF AN FSB [illegible] OF THE PHASE II FSB, [illegible] MENT OF THE NINTH MARINE REGIMENTAL COMMAND POST WITH ASSOCIATED [illegible] SUPPORTING ARTILLERY BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.

PHASE IV: INCLUDES THE ASSAULT OF ONE INFANTRY BATTALION [illegible] CONSTRUCTION AND OCCUPATION OF AN [illegible] OF THE PHASE II FSB.

PHASES II, III, AND IV WILL BE [illegible] AGGRESSIVE [illegible] OPERATIONS TO KILL, CAPTURE, [illegible] THE [illegible] FACILITIES.

E. (S) [illegible] ORGANIZATION:

THIRD MAR DIV

9TH MARINE REGT ([illegible])

1ST BN (REIN)

2ND BN (REIN)

3RD BN (REIN)

2ND BN, 12TH MARINES (REIN)

CO C, 3RD ENGR BN

F. (S) THE DEWEY CANYON AO IS BOUNDED TACTICALLY ON THE [illegible] BY THE [illegible] WEST GRID LINE, ON THE WEST AND SOUTH BY THE LAOTIAN BORDER, [illegible] THE TIONG RIVER, THE QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN BOUNDARY, AND THE [illegible] OF THE [illegible] CONG MICI ~~RIVER~~ FLOWS SOUTH TO THE LAOTIAN BORDER.

F. D-DAY 22 JAN 1969

G. ESTIMATED DURATION: 21 DAYS

SECRET

SECRET

(320)

''''ZZ
DE HUMSOD 1241 062 0149
ZDY SSSSS
P 251149Z MAR 69 TOA/0630/KFH
FM THIRD MARDIV CUC DGH
TO FOURTH MARINES FSC
AMPHIBIAN FSC
BT
S E C R E T L I M D I S
ARCLIGHT

1. THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIONS HAS BEEN MADE ON TOT FOR QT 8464.
THE CORRECT TOT IS 251155H MAR 69.
GP-4
BT
1241

SECRET

321

DRAFTED BY: WWB/RKR
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWO

PRIORITY 230344 Z MAR69

COPY TO: G-2
G-3
RECON REP
FSC
COC
CIC
TIO

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG TF HOTEL
INFO: THIRD MARINES
FOURTH MARINES
NINTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH ARTY GRP
FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES
SECOND BN, TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD BN, TWELFTH MARINES
FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MARINES
FIRST BN, FORTIETH ARTY
FIFTH BN, FOURTH ARTY
FIRST BN, SEVENTY-SEVENTH ARMORED
FIRST BN, ELEVENTH INF
THIRD RECON BN
THIRD BN, FOURTH MARINES
FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES
THIRD SQUADRON, FIFTH MECH

S E C R E T

SENSOR ACTIVITY BULLETIN, PERIOD ENDING 24.00 23 MAR 69 (U)

A. MAY 170020Z MAR69

1. (S) ADD FOL TO REF A:

STRING	CH/TONE CODE	KILL ZONE	TGT #	READOUT SITE	TYPE TERRAIN
64223	08/11,12,13,14	XD70804965 XD71464945	SD0223 SD1223	BAT CAT & HILL 950	OPEN, EL GRASS
64227	08/05,06,07,08	XD70324495 XD71264538	SD0227 SD1227	BAT CAT & HILL 950	OPEN, EL GRASS
64226	26/06,08,11,21	XD69964690 XD70764660	SD0226 SD1226	BAT CAT & HILL 950	OPEN, EL GRASS
63142	26/24,25,26,27	XD68145276 XD67365326	SD0142 SD1142	BAT CAT & HILL 950	OPEN, EL GRASS

GP-4

CON 2-198 RELEASED BY [signature] TIME 1100 H MAR69

[illegible]

DE UUMSO 1199 0830405
ZNY CCCCC
O P 230495Z MAR 69
FM III MAF COC
TO UUMSOI/I CORPS TOC
UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
UUMSOG/FIRST MARDIV
UUMSOW/FIRST MAW OPNS
UUMSOR/SECOND ROKMC BDE
UUMSOA/AMERICAL DIV TOC
INFO UUMSOD/THIRD MARDIVH
UUMSJEA/ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV (AM)
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION TWO OF TWO
RPT'D.
(4) OPN IRON MOUNTAIN: 1 INCOMING INCIDENT AND 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 FRD KIA WND 4 FRD WIA (EVAC).
B. 2ND ARVN DIV/12TH DTA:
(1) RF/PF UNITS: 5 SMALL CONTACTS RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 19 EN KIA AND 7 WPNS CAPT'D WITH 6 FRD KIA AND 8 WIA.

PAGE TWO UUMSO 1199 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(2) 5 TH ARVN REGT: OPN QUYET THANG 096 CONT'D WITH 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1HEN KIA WITH NO FRD CAS RPT'D.
(3) QUYET THANG 95: 1/4 ACAT AND 1/5 BN ENGAGED AN USEF, RESULTING IN 19 EN KIA WITH 1 FRD KIAHAND 1 WIA. ELSEWHERE 1 SMALL CONTACT AND 3 BODY FINDS RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 45 EN KIA, 2 IWC AND 1 CSWC WITH 2 FRD KIA AND 1 WIA.
(4) DC 25 (A 2/6 CONTROLLED CLEARING OPN): COMMENCED AT 220800H. 2/6 AND 5/46 US CAV ARE COMMITTED IN AN AREA W OF BINH SON. CENTER OF MASS: BS5292.
6. (C) CAP UNITS: IN A DELAYED RPT 211630H, CAP 1-4-2 CONDUCTED A MORT PREPARATION (BS765349) 17 KMS NE OF QUANGHNGAI CITY AND SWEPT THE ARE IN RESPONSE TO US ARMY SIGHTINGS. HSAF WAS REC'D BY THE SWEEPING CAP AND A SECOND MORT MSN WAS FIRED. THEHSWEEP WAS THEN COMPLETED AGAINST LIGHT SAF. RESULTS: 9 EN KIA, 7 PW (WIA (EVAC)) WITH 1 CIV WOUNDED. CAP 1-1-4 WHILE CROSSING A RICE PADDY (BT265294) 5 KMS WSW OF

6

PAGE THREE UUMSO 11.9 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TAM KY REC'D SAF FROM 9 VC. PTL ASLT'D THE EN PSN
KILLING 4 VC AND CAPT'G 1 IW. WHILE RTN'G TO OHE CAP
CP PTL AGAIN REC'D SAF. MGHFIRE WAS RTN'D KILLING
2 VC. TOTAL RESULTS: 6 EN KIA, 2 DETS AND 2 IWC
WITH 1 PF KIA AND 2 PF'S, 1 KIT CARSON AND 1
SCOUT DOG WIA (EVAC). ELSEWHERE 5 SMALL CONTACTS
WERE RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 13 EN KIA, 9 PW, 3 DETS AND
6 IWC WITH 1 FRD KIA AND 8 WIA (4 EVAC).
7. (C) SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES: CBT OPNS IN ICTZ RE-
SULTED IN 162 EN KIA, 5 PW, 11 DETS AND 31 WPNS CAPT'D.
ARVN FORCES ACCT'D FOR 71 EN KIA, 3 PW AND 14 WPNS
CAPT'D; ARVN LOSSES WERE 8 KIA AND 14 WIA. US AND
FWMAF RPT'D A TOTAL OF 91 EN KIA, 2 PW, 11 DETS AND
17 WPNS CAPT'D; US AND FWMAF LOSSES WERE 17 KIA AND
L134 WIA (122 EVAC).
GP-4
BT
1199

(322)

FOR INFO/MARK

IAW DE WING NR W252

MAF 1 - ALL ADDEES

ZE EGWS
DE DWIS - W252W 0621800
ZNY SSSS
ZZ 231800Z MAR 69
FM FROM CCC
TO ISL DET CDC
FIRST MARDIV PCOC
THIRD MARDIV COC
CG YDEW CORPS
FT S E C R E T
FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING FIRE INCIDENTS FOR 23MARCH 69
1. FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING INTSUM 82-69. (U)
2. FOR THE PERIOD 230001H TO 232400H MARCH 1969. (U)
3. (S) (U)AIRCRAFT RECEIVING FIRE (IN COUNTRY) (C)
VMO-2: 231550H, OV10A (XC61074298), 1100FT AGL, LT SA AW
30CAL, NO HIT
550600H, OV10A, (YT0783546), 1100FT AGL,MOD SA AW,30 CAL,
.9 85
VMFA-542: 231235H, 89:10N, (XC8806311), 1700 FT AGL, INT AW
50CAL, NO HIT
220930Z-23N K(LATE REPORT), UNIE, (YD830653), 100FT AGL,
2.5 INT SA AW 30 CAL, NO HIT
231920H UNIE, (YD0EOTRUPLN APPCN FT AGL, LT AIRBURST,.9 85

S-E-C-R-E-T
HMM-161: 231240H, CH46D, (XD618628), 30 FT AGL INT SA
AW WEP CAL, HIT 1 ROUND COCKPIT, 1 KIA
HMM-165: 231415H, CH46D, (YT0195565), 500 FT AGL,IVGJINT SA
AW 30CAL, NO HIT
HML-167: 231400H, UNIE, (YT0516681), 500FT AGL, MOD SA
AW 30 CAL, NO HIT
HMM-265: 231300H, CH46A, (YD2526081), 40FT AGL,LT AW
30 CAL, NO HIT
HMM-364: 232025H, CH46D, (YT/079695), 1200 FT AGL, MOD AW
65CCAL, NO HIT
HMM-462: 231100H, CH P53A, (TD618595), 20 FT AGL, INT AW
TRICAL,RSCK50 CAL, B-40 ROCKETS, 13 HITS, 5 ROUNDS PASSCOMP, 1 ROUND
ENGINE COMP, 1 ROUND RIGHT WHEEL BRACKET, 6 SHRAPNEL HITS
TAIL , FORCED TO LAND WILL BE RECOVERED
230950H, CH53A, (XD6885710),50 FT AGL, MOD AW 50CAL,
NO HIT
230930H, CH54, (XD6740572), 100FT AGL, INT AW TP CAL,
18 HITS, 9 ROUNDS COCKPIT, 10 PASS COMP, 2 MAIN ROTOR,

8

PAGE THREE [illegible] S E C R E T

[illegible] POLICE, GAE, [illegible], 5000FT AGL, INT SA BP
[illegible] 1 R.T., 1 ROUND [illegible]
[illegible] 2204[illegible], [illegible] KMT [illegible]), 8000FT AGL, MOD SA
[illegible] BP INT
[illegible], GATE [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] 589655), 400 FT AGL,
[illegible] BP, NO INT
[illegible], FAO, [illegible], 200FT AGL, INT SA
[illegible] BP INT
AIRCRAFT REGISTERED TYPE RECAP (IN COUNTRY) (C)
NO OF FIRE INCIDENTS 10
NO OF AIRCRAFT HIT 10
AIRCRAFT RECEIVING FIRE (OUT OF COUNTRY) (S)
[illegible], [illegible], [illegible], 1000FT AGL, MOD
SA, 1 RTN, 1 ROUND [illegible]
UPA-[illegible] [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], 8000 FT AGL, MOD
[illegible] AIRBURST, NO INT
UPA-[illegible] [illegible], FAO, [illegible], 15,000 FT AGL,
INT [illegible] AIRBURSTS NO INT
AIRCRAFT RECEIVING FIRE RECAP (OUT OF COUNTRY) (S)
NO OF FIRE INCIDENTS [illegible]
NO OF AIRCRAFT HIT [illegible]

PAGE FOUR [illegible] S E C R E T

[illegible]
OTHER THAN FRAM A/C RECEIVING FIRE (IN COUNTRY) (C)
[illegible] FAO, [illegible], UNK, [illegible], 1500 FT AGL, LT AW
1 RET, 1 ROUND PASS COMP
[illegible], OHG, [illegible], 1400
[illegible] 15 -8), INT AW [illegible], 1
RET, 1 ROUND PASS COMP
[illegible], OHG, [illegible], 1500 FT AGL, LT SA, NO RET
AIRCRAFT RECEIVING FIRE RECAP (IN COUNTRY) (C)
NO OF INCIDENTS 20
NO OF AIRCRAFT HIT 20
&%-4
DT

DE DIV AND NR 629
V
OO UUMSK UUMSO
DE UUMSOD 1262 0821830
ZNY CCCCC
O 231830Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC
TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
BT

Tod 23 19 30 MAF 629

C O N FI D E NT IA L FINAL SEC OF TWO
2. 1/61 NO CONTACT
(C) 3/4 AT 231145H L/3/4 VIC 945654 OBS 2 NVA MOVING EAST TO WEST. FIRED 81MM MSN WITH UNK RES.
(3) 1/77 AT 211030H B/1/77 VIC 293466 BULL DOZER FROM 59TH ENG CO UNCOVERED 2 BUNKERS. INSIDE BNKS FND 1 M1 CARBINE 1 SKS RES 2 IWC
(4) 3/4 CAV AT 231650H 3/4 CAV CP VIC 055614 REC'D 2 RDS RPG FIRE. APC HIT SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE. RETURNED FIRE. RES 1 USA KIA, 4 USA WIA(M) 1 NVA KIA.
(5) A/4/12 CAV NO CONTACT
(6) 1ST AMTRAC BN AT 230315H 1 ST AMTRAC BN VIC 297747 RADAR AND STARLIGHT SCOPE SIGHTED 10-15 NVA IN TWO GROUPS
O

PAGE TWO UUMSOD 1262 C O N F I D E N TI A L
MOVING SOUTH, FIRED NGF, TANKS AND DUSTERS WITH 2 UNK RES
C. OTCB. AT 231200H PATROL FROM OTCB VIC 282552 CHECKING OUT AREA OF SEC EXPLOSION SUSTAINED 3 WIA(E) 2 MEN TRIPPED SFD, 1 MAN FELL IN PUNGI PIT. PATROL FND PALLET OF GREN'D, BELIVED TO HAVE BEEN DROPPED BY HELO. PALLET HAD BEEN BROKEN INTO. PATROL OBS 2 EN FLEEING WEST. FIRED

4.2 MORTAR MSN WITH UNK RES RES 3 WIA(E)
AT 231645 H OTCB VIC 260550 ENGAGED 2-3 VC WITH SAF. 2 VC WOUNDE AND CRAWLED AWAY PATROL IN PURSUIT TRIPPED SFD 3 WIA(E) SEARCH CONTINUING FOR VC. RES 3 WIA(E)
D. 3RD RECON BN. SEE 3RD RECON BN 24 HR SITREP. E. ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. SEE 12 TH MAR 24 HR SITREP.
FQ GENERAL. CLEAR WEATHER THROUGHOUT 3RD MARDIV AO ENHANC ED OFFENSIVE OPNS
G. RECAP OF OPERATIONS

	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D	LIST	SCOUT
UNIT	FT	SOD	PLT	FT	SOD	PLT	CO	POST	SNIPER
3RD MAR									
1/3	-------MAINE CRAG								
2/3	MAINE-------CRAG								

PAGE THREE UUMSOD 1262 C O N F I D E N TI A L

3/3	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4TH MAR									
1/4	-----PURPLE MARTIN								
2/4	D0	3	3	0	0	0	0	10	0
	N0	0	0	0	6	0	0	8	0
3/4	D0	3	3	0	0	0	0	9	2
	N0	0	0	0	9	0	0	7	1
9TH MAR									
1/9	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2/9	D0	7	1	0	0	0	0	3	5
	N0	1	0	0	7	0	0	11	0
3/9	D0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	2
	N0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
1ST BDE									
5TH INF									
1/11	D3	0	1	0	0	0	1	3	8
	N0	0	1	0	11	0	0	5	7
1/61	D0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

PAGE FOUR UUMSOD 1262 C O N F I D E N TI A L

0	N0	0	0	27	0	0	0	0	0
1/77	D0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0
	N0	3	1	0	3	0	0	0	0
3/5	D0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0
	N0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1ST MATRAC BN									
	D0	3	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
	N0	0	0	4	2	0	0	4	5
QTCBD	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	0
	D0	17	16	0	0	0	4	31	21
	N0	3	3	24	39	0	0	46	13
	T0	21	19	24	39	0	0	77	34

H. SMALL UNITS CONTACT.

PROVINCE COOR	DATE TIME	ACTION SIZE/TYPE	FR UNIT LOSSES	EN UNIT LOSSES	INIT BY US/VC
YD 297747	230315H	CO DEF	1ST AMTRAC	UNK	US
			NONE	UNK	
XD 945654	231145H	CO DEF	L/3/4	UNK	US
			NONE	UNK	
YD 282552	231200H	SEC PAT	QTCB	UNK	VC
			3 WIA(E)	UNK	

0

YD 055614	231630H	CO DEF	3/5 1 KIA,4 WIA	UNK 1 NVA KIA	VC
YD 260550	231645H	PLT COMBAT PATROL	QTCB 3 WIA(E)	UNK UNK	US
XD 818623	231700H	CO DEF	G/2/4 NONE	UNK UNK	VC
XD 818624	231735H	PLT COMBAT PATROL	G/2/4 5 WIA(E)	UNK UNK	US

IQ PACIFICATION SUPPORT
1. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC
INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.
A. A/1/9 CONDUCTS COMBINED OPNS WITH RD/PF/CIDG IN MAI LOC TOAR.
B. B/1/9 CONDUCTS COMBINED OPNS IN CAMLO.DISTRICT.
CQ TWO SQD OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.
D. 1ST BDE 5TH INF(MECH) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1 ST AND 2 ND ARVN REGT'S THROUGHOUT POPULATED COASTAL ARE.
2Q DIRECT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (PIOCC)BY 9TH MARINES, DGCB, QTCB, AND 1 ST BDE 5 TH INF (MECH)
3. TABULATION OF VILLAGE/ HAMLET C&S DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE
GP-4
BT
1262

SECRET

323

DRAFTER 3/RED/cgw
SEC COC PHONE 3180
CWO

IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY 232310 Z MAR 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV DCH
TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
9TH MARINE REGIMENT
INFO: XXIV CORPS PHB
III MAF DNG
THIRD MARDIV

//SECRET//

PASSAGE OF OPCON (U)

1. (S) EFFECTIVE 241600H MAR 69 CG THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON OF 9TH MARINE REGIMENT (REIN) FROM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL.

CP-4

CCH 2248 RELEASED BY [signature] DATE/TIME 240630 H MAR 69

COC STAND

323

SECRET

SECRET

ZNY SES
O 2416 MARCO
RMS CG [illegible] FORCE HAGEL
TO: ZEN [illegible] MARINES
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
INFO: CG THIRD MARINES
CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/NINTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
MAG ONE SIX
MAG THREE SIX
MAG THREE NINE
FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES
SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES
ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD RECON BN
ZEN/VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR
BT
S E C R E T
FMG ORDER 82-69
A. CG TASK FORCE HAGEL 201556Z MAR69
2416152MAR

82

8

0

PAGE TWO RUMSUP 82 S E C R E T
1. THIRD AND FOURTH MARINES [illegible] REF A.
2. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS [illegible]
FOR TASK FORCE HAGEL [illegible] PROCESSING PROCES
[illegible]

SECRET

BYN [illegible] PENTENNUPVK SWITZVA 0621T
RE RENMKT
DE RUHHLA 3230 0031116
DTY 00000
O R 231116Z MAR 69
FM CG FIRST MARDIV DNG RVN
TO RHMCSFL/CG III MAF DNG RVN
INFO RUHMUP/CG THIRD MARDIV DNG RVN
RUHBQL/CG OCONN MAD
RUHLMPA/CG FORLOGSUP DNG RVN
FIRST MARDIV 00000
RUHLMPA/FLSG ALPHA DNG RVN
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
III MAF G-3 MISC
MB 31124M JUL 65
GSB AND CP LOG RPT. 000
1. (C) INW TEN A FOL RPT IS SUBS
A. CH CNTL CO. FOL UNIT AS OF 231400H MAR 69

UNIT	CONTROL
SLT 3/26	7TH MAR

BT
NT
3230

24116 Encl

C-3

PIS

CONFIDENTIAL

MAJ DeForest

3d Mar Div Msg

ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1276 0831215
ZNY CCCCC
Z 241215Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJ: MAINE CRAG INCREMENTAL CACHE REPORT NR 1 (C)
1. RICE 600 TONS (APPROX)
   SALT 1/2 TON
   SUGAR 7500 LBS
   LARD 100 LBS
   CAN FOOD 1 TON
   POWDERED MILK 1 TON
2. INT 1150 LBS
   COMM WIRE 600 METERS
   AT MINES 1
   CHI COMM GRENADES 8
   AK MAGAZINES 400
3. TRUCKS 3 (1 6X6 RUSSIAN, 1 FRENCH, AND 1 FLAT BED)
4. 122 MM RKT RDS 44
   82MM MORTAR RDS 4083
   RPG RDS 3000

TOD/241335/24/812

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1276 C O N F I D E N T I A L
   SMALL ARMS AMMO 183,280 RDS
   12.7 MM AMMO 5,000 RDS
5. IWC 289 (10 AK 50, 199 AK 47)
   [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

XXIV Corps Msg

SUMSGD
DUMSK 1450 0331625
ZHY CCCCC
Z 241555Z MAR 69
FM XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
TO DUMSG/III MAF COC DNG
UHMS/MACV CMD CTR SGN
3RD/3D MAR DIV CCC DGN
BT

Tor/241656 24/473

C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJ: MAINE CRAG CACHE RPT
1. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF CACHE FINDINGS IN OPERATION MAINE CRAG FOR PERIOD 22-24 MAR 69.
RICE 600 TONS(APPROX)
SALT 1000 LBS
SUGAR 7,500 LBS
LARD 160 LBS
CANNED FOOD 1 TON
POWDERED MILK 1TON
TNT 1,150 LBS
COMMO WIRE 600 METERS
TRUCKS 3 (1 RUSSIAN G/6, 1 FRENCH, 1 FLATBED)

PAGE TWO DUMSK 1452 C O N F I D E N T I A L
122 MM RKTS RDS 44
82MM MORT RDS 4,083
RPG RDS 3,000
SMALL ARMS 103, 280 RDS
12.7MM AMMO 5,000 RDS
EWC 289 (10 AK-50, 199 AK-47) 119 PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN PARA 3, THIRD MAR DIV COC MSG DTG 222200Z MAR 69, MAINE CRAG SITREP 36.
CSWC 2
SP-4
BT

SECRET NOFORN

324

DRAFTED BY: MAS/RKR
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWO

IMMEDIATE 250130 Z MAR69

COPY TO: G-2
G-3
RECON REP
FSC
CIC
TIO

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN
TO: CG III MAF, DNG, RVN
INFO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN
CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN
CG FORLOGCMD, DNG, RVN
CG FIRST MAW, DNG, RVN
CG TF HOTEL, VCB, RVN
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
CG TF ALPHA, NKP, THAI
CG FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THIRD RECON WING, KORAT, THAI
FOURTH MARINES
THIRD MARINES
NINTH MARINES

SECRET/NOFORN

DUFFEL BAG/DUEL BLADE OPREP-5 SER NO 012/18-24 MAR 69 (U)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

SECTION I. FOL DUFFEL BAG REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: NO TARGETS WERE ACQUIRED BY DUFFEL BAG SENSORS THIS WEEK. STRINGS 140 AND 141 LOCATED IN MAI LOC TAOR EXPIRED.

STRINGS 306, 307, AND 308 WERE EMPLACED ALONG THE APPROACHES TO QUANG TRI CITY TO PROVIDE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DETECTION. FOUR

UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO CLANDESTINELY INSERT STRINGS IN THE BA LONG VALLEY WERE ENCOUNTERED.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: A NEW READOUT SITE WAS ESTABLISHED AT SIGNAL HILL, VCB TO READ OUT PLANNED SENSOR EMPLACEMENTS IN THE BA

LONG VALLEY. ONE INSERT MISSION WAS ABORTED BECAUSE TWO GSIDS WERE NOT FUNCTIONING WHEN EMPLACEMENT ATTEMPTED. SECOND MISSION

ABORTED WHEN SENSOR EMPLACEMENT MAN INJURED ON INSERT AND REQUIRED MED EVAC. THIRD MISSION EXPERIENCED COMM DIFFICULTIES WITH READOUT

SITE SO TEAM MOVED TOWARD VICINITY OF YD097423 WHEN THEY ENCOUNTERED TWO VC. TM INITIATED SAF RESULTING IN 1 KIA AND ONE FEMALE WIA.

THREE MORE NVA/VC APPEARED, TM FIRED CLAYMORE RESULTING IN 3 ADDTL KIA. TM MOVED TO LZ AND ENCOUNTERED 1 MORE NVA/VC, TM INIATED SAF

GSV

2/3/ RECON REP

SECRET

RESULTING IN 1 KIA. WIA LATER DIED. FOURTH EMPLACEMENT MISSION ENCOUNTERED 7 NVA/VC VICINITY YD072420. TM SET UP AMBUSH AND

INITIATED SAF RESULTING IN 5 KIA. OVERALL RESULTS OF ALL CONTACTS WAS 11 EN KIA (C) AND 3 FRNDLY WIA (M). CAPTURED EN EQUIP WAS

1/AK-47, 2 PACKS, 20 LBS RICE AND MISC GEAR.

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS: NONE DISCERNED.

B. INFLUENCE ON OPS: PLANS UNDERWAY TO SWEEP BA LONG VALLEY AS SOON AS TACT SITUATION PERMITS IN VIEW OF MANY EN ENCOUNTERED

DURING EMPLACEMENT MISSIONS.

C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUE: NONE

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS:

(1) TRAINING: NONE

(2) EMPLACEMENT: EN CONTACTS AND INJURY PREVENTED FOUR EMPLACEMENTS.

(3) READOUT VALIDITY: NONE

(4) RFI: NONE

(5) SERVICEABILITY: TWO GSIDS DID NOT OPERATE AFTER REACHING EMPLACEMENT SITE ALTHOUGH MINISIDS DID. IT APPEARS

GSID MAY BE MUCH MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO DAMAGE WHEN TRAVERSING OVER ROUGH TERRAIN, SINCE ALL ITEMS CHECKED OUT 5-BY PRIOR TO DEPARTING

FOR EMPLACEMENT SITE.

3. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: NINE

4. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE SENSOR: 12 HANDSID; 11 MINIHANDSID; 8 MAGIDS; 3 GSIDS; 2 PIRIDS.

5. (S) ONE XM63 TRANSMITTER AND 4 XM63 RECEIVERS PRESENTLY BEING EMPLOYED BY 1ST BN, 11TH INFANTRY SCOUT SNIPER TEAMS. RESULTS

HAVE NOT BEEN OBTAINED TO THIS DATE.

SECTION II. FOL DUEL BLADE REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: SINCE LAST OPREP 7 TFA STRINGS AND TWO HAND EMPLACED STRINGS WERE RESEEDED IN DUEL BLADE AREA. PREVIOUSLY

DECEASED STRING 115 CAME BACK TO LIFE FOR A PERIOD OF 3 DAYS AND ACQUIRED 12 TARGETS. STRINGS 119 AND 111 IN THE EAST-CENTRAL

PORTION OF DMZ BORDER WERE ESPECIALLY ACTIVE WITH 39 TGTS ACQUIRED. ONE ARTY MSN ON LATTER TGT RESULTED IN ONE SECONDARY EXPLOSION. STRING

111 ALSO DETECTED TWO GRPS OF 350 AND 70 EN WITH ONE AIR STRIKE AND ONE MECHANIZED SWEEP WITH NEG BDA. THESE HIGH READINGS HAVE BEEN

FULLY VALIDATED BY SUBSEQUENT HEAVY EN CONTACTS IN 4TH MARINES AND 1ST BDE, 5TH INF (MECH) AO. TWO RECENTLY ACTIVATED DIV GRND

SURV TMS EQUIPPED WITH DUEL BLADE PPS-5, TVS-4, AND MSS-3 WERE ESPECIALLY VALUABLE IN DETECTING THREE EN THRUSTS AT A-4 AND C-2.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: IN ARVN AO SIX TGTS WERE ACQUIRED WITH STRING 102 ACCOUNTING FOR 5 OF THE TGTS IN WHICH 600 RDS OF ARTY

AND NGF WERE FIRED IN RESPONSE. TFA SEEDED STRING 211 HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY VALUABLE IN PROVIDING SECURITY TO FSB ALPINE WITH 11

TGTS ACQUIRED. ELSEWHERE IN DUEL BLADE AREA 87 TGTS WERE ACQUIRED WITH 1345 RDS MIXED ARTY, MTRS AND DUSTERS FIRED IN RESPONSE.

OTHER THAN ONE PREV MENTIONED SECONDARY EXPLOSION ALL WERE NEG BDA. TWO NVA KIA (C) WERE CREDITED TO NOW DECEASED STRING 114 WHEN

EMPLACEMENT TM SWEPT AREA FOR RESEEDING AND FOUND TWO EN BODIES IN KILL ZONE THAT WERE KILLED BY ARTY APPROX 2 WEEKS AGO. NOD

ACQUIRED TWO NVA CARRYING WHAT APPEARED TO BE RPG, 81MM MSN CALLED RESULTING IN 2 NVA KIA (C).

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS: EN CONTINUES TO BE DETECTED IN INFILTRATIONS AND PROBINGS BY SENSORS AND SURVEILLANCE DEVICES.

B. INFLUENCE ON OPERATIONS: INCREASED FRNDLY OPS IN AREAS OF HIGH SENSOR ACTIVITY HAVE CONTINUED TO MEET HEAVY EN CONTACTS,

ESPECIALLY IN CENTRAL AND NORTHWESTERN PORTIONS OF DIV AO SOUTH OF DMZ.

C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES: NONE

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS: NONE

3. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: 17 HANDSID/GSID/PIRID/MAGID; 9 ADSID; 2 ACOUBUOY.

4. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE SENSORS: 34 MINI/HANDSIDS; 9 GISDS; 37 ADSIDS; 13 MAGIDS; 2 PIRIDS; 11 ACOUBUOYS.

5. (S) ACTIVE TFA CH-23 TONE CODES 16 THRU 19, 07 THRU 09, 11.
ACTIVE 3D MARDIV CH-23 TONE CODES 03,04,08.

GP-4

CON 1351 RELEASED BY [signature] TIME 0920H MAR69

CONFIDENTIAL

SHOVE COC
OP CHIEF
G-3 W.O.
G-2 W.O.
DOPO
PO
ACTION

00 RUMHVP RUMLBPN
DE RUMLBPBM #1259 0840330
ZNY CCCCC
O 250332 MAR 69
FM CO 1ST INF BDE 5TH INF DIV (M) QTR RA
TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV

INFO RUMLBPN/CG XXIV CORPS
ZEN/CO 1-11 INF
ZEN/CO 1-61 INF
ZEN/CO 1-77 ARMOR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L CITE 1774 AVBL-B 3D MAR DIV ATTN:G-2
SUBJ: SUMMARY OF ENEMY CONTACT ON 241030H MAR 69.
1. CONTACT WAS INITIATED AT 241030H MAR 69 VIC YD047624 AGAINST AN ENEMY COMPANY DUGIN VIC YD045623 AND YD041616. AT 241115H MAR A BUNKER

COMPLED OCCUPIED BY AN ESTIMATED ENEMY PLATOON WAS SIGHTED VIC YD059 632. BUNKERS WERE ALSO SEEN VIC YD050615. ENEMY TROOPS EMPLOYED SMALL ARMS AND RPG FIRE AGAINST THE 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV. USMC GUNSHIPS RECEIVED HEAVY GROUND FIRE WHILE IN SPECTING A LZ AT YD038628. FIRE RECIVED WAS 50 CAL FROM THE EAST. TWO TRACK VEHICLES (1 TANK - 1 VTR) STRUVK MINES VIC YD070619 AT 241850H MAR RESULTING IN 7 FR WIA (E). THE ENEMY

MAINTAINED CONTACT UNTIL 241730H MAR AT WHICH TIME ENEMY FIRE CEASED.
2. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE 3D SQDN, 5TH CAV IS IN CONTACT WITH AN

ENEMY BATTALION DUE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF 2 SEPARATE MANEUVER ELEMENTS NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE VALLEY MOUTH. ALSO, THE RECEIVING OF 50 CAL MG FIRE FROM AN LZ VIC YD038623. APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY WAS DEFENDING THE MOUTH OF THE VALLEY TO PROTECT SOMETHING OF PRIME IMPORTANCE - PLSSIBLY A REGIMENTAL HQ. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE ENEMY ELEMENT IS A BN OF THE 27TH NVA REGT SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO OPERATE IN THIS AREA.
3. CONTACT WAS RESUMED AT 250930H MAR VIC YD047635 WHEN 20 ENEMY WERE SIGHTED AND ENGAGED.
RESULTS AS OF 251000H MAR: FRIENDLY - 1 KIA, 13 WIA
ENEMY - 14 KIA (CONFIRMED)

GP-4
BT
#1259

76

CONFIDENTIAL

UU UUMSK UUMSJEA
DE UUMSO 1616 0340545
ZNY CCCCC
O P 2505457 MAR 69 TOR/0650 \111 MAF
FM IIP MAF COC
TO UUMSOI/I CORPS TOC
UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
UUMUOG/FIRSO MARDIV
UUMSOW/FIRST MAW OPNS
UUMSOR/SECOND ROKMC BDE
UUMSOA/AMERICAL DIV TOC
INYO UUMSOD/THIRD MARDIV
UUMSJEA/ONE ZERO.ONE ABN DIV (AM)
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L FPNAL UECTION OF TWOHSECTIONU
1/5TH REGT AND A RECON W/5TH REGT) ON OPN OT 25 KND
NUMEROUS EN CAS VIC BU627634 5HKMS SSW OK QUANG NGAI
CITY. CAU WERE ATTRIBUTED TO SPOOKY WHICH HAD BEEN
WORKING OUT IN THE AREA. TOTAL FIND: 63 EN KIW, 2
PWHAND 6 IWC. ELYEWHERE 1 UMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM
TOTALS: 91 EN KIA, 2 PW, AND 6 IWC WITH 6 KRD KIA
AND 16 WIA.
(4) DI 25: CONT'D WITH 1 SMALL CONTACT

PAGE TWO.UUMUO 1616 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 2 EN KIA AND 2 IWC WITH NO FRD
CAS RPT'D.
(5) HO/OT/700, A QUANG TIN SECTOR CONTROLLED
ROAD CLEARING OPNS ALONG THE ROAD BETWEEN TAM KY AHD
TIEN PHUOC COMMENCED AT 250700H. 1/6 AND 1/46 RK
ARE COMMITTED ALONG THE ROAD KOR 1 DAY.
6. (C) CAP UNITU: A PLT KROM CAP 1-3-5 OBU 16 NVA
IN KHAKI UNIFORMS (BS704966& 11 KMS NE OF BINH UON.
THE PTL OPENED FIRE, CALLED ARTY AND UWEPT THE AREA.
DURING THE SWEEP THE PLTHAGAIN REC'D SAF AND CALLED
ON FIRE SPT FROM SWIKTROATU. RESULTS: 7HEN KIA AND
1 IWC 35 ,9 14$:-7 4@5'D. ELSEWHERE 1 INCOMING
INCIDENT AND 6HSMALL CONTACTS WERE RPT'D. CUM
TOTALS: 1? EN KIA, 1 PW, 1 DET AND 1 IWC WITH 1 KRD
KIAHAND 4 WIA (2 EVAC).
7. (C& SUMMARY OF CAUUALTIES: CBT OPNS IN ICTZ RE-
SULTED IN 112 EN KIA, [illegible] PW, 17HDETS AND 122 WPNS
CAPT'D. ARVN FORCEU W[illegible]'D FOR 21 EN KIA, AND 15 WPNU
CAPT'D. ARVN LOSSEU WE[illegible]E 1 KIA AND 29 WIA. US AND
FWMAF RPT'D A TOTAL OF 91 EN KIA, 2 PW, 17 DETU AND

PAGE THREE UUMUO 1611 C O N F I D E N T I A L
107 WPNS CAPT'D; US AND FWMAF LOSSEU WERE 14 KIA AND
84 WIA (67 EVAC).
GP-4
BT
1616

COM TOTALS: 9 ENPKIA, 3 IWC AND 2 CSWC WITH 3 FRD WIA.

3. (C) THUA THIEN PROVINCE:

A. 101ST ABN DIV(AM): W/1/502 INF WHILE ON A SEARCH AND CLEAR MSN (YC504973) 3 KMS SW OF FSB VESHEL, FND 7 EN BODIES APPARENTLY KILLED BY ARTY. ELSEWHERE 2 SMALL CONTACTS, 2 BODY/WPN FINDS AND 2 HELO INCIDENTS RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 13 EN KIA AND 4 IWC WITH 4 FRD KIA AND 4 WIA (EVAC).

B. 1ST ARVN DIV/11TH DTA:

(1) 1ST ARVN REGT: OPN LAM SON 261 CONT'D WITH 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 2 EN KIA AND 2 IWC WITH NO FRD CAS RPT'D.

(2) 3RD ARVN REGT: OPN LAM SON 265 CONT'D WITH 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 EN KIA AND 1 IWC WITH NO FRD CAS RPT'D.

(3) 54TH ARVN REGT: OPN LAM SON 245 CONT'D WITH 1 WPN FIND RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 MG CAPT'D.

(4) 7TH ARVN CAV REGT: OPN LAM SON 272 CONT'D WITH 1 MINE INCIDENT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 4

FRD WIA.

(5) RF/PFHUNITS: NO CONTACT OR CAY RPT'D.

4. (C) QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND BORDERING AREA W OF HAI VAN PASS.

A. 1ST MARDIV: CUM TOTALS: 14 EN KIA, 1 PW, 16 DETS AND 2 IWC WITH 1 FRD KIA AND 14 WIA (11 EVAC).

(1) DANANG TAOR: YANANG AIR BASE REC'D 15X140MM RKTS RESULTING IN DEST OF FUEL BLADDER AND JP-4 LINE, MODERATE DAMHTO PARA LOFT AND MINOR DAM TO ONE JEEP. THERE WAS 1 US WIA (MINOR) ELSEWHERE 2 OTHER INCOMING INCIDENTS, 5 MINE INCIDENTS, 16 SMALL CONTACTS, 1 RECON FIND AND 1 WPN FIND RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 14 EN KIA, 1 PW, 16 DETS AND 2 IWC WITH 1 FRD KIA AND 14 WIA (11 EVAC).

B. ARVN OPNS:

(1) RF/PF UNITS: 1 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 1 FRD WIA.

(2) 1ST ARVN RGR REGT: OPN LE LOI IV HAF 0 SMALL CONTACT RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 3 EN KIA AND 1 IWC WITH 3 FRD WIA.

(3) HUNG QUANG 1-07 CONT'D WITH NO CONTACT OR
CAS RPT'D.
C. 2ND ROKMC BDE: NO CONTACT OR CAS RPT'D.
5. (C) QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES:
A. AMERICAL DIV: CUM TOTALS: 42 EN KIA WITH
" FRD KIA AND 36 WIA (27 EVAC).
(1) OPN FREDERICK HILL: 1 INCOMING INCIDENT,
2 MINE INCIDENTS AND 6 YMALL CONTACTS WERE RPT'D.
CUM TOTALS: 9 EN KIAHWITH 1 FRD KIA AND 8 WIA (EVAC&.
(2) OPN GENEVA PARK: A BTRY,
3/18TH ARTY IN SPT OF CIDG PTL, ENGAGED 100 VC IN
BASE CAMP AREA (BS267866) 8 KMS WSW OF TRA BONG.
RESULOS: 10 EN KIA WITHH1 US WIA (EVAC) (FO).
ELSEWHERE 2 INCOMING INCIDENTS AND 1 YMALL CONTACT
RPT'D. CUM TOTALS: 11 EN KIA WITH 1 FRD KIA AND 6
WIA (EVAC).
(3) OPN RUSSELL BEACH: 1 MINE INCIYENT RPT'D.
CUM TOTALS: 1 FRD KIA AND 2 WIA (EVAC).
(4) OPN IRON MOUNTAIN: TRA BONG DET A/107
ON A CO SIZE CIDG OPN, WAS AMBUSHED BY 2 VC PLTS

(BS275863) 7 KMS WSW OF TRA BONG. THE CIDG ASLT'D
THE EN PSNS. RESULTS: 19 EN KIA WITH 1 CIDG KIA,
4 CIDG WIA (EVAC) AND 3 US WIA (1 EVAC). A/4/21
INF REC'D 4U AWF FROM 3 EN BUNKERS (BS525752) 13
KMS WNW OF QUANG NGAI CITY. GUNSHIPS WORKED THE
BUNKERS OVER AND A SWEEP WAS MADE FINDING 5 DEAD
NVA. AT 1720H, E/1 CAV AND RECON 4/21 REC'D AWF
ZUSTAINING 9 WIA (3 EVAC). OVEL THE NEXT 3 HRS
A/4/21 INF WHILE IN HNDP REC'D 28X82MM MORT RDS,
RESULTING IN 6 FRD WIA (3 EVAC). TOTALS: 5 ENHKIA
WITH 15 FRD WPA (6 EVAC). ELSEWHERE 1 PNCOMING
INCIDENT, " MINE INCIDENTS AND 3 SMALL CONTACTS RPT'D.
B. 2ND ARVN DIV/12TH DTA:
(1) RF/PF UNITS: 3 SMALL CONTACTS RPT'D.
CUM TOTALS: 9 EN KIA AND 3 WPNS CAPT'D WITH 1 FRD
KIA AND 11 WIA.
(2) 5TH ARVN REGT: OPN QUYET THANG 806
CONT'D WITH NO CONTACT OR CAS RPT'D.
(3) QUYET THANG 25: ARVN UNITS (1/4 ACAT,
GP24
BT
1615

LNNHN

325

DRAFTER 15:DCM:SLQ
SEC DIV ENGR PHONE DGH 3215
CWO Dwg

PRIORITY 250648Z MARCH 1969

FM: CG, THIRD MARDIV DGH
TO: COMNAVFORV REP ING
INFO: III MAF ING

S E C R E T

FY 71 MILITARY CONST PROGRAM FOR THIRD MARDIV (U)

A. III MAF MSG 100840Z MAR69 (U)

1. IAW REF A. THE FOLL REQUIREMENTS ARE SUB:

A. HILLETING REQUIREMENTS FOR QTCB

(1) 16'X32' SEAHUTS FOR QTCB
(2) CONSTRUCT 405 SEAHUTS FOR HILLETING TO REPLACE EXISTING FAC

(3) CAT CODE: 722
(4) SCOPE: 405 SEAHUTS (16'X32')

(5) UNIT OF MEASURE: 207,360 SQ FT
(6) EST COST: $293,919

(7) JUSTIFICATION: AT THE TIME FY 71 PROGRAM WILL GO INTO EFFECT, IT IS DEEMED NECESSARY THAT 405 SEAHUTS WILL BE REQUIRED TO BE REPLACED DUE TO AGE OF STRUCTURE AND ENVIRENMENTAL CONDITIONS CAUSING DETERIORATION.

B. HILLETING REQUIREMENTS FOR DONG HA COMBAT BASE

(1) 16'X32' SEAHUTS FOR DHCB
(2) CONSTRUCT 670 SEAHUTS FOR HILLETING TO REPLACE EXISTING FAC

(3) CAT CODE: 722
(4) SCOPE: 670 SEAHUTS (16'X32')

(5) UNIT OF MEASURE: 343,040 SQ FT
(6) EST COST: $486,286

(7) JUST: SEAHUTS REQUIRED TO REPLACE FIELD STANDARDS WHICH HAVE DETERIORATED DUE TO ENVIRENMENTAL CONDITIONS.

ENGR

12 Dwg

C. MESSHALLS AT QTCB AND DHCB

(1) 500 AND 250 MAN MESSHALLS AT DHCB AND QTCB
(2) CONSTRUCT (2) 500 MAN MESSHALLS AT QTCB, (2) 500 MAN MESSHALLS AT DHCB, (3) 250 MAN MESSHALLS AT QTCB, AND (2) 250 MAN MESSHALLS AT DHCB

(3) CAT CODE: 723
(4) SCOPE: (4) 500 MAN MESSHALLS AND (5) 250 MAN MESSHALLS

(5) EST COST: UNKNOWN
(6) JUST: MESSHALLS REQUIRED TO REPLACE FIELD STANDARDS WHICH HAVE DETERIORATED DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.

CON 2424 REL BY JR Lilley TIME

VV
OO UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1305 0841130
ZNY CCCCC
O 251130Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TO C
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
MAINE CRAG CUMULATIVE CACHE REPORT NUMBER 2
1. CUMULATIVE CACHE STATISTICS AS OF 251800H MAR 69
A. RICE 1000TONS
SALT 7000 LBS
SUGAR 7500LBS
LARD 100 LBS
CAN FOOD 1 TON
POWDERED MILK 1 TON
B. TNT 1190 LB
COMM WIRE 600 METERS
AT MINES 1
CHI COMM GRENADES 8
AK MAGZINES 409
CLAYMORES 11

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1305 C O N F I D E N T I A L
FUZES 75
CLOTHES 40 SMALL BUNDLES
PLASTIC WRAPPING 2 ROLLS
PACKS 25
GAS MASKS 3
E-TOOLS 2
C. TURCKS 3
D. 122MM RKT RDS 44

82MM MORTAR RDS 592
60MM MORTAR RDS 143
RPG-2 RDS 3003
12.7MM AMMO 7500
SMALL ARMS AMMO 103,280
37MM RDS 8
D. IWC 209
CSWC 13(INCLUDES 6 RPG'S)
F. NOTE 82MM AMMO IN PARAGRAPH D. FIGURE IN REPORT NO 1
SHOULD HAVE BEEN 483 VIC 4083. FIGURE OF 592 IS CORRECT FOR THIS REPORT.
GP-4
BT
1305

FOR INFO

FM UUMSQ UUMS UUMSQD
DE UUMSK 1476 [illegible]
TNY CCCCC
O 251423Z MAR 68
FM XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
INFO UUMS/NACV CMD CTR SGN
UUMSQD/ 3D MAR DIV COC DGN
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJ: NAINE CRAG CACHE RPT.
1.(C) CUMULATIVE STATISTICS OF CACHE FINDINGS IN OPERATION MAINE
CRAG AS OF 251800H MAR 68:
RICE 1000 TONS (APPROX)
SALT 7806 LBS
SUGAR 7500 LBS
LARD 100 LBS
DRY FOOD 1 TON
POWDERED MILK 1 TON
FLOUR 1990 LBS
COAX WIRE GOP METERS
AT MINES 4
CHICOM GRENADES 8
AK MAG 4PS

PAGE TWO UUMSK 1476 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CLAYMORES 11
FUZES 75
CLOTHING 40 SMALL BUNDLES
PLASTIC WRAPPING 2 ROLLS
PACKS 25
GAS MASKS 7
E-TOOLS 2
TRUCKS 3 (1 6X6 RUSSIAN, 1 FRENCH, AND 1 FLATBED)
122MM RKT RDS 44
82MM MORTAR RFS 592
60MM MORTAR RFS 143
RPG-2 RFS 3083
12.7MM AMMO 7500
SMALL ARMS AMMO 103,280
37MM RFS 8
TWS 209
CSWC 13 (INCLUDES 6 RPG'S)
2.(C) 82MM MORT AMMO IN PARAGRAPH 1, XXIV CORPS TOC MSG DTG
241533Z MAR 68, SHOULD HAVE BEEN 483 VICE 4,083. FIGURE OF 592 IN
PARA 1 ABOVE IS CORRECT AS OF THIS RPT. GP/4
BT
1476

43

#4

COC

Lets get WG-2 and have G-2 check figures

NNNN
OSL AT 1738
KKKILOZCZCEAA495
OO UUMSK
DE UUMSO 1638 0341645
ZNY CCCCC
O 251645Z MAR 69
FM III MAF COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS COC
INFO UUMSOD/THRID MARDIV COC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L/WIRENOTE
STATISTICAL DATA FOR OPERATION DEWEY CANYON (U)
A. XXIV CORPS FINAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY SUBMITTED TO III MAF (G-2) ON OPERATION DEWEY CANYON.
B. STATISTICAL RECAP FOR OPERATION DEWEY CANYON PREPARED BY CAPT T. H. MEEKER (3RD MARDIV FACT SHEET).
1. (C) PERCEPTIBLE DISPARITIES EXIST BETWEEN REFERENCES A AND B ON FOLLOWING ITEMS:

REF A REPORTED	ITEM	REF B REPORTED
138[illegible]	EN KIA	16[illegible]7
[illegible]	POW	6
15	DET	8
1126	IWC	1227
226	CSWC	244

FOLLOWING AMMO

PAGE TWO UUMSO 1638 C O N F I D E N T I A L/WIRENOTE

6533	.50 CAL	175983
69641	12.7MM	65126
19474	82MM MTR	23281
5982	120MM MTR	4983
1408	122MM ARTY	7298
328	122MM RKT	770
5	CLAYMORE MINES	444
3321 LBS	EXPLOSIVES	1910-1/2 LBS
34164	HAND GRENADES	50283
132691 LBS	RICE	220800 LBS
13	TRUCKS(CAPTR/DEST)	77

2. (C) IT IS FURTHER NOTED THAT THE TYPES OF IWC AND CSWC ARE INCONGRUOUS IN THE REFERENCES.
3. (C) IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU RECONCILE THE DIFFERENCES CITED HEREIN AND PROVIDE THIS HEADQUARTERS WITH CORRECT FIGURES AT THE EARLIEST.
GP-4
BT
1638

4

GC UUMSQ UUMSSJA UUMSQD UUMSJVA RUHGUIN
DE UUMSK 1434 [illegible]
ZNR UUUUU
O 260135Z MAR 69 LFTS
RHTKIV CORPS TOC CP.
TO UUMSW/III MAF COC DBG
INFO UUMSEMA/SA 1ST ARVN DIV HUE
UUMSQD/3RD MAR DIV COC DGH
UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV DTOC CEE
RUHGUIN/CTG 70.8
BT
UNCLASSIFIED E F T O AVII-GC
SUBJ:FORCAST T OF OPS REPORT WEEK OF 30 MAR-5 APR [illegible]
REF: A. CG III MAF MSG DTG 160606Z JUN 68 (C).
B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 120910Z JUL 68 (C).
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, NEGATIVE REPORT IS SUBMITTED .PRESENT OP
CONTINUE IN XXIV CORP AO.
GP-4
BT
'48'

SECRET

326

DRAFTER 14/JMC/tel
SEC AIR 3d MARDIV 3214
CWO

IMMEDIATE 26 0400 Z MAR69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV DGH
TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
INFO: CG III MAF DNG

//SECRET//

SUBJ: M-121 REQUEST

1. REQUEST A M-121 DROP BE MADE ASAP. THE FOLLOWING INFO IS PROVIDED:
   A. XD79206201
   B. ASAP
   C. OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN

GP-4 CCN 2501 REL BY

AIR

SECRET

327

TOD/2609352/TPH

VMM
ZNY SSSSS
Z 260730Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGK
TO FOURTH MAR FSC
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL FSC

BT
S E C R E T LIMDIS
ARC LIGHT
1. THIS HEADQUARTERS IS PRESENTLY CONSIDERING CLEARANCE OF ADDITIONAL ARC LIGHT TGTS IN SUPPORT OF 4TH MARINE OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN. XXV CORPS ADVISES THAT TGTS QT 8429 AND QT 8458 MAY BE FAVORABLE CONSIDERED IF TROOP SAFETY LIMITS CAN BE OBSERVED.
2. AT PRESENT THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS ELEMENTS OF 1/4 AND 2/4 LOCATED AT XD 755808 AND XD 822625 RESPECTIVELY, AND FSB CATAPULT.
3. REQUEST YOU ADVISE THIS HEADQUARTERS ASAP WHICH IF ANY ABOVE UNITS COULD BE MOVED TO ALLOW OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE OF ARC LIGHT TGTS QT 8429 AND QT 8458.
BT

Copy 1A of 7

SECRET

ZZ UUMSQ UUMS UUMSQI UUMSQD UUMSEMA
DE UUMSK 1500 0851447
ZNY SSSSS
Z 261437Z MAR 69
FM XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
INFO UUMS/MACV CMD CTR SGN
UUMSQI/DSA I CORPS TOC DNG
UUMSQD/3D MAR DIV COC DGH
UUMSEMA/SA 1ST ARVN DIV COC HUE
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ:SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT(S)
1 (S)AT 261100H MAR 69, PATROL"MAGIC SPELL,"
VIC XD 932656 FOUND A 50-60 BNKR COMPLEX
W/LARGE TRAIL LEADING EAST. PATROL CHECKED
BNKRS AND FOUND 1-82MM MORT RD AND 2
CANS 50 CAL ANNO. PATROL "MAGIC SPELL" EXITED
DMZ AT 261600H MAR 69.
2 (S) PATROL "HARSH WORD" WALKED OUT OF
DMZ 261900H MAR 69
GP-4
BT
1500

TCD/1545/XXIV/TTY

29

SECRET

CO SUBJ: UUMSOD
RE UUMSOD 1351 0851750
SUP 20300
D 261730Z MAR 68
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSO/XXIV CORPS TOC
INFO UUMSO/III MAF COC
TASK FORCE HOTEL
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L FIN SEQ OF TWO
1ST BDE 9TH
MF1/1102 0 3 0 0 1 3 0 5
N5 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
1/6106 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
N2 0 9 0 0 0 0 28 0
1/7706 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0
N6 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3/50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1ST AMTRAC BN
O3 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 4
N5 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 4
OTOB O3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N2 0 0 3 1 0 0 6 0
O2 12 23 0 5 1 6 8 15
N 5 3 9 2 16 2 3 47 18
17 15 52 2 21 3 9 55 25

PAGE TWO UUMSOD 1351 C O N F I D E N T I A L
K. SMALL UNITS CONTACT.

PROVINCE COOR	DATE TIME	ACTION SIZE/TYPE	FR UNIT LOSSES	EN UNIT LOSSES	UNIT BY US/VC
XD882518	251840H	PLT PATROL	F/2/4 NONE	UNK UNK	US
XD 889511	260050H	SNIPER	27TH MTB 1 WIA(E)	UNK NONE	VC
XD943627	260300H	CO DEF	A&B1/11 1 KIA,8 WIA(E)	UNK 3 NVA KIA	VC
XD985504	260320H	CO DEF	M/3/9 NONE	UNK UNK	US
XD851619	261930H	CO DEF	B/3/5 1 WIA(E) 2 WIA(M)	UNK UNK	VC
A-4	262135	CO DEF	B/1ST AMTRAC NONE	UNK UNK	US
XD287534	262150H	BASE DEF	OTOB NONE	UNK UNK	VC
XD287534	262245	BAS DEF	OTOB NONE	UNK UNK	

[illegible] THREE DUMSOD 1361 C O N F I D E N T I A L
[illegible] C-CIFICATION SUPPORT
[illegible] PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC
INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.
[illegible] A/1/9 CONDUCT COMBINED OPNS WITH
RF/PF/CIDG IN MAI LOC TOUR.
[illegible] B/1/9 CONDUCTS COMBINED OPNS IN CAM LO DISTRICT.
6. TMF SOGS OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG
[illegible] 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONTINUES
CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1ST AND 2ND ARVN REGT'S THROUGHOUT POPULATED
COASTAL AREA.
8. DIRECT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (PIOCC) BY 9TH MARINES.
DMUS, CICB, AND 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)
9. TABULATION OF VILLAGE/ HAMLET C&S DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE
CP-4
[illegible]

SECRET

ZOCCEA592
DC UUMS UUMSA
DE UUMSA 1592 0851818
ZNY SSSSS
UUMSA - T - UUMS/EA
O 25,818Z MAR 52 -
FM III MAF COC
TO UUMS/MACV CMD CNTR SAC RUH
INFO UUMSE/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB RUH
UUMSOI/I CORPS TOC DNG RUH
UUMSOA/AMERICAL DIV TOC CHU LAI RUH
UUMSOT/FIRST MAW COC DNG RUH
UUMSOD/THIRD MARDIV COC DONG HA RUH
UUMSA A/CMC ZERO ONE ASB SIG COC
UUMSA/I FORCEV BNA RUH
ZEN CORPS DSC RUH
ZEN/MMPAC MAW
ZEN/CTG SEE I ZERO PM 1852Z
SECRET

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 1C
MACV CMD INTP PASS ACTION TO SOCC [illegible] AND INFO J-3 FORE
SECOND OPNS DIV [illegible] AND FO [illegible]

Reclassified

7

SECRET

[illegible] S E C R E T
[illegible] CAV [illegible] ARVN [illegible]
[illegible] OPNS [illegible] LOC AND FOB CENTERS ALONG [illegible]
[illegible] REACTION FORCE FOR TAN KY [illegible]
[illegible] OF FOB AND CONT [illegible] AGAINST [illegible]
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[illegible] TO CONDUCT [illegible]
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[illegible] WILL [illegible] AS [illegible]





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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS TACTICAL SEMINAR







MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

27 MARCH 1969

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
APO San Francisco 96308

MAJ Roush/glt/2506

AVII-GCT

28 May 1969

SUBJECT: Fourth XXIV Corps Tactical Seminar

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Attached as inclosure is report of the fourth XXIV Corps Tactical Seminar on the subject "Mines and Booby Traps".

Presentations were made not only by subordinate XXIV Corps elements but also by representatives from MACV, USARV, and III MAF.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

H. R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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CG, Americal Div 10
CG, 25th Infantry Div 10
CG, 1st Cavalry Div (AM) 10
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CO, 5th Special Forces 10
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CG, Engineer Troops V (Prov) 5
CO, USA Headquarters Area Comd 5
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CO, 54th Artillery Gp 5
CO, 108th Artillery Gp 5
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CG, 44th Medical Bde 5
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CO, 34th General Support Gp 5
CO, 509th RR Gp 5
CO, 525th Military Intelligence Gp 5
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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

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271000H-1500H March 1969

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TACTICAL SEMINAR

271000-1500H March 1969

HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS

MG Drake

BG Bolling

COI Glikes

COL Le Tellier

COL Osteen

LTC Buchanan

LTC Dickens

LTC Fleming

LTC German

LTC Ghormley

LTC Jones

LTC Keenan

LTC Marder

LTC Merrell

MAJ Eiche

MAJ Chase

MAJ Dyer

MAJ Fiel

MAJ Janke

MAJ Lange

MAJ Leathers

MAJ Roush

3D MAR DIV

BG Carney

COL DeNormadie

LTC Britt

MAJ Kneeman

MAJ Mills

LT Hagensen

GY SGT Pickett

101ST Abn Div (AM)

COL Smith

LTC Sherron

MAJ Morin

CPT Friedrick

MSG Albanese

SGT Brown

TF Clearwater

CPT Jewett (USN)

LTC Colleton

LCDR Holmes

1ST Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech)

SSG Foster

SSG Kuck

XXIV Corps (Cont)

MAJ Stevens

MAJ Van Steenbergen

CPT Mitchell

1LT Breitweiser

1LT Guthrie

1LT Kunis

1LT Zimmer

SFC Cleverley

SP4 Barnes

SP4 Hedrick

MACV J2 CMEC

SSM Ziegler

SFC Brolo

USARV Engr

MAJ Skinner

III MAF G2

LTC Bunnell

MAJ Snydenham

32d NCR

CDR Wingast

MCB 40

CDR Daniel

LT (JG) Kunz

CE-1 Sweatt

UT-1 Collins

GY SGT Minehart

MCB 121

CDR Meger

LT (JG) Skikeleather

45th Engr Gp

CPT Reh

27th Engr Bn

1LT Hanish

1LT Hollands

HQ XXIV Corps Arty

LTC Spradlin

CPT Massa

MSG Halterman

1SG Canafax

HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
MARCH TACTICAL SEMINAR

AGENDA
271000H-1500H March 1969

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

EVENTS	TIME (hours)
Opening Remarks (DCG, XXIV Corps)	1000 - 1005
3d Marine Division Presentation	1005 - 1035
Group Discussion on 3d Marine Division Presentation	1035 - 1055
Morning Coffee Break	1055 - 1105
Task Force Clearwater Presentation	1105 - 1135
Group Discussion TF Clearwater's Presentation	1135 - 1155
Lunch	1155 - 1300
101st Airborne Division Presentation	1300 - 1330
Group Discussion on 101st Airborne Division's Presentation	1330 - 1350
Afternoon Coffee Break	1350 - 1400
MACV J2 CMEC Presentation	1400 - 1415
Discussion on MACV J2 CMEC's Presentation	1415 - 1420
III MAF G2 Presentation	1420 - 1430
Discussion on III MAF G2's Presentation	1430 - 1435
USARV Engineer Presentation	1435 - 1450
Discussion on USARV Engineer's Presentation	1450 - 1455
Closing Remarks (DCG, XXIV Corps)	1455 - 1500

ORGANIZATION OF DOCUMENTS

This publication is a report of the fourth XXIV Corps Tactical Seminar presented on 27 March 1969 in the XXIV Corps Conference Room, Headquarters, XXIV Corps. The subject of the seminar was "Mines and Booby Traps".

MG Clifford B. Drake, Deputy Commanding General, XXIV Corps, opened the seminar. The first of six presentations was made by 1Lt Hagensen, 3d Marine Division. CPT (USN) Jewett, Task Force Clearwater, made the second presentation. The third topic was presented by LTC Sherron and CPT Friedrick, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). SSM Ziegler, MACV J2 CMEC, presented the fourth topic. MAJ Skinner, USARV Engineer, presented the fifth topic. The sixth and final presentation was made by LTC Bunnell and MAJ Sydenham, III MAF G2. A brief question and answer period followed each presentation.

This Document contains the following annexes:

1) ANNEX A: Opening Remarks, DCG, XXIV Corps

2) ANNEX B: 3d Marine Division Presentation

3) ANNEX C: Task Force Clearwater Presentation

4) ANNEX D: 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Presentation

5) ANNEX E: MACV J2 CMEC Presentation

6) ANNEX F: USARV Engineer Presentation

7) ANNEX G: III MAF G2 Presentation

8) ANNEX H: Summary of Discussion Questions

9) ANNEX I: Closing Remarks, DCG, XXIV Corps

OPENING REMARKS

MAG Clifford B. Drake, USMC
Deputy CG, XXIV Corps

On behalf of General Stilwell, the Corps Commander, it is my pleasure and privilege to welcome you to the fourth Corps Tactical Seminar. In our first seminar last spring, we addressed the subject of "Night Operations" and published a summary of the presentations and the discussions which followed.

In the second seminar on "Combined Operations", the theme which emerged was that combined operations are a "thing of the present and future within XXIV Corps".

After these seminars were reproduced and distributed down to the company/battery/troop level, we requested feedback from the divisions as to whether anybody had bothered to read them. Assuming that all good soldiers, sailors, and marines tell "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth", the responses were very gratifying.

We conducted the third Corps seminar in December. The subject was "Tactics and Techniques Employed on Reconnaissance Missions in Airmobile Operations". We continued our distribution of this seminar down to the company level. Thus, we are continuing our programs of Corps Tactical Seminars.

For those of you who are here for the first time I think you will find that this will be a very interesting day. Our subject, "Mines and Booby Traps", is most apt for any time frame of this year. There has probably been no war in which mines and booby traps have been a greater casualty producer and greater hindrance to our operations than the type of war we are now fighting in Vietnam. By all rights we should have started with this subject. Perhaps, through our combined inquisitiveness, creativity, discussion, and questions both smart and seemingly stupid, we can produce some ideas which can reduce casualties from these devices.

Therefore, today, we will devote our efforts to the subject with presentations by the two divisions of the Corps and our naval element, Task Force Clearwater. In addition, teams from outside Corps will broaden the depth of the subject with brief presentations. Representatives from MACV, USARV and III MAF bring additional expertise to this conference.

In these opening remarks, I attempt to set the stage for the seminar. A seminar is not something in which presenters discuss their subject matter and we sit here, dutifully, as the audience. A seminar is of value only if we obtain maximum participation from all present. This means questions, comments, discussion, and challenges to ideas. Earlier, I mentioned the stupid question.

Gentlemen, sometimes what may seem to you to be a stupid question may very well be the one that sparks the best idea of the seminar. Please do not hold back. Any time you feel like interrupting a presentation feel free to do so. I am sure the presenters are fast enough on their feet to pick it up from there. Again, we are glad to have you here. Permit your inquisitive mind to work in conjunction with loose jaws. Let us start with the Third Marine Division.

PRESENTATION

3d Marine Division

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

INTRODUCTION

General Drake, General Carney, gentlemen. My name is Lt Hagensen, Assistant Operations Officer, 3d Engineer Battalion, 3d Marine Division. Assisting me today is Gunnery Sergeant Pickett, also a member of the 3d Engineer Battalion, who was instrumental in the establishment of the 3d Marine Division Land Mine Warfare/Demolitions School.

My presentation concerns a subject in which the 3d Engineer Battalion has gained much practical knowledge and expertise. The main thrust of our topic concerns route mine sweeps. During the course of this presentation, I will address four separate areas concerned with route sweeping: 1) enemy mining devices; 2) enemy counter sweep activities; 3) enemy mining trends; 4) friendly counteraction.

The 3d Engineer Battalion is responsible for conducting route sweeps on 49,200 meters of road daily. These sweeps are conducted east and west along Route 9 from Cam Lo to Vandegrift Combat Base and north and south on Route 556 and 558 from Con Thien to Mai Loc. The specific items I will discuss today are the results of experience gained by our sweep teams on these particular routes.

Displayed on the table before you are some of the more common manufactured enemy mines that are being employed by the enemy in the Third Marines Division TAOR.

ENEMY MINES

This is the P.M. 60. It is believed to be an East German manufactured mine with the following characteristics (chart 1);

1) Diameter: 12 inches

2) Thickness: 5 inches

3) Pressure required to actuate fuze: 300-500 pounds

4) Amount of explosives: 23 pounds TNT or amotel

5) Number of fuze wells: two

The mine is made entirely of plastic and is very difficult to pick up with the P 153/158 mine detector. This mine is being used frequently to interdict Route 9 at this time. The only metal found in this mine is the very small amount located in the firing device itself.

The next mine is the Soviet TM41 which has the following characteristics (chart 2);

1) Height: 10 inches

2) Weight: 11.9 pounds

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

3) Type of mine: blast

4) Pressure required to actuate fuze 26 pounds

5) Amount of explosives: 8.4 pounds TNT

6) Method of activating explosive: Russian MV5 pressure type fuze

As you can see it resembles a dimmer switch on our vehicles. There is a striker spring and striker at the top portion of the device. The spring and striker are held in place by a small ball bearing. When twenty six (26) pounds of pressure are placed at the top of this device, the small tip on the outside case becomes aligned thereby freeing the striker and striker spring, and hitting the detonating portion of the fuze which, in turn, activates the booster and actuates the mine itself. This fuze is common to many manufactured mines and many home made mines as we shall see later.

Now, this mine is the Soviet TM 46 antitank mine which has the followin characteristics (chart 3);

1) Diameter: 12.2 inches

2) Type of mine: blast

3) Height: 2.9 inches

4) Weight: 19.[illegible] pounds

5) Amount of explosive: 12.2 pounds TNT

6) Pressure required to activate fuze: 400 pounds

7) Number of fuze wells: two

8) Method of activating explosive: Russian MV5 pressure type fuze.

In addition to these manufactured mines, within the past two months, our sweep teams have been confronted with an increasing number of locally manufactured explosive devices. The most common of these explosive devices are 20 to 30 pound blocks of TNT assembled in a package and tied together with string or wires. The TNT block mine is effective for the following reasons: (1) It is easily placed: (2) It is difficult to detect; (3) The device can be positioned and the pressure type fuze added at at a later date.

ENEMY COUNTER SWEEP ACTIVITIES

Next, I would like to discuss enemy counter sweep activities or those actions designated to reduce the effectiveness of our route sweep teams.

The first of these is the "planting" or laying of false mines. The enemy will dig several holes in the road and simply fill them in again. This accomplishes two things: (1) It distracts the sweep team and forces them to probe each of these holes; (2) It also provides the enemy with a hole to put his mine in with little effort at a later date. The enemy will observe the sweep team probe the same holes for several days. After they have ceased their probing, the enemy will go in and plant his mines.

Another means of planting false mines is to bury sandbags with tin cans enclosed. Again, it is designed to wear down the patience of the sweep team and make them careless.

One enemy counter sweep activity, which has recently been used quite frequently in our area of operations, is the practice of emplacing non-metallic or locally made explosive devices in the roads without the metallic firing device. Unless the sweep team is especially alert and experienced, it will miss the device and move on past the area. After the sweep team is safely out of sight or perhaps much later in the day, the enemy will move back into the area and rapidly fuze the device. The enemy has gained only limited success with this tactic due to the alertness of our sweep teams.

As the sweep commences and as it terminates, a tendency exists for the sweep team to bunch up which provides a lucrative target for the enemy. We have attempted to counter this by various means during the past several months. In our particular area of operations, the most effective means employed is to have converging sweep teams meet and continue on past each other a safe distance before concluding their respective sweeps. This accomplishes a number of things. It prevents the sweep team from bunching up and eliminates the possibility of a mine being missed at the point where the sweep teams converge. As an additional measure, the teams never meet at the same point twice which prevents the enemy from effectively registering mortars or establishing ambushes at that point where both sweep teams meet. Mortar and sniper fire have also been used to distract the sweep team as it approaches mines in the road in the hope that the sweep team will move hastily through the area and miss the mines.

Another favorite tactic employed by the enemy is to register their mortars on the position where the mines are buried. Once a mine is located, it is blown in place by the sweep team. This, alerts the enemy that the engineers and security are at that particular point. The enemy, then, quickly fires a few mortar rounds.

Directional antipersonnel mines are being used as ambush and booby trap devices. I would like to show you the devices. The first is the Chinese Communist claymore mine (chart 4). It works like our own claymore.

Next, we have the DH-10 mine (chart 5) which has a matrix of 450 small fragments. It can be fired either electrically or non-electrically the same as our claymores. This particular mine has an electric fuzing device in it.

We also have detonating cord that has been used by NVA and VC elements. This is quite similar to our own detonating cord but of a much inferior quality.

This mine has been used several times on Route 556 just above Cam Lo (chart 6). What we see is a cluster of four mines placed in a staggered column in the road. The arrow indicates the direction in which the sweep team is moving. The enemy places the claymore mine approximately 25 meters from where each mine is laid and a trip wire is run out to the side. The mines are so positioned for two reasons. First, it is their hope that the flank security will trip the wire, thereby creating casualties before the mines are discovered and that in the resulting confusion the mines will be forgotten. If this fails to happen and the mines are discovered, the enemy hopes that curiosity will bring people from the flanks to look at the mines and, while doing so, they will trip the mines and obtain a maximum number of casualties. This configuration has been found several times on Route 556 and is recognized as a pattern or a trend by this particular sweep team.

Here (chart 7) you see a sketch of an ambush that has been established to hit our sweep team on Route 9. As you see, there are nine claymores set up with the killing zone oriented

to hit the sweep team itself with fragments directed to hit the point security and, of course, the cluster of mines in the rear directed to hit the rear security. Fortunately, this particular ambush was discovered because some of the mines were detonated prematurely. Also, some of the claymore mines did not go off due to faulty detonating cord.

This (chart 8) is a booby trapping device that is becoming quite popular with the NVA. When an engineer team finds a mine in the road, it will probe and attempt to identify it from the top. When the identification has been positively made, the team will place one or two pounds of C4 on top of it with a one to two minute fuze. They will then light the fuze and move to the rear 100 to 200 meters. Note that a claymore has been set up to catch the rear security force.

The enemy has proven himself adaptable at mining techniques; yet he has established certain patterns. There seems to be a high incident rate one week of every month. The enemy harasses the sweep teams with false mines and for one week out of every month will plant mines daily. The mines are planted, in clusters of two, between 20 and 50 meters apart. These mines are located in a staggered column and frequently favor one side of the road. The enemy also plants mines in the center of the road. Where the roads are narrow, mines are planted on the shoulders of the road for obvious reasons (chart 9).

When the road was only wide enough for one way traffic, which precluded the detonation of mines in the center of the road, this led to the axiom that enemy mines are almost always found on the edges and shoulders of the road. As the roads widened and we continued to find their mines, the enemy began to place them in the center of the road. Our response was to use a third detector in the center of the road. As roads continues to be improved and widened, the mines were placed left and right of center with our response being the use of four detectors on each road.

As you notice, gentlemen, these detectors are employed approximately 20 meters apart for the safety of the sweep team. At the present time, the trend is to place mines left and right of the center in staggered column about 50-70 meters apart.

FRIENDLY COUNTER ACTION

Friendly counteraction to enemy mining activities has taken several forms. Continual training of sweep personnel is being conducted. The latest information on mining activities, markers, and indicators is disseminated to the sweep teams. Sweep discipline receives continued command attention to insure constant vigilance and compliance with established sweep practices.

The same men are left on the sweeps so they may become familiar with sections of the road. Ninety percent of the mines are discovered visually. This can be traced directly to the team's thorough knowledge of the road's surface. The sweep teams have also established good relations with indigenous personnel who have pointed out mines and ambushes on many occasions. By leaving the same men in the area, this rapport is strengthend and the source of information is maintained.

The Voluntary Informant Program (VIP) augments this camaraderie between the sweep team and the indigenous personnel. It is a system whereby indigenous personnel are reimbursed monetarily for information on the location of enemy mines and ambushes. The 3d Engineer Battalion has sent its Vietnamese interpreters with the sweep team to explain this program to the Vietnamese people. This action has achieved good results. Recently a Montagnard pointed out a cluster of 6 mines on Route 9 west of Cam Lo. On another occasion, a small fort was found adjacent to a road upon which a sweep had started. The fort was built by

children who play there every day. There were objects, resembling mortars, pointing to the sky. The sweep team was subsequently moved further down the road.

The Third Marine Division has also conducted an extensive land clearing project on each side of Route 9 for the purpose of denying the enemy easy access to the road. This reduced his ambush capability and made it more difficult for him to place his mines undetected.

The training of non-engineer personnel has not been neglected. The Third Marine Division has established a Land Mine Warfare School which is operated and staffed by the Third Engineer Battalion personnel. Each week twenty men attend a three day comprehensive course on explosives, route sweep equipment and techniques, and enemy mines and booby traps.

While booby traps and mine incidents are not as prevalent in the northern portion of our Division AO as they are in the southern portion, there is a definite trend in this direction. We have received requests for schooling on this subject from units such as the "Seabees" and the Third Reconnaissance Battalion. In each case, we have endeavored to meet the demand. The training received by the participants results in a healthy respect for explosives and greater confidence. It teaches the marine what to look for, thereby reducing casualties in the field.

3RD MARINE DIVISION CHARTS

P.M. 60



CHART 1

TM-41 A.T. MINE



SOVIET TM 41 A.T. MINE

CHART 2

TM-46 A.T. MINE



SOVIET TM-46 A.T. MINE
CHART 3

CHART 44



CLAYMORE - CHICOM



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

CHART 6

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



CHART 8



CHART 9

PRESENTATION

Task Force Clearwater

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

General Drake, General Carney, and gentlemen. The primary areas of responsibility of Task Force Clearwater are the Cua Viet and Perfume Rivers. The frequency of mining incidents on the Perfume River within the past year has been almost non-existent. Only two such incidents were encountered by Task Force Clearwater personnel. On the other hand, the Cua Viet River has more mining incidents than any other river in the Republic of Vietnam (Chart 1). The main reason for the increased mine activity on the Cua Viet River stems from the fact that we can carry 3500 short tons of shipping per month down to Dong Ha and have carried an average of about 2200 short tons per month over the past nine months. That is a lot of logistics. Since the North Vietnamese are trying to gain a spectacular success of some sort, particularly during the bombing halt, they continue trying new things. One of these innovations is the river mine. The type of mines used by the enemy in the waterways are identical to those used against our coastal craft and ships at sea.

These include the following types: percussion, magnetic, acoustic, contact, and command detonated which we do not normally find at sea. The enemy has tried them all in the Cua Viet River. Some of these mines are very sophisticated. For this reason, I thought that it would be interesting to you if I gave a brief discussion of some of the enemy mines we have discovered in the Cua Viet River. I will also mention a few of the principles which these mines employ, theory of operation, and what we do to counter them.

The first mine I am going to discuss is the drifting contact mine (Chart 2) that the Viet Cong brought into the Cua Viet River. It is basically Bushnell's old torpedo. David Bushnell, as you may recall, invented the submarine. He also invented the drifting contact mine. This mine is basically just a case of gunpowder and a float. During the course of the American Civil War, a friction igniter was added. For a float, the Viet Cong use an inner tube. Instead of the wooden keg of gunpowder depicted on the chart, the Viet Cong use a 40 pound basket of C4 explosive (Chart 3). Little lines run from the basket to the float and wires, which circumvent the float, and connect to a pull-type friction igniter. The circuit then runs through a fuze to a detonator (½ pound block of TNT) and the mine explodes.

Usually something in the river touches the inner tube and displaces it from a basket. As soon as the displacement occurs, the igniters are activated which, in turn, completes the electrical circuit and causes the explosion. The explosion can result in the disappearance of forty pounds of C4 explosives and a friendly river vessel.

We attempt to counter this mine in several ways. One method employs the concussion grenade. The concussion grenade ruptures the innertube causing it to sink. If the inner tube remains in position on the surface of the river, the shock of the detonation will cause a horizontal displacement of the innertube on the river surface and force it to explode. We attempt to "sweep" this type of mine by running two boats parallel to each other and connected by a large strand of wire which is held approximately 18 inches beneath the surface. As the boats move in tandem on the river, the

wire contacts the drifting contact mine and it explodes.

Such mines are outlawed by the Geneva Convention. However, the enemy doesn't pay any attention to minor things like that. The only drifting mine that the United States has used was the Mark 19 mine during World War II. The North Koreans had a Soviet drifting mine during the Korean war.

The next mine that the enemy has used is the pressure mine. This type of mine first made its appearance in World War II. Our naval pressure mine, at the present time, cost approximately $800 each. The Viet Cong's pressure mine costs about $15 a copy.

As a matter of interest, I will review the basic principle of physics behind the operation of the pressure mine (Chart 4). Probably most of you are familiar with these already. As an example, let us say you have a pipe with water running through it. Along the length of the pipe you encounter a constriction which, of course, reduces the diameter of the pipe at that point. At the constriction, the velocity of the water increases. The velocity of the water at this point can be computed by a mathematical formula. In physics, this phenomenon is called Bernoulli's principle and is the basic principle used in all pressure mines. Using Bernoulli's principle, a boat going across the bottom like this (lower half of Chart 4) causes a displacement of the water. The water, which is temporarily displaced, seeks to return and fill the vacated space. The only way this physical action can occur is for the water to travel faster around the hull of the boat under the water. This causes a decrease in pressure. Obviously if a boat is at rest, pressure is normal. Therefore, the boat can stop over the mine and it will not explode. Also you can move a boat slowly over a pressure mine and a detonation will not occur. But if the boat obtains any appreciable speed over four knots - stand by - because this little "baby" will blow up. That is a quick review how a pressure mine operates.

This is a simplified diagram of a pressure mine (Chart 5). Again, you see the Viet Cong's favorite elements for constructing mines: the innertube and the big basket of explosives which can hold between 40 to 80 pounds of C4. The last one we picked up contained 75 pounds.

Let me explain this arrangement to you. At the top of the mine is a balloon. The balloon is connected to an upper pressure chamber that is filled with air. The upper pressure chamber is separated from the lower pressure chamber. Now if the ship crosses above the top of the mine, a decrease in pressure results outside the balloon causing it to expand. When this occurs, air in the upper chamber rushes into the balloon. This results in a state whereby there is more air in the lower pressure chamber than the upper pressure chamber. The only way that the differential can be eliminated is for air to push the bellows upward. This causes a completed firing circuit. The closing of the circuit and all actions previously mentioned occur only when a ship passes over the mine at a minimum specified speed.

As a parting remark, the pressure mine depicted is a North Vietnamese manufactured device.

The next mine I will discuss is the magnetic acoustic mine. Last summer, we found six of these things.

Let me briefly discuss the basic principle of operation, (Chart 6). The magnetic field of the earth has a vertical component - a field which is constant in a particular area. This condition does not change as long as this particular area is not invaded by a metallic object. When a metallic object passes through the field, it changes the earth's magnetic lines. If you have some kind of detector that can detect this change, then you can use the detector to generate a small current. This action, in turn, can close switches, set off detonator circuits, etc. Ordinary search coils are used and when a change in the field results, a current will be induced into the coil and amplified to throw the switch and turn off detonators.

This device is called a search coil. The search coil was invented by the British. The Germans were the first to come up with a magnetic mine and use a dip needle. The British followed suit with one of a more sophisticated design.

Here is the basic principle as far as the magnetic acoustic mine is concerned (Chart 6). The Viet Cong utilizes all aspects of the mine. He uses the magnetic principle to close switches and to [illegible] detonators.

This is the HAT/2 mine (Chart 7). It is a very sophisticated mine. However, it is not on a par with our new mines. It consists of three sections. The center and end case mechanisms, made by the North Vietnamese, contain explosives. The firing mechanism section is a Russian firing device. The mine weighs 850 pounds of which 660 pounds are explosives. The three sections can be separated and all components can be carried by 9 to 15 men. The explosives are carried separately from the mine itself.

The HAT/2 mine is assembled section by section. A little space is left between the end case section and center case section to allow for a [illegible]. After the sections have been assembled and filled with C4 explosive, the firing mechanism is bolted atop the previously assembled sections. After the assembly is completed, a plastic tube is placed around the mine and the mine is then placed into the water and settles to the bottom.

The search coil, previously mentioned, is located in the center case section and is the device that causes the magnetic "loop" as we call it. Here is the booster tube that connects to the firing mechanism.

There are several other prominent features of this mine that I might mention. It is hand portable and very rugged. For instance, we picked up one that had nine bullet holes in the battery pack. Yet, the battery pack was still operational. Another feature is that you can set this mine to fire from one to ten days. For example, if the Viet Cong want this to be a dud until ten (10) days from now, he can set it that way. Nine days from now - stand by - you will have problems. In addition to this delayed arming of ten days, the Viet Cong have installed a ship counting gadget. This device can count up to twenty one ships. This means you must wait ten days before it can be of any use at all; then, you have got to wait until 20 ships go by until you fire on the 21st ship. Therefore, theoretically, to ensure there is something like this down in the water, what you have to do every day for ten (10) days is run a minimum of 21 ship counts. This is assuming that you make perfect passes over this mine all the time. Actually, you would probably be required to complete at least thirty five passes.

On the 21st of February, sapper elements clandestinely slipped into our area and destroyed some of our boats on the Cua Viet River. I felt they might have followed this up with a good mining endeavor. I was particularly concerned about the possible setting of a HAT/2 mine in our training base which could sink an LST or similar ship. Therefore, I decided to run the 21 ship count drill on the theory that I would make it safe for at least one day. In order to obtain the 21 ship counts, we had to close the Cua Viet River until 1300 hours.

This type of mine has an anti-counter mining device which means that you can throw a concussion grenade at it or, if a mine explodes, it won't activate. The entire electrical circuitry will be dead for a certain period of time before it will activate again. This is actually a type of protection. The HAT/2 mine also has some beautiful anti-recovery aspects. When this mine lies on the bottom, it is tilted at 7 degrees angle to the horizontal and it will blow up in your face if it exceeds this deviation from the horizontal. If you have some energetic EOD types that want to go down to the river bottom and "nosey" around with this thing, they will probably have it explode in their faces. There must be at least 9 feet of water for this mine to arm itself. Once it goes below 9 feet of water, it becomes armed through a hydrostatic type device. If it is brought above 9 feet again it will automatically explode. In other words, there is only one way to clear this mine if she's setting on the bottom. You must send a person down to the mine, place a charge on its external surface, and blow it in place. The one we found on the beach had safety forks on it, and the device was not armed. This was how we obtained our information on the HAT/2 mine.

Our own mines do not have quite the same amount of anti-recovery aspects to them. For example, there's a real disadvantage to this anti-tilting aspect of recovering the mine. If you take a wire and connect it to the HAT/2 mine, it will detonate in place if the tilt is enough.

The only other feature of interest about the Viet Cong mine is that there is no sterilization. This HAT/2 device could lay on the river bottom for a year and it wouldn't self-destruct unless the angle of tilt became excessive. Long ago the United States Navy learned to place a sterilizer into their mines so that after a certain period of time which could be adjusted by ninety days or so, we would achieve a dud. The rationale behind this sterilization procedure was an outgrowth of our World War II naval mine warfare experience. At that time, our naval mines did not contain sterilizers and we spread mines all over the North Sea, Adriatic Sea, and similar places. Many of these mines, to this day, haven't been blown. No method exists of sweeping these non-sterilized mines. The resultant lesson is that if you want to be able to send your own troops and boats in, it is nice to add a sterilizer to friendly mines.

The Viet Cong, however, are not interested in this. They are interested in putting something down that will cause trouble.

Here's an additional problem with combating the HAT/2 mine. It is very difficult to sweep this thing. There are many ways the problem can be approached. You can run a wire called a "bottom-catenary" along the bottom hoping it will do it. You can run very fancy sweeps or very close sweeps over the enemy mine and it will work. For instance we have a magnetic sweep that consists of an elongated thirty foot length of railroad track which we have changed into a magnet.

We have actually towed this device up and down the river along with a huge clapper bar we hang down afloat. It is towed between two ships. However, we usually use a two boat sweep, which is our finest sweep, consisting of large magnetic tails. The latter metallic boats make a magnetic signature in the water. However, the boats towing the railroad track are wooden in nature.

I'd like to mention several other mines. The first is a limpet mine which we captured on the 21st of February. It's nothing more than a little, circular half-moon device. However, it gets a little nasty because once one of these mines is attached to the external surface of a ship or vessel the only way of removal is to take the ship into dry dock and saw it off. You can disarm it but you can't take it off. If you do, it will blow up in your face.

The other devices I would like to mention are enemy booby traps. These are simple devices and designed primarily for use against our patrol boats. They are made of a small piece of styrofoam. Inside the styrofoam is a little grenade and a little string which runs down to the little bag of mud that holds it on the bottom. It operates under the prinicple that if anybody attempts to open up the styrofoam booby trap, it will blow up in the opener's face.

These are the results of our experience of nine months on the Cua Viet River (Chart 8). Of course, these figures are not comparable to those of our big Army and Marine divisions in the XXIV Corps Area of operations. However, for a nice peaceful river with friendly resettlement villages along the banks it is not too bad. We average, on a weekly basis, one explosion and three wounded. The last ships damaged were by limpet mines. One such mine blew a four foot hole in one our ships and the backlash from it blew a similar hole in a sister ship near by.

What can we expect from the Viet Cong in the future? He can place a pressure device on his HAT/2 mine. We are obtaining some sophisticated naval equipment which will permit us to see if there are any foreign objects, like mines, on the river bottom. It is called "SHADOW GRAFT" and has never been used in the Republic of Vietnam.

In closing, I want to read you a little passage that we find in all our naval textbooks on sea mines and I think it is applicable for river mines. This is a definition of mine warfare. "Mine warfare is the science of big assumptions, based on debatable figures, taken from inconclusive experiments, performed with instruments of problematical accuracy, by persons of doubtful reliability, and of questionable mentality." Believe me, if you ever get into the mine business and you are on one side or the other this description is most appropriate.

TASK FORCE CLEARWATER

CHARTS

ENEMY MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS ON THE CUA VIET RIVER

CHART 1

DRIFTING CONTACT

BASIC PRINCIPLE



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A FRICTION IGNITER

CHART 2



CHART 3

PRESSURE MINE

BASIC PRINCIPLE



CHART 4



CHART 5

MAGNETIC-ACOUSTIC

BASIC PRINCIPLE





CHART 6

HAT/2



FEATURES

MAN - PORTABLE
DELAYED ARMING
SHIP-COUNTING
ANTI-COUNTERMINING
ANTI-RECOVERY
NO STERILIZATION

RESULTS SINCE 1 JULY 68

38 EXPLOSIONS

4 SUNK

11 DAMAGED

15 KIA

26 WIA

CHART 8

PRESENTATION

101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

Twenty seven casualties in twenty seven days due to booby traps. Because of this experience, we feel that we have a story to tell. We have lessons learned and use this opportunity as a vehicle to convey this knowledge. This is a battalion's limited experience in its area of responsibility within the 101st Airborne Division (AM) area of operation.

To set the stage we would like to resort to historical precedent. Late last year, a switch occurred between a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) and 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. This switch was accomplished in September 1968. Later, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was redeployed to the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam. This left a geographical area which was then filled by the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM). This area is north of Hue and south of Quang Tri City. The four combat maneuver elements operating in this area are: 3d Sqdn, 5th Armd Cav (an organic element of the 9th Infantry Division); 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry; 2d Bn, 506th Infantry; and the 3d Bn, 187th Infantry (Chart 1). This area contains a large number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army elements.

Our battalion mission was to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in our assigned area of operation. In order to provide you information concerning enemy and the terrain, I have asked CPT Frederick, the 3d Bde S2, to conduct the next portion of the presentation.

Good afternoon, Sir. I am CPT FREDERICK, S2, 3d Bde. The terrain in the area of interest (Chart 2) is unique in that the three basic types of terrain found in the Republic of Vietnam are located here: rice paddies; low rolling hills; and mountains. The area is bounded on the east by the Song Bo River; on the west by the Song O Lau River; on the north by QL1; on the south by Rocket Ridge. Contrary to the view of this terrain that one would gather from looking at it on a map and from the air, this terrain presents an obstacle to the foot soldier. The hills, though low in elevation, are very steep. The vegetation is extremely dense, consisting primarily of secondary growth ranging from six to fifteen feet in height. It is so dense that observation and fields of fire are virtually nonexistent.

Movement is normally restricted to trails in the area which, very often, are tunnels. The enemy can often walk through these tunnels unobserved from the air. The rice paddy area is dotted with an abundance of Vietnamese villages. The paddies are desolate because they haven't been planted since Tet, 1968. The hedgerows and overgrown rice paddies offer excellent concealment for the enemy while abandoned villages provide locations for caches. The Song O Ho runs through the center of the area from west to east. It presents no major obstacle to the foot soldier. To the south, Rocket Ridge, is covered with growth similar to that found in the Piedmont Area. The primary advantage of controlling this ridge is that it affords observation over the area of interest. When the brigade moved into the AO, the

enemy forces consisted mainly of C-113 local force units and reconnaissance elements from adjacent NVA battalions.

The enemy's mission was to maintain communication routes open between the mountains and the lowlands and to harass friendly forces by fire. There are two basic routes of interest. One is located along the Song Bo River from the village of Co Bi which is just south of the Song O Ho and up from Co Bi to Cao An which is located at the An Lo Bridge. The second route extends from the mountains to Hien An up to Hien Si and to Dong Lam. Dong Lam is situated directly to the north of Camp Evans.

The 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, entered its area of operations on the 3d of November. I will proceed to trace what our battalion has accomplished from that date until today (27 March).

We took the area from a battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). They were unhappy with the number of casualties they had sustained and were pleased to get rid of that piece of terrain. We entered with no experience in a booby trapped area and from the beginning, we began to sustain casualties. These casualties resulted from all types of booby traps. Within a matter of days, commanders at all levels sought to discover a pattern in the enemy mining activities.

Let's examine in more detail what the area of operations looks like (Chart 2). To identify a few key places, let me point out the following: (1) Camp Evans; (2) An Lo Bridge; (3) Song Bo River; (4) Song O Lau River; and (5) FSB JACK.

We looked for enemy mining patterns. First, we discovered that they were placing booby traps in our own night defensive positions. For example, after we had buried C-ration cans, the enemy returned and dug them up. The C-ration cans were then used to make their booby traps. In order to combat this trend, we ceased using the night defensive positions of previous units and began placing stay behind patrols in the positions from which we moved. This was usually successful because within two or three hours of dawn we would get a Viet Cong who entered the area to perform some task.

However, the enemy learns fast. Within a week this technique was no longer effective. As I mentioned previously, the trails were poor. We had to stay off these trails because of the likelihood that they were booby trapped. We established an SOP that movement on trails and in a straight line is prohibited. As you can see from the terrain, the enemy had direct observation of our area and could probably plot the direction in which friendly units were moving.

Let me cite and discuss a couple of examples of how continuous movement on trails causes trouble. On the 13th of February, with our battalion SOP well established, a friendly platoon moved out of a night ambush position. It did not move in a straight line but pursued a zig-zag pattern. The platoon sergeant, cognizant of the fact that we do not leave our litter on the battlefield, was checking the night ambush position to ensure nothing was left for Charlie's use. After his check was completed, he found himself approximately 200 meters behind the patrol

so he decided to cut across country in an attempt to intercept the patrol. Then, he made two mistakes. First, he moved alone and blazed his own trail. When he realized that he was losing ground to the patrol, he ran across a trail and decided to use it. He moved several steps on the trail, encountered a booby trapped M-26 fragmentation grenade, and became a permanent casualty.

One of the Viet Cong's habits in this vegetation is to almost wave a flag at you and get you to start chasing him and follow in pursuit. After we spotted two Viet Cong, we started in pursuit and came across this trail. On the trail was this piece (Chart 3) of C-ration box with the following remarks inscribed in Vietnamese, "Trail Marker - Booby Trapped Trail - Stay Off the Trail". This particular platoon had an interpreter with it. Again, we were lucky. The interpreter suggested that we had better get off the trail. As soon as we moved left or right of the trail, two booby traps were discovered. Fortunately we found these devices before they found us.

This is indicative of the type of enemy we encounter in our area of operations. If we try something, he counters it. In order to gather information about the enemy's mine and booby trap capabilities, we began collecting data. These black dots (Chart 4) represent booby traps encountered by our battalion. Some of the dots represent a cluster of 3 or 4 mines. This provides you a general idea of what we faced when we worked this area.

We looked for patterns and attempted to determine if the enemy had some tactical scheme in mind. We generalized and determined that the enemy's mine and booby trap activities were keyed to two district geographical areas. We have designated these as Area A and Area B (Chart 4). As you can see, most of the incidents fall into these two areas. There is a reason for this. We normally occupy this area with two rifle companies. How else would you put the companies in there except side by side. The most lucrative area to find the VC was in the vicinity of the junction of the Song O Ho and the Khe Vuc An (Chart 2). That is where we inserted a company. This area had lucrative finds because the trails which come out of the mountains run into Camp Evans.

Both sides had tactical reasons. What could these reasons be? First, we thought the enemy might be hiding something in this area. Why booby trap unless you have got something you want to keep the enemy out of? We checked the area very carefully. We were attempting to find tunnels, caves, etc. We did locate some but there was not any large cache. We did find tunnels, caves, and spider holes which contained some weapons. Next, we thought it was a barrier - a barrier to our movement in this direction toward the foothills. We reasoned this because, in February, we found a 122mm rocket pointed toward LZ Sally at this location. We then commenced looking for rockets. We dug up the ridges and tried to find if they had a lot of rockets there. However, we were unable to find any rockets. We found a few weapons and a few places where they had been spending the night in the draws that lead out into the foothills. The next point we considered was that the enemy was using this area as a barrier for themselves. The VC, we found in this area, were normally rice carriers, who were propagandizing in the villages or were guides available to the NVA who were operating in this area. Therefore, this may have been a barrier just to keep us from pursuing them. I'll be frank in saying that when a small platoon is heading towards the foothills in pursuit of the enemy a booby trapped area will slow them for a matter of hours. As a final thought, this could just be the location of a good way station for the enemy.

I'd like to briefly discuss some different types of mines and booby traps that we've encountered. I'll start with what is seemingly the enemy's favorite and most prevalent booby trap. You'll recognize it as our M-26 fragmentation grenade. Put it in a C-ration can (Chart 5). Pull the pin and tie a wire across. It's just that simple. The only thing that Charlie has provided is a couple of sticks which can be found on the ground. We last encountered one of these devices on 13 February. The enemy uses this grenade against us because it's good for at least one casualty.

However, he may decide to daisy-chain them. There are many ways to daisy-chain (Chart 6). I do not mean to imply that this is the only way. A wire is run across the road to a grenade and the grenade is staked in the ground. The wire goes through the pin of the grenade and from the grenade it is wrapped around a spool, exerting pressure upon it. Pins are then pulled, sequentially down the line. The first one is tripped here. The explosion then breaks the string, relieves the tension on this grenade, releases the spool which causes the second explosion and the process is repeated on down the line. The enemy uses these for distances up to 50 meters along a trail. This can result in a number of casualties.

Here is an example of a manufactured booby trap (Chart 7). It contains a Chinese Communist grenade. However, they reverse the alignment of the pin, pivot pin, and the safety pin. This particular grenade is very seldom found in our area.

The Viet Cong seldom leaves anything on the battlefield unless it suits his purpose. This (Chart 8) is his pressure release type booby trap. It is normally a grenade of some type. We found that the enemy would take an old SKS or other object that was damaged beyond use, leave it booby trapped on the ground, and an inquisitive GI would pick it up as a souvenir.

There is another homemade booby trap that I would like to mention (Chart 9). This device has a French fuze in it, a 3 to 4 second friction type fuze and the Viet Cong use it like the first one I showed you. You just stake it in the ground, place a trip wire across the trail, and the activation of the friction fuze will cause the detonation.

Now I would like to discuss the heavier ordnance. Since we fire a large amount of artillery, we naturally have some duds. If there is a dud in the area, the enemy will find it. The Viet Cong likes to tie an artillery dud to a tree (Chart 10) in order to obtain the greatest effect. He uses either an 81mm mortar round or a 105mm/155mm artillery round. This device was encountered at the Song O Ho River. The artillery round was tied to a branch overhanging the stream. A wire, leading from the dud, was tied to a branch which lay across the stream with a trip wire mechanism attached. Therefore, if you crossed the stream and grabbed the branch to steady yourself, it would break. This would pull the trip wire which would cause an explosion. As a side note, we often use the National Police to assist us in search operations and we recently lost one of these gentlemen due to such a device.

As far as electrical devices are concerned, here is a very simple one made out of pieces of bamboo with tin striker plates (Chart 11). A weakened piece of board is located on the top. When pressure is applied to the board, contact will be established by the striker plate and a detonation will result.

Here is another one that we ran across near the An Lo Bridge. It consists of a thin piece of bamboo with two electrical contact points established near the top (Chart 12). The stick is placed into the ground and can be buried to a point just below the electrical contact points. The trip wires can then be connected to run in any direction. This particular one was linked to a 105mm artillery shell in a tree. Pressure against either side of the top of the bamboo stake causes electrical contact. The electrical charge, for this device, appears to be a handfull of bamboo and string. However, if you look at it very closely you can detect that it is made of the components of an AN/PRC 25 radio battery (Chart 13). In the field we throw away these batteries every day.

What can we do about this. We've discussed the booby traps that we've encountered. In reality, our actions were many and varied. I think the first thing we should mention is a little technique called the "killer eye". It is a 155mm nose plug with 35 meters of string or nylon sus pension cord attached to it (Chart 14). It is thrown ahead of the advancing element and then pulled back towards the thrower in order to detonate any trip wires or cause a pressure release type booby trap to explode. I will briefly mention a few of the techniques involved with using this device. Most of the users have learned the hard way. When you throw this device, you need to have the troops well behind you. They must be kept dispersed because, enroute to its destination, it might detonate something in the heavy underbrush. Also when you throw this device, it should be thrown from the prone position like a grenade. Always instruct your men to take some cover when using this device. When you begin pulling the device towards you, be sure you are in the prone position. One of our sergeants, while on his knees, started to pull the device. An explosion resulted which caught the upper half of his body. As you pull it back, be sure the people behind you stay behind you. A further hint is not to pull the device like a fishing line. Just hold on to it and creep backward, maintaining the 35 meters distance. This device is 35 meters long because that's just about as far as a trooper can throw it. It can be carried in an ammunition pouch. Our SOP requires one per squad operating in a booby trap area. I assure you that, if you follow this advice, you'll sustain not more than one casualty - the man who actually hits the device. In this respect, we prescribe 20 meters as the minimum distance between personnel.

On 16 January, while moving into this same booby trap area, a platoon was walking through a break in the hedgerow. Four men had passed over a booby trap which was, in fact, a 105mm shell buried in the ground with a point sticking up with a pressure type fuze attached. Pressure is required on top of the device to cause detonation. The squad leader, who was the fourth man back, stepped on it, and became KIA. However, the men forward and to the rear of the victim received no shrapnel. This is a strong argument for dispersion.

Let me cite an example that happened yesterday. While running a combined operation with PF elements south of the An Lo Bridge, an area continuously inhabited by friendly farmers, a PF soldier moved through a hedgerow followed by the entire platoon. The district chief, police chief, district advisor and 3 PF soldiers were also moving through the hedgerow behind the platoon. An explosion occurred. It was a 105mm artillery booby trapped round. The results: 3 KIA and 3 WIA. Why? All participants were only a few feet apart. If you've ever walked around after a booby trap has gone off, there's a little sensitivity in the area. Of course you want to try and get the men moving quickly into the attack in order to eliminate this feeling.

FIELD EXPEDIENT

Something which we have found very useful is a field expedient which consists of a uniform for the point man. It's made up of a very large pair of fatigues. Inside the fatigues are seven hunks of this armored vest, both trousers and jacket. It does provide shrapnel protection. It does have one disadvantage - it weighs 45 pounds. You'd obviously wear out a point man rapidly especially in weather such as we have today, however, if you rotate your point every 20 minutes it can be used effectively in the field. If units want to try this idea all you have to do is take an old salvaged flak vest, convert it into fatigues. The number you can obtain is dependent upon your supply system; we have four of these outfits in the battalion and usually provide them to the company that is operating in the booby trap area. We have not hit a booby trap since 13 February. We obtained these flak vests about a week later.

TRAINING

We felt that a critical need for training in anti-mining and booby trapping techniques existed. Even though we were operating in the field in the real situation we still had to get vital information down to the soldier who was living through all of this on a daily basis. We felt a very critical need for training because we encountered something every day that we wanted everyone in all the companies to know about. In the field, it is very difficult to say "Ok Platoon Leader, conduct your training". In order to afford a satisfactory solution, the Division Engineers sent a Mobile Training Team to deliver the message. This team would displace by helicopter, land at a company position, and present a two hour class. The team eventually covered all company size combat units in the division within two and one-half months.

It might be interesting to digress for a moment and observe how this engineer mobile training team prepared itself for its mission. The team went to the Third Marine Division's Land Mine Warfare/Demolitions School and attended their courses. We also sent our MTT's down to the Land Mine Warfare School of the 25th Infantry Division. As a last preparatory measure, we requested that elements of the First ARVN Division, who had operated in our battalion area of operations, share their experiences with us. Training is an important thing and it can be done in the field.

HARDWARE

I would now like to discuss some of the "hardware" that we use in booby trap situations. We approached the Division Chemical Officer on the subject. He thought, perhaps, that we could burn these booby traps up. We loaded a CH-47 Chinook with 55 gallon drums of fougasse, became airborne, and eventually [illegible] over an area that was suspected to be filled with the enemy mines and booby traps. We dropped the fougasse and ignited it. The only significant results were a few secondary explosions. Although it was effective, the dispersion was not as great as we would have liked to have seen. In other words, you would probably burn an area not much larger than this room.

Since the terrain is as flat as the surface of a pool table, there was no way for it to run and gain distance. Perhaps the best way would be to drop a barrel at a time and just clear a path.

USE OF ARTILLERY

Another device that we have used to detonate mines and booby traps is artillery in the area using a VT fuze. We have found this to be very effective. The use of H&I fires in the area has resulted in some detonations. We have used artillery fire in front of the platoons as they have moved out. However, due to safety reasons the distance between friendly troops and the artillery impact area provides a sizeable buffer zone covered by small arms fire. We normally use the M-79 grenade launcher to cover this buffer zone, firing at suspected targets as friendly forces moved into the area. There are disadvantages to this technique. The use of small arms fire can give away your position immediately and assist the enemy in identifying your direction of movement.

SCOUT DOGS

We have also used scout dogs. These animals are very good for detecting things that are unusual in the area. They have effectively assisted us in detecting tripwires and pressure devices. However, dogs tire withing 3 to 4 hours and must be rotated. If you keep a scout dog on the alert very long fatigue usually results. To offset this condition we normally have two or three scout dog teams with a company and usually rotate them during the day. A scout dog team is an asset in a field situation such as this.

COMBINED ARMS

The 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment (minus Troop D) often operates in our area of operation. We grew tired of our infantrymen losing limbs so we combined our cavalry-infantry assets. We formed a combined arms task force, walking the infantry behind the armored personnel carriers and tanks. This was very effective because we were able to detonate anti-personnel mines very easily and clear the path for the infantry in an area devoid of AT mines. The infantry in turn found 105mm and 155mm booby trapped shells and various types of mines. The combined arms team was most effective in the kind of operation.

ROME PLOW

At this point in time (January 1969), we analyzed the area and determined that it should be "Rome plowed". We though of the concept of just "planing" the surface and getting rid of all the mines and booby traps once and for all. We submitted a request and the area was cleared by Rome plows. The stretch of land we are working on is as outlined (Chart 15). The area represents the "hotspot" of booby trap activity. We planned to move straight from the foothills all the way to the Song Bo River. Thus far, we have plowed 1800 acres of land. This technique has been very effective because we have located the enemy's tunnels, spider holes, and detonated his booby traps with very little damage to the Rome plow. We have used it many times and detonated 105mm artillery rounds with no damage to the vehicle.

TRAINING

What have we achieved in four months of combating mines and booby traps in our area of operations? First, we have learned and experienced many things. We have made our area one that is no longer Viet Cong controlled. We have significantly reduced our casualties. We have learned, and put into practice, techniques to deny the enemy the ability to use booby traps against us. We entered a very frustrating situation and have moved to the point now where we can hold our heads up high.

Perhaps, our very best activity has been producing the well-trained soldier. A soldier knowing what to look for, being able to find the mine and booby trap on the ground, is indispensable.

SUMMARY

Let us look at a few figures (Chart 16). I have previously mentioned that there were some fortifications in the area. There were tunnels, spider holes, and caves. Last November we were in this area with bare hands and infantrymen. At that time we found 15 fortifications and destroyed them. During December we found more enemy fortifications and requested the use of the Rome plow to clean out the scrub brush on the surface of the ground in order to uncover the tunnel complexes. In January, we began to use the Rome plow. On the very first day we discovered fifteen tunnels. During the entire month we uncovered over a hundred tunnels and other fortifications. We have uncovered four tunnels during the first twenty-seven days of March. We have, in fact, stripped the "Rome plow" cleared area of the protective fortifications utilized by the Viet Cong. We have also put a crimp in his booby trap activities and learned how to deal with the booby trap environment to reduce our casualties.

I showed you Area A and Area B on a previous chart. In November, we lost many people due to booby traps. However, in March, the booby trap incident rate dropped to zero. In Area B we reduced our own casualties. We also, in that area, reduced the number of booby trap incidents to zero in February. We feel that we can point with some pride to the fact that we've learned to deal with the booby trap situation and also, frustrate the enemy in his ability to use them against us. There was the psychological impact of denying an area to the Viet Cong. This was a large area which the enemy had used for cover and concealment and which afforded him a route into Camp Evans and the An Lo Bridge. I will also mention that very few Hoi Chanhs were discovered in our earlier operations. However, within the last several weeks, nine Hoi Chanhs have entered the program. We have learned, via interrogations, what the enemy's thoughts are. These concern such things as "There are too many Americans", "There are too many tanks out there", "There's too much artillery out there", or "We don't have a place to store our rice". In effect, we have denied him the area which he previously had denied us. For a wrap up, I'd like the Brigade S2, Captain Frederick, to give us his view of our operational experience over the past four months.

As you can see from LTC Sherron's comments, the enemy has made extensive use of the area. However, he has been forced to change his tactics drastically. He lost approximately one-third of his personnel due to friendly activity. Earlier, I mentioned communication routes. I discussed two. One route runs to Thoung An. The second route runs from Hien An, via Hien Si, to Dong Lam. The enemy has been

forced to come out of the mountains, cross the Song Bo River, and seek rice in this area. It is our opinion that the enemy has lost his foothold in this area even though small segments of C-113 still exist. He has relinquished his hold mainly due to the relentless pressure and perseverance of our forces.

LESSONS LEARNED

When a unit hits its first booby trap it should slow down. This should be followed by a slow meticulous search of the area. Do not let the enemy observe you establishing a pattern. Move short distances and move at night. Develop patience. Train the soldier to be patient as he moves through the area. Be sure that it is SOP that 20 meters is maintained between soldiers. Use body armor, armored vehicles, Rome plows.

Use all the ordnance you can obtain. Your artillery, tactical air, fougasse, M-79's. Use the bangalore torpedo. Always brief your incoming units since AO's are frequently swapped. Teach your men to police the battlefield.

101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AM)

CHARTS



INFILTRATION ROUTES

1D BRIGADE AO

CHART 1

PHONG DIEN DISTRICT



CHART 2

MEAL, COMBAT, INDIVIDUAL
BEEF SLICES & POTATOES
W/GRAVY
B-2 UNIT

ĐỪNG BƯỚC VÀO
CON ĐƯỜNG NÀY
NGUY HIỂM

C-RATION BOX LID
CHART 3



AREAS A AND B
CHART 4



M-26 FRAGMENTATION GRENADE BOOBY TRAP
CHART 5



M-26 FRAGMENTATION GRENADE BOOBY TRAP

CHART 6



CHI COM GRENADE BOOBY TRAP
CHART 7



PRESSURE RELEASE TYPE BOOBY TRAP
CHART 8 UNCLASSIFIED



FRENCH FUZED GRENADE BOOBY TRAP

CHART 9



ARTILLERY DUD BOOBY TRAP

 CHART 10



ELECTRICAL HOMEMADE BOOBY TRAP
CHART 11



BAMBOO STAKE BOOBY TRAP
CHART 12



BAMBOO STRIP BOOBY TRAP WITH COMPONENTS, AN-PRC 25 BATTERY ENCLOSED

CHART 13



155 ARTILLERY FUZE PLUG WITH 35 METERS OF NYLON CORD USED AS A DEVICE TO DETONATE BOOBY TRAPS

"KILLER EYE"

CHART 14



ROME PLOWED AREA

CHART 15

BOOBY TRAPS AND CASUALTIES

MONTH	U.S. KIA	U.S. WIA	TOTAL CAS	TOTAL BBT ENGAGED
NOVEMBER	3	24	27	23
DECEMBER	4	28	32	29
JANUARY	1	22	23	22
FEBRUARY	0	3	3	14
MARCH	0	0	0	0
CUM TOTAL	8	77	85	88

ENEMY POSITIONS DESTROYED

MONTH	MONTHLY TOTALS
NOVEMBER	16
DECEMBER	29
JANUARY	52
FEBRUARY	64
MARCH	4
CUM TOTALS	165

CHART 16

PRESENTATION

MACV J2 CMEC

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

General Drake, General Carney, Gentlemen: I'm from the Combat Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) MACV J2 Section. This is the organization that takes a considerable length of time to provide you with pertinent information. However, we are taking steps to remedy this situation as it pertains to mines and booby traps.

My purpose is to discuss the SECMA program. SECMA is an acronym for Study and Evaluation of Countermine Activities. The purpose of SECMA is to provide a means of analyzing mine and booby trap activities and exploiting the information gained. The desired end result is to minimize, in-country, the number of enemy mine and booby trap incidents.

In early 1967, the Army Concept Team in Vietnam, (ACTIV), made a study of enemy mines and booby trap incidents in-country. It was determined that 4300 friendly casualties resulted from enemy mines and booby traps. Seventy (70) percent of friendly tank and armored personnel carrier losses were due to mines and booby traps. As a result of its analysis, ACTIV produced a seven volume study on this subject. One of the recommendations of this study was that a central staff agency be designed to exploit the system, reporting on enemy mines and booby traps. CMEC has been delegated the responsibility to conduct the SECMA program. CMEC will be assisted in this endeavor by the Mine Warfare Center of the USARV Engineer Section. The latter agency will conduct an analysis on mines and booby traps as well as countermine research and development.

In front of each of you is a form (Handout 1) entitled "Mine/Booby Trap Report". This form contains the format for the reporting of enemy mine and booby trap incidents. A MACV directive will be published highlighting how this form is to be filled out, who is responsible for filling it out, and method of submission of this report to higher headquarters.

The second handout (Handout 2) contains a brief summary about the SECMA project.

MINE/BOOBY TRAP REPORT

1 [ ] Mine

2 [ ] Booby Trap

3 [ ] UNIT (BDE/DIV) 28 [ ]

12 [ ] Day

14 [ ] Time 29 [ ]

18 [ ] Mo

20 [ ] Location 30 [ ]

HOW DETECTED

1. Detonation
2. Visual
3. Civ Informat
4. Dtr PRS-4
5. Dtr PRS-3 or 153
6. Probe
7. Other*

*(Explain in remarks)

TYPE EXPLOSIVE **

1. Mine
2. Claymore
3. Grenade
4. Arty/Mortar Rd
5. Bomb
6. TNT
7. Other*
8. Unknown

ORIGIN OF MANUFACTURE

1. US
2. USSR
3. CHICOM
4. VC Local
5. Other*

**If possible report in remarks; type fuse, type ammo (HE, WP, etc) caliber and lot number if US.

31 [ ]

SIZE OF CHARGE

1. 0-10 lbs
2. 11-20 lbs
3. 21-40 lbs
4. Over 40 lbs

32 [ ]

TYPE FIRING DEVICE

1. Pressure
2. Pressure Release
3. Pull
4. Pull Release
5. Cmd Electric
6. Cmd Pull
7. Press/Electric
8. Tripwire
9. Other*
10. Unknown

T N T

33 [ ]

LAST FRIENDLY PASSAGE

1. 0-1/2hrs
2. 1/2-3hrs
3. 3-6 hrs
4. 6-12 hrs
5. 12-24 hrs
6. 1-2 days
7. Over 2 days
8. Unknown

34 [ ]

CIV IN AREA

1. None
2. Hostile
3. Friendly
4. Indifferent

35 [ ]

TYPE VEHICLE

1. 1/4 T
2. 3/4 T
3. 2½ T
4. 5 T
5. APC
6. Tank
7. Other*
8. N/A

36 [ ]

EXTENT OF DAMAGE

1. Light(operational)
2. Moderate(org maint)
3. Heavy(spt maint)
4. Destroyed

TOTAL CASUALTIES

37 KIA [ ]

39 WIA [ ]

CASUALTY DATA

	TYPE	MAJOR INJURY LOCATION	BODY ARMOR
	1. KIA 2. WIA	1. Head/Neck 2. Upper Torso 3. Abdomen/Groin 4. Feet/Legs 5. Hands/Arms	1. Yes 2. No
Man #1	41 [ ]	42 [ ]	43 [ ]
Man #2	44 [ ]	45 [ ]	46 [ ]
Man #3	47 [ ]	48 [ ]	49 [ ]
Man #4	50 [ ]	51 [ ]	52 [ ]
Man #5	53 [ ]	54 [ ]	55 [ ]
	56 [ ]	57 [ ]	58 [ ]

To be forwarded to HQ, MACV-CICV (CMEC), ATTN: ENGR, APO 96307

HAND OUT 1

E-2

Study and Evaluation of Countermine Activities (SECMA) 14 Feb 69

1. In early 1968 the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) headquartered at USARV Hqs, Long Binh, RVN conducted a SECMA project. The project involved, for the most part, selected Army and Marine Units throughout the RVN.

2. The major effort of the study centered around the report format attached here as Inclosure #1. The report was filled out for all mine and booby trap incidents. The reports were very accurately and neatly completed by everyone from squad leaders to company commanders to battalion S2's.

3. The reports were forwarded to ACTIV on a monthly basis. At ACTIV, they were put into a computer program and monthly/bimonthly printouts were obtained. These summarized mine and booby trap incidents for each reporting unit. Since the study was aimed towards technical rather than combat intelligence, plotouts (map overlays) were apparently not made.

4. The project, as it is being reinstituted command wide by MACV, will be aimed mainly at technical intelligence. We feel that the monthly or bimonthly (not decided upon yet) analyses will be of interest to the tactical field commander. Hopefully, after a period of 3-6 months, trends will be identified that will be of great use to the field commander. These might include locations, employment, types of firing devices, and types of mines or booby traps predominant in a given area. The goal here is to enable field commanders to better utilize their resources and, most importantly, to help reduce friendly casualties. Analyses, in report form, will be disseminated by MACV J2 as soon as possible after the close of each reporting period. Significant information of urgent tactical use will be disseminated by electrical message.

5. To make this project work, it is imperative that G2/S2 officers understand it, appreciate its potential results, sell it to their commanders, and insure that all responsible personnel throughout the unit appreciate the importance of rapidly and accurately completing and forwarding the report format.

6. If questions arise about the forthcoming MACV Directives on this project, the quickest response will be obtained by directly contacting the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center.

Phone: TSN-3373/2309
MACV-4218
EAC-168

HQ MACV-CICV (CMEC)
ATTN: Engr Sec
APO 96307

Handout 2

PRESENTATION

USARV ENGINEER

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

General Drake, General Carney, Gentlemen. I am Major Skinner, a representative of the USARV Engineer Section's Mine Warfare Center. After having listened to your comments through this seminar. I feel I should be able to offer you a quick solution to many of your problems. Unfortunately, I cannot do it nor will the magic of my USARV patch allow it. But I can give you one man's solution to a booby trap problem.

A traveling salesman who, a few years ago, rather than travel around in a car and stay at farmhouses used to fly from place to place which required him to fly a great deal. This occurred in the period about a decade ago when a lot of bombs were being placed in aircraft. The salesman was quite worried that someday he might get on the wrong plane. He conducted a very thorough analysis and ascertained that the odds of a bomb being carried onto a single plane were about 1 in 50,000. This fact, temporarily, pleased him. After he had made dozens of additional trips he began to think about how much he was flying and what his odds were of getting that one plane in 50,000. After making a second study he determined that the odds of carrying two bombs on the same plane were one in a billion. This really pleased him so he thought he would play the odds. From that time on, whenever he flew, he carried a bomb with him.

I am the Analysis Officer in the Mine Warfare Center so you can see what sort of things are going through my mind by that story. I am prepared to briefly discuss what the Mine Warfare Center is doing and what we're interested in. The Mine Warfare Center was organized last January and is under the Engineer Section, Military Operations Division, USARV G3. The Center is composed of three officers and three enlisted men.

Our mission is to serve as a point of contact between Research and Development activities in CONUS and units in the field. We also have an interest in conducting analyses of all the data we can gather from the field.

Let me first discuss some of our activities in the countermine area and what's being done in R&D. There is an ENSURE program which stands for "Expediting Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment". The USARV G-3 is the action officer on this particular program. It is a system whereby if you have an idea for a piece of equipment you need which is not in the current inventory and you can formulate the requirement, the item can be built in CONUS and shipped to the user in an expeditious fashion. This is assuming that the item is not too technically complicated. It does, however, save some time from the normal 10 year lag but probably not a whole lot.

There have been some mine rollers brought into country and tested. For example, there is ENSURE Item 202. This is a mine roller that can be pushed by either an APC (one model) or a tank (second model). These items work on an air transfer bellows system which applies air pressure from the vehicle on to the rollers themselves. The roller consists of two banks of wheels, one bank in front of each track. The bank of wheels (6 wheels in all) are individually articulate. This means they can move individually when one moves into a rut, the other wheels remaining level. There was a system which allowed the pressure to be redistributed so that you obtain good pressure in the hole. However, nothing covered the gap in between the two banks of tracks. That's one of the major problems because you can tow anything. towing is always much easier than trying to push something.

These rollers were tested by the 4th Engineers, the 26th Engineers in the American Division (APC model) and the 65th Engineers in the 25th Infantry Division (tank model). The tank model showed great promise. Both models ably demonstrated their ability to detonate mines. The technique developed is that when they detonate a mine, the wheel assembly blows up (it's expendable) and there's a shear device whereby it will break free from the bay roller assembly which is not expendable. The wheel assembly costs several hundred dollars but it's quite a bit cheaper than a life, a casualty, a lost tank, or APC.

These experiments proved worthwhile. There were several mechanical failures in the structures, i.e., the main frame. The APC roller was found to adversely influence the performances of the APC. It drained too much power from the engine. The roller attachment is now being redesigned for the tank pushed ENSURE item 202. I've also learned that it is eighteen months away from issue which is rather discouraging.

There are three or four mine rollers now in-country. One is located with an engineer battalion in the Delta. The 34th Engineer Battalion is preparing to build one. In addition, the 65th Engineer Battalion and the USARV Mine Warfare Center each have one. The latter was designed by Major Kleb and constructed by an engineer battalion located at Long Binh (Chart 1). The roller was built in January and tested a month later. The roller was tested on a 20 pound mine and the latter blew up the frame. Another one has been built and is being tested today. In several weeks, we should hopefully be able to show you some films of a successful test that has taken place. Several days ago, the Chief of Engineers saw the device and was very pleased. He offered to have the main frame built in the States. If this occurs and our tests are successful, what we hope to do is provide any unit which is charged with a road clearing responsibility with one of these devices.

In order to adapt the mine roller to a usable Army vehicle, it will take a modification to a 5 ton truck which is the vehicle we're using to push the test roller. A 5 ton truck or any larger vehicle is what is required to push this roller. It requires a tow device to cover the center lane of the road which is not covered by the tow banks of wheels in the front. Thus far, this device offers real promise. I wish I could give you the results of the test today.

Mine detectors are found to be entirely unsatisfactory in many parts of the country, particularly in the Delta and some parts of III Corps. In lieu of finding manufactured mines or ordnance in the road, they are finding recast TNT wrapped in a bag, burlap, or plastic container of some configuration. If a very small amount of metal is available in a pressure electric system, the mine detector will not pick it up. One reason for this is the presence of too much background noise on the road from H & I fires. In order to define what the mine detector is capable of doing, we have just completed several tests and are presently attempting to relate our results in terms of what the average background noises are. What, in fact, can a detector pick up in your area of operations?

This test was conducted at Long Binh. It will, when you see the report, have some benefit to you and you can adapt it to your area and determine what a well-trained operator can achieve with a P-153 mine detector. Believe me, not everybody can use a P-153 mine detector. Various units have vigorous programs for training their personnel. The Australian Task Force, for example, makes it a very prestigious position to be the mine detector operator.

The other mine detector that exists is the non-metallic detector, the PRS-4. It works on a density principle. Whenever there is a change of density in the soil such as a tree root, tin can, or similar item, it will provide a signal. However, experience has shown that there are too many false signals with this

detector. If you use it religiously you'll find that you are stopping, in most cases, every 6 inches, a foot, or yard. Most units don't use it. This summer we're obtaining PRS-7's in-country to replace all PRS-4's. However, it's the same detector, transistorized and lighter.

We have been working on a couple of mine detectors that are just in a conceptual stage. One is a neutralization device which will neutralize all explosive devices in the ground. This will be a great accomplishment. The objective guide sounds beautiful but, again, it's a long way off. Also, there are such things as jeep mine detectors which have been around for some time. there are also some remote control jeep mine detectors just coming over. These, however, work on the metallic principle and they will only enjoy limited success. In the areas that primarily have metallic mines, they should work quite well. Otherwise, they're going to be destroyed quickly and are very expensive.

Another area I want to touch on is scout dogs. I'm very pleased to mention that the 101st Abn Div likes scout dogs and uses them very much. I don't believe any of the scout dogs in-country have received any special or extensive training in mine or booby trap detection. There is, however, a platoon being formed in the states due in-country in April which has 30 dogs - 12 trained in mine and booby trap detection, 12 trained in mines, tunnels and caches, and 6 spare dogs. There's going to be a sixty day training period. These dogs, I believe, are going to the 25th and Americal Divisions.

Some analysis work that is being initiated at USARV is SECMA's reporting system. We're trying to encourage our engineer battalions to begin it at once.

It's going to take a sizeable data bank to get significant findings out of it. Again, I'm sure that a lot of conclusions are going to be fairly obvious. It's going to be a good technique for gathering information.

There are many different areas of search. This could include, for example, a province area or a unit AO, examined and scrutinized and perhaps conclusions drawn from the resultant analysis. Another is the effects of paving or oiling or penepriming roads. I'm sure all of you would agree that paving a road has a great effect on the prevention of mine incidents.

To show exactly what we're talking about, I've picked a few roads on which we're attempting to obtain data. Unfortunately, none are in I Corps. We're working on QL-19, between An Khe and Pleiku, two roads in III Corps near the Cu Chi area and QL-4 in the Delta, which is being upgraded now. The resultant statistics are quite favorable. For example, on one stretch of QL-13, Chu Chi to Tra Bang, there were over 100 incidents in 1968. So far this year, there's only been a fraction of that and the paving of the road surface is just about complete. At the present time the incident rate is almost non-existent. There are almost no incidents at all on that section of road.

I see you are running into different things in different areas. When you're traveling cross-country, it's grenades and booby traps. On the roads, it's manufactured ordnance and some captured 105 and 155mm artillery duds. IV Corps, for some reason, has a lot of recast TNT mines. II Corps, in the northern part, has a lot of manufactured mines. The southern part has 105's and 155's. These are only trends.

In the Delta, they are getting a lot of grenades. Grenades, under the water with trip wires; some Chicom grenades and a lot of M-26's. You mentioned lot numbers. I am attempting to trace lot numbers right now. There are many other

general conclusion.

Basically, I would like for you to know that the USARV Land Mine Warfare Center exists. We're expanding our functions. We are trying to develop an effective mine roller and conduct experimentation in mine detection equipment. We would appreciate any problems you desire to present to us as well as any information you would like to exchange with us. Our phone numbers are LONG BINH 4925 or 3734. Thank you.



M2A1 EXPEDIENT MINE CLEARING ROLLER

CHART 1

PRESENTATION
III MAF G2

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

Good afternoon General. I'm Major Sydenham, III MAF G2 Section. We are running a continual study of the mine and booby trap threat existent throughout ICTZ. We've noticed as part of our record keeping that the ROK Marine brigade, which operates in the southeastern portion of Quang Nam province, has an outstanding ratio of booby traps and mines discovered and neutralized as opposed to those that are unintentionally detonated. We thought, perhaps, that there is a reason for this success so we sent an officer down recently to talk with them to find out why. We also heard that the Australian Task Force, which operates in III Corps, has had similar success. They were also visited by the same officer. Unfortunately, we did not come up with a magical solution. We found that their success is based on the same sound tactical principles and command emphasis that you would suspect.

I would like to confine my remarks to a visit with the 3rd ROK Marines since they are operating in I Corps. Probably the basic reason for their success is the extreme emphasis that the ROK Brigade Commander places on the mine and booby trap threat. To illustrate this emphasis, I would like to relate to you what the ROK Bde G3 told our visiting officer when he went down there to get General Lee's reaction. He said that prior to every operation General Lee sends a message to the unit involved and always closes with the same words, "Spread Out". Then he goes down to the COC and monitors the operation. The G3 said that if there is one booby trap detonated and a casualty results, General Lee gets mad but he just sits there. If there is one booby trap detonated and two casualties result, he gets on the radio to the battalion commander and raises "ned" with him. If there is one booby trap detonated with three casualties General Lee gets very unhappy. The G3 then runs and hides someplace and General Lee gets in his chopper and flies out to the field. What happens there was not related.

The ROK brigade keeps very detailed records of their mine and booby trap experience. Any battalion that has a ratio of those discovered and neutralized to those discovered and unintentionally detonated less than 1 to 1 is in big trouble for that month.

Now to specific countermeasures that the brigade employs to reduce the threat in their area. There is an intensive training program that starts in Korea. After new troops arrive in South Vietnam, another intensive 5 day training program is conducted in which mines and booby traps are discussed. They also have a 3 day mine and booby trap school which is based on the one established by the 1st Marine Division. This school is attended by all platoon leaders, squad leaders, fire team leaders, and point men. Other personnel of the brigade attend as time permits. In addition, every squad carries a 3 prong grappling hook to clear mines in the same way described by LTC Sherron. They try to hold their operations to a 7-10 day time frame. They've also learned that as the length of an operation increases, the troops become careless and an increase in mines and booby trap incidents will result. When they run across a heavily mined area, they bypass it. They stress careful movement and dispersal - a minimum of 15 yards between men.

In summary, their success can be attributed to training and strenuously applied principles; their degree of success is directly proportional to the emphasis placed on it by all leaders from the brigade commander down to the fire team leaders. For the second part of the III MAF presentation, LTC Bunnell, who has very recently joined

the III MAF G2 Section from the 7th Marine Regiment where he spent 7 months, will discuss the problems that arise in Quang Nam Province in which our records show that over 50% of all casualties occur because of mine and booby trap incidents.

I'm a recent addition to your program, I came up here mostly just to visit with your G2 but I did spend 7 months with the 7th Marines. More than 50% of the casualties in the First Marine Division are caused by booby traps. There are two major areas: (1) Where the 1st Marines are operating south of Da Nang along the seacoast; (2) The other along the western approach to Da Nang and, in particular, the area known as the "Rocket Belt" - an area from which the rockets are fired on Da Nang. We have the "Rocket Belt" area. Booby traps are a daily occurrence, I'm sorry to say, in that area everyday; the only problem is the number that they will have and what they will do about it.

There is a vast and intensive program within the First Marine Division concerning this problem. For example, the ADC has been assigned by CG, 1st Mar Div, to conduct a series of seminars on this very subject. There was a meeting of all regimental commanders to discuss it last Tuesday. We've had a series of division seminars always looking, as people mentioned earlier today, for some magical solution. We've come up with none.

The division does conduct a school, an intensive school and everyone from the private up goes through the Land Mine Warfare School. There's indoctrination at battalion, company, and platoon level. No marine in the First Marine Division is allowed to go out on any patrol until he's been down at the company level for at least 5 days and during those 5 days he gets a minimum of 4 hours of instruction on mines and booby traps.

We have an intensive program of road preparation and this, perhaps, will be my only reference to the mine as a road mine or a land mine as opposed to the surprise firing device problem. We found that we can do a great deal in the First Marine Division TAOR with a program of paving where possible and we have only one or two of the roads that are of sandy surface. We oil the surface when we can't pave. The best single way to spot mines, despite the metal detector, for both engineers and the infantry, is a sharp pair of eyes and a change in the surface condition of the road. The patrol that goes over the road daily, if it's a road that has been oiled, will spot a change in the road and this picks up 85-90% of our mines.

We keep very intensive book in the 7th Marines right down to battalion. Battalion commanders keep book on the company commanders and, I'm sure, it moves all the way down to the fire team. We maintain records on what percentage of the casualties are caused by surprise firing devices. What percentage of the surprise firing devices are detonated as opposed to discovered. How many casualties per detonation - the same problem the ROK Brigade had. What percentage of our surprise firing devices are discovered as a result of the Voluntary Informant Program. We maintain these records weekly at the regimental level. The indications are very clear that the best outfit in the regiment, the best company in the battalion, and the best platoon in the company has the best percentages right down the line - it's the same problem LTC Sherron mentioned.

When you get good training and good leadership and good direction right down to the platoon, we come very close to whipping our problem.

In our First Marine Division seminar, the 7th Marine's contribution was a second lieutenant whose platoon in the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, had been in Operation Dodge City, through the "Rocket Belt", and had discovered 50 mines in the past three months and never detonated one of them. This fellow told the division command group this story, "I just don't allow them in my platoon". He personally briefed every patrol before it departed on a mission. No man was a point man in his platoon, ever, unless he had been in-country for three months. He trained his point men individually to watch for people who were especially good at detecting mines and booby traps and when it came time to relieve a point man in one of his fire teams, he knew which man was the next man in that fire team and he moved the selected individual up to it. Every time they discovered a mine or booby trap in the field, he had a standard SOP. When someone shouted "Booby Trap", everyone froze in place. There was none of this running to the side where you'd catch the second booby trap. They all froze. His squads carried their grappling hooks. Every night when they came back from patrol they discussed the booby trap problem and it was just a matter of pride in that platoon that they just "do not detonate booby traps" and they haven't. I think the example is there and is a valid one.

The experienced fire team point man will spot the booby trap nine times out of ten. When the percentage of booby traps exploded goes above 50% you've got a bum point man out there. That's all there is to it. If troops are stumbling over them, they are not adequately trained. A well trained Marine, who has gone through these schools, just doesn't kick the things.

What conclusions can I offer? In the case of road mining, we believe that a great deal can be done by clearing the shoulders of the road and by paving the surface of the road. The cheapest way is dumping diesel fuel on the road or oiling the road. This will provide a surface that will show signs of tampering. We believe that there should be an intensive training program. This means that it should have priority over other training programs since more than 50% of our casualties are produced by booby traps. It's our number one training objective in the First Marine Division.

We train every man on his way in to a unit. We insist on training every man before he is allowed to go on a patrol. We have a contact team, similar to what the Third Marine Division has, which flies out on short notice and hits each company once a month. We demand command attention right down through the platoon leader, squad leader and fire team leader. If I haven't offered you any real secrets I'm sorry. However, we think this is the right way to attack it.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

After each representative completed his presentation a short discussion ensued on the salient points addressed. The content of these discussions are summarized in question and answer form.

THIRD MARINE DIVISION

Q. How frequently does the Viet Cong mark the location of a mine?

A. The answer is quite frequently. We have discovered several types of marking devices. One that is frequently used is the broken stick. Another marker that we found quite recently was a vine with rocks tied to it and placed in a circle. Another type of marker is the familiar outline of an arrowhead formed by rocks. We've also noted that sometimes the mines are piled at right angles to the mine marker.

Q. In your countersweep operations, what particular techniques do your people follow when attempting to locate enemy claymores and ambushes?

A. We put our "trust" in our security force. This is a sweep team in staggered formation. Of course, with the mine detector and the prober behind him, we have a repeated pattern of detector - prober, detector - prober. In front of this team, of course, is a point man. We hope that, through their vigilance, the team will locate some of the enemy claymores and ambushes. Our sweep personnel are primarily concerned with observing the road and its shoulders.

Q. How does the enemy camouflage these claymore mines?

A. The enemy normally identifies a narrow portion of a high cut on each side of the road where there's dense vegetation and the likelihood exists that friendly forces will send out flank security. The enemy also secures the claymores up in the trees and brush. The mines are not actually located on the surface of the ground. In this respect, the mines are partially camouflaged. There is another tactic that they've developed. As you know, we have responsibility for Route 9. Lately, we have been receiving quite a bit of enemy activity with respect to enemy mine incidents. Of course, when you blow these mines, the detonation leaves a crater which causes an obstruction in the road. This requires that the hole caused by the detonation, be filled. The Seabees have countered this by piling rocks along the road at "logical" mining locations in an attempt to expedite the filling of holes. However, the enemy is now inserting his claymores into these piles of rock. I migh also add that as improvements are made on the raod, such as grading, it really complicates our road mine sweeps. As I pointed out earlier, 90% of our mines are discovered visually. This is because Route 9 is a hard-surface road. Anytime you attempt to dig up the surface of such a road and attempt to bury a mine beneath, it's difficult to camouflage it. When the Marine grader grades the road for maintenance purposes, a sizeable quantity of loose dirt is left on the surface of the road. This affords the necessary materials for camouflaging the emplacement of a mine. This is basically accomplished by burying the mine and spreading rocks over the top of it to ensure that the mine is well camouflaged.

Q. What is the mormal size of your security force in the directed sweep?

A. On routine sweeps, we use two squads of infantry and a couple of armored vehicles.

Q. With respect to these two squads that serve as security on the mine sweep, do you rotate the squads or do you use a couple of dedicated squads?

A. Unfortunately sir, it depends on who's in the area. Our battalions move through out the area very frequently. Our sweep teams are established at various locations and maintain the same sweep pattern.

However, as the various infantry battalions or companies move into an area, a representative would just say 1st Plat, Co A, you have the sweep tommorrow morning". The following morning, this platoon would show up at the designated start point at 0630 hours. Our sweep team would attempt to brief them on what they might find and what the route formation would be. There is no continuous use of the same infantry personnel.

Q. How far do you sweep down the road?

A. The average sweep is about 4000 to 5000 meters and we're usually finished about 1000 hours. This representative of a very slow sweep.

Q. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the mine detector?

A. It is the best device that we have available for detecting mines. You can use a substitute item such as a pick. However, you have to patch the road back up again.

Q. What is your opinion concerning the techniques of asphalting the surface of the road as an anti-mining technique?

A. Asphalting is a very effective anti-mining technique. The Viet Cong will often dig a hole, bury a mine, and patch the hole with asphalt. Then, they will take a tire and run it back and forth several times to ensure that road will appear to have been used.

Q. To what extent do you find anti-personnel mines connected to booby traps or other mines (excluding the claymore)?

A. No extent whatsoever. Only the enemy claymore mine has been the real bugaboo.

Q. Are you bothered with small metallic objects such as nails, nuts, and bolts being thrown on the surface of a road either innocently by friendly troops or by the enemy?

A. The P153/158 mine detector picks up metallic objects of any size. This emphasizes one of the purposes of the enemy's false mining routines and that is to wear down the patience of the friendly sweep team.

Q. Is there any reward system for indigenous personnel who report pertinent information on enemy mines and booby trap activity to friendly forces?

A. Yes, the Voluntary Informant Program. We've achieved some degree of success with this particular program. Indigenous personnel in our area are generally poor. They are usually glad to receive the piaster reward after trading off information.

Q. What is the difference between the Soviet TM 46 and TMN 46 mines?

A. The one displayed earlier before you was a TM 46. The TMN 46 has a supplementary fuze well in the bottom for booby trap purposes.

Q. You stated that you get most of your action during a seven day period each month. Do you have any method which gives you an indication when this period might occur such as the "dark of the moon" or anything like that?

A. No sir. This trend is just something I've noticed in the past few months. The enemy selects one particular week each month and really "puts" it to use. The odd thing about it is that it's always in the same place. On Route 9, there is a strip of road 2000 to 4000 meters in length that's mined. This is our only place. During the particular week in question, it is mined everyday. This puts terrific pressure on the sweepsteam. This is where the enemy also established its ambushes. I have no magic answer why or how the enemy picks a particular week. It just so happens that once it starts, you're going to find mines during the remainder of the week. There's another trend that we've noted in connection with this week of mining. There appears to be a definite trend with respect to areas. The enemy selects an area, saturates it with mines for a period of time, then departs. Last November and early December, we found Route 5-61 going north from Cam Lo to Con Thien as their favorite spot.

Q. (MG Drake) I'd like to ask the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) about their experiences in minesweeps and ambushes?

A. Sir, we've had one incident in the 3d Brigade AO where the enemy has sniped at a mine sweep team. We have found dummy ambush positions with some steel rods for rifle barrels and 50 caliber casing placed to resemble a M-60 MG barrel.

TASK FORCE CLEARWATER

Q. Have you had any problems with your PACV's concerning mines?

A. No. In our area, we've had little mining.

Q. (Posed by element, 101st Abn Div (AM) team) As an infantryman, I'm interested in bridges. I've got to protect one down at An Lo. Have you any "Lessons Learned" with regards to floating type mines that might bounce into the structures that hold up the bridge or, any idea of standoff protection devices that might keep them from getting around the pilings?

A. I have been involved in this subject. I've found that the question of water front and base defense is very similar to the bridge defense business. I've been involved in this, regrettably, for about three weeks, courtesy of III MAF and XXIV Corps. It's a real problem. It's a function of how much money people want to spend on it to start with. I know that the question of bridge defense and the associated topic, boat defense/ship defense, has been one of MACV's major problems for the past two years. This is lested as one of COMUSMACV's twenty five major problems every year. Are you talking sophisticated or nonsophisticated approaches to this problem?

We've found that the best defense against any of these drifting devices is a concussion grenade. It'll set them off. But, then, the problem is "do you have enough concussion grenades?" There is a great shortage of these things now. We've found that this is a very useful device against practically all mines, particularly if there's anything floating. If we see anything floating below the surface of the Cua Viet River, we throw a grenade at it because it's liable to be a mine. We have had many detonations. A great number of these thirty eight explosions were brought about be tossing a concussion grenade at a little pile of debris which is standard routine. Now, if you're talking about swimmer as well as mines, we have a different problem. We don't have any perimeter lighting. We're an outpost. A swimmer, who attacked the base on the 21st of February, had Russian SCUBA gear with recycles. The swimmer can stay down three to four hours, walk around at a depth of twenty five feet of water, and the question is "how do you combat a guy like that?" If the enemy's got this kind of gear, you've got troubles.

COMMENT: (101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)) We have responsibility for securing several bridges. First, we put an APC on a sand bar in the river. This vehicle and its occupants are oriented down stream. We've taken two assault boats, built a platform on them, and placed them beneath the bridge and put four infantrymen on them with starlight scopes. These guards look upstream. Then, there is a bridge that runs parallel to the one that we built there which is guarded by the ARVN. We walk our patrol through it and they drop concussion grenades on the side which is upstream. However, this is always a fluctuating problem. These are some of the measures that we have taken which may be of value to the people here.

COMMENT: (3d Marine Division) We have found that firing the M-16 rifle into the river at debris is not as effective as the concussion grenade.

COMMENT: (3d Marine Division) With respect to these floating mines in the Cam Lo River, a waterpoint, and a bridge, we use a flotsam dam which is nothing more than a one inch cable, about 15 or 16 fifty-five gallon drums banded together, and concertina wire underneath the bottom of it. It catches anything that floats down the river.

COMMENT: (Task Force Clearwater) We have a peculiar problem at our outpost. We have a very small base with a large number of multi-size boats. These include patrol craft, logistic craft, etc. About the time we established big barricades to protect our boats from the swimmers, Charlie sends in some 122mm rocket rounds and you've got to scramble the boats. You can imagine such a drill is anything but fun. We're damned if we do and damned if we don't.

Q. Sir, are you going to receive Project Deuce?

A. I understand that there is only one model of Project Deuce in existence in-country. It consists of a fire hose which shoots a high muzzle velocity at the rate of 200 pounds/square inch. We figure we can go driving down the Cua Viet with this hose out in front of us, blow all of the water out of the riverbed, and practically detonate every mine therein. I'm told that the pressure caused by this stream of water will penetrate two feet of concrete at 200 feet. Just think what it would do to a mine at the bottom. It might be a good way of taking out some of these people at night. Anyway, we're going to get the first model over here. The powers that be in the States probably thought that nobody in their right mind would want one of these things. It sounds like a beautiful idea. If you think you've got a mine

threat just go on down the river and blow the mine out of the riverbed. I don't know if the local VC in the resettlement villages would like it very much. It would probably chew up some of their sampans in the process - sounds like a great "gadget" anyway.

101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AM)

Q. Do you have any engineers in direct support of your battalion? If so, how do you employ them.

A. We do not usually have engineers in direct support of our battalion on a daily basis. However, we have used engineers in the area: especially when we started the Rome plow business. We used an engineer element to sweep the way for the plow. We did, unfortunately, lose more engineers due to their encountering frequent trip wires while probing for booby traps and mines with their mine detectors. We primarily use the infantryman with a sharp visual eye and move him ahead of the armored vehicles in the operational area. This does not purport to say that engineers are non-effective.

Q. From the grenades you have discovered or exploded, have you tried to trace any of the lot numbers to see if they originated from our troops or ARVN logistical resources?

A. From experience, I would say it's the grenade that falls off the belt of the troopers. In this case, the troopers are probably mine. However, you have brought up a good point. A trace, by lot numbers, could be most revealing.

Q. It's interesting to note that the enemy seems to employ trip wire specialists in your area. However, why don't they try other techniques such as pressure-electric devices or pressure-type anti-tank mines?

A. I think it's because of the level of operations. The Viet Cong use simple devices such as trip wires. They rarely use an NVA manufactured booby trap.

Q. Has anybody dreamed up a device that could be fired from the M79 grenade launcher that could be used to drag through prospective trip wire locations and set them off.

A. No. We, in our case, attempt to keep this technique very simple. We try to keep it down to something that you would expect every squad or platoon to have. The device, which we showed earlier, has worked quite effectively in our area of operations. If you're using bangalore torpedoes in this respect, you have to put some type of dummy portion in it. If you detonate a mine using just the bangalore torpedo, you will also ignite the bangalore itself and it will also blow up the user. The dummy portion could be made up of bamboo or empty filler portions in front so that when contact is made with an enemy mine or booby trap, it will blow up the dummy portion of the bangalore torpedo.

Q. What about booby trapping the trails the enemy uses to enter your operational area?

A. Generally, we don't mine an area and leave the mines in place. This is due mainly to the fact that we move our units about so rapidly that we, in fact, have little time to exchange information as detailed as the exact location and trace of mines. We're trying to indoctrinate our personnel with the fact that any unit, not in contact, is a reaction force. One of LTC Sherron's units may be in that area right now and, fifteen minutes from now, be lifted out and not see that area for another week. We may have to put another unit in there in the meantime. When we start seeding an area with our own mines, we're creating an unmanageable problem for the next unit that comes in because we've found it impossible to control the location of these minefields and pass the word from unit to unit.

USARV ENGINEER

Q. During my entire tenure of twenty years in the service, the Army has been totally unsuccessful in developing a jeep mounted mine detector. I even wonder about the use of the jeep as a vehicle. It has been so totally unsuccessful. Why don't we mount this mine detector on a truck so that we'll have some confidence. I think the 5 ton truck would be a satisfactory vehicle. We have few casualties in a five ton truck. At least, as it's driven down the road, it should offer some protection and some confidence to the operator.

A. Sir, that's very true. The 5 ton truck is a great vehicle for actually running down a road. You've got several feet of stand-off distance and if you detonate, for instance, strictly a blast mine, you're three or four feet away and you're naturally in good condition. It's hard on the ears and, no doubt about it, it's going to be tough on the wheels, axle, and engine. It can, of course, drive some other material back into the cab but casualties are really reduced by using 5 ton trucks or anything larger. APC's are terrible, mainly because they are too close to the ground. By being too close to the ground, the floor is often driven up into the APC, unfortunately, whether it's a pure blast mine or a fragmentation mine. The jeep is, perhaps, the most unsafe vehicle on the road from a standpoint of mines. A 5 ton truck, or anything larger, is the safest. We're geared towards our engineer battalions or the tank where it will work fine.

Q. What is the status of "Astrolite"?

A. This is a liquid explosive. Last summer, we had a team here with a tunnel destruction kit. It was using nitromethane in lay-flat tubing. The nitromethane was pumped into this tubing and it unrolled as the volume expanded the tube. Accompanying the team was an individual from the Explosive Corporation of America, who was trying to sell a liquid explosive called "Astrolite". This is a two-part explosive. When the two parts are separated, they are inert. They can be mixed together to make an explosive. They can be pumped up to a pressure of 26,000 psi without detonating. It seems to me that this would be a real valuable commodity for counter-booby trap activity similar to LTC Sherron's fougasse experiment. If this stuff was dumped into an area in plastic bags and allowed to spread out over an area and then one detonation occurred, you could obtain large area overpressure that could possibly purify the area of boobytraps.

Q. Can you give us a little more information concerning the mine roller project you previously discussed?

A. The project officer is Major George Kleb, also of the USARV Engineer's Mine Warfare Section. The M2A1 expedient mine clearing roller is so designed that when a mine is hit the wheel assembly blows free and the main frame does not absorb any of the blast effects. It was tested on a 20 pound mine and it worked beautifully. The wheels and tires are of the 5-ton capacity. Each wheel carries more that 650 pounds. It is being transported to the 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, and will be used on two roads near Cu Chi with heavy enemy mining densities. We are also building another model which will include wheels in the mid-section and a wide flange steel frame. Our idea is to put one of these rollers with every unit in the field that conducts extensive minesweeping.

III MAF G2

Q. How much does it cost us on the VIP program to find out about one of these surprise firing devices.

A. Our present rate, it seems to me, is $7.00. This, of course, is dependent upon the size of the ordnance they discover. There is no separate scale for something as distinct as a surprise firing device. Perhaps it should be recommended that the scale for voluntary information have a factor built into it.

COMMEMT: Might I suggest that we're pumping millions of dollars into this country. A marine or a soldier is a lot more valuable than $7.00. I suggest we quadruple it. If there's a price tag on it, let's find what it is and pay it.

CLOSING REMARKS

MG Clifford R. Drake, USMC

Deputy CG, XXIV Corps

I would like to thank our major presenters today, the Third Marine Division for your very interesting and lucid explanation of mine warfare that you're encountering. I was particularly interested in what Charlie is doing to counter your sweep operations and things you're doing to counter-counter him.

Commodore Jewett, we thank you for bringing the "monster of the deep" down here and letting us in on his intricacies. I thought the presentation that you gave, sir, was highly professional and shows that, in the end, professionalism is the answer for reducing casualties from any type of hostile action we encounter.

General Carney, would you like to offer any comments at this time before we wrap up.

Colonel Smith!

Commodore!

Anybody want to throw out a last thought or two here. We advertise on keeping close to the schedule. However, we'd be glad to entertain any last-minute ideas here and, if you do come up with any in the middle of the night, don't forget about them. Instead, write them down.

I'm sure that our experts will be available a few minutes longer for anyone who would like to talk to them individually.

Gentlemen, my thanks to all of you for your participation, the questions that were asked and answered, and the thoughts you've volunteered. We look forward to seeing you, we hope again, at our next seminar. Thank you very much.

SECRET

328

DRAFTER J. W. SHIELDS
SEC DIV REP PH QUANG TRI 202
CWO

PRIORITY 270123Z MAR69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG III MAF
INFO: THIRD MARDIV
FIRST MARDIV
FIRST MAW
FLC
I CORPS ADV GRU
AMERICAL DIV
FIRST AIR CAV
101ST ABN DIV
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF

S E C R E T

PROSSIBLE COMPROMISE OF KAC PAG AND QAL (U)

1. FOR INITIAL RPT IS SUB:

A. KAC PAG 15 REG NR 1142 DAYS 23 MAR-1Apr 69. KAC QAL 506 REG NR 1925 DAYS 23-31 MAR 69. LAST SIGHTED ON 25 MAR 69.

B. RADIO OPR CO E SECOND BN NINTH MAR HAD POSSESSION OF ABOVE PUBS IN BREAST POCKET WHILE CO WAS CONDUCTING SEARCH AND DESTROY

OPN WEST OF CAM LO RVN. AT 1330 CO RECD HEAVY EN MORTAR FIRE. RADIO OPR BLOWN OFF RIDGE AND ROLLED DOWN SIDE OF MOUNTAIN. PRIOR TO

BEING MED EVACED HE INSTRUCTED MARINES NEAR HIM TO CONDUCT SEARCH FOR MATL. CO COMDR INITIATED SEARCH WITH NEGAT RESULTS.

GP-4

CCN 4281 RELEASED BY J A Tolman TIME 270815H

ADJ(RPS) STAND

158

SECRET

[redacted]ED BY: TJC/RAA
[redacted]-2 PH 3202
CWO

PRIORITY 270150 MAR69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG XXIV CORPS

CONFIDENTIAL

ACCUMULATIVE TOTALS FOR OPN DEWEY CANYON

A. C., NINTH MAR LTR 6/RHB/TAS OVER 1650 OF 26MAR69 (NOTAL)
B. III MAF 251645Z MAR69 (C)

1. CONSOLIDATED TOTALS FOR THE SUBJECT OPNS AS PROVIDED THIS HQS BY REF A IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION IN ANSWERING INQUIRY MADE IN REF B.

OPERATION DEWEY CANYON
22 JANUARY 69-18 MARCH 69

KIA	1617	MIXED VEGETABLES		46LBS
POW	5	SOY BEAN OIL		8 CAL
DETAINEES	8	RADIOS		5
CHU HOI	2	MULTIPLEXES		2
BUNKERS	1000	SWITCH BOARD		1
STRUCTURES	373	FIELD PHONES		2
IWC	1223	COMM WIRE		600 FT
CSWC	243		ALIVE	DEAD
S/A AMMO	607874	PIGS	13	75
.50 CAL	17598	CHICKEN	67	83
12.7	65126	GOATS	1	
20MM AA	920	H20 BUFF		6
23MM AA	3636			
37MM AA	23,730			
75 PACK HOW	10			
60MM MORTAR	34,683			
82MM MORTAR	23,281			
120MM MORTAR	4,983			
UNK RDS	65			
85MM ARTY	556			
57MM RR	2,004			
75MM RR	994			
122MM ARTY	7,287			
122MM ROCKET	770			
140MM ROCKET	257			
RPG RDS	14,808			
AT MINES	1,621			
AP MINES	855			
CLAYMORES	444			
EXPLOSIVES	1,910½			
BLASTING CAPS	476			
FUZES	1,212			
DET CORD	1,950FT			

MISCELLANEOUS GEAR

MOVIE PROJECTOR	1
REELS OF FILM	20
LOUD SPEAKERS	2
AMPLIFIER	1

ARTY

	CAPT	DEST	DMG	TOTAL
122MM	6	5	1	12
85MM	4			
UNK		1		
75MM RR	1			
57MM RR	23			

MORTARS

	CAPT
60MM	12
82MM	13
120MM	1

2

			AA GUNS	CAPT	DEST	DMG	TOTAL
GRENADES	50,203						
R GRENADES	10,226			4	1		5
SATCHEL	36	.50 CAL		24	9	1	34
RICE	220,800	12.7		19	2		21
WHEAT	705 LBS	20MM			4		4
HERBS	200"	23MM			1		1
LARD	34 "	37MM		2			2
SUGAR	12 "	40MM					
CORN	863 "						
TOBACCO	210 "						
FLOUR	50 "						
POTATOES	3,690 "						
SALT	4,045 "						

MOTOR TRANSPORT

	CAPT	DEST	DAMG	TOTAL
TRUCKS	31	28	7	66
TRACTORS	4	10	1	15
APC		3		3
JEEP	1			1
PRIME MOVERS	6			6
FRONT LOADER	1			1
ENGINES	3			3
GENERATORS	3			3
TRACTOR CAB	1			1
HYD PUMP	2			2
TIRES	18			18
FUEL	2,750 GAL			
GREASE	370 "			
FUEL DRUMS EMPTY	397 "			
TOOL KIT	1			
BICYCLE PARTS:	108 FRAMES			
	228 RIMS			
	2176 TIRES			
	52 PUMPS			
	18 COMPLETE BICYCLES			
AIR COMPRESSOR	1			

BREAK DOWN OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED

PISTOLS, LUGERS	2
SKS'S	950
AK-47'S	161
PPSK-43	41
MAUSERS	6
RPG'S	18
M-1	1
M-16	1
MACHINE PISTOL	43

GP-4
GCH 45536 RELEASED BY [signature] TIME 2709 45H THROU

SECRET

329

DRAFTED BY: WWB/RKR
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWO

PRIORITY 270210 Z MAR69

COPY TO: G-2
CIC

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN
TO: CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN
INFO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN
CG III MAF, DNG, RVN

3H15T

S E C R E T

A. MACV DIR 525-27

B. IAW REF A FOL REQUEST SUBMITTED:

A. FOURTEEN MINIHANDSIDS, 6 MAGIDS, FIVE ACOUBUOYS, TEN ACOUBUOY BATTERIES, TEN EXTERNAL GSID BATTERY PACKS AND TWO PORTATALES.

B. CHANNEL 31

C. TONE CODES:

	INT	EXT
CH 31:	02	
	03	21
	04	
	NO [redacted]	
	05	
	06	22
	07	
	08	
	09	23
	11	
	NO [redacted]	
	12	
	13	24
	14	
	NO [redacted]	
	16	
	17	25
CH 23:	02	
	03	
	04	
	05	
	06	

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

2 CIC P2

SECRET

D. MULTIPLE

E. CHARLIE

F. END BATT LIFE

G. YD25107620; YD23857560; YD20287670; YD19307570; YD21887520; YD17957385.

H. HAND EMPLACED BY ARVN EMPLACEMENT PERSONNEL.

I. LTCOL M.A. SOFER JR.
TEL NO. 3279/3301; DONG HA AIRFIELD, GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION, THIRD MARDIV.

J. TEN ACOUBUOY BATTERIES, TEN MINIHANDSID BATTERIES, AND TEN EXTERNAL GSID BATTERY PACKS. TWO PORTATALES.

K. SHIP MINIHANDSIDS AND ACOUBUOYS WITH BATTERIES DISCONNECTED.

L. SENSORS WILL BE REQUIRED ON OR ABOUT 10 APRIL AS REPLACEMENTS FOR SENSORS PRESENTLY EMPLACED IN ARVN AO. ADDITIONAL BATTERIES ARE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO REUSE ASSETS WHOSE RECOVERY MAY BE PERMITTED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION. ADDITIONAL PORTATALES ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE A BACKUP FOR PORTATALES PRESENTLY BEING EMPLOYED ON SEVEN SENSOR READOUT SITES.

GP-4

CCN H538 RELEASED BY M.A. Sofer Jr TIME 1330 H MAR69

SECRET

330

*****ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1380 0860250
ZNY SSSSS
Z 270250Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS IOC PHB
BT
S E C R E T L I M D I S
ARCLIGHT
A. CG XXIV CORPS MSG 261730Z MAR 69
1. IAW REF A THIS HEADQUARTERS GRANTS CLEARANCE/ CONCURRENCE ON TGT IT 9592 UNTIL 102400H APR69.
2. THERE ARE NO OPT NO FRIENDLY TROOPS OR RECON PATROLS IN OR WITHIN THREE(3) KILOMETERS OF THE TGT BOX.
GP-4
BT
1380

Tod/0356/KRW Cooper

SECRET

SECRET 331

D ATTAR 32/HI/MAP
S V DIV INSP MI 3132
C:O

PRIORITY 2 MISSIONS 25 MAR 69

COPY TO:
OSJA THIRD MARDIV QTR

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV QTR (SC-32)
TO: CG III MAF DNG
CG XXIV CORPS PHB
INFO: SECOND BN, FOURTH MARINES
THIRD RECON BN

SECRET

III MAF PASS TO INSPECTOR
XXIV CORPS PASS TO AVIL-ATC

SIR 1-14 (III MAF SIR 2-1-69)

A. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 120517Z MAR 69
B. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 311015Z JAN 69
C. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 060525Z FEB 69
D. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 071027Z FEB 69

1. CFTT (AIR)

2. 301458H JAN 69

3. YD 082751

11. C. VICTIMS REC'D INJURIES WHEN MISTAKEN FOR ENEMY TROOPS AND WERE FIRED UPON BY FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT AND FRIENDLY ARTILLERY USING 2.75 ROCKETS AND "FIRECRACKER" ROUNDS.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY/FINAL REPORT

GP-4

CGR H1.10 REL BY T. Hayes

INSP OSJA

SECRET

AIR 0 ____ 4

SECRET

FROM: AIR 27206 5 MAR 69

332

FM: CG THIRD MAR DIV
TO: CG 1FH
OIC VANDEGRIFT DASC

INFO: CG XXIV CORPS PHU BAI RVN
CG 1ST MAW DANANG

//SECRET//

SUBJ: FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION 3-69

A. HQMC DASC ESG 190045Z MAR 69 (NO TAL)
B. CG THIRD MAR DIV 111240Z MAR 69

1.(S) REFERENCE A ADJUSTS BUFFER ZONES ESTABLISHED REFERENCE B.

2.(U) REFERENCE B IS HEREBY CANCELLED.

3.(S) THE FOLLOWING BUFFER ZONES ARE NOW IN EFFECT.

A. FOR PURPLE MARTIN AND MAINE CRAG. FROM LAOS/RVN BORDER AT XD 656679 WESTWARD ALONG THE HOUAY NAMXE RIVER TO XD 610655; THENCE SOUTHWARD PARALLELING THE LAOS/SVN BORDER AT A DISTANCE OF FIVE (5) KILOMETERS TO XD 980130 AND THENCE TO THE LAOS/SVN BORDER AT YD 010165.

4.(S) WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CG 1ST MAW THE FOLLOWING COORDINATION MEASURES WILL APPLY WITHIN THE BUFFER ZONE.

A. ALL AIRCRAFT WILL REPORT IN AND OUT WITH VANDEGRIFT DASC.

B. ALL ARTILLERY MISSIONS EXCEPT THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST ACTIVE ENEMY ARTILLERY, ROCKET, OR MORTAR POSITIONS WILL BE REPORTED TO VANDEGRIFT DASC PRIOR TO FIRING BY TASK FORCE HOTEL. EXCEPTED COUNTERBATTERY FIRES WILL BE REPORTED WITHOUT DELAY.

C. VANDEGRIFT DASC WILL PROVIDE ALL AIRCRAFT WITH ARTILLERY AIR WARNINGS.

D. TASK FORCE HOTEL WILL COORDINATE ALL AIRSTRIKES AND ARTILLERY FIRES IN THE BUFFER ZONE WHEN APPROPRIATE WITH CCN REPRESENTATIVE.

5.(S) ALL AIRSTRIKES AND ARTILLERY FIRES INTO LAOS OTHER THAN IN THE BUFFER ZONE MUST BE CLEARED BY ABCC/SYCAMORE AS FOLLOWS.

G-3

AIRO
2A

SECRET

//SECRET//

5. CLEARANCE FOR ALL ARTILLERY FIRES WILL BE OBTAINED BY DIV FSCC FROM THE APPROPRIATE AIR FORCE CONTROL AGENCY. COUNTERBATTERY FIRES DO NOT REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE. HOWEVER, VANDEGRIFT DASC WILL WARN AIRCRAFT ON GUARD IMMEDIATELY AND TASK FORCE HOTEL FSCC WILL NOTIFY DIV FSCC ASAP.

B. ALL AIRCRAFT REQUIRED TO WORK BEYOND THE BUFFER ZONE WILL REPORT IN AND OUT AND REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR ALL STRIKES FROM ABCCC/SYCAMORE.

6. (S) CURRENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR LAOS APPLY.

GP-4

CCN 4663

REL BY B. R. Simms

CONFIDENTIAL

uB

[illegible]

[illegible] (C) [illegible] RVN

[illegible] (MARCH 1969)

EQUIPMENT	LOCATION	PERSONNEL
[illegible] (FLD)	CAMP RED DEVIL	45/[illegible]/233
[illegible]		
	LZ SHARON	[illegible]
	LZ SHARON	[illegible]
	LZ SHARON	[illegible]
	LZ SHARON	[illegible]
	LZ SHARON	[illegible]
[illegible]	LZ SHARON	[illegible]
[illegible]	LZ SHARON	[illegible]

[illegible] C O N F I D E N T I A L

EQUIPMENT	LOCATION	PERSONNEL
[illegible]	RED DEVIL	16/1/1[illegible]
[illegible]	LZ SHARON	3/[illegible]/21
[illegible]	LZ SHARON	
[illegible]	LZ NANCY	1/[illegible]
	MAI LANG	[illegible]/21
[illegible]	LZ SHARON	[illegible]/122
[illegible]	LZ SHARON	
[illegible]	LZ SHARON	
[illegible]	LZ SHARON	
6-155MM, M109	MAI LANG	5/[illegible]/11[illegible]
[illegible]	MAI LANG	
[illegible]	LZ SHARON	3/[illegible]
[illegible]	MAI LANG	
[illegible]	LZ [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	LZ NANCY	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
	LZ [illegible]	

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] 13/1 3/C C O N F I D E N T I A L

[illegible]	9-APC	LZ SHARON	1/9/25
	1-APC	TF REMAGEN	6/8/10
[illegible]	9-APC	LZ SHARON	1/8/22
	1-APC	TF REMAGEN	6/8/10
[illegible]	2-APC	TF WESTWARD HO	1/9/17
[illegible]	1-CEN	TF REMAGEN	9/8/4
	9-AMAL	TF REMAGEN	9/8/4
	1-APC	TF REMAGEN	1/8/6
[illegible]	1-CRANE	RED DEVIL	5/1/138
	1-WRECKER		
	1-GRADER		
	9-DOZERS D-7E	N	
	9-SCOOP LOADERS		
[illegible]	4-5 TON DUMP		
	91-5 TON DUMPS TRUCKS		
[illegible]		RED DEVIL	10/3/43
[illegible] SIGNAL CO		RED DEVIL	3/8/31
		DONG HA	9/8/7

[illegible] 13/1 A/C O N F I D E N T I A L

		FSB GATES	9/8/3
		MAI LANG	9/8/2
		LZ SHARON	8/8/3
		LZ NANCY	8/8/3
[illegible]		RED DEVIL	1/8/5
[illegible]		RED DEVIL	5/8/65
		LZ SHARON	5/8/9
		PHU BAI	6/8/1
[illegible]			
[illegible]	S-M517	LZ SHARON	16/6/138
	18-M113A1	LZ SHARON	
	4-M113A1	WONDER BEACH	1/8/44
	4-M106A1	WONDER BEACH	
	1-M577	WONDER BEACH	
[illegible]	1-M113A1	LZ SHARON	1/3/43
	1-M577	LZ SHARON	
	15-M113A1	YD525587	5/8/101
	[illegible]	YD525587	
	[illegible]	LZ [illegible]	

[illegible] 1861 S/C C O N F I D E N T I A L

15-M113A1	YD431615	3/0/135
8-M109A1	YD431615	
5-M578	LZ SHARON	5/2/116
5-M578	LZ SHARON	
1-M113A1	WONDER BEACH	4/8/7
1-M113A1	YD792235	6/0/19
1-M548	YD792235	
1-M113A1	WONDER BEACH	6/0/7
1-M548	WONDER BEAC-	

[illegible]

5-M113	TF BINGADA	11/8/188
1-M151		
1-M548		
12-M113A1		
5-M577		
1-M548		
4-M109A1		
1-M577		
15-M151	LZ NANCY	8/1/43
9M35A2		

[illegible] 361 S/C C O N F I D E N T I A L

1-M577		
1-M113A1		
1-M577		
[illegible]	LZ LANCY	4/8/65
1-M113		
9-M35A2		
9-M151		
1-M577		
1-M109A1		
3-M113A3	MAL LAND	1/7/19
15-M113A3	LZ SHARON	5/2/82
2-M113A1		
1-M53		
9-M35A2		
8-M151		
1-M577		
1-M113A3		
[illegible]	TF BENNADEN	5/0/79
[illegible]		

```
SECRET SEVER RUNLOPEX  1391 7/C O N F I D E N T I A L
                      1-M33
                       1-M35A2
                       1-M3721                LZ NANCY     7/0/12
                      1-M151
                       1-M35A2      N
Y 1-77                S-M1513                LZ NANCY    1/1/73
                       1-M54A2
                       2-M3721
                      1-M35A2
                       3-M715
                       1-0113L-M60

                       1-M49A3
                       1-M54A2
                       1-M54A2              N
                       0-M115A1
                       1-M35A2                LZ SHARON   0/0/10
                       1-M54A2
                       1-M54A2
      0              1-M115A1
```

SECRET

ZNY SSSSS
O 270825Z MAR 69
FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/NINTH MARINES
WELF H MARINES
MAG ONE SIX
MAG THREE SIX
MAG THREE NINE
FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES
SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES
ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD RECON BN
ZEN/VANDERGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR
BT
S E C R E T
FRAG ORDER 84-69
A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 201850Z MAR 69

270825 Z C-2 3/COC

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 0583 S E C R E T
1. THIRD AND FOURTH MARINES: NO CHANGE FROM REF A.
2. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: HELO MOVEMENTS FOR
TASK FORCE HOTEL AND SUPPORTING FORCES FOR
28 MAR 69 WILL BE PASEP
GP-4
BT

NNNN

42 28

SECRET

C UUMSK
E UUMSQD 1396 0860910
T CCCCC
2709Ø2 MAR 69
I THIRD MARDIV COC
O UUMSK/XXIV CORPS COC
T
O N FI D E N TI A L
UUMSQD MAINE CRAG CUMULATIVE CACHE REPORT NR 3
. CUMULATIVE CACHE STATISTICS AS OF 270800H MAR 69
. RICE 1000 TONS
ALT 7000LBS
SUGAR 7500 LBS
SEED 100 LBS
CANNED FOOD 1 TON
POWDERED MILK 1 TON
. TNT 129,250 LB
50MM WIRE 600 METERS
T MINES 1
. COMM GRENADES 8
K MAGAZINES 409
CLAYMORES 11
FUZES 75
CLOTHES 40 SMALL BUNDLES
PLASTIC WRAPPING 2 ROLLS
SACKS 25
GAS MASKS 3

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1396 C O N F I D E N TI A L
. TRUCKS 3
. 122MM RKT 44 RDS
82MM MORTAR 6841 RDS
60MM MORTAR 587 RDS
RPG-2 3503 RDS
12.7MM AMMO 7500 RDS
.7MM 8 RDS
57MM 100 RDS
75 MM 55 RDS
SMALL ARMS AMMO 654,280RDS
. IWC 330
IWC 13

UB

[illegible] DUMBOC
[illegible] .SPDM 1306 0861350
[illegible] CCCCC
[illegible] 0723452 MAR 69
[illegible] CO 1ST CAV BDE 5TH INF DIV (M) GTR RVN
[illegible] CCC 5TH MER DIV

[illegible] PRECEDENCE CIRC 1500 AVPL-C ATTN: G-3
[illegible] 3RD SHIPED NO.167 1-5 MECH AO(271201-271800)HOMARCH 1969
[illegible] UNIT LOCATIONS:

[illegible] 1-11	TF 1-61	TF 1-77
[illegible] 619605	A:YD 331535	A 1-77: LZ NANCY
[illegible] 336331	C:YD 338610	A 4-12: LZ NANCY
[illegible]:YD 349644	B 1-77(-) YD 298463	
[illegible]-9: YD 836630	2 PLTS/D 1-11:LZ SHARON	
2 PLTS/D 1-11: YD836631	2 PLTS/B 1-77: LZ SHARON	
[illegible] 3-5 CAV	1ST CMTRAC	A-14TH ENG: YD298463
[illegible]YD835611	A:YD386684	
[illegible] YD 835618P	B: YD319797	
	PRC : YD 335782	
	H&S PLT:YD 262632	

[illegible] SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
[illegible] 1F 1-11: A & B CO'S 1-11 BEGAN MOVING AT 0700 HRS FROM THEIR NIGHT [illegible]NS TO THEIR OBJECTIVES ON THE HIGH GROUND TO THEIR NORTH,REACHING

[illegible] TWO SUMLRPM 1306 S/C C.N F I D E N T I A L
[illegible] OBJECTIVES AN APPROXIMATELY 1500 HRS. I 3-9 MOVED AT 0700 HRS [illegible] ITS OBJECTIVE VIC YD 836630 AND ESTABLISHED BLK PSN WEST OF THE [illegible]A OF CONTACT. C 1-11 WAS AIR ASSAULTED INTO LZ VIC YD 843644 [illegible]ENING AT 1110 HRS AND ESTABLISHED BLK PSNS NORTH OF THE AREA OF [illegible]TACT. TWO PLTS OF D 1-11 WERE CHOPPED OPCON FROM 3-5 CAV TO TF [illegible] AND SLICLIFTED TO PRESENT PSN.
[illegible] TF 1-61: A CO (-) CONDUCTED S/C OPN SE OF WUNDER BEACH WHILE [illegible] PLT MAINTAINED SPARROW HAWK ALERT AT WUNDER BEACH. C CO CON-[illegible]UCTED PLAT SIZE S/C OPNS WEST OF TOMBSTONE. B 1-77(-) SECURED [illegible] AND CLEARING OPN WHILE TWO PLATS B 1-77 SECURED LZ SHARON. 2 PLTS [illegible] 1-11 WITH THE LAND CLEARING OPN CLOSED INTO LZ SHARON AT [illegible]PROXIMATELY 1500 HRS TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE OPNS.
[illegible] TF 1-77: A 1-77 CONTINUED SECURITY OF HAI LANG FSB AND SECURITY [illegible] MINESWEEPS AND BRIDGES ON QLI VIC LZ NANCY. A 4-12 CONDUCTED [illegible]CAL SECURITY OF LZ NANCY.
[illegible] TF 3-5 CAV: STOOD DOWN IN PRESENT LOCATION FOR MAINTENANCE AND [illegible] PREPARE FOR FUTURE OPNS.
[illegible] TOTAL CASUALTIES FROM OA DREAM VIEW [illegible]

[illegible] SHEET RUMLRPRM 1306 5/ CO N F I D E N T I A L
[illegible] CONTACT:
[illegible] PRICOM, VIC YD 739638, VIC YD 742643- ELEMENTS OF 1-11
[illegible] MAINTAINED CONTACT THROUGH THE LAST REPORTING PERIOD WITH NO
[illegible] AS YET. THE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES PICKED UP AT 1200 HRS
[illegible] WILL BE ADDED TO THE TOTALS BUT BY NO MEANS REPRESENT THE
[illegible] FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. THERE HAVE BEEN 2 RPD'S AND 5-6 AK-47'S
[illegible] AND APPROXIMATELY 30 NVA KIA (20 BY AIR), BUT THESE WILL NOT
[illegible] UPDATED ON THIS REPORT DUE TO LACK OF DETAILS AT THIS TIME.
[illegible] SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:
[illegible] (LATE ENTRY) REF SITREP NO. 104, PARA C: WHILE SWEEPING AREA
[illegible] WHICH RPG FIRE WAS REC'D, FOUND 1 AK-47, 2 RPG-7, 28-40
[illegible], 1 B-41 ROCKET, SOME CHICOM GRENADES AND A WALLET.
[illegible] (LATE ENTRY) 271220H YD374457 - B 1-77 FOUND 1 BUNKER WITH
[illegible]ZINE IN IT, 1 .50 CAL AMMO CAN OF POLISHED RICE, ASSORTED FOOD.
[illegible] EVACED.
[illegible] PLANS:
1. IN 1-11: A, B, & D CO'S CONT TO ATTACK NORTH FROM PRESENT POSN.
[illegible] AND C 1-11 BLK ON WEST AND NE RESPECTIVELY. 2 PLATS OF D CO

[illegible] TOUR RUMLRPRM 1306 4/C C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. LZ SHARON WILL AIRLIFT TO B'CO PSN AT 0800 HRS.
[illegible] 1-5 1/ A CO (-) CONDUCTS S/C S. OF WUNDER BEACH WHILE 1 PLT
[illegible] SPARROW HAWK ALERT AT WUNDER BEACH. C CO CONTINUES S/C
[illegible] WEST OF TOMBSTONE. B 1-77(-) AND SCOUT PLAT SECURES LAND
[illegible] VIC HILL 29. ONE PLAT OF D 1-77 SECURES LZ SHARON.
[illegible] 1-77: A 1-77 CONT SECURITY MSN AT MAI LANG FSB AND ALONG
[illegible] A 4-12 CONDUCTS LOCAL SECURITY & NIGHT AMBUSHES FROM LZ SHARON.
[illegible] 3-5 CAV: BEGINS MOVING BACK TOWARD OLD AT 0930 HRS. IT
[illegible] CONTACT IN 1-11 AREA IS CONTINUING AT THIS TIME 3-5 CAV REACHES BY
[illegible] THEN THE CAV WILL BE COMMITTED WEST FROM C2 INTO THE AREA OF
[illegible].
5. [illegible] AMBUSH: CONTINUES LAND CLEARING VIC HILL 29.
[illegible]: 1-5 MECH AO (010001H-271800H) MARCH 1969.
[illegible]: FRIENDLY KIA WIA(E) WIA(M) MIA
[illegible]: 1[illegible] 119 14 0
[illegible]: 4 53 5 0
[illegible]: KIA POW RET
[illegible]: 170 8 0

[illegible] FIVE RUMLRPRM 1306 5/ C O N F I D E N T I A L
[illegible]: 56 17 1
[illegible]: 0, 0
[illegible]: 2, CIVDEF: 4, INC: 72, CSWC: 24

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO 96602

IN REPLY REFER TO:

28 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF

ATTENTION OF: G-3 PLANS

SUBJECT: Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas Security

Ref: (a) CG III MAF 0513462 July 68 (S)
Ref: (b) Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas Security 6 Aug 68
Encl: (1) Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Quang Tri
(2) Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Thua Thien
(3) Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Quang Nam
(4) Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Quang Ngai
(5) Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in Quang Tin

1. Reference (a) outlines US Forces' responsibility for security of Refugee installations and resettlement areas in I CTZ.

2. Enclosures (1) through (5) represent an update listing of the Refugee Installations and Resettlement Areas in I CTZ.

3. It is requested that this updated material be disseminated to the distribution list outlined in reference (b). Further that reference (a) be restated to all major military unit commanders.

4. It is our current plan to furnish an update each quarter.

L. A. McLendon, Jr.
Chief, Refugee Division
CORDS, III MAF, Danang

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-1	DONG HA	NGA TU SONG	NGA TU SONG	228624	2,538
R-2	DONG HA	MOC BAI	MOC BAI	231621	2,446
R-3	CAM LO	CAM THAI	NAM THUAN	133590	762
R-4	CAM LO	CAM HIEU	VINH DAI	178590	1,831
R-5	CAM LO	CAM HUNG	TAN DINH	118588	1,947
R-6	CAM LO	TRUNG HAI	TRUNG GIO	106567	12,210
R-7	CAM LO	CAM HUNG	HUNG PHU KINH	119567	681
R-8	CAM LO	CAM HUNG	HUNG PHU THUONG	121593	1,685
R-9	CAM LO	CAM HIEU	THIET TRANG	097525	343
R-10	CAM LO	CAM CHINH	DOC KINH	098523	3,036
R-11	CAM LO	CAM CHINH	CUA THUONG	084515	5,489
R-12	GIO LINH	HA THANH	HA THANH	220675	21,236
R-13	GIO LINH	XUAN KHANH	XUAN KHANH	338698	3,221
R-14	TRIEU PHONG	TRIEU AI	HA XA	276577	1,445
R-15	TRIEU PHONG	TRIEU AI	TIEN KIEN	298569	915
R-16	TRIEU PHONG	TRIEU AI	BA BEN	348541	2,665
R-17	TRIEU PHONG	TRIEU THANH	AN TIEN	341541	1,560
R-18	MAI LINH	TRIEU THUONG	NHAN BIEU	320539	347
R-19	MAI LINH	QUANG TRI	HANH HOA	342535	521
R-20	MAI LINH	HAI TRI	THACH HAN A-B-C	333522	4,139
R-21	MAI LINH	TRIEU THUONG	XOM CHUOI	327513	1,421
R-22	MAI LINH	HAI TRI	THACH MON	344502	876

ENCLOSURE (1)

QUANG TRI PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-23	MAI LINH	HAI PHU	LA VANG TA	348496	1,616
R-24	HAI LANG	HAI KHE	TRUNG AN	521538	2,663
R-25	HAI LANG	HAI THO	TAN DIEN	418483	122
R-26	HAI LANG	HAI THO	TAN SANH	420475	194
R-27	HAI LANG	HAI LAM	XUAN LAM	393468	1,690
R-28	HAI LANG	HAI TRUONG	CIAP TRUNG	448429	317
R-29	HAI LANG	HAI SON	LUONG DIEN	462406	267
R-30	HAI LANG	HAI CHANH	GA MY CHANH	464401	813
R-31	HAI LANG	HAI CHANH	TAN VAN	462392	143
R-32	HAI LANG	HAI CHANH	TRUNG CHANH	462392	778

ENCLOSURE (1)

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-1	HUONG DIEN	DIEN THANH	TAM DIEN	730376	3,362
R-2	PHONG DIEN	PHONG NGUYEN	PHONG NGUYEN	536352	240
R-3	PHONG DIEN	PHONG NGUYEN	QUANG PHONG	531334	3,297
R-4	PHONG DIEN	PHONG NGUYEN	TAN NGUYEN	531334	368
R-5	PHONG DIEN	PHONG NGUYEN	GIA LONG A-B	528348	1,054
R-6	PHONG DIEN	PHONG NGUYEN	KHANH MY	531334	1,352
R-7	PHONG DIEN	PHONG AN	THUONG AN	613295	2,135
R-8	QUANG DIEN	QUANG PHUOC	PHUOC LOI A	684335	2,836
R-9	QUANG DIEN	QUANG PHUOC	PHUOC LOI B	693340	1,712
R-10	QUANG DIEN	QUANG LOC	AN THANH	737294	2,612
R-11	HUONG TRA	HUONG CAN	HUONG CAN	714275	1,191
R-12	HUONG TRA	HUONG LONG	XUAN LONG	740217	865
R-13	NAM HOA	THUONG BANH	CU CHANH A-B-C-D-E	748165	2,118
R-14	NAM HOA	THUONG BANG	BANG LANG A-B	759139	1,856
R-15	PHU VANG	PHU DIEN	PHUONG DIEN	942248	1,606
R-16	PHU VANG	PHU THUAN	THUAN AN	829322	4,779
R-17	HUONG THUY	THUY PHUOC	THUY PHUOC	770200	860
R-18	HUONG THUY	THUY TRUONG	NAM GIAO	767192	383
R-19	HUONG THUY	THUY LUONG	THUY LUONG A-B	873179	3,524
R-20	HUONG THUY	THUY CHAU	THUY CHAU	853167	2,981
R-21	HUONG THUY	THUY PHU	THUY PHU	933139	523
R-22	PHU LOC	LOC SON	TAN THAT XA A-B	932087	1,000

ENCLOSURE (2)

THUA THIEN PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-23	PHU LOC	LOC AN	NAM THANH	965070	607
R-24	PHU LOC	LOI HAI	LANG CO	884972	639
R-25	PHU LOC	LOC THUY	LOC THUY	146998	3,023
R-26	PHU LOC	LOC TU	THUA LOU	192009	2,869
R-27	PHU THU	PHU DA	HOA DA TAY A-B	900190	176

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-1	HOA VANG	HOA LOC	NAM MY	860855	1,101
R-2	HOA VANG	HOA LOC	AN DINH	887832	302
R-3	HOA VANG	HOA THANH	AN NGAI TAY	907783	105
R-4	HOA VANG	HAO KHANH	PHUOC THANH	957787	3,210
R-5	HOA VANG	HOA KHANH	PHUOC QUANG	954787	2,146
R-6	HOA VANG	HOA KHANH	HOA KHANH	954787	4,522
R-7	HOA VANG	HOA KHANH	CHON TAM	957782	4,191
R-8	HOA VANG	HOA KHANH	PHUOC TAN	950793	2,158
R-9	HOA VANG	HOA KHANH	PHUOC NGHIA	961784	3,676
R-10	HOA VANG	HOA KHANH	TRUNG PHUOC	952791	1,743
R-11	HOA VANG	HOA MINH	PHUOC XUAN	968760	2,341
R-12	HOA VANG	HOA CUONG	KHUE TRUNG I	015728	1,280
R-13	HOA VANG	HOA DA	CON DAU	035725	207
R-14	HOA VANG	HOA KHANH	DA PHUOC	948787	2,757
R-15	HOA VANG	HOA LONG	KIM SON	074704	1,891
R-16	HOA VANG	HOA THAI	XEN NE	982682	1,433
R-17	HOA VANG	HOA LOI	LE SON	972662	646
R-18	HIEU DUC	HOA NINH	TUNG SON	886760	652
R-19	HIEU DUC	HOA THUONG	AN TAN	926705	455
R-20	DIEN BAN	VINH XUONG	NGUYEN DUY HIEU	058580	1,054
R-21	DIEN BAN	VINH XUONG	BEN DA	058580	3,840
R-22	DIEN BAN	VINH XUONG	VINH DIEN	058580	577

ENCLOSURE (3)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-23	DIEN BAN	VINH XUONG	LAM SON	065588	3,752
R-24	DIEN BAN	VINH PHUOC	TAM TANG	060565	968
R-25	DIEN BAN	VINH PHUOC	KIM THANH	060565	769
R-26	DIEN BAN	VINH THO	PHU CU	074560	3,494
R-27	DIEN BAN	VINH THO	THANH CHIM	074560	1,818
R-28	DAI LOC	LOC HUNG	HOAN MY	938578	2,931
R-29	DAI LOC	LOC HUNG	KY TAN	927572	2,870
R-30	DAI LOC	LOC PHONG	AI MY DONG	921570	2,846
R-31	DAI LOC	LOC CHANH	PHU BAC	926608	652
R-32	DAI LOC	LOC CHANH	PHU TRUNG	919597	331
R-33	DAI LOC	LOC CHANH	PHU DONG	923583	1,611
R-34	DAI LOC	LOC AN	NGHIA DONG-I-II	910580	2,060
R-35	DAI LOC	LOC AN	GO CAM	910580	884
R-36	DAI LOC	LOC MY	TAM HOA	863573	3,692
R-37	DUC DUC	XUYEN THU	GO CHUA	863480	446
R-38	DUC DUC	SON NINH	BAN SON	875474	1,129
R-39	DUC DUC	SON KHUONG	THANH MY	830390	4,073
R-40	DUC DUC	SON KHUONG	NONG SON	825385	2,133
R-41	DUC DUC	SON KHUONG	QUAN LY	861394	4,664
R-42	QUE SON	PHU HIEP	XUAN LU	032345	512
R-43	QUE SON	SON THANH	CANG TAY	042345	18,693
R-44	QUE SON	PHU THO	BA REN	104402	648

QUANG NAM PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-45	QUE SON	PHU KHUONG	HUONG AN	141465	506
R-46	DUY XUYEN	XUYEN HIEP	KIEU SON	033507	3,794
E-47	DUY XUYEN	XUYEN KIEU	TRA KIEU	037510	2,509
E-48	DUY XUYEN	XUYEN TRA	TRUNG DONG	058508	2,315
E-49	HIEU NHON	CAM HA	THANH DONG	122577	4,218
R-50	HIEU NHON	CAM HA	THANH TRUNG	122577	1,609
R-51	HIEU NHON	CAM HA	THANH TAY	122577	8,126
R-52	HIEU NHON	CAM AN	DOI	205573	2,988
R-53	HIEU NHON	HOI AN	XUAN MY	137571	2,225
R-54	HIEU NHON	HOI AN	KHONG MIEU	145570	1,347
R-55	HIEU NHON	HOI AN	LIEN GIA V	145570	217
R-56	HIEU NHON	CAM CHAU	CUN CHAI	163573	286
R-57	HIEU NHON	CAM CHAU	CAM CHAU	163573	2,874
E-58	HIEU NHON	CAM KIM	NGOC THANH	k34567	3,562
R-59	THUONG DUC	LOC BINH	TRUC HA	145548	862
R-60	THUONG DUC	LOC BINH	HA TAN	150534	2,661
R-61	THUONG DUC	LOC BINH	LOC VINH	150534	2,554
R-62	THUONG DUC	LOC NINH	LOC NINH	100503	1,521
R-63	THUONG DUC	LOC NINH	TAM HOA	137524	829

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-1	BINH SON	BINH GIANG	SON TRA	624015	3,879
R-2	BINH SON	BINH THIEN	PHUOC THIEN	712972	2,409
R-3	BINH SON	BINH THANH	PHU LE	577938	232
R-4	BINH SON	BINH VAN	AN CHAU	607930	596
R-5	BINH SON	BINH VAN	CHAU	599925	902
R-6	BINH SON	BINH VAN	TU VAN	599925	1,008
R-7	BINH SON	BINH THANH	THIEU DAO	595927	4,493
R-8	BINH SON	BINH PHONG	VINH XUAN A-B-C	599918	3,987
R-9	BINH SON	BINH PHUONG	MY YEN	608914	302
R-10	BINH SON	SON LONG	PHU HOA A-B	605865	1,043
R-11	BINH SON	BINH LIEN	BINH LIEN	622870	1,548
R-12	TRA BONG	TRA KHUONG	QUANG LY	335880	699
R-13	SON HA	HA TRUNG	LIEN SON	385638	1,511
R-14	SON HA	HA TRUNG	HA HIEP	385638	480
R-15	SON HA	HA BAC	HA BAC	390706	709
R-16	SON HA	HA BAC	HA GIA	398718	125
R-17	TU NGHIA	TU HIEN	GO PHU	735735	559
R-18	TU NGHIA	TU LO	PHAT GIAO	636725	2,883
R-19	TU NGHIA	TU BINH	CATHOLIC	675724	732
R-20	TU NGHIA	TU QUANG	TU MY	620720	1,088
R-21	TU NGHIA	TU QUANG	RUNG LANG	615717	4,044
R-22	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	BAC GIANG	662698	2,215

ENCLOSURE (4)

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-23	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	CAO DAI - A	670694	6,553
R-24	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	CAO DAI - B	666693	3,386
R-25	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	CAO DAI - C	666694	4,046
R-26	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	DUC HAI	667689	1,358
R-27	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	DAO DUC DOAN	668688	859
R-28	TU NGHIA	TU DUY	CAO DAY TAY NINH	772687	1,038
R-29	TU NGHIA	TU AN	TIN LANH	684685	3,334
R-30	TU NGHIA	TU AN	LA HA	684685	3,078
R-31	NGHIA HANH	NGHIA KHUONG	NGHIA KHUONG	620680	990
R-32	NGHIA HANH	NGHIA KHUONG	PHUC MINH	621668	798
R-33	NGHIA HANH	SON LONG	SON TAY	627660	394
R-34	NGHIA HANH	NGHIA CHANH	PHU BINH A-B-C	612652	1,659
R-35	NGHIA HANH	NGHIA CHANH	XUAN VINH	620620	1,540
R-36	MO DUC	DUC QUANG	DUC HOAI	715602	2,268
R-37	MO DUC	DUC VINH	THI PHO	723571	776
R-38	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DUC SON	736542	1,694
R-39	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DIA SO	732542	331
R-40	MO DUC	DUC VINH	THANH THAT	731541	333
R-41	MO DUC	DUC QUANG	DUC QUANG	725540	735
R-42	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DUC THACH	725543	1,029
R-43	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DUC THUAN	735530	466
R-44	MO DUC	DUC VINH	DUC THUAN - A	735530	911

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-45	MO DUC	DUC MY	DUC MY	767471	2,077
R-46	BA TO	BA LANG	DINH NHI	576357	274
R-47	BA TO	BA LOI	QUANG LY	555322	230
R-48	DUC PHO	PHO BINH	LA VAN DUYET	801395	892
R-49	DUC PHO	PHO THACH	PHO PHUOC - B	805379	809
R-50	DUC PHO	PHO BINH	PHO PHUOC - C	795379	1,010
R-51	DUC PHO	PHO BINH	PHO PHUOC - A	925255	284
R-52	DUC PHO	PHO DAI	THO LAC - B	809378	1,063
R-53	DUC PHO	PHO BINH	TIN LANH	810377	151
R-54	DUC PHO	PHO DAI	THO LAC - C	809377	525
R-55	DUC PHO	PHO DAI	THO LAC - A	806378	276
R-56	DUC PHO	PHO BINH	PHAT GIAO	806574	375
R-57	DUC PHO	PHO DAI	HOA THANH	858663	859
R-58	DUC PHO	PHO HIEP	THUY THACH A-B	864318	587
R-59	DUC PHO	PHO THACH	SA HUYNH	925255	674
R-60	DUC PHO	PHO THACH	VINH LOC	925224	820
R-61	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON TRA I & II	639753	1,941
R-62	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON CHAU - B	614575	445
R-63	SON TINH	SON LONG	AN LAC	638765	683
R-64	SON TINH	SON LONG	PHU NHON A-B	638765	2,506
R-65	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON CHOU - A	638765	2,432
R-66	SON TINH	SON LONG	TAN LOC A-B	614762	1,444

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE - Continued

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-67	SON TINH	SON LONG	HA TAY	627762	876
R-68	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON BAC A-B	625761	3,379
R-69	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON DONG	625760	2,085
R-70	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON LOC	625754	3,204
R-71	SON TINH	SON LONG	SON PHUONG	627759	2,434
R-72	SON TINH	SON LONG	DONG PHUONG NAM	639759	1,767
R-73	SON TINH	SON LONG	NUI SUA	634750	1,206
R-74	SON TINH	SON LONG	SICA	638749	1,030
R-75	SON TINH	SON LONG	SONG QUANG	645747	1,110
R-76	SON TINH	SON LONG	TRAI HE	645747	1,277
R-77	SON TINH	SON LONG	TONG HOC DUONG	645747	537

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

No.	DISTRICT	VILLAGE	CAMP	COORD.	POPULATION
R-1	THANH BINH	BINH NGUYEN	HA LAM	170416	5,858
R-2	THANH BINH	BINH NGUYEN	DON THOI A-B	148409	11,723
R-3	THANH BINH	BINH AN	AN THANH	247298	7,872
R-4	THANH BINH	TIEN PHUOC	VIET AN	022274	730
R-5	TIEN PHUOC	PHUOC THANH	AN TRUNG	109133	4,571
R-6	TIEN PHUOC	PHUOC KY	HUU LAM	130128	832
R-7	TIEN PHUOC	PHUOC LAM	TIEN CHANH	082065	1,098
R-8	TIEN PHUOC	PHUOC LAM	TIEN CHAU	063063	1,100
R-9	TAM KY	KY HOUNG	TU HIEP	300228	19,442
R-10	TAM KY	TAM KY	VOUN LAI	322209	8,045
R-11	TAM KY	TAM KY	HOUNG SON	378218	1,683
R-12	TAM KY	KY HUNG	KY HUONG	329203	6,441
R-13	TAM KY	KY BICH	BICH NGO	342170	1,492
R-14	TAM KY	KY HUONG	RECEPTION CENTER	299300	3,476
R-15	LY TIN	KY LIEN	CHU LAI	500069	3,051
R-16	LY TIN	KY CHANH	LY TRA	397162	297
R-17	LY TIN	KY HOA	KY HOA	499134	1,713
R-18	LY TIN	KY SANH	KY SANH	450066	360
R-19	LY TIN	KY THANH	KY THANH	350087	647
R-20	LY TIN	KY KHUONG	KY KHUONG	470080	1,237

ENCLOSURE (5)

ZNY SSSSS
E 280430Z MAR 69
FM CT TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/NINTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
MAG ONE SIX
MAG THREE SIX
MAG THREE NINE
ZEN/VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATORI(VIC)
FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINEE
ZEN/SECOND BN TWELFTH MA
OSY

SH

XBXTHIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD RECON BN
BT
S E C R E T
FRAG ORDERP86-69
1. THIRD MARINES

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 0606 S E C R E T
A. CO, 2ND ARVN WILL ASSUME SECTH
EDAM
MISSION FOR RICE CACHE ON 29 MARP69 ON
ORDER.
B. CONTINUE OPERATIONS DTM FSB CATEN
AND HILLS 691 AND 950.
C. CONTINUE OPERATION MAINE CRAG.
D. MAINTAIN ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN)
AT VCB AS SPARROW HAWKL/BALD EAGLE.
2. FOURTH MARINES
A. CONTINUE OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN.
B. CONTINUE CONSTRUCTION OF FSB GREEN.
C. CONTINUE OPERATIONS FROM FL ARGONNE,
ALPINE, NEVILLE AND RIRHSLWPQUE AND LZ CATAPULT.
D. PREPARE TO CLOSE FSB ARGONNE ON
ACTIVATION OF FSB GREENE.
3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. HELO MOVEMENTS
SCHEDULED FOR TF HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING
FORCES FOR 29 MARCH 69 WILL BE PASEP.J
GP-4
BT

SECRET

050

°°°°°ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1428 0870530
ZNY SSSSS
Z 280530Z MAR 69 Ted | 079 | 0600 | XXIV Corps
FM THIRD MARDIV COV
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
INFO TASK FORCEHOTEL COC
TWELFTH MARINES FDC
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1. 4TH MARINES RECON PATROLS
A. TM DESERT SANDS 280915H FR 934658 EN 938661 OBS 4 NVA MOVING ALONG SIDE OF HILL. ATTEMPTED TO CALL 81 MM MSN. BUT WAS WAS UNSUCCESSFUL DUE TO POOR COMM.
B. TM MAGIN SPELL 280815 H 926658 FND TRAIL FRUNNING NW TO SW USED WITHIN LAST 24 HRS TRAIL RUNS TOWARD I 3/4 POSIT AT 911642.
C. TM MAGIC SPELL 281000H 928659 PATROL REC°D SAF FROM EST 3-4 NVA PATROL RET°D FIRE W/ ORGANIC WEAPONS. REC: 2 NVA KIA(C)
D. TM MAGIC SPELL 281100H EXTRACTION FORCE FROM 2-K3/4 TO LINK UP WITH MAGIC YPELL. EXTRACTION FORCE WILL RETURN TO K CP AS SOON AS EN SITUATION PERMITS.
E. UNIT LOCATIONS:
MAGIC SPELL XD 928661
DESERT SANDS XD 934663
GP-4
BT
1428

SECRET

ZCZCSAB344
RR UUMSK UUMSJEA
DE UUMSK 757 0870625
SECRET
R 280625Z MAR 69
FM III MAF COC DNG RVN
TO.UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB RVN
UUMSOG/FIRST MARDIV COC DNG RVN
UUMSOW/FIRST MAW COC DNG RVN
UUMSOA/AMERICAL DIV TOC CHL RVN
UUMSOI/DSA I CORPS DNG RVN
INFO UUMSOD/ HIRD MARDIV DOH RVN
UUMSJEA/ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV (AM) CEE RVN
P 251300ZMAR 69 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO.ZEN/CDR 7 H AF SAIGON
ZEN/CG USARV LONG BINH
UUMSO/CG III MAF/SA I CTZ DA NANG
ZEN/COMNAFORV SAIGON
UUMSA/CG I FFORCEV/SA II CTZ NHA TRANG
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV/SA III CTZ LONG BINH
UUMSD/SA IV CTZ CAN THO
UUMSJ/CO.5TH SFGA NHA TRANG
BT
S E C R E T 181400 ARRAMS SENDS
SUBJ: OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE NO. 3 (U)
1. (S) THE UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF RECENT SAPPER ATTACKS POINTS UP A CONTINUING VC CAPABILITY THAT REPRESENTS A SERIOUS THREAT TO FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS. VC EMPHASIS ON SAPPER ATTACKS IS INDICATED BY AN INCREASE IN SAPPER UNITS REPORTED IN EACH C.E. MOREOVER, THE SUCCESSFUL SAPPER ATTACKS AGAINST INSTALLATIONS AT BUI NHON AND KONTUM DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SMALL, HIGHLY TRAINED SAPPER UNITS.

PAGE 2 UUMS 9980 S E C R E T ARRAMS SENDS
2. (S) IN THE 21 MARCH ATTACK ON BUI NHON POL DEPOT, A 3-MAN SAPPER UNIT INFILTRATED THE INSTALLATION WITHOUT BEING DETECTED AND SET SATCHEL CHARGES TO 3POL TANKS. THE RESULTING EXPLOSION AND FIRE IGNITED TWO MORE POL TANKS AND THE PACKAGE POL AREA. ESTIMATED LOSS OF POL STOCKS EXCEEDS 700,000 GALLONS.
3. (S) ON 22 MARCH, ANOTHER SUCCESSFUL SAPPER ATTACK WAS CONDUCTED AGAINST THE ROCK CRUSHER COMPLEX AT KONTUM. IN THIS ATTACK, THE ASSAULT WAS PRECEDED BY A ROCKET, MORTAR AND 82MM BARRAGE, AND WAS CONDUCTED BY A 30-MAN SAPPER UNITS WHICH PENETRATED THE PERIMETER AND CAUSED THE PRINCIPLE LOSSES. RESULTS OF THIS ATTACK WERE DESTRUCTION OF LARGE QUANTITIES OF ROCK CRUSHER AND MOTOR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT PLUS DAMAGE TO PLANT FACILITIES.
4. (S) SAPPER ATTACKS HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY THE INFILTRATION OF INSTALLATIONS BY SMALL HIGHLY TRAINED UNITS. THE SIZE OF SAPPER UNITS HAS VARIED FROM BASIC 3-MAN CELLS TO UNITS OF 25 TO 30 MEN. SAPPER UNITS ARE COMPOSED OF TOUGH, WELL-TRAINED AND HIGHLY MOTIVATED SOLDIERS. THE INDIVIDUAL SAPPER IS COMBAT EXPERIENCED, HAS RECEIVED EXTENSIVE SPECIALIZED TRAINING, AND IS A VOLUNTEER. HIS PRIMARY WEAPON IN THE EXPLO-

8

SECRET

SIVE CHARGE. SAPPER ATTACKS FOLLOW A STANDARD PATTERN AND CAN
BE PREVENTED THROUGH THE USE OF IMAGINATIVE TECHNIQUES DESIGNED
TO DETECT SAPPER UNITS BEFORE THEY BEGIN THE ASSAULT. SAPPER
ATTACKS ARE THE RESULTS OF DETAILED PLANNING AND THROUGH RECON-
NAISSANCE FOLLOWED BY PATIENT, DELIBERATE EXECUTION USUALLY UNDER
COVER OF DARKNESS. COUNTER-SAPPER PLANS SHOULD PROVIDE FOR DAY
AND NIGHT PATROLLING, INTEGRATION OF DECEPTION AND COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE PLANS, ANTI-INTRUSION DEVICE SYSTEMS, TROOP ALER-
NESS, ILLUMINATION OF DEFENDED AREAS, USE OF SIGNALS, AND PROPER
UTILIZATION OF A REACTION FORCE.
5. (S) OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE IN THIS AREA IS AS FOLLOWS:
A. DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS FOR INSTALLATIONS WILL BE REVIEWED,
UPDATED, AND STRENGTHENED WHEREVER NECESSARY AS A MATTER OF PRIOR-
ITY. CARE WILL BE TAKEN AT EVERY LEVEL OF COMMAND TO PROVIDE A
DEFENSE AGAINST THESE SAPPER ATTACKS. POSITIVE COORDINATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE MAINTAINED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE INS AL-
LATIONS WITH A DEFENSE IN DEPTH.
B. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENDING INSTAL-
LATIONS AGAINST SAPPER ATTACKS WILL BE STRESSED. INTELLIGENCE
AVAILABLE ON SAPPER OPERATIONS AS WELL AS PREVIOUS TACTICS USED

LOCALLY SHOULD BE COVERED.
6. (U) JGS AND ROKA HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO ISSUE SIMILAR
INSTRUCTION THROUGH ALLIED CHANNELS.
7. (S) COMMANDERS ARE REQUESTED TO INFORM THIS HEADQUARTERS OF
TRAINING PROGRAMS AND RESPONSIVE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES DESIGNED
TO COUNTER THE SAPPER THREAT TO CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS.
8. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE MAIL EAC 384 OR 3834.
GB-4
PT
998V

NNNN

SECRET

UB

Copy 8 of 8

00 UUMSQ
DE UUMSQW 314W 0870845
ZNY SSSSS
O 280845Z MAR 69
FM FIRST MAW COC
TO III MAF COC
THIRD MARDIV COC
NINTH MARINES
BT
S E C R E T
THIRD MARDIV PASS TF HOTEL
A6 MISSION REPORTING
A. MISSION 6308
B. AIR-ABORT

280940/MAR/807

A6 MISSION REPORTING
A. MISSION 6382
B. TOT 0645
C. CONDITION OF SYSTEM: UP
G. BEACON
(1) XD 812643
(2) AW PSN
(3) 22 D2
(4) UNK BDA

PAGE TWO UUMSQW 314W S E C R E T
(5) CONTROLER: JACKSONVILLE 14

A6 MISSION REPORTING
A. MISSION 6265
B. TOT: 281010
C. CONDITION OF SYSTEM: UP
G. BEACON
(1) ZC164727
(2) IN. POINT
(3) 27 D2
(4) NO BDA
(5) CONTROLLER: COFFE TIME 14

A6 MISSION
A. MISSION 6553
B. TOT: 1144, 1152, 1159, 1207.
C. CONDITION OF SYSTEM: DOWN
G. TPG
(1) AT972482 AT883692 -585 6685 AT 885656

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSQW 314W S E C R E T
(4) NO BDA
(5) CONTROLLER: AN HOA ASRAT 37

A6 MISSION REPORTING
A. MISSION 6369
B. TOT: NONE
C. DOWN
G. BEACON
(5) CONTROLLER: S B - 14
H. CANX
A6 MISSION REPORTING
A. MISSION 6559
B. TOT: ABORT
H. AIR ABOUT A/C UITC RER DOWN.
GP-4
SE

SECRET

SHOVE COC
OP CHIEF
G-3 W.O.
G-2 W.O.
DCPO
CPO
ACTION

V
ZO UUMSQ
DE UUMSQD 1434 0870950
ZNY SSSSS
O 280950Z MAR 69 Tod | 1055 | III MAF
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC
BT
S E C R E T
(ATT: MAJ. NORDBERG
RZ DESERT SANDS UL 9268 LR 9466 DATES IN 27 MARCH UNTIL 29 MARCH
RZ AMAND UL 9669 LR 9466 ON 28 TEAM WAS SHOXT OUT AND COULDN'T
BE INSERTED.
GP-4
BT
1434

29

Copy 2 of 3

SECRET

SECRET

SHOVE COC
OP CHIEF
G-3 W.O.
G-2 W.O.
DOPO
APO
ACTION

DE DIV AND MATE HERE WITH MY CH NU 994.....994.....994.....
QK
ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1445 0871200
ZNY SSSSS
ZP 281200Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH MARINES FDC
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1. ARVN RECON
A. TM HOTEL EXITED DMZ 281700H MAR 69
GP-4
BT
1445

TOD 27 1159 24 99

29

SECRET

SECRET

COC WIRENOTE

IMMEDIATE 281420 Z MAR69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
INFO: CG III MAF
THIRD MARDIV

COPY TO: GENERAL

BT

//SECRET//

OPERATION MONTANA MAULER (U)

1. (S) WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 3/5 CAV AND 1/11 RECONNAISSANCE-IN-FORCE NORTH OF DONG HA MOUNTAIN INTO A MAJOR OPERATION, THIS OPERATION IS DESIGNATED MONTANA MAULER AS OF 23MAR69.

GP-4

PKS

CCN 4847 REL BY Martin J. Spitzer COC TIME H MAR 69 STAND

RECEIVED 29 MAR 69

SHOWC OP CHIEF
G-1 NO. S
G-2 NO. 4
DCPO
APO
ACTION

START NEW MONTANA MAULER 39

SECRET

SECRET

SHOVE COC
OP CHIEF
G-3 W.O. S
G-2 W.O.
DCPO
APO
ACTION

ZNY SSSSS
DIV-I-COC
COC-T-MAG THREE NINE
ZNY SSSSS
P 290150Z MAR 69
FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/NINTH MARINES
MAG ONE SIX
MAG THREE SIX
MAG THREE NINE
TWELFTH MARINES
FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES
ZEN/SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES
ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
ZEN/VANDEGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR (VIC)
THIRD RECON BN
BT
S E C R E T
CHANGE TO FRAG ORDER 86-69
A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 230730Z MAR 69
29 ϕ 130 zmmz

C-3

Dwg
2/ac

PAGE TWP RUMWP 86211 S E C R E T
1. CHANGE PARA 2D TO READ AS FOLLOWS: PREPARE TO CLOSE FSB ARGONNE ASAP. CLOSURE SHOULD BE INITIATED BY DISPLACEMENT OF CP/ONE/FOUR AND GOLF-XRAY/THREE/TWELVE ON 30 MAR 69.
GP-4

82

BT

21

SECRET

SECRET

333

DRAFTED BY: NWB/NWB
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWO

PRIORITY 290226Z MAR 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN
TO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN
INFO: CG III MAF, DNG, RVN
CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN
CG USASUPCO, CRB, RVN
CG TF HOTEL, VCB, RVN
THIRD MARINES, DGH, RVN
FOURTH MARINES, VCB, RVN
NINTH MARINES, VCB, RVN
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH), QT, RVN

S E C R E T

FOR CODE J3-04

SENSOR ACTIVATION/DEACTIVATION REPORT (C)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

1. (S) FCL SUBMITTED IAW REF A FOR STRING 142:
   A. ONE MINIHANDSID, ONE MAGID, ONE GSID
   B. 29/04-21, MINIHANDSID/MAGID
      29/02, GSID
   C. XD 05804300
      XD 05904300
   D. 271500 H MAR 69
   E. ALL SET FOR END OF BATTERY LIFE
   F. DESTRUCT ACTIVATED IN RECOVERABLE MODE
   G. TEN (DUFFEL BAG)

2. (S) DELETE STRING 125
   A. TWO HANDSIDS, ONE MAGID
   B. 29/07, HANDSID
      29/08-22, HANDSID/MAGID
   C. XD 87656205
      XD 87756220
   D. 4 JAN 69
   E. 28 MAR 69
   F. SIXTEEN (DUEL BLADE)

3HIS

GSV

21

SECRET

3. (S) DELETE STRING 124
   A. THREE HANDSIDS, ONE MAGID
   B. 29/11, HANDSID
      29/12-23, HANDSID/MAGID
      29/13, HANDSID
   C. XD 92156497
      XD 92006481
      XD 91766478
   D. 12 JAN 69
   E. 28 MAR 69
   F. FIFTEEN (DUEL BLADE)

4. (S) DELETE STRING 121
   A. ONE HANDSID
   B. 29/03, HANDSID
   C. XD 02156595
   D. 25 DEC 69
   E. 28 MAR 69
   F. FOURTEEN (DUEL BLADE)

GP-4

CCN 4925 RELEASED BY [illegible] TIME 0935 H MAR 69

334

[illegible]

1A of 4

SECRET

335

DRAFTED BY: MRE:MRE
SEC S-2 PN 3D RECON
CWO

PRIORITY 290551Z MAR69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG III MAF DNG
CG XXIV CORPS PHB
INFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV
CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
THIRD MARINES
FOURTH MARINES
NINTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
MAG THREE NINE
SR ADV QUANG TRI PROVINCE
THIRD RECON BN
THIRD FORCE RECON CO

3 HIST

SECRET
RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS FOR 01MAR69 TO 05APR69 (U)

1. MISSION: TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OF ASSIGNED AREA TO DETERMINE ENEMY INFILTRATION AND/OR POSSIBLE

ENEMY BASE CAMPS OR STAGING AREAS. PLOT WATER SOURCES, TRAILS, AND ALL AREAS SUITABLE FOR HLZ'S. EMPLOY SUPPORTING ARMS ON

APPROPRIATE TARGETS, BE ESPECIALLY WATCHFUL FOR SIGNS THAT MIGHT CONFIRM REPORTS THAT ENEMY MAY USE THIS AREA FOR ROCKET/MORTAR

POSITIONS.

2. PATROL PLAN

RZ		DATE
UL XD 7067	LR XD 7265	31-04
7465	7663	31-04
7851	8048	30-03
7541	7739	29-01
8242	8440	28-30
9167	9265	29-31
9766	9964	29-01
XD 0040	XD 0238	28-01

2

34

SECRET

RZ		DATE
UL YD 0338	UR YD 0536	30-03
0334	0532	30-03
0632	0830	30-03
0541	0739	30-03
1044	1242	30-03
1042	1241	30-03
1232	1430	30-03
1656	1854	30-03
YD 7251	7449	30-03
7944	8142	30-02
6755	6953	30-03
YD 1548	YD 1746	30-03

3. IN ADDITION THERE ARE SEVEN TEAMS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF 1ST AMTRACKS WITH THE MISSION OF PERFORMING NIGHT AMBUSHES, AND TWO TEAMS DEPLOYED AT A-2 IN SUPPORT OF THE 2ND ARVN REGIMENT. THERE ARE THREE TEAMS LOCATED AT INDIA RELAY, ONE TEAM AT SERRIA RELAY AND ONE TEAM AT HOTEL RELAY.

GP-4

SECRET

OCN 4953 RELEASED BY [signature] TIME 291013 MAR69

336

DRAFTED BY:LRC:IRC
SEC S-2 FH 3D RECON 2
CWO

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 290055Z MAR 69

FM: CG THIRD MARINE DIV
CG XXIV CORPS FEB
CG III MAF DMO

INFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV
CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
THIRD MARINES
FOURTH MARINES
NINTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
MAG THREE NINE
SR. PROVINCE ADVISOR QUANG TRI
THIRD RECON BN
THIRD FORCE RECON CO

COPY TO:
G-2
G-3
GSV

SECRET
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
RECON DEBRIEFING REPORT (U)

SPOT REPORT MADE IN LIEU OF PATROL REPORT.
RECON TEAM: AMANDA 1C2 (6 MEN) OPO-154D-69

281400 H, TEAM WHILE BEING INSERTED AT (XD 978685) OBSERVED A LARGE BUNKER BUILT INTO THE SIDE OF A HILL AT (XD 975685) APPEARED TO BE NEW,

AT THE SAME GRID THERE WERE NUMEROUS SMALL BUNKERS, BUILT IN A SEMI-CIRCULAR PATTERN. TEAM WAS ABOUT 20 FT. OFF THE GROUND, WHEN THEY BEGAN

RECEIVING A/W FIRE, FROM (XD 975685) TEAM OBSERVED ONE ENEMY, BUT WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE UNIFORM.

GP-4
BT

OPO-154D-69
SECRET

CCN H0516 RELEASED BY C. H. Perry TIME 290755 H MAR 69

2 3/GSV

SECRET

*****ZZ UIMSK
DE UUMSQD 1482 0880612
ZNY SSSSS
Z 290612Z MAR 69
FM THIRDMARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
BT
S E C R E T
OPERATION MONTANA MAULER (U)
1. () FOLLOWING INFORMATION SUBMITTED ON SUBJECT OPERATION.
A. MONTANA MAULER, 1ST BDE, 5 TH INF DIV(MECH).
B. AREA BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ, ON THE WEST BY A LINE DRAWN FROM YD 000658, THEN FOLLOWING THE KHE KHI RIVER SOUTH AND WEST TO YD 986640, THEN SOUTHEAST TO YD 992627, THEN SOUTHWEST TO YD 990623 THEN SOUTHEAST TO YD 012597 ON THE SOUTH CONTINUE FROM YD GPQWTOU TO YD 020600, THEN E
ST TO YD
029603, THEN EAST TO YD 035600, THEN EAST TO YD 050607, THEN TO YD 068604 TEN TO TRAIL JUNCTION AT YD 076604, ON THE EAST, CONTINUE TO YD 080608, THEN UP THE 08 GRID LINE TO DMZ.
C. 23 MAR-DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY.
D. 1T N, 11 TH INF; 3 SQDN(-), 5TH CAV; AND I CO 3D BN, 9TH MAR AND D CO (-)1ST BN, 2D ARVN REGT.
E. CONDUT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES.

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1482 C O N FI D E N TI A L
F. 3/5(-)CONDUCTED RIF ALONG VALLEY BETWEEN DONG HA MTN AND MUTTER'S RIDGE, WERE ENGAGED BY ENEMY MORTARS FROM VIC HILL 208. 1/11(-) EMPLOYED WITH I 3/9TO LOCATE
ND DESTROY N FORCES, 3/(-) REDE
PLOYED O BLOCK EASTERN AVES OF ESCAPE. 1ST BN, 2D ARNV HELICOPTER ASSAULTS TO BLOCK NORTHERN ESCAPE. 1/11 CONTINUES ATTACK TO NORTH.
GP-4
BT
1482

76

SECRET

337

ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1476 /880630
ZNY SSSSS
Z 290630Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
BT
S E C R E T L I M D I S
ARC LIGHTA. CG XXIV CORPS MSG 281440Z MAR 69
B. 3D MAR DIV MSG 270900Z MAR 69
C. 3D MARDIV MSG 171435Z MAR 69
D. 3D MARDIV MSG 172300Z MAR 69
D. 3D MAR DIV MSG 270930Z FEB 69
1. IAW REF (A) THIS HEADQUARTERS GRANTS CLEARANCE/ CONCURRENCE UNTIL 012400H MAR 69. TGTS ARE CLEARED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY.
(A) DMZ INFORMATIONS IS AS FOLLOWS:
(1) QT 8428 FRIENDLIES 17,000 METERS AT XD 758610(B1/4)
NONCOMBATANTS 43,010 METERS AT CAM LO
(2) QT 8445 FRIENDLIES 22,000 METERS AT XD 758610(B1/4)
NONCOMBATANTS 44,700 METERS AT CAM LO
(3) QT 8446 FRIENDLIES 19,200 METERS AT XD 758610(B1/4)
NONCOMBATANTS 44,200 METERS AT CAM LO
(4) QT 8478 FRIENDLIES 1,000 METERS AT XD 943630(3/4 CP)
NONCOMBATANTS 20,300 METERS AT CAM LO
(5) QT 8425FRIENDLIES 7,000 METERS AT XD 683582(C1/4)
NONCOMBATANTS 47,300 METERS AT CAM LO

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1476 S E C R E T L I M D I S
(6) QT 8379 FRIENDLIES 2,200 METERS AT YD 080630(I3/9)
NONCOMBATANTS 12,500 METERS AT CAM LO
2. THE DMZ INFORMATION FOR OTHER TGTS REMAINS THE SAME AS IN REF B, C, D AND E.
3. THERE ARE RPT ARE FRIENDLY TROOPS WITHIN THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF TGT BOXES IN SOUTHERN DMZ AREA. TGTS ARE CLEARED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY.
GP-4
BT
1476

NNNN

A-1

SECRET

338

"""ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1483 0880845
ZNY SSSSS
Z P 290845Z MAR 69; Tod\0921\24th Corps
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH M
RINES
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: SNECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1 3RD MAR DIV RECON TMS
A. TM CLOUDY SKIES ENTERED DMZ
291510H MAR 69
B. TM LUCK PUNCH 291430H XD 898665 TM MADE CONTACT W/ ESI 4 NVA
TM ASSAULTED THROUGH EN POSIT RES 1 FR KIA 1 WIA(E) ARTY AND 81MM
MSN CALLED
C. AT 291450H EXTRACTION FORCE FROM 2-13/4 COMMITTED OUERLAND
D. TM LUCKY PUNCH 291210H XD 903657 FND 7 INDIVICUAL GRAVES
YIELDING7 NVA BODIES KILLED BY SAF. FURTHER SEARCH OF AREA PRODUCED
NEG RES RES 7 NVA KIA
GP-4
BT
1483

SECRET

SECRET



ZNY SSSSS
DIV-I-COC
-I- 12 MARINES
COC-I-MAG 39
ZNY SSSSS
O 290945Z MAR 69
FM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
TO ZEN/THIRD MARINES
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/NINTH MARINES

TOR 291125 / 1 / 2 / 10

C

TWELFTH MARINES
MAG ONE SIX
MAG THREE SIX
MAG THREE NINE
FIRST BN TWELFTH MARINES
ZEN/SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES
ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD RECON BN
ZEN/VANDERGRIFT INSTALLATION COORDINATOR
BT
S E C R E T
FRAG ORDER 87-69
A. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 280730Z MAR 69
B. CG TASK FORCE HOTEL 290103Z MAR 69

290945 Zmar

C-3

PKS
2/COC

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 8625 S E C R E T
1. THIRD MARINES: NO CHANGE FROM REF A.
2. FOURTH MARINES: NO CHANGE FROM REF A AS MODIFIED BY REF B.
3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: HELO MOVEMENTS FOR TASK FORCE HOTEL FORCES AND SUPPORTING FORCESE FOR 30 MAR 69 WILL BE PASEP

42

3

SECRET

ZZ UUMSQ UUMSENA UUMSQD UUMSJEA
DE UUMSK 1582 0831448
ZNY SSSSS
R 291430Z MAR 69 ZFF-6
FM XXIV CORPS TOC CP HOCHMUTH
TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
INFO UUMSENA/SR US ADVISOR 1ST ARVN DIV HUE
UUMSQD/3D MAR DIV COC DGN
UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV DTOC CEE
KONGUIN/CTG 70.8
BT
S E C R E T AVII-GC
SUBJ: OPERATION MONTANA MAULER (U)
REF: A. CG III MAF MSG DTG 160608Z JUN 68 (C).
B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 120910Z JUN 68 (C).
1. (S) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFFERENCES A AND B:
A. FORCE MOVEMENTS: NONE.
B. FORECAST OF MAJOR OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY 3D MAR DIV.
(1) NAME: MONTANA MAULER-1ST BDE, 5TH INF (MECH) CONTROL HQS.
(2) LOCATION: AO BOUNDED ON N BY SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF DMZ. ON THE E BY LINE FROM YD000658, THEN FOLLOWING THE KHE KHI RIVER S AND W TO YD 986640, THEN SE TO YD 992627, THEN SW TO YD990623, THEN SE TO YD012597 THEN NE TO YD 028600, E TO YD 029603, E TO YD 035600, E TO 050607, TO YD060504, TO TRAIL JUNCTION AT YD 076604, NE TO YD 080608 THEN NORTH ALONG 08N-S LINE TO DMZ.
(3) DATES : 23 MAR- DESTRUCTION OF EN FORCES.
(4) FORCES: 1 US BN, 2 USMC CO'S, 2 US ARMY CAV TRPS, 1 ARVN BN.
(5) MISSION: TO CONDUCT RIF OPS AND TO LOCATE AND DESTRY ENEMY FORCES.
(6) CONCEPT: ON 23 MAR 3/5 CAV(-) INITIATED RIF OPS ALONG VALLEY

PAGE TWO UUMSK 1582 S E C R E T
BETWEEN DONG HA MTN AND MUTTER'S RIDGE AND WAS ENGAGED BY ENEMY MORTAR FIRE FROM VIC HILL 208 (YD043644). 1/11 INF(-) DEPLOYED WITH 1/3/9 MAR TO LOCATE AND DESTROY EN, 3/5 CAV (-) REDEPLOYED TO BLOCK EN AVENUES OF ESACAPE. 1ST BN 2ND ARVN CA ON 28 MARCH VIC YD0664AND YD0665 AND MOVES TO BLOCKING PSN VIC YD0467. 1/11 INF CONTINUES TO ATTACK N.
(7) RATIONALE: 1/11 INF IS IN CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE 27TH NVA REGT
GP-4
BT
1582

76

SECRET

051

DRAFTER ISO/CAR/RMB
SEC ISO PHONE 3201
CWO

IMMEDIATE 300240 Z MAR 69

FROM: CG, THIRD MAR DIV
TO: CG, XXIV CORPS
INFO: CG, III MAF

//SECRET//

RELEASE OF EMBARGOED NEWS MATERIAL

A. COMUSMACV MSG 221515 Z AUG 68

1. AS PRESCRIBED IN REF A THE INITIAL RELEASE OF INFORMATION PERTAINING TO ANY TACTICAL OPERATION WILL BE MADE BY MACV WHEN IN THE OPINION OF THE COMMANDER CONCERNED THE RELEASE OF SUCH INFORMATION WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THIS COMMAND.

2. ACCORDINGLY IT IS REQUESTED THE EMBARGO BE LIFTED IMMEDIATELY ON RELEASE OF NEWS STORIES CONCERNING OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN WHICH COMMENCED 27 FEBRUARY 1969.

GP-4

CCN 5045 REL BY RH Dains

150

P

7

SECRET

052

WW
ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1517 0890355
ZNY SSSSS
Z P 300355Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH MARINES FDC
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1 3RD MARDIV RECON
A. TM PEACH GATE 300930H X D 932661 WHILE CHECKING DANGER AREA, SUSTAINED CASUALTIES FROM COMMAND DETONATED NVA CLAYMORE. TM FIRED ON FLEEING NVA W/NEG RES MOVED TO LZ FOR MEDIVAC AND FIRED 81MM MSN AND ARTY. RES 4 WIA(E)
B. TM DESERT SAND 291400H XD 934656. FND 6 A FRAME BNKRS, 251 CHICOM CRENS, 61/82MM RDS, 70/60MM RDS, 232 MORTAR PRIMERS, 68 FUZES. 5 BAGS RICE, 8LBS INCREMENTS. WHILE CHECKING AREA, REC'D SAF FROM SQD SIZED ENEMY FORCE RET'D SAF RES 1 NVA KIA
C. TM DESERT SAND 291510H XD 934659 TM FOUND 9 BNKRS APPROX 6MOS OLD 23 FIGHTING HOLES, 7/ RPG RDS, 2 CANS/82MM FUZES, 2 CANS/60MM FUZES, 2/10" CLAYMORES. 100/50 CAL RNDS, 2000/30 CAL RDS SIGNS OF REC ACT IN AREA DEST'D ALL GEAR.
GP-4
BT
1517

Tod | 0407 | 24 Corps

1 A of 4

SECRET

053

W.P.S.
HISTORICAL
COC
PLANS

TO UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1523 0890720
ZNY SSSSS
O 300720Z MAR 69 Tod | 0 a 43 | 24th Corps
FM THIRD MAR DIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: OPERTION MONTANA MAULER(U)
REF (A) THIRD MARDIV WIRENOTE 281420Z MAR 69
(B) THIRD MARDIV WIRENOTE 290612Z MAR69
1 (S) PURSUANT TO REF A AND B OPERTION MONTANA MAULER IS REDEFINED AS A CO-ORDINATED MAJOR OPERATION AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN AN AREA BOUNDED BY THE DMZ ON THE NORTH, THE 08 N/S GRID LINE ON THE EAST, ROUTE 9 ON THE SOUTH, AND THE 99N/S GRID LINE ON THE WEST. THIS AREA IS RETROACTIVE, FOR REPORTING PURPOSES, TO 23 MARCH. REALIGNMENT OF CASUALTY FIGURES WILL BE REFLECTED IN FUTURE MONTANA MAULER AND THIRD MARDIV SITREPS
2 (S) PRINCIPAL CONTROL HEADQUARTERS FOR OPERATION MONTANA MAULER IS 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) WHICH IS OPERATING IN CO-ORDINATION AND CO-OPERATION WITH 2ND ARVN REGIMENT AND ELEMENTS OF 9TH MARINE REGT
GP-4
BT
1523

8

SECRET

054

TPJJJJJSSSSSZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1526 0890810
ZNY SSSSS
Z P 300810Z MAR 69 Tod | 0810 | 2 + Copy
FM THIRDMARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH MARINES FDC
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1 3RD MARDIV RECON
A K-3
ND MAGIC SPELL EXITED DMZ AT 301130H MAR 69
B. I -2, EXTRACTION FORCE FOR LUCKY PUNCH EXITED DMZ AT 301350H MAR CH 69 LUCKY PUNCH CONTINUES MSN.
C. TM PEACH STATE 301210H XD 933658 TM REC'D 5 CHICOMS. PULLED BACK TO CALL IN ARTY AND 81MSN AND REC'D 9/82MM RNDS. RNDS COMING FROM VIC XD 933662. TM STILL REC SPORADIC 82MM RNDS AT 301445H. TRYING TO DETERMINE GRID OF EN MORTAR SITE. RES 1 WIA(M) 1 NVA KIA
TM HAS REQUESTED ARTY 81MM AND F/W
D. UNIT LOCATIONS: CLOUDY SKIES XD 918658
LUCKY PUNCH XD 900645
PEARCH STATE XD 933658
E. TM LUCKY PUNCH XD 905644 301355H FND 52/82MM RNDS AND 4 BNKRS. NO DEMO. MARKED FOR LATER DEST.
GP-4
BT
1526

NNNN

ZZ UUMSQ UUMSEMA UUMSQD UUMSJEA RUHGUIN
DE UUMSK 1604 0891424
ZNY SSSSS
ZO 301412Z MAR 69
FM XXIV CORPS TOC GP HOCHMUTH
TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
INFO UUMSEMA/SR US ADVISOR IST ARVN DIV HUE
UUMSQD/3RD MAR DIV COC DGK
UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV DTOC CEE
RUHGUIN/CTG 70.8
ST
S E C R E T AVII-GC
SUBJ: MONTANA MAULER (U)
REF: A. XXIV CORPS TOC MSG DTG 291430Z (S)
B. CG III MAF, MSG DTG 160606Z (C)
C. CG III MAF, MSG DTG 120910Z (C)
1. (S) THE BOUNDARIES DELINEATED IN REF C PARA 1, B, (1) ARE AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF AO IS RTE 9; E AND W BOUNDARIES REMAINS THE SAME".
2. (S) TWO USMC COYS CITED IN REF A PARA 1, B, (4) ARE ELEMENTS OF THE 9TH MAR REGT. ONE ARVN BN IS FROM THE 2ND ARVN REGT.
GROUP-4.
ST
1604

Jlor/30 1600 241/667

76

1

SECRET

SHOVE CIRC
OP CHIEF
G-2 W.O.
G-3 W.O.
DCHO
APO/OC
ACTION

COC

ARMY SERES
C 301/382
FM CG 1ST
TO FORD
ZEN/TCAMCI
INFO CG FIRST
CG FIRST
NINTH
TWELFTH
AMBASSADOR COORDINATOR
MAG DEF
MAG THREE
MAG THREE
FIRST
ZEN/MEDIA
ZEN/THREE
FIRST
FM
S E C R E T
MAG ORDER
A. OPTIONS MELO MOVEMENTS

301/3 [illegible] C-3 G-2/OOC

PAGE TWO FORMATIONS S E C R E T
B. TIMES AND HOURS MEANS. NO CHANGE
EXCEPT REF A.
C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. HELO MOVEMENTS
LOHEDHEAD FOR 1ST WOTL FORCES AND SUPPORTING
FORCES FOR 31 MAR 68 HEAD IN FOUR COLUMNS
FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: MISSION NUMBER, LINE
DESIGNATION, UNIT DESCRIPTION AND
PLANNED EXECUTION TIME):

401 ALFA	CH-46/ONE/THREE (150 PAX) FROM LZ [illegible] XD508757 TO LZ AT XD5[illegible]964	0800
401 BRAVO	[illegible] PTS ENDIA/THREE/ TWELVE (90 PAX AND 1000 LB CARGO INTO FROM VCB [illegible] TO PTS GREENE	ON COMPLETION 401 ALFA
401 CHARLIE	CH-46 AND ELEV/ONE/FOUR (221 PAX, TWO 106MM RR INE AND 17 CHIC EAT) FROM FSB ARGONNE TO LZ AT XD[illegible]9587	ON COMPLETION 401 BRAVO

CH-46
AT
[illegible]

82

27

SECRET

055

DRAFTER J.E. KUSSMANN
SEC DUEL BLADE PHONE 3361
CWO

PRIORITY 310156 Z MAR69

FM: CG, THIRD MARDIV DGH
TO: CG, III MAF DNG

INFO: CG, XXIV CORPS PHB
CG, FIRST ARVN DIV
ELEVENTH ENGR BN DGH
SECOND ARVN REGT

3HS

S E C R E T/ DUEL BLADE

DUEL BLADE CONSTRUCTION CY 69

A. CG, III MAF 160542Z MAR69

1. IAW REF A, A RE-EVALUATION OF CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR DUEL BLADE SITES WAS MADE AND IS SUBMITTED AS FOLLOWS FOR THE CY 69 CONSTRUCTION SEASON.

SITE	ITEM	DATE	NO/PLTS
A-4	2-20' TOWERS	1-6 MAY	1
C-2	2-20' TOWERS 6 HEAVY GUN PADS	1-15 MAY	2
C-1	2 HEAVY GUN PADS 12 LIGHT GUN PADS	17-31 MAY	3
C-4	1-50' TOWER 2-20' TOWERS	1-4 JUNE	3
ECB	4-20' TOWERS 4 STEEL ARCH BUNKERS	6-21 JUNE	3
VCB	6-20' TOWERS 10 STEEL ARCH BUNKERS	23 JUN-19 JULY	3

2. LIAISION HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE SECOND ARVN REGT AND THEIR CONSTRUCTION GOALS ARE LISTED BELOW. TO DATE ONE COMPANY OF ARVN ENGRS HAVE BEEN TASKED FOR CONSTRUCTION AND IT IS ESTIMATED IT WOULD TAKE 2½ MONTHS TO COMPLETE THE DESIRED CONSTRUCTION. AS ADDITIONAL FORCES

DUEL

ARE ASSIGNED THIS TIME FIGURE WOULD BE ADJUSTED ACCORDINGLY.

SITE	ITEMS
A-2	55 BUNKERS 2-20' TOWERS 2 HEAVY GUN PADS 2 LIGHT GUN PADS
G-1	87 BUNKERS 2-20' TOWERS 1-50' TOWER 4 HEAVY GUN PADS 10 LIGHT GUN PADS
A-2	49 BUNKERS 2-20' TOWERS 1-50' TOWER

GP4

CON 5176 REL BY JR Lilley TIME _____ H MAR69

SECRET

056

Z
IIIIFRZ°°°°°ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1552 0900600
ZNY SSSSS
Z P 310600Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH MARINES FDC
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPORT
1 4TH MARINES RECON TMS
A. CLUDY SKIES EXITED DMZ OVERLAND AT 310850H MAR 69
B. K-3 311100H XD 932662. UNIT RETURNING FROM LINKUP W/ PEACH STATE FND 2/50CAL POSITS, 4/A-FRAME BNKRS, 1/ MORTAR PIT, 20/82MM MORTAR RNDS, 63/50 CAL RNDS. GEAR AND POSITIONS APPROX 2 WEEKS OLD DESTROYED ALL.
GP-4
BT
1552

Tod | 0750 | 24 Corph

A-1

SECRET

SECRET

057

°°°°°ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1562 0900730
ZNY SSSSS
Z 310730Z MAR 69 Tod/0802/24 Corps
FM THIRD MARDIV COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
BT
S E C R E T L I M D I S
ARC LIGHT
A. XXIV CORPS MSG 311030Z MAR 69
1. IAW REFERENCE A THIS HEADQUARTERS GRANTS CLEARANCE TO 012400H MAY 69
FOR ARC LIGHT SECONDARY TGTS LISTED BELOW. ACKNOWLEDGE TGTS MAY BE STRUCK ON 15 MINUTE NOTICE.
A. QT 8465
B. QT 8464
C. TT 9563
D. TT 9587
E. TT 9593
2. THERE ARE NO RPT NO USMC FORCES OR TRCON TEAMS WITHIN THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF TGT BOXES.
GP=4
BT
1562

A-1

SECRET

[redacted]

OO UUMSK UUMSQ
DE UUMSQD 1583 0901800
ZNY CCCCC
O 311800Z MAR 69
FM THIRD MARDIV COC
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC
TASK FORCE HOTEL
BT

[redacted] FINAL SECTION OF TWO
SPARK. 1/3 OPERATES SOUTH OF RT 926. 2/3 CP AND I CO OPERATES FROM FSB WHISMAN XD 973334. K/3/3 OPERATES FROM FSB CATES AND I/3/3 CONDUCT RIF VIC OF FSB CATES. TF REMAGEN OPERAES IN WESTERN PORTION OF AO ALONG RT 926.
C. MONTANA MAULER 1/11 COMMMENCES ATTACK TO THE EAST TOWARD C-2 & C-3 BRIDGE. 1/2 ARVN CONT OFFENSIVE OPNS IN NORTHERN PORTION OF AO NEAR DMZ. 3/5 CAV OCCUPY BLOCKING POSITION TO NORTHEAST. I63/9 MOVE OVERLAND TO KHE SANH VALLEY AND PREPARE TO HELOLIFT TO CAU VIET.
E&F 2/9 PREPARE TO MOVE TO VCB.
4. SPECIAL OPERATIONS. SEE 3RD RECON BN 24 HR SITREP
5. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS.
A. TASK FORCE HOTEL
(1) 3RD MARINES
(A) 1/3 MAINE CRAG
(B) 2/3 MAINE CRAG
(C) 3/3(-) MAINE CRAG

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1583 [redacted]
(2) 4THMARINES
(A) 1/4 PURPLE MARTIN
(B) 2/4 NO CONTACT
(C) 3/4
AT 311245H I/3/4 VIC XD 910630. HEARD MOVEMENT ON TRAIL. SET UP AMB. MADE CONTACT. 1 NVA KIA(C).
B. 9TH MARINES
(1) 1/9 NO CONTACT
(2) 2/9
AT 301900H E/2/9 VIC YD 055599. FOUND TWO NVA BODIES 2 HOURS OLD. CAUSE OF DEATH UNK.
(3) 3/9 NO CONTACT
C. 1ST BDE 5TH INF MECH

(1) 1/11 MONTANA MAULER
(2) 1/61 NO CONTACT
(3) 1/77 NO CONTACT
(4) 3/5 CAV MONTANA MAULER
(5) A/4/12 CAV NO CONTACT
(6) 1ST AMTRAC BN NO CONTACT

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE THREE UUMSQD 1583 [redacted]
3RD RECON BN SEE 3RD RECON BN 24 HR SITREP
ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. SEE 12TH MAR 24HR SITREP
GENERAL. LOW CLOUD COVER, FOG AND RAIN GREATLY
HAMPERED AO SORTIES. EMERGENCY RESUPPLY ONLY

WEATHER DID NOT AFFECT GROUND OPERATIONS IN 3RD
MAR DIV AO.
D. RECAP OF OPERATIONS

UNIT		PATROL FT SQD	PATROL PLT	AMBUSH FT SQD	AMBUSH PLT	S&D CO	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPER	
3RD MAR									
1/3 MAINE CRAG									
2/3 MAINE CRAG									
3/3 MAINE CRAG									
4TH MAR									
1/4 PURPLE MARTIN									
2/4	D	0	4	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
	N	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	5	0
3/4	D	0	5	3	0	0	0	1	2	3
	N	0	0	0	0	6	1	0	5	0
9TH MAR										
1/9	D	0	3	2	0	0	5	0	0	3
	N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0
2/9 MONTANA MAULER										

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 1583 [redacted]

3/9	D	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	1
	N	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH)										
1/11 MONTANA MAULER										
1/61	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	N	0	5	0	18	0	0	0	5	0
1/77	D	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0	3	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
3/5 CAV MONTANA MAULER										
1ST AMTRAC BN										
	D	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	1
	N	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	11	0
QTCB	D	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	5	0
	D	12	13	11	0	0	7	1	8	9
	N	0	13	2	18	27	2	0	36	0
	T	12	26	13	18	27	9	1	44	9

[redacted]

PAGE FIVE UUMSQD 1583 [redacted]

E. SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROVINCE COORD	DATE TIME	ACTION SIZE/TYPE	FR UNIT/ LOSSES	EN UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY US/VC
YD 055599	301900H	PLT S/C	E/2/9 NONE	UNK 2 NVA KIA	US
YD 910630	311245H	SQD AMB	I/3/4	UNK 1 NVA KIA	US

F. PACIFICATION SUPPORT

1. PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING VC INFRASTURCTURE AND POLITICAL APPARATUS.

A. A/1/9 CONDUCT COMBINED OPSN WITH RF/PF/CIDG IN MAI LOC TOAR.

B. B/1/9 CONDUCT COMBINED OPNS IN CAM LO DISTRICT.

C. TWO SQUADS OF QUANG TRI PROV RIFLE CO CONTINUES OPNS WITH 4TH CAG.

D. 1ST BDE 5TH INF (MECH) CONTINUES CO-ORDINATED OPNS WITH 1ST AND 2ND ARVN REGTS THROUGHOUT POPULATED COASTAL AREA.

2. DIRECT CO-ORDINATION WITH PROVINCE (PIOCC) BY 9TH MARINES, DHCB, OTCB AND 1ST BDE 5TH IN (MECH)

3. TABULATION OF VILLAGE/HAMLET C&S DURING RPT PERIOD. NONE

GP-4

BT

1583

[redacted]