

UNCLASSIFIED

HIST.
3/WBS/djw
3480
Ser: 003A18569
4 Jul 1969

(Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO 3d Marine Regiment ltr 3/TCD/wah 3480 Serial No. 003A15369 of 2 June 1969

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
To: Commanding General, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Via: (1) Commanding General, XXIV Corps
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Operation Maine Crag Combat After Action Report

Ref: (f) MACV Dir 335-8

1. Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with reference (f).

2. Contents noted with following remarks:

a. Operation officially commenced on 15 March vice 10 March 1969.

b. Official Division SITREP Cumulative Losses (both friendly and enemy) differ from After Action Report Results, paragraph #11, page 18 and should be adjusted as follows:

Report Result,

FRIENDLY LOSSES

- (1) USMC
 - (a) 17 KIA vice 16 KIA
 - (b) 97 WIA(E) vice 103 WIA(E)
 - (c) 7 WIA(M) vice 10 WIA(M)
- (2) USA
 - (a) 4 KIA vice 3 KIA
 - (b) 28 WIA(E) vice 23 WIA(E)
 - (c) 2 WIA(M) vice 6 WIA(M)

3D MAR DIV SEC FILE
BT# 220369

ENEMY LOSSES

- (1) Personnel - 157 NVA KIA vice 95 NVA KIA
- (2) Weapons
 - (a) 21 CSWC vice 15 CSWC
 - (b) 414 IWC vice 340 IWC

COPY 13 OF 15 COPIES
SER: _____

F.R. Kraince
F. R. KRAINCE
By direction

UNCLASSIFIED

T-A

DECLASSIFIED

3rd Marine Division
Command Chronology

Encl 5A After Action Reports, from Marine & USA Elements

Tab A 3rd Marines Combat After Action Report, Operation Maine Crag, w/1st End.

Tab B 4th Marines Combat After Action Report, Operation Purple Martin, w/1st End.

Tab C 4th Marines Report, Subj: Marine Corps Matters in Connection with Operation Purple Martin

Tab D Department of the Army, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) Combat Operation After Action Report (Operation Task Force Remagen), w/1st End & 2 Annexes Tabs E & F

Tab E Department of the Army, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation Maine Crag), w/9 Incls:

Incl 1 Area of Operations Overprint

2 Operation Order 3-69

3 Frag Order #1 to Operation Order 3-69

4 Overlay Issued With Verbal Order on 26 Mar 69

5 Frag Order #2 to Operation Order 3-69

6 Frag Order #3 to Operation Order 3-69

7 Frag Order #4 to Operation Order 3-69

8 Frag Order #5 to Operation Order 3-69

9 Resupply & Maintenance Statistics

Tab F Department of the Army, 1st Battalion Mechanized, 61st Infantry, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation Task Force Remagen II), w/12 Incls:

Incl 1 Map Overprint

2 Initial Disposition of Task Force

3 Frag Order #15

4 Frag Order #16

5 Frag order #17

6 Frag Order #18

7 Frag order #19

8 Frag Order #20

9 Frag Order #21

10 Plan for Post-Attack Pursuit of the Enemy on 28 Apr 69

11 Intelligence Spot Reports

12 Logistics

Tab G Department of the Army, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation William's Glade), w/1 End; & 2 Incls:

Incl 1 Operation Overlay

2 Operation Overlay

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), BNP
APO San Francisco 96602

S & C FILES

3D MARINES

00147-69

3/TCB/wmh
3480
Ser No 003A15369

2 JUN 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Marine Regiment
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS, Series L 7014,
Sheets 6242 III, 6242 II, 6341 IV, 6241 I
(b) Div O 3100.1D
(c) CG, 3d Mar Div Op Order 13-69 (Maine Crag)
(d) 3d Marines Op Plan 3-69
(e) 3d Marines Op Order 5-69

Encl: (1) 3d Marines Op Plan 3-69
(2) 3d Marines Op Order 5-69
(3) Operations Overlay
(4) After Action Report (Task Force Remagen)

1. Code Name: Maine Crag (Search and Destroy)2. Dates of Operations: 101610H March to 021300H May 1969

3. Location: The Vietnamese Salient, Western Quang Tri Province. Bordered on the North by Route #9, on the West by the Xe Pon River, on the South by the Laotian Border, and to the East generally along the Da Krong River Valley.

4. Task Organization

3d Marines (Rein)
Hq Co, 3d Marines (Field)
Task Force Remagen
1st Bn, 3d Marines
2d Bn, 3d Marines

Col P.D. LA FOND (10 March-02 May)
1st Lt G.E. PLANT (10 March-02 May)
Lt Col MILIA (18 March-05 April)
Lt Col J.S. KYLE (15 March-20 April)
Lt Col J.J. McMONAGLE (10 March-02 May)

3d Bn, 3d Marines

Lt Col R.G. SCHULZE (10-11 March,
23 March-11 April,
18 April-02 May)
Lt Col MOSS (10 March-02 May)

1st Bn, 12th Marines

3d Marines

Copy 4 of 17

UNCLASSIFIED

Tab A

UNCLASSIFIED

Direct Support Artillery (Operation Maine Crag)

(1) 1st Bn. 12th Marines was in direct support (D/S) of the 3d Marines for Operation Maine Crag. The following D/S Btry's were utilized during this operation:

4/1/12 - 105 How
 5/1/12 - 105 How
 6/6/66 - 105 How
 1st Btry - 155 How
 2/1/12 (-) - 4.2 Mor

(2) The D/S Artillery was employed using the Fire Support Base (FSB) concept of operation. Five separate FSB's were constructed & occupied during the course of this operation, in order to provide continuous fire support to the Infantry in a fast moving tactical situation. The FSB concept of operation is not new to the 3d Marines or 1/12, and was handled in a professional manner with few problems. The following points are salient and should be considered on future operations.

(a) All Btry moves should be considered as tactical moves and fraggd as tactical lifts. This is contrary to current Division/Wing policy; however our experience indicates the Tactical Frag is a far superior system with regards to a Btry move in support of an operation.

(b) The use of the Fire Support Base Inspection and Reconnaissance Planning Preparation and Organization (FIRPPO) Team has proven to be extremely beneficial and time saving, and should be employed whenever possible.

(c) The Zone Interpretation Planning Preparation, and Overflight (ZIPPO) Team will select the proposed site for a new FSB. The Infantry Company Commander will normally be the first one to actually walk the ground at the proposed FSB. He should make a determination as to whether the ground lends itself to the construction of a FSB, and report this info to the Regimental Commander. This can eliminate much unnecessary work and save time if the proposed site cannot be developed into a FSB.

(*) Ammunition resupply of our FSB's was a limiting factor throughout this operation. This is a continuous problem inherent in this type of operation, and it is important this limitation be considered at all levels of planning prior to and during the operation. The following points are offered for consideration:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(a) Prior to commencing this type of operation the Artillery Bn Commander makes an estimate, based on past experience and the present tactical situation, of the heavy lift copters, needed on a daily basis to resupply his Bn. The MAG, knowing it's overall commitments can determine to what extent they will be able to support the subject operation.

(b) The Artillery Bn Commander will establish priorities for resupply and these must be adhered to by the G-4/S-4 and LSA personnel. There were times on this operation when it appeared that priorities from the field were not honored.

(c) Detailed planning must be accomplished at all levels to ensure maximum utilization of heavy lift assets.

(d) A minimum acceptable ammunition level must be established, and when this point is reached only contact and active missions will be fired.

(e) Resupply of artillery ammunition by para-drop should be considered only in an emergency situation, due to its inaccuracies.

(4) It is worth noting that during this operation the ARVN 105 Btry on FSB Torch was used to support 2/3 during a critical period of time. The Btry performed very well, and no problems were encountered.

(5) General Support Artillery was provided by the following units:

1st 8" How Btry (SP) - VCB
 5th 155 Gun Btry (SP) - VCB
 2d Bn 94th (175) Field Arty (USA) - Calu
 ARVN 105 Btry - FSB Torch

(6) Significant Displacements

<u>BTRY</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
1st Prov	12 March	VCB	FSB Cates
A/1/12	15 March	ECB	FSB Snapper
C/1/12	15 March	C-2	Calu
C/1/12	16 March	Calu	VCB
C/1/12	17 March	VCB	FSB Saigon
1st Prov	18 March	FSB Cates	FSB Saigon
A/1/12	23 March	FSB Snapper	FSB Spark
1st Prov	26 March	FSB Saigon	FSB Spark

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>BTRY</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
C/1/12	6 April	FSB Saigon	FSB Whisman
A/1/12	14 April	FSB Spark	FSB McClintock
1st Prov	13 April	FSB Spark	FSB McClintock
W/1/12	27 April	Dong Ha	FSB Gaucho
C/1/12 (-)	29 April	FSB Whisman	FSB Gaucho
W/1/12	30 April	FSB Gaucho	VCB

(7) Missions (Operation Maine Crag)

	<u>OBS</u>	<u>UNOBS</u>	<u>H & I</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
105	802	2611	1962	5375
155	132	373	64	569
TOTAL	934	2984	2026	5944

(8) Total Rounds Expended (Operation Maine Crag)

	<u>HE</u>	<u>ILL</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
105	51,642	140	2330	54,112
155	6,138	48	299	6,485
TOTAL	57,780	188	2629	60,597

(9) KBA's

NVA = 36
VC = 0

TOTAL = 36

(10) During Operation Maine Crag fire direction for all D/S Btry's were centralized with 1/12 FDC to effect better control and coordination. The Bn CP made the following displacements in order to maintain effective control:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
10 March	Dong Ha	VCB
17 March	VCB	FSB Saigon
04 April	FSB Saigon	FSB Whisman

(11) Fire Support coordination remained the responsibility of the 3d Marines FSCC during the entire operation. Communications were established with higher, lower and adjacent units to ensure responsive Fire Support and effective control.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Air Operations Operation Maine Crag was supported by the air assets of the 7th Air Force, 101st Air Cavalry, and 1st MAW. All Air Support requests were submitted through radio relay, telephone and TFM TACP radio net. The majority of all Air Support was requested on a pre-planned basis with exceptions for med-evac, emergency TPQ's, and Close Air Support. The feedback on preplanned helo-support was generally good in that our missions were accepted and a schedule for their execution sent to us by 0700 on the day of execution. If a lift could not be done, we were notified the previous night. Close Air Support was never well programmed and often required follow up calls and resubmission of requests because the feedback of information was incomplete and/or lost. In general the Air Support was good when available; the specifics of each will be discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs. Of specific interest are the following missions: Aerial Observation, Command and Control, Med-Evac, Resupply, Troop-lift, Close Air Support, and Special Missions.

Aerial Observation was excellent and greatly assisted the Regiment and the Battalions in the operation. During the first phase of the operation, they covered the routes of march and visually reconnoitered the area ahead of each Battalion for trafficability and enemy ambushes. Once into the objective area they not only covered troop movement, but also spotted bunkers and enemy positions which they neutralized with Fixed Wing Air Strikes, Artillery Fire, and in some cases, their own ordnance. By effectively utilizing these supporting arms they destroyed four enemy trucks, several anti-aircraft weapons, and killed thirty or more NVA.

The second phase of the operation required constant A/O coverage of 1st Bn, 3d Marines since they were left in an exposed blocking position. It was learned from previous operations that the NVA would only use their artillery against our forces when we were without air coverage. This was emphasized to the supporting units and a request for a maximum effort was requested. In all but a few instances, this request was honored and the number of fire incidents was held to a minimum.

When 1/3 was left uncovered they took rockets and mortar fire. As soon as the A/O was back on station the fire stopped. If the ground unit had been able to spot the enemy, the A/O would strike back with a Fire Mission, generally netting one or several secondary explosions.

In any operation, which is conducted in mountainous jungle terrain, a Command and Control package is imperative to the overall success of the operation. This mission so necessary to success, however, is the lowest priority in support. In general the aircraft (UH-34D, CH 46A) are unsuitable for the mission and have far too many mechanical failures to be of dependable service. Conversely, the most

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

desirable and dependable aircraft (UH-1H, LOH) are not available because they do not exist in our inventory. Thus the ground Commander must live with what is available when it is available.

The med-evac support was very good with several exceptions, not in reference to the med-evac's ability, but to the flow of timely information which was sadly neglected in the field. The average response to a med-evac call was a little over one hour which is a little long. The problem as we saw it was that the med-evac package is not well supported in that only one package existed when there were three full Regiments in the field.

Resupply for Operation Maine Crag was good; the only problems resulted from weather and confusion through S-4 channels.

Helicopter Troop Lifts and Artillery Battery Lifts were many and varied. The execution of the troop lifts was excellent with one exception, the execution of the battery lifts was poor. Every troop lift that was planned went extremely well with possibly one exception. The initial lift of 2/3 was done on the spur of the moment and could have been disastrous if the battalion had not maintained a "Ready" posture. The next large lift was that of 1/3 which we had requested to be a night assault, but due to poor weather and the lack of necessary equipment, was denied. Then again on the spur of the moment, TFI directed (9) "Heavy Lift" aircraft to move the battalion into a secure zone at dusk. By the time the lift was half complete it was very dark (2000) and several aircraft were unable to land due to lack of lighting and a cluttered LZ. As a result of these aircraft not landing, the CP unit for one company was landed in Quang Tri and did not get out to the field for three days. The entire lift took another day to complete.

The one exception to a well planned lift was the move of 1/3 from LZ Spark into Phase II area of Operation Maine Crag. 1/3's lift is of special note because it was dependent upon two factors for success. The first was that an A/O be continuously orbiting overhead in order to direct fixed wing cover upon enemy rocket and mortar sites. This was imperative since they had taken enemy rockets and mortars for the past several days prior to the lift. The second factor was that the critical battery lift go within the time frame planned so that the CP and one remaining company could be lifted on schedule.

The A/O's failed to relieve on station, thus incoming enemy rockets and mortars were received. The heavy lift helos were not tactically assigned or briefed thus extending a (3) three hour lift to (8). Fortunately the lift was completed without a casualty.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The battery lift mentioned in the preceeding paragraphs readresses our attention again to its peculiar problem. All battery lifts are considered by the Regimental CO as tactical lifts and are requested as such. However, neither TFH nor 3d Marine Division consider them as such for they are controlled through Logistics channels.

It is felt that as a result of the preceeding problems that a representative of the heavy lift aircraft or a designated flight leader of the same should be included in all ZIPPO briefs in which a Battery is to be part of the assault and/or a tactical consideration. And if a Battery is involved in any lift, that a package be constituted, briefed, and operated as a flight to accomplish the lift just as a troop lift is accomplished.

It has also been discovered that the use of helo-assault tables be reemphasized and extensively used in all troop and battery lifts. This is an extremely useful tool for all ground Commanders in that it will give him an exact status of what remains to be lifted during any troop movement.

The Close Air Support that we actually received during Operation Maine Crag was outstanding, however its availability and feedbacks of its availability were unsatisfactory. We never seemed to get the information on what we were going to receive for the following day until approximately an hour prior to the time of need.

Our one special mission consisted of a lift of two ontos disguised as dozers. The ruse worked well, but the lift went exactly 180 degrees out of phase. In order to execute the lift properly the parts and personnel had to be lifted into the zone prior to the Ontos arrival. Of course the opposite happened. Luckily all turned out well and the lift was completed successfully.

6. Intelligence

a. Prior to commencement of Operation Maine Crag it was assessed that enemy units within our AO would be of a support and logistic type. Unit identifications and strengths of enemy forces were unknown due to lack of adequate COB.

b. Operation Maine Crag was based on intelligence gained from reconnaissance teams, URS's, PI, SLAR and IR missions which showed that the enemy was using Route #926 for vehicular traffic into SVN. The mission of Maine Crag was logically to interdict Route #926. During the operation, Route #926 was interdicted and the enemy's vehicular traffic halted. Several caches were found throughout the AO, the largest of which were adjacent to Route #926 in the western portion of the salient. The following were the most significant caches found:

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (1) 21 Mar - H/2/3 - (XD 902233) - 600 tons of rice, 750,000 rnds of 7.62 mm, 3718 rnds of 82mm mort, 362 RPG-2 rkts, 86 rnds of 60mm mort, and 16 rnds of 82mm RR.
- (2) 23 Mar - H/2/3 - (XD 903244) - 23,000 lbs of rice, and 7000 lbs of salt.
- (3) 23 Mar - F/2/3 - (XD 918240) - 209 AK-47's, 21 AK-50's, 3 SKS's, 1000 lbs TNT, 2000 lbs of canned food, and 400 AK magazines.
- (4) 23 Mar - G/2/3 - (XD 915229) - 2500 RPG-2 rkts, 288/82mm mortar rnds, 3200/7.62mm rnds, 7500 lbs of sugar, 5700 lbs of rice, 2000 lbs of powder milk, & 100 lbs of lard.
- (5) 25 Mar - E/2/3 - (XD 908234) 100 tons of rice.
- (6) 26 Mar - E/2/3 - (XD 915227) 4000 lbs TNT, 1400 82mm mortar rnds, 55/75mm RR rnds, 100/57mm RR rnds, 500 RPG-2 rkts, 500/60mm mortar rnds, and 1000 7.62mm rnds.
- (7) 30 Mar - C/1/77 - (XD 790255) 1120/82mm mortar rnds, 218/60mm mortar rnds, 86/75mm RR rnds, 3500/12.7mm rnds, 5000/7.62mm rnds and 20/37mm AA rnds.

c. As the operation progressed, after originally defending his caches, the enemy chose to withdraw. Only once did he take the offensive on the ground. This came in an attack on FSB Big Foot Brown with an estimated company, which resulted in 20 NVA KIA. During the first 2 weeks of April the enemy proved his capability to launch mortar/artillery/rocket attacks on friendly positions. During this period he attacked by fire on 14 occasions with 60mm mortars, 82mm mortars, 75mm howitzers, 85mm field guns, and 122mm rockets.

d. As Operation Maine Crag proceeded the following enemy units were identified from interrogation of PW's and translation of documents.

- (1) 5th Engr Bn, 83d Engr Regt located vicinity (XD 864150) on 15 March 69.
- (2) 808th NVA Inf Bn (Indep) located vicinity (XD 8515) on 19 March 69. Mission of unit was to carry supplies.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) 1st and 2nd Inf Bns located vicinity (XD 8616) on 13 March 69. These two Bns were held as unassigned units from Infiltration Group 4019 and because of Operation Maine Crag they were temporarily assigned to the 612th Regt.

(4) 3rd Inf Bn located vicinity (XD 8722) on 19 March 69. This Bn was also from Infiltration Group 4019 and temporarily under the 612th Regt. This Bn was assigned the mission of relieving the 608th Bn of its duties.

(5) 5th Co. 3rd Bn located vicinity (XD 937003) on 12 April.

(6) 6th Bn located vicinity (XD 9426) on 15 April.

(7) 608th Bn located vicinity (XD 9426) on 15 April 69.

Based on coins identified and their assigned mission, the original estimate that enemy forces within the Maine Crag AO would most likely consist of support and logistics type units was corroborated.

4. The terrain within the western portion of the AO consisted generally of a large U-shaped valley, surrounded by dominant terrain with a large high ground mass in the center of the "U". Terrain in the northern and eastern portions of the AO consisted of rugged mountains with intermittent plots of vegetated land. Critical terrain features within the AO consisted of hill masses Co Van and Co Yan, the Xe Ban River and Route #926.

5. Generally the terrain within the Maine Crag AO did not present any major obstacles to foot movement although in the eastern portion the rugged mountain regions did slow down ground operations.

6. Cover and concealment within the AO ranged from none on the landing zones/fire support bases, poor to fair on the valley floors and good to excellent on the high ground. Concealment from the high ground masses was generally poor although early morning fog did hinder it at times. Observation in the valleys generally was poor due to dense vegetation and scrub growth.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

h. There were two primary ground avenues of approach that entered the Maine Crag AO. The first ran north to south beginning at Lang Vei and extended south to the border. The other low ground avenue of approach was astride Route #926 running west to east from Laos into the southern portion of the Vietnamese Salient.

i. Psychological operations utilized during Operation Maine Crag consisted of leaflet air drops and loudspeaker operations. Even though final figures showed that 133 Montagnards were detained and subsequently reclassified as innocent civilians, the evaluation of the population and its attitudes could not be ascertained in terms of the effectiveness of psychological operations conducted.

j. The weather during Operation Maine Crag, for the most part, was hot and dry although there were spotted incidents of rain and thunder showers. The months of March and April had temperatures during the day in the high 90's and during the night in the mid 60's. Humidity was high and precipitation was low. The skies were clear except for occasional morning cloudiness.

7. Missions

a. Initial 3d Marines conducts helicopter borne assault into the Vietnamese Salient and establishes FSB's to support search and destroy operations along Route #926 to locate and destroy enemy forces, fortifications and supply caches.

b. Subsequent 3d Marines (-)(Rein) in cooperation and coordination with the 2d ARVN Regt (-) seals off the Laotian Salient and conducts extensive search and destroy operations in AO and conducts massive destructive fire within Laotian Salient.

8. Concept of Operations

a. Phase One

(1) 3d Marines with two battalions conducts helicopter borne assault to seal off and interdict Route #926.

(2) On D-Day 1st Bn conducts helicopter borne assault to seize and block western end of Route #926 via LZ Paris via (807237) and LZ Passport via (797228) conduct search and destroy operations south along Route #926 in AO.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) 2d Bn on D-Day conduct helicopter borne assault to secure LZ Hound vic (818264), and Domino vic (822278). (Modified due to fire support and weather conditions, conduct heliborne assault to LZ Hawk and conduct overland move to LZ Snapper to establish FSB.) Conduct search and destroy operations west along Route #926 in AO.

b. Phase Two

(1) 3d Marines with two Bn's and 2d ARVN Regt seal off Laotian Salient to the north, east, and west, while Task Force Remagen continues to screen the western area of AO along the south Vietnamese/Laotian border. One Bn (-) of 3d Marines will continue to conduct search and destroy operations north of Route #9 east of Khe Sanh.

9. Execution

a. Operation Maine Crag commenced at 1610H, 10 March 1969 with the helilift of the 2d Bn to LZ Hawk. Commencement of operations had been continually delayed from 1 March 69 by inclement weather which precluded the use of helicopters. After initial insertion, the weather cleared and posed little problem for the duration of the operation.

The vegetation offered excellent cover and concealment for the enemy and thus the majority of contact was "Point" contact at extremely short range.

b. Significant Events

10 March. Operation Maine Crag commenced at 101610H with the helilift of 2/3 to LZ Hawk vic (895405). 2/3 then commenced overland move to FSB Snapper vic (842344).

11 March. At 1000H 3d Marines was passed OPCON to Task Force Hotel. Company F while moving to FSB Snapper discovered a bunker complex of (15) very old and partially destroyed bunkers. Misc enemy ordnance was found and destroyed.

12 March. Company G discovered a small bunker complex containing misc 782 gear, (1) AK-50 and (1) RPG launcher.

13 March. One battery of 155's was helilifted to FSB Gates, vic (927437), allowing 2/3 to continue move to FSB Snapper and remain under the artillery fan.

14 March. 2/3 arrived at FSB Snapper and conducted search and destroy patrols.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

15 March. One battery of 105's was helilifted to FSB Snapper. Three Companies of 2/3 commenced overland move to the south to Route #926, while Company E provided security for FSB Snapper.

16 March. Company F arrived at FSB Saigon vic (818275). Upon arrival F received several rnds of small arms fire from LZ Hound vic (818265). Small bunkers were found on FSB Saigon with candles still burning. 3d Marines CP established on FSB Snapper.

17 March. Four 105 Howitzers were helilifted to FSB Saigon with 500 rnds. Due to inclement weather the lift was halted. Two Companies of 2/3 continued to objective to the southeast (884237).

18 March. At 181430H 3d Marines assumed OPCON of Task Force Remagen vic Khe Sanh Plateau. Three Companies of the 1st Battalion were helilifted to FSB Saigon. A unit from B/1/61 detonated a surprise firing device resulting in (1) one KIA and (9) USA WIA. Company G while in ambush position along Route #926 observed two trucks approach their position vic (881229). Ambush was sprung. Res one (1) USMC KIA, one (1) USMC WIA, (7) NVA KIA.

19 March. One battery of 155's was helilifted to FSB Saigon. 1/3 (-) moved overland from FSB Saigon vic (818275) to LZ Paris. Company B moved to LZ Passport vic (797228) to receive helilift of two Ontos. Security for FSB Snapper was assumed by Company L. Company E prepared for helilift from FSB Snapper to LZ Gunner vic (895260). Company H 2/3 made point contact with four NVA on Route #926. Res one USMC MEDEVAC.

20 March. Company E helilifted to LZ Gunner vic (895260). Company A made contact with (3) enemy at (883217). Res (2) NVA KIA, (1) USMC WIA. Company G made contact with (12) NVA in bunker complex. Fixed Wing was run. Res (2) USMC KIA, (1) USMC WIA, (3) NVA KIA. Company B secured LZ Big Foot Brown. Company G made contact with (4) NVA. Company G assaulted enemy position. Res (6) USMC WIA, (2) NVA KIA. Company H found what appeared to be a truck stop.

21 March. Company E helilifted from FSB Snapper to LZ Gunner vic (895260). 3d Marines CP helilifted from FSB Snapper to FSB Saigon. Patrol from Company H while on water run was taken under fire from high ground. Res (3) USMC KIA, (15) USMC WIA. Artillery fired on enemy position. Res (5) NVA KIA. A patrol from Company H captured (2) NVA in a bunker. Task Force Remagen moved into blocking

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

position on western end of Route #926, vic Xe Pon River. 1/3 CP and Company C moved to LZ Big Foot Brown. Company H, vic (902233), found what appeared to be a large rice cache.

22 March. Company H while in cache area received fire from a well entrenched enemy. Fixed Wing and mortar missions were called in. Companies E and G maneuvered to blocking positions. Res of H contact: (1) USMC KIA, (12) USMC WIA. Contact was broken and approximately 440 tons of rice was found. 100,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition was also discovered.

23 March. One platoon from Company F was helilifted from FSB Saigon to LZ Spark, vic (870235). Two 105's were helilifted from FSB Snapper to FSB Spark. Company E made contact with (10) enemy in a cave. Fired M-79 and assaulted the position. Res (8) NVA KIA, (17) USMC WIA, (10) AK-50's and (80) AK-47's captured. Patrol from Company H discovered a French truck with Russian tires and American markings. Truck vic (903244), contained salt and rice. Company C discovered (230) L shaped bunkers along Route #926. Bunkers were 4-6 months old but in good condition. Company A vic (788253) discovered (35) bunkers; also damaged enemy 60mm mortar tube.

24 March. Company I helilifted to FSB Saigon and Company L with four 105's, helilifted from FSB Snapper to FSB Spark. Company B at (869199), found living area of (14) shelters and (9) bunkers, all recently constructed. Company D, at (827237), found (14) shelter type bunkers.

25 March. (51) Bru approached Company B with valid ID Cards. Bru were evacuated to VCB. A squad from Company F 2/3 at (910230) ambushed (8) NVA on trail. Res (5) NVA KIA; (3) USMC WIA. Company E at (910230) discovered supply and re-distribution point. 100 tons of rice, and (16) recoilless rifle rounds were found. Company C at (911229) discovered a battalion size enemy bunker complex.

26 March. Company F was helilifted from FSB Spark and Saigon to a blocking position to the south, vic (928220). Company G discovered (2) NVA filling canteens in a stream vic (918227). Res (2) NVA KIA. Company B encountered (5) enemy. Enemy fled and were taken under S/A fire. Res (2) NVA KIA. Company H discovered bunker complex vic (905233) consisting of approximately 100 bunkers. (1) grave was also found. Res (1) NVA KIA.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

28 March. 1/3 CP helilifted to FSB Spark and Company C moved overland to provide security for same. Ontos were helilifted from 2/3's position to VGB.

29 March. (15) Bru Villagers arrived at Company B position vic (895201), all with valid ID Cards and were helilifted to VGB.

30 March. Company B 1/61 while moving to new command post location had one tank hit a mine. (3) NVA observed. Res (3) USA WIA, (3) NVA KIA. C/1/77 vic (790255) found numerous bunkers and cache of (1800) 82mm rounds, (2) 12.7 AA guns. 2/3 CP and Company H helilifted to LZ Whisman to establish a FSB.

31 March. B/1/61 received approximately 100 rounds 82mm incoming from Laos. Res (1) USA KIA, (5) USA WIA. Company G (-) helilifted vic FSB Whisman to assist Company H in security and construction of same.

01 April. At 1430H the remainder of Company G completed their lift from (909239) to FSB Whisman (973333).

02 April. An ambush from Company E at (828237) spotted (30) NVA, moving west along trail, they opened fire, resulting in (5) NVA KIA.

04 April. 3d Marines advance CP moved to FSB Whisman (973333) at 1610H. At 0350H Company E, at LZ Big Foot Brown, was attacked by an estimated company of NVA resulting in (2) USMC KIA, (19) NVA KIA and (10) IWC.

05 April. At 1400H emergency air drop of 105 ammo to FSB Saigon (814286) commenced.

06 April. At 1430H 3d Marines CP helilifted from FSB Saigon (814286) to FSB Whisman (973333). At 1200H Task Force Remagen was chopped OPGON from 3d Marines, to Task Force Hotel.

07 April. Company E at 1025H, conducted a heliborne assault on LZ Hardtop (008304). Company F at 1205H conducted a heliborne assault on LZ Mink (986357). At 1330H Company B conducted a helilift to FSB McClintock (045302). Company C found two destroyed enemy trucks, one at (879226) and one at (879229). Both had been loaded with various types of ammo. 1/3 CP on FSB Spark received 8-10 122 rkts. An AO was called and he fired arty on suspected enemy position.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 08 April. 1/3 CP, on LZ Spark, received (4) incoming rkts. Counter btry was fired. A patrol from Company F detained 31 Bru in vic (007354).
- 10 April. 3/3 helilifted to VCB and then trucked to Cua Viet vic (335703) for R&R. 1/3 CP on FSB Spark received (8) rnds of 122mm rkts from vic (812196).
- 11 April. At 0800H, TFH assumed OPCON of 3/3 from 3d Mar and passed OPCON to 3d Mar Div. At 1450H a platoon of Company A, in vic of (834226), engaged approx (1) enemy squad resulting in the capture of one complete 82mm mortar with (92) 82mm mortar rnds, and (2) NVA KIA. 1/3 CP on FSB Spark received approx 30 incoming 82mm rnds. Counter mortar was fired.
- 12 April. 1/3 CP at FSB Spark, took (8) rnds of incoming rkts, caliber unknown. Negative casualties.
- 13 April. At 2035H Company A received (40) rnds of unknown caliber. Counter mortar and artillery were fired. At 1730H an AO spotted (9) NVA vic (941184), ran fixed wing and artillery. AO reported (3) large secondary explosions, (3) large secondary fires and (1) NVA KBA.
- 14 April. Company A at 1045H conducted helilift to LZ Fisher (037280). Btry A, 1/12 was helilifted along with 1/3 CP and Company B to FSB McClintock (045302). Companies C and D were helilifted to LZ Pusan (043247). Prior to departure, 1/3 CP on FSB Spark, recvd (8) rkt rnds and 10-15 60mm rnds. Ran close air support on enemy position vic (872217) resulting in (6) NVA KBA.
- 15 April. At 1400H 3d Mar chopped AO west of 2d ARVN Bn to Task Force Hotel.
- 16 April. Battalion of 2d ARVN Regt redeployed from Operation Maine Crag to vic Dong Ha City.
- 17 April. At 1800H TFH chopped 2d ARVN AO to 3d Marines.
- 18 April. At 1300 Co C found (3) destroyed Bru Villages vic (043235) with (8) houses and a number of chickens and pigs. 3/3 returned to OPCON of 3d Marines effective 1345H.
- 19 April. At 0958H 3/3 assumed responsibility for new AO as part of Operation Maine Crag relieving 1/3 in place. 3d Marines chopped 1/3 (-) to TFH for R&R at Cua Viet.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

21 April. At 1010H Company M 3/3 conducted heliborne assault into LZ Tuba vic (080270). At 1200H Company I completed relief in place of Company A on LZ Fisher. At 1500H TFH assumed OPCON of remainder of 1/3.

22 April. At 1100H Company H along with FSB McClintock, was passed from 2/3 to 3/3.

24 April. Company C was directed to return from the Cua Viet and relieve Company F 2/9 at Elliot Combat Base at 250830H.

25 April. 3d Marines assumed responsibility for area north of Maine Crag AO to southern Mai Loc boundary at 240600H.

26 April. 3/3 CP completed helilift from LZ Hardwick (049287) to LZ Gaucho (049242).

27 April. At 0800H Company H, 2/3 and FSB McClintock passed from 3/3 to 2/3.

28 April. Company E captured 13 Bru in a cave vic (093308). Bru had (1) SKS. Bru were evacuated to VCB.

29 April. At 1045H a plt of Company L helilifted from vic (072242) to hill 849. At 1300H 3d Marines advance CP helilifted from FSB Whisman to DHCB. At 1800H, C Btry 1/12 lifted from FSB Whisman to FSB Gaucho.

30 April. Company M received 60 rnds S/A and (2) RPG's from vic (098207). Returned fire with S/A, 81's and arty w/unlk results. (1) USMC WIA. Company I completed their overland drive to provide security for downed helicopters vic (010830).

01 May. Company K helilifted from vic (122237) to FSB McClintock to relieve Company H.

02 May. At 1300H CG, 3d Mar Div assumed OPCON of 3d Mar Regt (-) with 1/3 and 2/3 (-) E, F, and H. Operation Maine Crag ended at 021300H with the 3d Battalion Reinforced with Company G being passed OPCON to TFH. Third Marines commenced Operations in Virginia Ridge AO.

10. Civic Action

a. Statistics

(1) Total number of man-days: 331

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) COST OF CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:

(a) From Military sources: VN\$ 1,335,413(b) From US/FWMAF CA PSYWAR Fund: VN\$ 36,800(3) Voluntary contribution: VN\$ 426,400

14. Note: Because of the virtual impossibility of obtaining accurate figures on the cost of many of the materials used in civic action, e.g., scrap lumber, all figures contained in the civic action portion of this report must be viewed as very rough approximations.

b. GVN Program support

(1) The 3d Marines provided an external security screen during the village and hamlet elections which took place on 9 March and 16 March 1969, in Quang Tri Province.

c. General comments

(1) During Operation Maine Crag the 3d Marines (rear), Dong Ha Combat Base, conducted a civic action (CA) campaign in Cam Lo (D) and Huong Hoa (D). Tactical units in the field did not operate near populated areas; thus the battalions conducted little or no CA, with the exception of 3/3 which remained in Cam Lo (D) and Huong Hoa (D) until 22 March 1969, at which time they were replaced by elements of the 9th Marines. Until their departure for the field, members of 3/3 were very active in CA under guidance of Lt. HATCH, Battalion S-5. Lt. MACMILLAN, 3/3 Battalion Surgeon, and his staff carried out a brief but vigorous medcap program in the Cua Valley.

(2) The 3d Marines CA role during the reporting period consisted largely of supporting the projects of subordinate units and other organizations, both Vietnamese and American, public and private. The nature of this role has made it difficult to accurately assess the effects of CA during the reporting period in terms of stronger local identification with GVN, increased flow of intelligence, and the like. On the other hand, the overall increase in Vietnamese-initiated projects, particularly in the Cua Valley,

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

leads to the inference that the villagers and the GVN are convinced that many of the contested areas of 3 or 4 months ago are now sufficiently pacified to allow involvement in new, expensive (for the Vietnamese) projects for which there is reasonable assurance that VC interference will not occur. It can be assumed that the general increase in the construction of schools, dispensaries, etc., must be producing feelings of greater confidence in the capacity and willingness of the GVN to provide for a secure environment, since some of the increased confidence may well derive from the American presence in the area.

11. RESULTS

a. Friendly losses

(1) USMC

- (a) 16 KIA
- (b) 103 WIA (MEDEVAC)
- (c) 10 WIA (MINOR)

(2) USA

- (a) 3 KIA
- (b) 23 WIA (MEDEVAC)
- (c) 6 WIA (MINOR)
- (d) 3 NBC (MEDEVAC)

b. Enemy losses

(1) Personnel

- (a) 95 NVA KIA (Conf)
- (b) 50 NVA KBA (Conf)
- (c) 4 NVA POW

(2) Weapons

(a) Crew-served (15) - 1 M-60 MG, 1 Hvy CHICOM, 7.62mm MG, 9 RPD's, 2-12.7mm AA Guns, 1-60mm Mortar Tube, and 1-82mm Mortar Complete.

(b) Individual (340) - 241 AK-47's, 24 AK-50's, 67 SKS's, 5 RPG-2 Launchers, 1 M-16, 1 Sub MG, and 1-45 cal pistol.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Ammunition and Explosives

(1) 6845-82mm mortar rds, 708-60mm mortar rds, 3882 RPG-2 rds, 769,600 rds 7.62mm ammo, 11,000 rds 12.7mm AA ammo, 138-75mm RR rds, 24-82mm RR rds, 100-57mm RR rds, 20-37mm AA rds, 22 UNICOM grenades, 500 lbs of TNT, 12 directional mines, and 5000 feet of time fuse.

(4) Vehicles

(1) 4 trucks (6x6 type)

(5) Misc Equipment

(1) 46 MVA packs, 10 gas masks, 15 canteens, and 12 E-tools.

6. Food Supplies

(1) 717.8 tons of rice, 7500 lbs of sugar, 7000 lbs of salt, 2000 lbs of powdered milk, 2000 lbs of canned food, 100 lbs of lard, 100 chickens, and 25 pigs.

12. Administrative Mattersa. Supply

(1) The administrative matters of this operation proved to be satisfactory and no serious problems were encountered. The major classes of resupply (CI I, III, IV, and V) were drawn from the dumps at Vandegrift Combat Base (VCB). All other supplies (i.e. CI II, VI etc) were drawn from FL30-B Dong Ha and trucked to the Logistic Support Area (LSA) at VCB. All deployed units were resupplied by helicopters from VCB.

(2) Lessons Learned

(a) The 500 gallon bladder is much better than the M107A2 water trailer due to the retrograde problem. The "water buffalo" holds 400 gallons and weighs 1800 pounds empty. The membrane water bladder weighs 200 pounds. The

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

250 gallon bladder is ideal for a company position and doesn't have the deficiencies of 5 gallon water cans (i.e. spillage due to loose covers, time required to fill and stage, etc).

(b) Third Shore Party Battalion developed a net made of canvas that would hold 2000 pounds. This inexpensive (\$20) net was used if a unit was due to move and not able to make a retrograde.

(c) Initially when an 81 section was moving the tubes and Marines were fraged as a tactical lift while the ammunition was staged at the LSA for resupply. To insure timely arrival of all elements, tactical frags were changed to include the initial stockage of ammunition from a secure position such as the LSA.

b. Maintenance

(1) Maximum utilization of field maintenance was accomplished during this operation. Battalions had limited maintenance capabilities at VCB but all 3d echelon was performed at FLSU-B, Dong Ha. The direct exchange (DX) program was used when ever possible, especially for ordnance items.

c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation and hospitalization

(1) Casualties were treated in the field whenever prudent. Evacuations from the field were accomplished by helicopter. The expeditious evacuation and treatment of all casualties contributed immeasurably to the morale and spirit of all hands.

(a) WIA's were evacuated to "C" Med, VCB, the USS REPOSE, and to 3dMedBn, QTCB.

(b) KIA's were evacuated to 3dMedBn, QTCB for processing and further evacuation.

(2) Personnel replacements received COATIPS Training at the battalion rear areas at QTCB. They were then moved to battalion field positions for duty. Replacements were adequate and timely.

DECLASSIFIED

(3) Morale and personnel service, to include the following, were continued expeditiously:

- (a) Keeping all hands informed of the current situation.
- (b) Emergency leave.
- (c) The R&R Program.
- (d) Decorations and awards.
- (e) Postal service.
- (f) BP Packs.
- (g) Finance services.

d. Communications

(1) During Operation Maine Crag no unusual communications problems were encountered. Portable equipment was used throughout the operation. No fixed plant equipment was utilized.

(2) A basic radio system for functional traffic was used. One covered circuit was available to subordinate units and one to the higher headquarters.

(3) A net at regimental level was established to handle the admin/logistics traffic. A like net was established within each of the battalions. This allowed units of company size to call logistic requirements directly back to the LSA. High precedence administrative traffic (CASREPS, HUMANITARIAN, etc.) was also passed over these nets.

(4) Message traffic (Command) was handled by courier.

(5) The operation encompassed five displacements of the regimental CP:

- (a) From Dong Ha CB to Vandegrift CB
- (b) From Vandegrift CB to FSB Snapper
- (c) From FSB Snapper to FSB Saigon
- (d) From FSB Saigon to FSB Whisman

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(e) From FSB Whisman to Dong Ha CB

During these displacements the normal echelonment of the command group was employed. There was no loss of control during displacement.

(6) There were no unusual maintenance problems. Most outages could be attributed to normal wear, heat and the dust conditions. All units utilized the AN/PRC-41 (UHF) radio in conjunction with the A-6 beacon with satisfactory results.

e. Medical Evaluation

(1) During the period covered by the MAINE CRIAG operation, the 3d Marines suffered from an extremely high incident of FUO's. Further investigation revealed that 50-75% of the FUO's medevaced from the field were malaria infections. Almost all of these were Falciparum malaria.

(2) Conclusions reached after reviewing extensive patient interviews, Wilson-Edison urine tests, the endemic malaria area, and the tactical employment of the troops are:

(a) The 3d Marines were operating in a high-risk malaria area.

(b) Malaria discipline required improvement.

(c) Troops need rehabilitation every 30-45 days to decrease their susceptibility.

(3) Combat and non-battle injuries were not a major problem during this operation.

13. Special Techniques Employed

a. A Paradrop of 105 ammunition was used to resupply FSB Saigon during a period of inclement weather. The great dispersion of the pallets of ammunition rendered the majority of the resupply virtually useless. Four of the twenty-five pallets dropped were recoverable, all others landing from 500-1000 meters from the fire support base.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

b. Unique to this operation was the utilization of a fully mechanized force, Task Force Remagen, penetrating deeper into western Vietnam than any armored force prior. Task Force Remagen was a completely self-sufficient unit repairing its vehicles as it moved. Helicopter support was kept to a minimum consisting mainly of resupply of food, POL, and vital parts. Numerous improvements were made by this Task Force to Route 9 between Calu and Khe Sanh. New roads were constructed south from Route 9 to Route 926.

c. Initial intelligence recieved concerning the enemy situation in the vicinity of Route 926 disclosed that the enemy possessed an armor capability. A deception plan was implemented enabling the insertion of two Ontos into the objective area. The Ontos were stripped of all superficial armor and recoilless rifles. Plywood "bulldozer blades" were attached, disguising to all but the experienced eye, the two Ontos were inserted by CH-54, the recoilless rifles and personnel were inserted by CH-46. Armor and fuel were delivered externally to the objective area. A large amount of practice enable the Ontos crews to have the ontos in running condition in nine minutes. Although the armored threat was not realized in this operation it is felt the deception technique was valid and may be use at another time when the enemy possesses an armor capability.

d. The employment of scout dog teams again was very helpful during this operation. In several instances the scout dogs alerted to possible enemy positions thereby giving the Marines an early warning. Lack of availability in desired numbers seemed to be the only drawback in the use of this valuable aid.

e. The effectiveness of scout snipers was minimized in the thick vegetation encountered during Maine Crag. When the scout snipers were employed on the high ground and fire support bases they were a great asset in scanning the countryside for signs of enemy activity.

f. Beacon Hops again proved to be an invaluable technique enabling the ground unit to bring air power to bear against the enemy in periods of reduced visibility.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

14. Commanders Analysis

During this operation, as in many of this war, no significant new lessons were learned but many older, proven ones were re-emphasized. Techniques taught in service schools proved again to be invaluable assets.

In preparation for any tactical helilift it was found necessary to conduct a briefing of the infantry troop Commanders, the Commanders of both troop and heavy lift helicopters, the Gunship Leader and the Helicopter Director Airborne (SDA). This and the use of helicopter assault tables ensured a more controlled, better coordinated and rapidly executed, helo-assault.

It was found at the outset of this operation, that the helilift of an artillery battery as an administrative rather than tactical lift was not a sound procedure. The helilift of an artillery battery in an operation such as Maine Crag is as important as the tactical insertion of the ground troops. In several cases necessary fire-support was endangered by the slow displacement of an artillery battery utilizing helicopters "shared" with resupply. It was found that rapid displacement was necessary to clear a fire support base so security forces could be released in time to assume their proper position in the tactical scheme. The concept of mutually supporting fire support bases (FSB) was key to operations during Maine Crag. Having evolved within the 3d Marine Division, it was not unique, but again proved itself as a valuable tactic. An 8 KM fan with a 3 KM overlap to supported the adjacent fire bases and troops, affords maximum accuracy of the 105 Howitzer and a counter mortar capability to the range of enemy mortars. This concept has had such an effect upon our operations that SOP's have been established as to the selection of terrain for FSB's, selection of & development of FSB's, and an inspection after the FSB has been dismantled to ensure nothing remains which could be utilized by the enemy.

The use of psychological operations was an invaluable asset during this operation. The use of loud speaker systems and leaflet drops, enticed the Bru to turn themselves into "Friendly United States Troops". They then were relocated in an area free from the terrorism of the VC/NVA. Many Bru approached Marines seeking assistance. Interrogation of these people produced invaluable intelligence information as to size and deployment of the enemy. Exploitation of this intelligence source was possible in

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

several cases. Other instances provided corroboration to intelligence gained from other highly reliable sources.

The concept of complete mobility was illustrated with the OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND BN. THE BATTALION was stripped to bare essentials allowing the maximum freedom of movement to meet the changing enemy situation. The need for helicopter support was kept to the minimum to include only the following:

- a. Initial insertion of the Battalion.
- b. Resupply of ammunition and food.
- c. Medical evacuation of wounded personnel.

Maximum use of stream water, properly treated, for drinking and bathing, greatly decreased the troops dependence upon helicopter resupply. Medical evacuation due to heat exhaustion and skin diseases was reduced.

15. Recommendations

a. The effectiveness of ground troops greatly diminishes after approximately 45 days in the field. Health, both physical and mental, wanes after long periods of exposure to combat conditions. Attitudes of the troops seem to change and a higher percentage of avoidable accidents occur. The combat effectiveness of the individual Marine will increase greatly if every 6 weeks he is returned to an atmosphere free from worries and pressures of combat for a period of 5-7 days.


b. Total dependence upon helicopter support should be discouraged. An attempt should be made to restrict the use of helicopters to insertion into the objective area in a rapid, timely, and fully supported manner. Although helicopter displacement is the most desirable, an alternate plan for the insertion of troops at the outset of an operation should be evolved whether by foot, motor march, or other means, the dependence on helicopters during periods of inclement weather would be reduced. Once in the objective area, units should depend upon the helicopter as little as possible, except for essential resupply and medical evacuation. Although this method may be less convenient in one area of operation, it will greatly increase the availability of helicopters for more critical missions in other areas.

c. Higher unit Commanders at Division and Regimental levels should issue periodic guidance as to priority of air

DECLASSIFIED

support, so subordinate unit Commanders can plan realistically and have reason to believe their time-space requirements can be accomplished.

d. A greater emphasis should be placed on advance planning at Wing and Division levels. There seems to exist an increasing tendency to treat tactical helilifts as routinely as overland administrative truck moves. This tendency is dangerous because planning, coordination, and timeliness are of the utmost importance in the helicopter-borne assault by an infantry unit.


Thomas C. DOLSON
by direction

3D MARDIV S&C FILE
BT# 243769

3/WBS/djw
3480

Ser: 003B20969

28 July 1969

SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO 4th Marine Regiment ltr 3/GXM/oeb S&C No.
00276 - 69 of 16 June 1969

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
To: Commanding General, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Via: (1) Commanding General, XXIV Corps
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Operation Purple Martin Combat After Action Report

Ref: (d) MACV Dir 335-8

1. Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with reference (d).

2. Contents noted with following remarks:

a. Dates of Operation, paragraph 2, page 1, should be changed
to read " 27 February 1969 - 7 May 1969" vice " 1 March 1969 - 8 May
1969".

b. Combat After Action Report Results, paragraph 10, page 23,
to reflect Official Division SITREP Cumulative Losses for the
Operation, should be adjusted as follows:

(1) FRIENDLY LOSSES

	USMC	USA
KIA	79 vice 101	1 vice 5
WIA(E)	243 vice 336	
WIA(M)	25 vice 91	
MIA	1 vice 0	

(2) ENEMY LOSSES

KIA(C)	252 vice 347
DET	2 vice 3
IWC	192 vice 198
GSCW	10 vice 24

COPY 14 OF 14 COPIES
SER: _____

C. G. Moody
C. G. MOODY
By direction

Tab B

HEADQUARTERS

4th Marines (-)(Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), MTF
 FPO San Francisco 96602

3/CX/ceb
 16 June 1969

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Rein), MTF
 Via: Commanding General, Task Force Hotoi

Subj: After Action Report

Ref: (a) TWH Frag Order 126-69, DTG 071530Z May69
 (b) CG, 3d MarDiv MSG 091646Z April69
 (c) DivO 310031D

1. Code Name. Operation PURPLE MARTIN
2. Dates of Operation. 010001H March69 - 002400H May69
3. Location. III I Corps, Quang Tri Province, Districts of Trung
 Haong, Huong Hoa and Cam Lo.

4. Task Organization.

- a. 1 March - 30 April 1969
 Fourth Marines
 First Battalion, Fourth Marines
 Second Battalion, Fourth Marines
 Third Battalion, Fourth Marines

- b. 1-6 May 1969
 Fourth Marines (-)
 Second Battalion, Fourth Marines
 Third Battalion, Fourth Marines

- c. 7-8 May 1969
 Fourth Marines
 First Battalion, Fourth Marines
 Second Battalion, Fourth Marines
 Third Battalion, Fourth Marines

5. Supporting Forces.

- a. Artillery

4TH MARINES (REIN)
 SAC FILES

00276-69

12 20

SECRET

12 of 20 Copies

SECRET

(1) Direct support artillery was provided by the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines throughout Operation PURPLE MARTIN.

(2) During Operation PURPLE MARTIN 10,988 missions were fired by the direct support artillery battalion broken down as follows:

(a) Observed = 2,339

(b) Unobserved = 1,355

(c) Acquired = 6,794

(3) A total of 121,158 rounds were fired in direct support of Operation PURPLE MARTIN broken down as follows:

(a) 105MM = 102,572

(b) 155MM = 10,337

(c) 4.2" = 8,249

(4) Reinforcing fires were provided by the 12th Marines and other artillery elements.

b. Air-Fixed Wing

(1) Primary air support was provided by the First Marine Air Wing. Limited assistance was provided by Air Force fixed wing elements and substantial support by Army Helicopter Forces.

(2) Fixed wing support for Operation PURPLE MARTIN included the following:

(a) Conventional sorties = 445

(b) TPQ-10 sorties = 2,627

(c) TPQ-10 ordnance dropped = 2,163 tons

(d) AO's on station = 475

(e) TPQ request's = 2321

(f) BDA as follows:

SECRET

Hootches destroyed	= 11	AAA destroyed	= 3
Bunkers destroyed	= 308	Caves Destroyed	= 7
Bunkers damaged	= 28	Mortars destroyed	= 6
KBA's confirmed	= 30	Mortars damaged	= 3
Secondary fires	= 20	.50 cal destroyed	= 2
Secondary explosions	= 57	Vehicles destroyed	= 1

c. Air-Helicopter

(1) Helicopter support provided by the 1st Marine Air Wing for 1 March - 8 May was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TEOOPS</u>	<u>VRS</u>	<u>MLDEVACS</u>
HqCo	164	9	0
1/4	1520	7	55
2/4	594	4	161
3/4	<u>1151</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>409</u>
TOTALS	3429	27	625

Com and Control aircraft moved 1,721 PAX in addition to mail and hot chow.

d. Other Supporting Units

(1) A(-), 3d Engineers provided combat engineer teams in support of companies in the field. The teams assisted in demolition missions, clearing of booby traps and other required engineer support. During April, engineers support was instrumental in the completion of the following tasks: Construction of FSB Greena; the enlargement of FSB Neville to accommodate three 105 howitzers and the modification of two bunkers at FSB Neville. Additional construction of FSB Albina included the addition of a Regimental Aid Station and an additional HLZ. Three FCB's were closed during April with the assistance of the engineers.

(2) Scout Dog Platoon provided dogs as required and requested by units in the field.

SECRET

6. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy activity was heavy during the first half of March with the 1st Bn, 246th Regiment (IND) in contact north of the Razorback and the 3rd Bn, 246th Regiment (IND) in contact in the vicinity of FSB CATAPULT. These engagements were characterized by the enemy's employment of command and detonated mines when his base areas/bunker complexes were encountered, in order to delay the attacking forces; executing ground attacks on friendly positions at night with up to squad size units; mortar attacks on friendly positions, particularly during the landing of helicopters; and lastly, in the area north of the Razorback, surface to surface rocket attacks. All source information including a prisoner of war and numerous documents indicated the following:

- (1) The enemy was provisioned to fight until approximately 15 March.
- (2) Due to heavy losses and an inability to resupply his committed forces the enemy began his withdrawal in mid-March.
- (3) The 1st Bn's approach and retirement route centered on Dong Khi Mountain and the road and trail system to its north and northeast.
- (4) The 3rd Bn's approach and retirement route centered on XD8462, east and west along the Can Lo River and north into the IIZ.
- (5) The 3rd Bn withdrew from the vicinity of FSB CATAPULT north to the vicinity of Lu Bu Mountain and Hill 804 and held this position, until 02 April.

b. Contacts with 1st and 3rd Battalions, 246th Regiment (IND) and elements of the 4th Bn, 24th Arty/Rct Regiment diminished in frequency and intensity in the last half of March as the remaining elements withdrew from the battlefield. However, heavy contact was made with the 6th Company, 2nd Bn, 246th Regiment (IND) in the vicinity of FSB ARCONNE on 20 March. Here the enemy occupied the FSB with a platoon size force. The remainder of the company with 82mm mortars and 12.7mm HMG's was disposed on Hill 1154, to the west and on adjoining terrain to the east and southeast. Mortar fire was selectively delivered on FSB ARCONNE from positions on the western slopes of Hill 1154 in Laos as helicopters attempted to land. These mortar attacks occurred daily until Hill 1154 was occupied by friendly forces.

c. Beginning in the latter half of March and continuing through April and the first week of May, enemy activity was characterized by harassment attacks and reconnaissance patrols. The harassment attacks were launched against friendly forces operating in proximity to and within the IIZ, north of the Razorback and FSB CATAPULT, against FSB ARCONNE prior to closing. These attacks utilized a variety of tactics;

SECRET

sporadic mortar and automatic weapons fire, especially while helicopters were entering HLZ's, the emplacement of surprise firing devices; and effective ambushes by small units against friendly patrols utilizing command detonated claymore mines, a short burst of automatic weapons fire, and an immediate withdrawal. Sporadic light contact occurred throughout the Regiment's AO with the enemy's reconnaissance patrols during this period. All source analysis indicates the enemy was especially interested in Elliott Combat Base.

d. On 03 April two individuals approached a friendly position on the southern edge of the HLZ north of the Razorback and surrendered. They stated that they were political cadre from North Vietnam but were defecting to South Vietnam after becoming disenchanted with the communist regime. Especially interesting was that they were able to travel from Hanoi to the southern edge of the HLZ in seven days. The individuals were unable to provide information of enemy units in proximity to the Regimental AO and were evacuated for strategic exploitation.

e. On 10 April all source analysis located the Hq, 308th NVA Division at XD 9175 north of the Regiment's AO in North Vietnam. This placed the Division within 24 hours closing time on the 4th Marines; however, all source analysis indicated the 308th Division was oriented on a southeast attack axis.

f. On 12 April three POW's were captured in the Upper Can Lo River Valley northwest of FSB CATAPULT; they identified their unit as the 1st Co, 1st Bn, 246th Regiment (IND). One of the prisoners was the Company Commander of the 1st Co. He stated the 1st Bn. had relieved the 3rd Bn. in the FSB CATAPULT area on or about 03 April and that the 1st Bn. was disposed in and just south of the HLZ north of FSB CATAPULT. His company's mission was to provide security for three transportation companies and to locate sites for supply caches in the Upper Can Lo River Valley. According to this POW 1st Bn. was to be relieved in late May by the 2nd Bn., 246th Regiment which, at that time, was located in Laos.

g. The POW further stated his company had provided security for the A-12 Rocket Unit during early April and that this unit's mission was to attack VANDEGRIFT COMBAT BASE. On 13 April VANDEGRIFT COMBAT BASE received a rocket attack of six 107mm rockets.

h. On 04 May a friendly unit operating north of the Razorback made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The enemy displayed a new capability when he utilized an unidentified chemical agent to cover his withdrawal. It is believed probable that the enemy were from the 36th Regiment, 308th NVA Division. This unit was known to be operating on the Regiment's eastern flank and had previously displayed a chemical warfare capability.

SECRET

1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATE TO</u>	<u>INITIAL LOCATION</u>	<u>LAST KNOWN LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
(1) 1st Bn, 246th Regt (IND)	B-5 Front	XD946630	XD026689	12 Apr69
(2) 2nd Bn, 246th Regt (IND)	B-5 Front	XD676573	XD569429	12 Apr69
(3) 3rd Bn, 246th Regt (IND)	B-5 Front	XD824615	XD024615	15 Mar69
(4) HQ, 246th Regt (IND)	B-5 Front	X 0666	XD8666	15 Apr69
(5) HQ, B-5 Front	-	XD9177	XD9177	15 Apr69
(6) 4th Bn, 84th Arty/Bkt Regt	351st Arty Grp	XD944654	XD944654	21 Mar69
(7) 308th Division		XD9175	XD0373	23 Apr69

(1) a. PW captured by I/3/4 on 14 March 1969, vicinity XD 946630, stated that he was in the 1st Bn, 246th Regiment.

b. LBI on document captured by I/3/4 on 20 March 1969, vicinity XD944656, identified the presence of the 1st Bn, 246th Regiment.

c. Documents captured by I/3/4 on 21 March 1969, vicinity XD950628, reconfirmed the presence of the 1st Bn, 246th Regiment.

d. PW's captured by E/2/4 on 12 April 1969, vicinity XD792647, stated they belonged to 1st Co, 1st Bn, 246th Regiment and located their battalion at above grid.

(2) a. 2nd Bn written on helmet and canteen cover captured by D/1/4 on 20 March 1969 vicinity XD676573 identified the 6th Co, 2nd Bn, 246th Regiment.

b. PW in #1d above stated 2nd Bn, 246th Regiment was at this location.

(3) Document captured by G/2/4 on 14 March 1969, vicinity X 024615, identified 3rd Bn, 246th Regiment.

(4) ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(5) ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS

(6) LBN taken from documents captured by I/3/4 on 21 March 1967, vicinity XD944654 equated with the 4th Bn, 84th Arty/Hct Regiment.

(7) ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

j. WEATHER

(1) During the period 1-18 March and 29-31 March, cloud coverage ranged from 500 feet scattered to 1000 feet broken in the AI and 1000 feet variable broken to 2500 feet overcast in the FI. Visibility ranged from 1-3 miles in the AI to 4-6 miles in the FI. During the period 19-28 March cloud coverage ranged from 12000 feet scattered to clear. Visibility ranged from 5-7 miles in the AI to unrestricted in the FI.

(2) Average temperatures for March were: Low 68 degrees and high 79 degrees. The monthly low was 63 degrees and the high was 101 degrees.

(3) Winds were usually light and variable to 4-8 knots from the east.

(4) During the first half of April, the sky condition in the AI averaged 5,000 feet broken, occasional overcast to 8000 feet broken and variable overcast, becoming 2500 feet scattered to 8000 feet broken in the FI.

(5) Visibility was 3-5 miles with ground fog in the AI, becoming 5-7 miles with haze during the FI. The latter half of April and the first week of May witnessed sky conditions similar to the first half, but intermittent clouds were added with scattered afternoon rainshowers and thunderstorms.

(6) Generally the winds were light and variable with occasional gusts of up to 25 knots. During the latter part of April and first week of May the winds increased to 8-10 knots from the southeast with gusts up to 30 knots.

(7) Average temperatures for April were a low 68 degrees and a high of 80 degrees. The monthly low was 63 degrees and the high was 105 degrees.

k. CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

NVA KIA	347	MORTAR ROUNDS	3,516
NVA POW	4	ARTILLERY ROUNDS	315
CHINA HOI'S	3	ROCKET ROUNDS	177
INDIVIDUAL VPNS CAPTURED	198	MINES	597
CREW SERV D VPNS CAPTURED	24	GRENADES	2,033
SMALL ARMS AMMO	81,279	EXPLOSIVES (LBS)	613
		RICE (LBS)	16,336

SECRET

7. MISSIONS (AS ASSIGNED BY TF HOTEL)

a. 1 March 69 - 4 March 69

(1) Continue Operation Purple Martin.

(2) Continue operations from FSB Alpine, Neville, Russell and Fuller.

b. 5 March 69 - 14 March 69

(1) Continue Operation Purple Martin.

(2) Continue operations from FSB Alpine, Neville, Russell, Fuller and LZ Amy.

c. 15 March 69 - 19 March 69

(1) Continue Operation Purple Martin.

(2) Continue operations from FSB Alpine, Neville, Russell, Fuller and LZ Mack.

d. 20 March 69 - 27 March 69

(1) Continue Operation Purple Martin.

(2) Continue operations from FSB Argonne and Alpine.

(3) Prepare to assume opcon of M/3/3 for employment in Operation Purple Martin on order.

e. 28 March 69 - 2 April 69

(1) Continue Operation Purple Martin.

(2) Continue construction of FSB Greene.

(3) Continue operations from FSB Argonne, Alpine, Neville, Russell and LZ Catapult.

(4) Prepare to close FSB Argonne ASAP. Closure should be initiated by displacement of CP/1/4 and G-XRAY/3/12 on 30 March 69.

f. 3 April 69 - 7 April 69

(1) Continue Operation Purple Martin.

(2) Continue operations from FSB Alpine, Russell, Neville, LZ Catapult and Sierra.

SECRET

(3) Continue construction of and operations from FSB Greene.

g. 8 April 69 - 9 April 69

(1) Continue Operation Purple Martin.

(2) Continue operations from FSB Neville, Russell, Alpine, Greene, LZ Catapult and Sierra.

h. 10 April 69

(1) Seize Purple Martin objectives near southern boundary of IMZ by 12 April 69.

i. 11 April 69 - 24 April 69

(1) Continue Operation Purple Martin.

(2) Continue operations from FSB Alpine, Greene, Neville, Russell, LZ Catapult and Sierra.

(3) Prepare to relieve L/3/9 at FSB Alpine and chop open to TF Hotel.

j. 25 April 69 - 29 April 69

(1) Close FSB Alpine and continue preparations to close FSB Greene.

(2) Chop open L/3/9 to TF Hotel on closure of FSB Alpine.

(3) Continue Operation Purple Martin.

k. 30 April 69 - 8 May 69

(1) Continue Operation Purple Martin. Scheduled moves for 1/4(-) on 30 April 69 will be executed on 1 May 69.

l. 7 May 69

(1) Operation Purple Martin terminates on 082100H May 69.

m. 8 May 69

(1) Commence Operation Herkimer Mountain in current AO at 090000H May 69.

SECRET

8. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. The enemy had gained key terrain as the result of his Winter-Spring Offensive and had to be denied the terrain he occupied south of the DMZ. Our counter offensive (Operation Purple Martin) had two major objectives:

(1) To attack the enemy and destroy his men and material.

(2) To continue offensive operations until the enemy had been pushed back into the DMZ. All battalions and supporting/attached units were to continue the attack until all NVA units were either destroyed or retreated into the sanctuary of the demilitarized zone.

b. When the enemy has been pushed into the DMZ, all battalions were to secure key terrain on the southern edge of the DMZ, and one battalion at a time was to operate in the southern portion of the DMZ.

c. Supporting artillery was to fire maximum rounds on designated targets. Live targets and prep fires on known enemy positions were to be controlled at the company level when possible to ensure that a sufficient number of rounds had been fired.

9. EXECUTION

a. March 1, 1969, the first day of Operation Purple Martin, found our three battalions operating in NW I Corps 5,000-10,000 meters south of the DMZ. The NVA started their Winter-Spring Offensive on the night of 24Feb69 and the entire 4th Marines were deployed to stop their new push. Once deployed the 4th Marines AO covered an extensive area which included the DMZ and the Laotian Border.

b. Operation Purple Martin was characterized by infantry company assaults against enemy bunker fortifications; to include close combat with a fanatical enemy in mutually supporting fortified positions.

c. The first significant contact was initiated by Company "C", 1st Bn. near an area north of Elliott Combat Base (Rockpile) known as LZ Mack; an old firebase abandoned for about a month. The location of this action by grid was XD 9661 (Hill 484).

d. The action started at 010430H March 69 when Company "C" received 4 rounds of 60mm mortar in their perimeter. They sustained 3 casualties which required evacuation. However, the incoming was not considered very significant. The next morning at approximately 1200H, Company "C" commenced their assault on LZ Mack. The enemy had been willing to stand and fight the previous day, a stature which he was to maintain throughout Operation Purple Martin.

e. It was known that the NVA had heavily fortified LZ Mack. There

SECRET

were over 3000 rounds fired in the prep for the assault, but as the assault commenced, the NVA still occupied his bunker labyrinth and was determined to hold. 1st Lieutenant HILBON the Commanding Officer of Company "C" placed his base of fire on LZ Amy (XD 973615) and used two platoons in the assault. The first phase of the assault was one platoon seizing a small knoll north of LZ Mack; from this they established their second base of fire. The company encountered numerous booby traps, far in excess of those previously encountered in the 4th Marine AO. These devices inflicted numerous casualties throughout Operation Purple Martin. The booby traps consisted of chicomms and IH-10 claymores detonated by a trip wire. The NVA had placed many IH-10 claymore mines 360 degrees around their bunkers.

f. The assault reached the summit of LZ Mack with casualties remaining light. However, when the assault platoon attacking east to west secured the hilltop, three 82mm mortars located north of LZ Mack started firing an intense barrage. This inflicted numerous casualties on Company "C" and they were forced to pull back to LZ Amy where a base of fire had been located, carrying their dead and wounded.

g. The perimeter for the night was located on LZ Amy. The hill has three prominent fingers; northeast, east along the ridge, and west toward LZ Mack. In addition, the hill had numerous draws leading to the edge of the perimeter and each draw was a likely avenue of approach.

h. During the assault on LZ Mack, Company "L", 3d Bn. was moved to LZ Amy to serve as a reserve force. At this time, the operation was in the 3d Bn. AO and controlled by the 3d Bn., Commanding Officer, LtCol DONALD. As night closed, LZ Amy was consolidated with Company "C" and Company "L" each having half the perimeter. Each company was tasked with local security and Company "L" provided an ambush on the finger northeast. It is worth noting that from 011200H March 69 until 011730H, Company "C" was under almost constant enemy mortar attack. Even during their withdrawal back to LZ Amy and reoccupying LZ Amy, the enemy 82mm and 60mm mortars were never completely silenced. During this same time, "H" Battery and "I" Battery, 3d Bn., 12th Marines provided constant fire support. At the end of the day Company "C" had suffered 2 KIA and 21 WIA (Evac) and accounted for 5 NVA KIA.

i. On 2 March, the action diminished to sniper fire and occasional incoming 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds. Company "L" suffered 2 WIA (Minor), but accounted for 3 NVA/KIA(C) with small arms fire. Company "C" spent the day consolidating their defensive position, accomplishing mineclears, and preparing for their second assault on LZ Mack. Company "C" reported an additional 2 WIA (Evac) and 50 WIA (Minor). As night approached, the ambushes and listening posts were assigned. It was decided to place another ambush on the finger leading to the northeast.

SECRET

j. The weather continued to hamper the availability of air support. The dense fog and misting rain seldom lifted. This factor placed the burden of fire support upon the artillery.

k. At 0430H on 3 March, the perimeter of C/1/4 and L/3/4 received a ground attack at their north and northeast sector. The enemy penetrated their defenses and inflicted casualties from the rear on personnel in their fighting holes. When the firing started, the ambush on the northeast finger tried to return to the lines. However, several NVA had positioned themselves between the lines and the ambush. The ambush was hit with S/A fire and all members were killed or wounded. Sporadic S/A fire continued until first light when the enemy withdrew. The two companies suffered 9 KIA and 6 WIA while killing 11 NVA/KIA.

l. Other units reported contact. E/2/4 had 2 WIA (Evac) when an LP tripped a chicom booby trap. H/2/4 found 1 NVA/KIA while on patrol, apparently killed by arty.

m. On 4 March, other units reported sporadic, light contact at close quarters from 5 to 40 meters. K/3/4 found 1 NVA/KIA and five empty graves plus assorted gear. E/2/4 squad patrol made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 PR WIA (Evac) and 2 NVA/KIA. 3/K/3/4 suffered 1 WIA (minor) and accounted for 1 NVA KIA(C) in a fire-fight.

n. On 5 March, action continued and contact was frequent. This day was highlighted by outstanding support from aerial observers. During the day they accounted for 16 NVA/KIA(C) when they caught enemy troops in the open on three different occasions. I/3/4 received an unknown number of 82mm rounds resulting in 1 KIA, 4 WIA (Evac). Later, I/3/4 had 1 NVA/KIA by S/A fire from their O.P.

o. At 1500H, after an extensive artillery prep, C/1/4 assaulted LZ Mack. They used a base of fire on LZ Arty which consisted of M-60's, LAAT's, M-79's and S/A. The assault force was two platoons; one platoon would secure a small hill north of LZ Mack and the base of fire would move to this knoll. From this position they could fire at the side entrances of the numerous bunkers on LZ Mack. This part of the assault was accomplished with no problems. The other platoon would move from LZ Arty to LZ Mack using a trail located at the base of the hill. Once the unit had reached this position they were to deploy and assault to the summit of the hill. This scheme of maneuver worked very effectively. The assaulting forces received only 8 KIA when they reached the topographical crest of the hill. The squad and fire team actions consisted of methodical bunker to bunker action, with several instances of individuals clearing bunkers while under fire from others. During the assault a CH-46D, which had been hit while resupplying I/3/4, landed on top of LZ Mack. At the time of landing Company "C" 1/4 held one half of the hill, while the NVA

SECRET

held the other half. Had the helicopter landed a few minutes earlier it would have been behind the NVA lines.

p. When the hilltop was secured, the NVA inflicted their first KIA's. Several NVA had slipped into a draw to the south of the hill and fired an RPG which killed 2 Marines. Total casualties for this action of C/1/4 were 2 KIA and 8 WIA (Evac) while they accounted for 16 NVA/KIA(C).

q. The period from 1-6 March was one of constant contact for the regiment's forces in the field. The weather was poor and hampered all air support. Due to the weather conditions, our artillery provided almost all supporting fires. During the above period our direct support artillery battalion (3/12) fired 11,824 rounds.

r. The enemy was definitely prepared to fight. He was well equipped, well supplied, and gave up terrain only when physically dislodged by infantry forces. L/3/4 had an engineer team on LZ Mack detonate a DH-10 claymore resulting in 2 FR KIA and 2 WIA (Evac).

s. 07 March, K/3/4 found a grave with 1 NVA body KB arty.

t. 08 March, G/2/4 killed 2 NVA in a brief firefight and suffered 1 WIA (Minor). A/1/4 suffered 2 WIA (Minor) from 2 incoming recoilless rifle rounds.

held the other half. Had the helicopter landed a few minutes earlier

u. 05 March, Recon Team "Dock Leaf" received a ground assault by 30 NVA, resulting in 3 FR KIA, 3 FR WIA (Evac), and 1 NVA/KIA. D/1/4 apprehended 1 detainee carrying a white flag. Individual was a friendly agent.

v. 09 March, L/G/2/4 suffered 2 FR KIA, 6 FR WIA (Evac), and killed 2 NVA in a firefight in the vicinity of LZ Catapult (XD 825616). This area had been a friendly Fire Support Base which was abandoned early this year. The NVA had occupied the general area and intended to hold this terrain. G/2/4 had been in this area for about two days and confirmed intelligence information which located a large force near LZ Catapult. The significance of the terrain could be determined by two facts; one, it is located 4000 meters from FSB Neville; two, this terrain dominated an extensive trail complex in the Upper Cam Lo River Valley which was in constant use by the NVA. G/2/4 was given the mission to secure LZ Catapult and surrounding terrain. As Company "G" approached their objective they engaged a large NVA force in bunkers. The NVA used claymore mines with S/A at 10-15 meters to inflict casualties on Company "G".

w. The movement of Company "G" was slow and cautious. They were moving along a ridge which was south of LZ Catapult and again their main support was artillery. The weather had continued to hinder air

SECRET

operations. Fixed wing was virtually non-existent except for TPQ support which was excellent. As G/2/4 continued, resistance became more stubborn and the NVA employed ambushes and snipers. On 10 March, the company entered a bunker complex which was their primary objective. Again they made contact and a firefight ensued with exchange of S/A, chicons and RPG's. The action lasted all day and at dark Company "G" consolidated in the bunker complex; results: 9 KIA (Evac), 2 KIA (Minor); 3 NVA/KIA.

x. On 11 March, as G/2/4 continued their attack toward LZ Catapult, the NVA launched a counter attack against G/2/4 with a company size force. The attack was initiated with S/A, chicons, RPG's and RPD MG's and it hit G/2/4 from the NW, N and NE. Fighting was at close quarters; sometimes 5 meters. G/2/4 suffered 4 KIA, 13 KIA (Evac), including 3 KIA's and 4 KIA's from a 105 short round. This violent contact which lasted all day broke the enemy's final attempt to hold LZ Catapult. When the company reached LZ Catapult on the 11th, they found 24 NVA/KIA from their S/A and artillery. Again the artillery support was the extra impetus which defeated the enemy. In three days 6,272 artillery rounds were fired with over a thousand rounds in support of G/2/4.

y. During the heavy action around LZ Catapult, other small contacts were made: 09 March, D/1/4 suffered 9 KIA (Minor) during a 60mm mortar attack. 10 March, I/K/3/4 suffered 1 KIA from a grenade; L/3/4 suffered 2 KIA (Minor) and 2 KIA (Evac) from incoming 82mm. 11 March, F/2/4 killed 1 NVA in a brief firefight and suffered 1 FR KIA.

z. On 13 March, 3d Bn., 4th Marines continued their push along the ridgeline leading to LZ Sierra (XD 945624). This area had been a friendly position two months previously, but had been abandoned. The NVA were sighted on numerous occasions on LZ Sierra and during the assault on LZ Mack, enemy mortars were firing from this position.

aa. The 3d Bn. commenced their attack on 13 March. The weather continued to hamper air support and the prep fires consisted of artillery and some TPQ air drops. The terrain was exceptionally rugged with deep draws and steep hills. The avenues of approach to LZ Sierra were limited and every meter offered the threat of mines. The scheme of maneuver for the attack showed "I" and "M" in the attack with "K" and "L" in reserve. This action was again characterized by a stubborn enemy in well-constructed bunkers capable of withstanding direct hits from 105 rounds. The basic concept of fire and maneuver was employed on the company scale.

bb. Company "M" was assigned to assault LZ Sierra and Company "I" was assigned a hill north of LZ Sierra, commonly known as Sierra North. As the assault commenced, it was apparent that LZ Sierra was defended by another hard-core NVA unit of platoon size. With the base of fire

SECRET

located south of LZ Sierra, two platoons maneuvered to the east. The final assault would be from the southeast and east. Once initiated, the assault consisted of fire teams and squads working to destroy each bunker. In addition to the intense S/A fire received, 60mm mortars and RPG's were fired into the assaulting forces.

cc. By late afternoon on the 13th, 11/3/4 had secured LZ Sierra, but enemy mortar fire had not ceased. The casualties suffered were: 10 PR KIA, 35 WIA (Evac); 23 NVA/KIA. Continuing inclement weather conditions made medevacs a difficult task; additionally, numerous AA weapons harassed the helicopters.

dd. On 14 March, Company "I" assaulted Sierra North (XD 946630). This action was a well executed envelopment to the north of the objective. The enemy, apparently expecting an attack from the south, were surprised inside their bunkers. At the end of the day 1/3/4 had suffered 1 PR KIA, 7 WIA (Evac), 2 WIA (Minor); 7 NVA KIA and 1 POW.

ee. While Company "I" was engaged on Sierra North, Company "J" received a ground assault from NVA forces. This assault was initiated when the NVA downed a CH-46 with an RPG. The helicopter had just picked up medevacs from 11/3/4. The helo went down in flames with some medevacs aboard. Results from this action were: 5 PR KIA. During the assault, artillery support, again, accounted for almost all the supporting fires.

ff. From 14-17 March, 15,595 artillery rounds were fired in support of the 4th Marines with seventy-five per cent being fired for 3d Battalion's assault of Sierra North and Sierra. The weather improved on the 17th and 18th and fixed wing support was utilized.

gg. It is noteworthy to mention that from 1-17 March, weather conditions were almost always prohibitive for fixed wing, and usually restricted helicopter movement and resupply.

hh. 17 March, 1/F/2/4 squad patrol killed 1 NVA with S/A fire. G/2/4 squad ambushed 1 NVA near company perimeter; 1 NVA KIA. 3/F/2/4 found 4 NVA bodies. 18 March, 1/3/4 suffered 2 WIA (Evac) from booby trapped claymore mines. 2/G/2/4 found 2 NVA bodies buried in a bunker complex. 19 March, 2/G/2/4 suffered 1 KIA when NVA opened fire on lead elements. K/3/4 found 1 dead NVA with multiple shrapnel wounds. 2/G/2/4 suffered 2 KIA and 5 WIA (Evac) when lead elements were hit with 3 claymores, RPG's, S/A and MG fire. 20 March, K/3/4 detonated mines near perimeter; 2 KIA and 4 WIA (Evac).

ii. On 20 March, the long anticipated assault on FSB Argonne commenced. This area, Hill 1308 (XD 6755573) offers observation into Laos and parts of the Ho Chi MINH trail. Information from all intelligence sources revealed increased activity in this area.

jj. For this operation, the weather had finally cleared and air

SECRET

support was available. This operation had been planned for almost a month, but air assets were committed heavily to 9th Marines in the Au Shau Valley and weather conditions prohibited the helicopter assault on this high terrain feature (1308 meters).

kk. The scheme of maneuver was a three company helicopter assault with one company landing on FSB Argonne and two companies landing in the valley to the north. A recon team would be inserted just prior to L-Hour and would guide the assault helicopter into the zone. Although the operation had been tentatively scheduled for almost a month the final decision to conduct the assault was given at 2230H 19 March.

ll. 1st Bn., 4th Marines was tasked with the assault on FSB Argonne and had moved their companies to FSB Alpine (XD 769427) prior to the assault. Along with the companies came tons of contingency supplies to be staged for support of FSB Argonne and the immediate AO. This backup supply base, or mini ISA, proved an asset to the resupply of FSB Argonne by decreasing the distance required for helicopter resupply lifts.

mm. At 0930H, after an extensive artillery and air prep, Recon Team "Frostburg" started their insert into the upper LZ on FSB Argonne. As the helicopter approached the LZ an explosion was set off and S/A fire raked the cockpit killing the pilot and wounding the co-pilot. The helicopter hit the ground. The team disembarked and formed a hasty 360 degree perimeter and pulled the wounded co-pilot to safety. Almost simultaneous with the crash came an NVA assault on the team. The team reacted quickly enough to repel the enemy's initial charge and killed 3 NVA in the process. After making a quick estimate of the situation, the team leader called for an extraction of his team. Immediately after the extraction, the first transport helicopter landed with the Battalion Commander and parts of Company "D" - the assault company. The UH1E which the recon team was using prevented the CH-46D transport from entering the upper zone. Consequently, the lower zone was the site of the main helo assault. The necessity for a primary and alternate zone was amply demonstrated.

nn. At first, the assault troops received only sporadic sniper fire, but as the lead elements advanced up the hill toward the upper LZ, the S/A and automatic weapons fire intensified from a mutually supporting bunker system oriented toward the center of the LZ. Again, the combat consisted of destroying the enemy by using small units to methodically destroy each bunker. This was accomplished with a base of fire directed toward the aperture and one or two Marines crawling to within grenade range and assaulting the bunker entrance. The action continued until dark and the objective was secured. However, enemy snipers continued to harass Company "D" and the battalion CP throughout the night. During the day, Company "D" suffered 6 KIA and

SECRET

ll WIA (Evac) while killing 15 NVA. The helilift of the remaining two companies to the valley north of FSB Argonne was cancelled by higher headquarters.

oo. On 21 March the NVA used mortars for the first time since the assault the previous day. At 0815H, (12) 82mm mortar rounds landed in the 1/4 CP killing the Battalion Commander, S-2, two other Marines and wounding 12 additional Marines. Later as helicopters were extracting the medovacs, FSB Argonne received (10) 82mm rounds, resulting in 3 KIA and 11 WIA (Evac).

pp. On 21 March companies "A" and "C" were lifted south of FSB Argonne (vic XD 6854). Their mission was to sweep north of FSB Argonne. Later, Company A's mission was modified and they moved to the west and Hill 1154. The enemy mortars had been shooting from several positions west of FSB Argonne very close to the Laotian Border.

qq. On 22 March the action had quieted somewhat, except for a mortar attack on FSB Alpine which inflicted 5 WIA (Evac) and another attack on FSB Argonne inflicting 2 WIA (Minor).

rr. During the first three days of the action on FSB Argonne, air support was outstanding. The fixed wing were on station well into the hours of darkness and provided instant fire power when needed. The aerial observers were magnificent in all respects frequently rendering information of suspected enemy positions to the ground forces. The artillery fire support was accurate and responsive. They fired a total of 12,748 rounds on the 19th, 20th, and 21st for prep fires and live missions. The above rounds were fired by four 155 (Towed) howitzers and six 105 howitzers on FSB Alpine.

ss. Helicopter support was good but they were hindered by enemy ground fire. The NVA adopted a pattern on FSB Argonne of firing at the LZ whenever a helicopter approached. The noise of the helicopter made it difficult to hear the mortar tubes pop. One solution, which showed results, was the use of a fast approach to the LZ vice circling prior to landing. The helicopter would stay about four miles from the zone until mortar suppression fires were started, then he would make a fast approach into the zone and complete his mission. The helicopters that circled, sometimes for five minutes, prior to landing invariably received fires.

tt. On 23 March Company "D" moved their patrols to an area north of FSB Argonne. This had been the assembly area for several probes at the D/1/4 lines. They encountered nothing until 1400H, when the point spotted five graves. Security was placed around the graves and part of the patrol started to exhume the bodies. Only a few minutes had elapsed before the NVA opened fire on the security and the excavators. A firefight resulted which inflicted 3 KIA and 4 WIA on the patrol. The patrol killed 3 NVA. The same day FSB Argonne received

SECRET

more incoming from 60mm and 82mm mortars but had only 1 MIA (Minor).

uu. On 24 March a patrol from M/3/3 at FSB Alpine made contact with an unknown size NVA unit in newly constructed bunkers in the same area where enemy mortars had been fired. This activity was expected because FSB Alpine was providing supporting fires for FSB Argonne. M/3/3 suffered 2 KIA, 1 MIA (Minor) and killed 3 NVA.

vv. The major action shifted to FSB Argonne but other small contacts were made in the LZ Catapult and Sierra areas. March 20, 2/G/2/4 suffered 2 MIA (Evac) from S/A fire; M/3/4 found 7 NVA/KIA in graves; L/K/3/4 suffered 1 MIA (Evac) and 1 MIA (Minor) from (2) 82mm rounds. March 21, M/3/4 found 2 NVA/KIA in graves. 22 March, L/A/3/4 found 2 NVA KB arty. L/3/4 found 1 NVA body in an old bunker complex. 23 March, G/2/4 encountered an NVA force near LZ Catapult, resulting in 5 FR MIA (Evac); H/2/4 squad found 5 FR KIA in an Army UH-1H which had crashed west of FSB Neville (XD 802596). 25 March, I/3/4 received 6 FR MIA (Evac) from booby traps located on their new objective south of the DMZ.

ww. On 25 March, 3d Bn. received the order to commence recon operations in the DMZ. The two companies directly involved were Company "I" and Company "K" which were deployed south of the DMZ on hilltops. Their location interdicted major trail complexes which were frequently used by the NVA. These trails offered easy access to the DMZ for the patrols from Company "I" and Company "K". The grid locations were: Company "I" XD 911614, Company "K" XD 932655.

xx. The general concept was: one squad of fourteen men would enter the DMZ on a recon mission. If they made contact a reaction force was deployed to their aid on an extraction mission. The reaction force could move overland, or be helilifted. This action was aimed at diminishing the rate of infiltration into the LZ Mack, LZ Amy area and continued until the end of Purple Martin.

yy. At FSB Argonne, Company "A" continued to sweep to the west and northwest. On several occasions, the company accurately located enemy mortars, enabling suppressive fire to be delivered.

zz. On 25 March, Company "A" continued to sweep toward Hill 1154, near the Laotian Border. At 0930H, the point man, an S-2 scout heard movement to his front. After passing the word to the C.O., the scout advanced up the trail into the fire of an AK-47. The

SECRET

bunker complex was a common NVA tactic prior to and throughout Operation Purple Martin. A/1/4 assaulted on line through the bunker complex. They suffered 2 WIA (Evac), and killed 6 NVA, but an artillery short round inflicted 3 FR KIA and 15 FR WIA (Evac).

bbb. Air support continued to be excellent and accounted for 4 NVA/KBA while in support of Company "A".

ccc. On 27 March mortar fire was again directed at FSB Argonne. The attack during the afternoon inflicted 1 WIA (Evac), 2 WIA (Minor). The direction and location of the mortars were determined to be Hill 1154, and Company "A" was directed to return to the area and silence the mortars.

ddd. The search on the 27th terminated short of Hill 1154 and Company "A" established their night position. During the early morning hours an LP reported definite movement and the lines were alerted. At 0030H, the NVA started their probe, but they had mistaken the listening post for the main perimeter. The NVA initiated their probe with ohicoms and S/A. The LP answered back with grenades, S/A and claymores. After the LP started firing, the NVA realized their error and moved toward the main perimeter. The intensity of the fire quickly increased as the NVA came closer. The fight continued for about two hours with arty, 81's and fixed wing support being employed.

eee. Estimates of the enemy strength were that at least an NVA platoon had probed A/1/4. Their mistaking the LP for the main perimeter eliminated the element of surprise.

fff. The next day Company "A" continued to push toward Hill 1154 and found an NVA company-size bunker complex. In this complex they found 9 NVA KIA from the previous day's action.

ggg. Activity around FSB Argonne decreased in the last days of March, and early April.

hhh. In other areas of Purple Martin contact was evident from 26-31 March. March 26, H/2/4 found 1 badly decomposed NVA near their perimeter under a rock ledge; H/3/4 sniper on Sierra killed 1 NVA; I/3/4 received one short 8" round inside their perimeter, 1 KIA and 10 WIA (Evac). 27 March, I/3/4 had one 60mm short round land in their perimeter, 3 WIA (Evac) and 1 WIA (Minor). 3/H/2/4 suffered 2 WIA (Evac) from enemy S/A fire while on patrol. 28 March, K/3/4 recon squad patrol in the IMZ killed 2 NVA when the NVA attempted to ambush them. Recon team "Amada" killed 1 NVA during their attempted insert. 29 March, 3/K/3/4 made contact with an NVA squad and killed 1 NVA. I/3/4 found seven bodies apparently killed by S/A. Squad recon patrol from I/3/4 suffered 1 FR WIA (Evac) when a recon patrol made contact in the IMZ. 30 March, 2/M/3/4 suffered 4 WIA (Evac) from a IM-10 claymore. It could not be determined whether the claymore was tripped

SECRET

or command detonated. K/3/4 squad recon patrol in the IMZ suffered 1 KIA, and 3 WIA (Evac) when their patrol detonated two IM-10 claymore mines; later (3) 82mm mortar rounds inflicted an additional 4 WIA (Evac). 31 March, E/2/4 killed 1 NVA in a hasty ambush. 3/F/2/4 suffered 2 FR WIA (Minor) in a brief firefight. H/2/4 found 14 graves and 3 NVA KIA(C). 1 April, 1/H/2/4 exhumed 11 NVA(C). 2/F/2/4 patrol made contact with an unknown size enemy force and sustained 4 WIA (Minor). On 2 April 1/H/2/4 found 1 NVA KIA in an old bunker complex. 3 April, 1/3/4 found 7 NVA graves with 7 bodies. Recon Team "Hasty Foot" received enemy S/A fire during attempted insertion and the mission was aborted, 1 WIA (Minor). K/3/4 apprehended 2 civilians from North Vietnam, considered to be detainees.

iii. On 3 April, 1/4 "A" Command Group was extracted from FSB Argonne. Companies "A" and "C" moved south to an LZ for extraction and Company "D" moved northwest sweeping the area toward FSB Greens (XD 759610).

jjj. 1/4 had given an excellent account of themselves while accomplishing their mission. The enemy infiltration routes had been disrupted and his forces guarding the Ho Chi MINH Trail had received an assault which pushed his forces into Laos with considerable casualties.

kkk. On 4 April, 1/3/4 found 1 NVA/KIA on a trail where a recent arty mission had been fired. Recon Team "Football Star" while working in the IMZ observed 23 NVA digging. They fired an arty mission which resulted in 15 NVA/KIA. On 5 April, K/3/4 recon patrol made contact with 5-6 NVA while working in the IMZ. They fired arty and 81's killing 1 NVA. 6 April, F/2/4 found 2 NVA/KIA in graves. 7 April, F/2/4 patrolling near XD 813643 was ambushed with claymore mines, 4 KIA, 1 WIA (Evac). M/3/4 detonated a claymore mine near their perimeter, 1 KIA, 6 WIA (Evac). Debrief of pilots and AC's on 7 April showed 5 NVA/KIA not previously reported.

lll. 8 April, F/2/4 found 4 NVA killed by arty during their contact on 7 April. 3/F/2/4 squad patrol made contact with an enemy force. The enemy detonated a claymore mine to initiate contact and S/A fire was exchanged. The patrol called in air, arty, and 81's; 2 WIA (Evac). 10 April, Recon Team "Black Bud" killed 1 NVA prior to extraction with S/A fire. 11 April, C/1/4 patrol detonated a booby trap at XD 724623, 2 WIA (Evac). K/3/4 squad recon patrol in IMZ made contact with 3-5 NVA, killing 3 NVA and suffering 3 WIA. Later 1/K/3/4 detected an NVA ambush while attempting to extract the recon squad, 2 NVA/KIA, 1 FR WIA (Evac). F/2/4 made contact with an NVA force near Hill 715 (North) (XD 852654), 3 NVA KIA. E/2/4 found 1 NVA killed by napalm. E/2/4 made contact with 10 NVA, patrol pursued enemy and received fire from a cave complex, 1 FR KIA, 8 WIA (Evac). 12 April, 1/E/2/4 sighted 10-15 NVA in the same cave complex, made contact, 2 FR KIA, 1 FR WIA (Evac).

SECRET

mm. The area of the E/2/4 contact is a low land with steep cliffs towering on both sides of the Cam Lo River. E/2/4 approached the cave/tunnel complex located at XD 789639. The NVA still alive after several days of air and artillery prep plus the action earlier that day, retreated into the caves and tunnels. As E/2/4 advanced they captured 2 NVA wounded during the morning's fight. One of the enemy was the company commander of the 1st Co., 1st Bn., 246th Regiment. Both were immediately extracted from the battle area and provided timely and accurate information about their unit.

nn. The tactics used to neutralize the caves and tunnels were a combination of psychological operations and tactics designed for assaulting a fortified position. When the information was received in the rear that NVA were in caves and screaming obscenities, the S-2 went to the field with a loudspeaker and one interpreter. Just in case the NVA were stubborn, a flame section was deployed with a Psy Ops team.

oo. The results of the combined tactics yielded 3 POW, attributed to the fine work of the loudspeaker operation, and 3 NVA KIA attributed to S/A fire and the flamethrowers.

pp. Other actions during the day were: "A" Cnd 2/4 had 1 KIA from a .50 cal, C/1/4 suffered 1 KIA, 2 KIA (Evac) from an NVA ambush initiated at 5 meters in thick terrain, and F/2/4 confirmed 1 NVA KIA after arty and air were used on an enemy bunker complex.

qq. After clearing the caves, E/2/4 started a thorough search of the labyrinth. On 13 April, they found the first portion of a substantial cache: (1) German rifle, (600) .30 cal rounds, (6) 82mm mortar fuses. Later finds resulting from the search were: (2) 82mm mortar tubes, (1) bipod, (3) RPG IIG, (1) AK-47, (300) 60mm rounds, (500) 82mm rounds, (100) 90mm recoilless rifle rounds, (50) 37mm cannon rounds, (50) chicom grenades, (5) claymores, and (1000) .30 cal rounds.

rr. Other actions on 13 April were: C/1/4 spotted 2 NVA and killed 1: C/1/4 ambush was taken under fire as they approached their ambush site, 2 KIA (Evac).

sss. 14 April, AO (OV-10) killed 2 NVA on a trail with his organic ordnance; 2 NVA/KIA. 15 April, AO reported 1 NVA KB Air; 1/3/9 found 1 NVA body killed by arty, 1 NVA/KIA. 17 April, D/1/4 ambush killed 1 NVA scavenger in their old night position. K/3/4 found 1 NVA body about four days old. 18 April, F/2/4 received 1 KIA and 3 KIA from claymore mines. 19 April, 2/I/3/4 tripped 2 claymore mines, 1 KIA, 7 KIA (Evac). 20 April, Recon Team "Football Star" and 1/K/3/4 combined for 7 NVA/KIA during the overland extraction of the recon team from the DMZ; AO reports 1 KB Air in support of the above action. 21

SECRET

SECRET

April, C/1/4 found 1 NVA body and a radio during their BDA of the arc-light area. 22 April, H/2/4 made contact with unknown size enemy force, 3 NVA/KIA, 1 FR KIA, 2 WIA (Evac). 25 April, F/2/4 received 1 WIA (Minor) when S/A fire was received in their LZ during their helilift.

ttt. On 25 April, 2/4 after accomplishing their mission of pushing the NVA back into the DMZ, started to move south away from the DMZ. The sanctuary offered the NVA an advantage of firing without the threat of physical pursuit. Consequently, 2/4 moved south outside of the 82mm mortar fire fan.

uum. 27 April, K/3/4 squad recon patrol in the DMZ heard 8-10 NVA and ambushed them, 1 NVA KIA. However, the extraction force was hit with S/A fire when they were moving to the squad's position, 1 FR KIA, 1 FR KIA (Evac); G/2/4 found 1 NVA outside their perimeter.

vvv. 30 April, F/2/4 suffered 1 KIA and 4 WIA (Evac) during a brief firefight. 1 May, 2/4/3/4 found 5 NVA bodies in graves. F/2/4 ran air and arty on two NVA, 1 NVA KIA. On 2 May an AO reported 1 NVA/KIA at XD 649648. 2/4/2/4 suffered 2 KIA and 1 WIA from command detonated mines, but killed 2 NVA as they were running away. 4 May, H/3/4 was hit by command detonated mines, 2 KIA, 3 WIA (Evac), and then killed 1 NVA in brief firefight. 3/4/3/4 suffered 10 WIA from unknown type gas used by the NVA. Recon Team "Albatross" reported 3 NVA/KIA from contact prior to their extraction. E/2/4 while attempting to makevac heat casualties took S/A fire. They returned fire, ran air and fired arty, 2 NVA/KIA. 7 May, Recon Team "Air Minded" made contact at XD 881586, moved to LZ for extraction and took additional casualties, 2 FR KIA, 2 WIA, 1 NVA/KIA. 8 May, I/3/4 suffered 1 WIA (Evac) from an enemy sniper.

www. 082400H May 69 Operation Purple Martin terminated.

10. RESULTS

a. Personnel losses were as indicated below:

(1) USMC

(2) US ARMY

KIA 101
WIA (EVAC) 336
WIA (MINOR) 91
MIA 0

KIA 5
WIA (EVAC) 1

b. Personnel losses for the NVA are based on actual body count.

(1) NVA KIA 347
VC KIA 0
POW 4

DET 3
INC 198
CSMC 24

SECRET

SECRET

In addition to the above figures there were thousands of miscellaneous items of NVA 782 gear destroyed.

c. All areas were searched after air strikes or artillery missions if they were in close proximity to friendly troops. For this operation, the 4th Marines covered their entire AO. Thus all areas were searched if not immediately, during some part of the operation.

d. No materials of U.S. origin were discovered except fin assemblies of 60mm mortars; after they had been fired at us.

11. Administrative Matters

a. General

(1) Supplies were handled through normal logistical channels from USA to FLC, Da Nang, and FLC (B) in Quang Tri. From Quang Tri to the ISA at Vandegrift was by motor convoy and helicopter.

(2) The effectiveness of the resupply effort depended upon helicopter availability.

(3) The position of troops in the field presented a variety of problems. Frequently, units would be located in areas of excessively thick canopy which afforded no LZ. This problem was alleviated by employing extra long slings on the external resupply.

(4) Operation Purple Martin had several periods of poor weather; one period being for eighteen days, 1-18 March. This put a severe burden on the individual Marine to carry extra equipment. In anticipation of continued inclement weather, the normal (3) days rations were often increased to (6) days. Weapons remained according to TO. The LAAM (1.72) was carried during the operation and used frequently in assaults on bunkers. The 1.79 continued to provide excellent firepower on the squad level, but the HE round should have a longer delay for firing in thick terrain. The 1.79 shotgun round proved its worth during operations in thick terrain.

b. Maintenance

(1) This area offered some minor problems because of the wet weather. First echelon maintenance by the individual Marine was excellent. There were periods of shortages, but nothing which curtailed the combat effort.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization

(1) Casualties were evacuated by helicopter to "C" MED at VANDEGRIFT if wounded near or west of VANDEGRIFT. Most personnel are evacuated from "C" MED to 3d MED Bn. in Quang Tri, or sent to one of two hospital ships off the coast of VIET-NAME. Treatment of the wounded had received only the highest praise. Wounded returning to duty commented that they received excellent care.

(1) Transportation for tactical moves relied upon the helicopter. Trucks were used on various occasions for moves to areas in close proximity to Rt. #9.

e. Communications

(1) Communications remained consistently good during the operation. There were periods of poor communications but this problem was alleviated with the establishment of radio relays on fire bases.

(2) Fire Support Base Neville was the mainstay for our communication efforts during Purple Martin. From the base, the Regimental Commander had direct communications with his entire regiment and his rear at Vandegrift. Neville proved an important communications relay during 1st Bn's operations at FSB Argonne.

f. Medical Evaluation

FUO and malaria coupled with jungle rot remained as our medical nemesis. Although the regiment was in the field for the entire Purple Martin Operation, the FUO and malaria incidents were low.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. The newest technique employed during Operation Purple Martin was the beacon. This beacon was employed extensively by 2/4 in their AO. By late April each battalion had obtained a beacon and was utilizing it fully.

13. Commander's Analysis

a. In general, the lessons learned from this operation simply reinforce the lessons learned in the past. I cannot overemphasize the importance of the employment of supporting arms for extensive prep of areas. The normal amount consisting of approximately 1000-1500 rounds wasn't enough. The NVA have learned to build bunkers which can absorb a direct hit from our 105 howitzer and sometimes even our 155 howitzer.

b. The lack of air support can severely hinder the advance of friendly troops. Because of the enemy bunkers we encountered, advance was slow and costly. In some instances if air support had been available - weather being the limiting factor - we could have placed napalm on some of the more costly objectives - MACK, SIERRA, and SIERRA NORTH.

14. Recommendations

a. There is a need for closer liaison between the recon teams and the infantry. Our recommendation would be; recon representatives at the battalion level to assist the battalion commander and the recon team; an alternate recommendation would be to give all frequencies of teams operating in his AO to the battalion commander for use when recon teams require assistance or when an emergency exists.

HEADQUARTERS

4th Marines (-)(Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

4 July 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division
Via: Commanding General, Task Force Hotel

Subj: Marine Corps Matters in Connection with Operation Purple Martin

1. In accordance with paragraph 15 of reference (a), the following report is submitted.

2. Problem areas encountered during Operation Purple Martin were as follows:

a. Designation of specific operations and subsequent changes thereto.

(1) On 26 February the 4th Marines were directed by Task Force Hotel to immediately prepare a boundary within their current AO for the separate operation Massachusetts Bay. This task was accomplished and an overlay submitted. On 27 February the 4th Marines were informed that this boundary was effective on the 23rd of February, three days before it was prepared.

(2) At 2400 28 February 1969 Operation Scotland II was terminated and sitreps were prepared on a 4th Marines operation without a code name. This operation involved the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, while Massachusetts Bay continued with the 1st Battalion.

(3) On 2 March 1969 this Regiment was notified that Operation Massachusetts Bay was changed to Operation Purple Martin. Sitreps were continued with the new heading.

(4) On 11 April 1969 this Regiment was notified that the unnamed operation of the 4th Marines was now considered part of Operation Purple Martin and all previous actions were to be included in that operation. On Purple Martin Sitrep #171 covering the period of 110600 to 111200 April 1969 these totals were combined.

(5) Although sitreps on Operation Massachusetts Bay (later Purple Martin) were commenced on 27 February 1969 to cover a period beginning 23 February the regiment was subsequently informed that when Operation Scotland II terminated at 2400 on 28 February that all Massachusetts Bay (Purple Martin) operations prior to that time would be considered a part of Operation Scotland II.

SECRET

TAB-C

(6) All of the above changes were received verbally from the G-3 Section of Task Force Hotel and were purportedly directed by the 3rd Marine Division.

(7) The conduct of separately named operations by the same regiment in contiguous geographical areas and frequent shifting of names, dates and boundaries created an unnecessary administrative burden. These problems could be easily avoided simply by announcing the termination of a single operation and the commencement of another at a specific time and date.

b. Effective times for boundary adjustments.

(1) Throughout the operation a boundary adjustment or a change in units under the operational control of the 4th Marines were directed at a time in the past, rather than the future.

(2) When a change in unit boundaries is made it takes anywhere from a few minutes to several hours to notify subordinate units. These changes are transmitted either by radio by means of an overlay, or both.

(3) To have a boundary change effective before all units concerned are aware of its existence presents the possibility of troops being located in the AO of an adjacent unit, or delivering organic fires outside their revised AO.

c. Effective times for changes in operational control.

(1) When the regiment assumes operational control of a unit, this control is generally passed down to an appropriate battalion, provided it is a unit less than battalion size. Regardless of the size or composition of the unit coming under 4th Marines control, a period of time is required to establish communications, brief on the mission assigned and orient the arriving unit to the existing situation.

(2) When operational control is passed prior to establishing communications with the incoming unit control cannot be exercised over the actions of that unit, nor can fire support be provided.

(3) If operational control is passed after communications are established but before liaison or briefing can be accomplished, fire support will be delayed and the unit cannot effectively react to requirements which may be laid upon it.

c. Timely Decisions:

(1) A continuing requirement exists for timely decisions at all levels of command and expeditious notification of subordinate units.

(2) One example of failure to meet this requirement occurred in April 1969. On that occasion the 3rd Battalion was operating in the IIR with relatively little contact. The 2nd Battalion was deployed in close proximity to the IIR and was making contact with enemy forces daily.

(3) The 4th Marines requested that the 3rd Battalion operations be terminated and that the 2nd Battalion commence operations into the IIR. Task Force Hotel was queried daily on the status of this request with neither an affirmative nor a negative answer being received.

(4) A period of twelve days elapsed before a negative answer was received.


(5) During this period the 2nd Battalion was maintained in a relatively static position. They did not have authority to cross the southern boundary of the IIR, yet it was not prudent to withdraw elements to the south if this approval was forthcoming.

(6) The above is only one example of the requirement for expeditious action, either affirmative or negative, on requests emanating from the Regiment.

W. F. COOPER

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



3/WBS/rwb
3480
Ser: OA17169
20 Jun 1969

CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on HQ, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
report AVBL-C of 4 June 1969

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
To: Commanding General, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Via: (1) Commanding General, XXIV Corps, Vietnam
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) MACV Dir 335-8

1. Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with reference (a).
2. Contents noted, no action deemed necessary.

F. R. KRAINCE
F. R. KRAINCE
By direction

Copy 3 of 10 Copies
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab D

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
APO San Francisco 96477

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

THRU: Commanding General
3rd Marine Division
FPO 96602

THRU: Commanding General
XXIV Corps
APO 96308

THRU: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO 96602

TO: Commander
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MAC J343
APO US Forces 96222

1. (U) NAME & TYPE OF OPERATION:

a. Name: Task Force Remagen

b. Type: Reconnaissance in Force

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 160800H March - 292150H April 1969.

3. (U) LOCATION: Western Quang Tri Province, RVN, along the Laotian border north, west and south of Khe Sanh. Maps, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L7015, 6341 I and IV; and AMS Series L7014, 6342 I, II, III, and IV. Maps, Vietnam, 1:100,000 AMS Series L607, 6341 and 6342.

4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:

a. From 160800H March to 111300H April 1969 the control headquarters was the 1st Bn, 77th Armor, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech).

b. From 111300H April 1969 to 292150H April 1969 the control headquarters was the 1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech), 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech).

5. (U) TASK FORCE COMMANDERS:

Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 77th Armor from 160800H March 1969 to 111200H March 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
RECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
RDP DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

1969 and 081200H April 1969 to present: LTC Carmelo P. Milia, 062462.

Acting Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 77th Armor from 311200H March 1969 to
081200H April 1969: LTC John M. Pickarts, 062057.

Acting Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 61st Inf (M) from 101400H April 1969 to
191200H April 1969: LTC Walter J. Bickston, 071316.

Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 61st Inf (M) from 191200H April 1969 to present:
LTC David E. Hartigan, Jr., 066159.

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Phase I (160800H Mar 1969 - 111300H Apr 69; Control of the 1st Bn, 77th
Armor).

TM B
B/1-61 Mech (-3d Plat)
2/C/1-77 Armor

TM C
C/1-77 Armor (-2d Plat)
3/B/1-61 Mech

TF Control
C/1-40 Arty (105 SP)
Scts/1-77 Armor
Mort/1-77 Armor (4.2 in SP)
Sec/C/1-44 Arty (Dusters)
Flat/A/7th Engr (Reinf)
2 Dozers/11 Engr (USMC)
2 Dozers/14 Engr (USA)
2 AVLB

b. Phase II (111300H Apr 1969 - 151200H Apr 69, Control of the 1st Bn, 61st
Inf (M).

TM A
A/1-61 Mech (-2d Plat)
3/A/1-77 Armor
1 Dozer/14 Engr (USA)

TM ARMOR
A/1-77 Armor (-3d Plat)
2/A/1-61 Mech
Sqd/A/7th Engr

TM B
B/1-61 Mech (-3d Plat)
2/C/1-77 Armor

TM C
C/1-77 Armor (-2d Plat)
3/B/1-61 Mech
Sqd/A/7th Engr

TF CONTROL
C/1-40 Arty (105 SP)
M/4-12 Marine Arty (155 SP)
Flat/B/1-12 Marine Arty (8 in SP)
Sct/1-61 Mech
Mort/1-61 Mech (4.2 in SP)
1/A/7th Engr (-)
1 Dozer/A/7th Engr
1 Dozer/14 Engr (USA)
2 Dozers/11 Engr (USMC)
2 AVLB

c. Phase III (151200H Apr 69 - 201200H Apr 69; Control of 1st Bn, 61st Inf (M).

TM A
A/1-61 Mech (-2d Plat)
3/A/1-77 Armor
Sqd/A/7th Engr

TF CONTROL
Sct/1-61 Mech
Mort/1-61 Mech (4.2 in SP)
1/A/7th Engr (-)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

4 June 1969

TM ARMOR

A/1-77 Armor (-3d Plat)
2/A/1-61 Mech
Sqd/A/7th Engr (Reinf)

TF CONTROL

cont
1 Dozer/A/7th Engr
1 Dozer/14 Engr (USA)
2 Dozers/11 Engr (USMC)
2 AVLB
C/1-40 Arty (105 SP)
M/4-12 Marine Arty (155 SP)
Sec/1-44 Arty (Dusters)

d. Phase IV (201200H Apr 69 - 292150H Apr 69).

TM A

A/1-61 Mech (-2d Plat)
3/A/1-77 Armor
Sqd/A/7th Engr

TM ARVN

2d Trp/7th ARVN Cav
Recon Co/1st ARVN Regt

TF CONTROL

TM ARMOR
A/1-77 Armor (-3d Plat)
2/A/1-61 Mech
Sqd/A/7th Engr (Reinf)

C/1-40 Arty (105 SP)
M/4-12 Marines Arty (155 SP)
Sct/1-61 Mech
Mort/1-61 Mech (4.2 in SP)
1/A/7th Engr (-)
1 Dozer/A/7th Engr
2 Dozers/11 Engr (USMC)
1 Dozer/14 Engr (USA)
2 AVLB

e. M/4-12 Marine Arty was a 155 SP howitzer battery consisting of three (3) howitzers. Four (4) M548 cargo carriers were attached to M/4-12 Marine Arty to carry ammunition.

f. The section of dusters from C/1-44 Arty consisted of two (2) dusters (Twin 8 inch self tracked, anti-aircraft weapons) and the platoon of B/1-12 Marine Arty consisted of two (2) 8 inch self-propelled howitzers.

7. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Aviation: During the course of the operation 2,042,00 lbs of cargo were moved from Vandergrift Combat Base to TF Remagen and included such items as tank engines and transmissions. The cargo was hauled by USMC CH-46 and CH-53 or US Army CH-47 helicopters operating from the Logistical Support Area (LSA) at Vandergrift Combat Base. In addition the Brigade aviation section attached one UH-1H helicopter to TF Remagen for command and control on a daily basis. The UH-1H also hauled 75,000 lbs of cargo.

b. Artillery:

(1) Throughout the operation TF Remagen was supported by a battery of 105mm self-propelled artillery (C/1-40 Arty). In addition, three (3) 155mm self-propelled howitzers from M/4-12 Marine Arty supported the task force from 11 thru 29 April 1969, and two (2) self-propelled 8 inch howitzers from B/1-12 Marine Arty

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

supported the operation from 11 thru 15 April 1969. A total of 8,883 105mm; 1044 155mm; and 400 8 inch rounds were fired in support of Task Force Remagen.

(2) Throughout the operation two dusters from C/1-44 Arty (Twin 40mm anti-aircraft guns mounted on an M41 tank chassis) supported Task Force Remagen. Although not employed extensively during this operation, the dusters were included in the organization in order to provide a weapon with a large amount of fire power, that could reach the tops of the ridgelines overlooking Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh. The road from Khe Sanh to Ca Lu is cut out of the side of a ridgeline and winds through 21.9 kilometers of excellent ambush sites. The 90mm gun on the tanks is not able to elevate enough to hit the tops of the ridges and it was felt that the dusters would help make up for this deficiency while the column was between Khe Sanh and Ca Lu.

c. TAC Air: Throughout the operation forward air controllers (FAC's) flew over the area of operation. The FAC's were used to adjust artillery and mortar fire, conduct aerial reconnaissance, and control air strikes. The FAC's used for the operation were USMC FAC's assigned by Task Force Hotel and the FAC's from the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron that are regularly assigned to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M).

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy strength and disposition in the area of operations was unknown prior to starting the operation. Intelligence did indicate that highway 926, which connected north-south Route 92 in Laos with enemy base areas in Vietnam entering RVN at XD780234 and running east to XD985299 was being used by the NVA to transport men and materials into South Vietnam by wheeled vehicles. Aerial photos showed the road to be in good condition with signs of recent heavy use. In addition, marine reconnaissance teams had reported hearing tracked vehicles along Route 926 during the hours of darkness, and aerial observers had, on several occasions during the latter part of February and the first of March, reported suspected tracked vehicle movement along the same route. It was believed that the tracked vehicles, if they did in fact exist, were prime movers for supply and or artillery convoys, but the possibility did exist that the enemy had moved tanks into the area (Enemy tanks had struck the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp along Route 9, thirteen (13) kilometers north of Route 926 during the 1968 siege of Khe Sanh).

b. Upon first entering the area around Khe Sanh (XD862398), on 19 March 69, elements of the Task Force found only signs of the 1968 siege. As the Task Force pushed on closer to the Laotian border, its lead elements passed through the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp (XD794361). Four PT76 tanks, all of which had been destroyed, were found at that location along with an abundance of old munitions and destroyed equipment of both NVA and friendly forces. No signs of recent activity were apparent. Not until the lead elements reached the Xe Pon River (vicinity XD 780340), on 20 March 1969, were there any signs of recent activity. At this point fresh footprints in the river bottom indicated possible platoon sized elements had been in the area within the last 24 hours. Aerial observers reported signs of recent activity all along the Xe Pon River on the Laotian side of the border. Such signs as gardens, corrals, and fish nets along the bank of the river were seen by the lead elements of the Task Force. Throughout the period of 23 Mar 69 through

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

29 April 1969, elements of the Task Force spotted vehicle lights and a large amount of anti-aircraft fire almost nightly in the vicinity of the Co Roc Mountains (XD740317). Intelligence reports, red haze and reports from aerial observers operating in the vicinity of TF Remagen during the hours of darkness all indicated that there was a large enemy force encamped west of the Co Roc (The enemy force was believed to be the 304th NVA Division).

c. The dominating terrain feature in the area of operations south of Route 9 was the Co Roc. The Co Roc is a granite ridge in Laos that runs along the border from XD725348 southeast to XD768321 and then south to XD753270. Varying in height from 850 meters to 515 meters above sea level the Co Roc is more than 300 meters higher than the Khe Sanh Plain and the crest of the ridge is only one to three kilometers inside Laos. From their privileged sanctuary high atop the Co Roc the enemy was able to direct mortar fire on Task Force Remagen as it moved toward Route 926, and with artillery the enemy could control the majority of the Khe Sanh Plain. Other than the Co Roc, the terrain in the area of operations was of two types: high steep mountains and gently rolling plateau covered with elephant grass. The high steep mountains were characterized by dense undergrowth and numerous mountain streams that were found on the eastern and northern portions of the area. The slopes of the mountains were a challenge to track vehicles and exceeded sixty percent (60%) in many cases. The plateau ran generally west from the Khe Sanh area and to the south along the Xe Pon River under the Co Roc with elephant grass up to fifteen (15) feet high covering the remainder of the area. Erosion has caused many gullies running from the mountains, west into the Xe Pon River. Cover and concealment was good for dismounted troops throughout the area and concealment for tracked vehicles would have been good along the Xe Pon River, where the trees and surrounding vegetation exceeded 100 feet in height in most places, except that the area was so dry that the vehicles could be easily spotted by the dust that they stirred up as they moved.

d. The weather for the period 16 March to 12 April was extremely dry with no rain. Heat inversion caused the visibility to be only fair during the period of 26 Mar 69 to 30 Mar 69. The reduced visibility was an asset on the Laotian border. Temperatures ranged from the mid 90's to 105° F during the period. Throughout the operation the weather in the pass east of Khe Sanh and running east by northeast was characterized by low clouds and fog which lasted until mid morning each day. This condition hindered any aircraft from entering the area of operations prior to 1000 hours. During the last two weeks the weather turned cool and several rain storms created trafficability problems in the mountainous areas.

9. (C) MISSION:

a. Background: Based on the reports of heavy vehicular traffic along Route 926, and the reports of possible tracked vehicle movements in the area, the 3D Marine Division launched Operation Maine Crag on 15 March 1969. Operation Maine Crag was designed to be a regimental size search and clear operation along the eastern portion of Route 926 and around the Laotian Salient in Quang Tri Province. The 3D Marine Regt landed on LZ's Saigon (XD815275), Paris (XD808236), and Hanoi (XD802310). The Marines moved east along Route 926 searching for possible enemy storage and assembly areas and trying to find where all of the traffic along Route 926 had terminated.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

b. Mission: The mission of TF Remagen was to open Route 9 to Khe Sanh, cut Route 926 in support of the 3D Marine Regiment's operation Maine Crag, protect the 3D Marine Regiment from an attack by an enemy armor thrust from Laos, conduct reconnaissance in force operations on the Khe Sanh Plain and to conduct strike operations as directed by Task Force Hotel.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Task Force Remagen was to stage at Ca Lu (YD015455) on 16 March and beginning on the morning of 17 March the Task Force was to move west opening Route 9 to Khe Sanh. The move to Khe Sanh was to be a deliberate move with the scouts and engineers clearing the road of mines and obstacles, the mech infantry securing the high ground along the route and the artillery displacing as needed to cover the lead elements of the Task Force. After the lead elements opened the route the tank company and command group were to proceed through to Khe Sanh. From Ca Lu to Khe Sanh 21.9km of Route 9 is nothing but a turning, twisting road cut out of the side of a steep ridgeline. In short, 21.9km of Route 9 is perfect ambush country and TF Remagen was not going to take any chances. After arriving at Khe Sanh the task force was to proceed south as rapidly as possible to cut Route 926 and protect the exposed flank and rear of the 3D Marine Regt from any possible enemy armor thrust from Laos. Because of the need to get astride Route 926 rapidly the task force would have to move along the relatively easy terrain at the base of the Co Roc. Once astride Route 926 TF Remagen was to conduct search and clear operations south of the highway and along the Laotian border.

b. Another objective of Task Force Remagen was to give the enemy cause to think about the vulnerability of any equipment or units that he might try and move from Laos into Quang Tri using the main avenues of approach into the Province. By demonstrating the ability of a mech/armor force to operate in the difficult terrain around and to the south of Khe Sanh the enemy would not only realize the vulnerability of his infiltration routes, but the vulnerability of his main lines of communications in Laos to an armored thrust would also become quite apparent.

c. It was decided that TF Remagen would operate at Khe Sanh without a ground line of communications. Because of the length of the road from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh, the distance that the task force planned to move from Khe Sanh while operating in the area, and the limited combat power available to the task force it was decided not to waste combat power on the security of resupply operations. All resupply to include all gas, oil and replacement parts for the vehicles was to be accomplished by air.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. At 0600 hours on 17 March TF Remagen departed Ca Lu for Khe Sanh. The scout platoon of the 1st Bn, 77th Armor supported by the attached engineer platoon, dozers and AVLBs led the way. Progress was slow but steady as bypasses around destroyed bridges were constructed, AVLBs were used repeatedly to span washouts and fallen bridges and the road was swept for mines. The scouts reached XD921419 at 2015 hrs and established a night defensive position at that location. At 180600H March the scouts and engineers resumed their operations westward. B Company, 1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech) simultaneously displaced from Ca Lu and moved to secure the high ground vic XD935410. At 1530 hrs Btry C, 1st Bn, 40th Artillery (105 SP) displaced from

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

Ca Lu to XD921419 to provide fire support for the Task Force elements which now extended along Route 9 from XD913403 east to Ca Lu. By nightfall, the scout platoon had crossed the last barrier to traffic and spent the night on the Khe Sanh Plateau. Their arrival on the plateau marked the reopening of Route 9 for armored traffic. A prodigious amount of engineering effort had been required in the first two days. Thirteen (13) bypasses were constructed, the AVLBs had been launched and recovered six (6) times, and enemy anti-tank mines were discovered and destroyed in two locations along the route. C Company, 1st Bn, 77th Armor began moving west on Route 9 at 190800H Mar 69. The Task Force Command Group and combat trains followed C/1-77 Armor. The march went without incident, and all task force elements had closed on the plateau within five hours. Lead elements of the task force reached Khe Sanh City by noon, where they were visited by LTG Stilwell, XXIV Corps Commander.

b. On 20 March TF Remagen moved through the abandoned Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei (XD795363) and then turned south along the Laotian border toward Highway 926. At 1520 hrs on 25 March Tm C made contact with A/1-3 Marines in the vicinity of Highway 926 and established a night position at XD777236. Team B passed through Team C at 1700 hrs and spent the night at XD807236. The battalion 4.2 in mortar platoon and the engineers displaced to XD799255 to support the teams. Team C placed an ambush at the point where Highway 926 enters South Vietnam after crossing the Xe Pon River. This ambush engaged 3 to 5 enemy moving through the ford site and the enemy returned fire. A search of the area the following morning revealed blood trails; two 82mm mortar rounds were found at XD780242.

c. From 26-29 March 1969, both teams conducted extensive search and destroy operations north and south of Route 926 from the Laotian border to the vicinity of the Laotian Salient. Approximately 100 square kilometers were searched with negative results. Highway 926 was found to be a good dry highway for wheeled vehicles. Observation of the Laotian side of the river revealed numerous huts, bunkers and trails. On the night of 29 Mar, Team C started moving north back toward Khe Sanh.

d. At 300720H Mar 69, Team B and the battalion mortar platoon began moving north. They were attacked at 0836 hrs vicinity XD778239 by an unknown sized enemy force. One tank was damaged by an anti-tank mine, and another was struck by an RPG. Tm B returned the fire and swept the area. Three enemy bodies were found. Team B suffered three wounded in action and both damaged tanks were repaired in their field locations. Team C had sent a tank platoon, preceded by a mine sweep team, in reaction to Team B's firefight. Following the mine sweep team, the lead tank struck what was estimated to be two Chinese Communist plastic AT mines stacked one on top of the other. The explosion blew sections of tank track 300 meters from the vehicle, and left a crater seven feet in diameter by four feet deep. While securing the tank and sweeping the area, Team C discovered and destroyed a large enemy cache at XD790255. The cache contained the following:

82mm mortar rounds	1120 with fuzes
60mm mortar rounds	218 with fuzes
75mm recoilless rifle rounds	36
.51 cal MG rounds	3500
37mm rounds	20
7.62mm rounds	1500

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

RPG boosters	25
ChiCom Lt MG	1
AK-47 ammunition	3400
RPG - 2	2
ChiCom grenades	2
Mount, 51 cal MG	2
Gas Mask	300
Plastic anti-tank mine	1

Team B passed through Team C and moved north to a night position at XD765292 while Team C secured the badly damaged tank. The following morning (310615H Mar 69) Team B received approximately 100 rds of 82mm mortar, resulting in one (1) friendly KIA and six (6) WIA. Counter-battery fire from C/1-40 Arty was placed on the suspected mortar position in Laos and the enemy fire ceased at 0654 hrs. At 0855 hrs Team C received three (3) rds of 82mm mortar from the Laotian side of the river but there were no casualties. At 1215 hrs, Team C came under mortar and RPG fire. A VTR from C Company, 1-77 Armor took a direct hit from a RPG detonating six (6) LAW's stored inside resulting in one (1) KIA, four (4) WIA, and a total loss of the VTR. Team C returned fire with tank guns, suppressing the enemy fire.

c. From 2 through 6 April 1969 the Task Force was involved in extracting the damaged vehicles and in relocating back to the vicinity of Khe Sanh where extensive maintenance was performed. It must be remembered that all of the replacement parts, to include tracks and power packs, had to be delivered by air.

f. On 7 April the task force moved north to conduct a reconnaissance in force toward LZ Alpine (XD755530) with Team C while Team B conducted search and clear operations west-northwest of the Khe Sanh airfield. By being able to move from Khe Sanh to Alpine the armor/mech force demonstrated that armor is capable of getting astride all three of the main routes of infiltration into Quang Tri Province from Laos.

g. On 9 April an accident occurred at Vandergrift Combat Base. Late in the afternoon a Marine CH-46 crashed and burned destroying the Division's forward logistical support area (LSA). The LSA at Vandergrift was the sole means of support for TF Remagen, the 3D Marine Regt and the 4th Marine Regt. The LSA remained closed on the 10th and did not reopen until 11 April. Operations by TF Remagen were able to continue unabated.

h. On the night of 10 April 1969, after the LSA had been closed all day, C/1-40 Arty secured by the battalion headquarters tank section and the scout platoon moved to XD811369 and conducted an artillery raid. Targets consisted of 40 to 50 vehicle lights vic XD780280, vehicle lights at XD761328, XD772318, and grids XD770310, XD770300. The battery fired 1149 HE, 95 WP, and 70 VT rounds. There were 45 secondary explosions, including 6 large flashes. One large fire was started.

i. On 11 April the 1st Bn, 61st Inf (M) relieved the 1st Bn, 77th Armor as the control headquarters of TF Remagen. At 1345 hrs the command group, scout platoon, mortar platoon and support elements of the 1st Bn, 77th Armor departed Khe Sanh and after a 97.6km road march the last elements arrived at LZ Nancy at 2030 hrs. When the 1st Bn, 61st Inf (M) arrived at Khe Sanh it brought with it A/1-61 Inf (M),

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

A/1-77 Armor, the scout and mortar platoons of the 1st Bn, 61st Inf (M), a 155 SF battery and two Marine 8 in howitzers. The 8 in howitzers broke down before they reached Ca Lu and A/1-77 Armor had to drag them to Khe Sanh after dark.

j. After arrival at Khe Sanh, A/1-61 Inf (M) moved toward LZ Alpine to conduct search and clear operations south of the LZ while B/1-61 Inf (M) and C/1-77 Armor conducted search and clear operations in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. On the 13th A/1-77 Armor began to move directly south from Khe Sanh, toward LZ Saigon (XD815275) and Route 926 attempting to find a way through the mountainous terrain that would allow the task force to move between Route 926 and Khe Sanh without moving along the base of the Co Roc.

k. While A/1-77 Armor moved south, the remainder of the task force made a dash for the Laotian border. Employing TAC air, artillery and advancing directly west from Khe Sanh the mech/armor force moved toward the border attempting to make the enemy believe that his lines of communications in Laos were in danger, and that he would be attacked in his sanctuary. The enemy did not react to the feint.

l. On 15 April B/1-61 Inf (M) and C/1-77 Armor departed Khe Sanh for LZ Sharon and LZ Nancy respectively. As the companies reached Ca Lu the columns split. All inoperable vehicles moved along Route 9 to Dong Ha and then down Route 1 to their final destination while the remainder of the companies moved through the newly opened Ba Long Valley road. As B/1-61 Inf (M) and C/1-77 Armor departed Khe Sanh the two (2) 8 inch howitzers that had accompanied TF 1-61 Inf (M) on its move to Khe Sanh returned to Vandergrift Combat Base.

m. On 19 April the 2d Troop, 7th ARVN Cav reinforced by the Recon Co, 1st ARVN Regt moved from Camp Evans to Ca Lu. The following day the ARVN moved to Khe Sanh and was placed under the operational control of TF Remagen. After arriving at Khe Sanh the ARVN conducted search and clear operations north of the airfield and then west toward the Laotian border.

n. On 21 April A/1-77 Armor reached Highway 926. After spending the night astride the highway, A/1-77 Armor returned to LZ Saigon while A/1-61 Inf (M) moved through the tank company, turned east on Highway 926 and conducted search and clear operations near the Laotian Salient in the vicinity of XD885225.

o. On the 23d the elements of TF Remagen that had been working along Highway 926 began their move back to Khe Sanh. The last element returned to Khe Sanh on 24 April and the Task Force performed maintenance in preparation for its scheduled move to LZ Sharon on 26 April.

p. At 0330 hours on 25 April an estimated NVA battalion minus attacked the 2d Troop, 7th ARVN Cav which was located at XD812410. The attack started with a heavy mortar barrage which lasted for about one hour. (One mortar round landed near the FDC track of C/1-40 Arty killing the battery executive officer and wounding every man in the FDC). Following the mortar fire the enemy attacked the ARVN position using RPGs, small arms fire, automatic weapons fire, flamethrowers and small satchel charges. At 0600 hours the enemy broke contact leaving behind 33 NVA KIA. A further search of the area resulted in the capture of 12 AK-47s, four (4) B40 launchers, one (1) B41 launcher, two (2) ILCs, one (1) Bangalore torpedo, two (2) pole charges, fifty (50) Chicom grenades, 300 satchel charges and one (1) flame-

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

4 June 1969

thrower. Friendly casualties were eight (8) ARVN KIA, 40 ARVN WIA, one (1) Australian advisor KIA, two (2) US advisors WIA, two (2) US KIA, and three (3) US WIA. Three (3) ARVN personnel carriers were destroyed and one (1) tank from A/1-77 Armor was damaged.

q. The move from Khe Sanh was postponed until 28 April to allow Task Force Remagen time to conduct a thorough search for the enemy. At 0300 hrs on the 28th the enemy attacked once again. This time the main attack was directed against Co A, 1st Bn, 61st Inf (M) which was located at XD845390. The company was alerted just prior to the start of the attack by a listening post which sprang an ambush on the enemy as they were moving into position. The enemy attack was supported by RPG, mortar, small arms and automatic weapons fire. Throwing satchel charges and using flame devices the enemy charged from the southwest but was unable to penetrate the perimeter. At approximately 0540 hours the enemy broke contact and disappeared into the night. While A/1-61 Inf (M) was under attack, both 2/7 ARVN and the Task Force CP were probed by the enemy ground forces. 2/7 ARVN moved to A/1-61 Inf (M) location and swept the area. The day was spent attempting to regain contact and at 1100 hrs C/1-11 Inf was air assaulted into an LZ near the Khe Sanh airfield. Contact was not re-established.

1. Friendly casualties were five (5) KIA and 35 WIA. In addition, two (2) 105mm SP howitzers and one (1) M548 cargo carrier were damaged while one (1) M113A1 personnel carrier, one (1) M48A3 tank, one (1) water trailer and one (1) M548 were destroyed (One of the M548s was loaded with 105mm ammunition which exploded causing most of the friendly casualties).

2. The enemy lost 34 NVA KIA and abandoned the following equipment: 15 AK-47s, one (1) RPD LMG, two (2) RPG-2s, 500 satchel charges and 76 B-40 rounds.

r. Enemy units involved in the contacts of 25 and 28 April have been identified as elements of the 57th and 9th Regts, 304th NVA DIV.

s. At 0700 hrs on 29 April TF Remagen began its move from Khe Sanh back to its home base. Because of the enemy attacks on the 25th and 28th it was anticipated the enemy had mined the road from Khe Sanh to Ca Lu and that he might try and attack the Task Force while it was on the road. The move to Ca Lu was slow and careful but by 1246 hrs the lead element had reached Ca Lu without incident and by 2150 hrs the last vehicle returned to LZ Sharon, a distance of 80 grueling kilometers.

t. For forty-seven (47) days an armor/mech force had operated in the northwestern mountains of South Vietnam along the Laotian border. Except for the early morning hours of 25 and 28 April no major battles were fought but the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) had demonstrated that armor can operate in difficult terrain over extended distances without a ground line of communications.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Casualties:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

	ARMY	USMC	ARVN	OTHER FWMAF	TOTAL
KIA	12	0	8	1	21
WIA	70	0	44	0	114
POW	0	0	0	0	0
MIA	0	0	0	0	0
CAPTURED	0	0	0	0	0
NH DEATH	1	0	0	0	1
NH INJURY	20	0	0	0	20

b. Enemy Casualties (All enemy casualties were NVA).

(1) Cumulative: KIA: 76; POW: 0; CIVDEF: 0; HOI CHANH: 4

(2) Inflicted by US Forces: KIA: 48 (including 4 KBA); POW: 0; CIVDEF: 0;
HOI CHANH: 0.

(3) Inflicted by ARVN: KIA: 28; POW: 0; CIVDEF: 0; HOI CHANH: 4

c. US Equipment Losses:

ITEM	AMOUNT
M48A3 Tank	1
M113A1 Personnel Carrier	2 (One more was lost at Vandergrift Combat Base when a helicopter not connected with TF Remagen crashed and burned setting the Vandergrift Logistical Support Area on fire. The M113A1 involved was part of the 1-77 Armor rear at Vandergrift).
M88 Recovery Vehicle	1
M548 Tracked Cargo Carrier	1
EIMCO Dozer (USMC)	1
M119 400 Gallon Water Trailer	1

d. ARVN Equipment Losses:

ITEM	AMOUNT
M113 Personnel Carrier	2
M125A1 81mm Mortar Carrier	1

e. Enemy Equipment Losses:

ITEM	UNIT	QUANTITY
AK-47 (Wood Stock)	Each	15
AK-47 (Folding Metal Stock)	Each	15
Machinegun RPD-1	Each	1
Machinegun, Light. ChiCom	Each	1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report -- Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Machinegun SG-43 (Russian)	Each	2
Machinegun Mount (For SG-43)	Each	1
122mm Rocket	Each	11
120mm Mortar Round	Each	1
82mm Mortar Round	Each	1225
82mm Mortar Fuzes	Each	12
60mm Mortar Round	Each	237
60mm Mortar Cartridges	Can	2
75mm Recoiless Rifle Round	Each	86
Satchel Charges, Small	Each	800
RPG-2 (B-40) Launcher	Each	7
RPG-2 (B-40) Round	Each	88
RPG-7 (B-41) Launcher	Each	1
RPG-7 (B-41) Round	Each	6
RPG Booster	Each	25
ChiCom Hand Grenade	Each	54
Anti-tank Mine	Each	10
Bangalore Torpedo	Each	4
Gas Mask, Russian	Each	300
Gas Mask, NVA	Each	1
Dunkers Destroyed (3'x5'x4')	Each	298
Caves Discovered	Each	35

e. No significant items of US origin were captured by friendly forces.

13. (c) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Logistics: Because the bridges behind TF Remagen were removed the operation was a test of the ability to resupply, and keep an armored force operating without the use of ground lines of communications. The Brigade established a forward support element (FSE) at Vandergrift Combat Base where supplies and repair parts were assembled for shipment by helicopter to TF Remagen. Both battalions maintained combat trains with TF Remagen which consisted of tracked maintenance and resupply vehicles, the majority of the mechanics and a portion of the battalion supply section. At Vandergrift, with the FSE, the battalions maintained their PILL personnel and most of the remainder of their sections.

(a) All types of Class I were available at Vandergrift. Sundry packs were issued on the basis of one (1) pack per 100 men every two (2) days. The USMC Class I point issued one (1) A-ration meal per day. Because of the difficulty of distributing A-rations, C-rations were used about 90% of the time.

(b) Class III was available, except for some special items such as OH-C (hydraulic fluid) and LSA (lubricating oil, semi-fluid), in large containers. By anticipating requirements, sufficient quantities of packaged POL were ordered from Brigade stocks to meet demands as they arose. Five-hundred gallon rubber drums were used to carry 75,000 gallons of fuel to the maneuver elements.

(c) There was no difficulty in drawing ammunition. The Brigade S-4 and the Marine Logistics Support Unit (LSU) Commander arranged an ammunition accountability

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

transfer that enabled the TF Remagen S-4 to draw Class V quickly. Specialized items such as 40mm anti-aircraft (duster), M79, claymores, and hand flares were not available in large quantities but could be ordered through the LSU. Non-emergency delivery was normally made one or two days after ordering. The 105mm battery fired 8,883 rounds and the 81mm mortars fired 4,677 rounds during the operation.

(d) The USMC LSA scheduling system for helicopter logistical support caused the greatest logistical problem. Helicopters were not dedicated to the support of TF Remagen and the LSA scheduling system requires precise locations and times for delivery the afternoon before the supplies are to be delivered. With all elements maneuvering daily it was extremely difficult to comply with the LSA system. A better resupply system would have been for the USMC to apply all helicopter support to its priorities until TF Remagen was in a position to be resupplied; then concentrate on TF Remagen needs until completed. With an average of 30 minutes per round trip, four (4) heavy lift (CH-47) helicopters could have met TF Remagen's average daily resupply requirements in 1½ hours. In addition a Brigade UH-1 was used daily for retail distribution of the parts, mail and meals from the combat trains areas to the users.

(e) Organizational maintenance support was available from the combat trains and a contact team from D Company, 75th Support Battalion was in the field during most of the operation to provide direct support. In addition, the Brigade provided repair parts and direct support maintenance for the 2d Troop, 7th ARVN Cav. While operating under combat conditions, the maintenance teams performed all required functions to include the pulling of power packs to adjust or replace them.

(f) Following is a summary of the logistical activities required to support TF Remagen. It must be remembered that all resupply, to include replacement parts such as power packs, was accomplished by air.

CLASS I

Meals	93 pallets (55,662 meals)
Sundry Packs	96

CLASS III

Mogas	19,550 gallons
Diesel	56,450 gallons
OE 50	865 gallons
OE 30	980 gallons
OE 10	320 gallons
Drake fluid	45 gallons
GAA	110 gallons
LSA	56 gallons
G090	90 gallons
Hydraulic fluid	71 gallons

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

CLASS V

105mm	8883 rounds
81mm	4677 rounds
4.2"	2338 rounds
90mm tank	522 rounds
.50 cal	59,200 rounds
7.62mm	174,800 rounds
5.56mm	44,200 rounds
40mm (M79)	5,760 rounds
Hand Flares	624
Frag Grenades	606
155mm	1044 rounds
8"	400 rounds

CLASS IX: Items listed below are items that were replaced. This does not include items that were "pulled" and adjusted or repaired in the field.

1-77 Armor (16 Mar - 11 Apr)GRAND TOTALTANKS

Engine	3	3
Transmission	2	2
Starter	1	1
Track	3 sets	3 sets
Comp Idler Arm	1	1
R/Final Drive	2	2
Track	2 sets	2 sets
Generator	1	1
Comp Idler Arm	1	1

1-77 Armor (16 Mar - 11 Apr)1-61 Mech (12 Apr - 28 Apr)*GRAND TOTALM 113A1 / M 577A1M 113A1 / M 577A1

Engine	3
Track	6 sets
Transmission	0
Final Drive	1

Engine	6	9
Track	7 sets	13 sets
Transmission	4	4
Final Drive	3	4

M 106A1M 106A1

Engine	1
--------	---

Engine	1	2
--------	---	---

M 125A1

Engine	1	1
Transmission	1	1

*Vehicles not repaired by 28 April were evacuated with the move of the task force to LZ Sharon.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVEL-C

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

11 June 1969

d. Administration:

(1) All personnel functions were handled by the SI at the CP and by the PSNCO at the base camps (LZ Sharon for the 1st Bn, 61st Inf (M) and LZ Nancy for the 1st Bn, 77th Armor). The UH-1H from the brigade aviation section was used to haul mail and correspondence between the CP, the FSE at Vandergrift and the base camps.

(2) Replacements were flown into Khe Sanh and personnel returned from Khe Sanh for R&R by means of the UH-1H helicopter.

(3) Medical:

(a) Medical evacuation was requested through TF HOTEL at Vandergrift Combat Base. If the Marines could not handle the Medvac then TF Remagen requested it through the 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (M). When the request was made through the Brigade the Medvac was usually flown by the 237th Med Evac (Amb) located at B Company, 75th Support Battalion (The Brigade's organic support battalion). Several patients were evacuated by the Brigade's UH-1H helicopter that was working for TF Remagen.

(b) Both battalions involved in TF Remagen had the normal forward aid station, with the battalion surgeon, at the task force CP and the normal complement of medics and medical tracks with each maneuver unit.

(c) See Tab C (Medical Support) to Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Annex B (1st Bn, 61st Inf (M) After Action Report) for more details on the medical aspects of TF Remagen.

(d) There were 16 cases of malaria contracted by personnel serving with Task Force Remagen (15 Falcip and 1 Vivax). The cases occurred after the contacts with the NVA and may have been transmitted from the enemy force.

c. Communications:

(1) TF Remagen was required to operate in three (3) command nets and two (2) administration and logistics nets. The nets were as follows:

(a) Task Force Hotel Command Net.

(b) 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) Command Net.

(c) TF Remagen Command Net.

(d) 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) Admin Log Net.

(e) TF Remagen Admin Log Net.

(2) In spite of the great distance and the rugged terrain, there were very few communications difficulties.

(a) A retransmission station was established at FSB Cates (XD927444). The retransmission station enabled TF Remagen to communicate with Brigade in both

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

secure and non-secure FM voice.

(b) During the course of the operation the 1st Bn, 77th Armor discovered an AS-2236/GRC directional antenna which had been abandoned near Khe Sanh. This antenna proved invaluable and allowed the task force to communicate directly with Brigade in both the secure and non-secure FM modes. Even when functioning properly the retransmission unit never provided as clear, reliable link between the Task Force and Brigade as did the AS-2236/GRC. In the secure mode the retransmission station was very difficult to understand while the AS-2236/GRC provided a clear signal.

(3) One communications problem existed throughout the operation. Task Force Hotel uses the same frequency for both their secure and their non-secure FM voice nets. On several occasions TF Remagen had operational or emergency traffic to pass to TF Hotel, but TF Hotel was receiving or passing routine traffic on secure voice and TF Remagen could not contact TF Hotel. By using one frequency for secure and another for non-secure FM voice the problem could have been eliminated.

14. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. For forty-seven (47) days TF Remagen, an armor/mech force, operated in the northwestern mountains of South Vietnam along the Laotian border. This armored task force from the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) had proved that such a force can operate in difficult terrain over extended distances without a ground line of communications. For the first time an armor force had operated 90 kilometers from its base and relied entirely upon helicopters to maintain its line of communications.

b. In being able to move south to Route 926 and north to LZ Alpine TF Remagen demonstrated that the major enemy supply routes into South Vietnam can be interdicted by an armor/mech task force, at a most vulnerable point. There are three routes that the enemy can use to easily transport a large volume of supplies from Laos into Quang Tri Province through the mountains. TF Remagen was able to get astride all three of them.

c. In moving at will in difficult terrain from LZ Alpine to Route 926 along the Laotian border Task Force Remagen has given the enemy cause to be concerned with respect to his LOC thru the neighboring Lao area. The enemy's lines of communications in Laos are vulnerable. An armor task force, which is totally supplied by air, is not subject to being defeated because it lacks a ground LOC.

d. TF Remagen was supported throughout the operation by self-propelled artillery operating in its mobile role. The artillery (105, 155 and 8 in) moved with the maneuver units and established firing positions whenever the maneuver unit established its night locations or command post. This method of employment allowed the Task Force Commander to use his combat power to its fullest extent in that maneuver

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED


CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation TASK FORCE REMAGEN,
16 March 1969 - 29 April 1969.

units were not tied down by the requirement to secure fixed artillery, and the artillery could move anywhere and at anytime that the maneuver units and the task force command post moved.



Annexes: A - After Action Report
of the 1st Bn, 77th Armor
JB - After Action Report
of the 1st Bn, 61st Inf (M)

JAMES M. GIBSON
COL, Infantry
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 77TH ARMOR
APO San Francisco 96477

5 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

Commanding Officer
1st Infantry Brigade
5th Infantry Division (Mech)
APO San Francisco 96477

1. Name and Type of Operation:

- a. Name: Operation Maine Craig, (OPORD 3-69)
- b. Type: Reconnaissance in Force

2. Dates of Operation: 151200 Mar 69 to 112330 Apr 69

3. Location: Laotian border area located generally northwest, southwest and west of Khe Sanh. May, Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS Series L7015, 6342 I, Cam Lo, 6342 II, Thon Doc Kinh, 6342 III, Huong Hoa, 6342 IV, Hguon Bao. Operational area bounded by coordinates XD760490 to 658510 then south along the Laotian Border to coordinates XD820490 to XD760490, south southeast along the Xe Pon River to XD813192, northeast to XD880210, to XD880390.

4. Command Headquarters - Task Force Remagen: 1st Battalion, 77th Armor 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), APO San Francisco 96477.

5. Unit Commanders:

Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor: Lieutenant Colonel Carmelo P. Milia, 062462.

Commanding Officer, C Company, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor: Captain Darrell N. Blalock, OF117544 from 151200 Mar 69 to 311200 Mar 69. Captain Patrick L. Sullivan, 05244920, from 311200 to present.

Commanding Officer, B Company, 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry (Mech): Captain David P. Porreca, OF116787.

Commanding Officer, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, (105 SP): Captain Samuel L. Cannon, 0524156.

DECLASSIFIED

T J E

6. Task Organization: Task Force Remagen

C/1-77 Armor (-)	B/1-61 Inf (M) (-)	TF Control
		C/1-40 Arty (105SP)
3/B/1-61 INF (M)	2/C/1-77 Armor	Scts/1-77 Armor
		Mort/1-77 Armor
		C/1-44 Arty (-)
		Plat/A-7th Eng
		(Reinf)
		2 Dozers/11th Eng
		(USMC)

a. Task Force Remagen CP group and trains departed LZ Nancy at 160800 Mar 69, composed of headquarters elements, scout platoon and mortar platoon of the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor. All elements closed Fire Base Calu, (YD011454), at 161615 Mar 69.

b. B Company, 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry (Mech) joined the Task Force Remagen column on QL-1 just outside IZ Sharon. B Company closed FB Calu with Task Force Remagen.

c. C Company, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor moved at 150900 Mar 69 from Con Thien, (YD115705) and closed Fire Base Calu at 151200 Mar 69. C Company secured FB Calu while awaiting the arrival of Task Force Remagen.

d. A Company, 7th Engineers (-) joined the Task Force Remagen column as it passed through the Quang Tri Combat Base on 16 Mar 69 and closed FB Calu with the Task Force.

e. C Battery, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, (105 SP) joined Task Force Remagen at Fire Base Calu at 161630 Mar 69.

f. Field trains of Task Force Remagen were dropped off at Vandergriff Support Base as the Task Force passed through and set up operations at that time.

g. At 161630 Mar 69 Task Force Remagen had completed consolidation at Fire Base Calu and became OPCON to Task Force Hotel at 161515 Mar 69. Task Force Hotel was located at Vandergriff Support Base, (XD435480).

h. F Company, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines located at Fire Base Cates (XD926443), and E Company, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines located on hill 950 (XD844456), were placed OPCON to Task Force Remagen by Task Force Hotel until such time as Task Force Remagen cleared their area along QL-9 vicinity of Khe Sanh, (XD847381).

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Army Aviation:

(1) Throughout the operation the Brigade Aviation Section furnished one UH-1H during daylight hours for reconnaissance, resupply, command and control and medical evacuation.

(2) O-1 fixed wing aircraft from the 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, supplemented US Air Force Forward Air Controllers and provided assistance in artillery adjustment and reconnaissance for the Task Force.

(3) CH 47's from the 101st Airmobile Division provided bulk air resupply daily from Vandergriff Support Base.

(4) Eight (8) Medevac's were flown by Army helicopters from Camp Evans, Quang Tri Combat Base and Vandergriff Support Base. Five (5) Medevac's were flown by Brigade Aircraft.

b. USMC Aviation:

(1) Bulk resupply was also furnished by USMC CH 46 helicopters and USMC CH-53 helicopters almost daily.

(2) Two (2) Medevac's were flown by USMC helicopters located at Vandergriff Support Base and Quang Tri Combat Base.

c. Over 1,250,000 pounds of supplies, on over 200 bulk supply missions were airlifted into Task Force Remagen during the operation. (See Inclosure 9, Resupply STATISTICS)

d. Tactical Air Support:

(1) During the operation only one (1) air strike was requested in close support of ground forces; it was denied because of bad weather.

(2) There were nine TPQ's (radar controlled bombing) requested and flown in addition to the nightly TPQ's on enemy targets located in the area.

(3) Throughout daylight hours of operation, Air Force Forward Air Controllers from the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, Tactical Air Control Party, attached to the 1st Brigade flew daily air cover over the ground forces. The Forward Air Controllers were used primarily for visual reconnaissance. Their assistance was invaluable to the success of the operation.

8. Intelligence:

a. Enemy strength and dispositions in the area of operations were unknown prior to starting the operation. Intelligence was almost a complete void.

b. Highway 926:

Intelligence did indicate that Highway 926 entering RVN at (XD7800234) and running east to XD985299 was being used by support elements of the NVA to transport men and materials into South Vietnam by wheeled vehicles. Aerial photos showed the road to be in good condition with signs of heavy traffic.

c. Marine Infantry elements in the area stated that only sporadic

contact had been made during the week preceeding the operation. There had been no vehicle traffic on Highway 926 the week prior to the operation.

d. Marine elements had found an enormous rice cache vicinity XD 915229. Numerous weapons caches were found in the same general area indicating that Highway 926 had been used extensively as an NVA supply route.

e. Upon first entering the area around Khe Sanh (XD862398) on 19 Mar 69, elements of the Task Force found only signs of the siege of Khe Sanh (XD848417) a year ago. As the Task Force pushed on closer to the Laotian Border, its lead elements passed through the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp (XD794361). Four PT 76 Tanks, all of which had been destroyed, were found at the location along with an abundance of old munitions and destroyed equipment of both NVA and friendly forces. No signs of recent activity were apparent. Not until the lead elements reached the Xe Pon River vicinity XD780340, on 20 March 1969, were there any signs of recent activity. At this point fresh foot prints in the river bottom indicated possible platoon sized elements had been in the area within the last 24 hours.

f. Aerial observers reported signs of recent activity all along the Xe Pon River on the Laotian side of the border. Such signs as gardens, corrals, and fish nets along the bank of the river were seen by the lead elements of the Task Force. Throughout the period of 23 Mar 69 through 10 April 1969, elements of the Task Force spotted vehicle lights almost nightly in the vicinity of the Co Roc Mountains (XD740317).

g. The first enemy activity of any significance occurred on 30 Mar 69 when elements of the task force were attacked on the South Vietnamese side of the border and other elements found a large munitions cache, vicinity XD790255. On 31 March 1969 an airborne visual reconnaissance by the Task Force S-3 turned up a fresh vehicle trail leading north from XD774235 (vic Highway 926) to XD772249, where it then headed northeast to XD755260 and disappeared in the heavy jungle. The area had been burned off and showed fresh dust from the trail. An air observer later in the day spotted numerous trails, bunkers, and signs of movement in the area, indicating heavy recent activity.

h. Indications were that the longer the task force stayed in the area the more likely the enemy would react, beginning with harassing actions from across the border in Laos.

i. In the absence of a civilian population, and anticipating heavy enemy contact, no CA/PSYWAR operations were planned or conducted.

j. Terrain and weather. Terrain in the area of operations was of two types: high steep mountains and gently rolling plateau covered with elephant grass. The high steep mountains were characterized by dense undergrowth and numerous mountain streams. The slopes of the mountains were a challenge to tracked vehicles and exceeded 60 percent (60%) in many cases. These mountains were located in the northern and eastern sections of the area of operations. See Inclosure 1 (Area of Operations). The plateau ran generally west from the Khe Sanh area and to the south along the Xe Pon

River with elephant grass up to 15 feet high covering the remainder of the area. Erosion has caused many gullies running from the mountains, west into the Xe Pon River. Cover and concealment was good for dismounted troops throughout the area and concealment for tracked vehicles was exceptionally good along the Xe Pon River where the trees and surrounding vegetation exceeded 100 feet in height in most areas.

The weather for the period was extremely dry with no rain. Heat inversion caused the visibility to be only fair during the period of 26 Mar 69 to 30 Mar 69. The reduced visibility was an asset because it minimized the advantage the enemy had from his OP's on the Laotian border. Temperatures ranged from the mid 90's to 105 during the period. Throughout the operation the weather in the pass east of Khe Sanh and running east by northeast was characterized by low clouds and fog which lasted until mid morning each day. This condition hindered any aircraft from entering the area of operations prior to 1000 hours each day. Light conditions during the period 15 Mar 69 to 11 Apr 69 ranged between 0% and 100% illumination.

9. Mission: Task Force Remagen was to conduct a reconnaissance in force commencing 150900 March 1969 on the Khe Sanh plateau. After accomplishing this mission, the Task Force was ordered to turn south to cut Highway 926 and to support the 3rd Marine Regiment in Operation Maine Craig. The operation was conducted in three (3) phases.

a. Phase I. Open Highway 9 from Calu (YD11460) to Khe Sanh (XD861396). This phase was to commence at 170600 Mar 69.

b. Phase II. Conduct a reconnaissance in force on the Khe Sanh Plateau.

c. Phase III. Conduct search and destroy operations in the AO from Highway 926 in the south to an area north and northwest of the Khe Sanh airfield.

10. Concept of the Operation:

a. Task Force Remagen's portion of Operation "Maine Craig" was an armored reconnaissance in force along the Laotian Border west of Khe Sanh. Objectives were given initially for orientation purposes only and once any sign of enemy activity was evident, the Task Force was to orient on the enemy. The task force moved south of Khe Sanh with two teams abreast, cross reinforced, until highway 926 was reached. At that point, each team was given an area of operation with the mission to cut highway 926 and conduct search and destroy operation in the area. (See Inclosure 4. Overlay issued with verbal order)

b. The return north to the Khe Sanh Plateau was accomplished by moving the teams by successive bounds until they were consolidated at Khe Sanh. They then conducted search and destroy operations north and northwest of Khe Sanh.

c. Task Force Remagen OP Group composed of headquarters element of the 1st Bn, 77th Armor was relieved in place by headquarters elements of the

1st Bn, 61st Infantry (Mech) at Khe Sanh and returned to LZ Nancy. The two maneuver teams remained OPCON to the new Task Force Hqs. These elements were relieved in place four days later and returned to LZ Nancy.

11. Execution: OPORD 3-69

a. Operations west of Khe Sanh as a part of Operation "Maine Craig" were announced 151230 Mar 69 by Headquarters, 1st Bn, 77th Armor. The Force received the name "Task Force Remagen" from 1st Brigade, 5th Inf Div (Mech) in remembrance of the 1st Bn, 77th Armor's actions in the Remagen Campaign of WW II. The consolidation of elements at Calu had already begun prior to the publishing of OPORD 3-69. All elements were consolidated and Phase I commenced at 170600 Mar 69.

b. Phase I 170600H - 191330H March 1969. The Battalion Scout Platoon, engineers from A Co, 7th Engineers, bulldozers from 11th Engineer Bn, and AVLB's of the 7th Eng began their movement up Route 9 toward Khe Sanh at 170600H Mar 69. Progress was steady throughout the day. Bypasses around destroyed bridges were constructed; the AVLB's were repeatedly used to span washouts and bridge abutments, and the road was swept for mines. This force reached Checkpoint Golf (See Inclosure 1, Area of Operations for Checkpoint locations) at 172015H Mar 69 and established a night defensive position at that location. At 180600H Mar 69, the scouts and engineers resumed their operations westward. B Company, 1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech) simultaneously displaced from LZ Calu. B-1-61 Inf reached CP Golf at 1905 and secured the high ground vic XD935410. At 1530, Btry C, 1st Bn, 40th Artillery (105 SP) displaced from Calu to CP Golf to provide fire support for the Task Force elements which now extended along Route 9 from CP Hotel east to LZ Calu. The task force suffered its first casualties at 181730H when a soldier digging in on the B-1-61 perimeter activated an old US "Bouncing Betty" type mine. One man was killed and nine others wounded. By nightfall, the Scout platoon had crossed the last barrier to traffic (CP Hotel) and spent the night on the Khe Sanh plateau. Their arrival on the plateau marked the reopening of Route 9 for armored traffic. A prodigious amount of engineer effort had been required in the first 2 days. Thirteen bypasses were constructed. The AVLB's had been launched and recovered six times, and enemy anti-tank mines were discovered and destroyed in two locations along the route. C Company, 1st Bn, 77th Armor began moving west on Route 9 at 190800H Mar 69. The Task Force Command Group and combat trains followed C-1-77 Armor. The march went without incident, and all task force elements had closed on the plateau within five hours. Lead elements of the task force reached Khe Sanh city by noon, where they were visited by LTG Stillwell, XXIV Corps Commander.

c. Phase II 200900H Mar 69 - 030825 Apr 69 (Frag Orders 1-3 to OPORD 3-69). Task Force Remagen began strike operations south and west of Khe Sanh on the morning of the 20th with C-1-77 Armor organized as an armor heavy team on the right and B-1-61 Infantry organized as a mechanized infantry heavy team on the left. (See Incl 1 for team zones of advance and control measures).

Team C Crossed Phase Line White at 201000 and moved through the remnants of the abandoned Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei. Both teams experienced considerable difficulty in movement because of terrain. No enemy contact was made during the day. Team C found evidence of recent enemy movement by a platoon-sized unit Vic XD780341. Team B established a night position

at XD831355, Team C at XD793351, and the Task Force Cmd Grp with C-1-40 Arty moved to XD836364 for the night. On 21 March, Team C was resupplied by ground, and continued movement south aided by a bulldozer. Team B moved south on its axis of advance. Both teams experienced extreme difficulty in movement. Team B took up a night position at XD805327 and Team C at XD780375. Because of the problems with trafficability, and resupply needs of both teams; it was decided to move Team B into position following Team C. Both teams were to continue in column, on the western axis of advance. On 22 March 1969, Team C, leading, encountered a deep ravine at XD790325. Team C progressed only two kilometers on 22 Mar, while Team B remained stationary and conducted dismounted patrols in the area. Team C spent the night at XD798317. The task force cmd grp and C-1-40 Arty displaced to XD797344. On 23 and 24 March, both teams continued to move south. Terrain remained very difficult, but progress was steady. Enemy trails and bunkers were found by both teams but no sign of recent activity was evident.

At 250435H Mar 69, Team C took approximately thirty rounds of friendly 105 MM artillery rounds, and suffered six casualties. Team B also received an unknown number of 105 MM rounds in their vicinity, but suffered no casualties. Two attached Marine bulldozers were damaged in the Team C area.

By 1520 Team C had made contact with Company A, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines vicinity of Highway 926, and established a night position at XD777236. Team B passed through Team C at 1700 hours and spent the night at XD807236. The Battalion 4.2 in Mortar Platoon and the engineers displaced to XD799255 to support the teams. Team C placed an ambush at the point where Highway 926 enters South Vietnam after crossing the Xe Pon River. This ambush engaged 3 to 5 enemy moving through the ford site and the enemy returned fire. A search of the area the following morning revealed blood trails, two 82MM Mortar rounds were found at XD780242.

From 26-29 March 1969, both teams conducted extensive search and destroy operations; Team B operating around XD835226; Team C, with the Battalion Mortar Platoon attached, based at XD796226. Approximately one hundred square kilometers were searched with negative results. Highway 926 was found to be a good dry highway for wheeled vehicles. Observation of the Laotian side of the river revealed numerous huts, bunkers and trails. On the night of 29 Mar, Team C moved its location to XD799255.

At 300720 Mar 69, Team B and the Battalion Mortar Platoon began moving north. They were attacked at 0836 vicinity XD778239 by an unknown-sized enemy force. One tank was damaged by an anti-tank mine, and another was struck by an RPG direct hit. Team B returned the fire and swept the area. Three enemy bodies were found. Team B suffered three wounded in action. Both damaged tanks were repaired in their field locations. Team C had sent a tank platoon, preceded by a mine sweep team, in reaction to Team B's firefight. Following the minesweep team, the lead tank struck what was estimated to be two Chinese Communist Plastic AT mines stacked one on top of the other. The detonation blew sections of tank track 300 meters from the vehicle, and left a crater seven feet in diameter by four feet deep. While securing the damaged tank, and sweeping the area, Team C discovered a large enemy cache at XD790255. The cache contained the following:

82mm mortar rounds	1120 w/fuses
60mm mortar rounds	218 w/fuses
75mm recoilless rifle rounds	86
51 cal MG rounds	3500
37mm rounds	20
7.62mm MG rounds	1500
RPG boosters	25
ChiCom lt MG	1
AK 47 Ammunition	3400
RPG -	2
ChiCom grenades	2
Mount, 51 Cal MG	2
Gas Mask	300
Plastic Anti-Tank mine	1

The cache was destroyed

Team B passed through Team C and moved north to a night position at XD765292. Team C secured the badly damaged tank. The following morning (310615H Mar 69) Team B took approximately 100 rounds of 82mm Mortar, resulting in one friendly KIA and 6 WIA. Counter-battery fire from C-1-40 Arty was placed on the suspected source (XD760270 in Laos) and the enemy ceased fire at 0654. At 0855 Team C took three rounds of 82mm from the Laotian side of the River. There were no casualties. At 1215, fifteen minutes after CPT Sullivan had taken command from CPT Blalock and while attempting to extract the mine damaged tank from the river bed; Team C came under mortar and RPG fire. A VTR from D Company, 1-77 Armor, took an RPG direct hit, detonating six IAW's stored inside. One KIA, four WIA, and total loss of the VTR resulted. Team C returned fire with tank guns, suppressing the enemy fire. Because the task force could not enter Laos, enemy losses could not be determined. The damaged tank was stripped of all movable equipment and left with the destroyed VTR in the river bed. Team C moved to the high ground at XD784263 for the night, after leaving an ambush in the vicinity of the downed vehicles. Team B moved to XD787295. The Task Force Command Group and C-1-40 Arty remained at XD801336.

From 2-6 April, 1969, the task force was involved in extracting the damaged vehicles and in relocating its center of mass to XD826354 where extensive maintenance was performed. Numerous supply sorties were flown in to the task force in support of these maintenance requirements.

On 7 April 1969, the Task Force, minus Team B, moved to XD861397. Team B moved to XD848377. From 7-11 April, Team C conducted search and destroy operation in the area of XD812463, while Team B conducted operations based from XD848377.

On the night of 10 April 1969, C-1-40 Arty secured by the battalion headquarters tank section and the scout platoon moved to XD811369 and conducted an artillery raid. Targets consisted of 40 to 50 vehicle

lights vic XD780280, vehicle lights at XD761328, XD772318, and grids XD770310, XD770300. The battery fired 1149 HE, 95 WP, and 70 VT rounds. There were 45 secondary explosions, including 6 large flashes. One large fire was started.

From 2-10 April 1969 ranger teams "Killer 14" and "Killer 15" were inserted at XD781342, XD803338, XD832362, and XD846377, but no contacts were made. On 11 April 1969, the Command Group and trains of the 1st Bn, 77th Armor were relieved in place by elements of the 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry. The Task Force was reinforced by Company A, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, and Company A, 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry. The Command Group and support elements of 1st Battalion, 77th Armor departed the Khe Sanh area at 111345H Apr 69 and closed IZ Nancy at 112030H Apr 69.

12. Results:

a. Casualties:

- (1) Enemy KIA: 3 confirmed
- (2) Probable Enemy KIA: 250
- (3) Enemy WIA: 2 confirmed
- (4) Cause:

a. Ground Fire	KIA	3	
Ground Fire	WIA	1	
b. KBAIR		0	
WBAIR		0	
c. KB Arty		1	(250 probable)
WB Arty		1	
- (5) Enemy captured 0
- (6) Friendly KIA 4
- (7) Friendly WIA 24
- (8) Friendly non-hostile killed 1
- (9) Friendly non-hostile wounded 14

b. Captured or destroyed enemy equipment positions

- (1) Anti-tank mines destroyed 3
- (2) Bunkers destroyed 45
- (3) New fishing baskets destroyed 8
- (4) Mortar position destroyed 1

- (5) TNT (Polish) destroyed 31 lbs
evacuated 60 lbs
- (6) Grass huts destroyed 12
- (7) 82mm mortar rounds destroyed 1129
- (8) 60 mm Mortar rounds destroyed 218
- (9) 75mm recoilless rifles rounds 86
- (10) .51 Cal rounds destroyed 3700
- (11) 37 mm rounds destroyed 20
- (12) 7.62 mm MG rounds 1700
- (13) RPG boosters destroyed 25
- (14) ChiCom light MG, evacuated 1
- (15) 7.62 AK-47 rounds destroyed 3600
- (16) RPG-2 rounds destroyed 2
- (17) ChiCom frag grenades 2
- (18) Mount, 51 Cal MG, destroyed 1
- (19) Gas Mask, Russian, destroyed 300

c. C Battery 1st Bn, 40th Arty (105 SP) fired 340 missions and expended 11,593 rounds during the operation. Results were:

EN KBARTY	0	Probable 200
EN WBARTY	1	
Secondary explosions	45	
Fires	2	

13. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply

(1) Because the bridges behind TF Remagen were removed, all resupply was by helicopter. The S-4 set up a forward supply area (FSA) at Vandergrift, and the D Company Commander moved forward with the Command Group (CGP).

(2) Most resupply items were drawn from the USMC at Vandergrift; the aerial loads were prepared and staged at the Logistics Staging Area (LSA) there. With the S-4 were the support platoon leader, the transport

officer, six truck drivers, a PHL clerk, a maintenance representative from both HHC & D companies, three 5-Ton trucks, and a complete welding capability that was air transportable. Also located at Vandergrift was a mess team for each company/battery with the CGp. The D Company Commander had 3 M548 POL carriers, 1 M548 ammunition carrier and crews. He received most of the supplies and distributed them to the users. In retrospect, the transportation officer could have been used more profitably forward with the combat trains. The D Company Commander could have then become the logistics operator at the CGp.

(3) All types of Class I were available at Vandergrift. Sundry packs were issued on the basis of 1 pack per 100 men every 2 days. The USMC Class I point issued 1 A-ration meal per day. But because of the difficulty of distributing A-rations, C-rations were used about 90% of the time. C rations were adequate.

(4) Class III was available except for some special items such as OH-C (cherry juice) and ISA (lubricating oil, semi-fluid) in large containers. By anticipating requirements, sufficient quantities of packaged POL were ordered from brigade stocks to meet demands as they arose. Five-hundred gallon rubber drums were used to carry over 40,000 gallons of fuel to the maneuver elements. See Inclosure 9 for a detailed listing of Class III consumption.

(5) There was no difficulty in drawing ammunition. The Brigade S-4 and the Marine Logistics Support Unit (LSU) Commander arranged an ammunition accountability transfer that enabled the TF Remagen S-4 to draw Class V quickly. Specialized items such as 40mm anti-aircraft (duster), M79, claymores, and hand flares were not available in large quantities but could be ordered through the LSU. Delivery was made 1-2 days after ordering. The 105mm battery fired over 7,000 rounds and the 81mm mortars fired approximately 4,000 rounds during the first 3 weeks of the operation. Inclosure 9 gives a detailed breakout of Class V expenditures.

(6) Culvert material was available from the 11th Engineers, USMC. The LSU had a limited amount of concertina, barbed wire, and engineer stakes, although the TF used only quantities carried on its vehicles.

(7) The lack of responsive helicopter support at the exact time TF Remagen needed it caused the greatest logistics problem. US Army helicopters (CH-47s) allocated to the USMC to support TF Remagen were applied against USMC priorities when the choppers reached Vandergrift. The LSA scheduling system requires precise locations and times. With all units maneuvering, it was exceedingly difficult to comply with the LSA's system. A better resupply system would have been for the USMC to apply all helicopter support to its priorities until TF Remagen was in a position to be resupplied; then concentrate on TF Remagen needs until completed. With an average of 30 minutes per round trip, 4 helicopters could have met TF Remagen's average daily resupply requirements in 1½ hours. Overall, TF Remagen maneuver elements received from Vandergrift over 200 aerial lifts, representing over 1½ million pounds, plus an additional 50,00 pounds of hot meals, mail, and spare parts flown in on the brigade UH-1. A UH-1

was a daily necessity for retail distribution of parts, mail, and meals from the combat trains area to the users.

(8) The altitude and temperatures in the Khe Sanh area reduced the lifting capability of the helicopters. A CH-46 would lift only 2,000 pounds; a CH-53 7,200; a CH-47 9,000 and a CH-54 (Sky Crane) 20,000. Lifts from the LSA averaged 6,000 pounds.

(9) A minor problem with air support was the mixed radio configuration of USMC aircraft. All the CH-46s had an old series radio that would go only to 51.9 mc; some of the CH-53s had the same type radio while other CH-53s had a newer series radio that would net with any frequency TF Remagen used. Consequently, a low-band frequency was used for air deliveries since the air controller didn't know which CH-53 had which type radio.

b. Maintenance.

Second echelon maintenance support was available from the combat trains. A contact team from D Company, 75th Support Battalion was in the field during most of the operation. While operating under combat conditions, the maintenance teams performed all required functions to include pulling 16 power packs. Inclosure 9 lists specific Class IX activities. All vehicles moved from the field under their own power.

c. Communications.

(1) In spite of great distances and rugged terrain, there were very few communications difficulties. A retrans capability on the logistics net solved the major communications problem. An AM voice backup was most helpful.

(2) Failure rate of radios was low. The turnover of inoperative for operative radios with DSU was fast, normally 2-3 days.

d. Personnel and Services.

(1) Mail and all required correspondence came in daily by UH-1 from the battalion basecamp. All personnel functions continued with the S-1 at the CGP and the PSNCO at the basecamp.

(2) The troops received ample beer and soda. A truck brought Class VI to Vandergrift for airlifting to the CGP and the maneuver elements.

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

The initial objective and challenge presented to Task Force Remagen was "Get to Khe Sanh". This mission was the major factor which determined the task force organization and the equipment which had to be taken. Aerial reconnaissance of the 17 kilometers from Calu to Khe Sanh City convinced us that a major engineering effort would be required.

In spite of the effort expended to improve the road, we insisted that only track laying vehicles constitute Task Force Remagen. Wheels of any type were forbidden. The task force consisted of 86 tracked laying vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, 105 MM SP artillery howitzers, M548 cargo carriers, armored vehicle launched bridges, combat engineer vehicles, armored mortar carriers, bulldozers, and M88 tracked recovery vehicles. While wheeled vehicles may have simplified the control and logistic challenge, the terrain was such that they never could have made the trek. In retrospect, every type tracked vehicle served its intended purpose and we could not have succeeded without it.

The mission was a natural for an armored task force. The scouts reconnoitered; mech infantry moved rapidly to secure the high ground; armored engineers pioneered a road; armored artillery and mortars provided continuous fire protection. When the preliminary work was completed, the tanks thrust deep into the Khe Sanh plateau reaching the Laotian border one day after crossing the LD at Calu.

Intelligence of the area of operations was non-existent. The friendly minefields emplaced for the protection of the old besieged Khe Sanh perimeter and the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp posed a constant threat. Minefield plots were not available; some minefield assistance was provided by two veterans of the Khe Sanh siege who drew a rough trace on the situation map. An even more dangerous threat was to be presented by the abundance of air force and artillery duds that lay on the plateau. The need to move gingerly and to detonate the threatening duds tended to slow progress the first week of the operation.

After reaching Khe Sanh, the task force was given a new mission - to turn southward in order to cut Highway 926 which was an enemy road leading from the Laotian border. Two factors were to have a heavy bearing on our modus operandi after the task force reached the plateau. These factors concerned the Co Roc and the existence of a purported north-south road on the RVN side of the border.

The Co Roc, an overwhelming ridge of mountains which completely dominated the intended axis of advance. The Co Roc lies in Laos, parallel to the border and the Xe Pon River. From this ridge of rock, the enemy could observe our every move. Enemy possession of this critical terrain demanded that the task force move continuously before enemy direct and indirect fire could be brought to bear on us.

The second factor was an intelligence report which indicated that a good north-south road existed along our intended route of advance. If true, the existence of such a road would materially assist our progress and allow the leading tank heavy team to cut east-west Highway 926 in a few hours. As it developed, the reported highway did not exist. The search for this road committed the tank team to blaze a trail within a few hundred meters of the

Laotian border and the Co Roc. The new pioneer road thus made vulnerable the entire task force as it displaced southward. If the road had been built further to the east, the task force would have been less vulnerable to enemy disposition on the Co Roc.

It would have been desirable if Task Force Remagen could have simply kept going west into Laos or south and east back to the Au Chau Valley or Hue. Political considerations prevented the first option while an impenetrable mountain blocked any serious thought of the latter. Accordingly, we knew that we had to withdraw over the same route on which we advanced. The enemy knew this, which gave him an advantage. He could let us advance in the full knowledge that sooner or later, Task Force Remagen would have to run the Xe Pon gauntlet again.

In spite of the rather small enemy contacts made during the operation, I believe significant damage was done to the enemy. I conservatively estimate that over 200 enemy were killed on the side of the border. The bulk of these were killed by tank and self-propelled artillery fire especially during the successful artillery raid on the night of 10-11 Apr when 45 secondary explosions were observed from the OP at the old Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. In addition to this, I believe there were three other results:

1. The western flank of the 3rd Marine Regiment was secure so that they could devote their attention to the profitable "Maine Craig" operation.

2. The enemy has learned that fast moving, armor protected formations can close on Khe Sanh in a few hours. Realizing this, the enemy will be reluctant to use this area for the massing of troops and supplies.

3. It proved that a conventional armor unit could be employed deep in enemy territory for an indefinite period of time without any ground LOC and supported only by helicopter resupply.

15. Recommendations:

That the concepts of operating armored formations independent of a ground line of communications be more thoroughly studied by Army developmental agencies with a view to making appropriate changes to TO&E, ATP's, ATT's and other doctrinal documents.

Carmelo P. Milia

CARMELO P. MILIA
LTC, Armor
Commanding

- 9 Incl
- ✓1. Area of Operations Overprint
- ✓2. OPORD 3-69
- ✓3. Fragorder 1 to OPORD 3-69
- ✓4. Overlay issued with verbal order on 26 Mar 69
- ✓5. Fragorder 2 to OPORD 3-69
- ✓6. Fragorder 3 to OPORD 3-69
- ✓7. Fragorder 4 to OPORD 3-69
- ✓8. Fragorder 5 to OPORD 3-69
- ✓9. Resupply and Maintenance statistics

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

Copy 1 of 1 Copies
1-77 Armor
IZ Nancy
YD445403
151230 H March 1969
JF-7

OPORD 3-69 (U)

Task Organization:

C/1-77 Armor

B/1-61 Inf

TF Control
Scouts
Heavy Mortar Plt
Ground Surveillance (-)
2-Dozers/11th Eng
2-Squads/A-7th Eng
2-AVIB/A-7th Eng

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces: Current INTSUM.
- b. Friendly forces: Current OPORD.
- c. Artillery: C-140 Arty (loc MAI LOC) DS.

2. MISSION. TF 1-77 (-) secures engineer construction on QL-9 from Calu to Khe Sanh and conducts strike operations in vic Khe Sanh.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operation: (1). Maneuver: This operation to consist of a tactical motor march from IZ Nancy to vic Calu (YD015465); security of engineer construction on QL-9 from Calu (YD015465) to Khe Sanh (YD848418; strike operations west of Khe Sanh.
(2). Fires: On call
- b. C/1-77: Security of Calu (YD015465) from 151200 H Mar 69 until TF 1-77 (-) closes into Calu.
- c. Scouts (-): First in order of march.
- d. HHC Tank Section: 2nd in order of march.
- e. Grd Surv (-): 3rd in order of march.
- f. Heavy Mortar Plat: 4th in order of march.
- g. D C- (-): 5th in order of march.
- h. B/1-61: 6th in order of march.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 2

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

i. 2-Squads/7th Eng: Last in order or march.

j. Coordinating Instructions: B/1-61 will join march column at the intersection of Q1-1 and Sharon road as march serial passes the intersection. A-7th Eng (-) will join the march serial at Q1-1 and Red Devil road.

k. SP 12 Nancy at 160800H March 1969.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. a. ASR: Basic load every two days.

b. Class I, III and V available from Vanderghift. Vehicle evacuation to Vanderghift.

c. Daily road convoy from Vanderghift to Red Devil. Coordinate for personnel and track vehicle movement thru S-4.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Signal: Current SOI in effect; TF 1-77 Armor (-) enter TF Hotel ops net on closing Vanderghift; Call Sign: WHITE FISH; Freq: (P) 46.75 (A) 70.10.

b. Command: No change.

Acknowledge:

Annex A-Route Overlay

MTJLA
ITC

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Bradshaw

BRADSHAW
S-3

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DER 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

Copy of Copies
TF REMAGEN (1-77 Armor)
FB Calu
YD015445
181920 H March 1969
DM-1

FRAG ORDER 1 to OPRD 3-69

Task Organization:

Team B

B/1-61 (-1 Plat)
2/C/1-77

Team C

C/1-77 (-1 Plat)
3/B/1-61

TF Control

Scouts
Heavy Mortar Platoon
Gd Survl
D/1-77 (-)
C-1-40 Arty
Sec/C-1-44 Arty
A-7th Eng (-)

1. SITUATION.

- a. Friendly forces: No Change.
- b. Enemy forces: No Change.
- c. Attachments and Detachments: Task Organization.

2. MISSION. TF Remagen conducts strike operations west and south of Khe Sanh.

3. EXECUTION. a. Concept of Operation: (1). Maneuver: TF Remagen attacks with two teams abreast; Team "C" on the north; Team "B" on the south to seize and clear objectives REMAGEN, SABCT and RIFLE.
(2). Fires: Priority of fires to Team "C"

b. Team B

c. Team C

d. Set Platoon: TF Reserve; follow Team C; provide security for TF HQ's at RON position.

e. 4.2 Mortar Platoon: GS; priority of fires to Team B.

f. C-1-40 Arty: DS; priority of fires to Team C.

g. C-1-44 (-) Arty: follow CMD GP; provide local security for TF Hdqs.

h. A/7th Eng (-):

i. Gd Survl: provide security at RON pos.

j. D/1-77 (-):

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 3

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

- k. Coordinating Instructions: (1). SP from pres loc 190800 H March 1969.
(2) Order of march: C/1-77; Cmd Gp; D/1-77 (-) Route: Milia road
(QL-9) (3) Cmd Gp order of march: 66, 67, 13, 49, 12, 31, 16, 32, D56, 15,
65 and CEV.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: No change.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:
a. Signal: No change.
b. Command: Cmd Gp follows Team C initially.

Acknowledge:

MILIA
ITC

Distribution: Special

Annex

A-Operations Overlay

OFFICIAL:

Bradshaw
BRADSHAW
S-3

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DCD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

Copy _____ of _____ Copies
TF Remagen (1-77 Armor)
Lang Pe Rang, SVN
030825 H April 1969
Max-1

Frag Order 2 to OPRD 3-69

Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50000, sheets 6342 II, 6342 III

1. Team B: Move NLT 031630 H April to vic XD823353 and conduct dismounted S/D operations in AO.
2. Team C: Conduct S/D operations in AO. Maintain a reaction force for immediate reinforcement of Ranger Team. Recon a route from present location to QL-9 for rapid reinforcement of Ranger Team.
3. C-140 Arty: DS; Priority of fires to Ranger Team.
4. Scouts: Insert Ranger Team into team AO NLT 031200 H April 69.
5. Mortars: DS; Priority of fires to Ranger Team.
6. C-144 Arty (-): Provide local security for TF Remagen CP.

Acknowledge.

PECKARTS
IEC

Distribution: Special

Annexes: A-Operations Overlay

OFFICIAL.

Bradshaw

BRADSHAW
S-3

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

INCL 5

CONFIDENTIAL

OVERLAY ISSUED WITH
VERBAL ORDER GIVEN
BY CO 1/77 ARMOR
ON 260900 MAR 69

TF
= 2
A

25
X
09

07
C

21
X
08

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 4

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

Copy of Copies
 TF Remagen (1-77 Armor)
 Lang Con, RVN
 XD825356
 061025 H April 1969
 2-ESF

FRAG ORDER 3 to OPORD 3-69 (U)

Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50000, Sheets 6342 II and 6342 III

Task Organization:

<u>Team B</u>	<u>Team C</u>	<u>TF Control</u>
B/1-61 Inf (-1 Plt)	C/1-77 Armor (-1 Plt)	C-1-40 Arty
2/C/1-77 Armor	3/B/1-61 Inf	C-1-44 Arty (-)
4.2 Mortar Platoon		Scout Platoon
		A/7 Eng (-)
		D/1-77 Armor (-)

1 (C) SITUATION.

- a. Friendly forces: No change.
- b. Enemy forces: No change.
- c. Attachments and detachments: Task Organization.

2 (C) MISSION. TF Remagen moves from present location and conducts search and destroy operations in AO vicinity Khe Sanh.

3 (C) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation: (1) Maneuver: This operation to be conducted in two parts: Tactical march from present location to vic XD861395; Search and destroy operations northwest of Khe Sanh airfield area.

(2) Fires: Priority of fires initially to Team C.

b. Team B: Move on order; last in order of march; provide covering fires for TF move to new location; occupy new position vic XD840380.

c. Team C: Move on order; 2nd in order of march; occupy position vic XD860398; be prepared to counterattack to the west on QL-9 and to northwest toward Khe Sanh airfield; provide dismounted OP vic XD845393.

d. Scouts: 1st in order of march; provide quartering party security during march.

e. 4.2 Mortar Platoon: GS; attached to Team B for security and move to new location.

f. C/1-40 Arty: Move on order; fourth in order of march; provide covering fire for move of team B.

g. C/1-44 Arty (-): Move with Command Group; provide local security for Cmd Gp at new loc.

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 6

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

h. A/7 Eng (-): Move with scouts and quartering party; provide mine sweep and dozer work as needed along route and in new loc.

i. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Order of march: Scouts with quartering party and A/7 Eng (-); Team C; Cmd Gp; C/1-40 Arty; Team B with 4.2 Mortars.

(2) Scouts SP time: 070730 H April 69; All other elements move on order.

(3) All elements will thoroughly police area: burn and bury refuse.

(4) A/7 Eng (-) AVLB launcher attached to Team B for move.

4.(U) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS. No change.

5.(C) COMMAND and SIGNAL.

a. Signal: Current SOI.

b. Command: No change

Acknowledge:

Annexes:

A-Operations Overlay
B-Fire Support Plan
C-Suspected Mine Fields

FIGKARTS
ETC

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Bradshaw
BRADSHAW
S-3

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

4TH M¹R
||
TFR

80
+
42

ANNEX A (OPERATIONS OVERLAY) TO FRAG
ORDER 3 TO OPORD 3-69

RP
CP2
TM3
CP1
SP

||
TFR

TFR
X
30 MAR

80
+
33

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

Copy _____ of _____ Copies
 TF Remagen (1-77 Armor)
 1st Sanh, RVN
 XDB 1396
 072220 H April 1969
 GR-7

FRAG ORDER 4 to OFORD 3-69 (U)

1.(C) SITUATION.

- a. Friendly forces: No change.
- b. Enemy forces: No change.

2.(C) MISSION. TF Remagen continues S/D operations in AO with particular interest to area enclosed by XD790430, XD820430, XD820400 and XD790400 and an area of reported truck movement vic XD789419.

3.(C) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation:

(1) Maneuver: TF Remagen conducts S/D operations in AO with two teams cross reinforced.

(2) Fires: Priority of fires initially to Team B.

b. Team B: Conduct detailed S/D operations in AO beginning 080900 H April 69. Recon team CARPET loc in XD790430, XD800430, XD780410, XD800410, freq: 48.80.

c. Team C: Conduct route recon along route 608 and S/D operations in AO. Breach suspected friendly minefield vic XD823448 commencing 080800 H April 69.

d. 4.2 Mortar Plt: GS; move from present loc to TF Remagen command post on order.

e. Scouts: Provide local CP security.

f. A/7 Eng (-): GS; attach one squad to Team C.

g. C-1-40 Arty: GS; priority of fires to Team B.

h. C-1-44 Arty (-): Provide CP security.

i. Coordinating Instructions: All personnel should be especially careful in this area because of unexploded ordnance, both friendly and enemy and unrecorded friendly anti-tank and anti personnel mines.

4.(U) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS. No change.

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

5.(U) COMMAND And SIGNAL.

a. Signal: No change.

b. Command: CP remains **present location.**

Acknowledge:

PICKARTS
LTC

Annexes
A-Operations Overlay

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Bradshaw
BRADSHAW
S-3

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL




DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

3 ▽

ANNEX C (SUSPECTED MINE FIELD) TO FRAG ORDER
3 TO OPORD 3-69



--- Known Mine Areas
----- Suspected/Reported Mine Areas

1. Vicinity XD786346
2. Vicinity XD793363
3. Vicinity XD824448
4. Vicinity XD837408
5. Vicinity XD844126 to XD355 416

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

Copy _____ of _____ Copies
TF Remagen (1-77 Armor)
Khe Sanh, RVN
XD861397
100845 H April 1969
HOW-4

FRAG ORDER 5 to OPORD 3-69 (U)

Task Organization:

Team 1

B/1-61 Inf
Scout Plat
4.2 Mortar Plat
A-7 Eng (-)
HHC Tk Sec (-)

Team 2

C-1-77 Armor
C-1-44 Arty (-)
CEV

TF Control

Cmd Gp
D-1-77 Armor (-)

1 (C). SITUATION.

- a. Friendly forces: No change.
- b. Enemy forces: No change.
- c. Attachments and detachments: Task organization; task organization effective 110600 H April 1969.

2 (C). MISSION. Task Force Remagen continues Search and Destroy operations in AO; conducts relief in place by TF 1-61 Inf (M).

3 (C). EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation:

(1) Maneuver: This operation to be a relief in place by TF 1-61 Inf (M) in three increments.

(2) Fires: Priority of fires to team 1 effective 110630 H April 69.

b. Team 1: Scouts, A-7 Eng (-), AVIB w/bridge, HHC tank section (-) Hq 66) and 4.2 Mortar platoon departs present location 110630 H April 69 to clear QL-9 to CP G; B/1-61 moves to CP G on order; team 1 completes move to FB Calu, Rockpile, Red Devil and LZ Nancy on order.

c. Team 2: Depart present location on order for Calu, Rockpile, Red Devil and LZ Nancy on order.

d. Task Force Headquarters and D/1-77 (-) depart present location on order for LZ Nancy.

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

INCL 8

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

e. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Report crossing CP's.
- (2) Last vehicle in each team/march element will display a colored flag/streamer for identification.
- (3) Task organization eff 110600 H April 1969.

4 (U). ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. Maintenance halts will be conducted vic FB Calu.
- b. All vehicles refueled prior to departure from present location.

5 (C). COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- a. Signal: No change.
- b. Command: CP remains present location; moves on order; jump CP moves behind team 1 to CP G.

Acknowledge.

Annexes:

- A-Check Points (Cam Lo Route)
- B-Check Points (Ba Long Route)
- C-Fire Support Plan

MILIA
ITC

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Bradshaw
BRADSHAW
S-3

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

ANNEX A (CHECK POINTS) TO FRAG ORDER 5 TO OPRD 3-69

HAWK - XD895405
H - XD911404
G - XD921419
F - XD925421
E - XD943423
D - XD976434
C - XD994445
B - XD001452
A - XD009452

1 - XD995482
2 - XD981543
3 - YD026561
4 - YD145589
5 - YD249604
6 - YD330519
7 - YD422477
8 - 460402

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

ANNEX B (CHECK POINTS FOR BA LONG ROUTE) to FRAG ORDER 5 to OPORD 3-69 (On Order Only)

VV - YD033449

WW - YD112449

XX - YD158406

YY - YD264439

ZZ - YD311481

CC - YD344484

DD - YD372496

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

ANNEX C (Fire Support Plan) to FRAG ORDER 5 to OPORD 3-69 (U)

MAX ORD 7600

O/C for March to Calu

RC 1.	871399		RC 21.	928409	Gates 105's
" 2.	881101		" 22.	948407	"
" 3.	899108		" 23.	948417	"
" 4.	912109		" 24.	965409	"
" 5.	911127		" 25.	960420	"
" 6.	931125		" 26.	971117	
" 7.	943137		" 27.	981128	Gates 105's
" 8.	952131		" 28.	999431	"
" 9.	957137		" 29.	998442	"
" 10.	968142	Gates 105's	" 30.	015436	"
" 11.	973138	Gates 105's	" 31.	007447	"
" 12.	979144				
" 13.	982152				
" 14.	972162				
" 15.	978155				
" 16.	006161				
" 17.	882395				
" 18.	898393				
" 19.	918395				
" 20.	932391				

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

INCLOSURE 9 (RESUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE STATISTICS)

1. Total pounds air-lifted from the Vandergrift LSA	1 1/4 million pounds (over 200 missions)
2. Estimated cargo by UH-1	50,000 pounds
3. MOCAS consumed	11,950 gallons
4. DF-2 consumed	29,650 gallons
5. OE-50 consumed	335 gallons
6. OE-30 consumed	550 gallons
7. OE-10 consumed	110 gallons
8. GAA consumed	50 gallons
9. Brake fluid	10 gallons
10. LSA	50 gallons
11. Class V consumption included the following:	
105mm HE w/fuse, w/o fuse	5,730
105mm WP	900
105mm HC SMK	120
105mm Illumination	480
81mm HE	2,700
81mm WP	1,188
81mm Illumination	324
4.2 HE	960
4.2 Illumination	200
4.2 WP	160
90mm HE	120
90mm Cannon	150
Cal. 50	16,000

INCL 9

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

7.62 ammo	32,000
5.56 ammo	16,800
40mm HE (M79)	1,728
Claymore	204
Green Star Cluster	256
White Star Cluster	128
Chg Demo C-4	30 kits
Det. cord	1,000 feet
Grenade, hand, frag	60
Fuse, PD M557	2,304
Smoke grenade, Green	112
Smoke grenade, Yellow	128
40mm Duster	12,000
E-8 Launcher	3
12. MGIs	59 pallets
13. Class IX:	

Pulled/changed	2 M108 power packs
Pulled/changed	1 CEV power pack
Pulled/changed	1 AVLB power pack
Changed	Radiator and fuel tank for dozer EIMCO
Changed	6 M113A1-type power packs
Pulled	5 M48A3 power packs
Pulled/changed	1 M88 power pack
Pulled/changed	2 M88 transmissions
Pulled/ changed	2 M88 final drives
Pulled/changed	1 M578 transmission

DECLASSIFIED

14. Combat loss vehicles included:

1 M88 Recovery Vehicle

1 EIMCO dozer

1 M113A1 personnel carrier (as a result of helicopter crash at Vandergrift)


1 M37B1 3/4ton truck, utility (as a result of helicopter crash at Vandergrift)

1 M151A1 1/4t on truck, utility (as a result of helicopter crash at Vandergrift)

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST BATTALION (MECHANIZED), 61ST INFANTRY
1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT



CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
APO San Francisco 96477

53

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

Commanding Officer
1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
Attention: AVEL-C
APO San Francisco 96477

1. (C) Type of Operation: Search, reconnaissance-in-force and pioneering operations by armor and mechanized infantry teams in the area of Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
2. (C) Dates of Operation: 101400H April 1969 to 292145H April 1969.
3. (C) Location: West of Khe Sanh to the Laotian border and south to NVA Route 926. See Inclosure 1, a map overlay of TF REMAGEN II's area of operations.
4. (C) Command Headquarters: Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry.
5. (C) Task Organization (TF REMAGEN II):
 - a. Phase I (101400H April 1969 to 120800H April 1969):
 - (1) Team ALPHA:
Company A (-), 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
3d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
 - (2) Team ARMOR:
Company A (-), 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
One Platoon, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th Artillery
(8-Inch) (SP), USMC
Detachment (Two Bulldozers), Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion
 - (3) Task Force Control:
Scout Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
Heavy Mortar Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
One Platoon, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 12th Artillery
(155mm) (SP), USMC
Combat Trains, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry

CONFIDENTIAL

301

CONFIDENTIAL

S3:

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

b. Phase II (120800H April 1969 to 151200H April 1969):

(1) Team ALPHA:

Company A (-), 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 3d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
 Detachment (One Bulldozer), 14th Engineer Battalion

(2) Team ARMOR:

Company A (-), 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 Squad (Reinforced), Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion

(3) Team BRAVO:

Company B (-), 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor

(4) Team CHARLIE:

Company C (-), 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
 3d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 Squad, Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion

(5) Task Force Control:

Scout Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 Heavy Mortar Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 1st Platoon (-), Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion
 Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm) (SP)
 One Platoon, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 12th Artillery (155mm) (SP), USMC
 One Platoon, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th Artillery (8-Inch) (SP), USMC
 One Section, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (40mm) (AA) (AW) (SP)
 Combat Trains, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry

c. Phase III (151200H April 1969 to 201200H April 1969):

(1) Team ALPHA:

Company A (-), 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 3d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
 Squad, Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion

(2) Team ARMOR:

Company A (-), 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 Squad (Reinforced), Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion

(3) Task Force Control:**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

S3

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

Scout Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 Heavy Mortar Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 1st Platoon (-), Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion
 Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm) (SP)
 One Platoon, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 12th Artillery (155mm) (SP), USMC
 One Section, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (40mm) (AA) (AW) (SP)
 Combat Trains, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry

d. Phase IV (201200H April 1969 to 292145H April 1969):

(1) Team ALPHA:

Company A (-), 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 3d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
 Squad, Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion

(2) Team ARMOR:

Company A (-), 1st Battalion, 77th Armor
 3d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 Squad (Reinforced), Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion

(3) Team ARVN:

Troop, 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, ARVN
 Reconnaissance Company, 1st Regiment, ARVN

(4) Task Force Control:

Scout Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 Heavy Mortar Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 1st Platoon (-), Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion
 Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm) (SP)
 One Platoon, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 12th Artillery (155mm) (SP), USMC
 One Section, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (40mm) (AA) (AW) (SP)
 Combat Trains, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry

6. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm) (SP) was in direct support of TF REMAGEN II. The battery, already at Khe Sanh in direct support of TF REMAGEN I, became attached to TF REMAGEN II effective 111200H April 1969.

b. One Platoon, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 12th Artillery (155mm) (SP), USMC, consisting of three 155mm self-propelled howitzers and four M548 cargo carriers, was in direct support of TF REMAGEN II. The platoon was attached at Ca Lu (XD010455) at 101800H April 1969.

c. From 110800H April 1969 to 151200H April 1969, one platoon, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th Artillery (8-Inch) (SP), USMC, consisting of two 8-inch self-propelled howitzers, was in direct support of TF REMAGEN II. The platoon was attached at Ca Lu at 110800H.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S3.

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

April 1969.

d. A reinforced engineer platoon was attached to TF REMAGEN II effective 111200H April 1969. The platoon consisted of two squads (with minesweeping and demolitions capabilities), Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion; two AVLBs, Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion; one bulldozer, 11th Engineer Battalion; one bulldozer, 12th Artillery, USMC.

e. One UH-1D helicopter was made available to TF REMAGEN II on a daily basis by Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), based at Camp Red Devil.

f. One aerial observer was made available by Headquarters, TF HOTEL, based at Vandegrift Combat Base, on a daily basis.

g. One Tactical Air Control Party/Air Liaison Officer was made available by Headquarters, TF HOTEL, beginning 22 April 1969.

7. (C) Intelligence:

a. Prior to TF REMAGEN II's move to Khe Sanh on 11 April 1969, the following intelligence was made available by Headquarters, TF HOTEL and Headquarters, TF REMAGEN I:

(1) Sensors northwest of Khe Sanh and north of QL-9 registered movement of small, ten- to fifteen-man groups of enemy soldiers. Movement was generally northwest to southeast and west to east from the international boundary between South Vietnam and Laos. The sensors were monitored by Headquarters, TF HOTEL and readouts were supplied to TF REMAGEN I. Movement was detected almost daily.

(2) The TF HOTEL S2 believed that elements of the 304th NVA Division were located in Laos, immediately west of the international boundary, in a passive defensive posture.

(3) TF REMAGEN I (with command and control provided by Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor) operated south of Khe Sanh during the period 16 March 1969 to 10 April 1969 and experienced three contact-type incidents. At 300836H March 1969, elements of Team BRAVO encountered and engaged a small ambush party, resulting in three NVA KIA. At 311250H March 1969, one M88 VTR and one M18A3 tank were damaged by a rocket-propelled grenade or recoilless rifle fire. At 010615H April 1969, Team BRAVO received 100 82mm mortar rounds from Laos. Team BRAVO was located at CP-28 on the international border.

b. Upon TF REMAGEN II's arrival at Khe Sanh on 11 April 1969, intelligence concerning the overall enemy situation in the area was very sketchy. Generally, it was believed that, at most, the area from Khe Sanh west to the Laos-South Vietnam border was being used as an infiltration route, but that no major NVA or VC units were occupying the area.

c. During the period 11 April 1969 to 24 April 1969, the intelligence situation did not change substantially from that outlined in paragraph 7a, above:

(1) Sensors continued to register movement of small groups in the northern portion of TF REMAGEN II's AO. It was felt that the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S3

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

sensors were detecting the movement of men (and supplies) through the Khe Sanh area by the NVA 559th Transportation Group, the support organization that normally operates in this area.

(2) TF REMAGEN II units moved throughout the AO without encountering any enemy units, mines or booby traps. During the period, the TF had aerial observers and an air cavalry team on station: none of these was fired upon by the enemy while reconnoitering throughout the area at altitudes of from 300 to 400 feet. The mission of the aerial observers and the air cavalry team was to provide intelligence input to TF REMAGEN II while attempting to develop the enemy situation.

(3) It was felt by Headquarters, TF HOTEL that TF REMAGEN II, by occupying the enemy's attention with respect to TF capabilities and intentions, had fixed a division-size enemy force (possibly the 304th NVA Division) in Laos.

(4) Inclosure 11 is a list of all spot reports made by aerial observers, the air cavalry team and ground units during this period.

d. During the period 24 April 1969 to 28 April 1969, several confrontations occurred that signalled a significant change in the intelligence situation:

(1) TF REMAGEN II's FSB at Lang Vei (vicinity of the old U.S. Special Forces Camp) (XD790358) was attacked by an estimated reinforced NVA company at 250300H April 1969.

(2) On the morning of 27 April 1969, the tank platoon attached to Team ARVN and performing as Team ARVN's lead element in its movement to CP-23, spotted an enemy ambush at CP-13 (XD815370). The ensuing contact resulted in one NVA KIA at the ambush site, one NVA KIA near the ambush site, and the discovery of seven mines emplaced along QL-9 and rigged for command detonation.

(3) TF REMAGEN II's FSB at Khe Sanh Village (XD846381) was attacked by an estimated reinforced NVA company at 280250H April 1969.

8. (C) Mission:

a. Pioneer a tank trail from QL-9 south to NVA Route 926 (trail to be constructed 4 to 5 kilometers away from, but generally parallel to, the Laotian border in order to remove friendly forces operating along the trail from within range of enemy QM mortars situated in Laos);

b. Determine the feasibility of pioneering a tank trail from Khe Sanh northwest to FSB Alpine (XD755532) and then east to Vandegrift Combat Base (VCB) (YD000485);

c. Develop the enemy situation in the Khe Sanh area; and

d. Determine trafficability and maneuverability conditions in the Khe Sanh area for armor-mechanized operations.

9. (C) Execution:

a. Phase I (101400H April 1969 to 120800H April 1969): At 091700H

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S3

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

April 1969, Fragmentary Order 14 to Operations Order 5-69 was issued. The movement to Ca Lu (YD010548), a distance of 54 kilometers, was accomplished in four hours and thirty-one minutes with only one breakdown. The night of 10 April 1969 was spent at Ca Lu in a perimeter-type night defensive position. At 110800H April 1969, the 21 kilometer move from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh commenced. Movement was completed by 112100H April 1969. Several breakdowns, primarily ones involving bulldozers and 8-inch self-propelled howitzers, caused a delay of approximately 4.5 hours. Aside from breakdowns, the bulldozers had to be land-walked from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh and the average speed of the convoy was reduced to five kilometers per hour. One AVLB was laid enroute at XD911404. Overhead convoy cover was supplied by an air cavalry team, two USMC aerial observers, and on-call tactical air support aircraft.

b. Phase II (120800H April 1969 to 151200H April 1969): Fragmentary Orders 15, 16 and 17 to Operations Order 5-69 (Inclosures 3, 4 and 5 hereto).

c. Phase III (151200H April 1969 to 201200H April 1969): Fragmentary Orders 18 and 19 to Operations Order 5-69 (Inclosures 6 and 7, hereto).

d. Phase IV (201200H April 1969 to 292145H April 1969): Fragmentary Orders 20 and 21 to Operations Order 5-69 (Inclosures 8 and 9, hereto).

10. (C) Results:

a. A new tank trail, whose trace is shown on the map overlay at Inclosure 1, was pioneered. Trail breaking began on 12 April 1969 and Team ARMOR reached NVA Route 926 on 21 April 1969. The Trail, rated good for tracked vehicles during dry weather, only, is one-way, with its few turnaround points located at CP-17, 19, 21 and 56. For illustrative purposes, after a two-hour rain, two M113As without track pads were able to negotiate the trail with moderate to extreme difficulty.

b. The mission of pioneering a trail northwest to FSB Alpine and then east to VCB was rescinded on 26 April 1969, based upon a survey made by the Brigade Engineer, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The engineer survey revealed that to accomplish the mission would require an engineer company and that it could not be accomplished by armor-mechanized forces alone.

c. To a limited extent, the enemy situation was developed in the Khe Sanh area in that, on three separate occasions, the enemy chose to abandon his hide-and-seek tactics and to engage, offensively, elements of TF REMAGEN II. Despite the facts that Team ARVN did not occupy CP-23 until 241630H April 1969, and that Team ALPHA and Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery occupied CP-22 (less than 1000 meters from, and within mutual supporting distance of, CP-23), the enemy was able to launch an attack against Team ARVN at 250300H April 1969. Initially, it was believed that a security element of the NVA 559th Transportation Group had attacked Team ARVN following an infiltration-type move from Laos into South Vietnam along the general axis from XD770335 to XD785352 and its positioning of forces, vicinity XD787359 and XD783355, on opposite sides of Team ARVN's night defensive position. Subsequently, the enemy's identity was established, however, his routes of access and egress to and from the battle position were not confirmed. Later events would tend to indicate, though,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S3:

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

that he approached CP-23 from an area bounded on the south by a line through CP-9, -10, -11 and -35. It is possible that the purpose of the attack was to preclude or forestall another move by TF REMAGEN II to the international border vicinity CP-39. Credence is lent this possibility by virtue of the fact that, when Team ARVN began moving west along QL-9 on the morning of 27 April 1969, the enemy established and was prepared to execute an ambush whose single distinguishing characteristic was that it was to have been sprung during daylight hours. The ambush failed. The attack against Team ALPHA and Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, located in a night defensive position near Khe Sanh Village (XD846381) (CP-3), probably was launched from an area bounded on the southeast by a line through CP-9 and -10. The main thrust of the assault was directed against Team ALPHA from that direction, enemy survivors withdrew in that direction after breaking contact, and indications were that the enemy had 120mm (regimental) mortars positioned vicinity XD794407. Sensors had registered activity at that point and in the surrounding area almost daily, though no enemy were observed by aerial observers or the air cavalry team, and TPQs and artillery H and I fires were employed in the area daily and nightly. It should be noted that, on the night of 22 April 1969, Team ARVN reported observing vehicle lights and hearing tracked vehicles vicinity XD785365, and that sensors confirmed tracked vehicle-like movement at the same coordinates and at the same time as seen and heard by Team ARVN. Ground and aerial reconnaissance the following morning failed to reveal tracks in the rain-softened earth in the area. The sapper attacks of 25 and 28 April 1969 lasted for 2.5 and 3.25 hours, respectively, and both were characterized by light to moderate use of small arms, machinegun and mortar fires, and by heavy use of pole and satchel charges, hand, rocket-propelled and rifle grenades, and flame-throwing devices. All of the equipment captured, to include the uniforms worn by the NVA KIAs, was new. Uniforms worn in the 25 April 1969 attack were the same color as those worn by ARVN regulars: in the 28 April 1969 attack, NVA uniforms were the customary khaki/gray color. Most of the NVA KIAs were young, clean-shaven, had short haircuts, were well equipped, and, based upon an inspection of the condition of their feet, apparently had not travelled any lengthy distances in the immediate past. Information assembled during and after the contacts of 25, 27 and 28 April 1969 (specifically, embroidered shirt-pocket markings, e.g., 403015/40-20, 403011/40-20, 403020/40-20, et cetera; the number 40, enclosed by a triangle, heat-branded onto the front handguards of captured AK-47s; and the LBN 13974 marked inside and on items of apparel) was processed and evaluated and, from that information, it was determined that elements of the 9th and 57th NVA Regiments had participated in the two sapper attacks and the frustrated ambush.

d. Trafficability and maneuverability conditions in the Khe Sanh area north of QL-9 rendered armor-mechanized operations moderately to extremely difficult. South of QL-9 to the east-west grid line 25, vegetation and terrain restricted armor-mechanized movement to existing and/or newly-blazed trails. Generally, there was little maneuver area on either side of the New Remagen Trail. Immediately north of NVA Route 926 and south, therefrom, to CP-45 and -46, terrain and vegetation favored armor-mechanized movement, except that movement was restricted to roads and trails east of the 87 north-south grid line.

e. Friendly Casualties:

7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S3

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>OTHER FWMAF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	8	0	8	1	17
WIA	46	0	44	0	90
DOW	0	0	0	0	0
MIA	0	0	0	0	0
CAPTURED	0	0	0	0	0
NON-HOSTILE DEATH	0	0	0	0	0
NON-HOSTILE INJURY	46	0	0	0	0

f. ~~Enemy~~ Casualties:

- (1) Cumulative: 73 KIAs; 0 PWs; 0 CDs; and 4 Hoi Chanhs.
- (2) Inflicted by U.S. Forces: 45 KIAs (including 4 KBAs); 0 PWs; 0 CDs; and 0 Hoi Chanhs.
- (3) Inflicted by ARVN: 28 KIAs; 0 PWs; 0 CDs; and 4 Hoi Chanhs.

g. U.S. Equipment Losses: Two M113A1s, one M548, one M48A3 and one M1149 400-gallon water trailer were destroyed by a combination of RPG fire, pole and satchel charges and flame-throwing devices.

h. ARVN Equipment Losses: Two M113s and one M125A1 were destroyed by a combination of RPG fire, pole and satchel charges and flame-throwing devices.

i. Enemy Equipment Captured, Destroyed or Discovered:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
122mm Rockets	Each	11
120mm Mortar Round	Each	1
7.62mm Cartridges	Each	30,000
82mm Mortar Round	Each	96
82mm Mortar Round Fuzes	Each	12
60mm Mortar Round Cartridges	Can	2
60mm Mortar Round	Each	19
RPG-2 (B-40) Launcher	Each	7
RPG-2 (B-40) Round	Each	86
RPG-7 (B-41) Launcher	Each	1
RPG-7 (B-41) Round	Each	6
Bulk Explosives	Pound	306
Satchel Charges	Each	300
Bangalore Torpedo	Each	4
Rifle Grenade	Each	16
ChiCom Hand Grenade	Each	52
Anti-Tank Mine (T-41)	Each	7
Bomb, 1000-Pound	Each	1
Bomb, 500-pound	Each	1
Machinegun, RPD-1	Each	1
Machinegun, SG-43 (Russian)	Each	2
Mount, Machinegun (For SG-43)	Each	1
AK-47 (With Standard Wood Stock)	Each	15
AK-47 (With Folding Metal Stock)	Each	15
Magazine, AK-47 (Full)	Each	100
Gas Mask, NVA-Type	Each	1
Pack, NVA-Type	Each	3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S3

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Pith Helmet	Each	2
Medical Kit (ChiCom-Type)	Each	2
Bamboo Bridge (7' x 20' x 3')	Each	3
Bamboo Hut	Each	5
Bunker (3' x 5' x 4')	Each	253
Cave	Each	35

11. (U) Logistics: Inclosure 1212. (C) Communications:

a. An operations/intelligence net and an FSCC net were maintained with Headquarters, TF HOTEL utilizing an AS-2236/GRC directional antenna which proved to be invaluable.

b. An administrative/logistics net was established and maintained between TF REMAGEN II's combat trains at Khe Sanh and its field trains at VCB using organic radio equipment.

c. In order to maintain communications with Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), without whose support and assistance beyond that which Headquarters, TF HOTEL was readily able to provide TF REMAGEN II probably would not have been capable of accomplishing its several missions, a brigade retransmission station was established at FSB Cates (XD927144). This enabled TF REMAGEN II to communicate with Brigade in both secure and non-secure voice modes over straight line distances of fifty-one kilometers.

d. Overall, no major problems were encountered in the communications area.

13. (C) Observations and Recommendations:a. Task Organization:

(1) Observation: TF REMAGEN II's AO contained many areas which were inaccessible to tracked vehicles, yet those areas needed to be searched thoroughly by dismounted elements. Although limited searching was accomplished by mechanized infantrymen, it would have been desirable to have had a dismounted rifle company, free of the maintenance and logistical problems associated with a mechanized infantry company, for use in conducting detailed search and clear operations.

(2) Recommendation: That task forces assigned similar missions in comparable areas be task organized to include an Armored Cavalry Troop; one Mechanized Infantry Company; one Rifle Company; an Air Cavalry Team (with one LOH and two helicopter gunships); a Combat Engineer Platoon (reinforced with three bulldozers and two AVLBs); and a battery, each, of 105mm and 155mm self-propelled howitzers. It would also be desirable to have one CH-46/47 and one CH-53 operating in direct support of the TF in an aerial resupply role. This task organization would reduce the number of tanks (and the logistical requirements and problems associated therewith), yet retain an armor capability to counter an armor threat. It would have increased TF REMAGEN II's capability to conduct detailed search and clear operations in the dense, rugged terrain so prevalent in its AO.

b. UH-1D Support:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S3

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

(1) Observation: One UH-1D was made available to TF REMAGEN II for ten hours (0800 to 1800 hours), daily. Control and use of the helicopter for command and control, reconnaissance, medical evacuation and emergency and routine administrative and logistical tasks proved to be invaluable to the success of TF operations. However, considerable time was spent and, hence, useable time was lost, in flying to and from Vandegrift Combat Base to refuel.

(2) Recommendation: That a UH-1D be made available to task forces assigned similar missions in comparable areas on a daily basis, and that one M548 be fitted with a collapsible fuel container filled, daily, with JP-4 and from which the supporting UH-1D could refuel on site.

c. Artillery Organization and Employment:

(1) Observation: One 105mm self-propelled artillery battery and one 155mm self-propelled artillery platoon operated with and in support of TF REMAGEN II. It proved to be an excellent combination and, employed as it was, enabled the TF to conduct artillery raids and/or to establish forward fire support bases with each artillery element operating or located within the other's range fan. With two artillery elements, it was possible to fire defensive concentrations around each position each night, which would not have been possible had but one artillery unit supported TF REMAGEN II from a field position. An advantage of being supported from within the field by a 155mm artillery unit was that the howitzers' range capability allowed TF movement over considerable distances without necessitating displacement. It was necessary at night however, to insure that the 105mm battery was not separated from the 155mm artillery platoon more than a distance equal to its (the 105's) maximum illumination range.

(2) Recommendation: Ideally, two 155mm batteries are preferred to one 155mm battery and one 105mm battery, or to one 105mm battery and one 155mm platoon (which latter combination supported TF REMAGEN II); however, it is felt that resupplying two 155mm batteries over an air LOC would ordinarily overtax the support capabilities of the helicopter-supplying organization. One battery of 155mm self-propelled howitzers, vis-a-vis and with double the firepower of a platoon, could be supported logistically with little effort beyond that required to support a platoon, and is, therefore, recommended for task forces assigned similar missions in a comparable area. See paragraph 13a(2), above.

d. Air Cavalry Team Support:

(1) Observation: During the eight-day period 11 to 18 April 1969, an Air Cavalry Team consisting of one LOH, two helicopter gunships and one UH-1D operated in support of TF REMAGEN II and assisted in developing the enemy situation. It is felt that the presence of the ACT assisted in discouraging the enemy from harassing elements of the TF while pioneering trails or moving throughout the AO. Additionally, the ACT greatly assisted in the intelligence collection effort, as a result of which operations planning was facilitated.

(2) Recommendation: That an Air Cavalry Team be attached to, or placed in support of, task forces assigned similar missions in a comparable area. See paragraph 13a(2), above.

e. Bulldozer Support:

10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S3

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U) 29 May 1969

(1) Observation: Bulldozers were employed in three roles: trail blazing and repair, clearing of obstacles, and preparing of defensive positions. A technique successfully employed during the operation was to attach a bulldozer to each armor and mechanized team. Bulldozers moved with the team's lead element and built fording sites and/or eliminated obstacles when necessary, since the area was crisscrossed by numerous streams and draws, bomb and shell craters, and deadfalls. It was important that the bulldozer remained forward with the lead element, otherwise, when the team encountered an obstacle, considerable time was lost waiting for its displacement. Employing a bulldozer with each team, however, resulted in numerous breakdowns that occurred as a result of operating in the rough terrain that characterized the area of operations. What appeared to be an inordinate amount of maintenance was necessary. However, the advantage of having the bulldozer with each team far outweighed the problems of maintaining them. Bulldozers were particularly valuable for use in the preparation of defensive positions and for as long as they remained operational were used to dig in command carriers, artillery pieces, APCs, tanks, cargo carriers and some items of supply. Unfortunately, near the end of the operation none of the bulldozers were fully operational and it became necessary to reoccupy old, previously used, dug in positions, with the protection they offered, or to forego that protection in favor of occupying new positions nightly.

(2) Recommendation: That task forces assigned similar missions and operating in comparable terrain possess a minimum of three bulldozers (see paragraph 13a(2), above), that an augmented PILL be stocked on site, and that qualified bulldozer maintenance personnel accompany the task force combat trains.

14. (C) Commander's Analysis:

a. Cooperation, coordination, support and assistance by and between the several headquarters, units and services involved were exceptional. No problems capable of being solved by Headquarters, 3d Marine Division, Headquarters, TF HOTEL, or Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), were left unsolved, and their solution was accomplished with speed, efficiency and dispatch.

b. Tactical air and aerial observer support were timely, adequate and absolutely essential to successful accomplishment of TF REMAGEN II's missions. Fighter-bomber, flareship, gunship and "Spooky" support was invaluable to the overall success of the operation and, in particular, to the defense against, and subsequent pursuit of, enemy forces which attacked Team ARVN's and Team ALPHA's night defensive positions on the mornings of 25 and 28 April 1969.

c. Successful defense of night defensive positions against enemy sapper attacks hinges, in the case of armor and mechanized forces, upon detailed planning and preparation; reconnaissance of the position and an area extending 500 to 1000 meters from its periphery; dispersion of men, weapons and vehicles; dug in positions for all vehicles; one- and two-man fighting positions dug in and located between and forward of vehicles sited on the perimeter; ambushes and listening posts well forward of the perimeter; planned defensive fires, to include those of automatic weapons removed from vehicles and employed in a ground role; instantaneous and continuous illumination; saturation use of claymores, trip flares, protective wire, hand grenades and M79-launched 40mm grenades; plans for employing artillery in a direct fire role; good communications; and the spirit

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

S3

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II) (U)

professionalism and courage of the defenders.

d. Sustained operations in an environment and under the conditions which existed in the Khe Sanh area eventually exerted their toll on APCs, tanks, bulldozers and other tracked vehicles. Despite the outstanding maintenance effort put forth, force vehicles were fast approaching the point where more time was spent in maintaining them than operating them. In time, a lengthy maintenance standdown would have been required, and it is questionable whether available helicopter assets would have been sufficient to support the lift of assemblies, components, parts and materials that would have been required to render all vehicles completely operational.

e. In this type of an operation and since tactical employment of the force was tied so closely to logistical resupply, which, in turn, was tied to aerial delivery, it was imperative that the commander and the operations officer remain abreast, at all times, of the current and projected POL and ammunition status of the force. This was particularly true in the case of high density, high consumption 105mm, 155mm, 4.2-inch and 81mm ammunition.

f. Probably the most significant aspect of TF REMAGEN II's operation was that of logistically supporting an armor-mechanized infantry force solely by air. Aerial resupply was accomplished by USMC and 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) helicopters (CH-46s, CH-47s and CH-53s), and, considering the limited helicopter assets available to TF HOTEL, support received was outstanding. Inclosure 12, hereto, outlines the magnitude of the effort required to maintain an armor-mechanized infantry force via an ALOC.

12 Incl

1. Map Overprint
2. Initial Dispositions of TF
3. Fragmentary Order 15
4. Fragmentary Order 16
5. Fragmentary Order 17
6. Fragmentary Order 18
7. Fragmentary Order 19
8. Fragmentary Order 20
9. Fragmentary Order 21
10. Plan for Post-Attack Pursuit
of the Enemy on 28 April 1969
11. Intelligence Spot Reports
12. Logistics

David E. Hartigan, Jr.
DAVID E. HARTIGAN, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 3 (FRAG ORDER 15 to OPORD 5-69) Combat After Action Report.

Phase II (120800H Apr 69 - 130700 Apr 69)

1. Mission

TF REMAGEN conducts Recon-in-Force West to Laotian border; begins pioneering operation North to LZ ALPINE and South to NVA Hwy 926 effective 120800H Apr 69.

2. Tm ALPHA:

a. Attached 1 Bulldozer effective 120800H Apr 69

b. Begin tank trail from CP5 - CP6 - CP7.

c. Be prepared to continue to CP8 O/O.

3. Tm BRAVO: Conduct detailed search of area Y.

4. Tm CHARLIE: Conduct Recon-in-Force to CP22 - 23; be prepared to continue to CP31 O/O.

5. Tm ARMOR: Displace to CP3; be prepared to reinforce Tm BRAVO or Tm CHARLIE O/O.

6. Set/1-61: CP Security.

7. 4.2 Plat: GS from CP1

8. 1/A/7 Engr (-): Improve fording site at CP14.

9. C/1-40 Arty:

a. GS from CP1

b. Be prepared to displace to CP22.

10. M/4-12 Arty: GS from CP1.

11. Plat/B/1-12 Arty: DS of Tm CHARLIE.

Acknowledge:

EARTIGAN
LTJ

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Girouard
GIROUARD

S3

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 4 (FRAG ORDER 16 to OPOD 5-69) to Combat After Action Report

Phase II (130630H Apr 69 - 141200H Apr 69)

1. Mission: No Change.
2. Tm ALPHA:
 - a. Displace to CP 39.
 - b. Be prepared to conduct search in area Z.
3. Tm BRAVO: Continue present mission.
4. Tm CHARLIE:
 - a. RRF for Tm ALPHA at CP 22.
 - b. Be prepared to displace to CP 33 O/O.
 - c. Provide security for C/1-40 at CP 22.
5. Tm ARMOR: Continue present mission.
6. Sgt Plat: CP security.
7. 4.2 Plat: GS
8. C/1-40:
 - a. Displace to CP 22 at 130900H Apr 69.
 - b. DS of Tm ALPHA.
9. M/4-12: GS
10. Plat/B/1-12: GS
11. 1/A/7 Ezer (-): Continue present mission.

Acknowledge:

HARTIGAN
LTC

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Girouard
GIROUARD
S3

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 5 (FRAG ORDER 17 to OPORD 5-69) to Combat After Action Report

Phase II (141200H Apr 69 - 151700H Apr 69)

1. Tm ALPHA:

- a. Continue search in area Z.
- b. Displace to CP 3 effective 141400H Apr 69.
- c. Assume security of C/1-40 Artillery at CP 22 effective 150800H Apr 69, and displace to CP 14 with C/1-40 Artillery 0/0.

2. Tm BRAVO:

- a. Assume security of C/1-40 Artillery at CP 22 effective 141700H Apr 69.
- b. Move to Ca Lu at 150800H Apr 69 and become OPCON to 1st Brigade 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), upon arrival at Ca Lu.

3. Tm CHARLIE:

- a. Ready Reaction Force at CP 22 for Tm ALPHA.
- b. Displace to CP 1 upon arrival of Tm BRAVO who will assume security of C/1-40 Artillery at CP 22.
- c. Move to Ca Lu at 150630H Apr 69 and become OPCON to 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), upon arrival at Ca Lu.

4. Scout Plat: TF REMAGEN Command Post Security.

5. 4.2 Plat: GS

6. Other units: No Change.

Acknowledge:

HARTIGAN
LTC

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Gironard
GIRONARD
S3

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 6 (FRAG ORDER 18 to OPORD 5-69) to Combat After Action Report

Phase III (151700H Apr 69 - 180700H Apr 69)

1. Tm ALPHA:

- a. Move to CP 39 effective 160700H Apr 69 and search area Z.
- b. Be prepared to displace to CP 13 O/O.

2. Tm ARVN: Continue present mission.

3. Other units: No Change.

Acknowledge:

HARTIGAN
LTC

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Girouard
GIROUARD
S3

CONFIDENTIAL

**DOWNGRADED at 3 year intervals
DECLASSIFIED after 12 years
DOD Dir 5200 10**

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 7 (FRAG ORDER 19 to OPORD 5-69) to Combat After Action Report

Phase III (180000H Apr 69 - 231200H Apr 69)

1. Tm ALPHA:

- a. Move to CP 17 with C/1-40 Artillery.
- b. Continue move to CP 56 with C/1-40 Artillery.
- c. Be prepared to move to CP 52 O/O.

2. Tm ARMOR:

- a. Continue to move to CP 44.
- b. Upon arrival at CP 44 conducted mounted sweeps to CP 61, 45 and 47.
- c. Be prepared to displace back to CP 56 and assume security of C/1-40 Artillery O/O.

3. Tm ARVN:

- a. Upon arrival at CP 5, conduct a search of area north of QL-9 as shown on overlay.
- b. Report crossing of Phase Lines.

4. Other units: No Change.

Acknowledge:

HARTIGAN
LTC

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Girouard
GIROUARD
S3

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED at 3 year intervals
DECLASSIFIED after 12 years
DOD Dir 5200 10

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 8 (FRAG ORDER 20 to OPOD 5-69) to Combat After Action Report

Phase IV (231200H Apr 69 - 251200H Apr 69)

1. Tm ALPHA:

a. Assume security of C/1-40 Artillery and displace to CP 17 with C/1-40 Artillery effective 230800H Apr 69.

b. Be prepared to establish a Fire Support Base at CP 22 with C/1-40 Artillery O/O.

2. Tm ARMOR:

a. Laager at CP 56 and conduct search in area around CP 56.

b. Be prepared to displace to CP 1 O/O.

3. Tm ARVN: Continue search in present zone.

4. Other units: No Change.

Acknowledge:

HARTIGAN
LTC

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Girouard
GIROUARD

S3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 9 (FRAG ORDER 21 to OPORD 5-69) to Combat After Action Report

Phase IV (251200H Apr 69 - 280600H Apr 69)

1. Tm ALPHA:

- a. Conduct detailed search of area Y effective 250600H Apr 69.
- b. Be prepared to displace to CP 3 0/0.

2. Tm ARMOR:

- a. Move to CP 13 and conduct search in area S.
- b. Ready Reaction Force for TF REMAGEN.

3. Tm ARVN:

- a. Conduct detailed search of area V effective 250700H Apr 69.
- b. Displace to CP 5 effective 251700H Apr 69.
- c. Be prepared to conduct search in vicinity of CP 22 effective 270800H Apr 69.

4. C/1-40 Arty: Displace to CP 3 with Tm ALPHA.

5. Other units: No Change.

Acknowledge:

HARTIGAN
LTC

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

Girouard
GIROUARD
S3

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED at 3 year intervals
DECLASSIFIED after 12 years
DOD Dir 5200 10

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 11 (Intelligence Spot Reports) to Letter, Headquarters,
1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry, subject: Combat After
Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN III), dated 29 May 1969.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>INCIDENT</u>
12 April	1400	A/1-77, at XD701360, found three shelters, 20'x10', freshly cut.
14 April	0715	A/1-61, at XD703383, found two cans of 60mm mortar cartridges, estimated to have been there one week. Not rusty. Destroyed.
14 April	0743	A/1-61, at XD705386, found five old bunkers (4'x4'x8'), with two-foot overhead cover. Bunkers destroyed.
14 April	0800	A/1-61, at XD705385, found one 1,000 pound bomb and one 500 pound bomb. Destroyed in place.
14 April	0930	A/1-61, at XD709388, found one bunker, fairly new, 8'x7'x4', with 1 1/2 foot dirt cover and bamboo door. Destroyed.
14 April	1015	A/1-61, at XD709388 found one box of 82mm fuses. Destroyed.
14 April	1210	A/1-77, at XD787329, spotted three NVA. Tried to apprehend. Unsuccessful.
14 April	1320	A/1-61, at XD705388, found 11 122mm rockets, 9 fuses, 1 120mm mortar round, 30,000 rounds of 7.62 in cases, and 96 82mm mortar rounds. Destroyed.
16 April	1100	A/1-61, at XD710386, found four bunkers, 3'x6'x6', with double wood roof. Two to three weeks old. Also a trail from NW to SE.
16 April	1325	A/1-61, at XD698394, found one bridge across a gorge. Seven to eight feet wide, 15 feet long, made of interwoven bamboo. Could support any two-wheel vehicle or towed artillery piece. Also found a footbridge.
16 April	1355	A/1-61, at XD775241, found numerous bunkers and signs of recent activity. Also, at XD369234, found more bunkers and a bicycle tire.
16 April	1405	A/1-61, at XD690394, found a bridge 7 feet wide and 20 feet long. Reinforced to hold large trucks.
16 April	1505	A/1-61, at XD690394, found another bridge 7 feet wide and 14 feet long.
16 April	1645	A/1-61, at XD708392, found three I-shaped bunkers, 5'x3' with bamboo tops.
17 April	0855	A/1-61, at XD716394, found an old bunker complex made of logs. Inside found one NVA gas mask (fairly new) and one ChiCom grenade (old). Destroyed.
17 April	1000	A/1-61, at XD708393, found an old bunker complex and some huts. Destroyed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 11 (Intelligence Spot Reports) to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry, subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969.
(Continued).

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>INCIDENTS</u>
17 April	2315	HHG/1-61 reported one man approximately 50 meters out from TFR CP perimeter. Illumination fired. Negative results.
18 April	0020	HHG/1-61 spotted one man on perimeter of TFR CP. Fired M-79 with negative results.
18 April	0105	HHG/1-61 reported one man on west edge of perimeter of TFR CP. Fired M-16 and M-79 with negative results.
20 April	1800	A/1-77 spotted six to seven individuals at XD815274. Called in artillery fires with negative results.
20 April	2055	2/7 ARVN heard and saw some movement 300 meters south of its perimeter at XD862396.
20 April	2128	TFR CP, at XD818356, had trip flare set off outside of perimeter. Also sighted lights 100-200 meters out. M-79 fired with negative results.
22 April	1420	A/1-61, at XD865238, XD874227, and XD874225, found two bunkers 4'x4'x6', one bunker 2'x4'x4', one bunker 2'x4'x4', respectively. Also found one ChiCom grenade. Destroyed.
22 April	1650	2/7 ARVN, at XD815392, and XD817386, respectively, found five old caves and three old bunkers, and two old hooches.
22 April	1730	A/1-61, at XD860248, found two bunkers, 3'x5' and 2'x3'x4'. Roofs reinforced with logs. Newly built. Destroyed.
22 April	1800	2/7 ARVN, at XD817386, spotted three to eight NVA. Fired mortar and .50 caliber with negative results.
24 April	1815	FAC informed A/1-61 of three NVA in the open at XD812376. FAC fired WP rockets with negative results.
25 April	0330	2/7 ARVN, at XD788358, received mortar and RPG fire followed by ground attack.
25 April	0430	A 1/77 3rd Platoon with ARVN at XD788358, reported taking RPG and mortar fire.
25 April	0545	Results of Contact on Fire Support Base: 33 NVA KIA. Captured materials: 12 AK-47s; 4 RPG-2 (B-40) Launchers; 1 RPG-7 (B-41) launcher; 2SG-43 machineguns; 1 SG-43 mount; 1 bangalore torpedo; 100 AK-47 magazines; 10 RPG-2 (B-40) rounds; 300 satchel charges; 50 ChiCom grenades; and 6 RPG-7 (B-41) rounds. All NVA KIAs had number sewn on left pocket, to. 403015/40-20. Bottom number same in all cases. Top number differed only in last two or three digits.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 11 (Intelligence Spot Report) to Letter, Headquarters,
1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry, subject: Combat After
Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969.
(Continued).

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>INCIDENTS</u>
25 April	0605	A/1-61, at XD794362, received two RPG rounds and one 82mm mortar round.
27 April	0740	2/7 ARVN and 1st Platoon A/1-77, at XD819379, had a mine command detonated in front of the lead vehicle. They spotted one man and fired on him.
27 April	0835	A/1-77 platoon with ARVN, at XD819379, found one NVA KIA and the wire on the command-detonated mine.
27 April	0845	2/7 ARVN, at XD819379, reported two NVA KIA wearing pith helmets, light khakis, web gear, one full pack, one AK-47, one RPG-2 (B-40) launcher, wire and blasting cap, generator, and four T-41 mines.
27 April	0955	Scouts 1-61 found two T-41 mines, 100 meters ahead of last mine and downed vehicle. Command detonated. Destroyed.
27 April	1240	2/7 ARVN, at XD799358, found 30 old caves, foxholes and 2-man positions. Approximately a company-size position. Had been used in the last few days.
27 April	1310	2/7 ARVN at XD799358, had one trip flare set off in front of Scouts and two in front of A/1-77. Scouts spotted man and fired on him. A/1-77 saw two dogs.
28 April	0309	A/1-61, at XD844372, received ground attack with SAF and RPG fire from an estimated company (reinforced).
28 April	1030	2/7 ARVN, at XD834392, spotted enemy in trees along stream. Took under fire. Results: Four NVA KIA, two AK-47s and one fieldphone captured.
28 April	1100	Results of A/1-61 contact: 26 NVA KIA (Team ALPHA; 4 NVA KIA (Team ARVN); 4 NVA KBA; with 15 AK-47s (with folding stocks); 1 RPD IMG; 2 RPG-2 (B-40) launchers; 76 RPG rounds; 19 60mm rounds; 16 rifle grenades; 3 bangalore torpedoes; 300 pounds of explosives, and 2 ChiCom medical kits.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 6 st Infantry, subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969

1. (C) General:

a. Personnel average daily strength for Task Force REMAGEN II,

(1) Average daily strength during the period 110800H April 1969 to 151200H April 1969 was 743.

(2) Average daily strength during the period 151200H April 1969 to 201200H April 1969 was 549.

(3) Average daily strength during the period 201200H April 1969 to 292145H April 1969 was 749.

b. Organization for Logistics: Tab A to Inclosure 12 to Combat After Action Report.

c. All resupply was accomplished by air. Aerial resupply missions were flown to Task Force REMAGEN II daily by United States Marine Corp and 101st Airborne Division helicopters (primarily CH-47's). Daily resupply: Tab B to Inclosure 12 to Combat After Action Report.

d. Medical Support: Tab C to Inclosure 12 to Combat After Action Report.

2. (C) Summary of Resupply Problems:

a. The logistical problems encountered by Task Force REMAGEN II were complex and varied. The initial problems resulted when the Task Force received a major task organization change immediately after arriving in the area of operations. This task organization change resulted in the battalion field trains being tasked to provide support for four maneuver companies, two artillery batteries and the Task Force Headquarters. The logistical requirements of the reorganized Task Force were almost double those anticipated when the battalion trains were organized. One of the major difficulties derived from the lack of necessary equipment was aerial resupply. Fuel bladders, water bladders, and cargo nets were the most critical items, although, initially, there were not enough aircraft available to deliver the required fuel and resupply items, even if the bladders and slings had been available. Resupply operations were hindered considerably when Vandegrift Combat Base was subjected to an indirect fire attack that closed the logistical supply area for about seven hours. The logistical problems, especially those problems of a reoccurring nature, encountered in the forward area were extremely difficult to solve due to the lack of a main supply route or organic support aircraft and the logistical operations did not stabilize until the fifth day of the operation. At this time, the additional personnel and equipment necessary to support the task force began to arrive at Vandegrift Combat Base. Additionally, logistical air support (CH-47s) was received from the 101st Airborne division. As a general rule, priority cargo that was delivered to the logistical supply point, and manifested the evening prior to the day it was needed, was delivered without difficulty. The availability of aircraft continued to be a problem, however, as many priority requests for parts were delayed from two to three days due to an inability to deliver repair parts from the base camps of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry and 1st Battalion, 77th Armor to the forward support area in one day. Tactical vehicles frequently were deadlined for two or three days for parts that were available in the rear areas, because those parts had to be transported to the forward support area at Vandegrift Combat Base by vehicle. In some cases, tactical operations were hindered by inoperable vehicles deadlined for parts. One UH-1D helicopter made

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry, subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969. (Continued)

available to the S4 on a daily basis would solve these problems as well as the problems of moving personnel, administrative paraphernalia and mail that needs to be transported on an unscheduled basis.

b. Loss of, or damage to, bladders, slings, and other equipment was minimal, even though the most frequently used method of resupply was unit distribution, and water bladders, as well as fuel bladders, were delivered to the maneuver elements on a daily basis. Of the two water trailers destroyed, one was destroyed by enemy fire. There were only five bladders destroyed during the entire operation.

c. For an armor or mechanized force to operate effectively when resupply is being accomplished totally by air, maintenance requirements must be considered as critical. Otherwise, the mission of the task force may be jeopardized due to the lack of necessary repair parts. The fact that logistical air support must be more responsive than would normally be required for support of a pure Infantry unit was apparent from the beginning of the operation.

3. (C) Compilation of Logistics:

a. Rations:

- (1) C-rations: 34 pallets (26,112 meals).
- (2) Sundry Packs: 50.
- (3) One hot meal was fed daily to an average of 530 personnel.

b. POL:

- (1) MOGAS: 7600 gallons.
- (2) Diesel: 26,800 gallons.
- (3) OE 10: 210 gallons.
- (4) OE 30: 430 gallons.
- (5) OE 50: 530 gallons.
- (6) GO 90: 90 gallons.
- (7) GAA: 60 gallons.
- (8) Hydraulic Fluid: 71 gallons.
- (9) Brake Fluid: 35 gallons.

c. Ammunition:

- (1) 5.56mm: 27,400 rounds.
- (2) 7.62mm: 112,800 rounds.
- (3) .50 caliber: 43,200 rounds.
- (4) 40mm (M79): 4,032 rounds.
- (5) 40mm (Duster): 256 rounds.
- (6) Hand Flares: 240.
- (7) Fragmentation Hand Grenades: 546.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanical), 61st Infantry, subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969. (Continued)

- (8) 81mm: 418 HE, 32 Illumination and 15 WP.
- (9) 4.2-Inch: 830 HE, 155 Illumination and 33 WP.
- (10) 90mm: 156 HE, 74 Canister and 22 WP.
- (11) 105mm: 1277 HE, 210 Illumination, 80 WP and 86 Beehive.
- (12) 155mm: 900HE and 104 Illumination.
- (13) 8-Inch: 400 HE.

d. The following major assemblies were installed in the field:

- (1) Engine: M113A1 (1) and M548 (1).
- (2) Power Pack: M106A1 (1); M108A1 (1); and M109A1 (1).
- (3) Transmission: M548 (2); M578 (1); and M48A3 (1).
- (4) Final Drive: M48A3 (1) (This includes major suspension system repair necessitated by anti-tank mine damage.)

- ✓ Tab A: Organization for Logistics
- ✓ Tab B: Daily Resupply List
- ✓ Tab C: Medical Support

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab A (Organization for Logistics) to Inclosure 12 (Logistics)
to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry,
subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II),
dated 29 May 1969.

1. (C) Combat Trains - Khe Sanh

a. Headquarters Section:

CPT CHRISTIAN	1542	Battalion S4
SP5 WILBURN	64B20	RTO
PFC MUNOZ	11B20	RTO
PFC FARMER	63C20	Driver/RTO

b. Support Platoon:

SGT KNIGHT	64C40	Ammunition Section Chief
SP4 AVILA	64B20	Driver
SP4 RAMIREZ	64B20	Driver
SP4 BOOK	64B20	Driver
SP4 KELLY	11B20	Driver
PFC SCHWARTZ	64B20	Driver
PFC HOTCHKISS	64B20	Resupply RTO

c. Medical Platoon:

CPT MASTER	3100	Battalion Surgeon
SSG DARGER	91B40	Evacuation Sergeant
SP5 EARLIN	91C20	Medical Operations Assistant
SP5 MC GORMICK	91B20	Aidman
SP5 LUTHER	91B20	Aidman

d. Maintenance Section:

MSG GUESS	63Z50	Battalion Motor Sergeant
1LT FITZGERALD	1542	Battalion Motor Officer
SP5 SMITH	63C30	Senior Recovery Specialist
SP5 ZIEGLER	63C30	Senior Recovery Specialist
SP5 ELLIOT	63C30	Senior Recovery Specialist
		Senior Track Mechanic
SP5 BOWERS	63C30	Senior Recovery Specialist
SP5 MILLER	63C30	Engineer Equipment Repairman
SP4 BERQUIST	63C20	Recovery Specialist
SP4 BROWN	12A10	Recovery Specialist
SP4 BOYLE	63C20	Track Mechanic
SP4 DODD	63C20	Track Mechanic
SP4 PACINSKI	63C20	Track Mechanic
SP4 CARAWAY	63C20	Track Mechanic
SP4 DANYLUK	63C20	Track Mechanic

e. Equipment:

M577 Command Carrier	1
M578 VTR	2
M548 Cargo Carrier	2
M548 w/POL Pods	3
M88 VTR from D/75th Spt-Bn	1
M88 VTR with Tm ARMOR	1

2. (C) Field Trains - Vandegrift Combat Base (YD000490)

a. Headquarters Section:

CPT LANGSTON	1542	GO, Company D
1LT MOORE	1542	XO, Company D
SGT GREENWOOD	11B40	Communications Section
		Chief
SP4 NELSON	63C20	Driver

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab A (Organization for Logistics) to Inclosure 12 (Logistics)
to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry,
subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II),
dated 29 May 1969. (continued)

b. Support Platoon:

1LT HEATH	1542	Support Platoon Leader
SGT MIFFLIN	64C40	Truckmaster
SP5 ALLEN	64B20	POL Section
SGT WAINWRIGHT	76S40	TAERS Clerk
SSG RAMEY	11B40	Platoon Sergeant/Ammo Section
SP4 SURRETT	11B20	Driver
SP4 MICHELI	64B20	Driver
SP4 TULLO	64B20	Driver
SP4 BALTEZORE	11B20	Driver
PFC BAIRD	64B20	Driver
SP4 FERGUSON	64B20	Driver
SP4 COLLIER	64B20	Driver
SP4 KASKY	11B20	Driver

c. One Company Mess Team.

d. Equipment:

M54 5-Ton truck	5	
M543A2 5-Ton Wrecker	1	(Critical Item)
M151 1/2-Ton Truck	3	
M37 3/4-Ton Truck	1	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab B (Daily Resupply) to Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry,
subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969.

DATE	FUEL (Consumption per Day)		AMMUNITION (Nr of rds by type per day)	C-Rations (Pallet = 120 cases)	WATER	LUBRICANTS	TRACKS	TOTAL TONNAGE	AIRCRAFT (Required per day)
	Diesel	Mogas							
11 Apr	2500 gal		105mm: 1200	3	500			61,800	8
12 Apr		500 gal	81mm: 108 90mm: 40 105mm: 240 Pwdr bags: 400 8 in.: 300	6		795 gal	164 track blocks for M48A3	100,900	14
13 Apr			4.2 in.: 400	10		100 gal		26,800	3
14 Apr	2500 gal	500 gal	8 in.: 100 Pwdr Bags: 300 4.2 in.: 240 90mm: 96 81mm: 60 .50 cal: 2000 105mm: 60 .30 cal: 600	7		100 gal	400 track blocks for M113A1. 180 track blocks for M48A3	100,920	13
15 Apr	2500 gal	500 gal			1,000		164 track blocks	43,000	11
16 Apr	3000 gal	1000 gal		2	1,000	330 gal		16,200	2
17 Apr	3000 gal	500 gal	.50 cal: 4000 90mm: 60 81mm: 60	3		100 gal		42,900	6

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab B (Daily Resupply) to Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry, subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969. (continued)

18 Apr	2000 gal	5000 gal	105mm: 240 Pwdr Bags: 250 155mm: 190			
19 Apr	1500 gal	500 gal	4.2 in.: 240 155mm: 1500 Pwdr Bags: 200 .50 cal: 1000 7.62mm: 1000		150 VTR blocks	58,400
20 Apr	2000 gal		81mm: 55 90mm: 59 105mm: 60	1,500		49,900
21 Apr				500	Engine and transmission	17,400
22 Apr			155mm: 72	3 500	Engine, M113A1	26,200
23 Apr	3300 gal	1600 gal				21,600
24 Apr		500 gal	155mm: 290			39,500
25 Apr	3000 gal		5.56mm: 30000 .50 cal: 20000 90mm: 75 7.62mm: 12000 90mm: 38 .50 cal: 3200 7.62mm: 15000 40mm: 256 81mm: 300 Frsg Gren: 300		Final Drive, M113A1	63,000

2
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab B (Daily Resupply) to Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry
 subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969. (continued)

26 Apr	1000 gal	155mm: 160	1,500	48,800	7
27 Apr	1500 gal	105mm: 260 4.2 in.: 55		Engine, M113A1	3
28 Apr		.50 cal: 20000 7.62mm: 52800 7.62mm: 18000 40mm: 350 81mm: 432 5.56mm: 13440 M18A1: 36 Trip Flare: 192 L-312: 72		36,000	4
TOTAL	26,800 gal 7,600 gal		34 6,500 gal	777,400	119

Tab B does not show the many small repair parts, items of equipment and various small arms ammunitions which were placed within larger aircraft loads, or vice versa. Also one hot meal daily to include sundry items which were placed on various aircrafts.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab C (Medical Support) to Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry, subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969.

1. (C) Medical personnel in direct support of Task Force REMAGEN II consisted of the Battalion Surgeon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry, and four medics: one 91020 (doctors assistant), two 91B20 (field medic), and one 91B40 (evacuation sergeant). The forward aid station worked from an armored personnel carrier (M113A1) and a GP small tent. Each line company was supported by five medics.

2. (C) There were 150 total patient visits. A complete summary of individual patients treated by the battalion aid station, forward, from 10 April 1969 to 28 April 1969 is as follows:

	INITIAL VISITS	TOTAL NUMBER OF PATIENT VISITS
Diarrheal Disease	2	2
Respiratory Disease	12	15
Dermatological Disease	38	38
FUO	4	8
Dental Problems	3	4
Veneraal Disease	2	2
RENT	8	8
Fragmentation Wounds	7	7
Cephalgia	9	11
Dressing Change	0	10
Sprains	3	3
Burns	5	7
Concussion	1	1
Minor Injuries	18	18
Lower Back Pain	3	3
Insect Bites	3	4
Hernia	1	1
Constipation	3	3
Major Laceration	1	1
Fractures	1	1
Ingrown Nail	1	1
Gastroenteritis	2	2
TOTAL	127	150

3. (C) Despite almost daily ambient temperatures in excess of 100° F, only one case of heat fatigue was sustained in approximately five hundred and twenty men.

4. (C) There were fourteen cases of Falciparum malaria reported from Task Force REMAGEN II. Eleven of these cases gave history of irregular use of both Chloroquine-Primaquine and Dapsone. The following is a breakdown by units:

a. 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry (290 personnel): 10 cases.

b. Company A, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor (70 personnel): 2 cases.

c. 1st Platoon, Company A, 7th Engineers (Reinforced) (33 personnel): 2 cases.

5. (C) Two cases of gonorrhea reported were men returning from out-of-country R&R centers and responded readily to penicillin therapy.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab C (Medical Support) to Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Letter, Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry, subject: Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969. (continued)

6. (C) There were 19 medivacs flown carrying a total of 123 patients (17 KHA, 90 WHA, 16 non-hostile injuries). Medivacs were flown to either Company B, 75th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), at Camp Red Devil or 3rd Marine Division Field Hospital at Dong Ha Combat Base. There were ten patients that did not require evacuation and were treated successfully in the field.

7. (C) Field sanitary discipline was maintained on a high level with the daily burning of trash and garbage and the burning or burying of human feces.

8. (C) Bathing was encouraged in the clear, quick running streams in the area.

9. (C) Local streams supplied an easily accessible source of water and supplied fifty to sixty percent of our daily drinking water. This water was rendered potable by use of calcium hypochlorite and water purification tablets. Daily untoward effects and diarrheal disease was kept at a minimum. Potable water was also flown in from the rear areas.

10. (C) Preventive dentistry paste was distributed to all companies to prevent oral disease and reduce non-effectiveness from these conditions.

11. (C) Medical plans of support were capable of handling the amount and types of casualties occurring during the operation of Task Force REMAGEN II.

12. (C) A complete inventory of supplies used by the battalion aid station, forward, and company aidmen is as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Varidase	tablet	16
Tetracaine ophthalmic ointment	tube	1
Benadryl, 50mg	capsule	24
Ornade Spansule	capsule	12
Compazine	capsule	40
ECN		2 ounces
Tedral	tablet	40
Cortisporin Ophthalmic Ointment	tube	3
Hydrocortisone Cream	tube	5
Robaxin, 500mg	tablet	1500
Cascara Segrada	tablet	4
Eugenol	bottle	1
Chloroquine-Primaquine	tablet	1500
Dapsone	tablet	10,500
Calcium hypochlorite	ampule	500
Water Purification	tablet	3,000
Procaine Penicillin	unit	4.8 mil
Bicillin	unit	4.8 mil
Benadryl injectable	ampule	1
Epizuphrine	tube	1
Morphine Tartate	syrette	16
Ringers Lactate	liter	1
Darvon Compound 65	capsule	200
Bacitracin Ointment	tube	10
Tetracycline HCl	tablet	400

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab C (Medical Support) to Inclosure 12 (Logistics) to Letter,
Headquarters, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 61st Infantry, subject:
Combat After Action Report (Task Force REMAGEN II), dated 29 May 1969.
(continued)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Aerosporin	bottle	2
Donnatal	tablet	75
Phenergan		4 oz.
V Cillin K, 250mg	tablet	600
Furacin Ointment	jar	1
Hydrogen Peroxide	pint	8
Vioform HC Ointment	tube	10
Polycillin, 250mg	capsule	80
Zactirin Compound	tablet	500
Dimetapp	tablet	500
ASA		450
Polymagma	tablet	50
Salt	tablet	80,000
Probalithine	tablet	40
Zinc Oxide	tube	1
APC	tablet	200
Potassium Permanganate	tablet	12
Tinactin Drops	bottle	2
Kwell Cream	tube	1
5% Dextrose	liter	12
PhisoHex	gallon	1
70% Isopropyl Alcohol	gallon	2 1/2
Vescodeine	quart	1
Dressing	4x7	60
Dressing	4x4 n/s	240
Dressing	2x2 n/s	72
Dressing	2x2 sterile	48
Dressing	4x4 sterile	120
Band-aids		50
Adhesive Tape	2 in. roll	2
Adhesive Tape	3 in. roll	3
Paper Tape	1 in. roll	10
Paper Tape	3 in. roll	3
Ace Bandage	roll	14
6 in. Kerlex	roll	20
Steri Strip	pack	2
1/2 "00" Nylon Suture	pack	4
Sylocaine	bottle	1
20 gage needles		20
syringes	5cc	20
Cotton Tipped Applicator		120
IV Set-Up		13
Litter		6

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

3D MARBIV
BT#308169

3/AJM/rwb
3480
Ser: 03027369
30 Sep 1969

CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) Report
AVBL-G of 21 Sep 1969

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
To: Commanding General, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Via: (1) Commanding General, XXIV Corps, Vietnam
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation WILLIAM'S
GLADE)

Ref: (a) MACV Dir 335-8

1. Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with reference (a).
2. Contents noted, no action deemed necessary.

W. E. Barrineau
W. E. BARRINEAU
By direction

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

Copy No. 9 of 9 Copies
CONFIDENTIAL

TAB-6

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
APO San Francisco 96477

AVBL-C

21 September 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation William's Glade, 12
July 1969 - 26 July 1969.

THRU: Commanding General
3rd Marine Division
FPO 96602

THRU: Commanding General
XXIV Corps
APO 96308

THRU: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Forces
FPO 96602

TO: Commander
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MAC J343

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION:

- a. NAME: William's Glade
- b. Type: Search and Clear

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 121200H July 1969 to 260600H July 1969.

3. (U) LOCATION: From the Dong Ha and Quang Tri Combat Base areas (YD 2650)
southwest to the Mai Loc area and south to the Ba Long Valley.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

AVR-0

21 September 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation William's Glade, 12 July 1969 - 26 July 1969.

4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

5. (U) UNIT COMMANDERS:

Commanding Officer, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech): COL John L. Osteen, Jr.

Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion (Mech), 61st Infantry: LTC David E. Hartigan.

Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division: LTC C. E. Wilcox.

6. (G) TASK ORGANIZATION:

Task Force 1-61

1-4 Marines

1-61 Inf (Mech) (-1 Co)

A/4-12 Cav

A/1-11 Inf

2 teams, P/75th Inf

1 team, 407th RRD

7. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Helicopter Support:

(1) During the period 12 July to 26 July 1969 the Brigade aviation section flew a total of 64 hours in support of Operation Williams's Glade. The missions flown included daily resupply flights from LZ Sharon to the forward CP at LZ Pedro and to the units operating in the field. Aircraft from the Brigade aviation section were used extensively for command and control and visual reconnaissance by the battalion and company commanders.

(2) There were no air assaults conducted during this operation.

b. Fixed Wing Support:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A/PL-G

21 September 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation William's Glade, 12 July 1969 - 26 July 1969.

(1) The Brigade TACP provided the forward air controllers. The FACs from the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron were in the air or on alert status 24 hours a day.

(2) There were no TPQ's flown during Operation William's Glade.

c. Artillery Support:

(1) The 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery was in direct support of the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) with priority of fires from A and C Batteries to the task force operating in William's Glade AO. Battery L, 4th Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division was in general support - reinforcing the 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery.

(2) Summary of Artillery Missions:

<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>ILL</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>SMK</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A/5-4 Arty	327	993		52	4	1049
C/5-4 Arty	296	1448	35	118		1601
L/4-12 Regt (Marine)	22	103	18	4	-	125
TOTAL	645	2544	53	174	4	2775

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Information Available Prior to the Operation:

(1) Prior to Operation William's Glade extensive patrolling was done by Army Rangers and Marine reconnaissance units in the proposed area of operations. These intelligence gathering units produced no indications that enemy forces were operating in strength in the area.

(2) Elements of the Quang Ha Committee were believed to be located southwest of the Ba Long River. This committee takes its name from the area in which it serves (Quang Tri - Dong Ha). The primary mission of the committee is political in nature. It is designed to serve as the governing body for the Quang Tri - Dong Ha area in the event of a National Liberation Front victory. Currently committee members serve as guides for enemy propagandists sent to proselytize Vietnamese civilians in the Brigade's AO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVEL-C

21 September 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation William's Glade, 12 July 1969 - 26 July 1969.

(3) Although their mission at present is to supply food for the 5th Company, 27th Battalion (indep) located in the Mai Loc area, units of the 7th Front in Base Area 101 and NV elements infiltrating from Laos; the committee also has a limited tactical capability. The committee is believed to consist of approximately 200 people, 60 of whom carry arms and normally operate in groups of five to eight. This unit is equipped with AK-47's, SKS's, RPG's and 60 mm mortars and has the capability of harassing friendly troops by direct fire.

(4) Intelligence indicated the enemy would avoid decisive contact. Heavy engagements would be too costly to enemy forces and would further restrict their northeast - southwest activity along two major trails: YD 181480 to YD 239530 and YD 210480 to YD 266550.

(5) All of the above information was obtained from captured documents and interrogation of PW's.

b. Terrain Analysis: The terrain in AO William's Glade is characterized by small hills and valleys covered with brushwood averaging three to five feet in height. Fields of fire extend 150 to 400 meters from the tops of these hills. An extensive trail network facilitates tracked vehicle movement. However, shallow streams in gulleys up to 12 feet deep with thick hedgerows restrict cross country vehicle movement and provide concealment for foot movement. Vegetation below horizontal grid line 45 is characterized by undergrowth and jungle canopy.

c. Enemy Contacts: During Operation William's Glade enemy forces in the area avoided contact. The only enemy initiated acts were a ten round mortar attack against a night defensive position and the emplacement of a 105 mm HE round as a mine. The mine was detected by Army engineers and destroyed in place. US forces initiated contact on two occasions. A day patrol engaged two NVA on a trail; both NVA fled to safety. A night ambush engaged and killed one NVA.

9. (C) MISSION: The 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) (reinforced by 1st Bn, 4th Marine Regiment) conducted search and clear operations in the area east of Highway 558 and west of QTGB. (See Operation Overlay, Inclosure 1).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVEN-C

21 September 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation William's Glade, 12 July 1969 - 26 July 1969.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: From 12 July to 24 July 1969 elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) with 1st Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division under its OPCON conducted a joint operation in the area east of Highway 558 and west of QTCB. From 24 July to 26 July 1969 elements of the 1st Brigade in coordination with 3rd Marine Division and ARVN forces conducted a search and clear operation and established a cordon to provide security for the departure ceremony of the 9th Marine Regimental Landing Team, 3rd Marine Division on 25 July 1969. (See Operation Overlay, Inclosure 2).

11. (C) EXECUTION: During Operation William's Glade elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) (Reinforced) conducted multiple search and clear operations, day patrols, and night ambushes. The following is a chronological list of significant events:

13 July 1969:

a. A/1-4 Marines uncovered a well camouflaged platoon patrol base with a small harbor for rivercraft at YD 250553.

b. D/1-4 Marines apprehended a female Vietnamese without an ID card. She was evacuated to IPW at Red Devil; she was interrogated, reclassified and released as an innocent civilian.

15 July 1969:

A/7th Engineers found a 105 mm HE round that was employed as a mine in the road at YD 257485. The round was blown in place.

17 July 1969:

B/1-61 Inf (Mech) found a bunker complex at YD 137482. The complex contained a medical station, underground mess, and five one-man fighting holes. The complex was destroyed.

18 July 1969

a. An ambush patrol from 3/B/1-4 Marines, located at YD 171431, engaged and killed one NVA with small arms fire.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

AVEL-G

21 September 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation William's Glade, 12
July 1969 - 26 July 1969.

b. At 1920H B/1-4 Marines, located at YD 174427, received eight to ten 60 mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from the east. There were no friendly casualties.

19 July 1969:

A/1-11 Inf found a complex of seven bunkers at YD 141510. They destroyed the bunkers.

22 July 1969:

1-4 Marines terminated their participation in Operation William's Glade and were lifted by helicopter to Vandegrift Combat Base.

23 July 1969:

A/1-11 Inf returned to LZ Sharon and ended their participation in Operation William's Glade.

24 July 1969:

TF 1-61 Inf, in conjunction with Marine and ARVN forces, conducted a search and clear operation. Purpose was to clear and secure the area for the departure ceremony of the 9th Marine Regimental Landing Team, 3rd Marine Division at Quang Tri on 25 July 1969. The mission was completed at 260600H July 1969.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Losses:

(1) Personnel: KIA. - 0
WIA(E) - 0
WIA(M) - 0
MIA - 0

(2) Material: None

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AEBL-C

21 September 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report, Operation William's Glade, 12
July 1969 - 26 July 1969.

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) Personnel: KIA - 1
PW - 0
Returnees - 0

(2) Material Losses: IWC - 0
CSWC - 0
seven - AK-47 magazines
one - 105 mm HE round

c. Due to terrain and weather, it was not possible for ground troops to search all areas where artillery missions were conducted.

d. There were no supplies of US origin found during this operation.

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply: During Operation William's Glade, there were 47 air-lifts (POL, water, and ammunition), for a total weight of 99,575 lbs. There were no logistical problems encountered during this operation.

b. Maintenance: There were no significant maintenance problems during this operation.

c. Medical: There were four friendly non hostile casualties (heat exhaustion).

d. Personnel: There were no problems encountered in maintaining unit strengths during this operation. The high loss of Brigade personnel during this period due to DEROS was offset by the replacements who arrived in late June and early July.

e. Civil Affairs: The 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) continued its support of the GVN Quang Tri Province Accelerated Pacification Program 1969 and the Refugee Resettlement Program (Phase II)..

14. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Although there were minimal enemy contacts during Operation William's Glade, the operation was successful in that:

a. It denied or impeded movement of NVA/VC from the Mai Loc area into populated areas for rice and during the operation stopped the launching of rockets from the area of operation into QTCE.

b. It provided an excellent training vehicle for the large number of new personnel who came to the unit in early July as a result of the Brigade's DEROS losses.

16. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS: None

John L. Osteen, Jr.

JOHN L. OSTEEN, JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Inclosures

- ✓1 - Operation Overlay
- ✓2 - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Special

9 - 3rd Mar Div

UNCLASSIFIED