

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 1969

SECRET MESSAGES

3RD MARINE DIVISION

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

6. 3d Marine Division (Rein)
Originated Messages (Secret)

DECLASSIFIED

NAVAL MESSAGE
 OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (REV. 3-61)

RELEASED BY

From COC

DATE

TOR/TOR

010039 H

ROUTED BY

CHECKED BY

PAGE

PAGES

OF

MESSAGE NR

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

302315 H

 PRECE-
 DENCE
 ACTION
 INFO

FLASH

EMERGENCY

OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

 FROM: CRYSTAL STAR
 TO: BENNINGTON
 AUGUST NIGHT
 EAGLE EYE

FRAG. ORDER # 26-69

1. A. 2. ENEMY BN. REPORTED IN VIC. ARUN/GRASS
 HOPPER AO 1 TO HOLD, 1 TO MOVE SOUTH TO
 ROUTE # 9 ON 1 MAY
 B. ARUN REGIMENT CONTINUE OPER. IN AO
2. CRYSTAL STAR CONT. PRESENT MISSION. PREPARE FOR
 RELIEF IN VIRGINIA BRIDGE AO BY AUGUST NIGHT
 ON 2 MAY VICE. 1 MAY.
3. A. NO CHANGE
 B. GRASS HOPPER COMPLETED HELO LIFT ON 1
 MAY TO SELECTED LZ AND CONT PRESENT MISS.
 C. SPEEDING HOME CONT. MISS. PREPARE FOR
 RELIEF ON 2 MAY
 D. LEAGUE LEADER CONT PRESENT MISS. PREPARE FOR
 RELIEF ON 2 MAY
 E. KNIFE BOY CONT. PRESENT MISS. PREPARE FOR
 ON 2 MAY
 F. C/I NO CHANGE
4. NO CHANGE
5. NO CHANGE.

010039 / 1 MAY 69 / GSH / KY-8 / TAC-2A

DISTRIBUTION

(PAGE ONE ONLY)

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

RECEIVED
8 MAY 2 M.
W

SHOVE COL

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DOPD

APPROVED BY RANGER
IN BASE AREA 101.

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~THE INTERIOR OF A VIET CONG~~

ON 26 SEP 69, A VIET CONG WAS AMBUSHED, SHOT AND CAPTURED BY RANGERS
FROM RANGEN 14. CAPTAIN P BALORE, 75TH INFANTRY IN BASE AREA 101.

THIS WAS NO ORDINARY VINE CONG. HIS NAME WAS MENTIONED AND HE
HAD BEEN HURLED FOR WEEKS BY ELEMENTS OF 1/1 OF THE 1ST BDE, FIFTH

THE 1ST (HONG) AND 2ND (HONG) TEAMS OF THE 75TH INF. HE WAS ONE OF THE
FIRST WANTED LIST GONG IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. HE HAD BEEN WANTED

... 45, FOR FAMILIARIZING ACTS OF AGGRESSION THAT INCLUDED THE
KILLING OF AMERICAN CIVILIANS, SABOTAGE, AND ESPIONAGE. HE WAS

VICTOR, FORMER ASSISTANT VILLAGE FORCE CHIEF, SAPPER CHIEF, AND GUERRILLA LEADER, WHO FOR THREE YEARS HAD OPERATED IN THE AREA WHERE HE WAS

• 11.11.2020

PLANNING FOR THE SUCCESSFUL AMBUSH AND SHOOTING TO DEATH OF

100 - 40TH VIET CONG CAIRE WAS THE RESULT OF THE WORK OF MANY. THE
 SENIOR ADVISOR, QUANG TRI PROVINCE, THE PHOENIX COMMITTEE, THE PROVINCE

ARMY TRNG COMB TREN, THE PROVINCIAL RECON UNIT, THE MAI LINH (D) HQCC, THE PROVING POST ADVISOR, THE 7TH COUNTERINTEL HQCCB TEAM, AND THE

SEVEN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT ALL TOOK PART IN THE PLANNING STAGE

10. TO THOSE PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PLANNING AND THE EXECUTION
OF THE ASSASSINATION OF VINCE GONG GAOBE QUENT, I EXTEND A "WELL DONE".

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

11:00 AM K. O. ... TIME 301626 APR 69

STAND Pg C

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

136

***** ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 002 1210245

ZNY SSSSS

Z 010245Z MAY 69 *Tod 0228/24 Corps*

FM THIRD MARDIV(REIN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC

TWELFTH MARINES COC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

I 3RD MARDIV

A. IM COMING EVENT ENTERED DMZ 010745H MAY 69 010745H AT 911650 WWS
INGAGED BY 6 MVA USING 3 COMMAND DETONATED CLWYMORES. REC FIRE
FROM 3 A/ W WPS IM SUSTAINED 1 FN KIA AND 1 FN WIA. IM RETURNED FIRE
AND WITH DREW WITH THEIR DEAD AND WOUNDED. IM REQ 81 AND ARTY FIRE
SUPPRRT, MED EVAC AN EXTRACTION FORCE. 010807H MAY 69 3 PLT I/3/4
DETACHED AND SENT AS EXTRACTION FORCE. 010828H AT 911653 EXTRACTION
FORCE LINKED UP WITH IM COMING EVENT. 010855 1 MED EVAC(EMERGENCY)
COMPLETZD, 1 KIA RETURNED TO I/3/4. P.S.

GP-4

BT

002

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

*****ZZ UUMSQ UUMSEMA UUMSQD UUMSJEA UUMSQW
DE UUMSK 3330 1210410

ZNY SSSSS

Z 0 010400Z MAY 69

FM XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG

INFO UUMSEMA/SENIOR US ADVISOR 1ST ARVN DIV RUE

UUMSQD/3D MAR DIV COC DNG

UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV (AM) DTOC CLE

UUMSQW/1ST MAW TOC DNG

RUYIN/CTG 70.8

BT

SECRET AVII-GC

SUBJ: FORCAST OF OPS REPORT FOR WEEK OF 3-12 MAY 69 (U)

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG DTG 160626Z JUN 68 (C).

B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 120910Z JUL 68 (C)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES A AND B :

A. FORCE MOVEMENT: NONE

B. FORECAST OF MAJOR OPEGATION BY 3DMAR DIV:

(1) NAME: HERKIMER MOUNTAIN 4TH MAR REG CONTROL HQS.

(2) DATES: 7 MAY 69-30 MAY 69

(3) LOCATION: AO BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY THE SOUTHERN

PAGE TWO UUMS 3330 SECRET

BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ; ON THE WEST XORM XB763663 TO XD820456 TO XD873402; ON THE SOUTH FROM XD873402 TO XD927400, ALONG THE DAKRONG RIVER XD983399 TO MAI LOC TAOR AT YD055458 TO YD022525 O XB946516 TO XB945580 QKD904650 TO SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF DMZ.

(4) FORCES: TWO BN'S OF 4TH MARINES

(5) MISSION: TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE CAM LO RIVER WITHIN THE AO AND PROVIDE YPCURITY FOR VCB, FSB, CATES, HILLS 691 AND 950.

(6) CONCEPTUAL SUMMARY: ONE BN SECURES THE RUSSEL AND NEVILLE AND CONDUCTS RIF OPS NORTH OF THE CAM LO RIVER WITH THE AO. THE REMAINING BN OPERATES VIC FSB CATES AND HILLS 950 AND 691.

(7) RATIONALE: ENEMY PRESENCE REQUIRES CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE ALONG THE DMZ

GP-4

BT

3330

**6
SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

H

DRAFTER 3/CED/egw
 SEC G-3OPNS PHONE 3180
 CWO PLA

010504 2 MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) DCH
 TO: FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QRR
 THIRD MARINES DCH
 INFO: CG III MAF DNG
 CG ARMY COMPS PHB

COPY TO: C/S
 COC
 G-3

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF OPCON

1. (G) EFFECTIVE 011200H JUN 69 CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) ASSUMES
 OPCON OF E/2/2 FROM 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH) AND SIMULTANEOUSLY
 PASSES OPCON TO THIRD MARINES.

2. (G) EFFECTIVE 011500H JUN 69 CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) ASSUMES
 OPCON OF E/2/3 FROM THIRD MARINES AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSES
 OPCON TO 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH).

GP-4

010504 RELEASED BY Thorgan Lubke DATE/TIME 011300H MAY 69

3(OPS)

C/S/COC/3

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SECRET

(137)

DRAFTED BY: WWB/RXR
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWC *WLB*

PRIORITY 011224 Z MAY 69

COPI TO: CIC

G-2

G-3

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN
TO: CMR TASK FORCE ALPHA, NKP, THAI
INFO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL, VCE, RVN

S E C R E T

THIS IS A DUEL BLADE MSG

PASS TO MARINO

1. (S) REQUEST SEEDING OF SENSOR STRINGS AT FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>COORDS</u>
MSID/ACOMTUOY	XD77206821 TO XD77916731
MSID	XD79012310 TO XD82002350
MSID	XD72306160 TO XD72906110
MSID	XD95201610 TO XD95701630
MSID	XD89501961 TO XD90011931

12104

2. (S) FURTHER REQUEST RESEEDING OF PREVIOUSLY SEEDDED STRINGS AS THEY BECOME DEACTIVATED.

GP-4


CGN 0124 RELEASED BY *Malapach* TIME _____ H MAY 69

FOR COMM CNTR: REQ SEND TO TF ALPHA VIA KEM-1 CIRCUIT.

GSV

G-2/G-3

SECRET

CONFIDENTIALPRIORITY 011300

FROM: CG THIRD MARINE DIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
 ONE ZERO EIGHT ARTY GRP DGH
 TWELFTH MARINES DGH
 CG FIRST ARVN REG HUE
 INFO: THIRD MARINE DIV (REIN) DGH

//CONFIDENTIAL//

TASK FORCE REMAGEN

DRAFTER 3/CED/cgw	
SHOVE	PHONE 3180
OP CHIEF	COPY TO: GENERAL
G-3 W.O.	S
G-2 W.O.	7
DOPD	M
APO	
ACTION	

1. (C) TASK FORCE REMAGEN WAS DEACTIVATED AFTER 43 DAYS OF EXTENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE VITAL AREA OF ROUTE #9 BETWEEN KHE SANH AND THE LAOTIAN BORDER. THIS ALLIED MECHANIZED FORCE OPERATED UNDER AUSTERE, COMBAT CONDITIONS WHICH CONTINUALLY CHALLENGED THE CAPABILITIES OF ITS MEN AND MACHINES. A CUNNING AND AGGRESSIVE ENEMY, OPERATING FROM A VIRTUAL SANCTUARY, WAS ENCOUNTERED IN 14 SEPARATE INCIDENTS, INCLUDING AN NVA COMPANY-SIZE ASSAULT ON A NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITION.

2. (C) THE FLEXIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS WITH WHICH TASK FORCE REMAGEN CONDUCTED OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT ITS LARGE AO ILLUSTRATED IMAGINATIVE PLANNING AND BOLD, PRECISE EXECUTION. THESE OPERATIONS RESULTED IN SOME 90 CONFIRMED ENEMY KILLS, WITH 45 WEAPONS CAPTURED AND SEVERAL POSITIONS DESTROYED. THE NVA WAS THUS DENIED FREEDOM OF MANEUVER IN THIS REGION WHERE HIS LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS ARE CONSIDERABLY SHORTER THAN OUR OWN. TASK FORCE REMAGEN'S

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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ACTIONS IN IMPLEMENTING OUR CONCEPT OF MOBILITY AND THE OFFENSIVE HAVE
BEEN A CREDIT TO ³⁰THE ARMY, MARINE CORPS, AND ARVN UNITS REPRESENTED.

3. (C) IT IS WITH PLEASURE THAT I CONGRATULATE THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF TASK
FORCE REIMAGEN FOR A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE MET AND A TOUGH JOB "WELL DONE".

4. (U) NGEN JONES SENDS.

GP-4

CCN 0143 RELEASED BY Wm K JONES DATE/TIME 011620 H ^{MAY} ~~APR~~ 69

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ec

STAND

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DE DIV AND MATE I RZ UNDER CH CU 018 AT1820Z
 ANE MATE HERE WITH MY CH NU 019.....019.....019....

00 UUMSK UUMSQ

DE UUMSQD 020 1211715

ZNY CCCCC

O 011715Z APR 69

FM CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC

TO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO UUMSQ/CG III MAF COC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE 012001-012400H MAY 69

UNIT

MORTAR

ARTY

CAS

3/2ARVN

12RND-82MM

NEG

3/2ARVN

5

NEG

GP-4

BT

020

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 34 1212120
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 012120Z APR 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORP TOC PHB
 INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L

(U) 1. LOCATIONS: NO CHANGE
 (C) 2. SUMMARY OF OPNS UNITS CONTINUED TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPNS
 IAW MSNS ASSIGNED.

(U) 3. CONTACTS: NONE
 (U) 4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS :
 AT 011815H F/2/4 VIC (858615) IN (858613)
 F

F C O OBS ONE NVA . ARTY FIRED ON EN POS
 AO OBS ONE NVA IN BNKR AND TWO ADDITIONAL NVA

RUNNING ACROSS AREA F/W RAN ON EN POS
 RESULT ONE NVA KIA BY ARTY
 (B) AT 012300H E/2/4 VIC (793620) LP HEARD
 MOVEMENT AND SAW FIGURES OF MEN IN FRONT OF
 THEM FIRED M-16 60MM THREW FRAGS AND FIRED ILLUMINATION SEARCHED AREA
 WITH NEG RESULTS.

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 034 C O N F I D E N T I A L

5. PLANS; UNITS CONTINUE TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPNS
 IAW MSNS ASSIGNED.

6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES:

USMC - 73 KIA 227 WIAE 23 WIAM 0 MIA

USA-1 KIA 1 WIAE 0 WIAM 0 MIA

ENEMY - 245 KIA 4 POW 0 RET 2 DET 192 IWC 10 C SWC

GP-4

BT

034

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/JDS/lrb
5213/2
SerNo:
2 May 1969

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, XXIV Corps

Subj: Task Organization; report of

Ref: (a) PCV TOC 220730Z Apr68

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted, personnel strengths included.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Hq Bn (-) Rein	Quang Tri	
Hq Co (-)	Quang Tri	133/501
Ser Co (-)	Quang Tri	19/195
MP Co (-)	Quang Tri	4/109
Comm Co (-)	Dong Ha	16/301
Det HqBn	Dong Ha	
Det HqCo	Dong Ha	88/305
Det SerCo	Dong Ha	1/ 52
Det MPCo	Dong Ha	1/ 31
Det CommCo	Quang Tri	0/ 31
Det HqBn	Cua Viet	
Det HqCo	Cua Viet	0/ 4
Det SerCo	Cua Viet	0/ 5
Det CommCo	Cua Viet	0/ 3
Det HqBn	VCB	
Det HqCo	VCB	20/ 76
Det CommCo	VCB	0/ 3
Det HqBn	TFH	
Det SerCo	TFH	0/ 5
Det HqBn	III MAF	
Det HqCo	III MAF	0/ 23

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

Page 1 of 13 pages
SECRET

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Det HqBn	Hue	
Det HqCo	Hue	1/ 0
Det SerCo	Hue	0/ 0
Det HqBn	Cam Lo	
Det HqCo	Cam Lo	1/ 2
Det HqBn	Ca Lu	
Det HqCo	Ca Lu	0/ 2
Det HqBn	Signal Hill	
Det CommCo	Signal Hill	0/ 3
Det HqBn	2d ARVN Regt FSCC	
Det CommCo	2d ARVN Regt FSCC	0/ 3
Det HqBn	"A" I NGS Team	
Det CommCo	"A" I NGS Team	0/ 3
Det HqBn	LZ Whisman	
Det CommCo	LZ Whisman	0/ 3
Det HqBn	Con Thien	
Det CommCo	Con Thien	0/ 2
Det HqBn	4th Marines FAC Party	
Det CommCo	4th Marines FAC Party	0/ 2
Det HqBn	LZ Sierra	
Det CommCo	LZ Sierra	0/ 2
TASK FORCE HOTEL		
Hq Task Force Hotel	VCB	22/120
3d Force Recon	VCB	1/ 8
1st Radio Bn	VCB	1/ 38
ASRT	VCB	2/ 5
3rd Marines		
HqCo	FSB Whisman	21/193
2dBn 3dMar	XD 071345	39/1152
3dBn 3dMar	XD 242019	35/1156
4th Marines		
Det HqCo	FSB Neville	2/9
Det HqCo (SS)	VCB	13/103
	C/1/4 XD 698623	0/ 4
	G/2/4 FSB Neville	0/ 2
	F/2/4 XD 847633	0/ 2
	L/3/4 FSB Russell	0/ 2
	M/3/4 XD 946630	0/ 2
	Cua Viet	0/ 10
	FSB Greene	3/ 45
	VCB	7/147
1stBn 4thMar		
H&SCo		

SECRET

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A Co	FSB Greene	3/147
B Co	XD 722642	6/148
B Co	VCB	0/ 39
C Co	XD 698623	4/129
C Co	VCB	0/ 21
D Co	XD 701634	4/136
D Co	VCB	1/ 31
2d Bn 4th Mar	XD 802634	4/142
H&S Co	FSB Neville	3/ 47
H&S Co	VCB	7/100
E Co	XD 805641	3/ 86
E Co	XD 793620	1/ 34
E Co	VCB	9/ 32
F Co	XD 847633	3/110
F Co	VCB	0/ 39
G Co	FSB Neville	2/129
G Co	VCB	0/ 21
H Co	XD 815645	5/129
H Co	VCB	0/ 33
3d Bn 4th Mar	XD946630	3/ 99
H&S Co	VCB	5/156
I Co	XD 911644	3/ 99
I Co	XD 917657	1/ 34
I Co	VCB	0/ 16
K Co	XD 932654	4/128
K Co	VCB	0/ 22
L Co	XD 912584	1/ 32
L Co	FSB Russell	3/100
L Co	VCB	0/ 13
M Co	XD 946630	2/ 65
M Co	XD 962648	1/ 30
M Co	XD 945624	1/ 34
M Co	VCB	0/ 11
9th Mar (Rein)	VCB-QTCB	21/218
1st Bn 9th Mar	Cam Lo	44/1246
2nd Bn 9th Mar	FSB Fuller	37/1155
3rd Bn 9th Mar	VCB	34/1161
 <u>1st Brigade 5th Inf (Mech)</u>		
HHC 1/5 (Mech)	4 OH6ALOH	Red Devil
	4 UHLH	62/266
	1 M543A2	
	5 M577A1	
 <u>1-11 Inf</u>		
HHC 1-11	L3 Sharon	19/163
Co A 1-11	L2 Sharon	4/141
Co B 1-11	L2 Sharon	5/152
Co C 1-11	L2 Sharon	5/138
Co D 1-11	L2 Sharon	4/136
Co E 1-11	L2 Sharon	3/100
B 1-77 Armor	L2 Sharon	5/ 84
17M48A3		

SECRET

SECRETCo A 7th Engr
1/A/7E2/A/7E
A/7E(-)3 APC
3 APC
4 APC
1 Crane
1 Wrecker
1 Dozer D-7E
2 Scoop Loaders
4-5 Ton Dump Trucks
1 CEV
21-5 Ton Bridges
2 AVLBTF REMAGEN 1/ 24
LZ Sharon 0/ 9
LZ Sharon 1/ 33
Red Devil 4/130298th Signal CoRed Devil 3/ 91
Dong Ha 0/ 3
FSB Cates 0/ 3
Hai Lang 0/ 2
LZ Sharon 0/ 3
LZ Nancy 0/ 3
Gua Viet 0/ 386th Chemical Det

Red Devil 1/ 6

407th REDRed Devil 2/ 65
Phu Bai 0/ 31-61 Inf (Mech)

HHC 1-61

6-M577
4-M106A1
12-M113A1
2-M132A1
1-M132A1
15-M23A1
3-M125A1
1-M578
1-M113A1XD 862398 10/ 90
XD 862398
LZ Sharon 5/ 86
LZ Sharon
Cam Lo 0/ 4
XD 845380 4/150

A Co 1-61

A Co 1-77

16-M48A3
1-M88
2-M113A1
1-M48A3
5-M548
1-M113A1
2-M578
1-M113A1
1-M113A1LZ Sharon 2/ 25
VCB 0/ 4
XD 862398 5/ 77

D Co 1-61

LZ Nancy 0/ 9
XD 862398 5/ 45
LZ Sharon 2/ 82
XD 845380 0/ 5
Wunder Beach 0/ 51-77 Armor
HHC 1-773-M48A3
16-M151
12-M113A1
1-M543
4-M106A1
2-M151A1
1-M718
3-M35A2

LZ Nancy 17/152

C Co 1-77

LZ Nancy 5/ 79

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

	1-M603A1		
	1-M88H1		
	17-M48A3		
	2-M105A2		
	1-M107A2		
D Co 1-77	3-M718	LZ Nancy	8/128
	3-M37E1		
	11-M35A2		
	1-M88VTR		
	6-M151A1		
	1-M513A2		
	1-M49A2		
	1-M50A1		
	1-M577		
	6-M548A2		
	1-M113A1		
	2-M60 AVIB		
	1-M35A2	LZ Sharon	0/ 8
	1-M548A2		
	1-M113A1		
	1-M35A2	Red Devil	0/ 4
	1-M54A2		
	1-M11A1	VGB	0/ 3
B Co 1-61 Inf (Mech)	14-M113A1	LZ Nancy	4/131
	3-M125		
	3-M113A1	LZ Sharon	1/ 38
	1-M578		
C Co 1-61 Inf (Mech)	16-M113A1	Wunder Beach	4/129
	2-M125		
	1-M578		
	2-M151		
	2-M35A2	LZ Sharon	1/ 42
	1-M37E1		
	1-M125		
C 3-5 Cav	19-M113A1	LZ Nancy	4/136
	2-M105A1		
	1-M88		
	2-M151		
	3-M35A2	Camp Evans	4/ 12
A 4-12 Cav	2-M151A1	LZ Nancy	3/149
	6-M48A3		
	14-M113A1		
	4-M35A2		
	2-M125A1		
	3-M48A3	Hai Lang	1/43
	9-M113A1		
	1-M125A1		

SECRET

SECRET

7th Spt Bn
 8/75
 4/75
 8/75
 0/75

5-M07B1
 31-M05A2

8-M131A50

18-M02A2
 1-M013A2
 2-M11TTS
 9-M127A2C
 7-M151A1
 12-M037B1

5-M06B1

1-M19A2C
 1-M027A2

2-M185A3
 2-M151A2
 2-M123A1C
 1-M03
 1-M2380
 1-M11T6

FLOAT ITEMS

1-M18A3C
 10-M113A1
 1-M01A2
 3-M02A2
 2-M109A3
 15-M05A2
 1-M265A2
 6-M151A1
 1-M718

Red Devil
 Red Devil
 QTCB
 XD 35832h
 Red Devil
 LZ Sharon
 LZ Nancy
 Red Devil
 LZ Sharon
 Red Devil

14/ 58
 24/258
 9/85
 6/156

0/ 7
 0/ 3

LZ Sharon
 Red Devil
 LZ Sharon
 LZ Sharon
 LZ Nancy
 LZ Sharon
 LZ Nancy
 VCB

9/228

0/ 7

0/ 10

LZ Sharon
 LZ Nancy
 Hai Lang
 LZ Sharon
 LZ Sharon
 LZ Sharon
 VCB
 LZ Sharon
 LZ Sharon

0/ 2

LZ Sharon

Co B Rangers
 1st Bn

1st Bn 3rd Bn

Red Devil

3/56

Cua Viet

40/1180

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

<u>1st Amphib Bn (-)</u>			
<u>1st Amphib Bn (-) (Rein)</u>	98 LVTP-5	Cua Viet	19/494
	9 LVTP-5 CMD		
	2 LVTR-1		
	3 LVTR-1		
1ASG	12 LVTP-5	Cua Viet	16/313
	2 LVTR-1		
	3 LVTP-5(CMD)		
	1 LVTR-1		
Co A	44 LVTP-5	Cua Viet	2/ 96
	1 LVTR-1		
	3 LVTP-5(CMD)		
Co B	42 LVTP-5	Cua Viet	1/ 85
	1 LVTR-1		
	3 LVTP-5(CMD)		

Page 7 of 13 pages**SECRET****SECRET**

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12th Marines (Rein)

HqBtry (-)	
Det HqBtry	
Det HqBtry	
Det HqBtry	
Det HqBtry	
Det HqBtry	
Det HqBtry	
Det HqBtry	2/AN/MPQ-10
Det HqBtry	1/AN/MPQ-10
	1/AN/TPS-25
Det 1st PAB	1/AN/MPQ-10A
DET 1st PAB	1/AN/MPQ-10A
Det 1st PAB	1/AN/TPQ-37
Det 1st PAB	

Dong Ha	11/198
Prov Rifle Plt	1/ 3
Cua Viet	1/ 6
VCB	3/ 12
Quang Tri	1/ 2
Red Devil	0/ 2
Vinh Dia	0/ 2
C-2	0/ 7
Gio Linh	2/ 27
Red Devil	0/ 7
Vinh Dai	0/ 6
C-2	0/ 10
Dong Ha	0/ 4

1st Searchlight Battery

Hq Plt (-) 11/23" SLT	
Det Hq Plt	
1st Plt	5/23" SLT
2nd Plt (-)	11/23" SLT
Det 2nd Plt	1/23" SLT
Det 2nd Plt	1/23" SLT
3rd Plt (-)	3/23" SLT
Det 3rd Plt	2/23" SLT

Dong Ha	2/ 34
Prov Rifle Plt	0/ 1
Cua Viet	0/ 10
C-2	0/ 4
FSB Russell	0/ 2
Khe Gio Bridge	0/ 2
VCB	0/ 5
Quang Tri	0/ 4

1st Bn 12th Mar (-) (Rein)

HqBtry (-)	
Det HqBtry (Rear)	
Det HqBtry	
Det HqBtry	
Det HqBtry	
A Btry (-)	6/105 TD
Det A Btry (Rear)	
Det A Btry	
Det A Btry	
Det A Btry	
C Btry (-)	6/105 TD
C Btry (Rear)	
Mortar Btry	6/4.2M
1st Prov (-)	4/155TD
Det 1st Prov (Rear)	

FSB Whisman	9/ 47
Dong Ha	8/103
VCB	1/ 14
FSB Alpine	0/ 1
Prov Rifle Plt	0/ 2
FSB Mcclintock	9/ 60
Dong Ha	0/ 40
FSB Whisman	0/ 4
VCB	0/ 1
Prov Rifle Plt	0/ 2
FSB Whisman	7/ 70
Dong Ha	
Dong Ha	3/ 66
FSB Mcclintock	2/ 48
Dong Ha	0/ 21

2nd Bn 12th Mar (-)

Hq Btry (-)	
Det HqBtry	
Det HqBtry	
D Btry (-)	6/105TD
Det D Btry (Rear)	
E Btry (-)	6/105TD
Det E Btry (Rear)	

Dong Ha	13/115
VCB	7/ 93
Prov Rifle Plt	0/ 6
C-2	6/ 78
Dong Ha	1/ 19
FSB Fuller	7/ 66
Dong Ha	3/ 27

SECRET

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Det E Btry
 F Btry (S) 6/105TD
 Det F Btry (Rear)
 Mortar Btry (-) 4/4.2 Mort
 Det Mortar Btry (Rear)
 Det Mortar Btry

VCB 0/ 3
 VCB 7/ 74
 Dong Ha 0/ 24
 ECB 3/ 40
 Dong Ha 0/ 15
 VCB 0/ 6

3rd Bn 12th Mar (-) (Rain)

Hq Btry (-)
 Det Hq Btry
 Det Hq Btry
 Det Hq Btry
 Det Hq Btry
 Det Hq Btry
 C Btry (-) 6/105TD
 Det C Btry (Rear)
 Det C Btry
 E Btry (-) 6/105TD
 Det E Btry (Rear)
 E Btry (-) 6/105TD
 Det E Btry (Rear)
 I Btry (-) 6/105TD
 Det I Btry (Rear)
 Mortar Btry 6/4.2M
 3rd Prov (-) 4/155TD
 3rd Prov Det (Rear)
 B Btry (-) 6/105TD
 Det B Btry (Rear)
 Det B
 Det B Btry

Vandegrift 11/ 89
 Quang Tri 6/86
 Oceanview 1/ 2
 C-4 0/ 2
 Con Thien 0/ 2
 Prov Rifle Plt 0/ 4
 FSB Neville 7/ 62
 Quang Tri 2/ 39
 VCB 0/ 1
 FSB Russell 8/ 66
 Quang Tri 1/ 40
 FSB Greene 8/ 70
 Quang Tri 1/ 34
 Quang Tri 4/ 59
 FSB Greene 2/ 41
 Dong Ha 1/ 17
 FSB Alpine 8/ 66
 Dong Ha 0/ 30
 Vandegrift 0/ 5
 Prov Rifle Plt 0/ 1

4th Bn 12th Mar (Rain)

Hq Btry (-)
 Det Hq Btry
 Det Hq Btry
 K Btry (-) 6/105SP
 Det K Btry (Rear)
 L Btry (-) 3/155SP
 Det L Btry 3/155SP
 M Btry (-) 3/155SP
 Det M Btry 3/155SP
 Det M Btry (Rear)
 Det Prov (-) 4/155TD
 Det 2nd Prov
 1st Sin Hoa Btry (Rear)
 Hq Plt (-)
 Det Hq Plt
 A Plt 2/80 H SP
 B Plt 2/80 H SP
 C Plt 2/80 H SP

Dong Ha 12/157
 Elliot 0/ 1
 Prov Rifle Plt 0/ 5
 Elliot 3/ 77
 Dong Ha 1/ 11
 Dong Ha 3/ 69
 C-2 1/ 30
 C-1 2/ 42
 Khe Sanh 2/ 39
 Dong Ha 0/ 12
 Dong Ha 3/ 67
 Prov Rifle Plt 0/ 1
 Dong Ha 3/ 68
 Prov Rifle Plt 0/ 2
 Gio Linh 2/ 33
 Elliot 2/ 41
 Con Thien 2/ 40

SECRET

SECRET5th Br 1st Arty (USA)

Hq Btry (-)

Service Btry

Det Hq Btry Radar

A Btry

B Btry

C Btry

1/AN/MPQ-4

2nd Flt 1st Armd Amphib

6/LVTH-6

2nd Tank Bn (Rein)

Hq Co (-)

2 M48A3 Tanks

2 M67A2 Flame Tanks

Det. Hq Co

1 M51 VTR

6 APC M113A1

Company A (Rein)

1 M48A3 Tank

2 M48A3 Tanks

1 M67A2 Flame Tanks

1 M51 VTR

2d Flt

4 M48A3 Tanks

Section 1st Flt

2 M48A3 Tanks

Section 1st Flt

2 M48A3 Tanks

3d Flt

5 M48A3 Tanks

Hq Section

1 M48A3 Tanks

2 M67A2 Flame Tanks

Company B (Rein)

3 M48A3 Tanks

1 M51 VTR

1 M67A2 Flame Tank

Section 2d Flt

2 M48A3 Tanks

Section 1st Flt

3 M48A3 Tanks

1 M67A2 Tank

3d Flt (Rein)

3 M48A3 Tanks

1 M67A2 Flame Tanks

Section 1st Flt

2 M48A3 Tanks

1 M67A2 Flame Tank

Company C (Rein)

Red Devil

22/123

Red Devil

1/ 86

LZ Sharon

0/ 11

LX Sharon

11/116

Hai Lang

7/122

LZ Nancy

7/122

Cua Viet

2/ 14

Quang Tri

32/550

Quang Tri

16/223

Dong Ha

3/ 74

Vinh Dai

0/ 25

Vandegrift

0/ 8

Dong Ha

1/ 25

C-2

1/ 18

Mai Loc

1/ 8

Hill 37

0/ 8

(YD 088577)

A-4

2/ 25

C-3 Bridge

1/ 14

Vinh Dai

2/ 51

OceanView

1/ 7

Gio Linh

0/ 12

YD 078664

3/ 25

Dong Ha

0/ 5

Quang Tri

1/ 14

SECRET

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7 M48A3 Tanks			
Flt		Dong Ha	0/ 7
7 M48A3 Tanks			
<u>Company A, 3d AT Bn (Cadets)</u>		Quang Tri	1/ 10
15 M50A1 Ontos		Dong Ha	0/ 9
<u>3d Signal Party Bn</u>			
H&S Co (-)		Quang Tri	12/229
Det Co H		Quang Tri	0/ 5
Co A (Rain)		Quang Tri	1/ 61
Co B (-) (Rain)		Vandegrift	3/ 72
Co C (Rain)		Dong Ha	1/ 59
Det H&S Co (Heavy Rifle Co)		Cua Viet	0/ 5
Det H&S Co (Light CAG)		Dong Ha District	0/ 7
Det H&S Co (Movement Control)		Vandegrift	2/ 4
Det H&S Co (Task Force Hotel)		Vandegrift	0/ 2
<u>3d Recon Bn</u>			
H&S Co		Quang Tri	11/165
		Fortrot Relay	1/ 7
		Sierra Relay	0/ 3
		Tango Relay	1/ 8
		Papa Relay	0/ 4
		Romeo Relay	0/ 3
		November Relay	0/ 3
		9th Marines	0/ 1
		India Relay	0/ 1
Co A		Quang Tri	1/ 94
Co B		Quang Tri	1/ 97
Co C		Quang Tri	1/ 73
		India Relay	0/ 17
Co D		Quang Tri	2/ 29
		Cua Viet	2/ 65
Co E		Quang Tri	1/ 95
		Cua Viet	0/ 1
3d Recon Recon Co		Quang Tri	6/124
		Fortrot Relay	0/ 1
		Golf Relay	0/ 1
<u>3d Eng Bn</u>			
H&S Co		Quang Tri	1/ 3
Co A 3d Eng Bn		Quang Tri	10/ 89
H&S Co (-) 3d Eng Bn		Quang Tri	1/ 5
Heavy Rifle Co		L2 Cunningham	
Engineer Support Co			
H&S Co 3d Eng Bn		Quang Tri	1/ 5

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Engr Spt Co		Quang Tri	4/162
TF Hotel		Vandegrift	0/ 15
Prov Rifle Co		LZ Cunningham	0/ 18
Co A 3d Engr Bn			
Hq Co 3d Engr Bn		Vandegrift	4/ 4
Hq Co 3d Engr Bn		Quang Tri	0/ 7
1st Plt 3d Engr Bn		An Hoa	1/ 25
2nd Plt 3d Engr Bn		Vandegrift	1/ 35
3rd Plt 3d Engr Bn		Vandegrift	1/ 36
Co B 3d Engr Bn			
Hq Co 3d Engr Bn		Dong Ha	1/ 17
Hq Co (Rear) 3d Engr Bn		Quang Tri	0/ 11
1st Plt 3d Engr Bn		Cam Lo	1/ 38
2nd Plt 3d Engr Bn		Vandegrift	1/ 27
3rd Plt 3d Engr Bn		Vandegrift	1/ 35
Co C 3d Engr Bn			
Hq Co 3d Engr Bn		Vandegrift	1/ 6
Hq Co (Rear) 3d Engr Bn		Quang Tri	0/ 5
1st Plt 3d Engr Bn		Vandegrift	1/ 40
2nd Plt 3d Engr Bn		Vandegrift	1/ 38
3rd Plt 3d Engr Bn		Vandegrift	1/ 36
<u>11th Engineer Bn</u>			
Co A		Dong Ha	12/219
Company Co		Dong Ha	6/31
Co B		Dong Ha	3/107
Co C		Vandegrift	4/116
Co D		Dong Ha	2/ 12
Co E		Vandegrift	5/101
3rd Plt, 3rd Bridge Co		Dong Ha	1/ 1
3rd Bridge Co		Gia Le	5/118
<u>3d Motor Transport Bn</u>			
333 Co 3d MTRB		Quang Tri	9/ 66
Det IEC Co Motor Plt	15 M79 Otters	Quang Tri	1/ 12
Det Other Plt	12 M79 Otters	Cua Viet	0/ 15
Det A		Quang Tri	0/ 22
Det Co A		Vandegrift	3/ 7
Det Co B		Quang Tri	2/ 52
Det Co B		Cam Lo	0/ 8
Det Co E		Vandegrift	1/ 14
Det Co C		Quang Tri	1/ 26
<u>9th Motor Transport Bn</u>			
125 Co		Dong Ha	10/ 65

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A Co
B Co
C Co
D Co

Dong Ha 4/ 70
Dong Ha 3/ 71
Dong Ha 3/ 69
Dong Ha 4/ 81

3d Dental Company3d Dental Co CP

Det A
Det B
Det C
Det D
Det E
Det F
Det G
Det H
Det I
Det J

Medevac/Quang Tri

Quang Tri 9/ 25
Bn Rears Quang Tri 1/ 2
3d Engr Quang Tri 1/ 2
4/9 Rear Quang Tri 1/ 2
3d Med Bn Quang Tri 2/ 2
Sub-Unit 2 Dong Ha 3/ 2
D Med Dong Ha 1/ 2
12th Marines Dong Ha 1/ 2
11th Engr Dong Ha 0/ 2
9th Marine Vandegrift 2/ 2
1st Amtracs Qua Viet 1/ 2
1/ 2

2d Medical Bn

H.S. Co (-) (Rein)

Attached H.S. Co #2

UNIT

A Co
B Co
C Co
D Co

Quang Tri 40/390

Quang Tri 0/ 2
Quang Tri 0/ 2
Vandegrift 0/ 2
Dong Ha 2/ 37

F. E. KRAINCE
F. E. KRAINCE
By Direction

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SECRET

(138)

TO DUMSK DUMSK
 31 DUMSK 044 1220055
 DUMSK
 0 020055Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC
 TO DUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHO
 INFO DUMSK/III MAF COC
 RP

TOP/XXIV/0000

S E C R E T

FORECAST OF FUTURE OPERATIONS (U)

(S) FORECAST OF FUTURE OPERATIONS UP DATE FOR WEEK OF 27 APR
 2 MAY 1969.

A. FORCE MOVEMENTS - NONE

B. FORECAST OF MAJOR OPERATION.

(1) VIRGINIA RIDGE. 9TH MAR REGT 30 APR - 1 MAY 30 MAR REGT (2-30 MAY)
 30 APR - 30 MAY.

(2) FUTURE AD WILL ENCOMPASS AREA BOUNDED ON SOUTH BY MAI LOC TWO; ON EAST BY PRESENT BOUNDARY BETWEEN 9TH MAR AND 2D ARVN REGT; ON NORTH BY SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF DMZ. ON WEST BY LINE GENERALLY FROM XD 955660 TO 955800 TO 95514 TO 923524.

(3) 2 BATT OF 9TH MAR AND 1 BN 30 MAR (30 APR - 1 MAY)

(4) BATT OF 30 MARINES. (2 MAY - 30 MAY)

(5) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY BUNKERS, FORTIFICATIONS, AND SUPPLY CACHES AND PREVENT ENEMY INFILTRATION AND INTERFERENCE WITH RICE HARVEST.

INFO TWO DUMSK 044 S E C R E T

(1) 9TH MARINES COMMENCED S/D OPS GENERALLY NORTH OF DONG HA

COMPLEX ON 30 APR 1969, 30 MAR RELIEVED 9TH MAR FORCES

AT KOB, KHE GIO BRIDGE, FULLER, CAM LO, 7-2 AND 4-4 AND CONTINUES

9TH OPS COMMENCING 2 MAR 69.

(2) THE OPS IS TO EXPLOIT RECENT CONTACTS BY 2D ARVN REGT

AND 2D BN, 9TH MAR TO DENY ENEMY INFILTRATION AND TO ASSIST IN THE

RICE BENTAL OPERATIONS.

044

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TRAINING BY: JCS: DMC
 SEC 9-2 PH 30 REG 2
 GPO *PLS*

1. DEAF/TOC/IN/CI 12, 4 12 17 JUN 69

RE: CG THIRD MAR DIV (RESIN) DMB
 TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 CG III MAF DMC

INFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV CEE COPY TO:
 CG BASH FORCE HOTEL VCB G-2
 FIRST FDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR G-3
 THIRD MARINES GSV
 FOURTH MARINES COC
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 SR. ADVISOR QUANG TRI PROVINCE
 THIRD REGON BN
 MAG THREE NINE

SECRET
 RECON DESCRIBING REPORT (U)

1. REGON TEAM: LUCKY PUNCH (3A1) (7 MEN) OPO 2583-69
2. DTC INSERTED/EXTRACTED: 281000H MAY69/011000H JUN69 (96 HRS)
3. ROUTE: FM YD116703 TO YD083712 TO YD116703
4. TERRAIN: LOW ROLLING HILLS, EXTREMELY THICK VEGETATION, RATE

OF MOV'T 100 METERS PER HOUR (OR LESS), VERY GOOD COVER &
 CONCEALMENT, WATER SOURCES AS SHOWN ON THE MAP, NO TRAILS IN RZ.

5. BLANS: NEGATIVE
6. ENEMY: 291500H MAY69 AT YD083712 TM HEARD MOV'T COMING

TOWARDS THEIR POSITION, THE KIT CARSON SCOUT OPERATING WITH THE
 TM TRIED TO GET THE ENEMY TO "CHIEU HOI", AT THIS TIME THE THREE

WENT AWAY, TM PURSUED THE ENEMY BY FIRE AND SEARCHED THE
 AREA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, EN WORE GREEN UTILITIES AND BUSH

COVERS, TM COULD NOT DISTINGUISH WHAT TYPE OF WEAPONS EN CARRIED.

7. OTHER INFO: NEGATIVE

REF: OPO 2583-69
 BN - SECRET

CGE 0229 RELEASED BY *JP Brier* TIME 1751 H JUN 69

248

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DRAFTED BY: WNB/RKR
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CNO PBC

IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY 0204020 Z MAY 69 COPY TO: G-2

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV

TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

INFO: THIRD MARINES

FOURTH MARINES

NINTH MARINES

TWELFTH MARINES

FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)

FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES

SECOND BN, TWELFTH MARINES

THIRD BN, TWELFTH MARINES

FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MARINES

FIFTH 175 GUN BATTERY

FIFTH BN, FOURTH ARTY

G-3

TIO

TSS

CIC

GSV (2 copies)

6-3
+115T

SECRET

SENSOR ACTIVITY BULLETIN PERIOD ENDING 2400 2 MAY 1969 (U)

A. NY 210300Z APR 69

1. (S) AND FOL STRINGS TO REF A:

STRING	CH/TC	KILL ZONES	TOT NO	READOUT SITE	TERRAIN
31011	37/11,12,13, 11	YD12817724 YD13457759	SD0011 SD1011	A-4	OPEN, LOW SHRUBBERY
31101	33/01,03,02, 01	YD06307046 YD06987113	SD2101 SD3101	A-4	OPEN, LOW SHRUBBERY
31051	33/08,07,06, 05	YD16857652 YD18307590	SD0051 SD1051	A-4	OPEN, LOW SHRUBBERY
31151	38/04,03,02, 01	YD01256980 YD05407048	SD2151 SD3151	DI MTN	OPEN, LOW SHRUBBERY

G2-4

C-1278 RELEASED BY M. J. [signature] TIME 1710 H MAY 69

GSV (2 copies)

G-2/3/TIO/TSS/CIC

PBC

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SECRET

DRAFTED BY: WWB/CJH
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
C/O

DATE/TIME/PRIORITY 020816 Z JUNE 69 COPY TO: G-2
G-3
TIG
TSS
COC
GSV X 2 COPIES

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
TO: CG 7P HOTEL
INFO: THIRD MARINES
FOURTH MARINES
FIFTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES
SECOND BN, TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD BN, TWELFTH MARINES
FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MARINES
FIFTH ONE SEVEN FIVE GUN BTRY
FIFTH BN, FOURTH ARTY

SECRET

SENSOR ACTIVITY BULLETIN/PERIOD DURING 2400 2 JUNE 69 (U)

A: BY 211244Z MAY 69

1. (S) ADD FOL NEW STRING TO REF A:

STRING	CH/TC	KILL ZONES	TOT NO	READOUT SITE	TERRAIN
11191	26/22,23,27, 28	XD91756605 XD91056685	SD1191 SD5191	DATCAT	SPARSE WOODS

GP-4

CH 0253 RELEASED BY TIME 1600 Z JUNE 69

GSV

2/3/TIG/TSS/COC

SECRET

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OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 062 1221430
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 021430Z APP 69
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO UUMSQ/CG III MAF CC DNG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 POSITIONS PLANS AND BUSHMASTER REPORT FOR 23, MAY 69
 POSITION, PLANS, SCOUT / SCOUTER IM, SCOUTER
 TMS ACTIVITY REFER TO SITREP 11-69 FM 021300H TO
 0221300H MA 69

BUSHMASTER
 ATLP 25: SQ AMBUSHES 0 PLT AMBUSHES 4 500 DAY PTL
 4 500 DAY PTL 9 CO DAY PTL 0 CO MOVEMENT 1:
 BUSHMASTER REPORT:
 GP-4
 T

062

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E-3 PLANS ROUTING	
Plans Off	(1) <u>W</u>
	(2) <u></u>
	(3) <u>WJA RUMLEDNL</u>

Handwritten notes: 10/16/20, 703, PC, 10/10

RPTTSZYU RUMLEPA 5453 1230010-SSSS--RHHG FA R'EMVP R (3) WJA RUMLEDNL.
 ZNY 1555
 P 021510Z MAY 69
 FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 TO RUMLEPA/CG III MAF DNG
 RUMLEPA/CG 30 MAR DIV DCH
 RUMLEPA/CG 101ST AAA DIV (AW) CEF
 ELN/CG XXIV CORPS ARTY PHB
 INFO RUMLEPA L/SA 1ST ARVN DIV HQL
 BT

S. C. L. T. AMII-60P 02042 II MAF FOR G3
 FRAG ORDER S TO XXIV CORPS-OPORD II-53C G)
 BLOCK ENEMY FORCES AREA A (INTEL) TO FRAG ORDER S TO 2A
 1. SHED SEPARATELY.
 THIS MISSION CO-ORDINATING D-DAY XXIV CORPS IN COOPERATION
 AND COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN DIV CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN
 SOUTHERN A SHAU VALLEY-SOUTHERN DAKHONG VALLEY TO DESTROY
 ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN AO.
 2. (S) EXECUTION
 A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ON D-DAY ELEMENTS OF PARTICI-
 PATING DIVISIONS WILL CONDUCT COMBAT ASSAULTS INTO THEIR RESPEC-
 TIVE ASSIGNED AREAS

ON REPERATIONS (AO'S) ROUTES WITHIN THE AO'S

C. 155Z MAY

4-3

2/COE

PAGE 2 RUMLEPA 5453 SECRET
 WILL BE INTERDICTION AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE LAOTIAN BORDER.
 SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY INTENSIVE SEARCH
 FOR ENEMY FORCES BASE AREAS AND SUPPLY LINES. DIVISIONS WILL
 BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT OR REINFORCE ADJACENT UNITS AS REQUIRED.
 30 MAR 69

1. OCCUPY SOUTHERN DAKHONG VALLEY ON D-DAY
 2. BLOCK ENEMY ESCAPE INTO LAOS ALONG DAKHONG VALLEY ROAD.
 CONCURRENTLY INTERDICTION ROUTE 922 BY FIRE
 3. CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN ZONE TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND
 INSTALLATIONS

4. 101ST AAA DIV (AW) IN COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN REGT
 5. OCCUPY SOUTHERN A SHAU VALLEY ON D-DAY
 6. BLOCK ENEMY ESCAPE INTO LAOS ALONG ROUTE 922 AND INTER-
 DICTION ROUTE 542
 7. CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN ZONE TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND
 INSTALLATIONS

8. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

9. OPERATIONAL SIGNATURE FOR THIS OPERATIONS IS APACHE

10/16/20 8 10/10

SECRET

SECRET

overlay to be processed separately

PAGE 3 RUMLEPA 5453 S E C 1 1 7
 AO WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS FROM YD 013200 TO YD 222200
 TO YD 475970 TO YD 305970 FENCE NORTHWEST ALONG THE LAOTIAN
 BORDER TO YD 013200 THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN 101ST AEN DIV (AM)
 AND THE 3D MAR DIV WILL BE AS FOLLOWS FROM YD 160935 NORTH
 ALONG GRID LINE 13 TO YD 130037 NORTH TO YD 130037 NORTHEAST TO
 YD 190973 NORTH TO YD 130037 EAST TO YD 190973 NORTHEAST TO
 YD 245150 THEN NORTHEAST ALONG STREAM TO AO BOUNDARY AT
 YD 263151 OPERATIONS OVERLAY TO BE ISSUED SEPARATELY. 55Z-A
 WILL BE CANCELLED UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF APACHE SHOW AO
 (3) THE ROAD RUNNING NORTHEAST FROM YD 173025 CROSSING THE
 KRONG AT YD 153097 THEN TO YD 245151 THEN SO THE GENERALLY
 FOLLOWING STREAM TO YD 253113 IS TEMPORARILY DESIGNATED AS
 KRONG VALLEY ROAD.

Can't find

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION
 ARTILLERY FIRES WITHIN 1000 METERS OF THE BOUNDARY

BETWEEN DIVISIONS AND AIR STRIKES WITHIN 500 METERS OF THIS
 BOUNDARY WILL BE COORDINATED USING NORMAL PROCEDURES. A
 CYLINDER OF RADIUS 5 KM CENTERED ON THE AIR TARGET AND
 EXTENDING VERTICALLY INTO THE AIR WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR AIR
 STRIKES. WHILE THE CYLINDER IS IN EFFECT ARTILLERY WILL NOT

~~SECRET~~
 BE FORN ENOUGH OF INTO THE CYLINDER AND AIR OBSERVERS WILL
 NOT ENTER IT.

EFFECTIVE 100001 H MAY 69 A BUFFER ZONE WILL BE
 ESTABLISHED. THE BUFFER ZONE IS DEFINED BY A LINE IN LAOS PARALLEL
 TO THE LAOS-VNM BORDER AT 5 KM DISTANCE (SEE OPERATIONS OVERLAY
 TO BE ISSUED SEPARATELY). THIS LINE HAS THE SAME FUNCTION AS
 A FORWARD BOMB LINE (FBL) AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE
 (FSL).

66 101ST AEN DIV MSC DTC 120724Z FEB 69 SUBJECT RULES OF
 ENGAGEMENT LAOS SECRET APPLIES.

(3) D-DAY IS 10 MAY 69
 101ST AEN DIV ALC.

SECRET

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DRAFTER 3/DEF/cgw
 SEC COC PHONE 3180
 CWO WAC

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 022338 Z MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 THIRD RECON BN CTR
 TWELFTH MARINES DGH
 100TH ARTILLERY GROUP DGH
 INFO: CG III MAF
 CG XXIV CORPS
 THIRD MARDIV (REIN) (LESS ACTION ADDRESSES)
 CG FIRST MAF
 MAG-39
 MACG-18

COPY TO: GENERAL

6-3
HIST

//CONFIDENTIAL//

ESTABLISHMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE ZONE

REF: (A) CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 250122Z APRIL 69

1. (C) THE RECONNAISSANCE ZONE ESTABLISHED IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE DIVISION AO BY REFERENCE (A) IS EFFECTIVE 030800H MAY 69.
2. (C) THIS ZONE IS BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY THE SOUTHERN BORDER OF THE DMZ AND ON THE WEST AND SOUTH BY THE LAOTIAN BORDER. THE EASTERN BOUNDARY IS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

FROM SOUTHERN BORDER OF DMZ AT HILL 896 AT	XD766663
GENERALLY SOUTH TO STREAM AT	XD770643
GENERALLY EAST ALONG STREAM TO	XD780639
SOUTH TO HILLTOP AT	XD781636
SOUTHWEST TO NOSE AT	XD776628
GEN RALLY SOUTH ALONG RIDGELINE TO KNOB AT	XD779611
SOUTH TO STREAM AT	XD781601

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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CONFIDENTIAL

GENERALLY SOUTH TO HILL 1030 AT	XD787584
SOUTHWEST ALONG RIDGELINE TO HILLTOP AT	XD779569
SOUTH TO KNOB AT	XD779560
GENERALLY EAST ALONG RIDGELINE TO KNOB AT	XD800556
SOUTHEAST TO KNOB	XD814537
SOUTH TO HILL 1371 AT	XD814520
GENERALLY SOUTH TO NOSE AT	XD817504
SOUTHWEST TO HILL 527 AT	XD813482
GENERALLY SOUTH TO HILLTOP AT	XD815473
SOUTH TO STREAM JUNCTION AT	XD815463
GENERALLY SOUTHEAST ALONG BAO QUAN RIVER TO ROUTE #9 BRIDGE AT	XD913403
SOUTH TO BEND IN STREAM AT	XD912392
WEST TO STREAM AT	XD906390
WEST, THEN SOUTH ALONG STREAM TO	XD920352
SOUTH TO STREAM JUNCTION AT	XD921327
SOUTHEAST TO HILL 908 AT	XD941311
SOUTHEAST TO LAOTIAN BORDER AT	XD957296

3. (C) OVERLAY PASEP.

GP-4

CCN 0356 RELEASED BY G.R./maire W DATE/TIME H MAY 69PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

coe

STAND ^{WC}**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS
3D MARINE DIVISION FMFOPS

MEMORANDUM

FOR

G-3

8 MAY 69

SUBJ:

ATTACHED

1. 3D MARINES WOULD
LIKE TO DELAY
CONSIDERATION OF THIS
FOR AT LEAST 30
DAYS.

Moved

CO 3rd MARINE agrees to
do this - so problem
is solved - presumably
FILE ← *TH*

3d MarDiv 1126

HOME DOC

HEADQUARTERS
3D MARINE DIVISION FMF

RECEIVED
5 MAY 1969

6-3

Douglas Stirling
MEMORANDUM

FOR IT. O/PNS APO

4 May 1969

SUBJ: **ACTION**
OPENING OF AREAS IN 3rd MAR'S
AREA FOR WOOD CUTTERS AND
RIVER FISHERMEN.

1. Check with 3rd Marine
and see if we can't
get this squared away
so the SVN can cut
wood and fish.

2. Let me know if we
have any difficulties.

Maj. Davis

Shanks

3d Mar
request
21 May
27 May

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) RVN
APO San Francisco 96602

46/AMM/0000
1000
3 May 1969

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
To: Commanding General

Subj: Visit of OTHER Personnel to Look at Timberland

1. On 2 May 1969, we received word that two U. S. civilians, Mr. Jack B. SHIMMIE, Chief of the Forestry Bureau (BFD) and Mr. Wally FISHER, his assistant chief, accompanied by Colonel LAND, G-5, XIV Corps would visit the area to look at a possible site to cut timber for civilian use. The area in which they were interested was around the Gio Bridge.
2. After flying over the area, the group was of the opinion that the area was not suitable for logging because of the terrain. He explained to this party our past efforts in regards to the Cathe Tri Smuelli, which so far have been unsuccessful due largely to lack of interest on the part of the province officials.
3. For information, our letter of 25 Jan to the Province Chief in regards to the Smuelli is attached (Tab 1). No written reply was received to this letter, although several discussions were conducted with the province officials and the Smuelli cooperative officials.
4. It was agreed that we would undertake to locate two or three suitable sites for logging operations, and that Mr. SHIMMIE would plan to return in ten days to two weeks, accompanied by representatives of the Vietnamese Forestry Service, to inspect the site and to encourage the Province Chief to get logging operations started. The G-5 section will coordinate with the Province Senior Advisor (PSA) and the G-5 on possible locations.
5. Colonel LAND, called this morning to advise that General LAND and General SHIMMIE were interested in the area around the Gio Bridge not for logging operations but for an area to be opened to the people of Cam Lo to cut fire wood. Colonel LAND will pass this information to the PSA and request coordination be made with the 3d Marine Division on this.
6. The mistaken interest of the Gio Bridge area not withstanding an arrangement with Mr. SHIMMIE to continue the efforts to get the logging industry started is still in effect.
7. As a related matter, Colonel LAND brought up the problem of civilians being restricted from fishing in the sea lo area above the OT guideline. This has been discussed with the Commanding Officer, 3d Marine. He knows of no reason why this restriction should not be moved further up the river.

82

DECLASSIFIED

He will investigate and advise us within a day or two.

W. E. KERRIGAN

Copy to:
G-3

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR
QUANG TRI PROVINCE
Advisory Team 19
APO 96495

MACTN-HUQT

6 May 1969

SUBJECT: Bru Montagnard Fishing and Woodcutting at Cam Lo District

Commanding General
3d Marine Division
FPO 96602

1. The District Chief of Cam Lo District requested through the Cam Lo District Advisor on 24 April the extension of Bru Montagnard fishing and woodcutting west to the 98th grid and along the Song Cam Lo River. This request was discussed with the CO, 1/9 USMC and the G-3, 3d Marine Division, and this memorandum is a formalization of those discussions. The Bru refugees in Cam Lo District are a major maintenance problem, having no arable land of their own and being inexperienced in wet rice cultivation. There is little or no security problem with the Bru and presuming they can be made self-supporting, these loyalties should remain unchanged. To this end, if the Bru could fish only two days per week, the income derived would enable them to purchase a week's supply of rice. The deep waters of the Song Cam Lo to the east of grid 07, are unsuitable for traditional Bru fishing methods.

2. The security problems associated with movement along route 9 are appreciated. Should permission be granted for this excursion, the following control measures are proposed:

- a. Fishing and woodcutting confined to area as delineated on Annex A.
- b. No movement west of Khe Gio bridge, YD026562 between 1730 hours and first light.
- c. Activity restricted to twice weekly.
- d. Cam Lo District Senior Advisor to contact 3d Mar Regt weekly to confirm days of activity.
- e. Bru to be accompanied by 88 PF Platoon (composed of Bru personnel) with radio contact to Cam Lo Sub-Sector Headquarters. Additionally personnel of the Truong Song Cadre (Ethnic Minorities RD Cadre) will be present.


DECLASSIFIED

f. Two US Advisors, with radio contact to Cam Lo, present each day.

g. No guarantee can be given of exact figures owing to the rather sketchy Bru concepts of time and numbers. However, continued presence of PF and advisors should prevent VC infiltration of Bru parties.

3. Although the possible security risk involved is appreciated, experience in this Province has indicated that increased civilian movement along a road tends to reduce enemy interdiction attempts. This should apply even more so where Bru civilians are involved.

1 Incl
as


H.F. MOONEY
LTC, INF
Province Senior Advisor

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(140)

TD150ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 091 1231130

ZNY SSSSS

Z 031130Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV(REFIN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC

TWELFTH LINES COC

BT

VKKDLT C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1 3RD MARDIV

A TM MARBLE CHAM EXITED DMZ AT 031515H

2. 3RD RECON

A TM HARBOR QUEEN ENTERED PREV ASSIGNED RZ AT 030900H

B TM GARDEN VALLEY INSERTED WRONG RZ AT 032000. TM AN A/C REC
AND RETURNED SAF UPON EXTRACTION.

C TM DEER FERN REPLACED BY TM HUNGARIAN IN PREV ASSIGNED RZ.

TM SCHEDULED TO ENTER 040600 MAY 69

D TM SCHEDULED TO ENTER DMZ 04 MAY 69

(1) GARDEN VALLEY

(2) ELK RIVER

(3) HUNGARIAN

E TM AIR POLICE CANCELED

F HIGH POS FOR TMS IN DMZ

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 091 S E C R E T

(1) TM HARBOR QUEEN-995675

3. MLS-1 NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 4 MAY 69

4 ARVN NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 4 MAY 69

GP-4

BT

E9

SECRET

SECRET

(141)

*****ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSOD 092 1231200
ZNY SSSSS
Z 031200Z MAY 69
FM THIRD OAR DIV (FEIN) COC DGH
TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH MARINES COC
BTM
S E C R E T M
SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
1 3RD MAARDIV
TM FROST BURG SCHEDULED TO ENTER DMZ 040630 MAY 69 AND EXIT 041700H
MAY 69 WITH RZ UL 9267 LR 9365
GP-4
BT
092

INNN

SECRET

SECRET

(147)

OO UUMSK UUMSQ

DE UUMSQD 105 1231600

ZNY SSSSS

C 031600Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV COC

TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC

UUMSQ/III MAF COC

INFO THIRD MARINES

FOURTH MARINES

NINTH MARINES

TFH

FIRST FDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)

BT

S E C R E T

I SUBJ: 3D RECON BN SITREP FOR PERIOD OF 030001H TO 032400H MAY 69

II. INSERTS & EXTRACTS

A. INSERTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COORD

1 IH3 030920H XD 945635

2 IA1 031535H XD 701479

3 IC1 031550H XD 744377

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COORD.

1 3C 2 031535H XD 701479

2 IB2 031550H XD 744377

3 2B2 031645H XD 887212

SECRET

SECRET

UUMSQD 015 S E C R E T

4 2E1 031715H YD 022502
 5 2E3 031730H XD 894313

C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

1 3B2 8944 (1) UH1-H RECEIVED HITS FROM
 2 2A2 8947 SAF WHILE COMPLETING AN
 3 3E2 9256 EXTRACT. ANOTHER PACKAGE WAS ASSEMBLED BUT
 TIME AND INCLEMENT WEATHER PRECLUDED THE COMPLETION
 OF THERE INSERTS

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLET

PATROL REASON

1 1A2 7357 SAME AS SECTION C

E. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 04 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1 2E2 XD 3763
 2 3-2 XD 9560
 3 3E2 XD 9256

F. EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 04 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1 1A2 XD 7457
 2 1B3 YD 3229
 3 1B1 YD 1649
 4 2B1 XD 6650

PAGE THREE UUMSQD 105 S E C R E T

III LOCATION OF OPERATION PATROLS AS OF 032400H MAY 69

PATROL MEN LOC ATION

1 2-3 RR/ OP 3 XD 978559
 2 1H1 SCUBA 3 Y D 330520
 3 2C2 RR/OP 7 YD 097379
 4 2C1 7 "
 5 1C2 7 "
 6 1H8 4 XD 945635
 7 1D1 AMBUSH TM 6 UL 3469 YD 349694
 8 1D2 " 6 UL2874 YD 288747
 9 1D3 " 6 UL 2966 YD 290667
 10 2D1 " 6 UL 2564 YD 253643
 11 2D2 " 6 UL 2764 YD 276647
 12 2D3 " 6 UL 2856 YD 286657
 13 3D1 " 6 UL 3073 YD 303733
 14 3D2 " 6 UL 2868 YD 281683
 15 3D3 " 6 UL 2662 YD 266628
 16 3-3 " 6 YD 163557
 17 1A1 6 XD 703475
 18 1B1 6 YD 162483

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 105 S E C R E T

19 1B3 6 YD 022274

20 1C1 7 XD 744378

21 2B1 6 XD 673497

22 1A2 6 XD 731579

IV SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS

NONE

3-4

5

109

SECRET

SECRET

(143)

Rec'd 5 MAY 69
WB

X

*****ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 131 1241238

ZNY SSSSS

Z 041238Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) CUC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL CUC

TWELFTH MARINES CUC

BT

SECRET

1 (S) 3D MARDIV

A. TM FROST BURG ENTERED DMZ OVERLAND AT 040705H. EXITED DMZ OVERLAND 041628H.

B. TM HUNGARIAN RECD SAF ON INSERTION AND ABORTED MSN.

C. TM OLD COLONEL SCHED ENTER DMZ OVERLAND AT 050700H. RZ UL 9367 LR 9465. EXIT DMZ 051700H.

D. TM LUCKY PUNCH SCHED TO ENTER DMZ OVERLAND AT 050700H. EXIT AT 051700H.

E. TM HARBOR QUEEN EXTRACTED 041920H.

2. MLS-1 NO TM SCHED 04 MAY 69

3. ARVN: A - TM A REMAINS ASSGND RZ.

B - TM B ENTERED DMZ 031800H. ASSGND RZ 224780, 240780
240754, W ON SBDMZ TO 223770, 224780. SCHED TO EXIT DMZ 050800H

GP-4

BT

131

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER 3/HLC/bwh
 SEC G-3 OPNS PHONE 3180
 CWO ve

IMMEDIATE 050726 Z MAY69

TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
 3D RECON BN
 INFO: 3D MARINES
 4TH MARINES
 9TH MARINES

COPY TO: C/S
 COC
 G-3
 G-2
 FSCC
 AIRO

//SECRET//

- A. CG 3D MARDIV (REIN) MSG 022338Z MAY69 (C)
1. (C) REF A ESTABLISHED A RECON ZONE BETWEEN THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF TASK FORCE HOTEL AND THE LAOTIAN BORDER.
 2. (S) INSERTION AND OPERATION OF ALL RECON TEAMS WITHIN THIS WESTERN RECON ZONE WILL BE PLANNED AND CONTROLLED BY TASK FORCE HOTEL. TASK FORCE HOTEL WILL INSURE OPTIMUM SURVEILLANCE OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN RECON ZONE UTILIZING ITS ASSIGNED ASSETS AS COMPLEMENTED BY ONE RECON COMPANY (APPROXIMATE). ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE, IF REQUIRED, MAY BE REQUESTED FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS.
 3. (S) PRIORITY WILL BE GIVEN TO INSERTS IN THE WESTERN RECON ZONE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. KNOWN ENEMY LOC'S/INFILTRATION ROUTES,
- B. SUSPECTED ENEMY LOC'S/INFILTRATION ROUTES,
- C. SENSOR EMPLACEMENT,
- D. SUSPECTED ENEMY BASE CAMPS,
- E. SUSPECTED ENEMY ROCKET/MORTAR SITES,
- F. OTHER AREAS OF SUSPECTED ENEMY ACTIVITY, AS APPROPRIATE

4. (C) OPCON OF DIVISION RECON ASSETS PASEP.

GP-4

CON 1466 RELEASED BY Wm K Jones TIME 051100 Z MAY 69
 AFB
 C/S/LOC 14-2/FSCC/AIRO

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

(145)

Rec'd 0805
6 MAY 69
UB

DEPTER	11/JCM/tel
SEC-ALH	3d MARDIV 3214
CWO	we

FLASH 050846 Z MAY 69

FM: CG TIRD MARDIV DGH
TO: CG FIRST MARINE AIR WING DNG

FLASH

SUBJ: TIRD MARDIV HELO FRAGS FOR 6MAY69

//SECRET//

1. F A MSG 240716Z M R 69

msn priority

G-3-H

UH-1E(G)	UH-1E(S)	CH-46 D	CH-46A	CH-53	OV-10/01
507/203	101	505	502/108	303	508
401	102	501/503	105		506
510/301	111	401	104		510
		301	103		
		203	106/110		
			107		

1. MSN 101 STD FRAG
6. 0730 LZ OWL
1. MSN 102 STD FRAG
1. MSN 103 STD FRAG
4. C&C
6. A. PU 004429 0730 DZ TBA
- B. PU LZ BOSS 0800 DZ CUA VIET 200lbs/12PAX
- C. PU CUA VIET 1130 DZ LZ BOSS 12PAX
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 105 STD FRAG
6. 0800
1. MSN 106 STD FRAG
6. 0800
1. MSN 107 STD FRAG
1. MSN 108 STD FRAG
4. SI IP RUN
6. A. PU LZ KIWI 1300 DZ USS ST PAUL 13PAX
- B. PU USS ST PAUL CONT DZ LZ KIWI 13PAX
1. MSN 111 STD FRAG
6. 1645
- 1745

AIR

FLASH**SECRET**

SECRET

1. ISN 203 STD FRAG
 4. RECON I/E, VIS RECON
 6. A. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 152225 GPAX
 P. " " " " " " 928546 "
 C. " " " " " " 725558 "
 D. " " " " " " 887587 "
 E. " " " " " " 948594 "
 F. " " " " " " 783423 "
 G. " " " " " " 730416 "
 H. " " " " " " 073156 "
 I. " " " " " " 142186 "
 J. " " " " " " 813355 "
 K. " " " " " " 325295 "
 L. " " " " " " 238344 "
 M. " " " " " " 773614 "

7. A THRU M DZ NOT SECURE

1. MSN 301 STD FRAG

2. 8 CH-46, 2 UH-1E(G)

1. MSN 303 STD FRAG

2. 8 CH-53

6. 0700

1. MSN 401 STD FRAG (INCOMPLETE)

1. MSN 501 STD FRAG

1. " 502 " "

1. " 503 " "

1. " 505 " "

2. 4 CH-46's

1. " 507 " "

1. " 508 " "

1. " 510 " "

GP-4

CON

679

REL BY

Jack S. Mills

SECRET

SECRET/NOFORN

(146)

DRAFTED BY: WMB/RKR
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWOIMMEDIATE/PRIORITY 060012 Z MAY 69COPY TO: G-2
G-3
RECON REP
FSC
CIC
TIO
TSS
GSV I 2FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DCH, RVN
TO: CG III MAF, DNG, RVN
INFO: COMUSMACV, SON, RVN
CG XXIV CORPS, FEB, RVN
CG FORLOGCMD, DNG, RVN
CG FIRST MAW, DNG, RVN
CG TF HOTEL, VCB, RVN
CG TF ALPHA, NKP, THAI
CHDR 553 RECON WING, KORAT, THAI
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH), QT, RVN
THIRD MARINES, DCH, RVN
FOURTH MARINES, VCB, RVN
NINTH MARINES, VCB, RVNRecd 0820
7 MAY 69
UB

SECRET/NOFORN

DUFFEL BAG/DUEL BLADE OPREP-5 SER NO 018/29 APR-5 MAY 1969 (U)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

G-3-14

SECTION I. FOL DUFFEL BAG REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: NO SENSOR TARGETS WERE DETECTED IN THE 1ST BDE, 5TH MECH AG DURING THE PAST WEEK. IN ADDITION, STRINGS 145, 147 AND 149

IN THE BA LONG VALLEY, STRING 153 AND 154 ALONG RTE 926 AND STRINGS 146 AND 148 IN THE DA KROM VALLEY REMAIN ACTIVE WITH STRINGS 153 AND

154 BEING READOUT BY THE BATCAT AIRCRAFT.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: STRINGS 145, 147 AND 149 IN THE BA LONG VALLEY DETECTED SIX TARGETS AND 22 ROUNDS MIXED 105/155MM ARTY WERE

FIRED IN RESPONSE. STRING 148 DETECTED ONE TARGET BUT NEGATIVE CLEARANCE WAS GRANTED DUE TO FRIENDLY TROOPS IN THE VICINITY OF

THE SENSORS. STRING 153 DETECTED 14 TARGETS AND 8 ROUNDS 175MM ARTY WERE FIRED IN RESPONSE. BDA WAS UNOBSERVED IN ALL CASES.
^ WERE

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS: SENSOR EMPLACEMENT TEAMS ALONG RTE 926 WERE REPEATEDLY IN CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCES WHILE STRINGS 153

AND 154 WERE BEING EMPLACED PLUS SENSOR STRING 153 HAS INDICATED ENEMY MOVEMENT ON 14 OCCASSIONS INDICATING THAT THE ENEMY HAS MOVED

SOME TROOPS BACK IN ALONG THE ROAD SINCE THE THIRD MARINES DEPARTED THE AREA ABOUT ONE MONTH AGO.

34

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

E. INFLUENCE ON OPERATIONS: NONE

C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES: NONE

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS:

(1) TRAINING: NO CHANGE

(2) EMPLACEMENT: NONE

(3) READOUT VALIDITY: NONE

(4) RFI: NONE

(5) SERVICEABILITY: NONE

4. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: TWELVE

4a. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE SENSORS: 27 MINIHANDSIDS, 11 MAGIDS, SEVEN GSIDS, FIVE FIRIDS.

5. (C) NEGATIVE XM-63 FIRING TO DATE.

SECTION II. FOL DUEL BLADE REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: SINCE LAST OPREP-5, STRINGS 62071, 31191, 31131, 31141, 31151, 31101, 31041 AND 31051 AIR EMPLACED IN THE DMZ. NEW

STRINGS 101 AND 104 EMPLACED BY HAND IN DMZ NORTH OF A-2 AND OLD STRINGS 101, 102 AND 104 DEACTIVATED.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: DURING THE PAST WEEK, EIGHT TARGETS DETECTED BY ARVN SENSORS AND 400 ROUNDS ARTILLERY FIRED IN RESPONSE.

BDA NOT OBSERVED. BATCAT AIRCRAFT ACQUIRED 67 TARGETS WITH 92 ROUNDS 155/175MM FIRED IN RESPONSE. IN MANY CASES THE ONLY GUNS

NOW AVAILABLE TO FIRE ON BATCAT TARGETS ARE THE 175MMS. ELSEWHERE IN THE DUEL BLADE AREA, 10 TARGETS WERE ACQUIRED WITH 122 ROUNDS

MIXED ARTILLERY FIRED IN RESPONSE. ALL BDA WAS UNOBSERVED. SURVEILLANCE TEAMS DETECTED THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF PATROL SIZED

TARGETS: TM "A" - 1; TM "B" - 0; TM "C" - 4; TM "D" - 5. IN MOST CASES FRIENDLY PATROLS IN THE VICINITY OF DETECTED TARGETS PRECLENDED

FIRE MISSIONS. AS A RESULT ONLY 60 ROUNDS 160MM AND 18 RDS 81MM WERE FIRED AT ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TARGETS.

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS: ENEMY ACTIVITY DETECTED BY THE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TEAMS WAS LIGHT DURING THE PAST WEEK COMPARED TO

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

PREVIOUS WEEKS.

B. INFLUENCE ON OPS: NONE

C. APPLICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES: NONE

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS:

(1) TRAINING: NONE

(2) EMPLACEMENT: STRINGS 31051, 31041, 31101, 31151, 31141, 31131, 31191 AND 62071 WERE EMPLACED IN THE DMZ BY TPA.

31051, 31041, 31101, 31151 AND 31141 WERE TO BE READOUT BY GROUND READOUT SITES AT EITHER A-2, A-4 OR FSB FULLER (DOWN HA MTN)

WHEREAS 31131, AND 31191 WERE TO BE READOUT BY THE BATCAT AIRCRAFT. AT THE PRESENT TIME 31051, AN ACTIVE STRING ON CHANNEL 33, IS BEING

MONITORED FROM A-2 BY THE 2D ARVN REGT. STRING 31101 AND A PORTION OF 31141, ALSO ACTIVE ON CHANNEL 33 ARE BEING MONITORED BY A-4.

STRINGS 31151, 31041 AND A PORTION OF 31141, WHICH ARE SUPPOSEDLY ON CHANNELS 38, 37 AND 37/33 RESPECTIVELY ARE NOT TRANSMITTING EITHER

TO THE READOUT SITE AT A-4 OR FSB FULLER. HOWEVER, TONE CODES 28, 29 AND 15 ON CHANNEL 35 AND TONE CODES 15, 25, 03 AND 01 ON CHANNEL

36 HAVE BEEN MONITORED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TONE CODES 15, 29, AND 01 ARE RE-1 BUT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN DETECTED ON CHANNELS 37 OR 38.

() A FURTHER CHECK, A PORTATALE WAS MOUNTED IN AN OE-1 AIRCRAFT AND CHANNELS 33-40 WERE MONITORED FOR 15 MINUTES EACH BY AN AIR OBSERVER

AS THE PLANE OVERFLEW THE DMZ. ONLY CHANNEL 33 WAS ACTIVE DURING THE TEST. FURTHER PROBLEMS ON EMPLACEMENT DEVELOPED WHEN SENSOR

EMPLACEMENT TEAM DIED FEEN ON 2 MAY 69, WHILE ENROUTE TO SENSOR EMPLACEMENT SITE AT YD835647 WAS INVOLVED IN A MID AIR COLLISION

BETWEEN THEIR HELO AND ANOTHER HELO. TWO MEN IN THE TEAM WERE SEVERELY INJURED, HOWEVER THE AIRCRAFT MADE A CRASH LANDING

SAFELY AND THE PERSONNEL WERE EXTRACTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THE OTHER HELICOPTER CRASHED WITH TWELVE PERSONNEL KILLED. TWO DAYS LATER,

SENSOR EMPLACEMENT TEAM HUNGARIAN, WHILE ATTEMPTING LANDING IN LZ AT YD835647, RECEIVED FIRE FROM ABOUT 5 NVA IN THE LZ. THE MISSION WAS

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

ABORTED AS AIRCRAFT TOOK SEVERAL HITS.

(3) READOUT VALIDITY: NONE

(4) RTI: SEE PARA C (2) ABOVE

(5) SERVICEABILITY: ONLY TONE CODES 05 AND 06 TRANSMITTING ON STRING 31051. ADSIDS ON TONE CODES 07 AND 08 POSSIBLY DESTROYED

DURING IMPLACEMENT.

3. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: 32

4. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE SENSORS: 25 MINIHANDSIDS/HANDSIDS, THREE GSIDS, EIGHT MAGIDS, ONE PIRID, 66 ADSIDS, 18 ACOUSBUOYS.

5. (S) ACTIVE TFA CH 23 TONE CODES: 23/02, 01, 09, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. ACTIVE THIRD MARDIV

CH 23 TONE CODES 23/06, 11.

GP-4

CCN 0755 RELEASED BY MAJOPUB TIME 0800 H MAY 69

GSV

2/3/RECONREP/FSC/KIC/
T16/TSS/

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET

(147)

DRAFTED BY: MAS/RER
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION.
C.FOPRIORITY 060116 2 MAY 69FROM: CG THIRD MARINE, DGH, RVN
TO: CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN
INFO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN
CG III MAF, DGH, RVNRec'd 0820
7 MAY 69
WB

SECRET

THIS IS A DUEL BLADE MSG

DUEL BLADE EQUIP REQUEST (U)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

1. (S) IAW REF A FOLLOWING REQUEST IS SUBMITTED:

A. SIX PORTABLES MODIFIED FOR 40 CHANNEL OPERATION, 14
PRESENTLY ON HAND. REQUIREMENT IS 4 EACH AT A-2, A-4 AND DONG HAMT (FSB FULLER); 2 EACH AT SIGNAL HILL (VCB), HILL 950 AND DONG
HA COMBAT BASE. OVERALL QTY REQUIRED IS 20..B. SIX MULTICOUPLERS FOR AN/USQ-12B. REQUIRE ONE EACH AT
EACH OF SIX READOUT SITES: HILL 950, SIGNAL HILL, DONG HA MT,

A-4, A-2 AND DONG HA COMBAT BASE.

C. ONE CRP AND ONE TP ON NINE IOTZ OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS. TP
LOCATED AT DONG HA COMBAT BASE, CRP ON RECON REWAY SITE AT HILL

950 OR HILL 819.

D. FIVE OMNI-DIRECTIONAL. TWO AT A-2, ONE AT A-4, TWO AT
DONG HA MT. THESE ANT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR TURN-IN ON RECEIPT

OF MULTICOUPLERS.

GP-4

CCN #752 RELEASED BY MAS/RER TIME 0900 4 MAY 69

G3V

G3H

SECRET

SECRET

(148)

DRAFTER 3P/HLC/lew
 SEC G-3P PHONE 3203
 CWO *we*

PRIORITY 060844 Z MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TO: THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 INFO: CG XXIV CORPS PHE
 ONE-ZERO-ONE ABN DIV (AM)
 FIRST MAW

*Recd 0820
 7 MAY 69
 UB*

BT

//SECRET//

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, CHANGE 1 (U)

A. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 250122Z APR69 (S)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO REFERENCE A ARE EFFECTED.

2. (S) ADD REFERENCE: B. CG XXIV CORPS MSG 021915Z MAY69 (S)

3. (S) DELETE LINE 2, PARA 2E AND SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:

"AND PREPARES TO PARTICIPATE IN XXIV CORPS OPN APACHE SNOW IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE B."

4. (S) DELETE LINE 3, PARA 2F. AFTER SEMI COLON AND ADD THE
 FOLLOWING: "AND CONDUCTS OPERATION CODY NIGHTHAWK TO PROVIDE
 ASSISTANCE TO . . ."

GF-4

CGN 820 REL BY 117m K Jones TIME H MAY69

G-3

STAND *we*

116

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/CED/bwh
 SEC DIV COC PHONE 3180
 CWO BC

PRIORITY 061316 Z MAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
 INFO: THIRD MARDIV DGH

COPY TO: C/S
 G-3

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF OPCON

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 061100H MAY69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMED OPCON OF 1/4 (-)
 WITH B AND C COMPANIES, FROM 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) AND SIMULTANEOUSLY
 PASSED OPCON TO CG TASK FORCE HOTEL.

GP-4

CCN 0851 REL BY Morgan/West DATE/TIME 061915 HMAY69

COC STAND S/S G-3

BC

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(149)

rec'd 0820
7 MAY 69

US

VVVV
 OO UUMSI UUMSO
 DE UUMSO/ 223 1261445
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 061445Z MAY 69
 BY THIRD MA'DIV MTC
 TO UUMSK/XXV CORPS TOC
 UUMSO/III MA' COC
 INFO THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES

TO D/III MA' 1430

TFH
 FIRST BDE FIFTI IMF DIV (MECH)

SECRET

I SUBJ: 3D RECON BN. STREP FOR PERIOD OF 063001H TO 062400H MAY 69

II INSERTS AND EXTRACTS

A INSERTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG 000R.

1 301 061030H XD 837586

2 303 061445H XD 948594

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COOR.

NONE

INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

PAGE TWO UUMSO/ 223 **SECRET**

1 3A3 7343 INCREMENT WEATHER

2 203 7143 "

3 3-2 0617 "

4 2E3 8136 "

5 2B2 3230 "

6 103 2336 "

7 1E2 7765 "

8 2-1 9148 "

D. EXTRACTS NO COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

NONE

E. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 07 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1 1E1 XD 8751

2 1-2 YD 9119

3 2-1 XD 9148

4 3A3 XD 7343

5 3-2 YD 0617

6 2E3 XD 8136

7 103 YD 2636

8 1E2 XD 7765

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSQD 228 S E C R E T
F. EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 27 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1 1A1 XD 7043
2 1C1 XD 7439

III LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AS OF 062400H MAY 69

PATROL MEN LOCATION

1 2-3 RR/OP	3	XD 978559	
2 1H1 SCUBA	3	YD 330520	
3 2C2 RR/OP	7	YD 097375	
4 2C1 "	7	"	
5 1C2 "	7	"	
6 1H3 "	4	XD 945635	
7 1D1 AMBUSH TM	6	UL 2765	YD 279653
3 1D2 "	6	UL 2662	YD 265627
9 1D3 "	6	UL 2963	YD 295678
10 2D1 "	6	UL 2363	YD 231633
11 2D2 "	6	UL 2375	YD 233752
12 2D3 "	6	UL 3073	YD 303735
13 3D1 "	6	UL 3067	YD 305671
14 3D2 "	6	UL 2764	YD 272640
15 3D3 "	6	UL 3469	YD 349694

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 228 S E C R E T

16 1A1	6	XD 711479
17 2A1	6	XD 896619
18 3E2	6	XD 923547
19 3E2	6	XD 899448
20 1C1	7	XD 756377
21 3C1	6	XD 330535
22 3A2	3	XD

PIITEUO

23 3C3	6	XD 818259
24 2A2	6	XD 893459
25 2A3	6	XD 812503
26 3E3	6	XD 946594

IV SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS

A. 060700H D 925546 (3E2) ISHERWOOD OBSERVED 3 ENEMY MOVING TOWARD THEIR OP POSITION. THE ENEMY MOVED TO WITH IN 20 METERS BEFORE INITIATION SAF. THE TM RETURNED SAF WITH UNK RES. AFTER CONTACT THE TM MOVED TO WHERE THE ENEMY WERE. THEY FOUND 1 AK47 MAG. 1 NVA HELMET AND FOOT PRINTS, PLUS SPENT AK47 RND. THE TM IS CONTINUING ITS MISSION.

GP-4

BT

228

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NAVAL MESSAGE
 OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (2-41)

RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY		PHONE EXT NR		PAGE		PAGES		
DATE 06 MAY 69		TOR/TOD 2044		ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		OF		
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT) 061555 H MAY 69			PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
				ACTION				SEC.		
				INFO						

FROM AUGUST NIGHT
 TO GRASS HOPPER, SEVEN UP, MAIL TRUCK
 INFO BENNINGTON

SUBJ: FRAG ORDER 37-69
 REFF: OP ORDER 6-69

I. FRIENDLY FORCES

A. 2/4 UNIT LOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

CP AND GG) FSB NEVILLE
 G PLT 850575
 E 793620
 F 858614
 H. 826617

B. 3/4 UNITS LOCATED AS FOLLOWS

CP AND M (-) 948630
 M PLT. 946623
 I 912643
 K 933653
 L (-) 912591
 L PLT 897586

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NAVAL MESSAGE

OPNAV FORM 2110-26, 3-61)

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY
		ACTION				
		INFO				
					ROUTINE	DEFERRED

C. 2ND ARVANS UNITS LOCATED AS FOLLOWS :

+ BN. CP Ø53643
 1ST, 2ND AND ~~4TH~~ CO. Ø38637
 3RD CO. 037632
 2ND BN CP Ø566ØØ
 1ST AND 2ND CO. Ø496Ø8
 3RD AND 4TH CO. Ø396Ø7

2. 1/3

- A. SECURE HILL 366, CONT. S/D OPER. FROM VIC. NEAR HILL 366.
- B. BE PREPARED TO SECURE FOOT HOLD ON FOXTROT RIDGE AND BEGAN S/D OPER. BACK TO EAST IN CONJUNCTION WITH 3/3 AND 2ND ARVANS ABOUT Ø8 OR Ø9 MAY
- C. 24 HOUR AO COVERAGE NORTH OF YOUR POSS. HAS BEEN REQUESTED. ADVISE THIS HQ. OF RESULTS/DEFICIENCY

3. 2/3

- A. CONT. SECURITY FOR A-4, C-2, C-3 B, CAM LO DIST. HQ., KGB AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN AO

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NAVAL MESSAGE

OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (1)

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED	
		ACTION							
		INFO							

- B. CONT S/D OPER IN ROUTE #9 PASS AREA
AND DONG MA - ABOUT CAO HILL
- C. PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEPS
WITH IN AO
- D. PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ~~THE~~ ROAD CONSTRUCTION
FROM C-2 WEST
- E. WORK IN COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
WITH GVN FORCES TO PREVENT DUPLICATION
OF EFFORT AND GAIN MAXIMUM MUTUAL
SUPPORT FOR YOUR TASK AND THEIRS.

4. 3/3

- A. CONDUCT S/D ALONG MUTTERS RIDGE TO
EAST. SECURE OBJECTIVE SCHULZE BY 08 MAY
- B. CONDUCT S/D ON DONG HA MOUNTAIN
- C. BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE NORTHEASTERN
ATTACK, IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1/3 ABOUT 09 MAY
- D. PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ECB, FSB FULLER
AND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN AO.
- E. PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP
WITHIN AO.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (REV 7-41)

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED	
		ACTION							
		INFO							

5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. SECURITY FOR FIXED POSITIONS WILL ENCOMPAS AS A MINIMUM DAY AND NIGHT PATROLS AND AMBUSHES TO ENEMY MORTAR RANGE,

B. MOBILE BN. REMAIN LIGHT NOTIFY THIS HQ. OF ANY ON CALL. SUPPLYS REQUESTED TO BE STAGED FOR PRIORITY/EMERGENCY BUILD UP

C. AUGUST NIGHT 22 IS THE LEIASON STATION WITH 2ND ARVHS AT C-2 (DIRLAUTH) OVER REGEMENTAL TAC.

D. AUGUST NIGHT CP TO DISPLACE TO C-2 ABOUT 08 MAY

6. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

2044/06 MAY 69 / PSH / KY-8
TAC-2A

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DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

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CONFIDENTIALPRIORITY 070324 Z MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: THIRD MARINES DGH
 INFO: THIRD MARDIV (REIN)

//CONFIDENTIAL//

1. (C) ON 2 DAY OPERATION MAINE CRAG WAS TERMINATED AFTER 19 DAYS OF ACTIVE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS. DURING THIS PERIOD THE THIRD MARINES AND SUPPORTING UNITS EXEMPLIFIED THE AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT OF THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION IN SEEKING OUT THE ENEMY AND DENYING HIM THE USE OF A VITAL LOC IN ROUTE 926. THE NUMEROUS SUPPLY CACHES SEIZED AS WELL AS 157 CONFIRMED KILLS HAVE DEALT A CRIPPLING BLOW TO THE ENEMY'S INFILTRATION EFFORT IN THE SOUTHWEST PORTION OF THE DIVISION AO.


2. (C) THE EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY UNITS AND EXCELLENT EXECUTION OF THE FIRE SUPPORT BASE CONCEPT INDICATE A HIGH DEGREE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF YOUR REGIMENT. IT IS A PLEASURE TO CONGRATULATE YOU FOR A JOB "WELL DONE".

3. (U) WHEN JONES SENDS.

GP-14

CON 898 RELEASED BY Wm K Jones DATE/TIME 070745 H MAY 69

COC

STAND ^{we}**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/THM/cgw
 SEC COC PHONE 3180
 CWO W

PRIORITY 070326 Z MAR 69

FROM: CG THIRD ARDIV (C IN) BQH
 TO: CO FOURTH MARINES VCB
 INFO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB

//CONFIDENTIAL//

OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN


1. (C) SINCE 271800H MAR 69 THE 4TH MARINE REGIMENT HAS BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN. THROUGH MOST ADVERSE WEATHER AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS THE REGIMENT HAS CONTINUED TO AGGRESSIVELY ROOT OUT THE ENEMY IN A CRITICAL PORTION OF THE 3RD MARDIV AB. OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN HAS ACCOUNTED FOR THE 250 NVA KILLED.

2. (C) HAVING JOINED THE DIVISION WHILE OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN WAS IN PROGRESS, I HAVE NOTED WITH PRIDE, THE PROFESSIONALISM, SPIRIT AND DEDICATION OF THE OFFICERS AND MEN WITHIN THE REGIMENT. UPON CESSATION OF OPERATION PURPLE MARTIN, I COMEND THEM FOR A JOB "WELL DONE".

3. (U) NGEN JONES SENDS.

GP-4

CCN 897 RELEASED BY Wm K Jones DATE/TIME 070800

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

SOD 144 144 144

OO UUMSO UUMSEMA UUMSJEA UUMSOD UUMSOW RUYNIN
DE UUMSV 3507 1270300

ZNY SSSSS

Z 070750Z MAY 69

FM XXIV CORPS PHB

TO UUMSO/III MAF COC DNG

INFO UUMSEMA/SENIOR ADVISOR 1ST ARVN DIV HUE

UUMSOD/3D MAR DIV COC DGH

UUMSJEA/101ST ARN DIV (AM) DTIC CEE

UUMSOW/1ST MAW TOC DNG

RUYNIN:CTG 70.8

BT

S E C R E T

AVII-60

SUBJ: FORECAST OF OPERATIONS (U)

1. (S) FORECAST OF OPERATIONS UPDATED FOR WEEK OF 10 MAY-17 MAY 69.

A. FORCE MOVEMENTS: NONE

B. FORECAST OF MAJOR OPERATIONS BY 101ST ARN DIV:

(1) NAME: APACHE SNOW

(2) DATES: 10 MAY-INDEFINITE

(3) LOCATION: NORTHERN A SHAU VALLEY

(4) FORCES: 4 BNS OF 3D ARVN BDE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THREE BNS, 1ST ARVN REGT & ONE BN, 3D ARVN REGT. 3D ARVN BDE SERVES AS CONTROL HQ'S. MANEUVER FORCES ARE: 1/506INF, 3/197INF, 2/501INF, 3/5CAV, C-2/34 ARMOR, 2/1ARVN, 3/1 ARVN, 4/1 ARVN AND 1/3 ARVN.

PAGE TWO UUMSV 3507 S E C R E T

(5) MISSION: TO CONDUCT AIRMOBILE COMBAT ASSAULT AND RIF OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN A SHAU TO DESTROY NVA FORCES, SUPPLIES CACHES, AND INSTALLATIONS AND PREVENT EXFILTRATION INTO LAOS. TO INTERDICT ROUTES 922 AND 548

(6) CONCEPTUAL SUMMARY: FSB'S WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT BRADLEY (YD 4201) AIRBORNE (YD 3507) AND CANNON (YD 4702). ON D MINUS 2, 2/1 ARVN WILL CA INTO BRADLEY TO ESTABLISH A FSB AND CONDUCT RIF OPERATIONS. ON D-DAY THREE U.S. AND TWO ARVN BNS WILL CA INTO BN ZONES ADJACENT TO THE LAOTIAN BORDER AND CONDUCTS RIF OPERATIONS. WHEN THE AREA IS THOROUGHLY SEARCHED, UNITS WILL RIF BACK INTO THE A SHAU VALLEY. O/A 1 JUNE, WHEN RT 547 IS COMPLETED FROM HUE TO THE VALLEY FLOOR, TF 3/5 CAV, SUPPORTED BY C-2/34 ARMOR AND SPRT ARTY, WILL INITIATE ARMORED CAVALRY OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY.

(7) RATIONALE: XXIV CORPS FRAGO NO 6 OPORD 11-69 (U)

C. (S) FORECAST OF MAJOR OPERATIONS BY 101ST ARN DIV.

(1) NAME: BRISTOL BOOTS (TIME EXTENSION AND AO EXPANSION)

(2) LOCATION: AREA WEST OF ROUNG ROUNG VALLEY BOUNDED BY YC 6700 TO YC 8590 TO YC 8550 TO YC 6750 TO 6700.

(3) DATES: 10 MAY-INDEFINITELY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE HUMSV 3507 S E C R E T

(4) FORCES: 1ST ARVN BDE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE 54TH ARVN REGT: 1ST ARVN BDE SERVES AS CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. MANEUVER FORCES ARE: 2/327 INF, 1/502 INF, 1/501 INF AND 1/54 ARVN.

(5) MISSION: TO CONDUCT RIF OPERATIONS WEST OF THE ROUNG ROUNG VALLEY TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES, CACHES AND INSTALLATIONS.

(6) CONCEPTUAL SUMMARY. FSB'S WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND /OR USED AT WITSU(YC7585) THOR(YC6603) PPVE(YC6674) AND LASH(YC6766).

1/502 INF WILL MCA INTO VPC FVB YPEAR AND RIF SOUTH. 1/501 INF WILL RIF NORTH FROM FVB PPVE. 2/327 INF WILL RIF WEST AND NW FROM HROUNG ROUNG. 1/54 ARVN WILL RIF WEST AND SW FROM YC 7939.

(7) RATIONALE: OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN A SHAN VALLEY, NORTHEAST QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND THE ROUNG AREA HAVE STRUCK AROUND THE PERIPHERY OF THE AREA SUSPECTED OF BEING THE 5TH NVA REGT'S LOGISTICAL AREA. THE 5TH NVA REGT HAS TRADITIONALLY OPERATED IN THIS AREA.

GP-4

BT

3507

SECRET

SECRET

00000 ZZ UUMSO UUMSOD UUMSJEJ UUMSEMA UUMSOW RUMLEST ROLUJ
 DE UUMSV 3519 1271312
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z O 071303Z MAY 69
 FM XXIV CORPS PUB
 TO UUMSO/CG III MAF DNG
 INFO UUMSOD/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH
 UUMSJEJ/CG 101ST ARN DIV AM CFE
 UUMSEMA/CG 1ST ARVN DIV HUE
 UUMSOW/CG 1ST MAW DNG
 RUMLEPR/TF CLEARWATER CVT
 RUMLEST/CTG 70.0

BT

SECRET AVII-6C

SUBJ: COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE FORECAST OF OPERATIONS FOR 8 MAY 69 (U)
 1.(S) 3D MAR DIV:

A. 4TH MAR REGT (-): 1/4 MAR (-) RELIEVES 2/4 MAR AND CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS VIC FSB'S CATAPULT AND NEVILLE (NVA). C/1/4 AT VCB MAINTAINS READINESS AS DIV REACTION FORCE. 3/4 MAR CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS VIC FSB RUSSELL AND N OF LZ'S SIERRA AND DODGE (NVA).
 B. 9TH MAR REGT: 1/9 MAR CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC LZ TARAWA (YD 097 232) AND VIC YD 096242. 2/9 MAR CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC FSB RAZOR (YD 143186) (NVA). 3/9 MAR (-) CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC VCB, FSB CATES, HILL

PAGE 2 UUMSV 3519 SECRET
 550 AND HILL 691 (NVA).

C. 3D MAR REGT IN CONJUNCTION WITH 2ND ARVN REGT (-) CONTINUES OP VIRGINIA RIDGE. 3/3 MAR (REIN) CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC FCB AND FSB'S FULLER AND PETE (NVA, VCLE). 2/3 MAR CONTINUES TO SECURE RIF 9 FROM CAM LO TO ECR AND CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS VIC A-4 AND C-2 (NVA, VCLE). 1/3 MAR CONTINUES RIF OPS WEST OF LZ SPARROW (NVA).

D. 1ST BDE, 5TH INF (MECH) (REIN): TF 1/11 INF CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC FSB'S SHARON AND NORTH RA 121 AND SECURES LAND CLEARING OPS VIC OF FSB SHARON (NVA, VCLE). 1/61 INF (MECH) CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPERATIONS VIC FSB'S HARCORE AND TOMBSTONE AND VIC WUNDER BEACH (VCLE). TF 1/77 CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS VIC FSB NANCY (VCLE). 2/4 MAR MOVES TO CHA VIET, CONDUCTS LOCAL PATROLS AND PREPARES FOR FUTURE OPS. (NVA, VCLE).

2.(S) 101ST ARN DIV:

A. 3D ARN BDE: TF 1/506 CONTINUES RIF OPS NE OF FSB ZON AND VIC FSB'S BLAZE AND BASTOGNE AND SECURES ENGR FORCES UPGRADING RTE 547A (NVA). 2/506 (-) (REIN) IN COORDINATION WITH 7TH ARVN TF CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC PHONG DIEN AND AN LO BRIDGE AND SECURES
 1/506 AND 2/506 TO BEACH (NVA, VCLE). 3/506 (-) (REIN) CONTINUES

**7
SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 3 HUMSKY 3518 S E C R E T

SECURE FSB'S RAYVASAN AND BERGUESCADEN AND CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC YD 3508 AND EAGLES NEST (YD 405036) (NVA). 2/501(-) AT LZ SALLY PREPARES FOR FUTURE OPS. 3/5 CAV AT CAMP EVANS PREPARES FOR FUTURE OPS.

B. 2D ARVN BDE IN CONJUNCTION WITH 3D ARVN REGT (-) CONTINUES OP MASSACHUSETTS STRIVER (NVA). 1/502 INF(-) SECURES FSB LASH AND CONTINUES RIF OPS WEST OF FSB LASH AND VIC YD 664605 (NVA). 1/501 SECURES FSB'S PIKE AND MUIP AND CONDUCTS RIF OPS NW OF FSB PIKE (NVA).

C. 1ST ARVN BDE IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1/54 ARVN BN CONTINUES OP BRISTOL BOOTS (NVA). 2/327 INF (REINF) SECURES FSB'S PISTOL AND FIST AND CONTINUES RIF OPS WEST AND VIC OF FSB PISTOL, W OF RUONG RUONG VILLAGE AND VIC YD 757856 (NVA). 1/327 INF CONTINUES SECURITY MISSION WITH LOCAL PATROL/AMBUSH OPS ALONG QL-1 FROM VIC TRUOT RIVER BRIDGE TO SF CORPS BDRY AND CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS VIC FSB'S ROY, TOMAHAWK AND LOS BANOS (VCLF, UCMF). 2/502 INF (-) WITH RF CONTINUES RIF OPS SOUTH OF NUIHVE MIN AND VIC FSB'S PANTHER PT AND BIRMINGHAM AND SECURES POUL BRIDGE (NVA, VCLF).

3. (C) 1ST ARVN HDPV:

HA. 2ND ARVN HREGT (-) (REINF): TENDUNG CONTINUES PATROL AND RIF OPS VICHU-1, A-2, AND OLD A-3 (NVA, VCLF). 1/2 ARVN HCONTINUES RIF OPS SOUTH OF LZ COMET (NVA, VCLF). 2/2 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS SOUTH

PAGE 4 HUMSKY 3518 S E C R E T

OF LZ SPARROW (NVA, VCLF). 4/2 ARVN AT DONG HA, PREPARES FOR FUTURE OPS AND MAINTAINS READINESS AS REGT'S REACTION FORCE (NVA, VCLF). 5/2 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC C-1 (NVA, VCLF).

4. B. 1ST ARVN REGT (REINF): 2/1 ARVN CAV'S VIC YDH278123 TO ESTABLISH FSB BRADLEY AND CONDUCTS LOCAL RIF OPS. 3/1 ARVN AT LA VANG PREPARES FOR FUTURE OPS. 4/1 ARVN AT

LA VANG PREPARES FOR FUTURE OPS. 1/1 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS VIC AND SE OF FSB BARBARA (NVA). 3/11 ARVN CAV AT LA VANG CONTINUES LOCAL PATROL OPS (VCLF) AND PREPARES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

C. 3D ARVN REGT (REINF): 1/3 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS NW OF TA BAT (NVA). 4/3 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS SW OF FSB ZON (NVA). 3/3 ARVN CONTINUES HUP SECURITY MISSION. 3/54 ARVN CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH OPS SW OF HUE IN RYT BELT (NVA, VCLF). 400 BAO COMPANY MOVES TO HUE AND PREPARES FOR FUTURE OPS.

D. 54TH ARVN REGT (-) CONTINUES CLEAR AND SEARCH/CORDON OPS IN VINH LOC, HUONG THUY, PHU VANG AND PHU THU DISTRICTS (VCLF, VCLF). 1/54 ARVN CONTINUES RIF OPS SOUTHEAST OF LZ YELLOW TOWARD RUONG RUONG VALLEY (NVA).

E. 7TH ARVN CAV TF: 3/7 ARVN CAV CONTINUES RIF OPS SOUTHEAST OF FSB JACK (VCLF). 2/7 ARVN CAV CONTINUES LOCAL PATROLS VIC FSB GERONIMO (VCLF)

GP-4

BT

3518

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/DEF/cgw
SEC COC PHONE 3186
CWO Pg. 1

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 071338 Z MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (MTH) DCH
TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
LST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
INFO: CG JII MAF

COPY TO: C/S
COC
G-3

THIRD MARDIV (MTH)

//CONFIDENTIAL//

PASSAGE OF O CON

1. (C) EFM ACTIVE 071200H MAY 69, THE CG THIRD MARDIV (MTH) ASSIGNED OPCON OF C/3/5 CAV FROM LST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSED OPCON TO CG XXIV CORPS.

GP-1

COY 0997 RELEASED BY F. R. /rained w DATE/TIME 11 MAY 69

COC

STAND

S/S

G-3

PAC

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

*****ZZ UUMSQ UUMSEMA UUMSQD UUMSJE A UUMSQW RUYUIN
DE UUMSK 3526 1271379

ZNY SSSSS

Z O 071752Z MAY 69

FM XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG

INFO UUMSEMA/SENIOR US ADVISOR 1ST ARVN DIV HUE

UUMSQD/3D MAR DIV COC DGH

UUMSJE A/101ST ABN DIV DTGC C EE

UUMSQW/1ST MAW DNG

RUYUIN/CTG 73.3

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: FORECAST OF OPS REPORT WEEK OF 13 MAY 69 - 17 MAY 69 (U).

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG DTG 167606Z JUN 68 (C).

B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 120910Z JUL 68 (C).

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
REFERENCES A AND B:

A. FORCE MOVEMENT: NONE

B. FORECAST OF MAJOR OPERATION BY 3D MAR DIV.

(1) NAME: APACHE SNOW

(2) LOCATION: YD 017273, TO YD 230273, TO YD 273165, SW ALONG
STREAM TO YD 244151, SW TO YD 194050 SW ALONG STREAM TO YD 130095,
S TO YD 130077, TO YD 166957, TO YD 160037 AND ALONG LAOS BORDER

PAGE 2 UUMSK 3526 S E C R E T

TO YD 017200.

(3) DATES: 13 MAY - INDEFINITE

(4) 2 BNS OF 9TH MAR REGT. 9TH REGT IS CONTROL HQS.
MANEUVER UNITS 1/9 AND 2/9 MAR REGT.

(5) MISSION: TO CONDUCT COMBAT ASSAULTS INTO SOUTHERN DA
KRONG VALLEY ALONG LAOTIAN BORDER TO DESTROY NVA FORCES,
SUPPLIES, CACHES, AND INSTALLATIONS AND PREVENT EXFILTRATION
INTO LAOS.

(6) CONCEPTUAL SUMMARY: ON D DAY UNITS CA INTO
SOUTHERN DA KRONG VALLEY AND BLOCK ENEMY ESCAPE ROUTES INTO
LAOS AND INTERDICT ROUTE 922 BY FIRE. CONDUCT SEARCH AND CLEAR
OPERATIONS IN ZONE TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS.

(7) RATIONALE: INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT NVA
ENGINEER ELEMENTS CONTINUE TO UPGRADE THE EXISTING TRAIL AND ROAD
NETWORKS AND CONSTRUCT APPENDAGES TO THESE NETWORKS TO FACILITATE
INFILTRATION INTO NICTZ AND LOCATIONS FURTHER SOUTH

GT-4

BT

3526

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

AND MATE I HAVE ABOUT FIVE FIVER OFOR U AND
 MATE NONE AR ERELAY SO HERE THEY COME

MITO
 OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 273 1230135
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 330135Z APR 69
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV(REIN)COC DGH
 TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 SCOUT DOG TEAMS
 REF (A) FORO 5312.10

1. IT IS REQUESTED THAT FOURTH MARINE REGIMENT BE PROVIDED
 FOUR (4) SCOUT DOG TEAMS FM 14 MAY - 28 MAY 69
 2. DOG TEAMS WILL
 BE UTILIZED BY 4TH MAR REGT
 IT IS FURTHER REQUESTED THAT SCOUT DOG TEAMS BE DELIVERED TO
 MCB AND THAT (1) ONE DOG HARNESS BE FORWARDED ASAP TO REPLACE
 BROKEN ONE NOW IN USE

GP-4

BT

075

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(51)

Rec'd. 9 MAY 68
AT 0815
UB

TRAFFIC 3482: EID: 1st
SECTION ASST FSC EID: 3482
CWO

JCH

PRIORITY 080332Z MAY 69

FM: CG THIRD MAR DIV
TO: CG TTH

INFO: CG XXIV CORPS PHU DAI
101ST ABN DIV (AM)

//SECRET//

SUBJ: (S) FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION 6-69

A. TELECOM MAJ ELLIOT
XXIV CORPS 074600H MAY 69

1. (S) IAW REF A DIRECTIVE WITH 101ST ABN DIV (AM) FOR THE PERIOD OF
OPERATION APACHE SNOW.

2. (S) THE FOLLOWING COORDINATION MEASURES APPLY,

A. ALL ARTILLERY FIRES AND FPQ/CAS/DRAAGON STRIKES WITHIN 1000
METERS OF 101ST ABN DIV (AM) BOUNDARY WILL BE COORDINATED.

B. ALL AIRSUPPORTS WHERE THE FLIGHT PATH OF THE AIRCRAFT
PASSES THROUGH THE 101ST ABN DIV (AM) AREA OF OPERATION WILL BE
COORDINATED.

C. A QUICK FIRE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR
PURPOSES OF MUTUAL FIRE SUPPORT.

GP-4

1030

REL BY

FSCC

me

SECRET

SECRET

G-3 PLANS ROUTING	
Plans Off	(1) <u>W</u>
	(2) <u>/</u>
	(3) <u>L</u>
	(4) <u> </u>

P

PTTSZYUW RUMLEPA5869 1281705-SSSS--RUMWP.

ZNY SSSSS

P 081545Z MAY 69

FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB

TO RHMMAFA/C G III MAF DNG

RUMVUP/C 3D MAR DIV DNG

RUMLM A/C G 101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEE

ZEN/C G XXIV CORPS ARTY PHB

INFO RUMLOAL/SA 1ST ARVN DIV HUE

BT

SECRET 02175 FROM AVII-CP III MAF FOR G3

SUBJ: FRAG ORDER NO. 7 TO XXIV CORPS OPORD 11-69 (U).

REF: XXIV CORPS MSG, DDG 021915B MAY 69 (S), SUBJ: FRAG ORDER NO. 6

TO XXIV CORPS OPORD 11-69 (U).

(S) IAW PARA 3D (2) G REF, APACHE SNOR A EFFECTIVE 100001H MAY 69.

SSZ-X IS CANCELLED EFFECTIVE 092400H MAY 69.

P-1

080545Z MAY

A-3 2/COC

0800

SECRET

SECRET

(152)

Reid 0815
9 MAY 69
UB

*****ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 304 1281330
ZNY SSSSS
Z 081330Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PH3
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH MARINES COC
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
1 (S) 3D MARDIV
A. (1) 3/4 TM LEGHORN REMAINS ASSNGND RZ.
(2) TM FROST BERG REMAINS ASSNGND RZ.
(2) NO TEAMS SCHED TO ENTER DMZ 09 MAY 69.
B. 3RD RECON- NO TEAMS SCHED 09 MAY 69
2 (S) MLS-1 NO TEAMS SCHED. 09 MAY 69
3 (S) ARVN
A TM BAT SPIDER EXITED DMZ AT 281620H.
GP-4
BT
304

SECRET

SECRET

00 UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 305 1281400
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 081400Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC
 TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC
 UUMSQ/III MAF COC
 INFO THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES

TO III MAF

(153)

Rec'd 0815
9 MAY 69

TFH
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
 BT

S E C R E T

I SUBJ: 3D RECON BN SITREP FOR PERIOD OF 080001H TO 082400H MAY 69

II INSERTS AND EXTRACTS

A. INSERTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COOR.

1 2-2	080955H	XD 969363
2 1H9	081010H	YD 082483
3 3-1	081030	XD 754637
4 2B2	081500H	YD 123203

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COOR.

NONE

C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 305 S E C R E T

1 2E2	7163	CANCELLED DUE TO NEG COMM
2 1-2	0119	CANCELLED DUE TO ENEMY IN LZ.
3 3AE	UIRE	INCLEMENT WEATHER
4 3-2	0617	"
5 1E2	7765	"

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

NONE

E INSERTS PLANNED FOR 09 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1 3A3	XD 7343
2 3-2	YD 0617
3 1E2	XD 7765
4 203	XD 7143
5 0E3	XD 8136
6 1-2	XD 9148

F. EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 09 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1 2A1	XD 8962
2 303	XD 8127
3 3E2	XD 9256
4 3A2	XD 8339
5 2A2	XD 8747
6 3B2	XD 8744

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSQD 305 S E C R E T
 LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROL AS OF 032400H MAY 69

PATROL	MEN	LOCATION
1 2-3	RR/OP 8	XD 978559
2 1-1	SCUBA 3	YD 332529
3 2C2	RR/OP 7	YD 097379
4 1C1	" 7	"
5 1C2	" 7	"
6 1H8	" 4	XD 945635
7 1H9	" 4	YD 145185
8 1D1	AMBUSH TM	GUL 2662 YD 266623
9 1D2	" 6	UL 2863 YD 285631
10 1D3	" 6	UL 3073 YD 307739
11 2D1	" 6	UL 2865 YD 281655
12 2D2	" 6	UL 3469 YD 349694
13 2D3	" 6	UL 2764 YD 276647
14 3D1	" 6	UL 2564 YD 252644
15 3D2	" 6	UL 2966 YD 291666
16 3D3	" 6	UL 2374 YD 283749
17 2B2	" 6	YD 137210
18 2-2	" 6	XD 973354
19 2A1	" 6	XD 395617
3E2	" 6	XD 923547

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 305 S E C R E T

21 3B2	6	XD 899443
22 3-1	6	XD 749682
23 1E1	7	XD 875503
24 3A2	8	XD 893376
25 3C 3	6	XD 819254
26 2A2	6	XD 894457
27 2A3	6	XD 814511
28 3E3	6	XD 949589

IV SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS

A. AT 031435 H YD 021135 (1-2) PAWN TICKET WAS FLYING OVER
 THEIR LZ WHEN THEY SAW SEVERAL ENEMY IN IT. THERE WERE FIRES AND
 MANY TRAILS ALSO. INS MISSION WAS ABORTED AND A TOT FIRED INTO AREA.

GP-4

BT

305

SECRET

SECRET

G-3 PLANS ROUTING

Plans Off	(1)	<i>W</i>
	(2)	<i>A</i>
	(3)	<i>G</i>
	(4)	<i>P</i>

RUMHVP

VPE612MMZVA 7551675

CO RUMHVP

ZNY 5888

UTISEYOW RUMLBPA 5870 1281715-SSSS-UMINP.

ZNY 5888

O 081552Z MAY 69

FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB

TO RUMHVP/CG III MAF DNG

INFO RUMHVP/CG 101ST ARVN DIV (AM) CEE

RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH

BT

SECRET 22176 FROM AVII-CCO III MAF FOR G3

SUBJ: OPERATION APACHE SNOW (U)

1. (S) INFO CONTAINED IN SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPHS PERTAINS TO OPERATION APACHE SNOW, WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED NEAR THE LAO/VN BORDER STARTING ON 10 MAY 69 AND WILL CONTINUE FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD.

2. (S) MISSION: XXIV CORPS, IN COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN DIV, CONDUCTS OPNS IN NORTHERN A SHAU VALLEY-SOUTHERN DA KONG VALLEY TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN O.

3. (S) CA'S WILL BE CONDUCTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 101ST PH DIV (AM) AND 1ST ARVN DIV AS INDICATED:

DATE	UNIT	COORD
10 MAY 69	4/1 ARVN	YD 241041
10 MAY 69	2/5 21	YD 293018

041550Z MAY

C-3

PAGE 2 RUMLBPA 5870 SECRET

10 MAY 69 3/187

10 MAY 69 1/2 26

11 MAY 69 3/1 ARVN

YC 314988

YC 314924

YD 198240

FOLLOWING CA'S, UNITS WILL SEARCH THE AREA AND THEN RIF TOWARDS THE A SHAU VALLEY.

4. (S) 1/9 MAR WILL CA INTO FSB ERSKINE (YD 164107) ON 10 MAY 69 AND RIF TO THE SW TOWARD THE LAOTIAN BORDER.

5. (S) OPERATIONS VICINITY THE LAOTIAN BORDER WILL BE FORWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMUSMACV MSG, DIG 120724 FEB 69, SUBJECT: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT-LAOS (SECRET).

GP-4

BT

5888

SECRET

SECRET

(154)

Rec'd 0815
9 MAY 69
UB

FM 32Z UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 315 1281720
DTY 88888
Z 081720Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MARDIV (RAINF) COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TCC PB
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
EIGHTH MARINES COC

Tod 17 55 / 24 Corp

S 1 3 R A T
SUBJ: SPEC DM7 OFNS REPORT

1. 3RD MARDIV
A TH LECHORN AT 081520Z FND AT XD 889652 SHOMZ 4 BNKRS APPROX 1 WK OLD
2-00 CAL PSNS W/ AIMING STAKES PTG AT LZ DODGE. APPROX 50 SPENT
EVS EACH PSN. WHILE BLOWING BNKRS TM RECD 2-15 RDS BURSTS AWF.
CALLED ARTY SUSP AVENUES OF ESCAPE. BNKRS DEST.

GC-4

BT

155

SECRET

SECRET

(155)

Rec'd 0830
10 MAY 69
UBDRAFTER 38/MJS/Jen
SEC STAFF SEC PHONE 3138
CWO WLFPRIORITY 090038 2 MAY 69FROM: (9 THIRD MARDIV (RHN))
TO: (9 III MAF

//SECRET//

THIRD FORCE RECON COMPANY (U)

REF (A) GROUND RECON CONFERENCE, 5 MAY 1969

1. (S) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICIES DISCUSSED DURING THE SUBJECT CONFERENCE, AND THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED THEREAT, THE FOLLOWING STATUS REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

A. PERSONNEL ACTION WAS INITIATED ON 6 MAY TO BRING THE FORCE RECON COMPANY TO ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF AUTHORIZED MANNING LEVEL. IT IS PLANNED THAT THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY 10 MAY 1969.

B. AN ACCELERATED SEPARATE TRAINING PROGRAM IS BEING DEVELOPED, AND WILL COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY UPON FULFILLMENT OF (A) ABOVE.

C. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT A THIRTY DAY MINIMUM TRAINING PERIOD IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO A TAINMENT OF SUFFICIENT READINESS FOR INITIATION OF SEPARATE COMPANY OPERATIONS.

D. ALL MAJOR T/E ITEMS ARE CURRENTLY EITHER AVAILABLE, ON BACK ORDERS, OR RECENTLY REQUISITIONED. THERE ARE NOT ANY SHORTAGES WHICH ARE CONSIDERED CRITICAL TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF SEPARATE FORCE COMPANY OPERATION.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASED SCHOOL QUOTAS FOR PARACHUTE AND SCUBA QUALIFICATION WILL BE SUBMITTED SEPARATELY.

CCN 1180RELEASED BY Wm R JohnsonPAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

S/S

MK b
SECRET

SECRET

(156)

DRAFTER 3P/HLC/11s
 SEC G-3 PH 3203
 CWO *WLC*

PRIORITY 090324 Z MAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TO: THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 INFO: CG XXIV CORPS
 ONE-ZERO-ONE ABN DIV (AM)
 FIRST MAW

*Per'd 0830
10 MAY 69*

*6-3
HIST*

BT

//SECRET//

CONCEPT OF OPERATION, CHANGE 2 (U)

A. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 250122Z APR69 (S)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING CHANGE TO REFERENCE A IS EFFECTED.
2. (S) IN LINE 3, PARA 2F. CHANGE OPERATION NICKNAME FROM CODY NIGHTHAWK TO MASSACHUSETTS BAY.

GP-4

CON 1208 REL BY *F.R. /rannie* TIME H MAY69

*G-3**STAND***SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

OO UUMSQD 1 UMLBPB
 DE RUMLBPM 1125 1290815
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 090745Z MAY 69
 FM CO 1ST INF BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) QTR RVN
 TO UUMSQD/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH
 ZEN/ALL UNITS 1-5 MECH
 UUMSQD/CO COC QTCB
 UUMSQD/10E ARTY GP DGH
 ZEN/14TH ENGR FSB NANCY
 RUMLBPM/63D MAINT BN QTR
 RUMLBPM/58G SIGNAL CO QTCB
 RUMLBPM/504TH MP QTCB
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL AVBL-C 2585

SUBJECT: WUNDER BEACH (U)

1. (C) REQUEST THAT YOU INFORM ALL UNITS THAT WUNDER BEACH IS CLOSED
 AND ABANDONED AS OF 08 MAY 69. 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH) NO
 LONGER PROVIDES SECURITY FOR THE AREA NOR LIFE GUARDS AT THE BEACH.
 THE ROAD FROM QL1 TO WUNDER BEACH AREA IS NO LONGER CLEARED BY MINE-
 SWEEP TEAMS EXCEPT AS REQUIRED BY THE TACTICAL SITUATION. IT IS
 IMPORTANT THAT ALL PERSONNEL BE INFORMED OF THIS ASAP TO PRECLUDE
 SERIOUS INCIDENTS.

2. (C) UNITS OF 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH) DESIRING TO REHAB PERSON-
 NEL AND/OR UNITS SHOULD CONSIDER SENDING SECURE CONVOYS TO CUA VIET.

PAGE TWO RUMLBPM 1125 CONFIDENTIAL
 AREA (COORDINATE WITH TF I-61 MECH). TANKS NOT INVOLVED IN TACTICAL
 OPERATIONS WILL NOT USE ROUT 560 BETWEEN CUANG TRI AND CUA VIET.
 3. (C) TRACK VEHICLES MOVING BETWEEN BU BANG AND CUA VIET WILL NOT
 MOVE IN ROUT 560. CROSSING SITES ARE LOCATED AT YD 344655 AND
 GS 344645.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(157)

Rec'd 0830
10 MAY 69

TOD/FFA/1910

E
 *****ZZ
 DE UUMSQD 340 1291230
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 091230Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MA. DIV (REIN)
 TO TASK FORCE HOTEL FSC
 BT

SECRET LIMDIS
 ARC LIGHT

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ARC LIGHT TARGETS PROPOSED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION APACHE SNOW.

2. THE FIRST SIX(6) TARGETS HAVE ASSIGNED TOT'S AS INDICATED BELOW. THE FOLLOWING ARE VALID TO THEIR RESPECTIVE DATES. FOUR(4) TARGETS ARE LISTED AS SECONDARY TARGETS. SECONDARY TARGETS MAY BE STRUCK WITH ONLY FIFTEEN(15) MINUTES NOTICE PRIOR TO TOT.

A. TARGETS WITH ASSIGNED TOT'S:

(1) QT 10,036 YD 145090 TOT: 091105H MAY 69

YD 143099

YD 174096

YD 172105

(2) QT 10,043

YD 231056 TOT: 091400H MAY 69

YD 239060

YD 240043 ALSO WILL BE STRUCK AT : 100425H MAY69

YD 240035

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 340 SECRET LIMDIS

(3) QT 10,044

YD 220050 TOT: 091605H MAY 69

YD 230050

YD 220030

YD 230030

(4) QT 10,035

YD 191060 TOT: 091815H MAY 69

YD 200063

YD 209035

YD 200032

(5) QT 10,040

YD 224072 TOT: 092050H MAY 69

YD 234072

YD 224092

YD 234092

(6) TT 10,046

YD 251101 TOT: 092300H MAY 69

YD 245092

YD 261081

YD 267088

B. SECONDARY TARGETS:

(1) QT 0465

YD 202037 VALID: 112400H MAY 69

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSQD 340 S E C R E T L I M D I S

YD 212033

YD 210056

YD 219052

(2) QT 10,050

YC 067970 VALID: 092000H MAY 69

YC 072962

YC 083980

YC 089972

(3) QT 10,049

YC 046973 VALID: 092400H MAY 69

YC 046983

YC 016973

YC 016983

(4) QT 0464

YD 120093 VALID: 142400H MAY 69

YD 130091

YD 113063

YD 121060

C. PREPLANNED TARGETS:

QT 10022

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 340 S E C R E T L I M D I S

YD 100021 VALID: 122400H MAY 69

YD 120030

YD 131021

YD 103012

(2) QT 10,051

YD 091002 VALID: 212400H MAY 69

YD 101003

YD 080021

YD 090022

(3) QT 10,023

YC 081996 VALID: 092400H MAY 69

YC 091997

YC 079015

YC 089015

(4) QT 10039

YC 259999 VALID: 100600H MAY 69

YD 270015

YD 262021

YD 251004

(5) QT 10,042

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE UUMSQD 340 SECRET LIMDIS

YC 274979 BALID: 100600H MAY 69

YC 294979

YC 294989

YC 274989

(6) QT 10,037

YD 235009 VALID: 100600H MAY 69

YD 244006

YD 240026

YD 249025

(7) QT 10,003

YD 204044 VALID: 112400H MAY 69

YD 207035

YD 232054

YD 235045

3. THESE TARGETS ARE FORWARDED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS FOR GENERAL
INFORMATION ONLY.

GP-4

BT

340

SECRET

SECRET

(158)

Rec'd 0830
10 MAY 69
UB

V
 *****ZZ UUMSK
 DE UUMSQD 339 1291145
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 091145Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV CUC (REIN) DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 BT

To D/XXIV 1213

SECRET LIMDIS
 ARC LIGHT

A. CG XXIV CORPS MSG 090205Z MAY 69

1. THIS HEADQUARTERS GRANTS CLEARANCE/ CONCURRENCE FOR THE FOLLOWING TARGETS:

A. QT 10,032 VALIDATION PERIOD: 152400H MAY 69

B. QT 10,051 VALIDATION PERIOD: 212400H MAY 69

2. THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY TROOPS OR RECON ELEMENTS WITHIN THREE(3) KILOMETERS OF THE TARGET BOXES.

GP-4

BT

339

SECRET

700/1110/101-

139

Rec'd 0830
10 MAY
VB

10 3341
10 ID IN LEIGHORN: 090750 AT XO 888651 FOUND
1 A-FRAG BNKR 2X3X3" 1 FLAT TOP BNKR 4X4X3"
1 50 CAL SIGHTS W/ AIMING STAKES AIMING TOWARD
12 DODGE ON AZIMUTH OF 1140 BNKRS & 50 CAL SIGHTS DEST.
090750 AT XO 881657 DOUND 1 A

ENR 2X2X4 APPROX 3-6 NO OLD AN

RECEIVED
FEBRUARY 1964
RECEIVED
FEBRUARY 1964

100. 0000 00 011645 IM OBS 2 EN MOV TOWARD THEM ON
TEL. EN INITIATED CONTACT W/ SAF EN WITHDREW NORTH
WITHOUT RETURNING FIRE. 81 FIRE WAS REQ
EN 1 ENRAGING EN AND TWO SQDS FROM I 3/4 SENT TO REINFORCE IM AREA WAS
REPORTED W/ NEG RESULTS. IM AND 2 TWO SQDS FROM I 3/4 EXITED DMZ OVERLAND
05114H MAY 69

REF ID: A66582 346 S E C R E T
127 IN FRONT BERG: 691438N FROM XD 932656 OBS 15 LN WEARING G
SEN MOV

BOUNCE COLUMN AT NO 943686 TM REQUESTED AO TO OBS FIRE MISSION
 TO BE DEFERRED TO MY MSG DMZ INCIDENT (10-129-1)
 1000Z 010100Z MAY 68

REF REFERENCE TO MY MSG DMZ INCIDENT 091625H MAY 69
 091625H MAY 69 HERITAGE 100700H
 SCHEDULED TO ENTER DMZ 10 MAY 69 RZ UL 9267 LR 9465
 091625H MAY 69

1. BARKWOOD AND CATBU CHOPTERED ASSIGNED
2. DEPARTED AND EXITED 091500H MAY 69
3. ALL FOLLOWING TMS WILL ENTER DMZ 104700H WITH SAME NZ OF
4. 000000Z MAY 69.

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-388610)
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) (P)
SUBJECT: JAMES EARL RAY, AKA
RE: NEW YORK TELETYPE TO BUREAU, MAY 1, 1969

6. Dr. J. P. SCHUBERT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-29-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW

SECRET

SECRET

(160)

Rec'd 0830
10 MAY 69
UB

000000Z UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 355 1291500

ZNY SSSSS

Z 091500Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV COC (REIN) DGH

TO UUMSK XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

BT

SECRET LINDIS

ARC LIGHT

1 (S) THIS HEADQUARTERS REQUESTS EXTENSION PERIOD ON TGT QT 10032
UNTIL 152400H MAY 69.

2 (S) THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY FORCES OR RECON ELEMENTS WITHIN THREE
(3) KILOMETERS OF TGT BOX.

GP-4

BT

355

Tab (XXIV) 1508

SECRET

SECRET

XXXX
 OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 356 1291510
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 091510Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC
 TO UUMSK XXIV CORPS TOC
 UUMSQ/III MAF COC
 INFO THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES

TFH
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)

BT
 S E C R E T
 I SURJ: 3D MRECON BN SITREP FOR PERIOD
 OF 090001 H TO 092400H MAY 69

II INSERTS AND EXTRACTS

A. INSERTS COMPLETE

PATROL	DTG	COORD.
1 IE2	090945H	XD 773694
2 1 H12	091100H	YD 022493
3 2E3	071110H	XD 313357
4 2C3	091400H	XD 710426
5 1-2	071435H	XD 929471
6 3A3	091445H	XD 783423
7 IE3	091600H	XD 980558

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 356 S E C R E T

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

PATROL	DTG	COORD.
1 2A1	091000H	XD 895617
2 2A3	091005H	XD 314513
3 2C3	091415H	XD 710426
4 2A2	091430H	XD 893459
5 3E2	091440H	XD 923547
6 3B2	091450H	XD 899433
6 3C3	091525H	XD 919264
8 3A2	091535H	XD 933332
9 2-3	091600H	XD 980558

C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON
 1 3-2 0617 F/U COVER WAS DIVERTED. NOT ABLE TO COMPLETE MISSION.

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON
 NONE

E. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 10 MAY 69

PATROL	LOCATION
1 1A1	XD 8524
2 3-2	YD 8617
3 3B1	YD 1309
4 2C3	YD 1715
5 1B2	YD 2117
6 1C1	XD 8562
7 3E2	YD 8967

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSQD 356 S E C R E T

EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 12 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1 SE3 XD 9360

LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AS OF 120400H MAY 69

PATROL		MEN	LOCATION
1 IE3	RR/OP	3	YD 975559
2 IH1	SCUBA	3	YD 333523
3 2C2	RR/OP	7	YD 397379
4 2C1	"	7	"
5 IC2	"	7	"
6 IH8	"	4	XD 945635
7 IH9	"	4	YD 145195
8 IH10	"	4	YD 032493
9 ID1	AMBUSH TM	6	UL 2964 YD 293647
10 ID2	"	6	UL 3361 YD 333671
11 ID3	"	6	UL 3373 YD 333739
12 2D1	"	6	UL 2375 YD 233752
13 2D2	"	6	UL 2367 YD 231673
14 2D3	"	6	UL 2963 YD 291633
15 3D1	"	6	UL 2662 YD 263625

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 356 S E C R E T

16 3D2 " 6 UL 2765 YD 277013

17 3D3 " 6 UL 3469 YD 349694

18 3A5 6 XD 781425

19 1-2 6 XD 936475

20 2E3 6 XD 913357

21 1-2 6 XD 787636

22 2E3 6 YD 129297

23 2-2 6 XD 874350

24 3E3 6 XD 946350

25 3-1 6 XD 745697

26 1B1 7 XD 874491

SIGHTINGS - CONTACTS

AT 011815H RV 119423 (203) CONSTITUTION HAD JUST BEEN INSERTED WHEN
 2 ENEMY STOOD UP. THE TM INITIATED SAF RESULTING IN 2 ENEMY KIAs
 IT ALSO TOOK SAF AND ANF FROM SE. GUNSHIPS TOOK FIRE WHILE MAKING
 STRAPPING RUNS. TM WAS EXTRACTED.

BT-4

BT

BT-6

SECRET

SECRET

(162)

Rec'd 0830
10 MAY 69
UB

EOMM

000000Z

DE UUMSQD 367 1291630

ZNY SSSSS

Z 091630Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MAIDIV (HEIN) DGH

TO TFH FSC

BT

SECRET LIMDIS

ARC LIGHT

A. THIRD MAIDIV MSG 091230Z MAY 69

1 (S) IAW REF A THIS HEADQUARTERS GIVES UPDATE OF VALID ARC LIGHT
TGTS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION APACHE SNOW.

A TT 10,037 VLD UNTIL 100600H MAY 69

B QT 10,049 VALID UNTIL 092400H JUN 69

C QT 10,050 VALID UNTIL 092400H JUNE 69

D QT 10,051 VALID UNTIL 212400H MAY 69

2 (S) QT 10,049 AND QT 10,050 ARE SECONDARY TGTS.

3 (S) TGTS WITH TOT'S ASSIGNED REMAINE THE SAME AS INDICATED IN REF

A, PAF A.

GP-4

BT

367

TOD TFH 1915

SECRET

SECRET

G 3 PLANS ROUTING

Plans Off (1) *P*DRAFTER *37/HLC/118*SEC *G-3* PH *203*CWO (3) *W*2 MAY 69 (4) *P*PRIORITY *100035*

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TO: CG XXIV CORPS
 INFO: CG TFFH
 ONE-ZERO-ONE ABN DIV (AM)

BT

//SECRET//

REQUEST FOR APACHE SNOW BOUNDARY CHANGE

A. FRAG ORDER 6 TO XXIV CORPS OPORD 11-69 (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING CHANGE IS REQUESTED IN THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THIRD MARDIV AND ONE-ZERO-ONE ABN DIV (AM): FROM PRESENT BOUNDARY AT YD215169, THEN ALONG TRACE OF FOLLOWING POINTS, YD215165, 213698, 213694, 215088, 216084, 208077, 205068, 198064, 188056, 178052, 171048, TO LAOTIAN BORDER AT YD168042.
2. THIS CHANGE IS REQUESTED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE COUNTER BATTERY FIRES ON MORTAR POSITIONS CAPABLE OF HITTING FSC ERSKINE; AND SUFFICIENT MANEUVER AREA TO EMPLOY EFFECTIVE IN DEPTH SECURITY PATROLLING.

GP-4

CON *1327* REL BY *F.R. /r. amio* TIME *6-3* H MAY 69 *W***SECRET**

SECRET/NOFORN

C. C. SEABROOK 12
 DRAFTER M. E. DARTMOUTH
 SEC G-1 PHONE CT 385
 CWO WLC

ROUTINE 160103 Z MAY69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV (KEIN)
 TO: CG FMFPAC (0000)

COPY TO: GSV

INFO: CG III MAF

//SECRET NOFORN//

DCPG STAFF OFFICER ORIENTATION COURSES

A. CG III MAF 070842Z MAY69

1. AS REQUESTED BY REF A, FOLLOWING OFFICERS NOMINATED
 FOR SUBJ COURSES:

CLASS	NAME	RK	SN	MCS
JULY	CHRISTENSON, K. L.	MAJ	06 57 68	0302
AUG	FRYE, D. J.	MAJ	07 74 79	0302/0430/0202
SEP	GROME, R. W.	MAJ	06 55 46	0302/0202/0130
OCT	WHITING, C. S.	LTCOL	5 01 66	0302/0202
NOV	FEIND, W. J.	MAJ	07 79 04	0602/9962

CCN 1395 RELEASED BY M. A. Hall

TIME

G-1

GSV

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET

OO UUMSQ UUMSQD UUMSEMA UUMSJEA UUMSQW RUYUIN
DE UUMSK 3602 1300245

ZNY 35555

O 100237Z MAY 69

FM XXIV CORPS, PHB

TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC, DNG

INFO UUMSEMA/SENIOR ADVISOR 1ST ARVN DIV, HUE

UUMSQD/3RD MAR DIV COC, DGH

UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV (AM) DTCC, CEE

UUMSQW/1ST MAW TOC, DNG

RUYUIN/CTG 70.8

BT

SECRET AVII -GC

SUBJ: FORECAST OF OPERATIONS UPDATE FOR WEEK 26-25 APR 69 (U)

REF: CG III MAF MSG DTG 160606Z JUN 68 (C)

CG III MAF MSG DTG 120910Z JUL 68 (C)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
REFERENCES A AND B.

A. FORCE MOVEMENT: NONE

B. FORECAST OF MAJOR OPERATIONS BY 3D MAR DIV

(1) NAME: MASSACHUSETTS BAY

(2) LOCATION: MAI LINH, TRIEU PHONG AND HAI LANG DISTRICTS.

(3) DATES: 26 APR - INDEFINITE

(4) FORCES: 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH)

PAGE TWO UUMSK 3602 SECRET

(5) MISSION: TO CONDUCT RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS IN EASTERN QUANG TRI
PROVINCE.

(6) CONCEPTUAL SUMMARY: 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH) CONDUCTS RIF'S :
PATROL AND CORDON OPERATIONS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SUPPLY CACHES AND DETER ENEMY MOVEMENT IN THE AO
AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1ST AND 2ND ARVN REGTS AND PROVINCE AND DISTRICT
FORCES DENIES ENEMY FORCES ENTRANCE AND EGRESS TO POPULATE
AREAS.

(7) RATIONALE: INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT NVA/VC WILL CONDUCT
RICE TAXATION OPERATIONS DURING THE THRESHING, DRYING, MILLING AND
TRANSHIPMENT PHASES OF LOCAL RICE PRODUCTION.

2. (U) GROUP 4.

BT

3602

NNNM

IMI PAGE TWO, LINE SIX CHUD RD

IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1ST AND 2ND ARVN REGTS AND PROVINCE AND DISTRICT

SECRET

SECRETDRAFTED OSC/RKR
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWO WJPRIORITY 1005387 Z MAY 69COPY TO: G-2
G-3FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, HGH, RVN
TO: CG III MAF, DMG, RVN
INFO: CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN

S E C R E T

FOR INFO

FRIENDLY RADAR ORDER OF BATTLE (FROB) (U)

7. (S) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

- A. 12TH MARINES
- B. AN/MPQ-10A
- C. 16 DEG 51 MIN 15 SEC - 107 DEG 00 MIN 29 SEC
- D. C-2
- E. COUNTER BATTERY

- A. 12TH MARINES
- B. AN/MPQ-10A
- C. 16 DEG 56 MIN 24 SEC - 107 DEG 04 MIN 47 SEC
- D. GIO LINE
- E. COUNTER BATTERY

- A. 12TH MARINES
- B. AN/MPQ-10A
- C. 16 DEG 15 MIN 26 SEC - 107 DEG 08 MIN 44 SEC
- D. CAMP RED DEVIL
- E. COUNTER BATTERY

- A. 12TH MARINES
- B. AN/MPQ-10A
- C. 16 DEG 48 MIN 00 SEC - 107 DEG 02 MIN 26 SEC
- D. VINH DAI CRUISER
- E. COUNTER BATTERY

- A. 12TH MARINES
- B. AN/TPS-25
- C. 16 DEG 56 MIN 32 SEC - 107 DEG 04 MIN 51 SEC
- D. GIO LINE
- E. ANTI-PERSONNEL

- A. 12TH MARINES
- B. AN/TPQ-31
- C. 16 DEG 51 MIN 22 SEC - 107 DEG 00 MIN 31 SEC
- D. C-2
- E. TARGET ACQUISITION

GP-4

CGN 1388 RELEASED BY McDonoughTIME 1340

ON MAY 69

SECRET

SECRET

163
 Rec'd 0815
 11 MAY 69

000000Z UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 392 1301105

ZNY 000000

Z 101105Z MAY 69

FM CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS TOG PHB

BT

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3D MARDIV

A 3/4

(1) TMS HERITAGE AND MARBLE CHAMP

CANCELLED NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 11 MAY 69

3 3D RECON

(1) OLD COLONEL SCHEDULED TO ENTER DMZ 11 MAY

RZ UL 9667-LR 9865

C. C 1/3

(1) TM DUNBAR COUNTY ENTERED ASSIGNED RZ 100925H

(2) TM CRYSTAL STAR ENTERED ASSIGNED RZ 101145H

(3) TMS DUNBAR COUNTY AND CRYSTAL STAR EXITED

DMZ 101700H

(4) NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 11 MAY 69

2. MLS-1

NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 11 MAY 69

3. ARVN NO PATROLS SCHEDULED

GF-4

BT

392

SECRET

166

Recd 0815
11 MAY 69
UB

05 ZUMSK
UUMSQD 395 1301230
000000
230Z MAY 69 700/1234/34-289
THIRD MARDIV (REIN) CUC DGH
UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

IDENTIFICATION
BU DMZ INCIDENT (3D MARDIV) B-130-1
SUBM IAW DA 2185-R:
12 MAR
ID 896672 SHDMZ

FO BEACH BOY 61
101350H
EN IN OPEN
NONE
101359-1500H
R/S/12(105)
1 WP, 100 REO, 6 LEAFLET, 10 ICM
1 KIA 1 BNRK DEST
NO INITIAL/ FINAL REPORT

SECRET

SECRET

(167)

Pact 0815
11 MAY 69
US

*01000000 7711

UUMSQD 403 1301510

Y SSSSS

101510Z MAY 69

THIRD MARDIV (ALIND) CDD DGH

UUMSK XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

FO TASK FORCE HOTEL CDD

ELFTH MARINES CDD

TO D/XXIV/1545

SECRET

OBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

A 1/3

M MOLESKIN. UNLESS OTHER WISE DIRECTED WILL INTER DMZ 110700H

UL 9968 LR 0166 WILL SALT 111300H

P-4

403

SECRET

SECRET

168

Rec'd 0813
11 MAY 69
WB

MODE DIV AND MATE DISREGARD THE FOLLOWING

DE UUMSQD 406 1301730

ZNY SSSSS

Z 101730Z MAY 69

FM OHIRD MARDIV (REIN) OGM

TO DTFH FSC

NINTH MARINES FSC

BT

BT OR ETL IWD IS

ARC LIGHT

1. S) THIS HEADQUARTERS REQ FINAL CLEARANCE/ CONURRENE FOR THE
FOLLOWING TGT:

GT 10,051

D 091032

D 101333

T T: 112310H MAY 69

D 033021

D P093022

1. (D) REQUEST TO NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS ASAP WITH CLEARANCE/CON-
CURRENCE. INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY FORCES OR
RCON ELEMENTS WITHIN THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF TGT BOX.

GP-4

75

106

SECRET

G-3 PLANS ROUTING

Plans Off (1) _____
 (2) ☒ _____
 (3) ds _____
 (4) _____

DRAFTER 3P/RLG/dao
 SEC G-3 PLANS PH 3203
 CWO dlc

IMMEDIATE 110018 Z MAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL

COPY TO: GENERAL
 G-3 - 10 COPIES

THIRD MAR
 TWELFTH MAR
 INFO: CG XXIV CORPS PHE
 THIRD MARDIV (REIN) (LESS ACTION ADEES)
 CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM)
 FMAW DNG
 FMAW (FWD) QTR

FSC dyd
 G-3 dyd
 ARTY dyd

BT

//UNCLAS//

OP ORDER 19-69 (APACHE SNOW), CHANGE 1 (U)

- A. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 081330Z MAY69 (S)
- B. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 080332Z MAY69 (S)

1. (U) PARAGRAPH 3.I. (5)(A) OF REFERENCE A IS CANCELLED
 AND SUPERSEDED BY THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE B.

GP-4

CGM 1516 REL BY Martin J. Sington TIME _____ H MAY69

G-3

STAND/

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTED 3/8 D/LB
 SEC 800 1009945H 1100
 GIC 1100

URGENT 1009945H 2 MAY 69

COPY TO: C/S
 COC
 C-3

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (RUM) DCM
 FOR: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (100CH) GTR
 INFO: CG III MAF GND
 CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 THIRD MARDIV (RUM)

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF DROCK

1. (C) NEGATIVE 1009945H MAY 69 CG THIRD MARDIV (RUM) ADVISED CP ON OF
 2/4 (=) WITH FOX AND HOTEL COMPANIES FROM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL AND SERVICEMEN KEY
 PASSED UPON TO FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (100CH).

OP-4

CN 1518 TEL BY Thompson DATE/TIME 102015 H MAY 69

COC

C/S/COC/6-3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

H

DRAFTER	3/CED/cgw
SEC COC	PHONE 3180
CWO	WLC

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 110058 Z MAY 69

COPY TO: GENERAL

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 TWELFTH MARINES DGH
 ONE ZERO EIGHT ARTY GRP DGH
 INFO: CG III MAF DNG
 CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV GEE
 CG FIRST MAW DNG
 MAG-39 QTA
 MACG-18 DNG

//CONFIDENTIAL//

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 101800H MAY 69 THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN TASK FORCE HOTEL AND
 101ST ABN DIV IS MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

FROM PRESENT BOUNDARY AT

YD180075

NORTHEAST TO PRESENT BOUNDARY AT

YD200100

GP-4

CGN 1516 RELEASED BY

Morgan

DATE/TIME 110630 H MAY 69

COC

STAND

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

[illegible]

00 50 2

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840.

UNCLAS 000000 AVII-AIC
FM XIV CORPS OPLAN 12-89

THE ALIAS NAME DIAN THUNDERBOLT HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR REFERENCED PLAN.

REQUEST ADDRESSES MAKE PEN AND INK ADDITION OF THE NICKNAME TO THE PLAN.

Plans Off (1) _____
 14VI RM HVP (2) _____
 _____ (3) 6 _____
 _____ (4) _____

A-3

2/100

SECRET

DRAWN BY: RWD:DWG
 SEC S: [unclear]
 CWO [unclear]

PRIORITY 110513 Z MAY 69

FM: CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN)
 TO: CG AXIV CORPS PHB
 CG III MAF DNG

INFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV
 CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
 FIRST BDL FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
 THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 MAG THREE NINE
 SR. ADVISOR QUANG TRI PROVINCE
 THIRD REGON BN.

COPY TO:

G-2

G-3

GSV

Rec'd 0750
 12 MAY 69
 UB

SECRET

RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS FOR 10 MAY TO 16 MAY 1969

1. MISSION: TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE & SURVEILLANCE OF
 ASSIGNED AREA TO DETERMINE ENEMY INFILTRATION AND/OR POSSIBLE

ENEMY BASE CAMPS OR STAGING AREAS. PLOT WATER SOURCES, TRAILS,
 AND ALL AREAS SUIT BLE FOR HLZ'S. EMPLOY SUPPORTING ARMS ON

APPROPRIATE TARGETS, BE ESPECIALLY WATCHFUL FOR SIGNS THAT MIGHT
 CONFIRM REPORTS THAT ENEMY MAY USE THIS AREA FOR ROCKET/MORTAR

POSITIONS.

2. PATROL

RZ

A. THIRD MARINE DIVISION (R.IN)

| | | |
|------------|------------|-------|
| UL YD 0254 | LR YD 0452 | 10-14 |
| 1454 | 1652 | 10-14 |
| 1251 | 1449 | 10-14 |
| 0871 | 1069 | 10-14 |
| 0967 | 1063 | 10-14 |
| 0617 | 0815 | 10-14 |
| 1009 | 1207 | 10-14 |
| 1915 | 2113 | 10-14 |
| 2017 | 2315 | 10-14 |
| UL XD 8962 | LR XD 9160 | 10-14 |

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

G-2

SECRET

40
 G-3/03

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

| RZ | | DATE |
|------------|------------|-------|
| UL YD 1928 | LR YD 2126 | 12-17 |
| XD 6852 | XD 7050 | 11-15 |
| 8951 | 9149 | 13-17 |
| 8550 | 8748 | 13-17 |
| 8840 | 9236 | 12-17 |
| 7555 | 7951 | 12-17 |
| 8765 | 8963 | 11-15 |

3. IN ADDITION THERE ARE NINE TEAMS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF
CIA VIET OPERATIONS WITH THE MISSION OF PERFORMING NIGHT

INTERSEES. ADDITIONALLY THERE ARE THREE TEAMS AT INDIA RELAY,
ONE TEAM AT SIERRA RELAY, ONE TEAM AT QUEBEC RELAY AND ONE

TEAM AT JULIET RELAY.

32-4

SECRET

REF 1575 RELEASED BY P. H. Perry TIME 101200 EMAY69

SECRET

SECRET

(170)

Rec'd 0750
12 MAY 69
WB

NR 420.0000 7220.0000 7220

000000Z UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 432 1311200

ZNY SSSSS

Z 111200Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK /XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO QTASK FORCE HOTEL COC

TWELFTH MARINES COC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1 5RD MAR DIV

A THE FOLLOWING TMS SCHEDULED FOR 15 MAY 69

100 OLD COLONEL PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED RZ

120 AMANDA UL 8765-LR 8963

140 NOON WATCH UL 8068 LR 8265

BT 1/3

A FOLLOWING TMS EXITED DMZ 11 MAY 69

100 TM NURSE 111625H

120 TM SAND BOX 111645H

140 TM MOLE SHIN 111515H

B NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 12 MAY 69

2 MLS-1 NO PATROL S SCHEDULED FOR 12 MAY 69

3 ARVN NO PATROL SCHEDULED FOR 12 MAY 69

BT-4

BT

432

SECRET

SECRET

(171)

Rec'd 0750
12 MAY 69
UB

X

*****ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 436 1311320

ZNY SSSSS

Z 111320Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC

WELFTH MARINES COC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1 1/3

A. TWO ADDITIONAL TM FROM 1/3 ARE SCHEDULED TO ENTER RZ OCCUPIED BY TM MOLESKIN.

THIS RZ WILL BE EXPANDED TO UL 9868 LR 0166 TMS TO ENTER ARE:

(1) NURSE 110630H OPERATING AT TERMINAL PT 988668

(2) SAND BOX 110630H OPERATING AT TERMINAL PT 995665. TMS

WILL EXIT 111400H MAY 69

B TM NURSE ENTER DMZ 110730H MAY 69

C. TM SAND BOX ENTERED DMZ 110830H MAY 69

D. TM HOLE SKIN ENTERED DMZ 110913H MAY 69

GP-4

BT

436

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(172)

Rec'd 0750
12 MAY 69
UB

U
*****ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 437 1311325

ZNY SSSSS

Z 111325Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COG DGH

TO UUMSK XXIV CORPS TOC FB

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COG

TWELFTH MARINES COG

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1 3RD MAR DIV

ALL PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED PATROLS IN TO DMZ

CANCELED.

GP-4

BT

437

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(173)

Rec'd 0750
12 MAY 69
UB

VVVV

*****ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 456 1311806

ZNY SSSSS

Z 111806Z MAY 69

FMTHIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
TO UUMSK XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: DMZ INCIDENT (AMPLIFICATION MY MSG 13-131-1 (3D MARDIV)
13-131-2

- 1 (CL 1/3/4
2. OCCUPYING CO PATROL BASE
3. DEFENDING SAME
- 4 XD 911644
- 5 XD 908667SHDMZ
6. NONE

7 CONTINUALLY OCCUPIED THIS POS SINCE 20 MAR 69

8 K/3/4 932654

9 REF MSG 13-131-1

10 DISTANCE FROM EN TO FR POS 3500 MTRS
82MM CAPABLE OF THIS RANGE

11 REF MY MSG 13-131-1

FINAL REPORT

GP-4

BT

456

Top/XXIV/1830

SECRET

SECRET

174

Rec'd D750
12 MAY 69
WB

NNNN

*****ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 457 1311808

ZNY SSSSS

Z 111808Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH

TOUUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: DMZ INCIDENT (3D MARDIV) 21-131-1.

1 (C) SUBM IAW DA 2185-R:

L 12 TH MAR

M YD 005662 SHDMZ

N FO BARCROFT 61A

O 112010H

P ACT MIRS

Q(1) A/1/3 (2) OCCUPYING COMPANY PATROL BASE (3) DEFENDING CO
PATROL BASE (4) FR 001652 (5) EN 005662 SHDMZ (6) NEG CAUS.(7) OCCUP FOR LAST 3 DAYS (8) C/1/3 (991659) (9) REQ ARTY
SUPPORT FROM 12 TH MAR (10) REC 6-8 82MM MTR RNDZ IMPACT ON FR GRID.

R 112019H-2106H

S A/1/12(105)

T 2 WP 67HEQ

U MORTAR SILENCED

2 (U) INITIAL/ FINAL REPORT

GP-4

BT

457

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER 15: DGM: JKC
 SEC DIV ENGR PHONE DGH 3215
 CWO *WLC*

PRIORITY 120054 MAY 69

FM: CG, THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG, III MAF DNG
 INFO: COMNAVFORVREP DNG
 COM, THIRD NCB DNG
 COM, THIRTY SECOND NOR GLE
 CO, HQBN THIRD MARDIV (REIN) QTR
 CO, ELEVENTH ENGR BN DGH

C/S
G-3
G-4
175
Rec'd 0830
13 MAY 69
UB

S E C R E T

III MAF FOR ENGR

TSFC REQUEST #194

A. FORO 11013.1B

1. LAW REF (A), IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE BELOW LISTED
 TSFC BE FURNISHED THE UNIT INDICATED:

- A. CANTONMENT (PORTION THEREOF)
- B. 1153, 1154, 500 MAN MESSHALL
- C. N/A
- D. (1) 79 - SEAHUTS W/CONCRETE DECKS
 (2) 1 - 500 MAN MESSHALL
 (3) 2 - 16x32 SHOWERS
- E. HQBN, 3D MARDIV (REIN)
- F. CUA VIET
- G. 11TH ENGR BN
- H. DEO, 3D MARDIV (REIN)

I. THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE TACTICAL DISPOSITION
 OF THIS DIVISION NECESSITATE THE ACTION REQUESTED:

(1) REVISED FORCE STRUCTURE HAS RESULTED IN 1ST
 AMTRAC BN BEING: FIRST, PLACED IN A CADRE STATUS AND;

SECOND, REMOVED FROM THE DIV AO.

(2) HQCO AND SER CO 1/61 WILL MOVE INTO AMTRAC
 CP ON SOUTH BANK OF CUA VIET AND CONTROL AO.

DIV ENGR

SECRET

SECRET

(3) REHAB INF BN WILL BE POSITIONED ON NORTH BANK OF CUA VIET WITH ADDITIONAL MISSION OF EXPLOITATION/REACTION FORCE FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.

(4) IN LINE WITH THE MACV POLICY OF TURNING A BIGGER PART OF THE WAR OVER TO GVN THAT PART OF THE DIV AO ON THE GULF OF TONKIN NORTH OF THE CUA VIET WILL BE TURNED OVER TO THE 2D ARVN REGT.

(5) THE ABOVE AREA CONTAINS THE OP AT OCEANVIEW AND THE COMPANY SIZED DUEL BLADE POSITION AT C-4.

(6) THE ARVN WILL BE ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE OF OCEANVIEW ON OR ABOUT 15 MAY AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER C-4 WILL BE DEACTIVATED.

(7) THEREFORE, THIS DIV MUST ACQUIRE NEW FACILITIES NORTH OF THE CUA VIET TO ACCOMMODATE ONE INF BN WHICH WILL BE CHARGED WITH AN ADDITIONAL MISSION OF EXPLOITATION/REACTION FORCE FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.

Jc (1) IT IS REQUESTED THAT NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES BE TASKED WITH CONSTRUCTION OF MESSHALL AND SHOWERS.

(2) IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE 11TH ENGR BN BE TASKED WITH CONSTRUCTION OF SEAHUTS.

(3) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT SUBJECT PROJECT BE ASSIGNED PRIORITY 8.5V ON 3D MARDIV CONST PRI LIST.

GP-4

CGN 16284 RELEASED BY 117th K Javal TIME

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER 3P/HSC/dac
 SEC G-3 PLANS PH 3203
 CWO WLC

PRIORITY 120146 Z MAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TO: CG XXIV CORPS (ATTN: G-3 PLANS) PHB
 INFO: CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM)

BT

//SECRET//

POINTS OF CONTACT FOR C & D MATTERS (U)

- A. CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 071150Z FEB69 (S)
 B. CG XXIV CORPS MSG 181455Z DEC68 (S)

1. (U) REFERENCE A IS CANCELLED.
2. (S) AS REQUIRED BY REFERENCE B, THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS
 WILL ACT AS THIRD MARDIV (REIN) POINTS OF CONTACT (POC)
 FOR C & D MATTERS:

PRIMARY: LTCOL H. L. COOK (PH 3203)

ALTERNATE: MAJ H. E. PIERPAN (PH 3203)

3. (C) OFFICERS DESIGNATED HAVE TOP SECRET CLEARANCES.

GP-4

CON/625 REL BY F. R. /rmine TIME H MAY69

G-3

WLC

G3/610

11

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER ISO/FLG/RMB
 SEC ISO PHONE 3211
 CWO W

IMMEDIATE 120630 Z MAY 69

FROM: CG, THIRD MARDIV (REIN) FMF
 TO: CG, KEIV COMS
 INFO: IN, III MAF

//SECRET//

RELEASE OF EMBARGOED NEWS MATERIAL

A. GCMASHACT MSG 221515 Z AUG 68

1. AS PRESCRIBED IN REF A THE INITIAL RELEASE OF INFORMATION PERTAINING TO ANY TACTICAL OPERATION WILL BE MADE BY MACV WHEN IN THE OPINION OF THE COMMANDER CONCERNED THE RELEASE OF SUCH INFORMATION WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THIS COMMAND.

2. ACCORDINGLY IT IS REQUESTED THE EMBARGO BE LIFTED IMMEDIATELY ON RELEASE OF NEWS STORIES CONCERNING OPERATION VIRGINIA RIDGE WHICH COMMENCED 30 APRIL 1969 AND OPERATION HERKIMER MOUNTAIN WHICH COMMENCED 9 MAY 1969.

GP-10

CCN

11082

REL BY

Walter J. Lipton
BSO

(177)

Rec'd 0830
 13 MAY 69
 UB

G31614

SECRET

SECRET

(178)

Rec'd 0830
14 MAY 69
UG

*****ZZ UUMSK

DD UUMSQD 513 1321705

ZNY SSSSS

Z 121705Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO TASK FORC E HOTEL COC

TWELFTH MARINES COC

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1 3RD MAR DIV

A TM SIDEDISH IS SCHEDULED TO INTER DMZ 130645 H RZ UL 0067 LR 0166

BT

BT

513

SECRET

SECRET

(179)

Rec'd 0830
14 MAY 69
UB

700000ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 543 1330745
ZNY SSSSS
Z 130745Z MAY 69
FM CG THIRD MARDIV(REIN) COC DGH
TO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS TOC PRB
BT

TOP/XXIV/11142

SECRET
SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
1. (A) TM SIDEDISH ENTERED THE DMZ AT 130810H
GP-4
BT
543

SECRET

SECRET

(186)

Rec'd 0830
14 MAY 69
UB

TOP/TFH/10

*****ZZ TFH FSC

DE UUMSQD 551 1330838

ZNY SSSSS

Z 130838Z MAY 69

FM CG THIRD MA DIV (HEIN) COC DGH

TO TASK FORCE HOTEL FSC

BT

SECRET LIMIDIS

1. (S) THIS HEADQUARTERS REQUEST CLEARANCE / CONCURRENCE FOR
THE FOLLOWING SECONDARY TGT'S UNTIL 132400H JUNE 69

1. QT 1G, 657 XD 817237

XD 822245

XD 832226

XD 838234

2. QT 1G, 658 XD 841222

XD 845231

XD 858213

XD 862221

2. (S) SECONDARY TGT'S MAY BE STRUCK WITH ONLY 15 MINUTES
NOTICE PRIOR TO TGT.

3. (S) IF VALIDATION TIME CANNOT BE MET REQUEST YOUR LATEST
POSSIBLE TIME.

4. (S) REQUEST YOU NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS ASAP WITH CONCURRENCE
/ CONCURRENCE. INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY TROOPS
OR RECON ELEMENTS WITHIN THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF TGT BOXES.

GP-4

BT

551

SECRET

SECRET

DISPATCH 11/JGM/tel
 SEC AIR THIRD MARDIV (REIN) 3214
 CWO W/C

FLASH 130840 Z MAY69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV DGH
 TO: CG FIRST MARINE AIR WING DNG

SUBJ: THIRD MARDIV FELO FRAGS FOR 14 MAY 69

//SECRET//

MSN PRIORITY

| | | | | | |
|-----------|----------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| UH-1 E(G) | UH-1E(S) | CH-46D | CH-46A | CH-53 | OV-10/O1 |
| 507/203 | 101 | 505 | 502/108 | 303/304 | 508 |
| 401 | 102 | 501/503 | 104/203 | | 510 |
| 510 | 111 | 401 | 103/106 | | |
| | | 301 | 105 | | |
| | | | 107 | | |

Rec'd 0830
 14 MAY 69
 UB

1. MSN 101 STD FRAG
1. MSN 102 STD FRAG
1. MSN 103 STD FRAG
1. MSN 104 STD FRAG
1. MSN 105 STD FRAG
1. MSN 106 STD FRAG
1. MSN 107 STD FRAG
1. MSN 108 STD FRAG
4. SHIP RUN
6. A. PU LZ KIWI 1300 DZ USS ST PAUL 15PAX
 B. PU USS ST PAUL CONT DZ LZ KIWI 12PAX
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 111 STD FRAG
1. MSN 203 STD FRAG
4. RECON I/E, VIS RECON
6. A. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 212162 37.3 6PAX
 B. " " " " " " 883315 " "
 C. " " " " " " 186307 " "
 D. " " " " " " 116262 " "
 E. " " " " " " 199278 " "
 F. " " " " " " 885361 " "
 G. " " " " " " 094178 " "
 H. " " " " " " 892491 " 8PAX
 I. " " " " " " 173190 " 7PAX
 J. " " " " " " 855492 " 6PAX
 K. " " " " " " 323283 " 6PAX
 L. " " " " " " 225412 " "
 M. " " " " " " 103087 " 8PAX
 N. " " " " " " 853236 " 7PAX
 O. PU 103087 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 6PAX
 P. " 203142 " " " " " 5PAX
7. A THRU N DZ NOT SECURE, O AND P PU NOT SECURE
8. C AND P RADIO, PA EL

AIR

SECRET

SECRET

- 1. MSN 301 STD FRAG
- 4. TRPS, LOGISTICS
- 6. A. PU 438398 1400 STUDY 3947.8 DZ 325365 ICEBERG 6 47.8 4500lbs/
5PAX
- B. PU 438398 CONT DZ 325365 DISPLAY 6 47.8 9000lbs/5PAX
- 7. ALL ZONES SECURE
- 1. MSN 303 STD FRAG
- 2. 10 CH-53
- 1. MSN 301 STD FRAG
- 4. TRPS, LOGISTICS
- 6. A. PU QT LSA 0700 DZ VCB LSA 1000lbs/2PAX
- B. PU QT/VCB LSA CONT TBA RESUPPLY
- 7. ALL ZONES SECURE
- 1. MSN 401 STD FRAG (INCOMPLETE)
- 1. MSN 501 STD FRAG
- 1. " 502 " "
- 1. " 503 " "
- 1. " 505 " "
- 2. 4 CH-46's 1 OV-10
- 1. " 507 " "
- 1. " 508 " "
- 1. " 510 " "
- 2. 4 UH-1E(G)

GP-4

CEN

1863

REL BY

J. Smith**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/CMD/Lrb
 SEC/COC PHONE 3180
 CWO WLC

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 130904 Z MAY 69

COPY TO: C/S
 G-3

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 THIRD MARINES DGH
 INFO: CG III MAF DNG
 CG XXIV CORPS PHB

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF BOUNDARY AND OPCON

A. CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) MSG 120048Z MAY 69

1. (C) THE BOUNDARY CHANGE BETWEEN 3D MARINES AND TASK FORCE HOTEL OUTLINED IN REF A TAKES EFFECT 131500H MAY 69 VICE 130800H MAY 69.

2. (C) EFFECTIVE 131500H MAY 69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMES OPCON OF 1/3/9 FROM 3D MARINES AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSES OPCON TO CG TASK FORCE HOTEL.

GP-4

CCN 1868 REL BY Morgan W. Wood DATE/TIME 131500 H MAY 69

000

C/S/G-3

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(182)

Rec'd 0830
14 MAY 69
WB

000000ZZ UUMSK
 EDE UUMSQD 553 1331120
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 131120Z MAY 69
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV(REFIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO UUMSQ/CG III MAF COC DNG
 BT
 S E C R E T
 SUBJ:SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
 1. 3D MARDIV
 2. FM SIDEDISH EXITED DMZ AT 131314H
 3. 4
 BT
 553

SECRET

SECRET

(183)

Rec'd 0815
16 MAY 69
WB

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SECRET

(184)

Rec'd 0815
16 MAY 69
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DE UUMSGD 000 000 005

ZNY SSSSS

Z 140400Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MANDIV (REIN) COC SGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO/TASK FORCE HOTEL COC

/TWELFTH MARINES COC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS : TEPOR

1. 3D MAR DIV (LATE ENTRY)

1. TM BARKWOOD SCHEDULED TO ENTER DMZ

140907-YD 018659 SHOMZ

2. MLS-1 NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 14 MAY 69

3. ARVN- NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 14 MAY 69

GP-4

BT

602

NNNM

SECRET

SECRET

(185)

Rec'd 0815
16 MAY 69
UB

NNNN

*****ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 694 1340600

ZNY SSSSS

Z 140630Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (K. IN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS IOC PHB

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC

TWELFTH MARINES SOC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

A 1/3 TM BARKWOOD ENTERED DMZ AT 0907 14 MAY 69

WITH RZ UL 0167 LR 0366 TM SCHEDULED TO EXIT 1500 MAY 69

GP-4

BT

604

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

(186)

Rec'd 0815
16 MAY 69
UB

0000

ZZ UUMSK

DE UUMSQD 635 1340830

ZNY SSSSS

Z 140830Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) COC (DGH)

TO XXIV CORPS TOC (PHB)

BT

SS E C R E T L I M D I S

SUBJ: ARC LIGHT

1. (S) THIS HEADQUARTERS REQUESTS EXTENSION PERIOD ON IGT QT 10032 UNTILL 202400H MAY 69.

2. (S) UPDATED INTELLIGENCE AS FOLLOWS:


ND 628619 NEW DIRT ROAD 800 METERS LONG LEADING 7MAY AO
TO POSSIBLE BASE CAMP3. (S) THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY FORCES OR RECON ELEMENTS WITHIN THREE
(S) KILOMETERS OF IGT BOX.**SECRET**

(187)
Rec'd 0815
16 MAY 69
WB

649

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

| | |
|--------------|-----------|
| SHOVE | |
| OP CHIEF | <i>MB</i> |
| G-3 W.O. | <i>S</i> |
| G-2 W.O. | <i>MB</i> |
| DCPO | <i>MB</i> |
| APD | |
| ACTION | |

KKKKKKKILO

ZCZ GEAA236

7P UMS

DE UUMSQ 0799 1341557

ZNY CCCCC

P 141557Z MAY 69

TO UUMS/COMUS MACV SGN RVN

INFO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN

UUMSD/CG THIRD MARDIV DHA RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ATTN MACV CMD CTR AND INFO TOC/COC

~~RELEASE FOR NEWS COVERAGE OF OPERATIONS VIRGINIA~~~~RIDGE AND HERTFORD MOUNTAIN~~

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 120630Z MAY 69 (NOTAL)

B. CG XXIV CORPS 140258Z MAY 69 (NOTAL)

1. RECOMMEND THAT OPERATION VIRGINIA RIDGE AND OPERATION HERTFORD MOUNTAIN BE RELEASED FOR NEWS COVERAGE AS REQUESTED IN REF (A).

2. REQUEST THIS HQ BE ADVISED OF DATE/TIME OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

BT

BT

E 105

0000

82

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(188)

Rec'd OBIS
16 MAY 69
UB

*****TFH FSC
DE UUMSQD 649 1340020
ZNY SSSSS
Z 150020Z MAY 69
FM CG THIRD MARDIV(REIN) COCDGH
TO TASK FORCE HOTEL FSC

BT
SECRET LIMIDIS

ARC LIGHT

1. THIS HEADQUARTERS REQUESTS CLEARANCE FOR THE FOLLOWING
TGIS UNITL 222400H MAY 69

TA-14-219 XD 802230
XD 804241
XD 818227
XD 821237

TA-14-220 XD 819243
XD 825226
XD 833229
XD 827246

TA-14-221 XD 839243
XD 837234
XD 855232
XD 857240

1A

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 649 SECRET LIMIDIS

TA-14-222 XD 863233
XD 869239
XD 887216
XD 893223

2. REQUEST YOU NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS ASAP WITH CLEARANCE/
CONCURRENCE. INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY TROOPS
OR RECON ELEMENTS WITHIN THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF THE TGT BOX.

SECRET

SECRET

Rec'd 0815
16 MAY 69
WB

(189)
G-3 H

47

DRAFTED BY: WNB/CJH
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWO PLT

IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY 150512Z MAY 69

COPY TO: G-2

FROM: CG THIRD MA DIV
TO: CG TF HOPEL
INFO: THIRD MARINES
FOURTH MARINES
NINTH MARINES
TWELFTH MARINES
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES
SECOND BN, TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD BN, TWELFTH MARINES
FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MARINES
FIFTH ONE SEVEN FIVE GUN BTRY
FIFTH BN, FOURTH ARMY

G-3
TIO
TSS
COC

SECRET

SENSOR ACTIVITY BULLETIN PERIOD ENDING 2400 15, MAY 69 (U)

A. MY 210300Z APR 69

1. (E) ADD POL TO REF A:

| <u>STATION</u> | <u>CH/TC</u> | <u>KILL ZONES</u> | <u>TGT NO</u> | <u>READOUT SITE</u> | <u>TERRAIN</u> |
|----------------|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| 50L | 29/02,
04-19,
05 | XDOL326555
XDOL726566 | SD050L
SD150L | DONG HA MTN | OPEN,
WOODS |

GP-4

CON 2076 RELEASED BY MA Spn TIME 1300 H MAY 69

GSV

2/3/TIO/TSS/COC

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

TRAFFIC 3323 : DAG :
SECTION ARC LIGHT PH 3223/3323
CNO

CCN 658

FLASH 150545 Z MAY 69

FM: THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) CMC (DGH)
TO: XXIV CORPS TOC (PHB)

//SECRET//

ARC LIGHT

A. THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) 150020Z MAY 69

1. (S) CANCEL REF A.

GP-4

REL BY S. N. Helms

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



| | |
|------------------|-----------|
| SHOVE CUC | |
| OP CHIEF | <u>W3</u> |
| G-3 W O | <u>5</u> |
| G-2 W O | <u>Q</u> |
| DCPO | <u>M</u> |
| APD | |
| ACTION | |

C

UNCLAS 1001 WY AA P240 FT UZ YOM RHMMATA2259 135 135 0-0000--RUMLBPA RUMLMJA.

FOR UNCLAS

P 15 135 09 MAY 69

IN CG III MAF DNG RVN

10 RUM BPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB

INFO RUMLMJA/CG ONE ZERO ONE AED (AND) CAMP EAGLE RVN

RUMLBPA/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH RVN

UNCLAS

RELEASE FOR NEWS COVERAGE OF OPERATION APACHE SNOW

4. 38 XXIV CORPS TOC 110625Z MAY 69

5. COMUSMACV 140823Z MAY 69 (NOTALY)

6. OPERATION APACHE SNOW WAS RELEASED FOR NEWS COVERAGE

7. 10 1350H MAY 69.

2259 151354 Z MAY

C-150 1/3/coc

8

82

SECRET

XXX

ZZ UUMSK UUMSQ
DE UUMSQ 683 1351730

ZNY SSSSS

Z 151730Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC

INFO UUMSQ/III MAP COC

BT

SECRET L I M D I S

ARC LIGHT

A. MACV DIR 95-14

1 (S) IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING TARGETS ARE NOMINATED FOR ARC LIGHT STRIK
TARGETS ARE INTENDED TO INTERDICT ROUTE 926 WHICH THE ENEMY HAS BEEN
UTILIZING FOR RESUPPLY AND MOVEMENT OF TROOPS. TARGET CLASSIFICATION
S-E. MAP SERIES: L - 7014: SHEETS 6342 IV.

A. TA 14-219 RPT TA 14 219

(1) UTM COORDINATES

XD 802230

XD 804241

XD 818227

XD 821237

(2) TARGET INTELLIGENCE:

XD 805237 STREAM CROSSING W/ RECENT ACTIVITY 2 MAR AO

XD 818237 BEND IN ROAD, SUPPORTED BY BUNKERS 2 MAR AO

XD 815228 BUNKERS AND TRENCH LINE 5 MAR AO

XD 814234 TRUCK PARK 9 MAR AO

XD 805234 BUNKER COMPLEX & RECENT ACTIVITY 7 MAR MAG 39

PAGE TWO UUMSQ 683 SECRET L I M D I S

XD 804235 35 BUNKERS W/ OVERHEADS 22 MAR 1/3

XD 816233 LARGE BUNKER COMPLEX W/ FIGHTING HOLES 7 APR 2/3

XD 803235 ROCKET POSITION 7 APR 12 TH MAR

XD 807237 75 MM ARTY SITE, 50 CAL PIT 4 APR AO

XD 805233 SMALL ARMS FIRE 13 MAR AO

XD 807237 SMALL ARMS FIRE 7 APR AO

XD 807233 AW POSITION 10 APR RECON

XD 807237 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION 7 APR

B. TA 14 220 RPT TA 14 220

(1) UTM COORDINATES:

XD 819245

XD 825226

XD 833229

XD 827246

(2) TARGET INTELLIGENCE:

XD 824242 BUNKER COMPLEX W/ RECENT ACTIVITY 5 MAR AO

XD 829237 2 BUNKERS W/ RECENT ACTIVITY 5 MAR AO

XD 827235 6 BUNKERS 7 MAR MAG 39

XD 825242 BUNKER COMPLEX 9 MAR AO

XD 825233 6 U/G BUNKERS 5 MAR RECON

XD 825233 SUSPECTED SUPPLY CAC HE 19 MAR AO

XD 825233 POSSIBLE BASE CAMP 25 MAR III MAP

XD 825233 BASE CAMP 25 MAR PI

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSQD Q633 S E C R E T L I M D I S

XD 827232 BASE CAMP 4 APR 12 RITIS

XD 825242 STAGING AREA 3 APR 2/3

XD 810228 MTR POSITION 7 APR 12 TH MAR

XD 823237 2 BUNKERS 13 APR AO

XD 824252

XD 828225 TO 60 BUNKERS ALONG TAIL 6 MAY RECON

XD 827233 5 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS 2 MAR

XD 818237 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS 2 MAR

XD 831231 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS 14 APR

XD 825248 URS WITHIN RADIUS OF 5,000 METERS 5 MAY

C. TA 14 221 RPT TA 14 221

(1) UTM COORDINATES

XD 839243

XD 837234

XD 855232

XD 857240

(2) TARGET INTELLIGENCE:

XD 846235 50 CAL PSN: BUNKERS:W/ RECENT ACTIVITY 2 MAR AO

XD 848239 SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITION 3 MAR AO

XD 854233 BASE CAMP 3 MAR AO

XD 843239 BUNKERS 18 MAR AO

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 683 S E C R E T L I M D I S

XD 843239 LARGE BUNKER COMPLEX 20 MAR MAG 39

XD 804235 35 OLD BUNKERS, 15 HUTS 21 MAR 1/3

XD 851239 14 BUNKERS 24 MAR 1/3

XD 854233 20 FOXHOLES 23 MAR PIQ

XD 843240 15 FOXHOLES 23 MAR PI

XD 850237 40 FOXHOLES 23 MAR PI

XD 845235 A W POSITION 5 MAR AO

XD 850240 SMALL ARMS FIRE 5 MAR AO

XD 855235 30 CAL POSITION 18 MAR MAG 39

XD 839260 URS WITHIN RADIUS OF 5,000 METERS 4 MAR

SENSORS READINGS FOR TARGET TA-14-221

DATE PERSONNEL VEHICLES

14 MAY 32 2

13 MAY 52 21

12 MAY 111 1

11 MAY 19 0

10 MAY 146 0

9 MAY 0 0

8 MAY 20 0

7 MAY 184 0

6 MAY 176 0

5 MAY 40 0

4 MAY 71 0

3 MAY 0 0

2 MAY 0 0

1 MAY 0 0

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE UUMSQD 683 S E C R E T L I M D I S
D. TA-14-22 RPT TA-14-222

(1) JTM COORDINATES:

XD 853233
XD 869239
XD 837216
XD 893223

(2) TARGET INTELLIGENCE:

XD 871227 SUSPECTED TRUCK PARK W/ RECENT ACTIVITY 2 MAR AO
XD 878232 BUNKER COMPLEX & TRAILS 7 MAR AO
XD 871231 BUNKER C OMPLEX W / HEAVY TRAIL ACTIVITY 7 MAR MAG 39
XD 873237 SUSPECTED BUNKER COMPLEX 9 MAR VASACC
XD 887227 BUNKER COMPLEX 15 MAR AO
XD 885224 BUNKERS 15 MAR AO
XD 883227 ROAD 19 MAR AO
XD 882225 BUNKERS & MTR POSITION 20 MAR FMAW
XD 880222 4 BUNKERS 20 MAR AO
XD 872227 25-30 BUNKERS 20 MAR 2/3
XD 881225 BUNKERS 20 MAR AO
XD 885236 SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITION 20 MAR AO
XD 881223 BUNKER COMPLEX 80-100 METERS LONG 20 MAR AO
XD 873226 SUPPLY & STORAGE AREA 19 MAR XXIV CORPS

PAGE SIX UUMSQD 683 S E C R E T L I M D I S

XD 884225 20 FOXHOLES 23 MAR PI
XD 866234 BUNKERS 16 APR AO
XD 875226 25 FOXHOLES ON BOTH SIDES OF ROAD 16 APR PI
XD 873237 3 BUNKERS 23 APR AO
XD 889221 BUNKER COMPLEX 2 MAY AO
XD 885224 AK 47 FIRE 15 MAR AO
XD 880233 50 CAL POSITION 20 MAR AO
XD 876224 SMALL ARMS FIRE 19 MAR FMAW
XD 885225 AW POSITION 15 MAR AO
XD 875224 SMALL ARMS FIRE 19 MAR AO
XD 880233 50 CAL POSTION 20 MAR AO
XD 873235 SMALL ARMS FIRE 13 APR FMAW
XD 865235 SMALL ARMS FIRE 13 APR AO
XD 885224 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION 15 MAR
XD 885223 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION 20 MAR
XD 866234 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION 16 APR
XD 890200 URS WITHIN RADIUW OF 3,300 METERS 9 APR

SENSOR READINGS FOR TARGET TA-14-222

| DATE | PERSONNEL | VEHICLES |
|--------|-----------|----------|
| 14 MAY | 20 | 3 |
| 16 MAY | 32 | 4 |
| 18 MAY | 69 | 6 |

SECRET

SECRET

AAAAA

*****ZZ UUMSK UUMSQ

DE UUMSQD 684 1351730

ZNY SSSSS

Z 151730Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH

TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

INFO UUMSQ/ II MAF COC DNG

BT

S E C R E T L I M D I S

SEC TWO OF TWO (FINAL)

2. THIRD MARDIV SENSORS SHOW THERE HAS BEEN AN EXTREME INCREASE OF ENEMY ACTIVITY ON AND AROUND ROUTE 926. TARGET IS PROPOSED TO INTERDICT ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTE, TO DESTROY SUSPECTED ENEMY STAGING AREAS AND BASE CAMPS. TARGETS WILL BE GROUND EXPLOITED BY RECON TEAMS.
3. REQUESTED TOT: AT FIRST LIGHT AND IN A PERIOD OF THREE HOURS.
4. TARGET VALIDATION PERIOD: ASAP TO 222400H MAY 69.
5. EXPLOITATION BY THIRD MARDIV AO, WHICH WILL BE ON STATION PRIOR TO STRIKES.

6. REQUEST NOSE AND FIN DELAY FUZE ON 50 PERCENT OF THE 750 POUND BOMB LOAD.

7. THERE ARE NO RPT NO FRIENDLY TROOPS OR RECON ELEMENTS WITHIN THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF THE TARGET BOXES.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

(193)

ZNY SSSSS

Z 160708Z MAY 69

FM CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGM
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

BT

S E C R E T LIMDIS

ARC LIGHT

A. XXIV CORPS 151845Z MAY 69

1. (S) IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING TGTS ARE GRANTED CLEARANCE/
CONCURRENCE UNTIL 252400H MAY 69. TGTS ARE CLEARED FOR
PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY.A. QT 10059- NEAREST FRIENDLIES 6500 METERS VIC A-2.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 8000 METERS VIC GIO LINH.B. QT 10064- NEAREST FRIENDLIES 3900 METERS VIC A-2.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 5500 METERS VIC GIO VLIGN.C. QT 10064- NEAREST FRIENDLIES 3100 METERS VIC A-2.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 4500 METERS VIC GIO LINH.D. QT 10066-NEAREST FRIENDLIES 4500 METERS VIC A-2.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 6000 METERS VIC GIO LINH.

E. QT 8404-NEAREST FREINDLIES 4000 METERS VIC A-2.

Q

PAGE TWO RUMHVP702 S E C R E T LIMDIS

NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 5500 METERS VIC GIO LINH.

F. QT 10060-NEAREST FRIENDLIES 3200 METERS VIC XD845618.
NEAREST NON COMBATANTS 29000 METERS VIC CAM LO.G. QT 10061-NEAREST FRIENDLIES 3300 METERS VIC XD845618.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 29000 METERS VIC CAM LO.H. QT 10062-NEAREST FRIENDLIES 4100 METERS VIC XD893600.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 25000 METERS VIC CAM LO.I. QT 10067-NEAREST FRIENDLIES 3500 METERS VIC XD944622.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 21000 METERS VIC CAM LO.J. QT 10069-NEAREST FRIENDLIES 500 METERS VIC DXD014656.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 14000 METERS VIC CAM LO.K. QT 10070-NEAREST FRIENDLIES 2500 METERS VIC YD032655.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 13500 METERS VIC CAM LO.L. QT 10071- NEAREST FRIENDLIES 4200 METERS VIC YD03265.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 12500 METERS VIC CAM LO.M. QT 10072-NEAREST FRIENDLIES 3500 METERS VIC A-4.
NEAREST NONCOMBATANTS 10000 METERS VIC GIO LINH.

2. (S) QT 10063 AND QT 10068 HAVE NEGATIVE CLEARANCE.

3. (S) THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY FORCES OR RECON ELEMENTS WITHIN

PAGE THREE RUMHVP 702 S E C R E T LIMDIS

THREE (3) KILOMETERS OF TGT BOXES EXCEPT AS INDICATED IN
PAR 1 I ITEMS J AND K. TGTS ARE CLEARED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES
ONLY.

BT

GP-4

702

Rec'd 0830
17 MAY 69
UB**7
SECRET**

SECRET

(193)

Rec'd 0830
17 MAY 69
WB

DE UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 786 1361035
EY SSSSS
E 161035Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DEN
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHO
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH MARINES COC

BT
C M C K E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. (AO) 3RD MAR DIV

NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 17 MAY 69

1ST MARS NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 17 MAY 69

CO ARVN NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 17 MAY 69

BT

BT

BT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/CED/lrb

SEC COC PHONE 3180

CNO

P3

PRIORITY: 161210 2 MAY 69

COPY TO: C/S

G-3

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
 THIRD BAKB BN QTR
 INFO: CG III MAF DNG
 CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANCE OF OPCON

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 161200H MAY 69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMED OPCON OF 2/4 (-)
 FROM 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSED OPCON TO CG TASK FORCE
 HOTEL.

2. (C) EFFECTIVE 161600H CG THIRD MARDIV ASSUMED OPCON OF TASK FORCE BRAVO AND
 PASSED OPCON TO CG TASK FORCE HOTEL.

GP-4

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASED BY B. B. / [signature] DATE/TIME 18 MAY 69

COC

STAND/SIS/G-3

P3C

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IKNUGRH

VV SKA 467...467

I

O) UUMSK UUMSQ UUMSQW UUMSQD

DE UUMSJEA 0693 1351635

ZNY CCCCC

O 151235Z MAY 69

FM CG 101ST ABN DIV CEE RVN

TO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN

INFO UUMSQ/CG III MAF COC DNG RVN

UUMSQW/CG 1ST MAW COC DNG RVN

UUMSQD/CG 3RD MAR DIV DGH RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FROM AVDF-GC FOR XXIV CORPS TOC 050250A

SUBJECT: OP KENTUCKY JUMPER SITREP 308 FOR PD 151000H TO 162400H

MAY 69 (U)

1. (U) UNIT LOCATIONS: NO CHANGE.
2. (C) SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS: THE 101ST ABN DIV ESTB NDPS AND
UNMEROUS AMBUSHES THROUOUT THE AO TO DENY THE ENEMY FREEDOM OF MOV.
3. (C) ENEMY CONTACTS: ARVN:
 - A. AT 1925H VIC YD 313117, 2-1 APVN RECD 1XB-42 PD FROM 2-3 EN ABOUT
500M E OF FRIENDLY LOCATION. RESULTS: 3 ARVN WIA (EVAC), 1NVA KIA
(BC) AND 1IWV (AK-47).
 - B. AT 2130H VIC ZD 170009, RF 596 ENGAED USCF WITH SA FIRE. RESULTS:
2 PF WIA (EVAC), 3VC KIA (BC) AND 3IWV (AK-47 AND 1XM-49).
4. (C) OTHER SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES: 3RD BDE: (DEL
1530H VIC YC 360078, C/2-501 INF DSC IDEAD RVA IN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO UUMSJEJ 0693 C O N F I D E N T I A L

BY 3A FIRE. RESULTS: 1VNA KIA (3C).

5. (C) PLANS: THE 101ST ABN DIV WILL MAINT MDPS AND NUMEROUS AMBUSHES THROUGHTOUT THE AO TOMDENY THE ENEMY FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.

6. (C) CUMULATIVE LOSSES:

A. OP KENTUCKY JUMPER:

FRIENDLY

158 UA KIA

226 US WIA (692 EVAC)

B. OP APACHE SNOW:

(1) US:

FRIENDLY

41 US KIA

291 US WIA (269 EVAC)

(2) ARVN:

FRIENDLY

3 ARVN KIA

12 ARVN WIA (12 EVAC)

ENEMY

57 KIA

211 PV ITC

S4 CSWC

ENEMY

211 KIA

1 PV

57 ITC

9 CSWC

ENEMY

41 KIA

3 PV

PAGE THREE UUMSJEJ 0693 C O N F I D E N T I A L

175 ITC

45 CSWC

7. (C) REMARKS: THE FINAL CASUALTY FIGURES FOR 3-127 INF XMP 14 MAY ARE 5 US KIA AND 55 US WIA (55 EVAC). THIS IS AN ADDITIONAL 3 KIA AND 31 US WIA (31 EVAC) FROM WHAT WAS REPORTED ON SITREPS FOR 14 MAY. ADD THESE TOTALS TO OPS KENTUCKY JUMPER AND APACHE 2001. THE TOTALS ON THIS SITREP ARE CORRECTED.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

13 May

Comdant

0000Z UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQ 715 1361710
 ZNY SSSS
 Z 161710Z MAY 69
 FM CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) C OC DGH
 TO UUMSK/ C XXIV C ORPS TOC PHB
 INFO UUMSQ/ CG III MAF COC DNG

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RASPING (C)
 SUBJ: TACTICAL COVER AND DECEPTION OPERATIONS (C)
 A. CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) 130022Z MAY 69 (S)
 B. TELCON MAJ THOMAS XXIV CORPS -LT COL COOK THIRD MAR DIV
 OF 162115H MAY 69
 1. (S) REFERENCE A REQUESTED PERMISSION TO CONDUCT C AND D
 OPERATIONS. FURTHER INFORMATION ON PLANS FOR C AND D OPERATION
 AS REQUESTED BY REFERENCE B ARE HEREBY SUBMITTED.
 2. (S) DETAILED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
 A. ON D-DAY L- HOUR FOLLOWING NORMAL ARTY/AIR PREP
 OF LZ, ACTUAL HELICOPTER MOVEMENT TO LZ AND INSERTION OF
 DIVISION REINFORCED RECON TEAM. SIMULATED LANDING OF AND
 INFANTRY BN CONTINUES INCLUDING LIFT OF DUMMY ARTY BTRY
 AND EXTERNAL DUMMY LIFTS OF SUPPLIES. SIMULTANEOUSLY AN
 ACTUAL MORTORIZED / MECHANIZED TASK FORCE BEGINS OPERATIONS
 ALONG ROUTE 9 TOWARD FSB CATES AREA. BUT DOES NOT ENTER

PAGE TWO UUMSQ 715 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RASPING
 (C)
 SIMULATED AO.

B. MANIPULATIVE AND SIMULATIVE COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION
 IS EMPLOYED BY ACTUAL BN COMMAND/COMMUNICATIONS GROUP LOCATED
 NEAR LZ. COMMUNICATIONS ON ALL NORMAL NETS ARE MAINTAINED AND
 ACTIONS OF A BN CONDUCTING SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS WILL
 BE SIMULATED. SUPPORTING ARMS EMPLOYED IN AREA TO ADD REALISM.

C. COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC AND EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING
 ARMS CONTINUE THROUGH SIMULATED LIFT OUT OF THE BN ON D+2
 MORTORIZED / MECHANIZED TASK FORCE RETURNS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

D. REINFORCED RECON TEAM EMPLACES SENSORS AND IS
 EXTRACTED DURING SIMULATED LIFT OUT OF BN.

✓ 3. (S) OBJECTIVE OF OPERATION: TO DECEIVE AND MISLEAD THE
 ENEMY AND TO ENTICE HIM INTO A REACTION TO FALSE INFORMATION
 CAUSING HIM TO MASS HIS FORCES AND CREATE A LUCRATIVE TARGET
 FOR ATTACK BY SUPPORTING ARMS AND OR GROUND FORCES

✓ 4. (S) REACTION ANTICIPATED. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE
 ENEMY MAY REACT BY MOVING UP TO A REGIMENTAL SIZED FORCE
 INTO THE AREA. U.S. UNITS OPERATING IN THE GENERAL AREA WERE
 ATTACKED ON TWO OCCASIONS WITHIN THE PAST MONTH. INTELLIGENCE
 INDICATES THE ENEMY HAS THE CAPABILITIES OF MASSING UP TO
 TWO REGT. AGAINST THIS SIMULATED BN. THIS OPERATION MAY ALSO
 DELAY OR CAUSE PREMATURE COMMITMENT OF ELEMENTS OF THE 304TH NVA DIV.

✓ 5. (S) PLANS FOR EXPLORATION. TARGETS IN THE AREA DURING
 THE OPERATION CAN BE ACQUIRED BY THE REINFORCED RECON TEAMS
 OPERATING NEAR THE LZ AND BY AERIAL OBSERVERS. IN ADDITION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE DUMSQD 715 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RASPING

TO THESE TWO MEANS AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE OPERATION, SENSORS
CAN ACQUIRE TARGETS FOR A PERIOD OF 10 DAYS. THE FOLLOWING
REACTIONS TO ACQUIRED TARGETS ARE AVAILABLE.

1. ATTACK OF TARGETS UP TO 4 BATTALIONS OF ARTY.
2. ATTACK OF TARGETS BY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT.
3. EMPLOYMENT OF BN SIZED REACTION / EXPLOITATION
FORCE AND SUPPORTED BY TANK COMPANY.

GP-4

GP

SECRET

SECRET/NOFORN

DRAFTER G-3/HLC/11s
 SEC G-3 Plans PH 3203
 CWO *Bob*

Flash
 PRIORITY 170032 ZHAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL UCB
 CG TWELFTH MARINES DGH
 CG THIRD ENG BN QTR
 CG THIRD RECON BN QTR
 CG THIRD TANK BN QTR
 INFO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 CG ONE ZERO EIGHT ARTY GRP DGH
 CG FIRST MAF
 THIRD MARDIV (REIN)

COC

BT

//SECRET/NOFORN//

D-DAY FOR OPERATION ORDER 20-69


A. THIRD MARDIV (REIN) OP ORDER 20-69

1. (S) D-DAY OF SUBJECT OPERATION AS ESTABLISHED BY REF. (A)
 IS CHANGED TO 180900H MAY69.

CG-4

CGM 20385 REL BY *F.R. / name* TIME _____ H MAY69

G-3

STAND *PBC*

SHOVE COC

OF CHIEF *BSC*

CGM *O M*

CGM *C E*

CGM *A*

ACTION

10

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET

(194)

Rec'd 1000
18 MAY 69
WB

OO UUMSK UUMSQ
DE UUMSQ 746 1370255
ZNY SSSSS
O 170255Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) C OC DGH
TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
INFO THIRD MARINES
FOURTH MARINES
NINTH MARINES
TASK FORCE HOTEL
1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: 3D RECON BN SITREP FOR PERIOD OF 170300H TO 172400H

MAY 69

INSERTS AND EXTRACTS

A. INSERTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COORD

1. 2A1 170910H XD944613

2. 2E2 170945H XD797627

3. 1-2 171045H XD105119

4. 2E3 171230H XD810377

5. 2-3 171430H YD289304

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

PAGE TWO UUMSQ 746 S E C R E T

PATROL DTG COORD

1. 2E3 171245H XD752364

2. 2E2 171300H XD723463

3. 2E3 171915H XD791355

4. 2A1 171330H XD940611

C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

1. 3-1-0613 A/C RTB AT 1400H BECAUSE OF INCLEMENT WEATHER

2. 1A5-3539

3. 3E1-1740

4. 1-1-6955

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

-NONE-

1. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 18 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1. 1A3 XD3539

2. 1-1 XD6955

3. 1-1 XD1340

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UMSQD 746 S E C R E T

4.3-1 YD 0613
 5.2E1 XD 8951
 6.1A2 XD 8432
 7.1A1 XD 6945
 8.2B1 YD 0613
 9.2B2 YD 1009

F. EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 18 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1.3C3 XD 8732
 2.1B3 YD 1732
 3.3B3 YD 1127
 4.3-2 YD 2242
 5.3E3 XD 9550
 6.1C3 XD 8951

LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AS OF 172400H MAY 69

| PATROL | MEN | LOCATION |
|-------------|-----|-----------|
| 1.1H1 SCUBA | 3 | YD 339529 |
| 2.1E3 RR/OP | 3 | XD 973559 |
| 3.2C2 " | 7 | YD 397379 |
| 4.2C1 " | 7 | " |
| 5.1C2 " | 7 | " |

PAGE FOUR UMSQD 746 S E C R E T

| | | |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|
| 6.1H9 " | 4 | YD 145135 |
| 7.1H10 " | 4 | YD 772433 |
| 8.1D2 AMBUSH TM | 6 UL 2662 | YD 266622 |
| 9.1D3 " | 6 UL 2363 | YD 286688 |
| 10.2D1 " | 6 UL 3469 | YD 349694 |
| 11.2D2 " | 6 UL 2374 | YD 287746 |
| 12.3D1 " | 6 UL 3073 | YD 307733 |
| 13.3D2 " | 6 UL 2365 | YD 286652 |
| 14.3D3 " | 6 UL 2764 | YD 277647 |
| 15.1C3 | 3 | XD 893497 |
| 16.3A2 | 7 | XD 763528 |
| 17.3B2 | 6 | YD 036199 |

| | | |
|--------|---|-----------|
| 18.1E1 | 7 | YD 213367 |
| 19.3-2 | 6 | YD 233421 |
| 20.1B3 | 6 | YD 132313 |
| 21.3-3 | 6 | YD 249464 |
| 22.3E3 | 6 | XD 859491 |
| 23.3B3 | 6 | YD 115257 |
| 24.3C3 | 6 | XD 873313 |

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE UUMSQD 746 SECRET

| | | |
|--------|---|-----------|
| 25.2-3 | 6 | YD 288317 |
| 26.1E2 | 6 | XD 799631 |
| 27.1-2 | 6 | YD 194118 |

SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS.

A. AT 162340H YD 271643 (D3) SHOW CASE INITIATED CONTACT WITH ESTIMATED ENEMY PLATOON NW OF THEIR POSITION. THE ENEMY WORE KHAKI BUSH COVERS AND CARRYING AK-47'S WITH WEB GEAR. A REACTION FORCE WAS SENT IN TO THE IM UPON ARRIVAL. THEY STARTED TAKING RPG RND'S AND 60MM MORTARS. THE FRIENDLYS SUFFERED 7 WIA. THE EN 8 KIA'S CONFIRMED. JVI'S AND GUNSHIPS RAN RKT AND STRAFING RUNS ON THE ENEMY POSITION.

AT 170930H XD 940610 (2A1) AMERICAN BEAUTY HEARD MOVEMENT TO THE NEAO ON STATION HE WORKED OVER AREA RESULTING IN 1 EN KIA. THE TM THEN CALLED ARTY MSN. 1125H TM INITIATED SAF ON 1 EN RESULTING IN 1 EN KIA. AT 1135H 5 EN WERE OBS TO TMS WEST. ARTY WAS CALLED ON THEM RESULTING IN 5 EN KIA CONFIRMED BY AO. AT 1200H 4 EN WERE MOVING UP HILL NE OF TM. F/W WAS RUN RESULTING IN 4 MORE EN KIAs. F/W TOOK SAF FROM THE NORTH. F/W MADE RUN OVER AREA RESULTING IN 1 EN KIA.

PAGE SIX UUMSQD 746 SECRET

MOST OF THE ENEMY CARRIED AK-47'S WITH HELMETS, ALL WORE GREEN UTILITIES. THE TM WAS EXTRACTED LEAVING 12 EN KIAs ON GROUND. F/W AND GUNSHIPS WORKED OVER AREA AFTER THE EXTRACTION.

GP-4

BT

746

SECRET


SECRET

(195)

*Rec'd 1000
18 MAY 69
UB*

Z UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 741 1370355
ENY SSSSS
Z 170355Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
BT
SECRET LIMDIS
ARC LIGHT
SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE UPDATE
1. (S) THIRD MAR DIV SENSORS DETECTED 6 VEHICLES AND 44 ENEMY WITHIN
TGT AT 10,075 ON 16 MAY 69.
GP-4
R
741

SECRET

SECRET/NOFORN

SHOVE COC
 OF CHIEF *BS*
 C-10. *M*
2
 D-10
 APO
 ACTION

DRAFTER 3/THM/cw
 SEC COC PHONE 3180
 CWO *PLT*

FLASHFLASH 171452 Z MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 TWELFTH MARINES DGH
 THIRD ENGR BN QTR
 THIRD RECON BN QTR
 THIRD TANK BN QTR
 INFO: CG XXIV CORPS PHE
 CG FIRST MAW DNG
 108TH ARTY AROUF DGH
 THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH

COPY TO: GENERAL

CO

//SECRET/NOFORN//

D-DAY FOR OPERATION ORDER 20-69

REF: (A) CG THIRD MARDIV MSG 170032Z MAY 69 (S)
 (B) THIRD MARDIV (REIN) OP ORDER 20-69(S)

1. (S) REFERENCE (A) IS CANCELLED.
2. (S) THE OPERATION AS ESTABLISHED BY REFERENCE (B) IS APPROVED. D-DAY AS DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE (B) IS CHANGED TO 19 MAY 1969. L HOUR IS 0900H.

GP-4

CCH 2.516 RELEASED BY

F.R. / name

DATE/TIME

H MAY 69

*PLT**COC***FLASH**
*SS/STAND**ca***SECRET/NOFORN**

CONFIDENTIAL

CO UUMSK UUMSQ UUMSQW UUMSQD
 DE UUMSJEA 0006 1311755

ZNY CCCCC

O 172150Z MAY 69

FM CG 101ST ABN DIV CEE RXN

TO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN

INFO UUMSQ/CG III MAG COC DNG RVN

UUMSQW/CG 1ST MAW COC DNG RVN

UUMSQD/CG 3RD BAR DIV DGH RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FROM ABDF-CG FOR XXIV CORPS TOC 050270A
 SUBJECT: OP KENTUCKY JUMPER SITREP 313 FOR PD 180001H TO 180600H
 MAY 69 (U)

2. (C) UNIT LOCATIONS: NO CHANGE.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS: THE 101ST ABN DIV MAINT NDPS AND
 NUMEROUS AMBUSHES THROUGHTOUT THE AO TO DENY THE ENEMY FREEDOM OF MOV.

3. (C) ENEMY CONTACTS: ARVN:

A. AT 2130H VIC YD 844126, 3-54 ARVN ENGAGED AN USEF. RESULTS: 2
 VC KIA (BC) AND 1 IWC.

B. AT 0340 VIC YD 673157, 473 ARVN ENG AT SET ENEMY PLAT WITH SA
 PIPE, RESULTING IN 3VC KIA (BC) AND 3 IWC.

4. (U) OTHER SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES: NONE.

5. (C) PLANS: THE 101ST ABN DIV WILL CONT EXTENSIVE RIF AND SIXTY

PAGE TWO UUMSJEA 0706 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 OPS THROUGHTOUT THE AO. THE 3RD BDE WILL CONT OP APACHE SNOW.

6. (U) CUMULATIVE LOSSES: NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT

0006

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

00 UUMSK UU SQ
DE UUMSQD 751 1380035
ZNY CCCCC
O 180035Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO UUMSQ/ III MAF COC DNG
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJ: DAILY ATTACK BY FIRE
UNIT MORTARS
5/2 ARVN 20/60MM
H2/3 5 / UNC CALINEC
11 ARVN APC 11/82 MM
GP-4
BT
751

CAS
NEG
NEG
1 ARVN WIAE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET**196**Rec'd 0815
19 MAY 68
WB

VX
 CO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQ 793 1331730
 ZNY SSSSS
 C 131737Z MAY 68
 FM THIRD MAR (REIN) CCG DGM
 TO UUMSK/ NKIV CORPS TOC PHB
 UUMSQ/III MAP CCG DNG
 INFO THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TASK FORCE E HOTEL
 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: 5D RECON BN SITREP FOR PERIOD OF 180001H TO
 182400H MAY 68

INSERTS AND EXTRACTS

A. INSERTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG C COORD

1.101 181425H XDS16602

2.221 181500H XDS18591

3.1A1 181620H XDS95449

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COORD

PAGE TWO UUMSQ 793 S E C R E T

1.333 181100H YD115257

2.112 181645H XD792621

3.332 181730H YD099187

4.131 181745H YD132313

C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

1.231 -0619 UH-1E CRASH LANDED DUE TO LOSS OF TAIL ROTOR

2.282-1000 SECOND UH-1E DAMAGED TAIL ROTOR WHILE LANDING TO

3.1-1-5955 ASSIST FIRST UH-1E CREW UNABLE TO RECONSTITUTE

4.3-1-3613 PACKAGE IN TIME TO COMPLETE INSERTS.

5.1A2-0432

6.3E1-1745

7.1A3 -0339

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

1.50 3-3732 SAME AS SECTION C

2.3-2 0242

3.3E3 0050

4.103 0051

SECRET

[illegible]

1. ENEMY POSITION WHEN 3 EN MOVED INTO THEIR
2. THE 3 EN BLEW 2 CLAYMORE MINES AND THREW M-33 GRENADES
3. ENEMY BLEW 1 EN IN 3 EN KIA. THE ENEMY WORE
4. ENEMY BUSH HATS. CARRIED M-16'S CARTRIDGE
5. ENEMY. THE GUNSHIP WORKED OVER AREA
6. ENEMY (SEE) BETTER RIDGE
7. ENEMY M-16 AND 1 GRS. THE TW RECD SAF
8. ENEMY ENEMY AND RAN MISSION
9. ENEMY ENEMY. RECON RADIO RELAY OBS 1. ACTIVE RPT
10. ENEMY ENEMY 1 RPT EVEN WITH GOOD COVERAG. BUT
11. ENEMY ENEMY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSQD 795 SECRET
 E. PATROLS PLANNED FOR 19 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1.281 YD0613
 2.282 YD1009
 3.1-1 XD6955
 4.1-1 YD0613
 5.1-1 XD3432
 6.3-1 YD1740
 7.1A3 YD3539
 8.2C3 YD1647

F. EXTRACIS PLANNED FOR 19 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1.3C3 XD3732
 2.3-2 YD2242
 3.3E3 XD3550
 4.1C3 XD3951
 5.3-3 YD0346

LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AS OF 172400H MAY 69

| PATROL | MEN | LOCATION |
|--------------|-----|----------|
| 1. 1H1 SCUBA | 3 | YD333529 |

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 795 SECRET

| | | |
|--------------|---|----------|
| 2. 1E3 RR/OP | 3 | XD973559 |
| 3. 2C2 " | 7 | YD973559 |
| 4. 2C1 " | 7 | |

| | | |
|-----------|---|-----------------|
| 5. 1C2 " | 7 | |
| 6. 1H9 " | 4 | YD145135 |
| 7. 1H10 " | 4 | YD032433 |
| 8. 1D2 " | 6 | UL2763 YD276635 |
| 9. 1D3 " | 6 | UL3067 YD306673 |
| 10. 2D1 " | 6 | UL3075 YD307736 |
| 11. 2D2 / | 6 | UL2375 YD307757 |
| 12. 3D1 " | 6 | UL2363 YD235639 |
| 13. 3D2 " | 6 | UL2965 YD296657 |
| 14. 3D3 " | 6 | UL2662 YD266624 |
| 15. 1C3 | 3 | XD357493 |
| 16. 3A2 | 7 | XD761531 |
| 17. 1E1 | 7 | YD204367 |
| 18. 3-2 | 6 | YD225424 |
| 19. 1A1 | 6 | XD695449 |
| 20. 2E1 | 6 | XD918599 |
| 21. 3-3 | 6 | XD049464 |
| 22. 3E3 | 6 | XD353493 |

SECRET

SECRET3
HISDRAFTER 3/ERL/146
SEC G-3A PHONE 3103
CWO PBCPRIORITY 190510 Z MAY 69

COPY TO: G-3

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)

INFO: TASK FORCE HOTEL

3RD MARINES

4TH MARINES

9TH MARINES

12TH MARINES

1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) — Rum Lm BPPB

108TH ARTY GRP

1. COM CNTR READDRESS XXIV CORPS MSG 180930Z MAY 69 AS INDICATED ABOVE.

XXIV CORPS MSG 180930Z MAY 69 HIGHER CLASS.CON 2708 REL BYE. R. Leane, Jr.DATE/TIME 191115 H MAY 69

G-3

PBC

(212)

SECRET

SECRET

PP U LBPB
 P 1 2012Z AYI
 F CG THH D A DIV (EIN)
 TO ZEN/TAS FO CE HOTEL
 ZEN THH D A INES
 ZEN/FCU TH A INES
 ZEN/NINCH A INES
 ZEN/TWELFTH A INES
 U LBPB FI ST 502 FIFTH INF DIV (ECH)
 ZEN/ONE ZE C EIGHT A TY G-P
 C 130 12Z AYI
 F IV CG PS PHU BAI VN
 INFO CG ONE ZE C ONE ABN DIV CEE
 CG THH D A DIV DGH
 P 171022Z AYI
 F CG US ACV SAIGON
 IC CD SEVENTH AF SAIHOOI
 DCS USA V LONG BINH
 CG III AF SA I CTZ DANANG
 CG I FFC C V SA II CTZ NHA T ANH
 CG II FFC CIV SA III CTZ LONG BINH
 CG NAVFO
 CG FIFTH SFGA NHA T ANH
 INFO CINCPAC
 CG IV CG PS PHU BAI
 BT

S 1 C 1 11 DIS 2064 (J)
 SUB: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT-LAOS (S)
 EFS: 1. CINCPAC HSB DTB 172 12Z FEB 68 (S)
 2. CINCPAC SG DTB 206 11Z FEB 67 (IS)
 C. CG US ACV 00 4 DTB 120724Z FEB 68 (SL)

G-3

h

PAGE TWO U HVP 2708 S E C 1 1
 1. ACV DI 12, 13 ASB SB (U)
 2. REFERENCE A OUTLINES THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR OPERATIONS IN SVN INVOLVING LAOS. REFERENCE B AUTHORIZES THE USE FOR A FULLY FIE FOR POSITIONS IN SVN AGAINST VALID MILITARY TARGETS IN LAOS. REFERENCE C IS THE CURRENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR LAOS. REFERENCE D IS THE CURRENT DIRECTIVE WHICH PRESCRIBES POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR EXPEDITIONS REPORTING OF SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION TO THE MACV COMMAND CENTER.
 3. (U) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR 30 DE LAOS WILL BE MODIFIED AND UPDATED AS NECESSARY AND PUBLISHED QUARTERLY. THIS IS THE TWELFTH SUCH PUBLICATION OF RULES APPLICABLE TO THE LAOTIAN/VN BORDER.
 4. (U) REFERENCE C IS RESCINDED.
 5. (S) THESE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAIN SENSITIVE INFORMATION, THE KNOWLEDGE OF WHICH SHALL BE HELD CLOSELY, WITH ACCESS LIMITED BY ADDRESSES TO PERSONS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED ON A SUBSTANCE OF THIS MESSAGE OR OF ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THE AUTHORITY CONTAINED HEREIN
 WILL BE MADE EXCEPT BY THE HEADQUARTERS.
 6. (S) THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONTAINED HEREIN APPLY TO U.S. FORCES ONLY. PERSONNEL DISPOSITIONS TO INFLUENCE VNAF OPERATIONS

SECRET

SECRET

CONDUCTED WITH THE LAOTIAN/VN BORDER WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO
 SUCH THAT SUCH VIOLATIONS ARE COMPLETED UNDER RULES OF
 ENGAGEMENT.

1. AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURES:

A. AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO APPLY A TIMELY FIRE AGAINST VALID
 ILLEGAL TARGETS IN LAOS.

B. ALL OPERATIONS PLANNED NEAR THE LAOTIAN BORDER WILL BE
 REPORTED IN ADVANCE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS. REPORTS WILL INCLUDE:

1) NAME OF OPERATION.
 2) COORDINATES OF AREA OF OPERATIONS ADJACENT TO THE VN/LAOTIAN
 BORDER.

3) DATE OPERATION WILL COMMENCE AND ESTIMATED DURATION OF
 OPERATION.

4) FRIENDLY FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE OPERATION.

5) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS UP-DATING THE ORIGINAL REPORT WILL
 BE MADE AS APPROPRIATE.

C. IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, U.S. FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED AND
 DIRECTED TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTER ACTIONS IN THE EVENT OF
 THE THREATS OF SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST
 US/VN/FWAA FORCES FROM LOCATIONS INSIDE LAOS. AN EMERGENCY SITUATION

PAGE FOUR UHVP 2738 SECRET

1. AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURES:
 AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTER ACTIONS IN SELF-DEFENSE OF US/
 VN/FWAA FORCES IN THE EVENT OF SELF-DEFENSE OF US/
 VN/FWAA FORCES INCLUDES OBTAINING PRIOR APPROVAL. SUCH COUNTER
 ACTIONS MAY INCLUDE:

1. A TIMELY AND ACCURATE FIRES AGAINST ENEMY FORCES FIRING FROM THE
 LAOTIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER AGAINST US/VN/FWAA FORCES.

2. INVOLVE BY US TROOPS, WHILE ACTUALLY ENGAGED AND IN CONTACT
 WITH THE ENEMY FORCES, INTO LAOS AS REQUIRED FOR THE PRESERVATION
 OF THE FORCE.

D. IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ABOVE, LAOTIAN VILLAGES WILL NOT BE
 ATTACKED OR SEIZED:

1) WHEN FIRE IS BEING RECEIVED FROM AN

2) WHEN IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE U.S. COMMANDER, THE ATTACK ON
 A POPULATED AREA IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE FORCE.

E. THE AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURES CONTAINED HEREIN ARE ESTABLISHED

TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE OF VN AND US/VN/FWAA FORCES.
 THESE AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURES WILL NOT BE APPLIED TOWARD WIDENING
 THE CONFLICT IN SE ASIA.

F. NOTHING HEREIN WILL BE CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT COMMANDERS FROM
 DEFENDING THEIR UNITS AGAINST A RED ATTACK. COMMANDERS ARE

PAGE FIVE UHVP 2738 SECRET

AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTER ACTIONS AGAINST
 VN/FWAA FORCES IN THE EVENT OF SELF-DEFENSE AND TO DEFEND THEIR
 UNITS AGAINST A RED ATTACK WITH ALL MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

7. SOCS III, AR, CG I FFC CLV, AND CG, TR SFGA LEVEL
 IMMEDIATELY ALL ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THIS AUTHORITY CONCERNING
 INCIDENTS INVOLVING OPCON A/C AFT AND MANEUVER ELEMENTS IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF REFERENCE D.

GP-4

BT

217

SECRET

SECRET

(197)

Rec'd 0830
20MAY69
WB

*****UNSK

DE UMSQD 817 1390630

ZNY SSSSS

Z 190630Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV(REIN) COC DGH

TO UUSMSK/XXIV ORPS ITC PHB

INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC

TWELFTH MARINES SCOC

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3RD MARDIV

IN LUCKY PUNCH TO ENTER DMZ AT 191500

P.Z. UL9669 LOR. 9867 19MAY69

BT

817

SECRET

SECRET

(198)

Rec'd 0830
20 MAY 69
WB

VA
 *****ZZ UUMSK
 DE UUMSQD 825 1390800
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 190800Z MAY 69
 (THIRD MARDIV (REIN) CUC DGH
 TO UUMSK XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL CUC
 FIFTH MARINES CUC

SECRET

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

13RD MAR DIV

TH LUCKY PUNCH WAS UNABLE TO ENTER DMZ BECAUSE OF
 HEAVY ENEMY FIRE. 191500H

BT

BT

BT

SECRET

SECRET

(199)

Rec'd 0830
20 MAY 69
UB

DE UUMSQD 832 1391245
ZNY SSSSS
Z 191245Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) COC DGH
TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH MARINES

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3D MAR DIV

3D RECON BN.

(1) TM NOON WATCH ENTERED DMZ AT 191000H. IN 191015H AT
YD080703 SHDMZ TM FND 10-15 BNKRS (4X6X4').

APPROX 5 MONTHS OLD. NEG ACT TAKEN. TM REMAINS IN
DMZ OVERNIGHT AT 078702.

(2) TM LUCKY PUNCH 191505H AT XD973686 TM REINSERTED
INTO ASSIGNED RZ UPON INSERTION TM HEARD GOV ALL
AROUND THEIR POS APPROX 40METERS AWAY. TM OBS 2 EN
WEARING HELMETS AND GREEN UTILITIES AND ARMED WITH SKS'S
HELO RETURNED TO EXTRACT TM AND REC HVY A/W
FIRE TM AND HELO'S RETURNED FIRE. TM EXTRACTED
NO SEAWORTHY CONTROLLED F/W STRIKE ON AREA CREF

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 832 S E C R E T

DMZ INCIDENT REPORT 9-139-1). MISSION WAS CANCELED.

2. MLS-1 NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 20 MAY 69

5. ARVN NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 20 MAY 69

GP-4

BT

832

SECRET

SECRET

(200)

Rec'd 0830
20 MAY 69
UB

OO UUMSK UUMSQ
DE UUMSQD 836 1391325
ZNY SSSSS
C 191325Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO UUMSQ/ III MAF C OC DNG
BT
S E C R E T
SUBJ: SPEC OPNS
REF (AL DMZ SPECIAL OPNS MSG : 190510Z
ADD 1 NVA KIA
GP-4
BT
856

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(201)

Rec'd 0830
20 MAY 69
UB

VV
ZZ

125R0MO UUMSK UUMSQ
DE UUMSQD 837 1391340
ZNY SSSSS

O 191340Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGA
TO UUMSK / XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
INFO UUMSQ / III MAF COC DNG

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: SPECIAL OPNS

REF: (A) DMZ INCIDENT MSG : 9-139-1

1 NVA KBA

GP-4

BT

852

NNNNQ

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NOFORN

DRAFTED BY: SLM/MIS
 SEC 15 CTF PH 3572
 CWO
 CY TO: 15CTF
 7CTF

191516Z MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TO: COMUSMACV

INFO: CG III MAF
 CG XXIV CORPS

SECRET/NOFORN/LINDIS

MACV ATTN: JERC

BRIGHTLIGHT (U)

1. AND FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON 17 REF REPORT NO. 38-69
 2. CG III MAF/AREA COORD ICITZ DANANG 131402Z/APR68 (S)

1. REF (A) RECD SIGHTING OF ONE (1) AMERICAN POW IN KOM TRAM (V), QUYNH
 COI (D), THAI BINH (P), NVN. PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF (B),

REF (A) IS AMPLIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

A. SOURCE (NGUYEN VAN TAN) (NGUYEN VEAN TANH) AKA: QUOC TAN (QUOC TANH),

FROM 4TH SQD, 2D PNT, 15TH INGR CO, 80TH REGT, 308TH DIV, STATED THAT HE SAW
 ONE (1) AMERICAN POW IN QUYNH COI (D) THAI BINH (P) DURING MAY-JUNE 1967.

POW HAD BAILED OUT OF F-105 AND WAS CAPTURED BY RESIDENTS OF KOM TRAM (V).
 THE POW WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROX SIX (6) FEET TALL, 185-195 POUNDS, LIGHT

COMPLEXION, WITH A BLOND MUSTACHE. POW WAS WEARING A BLACK FLIGHT SUIT AND
 FLIGHT HELMET. POW WAS WEARING GREEN WEB BELT WITH PISTOL HOLSTER ATTACHED

(TYPE UNKNOWN). POW DID NOT APPEAR INJURED WHEN SOURCE VIEWED HIM FROM APPROX
 FIVE METERS. POW WAS TAKEN INTO KOM TRAM (V) AND WAS NOT SEEN AGAIN BY SOURCE.

B. SOURCE SELECTED PHOTO #215 FROM 525TH MC GROUP POW PHOTO ALBUM AS RESEMBLING
 THE POW HE HAD SEEN.

C. APPROX ONE (1) MONTH LATER SOURCE SAW THE POW'S PICTURE IN A NORTH VIETNAM
 ARMY NEWSPAPER FROM HANOI. THE POW'S NAME WAS BELOW THE PICTURE WITH A WRITE-UP

CONCERNING THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE F-105 AND CAPTURE OF THE PILOT. (NFI)
 2. ON 2SEP67, SOURCE VISITED HANOI TO CELEBRATE "INDEPENDENCE DAY". DURING

SECRET/NOFORN/LINDIS
 PAGE 1 OF 2

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

BRAMPTON (U) CONTINUED
 SECRET/NOFORN/LIMDIS

THIS VISIT, SOURCE OBSERVED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF AMERICAN PRISONERS WHO WERE ON PUBLIC DISPLAY IN A TWO (2) STORY BUILDING. SOURCE DESCRIBED THE BUILDING

AS FOLLOWS: APPROX 30 METERS LONG (NORTH/SOUTH), APPROX 10 METERS WIDE (EAST/WEST), CONSTRUCTED OF CONCRETE AND BRICK. ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE

BUILDING WAS A TWO-WAY STREET. (NFI) THE BUILDING WAS ENCLOSED BY A FENCE OF STRAND BAREWIRE APPROX 2 METERS HIGH. THERE WERE THREE (3) GUARD TOWERS

ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE BUILDING CONSTRUCTED OF WOOD AND HIGHER THAN THE BUILDING THERE WAS ONE (1) SENTRY IN EACH TOWER. THERE WERE DOORS ON THE NORTH, SOUTH,

AND WEST SIDES OF THE BUILDING. THERE WAS A ROAD INTERSECTION AT THE NORTHEAST END OF THE BUILDING (DISTANCE NOT KNOWN). THERE WERE FIVE (5) OR SIX (6)

VIETNAMESE PRISONERS IN THE BUILDING ALSO.

3. SOURCE GAVE MISLEADING INFORMATION TO THE JET INTERROGATORS COVERING THE

DATE AND PLACE OF THE SIGHTING OF THE POW. SOURCE STATED THAT HE HAD NOT COUNTED 1969 WHEN STATING THAT HE HAD SIGHTED THE POW LAST YEAR. SOURCE FURTHER STATED

THAT THE PLACE OF SIGHTING IS QUINH COI (D) VICE THAI BINH (D), THAI BINH (P), NVN.

CON 2804 RELEASED BY P. P. Hall TIME 192250H

SECRET/NOFORN/LIMDIS
 PAGE 2 OF 2

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET

(203)

Rec'd 0830
20 MAY 69
UB

V
 OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 841 1391630
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 191630Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 UUMSQ/III MAF COC DNG
 INFO 3D MARINES
 4TH MARINES
 9TH MARINES
 TASK FORCE HOTEL
 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)

BT
 S E C R E T
 SUBJ: 3D REC ON BN SITREP FOR PERIOD OF 190001H TO
 192400H MAY 69
 INSERTS AND EXTRACTS
 A. INSERTS COMPLETE
 PATROL DTG COORD
 1. 1A3 190920H XD334362
 2. 2A1 190920H XD334362
 B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE
 PATROL DTG COORD
 1. 1-2 191215H YD093115
 2. 3-2 191613H YD225423

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 841 S E C R E T

3. 3-3 191613H YD225423
 4. 1C3 191650H XD337493
 5. 3C3 191700H XD378309
 6. 3E3 182230H XD336490
 C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE
 PATROL REASON
 1. 2B1 -0618 A/C TAN 2 EMERGENCY EXTRACTS DUE TO CONTACT
 2. 2B2 1009 PLUS 1 EMERGENCY MEDEVAC
 3. 1-1 6955
 4. 3-1 0613
 5. 2C3 0647
 6. 1A2 8432
 7. 3E1 1740

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLETE
 PATROL REASON

- NONE -

E. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 20 MAY 69
 PATROL LOCATION
 1. 2B1 YD0613

6

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSQD 841 S E C R E T

2.2B2 YD1309

3.1-1 XD6955

4.3-1 YD0613

5.2C3 YD0647

6.1A2 XD8432

7.3E1 XD1740

8.3C2 XD7766

9.2B3 YD1619

10.1B2 YD2216

11.1E2 XD7744

F. EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 20 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1.3A2 XD7555

2.1E1 YD2037

3.1D3 YD3469

4.3D1 YD3469

5.3D2 YD3469

LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AS OF

192400H MAY 69

PATROL MEN LOCATION

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 841 S E C R E T

1.1H1 SC UBA TM 3 YD330520

2.1E3 RR/OP 3 XD2 " 7 YD097379

4.2C1 " 7 " "

5.1C2 " 7 " "

6.1H9 " 4 YD145135

7.1H13 " 4 YD362433

8.1D2 AMBUSH TM 6 UL 3469 YD349694

9.1D3 6 UL 2564 YD256646

10.2D1 6 UL 2764 YD276646

11.2D2 6 UL 2365 YD236657

12.3D1 6 UL 3773 YD37736

13.3D2 6 UL 2363 YD236639

14.3D3 6 UL 2662 YD266624

15.3A2 7 XD761539

16.1E1 7 YD205367

17.2A1 9 XD877363

18.1A1 6 XD633445

19.2E1 9 XD377363

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE UUMSQD 841 S E C R E T
 22.1A3 9 X0399572
 21.1C1 6 YD918599
 22.2-3 6 YD233313

SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS

A. (LATE ENTRY) AT 181930H YD072413 RECON
 RADIO RELAY OBSERVED 4 ENEMY CROSSING
 STREAM. ENEMY WORE DARK UTILITIES PACKS
 CARTRIDGE BELTS AND CARRIED AK-47'S THE
 RELAY CALLED ARTY MSN WITH UNKNOWN
 RESULTS.

B. (LATE REPORT) AT 181530H YD048454 (3-3)
 DESERT SAND OBSERVED 3 ENEMY 100 METERS AWAY.
 TEAM CALLED 81MM MORTAR MISSION
 WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. AO ON STATION
 TO CONTROL F/W STRIKE. TM CONTINUED
 ITS MISSION.

C. (LATE REPORT) AT 182020H YD856490 (3E3)
 DRIVING TEST HEARD MOVEMENT 40-50
 METERS N AND E OF POSITION. TM CALLED
 81MM MORTAR MISSION MOVEMENT STOPPED.
 AT 2100H TM RECEIVED TWO CHI COM GRENADES

PAGE SIX UUMSQD 841 S E C R E T
 AND SAF. TWO OV10'S ON STATION TO
 RUN STRIKES ALSO SPOOKY. AT 2200H GUNSHIPS
 AND TRANSPORTS ON STATION TO EXTRACT
 TEAM. ON EXTRACT HELO TOOK SAF. NEG
 CAS.

1) (LATE REPORT) AT 182035H YD267643 (3D1)
 JAW BREAKER OBSERVED APPROX 17 MAN MORTAR
 TM MOVING SW. THE ENEMY WERE CARRYING
 UNKNOWN TYPE RIFLES, CHICOM GRENADES AND
 (2) 60MM MORTAR TUBES. TM INITIATED SAF
 FBR'S ALSO FIRED 50 CAL AT ENEMY. TM WAS EXTRACTED
 AND A REACTION FORCE INSERTED TO SWEEP AREA.
 SWEEP PRODUCED NEG RESULTS.

GP-4

BT

841

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DESTROY

DR/FTER 3/JED/1rb
SE: G-3T PHONE 3303
CNO B3CIMMEDIATE 200022 2 MAY 69FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
TO: CG III MAF DMC10470
20

COPY TO: G-3

G-2/IL
RECON/convert
G-3/REH

//CONFIDENTIAL//

ADDITIONAL SCHOOL QUOTAS FOR FORCE RECON COMPANIE PERSONNEL

REF: (A) CG III MAF MSG 151532Z MAY 69

1. REF (A) APPLIES. THE CURRENT QUOTAS ALLOCATED ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO BRING THE FORCE RECON COMPANY TO THE REQUIRED CAPABILITY OF READINESS IN BOTH FIELDS; THEREFORE, THE ADDITIONAL QUOTAS LISTED BELOW ARE REQUESTED:

PARACHUTESCUBA

30 JUMPERS
5 JUMP MASTERS

4 DIVERS

2. (C) THE ABOVE QUOTAS WILL ACCOMPLISH THE MINIMUM TRAINING REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO BRING FORCE RECON CO TO AN OPERATIONAL STANDARD OF READINESS.
3. (C) FUTURE QUOTAS NECESSARY TO KEEP FORCE RECON CO IN AN OPERATIONAL STATUS WILL BE REQUESTED THROUGH NORMAL TRAINING CHANNELS.

CP-4

CCN 2825 RELEASED BY Wm K Jones DATE/TIME _____ H MAY 69


G-3
A-1 RE
A-3 _____

B3C

20

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ZZ UUMSQ UUMSK
 DE UUMSQD 364 1400345
 ZNY SSSSS

Z 200345Z MAY 69 *Tod 0421 / 2.11.69*
~~FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DEN~~
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC (ATTN G-3 PLANS)
 INFO UUMSQ/III MAF COC (ATTN G-3 PLANS)
 BT

S E C R E T

~~SUBJ STATUS REPORT ON THIRD MARDIV (REIN) OPERATION 20-69~~

1. (S) THE THIRD MARDIV (REIN) OPERATION 20-69 CONTINUES ON SCHEDULE WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT T.F.B. HAS NOT CLOSED LZ STORMY (XD 944425).
2. (S) SENSORS HAVE BEEN EMPLACED ON LZ ENTERPRISE (XD 835361) AND ARE OPERATIONAL.
3. (S) RECON TEAM "MEETING HOUSE" WITH 13 MEN REMAINS IN VIC OF LZ ENTERPRISE.
4. (S) THERE HAS BEEN NO NOTICEABLE OVERT ENEMY REACTION TO THE OPERATION.

GP-4

BT

364

SECRET

SECRET

(204)

Reid 0815
21 MAY 69
UB

ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 867 1400900
ZNY SSSSS
Z 200900Z MAY 69
FM THICD MARDIV(REIN) COC DGM
TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3RD MARDIV

A. 3RD RECON BN

(1) TM NOON WATCH: 201115H AT YD 071702

FM OBS 2 EN APPROX 15 MTR FROM THEIR POS,

WEARING GREEN UTILITIES, PITH HELME

PACKS, AND AR-47. TM

INITIATED CONTACT WITH/SAF FIRE KILLING 1 EN.

AO ON STATION NOON WATCH CONTROLLED

2 F/W AIR AND 4

RTY MISSIONS. TM

EXTRACTED AT 201130H.

GP-4

BT

867

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205

Rec'd 0815
21 MAY 69
UB

ZZ DUMSK

DUMSQD 878 1401400

FM DUMSK

001400Z MAY 69

CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC-DGH

TO DUMSK/ CG XXIV CORPS TOC-PHB

SECRET

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

A. IM LUCKY PUNCH TO ENTER DMZ 21 MAY 69

BT 010067 LR 0265. DUE TO EXPI DMZ 23 MAY 69

BT

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SECRET

(206)

Rec'd 0820
22 MAY 69
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SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTED BY: MAS/MAS
GROUND SURVEILLANCE
CWC PSC

DATE: 22 0030 2 MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
TO: CG III MAF
INFO: CG FIRST MAW
CG 19 HOTEL
PROVAC-39
NORTH MARINES

CHOP & COPY TO:

AIR 0
G-2
G-3

(GSV 2 copies)

SECRET

THIS IS A DUEL BLADE REG
WE DEL OF SENSORS (U)

1. (S) CG DAVE PROVAC-39 AND THIRD MARDIV GSV SECT HAVE MADE THREE PRACTICE
RECOVERIES OF AERIALS FR HELO WITH SATISFACTORY RESULTS. BASED ON THESE

1. DAVE SECT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY MADE TO SEND THREE STRINGS IN APACHE SNOW AO
ON 19 MAY 69. TOWARDS THIS END AIR PHOTOS WERE TAKEN OF

PROPOSED DROP ZONE ON 19 MAY BY MAG-39 AND REPLANT MISSION WAS SKED FOR
19 MAY. ALL ABOVE ACCOMPLISHED VIA LOCAL LIAISON BETWEEN MAG-39 AND THIRD

MARDIV REFS.

2. (S) PRIOR TO DROP ON 19 MAY CG FIRST MAW REP ADVISED MISSION COULD NOT
BE RUN UNLESS MISSION WAS FRAGGED VIA THEIR HQ. AS A RESULT OF SHORT NOTICE

MISSION WAS CANCELLED BY THIRD MARDIV AND COORD RE-EFFECTED WITH NINTH MAR
LINE MAG-39 AND DROP RESCHEDULED FOR 21 MAY; MEN NUMBER 555 WAS SUBSEQUENTLY

ASSIGNED. HOWEVER, IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT REPLACEMENT HELO WERE TO
COME OUT OF HELO ASSETS ALREADY SKED FOR THIRD MARDIV OPS ON 21 MAY.

CONSEQUENTLY REQUEST FOR MEN 555 HAS BEEN CANCELLED BY THIRD MARDIV SO AS
NOT TO INTERFERE WITH PREV SKED TACTICAL OPS.

3. (S) PREVIOUS IN VISITS WITH III MAF SPCL PROJ REFS LED TO BELIEF THAT
FIRST MAW SENSOR AIR DEL OPS WOULD BE BY DEDICATED HELO ASSETS ARRANGED BY

THE MAF RATHER THAN OUT OF HELO ASSETS NORMALLY AVAL TO THIRD MARDIV.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

GSV

AIR/G-2/3

SECRET

SECRET

1. (1) IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT GUIDANCE/INSTRUCTIONS BE PROMULGATED ~~HEREIN~~ IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

1. DETAILED ADJUTANT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GROUND UNITS TO FOLLOW IN REQUESTING AIR SUPPORT OF SENSORS BY USED AIRCRAFT.

2. DESIGNATE THE LOCATION OF CND TO ESTABLISH MEN PRIORITIES.

(3) IF SUCH DETERMINATION IS TO BE MADE LOCALLY, REQUEST FURTHER ~~ADVICE~~ OR RELATIVE TO PRIORITY OF SENSOR REPLACEMENTS VERSUS TACK OPS, ~~ENSURING~~ ~~OR~~ RUNS, OR ADJUTANT BE PROMULGATED.

FORM 1135

RELEASED BY

Wm K Jones

TIME

11 MAY 69

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER G-3P/HLC/118
 SEC G-3 Plans PH 3203
 CWO PAC

ROUTINE 22dd4dz ZMAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (RLIN)
 TO: THIRD MAR DIV (RLIN)
 INFO: XXIV CORPS

BT

//SECRET//

SUBJ: INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEMPORARY CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE
 OPERATIONS (U)

A. COMUSMACV MSG 091010Z MAY 69 (S)

1. (S) REFERENCE A PROVIDES INSTRUCTIONS FOR CEASEFIRE PERIOD
 FROM 300600H MAY69 TO 310600H MAY69 IN OBSERVANCE OF BUDDHA'S
 BIRTHDAY.

2. (S) THE IMPORTANCE OF CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN STRICT
 COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF REFERENCE A CANNOT BE
 OVEREMPHASIZED. QUESTIONS CONCERNING REFERENCE A, IF ANY,
 SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

3. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF REFERENCE A TO THIS HEADQUARTERS
 (DIV COC).

GP-4

CCN 3140 REL BY Wm K Jones TIME MAY69

G-3

STAND PAC

SECRET

SECRET

000000Z UUMSK
 DE UUMSQD 920 1421100
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 221100Z MAY 69
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV COG DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS ICG PHB
 INFO/TASK FORCE HOTEL COG
 TWELFTH MARINES COG
 AT

SECRET

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3RD MARDIV.

2. TMS APRIL SHOWERS AND OLD COLONEL RESCHEDULED TO
ENTER DMZ 20 MAY 69

3. TM LUCKY PUNCH EXITED NZ 221000H

4. TM DRIVING TEST NIGHT POS YDD62697 SHDMZ

5. A. WLD-1 NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 20 MAY 69

6. B. FWD NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 20 MAY 69

BT

208

SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/CEB/lrb
SEC COC OPNS PHONE 3180
CWO PLT

PRIORITY 221256 Z MAY 69

COPY TO: C/S
COC
G-3

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VGE
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
INFO: CG III MAF DNG
CG XXIV CORPS PHB
FOURTH MARINES

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF OPCON

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 221500H MAY69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMES

OPCON OF E/2/4 AND G/2/4 FROM FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)

AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSES OPCON TO CG TASK FORCE HOTEL.

GPA-4

CCN 3272 REL BY Morgan/Went DATE/TIME 22 1950 H MAY 69
COC(OPNS) d/s/coc/G-3

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

00 UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 968 1421715
 ZNY 55555
 O 221715Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV (COC) (REIN) DGH
 TO UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 UUMSQ/III MAF COC DGN
 INFO THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES
 TASK FORCE HOTEL
 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: 3D RECON BN SITREP FOR PERIOD OF
 220000H TO 222400H MAY 69
 INERTS AND EXTRACTS
 PATROL DTG COORD
 1. IN1 220945H XD926547
 2. IN12 221000H YD115705
 B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE
 PATROL DTG COORD
 1. 2B3 221300H XD988413
 C INERTS NOT COMPLETE

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 968 SECRET
 PATROL REASON
 3. 3C2-7766 HIGH WINDS PREVENTED NORMAL OPERATIONS
 2. 3B3 OF ASSIGNED
 3. 3C3-7762 PACKAGE . THE EMER EXTRACTIONS WERE COM-
 4. 1B3-1713
 5. 3B3 -1915
 6. 1B2 PLETED BY USMC BH 46 TRANSPORTS
 D. EXTRAC TS NOT COMPLETE
 PATROL REASON
 "NONE"

E. INERTS PLANNED FOR 23 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1. 2A3 XD9435
 2. 3A2 XD7655
 3. 3C2 XD7766

4. 3C3 XD7762

T. 1A1 XD7958

5. 1A1YD1A1 XD7958

6. 2A2 YD8834

7. 3D1 YD1619

101116

209

SECRET

SECRET

THREE UL 968 S E C R E T

10.2E2 YD1915

10.1B3 YD1713

11.2E2 YD2537

12.2E1 YD2223

F. EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 23 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

-NONE-

LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AE OF 222400H MAY 69

| PATROL | MEN | LOCATION |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1.1H1 SCUBA TM | 3 | YD333523 |
| 2.1E3 RR/OP | 3 | XD 973559 |
| 3.2C2 " | 7 | YD297379 |
| 4.2C1 " | 7 | " |
| 5.1C2 " | 7 | " |
| 6.1H9 " | 4 | YD145135 |
| 7.1H10 " | 4 | YD032433 |
| 8.1H12 " | 4 | YD115775 |
| 9.1D2 AMBUSH TM | 6 UL 3373 | YD337736 |
| 10.2D1 " | 6 UL 3469 | YD349694 |
| 11.2D2 " | 6 UL 2764 | YD276646 |
| 12.2D3 " | 6 UL 2365 | YD236657 |

PAGE FOUR UUMSQD 968 S E C R E T

| | | |
|--------|---|----------|
| 13.1A2 | 6 | XD352311 |
| 14.1E1 | 7 | XD926547 |
| 15.331 | 6 | XD958411 |
| 16.1-1 | 6 | XD697544 |
| 17.1E2 | 6 | XD778437 |
| 18.2B1 | 6 | YD073164 |
| 19.2B2 | 6 | YD113333 |

SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS.

A. AT 220220H YD103030 (2B2) NORTH TIDE
HEARD MOVEMENT. TM THREW M-26 GRENADES
AND FIRED M-79 ILLUMINATION. TM THEN CALLED
ARTY MSN WITH GOOD COVE
UNK RESULTS. TM CHECKED AREA OF ARTY MSN AT DAY LIGHT. NEG
FINDINGS

B. AT 220210H XD987415 (2B3) EARLY FLOWER
HEARD 1 MTR TUBE FIREING BELIEVED TO
32MM. 13 RND5 WERE FIRED. AT 0320H
TM OBS 1 NEMY 20 METERS TO THE NORTH.
HE WORE KHAKIS AND STEEL HELMET
TM CALLED ARTY MSN ON TRAIL THE ENEMYA

PAGE FIVE UUMSQD 968 S E C R E T

WALKED DOWN UNK RESULTS
0330H WHILE MOVING TM HEARD HVY MOVEMENT
ONE ENEMY STOOD UP. TM INITIATED SAF
RESULTING IN ONE ENEMY KIA. ENEMY WORE KHAKIS. AO ON
STATION ESTIMATED APPROX 20 ENEMY
IN AREA. AO DIRECTED TM TO LZ. TM
WAS EXTRACTED AT 1300H AO RAN F/W AFTER EXTRACTION.

GP-4

BT

968

SECRET

10-11-2011

210

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTED BY: J. MILLEN
 BEO 8-3 RE 30 REG 2
 CWO 4736

DATE/ROUTINE 230151 Z MAY 69

FM: CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) DGC
 TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 CG III MAF DNG

INFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV CEE
 CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QPR
 THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 MAG THREE NINE
 SR ADVISOR QUANG TRI PROVINCE
 THIRD R CON BN

COPY TO:

G-2

G-3

GSV

6-3
 Hist

SECRET

RECON DEBRIEFING REPORT (U)

1. RECON TEAM: MATTING HOUSE 1A3 (15 MEN) OPO 376-D-69
2. DTG INSERTED/EXTRACTED: 190815H/211200⁰⁰ 78 HOURS
3. ROUTE: FM XD885362 TO XD878362 TO XD885362 UL 8559 LR 9035
4. TERRAIN: STEEP HILLS WITH 3-8 FOOT ELEPHANT GRASS, GOOD COVER AND CONCEALMENT, OP SITE AT XD878362 OFFERS 360 VIEW.
5. HLZ'S: XD878362 SITE IS A HILLTOP WITH LOW GRASS, AND WILL

ACCOMMODATE ONE CH-46, APPROACH FROM NORTH EAST TO SOUTH WEST, NO OBSTACLES. XD885362 SITE IS A HILLTOP AND WILL ACCOMMODATE

ONE CH-46, APPROACH FROM NORTH EAST TO SOUTH WEST, NO OBSTACLES.

6. ENEMY: 210930H TM AT XD885362 OBSERVED ONE VC/NVA RUNNING DOWN

TRAIL APPROX 50 METERS SOUTH WEST OF TM'S POSITION, TM FIRED BAF, LAAWS AND M-79 AT ENEMY WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. ENEMY WORE GRASS

UTILITIES BUT TM COULD NOT OBSERVE WEPS OR GEAR BECAUSE OF TERRAIN.

7. OTHER INFO: ON THE 19TH AND 20TH OF MAY AT APPROX 2300H TM AT

XD878362 HEARD A DOG BARKING FROM APPROX THE XD863862. NEGATIVE ACTION TAKEN.

GPR4

SECRET

BT

OPO 376-D-69

CCN 3333 RELEASED BY A. H. Perry TIME 12 12 00 18 MAY 69

(213)

G-2

2A
SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL**SHOVE**

OP CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCFO

APO

ACTION
 DRAFTER 3/KC/1rb
 SEC COC PHONE 3180
 CWO *obm*
IMMEDIATE 230220 Z MAY

COPY TO: GENERAL

 FROM: COC THIRD MARDIV DGH
 TO: TOC XXIV CORPS PHB
 INFO: III MAF DNG

//CONFIDENTIAL//

NAME OF HLS FOR APPROVAL

A. TELECON 221330H MAY 1969 SSGT COUNCIL AND MAJ CHASS

 1. (C) IAW REF A IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS HQ BE AUTHORIZED TO USE THE NAME RAMOS
 FOR A HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE.

GP-4

 CCN 3330 RELEASED BY Thomas H. Medley DATE/TIME 231000 H MAY 69
*COC**STAND obm**84***CONFIDENTIAL**

100/XXIV/0210

A-1
SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTED BY: WNB/CJH
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CNO *olm*

HEADLINE/PRIORITY 230250 Z 14Z 69 COPY TO: G-2
G-3
TIO
TSS
CCC
G.V. 2

FROM: CG THIRD INF DIV
TO: CG TF HORRLE
INFO: THIRD BATTAL
FOURTH BATTAL
NINTH BATTAL
TWELFTH BATTAL
FIRST BN, FIFTH INF DIV (REG), QT, RVN
FIRST BN, TWELFTH BATTAL
SECOND BN, TWELFTH BATTAL
THIRD BN, TWELFTH BATTAL
FOURTH BN, TWELFTH BATTAL
FIFTH ONE SEVEN FIVE GUN BATTERY
FIFTH BN, FOURTH ARTY

SECRET

SENIOR ACTIVITY BULLETIN/PERIOD ENDING 2400 23 MAY 69

A. MY 211244 MAY 69

1. (S) ADD FOL NEW STRING TO REF A:

| STRING | CH/TC | KILL ZONE | TGT ID | READOUT SITE | TERRAIN |
|--------|----------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|
| 31042 | 38/05,06,07,08 | YD08577656
YD03687570 | SD2042
SD3042 | A-4 | LOW
SHRU-DEMY |
| 31131 | 26/01,08,09 | YD92006750
YD92216655 | SD4131
SD5131 | BATCAT | OPEN WO DS |

GP-4

3329 RELEASED BY *Masopu h* FILE 1045 14 MAY 69

GSV

2/3/TIO/TSS/COE *olm*

(215)

SECRET

SECRET

***ZZ DUMSK

DE DUMSQD 1025 1452346

ZNY SSSSS

Z 202048Z MAY 69

FM THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) CUC DGR

TO DUMSK XXIV CORPS TOL

INFO TASK FORCE HTL CUC TWELFTH MARINES CUC

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3RD MAR DIV

2. 3RD RECON BN.

IN DRIVING TEST HEARD AN AK47 FIRING FROM YD 854692 AT 201500 AT

2. UH1-E'S ARTY MISSION WAS CALLED RES ON SECONDARY EXPLOSION

AND SOME SMALL ARMS ADS GOOKING OFF

GP-4

BT

1025

100/XXW/0038

(216)

A-1
SECRET

SECRETDRAFTED BY: MASON
RECON SURVEILLANCE SECTION
PAC

PRIORITY

230514

GSV 2 copies

FROM: CG, THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN
TO: CG, III MAF, DGH, RVN**SECRET**

THIS IS A DUEL BLADE MSG.

A. IN VIET JOURN REQUEST (U)

1. REQUEST AUTH FOR LT COL M. A. SOPER, JR, DIV GSV OFFICER AND 1ST LT
2. B. BAINS, CMC GSV SCHOOL TO MAKE STAFF IN VISIT TO 553 BACON WING,
STATE AND TR ALPHA; MHP DURING PERIOD 27-30 MAY 69.2. PURPOSE OF VISIT IS TO DISCUSS BATCAT OPS AND TFA OPS IN SUPPORT
OF THIRD MARDIV DUEL BLADE OPS.3. 553 BACON WING REP AT VCB ADVISES SUBJ CMDS RECEPTIVE TO VISIT
AND WILL SET DOWN BATCAT AIRCRAFT AT DANANG 270900 H MAY 69 TO PICK
UP SUBJ PASSENGERS.

08-4

REF 2360

RELEASED BY

TIME

1300

H MAY 69

GSV

PAC

217

2A

SECRET

SECRET

KKKIOLZCZCEAA371
 OO UUMSK UUMSJEA
 DE UUMSQ 1331 1433739
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 230739Z MAY 69
 FROM CG III MAF
 TO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS
 UUMSQ/CG FIRST MARDIV
 UUMSQ/CG FIRST MAW
 UUMSQ/CG THIRD MARDIV
 UUMSQ/CG AMERICAL DIV
 UUMSJEA/CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM)
 UUMSQ/CG I CORPS
 UUMSQ/CG 2ND ROKMC BDE
 INFO ZEN/MAVSUPPACT
 ZEN/CG FLC
 O 230001Z MAY 69
 FM C OMUSMACV
 TO UUMSH/CG 7AF TAN SON NHUT
 UUMSQ/CG III MAF DA NANG
 UUMSA/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 UUMSB/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
 UUMSG/CG CMAC SAIGON
 UUMSD/CG DMAC CAM THO
 UUMSF/COMNAV FORV SAIGON
 UUMSE/CG USARV LONG BINH
 UUMSJ/CG 5TH SFG NHA TRANG
 INFO COMSEVENTH FLT
 UUMSK/CG XXIV CORPS
 BT

SECRET (J3)

SUBJECT: REPORTING ENEMY ACTIVITIES DURING CESSATION OF
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (U)

REF: A. MACV DIR 335-12, SUBJ: SPOT REPORTS, DATED 30 AUG 63
 B. COMUSMACV MSG 22122Z NOV 63, SUBJ: GUIDANCE
 ON VC/NVA ATTACK S AGAINST POPULATION CENTERS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 UUMS 428V S E C R E T

C. COMUSMACV MSG 791212Z MAY 69, SUBJ: INSTRUCTIONS
FOR TEMPORARY CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. (S) DURING THE 24 HOUR SUSPENSION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS FROM 303637H TO 313630H MAY 69, ADDRESSEES WILL REPORT ALL ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS TO COMUSMACV VIA DEDICATED CIRCUIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPOT REPORTING PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN REFERENCE A. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT COMUSMACV BE PROMPTLY INFORMED OF ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS.

2. (C) IN ADDITION TO REPORTS REQUIRED BY REF B AND C:

A. REPORT ASAP AFTER 303637H MAY WHEN CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATION IS ACHIEVED

B. REPORT MAJOR ENEMY INITIATED ACTIONS BY SPOT REPORT.

C. REPORT MINOR INCIDENTS BY SUMMARY EVERY TWO HOURS.

D. AT TERMINATION OF CESSATION, REPORT WHEN OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN RESUMED.

3. (U) A. THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS WILL BE REPORTED:

(1) AN INCIDENT INVOLVING AN ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ENEMY AND FRIENDLY GROUND, AIR OR NAVAL FORCES WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

(2) AN INCIDENT OF ENEMY HARASSING FIRE AGAINST FRIENDLY

PAGE 3 UUMS 428V S E C R E T

CIVILIAN OR MILITARY PERSONNEL, INSTALLATIONS, SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT.

(3) AN INCIDENT OF ENEMY SABOTAGE, TERROR, OR PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY.

(4) AN INCIDENT OF ENEMY USE OF COMMAND DETONATED LAND OR WATER MINES OR SELF-DETONATING MINES WILL NOT BE REPORTED IN THIS CONTEXT DUE TO THE INABILITY TO DETERMINE TIME OF PLACEMENT.

(5) A MAJOR MOVEMENT OF ENEMY TROOPS OR SUPPLIES.

B. THE FOLLOWING WILL BE CONSIDERED MAJOR INCIDENTS AND REPORTED TO COMUSMACV IMMEDIATELY.

(1) AN ACTION OR INCIDENT IN WHICH CASUALTIES OCCUR TO EITHER SIDE, INCLUDING ENEMY DETAINEES AND FRIENDLY MISSING PERSONNEL OR ABDUCTED CIVILIANS.

(2) A FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED BY ENEMY FIRE.

(3) A GROUND ATTACK OR AN INDIRECT FIRE ATTACK ON A POPULATION CENTER.

(4) ANY ENEMY INITIATED ACTION OF SUCH MAGNITUDE OF UNUSUAL SIGNIFICANCE AS TO REQUIRE SPECIAL REPORTING.

C. MINOR INCIDENTS ARE THOSE WHICH CANNOT BE CATEGORIZED ACCORDING TO ANY OF THE CONDITIONS IN B (1) THROUGH (4) ABOVE.

4. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT NLT 243930Z MAY 69. GP-4

BT

1331

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/CED/bwh
SIC G-3 OPNS PHONE 3180
CWO PLT

PRIORITY 23/352 2 MAY69

COPY TO: C/S
G-3
COC

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DCH
TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
INFO: CG III MAF DNG
CG XXIV CORPS PHE
FOURTH MARINES VCB

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF OPCON

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 230900H MAY69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMES OPCON
OF L/3/4 AND K/3/4 FROM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSES
OPCON TO FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH).

GP-4

CGH 3452 RELEASED BY Morgan/West TIME 231945 H MAY69

G-3(OPS)

C/S/G-3/COC

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

V
 CO UUMSK UUMSC
 DE UUMSQD QPPI 1431615
 ZNY SESSS
 O 231615Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK / XXIV CORPS TGC PHB
 UUMSQ/ III MAF COC DNG
 INFO THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TASK FORCE HOTEL
 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: 3D RECON BN SITREP FOR PERIOD OF
 230030H TO 232400H MAY 69
 INSERTS UND EXTRACTS
 INSERTS COMPLETE
 PATROL DTG COORD
 1.2A5 230900H XDS72338
 2.3A2 231000H XD763549
 3.3B3 231125H XD179174
 4.1B2 231135H YD222153

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1003 SECRET

1.2A2 231320H YD095335

2.2E2 231330H YD267363

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COORD

1.2E2 231630H YD265359

C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

1.1B5-1713 CANCELLED BY 9TH MARINE

2.3B2-1915

3.3C5-7762 HIGH WINDS AND ONE EMERGENCY EXTRACT PREVENTED

4.3C8-7763 COMPLETION OF INSERTS

5.1A1-7958

6.2E1-2223

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

1.2E1-2223

E. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 24 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1.2D1 ND6752

2.3A4 ND3495

3.1B1 ND7958

(218)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSGD 1993 S E C R E T

4.3C3 XD7762
 5.3C2 XD7766
 6.3E1 XD84 24
 7.1C1 XD9959
 8.1B3 XD 9951
 9.3B2 XD9549

F. EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 24 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1.1A2 XD8432
 2.1E2 XD7744
 3.1-1 XD6955
 4.3E1 XD9543

LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AS OF
232400H MAY 69

| PATROL | MEN | LOCATION |
|--------------|-----|----------|
| 1.1H1 SCUBA | 3 | YD333520 |
| 2.1E3 VRR/OP | 3 | XD973559 |
| 3.2C2 " | 7 | YD097379 |
| 4.2C1 " | 7 | " |
| 5.1C 2 " | 7 | " |
| 6.1H9 " | 4 | YD145135 |

PAGE FOUR UUMSGD 1993 S E C R E T

| | |
|------------------|-----------|
| 7.1H1 | YD002483 |
| 8.1H12 " | 4 |
| 9.1D2 AMBUSH TMC | UL 2763 |
| 10.2D 1 " | 6 UL 2662 |
| 11.2D 2 " | 6 UL 2375 |
| 12.2D 3 " | 6 UL 3469 |
| 13.3B3 | 6 |
| 14.1B2 | 6 |
| 15.1A2 | 6 |
| 16.1E1 | 7 |
| 17.2A3 | 7 |
| 18.3E1 | 6 |
| 19.3A2 | 3 |
| 20.2A2 | 7 |
| 21.1-1 | 6 |
| 22.1E2 | 6 |
| 23.2B1 | 6 |
| 24.2B2 | 6 |

SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS:

A. AT 222100H XD973559 RECON RADIO
 REL. 7 OBS 1A ENEMY NEAR THEIR LINES AFTER ENEMY HAD TRIP

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE UUMSQD 1003 S E C R E T
 A TRIP FLARE. RELAY AND ENEMY INITIATED DAF 2125H ENEMY
 THREW CHI COM GRENADES. 2130H SPOOKY ON STATION. 2140H
 ENEMY THREW CS GAS GRENADE. 2200H RELAY TOOK EST G-3 INDS
 LNK SIZE MORTAR. AC ON STATION BELIEVES MORTARS CAME FROM
 XD967563 AT 2230 H SNEY
 AGAIN THREW CS GAS GRENADE. SPOOKY WORED OVER RELAYS LINES
 AC TAN 3 FLIGHTS OF F/W THE RELAY SUFFERED 2 USMC
 WIA(M). 230200H RELAY ALL SEC URE
 B. 231400H YD263362 (2E2) JOHN BROWN HEARD MOVEMENT IN ALL
 DIRECTIONS BE FORE ENEMY INIHIATED SAF AND THREW CHI COM GRENA-
 DES. TM BROKE CONTACT AND MOVED TOWARDS LZ WHILE. AO AND F/W TOOK
 SAF WHIPETM WAS BEING EXTRACTED. TM SUFFERED 1 WIA(M)
 GP-4
 BT
 1008

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

RR UUMSQD
DE RUMLBPBM 1371 1440125

ZNR UUUUU
R 240114Z MAY 69
FM CO 1 ST INF BDE 5 TH INF DIV (MECH) QRT RVN
TO UUMSQD/CG 3RD MAR DI DGH RVN

BT
UNCLASSIFIED AVAIL-C : 2853 CG 3RD MAR DIV FOR COC
SUBJECT: RECEIPT OF MESSAGE (U)
(U) ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF COMUSMACV MAG 091013Z MAY 69 (S),
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEMPORARY CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE
OPERATION (U)

GP -4

BT

1571

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

ZZ UUMSK

UUMSQD 1030 144024Z

SSSSS

4024Z MAY 69

THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) CUC DGH

UUMSK/ XXIV CORPS 100 PRB

TO TASK FORCE HOTEL CUC

FTH MARINES CUC

TOP/XXIV/0345

SECRET

SUB: SPEC DMZ UPNS REPORT

AND MAR DIV

TM CARPET ENTERED ASSIGNED RZ AT 140922 H

*219**02**42*
SECRET

SECRET

1. 1111Z UDMISA

2. UDMISA 1031 1440400

3. 1111Z

4. 1111Z MAY 69

5. THIRD MANDIV (REIN) COC DEN

6. UDMISA/AXIV CMAPS HOC PAB

7. 1111Z TASK FORCE HOTEL

8. 1111Z MARINES COC

9. SECRET

10. 1111Z SPEC DIA UPNS REPORT

11. 1111Z MAR DIV

12. 1111Z IN SAND BOX ENTERED ASSIGNED 1111Z 1111Z

13. 1111Z

24 04 00

SECRET

NUMSJEJ UUMSQD PUMLBPP UUMSDG
 DE UUMSK 3993 1440500

NY EEEEE

000000Z MAY 69

FM CG XXIV CORPS PH3

TO NUMSJEJ/CG 101ST ABN DIV GEE

UUMSQD/CG 3D MAF DIV DGH

PUMLBPP:CDP TF CLEAR AFTER CVT

UUMSDG/CO 100TH ARTY GROUP DGH

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

SUBJ:REPORTING ENEMY ACTIVITIES DURING

CESSATION OF AFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (U)

REF: COMUSMACV MSG DTG 300012Z MAY 69

1. REF MSG YOURS FOR ACTION.

2. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT REF MSG TO

THIS HQS TOC

BT

3993

DECLASSIFIED

LENN

LENN

W SKA 674 674 674

00 UUMSQD UUMSDG UUMSJEA
00 UUMSK 4207 441338
00 UUUUU
00 XXIV CORPS PHB
00 UUMSD/3D MAR DIV CGH
00 UUMSDG/ 28 APTY GP DGH
00 UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV CEE
BT

UNCLAS SVC ZSI UUMSK 399 P 040415Z MAY 59 READDRESSAL SHOULD REFER TO
000012 MACV COMUS MSG

BT
0007

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

0 PUMLBPP UUMSGD UUMSJEA UUMSAD
 DE UUMSK 3990 14404-0
 00 55555
 000015Z MAY 69 (ZFF-6) *fol 0001/24 caps*
 TO CG XXIV CORPS PH3
 TO UUMSJEA/CG 121ST ABN DIV CEE
 UUMSGD/CG 3RD MAP DIV DGH
 UUMLBPP/CDP TF CLEAP ATER-CVT
 UUMSGD/108TH ARTY GROUP DGH

0002739Z MAY 69
 TO COMUSMACV
 IT

E C P E T (J3)

SUBJECT: REPORTING ENEMY ACTIVITIES DURING CESSATION OF
 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (U)

REF: A. MACV DIP 335-1, SUBJ: SPOT REPORTS, DATED 30 AUG 68.

B. COMUSMACV MSG 010102Z NOV 68, SUBJ: GUIDANCE
 ON VC/NVA ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATION CENTERS.

REF C UUMS 408V S E C P E T

C. COMUSMACV MSG 091010Z MAY 69, SUBJ: INSTRUCTIONS
 FOR TEMPORARY CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

(S) DURING THE 24 HOUR SUSPENSION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS FROM
 000000H TO 310600H MAY 69, ADDRESSEES: ILL REPORT ALL ENEMY
 INITIATED INCIDENTS TO COMUSMACV VIA DEDICATED CIRCUIT IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH SPOT REPORTING PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN REFERENCE A.
 IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT COMUSMACV BE PROPERLY INFORMED OF ENEMY
 INITIATED INCIDENTS.

(C) IN ADDITION TO REPORTS REQUIRED BY REF B AND C:

A. REPORT ASAP AFTER 300600H MAY 69, WHEN CESSATION OF
 OFFENSIVE OPERATION IS ACHIEVED.

B. REPORT MAJOR ENEMY INITIATED ACTIONS BY SPOT REPORT.

C. REPORT MINOR INCIDENTS BY SUMMARY EVERY TWO HOURS.

D. AT TERMINATION OF CESSATION, REPORT WHEN OFFENSIVE COMBAT
 OPERATION HAVE BEEN RESUMED.

(C) A. THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS ILL BE REPORTED:

(1) AN INCIDENT INVOLVING AN ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ENEMY AND
 FRIENDLY GROUND, AIR OR NAVAL FORCES WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS
 OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

(2) AN INCIDENT OF ENEMY HARASSING FIRE AGAINST FRIENDLY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 UUMS 478V S E C R E T

CIVILIAN OR MILITARY PERSONNEL, INSTALLATIONS, SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT.

(3) AN INCIDENT OF ENEMY SABOTAGE, TERROR, OR PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY.

(4) AN INCIDENT OF ENEMY USE OF COMMAND DETONATED LAND OR WATER MINES. SELF-DETONATING MINES WILL NOT BE REPORTED IN THIS CONTEXT DUE TO THE INABILITY TO DETERMINE TIME OF PLACEMENT.

(5) A MAJOR MOVEMENT OF ENEMY TROOPS OR SUPPLIES.

B. THE FOLLOWING WILL BE CONSIDERED MAJOR INCIDENTS AND REPORTED TO COMUSMACV IMMEDIATELY.

(1) AN ACTION OR INCIDENT IN WHICH CASUALTIES OCCUR TO EITHER SIDE, INCLUDING ENEMY DETAINEES AND FRIENDLY MISSING PERSONNEL OR ABDUCTED CIVILIANS.

(2) A FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED BY ENEMY FIRE.

(3) A GROUND ATTACK OR AN INDIRECT FIRE ATTACK ON A POPULATION CENTER.

(4) ANY ENEMY INITIATED ACTION OF SUCH MAGNITUDE OF UNUSUAL SIGNIFICANCE AS TO REQUIRE SPECIAL REPORTING.

C. MINOR INCIDENTS ARE THOSE WHICH CANNOT BE CATEGORIZED ACCORDING TO ANY OF THE CONDITIONS IN B (1) THROUGH (4) ABOVE.

4. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT NLT 040900Z MAY 69. GP-2

BT

1331

NNNNGLB3P

SECRET

SECRETDRAFTER 1h/JGM/rjcSEC AIR 3D MARDIV 321hCWO RCLFLASH 240814 Z MAY69FM: CG THIRD MARDIV DGH
TO: CG FIRST MARINE AIR WING DNG

SUBJ: THIRD MARDIV HELO FRAGS FOR 25MAY69

//SECRET//

| | | | | | |
|----------|----------|---------|---------|-------|----------|
| HU-1E(G) | HU-1E(S) | CH-46D | CH-46A | CH-53 | OV-10/01 |
| 507/203 | 101 | 505 | 502 | 303 | 508 |
| 401 | 102 | 501/503 | 103 | | 510 |
| 510 | 111 | 401 | 105/104 | | |
| | | 301 | 106 | | |
| | | | 107 | | |

1. MSN 101 STD FRAG
1. MSN 102 STD FRAG
2. 2 UH-1E(S)
4. VIP CODE 6
6. A. PU QT DIV PAD 0700 DZ LZ ASTOR(VCB) 1FAX
B. PU VCB CONT DZ TBA
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 103 STD FRAG
1. MSN 104 STD FRAG
1. MSN 105 STD FRAG
1. MSN 106 STD FRAG
1. MSN 107 STD FRAG
1. MSN 111 STD FRAG
2. 1 UH-1E(S)
4. VIP CODE 6
6. A. PU QMDDIV PAD 1645 DZ LZ OWL 2PAX
B. PU LZ OWL 1745 DZ QT DIV PAD 2PAX
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 112 STD FRAG
4. FMFPAC INSPECTION TEAM
6. A. PU QT ADC PAD 0800 DZVCB LZ ASTOR 10PAX
B. PU VCB LZ ASTOR 1130 DZ QT ADC PAD 10PAX
7. ~~ALL ZONES SECURE~~ USE 103 A/C
10. MSN 203 STD FRAG
2. 2 UH-1E(G), 2 UH-1E(S)
4. RECON I/E, VIS RECON
6. A. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 781657 37.3 8PAX
B. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 785612 37.3 6PAX
C. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 798567 37.3 6PAX
D. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 838482 37.3 8PAX
E. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 932612 37.3 8PAX
F. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 932612 37.3 8PAX
G. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 103089 37.3 6PAX

SECRET

SECRET

- H. PU 074175 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 6PAX
 I. PU 052699 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 8PAX
 J. PU 103089 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 6PAX
7. A THRU G DZ NOT SECURE, H, I AND J PU ZONE NOT SECURE
 8. H, I AND J RADIO AND PANEL
1. MSN 301 STD FRAG
 2. 8 CH-46'S
 4. TRPS, LOGISTICS
 6. A. PU Q LSA 0700 DZ VCB LSA 2000LBS MAIL/4PAX
 B. PU QT-VCB LSA CONT TBA RESUPPLY
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
 1. MSN 302 STD FRAG
 2. 2 CH-46'S
 4. TRPS, LOGISTICS
 6. A. PU LZ NANCY 1430 DZ 392325 ICEBERG 6 36.0 4000LBS/6PAX
 B. PU LZ SHARON CONT DZ 310390 CHIVES 6 49.6 2300LBS/5PAX
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
 1. MSN 303 STD FRAG
 2. 10 CH-53'S
 1. MSN 304 STD FRAG
 2. 2 CH-53'S
 4. ARMY LOGS
 6. A. PU QT LSA 1500 DZ LZ ANNE 290402 144,300LBS/2PAX
 B. PU QT VCB LSA CONT TBA RESUPPLY
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
 1. MSN 401 STD FRAG (INCOMPLETE)
 1. MSN 501 STD FRAG
 1. MSN 502 STD FRAG
 1. MSN 503 STD FRAG
 1. MSN 505 STD FRAG
 2. ~~EXHIBITS~~ 4 CH-46'S 2 UH-1E(G)
 4. GEN ABROHOMS, TRPS (SPARROW HAWK)
 6. PU LZ SHARON 0915 DZ TBA 105 PAX
 7. ALL ZONES SECURE
 1. MSN 507 STD FRAG
 1. MSN 508 STD FRAG
 1. MSN 510 STD FRAG

GP-4

CCN 3566 REL BY J. S. M. 9/22/92**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

77 77 'ZZ UUMSK
OF UUMSKD 1039 1440042
ZNY SSSSS
Z 240042Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MAINDIV (HEIN) CUC DUN
TO DUMAK/XXIV CORPS 100 PNB
BT
SECRET
SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
1. GRD MAID DIV
A 1/0
(1) TM CARPET EXIT EU 241500H MAY 69
GF-4
BT
1039

222

24 08 45

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

TBB
 000000Z UUMSK
 00 UUMSKD 1040 1440000
 00000000
 0 240000Z MAY 69
 00 THIRAD MANDIV (REINL 000 000)
 00 UUMSK/XXIV CORPS 100 PHO
 00

S E C R E T
 SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
 1. 3 AD MAN DIV
 A. 1/3
 00 IM SAND BOX EXITED DMZ 241000H
 00-4
 00
 104

00 XXIV/1019


223

24 09 30 A-1

SECRET

ROUTINE 240940 Z MAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TO: CG FORLOGCOMD
 INFO: HQBN THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TWELFTH MAR
 THIRD MAR



DRAFTER 10F/WCC/TJB
 SEC GEO PHONE 3167
 RAC

6-4/ *ant*

G-3 H

UNCLAS E F T O

FY-69 R&E PROGRAM

A. CG FORLOGCOMD 190618Z MAY69 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQ ACT BE TAKEN TO EXPEDITE TURN IN OF FY-69 ASSETS FOR
 SB-22/PT AND SB-86/PT.

2. FOL UNITS HAVE RECEIVED SB-22 IN QTY INDICATED AND HAVE BEEN
 DIRECTED TO TURN IN EVAC ITEMS TO FLSC BRAVO:

| UNIT | UIC | QTY |
|--------------------|-------|-----|
| HQBN, THIRD MARDIV | 13001 | 14 |
| HQBNRY TWELFTH MAR | 13301 | 10 |
| HQCO, THIRD MAR | 13101 | 1 |

3. HQBN THIRD MARDIV UIC 13001 HAS NOT RECEIVED SB-86'S FOR
 SUBJ PROGRAM.

GCN 3596 RELEASED BY *John M. [Signature]* TIME 1300 H MAY69

CEO

G-4 RAC

SECRET

XXXX
 OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQ 1054 1441600
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 241600Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
 UUMSQ/III MAF C OC
 INFO THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TASK FORCE HOTEL
 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)

S E C R E T

I. 5.0J: 3D RECON DN SITREP FOR PERIOD OF 240000H TO
 242400Z MAY 69

IIM. INSERTS AND EXTRACTS

A. INSERTS COMPLETE

| PATROL | DTG | COOR |
|--------|---------|-----------|
| 1 2E1 | 241415Z | XD853227 |
| 2 1C1 | 241430H | XD852483 |
| 3 1B3 | 241430H | XD102483 |
| 4 3B2 | 241430H | XD8432483 |
| 5 3D1 | 241500H | XD885371 |

PAGE TWO UUMSQ 1054 S E C R E T

6 3D2 241510H XD838483

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

| PATROL | DTG | COOR |
|--------|----------|----------|
| Q1 1-1 | 241050H | XD701541 |
| 2 1E2 | 241130H | XD778437 |
| 3 3E1 | 241145H | XD958411 |
| 4 1A2 | 2414 15H | XD353399 |

C. INSERTS NOT C COMPLETE

| PATROL | REASON |
|------------|----------------------|
| 1 1A1-7958 | HIGH WINDS PREVENTED |
| 2 3C3-7762 | INSERTS |
| 3 3C2-7766 | 88,345 |

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLETE

| PATROL | REASON |
|--------|--------|
| NONE | |

E. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 25 MAY 69

| | |
|---------|----------|
| 65-449) | 291-583, |
| 11 1A1 | XD8532 |
| 2 1A1 | XD7758 |
| 3 3C2 | XD7766 |

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UMSK 1054 S E C R E T

1 100 XD7762

2. CONTACTS PLANNED FOR 23 MAY 69

3. LOCATION

4. YD6618

5. LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AS OF 242400H MAY 69

| ITEM | NAME | LOCATION |
|------|---------------|------------------|
| 1 | 101 SCUBA TM | 3 YD333520 |
| 2 | 103 RP/OP | 8 XD978539 |
| 3 | 102 RR/OP | 7 YD097374 |
| 4 | 101 RR /OF | 7 YD697374 |
| 5 | 102 BAR/OP | 7 YD097374 |
| 6 | 100 RR/OP | 4 YD145133 |
| 7 | 100 RR/OP | 4 YD302433 |
| 8 | 102 RR/OP | 4 CYD115735 |
| 9 | 102 AMBUSH TM | GUL2662 YD266624 |
| 10 | 101 AMBUSH TM | GUL3469 YD349644 |
| 11 | 102 AMBUSH TM | GUL2564 YD256646 |
| 12 | 106 AMBUSH TM | GUL2365 YD236657 |
| 13 | 103 | 6 YD173135 |
| 14 | 102 | 6 YD223155 |

PAGE FOUR 1054 S E C R E T

| | | |
|----|-----|--------------|
| 15 | 101 | 7 XD924533 |
| 16 | 101 | 7 XD966336 |
| 17 | 101 | 6 XD853227 |
| 18 | 101 | 3 XD787545 |
| 19 | 102 | 7 Y YD094835 |
| 20 | 101 | 6 XD879301 |
| 21 | 103 | 6 XD969481 |
| 22 | 101 | 6 YD074165 |
| 23 | 102 | 6 YD113038 |
| 24 | 101 | 6 YD002533 |
| 25 | 102 | 6 XD837433 |
| 26 | 102 | 6 XD972473 |

7. NIGHTS AND CONTACTS.

8. DATE ENTRY: 231000H XD325286 (1A2) FOOTBALL STAR
 REPORTED 7-10 ENEMY WITH DARK UTILITIES. TM COULD NOT
 IDENTIFY CLEAR OR WEAPONS. TM CALLED ARTY MISSION WITH
 UNKNOWN RESULTS. TM MOVED OUT OF AREA. TM IS CONT MISSION.
 9. AT 02.00H YD113888 (3B2) NORTH TIDE RECEIVED SAF AND
 REPORTED 10-15 ENEMY FROM UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE. TM RETURNED
 AND 1000H PLUS FIRED 1 CLAYMORE MINE. TM THEN CALLED

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PAGE FIVE NUMBER 1654 **SECRET**
 ARTY MISSION AND BROKE CONTACT. TM SUFFERED 1 US/C WIA
 DURING TM IS CONTINUING MISSION.
 Z AT 241342N KD926523 (HE1) FIGHTING HAD INITIATED CON-
 TACT WITH TWO ENEMY. ENEMY RETURNED SAF. TM BROKE CONTACT AND
 CALLED FOR AC. ENEMY WORE GREEN AND BROWN CAMOUFLAGE UTILITIES
 AND CARRIED S&S REFLES. AC CONDUCTED ARTY MISSION WITH UN-
 KNOWN RESULTS. TM IS CONTINUING MISSION.
 Z AT 241000H YD591333 (342) NOON WATCH OBSERVED 5 ENEMY IN
 AREA. ENEMY WORE GREEN SHORTS. TM CALLED ARTY MISSION WITH UN-
 KNOWN RESULTS. TM IS CONTINUING MISSION.

SECRET

SECRET

12412 (155)

K
 *****ZZ UUMSK
 DE UUMSQD 1077 1450225
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 250225Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV COMPS TOC PHB
 INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
 TWELFTH MARINES COC

BT
 S E C R E T
 SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
 1. 3rd MARDIV
 AI/3
 (1) TM CENTIPEDE ENTERED DMZ 250800H MAY 69
 (2) TM LUNGING TULIP ENTERED DMZ 250822H MAY 69
 (3) TM DEER FERN ENTER DMZ 250905H MAY 69
 GP-4
 1077

225

25

02

25
SECRET

SECRET

UN
 TPSJSJSJSJSJSZZ UUMSK
 DE UUMSQD 1079 1450430
 ZNY SSSSS
 250430Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO/TASK FORCE HOTELV COC
 TWELFTH MARINES COC
 BT
 S E C R E T
 SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
 1. 3RD MAR DIV
 A. 3RD RECON BN
 C. TM DRIVING TEST EXITED DMZ
 271015H MAY 69
 GP-4
 BT
 079

226

25 04 30

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

*****ZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSQD 1063 1450550
ZNY 00000
Z 250550Z MAY 69
FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV COMPS TOC PHB
INFO/TASK PROCE HOTEL
TWELFTH MARINES COC

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. A. 3RD MAR DIV.

RELOCATION OF OLD COLONEL. AZ UL 2074 15 1072

CP-4

BT

1063

249**SECRET**

SECRET

*****ZZ UUMSK
 DE UUMSQD 1096 1451430
 ZNY C S S S S S
 Z 251430Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MANDIV (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

FM THIRD MANDIV

A. 1/3 (1) THE FOLLOWING TMS EXITED DMZ 25 MAY 69

(A) DEER FEARN 251515H

(B) LUNGING TULIP 251655H

(C) CENTIPEDE 251710H

(2) TM'S FM 1/3 TO ENTER DMZ 26-27 MAY 69

(A) TM PENGUIN TO ENTER 260700H TERMINAL POINT AT YD002710
 SHDMZ RZ UL 0773 ; LR 0971(B) TM'S GULF MAID AND HASTY PUDDING WILL ENTER DMZ ON
 WYYPV700H AND RENDEZVOUS AT COORD YD 042697. THESE TM'S
 WILL PATROL SEPERATELY THRU

UGHMOUT THE DAY IN RZ UL 0371

LR 0569. ON THE NIGHT OF 26 MAY 69 THEY WILL LINK-UP AT
 COOR YD042696 FOR NIGHT AMBUSH. ON 270700H MAY 69 TM GULF
 MAID WILL MOVE TO RZ UL0472 LR 0670. TM HASTY PUDDING WILL
 MOVE TO RZ UL 0370 LR 0566.

PAGE TWO UUMSK 1096 S E C R E T

(3) TM TO ENTER DMZ 260700 FROM 3/3

(A) CENTIPEDE UL 0068 LR 0266

(B) GULF MAIN UL 9968 LR 0076

(C) ISTHMUS UL 9768 LR 9966

(D) DEER FEARN UL 9668 LR 9766

B.

KD RECON BN

(1) TMS REMAINING IN DMZ OVERNIGHT

(A) OLD COLONEL NIGHT POS 089719

(B) APRIL SHOWERS NIGHT POS 100

(2) TMS TO ENTER DMZ FROM 3D RECON 260700 MAY 69

(--) IDA MEA RZ UL 9168 LR 9366

2. MLS-1 NO PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 26 MAY 69

3. ARVN

ZA PATROLS SCHEDULED FOR 26 MAY 69

GP-4

BT

1096

227

14

30

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER 3P/HLC/lis
 SEC G-3 Plans PH 3203
 CWO

IMMEDIATE 25/432 ZMAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TO: TFH
 THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES

COPY TO:
 G-3
 G-4
 SPL SVC

BT

//SECRET//

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: EN REHAB (26MAY-31MAY 1969)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IS PROMULGATED FOR
 PLANNING PURPOSES.

| DATE | UNIT | FROM | TO |
|-------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 26MAY | 3/4 (-)
2/3 (-) | CUA VIET
3D MAR AO | 3D MAR AO
CUA VIET |
| 28MAY | REMAINDER 3/4
REMAINDER 2/3 | CUA VIET
3D MAR AO | 3D MAR AO
CUA VIET |
| 29MAY | 2/3 (-)
3/4 (-) | CUA VIET
3D MAR AO | 3D MAR AO
VCB |
| 31MAY | REMAINDER 2/3
REMAINDER 3/4 | CUA VIET
3D MAR AO | 3D MAR AO
VCB |

GP-4

CCN 3786 REL BY 3 R. / raine TIME HMAY69

G-3 (PLANS)

G-3/G-4/G-1 (SPL SVC)

25

1 (228) 32

SECRET

SECRET

OG UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQ 1106 145 1830
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 251830Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV COC
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
 UUMSQ/III MAF COC
 INFO THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TASK FORCE HOTEL
 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)
 UBT
 S E C R E T

I. SUBJECT: 3D RECON BN FIREM 09 PERIOD OF 250001 TO 250000H MAY 69

II. INSERTS AND EXTRACTS

A. INSERTS COMPLETE

| PATROL | DTG |
|--------|---------|
| 1. 3C2 | 250930H |
| 2. 3A1 | 250950H |
| 3. 1A1 | 251210H |
| 4. 3C3 | 251215H |

COOR

| | |
|----|----|
| XD | 78 |
| XD | 8 |
| XD | 7 |
| XD | 1 |

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

P

PAGE TWO UUMSQ 1106 S E C R E T

| PATROL | DTG |
|--------|---------|
| 1. 2B1 | 250905H |
| 2. 3C3 | 251220H |
| 3. 1B2 | 251330H |
| 4. 3B3 | 251345H |
| 5. 3A1 | 251830H |
| 6. 3D1 | 251945H |

COOR

| | |
|----|-----|
| XD | 676 |
| XD | 775 |
| XD | 223 |
| XD | 179 |
| XD | 632 |
| XD | 981 |

C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL

NONE

REASON

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL

NONE

E. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 26 MAY

PATROL LOCATION

1. 2B1 XD

2. 3C3 XD

3. 1A1 XD

4. 3A3 XD

F. EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 26 MAY

PATROL LOCATION

NONE

CONF

PATROL

| | | | | |
|-----|------|-----------|---------|-----------|
| 17. | 12D1 | AMBUSH TM | 6UL3469 | YD 349694 |
| 18. | 2D2 | AMBUSH TM | 6UL2764 | FD 274642 |
| 19. | 3D3 | AMUSH TM | 6UL2662 | YD 262622 |
| 20. | 4A1 | | 7 | XD 777574 |
| 21. | 5D2 | | 6 | XD 963473 |
| 22. | 1E1 | | 7 | XE 4531 |
| 23. | 2A3 | | 7 | XD 85327 |

000

6

XD 855235

7

IV. SIGHTING AND CONTACTS

3. AT 261230H XD 585304 (3D1) JAW BREAKER HEARD MOVEMENT APPROX 30 METERS TO NW. TM THEN OBSERVED 3 ENEMY IN BOMB CRATER AND 2 IN TREE LINE. TM AND ENEMY EXCHANGED SAF RESULTING IN 2 ENEMY KIA. WHILE MOVING TO XD 585301 TM AGAIN MADE CONTACT RESULTING IN 1 ENEMY KIA. AO AND F/W ON STATION TOOK AWF WHILE F/W MADE STRIKES TM SAW ENEMY RUNNING FROM AREA. SEC

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE UMSGD 1106 S E C R E T

TM WAS EXTRACTED AT 1945H.

G. AT 251400H XD 940610 (3A1) LUCKY PUNCH HEARD UNK SIZE MORTAR TUBES FIRING FROM XD 928622 XD 969616 XD 919629. TM CALLED ARTY MISSION ON XD 928622 AND XD 969616. THERE WERE (7) SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AT XD 928622 AND (2) SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AT XD 969616. TM THEN HEARD MOVEMENT AND OBSERVED 1 ENEMY WEARING GREEN UTILITIES RUSH COVER AND CARRYING UNK TYPE RIFLE. TM THEN OBSERVED 1 ENEMY TO THE NORTH 30 METERS AND 11 ENEMY TO THE EAST AND 6 ENEMY TO THE WEST. TM MOVED TO LZ AT 1500H. AQ AND T/W ON STATION TOOK AWP EST TO BE 30 CAL. T/W DROPPED ORDNANCE ON PUNKERS RESULTING IN NUMEROUS SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. THE EXTRACT HELO TOOK 6-8 HITS ON EXTRACT AT 1845H.

GP-4

BT

1106

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE UUMSQ 1569 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 TRI PROV TOTALLED 58 MORT RDS AND 24 RKT RDS IN 6 INCIDENTS,
 RESULTING IN 9 KIA AND 9 WIA (EVAC). (TELECON, XXIV CORPS)
 7. 260001-262400H: INCOMING RPT'D BY US AND FVMAF THROUGH-
 OUT ICTZ (MINUS QUANG TRI PROV) TOTALLED 13 MORT RDS AS
 FOLLOWS: 1ST MARDIV RPT'D 1 INCIDENT, REC'G 5 MORT RDS,
 RESULTING IN (NEG CAS); AMERICAL DIV RPT'D 1 INCIDENT, REC'G
 8 MORT RDS, RESULTING IN 1 WIA (EVAC). (TELECON, XXIV CORPS,
 1ST MARDIV, 2ND ROKMC PDE, AMERICAL DIV)
 8. 26 MAY: THERE WERE 26 INCIDENTS IN THE DMZ. 26 IGIS
 WERE ATK'D BY ARTY, NGF AND AIRSTRIKES.
 9. 260710H DELAYED RPT: CIO LINH (YD235723) REC'D 10X 122MM
 RKT'S WHICH WERE LAUNCHED FROM WITHIN THE SHDMZ. NGF AND
 ARTY WERE FIRED ON THE SUSP LAUNCH SITE WITH UNK RESULTS.
 RESULTS: 1 KIA AND 2 RF WIA. (TELECON, I. CORPS)

GP-4

BT

15159

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET/NOFORN

DRAFTED 3482 : SHH : JAF
 SECTION FSCG IN 3482
 C/O Shm

COM 3812/3813

ROUTINE 260256 Z MAY 69

FM: CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN)
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
 THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 ELEVENTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (100TH)
 DONG HA BASE COORD
 QUANG TRI BASE COORD

C/S Shm
 G-3 Shm
 G-3 OPS Shm
 G-3 PLANS Shm
 AIR Shm
 FSC Shm
 COPY TO GENERAL

INFO: CG XXIV CORPS MHD
 THIRD MAR DIV
 100TH FA GP

//SECRET/NOFORN//

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- A. CG THIRD MAR DIV 181420ZNOV 68 (S)
- B. MACV DIR 525-13 (C)
- C. ANNEX B (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION) TO 3D MAR DIV LOI 1-69 (S)
(TO BE ISSUED)
- D. ANNEX J (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO 3D MAR DIV LOI 1-69 (S) (TO BE
ISSUED)
- E. COMUSMACV 040250ZDEC68 (TS) NOTAL
- F. COMUSMACV 200115ZFEB69 (S)
- G. COMUSMACV 171005ZMAY69 (S)
- H. COMUSMACV 180834ZNOV68 (S)
- I. COMUSMACV 121430ZDEC68 (S)
- J. COMUSMACV 231115ZMAR69 (S)

1. (U) REF (A) IS HEREBY CANCELLED.
2. (U) THIS MSG CITES CURRENT DIRECTIVES COVERING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) AND CONSOLIDATES RULES APPLICABLE TO THE DMZ, LAOS, AND APPROVED CONVENTIONAL BATTLES (ICB). IN-COUNTRY ROE ARE STATED CLEARLY IN APPLICABLE DIRECTIVES CITED ABOVE.
3. (U) REFS (B) THROUGH (D) PRESCRIBE IN-COUNTRY ROE.
4. (U) REFS (E) AND (F) PRESCRIBE ROE FOR THE DMZ.
5. (U) REF (G) PRESCRIBES ROE FOR LAOS.
6. (U) REFS (H) THROUGH (J) PRESCRIBE ROE FOR APPROVED CONVENTIONAL BATTLES (ICB).

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

//SECRET,NOFORN//

7. (S) GENERAL

A. THIS ISC CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION THE KNOWLEDGE OF WHICH WILL BE CONTROLLED CLOSELY WITH ACCESS LIMITED TO PERSONS ON A STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS. NO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ANY OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS ISC OR OF ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER AUTHORITY HEREIN WILL BE MADE EXCEPT BY THIS OR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. PRESS QUERIES, IF MADE, WILL BE REFERRED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

B. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONTAINED HEREIN APPLY TO US/FMAAF ONLY; HOWEVER, PERSONS IN POSITIONS TO INFLUENCE RVNAF OPERATIONS WILL MAKE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO INSURE THAT THEY ARE CONDUCTED UNDER THESE ROE.

C. EVERY COMMANDER RETAINS THE INHERENT RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SELF-DEFENSE OF HIS FORCES. THIS IS THE OVERRIDING CRITERION WHEN SELF-DEFENSE BY UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS BECOMES NECESSARY.

8. (S) AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE DMZ

A. U.S. GROUND FORCES WILL NOT CROSS THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ WITHOUT SPECIFIC ORDERS FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS TO DO SO. EVERY COMMANDER WILL BE AWARED OF THIS REQUIREMENT. REF (c) APPLIES.

B. REACTION TO ENEMY FIRE ORIGINATING FROM POSITIONS IN THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE DMZ AGAINST FRIENDLY FORCES WILL BE IMMEDIATE, AND THE WEIGHT DECISIVELY DESTRUCTIVE, USING WHATEVER MEANS APPROPRIATE AND AVAILABLE, INCLUDING AIR, ARTILLERY, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE.

C. ENEMY PERSONNEL, OCCUPIED POSITIONS, AND NEW POSITIONS IDENTIFIED SOUTH OF THE DMZ WILL BE PROMPTLY ATTACKED AND DESTROYED BY FIRE.

D. OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT UNDER 3D IFR DIV CONTROL WILL MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ, BUT WILL REMAIN ALWAYS SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

E. NO ARTILLERY, AIR, OR NAVAL GUNFIRE MISSION WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE DMZ WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF DIVISION FSCC.

9. (S) AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE DMZ NORTH OF THE DMZ

A. U.S. FORCES WILL NOT INITIATE ATTACKS BY FIRE ON TARGETS NORTH OF THE DMZ.

B. PRIOR TO RETURNING FIRE AGAINST THAT RECEIVED FROM NORTH OF THE DMZ, COMMANDERS WILL ASCERTAIN POSITIVELY, WITHOUT ANY DOUBT, THAT SUCH FIRE IS ACTUALLY, IN FACT, COMING FROM NORTH OF THE DMZ. A REASONABLE DETERMINATION OF THE ENEMY'S POSITION MAY BE A FLASH ALIGNED AND AN ESTIMATED RANGE TO A LOCATION WHICH IS VERIFIED BY AT LEAST ONE ADDITIONAL TARGET ACQUISITION BEAMS (INCLUDING A SECOND FLASH ALIGNED). HOWEVER, ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON ENEMY FIRING POSITIONS

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SECRET/NOFORN

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WILL BE REPORTED THROUGH FIRE SUPPORT CHANNELS TO THE DIVISION FSOC, EVEN THOUGH SUCH INFORMATION, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT MEET TARGET LOCATION CRITERIA. ONCE ACTIVE ENEMY ARTILLERY, MORTAR, OR ROCKET POSITIONS ARE LOCATED, THEY WILL BE RESPONDED TO WITH HEAVY COUNTERFIRE AND/OR AIR ATTACK UNTIL ENEMY WEAPONS ARE SILENCED. AN INTEGRAL PART OF SUCH RESPONSES WILL BE THE EMPLOYMENT OF AO AND TAC(A) AIRCRAFT NORTH OF THE PDL FOR FIRE CONTROL AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MISSIONS.

C. IN THE EVENT THAT SAMs OR ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS ARE FIRED AT FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT, FRIENDLY FORCES WILL DESTROY BY FIRE THE ENEMY'S WEAPONS INSTALLATIONS AND IMMEDIATE SUPPORTING FACILITIES, USING WHATEVER MEANS APPROPRIATE AND AVAILABLE, INCLUDING AIR, ARTILLERY, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE.

D. NO ARTILLERY, AIR, OR NAVAL GUNFIRE MISSION WILL BE CONDUCTED NORTH OF THE PDL WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CG, 3D MAR DIV. SUCH PERMISSION WILL BE REQUESTED THROUGH DIVISION COG.

10. (S) REPORTS

A. IN GENERAL, REPORTS WILL BE MADE ORALLY AND CONFIRMED BY FLASH MESSAGES VIA COG CIRCUITS.

B. REPORTS MUST BE PROMPT AND ACCURATE AND WILL INCLUDE FULL INFORMATION ON THE INCIDENT. IF FULL INFORMATION IS NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, AN INTERIM REPORT WILL BE MADE, FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

C. THE SENIOR RESIDENT COMMANDERS AT A-4, C-2, ~~OCEANVIEW~~, AND CUA VIEW, AND THE SENIOR U.S. REPRESENTATIVES AT A-1, A-2 AND C-1, AND OCEANVIEW ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECEIPT, COLLATION, AND REPORTING TO THE DIVISION COG BY FLASH MESSAGE, ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO ENEMY DE INCIDENTS AND ACTIVITIES WHICH AFFECT OR ARE DETECTED FROM THE VARIOUS INSTALLATIONS. ALL ATTACHED OR SUPPORTING UNITS OR PERSONNEL LOCATED AT THE INSTALLATIONS WILL REPORT SUCH INFORMATION TO DESIGNATED COMMANDERS. THIS REQUIREMENT WILL IN NO WAY PREVENT ATTACHED OR SUPPORTING UNITS FROM CONCURRENTLY REPORTING THE SAME INFORMATION THROUGH THEIR NORMAL COMBAT/FIRE SUPPORT CHANNELS.

D. TYPE INCIDENTS TO BE REPORTED:

(1) ALL ENEMY ACTIVITY, PERSONNEL, AND EQUIPMENT OBSERVED WITHIN THE DZ EITHER NORTH OR SOUTH OF THE PDL (C-2 BATTAL OFFICER DIV COG).

(2) ENEMY SMALL ARMS, ARTILLERY, MORTAR, AND ROCKET FIRE RECEIVED FROM NORTH OF THE SOUTHERN DZ BOUNDARY.

(3) FRIENDLY ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST ENEMY PERSONNEL AND POSITIONS NORTH OF THE SOUTHERN DZ BOUNDARY.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

//SECRET/NOFORN//

(4) SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES OR ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS FIRED AGAINST FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT FROM NORTH OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.

(5) ENEMY GROUND CONTACTS ACROSS THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.

(6) ALL ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE OR BY GROUND UNITS AGAINST POPULATED AREAS. ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATED AREAS INCLUDE ONE OR MORE ROUNDS OF MORTAR, ARTILLERY OR ROCKET FIRE, AND ENEMY GROUND PROBES OR TERRORIST ATTACKS INVOLVING THE USE OF MINES AND DEMOLITIONS. POPULATED AREAS ARE DEFINED AS HAMLETS OR LARGER.

(7) ALL FRIENDLY VIOLATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.

E. REPORTS OF ENEMY ARTILLERY, MORTAR OR ROCKET FIRE FROM NORTH OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ WILL BE SUBMITTED IN THE FORMAT OF DA FORM 2185-R. ALL OTHER REPORTS WILL ADHERE TO THE SPOT REPORT FORMAT, EXCEPT THOSE INVOLVING ATTACKS ON POPULATED AREAS.

F. REPORTS OF ATTACKS ON POPULATED AREAS WILL USE THE FOLLOWING FORMAT:

- (1) NAME AND COORDINATES OF POPULATED AREA ATTACKED.
- (2) TIME OF ATTACK.
- (3) IDENTITY OF TARGET: MILITARY OR CIVILIAN.
- (4) TYPE OF ACTIVITY AND WEAPONS USED TO INCLUDE NUMBER OF ROUNDS OF ROCKETS, ARTILLERY, AND MORTAR.
- (5) IDENTITY OF ENEMY FORCE AND EVIDENCE OF CONTROL IF KNOWN.
- (6) DEGREE OF INTENSITY AND DURATION OF ATTACK.
- (7) DAMAGE INFLECTED AND CASUALTIES TO INCLUDE FRIENDLY AND ENEMY, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN.
- (8) COUNTERACTION INITIATED.
- (9) ANY COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WILL ASSIST THIS COMMAND IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION.

11. (S) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR LAOS

A. REF (F) IS THE CURRENT DIRECTIVE IN A SERIES WHICH IS UPDATED QUARTERLY.

B. AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO EMPLOY ARTILLERY FIRE AGAINST VALID MILITARY TARGETS IN LAOS.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

//REMITTANCE//

C. ALL OPERATIONS PLANNED NEAR THE RVN/LAOS BORDER WILL BE REPORTED IN ADVANCE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS. REPORTS WILL INCLUDE:

- (1) PROPOSED NAME OF OPERATION, IF APPLICABLE.
- (2) COORDINATES OF AREA OF OPERATIONS ADJACENT TO THE RVN/LAOS BORDER.
- (3) DATED OPERATION WILL COMMENCE AND ESTIMATED DURATION OF OPERATION.
- (4) FRIENDLY FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE OPERATION.
- (5) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS UPDATING THE ORIGINAL REPORT WILL BE MADE AS APPROPRIATE.

D. IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS U.S. FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTERACTIONS IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST MILITARY ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST U.S./RVN/PAK FORCES FROM LOCATIONS INSIDE LAOS. AN EMERGENCY SITUATION EXISTS WHEN, IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE U.S. FORCE COMMANDER, THE URGENCY FOR TAKING MILITARY COUNTERACTIONS IN SELF-DEFENSE OF U.S./RVN/PAK FORCES PRECLUDES OBTAINING PRIOR APPROVAL. SUCH COUNTERACTIONS MAY INCLUDE:

- (1) ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES AGAINST MILITARY FORCES FLYING FROM THE LAOS SIDE OF THE BORDER AGAINST U.S./RVN/PAK FORCES.
- (2) MANEUVER BY U.S. TROOPS, WHILE ACTUALLY ENGAGED AND IN CONTACT WITH MILITARY FORCES, INTO LAOS AS REQUIRED FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE FORCE.

E. IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ABOVE, LAOS VILLAGES WILL NOT BE ATTACKED EXCEPT:

- (1) WHEN FIRE IS BEING RECEIVED THEREFROM, AND
- (2) WHEN IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE U.S. COMMANDER THE ATTACK ON A POPULATED AREA IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE FORCE.

F. THE AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES CONTAINED HEREIN ARE ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE OF RVN AND U.S./RVN/PAK FORCES. THESE AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES WILL NOT BE APPLIED TO ANY VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION IN OR OUT OF LAOS.

G. NOTHING HEREIN WILL BE CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT COMBATANTS FROM DEFENDING THEIR UNITS AGAINST ARMED ATTACK. COMBATANTS ARE AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTERACTIONS AGAINST VC/LV. FORCE IS IN THE EXERCISE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND TO DEFEND THEIR UNITS AGAINST ARMED ATTACK WITH ALL MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

//SECRET/NOFORN//

H. REPORT ALL ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THIS AUTHORITY CONCERNING INCIDENTS INVOLVING INFANTRY ELEMENTS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS. REPORTS WILL BE MADE ORALLY AND CONFIRMED BY FLASH MSG VIA COG CIRCUITS.

12. (S) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL INITIATIONS (ICI)

A. GENERAL

(1) ICI MAY BE EXPENDED IN TRAINING TACTICAL UNITS. SUCH TRAINING MAY INCLUDE FAMILIARIZATION OF GUN FIRES, FO'S AND AO'S.

(2) THE AREAS IN WHICH ICI MAY BE EMPLOYED SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ARE:

(A) LAOS

(B) SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS ANYWHERE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

(3) ICI WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED IN NORTH VIETNAM OR THE DMZ, EXCEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ROE PRESCRIBED IN PARAS 8 AND 9, ABOVE.

(4) ICI WILL NOT BE USED FOR HARRASSING AND INTERDICTION FIRES.

(5) NO LIMITATIONS ARE PLACED ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ICI HAND GRENADES AND 40MM CARTRIDGE IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM, SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

(6) THE USE OF AIR DELIVERED ICI WILL BE UNDER CONTROL OF A FAC OR FAC(A).

(7) TROOPS MUST BE ALERTED TO THE EXTREME DANGER OF ANY DUDS WHICH MAY BE ENCOUNTERED WHEN MOVING INTO AN AREA IN WHICH ICI MAY HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED.

B. AUTHORITY TO EXPEND ICI IS EXTENDED TO SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING BATTALION COMMANDERS.

13. (S) THIS MSG WILL BE MADE A PART OF THE COMMANDER'S COMPLETENESS FILE.

GP-4

DE

REL BY Martin J. Seltzer

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

SECRET/NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

***** ZZ UUMSQ UUMS UUMSQD UUMSEMA

DE UUMSK 4046 450335

DMY 58355

1 060106Z MAY 68

FM XXIV CORPS TOC PNB

TO UUMSQ/III MAF COC DMG

INFO UUMS/MACV CMD CTR SGN

UUMSQD/3RD MAP DIV/DCH

UUMSEMA/SA 1ST ARVN DIV HUE

BT

SECRET

REF: SPECIAL DMZ OPNS REPOB (S)

REF: MACV MSG DTG 04058Z DEC 67 (IS)

1. (U) SUBM IA REF.

2. (S) SANFORIZE ENTERED DMZ AT 50724H

3. (S) SOUTHERN ENTERED DMZ AT 50715H

4. (S) HUNGARIAN ENTERED DMZ AT 50711H

5. (S) CHESTER BROOK ENTERED DMZ AT 50718H

6. (S) PENGUIN ENTERED DMZ AT 50735H.

BT

BT

0046

251

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/CED/lrb

SEC COG PHONE 3180

CWO *Shan*

PRIORITY 260618 Z MAY 69

COPY TO: C/S

COC

G-3

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
INFO: CG III MAF DHC
CG XXIV CORPS PHB
FOURTH MARINES

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF OPCON

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 261400H MAY69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMES OPCON OF 3/4 (-) WITH L/3/4 AND M/3/4 FROM 1ST BDE, 5TH MECH AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSES OPCON TO CG TASK FORCE HOTEL.

GP-4

CCN 3828 RELEASED BY Morgan L. West DATE/TIME 261405 HMAY69

coc

3 Shan

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

WHVQXDXDXDXZZ UUMSK
DE UUMSOD 1133 1450740
ZNY SSSSS

Z 261747Z MAY 69
FM TH1 0 MA DIV (EIV) CGC DGH
TO UUMSK/XXIV CC PS TCC PHB
INFO TASK FC CE HOTEL COC
TWELFTH MA INES COC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ CPNS REIO RT

JCM 3 D MA DIV

3/3

SANFO IZE AT 262715H YD 991661 SHMDZ
FOUND 3 32 MM NT. BOUNDS GRAY W/ ED ST. IPE
1965 CHINESE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN
IN LOCATION 1 MONTH. BURIED BOUNDS IN
BUSHES AND CONT MISSION

2. IN CHESTE, B

CK JMYPCP

XD 963666 SHDMZ FOUND SINGS (FOOT PRINTS
AND FOOD W APPEARS 15 TO 20 EN STOPPED
LAST NIGHT. THIS MORNING FIRST AID
PACKETS INDICATED WOUNDED O. TREATED. BLOOD
TAILS

EED N SEARCHED AREA NEG RESULTS

PAGE TWO UUMSUD JUOEI S E C R E T

A
SC FOUND 1 CHI COM (ENADE OLD TYPE
GOOD CONDITION)

CHESTE B CCK 260945H F. YD 963667

EN 556674 SHDMZ SPOTTED EN MOV S

MOVING TO SET UP AMBUSH WILL COVER
AVE OF ESCAPE WITH A TY.

GP-4

BT

1133

253

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTED BY: WMB/RMR
 GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
 CWO *[Signature]*

IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY 260820 Z MAY 69

COPY TO: G-2

G-3

TIO

TSS

COC

GSV X 2 copies

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO: CG TF HOTEL
 INFO: THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
 FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN, TWELFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN, TWELFTH MARINES
 FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MARINES
 FIFTH ONE SEVEN FIVE GUN BTRY
 FIFTH BN, FOURTH ARMY

SECRET

SENIOR ACTIVITY BULLETIN/PERIOD ENDING 2400 26 MAY 69 (U)

A. BY 211244Z MAY 69

1. (S) ADD FOL NEW STRING TO REF A:

| STRING | CH/TC | KILL ZONES | TGT NO | READOUT SITE | TERRAIN |
|--------|----------------|--------------------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|
| 505 | 33/09,11-21,12 | YD07756851
YD07356825 | SD0505
SIL505 | DN MTN | LOW
SHRUBBERY |

GP-4

CCN 3868 RELEASED BY W. H. Bahman TIME 1605 H MAY 69

GSV

2/3/TIO/TSS/CIC/COC 0km

26

08

20

SECRET

SECRET

VANWEC
 *****Z URSK
 DE JUMSD 1165 1451143
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 231540Z MAY 69
 FM THE DMA DIV (EIN) COCDGH
 TO URSK/ XXIV CO PS TOC PHB
 INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
 TWELFTH MA INES COC

BT
 S E C R E T
 SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
 1. 3D MA DIV
 A. 3D ECON BN
 (1) TMS TO REMAIN IN DMZ OVE NIGHT
 A. CDD COLONEL NIGHT POS 295712
 E. AP EL SHOWERS NIGHT POS 137742
 C. TDA MAE NIGHT POS 924677
 (2) TMS TO ENTER DMZ 27 MAY 69
 A. DALLAS 91 L KZ UL 2372 L 2563
 E. JOHN B OWN ZUL 2166 LA 2364
 B. 173
 (1) TMS TO ENTER DMZ 272600H MAY 69
 A. FULF MAID Z UL 2772 LA 2971
 E. ISTHMS Z UL 2572 LA 2772
 C. INHAT Z UL 2371 LA 2578
 (2) TMS TO EXIT DMZ
 A. MASTY PUDDING 261413H YD265699
 TM OPS 12 EN CARRYING PACK NEG WPSN
 THE ENM EAS WEST ALONG A WELL USED T
 TM ESTABLISHED AMBUSH. BUT WAS EXECUTED PREMATURELY.
 EN CAUS EN FLED EAST A T MSN EQ RESULT UNK.

PAGE TWO UMSOD 1165 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 EXITED DMZ 261630H

(C) TM PINGUIN EXITED DMZ 261630H
 C. 8/3

(C) TM HUNGA IAN 261630H XD999605
 FWD 15 MAN CAMP SITE TM WILL REMAIN
 OVE NIGHT IN DMZ AT XD023661

(2) TM SANTO IZED NIGHT POS XD 892869
 (3) TSCUTHE N NIGHT POS. XDXD 977672
 (4) TM CHESTER S COK 261600H TM

TM NEG TCL BAK COMPLEX AT XD967 657 END THE
 FOLLOWING: 3 CHI CGM GAENADES 2 AK-47 MAGS 2 LETTERS BELONGING
 TO AN WVA SOLDIER. 1 HELMET TM WILL REMAIN OVE NITE IN DMZ
 AT XD 9677668

BT
 S E C R E T

254

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPTER 32/TH/MAF
SEC DIV INSP PH 3132
CWO *ohm*

IMMEDIATE 270125 Z MAY 69

COPY TO:
OSJA THIRD MARDIV CTR

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
TO: CG XXIV CORPS HIB
INFO: CG III MAF

SIC SET

- A. CG XXIV CORPS MSG 031715Z NOV 68
B. CG III MAF MSG 040910Z NOV 68

ATTACK AGAINST POPULATION CENTER

1. PURSUANT TO REFERENCE (A) & (B) THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED.

- A. FIRST RND YD 341526 NEAR HAI LINH DI
SECOND AND THIRD RND YD 350533 NEAR TRI ~~TH~~ *cau*
- B. 260110H MAY 69
- C. UNKNOWN
- D. ~~THREE~~ *3 rds* OF 120MM ROCKETS
- E. UNKNOWN - PROBABLY K-32, 1ST OF THE 84TH ARTY IN NVA
- F. HARASSING
- G. NO DAMAGE INFLECTED
- H. NO COUNTER BATTERY ACTION TAKEN DUE TO THE SHORT DURATION OF ATTACK
- I. NONE
- J. COLONEL F. B. MAYER, THIRD MARDIV INSPECTOR

GP-4

CCN

39716

REL BY

T. Maule

INSP

OSTA

ohm

27

01

25

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NOFORNDRAFTED BY OKM
GROUND SURVEILLANCE SECTION
CWO OKMIMMEDIATE/PRIORITY 270212 Z MAY 69 COPY TO: G-2

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV, DGH, RVN

TO: CG III MAF, DMG, RVN

INFO: COMUSMACV, SGN, RVN

CG XXIV CORPS, PHB, RVN

CG FORLOGEND, DMG, RVN

CG FIRST MAW, DMG, RVN

CG TF HOTEL, VCB, RVN

CMDR TF ALPHA, RTAFB, NKP, THAI

CMDR FIVE FIVE THREE RECON WING, RTAFB, KORAT, THAI

FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH), QT, RVN

THIRD MARINES, DGH, RVN

FOURTH MARINES, VCB, RVN

NINTH MARINES, VCB, RVN

CG FMFPAC, CAMP SMITH, HAWAII

G-3
FSC
RECON REP
CIC
TIO
TSS2415
(0003)**SECRET/NOFORN**

DUFFEL BAG/DUEL BLADE OPREP-5 SER NO 021/20-26 MAY 1969 (U)

A. MACV DIR 525-27

SECTION I. FOL DUFFEL BAG REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: DURING THE PAST WEEK (20-26 MAY), SENSOR STRING 313 WAS EMPLACED ON ONE OF THE APPROACHES FROM BASE AREA 101 IN SUPPORT

OF THE DIVISION'S RICE DENIAL PLAN. THE THREE ANCHORBUOYS WHICH WERE SEEDED ON LZ ENTERPRIZE (XD005302) IN SUPPORT OF THE DIVISION'S

DECEPTION PLAN (OPREP 020), WERE READOUT BY A MOBILE MONITOR TEAM LOCATED AT LZ CATES. SENSOR DETECTION OF EARLY MOVEMENT IN THE BALONG

VALLEY AND ALONG RTE 926 CONTINUES WITH THE SENSORS IN THE LATTER CASE BEING READOUT BY THE BATCAT AIRCRAFT.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: IN THE DUFFEL BAG AREA FIFTY SEVEN TARGETS WERE DETECTED, THIRTY OF WHICH WERE CLEARED FOR FIRE, AND 296

ROUNDS MIXED 175/155MM FIRED IN RESPONSE. TWENTY THREE OF THE TARGETS CLEARED FOR FIRE WERE DETECTED BY STRING 153 ALONG RTE 926, ONE

TARGET BY STRING 310 AND THE REMAINING TARGETS IN THE BALONG VALLEY. THE RECONNAISSANCE TEAM CORPORAL PETE WAS SENT TO INVESTIGATE THE

HEAVY MOVEMENT DETECTED BY STRING 153 AND INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE RTE 926 IS HEAVILY MARKED BY HUMAN FOOTPRINTS MOVING IN BOTH

DIRECTIONS; HOWEVER NO VEHICLE TRACKS WERE NOTED. BDA FROM ARTILLERY

(234)

27 02 1 2/3/155/175/155 OKM
SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

STRIKES ON STRING 153 WERE NOT YET BEEN REPORTED. STRING 601, WHILE BEING DOWNED ON MAY 21, DETECTED V. ETHA. USE VOICE S ON LZ INTERPRESE.

ARTILLERY FIRE AS PLACED ON THE LZ, HOWEVER ONLY THE ARTILLERY ROUNDS WERE HEARD IMPACTED. AN AO OVERFLYING THE AREA AFTER THE ARTILLERY

HAD CEASED FIRE, COULD NOT OBSERVE ANY ENEMY KIA'S. VOICES HAV NOT BEEN HEARD ON LZ INTERPRESE SINCE 21 MAY.

A. TRENDS/PATTERN: NONE DETECTED

B. INTENDING ON OPS: NONE

C. APPLICATION AND TECH IQS: THE UTILIZATION OF SENSORS AS A PORTION OF THE DIVISION'S DECEPTION PLAN PROVED SUCCESSFUL EVEN

THOUGH ENEMY DEAD WERE NOT OBSERVED IN THE TARGET AREA. FUTURE PLANS OF THIS NATURE WILL INCORPORATE THE USE OF SENSORS.

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS: NONE

3. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: 15

4. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE SENSORS: 33 HANDSIDS, 6 BIDS, 13 LAGDS, 3 ACQU-BUGYS, 3 FIRDS.

5. (S) NEGATIVE XI-63 FORIES TO DATE.

SECTION II. FOL DULL BLADE REPORT IS SUBMITTED:

1. (S) OVERVIEW: SENSOR STRINGS 107 AND 108 WERE HAND EMPLOYED BY THE 2ND ARVN REGIMENT AND STRING 505 WAS EMPLOYED BY THE 1ST ARVN SUR-

VEILLANCE SECTION TEAM IN THE VIRGINIA RIDGE AO. IN ADDITION ADDID STRINGS 31042, 31191, 31131, AND 31061 WERE EMPLOYED BY THE FORC.

ALPHA IN THE DMZ AND ACQUBUGY STRING 63135 SITED JUST BELOW THE DMZ. SURVEILLANCE TEAM ECHO, CONSISTING OF SEVEN FIVE S. OF THE P-51S,

TWO NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICES, AND TWO S. OF THE P-51S, WERE PLACED TO VANDERBILT COUNTY WASH. ON 22 MAY 1969.

2. (S) MISSION SUMMARY: IN THE DMZ AREA SENSORS CONTINUED TO DETECT ENEMY MOVEMENT AND 10 TARGETS WERE DETECTED WITH 110 105/155mm ARTILLERY

ROUNDS FIRED IN RESPONSE WITH UNOBSERVED RESULTS OTHER THAN THE TARGET CEASING. IN THE DULL BLADE AREA BELOW THE DMZ, 33 TARGETS WERE DETECTED

AND 216 ROUNDS FIRED 105/155/175mm ARTILLERY FIRED IN RESPONSE WITH UNOBSERVED RESULTS OTHER THAN MOVEMENT CHANGED. ACCORD TO CALCON-

KEEPER, WHILE PAROLEE IN THE DMZ, SITED BY STRING 204 FOUND ENEMY BUNKERS, THREE OF THEM NEW. EACH BUNKER HAD ENDS AND ON OPS. FURTHER,

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

THE RECON TEAM BLUEPLATE, OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF STRING 63141, WHICH HAS SHOWN CONSISTANT MEDIUM MOVEMENT DURING THE PAST WEEK,

OBSERVED TWELVE VC/NVA DRESSED IN GREEN CAMOUFLAGED UTILITIES AND A AA GUN NEAR THE TROOPS. THE TEAM TOOK NEGATIVE ACTION AND WAS

EXTRACTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. DURING THE FIRST PART OF THE WEEK, SURVEILLANCE TEAM WAS ACTIVE WITH ALPHA TEAM DETECTING SEVEN

TARGETS WITH 50 ROUNDS FIRED IN RESPONSE, BDA UNKNOWN, AND BRAVO, CHARLIE, AND DELTA TEAMS EACH DETECTING ONE TARGET WITH 32

ROUNDS FIRED IN RESPONSE, BDA UNKNOWN. DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE WEEK, TWO TARGETS WERE DETECTED BY CHARLIE AND DELTA TEAMS

RESPECTIVELY, HOWEVER CLEARANCE TO FIRE WAS NOT GRANTED DUE TO THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF FRIENDLY TROOPS.

A. TRENDS/PATTERNS: THE LACK OF TARGETS BEING DETECTED BY THE SURVEILLANCE TEAM INDICATES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY KNOWS

WE HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO SEE HIM AT NIGHT, THEREFORE HE MAY BE WATCHING TO SEE IF WE RELAXED OUR SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS, IN WHICH CASE

OUR FORWARDED BASES WOULD BE MORE VULNERABLE TO AN ENEMY ATTACK.

C. APPLICATION AND TECHNIQUES: THE XM-63 IS PRESENTLY BEING EMPLOYED IN THE DEFENSE OF THE KHE GIO BRIDGE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE

AN/PSR-1. IF A TARGET IS DETECTED, CLAYMORE MINES WILL BE DETONATED AT THE LOCATION OF THE DETECTION.

D. SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS: NONE

3. (S) TOTAL ACTIVE STRINGS: 37

4. (S) 41 HANDSIDS, 3 GSIDS, 15 MAGIDS, 23 ACOUBUOYS, AND 60 ABSIDS.

5. (S) ACTIVE TFA CH 23 TONE CODES: 01, 03, 07, 08, 09, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29; ACTIVE THIRD

HARDIV CH 23 TONE CODES: 06 AND 11

GP-4

CCN

3972

RELEASED BY

W. H. Bahmmia

TIME 271000

8 MAY 69

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET

DE UJMSQD 1188 1470545
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 270545Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL
 TWELFTH MARINES COC

SECRET

SBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3RD MAR DIV 1/3

A. TMS ENTER DMZ 270700H

1. 1STHMUS RZ UL 0670 LR 0868

2. RINGLET RZ UL 0469 LR 0667

B TM TO ENTER DMZ 28 MAY 69

1. HASTY PUDDING RZ UL 0670 LR 0868

2. 3RD RECON

A PREPOSED RELOCATION OF TM JOHN BROWN

RZ UL 0657 LR 0465

CP-4

BT

118

255

SECRET

SECRETDRAFTER 14/JGM/rjcSEC AIR 3D MARDIV 3214CWO shFLASH 270744Z MAY69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV DGH
 FO: CG FIRST MARINE AIR WING DNG

SUBJ: THIRD MARDIV HELO FRAGS FOR 28MAY69

//SECRET//

| | | | | | |
|----------|----------|---------|--------|-------|----------|
| UH-1E(G) | UH-1E(S) | CH-46D | CH-46A | CH-53 | OV-10/01 |
| 507/203 | 101 | 505 | 502 | 303 | 508/203 |
| 402/401 | 102 | 501/503 | 105 | | 505/509 |
| 510 | 111 | 402/401 | 104 | | |
| | | 301/302 | 103 | | |
| | | | 106 | | |
| | | | 107 | | |

1. MSN 101 STD FRAG
1. MSN 102 STD FRAG
1. MSN 103 STD FRAG
1. MSN 104 STD FRAG
1. MSN 105 STD FRAG
1. MSN 106 STD FRAG
1. MSN 107 STD FRAG
1. MSN 111 STD FRAG
1. MSN 203 STD FRAG
2. 2 UH-1E(G), 1 OV-10
4. RECON I/E, VIS RECON
6.
 - A. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 803443 37.3 8PAX
 - B. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 775612 37.3 6PAX
 - C. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 028653 37.3 6PAX
 - D. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 039692 37.3 6PAX
 - E. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 747465 37.3 6PAX
 - F. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 114304 37.3 6PAX
 - G. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 057416 37.3 7PAX
 - H. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 695490 37.3 7PAX
 - I. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 923512 37.3 6PAX
 - J. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 771528 37.3 6PAX
 - K. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 901235 37.3 6PAX
 - L. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 702567 37.3 6PAX
 - M. PU A-4 0715 DZ 085745 37.3 8PAX
 - N. PU A-4 0715 DZ 115745 37.3 8PAX
 - O. PU A-4 0715 DZ 077711 37.3 6PAX
 - P. PU 857493 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 6PAX
 - Q. PU 857232 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 6PAX
 - R. PU 094335 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 7PAX
 - S. PU 924531 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 7PAX
 - T. PU 959327 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 7PAX
 - U. PU 773547 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 8PAX

SECRET

SECRET

- 7. A THRU O DZ NOT SECURE, P THRU U PU ZONES NOT SECURE
- 8. P THRU U RADIO, PANEL
- 1. MSN 301 STD FRAG
- 2. 6 CH-46'S
- 4. TRPS, LOGISTICS
- 6. A. PU QT LSA ICEBOAT "A" 48.0 0700 DZ VCB LSA ICEBOAT "B"
48.0 2000LBS MAIL/2PAX
- B. PU QT/VCB LSA CONT DZ TBA RESUPPLY
- 7. ALL ZONES SECURE
- 1. MSN 302 STD FRAG
- 2. 2 CH-46'S
- 4. TRPS, LOGISTICS 47.8
- 6. A. PU LZ NANCY STUDY 93 1430 DZ 367367 BICFP 5 33.3 8000LBS
6PAX
- 7. ALL ZONES SECURE
- 1. MSN 303 STD FRAG
- 2. 10 CH-53'S
- 1. MSN 401 STD FRAG (INCOMPLETE)
- 1. MSN 402 STD FRAG
- 2. 6 CH-46'S, 2 UH-1E(G)
- 4. TRPS
- 6. A. PU DH LSA 0845, 0900(L HOUR) MALONE BYWORD "D" 43.4
DZ (P) 077467 (A) 067482 480PAX
- 7. DZ NOT SECURE
- 10. USE 401 A/C
- 1. MSN 501 STD FRAG
- ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
- 1. MSN 502 STD FRAG
- 1. MSN 503 STD FRAG
- 1. MSN 505 STD FRAG
- 1. MSN 506 STD FRAG
- 1. MSN 507 STD FRAG
- 1. MSN 508 STD FRAG
- 6. 0615-2000
- 1. MSN 509 STD FRAG
- 1. MSN 510 STD FRAG
- 6. A. 1730-2000

GP-4

CCN

1029 RFL BK *[Signature]*

Airo

*[Signature]***SECRET**

SECRETDTG P 270500ZS-2 SECTION
27 MAY 1969
CPL R.D. LACKIE
PAGE 1 OF 2FROM: 3D MAR
TO: 3D RECON BN
INFO: CG 3D MAR DIVBT
SECRETG-3
HIST

RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS FOR PERIOD 1-7 MAY 1969, REQUEST FOR

1. REQUEST THE FOLLOWING RECON TEAMS BE INSERTED:

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>RECON ZONE</u> | <u>MISSION</u> |
|-------------|-------------------|--|
| 1-5 MAY | XD 9662-9861 | OP FOR EN ACTY TO THE SW, S, & SE. BE ESPECIALLY WATCHFUL AT NIGHT FOR EN MOVEMENT. ALSO REPORT ANY WATER SOURCES FND. |
| 1-5 MAY | YD 0660-0859 | OP FOR EN ACTY TO THE NW, N, & NE. THE REST SAME AS ABOVE. WALK IN FM RTE AREA. |
| 1-5 MAY | YD 0070-0266 | RECON FOR EN ACTY. WATCH FOR INFILTRATION ACTY THROUGH AREA AND DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT. WALK IN. M/3/3 PATROL WILL ESCORT TM TO DMZ. MAKE RZ SMALLER AS TM MOVES NORTH. |

GP-4
BTRELEASED BY: Michael W. Shepard

CCN 3998

235

3/CSU OKM

27

05

00

SECRET

SECRET

V
 *****ZZ UUMSK
 DE JUMSQD 1192 1471000
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 271000Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
 TWELFTH MARINES COC

SECRET
 GJBJ: SPEC DMZ OPN REPORT
 1. 3 RD MARDIV 1/3
 ATMS TO ENTER 270700H
 ISTHMUS UL 0670 LR 0868
 RINGLET UL 0469 LR 0667
 BTM CHESUTER BROOK EXITED DMZ 271520H
 P-4
 1192

256

SECRET

SECRET

OO UUMSK UUMSQ
 DE UUMSQD 1466 1461400
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 271400Z MAY 69
 FM THIRD MA DIV COC
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
 UUMSQ/III MAF COC
 INFO THIRD MA LINES
 FOURTH MA LINES
 NINTH MA LINES
 TASK FORCE HOTEL
 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)
 BT

S E C 2.1
 I. SUBJECT: 3D RECON BN SIT EP FOR PERIOD OF 260000H TO
 262400H MAY 69.
 II. INSERTS AND EXT ACTS
 A. INSERTS COMPLETE
 PATROL DIG COOR
 1. 2B3 261415H XD 887623
 B. EXT ACTS COMPLETE
 PATROL DTG COOR
 1. 2B2 261930H YD 103087
 C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1466 E C E I
 PATROL REASON

1. 303-7762 THE 20H1-E WERE HIT WITH SAF ON
 INSERT OF IM(3A3) FLX HUNTER
 CAUSING 20H1-E TO SHUT DOWN

D. EXT ACTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON
 NONE

E. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 25 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION
 1. 1A2 XD 8638
 2. 1A3 XD 8045
 3. 2B1 YD 1032
 4. 303 XD 7762

F. EXT ACTS PLANNED FOR 27 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION
 1. 1E1 XD 9155
 2. 3A2 XD 7659
 3. 2A3 XD 9435

III. LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AS OF 262400H MAY 69
 PATROL LOCATION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSRD 1166 S E C R E T

| | | |
|-----------------|-----------|------------|
| 1. IH1 SCUBA TM | 3 | YD 330520 |
| 2. IE3 R/OP | 8 | YD 978559 |
| 3. 2C2 R/OP | 7 | YD 097379 |
| 4. 2C1 R/OP | 7 | YD 097379 |
| 5. IC2 R/OP | 7 | YD 097379 |
| 6. IH9 R/OP | 4 | YD 145185 |
| 7. IH10 R/OP | 4 | YD 002483 |
| 8. IH12 | 4 | YD 115703 |
| 9. ID2 | 6 UL 3464 | YD 344694 |
| 10. 2D1 | 6 UL 2868 | YD 286689 |
| 11. 2D2 | 6 UL 3073 | YD 307736 |
| 12. 3D3 | 6 UL 2865 | YD 286657 |
| 13. 1A1 | 7 | XD 779569 |
| 14. 1A2 | 6 | XD 962484 |
| 15. 1E1 | 7 | XD 924534 |
| 16. 2A3 | 7 | XD 938327 |
| 17. 2E1 | 6 | 7/5 857232 |
| 18. 3A2 | 8 | XD 773539 |
| 19. 2A2 | 7 | YD 094335 |
| 20. 2B3 | 6 | XD 878622 |

PAGE FOUR 1166 S E C R E T

| | | |
|---------|---|-----------|
| 21. IB3 | 6 | XD 964469 |
| 22. 3C2 | 8 | XD 788640 |
| 23. IC1 | 8 | XD 994577 |
| 24. 3D2 | 6 | XD 859493 |

IV. SIGHTING AND CONTACTS

A. AT 260815H XD 771539 (3A2) FROST BURG OBSERVED 5 EN WEARING GREEN UTILITIES AND BUSH HATS, PACKS, CARRYING AK-47'S AND ONE UNK SIZE MD TIA. TUE1 PLUS A LIGHT MACHINE GUN. TM CALLED ARTY MISSION RESULTING IN TWO EN KIA, TM CONT MISSION.

B. AT 260945H XD 855239 (2E1) CP. PETE FOUND A SANDY SURFACE ROAD 10 FT TO 12 FT WIDE. TM ALSO FOUND HUMAN FOOT PRINTS GOING ALONG ROAD. TM ALSO FOUND A LOG BRIDGE AT XD 859237 COULD BE USED BY T. UCK1. NEG ACTION TO DESTROY, TM CONT MISSION.

C. AT 261545H XD 754367 (3A3) ELK HUNTER WAS FLYING OVER THEIR LZ WHEN THE HELO GUNNER OBSERVED 1 EN WEARING BLACK PJ'S. THE EN WAS WATCHING THE HELO. GUNSHIPS MADE STRIKES ON LZ. AT 1630H 2 EN (AN FROM LZ, THEY WORE CAMOUFLAGED UTILITIES, BUSH HATS, PACKS. 1 EN HAD AN AK-47 THE OTHER

PAGE FIVE 1166 S E C R E T

HAD UNK TYPE RIFLE. TM INITIATED SAF RESULTING IN 2 EN KIA, F/W STRIKES WERE RUN. AO AND GUNSHIPS TOOK HEAVY SAF. THE AO OBSERVED 4 EN KIA. MISSION ABORTED.

GP-4

BT

1166

SECRET

SECRET

.....ZZ UNCL.

DE JMSRD 11N 141345

ZNY CCCCC

Z 271545Z MAY 69

FM CG TMLA D 407000Z

TO JUMSR/CG TMLA D 407000Z

SI

ON KS E 3000

SJBJS: SPEC D-4 THIS PRESENT

1. 3D MARDIV

A. 3D RECON BN

(1) TNS TO RECON BN 3A DMT 200000Z

(A) IDA HAZ RI WET POS 01 000600

(3) APRIL PRESENT NIGHT POS YD 100100

(C) OLD COLORED NIGHT POS 01 091711

(2) TNS TO ENTER DMZ 01 MAY 69

(A) JOGV BROWN RE 01 0007 LR 0405

(A) DALLAS 0101 01 01 0007 LR 0505

(7) LUCKY PUNCH 01 01 0007 LR 0513

(0) L DIXIE 0101 01 01 0007 LR 1013

(A) DRIVING DIST 01 01 0007 LR 04 0273

1. 1ST BN 300000Z

(1) TNS RECON BN IN DMZ 010100Z

(A) ISTHUS NIGHT POS 010100Z

PAGE TWO 000000Z 11N 141345

(C) RINGLET 0101 01 01 0007

(C) BOON TMLA 01 01 0007 100100Z 28 MAY 69

G 3D BY 30 010100Z

(1) THE FOLLOWING TNS 01 01 0007 27 MAY 69

(A) HUNGARIAN 010100Z 27 69

(3) SOUTHERN 010100Z 27 69

(C) SANFORD 010100Z 27 69

(0) CHESTER 010100Z 27 69

P-4

E

1109

258

SECRET

SECRET

77.1
 \$3 77.15 1215 1471845
 ZNY SS665
 0 2718/5Z MAY 69
 M THIRD MARDIV CCC
 T UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC
 UUMC III MAF COC
 INFO 1ST MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TASK FORCE MTEL
 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH)
 BT

S E C R E T

I. SUBJ: 3D RECON BN PREP FOR PERIOD OF 27000H TO 272400H
 MAY 69.

II. INSERTS & EXTRACTS

A. INSERTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COOR

NONE

B. EXTRACTS COMPLETE

PATROL DTG COOR

1. 3C2 271700H XD788640

C. INSERTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

Q1. 1A2-8638 A/C ON WEATHER HOLD ALL DAY.

2. 1A3-8045 ASAME

PAGE TWO UUMSQD 1215 S E C R E T

3. 2B1-1032 SAME

4. 3C3-7762 SAME

D. EXTRACTS NOT COMPLETE

PATROL REASON

1. 1E1-9155 SAME ASSEC C

2. 3A2-7655 "

3. 2A2-9435 "

E. INSERTS PLANNED FOR 28 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1. 1B1 XD9024

2. 1A3 XD8045

3. 1A2 XD8638

4. 3A3 XD6851

5. 3D1 XD7456

6. 1E2 XD0442

7. 2B1 YD1032

F. EXTRACTS PLANNED FOR 28 MAY 69

PATROL LOCATION

1. 1E1 XD9155

2. 2A3 XD9435

3. 2E1 XD8434

4. 3A2 XD7655

5. 2A2 XD0334

(259)

6

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE UUMSGD 1215 S E C R E T
 LOCATION OF OPERATING PATROLS AS OF
 272400H MAY 69

| PATROL | | MEN | LOCATION |
|--------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1. | | | |
| 1.1H1 | SCUBA TM | 3 | YD330520 |
| 2.1E3 | RR/OP | 8 | XD978559 |
| 3.2C2 | " | 7 | YD097379 |
| 4.2C1 | " | 7 | " |
| 5.1C2 | " | 7 | " |
| 6.1H9 | " | 4 | YD145185 |
| U.1H10 | " | 4 | YD002483 |
| L0 | | | |
| 8.1H12 | " | 4 | YD115705 |
| 9.0102 | | 6 UL 2863 | YD285658 |
| 10.2D1 | | 6 UL 2662 | YD262626 |
| 11.2D2 | | 6 UL 3469 | YD349694 |
| 12.3D3 | | 6 UL 2764 | YD274647 |
| 13.1A1 | | 7 | XD880629 |
| 14.3E2 | | 6 | XD9694821 |
| 15.1E1 | | 7 | XD923533 |
| 16.2A3 | | 7 | XD958327 |

PAGE FOUR UUMSGD 1215 S E C R E T

| | | |
|--------|---|-----------|
| 17.2E1 | 6 | XD8523227 |
| 18.3A2 | 8 | XD768538 |
| 19.2A2 | 7 | XD965490 |
| 20.2B3 | 6 | XD878622 |
| 21.1B3 | 6 | XD965490 |
| 22.1C1 | 6 | XD995572 |
| 23.3D2 | 6 | XD856493 |

SIGHTINGS AND CONTACTS

A. AT 271000H XD874624 (2B3) EARLY FLOWER HEARD POSS COND-
 STRUCTURE BEING DONE IN THE VALLEY. ESTIMATED TO BE A
 SQUAD. TM CALLED AN ARTY MSN WITH UNK RESULTS:

TM WIL CHECK OUT AREA

B. AT 271600H XD768628 (3C2) SKY MERCHANT
 HEARD ENEMY BREAKING BRUSH TM THEN
 OBS 2 3. TM INITIALIZED SAF RESULTING
 IN AN EN KIA AS TM MOVED ON 3 EN RPN IN
 FRONT OF TM X TM INITIALIZED SAF RESULTING
 IN ONE EN KIA TM THEN MOVED TO LZ TXD797627
 AO ON STATION TOOK SAF FROM GRID XDB00631.

TM MOVED TO LZ. THE TRANS PORT HELO TOOK AX-47 FIRE.
 AO CONDUCTED AIR STRIKES RESULTING IN 2 EN KIA

TM WIA EXTRACTED AT 271700H A
 TOT WAS FIRED INTO AREA. TM SUFFERED

CP-4

BT

1215

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division, (Rein) FMF
PFO, San Francisco, 96602

3P/HLC/jjs
3010
28 May 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
To: CEO

Subj: Planning critique, Caddo Creek

Ref: (1) Your memo dtd 26 May 1969 (C)

Encl: (1) Schedule of Planning Events (C)

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following is submitted.

(1) Problems encountered in planning.

a. The basic problem encountered in planning for the operation was one of lack of experience. With one or two exceptions, this represented the first exposure to C&D operations for most of the personnel involved in the planning phase. The experience gained from Caddo Creek will enhance chances of success in any subsequent C&D operations.

b. Obtaining permission of higher authority to conduct a C&D operation within the time allowed proved to be a problem. The initial request was sent by message on the morning of 13 May 1969. The MACV request for additional information was not received until the evening of the 16th and the answering message was transmitted by 0030 on the morning of the 17th. Further details were requested by MACV on the 17th and the final conformation was received by phone at 2055 on the 17th. This resulted in the postponement of D-Day from the 17th of May until the 19th of May. Since manipulative communications of necessity had already begun when this postponement was effected, they had to be continued for two extra days prior to the start of the operation. It is entirely possible that this delay tended to dilute the effect of the operation. Based on this experience, in future operations we should be able to include all required details in the initial request.

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c. The completed order was satisfactory if not entirely perfect. All phases and aspects of the operation were adequately covered in the order with the exception of Ground Surveillance. The use of an annex entitled "Sequence of Events" proved a satisfactory method of insuring that all concerned were operating from a common reference with regard to the major events scheduled for the operation. In any future C&D operation, a Ground Surveillance Annex should be included to insure full exploitation of their capabilities of monitoring enemy reactions.

d. Adequate time for planning proved a problem and greater lead time should be allowed for the planning of any subsequent operation. This would allow for the assembling of a planning group and better organization of its efforts in the production of the final plan. This problem will be somewhat alleviated now that we have planned and executed one C&D operation. Further, any increase in planning time must be weighed against the inherent possibility of compromise if too much time were allowed.

e. The concept of using an existing battalion staff/communications group was entirely successful. By using not only the previously assigned call signs and frequencies but also the actual radio operators from the battalion a great deal of credence was given to the communications deception. It is recommended that for future operations that this be considered the primary source for personnel and equipment in communications deception.

F. R. KRAINCE

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SCHEDULE OF PLANNING EVENTS

12MAY69 - Formulated concept of operation.

13MAY69 - (1) Presented concept of operation to
Commanding General.

(2) Started formulating the Operation Order
at 1500

14MAY69 - (1) Draft of Operation Order completed at
0600 and staffing commenced with copy
forwarded to Chief of Staff for approval.

(2) 0900 briefing at Task Force Hotel.

15MAY69 - Final Operation Order completed.

16MAY69 - Published Operation Order 20-69 (CADD0 CREEK).

17MAY69 - Permission received to conduct operation.

18MAY69 - D-Day.

Enclosure (1)

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OO UUMSC UUMSCD UUMSJEA UUMSEMA UUMSC RUMSPP RUMPSAA
 DE "UMSK 5005 14800 E
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 280015Z MAY 69
 FM XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 TO UUMSC/III MAF COC DNG
 INFO UUMSCD/3D MAR DIV DSH
 UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEE
 UUMSEMA/9A, ST ARVN DIV HUE
 UUMSC/1ST MA DNG
 RUMLBPP TF CLEAR ATEP CVT
 RUMPSAA/CTG 70.8

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L AVII-CC

SUBJ: FORECAST OF FUTURE OPERATIONS (ID)

1. (C) FORECAST OF FUTURE OPERATIONS FOR WEEK 1-5 MAY 69.

A. FORCE MOVEMENTS: NONE

B. FORECAST OF MAJOR OPERATIONS PLANNED: CONTINUE CURRENT

OPERATIONS.

2. (U) GROUP-

BT

5005

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DRAFTER 3/CED/cgw
 SEC G-3 OPNS PHONE 3180
 CWO *okm*

PRIORITY 280428 Z MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 THIRD MARINES DGH
 INFO: CG III MAF DNG
 CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 NINTH MARINES VCB

COPY TO: C/S
 COC
 G-3

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF OPCON

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 271800H MAY 69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMES
 OPCON OF ONE PLT, K/3/9 FROM CG TASK FORCE HOTEL AND SIMULTANEOUSLY
 ASSUMES OPCON TO THIRD MARINES.

GP-4

REF 4087 RELEASED BY Morganwhite DATE/TIME 180715 H MAY 69

COC

3

okm

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

.....ZZ UUMSK
 DE UUMSQD 1226 1480215
 ZNY 39SSS
 Z 280215Z MAY
 FM THIRD MARDIV (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
 TWELFTH MARINES COC

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT

1. 3RD RECON BN

A. TM IAD MAE 271100H XD 924674. TM.
 WHILE IN DEFENSIVE POSIT. OBS 5 NVA
 APPROACHING TMS POSIT FROM SOUTH TM LET
 EN GET WITHIN CLOSE RANGE, INITIATED CONTACT
 W/SAF. RES: 2 NVA KIA. TM CONTINUES MSN
 2 3RD MARINES RECON

A. TM RINGLET 271920H YD047696 TM
 REC'D 5 RND5 INCOMING UNK CALIBER.
 CALLED ARTYMSV ON SUSPECT EN POSTI
 WILL CHECK AREA AT FIRST LIGHT. NEG CAS.
 B. TM RINGLET EXITED DMZ 280735H MAY 69.

GP-4

BT

1226

260

SECRET

SECRETIMMEDIATE DTG: 280406 Z MAY 69

FROM: THIRD MARINES
 TO: FIRST BN, THIRD MARINES
 SECOND BN, THIRD MARINES
 THIRD BN, THIRD MARINES

DTG 272150H
 MAY 69

INFO: FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES
 CO A, THIRD TANK BN
 CO B, THIRD ENGR BN
 3D MARDIV

SUBJ: FRAG ORDER 56-69

REF: (A) 3D MARINES OP ORDER 6-69
 (B) 3D MARINES OP ORDER 7-69
 (C) REVISED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR VIRGINIA
 RIDGE AO.
 (D) 3D MARINES FRAG ORDER 37-69

1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY. THE ENEMY HAS SHOWN A MARKED INCREASE IN GROUND ACTIVITY. MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS WILL REMAIN AT A HIGH LEVEL AND ENEMY INITIATED GROUND CONTACTS WILL POSSIBLY INCREASE. MOVEMENT SOUTH INTO 3D MARINES AO HAS BEEN NOTED THROUGH (B-3) INTELL REPORTS, TRAIL ACTIVITY, POW'S AND SIGHTINGS.

B. FRIENDLY.

- (1) B (-) 1/4 902609
- (2) A/1/4 911590
- (3) 1/3/9 ECB
- (4) AT 280900H MAY 69 THE 2D ARVN REGT COMMENCES

AN OPERATION WITH ONE BN LANDING AT LZ SUMMER VIC 078470. THIS BN WILL SWEEP TO THE NORTH GENERALLY ALONG THE HIGH GROUND TO THE EAST OF VCB. OPERATION IS EXPECTED TO LAST 07 DAYS.

(5) CO A, 3D TANKS REMAINS D/S 1/3 AT CON THIEN. TANK OPERATIONS LIMITED TO EXPLOITATION OF GROUND CONTACTS WHEREIN ARMOR WILL MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORCES

2. MISSION. REMAINS THE SAME AS IN REF (A). SPECIAL PINK PANTHER OPERATION (REF(3)) IS CANCELLED 281800H MAY 69.

3. EXECUTION. (OPERATIONS OVERLAY)A. CONCEPT.

(1) MANEUVER. 3D MARINES RETURNS TO DISPOSITION Delineated IN REF (C) WITH TWO BATTALIONS DEPLOYED IN A DEFENSIVE DISPOSITION ATTHWART MUTTER'S RIDGE AND ONE BATTALION IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND LOC'S. A ROTATION OF THE 2D BATTALIONS WILL OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A CONTINUAL ROTATION OF 2D BATTALION COMPANIES TO R.R. LOC'S WITH THE ABUTTING OF THE DZ TO RECREATE THE DEFENSIVE DISPOSITION Delineated IN REF (C).

SECRET

SECRET

(2) FIRES. THE RE-ESTABLISHED PATROL ZONE WILL ALLOW A MORE EFFECTIVE H & I PROGRAM WITHIN THE NORTHERN AO. HOWEVER, PRIORITY OF EFFORT SHOULD BE TO: OBSERVED MISSIONS ON KNOWN AND SUSPECTED TARGETS; UNOBSERVED MISSIONS, ON KNOWN AND SUSPECTED TARGETS; AND H & I'S.

B. 1ST BATTALION.

- (1) COMPLETE ALL PINK PANTHER ACTIVITY ON 28 MAY.
- (2) DEPLOY ONE COMPANY TO RELIEVE UNIT OF 2/3 AT C-2 AND C-3 BRIDGE BY 291200H.
- (3) BY 311200H HAVE ALL FORCES DEPLOYED GENERALLY EAST OF 08 N-S GRID LINE.
- (4) RELIEVE COMPANY OF 2/3 AT KHE GIO BRIDGE AND 2/3 CP AT CAM LO BY 011200H JUNE. ASSUME SECURITY MISSIONS FOR ALL FIXED POSITIONS (LESS FSB FULLER) AND ALL MAJOR LOC'S IN 3D MARINES AO. (SEE 2/3'S TASKS, REF (D)).

C. 2D BATTALION.

- (1) CONTINUE PRESENT OPERATIONS IN WESTERN AO.
- (2) BE PREPARED FOR RELIEF OF CO E BY ELEMENT OF 1/3 BY 291200H.
- (3) ON 29 MAY, COMMENCE COMPANY ROTATION TO R & R ON A FOUR DAY CYCLE: 1ST DAY TRAVEL; 2D & 3D DAYS R & R; 4TH DAY ROTATE/TRAVEL.
- (4) BE PREPARED FOR RELIEF OF CO F AND CP (AT CAM LO) BY 011200H JUNE, BY 1/3.

D. 3D BATTALION.

- (1) CONTINUE PRESENT MISSIONS.
- (2) COMPLETE ALL PINK PANTHER ACTIVITIES ON 28 MAY.

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) COMMANDERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING PRECEPTS AS BASIC TO THEIR FUTURE OPERATIONS NEAR THE DMZ.

(A) WITHOUT CONTACT, LARGE FORCES SHOULD NOT BE CONCENTRATED SO AS TO PROVIDE LUCRATIVE TARGETS WITHIN MORTAR RANGE OF THE DMZ.

(B) WITHIN MORTAR RANGE OF THE DMZ, MAXIMUM USE OF SMALL RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS AND AMBUSHES SHOULD BE MADE IN ORDER TO FIND THE ENEMY WHILE PRESENTING SMALLER TARGETS.

(C) FORCES COMMITTED IN REACTION TO PATROL CONTACTS SHOULD RELY ON MAXIMUM MANEUVER AND SHOCK ACTION IN ORDER TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK BY MORTARS FROM WITHIN THE DMZ.

NOTHING IN THIS GUIDANCE IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS A DECREASE IN TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE DMZ.

(2) ALL UNITS SUBMIT PLANS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS WITHIN 48 HOURS FROM TIME OF RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER.

4. ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS.

N/A.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

5. COMMAND & COMMUNICATIONS.

REGIMENTAL TAC #1 & TAC #2 WILL BOTH HAVE CYPHER CAPABILITY. PASS ALL ROUTINE TACTICAL TRAFFIC, PLUS SPOT & SITREPS OVER TAC #2, LEAVING TAC #1 FOR PRIORITY & HIGHER TACTICAL TRAFFIC.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

ANNEX: A. OPERATION OVERLAY

GP-1.

RELEASED BY Thomas C. Osher TIME: 2150H

CCN 4107

SECRET

SECRET

.....ZZ UUMSK
 DE UUMSQD 1232 1480435
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 280435Z MAS 69
 FM THIRD MARDIM (REIN) COC DGH
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS TOC PHB
 INFO CG TASK FORCE HOTEL COC
 TWELFTH MARINES COC
 H
 S E C R E T
 SIBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
 1. 3RD RECON BN
 A. TM OLD GOLDNEL EXITED DMZ 281105H MAY 69.
 3. TM DALLAS GIRL ENTERED DMZ
 281247H MAY 69.
 2. 3RD MARINES RECON
 A. TM ISTHMUS EXITED DMZ 281108H MAY 69.
 3-4
 H
 1232

261

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTER 14/JGM/rjc
 SEC AIR 3D MARDIV 3214
 CWO okm

FLASH 280756 2 MAY 69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV DGH
 TO: CG FIRST MARINE AIR WING DNG

SUBJ: THIRD MARDIV HFLO FRAGS FOR 29MAY69

//SECRET//

| | | | | | |
|----------|----------|---------|--------|-------|----------|
| UH-1E(G) | UH-1E(S) | CH-46D | CH-46A | CH-53 | OV-10/01 |
| 507/203 | 101 | 505 | 502 | 303 | 508/203 |
| 402/401 | 102 | 501/503 | 105 | | 505/509 |
| 510 | | 402/401 | 103 | | |
| | | 301 | 104 | | |
| | | | 106 | | |
| | | | 107 | | |

3
HB

1. MSN 101 STD FRAG
1. MSN 102 STD FRAG
2. 2 UH-1E(S)
4. VIP CODE 6
6. A. PU VCB (LZ ASTOR) VANDY DASC 338.9 0710 DZ TBA
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 103 STD FRAG
1. MSN 104 STD FRAG
1. MSN 105 STD FRAG
1. MSN 106 STD FRAG
1. MSN 107 STD FRAG
1. MSN 203 STD FRAG
2. 2 UH-1E(G), 1OV-10
4. RECON I/E, VIS RECON
6. A. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 803443 37.3 8PAX
- B. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 775612 37.3 6PAX
- C. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 057416 37.3 7PAX
- D. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 695490 37.3 7PAX
- E. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 771528 37.3 6PAX
- F. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 702567 37.3 6PAX
- G. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 228303 37.3 6PAX
- H. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 043298 37.3 6PAX
- I. PU 857493 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 6PAX
- J. PU 924581 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 7PAX
- K. PU 959327 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 7PAX
- L. PU 779689 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 7PAX
7. A THRU H DZ NOT SECURE, I THRU L PU ZONE NOT SECURE
8. I THRU L RAD, PANEL

238

28

Airo

07

SECRET
 okm

SECRET

1. MSN 301 STD FRAG
2. 6 CH-46'S
4. TRPS, LOGISTICS
6. A. PU QT LSA ICEBOAT "A" 48.0 0700 DZ VCB LSA ICEBOAT "B"
48.0 2000LBS/4PAX
- B. PU QT/VCB LSA CONT DZ TBA RESUPPLY
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 303 STD FRAG
2. 14 CH-53'S
1. MSN 401 STD FRAG (INCOMPLETE)
1. MSN 402 STD FRAG
2. 6 CH-46'S, 2 UH-1E(G)
4. TRPS
6. A. PU DH LSA 0845, 0900(L HOUR) MALONE BYWORD "B" 43.4
DZ (P) 077467 (A) 067482 480PAX
7. DZ NOT SECURE
10. USE 401 A/C
1. MSN 501 STD FRAG
1. MSN 502 STD FRAG
1. MSN 503 STD FRAG
1. MSN 505 STD FRAG
1. MSN 506 STD FRAG
1. MSN 507 STD FRAG
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1. MSN 508 STD FRAG
6. 0615-2000
1. MSN 509 STD FRAG
1. MSN 510 STD FRAG

GP-4

CON 4123 REL BY J. B. Miller**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

OO UUMSC UUMSEMA UUMSOD UUMSJEA UUMSQ PUMFSAA

DE UUMSK 5211 1480830

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FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB

TO UUMSQ/CG III MAF DNG

INFO UUMSEMA/SENIOR ADVISOR 1ST ARVN DIV HUE

UUMSOD/CG 3PD MAR DIV DGH

UUMSJEA/CG 21ST ABN DIV (AM) DTCC CEE

UUMSQ/CG 1ST MA TOC DNG

PUMFSAA/CG CTG 70.8

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJ: FORECAST OF OPERATIONS UPDATE FOR WEEK 5-31 MAY 69.

REF: (A) CG III MAF MSG DTG 60606Z JUN 68 (C)

(B) CG III MAF MSG DTG 09 02 JUL 68 (C)

(C) 3PD MAR DIV MSG DTG 0 80015Z MAY 69 (S)

1. (C) CONCUR IN EXECUTION OF OPERATION FORECAST IN REF C.

GP-2

BT

5211

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96370

AVDE-CG

29 May 1969

SUBJECT: History of the Battle of Thanh Phu, 11 - 12 March 1969

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. On 11-12 March 1969 the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, engaged the 261 B VC Main Force Battalion in the village of Thanh Phu in the vicinity of My Phuoc Tay at the edge of the Plain of Reeds in upper Dinh Tuong Province. Eight US companies made day and night helicopter assaults into the area to surround the enemy, and tactical air, artillery, and air cavalry were utilized to bring over-powering firepower into the enemy's position.
2. One month later the Headquarters Secretary of the 261 B Battalion was captured in an ARVN engagement. This young VC officer turned out to be an intelligent, well educated, hard core Viet Cong that had a complete grasp of the Battle of Thanh Phu. His interrogators believed that he wrote an account of the battle for the battalion commander, which was sent to the Headquarters, Dong Thap I Regiment, MR II. He admitted discussing the battle with all his unit officers. In addition it became apparent that the prisoner was very gifted in the art of expressing himself, and he was asked to write in his own words an account of the battle. This he did, and his account with clarifying sketch maps is attached. The account of the 9th Infantry Division participation is also described by Colonel Ira A. Hunt, Jr., Commanding Officer of the 1st Brigade. The parallelism between the two accounts is striking. As a result of the two accounts and previous experiences, Colonel Hunt has also delineated the lessons learned from the Battle of Thanh Phu.
3. Not only do these two accounts make absorbing reading, but it is believed that Free World Forces can learn much from the analysis of the Battle of Thanh Phu. The attached History of the Battle of Thanh Phu is therefore provided for your information.

1 Incl
The Battle of Thanh Phu,
11-12 March 1969

Harris W. Hollis
HARRIS W. HOLLIS
Major General, USA
Commanding

The protective marking
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
is cancelled upon removal of
Lessons Learned, pgs 25-30
of Incl 1.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE BATTLE OF THANH PHU


11 - 12 March 1969

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BATTLE OF THANH PHU

ORIENTATION MAP



THE BATTLE OF THANH PHU

On the morning of 11 March 1969 the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, of the 1st (Recondo) Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division was conducting "Jitterbug" operations in the vicinity of My Phuoc Tay, at the edge of the Plain of Reeds, in upper Dinh Tuong Province, trying to find and fix the enemy (See Orientation Map). By 1115 hours in the morning they had checked out all of their intelligence targets and had not established contact. However, the airborne personnel detector (People Sniffer) in the air cavalry troop command-and-control helicopter had obtained a significant reading along the Kinh Tong Doc Loc Canal and the battalion commander had decided to insert and check this out. Charlie Company was inserted at 1152 hours and about 1230 hours ran into a withering fusillade of enemy fire south of the canal about five kilometers west of the CIDG Camp at My Phuoc Tay. Thus started the Battle of Thanh Phu. Immediately, the pile-on commenced. Before the evening was over, eight US infantry companies had been inserted and tactical air, artillery and air cavalry had been brought to bear while Chinooks and Hueys had transported men and materiel.

It was later determined that an enemy battalion had been encircled and had been almost annihilated. This story has been carefully recounted by Prisoner of War Phan Xuan Quy, Headquarters Secretary (Battalion Adjutant) of the 261 B Main Force Battalion, Dong Thap I Regiment of Military Region II. The account of the 9th Division participation in the battle has also been described by Colonel Ira A. Hunt, Jr., Commanding Officer of the 1st Brigade. The parallelism between the two accounts is striking--time of insertions, weapons locations, bunkers, troop maneuvers--all relating very closely. The only major difference is in the box score. When the US statistics are compared to the VC claims, glaring inconsistencies are noted. These, too, tell a story: the conservatism of the US forces versus the exaggerations of the Communists. In the pages that follow, the prisoner of war's story, the 9th Infantry Division's depiction, and the lessons learned from the operation are provided. It is believed that the Free World Forces can learn much from the analysis of the Battle of Thanh Phu.

Box Score - Battle of Thanh Phu

| Combat Statistics | <u>Reported by US</u> | | <u>Reported by VC</u> | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------|-----------------------|-----|
| | US | VC | US | VC |
| Forces in Contact | 630 | 150-200 | 1500 | 298 |
| Helicopter Insertions | 101 | NA | 84 | NA |
| Killed in Action | 3 | 72 | 150 | 203 |
| Wounded in Action | 20 | -- | -- | -- |
| Weapons Lost | 0 | 7 | -- | Unk |
| Aircraft Lost | 1 | NA | 3 | NA |

An Account of
THE BATTLE OF THANH PHU

by

Phan Xuan Quy

Headquarters Secretary, 261 B Viet Cong Battalion

The 261st B Battalion with four companies and a headquarters section totaling 268 men arrived to Thanh Phu (V) at 0200 hours on the morning of 11 March 1969 after many hours of traveling from Hau My (V). The time for travel varies depending upon the situation and whether or not bunkers are available at the new site. This day we started at 1700 hours. On arrival the battalion was joined by 30 guerrillas of Thanh Phu (V) and though very tired and hungry, immediately started building bunkers (usually 10 meters apart), and camouflaged the area because of constant fear of air and artillery strikes.

At 0630 hours, 11 March 1969 we suddenly received word from higher ranks that this morning there would be a sweep operation in our area. This message was received on a PRC-10 radio to the battalion commander by coded radio transmission from 122-X signal element. The 122-X signal company is assigned to Dong Thap I Regiment of MR II and has an element with each battalion.


Immediately we received an order from battalion headquarters to get in the bunkers and wait to see what happens in the next few hours. Our unit was tired and when we got word it was too late to move to another area with bunkers. We did not want to move during the daylight. Besides it usually takes us one to two hours to prepare to move because we have to raise our sunken sampans hidden in the small canals used to move our heavy weapons.

Two hours passed, then three hours, so I felt nothing was going to happen. I went out to look for some fish in the nearby canal, since I had not eaten since the day before. We get 28 piasters a day with which to buy rice. We spend very little in the first part of the month, saving seven or eight piasters a day with which to buy a duck or chicken for the squad or platoon to have an interesting party. A party for the morale of the unit and decorations are given at this time.

About a half an hour later (1030 hours, 11 March 1969) a small helicopter came into the area (C3) and flew around several times. We call this the "Staff Officer's" helicopter and when it visually reconns the area, we know from past experience that US troops would definitely have an operation in that area. We had standing orders not to fire on helicopters when hiding in an area.

Suddenly another two helicopters came in and flew around our area. The order was immediately given by the C3 commander to prepare for combat. I think that then one of the helicopters discovered my position. It hovered right above me. Quickly I jumped in the ditch, trying to hide. The second helicopter was coming over fast and it looked like it was going to open fire on me. I jumped from the ditch and crawled to my bunker. As the helicopter came around again, I saw the ditch where I had been receive rockets and gunfire. The helicopters were dropping the "crying gas" and a marsh grass fire was set off by smoke grenades. To defend against the gas, we placed a wet cloth across the bunker openings, then lit a candle or burner to cause any gas which might penetrate the bunker to rise to the ceiling while we remained on the floor. This was 100 percent effective. The other method we use is to urinate on a towel and place it over the face. After the attack we use a "Chinese Oil" to clear the "crying gas" from our skin.

They were all Americans without a doubt, because they were tall and had huge bodies. They started to move in our direction. C3 element got ready to hold their position and had their gun emplacements ready for them. Then I could see them advancing through the booby trap area which the Thanh Phu (V) Guerrillas had set up for our unit as a defense. Local guerrillas are used to lay booby traps to protect the flanks of the battalion. They had set up these booby traps in three rows around our defense in the following way:



We had given the Thanh Phu (V) Guerrillas 150 grenades to set up for us plus they had some of their own. The guerrillas' position was set up along the south bank of Nguyen Van Tiep Canal four kilometers from the ARVN Special Forces of My Phuoc Tay Camp to the east. This area was familiar with the local guerrillas and main ways the ARVN Special Forces would come in. The guerrillas were spread out in this area which already had old bunkers there.

(1200 hours, 11 March 1969) US troops were moving fast, so I knew they did not have any idea the booby traps were there. Suddenly I heard some booby traps explode. Five US soldiers in the front element went down and were wounded or dead. Then the entire US element stopped, lay down for five minutes and started advancing again. I think US troops were staying too close together during movement. US troops moving single file, too close together causing many booby trap casualties.

I could feel the intensity of the heat on my face from the grass burning and the soldiers around me were coughing from the black smoke. Then I was informed that two killed in action and two wounded in action had resulted from the time the very first two helicopters had flown over our location (C3). US troops were still advancing, but now were dividing into two single file elements. They were 40 meters away from our location. . . . 20 meters. . . . ten meters. I remember seeing the tactic of advancing and dividing into single file elements being used by the ARVN's.

I heard someone yell "Fire!" To the right of my position two submachine guns swiftly spit out ammo at US troops. Meantime I gave the order to the machinegunner in my area to fire on the second part of the US element. I was put in charge of the machine gun in that area by the C3 commander, Ba Kiet, 37, K-54, when the positions were first set up. I had been ordered from battalion headquarters to stay with C3 element as acting platoon leader.

We had them pinned down at this point (See Sketch Map A). Then I saw two helicopters fly over our C3 location and opened up, killing two soldiers and wounding three more to the west of my location. In my opinion US troops were moving in large groups allowing us to easily pin down the element with one or two machine guns. They waited until they were too close to our position to deploy any assault tactics. US troops believe that because they cannot see the VC in the area, the VC are not there.

About 1300 hours the reinforced elements of the US were landing 15 more helicopters to the east of C3 location approximately 350 meters away (See Sketch Map B). During this time the US was dispersing in that area where the second insertion took place. Two 82mm mortars from C4 (Heavy Weapon) element were firing away. I heard many mortar rounds hit that US element, but they were still advancing. The C4 Heavy Weapon element was set up in the middle of the defense area to protect battalion headquarters and provide artillery support to the infantry companies.

The US second inserted troop landing had started to break up into three elements to try to penetrate the battalion defense position: first element concentrating on C4 location; second element moved north to Thanh Phu Guerrillas position guarding the aid station in that area; third element was heading southwest to C3 location where I was. I ordered the machinegunner at my position to turn and fire at the second inserted landing of US troops to the east. At this time C3 and C4 machine gun elements were concentrating to fire on US advancing elements and it was effective because we had "dug in" positions and bunkers (See Sketch Map B). Then the C3 commander, Ba Kiet, near my position, gave the order to concentrate B40's and antitank weapons on the dikes and small canals which US soldiers were using as protection when advancing to the company defense positions from the east. Also he gave the order to start evacuating the wounded. The wounded are carried to a battalion aid station for emergency treatment by members of the battalion. From that point they are transported by recruited civilians to a hospital supporting the unit. Nylon hammocks are often used to transport the wounded.

About 1600-1700 hours, the C3 location was hit by helicopters. This time they destroyed two submachine guns and killed two west of my location. Suddenly there was a terrific flash to the north of C3 location near the Nguyen Van Tiep Canal where the Thanh Phu Guerrillas were located. No more firing was coming from that area. Later after the battle, I found out that this air strike knocked out the guerrilla position resulting in 30 Thanh Phu Guerrillas killed (See Sketch Map B). At 1700 hours there was one helicopter flying at low altitude at C3 location and spotted our position, forcing us to open up with AK-47 and machine gun fire. The helicopter was hit and started shaking as it flew back toward Highway 4 in a southwest direction.

The recon reported the following to battalion headquarters and this information was passed to the companies by field phone:

About 1730 hours the third element of US troops were landing 20 helicopters southwest of the battalion location (See Sketch Map C). The US troops were 400 meters from the contact area. They broke up into two elements; first element moving toward battalion headquarters and C4 location and second element toward C1 and C2 locations. At 1800 hours it was reported that the first element of this third US troop landing got hit by booby traps 150 meters

from battalion headquarters and C4 location (See Sketch Map C). At 1830 hours it was reported that this third reinforced element then had pulled back 100 meters and deployed as a blocking force along the southwestern flank of our battalion location (See Sketch Map D).

I saw US troops using sniper fire tactics and launching M-79 rounds at our elements during this time. The battle area was covered with thick black smoke from the marsh grass fire.

About 1830 hours US troops to the east (second US troop landing) started to strongly assault the C4 Heavy Weapon element located in the center of the battalion defense formation (See Sketch Map E). Two helicopters and two jets had already destroyed the C4 Heavy Weapon position that had been blocking US troops coming from the east earlier. Many VC were lying around dead or wounded in that area. This caused the C1 (100 men) to reinforce the C4 element which was hit so badly and to continue to prevent US troops from penetrating that area by acting as a screening force. C2 had only 40 men and did not reinforce C4. C3 element was still holding off US elements to the south with small arms fire. During this time the elements kept close communication by using runners from platoon to companies headquarters and field phones were used from company headquarters to battalion headquarters. (This is how C1 knew to reinforce C4.) We had a PRC-10 radio at battalion headquarters but did not use it during contact because the helicopters might discover our positions.

About 1900 hours the C3 commander, Ba Kiet, 37, K-54 ordered some of his men to look around for dead bodies and hide them in bunkers and cover others with camouflage nylon because it would be dark soon.

About 2000 hours the US hit the C2 location and southern bank of Nguyen Van Tiep Canal with air and artillery strikes, but the C2 element had already pulled back before the strikes to the northwest where the C1 element was previously. They had only left a squad size element in the air/artillery strike zone to fire at US troops on the southwestern flank. The C2 soldiers had informed this to me after the battle (See Sketch Map F). Also during this time I did not know what was happening to the north of Nguyen Van Tiep Canal because we were in heavy contact with US elements to the east but the battalion commander, Le Ha, 44, K-54 had already known helicopters had landed to the north of this canal. He did not inform to our element (C3) because it would cause fear and low morale among the soldiers. I found this out later after the battle from him. (See Sketch Map F).

About 2100 hours it was completely dark except for flares and the speed of the fire fight was diminishing, but sound of helicopters were heard and seen still flying around our area of defense. At this time our element (C3) was informed by the battalion commander, Le Ha, that 44 helicopters with US troops had landed and already set up all along the northern part of Nguyen Van Tiep Canal. At this time I just knew that US troops had completely surrounded our position (See Sketch Map G).

About 2200 hours the recon had reported to the battalion commander, Le Ha, that the withdrawal route was found. He informed to the companies that at 2300 hours the units would start withdrawing, element by element. At 2330 hours a recon member from battalion headquarters came down to C3 position to give the word that we were to move north to Nguyen Van Tiep Canal (See Sketch Map H). The strength of our element (C3) was very low at this time. Many small arms (AK-47) were lying around the bunkers

where our soldiers lay dead. We placed some more of the dead in the bunkers and covered some with nylon stuff because US troops fail to check all possible places for bodies. Usually one day later a recon element goes back to check if US troops have left the area. Then they report back to battalion headquarters. A platoon size element is sent back into the area in the next few days to find the hidden bodies to bury them and to look for weapons that US troops failed to discover after the battle.

The C3 commander, Ba Kiet, told the soldiers to carry as many rifles and equipment with them as they could. I carried out a machine gun stand and an AK-47 rifle. The recon element then guided our element north to the Nguyen Van Tiep Canal. I saw, when we were withdrawing, that each soldier carried two to three small arms (AK-47, SKS, etc.). There were some flares in the sky around our defense area. In this case, where the tactical situation required rapid withdrawal, some weapons were hidden in the area of contact for pickup several days later.

About 0030 hours, when we reached the Nguyen Van Tiep Canal, the C3 element lost contact with the recon. The political officer, Bay Quyen, 27, K-54 took charge and guided the C3 on the withdrawal route. The rest of the battalion was ahead of C3 already moving west along the canal with elements ten meters apart. The battalion's main recon element was in front avoiding contact with US troops as much as possible. I would like to include here that the recon elements conducted continuous and extensive recon during the course of the contact to attempt to locate a gap in the US defense formation. They reported constantly to the battalion commander.

About 0045 hours, when the C3 element was along the Nguyen Van Tiep Canal, we began receiving M-16 and M-79 fire from the US troops on the northern bank of the canal. One round hit the machine gun stand I was carrying and I fell in a ditch. I picked up the stand and continued on. The tracers continued to fly all around us. Later the political officer found a new way to bypass traveling near the canal where the tracers were hitting (See Sketch Map H). Continuous air strikes were dropping all along the canal and surrounding area. When they came close to our position, we would lie down. While moving along the withdrawal route, we tried to run quickly to wherever the air/artillery strikes already hit. This is how we got through them. Move back when the first bombs fall. Then after the strikes, move back into the same area, as we believe the US does not bomb in the same area right away.

Approximately 0100 hours we finally reached the area where the battalion recon element was standing guard. They showed us the 50 meter gap where the rest of the battalion had made it through. The tactics we used here were the recon element secured each side of the gap. The companies infiltrated through the gap in small groups in single file. A small force is left behind in the contact area to cover the withdrawal of the main body (See Sketch Map H).

As we passed through the gap, we could hear the Americans talking loudly on both sides of us. We quietly took our clothes off upon reaching the Cha La Canal and made floating rafts out of nylon. These floating rafts hold the weapons while in the water as we swam to the other side. We did not use sampans because they can easily be detected by US helicopters. I just got out of there in time and was glad to be alive!

The air/artillery strikes could be heard in the distance as we were moving away from the contact area (0130-0200 hours). After moving out of that

area for one and a half kilometers, I estimated 95 men left. The air/artillery strikes continued all night in the area of Thanh Phu.

On 13 March 1969, when we reassembled at the Trai Lon Canal after the battle, I found we had 20 deserters, leaving only 75 men left.

We discussed the battle. Before the battle we had 268 men in our unit plus there were 30 guerrillas. In the reassembly area after the battle there were 95 in the unit but 20 deserted. The 30 Thanh Phu (V) Guerrillas were killed by air/artillery strikes and general casualties were 173 men of our unit. It was unknown how many were killed and wounded of each company because the report was not made out that was to go to MR II. Since my position is secretary of the battalion at this time I have to collect the information and write the report to the battalion commander but the only thing I received was the weapon loss report. This consisted of the following:

| | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| C1 - 1 Machine gun
1 B40
1 60mm mortar | C2 - 1 Machine gun
1 B40 |
| C3 - 2 Submachine gun
1 B40 | C4 - 1 82mm mortar
1 Machine gun |

Small arms lost in the battle were not reported. The reason I have to take a long time to make a report is because the exact personnel loss was not reported by each company commander yet.

On the day of 13 March 1969 my battalion commander reported on the radio to the 1st Regiment that: There were 1500 US troops that participated in the battle from Saigon. We were courageous and killed 150 US troops, shot down one jet aircraft and two helicopters. After this the battalion commander gave the speech in front of the soldiers that the regiment highly recommended praise to each soldier.

On the 15th of March 1969 at 0300 hours in the morning 20 men (subject included) of the unit arrived back at the battle area. We just arrived in the battle area and observed around the area. The truth of the area was exposed under my eyes. Oh, I could not believe any view more lonely and terrible than this. All of the trees were burned down all around the area and I could not see any grass left on the ground. Our bunkers were destroyed and out on the ground I saw dried blood all around, still smelling the odor of the dead bodies in the air. It made me feel terrible. Also the big holes that were made by bombs made me thankful I had made it out alive. We encouraged ourselves to look for the dead and bring them to the sampans forgetting the smell of their bodies. At about 1000 hours in the morning we saw the ARVN Special Forces in that area but we ran away and hid from them along the Cha La Canal, one kilometer to the west of the battle area. We had only recovered five bodies before we were forced to move. Then we returned to the units with a sentimental feeling for all our dead comrades that were lost in the battle.

EPILOGUE: After we had returned to Trai Lon Canal the unit broke up into small groups. The regiment had already sent us three new 60mm mortar tubes a few days after the battle. We were very tired and our morale was very low, but the battalion commander gave the word that our unit (75 men) would return to Kien Phong (P) to get reinforcements and recruit new men to fight again. On the way I got hit by a booby trap so I

had to stay back at X-12 Hospital of MR II in Hau My (V). I just stayed there one night and the next morning the 7th ARVN Division soldiers swept the area and captured me and six other VC, when discovering and destroying the hospital.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Phan Xuan Quy - Headquarters Secretary, 261 B Battalion

On 11 April 1969, approximately 12 kilometers southwest of My Phuoc Tay, elements of the 7th ARVN Division discovered a VC hospital and captured a PW identified in subsequent interrogation as Phan Xuan Quy, Headquarters Secretary of the 261 B Battalion. This position is roughly equivalent to that of Battalion Adjutant. The subject is an intelligent, well educated and hard core Viet Cong. He had been wounded on five occasions in contact with ARVN elements and did not desire to rally to GVN.

Phan Xuan Quy was born in the 1st District of Saigon in 1949. He lived with his stepfather as his mother had been imprisoned during the reign of Bao Dai for reasons unknown to Quy. Quy's mother was released from prison in 1954 and died a few days after her release. According to Quy her last words to him was a request that he avenge her death and the wrongs she had suffered at the hands of the Bao Dai regime. His disaffection and dissatisfaction with the GVN and the later rallying to Viet Cong ranks can be traced to this. In 1958 Quy's stepfather died and Quy went to live with Pham Binh, a friend of his father. From 1958 to 1963 Quy attended school in Saigon. In 1963 Quy moved to the capital of Cambodia, where he attended a private school until 1966. While in this school Quy became fluent in both the French and the Cambodian languages. In January of 1966 Quy went to work for the Doc Lap newspaper, a neutralist newspaper in the capital of Cambodia. In February he joined the Viet Cong to as he stated "Fight for the country he loved so much." He attended basic training and NCO school in Bac Lien (P), Cambodia, for five months. In July of 1967 he was assigned to the VC 502d Battalion as a squad leader. In August of 1968 he was transferred to the 261 B Battalion, where he was promoted to the rank of platoon leader. In March of 1969 he was made Battalion Headquarters Secretary. On 11 and 12 March his battalion was decimated by elements of the 9th Infantry Division at Thanh Phu (V), Cai Be (D), Dinh Tuong (P), Republic of Vietnam. On 11 April 1969 he was captured by elements of the 7th ARVN Division while he was a patient in a VC hospital where he was recovering from wounds incurred from a booby trap on 10 April. He was subsequently turned over for interrogation to the 9th Infantry Division and has voluntarily provided the information concerning a contact between his unit, the 261 B Battalion, and elements of the 9th Infantry Division.

INTERROGATOR'S COMMENTS:

It is believed that the subject, as Battalion Secretary, wrote an account of the battle for the Battalion Commander, which was to be sent to the Headquarters Dong Thap I Regiment of MR II for possible preparation of a unit citation. He admitted discussing the battle with all the unit officers.

INTERROGATOR: SP5 ROBERT T. KCT,
9th MI Detachment

INTERPRETER: SSG HUYNH VAN MAI,
9th MI Detachment

REFLECTIONS OF A PRISONER

Introduction

When it was determined that Prisoner of War Phan Xuan Quy was the Battalion Secretary of the 261 B Viet Cong Battalion, the 9th Infantry Division requested permission from the 7th ARVN Infantry Division to interrogate the prisoner. All concerned were amazed with the intelligence and knowledge which Phan Xuan Quy possessed. We therefore requested him to write a narrative of the Battle of Thanh Phu, which he did. During many meetings with the prisoner, it became apparent that the young man was also very gifted in the art of expressing himself. Consequently, he was asked if he would consider writing his reflections on becoming a prisoner of war. He readily agreed, and although what he wrote did not coincide with the expectations of the requestor, his reflections were sheer beauty, expressing his feelings with force and with clarity. Phan Xuan Quy wrote these reflections at midnight on 30 April 1969 in the 9th Infantry Division POW Compound located at Dong Tam, Republic of Vietnam.

* * * * *

"Night is falling deeper and deeper, the breeze is colder and colder, the wind is blowing into my prison camp. Perhaps today is the 19th day of my life staying in the prison. At this time it is 12 o'clock midnight. There are two soldiers standing guard at the door of my prison camp. They wear the letters M. P. on their sleeves. I feel they are well trained to stand guard awake. Outside at this time some jeeps pass by in a hurry out on the road plus the roar of artillery is heard out going from this Binh Duc Base Camp (Dong Tam). The dew drops are falling thicker and thicker, the wind is blowing harder. All of this gives me a feeling of indifference. I could not fall asleep. I sat up to light my cigarette and think deeply of my life about 'what could happen to me in the future.' I was feeling that my future is very dark. While being a soldier, I had been wounded 5 times and about 10 times escaped out of death. I don't have any grief, but this time I worry about it. I am a young man, but somehow I always find myself in trouble. As I look back and remember the day I was captured and turned into the prison camp of the Americans. Before I got in here I always thought that I would be kept in a completely dark jail in which I could not see any rays of sunlight fall into my prison and lie in handcuffs. But, everything is the opposite. This prison camp is a large area. It contains 6 barracks all of which are covered by canvas, and very clean area. I receive three meals a day. Some bystanders passing on the road outside just think that is a workers sleeping barracks. The few days that have passed, I have been given good treatment. They have given me cigarettes and anything I need. Each time they brought me in for interrogation, it was a narration of mine for them, no more and no less. I simply sat down, talking friendly. Before I got here my thinking was about the pressure and misery I would have to endure at a prison camp. Now my bad impression is replaced by the highest opinions of Americans."

Phan Xuan Quy

PHAN XUAN QUY
Battalion Secretary
261st B Battalion

An Account of
THE BATTLE OF THANH PHU

by

Colonel Ira A. Hunt, Jr.

Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division

Intelligence information indicated that there was enemy movement northwest of Cai Lay along the major canals that run from the Plain of Reeds south into Dinh Tuong Province. Consequently, on 11 March 1969 I directed the Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, to insert on several targets in this area. He was given Alpha Troop, 7th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment (Apache) to assist in his reconnaissance-in-force, and he was also programmed for the use of the 191st Assault Helicopter Company (Boomerang) to insert troops. Starting about 1100 hours the cavalry carefully reconnoitered the brigade-assigned targets utilizing CS gas to flush out the enemy, but they found no evidence of current enemy activity. Ranging out further from the assigned targets the air cavalry employed the Airborne Personnel Detector ("People Sniffer") to see if they could get readings which might indicate the presence of enemy troops. "People Sniffer" readings were sparse and only one significant reading was obtained along the Kinh Tong Doc Loc Canal, just south of the border between Kien Tuong and Dinh Tuong Provinces and about five kilometers west of the CIDG Camp at My Phuoc Tay.

Initial Insertion

The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Sullivan, decided to air assault one platoon of Charlie Company in five slicks to check out this reading. The Cobras from "Apache" assisted in the insertion. The 2d Platoon of Charlie Company, commanded by Lieutenant Richard A. Fisher, was inserted at 1152 hours, about a kilometer south of the canal (See Sketch Map 2). As the troops were inserting the gunships sighted some enemy and fired rockets at the bunkers. The grass in the normally inundated Plain of Reeds was tinder dry and these rockets set it on fire. As you will see later, these grass fires were to have a great impact on the conduct of the battle. On insertion Lieutenant Fisher's platoon was given instructions to move north. Staff Sergeant Jantzen E. Childers, squad leader, stated the platoon moved out with three squads abreast, about 30 to 40 meters between the squads. After they had advanced about 200 meters they began to notice many Tu Dia (death field) signs. Cobras circled continuously overhead while the LOH's, flying low and courageously as they always do, were looking for VC. Now and then the Cobras would shoot, starting still more of the grass fires. There was a lot of smoke, but it was not bothersome yet because the wind was blowing to the northwest. As the platoons moved forward one of the men hit a booby trap. Luckily there were no casualties. The troops had not been fired at and although they could see the bunkers, they had seen lots of them before; they were not too concerned. The booby traps had made them cautious, however, and they decided to prep the woodland ahead with M-79 fire. When they did this, the VC fired back. Everyone hit the ground and the enemy in bunkers, no more than 15 meters away in a small canal line, opened up from the west. Fire was also coming from out of the banana grove to the east. Lieutenant Fisher called for gunships and they worked over the area. The platoon lay there for about five minutes. Then everyone got up to move forward again. Before they had gone five yards they were pinned down for the second time by heavy fire from three sides. They were running a little low on ammunition; the smoke was getting worse; the grass fire was spreading towards them; and the VC continued to shoot. About 1245 Lieutenant Fisher was wounded in the upper thigh. Nevertheless, he continued to direct the unit until he went into shock from loss of blood. The troops were still pinned down and could not move. The medic passed out from heat. It was real hell. The Cobras kept coming in and they began to withdraw. On the way out two men hit booby traps. SP4 Michael G. Allendorf died from chest wounds.

Still another soldier hit a booby trap. By now the smoke was so bad that, unknown to the men on the ground, the Cobras couldn't see to pin down the VC effectively.

Reaction to Contact

While the men were valiantly fighting on the ground the whole apparatus of the brigade had been alerted. Major General Julian J. Ewell, Commanding General of the 9th Infantry Division, and Brigadier General Frank L. Gunn, Assistant Division Commander, were overhead. Sullivan, having assessed the situation, immediately had the 3rd Platoon of Charlie Company picked up and inserted in a LZ about 600 meters from where the fight was taking place. The Charlie Company commander had the 3rd Platoon move forward as a line of skirmishers. They moved up to behind the "hooch" (See Sketch Map 2) and laid down a base of fire trying to assist the 2d Platoon to extricate themselves, not only from the VC, but from the burning grass.

The cavalry had reconnoitered the area thoroughly by now. They said there was at least a company of VC here, which meant there could be as many as a hundred. It has not been too often lately that we have found a company of VC, since VC tactics for the past four months have been to break down into small units, platoon size at the most to avoid detection. The "jitterbug" tactics had found them, now was the time for a "pile-on." General Ewell gave instructions to go at them and made the chopper assets of the division available. I decided to pull Recondo Brigade companies from wherever we could spare them. We would stage out of My Phuoc Tay, air assault into the battle area to seal off the enemy, and then stand off and literally beat him to death with gunships, tactical air, and artillery. The major question now was where to insert in order to cut him off? It would also be nice to know how far the enemy bunker system extended? How many VC were there? What was the unit in contact? The first order of business was to cut off his escape. Troops had to be inserted quickly to the east and to the west of the area of contact south of the canal, and some troops inserted north of the canal to prevent him from swimming the canal and heading out. For the time being artillery could cover the north and the order went out to get the artillery moved into My Phuoc Tay. Air strikes were called for and the other battalions in the brigade were alerted to have companies standing by in the ready rack. The 1st Brigade had a string of successful seals under its belt, and although none of the current battalion commanders had as yet been in a large one, they were all anxious to get a piece of the action.

Encirclements South of Canal

On the ground the 2d Platoon C/2-39 started to move back, dragging the wounded with them (See Sketch Map 2). They had to leave Allendorf's body. As they crawled toward the hooch they found Lieutenant Fisher and SP4 Gerald L. Tharp, both badly wounded, in a small ditch behind the hooch. About this time the wind turned and the smoke and fire started blowing towards the south. The men had to walk through the grass fires. Mortars started coming in. Most of the small arms fire that was cutting down the men was coming from the banana grove to the northeast about 180 meters away. The VC were bold and were out in the open, so my C&C made repetitive passes around the banana grove with the door gunner letting them have it. The first time his fire was very inaccurate, but by the third pass he was pumping it into them. This kept their heads down. Down below Childers, carrying Lieutenant Fisher on his back, moved further to the rear. They reached the 3d Platoon who helped them pull in the wounded. By now they were able to collect themselves. During the move Tharp died from his booby trap wound. Another man was

shot by small arms fire and killed. The wounded organized themselves into two groups of eight for pick-up. The slicks came in through the smoke and extracted them. One of the men was completely passed out. This was Sergeant (E5) Wray E. Walker. That afternoon Walker had raced back and forth across the open area, firing as he went, and almost single-handedly had carried most of the wounded back to the collection point. In the process he had personally killed several of the VC. However, he had worked so hard and so long in the heat and fire that he had passed out. For his outstanding action during this battle Sergeant Walker has been recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross. By now the fire was burning badly and Charlie Company had extracted two of their three killed and all of their 12 wounded. The remaining men were picked up and carried back to My Phuoc Tay.

In the initial insertion, the 2d Platoon of C/2-39 had not paid enough attention to the enemy bunkers. They didn't have flank security and as a result walked right into a trap. The enemy waited until the troops were only 10-12 meters away before opening up. Once hit, the troops departed themselves well. However, after the insertion of the rest of C/2-39, the company commander didn't grab hold of the situation. He paid too much attention to the killed and in trying to evacuate the wounded, but not enough in getting proper fire and maneuver. As brigade commander, I was sharply critical of C/2-39. Obviously, the company commander had panicked. All he could think about was pulling out of the contact area. The battalion commander made a decision to extract Charlie Company. At the time it was undoubtedly a proper decision because the company was not functioning well and the grass fires obliterated visual contact of the VC positions. However, I was adamant that C/2-39 was to be re-inserted later and pick up their share of the battle.

Major James R. Taylor, Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, was back in Fire Support Base Schroeder, the battalion CP, when the battle started. He immediately loaded Bravo Company, which was at the FSB, in the slicks of the 191st AHC and inserted them at 1415 hours about a kilometer to the east of the point of contact (See Sketch Map 3). He gave them instructions to move due north to the Tong Doc Loc Canal. Once Bravo Company was on the ground there was much confusion because as they inserted air strikes were going on just to their north.

Rather than move out in the direction of the air strikes, Bravo Company was told to move due east until they hit a north-south streamline, then to move north until they hit the main canal. They were then to move west and seal the area to prevent the VC from escaping to the east. Because of the involvement with Charlie Company, Bravo Company was allowed to move too far to the east. They were finally turned to the north, and by the time they reached the main canal it was around 1700 hours. When they began to push west they did not hit much fire but there were bunkers and assorted booby traps. The further west they got, the more dense the booby traps became and the slower was their progress. Nevertheless, it was certain that the VC did not and could not get out to the east. Around 1730 hours several well-placed air strikes clobbered the enemy to their front and greatly eased their situation.

A/2-39 had also been alerted to move and the company, commanded by Captain Williford, was inserted south of the river with ten slick-loads of troops at approximately 1511 hours (See Sketch Map 3). The assault helicopter company personnel had indicated that because of intense small

arms fire there were only four LZ's where they would consider landing troops. The closest LZ to the canal was picked, but as it turned out this was much further south than desired. This fact proved instrumental in preventing Alpha Company from reaching the Tong Doc Loc Canal in a timely fashion. Once inserted, they were directed to move on a 320 degree azimuth, almost due north, until they hit the main canal, and then to set up a block to prevent the enemy from moving to the west. Captain Williford moved his two platoons forward in four columns, about 25 meters between columns, and 100 meters between platoons. At first they received only sporadic small arms fire. About 1800 hours, while moving across an open field, they drew heavy machine gun fire from the north. Tracers ricocheted everywhere. Captain Williford held up the 1st Platoon and sent the 2d Platoon to the northeast to maneuver around the machine gun. However, this platoon ran into heavy AK fire from a woods near the bend of the canal and could progress no farther. The 1st Platoon started to move northward and again drew machine gun fire, this time joined by a few AK's. About this time 60mm mortar fire began to plunk in around their location. Fifteen mortar rounds hit, wounding three soldiers. Alpha Company was getting little air support because smoke completely covered the area. Cobras had to fly blind. However, there were a few gutsy pilots who unhesitatingly went down into the smoke. One light fire team from Apache was especially effective.

By 1511 hours the three available companies of the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry had been inserted south of the canal. The eastward and westward escape routes were in the process of being cut off. However, the central portion of the battle area, where C/2-39 had made the initial contact, was open. I decided to put the next available company into this slot. C/6-31, located at FSB Moore, was available and was picked up by CH-47's, offloaded at My Phuoc Tay at about 1630 hours and shortly thereafter inserted by slicks into the contact area at exactly the same spot where C/2-39 had been extracted several hours earlier (See Sketch Map 3). The company, commanded by Captain George Maudlin, was directed to go due north and upon closing on the enemy position to spread out and attempt to link up with B/2-39 on the east. As they moved forward, they had a casualty from a booby trap in the open field. Captain Maudlin said that Chicom booby traps were everywhere. They were not the grenade type but plastic, filled with nails and ball bearings. The VC opened up with AK's around 1730 hours from the right front as they approached the woodland south of the canal. No sooner had the VC fired than an air strike with napalm came right in on the VC. The company RTO saw the enemy engulfed in flames. About this time they also came upon some equipment dropped by C/2-39, when they had been surprised by machine gun fire. By now the grass fires had subsided somewhat. There was dark charred ash everywhere. The fire that hampered everyone performed one useful function. It burned up the tripwires of the booby traps, rendering many ineffective. They began drawing fire from their left front about 1830. This time a machine gun opened up, pinning them down and slowing their movement. Captain Maudlin directed the company to spread out and form a cordon and they began making their way to the east and to the west to link up with the adjacent units.

Artillery Support

As mentioned, I directed the artillery to displace to My Phuoc Tay where they could insure timely and accurate fire on the encirclement as it developed. Therefore, at 1403 hours three tubes of Battery B, 1-11th Artillery (105mm) were given march orders at Fire Support Base Moore. These tubes were

laid and ready to fire at My Phuoc Tay at 1450 hours, after a 16 kilometer road march. When the series of air strikes that were going on were completed, the howitzers began firing at 1515 hours and continued in close support of the units in contact until 0130 hours. After that time, the friendly troops had closed in too tightly for supporting fires and only blocking fires and illumination rounds were continued throughout the early morning. As the enemy attempted to push out to the west three tubes of the 1-84th Artillery located at My Da were able to bring effective blocking fires and illumination over the area. The 1-11 initially fired north of the main canal and walked their fires south until they were interdicting the woods adjacent to the canal (See Sketch Map 1). At this time they moved the fires east and west along the nipa palm on both sides of the canal. The artillery fires were interrupted often during the afternoon because the gun-target line was exactly the axis of the air strikes, all of which were brought along the southern portion of the canal. The smoke from the grass fires to the north and south blanketed the area, making observation of aircraft extremely difficult. I know for a fact that Lieutenant Colonel William L. Hauser, the Battalion Commander of the 1-11, had to check fires several times as we saw Cobras emerging from the smoke in the line of artillery fires. Although the 688 rounds fired were generally far less than that normally expected in an encirclement, the ultimate tightness of the circle and the situation prevailing mitigated against more extensive coverage. Both the commanders and the infantrymen were well satisfied with the support, which amounted to about 171 rounds per tube of 105mm, which in actuality is above the 9th Division's 150 round average per tube for this type of contact.

Tactical Air Support

The first Air Force tactical air strike was put in at 1405 hours about 100 meters south of the large canal and several hundred meters to the northeast of where C/2-39 was in heavy contact. This was a pre-planned target which was diverted to the in-contact mission. Subsequently, five additional, immediate air strikes were placed (See Sketch Map 1). The second strike was also needed to extricate C/2-39 which was hung up by fire coming from a banana grove to the northeast. Because of the smoke and the inability of the troops to identify themselves clearly with smoke grenades, there was hesitancy both on the part of the ground troops as well as the FAC to put the strikes in too close. However, the FAC in this case was, in my opinion, overly cautious and took too long to get the second strike placed. In the meantime while the FAC was getting oriented, the gunships were working the area over. As the afternoon wore on, the ability of the FAC and tac air to hit the target improved measurably. The artillery was located almost due east at My Phuoc Tay. Since all air strikes had to go in on the artillery gun-target line, the two could not be utilized simultaneously. The air strikes also made it difficult for the gunships to operate during the early part of the afternoon. The air strike put in at 1740 by Blade 03 under the guidance of Major Ramon Medina (callsign Tamale 02) was right on target. Through binoculars I could see four VC completely engulfed by napalm. On the second sortie Apache saw eight men wiped out, so we know that at least 12 enemy were killed and certainly there were many more that we could not see. The last air strike of the day went in at 1800 hours, again on target to the east. The fact that the wind was blowing to the northwest made it extremely difficult to put air strikes into the west. By 1900 hours we knew the enemy was trying to escape to the west and we hoped to clobber him at night. However, we had trouble getting "Spooky," who was VNAF, on the "push" and the Air Force would not put in air strikes without flare ship coverage. As a substitute, 155 howitzers from My Da about 10 kilometers

to the west were used to block the enemy. The sketch attached shows the location of the air strikes and it can be seen that they were very effective along the nipa next to the canal but did not move inland enough to take out the machine gun positions. Unquestionably, the air strikes should have been closer to the troops in contact but the pilots stated they just couldn't chance it because of the smoke and highly fluid situation. In retrospect we probably could have used six more air strikes to great advantage.

Gunship Support

Chief Warrant Officer Robert Beck, 9th Aviation Battalion, a fire team leader of a pair of Cobras on station during the afternoon, for one doesn't agree with the last statement. He felt that the air strikes were brought in too soon. It was his experience that troops in close contact needed gunship support. I couldn't agree with CWO Beck more, but unfortunately we've found out through experience that gunship rockets just won't take out a heavily bunkered position and that is what the troops were up against. CWO Beck stated, as did the tac air pilots and FAC's, that he had a hard time seeing troop position markings because of the smoke. Consequently, most of the afternoon he was unsure exactly where the troops were located. He thought at the beginning of the battle that there were too many light fire teams on station at one time and that with the air strikes and artillery that the area was very congested. When one of the units was in extremely heavy contact, he swept in after one sortie of a tac air mission, plastered the bunker area, and got out of the way before the second sortie. He stated that he couldn't hang in close to the target like he wanted because of the smoke.

Delta Troop, 3-5 Cav was scrambled late in the afternoon from the 2d Brigade area in Kien Hoa Province to provide support for the Boomerangs (191st AHC) because they had had one chopper shot down and two others with mechanical problems. Delta Troop had a hard time providing proper gunship coverage to the slicks during insertions because of the smoke. However, all LZ's used during the day were cold.

The most decisive support by the gunships, in my opinion, occurred about 2200 hours when a light fire team was making a run parallel to the canal from west to east just as "Spooky" dropped a flare. The flare dropped right over some VC moving out hurriedly to the west, catching them by surprise. It was just as light as day. The Cobra pilot, with instant reflexes, cut loose with his mini-guns. It looked to me as if he cut down at least ten VC. Shortly thereafter A/4-39, north of the canal, complained that they were being shot up. The acting company commander, First Lieutenant John L. Roberson III, just as calm as could be, stated that he had had several men wounded and he himself had a slight wound. In reality he lost two fingers in the mishap. Although the troops to the north of the canal were quite concerned about this fire, the Cobras flew very carefully parallel to and south of the canal and for the rest of the evening utilized rockets only, giving them a better point target capability. In my opinion, between 2200 and 2230 the gunships were decisive in slowing down the enemy pullout and in creating VC casualties. As I review the battle, I don't believe that the gunships got full credit for all of the VC they hit. This was the first time in my memory that we had kept gunships so late at night. By the time they left station about 2330, they had made a decisive contribution.

Encirclements North of Canal

Three companies had been inserted south of the canal and the enemy was well on its way to being cut off to the east and the west as well as to the south. Past experience has shown that when faced with a situation like this the VC unhesitatingly take to the water and try to escape away from the US troops. In almost every contact I have been involved with, both in Long An and Dinh Tuong Provinces, the VC have been located on a stream. US forces tend to think of streams as obstacles, but the VC tend to think of them as communication routes and escape routes. Therefore, I decided to insert and seal the northern side of the Tong Doc Loc Canal (See Sketch Map 4). The first unit to be inserted north of the canal was A/4-39 at 1720 hours. They were inserted without mishap in the central portion of the battle area opposite the machine gun locations to the south. The unit moved out sharply to the south encountering no booby traps. At 1920 hours several hundred meters north of the main canal they engaged and killed five VC and captured two AK's as they moved to seal the canal.

Next to be inserted on the north was A/6-31 who air assaulted about a "click" to the west of A/4-39 at 1742 hours (See Sketch Map 4). According to Sergeant Thomas A. Cashmire, RTO for the 1st Platoon, they were told to head east until they hit a "small blue" and then to move south to the "big blue." This they did. As they monitored the radio net, they could hear the intense firing and maneuvering by other elements. On their way east they engaged two VC moving parallel to them. They didn't get them and a light fire team was called in. The light fire team zapped them good. As they came to the "small blue," there was a "hooch" which had VC writing all over it--propaganda of some sort. The water was chest high as they crossed the small canal. They began to move south until they hit the big canal where they proceeded to link up with the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry to the east. It was then about 2000 hours. Sergeant Cashmire says that there was firing on the south of the river all the time. He and the men were getting excited. They were anxious to get set up, and once they did everyone fired across the river. When they opened up, the VC to the south really hit back. This went on and off for a long time. At about 2200 hours the Cobras started firing south of the canal. Illumination was overhead. All of a sudden the Cobras started firing on their side. The gunships were trying to get the VC who were near the canal's edge. He remembered shouting on the radio that the Cobras were shooting up their side of the bank. Once the Cobras had been warned, the firing stopped immediately.

C/4-39 was inserted just at dark, 1912 hours to be exact, to the east of A/4-39 (See Sketch Map 4). They were given instructions by Lieutenant Colonel David H. Hackworth, Battalion Commander of the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, who was in charge of all troops north of the canal, to move south to the canal and to link up with A/4-39 and with B/2-39 south of the canal. Captain Gordon D. DeRoos, the company commander, moved his 80-man company in three columns about 75 meters apart. Everything was uneventful until they hit the river and moved to the west to attempt to link up with "Alert" (A/4-39). About this time "Spooky" came on station, illuminating the area, which made movement more difficult because they were not set in position. They linked up with "Alert" Company very easily. Captain DeRoos initially set men up in strong points 15 meters apart but he found the area too large and re-established four-man strong points 50-60 meters apart. During this time, Lieutenant Colonel Hackworth was overhead,

getting his companies linked together to the north and tied to the units to the south. He had very little trouble tying his companies north of the river together, but C/4-39 was not exactly matched up with B/2-39 south of the canal. Finally, with the use of M-79 illumination and strobe lights, a positive linkage was made. About 2300 hours the 2d Platoon of Charlie Company saw enemy groups moving out to the west. The first group of six VC was engaged and at least half of them struck down. Immediately following, a group of three or four was seen in the illumination of the Spooky aircraft and fire was brought to bear on them. The VC were running close to the river, and they were observed moving to the west in small groups until about 0200 when the flare ship went off station. After that there was not much action.

Reenforcing South of the Canal

By 2000 hours three companies had also been inserted north of the canal and they were well on their way toward the canal's northern edge and a complete link-up to insure that none of the VC could escape northward across the canal. With evening approaching, it was obvious that the enemy south of the canal was trying to break out. Three companies just could not possibly cover the required two to three kilometers of seal and it was obvious that additional units would have to be inserted. A/3-39 in mid-afternoon was 20 kilometers away, broken down into six ambush patrols in the vicinity of Vinh Kim. They were alerted in the field about 1600 and hooked into My Phuoc Tay with about 50 personnel at 1915 hours. They immediately went into a PZ configuration and were picked up and inserted in the area of contact behind C/6-31 at 2031 hours (See Sketch Map 5). Lieutenant Seth W. Collins, the company commander, went on the ground prior to insertion to talk to Captain Maudlin, the company commander of C/6-31, to get a picture of the situation. C/6-31 was taking a lot of enemy fire. A/2-39 with whom A/3-39 (Pistol) was supposed to link up with on the west was over a kilometer and a half distant at that time. There were grass fires everywhere. A/3-39 moved northward until they hit the position of C/6-31. They then were passed to the west along C/6-31's perimeter. They moved west to a stream line which they crossed and started northwest across an open field.

When they had gone several hundred meters, the point man saw something moving in the treeline to their north (See Sketch Map 5). Two VC were observed to be running. The troops opened up on them, killing them. At this time the whole company dropped to the ground and the VC opened fire simultaneously. Lieutenant Collins says the fire was fantastic, the best VC fire that he had encountered. The VC were very disciplined. It was all grazing fire and extremely intense. Three men were hit in the legs before they could hit the ground. There was no cover. No dikes. They were out in the open. For the moment A/3-39 returned the fire as best they could. However, they immediately got calls from 2d Platoon of A/2-39 to the north, stating that they were being fired into. It was obvious that the VC were between the right flank of the 2d Platoon, A/2-39, and A/3-39. Collins decided to withdraw and regroup. On the way back AK's (green tracers) opened up on them from the northeast. The men crawled back at least 150 yards. From then on out sporadic firing continued. As they were regrouping, they could hear A/2-39 on the radio. They had hit some barbed wire and booby traps, wounding one man. About that time machine guns from the north opened up on A/2-39. Lieutenant Colonel Hackworth asked "Pistol Alpha Six" to move. Major Taylor, Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan's Exec, arrived about that time and he and Lieutenant Collins

talked it over. They didn't know how they were going to link up with A/2-39, which was over one kilometer to the west. Major Taylor recommended they move several hundred meters to the north and as far west as possible. With this, Lieutenant Collins sent one element north along the stream bank and when they got to the intersection of the small east-west blue they moved northwest, across the open field, trying to block VC movement to the west from the area where intense machine gun fire had been forthcoming (See Sketch Map 6).

Captain Maudlin, C/6-31, remembers discussing the ground situation with Lieutenant Collins, A/3-39. Sometime after A/3-39 had moved out to the west, AK-47's opened up throughout the middle of the contact area and a real gunfight started. Although it was "hot" in his area, the majority of the enemy fire from three or four machine guns was directed at A/3-39. He remembers the situation was made very difficult because the enemy was between A/3-39 and A/2-39. A/3-39 had three men hit. From about 2200 hours on, Captain Maudlin said that there was a small enemy group which was reconning the area. Captain Maudlin knew that the VC recon element was looking for a way out and although his unit tried to hit them, they could not get any bodycount. Fighting continued at a heavy rate of fire until about 0100. In summing it up, Maudlin said it was a hell of a fight, with the mass of booby traps and the intense enemy fire (See Sketch Map 6).

About 2100 hours C/2-39 was re-inserted back into the same area from which they had been extracted earlier in the afternoon. They moved to take their position in the seal between C/6-31 and B/2-39 (See Sketch Map 5).

About 2300 hours, Major Taylor, who was acting as ground commander for all of the troops south of the canal, started what was in reality a heroic walk around the perimeter. He trod through booby trap fields and took a very real chance of being shot by either friendly or enemy troops. He states that there was a definite link in the east between B/2-39 south of the canal and C/4-39 to the north, as well as between B/2-39, C/2-39, and A/6-31 (See Sketch Map 6). When he got to A/3-39, Lieutenant Collins had just finished withdrawing after having some men wounded and was regrouping. After the wounded were dusted off, Major Taylor suggested that Lieutenant Collins move his people to the north and northwest in order to extend the perimeter as far as possible. As noted previously, Lieutenant Collins did just that, extending the perimeter another 700 meters to the west. However, he did not make contact with A/2-39.

After Captain Williford's western unit had received mortar fire and his platoon on the east had run into machine gun fire and had been caught in a crossfire between A/3-39 and the VC, Captain Williford brought his two platoons together and again prepared to move out to the Tong Doc Loc Canal. At that time, 2000 hours, the friendly forces on the north side of the canal opened fire and maintained a rapid rate of fire for eight to ten minutes. Around 2200 hours the gunships expended their entire load on a bunker line running east to west. Following the gunship strike, both platoons moved forward approximately 100 meters and again drew immediate machine gun fire. Artillery was also adjusted into the bunker line. A second gunship strike was called in around the same area and again most of the rockets were on target. One of the gunships took several hits from one of the bunker positions. Booby traps were encountered and a claymore mine was used to clear a path through the mine fence and booby trap area. A/2-39 moved another 50 meters and encountered another booby trap fence. As they were

setting up another claymore, "Spooky" (an AF flare ship) came up on station and his first flare was right on the treeline. Captain Williford's men spotted nine VC, three of which were carrying a wounded man (See Sketch Map 6). Immediately the VC were engaged with small arms and M-79's. They think they got them all. A/2-39 again drew light AK fire from the northwest wood line. Nevertheless, they pushed on and at about 0120 hours reached the major canal. Captain Williford then stationed his people 10 to 15 meters apart to the south and southeast, hoping to meet up with A/3-39. However, the distance between the units was too great and a firm link-up with A/3-39 was not made. However, a positive link-up was made with A/6-31 to the north of the river and except for a small portion south of the canal the six kilometer seal was complete (See Sketch Map 6).

Gunships were on station until about midnight and proved particularly effective in interdicting enemy movements and giving support to the troops. I personally had never seen such a fire fight at night as that which occurred about 2100 hours. My troops at Fire Support Base Moore, approximately 11 kilometers away, watched from roof tops. An area a couple of kilometers square was almost completely interlaced with tracers. Although the guns were spewing destruction, the patterns of the varied tracers reminded one of colored lace work. The gunships silenced at least three enemy machine guns that evening.

Policing the Battlefield

It had been a hard battle. In the early morning a sweep was started south of the canal. Captain Williford swept the contact area to the east, uncovering eight bodies hidden in the tall grass and Chicom machine gun ammunition, uniforms and documents. As the sweep progressed, numerous blood trails were spotted and five additional bodies were uncovered. A/3-39 started to move again at 0400. The fog was heavy. They ran right into the middle of an enemy base camp which was heavily bunkered. Later in the morning, A/3-39 linked up with A/2-39 and they swept east until they met with C/6-31. There were Chicom grenades everywhere. It looked like a minefield. A/3-39 destroyed six grenades, but by this time they had had enough of the minefield so they got back to the treeline and followed a path south to the PZ. Captain Maudlin's troops, C/6-31, swept along the north-south canal to his west where there were many booby traps on mounds near the bunkers. In the grassy area where C/2-39 had received such brutal punishment they found at least 25 RPG tail fins. They also found US type cartridges for a machine gun, an indication that one of our 60's had been pouring it back on the VC. Again booby traps and burnt out grass were everywhere. The sweep was anything but easy, and afterward the troops moved south and most of them were picked up by the slicks and deposited at My Phuoc Tay from where they were "hooked" or convoyed back to their bases.

To the north of the canal Sergeant Cashmire states that A/6-31 started to move back the way they came about 1100 hours. On the way out the lead element saw two VC and killed them. When they got to the PZ, they set up a perimeter defense for themselves and the two companies of the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry. As the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry moved to the PZ, they saw many bunkers and fighting positions but they had seen very few Charlies north of the river. Hooks came in and transported the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry back to Fire Support Base Danger.

The sweep of the area turned out to be very disappointing. I expected at least a hundred bodycount but a total of 72 including the 12 wiped out by the Air Force were reported. Only seven weapons were picked up. It was obvious that the troops didn't police the area properly. The troops were so concerned about the booby traps that most of the time they just didn't get off the trails and the junior leaders were reluctant to push their men into areas where they might be killed just to tidy up the battlefield. I know for a fact, for example, that two mortars were discovered by the CIDG in the area on the 13th of March. It's a tough trade-off, possible weapons and bodycount for possible booby trap casualties.

Communications

Communications-wise, the troops showed a tremendous versatility by moving to another unit's command push while utilizing their own callsigns. South of the blue there were elements of three separate battalions, all utilizing the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry push. Whereas, north of the blue, there were two battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hackworth using the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry push. Once the insertion to the north was completed, I controlled both air and artillery strikes to insure that both battalion commanders were completely aware of the situation. It really paid off to have Lieutenant Colonel Peterson, CO of the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry, run the staging area at My Phuoc Tay. The Hooks were coming in continuously depositing troops which were then loaded into slicks for air assault into the combat area. "Pete" kept things sorted out and by utilizing his command push I freed the other two pushes of most of the logistical problems. The C&C console with two stations just could not hack the traffic and we had to have two PRC-25's operating all the time just to monitor the three battalion nets and to use the brigade command net. Both "Spooky" and the air cav reported to Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan on the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry net. For in-contact support the air cav got on the company frequencies to get specific instructions. Without good communications at the company level the link-up of units would not have been possible.

Conclusions

All in all the battle had been conducted most satisfactorily. Elements of four battalions had participated on the ground. Thirteen insertions had been made, four after dark. Tac air, artillery, and gunships had been used with great finesse and a seal six kilometers long had been effected, with eyeball to eyeball contact established by all elements except A/2-39 and A/3-39 in the southwest. The battalion and small unit commanders had performed extremely well. Except for the initial casualties when three men were killed and 12 men wounded, only eight additional personnel had been wounded. At least 72 VC had been killed. Personnel for the most part had acted extremely professional. The bravery and guts of the individual soldier was extraordinary. He forced himself to close through smoke and grass fires and devilish booby trap fields, mostly at night, with a well entrenched enemy and against heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire.

DECLASSIFIED

THE BATTLE OF THANH PHU
LESSONS LEARNED

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THE BATTLE OF THANH PHU

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Reaction Time. Once contact is established, it is absolutely essential to make an early decision to pile on and encircle the enemy. In the case of the Battle of Thanh Phu, the decision was made at 1330 hours. The Commanding General made all of the aviation assets of the division available. Personnel were inserted as rapidly as possible, utilizing Chinooks for the non-tactical lift and "slicks" for tactical insertions, yet three insertions were made after dark. Our experience has shown that when the decision to pile on is made after 1500 hours, generally at least 50 percent of the insertions are made during darkness when the enemy is slipperiest.
2. Airborne Personnel Detectors. Although it was known that an enemy unit was in the general area of the contact, insertions on agent reports and visual reconnaissance by the air cav failed to produce any contacts. It was only when the unit inserted on a significant "People Sniffer" reading that contact was established. The "People Sniffer" has proven to be the most reliable intelligence asset of the 9th Infantry Division. Its use has enabled the division to make many contacts with the enemy.
3. Maintenance of Proper Tactical Formations at All Times. Probably, the single major fault of small unit commanders in the field is that they do not maintain proper tactical formations at all times. In the case of the Battle of Thanh Phu, the failure to have flank security out enabled the enemy to obtain surprise and flanking fires. The fact that the troops did not use a point man properly and were bunched up while walking in column formation enabled several booby traps to create multiple casualties. Maintenance of proper tactical formations is of such great importance, particularly in areas where booby traps are found, that repetitive training in this subject is a must.
4. Point of Airborne Insertions. In the Delta terrain with the inundated areas and dense foliage, it is essential that air assaults be inserted as close to the target as is prudent so that troops can close with the enemy in an expeditious manner. Consider the situation where A/2-39 was inserted over one kilometer away from the main canal which they were directed to cut in order to prevent the escape of the enemy to the west. The fact that the unit was inserted so far away enabled the enemy to withdraw part of his forces west along the canal prior to A/2-39 completing its seal. In this case no hot LZ's had been encountered and it appears that with proper LZ preparation that the insertion should have been made much closer to the target area. Combat doctrine of the 9th Infantry Division calls for insertion between 300 and 500 meters from the target area.
5. Grass Fires. This was the first case in which major grass fires had actually enveloped a whole area of contact, thereby creating physical problems for troops on the ground and blanketing the area with smoke. The normal heavy reliance of units on smoke grenades for identification was negated by the smoke. It is recommended when operating in a dry area susceptible to grass fires that units carry pyrotechnic pistols to identify themselves and to direct gunships and aviation fire support on to enemy targets.

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6. Bunker Busting. It has been the experience of the 9th Infantry Division that well-entrenched enemy in bunkers generally can be knocked out only by tac air strikes. We have found that the most productive means of eliminating bunkers is by use of fuse delay bombs. These have proven highly successful and can be placed closer to friendly troops than point detonating ordnance. Gunship rockets and napalm have repeatedly proven non-effective against bunkers. Several units in the past have utilized satchel charges placed on top of bunkers by the air cav to eliminate difficult strong points. Although this method has proven successful, it places the air cav in an extremely vulnerable position and it is recommended only when friendly troops have been pinned down too close to a bunker to extract and bring in air strikes.

7. Gunship Support at Night. At the Battle of Thanh Phu, gunship support during the evening proved to be one of the most important means of interdicting enemy movement. In a nighttime situation identification is absolutely essential and a firm knowledge of the position of friendly elements is required. In the Delta the most easily identifiable terrain feature is normally waterways and it is recommended that gunships use these terrain features in adjusting supporting fires. The gunships were particularly useful in eliminating enemy machine gun elements. Machine guns gave their positions away by the telltale white tracers, enabling gunships to bring devastating fire to bear.

8. Unit Identification at Night. Experience of the 9th Division has been that units in a seal operation are fairly easily identifiable to personnel in the air by use of a strobe light (light, marker, distress). The division has issued 1500 strobe lights for use by troops in the field. Without them positive linkage of units in a seal operation would be virtually impossible. It is particularly important that all friendly troops be identified when artillery strikes are to be brought inside the doughnut (seal). The artillery commander, flying in an LOH, can identify friendly units on the ground at night only if strobe lights are available.

9. Booby Traps. Enemy PW's have repeatedly indicated that they are using booby traps as tactical weapons. Contrary to previous beliefs, the enemy is quite often very near to booby trapped areas. PW's have indicated that many Free World Forces units are discouraged when striking booby traps so that when the enemy holds its fire they withdraw rather than accept the apparently inevitable casualties. Therefore, troops should be alerted that although 94 percent of booby traps are not covered by fire, this is no indication that the enemy is not near. On the contrary they should increase their alertness for bunkers and enemy positions. The PW indicated that around a defensive position the VC normally employ booby traps in three rows with ten meters between rows. Once you penetrate the enemy's outer protection, you will not find booby traps within the interior positions.

10. Policing the Battlefield. Recent experience has indicated a reluctance on the part of troops to sweep the battlefield where large numbers of enemy weapons have been encountered. As mentioned, it is a tough trade-off, possible weapons and bodycount against possible booby trap casualties. When the enemy is known definitely to have been killed, it appears vitally important to accept possible casualties to sweep the area for weapons so that the weapons cannot be used again to kill and cripple US personnel. Sweep operations need not be hurried and when conducted carefully, booby trap casualties will not occur.

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11. Sunken Sampans. VC move their logistical support and their heavy weapons by sampan. When they have arrived at a new base area they offload the sampans, set up their weapons, and then they camouflage the sampans by sinking them. Quite often variations in the tide will show up sunken sampans. Sunken sampans can be an indication that a major VC element is in the area. They are a very useful intelligence indicator.

12. Mortar Fire. The VC have been taught to fire mortars on air assault insertions. It is essential, therefore, that troops exit from the aircraft quickly and disperse rapidly so that neither aircraft nor troops make a good target.

13. VC Communications. As indicated, the VC have a central commo center which is normally the battalion headquarters. The battalion headquarters area has a switchboard, radio receivers and transmitters, as well as the message center. During a battle the VC rely solely upon runners and field phones. They do not use FM radio for fear of giving their position away. The VC organize their position on the basis of interior lines, and the elimination of a headquarters element would just about eliminate all possibilities of command and control.

14. Enemy Use of Reconnaissance Element. Enemy battalions have a very small highly trained recon element. In the case of the 261 B Battalion, it was a 12-man unit. These units continuously probe our units to find weak spots which the rest of the VC battalion can exploit. The movement and probing of the recon element is continuous and starts at the advent of a contact and goes on both day and night.

15. Withdrawal. When ordered to withdraw, the VC send out their recon element first. When the recon element has found a route, the heavy weapons company, battalion headquarters, then the individual elements withdraw, in that order. Consequently, the cessation of mortar and machine gun fire is an excellent indication that the enemy is withdrawing. Commanders should do everything in their power to attempt to determine the route of withdrawal and block up the gap. All VC have been given night training, the most important aspect of which is how to crawl and move at night without being detected. On withdrawals they mostly move in crouching position. With aerial illumination and observation, as used in the Battle of Thanh Phu, the movements can be detected and effective fire brought to bear.

16. The VC Action During Bombing and Artillery Strikes. The VC note the impact area of bombs and artillery and immediately after impact they move into the craters. The PW stated, "Then right after the strikes we would move back into the same area because the US does not bomb into the same area right away." The 9th Division passed this information on to our commanders and within five days one of the brigades picked up seven bodycount by clobbering the VC engaged in just that tactic. There are two methods of combating this VC tactic. One is by having gunships make a pass after every tac air strike or artillery volley. The other is by having the tac air and artillery strike the same area twice in a row without any shift.

17. Advance Warning of US Operations. Interrogation of the VC indicated that his battalion often received advanced warning of planned US troop operations. The warning message was received by the battalion commander via coded radio transmission. He stated his battalion normally received

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warning of a planned US operation for the next day the evening before. The 9th Division has found the aforementioned to be the case on several occasions. Although it is disconcerting, it shows the requirement for strict security concerning forthcoming operations. It is believed that AO clearance procedures lead to the leaks. Clearance procedures should be reviewed to preclude such leaks either by the establishment of permanent AO's or by the ability to obtain AO's quickly just prior to an operation.

18. Helicopter Over-flights. The PW further stated that whenever US choppers over-flew an area, the VC realized that an insertion was imminent and quite often they would move out of the area completely. He called the LOH a "staff officer's" helicopter. The VC have standing orders not to fire on US helicopters, particularly LOH's, because this gives away their position and invites attack.

19. Weapons Evacuation. All VC personnel are ordered to make every effort to recover the weapons of fallen VC. In many cases when the tactical situation requires rapid withdrawal, individual and crew-served weapons are hidden for pick up five or six days later. In the Battle of Thanh Phu, the VC carried out two or three weapons each from the contact area.

20. Evacuation of Wounded. VC wounded are carried to a battalion aid station for emergency treatment by members of the battalion. The battalion aid station is normally centrally located near a route of withdrawal. From that point the wounded are transported by recruited civilians to a hospital supporting the unit. Nylon hammocks are often used to transport the wounded. Evacuation of wounded is often conducted during the heat of the battle.

21. Disposal of Dead. During contact, if the VC are unable to remove their dead or to bury them then the dead are wrapped in nylon camouflage material and left out in the open or hidden in bunkers. The unit normally returns to an area of contact later to bury their dead or to recruit civilian labor to recover and to bury the dead. The PW stated, "We placed some more of the dead in the bunkers and covered some with nylon stuff because US troops fail to check all possible places for bodies." We believe that is highly useful to utilize stay-behind patrols with snipers to stake out the area of a sizable contact. During the past month this has produced additional bodycount on several occasions.

22. Defense Against CS Gas. The PW stated, "The helicopters were dropping the 'crying gas' and a marsh grass fire was set off by smoke grenades. To defend against the gas, we placed a wet cloth across the bunker openings, then lit a candle or burner to cause any gas which might penetrate the bunker to rise to the ceiling while we remained on the floor. This was 100% effective. The other method we use is to urinate on a towel and place it over the face. After the attack we use a 'Chinese Oil' to clear the 'crying gas' from our skin." The 9th Division ran a test on the VC methods and determined that they indeed were effective as stated. However, we found out that during a temperature inversion when the gas persistently stayed on the ground that it would penetrate into the foxholes. We also found out that if we used double doses of gas instead of the normal single cannister drop that the CS would then penetrate the foxholes. A useful technique for friendly troops arises from the foregoing VC tactic:

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since the VC stay covered up for five to fifteen minutes (the time depending on the persistency of the gas) after a CS attack, then after a CS drop is a good time for friendly soldiers to maneuver against VC positions.

23. The Use of Local Guerrillas. Local guerrillas are used to lay booby traps to protect the flanks of the battalion. These booby traps are often laid in two to four rows along the battalion flanks and astride possible avenues of approach into the battalion defensive positions. The local guerrillas also provide a screening and delaying force for the battalion.

24. VC Stream Crossing Technique. When withdrawing from contact, they often use inflated nylon sheets to float clothes, weapons, and equipment across a stream or canal. Where possible, the larger weapons are broken down and floated across. Sampan use is avoided due to ease of detection by US helicopters.

25. US Helicopter Assaults. Helicopter assaults were very fast and well done, allowing VC no time to move out. Immediately after the first two helicopters popped smoke, US troops came in.

26. US Tactics - VC View. US troops stay too close together during movement, rest, or withdrawal. US troops move in one group allowing the VC to easily pin the element down with one machine gun. The US wait until they are too close to VC position to deploy for assault. US troops believe that because they cannot immediately see the VC in the area, the VC are not there. US troops fail to check all canals and bunkers. US troops go slowly in booby trapped areas, but fight very courageously. US troops moving in single file close together cause many booby trap casualties.

27. US Artillery. VC do not greatly fear US artillery if they are in bunkers. The VC infantry are well protected from air/artillery strikes if they stay in their bunkers.

28. VC After-Action Reports. As a result of this battle the US had three killed and 20 wounded and one helicopter was shot down. In the words of the PW, the following VC report was submitted: "On the day of 13 March 1969 my Battalion Commander reported on the radio to the 1st Regiment that: There were 1500 US troops that participated in the battle from Saigon. We were courageous and killed 150 US troops, shot down one jet aircraft and two helicopters. After this the Battalion Commander gave the speech in front of the soldiers that the Regiment highly recommended praise to each soldier. The Battalion Commander told me to make a good report to the Regiment." It has been our experience that the VC always exaggerate the results of a battle. Therefore, it is important to counteract this false reporting, which tends to improve their morale and give the VC a sense of accomplishment, by US and GVN PSYOPS activities that tell the true story of the battle. PSYOPS should be the quick reaction type so that they can be disseminated within 48 hours after the completion of the contact.

29. VC Re-Supply. The PW stated that within a few days after the battle his unit had been re-supplied 60mm mortars and "We were very tired and our morale was very low, but the battalion commander gave the word that our unit (75 men) would return to Kien Phong to get reinforcements and recruit new men to fight again." It appears that the ability of the VC to re-supply and to immediately commence recruiting gives them a resiliency

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that makes it difficult to eliminate a unit. Once a unit has been in contact and hurt bad, every effort should be made to find him and keep the pressure on to prevent him from bouncing back. It has been our experience that enemy units are rarely, if ever, "wiped out."

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SECRET

G-3 HIST

DRAFTED BY: J S:LRG
 SEC 8-2 PH 3D RECON 2
 CWO John

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 290121 2 MAY 69

FM: CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 CG III MAF DNG

INFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV CEE
 CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
 THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 MAG THREE NINE
 SR. PROVINCE ADVISOR QUANG TRI
 THIRD RECON BN

COPY TO:
 G-2
 G-3
 GSV

SECRET
 RECON DEBRIEFING REPORT (U)

1. RECON TEAM: APRIL SHOWERS 203 (8 MEN) OFO-2574-69 (100 HRS)
2. DATE INSERTED/EXTRACTED: 241030 H/281300 H
3. ROUTE: FM (YD 117703) TO (YD 102719) TO (YD 114734) TO (YD 117703)
4. TERRAIN: LOW ROLLING HILLS, WITH THICK UNDERBRUSH, GOOD COVER AND CONCEALMENT. NO GOOD OP. SITES.
5. HLZ'S: AT (YD 115738) SITE WILL ACCOMMODATE FIVE CH-46'S, SITE IS AN OPEN FIELD, BEST APPROACH IS 360.
6. ENEMY: NONE.

7. OTHER INFO: NONE
 GP-4

BT
 C

RELEASED BY

OFO-2574-69

SECRET

36 H MAY 69

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTED BY: JFS:LFM
 SEC S-2 PH 3d REC 2
 CNO St

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 290123 Z MAY 69

FM: CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 CG III MAF DNG

INFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV CEE
 CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCE
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
 THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 MAG THREE LINE
 SR ADVISOR QUANG TRI PROVINCE
 THIRD RECON BN

COPY TO:

G-2

G-3

GSV

3 H151

SECRET

RECON DEBRIEFING REPORT (U)

1. RECON TEAM: OLD COLONEL 103 (10 MEN) OPO 2575-69
2. DTG INSERTED/EXTRACTED: 241130H / 281100H 96 HOURS
3. ROUTE: FM YD117702 TO YD088718 TO YD117702
4. TERRAIN: LOW ROLLING HILLS WITH VERY THICK UNDERGROWTH, GOOD

COVER AND CONCEALMENT, NEGATIVE OP SITES.

5. HLZ'S: YD097714 SITE WILL ACCOMMODATE THREE CH-46'S AND IS A RICE PADDY WITH A 360 APPROACH AND NO OBSTACLES. YD097727 SITE IS A RICE PADDY AND WILL ACCOMMODATE TWO CH-46'S AND HAS A 360

APPROACH WITH NO OBSTACLES.

6. ENEMY: NONE

7. OTHER INFO: NONE

GP-4

SECRET

BT

OPO 2575-69

CCN 4274 RELEASED BY APB TIME 181830 H AY 69

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 DE UUMSQD 1267 1490505
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 FM THIRD ARDIV (REIN) COC
 TO UUMSK/XXIV CORPS
 INFO ZEN/TASK FORCE HOTEL
 ZEN/TWELFTH MARINES
 BT
 S E C R E T
 SUBJ: SPEC DMZ OPNS REPORT
 1. 3D MARDIV
 A. 3RD RECON BN
 (1) TM DALLAS GIRL 281500H YD 039689 SHDMZ
 TM INITIATED CONTACT W/5 EN RESULTING IN TWO EN
 KIA AND ONE WOUNDED POW WHO DIED ENROUTE TO
 CON TIEN. TM ALSO CAPTURED 1 PACK & DOCUMENT. ALL GEAR
 WAS TAKEN TO THE S-2 3RD RECON BN
 GP-4
 BT
 1267

252

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFTED B : LRC:LEH
 SEC 8-3 PH 3d REG 2
 CWO *[Signature]*

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE **290823** Z DAY 69

FM: CG THIRD MAR DIV (REIN) DGH
 TO: CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 CG III MAF DNG

INFO: CG ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIV CDE
 CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
 THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 MAG THREE NINE
 SR ADVISOR UANG TRI PROVINCE
 THIRD RECON BN

COPY TO:

G-2

G-3

GSV

SECRET

RECON DEBRIEFING REPORT (U)

1. RECON TEAM: IDA MAE 3B1 (6 MEN) OPO 2582-69
2. DTG INSERTED/EXTRACTED: 261500H/281730H 60 HOURS
3. ROUTE: TM MOVED FROM INSERT POINT TO R CON ZONE, MADE A PHYSICAL RECO NAISSANCE OF RZ AND WAS EXTRACTED.
4. TERRAIN: STEEP HILLS WITH CANOPY 20-30 FEET HIGH, THICK UNDERGROWTH BL PHANT GRASS TO 10 FEET, GOOD COVER AND CONCEALMENT, OP SITES AT XD915665 AND XD927668 BOTH OFFER A 360° VIEW.
5. HLZ'S: XD919678 SITE WILL ACCOMMODATE TWO CH-46'S AND IS A VALLEY WITH LOW GRA S, AN ROACH FROM WEST TO EAST, THERE IS HIGH TE RAIN TO THE SOUTH AND NORTH. XD924683 SITE WILL ACCOMMODATE ONE CH-46 AND IS A BOMB CRATER WITH LOW GRA S, APPROACH FROM SOUTH EAST TO NORTH WEST, THERE ARE TREES TO NORTH AND SOUTH.
6. ENEMY: 271100H TM AT XD924674 OBSERVED SEVEN VC/NVA MOVING NORTH WEST ALONG TRAIL AT SAME GRID, TM INITIATED CONTACT WITH SAF RESULT-
 ING IN TWO VC/NVA KIA (C). ENEMY WORE DARK BROWN TROUSERS, WELL TAI-
 LORED SHIRTS ALSO BROWN, PITH HEDMETS AND WERE ARMED WITH AK-47'S
 ONE ENEMY WORE A PITH HEDMET OF UNKNOWN TYPE, BOTH APPEARED WELL GROOMED
 AND AT HOME IN THE AREA. TM OBSERVED THAT ENEMY'S CLOTHES WERE DRY
 AND IT HAD RAINED THE NIGHT BEFORE. DURING CONTACT ENEMY FIRED SAF
 AND RECOVERED CONTACT.

290823
 2 3/88
 PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

281200H TM AT XD925684 OBSERVED 6-7 VC/LVA READING NORTH WEST ALONG
A TR IL AT SAME GRID, T. COULD NOT OBSERVE ENEMY'S WEAPONS OR GEAR

BECAUSE OF TERRAIN, NEGATIVE ACTION TAKEN. 281730H TM WHILE BEING
EXTRACTED FROM XD924683 RECEIVED SAF AND WHAT APPEARED TO HVE BEEN

A.A. FIRE FROM XD923682, TRANSPORT HELO WAS HIT BUT CONTINUED TO
FLY AND T. WAS EXTRACTED.

271300H TM AT XD925677 HEARD VOICES OF TWO MEN AND ONE WOMAN, WHO
APPEARED TO BE SWIMMING IN RIVER AT XD926685, NEGATIVE ACTION TAKEN.

TM DURING ENTIRE PATROL HEARD WHAT SOUNDED LIKE AN A.A. WEAPON
FIRING FROM XD910685 AND ANOTHER AT XD930684 BOTH GRIDS ARE APPROX-

IMATE AS T. COULD NOT GET AN ACCURATE FIX ON GUNS.
7. OTHER ILFO: NONE

SECRET

GP-4

BT

OPD 2582-69

CCN

4357

RELEASED BY

NP Beyer

TIME 29 0945 H MAY 69

SECRET

SECRETDRAFTER 14/JGM/rjcSEC AIR 3D MARDIV 3204CWO SanFLASH 290840Z MAY69FM: C# THIRD MARDIV DGH
TO: CG FIRST MARINE AIR WING DNG

SUBJ: THIRAD MARDIV HELO FRAGS FOR 30MAY69

//SECRET//

| | | | | | |
|----------|----------|---------|--------|-------|----------|
| UH-1E(G) | UH-1E(S) | CH-46D | CH-46A | CH-53 | OV-10/01 |
| 507/203 | 101 | 505 | 502 | 303 | 508/203 |
| 401 | 102 | 501/503 | 105 | | 505/509 |
| 510 | | 401 | 106 | | |
| | | 301 | 103 | | |
| | | | 104 | | |
| | | | 107 | | |

1. MSN 101 STD FRAG
1. MSN 102 STD FRAG
2. 2 UH-1E(S)
4. VIP CODE 6
6. A. PU VCB (LZ ASTOR) VANDY DASC 338.9 0710 DZ TBA
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 103 STD FRAG
1. MSN 104 STD FRAG
1. MSN 105 STD FRAG
1. MSN 106 STD FRAG
1. MSN 107 STD FRAG
1. MSN 203 STD FRAG
2. 2 UH-1E(G), 1 OV-10
4. RECON I/E, VIS RECON
6. A. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 057416 37.3 7PAX
- B. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 695490 37.3 7PAX
- C. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 702567 37.3 6PAX
- D. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 228303 37.3 6PAX
- E. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 799633 37.3 7PAX
- F. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 791581 37.3 2PAX
- G. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 824666 37.3 6PAX
- H. PU RECON OZ QT 0715 DZ 207506 37.3 7PAX
- I. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 708427 37.3 7PAX
- J. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ 793416 37.3 6PAX
- K. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 7PAX
- L. PU RECON LZ QT 0715 DZ RECON LZ QT 37.3 7PAX
7. A THRU J DZ NOT SECURE, K AND L PU RECON NO SECURE
8. K AND L RADIO AND PANEL

SECRET

SECRET

1. MSN 301 STD FRAG
2. 6 CH-46'S
4. TRPS, LOGISTICS
6. A. PU QT LSA ICEBOAT "A" 48.0 0700 DZ VCB LSA ICEBOAT "B"
48.0 2000LBS/4PAX
- B. PU QT/VCB LSA CONT DZ TBA RESUPPLY
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 302 STD FRAG
2. 2 CH-46'S
4. TRPS, LOGISTICS
6. A. PU LZ SHARON SIZES 4R 49.6 0700 DZ 249405 GATES 6R
2100LBS/5PAX
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 303 STD FRAG
2. 14 CH-53'S
1. MSN 304 STD FRAG
2. 1 CH-53
4. LOGISTICS
6. A. PU 021588 TRADEWIND A8 36.9 0700 DZ 124585 TRADFWIND A7
6500LBS
- B. PU 124585 TRADEWIND A7 36.9 CONT DZ 021588 TRADFWIND A8
7500LBS.
7. ALL ZONES SECURE
1. MSN 401 STD FRAG (INCOMPLETE)
1. MSN 501 STD FRAG
1. MSN 502 STD FRAG
1. MSN 503 STD FRAG
1. MSN 505 STD FRAG
1. MSN 506 STD FRAG
1. MSN 507 STD FRAG
1. MSN 508 STD FRAG
1. MSN 509 STD FRAG
1. MSN 510 STD FRAG

GP-4

CCN

4343

REL BY

J. G. Mills

SECRET

CONFIDENTIALDRAFTER 3/CED/lrbSEC COC PHONE 3180CWO [Signature]PRIORITY 290920 Z MAY 69

COPY TO: C/S

COC

G-3

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH

TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB

INFO: FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR

CG III MAF DNG

CG XXIV CORPS PHB

FOURTH MARINES

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF OPCON

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 291200H MAY69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMES OPCON OF L/3/4 AND M/3/4 FROM FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSES OPCON TO CG TASK FORCE HOTEL.

GP-4

CCN 4345 RELEASED BY Morgan [Signature] DATE/TIME 291450 HMAY69

COC

SS/G-3

[Signature]**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/CED/1r
 SEC COG PHONE 3180
 CWO PL

PRIORITY 29 1106Z MAY 69

COPY TO: C/S
 COG
 G-3

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DCH
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL VCB
 THIRD MARINES DCH
 INFO: CG III MAF DNG
 CG XXIV CORPSPHB
 NINTH MARINES

H

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF OPCON

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 281500H MAY69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMES OPCON OF ONE PLT, K/3/9 FROM THIRD MARINES AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSES OPCON TO TASK FORCE HOTEL.

GP-4

CCN 4364 RELEASED BY Morganella DATE/TIME 261535 HMA69

COC

C/S/G-3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ZCZCENAA461

OO UUMS
 DE UUMSQ 1743 149107
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 291307Z MAY 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO UUMSK/CG XXIV CORP
 UUMSQG/CG FIRST MARDIV
 UUMSQD/CG THIRD MARDIV
 UUMSQW/CG FIRST MAW
 UUMSQA/CG AMERICAL DIV
 UUMSQS/FIFTH SPEC FORCES
 INFO UUMS/COMUSMACV
 UUMSQI/CG I CORPS
 UUMSQR/CG SECOND ROKMC BDE
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 REPORTING ENEMY ACTIVITIES DURING CESSATION
 OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
 A. COMUSMACV 230001Z (PASEP)
 B. CG III MAF 232354Z
 1. REFS A AND B REFER. PARA 2.C. OF REF
 A MODIFIED IN THAT ALL MINOR AS WELL AS MAJOR
 INCIDENTS WILL BE PROMPTLY REPORTED BY TELECON
 TO COC THIS HQTS FOR FURTHER ACTION
 2. REPORTING PERIOD REMAINS 300600H MAY-310600H MAY69.

GP-4

BT

1743

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DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DRAFTER: MAJ. E.E. EVANS

SECTION: G-4 OPS 3D MAR DIV

CWO: *PS*

PRIORITY 291426 ZMAY69

FM: CG, THIRD MAR DIV
TO: THIRD RECON BN

//SECRET//

BEACH AND HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY

1. CONDUCT BEACH SURVEY AND HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY OF OCEANVIEW AREA
TO DETERMINE SUITABLE LANDING SITE FOR LCM-8'S TO OFF LOAD HEAVY

CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL.

2. SUBMIT SURVEY THIS HQ NLT 010800 JUNE 1969.

GP-4

BT

JCM 4406 RELEASED BY *Hubbard* TIME

(G-4 Ops)
(24)

291426
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFTER 3/CED/cgw
SEC G-3 OPNS PHONE 3180
CWO _____

PRIORITY 29 2245 Z MAY 69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) DGH
TO: THIRD MARINES DGH
FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
INFO: CG III MAF DNG
CG XXIV CORPS PHB

COPY TO: C/S
COC
G-3

//CONFIDENTIAL//

CHANGE OF OPCON

1. (C) EFFECTIVE 291600H MAY 69 CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN) ASSUMES OPCON OF
E/2/3 FROM 3D MARINES AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PASSES OPCON TO 1ST BDE, 5TH INF
DIV (MECH).

GP-4

CCN 4416 RELEASED BY Morgan DATE/TIME 30 06 30 H MAY 69

G-3

C/S/COC

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DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTED BY: ESK/ley
 SEC G-2 PH 3302
 CWO PLV

IMMEDIATE 300158 MAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
 TO: CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
 FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
 THIRD MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES
 NINTH MARINES
 TWELFTH MARINES
 THIRD TANK BN
 FIRST AVTRAJ BN
 MCB-62
 QTR BASE COORDINATOR
 DUCB BASE COORDINATOR

COPY TO:
 G-2
 G-3
 G-4
 GSV
 DIV ENGR

6-3
 HIST

UNCLAS

FORECAST VALID: 310800 TO 010800

1. I CORPS COASTAL: CLOUDY TO PARTLY CLOUDY, WITH SCATTERED RAINSHOWERS, OR THUNDERSHOWERS FOR THE AFTERNOON.

SKY CONDITION: 2500-3500 SCATTERED, 4000-6000 BROKEN VARIABLE SCATTERED, 8000-10000 BROKEN TO OVERCAST, HIGH BROKEN TO OVERCAST, INTERMITTENT 1500-2000 SCATTERED TO BROKEN, 4000-5000 BROKEN IF SHOWER ACTIVITY, GRADUALLY 3000-4000 SCATTERED TO BROKEN, 5000-7000 BROKEN, 8000-10000 BROKEN, HIGH BROKEN TO OVERCAST, INTERMITTENT CONDITIONS AS ABOVE IN SHOWERS.

VISIBILITY: 5-7 MI. IN SHOU D FOG, BECOMING UNRESTRICTED, INTERMITTENT 2-4 MI. IN LIGHT SHOWERS, AND 1-3 MI. IN MODERATE SHOWERS.

SURFACE WINDS: SOUTHWESTERLY 4-6 KTS, BECOMING VARIABLE 5-10 KTS.

2. I CORPS MOUNTAINS: SAME AS COASTAL, EXCEPT MORE SHOWER ACTIVITY OVER MOUNTAINS.

3. 48 HOUR OUTLOOK: LITTLE CHANGE TONIGHT, BUT PARTLY CLOUDY TOMORROW WITH INCREASING CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY.

MAX/MIN TEMP: 91/75

CON 4619 RELEASED BY DC Harrison TIME MAY69

2

3/4/GSV/ENGR

DECLASSIFIED

ROUTINE 300444 ZMAY69

FM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
TO: CG PROV MAG-39
INFO: CG FIRST MAW
THIRD MARINES
FIRST BN THIRD MAR

UNCLAS

SHOVE DOC
DRAFTER: 21/00R/240
SECTION: HLO PHONE 3134
G-3 W.O. *m*
G-2 W.O. *21/00R*
DCPO
APO
ACTION

ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION UNDER HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS

1. ON 22MAY69 ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST BN THIRD MAR WERE HELO-LIFTED UNDER EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS. THROUGHOUT THE HELO-EXTRACTION ENEMY MORTARS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE CONTINUALLY IMPACTED IN AND NEAR THE LZ. DUE PRIMARILY TO THE COURAGE AND AIRMANSHIP EXHIBITED BY MAJ D. O. MC GANA, THE TRANSPORT FLIGHT LEADER, AND THE OUTSTANDING SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE AERIAL OBSERVERS AND PILOTS OF VMO-6, THE LIFT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT LOSS OF LIFE OR AIRCRAFT.
2. IT IS REQUESTED THAT APPROPRIATE RECOGNITION BE GIVEN TO THOSE CONCERNED AND BE MADE A MATTER OF OFFICIAL RECORD.

MAJ GEN JONES SENDS

BT

CCN 4594 RELEASED BY Wm R Jones TIME _____ HMAY69

S/S

STAND

ok

81

* your friendly exchange man, Lt McNulty, was there on Maj Mc Lake's bird

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SECRET

DRAFTED 3P/HLC/11s
SEC G-3, Plans PH 3203
CWO Div

PRIORITY 301212 3 MAY69

FROM: CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
TO: FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)
INFO: CG TFF
THIRD MARINES

COPY TO: G-3

BT

//SECRET//

EMPLOYMENT OF REHAB BN IN A CONTINGENCY ROLE (U)

A. FIRST BDE, FIFTH INF DIV (M) MSG 200900Z MAY69 (S)

1. (S) REFERENCE A REQUESTED APPROVAL OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE REHAB BN UNDER CERTAIN CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS.

2. (S) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, APPROVAL IS GRANTED FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE REHAB BN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES CITED IN PARA

2 (A) AND (D) OF REFERENCE A. THE CIRCUMSTANCES CITED IN PARA 2 (E) ARE NOT DEFINITIVE ENOUGH FOR APPROVAL.

3. (S) THE DIV PLANS CITED IN PARA 2 (C) OF REFERENCE A WOULD CAUSE RETURN OF THE REHAB BN TO ITS PARENT ORGANIZATION FOR COMMITMENT, HENCE IT IS NOT ADVISABLE THAT YOUR CONTINGENCY PLANNING CONSIDER USE OF THIS BATTALION IN THE EVENT TF 1/61 WAS COMMITTED ELSEWHERE.

4. (S) IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THE APPROVAL GRANTED IN PARA 2 IS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY. IT WOULD OF NECESSITY BE SUBJECT TO A FINAL DECISION BASED ON THE OVERALL TACTICAL SITUATION AT THE TIME OF THE OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE REHAB BN.

GP-4

CCN 4566 REL BY Wm K Jones TIME 245 3 MAY69

30

3(PLANS)

3/3(OPS) 2/4/AR/F.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
PFO, San Francisco 96602

W/HLC/dac
3010
Ser I
11 May 69

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
To: CEO

Subj: Planning Critique, Caddo Creek (U)

Ref: (a) Your memo dtd 26 May 1969(C)

Encl: (1) Schedule of Planning Events
(2) Op Order 20-69

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following information is submitted.

2. General. The basic problem encountered in planning for the operation was one of lack of experience. With one or two exceptions, this represented the first exposure to C&D operations for most of the personnel involved in the planning phase. The experience gained from Caddo Creek will enhance chances of success in any subsequent C&D operations.

3. Permission to conduct C&D Operations. Obtaining permission of higher authority to conduct a C&D operation within the time allowed proved to be a problem. The initial request was sent by message on the morning of 13 May 1969. The MACV request for additional information was not received until the evening of the 16th and the answering message was transmitted by 0030 on the morning of the 17th. Further details were requested by MACV on the 17th and the final conformation was received by phone at 2055 on the 17th. This resulted in the postponement of D-Day from the 17th of May until the 19th of May. Since manipulative communications, of necessity, has already begun when this postponement was effected, they had to be continued for two extra days prior to the start of the operation. It is entirely possible that this delay tended to dilute the effect of the operation.

Recommendation: Based on this experience, in planning future C&D operations it should be possible to provide all the required details in the initial request, however in order to preclude another postponement it is recommended that the request be submitted at least one week prior to the tentative D-Day.

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4. Operation Order. The completed order was satisfactory if not entirely perfect. All phases and aspects of the operation were adequately covered in the order with the exception of Ground Surveillance. The use of an annex entitled "Sequence of Events" proved a satisfactory method of insuring that all concerned were operating from a common reference with regard to the major events scheduled for the operation.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the use of a Sequence of Events Annex should be continued and in subsequent C&D operation orders a Ground Surveillance Annex should also be included.

5. Planning Time. Adequate time for planning proved a problem and greater lead time should be allowed for the planning of any subsequent operation. This would allow for the assembling of a planning group and better organization of its efforts in the production of the final plan. This problem will be somewhat alleviated now that we have planned and executed one C&D operation. Further, any increase in planning time must be weighed against the inherent possibility of compromise if too much time were allowed.

Recommendation: In planning future C&D operations it is recommended that a minimum of 10 days be allowed from time of receipt of initial planning guidance until D-Day.

6. Communication Deception Group. The concept of using an existing battalion staff/communications group was entirely successful. By using not only the previously assigned call signs and frequencies but also the actual radio operators from the battalion a great deal of credence was given to the communications deception. The Rehab Battalion proved ideal in this regard since it presented an opportunity to employ an organic battalion while it was standing down from offensive operations.

Recommendation: It is recommended that for future C&D operations that the Rehab Bn be considered the primary source for personnel and equipment needed for communications deception.

F. M. BRAYNE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

DE UUMSK 5061 1510050
 ZNY SSSSS

Z 310045Z MAY 69

FM XXIV CORPS TAC PHB

TO UUMSQD/3RD MAP DIV DGH

UUMSJEA/101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEE

BT

SECRET LINDIS AVII-GCAV

AU9J: ARC LIGHT TARGETING (U)

1. (S) INFO RECEIVED FROM III MAF THIS DATE INDICATES THERE ARE
 VERY FEW ACTIVE PERPLANNED ARC LIGHT TARGETS AT THEIR HQS.
 AS OF THIS DATE THERE ARE NO ACTIVE PERPLANNED ARC LIGHT TARGETS AT
 XXIV CORPS HQS.

2. (S) REQUEST ADDRESSEES ASSESS EXISTING AND PLANNED OPERATIONS
 AND SUBMIT ARC LIGHT TARGET NOMINATIONS THAT COULD SUPPORT THESE
 OPERATIONS. REQUEST NOMINATION MSGS REFLECT SPECIFIC COMMANDERS
 ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPPORT THESE TARGETS COULD GIVE TO OPERATION
 (U) CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN ARC LIGHT AND LONG RANGE
 AND G-3 ARC LIGHT, THIS IS A MUST.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTER R. J. HOFMANN
SEC. ADJ PHONE 396
CWO PLT

PRIORITY 310527 ZMAY69

FROM: CO, THIRD MARDIV (REIN), FMF
TO: MARCORCRUITSTA CHGO

INFO: CO, THIRD BI, FOURTH MAR

UNCLAS E F T O

SUBJ: PFC R. E. TUBBS 245 77 02/0311 USMC

A. MARCORCRUITSTA CHGO MSG 191520Z MAY69

1. RLF A REFERS. SRB SUBJ MARINE FORWARDED YOUR ACTIVITY 5MAY69.

CCN 4693 RELEASED BY QAP TIME 310830H

ADJ

6-3
H13T

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