

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

3D MARDIV S&C FILE
BT# 488368


UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY JULY 68

S & C FILES

3D MARINES

00440-68



3D MAR

COMMAND

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DD FORM 5200 17

3d Marines
Copy 1 of 8

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
APO San Francisco 96602
3d MARINES
00440-68

3/0AN/row
5750
10 Aug 68
Ser.003A12368

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for Period 1 to 31 July 1968.

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A w/Ch #1
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) 3d Mar DivO 5750.1B (NOTAL)
(d) Maps: VIETNAM: AMS Series L7014 1:50,000 Sheets
6342I, 6332IV, 6342II, and 6442IV.

Encl: (1) 3d Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b), and (c) enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Upon removal of enclosure (1) this letter is downgraded to unclassified.

R. L. Michael Jr.
R. L. MICHAEL JR.

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
3d Marines
DOD DIR 5200.10
Page 1 of 8

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 TO 31 JULY 1968

INDEX

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

enclosure (1)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDERS

3d Marines(-) (Reinf)

Colonel W. A. HULL 1-14 July
Lieutenant Colonel V. R. STUART
15-31 July2. LOCATION. Republic of Vietnam.

3.

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Hq Co, 3d Marines

1st Lieutenant C. B. KRUCZAKOWSKI
1-8 July
1st Lieutenant J. L. HICKMAN
9-31 July

1st Bn, 3d Marines

Lieutenant Colonel G. V. JARMAN
1-31 July

2nd Bn, 3d Marines

Lieutenant Colonel M. DAVIS
1-31 July

3d Bn, 3d Marines

Lieutenant Colonel J. W. MARSH
1-28 July
Lieutenant Colonel W. H. BATES
28-31 July

1st Bn, 1st Marines

Lieutenant Colonel A. VAN WINALE
14-26 July

4.

ATTACHED UNITS

NONE.

5. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

Lieutenant Colonel V. R. STUART
1-14 July

S. 1.

Captain C. G. GIPSON 1-8 July
1st Lieutenant C. B. KRUCZAKOWSKI
9-31 July

S. 2.

Major J. G. HANRAHAN 1-23 July

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

	GySgt F. J. FLORIAN 23-26 July
	Major J. R. GUTHEINZ 27-31 July
S-3	Major D. J. MURPHY 1-10 July
	Major D. C. ROVEGNO 11-31 July
ALO	Major D. J. KIELY 1-31 July
S-3A	1st Lieutenant R. B. STONE
	1-8 July
	Captain K. E. FOX 8-31 July
S-3A/NBC Employment Off	1st Lieutenant R. R. RICE
	1-31 July
S-3A/NBC Defense Off	1st Lieutenant P. J. WYMES
	1-18 July
S-3A/Sniper Plt Ldr	1st Lieutenant C. V. SPAIDE
	1-18 July
S-3 Ln Off	1st Lieutenant D. T. MADISON
	17-31 July
S-3 Ln Off	1st Lieutenant R. T. STONE
	9-18 July
S-4	Major B. W. ADAMS 1-20 July
	Captain V. E. WALLACE 21-22 July
	Captain F. R. LENNON 23-31 July
S-4A	1st Lieutenant J. L. HICKMAN
	1-8 July
Rgt Supply Off	Captain V. E. WALLACE 1-31 July
Asst Rgt Supply Off	2nd Lieutenant R. G. HOWIE
	1-31 July
Asst Rgt Supply/Emb Off	1st Lieutenant F. H. GOSLIN
	1-3 July
MTO	1st Lieutenant D. M. BIENVENOUR
	1-6 July
	GySgt C. E. LAWLER 7-31 July
Comm Off	Captain A. A. JANSSEN 1-27 July
	Captain D. J. KENT 28-31 July

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

Asst Comm Off

2nd Lieutenant W. O. WEIDON
1-31 July

S-5

1st Lieutenant W. M. PUGH
1-20 July

Regt Surgeon

Lieutenant V. D. MASON, MD, USN
1-30 July
Lieutenant G. W. GREGORY, MD, USN
31 July

Chaplain

Commander F. R. McALISTER, CHC, USN
1-26 July
Lieutenant Commander H. H. BOND,
CHC, USN 26-31 July

Hq Commandant

1st Lieutenant C. B. KRUCZKOWSKI
1-8 July
1st Lieutenant J. L. HICKMAN
9-31 July6. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u> <u>OFF/ENL</u>	<u>USN</u> <u>OFF/ENL</u>
16 195	2 3

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The beginning of July found Third Marines "A" Command Group at a forward command post vicinity MAI XA THI (YD 285671) preparing for the upcoming Jones Creek operation. The remainder of the Regimental Headquarters Company was completing a displacement from Camp Kistler, Cua Viot (YD 345695) to Camp J.J. Carroll (YD 062547) in preparation for Third Marines assumption of responsibility for the LANCASTER II area of operation.

On 2 July, Third Marines commenced the Jones Creek operation (a part of NAPOLEON/SALINE) with its two battalions, 1/3 and 2/3. The scheme of maneuver involved sweeping north along Jones Creek to the DMZ with 1/3 on the left bank and 2/3 on the right bank, seizing a series of assigned objectives. The operation was in conjunction with OPERATION THOR, a massive air, arty and NGF attack on enemy forces/positions in and around DMZ (See Third Marines Overlay for Frag Order 14-68).

1/3 was directed to move out first and was given the additional mission of uncovering the LAI AN road and providing security for ARVN engineer effort on the road, but as it turned out the ARVN cancelled their plans for work on the road. On 4 July, 1/3 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. 2/3 commenced attack on the 5th of July but did not make enemy contact until 6 July. Both pushed on through the NVA resistance (SAF, AWF, mortars, arty, RPG, etc.) seizing and searching their assigned objectives. A considerable amount of enemy gear was captured and the NVA suffered significant losses while 1/3 and 2/3 sustained relatively few casualties. At 060600H, Third Marines assumed operational control of 3/3 and directed the battalion to commence an attack on its assigned objectives (on 2/3's right flank) on 7 July. 3/3 seized its objectives with negative contact. On 8 July the phasing out of the Jones Creek operation began. Each of Third Marine's battalions was helilifted successively to Quang Tri to undergo rehabilitation in the SURE program. The cumulative totals for the Jones Creek operation were:

Friendly

16 KIA
75 WIA (MED EVAC)
27 WIA (MINOR)

Enemy

230 NVA KIA
7 NVA POW
29 IWC
8 CSWC

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

On 9 July, Third Marines terminated the Jones Creek operation and passed responsibility for the NAPOLEON/SALINE AO to First Marines effective 091200H. The "A" Command Group then helilifted to Camp Carroll to commence planning for MULTI-REGIMENT OPERATIONS in LANCASTER II AO. (During this period of planning Third Marines was designated as division reserve).

At 092200H, Third Marines assumed OPCON of G/2/4 and the following day at 0830H assumed OPCON of D/1/4 and D/1/9. Also at 100830H, Third Marines assumed responsibility for the LANCASTER II AO.

Camp Carroll received 6 rnds 75mm arty on the morning of the 10th. Negative casualties were sustained in this enemy welcome gesture to the Regiment.

At 101800H, after 2/3 had moved into position at Thon Son Lam, Camp Carroll, and along Rt#9, Third Marines passed operational control of G/2/4, D/1/4 and D/1/9 to higher command. Third Marines directed 2/3 to assume responsibility for the defense of Thon Son Lam and Camp Carroll, to provide security for convoys traveling along Rt#9, and to designate a company as Sparrow Hawk and Bald Eagle force in the Regimental AO.

On 11 July, 3/3 arrived at Camp Carroll and relieved 2/3 of responsibility for the Camp Carroll defense.

On 12 July, Third Marines issued Frag Order 15-68 directing 3/3 to commence an ambush/anti-infiltration operation north of Rt#9 and the Cam Lo River (See Overlay to Frag Order 15-68) and 2/3 to reassume responsibility for Camp Carroll defense, Sparrow Hawk and Bald Eagle. On the same day at 1200H, Third Marines passed OPCON of M/3/3 to Task Force Hotel.

At 141600H, Third Marines assumed OPCON 1/1(-) and directed 1/1(-) to relieve 2/3 of its defense and security mission, thus enabling 2/3 to commence planning and preparation for the upcoming MULTI-REGIMENT Operation. At 141745H, Third Marines reassumed OPCON M/3/3 from Task Force Hotel.

Meanwhile 3/3 continued its anti-infiltration mission in its assigned AO, where they received sporadic mortar fire. They located enemy positions, ordnance, and equipment and recovered the bodies of 2 recon team members who had been killed in an earlier operation in that area. Effective 150800H,

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

Third Marines directed 3/3 to terminate the anti-infiltration operation and returned to Camp Carroll to prepare for the upcoming operation. 3/3 was also directed to assume the Sparrow Hawk and Bald Eagle responsibilities.

At 161200H, Third Marines assumed OPCON 1/3 from Task Force Hotel but allowed 1/3 to remain vic LZ Stud to continue plans and preparations until they jumped off on the operation.

On D-Day, 17 July, the OPERATION LANCASTER II July commenced with forces from 2nd ARVN Regiment attacking objectives on Third Marines left flank and Ninth Marine units attacking on the right flank. At 171400H, 2/3 helilifted to LZ Falcon (YD 032642) and moved to seize obj 5 (under light SAF and mortar fire) as directed by Third Marines Operation Order 3-68 (See Operation Overlay to Op Order 3-68).

On the morning of the 18th (D+1), 1/3 helilifted to LZ Crow and commenced an assault on obj 7. At 1354H, K/3/3 with the battalion "B" Command Group, designated Task Force Siorra, landed at LZ Cardinal and commenced seizure of obj 15 in order to observe any enemy movement in or out of the regimental AO on the left flank.

At 190830H (D+2), 3/3(-) was lifted into LZ Buzzard (YD 0360) to commence assault on obj 11.

In the period 17-25 July, the regiment's three battalions successively seized and secured their assigned objectives in the "Mutter's Ridge", "Helicopter Valley" and "Dong Ha Mountain" area, terrain through which U.S. force had not operated in over a year. Virtually no contact was made as 1/3, 2/3, and 3/3 seized their assigned objectives (1/3-objectives #7, #9, #17; 2/3 - objectives #5, #1, and #3; 3/3 - objectives #11 and #13). The battalions cleared numerous landing zones and located and destroyed many enemy bunker complexes and base camps. A considerable amount of enemy gear and ordnance was captured. Of particular significance were 2 - 75mm pack howitzers captured by 1/3/3 vic Dong Ha Mtn. These howitzers are believed to be the same ones that had harassed Camp Carroll with sporadic fire for months. Losses for the period were:

Friendly

5 KIA
26 WIA (MED EVAC)
9 WIA (MINOR)

Enemy

33 NVA KIA
4 IWC
3 CSWC

(Note - two of the friendly casualties were sustained during rocket attacks on 1/1 at Thon Son Lam).

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

At 221610H, Task Force Siorra was helilifted to LZ Joan to secure the area and establish a Fire Support Base there for continued operations to the West. Meanwhile 3/3 had been tasked to develop a permanent OP position on Dong Ha Mtn and was commencing work to fulfill that mission.

On 25 July 2/3 was helilifted back to Thon Son Lam in order that 1/1(-) could be relieved of its security mission.

On 26 July, Third Marines directed 2/3 to relieve 1/1(-). At 260900H, Third Marines passed OPCON 1/1(-) to higher command and gave 2/3 the defense, security, Sparrow Hawk, and Bald Eagle missions.

At 271028H, 1/3 helilifted to LZ Bocky in accordance with Third Marines Frag Order 24-68 (See Overlay to Frag Order 24-68) to conduct a two battalion search and destroy operation in the Cam Lo River Basin. In the afternoon of the 27th, 3/3(-) lifted to LZ Margo to provide a blocking force and develop a fire base to support future operations. 2/3 was designated regimental reserve. The operation continued through the end of the month without any significant contact. 1/3 and 3/3 experienced minor probes, but the NVA refrained from making contact. During the operation numerous new landing zones to facilitate future operations were developed, many security bunker complexes were destroyed, and many infiltration routes were explored. As the month ended, 3d Marines were making plans to withdraw its battalions from the field and began looking ahead to future operations.

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Combat Missions Assigned:

(a) Operation Jones Creek 021201H - 090600H July 68, 3d Marines conduct combat operations with a (3) battalion sweep up Jones Creek to locate and destroy enemy forces, fortifications, installations and supplies. Provide security for ARVN Engineer Bn conducting improvements on Lai Road. (See 3d Marines Frag 14-68 (Operations Overlay).

(b) Upon conclusion of Operation Jones Creek the 3d Marines commenced deployment to Camp Carroll, Kho Ghia, and Thon Son Lam as Division Reserve. The 3 organic battalions were passed to CG, 3d Mar Div for OPCON temporarily while undergoing the SURE Program. Upon conclusion of the SURE Program the battalions commenced their deployment. One battalion was deployed to LZ Stud and Ca Lu and one battalion to Thon Son Lam. Units operated in their assigned areas. 3d Marines' Headquarters, with one battalion, was based at Camp Carroll and assigned to operate in the area south of Route 9. The posture, as outlined, was maintained during period 101200H - 170600H and planning for a MULTI-REGIMENT OPERATION was initiated.

(c) Operation LANCASTER II, July

3d Marines (Reinf) conduct search and destroy operation in assigned area to locate and destroy enemy forces, fortifications, supply caches and be prepared to support 2nd ARVN Regiment by fire or maneuver.

2. Significant Operations Covered.

See paragraph 1 above.

3. Casualties Inflicted on the Enemy.

	<u>Opn Jones Creek</u>	<u>Opn Lancaster II</u>	<u>Tot</u>
(a) Confirmed NVA/VC KIA	220	33	253
(b) NVA PW	7	0	7
(c) Detainees (Unclassified)	2	0	2
(d) Detainees Released as Innocent Civilians	6	0	6

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

4. Casualties Sustained.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA (MED EVAC)</u>	<u>WIA (MINOR)</u>	<u>MIA</u>
3	8	11	0

5. New Techniques Employed. None.6. Command Relations.

(a) During the period 01 - 091400H July, the 3d Marines were OPCON to CG, 3d Mar Div.

(b) During the period 091401H to 312400H July, the 3d Marines were OPCON to Task Force Hotel of the 3d Mar Div.

7. Equipment. Allowance of T/E equipment supporting Headquarters Third Marines was considered adequate. No recommendations for modification of allowances were received during this period.

8. Logistics

(a) General. Logistically, July was a very big operational month. The transportation of supplies and Equipment to and from Units involved in operation Lancaster II, July was its self a major operation. All classes of supplies were airlifted out of LZ Stud and the LZ at Camp Carroll for the over all support of 1/3 - 2/3 - and 3/3. For the period 18 July to 29 July a total of over 1,000,000 pounds of resupply was airlifted by Helicopter to the units in the field. From 1 July to 31 July a large amount of supplies was transported from Dong Ha to Camp Carroll by truck. This included fresh chow for the Regimental messhall.

(b) Supply.

(1) FLSG-B at Dong Ha remained the primary source for all classes of supplies.

(2) Problems continued to exist in obtaining certain class II items such as repair parts for motor transport and communications equipment. Generally all other classes of supply were available providing transportation could be arranged to deliver the items where needed.

(c) Evacuation and Hospitalization. The Regimental Aid Station provided routine medical treatment and emergency first aid. Serious cases were evacuated to D-Medical Company for treatment and further evacuation.

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

(d) Transportation.

(1) 3d Marines has a truck platoon consisting of (15) 2 1/2 ton trucks, (9) cargo trailers, and (1) wrecker from 3d Motors, for general support. During this period 1 July to 31 July the truck platoon was utilized for troop moves based on the tactical situation of Operation Lancaster II. Also during this period large amounts of supplies were moved from Dong Ha to Camp Carroll. During the last few days of July while still in operation Lancaster II (3) 2 1/2 ton trucks were in support of 1/3 - 2/3 - 3/3 at LZ Stud.

(2) The Headquarters Company Motor Transport section maintained general support of the Regimental Headquarters. The motor transport section had some problems acquiring spare parts and batteries from the supply source.

(e) Service.

(1) Construction. No construction was accomplished during this period due to tactical commitment.

(2) Maintenance. Problems continued to exist in obtaining certain first and second echelon repair parts.

(3) Laundry Service from Vietnamese Civilians establishment in Cam Lo was very satisfactory.

(4) Sanitation for the month of July at Camp Carroll has been unsatisfactory. Some of the reasons are a shortage of personnel plus the fact that we just moved in the area at the beginning of the month. The biggest problem is poor policing, inadequate head facilities and showers. The heads need new buckets and fly proofing, the showers need new soakage pits. The mess hall has been and is still a problem primarily because of a lack of cooks and more supervisory personnel.

9. Civic Action. None.

10. Administration.

(a) Administrative personnel received on the job training during this period.

(b) Discipline. No disciplinary action during this period.

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

(c) Special Services provided:

- (1) Stationery kits
- (2) Game kits including athletic recreation equipment
- (3) Nightly motion pictures when possible
- (4) Free soda and beer

(d) Post exchange facilities were available at Camp Carroll and continued to carry basic health and comfort items and other merchandise.

(e) A postal unit from the Division Post Office was in operation and served all units.

11. Personnel

(a) There is a critical shortage of: 9999 First Sergeant, 8421 Career Advisor.

(b) Summary:

- (1) Gains: 6 MCOff 21 MCEnl 2 USNOff 0 USNEnl
- (2) Losses: 10 MCOff 20 MCEnl 2 USNOff 0 USNEnl
- (3) Monthly average strength
16 MCOff 195 MCEnl 2 USNOff 3 USNEnl
- (4) Net loss/gain:
4/0 MCOff 0/1 MCEnl 0/0 USNOff 0/0 USNEnl
- (5) Emergency leave. 3

(c) Awards. During the reporting period the following awards were presented:

- 13 Purple Hearts
- 1 Air Strike/Flight Medal
- 1 Letter of appreciation
- 2 Crosses of Gallantry (RVN)

(d) Morale is considered to be from excellent to outstanding. The R & R program and the motion pictures were contributing factors. There were 13 out of country and 5 in country R & R quotas used during this period.

(e) Chaplain:

(1) Sunday Services

- | | |
|------------------------|----------------|
| (a) 4 Protestant | 103 Attendance |
| (b) 4 Catholic | 70 Attendance |
| (c) 4 Latter Day Saint | 12 Attendance |

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

(2) Professional Counselling Cases - 32.

12. Intelligence.

(a) Significant Events. During the early part of July, there was one engagement with the enemy. This occurred in the Napoleon/Saline AO during the 3d Marine's special operation along the Song Ben Ngu (Jones Creek). The enemy avoided contact for the remainder of the month, as the 3d Marines conducted operations in the Northern portion of the Lancaster AO.

(1) The Jones Creek engagement commenced on the 2nd, at Lai An (YD 2472), and lasted until the 9th. The enemy force encountered is believed to have been the entire 48th Regiment, based on the size of the enemy force, although only the 1st and 3d Battalions and separate engineer and transportation companies of the 48th were positively identified. Major contact was broken as the enemy withdrew North into the Demilitarized Zone.

(2) As in the past Jones Creek area contacts, the enemy fought from well-prepared defensive positions, and he was supported by coordinated artillery fire from North of the Ben Hai River. As the enemy was pushed to the Southern edge of the DMZ, extensive concertina wire covered by enemy fire were encountered. It was later learned that this wire had been emplaced by the 2nd ARVN Regiment prior to the enemy's Tet offensive.

(3) In the Lancaster area which the 3d Marines assumed on the 9th, the enemy withdrew either North or West, most probably North, as our battalions swept Dong Ha Mountain and the two ridges to the North. 2/3, the Northernmost battalion, had minor contact with an enemy delaying force on the 18th, and received mortar fire. With the exception of this one encounter, however, the enemy avoided infantry contact. Sweeping battalions found many unoccupied bunkers, empty in most cases, although a few contained NVA material. The most significant find was two 75mm howitzers emplaced in bunkers with firing ports facing Camp Carroll.

(4) Very little recent trace of the enemy was found in end-of-the-month operations in the Northwestern part of the AO. There was contact with only one NVA, although a small number of others were observed. Prior to the operation,

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

there had been ADSID reports of vehicular activity in the area, but no road or vehicle tracks were discovered.

(5) As the month ended, numerous reports of enemy movement into the 3d Marines AO and into the DMZ immediately North of the AO were received from usually reliable sources. However, the enemy continued to avoid contact. It appears that he is either just infiltrating through the area or also that he is moving into position for future action.

(6) Because of the change of operating area, no local trends are revealed when July statistics are compared with previous months.

(b) Contacts and Incidents DAY NIGHT TOTAL

(1) Small Arms/Snipers

(a) Opn Jones Creek

1stBn, 3d Mar	6	1	7
2ndBn, 3d Mar	4	0	4

(b) Lancaster II

1stBn, 9th Mar	1	0	1
2ndBn, 3d Mar	3	0	3
1stBn, 1st Mar	2	1	3
1stBn, 3d Mar	2	0	2
Other	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>
Total for Month	22	2	24

(2) Grenades

(a) Opn Jones Creek	0	0	0
---------------------	---	---	---

(b) Lancaster II

3dBn, 3d Mar	0	2	2
Other	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Total for month	1	2	3

(3) Mines

(a) Opn Jones Creek

1stBn, 3d Mar	1	2	3
2ndBn, 3d Mar	4	0	4

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

(b) Lancaster II

1stBn, 3d Mar	1	0	1
3dBn, 3d Mar	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
Total for month	9	2	11

(4) Booby Trap(a) Opn Jones Creek

2ndBn, 3d Mar	1	0	1
1stBn, 3d Mar	3	0	3

(b) Lancaster II

2ndBn, 3d Mar	1	0	1
1stBn, 3d Mar	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Total for month	6	0	6

(5) Sightings-Where Enemy Did Not Fire or Return Fire(a) Opn Jones Creek

1stBn, 3d Mar	1	1	2
2ndBn, 3d Mar	4	0	4

(b) Lancaster II

1stBn, 1st Mar	1	2	3
1stBn, 3d Mar	0	2	2
2ndBn, 3d Mar	0	3	3
3dBn, 3d Mar	4	5	9
Other	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>
Total for month	12	14	26

(6) Mortar/Arty/Rocket Fire(a) Opn Jones Creek

1stBn, 3d Mar	9	2	11
2ndBn, 3d Mar	5	3	8
1st Amtrac Bn	0	1	1

(b) Lancaster II

1stBn, 1st Mar	3	1	4
1stBn, 9th Mar	2	0	2

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

2ndBn, 3d Mar	2	1	3
3dBn, 3d Mar	5	1	6
Camp Carroll	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Total for month	27	9	36

(7) Unidentified Flying
Lights (Possible
Helicopters) Observed

(a) Opn Jones Creek

1st Amtrac Bn	0	1	1
---------------	---	---	---

(b) Lancaster II	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total for month	0	1	1

(c) Enemy Losses

(1) Personnel Opn Jones Creek Opn Lancaster II Total

(a) Confirmed NVA/VC KIA	220	33	253
(b) NVA PW	7	0	7
(c) Detainees (Unclassified)	2	0	2
(d) Detainees Released as Innocent Civilians	6	0	6

(2) Material

(a) Weapons

(1) SRS	11	1	12
(2) AK-47	14	1	15
(3) RPD	1	0	1
(4) LMG #56	5	0	5
(5) HMG #57	0	1	1
(6) 75mm Pack How.	0	2	2
(7) 60mm Mortar Tube	0	1	1
(8) 82mm Mortar Tube	2	1	3
(9) Bolt Action Rifle (Unk Type)	1	0	1
(10) U.S. M-16	0	3	3
(11) 45 Cal. Pistol	0	1	1
(12) Pistol (Unk Type)	0	2	2

(b) Ammunition

(1) 82mm Mortar Rnds	140	158	298
----------------------	-----	-----	-----

Enclosure (1)
 SECRET

SECRET

(2)	7.62mm Rnds	755	555	1,310
(3)	60mm Mortar Rnds	21	33	54
(4)	RPG-2 Rnds	26	21	47
(5)	RPG-7 Rnds	20	10	30
(6)	.50 Cal Rnds	50	4,400	4,450
(7)	75 RR Rnds	0	1	1
(8)	Rifle Grenades	0	55	55
(9)	75mm Pack How. Rnds	0	26	26
(10)	.30 Cal Rnds	0	500	500

(c) Explosives

(1)	Bangalore Torpedo	9	0	9
(2)	TNT (lbs)	60	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	67 $\frac{1}{2}$
(3)	Blasting Cap	11	0	11
(4)	ChiCom Grenades	15	38	53
(5)	U.S. bombs	1	3	4
(6)	AT Mines	2	5	7
(7)	ChiCom Claymore	0	6	6
(8)	U.S. M-26 Grenades	0	15	15
(9)	Dunanite (Case)	0	1	1

(d) Weapons Accessories

(1)	AK-47 Magazines	8	15	23
(2)	Electric Detonator	2	0	2
(3)	Drum Magazines	0	1	1
(4)	60mm Mortar Base Plate	0	1	1
(5)	12.7 AAG Carriage	0	1	1
(6)	75mm Pack How. Parts	0	Unknown	

(e) Individual Equipment

(1)	Packs	1	14	15
(2)	Poncho	0	1	1
(3)	Flashlight	0	2	2
(4)	Gas Mask	0	27	27
(5)	E-Tool	0	1	1
(6)	Gas Mask Filters	0	2	2
(7)	Picks	0	2	2
(8)	Pocket Knife	0	1	1
(9)	Helmets	0	2	2
(10)	Belts	0	2	2
(11)	Canteens	0	3	3

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

(12) Shovels	0	8	8
(13) Whistle	0	1	1
(14) Cooking Pots	0	3	3
(15) Assorted Messgear			

(f) Communication Equipment

(1) PRC-93	0	1	1
(2) PRC-25	0	1	1
(3) Radio Whip Antenna Base	0	1	1

(g) <u>Medical Supplies</u>	0	0	0
-----------------------------	---	---	---

(h) Documents

(1) Papers	0	7	7
(2) Pictures	0	3	3
(3) Diary	0	1	1

(i) <u>Rice (lbs)</u>	0	520	520
-----------------------	---	-----	-----

Old Chow (Unknown Amount)

(j) Fortifications and Positions

(1) Bunkers	20	323	343
(2) Concertine Wire	Unk		
(3) Fighting Holes	0	171	171
(4) Trenchlines	0	1	1
(5) Mortar Positions	0	5	5
(6) AW Positions	0	7	7
(7) Base Camp	0	1	1
(8) Trails	0	4	4

(d) Enemy Observed

(1) Opn Jones Creek

Size of Unit	Location	Date
2	246721	6 July
3	267756	6 "
3	258734	6 "
15	251742	7 "

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

(2) Lancaster II

12	960581	11	July
4	062592	12	"
2	076587	12	"
7	958607	12	"
20	961559	12	"
3	080557	14	"
4	873573	16	"
2	056576	19	"
1	014614	19	"
11	008552	20	"
1	026599	20	"
15	06355410	22	"
1	063541	22	"
5	063563	22	"
1	945601	26	"
4	195709	27	"
1	896609	29	"
3	102622	30	"
2	019568	31	"
4	898608	31	"
1	898608	31	"

(e) Trend. Summary of incidents on a monthly basis for past 3 months.

	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
SAF	33	15	24
Surprise Firing Devices	9	8	4
Mines	9	12	11
Grenades	3	0	3
Mortar/Arty/Rocket Fire	62	14	36
Movement W/O Fire	26	60	26
Engagements	10	0	1
Assassinations	0	0	0
Sabotage	0	0	0
Kidnappings	0	0	0
Demonstrations	0	0	0
Intimidation	0	0	0
Rewards Paid	2	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>
	155	115	106

Enclosure (1.)
SECRET

SECRET

13. Communications(a) General

(1) During the month of June, communications were maintained in support of the Third Marine Regiment.

(2) During this period of time, the Regimental repair shop received 49 pieces of communications equipment for repair. Of these, 18 pieces were evacuated to a higher echelon for repair. The remainder were repaired and returned to the using section.

(3) The Regimental Message Center processed a total of 1328 messages. Of the 1160 incoming messages 754 were received electrically and 406 by courier. Of the 168 outgoing messages 147 were sent electrically and 19 by courier.

(b) Sequential Listing of Events

(1) 2 July - At 1500 1st Marines began taking over operation of the existing communication facilities at Cua Viet. At 1630 3d Marines secured all communications at Cua Viet.

(2) 3 July - Left Cua Viet

(3) 4 July - Arrived at Camp Carroll

(4) 5 July - At 0900 3d Marines took over the communications facilities at Camp Carroll from the 4th Marines.

(5) 9 July - Alpha Command Group Returned from Jones Creek.

(6) 13 July - AN/TRC-97 was installed at Camp Carroll as the primary source of radio relay communications between 3d Marines and the 3d Marine Division. Organic AN/TRC-27's reverted to a back-up status.

(7) 18 July - Detached one radio operator with radio equipment to LZ Stud to set up an S-4 liaison net.

(8) 20 July - Detached one radio operator to the 3d Battalion 3d Marines as a liaison operator to Task Force Sierra.

(9) 27 July - A log Periodic Antenna, AS-2236/GRC was installed and operated on Regimental Tactical Radio Net I. It was used with success and eliminated the problems encountered in operating over difficult terrain.

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

14. Weather

(a) Weather during the month of July was generally hot, and skies were generally clear. There was one three-day period of rain during the latter part of the month. Except for that one period, rainfall was limited to widely scattered showers.

(b) The major effect of the weather was a high incident of heat casualties. Aerial and ground observation remained excellent except during the three days of rain and during showers. Then, visibility was only slightly limited.

(c) Statistics were as follows:

	<u>Opn Jones Creek</u>	<u>Lancaster II</u>
Average high temperature	96	95
Average low temperature	81	79
Average humidity	73%	70%

(d) Except for the three-day July rain, weather was essentially the same as in June.

15. Fire Support(a) Units Providing Artillery Support

(1) Direct Support

A/1/12
B/1/12
C/1/12
W/1/12
W/3/12
Det, Prov 155mm How Btry
PH How - 6, 1st AndAmphip Co.

(2) General Support - Reinforcing

K/4/12
M/4/12
A/1/40 (USA)
B/1/40 (USA)
B/1/11
1st 8" How Btry
108th U.S. Army Field Arty Gp.

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

(b) Displacements

2 July - B/1/12 from C-2 to My Loc (YD 3068)
 7 July - A/1/12 from C-3 to Cua Viet (YD 3469)
 9 July - B/1/12 from My Loc to Thon Son Lam
 12 July - C/1/12 from Mai Xa Thi to Camp Carroll
 15 July - A/1/12 from Cua Viet to Camp Carroll
 26 July - A/1/12 from Carroll to LZ Joan (XD 9360)
 27 July - C/1/12 from Carroll to LZ Margo (XD 9061)
 26 July - Det W/3/12 from Carroll to LZ Becky, attached
 1/3 (XD 8561).
 28 July - Det Prov 155mm How Btry from LZ Cates to LZ
 Joan.

(c) Missions Opn Jones Creek Opn Lancaster II

Obs	134	533
H&I	26	403
Total	158	1716

(d) Ammunition Expended Opn Jones Creek Opn Lancaster II

105	HE	6700	19758
	WP	319	1535
	ILLUM	248	193
	HC	39	26
	COFRAM	100	
107	HE	219	858
	WP		74
	ILLUM		53
155	HE		1729
	WP		172
	ILLUM		28
	TOTALS:	7616	24426

(e) Enemy Casualties Inflicted

Opn Jones Creek	32
Opn Lancaster II	3

(f) Control and Coordination. 3d Battalion, 12th Marines
 with it's OPCON and organic units provided direct support of
 reinforcing fires to units of the 3d Marines. The 3/12 CP
 displaced with the regimental CP on all occasions. Initial
 tactical and technical fire direction was centralized at Camp

Enclosure (1)
 SECRET

SECRET

Carroll, however as the batteries occupied the fire bases, technical fire direction was relinquished for ease of handling and speed in response. Fire Support Coordination was performed from Camp Carroll, with direct communications between adjacent, higher and lower echelons.

16. Air Support.

(a) During the month of July 1968, the 3d Marines received air support from 1st MAW, 7th Air Force, and U.S. Army units. Helicopter support was provided by MAG-36, MAG-39 and MAG-16. Fixed Wing Support came from MAG-11, MAG-12, and MAG-13 as well as from 7th Air Force units. During July, air support was used in both Operations Jones Creek and Lancaster II. A breakdown of support is as follows:

(b) MED EVACS

	US WIA	US ILL	US NBC	US KIA	VC/NVA KIA
0/3	8	16	8	0	0
1/3	68	19	15	4	1
2/3	56	125	25	7	0
3/3	7	28	25	0	0
1/1	5	14	9	3	0
2/1	0	6	1	0	0
1st Amtrac Bn	0	0	2	0	0
Totals:	144	208	85	14	1 = 45?

(c) CAS: 106 Flights 212 A/C 625,250# Ord.
 CSS: 58 Flights 66 A/C 256,000# Ord.

(d) R/S: 1/3 230470#
 2/3 309448#
 3/3 326093#
 12th Mar 706111#
 Total: 1572122#

(e) A/O: Klondike 103 Flights 190 1/2 Hrs.
 Sandbox 10 Flights 12 1/2 Hrs.
 Trail 13 Flights 29 1/2 Hrs.
 Total: 126 Flights 232 Hrs.

(f) G/S: 26 Flights 53 A/C 912 Rockets Expen.

Enclosure (1.)
 SECRET

SECRET

(g) C&C:	0/3	33	Flights	65	A/C	408	Pax	20	V/R's	16	MED	EVACS
		1/3				70	Pax	7	V/R's	10	MED	EVACS
		2/3				58	Pax	4	V/R's	30	MED	EVACS
		3/3				42	Pax	7	V/R's	6	MED	EVACS
		1/1				5	Pax	0	V/R's	5	MED	EVACS
		2/1				2	Pax	1	V/R's	0	MED	EVACS
			1st Amtrac Bn			5	Pax	0	V/R's	0	MED	EVACS
			Totals:			590	Pax	39	V/R's	67	MED	EVACS

(h) 3858 Control Functions
124.4 Average Per Day

High Per Day 233 on 29 July
Low Per Day 21 on 10 July

(i) 10 Psywar Birds 73/4 Hrs.
1 Spooky 2 Hrs.
9 Bn Troop Lifts (includes Bn - Lifts)
8 Co Troop Lifts (includes Co - Lifts)
3 Gun Btry Lifts
2 Regt. Com. Grp. Lifts

17. Psychological Operation. None.

18. Training

(a) Objectives. To develop individuals and units to the state of operational readiness requisite to successful combat operations in RVN.

(b) Highlights

- (1) Approximately 75 men test fired M-16 rifles.
- (2) One Lieutenant attended the Comm Crypto Security School in Yokosuka Japan.
- (3) One Corporal and one Private First Class attended NCO School on Okinawa.
- (4) One Sergeant attended the 16th Div Personal Response Course.
- (5) Three Corporals and two Private First Class attended Ground Surveillance Radar (AN/PPS-6) School at Dong Ha.

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET

PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS


- ✓ 1. Third Marines Frag Order 14-68 (Overlay)
- ✓ 2. Third Marines Frag Order 15-68 (Overlay)
- ✓ 3. Third Marines Op Order 3-68 (Overlay)
- ✓ 4. Third Marines Frag Order 24-68 (Overlay)
- ✓ 5. N/ARPT (OPN NAPOLEON/GOLINE
- ✓ 6. MSG-121040 - RETA TASK FORCE HOTEL PLAN 1-68
- ✓ 7. MSG-130345 - RETA Black Bottom msg

Enclosure (1)
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

3D MARDIV S&C FILE
BT# 473668



A/H RPT (MARPOLEON/SHINE)

29 FEB - 2504 1968

SECRET

SECRET
TAB-15

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

3d Marines
Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

~~SECRET~~

S & C FILES

3D MARINES

00424-68

3/DCR/bb

3100

26 July 1968

SerNo: 00424-68

Copy A of 11 Copies

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Reinf) FMF

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report

Ref: (a) Maps, VIETNAM AMS Series L7014, 1:50,000 Sheets
6442 IV
(b) DivO 3100.1D
(c) 3d MarDiv OpO 5-68

1. Code Name. NAPOLLEON/SALINE (Search and Destroy)
2. Dates of Operation. 290630H February - 090600H July 1968
3. Location. COA VIET RIVER COMPLEX, CAMP KISTLER (YD 349694)
QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Task Organization.

3d Marines (Reinf)
Hq Co, 3d Marines
3d Bn, 1st Marines
2nd Bn, 4th Marines

1st Bn, 3d Marines

I & M/3/4 OPCON TO 1/3
2nd Bn, 3d Marines
3d Bn, 3d Marines
1st Bn, 9th Marines

2nd Bn, 9th Marines
3d Bn, 9th Marines
1st Amtrac Bn,

B Co, 3d Engr Bn

3d Bn, 21st Inf, 196th
Light Inf Bde

1st Bn, 5th Cav, 1st
Air Cav Div

C Co, 1st Bn, 8th Cav,
1st Air Cav Div

D Co, 1st Bn, 9th Cav,
1st Cav Div

COL M. A. HULL (29FEB-09JUL)
LT G. B. KRUCZKOWSKI (29FEB-09JULY)
LT COL M. MCGOWAN (29FEB-05MAR)
LT COL C. W. WEISE (05MAR-02MAY)
MAJOR C. W. KNAPP (03MAY-05MAY)
LT COL L. A. RANN (06MAY-31MAY)
LT COL R. W. GOODALE (01MAR-15APR)
LT COL C. V. JARMAN (16APR-05JUN)
LT COL C. V. JARMAN (25JUN-09JUL)
05MAY-08MAY)
LT COL M. DAVIS (25JUN-09JUL)
LT COL J. W. MARSH (31MAY-09JUL)
LT COL M. V. PALATAS (26MAY-27MAY)
LT COL M. V. PALATAS (01JUN-02JUN)
LT COL F. S. KNIGHT (26MAY-31MAY)
LT COL D. J. LAMONTAGNE (18MAY-19MAY)
LT COL E. R. TONER (29FEB-18MAR)
LT COL G. F. MEYERS (19MAR-09JUL)
LT A. R. BREHM (29FEB-12APR)
CAPT B. M. RANTA (13APR-09JUL)
LT COL W. P. SNYDER (01MAY-16MAY)

LT COL C. E. JORDAN JR. (06MAY-08MAY)

CAPT C. P. SCHELL (05JUN-17JUN)

CAPT W. A. CHABOUDY (17JUN-30JUN)

Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

A TROOP, 3d Squadron 5th CAPT S. S. MCLAUGHLIN (05JUN-20JUN)
 Armored Cav Div
 C TROOP, 3d Squadron 5th CAPT P. METHERALL (20JUN-30JUN)
 Armored Cav Div
 3d Bn, 12th Marines LT COL J. A. COMO

5. Supporting Arms.

a. Artillery Support.

(1) 3d Bn, 12th Marines together with reinforcing Artillery and Naval GunFire Support Ships provided direct support to the battalions of the 3d Marines during the period 29 February to 09 July 1968. General support and reinforcing fires were provided by the 12th Marines Units in DONG HA and C-1.

(2) The following is a summary of unit locations, significant displacements, missions and ammunition expended during the operation.

a. MARCH

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
G Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	01-31 Mar
I Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	01-31 Mar
W Btry 3/12	CUA VIET	15-31 Mar
2nd PROV 155 HOW Btry	QUANG TRI	01-31 Mar
1st Plt, 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor CO.	CUA VIET	01-31 Mar
C Btry 1/11	CUA VIET	01-31 Mar
Det Btry W/1/12	C-4	01-31 Mar
W Btry 1/11	C-4	01-15 Mar

Significant Displacements.

- (1) 15 Mar W/1/11 From C-4 to CAMP CARROLL. OPCON to 1/12.
- (2) 15 Mar W/3/12 from CAMP CARROLL to CUA VIET. OPCON to 3/12 from 1/12.
- (3) 31 Mar 1st Plt, 1st Arm Amph Trac CO, from CUA VIET to C-4.
- (4) 31 Mar Det W/3/12 from CUA VIET to C-4.

Missions Fired

Ammunition Expended.

Observed	540	105MM	16349
Unobserved	442	4.2"	6812
H&Is	1198		
TOTALS	2180		

DECLASSIFIED

b. APRIL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNIT	LOCATION	DATE
G Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	01-27 Apr
I Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	01-30 Apr
W Btry 3/12	CUA VIET	01-30 Apr
2nd PROV 155 HOW (-)	QUANG TRI	01-30 Apr
HOW 6 Plt	CUA VIET	01-30 Apr
C Btry 1/11	CUA VIET	01-30 Apr
Det W/1/12	C-4	01-30 Apr
A Btry 1/40 (USA)	QUANG TRI	17-30 Apr

Significant Displacements.

(1) 02 Apr 1st Plt, 1st Armd Amph Tractor CO, displaced from C-4 to CUA VIET.

(2) 17 Apr A/1/40 (USA) displaced to QUANG TRI under OPCON of 3/12.

(3) 17 Apr I/3/12 displaced from QUANG TRI to WONDER BEACH.

(4) 27 Apr G/3/12 displaced to KHE SAHN and passed OPCON to 1/11.

THROUGH

(5) 27 Apr I/3/12 from WONDER BEACH to QUANG TRI.

Missions Fired.Ammunition Expended

Observed	201	105 - 9596
Unobserved	129	107 - 3549
H&I's	1069	

Naval GunFireAmmunition Expended

5/38	8412	5"/38 - 8412
5/54	859	5"/54 - 859
8/55	1237	8"/55 - 1237

c. MAY

UNIT	LOCATION	DATE
I Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	01-31 May
2nd PROV 155 HOW (-)	QUANG TRI	01-31 May
A Btry 1/40 (USA)	QUANG TRI	01-03 May
D Btry 3/82 (USA)	MAI XI THI	10-17 May
C Btry 1/11	CUA VIET	01-31 May
H Btry 3/12	CUA VIET	26-31 May
W Btry 3/12	MAI XI THI	01-31 May
Det W Btry 1/12	C-4	01-31 May
1st Plt, 1st Armd Amph CO	CUA VIET	01-18 May
3d Plt, 1st Armd Amph CO	CUA VIET	19-31 May

Significant Displacements.

UNCLASSIFIED

- (1) 03 May A/1/40 CHOPPED to 1/13 (YD312544).
- (2) 10 May D/3/82 MAI XI THI (YD286671). 17 May D/3/82 was helilifted to PHU BAI area.
- (3) 19 May 1stPlt, 1st Armd Amphib CO was relieved in place (XD345697) by the 3dPlt.

Missions FiredAmmunition Expended

Observed 521
 Unobserved 113
 H&I's 1286
 TOTAL 1950

105 - 26235
 107 - 8464
 155 - 465

a. JUNE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
C Btry 1/11	CUA VIET	01-03 Jun
I Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	01-11 Jun
H Btry 3/12	CUA VIET	01-23 Jun
G Btry 1/12	CUA VIET	23-24 Jun
G Btry 1/12	MAI XI THI	25-30 Jun
A Btry 1/12	C-3	25-30 Jun
B Btry 3/12	C-2	25-30 Jun
W Btry 3/12	CUA VIET	01-16 Jun
W Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	17-30 Jun
3dPlt 1st Armd Amphib	CUA VIET	01-30 Jun
Det W Btry 1/12	C-4	01-30 Jun
C Btry 1/40 (USA)	C-1	25-30 Jun

Significant Displacements.

- (1) 13 Jun H Btry 3/12 from CUA VIET 225675 to 340694.
- (2) 16 Jun W Btry 3/12 from MAI XI THI 280688 to 309541.
- (3) 23 Jun C Btry 1/12 from CA LU 015453 to 346694.
 CUA VIET.
- (4) 24 Jun C Btry 1/12 from CUA VIET to MAI XI THI.
- (5) 25 Jun A Btry 1/12 from PHON SON LAI to C-3.
- (6) 24 Jun B Btry 1/12 to C-2.

Missions FiredAmmunition Expended

Observed 211 NAPOLEON/SALINE
 Unobserved 325
 H&I's 785
 TOTAL 1321

105 - 7058 T88082
 107 - 2890
 155 - 54

e. JULY

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
A Btry 1/12	C-3	01-07 Jul
A Btry 1/12	CUA VIET	07-09 Jul
B Btry 1/12	C-2	01 Jul
B Btry 1/12	MY LOC (YD305680)	02-09 Jul
C Btry 1/12	MAI XI THI (YD282620)	01-09 Jul
Mortar Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	01-09 Jul
3dDet HOW-6	CUA VIET	01-09 Jul
Det Mortar Btry 1/12	C-4	01-09 Jul

Significant Displacements

(1) 01 Jul B/1/12 from C-2 to MY LOC (YD 305680) OPCON 3/12.

(2) 07 Jul A/1/12 from C-3 to CUA VIET (YD 345695) OPCON 3/12.

Missions FiredAmmunition Expended

Observed	58	105	7255	
Unobserved	77	4.2	230	
H&I's	349	8"/55	54	TEROR2
TOTAL	484	5"/54	35	
		5"/38	176	

f. Summary of Unit Movements, Locations and Dates

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
G Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	01Mar-27Apr
I Btry 3/12	QUANG TRI	01Mar-17Apr
	WUNDER BEACH	17Apr-27Apr
	QUANG TRI	27Apr-14Jun
W Btry 3/12	MAI XI THI	15Mar-16Jun
2ndPROV 155 HOW Btry(-)	QUANG TRI	01Mar-31May
1stPlt, 1st Armored		
Amphibian Tractor CO	CUA VIET	19May-09Jul
C Btry 1/11	CUA VIET	01Mar-03Jun
W Btry 1/11	C-4	01Mar-15Mar
Det W Btry 1/12	C-4	01Mar-09Jul
A Btry 1/40 (USA)	QUANG TRI	17Apr-30Apr
D Btry 3/82 (USA)	MAI XI THI	10May-17May
H Btry 3/12	C-2	27May-15Jun
H Btry 3/12	CUA VIET	16Jun-23Jun
C Btry 1/12	CUA VIET	23Jun-24Jun
	MAI XI THI	24Jun-09Jul
A Btry 1/12	CUA VIET	07Jul-09Jul
B Btry 1/12	MY LOC	01Jul-09Jul

g. Total Missions Fired

Observed	1665
Unobserved	1178
H&I's	4980

TEROR2

UNCLASSIFIED

h. Total Ammunition Expended

<u>105</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>NGF</u>	
HE 58409	18190	519	8"/55	1291
WP 3794	656		5"/54	894
ILLUM 3386	2888		5"/38	8588
FIRECRACKER 312	CS 190			
TOTAL	66544	519		10773

(3) Control and Coordination

(a) 3d Bn, 12th Marines exercised tactical control and provided technical fire direction for all batteries under its OPCON.

(b) Mission clearance was provided by the ground unit originating the mission, the Regimental FSCC, and higher headquarters when necessary. All missions falling within 500 Meters of another unit unit boundary were cleared by the next higher headquarters.

b. Air Support

(1) During Operation NAPOLBON/SALINE, 3d Marine units received Air Support from 1st Marine Air Wing units, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, 7th Air Force, and U. S. Army units. TAROE2

(2) Fixed Wing support came from MAG's 11, 12, and 13 and included close and direct Air Support strikes. Photographic Reconnaissance, Helo Escort, Radar Bombing (TPQ-10) aerial mining, illumination, and aerial observer. 7th Air Force units provided close and direct air strikes, aerial observer, photo reconnaissance illumination and Radar Bombing (TPQ-10). In addition, the capabilities provided by the AC-47 "Spooky" aircraft were utilized on numerous occasions with great effectiveness and contributed a great deal to the success of the operation. Strategic Air Command strikes were also provided in an effort to reduce the amount of enemy artillery and logistic support with a profound effect.

(3) Aerial Observer flights by U.S. Army aircraft and pilots were timely and effective and provided the key to the outstanding utilization of fixed wing support. Rotary Wing support was provided almost solely by USMC units, MAG's 16, 36, and 39 provided the majority of support in the form of River Reconnaissance. During the Operation, rotary wing support took the form of Command and Control troop lift, MED-EVAC, Resupply, Close Air Support and observation flights significantly. 3d Marine units were able to execute several heliborne assaults the largest of which was a battalion assault of the LE XUYEN area providing once again the great capability to maneuver rapidly with helicopter aircraft.

TAROE2

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) The Air Support throughout the Operation was outstanding and the determination and devotion to duty exemplified by all aircrews was commendable to the overall success of this Operation. Though there were many instances of outstanding performance, most noteworthy is an incident which occurred during the battle for DAI DQ on 05 May, which serves as an example of the superior support provided and the courage and devotion of the aircrew involved.

(5) During a MEDEVAC into a hotly contested area, a CH-46 transport, space 1-13 landed under fire to pick up casualties. Lifting from the zone the pilot was informed that more wounded were staged a short distance away though already hit and subjected to continuous and intense fire. Space 1-13 attempted the second rescue. In the attempt Space 1-13 was shot down. Without hesitation, his wing man, armed into the zone under fire provided by HUEY aircraft, and completed the daring rescue of troops and aircrew. The crews of these aircraft functioned without regards for their own lives but only in the interest of the men they were to save.

(6) Earlier, on 03 May, while conducting an airstrike in support of 3d Marine units, Combat 500, an F8E fighter was shot down by enemy 120 cal fire while attempting to strike enemy positions. CAPT S. W. CLARK, USMC, of Marine Fighter Squadron 235, lost his life because he continued to press his attack even though he was aware of intense enemy fire.

(7) The exemplary courage determination in the face of the enemy and the strong spirit that exists among fellow Marines displayed by these pilots and all of those who supported this Regiment will long be remembered and their acts serve to once again illustrate the tremendous effectiveness of the Marine Air-Ground Team.

(8) The following is a resume of Operations

- a. MEDEVACS: 1499 USMC, USA, CIV, and VC/NVA
- b. CAS: 231 FLIGHTS 453 A/C 1,348,150 #ORD.
CSS: 281 FLIGHTS 343 A/C 1,528,550 #ORD.
- c. R/S 1,514,435 lbs.
- d. A/O 331 FLIGHTS 465 1/2 HRS.
- e. G/S 138 FLIGHTS 269 A/C 950 ROCKETS EXP.
- f. C&C 68 FLIGHTS 176 A/C 2553 FAX 40330 V/R's.
- g. 6982 CONTROL FUNCTIONS
56 AVERAGE PER DAY
LOW 12 ON 11 APRIL
HIGH 118 ON 01 MAY

3 GUN BTRY LIFTS
 1 REGT TROOP LIFT
 1 REGT CMD GRP LIFT
 7 CO TROOP LIFTS
 4 BN TROOP LIFTS
 PLUS PSYWAR BIRDS AND FLAKSHIPS

UNCLASSIFIED

6. Intelligence

During Operation NAPOLEON/SALINE, enemy activity occurred in spurts. There were periods of intense enemy-initiated action, and there were others when only isolated contacts and sightings occurred. Corresponding with geographic location, there were two distinct types of enemy contact.

The portion of the NAPOLEON/SALINE AO north of the THACH HAN River (Cua Viet Waterway) is sparsely populated, has very little vegetation, and villages exist but, for the most part, have been destroyed by combat operations. The terrain is open with the only channelizing feature being the SONG BEN NGU (Jones Creek) running from north to south from the BEN HAI to the CUA VIET. Combat operations in this area were characteristically conventional as opposed to guerrilla in nature. The enemy was almost entirely North Vietnamese, and he employed artillery, rockets, recoilless weapons, and mortars in support of his infantry. The enemy's basic tactic was to occupy villages that have been vacated by the Vietnamese or only partially occupied by civilians, and to occupy areas that have been recently abandoned by friendly units. He then fortified these areas and waited for us to enter on operations, patrols, and sweeps. The enemy used this tactic to good advantage in that he was able to employ his supporting arms (on call and adjusted) against our attacking personnel, while employing concentrated automatic and small-arms fire along prepared fields of fire. His tactics also limited the effects of friendly supporting arms in that he was protected by well constructed, fortified positions. The enemy fought tenaciously and only withdrew, usually, under the cover of darkness, when he no longer had the means or ability to continue to resist. The enemy used this tactic in major engagements at MY LOC (YD 305681), MAI XA THI (YD 280669), LAM QUAN (YD 268700), NHI HA (YD 272703), AND DAI DO (YD 254629). There was only one large enemy attack against a U. S. position in this operation. It occurred when an enemy battalion attacked the U. S. Forces occupying the NHI HA area (YD 272703). The attack commenced at dawn and continued until after daylight; the enemy withdrew to the north only after sustaining heavy casualties and, in effect, had ceased to be a fighting force.

The portion of the NAPOLEON/SALINE AO south of the THACH HAN River is heavily populated, vegetated around villages, and is compartmented by rivers and streams throughout. This area has been characterized by sniper fire, ambushes, use of surprise-firing devices, and generally harrassing tactics. The enemy was usually local Viet Cong; there were only two encounters with large forces and were of short duration. Engagements took place at PHU TAI (YD 297625) and LE XUYEN (YD 345633). These contacts occurred when we swept these area and encountered dug in Viet Cong. The enemy in this area has used artillery and mortars in a harrassment role, as opposed to support of infantry troops. He has shown little tendency to fight and was mainly engaged in proselyting, taxation, and vice gathering.

UNCLASSIFIED

Confirmed enemy units in the northern portion of the NAPOLEON/SALINE AO included the 48th and 52nd Regiment of the 320th Division and elements of the 27th and 270th Independent Regiments. There were no confirmed major units in the south.

7. Mission

a. Third Marines with assigned forces conduct combat Operations in your AO on both North and South Banks of CUA VIET and include all tributaries as necessary in order to insure the uninterrupted passage of shipping on the CUA VIET River and to deny enemy access to rocket positions oriented against DONG HA and QUANG TRI. (OpO 5-58)(unrec'd)

b. Additional Missions

1. Rice Denial. Third Marines conducted extensive supplement operations throughout AO during rice harvest to deny enemy access to rice stores, uncover enemy assembly areas and caches, and deny enemy freedom of movement.

2. Dredge Security. Third Marines provided local security for equipment and personnel involved in dredging Operations on the CUA VIET.

3. Leatherneck Square Operations. Third Marines conducted combat operations in Leatherneck Square to locate and destroy enemy forces, fortifications, installations, and supplies.

4. Jones Creek. Third Marines conducted combat operations in Jones Creek Area to locate and destroy enemy forces, fortifications, installations, and supplies.

8. Concept of Operations.

Third Marines accomplishes its mission by the employment of Second Infantry Battalions and First Amtrac Battalion with supporting arms.

One Infantry Battalion, with assigned forces, conduct aggressive ground surveillance, search and destroy operations, and spoiling attacks in assigned AO on the North bank of the Thach Han River (See Overlay). Initially establish combat operation base in vic MY LOC (YD305682).

One Inf Bn, with assigned forces, conduct aggressive ground surveillance, search and destroy operations, and spoiling attacks in assigned AO on the South Bank of Thach Han River (See Overlay). Maintain Sparrow Hawk in accordance w/OG 3d MarDiv OpO 2-68.

UNCLASSIFIED

First Amtrac Bn conduct combat patrolling, aggressive ground surveillance, and limited search and destroy operations in assigned AO along the coast of Gulf of Tonkin. Defend CUA VIET Port Facility, LSA, and CUA VIET Base Area. Maintain rifle company (Reinf) at C-4 combat outpost to interdict coastal infiltration routes.

Civic Action programs will be executed in support of tactical operations employing MEDCAPS and other services to foster better understanding and relations between the VN people and American servicemen. Active support will be lent to the revolutionary development program.

PsyOps will be increased and accented toward the Chieu Hoi program, the NVA soldier and the civilians who support him.

9. Execution.

In accordance with Third Marine Division OpO 5-68, Third Marines under the Command of Colonel M. A. HULL commenced OPERATION NAPOLEON/SALINE 290630H and by 291300H Feb the Regiment's "A" Command Group had displaced from Quang Tri Airfield Complex (YD305556) to Camp Kistler, CUA VIET (YD349694).

At 010800H March, Third Marines received operational control of BLT 3/1, 1st Bn 3d Mar and 1st Amtrac Bn (..) and initiated a search and destroy operation vicinity MIA XA THI (YD2766) employing 3/1. The operation commenced with an attack across JONES CREEK in which 3/1 received heavy sniper, RPG, mortar, and artillery fire. The fire continued throughout the day and 3/1 sustained heavy casualties but was successful in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy as well. 3/1 continued their sweep through the village taking occasional mortar and arty fire. On 5 March 3/1 was relieved by BLT 2/4. Cumulative losses for this operation were; Friendly; 30 KIA, 91 WIA (MEDEVAC). Enemy: 95 NVA KIA, 3 NVA POW'S, 8 IWC, 15 CSWC.

Meanwhile, 1/3 commenced clearing operations South of the CUA VIET River. Significant contact was made by A/1/3 on 5 March when they attacked an objective vicinity (XD260630). Crossing the river by ontrac, they received heavy automatic and machineless rifle fire from an estimated enemy platoon. A/1/3 sustained 5 KIA and 14 WIA and killed 9 NVA, captured a considerable amount of gear.

On 7 March, BLT 2/4 commenced a joint operation with forces of the 2nd ARVN Regiment to clear the area North of the Bo Dieu River. Contact was made with an estimated enemy company. BLT 2/4 suffered 10 KIA, 40 WIA (MEDEVAC) and 24 WIA (MORC) while killing 53 NVA and capturing 16 IWC and 2 CSWC.

UNCLASSIFIED

Reacting to intelligence, 1/3 commenced a sweep of PHU TAI (YD2962) on 7 March and encountered an estimated VC company or larger unit. 1/3 sustained 13 KIA, 53 WIA (MEDEVAC), and 14 WIA (MINOR) in the contact. A sweep of the area revealed 27 NVA KIA, 20 IWC, and 2 CSWC.

Continuing operations North of the CUA VIET River, BLT 2/4 assaulted LAM XUAM (YD2869) and made contact with an estimated enemy battalion on 12 March. Maneuvering and using supporting arms to maximum extent, 2/4 killed 78 NVA while sustaining 11 KIA, 54 WIA (MEDEVAC), and 11 WIA (MINOR).

On 13 March, B Company, 3d Engr in direct support of 3d Marines constructed a wire barrier across JONES CREEK at (YD284671) to prevent mines from floating into CUA VIET river traffic.

BLT 2/4 commenced operations via VINH QUANG THUONG (YD2565) on 18 March. In assaulting their objective, they encountered the enemy who was fighting from well fortified positions. Advancing under air and artillery support, 2/4 swept through the village killing 120 NVA and capturing 4 POW'S, 17 IWC, and 4 CSWC. BLT 2/4's casualties were 15 KIA, 88 WIA (MEDEVAC), and 18 WIA (MINOR). This action earned BLT 2/4 congratulations from General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV.

There was no major action again until the end of March but it should be mentioned that 1/3 continued clearing and pacification operations South of the river, and 1st Amtrac Bn provided valuable support to both infantry battalions as well as conducting aggressive patrolling operations along the Gulf Of Tonkin.

On 30 March, 3d Marines, as part of TASK FORCE KILO, commenced a coordinated assault North to the DMZ with 3/5 ARMORED CAV USA and elements of the 2nd ARVN Regiment in order to divert enemy attention from Rte #9 so other 3d Marine Division forces could open the road to KHE SANH. BLT 2/4, as 3d Marines maneuvering force, operated on the right flank and took heavy rocket fire on 1 April. The only significant contact occurred when E/2/4 was probed by an estimated enemy company. The enemy was repelled. E/2/4 suffered no casualties but killed 3 NVA and captured 1 POW and 1 IWC. The operation terminated on 2 April and, though there was little contact, a considerable amount of enemy ordnance and gear was captured and many enemy positions were destroyed. Losses for the operation were 10 WIA (MEDEVAC) while 27 NVA KIA's were confirmed.

The period 4-6 April was without significant enemy contact. All units conducted extensive patrolling and company sweeps in their respective AO'S. BLT 2/4 established patrol bases at LAM XUAM (YD2670) and NHI HA (YD2771) to monitor any enemy movement in the area. During the period the patrol activities of the various units uncovered significant caches of enemy ordnance.

UNCLASSIFIED

On 17 April A/1/3 made contact with a well dug in enemy force in vic (YD352619). Contact continued throughout the day and into the evening. A sweep of the area the following day revealed 17 NVA bodies and evidence that more had been killed and dragged away. Considerable gear was found and numerous enemy bunkers were destroyed. A/1/3 sustained 3 KIA, 14 WIA (MEDEVAC), and 7 WIA (MINOR) in the action.

On 30 April the most significant action within OPERATION NAPOLEON/SALINE commenced when a patrol from H/2/4 encountered a dug-in NVA company Vic (YD261632) at the Southeastern edge of 3d Marines AO. An extension of the AO was approved and the fierce battle of DAI DO (YD2562) commenced. BLT 2/4 moved the balance of H/2/4 to reinforce and utilized available supporting arms to soften the enemy. F/2/4 moving to attack DAI DO came under heavy fire. The balance of BLT 2/4 and B/1/3 were committed to the conflict. The contact became extremely heavy and the NVA displayed a strong will to stand and fight. Friendly units sustained many casualties from the intense enemy fire. Many enemy counterattacks were experienced and successively repelled. On 3 May 1/3 moved through BLT 2/4's lines to continue the attack. On 5 May while securing a series of objectives 1/3 came under heavy fire from vic (YD245651). The fighting was intense and the NVA counterattacked. M and 1/3/4 were lifted in to protect 1/3's west flank. On 6 May 3d Marines assumed OpCon 1/5, 1st Air Cav and moved them into position to continue the attack to the West. By 9 May the battle for DAI DO had been won. Friendly losses for the DAI DO conflict were 96 KIA, 326 WIA (MEDEVAC), and 13 WIA (MINOR). The NVA suffered an impressive defeat. 768 NVA were killed and 10 NVA were captured as well as 128 IWC, 44 CSWC, and large amounts of ordnance and NVA equipment. A major attempt of the enemy to isolate DAI DO by closing the CUA VIET LOC was defeated--the waterway remained open.

Concurrent with the DAI DO battle, 3d Marines conducted operations with 3/21 of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade USA in the LAM XUAM/WHI HA area. The army unit made several heavy contacts as they swept through the area. In the period 2-16 May 3/21 sustained 29 KIA, 48 WIA (MEDEVAC), and 40 WIA (MINOR). 3/21 and supporting air and artillery accounted for 415 NVA KIA, 2 NVA were captured along with 78 IWC and 27 CSWC.

On 17 May, E/2/4 made contact with the enemy in vic (YD253714) sustaining 2 KIA and 3 WIA (MEDEVAC). The short contact resulted in 23 NVA KIA.

Again on 25 May, E/2/4 engaged a large NVA force in vic (YD282713). H/2/4 moved in to reinforce and both units remained in heavy contact throughout the day sustaining 18 KIA, and 33 WIA (MEDEVAC). With the help of supporting arms, the two companies killed 230 NVA and captured 4 NVA POW'S, 4 IWC, and 1 CSWC.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The next significant contact occurred on 27 May. 2/9 (-), A and D/1/3 made contact with an estimated NVA Battalion dug in vic LAI AN (YD 247724). Both units received considerable mortar fire. 2/9 (-) sustained numerous casualties due to the mortar fire and heat so the 1/3 units passed through 2/9 (-) to continue the attack. Heavy contact was made by 1/3 units as soon as they passed through 2/9 (-) positions. The enemy employed mortar, rockets, artillery, and small arms. The fight for LAI AN continued through the end of the month. Cumulative Losses for the battle were: Friendly: 21 KIA, 141 WIA (MEDEVAC), 19 WIA (MINOR), Enemy: 88 NVA KIA, 8 NVA POW, 34 IWC, and 3 CSWC.

The month of June saw 3d Marine units conducting patrolling and company sweep operations but there was little contact. On 25 Jun 3d Marines displaced the "A" Command Group to C-2 to conduct Regimental Operation LEATHERNECK SQUARE. For the first time since the unit entered RVN, 3d Marine Regiment was able to operate with all its T/O battalions, 1/3, 2/3, and 3/3. The Operation was in reaction to intelligence information and was designed to trap an enemy force of battalion strength or larger between 3 maneuvering battalions. 2/3 approached on the ground from the south while 1/3 and 3/3 were helilifted in to move in from the east and north respectively. Forces from the 2nd ARVN Regiment set up blocking positions on the east. The operation located numerous enemy bunkers which were destroyed but the only contact occurred when 3/3 encountered an estimated squad (enemy) vic (YD 173695) firing small arms from bunker. Supporting arms claimed 6 enemy KIA. Total NVA KIA for the operation were 9. Friendly Losses were 1 KIA, 18 WIA (MEDEVAC), and 2 WIA (MINOR). Though there was little action, the operation showed that the 3 battalions could operate well as a regiment.

The final operation conducted by 3d Marines as part of NAPOLEON/SALINE was a 3 battalion sweep up "JONES CREEK" to the DMZ, in conjunction with operation THOR. Again, 3d Marines had its own 3 battalions. 1/3 commenced the attack moving north on the west side of JONES CREEK to get in position to provide security for ARVN engineer work on the LAI AN road. on 4 Jul 1/3 made contact with an estimated enemy platoon vic (YD 246723). 1/3 received mixed arty, RPG, 82MM and small arms fire as they attacked the enemy who were fighting from bunkers and village ruins. 1/3 continued to receive heavy mortar and arty fire. On 6 Jul 1/3 continued attack on objective 8 (LAI AN) and 2/3 conducted search of objective 9 (NHI TRUNGO) and continued attack to objective 12 (YD 265745). 1/3 continued to meet NVA resistance as they pushed through objective 9 towards objective 11 (YD 2473). Though 1/3 sustained some casualties in this contact, particularly from the mortars and arty, they inflicted considerable losses on the enemy. As 2/3 maneuvered around the ARVN position A-1 toward objective 12 they made contact with an unknown size NVA force armed with small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG. They also received 82MM mortar fire from objective 12. On 7 Jul 1/3 again met heavy resistance as they conducted a coordinated tank/infantry assault on objective 11. The enemy utilized small arms as well as mortars and 85MM arty to hold their position. 1/3 successfully took objective 11, capturing 2-82MM mortars and continued on to take objective 13. Meanwhile, 2/3 took objective 12 and 14, receiving light resistance at objective 12 (YD 2673).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3/3, who had been in reserve, moved north and seized objective 10 (YD 2974) without incident. On 8 Jul 63 continued attack as 1/3 and 2/3 began withdrawing south. The operation ended on 9 Jul with these totals: Friendly; 16 KIA, 75 WIA (MEDEVAC) and 27 (MINOR). Enemy; 230 NVA KIA, 7 NVA POW's, 29 IWC, and 8 CSWC captured.

With the conclusion of the JONES CREEK Operation, 3d Marines ended its participation in Operation NAPOLEON/SALINE and passed responsibility for NAPOLEON/SALINE to 1st Marine Regiment.

10. Results

a. U.S. losses; 378 KIA, 1598 WIA (MEDEVAC), 430 WIA (MINOR), and 1 MIA (USA)

b. Enemy losses; 2293 NVA KIA, 84 NVA POW, 60 VC KIA, and 9 VC POW.

c. Captured enemy equipment/material during operation NAPOLEON/SALINE:

(1) Weapons; 599 IWC, and 196 CSWC including:

176 AK-47
159 SRS/CKC
57 LMG
21 RPG-2
9 60 MM MORTARS
6 82MM MORTARS
6 SK-44
5 AK-44
5 PPS-43
5 HMG
5 RPG-7
4 AK-50
2 82MM RPG
2 9MM PISTOL
1 FLAME THROWER
1 75MM RR
1 57MM RR
1 SMG
1 MAUSER
1 .45 PISTOL
1 .38 PISTOL

THROWER

(2) Ammunition

18,363 7.62MM
16,062 12.7MM
1,207 60MM MORTARS
1,072 82MM MORTARS
334 RPG-2
140 RPG-2 BOOSTERS
99 82MM MORTAR BOOSTERS
76 140MM RKT
48 8"
44 RIFLE GRENADES

UNCLASSIFIED

THROWER

40 75MM RR
 26 RPG-7
 21 60MM MORTAR FUSE
 14 2.75 RKT
 12 57MM RR
 10 82MM RG
 8 82MM FUSE
 2 122MM RKT

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Explosives

735 LBS TNT
 454 GRENADES
 322 FT TLM FUSE
 79 AT MINES
 44 BLASTING CAPS
 27 CHICOM GRENADES
 24 SATCHEL CHARGES
 20 U.S. ARTY DUDS
 14 C-4 (LBS)
 9 DANCALORE
 9 AP MINES
 8 U.S. BOMB DUDS
 8 CNAS AND 1 BAG BLACK POWDER
 2 ELECTRICAL FIRING DEVICE
 1 DETONATOR CORD

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Weapons Accessories

153 AK-47 MAGS
 32 RPD DRUMS
 5 60MM MORTAR LIGHTS
 5 AA MG BASE PLATES
 4 60MM MORTAR BASEPLATES
 3 82MM MORTAR SIGHTS
 2 82MM MORTAR BASEPLATE
 2 82MM RG EXTENSIONS
 2 82MM RG TRIPODS
 2 HMG SHOULDER HARNESSSES
 1 HMG MOUNT
 1 AA WEAPON TRIPOD
 1 HMG REPAIR KIT
 1 82MM MORTAR AIMING STAKE
 1 MG RUPTURED CARTRIDGE EXTRACTOR

(5) Individual Equipment

112 PACKS
 96 GAS MASKS
 81 HELMETS
 48 ENTRENCHING TOOLS
 36 PONCHOS
 28 GENTLENS
 15 POUCHES
 8 CARTRIDGE BELTS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

2 FLASHLIGHTS
2 GAS MASK FILTERS
2 MESS GEAR KITS
2 HAMMOCKS
1 RAINSUIT
1 PICK
1 BAYONET SCABBARD
1 BINoculars
ASSORTED CLOTHING

(6) Communication Equipment

12 BATTERIES
7 RADIOS
4 HEADSETS
4 FIELD PHONES
1 REEL OF WIRE
1 MICROPHONE
1 TELEGRAPH KEY

(7) Medical Supplies

109 AMPULES W/NEEDLES
24 CONTAINERS OF WATER PURIFICATION TABLETS
5 PERSONAL HEALTH KITS
5 CONTAINERS OF U/I MEDICINE
4 BATTLE DRESSING
3 MEDICAL KITS
3 SYRINGES
1 ACE BANDAGE

(8) Documents

MAPS
OVERLAYS
NOTEBOOKS
RADIO BOOKS
TRAINING MANUALS
DIARIES
I.D. CARDS
LETTERS
PHOTOGRAPHS
PROPAGANDA PAMPHLETS
PERSONAL PAPERS

(9) Food

37,095 LBS OF RICE

(10) Fortifications and Positions

937 BUNKERS
218 HOLES
23 STRUCTURES
3 HMG POSITIONS
2 HARBOR SIGHTS

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Supply

(1) The primary source of supply during operation NAPOLEON/SALINE was supply point distribution from FLSG-B DONG HA. An additional supply point . . . was established under Regimental Control at the mouth of the CUA VIET River. This distribution point received a limited amount of Bulk supplies direct from Force Logistics Command, DANANG.

(2) The supply system during the operation functioned with no significant problems. Resupply was effected by helicopter, Naval Landing Craft (LCM-8), LVTP-5, M76 Amphibious carrier (Otter), Truck, and small boat.

(3) "A" Nations were served in the messhalls of the Regimental Headquarters, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, and the resident Infantry Battalion, which was located at MAI XI THI vic (YD 282668). Battalions operating south of the CUA VIET River normally received one hot meal every other day, operations permitting. This meal was prepared in Battalion rear areas, either QUANG TRI or DONG HA, and transported to the battalion by small boat or helicopter.

d. Maintenance

(1) First and second echelon maintenance was performed by using units. Third echelon maintenance contact teams from FLSG-B were used extensively for both wheeled and tracked vehicles.

e. Transportation

(1) Carrier Amphibious, M76 (Otter). During the entire operation a detachment of the Otter Platoon of M&SCo, 3d Mortar Transport Battalion was under the operational control of 3d Marines. The Otters were used primarily in inter battalion resupply and medical evacuation. The capability of this vehicle to swim and to negotiate marginal terrain made it invaluable in the CUA VIET Area.

(2) Amphibian Tractor (LVTP-5). Tractors of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion were used in daily resupply and for tactical troop moves. When operated over favorable terrain this vehicle was highly effective. Its use was hampered by vulnerability to land mines and difficulty in negotiating marginal terrain.

(3) Truck. The lack of road nets and extremely sandy terrain in the CUA VIET Area restricted use of wheeled vehicles. The organic vehicle of 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion and 3d Marines were augmented by a section of trucks from 3d Mortar Transport Battalion. Truck assets of BLT 2/4 were used in general support of the Regiment.

UNCLASSIFIED

(11) Recommendation

Because the enemy moved almost entirely at night in the NAPOLEON/SALINE AO and because the terrain there is level with little vegetation, extensive use of night observation devices and ground surveillance radar for detection of enemy movement is recommended for future operations in this area.

11. Administrative Matters

a. Administrative plans issued by this Regiment proved to be adequate for all operations conducted during Operations NAPOLEON/SALINE. Personnel paragraphs of Operational Orders covered the following categories:

- (1) Personnel Strengths, Records and Reports.
- (2) Replacements
- (3) Discipline, Law and Order
- (4) Burial and Graves Registration
- (5) Moral and Personnel Services that included the following
 - (a) Keeping troops informed of current situation
 - (b) Emergency Leave
 - (c) Decorations and Rewards
 - (d) Information pertaining to R&R
 - (e) Postal Services
 - (f) Exchange Services
 - (g) Finance Services

(6) Personnel Procedures

b. Casualties were treated in the field when appropriate. If evacuation was necessary it was accomplished in most cases by helicopter. The expeditions treatment and evacuation of casualties during Operation NAPOLEON/SALINE was a definite asset to the fighting spirit and moral of the troops.

(1) All WIA's were evacuated to D Med, DONG HA, the USS IWO JIMA, and 18th Field Med Hospital USA, QUANG TRI.

(2) All KIA's were evacuated to D Med, DONG HA, and 18th Field Med Hospital USA, QUANG TRI for processing and further evacuation.

(4) Landing Craft. LCM-8 craft were made available by NSAD, CUA VIET. For the first 10 weeks of the operation one craft was assigned daily and its use coordinated by the Regiment. After 15 May landing craft were controlled by Division Embarkation Section and as many as 3 per day were utilized.

(5) Small Boats. Outboard Motor Boats, both fire team assault boats, and Commercial Ski Barges were utilized for re-supply, courier, and liaison transportation.

(6) Helicopter. Helicopter support during the operation was adequate.

f. Communications

(1) General. The Regimental Communications Platoon provided adequate communications for the Commander to command and control operation NAPOLEON/SALINE. Communications were in accordance with DivO P02000.2G.

(2) Radio. Radio circuits within the Regimental Headquarters were in accordance with DivO P02000.2G. Units OPCON to the Regiment utilized Regimental TAC #1. On occasion Army units were OPCON to this Regiment and no particular problems were noted while operating with these units. The covered circuit used to communicate with Division presented some problems, the majority of which involved the power source.

(3) Radio Relay. Radio Relay was employed from the Regimental Headquarters to Division and to the OPCON battalions. The equipment used were the AN/TRC-27 and AN/MRC-62. No major problems were encountered other than power source.

(4) Wire. All wire within the Regimental Headquarters area was considered adequate. No major wire problems were noted.

(5) Message Center. The Regimental Communications Center Section passed a total of 6,390 messages by electrical means. One problem deserves special consideration - the overheating of equipment. The type of shelter provided for the message center must be considered to minimize this problem.

(6) Problem Areas

(a) Frequencies and Frequency Interference due to the number of Marine and Army units operating in the northern I Corp. Tactical Zone and in our AO and the number of frequencies available. Minor difficulties on frequency coordination were encountered.

(b) Power Sources were 60 and 400 cycle power generating equipments availability continue to be marginal.

UNCLASSIFIED

12. Commander's Analysis

a. During this operation the enemy demonstrated a willingness to stand and fight in a conventional manner utilizing well constructed, fortified positions along the tree lines of villages and supported his infantry with mortars and artillery. He also utilized counterattacks in an attempt to catch assaulting forces off guard before they had a consolidated position. The NVA also exhibited an ability to infiltrate large units of up to regimental size into abandoned villages at night and prepare defensive positions rapidly. He continually utilized the tactic of waiting until friendly forces were within a few meters of his defensive position before commencing fire in an attempt to pin-down friendly forces so close that effective supporting arms could not be used.

b. In areas north of COA VIET it is highly recommended that village areas demarcated by tree lines be reconned by fire and that preparatory fires be utilized prior to advancement across the paddies into the villages. During the dry season tanks can be effectively employed to advantage against the fortified positions, but they must have adequate infantry protection from RPG's and mines.

c. A strong reserve can be successfully employed to exploit initial successes and maintain initiative once the enemy has been driven from his fortified positions. Aerial Observers are also invaluable in detecting enemy build-ups and counterattack forces.

d. Rapidly responsive counterbattery fire must be planned and execute to silence the 130MM and 152MM guns emplaced north of the DMZ when infantry forces operate north of the COA VIET.

13. Recommendations. There are no recommendations at this time.

V. R. Stuart
V. R. STUART

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

BY 88888
 121042Z JULY 68
 FM CG THIRD MAR
 TO CG TASK FORCE HOTEL
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG NINTH MARINES
 CG TWELFTH MARINES
 BT

SECRET

REF: A. TASK FORCE HOTEL OPPLAN 1-63

1. THOROUGH RECON 3D MAR AG INDICATES NOTTACTICALLY SOUNDLY IN THIS
 CONCEPT OF 52 GL. THIS FACTOR TENDS TO NEGATE PRESENT CONCEPT OF
 OPNS DIR IN REF A. TO EXECUTE PLAN AS CONCEIVED REQUIRES MAXIMUM
 EFFORT FOR MIN OF FOUR TO FIVE DAYS. ADDITIONAL LOGISTICAL EFFORT
 TO SUPPLY ENGR PERS ALSO REQUIRED. IF ENGR EFFORT INITIATED, SUBSTANTIAL
 DEF SECURITY ALSO REQUIRED TO PROTECT ENGR EFFORT. THIS NEGATES
 ELEMENT OF SURPRISE. FOUR LZ INITIALLY PREPARED COULD ONLY SUPPLY ASSAULT
 FOR 2000-3000 METERS SOUTHWARD BEFORE ADDL LZ CONSTRUCTION FOR
 RESUPPLY AND MEDEVAC OF UNITS ARE REQUIRED.

2. DUE TO PLANNING BY ALL UNITS AND CLOSE PROXIMITY TO D-DAY, DO
 NOT PLA

RECOMMENDED FOR 3D MAR ONLY TO REDUCE NECESSITY OF PLA

CHANGES BY ADJACENT UNITS:

121040Z JUL 68

A-3 (12 COPIES)

GSH/BIRO/STAN

PAGE TWO 0920 SECRET

A. LIMITED OBJECTIVE PLAN IN LIEU OF PHASE LINE SWEEP OPNS
 REFERRED TO IN REF A.

B. AERIAL RECON REVEALS ADEQUATE LZ'S CAN BE DEVELOPED IN GRID
 YD0060 AND YD0061 AS WELL AS YD0360. ADDITIONAL LZ IN X09659
 COVERS NATURAL TERRAIN COMPLEX OF MUTTER'S RIDGE, HELICOPTER VALLEY
 AND DONGHA MOA

TAINS

C. RECOMMEND LAND TWO BNS D-DAY IN AREAS YD0060 AND YD0061.
 GAS PROVIDE SUPPRESSION BOTH MUTTER'S RIDGE AND DONG HA MTN COMPLEX.
 1ST BN PATROL BASES IN MUTTER'S RIDGE AREA TO INSURE COVERAGE AS FAR
 NORTH AS GL63.

D. D PLUS 1 OPNS CONDUCT OF LDC THIRD BN BY HELO IN YD0360 TO SECURE
 THE DONG HA MTN COMPLEX. 9TH MAR BOUNDARY CHANGE REQUIRED FOR THIS
 OPERATION REQUIRED GRIDS YD0359 AND YD0360 INCL IN 3DMAR AG.

E. MODIFICATION

F. EXTENDED REQUIRE LITTLE TONO CHANGE IN ADJACENT
 OPERATIONS AND WILL NOT REQUIRE MAXIMUM ENG

NEED EFFORT RECOMMEND

DETAILED PLAN CAN BE PROVIDED ON REQUEST.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TAB-6

SECRET

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

1/100
2/✓
3/✓

hanger
N

130545Z JULY 68
FM COMM CNTR
TO: 1ST MARDIV
INFO: 1ST MARDIV

131340Z JULY 68

1. 1ST MARDIV
2. 1ST MARDIV BOYTON MSG 123831R JULY 1968
3. 1ST MARDIV
4. 1ST MARDIV PROPOSED PLAN FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS
5. 1ST MARDIV
6. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS (YD 926637) FOR 151300H JULY 1968 THROUGH
7. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO HANDLE ROUTE NR 9 IN AC NOV LATER
8. 151300H JULY 68.
9. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
10. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
11. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
12. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
13. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
14. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
15. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
16. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
17. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
18. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
19. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.
20. 2 REPAIRER TEAMS TO CAMP CARROLL NLT 151300H JULY 1968.

130545Z JUL 68

G-3 (12 COPIES)

G-2/AIR

8

TAB-7

SECRET