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P. B. Jeffery 4 Mar 77

Signature/date

1/3d Marine Command Diary

Jul 1965

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3/GFS/jay
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
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Diary

Ref: (a) Division (Fwd) Order 3100.1
(b) Regimental Order 3120.1

Encl: (1) 1st Battalion, 3d Marines Command Diary

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is submitted.


W. H. LANAGAN

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3d MARDIV (FWD)
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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA SHEET

DESIGNATION OF REPORTING UNIT

1st Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT:

1 July to 31 July 1965

DATE OF SUBMISSION OF REPORT:

1 Aug 1965

COMMANDING OFFICER

Lieutenant Colonel William H. LANAGAN

LOCATION OF COMMAND POST AT END OF PERIOD

Grid Coordinates: 950721

Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, TOURANE, Sheets 6658I, 6658IV, 6659II, 6659III,
Series I701

SUBORDINATE UNITS AT END OF PERIOD:

H&S Co, 1st Bn, 3d Mar
Co A, 1st Bn, 3d Mar
Co B, 1st Bn, 3d Mar
Co C, 1st Bn, 3d Mar
Co D, 1st Bn, 3d Mar

COMMANDERS:

1st Lt Michael B. RILEY
Capt James K. MILLER
Capt Richard D. ROSS
Capt Lee A. PETERSON
Capt Terry TURNER

I-1

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1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES, COMMAND DIARY

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. MISSION ASSIGNED
2. OPERATION PARTICIPATION
3. TERRAIN AND WEATHER
4. TRAINING CONDUCTED
5. MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

ENCLOSURE (1)

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1 Aug 65

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY1. MISSION ASSIGNED.

The mission of the Battalion has been the continuation of aggressive counter-guerrilla operations throughout the TAOR. The importance of active and continuous patrolling assumed increased significance after the Battalion's forward displacement to positions along the 3d Marine FEBA in June. To lessen the threat of the VC employing mortars or concentrating large units forward of the FEBA, and to render any of his operations in the area ineffective, the Battalion executed its mission with daily patrolling from squad to company (-) size units, and complete saturation with ambushes on likely VC avenues of approach.

2. OPERATIONS PARTICIPATION.

The Battalion concentrated the majority of its efforts along the SONG YEN River in the villages of LA CHAU, THUOC NINH, and DUYN SON, and the dominant terrain in the southwestern sector of the TAOR including Hills 310 and 502. VC activity was encountered to a lesser degree along the SONG TUY LOAN particularly in the vicinity of HUI TUC village.

The primary difficulty experienced along the SONG YEN and the villages of LA CHAU has been the vulnerability of units to VC sniper fire, and small arms and automatic weapons fire and mortars on some occasions employed by larger units. Because of the characteristics of the area, i.e., heavy population, hostile attitude of the civilians, it was virtually impossible to ascertain the origin of any enemy fire emanating from this area. The difficulty was further compounded by the mere presence of the SONG YEN River itself, invariably used as a convenient means of escape to the east for a retreating group of VC.

The presence of the VC on the highground to the west (Hill 310, 502, and 270) overlooking the valley floor has been previously ascertained and further confirmed through extensive patrolling in that sector.

Patrols discovered evidence of large unit occupation, Guerrilla Base Camps, rest areas, and sophisticated training facilities and classrooms.

The problem was two-fold: (1) To counteract the activity of the VC along the SONG YEN River to the east, and (2) to disrupt and discourage their movement from the highground in the west along the numerous avenues of approach to the valley.

II-1

ENCLOSURE (1)

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UNCLASSIFIED

5750.1
1 Aug 65

The Battalion elected to continue extensive and continuous platoon-size patrols, but resorted to introducing those patrols into the TAOR on foot as opposed to dropping them in by helicopter. This was done to eliminate the possibility of discovery by the VC, heretofore caused by the helicopters, and to take advantage of the strategic proximity of the Battalion along the FEBA.

In addition, the Battalion oriented its thinking to night operations to further conceal the introduction of the patrolling unit into the TAOR and its subsequent movement, and to reduce the number of casualties sustained during daylight operations. The daylight hours were used for rest and reconnaissance of ambush positions that were to be occupied at night under cover of darkness. Advantage was then taken of the unit's thorough knowledge of the area, acquired through previous operations, and consequently there were no difficulties in moving at night.

To discourage movement from the western highground overlooking the valley, the Battalion continued to saturate likely avenues of approach with squad-size ambushes. Artillery and air were used as harassing and interdiction fires on a nightly basis.

To enhance the flow of intelligence and exploit any information without loss of time the HUEI DUC District Headquarters continued to be utilized as a Battalion liaison post at night. Representatives from the operations section of the Battalion effected coordination and rapid dissemination of intelligence information, including the disposition of VC units, their plans, etc., back to the Battalion Headquarters for further analysis and dissemination to units operating in the TAOR at the time. In this way any intention of the enemy, his movements, etc., were effectively disrupted.

In conjunction with the District Headquarters as an effective intelligence source, the AN/TPS-21 proved invaluable in radar detection and surveillance of VC units at night. Range, data, azimuth, and size of target was immediately relayed from the AN/TPS-21 and plotted. The data was then relayed to the supporting artillery which brought fires to bear on known and suspected VC concentrations or troop movements.

VC activity slacked off noticeably and the hazards of daytime movement were significantly reduced once operations at night commenced. Mines and booby traps proved to be the greatest obstacles. The susceptibility of Marines to these mines and other booby traps was due in part to fatigue and in some cases led to carelessness. Only through increased emphasis by unit leaders on the proper procedures and principles to be applied when encountering mines, or when the possibility of such obstacles presented itself, could this problem be overcome.

II-2
UNCLASSIFIED

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3. TERRAIN AND WEATHER.

a. Terrain. With the tactical area of responsibility remaining unchanged, the terrain conditions within the TACR continue the same as in the previous analysis, except as noted in the following. Most paddy areas now contain rice crops at a stage of growth ranging from a relatively young crop to those areas where it has attained a height of 2 to 3 feet. The growth of the rice crops, along with the continued inundation of paddy areas has reduced trafficability throughout the area. During periods of dry weather, the probability of improved trafficability was found to be negated by the brush having grown to greater heights and with increased density. Aerial observation continues to be limited proportionately by this factor.

b. Weather.

(1) General. An analysis of past climatological factors for the month of July indicated the probability of no marked difference from the weather patterns experienced in June 1965.

(a) Precipitation. Precipitation during July was in the form of showers and thunderstorms occurring in the late afternoon and early evening. They were generally moderate to intense with the duration varying from several minutes to occasionally 2 or 3 hours. Rain fell on 11 days and the total was consistent with the monthly average expected. Precipitation has, to some degree, limited air and ground operations.

(b) Temperature. Temperatures have ranged from 90 degrees to 98 degrees during the day and 76 degrees to 81 degrees at night. These temperature ranges are generally consistent with those recorded for June. However, there were several days when the temperature failed to reach the predicted high and the effects of the showers and thunderstorms produced a slight cooling trend.

(c) Visibility. Although the rainfall was average for the month of July, visibility continued to be good to excellent. Visibility was reduced to less than 5 miles, 5 percent of the month. The few periods of reduced visibility have had little limiting effects on air or ground operations.

(d) Surface winds. During the month of July, the prevailing wind flow was southwesterly, with an average speed of 7 knots.

(2) Summary. The month of July has produced an average rainfall with the prevailing surface wind occasionally shifting from the southwest to the northeast. Normal temperature ranges were recorded for the month with the high being 98 degrees and the low 76 degrees. July 1965, has conformed to past norms.

II-3
UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

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1 Aug 65AVERAGES

<u>ELEMENTS</u>	<u>JULY 1965</u>	<u>JULY AVERAGE</u>
Average Maximum Temperature	92	90
Average Minimum Temperature	76	75
Total Precipitation(inches)	3.94	4.00
No. of Days with Precipitation	11	10
No. of Days with Thunderstorms	3	4

EXTREMES

<u>ELEMENTS</u>	<u>JULY 1965</u>	<u>ALL TIME EXTREMES</u>
Extreme maximum temperature	98	105
Extreme minimum temperature	76	71

4. TRAINING CONDUCTED.

a. Training increased in the technical aspects of the AN/TPS-21 in view of its continued utilization in the detection of enemy movement at night. The information obtained from the AN/TPS-21 was transformed into data and integrated into the FSCC for plotting and execution of artillery fire support missions.

b. re-emphasis and review was conducted in the basic principles of night operations and included training in the detection and disarmament of mines and booby traps, selection of routes both during day and night movement, establishment of ambush sites, and employment of security.

c. In line with the Battalion's occupation of defensive positions along the FEBA, training was conducted in the construction of fortified positions, laying of tactical wire, establishment of platoon strong points, and employment of mutually supporting fires. Continuous improvement of positions provided practical application in this area.

d. Each company established company firing ranges for the conduct of continuous familiarization firing of small arms, automatic weapons, machine guns, and 3.5 inch rockets. Firing was also conducted by the 106mm RR Platoon on the FOA CAM training range the latter part of the month.

e. Training and instruction continued in counter-guerrilla operations and included briefings in the doctrine of the guerrilla and his tactics, counter-measures to enemy ambushes, methods of neutralizing guerrilla sniper fire, and countering his increased employment of mines, traps and other harassing obstacles. Particular emphasis was placed on the dispersion of Marine units operating in guerrilla territory, as well as interval of the individual Marines while moving in column.

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UNCLASSIFIED

5750.1
1 Aug 65

Adherence to these principles proved to be essential in reducing the number of Marine casualties during operations conducted in the TAOR.

f. Helicopter training continued. Securing LZ's with smoke was experimented with during the month. The variance in the direction of wind in the LZ and its surrounding area proved to be the major problem. All personnel were re-indoctrinated in LZ procedure and preparation of the LZ, to include perimeter security around the LZ, dispersion of units, marking of the LZ, and methods of retrograding by helicopter.

g. The security and safety of the individual Marine assumed increased importance with the length of employment of the Battalion in the Republic of Vietnam. Instruction in the safe handling of weapons and hand grenades, and proper challenging and password procedures was conducted for all hands. Such instruction applied to sentry positions in administrative and/or bivouac areas as well as defensive positions along the FEBA.

5. MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

a. Morale.

(1) While personnel are still eager and aggressive in offensive patrolling certain morale problems have been encountered during the past month. This organization has been under constant peak work loads because of the exigencies of combat for almost five months. Presently, there is a good deal of uncertainty prevalent about this Battalion's departure date, and those troops who will have two years of service remaining in their contract feel there is a strong possibility of their returning to RVN. Inflationary prices for refreshments (beer and soda) and ice have made that type of recreational facility in company areas a hit-miss proposition. In this regard, the intense heat of the day, and the long hours of night work might be cited as contributing to the general dissatisfaction. To date, there have been only limited outlets for the troops who daily find themselves confronted with the drudgery and tedium of their present duties. The Division R & R Program is at best inadequate and a day of liberty in Da Nang, RVN, includes no more than four or five hours of rather expensive forms of leisure. The PX facilities are accessible but because of the large number of consumers their stock is quickly depleted, and even many health and comfort items are not available.

(2) Postal service has improved and daily mail delivery has become a reality.

(3) The Special Services Program has been able to show daily movies in two companies: H&S and Company "C". And each company has a concession area where cold drinks are served when available. Satisfactory barber and laundry facilities are available to all on a continuing basis in each company area.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

5750.1
1 Aug 65

(4) Liberty is being granted to ten percent of the command daily.

(5) Paycall continues twice monthly. However, because of the large number of accounts handled, reports indicate it does take a great deal of time to get pay records corrected when necessary.

b. Discipline.

(1) Some major disciplinary problems have been encountered. There has been an increasing amount of irresponsibility among troops, while on liberty in Danang, RVN. Also, a sharp increase in the number of disciplinary actions resulting from sleeping on post and disrespect to Non-Commissioned Officers has been noted.

(2) There were five Battalion Commander's Officer Hours, ten Summary Courts-Martial, and eight Special Courts-Martial in this organization during July.

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1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES, COMMAND DIARY

PART III

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE

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1 Aug 65

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PART III1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE1 Jul 65

The first platoon, Company D departed their ambush sites at 0610H to continue patrolling in accordance with Frag Order 9 to Operation Order 328-65.

The Marine at the point of this patrol, while moving north on the path at 878700, stumbled on 15 to 20 armed VC in a clearing to his right. Recognition being simultaneous the VC immediately disappeared into the brush, the point Marine firing in pursuit. Due to the spontaneity of action and the inability of other members of the patrol to observe or comprehend the situation, the VC made good their escape. However, one VC was confirmed as being wounded and one rifle of French manufacture was recovered. Two VCs were also apprehended in this area. They were presumed to have been hosts to the departed VC element. This incident took place between 0900H and 0930H.

At 1040H, the 3d Platoon of Company D was heli-lifted to Landing Zone PELICAN (vicinity 878692) to assist the 1st Platoon in sweeping operations of the Village of HOI VUC (875712). This search and destroy mission was conducted without significant results. At 1700H, the 3d Platoon returned to its positions on the FEBA, while the 1st Platoon continued its patrolling operations.

Ambush sites were established by the 1st Platoon, under cover of darkness, as directed by Frag Order 9 (Operation Order 328-65). The squad ambush located at 898674 reported they had made contact with eight VC. Three of these VC were confirmed wounded when the ambush opened fire, falling approximately 25 meters from the ambush positions.

There was no further enemy contact reported this date.

Two platoons of Company C were placed on regimental alert, at 0530H, this date.

At 1517H, one Marine of Company I was evacuated due to injuries caused by a "Punji stake".

2 Jul 65

The 2d Squad, 1st Platoon, Company E (at ambush site vicinity 898674) reported receiving sporadic small arms fire throughout the night. Other ambush sites reported negative contact with the enemy. At 0600H, the 2d Squad conducted a search to its front in an attempt to locate the VC wounded or killed during the previous night's incident.

UNCLASSIFIED

III-1

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1 Aug 65

The search resulted in the recovery of two packs containing canned food and various other items. Large blood stains and trails were found in close proximity to the ambush site, but no bodies were found.

Patrolling by all units continued as planned, at 0630H. The 1st and 2d Squads of the 1st Platoon reported receiving sporadic small arms fire, at 0735H, in the vicinity of 934678. This fire continued from 45 to 50 minutes, the enemy firing approximately 40 rounds. Two VCS were apprehended - one male and one female - after the ensuing pursuit of the snipers. The VCS were turned over to the Regimental S-2.

Company D reported the 1st Platoon had returned, from patrol at 1010H, without further incident.

No enemy activity was reported the remainder of this date.

At 2013H, the 2d Platoon of Company A departed on operations in accordance with Frag Order 10 to Operation Order 326-65.

3 Jul 65

The platoon patrol from Company A reported apprehending two VCS at 0200H in the vicinity of 873712. The VCS were kept in custody throughout the night. At 0930H they were evacuated by helicopter to the Regimental S-2 for interrogation and disposition.

At 0240H, the patrol established a defensive perimeter in the vicinity of 870702.

At 0945H, after helicopter evacuation of the two VCS, the patrol proceeded to an area in the vicinity of 882698 where it remained until 1525H. At this time the patrol proceeded to vicinity 902687, where it remained until establishing ambush sites in the vicinity of 904686 and 905670 at 2230H.

Ambush sites, as outlined in Frag Order 10, were not utilized due to a VC unit of unknown size suspected of being in the immediate area.

No further enemy contact was reported this date.

4 Jul 65

At 0700H, the patrol from Company A apprehended a VC, armed with a US Pistol (M1911A1), in the vicinity 904666. The prisoner, along with captured equipment, was evacuated by helicopter and turned over to the Regimental S-2 for disposition.

The squad occupying the ambush site in the vicinity of 904686 rejoined the platoon at approximately 0800H in the vicinity of 905670. The platoon departed from this area at 1130H and secured a landing zone in the vicinity of 897675.

UNCLASSIFIED

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1 Aug 65

While establishing the landing zone defense, one Marine was wounded by a grenade type booby trap (trip wired). The Marine, evacuated by helicopter, was not considered to be in serious condition.

At 1430H, the 3d Platoon of Company A commenced a heli-relief of the 2d Platoon. The relief completed at 1530H, the 3d Platoon departed the landing zone to conduct operations in accordance with Frag Order 11 to Operation Order 328-65.

While the 1st Squad was enroute to its ambush site, a VC was encountered in the vicinity of 873664. The VC, hit by rifle fire from the squad, withdrew through the brush leaving a trail of blood which the squad followed to a deserted guerrilla base camp (870664). At this point the trail was lost and the search discontinued. The squad proceeded to 689665 and established its ambush. One VC was observed at 2045H moving east toward the ambush. While the VC was approaching the ambush an ARVN soldier dropped his helmet and rifle, then clapped his hands, alerting the VC who immediately fled. The ARVN soldier was turned over to Regimental Headquarters for interrogation and disposition.

The 2d and 3d Squads proceeded, by another route, to 862665. They arrived without incident at 2030H and established their ambush.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

5 Jul 65

In the morning, at approximately 0700H, while the patrol was preparing to move to a new location, a VC was encountered on the trail at 860663. The patrol fired at the VC, wounding him. A search was conducted with negative results for the body which had disappeared in the thick brush.

The platoon patrol reorganized and moved east along the ridgeline to the trail at 886656. The platoon continued northeast and established a defensive perimeter in the vicinity of 917700 for the night.

While enroute to the defensive site, the patrol discovered several small campsites along the trail from 873663 to 862665 to 855663, all capable of sleeping eight people.

At 2200H, the patrol reported hearing 30 shots of small arms fire and a woman screaming. It was the patrol's opinion the woman was being kidnapped or shot by the VC.

At 0600H, one platoon of H&S Company departed on patrol in accordance with Frag Order 12 to Operation Order 328-65. This patrol discovered a cache of rice, buried in the vicinity of 903708, and a cave, previously unreported, at 886703. One round of sniper fire was received by the patrol at 1430H. The patrol returned at 1830H with nothing further to report.

UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED

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1 Aug 65

There was no further enemy activity reported this date.

6 Jul 65

The 3d Platoon, Company A, located at 917700 reported no enemy activity during the night. The platoon returned to the battalion area at 0825H.

At 2020H, two platoons of Company B departed on patrol in accordance with Frag Order 13 to Operation Order 328-65. The patrol proceeded without incident establishing ambush sites at the following locations: 920701, 918702, 917706, 910701, 903698, 907698. No contact was made with the enemy by these ambush sites.

The Marine Liaison Officer at HILU DUC District Headquarters reported receiving 20 to 25 rounds of small arms fire at 2356H.

7 Jul 65

At 0625H, the Company B patrol departed its ambush sites and proceeded to KUHONG LY (2) in the vicinity of 913693. Search and clear operations were conducted through the village and surrounding area with negative results.

While the point fire team was crossing the stream at 899682 an explosive charge was detonated killing one Marine and wounding three (See Intelligence Report dtd 082030H). After helicopter evacuation of the four Marines, the patrol proceeded to the vicinity of 908698 where it remained until nightfall. Under cover of darkness, ambushes were established at 876689, 886699, 878699, and 888705.

Company D reported receiving 8 to 10 rounds of fire at 2030H. The 81mm Mortar Platoon reported these same rounds entered its position after passing over the Company D position.

Company B reported its listening post received small arms fire at 2035H.

No further enemy action was reported this date.

8 Jul 65

The Company B ambush site, located at 888705, reported receiving two bursts of fire from the south, at 0030H. At 0545H, movement was reported from the same area. At 0627H, the patrol departed the ambush sites and proceeded to the company area, arriving there at 1108H.

At 0226H, Company D received one round of small arms fire from the village in front of its position. Illumination of the area disclosed a person running away from the positions. Two rounds were fired at the person with negative results.

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1 Aug 65

At 0500H, Company A reported one of its men had shot himself in the left foot accidentally. The wounded man was evacuated by helicopter at 0620H.

The Division Chaplain returned from SAIGON with TRAN THI NGUYEN, a seven year old girl, who received an operation to correct a cleft lip at the US Naval Hospital there. The operation was arranged under the sponsorship of the Battalion Chaplain, and was the second such operation sponsored by the Chaplain.

Two platoons of Company D departed on operations in accordance with Frag Order 14 to Operation Order 328-65, at 1805H.

While in the process of establishing its ambush site in the vicinity of 879700, an element of Company D observed two armed VC approaching from the west. Both VC were killed by fire from this unit at approximately 2030H. The bodies were recovered along with 2 rifles (M1903 and M1), some letters, and other items (See Intelligence Reported dtd 101930H July 65).

The bodies and captured items were evacuated the following day to Regimental S-2.

All ambushes were reported in positions at 2155H.

There was no further enemy contact this date.

9 Jul 65

At 0800H Company D (-) reported all ambush units had completed their move to covered positions where they would remain until darkness.

Two VC suspects were apprehended by the 1st Platoon at 1030H, in the vicinity of 922700. These prisoners were subsequently evacuated to Regimental S-2 for disposition.

The 3d Platoon reported making contact with three VC in the vicinity of 897674 at 1530H. When sighted, the VC broke and ran from the trail toward a hill at 892677. One VC was seen to fall as the patrol pursued the enemy physically and by fire. A search of the hill and surrounding area was conducted without results. (See Intelligence Report dtd 101930H July 1965). All ambush sites were reported occupied at 2030H. Ambush sites were located in the following areas; 872692, 879703, 888695, 889673, 895663, and 897680.

Sporadic fire, heard throughout the night, was believed to have originated from the area of GS 8770. The target of this firing was unknown.

The Battalion Commander held a conference with HIEU DUC District Chief and his staff officers. A luncheon was held for the District Chief and his officers at the Battalion Officer's Mess.

The Regimental Commander visited the command post this date and conferred with the Battalion Commander.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Ambush units of Company D departed their sites at 0630H, junctured along the route depicted on the overlay (Frag Order 14 to Operation Order 328-65), and proceeded to the battalion area, arriving at 0835H.

While the 3d Squad, 1st Platoon was enroute to its juncture point two VCS were apprehended in the village of CAO SANG (2) (vicinity of 879700). The VCS were turned over to Regimental S-2 for disposition when the patrol returned.

At 1645H, 2 platoons of Company A departed on operations in accordance with Frag Order 15 to Operation Order 328-65.

Ambush sites were reported established in the vicinity of 904593, 905676, 906682, 907695, 914699, and 933676. No contact was reported by these sites this date.

11 Jul 65

At first light, units of Company A departed their ambush sites to occupy concealed patrol bases until darkness, at which time they occupied new ambush sites.

A report was received at 1045H that a truck, halted with mechanical problems on the main supply route was receiving sniper fire. A mobile patrol, composed of members of H&S Company, was dispatched to the scene at 1107H. Upon arrival there was no enemy contact. The area from which the fire reportedly came was scouted by the patrol with negative results. The truck was subsequently towed to the rear and the patrol returned to the CP without incident.

Under cover of darkness, approximately 1930H, the squads of Company A departed their platoon patrol bases and proceeded to their ambush sites.

At approximately 2030H, a mine was detonated in the vicinity of 926668, by the 2d squad, 2d Platoon while enroute to its ambush sites. Two Marines were killed and four wounded as result of the explosion. An attempt to evacuate the casualties by helicopter at 2145H, was aborted due to enemy fire. The subsequent consolidation of the remaining ambush units allowed the securing of another landing zone in the vicinity of 916667 at approximately 2400H.

12 Jul 65

The helicopter medical evacuation of Company A's casualties was reported complete at 0042H.

III-6

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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1 Aug 65

(See Patrol Operation Summary to Fragmentary Order 15 to Operation Order 328-65, and Intelligence Report (Frag Order 15) to Operation Order 328-65, for a detailed report of the mine detonation and incidents creating delay in evacuating the casualties.)

Upon completion of the medical evacuation the consolidated units of Company A proceeded to 907688 and established a perimeter defense.

At 0731H, Company A requested medical evacuation of a casualty wounded by a mine at coordinates 897699. The helicopter evacuation was completed at 0820H. Company A continued enroute to the battalion area without further incident, arriving there at 1000H.

No significant operations were conducted this date.

Small unit ambushes were established along the FEBA for the night.

There was no further enemy action reported this date.

13 Jul 65

No significant operations were conducted this date.

The S-3 Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC introduced intelligence data from the District Chief into the collection system.

Harassing and interdiction fires were delivered throughout the Battalion's TAOR throughout this date.

A radar controlled bombing mission was conducted at coordinates 820673 and 826673 from 2100H to 2400H (eight 500-pound bombs). Simultaneously, artillery delivered scheduled fires in the same area.

14 Jul 65

At 1315H, the 3d Platoon of Company B departed on operations in accordance with Frag Order 16 to Operation Order 328-65. The platoon proceeded over the proposed route without incident, arriving in the vicinity of 882717 at 1755H. The platoon established a perimeter defense in this area for the remainder of the night. There was no enemy contact.

Small unit ambush sites were manned along the battalion's front throughout the night with negative enemy contact.

15 Jul 65

The 3d Platoon of Company B departed its defensive area at 0607H and proceeded along the proposed route to the village of BAN AN PHUONG (vicinity of 866736). A systematic sweep of the village and surrounding area was conducted with negative results. Upon completion of the

III-1

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1 Aug 65

"village sweep", the platoon proceeded south over the planned route.

The platoon reported receiving one round of sniper fire from the vicinity of 845723 at 1400H.

At 1420H, the 3d Platoon reported they had encountered six VC in the vicinity of 866713, capturing two and killing four. The prisoners and dead bodies were evacuated by helicopter to Regimental S-2, along with several articles of possible intelligence value. (See Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 16, to Operation Order 328-65 and Intelligence Report to Frag Order 16 to Operation Order 328-65 for details of this incident.)

The platoon continued along its prescribed route until 1510H, at which time a platoon patrol base was established in the vicinity of 864717. At 1928H, the platoon reported receiving 4 rounds of sniper fire. The platoon subsequently displaced to a new patrol base, in the vicinity of 867712, arriving at 2030H.

No further enemy activity was reported, within the battalion's TAOR, this date.

16 Jul 65

The 3d Platoon of Company B departed its patrol base at 0630H, and proceeded along its prescribed route of operations. The platoon returned to the Company B CP at 1059H without further incident.

At 1600H, the 1st Platoon of Company D departed on operations in accordance with Frag Order 17 to Operation Order 328-65. The 2d Platoon departed at 1620H, following in trace of the 1st platoon.

At 1745H, the patrol reported receiving small arms fire from an automatic weapon in the vicinity of 943678. As the patrol continued along its route, the tempo of the firing increased to such an extent, the 2d Platoon was committed to the action. The lead elements of the patrol received small arms fire from both flanks and the front, and one 60mm mortar round at 1827H. Two Marines with shrapnel wounds and one Marine with a broken arm were subsequently evacuated as a result of the action. (See Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 17 to Operation Order 328-65 for details of this engagement). After commitment of the 2d platoon and the 60mm Mortar Section, the enemy disengaged. The patrol reformed and continued to the vicinity of 927668 where a patrol base was established. Squad sized ambush sites were occupied in the vicinity 917664, 925666, and 937664 under cover of darkness.

There was no further enemy activity reported the remainder of this date.

III-3

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

5750.1
1 Aug 6517 Jul 65

Company D (-) reported hearing drum signals and the sounds of much activity in the village at 943663 during the night.

At 0637H the 2d Platoon departed the patrol base and continued over the proposed route of patrol. The 1st Platoon departed thirty minutes later, following in trace of the 2d Platoon.

The patrol reported engaging three to four VC in the vicinity of 948640 at 1000H. The 2d Platoon conducted a sweep of the village of PHU SON (2) with negative results. The patrol then continued on its route to the north.

A helicopter evacuation of four casualties (1 KIA, 3 VIA) was requested by the patrol at 1110H. The casualties resulted from the detonation of an enemy installed M16A1 mine (of United States manufacture) at coordinates 952665. A wounded VC suspect was apprehended, in the vicinity of this incident, by the patrol. All casualties, including the VCS, were evacuated at 1146H. The patrol then continued on its mission.

At 1340H the patrol requested a helicopter evacuation of two Marines wounded by a land mine explosion in the vicinity of 952678. At 1410H, as the casualties were being loaded aboard the helicopter, the patrol received a heavy volume of fire from three directions. The helicopter lifted off, with the casualties, without sustaining any damage from enemy fire. However, three more Marines were wounded as a result of this engagement and required helicopter evacuation. Another helicopter arrived at coordinates 948677, at 1425H, to evacuate these casualties. A corpsman, serving as air evacuation medical assistant, was killed when the casualties were being placed aboard the helicopter. As the helicopter departed, the VC commenced saturating the area with 60mm mortar fire. The barrage and small arms fire continued for approximately thirty minutes. At this time an artillery fire mission was delivered in the area, silencing the majority of the VC fire. The Company D patrol consolidated in the vicinity of LA CHAU (2), while an air strike was being directed on LA CHAU (1). Enemy fire subsequently ceased.

The patrol proceeded to the vicinity of 942685 where they were resupplied by helicopter at 1825H. The patrol then proceeded to the vicinity of 915700 and assumed a perimeter defense for the night.

At 2243H, the Liaison Officer stationed at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported that Popular Force elements from 945693 to 946699 were engaged with VC elements, and drum signals were constant. The enemy disengaged at approximately 2330H.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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1 Aug 65

18 Jul 65

At 0820H, the two platoons of Company D departed their defensive area and proceeded without incident to the Company Command Post, arriving at 0930H.

No significant operations were conducted this date.

At 2350, the Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported sporadic rifle firing along the SONG YEN River, and constant drum signals. Artillery fire was delivered in the vicinity of 957687.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

19 Jul 65

At 1350H, the 1st platoon, of Company C was lifted by helicopter to a landing zone in the vicinity of 869693. The heli-lift was completed at 1420H and the 1st platoon departed the landing zone on operations in accordance with Frag Order 16 to Operation Order 328-65.

Patrolling was conducted without incident until 1650H, at which time the 1st platoon occupied a patrol base in the vicinity of 862697.

Under cover of darkness, squad sized ambush sites were occupied at 858687, 863692, and 866689. No enemy contact was reported from these sites this date.

The Marine Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported receiving small arms fire at 2125H. Artillery delivered fire on targets reported at 944680 and 937686 silenced the enemy.

Five Ontos and two tanks were placed in direct support of the battalion this date occupying positions on the PERM.

20 Jul 65

The 1st Platoon of Company C remained at the patrol base until 1200H, at which time it departed to secure a landing zone in the vicinity of 869693. The landing zone was established and secured at 1255H.

The 2d Platoon of Company C commenced a heli-relief of the 1st Platoon at 1500H. Upon completion of the relief, two patrols were dispatched. Both patrols had returned to the patrol base without incident, by 2000H. Under cover of darkness, two squad sized ambushes were established for the night at 859687 and 868689.

At 1030H, the driver of a refueling vehicle (179) reported one sniper round had been fired through the door of his vehicle. This incident occurred on the MSR in the vicinity of 953714.

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III-10

ENCLOSURE (1)

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1 Aug 65

other than the bullet hole in the door.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

21 Jul 65

At 0735H, after the two ambush squads returned to the patrol base (vicinity 869695), the 2d Platoon of Company C proceeded to the vicinity of 890680. A landing zone was secured in this area at 0845H.

At 0947H, after aircraft had smoke screened the landing zone, the heli-relief of the 2d Platoon, by the 3d Platoon, commenced. The relief was reported complete at 1005H. The 3d Platoon of Company C then departed the landing zone on operations in accordance with Frag Order 18 to Operation Order 328-65. Squad size ambush sites were reported occupied in the vicinity of 878704, 886761, and 884705 at 2032H. No enemy contact was reported by the 3d platoon this date.

The 1st Platoon of Company B reported three to five rounds were fired behind their positions (vicinity 955710), at 1607H. Investigation disclosed 2 persons moving east to west. When these persons were physically pursued however, they could not be located.

Company D reported receiving two rounds of small arms fire within their positions, at 2335H.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

22 Jul 65

At first light all elements of the 3d Platoon of Company C assembled the vicinity of 883700. The platoon then moved to the vicinity of 884703 where a landing zone was established at 0900H, the 3d platoon was lifted from this LZ and returned to the company area.

The 3d Platoon of Company A departed at 1310H on operations in accordance with Frag Order 19 to Operation Order 328-65. The 1st Platoon of Company A departed at 1630H, in accordance with the same order. Both platoons conducted patrolling as planned until 1930H, at which time the 3d Platoon established a patrol base in the vicinity of 878669 and the 1st Platoon occupied ambush sites in the vicinity of 878728 and 878725. No enemy activity was reported by either platoon, the remainder of this date.

The 3d Platoon of Company D conducted a local security patrol near the village at 944716. An object, assumed to be a hand grenade, was thrown at the point of this patrol at approximately 2235H. (This object did not explode and would not be located).

III-11

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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1 Aug 65

Simultaneously five to ten persons were seen running from the village. These persons were pursued by the patrol but could not be located.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

23 Jul 65

The 1st and 3d Platoons of Company A resumed patrolling at approximately 0630H.

The 3d Platoon moved from its patrol base (vicinity 878669) south along a trail to 873663. Booby traps were found at various intervals along this trail making movement extremely slow. At 1018H, the platoon reported they were receiving sniper fire and had sustained one casualty (subsequently evacuated by helicopter). Sporadic sniper fire continued for approximately one hour. At 1134H, the 3d Platoon requested an air strike be conducted in the area of Hill 310 (vicinity 863665). Aircraft, on station at 1205H, were directed by the TACP with excellent effect. Upon completion of the air strike, the 3d Platoon moved to the summit of Hill 310, where they reported the target neutralized and the snipers dispersed. At approximately 1630H, a second air strike was delivered on Hill 502 (vicinity 832659) and the surrounding area. Artillery fires were also delivered in this area. Upon completion of the fires, the 3d Platoon proceeded to the vicinity of 859668 where a patrol base was established for the night.

The 1st Platoon assembled its units in the vicinity of 872727, then proceeded toward the village of TAN AN PHUONG. The point fire team, upon entering the village, startled three young men cooking along side the trail. When challenged, the three youths halted and surrendered to the Marines. All three, without proper identification, were apprehended as VCS at 1032H. The prisoners were kept with the 1st Platoon as guides throughout the remainder of this patrol.

Upon completion of the search and clear of TAN AN PHUONG, the 1st Platoon proceeded south toward NOI VUC (vicinity 872700). At 1700H, while approaching NOI VUC, the platoon received one round of sniper fire in the vicinity of 870708. A search and clear operation was conducted through the village of NOI VUC at 1800H, without incident. The 1st Platoon then proceeded to the vicinity of 879718 where a patrol base was established for the night.

There was no further enemy activity reported this date.

24 Jul 65

The 1st Platoon departed the patrol base at 0700H, proceeded to the village of CAO SUNG (2), and occupied a blocking position along

III-12

ENCLOSURE (1)

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5750.1
1 Aug 65

the ridge line northeast of the village. Simultaneously, the 3d Platoon departed its patrol base and approached CAO SUNG (2) from the south. After deploying the 3d Platoon searched the village with negative results. Both platoons then proceeded to their Company area, arriving at 1145H.

The 3d Platoon of Company D was lifted by helicopter, at 1700H, to Hill 221 (vicinity 908648). Upon completion of the heli-lift, the 3d Platoon departed the landing zone and commenced operations in accordance with Frag Order 20 to Operation Order 328-65. The patrol continued over the proposed route until darkness, at which time a patrol base was established in the vicinity of 850620.

No enemy activity was reported this date.

25 Jul 65

At 0630H, the 3d Platoon of Company D departed the patrol base.

The patrol reported killing one VC in the vicinity of 832631, at 0930H. The VC was apparently observing the movement of the patrol from a place of concealment when spotted and killed by the platoon's rear guard.

At 1050H, while in the vicinity of 830632, a fire team from the patrol observed two men cutting wood (one man armed with a rifle). When challenged, the VC attempted to flee and were fired upon by the patrol. One VC was killed, while the other, carrying the rifle, was wounded. The wounded VC disappeared into the underbrush making good his escape. As a search began for the wounded VC, the scouting fire team came under fire from approximately three VC weapons.

Fire was returned and the enemy disengaged. Two Marines were wounded as a result of this encounter and subsequently evacuated by helicopter.

As the patrol proceeded east, about fifty meters from the scene of the last incident, it came upon a large VC Camp. This was determined by intelligence sources to be a Medium Level Viet Cong Cadre Camp. (See Intelligence Report (Frag Order 20) to Operation Order 328-65 dated 261830H July 65, for a complete description of the camp and its contents.) Due to the extensive quantity of articles contained in the camp a random sampling was collected and brought back with the patrol. Since time precluded the destruction of the camp it was left intact. However, approximately 50 rounds of medical supplies were destroyed. At 1600H, about 100 meters east of this camp, the patrol engaged a small VC element hiding or resting in two bamboo structures that were concealed among the rocks. Fire from the Marines killed two of these VC and wounded another, who escaped. Search of the structures led to the discovery of approximately 40 hand grenades as well as confiscation of the personal

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

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5750.1
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belongings of the VC. The patrol continued its search of this area locating several structures which were recently erected. Upon completion of the search, the 3d Platoon established a patrol base, in the vicinity of 839632, for the night.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

26 Jul 65

The 3d Platoon of Company D departed its patrol base at 0630H and continued on its mission. Patrolling was conducted until 1435H, without incident, at which time a landing zone was secured in the vicinity of 887657. At 1500H, the 3d Platoon was returned by helicopter to its company area.

At 1800H, the 2d Platoon of Company D departed on operations in accordance with War Order 21 to Operation Order 328-65. Patrolling was conducted without incident until 2025H, at which time squad ambush sites were established at 916701, 916704, and 921707.

NGUYEN THI PHUOI, a young Vietnamese girl, was returned from the U. S. Naval Hospital, Saigon, where an operation was performed for the correction of her double cleft lip. The operation was made possible under the sponsorship and coordination of the Battalion Chaplain.

Artillery continued delivering H&I fires throughout the Battalion's TAOR.

No further activity or significant events were reported this date.

27 Jul 65

The 2d Platoon of Company D resumed patrolling at 0655H. Patrolling continued until 1927H, without incident, at which time ambush sites were occupied in the vicinity of 895668 and 895662.

The Marine Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported hearing drum signals and observing flashlight signals along the SONG YEN River in grid squares 9568, 9668, and 9669.

Ambush sites were occupied along the FIBA and local security patrols were dispatched throughout the night.

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III-14

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1 Aug 6528 Jul 65

The 3d Platoon of Company B departed at 0645H on a reconnaissance patrol of the terrain encompassed by grid squares 9469, 9470, 9569, 9570, 9669, 9670. The patrol was conducted to familiarize members of the patrol with the terrain in front of the Company's lines. The patrol made no enemy contact and reported its return at 1100H.

Planning commenced on Operation Order 330-65.

No significant enemy activity was reported this date.

29 Jul 65

The 3d Platoon of Company B departed on operations in accordance with Frag Order 22 to Operation Order 328-65. The patrol was conducted without contact or incident until 1950H, at which time two shots were heard in the vicinity of 876707. It was assumed these shots were utilized to alert other VC in the area. No further incidents were reported and at 2100H squad sized ambush sites were established in the vicinity of 862707, 868706, and 873709.

No enemy contact was reported the remainder of this date.

30 Jul 65

The 3d Platoon of Company B continued patrol operations at first light.

At 1200H, the patrol reported apprehending two VCS in the area of 879707. The suspects were taken into custody because of improper identification.

While the patrol was moving through the vicinity of 883707, an explosion occurred which killed one Marine and wounded two (one Marine died of wounds after evacuation). The explosion, which occurred at 1318H, was assumed to have been a home made land mine. (See Intelligence Report (Frag Order 22) to Operation Order 328-65).

After evacuation of the casualties patrolling resumed. The 3d Platoon reported apprehending a VCS in the vicinity of 886705 at 1345H.

At 1430H, another VCS, without proper identification, was apprehended in the vicinity of 893706.

The patrol returned to the Company area at 1610H, without further incident.

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III-15

ENCLOSURE (1)

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1 Aug 65

Company C reported, at 1840H, a listening post at grid coordinates 969749 was discovered with its three occupants dead. Circumstances at this time indicate the Marines had died of electrical shock caused by lightening. An investigation is currently being conducted.

NGUYEN THI HUONG, a nine month old infant, was returned from the U. S. Naval Hospital, Saigon, where an operation was performed for the correction of her cleft lip. The operation was made possible under the sponsorship and coordination of the Battalion Chaplain.

31 Jul 65

No significant operations were conducted this date.

Planning and preparations, continued in conjunction with Operation Order 330-65.

Small unit ambush sites were manned along the battalion's front throughout the night.

No enemy contact was reported this date.

III-16

ENCLOSURE (1)

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1. Fragmentary Order 10 to Operation Order 328-65
2. Fragmentary Order 11 to Operation Order 328-65
3. Fragmentary Order 12 to Operation Order 328-65
4. Fragmentary Order 13 to Operation Order 328-65
5. Fragmentary Order 14 to Operation Order 328-65
6. Fragmentary Order 15 to Operation Order 328-65
7. Fragmentary Order 16 to Operation Order 328-65
8. Fragmentary Order 17 to Operation Order 328-65
9. Fragmentary Order 18 to Operation Order 328-65
10. Fragmentary Order 19 to Operation Order 328-65
11. Fragmentary Order 20 to Operation Order 328-65
12. Fragmentary Order 21 to Operation Order 328-65
13. Fragmentary Order 22 to Operation Order 328-65
14. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 8 and 9) to Operation Order 328-65
15. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 10, 11 & 12) to Operation Order 328-65
16. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 13) to Operation Order 328-65
17. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 14) to Operation Order 328-65
18. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 15) to Operation Order 328-65
19. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 16) to Operation Order 328-65
20. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 17) to Operation Order 328-65
21. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 18) to Operation Order 328-65
22. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 19) to Operation Order 328-65
23. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 20) to Operation Order 328-65
24. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 21) to Operation Order 328-65

ENCLOSURE (1)
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- 25. ✓ Intelligence Order (Frag Order 22) to Operation Order 328-65
- 26. ✓ Special Intelligence Report (dtd 251200H July 65)
- 27. ✓ Special Intelligence Report (dtd 251800H July 65)
- 28. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 8-65 and 9-65 to Operation Order 328-65
- 29. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 10-65 to Operation Order 328-65
- 30. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 11-65 to Operation Order 328-65
- 31. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 13-65 to Operation Order 328-65
- 32. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 14-65 to Operation Order 328-65
- 33. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 15-65 to Operation Order 328-65
- 34. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 16-65 to Operation Order 328-65
- 35. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 17-65 to Operation Order 328-65
- 36. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 18-65 to Operation Order 328-65
- 37. ✓ Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 19-65 to Operation Order 328-65

ENCLOSURE (1)

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1stBn, 3d Marines
 3d MarDiv (Rein), FME
 DA NANG, RVN
 022000H July 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 8 and 9) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III
 and 6658 IV

(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. 1ST PLATOON, COMPANY D

a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 301500H June TOR - 021030H July

c. Terrain - Nothing new of significance.

d. Enemy Activity

(1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows:

(a) 301930H to 010600H - coords 895707

(b) 301930H to 010630H - coords 868694

(c) 301930H to 010600H - coords 887704

(d) 012000H to 020630H - coords 914690

(e) 011930H to 020600H - coords 902684

(2) At 301830H, coords 903708, near northern edge of river, an area 12" in diameter, circular in shape was discovered, with a light covering of dirt and a lattice work of small bamboo shoots underneath. This covering, then 3" of dirt, were removed disclosing another covering of banana leaves. The ~~squad~~ leader assuming it to be a mine, so marked it and departed.

(3) At 010800H, patrol at coords 938666, was taken under fire from 2 small huts at coords 943666. Three to five VC expended 35-40 small arms rounds (none automatic) over a 20 minute period. During this time the patrol advanced to within 40 meters of the enemy's firing point, at which time the firing ceased. Entering the 2 huts, the patrol apprehended 1 man possessing an invalid ID card and 1 woman wounded in the abdomen with what appeared to be shrapnel from an M-79 round. Both VCS turned over to 3d Marines.

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Tab 14

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(4) At 010330H, the lead Marine of patrol, moving north on path, coords 878700, passed an open spot in the brush to his right. Through this opening, he spotted 15-20 VC, with packs, rifles, cartridge belts and one radio. The radio, smaller than a PRC-10 and larger than a PRC-6, had knobs, selector device, no aerial, and was carried upon the back. The VC were preparing to leave the area which was relatively clear, although small, and surrounded by dense brush. The vis a vis, immediate recognition, of both the Marine and VC was simultaneous. The Marine opened fire while the VC melted into the brush without returning fire, 10-12 heading south and the others west. One VC fell under the fire, but made good his escape, even though wounded; blood and a French MAS (1936), SerNo 276079 in fair condition, with two .30 cal. rounds - 1 ball and the other hand crimped (forwarded to 3d Marines) were found at that spot upon subsequent occupation of the area by the remainder of the patrol. 2 VCS, one of them appearing to have been the host of the departed VC, were apprehended and also turned over to 3d Marines. The "host" received minor head abrasions during his escape attempt. The engagement, which lasted only 30 to 45 seconds, resulted in no friendly casualties, 1 confirmed VC KIA, and 2 apprehended VCS. (S-2 Comment: Radio may indicate unit a part of larger, controlling and organized parent unit.)

(5) At 012000H, coords 898674, Marine ambush observed 8 VC with packs and rifles 50-100 meters north. When this group approached within 25 meters, they were taken under automatic rifle fire; 3 VC were seen to fall backwards from effectively directed fire. The fire pattern was clearly delineated with every third or fourth round being tracer. Since the patrol had moved into the position during darkness and were generally unfamiliar with this specific area, and because of the existing undesirability of splitting the 9 man force, the density of brush, unknown whereabouts of the remaining VC force, the unknown degree of severity of wounds inflicted upon the 3 enemy, which at that time were not visible; the patrol, rather than move forward in search, felt it advisable to hold their position and await the return or the enemy to recover their casualties. Throughout the night 10-15 rounds of sporadic sniper fire was received. At 020600 the patrol moved towards the village at coords 903676. While enroute a great amount of blood was noted on and near the trail with marks indicating someone crawling and others showing a body being dragged leaving small ruts. Midway between the ambush site and village more blood was discovered and nearby, 2 packs (forwarded to 3d Marines) containing the following items.

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7 cans (assorted brands) condensed milk
 2 cans fish
 1 plastic bag w/soap, shrimp and tea
 1 small medicine bottle (contents unknown)
 1 pr. tire sole sandals
 1 grey shirt
 1 unused battery - BA-270/U
 Small quantity dried tobacco

Although the enemy suffered 3 confirmed WIA, no friendly casualties resulted from the action.

- (6) At 020735H, coords 934678, patrol received small arms fire directed from LA CHAU (2), coords 945674. The patrol advanced, occupied and searched the village; the search proved negative. Contact lasted 45-60 minutes, the VC firing 30-40 rounds; 1 automatic rifle noted. No known casualties resulted.
- (7) Small piles of 15 to 30 aged punji stakes scattered along trail for about 150 meters, coords 883705.
- (8) At 011530H, coords 882707, 1 young female reported seeing 100 men dressed in camouflage utilities with "big and small weapons," some with bipods, moving eastward from Hill 310 (GS 8666) (S-2 Comment: This report is considered unreliable.)
- (9) At 011330H, 2 middle aged women reported seeing 10 VC with khaki uniforms at coords 878702, the day before and 5 VC, two days before. (S-2 Comment: This report also unreliable.)
- (10) Platoon sweep of the Village of HOI VUC, coords 875712. The operation, beginning at 011030H was completed at 011500H, utilized 3 squads, one ARVN Civil Affairs Team with loudspeakers and one demolition team. One squad blocked all trails leading from the village and gathered all indigenous personnel, while the second, with the CA Team informing the people to leave their places of hiding and that the Marines would harm no one, searched huts 2 at a time, located caves, tunnels and holes marking them for the demolition team (using grenades) which followed. Although the villagers appeared surprised, no men of military age were found. 19 huts were searched netting the following:
- 33 women
 - 4 girls 11-17 years old
 - 25 girls under 11 years old
 - 27 boys under 11 years old
 - 17 men over 50 years old.
- 106 Total, plus 1 baby born during search.

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No evidence of recent VC activity noted (see 1stBn, 3d Marines Intelligence Report of 241800H June 1965, paragraph d.(12).) One Marine WIA occurred when he lost his balance and fell on an uncovered punji stake.

- (11) At 020200H, coords 898674, a CS grenade was detonated approximately 25 meters from patrol. The CS did not effect the friendly force. One small piece from the red band of a baseball type CS grenade was recovered, but subsequently lost during later encounter with the VC (paragraph (6) above).

2. 2ND PLATOON, COMPANY D

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 280720H TOR - 301100H
- c. Terrain- Nothing new of significance.
- d. Enemy Activity
 - (1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows.
 - (a) 291930H to 300600H - coords 903673
 - (b) 291930H to 300600H - coords 904685
 - (2) At 280930H, VCS apprehended, coords 925702. He had two different ID cards, one marked "suspect" giving his age as 15 although he appeared to be a good deal older. This, and the recommendation of the RVNMC NCO accompanying the patrol resulted in the VCS being turned over to 3d Marines.
 - (3) HIEU DUC Headquarters reported that VC were digging fighting holes along the road from coords 943671 to 943660 (later verified by U.S. Marine Corps patrol). Villagers had reported to the District Chief that a group of VC whose base of operations is AN-TRACH (GS 9665) were, on the 27th of June, operating in areas and in numbers as follows.
 - (a) 30 VC with 2 automatic rifles at coords 960677.
 - (b) 4 or 5 man VC outpost at coords 953681.
 - (c) 10 VC with 1 SMG at coords 942660.
 - (d) 2 man VC outpost at destroyed concrete bridge coords 943673 (at 281540, school children on the morning of the 28th, on road reported 3 VC at this position to Marine Corps patrol).

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- (4) At 281330H an ARVN patrol reported 12 VC dressed in black with straw hats moving from the southeast to village at coords 941679. Although no weapons were seen, the ARVN claimed that the VC might be carrying "sawed off" U.S. Carbines strapped to their legs under their trousers. The area was subsequently investigated by U.S. Marine Corps patrol with negative results.
- (5) At 281430H, patrol at coords 941679 recieved sniper fire from coords 946676, 940673 and 937676. The fire continued for approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ hour, the enemy expending 20-25 rounds, no automatic weapons noted. 60mm mortars and 3.5" rockets were fired into village at coords 946675, at which time all sniper fire ceased.
- (6) At 281600H, acting upon a report of ARVN that 6-8 VC were seen moving into village, coords 937682, the patrol instituted a search of the vicinity, apprehending 1 VCS who was attempting to hide. VCS turned over to 3d Marines.
- (7) At 281815H, patrol at coords 953637 received 10 rounds of sniper fire over a 5 minute period from 2 VC at coords 958675 and 2 more at coords 958675 and 2 more at coords 955678. VC sniper activity ceased when fire was returned and artillery was brought to bear. Villagers reported later that 1 VC had been killed during the action.
- (8) At coords 962675, sign "Down with Americans," and nearby a punji trap containing a snake. (S-2 Comment: Second such report - see 1stBn, 3d Marines Intelligence Report 282200H May, paragraph d.(14)). Another sign "Hate U.S." at coords 951669.
- (9) At 290820, a charge was detonated 4 feet forward of the first man of patrol moving along a "U" shaped dike, coords 948674. Available information is as follows.
 - (a) The lead man observed an orange fire ball, approximately 12" in diameter as he was lifted by the force of the explosion and deposited in the adjoining paddy. He suffered 2 broken ear drums and minor shrapnel wounds on the side of his body.
 - (b) 5 other Marines and 2 ARVN were wounded; 2 ARVN seriously.
 - (c) Personnel on the overall axis of march received wounds even though 120 meters distant from the explosion, although these a good deal nearer, but at the time, transversing the lower portion of the curved "U" shape of the dike, escaped injury.

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- (d) The Charge left a "V" shaped crater, 12" in diameter and 18" deep in the soft earth of the dike.
- (e) The size of the explosion appeared to be similar to that of a 105 mm projectile.
- (f) Wires led from the point of detonation to a village 40 meters away, at coords 947674.
- (g) Packing canister from a 2.75" rocket found in the immediate vicinity.
- (h) Man observed running from the scene, disappearing into the bush.
- (i) Male VCS holding child, within 40 meters of blast apprehended and turned over to 3d Marines.

(S-2 Comment: This appears to have been an electronically detonated, visually controlled, shaped charge of similar size to a 105mm projectile round planted and aimed along the dike.)

- (10) At 290840H - medical helo evac (paragraph (9) above and troops in vicinity were taken under fire from enemy located as follows.
 - (a) 2 VC coords 951671 - 25 to 40 rounds
 - (b) 2 VC coords 953674 - 25 to 40 rounds
 - (c) 4 VC coords 948684 with 1 automatic rifle.
 - (d) 2 VC coords 939676 with 1 automatic rifle.

The patrol returned fire, 1 VC was seen thrown back into the bush by the fire of 2 Marines at coords 951671. At coords 940684 one VC wounded by M-60, and 3 others "hit the deck", 4 then disappeared into the brush. Artillery was directed into the area of coords 951671 and 953674. When 2 artillery rounds landed in the vicinity of the latter coords, 6 detonations occurred; Artillery FO and platoon commander convinced these added, unexpected explosions were mines. The engagement consumed approximately 45 minutes (during med helo evac) and at least 1 round hit the helo's. The enemy suffered 2 confirmed WIA's, with the only friendly casualties resulting from device detonated at 290820H. At 291045H the village of LA CHAU (2) coords 945675 was again searched and a pack containing a pancho and camouflaged utilities was discovered and forwarded to 3d Marines.

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- (11) At 291945H four persons, walking in column were observed 600 meters to the northwest in an open field.
- (12) The District Chief of HIEU DUC reported that at 280215H his headquarters received 15 81mm mortar rounds which dug craters 16 to 20 inches in diameter and 4 inches deep into the hard packed earth. Two of his men were killed and 1 wounded while taking cover in an open trench. The District Chief estimates that the VC mortar firing point was located in the vicinity of coords 918678. One 81mm mortar tail assembly found in impacted area, forwarded to 3d Marines.
- (13) The HIEU DUC District Chief states that he has received reports from villagers that the VC are collecting all ID cards and/or papers.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL:

CHARLES J. HILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

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S-3

1st Bn, 3d Marines
3d MarDiv (Rein), FMF
DA NANG, RVN
051300H July 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 10, 11, & 12) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III
and 6658 IV

(b) 1st Bn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. 2ND PLATOON, COMPANY A

a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 022000H TOR - 041500H

c. Terrain - Nothing new of significance.

d. Enemy Activity

- (1) At 030200H, 2 VCS apprehended in hut, coords 873712. The 32 year old suspect made a number of conflicting and obviously untrue statements concerning the reason for his present location, type of employment, place of residence, and recent activities. This is also true of the 15 year old suspect discovered hiding under a bed. VCS returned to S-2, 3d Marines.
- (2) Suspected, recently used VC camp site, coords 876698, with 6 small trees placed across each trail entrance.
- (3) At 032030H, coords 902671, while placing ambush sites, patrol observed approximately 15 VC 100 meters to the south. The platoon commander recalled the personnel from 2 of the ambush sites already established and assumed a defensive perimeter around the hill at the above coords. No further enemy contact or observation occurred until 040700H when a lone man was seen walking west on trail, coords 907668. The stranger was hailed by the RVNMC NGO accompanying patrol, and told to approach, which he did. The captive attempted to draw a U.S. .45 caliber (M1911) pistol, which was cocked with a chambered round, from his belt, under his shirt. He discontinued this action when a muzzle of an M-14 was placed at his abdomen. The following information was obtained prior to the VC being helo-evacuated and turned over to 3d Marines along with all papers, documents, personal effects and weapon.

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T-4 15

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- (a) [redacted] departed from "PT T-110" at 0310 [redacted] and was captured while returning to that same point (thought to be Hill 502, GS 9066, at 040715H.
- (b) He had become separated from the others with whom he had been sent on a food gathering mission.
- (c) He became separated from the rest at approximately 040100H.
- (d) The captive assumed those hailing him to be his former companions.
- (e) His overall mission at that time was to attend a "school" of 8 days duration.
- (f) At time of capture he had in his possession at least 8 days food supply.
- (g) POINT T-110 consists of one large house and two small huts. Judging by the time/space factor and his direction of movement, Pt T-110 may well be either hill 270 (GS8564) or hill 502 (GS8365).
- (h) Name - TRAN-DINH-NGO and/or TRAN-DINH-THAUNH.
- (i) Age - 48 years old.
- (j) Arrived in RVN 2 months ago, taking 1 month and 8 days travel time.
- (k) Had lived in North Vietnam since 1954.
- (l) On his route south he stopped periodically to "give school".
- (m) Had in his possession at time of capture:
 - 1 Camouflaged cover
 - 1 carrying bag
 - 1 wrist watch (made in USSR)
 - 1 U.S. pistol, cal. 45 -1911
 - 1 document indicating orders to attend 8-day school (which he attempted to throw away)
 - 2 wedding bands.
- (4) At 041300H, coordinates 892678 1 grenade type booby trap, with a vine used as "trip wire," was detonated, resulting in one USMC WIA. There were a number of "C" ration cans in the vicinity, indicating a prior friendly bivouac site.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~2. 3d PLATOON, COMPANY A

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 041500H TOR - 060830H
- c. Terrain - Good trail from coords 877670 to summit of hill at coords 874664. This is also the point of juncture of another trail leading from coords 883655. From the juncture, a good, well used trail, 3 to 4 feet wide extends along ridgeline to Hill 310, coords 863665, and then on to Hill 502, GS 8365. Hill 310 may also be approached from the north by following the trail from coords 877670, west to coords 862669, then south, up the hill, through dense but passable terrain. Reference is made to this trail complex throughout following paragraphs.
- d. Enemy Activity
 - (1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows.
 - (a) 042000H to 050700H - coords 863666
 - (b) 052000H to 060700H - coords 917701
 - (2) At 041745H, coords 871665, patrol heard the sound of voices forward of the point. Evidently, the patrol itself was also overheard, as 3 VC came out of hiding to investigate. The point fired, wounding one VC, who was dragged into the heavy brush by the other two, leaving a trail of blood which led to a campsite at coords 870665. One newly constructed 15' by 15' bamboo hut was located and destroyed at this campsite and a search of the vicinity produced the following, which were either turned over to 3d Marine or destroyed. One confirmed VC WIA resulted from this encounter.
 - 25 - 35 lbs of rice
 - several cooking pots
 - 1 bottle rice wine
 - 3 ponchos
 - 3 packs containing good quality clothing
 - 8 rounds, .30 cal
 - 1 khaki uniform (dark brown)
 - 1 packet vitamins (CALVITA)
 - (3) At 042045H, coords 871665, 4 VC were observed approaching ambush site. As the ambush prepared to fire, an ARVN soldier, accompanying the unit, clapped his hands, and knocked over his rifle and helmet, alerting the VC who fled. The ARVN soldier was placed in custody and turned over to 3d Marines.

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- (4) At 0421, coords 871665, ambush fired at figures. A search of the area the following morning proved negative.
- (5) at 050700H, coords 863666, a man dressed in black peasant clothing, with web belt and pistol, carrying approximately 20 lbs of rice, was encountered by patrol. Automatic rifle fire was directed at this lone target, who after being wounded, disappeared to the south. Although the VC made good his escape, he dropped the following items.
(Forwarded to 3d Marines)

1 pr glasses with case
1 bloodstained cap
1 pen
1 note, translated as follows

Receipt

Advance point had received the rice resupply to distribute for people marching equalling "8 ang" (untranslated). Therefore, makes this temporary receipt, because it doesn't have the main receipt yet.

date July 4, 1965

/S/ TIEN
NGUYEN TIEN

One (1) confirmed VC WIA resulted from this action.

- (6) At coords 869664 patrol discovered and destroyed 75 lbs of tobacco.
- (7) At 051300H, coords 885657, patrol discovered and detonated a grenade type booby trap on trail leading to VC campsite.
- (8) Small campsites (Platoon Commander noted approximately 20 and estimates at least 100 in the area) along trail from coords 873663, to Hill 310, coords 862665, and to summit of hill, coords 856663. These sites consist of matted down grass, space for 5-8 persons, covered by leaves and brush, with charcoal pots and a number of cooking utensils. This paragraph, as well as the 8 preceding are related to paragraph c. above.
- (9) Although there was no contact with the enemy, while occupying an ambush site, coords 917701, the following activity was noted.
- (a) At 052200H, coords 917706, 30 small arms rounds fired at an unknown target. A woman was heard screaming "VC" and sounds giving the impression that she was being kidnapped and/or shot.

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- (b) 060100H, coords 924706, 15 small arms rounds fired at unknown target.
- (c) At 060300H, coords 911600, 15 small arms rounds fired at unknown target.

3. REACTION PLATOON, H&S COMPANY

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 050800H TOR - 051830H
- c. Terrain - Nothing new of significance
- d. Enemy Activity
- (1) Site of suspected VC mine (see 1stBn, 3dMar Intelligence Report dtd 022000H Jul 1965) at coords 903708, investigated, disclosing a cache of rice buried under banana leaves.
- (2) Cave discovered at coordinates 88670. Nearby was an old covered punji trap, 12" square and 2' deep.
- (3) At 051430H, patrol at coordinates 874708 received one round of sniper fire from 300meters west. Man was seen to flee from that vicinity after shot. Since he was only momentarily visible, Marines were unable to fire effectively.

WILLIAM H. LAMAGAN


Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

ENCLOSURE

(1) Special Intelligence Report

OFFICIAL:


CHARLES J. GILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

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Special Intelligence Report regarding information obtained by 1/3
Liaison Officer from HIEU DUC District Chief at 05000H July 1965.

1. Three VC Companies reported operating in the vicinity of coordinates 866710, 887705 and 895665.
2. District Headquarters has received fire from coordinates 945677 and 949684 (type and time not stated).
3. Night of 28 June received four (4) 60mm mortar rounds at District Headquarters. The District Chief called in artillery fire and later reports from villagers indicated 4 VC KIA and 2 WIA.
4. A 1900 curfew exists in HIEU DUC District.
5. 5 VC captured at coordinates 945674.
6. 3 VC surrendered stating that they received no weapons unless assigned a mission, morale was low, and their situation has been difficult and dangerous lately.
7. School guard at coordinates 943888 found to be VC and arrested. His 2 assistants, also VC, escaped.
8. District Chief Gives the following coordinates as VC mortar sites. 913703, (best), 931707, 917689, 933677, (60mm), 946667, 957669, and 954672. (S-2 Comment: At 060145H HIEU DUC District Headquarters was hit with one round of 60mm mortar fire from coordinates 933677 - no casualties.)
9. Villagers vicinity of HOI VUC, GS 8770, have requested VC not to fire at Marine Corps patrols.

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1stBn, 3d Marines
3d MarDiv (Rein), FMF
DA NG, RVN
082030H July 1965

3-3

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 13) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: Indochina 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III
and 6658 IV
(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. COMPANY B

a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 062000H TOR - 081100H

c. Terrain

- (1) Brush growing heavier and higher throughout route of patrol.
- (2) Some rice crops have now attained a height of approximately 3 to 5 feet., Grid Square 9169.
- (3) Trench/irrigation ditch, at places 10' deep, runs erratically throughout a 200 meter area, vicinity coordinates 924702.
- (4) Recent dry weather has substantially increased trafficability throughout TAOR.

d. Enemy Activity

(1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows:

(a) 062000H to 070600H-coordinates 920701, 918702, 917706, 903698, 907698, 910701,

(b) 072000H to 080600H-coordinates 876689, 886699, 878699, 888705,

(2) At 071900H, coordinates 876689, one man seen running west at a distance of 80 meters.

(3) At 070615H, immediately prior to sweep of village, coordinates 910690, a large puff of white smoke was observed to rise from that village.

(4) At 080030, ambush site at coordinates 889705, received two, 3-round bursts, sound indicative of U.S. Carbine, 100 meters to the south. At 080545H, movement was observed in that same vicinity. One M-79 round was directed near

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Tab 16

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that spot located by a large tree. Later investigation disclosed matted grass, indicating possible use by 2 or 3 persons.

- (5) At 071000H, coords 908679, a mine detonated resulting in one USMC KIA and two WIA. Investigation has revealed the following information.
- (a) the charge produced a large amount of dark smoke, and a crater 27" wide and 6" deep, surrounded by blackened soil and sand.
 - (b) A few fragments (forwarded to 3d Marines) were found in the vicinity and presumed to have resulted from the mine. They were composed of a light weight alloy, possibly aluminum.
 - (c) The point (those injured) was in the process of securing the stream crossing in order that the remainder of the patrol might refill their canteens.
 - (d) The patrol was moving southwest, crossing the stream from north to south.
 - (e) At this point, the stream was about 10 meters wide, running west to east, through a "cut" of approximately 30 meters.
 - (f) The charge was planted 2 or 3 feet west of the trail on the south bank of the "cut", with the explosive force directed northward, across the stream and along the trail entering the stream bank from the opposite side.
 - (g) The USMC KIA was located 5 meters north, directly in line with the main force of the blast.
 - (h) One USMC WIA was located 8 meters northeast, another 15 meters northeast, while the third, the fire team leader, was 5 meters forward (south) of the point of detonation.
 - (i) The closest uninjured man to the blast was at a distance of 20-30 meters. It is noted, however, that the trail curves slightly northward at this point and is at a somewhat higher elevation than the area in which the KIA, WIA's occurred.
 - (j) Wire (forwarded to 3d Marines) from point of detonation was followed approximately 60 meters east through the brush on the south edge of the stream. The wire terminated at a spot hidden under overhanging vegetation, next to the high stream bank. This location gave evidence of being occupied, on and off, for the

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past few days. The surrounding area was thoroughly investigated for routes of egress with negative results, indicating a withdrawal eastward, via the stream.


- (h) This stream-crossing had often been used by friendly forces. (S-2 Comment: The need for avoiding established patterns of movement has been reemphasized.)

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL:



CHARLES J. HILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

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D.C.

1stBn, 3d Marines
 3d MarDiv (Rein) FME
 DA NANG, RVN
 101930H July 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 14) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: Indochina 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III
 and 6658 IV

(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. COMPANY D

a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 081800H TOR - 100900H

c. Terrain - Nothing new of significance

d. Enemy Activity

(1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows.

(a) 082030H to 090630H-Coordinates 895704, 889698,
 897680, 889673, 895663

(b) 092030H to 100630H-Coordinates 897680, 889673,
 895663, 872692, 888695, 879703

(2) At 082030H, coordinates 879700, the point of patrol observed 2 armed men walking toward him from the south, at a distance of 50 meters. The point concealed themselves and waited until the enemy were within 5 feet, then fired, killing both VC. The following items were confiscated and forwarded to 3d Marines.

1 U.S. Rifle, cal. 30, M1903, #139465, in fair condition, the stock of which gives evidence of having at one time been painted black.

1 U.S. Rifle, cal. 30, M-1, #4229012, in poor condition (M-14 bullet had pierced one side of the barrel and imbedded itself in the other, as a result of the preceding encounter).

3 envelopes, containing 5 letters, the translations of which are appended as enclosure (1).

1 pamphlet - a poem commemorating the anniversary of the birth of HO-CHI-MINH.

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8 clips .30 cal. ammunition
 1 piece black plastic
 1 piece camouflaged parachute silk
 1 packet gauze
 3 VC grenades
 1 pair black trousers
 1 pair blue and white shorts

2 confirmed VC KIA resulted from this engagement. (See para 4, below)

- (3) At 091030H, coordinates 922708, 2 VCS were apprehended when they attempted to escape the patrol. They were uncooperative, and possessed improper identification.
- (4) At 092030H, while occupying an ambush site at coordinates 879703, the sound of 10-20 rounds of automatic small arms fire, directed at an unknown target, was heard. The sound appeared to be from the vicinity of coordinates 879700 (see paragraph 2, above). Intermittent fire continued until 100200H. The following morning, at 100700H, 2 VCS were apprehended in the vicinity of 879700. The VCS (turned over to 3d Marines) had improper identification, were evasive and refused to answer the simplest and most basic queries.
- (5) At 091530H, a patrol was occupying concealed positions at coordinates 897674, in heavy brush adjacent to a stream running south to north, and 15 meters south of a trail which crosses the stream from east to west. One man was seen jogging westward along the trail 15 meters to the north. A Marine observed this movement through an opening in the brush, and also that of another man following within 30 seconds. When the third passed shortly after, carrying what appeared to be a U.S. Carbine, the observer alerted the remainder of the patrol which immediately began a sweep westward, covering both sides of the trail. The brush terminated at a point approximately 100 meters west of the patrol site, at the edge of a large paddy area. The VC were seen running west through the paddies. The patrol pursued the fleeing enemy both physically and by fire. As the fire commenced, the VC changed direction and headed directly north toward the safety of dense brush at the base of the hill mass at coordinates 891676. One VC was wounded and fell to the ground; the other 2 attempted to carry him but, under heavy fire, released him and continued their flight northward, up the hill, while the fallen VC was left to crawl off and disappear into the dense brush. A thorough search was conducted throughout the entire area with negative results. One confirmed VC, WIA resulted from this action. The Company Commander, present at the scene, attributes the haste of the VC,

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jogging rather than walking to a possible warning by villagers of Marines in the vicinity, although their exact location, obviously, was unknown.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN


Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

ENCLOSURES:

(1) Translation of VC documents

OFFICIAL:


CHARLES J. HILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

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TRANSLATION OF VC DOCUMENTS CAPTURED AT 082030H JULY 1965,
COORDINATES 879700

ENVELOPE # 1

From LUAN to CHINH at HOA THUONG
Letter #1

- From girl to sweet-heart
- She waits for return letter
- Nothing of significance

Letter #2

- From PHUEN to the family who receive this letter
- Notify that his son-in-law is dead

Letter #3

- From Q.16 to his companion DUNG and NHI
- Meet difficulties on military actions these days
- Built up more ambushes for killing American troops (VC strength about 1 rifle squad to 1 platoon)
- Notify his companion that on the battlefield on June 5, 1965 they (VC) killed 21 American troops
- There are some Americans going to AN TAN, try to kill them.

ENVELOPE # 2

From No 11 to H.56

- Military enemy actions are oppressing us (VC) more and more
- American troops seized one MAS rifle from TUU's village and guerrillas village captured one garand M1 from American troops on June 2, 1965
- Enemy strength increased on the afternoon of June 2, 1965
- The moral of the people from DONG-BICH to PHUOC-GIANG (HOI-VUC) is going down. The amount of people go for receiving temporary identification is 35 people - the guerrillas cannot shoot them
- American troops go many ways therefore all guerrillas have to run up the mountain
- American troops captured TRO and TAN
- Propose to district troops (VC) send over to us, more tunnel shoring, a lot of hand grenades and mines

June 6, 1965

From No 11 to H.56

One small pamphlet containing poems of HO-CHI-MINH

Enclosure (1)

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ENVELOPE #3

Letter #1

- From one oldest brother to his young brother
- Enemy troops searching everyday in our area.
- I shot down one helicopter (was burned) in 1965
- Some day I cannot go out from the tunnel therefore I was very hungry
- The rest of letter, no significance
- A piece of paper rough draft of above letter

Enclosure (1)

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C D

1st Bn, 3d Marines
3d Mar Div (Rein),
DA NANG, RVN
122000H July 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 15) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series 1701 Sheets 6659 III
and 6658 IV

(b) 1stBn, 3dMarines Operation Order 328-65

1. COMPANY A

a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 102000H TOR - 121100H

c. Terrain - Nothing new of significance

d. Enemy Activity

(1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows.

(a) From 102330H to 110615 - coord 905676, 906682,
933678, 914699, 907695, 904693.

(b) From 112200H to 120630 - coords 907698.

(2) At 120845H, coords 897699, one USMC WIA occurred when a mine detonated on the trail they were following to the northwest. No "pop" was heard prior to the blast which was similar to a grenade. The men were at 15 - 20 meter intervals. Immediately after the explosion, the patrol leader withdrew his unit to the southeast. No further investigation was conducted because of the need for rapid medical helo-evac.

(3) At 112025H, coords 926668, a mine detonated, resulting in two USMC KIA's and four USMC WIA's. Relevant comments are appended as enclosure (1).

Subsequent to the detonation, the remainder of the 16 man patrol formed a 360° defense perimeter, and requested a medical helo-evac. While attempting to guide the helicopter with flashlights, at 112115H, the patrol received 3 or 4 initial small arms rounds from 100 to 150 meters to the north. When fire was returned, enemy fire intensified driving off the helicopters.

Soon after the explosion, three other USMC units, located at coords 898675, 895654, and 906682, commenced movement toward the patrol which had suffered the casualties at

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(c) From 112200H to 120630

Tab 18

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coords 926668, arriving within 5 minutes of each other at approximately 112325H.

The first relief unit to arrive, while 100 meters west of their destination, was taken under heavy machine gun and automatic rifle fire from coords 925667 and 924667, which continued for approximately 5 minutes, followed by sporadic small arms fire from coords 926667 as the unit and accomplished the "link up" at coords 926668.

While at coords 928669, the second relief unit to arrive was taken under heavy machine gun fire from coords 924668 and small arms fire from coords 925676. The enemy fire, which lasted 25-30 seconds, was returned and the relief unit moved on to their destination at coords 926668.

The third relief unit, moving southeast, received machine gun and automatic rifle fire, directed at their right and left flanks from enemy positions at coords 926670 and 924668, while 200 meters northwest of the "link-up" point at coords 926668. The patrol reports silencing both enemy weapons with grenades and M-79 fire. At this point, they were warned by the unit, which they were enroute to aid, that they were moving into a VC ambush. Heeding this warning, the relief unit moved directly south, in column, to coords 924667, then east to their destination at coords 926668, receiving small arms fire from the north until the "link-up". This relief unit, moving from the northwest, reports the enemy imitating the 3-single-shot identification signal agreed upon by the USMC elements involved, and also using whistling signals. (S-2 Comment: Four USMC units in the vicinity were using the "3-shot" signal during the same general period. The relief unit moving eastward had used whistles in order to locate the element requiring aid.)

The helo-evac, attempting to land at coords 926668 at 112145H reported receiving fire from six different directions.

Two USMC WIA's reported at 2315 by relief unit as a result of small arms fire was erroneous. One Marine received a bullet hole in the sleeve of his utility jacket and the other had been struck on the head by a stone, both without injury.

At approximately 112330H, the entire USMC force departed the area in order to secure an LZ at coords 916667. The medical helo-evac was accomplished at 120030H.

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WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

ENCLOSURE

(1) Comments regarding the detonation of mine at 112025H, Coords 926668

OFFICIAL:


CHARLES J. WILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

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Comments regarding the detonation of mine at 12025H, Coordinates 926668.

1. The explosion produced a "fire ball" 18" in diameter, and a crater 2" to 3" deep and 30" wide. The size of the blast approximated that of a 3.5" rocket round.
2. The main force of the blast appears to have been directed along the trail to the east.
3. In the crater produced by the detonation, a black metal object was found, 1½" to 2" square and 2" from the enclosed end to the jagged other end. The object was lost later in the patrol.
4. A secondary explosion, immediately followed the initial blast, and was caused by the detonation of one or more M-79 rounds carried by the Marine located 2' to 3' north of the original point of detonation. The grenadier was killed instantly. His wounds, as noted by the corpsman present, consisted of a large, deep cut at the neck, both legs broken, small shrapnel wounds over his entire body and a 6" abdominal opening. A second Marine, 3' to 5' east of the blast was severely wounded and subsequently died approximately 3½ hours later. His wounds, as noted by the corpsman present, consisted of one small shrapnel wound at the small of the back, one broken leg, one broken foot, small shrapnel wounds in both legs and internal injuries, indicated by a "bloating" of the abdomen. Four other Marines, one 7' to 10' west and the others 10' to 25' east, all received small multiple shrapnel wounds.
5. Warning of a "vine across the trail" had been passed to the rear prior to the explosion, although the two lead Marines had not observed any such obstruction on the trail. The two men having personal knowledge of "a vine across the trail" were KIA. Prior to his death however, the Marine first noticing the "vine" made the following remarks to four or five other Marines.

"I was showing SEISSER (LCpl SEISSER was killed instantly) right where it was."

"We saw the vine, but it was tripped anyway."

"I told SEISSER, dammit, to watch out for the vine."

"Smith, don't screw up like I did -- I think I hit the vine."

The above remarks are remembered and repeated by those involved as accurately as possible.

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6. The patrol was in a staggered column, on, and off to the sides of the trail, moving eastward. Their destination was the site of the previous night's ambush at coords 933678. The patrol appears to have followed the same route as that taken earlier that day when moving from their ambush site, coords 933678, to the platoon patrol base, coords 895654.
7. Observations relative to this mine and previous experiences imply some similarities.
 - a. Large blast and concussion -- men lifted off their feet, broken legs and feet, large "fire-ball."
 - b. No large or heavy pieces of shrapnel found, generally small shrapnel wounds.
 - c. Main force of the blast specifically directed.
 - d. Placement on routes known to be traversed by USMC personnel.

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1stBn, 3d Marines
 3dMarDiv(Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, RVN
 161138H July 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 16) To Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III
 and 6658 IV

(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. 3D PLATOON, COMPANY B

a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 141315H TOR - 161115H

c. Terrain

(1) Ten to fifteen huts located throughout GS 8472.

(2) No new obstacles found in or around the village of TAN AN PHUONG, coords 865734, nor were any young men or women seen.

(3) Area in northwest quarter of GS 8670 no longer cultivated, now overgrown by brush.

(4) At coords 856711, excellent ambush site -- a stream with steep bank to the immediate west and a canopied trail covering 10 meters, with extremely dense brush to the east.

(5) Thickly canopied trail, 6 feet high and 5 to 6 feet in width, running east to west for 100 meters at coords 872732.

d. Enemy Activity

(1) At 151400H, coords 846723, patrol received 1 round sniper fire from coords 845723. Platoon Commander believes this to have been a signal.

(2) At 151445H, coords 866713, as the patrol point emerged from the brush into an open area, they encountered a group of 5 young men engaged in conversation with an old man. The group was approximately 10 meters from the lead man of the point. Three or four women were also in the vicinity. Upon seeing the Marines, 4 of the young men immediately fled across the open area. An ARVN soldier, with the point, shouted, in Vietnamese, to them to halt, but they continued their flight. When they had gone a distance of 40 meters, the point fired over their heads and the ARVN soldier repeated his warning which went unheeded. As did his first. By this time, the entire lead squad of the patrol had taken up firing positions at the edge of the clearing and opened fire when

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Tab 19

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the second warning was ignored, bringing down the 4 at distances between 80 and 175 meters. The 1 man and 1 one young man did not run and consequently were taken into custody without injury. The women present earlier had disappeared into the brush. An ID card, indicating he was a suspected VC by the RVN Government was found in the possession of the younger captive. Only 1 farm implement, a cutting tool was found in the vicinity. 3 Confirmed VC KIA and 1 confirmed WIA, who subsequently died, and 2 VCS resulted from this encounter. All bodies, captives, and other paraphernalia confiscated at the scene were, by means of helo-evac, turned over to 3d Marines within 45 minutes. No interpretation of evaluation of captured items had been conducted by this headquarters and no weapons had been discovered in the vicinity.

- (3) At 152015H, at coords 861717H, patrol site received 4 rounds rifle fire directed at their positions from the vicinity of coords 858718.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL:
CHARLES J. HILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

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1stBn, 3d Marines
 3dMarDiv(Rein), FME
 DA NANG, RVN
 181800H July 75

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 17) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659III
 and 6658 IV

(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. COMPANY D

a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 161600H TOR - 180920H

c. Terrain

(1) Two small hills, not shown on reference (a), located north of Hill 22, GS 9566. One hill, coords 953675, is 100 to 125 meters in diameter and approximately 20 meters high. The other, 50 to 75 meters in diameter and approximately 10 meters high, at coords 953676. (See paragraph d.(9), below.)

(2) Since the present situation dictates avoidance of trails and rice paddy dikes, movement is considerably more difficult, especially when in areas of inundated rice paddies. By afternoon, the paddy water has become quite warm, almost hot. The oppressive heat, in general, and deep mud causes such movement to be extremely tiring, and also has a disastrous effect upon Marine Corps issue type leather boots.

d. Enemy Activity

(1) At 161800H, HIEU DUC District Chief reported the presence of two VC, Montagnard platoons operating in the vicinity of GS 9567.

(2) At 161830H, patrol enroute south on road between coords 943677 and 943686, with the point at coords 943675, was taken under enemy fire from points and by weapons and strength estimated as follows.

<u>Coords</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Weapon</u>
940680	1-2	carbine
940678	1-2	rifle
940673	1-2	rifle
944673	3-5	automatic rifle
946675	1-2	rifle
946678	3-5	automatic rifle

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Tab 20

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One 60mm mortar round was received and impacted at coords 943679 (1 piece, thought to be part of the fuse and 1 piece of metal found in the crater, forwarded to 3d Marines.) Firing point of enemy ~~unknown~~. The engagement continued approximately 10 minutes, the enemy expending 200 to 300 small arms rounds and breaking contact when their positions were assaulted by elements of the patrol. Two USMC WIA occurred during this period, while the enemy suffered no known casualties. (S-2 Comment: Placement of the enemy force indicates a prepared ambush. Dispersion of patrol elements, and the point preceeding the forward unit by 125 to 150 meters, appear to have forced the enemy into premature action before the main body was within the "killing zone," as the majority of the VC firing positions were to the south, southeast and southwest. The main body was also afforded partial protection at this point by a tree line immediately to the east, while 25 meters further south, open paddy areas bordered the road, extending approximately 400 meters southward and 200 to 300 meters laterally.)

- (3) Negative enemy contact at patrol site, coords 932668, ambush sites, coords 928668 and 940665; listening post, coords 935662. Although reporting negative enemy contact, USMC units did note light signals, 500 and 700 meters to the northeast and heard three types of drum sounds 300 to 500 meters to the southeast, both of which continued throughout the night.
- (4) At 170808H, patrol moving eastward, at coords 943634, received one sniper round from coords 945636. The few huts in that vicinity were searched with negative results. (S-2 Comment: This may well have been a signal shot, fired to alert other VC elements in the neighboring areas.)
- (5) At 170925H, coords 946639, patrol discovered a khaki shirt with a number of small holes and entirely stained with dried blood, which appeared to have been discarded in the dry rice paddy no more than a day or two earlier.
- (6) At 170930H, patrol at coords 947642, received 20 to 30 rounds of small arms fire, including one automatic weapon, from coords 950642. The rear element of the patrol which had been in an "echelon right," moving north, "swept" the enemy firing point with negative results.
- (7) At 170950H, patrol now at coords 945650 (see para (6), above), received 35 to 40 small arms rounds, again including one automatic weapon; and again the rear element
- (8) "swept" the VC firing point. On this occasion, however,

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the patrol discovered a "bomb shelter" with firing ports, built as part of a hut, and the aroma of gun powder still in the air. One VCS, WIA, was killed in this action and was turned over to 3d Marines.

- (8) At 170930H, the advanced element of the patrol, at coords 947655, received 5 small arms rounds from coords 958662. They continued to advance northward and at 171030H, coords 950662, were again taken under enemy fire, 50 to 75 rounds small arms, including one automatic weapon, located at coords 962663. The patrol returned fire and moved along the planned route to Hill 22, Check Point 22. (See para (9), below).
- (9) At 171100H, while taking up firing positions among rocks on Hill 22, coords 953666, one man of a 3.5" rocket team detonated an enemy planted mine. Relevant information is as follows.
 - (a) Type of device: Mine, Anti-Personnel, M16A1, Loaded 8-57, Lot IOP-42-5. Cannister and shrapnel forwarded to 3d Marines.
 - (b) Casualties incurred were one USMC, KIA, and 5 USMC, WIA. The KIA was the Marine who activated the device, with the 5 WIA's having been dispersed over a 10 to 60 meter area.
 - (c) The mine had been buried with the bottom of the cannister 8" below ground level.
 - (d) The immediate area of the point of detonation is a "natural" firing position, surrounded on three sides by rocks 2 to 4 feet high, forming a "U," with the open end to the west. This spot offers good cover and an excellent field of fire in the direction of LA CHAU (5), GS 9666, the primary target.
 - (e) This site, as well as many similar, have been used previously on a number of occasions by Marines.
 - (f) The casualties resulted well within the area of a previously planned Check Point.
 - (g) The placement of the mine and the enemy firing from LA CHAU (5) have a definite relationship.
 - (h) Hill 22 is bare with the only available cover being rock formations and tombs.
 - (i) The casualties were minimal compared to the potential of the mine.

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- (j) There are a number of similarities between this detonation and others reported in 1stBn, 3d Marines Intelligence Reports dated 122000H Jul 1965, para d.(3) and enclosure (1) thereto; 082030H, para d.(5); 022000H July 65, para 2, d.(g). These similarities include: large blast and concussion, men lifted and thrown about, broken legs and feet, severe wounds to the lower body of the men closest to the blast, black smoke, small shrapnel wounds, and wounds at relatively long distances ('up to 120 meters).
- (10) At 171350H, coords 953676 (see para c.(1), above), two grenades were detonated, resulting in 3 USMC, WIA's. Pertinent data is as follows.
NOTE: The term "mine field," although technically incorrect, is used in the text as follows, for reasons of word economy.
- (a) The "mine field" covered the northeast quarter of a small hill (already noted) with the explosive devices and "wires" hidden among manioc plants 2 to 3 feet high.
 - (b) Explosive devices consisted of CHICOM/VC grenades, attached to the manioc plants or buried in the soil. Other lines of thin, clear plastic were attached to the grenades and then to either bamboo stakes 8" to 10" in length, implanted in the ground, or to other manioc plants. A number of the bamboo stakes were also attached to manioc plants.
 - (c) The grenades were "short fused," with no "poy," detonating immediately, and would be activated by disturbing either any of the lines, the manioc plants, or the grenades themselves.
 - (d) The "mine field" consisted of an estimated 25 to 50 of such devices. The color back ground of the sandy soil made it extremely difficult to distinguish the thin plastic lines; the color of the bamboo stakes also blended harmoniously with that of the manioc stalks.
 - (e) The casualties occurred when a scout team sent to investigate the southwestern portion of LA CHAU (3), coords 956678, was returning to report that the area appeared unsafe. As the lead scout passed through the "mine field," (southward), he spotted a "trip wire" (plastic line), stepped back and detonated another, from which he received wounds on the arms and a small cut on the nose. Another Marine in the vicinity, shouted two or three times for a corpsman, neglecting, however, to warn him of a

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"mine field." As the corpsman ran to the aid of the scout, he exploded another device, further injuring the already wounded scout, another and himself.

- (f) The "mine field" was cleverly conceived and professionally emplaced. The geographic position and topographic aspects of the hill on which it was located imply further enemy intentions discussed in following paragraphs.
- (11) At this point in time (171350H), the unit commander dispatched one platoon and one squad to secure and occupy LA CHAU (2), GS 9467. This seems to have been a decisive maneuver, the ramifications of which became apparent shortly after and are noted.
- (12) At 171410H, a helicopter had arrived at coords 952676, and was in the process of evacuating the casualties caused by the "mine field" (para (9), above), when a high volume of enemy fire was received from points by weapons and in strength estimated as follows.

Coords	Personnel	Weapons
952673	1 squad	at least 1 automatic
953682-952687	1 platoon	automatic weapons and possibly 1 .50 Cal MG
942673	3 to 5 men	1 automatic weapon
943675-943684	1 platoon	automatic weapons
945681-946680		and 1 machine gun

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- This fire continued unabated, and at 171425H another helicopter arrived in order to evacuate, 3 USMC WIA's resulting from the assault and seizure of LA CHAU (2), GS 9467. During this evacuation, a corpsman aboard the helicopter was KIA. As the helo-evad departed from coords 948677, at 171424H, moderate to heavy 60mm mortar fire was received, impacting in two general areas; 20 to 25 rounds within 200 meters of coords 950677, and 6 to 8 rounds within 50 meters of coords 946677. Enemy mortar and small arms fire continued for another half hour. The firing position of enemy mortar(s) was not accurately plotted; all available information, however, suggests that there were two: one vicinity coords 957682, and the other vicinity coords 938672. At 171515H, when enemy fire had been substantially suppressed, the two squads departed the vicinity of the "mine field," moved west through the rice paddies and rejoined the remainder of the patrol at LA CHAU (2). While crossing the rice paddies sporadic small arms fire was received from coords 952673, and was silenced within 5 or 10 minutes by artillery. When the entire Marine Corps force was united at LA CHAU (2), an air strike was conducted on enemy positions to the east,

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destroying the "mine field" in the process. Fire ceased by 171530H. Two confirmed VC KIA resulted from this engagement, one as a consequence of rifle, machine gun and M-79 fire at coords 941677 at 171435H, and the other at coords 952681 at 171445H. (S-2 Comment: Disposition, position and actions, indicate the focal point of enemy interest was the small hill containing the "mine field," and had intended to "trap" the patrol in that vicinity with open rice paddy areas on 3 sides and Hill 22 and LA CHAU (4), occupied by an enemy force, to the rear. That position, barren of either cover and concealment would no doubt have proven untenable, and the only escape would have been through the open paddy areas, not to mention the difficulties presented by necessary helo evacuation and the "mine field" itself. Evidently, the enemy held fire in order to destroy the medical helo-evac and thereby permitted the platoon sent to LA CHAU (2) to pass through the open paddies unmolested. The rapid offensive deployment by the commander of the patrol and the subsequent occupation of LA CHAU (2), (para(11), above, while leaving 2 squads with the wounded in the vicinity of the "mine field," prevented the enemy from utilizing either of these areas to bring effective fire to bear upon the other. This dispersion apparently also had an adverse effect upon the usually accurate enemy mortar fire, which during this engagement was decidedly ineffective.)


- (13) Negative enemy contact at patrol site from coords 910700 to 930700, from 172100H to 180830H.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL:


CHARLES J. WILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

CONFIDENTIAL*Correspondence*
*Wang*1stBn, 3d Marines
3dMarDiv(Rein), FME
DA NANG, RVN
221630H July 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 18) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III
and 6658 IV
(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-651. COMPANY C

a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.

b.	<u>TOD</u>	<u>TOR</u>
	1st Platoon 191400H	201500H
	2nd Platoon 201500H	210930H
	3rd Platoon 210930H	221000H

c. Terrain

(1) Trails overgrown throughout route of patrols. Little indication of any movement or activity.

d. Enemy Activity

(1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows.

(a) From 192000H to 200730H, coords 859687, 869695, 868689

(b) From 202100H to 210600H, coords 864698, 867697, 867698

(c) From 212000H to 220630H, coords 870700, 878704, 884704

(2) Cigarette lighter found at coords 877692 near remnants of small fire.

(3) Foot prints discovered at coords 878690 along stream bed.

S-2 COMMENTEach Platoon Commander familiar with the area through prior operations, commented upon the apparent desertion of the vicinity by enemy forces. This is consistent with reports received from HIEU DUC District Chief.CONFIDENTIAL*Feb 81*

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
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WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL:


CHARLES J. HILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

-2

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Commanding Officer

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1stBn, 3d Marines
3d MarDiv (Rein), FME
DA NANG, RVN
241630H Jul 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 19) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6659 III
and 6658 IV

(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. COMPANY A

a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report

b. TOD - 221300H TOR - 241230H

c. Terrain

(1) Road, coordinates 838719 appears to lead westward to the summit of Hill 1279, Grid Square 7970.

d. Enemy Activity

(1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows.

(a) From 222000H to 230630H coordinates 876728, 878725, 878669.

(b) From 232000H to 240630H - coordinates 864735, 856668.

(2) At 231200H, coordinates 864735, point of patrol observed 3 young men eating by the side of the trail. When the 3 saw the Marines, one attempted to flee but halted when one Marine raised his rifle to fire. They were all of military age (middle 20's), had improper identification, did not appear to be farmers or workmen, and were in an area usually vacant of young men. No one in the neighboring village professed any relationship or familiarity with them. The 3 VCS were utilized as guides for the remainder of the patrol, then turned over to 3d Marines at 241300H.

(3) At 231700H, patrol at coordinates 868706, received one sniper round appearing to have come from vicinity coordinates 867707; a search of the area proved negative.

(4) Barriers composed of brush and communication wire, across road, between coordinates 846727 to 846724.

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Tab 22


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- (5) At 230530H, patrol at coordinates 878669, heard the sound of chickens from vicinity coordinates 875666.
- (6) Five grenade type booby traps located on trail from coordinates 878669 to 871663. The "trip wire" consisted of vines across the trail at a height of 1 inch to 12 inches. They were fairly new, showing no effects of weather.
- (7) At 231115H, coordinates 870664, patrol received one USMC WIA as a result of a sniper 15 meters distant to the west. A few minutes later an automatic weapon fired estimated 10 rounds at the patrol from a distance of 40 meters. The enemy fled when the patrol returned fire, leaving 10 lbs of rice and one shoe. A helicopter then evacuated the USMC WIA without incident. Artillery and air strikes were conducted on suspected VC positions to the west and southwest from 231130 until 231600. No known enemy casualties resulted.
- (8) Patrol at coordinates 870664 discovered one grave covered with fresh branches. Grave no more than one week old.
- (9) Bundles of stakes, and vines tied in a sphere, found on trail at coordinates 866665. They were not obstacle devices in themselves and gave the appearance of having been dropped by the enemy in flight.
- (10) Rough diagram found at coordinates 865693 at 240730H, indicating the market place in DA NANG, RVN, (Forwarded to 3d Marines) and appears to bear the signature of a Corporal.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL:
CHARLES J. HILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

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1st Bn, 3d Marines
 3d Mar Div (Rein), FMF
 DA NANG, RVN
 261830H July 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 20) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III
 and 6658 IV

(b) 1st Bn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. 3D PLATOON, COMPANY D

a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 241700H TOR - 261500H

c. Terrain. A well used trail, with bamboo railings at the sides, leads from coords 859623, southwest to coords 854621, west to coords 850622, north to coords 850632, then west to coords 826630. The entire area in the vicinity of this trail is heavily canopied, and covered by jungle vegetation, which although thick, is passable off the trail in some parts. Events narrated in the following paragraphs took place on or near this trail.

d. Enemy Activity

(1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows.

(a) From 242200H to 250600H - coords 850620,

(b) From 252130H to 260600H - coords 839632.

(2) Remnants of small campfires and bits of food at sides of trail, coords 841631.

(3) At coords 838632, a "sign board" overhangs the trail 6' off the ground, the roof of which, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ' wide and 6' long, is supported by 4 bamboo poles. The sign, itself, is translated as "People keep the secrets of the VC!!" Near the "sign board," and just off the trail, is a deep circular hole. The hole is 3' in diameter, and extends to a depth of 5 or 6 feet, where it bends at a right angle, running parallel to the ground surface for an undetermined distance. Also along the trail in this vicinity are 6 or 7 holes, 2 to 3 feet in depth, separated from each other by 10 to 15 meters. One hundred meters further north of the trail are approximately one dozen bamboo frame structures, 5 by 10 feet in size. These structures are not finished "hocches," but rather, frames whereupon a covering may be draped for temporary shelter.

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- (4) Located in the vicinity of coords 838635 is a 50 acre clearing with a 3' high, split-log, "hog fence." Portions of this clearing appear to be under cultivation and sound of poultry were heard. At the western edge of the open area is a "horseshoe" type emplacement, covering both the trail and clearing.
- (5) At 250930H, coords 832631, the rear element of the patrol shot and killed one VC who attempted to flee when he was discovered observing the patrol from his place of concealment in the brush. Possessions of the VC, KIA are itemized in enclosure (1), and have been forwarded to 3d Marines.
- (6) At coords 832631, 25 meters north of the trail, three "hooches" were discovered. Although not raised off the ground, they were, nevertheless, well constructed, with 2" to 5" bamboo poles, covered with grass, and having ample space for 4 or 5 men. A concealed cave is also located 100 meters to the north.
- (7) At 251050H, the patrol, halted at coords 830632, overheard noises coming from the west. A fire team was sent to investigate. Fifty meters west along the trail and twenty meters north of it, across a small draw, 2 men, one with a rifle, were seen in the process of cutting wood. The Marines fired when they attempted to flee; one VC was killed, while the other, with the rifle, and although wounded made good his escape. His trail of blood was followed for a short distance then lost. While searching the area of the shooting, approximately 3 VC fired 15-20 rounds of small arms at the fire team from a distance of 50 to 100 meters west, resulting in 2 USMC, WIA. Fire was returned and the VC fled. No personal effects or other items of either the VC, KIA or WIA, were located.
- (8) At coords 829632 (50 meters west of the fire fight mentioned in para (7), above), an inhabited area was discovered, which, from indications of documents confiscated at the spot, appears to be a Medium Level Viet Cong Cadre Training Camp. The camp had been erected on a knoll and is composed of 15 buildings and 3 caves. Description as follows.
 - (a) One large "finished-wood" structure, 20 X 40 meters, well constructed and containing a rostrum, ink, paper, blackboard, books, pamphlets, one 2' high, 8" in diameter gasoline-air, "Coleman" type lantern suspended from the rafters. Other furniture consisted of benches and chairs with a seating capacity of 200 or more. A festive air was added to the decor by banners, drawings, slogans, streamers, rings and numerous other decorations suspended from the rafters and affixed to the walls.

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- (b) One 10' X 15' office type hut containing 2 desks, office supplies, books, pamphlets, papers, 8 turtle neck sweaters, 20 to 25 sets khaki uniforms, and civilian clothes.
- (c) Nine 10' X 15' raised huts, well constructed with 6" bamboo poles, floors, and covered with grass.
- (d) Four 15' X 20' well constructed huts which appear to be used as sleeping quarters, and have space for 20 to 25 men.
- (e) Three caves, protected by rocks with an opening 25' to 30' wide and 7' to 8' high.
- (f) There were signs throughout the camp area indicating direction and location; each building was numbered and/or titled. The camp, as a whole, is quite new, showing no signs of weathering, and was extremely neat, clean and decidedly military. Vast amounts of paper, books, pamphlets, writing implements and other paraphernalia were stored in the buildings, the patrol leader estimates "three '6X6' truck loads." Fifty lbs. of medical supplies were also discovered and destroyed.

The camp was left intact, since time precluded its destruction. A sampling of gear was confiscated, is itemized in enclosure (1), and has been forwarded to 3d Marines.

- (10) At 251550H, coords 839632, while moving east through the brush, the point of the patrol spotted what appeared to be a "hooch," 150 meters to the north. Upon investigation, two "hooches" were located hidden among rocks. The point advanced to within 25 meters, and fired into the "hooches," killing two VC and wounding another, who left a trail of blood during his escape. Personal effects of the VC, KIA's and other items found in the vicinity, excluding 30 to 40 VC grenades located in the structures, are itemized in enclosure (1), and have been forwarded to 3d Marines.
- (11) At coords 832632, three 60' X 30', bamboo framed structures were discovered. All three were raised off the ground and appeared to be fairly old. Two were used as sleeping quarters and another for wood storage, the wood recently cut and corded.

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
WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

ENCLOSURE: (1) Itemized Account of Captured Material

OFFICIAL:



CHARLES J. HILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

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ITEMIZED ACCOUNT OF CAPTURED MATERIAL

Time: 251400H July 1965

Coordinates: 829632

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1	Pamphlet	"Conception of Our Party in the Eyes of the World"
1	Pamphlet	"Mission and Conception of the Party"
3	Pamphlets	"Materialism"
1	Pamphlet	"History of Materialism"
1	Package	Typewritten political indoctrination lectures, District Level and higher
3	Newspapers	Viet Cong
1	Notebook	High level political student
1	Package	Interorganizational communication dealing with supply and administrative matters
23	Notebooks	Military records of fiscal, supply, disbursing, and personnel data
1	Package	Administrative instructions, regarding the Training Camp, from higher authority
4	Circulars	Circulars relate to VC activity on a national level
8	Notebooks	Assorted sizes -- Poetry
1	Package	Miscellaneous pages political indoctrination
1	Statement	Financial Statement of Training Camp for the first six months of 1965.
1	Package	Personal letters
10	Pictures	Family photographs
1	Briefcase	Black, leather
1	Briefcase	Brown, leather
1	Poncho	Brown, plastic

Enclosure (1)

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NUMBER	ITEM	DESCRIPTION
1	Document	Relates to the camouflage against aircraft, translated as follows.

"This station requests all individuals concerned to apply the following rules when moving on a road.

All individuals concerned must be familiar with the technique of concealment from aircraft.

They must be alert and watch for approaching aircraft, they must not run, but sit down on the sides of the road.

Camouflage everything which may be seen from the air.

Do not move close to one another but keep a long distance apart."

1	letter	Regards the results of a minor battle, translated as follows.
---	--------	---

"From THANH To Mr. THIN

At 1600 hrs., on 22 Jan 1965, our troops attacked KY CHAU. We killed 2 enemy, wounded 6, and captured 1. Our troops also destroyed 1 truck, seized 6 radios #300, 6 portable radios, 200 kgs of rice, and 1, 200 litre drum of gasoline.

I request you send someone to pick these things up, tomorrow night, 24 Jan 1965. The name of the old place is Z3.

Sincerely Yours"

1	Pamphlet	Chinese
3	Small Cans	36mm, color and black/white propaganda film -- "stills."
Sets, 4	Text books	Secondary School (High School)
1	Dictionary	Vietnamese to Russian -- Moscow 1961
2	Magazines	Educational
2	Pamphlets	Interorganizational competition
6	Notebooks	Political Instructors'
1	Pamphlet	"Summary of the Situation and Mission of the Vietnamese Revolution at the Present time."

2 Enclosure (1)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1	Package	Cadre lesson plans. Reading and writing instructions
1	Ruck sack	Brown, canvas

Time: 251500H July 1965		
Coordinates: 832632		
1	Pistol	Cal., 7.65, "MODELE" 1935, "MAC," with holster, magazine, and 15 rounds.
1	Magazine	U. S. Carbine type, w/15 rounds
1	Sheet	Brown plastic, containing clothing
1	Belt	Pistol, w/2 VC grenades.
1	Bag	Plastic, with 10 family photographs and 2 negatives.
1	Taperecorder	Portable, battery operated, with one tape of children singing traditional folk songs.
1	Package	Vietnamese ID Cards (24). 13 issued at DIEN BAN 4 issued at HOI AN 2 issued at DA LAT 1 issued at TUY HOA 2 issued at QUE SON 1 issued at DA NANG 1 issued at TAN BINH
1	ID Card	Student, issued at DA LAT.
6	Licenses	Fishing, issued at HOI AN.
16	Cards	Military Induction 9 Issued at APO 4191 5 issued at DIEN BAN 1 issued at DA LAT 1 issued at HOI AN
2	Certificates	Graduation from Elementary School
28	Certificates	Birth
5	Cards	Voting

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1	Package	Biographical Data
1	Package	Typewritten pages relating to disease prevention.
9	Receipts	Itemized medicine
2	Notebooks	Medicine receipts
3	Books	Prevention of disease and poetry
1	Circular	Twelve page document on "Purpose and Aims of Our Party."
3	Notebooks	Political students'
5	Newspapers	Viet Cong
1	Book	Small book of poetry
13	ID Cards	Temporary Vietnamese ID Cards 4 issued at CAM HAI 1 issued at DA NANG 2 issued at DA LAT 2 issued at QUANG NAM 3 issued at THANH SON 1 issued at TRUONG THANH
1	Diary	Assistant Squad Leader while attending Training, w/diploma.
1	Book	Biographical and personal data
1	Notebook	Political student, low level
1	Diary	Actions of a man and his unit during January 1965, and his participation in the revolution.
1	Circular	Typewritten account of VC activities in South Vietnam.
2	Sheets of paper	Squad Leaders guide lines.
1	Magazine	VC newyear
2	Pamphlets, small	"Ten Pledges of a Guerrilla"
1	Pamphlet	"Proclamation of SNLF"

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1	Pamphlet	"Declaration of the Central Committee of the SNLF concerning the Increase of the War by the United States"
1	Pamphlet	"Volunteer to Serve in the SNLF to kill Americans"
1	Diary	Financial accounts of an individual
1	Notebook	A record of fantastic Viet Cong victories
2	Pages	Individual self-criticism
1	Box	Aluminum, containing: 3 Shotgun shells 1 Spool, thin, green, plastic line 2 Aluminum cans of pills 1 Small homemade kerosene lamp (bottle and wick) 1 U.S. Carbine magazine w/15 rounds 1 "End" buckle 1 Headache salts (Vietnamese) 2 Cigarette lighters 5 9mm pistol rounds

Time: 251050H July 1965

Coordinates: 830632

3	plastic	Small pieces
	Tobacco	Small quantity
135	Piastres	Vietnamese currency
1	Clip	Money
1	Mirror	Small, round
1	Bottle	Small, headache salts
1	Leaflet	Propaganda

5

Enclosure (1)

3 Shotgun shells
1 Spool, thin, green, plastic line
2 Aluminum cans of pills
1 Small homemade kerosene lamp (bottle and wick)
1 U.S. Carbine magazine w/15 rounds
1 "End" buckle
1 Headache salts (Vietnamese)
2 Cigarette lighters
5 9mm pistol rounds

Notes: 830632

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1stBn, 3d Marines
3dMarDiv(Fwd), FME
281800H July 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 21) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series 1701 Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV
(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-56

1. 2d PLATOON, COMPANY D

- a. Route - as planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report
- b. TOD - 261900H TOR - 280900H
- c. Terrain - Nothing new of significance
- d. Enemy Activity
 - (1) Negative enemy activity at ambush sites as follows.
 - (a) From 262000H to 270700H - coords 920709, 917706, 912700
 - (b) From 272000H to 280630H - coords 895668, 895662
 - (2) Platoon Commander feels local inhabitants showed an unusual interest in the movement of the patrol through GS 9169.
 - (3) Three poles, 2" to 3" in diameter and 25' to 30' in height, observed atop Hill 41, GS 9366, during the early evening hours of 27 July.
 - (4) Five small trenches, 2" in depth and 2" in width, were discovered in the vicinity of coords 894666. These "trenches" originated at, and were positioned at right angles to, rice paddy dikes. They covered a distance of 40 or 50 meters through dry rice paddy, terminating in open spaces, with no apparent pattern or direction, and seem to be no more than a day or two old.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

~~OFFICIAL~~


CHARLES J. GILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

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1stBn, 3d Marines
3dMarDiv(Rein), FMF
DA NANG, RVN
311000H July 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 22) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III
and 6658 IV
(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. 3D PLATOON, COMPANY B

- a. Route - As planned in reference.(b), and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 291700H TOR - 300630H
- c. Terrain. The trail at coords 883707 is the only means of foot movement from west to east. along the southern bank of the SONG TUY LOAN River, in this area; other routes are precluded because of dense jungle and brush. (See para d(5)(a), below)
- d. Enemy Activity
 - (1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites from 292100H to 300630H, coords 864703 and 869706.
 - (2) At 291950H, patrol at coords 874706, received two rounds sniper fire from vicinity coords 876707. The Platoon Commander feels this was a warning to other VC in the vicinity as the projectiles came nowhere near any members of the patrol.
 - (3) Search of the area within GS 8773 for tunnels and caves reported in 3d IIT Report, dated 26 July 1965, #22-7, time 1030, proved negative.
 - (4) At 301250H, coords 879707, two VCS's apprehended; they were of military age and possessed improper identification.
 - (5) At 301330H, coords 883707, a detonation occurred, resulting in two USMC KIA and one USMC, WIA. Available information as follows.
 - (a) The explosive device was located 2' off to the north side of the trail which runs east and west (See para c. above), and 2' west of a gully, 2 meters in width, intersecting the trail at this point. Three bamboo poles bridge the gully as a part of the trail.

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- (b) The blast was directed westward along the trail, appears to have had a force approximating that of a 3.5" rocket, and was accompanied by a large amount of black smoke.
- (c) No crater was found, although a circular area, approximately 5' in diameter, blackened and burned, surrounded the point of detonation. Within this 5' blackened area were two uncovered punji traps, 10" long, 6" wide, and 6" deep, and a metal object which seems to be a 4" length of steel pipe, 1/8" thick, 1/2" in diameter, with one jagged end. No wires or other signs indicative of cause of detonation were discovered.
- (d) One KIA was immediately adjacent to the blast, suffered numerous small shrapnel wounds, broken bones and died instantly. The other was approximately seven meters to the west of the blast, suffered multiple small shrapnel wounds and died within 1 1/2 hours. The WIA was located seven meters east of the explosion and suffered a minor shrapnel wound of the thigh. The two Marines nearest the blast and uninjured, were at a distance of 20 meters west and 10 meters east, although they did feel the heat and see the flash.
- (e) More than 30 men had already passed the point of detonation prior to the explosion.
- (f) The patrol was well within the vicinity of a preplanned checkpoint.
- (g) The patrol had paused 30 or 40 minutes, a short time prior to the incident, 300 meters to the west in order to permit the recovery of a Marine from temporary illness.
- (h) This same spot has been traversed by Marines numerous times previously, and approximately 400 meters of it had been utilized by this patrol the day before on their movement west. At the moment of detonation, the patrol was moving east.
- (i) Immediately after the explosion, movement, which appeared to be that of a man crawling through the brush, 50 or 60 meters to the southeast, was observed. The patrol fired into the vicinity with negative results.

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
- (6) At 301345H, one VCS was apprehended at coords 886705, who had improper identification and was in the vicinity of the explosion (para (5), above).
- (7) At 311430H, one VCS, of military age, with improper identification, was apprehended at coords 893706.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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CHARLES J. HILBERT

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S-2

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1stBn, 3d Marines
3d MarDiv (FWD), FMC
DA NANG, RVN
251200H July 1965

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Ref (a) Map, INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III
and 6658 IV

1. PURPOSE: To publish in consolidated form an overlay and legend
of all incidents of enemy mines and/or booby traps encountered within
the Battalion TAOR, through 25 July 1965.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL


CHARLES J. GILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

Enclosure (1) Overlay of Mines and Booby traps

Distribution: CG 3d MarDiv (G-2) 1
CO 3d Mar (S-2) 1
CO/XO 1
S-2 2
S-3 1
Rifle Co's 1 (4)

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Tab 26

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1stBn, 3d Marines
 3d MarDiv (FWD), FME
 DA NANG, RVN
 251200H July 1965

Tab A (Legend) to Enclosure 1 (overlay of mines and booby traps) to
 Special Intelligence Report 1stBn, 3d Marines 251200H July 1965.

<u>INCIDENT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1	171100H Jul	953666	U.S. AP Mine - buried 8" in ground 1 KIA 5 WIA
2	171350H Jul	953676	CHICOM grenades wired to manloc plants and/or stakes - plastic trip wires - short fused, well camouflaged - estimate 25 to 50 devices - 2 WIA
3	120845H Jul	897699	Booby trap grenade trip wire across trail no delay - 1 WIA
4	112025H Jul	926668	Device unknown - suspected home made device with trip wire 2 KIA 4 WIA (Note - casualties compounded by sympathetic detonation of M-79 rounds on 1 KIA)
5	071000H Jul	908679	Charge of undetermined type - electri- cally detonated - emplaced in cut on side of trail - 2 KIA 2 WIA
6.	041300H Jul	892678	Booby trap grenade above ground - trip wire across trail - 1 WIA
7	051300H Jul	885657	Booby trap grenade, vine across trail purposely detonated - no casualties.
8	290820H Jun	948674	Charge of undetermined type - electri- cally detonated - emplaced in paddy dike frequently used - 8 WIA (2 ARVN)
9	231100H Jun	887665	Booby trap grenade, vine across trail accidently detonated - no casualties
10	151100H Jun	Hill 41 and area 950674 to 945670 to 943660	Villagers reported area mined by VC
11	112230H Jun	904686	Booby trap grenade, trip wires - 2 detonations - 1 WIA

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12	091200H Jun	898628	Booby trap grenade - purposely detonated - no casualties
13	071300H Jun	910649	Booby trap U.S. Fragmentation grenade purposely detonated - no casualties
14	061200H Jun	906666	Unknown device - buried charge - detonated by tank - 1 WIA
15	071200H Jun	835660	Booby trap grenade - vine across trail purposely detonated - no casualties
16	051300H Jun	GS 9564 Vic PHU SON (3)	2 booby trap - grenades - well camouflaged - vines in hedgerow - purposely detonated - no casualties
17	051200H Jun	GS 9666 LA CHAU (5)	Villagers report mines
18	051200H Jun	957685	Wire in rice shoots - small field - home made charges and grenades - no casualties
19	051200H Jun	911706 & 899703	Signs indicating mines - results of search, negative
20	281100H May	902702	Booby trap - grenade - in heavy brush 2 WIA
21	201210H May	869657	Booby trap grenade - vine across trail purposely detonated - no casualties
22	201400H May	966668	Booby trapped boat at river edge - no casualties
23	180900H May	870763 to 868760	Marked minefield - not checked
24	071200H May	875697	Marked minefield - not checked
25	071200H May	873758 & 882764	Booby trap - grenade - purposely detonated - no casualties
26	061200H May	904698 & 916696	Booby trap - grenade - punji traps
27	051400H May	878699	Gate booby trapped - 1 WIA
28	021400H May	903717 905719	Mined area Possible mining
29	021600H May	923718	Villagers report high ground this vicinity mined

A-2

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30	301700H Apr	896704	Mine marker
31	251100H Apr	901708	Mine marker
32	251500H Apr	857717	Booby trap - grenade - no casualties
33	221245H Jul	924686	Big shade trees mined
34	221245H Jul	919674	300 meter radius mined
35	230530H Jul	878669 to 871663	5 booby trap grenades on trail - trip wire consisted of wire across trail at 1 to 12 inches in height
36	271200H Apr	887717	Booby trap - thought to be sprung by wire - made of wood - not very powerful - 1 WIA

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL:
CHARLES J. HILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

A-3

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1stBn, 3d Marines
3d Mar Div (Fwd), FMF
DA NANG, RVN
251800H July 1965

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Translation of pamphlet discovered at 082030H July 1965, coordinates 879700 (See 1st Bn, 3d Marines Intelligence Report dated 101930H July 1965)

THE PURPOSE AND REGULATIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

PART I - PURPOSE

PART II - REGULATIONS

PART I

The Vietnamese Country or Vietnamese Nation are one and the same, but at the present time our country has been temporarily divided into two parts. The Northern is rising to socialism, the Southern is becoming a new colonial area of the American Imperialists. Therefore, the two parts now have different revolutionary missions, but have the same close relation to each other.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party was born in order to satisfy the requirement of leading and realizing the revolution in South Vietnam.

During the last thirty years, the communist members in South Vietnam and of the entire country have been struggling, and sacrificing to serve the people and nation. They have led the revolution, achieving success. Northern Vietnam has been liberated from the regime of exploitation. The South still suffers under the yoke of imperialism and monarchy.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party attempts to continue the glorious tradition of revolution of the communist members in South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party is a party of the laborers, an advanced guard, the highest organization of the laboring class.

The party is organized with the members who have been well cleansed and represent the class of labor, scholarship, and all other classes of the people.

The party is representative of the rights of labor, and at the same time, the rights of the nation.

The actions of the party are based on the doctrine of MARX and LENIN, using it in educational matters, and it is opposed to the revisionist doctrine. The party has used the doctrine of MARX and LENIN in the revolutionary situation of South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party was born in order to satisfy the requirement of leading and realizing the revolution in South Vietnam.

During the last thirty years, the communist members in South Vietnam and of the entire country have been struggling, and sacrificing to serve the people and nation. They have led the revolution, achieving success. Northern Vietnam has been liberated from the regime of exploitation. The South still suffers under the yoke of imperialism and monarchy.

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The purpose of the party is to achieve the Popular Democratic Revolution in South Vietnam, unite the entire country, and together to build socialism and then arise to the heights of communism.

The primary mission of the party is to struggle and overthrow the yoke of the American aggressors and their underlings, liberate South Vietnam, set up a full scale allied government, realize independence, and carry out democracy and freedom, improve the life of the people, develop handicraft, business, and education, in order to unite the entire country and maintain the peace of the world.

To carry out that mission, the party has to realize a full scale national front and associate with other nations, religions, parties, classes of labor, and people who have the viewpoint of opposing the American Imperialists and their underlings.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party states that the revolution in the North and the South have a relation in common and are mutually supporting. The strength of the socialism of the North is the anchor for the revolution in South Vietnam, and assists the revolution in the South to break the yoke of American aggressors and their underlings, liberate South Vietnam, and protect the building of socialism in the North.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party recognizes that the revolution in South Vietnam is a symbol of the revolution of the world that is struggling for independence, democracy, and socialism.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party always has acted in the best interests of the people. Each member is instructed to work closely with the people.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party is organized in accordance with the principle of centralized democracy. It has a specific discipline in order to maintain the union, ideals, and actions of the party, while opposing the division of the party, and maintain departments in local areas as well as the other positions of leadership.

The party must remain in secret and increase its vigilance before the onslaught of the enemy.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party insists on self-criticism, and does it always in order to develop proper techniques and correct bad points. The party requests all members to carry out the policies of communism, to hold firmly to the point of view of the labor classes. The party is determined to oppose the rightist tendency as well as the leftist, the ideal of private estates, and capital, etc.

The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party notes that its mission is enormous. The party always maintains faith with the rights of the laboring class and of the nation. The party is determined to overcome the difficulties in order to complete its duty to the people and the nation. The members must increase the union, continue to study revolutionary virtue, and enthusiastically serve the people as well as the nation. They are not afraid, they struggle and carry out the purpose and decisions of the party to unite the people and lead the revolution to success. They will realize the very high purpose of the party.

PART II

CHAPTER I

Party Membership

Article 1 - The Conditions of Membership

All Vietnamese citizens, from 18 years of age who recognize the authority and regulations of the party, volunteer to serve in the installations of the party, consistently struggle in order to implement the authority and regulations of the party, and agree to pay the initial fee, will be considered for membership in the party.

Article 2 - Duties of Membership

1. Absolutely maintain faith with the party, always take the opportunity to serve the people, continually struggle against the enemy in order to achieve the success of the revolution, and protect the life and reputation of the party.
2. Strictly carry out the decisions and instructions of the party, propagandize the activities of the party, propagate the party, and introduce people into the party.
3. Strictly keep the secrecy of the party, always increase vigilance regarding enemy plots of destruction, and protect the powers of the party.
4. Strictly obey the discipline of the party, maintain and consolidate the union of the party.
5. Retain close contact with the people, provide education and propaganda for the people, and guide people in their struggle to achieve their rights.
6. Strictly study the doctrine of MARX and LENIN, the policies of the party, continually increase in oneself knowledge of politics, ideals and actions. Be an expert in action.
7. Practice criticism, and strictly criticize the other fellow in order to improve each other.

Article 3 - The Rights of Membership

1. Discuss and contribute to the ideas and activities of the party.
2. Vote and be elected to the leading agencies of the party.
3. In the conferences of the party, criticize and question the cadres and party members about the authority and organization of the party.
4. Carry out the decisions of the party unconditionally. Submit ideas to the leading agency if one has any point of disagreement.
5. Report, suggest or complain about anything considered necessary, to the leading agency of the party. The reserve member has the same rights as the official member except the power of voting, and election into the leading agency of the party.

Article 4 - The Procedures for Joining the Party.

1. The applicant must request and report himself and his background to the party for consideration.
2. The applicant must be introduced by 2 official members who will be responsible for the applicants background and character.
3. The applicant must be considered by sub-commissioners or commissioners, and also by the higher commander of the party prior to approval.
4. The applicant must serve a period in reserve. Anywhere the sub-commission of the party is not in operation, the higher leading section has the authority to determine and approve receiving the new member, but following proper procedures of the party.
5. Conditions required for the introduction, the approval of an agency, and time periods.
 - a. Laborer, farmer, farm-hand, and city worker must have 2 official members who have been members of the party at least six months before presentation, be directly approved by the higher leading section, and have six months in reserve.
 - b. Middle class, school children, students, intellectuals, and people of other classes, must have two official members who have been members of the party at least nine months prior to presentation, and will be approved directly by the organization and have 1 year reserve.
 - c. The people in highland areas, whose classification is unclear, the people of other social classes, cadres, and leaders of religions, members of other parties, soldiers, officers of the army of the enemy, must follow the special regulations of the Central Committee.

Article 6 - The reserve member.

The period of reserve is counted from the date of approval of membership by the sub-commissioner.

During the period of reserve, the member must study the minimum requirements of communism, policy and procedure of the party, (and the activity of the party during that period.. The sub-commissioner must strictly educate, guide and assist the reserve members).

When the reserve time is over, the sub-commissioner or commissioner must consider whether or not to grant them official membership. If they are unable to grant official membership, the sub-commissioner or commissioner may decide to extend their reserve time up to a year. If over this period, they are not granted official membership, they will be dropped from the party.

The decision of sub-commissioner or commissioner about extending the reserve time or granting official membership must be approved directly by the sub-department.

The expulsion from the party must be approved by the high leading sections of the organization.

The time will be computed from the date that the sub-commissioner or commissioner approve him official membership.

Article 7 - The movement of a member from one place to another must have the approval of the party, if the member has authorization to participate in activities in the new location. The procedure will be applied in accordance with the fixed procedure of the Central Committee.

Article 8 - During periods of last contact with the party, the members will continue their assignments and their time is to be accounted for.

Article 9 - Any member who leaves his post without a specific reason or refuses to contribute initial fee for 3 months, is to be expelled from the party. The sub-commissioner will strike his name from the party roster and immediately report to sub-department for approval.

Chapter II - The procedures of organization and the mechanics of the party.

Article 10 - The Vietnamese Popular Revolutionary Party is activated in accordance with the centralization of democracy. The basic points of that procedure are:

1. The leading section of the party is selected by vote (in case the election is impossible, the leading section will be designated by the high leading council).

2. The highest leading agency at all levels of the party is the congress of the representatives. In the areas closely controlled by the enemy, and the meeting of representatives may not be conducted in order to select the commissioner, the high leading sections will designate, with the approval of the highest leading section.

3. The activation of party leading sections must be realized in accordance with the community procedures.

4. A decision in the party during meeting will be decided by the majority of members.

5. The decision of the party must be applied unconditionally. The members must obey the party, the minority obey majority, the low level obey the high level, and all obey the Central Committee of the party.

6. The regional leading agency of the party has authority to solve the problems within its jurisdiction, and the actions must be carried-out in accordance with the policy and procedure of the party and consistent with the purpose of the high leading sections. When important problems arise, outside their authority, the high leading section will be consulted.

Article 11 - The organization of party must be kept secret in enemy controlled areas.

Article 12 - To activate a new party department, or inactivate one already established, a decision will be made by the high leading section and be approved by the highest leading section. The organization of party among the liberation troops, considered an element of the party, is under the command of Central Committee with special procedures.

Article 13 - The organization system of the party consists of 5 levels, central level, zone level, provincial level, district level, and city level.

Article 14 - The ordinary meeting of the representatives will be held at each level. The meeting may be held at each level. The meeting may be held early, or delayed for a period of time and it must be approved by the high leading section, at the same time, the lower levels are notified.

The official and reserve members attending the meeting, and voting in elections, must be designated by the level concerned, and based on the regulations of Central Committee.

The lower level may send their representatives to participate in the meeting of higher levels, but the number of representatives will be no more than half ($\frac{1}{2}$) that of total membership. Besides, the higher level may designate the members of other level to attend meeting cannot be set up at the lower level.

1. The organization of party must be kept secret in enemy controlled areas.

The value of meetings is dependent on the participants. It is desired that half of total official membership represent the total membership of the level, and be present.

The leading sections of the meeting must be selected by participants and be approved by the high leading sections.

Article 15 - When it is necessary to decide an important problem or replace a member of the section in the lower level, a meeting of representatives is required, which consists of commissioners of the lower level, representatives from the lower level, and a number of personnel working in the agencies of the lower level.

The decisions of the meeting is approved by the high leading section, and the personnel to be assigned to regional levels must be directly approved by the high leading section.

In case of emergency, and with the approval by the high leading section, the meeting of representatives has authority of a meeting of the representative of its lower level.

Article 16 - The committee of the commissary of the party may set up a number agencies if necessary - the composition, responsibilities and operation of these agencies will be decided at the commissary level.

Chapter III - The organization of offices of the party.

Article 17 - The offices may have one or more sub-departments.

The sub-department is foundation of the party which connects the leading agencies of the party with the people.

In a village, street, factory, school, public administrative section, agency, unit of liberation troops, etc.,.....a sub-department of the party will have at least 3 members or more.

Article 18 - The organization of an agency is a sub-department, the meeting of members or meeting of representatives select the committee of the sub-department (it is called the sub-commissary). In case the organization of an agency has many sub-departments, it is then required that a meeting of representatives or meeting of members be conducted in order to select an operating section for the organization of the agency, which is called the Party Commissariat, Village Commissariat, Town Commissariat, and Factory Commissariat, etc. Under the Party Commissariat, the sub-departments will be activated in accordance with the productive unit or combat unit.

Article 19 - The activation of a sub-department must be directly approved by the organization agency. Special areas, such as Party Commissariat at the provincial level, up to the higher echelons, may set up a special sub-department, this will be under the direct command of that Commissariat.

1. 1.

Chapter III - The organization of offices of the party.

Article 17 - The offices may have one or more sub-departments.

Article 20 - The duties of the sub-department.

1. Realize the decisions, instructions of the higher leading section, take care of the propaganda, organization, guidance of the people, realize the policy of the party, report the general situation of regional areas to the high leading section.
2. Study the situation, desires, and opinion of the people, based on the regional situation, the rights of the people and guide them in their struggle, and enlarge the image of the party in the eyes of the people.
3. Educate the party members, distribute and control their mission, train them to criticize themselves, collect initial fee, introduce new members, carry out the discipline of the party.
4. Permanently control and supervise the procedures of secrecy, and the party, increase understanding of revolution in the people.
5. Discuss and submit ideas for decision, concerning the policy of the party.
6. Keep contact with the high leadership. If contact is broken, continue the activity and attempt to regain contact.

Article 21 - If the agency has over three members, but three of them are not official members, it is required that a reserve sub-department be established, the supervisor will be designated by the high leader. The reserve sub-department must carry out the missions that were outlined in Article 20, but do not have the authority to recruit new members, to raise reserve members into official status, to extend the reserve time of the new members, or expel a member from the party. Nor does it have the authority to apply the disciplinary action to a member, nor to select the representative participating in the meeting of higher levels. But the reserve sub-department may suggest the above matters to the high leading section. The decisions of the reserve sub-department will be carried out after being approved directly by the high leadership.

Article 22 - The conference of sub-departments or conference of representatives are called by the sub-commissioner or his assistant, usually once over a two month period. In case of emergency, or because of a request of over half of the total membership, the sub-commissioner or assistant may set up a special meeting.

Article 23 - A three member sub-department has one supervisor; one supervisor and one assistant are in a sub-department which has from five to seven members. A seven member sub-department will have a leading section. This section will select a supervisor who may have an assistant if needed. The supervisor of a sub-department or sub-commissariat will be selected by a meeting of representatives and be approved by the high leading section. The supervisor of a sub-commissariat has a period of six months in office. If the sub-department has many members, it will be divided into groups, each with one leader.

Article 24 - At the village, factory, town, street levels, etc., there may be two or more sub-departments, depending upon necessity. The commissariat level will directly activate the operating section by calling a conference of representatives. A conference is held every six months.

Article 25 - The commissioner of a village, factory, town, etc., has a duty to command the mission of sub-departments located in their responsible area, based on the decisions of their meetings and the decisions of the high level, set up the management of personnel and financial matters of the party.

Article 26 - The commissioner of a village, factory, town, street, etc., selects the supervisor and assistant and usually conducts a meeting every two or three months. The supervisors must have at least one year of service in the party, in special cases, however, this may be decided by the commissioner of the province or city.

CHAPTER IV

The organization of the party at District, Province, City, Town, Zone, and Special Areas.

Article 27 - A meeting of representatives of the District and Town is often held at periods from one year to eighteen months. The high level, such as Province, City, Zone, and Special Area, are held every two years.

Article 28 - Usually the commissariat level of the District, Town meet every 3 to 6 months, and the same for the Province of City level. In special situations, the meeting may be scheduled earlier or delayed.

Article 29 - The commissariat level meeting will select the operation section supervisor and assistant. The supervisors of district and town levels must have at least three years service in the party. The supervisors of provinces and city levels must have at least five years service in the party. The supervisors of zone or special zone levels must have at least seven years of service to the party. The operation section of the commissariat level represents the commissariat levels and commands the operation of the party between periods of conference. The supervisor and assistant represent the operation section and deal with daily business. The commissariat levels, from province level on up, are required to set up an inspection section, this will be designated by the commissariat level and be approved by the high leading section. The authority, mission, and operation of the inspection section, at all levels, will apply the decisions of the Central Committee.

CHAPTER V

The Organization of the Central Committee of the Party.

Article 30 - Usually, the meeting of the representatives of the entire party will be held every six years. The Central Committee is selected by the representatives of the entire party. The Central Committee usually has a meeting at least once between one year and eighteen months. The Central Committee calls for a meeting and selects the operation section, supervisor and assistant. Between periods of conference of the entire party, the Central Committee is the highest agency and leads the operation of the party, represents the party in relations with other parties in the country, and brother parties of the world, activates agencies of the party and controls them.

CHAPTER VI

Organization of Party Groups

Article 31 - In the organization of the people, or other organizations considered necessary, the party activates party groups. Those will be commanded by their commissariat levels. The mission of party groups is to carry out the policy and decisions of the party, to strengthen the image of the party, study and suggest to the commissariat level the aims of that organization.

Article 32 - The party group has a supervisor who may have an assistant, if required, the supervisor and assistant are designated at the commissariat level. The party group is under the supervision of the commissariat level.

CHAPTER VII

The Relationship between the Party and the Vietnamese Popular and Youth Revolutionary Groups.

Article 33 - The Vietnamese Popular and Youth Revolutionary Groups are the helpful hands and final reserve elements of the party. These groups have the mission of participating in propaganda and carrying out the policies of the party, to suggest, and to provide their experience or talent to the party. The groups are under the command of the party, but are under the immediate supervision of their respective levels, and at the same time, under the guidance of the high youth groups. The levels of the party have the duty to help them with their ideas and operations, political training, and relationships with other youth groups and the people. The members of the Vietnamese Popular and Youth Revolutionary Groups, after being approved for membership in the party, and then becoming official members, bear the responsibility of that position. But if they fail to provide the high caliber of service required, they may be expelled.

CHAPTER VIII

The Discipline

Article 34 - Discipline is required in order to hold firmly to the unification ideals and action of the party, to strengthen the combat power of the party. The application of discipline and its severity is necessary to educate the members and organizations of the party.

Article 35 - When a member is reprimanded, warned or reduced in rank, he may be retained in the party and undergo a period of education with a constant follow-up action. If he shows no improvement, he will be expelled from the party. For organizations: reprimand, warning and dissolution. The period of time for retention of a member in the party for education and follow-up is not over one year, if the member really understands his fault, he will be reinstated as a member, but if he is considered as incapable, he will be expelled from the party.

Article 36 - Authority for the application of discipline.

1. The application of discipline by reprimand or warning is decided by the sub-department, or by the ~~decision~~ of the group, which submits it to the sub-commissariat for consideration. The expulsion of a member must be approved by the organization of that agency. If the expulsion is not approved immediately by the agency concerned, the member will continue his activity in the party. If necessary, the sub-department has the authority to temporarily suspend the member, but must report this action to the commissariat level of the sub-department.

For a member of the high commissariat level, but not a commissioner or reserve. If he violates the regulations of the sub-department, he will be reprimanded, warned by his sub-department. Other forms of discipline must be recommended to the commissariat level of that cadre for action.

For the commissioners and reserve commissioners of operation sections at all levels, the application of discipline will be decided by a meeting of the entire operation section. Retention for education and follow-up, or expulsion will be decided by a meeting of representatives, or a conference of members of the entire party. In case the meeting of the entire operation section cannot be held, the higher commissariat chief has the authority to suspend the lower commissioner who violates the regulations. The application of discipline for a sub-commissioner must be decided by a meeting of sub-departments, or a meeting at the commissariat level, and be approved by the higher level of sub-departments, but the expulsion must be approved by the high commissariat level of the agency.

2. For the organizations of the party. Reprimand, warning and application of discipline to an organization of the party will be decided directly by the leading level of that organization. Dissolution on a commissariat level: The dissolution of an organization agency of the party of the high commissariat level must be recommended to a higher commissariat for consideration.

Article 37- When the organization of the party has decided to discipline a member or an organization of the party, especially the action of expulsion, it must be careful and kept in secret, and the violator will report to explain his reasons or defense. After the disciplinary action has been approved, except in special cases, an explanation is required to ensure the understanding of the member of its purpose. The violator may request reconsideration, or appeal to higher authority and to the Central Committee. When receiving the appeal, the agencies must act with dispatch.

CHAPTER IX

Finance

Article 38 - The finance of the party consists of the initial fee that is contributed by the members, and other collections. Procedures for contribution of the initial fee is decided by the Central Committee. The member without a job, or who is poor, will be exempted from the initial fee. When a collection is required in the party, the commissariat level of the party must consult the Central Committee, and assess this fee if approved. The initial fee is collected from the membership monthly and only one third of the total will be retained at that level, the remainder will be forwarded to higher levels.

CHAPTER I

Changes of Regulations

Article 39 - Only the Party Congress (a meeting of representatives of the entire party) has the authority to change the regulations. In case of emergency, and having the authorization of the Party Congress, the Central Committee has the authority to change and add regulations. The members must then strictly apply those regulations and prevent their violation.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL:



CHARLES J. GILBERT

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-2

CONFIDENTIAL

1st Bn, 3d Mar
3d MarDiv (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
021800H Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 8-65 and 9-65 to
Operation Order 328-65 (Company D (-))

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV
(b) Operation Order 328-65

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL.

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.
(see also Intelligence Report dtd 022000H Jul 1965).
- b. Period Covered - 280720H June to 021030H July.
- c. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company D were employed south of the SONG TUY LOAN River during this period, with the 2d platoon operating from 28 to 30 June, and the 1st platoon from 30 June to 2 July. Both units were introduced into the area on foot.

During the first two days efforts were directed toward the LA CHAU "district" along the SONG YEN River, with VC small arms and automatic weapon fire received from within the villages on two different occasions, in the vicinity of LA CHAU (2) and (4). Light sniper fire prevailed during the nights.

Patrolling for these first two days was also an attempt to confirm and/or exploit reports from the HUEI DUC District Headquarters obtained prior to proceeding south. (See Intelligence Report). This included an investigation of suspected 81mm mortar gun positions in the vicinity of KHUONG MY (3), as a result of a VC mortar attack against the District Headquarters on 280215H June.

Patrolling and counter-guerrilla operations by the 1st platoon (30 June - 2 July) included a thorough search of the village of HOI VUC along the SONG TUY LOAN River. prior to the search an estimated 15-20 VC were encountered south of the Village, with 10-12 fleeing in the direction of HOI VUC.

Extensive ambush sites were established at night at the base of the ~~dominate~~ highground (HILL 270 and 310) on approaches to the valley. Eight (8) VC were engaged at a site established immediately west of PHUOC NINH (6). Three (3) were observed falling, and believed hit, when the squad-size ambush opened fire.

Again, operations of the 1st platoon extended to the villages of LA CHAU, and again, increased resistance in the form of small arms and automatic weapons fire was encountered as the platoon pursued closer to the SONG YEN River.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab 28

CONFIDENTIAL2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS.

- a. 2d Platoon 28-30 June. One squad w/60mm mortars departed from the bridge at 947701 and moved south down the main road towards LA CHAU (1). The other two (2) squads moved to the HUEI DUC District Headquarters, capturing 2 VCS along the route at 925702.

The squad moving to LA CHAU (1) reported 12 men moving to a village at 941679. An ARVN force operating in the same area, opened fire on what they claimed were VC. The VC, who were observed crossing the paddies one at a time, appeared to take evasive action when fired upon. No weapons could be noticed by the Marines, however, information derived from the ARVN's indicated the VC carry sawed-off carbines in their trouser legs. (See Intelligence Report).

The two (2) squads moving through District Headquarters proceeded southwest to the village at 943681 southwest of LA CHAU (1). After conducting an easterly sweep of the village with negative results, they deployed in the vicinity of 941679. At approximately 281500H, immediately upon setting in, the 2 squads received approximately 30-35 rounds of sniper fire from 3 directions; 2 snipers firing from 946675 vicinity LA CHAU (2), 1 sniper at 940673, PHOU C NINH (1), and 1 sniper at 937677.

The platoon returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons, employing 3.5's and 60mm mortars (with the 1st squad at LA CHAU (1)) on LA CHAU (2). There was no further contact at LA CHAU (2) and the two squads moved on to LA CHAU (4) with the one squad and mortars proceeding to LA CHAU (2).

On the evening of the 28th the platoon set in for the night at 951670 just northeast of Hill 22. Sniper fire was received from the vicinity of 958674 and 957676. A sweep of the area the following morning disclosed propaganda signs, and numerous punji traps and holes along the SONG YEN River at 961676.

On the morning of the 29th, the platoon departed on a northwest route toward LA CHAU (2). One squad was dispatched across the rice paddies between LA CHAU (4) and LA CHAU (2) where a charge, apparently electrically detonated, wounded 5 Marines and 2 ARVN (See Intelligence Report). One VCS (holding a child) was apprehended approximately 40 meters from the blast.

The 2d squad then moved in as reinforcement to secure an LZ for evacuation of the wounded. In the process of evacuating the wounded, the platoon received small arms and automatic weapons fire from 3 directions: 948683 (east of LA CHAU (1)), 940676 (west of LA CHAU (2) and the LZ), and at 953675 and 951673 (both north of LA CHAU (4) and Hill 22). An estimated total of 10-12 VC and 3 automatic weapons was reported. The platoon returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and machine guns, employing 60mm mortars in the vicinity of LA CHAU (1). Artillery was delivered on LA CHAU (4). VC WIA's were unknown. There were no Marine casualties.

CONFIDENTIAL

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On the evening of the 29th the platoon proceeded west to the vicinity of 927676 (PHOU NINH (3)). They investigated the gun locations of 81mm mortars previously employed by the VC on the HUEI DUC Headquarters on the morning of 28 June from the vicinity of KHUONG MI (3). Two (2) 81mm illumination tail assemblies were discovered and returned with the patrol:

- b. 1st Platoon 30 June - 2 July. The three squads from the 1st platoon departed on 30 June at 15-minute intervals to ambush sites along the SONG TUY LOAN River at the following coordinates: 903708 (mine, covered with bamboo and banana leaves, discovered along northern side of the river - see Intelligence Report), 895707, and 887704. A fourth ambush was established at 868694 along the streambed north of CAO SUNG (3). There was negative contact at all ambush sites the first night.

On the morning of 1 July all squads departed their ambush sites. One squad proceeded to the HUEI DUC District Headquarters, continued west to the base of Hill 270 and then north to the village of HOI VUC. The 2d squad, moved straight to HOI VUC.

Meanwhile, the third squad, occupying the ambush site north of CAO SUNG (3), departed in a northeasterly direction towards HOI VUC. At approximately 010630H, at 878700 the squad's point saw 15-20 VC moving off to its right (northeast) 20 meters away, simultaneously with the VC's discovery of the Marines. The point opened fire, observed one VC fall (a rifle was later retrieved), before the VC dispersed, 10-12 fleeing to the south and the remainder to the west (towards HOI VUC). Only 20-30 seconds elapsed between the initial contact and complete dispersion of the VC. The squad then moved on to HOI VUC to join the rest of the platoon.

The sweep of HOI VUC took place between 010300H and 011500H. Approximately 120 villagers (old men, women and children), were first assembled and explained the purpose of the search. A thorough search then commenced after establishing the outer security around the village. Demolitions were utilized on all tunnels, caves, holes, etc., and marked. All huts were searched inside and out. There was no contact with the VC during the search. (See Intelligence Report).

Ambush sites were established on the evening of 2 July at 902684 (DONG KUCH (2)) and 914570 (KHUONG MI (2)). Only the first site, immediately west of PHOU NINH (5), realized any contact that night. At 2000H, a VC were observed moving southwest about 50-100 meters to the north of the ambush site. When the VC were within 25 meters, a 15-round burst hit 3 VC (observed falling), with the remainder fleeing. At daybreak, the squad followed blood trails to PHOU NINH (6) at 903676 and found 2 VC packs. (See Intelligence Report).

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On the morning of 2 July the 1st squad moved from PHUOC NINH (6) to vicinity 938666 where it came under fire (approximately 30-35 rounds) from the village at 943666. The squad returned fire while maneuvering towards the road. One (1) VCS was apprehended in a hut from where the fire was coming, and returned to 3d Marines / S-2 for disposition.

At 0615H, the 2d squad proceeded from DONG BICH (2), to LA CHAU (2) receiving 30-40 rounds of small arms fire (including 1 automatic weapon) from 934678 and 945674 (LA CHAU (2)) at 0730H, lasting approximately 45 minutes to an hour. The squad returned fire and finally maneuvered to the road where contact was lost.

The platoon returned at 021030L.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. Without minimizing the known existence of VC activity along the SONG TUY LOAN River, particularly in the vicinity of HOI VUC village; further confirmation of greater VC activity in the villages of LA CHAU was attained on this patrol. An approximate total of 22 VC, fired an estimated 120 rounds; on 5 separate occasions from the vicinity of LA CHAU (2), LA CHAU (3), and LA CHAU (4) during this 4-day operation.

Again, as experienced on previous patrols to LA CHAU, the dispersed hit and run tactics of the VC proved both frustrating and difficult to counter with a small unit. The difficulty is further compounded by the presence of numerous villages, and the SONG YEN River itself, invariably used as a convenient means of escape for a retreating group of VC.

Though contact was negligible on most of the ambush sites, the encounter in the vicinity of PHUOC NINH (6) is a further indication of the VC traffic moving east and west. In that daylight patrolling on the valley floor apparently meets with negative contact, it is conceivable that a saturation with ambushes of the approaches to and from the valley, with movement conducted only at night, would produce more tangible results.

By introducing units into this sector of the TAOR on foot for the first time, their disclosure is effectively reduced, as opposed to the use of helicopters. The Battalion's present position along the FEBA becomes a definite advantage in this respect.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

OFFICIAL:

G. F. SQUILLACE

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

CONFIDENTIAL

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1st Bn, 3d Mar
 3d MarDiv (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 051300 Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 10-65 to Operation Order 328-65
 (2d Platoon, Company A)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV
 (b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL.

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.
 (See also Intelligence Report dtd 051300H Jul).
- b. Period Covered - 022000H to 041500H July.
- c. The 2d Platoon, Company A proceeded by foot along its prescribed route, generally along the northern side of the SONG TUY LOAN River, west towards the village of HOI VUC.

The operation was designed to take advantage of the cover of darkness, restricting movement and the establishment of ambush sites during the night only.

The platoon moved through HOI VUC, and then proceeded in a south-west direction through CAO SUNG (2) (south of SONG TUY LOAN) and down to DONG BICH (2), where the platoon remained until nightfall 3 July.

That night the platoon was only able to set in an ambush at 905685 (#1). In the process of moving south to establish the next 2 sites, the platoon's lead elements heard movement 100 meters to its front. The platoon leader elected to keep the remainder of his platoon together and set up in a perimeter defense on the highground overlooking PHUOC NINH (6). Artillery illumination was called in to the southeast of the Platoon's position, but failed to disclose any further movement.

On the morning of the 4th, the platoon apprehended a VCC moving west, with information regarding an apparent VC meeting at 1200H. Artillery and air was called in on the suspected meeting place at 1200H. The platoon returned to the LZ, sustaining one casualty from a trip grenade; the platoon was heli-lifted out at 041500H.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS.

Movement along the northern sides of the SONG TUY LOAN River towards HOI VUC was severely hampered by extensive illumination which resulted due to report of a Company or Battalion of VC crossing the river at GS 0070.

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At 030200H, 2 VCS were apprehended at 873712 immediately north of HOI VUC (See Intelligence Report). The platoon proceeded southwest, finally entering the village of HOU VUC from the south. The surprise of the people, at the presence of the Marines, was very noticeable. A sweep of the village ensued with negative results.

The platoon continued southeast, noting a suspected VC campsite on trail at 876698, to BONG VIERL (2) (coords 904687). The platoon arrived at 1800H and remained until night fall.

Under cover of darkness the platoon proceeded south setting in an ambush at 904686 covering two parallel trails south of DONG VICH (2) (GS 9068) and running east and west. (S-3 Comment: The squad utilized the standard linear-type ambush with cut-off teams at either end of the killing zone. Trip flares were laid across each trail, in the center of the killing zone. The squad also had available a few hand illumination grenades. The cut-off teams are also utilized as a control factor exclaiming the number of VC "in" the zone after the flare is tripped; this alerts the opposite cut-off team to the number of VC who are "in" and might attempt escape). That night this particular ambush had no VC contact.

In the process of moving further south, voices and movement could be heard by the platoon lead elements approximately 100 meters to its front, vicinity 9066. In that the last ambush site had not been established as yet (2100H), the size and disposition of the group moving was unknown, and the fact the platoon was by now sufficiently fragmented, the platoon leader regrouped his forces, recalling ambush #2 at 906676. The platoon (-) reorganized, set in a perimeter defense on the highground immediately south of PHUOC NINH (6) overlooking the trail in 659006. Artillery illumination was called for over GS's 9166, 9266, and 9366, but was unable to confirm any movement.

The following morning at 040700H, just prior to returning north to the LZ, the platoon apprehended a VCS moving west on the trail at 904666. (See Intelligence Report). Questioning and information from papers on the VCS's person, revealed a VC meeting to take place at 041200H. The place of the meeting was not certain, but by taking into consideration the time of apprehension and the time for the meeting, the platoon commander estimated its place to be in the vicinity of Hill 310 (GS 8666) or Hill 220 (GS 8644), both about a 5 hour walk from the point of apprehension. Both air and artillery were called in on the suspected areas of the VC meeting place at 041200H. (S-3 Comment: Results of the air and artillery strike are unknown, though on target). The VCS was heli-lifted back to Regimental Headquarters for disposition.

The platoon then continued north to an LZ at 9067. Prior to their heli-return, the platoon sustained one casualty at 892678, as result of a trip grenade, at 041300H. (See Intelligence Report).

The platoon returned at 041500H.

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CONFIDENTIAL3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION.

The surprise of the villagers at the presence of the patrol in HOI VUC, further supports the advantage of moving on foot under cover of darkness. Also the advantages of nighttime movement, over what is now familiar terrain, is also realized in the establishment of ambush sites, reducing any discovery by the VC prior to setting in.

In that this was the first planned movement at night, particular note was taken of the technique of movement, means of control, security employed, and utilization of routes. The platoon commander on this operation used the standard column formation with a point, consisting of 2 scouts and a squad, moving approximately 200 meters ahead of the main body. Due to the nature of the terrain with its thick vegetation, and the reduced visibility of nightfall, flanks could not be employed.

The primary means of control was through the use of predesignated rally points, chosen through a combination of map reconnaissance and the platoon commander's personal familiarity with the area. (Note: The platoon commander highly recommends an aerial photo study of the area prior to the operation). The point halts the column at the rally points, at which time the platoon commander can issue further instructions or merely direct the point to continue.

Communications with higher headquarters in addition to the numerous other tasks required of the platoon commander, necessitate the use of rally points to stop the column occasionally and maintain control. Additional means of control accessible to the platoon commanders consist of whistles (with the mouth; not mechanical) to indicate he is approaching the point during its stops and the keying of handsets on the PRC-6 (w/the point) primarily as a means of "acknowledgement" to further instructions.

During the hours of darkness the platoon commander prefers to utilize familiar and obvious trails as opposed to breaking a new one through unknown foliage and terrain and its inherent obstacles, particularly at night when visibility is significantly reduced, landmarks virtually nonexistent and expediency the primary concern when proceeding to night ambush sites.

The possibility of a VC meeting place in the highground (Hill 310 - 220 complex) overlooking the valley floor is not a remote one, in that the VC's traffic from this western highground to the SONG YEN River has been confirmed on previous operations and patrols. This east-west movement is believed to be primarily an administrative route, with the villages lining the SONG YEN River, a source of supply, rest, and an area for the VC's propagandizing. The primary military movement appears to be on a North-South axis.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
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S-3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1st Bn, 3d Mar
 3d MarDiv (Rein)
 DA NANG, RVN
 061800 Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Reg Order 11-55 to Operation Order
 328-65 (3d Platoon, Company A)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000. AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV
 (b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL.

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.
 (See also Intelligence Report dtd 051300H Jul).
- b. Period Covered - 041500H to 060800H.
- c. The 3d Platoon, Company A was heli-lifted into the TACR south of the SONG TUY LOAN River in the vicinity 900678 on 4 July for a 2-day operation.

The platoon operated on the western highground in the vicinity of Hill 310, employing ambush sites at night, and during the day, reconnoitering trails and other possible avenues of approach to the valley that might be utilized by the VC.

Contact with the VC was minimal, however a number of heretofore undiscovered trails and VC campsites were uncovered during the course of the operation, along the ridgelines.

The platoon moved to the valley the second night setting up in the vicinity of 917701 prior to its return the following morning.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS.

The platoon departed its LZ at 041545H, moving west approximately 2000 meters along the base of the ridge (GL 67) in GS's 8687 and 8767, prior to its approach to the top of Hill 310.

The 2 squads moving to the saddle were unable to conduct a thorough recon of the ambush site to be established on the trail to Hill 310 due to darkness. However, numerous possible campsites, some (previously used by the VC) were discovered along the route. (See Intelligence Report). Despite the inability to recon the position a lineal ambush was established on the trail atop Hill 310 (vic 862667), with no enemy contact that night.

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Meanwhile, the first squad in the process of moving along its route to Hill 310, fired and hit one VC at 041745H moving along the same trail (873664). The VC retreated and a blood trail was followed to a Guerrilla Base Camp at 870664 where contact was lost.

The squad set in its ambush at 874665. At 042045H one VC moving east at 870664 passed the first cut-off team in the ambush and was almost in the killing zone, when an ARVN soldier clapped his hands, dropped his rifle and helmet, alerting the VC who stopped and retreated to the west. (The ARVN soldier was placed under custody and turned over to the 3d Marines).

On the early morning of 5 July, when the first 2 squads at 862667 were preparing to move east back to the valley, 20 rounds of automatic weapon fire were delivered on a VC (carrying bundles of rice) along the trail at 860663. The VC staggered and fell off into the thick brush aligning the ridgeline (to the south). The squad pursued about 500 meters for about $\frac{1}{2}$ hour, but were unable to locate him. (S-3 Comment: The Platoon Commander states the steepness of the ridge could conceivably allow a man to literally "slide" off the side of the ridge and out of sight). (See Intelligence Report for detailed description of the ridgeline at Hill 310 and the trails and campsites).

The Platoon, now reorganized, moved east off the ridgeline picking up the trail at 886656. A VC campsite was discovered at 886657 with 3 trails entering into its base. (See Intelligence Report). The platoon continued northeast to 917700 where it set up in a triangular defense south of the village of AM TAN, utilizing 2-man positions and a 50% alert with 60mm mortars in the center, trained on the Hill at 920703.

The Platoon Commander elected the triangular defense due to reports received that night of 1 VC Company in the TAOR, vicinity HOI VUC, and approximately 4 Companies east of the SONG YEN River. Sporadic firing at 923707 and 911690 (at 0400H) and an aura of continuous movement around the platoon positions was noticeable. No Contact that night.

The platoon returned to the Battalion area at 060700H.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION.

Communications was virtually nonexistent during the platoon's movement along the north base of the Hill 152 and 310 complex. Once upon the highground communications was continuous, surveillance of the valleys was commanding, and movement along newly discovered trails was easy. Continuous reconnaissance along this western highground and occupancy thereof can significantly enhance the control of those approaches to the valley.

The value and importance of individual troop discipline in ambush sites became extremely apparent during this operation, by the very

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
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absence thereof in a couple instances. Unless maximum silence is maintained and the individual Marine sacrifices his own personal comfort while in the ambush, the slightest noise, made more audible by the stillness of the night, will prematurely trip the ambush, negating any prior detailed reconnaissance of the sites and rendering useless the ambush killing zone.

Though the tripping of one ambush site by the ARVN soldier is unfortunate, it is also conceivable that a Marine's canteen, his coughing, rifle, etc., could have just as easily disclosed ambushes at other times during this operation.

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G. F. SQUILLACE

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-3

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1st Bn, 3d Mar
3d MarDiv (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
082030H Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 13-65 to Operation Order 328-65 (Company B)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL.

- a. Route - As planned in Fragmentary Order 13-65 and as noted in this report. (See Intelligence Report dtd 082030H Jul 65).
- b. Period Covered - 062000H to 081100H.
- c. Two (2) platoons from Company B crossed the SONG TUY LOAN River at nightfall on 6 July for 2-day counter-guerrilla operations in the southern sector of the Battalion's TAOR.

The platoons saturated the northwest approaches to the valley with ambush sites immediately south of the SONG TUY LOAN and west towards the villages of CAO SUNG.

Enemy contact was light consisting of a few rounds of light sniper fire the second night. At 071000H vic 908679, a mine detonated resulting in one USMC KIA and three WIA's. (See Intelligence Report).

There was no enemy contact at the ambush sites.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS.

The two platoons crossed the IP at 947700 (bridge) and proceeded west, without incident, to establish ambush sites at the following coordinates: 920701, 918702, 917706, (all in the vicinity of village of AN TAN); 903698, 907698, and 910701.

All ambushes were occupied by 062000H and had no VC contact.

The following morning one patrol's point was in the process of securing the stream crossing in order that the remainder of the patrol might refill their canteens. The stream ran north and south, through a "cut". An explosive charge, planted a few feet off the trail on the south bank of the "cut" (908679) was detonated, resulting in Marine casualties. (See Intelligence Report).

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Tab 31

The 1st platoon then commenced a search of the village of KHOUNG MY (2) in GS 9169 with negative results, with the 2d platoon occupying blocking positions west of the village GS's 9069, 9068. After the search the platoon set up for the day at 908698.

At 072000H, the platoons established ambush sites as follows, with negative contact: 876689, 886699, 878699, and 888705 (vicinity of the villages of GIAO TRI and CAO SUNG).

At 080030H, the ambush site at coordinates 888705, received two, 3-round bursts, 100 meters to the south. At 080545H, movement was observed in that same vicinity. (See Intelligence Report).

The platoon returned at 081100H.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION.

Movement to the ambush sites during the operation, contributed as much to the disclosure of the sites, as did any subsequent noise that might have occurred once established.

The importance of small units moving along previously unused routes, particularly at night, in order to conceal their movement was brought out during this operation. Though reconnaissance of new routes is difficult at night, particularly when the patrols are more concerned with expediency when moving to the ambush sites, it is not impossible, and may mean the difference between a successful or unsuccessful ambush.

Platoon-size units moving to ambush sites, and dropping squads off along the way, or dispatching squads from a platoon base camp, "backtracking" as it is, proved to be too cumbersome with the risk of disclosure too great. A more successful technique has been to establish a squad release point at the Company Patrol Base, thus eliminating the awkwardness of a platoon, and decreasing the possibility of discovery both during the approach to, and occupation of, the ambush site.

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1st Bn, 3d Mar
3d MarDiv (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
101800H Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 14-65 to Operation Order 328-65
(Company D (-))

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL

- a. Route - As planned in Frag Order 14-65 to reference (b).
(See also Intelligence Report dtd 101800H Jul 65).
- b. Period Covered - 081800H to 100900H.
- c. Company D (-), with 2 platoons, proceeded by foot across the SONG TUY LOAN River into the southern sector of the Battalion's TAOB for 2-days of counter-guerrilla operations.

Extensive ambushes were employed at night over the western approaches to the valley floor, with contact being realized at one of the sites located near the village of CAO SUNG (2), where 2 VC were killed with automatic weapons fire.

Ambushes established at the following coordinates met with negative contact:

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
082000H	895704	092000H	897680
	889678		889673
	897680		895663
	889673		872692
	895663		888695
			879703

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. The 2 platoons departed the D Company CP area at approximately 081800H, moving southwest, crossing the SONG TUY LOAN River at the vicinity of 930710. The 1st platoon proceeded to their ambush sites in the vicinity of CAO SUNG. The 3d platoon moved on south to their ambush sites around DONG BICH and PHUOC NINH. Both platoons were occupying their ambush sites approximately 2030H the first night.

In the 1st platoon's process of setting in an ambush at 879700, the security team, while moving to its positions noticed 2 VC moving east down the trail towards CAO SUNG (2). The VC were approximately 50 meters away when first sighted, carrying weapons. The Marines concealed themselves, waited until the VC were within 5 feet, opened fire, killing both VC. (See Intelligence Reprt).

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Tab 32

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There was no further contact the first night. The following morning the platoons departed their ambush sites, reconnoitered respective covered areas, and remained in concealment during the daylight hours prior to moving into their ambushes the night of 9 July.

At 094030H, two (2) VCS were apprehended by a squad from the 3d platoon at 922708 after an attempt to escape. Neither VCS possessed proper identification and so were turned over to the 3d Marines.

At 091530H, while occupying concealed positions at 897674, one man was seen jogging along the trail 15 meters to the north, followed 30 seconds later by a second man. A third man passed shortly thereafter, carrying what appeared to be a U. S. carbine. The Marine doing the observing, alerted the remainder of the patrol and a sweep was conducted westward along both sides of the trail. The 3 VC were then seen running west across the paddies. The patrol pursued physically and by fire, wounding 1 VC, (observed falling) while the other 2 escaped to the north in some dense brush at 891676. A thorough search of the area for all 3 VC produced negative results. (See Intelligence Report).

At 092030H, while occupying an ambush site at 879703, 10-20 rounds of automatic small arms fire was heard, and appeared to be coming from the vicinity of 879700. Intermittent fire continued until 100200H. The following morning, at 100700H, 2 VCS, with no identification, apprehended at 879700 and turned over to the 3d Marines.

Both platoons returned at 100900H.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. The squads were released at timed intervals from the Company CP area, and from that point proceeded, independently, to their respective ambush sites. This method of squad release, as opposed to moving a platoon into the area of operations and then releasing the squads, has proven a more effective means of covering the movements of a unit, and has defied detection by the VC. In addition, it eliminates the disadvantages inherent in the very size of a platoon, as well as those disadvantages of dropping squads off along a platoon route, or releasing them back over the same route to their ambush sites, from a platoon patrol base. (See Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 13-65).

The daylight hours were used solely for rest. An early morning reconnaissance of adequate coverage is accomplished wherein the unit can remain concealed during the day prior to assuming their ambush sites at night. A Marine's efficiency and alertness is subsequently increased during his all night occupation of an ambush site.

Night movement during this operation posed no control problems. With a full moon, 15-20 meter intervals between men could be used, with movement 20 meters off known trails. The trails were used mainly as a "guide".

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The platoon commander observed that the more successful ambushes have been established between a village and a nearby hill, noting that the VC traffic is between the huts and the hills, and the majority of contact realized from 1930H - 2100H and 0600H - 0730H.

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Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-3

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1st Bn, 3d Mar
3d MarDiv (Rein)
DA HANG, RVN
122000 Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 15-65 to Operation Order
328-65 (Company A (-))

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS 1701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL.

- a. Route - As planned in Frag Order 15-65 to reference (b) and as noted in this report. (See also Intelligence Report dtd 122000H).
- b. Period Covered - 102000H to 121100H.
- c. At 102000H the 2d and 3d platoons from Company A proceeded on foot, south across the SONG TUY LOAN, to ambush sites along VC approaches to the valley from the dominant high ground to the west. One ambush site was established immediately east of PHUOC MINH (5) at a suspected mortar position. The Company Commander and his CP Group were established at the District Chief's Headquarter at PHUOC BUC (630633).

The ambushes had no contact the first night. They occupied concealed platoon patrol bases during the daylight hours, and moved into their ambush sites the second night at approximately 2000H, with the exception of the squad moving toward PHUOC MINH (3).

At 112025H, the 3d squad, 2d platoon moving to their site at PHUOC MINH (3), was stopped by a mine at 926667. The explosion resulted in 2 USMC KIA's and 4 WIA's. An initial attempt at helo-evacuation was thwarted by VC fire. Meanwhile, the platoon commander had reported the incident to his other units, and the 3d platoon, all of which were proceeding to his aid from their positions in the west.

The 2 remaining squads of the 2d platoon, and the 3d platoon (-) all arrived at the link-up point within minutes of each other, and all encountered automatic weapons and machine gun fire, as well as harassing sniper fire in the vicinity of 926668, just prior to reaching the 3d squad.

After reorganizing his forces, and coordinating the movement of the casualties to an LZ, the 2 platoons proceeded west, and secured an LZ in GS 9156, where the helo-evacuation was completed without any further incident.

Tab 33
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The 2 platoons then established a perimeter defense for the night, returning the following day at 121100H. Prior to returning, 1 USMC WIA resulted from a mine at 120830H in the vicinity of 897699. (See Intelligence Report).

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS.

- a. Movement to the ambush sites the first night (10 July) met negative contact. All ambushes were occupied at approximately 102300H, at the following sites, and had no VC contact:

102300H to 110615H - 3d Platoon:	Coord:	2d Platoon:	Coord:
	914699		905676
	907695		906682
	904693		933678

During the day all units remained in platoon patrol bases with the 3d Platoon at 898675 and the 2d Platoon at 895654. That night the 3d Platoon moved into its ambushes at approximately 112000H. The 2d Platoon occupied 2 of its sites by 112000H. Coordinates of ambushes for 112000H:

3d Platoon:	Coord:	2d Platoon:	Coord:
	916695		897664
	907698		906682
	909688		

The Company Commander with his OP Group walked to the District Chief's Headquarters and established communications with his two platoons. By establishing the Company OP at HIEU DUC it was intended to gain better communications with the ambushes and effect liaison with the District Chief, thereby assuring the rapid dissemination of intelligence directly to the Commander.

- b. Encounter with Mine. The 3d squad, 2d Platoon departed the platoon patrol base at 101800H to return to its ambush site at 933678 (vic PHUOC NINH (3)). The squad proceeded east, generally following the main trail towards PHUOC NINH (2).

The mine, located on the southside of the trail at 926667, exploded at 102025H, resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 5 WIA (1 WIA later died). (See Intelligence Report).

The platoon commander who was with the 3d squad, finally made radio contact with the 3d Platoon, who called for the helo evacuation. Meanwhile, an LZ was secured in the vicinity of 927668 and a perimeter defense established by the 3d squad.

Flashlights were used to guide the helicopters in. It was approximately 45 minutes after the mine exploded that the 3d squad received sniper fire from the north approximately 150 meters, consisting of 3-4 rounds.

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- (3) The 3d platoon (-), after arranging for the initial helicopter evacuation, recalling its ambushes, and attempting unsuccessfully to establish radio contact with the 3d squad, was finally able to move out. The platoon (-) proceeded southeast to 915670 and then east toward PHUOC NINH (2).

At this point the platoon was guiding on the noise caused by sporadic firing in the vicinity of the link-up point (possibly caused by the previous 2 USMC units moving in). Radio contact was established with the platoon commander at the link-up point and the 3 round rifle burst signal was arranged.

The platoon approached the link-up from the northwest in an attempt to capitalize on the VC in that area as per reports from the 2d platoon commander (w/ the squad encountering the mine). At 925669, approximately 250 meters north of the trail (and link-up point) the platoon received automatic weapons fire about 22-30 yards from its left flank at 928669. Return fire and 1 grenade silenced the fire. At the same time the right flank was receiving machine gun fire from about 150 meters away at 924667. Three (3) rounds from the M-79 Grenade Launcher silenced this fire. Sporadic sniper fire continued to harass the platoon as it moved to the link-up point, juncturing at 9225H.

- e. Consolidation and Evacuation of Casualties. After all units junctured at 112325H, the process of reorganization began with the 3d platoon (-) leading the column, with the casualties, west to the LZ at 916667, with the 3d platoon following and acting as the covering force.

No further VC contact or fire took place and the helio-evacuation was accomplished without difficulty at 120030H. The 2 platoons (-) then proceeded northwest to establish a perimeter defense for the night at 907688. No further enemy contact was encountered.

3. UNEXPECTED SITUATION. Though the overall movement of this unit was exceptional, the danger of moving over known and previously used routes, in just to cross over it, (specifically the main trail where the mine was encountered) was realized with ugly results. The decision to cross the trail where the mine was encountered on this operation, resulting in 2 KIA's and 4 WIA's, was influenced by the channelizing nature of the natural vegetation and dense foliage at that point. (Note: The squad, during its movement east, was guiding off the trail along its southern side with the moonlight providing adequate illumination). The mine was placed just off the south-side of the trail at the point where the squad decided to utilize this route.

In addition, the degree of fatigue, and probability of carelessness of the individual Marine can become a very real contributing factor in increasing his susceptibility to an enemy trap. This resulting aloofness can be overcome only through determined and positive guidance by unit leaders with continuous reemphasis on the basic

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- (3) The 3d platoon (-), after arranging for the initial helicopter evacuation, recalling its ambushes, and attempting unsuccessfully to reestablish radio contact with the 3d squad, was finally able to move out. The platoon (-) proceeded southeast to 915670 and then east toward PRUCC NINH (2).

At this point the platoon was guiding on the noise caused by sporadic firing in the vicinity of the link-up point (possibly caused by the previous 2 USMC units moving in). Radio contact was established with the platoon commander at the link-up point and the 3 round rifle burst signal was arranged.

The platoon approached the link-up from the northwest in an attempt to capitalize on the VC in that area as per reports from the 2d platoon commander (w/the squad encountering the mine). At 925669, approximately 250 meters north of the trail (and link-up point) the platoon received automatic weapons fire about 20-30 yards from its left flank at 928669. Return fire and 1 grenade silenced the fire. At the same time the right flank was receiving machine gun fire from about 150 meters away at 924667. Three (3) rounds from the M-79 Grenade Launcher silenced this fire. Sporadic sniper fire continued to harass the platoon as it moved to the link-up point, juncturing at 2325H.

- e. Consolidation and Evacuation of Casualties. After all units junctured at 112325H, the process of reorganization began with the 3d platoon (-) leading the column, with the casualties, west to the LZ at 916657, with the 3d platoon following and acting as the covering force.

No further VC contact or fire took place and the helo-evacuation was accomplished without difficulty at 120030H. The 2 platoons (-) then proceeded northwest to establish a perimeter defense for the night at 907688. No further enemy contact was encountered.

3. COMMUNICATIONS. Though the overall movement of this unit was exceptional, the danger of moving over known and previously used routes, if just to cross over it, (specifically the main trail where the mine was encountered) was realized with ugly results. The decision to cross the trail where the mine was encountered on this operation, resulting in 2 KIA's and 4 WIA's, was influenced by the channelizing nature of the natural vegetation and dense foliage at that point. (Note: The squad, during its movement east, was guiding off the trail along its southern side with the moonlight providing adequate illumination). The mine was placed just off the south-side of the trail at the point where the squad decided to utilize this route.

In addition, the degree of fatigue, and possibility of carelessness of the individual Marine can become a very real contributing factor in increasing his susceptibility to an enemy trap. This resulting aloofness can be overcome only through determined and positive guidance by unit leaders with continuous reemphasis on the basic

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tactical principles which are inadvertently ignored or overlooked with time. The point of the squad noticed a "mine" when they first passed the point of the explosion and the word to the remainder of the unit was relayed. The Grenadier apparently tripped the mine after having it pointed out to him by the squad leader. The explosion of the mine devastated all his M-79 rounds and was the principal cause of the casualties.

The decision to link-up the reinforcing units was based upon the unknown disposition of the VC. The likelihood of other enemy units being in the area was the only safe assumption to make in this situation. It could not be determined whether the fire received by each reinforcing unit, all from the same vicinity, was coincidental or planned by the VC. This particular area has always been one of increased VC resistance, and any encounter, planned or the result of consequences (the mine's explosion), was no surprise.

The fact that the VC did not react until approximately 45-50 minutes after the explosion, when the reinforcing unit first attempted to link, would indicate they were waiting just for the purpose of hitting the reinforcements. In order to take consideration, the Platoon Commander to the link-up point, instructed the reinforcing units of their possibilities and the disposition of the VC. This additional precaution prevented any casualties from occurring from the enemy's fire that was subsequently delivered on each reinforcing unit's flanks during the approach to the link-up point.

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Commanding

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Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-3

1st Bn, 3d Mar
3d MarDiv (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
171200 Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 16-65 to Operation Order
328-65 (3d Platoon, Company B)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6652 III and 6658 IV
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL.

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.
- b. Period Covered - 141315H to 161115H.
- c. The 3d Platoon, Company B departed via foot for 2-day counter-guerrilla operations throughout the western sector of the TAOR, north of the SONG TUY LOAN River.

The operation included a search of the village of TAN AN PHUONG, and extended south to HOI VUC and the villages along the river.

Due to the period of time that elapsed since the Battalion's last operation in this sector, the patrol's efforts were committed to ascertaining any new VC activity that might be present as well as evaluating the results of a recent artillery strike on an estimated Company of VC.

Resistance was light, however, southwest of HOI VUC the platoon fired upon 6 fleeing VC, killing 4 and capturing 2. The platoon received sniper fire that second night while occupying its patrol base.

The platoon returned without further contact at 161115H July 65.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. The 3d platoon departed its company area on foot at 141315H on its prescribed route, proceeding west along the northern side of the SONG TUY LOAN River toward its patrol base at 882717 in the vicinity northwest of BINH THAI. A platoon defensive position was established the first night with negative contact.

The following morning the platoon continued its movement north to the village of TAN AN PHUONG (GS 8673), conducting a thorough search without any VC contact. (See Intelligence Report).

Tab 34

Upon completion of the search the platoon continued south. In the vicinity of 866713 at 151445H, the platoon's point (including ARVN soldiers) came upon 6 VC. Four of the VC ran when confronted and continued to run after the ARVN soldier twice yelled, "halt," and fired overhead. By this time, the remainder of the platoon's first squad arrived on the scene. As the 4 VC continued to run, the squad pursued by fire, killing 3 and wounding one within a distance of 80-175 meters. The VC WIA was lost in the brush and later discovered with extensive wounds. (The VC WIA died after evacuation). The two other VCC's were delivered to the 3d Marine Regiment.

The platoon established its patrol base that evening at 861717, in the vicinity of Hill 107. At 152015H, they received 4 sniper rounds from the vicinity of 858718. The platoon displaced approximately 400 meters to the southeast under cover of darkness and had no further contact.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. During this operation, squad-size ambushes were not utilized, due primarily to the absence of any significant VC activity in this sector and the fact that the purpose of the mission was to ascertain the validity of this absence. This platoon-size reconnaissance in force, was therefore employed for this operation to specifically reconnoiter for mines, booby traps, etc; search the village of TAN AN PHOUNG, and determine the extent, of any new VC movement.

The decision to displace the platoon patrol base the second night was to negate the possibility of the VC employing mortars after the initial sniper fire had disclosed the site.

No positive evaluation of the Artillery strike conducted could be made by the platoon with the exception of burned and charred vegetation and some cleared areas in the vicinity.

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S-3

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1st Mar, 3d Mar
3d Div (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
211600H Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 17-65 to Operation Order 328-65 (Company D (-))

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000; AMS L701, Sheets 6658 III and 6659 IV
(b) Operation Order 328-65

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL

- (a) Route - As planned in Frag Order 17-65 to reference (b) and as noted in this report (See also Intelligence Report dtd 181800H).
- (b) Period covered - 161600H to 180930H.
- (c) Company D (-) with two platoons (rein) proceeded, via foot, south of the SONG TUY LOAN River to conduct a reconnaissance in force for a 2 day period throughout the southeast sector of the TACR in the vicinity of PHU SON, DUYEN SON, and LA CHAU.

The 2 platoons followed a route which took them directly south, generally along the main north-south road, and which met continued resistance throughout the 48-hour period.

Enemy fire was received initially the first evening at LA CHAU (2) slowing the platoon's movement to its patrol base that night in the vicinity of Hill 41. Fire consisted of small arms and automatic weapons fire, and 1 round of 60mm mortar fire resulting in 2 Marine WIA's.

Movement south the following day to PHU SON (4) was conducted without resistance. The subsequent swing to the north however encountered sporadic sniper fire at PHU SON (3) and again at DUYEN SON (4).

As the platoons continued north small arms fire was received and one rocket team, moving into firing position on Hill 22, detonated a mine suffering 1 KIA and 4 WIA's.

After the medical evacuation was completed and enemy fire subsided, the Company (-) pushed further north, again encountering booby trapped grenades at LA CHAU (4) resulting in 3 WIA's.

The arrival of this second helo evac immediately drew enemy fire, increasing in intensity from light to extremely heavy and included small arms, automatic weapons fire, 60mm mortars and possibly a 50 caliber machine gun. An estimated 2 platoons (rein) of VC delivered the fire from 3 general directions; LA CHAU (1), (2) and (3) and BO BAN (1).

Artillery and air strikes silenced heavy fire emanating from vicinity LA CHAU (2) with other VC fire subsiding after approximately one (1) hour of fighting, with the Marines employing semi-automatic, automatic rifle and machine gun, 3.5's, M-79's, and 60mm mortars while maneuvering.

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Tab 35

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Marine casualties after this encounter consisted of 2 WIA's from 60mm mortars. The sweep of the village of LA CHAU (1) was then conducted with negative results.

After resupplying with ammunition and other supplies the Company (-) continued north, setting up in the vicinity of AN TAN and NINH AN (1), maintaining surveillance to the south, southeast and west over the valley floor that night until its return the following morning at 180930H.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS

- a. Initial Contact. The 2nd Platoon, followed in trace by the 1st Platoon, picked up the patrol route along the main north-south road after moving across the SONG TUY LOAN River and through District Headquarters.

At 161800H the lead platoon's point and forward elements (at 943676) received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 10-13 VC, and 1 60mm mortar round. Small arms and 1 automatic weapons fire was delivered on the Marines' right flank from 940680, 940678, and 940673. Additional small arms and 1 automatic weapons fire emanated from vicinity of LA CHAU (2) at 945680, 946675, 946678 on the Marines' left flank. The 60mm mortar round impacted at 942680 wounding 2 Marines.

The 2nd Platoon employed 60mm mortars on LA CHAU (2) and engaged the VC for approximately 25-30 minutes in small arms and automatic weapons fire. After silencing the enemy fire, and the withdrawal of the VC, a sweep of LA CHAU (2) was conducted prior to continuing south, with negative results.

A 2 platoon perimeter defense was established for the first night at 932668. An LP was positioned on Hill 41 at 935662, and 2 squad-size ambushes employed at 928668 and 940665 with negative contact the remainder of the night.

- b. Sniper Fire and Mine: Hill 22. The 2 platoons moved out the following morning at 170800H, the 1st Platoon proceeding to 936641, the 2nd Platoon to PHU SON (4) at 943634, further south.

At 171000H, prior to continuing the prescribed route north, the 2nd Platoon received sporadic fire from 3 snipers at 948640, vicinity PHU SON (3). While the 2nd Platoon was employing 60mm mortars and 3.5's on the VC positions the 1st Platoon was repositioned at 943646, southwest of PHU SON (2), to cover the 2nd's northern movement.

As the 2nd Platoon continued moving north 3 more snipers fired from 953652, vicinity DUYEN SON (3), before retreating. Both platoons continued north thereafter, linking up again at DUYEN SON (4).

Later, at 171110H, while in the process of moving to Hill 22, the 1st Platoon came under enemy small arms fire. One rocket team, while assuming a firing position at 943663 (Hill 22), detonated an M16A1 mine, the explosion causing 1 KIA and 4 WIA's. (See Intelligence Report).

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Enemy fire subsided and the med evac was completed at 1145H. The 2nd Platoon was meanwhile positioned to the west of Hill 22 on the 1st Platoon's left flank.

- c. Enemy Contact: LA CHAU. Later that afternoon the 2 platoons continued their northern movement with the 1st Platoon proceeding to 947677, north of LA CHAU (2). Meanwhile at 171310H, a booby trapped grenade was detonated by the 2nd Platoon, vicinity 955678 (LA CHAU (3)) resulting in 2 WIA's.

In that the 1st Platoon was still considerably southwest of the explosion, the Commanding Officer (in this case, the Company Executive Officer) decided to move the last squad of the 2nd Platoon to a position north of LA CHAU (2) to protect his left flank until the 1st Platoon arrived, leaving 2 squads in the vicinity of the mine to secure an LZ for the med evac.

With the arrival of the helo med evac at 171410H, the 1st Platoon was occupying positions north of LA CHAU (2) with the squad from the 2nd Platoon. It was also at this time that the heaviest encounter with the VC began.

Heavy fire, including 1 automatic weapons, was delivered by an estimated squad of VC from the south at 952673. Extremely heavy fire was also being received from the northeast direction extending from 953682 to 952687, vicinity southwest of BO BAN (1) from an estimated platoon of VC. Heavy fire, including 1 machine gun emanated from the west and northwest (942677 to 943684) at the same time from an estimated platoon-size VC unit. In addition, 20-25 rounds of 60mm mortars rained down on the Marines at 950678 covering an area approximately 300 x 300 meters. It is believed a 50 caliber machine gun was also being employed by the VC.

All available Marine firepower was brought to bear on the VC positions. Two artillery missions were on target at 952673, silencing the VC fire from the south and enabling the Commander to move 2nd Platoon to the west to consolidate his forces. Unable to get an AO or UH-1E's on station for observation the Executive Officer resorted to F4-B PHANTOMS and an airstrike. Four 500lb bombs were delivered at 954682 silencing the fire from the northeast.

The Marines suffered 2 WIA's from the enemy mortars who were evacuated at approximately 171430H. With air still on station and the VC fire finally subdued, the 1st Platoon commenced a sweep of LA CHAU (1) with negative results, setting up north of the village at 943688.

After resupplying at 171825H in the vicinity of 943685 the Company (-) proceeded to positions along the high ground in Grid Square's 9170 - 9370 (vicinity AN TAN) to maintain night surveillance over the valley floor to the south, southeast, and west.

There was negative contact that night. The company (-) returned to the Company area at 180930H.

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3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. The most significant fact during this operation was the realization of the advantage of moving units on a widely dispersed front, and maintenance of extended intervals to preclude the entire column from becoming engaged.

This oft times overlooked principle was applied from the outset of the Company's movement when its lead platoon made initial contact with an estimated 10-13 VC. Moving two platoons in a Company column formation, which extended over a distance of approximately 1300 meters, made it virtually impossible for the VC to bring fire to bear upon the entire unit, and conceivably mislead them into believing they had when actually only the Marines' lead elements received the flanking fires.

Again, during the battle in the vicinity of LA CHAU the following day, the dispersion of Marine units provided the commander with a greater maneuver capability enabling him to control and employ his platoons in an immediate response to a fast-changing situation.

The dispersion of units negated any intentions the VC might have had of encircling the Marines, and in addition, provided a tactical deterrent to any VC attempt to displace its units to more advantageous positions, or exploit its initial offensive.

One other point is worthy of note: During the encounter in LA CHAU with relatively large VC units delivering heavy volumes of fire from 3 directions, the problem of pinpointing actual VC positions rests on the Unit Commander on the scene and must be resolved with rapidity. Observation from the air is the most desired. However, due to the nonavailability of these additional "eyes", and with time of the essence, the unit commander was given the F4-B's for the purpose of hitting targets and silencing enemy fire.

This action again demonstrated the importance of immediate action when taken under fire and the need for maintaining pressure on the enemy. To this end, it is interesting to note that although the VC fired 4000-5000 rounds of small arms, no casualties were sustained by direct fire.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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S-3

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1st Bn, 3d Mar
3d Mar Div. (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
222000 Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 18-65 to Operation Order
328-65 (Company C)

Ref: (a) Map: INDCCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL

- a. Route - As planned in Frag Order 18-65 to reference (b) and as noted in this report. (See also Intelligence Report dtd 221630H Jul 65).
- b. Period Covered - 191400H to 220900H.
- c. Company C conducted a 72-hour period of counter-guerrilla operations throughout the southwestern sector of the TAOR concentrating on the western approaches to the valley floor, south of the SONG TUY LOAN River.

Individual platoons operated for a 24-hour period each, effecting their respective reliefs-in-place by helicopters.

Throughout the entire operation there was a noticeable lack of VC activity and negligible signs of any recent activity or movement. Numerous trails showed no signs of use and were predominantly covered with overgrowth (See Intelligence Report).

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. The 1st platoon was heli-lifted into an LZ (vicinity 869691) at 191400H without incident. The following squad-size ambushes were established and were occupied from 192000H to 210600H with negative contact:

AMBUSH COORDINATES

859687
859695
968699

The 2d platoon was then heli-lifted into an LZ vic 869694 relieving the first. Reconnaissance of ambush sites commenced during the day prior to occupation at night at approximately 202100H until 210600H, with negative contact. Coordinates of ambush sites for the second night:

AMBUSH COORDINATES

864698
367697
867698

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Tab 36

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The 3d platoon relieved the 2d at 210930H, landing by helicopters at 884681. Again, as with the first two platoons, the 3d experienced a noticeable lack of VC activity, and moved into the following ambush sites without incident:

AMBUSH COORDINATES

870700

873704

884704

The 3d platoon was heli-lifted out by 220900H from 883703.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. During the heli-relief of the 2d platoon by the 3d, a smoke screen was utilized for the first time as an experimental attempt to evaluate its usefulness in screening off any VC observation of the LZ and disposition of the Marine units prior to embarking.

The smoke was laid from 8869 south to 880675 during the relief, was extremely thick and adequately obscured the ground to Hill 270. Visibility extended to the smoke about 400 to 500 meters from the ground troops and provided adequate protection from any VC observation.

The primary problem evolves out of the variance in wind direction in the immediate LZ and the surrounding area. A failure to compensate for this variance will result in the LZ itself being completely covered with smoke, necessitating re-runs, repositioning of embarking units and loss of time.

During the latter stages of heli-lifting the remaining units out of a combat LZ, security becomes of utmost importance when there is no relieving unit to insure such security on a continuing basis. Dispersion of troops and timing are the key elements during this vulnerable period. In this operation, the troops were widely dispersed and divided according to heli-team size. Commitment of the embarking troops into the LZ is not made until the helicopter is actually in the process of touching down, and not just making a routine passover. Immediately prior to the helicopter's landing the troops are in the process of moving rapidly into the LZ for embarkation. In such a situation UE-LB's, covering the LZ by fire, offer greater security in the LZ and as such are preferable.

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1st Bn, 3d Mar
3d MarDiv (Rein)
DA NANG, RVN
242000 Jul 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 19-65 to Operation Order 328-65 (Company A)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL

- a. Route - As planned in Frag Order 19-65 to reference (b) and as noted in this report. (See also Intelligence Report dtd 241630H Jul 65).
- b. Period Covered - 221300H to 241230H.
- c. Two platoons of Company A commenced 2-day counter-guerrilla operations in two different sectors of the Battalion's TAOR, on 22 July. The 1st platoon conducted operations in the western sector north of the SONG TUY LOAN River and included the villages of TAN AN PHUONG and HOI VUC. The 3d platoon operated south of the SONG TUY LOAN on the southwestern high-ground in the vicinity of Hill's 310 and 502.

The 1st platoon conducted sweeps of both TAN AN PHUONG and HOI VUC and met no resistance throughout the 2-day period with the exception of one sniper on the second night. The 1st platoon's mission also called for it to reconnoiter and ascertain a trafficable trail that might extend to Hill 1279 (GS 7970) and the remains of a French resort-type building. Said trail was located at GS 8472, was followed for approximately 3/4 miles, and was believed to continue to Hill 1279, though positive determination could not be made due to the lack of time.

The 3d platoon encountered automatic sniper fire during its ascent to Hill 310, sustaining one WIA in the process. Numerous booby traps impeded the movement of the platoon along the ridge. After a successful harness manipulated med evac from a hovering helicopter the platoon continued its mission. Artillery and air were called in on Hill 502 and 310, and later Artillery in the vicinity of GS 8264 in response to reports of a VC Battalion in the area.

There was no further contact as both platoons linked up on the morning of the 24th in the vicinity of CAO SONG (2). The 3d platoon conducted a search of the village with negative results while the 1st platoon acted as a blocking force. The platoons returned at 241230H.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS

- a. First platoon: TAN AN PHUONG and HOI VUC. The first platoon departed at 221600H from its company area and proceeded to 876728, southeast of TAN AN PHUONG, where it occupied its platoon patrol base by 222000H.

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The platoon continued its movement north to TAN AN PHUONG the next morning. Approaching the village from the south, one fireteam was sent in first (to preclude any confusion and noise that might result from a larger unit entering a village). The fireteam came upon 3 young men eating off the side of trail. One attempted to run, but halted after being challenged. The 3 VCS were retained as guides and were turned over to the 3d Marine Regiment following the operation.

After searching TAN AN PHUONG the platoon continued south and attempted to locate a trail to Hill 1279 (GS 7970). In the vicinity of GS 8472 a trail was followed for approximately 3/4 of mile and was believed to extend all the way to Hill 1279. With time running out the platoon then moved on south toward HOI VUC.

While approaching HOI VUC the rear guard of the platoon received one round of sniper fire from approximately 300 meters away (867707) at 231700H. Believing this to be a "warning" signal for the occupants in HOI VUC, the platoon commander elected to search the village that night rather than the following morning as planned. The search was conducted at 231800H with negative results.

The platoon established a platoon patrol base that night in the vicinity of 872719 occupying same by 232000H.

The following morning at 240630H the platoon returned to the south and assumed blocking positions north and east of CAO SUNG (2) while the 3d platoon (moving from the south) conducted a search of the village at 240800H with negative results.

- b. Third platoon: Hill 310. The 3d platoon departed the company area at 221300H, crossed the SONG TUY LOAN River and proceeded south to its patrol ambush site at 878669 (northern base of Hill 62). There was no contact that night.

At 230530H just prior to moving out, chickens could be heard (vicinity 875666) on the ridgeline leading east from Hill 310, and was believed to be a Guerrilla Base Camp (see Intelligence Report dtd 241600H Jul 65).

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In the process of moving from the platoon's ambush site to 871663 (east of Hill 310) 5 booby traps were disarmed along the trail. This added precaution consumed approximately 5½ hours of the platoon's movement time toward Hill 310.

At 231115H, while in the vicinity of 870664 the platoon's point was hit by 1 round of sniper fire from down the trail 15-20 meters west, resulting in 1 USMC WIA (leg wound). Two scouts pursued both physically and by fire, but failed to apprehend the sniper, who discarded 10 lbs of rice and lost one shoe along the way. (See Intelligence Report dtd 241600H Jul 65).

Automatic weapon's fire was then received from the west approximately 40 meters up the trail, estimated at 10 rounds. Fire was returned and contact broken.

A med evac was successfully completed at approximately 231145H. Due to the mountainous terrain and tall trees it was necessary to hover the helicopter 35-40 feet above the ground and effect a hoist-pulley type evacuation.

After marking friendly positions with yellow smoke, artillery and air strikes were called in on Hill 502 and 310. A subsequent search of Hill 310 and the trail leading to Hill 502 disclosed evidence of a hasty retreat by the VC, and included vines and bundles of stakes at 866665. From Hill 310 an artillery mission was delivered in the vicinity of GS 8264 on a suspected VC Battalion, as reported through intelligence channels.

The platoon occupied its platoon patrol base by 232000H at 856687 in the vicinity of CAO SUNG (4), and the following morning conducted a search of the village of CAO SUNG (2) with the 1st platoon assuming its blocking positions to the north of the village.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. The 3d Platoon's encounter further confirmed the VC's presence in that strategic highground, particularly in the vicinity of Hill 502 and further west. Physical evidence of the VC retreating after the artillery and air strikes, trails heavily laden with booby traps approaching Hill 310 and 502, as well as additional trails leading to the valley floor immediately south of this dominant terrain bear out the VC's occupation.

The danger in approaching Hill 310, up the main trail along the ridgeline is further compounded by the channeling nature of the heavy brush on either side. Consequently, the VC are able to saturate this approach with numerous booby traps to impede a unit's movement, and in addition, can effectively control such a trail with a few well placed snipers.

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The sweep of TAN AN PHUONG and HOI VUC was a precautionary measure to keep the VC off balance and ascertain any activity in that area. Of primary concern was the location of a trail leading to Hill 1279, a likely avenue of approach for the VC from the west. By the same token, such an approach might be utilized by future friendly patrols in effecting an advantageous western penetration into VC territory.

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S-3

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