

Aug 1965

1/3d Marines  
Command Chronology

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3/3/77  
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HEADQUARTERS  
1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3d mar  
S & C FILES  
3D MARINES

29865  
3/GFS/rwj  
5750.1  
1 Sep 65

189165

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Via: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Subj: Command Diary  
Ref: (a) Division (Fwd) Order 3100.1  
(b) Regimental Order 3120.1  
Encl: (1) 1st Battalion, 3d Marines Command Diary

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is submitted.

*W. H. Lanagan*  
W. H. LANAGAN

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1st BN, 1st UNCLAS 18-65

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1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES, COMMAND DIARY

PART II

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA SHEET

DESIGNATION OF REPORTING UNIT

1st Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT:

1 Aug to 31 Aug 1965

DATE OF SUBMISSION OF REPORT:

1 Sep 1965

COMMANDING OFFICER

Lieutenant Colonel William H. LANAGAN

LOCATION OF COMMAND POST AT END OF PERIOD

Grid Coordinates: AT950721

Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, TOURANE, Sheets 6658I, 6658IV, 6659II, 6659III,  
Series I701

SUBORDINATE UNITS AT END OF PERIOD:

H&S Co, 1st Bn, 3d Mar

Co A, 1st Bn, 3d Mar

Co B, 1st Bn, 3d Mar

Co C, 1st Bn, 3d Mar

Co D, 1st Bn, 3d Mar

COMMANDERS:

1stLt Michael B. RILEY

Capt James K. MILLER

Capt Richard D. ROSS

Capt Lee A. PETERSON

1stLt Leonard C. HAYES

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARY1. MISSION ASSIGNED.

The mission of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines continued to be the conduct of extensive counter-guerrilla operations throughout its assigned TAOR. The concept of operations required continuous day and night combat patrolling to counter the activity of the enemy, disrupt his routes of supply, and render his own operations in the area ineffective. In addition, the Battalion assumed a 4-day reaction posture 14-17 August, in preparation for possible deployment to the BA LONG Valley to support ARVN forces operating in that sector. On 20 Aug the Battalion received orders to prepare to effect a relief on position with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on or about 28-29 August. Preparation commenced for the relief and subsequent departure from the Republic of Vietnam to Okinawa on 31 August.

2. OPERATIONS PARTICIPATION.

On 2-3 August the Battalion participated in a joint U. S. - ARVN search and destroy operation along the SONG YEN River. See Part IV. Three Companies from the Battalion executed the actual search and destroy mission through the outlying villages. Supporting the operation, and adjacent to the Battalion, were the 3d Battalion, 4th Regiment, of the 2nd ARVN Division and the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 3d Marine Division.

The operation itself required very little, if any, flexibility and its success was directly attributed to the thoroughness of the pre-operation planning. Though enemy resistance was light, there was an abundance of evidence indicating extensive VC activity had prevailed in the area. Numerous elaborate VC tunnels, caves, fighting holes and shelters were uncovered. The Battalion suffered 3 WIA throughout the entire operation. Enemy losses were 5 KIA's, 11 WIA's, and 12 VCC. Post operation analysis resulted in a beneficial guidance to future operations of a similar magnitude, particularly in the employment of helicopters, tanks, and in the basic concept of search and destroy missions.

The techniques of cordoning villages, utilized during this initial U. S. - ARVN joint operation, proved to be both realistic and effective when employed in a subsequent operation by Company D in the village of KHOUNG MY (2). Company D was introduced into the TAOR by foot, under cover of darkness, and was occupying positions around the village prior to dawn. The cordon was tightened around the village at daybreak with no loss of surprise. The ensuing search and destroy operation was conducted in conjunction with a composite ARVN force and resulted in 4 VC KIA's and 1 WIA, and the discovery of numerous intelligence items.

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Similar search and destroy operations were conducted in the villages of TAN AN PHOUNG, HOI VUC and CAO SUNG, by platoons from Companies A and B. The Battalion also continued extensive combat patrolling throughout the range of dominant highground in the southwestern portion of the TAOR. During the course of patrolling along this complex, a VC Medium-Level Cadre Training Camp was discovered, as well as other guerrilla base camps in the vicinity of Hills 502 and 310.

VC resistance was light along the 502 - 310 ridgeline and the approaches to the valley floor. H&I fires employed on a nightly basis by the Battalion severely interdicted the movement of the VC and accounted, to a large extent, for the decrease in the enemy's activities.

Coordinated tank/infantry operations were conducted along the SONG TUY LOAN River and increased significantly the speed and maneuverability of the infantry. The utilization of the tanks also enabled the infantry to reach their objective, rested and fresh, and consequently enhanced their efficiency in the execution of its mission. Immediate firepower was also available to the infantry with the tanks. However, where the terrain was unfamiliar to the tanks and was broken in nature they became cumbersome and a definite disadvantage. This was particularly evident during subsequent operations with tanks along the base of the Hill 502 and 419 ridgelines with 2 platoons from Company C.

The Battalion's Out Post/Liaison Team located at the HIEU DUC District Headquarters continued to be an expedient and efficient source of intelligence information. The reaction time of the Battalion was decreased accordingly, and a continuous cognizance of enemy activity in the TAOR was achieved.

The AN/TPS-21 continued to be used as a positive means of surveying enemy movement during the hours of darkness. The targets uncovered by the AN/TPS-21 were the object of two artillery missions.

From 17-21 August the Battalion occupied positions forward of the FEBA, employing numerous ambushes and local patrols, in response to an increased readiness posture prompted by the Communist Manifesto holidays, and the likelihood of stepped up VC activity. Company B realigned positions forward of the FEBA in order to secure the right flank of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines in accordance with 3rd Marines message (CONFIDENTIAL) 201645Z.

Company A conducted the final operation of the Battalion on 23-25 August. The three platoons of Company A converged on the Hill 502 - 310 and 419 ridgelines via helicopter, landing in two separate LZ's. The approach to the rendezvous point was attempted from three directions. The formidable nature of the terrain however prevented a thorough search and destroy operation from being carried out.

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1 Sep 653. TERRAIN AND WEATHER.

a. Terrain. With the tactical area of responsibility remaining generally unchanged, the terrain conditions within the TAOR are unchanged from previous analyses, except as noted in the following. Nearly all paddy areas which are cultivated contain rice crops having attained a height of 3 feet. The inundation of these paddy areas, resulting in ankle deep water, has contributed to reducing trafficability in these areas. Continued growth of vegetation along many trails has resulted in trafficability of these trails to be increasingly difficult with movement in some areas being slow and cumbersome. Aerial observation is again limited to some degree by this factor.

b. Weather.

(1) General. An analysis of past climatological factors for the month of August indicated the probability of no marked difference from the weather patterns experienced in July 1965.

(a) Temperature - Temperatures have ranged from 87 to 92 degrees during the day and 72 to 79 degrees at night. These temperature ranges are slightly lower than those recorded for July, however, they are generally consistent with past averages for the month of August. The continued high humidity, particularly after periods of rain, has generally negated the cooling effects attributed to lower temperatures ranges.

(b) Visibility - Although the rainfall was average for the month of August, visibility has continued to be good to excellent. Visibility was reduced to less than 5 miles, 3 percent of the month. The few periods of reduced visibility have had very little limiting effects on air or ground operations.

(c) Surface Winds - During the month of August the prevailing wind flow was northeasterly, with an average speed of 8 knots.

(2) Summary. The month of August has produced an average rainfall with the prevailing surface winds being generally in a northeasterly direction occasionally shifting to the southwest. Normal temperature ranges were recorded for the month with the high being 92 degrees and the low 72 degrees. August 1965 has conformed to past norms.

AVERAGES

<u>Elements</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>Normal</u>
Average Maximum Temperature	90	90
Average Minimum Temperature	76	75
Total Precipitation (inches)	2.7	4.56
No. of Days with Precipitation	7	10
No. of Days with Thunderstorms	3	8

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	<u>August</u>	<u>All Time Month Extreme</u>
Extreme Maximum Temperature	92	102
Extreme Minimum Temperature	72	70

4. TRAINING CONDUCTED.

a. Orientation and familiarization training was conducted throughout the Battalion in the employment of the 60mm mortar. A formal training school was organized by the 81mm Mortar Platoon Commander for all units, in view of the Battalion's success with the 60mm mortar on patrols, and the possibility of its being retained by the Marine Corps for future use in the Republic of Vietnam.

b. Refresher instruction classes were conducted for all small unit leaders in the employment of Artillery fire missions. Forward observer techniques for calling in and adjusting artillery fires were reviewed and put to practical use during the Battalion's program of extensive combat patrolling.

c. Communications continued to be the subject of intensive training due to the difficulties invariably encountered while patrolling in rugged terrain. Unit operators received instruction in proper voice and operational procedure as well as alternate techniques for employing and insuring sustained communications in a fast-moving situation. Particular emphasis was placed on the safety precautions necessary during inclement weather and included proper grounding of communications wires and the utilization of electrical arresting systems.

d. The operational commitments of the Battalion precluded an elaborate formal schooling in the areas of small-unit patrolling, employment of ambushes, etc., but did provide a practical opportunity to institute that instruction received from previous review and indoctrination courses conducted during the Battalion's tour in Vietnam.

e. The concept of searching villages received increased emphasis during this reporting period in line with the nature of operations the Battalion conducted. Cordoning of individual villages, a relatively new technique, was the subject of review and discussion during most post-operation critiques. Particular attention was given to small unit leaders and their responsibilities for close supervision of Marines conducting the actual physical searches of tunnels, caves, and holes within the villages.

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1 Sep 655. MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.a. Morale.

(1) In spite of the Battalion's approaching departure from the Republic of Vietnam, there has been no slackening of effort in the field. The battalion continues to react to the exigencies of combat service with remarkable enthusiasm and teamwork. There have been no significant morale problems encountered this month. Through the agency of the Division Clubs Officer, money and material were provided for the erection of an enlisted man's club in the Battalion Headquarters area. The resulting Club was more than adequate to serve the needs of the men. American and Japanese beer and soda appeared in plentiful supply at reduced PX prices and obviated the dependence on local sources at inflationary prices. This month's R&R program was a tremendous success and enabled more than 200 Marines from this battalion to enjoy from three to five days in Bangkok or Hong Kong. However, the success of these trips was marred in the last week of the program when an airplane returning from Hong Kong crashed into the bay. Of the thirteen men on board from this organization, there were only two survivors. It is understood that when this battalion returns to CONUS it will be the end of the transplacement system between the First and Third Marine Divisions, and as of yet the status of this organization as a Battalion is still undecided. Those individuals who have completed the overseas cycle are presently apprehensive about their next duty assignment. Presently, morale is sky-high with the anticipation of leaving the Republic of Vietnam, and the subsequent port calls to Subic Bay, P.I. and BCC, Hong Kong.

(2) Postal Service continues regularly and has been providing daily mail to Battalion personnel.

(3) The Special Service program has made inexpensive American soft drinks and beer available to the widely dispersed rifle companies. Movies continued nightly at Battalion Headquarters and over fifteen beach parties were financed and coordinated thru Special Services. The Cruise Book was completed and forwarded to the publishers. It will be over 112 pages and some 825 copies have been sold.

(4) Liberty in the form of organized shopping parties was granted to selected individuals every afternoon in DaNang, Republic of Vietnam.

(5) The Battalion had its last payday in RVN and no problems were anticipated. Division Disbursing was more than cooperative in providing special attention to those people who needed cash for R&R trips. Also the disbursing officer has made arrangements to conveniently pay this Battalion during a Subic Bay, Philippines Island, port call.

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1 Sep 65b. Discipline.

(1) No significant disciplinary problems were encountered this month. However, irresponsibility continued to characterized the behavior of the Battalion liberty party in Danang, Republic of Vietnam. This troublesome situation was resolved by granting liberty to selected individuals under officer and Staff NCO supervisors for organized shopping parties.

(2) During the past months, ten men were disciplined at Battalion Commander's Officer Hours. There were three Special Court-Martials, of which one resulted in a Bad Conduct Discharge, and five Summary Court Martials.

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1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES, COMMAND DIARY

PART III

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE

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Received Regimental Operation Order 327-65 (Operation "BLAST OUT I").

Issued Battalion Operation Order 330-65 to amplify instructions contained in Regimental Operation Order 327-65.

Briefings were conducted, by the Commanding Officer and the S-3, for the Company Commanders and attached unit commanders in regard to Operation "BLAST OUT I".

At 1900H, Company A (-) of the 3d Tank Battalion reported under operational control of this Battalion.

Company D reported, at 2115H, receiving three rounds of small arms fire at the French Fort (vicinity AT943722).

Company D reported observing a suspected infiltrator in the vicinity of AT932719. The area was illuminated disclosing a person moving east. Three rounds were fired at this suspect, with negative results.

2 Aug 65

Operations in accordance with Regimental Operation Order 327-65 (Operation "BLAST OUT I") and Battalion Operation Order 330-65 were conducted this date. (Refer to Operational Summary to Operation Order 330-65; Part IV; Supporting Documents for details of the Operation).

3 Aug 65

Operation "BLAST OUT I" continued. (Refer to Operational Summary to Operation Order 330-65; Part IV; Supporting Documents for details of the Operation).

Company D departed on operations at 2100H in accordance with Fragmentary Order 23 to Operation Order 328-65.

The patrol reported no unusual activity other than hearing occasional drum beating and observation of apparent signal lights.

Progress of Company D was intentionally slow due to the presence of enemy mines in the area.

The patrol reported negative enemy contact the remainder of this date.

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Company D continued on its assigned route until 0322H, at which time it reported platoon ambushes had been established in the vicinity of AT909698, AT905690, and AT919700.

At 0700H, Company D reported a landing zone was established and secured in the vicinity of AT906698, while the remaining members of the company were establishing a perimeter around the village of KHOUNG MY (2).

Thirty Vietnamese (organized into ARVN Investigation Teams) landed by helicopter at 0746H.

The cordoning of the village reported complete at 0805H, the command group of Company D and the ARVN Investigation Teams entered KHOUNG MY (2), and commenced their search.

Company D reported at 1000H, the 3d Platoon had engaged, shot and wounded a VC in the southeast sector of the village. The VC was subsequently captured with two fragmentation grenades in his possession. Interrogation by the ARVN investigators determined the prisoner was a VC courier. The prisoner and his papers were evacuated to the Regimental S-2 for disposition.

At 1010H, Vietnamese Team exchanged rifle fire with an undetermined number of VC in the central portion of the village. There were no casualties.

A tunnel was discovered at 1040H containing one U. S. Carbine and three rifles of French manufacture, plus a large assortment of small arms ammunition.

The 1st Platoon of Company D, occupying the northern sector of the cordon, reported receiving approximately twenty rounds of small arms fire and four 60mm mortar rounds from the vicinity of AT895686. No casualties were sustained as a result of this action.

After receiving information from the ARVN that three VC were in its area, the 1st Platoon conducted a search of the area adjacent to their lines. The search resulted in the discovery of a tunnel under the base of a tree. Two hand grenades were thrown into the tunnel killing three VC hiding therein.

At 1318H, Company D reported killing a VC, who was concealed in a tunnel, and capturing one automatic weapon of French manufacture plus 2 U. S. Carbines.

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The village search was completed without further incident.

A landing zone was subsequently secured in the vicinity of AT908698 for the helicopter pick-up of the ARVN Investigation Teams. The lift being complete at 1540H, Company D proceeded to the vicinity of AT910700 where it junctured with elements of Company A, 3d Tank Battalion, and Company A, 3d Amphibious Tractor Battalion.

At 1555H, one LVT had a mechanical breakdown in the vicinity of AT910700. The 1st Platoon of Company D remained with the LVT unit, while the remainder of Company D and the Tank Battalion unit returned to their parent commands.

There was no further enemy activity reported this date.

5 Aug 65

The 1st Platoon of Company D continued its security mission for the halted LVT unit. Repairs completed on the disabled LVT, the composite unit commenced return to friendly lines, at 1307H. The 1st Platoon reported its arrival at D Company's CP at 1349H, while the LVT's continued, unescorted, to their Command Post.

No significant operations were held within the Battalion's TAOR this date and negative enemy contact was reported.

6 Aug 65

The 1st Platoon of Company B departed on operations at 1022H, in accordance with Frag Order 25 to Operation Order 328-65. The platoon was accompanied by a heavy section of tanks, including two flame tanks.

The reinforced patrol, with infantry riding the tanks, proceeded over the prescribed route to check point 3 (vicinity AT907685), arriving there at 1120H.

From this point, two squads of the 1st Platoon proceeded along the stream (vicinity AT899680) and occupied a position southwest of CAO SUNG (1), from AT881687 to AT872689.

The remaining rifle squad, embarked on the three tanks, proceeded over the northern trail to CAO SUNG (1), arriving there at 1300H, simultaneously with the two squads moving up from the south.

A thorough search was conducted throughout the village with negative results, except the discovery of a booby trapped hand grenade (U. S. manufacture; M-26) at grid coordinates AT879694. (See Intelligence Report, Frag Order 25 to Operation Order 328-65).

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At 2010H, a tank broke its track in the vicinity of AT885686. The patrol established a perimeter defense in this area for the remainder of the night with a squad sized ambush in the vicinity of AT882683. No enemy contact was reported by this patrol the remainder of this date.

The 1st Platoon of Company A departed on operations at 1620H in accordance with Frag Order 24 to Operation Order 328-65. The Platoon proceeded over the prescribed route, without incident, until 1930H. At this time, a platoon patrol base was established in the vicinity of AT884715. A squad size ambush was established in the vicinity of AT880717. No enemy activity was reported by this patrol the remainder of this date.

7 Aug 65

The 1st Platoon of Company A departed the patrol base at 0500H and continued on its mission. The platoon arrived in the vicinity of TAN AN PHOUNG at 0630H, established a blocking force, then conducted a search of the village. At 0730H, an ARVN Investigation Team was heli-lifted to TAN AN PHOUNG to assist in the search. (See Intelligence Report (Frag Order 24) to Operation Order 328-65). The search was concluded at 1130H without incident. The ARVN Investigation Team was returned by helicopter to its base, while the platoon continued on its mission. Patrolling was uneventful and at 1800H, the 1st Platoon reported back in its Company's area.

The 1st Platoon of Company B resumed operations at 0800H. At this time, two squads with a flame tank commenced a search of Hill 112 (AT887688) and the surrounding area. Although no enemy was encountered, the flame tank was used to burn areas of possible VC habitation.

Simultaneous with the above operation, the gun tank moved to a firing position in the vicinity of AT873694. Twenty-five rounds of 90mm HE and WP were expended on Hill 502 (vicinity AT832658).

At 0905H, twenty VC were observed moving rapidly west along the trail in the vicinity of AT872674. The VC were observed to keep a 5 to 10 yard interval, and all were dressed in black shorts with short sleeved shirts. Some were observed wearing white sun helmets and many appeared to be carrying weapons. An artillery fire mission was delivered in the area with unknown results.

Two small shelters, well camouflaged and located in thick brush, were discovered and destroyed in the vicinity of AT875681.

No further enemy activity was reported by this patrol. The patrol returned to its company area at 1735H. Progress of the patrol was slowed considerably due to mechanical problems with the tanks throughout the day. There were three major breakdowns, each being over an hour in duration.

The Chief of Staff, 3d Marine Division visited this Command Post at 1000H.

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No significant operations were held within the battalion's TAOR this date.

Company D conducted a search for possible land mines over the road leading to the Battalion Command Post.

Company A conducted test firing of several company weapons between 0830H and 0930H.

The battalion continued to improve the entrenchments and barbed wire entanglements along its front lines.

No significant enemy activity was reported within the battalion's TAOR this date.

9 Aug 65

No significant operations were held within the battalion's TAOR this date.

A Marine from Company B reported receiving two rounds of small arms fire at 1245H, while walking along the road in the vicinity AT959708. Location, or direction, of the position from which the rounds came could not be determined.

At 2345H, the Commanding Officer of Company B reported observing approximately twenty to thirty 60mm mortar rounds impact in the vicinity of AT 979690. It was presumed these rounds were fired by the VC from an undetermined location south of the SONG TUY LOAN River.

Work continued on the construction of defensive positions within the battalion's TAOR.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

10 Aug 65

A company sized patrol, scheduled in accordance with Frag Order 26 to Operation Order 328-65, was suspended this date due to the determination by higher headquarters that the selected landing zone was not suitable for helicopters. The patrol was rescheduled for 11 August 1965, contingent upon the availability and selection of a new landing zone in close proximity to the original LZ.

At 1835H, a report was received that approximately 100 VC were located in the vicinity of AT964675. Control of artillery and aircraft was by the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines since the VC unit was just over the boundary line separating the two battalion tactical areas of responsibility.

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At 1935H, the Marine Liaison Officer, at HIEU DUC District Headquarters, reported they had received some light small arms fire without any damage. The Liaison Officer reported more sporadic fire from the same direction at 2135H.

Construction and improvement of defensive positions continued.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

11 Aug 65

At 1658H, Company D (-) commenced a heli-lift to a landing zone in the vicinity of AT867626. The lift completed at 1734H, Company D (-) departed the LZ on operations in accordance with Frag Order 26 to Operation Order 328-65.

A radio relay station was established near the summit of Hill 419 (vicinity AT866626), with one rifle squad and one section of 60mm mortars as security.

As the patrol proceeded over its designated route, three VC were seen and challenged in the vicinity of AT857620, at 1855H. Failing to heed the challenge by the patrol's point, the VC were immediately fired upon. One VC was killed instantly, while another was mortally wounded, and the third escaped. Before succumbing, the mortally wounded VC revealed the three men were recently recruited from a village about four kilometers to the west, and claimed they were members of the VC unit that delivered a mortar attack on positions of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines on the night of 9 August 1965. (See Intelligence Report (Frag Order 26) to Operation Order 328-65). The bodies of the VC were subsequently evacuated by helicopter to Regimental Headquarters.

Five men were observed at 1910H, moving north along the ridge in the vicinity of AT840600. These men were presumed to be VC but were not engaged due to the distance from the patrol.

Due to the possibility of having been observed during the encounter with the VC, and to avoid possible ambush, the patrol moved back toward the landing zone, establishing a perimeter defense in the vicinity of AT861623 for the night.

At 2226H, the Marine Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported Vietnamese security personnel had engaged in a brief exchange of fire with VC elements to the south.

No further enemy activity was reported within the battalion's TAOR this date.

12 Aug 65

Company D (-) departed its patrol base at 0600H, and continued on its mission in accordance with Frag Order 26 to Operation Order 328-65.

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The patrol proceeded over the prescribed route towards Hill 722. When the patrol reached a point in the vicinity of AT843616 it moved west across a streambed, located a new trail on the opposite side which was followed to AT839628. At this point the trail forked and headed back uphill. The patrol, unable to locate an avenue of approach to the VC Medium Level Cadre Camp, (vicinity AT829632) returned to the patrol base (vicinity AT868626) where a perimeter defense was established for the night.

At 1545H, the Radio Relay Team, with its security element, reported sighting two VC, carrying large rucksacks, in the vicinity of AT869627. When fired upon, both VC fell. However, one VC rose, picked up his companion and disappeared over the ridge. A search of the surrounding area was conducted with negative results.

The 2d Platoon of Company B, commenced a special clearing operation in front of its company's lines at 0530H. The search was conducted in grid squares AT9569 and AT9669 to a distance of 500 meters south of the SONG TUY LOAN River.

In the village of BO BAN (2), the platoon apprehended two men without identification cards, seven men with invalid identification, and one boy, eleven years old, who had an incriminating letter in his possession. All prisoners were taken to HIEU DUC District Headquarters for interrogation and disposition.

The battalion's TAOR was realigned in accordance with instructions contained in CG 3d MarDiv message number 143 dated 110052Z August 1965.

13 Aug 65

Company D (-) dispatched a squad sized patrol in an attempt to locate the trail leading to the "Medium Level Viet Cong Cadre Camp" (vicinity AT828632). The patrol was conducted with negative results.

At 1505H, Company D (-) commenced return to its defensive area by helicopter. The heli-lift was reported complete at 1550H.

One helicopter was reported downed, in Landing Zone WHIP-POOR-WILL (vicinity AT942723), with engine trouble. Company D dispatched a squad to the area as security until repairs were completed.

At 2100H, Company B (-) departed on operations in accordance with Frag Order 28 to Operation Order 328-65.

The patrol made no enemy contact this date.

Received Division Operation Plan 326-65 (Top Secret), placing this battalion on a twelve-hour alert as of 2400H this date, as a reaction force prepared to support ARVN forces operating in the DONG HO Valley.

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14 Aug 65

The Company B patrol proceeding over the assigned route was momentarily halted by a secured gate in the vicinity of AT887706 at 0335H. While the point was investigating the gate for trip wires a booby trap was set off wounding one officer and one enlisted Marine. Both wounded were quickly evacuated from the scene. Approximately ten rounds of sniper fire were received during the heli-evacuation.

As a precaution against running into more mines, the patrol commander occupied a patrol base in the vicinity of GIAO TRI (3) (AT888703).

At 0705H, seven civilian Vietnamese policemen were lifted by helicopter from HIEU DUC District Headquarters to the vicinity of AT888703, where they joined the Company B patrol.

A search of HOI VUC village and the surrounding area ensued. The search of the area, and interrogation by civil police was without significant results. Six rounds of sniper fire were reported received at 1023H from the vicinity of AT875706, and five men dressed in black were later seen running from this area. Investigation was without results.

At 1250H, two engineer mine sweeping teams were heli-lifted into the area (vicinity AT855714), and the seven civil policemen were returned to HIEU DUC District Headquarters.

The patrol continued on its mission of mine detection and clearance with negative results.

At 1630H, Company B (-) was relieved by an element of the Reconnaissance Battalion and subsequently heli-lifted back to its company defensive area.

The 2d Platoon of Company C, reinforced with a heavy section of tanks, departed on operations at 1100H, in accordance with Reg Order 27 to Operation Order 328-65.

Patrolling was without incident and, at 2005H, a patrol base was established in the vicinity of AT898660. There was no enemy activity reported by the patrol the remainder of this date.

Repairs were not completed on the helicopter in Landing Zone WHIP-POOR-WILL.

15 Aug 65

After spending an uneventful night at the patrol base, the 2d Platoon of Company C proceeded to the vicinity of AT909672 where a landing zone was secured.

At 0830H, the 2d Platoon was relieved in place by the 3d Platoon of Company C. The heli-relief was reported complete at 0905H.

The 3d Platoon proceeded over the prescribed route without incident until 1305H. At this time the patrol reported they had received light sniper fire in the vicinity of AT878695 while they were stopped for the

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1 Sep 65

noon meal. There were no casualties sustained as a result of this incident. A search of the general area from which the shots came was conducted with negative results.

Patrolling was resumed and continued until 1710H. At this time, the 3d Platoon occupied a patrol base in the vicinity of AT897700.

The Marine Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported receiving small arms fire upon landing at 1825H. There were no casualties and no damage to the helicopter.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

Company D reported repairs were completed on the helicopter that had been in its landing zone for three days, and that the helicopter had returned to the airstrip at 1925H.

16 Aug 65

At 0645H, the 3d Platoon of Company C departed the patrol base, embarked on the tanks, and proceeded to the battalion's defensive area. After travelling about 200 yards, the patrol received two rounds of sniper fire, without injury or damage.

The patrol returned to the company area at 0902H without further incident.

The Marine Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported apprehending a member of Company D in the village at AT944698. The Marine Private was subsequently picked up at District Headquarters by members of Company D.

At 2010H, a vehicle returning to the battalion CP reported receiving one round of sniper fire in the vicinity of AT959717. No injury or damage was caused by the round.

17 Aug 65

The Marine Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported hearing drum signals and sporadic shots throughout the night originating from a point north of the headquarters.

The ground surveillance radar (AN/TPS21) reported activity in grid squares AT9267, AT9367, and AT9368, which increased in tempo between 2400H and 0330H. Artillery fires were delivered on targets at AT924679, AT931679, and AT933681.

At 0530H, the Chief of District Headquarters dispatched a forty man ARVN patrol to investigate the area of last night's targets. The patrol reported no trace of VC in the area.

III-9

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5750.1  
1 Sep 65

Squad and Platoon sized ambushes were manned throughout the battalion's area in accordance with Frag Order 29 to Operation Order 328-65. All ambush sites were occupied under cover of darkness.

The battalion was relieved of standby duties as of 2400H this date, in accordance with provisions of Division Operation Plan 326-65 (Top Secret).

18 Aug 65

No significant operations were conducted within the battalion's TAOR this date. However, ambush sites were manned throughout the TAOR as specified by Frag Order 29 to Operation Order 328-65.

The Regimental Commander visited the Battalion Command Post and viewed front line defensive positions.

A member of Company A was wounded in the leg by an accidental discharge at 1730H. The victim was evacuated for treatment.

No significant enemy activity was reported within the battalion's TAOR this date.

19 Aug 65

No significant operations were conducted within the battalion's TAOR this date.

Ambushes, in accordance with Frag Order 29 to Operation Order 328-65, were manned throughout the TAOR.

No enemy activity was reported within the battalion's TAOR this date.

Construction and improvement of defensive positions continued.

20 Aug 65

No significant operations were conducted within the battalion's TAOR.

Ambush sites continued to be manned in accordance with Frag Order 29 to Operation Order 328-65.

Companies continued construction and improvement of their defensive positions.

Harassing and Interdiction fires were delivered throughout the TAOR.

There was no significant enemy activity reported within the battalion's TAOR this date.

III-10

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5750.1  
1 Sep 65

NUGYEN VAN BE, a six year old Vietnamese boy, was escorted to the hospital at BIEN HOA, where an operation was to be performed for the correction of a cleft lip. The operation was to be conducted under the sponsorship and coordination of the Battalion Chaplain.

21 Aug 65

No significant operations were conducted within the battalion's TAOR this date.

At 0945H, Company B requested an emergency air evacuation of a Marine who had been shot in the back while on security duty at the front lines. The Marine died of his wounds subsequent to the evacuation. A search of the area for the sniper met with negative results.

Company A reported approximately 10 rounds of small arms fire were received within their position from the vicinity of AT916730 at 2115H. A patrol dispatched to investigate the area from which the fire came met with negative results.

There was no further enemy activity reported this date.

Artillery continued to saturate the battalion's TAOR with harrassing and interdiction fires throughout this date.

The Commanding General, FMF Pacific, visited Company D's area and spoke to the assembled troops.

Realignment of the battalion's TAOR and defensive positions was accomplished in accordance with Regimental Commander's message dated 201645Z.

22 Aug 65

It was reported at 0730H, that approximately fifteen VC attacked the village of PHUOC HUNG (vicinity of AT916727), killing two villagers and wounding four Popular Force soldiers. The VC subsequently withdrew with the Popular Force personnel in pursuit. There was no Marine involvement in this incident.

No significant operations were conducted within the battalion's TAOR this date.

Company D reported approximately five rounds of fire was delivered at an unidentified figure moving across the front. The figure disappeared into the dark.

There was no further enemy activity reported this date.

Artillery continued to deliver harrassing and interdiction fires throughout the TAOR this date.

III-11

ENCLOSURE (1)  
UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5730.1  
1 Sep 65

The Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, visited the battalion area and conferred with the Battalion Commander.

23 Aug 65

The Marine Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported grenade type booby traps had been discovered, at 932708, by Regional forces operating in that area.

At 1607H, Company A (-) heli-lifted from the company area to a landing zone in the vicinity of Hill 419 (AT867626). (The Battalion Commander accompanied Company A (-) the duration of the operation). The heli-lift was reported complete at 1628H.

Company A departed the landing zone on operations in accordance with Frag Order 30 to Operation Order 328-65.

At 1700H, a VC was discovered hiding in the rocks near the landing zone and was captured. This VC was utilized as a guide by the patrol the remainder of this date.

At 1824H, approximately 20 VC were observed in the vicinity of AT853662 moving northwest. The VC were engaged by fire and two were seen falling. A search was conducted of the area where several blood trails were found, one carbine (U. S. manufacture) recovered, and many items of intelligence value collected (see Intelligence Report (Frag Order 30) to Operation Order 328-65).

As darkness ensued, Company A (-) returned to the area of the landing zone (AT867626) and established a perimeter defense for the night.

The patrol reported no enemy activity the remainder of this date.

24 Aug 65

At 0710H, Company A (-) departed its patrol base and continued on its mission. Movement was extremely slow and fatiguing due to the dense vegetation, lack of trails, and the necessity to break trails through the growth.

At 0800H, the 2d Platoon of Company A was heli-lifted from the company area to a landing zone in the vicinity of 850691. The 2d Platoon departed the landing zone and proceeded over the proscribed route toward Hill 502 (vicinity AT832658). Several attempts were made to find a trail to the summit of Hill 502, but most trails dissipated after 150-200 meters. At 2000H, the 2d platoon reported its inability to surmount the obstacles of vegetation, heat, mountainous terrain, and lack of water. The platoon returned to the vicinity of AT849678 and established a patrol base for the night.

III-12

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

750.1

1 Sep 65

UNCLASSIFIED

The Company A (-) patrol found the terrain in their area extremely discouraging and was also unable to reach the rendezvous point on Hill 502. A patrol base was occupied in the vicinity of AT872626.

Company B reported at 0030H, that a VC had thrown two hand grenades at a position located in the vicinity of AT951688. One Marine was wounded as a result of this incident, but was not evacuated.

25 Aug 65

Company A (-) dispatched the 1st Platoon to the vicinity of AT865629 and the 3d platoon to the vicinity of AT879625 in an attempt to locate a trail leading toward Hill 502. Simultaneously, the 2d Platoon departed its patrol base and attempted to locate a trail to Hill 502. Both Company A (-) and the 2d Platoon units found it impossible to reach their rendezvous point. However, Company A (-) discovered several spider traps, sleeping mats, articles of discarded clothing and other signs the area was being used by the VC as a way station. The Company was heli-lifted back to the company defensive area at 1630H, without incident.

Company B reported that two VC had fired several rounds of small arms fire at their position at approximately 0300H, in the vicinity of AT953687. The fire was returned, resulting in one confirmed VC wounded.

There was no further enemy activity reported this date.

26 Aug 65

No significant operations were conducted within the battalion's TAOR this date.

Ambushes, local security patrols, and listening posts were manned forward of the front lines.

Harrassing and Interdiction fires were delivered by artillery throughout the TAOR.

The Marine Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported a Regional Force patrol engaged in an exchange of fire at 1700H in the vicinity of AT933686. The VC withdrew under fire from the patrol.

There was no further enemy activity reported this date.

III-13

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

5750.1  
1 Sep 6527 Aug 65

There were no significant activities conducted this date.

The Regimental Commander visited the Command Post and conferred with the Battalion Commander.

The Marine Liaison Officer at HIEU DUC District Headquarters reported possible VC mining activity on the road in the vicinity of AT943687. A subsequent check of the area met with negative results.

No further enemy activity was reported this date.

Harrassing and interdiction fires were delivered throughout the battalion's TAOR this date.

28 Aug 65

No significant operations were conducted this date.

At 0421H, Company B reported an unknown number of VC were engaged with ARVN forces at the west end of HOA CAM Range, near the vicinity of AT961719. Rounds from ARVN Troops were reported impacting in the B Company Area. At 0800H, it was revealed through investigation that the reported ARVN and VC engagement was without foundation. It was assumed the shooting was initiated when an ARVN soldier accidentally detonated a hand grenade.

At 1115H, the 3d Platoon of Company D was placed on an alert status for helicopter movement to the village of CAO SUNG (1) (vicinity AT880696), where several VC had been observed by a reconnaissance patrol. At 1325H, the 3d Platoon of Company D was released from standby status by Regimental S-3.

Artillery harrassing and interdiction fires continued to saturate the battalion's TAOR throughout this date.

The forward party of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and its Commanding Officer arrived this date. Briefings and familiarization tours were conducted by the Executive Staff and the Company Commanders.

III-14

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED  
Aug 655750.1  
1 Sep 65

No significant operations were held within the battalion's TAOR this date.

Elements of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines commenced arriving at this battalion's positions.

Company B of the 3d Marines reported all of Company B of the 1st Marines had arrived at 1450H.

Company C of the 3d Marines reported all of Company C of the 1st Marines, less the ship's platoon, had arrived at 1530H.

Company D of the 3d Marines reported all of Company D of the 1st Marines had arrived at 1605H.

Company A of the 3d Marines reported all of Company A of the 1st Marines, less an eight man working party, had arrived at 1650H.

As of 1900H, 75% of H&S Company, 1st Marines arrived at the command post, with the remaining elements expected tomorrow.

This battalion commenced staging vehicles and equipment at Monument Beach, and continued preparations for loading ship.

Intelligence reported a suspected VC battalion had been observed in the vicinity of AT885717, at 1505H. Artillery saturated this area with H&I fires which continued throughout the night.

No further enemy activity was reported within the battalion's TAOR this date.

30 Aug 65

Continued to stage vehicles and equipment at Museum Beach (vicinity BT033767) in preparation for loading aboard the USS BAYFIELD (APA 33).

It was reported at 1020H, that approximately twenty VC had fired at a helicopter in the vicinity of AT888708. A request for aerial observation of this area for the adjustment of artillery fire was subsequently denied by Regimental Headquarters.

The Company Commander of Company B, while on a helicopter

III-15

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

5750.1  
1 Sep 65

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

reconnaissance reported observing approximately twenty persons moving north from AT916659. All persons were observed carrying gear, however the nature of this equipment could not be determined. This sighting occurred at 1020H.

Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines departed on a familiarization patrol with members of Company D, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines at 1100H. The patrol was conducted with negative enemy contact and returned to the company area at 1730H.

At 1145H, the 1st Platoon of Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines departed on a familiarization patrol of the area forward of its lines. Members of Company B, 3d Marines accompanied the patrol in an advisory role. There were no enemy contacted during the conduct of this patrol. The patrol returned to its company area at 1625H.

The Battalion Commander of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and the Battalion Commander of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines visited the village in the vicinity of AT947701 at 1630H, in connection with the "People to People" program. While touring the village, three wounded women were discovered and evacuated to the Aid Station of Company B. The interpreter, accompanying the party, stated the women claimed to have been wounded by an armed Army helicopter.

At 1820H, Company A of the 1st Marines, accompanied by personnel of Company A of the 3rd Marines, departed on a familiarization patrol. Squad sized ambushes were established along the patrol route in the vicinity of AT898738, AT900732, AT903725, AT915736, AT915730, AT914723, AT923738, and AT928734. The last ambush site was reported established at 2155H.

Company B reported they had shot and wounded a VC suspect at 1826H, in the vicinity of AT948684. The VC was shot by personnel of the 2nd Platoon, Company B, 1st Marines. The VC was subsequently evacuated by helicopter.

There was no further enemy activity reported this date.

31 Aug 65

The Command Post of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines was closed at 0800H, this date. The command shifted to USS BAYFIELD for departure from the Republic of Vietnam.

III-16

ENCLOSURE (1)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES, COMMAND DIARYPART IVSUPPORTING DOCUMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS

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- 23. Intelligence Report (Frag Order 27) to Operation Order 328-65
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ENCLOSURE (1)

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1st Bn, 3d Mar  
3d Mar Div (Rein), FMP  
DA NANG, RVN  
312300 Jul 1965

Operation Order 330-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS 1701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV  
(b) Annex C to Operation Order 321-65

Time Zone: H

# 1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current ISOM's.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) 3d Mar continues defense Daung area and aggressive combat patrolling within TAOR.
- (2) I Co, 3d Bn, 4th Mar, relieves Co C, 1st Bn, 3d Mar responsibility defense Hill 327, 268, NAI LA Pass with two platoons and Co B, 1st Bn, 3d Mar with one platoon for period of operation.
- (3) Co (-), 2d Bn, 3d Mar relieves Co A, 1st Bn, 3d Mar of defensive position for period of operation.
- (4) 3d Recon Bn, conducts screening operations in western sector of Regt area of responsibility and search and destroy operations in trace of Co B and A along both banks SONG YUN. See Annex B (Sketch of River Sweep).
- (5) 3d Bn, 4th Regt ARVN conducts search and destroy operation in eastern sector of Regimental area of responsibility. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).
- (6) 1st MAW (-) provides helicopter support and CAS.
- (7) 1st Bn, 12th Mar provides fire support.

c. Attachments and detachments.

- (1) A Co (-) (Rein), 3d Tk Bn.
- (2) A Co (-), 3d Engr Bn.
- (3) Plat ARVN.
- (4) Three Scout Dog TMs.

2. MISSION. Conduct search and destroy operations within the battalions assigned area of responsibility; kill or capture all VC encountered, apprehend all males of military age, destroy all enemy fortification and capture all materials.

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a. Concept of operations. Land three reinforced companies and Bn Cdn Bty in one LZ; conduct search and destroy operations for a period of 48-hours in vicinity NOI DAT SON and both banks of SONG YEN. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

b. Co A (Main).

Attached: PO TM Arty  
1 Sec 60mm Mortars  
Scout TM H&S Co  
Interpreter  
Det ARVN Platoon  
2 Sqd Engs  
Scout Dog TM

- (1) Occupy Co assembly area via LZ 0008H by 020700L.
- (2) Land in LZ YELLOW at L + 1 hour, D-day.
- (3) Conduct search and destroy operations within area of responsibility.
- (4) On order occupy defensive position vicinity 937620.
- (5) On order on D + 1 day, conduct search and destroy of Bn Objective 1.
- (6) Continue attack on order to search and destroy Bn Objectives 3, 5, and 7.
- (7) Be prepared to cross SONG YEN utilizing HTAs, rubber boats and native boats.

c. Co B (Rein).

Attached: PO TM Arty  
TACP (5 men)  
1 Sec 60mm Mortars  
Scout TM H&S Co  
Interpreter  
Det ARVN Platoon  
2 Sqd Engs  
Scout Dog TM

- (1) Occupy Co assembly area vicinity 963710 by 020630L.
- (2) Land in LZ YELLOW at L + 30min, D-day.
- (3) Conduct search and destroy operations within area of responsibility.
- (4) On order occupy defensive position vicinity 935640.
- (5) Land in LZ vicinity 9363 at 0600H on D + 1 Day.
- (6) Assume McCoy Tank Co (-) (Rein) upon landing LZ 9363.
- (7) On order conduct search and destroy Bn Objective 8.

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- (8) Continue attack on order to search and destroy Bn Objective 9.
- (9) On order secure river crossing site vicinity 959658; cover crossing Companies A and C west side SONG YEN.

d. Co C (Rein).

Attached: FO TM Arty  
 TACP (5 men)  
 1 Sec 60mm Mortars  
 Scout TM H&S Co  
 Interpreter  
 Det ARVN Plnt  
 2 Sqd Engr  
 Scout Dog TM

- (1) Occupy Co assembly area vicinity 965710 by 020630H.
- (2) Land and secure LZ YELLOW at L-hour on D-day; provide 1 platoon security for LZ.
- (3) Conduct search and destroy operations within area of responsibility with 2 platoons.
- (4) Provide security Bn Cmd Grp and Reg Cmd Grp via 963612.
- (5) On order occupy defensive position vicinity 970620.
- (6) On order on D + 1 day, conduct search and destroy of Bn Objective 2.
- (7) Continue attack on order to search and destroy Bn Objectives 4 and 6.
- (8) Be prepared to cross SONG YEN utilizing LVT's, rubber boats and native boats.

e. Co D (Rein). Assume responsibility CP security by 011800H.

f. Flame Section.

- (1) Provide security Tank Co (-) (Rein) for movement to Objective area on D-day.
- (2) Be prepared employ Flame throwers against enemy fortifications.
- (3) Provide security Tank Co (-) (Rein) return to CP on D + 1 day.

g. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) L-hour, 0700H.
- (2) D-day, 2 Aug 65.

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- (3) Attachments effective 011800H.
- (4) 8 men bell-team.
- (5) Caution all troops to be alert for duds, mines and booby traps.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No changes.5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

- a. (1) Call signs and frequencies will be in accordance with reference (b).
- (2) Units in paragraph 3. will enter Bn Tac Net at 1-2 hours.
- b. Command posts.
  - (1) 1st Bn, 3d Mar Rear....950721
  - (2) 1st Bn, 3d Mar (Cmd Grp) D-day....961611. D + 1 day with Co A.
- c. (1) Pyrotechnic and Brevity Code will be in accordance with current Bn Brevity Code.
- (2) In the event of loss of communications on Company Tac, or Bn Tac Nets, artillery, air, mortars, or attached unit radio nets will be utilized.
- (3) Authentication will be drawn and used by all units.
- (4) All units will draw a 2 day supply of batteries.
- d. (1) Attached Task platoon will guard Bn Tac Net.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL LANAGAN

ROBERT J. LYONS

Major, U. S. Marine Corps

Executive Officer

ANNEXES:

- A - Operation Overlay
- B - Sketch of River Sweep NIF

OFFICIAL:

G. F. SQUINACE

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-3

4

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1st Bn, 3d Mar  
 3d MarDiv (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, RVN  
 072000 Aug 1965

Operational Summary to Operation Order 330-65 (2-3 Aug 1965)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets  
 6659 III and 6658 IV  
 (b) Operation Order 328-65  
 (c) Intelligence Report dtd 101200H Aug 65

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay to Operation Order 330-65

Time Zone: H

1. PLANNING. On 29 July the Regimental S-3 issued a warning order for an initial plan which conceived a search and destroy operation in the area of NUI DAT SON utilizing two companies from the Battalion with one reconnaissance company attached. Based on this plan missions were assigned to Companies A and C and the Reconnaissance Company for 2 August, with a maximum availability of helicopters. Extensive helicopter reconnaissance was conducted for tentative LZ's by the Battalion Commander, S-3 and S-2.

On 30 July the concept of operations was altered to include a joint U.S. - ARVN search and destroy mission along the SONG YEN River and the immediate outlying villages as depicted on the overlay to reference (b). Friendly forces included the 3d Battalion, 4th Regiment, 2d Division from the ARVN, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion (-), and an additional company from the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Company B was added).

The ARVN forces were assigned the eastern sector as their area of responsibility, east of the SONG BAU XAU River. The 3d Reconnaissance Battalion was assigned a western sector of responsibility, west of the SONG YEN River.

The plan then called for the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines to conduct search and destroy operations in its assigned area of responsibility for a 48-hour period, with the mission of killing or capturing all VC encountered, apprehending all males of military age, destroying all enemy fortifications, and capturing all materials.

Helicopter reconnaissance for LZ's and constant study of map aerial photos then ensued. The concept required the landing of 3 reinforced companies and a Battalion Command Group in an LZ. designated LZ YELLOW in the 66 9561.

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From the aerial photos, the villages in the Battalion's area of responsibility were divided into a series of 9 objectives. These cordoned objectives were split up and assigned to each of the 3 rifle companies in their respective zones of action along their direction of advance to the north.

Prior to the operations, a briefing and ground reconnaissance was conducted for a representative from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines who provided one (1) rifle company to man the FEBR during the operation.

With the planning completed, and missions assigned, L-hour was set for 0700H, and Day, 2 August 1965.

2. EXECUTION.

- a. Landing and Southwest Sweep: D-day. At H-hour 0630H, Reconnaissance Battalion (1) landed in 2 LZ's west of the SONG YEN River. At L-hour Company C was heli-lifted into LZ YELLOW. One platoon secured the LZ for Companies B & A and the Battalion and Regimental Command Groups which followed.

Upon landing, Company C dispatched 2 platoons to Hill 55 to survey the ARVN landing at L + 2. Meanwhile, at L-hour, the Tank/LVT column with the Flame Section from H&S Company as security, proceeded to a rendezvous point at Hill 41.

After completing the landing, Company C swept southwest on the west side of the SONG BAU XAU River abreast of the ARVN forces on the eastern side, to Hill 47, vicinity DUC KY (2). Upon completion of the sweep Company C returned to Hill 55 to establish defensive positions. They then conducted a sweep in the vicinity of THAI CAM (3). One platoon conducted the sweep and received heavy sniper fire. Fire was returned and UH-1E's called in to suppress the VC fire.

Companies A and B abreast also swept to the southwest to the SONG AI NGHIA River, Company B sweeping CHAU SON (3), Hill 42, and Company A sweeping CHAU SON (1).

The search and clear operations to the southwest were completed at 021800H whereupon the companies established defensive perimeters, occupying the actual positions under cover of darkness. Company A was located at 960620, with the Battalion Command Group, Company B at 964640, and Company C on Hill 55.

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- b. Search and Destroy: D + 1. With 3 companies abreast, final preparations were made for the search and destroy operations to the north. Company A was assigned objectives 1, 3, 5, and 7 along the eastern bank of the SONG YEN River; Company D was assigned objective 2, 4, and 6, and Company B, objectives 8 and 9 on the river's western bank. See Enclosure (1).

In that Company B's objectives were on the opposite side of the river it was necessary to plan for a rapid heli-lift to that side. Prior to lifting B, Company A secured objective 1, then moved to a link-up point at 950620 to juncture with Company B. The heli-lift of Company B to the opposite side of the river was completed at 030645H.

Company B then linked up with tanks and was given the additional mission of searching DONG PHU (3). Meanwhile, Company A supported Company C's seizure of objective 2 (XUAN DIEM (1)) from its positions at 950630.

The success of the search and destroy operations was dependent upon the deliberate cordoning of each individual village and a continuous alignment of companies in order to allow no exposed flanks.

Accordingly, Company A secured objective 3 at LE SON (5) and Company B secured the southern portion of objective 8 (PHU SON (4)), staying abreast of Company A on the opposite bank of the river.

Company C then proceeded to secure objective 4, LE SON (3), at which time Company A secured objective 5 and Company B completed objective 8 and a portion of objective 9 at PHU SON (2).

After Company C secured objective 6 all 3 companies were still on line along GI 65 from west to east, with Companies B and C on the left and right flanks respectively, and Company A in the middle.

Following A and B up the SONG YEN River was Company D, 3d ~~Reconnaissance Battalion in rubber boats searching for underground caves along~~ the river's banks. Four (4) VC were killed in the river and approximately 3-4 large caves destroyed in the water.

- c. Lift-Out: D + 1. In order to adhere to a 1700H heli-lift out of 2 companies, Company C was assigned the mission of locating and securing an LZ in the vicinity of objective 6 which they did by 031600H at 966650.

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Company A remained in the vicinity of objective 7 (AM TRACH (3)) 800 meters south of the dam (limit of advance) at 959658, while Company B proceeded west to Hill 41. Company B then returned parallel to the main north-south road back to its CP. The tanks returned along its predesignated route.

Company A then proceeded to the LZ secured by Company C. The helicopters arrived earlier than scheduled and necessitated lifting Company C out first in that Company A had not yet arrived at the LZ. During the lift sniper fire was being received from about 100 yards west of the LZ. To avoid fire, the helicopters were advised to break off to the east on subsequent waves (See paragraph 4.) Company A picked up the LZ security and was then lifted along with the Battalion Command Group. As the last elements of the Battalion Command Group were being lifted out a VCC was apprehended by Company A near the LZ. Company C sustained 1 WIA during its lift.

3. RESULTS OF OPERATION.

- a. Company A. Company A was heli-lifted into LZ YELLOW without incident. Resistance was light during the Company's initial sweep to the southwest on D-day, consisting of light sniper fire from an archway vicinity 947607. Company B was moving abreast of Company A's left flank, and because A's extreme left flank platoon commander had not ascertained B's exact location, did not return fire. Company B was also receiving fire at the time as A was moving to effect the liaison with B.

Numerous holes, trenches and family bunkers were located in the villages at 945614, 942610, and 938607. All were searched and many destroyed. See reference (c).

One (1) seriously wounded VC (apparently as a result of artillery) was found by the 1st platoon at 946615 and believed dying. The 3d platoon captured a VCC at 938607, who had been flushed from the thick brush and was suffering from a slight wound.

An extremely sophisticated network of trenches consisting of a main trenchline with a number of tributaries running off the main trench was discovered by Company A. See reference (c). One squad was employed to screen the entire trench line running along the trail for approximately 600 meters terminating at 943606.

The objective at 943607 was a relatively small hamlet containing extremely well constructed bunkers approximately 15 meters from the huts. Three bunkers were destroyed by the Engineers. One VCS was apprehended at 940606.

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There was no further contact the evening of D-day as Company A occupied its defensive positions at 960620, providing security for the Battalion and Regimental Command Groups.

On D+1 Company A moved north to secure Battalion objective's 1, 3, 5, and 7. Numerous holes were blown in and around the villages at 960625, 957630, and 956639. Elaborate tunnels were discovered in the last village and partially destroyed with C-4, WP grenades, and frag grenades (most tunnels were so well constructed that at least a 5-lb charge of C-4 was necessary to effect any appreciable damage). Holes and tunnels were also destroyed in and around the villages at 955644, 957648, and 959654. Anti-helicopter stakes, 20-30 feet high with charges on their tops, were discovered at 959651. One VCC was captured southeast of 968650. Grenades were discovered in the holes dotting the village at this point and were destroyed with WP grenades.

Two sniper rounds were received from the village at 955636. Small arms, M-79 and WP 3.5 were directed on the hut from which the fire ~~emanated~~. No snipers were sighted. Directly behind this hut was a trenchline running parallel to Company A's advance along the east bank of the river, a likely route of escape/withdrawal.

- b. Company B. Company B landed in LZ YELLOW at 020730H and commenced its southwestern sweep of the villages while abreast of Company A. Approximately 40-50 rounds of fire were received from an estimated 6-8 snipers while approaching the village at 953608. Light resistance was encountered in the village after the initial enemy fire was silenced with a heavy volume of return fire. One (1) VC KIA and 1 WIA were garnered during the village sweep. A frag grenade ignited one hut and small arms ~~ammunition~~ resulted in secondary explosions.

There was no further contact until 021730H in the vicinity of 945595 when one squad of Company B noticed 4 men dressed in tan clothing running out of a ditch; 3 were armed with rifles and one with 2 grenades. One man was hit. The ensuing sweep south met with small arms fire. Fire was returned and contact lost whereupon the company moved to Hill 42.

On D+1 Company B was heli-lifted from LZ YELLOW to the west side of the SONG YEN River, where it linked up with the tanks and proceeded southeast to the river. Tanks were used primarily to crush bunkers along B's axis of advance. In PHU SC (3) (objective 8), houses were found with small arms ammunition.

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Numerous trails and trenches were discovered along B's axis of advance. Two (2) VC were killed at 946650 when smoke was used on a hole through which a VC was discovered entering. In their attempt to escape they throw grenades before being killed with small arms fire. Noise could still be heard from the holes. C-4 was used killing 1 VC. C-4 was used again deeper in the tunnel. Two (2) more VC with 3 weapons were recovered as a result.

- c. Company C. On D-day at L-hour, Company C landed first in LZ YELLOW securing same with one (1) platoon. Two platoons were deployed to Hill 55 awaiting the arrival of the ARVN forces. After the ARVN landing Company C continued to sweep the hill mass in a easterly direction finding it completely void of any emplacements or other signs of VC occupation.

One platoon then continued the sweep along the SONG BAU XAU to the vicinity of DUC KY (2). Numerous trenchlines (some covered) were discovered along the river. A total of 33 bunkers and covered trenches were destroyed by Company C on D-day with 7 VCS apprehended during the first day's sweep.

Company C established its defensive perimeter the first night on Hill 55 and received occasional sniper fire throughout the night.

Objectives 2, 4, and 6 were searched and cleared by Company C who encountered only very light and sporadic sniper fire during the entire operation. Extensive trenchlines, bunkers, fighting holes, caves, and tunnels were evident along Company C's northern axis of advance.

4. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. The success of a sweeping operation of a Battalion size involving the search of villages, with reconnaissance units, ARVN, tanks and LVT's attached and/or operating in adjacent areas, is dependent upon a thorough working knowledge of the area and its numerous villages.

Aerial reconnaissance for tentative LZ's, objectives, and exact location of villages, and a continual map photo study are the prerequisites for an efficient operation. Through this type of pre-planning it was discovered that the location of the separate villages landed themselves to a logical series of individual objectives. They were cordoned off accordingly. The organization of villages into separate objectives enabled the sweeping units to gauge the speed of their movement to coincide with that of adjacent units without exposing respective flanks.

The concept also called for the three rifle companies to execute a deliberate objective to objective mission while remaining aligned with adjacent units, and also enable each to provide mutually supporting fires if necessary.

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The execution of the operations required very little flexibility. On the contrary, the time schedule was seldom off as the actual sweep met negligible resistance. Positive control of all units was accomplished through the proper location of the Battalion Command Group who possessed a commanding view of the activity throughout the entire operation.

The most significant difficulty encountered involved the helicopters and indicated the necessity for further study into a solution to insure an efficient tactical landing. The helicopters failed to land in the proper LZ's (LZ's that were supposedly approved prior to the operation, after a thorough map and photo study and aerial reconnaissance). One landing occurred in flooded rice paddies, and a second missed the LZ by 1000 meters.

The timing of heli-lifts is a tactical requirement and any variance therefrom disrupts a ground unit's scheme of operations, a scheme which evolved around a certain pre-established pick-up time in a certain LZ, in the first place. It is incumbent upon the helicopters to consult with the ground units on any change of time in that the infantry is gearing its operations around the time that was originally set. By the helicopters arriving too early when heli-lifting out Companies A and C at the conclusion of the operation, it was necessary to change the plans and lift Company C out first. In that Company C was to secure the LZ for Company A to be lifted out first, at a certain time, Company A gauged their movement to the LZ accordingly. Consequently, Company A had not yet arrived in the LZ when the helicopters landed, necessitating the change in plans to lift Company C out first and then Company A. The LZ had to be secured a second time.

Other problems were encountered which will require a common understanding between the air and ground in the future. Pre-operation requests for helicopters are often "approved" for the infantry's planning before the squadron itself receives the request. Communications between the ground and incoming aircraft must be improved to allow both to react to the situation in the LZ and to facilitate the control of the aircraft in its landing. Helicopters must remain cognizant of the tactical situation in and around the LZ as per instructions from the ground units. At the conclusion of the operation such instructions were relayed to the aircraft requesting they break to the east due to the sniper fire emanating from the west. These instructions were relayed to the first two aircraft, but apparently not to the remainder who continued to break off to the west. One (1) KIA resulted from one round of sniper fire; at the time the casualty (from Company C) was airborne in the aircraft.

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The tanks proved to be unsuitable for the flooded rice paddies and broken terrain characteristic of the area in which this operation was conducted. Their speed was reduced and many times slowed up the progress of the infantry. Flame tanks could therefore not be used effectively because the infantry had already destroyed all possible targets. The tanks complete unfamiliarity with terrain and routes also proved to be a serious handicap.

Most of the VC bunkers were extremely sophisticated structures, the parapets integrated in some cases with the roots of trees. Bangalore torpedoes could conceivably do a more thorough job in destroying bunkers where 25-lb charges were otherwise required on this operation.

During the physical search of the villages and the river banks it became apparent that the individual Marine is reluctant to enter caves, holes, tunnels, and other possible hiding places and escape routes used by the VC, without direct supervision by his superiors. It is a characteristic of most Marines which is attributed in part to their ignorance of the proper methods of searching, including where to look, what to look for, and how to look for it. In this, and any operation requiring the search of villages, the interrogation and investigative methods utilized by a force of ARVN police, as opposed to ARVN soldiers, proved to be the most effective and positive means of uncovering the unknown in a village, with the Marines providing the fire support.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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G. F. SQUILLACE

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

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1st Bn, 3d Mar  
3d MarDiv (Rein), FMF  
DA NANG, RVN  
101800 Aug 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 23-65 to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV  
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

# 1. OPERATION IN GENERAL

- a. Route - As planned in Fragmentary Order 23-65 to reference (b) and as noted in this report and the Intelligence Report dated 101800H Aug 1965.
- b. Period Covered - 032100H to 041800H.
- c. Company D, with 3 platoons reinforced, moved off its positions along the FEBA at 031900H and proceeded along its predesignated route across the SONG TUY LOAN River and then south to the village of KHUONG MY (2) to conduct search and clear operations for a period of about 48-hours.

The company occupied positions south of Hill 39 (GS 9070) by 040315H outside KHUONG MY (2), with 2 platoons to the north and 1 platoon on the western highground vicinity 905694.

In accordance with the concept of operations a composite ARVN force (approximately 30 personnel) was then heli-lifted into an LZ northwest of the village simultaneous with Company D's movement to form a cordon around the village within its bordering tree-lines.

KHUONG MY (2) was virtually surrounded when the security fire team from Company D, the Company CP group, and the ARVN investigation team entered the village to commence the house to house search.

Numerous tunnels, sophisticated caves, fighting holes, and elaborate family shelters were discovered throughout the village. Evidence of strong family ties and relationships with the VC soldiers were uncovered through thorough interrogation of local villagers, relatives, and other suspects, and a detailed search of the village itself.

One (1) VC WIA and 4 KIA's resulted from the operation. The Company returned to its area by 041800H.

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2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. Company D crossed the SONG TUY IOAN River at 034712. Movement was deliberately slow to avoid mines. Upon crossing the river, dogs barking disclosed the Company's movement momentarily, but subsided once the company continued south.

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At 040315H, the company occupied positions west and north of KHUONG MY (2) on the surrounding highground overlooking the village.

At 040715H, the composite ARVN force landed in an LZ at 907698 as the 3 platoons of Company D converged on the village to occupy positions to its west, north, and south-southeast within the tree lines and lowground ringing KHUONG MY (2).

The search of the village commenced at 040745H, with one (1) fire team as security, the Command Group, and the ARVN investigation teams.

Intelligence items (subsequently turned in to the 3d Marines) were uncovered in holes near a couple of huts. One VC was fired at and wounded during an attempt to escape through a drainage tunnel in the 3d platoon's positions east of the village. He was later captured at 041000H in the tree line and determined to be a courier and VC squad leader residing in the village.

Additional searching and probing ascertained the possible presence of VC in a hole who was being harbored by a family in the village. An arms cache was discovered in a large hole, containing a wooden insert which fit snugly in the hole itself and had a removable camouflaged lid. (See Intelligence Report).

At 041400H, the 1st platoon, north of the village, received carbine and automatic weapons fire. The ARVN yelled a warning to the Marines that "3 VC" were in the area.

In the vicinity of 913603, 2 additional rounds were received and the VC observed running into a hole at the base of a tree. The covering of the hole was intermingled in the roots of the tree with small firing ports in the hole itself. After an initial warning by the ARVN, 2 grenades were thrown into the spiral-shaped cave killing 3 VC.

Two (2) VC were purported to be in another family underground shelter. After uncovering the large hole, an additional, but smaller hole was discovered leading down to what was apparently an escape alcove. (See Intelligence Report). One grenade was tossed into the deeper hole and a secondary explosion occurred, believed to be the result of one of the VC's futile attempts to toss a grenade out of the hole at the same time. One VC squad leader (ascertained by sight, personal papers, and ID) was recovered along with 3 rifles. It is believed the secondary explosion buried the second VC.

The detailed search of the villages continued with the ARVN investigation teams interrogating all males. A majority of the homes included family shelters with caches of timber, apparently for shoring tunnels.

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COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. The concept of cordoning a village is an effective means of insuring positive results when conducting a search, in that the possibility of escape by any VC in the village is negated by the tight perimeter surrounding it. Additionally, the investigation and interrogation of the inhabitants and their homes is more professionally executed by a force of ARVN police, such a task being unfamiliar to the individual Marine.

KHUONG MY (2) was ideally situated for just such a cordon. The surrounding highground and shrubbery was just far enough from the village to conceal the company once it occupied these positions at night, and close enough to allow the cordoning force to rapidly converge on and surround the village without loss of surprise at daybreak.

On this operation, as on any cordoning operation, it was necessary to approach the village from as many directions as possible, keeping the converging units out of the village until daybreak. The only exit from KHUONG MY (2) was to the west, which was effectively blocked by one platoon. The village itself was split by prominent rice paddies and was surrounded on its other sides by open fields.

As the ARVN began landing by helicopter, and the Marine units began surrounding the village and tightening the perimeter, the inhabitants on its outer edge became insighted, and it was obvious were trying to relay the warning to the rest of the village. By then it was too late and the clamp was firm.

It is believed that the initial stir caused the VC in the village to run for fighting holes around the village's perimeter. Their effectiveness was subsequently negated when the Marines took up positions over and around the same holes. Caught by surprise, the VC's only alternatives were to remain in the holes, or attempt an escape to another hole or shelter within the village itself. Either alternative could only result in their capture.

It is worthy to note that the family shelters were never actually utilized by the families themselves, even during the fire fighting. Two reasons for this are possible: (1) Because this village was not prepped by artillery prior to the search, but instead was occupied through surprise, the families had no need to use the shelter; or (2) with or without artillery prep fires, families refused to go into the holes, by now already occupied by the VC. The second reason possibly substantiated the close family ties and obligation to protect the VC, who were in fact, relatives as well.

The success of such an operation depends upon the element of surprise and a thorough and professional search. Not all villages lend themselves to an effective cordon.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
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Captain, U. S. Marine Corps  
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1st Bn, 3d Mar  
 3d MarDiv (Rein), FMP  
 DA NANG, RVN  
 081630 Aug 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 24-65 to Operation Order  
 328-65 (1st Platoon, Company A)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and  
 6658 IV  
 (b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL

a. Route - As planned in Fragmentary Order 24-65 to reference  
 (b) and as noted in this report and the Intelligence Report  
 dated 081630H Aug 1965.

b. Period Covered - 061600H to 071800H.

c. The 1st Platoon, Company A conducted search and clear  
 operations in the village of TAN AN PHUONG, utilizing an  
 ARVN interrogation team during the search. The platoon  
 remained in a patrol base the first night (vicinity of  
 BINH THAI) and conducted the search the following day.  
 Extensive intelligence information was gathered, but there  
 was an obvious absence of VC activity. No enemy contact  
 was made during the 24-hour period.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. The 1st Platoon of Company A departed its  
 Company area, at 061700H, proceeding along its prescribed route  
 to the village of BINH THAI. The platoon's base camp was  
 established at BINH THAI with one squad-size ambush on the trail  
 at 880717. There was negative contact the first night.

At 070500H the platoon continued along its route north to TAN  
 AN PHUONG, arriving at 070630H without incident. One fire team  
 entered the village for a cursory reconnaissance, while the platoon's  
 blocking force moved into positions around the village.

The village itself was completely deserted of all males with  
 the exception of a few elderly men. A detailed search of the  
 village was conducted once the blocking force was in position.  
 Information could not be obtained from the villagers at this time.

At 070730H the ARVN interrogation team was heli-lifted in from  
 the HIEU DUC District Headquarters. Extensive interrogation of  
 the villagers ensued and important information regarding VC  
 movements and operations in and around TAN AN PHUONG was  
 gathered (See Intelligence Report).

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The patrol returned to the company area by 071800H without incident.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. The effectiveness of a professional interrogation team again proved to be a more efficient means of uncovering intelligence information in a village. The individual Marine's reluctance to investigate holes, caves, and tunnels, and their inability to communicate intelligibly with the local villagers, fails to obtain the same information.

In order to accomplish a detailed search of a village, constant supervision by unit leaders is necessary. In addition, the interrogation of the villagers is more effectively accomplished thorough the use of ARVN interrogation teams or police.

TAN AN PHUONG lends itself to an effective cordon if properly executed. The surrounding terrain overlooking the village provides the necessary concealment during night and allows the cordon to be established at daybreak without losing the element of surprise. The absence of VC activity on this operation, however, negated an effective appraisal of the effects such a cordon might have.

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1st Bn, 3d Mar  
3d MarDiv (Rein),  
DA NANG, RVN  
081000 Aug 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 25-65 to Operation Order 328-6,  
(1st Platoon, Company B)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS 1701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 I.

(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: HOTEL

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL.

- a. Route - As planned in Fragmentary Order 25-65 to reference (b) and as noted in this report and in Intelligence Report dated 081000H Aug 1965.
- b. Period Covered - 061000H to 071730H.
- c. The 1st Platoon, Company B with 3 tanks proceeded along its prescribed route south of the SONG TUY LOAN River to search out and destroy reported VC caves and tunnels in the vicinity of CAO SUNG (1), and to conduct other counter-guerrilla operations for a 19-hour period.

The objective was secured utilizing a coordinated tank-infantry attack on a converging axis. There was no enemy resistance. The ensuing search of the objective, likewise, failed to confirm the presence of the caves or tunnels.

The platoon with the tanks established a base camp and ambushes the first night in the vicinity south of Hill 112. There was no enemy contact.

The gun tanks directed fires on Hill 502 the following day. Artillery was also fired on approximately 20 VC sighted moving west on the trail south of Hill 92. A subsequent search of the impact area produced negative results with the exception of some small VC "hooches" which were then burned.

The patrol returned to the CP by 071730H with negative contact.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. The patrol departed its CP (965707) at 061015H embarked on 2 flame tanks and 1 gun tank, accomplishing the move to vicinity 906685 (DONG BICH (2)) in 55 minutes.

The mission called for searching and destroying reported caves and tunnels located in the vicinity of CAO SUNG (1) (876692) (See Intelligence Report). Two squads proceeded on foot west along the stream bed at 899682 at 061140H while one squad remained with the tanks at 906685. A reinforced fire team moved west along the crest of Hill 112.

At approximately 061250H the tanks with the 1 squad of infantry embarked, proceeded along a northern route for the objective area, traveling at speeds of 25 MPH. The infantry and tanks converged on the objective area simultaneously at 061255H. There was a noticeable absence of VC activity. A thorough search failed to disclose the caves or tunnels.

One squad searched the area from 879693 to 876689. A second squad searched the area from 884687 to 872689, with one squad remaining as security for the tanks immediately south of CAO SUNG (1). Scout swimmers also reconnoitered the rivers for underwater caves with negative results.

The platoon established its base camp that night southwest of Hill 112 with a squad-sized ambush at 882683. There was no contact throughout the night.

At 070800H, 2 squads (-) with one flame tank commenced a search of Hill 112. The flame tanks were employed along the Hill 112 ridgeline, directing fire at targets located in the Hill 112 vicinity.

One reinforced fire team with the gun tank took up firing positions at 873694 where the tank directed 25 rounds of HE and WP on Hill 502.

An OP at 884687 sighted approximately 20 VC (071010H) moving rapidly west along the trail at 880673. The VC were carrying rifles or "carrying sticks", the distance and momentary sighting precluding an accurate determination. Thirty (30) rounds of artillery were directed along the VC's suspected route of movement southwest of Hill 92. Artillery impacted at 877674, 872675, and 865675.

With two tanks and 2 infantry squads a search was conducted of the impact areas with negative results. Some simlance of a VC Base Camp was located at 875681. Two (2) small "hooches" were destroyed by burning.

A thorough search commenced in the vicinity of 880676 with negative results. The platoon returned without further incident at 071730H.



3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. The employment of the tanks during this operation was invaluable. Speed was the primary advantage as evidenced by the patrol's movement from its Company CP to the dismount point (a distance of approximately 7000 meters) in 55 minutes, and again on the return route (while breaking new trails) in one hour and 20 minutes.

Embarking the infantry aboard the tanks resulted in a fresh and well-rested unit at their destination. The efficiency of the infantry was thereby increased once it commenced the actual search and destroy operations.

Immediate fire power was also available to the infantry commander to counter any resistance of the enemy with a minimum loss of time.

The only difficulty encountered with the tanks occurred on two occasions when their treads were thrown and required time for repair. Security had to be provided for a damaged tank and in a fast-moving situation would have been a definite handicap.

Breaking new trails created minor difficulties. Ten (10) minutes of prior reconnaissance by the infantry over possible routes can eliminate a couple hours of difficulty that would otherwise be encountered with the tanks.

Rivers are the main obstacle for tanks when cutting new trails. Again, prior reconnaissance by the infantry for points of entry and exit on the river banks, or the use of a blade tank to level the banks would alleviate this problem.

The absence of VC activity during this operation, and the appearance of extensive overgrowth over heretofore well-used trails, is a positive indication that the H&I fires previously employed throughout this area has severely interdicted the VC's movement.

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Captain, U. S. Marine Corps  
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1st Bn, 3d Mar  
 3d MarDiv (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, RVN  
 132000 Aug 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 26-65 to Operation Order  
 328-65 (Company D (-))

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6658 IV and  
 6659 III  
 (b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL.

- a. Route - As planned in Fragmentary Order 26-65 to reference (b); and as noted in this report and the Intelligence Report dated 132030H Aug 1965.
- b. Period Covered - 111700H to 131500H.
- c. Company D (-), with 2 platoons reinforced, was heli-lifted to an LZ on the southern most highground of the Battalion's TAOR in the vicinity of Hill 419 the evening of 11 August.

Previous patrolling in this highground disclosed the presence of a VC Medium-Level Cadre Training Camp in the vicinity of 829632. Company D's mission was to search out and destroy the camp and return by helicopter.

The patrol encountered 3 VC while moving along the Hill 419 ridgeline, and killed 2 with small arms fire. A heli-evacuation of the VC KIA's was conducted later that evening.

The patrol continued along its prescribed route the following morning towards Hill 722. Various approaches to the suspected location of the VC Camp were taken without success. The patrol returned to its original base camp, encountering 2 VC along the way. Small arms fire ensued; 1 VC was knocked down, but both managed to escape.

Routes and trails were reconnoitered the following day with negative results. The patrol was heli-lifted back to its CP area at 131500H.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. At 111700H the 1st and 3d platoon of Company D were heli-lifted into an LZ located at 871626, immediately east of Hill 419. One squad with a section of 60mm mortars and a radio relay team was stationed on Hill 419 as the remainder of the Company (-) proceeded west along its designated route.

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A trail at 871628 was picked up and followed by the patrol along the ridgeline toward Hill 722. The 3d platoon led the column, followed by the CP group, and the 1st platoon.

At 861623, 3 VC were sighted (unarmed, with no equipment) moving west along the trail. The patrol's point whistled and the VC began running. Small arms fire killed one and wounded one (later died). The third VC escaped. A medical evacuation was completed at 111900H. Subsequent reports revealed the 2 VC KIA's to be recent recruits of the VC. (See Intelligence Report).

To avoid the consequences of possibly being observed during the aforementioned encounter, the Company (-) pulled back to 861623 for the night. There was no further enemy contact.

At 120530H the patrol continued along its route to 843616 (northeast of Hill 722). At that point the patrol proceeded west across the streambed, picked up a northwest trail across the creek to 839628. The trail forked in a southwesterly direction up the mountain. This trail was traversed for approximately 200 meters. Finding no accessible approaches to the VC Camp, the patrol returned to Hill 419.

Meanwhile, at 121500H, an OP with the radio relay team on Hill 419 sighted 2 VC at 869627 approximately 400 meters away, moving east. M-79 and small arms fire knocked both VC down. One recovered and continued to run, but returned long enough to retrieve the one still lying on the ground. Both escaped. A search of the area met with negative results.

The Company (-) established a defensive perimeter for the night of 12 August at 868626.

At 131100H a squad-size patrol conducted a search of the area for trails, routes, and any evidence of VC movement north and west of the patrol base, with negative results.

The Company (-) returned by helicopter at 131500H.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. Due to additional commitments and requirements placed upon the Battalion, this particular operation was delayed for a considerable period of time. The last delay was caused by the squadron's disapproval of the "approved" LZ and required more air reconnaissance for an alternate.

Consequently, the 2 platoons of Company D were heli-lifted into an LZ in the vicinity of Hill 419 approximately 3000 meters south of the originally planned location.

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
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The patrol then had to pursue an approach to the VC Base Camp from a southeastern direction, ascending along formidable terrain, and through extremely thick vegetation. In effect, this approach necessitated searching for the VC Camp through the "backdoor", rather than from above on higher terrain as originally planned.

Scaling the mountains from the southeast slowed the movement considerably. The unfamiliar approaches failed to lead to the camp. Precious time was consumed reconnoitering possible trails. Water was scarce and resupply impossible. Under these conditions the VC Camp could not be located.

WILLIAM H. LANAGAN  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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G. F. SQUILLACE

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S-3

1st Bn, 3d Mar  
3d MarDiv (Rein), FMF  
DA NANG, RVN  
140800 Aug 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 27-65 to Operation Order 328-65 (Company B (-))

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6658 IV and 6659 III  
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

# 1. OPERATION IN GENERAL

- a. Route - As planned in Fragmentary Order 27-65 to reference (b), and as noted on this report and the Intelligence Report dated 140800H Aug 1965.
- b. Period Covered - 132100H to 141700H.
- c. Company B (-) with two platoons (reinforced) conducted operations north of the SONG TUY LOAN River in response to intelligence reports which indicated the VC were mining the road west of TAN AN PHOUNG.

Moving during the hours of darkness, the patrol entered the village of GIAO TRI (2) early the first morning. Two (2) WIA's had been sustained earlier as the result of a booby-trapped gate; sporadic sniper fire was also encountered, but subsided and the evacuation and establishment of the patrol base around GIAO TRI was completed without further incident.

An ARVN Interrogation Team was heli-lifted in the vicinity of HOI VUC. Six (6) rounds of small arms fire was received during the search of HOI VUC. There were no casualties.

After the sweep of HOI VUC the patrol continued northwest where the Engineer's (with mine detection equipment) were heli-lifted in and the ARVN lifted out. A mine sweep of the road west of TAN AN PHOUNG failed to confirm the presence of any mines.

The Company (-) was heli-lifted back to its CP area at 141630H.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company B embarked on trucks at 131900H and proceeded to a dismount point, forward of Company D's positions on the FERA (vicinity 930715).

At 132100H, under cover of darkness, the patrol proceeded on foot parallel and north of the SONG TUY LOAN River to the vicinity of 890705 (northwest of GIAO TRI (3)).

Upon continuing the advance toward HOI VUC the patrol encountered a booby trapped gate vicinity 887706 at 140325H. The booby trap detonated before the point could actually check the gate itself. Two (2) WIA's resulted, one serious. Ten (10) rounds of sporadic sniper fire were received shortly thereafter and during the medical evacuation. The evacuation was completed approximately 140410H.

The Company Executive Officer elected to pull his two platoons back to GIAO TRI (3) for the remainder of the night instead of HOI VUC as originally planned.

At 140710H the ARVN Interrogation Team was heli-lifted into an LZ at 888702. The patrol then continued along its route to HOI VUC, clearing several more gates (none booby trapped) in the process.

One platoon was positioned south of HOI VUC and one platoon (-) north of the village. One reinforced squad with the Interrogation Team commenced a search of HOI VUC. Six (6) rounds of small arms fire were received upon entering the village, and 8 additional rounds could be heard during the search (possibly warning shots). There was no contact in the village, nor was any significant intelligence information gained during the interrogation.

After the sweep, the Executive Officer consolidated his forces and continued along his patrol route to 855712. The Engineers were heli-lifted in approximately 141330H, at which time the ARVN were lifted out.

The patrol then proceeded to the road junction at 846718. The Engineers started sweeping the road for mines from the road junction to 846725, a distance of approximately 200 meters. There was negative results.

An LZ was secured at 846723. A reconnaissance patrol was heli-lifted in for commencement of operations in that area and Company B (-) was lifted out at 141630H.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. According to the more seriously wounded casualty, the booby trapped gate was never opened at the time the explosion occurred. The two (2) WIA's were preparing to conduct a routine check of the gate at the time. A subsequent investigation of the area of the explosion disclosed the presence of black powder around the resultant hole, but no fragments.

The difficulty of moving at night was increased by the presence of dogs barking as the patrol neared the villages. The booby-trap incident also signaled the movement of the patrol. It was for these reasons that the commander elected to pull back his unit the first evening.

The use of the Engineers and the mine detection equipment proved both cumbersome and extremely slow. Their use would be more economical and beneficial in a known minefield requiring the clearing of a passage through the field, rather than on a well-used road where the presence of mines is unknown.

In that the possibility of the VC employing mines still exists, trails which have been continuously used by previous patrols, and are obvious routes, should not be utilized. This applies particularly to the route which extends from 889704, vicinity GIAO TRI (3), northwest to 846719.

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Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

G. F. SQUILLACE

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-3

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1st Bn, 3rd Mar  
3rd MarDiv (Rein), FMP  
DA NANG, RVN  
162000 Aug 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 28-65 to Operation Order 328-65  
(1st and 2nd Platoons of Company C)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA; 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV  
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL

- a. Route - As planned in Frag Order 28-65 to reference (b) and as noted on this report and the Intelligence Report dated 161200H August 1965.
- b. Period Covered - 141015H to 160920H.
- c. Two platoons of Company C and a heavy section of tanks conducted coordinated tank/infantry patrolling south of the SONG TUY LOAN River in the southwestern sector of the Battalion's TAOR for a 48-hour period.

The 2d platoon of Company C, with the section of tanks, jumped off the first day proceeding south along the lowground immediately east of the Hill 270-310 complex to PHOU NHAN (1). The following day, a helicopter relief of platoons was conducted, with the 1st platoon of Company C relieving the 2nd platoon. The patrol continued on the predesignated route, north to CAO SUNG (1) and east to a patrol base vicinity Hill 39. The Patrol returned the following morning.

Contact with the enemy was virtually nonexistent with the exception of sporadic sniper fire received by the 1st Platoon during the second day of operations.

2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. At 141015H, the 2d platoon, Company C embarked aboard a heavy section of tanks vicinity 985747 and proceeded along its patrol route south across the SONG TUY LOAN River, across country to the vicinity of PHOU NHAN (1) in GS 8966. Movement up to this point was extremely slow, the patrol arriving approximately 141700H (6 hours and 45 minutes travel time).

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The tanks were unable to traverse the terrain any further west into the valley. One squad was employed as security for the tanks at 892667 while the remainder of the platoon conducted a terrain reconnaissance of the valley south of Hill 310. (See Intelligence Report).

The platoon occupied its patrol base at 898660 by 142100H without incident. There was negative contact that night.

The following morning at 150730H an LZ was secured vicinity 909672. The 1st platoon was heli-lifted in to relieve the 2d platoon at 150830H.

The patrol continued north along its route to CAO SUNG (1). Between 151145H and 151245H during a stop vicinity 878695, 5 rounds of sniper fire were received - two single shots, and one 3 - round burst from an automatic weapon. The firing appeared to come from the vicinity of 878699, though a subsequent search of this area proved negative.

The patrol occupied its patrol site from 142100H to 150600H, vicinity 898660, with negative enemy contact.

At 160645H, the platoon, mounted on tanks, received 2 rounds of sniper fire from vicinity 899703. Fire was returned and the patrol continued on its route, returning at 160920H.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. The use of the tanks on this particular operation slowed the movement of the patrols both days. This is attributed in part to the broken nature of the terrain and in part to the failure of the tanks to heed the advice of the infantry commanders whose familiarity with, and knowledge of the area should have been exploited.

Breaking new trails again proved to be a time-consuming process with the tanks, particularly over hills covered with dense foliage. The lead tank in a column managed to break a trail without too much difficulty. However, the following tanks appeared to "slip and slide" initially, off and on the new trail, over a surface of flattened slick branches and brush.

The noise of the tanks precluded any surreptitious introduction of the patrol into the area of operation and may have accounted for the absence of any VC activity. On the other hand, their absence may be a further testimony to the effectiveness of the artillery's H&I fires, employed on a nightly basis throughout the TAOR.

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Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

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1st 3d Mar  
3d MarDiv (Rein), FMP  
DA NANG, RVN  
260300H Aug 1965

Patrol Operational Summary to Frag Order 30 to Operation Order 328-65  
(Company A)

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV  
(b) Operation Order 328-65

Time Zone: H

1. OPERATION IN GENERAL

- a. Route - As planned in Frag Order 30 to reference (b) and as noted on this report and the Intelligence Report dated 261645H August 1965.
- b. Period Covered - 231600H to 251630H.
- c. Three platoons of Company A were heli-lifted into two separate LZ's in the southwestern sector of the Battalion's TAOR for the conduct of operations along the Hill 502-310 complex.

Two platoons were heli-lifted to an LZ on Hill 419, with the command group, on 23 August. The third platoon was dropped in the following morning in the vicinity of CAO SUNG (5).

The concept of operations envisioned the two forces converging on a rendezvous point vicinity Hill 502, reconnoitering trails, guerilla base camps, and a VC Medium Cadre Training Camp in the process. The dense vegetation and absence of any traversible trails prevented the company from following its prescribed route. Likewise, the formidable terrain and scarcity of water impeded the movement of both units and prevented the execution of the planned link-up.

Enemy resistance was light throughout the operation. One VCC was apprehended initially on Hill 419. A group of 15-20 VC were also sighted the first evening and fired upon, but contact was broken shortly thereafter.

- 2. DETAILED SYNOPSIS. At 231600H the 1st and 3d Platoons, with the command group of Company A, were heli-lifted into an LZ vicinity 867626, Hill 419. The two platoons proceeded southwest on the prescribed route with the 1st Platoon leading.

At 231700H, vicinity 867626 (LZ), one VCC was apprehended hiding in the rocks (See Intelligence Report). After initial interrogation the VCC was utilized as a guide and turned over to the 3d Marines the following day.

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At 251924H the 1st platoon observed a group of 15-20 VC vicinity 851620. The patrol delivered fire and 2 VC were observed falling. At 232008H, the patrol discovered VC trails at the spot where the VC were taken under fire. Intelligence items were also discovered and forwarded to the 3d Marines. (See Intelligence Report).

Movement was extremely slow and trails practically nonexistent. The patrol occupied its patrol base by 232000H vicinity 862626. There was negative enemy contact throughout the night.

The following morning at 240800H the 2d platoon was heli-lifted into an LZ vicinity 850691 immediately east of CAO SUNG (5). (Note: This was the wrong LZ; the proposed LZ was 1000 meters southeast in the vicinity of CAO SUNG (4)).

Movement by the 2d Platoon was likewise impossible and water supply nonexistent. Numerous trails were attempted toward Hill 502, but most dissipated after 150 meters. By 242000H the 2d Platoon confirmed its inability to reach the rendezvous point and so occupied a patrol base vicinity 849678. There was negative enemy contact that night by the 2d Platoon.

Meanwhile, the 1st and 3d Platoon found movement (on 24 August) along Hill 419 just as discouraging as on the previous day and were, likewise, unable to reach the rendezvous point. A patrol base was occupied at 872626 by 242000H. There was negative enemy contact.

The following morning the platoons continued to search the area for possible trails, the first platoon vicinity 865629; the 2d platoon vicinity 846679; and the 3d platoon vicinity 879625. All met with negative results and no enemy contact. Numerous spider traps, sleeping mats, articles of discarded clothing and other signs that the area was being used as an overnight way station, were discovered.

The Company was heli-lifted out at 251630H and returned to their CP area.

3. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION. The terrain itself was the sole obstacle to reaching the rendezvous point on Hill 502 from the northern and southern approaches that were selected. The extremely steep mountainous terrain was rendered more formidable by the dense vegetation, absence of trails, the heat, and a shortage of accessible water.

Numerous attempts to locate any semblance of traversible ground failed. The element of time precluded attempts to utilize known trails from other directions to Hill 502, which were discovered on previous patrols.

The mission, to locate a northern and southern approach to Hill 502 if, in fact, such routes did exist, was accomplished in the sense that there were no routes.

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1stBn, 3d Marines  
3d MarDiv (FWD), FMF  
DA NANG, RVN  
101200H Aug 65

Intelligence Report to Operation Order 330-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III  
and 6658 IV  
(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 330-65

1. COMPANY A

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 020700H      TOR - 031900H
- c. Terrain - Reference (b) accurately depicts the terrain in the operational area.
- d. Enemy Activity
  - (1) Negative enemy contact at LZ, coordinates AT960616 upon initial landing at 020800H and 021830H to 030730H.
  - (2) At coordinates AT946615, 1st platoon discovered a VC, in his early twenties and dressed in green utilities who had been severely wounded in the chest by fragments from artillery preparation fires.
  - (3) At coordinates AT 949609, 2nd platoon received 2 rounds of sniper fire directed at their position from an archway at coordinates AT947607. Fire was not returned because of Company B moving into position on the left flank.
  - (4) At coordinates AT947607, 2nd platoon observed Company B engaged in a fire fight of short duration.
  - (5) Hamlets at coordinates AT945614, AT942610 and AT938607 were searched by the 3rd platoon. It was noted that all these hamlets contained numerous fighting holes.
  - (6) At coordinates AT938607, 3rd platoon conducting a recon by fire wounded and flushed one VCC from the brush where he was hiding. Turned over to 3rd Marines

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- (7) At coords AT949618 to AT943616 a trench line runs for 600 meters. Paralleling this trench is a trail bordered by a tree line running its entire length. At intervals of 50 to 75 meters along the trench line additional trench lines jut off in a southerly direction. Both the main trench and those branching off at right angles, were covered at various intervals with wooden planking supporting an earth covering.
- (8) A small hamlet, coordinates AT943607, was cleared, disclosing the following:
  - (a) The village consisted of 6 huts and a prayer hut.
  - (b) Bunkers were extremely well constructed and placed approximately 15 meters apart (3 of these destroyed by C-4)
  - (c) One trap door punji trap on the western edge of the hamlet.
  - (d) One of the "family type" bunkers contained one khaki shirt, assorted expended ammo cartridges and assorted written material.
  - (e) The inhabitants consisted of 10 young women, 4 old men, 2 young men (crippled) and 20 children.
- (9) After destroying the bunkers (para 8, b. above) one VCS approximately 16 years old was apprehended at coordinates AT940606 moving across a rice paddy. Interrogation led an ARVN interpreter to believe he was a VC. VCS turned over to 3rd Marines.
- (10) On D+1, upon approaching the hamlet of LE SON(5), coordinates AT956636, the 2nd platoon received 2 rounds of sniper fire from a "hooch" in the hamlet. Fire was returned in the form of concentrated small arms fire, M-79 and 3.5 WP rounds, resulting in the "hooch" catching fire and burning to the ground. Search of the "hooch" and the immediate surrounding area did not disclose the sniper. The fact that he could not be found may be attributed to a 4 foot deep trench, which led from the hooch westward to the bank of the river offering an excellent route of egress.
- (11) Following in the trace of the 1st and 2nd platoons, the 3rd platoon destroyed bunkers in and around the hamlets at coordinates AT960625, AT957630 and AT956639. In the last hamlet, LE SON (5), elaborate tunnels were found and partially destroyed with C4, WP grenades and fragmentation grenades.

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These tunnels were so well constructed that at least a 5 pound charge of C4 was needed to effect damage to any appreciable degree. (S-2 Comment - An engineer officer calculates an average charge of 25 pounds is required to effectively destroy tunnels.)

- (12) In the hamlet at coordinates AT955644, AT957648, and AT959654 many bunkers and tunnels were discovered. These were also damaged by charges of C4.
- (13) At coordinates AT959651, anti-helo stakes, extending from 20 to 30 feet in the air were discovered. The tops of these stakes had cloth wrappings of 5 to 6" near the top. Believed to be explosives connected by ropes suspended between them.
- (14) At coordinates AT960645 two USMC WIA's occurred while they were in the process of opening a booby trapped gate. The booby trap consisted of a grenade buried in the ground opposite the hinges. The gate was checked and appeared safe, however a wire led from the bottom of the gate to the grenade. The gate opened to a distance of 12 inches prior to detonating the grenade.
- (15) At coordinates AT968650 the 3rd platoon noted sniper fire from coordinates AT969649. The sniper fire was directed at the helicopter. Fire was returned and search of the huts at the latter coordinates resulted in the capture of 1 VCC. Continued search uncovered grenades in the bunkers of these huts. The huts were subsequently destroyed by WP grenades.
- (16) It was noted throughout the entire operation that there was a lack of males of military age in all villages searched and cleared by the Company.

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- a. Route - As planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report
- b. TOD - 020700H      TOR - 031900H
- c. Terrain - Hill 55, coordinates AT970620 was devoid of tunnels, trenches and field fortifications.
- d. Enemy Activity
  - (1) Negative enemy contact at 020700H at coordinates AT960616.
  - (2) At 020900H, 1 VCS apprehended while attempting to hide in a hole on Hill 55 coordinates AT970620. VCS turned over to 3rd Marines.
  - (3) A trench line runs from coordinates AT974613 to AT976615 along the northwestern bank of the SON AI NGHIA RIVER.
  - (4) In the vicinity of DUC KY (2), coordinates AT969609, many minor trenches were noted in and around the village and along the SON AI NGHIA RIVER.
  - (5) At 021120H one USMC squad which remained in DUC KY (2), coordinates AT969609, received 15 - 20 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated 4-5 men, directed at their position from coordinates AT968605. Fire was returned with negative results. During the sweep of DUC KY (2), 6 VCS were apprehended. All were wearing the typical black "pajama type" uniform. VCS turned over to 3rd Marines.
  - (6) At 021140H, coordinates AT978607, 1 small boat, of sufficient size to accommodate a maximum of 3 men, was discovered hidden in the brush along the bank of the river and subsequently destroyed.
  - (7) In all villages searched on D-Day, it was noted that all homes had well constructed bunkers requiring more than 2½ pounds of C4 to destroy them.
  - (8) At 03000H, while the company was in its night defensive position on Hill 55, coordinates AT970620, 1 round small arms fire was received from an undetermined position.

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- (9) At the village of XUAN DIEM (2), coords AT 965627, very extensive and well constructed trenches, tunnels and family bunkers were noted. One tunnel, in a home yielded 1 VC star, and 1 pair U.S. Jungle boots (brand new). Also discovered in the village was a punji trap with a covering of unique design, constructed of a bamboo lattice with a metal bar traversing the center and anchored in the earth on either side. This in turn was camouflaged with earth and grass. A man stepping on either end of this cover would cause it to pivot on the metal bar dropping the man onto the sharpened bamboo stakes embedded in the bottom of the trap. The trap was destroyed.
- (10) At the village of THAI CAM (1), coords AT 969642, the following observations were noted:
- (a) There were few tunnels, trenches and field fortifications. (Those noted were of poor construction)
  - (b) Archway over entrance to village had a VC Star on it.
  - (c) Villagers appeared quite friendly.
- (11) In the vicinity of THAI CAM (1), coords AT 969642 one VCS was apprehended. He was approximately 35 years of age and wearing a white robed costume and a white turbine. The ARVN interpreter stated this costume is representative of a Vietnamese custom for a person mourning a death in his family, however, it is only worn on the day of the death. In this case interrogation revealed the death had supposedly occurred 4 days prior. The company commander felt that this VCS could understand English, to at least some degree, for when reference was being made to his having no callouses on his hands and this being unusual for one claiming to be a farmer, he attempted to hide his hands behind him. VCS turned over to 3d Marines.
- (12) At coords AT 970645, a booby trapped pit was discovered. It was 1 1/2 feet long by 1 foot deep by 1 foot wide. It was covered with a bamboo lattice, camouflaged with earth and grass. The booby trap consisted of a small mine buried near the surface and on the side of the pit. A very taut pull cord was attached to both the mine and the bamboo support of the covering so that a person stepping into it, would upon depressing the covering, pull the pin on the mine. This booby trap was destroyed.
- (13) The village of LE SON (3), coords AT 971645, contained numerous well constructed trenches and bunkers.



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- (14) Throughout the entire day of 3 August, all areas covered by Company C were noted to contain extensive trench networks, tunnels and bunkers.
- (15) Between the villages of TAI CAM (1), coords AT 969642 and LE SON (3), coords AT 971645 trenches ran in a generally north - south direction. At intervals of between 20 and 40 meters the trenches were covered with a bamboo lattice or a steel grating which in turn was covered with earth and grass. These coverings were so solidly constructed that they permitted a man to walk on them.
- (16) At 031900H, as the last elements were being lifted out of the LZ, coords AT 969658, a sniper firing from a concealed position fired at the helicopters after lift off from the LZ resulting in one USMC WIA. The VCC sniper was subsequently captured by Company A.

3. COMPANY B

- a. Route - as planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 020700H      TOR - 031830H
- c. Terrain
  - (1) GS 9460 - area contains new rice crop, paddies dry - also corn fields with crop at height of 6'.
  - (2) Bank of SONG YEN from AT 940604 to AT 942600 is approximately 30° slope and contains dense growth of young deciduous trees 12' - 14'.
  - (3) Vicinity AT 947597 northeast to AT 947608 - flat, inundated paddies with rice crop 2' - 3' - ankle deep mud in paddies - dikes approximately 2' high.
  - (4) Vicinity GS 9462 - dry paddy and pasture land interspersed with inundated paddies.
  - (5) Vicinity GS 9562 along river bank - LVT easily cleared sparse stands of bamboo and light brush - could not clear 12" thick deciduous trees.
- d. Enemy Activity
  - (1) Caves located vicinity AT 942594 to AT 941595 - spiral entryway, 24" opening, estimated 8' - 10' deep. In fields behind stand of bamboo. Shovels and other digging implements in nearby vicinity hidden under brush. Threw in smoke grenade - no reaction - cave entrances sealed with demolition charges.

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- (2) At 020730H platoon received sniper fire from hamlet of CHAU SON (3) vicinity AT 953608. Estimated 6 to 8 weapons (2 auto) total fire 40 to 50 rounds - platoon returned small arms fire. No casualties. In clearing this hamlet several bunkers were assaulted. In one case an individual believed to be VC was seen to duck into a bunker - a grenade was thrown into the bunker and when it was searched the bodies of two young boys ages 5 and 7 were discovered. A similar incident occurred and one VN female estimated 20 years of age was fatally injured. A dead VN male, estimated 45 years of age was found in the hamlet presumably killed by the preparatory fires of HU-LE's. 5 VN nationals suffering from wounds were helo-evacuated. At 020820H a VC with weapon, wearing a tan colored uniform ducked into a family shelter inside a bamboo house - bunker attacked with grenades - the explosion caused a fire in the bamboo - the house was consumed in flames with secondary explosions following.
- (a) At 020900H platoon received a long burst of fire from an automatic weapon assumed to be a MG - 2 VC in khaki followed by another in black peasant garb were observed running southwest from the hamlet. Black clad VC was hit and wounded in right leg - helo evaced. Two in khaki successfully escaped.
- (3) Within LZ YELLOW vicinity AT960613 to AT957608 small 2½' - 3' anti-helo stakes were located - sparse random pattern of emplacement 15' apart. Stakes were split bamboo 2" wide and very old - bleached greyish white.
- (a) Vicinity AT963619 - large anti - helo stakes.  
3' - 4' diameter sharpened poles 6' - 7' in height, set in irregular square pattern 10' - 15' apart and forming a long rectangular field 50 yds X 300 yds. This field had short 10" long sharpened bamboo stakes set in the deck at 30° angle interspersed throughout the larger stakes. (S-2 Comment - VCS were used to clear and burn all stakes from the field.)
- (4) Vicinity AT 958604 hamlet of CHOU SON (3) - the left flank had extensive trench network - rough rectangle 200 yds X 100 yds. average 3' to 10' deep - partially covered with lattice bamboo and earth with small side tunnels running off the main tunnel. Amount of area of trenches covered was approximately 60% - the trench lines parallel crop areas.
- (a) Three structures were destroyed by burning - evidence of .50 caliber rounds being converted into anti-personnel booby traps. 11 bunkers destroyed.

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- (5) At 021045H searched small hamlet vicinity AT 955598. Had been previously struck by HU-1E's - evidence of peasants attempting to rebuild - 2 VCS picked up and passed to Regt'l collecting point.
- (a) Wrecked HU-1E vicinity AT 955599 - hulk had been completely stripped and burned - all component scraps in area were thrown in river by marines.
- (6) At 021130H - area from AT 955598 southwest to AT 949594 then to Hill 42 GS AT 9459 - hamlet located AT 948597 - no evidence of fortifications - one old trench runs north and south - average depth 2' - 3' and 200 meters in length - not linked to irrigation network.
- (7) Hill 42 GS AT 9459 - scattered foxholes - appeared to have been dug sometime ago - no evidence of new diggings top 10 - 20 meters of hill had been burned by earlier air strikes - top of hill is rocky with sparse burned out brush - no evidence of new growth.
- (8) At 021430H - 15 men moving in groups of 2 or 3 were observed moving from AT 935599 south to AT 926595 - black peasant clothing - no weapons observed.
- (9) At 021630H - observer on Hill 42 noted 4 VC (one carrying rifle) - 1 with black shirt - 1 with green shirt - running through corn field from AT 944597 to AT 948594 (corn crop near maturity with ears 5-6" long) - VC ran to river vic. AT 947594 and crossed at AT 952596 - river was waist high at this point - the VC were taken under fire with M-60 fire - one hit and carried off.
- (10) One Platoon moving in trace of lead elements sweeping CHOU SON (3) found further evidence of tunnels alongside trails average length of tunnels 50 to 100 meters.
- (11) At 021500H - 50 meters south of Hill 42 vic. AT 946596 a Marine observed a slight movement of the cover of a spider trap. The cover was extremely well camouflaged and of the "Flower Pot Base" type described earlier in this report.
- (a) The VC cave was dug at the base of a 4' earthen dike embankment. Removing the cover exposed a 20" entry hole and a square hole 3 1/2' deep. A yellow smoke grenade was thrown into the hole in an attempt to force the occupants to vacate, and the cover replaced. One round was fired out from the hole through the cover. Upon removing the cover a second time

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a hand was observed clutching a CHICOM grenade. The grenade was thrown out of the hole and detonated inflicting flash burns on one Marine close to the hole. Two VC attempting to fight their way out of the cave were shot by the patrol and the cave was demolished with a 5 lb charge of C4. The patrol dug into the cave with entrenching tools and removed the bodies of 3 VC KIA. the tunnel was discovered to run under the aforementioned embankment for a distance of 2 meters and then turned left for an additional 1 meter in length. 3 weapons (2 Chinese 7.62 mm carbines and 1 MAS 36) were found. The C4 charge had fractured the stocks of the weapons. At this point the patrol heard voices in the tunnel - a second 5 lb C4 charge was detonated resulting in two additional VC KIA. 2 CHICOM and 2 U.S. fragmentation grenades, 2 pouches w/ 30 rounds each, an ID card and misc. clothing were also found in the tunnel. All captured material was forwarded to 3d Marines. After ascertaining there were no further bodies or equipment in the tunnel the VC KIA were photographed by official USMC photographers accompanying the patrol, the bodies were put back into the tunnel and the entrance sealed. (S-2 Comment: the latter 2 bodies discovered had the appearance of Chinese and the photographs should be scrutinized to see if a positive identification can be made). This action resulted in 5 VC KIA confirmed, recovery of three weapons, and 1 USMC WIA (minor) not evacuated.

- (b) 3 additional holes were found within 50 - 75 meters the holes were not covered and were adjacent to the dike embankment. Search of these holes showed no indication of VC occupancy.

- (12) On D+1 the company was heli-lifted to LZ Green - negative enemy contact in LZ. The patrol linked up with one flame tank and 2 LVTE's. The LVTE capability to negotiate terrain is commented upon in para. c. above. The blade tank was unable to uncover tunnels, however, by digging wide swaths through ground it crushed trench & tunnel areas. (S-2 Comment: an experienced operator working a bulldozer with variable pitch blade could effect greater destruction of tunnels, and where desirable expose tunnels.)

- (a) At one point a tank traversed a small flooded paddy - no rice had been planted and water depth was 2" - the tank "bellied-up" but did not "stick."

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- (13) Vicinity AT 953644 - tank crushed hole 3' deep X 4' wide X 6' long with 18" earth cover.
- (14) At 031300H vicinity AT 951640 - the patrol crossing a fenceline found a mine located 2' off the trail - a 2" circular wood cap was exposed - engineers advised against removal because of probable booby-trap - mine detonated in place - 2d similiar mine was exposed and it too was purposely detonated.
- (15) Vicinity AT 951640 large square trench network 150 meters square with average depth of 3' - evidence of extensive tunneling.
- (16) Hamlet of PHU-SON (3) vicinity AT 953642. No Vn personnel in hamlet - evidence of physical occupancy, however, the normal indications were missing, e.g. houses were generally unkempt and floors unswept, an absolute minimum of clothing furniture and cooking utensils remained in dwelling places. (S-2 Comment: these indications point to the possibility that this hamlet is no longer populated by local peasants, but is used as a transient billeting and quartering area for VC units often reported in this vicinity.)
- (17) Vicinity DUYEN SON (3) AT 950651 to AT 958658 - many punji traps - most already broken - exposed bamboo matting - traps small 6" X 12" varying in depth from 12" to 24" - one USMC WIA after falling into punji trap.
- (18) Patrol returned via Hill 41 GS AT 9366 no evidence of mining. Road from AT 943660 north is severly cut through-out it's length.

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1stBn, 3dMarines  
3dMar (FWD), I M F  
DA NANG, RVN  
101800H August 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 23) to Operation Order 328-65.

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III and 6658 IV.

(b) 1stBn, 3dMarines Operation Order 328-65

1. COMPANY D(-

a. Route - as planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 032100H TOR - 041600H August

c. Terrain - A tree line borders the edge of the village of KHOUNG MY (2) vicinity AT909692. Contains numerous fighting holes which offer good observation and fields of fire over the rice paddies extending outward from the trees to the north, east and southeast and to the high ground to the west.

d. Enemy Activity

(1) Negative enemy contact at ambush sites as follows from 040315H to 040715H

(a) 1st Platoon - coordinates AT908700 to AT914701.

(b) 2nd Platoon - coordinates AT906686 to AT906695.

(c) 3rd Platoon - coordinates AT914701 to AT 922700

(d) CP - coordinates AT910704

(2) At 040715H an intelligence team (composed of District Police and ARVN representatives and numbering 30 men) was heli-lifted into the LZ at coordinates 907698. With their arrival commenced the movement forward of the 3 platoons from their positions (see para. d 1) to form a cordon in the tree line surrounding the village of KHOUNG MY (2). The 1st platoon to the north, the 2nd platoon to the west and the 3rd platoon to the east and southeast. All platoons completed their movement at 040730H at which time the CP joined the composite intelligence unit dividing into search teams and proceeded to pass through cordon into the village. They immediately began a thorough house to house search.

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- (3) At 041000H, coordinates 910691, a search team discovered a cache which yielded the following items. (All captured weapons, documents and etc. were turned over to the charge of the senior ARVN Officer.)

- 3 French MAS rifles
- 1 U.S. Carbine
- 2 Pouches of cal.30 ammo
- 3 grenades (VC homemade)

This cache was a very cleverly constructed hole well camouflaged in an extremely dense thicket near a house. The following description of this hole is indicative of the type construction of others later to be discovered.

- (a) The hole was approximately 5 feet deep and 20 inches square. 4 inches from the top a picture frame type wood construction was built to support the covering which is placed in the opening. This covering is built on the order of a shallow flower box with wooden sides and base, sloping slightly inward from the sides so as to permit it to wedge tightly into the opening. It was 4 inches in depth and filled with very hard packed earth. Attached to the wooden base are 2 metal rings that will allow a person to pull this covering into position and firmly hold it thus. Camouflage of this covering consisted of "pineapple plants" being placed on top of it so as to give the appearance that they are actually growing there. Attention was brought to bear on this position by the search team tugging at these plants and discovering in fact that they were placed there, rather than actually growing. Sharpened bamboo poles were used to probe the ground in this vicinity resulting in the discovery of the covering over the hole when the probing met the resistance of the wooden base.

- (4) At 041000H a VCS was spotted by elements of the 3d platoon, when he attempted to escape in a trench leading through their position on the eastern edge of the village. Small arms fire was directed at him and he was seen to fall backwards indicating he may have been wounded. A thorough search of the area where he was seen to fall proved negative.
- (5) At 041020H, after continuing the search for the suspected WIA (see (4) above) this man was discovered hiding in a culvert in the tree line on the eastern edge of the village. He was bleeding from several superficial wounds probably incurred from rock fragments resulting

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from the fire directed at him by the 3d platoon. He was exhausted and cowering and had somehow become tangled in some wire. Search of his person revealed documents identifying him as a VC squad leader and courier. The Vietnamese and ARVN Intelligence Team used "EE-8" persuasion in their interrogation of the VCS WIA and he then led a search team to a house in the western portion of the village that purportedly harbored 2 VC. A search of the house, the family shelter and interrogation of its occupants proved negative at this time.

- (6) At 041330H, elements of the 3d platoon heard several rounds of .30 cal rifle fire directed at their position in the tree line on the eastern edge of the village. They then observed 5 VC attempting to escape through the cordon to the east. Pursuit of 3 of these VC led them to a large tree in the center of the village which contained a cleverly camouflaged spiral cave. The entrance to this cave was concealed by a covering of the same nature as that described in para (3). It was, however, set into the roots at the base of the tree which grew on a slight hill mass. 1 small firing port, slightly larger than the barrel of a rifle, was found on each side approximately two feet from the cover. A grenade was thrown into the cave resulting in 3 VC KIA's. Inspection of the cave revealed only that it was approximately 15 feet in length and of a height requiring entry to be on hands and knees. The other 2VC sighted were able to elude searchers.
- (7) At 041400H, interrogation by the ARVN's of an old woman occupant of the house mentioned in para (5) above, convinced the Company Commander that the family shelter previously searched did in fact contain 2 VC. After again searching this shelter with negative results, the occupants were directed to clear away the protective covering of the shelter. When the earth had been removed exposing the bamboo support overhead, a small black metal box containing documents and measuring 6X6X4 inches was discovered (turned over to the OIC of the VN Intelligence Unit). After removing the bamboo support, exposing the base of the shelter, the occupants were then told to dig further. This order was met with refusal, however, ARVN "persuasive measures" prompted their doing so. Shortly after they began digging, a rasping sound was heard, as the tools being used struck the cover of in fact another hole in the base of the shelter. Removal of this cover revealed an "L" shaped tunnel leading downward for about 5 feet and approximately 5-6 feet off the the vertical hole at a right angle. Immediately after removing the cover a grenade was dropped into the hole

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and at this same time a VC inhabitant attempted to throw one up to the level of the family shelter. The explosion of the U.S. grenade detonated the VC grenade causing this attempt to be unsuccessful. The combined explosion was of such force so as to partially collapse a portion of the lower section of the "L". Search of the tunnel revealed 1 confirmed VC KIA identified by documents in his possession as a squad leader. The forcing of a villager to explore further, revealed a 3rd rubber tire sandal indicating the probability of of at least a 2nd KIA, and the following material was recovered.

- 2 - U. S. carbines
- 1 - French MAS rifle

- (8) The following observations were noted by the Company throughout the search of KHOUNG MY (2).
- (a) One shelter was discovered constructed of concrete approximately 6 feet long, 4 feet wide and 3 feet deep. It was covered with the wood/dirt "flower box" type cover. (See para (3), (a) above.)
  - (b) One metal conical cover over a hole with an approximate height and diameter of 4 feet. Attached to this cover was a metal tube 4 feet in length jutting outward parallel with the ground. (Purpose of the tube is undetermined.)
  - (c) Two stockpiles of 4X4 timber (possibly used for tunnel shoring), 1 containing 15-20 pieces of wood and the other an estimated 30-40.
  - (d) No families in KHOUNG MY (2) were found to be utilizing their family shelters; rather they were just sitting in their homes observing the activity of the search teams.
  - (e) A coolness of attitude of the villagers and their reluctance to comply with requests was met by the search teams throughout the entire operation.
  - (f) The stealth of movement and the early movement into the cordon by Co D in the tree line prevented the VC from being alerted to the operation and from being able to utilize their prepared fighting holes located in the tree line around the village.

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
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COC

1st Bn, 3d Marines  
 3dMarDiv (FWD), MAF  
 DA NANG, RVN  
 081630H August 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 24) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III  
 and 6658 IV

(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. 1ST PLATOON, COMPANY A

a. Route - as planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.

b. TO - 061600H TOR - 071800H

c. Terrain - Nothing new of significance.

d. Enemy Activity

- (1) At 070630H, the patrol arrived at the village of TAN AN PHUONG, coords AT864735. The villagers were sullen and uncooperative, volunteering no information concerning VC activities in that area. At 070730H an Interrogation Team from HIEU DUC District Headquarters, arrived by helicopter, and elicited the following information from the local inhabitants. One VC squad, consisting of 13 men and one woman, with weapons, visits the village at least once a week in order to collect food and RVN Identification Cards; their last appearance was on, or about, 6 August 1965. Two VC platoons, armed with carbines, rifles and mortars, and dressed in camouflaged caps and utilities, operate within the area between TAN AN PHUONG, coords AT 864735, and HOI VUC, coords AT 870707. They remain in the hills to the west, vicinity GS AT 8374, when Marines are near, but occasionally mass in the villages in a show of strength. The villagers claim only two young men of that village (TAN AN PHUONG) are VC, the others flee to the west because of fear. These young men cut wood and burn charcoal for a livelihood, returning to the village only when VC or Americans are not present. The people also disclaim any knowledge of caves or tunnels.

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1stBn, 3d Marines  
3dMarDiv (FWD), FME  
DA NANG, RVN  
081000H August 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 25) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III  
and 6658 IV.

(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65.

1. 1st Platoon, COMPANY B

a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.

b. TOD - 061000H TOR - 071730H

c. Terrain

- (1) The trail complex from AT902683 west to AT880689 is completely overgrown with brush, both from the sides of the trail and with new growth on the trail itself. There was no evidence of any recent use of these trails. (S-2 comment - this area had been heavily traveled in past months - indications are that H and I fires have been most effective in interdicting VC traffic in this area.)

- (2) The hill complex in the vicinity of hill 112 grid square AT8868 to the river bed vicinity AT876692 is heavily cratered from H and I fires.

(3) New water points were discovered at the following locations. In both cases the movement of the water is sluggish, but the water is clear and with the addition of purification tablets was used as drinking water.

- Ref: (a) Intelligence Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12-1-65.  
(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65.
1. 1st Platoon (a) Small stream - from AT873679 to AT876683 - average width 8' - depth 1' to 2 1/2'.

a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.  
(b) Small stream - from AT883677 to AT882679 emptying into rice paddies. Average width 8' - depth 1 to 3'.

- c. (4) New tunnel-type trail cut through low brush from AT874680 southeast to AT880675. Interior height of canopy 3' to 4' and an average width of the trail 1 1/2'. The trail had been freshly cut. Cumbersome roots and stubble brush remain on the trail and movement is tedious and difficult.

(S-2 comment - this area had been heavily traveled in past months - indications are that H and I fires have been most effective in interdicting VC traffic in this area.)

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- (5) New trails located in following areas.
  - a) From AT882676 north to AT882678. Trail is clear, hard packed dirt, averages 3' in width with no overhead canopy.
  - b) From AT894682 west along the river to AT880684. Trail is narrow with an average width of 1' and a clear, hard packed dirt surface.
- (6) This patrol was a coordinated Tank/Infantry Patrol. The following comments are offered regarding the mobility of tracked vehicles.
  - a) Although the tanks suffered broken or thrown track, this occurred only at sandy, stream crossings when the vehicles were moving parallel to the stream beds and can be avoided in future operations.
  - b) Evidence of the rapid mobility of the patrol (infantry mounted aboard the tanks) is the movement from AT965707 to AT901685 in 55 minutes, and the return route (blazing a new trail) from AT880690 to AT965707 in one hour and 20 minutes.
  - c) The tanks crossed the river at AT878693 and AT83684. The latter crossing site is considered a secondary site, less desirable but adequate for use.
- (7) Vicinity AT876679 is suitable as a small (4 aircraft) LZ - area is covered with low 1' to 3' thorny bushes.
- (8) Vicinity AT875681 - soft earth had large amount of cloven hoof prints - too small for cattle - probably wild pigs abundant in the area.

d. Enemy Activity

- (1) At 061300H vicinity AT879694 a U.S. M26 Fragmentation Grenade was found. The grenade was rigged as a booby trap with a piece of cotton string across the trail. The grenade was heavily encrusted with rust and failed to explode when another grenade was detonated next to it.
- (2) Vicinity AT875681 - 2 small "hooches" constructed of bamboo 3' high X 8' long and 5' wide were located in thick brush. The structures were well camouflaged but bore no indications of recent occupancy. (Structures destroyed by burning)

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- (c) A VN poncho (mildewed and partially covered with soil) and a water soaked tobacco pouch were discovered in the area.
- (b) The general vicinity of the above coordinates bore evidence of extensive cratering from friendly H and I fires.
- (3) Vicinity grid square AT8767 - area bears evidence of extensive daily wood and brush cutting and charcoal burning. New trails being blazed throughout the area - secondary growth of brush in evidence.
- (4) At 07:00H vicinity AT881673, 20 VC were sighted moving rapidly to the west. They were in single file, maintaining a 7-8 yard interval. All were dressed in black peasant clothing, shorts and short sleeved shirts, with 3 men noted to be wearing white sun helmets. The VC were observed to be carrying either rifles or "carrying sticks" but the exact nature of the item carried could not be ascertained. An artillery fire mission was called, however no damage assessment could be made because the target was only visible for approximately 20 seconds.

e. General Observations

- (1) The peasants observed in the vicinity of the following hamlets, continued their work despite the proximity of Marines. Appeared to be at ease and were oblivious to the patrol's activities except for the shock impression when flame tanks fired in the vicinity of hill 112 grid square AT8868.
  - (a) DONG BICH (1) grid square AT8968
  - (b) DONG BICH (2) grid square AT9068
  - (c) AN NHON (1) grid square AT8969
  - (d) PHOUC NINH (7) grid square AT8967
- (2) S-2 COMMENT - The H and I fires mentioned in preceding paragraphs have evidently impeded VC activities and forced their movement generally south of grid line 69 as indicated by the deterioration of older trails and the cutting of new trails to the south.

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1st Bn, 3d Marine  
3d Mar Div (FWD), IIF  
DA NANG, RVN.  
132030H August 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 26) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III  
and 6658 IV  
(b) 1st Bn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. COMPANY D (-) REINFORCED

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 111700H TOR - 131500H
- c. Terrain. Trail leads from coords AT 850620 west to AT 840620, then north to AT 840630. The entire area is rugged with enormous rocks, waist high "saw grass" and steep slopes; movement is difficult and time consuming.
- d. Enemy Activity
  - (1) Negative enemy contact at patrol sites as follows.
    - (a) From 112000H to 120600H - coords AT 861623
    - (b) From 121700H to 130630H - coords AT 868626
  - (2) Patrol was unable to locate "Medium Level Viet Cong Cadre Training Camp," reported in 1stBn, 3dMar Intelligence Report dated 261830H July 1965, para 1,d,(8).
  - (3) At 121500H, coords AT 871626, one Marine squad, with a 3-man radio relay team and 60mm mortar section, observed 2 VC at coords AT 869627, dressed in green shirts and khaki shorts, carrying large ruck sacks. Both fell under M-14 and M-79 fire. One of the VC rose to his feet and began to run, then returned to his companion, picked him up and disappeared over the crest of the hill. One confirmed VC WIA resulted from this action.
  - (4) Many small cleared campsites along trails vicinity GS's AT 8362 and 8462.
  - (5) At 111745H, coords AT 857620, as the patrol was moving west along the trail, the point observed 3 men, without weapons, moving west, preceeding the patrol by approximately 50 meters. These men began to run when the lead

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Marine called out to them. The point opened fire, killing one immediately and mortally wounding another, while a third escaped. Before dying the one mortally wounded revealed the following.

- (a) All three were VC and had been recruited by the VC from a village 4 kilometers to the west.
- (b) They were members of a 100-man VC Company armed with mortars. This company had fired their mortars from the immediate vicinity of the incident on numerous occasions, and claimed to be the unit which conducted the mortar attack in the 2ndBn, 9thMar area at 092345H.
- (c) Two days ago the VC company had departed this area and moved to a "forest to the west," called RUNG CHANH.


Two confirmed VC KIA resulted from this encounter. One notebook taken from one of them, forwarded to 3d Marines, represents the only item of personal effects carried by the VC KIA and found by the patrol. During this same period 5 men were seen moving north along ridgeline, vicinity coords AT 840600.

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1stBn, 3d Marines  
 3dMarDiv (FWD), FMP  
 DA NANG, RVN  
 140800H August 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 27) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series 1701 Sheets 6659 III  
 and 6658 IV

(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. COMPANY B (-)(Rein)

a. Route - as planned in reference (b) and as noted in this report

b. TOD - 132100H TOR - 141700H

c. Terrain - nothing new of significance.

d. Enemy Activity

- (1) Negative enemy contact at patrol site from 132400H to 140300H, at coords AT 890705.
- (2) At 140300H, coords AT 887706 a mine was detonated, activated by the opening of a gate, resulting in 2 USMC WIA's. The explosive device, buried in the ground, left a crater 3" in diameter and 6" in depth in the center of the trail at the gate, a good deal of black smoke accompanied the blast. The most seriously wounded Marine was located within 2' of the explosion and suffered broken legs and one arm and multiple shrapnel wounds. Another, approximately 5' distant, suffered numerous shrapnel wounds. The Marine nearest the blast, but uninjured, was at a distance of 7'. While tending the wounded, sniper fire, approximately 10 rounds, was received from vicinity coords AT 888707.
- (3) During the sweep and search of the village of HOI VUC, GS AT 8770, between 140900H and 141000H, 5 sniper rounds received from the southwest and northwest, fired from a distance of 200 to 500 meters. An ARVN Interrogation Team was heli-lifted to coords AT 888702 at 140710H in order to assist with the search of HOI VUC. Both search and interrogation turned up nothing of significance.
- (4) At 141023H, the patrol at coords AT 875706 received 6 sniper rounds from vicinity coords AT 875706. Five men dressed in black, without weapons, were seen to run from that area a short time later.

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1stBn 3d Marines  
 3dMarDiv (FWD), FME  
 DA NANG, RVN  
 161200H August 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 28) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6659 III  
 and 6658 IV  
 (b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. 2nd Platoon, COMPANY C

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 141015H      TOR - 150830H
- c. Terrain - Nothing new of significance.
- d. Enemy Activity
  - (1) Negative enemy contact at patrol site from 142100H to 150600H, coordinates AT898660.
  - (2) Trails between coordinates AT864653 and AT883655 appear to be well used with many fresh tracks and newly cut trails, indicating a good deal of activity.

2. 1st Platoon, COMPANY C

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 150830H      TOR - 160920H
- c. Terrain - Nothing new of significance
- d. Enemy Activity
  - (1) Negative enemy contact at patrol site from 152100H to 160600H, coordinates AT897700.
  - (2) While engaged in "chow break" from 151145H until 151245H at coordinates AT878695, 5 rounds of sniper fire were received - two single shots and one, 3 round burst from an automatic weapon. The enemy firing point appeared to be in the vicinity of coordinates AT878699. An investigation proved negative.

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- (3) At 160645H, coordinates AT900702, the patrol, mounted on tanks, received 2 rounds of sniper fire from vicinity coordinates AT899703. Fire was returned and the patrol continued its route.
- (4) Anti-helo stakes, 4' to 5' in height, coordinates AT886703. These stakes cover a relatively small area, approximately 200 meters parallel to the river and are camouflaged with leaves and bark stripped from bamboo.

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1stBn, 3d Marines  
 3dMar Div (FWD), FMP  
 DA NANG, RVN  
 261645H August 1965

Intelligence Report (Frag Order 30) to Operation Order 328-65

Ref: (a) Map: INDOCHINA 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6659 IIF  
 and 6658 IV

(b) 1stBn, 3d Marines Operation Order 328-65

1. COMPANY A(-) Reinforced

- a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.
- b. TOD - 231600H      TOR - 251630H
- c. Terrain - Unable to traverse the complete planned route because of dense jungle and difficulty of water resupply.
- d. Enemy Activity
  - (1) At 231700H, coordinates AT867626, one VCC apprehended hiding in rocks. He stated that he and 3 others had been kidnapped by the VC and taken into the mountains, held one month and released. This VCC was used as a guide and turned over to 3d Marines the following day.
  - (2) Negative enemy contact at patrol sites as follows
    - (a) From 232000H to 240600H - coordinates AT862626
    - (b) From 242000H to 250600H - coordinates AT872626
  - (3) Many places of temporary shelter, camp sites, and small trails throughout grid square AT8562, 8662 and 8762. Trails along ridgelines well used.
  - (4) At 231824H patrol, at coordinates AT853622, observed a group of 15-20 VC at coordinates AT851620. The patrol fired and 2VC were seen to fall. Supporting arms were utilized. The patrol at 232008H discovered blood trails at the spot where the VC were taken under fire. Items discovered in the vicinity are listed in enclosure (1) and have been forwarded to 3d Marines.

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- a. Route - As planned in reference (b), and as noted in this report.
- b. TCD - 240800H TOR - 251630H
- c. Terrain .
  - (1) Unable to locate trail to hill 502, grid square AT8365, from the north. Jungle extremely dense throughout grid square AT8367 and AT8467
  - (2) Trail from coordinates AT845676 to AT850679 accurately indicated on reference (a).
- d. Enemy Activity
  - (1) Negative enemy contact at patrol site from 242000H to 250600H, coordinates AT849678.
  - (2) Trails throughout route of patrol well used.

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Enclosure (1) Captured Material

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Time: 232008H

Coordinates: AT851620

Circumstances: Patrol (Co A (-)) engaged 20 VC, wounding one and capturing one. These items discovered at the scene and taken from captive.

- 2 Carrying sacks
- 1 US Carbine, M-1
- 2 Carrying poles (Vietnamese)
- 1 6'x7' piece black cotton cloth
- 1 Large piece plastic (bloody)
- 1 Piece blue plastic
- 2 Piece brown plastic
- 2 Canvas hats
- 1 USCM corn sack (Catholic relief) with unidentified meal and herbs etc -  $\frac{1}{2}$ " in bottom
- 1 Green plastic canteen
- 1 French canteen (metal)
- 1 US canteen (metal)
- 1 5" rice ball wrapped in brown plastic
- 1 USCM "Feed sack"
- 2 sandbags (empty)
- 1 4" rice ball in tin can
- 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb bags rice
- 1 package corn meal  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb
- 2 small bottles, Vietnamese headache medicine
- 1 pair tire sandals
- 1 orange parachute silk
- 2 small plastic bags ( $\frac{1}{4}$  lb ea.) tobacco
- 1 aluminum container ( $\frac{1}{2}$  lb) tobacco
- 1 tooth brush
- 1 pocket comb
- 1 leather belt
- 1 length of rope (hemp)
- 1 pink sack
- 1 shower shoes
- 1 rice carrying bag (5')
- 1 blue cotton pack
- 1 bottle ink
- 1 small piece gauze
- 1 small black cotton pouch
- 1 small bottle pills (unidentified)
- 1 bottle salt and pepper
- 1 pair blue trousers
- 1 pair black trousers

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- 1 black shirt
- 1 pair black shirt
- 1 aqua color shirt
- 1 wool maroon shirt
- 1 red and white towel
- 1 round moulded sugar (brown)

## DOCUMENTS

- 1 watch receipt
- 1 roster of Team #3
- 1 VC pass (2men)
- 1 maroon notebook - poetry, roster of Team #9 and other names
- 10 piastres
- 1 blue notebook with envelope (blank)
- 1 orange notebook (blank)
- 1 red wallet (empty)

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