

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMP
FPO, San Francisco 96602

DECLASSIFIED

1/AL/swd
03000
Ser 0134-66
7 Dec 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMP
Subj: Command Chronology for the month of November, 1966
1. Subject chronology is hereby submitted.

P. A. Wickwire
P. A. WICKWIRE

Copy to:
CO 3dMar

DECLASSIFIED

Copy 1 of 4 copies

DECLASSIFIED

Nov 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PART I

1. Reporting Unit. 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ Division (Rein) FMF

2. Command Post. Coordinates XD 847415

3. Period Covered. 1 November 1966 through 30 November 1966

4. Date of Submission. 7 December 1966

5. Average Monthly Strength

USMC		USN	
OFFICERS	ENLISTED	OFFICERS	ENLISTED
33	1018	3	53

6. Commanding Officer. LtCol P. A. WICKWIRE

7. Principal Staff

Executive Officer

Maj C. N. DEZER 1-9 Nov 1966
 Maj A. LUKEMAN 10-30 Nov 1966

S-1

2dLt J. R. SIMKINS

S-2

1stLt W. A. SPEAR

S-3

Maj A. LUKEMAN 1-14 Nov 1966
 Capt R. C. OSSENFORT 15-30 Nov 1966

S-4

Capt G. F. RECZEK

8. Subordinate Units

H&S Company

Capt G. F. RECZEK

Company A

Capt R. C. OSSENFORT 1-14 Nov 1966
 Capt J. R. SWEENEY 15-30 Nov 1966

Company B

Capt A. G. WHITTELSEY

Company C

Capt C. G. JORDAN

Company D

Capt D. E. MULLALLY JR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

9. Mission Assigned. Conduct reconnaissance in force operation in the Khe Sanh TAOR to provide security for the Khe Sanh CIDG camp/airfield.

10. Background. This reporting period was characterized by an intensive patrolling effort on the part of the 1st Battalion to make contact with the enemy or ensure early warning of his arrival in the area. Concurrently, the battalion continually improved defensive positions (over 22,000 feet of concertina and over 134,000 feet of barbed wire used in double apron fences and tanglefoot, primary and alternate positions dug and improved and fields of fire cleared) to provide close-in defense of the Khe Sanh camp/airfield. Enemy contact was light, consisting primarily of night probes of company positions and brief encounters with patrols.

PART II

1. Personnel.

a. Number of replacements received: 2 Marine Officers, 82 Marine Enlisted, 1 Navy Officer, 4 Navy Enlisted

b. Number of personnel rotated: 26 Marine Enlisted, 1 Navy Officer

c. Number of personnel lost through attrition other than rotation:

(1) WIA: 4 Marine Enlisted

(2) KIA: 0

(3) Humanitarian/Emergency Transfers: 0

(4) Non-battle injuries: 7 Marine Enlisted; MedEvacs 17

(5) Intra-Division/Regimental Transfers: 1 Marine Officer, 2 Marine Enlisted, 1 Navy Officer

(6) Transferred for confinement: 0

d. R&R trips: 97

2. Administration. Orderly administration under conditions of a split administrative rear echelon and fully functioning forward element (including teletype and attendant administrative traffic) is far more taxing than that encountered in a garrison status. The companies have to function without the constant supervision of their First Sergeants in the rear. All of the companies have serious shortages.

CONFIDENTIAL

of administrative personnel. The Battalion S-1 with the forward element requires as many administrative personnel as the rear echelon, since it must perform almost all of the companies' administrative functions required with the forward element. Mail handling has required additional full time personnel, and the holiday mail has, of course, made this a significant administrative responsibility. Lack of constant communication between the echelons and inclement weather (preventing courier or guard mail services on a regular basis) have prevented satisfactory liaison between forward and rear echelons.

a. Personnel accounting: Personnel accounting continues to be satisfactory.

b. Awards: 3 Purple Hearts

c. Promotions: 1 to Sergeant, 21 to Corporal, 58 to Lance Corporal and 5 to Private First Class

d. Postal: Postal Service continues to be satisfactory. Weather prevents aircraft from delivering mail daily. Mail is sorted by company at Dong Ha, with resultant minimum handling at Khe Sanh.

e. Post Exchange: Limited exchange facilities have been available through mobile exchange from Division. Re-supply has been severely restricted by weather. Some health and comfort items have been out of stock approximately 2 weeks.

3. Intelligence

a. Summary of Enemy Situation during Period.

(1) There was no large enemy unit resistance during the month of November.

(2) Enemy reconnaissance/combat teams organized into two and three man teams conducted probes and harrassing type action against fixed positions such as the battalion water point, logistic support area and company perimeters.

(3) No enemy resistance was encountered by day or night patrols moving to or from ambush sites.

(4) There was no pattern established by the enemy during movement into or out of areas of contact which was initiated by them.

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) All contacts initiated by the enemy were during the hours of darkness with the exception of one daylight contact. (See paragraph d.)

(6) Enemy strength, location and disposition were not firmly established within the battalion TAOR.

(7) The total number of enemy contacts indicated that enemy strength and activity did not increase during the month of November.

b. Enemy initiated incidents during period.

(1) 100745H - One Marine forward of his defensive position at XD843420 was shot and wounded by a VC dressed in brown tiger striped utilities. No weapon identification made.

(2) 161925H - Battalion water point received two (2) small arms rounds from approximately XD836432. No VC were sighted.

(3) 232304H - 2nd Platoon, Alpha Company received nine (9) small arms rounds from XD850421. 81mm mortar illumination was requested and four (4) VC were spotted. No weapon or uniform identification made.

(4) 250315H - 2nd Platoon, Alpha Company received three (3) small arms rounds from approximately XD852421. Three (3) VC were spotted under illumination and were observed moving away in a northerly direction.

(5) 272306H - An Alpha Company squad size patrol received one (1) small arms round in vicinity of XD847425. No VC were sighted.

(6) 282209H - 2nd Platoon, Alpha Company received one (1) grenade and one (1) small arms round from XD847422. No VC was sighted.

(7) 282315H - 2nd Platoon, Alpha Company received one (1) rifle grenade, possible M-79 round, from XD848421. No VC were sighted.

c. Summary of enemy casualties, captured weapons and equipment losses during period.

(1) Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

KIA: 0 VCC: 0
WIA: 0 VCS: 0

(2) Equipment losses. None

(3) Enemy fortifications destroyed. None

d. Significant trends during period.

(1) One daylight contact was initiated by VC.

(2) The enemy avoided daylight detection or contact by USMC patrols.

(3) Night contacts initiated by the VC were not affected by weather conditions. VC operated under all weather conditions therefore avoiding establishment of a pattern.

(4) No mines or booby traps were encountered by USMC patrols.

(5) The monsoon season was well established in November in the Khe Sanh area. Rain fall was almost constant. Winds were generally from the NE with a minimum velocity of 4 knots to a maximum of 50 knots.

(6) No increase in enemy strength or movement was observed during November.

e. Other.

(1) A Seismic Intrusion Detector (SID) was employed at the battalion waterpoint from the period 17 November until 21 November. No intrusions were detected during these dates.

(2) 2d Platoon, Company A, began using a Seismic Intrusion Detector (SID) on the 25th of November. On the 29th of November at 2010 hours an intrusion was detected and mortar fire brought to bear on the area. The area was later checked with negative results.

(3) Two PPS-6's held by the battalion were not in operation during the reporting period. Both units were sent to FLSG for repair on 11 November and returned on the 29th of November. The battalion recommended by letter that trained technicians be assigned or that this radar equipment be invoiced to a command closer to an effective maintenance source, since trained technicians and maintenance are a continuing problem.

CONFIDENTIAL4. Training

a. Objective. The objective of training conducted during the month of November was the maintainance and improvement of the Battalion's capability to carry out its assigned missions.

b. Major Training Highlights.

(1) Special attention was directed toward small unit offensive tactics (squad level) and the improvement of the individual rifleman's marksmanship proficiency. Initially squad tactics training was begun on the company and platoon level with classes on the phases of offensive combat, formations, troop leading steps and the operation order. This preparation was followed by practical application on the ground in each company area. The training culminated in a squad live-fire problem ~~was~~ conducted by the Battalion from 11 to 18 November. The problem consisted of the following:

(a) Issuance of attack order to squad leaders by the problem director.

(b) Troop leading procedures and issuance of "Frag" orders by the squad leaders to their team leaders.

(c) Conduct of the problem: ~~included~~ envelopment of an intermediate objective and frontal assault by the squad on the final objective.

(d) Staff Officer Critique: Every rifle squad of the Battalion was run through the problem. Lance Corporal and Corporal squad leaders (some of them placed in their current positions of responsibility without having undergone similar training since passing through an Infantry Training Regiment) were uniformly enthusiastic in their reception to the live-fire problem. The lessons learned are considered invaluable. A schematic diagram of the live-fire exercise follows as page 7.

(2) In conjunction with the tactical training of the squad, a program was established by the Battalion to improve the individual rifleman's marksmanship proficiency. The training consisted of a four hour lecture and application period conducted by a staff noncommissioned officer with extensive team shooting experience. A period of two days was necessary to present the training to each company. The main teaching points included:

PURSUIT BY FIRE

DEFENSE

OBJ 2

ASSAULT

500 M

FIRST COORDINATION LINE

ELEPHANT GRASS

600 M

DRAW

FINAL COORDINATION LINE

FT BASE OF FIRE

OBJ 1

ASSAULT

500 M

FT BASE OF FIRE

250 M

TREE LINE

LOD

ASSEMBLY AREA

ATTACK POSITION

7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Stressing that "hits count," and making the first shot good.

(b) Knowing the zero of the weapon and the weapon's capabilities.

(c) Maintaining the weapon in the field.

(d) Instilling confidence in the individual Marine by practical application.

A 15 yard range was set up in the Battalion area, and a one inch "D" target was used. The Marine was shown the importance of aiming at the correct point (center of mass) on the silhouette, and its relationship to range. Five hundred and forty-four riflemen of the Battalion have participated to date, and preparations are underway to establish a continuous program of marksmanship.

(3) Training of the 106mm Rifle Platoon was stressed, since the experience level of the Platoon is low. The purpose of this program was to train the 106 Platoon to carry out its primary mission of AT warfare with emphasis on its secondary mission of AP support for the Battalion.

(a) Subjects covered	Hours
<u>1</u> Introduction	$\frac{1}{2}$
<u>2</u> Mechanics of the 106 R. R.	$7\frac{1}{2}$
<u>3</u> The .50 cal. spotting rifle	7
<u>4</u> Spare parts and PM	1
<u>5</u> Crew drill	3
<u>6</u> Marksmanship	4
<u>7</u> Technique of fire	4
<u>8</u> Tactical employment	2
<u>9</u> FIREX	32

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Highlights of cycle of training included four FIREX. Total ammunition expenditures included 102 rounds of 106 and 340 rounds of .50 caliber. Subcaliber (.30) training is planned for December.

(c) Combat readiness of the Platoon was raised from marginal to fully combat ready.

(4) Other Company/Platoon level training included mapping, patrolling techniques, local reaction drills, rules of engagement, safety of personnel, fire support requests by small unit leaders, and personal sanitation and hygiene. Communication personnel conducted company level training on preventive maintenance, waterproofing techniques and field expedient antenna construction. Continuing emphasis has been placed on NCO leadership at the fire-team and squad levels.

5. Special Operations

a. Amphibious Operations. None

b. Combined Operations.

(1) The Battalion participated in Operation Prairie throughout the reporting period.

(2) Defense of the Khe Sanh Special Forces Camp/airfield continued throughout the period covered.

c. Psychological Operations. None

d. River Operations. None. Numerous small river crossings were made by rifle companies and subordinate units using rope techniques.

6. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and other special types of Warfare. None. All major items of equipment are on hand.

7. Command and Control.

a. Task Organization. (Including units in direct support)

1st Battalion, 3d Marines

LtCol WICKWIRE

H&S Co (-)

Capt RECZEK

CONFIDENTIAL

Co A (Rein)

Capt SWEENEY

Co A

Det H&S Co (-)

Det Med. Plat.

Det Sl Mort. Plat.

Det Comm. Plat.

Det S-2 Scout Team

Det FAC Team

Co B (Rein)

Capt WHITTLESEY

Co B

Det H&S Co (-)

Det Med. Plat.

Det Sl Mort. Plat.

Det Comm. Plt.

Det S-2 Scout Team

Co C (Rein)

Capt JORDAN

Co C

Det H&S Co (-)

Det Med. Plat.

Det Sl Mort. Plat.

Det Comm. Plat.

Det S-2 Scout Team

CONFIDENTIALBattalion Reserve

Co D (Rein)

Capt MULLALLY

Det H&S Co (-)

Det Med. Plat.

Det 81 Mort. Plat.

Det Comm. Plat.

Det S-2 Scout Team

Btry B, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines (Rein) Capt PALMER

Det 3d Shore Party Bn

2dLt KERR

Det 3d Engineer Bn

Cpl BOSAVAGE

b. Location of all command posts of subordinate units and reporting units.

1st Battalion, 3d Marines	_____	XD 847415
Company A (Rein)	_____	XD 830414
Company B (Rein)	_____	XD 832434
Company C (Rein)	_____	XD 856407
Company D (Rein)	_____	XD 847414
H&S Company (-)	_____	XD 847415
Btry B, 1stBn, 13thMar	_____	XD 844414
Det, 3d Shore Party Bn	_____	XD 847418
Det, 3d Engineer Bn	_____	XD 835430

c. Attachments and Detachments. Above attachments were attached throughout reporting period.

d. Control. Primary means of control was land line supplemented by radio.

e. Problem Areas. The geographical location of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and its associated poor weather presented a continuous support problem to the Battalion. Current air support "Frag" order scheduling and lack of aircraft maintenance support in the area preclude RON possibilities of Khe Sanh. As a result support aircraft were available less than

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

50% of the required period.

The lack of local air support further provides a hardship in the medical evacuation capability of the Battalion. To date emergency med-evacs have occurred in periods of good weather. The present system does not allow the flexibility necessary in the Battalion to handle a med-evac during a brief break in the weather.

8. Close Combat

a. Operations Conducted

(1) Patrols

(a) Squad _____ 309

(b) Platoon _____ 30

(c) Company _____ 0

(2) Operations

(a) Platoon _____ 0

(b) Company _____ 3

(c) Battalion _____ 1

b. Significant Events.

(1) 021535 "B" Btry 1/13 fired fifteen rounds W. P. 105 How. on BT 805469. Nature of target emission of radio signals.

(2) 022205 a Co D patrol fired four rounds small arms at two Viet Cong encountered along patrol route at 839434. 81 mortar illumination called for, area searched, negative results.

(3) 030530 Co C (-) began a seven day search and clear operation in the northern portion of the Battalion TAOR. Co D (-) later participated as a screening and blocking force.

(4) 040346 a Co D sentry posted at battalion water point (835431) sighted VCS and fired four rounds small arms. 81 illumination provided. Area searched, negative results.

(5) 051005 Co D reported OE aircraft was fired on from 812483. Unobserved 81 mortar fire mission called

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(6) 061700 Generals WALT, KYLE, ROBERTSHAW and Party arrived in Khe Sanh area. Briefing held by CIC, III MAF Representative and Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.

(7) 100745 A Marine from the H&S Company, while investigating a suspicious acting indigenous person in front of the company's perimeter, (840421) was wounded by rifle fire and evacuated. Marine returned 5 or 6 rounds of small arms after being hit. Area searched, negative results.

(8) 102120 Lights reported in the vicinity of 778438. Fire mission called--twenty four HE rounds 105mm How. fired. Area searched by CIDG patrol. Negative results.

(9) 130315 Co A patrol reported two incidents of VCS sightings within minutes apart in area 823412. First sighting reported two VCS, second counted three VCS moving in SW direction. Efforts to make contact unsuccessful.

(10) 131445 CG, III MAF arrived in the Khe Sanh area.

(11) 131040 Battalion visited and entertained by Martha RAYE who was accompanied by B/Gen ENGLISH.

(12) 192045 Co A listening post sighted three VC moving past their positions, vic 856405. Sound power line failed and L. P. attempted to return to their lines. Received one incoming small arms round from fourth VC. One hundred rounds small arms, 3 M-79 rounds and 5 81 illumination rounds were fired. Area immediately searched. Negative results.

(13) 230304 Co A reported receiving approximately nine rounds small arms fire from vicinity 850421. Observed three VC under area illumination. Small arms fire returned and grenades returned. Area searched later with negative results.

(14) 272306 Co A patrol at 847425 received one small arms round. Patrol returned fire and threw two grenades. Area searched with negative results.

(15) 282315 Platoon from Co A received two incoming grenades and one round of small arms fire 848421 two grenades were thrown in response and nine rounds of M-79 were fired.

9. Fire Support Coordination

a. Significant Events:

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) 8 Nov 1966 - Two 4.2" mortars assigned to B-1-13 increasing fire capabilities of Khe Sanh TAOR - Designated as Bravo Whiskey.

(2) During the month five visual/recon artillery spot missions were conducted by the Battery Commander utilizing USMC HU1E and H-34 helicopters and USMC and USAF O1E spotter aircraft.

(3) 27 Nov 1966 - Artillery mission fired in support CIDG patrol, operating from Khe Sanh Special Forces Camp, resulted in four probable KIA (Arty).

(4) An average of 31 Artillery and 17 Mortar H&I's were fired daily during the month.

b. Artillery Units Providing Support/Reinforcing Fires:

(1) Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines (Rein)

(a) Six 105mm Howitzers

(b) Det, K-4-12, two 155mm Howitzers

(c) Det, two 4.2" Mortars

(2) 175mm Artillery from Artillery Plateau

c. Naval Ships Providing Naval Gunfire Support: None

d. Type and Number of Missions Fired:

(1) Artillery

(a) Observed missions - 15

(b) Unobserved missions - 13

(c) H&I fires - 920

(d) Group fires - 123

(e) Training/practice missions - 23

(f) Registration missions - 22

(g) Prep fires - 7

(2) Naval gunfire - none

(3) 81mm mortars

(a) Observed missions - 6

CONFIDENTIAL

- (b) Unobserved missions - 8
- (c) H&I fires - 480
- (d) Practice/training missions - 21
- (e) Registration missions - 3
- (4) 60mm Mortars
 - (a) Observed missions - none
 - (b) Unobserved missions - 3
 - (c) H&I fires - 143

e. Ammunition Expended by Type and Caliber

(1) Artillery

(a) 105mm Howitzer

1 HE - 37852 WP - 2123 Ill - 1014 Smk - 0

(b) 155mm Howitzer

1 HE - 2302 WP - 223 Ill - 2

(c) 4.2" Mortar

1 HE - 3502 Ill - 4

(2) 81mm Mortar

(a) HE (light) - 458

(b) HE (medium) - 220

(c) Ill - 243

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Naval gunfire: None

10. Combat Air Support

a. During the period from 1 November 1966 through 6 November 1966 the TACP was deployed as follows: one ALO and five enlisted men within the Battalion C. P.; one FAC and two enlisted men attached to Company A. On 7 November, one FAC was detached from Company A and became acting ALO, continuing in this capacity through 20 November. An additional FAC was requested and received on 7 November from 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. One FAC and two enlisted men accompanied a Company D patrol from 7 November to 9 November. On 10 November the FAC from 3d Battalion, 3d Marines was detached and returned to his parent unit. On 21 November the ALO assumed his duties and the remaining FAC was again attached to Company A. Present TACP strength is one ALO, one FAC and seven enlisted men.

b. No CAS was provided for the Battalion's use during the month of November. Helicopter support was provided on a daily basis with the exception of the following dates: 3, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 November.

c. A total of fifty-five persons were med-evac by air during this reporting period.

d. Air support was provided for the Battalion by the following units:

HMM-163	HMM-265
HMM-164	VMO-1
HMM-263	VMGR-152

11. Logistics (S-4)

a. Supply. Logistic support was channeled through the LSA, Khe Sanh, to the main supply source, FLSG Alpha at Danang. Emergency support, when required, was furnished by the FLSU at Dong Ha. The flow of material into the Battalion, through the LSA, for the month of November improved to a degree that adequate supplies of Class I, III, IV and V were normally available to using units. This supply support was effective and timely. Class II, Type 1 supply items were requisitioned through the Battalion rear echelon in Danang.

The only method of resupply for the Battalion at Khe Sanh was by aircraft, both fixed and rotary wing; therefore, the normal problems of supply were magnified by the vagaries of the weather. Low-altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) has been proposed as a method of resupply, if necessary, but has not

CONFIDENTIAL

been utilized to date.

Primarily as a result of weather, and secondarily as a result of the random nature of demand and lack of mechanization at the Khe Sanh end of the supply line, Class II support was not totally satisfactory during November. At the end of the month, numerous unfilled requisitions were held for Class II items ordered through the LSA, and numerous items provided by the Battalion rear echelon were staged awaiting air transportation at Danang.

b. Maintenance. Requirements exceeding organizational maintenance are being air evacuated to either FLSU at Dong Ha or FLSG Alpha at Danang, dependent upon the type of equipment in need of repair. Ordnance maintenance performed at FLSG Alpha has been most satisfactory, in that repaired ordnance items are being returned in five to seven days, which includes air travel to and from Danang. FLSU at Dong Ha performs required maintenance on electronic equipment.

Problems in resupply of spares (discussed in paragraph a.) resulted in four vehicles deadlined during November requiring only three different line items to bring them off deadline, (blower belts and generator belts for the mite, and pulley belts for the mule.) Greater than average usage of belts is attributed to the extremely wet, muddy conditions which prevailed throughout the month.

c. Food Services. From the time the Battalion arrived at Khe Sanh on 29 September until about 10 November, the main subsistence item was MCI's three times per day. "A" Rations (bread, steaks and fresh fruit) were flown into Khe Sanh three times during that period. On 10 November, the Battalion's Galley, consisting of four stoves, started serving "B" Rations to approximately 1100 men once per day and soup to one company each night, to supplement the MCI's. This procedure is the desired balance at this time between maintaining maximum tactical dispersion and providing variety in the type of meal served. The successful operation of the galley and the "can do" spirit of the cooks was the highlight of the battalion's food service operation for the month.

d. Cantonment and Camp Facilities. Cantonment and camp facilities in the Khe Sanh area have been restricted to the minimum commensurate with the tactical situation. The principle means of shelter is a field expedient commonly referred to as a "Hooch," located on or near to a fighting position or a protective hole. Defensive positions were improved extensively. (See part I, paragraph 10.)

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Transportation and Roads. The road system in the Khe Sanh area is strictly a fair weather system. During fair weather, all roads are trafficable for M274 and M422 vehicles. During inclement weather, the M274 "mule" is the workhorse of the Battalion on the barely passable roads. It is a common requirement to have a "bulldozer," pull water trailers out to the water point and back during periods of inclement weather. At times some roads become completely impassable for all equipment.

f. Fiscal. Supply discipline has been emphasized to assure economical use of available assets.

g. Water. The water point operated by the two-man engineer detachment provides the bulk of the water supply for entire Khe Sanh area. Units use organic vehicles for resupply from the water point during fair weather. During inclement weather, tracked-vehicles provide the main resupply to units not proximate to the water point, with resupply by helicopter utilized when roads become barely passable.

h. Motor Transport. Unit transportation requirements are being provided from the Battalion's organic vehicles. Some maintenance problems were experienced due to the constant usage in mud, on bad roads and the supply problems noted in paragraph a. above. However, the Battalion was able to perform its mission at Khe Sanh without serious problems, using eighteen M274's, twelve M422's and two 2½ ton 6X6 trucks from B-1-13. The remaining vehicles were in use by the Battalion rear echelon.

i. Embarkation. Embarkation planning for future requirements has been continuous with material stored at the administrative rear echelon ready for embarkation, and working documents being prepared for equipment at Khe Sanh. Unit Cargo Manifests, UP&TT, and VS&PT for the Battalion at Khe Sanh are being updated; box pallet and banding requirements are being determined.

j. Evacuation and Hospitalization. 62 Marines were evacuated during November, all by aircraft. No difficulties have arisen to date concerning evacuation; however, the dependence on air transportation and prevalent poor weather combine to make med evac difficulty a possibility.

12. Medical and Dental Support

a. Surgeons.

(1) Lieutenant H. A. ACKLEY, MC, USNR, Battalion Surgeon

(2) Lieutenant T. L. FOLKERTH, MC, USN, Assistant Battalion Surgeon

b. Significant Events.

(1) Laboratory facilities became available to do blood smears, urinalysis and to examine stool specimens.

(2) It has been discovered while on patrol, the standard stock Insect Repellent, Type IIA (6840-753-4963) is helpful in preventing leach infestation.

c. Medical Trends.

(1) Five men contacted malaria.

(2) The continual wet weather and mud have dictated that prevention of foot casualties be a major program. Company Corpsmen and unit leaders inspect feet daily; every man in the Battalion is required to air his feet for an hour each day. Socks are kept dry when possible. As a result, although treatment of foot problems at the Company and BAS increased sharply, no Marine or Sailor has yet required evacuation as a result of improper foot care.

(3) Skin infections continue to be a major medical problem. These appear to be related to weather and terrain factors, difficulty in conducting personal hygiene, and numerous insect and leach bites.

d. Number of Battle Casualties Treated at BAS.

(1) One bullet wound to a left thigh.

e. Number of Non-battle Casualties Treated at BAS-429.

(1) Emergency treatment

CONFIDENTIAL

- (a) Lacerations - 19
- (b) Foreign body in eye - 5
- (c) Fractures - 3
- (d) Gun shot wound - 1
- (2) Patients admitted to BAS Ward-30
 - (a) Prevalent admission diagnosis: Skin infections and gastro-enteritis
 - (b) Total number of patient days - 207
- (3) Number of "med evacs" - 62
- (4) Venereal disease
 - (a) Types
 - 1 N. gonorrhea - 5
 - 2 Chancroid - 2
 - (b) Locations
 - 1 Danang - 4
 - 2 Hawaii - 1
 - 3 Singapore - 1
 - 4 Taipei - 1
- (5) During the month of November a dentist and two dental technicians set up a clinic at the Special Forces Camp. This facility handled all the dental emergencies and routine dental care and administered prophylactic dental care. The equipment and one dental technician will remain in the Khe Sanh area and a dentist will visit at appropriate intervals to provide continuing treatment.

CONFIDENTIALf. Preventive Medicine and Sanitation.

(1) The number of cases of gastro-enteritis, although not alarmingly high, has prompted closer supervision of food handling personnel and facilities.

g. Civil Affairs Medical Support.

(1) The Battalion Surgeons have been visiting the Vietnamese Government Clinic, a local missionary clinic, and the Special Forces Dispensary three or four times a week to offer their advice and assistance. In addition the Battalion Surgeons have supported the combined civic action programs of the local government and the Special Forces team whenever possible. The Battalion moved to its new TAOR 29 September 1966, but received no "MEDCAP" supplies until 25 November 1966. Consequently "MEDCAP" activity has been limited. Now that supplies are available, Battalion Corpsmen will hold regularly scheduled clinics in the local villages, referring all serious cases to the Vietnamese Government Clinic, which we will continue to support.

h. Problem Areas.

(1) The main problem area is in getting supplies, however, this situation has improved over the past month. Obtaining stretchers has remained a serious problem.

(2) The BAS does not have adequate lighting for examining and treating patients. Steps are being taken through the proper channels to alleviate this deficiency.

13. Chaplain's Supporta. Battalion Chaplain.

(1) Lt George R. WITT, CHC, USN 651991, 1-23 Nov

(2) LCDR Michael A. ONDO, CHC, USN 611298 24-30 Nov

b. Masses.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Attendance</u>
Sunday Masses	21	564
Weekday Masses	14	298
Communed		449

Protestant and Jewish religious coverage is provided by 3d Marine Regt. Chaplain, Division Chaplain's office (Forward) and 1st Marine Air Wing Chaplain's office (Danang).

CONFIDENTIALc. Number of Persons Receiving Counselling: 20

d. Significant Events: Thanksgiving Day; Regimental Chaplain's visit, for Protestant Divine services on 28 November. Also, after six months the current Chaplain received orders to an Infantry Battalion, 1/3, on Thanksgiving Day, 24 November. Half an hour later, upon the Battalion Commander's request, ^{a Thanksgiving Day message was read to} the companies. Catholic Mass followed at 1700 in the CP area. Sergeant Major DURKEE escorted the Padre on all runs.

e. Facilities: Outstanding, GP tent accommodations.

f. During the period of this report, the command attention to attendance at divine services has been most effective. Increasing numbers of personnel of all ranks have been present at divine services. Every effort has been made to provide suitable places for these services.

14. Civil Affairs/Military Government/Community Relationsa. Significant Activities.

(1) On 10 November 1966 the District Chief of Khe Sanh and two American women missionaries, including a mission school class of approximately thirty children, were invited and attended the Marine Corps Birthday ceremony.

(2) Regional and Popular Forces from the Special Forces Camp were attached to Companies A and C to aid USMC patrols in identification of suspected VC. These RF and PF forces consisted of four to eight men attached to each company.

(3) On 1 November six thousand pounds of rice were distributed to indigenous personnel, under the supervision of the District Chief.

(4) Medcap assistance was provided in coordination with Khe Sanh Special Forces Camp.

15. Communications

a. Wire. Activities during the period included installation and maintenance of the Battalion wire system. ~~The wire~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~system.~~ The wire system includes a 20 pair cable running East to the Special Forces Camp and a 26 pair cable running West and around to the North side of the runway. The Battalion has provided the wire lines to all units operating in support of the Khe Sanh airstrip. Telephone service is also provided to all attachments and supporting units of the Battalion. A telephone system for the use of the SOP, 3d Marine Division/III MAF Representative has also been installed. At this time the Battalion has approximately thirty miles of WD-1/TT, telephone cable, installed in cables and overheaded on poles. There are presently thirty-three locals off the Battalion Switchboard plus trunk lines to each company and the artillery battery supporting the Battalion.

b. Radio. Radio communications during the period have been generally good. Communications with 3d Marine Division were good with few problems. AN/MRC 83 and 87's were used for this shot. FM communications with 3d Marine Division (Forward) were fair to good. The distance involved dictated the use of a mobile equipment, AN/MRC-109 and a RC-292 antenna. With a relay established midway between Khe Sanh and Dong Ha, the AN/MRC-25 was used satisfactorily. During this period the MRC-109 was operated on a three hour motor off, one hour motor running cycle. The MRC-109 was used on the division TAC #3 circuit as the primary tactical contact with 3d Marine Division (Forward). Division TAC #1 was used as an alternate circuit for command traffic during radio relay failures. Internal radio nets were operated on a continuous basis throughout the period. The RC-292 antenna was used to maintain continuous communications with the companies.

c. Radio Relay

(1) During the entire period the Battalion has had attached an AN/MRC-62 and team from Communications Company, 3d Marine Division. The team provided the Battalion with common user circuits to the 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division (Forward), 3d Marine Division and a single user channel from 3d Marine Division (Forward) COC. A covered teletype circuit has been in use via this equipment, to 3d Marine Division Communication Center.

(2) On the 29th a second AN/MRC-62 and team was furnished to provide two additional common user circuits to the Battalion, a single user channel to the detachment from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and a single user channel for use by the LSA.

CONFIDENTIALd. Message Center.

(1) During the period a covered teletype circuit was established. The circuit began operating on 7 November to 3d Marine Division (Forward) and on 12 November the circuit was reterminated at 3d Marine Division. A total of 450 incoming and 222 outgoing messages were handled. After some initial equipment problems within the Battalion, i. e., AN/TGC-14 and AN/TGC-4, few equipment failures were encountered. There were continuing short duration failures in the radio relay system. Operation and management problems caused to some degree by inexperience and lack of field training of message center personnel were encountered and solved. Problem areas were:

(a) Message distribution: Timeliness and control.

(b) Prompt and effective use of all available communications means.

(2) Effective measures for message distribution and control were developed through coordinated staff action, and training of supervisory message center personnel resulted in effective use of available equipment.

(3) During the month of November, the message center provided communications guard for the SOP, 3dMarDiv/III MAF Representative, Khe Sanh.

e. Maintenance and Supply.

(1) During the period, a PM/repair team was organized to provide assistance and instruction in preventive maintenance and operating techniques to the company operators.

(2) Repair support by the Force Logistic Command has been timely throughout the period.

(3) Resupply of dry cell batteries BA-386 and BA-30 was sporadic. Emergency resupply of these items by the FLSU at Dong Ha was required on two occasions.

(4) Maintenance and repair of teletype equipment is discussed in paragraph f. below.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

f. Problems Encountered. The lack of qualified teletype repairmen has caused concern due to inability to trouble shoot outages and make necessary corrections. Minor repair of teletypes has been unusually slow because of necessity of waiting for repairman to be dispatched from another unit.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED