

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 June - 3 July 1967

INDEX

- PART I _____ ORGANIZATION DATA
- PART II _____ NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III _____ SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV _____ SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (COMBAT AFTER ACTION
REPORTS: OPERATION CIMARRON AND OPERAT-
ION BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN)

GP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

Battalion Landing Team 2/3

Major W. O. BEARD

1 June - 3 July 67

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Company
 Company E
 Company F
 Company G
 Company H

Capt R. C. MADONNA
 Capt R. N. BOGARD
 Capt S. R. VAUGHAN
 Capt J. P. SHEEHAN
 Capt R. O. CULVER

1 June - 3 July 67
 1 June - 3 July 67

ATTACHED UNITS

B Battery (Rein) 1st Battalion, 12th Marines

G. B. FILE Capt
 10 June - 3 July 67

First Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3rd Tank Battalion

EPB O'NEIL 2/Lt.
 10 June - 3 July 67

Third Platoon (Rein), Company B, 1st AMTRAC Battalion

D. R. RUSH 2/Lt
 10 June - 3 July 67

Second Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3d Anti-Tank Battalion

F. Y. LAWLER 2/Lt
 10 June - 3 July 67

Third Platoon, Company B, 3rd Recon Battalion

F. J. CARRIGAN 1/Lt
 10 June - 22 June 67

Second Clearing Platoon (Rein), Company B, 3rd Medical Battalion

1 July - 3 July 67
 S. C. SMITH L/CDR
 1 June - 3 July 67

Logistic Support Unit (DET FORLOGCMD)

T. E. HUGHES 1/Lt
 10 June - 3 July 67

First Platoon (Rein), Company C, 3rd Shore Party Battalion

A. G. MUELLER 2/Lt
 10 June - 3 July 67

First Platoon (Rein), Company C, 3rd Motor Transport

W. H. HOOVER 2/Lt
 1 June - 3 July 67

First Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3d Engineer Battalion

J. R. ASHBURY 2/Lt
 10 June - 3 July 67

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Det "A", Beach Jumper Unit - 1

J. F. DORSEY LTJG
18 June - 2 July 67

UNCLASSIFIED

2. LOCATION

- 1-10 June 1967: Operation CIMARRON - RVN
- 11-17 June 1967: Afloat with ARG shipping
- 18 June - 2 July 1967: Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN - RVN
- 3 July: Afloat with ARG shipping

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer	Major J. H. BROUJOS	1 June - 3 July 67
S-1	2/Lt B. L. HEATON	1 June - 3 July 67
S-2	Capt V. M. SMITH	1 June - 3 July 67
S-3	Capt D. W. LEMON	1 June - 3 July 67
S-4	Capt R. R. GREEN	1 June - 3 July 67
CommO	1/Lt J. B. DENNY	1 June - 3 July 67

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
59	1465	8	82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Battalion Landing Team 2/3 participated in Operation CIMARRON 1-10 June 1967, while OPCON to CO, 9th Marines. This operation is discussed in detail in Part IV of this chronology. During the period 11-17 June 1967, the BLT was embarked aboard ARG shipping. This period was devoted primarily to upkeep and maintenance of organic equipment, shipboard training to include updated instruction on mines and booby traps and test firing of small arms weapons, and preparation for Operation BEACON TORCH. Operation BEACON TORCH commenced 18 June 1967, and was terminated 2 July 1967. During this operation, the BLT also participated in Operation Calhoun, which was conducted in conjunction with BEACON TORCH. Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN is discussed in detail in Part IV of this chronology.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED. See Part IV
2. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED
 - a. Operation CIMARRON: 1-10 June 1967 - RVN
 - b. Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN: 18 June - 2 July 1967 - RVN

3. CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

	<u>VC/NVA</u>
Confirmed	87
Probable	86

4. CASUALTIES SUSTAINED

USMC

<u>OFFICER</u>				<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	1	0	0	11	118	0	2

USN

<u>OFFICER</u>				<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0

5. NEW TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED. None

6. COMMAND RELATIONS

- a. 1-102400Z June 1967. 2d Battalion (Rein), 3rd Marines OPCON to CO, 9th Marines.
- b. 1-101500H June 1967. Following units of BLT 2/3 OPCON to parent organizations 3rd Marine Division:
 - (1) 3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Recon Bn.
 - (2) 2d Plat, (Rein), Co A, 3rd AT Bn.
 - (3) 3rd Plat (-) (Rein), Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bn.
 - (4) 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn.
 - (5) Det, LSU, FORLOGCMD
 - (6) 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn.
- c. 110001Z - 111800H June 1967. BLT 2/3 (-) OPCON 3rd Marine Division.
- d. 111801H June - 3 July 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON to CTG 79.5.
- e. 221800H June - 011800H July 1967. 3d Plat, Co B, 3rd Recon Bn OPCON 1st Recon Bn.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7. EQUIPMENT. See Part IV

8. LOGISTICS. See Part IV

9. CIVIC ACTION. During Operation Beacon Torch/Calhoun, the battalion conducted a limited MEDCAP program from 23-27 June in MONG NGHE (2) Hamlet, QUE SAN District, Quang Tin Province, RVN. A total of 261 patients were received (83 women, 49 elderly men, 129 children). The majority of cases treated were skin disorders that were caused mainly by the lack of personal hygiene. The children were thoroughly bathed and soap provided by USS TRIPOLI, was distributed to families. The elderly patients were suffering mainly from generic conditions, for which no treatment could be provided. Dental treatment for approximately 10 persons was also provided. This treatment consisted mainly of extractions. Six villagers were evacuated to USS TRIPOLI. Two women were treated for shrapnel wounds, however, the other four were suffering from ailments of long standing (cancer, genital defects) which would have required prolonged care, and thus, could not be treated extensively. The program, though limited, was successful and well received by the local populace.

10. ADMINISTRATION

a. PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING. A shortage of consumable supplies still exists.

b. AWARDS. Purple Heart Medal -216.

c. PROMOTIONS. 1stLT-7, SSGT-1, SGT-25, CPL-189, LCPL-256, PFC-7.

d. LEGAL AND DISCIPLINE. One Special Court Martial and one Summary Court Martial were conducted during this period. One man was confined as a result of Special Court Martial. There were six cases of company non-judicial punishment. The following articles of the UCMJ were violated: Article 86 (2), Article 91 (1), Article 112 (2) and Article 113 (3).

e. POSTAL. Satisfactory

f. PAY and ALLOWANCES. Satisfactory

g. POST EXCHANGE. The ship store facilities of ARG shipping were utilized while the BLT was afloat. There were no PX facilities available during Operation Beacon Torch/Calhoun. A mobil PX serviced the battalion at Cam Lo artillery position during the period 1 - 10 June.

h. RELIGIOUS SERVICES. Protestant Divine Services were conducted by the Battalion Chaplain. A total of 17 services were held during this reporting period with a total attendance of 392. Bible study meetings, held Monday thru Saturday of each week, resulted in a total attendance of 372. One moral leadership class was given aboard USS TRIPOLI. The total attendance during this class was 118. Catholic services were conducted by Chaplain J. E. RYAN, 9th Marines during the period 1-10 June. Chaplain IVERS, USS TRIPOLI, conducted Catholic services while afloat.

1. R&R. The battalion received the following R&R quotas: China Beach - 21, Taipei - 11, Hong Kong - 1.

11. PERSONNEL

a. LOSSES

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Battle	2	33	0	3
Non-battle	0	14	0	0
Admin	0	30	0	0

b. REPLACEMENTS

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
	3	92	0	6

12. INTELLIGENCE. See Part IV

13. COMMUNICATIONS. See Part IV

14. WEATHER. See Part IV

15. FIRE SUPPORT. See Part IV

16. AIR SUPPORT. See Part IV

17. ACTIVATIONS/DEACTIVATIONS/REDESIGNATIONS. None

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

9th Mar. Regt. 00559-67
Control No. 12 of 25
Copy No. 25

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
APO, San Francisco 96602

33-47
35 49

03/JJO/pgr
3000 0024-67
Ser No 6022-67
13 June 1967



From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines (Rein)
Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation Cimarron)

Ref: (a) VIETNAM, AMS Series L7014, 1;50,000; Sheets 6342 I, 6442 IV
(b) 9th Marines Operation Order 7-67 (Operation Cimarron)

Encl: ✓(1) Overlay of Operation Cimarron

1. Operation Cimarron.
2. Dates of Operation. 1 - 10 June 1967.
3. Location. Operation Cimarron was conducted in GIO LINH and CAM LO Districts, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Task Organization

2d Battalion (Rein), 3d Marines

Major BEARD

- H & S Co (-) (Rein)
 - Det, Hq Bn, 3rd Mar Div
 - Det, Hq Co, 3rd Mar
 - Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 - Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd MT Bn.

Co E (Rein)

Capt BOGARD

- Co E
 - Det, H & S Co
 - 1st Sec, 81mm Mort Plat
 - Det, Med Plat
 - Det, Intel Sec
 - Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn 12th Mar
 - 1st Sqd, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 - Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn


Co F (Rein)

Capt VAUGHAN

- Co F
 - Det, H & S Co
 - 2nd Sec, 81mm Mort Plat
 - Det, Med Plat
 - Det, Intel Sec
 - Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

BLT 2/3
A/R RPT (Opd CIMARRON)

1-10 JUNE 1967



TAB-A

DECLASSIFIED

2nd Sqd, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Co G (Rein)

Capt SHEEHAN

Co G
 Det, H & S Co
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Co F (Rein)

Capt CULVER

Co H
 Det, H & S Co
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 3rd Sqd, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

106mm RR Plat

2ndLt ELMS

81mm Mortar Plat (-)

2ndLt JENKINS

5. Supporting Forces

a. Close air support was available to the battalion during this operation, however, no situation arose which required the use of this support, and, therefore, none was requested.

b. Helicopter support was available for resupply in situations when priorities greater than routine were to be utilized. These situations did not exist, and, therefore, requests were not initiated. All MEDEVAC cases were transported by helicopter to the Dong Ha Combat Base. MEDEVAC helicopter support was outstanding.

c. Artillery support was available and utilized by the battalion during this operation. Support was received from 2d Battalion, 12th Marines and all missions were either preplanned or immediate. The preplanned missions consisted of H & I fires and night defensive registrations around platoon and company patrol bases and other likely avenues of enemy approach. Immediate missions were requested on suspected enemy positions and ambush sites during daylight patrolling activities. A total of 639 rounds of 105mm fire was delivered in support of the battalion.

d. In order to assist the battalion in its missions of providing security for the Cam Lo artillery position, and escort security for convoys along the MSR in its assigned AO, a platoon of ONTOS from 3rd AT Bn and a platoon of 40mm (SP) from 1st Bn, 44th Field Arty, USA, was assigned to the battalion in direct support.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6. Intelligencea. Enemy Situation, Strength and Capabilities - Prior to Operation Cimarron.

(1) Enemy Situation. The area of operation was not considered to be a VC stronghold or supply area. Enemy intentions in the area were to disrupt the flow of supplies to U. S. forces at Con Thien, and harass the upgrading and improvement work in progress on Highway 561.

(2) Enemy Strength. No known or identified enemy units were committed in the area of operation. The following surprise firing devices and mines, implaced prior to Operation Cimarron, constituted the immediate enemy threat throughout the battalion AO.

(a) AP mines reported in Grid Square YD 1767.

(b) Possible AT mines on Highway 561 from coordinates YD 145613 to Con Thien, at coordinates YD 115701.

(3) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy had the capability to move troops into the area of operation from the north and northeast. These troops would likely be elements of the 812th NVA Regiment. Local Force VC units operating West and South of Cam Lo Village, coordinates YD 138595, could also be moved into the area of operation.

b. Enemy Situation and Strength - During Operation Cimarron

(1) There was no contact with enemy forces during the period 1 - 10 June 1967. There were five VC initiated incidents during this period; 2 mines, 1 booby trap, 1 artillery, 1 wire cutting.

(a) Company E received 4 incoming artillery rounds from the north on the morning of 2 June 1967. Area of impact was in the vicinity of coordinates YD 135673 and YD 132663. These rounds may have been enemy H & I fire.

(b) On 3 June 1967, a land line between the battalion CP, at coordinates YD 147615, and the Cam Lo bridge, at coordinates YD 143605 was cut in 4 places in the vicinity of coordinates YD 150606. The wire was 15 meters off the road to avoid inadvertent cutting by vehicles. These four cuts appeared to have been made by wire cutters.

(c) On 4 June 1967, Company E detonated a surprise firing device at coordinates YD 173670. This device was on the side of a trail and was believed to be an AP mine.

(d) On 6 June 1967, a bulldozer hit an AT mine at coordinates YD 133626 while working on Highway 561.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

(e) On 8 June 1967, Company E detonated a Chicom grenade rigged with a nylon monofilament fishing line. This device was rigged about 4 feet off a trail at coordinates YD 173679.

(2) During the period 1 - 10 June 1967, enemy bunkers were discovered and destroyed at coordinates YD 121682 and YD 137667. Small quantities of equipment and supplies were located in these bunkers and evacuated or destroyed. An enemy camp site consisting of 8 huts and 100 fighting holes was discovered at coordinates YD 164683. The camp site appeared to have been last used in early May 1967. Small quantities of equipment were discovered and evacuated. The camp site was destroyed.

(3) During the period 1 - 10 June 1967, 60mm mortar rounds were discovered and blown in place at coordinates YD 147628 and YD 136673.

(4) On 3 June 1967, one VCS was apprehended at coordinates YD 122600 as he tried to avoid a Company H patrol. The VCS had no ID card, could not be identified by the local villagers, and had in his possession one USMC dog tag. The VCS was evacuated to Dong Ha.

(5) Vietnamese civilians from Ha Thanh Village, coordinates YD 218698 pass thru the northern part of the area of operation daily in order to harvest crops. These daily treks were composed of up to 300 people. On 2 June 1967, the Vietnamese civilians were stopped for identification purposes at Van Kim Village, coordinates YD 152682. The group, under the leadership of a Catholic priest, were all properly identified.

c. Summary of Significant Enemy Activities. There were no significant enemy activities during the period 1 - 10 June in the area of operation. It is significant to note, however, that although patrolling was extensive, and no enemy contact was made during this period, mines and surprise firing devices existed and may still exist in this area.

P. Mission. Reference (b) assigned the following missions to 2d Battalion, (Rein), 3d Marines:

- (a) Provide security for artillery position located vicinity 147617.
- (b) Position forces along route 561 in ZOA to provide security for MSR and ford site vicinity 136666 by aggressive patrolling along the flanks.
- (c) Provide security for mine sweep team along route 561 (MSR) in ZOA.
- (d) Provide security for Cam Lo bridge site.
- (e) Provide security for truck convoys between vicinity 145615 and Con Thien.

~~SECRET~~ ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

(f) Control traffic on MSR between Con Thien and vicinity 145615, each convoy having a minimum of one platoon (rein) as security.

(g) Provide security for 11th Engineer Battalion personnel and equipment while upgrading MSR.

(h) Be prepared to provide relief/reinforcement of Gio Linh, CUA Viet Facility and Con Thien CIDG Camp in the event of enemy attack.

(i) Conduct ground surveillance and spoiling attacks throughout AO with assigned forces to detect infiltrating NVA forces.

(j) Be prepared to provide a platoon (rein) reaction force in the event Cam Lo Resettlement Village comes under enemy attack.

8. Concept. (Enclosure (1)).

a. The battalion established a CP vicinity 147617 and provided security for the artillery position at this location with two reinforced rifle companies.

b. Two rifle companies reinforced were positioned along route 561 (MSR), each establishing platoon patrol base and a company patrol base. These companies conducted aggressive patrolling along the flanks of the MSR.

c. A platoon (rein) was positioned at the Cam Lo bridge site providing security for this site.

d. The following additional missions were assigned to the two rifle companies located at artillery position vicinity 147617.

(1) A squad size security element assisted in daily mine sweeps along the MSR.

(2) A platoon (rein) security element accompanied truck convoys from 145615 and assisted elements of other companies along the MSR in maintaining traffic control.

(3) A squad (rein) size security element accompanied 11th Engineer Battalion personnel while they upgraded the MSR.

(4) Provide relief/reinforcement of Gio Linh, CUA Viet Facility and Con Thien CIDG Camp on order.

(5) Provide a platoon (rein) reaction force on order in the event Cam Lo Resettlement Village was attacked.

e. Ground surveillance was conducted by all companies throughout the AC in order to detect infiltrating NVA forces.

9. Execution

a. Daylight patrolling activities were conducted by Companies E and F along the MSR and by Companies G and H in the immediate areas surrounding the Cam Lo artillery position. Night ambushes were set by all companies in their assigned sectors.

b. Company H dispatched a reinforced squad at 0800 daily to act as security for 11th Engineer Battalion personnel improving the MSR.

DECLASSIFIED

5

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

c. Company G provided a squad size security element at 0600 daily to assist 3rd Engineer Battalion personnel conducting a mine sweep of the MSR.

d. Company G provided a reinforced platoon as security for truck convoys from the Cam Lo artillery position to Con Thien and return. The average number of one way trips was six, with approximately 16 trucks in each convoy.

e. Company G provided a reinforced platoon as security for the Cam Lo bridge site.

f. The following incidents which occurred during Operation Cimarron are worthy of special mention:

(1) 010925H. Company F discovered a booby trapped 60mm mortar round vicinity 147628.

(2) 011130H. Company E found two dead VC in a bunker at 122683. Bodies were decayed.

(3) 020125H. Company E received 4 rounds of unidentified mortar or artillery fire near water point located 136666. No casualties.

(4) 020950H. Company E spot checked 300 civilians for identification in the Van Kim area who were harvesting rice. Civilians were from Ha Thanh village and harvest in this area daily.

(5) 031430H. Company G reported the land line to the Cam Lo River bridge site cut in four places.

(6) 031600H. Company H detained a VCS vicinity 122600. Search of VCS revealed a Marine dog tag with the following information on it: DUKES, J. E. 2159261 USMC, Baptist, Blood Type "A", Gas Mask Size - "M". VCS was sent to Dong Ha Combat Base for interrogation.

(7) 041130H. Company E detonated an AP mine while conducting a sweep vicinity 173670. Company sustained 2 WIA.

(8) 041845H. Company E discovered a camp site with 8 huts and 100 fighting holes vicinity 164683.

(9) 051230H. Company E detained 110 civilians on their way to Van Kim from Ha Thanh. Local priest identified all workers in the party.

(10) 051440H. Company F reported 11th Engineer Battalion bulldozer hit an AT mine on MSR vicinity 133626.

(11) 051815H. Company F dispatched platoon to guard downed helicopter located vicinity 117603.

(12) 060600H. Company H swept designated area north of Cam Lo and set in a company blocking position to act as security for visit of Premier KY to Cam Lo.

(13) 081030H. Company E patrol detonated a CHICOM grenade vicinity 173679 rigged with a nylon trip cord. Patrol sustained 1 WIA.

(14) 090800 - 091600H. Battalion made preparations for and moved from assigned AO to Dong Ha Combat Base.

(15) 100800 - 101500H. Battalion reorganized as a BLT at Dong Ha Combat Base.

6

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

(16) 102400Z. Second Battalion (Rein), 3d Marines CHOPPED OPCON to 3rd Mar Div and awaited arrival of ARG shipping to backload as an SLF.

10. Results

a. Friendly Losses

				<u>USMC</u>			
<u>OFFICER</u>				<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1
				<u>USN</u>			
<u>OFFICER</u>				<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

b. Enemy Losses. There were no significant enemy losses recorded during this operation. As previously stated in paragraph 6, no contact was made with the enemy, however, small quantities of his supplies and equipment were discovered and destroyed in bunkers in the vicinity 121683. On 3 June 1967, one VCS was apprehended and evacuated to Dong Ha Combat Base.

11. Administrative Matters. Administrative functions were normal to a battalion conducting field operations. An administrative rear was established within the confines of the Combat Base located at Dong Ha, prior to the beginning of Operation Cimarron, and this rear continued to function in support of the battalion located in the vicinity of Cam Lo artillery position.

a. Supply Techniques, Combat Loads, Ammunition and Weapons Carried by Assault Troops.

(1) Normal resupply of the battalion in the field was accomplished by rough rider from the battalion rear to the separate companies in the field. Three trucks of the 1st Platoon, Company C, 3d Motor Transport Battalion attached to BLT 2/3 were utilized to conduct this resupply. Resupply requests were passed from the S-4 representative in the field to the S-4 section's administrative rear where supplies were staged and convoys originated. Supplies of all types were drawn from the LSA located in Dong Ha. Nominal logistic support was received from a field LSA located within the battalion perimeter during the first few days of the operation. No difficulties in resupply were encountered.

(2) The combat loads and weapons prescribed by Administrative Plan 3-67 and the Battalion SOP for Operations were carried throughout the operation. No special weapons or equipment were employed.

(3) Battalion Supply, located with the administrative rear, continued to conduct normal supply functions throughout the operation in support of both the rear and forward elements of the battalion. The supply section made daily runs to Delta Med to recover any weapons and equipment of battalion casualties.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

b. Maintenance. Normal second echelon maintenance was conducted by the battalion throughout the operation. Third echelon maintenance was available through FSLU located in Dong Ha.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation, and Hospitalization

(1) First echelon medical care was provided by corpsmen attached directly to the rifle companies, and by four corpsmen attached to the command group.

(2) A rear BAS consisting of two medical officers and the remainder of the corpsmen was established at the Dong Ha Combat Base, and provided care for all rear area personnel as well as for patients sent from the field. A small field hospital was set up in this area for care of patients with minor wounds, infections etc., who could be returned to their companies after short duration care.

(3) A daily sick call was held by a medical officer at both Cam Lo and Dong Ha, and patients were brought by jeep ambulance from each of these locations to "D" Med in Dong Ha for second echelon care. Emergencies were evacuated by helicopter directly to the "D" Med facility. Patients who needed third echelon care were evacuated quickly and efficiently from Dong Ha to either "A" Med Battalion in Phu Bai or to the N. S. A. Hospital in Da Nang.

(4) A summary of casualties is as follows:

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
KIA	0	0	0	0
WIA (evac)	0	2	0	0
WIA (Non evac)	0	0	0	0
Non Battle	0	44	0	0
DOW's	0	1	0	0

(5) Three cases of malaria, presumably contracted in previous operations around the DMZ, were evacuated. No cases of heat exhaustion were evacuated. The remainder of the non-battle casualties constituted dental problems, sprains and other non serious conditions. No DOW's or morbidity due to delayed evacuation was encountered.

d. Transportation. The battalion had limited organic vehicles ashore during Operation Cimarron. A detachment of the 1st Platoon, Company C, 3rd Motor Transport Battalion augmented these vehicles and proved to be of considerable value in resupplying the forward elements of the battalion. Helicopters were used only once throughout the operat-

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
[REDACTED]
 UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ion for a tactical move, but served as the primary transportation means in the evacuation of casualties. The relief and movement of the battalion from Cam Lo to Dong Ha Combat Base was accomplished in coordination with the 9th Marine Regiment and the 9th Motor Transport Battalion.

e. Communications

(1) During Operation Cimarron, the communications section was responsible for providing convoy control communication for the convoy route from Dong Ha, through Cam Lo, and to Con Thien. A PRC-25 was sufficient for this purpose. In addition, radio circuits were provided for the battalion TAC net and a special night defense net which linked all units manning the defensive perimeter of the Cam Lo artillery position.

(2) Two TRC-27 were used to provide radio-relay links with the 9th Marines and the battalion rear, both located at the Dong Ha Combat Base. Intergrated wire systems were installed both at the battalion CP and battalion rear utilizing two SB-22 switchboards.

(3) Communications during Operation Cimarron were generally excellent with no unusual problems arising.

f. Medical Evaluation

1. Medical care on all echelon levels and evacuation procedures were satisfactory for care of the battalion.

2. The incidence of malaria in the battalion was far below that encountered by other units participating in operations near and in the DMZ, where the disease was presumably contracted.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

13. Commander's Analysis. The battalion's participation in Operation Cimarron was solely one of security, and was characterized by negative enemy contact. There were no interruptions to convoy movement or road improvement along the MSR. It is believed that this was due largely to the aggressive patrolling conducted by Companies E and F along route 516, the coordinated procedures which were used to sweep and maintain the MSR, and the manner in which traffic control was maintained, utilizing prominently spaced check points backed up by good communication, with convoy commanders.

W. O. Beard
 W. O. BEARD

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
 UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602

COMBAT 00270-67
COMBAT 11 60

UNCLASSIFIED

03/JJO/pgr
3000
3 July 1967
Ser No. 0028-67

~~SECRET~~

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo
Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation Beacon Torch/Calhoun)
Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, AMS 1:50,000 I7014, Sheets 6640 I, 6640 II, 6640 III, 6640 IV.
(b) CTG 79.5 Frag Order (Operation Beacon Torch).
(c) CTG 79.5 Frag Order (Operation Calhoun).
Encl: (1) ✓ Overlay of Operation Beacon Torch/Calhoun.

1. Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN

2. Dates of Operation:

- a. BEACON TORCH 180600H - 021300H July 1967
- b. CALHOUN 250600H June - 011200H July 1967

3. Location. Operation Beacon Torch/Calhoun was conducted in Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province, and Thang Binh and Que Son Districts, Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam.

4. Task Organization:

BLT 2/3

Major BEARD

- H & S Co (-) (Rein)
- Det, Hq Bn, 3rd Mar Div
- Det, Hq Co, 3rd Mar
- Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar
- Det, 15th Dental Co
- 2nd Clearing Plat (Rein), Co B, 3rd Med Bn
- 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
- 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd MI Bn
- 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn
- Det, (-) ISU, For Log Qnd

COPY OF BEACON TORCH/Calhoun 13 June - 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Co E (Rein)

Co E

Det, H & S Co
 1st Sec, 81mm Mort Plat
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn 12th Mar
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Capt BOGARD

Co F (Rein)

Co F

Det, H & S Co
 2nd Sec, 81mm Mort Plat
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 FAC Tm
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Capt VAUGHAN

Co G (Rein)

Co G

Det, H & S Co
 3rd Sec, 81mm Mort Plat
 NGF Spot Tm
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 Det "A" (-) BJU-1
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

Capt SHEEHAN

Co H (Rein)

Co H

Det, H & S Co
 4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plat
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 Det, "A" (-) BJU-1
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Capt CULVER

106mm RR Plat"B" Btry (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

2nd Lt. ELMS

Capt FILE

UNCLASSIFIED

Provisional Company

Det, (-), LSU, For Log Cnd

1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd MT Bn

1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

1st Lt HUGHES

UNCLASSIFIED

3rd Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bn

3rd Plat, Co B

Det, H & S Co, 1st AMTRAC Bn

2nd Lt RUSH

2nd Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd AT Bn

2nd Plat, Co A

Det, H & S Co, 3rd AT Bn

2nd Lt LAWLER

3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Recon Bn

1st Lt CARRIGAN

2nd Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Tank Bn

2nd Plat, Co A

Det, H & S Co, 3rd Tank Bn

2nd Lt O'NIEL

5. Supporting Forces

a. Air, artillery and Naval gunfire, were the supporting forces available to the BLT. Naval gunfire was not utilized due to the availability of air or artillery when support was required. The effectiveness of air and artillery support is discussed below.

b. Tanks were utilized during the first three days of the operation, where their effectiveness appeared to be as much psychological as actual thus limiting their use due to a lack of appropriate targets. As the BLT moved farther inland, the tanks were back loaded to amphibious shipping as the tanks were not capable of crossing the Troung Giang River.

c. Each rifle company was provided close combat engineer support for the destruction of enemy fortifications. The attachment of this support, at rifle company level, proved to be the most effective method of employment, allowing immediate and effective destruction of enemy fortifications as the battalion moved through areas where search and destroy missions were conducted.

d. Air Support:

(1) Fixed wing and UH-1E's provided by the 1st MAW, were used for preplanned and immediate missions, especially during the initial portion of the operation as targets were discovered. Particularly noteworthy is the excellent close air support provided by the UH-1E's.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

The inherent mobility and maneuverability of these aircraft, especially at near ground level altitudes, enabled the battalion to utilize this weapon to pinpoint and destroy targets of opportunity, such as snipers and small groups of enemy with an amazing degree of accuracy and timeliness. All close air support was controlled by the battalion ALNO, FAC's and Marine TAC (A). Fixed wing aircraft conducted eight missions delivering 36,000 pounds of ordnance while the UH-1E's expended 700 rockets in support of BLT 2/3.

(2) Logistical support, MEDEVAC, troop landing and tactical troop movement support were furnished by CH-46's from HMM 164 while CH-53's from 1st MAW provided movement for the Artillery Battery. Logistical support was satisfactory, although at times, delay in response to early morning logistical requirements caused delay in tactical movement. The two troop movements conducted by CH-46's were deficient in that landing zones actually utilized were not those requested and approved, resulting in a loss of tactical mobility. The delay in completing the displacement of Battery "B" by CH-53's was also unacceptable and could have adversely affected the tactical situation. The response to MEDEVAC requests, especially from units on the move was immediate and very satisfactory.

e. Artillery. Artillery support was available and utilized by the battalion during this operation. Support was received from 2d Battalion, 12th Marines and all missions were either preplanned or immediate. The preplanned missions consisted of R & I fires and night defensive registrations around platoon and company patrol bases and other likely avenues of enemy approach. Immediate missions were requested on suspected enemy positions and ambush sites during daylight patrolling activities. A total of 815 rounds of 105mm fire was delivered in support of the battalion.

6. Intelligence

a. Enemy Situation, Strength and Capabilities Prior to Operation BEACON TROCH.

(1) Enemy Situation. The area of operation was a forward logistics base and possible training area for support of operations in the river delta and coastal plains.

(2) Enemy Strength:

- (a) 1st Bn, 3rd NVA Regiment.
Strength: 200
Location: BT 013385
- (b) 3rd Bn, 3rd NVA Regiment.
Strength: 200
Location: BT 087373

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (c) 3rd NVA Regiment (Headquarters)
Strength: 210
Location: BT 080260
- (d) V-28 Local Force Company
Strength: 100
Location: BT 160470
- (e) V-29 Local Force Company
Strength: 100
Location: BT 190530
- (f) Unidentified NVA Battalion
Strength: 400
Location: BT 190530
- (g) Unidentified Local Force Company
Strength: 100
Location: BT 220520
- (h) District Local Guerrilla Forces

District	Strength
Que Son	702
Duy Xuyen	852

(i) The enemy was equipped with 120mm mortars, 82mm mortars, 81mm mortars, 60mm mortars, 57mm RR, 14.7 AA/MG, automatic weapons and small arms.

(3) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy had the capability to:

- (a) Attack with a force of up to one NVA Regiment.
- (b) Defend with a force of up to one NVA Regiment.
- (c) Reinforce in connection with (a) or (b) above.
- (d) Evade direct contact and resort to spoiling attacks, ambushes, and harassment with mines and surprise firing devices.

b. Enemy Strength and Situation - During Operation BEACON TORCH.

(1) 18 June 1967. The helicopter landing of companies H and F in the vicinity of coordinates BT 214173 was unopposed, although three of the assault helicopters did receive semi-automatic fire from the vicinity of coordinates BT 217497. The waterborne assault at coordinates BT 230518 by Company G was unopposed. At 0935H, Company H received semi-automatic fire and two 60mm rounds. The main enemy force encountered in the vicinity of coordinates BT 211504 consisted of an estimated 100 men

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

wearing light green uniforms. This force, believed to be a main force company, choose to defend from approximately 1540H until being driven from its position late in the evening. Contact was then broken by the enemy unit. Semi-automatic fire and sniper fire was received during the day at coordinates BT 194495 and BT 206493. On the evening of 18 June 1967, the Battalion CP received two hand grenades at coordinates BT 202482. Enemy casualties for 18 June 1967 were 31 KIA (confirmed), 50 KIA (probable) and 2 VCS.

(2) 19 June 1967. 19 June 1967 was characterized by sniper and semi-automatic fire. Fire was received from the vicinity of coordinates BT 211517 and BT 166519. One VCS carrying 3 green uniforms was captured at coordinates BT 172528 while signaling to three VC. Two thousand lbs. of rice was discovered and destroyed at coordinates BT 172528. Enemy losses for 19 June 1967 were 1 KIA (probable), 1 VCS, 3 uniforms and 2,000 pounds of rice.

(3) 20 June 1967. 20 June 1967, was similar to 19 June, in that the enemy employed semi-automatic fire and sniper fire to harass friendly troop activity from approximately 0700H to 1900H. Fire was received from vicinity of coordinates BT 162497, BT 195487, BT 170528, BT 214557, BT 169528 and BT 202482. Eight bunkers and 7 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition were discovered and destroyed at vicinity coordinates BT 214557. One VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 167522 and two more VCS at coordinates BT 139488. Enemy losses for 20 June 1967 were 4 KIA (confirmed), 3 VCS, 8 bunkers and 7 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition.

(4) 21 June 1967. Light enemy contact characterized the majority of 21 June 1967, with sniper fire and automatic weapons fire received from coordinates BT 202482, BT 145502 and BT 203448. On the evening of 21 June 1967, Company G was taken under fire by 20 NVA soldiers dressed in light green uniforms at coordinates BT 090478. Upon receiving fire from Company G, the enemy broke contact and moved west. Bicycle tracks on a 50 yard front with deep wheel impressions were discovered on an axis from coordinates BT 090478 to BT 093486 to BT 090488 to BT 091496. Enemy losses for 21 June 1967 were 2 KIA (confirmed), and 2 KIA (probable).

(5) 22 June 1967. Sniper and semi-automatic weapons fire from coordinates BT 096480, BT 202488, BT 098473 and BT 116404 constituted enemy contact on 22 June 1967. One VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 112482. Company G encountered a M-15 anti-personnel mine at coordinates BT 083490. Company E discovered 100 unexploded "Butterfly" bombs at coordinates BT 080507. Enemy losses for 22 June 1967 were 1 VCS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(6) 23 June 1967. On 23 June 1967, contact was limited to semi-automatic weapons fire from coordinates BT 068447 and BT 063484. An exploding device and an anti-personnel mine were found and destroyed at coordinates BT 078496 and two more mines were discovered and destroyed at BT 092452. One VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 119477 and three more from BT 142462. Three hundred pounds of rice were discovered and evacuated from coordinates BT 075478 and 1,500 additional pounds from BT 081482. Company E found "Butterfly" bomblets at coordinates BT 119487. Enemy losses for 23 June 1967 were 4 VCS and 1,800 pounds of rice.

(7) 24 June 1967. Contact with the enemy on this day consisted of semi-automatic fire received at coordinates BT 157456 and contact with an estimated 20 VC at coordinates BT 089470. Company G reported 8 KIA (confirmed) as a result of an air strike at coordinates BT 089470. The following fortifications/positions were destroyed: Mortar position and trench line at coordinates BT 131454; three fresh fighting holes at coordinates BT 122460 and a tunnel complex at coordinates BT 089470. One VC was captured at coordinates BT 089470. Equipment and supplies captured on 24 June 1967 included: 6,000 pounds of rice, 4,000 pounds of potatoes, eating utensils for 200 men and a seabag of documents and medical supplies at coordinates BT 081481; a uniform, civilian clothes, a gas mask, eating utensils and a bicycle at coordinates BT 089470; and fifteen sand bags of sugar, 300 pounds of charcoal, a small amount of medical supplies and 6,460 pounds of rice at coordinates BT 089470. In addition to these supplies and equipment, enemy losses for 24 June 1967 were 8 KIA (confirmed) and 1 VC captured.

c. Enemy Situation, Strength and Capabilities-Prior to Operation CALHOUN

(1) Enemy Situation. The area of operation was a forward logistics base and possible training area for support of operations in the river delta and coastal plains.

(2) Enemy Strength. No known enemy units were reported in the Area of Operations.

(3) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy has the capability to:

(a) Avoid contact and harass friendly units with sniper fire and surprise firing devices.

(b) Reinforce the area of operations.

(c) In connection with (b) above, to attack or defend locally if offered an advantageous tactical situation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

d. Enemy Strength and Situation-During Operation CALHOUN.

(1) 25 June 1967. One incident of sniper fire at coordinates BT 157456 constituted enemy contact on 25 June 1967. Three VCS were apprehended at coordinates BT 075466 and another at BT 084446. Four bear traps, 500 pounds of rice and 100 pounds of tapioca were discovered at coordinates BT 055448, and 4,000 pounds of rice and six bear traps at BT 055447. A VC, tentatively identified as chief of training and operations cadre on the province level was shot and killed at coordinates BT 055447. Records and supplies were recovered. In addition to the supplies listed above enemy losses for 25 June 1967 were 4 VCS, and 1 KIA (confirmed).

(2) 26 June 1967. Contact with the enemy on 26 June 1967, was limited to firing on 3 VC at coordinates BT 044434, resulting in 1 KIA (confirmed), and the recovery of 1 rifle and 1 pair of shoes. One tunnel was discovered and destroyed at coordinates BT 061461, and caves at coordinates BT 068467 and BT 053412. A total of 27,800 pounds of rice and 250 pounds of sugar were discovered and evacuated from coordinates BT 062455, BT 052447, BT 066464 and BT 052445. In addition to the supplies and equipment listed above, enemy losses for 26 June 1967 were one KIA (confirmed).

(3) 27 June 1967. On 27 June 1967, one VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 159450 and two more VCS at BT 156449. An exploding device with markings "Bomb, Inc. FMN 7 A/B", was found and destroyed at coordinates BT 122473. A cigarette lighter with "403" on the front was discovered at coordinates BT 156449. In addition to the 3 VCS, enemy losses for 27 June 1967 included 10,000 pounds of rice discovered and evacuated from coordinates BT 059441.

(4) 28 June 1967. There was negative enemy contact on 28 June 1967. Bunkers were discovered and destroyed at coordinates BT 091444 and BT 097441. One VCS was detained at coordinates BT 166448. Enemy losses for 28 June 1967 were one VCS.

(5) 29 June 1967. Enemy contact on 29 June 1967, was limited to sniper fire at coordinates BT 162462 and 3 VC engaged at coordinates BT 135429. Two civilians reported 50 enemy at coordinates BT 113427 at 0800H moving rapidly in a southwesterly direction. They were dressed in black pajamas, carried packs and were armed with carbines and rifles. Due to a difference in accent, 25 of the enemy were believed to be NVA. One VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 127476. Enemy losses for 29 June 1967 were two KIA (confirmed), 1 KIA (probable), two VCS and eight packs of rice.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(6) 30 June 1967. On 30 June 1967, semi-automatic rifle fire was received from coordinates BT 192454, BT 207464, and BT 217465. Friendly fire into these three areas resulted in enemy losses for 30 June 1967, of 5 KIA (confirmed), 3 KIA (probable), as well as a Chicom grenade, one AK-47, one carbine and miscellaneous NVA 782 gear recovered at coordinates BT 192454.

(7) 1 July 1967. Enemy contact on 1 July 1967 was limited to semi-automatic fire received from the vicinity of coordinates BT 239448. Ten punji pits and spider holes were discovered and destroyed at coordinates BT 241482. One of the punji pits was rigged with a Chicom grenade. Enemy losses for 1 July 1967 were two VCS apprehended at BT 235485.

(8) 2 July 1967. Early on the morning of 2 July 1967, the enemy probed friendly lines with automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire at coordinates BT 244478. At first light, one MAS-36 rifle, an ammunition belt, a pouch and three medical vials were discovered at coordinates BT 242481 and two Chicom grenades and an M-26 grenade at coordinates BT 244476. In addition to this equipment, enemy losses on 2 July 1967 were three KIA (confirmed), and three KIA (probable). Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN terminated at 021300H July 1967.

e. Summary of Significant Enemy Activities. There were no significant enemy activities during Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN. However two points are worthy of comment.

(1) The Viet Cong appeared to completely control the civilians in the area of operations east of the Truong Giang River. Indoctrination and enemy propaganda seemed extensive; civilians/VCS were generally uncooperative, and the civilians in most case flatly refused to be evacuated to RVN areas, even though they were exposed to artillery fire and air strikes.

(2) In the area known as "Pagoda Valley", the Viet Cong made no visible attempt to defend rice caches or to evacuate the 31 tons of rice captured in this area. This situation is attributed equally to two reasons: (a) The enemy did not expect the operation to extend the length of "Pagoda Valley"; and (b), once friendly forces reached into the valley in force, defense of the area until the rice caches could be evacuated was no longer tactically advisable or advantageous since the cache would still have been lost as well as casualties in its defense.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

7. Mission

a. Operation BEACON TORCH. On D-Day at L-H hour BLT 2/3 lands in designated landing Zone/Beach areas to secure landing Force Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4; conducts search and destroy operations in assigned sector with maximum effort to prevent the enemy from infiltration/exfiltration from area; designates one rifle company as Landing Force reserve, prepared to land by helicopter or surface; provides platoon size sparrow hawk force from reserve company.

b. Operation CALHOUN. BLT 2/3 on order conducts Search and Destroy operations in assigned Area of Operation, and be prepared to execute a tactical withdrawal.

8. Concept of Operationsa. Operation BEACON TORCH

(1) BLT 2/3 conducted a helicopter/waterborne assault into an assigned landing/beach area to secure Landing Force Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4. Two rifle companies with a command group landed by helicopter, secured the zone, moved to secure landing Force Objectives 1 and 2 and conducted clearing operations in the center of the assigned ZOA north to the Cua Dai River. One company with tank support landed over red beach and moved north to secure landing Force Objective 4. Either assault force would be directed to seize Landing Force Objective 3. The artillery battery, provisional company, a second command group, and reserve company would be landed by helicopter on order of the Battalion Commander, to aid in securing assigned objectives.

b. Operation CALHOUN

(1) BLT 2/3 conducted diligent search and destroy operations to the southwest in assigned ZOA and on order, conducted a tactical withdrawal from the area.

9. Executiona. Operation BEACON TORCH

- (1) 180630H. Assault elements, Company F landed LZ CARDINAL.
- (2) 180646H. Company F secured LZ CARDINAL.
- (3) 180745H. Command Group A landed LZ CARDINAL.
- (4) 180756H. Assault elements, Company H landed LZ WREN. Received small arms fire vicinity BT 217497.
- (5) 180800H. Company G, landed Red Beach.
- (6) 180845H. Company F, received information from civilians that route of march to north was mined, vicinity of BT 487212.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(7) 180857H. 2nd Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3rd Tank Battalion landed Red Beach.

(8) 180930H. Company H, received small arms fire and two rounds 60mm mortars vicinity of BT 468212. Called in gun ships with negative results. No casualties.

(9) 180945H. Company H, discovered four (4) killed and four (4) wounded civilians vicinity BT 468212. Wounded civilians evacuated to HOI AN.

(10) 180950H. Command Group A received small arms fire vicinity BT 479207. No casualties.

(11) 180955H. Company E, landed LZ WREN.

(12) 181130H. Company E, received small arms fire from vicinity of Objective #1. Returned fire and continued in advance. No casualties.

(13) 181135H. Company H, received small arms fire vicinity BT 495205. Estimated enemy force as platoon size, well dug in. Returned small arms fire with 60mm mortars and gun ships. No casualties.

(14) 181140H. Company G, moving for Objective #4.

(15) 181210H. Company G, uncovered two (2) enemy suspects vicinity BT 538220, who were evacuated to rear area.

(16) 181245H. Company E, engaged in fire fight with enemy size force of seven (7) vicinity BT 185500. One (1) enemy confirmed at this time. No friendly casualties.

(17) 181255H. Company E, search of area indicated blood trails and used bandages. Three (3) enemy KIA (probable). No friendly casualties.

(18) 181255H. Company H, observed enemy size of thirty (30) in open area vicinity BT 205500. Called in gun ships.

(19) 181330H. Composite Company, (GR November) landed LZ WREN.

(20) 181330H. Company F, observed enemy size force of ten (10) in vicinity BT 195469. Called in fixed wing. Pilot reported two (2) enemy KIA (confirmed).

(21) 181425H. Company E, secured Objective #1.

(22) 181515H. B Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines landed LZ WREN.

(23) 181530H. Company E, discovered fifty (50) punji traps and fighting holes vicinity of BT 177508. Destroyed obstacles and positions.

(24) 181540H. Company H, reported one hundred (100) enemy wearing light green uniforms carrying packs and weapons vicinity of BT 211504. Engaged enemy with small arms fire, 60mm mortars and fixed wing. Enemy returned fire in Company H area. Result of air coverage 23 enemy KIA (confirmed) and 44 enemy KIA (probable).

(25) 181555H. Command Group B landed LZ WREN.

(26) 181600H. Company H, pulled back from enemy contact to call in additional air support vicinity of BT 211504. Company H suffered five (5) KIA, fourteen (14) WIA and forty three (43) Non-Battle Casualties.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

- (27) 181605H. Company F, moved to assist Company H vicinity of BT 211504. Swept area west of Company H with negative results.
- (28) 181645H. Company G, started sweep of Objective #4, supported by gunships, resulting in three (3) enemy KIA (confirmed).
- (29) 181852H. Company G, evacuated one (1) family of five (5) to HOI AN. Family had previously identified two (2) VCS.
- (30) 181815H. Command Group, GR November and Battery receiving small arms fire vicinity of LZ WREN.
- (31) 181900H. Company E secured Objective #2.
- (32) 181900H. Companies F and H receiving small arms fire and eight (8) rounds of 61mm mortar fire vicinity of BT 206504, and BT 206493. Company F suffered 1 KIA and 7 WIA. Company H suffered 6 WIA.
- (33) 181900H. Received Frag Order #1 from CTG 79.5.
- (34) 181915H. Company G, secured Objective #4.
- (35) 181930H. Company F, swept area front of Company H with small arms fire, 60mm and 81mm mortars. Called in fixed wing support vicinity BT 214504. Results of sweep were two (2) enemy KIA (confirmed) and two (2) enemy KIA (probable).
- (36) 182240H. Issued Frag Order #38-67.
- (37) 182315H. Command Group received two (2) enemy grenades during probe of perimeter. No casualties.
- (38) 190900H. Company G, upon destroying two (2) 500 pound bombs vicinity of BT 210560, suffered one (1) WIA from bomb fragments.
- (39) 190945H. Company F, received sniper and automatic fire vicinity BT 211517. Returned small arms fire, 60mm and 81mm mortar fire. Three (3) friendly WIA and one (1) enemy KIA (confirmed) and one (1) enemy KIA (probable).
- (40) 191145H. Company H, vicinity of BT 203513 encountered enemy force of 15. Taken under fire by small arms. Enemy believed to have moved in northwesterly direction. No casualties.
- (41) 191150H. Detached Tanks from Company G to vicinity of Companies F and H, in direct support of Company F.
- (42) 191200H. Company E, received sniper fire from hut vicinity of BT 166519, returned fire with M-79. Hut destroyed and sniper silenced. One (1) enemy KIA (probable).
- (43) 191300H. Beach Jumper Team detached from Company G, returned to USS Tripoli.
- (44) 191335H. Composite Company, discovered 500 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 200478. Rice evacuated to HOI AN.
- (45) 191615H. Company H, uncovered eight (8) vats of buried rice, each weighing about 250 pounds vicinity of BT 185518. Destroyed rice by burning due to being on move and unable to evacuate.
- (46) 191705H. Company E, discovered woman signalling across river vicinity of BT 169521. Three (3) enemy seen and taken under small arms fire. One enemy KIA (confirmed). One (1) detainee evacuated to HOI AN.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (47) 191830H. Companies F and H secured Objective #3.
- (48) 191845H. Attached Tanks returned to Company G positions.
- (49) 191850H. Received Frag Order #2 from CTG 79.5.
- (50) 191900H. "B" Battery received sniper fire in vicinity of CP. Returned fire with small arms and sniper silenced. "B" Battery sustained two (2) WIA's.
- (51) 192200H. CP receiving probes of perimeter. No casualties.
- (52) 192345H. Issued Frag Order #39-67.
- D+2 (53) 200740H. CP receiving sniper fire. Returned fire with small arms silencing sniper. H & S Company suffered two (2) WIA.
- (54) 200845H. Company E, executed river crossing in vicinity of BT 163515.
- (55) 200930H. Company H, jumped off from Objective #5 in movement to river crossing position, vicinity of BT 169522.
- (56) 200930H. Beach Jumper Team rejoins Company G.
- (57) 201000H. Company E, receiving small arms fire vicinity of Objective #6. Returned fire with 60mm mortars and small arms. No casualties.
- (58) 201055H. Company E, secured Objective #6.
- (59) 201200H. Composite Company patrol vicinity of BT 195487. Received small arms fire. Returned fire with small arms. One (1) enemy KIA (confirmed). Apprehended three (3) VCS detainees which were evacuated to USS Tripoli. Destroyed 15 enemy positions.
- (60) 211230H. Composite Company patrol returned to CP with one (1) woman and one (1) child that had been wounded seriously. Evacuated to USS Tripoli.
- (61) 201230H. Company G, discovered eight (8) bunkers and seven (7) rounds of 57mm Recoilless Rifle ammunition, vicinity of BT 215553. Destroyed in place.
- (62) 211250H. Issued modification to Frag Order #39-67. Company E to seize Objective #7. Company G to land in assigned LZ and seize Objective #8, then proceed onto Objective #9. Upon seizure of Objective #7, Company E be prepared to seize Objective #10.
- (63) 201335H. Lead elements of Company H across river at vicinity BT 169522 encountered great difficulty in fording.
- (64) 201400H. Company G, landed LZ Blue Jay. Upon being lifted, received small arms fire vicinity of BT 210558. Returned fire, resulting in one (1) enemy KIA (confirmed).
- (65) 201500H. Companies E and G, secured Objectives #7 and #8 respectively.
- (66) 201600H. Company H completed river crossing and moving toward Objective #5.
- (67) 201655H. Company H, received small arms fire vicinity of BT 170528. Called in artillery, firing 70 rounds 105mm. Results were six (6) enemy KIA (probable), with excellent target coverage.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (68) 201700H. Company F, arrived CP perimeter and assumed responsibility with Composite Company.
- (69) 201705H. Company H, apprehended one (1) VCS vicinity of BT 166522. Evacuated to USS Tripoli.
- (70) 201730H. Company G, apprehended two (2) VCS vicinity BT 139488. Evacuated to USS Tripoli.
- (71) 201800H. Company H secured Objective #5.
- (72) 201900H. Company H, received small arms fire vicinity BT 169528. Called in artillery silencing enemy fire. No casualties.
- (73) 201900H. H & S Company received small arms fire in the vicinity of CP. Returned small arms fire. H & S Co suffered two (2) WIA's.
- (74) 202000H. Received Frag Order #3 from CTG 79.5.
- (75) 202150H. Female CHIEN HOI truned herself in at CP perimeter. She was slightly wounded.
- (76) 202210H. CP perimeter received small arms fire on outer edge of perimeter. Called in gun ships. No casualties.
- (77) 202300H. Issued Frag Order #40-67.
- (78) 210820H. Company G, secured Objective #9.
- (79) 210830H. Company E, secured Objective #10.
- (80) 210930H. Company H, received small arms fire vicinity BT 145502. Returned fire with artillery. Company H suffered two (2) WIA's.
- (81) 210930H. Company F, received sniper fire into CP perimeter. Returned fire, sniper silenced. Company F suffered (1) WIA.
- (82) 211200H. Company F, squad size patrol received small arms fire vicinity of BT 200480. Returned fire, and observed enemy in spider traps and fighting positions. Three (3) friendly WIA's.
- (83) 211700H. Company G, received small arms fire from an estimated enemy force of about twenty (20) men dressed in light green uniforms. Returned small arms fire with mortars and gun ships. Results were two (2) enemy KIA (probable), and two (2) friendly WIA's.
- (84) 211700H. Command Groups A and B displaced forward to join with Company H, vicinity of BT 122473.
- (85) 211750H. Received Frag Order #4 from CTG 79.5.
- (86) 212210H. Issued Frag Order #41-67.
- (87) 220730H. Company E, located one hundred (100) butterfly bomb-lets vicinity of BT 080507. Marked and reported location.
- (88) 220930H. Company H, apprehended one (1) male, age 35, vicinity of BT 112482. Detainee did not have ID card, and was sent to USS Tripoli.
- (89) 221030H. Company H, apprehended one (1) VCS vicinity of BT 112482. Detained and sent to USS Tripoli.
- (90) 221145H. "B" Battery received sniper fire his position. Returned fire, resulting in enemy cease fire. "B" Battery sustained one (1) WIA.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(91) 221150H. Company G, upon clearing his position, set off one (1) land mine vicinity of BT 083488. Mine explosion caused eighteen (18) friendly WIA's.

(92) 221205H. "B" Battery and Composite Company completed lift to new firing position, vicinity of BT 150450.

(93) 221605H. Upon lifting Company F to new LZ vicinity BT 113473, support gun ships engaged enemy force of about 15. Resulting in three (3) enemy KIA (confirmed), and ten (10) enemy KIA (probable).

(94) 221615H. Company F, completed lift to LZ located BT 113473.

(95) 221615H. Company G, engaged enemy size force of about six (6), vicinity of BT 098475. Enemy fled west. Two (2) enemy KIA (prob).

(96) 221705H. Company G, discovered seven (7) enemy bunkers vicinity of BT 098476. All were destroyed in place.

(97) 221710H. Company H, apprehended one (1) VCS which was slightly wounded in foot. Detainee had no ID card and was evacuated to USS Tripoli.

(98) 221940H. Company G, while being re-supplied sniper engaged helicopter with small arms fire. Suspected enemy sniper position covered by gun ships. Results: one (1) enemy KIA (probable).

(99) 222000H. BAS commenced this AM, MEDCAP program in 2/3 CP area. Results of treatments: 10 men, 10 women and 8 children. Usual ailments were infected sores and minor ailments.

(100) 222005H. Received Frag Order #5 from CTG 79.5.

(101) 222300H. Issued Frag Order #42-67.

(102) 230710H. Company E, discovered exploding device vicinity of BT 078496. Destroyed in place. No casualties.

(103) 230815H. Company H, Apprehended one (1) VCS, vicinity of BT 119477. Evacuated detainee to USS Tripoli.

(104) 231015H. Company E, received small arms fire vicinity of BT 068477. Returned fire with small arms and mortars. Enemy fire ceased. No casualties.

(105) 231300H. Company E, uncovered approximately 300 pounds rice, vicinity of BT 075478. Destroyed rice in place by burning.

(106) 231430H. Company E, uncovered about 1,500 pounds of buried rice, vicinity of BT 081482. Rice was bagged and evacuated to HOI AN.

(107) 231555H. Company F, engaged four (4) VCS, one armed with carbine. Fired upon enemy with small arms, and armed VCS took off in westerly direction. Remaining three (3) VCS were apprehended and evacuated to USS Tripoli.

(108) 231545H. Company G, discovered a tunnel complex, vicinity of BT 094453. Complex searched with negative results and was destroyed in place.

(109) 231600H. Company F, discovered old trench line about 100 feet long, vicinity of BT 134445. Destroyed in place.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (110) 231700H. BAS MEDCAP program treated: 20 women, 9 men and 18 children, all for minor ailments.
- (111) 231800H. Received Frag Order #6 from CTR 79.5.
- (112) 231830H. Issued Frag Order #43-67.
- (113) 240730H. Company E, uncovered 3 tons of rice, 2 tons of potatoes, vicinity of BT 081481. Rice bagged and evacuated to HOI AN.
- (114) 240825H. Company F, discovered one (1) mortar position with trench line. Position was newly constructed and was destroyed in place. Trench line was located vicinity of BT 151454.
- (115) 241100H. Company G, taken under fire from enemy force of about fifteen (15) located vicinity of BT 089470. Returned small arms fire with 60mm mortars and on station gun ships. Negative results. Company G sustained one (1) WIA.
- (116) 241115H. Company G. Enemy was taken under fire again by gun ships while attempting to remove wounded from vicinity of BT 089470. Enemy losses were eight (8) KIA (confirmed).
- (117) 241420H. Composite Company received sniper fire vicinity of "B" Battery perimeter. Returned fire and sniper silenced. Composite Company suffered two (2) WIA's.
- (118) 241605H. Company G, apprehended one (1) VCS who was slightly wounded and had one (1) grenade with him, vicinity of BT 089470. Evacuated to USS Tripoli.
- (119) 241800H. Company F, apprehended one (1) VCS vicinity of BT 095450. Detainee was evacuated to USS Tripoli.
- (120) 241800H. BAS MEDCAP program treated: 10 men, 8 women and 12 children, all for minor ailments.
- (121) 241800H. All units at required positions LOA.
- (122) 241805H. Operational Order for CALHOUN.
- (123) 241900H. Issued Frag Order #44-67.

b. Operation CALHOUN

- 1277
- (1) 250600H. Operation Calhoun commenced.
- (2) 250950H. Company G, apprehended three (3) VCS, vicinity of BT 072466. Evacuated to DIEN BAN.
- (3) 251130H. Company F, apprehended one (1) VCS, vicinity of BT 076447, evacuated to DIEN BAN.
- (4) 251300H. Company E, located 1,000 lbs. of rice, vicinity of BT 070455. Rice bagged for evacuation to DIEN BAN.
- (5) 251440H. Composite Company, received sniper fire vicinity of "B" Battery perimeter. Returned fire and sniper silenced. One (1) friendly WIA.
- (6) 251445H. Company G, discovered four (4) unarmed bear traps and 500 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 055448. Traps destroyed and rice evacuated to DIEN BAN.

UNCLASSIFIED

(7) 251600H. Command Group A, displaced forward to Company F position.

(8) 251600H. Company G, located old trench line vicinity of BT 056445. Also discovered approximately 4,000 pounds of rice, 100 pounds tarooca, two (2) unarmed bear traps. Destroyed trench line and traps. Food supplies were evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(9) 251715H. Company G, discovered one (1) male and one (1) female vicinity of BT 044434, moving on trail. Both were challenged, and began to run. Company G took VCS under fire, killing male, and wounding female. Searched area, but was unable to locate female. Contents of male's pack disclosed one (1) typewriter, one (1) M26 grenade, documents. Material sent to DIEN BAN for evaluation. One (1) VC KIA (confirmed).

(10) 251940H. Received Frag Order #1 for Operation CALHOUN.

(11) 252255H. Issued Frag Order #45-67.

(12) 260800H. Company E, discovered tunnel complex vicinity of BT 061461. Destroyed in place.

(13) 260830H. Company F, uncovered approximately 1,000 pounds of rice vicinity of BT 062455. Rice bagged and evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(14) 260920H. Company F, uncovered approximately 6,000 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 052447. Rice bagged and evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(15) 260930H. Company H, displaced to "B" Battery position.

(16) 260930H. Company E, uncovered approximately 600 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 066464. Rice bagged and evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(17) 260935H. Company F, discovered 200 pounds of sugar, vicinity of BT 052445. Sugar was evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(18) 261050H. Company G, observed three (3) VC vicinity of BT 044434. Took under fire, killing one (1). Other two took off in westerly direction. Search of area disclosed blood stains. Captured one (1) M-1 rifle. One (1) VC KIA (confirmed).

(19) 261105H. Company E, discovered six (6) refugees vicinity of BT 048447. Refugees were three (3) young women, age 18 to 20 and three (3) children all without ID cards. Evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(20) 261330H. Company E, located cave, vicinity of BT 068467. Destroyed in place.

(21) 261730H. Company E, discovered cave, vicinity of BT 053462. Destroyed in place.

(22) 261755H. Received Frag Order #2 from CTG 79.5.

(23) 262200H. Issued Frag Order #46-67.

(24) 270730H. Two (2) platoons Company E displaced forward by helicopters to conduct Search and Destroy from high ground to valley at BT 030460.

(25) 270945H. Company F, discovered approximately 10,000 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 059441. Rice bagged and evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(26) 270950H. Company H, apprehended one (1) VCS vicinity of BT 159450. Evacuated to DIEN BAN. Suspect believed to have hidden his weapon prior to being captured. Searched area but was unable to find weapon.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

- (27) 271000H. Command Group B, located exploding device, vicinity BT 122473. Unable to destroy, and marked in place.
- (28) 271600H. Company H, apprehended two (2) VCS, vicinity of BT 156449. VCS evacuated to DIEN BAN.
- (29) 271700H. Company G, reported stray cattle forward of his position. Approximately 84 head of cattle were evacuated to DIEN BAN with ARVN personnel as escorts.
- (30) 271805H. Received Frag Order #3 from CTG 79.5.
- (31) 272236H. Issued Frag Order #47-67.
- (32) 280620H. Received modification to boundary change to CTG 79.5 Frag Order #3.
- (33) 280645H. Issued modifications of boundaries our Frag Order #47-67.
- (34) 281015H. Company H, captured one (1) VCS, vicinity of BT 166448. VCS evacuated to DIEN BAN.
- (35) 281100H. Command Group "A" displaced to "B" Battery position. Move completed 281220H.
- (36) 281300H. Company F, located two (2) bunkers, one at vicinity of BT 091444, the other at BT 097441. Destroyed in place.
- (37) 281330H. Command Group "B" communication personnel displaced to join Command Group "A".
- (38) 281500H. Command Group "B" (-) returned to USS Tripoli.
- (39) 281810H. Received Frag Order #3 from CTG 79.5.
- (40) 282020H. Issued Frag Order #48-67.
- (41) 290755H. Company E, apprehended one (1) VCS male, age 25, without ID card, vicinity of BT 128448. Evacuated to DIEN BAN.
- (42) 290905H. Company E, apprehended one (1) VCS and approximately 8 crows of rice, vicinity of BT 127446. Suspect and rice evacuated to DIEN BAN.
- (43) 291100H. Company F, two (2) civilians at BT 113427 reported about 50 VC this area. VC are armed, carrying packs and wearing black pajamas, moving in southwest direction. Called in gun ship to search surrounding area. Negative results.
- (44) 291400H. Company H, received sniper fire, vicinity of BT 162462. Returned fire with small arms fire and 60mm mortars, and searched area with negative results.
- (45) 291700H. Company F, observed three (3) VCS vicinity of BT 135429. One (1) suspect armed, other two (2) carrying full rice bags. Suspects taken under fire, killing two (2) carrying rice. Other unable to locate. Two (2) VCS KIA (confirmed), one (1) VCS KIA (probable).
- (46) 291810H. Received Frag Order #4 from CTG 79.5.
- (47) 292030H. Issued Frag Order #49-67.
- (48) 292030H. Naval Gun Fire Team chopped OPCON to Company H from Command Group "A".

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

(49) 301035H. Company G, received small arms fire from vicinity of BT 192454 from enemy size force of about eight (8) VC dressed in black pajamas. Returned fire with small arms and 60mm mortars and called in gun ships. Four (4) VC KIA (confirmed), and three (3) enemy KIA (probable). Captured one (1) AK-47, 1 carbine and miscellaneous 782 gear.

(50) 301440H. Company H, secured Objective #14.

(51) 301445H. Company F, landed LZ PIGEON.

(52) 301555H. Company G, upon river crossing vicinity BT 207464, received small arms fire. Returned small arms fire and enemy fire was silenced. One (1) friendly WIA.

(53) 301600H. Company F, upon securing LZ PIGEON taken under fire vicinity of BT 217465. Returned fire and enemy fire silenced. One (1) friendly KIA, three (3) friendly WIA and one (1) VC KIA (confirmed).

(54) 301630H. Command Group "A" helo-lifted to LZ PIGEON, joined with Company F.

(55) 301825H. Company F, engaged enemy in fighting positions, vicinity of BT 223460. Called in gun ships. Excellent coverage of enemy areas. Search disclosed six (6) enemy KIA (confirmed), and five (5) enemy KIA (probable).

(56) 301925H. Received Frag Order #5 from CTG 70.5.

(57) 302115H. Issued Frag Order #50-67.

(58) 010832H. Company G, lead elements on Objective #16, and sweeping objective.

(59) 010915H. Company G, apprehended two (2) VCS on Objective #16 without ID cards. Evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(60) 011045H. Company H, on Objective #15.

(61) 011200H. Operation CALHOUN terminated.

c. Operation BEACON TORCH (continued)

(1) 011200H. Composite Company completed helo-lift to assigned shipping.

(2) 011510H. Company H, located 10 punji and spider traps, vicinity of BT 241482. One (1) punji trap was booby trapped with a Chicom grenade. All were destroyed in place.

(3) 011700H. Company H, located one (1) 82mm mortar round vicinity of BT 214482. Destroyed in place.

(4) 011815H. Received Frag Order #6 from CTG 79.5.

(5) 011930H. Issued Frag Order #51-67.

(6) 012015H. Company H, received small arms fire his perimeter, vicinity of BT 239488. Returned small arms fire. Two (2) friendly WIA.

(7) 012315H. Company H, received small arms fire his perimeter. Returned fire with grenades and 60mm mortars. Enemy fire silenced. Five (5) WIA's minor for Company H.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

(8) 020200H. Company G, received small arms fire from estimated enemy probe of six (6) men. Returned fire with small arms and mortars. Company G sustained (1) KIA and one (1) WIA.

(9) 020600H. Company H, search of perimeter lines disclosed blood stains and tracing of bodies that had been drug away. One (1) MAS-36 rifle and ammo pouch found in search. Three (3) enemy KIA (confirmed), and three (3) enemy KIA (probable).

(10) 020720H. Company G, search of his lines disclosed two (2) Chicom grenades, and spent 9mm brass casings. Negative enemy casualties.

(11) 020730H. "B" Battery and Company H, helo-lifted to assigned shipping.

(12) 020820H. Company F, helo-lifted to assigned shipping.

(13) 020930H. Company E and Command Group "A" helo-lifted to assigned shipping.

(14) 021000H. Company G, returned to shipping via LVTS.

(15) 021150H. All units returned to assigned shipping.

(16) 021300H. Operation BEACON TORCH terminated.

10. Results

(a) Friendly Losses

(1) Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN

USMC

OFFICERS

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	1	0	0

ENLISTED

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
11	116	0	1

USN

OFFICERS

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0

ENLISTED

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
1	4	0	0

(b) Enemy Losses

<u>CATOGORY</u>	<u>BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN</u>
NVA/VC KIA (confirmed)	86
NVA/VC KIA (probable)	87
NVA/VC POW	4
DETAINNEES	28
WEAPONS CAPTURED/DESTROYED	4
FORTIFICATIONS DESTROYED	22

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

FIGHTING HOLES UNCOVERED	12
AMMUNITION CAPTURED/DESTROYED	7 rounds 57mm RR
EQUIPMENT CAPTURED	15 Chicom grenades
RICE/FOODS DESTROYED	N/A
RICE/FOODS EVACUATED	8 Tons
MEDICAL SUPPLIES	32 Tons
	25 Pounds

11. Administrative Matters. The Administrative Plan again proved adequate to support all combat operations during Operation BEACON TROCH/CALHOUN. The only modification was the reduction in rations prescribed to be carried by the troops as previous operations have proven that with a CH-46 squadron in direct support, resupply can rapidly be conducted, permitting the prescribed load to be lessened. The Serial Assignment Table with change #1 was applied without change as two assault companies were landed by helicopter, one by armored amphibious tractor, and one held in reserve capable of landing by either of the above transportation modes. No administrative problems arose throughout the operation.

a. Supply Techniques, Combat Loads, Ammunition, and Weapons Carried by Assault Troops.

(1) As during previous operations involving amphibious techniques, ammunition, rations, and special equipment were staged aboard assigned shipping on D-1. All of these supplies with the exception of high explosives were also issued on D-1 to scheduled waves and those on-call units known to be committed on short notice. High explosives were issued on D-Day just prior to loading assigned assault transportation. The only change to the prescribed load as stated in the Administrative Plan and the Battalion SOP for Operations was the reduction in rations carried as indicated in paragraph (11) above. No other changes were made, and the prescribed load proved effective to support all combat operations.

(2) Resupply was totally conducted from assigned shipping though D+7. The only resupply effected on D-day was water, which had been staged aboard the USS Tripoli in expectation of this need. It has been noted that during the first two days of combat operations from air conditioned shipping that the need for water and the frequency of heat casualties is far higher than during subsequent days ashore. All classes of materials were drawn from assigned shipping; however, as during previous operations, the majority of items was drawn from the LPH. Only items peculiar to combat support units and class IV items were drawn from the other ships. Resupply was conducted with the direct support helicopter squadron being the sole means of transportation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) On D+8, the majority of resupply requirements was shifted from the assigned shipping to a LSA located in DIEN BAN. In order to affect this change without interruption to normal resupply, a detachment from the BLT's Shore Party unit was transferred to DIEN BAN on the day prior to commencing resupply from that source. All classes of supplies were available through the LSA. The assigned shipping continued to resupply water, class II items, and additional foodstuffs not available through the LSA. The change over was conducted smoothly, and the reliance of resupply from two sources caused no breaks in normal resupply. Emergency resupply was conducted from assigned shipping throughout the operation.

(4) Battalion supply continued normal supply functions from assigned shipping. The supply section provided class II support in the field as required, and served as the main collection agency for personnel and government effects of those casualties returned to the USS Tripoli. Besides landing the disposition of the effects of KIA's and WIA's, battalion supply had the responsibility of re-arming and re-equipping those casualties returned to the field. When combat support units were assigned the mission of providing security of the Bravo Command Group, the supply section effected the issuance of weapons and accessories compatible to the mission assigned.

(5) The weapons and ammunition carried by the assault troops were normal and no special weapons or munitions were used. Certain ordnance items became in short supply in the IFORM; however, these items were available through the LSA, and the shortages are currently being rectified from the ASP located in Danang. As during previous operations, upon firing the weapon, the individual had the rifle explode. The probable cause for this was obstructions in the bore; however, a JAG investigation is being conducted to determine the exact cause. Frequent stoppages also occurred.

b. Maintenance. Normal second echelon maintenance was conducted by the Battalion Landing Team throughout the operation. Two M50A1 tanks developed generator problems after their return to assigned shipping. One generator was drawn from the LSU spare parts block and the other obtained from the 1st Tank Battalion in Danang. Repair was accomplished by individuals from the tank platoon. In addition a horizontal tube used with gunner quadrant was obtained from Danang to effect repair to a 105mm howitzer in the field.

c. Medical Treatment, Evacuation, and Hospitalization.

(1) First Echelon Medical care was provided by eight corpsmen in each line company, four corpsmen with the Alpha Command Group, three ~~corpsmen~~ with the Bravo Group and by corpsmen with each of the attached units.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Second echelon care (Collecting and Clearing Company), and third echelon care (Surgical Team) was provided aboard the USS Tripoli.

(3) Patients were evacuated by helicopters of HMM 164 directly from the field expediently and efficiently. No deaths or increased morbidity were as a result of delay in evacuation procedures.

(4) All sick and wounded from BLT 2/3 were evacuated to the USS Tripoli LPH 10 with the exception of one head injury which was sent to the NSA Hospital at Danang for Neuro Surgical care.

(5) Casualties from the operation were as follows:

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
KIA	0	11	0	1
WIA	1	116	0	4
DOW	0	1	0	0
Non-battle	2	116	0	5

(6) The non-battle casualties consisted mainly of heat exhaustions and sprains. No significant incidence of malaria, hepatitis or other infectious diseases was encountered.

(7) A MEDCAP program was set up for six days within the Bravo Command Group. See Civic Action Section.

d. Transportation. Only limited vehicles were off loaded during the Operation, and these were primarily communication vehicles. CH-46 helicopters were used for all tactical moves of the troops except for the landing of one assault company by LVT. The 105mm howitzer battery was landed and displaced by CH-53 helicopters. The backload of the Battalion Landing Team (-) on D+14 was accomplished by helicopter and LVT in like manner to the assault landing.

e. Communication

(a) Communications involved with Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN were in the ARG/SLF concept. During the initial phase of the operation, communications with shipboard elements were via VHF/FM and HF/SSB equipment. As the buildup ashore continued, and with the establishment of a command post, radio relay equipment was provided for telephone communications with higher authority. Channels were allotted to FSCC and ALO officers for "hot" communication with their respective counterparts in higher commands. In addition, a HF/SSB Tactical Air Request net was established to facilitate air requests.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(b) The general area of operations provided poor conditions for radio communications. Generally the ground itself was dry sand, several feet in depth. Consequently, ground and counterpoise were nearly impossible to establish. PRC-47 equipment could be grounded only with the use of a ground rod and wetting, and then a ground could be maintained only so long as the rod remained wetted. Although equipment range remained good, frequency override of as much as ten MCS was experienced, even from distant stations. All stations within twenty-five meters of each other with a frequency separation of less than six to eight MCS overrode in the immediate locale, but did not necessarily bother distant stations. Radio Relay equipment in one instance overrode a VHF/FM TAC circuit. Almost in every case the difficulty could be directly attributed to existing conditions.

(c) Radio Relay circuits were difficult to establish and equally difficult to maintain. Radio Relay utilization of the MRC-62 equipment ship-to-shore with either directional or omni-directional antennas has never proved satisfactory. Initially, ship-to-shore relay was attempted and once again proved to be unsatisfactory. Later, Radio Relay was established with 1st MARDIV, and, although the shot from the Battalion location to the Division Command Post was partially effective, the relay set up from shore to ship was rarely operational.

(d) In contrast to the Radio Relay attempt, a MRC-109 was utilized and proved most satisfactory. In a stationary location, the MRC-109 was equipped with 2 VRC-46's, 1 KY-8, and 1 GRC-125, all on vehicular power, and all 100% effective. It was found that the KY-8 required cooling with wet towels, but remained operational with negative card-warp.

(e) It is obvious that the MRC-109 is a much more productive lift than the MRC-62. The MRC-109 requires only one lift and can be carried internally, whereas the van requires two external lifts. Moreover, the MRC-109 is mobile once on the ground. Most important, it is more reliable than the MRC-62, and provides a covered circuit. In the SLF concept, the advantages of a MRC-109 lift over a MRC-62 are categorically evident.

f. Medical Evaluation

(1) The concept of combined 2nd and 3rd echelon care aboard the USS Tripoli worked extremely well, and casualties were handled efficiently and rendered excellent care.

(2) HMM 164 provided excellent evacuation of patients to the USS Tripoli.

(3) The psychological effect of fast, efficient medical care in an environment detached from combat is a definite morale factor to the troops.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

g. Civic Action. During Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN, the battalion conducted a limited MEDCAP program from 23-27 June in MONG NGHE (2) Hamlet, Que Son District, Quang Tin Province, RVN. A total of 261 patients were received (83 women, 49 elderly men, 129 children). The majority of cases treated were skin disorders that were caused mainly by the lack of personal hygiene. The children were thoroughly bathed and soap provided by USS Tripoli was distributed to families. The elderly patients were suffering mainly from generic conditions for which no treatment could be provided. Dental treatment for approximately 10 persons was also provided. This treatment consisted mainly of extractions. Six villagers were evacuated to USS Tripoli. Two women were treated for shrapnel wounds, however, the other four were suffering from ailments of long standing (cancer, genital defects) which would have required prolonged care, and thus, could not be treated extensively. The program, though limited, was successful and well received by the local populace.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

13. Commander's Analysis

a. The initial helicopterborne assault by the battalion during Operation BEACON TORCH was seriously hampered when the assault force was landed approximately 2,000 meters south of the intended area. Not only did this require that the assault force move an extra 2,000 meters in pursuance of assigned objectives but could have had serious consequences in the coordination of the helicopterborne assault with the waterborne assault. As it was, the contact which was made with an enemy force on the afternoon of the assault was lost due to the subsequent disengagement by the enemy under cover of darkness, while disengagement could have been prevented, had contact been initiated earlier and the enemy force overrun prior to darkness.

b. The delay in completing a movement by CH-53's of Battery "B", 12th Marines, which was in direct support of the BLT did not have an adverse tactical effect since immediate artillery response was not required. However, this situation remained potentially dangerous during the three days required to complete this move. A delay of this type, had full support of the battery been required, could have had disastrous effects.

c. Operation BEACON TORCH was a search and destroy operation in an area completely controlled by the enemy. Although this operation proved successful in completing the assigned mission, the area encompassed by this operation was immediately reoccupied by the enemy as evidenced by the presence upon the return of the BLT to the beach area.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

d. The helicopter tactical troop movement accomplished during operation CALHOUN again placed the BLT at a temporary disadvantage as units were landed 1,000 meters south of the assigned landing Zone. Although again a potential serious situation, this disadvantage was quickly overcome by the rapid movement of all units to assigned areas.

e. Operation CALHOUN, a search and destroy operation was extremely successful in denying the enemy huge quantities of food supplies, primarily rice. The discovery and evacuation of in excess of 31 tons of rice in the area of operation was the result of diligent and determined work by all elements of the BLT and close cooperation with HMM 164 evacuation aircraft.

W. O. Beard
W. O. BEARD

COPIES TO:

CG, 1st MARDIV (25)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~