

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2nd BN, 3rd MAR, S & C
CONTROL NO. 0288-67
COPY NO. 6 OF 26

HEADQUARTERS

Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

DECLASSIFIED

03/JJO/pgr
3000
31 July 1967
Ser No. 036-67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo
Subj: Command Chronology for period 4 -31 July 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) 9th Mar BrigO 5750.1B

Encl: (1) Battalion Landing Team 2/3 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).


E. W. HERICH

GP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

4 - 31 July 1967

INDEX

PART I _____ ORGANIZATION DATA
PART II _____ NARRATIVE SUMMARY
PART III _____ SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT
EVENTS
PART IV _____ SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (COMBAT AFTER
ACTION REPORTS: OPERATION BEAVER ✓
TRACK/BUFFALO; HICKORY II AND OPERA-
TION BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT)

already logged

UNCLASSIFIED

GP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (1)
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

Battalion Landing Team 2/3

Major W. O. BEARD

4-13 July 67

Major J. H. BROUJOS

14-16 July 67

LtCol E. W. HERICH

17-31 July 67

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Company

Capt R. C. MADONNA

4-26 July 67

Capt J. O. ROESLER

27-31 July 67

Company E

Capt R. N. BOGARD

4-31 July 67

Company F

1st Lt R. D. KOEHLER

4-28 July 67

Capt R. G. PONSFORD III

29-31 July 67

Company G

Capt J. P. SHEEHAN

4-7 July 67

Capt J. J. O'BRIEN

8-31 July 67

Company H

Capt R. O. CULVER

4-31 July 67

ATTACHED UNITS

B Battery (Rein) 1st Battalion, 12th Marines

G. B. FILE Capt

4 July 1967

16-31 July 1967

First Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3rd Tank Battalion

E.P.B. O'NEIL 2/Lt.

4-9 July 1967

16-31 July 1967

Third Platoon (Rein), Company B, 1st AMTRAC Battalion

D. R. RUSH 2/Lt.

4-9 July 1967

16-31 July 1967

Second Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3d Anti-Tank Battalion

F. Y. LAWLER 2/Lt.

4-9 July 1967

16-31 July 1967

Third Platoon, Company B, 3rd Recon Battalion

F. J. CARRIGAN 1/Lt.

4-9 July 1967

16-31 July 1967

Second Clearing Platoon (Rein), Company B, 3rd Medical Battalion

S. C. SMITH LCdr

4-9 July 1967

16-20 July 1967

J. P. RYAN LCdr

21-31 July 1967

Logistic Support Unit (DET FORLOGCMD)

T. E. HUGHES 1/Lt.

4-9 July 1967

16-31 July 1967

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

First Platoon (Rein), Company C, 3rd Shore Party Battalion

First Platoon (Rein), Company C, 3rd Motor Transport

First Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3d Engineer Battalion

Det "A", Beach Jumper Unit - 1

A. G. MUELLER 2/Lt.

4-9 July 1967

16-31 July 1967

W. H. HOOVER 2/Lt.

4-9 July 1967

24-31 July 1967

J. R. ASHBURY 2/Lt.

4-9 July 1967

16-31 July 1967

J. F. DORSEY LTJG

20-26 July 1967

2. LOCATION

4-17 July 1967: Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO; HICKORY II - RVN

18-19 July 1967: Afloat with ARG Shipping

20-26 July 1967: Operation BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT - RVN

27-31 July 1967: Afloat with ARG Shipping; rest and rehabilitation Da Nang

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer	Major J. H. BROUJOS	4-31 July 1967
S-1	2/Lt B. L. HEATON	4-31 July 1967
S-2	Capt V. M. SMITH	4-31 July 1967
S-3	Major D. W. LEMON	4-31 July 1967
S-4	Capt R. R. GREEN	4-31 July 1967
CommO	1/Lt J. B. DENNY	4-31 July 1967

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH


USMC	
OFF	ENL
60	1475

USN	
OFF	ENL
8	84

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED




PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Battalion Landing Team 2/3 participated in Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO and HICKORY II 4-17 July 1967, while OPCON to CO, 3rd Marines. This operation is discussed in detail in Part IV of this chronology. During the period 18-19 July 1967, the BLT was embarked aboard ARG shipping and made preparations for Operation BEAR CHAIN. This operation commenced 20 July 1967 and was terminated 26 July 1967. During this operation, the BLT also participated in Operation FREMONT while OPCON to CO, 4th Marines, which was conducted in conjunction with BEAR CHAIN. Operation BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT is discussed in detail in Part IV of this chronology. The period 27-31 July 1967 was spent aboard ARG shipping and a rest and rehabilitation program was organized and conducted in Da Nang.

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART III

UNCLASSIFIED

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED. See Part IV.2. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

- a. Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO; HICKORY II: 4-17 July 1967 - RVN
- b. Operations BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT: 20-26 July 1967 - RVN

3. CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMYVC/NVA

Confirmed
Probable

4. CASUALTIES SUSTAINEDUSMC

OFFICER			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	8	0	0

ENLISTED			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
23	317*	0	2

USN

OFFICER			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	0	0	0

ENLISTED			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
2	17**	0	0

* - Includes 31 additional WIA sustained in Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO; HICKORY II which were not included in the after action report for these operations due to the inadequate time between initial reports and receipt of casualty cards, of wounds sustained in the field.

** - Includes 4 additional WIA sustained in Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO; HICKORY II which were not included in the after action report for these operations due to the inadequate time between initial reports and receipt of casualty cards, of wounds sustained in the field.

5. NEW TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED. None

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

6. COMMAND RELATIONS

- a. 040900H - 170920H July 1967. BLT 2/3 (-) OPCON CO, 3rd Marines.
- b. 041200H - 111000H July 1967. 1st Plat, Co B, 3rd Tank Bn OPCON BLT 2/3.
- c. 051000H - 160600H July 1967. "B" Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar OPCON CO, 12th Marines.
- d. 051000H - 160600H July 1967. 1st Plat, Co A, 3rd TK Bn OPCON 3rd TK Bn.
- e. 092230H - 160600H July 1967. Following units of BLT 2/3 OPCON to parent organizations 3rd Marine Division.
 - (1) 3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Recon Bn.
 - (2) 2d Plat, (Rein), Co A, 3rd AT Bn.
 - (3) 3rd Plat (-) (Rein), Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bn.
 - (4) 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn.
 - (5) Det, LSU, FORLOGCMD.
 - (6) 1st Plat, (-) (Rein), 3rd SP Bn.
 - (7) 2d Clearing Plat, Co B, 3rd Med Bn.
- f. 092230H - 241000H July 1967. 1st Plat, Co C, 3rd MT Bn OPCON 3rd MT Bn.
- g. 211400H - 251400Z July 1967. 2d Bn (Rein), 3rd Mar OPCON CO, 4th Marines.

7. EQUIPMENT. See Part IV8. LOGISTICS. See Part IV

9. CIVIC ACTION. The commitment of the BLT as a special landing force during this period precluded participation in an active civic action program because of its operational requirements.

10. ADMINISTRATION

a. PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING. A shortage of consumable supplies still exists.

b. AWARDS. None

c. PROMOTIONS. Major - 1, GySgt - 2.

d. LEGAL and DISCIPLINE. None

e. POSTAL. Satisfactory

f. PAY and ALLOWANCES. Satisfactory

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

g. POST EXCHANGE. The ship store facilities of ARG shipping were utilized during this reporting period while the BLT was afloat. There were no PX facilities available ashore except for the brief period 27-31 July when the BLT went to Da Nang.

h. RELIGIOUS SERVICES. During this period a total of nine (9) Protestant Divine Services were held within the Battalion. Catholic Mass was held a total of four (4) times during this period by Commander Victor IVERS, Chaplain USS Tripoli. The total attendance for the Protestant Services was 190. The total for Catholic Mass was 135. During this reporting period there were a total of 27 Bible Studies with a total attendance of 125. The Chaplain held a total of 27 personnel interviews with BLT 2/3 Marines. Protestant Services were held either directly in the field or in the forecandle of the USS Tripoli. The same applies to all Catholic Services.

i. R&R. The battalion received the following R&R quotas: China Beach - 33, Hong Kong - 19, Manila - 5, Okinawa - 7, Kuala Lumpur - 4, Hawaii - 20, Penang - 4, Singapor - 7, Bangkok - 20, Toyko - 17, Taipei - 7.

11. PERSONNEL

a. LOSSES

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Battle	0	81	0	3
Non-battle	2	0	0	0
Admin	3	46	3	0

b. REPLACEMENTS

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
	7	64	3	3

12. INTELLIGENCE. See Part IV.

13. COMMUNICATIONS. See Part IV.

14. WEATHER. See Part IV

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- UNCLASSIFIED**
15. FIRE SUPPORT. See Part IV
16. AIR SUPPORT. See Part IV
17. ACTIVATIONS/DEACTIVATIONS/REDESIGNATIONS. None

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602

2nd BN, 3rd MAR, S & C
CONTROL NO. 00282-67

COPY NO. 11 OF 60

03/JJO/pgr

3000

17 July 1967

Ser No. 0032-67

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO;
HICKORY II).

Ref: (a) MAPS: VIETNAM, AMS 1:50,000 L7014, Sheets 6342 I, 6442 IV.
(b) CTG 79.5 Frag Order (Operation BEAVER TRACK).
(c) 3rd Marines Frag Order (Operation CIMARRON 7-67).
(d) 3rd Marines Frag Order (Operation HICKORY II 1-67).

Encl: (1) Overlay of Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO.
(2) Overlay of Operation HICKORY II.

1. Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO;HICKORY II

2. Dates of Operations

- (1) BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO: 040700H - 140659H July 1967
(2) HICKORY II: 140700H - 170920H July 1967

3. Location. Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO and HICKORY II were conducted in Gio Linh and Cam Lo Districts, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.

4. Task Organization

BLT 2/3

H & S Co (-) (Rein)
Det, Hq Bn, 3rd Mar Div
Det, Hq Co, 3rd Mar
Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar
Det, 15th Dental Co
2nd Clearing Plat (Rein), Co B, 3rd Med Bn
1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd MT Bn
1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn
Det, LSU, for Log Cmd

Major BEARD
(4-13 July 1967)
Major BROUJOS
(14-16 July 1967)
Lt Col HERICH
(17 July 1967)

DECLASSIFIED

GP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DECLASSIFIED

2/3

2/3 BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO
HICKORY II

4-17 July 67

DECLASSIFIED

Co E (Rein)

Co E

Det, H & S Co

1st Sec, 81mm Mort Plat

Det, Med Plat

Det, Intel Sec

Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Capt BOGARD

Co F (Rein)

Co F

Det, H & S Co

2nd Sec, 81mm Mort Plat

Det, Med Plat

Det, Intel Sec

FAC Tm

Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

1st Lt KOEHLER

Co G (Rein)

Co G

Det, H & S Co

3rd Sec, 81mm Mort Plat

Det, Med Plat

Det, Intel Sec

FAC Tm

Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Capt SHEEHAN

Co H (Rein)

Co H

Det, H & S Co

4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plat

Det, Med Plat

Det, Intel Sec

Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Capt CULVER

106mm RR Plat

2nd Lt ELMS

"B" Btry (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Capt FILE

3rd Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bn

2nd Lt RUSH

3rd Plat, Co B

Det, H & S Co, 1st AMTRAC Bn

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2nd Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd AT Bn

2nd Lt LAWLER

2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd AT Bn

Det, H&S Co, 3rd AT Bn

3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Recon Bn

1st Lt CARRIGAN

2nd Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Tank Bn

2nd Lt O'NEIL

2nd Plat, Co A

Det, H&S Co, 3rd Tank Bn

5. Supporting Forces

a. Air and artillery were available to the BLT during both operations covered in this report, and were used extensively in both preplanned and immediate missions. Naval gun fire was not available to the BLT during these operations.

b. Combat support and combat service support units attached to the BLT did not directly support the battalion ashore unless they were originally task organized to one of the companies. These supporting units were landed on D+5 and were CHOPPED OPCON to parent organizations of the 3rd Marine Division.

c. On D-Day, Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO, 1st Plat, Co B, 3rd Tank Bn, CHOPPED OPCON to the battalion at Cam Lo artillery position. The assignment of these weapons proved to be a hindrance rather than an aid to the battalion's movement in its assigned AO. The personnel of this unit were ready and willing to provide support desired, however, maintenance problems and terrain were constant obstacles to their overall effectiveness.

d. Each rifle company was provided close combat engineer support for the destruction of enemy fortifications. The attachment of this support, at rifle company level, proved to be the most effective method of employment, allowing immediate and effective destruction of enemy fortifications as the battalion moved through areas where search and destroy missions were conducted.

e. Air Support

(1) CAS was considered to be excellent overall, and in view of the number of times it was requested, it was considered to be very timely. Target accuracy during BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO was among the best that the battalion has witnessed in recent operations. Fixed wing aircraft conducted 18 missions and delivered a total of 124,000 pounds of ordnance.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(2) ~~Logistical support~~, MEDEVAC and tactical troop movements by helicopters were considered satisfactory. There were two occasions in which response to emergency MEDEVAC requests took more than 60 minutes. All other MEDEVAC requests were answered expeditiously.

f. Artillery. The battalion received excellent artillery support throughout both operations. Delays in counterbattery clearances were not so prevalent as those experienced in previous operations. On one occasion, almost instantaneous 8" counterbattery fire on a 140mm rocket position silenced enemy fire, and TAC (A) reported the position destroyed. The continuous artillery fired in support of Company F, when heavily engaged with an estimated 200 NVA, on 8 July, turned a near stalemate to an overwhelming defeat of an enemy unit whose losses numbered well over 100. A total of 6,088 rounds of artillery of assorted types were fired in support of the battalion.

6. Intelligence

a. Enemy Strength, Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO.

(1) Enemy Strength

- (a) 31st NVA Regiment
Strength: 2,400
Location: Gio Linh District
- (b) 32nd NVA Regiment
Strength: 2,000
Location: Nghe An Province
- (c) 90th NVA Regiment
Strength: 2,100
Location: Con Thien Area
- (d) 29th NVA Regiment Headquarters
Strength: 800
Location: YD 096665
- (e) 7th Battalion, 29th NVA Regiment
Strength: 400
Location: YD 085646
- (f) 9th Battalion, 29th Regiment
Strength: 400
Location: YD 085646

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

803rd NVA Regiment
 Strength: 2,600
 Location: North Quang Tri Province

(h) The enemy is armed with 82mm mortars, 60mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, 57mm recoilless rifles, 12.7mm AA/MG, 120mm rockets, automatic weapons and individual arms.

(2) Enemy Situation. The enemy in unknown strength was moving south from the DMZ, threatening Con Thien and the MSR between Con Thien and Cam Lo.

(3) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy had the capability to:

- (a) Attack or defend with up to one NVA Regiment.
- (b) Reinforce in connection with (a) above with up to one NVA Regiment.
- (c) Harass friendly forces using mortars, surprise firing devices and sporadic small arms fire.

b. Enemy Strength and Situation During Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO.

(1) 4 July 1967. There was negative enemy contact on 4 July 1967.

(2) 5 July 1967. Enemy contact on 5 July 1967 was limited to semi-automatic fire received at coordinates YD 105672. Fifteen fortified positions were destroyed at coordinates YD 104643 and one command detonated anti-tank mine was discovered and evacuated from coordinates YD 099659.

(3) 6 July 1967. Moderate contact and enemy mortar attacks characterized 6 July 1967. A probe of Company E lines at coordinates YD 107672 by an estimated 25 NVA at 0535H resulted in 5 KIA (confirmed) and 12 KIA (probable). A search of the area resulted in the recovery of two (2) SKS carbines, five (5) barrel magazines with 1,000 rounds of ammunition, 12 AK-47 magazines and pouches, two (2) cartridge belts each with 20 clips of 7.62 ammunition, 16 Chicom grenades, one (1) M-26 grenade, one (1) corpsman's bag with pills, dressings, vials and ointment. Also at 0535H, the Battalion CP and Company G received 40 rounds of 60mm mortar fire at coordinates YD 105656. At 0800H Company H at coordinates YD 115675 received semi-automatic fire accompanied by 60mm mortar fire and two (2) RPG rocket rounds. Fire was returned resulting in 14 KIA (confirmed) and 19 KIA (probable). At 1030H, the attached tanks spotted NVA in dark green uniforms with soft covers and at least two wearing body armor and helmets. Tank fire resulted in 16 KIA (confirmed) and 10 KIA (probable). At 1530H, a patrol from Company H received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire at coordinates YD 113675 and at 2125H, Company H at coordinates YD 114667 received 25

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Semi-automatic fire was received from the vicinity of YD 108677. A single command detonated claymore was set off at coordinates YD 095663 and two command detonated claymores were fired almost simultaneously at coordinates YD 101667. Enemy casualties for 6 July 1967 were 37 KIA (confirmed) and 40 KIA (probable).

(4) 7 July 1967. 7 July 1967 saw a marked decrease in enemy activity. One enemy was fired on at coordinates YD 113667 and one M-14 magazine and pouch were recovered. A small base camp with 10 bunkers and 15 foxholes was discovered at coordinates YD 115667. Two of the bunkers had fresh blood stains in them. A search of the area in the vicinity of coordinates YD 101671 following an artillery barrage revealed many blood stains and dressings. Twenty-one well built bunkers, a mortar pit and six (6) rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition were discovered at coordinates YD 107676. Another mortar position and bunker were destroyed at coordinates YD 096673. One anti-tank mine was discovered and destroyed at coordinates YD 085658. Four enemy were engaged by semi-automatic fire at coordinates YD 116675 resulting in 1 KIA (confirmed), 2 KIA (probable), and the capture of assorted 782 gear.

(5) 8 July 1967. Heavy contact was made on the afternoon of 8 July 1967. Semi-automatic fire was first received at coordinates YD 098661. Artillery and air was called in resulting in 4 KIA (confirmed) and 6 KIA (probable). Upon returning to the area, automatic fire and grenades were received. The ensuing fight resulted in 35 KIA (confirmed) and 20 KIA (probable). Shortly thereafter, 200-250 NVA were engaged in the vicinity of coordinates YD 089654 - YD 081654. Artillery and air were called in as the enemy elected to close and fight attempting to overrun friendly forces. The results were 43 KIA (confirmed), 60 KIA (probable) and 1 AK-47 captured. Eating utensils were discovered at coordinates YD 107671. One anti-tank mine was destroyed and one RPG launcher, a pack, a bloodstained set of utilities, a helmet and a mortar tube cover were evacuated from coordinates YD 115676. Sniper fire was received and a bouncing betty set off at coordinates YD 092661. An unknown exploding device was set off at coordinates YD 116676. A search of this area was thoroughly made revealing two containers of mortar fuses, seven (?) AK-47 magazines and ammunition, two Chicom grenades, two home made demolition kits and 782 gear. On the evening of 8 July 1967, the Battalion CP and Company G received 12 rounds of 120mm rockets. Through the evening of 8 July 1967, Battalion TAC Net #1 was subject to interference from NVA jamming. Enemy losses for 8 July 1967 were 82 KIA (confirmed) and 86 KIA (probable).

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(6) 9 July 1967. Actual contact with the enemy on 9 July 1967 was negative. An unknown exploding device was tripped at coordinates YD 101655. The Battalion CP was subjected to nine (9) rounds of 120mm rocket fire from the vicinity of coordinates YD 053704. A bivouac area was discovered at coordinates YD 105652 and enemy bunkers were destroyed at coordinates YD 096614, YD 090654 and YD 098674. Twenty fresh graves each containing one or two bodies were discovered at coordinates YD 090655 along with three (3) 82mm mortar rounds and 24 60mm rounds which were destroyed. The graves were believed to contain enemy dead from the action of 8 July 1967. A search in vicinity of coordinates YD 090400 yielded eight (8) RPG rockets, three (3) Chicom grenades, one (1) Chicom claymore, eight (8) blasting caps, 100 feet of electrical wire, three (3) boosters of RPG and 500 rounds of AK-47 ammunition - destroyed, and 782 gear, documents, Laotian money and four (4) gas masks - evacuated.

(7) 10 July 1967. A bunker complex and six (6) 82mm mortar rounds destroyed at coordinates YD 103661 was the extent of enemy presence noted on 10 July 1967.

(8) 11 July 1967. Enemy effectiveness on 11 July was evident only by a tank blowing an AT mine at coordinates YD 128638.

(9) 12-13 July 1967. There was negative enemy contact on 12 and 13 July 1967.

c. Enemy Strength, Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation Hickory II.

(1) Enemy Strength. The enemy was reported to have moved two companies of the 29th NVA Regiment into the area of operation to support local enemy forces.

(2) Enemy Situation. The area of operations had been occupied by friendly forces up to 48 hours before Operation BEAVER TRACK/HICKORY II. No significant enemy contact had been made. It was believed that elements of the 29th NVA Regiment were conducting recon operations in the area.

(3) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of:

(a) Harassing with small arms fire, mortars and surprise firing devices.

(b) Attacking or defending on a limited scale when given a favorable tactical situation.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

d. Enemy Strength and Situation During Operation HICKORY II.

¹⁰ (1) 14 July 1967. No actual enemy contact was made on 14 July 1967. Enemy surprise firing devices were set off at coordinates YD 075622, YD 076620 and YD 072635. None of these devices were command detonated. One Chicom claymore mine was discovered at coordinates YD 070635. Late in the evening of 14 July 1967, Company E received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from coordinates YD 083644.

¹¹⁻¹² (2) 15 and 16 July 1967. There was negative enemy contact on 15 and 16 July 1967. Operation BEAVER TRACK/HICKORY II terminated on 17 July 1967.

e. Summary of Significant Enemy Activities. No new or significant enemy tactics or activities were revealed during this operation. Enemy tactics of utilizing surprise firing devices, mortars, and small probes is standard when friendly forces are semi-stationary in the field. The one major engagement seemed to have resulted from NVA troops being on the move when engaged by friendly forces. Since these friendly forces were initially small in number, the enemy sensing a distinct tactical advantage, choose to attack, attempting to overrun initial friendly forces and subsequent reinforcements.

7. Mission

a. Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO

(1) At L-Hour on D-Day land in LZ CANARY and deploy to an assembly area to be designated and be prepared for employment as directed in 3rd Marine Division area.

(2) At H-Hour on D-Day conduct S&D operations north of Cam Lo attacking on a south to north axis in area bounded on north by YD 69, in west by YD 04, in south by Cam Lo River and in east by YD 12. In conjunction with S & D operations, a detailed search will be made for possible mortar/rocket sites and arms caches.

b. Operation HICKORY II. Conduct S&D operations on a south to north axis establishing blocking positions in vicinity as shown on operations overlay (enclosure (2)). Be prepared to CHOP OPCON from 3rd Marines on or about 16 July 1967.

8. Concept of Operations

a. Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO (Enclosure (1))

(~~SECRET~~) L-Hour on D-Day BLT 2/3 conducts an administrative helicopter move with four reinforced rifle companies and a command group into

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LZ CANARY, deploys to a designated assembly area for employment as directed in 3rd Marine Division area. Attached units BLT 2/3 prepare to land and CHOP OPCON to parent organizations of 3rd Marine Division.

(2) Second Battalion (Rein), 3rd Marines, consisting of a command group and four reinforced rifle companies, conducts S&D operations north of Cam Lo River. Operation consists of two phases: Attack on south to north axis to LOA (YD 69), turning and attacking to the west. When attack crosses Phase Line Blue, second phase commences with attack to continue on a north to south axis to Cam Lo River.

b. Operation HICKORY II. Second Battalion (Rein), 3rd Marines establishes blocking positions with four rifle companies and a command group in vicinity as designated in operations overlay (Enclosure (2)).

9. Execution

a. Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO

(1) 040640H. CO 2/3 and Company H departed USS Tripoli and arrived Cam Lo at 040705H.

(2) 040810H. Command Group Alpha arrived LZ CANARY and moved to vicinity YD 136615.

(3) 040820H. Company H completed lift to LZ CANARY and moved to vicinity YD 140614.

(4) 040950H. Company F completed lift to LZ CANARY and moved to vicinity YD 133619.

(5) 041045H. Company E completed lift to LZ CANARY and moved to vicinity YD 137619.

(6) 041200H. Tanks from 3rd Tank Bn. Plt "B" OPCON to 2/3 moved to vicinity YD 146613.

(7) 041250H. Company G completed lift to LZ CANARY and moved to vicinity YD 138617.

(8) 041300H. 2/3 CHOPPED OPCON to 3rd Marines.

(9) 041300H. Frag Order 7-67 received from 3rd Marines for 4 and 5 July 1967.

(10) 041330H. Lead Elements of Company F commenced movement to the west. Section of tanks with Company F and one with Company H. Units moving to be positioned for sweep to the north on three axes.

(11) 041730H. All units positioned for the night with night activities. Units were located at: Command Group Alpha and Company G at YD 108616, Company E at YD 110620, Company F at YD 108617 and Company H at YD 115626.

(12) 050300H. Issued Frag Order 52-67 to all units.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

(13) 050700H. All units displaced and moved in a northerly direction on three axes.

(14) 050915H. Company F secured objective #1 with no opposition.

(15) 050945H. Company E secured objective #2 with no opposition.

(16) 050945H. Company E discovered 15 fortified bunkers located at YD 104643 which were destroyed by demolitions.

(17) 051305H. Company E received sporadic sniper fire from YD 105672. Returned fire with small arms. Sustained one (1) KIA and one (1) WIA.

(18) 051650H. Lead elements of Company G discovered one enemy setting up what appeared to be a land mine at YD 099659. Enemy fled and was fired upon. Patrol followed in pursuit with negative results.

(19) 051800H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(20) 052015H. Issued Frag Order 53-67 to all units.

(21) 060535H. Perimeter of Company E at YD 107672 probed by approximately 25 enemy with small arms. Returned fire with machine gun. Artillery was called in and machine gun fire drove the enemy into artillery impact area. Excellent effect on target area. Search of area at first light produced 14 enemy KIA (confirmed) and 19 KIA (probable), as there were bloody bandages and dragging imprints. Miscellaneous 782 gear, medical bag, two (2) Chicm carbines SKS type, two (2) cartridge belts 20 clips each of 7.82 ammo, 16 Chicm grenades, five (5) barrel magazines with pouches were captured.

(22) 060540H. Company G and Command Group at YD 105656 received approximately 40 rounds 61mm mortars resulting in one KIA and four WIA's evacuated. Fourteen non-evac's were also recorded. 81mm mortar and artillery was fired on the enemy suspected position ceasing enemy fire.

(23) 060800H. Company H patrol received small arms and 60mm mortar fire. Fire was coming from a church in the area at YD 123674. Patrol returned small arms fire and utilized fire from two tanks that was with the patrol. Tanks received RPG rocket rounds, one hitting the turret and one hitting tracks, but both tanks were still operable. Artillery mission conducted firing 156 rounds on enemy position, resulting in enemy cease fire. Patrol had one KIA and six WIA's.

(24) 060930H. Patrol from Company F hit by claymore mine at YD 095663 which appeared to be command detonated. There was no further contact. Company F sustained three (3) KIA's and one (1) WIA.

(25) 061000H. Company G established PPB at YD 101667 and sent forward elements to check out area. Two command detonated claymores exploded. Area was covered with small arms fire and followed wires which set off mines.

(26) 061030H. Tank platoon commander reported seeing NVA at YD 117673 in dark green uniforms with soft covers, and at least two were wearing body armor and US helmets. Tanks took enemy under fire with 90mm and 50 cal MG. There was good coverage with 16 KIA (confirmed) and 16 KIA (probable).

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(27) 061222H. Company E patrol took one round sniper fire from YD 108677. Echo returned fire with small arms.

(28) 061417H. Company E called air strike on 8 enemy bunkers at YD 108677. Patrol sent out to search the area. Patrol was taken under fire. Patrol pulled back and called in artillery. Patrol sustained two WIA's.

(29) 061420H. Frag Order from 3rd Marines received.

(30) 061530H. Patrol from Company H took 15 rounds of 60mm mortar while returning to CP. Mortar fire received from YD 115674 was silenced with artillery and mortar fire. Patrol had 12 WIA evac and one WIA non medevac.

(31) 061800H. Mortar fire from YD 113675 was received at Company H position. Artillery was called in at enemy position resulting in two secondary explosions.

(32) 061930H. Frag Order 54-67 Issued to all units.

(33) 062125H. Approximately 25 rounds of 60mm mortars were received by Company H YD 114667. Artillery was called in on suspected position.

(34) 062215H. Company E heard movement forward of their lines. A total of 99 rounds artillery was delivered at YD 101671 into suspected enemy area. At early light area was checked and patrol discovered drag imprints, bloody stains and bandages, determining 8 probable KIA's.

(35) 070630H. Company H observed one silhouette of enemy by perimeter at YD 113667. Fired M-79 at target; checked area at first light, discovered blood soaked M-14 magazine and pouch.

(36) 070745H. 20 feet of communication wire was discovered by Company E patrol at YD 105672 at trail crossing. Junction was also marked by small rock pile. Wire was destroyed and rocks were scattered.

(37) 070930H. Patrol from Company H discovered what appeared to be a small NVA Camp at YD 115667. Ten bunkers 4 ft X 6 ft were discovered along with 15 fighting holes. Fresh blood found in two bunkers and traces of blood on bamboo matting. Bunkers were destroyed.

(38) 071115H. Company E patrol found extensive bunker complex at YD 107676 consisting of 21 bunkers which were well built and well hidden; about a week old. One mortar pit was also discovered along with six 82mm mortar rounds which were destroyed.

(39) 071414H. Company F patrol discovered anti-tank mine at YD 095658 which was destroyed.

(40) 071500H. Patrol from Company E discovered one bunker 4' X 6' and a reinforced mortar pit at YD 096673.

(41) 071530H. Company H patrol received small arms fire from YD 116675. Four enemy dressed in gray uniforms were running from a hut. Enemy were taken under fire. Area was searched and found one pack with miscellaneous 782 gear, which was full of bullet holes and blood soaked. One AK-47 magazine pouch with five full magazines, two chicom grenades, a battle dressing which had the following writing, Tien 32710RT and C3 KY were captured.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(42) 071840H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(43) 072030H. Frag Order 55-67 issued to all units.

(44) 080400H. Company E listening post heard movement and sounds of metal by perimeter YD 187671. Grenade was thrown and noise stopped. Early light, area was checked and eating utensils were found throughout the area.

(45) 080800H. Company H patrol discovered a CH-34 with the markings A4551 at YD 115676. It had been completely stripped. An anti-tank mine, RPG Rocket launcher, one empty booster propellant tube and misc 782 gear were found near the wreckage.

(46) 081015H. A patrol from Company H was collecting enemy equipment discovered at YD 116676. It was being destroyed when an unknown device was set off. Patrol received 8 KIA's. Equipment found were 2 containers with mortar fuzes 7AK-47 magazines with ammo, 2 chicom grenades, 2 home made demolitions and misc 782 gear.

(47) 081030H. Patrol from Company F moved to blocking position to assist Company G patrol and received sniper fire. Patrol tripped a bouncing betty at YD 092661 which resulted in 2 KIA, 1 WIA. Enemy was taken under fire with 60mm mortars and patrol remained in blocking position.

(48) 081030H. Company G patrol discovered bunker area at YD 098661 and was searching when taken under small arms fire. Patrol maneuvered against the enemy receiving automatic fire and grenades. Patrol disengaged and called in artillery which had good coverage on the target. Air was also utilized. One artillery round fell short in midst of ten men. Fixed wing heavy ordnance was used on bunker complex. Action results were 2 KIA, 17 WIA evac, 8 non-evac, 4 enemy KIA confirmed and 6 KIA probables.

(49) 081300H. Company G returned to bunker complex at YD 098661 after heavy air bombardment. On entering area Company G was taken under automatic weapon fire and grenades from enemy bunkers. Enemy inside appeared wounded and could not withdraw. Bunkers were knocked out. Area contained living quarters, field mess, 2 cook shacks. Company Commander reported bodies, and pieces of bodies over most of the bivouac area. Results of action were four KIA, 35 enemy KIA and 20 probables.

(50) 081630H. Capt O'BRIEN relieved Capt SHEEHAN as CO Company G. Capt SHEEHAN was wounded and evacuated.

(51) 081835H. Command Group and Golf received 12 artillery rounds from vicinity YD 079677. Counter battery of artillery and fixed wing was used on enemy suspected position.

(52) 081430H. Two squads from Company F were conducting routine patrolling. One squad received heavy automatic fire and was pinned down in vicinity YD 089654-081654. One platoon and unengaged squad moved to aid. Company Commander moved unit to assist with four squads as all units were engaged in heavy fire fight. Link up was made and continuous artillery was delivered on the enemy with outstanding results. Estimated 200 to 250 NVA were in the area.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

In sweeping the area, Foxtrot discovered 73 enemy KIA 30 probables. Bodies were in fresh graves with one or two bodies in them. Twenty-four rounds of 61mm mortars, three 82mm mortars, one AK-47 were also found. Foxtrot had one 60mm mortar destroyed, one PRC 25 radio, one KIA, 21 WIA evac, 20 non-evac.

(53) 091850H. Possible NVA jamming of Bn TAC net interfered but did not over-ride transmission.

(54) 082115H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(55) 082140H. Command Group received one enemy grenade. Returned fire with small arms and grenades. Listening post returned to perimeter.

(56) 082245H. Frag Order 56-67 issued to all units.

(57) 090805H. Company G patrol discovered old bivouac area at YD 105652 with fighting holes, 2 cooking shacks. Area was uninhabited.

(58) 090950H. Company E discovered 2 bunkers 4x6 ft at YD 096664. Bunkers reinforced and had not been used for some time.

(59) 091030H. Company F patrol discovered 15 bunkers at YD 090654. Each bunker able to house about 15 persons. Bunkers were destroyed.

(60) 091230H. Company E patrol found a hut 25'x30' at YD 098674. In the inside there were two bunkers 15'x10' constructed with bamboo and mud; appeared to have been used recently.

(61) 091415H. Company F patrol during search of area vicinity YD 101655 detonated exploding device believed to be buried mine resulting in 5 WIA's.

(62) 091400H. Company H discovered the following at YD 10674: 3 packs with misc 782 gear, 4 gas masks and a explosive device, 8 RPG rockets, 3 chicom grenades, 1 chicom claymore, demolitions equipment, Loatian money and various documents.

(63) 091804H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(64) 091810H. Command Group received 9 rounds of high velocity RR type weapon. Returned fire with artillery and fixed wing. Enemy fire was silenced. Enemy believed to be at YD 053704.

(65) 092030H. Issued Frag Order 57-67 to all units.

(66) 100825H. Company E found bunker complex of approx 25 of various sizes which were well camouflaged. Six 82mm rounds, 20 empty 82mm cans were also found and destroyed.

(67) 102020H. Frag Order received from 3rd Marines.

(68) 102210H. Issued Frag Order 58-67 to all units

(69) 110800H. Tank with Echo Company exploded anti-tank mine at YD 128536. It damaged track wheels, 1 track, and 1 shock absorber.

(70) 111865H. Frag Order received from 3rd Marines. 2/3 to conduct local patrolling in new assigned area vicinity of YD 0859.

(71) 112100H. Issued Frag Order 59-67 to all units.

(72) 121030H. Patrol from Golf received 7 rounds of small arms fire. Patrol checked the area and found one ARVN test firing carbine. Patrol withdrew from the area.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- (73) 122100H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.
 (74) 122130H. Issued Frag Order 60-67 to all 2/3 units.
 (75) 130700H. 2/3 remained static, with local patrolling. Negative enemy contact.
 (76) 131000H. Received Frag Order 1-67 for operation HICKORY II.
 (77) 131930H. Frag Order 61-67 issued to all units 2/3.
 (78) 131930H. FAC Team chopped from "G" to "E".

b. Operation HICKORY II

- (1) 140700H. 2/3 jumped off on Operation HICKORY II.
 (2) 141010H. Major BEARD Co 2/3 medevac to rear, relieved by Major BROUJOS.
 (3) 141100H. Company F secured Objective #1.
 (4) 141130H. Company H secured Objective #2.
 (5) 141200H. Company H while searching Objective #2 at YD 075622 set off a anti-personnel mine. Three M-26 frag grenades also discovered and were constructed as surprise firing devices. Company H sustained one (1) KIA and one (1) WIA.
 (6) 141230H. Company E secured Objective #3.
 (7) 141515H. Company E, while searching out area at Objective #3, had one surprise firing device go off resulting in one WIA.
 (8) 141550H. Company E discovered three claymore mines and two anti-personnel mines which were wired. They were destroyed in place at YD 070635.
 (9) 141600H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.
 (10) 141640H. While conducting search of Objective #3, Company E detonated anti-personnel mine which was rigged with trip wire resulting in one WIA evacuated and one WIA non evacuated at YD 070635.
 (11) 141700H. While Company E was loading med evacuations in landing zone, one Chicom grenade rigged as surprise firing device was set off resulting in one KIA and 9 WIA's.
 (12) 141720H. Frag Order 62-67 issued to all units.
 (13) 142300H. Company E received approximately 40 rounds 82mm mortar fire from vicinity YD 083644. Returned fire with artillery and 81mm mortar with good coverage. Company suffered one WIA non medevac.
 (14) 151815H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.
 (15) 151915H. Frag Order 63-67 issued to all units.
 (16) 160600H. BLT 2/3 reconstituted. Backload to ARG shipping commenced.

10. Results

a. Friendly Losses

USMC

OFFICER			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	8	0	0

ENLISTED			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
14	187	0	2

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

USN

OFFICER			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	0	0	0

ENLISTED			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	7	0	0

b. Enemy Losses

CATAGORY	TOTAL
NVA KIA (conf)	148
NVA KIA (prob)	116
Individual weapons captured	5
Fortifications destroyed	65
Fighting holes uncovered	15
Ammunition destroyed	
S/A	12,000 rds.
82mm	9 rds.
60mm	24 rds.
Chicom grenades	21
Demolitions	25 lbs.
Medical supplies captured	15 lbs.
Miscellaneous 782 gear captured	65 lbs.

11. Administrative Matters. The Administrative Plan was adequate to support all combat operations during Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO and HICKORY II. The Serial Assignment Table was modified to support the landing of four rifle companies and a CP group into a single landing zone. No administrative problems arose throughout the operation. While combat operations were being conducted, the battalion rear dislocated from its position afloat and established a rear at the Dong Ha Combat Base. Offloading was of a general nature and approximately 95% of all organic equipment and operating stocks of the Battalion Landing Team was offloaded. Prior to the cessation of Operation HICKORY II, the Battalion Landing Team closed its rear and again established itself aboard assigned shipping.

a. Supply Techniques, Combat Loads, Ammunition and Weapons Carried by Assault Troops.

(1) As during all amphibious operations, ammunition, rations, and special equipment were staged aboard assigned shipping on D-1. These items were also issued on D-1 except for high explosives which were issued just prior to embarking helicopters. The only change from the prescribed load as stated in the Administrative Plan and the Battalion SOP for Operations was the reduction in the number of rations carried. The attachments were issued their prescribed load just prior to their movement ashore.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(2) Resupply of the battalion was conducted from the LSA located in Dong Ha. On D-Day a detachment from the shore party platoon and battalion supply was moved to the LSA to coordinate resupply. Helicopters from the direct support squadron were positioned within the Dong Ha complex to insure timely resupply and casualty evacuation in accordance with the tactical situation.

(3) During the last three days of Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO while the battalion was in a reserve status resupply with the exception of Company E was conducted from the battalion rear. Rough riders composed of organic vehicles moved the required rations and ammunition from Dong Ha to the battalion located northwest of Cam Lo. Echo Company, because of its position forward of the rest of the battalion, and its inaccessibility to wheeled vehicles, continued to be resupplied from the LSA by helicopter.

(4) At the onset of Operation HICKORY II, the source of resupply was again moved back to the LSA. No problems in resupply arose from these changes of resupply sources. Additionally, special foodstuffs were obtained from assigned shipping and delivered to the field during both operations.

(5) Battalion supply continued normal supply functions throughout this period both from assigned shipping and from the battalion rear in Dong Ha. Battalion supply again had the responsibility for the collection of 782 gear and weapons of casualties. It should be noted that throughout these operations, jungle utilities and cleaning rods were not available through the supply system.

(6) The weapons and ammunition carried by assault troops were normal and no special weapons or munitions were used. Malfunctions of the M16A1 rifle continued to exist; however, their occurrence was not as frequent as during Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN.

b. Maintenance. Normal second echelon maintenance was conducted by the Battalion Landing Team throughout the operation. No special problems concerning maintenance were encountered.

c. Medical Evacuation, Treatment, and Hospitalization

(1) First echelon medical care was provided by eight corpsmen in each line company and four with the command group. Attached units were provided first echelon care by their unit corpsmen. First echelon care consisted of first aid, evaluation of wounds for possible evacuation, and care of minor medical problems.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Second echelon (Collecting and Clearing Platoon and BAS Medical Officers) and third echelon care (Surgical Team) was provided aboard the USS Tripoli, LPH-10. This combined group was able to provide complete medical treatment and hospitalization in a well supplied, 2½ operating room, clean, secure, facility. Only those patients requiring the specialized care of a neurosurgeon, ophthalmologist, or maxillo-facial surgeon, had to be evacuated to the hospital ship Repose or the NSA hospital in Da Nang.

(3) Hospitalization for up to 300 patients was provided aboard the Tripoli.

(4) Medical evacuation was provided by helicopter squadron HMM 164 from 4 July thru 9 July. Evacuation was rapid and efficient, and no mortality or morbidity occurred during the helicopter evacuation from the field to the USS Tripoli.

(5) SLF Medical care was aborted aboard the USS Tripoli on 9 July when the BAS and C and C platoon were offloaded; elements going to Dong Ha, Phu Bai and Quang Tri. This resulted in patients having to be evacuated quite circuitously from the field to the Dong Ha BAS, then to "D" Med Collecting and clearing Platoon, and then to 3rd echelon centers of Phu Bai, NSA Hospital, or the USS Repose. The attendant disadvantages could have reduced the promptness and effectiveness of medical care if substantial casualties had occurred during this period.

(6) Casualties were as follows:

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
KIA	0	14	0	0
DOW's	0	2	0	0
WIA's (evac)	8	114	0	7
WIA's (non evac)	2	71	0	0
Non Hostile (evac)	1	38	0	1

Of the non-hostile evacuations, seven causes of malaria were diagnosed, and the remainder represent sprains, heat casualties, minor infections and other non serious conditions.

(7) No treatment of indigenous personnel was attempted, nor any MED CAP program initiated.

d. Transportation. Initially, only those vehicles required to support the detachment at the LSA were offloaded; however, practically all organic vehicles were subsequently offloaded during general offloading.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

All tactical moves of troops and casualty evacuation were conducted by the direct support helicopter squadron. Resupply of the Battalion was conducted both by organic vehicles and helicopter as stated in paragraph 11 (a) above. The Collecting and Clearing Platoon had one 2½ ton truck destroyed when it hit a mine on the road between Dong Ha and Quang Tri. This vehicle is presently being held by FLSU, and the paper work to drop this vehicle from the BLT account has begun. A M-37 personnel carrier belonging to the 1st Plat, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn was damaged and will require parts for repair. The necessary parts have been ordered to accomplish repair. No other difficulties involving transportation were encountered. The 9th Motor Transport Battalion furnished support for the movement of the Battalion Landing Team during offloading and backloading.

e. Communications

(1) Only the operational communication channels were established within the BLT during Operation BEAVER TRACK/HICKORY II. Since the battalion was OPCON Third Marines, a station was activated on Third Marines Regimental TAC. Internally, the normal configuration of TAC and ADMIN was used.

(2) In order to pass administrative traffic to SLF shipping, a HF/SSB net was activated with the battalion CP, a relay element, and the SLF staff all providing stations on the net. Also, a VHF/FM relay element was provided as a backup.

(3) TACLOG was established with a station in support of the ISA. This net was also used to facilitate and coordinate backloading.

(4) A SQUIRE switchboard was briefly installed at Dong Ha with trunks to both PERFORMANCE DELTA and LEGION.

(5) No radio relay was used during the period covered.

f. Medical Evacuation

(1) Evacuation by helicopter squadron HMM 164 left nothing to be desired. No DOW's were as a result of delay in evacuation.

(2) Seven cases of Malaria falciparum were evacuated. These were contracted despite scrupulous distribution of the chloroquineprimaquine prophylaxis.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

DECLASSIFIED

13. Commander's Analysis

a. The coordination of supporting arms when the battalion CHOPS to a regiment ashore continues to be a serious problem and one which was not absent from the battalion's recent operations. Unnecessary delay in emergency counterbattery fires has proven costly to the battalion in the past and is a continual problem. Check fires in artillery are too frequent and are initiated usually at the division FSCC for aircraft which have not yet arrived on station. This battalion has never received a satisfactory explanation to inquiries made concerning check fires and counterbattery delays. It is the opinion of the undersigned that an over-safe policy for aircraft protection is being followed which is jeopardizing the safety of ground elements actually engaged with the enemy.

b. Once again the battalion demonstrated its combat readiness by its ability to respond to a call to land within 48 hours. On 2 July 1967, the battalion backloaded from Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN after sixteen days ashore, and landed 0700 4 July in the vicinity of the Cam Lo artillery position in support of the 3rd Marines.

c. The order to offload all of the battalion's equipment from ARG shipping to the Dong Ha Combat Base contributed to the loss of a number of items of personnel gear of members of this battalion. Although Shore Party elements of both 2/3 and 1/3 worked tirelessly to move equipment belonging to both battalions, there was insufficient landing craft, shore party and transportation facilities to effect the offloading and backloading expeditiously of two battalions.


d. The continuous artillery fired in support of Company F on 8 July 1967 when they were engaged with an estimated 200-man NVA force was effective and contributed materially to the routing of the enemy unit which appeared to be trying desperately to disengage from contact. The action of the artillery forward observer team with Company F and the battery supporting this action was outstanding.


E. W. HERICH

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED


Beaver Track / Buffalo



FCL

HICKORY II

+ 64
09



+ 55
04

Enclosure (2)

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602

2nd BN, 3rd MAR, 2 & 3

CONTROL NO. 00089-67

COPY NO. 11 OF 60

03/DWL/pgr

3000

30 July 1967

Ser No. 0035-67

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operations BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT).

Ref: (a) MAPS: VIETNAM, AMS 1:50,000 Series L7014, Sheets 6442 I, 6442 II, 6442 III and 6442 IV.
(b) CTG 79.5 Frag Order (Operation BEAR CHAIN).
(c) 4th Marines Frag Order 29-67 (Operation FREMONT).
(d) 4th Marines Frag Order 32-67 (Operation FREMONT).
(e) 4th Marines Frag Order 33-67 (Operation FREMONT).

Encl: (1) Overlay of Operation BEAR CHAIN.
(2) Overlay of Operation FREMONT (Frag Order 29-67).
(3) Overlay of Operation FREMONT (Frag Order 32-67).
(4) Overlay of Operation FREMONT (Frag Order 33-67).

1. Operation BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT.

2. Dates of Operations

a. BEAR CHAIN:

- (1) 200630H - 211400H July 1967.
- (2) 260001H - 261200H July 1967.

b. FREMONT: 211400H - 260001H July 1967.

3. Location. Operation BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT was conducted in Huong Dien Districts, Thua Thien Province and Hai Lang District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.

GP 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. Task OrganizationBLT 2/3

LtCol HERICH

UNCLASSIFIED

H & S Co (-) (Rein)
 Det, Hq Bn, 3d Mar Div
 Det, Hq Co, 3d Mar
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Marines
 Det, 15th Dental Co
 2d Clearing Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d Med Bn
 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3d MT Bn
 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3d SP Bn
 Det, LSU, For Log Cmd

Co E (Rein)

Capt BOGARD

Co E
 Det, H & S Co
 1st Sec, 81mm Mort Plat
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 FAC Team
 NGF Team
 Det (-) "A", BJU - 1
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Marines
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Co F (Rein)

1stLt KOEHLER

Co F
 3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Recon Bn
 Det, H & S Co
 2d Sec, 81mm Mort Plat
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 FAC Team
 NGF Team
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Marines
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Co G (Rein)

Capt O'BRIEN

Co G
 Det, H & S Co
 3rd Sec, 81mm Mort Plat
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Marines
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

UNCLASSIFIED

Co H (Rein)

Capt CULVER

Co H

Det, H & S Co

4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plat

Det, Med Plat

Det, Intel Sec

Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Marines

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

UNCLASSIFIED

106mm RR Plat

2ndLt ELMS

B Btry (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Marines

Capt FILE

Provisional Company

1stLt HUGHES

Det, (-), LSU, For Log Cmd

Det, 2d Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd AT Bn

Det, 3rd Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bn

Det, 2d Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Tank Bn

Det, H & S Co, 106mm RR Plat

3rd Plat (-) (Rein), Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bn

1stLt RUSH

2nd Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3rd AT Bn

1stLt LAWLER

2nd Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3rd Tank Bn

1stLt O'NEIL

2d Plat, Co A

Det, H & S Co, 3d Tank Bn

5. Supporting Forces

a. Air, Artillery and N. G. F. were the supporting forces available to the BLT. The effectiveness of air and artillery and naval gun fire support is discussed below.

b. Artillery. Artillery support was available and utilized by the battalion during this operation. Support was received from the 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines and all missions were either preplanned or immediate. The preplanned missions consisted of night defensive registrations around platoon and company patrol bases and other likely avenues of enemy approach. Immediate missions were requested on enemy sniper positions, enemy mortar positions and enemy troop concentrations. A total of 1,166 rounds of 105 and 155mm fire was delivered in support of the battalion.

c. Naval Gunfire Naval gunfire support was available and utilized by the battalion during this operation. The support was very effective and utilized as described below:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (1) USS WEDDERBURN (DD-684) fired a total of 60 rounds
 5"/38 (a) VC in woodline - 41 rounds
 (b) AW, mortar position, RR position - 17 rounds
 (c) AW - 2 rounds
 All were in support of Company E.

- (2) USS MORTON (DD-948) fired a total of 100 rounds
 5"/54 (a) AW position - 39 rounds, Support of Co E.
 (b) H & I's - 61 rounds - 21 for Co E, 40 for Co F.

d. Air Support.

(1) Fixed wing aircraft and UH-1E's provided by the 1st MAW were used for CAS. Fixed wing aircraft were used for nine (9) CAS missions on enemy positions with excellent results. UH-1E's were utilized against snipers and targets of opportunity which were delaying unit movements. All CAS missions were controlled by TAC (a) and 14 tons of ordnance was expended on enemy targets.

(2) All logistical support, tactical troop movements and MEDEVACS were provided by HMM 265, assigned to the SLF, with the exception of two (2) night emergency MEDEVACS which came from A - Med. All helicopter support was considered excellent, with the exception of the long response time for night MEDEVACS.

6. Intelligence

a. Enemy Strength, Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation BEAR CHAIN.

(1) Enemy Strength

- (a) 416th NVA Battalion
 Strength: Unknown
 Location: YD 499455
 Weapons: Unknown
- (b) 802nd Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment
 Strength: 300
 Location: YD 481435
 Weapons: 81 and 60mm mortars, 75mm RR, 57mm RR, automatic weapons
- (c) Unidentified Battalion
 Strength: Unknown
 Location: YD 487444
 Weapons: Unknown

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (d) Unidentified Battalion
Strength: Unknown
Location: YD 479462
Weapons: Unknown
- (e) Unidentified Company
Strength: Unknown
Location: YD 479462
Weapons: Unknown
- (f) Unidentified Company
Strength: Unknown
Location: YD 511432
Weapons: Unknown
- (g) C.11 NVA Intelligence/Recon Company
Strength: 105
Location: YD 506418
Weapons: Automatic weapons

(2) Enemy Situation. Numerous sighting of Battalion size units in early July 1967 indicated a build up of NVA and Main Force units in the area of operation. The intention of this build up was not known although it was suspected that the enemy was planning to use this area for attacks to the south and west.

(3) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of:

- (a) Attacking with a force of up to two NVA Battalions and two unidentified Battalions.
- (b) Defending with a force of up to two NVA Battalions and two unidentified Battalions.
- (c) Reinforcing (a) and (b) above within eight to ten hours with a force of up to three NVA Battalions (806th, 814th and 3rd) and one MF Battalion (808th).

b. Enemy Strength and Situation During Operation BEAR CHAIN.

(1) 20 July 1967. 20 July 1967 was characterized by semi-automatic fire against ground troops and helicopters. Fire against ground troops was received at coordinates YD 512450, YD 513453, and YD 492430.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

A CH-46 was shot down as a result of fire from coordinates YD 512486. Provisional Company night defenses at coordinates YD 529491 were probed with semi-automatic fire. Company E received four rounds of 82mm mortar fire at coordinates YD 494464. Four VCS were apprehended at coordinates YD 515470, and two VCS dressed in khaki at coordinates YD 523493.

(2) 21 July 1967. Heavy enemy contact in the form of an early morning probe and an afternoon defense of a fortified bunker complex constituted the main enemy contact on 21 July 1967. Company E at coordinates YD 494464 received a three pronged attack at 0500H from an estimated reinforced company. The infantry attack was accompanied by mortar, recoilless rifle and RPG fire. The attack was contained, resulting in nine (9) enemy KIA (confirmed), six (6) enemy KIA (probable) and the capture of one (1) RPG launcher, three (3) SKS Carbines, three (3) AK-47 rifles, 15 Chicom grenades, two (2) RPG rounds, 10 blocks of fuze TNT blocks, a first aid kit, miscellaneous documents and 782 gear, and the capture of one wounded POW. Contact by the enemy was broken at first light. Company H, while sweeping through a village received heavy automatic fire from a platoon at YD 511450. After calling in air and artillery, a second attempt to sweep the area was confronted by automatic and semi-automatic fire from coordinates YD 514454. Later, four (4) 60mm mortar rounds were received at coordinates YD 515437 from the same general area. Sniper fire was received from coordinates YD 494464, and YD 488488. Semi-automatic fire was received from coordinates YD 515485, YD 479430, YD 475427 and YD 477432. One enemy KIA (confirmed) and indications of three enemy KIA (probable) were discovered at coordinates YD 525423. Three VCS were detained at coordinates YD 515432.

(3) 22 July 1967. Mortar attacks, automatic and semi-automatic fire and combinations of the three, characterized the enemy's main effort on 22 July 1967. A combination of three 61mm mortar rounds, automatic and semi-automatic fire was received from coordinates YD 517424 and 519429. 60mm mortar fire and semi-automatic fire was received from coordinates YD 496412. 82mm mortar fire and semi-automatic fire was received at YD 520440. Sniper fire was received from coordinates YD 493437. One VC, killed by napalm, was discovered at coordinates YD 485434. One VC was killed and one enemy KIA (confirmed) were discovered at coordinates YD 509447. One VCS was detained at coordinates YD 477432 and another at YD 485434. Three VC were spotted moving in the vicinity of coordinates YD 474436. A secondary explosion in a house was triggered at coordinates YD 476923. Documents and an ID card were discovered at coordinates YD 510447.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) 23 July 1967. Enemy activity on 23 July 1967 was considerably less than the two preceeding days. Four rounds of 82mm mortar fire were received from coordinates YD 494414. Automatic weapons fire was received from coordinates YD 505409 and sniper fire was received from the vicinity of YD 488447. A surprise firing device was triggered at coordinates YD 485440. Three VCS were detained at coordinates YD 524491 and miscellaneous documents were discovered in a suitcase at coordinates YD 510447.

(5) 24 July 1967. Early on the morning of 24 July 1967 a concentration of enemy was reported in the vicinity of coordinates YD 507412. Artillery fire was called in and the enemy appeared to flee in a southeasterly direction. Sniper fire was received at coordinates YD 485504. A surprise firing device, apparently gunpowder, was triggered at coordinates YD 468523. Three VCS were apprehended at coordinates YD 497497. Another VCS along with two tons of rice, clothing, uniforms, documents, letters, medical supplies, a sleeping bag and a poncho were discovered at coordinates YD 475515. An additional ten tons of rice was discovered in the vicinity of coordinates YD 475515. On the night of 24 July 1967 a night ambush was triggered by an estimated three to six VC at coordinates YD 485515. A search of the area at first light revealed 3 individual weapons, ammunition, equipment, documents and 2 KIA (confirmed) and 1 KIA (probable).

(6) 25 July 1967. On 25 July 1967 sniper fire was received from coordinates YD 489503, and a M-26 grenade surprise firing device was triggered at coordinates YD 482507. Eight VCS were apprehended at coordinates YD 480520 and another at YD 477513. Five tons of rice was discovered and evacuated from coordinates YD 485517 and one Chicom AP mine and two 60mm mortar rounds were discovered at coordinates YD 457522. Operation Bear Chain terminated 26 July 1967 with negative enemy contact on the morning of 26 July 1967.

c. Significant Enemy Activities. The following enemy activities during Operation Bear Chain are considered significant.

(1) In the area of operation, many hamlets and villages were in actuality, defensive positions, well fortified, camouflaged, and entrenched. However, these areas were not always defended and quite often nearly deserted. However, on any given day these same hamlets or villages were occupied by one or two squads of VC armed with automatic weapons and capable of temporarily stopping a company size sweep until artillery and air support completely leveled the area.

(2) The rice cache discovered in the vicinity of coordinates YD 475515 was meant for the VC. Word had been passed by the VC that the villagers should expect the VC rice collectors within a few days and to prepare their harvested rice for the collectors.

UNCLASSIFIED

7. Missiona. Operation BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT

(1) On D-Day at L/H-Hour BLT 2/3 lands in LZ's BLUE JAY and SPARROW and over RED BEACH to establish blocking positions to prevent in/exfiltration from the TAOR; and conduct aggressive S&D operations in assigned sector to seize LF Objectives A&B. Be prepared to provide co size blocking force vicinity coord YD 565463 oriented along route 555 facing the SONG O LAU. On order employ recon plt between western boundary and route 1 for surveillance. Designate one (1) rifle co as LF reserve, not to be committed without approval of SLF commander with one (1) plt designated for sparrow hawk. On order conduct tactical amphibious withdrawal.

(2) At H-Hour establish blocking positions A (YD 497426 to YD 503410); B (YD 512447); C (YD 524445) and D (YD 478444) and provide support to 2/4 as required. Be prepared to commit reserve company to reinforce or exploit 2/3 success.

(3) At L-Hour, D-Day lift companies E, F and "A" Command Group from LZ's LARK and CRANE into LZ DOVE; Upon landing conduct aggressive S&D up axis BLUE toward boundary and blocking position provided by ARVN forces; upon completion reverse forces and establish blocking position vicinity (YD 478514). At first light, D-Day commence overland movement, with companies G, H and "B" Command Group to LD utilizing ferry crossing; then conduct aggressive S&D up axis Yellow. Be prepared to lift companies G, H and "B" Command Group from LZ SPARROW to reinforce or exploit success within AO. Assure coordination with PF platoon vicinity (YD 522448) for assistance in crossing at ferry site; be prepared to backload to naval shipping and chop to SLF on order.

8. Concept of Operationa. Operator BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT (Encl 1, 2, 3 & 4).

(1) Commencing at L-Hour on D-Day one Co lands in LZ BLUE JAY secures Objective #3; be prepared to continue S&D operations to the south and on order, revert to LF Reserve. Subsequently one company lands in LZ SPARROW and secures Objective #2; conducts S&D operations to the southwest and secures LF Objective A. At H-Hour one (1) Company and plt of tanks lands over RED BEACH and secures LZ vicinity of coordinates YD 522495 prepares to establish blocking position vicinity of coordinates YD 565463. Command Group Alpha, Prov Co and Arty Btry lands on order in LZ vicinity of YD 522495. On order one (1) co lands in LZ vicinity of YD 505475 and conducts S&D operations to the southwest to secure LF Objective B. S&D operations will be conducted immediately upon landing and will be characterized by aggressive movement on the part of small units to locate and destroy enemy forces in TAOR. Maximum reliance will be placed on use of supporting arms throughout operation.

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) At H-Hour 2/3 employing four companies will establish blocking positions A, B, C & D to block on north and south within assigned AO.

(3) At L-Hour two companies and a Command group will be lifted to the northwest corner of AO and sweep northwest along axis Blue into ARVN blocking position; then establish blocking position oriented to southwest while remaining elements move overland to LD and conduct S&D operations up axis Yellow to blocking position.

9. Execution

1. Operation BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT

a. Phase 1

- (1) 200630H. L-Hour for operation BEAR CHAIN
- (2) 200630H. First elements of Company H landed at LZ Sparrow with negative enemy contact.
- (3) 200700H. Company G landed at Red Beach with negative enemy contact.
- (4) 200700H. All units of Company H at LZ Sparrow preparing to move.
- (5) 200705H. Company G secured objective #1 waiting for tanks to arrive.
- (6) 200715H. 3rd platoon Company B, 1st AMTRAC Battalion and 2nd platoon, Company B, Recon Battalion OPCON 2/3.
- (7) 200725H. 2nd Platoon Company A, 3rd Tank Battalion arrived Red Beach. Heavy section sent with Company G and other two to remain in support of "B" Btry.
- (8) 200725H. Company E landed in LZ Sparrow with negative enemy contact.
- (9) 200750H. Company H lead elements entered objective #3.
- (10) 200945H. Command Group Alpha departed USS Tripoli.
- (11) 201000H. Command Group Alpha landed at LZ Owl with negative enemy contact.
- (12) 201000H. Company E apprehended four VC suspects vicinity of Objective #2. ARVN's attached questioned them and released suspects after interrogation.
- (13) 201005H. Company E secured Objective #2 with negative enemy contact.
- (14) 201006H. Company H secured Objective #3 with negative enemy contact.
- (15) 201045H. Company F notified to be prepared to be lifted from USS Tripoli to LZ Pigeon.
- (16) 201045H. All of B Btry on position and prepared to give support to units.
- (17) 201215H. Company E received automatic weapons fire from the village AP SIEM QUAN at YD 512450. Suspected size of enemy at six. Fire returned with S/A and 60mm mortars, and gun ships were requested. Two WIA were sustained and med evacuated.

UNCLASSIFIED

(18) 201305H. Helicopter making med evac pick up for Company E received small arms fire. It made the pick up and cleared the LZ and later was forced down due to damage received from the action. It landed at YD 515488. Platoon from Company G with tanks provided security for it until it was evacuated out.

(19) 201445H. Company F landed at LZ Pigeon with negative enemy contact.

(20) 201500H. Three VC suspects between the ages of 25 to 40 with no identification were apprehended by Company F, vicinity LZ Pigeon.

(21) 201505H. Two VC suspects were apprehended at LZ Pigeon by Company F suspects were carrying Khaki type uniforms and had no type identification. They were between the ages of 30 to 35 and were lifted to rear.

(22) 201530H. Small arms fire received at random by Company F. Returned fire to suspected position, also used gun ship on station and fire ceased. Firing came from vicinity YD 496462.

(23) 201940H. November Company perimeter received small arms fire from about 500 meters out. Fire caused no damage; it came from vicinity YD 537496.

(24) 201950H. Company E received four random rounds of 82mm mortars. Enemy position could not be located; this resulted in one KIA that was not serious enough to be evacuated.

(25) 201950H. Frag Order was received from SLF.

(26) 202130H. Frag Order 65-67 issued to all units.

(27) 210500H. Company E received a three sided probe attack from direction NE, south and west. Enemy engaged perimeter vicinity YD 496458 with small arms fire approximately 60 rounds 82mm rounds, 25 rounds 57mm RR and 15 rounds RPG rocket rounds. Main attack was from the southwest, estimated size of one Company. During the attack the enemy captured one inoperable M-60 machine gun. The attack was repelled with small arms fire, grenades, 60 and 81mm mortars, artillery, Naval Gun fire was used. Length of the attack was 45 minutes. Gun ships were called on station to cover the area. Results of the action Company E sustained 2 KIA, 22 WIA, 11 which were not serious and not med evac. The enemy losses were 9 KIA 6 probable and one wounded POW. 3 SKS carbines, 1 RPG Launcher, 3 AK-47, 15 chicom grenades, 2 RPG rocket rounds and 5 RPG propellant charges, 10 blocks of TNT, assorted documents and miscellaneous 782 were discovered after the attack.

(28) 210600H. Sniper fire was received by Company F from YD 495466. Fire with 60mm mortars was returned to suspected position which caused sniper fire to cease. Company F had one WIA.

(29) 210900H. Company F received sniper fire from YD 488448. Returned fire with 60mm mortars and sniper fire ceased.

(30) 210050H. Company H 1st helicopter lift landed LZ Cardinal.

(31) 211015H. Company H lift completed to LZ Cardinal.

(32) 211145H. 2nd platoon Company B 3rd Recon Battalion inserted at YD 489465.

(33) 211230H. Company H received heavy automatic fire and sniper fire from YD 511450 estimated enemy strength to be about 20 lead elements taken under fire and had to withdraw due to heavy casualties. Returned fire with small arms, 60 and 81mm mortars plus artillery fixed wing was on station and used. Company H suffered more casualties when med evacs were being taken out. Helicopter was taken under fire. Total casualties amounted to 5 KIA, 30 WIA, 10 which were not serious enough to be evacuated. Area of action to be swept after completion of air strike.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (34) 211400H. 2/3 OPCON TO 4th Marines.
- (35) 211440H. Platoon from Company G providing security for downed helicopter at YD 515487 received three rounds of random small arms harrassing type fire while helicopter was being evacuated.
- (36) 211700H. Three VC suspects running away from Company F advance elements at YD 485437 were apprehended and sent to the rear to be evacuated.
- (37) 211710H. Company F elements took heavy automatic fire at YD 479430 and YD 475427. Returned fire with small arms and continued to objective Bravo.
- (38) 211830H. In sweeping objective Bravo one VC KIA was discovered plus indications of numerous blood stains and cloth used for bandages estimation of 5 probables were credited. Objective Bravo was cleared.
- (39) 211845H. Company H upon receiving resupply received four rounds 61mm mortars from YD 515445, damaging the helicopter. The helicopter was able to lift off the LZ but then made a emergency landing at YD 530490 inside November Company's perimeter. Company H had 19 WIA, 10 of which were not serious enough to be med evacuated out. Enemy position was not located.
- (40) 220230H. Command Group and November Company received 6 rounds of 61mm mortars inside the perimeter at YD 530490. Rounds came from the northwest direction. Enemy position could not be located. There were no casualties.
- (41) 220625H. Tanks arrived at Red Beach and had transportation awaiting to return back to ship.
- (42) 220625H. Frag Order received from 4th Marines.
- (43) 220730H. Three male civilians were observed at YD 477432 by Company H. A patrol was sent after them and apprehended one of the three. The other two got away. Suspect was sent to rear.
- (44) 220910H. Objective #4 secured and are presently blowing bunkers.
- (45) 221010H. Company G 1st wave completed to YD 528447.
- (46) 221030H. Company G completed lift.
- (47) 221030H. In conducting sweep of village vicinity YD 511447, Company H discovered one VC lady that had been burned very badly by fixed wing NAPALM. Search of village was continued.
- (48) 221100H. Company E apprehended one VC suspect at YD 485434. Suspect was not armed but attached PF Unit identified suspect as a VC. Suspect was evacuated to the rear.
- (49) 221400H. Command Group Alpha commenced helicopter lift to new position at YD 475434. B Btry and November Company remained at YD 530490.
- (50) 221300H. Lead elements of Company G were taken under fire by two automatic weapons. Elements used small arms and 60mm mortars and maneuvered towards enemy location YD 519437. Fire from above coordinates held up lead elements. Gunships were employed and fixed wing. Enemy fire silenced and Company continued to move. Company G sustained 4 WIA and 6 non-battle casualties caused by heat exhaustion.
- (51) 221505H. Company E received four rounds of 82mm mortars and small arms fire vicinity YD 496412. Returned fire with small arms and artillery. Company E had two WIA in results of this action.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(52) 221645H. While Company G was on the move received three 61mm mortar rounds which came from YD 516437. Returned artillery fire causing secondary explosion also receiving automatic fire and small arms fire from YD 517434 and YD 519429. Received random fire from YD 524437 at Company G rear elements resulting in one KIA and one WIA.

(53) 221700H. Documents, pictures and one ID card were discovered by Company H while blowing a bunker at YD 510447.

(54) 221740H. Company E upon sweeping area towards the village of XOM NIEB received automatic small arms fire from vicinity of YD 505415. Returned fire with small arms and moved to enemy area then received four rounds of 61mm mortars. Fire was returned with 60 and 81mm mortars and artillery to enemy position.

(55) 221830H. Company G continued to receive heavy automatic fire and unable to move forward elements called in artillery on enemy position and Company G moved out of the village to establish night positions. Company G sustained 3 WIA during this action.

(56) 221940H. Company G received 10 to 12 automatic small arms rounds from YD 522440. Returned fire with small arms and 81mm mortars. Fire was silenced.

(57) 221950H. November Company and B Btry received four 6 61mm mortar rounds in their perimeter at YD 530490. Fired 81mm and 105mm at suspected enemy mortar location at YD 516494. Mortars silenced.

(58) 222230H. Company F listening post observed enemy activity of three persons that were armed enemy was taken under fire with small arms. The enemy returned total of two rounds. A squad was sent to check the area with negative results.

(59) 222325H. Frag Order #2 received from 4th Marines.

(60) 230115H. Frag Order 67-67 issued to all units.

b. Phase 2

(1) 230500H. 2/3 units moved to blocking position. Company E at YD 497427 to YD 504414. Company F and Command Group YD 478446. Company G YD 522447. Company H YD 511449.

(2) 230600H. All units arrived at blocking positions.

(3) 230745H. Lead elements of Company F detonated a surprise firing device along a hedgerow YD 485444 resulting in 2 WIA that were evacuated.

(4) 230747H. Company H discovered a suit case in an abandoned structure YD 510447. It contained various documents and a shirt of military origin. All items sent to the rear.

(5) 230910H. Sniper fire was received at random at Company F perimeter YD 488447. Location of enemy could not be located.

(6) 231120H. November Company observed three civilians near their perimeter. Patrol was sent out and apprehended them. They had no Identification card and were sent to the rear.

(7) 231800H. Company E received automatic fire, a total of 6 rounds from YD 505409. One man on an out post was hit and evacuated. Out post returned fire to suspected position. Check of area was negative.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(8) 232110H. Four rounds of 82mm mortars landed 100 yds from Company E's perimeter. Returned artillery fire at enemy mortar position at YD 494414. Enemy mortar was silenced.

(9) 232200H. Frag Order 68-67 issued to all units.

(10) 240400H. Listening post of Company E observed enemy unable to determine number. Enemy were wearing helmets, carrying weapons at YD 507412. A total of 18 rounds of 105 artillery were called on the enemy. Check of the area at first light resulted in negative results.

c. Phase 3

(1) 240700H. Company E lifted to LZ Dove at YD 490502 and Company F plus Command Group followed.

(2) 240700H. Companies G and H commenced overland search and destroy operations.

(3) 240845H. Three VC suspects were apprehended at YD 497497 by Company F and were returned to rear.

(4) 241020H. Lead elements crossed phase line Plumb.

(5) 241027H. While search of area was being made Company F detonated one surprise exploding device at YD 483513 resulting in one WIA that was evacuated.

(6) 241350H. Companies E and F reached blocking position that was to be ARVN's. Companies E and F now turning about to assume assigned block.

(7) 241500H. Company E and F in blocking position at YD 477512 and YD 475525.

(8) 241510H. First elements of Company G landed by Helicopter at YD 543467.

(9) 241520H. Command Group Bravo landed in trace of Company G.

(10) 241540H. Company H landed in trace of Command Group Bravo.

(11) 241600H. Companies G and H plus Command Group Bravo commenced move towards Line of Departure.

(12) 241700H. Company F apprehended one VC suspect as the only male in a village at YD 475515 which sniper fire was received from. Various medical supplies were discovered along with assorted 782 gear and 38,160 lbs rice that was evacuated.

(13) 242000H. Six to eight tons of rice were discovered at the same village YD 475515. Cache of rice was bagged and evacuated out. A total sum estimated found and evacuated.

(14) 242100H. Frag Order 69-67 issued to all units.

(15) 242215H. Company F ambush sits at YD 485515 had two enemy approach its position from a northerly direction enemy was taken under fire. Ambush weapons started to fail and ambush leader withdrew his unit back to perimeter. Enemy seemed not organized so did not suspect ambush. Ambush was supported by small arms, M-79 rounds and 12 60mm mortar rounds. 14 artillery rounds were also fired. Area was searched at first light and discovered 2 KIA, bloody bandages which enemy left behind, total of 6 probables was estimated, also one new M-1 rifle #2764690, one carbine M-1 #1450851, assorted documents and equipment, 100 rounds of 30 cal and 30 rounds of carbine was discovered. Company F sustained two WIA who were evacuated.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (16) 250700H. Command Group Bravo, Companies H & G commenced moving.
- (17) 250830H. Companies H and G sweeping and crossed phase line Orange.
- (18) 250915H. Assorted documents and personal papers were found in haystack wrapped in bags with plastic covering at perimeter of village YD 471511. Items tagged and returned to rear.
- (19) 251030H. Companies G & H at phase line Grape.
- (20) 251045H. Company E discovered one chicom anti-personnel mine, 2 60mm rounds at YD 477518 and fuze increments. They were destroyed in place.
- (21) 251400H. 30 to 35 local villagers outside of perimeter interpreter stated they wanted to reenter the village once the Marines left. Patrol was sent to check villagers who immediately fled.
- (22) 251450H. Lead elements of H and G Companies crossed phase line Plum.
- (23) 251505H. Company G while conducting survey exploded one surprise firing device believed to be a grenade. It resulted in 2 WIA, one which had to be evacuated.
- (24) 251500H. Company E discovered 5 tons of rice hidden under a hut. Rice was bagged and evacuated.
- (25) 251525H. Four to five sniper rounds were received by Company F. Fire was returned to expected position and sniper fire ceased.
- (26) 251100H. Company F apprehended one VC suspected at YD 477513 who was sent to the rear. He had no identification.
- (27) 251545H. Searching of area Company E discovered 8 VC suspected at YD 480520 who were hiding by the village. They were evacuated to the rear.
- (28) 251620H. Company F while on the move at YD 483507 received 5 rounds of small arms fire. Returned fire with small arms. Searched area with negative results. Action resulted in one WIA who was evacuated.
- (29) 252200H. Frag #34 received from 4th Marines.
- (30) 252220H. Frag Order 70-67 issued to all units.
- (31) 252300H. ARVN units attached will be returned to 4th Marines at first light.
- (32) 260700H. B Btry first wave out completed.
- (33) 260750H. Command Group and Company H at YD 530490 to be lifted out.
- (34) 260800H. Company E at objective 5.
- (35) 260830H. November Company lift completed.
- (36) 260850H. Company E secured objective #5 negative enemy contact and moving to Red Beach.
- (37) 260850H. Company H helicopter teams air borne and lift out completed for first 4 teams.
- (38) 260915H. All of Company H lift complete.
- (39) 260925H. Company G 1st four teams completed.
- (40) 260945H. All of B Btry lift completed.
- (41) 261005H. Command Group Bravo lift completed.
- (42) 261025H. Company G lift completed.
- (43) 261040H. Company F 1st 2 teams lifted out.
- (44) 261040H. Company E on Red Beach.

UNCLASSIFIED

- (45) 261100H. Command Group lift completed.
 (46) 261100H. Company F lift completed.
 (47) 261130H. Command Group, Companies H and G back on LPH.
 (48) 261200H. All units 2/3 back load completed. Operation

Bear Chain completed.

10. Results

a. Friendly Losses

USMC

OFFICER			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	0	0	0

ENLISTED			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
9	99	0	0

USN

OFFICER			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	0	0	0

ENLISTED			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
2	6	0	0

b. Enemy Losses

CATAGORY	TOTAL
NVA KIA (conf)	22
NVA KIA (prob)	37
POW	1
Detainees	28
Individual weapons captured	9
Chicom grenades	15
RPG Rocket Launcher	1
RPG propellent charges	5
RPG rounds	2
Demolitions	10 lbs
Medical kit	1
782 gear	10 lbs
Small arms ammo	130
Chicom mine	1
61mm fuzes and Increments	2 cans
Rice	44,610 lbs

11. Administrative Matters. The Administrative Plan was adequate to support all combat operations during Operation BEAR CHAIN. The Serial Assignment Table was changed to support the tactical scheme of maneuver. The prescribed load was again reduced in the amount of meals carried by the troops. No administrative problems arose during the operation.

a. Supply Techniques, Combat Loads, Ammunition and Weapons Carried by Assault Troops.

(1) As during all previous amphibious operations, ammunition, rations, and special equipment were staged aboard assigned shipping on D-1. All of these items, except for high explosive Class V, were issued on D-1. The high explosives were issued just prior to boarding assault transportation.

(2) On D-1, a detachment composed of Shore Party personnel, Battalion Supply, and Battalion Communication was moved to the 4th Marines Command Post to effect liaison with the LSA located at that position. The resupply source from D-1 to the end of the operation for all classes of resupply except for water, NIS items, and special foodstuffs was this LSA. The USS Tripoli supplied water, battery charge service, foodstuffs and NIS items. HMM 265 supplied the helicopters for all resupply. No problems in resupply resulted from having two separate points of supply.

(3) Battalion Supply continued normal supply functions throughout the operation. Additionally, a team of supply personnel collected all 782 gear, personnel effects, and weapons from casualties evacuated to the USS Tripoli.

(4) No special weapons or ammunition was carried by assault troops. Malfunctions with the M16A1 continued to occur; however, their frequency wasn't nearly so high as during Operation BEACON TORCH which took place under similar sandy soil conditions. Sufficient cleaning equipment is still not available for the M16A1 rifles.

(5) The resupply of an assault Battalion and a direct support artillery battery places stringent requirements upon a CH-46 squadron. The amounts of ammunition required by the battery coupled with the fact that the rifle companies were on the move several times until late afternoon resulted in some night resupply. The support given by HMM 265 in this respect was excellent.

b. Maintenance. Normal organizational maintenance was conducted throughout this operation. No problem areas arose during the operation.

c. Medical Evacuation, Treatment, and Hospitalization

(1) First echelon medical care was provided in the field by corpsmen attached directly to the line companies. In addition, four corpsmen were attached directly to the alpha command group. Attached units were cared for by corpsmen provided in their T. O.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) First echelon care consists of emergency first aid, evaluation of patients for evacuation, and treatment of minor field complaints.

(3) Combined Second echelon care (Collecting and Clearing) and Third echelon care (Surgical Team) was provided aboard the USS Tripoli.

(4) Facilities aboard the USS Tripoli were sufficient to provide care for any casualty except those requiring the specialized care of a neurosurgeon, ophthalmologist, or maxillo-facial surgeon.

(5) Hospital facilities aboard the USS Tripoli are sufficient to provide complete post-operative care for up to 200 patients.

(6) Those patients requiring additional hospitalization of over 30 days were transferred after sufficient convalescence from their wounds.

(7) Evacuation was quickly and efficiently performed by helicopter squadron HMM 265. All but three patients were evacuated directly to the USS Tripoli, and no mortality or morbidity was as a result of delay in evacuation.

(8) Casualties were as follows:

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
KIA	0	9	0	2
DOW's	0	0	0	0
WIA's (evac)	0	70	0	2
WIA's (non evac)	0	29	0	4
Non Hostile (evac)	2	26	0	1

(9) In addition to U. S. military personnel, six wounded vietnamese civilians and three ARVN troops were evacuated to the Tripoli. Two of the ARVN casualties were as a result of heat exhaustion. The civilians were then transferred to a RVN Hospital in Hue.

(10) Of the non-battle casualties, nine were due to heat exhaustion and the remainder due to sprains, infections and other relatively non-serious conditions.

(11) No cases of malaria presented during this operation.

(12) Of the 113 U. S. personnel evacuated, 32 have been/will be transferred, and the remainder (81) will be returned to duty within 30 days.

72
29
101
11 KIA
112

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

(13) No Med-Cap programs were initiated during this operation.

d. Transportation. Only limited organic vehicles were offloaded during the operation, and these were communication vehicles. The direct support helicopter squadron, CH-53's, LVT and ARG shipping boats were used to accomplish both the tactical landing and withdrawal. All tactical troop movement during the operation was accomplished by HMM 265. No transportation problems occurred during Operation BEAR CHAIN.

e. Communications

(1) Communications involved with Operation BEAR CHAIN were in ARG/SLF concept. During initial phase of the operation, VHF/FM communications equipment was used. The AN/MRC-109 was lifted ashore and reliable communications were established.

(2) A new system was established for supply requests from the companies. Companies requested resupplies on the TACLOG net which in turn relieved some of the administrative type traffic on BN TAC #2. Bn TAC #2 was then clear for spot reports and worked as an overload net for TAC #1.

(3) The AN/MRC-109 was returned to the ship on the first displacement and communications in the new location was established with the 4th Regt. Communications with 4th Regt. were good; however, the SLF, operating on the same net became a problem to communicate with, due to lack of serviceable RC-292 Antennas.

(4) Frequency override on the operation was troublesome at times. Times of day and location of equipment had some apparent effect on this condition.

f. Medical Evaluation

(1) Adequate medical care was provided during the operation. No significant problems in deployment of medical personnel, availability of care in the field or aboard the USS Tripoli, or problems with medical supplies were encountered.

(2) Excellent and expedient evacuation of patients from the field was provided by helicopter squadron HMM 265.

(3) No mortality or morbidity was as a result of unavailability of medical personnel, medical supplies, or delay in evacuation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Of the 113 personnel evacuated, 32 will be lost as either KIA's or transfers, however 81 will be returned to duty within 30 days, and most within 10 days. This rapid return to duty is because administrative integrity is maintained when a patient is evacuated to the USS Tripoli. Had these patients been evacuated elsewhere, the delay before return to duty would be much longer.

(5) A significant decrease in heat casualties was noted during this operation. This is attributable to command policy and not to any specific medical care.

(6) No cases of malaria presented during this operation.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

13. Commander's Analysis

a. The outstanding and professional support exhibited by the UH-1E's in answering fire support mission requests enhanced the ability of rifle companies to dislodge and pursue the enemy with a timeliness usually denied to infantry units. This support not only aided in dislodging the enemy from defensive positions but also allowed an effective pursuit by fire from the air. The work of HMM 265 in support of BLT 2/3 is equally noteworthy, especially in the difficult area of night resupply. After moving in the attack throughout the day, not only was the receipt of resupply at night an important factor in the continuance of the assigned mission, but the knowledge that this night support would be forthcoming if required must also be highly rated as a morale factor.

b. At times during operation BEAR CHAIN/FREMONT, the applicability of the "Rules of Engagement" was called into question, especially in the area of supporting artillery fire. The amount of enemy fire, duration of fire, and friendly casualties resulting from this fire must all be considered prior to calling in artillery fire. However; should the FSCC on the spot, state that the proposed target meets the established rules of engagement, this statement, except in rare, highly questionable circumstances, should be considered as adequate certification and not require further certification by the commanding officer.

c. Although the SLF Battalion CP is a mobile unit, certain problems are encountered when requirements demand that a battalion command group move with an assault rifle company. Among the problems involved, two are considered of major importance.

(1) In a moving situation, if rifle companies are widely separated not only by distance but by direction, communications while moving under as-

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

sault conditions are at best only marginal. A AN/PRC-25 with whip antenna can not match the communications support available in a semi-static situation utilizing a 292 antenna nor a slow moving reserve situation using only the AN/PRC-25.

(2) Moving with an assault company, a command group although protected by a reserve rear platoon is subjected at least to sniper fire and must constantly remain on the move. The sending of necessary orders, coordination of action, receiving reports from lower echelons and forwarding information to higher echelons is thus often delayed and always hurried. Added to this is the fact that with an assault company, the chances are considerably higher that the command group could become embroiled in a major engagement thus severely limiting its ability to influence the combined actions of the battalion.

E. W. Herich
E. W. HERICH

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET