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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602

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2nd BN, 3rd MAR, S & C
CONTROL NO. 0703-67
COPY NO. 5 OF 19

02/JJO/ttk
5000
12 November 1967
Ser No. 049-67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 October to 5 November 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) 9th Mar BrigO 5750.1B

Encl: (1) Battalion Landing Team 2/3 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).


HENRY ENGLISCH

SLF TaskGoup 79.5
S&C Control No 0835

GP 4
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BT 2/3

1 Oct - 5 Nov 67

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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 October to 5 November 1967

INDEX

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- PART II _____ NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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ACTION REPORTS: OPERATION KINGFISHER,
✓OPERATION FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II,
✓OPERATION KNOX)

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDING

Battalion Landing Team 2/3 LtCol HENRY ENGLISCH 1 Oct - 5 Nov 67

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H & S Company	Capt J. P. SHEEHAN	1 - 9 Oct 67
	Capt G. J. COOPER	10 Oct - 5 Nov 67
Company E	Capt R. N. BOGARD	1 Oct - 5 Nov 67
Company F	Capt R. G. PONSFORD	1 - 16 Oct 67
	1stLt C. P. CRITTON	17 Oct - 5 Nov 67
Company G	Capt J. O. ROESLER	1 Oct - 5 Nov 67
Company H	Capt V. M. SMITH	1 Oct - 5 Nov 67

ATTACHED UNITS

"B" Battery (Rein), 1st Battalion, 12th Marines	Capt E. P. RICHTER
First Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3d Tank Battalion	2dLt L. L. GORNALL
Third Platoon (Rein), Company B, 1st AMTRAC Battalion	1stLt D. R. RUSH
Second Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3d Anti-Tank Bn	1stLt F. Y. LAWLER
Third Platoon, Company B, 3d Recon Battalion	2dLt R. D. CREITZ
Second Clearing Platoon (Rein), Company B, 3d Medical Battalion	LCDR J. P. RYAN
Logistical Support Unit (DET FORLOGCOMD)	1stLt D. R. HUGHES
First Platoon (Rein), Company C, 3d Shore Party	1stLt A. G. MUELLER
First Platoon (Rein), Company C, 3d Motor Transport Battalion	1stLt W. H. HOOVER
First Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3d Engineer Battalion	1stLt J. R. ASHBURY

2. LOCATION

010001H - 140900H October 1967: Operation KINGFISHER - RVN
 150900H - 170800H October 1967: Afloat with ARG shipping
 170800H - 240800H October 1967: Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II RVN
 240800H October 1967 - 041000H November 1967: Operation KNOX - RVN
 041000H - 052400H November 1967: Enroute DaNang Rehab

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STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer	Major E. G. MILONE	1 Oct - 5 Nov 67
S-1	1stLt K. N. MCLEMORE	1 Oct - 5 Nov 67
S-2	Capt R. O. CULVER	1 Oct - 5 Nov 67
S-3	Major D. W. LEMON	1 Oct - 5 Nov 67
S-4	Capt R. R. GREEN	1 Oct - 5 Nov 67
CommO	2dLt R. L. LOVE	1 Oct - 5 Nov 67

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4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
58	1390	8	80

PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During this reporting period, BLT 2/3 continued its participation in Operation KINGFISHER while OPCON to 9th Marines. This operation was terminated 14 October 1967, and the BLT commenced backloading to ARG shipping on 15 October 1967. On 17 October 1967, the BLT was landed again and Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II commenced. During this operation the BLT was OPCON to CTG 79.5 and CG 3rd Marine Division. On 24 October, the BLT entered the 1st Marine Division TAOR and commenced Operation KNOX while OPCON to 7th Marines. The operations in which the BLT participated during this period are discussed in detail in Part IV of this chronology.

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED. See Part IV
2. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED
 - a. Operation KINGFISHER: 1 - 14 October 1967
 - b. Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II: 17 - 24 October 1967
 - c. Operation KNOX: 24 October - 04 November 1967
3. CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY. None
4. CASUALTIES SUSTAINED

USMC

	<u>OFFICER</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	2	0	0

	<u>ENLISTED</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	16	0	0

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USN

<u>OFFICER</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0

<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0

5. NEW TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED. None
6. COMMAND RELATIONS
- 010001H - 140900H October 1967. 2d Bn (Rein), 3d Marines OPCON 9th Marines. BLT 2/3 (-) OPCON parent organizations 3d Marine Division.
 - 140900H - 141200H October 1967. BLT 2/3 reconstituted under OPCON 3d Marine Division.
 - 141200H - 180100H October 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON CTG 79.5.
 - 180100H - 240800H October 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON CG 3d Marine Division.
 - 240800H October 1967 - 041000H November 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON 7th Marines.
 - 041000H - 052400H November 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON CTG 79.5.
7. EQUIPMENT. See Part IV
8. LOGISTICS. See Part IV
9. CIVIC ACTION. The commitment of the BLT as a special landing force during this period precluded participation in an active civic action program because of its operational requirements.
10. ADMINISTRATION
- PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING. A shortage of consumable supplies still exists.
 - AWARDS. Silver Star Medal - 1, Bronze Star Medal - 4, Navy Commendation Medal - 1, Navy Achievement Medal - 1.
 - PROMOTIONS. CPL - 74, LCPL - 92.
 - LEGAL AND DISCIPLINE. None
 - POSTAL. Satisfactory
 - PAY AND ALLOWANCES. Satisfactory
 - POST EXCHANGE. The ship store facilities of ARG shipping were utilized during this reporting period while the BLT was afloat. There were no PX facilities available while the BLT was ashore.
 - RELIGIOUS SERVICES. Protestant services were held either in the field or aboard USS TRIPOLI by the Battalion Chaplain. Catholic Mass was heard aboard USS TRIPOLI, and conducted by Chaplain KELLY, PHIBRON II, while in the field.
 - R&R. The battalion received the following R&R quotas: Okinawa - 9, Bangkok - 27, Taipei - 15, Hong Kong - 19, Hawaii - 31, Manila - 3, Singapore - 6, Penang - 4, Tokyo - 14, Sydney - 6, Kuala Lumpur - 4, Total - 138.

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11. PERSONNEL.

a. LOSSES

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Battle	0	23	0	0
Non-Battle	6	105	0	10
Admin	0	8	0	0

b. REPLACEMENTS

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
	10	77	0	9

- 12. INTELLIGENCE. See Part IV.
- 13. COMMUNICATIONS. See Part IV.
- 14. WEATHER. See Part IV.
- 15. FIRE SUPPORT. See Part IV.
- 16. AIR SUPPORT. See Part IV.
- 17. ACTIVATIONS/DEACTIVATIONS/REDESIGNATIONS. None

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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2nd BN, 3rd MAR, S & C
CONTROL NO: 00712-67
COPY NO: 17 OF 60

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602

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03/DWL/tlk
3000
19 November 1967
Ser No. 0052-67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo
Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II)
Ref: (a) MMS: RVN, AMS, 1:50,000 Series L 7014 Sheets 6541 I-IV, 6441 III-IV.
(b) CTG 79.5 Frag Order Operation FORMATION LEADER
Encls (1) Overlay, Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II

1. Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II
2. Dates of Operation. 17-24 October 1967
3. Location. Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II was conducted in Vinh Loc and Phu Loc Districts, Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Task Organization

PLT 2/3
H&S Co (-) (Rein)
Det, E Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
3d Sqd, MP Platoon, Hq Co, 9th MAB
ITT Team, III MAF

LtCol ENGLISH
Capt COOPER

Co E (Rein)
Co E
Det, H&S Co
1st Sec 81mm Mortar Platoon
Det, Med Platoon
Det, Intel Sec
FAC Team
Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Capt BOGARD

SLF Task Group 79.5
sdc Control No 00837

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2/3
2/10
FORMATION LEADER/
LIBERTY II

17-24 Oct 67

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Co F (Rein)

1st Lt CRITTON

Co F

Det H&S Co

2d Sec 81mm Mortars

Det, Med Plat

Det, Intel Sec

Det, ITT Team

Det, Bravo Battery, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Co G (Rein)

Capt ROESLER

Co F

Det, H&S Co

3d Sec, 81mm Mortars

Det, Med Plat

Det, Intel Sec

FAC Team

Det, ITT Team

Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Co H (Rein)

Capt SMITH

Co H

Det, H&S Co

4th Sec, 81mm Mortars

Det, Med Plat

Det, Intel Sec

Det, ITT Team

Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

5. Supporting Forces

a. Air, artillery and naval gunfire were available to the BLT during Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II, and each was used to it's maximum extent.

b. An ITT Team provided by CG III MAF was employed throughout the operation with satisfactory results, but it's potential was never fully realized due to the facts no POW's were captured and no extensive liaison was made with the Vietnamese citizenry.

c. 3d Sqd, MP Platoon, Hq Co, 9th MAB displayed a high degree of enthusiasm throughout its limited employment, but due to the fact no POW compound was ever established and movement on the MSR was generally trouble-free, the BLT did not have any particular requirement for it's services during this operation.

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d. Air Support. Limited air support was utilized during Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II. Prior to the administrative helicopter movement ashore, tactical air controllers (airborne) utilized one section of F-4 Phantom aircraft with 500 pound bombs and 2.75 inch rockets to secure the landing zone by preparing the surrounding high ground. The movement ashore aboard CH-53 "Sea Stallions" of HMH-463 was uneventful. This lift and the initial movement of the companies from the zone into their operating areas was covered by UH-1E gunships from VMO-3 and VMO-6. Throughout the remainder of the operation, invaluable support in administrative and medical evacuation helicopter lifts was provided by the single UH-1E and crew of VMO-3 attached to Special Landing Force Bravo.

e. B Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines provided direct support to the BLT. Artillery was used extensively throughout the operation. A total of 274 rounds of mixed caliber were fired in support of the BLT.

f. Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire was considered to be outstanding during this operation. Both day and nighttime H&I fires were delivered with unerring accuracy and regularity. Total number of NGF rounds delivered in support of the BLT was approximately 1,000.

6. Intelligence

a. Enemy Strength, Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II.

(1) Enemy Strength. Within the primary area of operation the following units were identified: 804th Bn (MF), and C.118 Co (LF).

(2) Enemy Situation. The enemy, utilizing acts of terrorism and sabotage, was expected to direct his efforts toward disrupting the Vietnamese National Elections. He was expected to concentrate these efforts in the densely populated areas east of Route #1. There was the added possibility of his launching a direct attack against the Phu Loc District Headquarters.

(3) Enemy Capabilities

(a) The enemy had the available attack units in the field and key installations with medium mortars, backed by the support of other enemy units which have been known to operate in the area from time to time. The K&B Bn (MF), A DA 802D Bn, C.116 Co (LF) and C.119 Co (LF) have all been identified, at various times, operating within the OA. With this force the enemy could launch attacks at times of his own choosing, and readily reinforce if a situation required.

(b) The enemy could also delay in his present positions while waiting for a more opportune time to inaugurate his activities.

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b. Enemy Strength and Situation During Operation FORMATION LEADER/ LIBERTY II.

(1) 17-18 October 1967. Negative enemy contact.

(2) 19 October 1967. Co F discovered a one-half pound block of TNT wrapped in comm wire and equipped with a pull type friction fuse. The device was apparently several days old. In the same area, via (ZD 059004) Co F also discovered a well used trail and a sleeping area large enough to accommodate approximately 50 VC.

(3) 20 October 1967. An ambush by an element of Co F was probed by 4 or 5 enemy who threw grenades. Co F retaliated with fragmentation grenades and then small arms fire. The action was brief and a subsequent search of the area produced negative results. In the area from (ZD 100987) to (ZD 110991) Co F discovered a well kept tunnel trail through the dense jungle foliage. There were many offshoots to group bedding areas which were used approximately one week prior to discovery. A mortar pit, which was laid in the direction of Phu Loc District Headquarters was discovered at (ZD 113928) and destroyed. Various intelligence sources revealed that VC were attempting to infiltrate friendly positions by donning ARVN uniforms, and friendly units were advised to insure maximum security measures were utilized in the identification of unfamiliar military personnel in the TAOR.

(4) 21 October 1967. In the late evening, friendly illumination exposed 8 to 10 enemy attempting to maneuver either an RPG or 57mm Recoilless Rifle into position. Upon their discovery the enemy unit opened fire with 5 rounds of either RPG or 57mm and automatic small arms. Artillery was called and a subsequent daylight search of the area revealed four blood trails, one of which contained marks suggesting a body had been dragged off. One blood soaked military sock containing shrapnel was found.

(5) 22-24 October 1967. Negative contact during this period.

7. Mission. At L-Hour, D-Day, BLT lands by helicopters in designated LZ's. Move to OA along Route #1 between (YD 920110) on the north and 1st Marine Division boundary (ZD 152011) on the south and relieve 2d Bn, 26th Marines. Conduct extensive patrols and ambushes in the OA to interdict enemy LOC's and deny enemy access to populated areas east of National Route #1. Be prepared to assist Phu Loc District Headquarters in event of enemy attack. Designate one rifle company as LF reserve. Designate Sparrow Hawk Platoon from reserve company, not to be committed without approval of SLF commander. Be prepared to conduct amphibious withdrawal on order.

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8. Concept of Operation (See Enclosure (1)). Commencing H-Hour on D-Day, BLT 2/3 lands in designated LZ's to conduct ambushes and extensive patrols within AO, to protect National Route #1 and to interdict enemy LOC's and deny enemy access to populated areas east of Route #1. On order, 1st Platoon (-) (Rein), Co C, 3d MT Bn, and B Btry (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Marines will land via surface means at Co Col or Blue Ramp. Upon landing they will move via rough rider to designated areas.

9. Execution

Operation FORTRESS SENTRY

160800H. CTG 79.5 Warning Order for Operation FORMATION LEADER received.

161000H. BLT Warning Order #10 for Operation FORMATION LEADER issued to all BLT units.

161100H. CTG 79.5 Frag Order for Operation FORMATION LEADER received.

161230H. BLT Frag Order #105 and Landing Plan for Operation FORMATION LEADER issued to all BLT units.

170800H. Operation FORMATION LEADER begins.

170843H. Co II began helolift by CH-53 in accordance with the landing plan.

171200H. All BLT units ashore. Landed at LZ OWL with negative enemy contact.

171600H. CTG 79.5 Commander arrived at command post.

171630H. CTG 79.5 Commander departed command post.

171700H. BLT units in static positions. Perimeter defenses and night activities established.

180600H. BLT units patrolling in assigned sectors.

Operation LIBERTY II

181000H. BLT 2/3 CHOPPED OPCON to 3d Marine Division, Operation LIBERTY II commenced.

190700H. Co F discovered a one-half pound of TNT electrically rigged via (ZD 063017). Area was thoroughly searched and one poncho and several expended cartridges were discovered.

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192100H. Recon platoon inserted into southern QA..

200110H. Co F was probed by 4 or 5 enemy at (ZD 129011). Enemy threw five grenades. Frag grenades and small arms fire was used on suspected enemy position. Search of the area at first light produced negative results.

201200H. Co F discovered a well maintained tunnel in heavy bush with thick canopy. Trail ran from vic (ZD 110987) to (ZD 110991). It appeared to be a bedding area.

202110H. Co F discovered a well kept mortar pit at (ZD 113988) which was destroyed.

212110H. Co E discovered 10 enemy attempting to move RPG or 57mm Recoilless Rifle vic (YD 983043). Area had been illuminated. Co E received 5 rounds of heavy calibre plus small arms and automatic fire. Fire was returned with M-79, 81mm mortars and 105mm artillery; area was searched at first light and four blood trails were found. From the indications found at the site of this incident 1 VC/NVA confirmed, and 1 VC/NVA probable killed were credited.

220845H. While burning trash in a previously used pit, 4 marines were wounded when a grenade, apparently left there by some unit that had once occupied the area, detonated. None of the wounds were of a serious nature.

230900H. Verbal Frag Order for Operation KNOX issued to all BLT 2/3 units.

240800H. Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II terminated.

10. Results.

USMC: 4 WIA evacuated, 1 WIA non-evac.

Enemy: 1 VC/NVA confirmed kill
1 VC/NVA probable kill

11. Administrative Remarks. As during all previous amphibious operations, the Administrative Order was adequate. The Serial Assignment Table required complete revision as all assault companies were positioned aboard LPH-10 for landing by CH-53. Pre D-Day transfers were effected to move elements of **Shore Party**, B Battery and Co C, 3d MT Bn to the USS HERMITAGE and assault companies from the USS PAUL BEVRE, and USS WASHOE COUNTY to the USS TRIPOLI. After several changes in the intended operations and L-Hour, the landing was made without difficulty. The MT platoon, Shore Party Platoon and B-1-12 were landed by ARG lighterage over the Hue Ramp for the ultimate move to positions from which to support the operation. High seas and bad weather prohibited the complete offload of the MT platoon, however, while the remaining elements were subsequently offloaded during the operation. All administrative matters were eventually solved and no severe difficulties remained.

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[REDACTED]

a. Supply Procedures. Prescribed loads, weapons, ammunition and special equipment carried by assault troops.

(1) All prescribed loads were positioned aboard ARG shipping for the landing on D-1; however, after the pre D-Day transfers the prescribed load for all companies except Echo was drawn from assets aboard the USS TRIPOLI. Echo drew its prescribed load from the USS WASHOE COUNTY. MT, B Btry and Shore Party drew their prescribed loads from the USS HERMITAGE. These prescribed loads were issued on D-1 except for high explosives which were issued on D-Day just prior to embarkation.

(2) Elements of Shore Party and Bn Supply were positioned in Phu Bai near FLSG-A from which resupply was drawn. The attached MT platoon was positioned with 3d Motors and worked in direct support of Shore Party to accomplish resupply. Resupply convoys were formed daily at Phu Bai and Route #1 served as MSR to the Battalion Forward. Resupply of the battalion was affected without difficulty. The resupply convoy delivered to each company and organic vehicles were used to resupply platoon positions along the MSR.

(3) The prescribed load carried by assault elements of the BLT was in accordance with the admin order and the Battalion SOP for operations. No changes were prescribed throughout the operation.

(4) All weapons and ammunition carried by assault troops were normal, and no special equipment was used.

b. Maintenance. Normal 1st and 2d echelon maintenance was conducted by all units throughout the operation. 3d echelon maintenance was conducted through FLSG-A in Phu Bai. Parts not available in Phu Bai were requisitioned through DaNang and transported to Phu Bai so that repairs could be expedited. No critical problems within the realm of maintenance occurred during this operation.

c. Medical Evacuation, Treatment and Hospitalization

(1) First echelon care was provided by corpsmen serving with the line companies. There were seven corpsmen with each of the letter companies and three with the command group. This care consisted of emergency first aid, and treatment of minor ailments such as bruises, headaches and sprains. Significant injuries were referred to second or third echelon care.

(2) Second and third echelon medical care was provided by the battalion medical officers and surgical team aboard the USS TRIPOLI. Transportation to this position was provided by helicopter medical evacuation originating mainly from out [REDACTED] positions.

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(3) Casualties:

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
KIA	0	0	0	0
DAI	0	0	0	0
DOW	0	0	0	0
WIA	0	0	0	0
MCI	0	5*	0	0

* Minor shrapnel wounds from accidentally detonated grenade.

d. Transportation. Limited organic vehicles were offloaded to support the BLT ashore. Each company was furnished an M 422 for resupply and administrative runs. Bravo Battery landed with the required prime movers and required no outside assistance. The MT platoon furnished all truck support required by the BLT throughout Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II.

e. Communications. Communications were in accordance with FMFM 10-1. Situation, weather and terrain were all conducive to outstanding radio communications, and no problems arose in this area. Wire/Radio Relay communications were utilized during this operation and proved a great asset by providing reliable communications and unburdening the radio nets.

12. New Equipment and/or Techniques Employed. None

13. Commanders Analysis. The combination of outstanding E&I fires and extensive, well executed patrols and night activities kept the enemy completely off balance throughout Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II. He was denied use of his assembly areas, and his activity came almost to a standstill. Had the enemy made any plans for the disruption of elections, the overwhelming presence of the BLT completely negated them. Despite the limited contact encountered during this operation, the accomplishment of the assigned mission was fully realized.

Henry English
HENRY ENGLISH

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7thMar S&C Log NR

DOB 26-67 Copy# 10/11

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3-EDP-js
3480.1A
8 Dec 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, BLT 2/3 ltr 03/JJO/tlk over 3000 of
14 Nov 1967

From: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation KNOX)

Ref: (c) 7th Marines After Action Report, Operation KNOX

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. It is noted that WIA statistics contained in the basic letter include med-evac and non-evac categories, whereas those contained in reference (c) include only the former category.

T. J. Bohannon

T. J. BOHANNON
By direction

S & C FILES
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1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

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Battalion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602

BN, 3rd MAR 5 & G
CONTROL NO. 00707-67
COPY NO. 10 OF 49

03/JJO/tlk
3000
14 November 1967
Ser No. 0048-67

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines
Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation KNOX)

Ref: (a) 7th Marines Operation Order 8-67
(b) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS SERIES 6541 I, 6541 II, 6541 III, 6541 IV.

2/3

Encl: (1) Overlay Phase I
(2) Overlay Phase II
(3) Overlay BLT 2/3 Frag Order 119-67
(4) Overlay BLT 2/3 Frag Order 121-67

1. Operation KNOX
2. Dates of Operation. 240800H October - 041000H November 1967
3. Location. Operation KNOX was conducted in Phu Loc District, Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Task Organization

a/a, KNOX

BLT 2/3

LtCol ENGLISH

H&S Co (-) (Rein)
Det, Hq Bn, 3d Mar Div
Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar
Det, 15th Dental Co
Det 1st ITT
Det A, BJU-1
2d Clearing Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d Med Bn
1st Plat (-)(Rein), Co C, 3d SP Bn
3d Plat, Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bn

SLF TaskG-oup 79.5
S&C Control No 00836

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24 Oct - 4 Nov 67

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Co E (Rein)

Capt BOGARD

Co E
 Det, H & S Co
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 Scout Dog Tm
 Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
 Det, Engr, Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 Det, SP, Co C, 3d SP Bn

Co F (Rein)

1stLt CHRITTON

Co F
 Det, H & S Co
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 NGF Tm
 FAC Tm
 Scout Dog Tm
 Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
 Det, Engr, Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 Det, SP, Co C, 3d SP Bn

Co G (Rein)

Capt ROESLER

Co G
 Det, H & S Co
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 NGF Tm
 FAC Tm
 Scout Dog Tm
 Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
 Det, Engr, Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 Det, SP, Co C, 3d SP Bn

Co H (Rein)

Capt SMITH

Co H
 Det, H & S Co
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Intel Sec
 NGF Tm
 FAC Tm
 Scout Dog Tm
 Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
 Det, Engr, Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 Det, SP, Co C, 3d SP Bn

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Provisional Co

Capt COOPER

Det H & S Co
 106 RR Plat
 Flame Section
 Sqd, MP Plat, 9th MAB
 Det, ForLogComd
 1st Plat (-), Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 2d Plat, Co A, 3d AT Bn
 1st Plat, Co A, 3d TK Bn

81MM Mortar Plat

1st Lt ELLER

B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Capt RICHTER

3d Platoon, Co B, 3d Recon Bn

1st Lt CREITZ

1st Platoon, Co C, 3d MT Bn

1st Lt HOOVER

5. Supporting Forces

a. Air, artillery and naval gunfire were available to the BLT during Operation KNOX, and were utilized to the maximum extent.

b. Each rifle company was provided close combat engineer support for the destruction of enemy fortifications. In addition, the engineer platoon minus was employed in mine sweeping missions.

c. An ITT team from the 1st Marine Division was attached to the BLT and provided excellent assistance in interpreting. In addition, a Popular Force Team from Phu Loc District was assigned to each rifle company.

d. The BLT was provided the services of a Beach Jumper Unit which was of material aid in affecting good relations with inhabitants of a hamlet in the operating area. Recordings explained the BLT presence in their area and recordings of national songs were played for their benefit.

e. Air Support

(1) Air support was utilized in the execution of all three phases of operation KNOX. Prior to Phase I numerous TPQ-10 radar bombing missions were flown by aircraft of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing using 500, 1000 and 2000 pound bombs. Targets for these missions included avenues of approach, harboring sites, and observation points. Direct Air Support missions were also flown using 1,000 and 2,000 pound bombs with Daisy-cutter type fuzes to prepare landing zones on the high ground in the anticipation of friendly troops occupying those positions.

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(2) Using landing zones cut and blasted out of the canopy by individual companies, resupply and medical evacuation missions were flown by CH-34 helicopters. On several occasions medical evacuees were hoisted through small openings in the canopy by hovering CH-34's and resupply was accomplished by dropping the rations, ammunition and water into similar areas. Among the CH-34 squadrons providing this vital support were HMM-262 and HMM-261.

(3) Phase II of operation KNOX was initiated with the helo-lift of Echo Company into position. As the companies entered relatively open areas, Air Force pilots flying O-1C spotter aircraft with Marine aerial observers from H&MS-16 were used for reconnaissance and the control of artillery and air. Early on the morning of 31 October, one such observation aircraft was diverted to support the logistical support activity when it received enemy mortar fire. The observer controlled a section each of F-4 Phantoms, F-8 Crusaders and A-4 Skyhawks delivering mixed ordnance of 250 pound bombs, 5 inch Zuni rockets and 20 mm strafe on the suspected mortar position. Subsequently the same area was prepared by a TA-4 Skyhawk of H&MS-11 delivering 250 pound bombs, napalm and 20 mm strafe.

(4) Phase III air support consisted of TPQ-10 radar bombing preparation of the area and subsequent cover flown by UH-1E gunships of VMO-3, principally during the withdrawal phase.

(5) Particularly noteworthy was the support provided by HMM-262 flying CH-46 "Sea Knights" on a night emergency resupply of artillery fuzes from the USS TRIPOLI on 31 October.

(6) Throughout the operation invaluable support in administrative and medical evacuation helicopter lifts was provided by the single UH-1E and crew of VMO 3 attached to Special Landing Force Bravo.

a. Artillery

(1) B Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines provided direct support to the BLT. L Battery, 11th Marines was in general support. In addition, reinforcing fires from two 105 mm howitzers located at the Phu Loc District were available to the BLT.

(2) Total rounds of artillery/ mortar fire expended during this operation:

155 mm - 445
105 mm - 2081
81 mm - 845

1571

4

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g. Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire during this operation was considered to be outstanding, particularly during nighttime H&I fires. Two destroyers (one 5"/28, one 5"/54) were assigned G/S missions to the 7th Marines. The BLT received a D/S destroyer during the later stages of the operation. Total number of NGF rounds fired in support of the BLT was 1235.

6. Intelligence

a. Enemy Strength, Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation KNOX.

(1) Enemy Strength. Within the primary area of operation the following enemy units were identified: 804th Bn (MF), and the C.118 Co., (LF); Contact, however, was restricted to 4-5 man enemy units. The enemy avoided direct contact with marine units and utilized mortar and occasional S/A fire to harrass.

(2) Enemy Situation. The enemy was expected to utilize acts of subversion, terrorism and sabotage in an effort to disrupt the Vietnamese National Elections. Directing these tactics toward the populated areas east of Rt #1 and a possible direct assault on the Phu Loc District Hq.

(3) Enemy Capabilities

- (a) Attack units in the field and key installations
- (b) Attack targets at a time of his choosing within the AO.
- (c) Delay in present position with forces available or supported by the units listed above.
- (d) Defend in present positions if tactical situation permitted and the topography was in his favor.

b. Enemy Strength and Situation During Operation KNOX.

(1) 24 October 1967. Negative activity in the area of operation.

(2) 25 October 1967. Co F, at coordinates (2D 105005) received an estimated 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from enemy location at coordinates (2C 103972). District Headquarters and Tiger Hotel received approximately 30 rounds of 82mm mortar. ARVN took 1 KIA and 4 WIA. Co F also received a small amount of auto S/A fire. Co F supported with

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60 mm counter-mortars, but fell short of target at maximum range. AO called in, and air strikes called in by AO to strike the target at coordinates (ZC 100983). Later in the day, Co F received 50 rounds of 82 mm fire from coordinates (ZC 100983). Returned fire with 60mm and called in air strikes with negative results. Artillery was called in, and 25 rounds were fired with good target coverage.

(3) 26 October 1967. LSA reported 60 rounds of 60mm mortar received from village southwest of LSA. 13 rounds of 81mm counter-battery were fired with negative results. Co G element met 5 NVA dressed in green uniforms at coordinates (AT 815978) and 50 rounds of S/A fire were exchanged. Enemy escaped to the south. Artillery was called in with negative results. At 1445H, Recon observed 3 VC moving into the village at coordinates (AT 840940). The VC were carrying S/A and wearing green utilities.

(4) 27 October 1967. Recon observed 2 VC in a fishing boat at coordinates (AT 849964) at approximately 0900H. They were dressed in utilities; no weapons were in sight. Co E sighted 3 enemy at coordinates (AT 847961) wearing light green uniforms and carrying weapons. Fire fight followed. One of the two appeared to be carrying a mortar tube or rocket launcher. Two POW's captured were sent to LSA. A search was conducted for the mortar tube or rocket launcher and the packs they were wearing. Received S/A fire from 4-5 VC vic (AT 820058), and returned with S/A and 60mm. Artillery was called in with negative results.

(5) 28 October 1967. Co F discovered 400 punji stakes buried at coordinates (AU 805042) with warning signs written in Vietnamese cautioning locals to stay away from area due to mines. The stakes were destroyed. The traps measured 2x2x3 feet. Co E discovered 1 cigarette pack made in Cuba, 1 handkerchief, 1 broken syringe and 4 155mm powder cases at coordinates (AU 835060). Aircraft observing for Co F spotted 1 bunker and trench line at coordinates (AU 824081). Artillery was called in and area searched with negative results. At 1640H, a patrol member tripped a surprise firing device. Device was a Chicom grenade about 2 feet off the deck and rigged with comm wire.

(6) 29 October 1967. Co E discovered a brown metal surprise firing device approximately three inches long and one inch in diameter. The device was tripped by wire. Also located an old VC harbor sight vic (AU 832064) littered with remains of old camp fire sites, old NVA type poncho, Cuban cigarette packs, chow. Rock formations in area provided natural bomb shelters.

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(7) 30 October 1967. Co E patrol at coordinates (AU 828056) found partial list of names and old chow list, pan lid, straw hat with bullet hole, 1 black shirt, 1 green shirt, NVA belt buckle, 1 medicine bottle, 1 ammo clip, 1 toothpaste (made in France). Also, 2 graves were found at coordinates (AU 527060). ARVN's informed Co E that the graves were VC.

(8) 31 October 1967. 7th Marines reported at 0745 that the bridge at coordinates (ZD 098006) had been blown up and is now impassable. RD received 43 rounds of 82mm mortar from coordinates (ZC 174288). Countered with 81mm mortars and fixed wing strikes. Negative results. Two Otters at coordinates (ZC 175988) were bogged in and received several rounds of mortar fire. Recon received S/A at (ZC 173994).

(9) 1 November 1967. Co H discovered 2 bunkers 4x3x4 feet with 4 foot overhead at coordinates (ZC 165980). Bunkers were occupied within the last 10 days. Co H received carbine fire from 2-3 enemy at (ZC 176979). Recon sighted 3 VC with carbines at (AU 818052) Co H found one surprise firing device utilizing a VC claymore rigged to a trip wire at (ZC 176979). Recon later observed 9 VC at coordinates (AU 834045) moving east over bridge, dressed in black PJ's and carrying rifles. Artillery called in with good coverage of target areas.

(10) 2 November 1967. Recon reported taking S/A fire from vic (AC 173063). They returned with S/A and grenades. Negative results.

(11) 3 November 1967. Co E spotted an unidentified individual dressed in khaki uniform at coordinates (ZD 173063) and fired 60mm mortar. Checked area with negative results.

(12) 4 November 1967. Negative enemy contact.

7. Mission:

a. Reference (a) assigned the following missions to the BLT.

(1) On D-Day, move by truck from present position to 3d Marine Division TAOR designated assembly areas.

(2) On D+1 conduct a detailed and very deliberate S/D operation in designated zone of action.

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(3) Designate one company as regimental reserve.

b. All subsequent BLT missions assigned by the 7th Marines involved conducting deliberate S/D operations in designated areas. These areas are shown in operations overlays contained in enclosures (1) through (4).

8. Concept of Operation. See enclosures (1) through (4).

9. Execution

- (1) 240800H. All BLT 2/3 units **CHOPPED** to 7th Marines.
- (2) 240805H. B Btry and BAS deployed to new position.
- (3) 241120H. Co G and Co H displaced to designated assembly areas.
- (4) 241300H. Co G completed displacement.
- (5) 241330H. Co E and Alpha Command Group displaced to designated areas.
- (6) 241340H. Co H completed displacement.
- (7) 241530H. Co E and Alpha Command Group displacement completed.
- (8) 241540H. BLT Recon Platoon **CHOPPED** to 7th Marines.
- (9) 241900H. Co F and Command Group Bravo completed displacement.
- (10) 242000H. All BLT units reported in 1st Mar Div TAOR.
- (11) 250730H. Co F received 10-12 rounds 82mm mortar fire (ZC 103973) returned with 60mm fire. AO searched area with negative results.
- (12) 250945H. Co F reported Phu Loc District Hq and CAP Tiger Hotel took 30 rounds of enemy 82mm fire.
- (13) 252025H. Co F reported heavy movement and seeing light at (ZC 804990). Called in artillery, 25 rounds. Area searched following morning with negative results.
- (14) 260830H. Lead elements Co G ran into 5 NVA in heavy canopy. Approximately 50 rounds of S/A were exchanged with negative results.
- (15) 261605H. Co H reported accidental explosion of blasting cap while arming a claymore mine. One non-battle KIA.
- (16) 271315H. Co F reported **engagement with 3 VCS** at road (847961). One VCS threw grenade at Co E. One VCS wounded. Later interrogation revealed that they were PF's. Information regarding use of grenade against Co E never received.
- (17) 271615H. Accidental explosion of .50 caliber spotter round in PLT CP. One non-battle wounded.
- (18) 271700H. Co F exchanged fire at (820058) with 4-5 VC. VC pursued with negative results.

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- (19) 280130H. Co H listening post shot and killed a member of his company who failed to respond to challenge.
- (20) 281135H. Co F found and destroyed 20 punji pits at (805042)
- (21) 281235H. Co E found evidence of VC occupation of area Coord 835060. Conducted search with negative results.
- (22) 281320H. AO spotting for Co E discovered trench line and bunker at coord 824081. Area searched with negative contact.
- (23) 281710H. Co F tripped surprise firing device at coord 810053. Sustained 3 WIA.
- (24) 291515H. Co E tripped surprise firing device at coord 828061. Sustained 1 WIA.
- (25) 301200H. Co G, 2dBn, 7th Marines C OFFED to BLT 2/3.
- (26) 301420H. Co E discovered VC harboring site with evidence of recent occupation at coord 826052.
- (27) 310745H. G 2/7 reported bridge at coord 098006 was destroyed. Area unpassable.
- (28) 310810H. CP received 43 rounds of 82mm from coordinates 174986-- sustained 9 WIA.
- (29) 311755H. Recon Plat and two Otters received 11 rounds 82mm and some high velocity S/A from (174984). Arty and 81 mm counter-battery fire delivered. Unable to determine results.
- (30) 011030H. Co H discovered and destroyed 2 enemy bunkers 4x4x4. Evidence present that they had been occupied within last ten days.
- (31) 011230H. Co H received carbine fire from estimated 2-3 enemy. Arty fire called into canopy in general direction from which fire came. Unable to determine results. Sustained one WIA.
- (32) 011500H. Co H discovered and destroyed surprise firing device made from a claymore mine at coord 176979.
- (33) 011745H. Recon spotted one VC believed to be following Co H vic coord 174985. VC appeared to be too close to Co H for recon to fire at him, however, Co H warned of his presence. Negative results.
- (34) 021710H. Recon Plat took S/A fire from coord 177984. Returned fire with S/A and called in 81mm. Enemy fire suppressed. Sustained one WIA. Two confirmed VC/NVA.
- (35) 021805H. Co G 2/7 reported 5 VC ambushed an ARVN truck at coord 815008. Co G 2/7 checked area of ambush with negative results.
- (36) 031515H. Co G 2/7 discovered a khaki shirt, M-14 magazine in hut vicinity (838999).
- (37) 032030H. Co E fired 60 mm at individual dressed in khaki. Area checked with negative results.
- (38) 032130H. Liaison officer at Phu Loc District Hq passed info that 100 VC were reported at coord 885973. District Chief would approve H&I with only illumination due to proximity of village.

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- (39) 040800H. Unable to execute plan for amphibious or helicopter withdrawal to ARG shipping due to bad weather.
 (40) 041000H. CHOPPED to CTG 79.5.
 (41) 041200H. B Btry, LSA, Co H and Command Group Bravo left for FLC, DaNang.
 (42) 041700H. Command Group Alpha, Companies E, F and G moved to Co G 2/7 position enroute FLC and remained overnight.
 (43) 051600H. BLT 2/3 in FLC.

10. Resultsa. Friendly LossesUSMC

<u>OFFICER</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	2	0	0

<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	13	0	0

USN

<u>OFFICER</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0

<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0

b. Enemy Losses. Two NVA/VC confirmed.

11. Administrative Matters. Unlike most of this command's recent operations, Operation KNOX commenced with BLT 2/3 employed in the Phu Loc area. On D-Day, the BLT moved by land utilizing its own organic and attached transportation facilities into its new AOA, for a scheduled jump off on D+1. The Administrative Order 3-67, however, proved adequate as during all previous operations. No special administrative problems arose during the operation.

a. Supply Procedures, Prescribed Loads, Weapons, Ammunition and Special Equipment carried by assault troops.

(1) Prior to departing from the Phu Loc area all units were issued the prescribed load for the forthcoming operation. Because it was anticipated that resupply would be difficult at best while operating under jungle canopy, the prescribed load was established as a BA + two DOA, six NCI to be consumed at the rate of two meals daily and extra halizone and salt tablets.

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(2) In order to resupply the BLT, an LSA was established in conjunction with the 7th Marines. To stock the LSA, the 7th Marines drew stocks from FLC while the BLT positioned its motor transport platoon to rough ride additional supplies from there to the LSA. The LSU platoon commander remained in Phu Bai to establish liaison between the LSA and FLSG - "A", from where all additional supplies were to be drawn. The BLT's shore party platoon was positioned at the LSA to handle daily resupply. A detachment of Battalion Supply was positioned at the LSA to handle organic Class II supplies which were flown in from the USS Tripoli prior to the operation.

(3) On 30 November 1967, BLT 2/3 took over complete operation of the LSA from the 7th Marines. The command post displaced and moved to the LSA site. All classes of supplies remaining at the LSA that were required by the BLT were signed over to BLT 2/3. To further support BLT 2/3, the 7th Marines left the water point, two maintenance vans from FLC, and detachments of 1st Shore Party, 1st MT Bn and the 1st Med Battalion on position at the LSA. The BLT's liaison and truck platoon remained at Phu Bai. Two helicopters were assigned daily to handle resupply and medevac missions.

(4) Three Otters were left at the LSA by the 1st MT Battalion to perform logistical missions. These vehicles were used twice to resupply a platoon of Golf Company. On both occasions they proved unsatisfactory as they were unable to negotiate the terrain. On the first mission, both Otters used became stuck; however the third was able to retrieve the other two. On the second occasion, one Otter became lodged in an artillery or bomb crater and the other stuck in a rice paddy. All efforts failed to dislodge the first one and eventually it was blown in place after all salvageable parts were removed. The second Otter was retrieved.

(5) Because of a shortage of fixed 105mm Howitzer ammunition, C444, the LSA was stocked with C454. Sufficient amounts of PD fuses, M-319, were not positioned at the LSA, and a shortage of these items precluded drawing them from either Phu Bai or Da Nang. CTG 79.5 was contacted and 875 of these fuses were flown in from LFORM assets aboard the USS Tripoli.

(6) Because it was not feasible to resupply water to the rifle companies by the standard water cans, Scholle water containers were used. Instead of using the cardboard containers, it was discovered that placing the plastic bags within sandbags was both an efficient way of transporting water and less time consuming in preparation.

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(7) Resupply of the BLT was accomplished using three separate modes of transportation: helicopter, Otter and truck. Of these, only the Otters were ineffective. The resupply of the BLT, however, was accomplished without hindering the tactical situation.

(8) The weapons and ammunition carried by assault troops were normal to those of an infantry battalion. No special equipment was utilized.

b. Maintenance. Normal 1st and 2d echelon maintenance was conducted by all units throughout the operation. Equipment requiring third echelon maintenance was evacuated to FLSG-"A", in Phu Bai for repair. An electronics maintenance van and a small arms technician van were left at the LSA by FLC for use by BLT 2/3 during Phase II of the operation. The small arms shop performed TI's on approximately 500 weapons, and repaired six M-60 MG's during this period. The electronics shop repaired several items of communication equipment and the fire control shop cleaned and adjusted various telescopes, range quadrants and M34 sights for 81mm mortars.

c. Medical Evaluation, Treatment and Hospitalization

(1) First echelon care was once again provided by corpsmen serving with the line companies. There were seven corpsmen with each of the letter companies and three with the command group. This care consisted of emergency first aid and the treatment of minor ailments such as bruises, headaches and sprains. Significant combat and non-combat injuries were referred to second or third echelon care.

(2) Second echelon care was provided by the two medical officers at the battalion aid station. The latter was situated at the LSA and was comprised of a physical plant of two general purpose tents. These provided shelter for the personnel, a small area for routine sick call and a holding facility for 12 patients. Second echelon care consisted of the evaluation and treatment of minor medical and surgical illnesses for third echelon care. Transportation from the line companies to the LSA was provided by motor vehicles or helicopter med evacs.

(3) Second echelon care was augmented by a collecting and clearing platoon from the First Medical Battalion, First Marine Division. This consisted of three medical officers and their complimentary staff. They too were located at the LSA adjacent to the BAS and their physical plant consisted of five general purpose tents, electric lights and the necessary equipment for emergency surgical procedures. During the eleven days they remained at the LSA, no personnel from the BLT required either treatment or disposition by the C&C Platoon.

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(4) Third echelon care was provided by the surgical team aboard the USS TRIPOLI and First Medical Battalion in DaNang. Transportation to these facilities was provided by helicopter medical evacuation originating mainly from outlying positions and occasionally from the BAS. All significant injuries were sent directly from the field to the third echelon units.

(5) <u>Casualties:</u>	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
KIA	0	0	0	0
DAI	0	2*	0	0
DOJ	0	0	0	0
WIA	2	13**	0	0
NCI	2*	61***	0	0

* One man died of accidental gunshot wounds
One man died of accidental explosion of a blasting cap

** Predominant wounds were fragment wounds from mortar attacks on the LSA. Less common were gunshot wounds.

*** Because of the long period of exposure without adequate shelter, inadequate facilities for personal hygiene and the physically exhausting nature of the operation an inordinate amount of non-combat injuries was noted. Thirty-three cases of purulent dermatophytosis (fungus **bacterially superinfected**) led the list of NCI's, following this were viral syndromes, bacillary dysentery, assorted sprains and malaria. The high incidence of fungal infections seemed in direct proportion to the prolonged exposure to moisture.

d. Transportation. Several organic vehicles and the attached MT platoon which were offloaded to support Operation LIBERTY II and utilized for this operation. These vehicles were used for the displacement of the Bn CP, several tactical moves of troops, in addition to their logistic missions. All other truck requirements were passed to the 7th Marines. The movement of the BLT from the field to Red Beach was accomplished both by organic vehicles and vehicles supplied by the 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalion.

e. Communications. Communications were IAW FMFM 10-1. Communications proved very satisfactory as long as proper consideration was taken in establishment of the CP. When working in areas covered by canopy, communications could be hampered, but, by moving the location of the radio a few meters, communications can be maintained. Due to the motor transport deadline of the AN/MRC-109, covered communications were lost

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temporarily. This situation was remedied by jury-rigging the RT-524 in an M-38.

(2) Wire/Radio Relay communications were used in this operation and proved very reliable and relieved a tremendous burden of traffic over all radio nets.

(3) Communications maintenance was less of a problem compared to some of the BLT's most recent operations. The weather was relatively dry and this contributed to the reduced amount of defective radio handsets.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

13. Commander's Analysis

a. It was apparent through the entire operation that the enemy used a tactic which he is well known for; attack when success is assured, retire when outnumbered. On two occasions, the recon platoon (12 men) organic, made contact with the enemy. Whenever a unit of company size was dispatched in the direction of contact the enemy chose to retire. On one occasion when the CP was mortared, the majority of the rounds were widely dispersed indicating that the enemy was firing from a position of maximum range of their 82mm mortar.

b. The enemy did not employ his usual nighttime probing tactics against any unit of the command. It is believed that he was hesitant to try this because of the outstanding H&I program employed by the battalion. The ability of fire support destroyers to remain on station throughout our night activities rendered immeasurable aid to this program and reduced the number of required missions from artillery and 81mm mortars when resupply of ammunition became questionable after the bridge at Phu Loc was destroyed.

Henry English
HENRY ENGLISH

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File ✓

SPOT REPORT

3dMarDiv - 3100

FROM: 7/3

TO: _____

ALPHA: (UNIT) _____

BRAVO: (DTG OF ACTIVITY/INCIDENT) _____

CHA	CLASSIFICATION	PRECEDENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> SEND MOD CLEAR <input type="checkbox"/> SEND CLEAR		
DEL	FROM	TO			
	RED DANCER	RED REBEL GOOD BRANDY (A)			
SIT REP #13 FORMATION LEADER					
201200H TO 201800H					
1. NO CHANGE					
2. CONDUCTED DAY ACTIVITIES					
3. —					
4. RED DANCER FOXTROT FOUND A WELL					
KEPT TRAK IN ZC 1198 AND					
DESTROYED A MORTAR PIT					
FOUND AT 113988. #175					
ECH	DAY	MONTH	YEAR	TIME SIGNED	SIGNATURE AND RANK OF RELEASER
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY			COMM CENTER OR RELEASER USE (INSTR - 11)		
TIME FILED	COMM CEN NO.	HOW SENT	DATE, TIME GROUP		
			201800H		

FOXTROT: (FRIENDLY KIA) _____
GOLF: (FRIENDLY WIA) _____
HOTEL: (FRIENDLY MIA) _____

INDIA: (VCKIA CONF) _____
JULIETT: (VC KIA PROB) _____
KILO: (PW) _____
LIMA: (DET) _____

MIKE: (WPNS CAPTURED) _____

NOVEMBER: (EQUIP & DOCUMENTS CAPTURED) _____



1967 1000000
ENSURE DANGER
ENSURE REBEL

- 1) NO CHANGE
- 2) GET LOCAL DEFENSES AND COMMENCE NIGHT ACTIVITIES.
- 3) NEG
- 4) NEG
- 5) CONTINUE NIGHT ACTIVITIES
- 6) NO CHANGE.

0100M/20 OCT 67/GVL/DIV TAG 2 W/O

TOR. 266146/Oct/67/SPM
A-3, COC CEO CRM

19

24

00

encl 1

FM 280600H OCT 67
FM RED DANGER
TO RED REBEL

BT
UNCLASS

SIT REP # 3 FORMATION LEADER 192400H TO 200600H

- 1) NO CHANGE
- 2) CONDUCTED NIGHT ACTIVITIES
- 3) NEG
- 4) NEG
- 5) SECURED NIGHT ACTIVITIES, CONDUCT DAY ACTIVITIES
- 6) NO CHANGE

BT



6549/20 OCT 67/MTS/DIV TAC 2

TOR: 200600/02/67/1800H (455)

A-3/COC stand

TOR 200600H JAF

COC

Normal

20

06

00

Encl 2

TO: RED DANGER - 2/3
TO: RED REBEL - 3rd MAR DIV.

BT
U N C L A S S
(PRESENT TO RED REBEL ON REQ OF RR 10)
SIT RPT 12 FORMATION LEADER 200600H T0201200H

- 1) NO CHANGE
 - 2) CONDUCTED SEARCH OF AREA SPOT RPT 2 AND SENDING MATERIAL TO RR AREA. COMMENCED DAY ACT.
 - 3) NEG
 - 4) NEG
 - 5) CONDUCT DAY ACTIVITIES.
- BT

0011/21 OCT 67/DSA/DIV TAG 2

A - 3/00 CEO
+ DR/20/1900/OCT 67/11/EE/ (691) JRM

TOR./210244 H / Oct. 67 P.W.O.

TOR 2/0130 H JHT
COC
Tactical



20

12

00

Encl 3

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2nd Battalion/3rd Marines
Command Chronology
Supporting Documents
Oct 1967

Encl 1	Msg	192400H	Subj: SITREP #2, Formation Leader
2	Msg	200600H	Subj: SITREP #3, Formation Leader
3	Msg	201200H	Subj: SITREP #12, Formation Leader
4	Msg	201800H	Subj: SITREP #13, Formation Leader
5	Msg	202400H	Subj: SITREP #14, Formation Leader
6	Msg	210600H	Subj: SITREP #15, Formation Leader
7	Msg	211200H	Subj: SITREP #16, Formation Leader
8	Msg	211806H	Subj: SITREP #17, Formation Leader
9	Msg	220600H	Subj: SITREP #09, Formation Leader
10	Msg	221210H	Subj: SITREP #20, Formation Leader
11	Msg	230600H	Subj: SITREP #21, Formation Leader
12	Msg	231800H	Subj: SITREP #25, Formation Leader
13	Msg	240800H	Subj: SITREP #26, Formation Leader


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RR 202400M OCT 67
FM: RED DANGER -- 2/3
TO: RED REBEL -- 3rd MAR. DIV
BT

UNCLAS S

SET RPT 14 FORMATION LEADER 201800M TO 202400M

- 1) NO CHANGE
 - 2) COMMENCE NIGHT ACTIVITIES
 - 3) NEG
 - 4) NEG
 - 5) CONTINUE NIGHT ACTIVITIES
 - 6) NO CHANGE
- BT



690

0013/21 OCT 67/OSA/DIV TAC 2

A-3/coc CEO ERM
 TOR/20/1900/OCT 67/HAS/

TOR 210130 H JH
 coc
 normal

TOR/210246 H /OCT. 67 P.W.O.

20

24

00

Encl 5

210600
3 BN THREE MARINES
CO. THIRD MARI DIV
ZEN/CTG. 79.5

- 1. NO CHARGE
- 2. CONDUCTED NIGHT ACTIVITIES
- 3. NEG
- 4. NEG
- 5. CONDUCTED DAY ACTIVITIES
- 6. NO CHARGE

FORN/21 OCT 67/OMM/DIV TAC/VP

FOR 210555/Oct/67/SDM/cwr-505
A-3/00 CEO KMC

FOR 210:50 11/9/67
W. A. ...
Encl 6



R- 211200H OCT. 67

FM:
TO:
INFO:

2nd BN 3rd MAR.
CG 3rd MARDIV ✓
CTG. 79.5 ✓

3
COL

UNCLASSIFIED

SIT-REP/ #7 FORMATION LEADER 210600H TO 211200H OCT. 67

- 1. NO CHANGE.
- 2. CONDUCTING DAY OPNS.
- 3. NEG.
- 4. NEG.
- 5. CONTINUED DAY ACTIVITIES, PREPARE FOR NIGHT ACTIVITIES.
- 6. NO CHANGE.

BT

T. O. R.
1200H / 21 OCT. 67 / R.R.B. / DIV TAC#2

to / D

TO: 210610Z/Oct/67/Comsec/521/ (initials)

A-3/COC

CEO

ZMC

Encl 7

1000 100

FROM: [REDACTED] 2-3
TO: [REDACTED] CG 34 MAR DV
INFO: [REDACTED] CTA 79.5

UNCLAS SIT REP #17 FORMATION LEADER
211200 TO 211800H

- 1. NO CHANGE
- 2. CONDUCTED DAY ACTIVITIES.
- 3. NEGATIVE
- 4. NEGATIVE
- 5. CONDUCT NIGHT ACTIVITIES.
- 6. NO CHANGE.

211806 / 21 OCT 67 / g/k / DIV TAC 2



21

18

06
Encl 8

TO: SAC, NEW YORK
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [illegible]

URGENT
COMMUNIST INFORMATION LEADER 212400H TO 213600H

- 1) NO CHANGE
- 2) CONTINUED NIGHT ACTIVITIES
- 3) NEG
- 4) NEG
- 5) CONDUCT DAY ACTIVITIES
- 6) NO CHANGE

0715/22 OCT 67/GJU/DIV TAC 2 *to J.D.*

FOR 2206748H/pt 67/925/Comer 957
A-3/COO CEO TCM

22 06 00

Encl 9

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-R- 221210H

FM: RED DANCER

TO: RED REBEL

2/3
3rd MAR. DIV.

BT

U N C L A S S

SIT REP 20 FORMATION LEADER 220600H TO 221200H

1) NO CHANGE

2) COMMENCE DAY ACTIVITIES AND SEARCH WITH REF SPOT REP 5

3) NEG

4) ACCIDENTAL SQUIR FOX REF SPOT REP 6

5) CONTINUED DAY ACTIVITIES

6) (C), AND 1 VC (P)

BT

1425/22 OCT 67/GVL/LL

w f d

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Encl 10

RE: ...
...
... BRANDY

SIT APT. #15
FORMATION LEADER 220400H TO 230-600H

1. NO CHANGE
2. SECURING NIGHTY ACTIVITIES, PREPARE FOR DAY ACTIVITIES
3. NEGATIVE
4. NEGATIVE
5. CONDUCT DAY ACTIVITIES

0550H / 22 OCT. 67 / MTS / DIV. TAC #2

*Totiz 230600H
Normal*



Encl 11

231845H

FM: RED DANGER
TO: RED REBLE
INFO: GOOD BRANDY



SIT RPT NO. 25
FORMATION LEADER 231255H TO 231845H

1. NO CHANGE
2. CONDUCTED DAY ACTIVITIES
3. NEGATIVE
4. TRUCK ACCIDENT. REF SPOT RPT 231725H
5. COMMENCED NIGHT ACTIVITIES
6. NO CHANGE

1845H/23 OCT 67/084 TAC 2 DIV 1308

7A

End

MESSAGE DRAFT

3dMarDiv - 2100/3

PR. ER 3: :
SEC PHONE
CWO

CCN _____

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/FLASH _____ 66

FM:
TO:

INFO: _____

CLASSIFICATION	PRECEDENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> SEND MOD CLEAR	<input type="checkbox"/> SEND CLEAR
FROM	TO		
RED DANGER	RED REBEL		
INFORMATION INFO: GOOD BRANDY SIT. REP. # 26 FORMATION LEADER FINAL 23000 H TO 24000 H 1. NO CHANGE 2. CONDUCTED NON ACTIVITIES AND SECURED THE SAME. 3 & 4 NEG. 5. CARRY OUT FRAG 143-67 MA. SEASIDE. 6. NO CHANGE 0800H/2400H/67/018/DV/KP-8			
DAY	MONTH	YEAR	SIGNATURE AND RANK OF RELEASER
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY		COMM CENTER OR RELEASER USE (INSTR - 11)	
TIME FILED	COMM CEN NO.	HOW SENT	DATE - TIME GROUP
			24000H

Encl 13

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SLF BRAVO

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
APO, San Francisco 96602

03/HB/lgz
3000

Ser. No. 055-67 680008

2nd BN, 3rd MAR, S & C
CONTROL NO. 0730-67
COPY NO. 3 OF 80

DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo

Subj: Command Chronology for period 6 November to 010000H December
1967.

Ref: (a) LCO 5750.2
(b) SFLMCO 5750.8
(c) 9th Mar BrigO 5750.1B

S & C FILES
HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
67 5014
Copy 6 of 12 copies

Incl: (1) Battalion Landing Team Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

SLF Task Group 79.5
S&C Control No 0979

DECLASSIFIED IN 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

6 Nov - 1 Dec 67

DECLASSIFIED

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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/3
APO, San Francisco 96602

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

6 November 1967 to 010600H December 1967

INDEX

PART I _____ ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II _____ SUMMARY HISTORY

PART III _____ UNIFIED LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV _____ SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (COMBINE AFTER
ACRIF & PART OF ACTION BADGER
HUNT/FOSTER)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GP 7
DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 1

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION

ASSIGNMENT

Battalion Landing Team 2/3 Lt Col FENNY HENNING 6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967

SUBORDINATE UNITS

I&S Company	Capt G. J. COOPER	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
Company E	Capt R. W. BOGARD	6 Nov - 6 Nov 1967
	Capt I. J. CAHILL	7 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
Company F	1st Lt. G. P. GRITTON	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
Company G	Capt. J. O. ROESLER	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
Company H	Capt. V. M. SMITH	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967

ATTACHED UNITS

B Battalion (Rein), 1st Battalion, 12th Marines	Maj E. P. RICHTER	6 Nov - 29 Nov 1967
	Capt J. E. DICKENS	30 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
First Platoon (Rein) Company A, 3d Tank Battalion	2dLt L. L. CORNELL	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
Second Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3d Anti-Tank Battalion	1stLt F. Y. LAWLER	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
Third Platoon, Company B, 3d Recon Battalion	2dLt R. D. CRITZ	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
Second Clearing Platoon (Rein), Company B, 3rd Medical Battalion	1stLt J. P. RYAN	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
Logistical Support Unit (Rein) (RELOGGED)	Capt D. R. HUGHES	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
First Platoon (Rein), Company C, 3d Shore Party	1stLt A. G. MUELLER	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
First Platoon (Rein), Company C, 3d Motor Transport Battalion	1stLt W. H. HOOVER	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
First Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3d Engineer Battalion	1stLt J. R. ASHURY	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
Third Platoon (Rein), Company B, 1st Amphib Battalion	1stLt B. R. RUSH	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967

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2. LOCATION

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060001H - 100900H November 1967: Rehab, FLC DaNang
 100900H - 130900H November 1967: Afloat with ARG Shipping
 130900H - 291700H November 1967: Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER
 291700H November - 010600H December 1967: Assuming TAOR 3d Battalion, 1st Marines

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer	Major D. W. LEMON	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
S-1	1stLt K. N. MOOREMORE	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
S-2	Capt R. O. CULVER	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
S-3	Major R. N. BOGARD	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
S-4	Capt R. R. GREEN	6 Nov - 7 Nov 1967
	Capt R. G. FONSFORD	8 Nov - 1 Dec 1967
CommO	1stLt R. L. LOVE	6 Nov - 1 Dec 1967

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>		<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
57		1405	6	80

PART III
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During this reporting period, BEE 2/3 underwent an intensive period of rehabilitation of equipment, 782 gear, clothing and personal affairs at FLC, DaNang. On 10 November 1967 the BLT commenced backloading to ARG shipping. On 13 November 1967, the BLT was landed again and Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER commenced. During this operation the BLT was OPCON to CTG 79.5 and 7th Marines. On 21 November 1967, the BLT terminated its participation in Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER, chopped OPCON to 5th Marines and moved into the TAOR of 5th Marines TAOR and commenced relief of 3/1. On 1 December 1967, the BLT was less OPCON of the BLT was chopped from 9th MAB to III MAF, to 3d MAF. The operation in which the BLT participated during this period is discussed in detail in Part IV of the chronology.

PART III
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS


1. COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED. See Part IV

2. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

a. Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER: 13 - 29 November

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3. CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

Confirmed 48
 Probables 184
 POW 12
 Civil Defendents 33

4. CASUALTIES SUSTAINED

USMC

<u>OFFICER</u>				<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0	0	32	0	0

USN

<u>OFFICER</u>				<u>ENLISTED</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

5. NEW TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED. None.

6. COMMAND RELATIONS

- a. 060001H - 131400H November 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON CTG 79.5.
- b. 131401H - 251700H November 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON 7th Marines.
- c. 251701H - 270955H November 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON 5th Marines.
- d. 270956H - 291700H November 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON 7th Marines.
- e. 291700H November - 010600H December 1967. BLT 2/3 OPCON 5th Marines.
- f. 010600H December 1967, command of BLT 2/3 passed from 9th MAB to III MAF to 1st Mar Div. Command less OPCON remains with 1st Mar Div.

7. EQUIPMENT. See Part IV

8. LOGISTICS. See Part IV

9. CIVIC ACTION. The command treated the BLT as a special landing force during this period precluding participation in an active civic action program because of its special requirements.

10. ADMINISTRATION

- a. PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING. A shortage of consumable supplies still exists.
- b. AWARDS. Bronze Star Medal - 2, Navy Commendation Medal - 2, Navy Achievement Medal - 1.
- c. PROMOTIONS. Major - 3, Captain - 4, First Lieutenant - 1, Sergeant Major - 1
- d. LEGAL AND DISCIPLINE. There were six cases of non-judicial punishment. The following articles of the UCMJ were violated: Articles 92 and 134.
- e. POST/L. Satisfactory
- f. PAY AND ALLOWANCES. Satisfactory

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g. POST EXCHANGE. The ship store facilities of ARG shipping, the FLC PX and the PX at Fregeon Hill were utilized during this reporting period. Limited PX facilities were available at AN HOA while the BLT was ashore.

h. RELIGIOUS SERVICES. Protestant services were held either in the field or aboard the USS TRIPOLI by the Battalion Chaplain. Catholic Mass was celebrated aboard the USS TRIPOLI, and in the field at AN HOA.

i. R&R. The battalion received the following R&R quotas: Okinawa - 5, Bangkok - 18, Hong Kong - 15, Taipei - 12, Manila - 2, Singapore - 6, Kuala Lumpur - 3, Penang - 5, Tokyo - 10, Hawaii - 22, Sydney - 6.
Total - 104

11. PERSONNEL.

a. LOSSES

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Battle	0	0	0	0
Non-Battle	0	1	0	0
Admin	6	150	0	0

b. REPLACEMENTS

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
	5	121	0	0

12. INTELLIGENCE. See Part IV.

13. COMMUNICATIONS. See Part IV.

14. WEATHER. See Part IV.

15. FIRE SUPPORT. See Part IV.

16. AIR SUPPORT. See Part IV.

17. ACTIVATIONS/DEACTIVATIONS/REDESIGNATIONS. None.

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