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HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

2nd BN, 3rd MAR, S & C
CONTROL NO. 0067-68
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10 April 1968
Ser No 0066-68

SECRET (UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE (1))

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, First Marines

Subj: Command Chronology for period 010001H to 312400H Mar 68

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPAC 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.28

Encl: (1) Second Battalion, Third Marines Command Chronology for
010001H to 312400H Mar 68.

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), (b) and (c),
enclosure (1) is submitted.

J. P. Gagliardo Jr.
J. P. GAGLIARDO JR.
By direction

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

010001H to 312400H March 1968

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PART IORGANIZATION DATA

| <u>1. DESIGNATION</u> | <u>COMMANDER</u> | <u>PERIOD</u> |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|
| 2nd Battalion, 3rd Mar | LtCol J. W. DAVIS | 1-31 Mar 68 |
| <u>SUBORDINATE UNITS</u> | | |
| H&S Co | Capt G. J. COOPER | 1-2 Mar 68 |
| | Capt L. H. VAY | 3-31 Mar 68 |
| Co E | Capt I. J. CAHILL | 1-1 Mar 68 |
| | Capt W. E. RUSSELL | 2-31 Mar 68 |
| Co F | Capt W. R. SMITH | 1-14 Mar 68 |
| | 1stLt M. P. CHELVENAK (Acting) | 14-15 Mar 68 |
| | 1stLt W. C. DISMAN (Acting) | 15-23 Mar 68 |
| | 1stLt W. C. DISMAN | 24-31 Mar 68 |
| Co G | 1stLt C. B. SCHMALZ | 1-31 Mar 68 |
| Co H | Capt R. R. GREEN | 1-27 Mar 68 |
| | 1stLt D. T. THOMPSON | 28-31 Mar 68 |

2. LOCATION

PHU LOC District, THUA THIEN Province and HIEU DUC District, QUANG NAM Province, RVN 1-11 Mar 68; PHU THU District, QUANG TRI Province, RVN 12-27 Mar 68; CAM LO and HOA HUONG Districts, QUANG TRI Province, RVN 28-31 Mar 68.

3. STAFF OFFICERS

| | | |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
| Executive Officer | Maj J. P. GAGLIARDO JR. | 1-31 Mar 68 |
| S-1/ADJ | 1stLt R. N. MCLEMORE | 1-3 Mar 68 |
| | 1stLt J. W. McLELLAN | 4-31 Mar 68 |
| S-2 | 1stLt C. L. WOODARD | 1-31 Mar 68 |
| S-3 | Maj R. N. BOGARD | 1-31 Mar 68 |
| S-4 | Capt W. E. RUSSELL | 1-1 Mar 68 |
| | 1stLt S. R. MARRONE | 2-31 Mar 68 |
| S-5 | 1stLt M. P. CHELVENAK | 1-31 Mar 68 |
| CommO | 1stLt W. T. GEORGE JR. | 1-31 Mar 68 |

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

| <u>USMC</u> | |
|-------------|------------|
| <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| 35 | 1086 |

| <u>USN</u> | |
|------------|------------|
| <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| 3 | 53 |

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PART II

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-11 March 1968, Second Battalion, Third Marines participated in Operation HUSTON under the ORCON of Fifth Marines. A report of activities during this period is contained in the After Action Report, Part IV of this report.

At 111200H March 1968, the Battalion chopped ORCON and ABCON to the First Marines and commenced movement to the PHU Bai Combat Base. Between 12 and 14 March, a special training and inspection cycle was conducted in preparation for Operation FORD. A copy of this schedule is included in Part IV of this report.

Second Battalion, Third Marines participated in Operation FORD from 14-20 March 1968. A report of activities during this period is contained in the After Action Report, Part IV of this report.

From 21-27 March, the Battalion conducted an intensive training and rehabilitation program in anticipation of future operations. A copy of this training schedule is included in Part IV of this report.

On 28 March, Second Battalion, Third Marines commenced movement to the Operation MAGASUB area of operation. This operation commenced 31 March 1968.

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANTEVENTS1. Personnel and Administration

a. Awards. Five Bronze Stars, two silver stars, two Navy Commendations, 24 Purple Hearts and one Gold Star in Lieu of 10th Air Medal were awarded during March 1968.

b. RAK. A total of 93 RAK quotas were utilized during March 1968.

c. Personnel Losses and Gains for March 1968.

USMC

| <u>OFFICERS</u> | | <u>ENLISTED</u> | |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>JOINED</u> | <u>DROPPED</u> | <u>JOINED</u> | <u>DROPPED</u> |
| 4 | 2 | 137 | 125 |

d. Casulties for March 1968

| | <u>USMC</u> | | <u>USN</u> | |
|-----|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| KIA | 0 | 7 | 0 | 2 |
| WIA | 3 | 133 | 0 | 2 |
| DOW | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| MIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

e. Promotions. Sergeant to Staff Sergeant - 1.

f. Legal and Discipline. A total of 4 Battalion Office Hours were held during March 1968. Articles violated were Article 82 (2), Article 91 (1), Article 134 (1). None of these office hours resulted in Courts-Martial. A total of three special Courts-Martial awarded in February were held during March 1968. These Courts heard charges in violation of Article 86, Articles 86 and 134, and Article 86 and two specifications of Article 90. There are no Courts-Martials pending as of 31 March 1968.

g. Pay and Allowances. Satisfactory

h. Postal. Average

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i. Food Exchange. During operations, PX facilities were not available but supplementary packs were obtained with 'C' rations. While training in the PHU BAI Base Area, a mobile PX run made daily trips to the Battalion CP area. PX facilities in the PHU BAI area were also available.

j. Religious Services. Protestant services were conducted as circumstances allowed by the Battalion Chaplain. Catholic Mass was celebrated by visiting chaplains when the Battalion was in the PHU BAI Combat Base.

2. Enemy, Weather and Terrain. See Operation HOUSTON and FORD After Action Reports, Part IV of this report.

3. Operations.

For period 1-27 March 1968 see Operations HOUSTON and FORD After Action Reports, Part IV of this report except as follows;

- 081200H Co E chopped OPCON from Second Battalion, Third Marines to 1st Marines.
- 201201H Co H chopped OPCON from First Battalion, Seventh Marines to Second Battalion, Third Marines.
- 271900H Assumed OPCON of two scout sniper teams from 1st Marines.
- 281200H Second Battalion, Third Marines departed the PHU BAI Combat Base.
- 281800H Second Battalion, Third Marines arrived DONG HA.
- 291230H Second Battalion, Third Marines departed DONG HA.
- 291500H Second Battalion, Third Marines arrived CA LU.
- 301500H Assumed OPCON, of a Platoon (-), First Engineer Battalion.
- 301600H Assumed OPCON of HST, First Shore Party Battalion.

Operation HEGASUS commenced 31 March 1968.

4. Training. The command has continued intensive training in all General Military subjects when not deployed on operations. Special training cycles developed and utilized during March 1968 are attached to Part IV of this report. A week long intensive indoctrination program is conducted for the training of all replacement personnel with emphasis on familiarization, care and cleaning and safety of the

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M-16 Rifle. Technical training was accomplished through both attendance at schools and on the job training. During the month of March the following schools were utilized.

| <u>SCHOOL</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>NO. ATT</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| Embarkation School | Okinawa | 2 |
| NCO Leadership School | 1st MarDiv - 1st Engr Bn | 5 |
| STAFF NCO Leadership | 1st MarDiv - 1st Engr Bn | 1 |

5. Artillery Support

a. For the period 1-11 and 14-20 March 1968 see Operation HOUSTON and FORD After Action report, Part IV of this report.

b. A total of 399 rounds were expended on fire missions and H&I fires during the period 21-31 March 1968.

(1) H&I

| | |
|-------------|-----|
| 105mm HE-Q: | 240 |
| Total | 240 |

(2) Fire Missions

| | |
|-------------|-----|
| 105mm HE-Q: | 97 |
| 105mm WP: | 17 |
| 81mm HE-Q: | 20 |
| 81mm WP: | 8 |
| 4.2 | 17 |
| Total | 159 |

6. Air Support

a. Air support from 1-11 and 14-20 March 1968 is discussed in Operation HOUSTON and FORD After Action Reports, Part IV of this report.

b. A total of 6 missions were flown in support of the Battalions during the remainder of March 1968.

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| (1) Med-evac: | 3 |
| (2) Visual Recon: | 3 |

c. No tactical fixed wing air strikes were conducted within the Battalion TAO.

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7. Logistics. Logistical support of the Battalion between 1-11 and 14-20 March is discussed in Operation HOUSTON and FORD After Action Reports contained in Part IV of this report. The comments below refer generally to the period 21-31 March 1968.

a. General. The overall logistical support of the Battalion is satisfactory.

b. Supply

(1) Battalion supply completed the movement of all supplies and equipment from the DAMANG area to the Bravo Sector of the PHU BAI Combat Base on 21 March 1968.

(2) From 21 March to 27 March the Battalion did not need resupply in the field. During this period the Battalion was conducting rehabilitation at PHU BAI. From 28 to 29 March 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines move by truck convoy to CA LU. All supplies were drawn from FLSG "A" in PHU BAI prior to the move. From 30 to 31 March supplies were provided by the 1st Marine Regiment LSA at CA LU.

(3) Plans to move Battalion Supply to the designated 2/3 rear in PHU BAI Combat Base Containment #5 are being worked out. The move is scheduled to commence 1 April 1968.

c. Motor Transport

(1) On 12 March 1968 the Motor Transport Section moved with the Battalion rear to PHU BAI. FSLG-A assumed responsibility for maintenance support.

(2) From 21 Feb 68 to 27 Feb 68 a program was carried out to prepare the organic vehicles for a pending move.

(3) On 28 Feb 68 none M-422's, twenty-four M-274's, two M-109's, one M-87, one M-83 and three M-37's moved north with the Battalion. The remaining portion of the Motorpool remained with the rear.

(4) From 21 March to 27 March this command was provided two trucks from 1st Motors in PHU BAI. These trucks were used for housekeeping duties. Additional trucks were provided by 1st Motors, on request, for troop movements to and from training areas in the PHU BAI Area. Task Force X-Ray provided the transportation for the move from PHU BAI to CA LU during the period of 28 to 29 March. Two housekeeping trucks were provided by 1st Motors from 30 to 31 March.

(5) The support and assistance received from Motor Transport Maintenance at FLSG-A was outstanding.

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~~DECLASSIFIED~~d. Engineers

(1) Engineer support and equipment are satisfactory.

8. Civic Action. The commitment of the Battalion to all or parts of three operations in three separate MOC's during March 1968 precluded participation in an active civic action program.

9. Communication.

a. For the period 1-11 and 14-20 March 1968 Communications is discussed in Operation HOUSTON and FORD After Action Reports, Part IV of this report.

b. Between operations all radios were thoroughly checked and those requiring rehabilitation were taken to FLSC-A.

c. Shortages experienced in accessories for the AN/PRC-25's were alleviated prior to the commencement of Operation PEGASUS.

10. Medical

a. For the period 1-11 and 14-20 March 1968, Medical is discussed in Operation HOUSTON and FORD After Action Reports, Part IV of this report.

b. First Echelon Care was provided by the field Hospital Corpsmen assigned to the companies. This consisted of first aid for battle casualties and treatment of minor medical illnesses. 7 corpsmen are assigned to each company.

c. Second Echelon Care was provided by the Battalion Aid Station composed of 2 medical officers and 11 corpsmen. This care consisted of minor debridement and surgical procedures, routine sick call and intermediate care of battle casualties.

d. Third Echelon Care was available at:

1st Med - 3rd Med Bn, DONG HA, RVN;
2nd Med - 1st Med Bn, PHU BAL, RVN; and
3rd Medical Bn, PHU BAL, RVN,

where full hospital and laboratory facilities together with medical officers trained in the various surgical and medical specialties were available. Patients requiring specialized care in the fields of ophthalmology, otorhino laryngology and psychiatry were referred to NSA Hospital, DANANG.

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| | |
|-------------------------------|-----|
| Patients treated, outpatients | 530 |
| Lacerations | 10 |
| Minor surgical cases | 4 |
| Gastro-Intestinal Disease | 23 |
| Rosicic Venereal Disease | 1 |
| Orthopedic | 5 |
| FUO | 2 |
| Urological | 1 |
| Diarrhea | 18 |
| Dermatology | 37 |
| Ear disorders | 17 |
| Strept Throat | 5 |
| URI | 10 |
| Amputation foot | 2 |
| Staph infection | 6 |

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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. ✓ AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION HOUSTON 27 Feb - 11 Mar 68
2. ✓ special training and inspection cycle 12 - 14 Mar 68
3. ✓ Special training schedule 21 - 27 Mar 68
4. ✓ AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION FORD 14 - 20 Mar 68

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HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

03/JWD/jak
3000
20 March 1968
Ser No. 0064-68

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation HOUSTON)

Ref: (a) MAPS: RVN, AMS 1:50,000 Serial L7014 Sheets 6541 I, 6541 II,
6641 III and 6641 IV
(b) Fifth Marines Frag Order, 16-68 Operation HOUSTON

Encl: (1) Overlay: Operation HOUSTON
(2) Lesson Learned Concerning Operations in a Heavily Canopied
Area: Operation HOUSTON

1. Operation. HOUSTON
2. Dates of Operation. 27 February to 11 March 1968
3. Location. Operation HOUSTON was conducted in PHU LOC District,
THUA THIEN Province and HIEU DUC District, QUANG NAM Province.
4. Central or Command Headquarters. Fifth Marines
5. Reporting Officer. Lt. Col J. w. DAVIS

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6. Task OrganizationSecond Battalion, Third Marines (-) (Rein)

Lt Col J. W. DAVIS

H&S Co (-)

81mm Mortar Plt (-)
 106 RR Plt (-)
 Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, 13th ITT Team
 Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn

Capt G. J. COPPER
 27 Feb - 2 March 1968
 Capt L. R. VAY
 3-11 March 1968

Co E (Rein)

Co E
 Det, BAS
 Det, Intel Section
 FAC Team
 Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, Co A 1st Engr Bn

Capt I. J. CAHILL
 27 Feb - 2 March 1968
 Capt W. E. RUSSELL
 3-11 March 1968

Co F (Rein)

Co F
 Det, BAS
 Det, Intel Section
 FAC Team
 Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn

Capt W. R. SMITH

Co G (Rein)

Co G
 Det, BAS
 Det, Intel Section
 FAC Team
 Det, B Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn

1st Lt C. B. SCHMALZ

7. Supporting Forces

a. Air and artillery were available to the Battalion during Operation HOUSTON and both were used to the maximum possible extent within a heavily canopied area.

b. A two man Sub-Team from the 13th ITT was employed during the operation and assisted primarily with road blocks set up along Route #1 to check and inspect foot and vehicle traffic in conjunction with Popular Forces.

c. The 3rd platoon, Co A, 1st Engineer Battalion was extensively employed with the rifle companies to aid in the construction of LZ's in the canopy area south of Route #1. In addition, engineer personnel were utilized to make local sweeps to uncover mines and surprise explosive devices in and near the Battalion CP and access road to Route #1.

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d. Air Support

(1) Helicopter support for operation HOUSTON was provided by HMM-362, HMM-164, HMM-464 and VMO-3. Availability of helicopters at the beginning of the operation was sporadic as only 5th Marines Command & Control helicopters were utilized for resupply. After the first three days, the Battalion received helicopters specifically "fragged" to accomplish our missions. Med-evacs were timely and effective. Gunships support and tactical air drops were satisfactory. Flare drops were used only on two occasions, the nights of 5 and 7 March with good results.

(2) Air support for the operation was good and the many lessons learned operating in mountain canopy at high altitudes have been passed on by separate report.

e. Artillery Support. B Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines provided direct support to the Battalion. F Battery, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines and 4th Battalion, 12th Marines also fired in support of the Battalion. A total of 1,219 rounds were fired in support of operations and an additional 754 rounds of H&I fire were expended in the operational area.

8. Intelligencea. Enemy strength prior to operation HOUSTON.

Prior to operation HOUSTON, very little accurate information as to the enemy's actual strength was known. Low level intelligence reports suggested the following units to be located within the area of operation: C-24th Sapper Company, C-19 Engineer Company, C-118 Local Force Company and the Headquarters group of the 4th NVA Regiment.

b. Enemy situation and capabilities.

Reports of ambushes conducted by the enemy upon convey's moving North suggested an aggressive force located in the area of operation. Prior to operation HOUSTON the enemy had a capability of attacking isolated outposts and road construction parties in order to prevent re-opening of Route #1. With the possibility of having a sapper company in the AO, the enemy could employ sappers and sabotage teams to interdict Route #1.

c. Enemy strength and situation during operation HOUSTON.

Resistance was in the form of harassing and delaying 60mm mortar attacks and ambushes. All ambushes were of one basic type: L-shaped trenches, (or fighting holes aligned in an L-shape) well camouflaged and facing down a narrow avenue of approach. On each occasion, after a heavy initial volume of fire, the enemy withdrew to higher ground. Such delaying action strongly indicated a base area further back in the mountains, placed beyond normal operating range of ground troops.

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Information extracted from detainees, and the mortar attacks indicated that the C118 L.F. Company, which had mortar capability, was engaged during this operation.

d. Terrain.

The terrain of the assigned area of operation was extremely mountainous and covered by a thick canopy. Cover and concealment were excellent due to the ever present canopy, which in itself was the major obstacle encountered. Avenues of approach were very poor as the maneuvering elements were channelized, and helicopter landing zones had to be cleared. Information received from detainees and local villagers indicated that new recruits captured during TET were within the enemies ranks, therefore it is strongly recommended that a PSYOPS operation be conducted in this area.

9. Mission. Conduct offensive operations within assigned TAOR to destroy enemy forces, material and positions and secure and open Route #1. (See attached overlay for assigned TAOR).

10. Concept of Operations. Second Battalion, Third Marines establishes control over that portion of Route #1, providing security for road and bridge repair parties, within TAOR and convoys passing through assigned TAOR. Additionally, the Battalion conducts operations in the area south of Route #1 in assigned TAOR.

11. Execution.

270930H Second Battalion, Third Marines less Co H chopped OPOW from Twenty Seventh Marines to Fifth Marines and commenced participation in Operation HOUSTON. Co H remained OPOW, First Battalion, Seventh Marines.

271910H All combat elements of Second Battalion, Third Marines arrive in new TAOR in the Operation HOUSTON area.

280930H Co G tripped a surprise explosive device vicinity AU 815008 resulting in 2 USMC WIA evacuated and 1 USMC WIA.

280940H Co F discovered a bouncing type surprise explosive device in a rice paddy vicinity AU 809017. Device destroyed.

281030H Second Battalion, Third Marines CP established at AU 810016.

281335H Co E discovered two Chicom grenades and a 105mm round rigged as surprise explosive devices vicinity AU 808016. Devices destroyed.

281400H Co F and Co G commenced movement into canopy south of Route #1.

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- 281710H Second Battalion, Third Marines CP security vicinity AU 810016 discovered three punji pits and eight M-16 AP mines in a rice sack. Mines and punji pits destroyed.
- 281800H Third Platoon, Co A, First Engineer Battalion joined Second Battalion, Third Marines in direct support.
- 290550H Second Battalion, Third Marines CP security vicinity AU810016 received one sniper round. Illuminated area and spotted one man moving into treeline vicinity AU 810017. Fired 40 rounds M-16 and searched area with negative results.
- 291315H Co F vicinity AT 820990 discovered a M-26 grenade along a trail. Grenade was not rigged as a surprise explosive device. Grenade destroyed.
- 291620H Co A vicinity 20174977 tripped an unknown type of surprise explosive device resulting in two USMC WIA evacuated.
- 010845H Co B vicinity 20183975 received 10 60mm mortar rounds from vicinity 20183984 resulting in 1 KIA and 5 WIA evacuated. Counter mortar fire was returned with 105mm with unknown results. Med-evac completed at 011105H.
- 011335H Co B vicinity 20183974 received 60mm mortar fire and automatic small arms fire from vicinity 20178967 resulting in 4 WIA evacuated and 1 WIA. Returned fire with small arms and 105mm fire. Med-evacuation of wounded included one non-battle casualty.
- 011625H Co B vicinity 20 183975 received 60mm mortar rounds and automatic small arms fire from vicinity 20 183975 resulting in 3 WIA evacuated. Returned fire with small arms and 105mm fire. UH-1B gunships requested. Enemy position assaulted. Search of area located 8 fighting holes 3'x4'x2' with over head cover, one AK-47 magazine, 500 rds of AK-47 ammunition, 2 US entrenching tools, 1 US Canteen, numerous blood trails and parts of bodies around 3 holes and two NVA KIA killed by artillery. It appeared that an additional 10-12 enemy had fled south.
- 021315H Co G vicinity AT 818991 discovered an enemy recoilless rifle position and one 75mm mk casing and a few fighting holes. Position was about a month old and had been hard hit by artillery fire.
- 031950H One additional WIA, reference entry of 011335H, and one non-battle due to wrenched knee will be evacuated from Battalion CP by vehicle at first opportunity on 4 March 1968.
- 040700H Due to increased civilian traffic along Route #1 in assigned TAO, checkpoints were established vicinity AU804008, AU833000 and AT861998. Checkpoints were established using 3-4 personnel and 20 cm F's.

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- 040815H While establishing a routine checkpoint on Route #1 vicinity AU804008, Bn CP security detained 1 Vietnamese male who attempted to sell marijuana to a Marine. Detainee possessed 3 ID cards none of which appeared valid. Classified VCS and evacuated to District Headquarters via Fifth Marines.
- 040910H Co G vicinity ZC174977 discovered 1 pound of TNT in a can rigged as a surprise explosive device. Device destroyed.
- 040930H Second Battalion, Third Marines checkpoint vicinity AU 804008 detained 2 Vietnamese males identified by RF's as VCS. One had an ID card the other ID papers. VCS forwarded to 5th Marines.
- 041103H Co G vicinity ZC175975 received 4 rounds of 60 mm mortars from vicinity ZC173978. Artillery fire was called in and lead elements continued to move.
- 041135H Co G vicinity ZC174977 received 50 caliber and small arms fire from vicinity ZC178973 resulting in 1 WIA evacuated. Called in artillery and continued to attack.
- 041330H Bn CP checkpoint vicinity 805008 discovered a decomposed body hastily buried near a bridge. It was impossible to identify the body or determine any other information.
- 041415H Co G vicinity ZC174997 continued to receive intermittent mortar fire from the vicinity ZC178973 resulting in 2 WIA evacuated. AO and UH-1H's on station, attack continued.
- 041640H Co G assaulted enemy position vicinity ZC185978 discovering two NVA MIA and recovering 3 blocks of TNT, 1 US Claymore, 1 NVA Claymore, 1 magazine, a spike for climbing trees and one Chicom grenade. Friendly casualties were 1 WIA evacuated and 2 WIA.
- 041825H Co B vicinity AU850015 received small arms fire from the vicinity AU845015 resulting in 1 WIA. Artillery fire and UH-1E gunships called. Co B continued to move toward suspected enemy position.
- 041933H Bn CP at AU810016 received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from unknown direction. No action taken.
- 041945H Co F vicinity AT810905 discovered 3 M-26 grenades wrapped in vines for carrying purposes. Grenades were not rigged as surprise explosive devices. Grenades destroyed.
- 050900H Bn CP checkpoint at AU804008 detained one VCS with no ID who had an old shrapnel wound in the stomach, also detained were 2 young females attempting to sell marijuana to Marines. All three detainees were sent to

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Fifth Marines.

051315H Co F vicinity AT809960 called Med-evac for three non-battle casualties. Evacuation completed at 051515H.

051630H Co E vicinity 838029 discovered a small base camp consisting of 2 huts and one natural bunker 3'x6'x2', last occupied about 24 hours ago. Huts and bunkers were destroyed.

051700H to 051800H Co G vicinity ZC 183965 triggered an NVA ambush prematurely, ambush was set in on both sides of a trail and utilized claymores, small arms and light machine gun fire. Six enemy were observed, 4 dressed in green uniforms 2 in black pajamas. Fire was returned with small arms, 60mm mortar and artillery fire. Five secondary explosions were observed. H&I fire will be fired into this area and a TRQ was requested. Advance will be continued at first light. Action resulted in 1 WIA evacuated.

051730H Chien Hoi working with Co E states that 30 VC/NVA between the ages of 15-20 armed with AR-15's, AK-47's and M-1's have been working in the vicinity of AU 803054, AU 810053 and AU 821049. Information passed to Fifth Marines and Third Battalion, Fifth Marines.

061815H Co F vicinity AT 808949 called Med-evac for 7 non-battle casualties. Med-evac of 3 casualties completed at 061850H. Evacuation of other 4 was completed from AT 805942 at 070900H.

061900H Co G vicinity ZC 195952 requested med-evac for 1 non-battle casualty. Evacuation completed at 070900H.

071100H Bn CP checkpoint vicinity AU 804008 detained 1 male without ID card. Detainee released after interrogation by LIT. Classified as innocent civilian.

071130H Bn CP checkpoint vicinity AU 857001 detained 1 male without ID card. Detainee classified as VCS by LIT and sent to PRU LOC District Headquarters for further interrogation.

071330H Second Battalion, Third Marines assumed responsibility for expanded TAOR as shown on operations overlay.

072145H Bn CP security vicinity AU 806016 spotted 4 individuals vicinity AU 080019 moving toward CCP. After receiving fire from Bn CP, the enemy fired two rounds of 82mm mortar fire from undetermined position. Action commenced by CP firing 3 rounds of 106 HR Beehive and 30 rounds of 50 Caliber machine gun fire. After receiving enemy fire, returned 9 rounds 81mm HE and 60 rounds M-60 MG. Illuminated area with 3 rounds 81mm illumination with negative sightings.

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081200H Co E and Battalion Command Group chopped ORCON to First Marines.

081455H Co F vicinity AT 837997 while moving North had an accidental discharge resulting in one Marine seriously wounded in the chest. Med-evac called Investigation initiated.

091100H At Ba CP checkpoint vicinity AU 804008, Popular Forces searched a truck detaining one male hiding among rice sacks. Detainee was blindfolded but removed blindfold and fled. The PF's ordered the detainee to halt and fired warning shots. The shots and warning were disregarded and the detainee was then shot. Detainee had no ID and a birth certificate which showed his age at 18 although he appeared about 30 years old. Detainee was evacuated.

091600H Co G vicinity AT 803990 discovered an M-26 grenade rigged as a surprise explosive device. Device destroyed.

111200H Second Battalion, Third Marines (-) terminated participation in Operation HOUSTON and chopped ORCON to First Marines.

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12. Results

a. Enemy Losses

- (1) Personnel: KIA 4
 POW 0
 VCS 5
 Detainees 18 IG's
- (2) Equipment: 2 AK-47 magazines
 2 US Entrenching Tools
 1 US Canteen
 1 set climbing Gaffs, US

b. Friendly Losses

- (1) Personnel: KIA 1
 WIA 23
 WIANE 10
 WIA NB 10

- (2) Equipment: None

c. Areas subjected to tactical air strikes and UH-1E rocket attacks were searched by ground troops.

13. Administrative Remarks

a. Supply procedures. Prescribed loads, weapons ammunition and equipment were carried by assault troops.

- (1) All prescribed loads were positioned at the 2/3 Command Post and the 2/3 Fire Base south of DANANG on D-2. Co B and Co F drew their prescribed loads from the 2/3 Fire Base and Co G drew its prescribed load from the 2/3 Command Post. These prescribed loads were drawn from Company ammunition stores and were supplemented from the Battalion ammunition store. All ammunition for the Battalion was drawn from ASP-1 in DANANG.
- (2) Elements of Battalion supply were positioned in PHU BAI near FLSG-A from which resupply was drawn until an LSA at the 5th Marines Command Post could be established. During the initial stages of the operation resupply was uncoordinated and had to be supplemented by the Battalion rear in DANANG. This was due to a lack of helicopters and trucks. After Route #1 was repaired an LSA was established at the 5th Marines Command Post and resupply could be accomplished not only by MAG-36 but also by 1st Motors. After the initial stages resupply was effected without significant difficulty. If the Battalion had not had sufficient M-26 hand grenades and claymore mines in their ammunition stores a problem might have arisen since these two items were NIS at ASP-1 in DANANG or PHU BAI. The other problem of resupply was that of landing helicopters in the canopy. (see enclosure (2))

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(3) The prescribed load carried by assault elements of the Battalion was in accordance with the administrative order and the Battalion SOP for Operations. No changes were prescribed throughout the operation.

(4) All weapons and ammunition carried by assault troops were normal.

b. Maintenance. Normal 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance was conducted by all units throughout the operation. 3rd echelon maintenance was conducted through FLSG-A in PHU BAI. Parts not available in PHU BAI were requisitioned through DANANG and transported to PHU BAI so that repairs could be expedited. No critical problems within the realm of maintenance occurred during this operation.

c. Medical Evacuation. Treatment and Hospitalization

(1) First echelon care was provided by seven line Corpsman serving with each of the three letter companies. This consisted of emergency first-aid and the treatment of minor medical and surgical malaises.

(2) Second echelon care was provided by the BAS located with the command group. This care was administered by two Medical Officers and their complementary staff. Utilizing an abandoned house, the BAS was able to provide emergency resuscitation and care in a well lighted, reasonably secure position. Minor fragmentation wounds and many medical illnesses were treated definitively at this installation and its adjacent wards. Care was provided for attachments and U.S. Army personnel (3rd Bn 57th Army Engineers) who were without direct medical support.

(3) Third echelon care was provided by the medical facilities in PHU BAI (3rd Medical Battalion) and "C" Co. (1st Medical Battalion). Ophthalmology, Neurology and Neurosurgical consultations were provided by NSA DANANG. Evacuation to these facilities was accomplished by Med-evac helicopters for the more seriously wounded, and convey for the less seriously injured.

(4) Casualties

| | USMC | | USN | |
|------------------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL |
| KIA | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| DOW | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Non Combat death | 0 | 1* | 0 | 0 |
| MIA | 1 | 20 | 0 | 2 |
| WLANE | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| Non Battle | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| Casualties | | | | |

* Accidental discharge of M-16.

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d. Transportation. Limited organic vehicles were dispatched to support forward elements of the Battalion. Each company was furnished with one M-422A1 with trailer for resupply and administrative requirements. Four M-274A2 vehicles were provided to the 106 platoon for mounting of the 106 recoilless rifles. The remaining portion of the Motor Transport section remained with the Battalion rear south of DANANG. Trucks for movement into the operational TAO were arranged by First Marine Division G-4. Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion 12th Marines moved with organic prime movers requiring no outside assistance. No major problems arose concerning organic transportation during this operation.

e. Communications. Communications were in accordance with FMFM 10-1. Situation, weather and terrain were not conducive to good radio communications, and numerous problems occurred. The high mountains coupled with thick canopy and extreme humidity hampered all radio communications. Antennas of proper dimensions could not be used by moving troops because of the brush and terrain. Wire radio relay communications were not utilized, except within the Battalion CP because of the locations and distance of units. The addition of radio relay would have improved communications immensely and would have reduced the radio burden considerably. Even though all units had KC-292's employed with fresh batteries, communications was intermittent.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques. See special report attached.

15. Commander's Analysis.

This operation was characterized by widely separated companies moving deep into the canopy along narrow ridge trails in an attempt to uncover enemy base camps and deny the enemy the use of the high ground south of Highway #1. It was successful in the latter case and there was not an instance of a mining or sniping incident along the highway in the assigned TAO. However it took nearly 7 days of continuous movement for units to reach the top of Hill 1412 which quite possibly overlooked the enemy base camp areas. It was at this time that the battalion was committed to an operation further to the North and was extracted from the canopy. I feel that units using the lessons we learned can and must penetrate farther to the South and extend their operations over a period of at least 15 days. The lessons learned were invaluable to my troops and staff if ever committed to similar areas again.

J. W. DAVIS

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HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FME
FPO, San Francisco 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines

Subj: Lessons Learned Concerning Operations in a Heavily Canopied
Area: Operation HOUSTON

Ref: (a) Verbal orders of CO, Fifth Marines

Encl: $\sqrt{\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \end{array} \right\}}$ Intelligence
Operations
Logistics

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1), (2), and (3) are submitted concerning lesson learned while operating within a heavily canopied area, specifically the Second Battalion, Third Marines' TAOR during Operation HOUSTON.

2. The remarks and comments contained in the enclosures are a compilation of staff experiences in the major fields of Intelligence, Operations to include Air and Artillery Operations, and Logistics, and the comments and recommendations of the Company Commanders who were on the ground in the canopy.

J. W. DAVIS

Copy to:

CG First MarDiv (less overlays)
CG Task Force X-Ray (less overlays)
First Marines (less overlays)

Encl 2 to Encl 1

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INTELLIGENCE

1. Prior to HOUSTON, very little was known about the enemy and terrain, particularly the high canopied areas south of Highway #1 in 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines' assigned area of operation. Previously accumulated intelligence indicated that infiltration routes leading from base areas into the valley were in existence, but more specific information was not available. Elements of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines pushed into the mountains, moving as far south as the 93rd grid line. These units uncovered old trails, cut new trails, and created landing zones (see Trail and Landing Zone overlay, annex (A)).

2. During this push, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines' forces encountered scattered enemy resistance, specifically in grids 201797, 201896, 201897 (see Enemy Activities overlay, annex (B)). Resistance was in the form of harassing and delaying 60mm mortar attacks and ambushes. All ambushes were of one basic type; L-shaped trenches, (or fighting holes in an L-shape) well-camouflaged and facing down a narrow avenue of approach. Ambushes were triggered by a command-detonated device, usually some variation of the claymore mine, and followed by interlocking automatic fire. At least one .50 caliber machine gun was employed. On each occasion, after a heavy initial volume of fire, the enemy withdrew to higher ground. Such delaying action is strongly indicative of a base area further back in the mountains, strategically placed to be beyond normal operating range of ground troops, yet close enough to allow the enemy easy access to the valley area along Route #1.

3. Movement in the higher areas is extremely slow and channelized, and providing adequate flank security is very difficult. Golf Company utilized forward scout elements with considerable success. These scouts provided early warning of enemy presence, and caused several ambushes to be triggered prematurely. Also, upon returning to recently constructed landing zones, these scouts discovered that the enemy had placed claymore-type mines and booby traps in the surrounding trees and bushes, possibly to be employed against helicopters entering the zones themselves, as well as against ground troops moving toward the landing areas. It is highly recommended that de-foliation, followed by napalm, be employed to create a series of landing zones in strategic positions in the mountains along Route #1. Without such zones, re-supply, particularly in regard to water, is a constant problem, and the capability to reinforce operating units is dangerously poor.

4. Lastly, area intelligence reveals that a platoon of local guerrillas is hiding in the Nui Phu Gia Mountains (grids 408300, 408301, 408302, 408400, 408401, 408402). Echo Company located a small base area at 40838028. Indications are that these guerrillas are very young, and that they are low on ammunition and food. One has already surrendered to Camp Hotel 9. Some Chieu Hoi broadcasting has been conducted by Echo Company, and additional broadcasting is highly recommended.

Enclosure (1)

OPERATIONS

A. GENERAL

1. In a heavily canopied area, search and destroy operations differ widely from search and destroy operations in open areas or over flat terrain. In the canopy the mission of the search and destroy is limited to searching accessible areas, destroying base camps and fortified positions and attempting to fix and destroy the enemy after he has found you.

2. Objectives must be reasonable and geared to the terrain, direction of movement, ease of resupply, weather, availability of LZ's, availability of water, and enemy resistance. With proper planning, a unit can be sustained in heavy canopy for a two or three week period. In this connection, barring enemy action which would alter the entire tactical posture, long range (10 day) objectives can be set up along with intermediate (24-48 hour) objectives.

3. A well prepared and detailed map survey/terrain study distributed well in advance of a unit entering a canopied area is mandatory. This survey, continually up dated by each unit that works an area as well as by foot and aerial reconnaissance, should show existing trails, prominent terrain feature, configuration of ridge lines, water supply points varying with the time of year and estimated rain fall and LZ's. The LZ survey should be detailed and show at least the following items:

- (1) Can a helicopter land in the zone (including what type; weather and wind restrictions)?
- (2) Can resupply be effected without landing (including type of helicopter required; nets or hoist requirements)?
- (3) Can medical-evacuation be accomplished (by horse-shoe sling, basket, other)?
- (4) Is the zone capable of being improved to receive larger helicopters or to aid medical-evacuation?

4. In order to effectively search out a suspected enemy within the canopy, it is recommended that company patrol bases be established for up to 48 hours, on critical over-looking terrain, and detailed searches be made from this base, searching out trails and river and stream beds. Although enemy movement in the canopy is restricted to trails, supply and ammunition caches will most likely be found along river banks or beds and down off the side of major ridge lines.

5. Engineer support in the area of demolitions, small chain saws, and axes are always required in the canopy. This support, along with necessary operating personnel should enter the canopy with the combat forces they will support. Constant

improvement of existing LZ's as well as cutting out new zones is a constant requirement and one which can pose serious manpower and time problems unless proper equipment and trained personnel are available. Engineer support is also required in the destruction of enemy fortifications along trails and for sweeping old LZ positions prior to re-use.

6. Additional factors which should be kept in mind when working in a canopy area are the necessity of three canteens per man, long range rations if available, knowledge of water gathering techniques and recognition of the fact that except during the rainy season water is scarce above the 600 meter level.

B. ARTILLERY

1. USE OF HIGH ANGLE FIRE. Both the forward observer and the fire direction officer must constantly be aware of altitude and position of a target. Targets on reverse slopes or behind hill masses require high angle fire even though high angle fire is not quite as accurate especially for the initial round. The height of the canopy itself as well as the map altitude must be considered. Care must also be taken that after small shifts that the fire does not have to shift from regular to high angle. If such a case occurs then it is advisable to return to the adjustment phase. Although the use of high angle fire is basically the FDO's problem the FO is the man on the spot.

2. USE OF AIR BURST WP. Due to the hills and valleys and the extremely thick growth it was found that using an air burst WP round as the initial round often saved considerable time. Not only was it easier to hear the round pop, but it naturally made it easier to see day or night.

C. AIR

1. Helicopter lift capability is severely restricted by increased elevations and the necessity to hover above jungle canopy when delivering resupply and extracting med-evacs.

2. When operating without an established landing zone, resupply loads should be external with a long (30'-40') pendant to allow the cargo to be lowered to or near to the ground before being released. This prevents breakage of gear, especially plastic water bags.

3. Med-evacs can be accomplished by employing the stokes litter and hoist combination, or a sling and hoist for less critically wounded personnel. In this case, trees can be cut down, generally with explosives, to allow a small clearing to lift the med-evac out. This can also apply to external resupply.

4. Cutting an LZ by hand requires in most cases at least one days work by a platoon sized group. Units should carry brush hooks, axes, and machetes for clearing undergrowth and small trees. Explosives can be used to fell some trees, but since large quantities

Enclosure (2)

are required, and it is generally better to have one or two chain saws per unit to help clear the LZ. Generally speaking, the tops of hills make the best LZ's.

5. Hot weather affects helicopter lift capability as much or more than altitude, requiring careful planning to insure that aircraft are not overloaded, or nonessential gear moved. Battalion air liaison sections should obtain from regimental air sections or from other sources, a daily projected chart on helo lift capacities to enable prior planning on staging of gear for lifts.

6. Although not utilized during this operation, a jungle penetrator is another means of evacuation that can be utilized in high jungle canopy. This device should be considered where evacuation is required and no LZ is available and time does not permit construction of an LZ. As the name implies, this device is capable of penetrating heavily canopied areas and extracting casualties through its penetration.

7. The CH-53, because of its hovering capability is normally the best aircraft to use in the canopy particularly late in the day. For an actual touchdown, however, a very large zone is necessary and this is usually impossible to clear except in certain areas. The UH-34 can operate in the cool morning hours and did resupply and evacuate at those times up to 1400 meters. Weather, type of aircraft and size of zone are all important in how you are going to effect any one mission.

8. Daisycutters, unless point of impact can be observed are next to useless. A unit could pass within 20 meters of an impact area and never find it. In very heavy canopy they do not have the desired effect.

Enclosure (2)

LOGISTICS

1. 4 Battalion LSA, controlled by the S-4 and assisted by the ALO, where all flights direct to the canopy originate is more preferable than direct resupply to units from an LSA remote from the minute to minute changes in the canopy. Working helicopters assigned at approximately 1600 hours daily allows a unit to move early on a days operations, cut an LZ and receive their resupply, mail and extract/insert personnel for administrative reasons.

2. All resupply to units in heavy canopy or mountainous terrain must be by helicopter and landing zones must be constructed.

a. Vegetation must be cleared in order for resupply to be effective.

b. The LZ must be big enough to accommodate one helicopter. Consideration must be given to the paths of approach and departure. Trees and brush must be cleared from the perimeter of the zone so that the rotors of the helicopter are not damaged on take off and landing.

c. Landing zones must be cleared for external lifts so that the helicopter can maneuver the cargo not within ten feet of the ground. At this level most resupply items will not be damaged if dropped.

d. Companies operating in the canopy should carry one, one man chain powered saw, 3 axes and 2 crosscut two man saws for construction of LZ's.

3. Resupply of Water and Rations

a. Water should be resupplied to units in the canopy in 2 1/2 gallon plastic containers or the 6 gallon Scholle Pack water containers lowered on strong lines. Water cans should not be used for resupply unless absolutely necessary.

b. Rations can be dropped free fall if within 40 feet of the deck.

4. Personnel Insertions and Extractions. All personnel should be prepared to insert or extract by use of a horseshoe sling. This is the only sure way to accomplish this mission.

Enclosure (3)

HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

The following special training and inspection cycle will be accomplished
between 12 to 14 March 1968

| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|---|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------|------|-----------------------------|
| INSPECTION | Bn CO/ Contact Tms | 0830-1030 12 Mar 68 | LPM | Co E | See note #1 & #2 |
| Gas Mask Familiar- ization/ inspection | Co Gysgt | 1030-1130 12 Mar 68 | None | Co E | None |
| Fire Team Tactics | Co CO | 1300-1400 12 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co E | Stress Fire and Maneuver |
| Squad Tactics | Co CO | 1410-1510 12 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co E | None |
| Platoon Tactics | Co CO | 1520-1620 12 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co E | None |
| Inspection | Bn CO/ Contact Tms | 0830-1030 13 Mar 68 | LPM | Co F | See note #1 & #2 |
| Gas Mask Familiar- ization/ inspection | Co Gysgt | 1030-1130 13 Mar 68 | None | Co F | None |
| Fire Team Tactics | Co CO | 1300-1400 13 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co F | Stress Fire and Maneuver |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-----------|----------|--------------------------|
| Squad Tactics | Co CO | 1410-1510 13 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co F | None |
| Platoon Tactics | Co CO | 1520-1620 13 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co F | None |
| Inspection | Bn CO Contact Tm | 1330-1430 13 Mar 68 | LFM | 81mm Plt | See Note #1 & #2 |
| Gas Mask Familiarization/Inspection | Plt Sgt | 1430-1530 13 Mar 68 | None | 81mm Plt | None |
| Inspection | Bn XO/ Contact Tm | 1445-1545 13 Mar 68 | LFM | Comm Plt | See Note #1 & #2 |
| Gas Mask Familiarization/Inspection | Plt Sgt | 1545-1645 13 Mar 68 | None | Comm Plt | None |
| Inspection | Bn CO/ Contact Tm | 0830-1030 14 Mar 68 | LFM | Co G | See Note #1 & #2 |
| Gas Mask Familiarization | Co GySgt | 1030-1130 14 Mar 68 | None | Co G | None |
| Fire Team Tactics | Co CO | 1300-1400 14 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co G | Stress Fire and Manuever |
| Squad Tactics | Co CO | 1410-1510 14 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co G | None |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-----------|-------------------------|---|
| Platoon Tactics | Co CO | 1520-1620 14 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co G | None |
| Inspection | Bn CO Contact Tm | 1330-1430 14 Mar 68 | LPM | 106th 1st Flame Sect | See note #1 & #2 |
| Gas Mask Familiarization/Inspection | Plt Sgt | 1430-1530 14 Mar 68 | None | 106th Plt Flame Sect | None |
| Inspection | Bn XO/ Contact Tm | 1445-1545 14 Mar 68 | LPM | Hqs (-) | Balance of Hqs Co not already inspected see note #1 & #2 |
| Gas Mask Familiarization/Inspection | Co Gygt | 1545-1645 14 Mar 68 | None | Hqs Co (-) | Balance of Hqs Co not already inspected |

- #1. Inspections are primarily designed to check serviceability of weapons and 782 gear. Clean up but not to the detriment of having gear ready.
- #2. Serviceable camouflage covers with rubber bands are required. Resupply 782 gear as much as possible prior to inspection. Weapons will be marked with names. Front sights will be marked. Use embossing tape if necessary.

V. M. SMITH
By Direction

HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
APO, San Francisco 96602

The below listed training is scheduled for the period of 21 - 27 March 1968

| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|---|-------------------------------|------------------------|-----------|--------------------|--|
| Care and cleaning of the Marine | Co. Gyugt/ 1st Sgt | 1300-1700 21 Mar 68 | None | 2nd Bn/ 3rd Mar | Issue of clothing, sick call, washing of clothing, checking of sea bags, PX runs, Showers, signing of pay roll |
| Inspection of Wpns and Communication Equipment | Co Officers Comm Personnel | 1300-1500 21 Mar 68 | - do - | - do - | Inspection of all wpns, turn in of unservicable wpns and ammunition, and communication equipment |
| Inspection of 782 Gear, turn in and replacement of unservicable items | Co Officers/ MSG's | 1500-1700 21 Mar 68 | - do - | - do - | All unservicable gear to be turned into supply and lists of needed items to Bn S-4 by 1800 21 Mar 68 |

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Case 913

| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|---|----------|---------|
| Co CO's Time | Co CO | 0700-0800 22 Mar 68 | None | All Co's | None |
| Mines and explosive Devices | Co Gysgt | 0800-0900 22 Mar 68 | FM 5-25 tactical trends and Tips | - do - | Co area |
| Ambushes and Immediate Action | Plt Ldrs/ Sgt | 0900-1000 22 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | - do - | - do - |
| Scouting and Patrolling | - do - | 1000-1100 22 Mar 68 | - do - | - do - | - do - |
| Escape and Evasion | - do - | 1100-1200 22 Mar 68 | FM 21-77 | - do - | - do - |
| Map and Compass Reading | - do - | 1400-1500 22 Mar 68 | FMFM 1-2 FM 22-100 | - do - | - do - |
| Source of Intelligence | Co CO/ Plt Ldr | 1500-1600 22 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | - do - | - do - |
| Co CO's Time | Co CO | 1600-1700 22 Mar 68 | None | - do - | - do - |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|--|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---------|
| Co CO's Time | Co CO | 0700-0800 23 Mar 68 | None | All Co's | None |
| Fire Team Tactics | - do - | 0800-1100 23 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co E | En Area |
| Weapons Safety | Co Gydgt | 0800-0900 23 Mar 68 | FM 23-9 USARV-PAM 750-30 | Co F | Co Area |
| Supporting Arms Fire Adjustment and Control | Arty FO | - do - | FM 6-135 | Co G,H, Hqs | - do - |
| Gun Drill | Weapons Plt Ldr | 0800-1100 23 Mar 68 | None | Co B 60 mm Mortars | Co Area |
| Techniques of Fire | Co Gydgt | 0900-1000 23 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co F | - do - |
| Handling of Captured Person- nel, Material and Documents | S-2 Rep | - do - | FC 3461.2 | Co G,H, Hqs | - do - |
| Fire Disci- pline | Co Gydgt | 1000-1100 23 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co F | - do - |
| Processing, Exploiting, Evacuation and Handling of POW's | S-2 Rep | - do - | FC 3461.2 | Co G,H, Hqs | - do - |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|---------|
| Care and Maintenance of M-16 | Co Gydg | 1300-1400 23 Mar 68 | FM 23-9 USARV-PAM 750-30 | Co MedF | Co Area |
| Night Operations | - do - | - do - | FMFM 6-5 | Co G,H H&S | - do - |
| Fire Team Tactics | Co CO | 1400-1700 23 Mar 68 | - do - | Co F | En Area |
| Gun Drill | Wns Plt Ldr | 0800-1100 23 Mar 68 | None | Co F 60 Mortars | Co Area |
| Weapons Safety | Co Gydg | 1400-1500 23 Mar 68 | FM 23-9 USARV-PAM 750-30 | Co L | Co Area |
| First Aid, Sanitation and Hygiene | Co Corpman | - do - | FM 21-10 FM 21-11 | Co G,H, H&S | - do - |
| Techniques of Fire | Co Gydg | 1500-1600 23 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co E | - do - |
| Voice Radio Procedures | Bn Radio Operator | - do - | ACP 1250 | Co G,H, H&S | - do - |
| Fire Discipline | Co Gydg | 1600-1700 23 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co E | - do - |
| Co CO's Time | Co CO | - do - | None | Co G,H, H&S | None |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|--|--------------|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|---|
| Co CO's Time | Co CO | 0700-0800 24 Mar 68 | None | Co G,H, H&S | None |
| Infiltration Course Live Fire | - do - | 0800-1100 24 Mar 68 | RFEM 6-5 | Co L | Range 20A, Dong Da Ranges; Transportation Required |
| Squad Fire and Maneuver Live Fire | - do - | - do - | - do - | Co R | Range 33, Dong Da Ranges; Transportation Required |
| Security of Classified Information | Co CO/XO | 0830-0900 24 Mar 68 | ..OPNAV Inst 5510.10 | Co G,H, H&S | Co Area |
| Leadership | - do - | 0900-1000 24 Mar 68 | RFEM 1-2 FM 22-100 | - do - | - do - |
| Air Operations FAC | H&S Tm | 1000-1100 24 Mar 68 | None | Co G,H, L&S | Co Area |
| Squad Fire and Maneuver Live Fire | Co CO | 1300-1600 24 Mar 68 | RFEM 6-5 | Co E | Range 33, Dong Da Ranges; Transportation Required |
| Infiltration Course Live Fire | - do - | - do - | - do - | Co F | Range 20A, Dong Da Ranges; Transportation Required |
| 81mm, 60mm Flame Thrower F&M | How Co CO/XO | - do - | None | All Co's | Range 8, Dong Da Training Center; Transportation Required |
| Co CO's Time | Co CO | 1300-1700 24 Mar 68 | - do - | Co G,H, H&S | None |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|---|-------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|---|
| Co CO's Time | Co CO | 0700-0800 25 Mar 68 | None | Co G, H, Head | None |
| Care & Cleaning of weapons/ CO's Time | - do - | 0800-1100 25 Mar 68 | - do - | Co L | - do - |
| M-16, .45 Cal FAM | - do - | - do - | - do - | Co F | Range to be designated Transportation required |
| M-79, 3.581 M-60 FAM (MG) LAAM FAM | Co M | - do - | - do - | - do - | - do - |
| Fire Team Tactics | Co CO | - do - | FM 6-5 | Co G | Bn Area |
| Gun Drill | Platoon Ldr | - do - | None | 60mm Mortars Co G | Co Area |
| Weapons Safety | Co Wggt | 0800-0900 25 Mar 68 | FM 23-9 UNCLV-FAM 750-30 | Co H | - do - |
| Techniques of Fire | - do - | 0900-1000 25 Mar 68 | FM 6-5 | - do - | - do - |
| Fire Discipline | - do - | 1000-1100 25 Mar 68 | - do - | - do - | - do - |
| Care and Cleaning of Weapons/CO Time | Co CO | 1300-1600 25 Mar 68 | None | Co F | - do - |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REFERENCE |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|--|
| M-16, .45 Cal PAM | Co CO | 1300-1600 25 Mar 68 | None | Co E | Range to be designated; Transportation required |
| M-79 3.581 M-60 PAM Last | - do - | - do - | - do - | - do - | - do - |
| Care and Main- tenance of M-16 | Co Gysgt | 1300-1400 25 Mar 68 | FM 23-9 USARV PAM 750-30 | Co GCH | Co Area |
| Fire Team Tactics | Co CO | 1400-1700 25 Mar 68 | FM 6-5 | Co H | Bn Area |
| Gun Drill | Wpn Plt Ldr | - do - | None | 60mm Mortars Co E | Co Area |
| Wpns Safety | Co Gysgt | 1400-1500 25 Mar 68 | FM 23-9 USARV PAM 750-30 | Co G | - do - |
| Techniques of Fire | - do - | 1500-1600 25 Mar 68 | FM 6-5 | - do - | - do - |
| Fire Discipline | - do - | 1600-1700 25 Mar 68 | - do - | - do - | - do - |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|---|------------|------------------------|-----------|--------|--|
| Co CO's Time | Co CO | 0700-0800 26 Mar 68 | None | Co L&F | Co Area |
| Care and Clean- ing of Weapons/ CO's Time | - do - | 0800-1100 26 Mar 68 | - do - | Co G | - do - |
| M-16, .45 Cal FAM | - do - | - do - | - do - | Co H | Range to be designated; Transportation Required |
| M-79, 5.56L M-60 FAM LAAW FAM | Co XO | - do - | - do - | - do - | - do - |
| Supporting arms, Fire Adjustment and Control | arty NO | 0800-0900 26 Mar 68 | FM 6-135 | Co L&F | Co Area |
| Handling of Captured per- sonnel Materi- al and Documents | S-2 Rep | 0900-1000 26 Mar 68 | PL 3451.2 | - do - | - do - |
| Processing, Ex- ploiting, Evac- uation and Hand- ling of POW's | - do - | 1000-1100 26 Mar 68 | - do - | - do - | - do - |
| Care and Clean- ing of wpsn/ CO's Time | Co CO | 1300-1600 26 Mar 68 | None | Co H | - do - |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|--------|--|
| M-16, .45 Cal FAM | Co CO | 1300-1600 26 Mar 68 | None | Co G | Range to be designated; Transportation required |
| M-79, 3.5 HL M-60 FAM LAW FAM | Co XO | - do - | - do - | - do - | - do - |
| Night Operations | Co Gyant | 1300-1400 26 Mar 68 | FMFM 6-5 | Co Law | Co Area |
| First Aid Sanitation & Hygiene | Co Corporal | 1400-1500 26 Mar 68 | FM 21-10 FM 21-11 | - do - | - do - |
| Voice Radio Procedures | Bn Radio Operation | 1500-1600 26 Mar 68 | ARF 1250 | - do - | - do - |
| Co CO's time | Co CO | 1600-1700 26 Mar 68 | None | - do - | - do - |

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| SUBJECT | INSTRUCTOR | DATE/TIME | REFERENCE | UNIT | REMARKS |
|--|------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------|--|
| Co CO's Time | Co CO | 0700-0800 27 Mar 68 | None | Co A&F | Co Area |
| Infiltration Course Live Fire | Co CO | 0800-1100 27 Mar 68 | FMEM 6-5 | Co G | Range to be designated; Transportation required |
| Squad Fire and Maneuver Live Fire | - do - | - do - | - do - | Co H | - do - |
| Security of Classified Information | Co CO/AG | 0800-0900 27 Mar 68 | OPNAV INSL 5510.10 | Co A&F | Co Area |
| Leadership | - do - | 0900-1000 27 Mar 68 | FMEM 2-1 FM 22-100 | - do - | - do - |
| Air Operations FAC | FAC Ins | 1000-1100 27 Mar 68 | None | - do - | - do - |
| Squad Fire and Maneuvers Live Fire | Co CO | 1300-1600 27 Mar 68 | FMEM 6-5 | Co G | Range to be designated; Transportation required |
| Infiltration Course Live Fire | - do - | - do - | - do - | Co H | - do - |
| Co CO's Time | - do - | 1300-1700 27 Mar 68 | None | Co A&F | Co Area |

for
H. N. BOGARD
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

03/JWD/jak
3000
27 March 1968
Ser No. 0065-68

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, First Marines

Subj: Combat after Action Report (Operation FORD)

Ref: (a) MAPS: NVN, AMS, 1:50,000 Serial L7014 sheets 6541 I
and 6541 IV
(b) First Marine Regiment OF Order 308-68 (FORD)

Encl: ✓(1) Overlay, Operation FORD

1. Operation. FORD
2. Dates of operation. 14 - 20 March 1968
3. Location. IBC 4th District, MUA 4th Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Control or Command Headquarters. First Marines
5. Reporting Officer. Lt. Col J. W. Davis

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GP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

Encl (4)

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6. Task Organization.

Second Battalion, Third Marines (-) (Rein)

Lt Col J. W. DAVIS

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Capt I. R. VAY

Platoon (-) Whiskey X-ray, 1/11
Det, Co A, 1st SF Bn
Third Platoon, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
AT Co, 1st Engr Bn
Fourth Platoon, Co A, 3rd Marine Bn
Platoon, CP, RVN THU District
Det, B Btry, 1/12
Sub M, 1st GTR
Sub M, 13th LTR
NGF Liaison Team

Co B (-) (Rein)

Capt W. E. ROSSMILL

Co B (-)
Section, 106 MM
FO M, B Btry, 1/12
81mm FO M
Det, Intel Section
Det, Bn
Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Det, Co A, 1st SF Bn
FAC M

Co C (Rein)

Capt W. R. SMITH
14-14 March 1968
1st Lt M. P. CHLVERNIK
14-15 March 1968
(Acting)
1st Lt W. C. DISMAN
15-20 March 1968

Co C
One Platoon, Co A
FAC M
Sec (-), 106 MM
Det, Intel Sec
Det, Bn
81mm FO M
Sec, 81mm Mortar Platoon
FO M, B Btry, 1/12
Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Det, Co A, 1st SF Bn

Co G (Rein)

1st Lt C. B. SCHILL

Co G
Section, 106 MM
Det, Intel Sec
Det, Bn
81mm FO M
FO M, B Btry, 1/12
Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Det, Co A, 1st SF Bn
NGF Spot M
FAC M

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7. Supporting Forces

a. Air, artillery, and naval gunfire were available to the Battalion during Operation FORD and each was used to its maximum extent practicable.

b. An LRA and two MLRs were available and employed throughout the operation with highly satisfactory results. Immediate interrogation of suspects and POW's enhanced the intelligence effort of the Battalion as well as providing local tactical information to the field commander on a timely basis. Future operations into the Operation FORD area should always include intelligence specialist teams as well as MLR, as targets for their employment are available.

c. Tractors and MTRs were in direct support of the Battalion and joined the Battalion in the field on D-Day. Although limited by the necessity to stop and load guns when required to fire, the Ontos were effectively used to the maximum extent possible. It is considered however, that tanks could have been more successfully employed and the area was suitable for tanks under the weather and season consideration prevalent during this operation. The MTRs were highly successful in their operations in support of this operation. Their use not only as a transportation means for resupply of ammunition and other critical supplies, but also as a casualty evacuation vehicle proved extremely effective. One tractor was also used as a field HQ, and another as a command tractor/post. The capability of the MTRs to deliver overhead fire in support of operations was also effectively utilized. The flexibility and effectiveness of these vehicles cannot be overstressed and it is strongly recommended that future operations in this area or under similar terrain situations fully exploit the many capabilities of these vehicles.

d. Phone party and engineer personnel were attached to the Battalion and down to company level during the operation. The utilization of such specialists in operations of this nature greatly enhances the overall effectiveness of the Battalion.

e. Air

(1) Operation FORD commenced with a helicopter lift of 3 rifle companies with attachments, a command group, and eight M274's five of which were mounted with 106mm recoilless rifles. This lift was accomplished with 3 CH-53's from HMM-464 and 10 UH-34's from HMM-362. This lift required one hour to complete from the Helicopter Air Freight area, PHU BAI to LZ PENGUIN YD 900224. Resupply, administrative and medical evacuation support provided by HMM 362 was excellent throughout the operation including support when landing zones were under fire. The same excellent support was also received from VMO-3 gunships. Aerial Observation aircraft also provided highly professional support in controlling artillery

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missions and air strikes. One incident of UH-1H gunships mistakenly firing into friendly troops, (ref para 11, 171400H), is being investigated.

f. Artillery. Artillery support was excellent during operation FORD. Although the majority of support was received from Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, additional fire was received from Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, Whiskey Battery, and Whiskey A-Day, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. A total of 4,675 rounds of artillery were fired as indicated below:

| | | |
|-------------------------|--------------|------|
| (1) B Btry 1/12: | 105mm WP: | 55 |
| | 105mm HB-Q: | 2059 |
| | 105mm HB-VI: | 32 |
| | 105mm HB-D: | 18 |
| | 105mm M107: | 4 |
| | Total: | 2218 |
| (2) Whiskey A-Day 1/11: | 105mm HB-Q: | 147 |
| | 105mm HB-VI: | 33 |
| | 105mm HB-D: | 100 |
| (3) Whiskey Btry 1/11: | 105mm HB-Q: | 156 |
| | 105mm HB-VI: | 8 |
| | Total: | 164 |
| (4) A Btry 1/11: | 105mm HB-Q: | 312 |
| | 105mm HB-VI: | 13 |
| | 105mm HB-D: | 5 |
| | Total: | 330 |
| (5) B Btry 1/11: | 105mm HB-Q: | 681 |
| | 105mm HB-VI: | 89 |
| | 105mm HB-D: | 27 |
| | Total: | 797 |

(6) A total of 1006 rounds of 105mm H&I fire were expended by B Btry, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines in support of the Battalion.

g. Naval Gun Fire. A total of 620 rounds of Naval Gunfire were expended during Operation FORD. Of this number 75 rounds were H&I fire and the balance was used on five targets as preparation fire.

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8. Intelligencea. Enemy strength and situation prior to operation FORD.

(1) Enemy Strength. Prior to operation FORD and within the primary area of interest, the following enemy units were identified: 4th NVA Regiment, K4B Battalion and one local unit identified as the C117 L.F. Company.

(2) Enemy Situation. Prior to operation FORD, enemy attacks on U. S. positions and HUE City indicated an aggressive force within the area of operation. Local intelligence reports indicated fortified hamlets designed and constructed for defensive actions and the enemy's ability to defend.

b. Enemy strength and situation during operation FORD. Intelligence gained from POW's and detainees indicated that the following units or, elements of these units were engaged during operation FORD: K4B Battalion, C117 LF Company, C118 L.F. Company, K10 Battalion and 24th Battalion, 5th Regiment. Contact during the first day was considered to be a holding action by information extracted from a POW of the C118 LF Company. This action was initiated to allow the K4B Battalion to withdraw. The units engaged during the operation utilized trench lines and bunkers with overhead cover as intelligence reports had indicated prior to the operation.

c. Terrain. The terrain of PHU THU District is a part of the coastal plain, a relatively flat strip which extends the length of the Vietnamese Coast. The eastern edge of the coastal plain consists of a belt of sand, 200 meters in width bordered with tree lines to the east and west. Cover and concealment was excellent to the east and west due to the bordering tree lines and prepared trench lines which ran the width of the peninsula from tree line to tree line and allowed unobserved lateral movement. No obstacles were encountered during the operation that warrant comment. Observation was limited due to the bordering tree lines and relatively flat terrain, with the exception of AO's. Avenues of approach were excellent due to the inter-coastal water way and the THU HUA River which bordered the major portion of the operational area.

d. Information received from local villagers and liberated students captured during the HUE CITY Operation indicated that an extensive PSYOPS operation should be conducted in the PHU THU area. Detainees questioned during operation FORD appeared afraid and withdrawn, possibly due to the area being VC controlled.

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9. Mission. Second Battalion, Third Marines (-) (Rein) conducts a Search and Destroy Operation within its assigned Area of Operations and destroys VC/NVA forces, logistical installations, and weapons and supply caches, and participates in the defense of the PHU Bai Combat Base.

10. Concept of Operations. On D-Day (14 March 1968) at H-Hour (0730H) Second Battalion Third Marines commences a three company (Rein) helicopter operation into LZ PENGUIN YD 900224 to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, logistical installations, weapons and supply caches within assigned Area of Operations. Headquarters and Service Company (-) provides troops for the defense of Bravo Sector, PHU Bai Combat Base.

11. Execution.

- 140720H Lead elements of Battalion departed MAG-36 area by helicopter.
- 140728H Lead elements of Battalion land in LZ PENGUIN vicinity YD 900224. Negative contact.
- 140828H Final elements of Battalion close LZ PENGUIN.
- 140900H Co G vicinity YD 893224 received information from villagers that 50 VC had fled south as helicopters landed in LZ PENGUIN.
- 140900H Co G vicinity YD 893224 sighted VC vicinity YD 902242 entering boats and moving east. An 81mm mortar mission was run on the sighting with unknown results.
- 140910H Co E vicinity YD 907226 detained one Vietnamese male. Man interrogated and classified as a VC.
- 141015H Co G vicinity YD 903229 discovered a 105mm round rigged as a surprise explosive device. Device destroyed.
- 141135H Second Battalion, Third Marines assumed ORCON of Ontos Company, (-), 1st Tank Battalion and 4th Platoon, Company A, 3rd Amphib Battalion.
- 141300H Co G vicinity YD 915195 received light automatic weapons and mortar fire from a treeline vicinity YD 923200. The treeline was assaulted and Co G moved toward a position to support Co F who was in contact. As Co G

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moved toward point of contact it received ever increasing sniper fire resulting in 1 WLA. Air and artillery were called in and the area assaulted and swept resulting in 2 MVA KLA and the capture of 1 AK-47, and 3 MVA packs.

- 141300H Co B vicinity YD 915218 engaged an enemy force vicinity YD 916215. Received heavy mortars and automatic weapons fire resulting in 3 USMC KLA, 1 USMC KLA and 22 USMC evacuated. Air and artillery were called in and the enemy position assaulted resulting in 5 MVA KLA and the capture of 1 SAS carbine, (destroyed by artillery) 1 M19 Light Machine Gun, 1 MVA pack and miscellaneous 782 gear.
- 141300H Co B vicinity YD 913220 while moving to relieve enemy pressure on Co B became engaged with an enemy force, receiving approximately 500 rounds of semi-automatic fire and 300 rounds of machine gun fire resulting in 1 KLA and 7 USMC evacuated. The machine gun position was assaulted resulting in 4 MVA KLA, one MVA POW, the destruction of 1 VC and the capture of 1 M19 Type 55 LMG, 1 Russian SAS carbine, 1 pistol, 1 Chicom grenade, 2 M-26 grenades and one MVA pack and gas mask.
- 141340H Co B vicinity YD 913217 received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar and 300 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated 6 to 10 MVA vicinity YD 916215 resulting in one USMC KLA. Returned fire with 7 rounds of 106 mm, 30 rounds of M-79 and 450 rounds of small arms fire. Assault continues.
- 141400H Co B vicinity YD 913217 trapped two M-26 grenades rigged as a single surprise explosive device resulting in 3 USMC WLA evacuated.
- 141405H Co C vicinity YD 909191 received 5 rounds of sniper fire from vicinity YD 912192 resulting in 1 WLA. Returned fire with 30 rounds of small arms fire. Area searched with negative results.
- 141505H Co B vicinity YD 916218 swept area following an artillery mission discovering 2 VC KLA. Age of VC's was between 16-20 years old.
- 142200H Battalion C vicinity YD 912218 received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from vicinity YD 890200 resulting in 7 WLA. Returned fire with 81mm mortar and 106mm recoilless rifle fire with unknown results.

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- 142325H while medical evacuation helicopter was in Battalion CP LZ vicinity YD 912218, CP received one H&G rocket round and 4 rounds of 60mm mortars from vicinity YD 890200. Returned fire with UH-1B gunship and 106mm recoilless rifle with unknown results.
- 150815H Co F vicinity YD 918213 discovered 2 male bodies ages 20 to 25 years old in civilian clothes with military ponchos over them. No papers or weapons were discovered. Bodies believed to be VC dead ready for removal.
- 150820H Co E vicinity YD 923212 discovered 2 NVA KLA dressed in green uniforms with no weapons. Also captured 1 NVA POW dressed in a green uniform without a weapon, and detained one VCS.
- 150930H Co G vicinity YD 923204 discovered a tunnel. After throwing a grenade into the tunnel, the tunnel was searched capturing 2 NVA POW's, one dressed in khaki, the other in utilities. Searching forces also captured a Chicom Light Machine Gun and one NVA pack and cartridge belt.
- 151612H Co E vicinity YD 952218 received automatic and semi-automatic fire from vicinity YD 960177. Returned fire with Ontos (Beehive), Artillery and small arms fire. UH-1B's were called in and area will be searched.
- 151915H Co E searched area vicinity YD 963177 where artillery and UH-1B's had hit discovering 18 freshly dug graves. Graves were uncovered discovering 18 recently killed NVA dressed in green uniforms.
- 152130H-152230H Co F vicinity YD 948180 received sporadic sniper fire from vicinity YD 948185. Fire was silenced with mortars, M-79, 106 mm and small arms fire.
- 160700H Co E vicinity YD 959177 tripped two Chicom grenades rigged as surprise explosive devices resulting in 2 USMC WIA.
- 160800H Co E vicinity YD 967172 uncovered a spider hole, detaining 3 males and 3 female VCS, ages 19 to 25 years, and capturing one M-1 carbine.
- 161200H Co G vicinity YD 968137 captured 1 VCS. After interrogation, VC stated that 20 other local guerrillas and thirteen weapons were hidden in the general vicinity

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where he had been captured. The area will be searched with the assistance of the POW.

- 161230H Co F vicinity YD 967163 uncovered 3 recently dug graves. Graves were uncovered revealing 3 NVA KIA dressed in green utilities.
- 161234H Co G vicinity YD 962143 discovered a freshly dug grave. Grave was uncovered revealing 27 M16 rounds, 1000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, a pistol belt and clothing.
- 170030H Co F vicinity YD 966138 received approximately 100 rounds of AK-47 and carbine fire and one grenade from vicinity YD 967134 resulting in 1 USMC KIA. Returned fire with small arms, M-79 and called in an artillery mission with unknown results.
- 170900H Co F vicinity YD 985135 detained one suspicious Vietnamese male dressed in khaki shirt and jacket and black shorts. Vietnamese will be interrogated.
- 171045H Co F vicinity YD 985135 detained one Vietnamese male for interrogation.
- 171305H Co F vicinity YD 965141 sighted 3 VC vicinity YD 967143 attempting to move northwest. Small arms fire was employed resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC POW and the capture of 1 M-1 carbine and 1 M-2 carbine, 40 rounds of ammunition, 2 M-26 hand grenades and 1 cartridge belt.
- 171340H Co F vicinity YD 965141 tripped an M-79 rigged as a surprise explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA.
- 171400H Co L vicinity ZD 000135 received automatic weapons fire and 10 mortar rounds resulting in 4 USMC and 1 RF WIA. Fire was suppressed with artillery and UH-1E aircraft and small arms.
- 171400H Co G vicinity ZD 000129 received mortars and small arms fire from vicinity YD 998132. Co L was directing an UH-1E strike into vicinity YD 994130. UH-1E strike hit at vicinity YD 994132 resulting in 10 USMC KIA. Matter is being investigated.
- 180840H Co L vicinity YD 970155 received one mortar round from the northeast resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Advance continued.
- 181000H Co L vicinity YD 963167 detained 2 Vietnamese females. Search of their hut revealed a bag of M-16 and M-1 carbine rounds.

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- 181715H Co F vicinity YD 932183 received 2 rounds of carbine fire from vicinity YD 931182. returned fire and pursued, resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 POW and the capture of 2 M16 carbines and 1 M-16.
- 190800H Co B vicinity YD 950196 discovered 6 NVA KIA, one RPG round and one 57mm recoilless rifle round.
- 190805H Bn C with Ontos vicinity YD 950190 uncovered a number of spider holes. Holes will be searched by 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.
- 191200H Co F vicinity YD 935195 detained two males hiding in a bunker about 18 to 25 years old. Neither detainee possessed an ID card.
- 191240H Co F vicinity YD 935198 detained a 28 year old male who was eager to give information. Detainee sent to the rear for interrogation.
- 191540H Co G vicinity YD 915216 tripped a M-26 grenade rigged as a surprise explosive device resulting in 1 USMC KIA.
- 191620H Co G vicinity YD 915216 tripped a Chicom grenade rigged as a surprise explosive device resulting in 1 USMC KIA.
- 191730H Co F vicinity YD 905229 tripped an M-26 grenade rigged as a surprise explosive device resulting in 3 USMC KIA.
- 192400H-200400H Co B vicinity YD 948193 received sporadic probes with grenades by unknown number of enemy. Fire was returned with 81mm mortars with unknown results.
- 201010H LIT and CIT detached to 1st Marines.
- 201020H ART detached to 1st Marines.
- 201645H Amtracs, Ontos, 4.2 Mortars, shore party and engineers chopped from Second Battalion Third Marines to parent organizations.
- 201800H Operation FORD terminated.

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12. Results.a. Enemy Losses

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(1) Personnel: KIA: 64
 POW: 34
 Detainees: 423 (28 Civil Defendants, 18 liberated
 civilians, 377 IC's)

(2) Equipment

- 1 - L.M.G. Type 56 - Ser # 227500
- 2 - SKS Carbines - Ser # 11327149, 11257084
- 1 - SKS Carbine destroyed
- 3 - U.S. Carbines Cal .30 - Ser # 6617521, 3778927, 1445663
- 1 - M-16 Rifle - Ser # 803497
- 1 - 7.62mm Chicom Pistol Type 54 - Ser # 11022714
- 1 - Submachine Gun Type - 50
- 6 - Chicom grenades
- 8 - B-40 Rocket Rounds
- 10 - pounds of TNT
- 4 - NVA Uniforms
- 4 - First Aid Kits
- 2 - NVA Field Protective Masks
- 5 - Sacks
- 1 - Blanket
- 3 - Ponchos
- 2 - Rain Jackets
- 5 - Hammocks
- 15 - Blasting Caps
- 2 - Riot Grenades
- 1 - U.S. Claymore mine
- Various Documents

13. Administrative Remarks

a. Supply procedures. Prescribed loads, weapons, ammunition, and equipment were carried by assault troops.

(1) All prescribed loads were staged at the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines Command Post at PHU BAI. These prescribed loads were drawn from the Battalion Supply and the Battalion ammunition store. All ammunition for the Battalion was drawn from ASP-1 in PHU BAI. All supplies other than ammunition were drawn from FLSG "A" in PHU BAI.

(2) Helicopter Support Teams were assigned to each company, the Battalion Command Group and to the LSA at ASP-1 PHU BAI. All

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resupply was from the LSA at ASP-1. Resupply items other than ammunition, were drawn from FLSG "A". The only significant problem in resupply was adequate water containers. Plastic, disposable water containers or Scholle containers should be maintained in stock for operations when water can pick up is not feasible.

(3) The prescribed load carried by assault elements of the Battalion was in accordance with the administrative order and the Battalion SOP for Operations. No changes were prescribed throughout the operation.

(4) All weapons and ammunition carried by assault troops were normal.

3. Maintenance.

b. Maintenance. Normal 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance was conducted by all units throughout the operation. 3rd echelon maintenance was conducted through FLSG "A" in PHU BAI. Parts not available in PHU BAI were requisitioned through DAKANG and transported to PHU BAI so that repairs could be expedited. No critical problem within the realm of maintenance occurred during the operation.

c. Medical Evacuation, Treatment and Hospitalization.

1. First echelon care consisted of first aid and treatment of transient minor medical and surgical illnesses. This was performed by the corpsmen serving with the letter companies, five corpsmen to a company.

2. Second echelon care was provided by a mobile BAS composed of one medical officer and seven corpsmen traveling in a specially equipped LVT. This vehicle generally moved with the Battalion Command Group and carried such medications, fluids, supplies and equipment to provide the capability to establish an airway, attempt emergency resuscitation, obtain hemostasis of superficial wounds, perform minor debridement and hold routine sickcall. The function of the mobile BAS was to provide initial emergency care to wounded and to provide intermediate care for wounded should helicopter med-evacuation be delayed or unavailable.

(a) In as much as the experience of using an LVT as a mobile BAS does not seem to be vast, comments concerning our experience would seem to be in order. F

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(1) The size of the vehicle permits at maximum, two stretchers patients inside at one time, and even then crowding restricts movement and hampers care. Many people can't stand upright in the vehicle, and some spaces can't be utilized because of the necessity of the LVT crew to reach certain areas, (radios and engine filters).

(2) Equipment must be stabilized to prevent breakage during travel. Unless special containers are prepared, this greatly decreases access to equipment immediately after stopping, and tends to require a period of time to set-up the tractor for medical operations.

(3) Many patients were delivered by other LVT's to us in groups of up to nine, making the concept of triage of casualties into groups of immediate, delayed, minimal, and expectant treatment highly important.

(4) The LVT proved to have several beneficial effects. Outstanding was the use of all the LVTs as a mode of casualty evacuation from zones where hostile fire prohibited the use of helicopters. Second, several Marine officers stated that they felt the presence of the mobile BAS with corpsmen and Medical Officers contributed to the good morale of the troops. Finally, and most important, slightly greater facilities were available for care of wounded should Med-evacuation by helicopter be delayed or unavailable.

3. Third echelon care was provided principally by "C" Co., 1st Medical Battalion and Bal. wide medical and surgical specialties were readily available. Transportation to these facilities was accomplished by helicopter Med-evacuation. Support on the specialties of Otorhinolaryngology, and Ophthalmology was provided by NSA Hospital, DANANG.

4. Statistics:

| | USMC | | USN | |
|---------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL |
| KIA | 0 | 7 | 0 | 1 |
| WIA | 3 | 57 | 0 | 2 |
| Missing | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |

d. Motor transport. The Battalion Motor transport section provided 10 M2742s for use on this operation. Five were mounted with 105's and five were cargo vehicles. One vehicle was evacuated because of damages resulting from enemy mortar fire. Six replacement tires were required and they were sent from Battalion near via

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resupply helicopter. The use of M274A2 vehicles in this area did not prove to be satisfactory due to the terrain and nature of the operation.

c. Communications. Operation and communications were in accordance with FMFM 10-1. Situation, weather and terrain were all conducive to outstanding radio communications and no problems arose in this area. Wire/radio relay communications were not used because they were unnecessary and impracticable for this type of operation.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques. A total of 147 rounds of CS were fired by the 4.2 mortars. Although no known enemy casualties were attributed directly to the use of CS, it can also be stated that combat units moving through the area where CS had been used met with negative contact.

15. Commander's Analysis. As evidenced by the results obtained during operation FORD, this area has been used and probably continues to be used as a major infiltration route to and staging/rehabilitation area for attacks on the ABU/RNB B.I Complex. This area appears to be supported/controlled by a well trained and disciplined local force unit and fortified with extensive trench lines, well camouflaged spider traps and punji pits. Additionally dud 105mm M41 rounds are quickly exploited to provide surprise explosive devices. Control of this area will require extensive patrolling by tenant units and/or continued large scale operations by Battalion size forces.

As stated in the body of this report, supporting arms and attachments were utilized to the maximum extent possible. Notable was the wide and varied use of AMTRACS. The Ontos, although valuable, were limited by their physical firing characteristics. In this regard, it is recommended that future operations in this area and similar terrain areas utilize tank support rather than Ontos.

It is recommended that future Battalion size operations be conducted in this area and along infiltration routes leading from the mountains into this area. It is also recommended that ACH LIGHT and TRQ-10 strikes be continued in this area.

J. P. Gagliardo Jr.
J. P. GAGLIARDO Jr.
By direction

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