

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

2nd BN, 3rd MAR, 5 & 6
CONTROL NO. 0292-68
COPY NO. 10 OF 10

3/ECG/pfk
5750
1 Dec 1968
Ser No 077-68

~~REDACTED~~ (UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL FROM ENCL)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Ref: (a) HCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPao 5750.8
(c) Divo 5750.1B (TOTAL)

Encl: ✓(1) 2d Battalion, 3d Marines Command Chronology for 010001K to 302400K NOV68

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

BT
B. T. GREEN

GP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

2nd BN/3rd MAR

CMD CHRON

Nov 1968

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), MAF
APO San FRANCISCO 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

010001H to 302400H November 1968

INDEX

PART I ORGANIZATION DATA
PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARY
PART III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

GP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

PART I

ORGANIZATION DATA

1. DESIGNATION	COMMANDER	PERIOD
2dBrn, 3dMar	LtCol B. W. CUMM	1-30 Nov 68

SUBORDINATING UNITS

MOS COMPANY	1stLt. J.L. McDONNELL	1-30 Nov 68
Company B	Capt. D.A. CROWE 1stLt. W.C. HENTON	1-07 Nov 68 8-30 Nov 68
Company F	Capt. C.E. DAVIS 1stLt. J.H. MARTIN	1-08 Nov 68 9-30 Nov 68
Company G	Capt. D.D. DEAN	1-30 Nov 68
Company H	Capt. D.J. MYERS	1-30 Nov 68

2. LOCATION

CHI LO DISTRICT, QUANG TRI PROVINCE, RVN

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer	Maj. J.C. GLICK	1-30 Nov 68
S-1/Adjutant	1stLt. P.J. MATTHEWS	1-30 Nov 68
S-2	SSgt. J.D. McDONALD 2ndLt. C.A. SUMNER	1-10 Nov 68 11-30 Nov 68
S-3	Maj. T.C. BOLSON	1-30 Nov 68
S-4	Capt. P.J. SINNOTT	1-30 Nov 68
CommO	1stLt. W.T. GEORGE Jr.	1-30 Nov 68

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE

OFF	USMC	NAVY	OFF	USN	NAVY
37		1131	3		51

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During November 1968 the Second Battalion, Third Marines became deeply involved in the pacification of Cam Lo and Houng Hoa Districts, Quang Tri Province.

All six of the hamlets in Cam Lo Province, as targeted by the GVN in their National Pacification Plan, were cordoned and searched during November. These C&S operations were combined ops with RVN Regional (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) teaming up with Marines of 2/3. In addition each hamlet had a County Fair consisting of a MedCap, propaganda, entertainment, movies, and a supplemental issue of food.

During the reporting period 2/3 accomplished Phase I and II of a plan for total integration with local RF and PF forces in an attempt to upgrade their training, efficiency, and overall combat effectiveness. Phase I consisted of placing a marine platoon with each of three RF companies in Cam Lo District for combined operations under a system of cooperation and coordination (C&C). This phase lasted almost a month and met with limited success. However, on 25 November, Phase II was initiated, which consisted of total RF/PF - Marine integration and it enjoyed almost immediate success.

Currently "H" Company has a fire team with each squad, a squad with each platoon, and a platoon with each of the 459, 350 and 912 RF companies in Cam Lo District. "F" Company has the same FT, Squad, and platoon integration with three PF platoons and one RF company in Huong Hoa District. Command, control and coordination is effected by the Marine unit leaders being designated as advisors/assistant commanders to a RF or PF unit one echelon higher than their own. For example a Marine squad is the advisor to an RF platoon and it's assistant commander.

RF Company
Marine Plt.

RF Plt
Marine Sqd

RF Squad
Marine FT

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

During the middle of November, the Battalion (-) participated in a C&S and a blocking operation in the Rao Vinh hill areas under command of it's parent regiment. The operation lasted about a week with "E" company remaining as a stay behind ambush unit for three additional days.

The end of the month found the Battalion conducting intensive patrolling in it's AO with two companies (E and G) while two companies (F and H) remained obligated to the pacification effort by virtue of their association with local GVN forces.

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel and Administration

e. Awards. There was one award for the month of November.

b. R & R. A total of 84 R & R quotas were utilized during the month of November.

o. Personnel Losses and Gains for November

USMC				USN			
OFF		ENL		OFF		USN	
Join	Drop	Join	Drop	Join	Drop	Join	Drop
8	9	69	86	0	0	4	3

d. Casualties for November 1968

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
KIA	0	6		
WIA	1	35		
DOW	0	0		
MIA	0	0		

e. Promotions. There were 32 enlisted promotions for the month of November.

f. Legal and Discipline. A total of five Non-Judicial punishments were held during November 1968. There are four investigations pending. There are four special courts-martials pending this month.

g. Pay and Allowances. Satisfactory.

h. Postal. Fair

i. Post exchange. Exchange facilities in Quang Tri are available to the 2/3 rear. A P.X. truck became available to some units in the field depending on their locations, twice a week. Supplementary packs are being obtained through resupply channels.

j. Religious Services. Protestant services were held by the Battalion Chaplain whenever possible in the field. Catholic mass was celebrated by visiting Chaplains when available. 2/3 rear personnel attended services in the Quang Tri complex.

2. Enemy, Weather, and Terrain.

a. Summary of Enemy Activity. Enemy activity for the month of

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

November was considered moderate. Moderately mined and booby trapped areas in which operations were conducted resulted in the majority of the contact. The area is VC orientated with it's units well equipped and consisting of approximately 50 percent NVA replacements. Fire fights were few and were predominantly ambushes triggered by 2/3 units. The operations conducted by the VC were of a harrasing type nature.

(1) Personnel: NVA KIA - 7, VC POW - 1, VC Suspects detained - 34

(2) Equipment and weapons:

2 Chinese light machine guns	5 82mm Mortar rounds
2 SKS carbines	33 60mm mortar rounds
2 AK-47's	2 20 lb blocks of TNT
1 Mauser rifle and scope	2 1/4 blocks of TNT
1 M-1 Carbine	100 Blasting caps
1 45 Cal. pistol	20 lbs of medical supplies
8 AK 47 magazines	1/2 ton of polished rice
1 pair of Chinese binoculars	1 portable blowtorch
7 RPG rounds	1 4.2 Illum canister booby trapped
8 M-26 grenades	1 60mm mortar illum canister
6 Chi-Comm grenades	booby trapped
30 M-79 rounds	50 pressure pull booby trap devices
2 U.S. claymores	numerous documents, diaries, and
2 Chinese claymores	propaganda leaflets
11 Anti-tank mines	

b. Weather and Terrain: Throughout the month of November the weather was particularly favorable, consisting of mostly clear days with some intermittent showers or late afternoon cloudiness. The average temperature ranged from 70 to 90 degrees. The terrain varied from low rolling farmland, hedgerows, and paddies to extreme heavy vegetation, water hazards, and steep slopes. Foot movement was not hampered, but conditions of some roads and vegetation made wheeled vehicle movement hazardous and tracked vehicle movement limited.

3. Operations:

01 Nov 68 Company G 2/3 chopped OpCon to 1st BDE, 5th Mech for a combined cordon and search operation south of Quang Tri.

011315H A platoon size patrol from Company F was fired on by four to six NVA from several directions at 102612. Company F pulled back and called in artillery and 81's. The enemy pulled out of their bunkers and were taken under fire. Two NVA were seen crawling up streambed and were taken under fire. Fixed wing missions were called in on enemy positions. Action resulted in one USMC WIA.

02 Nov 68 Detachment 2/3 Headquarters, 81mm platoon and engineer elements moved from Camp Carroll to Cam Lo.

021420H Two platoons from Company F while on platoon size patrol at 099609 were hit by command detonated claymore mine at 124521. This resulted in three USMC WIA's and one KIA.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- 03 Nov 68 Charlie Company, 1/3, chopped OpCon to 2/3 to assist in the pacification program.
- 03 Nov 68 Issued Battalion Operation Order 10-68 "2nd Battalion institutes a pacification program in the Cam Lo and Huong Hoa Districts, within area of operation in coordination with GVN Forces; conducts search and clear operations in coordination with GVN Forces; maintains security of GVN lines of communications located in area of operations; and provides reaction forces to assist GVN District Forces. The Battalion establishes permanent liaison at both District Headquarters.
- 031834H Hotel Company, at 094596, came to the aid of a Popular Force platoon who came under fire from small arms. Returned fire with negative results.
- 032255H 912 Regional Forde Company with a platoon from 2/3 sprung ambush at 168605. After ambush enemy move north. Ambush resulted in four NVA KIA's and one VC POW. Interrogation revealed that he was a VC guide and that there were two VC companies in the area. Called in artillery and air with negative results.
- 04 Nov 68 Combined GVN Regional and Marine forces (H 2/3 and C 1/3) conducted cordon and search operations at Tam Hiep (See Sketch #1). County Fair was also held consisting of: lectures by the Armed Propaganda Team, entertainment by the Drama Team, MedCap, and noon meal. After dusk movies were shown.
- 051015H Hotel Company, at 095598, while on a platoon size patrol received sniper fire from north of the river. Called in 81mm mission. Searched area with negative results.
- 051445H Fox Company, at its position while moving on combined operation was hit by a command detonated anti-personnel mine. Action resulted in one USMC WIA and five USA WIA's. Medevacs completed.
- 060337H Hotel Company received three incoming mortar rounds from the north at 085595. 81mm mission was fired. Results unknown. Action resulted in one USMC WIA.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 061408H Fox Company, while on combined operations with Popular Forces, discovered two anti-tank mines located at 116522 and 117532. Mines were well concealed two to four inches below the surface. One of the mines was a dud which had been booby trapped with a live mine beneath it. Mines were blown in place. Booby trap had been set along side of trail with trip type device and while moving through brush at 130530 point element tripped the device. Remains of booby trap appeared to be hand grenade fragments. Action resulted in five USMC WIA's.
- 07 Nov 68 Combined GVN Regional and Marine Forces (H2/3 and C1/3) conducted cordon and search operations at Bich Giang (See Sketch #1). County Fair was also held.
- 071755H 2/3 resupply convoy detonated enemy explosive device. Security remained with wrecked vehicle until wrecked arrived. Medevacs effected through the Army. Action resulted in five USMC WIA's.
- 071920H Hotel Company received six rounds artillery of unknown caliber from the direction of Dong Ha at 161605. Negative casualties. Checked with supporting artillery with negative results.
- 08 Nov 68 2/3 assumes responsibility for C-3 Combat Base at 145616 and bridge at 148604. Company Echo 2/3 heli-lifted to C-3 base and bridge and coordinated with 3/3.
- 080735H 2/3 Engineers while conducting roadsweep found one US M-14 anti-personnel mine on side of road. Mine was not concealed. Blew in place.
- 081550H Resupply truck at 115556 while making run overturned on side of road. Resulted in five USMC medevacs.
- 09 Nov 68 Combined GVN Regional and Marine Forces (H 2/3) conducted cordon and search operations at Quat Xa (See Sketch #1). County Fair was also held.
- 09 Nov 68 Company C chopped OpCon to 3/3.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 100300H At 2/3 CP, 108603, while in night time posture took approximately sixty 82mm rounds, called in artillery and 81mm missions on suspected positions. Action resulted in one USMC KIA and ten USMC WIA's.
- 100900H Echo Company reported receiving approximately 24 82mm rounds. All rounds impacted outside of perimeter. No casualties.
- 102200H Hotel Company reported the village of Quat Ka hit by two RPG's. Hotel Company not in immediate vicinity to take action. Assisted in medevacs. Action resulted in two Popular Forces WIA's and one civilian killed. All were medevaced.
- 110600H Combined GVN Regional and Marine Forces (H 2/3) conducted cordon and search operations at An My (See Sketch #1). County Fair was also held.
- 110900H Fox Company while on a sweep called in 81mm, 60mm, artillery and fixed wing missions on objective. Discovered five newly constructed bunkers, one mortar pit, two huts and 20 fighting holes. Bunkers were destroyed.
- 111500H Fox Company, at 104539, observed one VN female outside of lines. This woman appeared to be in general area of previous sniper fire. After being questioned, detainee was released.
- 12 Nov 68 Combined GVN Regional and Marine Forces (H 2/3) conducted cordon and search operations at Ten Dinh (See Sketch #1). County Fair was also held.
- 13 Nov 68 Assumed OpCon of Company L 3/3 and Company I 3/4 in preparation to execute Regimental OpOrder 8-68, "To conduct Operation Roa Vinh", cordon and search of the Roa Vinh Valley. Be prepared to enplace one company at LZ Bell at Camp Carroll at 131145H and land at LZ Club 154505 at 131200H. At 131200H establish initial driving force to be in position from 121515 to 145507 to 172517. Once phase lines one and two roadsweeps are reached drive through corridor from west to east. Conduct roadsweeps in AO and Route #9 to north,

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

south of grid line 19. Provide security of Cam Lo District Headquarters and C-3 bridge. (See Sketch #2)

- 131630H Company L 3/3 at 134512 came across warning sign for mines. Further investigation uncovered six RPG rounds and one anti-tank mine, canteens, one AK-47 ammo pouch, and numerous documents. All gear other than the documents were destroyed.
- 131940H Company L 3/3 while moving to coordinating point came across bunker complex at 122482. Found one Chinese light machine gun, two SK Carbines, and assorted ammo.
- 14 Nov 68 Combined GVN Regional and Marine Forces (M 2/3) conducted cordon and search operations at Vinh An. (See Sketch #4). County Fair was also held.
- 140810H Company Fox, at 136515, found one booby trapped Chi-com Claymore. Blew in place.
- 140932H Company L 3/3 spotted two NVA at 155537. Called in artillery. Called for AO to check area, neg results.
- 140932H Company F, while on patrol, tripped booby trap at 122521. Searched area with negative results. Action resulted in two USMC WIA's.
- 141115H Company G, at 133514, a booby trap was hit while moving. Searched area with negative results. Action resulted in one USMC WIA.
- 150850H Company I 3/4 found seven bunkers at 162521. Bunkers were approximately 7x7x4 feet. Bunkers had overhead of logs three inches in diameter and covered with 12 inches of dirt. Appeared to be approximately seven days old and 50 meters apart. Searched area with negative results. Destroyed bunkers.
- 151000H Company F, at 134525, while on search and destroy mission, found eight bunkers three hatches, small arms ammo and literature. Bunkers appeared to be partially destroyed by artillery and napalm. Bunkers were searched and destruction completed.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 151700H Company I 3/4, at 142512, while on search and clear mission, discovered suspected base camp consisting of 15 living bunkers approximately 7x8x4 feet. Camp appeared to have been occupied earlier in the day. Found one pack, one bottle quinine, one bandage with fresh bloodstains, well prepared trails from east to west. There was a water point in the center of the complex. Complex destroyed.
- 16 Nov 68 2/3 received 3rd Marine Operation Order 9-68 executing a rapid movement by foot, truck, and tanks, from their positions on the cordon to block to the west and north. This move was an attempt to trap an NVA battalion which was reported south of the cordon and search operation. (See Sketch #3).
- 161535H Company E found enemy base camp at 135482 for a squad size unit. Camp was approximately two days old. Conducted thorough search of area with negative results.
- 17 Nov 68 One platoon from Company E 2/3 sent to Camp Carroll for base defense.
- 17 Nov 68 Company G chopped back to 2/3 in the field (G S 1051).
- 17 Nov 68 Company G sent by truck convoy to C-3 bridge for security. One platoon went to Cam Lo District Headquarters for security.
- 170805H Roadsweep of Route 558 at 114553 received four rounds of sniper fire from 116554. Returned fire with small arms and continued sweep.
- 171100H Company F, while on sweep, found five fighting holds at 137495. Fighting holes were approximately 60 to 90 days old. Further search of area resulted in negative results. Destroyed fighting holes.
- 171100H Company E, while on search and destroy mission, found at 139495 three to five 82mm mortar rounds, assorted 762 gear, paper and documents, and rifle magazines for M-16, M-1 carbine, AK-47 and 45 caliber pistol. Destroyed 762 gear and bunkers in place. Documents and papers turned into S-2.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 171230H Company F, while on sweep at 143495, located one large fortified hut 12x18x8feet, contained storage box which has been used and capable of holding two tons of rice. The entrance of the hut was booby trapped with punji-pits. Searched hut and surrounding area with negative results.
- 171615H The point element of Company L 3/3 at 125514 tripped on a booby trapped 60mm mortar round on old trail complex, which resulted in three USMC medevacs. Booby trap considered to be four months old, and made from exploded 60mm round packed with TNT with a pressure device.
- 171915H Company G while on convoy at 100528, passing through hamlet, a hand grenade was thrown at lead truck, blowing tire. This resulted in four USMC WIA routine medevacs and three USMC WIA priorities. Repaired truck and continued to Cam Lo.
- 172145H Company G convoy carrying 4.2 Battery 3/12 along route 558 at 113553 had last truck strike pot hole. Truck went out of control overturning into a ravine, resulting in two USMC KIA's and 13 medevacs. Dispatched wrecker, dozer and onts with security to move truck and free personnel from under truck.
- 180230H 2/3, while in night defense position at 108518 received approximately 13 rounds of HE, 500 to 1000 meters outside of the northern perimeter. Rounds came from the north to northeast and was of heavy artillery type. Checked with friendly artillery guns and found rounds to be friendly.
- 180815H Road sweep on Route 558 investigated wrecked truck. Front wheel was booby trapped with 60mm mortar round with pressure device and trip wire. Under the drivers seat was a 60mm mortar round rigged with trip wire to the ground. Path leading to truck was booby trapped with 60mm mortar round with trip wire. Flak jacket with two grenades underneath. Blew booby traps in place.
- 190930H Road sweep on Route 9 at 116576 found 4.2 cannister illumination type filled with a charge in road with pressure device under it. Destroyed it by blowing in place.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- 191145H 2/3 took approximately 20 rounds 82mm HE at Cam Lo. Rounds landed to the north of the SoaDoo compound and west of the Cam Lo District Headquarters. Rounds were walked to the east of our wire approximately 200 meters. Returned fire with 81's and artillery. Results unknown.
- 191730H Company E platoon size patrol at 140493 discovered large marked grave. Grave was dug up revealing one dead NVA with metal in back and side. NVA was dead two days.
- 192105H Company H while in night position at 092599 took approximately 10 to 15 rounds 82mm HE. Rounds came from 094612. Returned fire with 81's and artillery missions. Results unknown.
- 201300H Company H, while conducting combined sweep at 092607, found 13 US 60mm mortar rounds, eight three men bunkers made of dirt and logs. Two showed signs of recent use. All bunkers in poor shape. Sent Engineers to blow bunkers and 60mm rounds.
- 201400H Company Hotel, while on combined sweep at 092607, took automatic and small arms fire and 60mm mortars from 092613. When assault was made ran into bunker complex resulting in two USMC WIA's and two USMC KIA's. Returned fire resulting in two confirmed NVA KIA's. Fired artillery on escape routes. Searched area until dark, and found one AK-47 rifle, one Mosin Nagent rifle with scope, one pair of binoculars, identification papers and uniforms. Searched further till dark, with negative results. Pulled back to night position.
- 201430H Company M platoon size patrol, at 131480, came across a fresh bunker complex, still under construction and building material staged for further construction of bunkers. Further search revealed warm rice and tea still over hot coals indicating enemy vacated 30 to 60 minutes prior to patrol reaching position. Also found one pack, two NVA ponchos, assorted US and NVA clothing.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 211150H Company F, while on patrol at 110505, found one booby trapped hand grenade. Grenade was located along side of trail, with green trip wire type device. Grenade was placed along small trail through a hedge row. Trip wire was found crossing trail about one foot above the ground. Booby trap was blown in place.
- 22 Nov 68 Company E became reaction force and chopped OpCon to 3/3. Company E moved to the Cam Lo District Headquarters and held-lifted to blocking positions for 3/3 at 094522.
- 22 Nov 68 Company E 2/3 moved by truck convoy for security at C-3 bridge and relieved Company G.
- 221015H Company H, while conducting ambush at 114514, sighted one VC. He was wearing tan shirt, black shorts and carrying SKS rifle. Upon being sighted, he fled for cover. Ambush pursued him. Searched area with negative results.
- 24 Nov 68 Company G chopped one platoon OpCon to 3rd Force Recon at Quang Tri.
- 24 Nov 68 Company E chopped OpCon back to 2/3.
- 251030H Company H, at 178604, had ambush made up of a squad of Regional Forces and a fire team of Marines. Ambush was triggered at suspected VC/NVA across the river. After checking area found three AK-47 magazines, cartridge belt, canteen, NVA pack, and various clothing and documents.
- 26 Nov 68 Received alert from 3rd Regiment to have units ready to move on 30 minutes notice. Company E moved from Camp Carroll to AO in vicinity of C-3 Bridge.
- 262250H Company G, while sitting in night defensive position, took approximately 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and two RPG rounds at 103539 resulting in one USMC KIA and four USMC WIA's. Called in artillery fire on suspected enemy positions. Results unknown.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 27 Nov 68 3rd Marines authorized execution of 2/3 OpOrder 11-68. GVN Forces and the 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines will conduct a cordon and search operation of VINH DIA (YD 177593). Concept: D-1 2/3 and the 912 RF Company executes a deception plan. D-Day 2/3 (-), the 350 and 912 RF companies will conduct the cordon and commence the initial sweep through the refugee village. The 350 and 912 Companies, prior to dark D-Day establish the inner cordon. D+1, 2, 3 and 4 the National Police Field Force conducts a search of each quarter of the village, while the populace is screened, and a county fair is conducted. D+5, the inner cordon is lifted and a final search of the village is conducted by the 350 and 912 RF Companies.
- 28 Nov 68 While on Tank-Infantry patrol found one anti-tank mine approximately 25 pounds in nature. It was buried two inches below the surface. Mine was blown in place.
- 280930H While on road sweep tank hit mine at 132622. Mine was approximately 50 pounds in nature. Swept sides of road where mine was detonated with no results. Negative casualties.
- 281400H While making a water run a light transport carrier slipped backwards and starting rolling downhill. Transport carrier hit Marine breaking his leg. Marine Medevaced.
- 29 Nov 68 Executed OpOrder 11-68. Cordon and search operation is now in progress. Target village is Vinh Dai.
- 29 Nov 68 Received Frag Order 64-68 from 3rd Marines: "2nd Bn. (Rein) after the completion of VINH DIA Cordon and search prepare to cordon Thon Bang Son. Be prepared to move into position vacated by 3/3. These positions will be held until relieved by 1/9".
- 29 Nov 68 Assumed OpCon of Delta 1/3.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4. Training. During the month of November weapons safety classes were held whenever possible. Special emphasis was placed on Mines and Booby Traps. Ambush techniques was also stressed. Personnel in Quang Tri conducted various classes and held on the job training.

<u>SCHOOL</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NO. ATTENDED</u>
Division Legal School	Quang Tri	1
Staff NCO Combat Leadership Sch	Quang Tri	2
PPS-6 School	Quang Tri	9
Mine & Booby Trap School	Dong Ha	6

5. Artillery Support.

a. During the month of November all Batteries of the 1st Bn 12th Marines were in direct support of 2/3 at various times. The following is a breakdown of the number of rounds and missions by all batteries which fired for 2/3 during November.

Alpha 1/12 105mm Bravo 1/12 105mm Charlie 1/12 105mm Kilo 4/12 105mm

HE	26	HE	1223	HE	516	HE	135
WP	0	WP	54	WP	12	WP	7
ILLUM	0	ILLUM	36	ILLUM	104	ILLUM	0
COFRAM	0	COFRAM	48	COFRAM	0	COFRAM	0
TOTAL	26	TOTAL	1361	TOTAL	632	TOTAL	142

Mike 4/12 105mm Lima 4/12 105mm Whiskey 3/12 4.2" 2nd Prov 155 Gms

HE	130	HE	155	HE	160	HE	2
WP	30	WP	21	WP	7	WP	6
ILLUM	14	ILLUM	0	ILLUM	31	ILLUM	0
COFRAM	0	COFRAM	0	TOTAL	198	TOTAL	8
TOTAL	174	TOTAL	176				

1st Bn. 40th Arty USA

HE	1
WP	2
ILLUM	0
TOTAL	3

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6. Air Support:

- a. The air support for the month of November was satisfactory.
- b. There was a total of 115 missions flown for 2/3.

(1)	Medevac	51
(2)	Visual Recon	7
(3)	Administrative	17
(4)	Logistics	13
(5)	Airborne Observer	27

- c. There was a total of 14 flights of fixed wing aircraft in direct support of 2/3.

7. Logistics.

a. General

(1) The overall logistical support of the battalion was satisfactory and no significant problems were encountered during November. Minor problems and arose out of vehicle non-availability and/or mechanical breakdown.

(2) The forward supply echelon of the battalion was located at LZ Vandergrift and Camp Carroll until 24 November. On that date both of those positions were relocated to Dong Ha Combat Base. This move has served two purposes, shortening the battalions resupply line and making vehicular resupply more efficient.

(3) Aerial resupply was utilized for G and F Companies only during the later part of the reporting period due to poor road conditions.

b. Supply. During this reporting period Battalion Supply operated from its permanent location within the 3rd Marine Regimental Rear, Quang Tri Combat Base. Supply representatives continued to be employed with the forward units and operating in unison with the S - 4 representatives. One at LZ Vandergrift which was later deployed to the Cam Lo C.P. The shop at Camp Carroll which was redeployed to the Dong Ha Combat Base. Class I, II, III and IV continued to be requisitioned from FLSO-B at Dong Ha. Certain items of critical class II supply items and the necessitated couriers being sent to FLC Da Nang for combat emergency walk-thrus. A casualty representative continued to be utilized at the 3rd Medical Battalion for purposes of collecting Med-Evaced equipment and weapons.

c. Motor Transport. For the month of November the motor transport Section supported the battalion at Cam Lo with eight 151 jeeps and trailers, one M-37 personnel carrier with trailer, and seven M-274 mules. The remainder of the vehicles were maintained at the battalion rear at Quang Tri.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

d. Services.

(1) Messing. The messhall operated jointly at Camp Carroll with 1/3 was closed on 24 November. All mess facilities have been relocated at Quang Tri. The new messhall which will service all battalions of the 3rd Marines is ready for operation but for the lack of crushed rock for a soakage pit and a generator. These items have been requested but have not been furnished.

(2) Showers. Field showers are being utilized at Quang Tri and the battalions new C.P. at Cam Lo District Headquarters. Water for the showers at Cam Lo is supplied by the Sea Bees every other day.

(3) Maintenance. Continuous second echelon maintenance was performed on all ordnance, motor transport and communications equipment as the tactical situation allowed. Third echelon support was through FLSC-B in Quang Tri. Third echelon support was considered adequate in most respects with the exceptions of delays in return of communication items. All motor transport test gear was turned into FLSC-B for repair and calibration. Six 151A1's were turned into FLSC-B for repair with five being returned. Two M 274's are still in Okinawa for repair.

8. Communications. During the month of November, the Communication section of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines supported the battalion throughout their movements and operations. Communications was established at Cam Lo District Headquarters while communications facilities at Camp Carroll and Vandergrift Combat Bases were terminated. Throughout the month the technicians repaired and maintained 24 RT 505's and turned into FLSC-B 2 RT 505's for repair. Currently in FLSC-B there are 16 RT 505's. In addition to radio repairs the tech shop prepared and inventoried all equipment and publications. A problem encountered was an extreme shortage of message books. NAVMC 694-GS, which created numerous problems for records and tactical traffic. During the month of November, the Coma Platoon received one 2542 message center man, two 2511 wireman. Two 2511 wiremen rotated. Casualties include one 2531 radio operator WIA and one 2531 radio operator KIA.

9. Medical

a. First echelon care was provided by the hospital corpsmen assigned to the line companies. They were equipped to hold routine sick call and provide emergency treatment for casualties.

b. Second echelon care was provided by the Battalion Aid Station which was composed of several units whose location varied according to the tactical situation. The Battalion Aid Station at Quang Tri was static and served to provide the administrative and medical supply support for the entire battalion. The Battalion Aid Station at Camp Carroll was static until the 15th of November at which time it moved to the new C.P. at Cam Lo District Headquarters. This aid station is staffed by a medical officer and several corpsmen depending on need. The corpsmen equipped for sick call, emergency aid and surgical support accompanied the Battalion C.P. in the field during the month of November.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Full third echelon medical support was provided by the following units: 3rd Medical Bn., Quang Tri, NSA Hospital, Da Nang, USS Repose and USS Samotuary.

d. Statistics.

Outpatients	572	Dermatology	176
FUO	11	Ortho	65
URI	31	Burns	2
GI	32	Malaria	3
GU	7	Eyes	21
VD	19	Ears	20
GSW	1	NP	7
S/W	22	Misc	26
Physioals	7	Immunizations	887
Prescriptions	531		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

10
63

Operation Plan 10-68 (OPERATION RONG OR DRAGON)

Ref: (c) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, CAM LO, QUANG TRI
THON DOG KINH AND BA LONG, AMS Series L7014,
sheets 6342 I and II, 6442 II and IV.

The hamlets shown below are six priority hamlets. The dates indicate when the hamlets were cordoned and searched. The following units participated in the County Fair at each one of the six hamlets. Vietnamese Information Service, Armed Propaganda Team, Drama Team, MedCap, Photo and ISO, District Intelligence Coordination Center.

(Sketch # 1)

Sequence of Events, County Fair

- (1) Remove people from homes and assemble
- (2) People addressed by District and Village Chief
- (3) Begin Screening, listen to complaints, census
- (4) MedCap begins operations
- (5) Armed Propaganda Team begins indoctrination
- (6) Drama Team entertains
- (7) Food is distributed and prepared
- (8) District Chief makes final address
- (9) After dark, team shows movies

ARMY

VINHAN

BICH GIANG

TAM HIEP
4 NOV

14 NOV

7 NOV

UNCLASSIFIED

QUAT XA

11 NOV

TAN DINH

4 NOV

18
56


Operation Order 8-68

Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS, Series L7014, Sheets

5342 I, II, III, and IV

Conduct "Operation Rao Vinh" cordon and search of the Rao Vinh Valley. Be prepared to emplane one company at LZ Bell at 131145E and land at LZ Club at 131200E. At 131200E establish initial driving force to be in position from 121515 to 145507 to 172517. Once lines are established drive to phase line two and establish blocking positions. Once phase lines one and two are reached, drive through corridor from west to east.

(Sketch # 2)



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

OPERATION ORDER 9-68

Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS,
Series L7014, Sheets 6342
I, II, III and IV

2nd Battalion employed moves shown below
in the RAO VINH Valley to cordon and trap
an NVA battalion which was reported to be
in the area.

(Sketch # 3)

DECLASSIFIED
+ 47

DECLASSIFIED

Supporting Documents

115-4

Tab A Annex C Fire Support Coordination to Operation Plan 10-68

DECLASSIFIED

2d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division
QUANG TRI Province, RVN
021400H NOV68

DECLASSIFIED

ANNEX C (Fire Support Coordination) to Op Plan 10-68

Ref: (a) Maps

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. Current Intelligence Summary.
- b. Friendly forces

(1) 1stBn, 12th Marines will be in direct support of the 3d Marines. General support and reinforced fires will be procured from Batteries of the 12th Marines, Force Artillery and U. S. Army V Artillery when required.

(2) 1stMAW will provide Air Support as required.

(3) Organic Fire Support - Ref Op Plan 10-68.

2. MISSION. The 2dBn, 3d Marines Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) will exercise overall responsibility for planning, coordinating and controlling supporting fires to insure maximum effective fire support and troop safety.

3. EXECUTION

a. Air. Air Support requests will be sent to Air Liaison Officer for processing. Ground clearance will be effected through necessary units by FSCC.

b. Artillery. Artillery fire missions will be sent to 1stBn, 12th Marine FDC by the artillery forward observer. Ground clearance for Marine units will be effected by the Bn FSCC. Air clearance will be granted by 3d Marines.

c. Fire Requests. Companies will request arty fires through normal channels.

(1) The Bn FSCC will clear grids in free fire zones.

(2) Grids in CAM LO District will be processed through the MACV Advisor by Bn FSCC to speed ground clearance.

(3) Grid clearance in HUONG HOA District will be cleared by the Bn FSCC. The Battalion Liaison Officer at HUONG HOA will process through the MACV Advisor to expedite ground clearance.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

d. 81mm Mortar Fires. 81mm fire missions will be processed through normal channels and will be cleared through the Battalion FSCC. The Battalion Liaison Officer at HUONG HOA will assist in gaining ground clearance for missions fired in that district. The 81mm Platoon Leader will inform the FSCC of missions being fired. The 81mm Platoon leader is responsible for aircraft lookout at each gun position.

4. TARGET INFORMATION

a. Restricted targets. Every effort will be made to preserve religious, cultural, medical and public utility installations. Clearance for supporting fires of any caliber in restricted areas will be granted by FSCC only during enemy contact.

b. Populated areas will be fired into only when unit is in jeopardy and only when cleared by the Bn FSCC and the appropriate MACV District Advisor.

5. SAFETY

a. Troop safety. If, at any time, it is apparent that friendly aircraft or ground troops will become endangered by supporting fires, the controlling unit (artillery FO team, mortar FO team, forward air controller) will immediately check fire.

b. Restrictive Fire Plan. Will formulate if required.

6. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

a. FSCC - CAM LO

b. 3d Marines .. CAMP CARROLL

c. Frequencies and call signs remain the same.

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

2

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

2d Battalion, 3d Marines
Quang Tri Province, RVN
021400H NOV68

ANNEX D (CIVIL AFFAIRS) TO OP PLAN 10-68

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Current Intelligence Summaries.
- b. Friendly Forces. Operation Plan 10-68.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. Task Organization to Operation Plan 10-68.
- d. Assumptions
 - (1) That the enemy order of battle will not change radically in the MAI LOC and CAM LO area.
 - (2) That the AO will not change.
 - (3) That the CA Program will project the GVN in a favorable and acceptable light.
 - (4) That the economy and general welfare to the populace will be improved.

2. MISSION The Battalion will provide CA support in conjunction with GVN forces within the Cam Lo and Houng Hoa districts. This support will enhance the security mission of the Battalion, but will not take precedence over tactical considerations.

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operation

- (1) Marine and GVN forces will coordinate civil affairs throughout selected hamlets. The main civil affairs effort will commence in the hamlet areas when pacification forces have been established.
- (2) All civil affairs operations will be designed to present the GVN government in a favorable light. All resources will be issued through GVN channels whenever possible.

b. Coordinating Instructions for County Fair(1) Cordon

- (a) RF/PF's have been in the target hamlets since 16 October. However, the RF's will be removed from their old TAOR's on 3 November to facilitate the Cordon/Search Operations commencing 4 November.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (b) The cordon will be established prior to first light on D-Day.
- (c) The cordon force will consist of one RF company supported by a Marine platoon.
- (d) Cordon prevents escape and searches likely cache in area.
- (2) Inform the People. The Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) and the HB PSTOPS Team will inform the people as to what is happening and what they are to do.
- (3) Search
 - (a) The search will begin as soon as most inhabitants are removed from their homes to the County Fair in a designated area of the cordon.
 - (b) One very young or very old member of each family will remain in each house during the search.
 - (c) The search will be conducted by the RF company responsible for that TAOR, as assisted by a PF platoon and a Marine platoon.
- (4) County Fair
 - (a) The County Fair will consist of the following agencies:
 - (1) VIS and HB Team - informing the people
 - (2) Armed Propaganda Team - begin to indoctrinate the people
 - (3) RD Drama Team - entertainment
 - (4) 3rd Marine Division Band - entertainment
 - (5) Battalion and Regimental Corpsman - MEDCAP
 - (6) Photo and ISO - future propaganda
 - (7) HE Team - movie
 - (8) District Intelligence Coordination Center (DIOCC) - screening the people
 - (9) Battalion Engineers - tentage and bulletin boards
 - (b) Sequence of Events, County Fair
 - (1) Remove people from homes and assemble
 - (2) People addressed by District and Village Chief
 - (3) Begin screening, listen to complaints, census taken.
 - (4) MEDCAP begins operations
 - (5) Armed Propaganda Team begins indoctrination
 - (6) Drama Team entertains
 - (7) Food is distributed and prepared
 - (8) Marine Band entertains
 - (9) District Chief makes final address
 - (10) After dusk, HE Team shows movies.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Bn S-5 will coordinate GVN and US supply and logistical support of Civil Affairs.
 - b. Bn S-5 will maintain a complete turnover file of contacts, sources, and means of procuring necessary Civil Affairs support.
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. GVN officials will direct civil affairs operations after coordination is effected.

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

2d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division
QUANG TRI Province, RVN
021400H NOV68

ANNEX G (Psychological Operations) to Op Plan 10-68.

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces

(1) VC and VCI are harassing and threatening local civilians and refugees.

(2) Local farmers have difficulty harvesting or retaining their crops because of VC.

(3) Local civilians and refugees are taxed by VCI with no returns for tax money paid.

(4) Local civilians and refugees cannot defend themselves adequately.

(5) The GVN has not achieved the complete loyalty of the local civilians and refugees.

(6) Current Intelligence Summaries.

b. Friendly forces. Operation Plan 10-68.

c. Attachments. Operation Plan 10-68.

2. MISSION. To support GVN/US military operations in populated areas and periphery by assisting the people to eliminate the VCI, organize for civil defense, consolidate hamlets and reorganize hamlet committees.

3. EXECUTION. Themes will be used against VC and VCI and will convince local civilians to cooperate with GVN/Allied Forces.

a. Concept. Inform local civilians of our intent to remain for security purposes so they may inform on VCI without fear.

b. Modes of Propaganda. The following units and techniques will be utilized:

(1) RD Drama Team

(2) HB and HE PSYOPS Teams

(3) AP Teams

(4) Handout leaflets and posters.

c. Themes to Stress.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

- (1) Allied forces know VC units in immediate area.
 - (2) Knowledge of VCI individuals in immediate area.
 - (3) Lack of any return from VC for hamlet support.
 - (4) VCI being lackeys and stooges of VC bandits.
 - (5) VC in serious jeopardy due to increased GVN/Allied forces in area.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Maximum use of local Vietnamese Information Service cadres.
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. Maximum use will be made of photos and other graphic aids, loud speakers and printed matter.

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

21 Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division
QUANG TRI Province, RVN
021400H NOV68

ANNEX H (Tips for Troops) to Op Plan 10-68

Ref: (a) NAVMO 261, Unit Leaders Personal Response Handbook

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

a. Importance. The success of any pacification assistance effort depends, in a large part, on the attitudes and conduct of each individual Marine and Navyman. Pacification is the real war since it a war for the people. If it is not won the effort and sacrifices of the Viet Nam and Free World Military Forces will have been in vain and the Communist threat will not be eliminated from the Country.

b. The "Key". The awareness and understanding of Vietnamese customs, religious beliefs and ways of life are vital to success. Attitudes of Americans are the key to how much training takes place with the PL/RF and whether joint operations are successful, how many enemy weapons are turned in, how much intelligence information is provided, how many VC will rally and how often mines and ambushes are pointed out to us.

2. VIETNAMESE WAY OF LIFE

a. Too often Americans in a strange country fail to accept the reasons for differences between them and other people. It is impossible for Vietnamese to "be like and do like Americans" since their way of life stems from their long history, culture, customs and religious beliefs which are completely different than American. This fact must be understood and accepted since we can not and should not expect the Vietnamese to change after 2,000 years to suit Americans.

b. The following points may aid in better understanding the people:

(1) Vietnamese rarely have the same sense of urgency as Americans. They have an entirely different idea of the meaning of time. Patience is a highly regarded virtue while undue haste and anxiety are felt to be unreasonable and unworthy of adults.

(2) Vietnamese show friendship and affection publicly with words and smiles. Very seldom do they touch each other the way Americans do.

(3) Vietnamese have been trained to respect authority. They revere their elected village chiefs and their religious leaders and also have great respect for the elderly.

(4) Religion has a deep meaning. Spirits and the soul reside in various parts of the body and home and dictate conduct and customs.

UNCLASSIFIED

3. POINTS

- a. Pat children, particularly on the head or pick them up.
- b. Slap a man on the back.
- c. Use typical American motions to beckon Vietnamese as they use such gestures only for animals.
- d. Never interfere in an argument among Vietnamese.
- e. Raise your voice, shout or gesture wildly. It is impolite.
- f. Hand out candy or food to children. This causes the father to "lose face" in the eyes of the children in that he cannot provide for them. The older Vietnamese resent this action which is so common to Americans.
- g. Stand close to an elder Vietnamese with your hands on your hips. It means you are getting ready to hit him.
- h. Walk on or damage graves.
- i. Disturb or remove objects from religious temples or homes.
- j. Interfere with religious or civil ceremonies.
- k. Pick up souvenirs. The item may have great value to a Vietnamese.

4. DO'S

- a. Be patient. "Fishing out" is not always a sign of laziness or unconcern.
- b. Try to understand rather than gripe.
- c. Smile and avoid physical contact.
- d. Avoid all incidents that do not concern you directly.
- e. Village elders and religious leaders should always be approached first in dealing with the Vietnamese people.
- f. In a village or hamlet contact the oldest man first
- g. Bow slightly if gifts are offered
- h. Offer gifts with both hands and bow slightly
- i. Ask a Vietnamese friend to buy items for you. This will prevent running up the price for Americans and will hold down inflation.
- j. Immediately assist wounded or injured persons

UNCLASSIFIED

k. Think before acting.

5. HELPFUL PHRASES

a. Hello, Sir - CHOW UNG

b. I am your friend - TOY LAH BAHN

c. Thank you, sir - COME ON UNG

d. Please come outside, sir -- MOY UNG RAH NGO-EYE

e. You will not be harmed, sir - CHUNG TOY SAY KUNG HANH HAH UNG
DOW

f. Where are the VC -- VIET CONG AH DOW

g. No - KUNG

h. Please keep away -- SIN TRAHN SAH

i. You are good people - WEE VEE LA NGOY TOT

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

2d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division
QUANG TRI Province, RVN
021400H NOV68

ANNEX I (Volunteer Information Program-VIP) to Op Plan 10-68

Ref: (a) For/3d I Corps O 7200.3B
(b) MACV Dir 36L-2 (c)

1. GENERAL. The VIP program is a system whereby "on the spot" monetary rewards are paid to Vietnamese who report information of tactical intelligence value or turn in military equipment to include, explosives, weapons, equipment, etc.
2. PAYMENTS. A maximum and minimum payment is designated for each item of equipment or information. A maximum of \$20,000 VN can be paid for any one item. Payment above \$20,000 VN has to be cleared through the Bn S-2. See appendix 1, Annex I, Op Plan 10-68.
3. LIMITATIONS. VIP funds will be paid to civilians only. Rewards will not be paid to U.S. Personnel, Vietnamese government officials or agencies, Vietnamese military or para-military personnel.
4. CONFIDENCE OF INFORMANTS. To provide a degree of security and reduce administrative requirements, informants who have provided information or material will not be required to receipt for compensation received.
5. REFERRALS. Repeated informants who have provided reliable information or have repeatedly brought in military items should be reported to the Bn S-2. This will further assist the entire program as such personnel will undoubtedly have information of greater import.
6. ACCOUNTABILITY. Custodians will maintain strict accountability for such funds to include date, amount, and purpose of each expenditure. Custodians will be appointed in each company, down to platoon and squad level, if deemed necessary by the company commander.

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

2d Battalion, 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division
 QUANG TRI Province, RVN
 021400H NOV68

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX I (Voluntary Informational Program, VIP) TO
 OPERATION PLAN 10-68

1. The following guide will be utilized for the expenditure of VIP funds:

<u>AMMO</u>	<u>MIN</u>	<u>MAX</u>
Small arms ammo-per round up to 50 rd	5\$VN	10\$VN
Small arms ammo-per lot (More than 50 rd)	50\$VN	500\$VN
Mortar ammo, 60mm/81mm/82mm	500\$VN	1000\$VN
Artillery ammo	500\$VN	3000\$VN
Recoilless rifle, ammo	500\$VN	3000\$VN

WEAPONS

Hand grenade or rifle grenade (Includes M-79)	500\$VN	750\$VN
Pistol	500\$VN	1000\$VN
Rifle, semi auto, or bolt action	1000\$VN	1000\$VN
Rifle, Auth	1500\$VN	2000\$VN
Submachine gun	2000\$VN	2000\$VN
M-79 grenade launcher	2000\$VN	4500\$VN
Machine gun 30 cal or 50 cal	5000\$VN	8000\$VN
Mortar 60mm/81mm/82mm	5000\$VN	10,000\$VN
Recoilless rifle, 57mm/75mm/82mm	5000\$VN	10,000\$VN
Artillery piece, less than 100mm	15,000\$VN	25,000\$VN
Artillery piece, or mortar over 100mm	20,000\$VN	50,000\$VN
Rockets, 122mm and 140mm or larger	20,000\$VN	65,000\$VN

MINES OR BOOBY TRAPS

Mines or booby traps	500\$VN	2,000\$VN
Mine or booby trap (explosive)	2500\$VN	10,000\$VN

INFORMATION

Information which results in the killing or capturing of VC/NVA troops:

Less than a squad	1000\$VN	2000\$VN
Squad size unit	2000\$VN	4000\$VN
Platoon size unit	4000\$VN	6000\$VN
Company size unit	6000\$VN	8000\$VN
Battalion size unit	8000\$VN	10,000\$VN

Information which leads to the capture alive of VC infrastructure.

Individual members	1000\$VN	2000\$VN
Hamlet leaders	2000\$VN	5000\$VN

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Village leaders	5000\$VN	8000\$VN
District leaders	8000\$VN	10,000\$VN
Information of enemy infiltration activities	2000\$VN	10,000\$VN
Information of imminent attack on U.S.		
RVNLF, or other EMFAR basis	8000\$VN	10,000\$VN
Information on location on PW's and PW camps	9000\$VN	10,000\$VN

For information which leads to the successful recovery of PW's special amounts in excess of 10,000\$VN can be paid. Amount will be determined by the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division. Also, for information on imminent attack by mortar, rocket, or artillery wherein the weapons are captured or destroyed in firing position; payments up to 100,000\$VN may be authorized.

COMMUNICATIONS OR ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT

Communications or electronic equipment in working or repairable condition	500\$VN	2000\$VN
--	---------	----------

2. The above list does not cover each and every type of information for which payments may be made. For those occasions when the situation does not fall into the examples listed above, that example most nearly describing the situation will be used.

3. If the material provided by the informant is not in serviceable condition, payments below the minimum are authorized and encouraged. Further, if the custodian making a disbursement has insufficient funds to execute the minimum payment for an item listed above, and timely payment is desirable, payments below the minimum are authorized. All questions regarding the appropriateness of any disbursement will be referred to the 3d Marine Division VIP funds custodian, phone 3d Marine Division 202 for resolution.

4. Under no circumstances will any expenditure of VIP funds in excess of 10,000\$VN be made without the prior approval of this Headquarters.

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Task Force Bravo
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/TWC/pfk
05 Jan 69

1ST ENDORSEMENT:

From: Commanding Officer, Task Force Bravo
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: After Action Report, Operation Vinh Dai

1. Forwarded

T W Clarke
T. W. CLARKE

2/3
A/RPT (OPN VINH DAI)

17 NOV - 4 DEC 1968

TALD

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion 3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO, San Francisco 96602

3/TCD/wnd
5500
23 Dec 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, Task Force Bravo

Subj: After Action Report, Operation Vinh Dai

Encl: ✓(1) 2dBn, 3dMar Operation Plan 11-68

1. OPERATIONAL DATA

- a. Type of Operation. Cordon & Search with associated Country Fair.
- b. Location. Vinh Dai Hamlet, Cam Hieu Village, Quang Tri Province (YD177590)
- c. Duration. 29 Nov to 04 Dec 1968
- d. Units Involved.

2d Battalion 3d Marines
350 & 912 Regional Force Companies
Cam Lo District Agencies: CQC, S-2, NP, MSS, NPSB
Platoon NPFF, Quang Tri
MACV Advisors, Cam Lo District

2. NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The C&S of Vinh Dai Refugee Hamlet was planned by 2/3 and run in cooperation and coordination with Regional and Popular Forces from Cam Lo District.

The cordon was effected at 0115 on 29 November, as one Marine company moved over land and another by tank and truck convey from positions selected to facilitate the deception plan. At the same time an RF company completed the cordon by blocking across the Cam Lo River. After the cordon was in, the river was lighted by tank search lights and the remainder of the interior by arty and mortar illumination.

D+1 was utilized to establish a joint screening center and a joint interrogation center, co-located with the CQC. Finally, an interior cordon was established.

On each of D+1, 2, 3, and 4, a quarter of the hamlet was searched while its inhabitants were screened. Those culled out by the screening process at the JSC were forwarded to the interrogation center for initial field interrogation.

DECLASSIFIED

On D+5 a final sweep and search of the hamlet was conducted by the 912 RF Company and NPFF.

3. LESSONS LEARNED

a. That, at first light, after the cordon is in, all known VCS and VCI should be picked up by the police and interrogated for immediate tactical intelligence. This will enhance rapid military operations inside and outside of the cordon against VC units and caches.

b. That, the major entrance/exits of the cordon (i.e., road nets) should be manned by Vietnamese National Police, Marines, and an interpreter. The police can readily identify those who may rate a pass and those that have no business in the cordon. The Marines will ensure that all who enter/exit have a proper pass.

c. That, all forces, both GVN and US need additional training in search techniques.

d. That, field interrogation must produce a skelton report on each prisoner, which is then translated from VN to English, and then processed through both GVN and US channels. This ensures more immediate information for the intelligence agencies, rather than waiting 6-8 weeks to get the full interrogation report from the Province Interrogation Center.

e. That, an infantry battalion's intelligence section and district intelligence agencies are not adequate to accomplish the screening and interrogation of suspects or translate VN interrogation reports for processing into US channels. Division and province assistance is required and must be requested.

4. STATISTICS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SCREENED</u>	<u>DETAINED</u>	<u>RELEASED</u>	<u>MEDCAP</u>
30Nov68	250	31	2	50
01Dec68	768	36	-	125
02Dec68	200	06	16	60
03Dec68	<u>386</u> 1604	<u>12</u> 85	<u>36</u> 54	<u>100</u> 335

NOTE: A total of 31 detainees are still being held at the Cam Lo as of this date.

J. J. McMONAGIE

Copy of Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN

Operation Plan 11-68 (OPERATION VINH DIA)

Ref: (a) MAPS: VIETNAME, 1:50,000, Quang Tri AMS, Series
L7914, Sheet 6343 II.

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION

2nd BATTALION, 3rd MARINES (-) Lt. Colonel CHEN

H&S COMPANY (-) 1stLt McDONALD

81mm Mortar Platoon (-)
106 RR Platoon (-)

ECHO COMPANY (-) 1stLt HELTON
GOLF COMPANY (-) Capt. DEAN

RVN FORCES

350 RF COMPANY
912 RF COMPANY

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces

(1) 3rd Marines (Rein) continues to be responsible for the KENTUCKY Area of Operations, conducts offensive operations to destroy enemy forces, maintains security for fixed installations, and roads in their AO, and assists RVN forces in pacification of CAM LO and HUONG HOA Districts.

(2) Artillery

(a) 1st Bn, 12th Marines, direct support, 3d Marines.

(b) 4.2 Mortar Battery, 3rd Bn, 12th Marines, direct support, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines.

(3) Company B, 3rd Tank Bn, direct support, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(4) 1st Platoon, Company B, 3rd Engineer Battalion, direct support, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines.

(5) Det CAP 412

c. Attachments and Detachments

(1) Det, 7th IIT

(2) Swimm Team 3rd Force Recon Company, 3rd Recon Battalion.

d. Assumptions.

(1) That the required units and assets will be available for the operation.

(2) That all planning and coordination can be made in such a manner that the operation in VINH DIA will not be compromised.

(3) Deception plan will be sufficient to insure the security of the operation.

(4) That the 3rd Marines can provide security for C-3 Bridge D-1 to D+4.

(5) That the 3rd Marines could provide a reaction platoon in case it is required.

(6) That the 2nd ARVN Regiment can provide surveillance from D-Day to D+4 in the highground enclosed by the following:

(a) YD 1665

(b) YD 1663

(c) YD 1965

(d) YD 1963

2. MISSION

GVN Forces and the 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines will conduct a cordon and search operation of VINH DIA, (YD 177593), on or about 28 November.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET(a) Concept of Operation. ANNEX B (Operations Overlay).

(1) D-1 2/3 and the 912 RF Company executes the deception plan in accordance with Annex C.

(2) D Day 2/3 (-), 350 and 912 RF Companies conduct the cordon and commence the initial sweep through the refugee village. The 350 and 912 (-) Companies, prior to dark, establish inner cordon.

(3) D + 1, 2, 3, and 4. The NPFV conducts a detailed search of each quarter of the village, while the populace is screened, and a county fair (modified) is conducted.

(4) D + 5. The inner cordon is lifted and a final search of the village is conducted by the 350 and 912 (-) RF Companies.

(b) Company Echo (-)

(1) D - 1, move to the C-3 Bridge in accordance with Annex C (Deception Plan).

(2) D Day, H + 1 form the convoy, mount trucks, and on order move with Tanks and establish a cordon around VINH DIA in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay).

(c) Company Golf (-)

(1) D - 1, move and set up a company patrol base at YD 169563 in accordance with Annex C (Deception Plan).

(2) D Day, H - 4, move into the MCB Camp.

(3) D Day, H Hour, move from the MCB 22 Camp, and establish a cordon around VINH DIA in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay).

(d) 350 RF Company (Rein)

(1) D Day, H + 6, arrive at VINH DIA by truck.

(2) On order commence the search of the village with the 912 RF Company (Rein) (-).

(3) On order, establish an inner cordon in accordance with Annex D (Village Operational Diagram).

(e) 912 RF Company (Rein)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(1) D - 1, on order move to CAM LO in accordance with Annex C (Deception Plan).

(2) D Day, H - 3, move the company in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay) and insure no one leaves the village via the river.

(3) D Day, on order, detach one (1) platoon to cross the river and set in a cordon along the river tying in with Company G on their right and Company E on their left.

(4) D Day, on order, move the Company (-) to VINH DIA and commence the search of the village in conjunction with the 350 RF Company.

(f) 81mm Mortar Platoon. D Day, on order, move one section to the MCB 22 Camp.

(g) Company B, 3rd Tank Battalion.

(1) D Day, H Hour, on order, escort Echo Company (-) motor convoy to dismount point.

(2) Proceed immediately to YD 189588 and cover the river to the northwest with fire and light.

(h) 1st Platoon, Company B, 3rd Engineer Battalion

(1) Provide road sweeps as required.

(2) D Day, on order, make a detailed sweep of the village in conjunction with the search force.

(3) D Day provide a construction force to string wire and to put up tents.

(4) D + 5, assist search forces in a sweep of the village.

(i) Swim Team, 3rd Force Recon Company, 3rd Battalion

(1) D Day arrive at the CAM LO District Headquarters.

(2) D Day move to VINH DIA and commence a search of streams, stream banks, and wells on order.

(j) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Tentative D Day, 28 November 1968.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(2) H Hour, TBA, about 0100.

(3) All briefings will be held at the last possible moment and in an isolated location (away from populated areas) to insure security.

(4) Once the cordon is closed no one will enter or leave the village without authorization of the Combined Operation Center in the field; this includes all children.

(5) Cordon force sector commanders will walk their sectors continually to insure they are alert and well teed in with adjacent units.

(6) No vehicles larger than 3/4 ton will be used to enter the village.

(7) Refer to Appendix 1 (Screening and Interrogation Plan) to Annex A (Intelligence) for the establishment of the Joint Screening Center and the Joint Interrogation Center.

(8) Cordon units will report reaching check points to facilitate coordination.

(9) The cordon will remain a minimum of 50 meters from the edge of the village; further when possible.

(10) All positions will be two man with 50% security at night. 25% during day, if observation permits.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Supply.

(1) Cordon forces will move into VINH DIA with four (4) MCI.

(2) Resupply of food and water will be on a daily basis.

b. Transportation. Truck requirements for troop movements:

(1) D Day and D-Day, seven (7) trucks for movement of Echo Company (-) and the 350 RF Company.

(2) D + 1, two (2) trucks.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

c. Medical. The MEDCAP will be located at the temple and will be run from D + 1 to D + 4.

d. Construction.

(1) Seven (7) GP and (1) CP tent will be constructed on D Day in accordance with Annex D (Village Operational Diagram).

(2) 20 rolls of conce^Rptina and 40 engineer stakes with sufficient driving tools will be required for construction of the JSC and JIT.

e. Civic Action. B rations consisting of spicy foods are required to feed 2200 people one (1) meal.

5. Command and Communication.

a. 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines CP will remain at CAM LO District Headquarters.

b. A forward CP will be established at VINH DIA (See Annex D).

c. Forward CP call sign will be GMX-Ray.

B. T. CHEN
LtColonel, USMC
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- (a) Intelligence
- (b) Operation Overlay
- (c) Deception Plan
- (d) Village Operational Diagram

DISTRIBUTION: Special 8 Copies

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Copy ___ of ___ Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN

Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 11-68

Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7914, Sheets
6343 II.

(b) BnO 3800.1D

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. Weather: Weather in the immediate future should follow the same general pattern that has prevailed for the past few weeks with ground fog in early mornings, increasing cloudiness with the possibility of rain in the afternoons and evenings.

b. Terrain: VINH DIA borders on the CAM LO River. South of the river the terrain consists of marshy flat areas with little cover and concealment. A tree line follows the northern trace of the river. Scrub growth offering good concealment increases to the north. A small ridgeline running east to west 5000 meters north of VINH DIA offers excellent observation south into the CAM LO Valley.

c. Enemy Situation: THIEN CHANH (YD 160639) is the suspected headquarters of C-9 Company which numbers approximately 40 including 12 women. Squad to platoon size units operate in the valley but size depends upon tactical situation. Weapons are reported to consist of two (2) 82mm mortars, one (1) 60mm mortar, two (2) B'40s, three (3) BARs, SKS sniper rifles and AK-47's. Mission of C-9 is to infiltrate VINH DIA and other areas, make contacts, recruit information, collect taxes, and obtain food. Guides are sent north to bring units south. VINH DIA Resettlement Area consists of civilians relocated from areas which have been VC strongholds in the past. First priority in the cordon must be to cover the river. Many boats tied to the shore offer opportunities for escape. The search must include inside and under the waterline of each boat.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~~~SECRET~~2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:

- a. What individuals are part of the VCI.
- b. What families willingly supporting the NLF.
- c. What VC units are supplied and supported by member of the village.
- d. Where do these units operate, and in what manner.

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS:

- a. An aerial reconnaissance will be tasked to MAG 36 and made by the Bn S-3A and S-2.
- b. An accurate drawing of the village and a list of head's of households is tasked to the CAM LO District Central Greivance Committee (CGC).
- c. Aerial photography of the VINH DIA/CAM LO area is tasked to the 7th Air Force via 3rd Marine Division G-2.
- d. The acquisition of agent reports is tasked to the 15th CIT.
- e. 15th CIT and the following GVN agencies are each tasked to compile Blacklists:
 - (1) Military Security Service (MSS)
 - (2) Special Branch National Police (SBNP)
 - (3) National Police (NP)
 - (4) National Police Field Forces (NPFF)
 - (5) Central Census Grievance Committee (CCGC)

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIALa. POW's, CIVILIANS, SUSPECTS and OTHER PERSONS.

The CCGC, MSS, NP, CIT, and NPFF will each screen every person with help provided by the 7th ITT. All villagers will be brought to a central point for this screening. The village will be segmented into quarters, and thus 1/4 of the population will be screened each of the four (4) days, D + 1 through D + 4. The Joint Interrogation Center (JIC) will be established in accordance with Appendix 1 (Screening and Interrogation Plan).

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
b. Captured documents and material will be turned over to the JIC.

5. DOCUMENTS REQUIRED:

a. Air photos will be available and should be used by commanders of the cordon and search forces.

b. See Appendix 2 (Village sketch and Household Roster of VINH DIA).

c. MAPS (Ref 2).

6. REPORTS. Standard intelligence reports will be submitted as prescribed by reference (b).

B. T. CHEN
LtColonel, USMC
Commanding

APPENDIXES:

- (1) Screening and Interrogation Plan
- (2) Village Sketch and Household Roster of VINH DIA.


DISTRIBUTION: Special 8 Copies

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Copy of Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN

Appendix 1 (Screening^{1/6} and Interrogation Plan) of Annex A
(Intelligence) of Operation Plan 11-68



Interrogation

B. T. CHEN
LtColonel, USMC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 8 Copies

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET


Copy of Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN

Annex B (Operation Overlay) of
Operation Order 11-68
Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS,
Series L7914 Sheet 6343 V
Time Zone: H

ASSAULT

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



DISTRIBUTION: Special 8 Copies

STUDY

A hand-drawn sketch of a rectangular area. The top edge is labeled '57', the right edge is labeled '56', the bottom-left corner is labeled '20', and the bottom-right corner is labeled '21'. A horizontal line segment is drawn below the '20' and '21' labels, with the word 'SECRET' written on it.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Copy _____ of _____ Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN

Annex C (Deception Plan) of Operation Order 11-68

Ref: Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, QUANG TRI AMS, Series L7914,
Sheet 6343 II

Time Zone: H

1. The following will be accomplished so as to deceive the enemy in regard to Operation VINH DIA.

a. D - 3 a helicopter aerial recon will be made of villages other than VINH DIA, so that if the VC get information of the coming operation, they will expect to come in another area.

b. Food supplements will be obtained from GVN sources under the guise they are to be used for another village rather than VINH DIA.

c. On D - 1 the 912 RF Company moves to CAM LO with instructions to conduct an operation in that area. On D - Day, H - 4 they will be ordered to move to their cordon position.

d. Company G will set up a company patrol base on D - 1. It will be constructed so that it has the look of a semi-permanent site. They will move out of the camp and move into the MCB 22 Camp after 2000.

e. Company E will take up positions at the C-3 Bridge as if they are to operate with the 912 RF Company, in the CAM LO area.

B. T. CHEN
LtColonel, USMC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 8 Copies

DECLASSIFIED

1. Lê Liên	53/3
2. Lê Thi Sen	64/4
3. Lê Canh	24/2
4. Nguyễn Tăng	26/2
5. Nguyễn Thu Tuy	51/3
6. Lê Thi Thi	68/4
7. Nguyễn Thi Thi	14/7
8. Võ Dang	48/7
9. Lê Lan	20/7
10. Lê Thi Dìu	119/7
11. Lê Thi Hy	138/8
12. Lê Phan	144/8
13. Lê Thi Miếu	22/2
14. Nguyễn Dầu	145/7
15. Trương Thi Giác	157/7
16. Đỗ Thi Khâm	154/7
17. Lê Phan	29/2
18. Lê Thi Nây	157/8
19. Nguyễn Thi Mion	46/3
20. Lê Duyệt	159/8
21. Lê Thi Vui	91/5
22. Võ Thi Con	22/2
23. Lê Tài Ưng	61/4
24. Trần Thi Nu	102/6
25. Lê Lước	59/4
26. Lê Thi Thuyên	60/4
27. Lê Thi Nây	42/4
28. Lê Thi San	39/3

29.	Lê Hào	49, 4
30.	Le Phuoc Nam	52, 3
31.	Le Pho	42, 3
32.	Le Thi Them	56, 4
33.	Nguyen Thi Hoa	100, 6
34.	Lê Duong	57, 4
35.	Lê To	80, 5
36.	Lê Dong	126, 7
37.	Nouyen Thi Thoi	78, 5
38.	Lê Thi Sy	38, 3
39.	Lê Phan	81, 5
40.	Lê Tiem	136, 7
41.	Lê Thi Con	123, 7
42.	Lê Thi Dieu	37, 3
43.	Lê Tri	66, 4
44.	Truong Kim	47, 9
45.	Nguyen Khan	11, 1
46.	Nguyen Sum	54, 3
47.	Lê Lam	87, 5
48.	Lê Dao	104, 6
49.	Lê Thi Qui	37, 3
50.	Lê Lieu	86, 5
51.	Nguyen Thi Tuyen	47, 3
52.	Lê Thi Ngu	16, 1
53.	Lê Quynh	50, 3
54.	Lê Tuu	74, 4
55.	Lê Thi Ngón	3, 1
56.	Nguyen Thi Chon	40, 3

85. Lê Thi Khuyên	115/8
86. Lê Ngan	84/5
87. Lê Thi Thi	146/8
88. Lê Liêu	65/4
89. Nguyễn Thi Kết	21/2
90. Lê Huyền	107/6
91. Nguyễn Khiết	71/4
92. Võ Sùng	112/7
93. Nguyễn Lê	44/3
94. Lê Thời	55/4
95. Lê Vy	149/8
96. Lê Thi Em	117/7
97. Nguyễn Niêm	33/3
98. Lê Thi Tảo	43/3
99. Nguyễn Thi Lam	49/3
100. Lê Thi Thoan	116/7
101. Nguyễn Bảo	25/2
102. Lê Mông	35/3
103. Trương Tu	127/7
104. Lê Dương	31/2
105. Võ Đoàn	108/6
106. Lê Biên	73/4
107. Lê Quyên	65/3
108. Lê Lạp	30/2
109. Lê Lĩnh	29/2
110. Võ Thi Con	42/7
111. Lê Thi Chu	31/2
112. Lê Thi Luv	25/2

57.	Lê Lôi	8/ 1
58.	Lê Thi My	41/ 3
59.	Lê Thi Ta	13/ 1
60.	Lê Thi Khiêm	15/ 1
61.	Lê Du	4/ 1
62.	Vô Thi Sát	12/ 1
63.	Lê Dam	79/ 5
64.	Nguyễn Thi Ngươn	92/ 6
65.	Lê Thi Tham	103/ 6
66.	Lê Dong	156/ 8
67.	Vô Thi Trâm	104/ 6
68.	Lê Thi Kham	105/ 6
69.	Lê Thi Diêu	2/ 1
70.	Vô Quyên	1/ 1
71.	Vô Di	13/ 4
72.	Lê Chan	14/ 1
73.	Lê Bôn	96/ 6
74.	Lê Thi Bong	36/ 3
75.	Lê Tiểu	18/ 1
76.	Lê Thi Lịch	124/ 7
77.	Lê Thạch	90/ 5
78.	Lê Châu	28/ 2
79.	Trương Thi Ngai	27/ 2
80.	Lê Năm	95/ 6
81.	Lê Luyên	103/ 7
82.	Lê Tho	114/ 7
83.	Lê Lu	26/ 2
84.	Lê Phi	143/ 8

113.	Lê Mão	27/2
114.	Lê Dươn	29/2
115.	Lê Thị Con	28/2
116.	Lê Thị Chuon	89/5
117.	Lê Hằng	83/5
118.	Hoàng Thị Xung	32/2
119.	Lê Thị Sui	48/3
120.	Lê Thái	6/1
121.	Lê Kẩn	7/1
122.	Lê Vinh	5/1
123.	Trần Thị Thon	99/6
124.	Lê Luông	17/1
125.	Lê Thong	57/5
126.	Lê Thị Thon	131/8
127.	Lê Thị Ngoi	117/8
128.	Lê Ba	33/2
129.	Lê Thiệu	112/7
130.	Lê Thị Ngy	129/7
131.	Lê Thị Hong	10/1
132.	Lê Luông	9/1
133.	Lê Thị Thanh	12/2
134.	Lê Thị Tuy	24/2
135.	Lê Thị Thon	32/2
136.	Lê Thị Xi	34/3
137.	Thái Thị Thon	71/4
138.	Lê Tha	82/5
139.	Nguyễn Thị Liên	65/5
140.	Lê Kẩn	84/5

141.	Lê Thi Bưởi	94, 6
142.	Nguyễn Thi Lanh	97, 6
143.	Hoàng Lương	98, 6
144.	Trần Thi Hưng	101, 6
145.	Nguyễn Thi Lý	106, 6
146.	Nguyễn Thi Tiểu	110, 6
147.	Lê Thi Quyên	130, 8
148.	Lê Thi Miết	1 35, 8
149.	Lê Dam	133, 8
150.	Lê Thi My	132, 8
151.	Lê De	137, 8
152.	Lê Thi Hào Hao	140, 8
153.	Nguyễn Ai	142, 8
154.	Lê Thi Tam	141, 8
155.	Lê Kỳ	138, 8
156.	Lê Thi Cúc	139, 8
157.	Nguyễn Dai	147, 8
158.	Lê Thi Tao	148, 8
159.	Lê Thi Riêng	153, 8
1 60.	Lê Den	154, 8
161.	Lê Hien	52, 8
162.	Nguyễn Thi Thanh	153, 8
163.	Lê Thi Nghĩa	150, 8
164.	Lê Thi Nây	151, 8
1 65.	Lê A	76, 5
166.	Nguyễn Thi Lê	77, 5
167.	Lê Doi	68, 4
168.	Lê Gian	59, 2

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Copy No. of Copies
 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
 Quang Tri Province, RVN

Operation Plan 11-68 (OPERATION VINDI DIA)

Ref: (a) MAP: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Quang Tri AMS, Series L7914,

Sheet 6343 II.

Time Zone H.

BASE ORGANIZATION:

2nd BATTALION 3RD MARINES (-)

1A. Colonel CUBB

1ST COMPANY (-)

1stLt McDonald

8mm Mortar Platoon (-)

106 RR Platoon (-)

2ND COMPANY (-)

1stLt BELTON

3RD COMPANY (-)

Capt DEAN

RVN FORCES

350 RF Company

912 RF Company

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces

(1) 3rd Marines (Rein) continues to be responsible for the LANCASTER/KENTUCKY Area of Operations, conducts offensive operations to destroy enemy forces, maintains security for fixed installations, and roads in their AO, and assists RVN forces in pacification of CAM LO and HUONG HOA DISTRICTS.

(2) Artillery

(a) 1st Bn, 12th Marines, direct support, 3rd Marines.

(b) 4.2 Mortar Battery, 3rd Bn, 12th Marines, direct support, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines.

DECLASSIFIED

(3) Company B, 3rd Tank Bn, direct support, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines.

(4) 1st Platoon, Company B, 3rd Engineer Battalion, direct support, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines.

(5) Det ~~CAY 412~~ *3025*

c. Attachments and Detachments

(1) Det, 7th TPT

(2) Swim Team 3rd Force Recon Company, 3rd Recon Battalion.

d. Assumptions.

(1) That the required units and assets will be available for the operation.

(2) That all planning and coordination can be made in such a manner that the operation in VINH DIA will not be compromised.

(3) Deception plan will be sufficient to insure the security of the operation.

(4) That the 3rd Marines can provide security for C-3 Bridge D - 1 to D + 4.

(5) That the 3rd Marines could provide a reaction platoon in case it is required.

(6) That the 2nd ARVN Regiment can provide surveillance from D Day to D+4 in the highground enclosed by the following:

(a) YD 1665

(b) YD 1663

(c) YD 1965

(d) YD 1963

2. MISSION. GVN Forces and the 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines will conduct a cordon and search operation of VINH DIA, (YD 177593), on or about 28 November.

(a) Concept of Operations. ANNEX B (Operations Overlay).

(1) D - 1 2/3 and the 912^{2ND 350}ARF Company^{ES} executes the deception plan in accordance with Annex C.

(2) D Day 2/3 (-), 350 and 912^{ONE PLATOON OF THE}ARF Companies conduct the cordon and commence the initial sweep through the refugee village. The 350 Company and 912^{ONE OF PLATOON} (-) companies, prior to dark, establish the inner cordon.

(2)

SECRET

SECRET

(3) D+1, 2, 3, and 4. The NPFF conducts a detailed search of each quarter of the village, while the populace is screened, and a county fair (modified) is conducted.

(4) D+5. The inner cordon is lifted and a final search of the village is conducted by the 350 and 912 (-) RF Companies.

(b) Company Echo (-)

(1) D - 1, move to the G-3 Bridge in accordance with Annex C (Deception Plan).

(2) D Day, H + 1 form the convoy, mount trucks, and on order move with tanks and establish a cordon around VINH DIA in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay).

(c) Company Golf (-)

(1) D-1, move and set up a company patrol base at YD 169563 in accordance with Annex C (Deception Plan).

(2) D Day, H - 4, move into the MOB 22 Camp.

(3) D Day, H Hour, move from the MOB 22 Camp, and establish a cordon around VINH DIA in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay).

(d) 350 RF Company (Rein)

(1) D-1, ON ORDER MOVE TO TAM HIEP IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX D

(2) D Day, H + 6, arrive at VINH DIA by truck.

(3) On order commence the search of the village with the 912 RF Company (Rein) (-).

(4) On order, establish an inner cordon in accordance with Annex D (Village Operational Diagram).

(e) 912 RF Company (Rein)

(1) D - 1, on order move to ~~CAM-78~~ TAM HIEP in accordance with Annex C (Deception Plan).

(2) D Day, H - 3, move the company in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay) and insure no one leaves the village via the river.

(3) D Day, on order, detach one (1) platoon to cross the river and set in a cordon along the river tying in with Company G on their right and Company E on their left.

(4) D DAY TO D+4 WITH THE COMPANY (-) CONDUCT PATROLS AND AMBUSHES IN THE LAM LANG AREA.

(3)

SECRET

SECRET

~~(4) D Day, on order, move the Company (-) to VINH DIA and commence the search of the village in conjunction with the 350 RF Company.~~

f. 81mm Mortar Platoon. D Day, on order, move one section to the MGB 22 Camp.

g. Company B, 3rd Tank Battalion.

(1) D Day, H Hour, on order, escort Echo Company (-) motor convoy to dismount point.

(2) Proceed immediately to YD 189588 and cover the river to the northwest with fire and light.

h. 1st Platoon, Company B, 3rd Engineer Battalion.

(1) Provide road sweeps as required.

(2) D Day, on order, make a detailed sweep of the village in conjunction with the search force.

(3) D Day provide a construction force to string wire and to put up tents.

(4) D+5 assist search forces in a sweep of the village.

i. Swim Team, 3rd Force Recon Company, 3rd Battalion.

(1) D Day arrive at the CAM LO District Headquarters.

(2) D Day move to VINH DIA and commence a search of the streams, stream banks, and wells on order.

j. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Tentative D Day, ⁹28 November 1968.

(2) H Hour, TBA, about 0100.

(3) All briefings will be held at the last possible moment and in an isolated location (away from populated areas) to insure security.

(4) Once the cordon is closed no one will enter or leave the village without authorization of the Combined Operation Center in the field; this includes all children.

(5) Cordon force sector commanders will walk their sectors continually to insure they are alert and well tied in with adjacent units.

(4)

SECRET

SECRET

(6) No vehicles larger than 3/4 ton will be used to enter the village.

(7) Refer to Appendix 1 (Screening and Interrogation Plan) to Annex A (Intelligence) for the establishment of the Joint Screening Center and the Joint Interrogation Center.

(8) Cordon units will report reaching check points to facilitate coordination.

(9) The cordon will remain a minimum of 50 meters from the edge of the village; further when possible.

(10) All positions will be two men with 50 % security at night. 25 % during the day, if observation permits.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Supply.

(1) Cordon forces will move into VINH DIA with four (4) MCI.

(2) Resupply of food and water will be on a daily basis.

b. Transportation. Truck requirements for troop movements:

(1) D Day and D - Day, seven (7) trucks for movement of Echo Company (-) and the 350 RF Company.

(2) D + 1, two (2) trucks.

c. Medical. The MEDCAP will be located at the temple and will be run from D + 1 to D + 4.

d. Construction.

(1) Seven (7) G P and one (1) O P tent will be constructed on D Day in accordance with Annex D (Village Operational Diagram).

(2) 20 rolls of concertina and 40 engineer stakes with sufficient driving tools will be required for construction of the JSC and JIC.

e. Civic Action. B rations consisting of spioy foods are required to feed 2200 people one (1) meal.

5. Command and Communications.

(a) 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines C P will remain at CAM LO District Headquarters.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(b) A forward C P will be established at VINH DIA (See Annex D).

(c) Forward C P call sign will be GMX-Ray.

B. T. CHEN
LtCol USMC
COMMANDING

ANNEXES:

- (a) Intelligence
- (b) Operation Overlay
- (c) Deception Plan
- (d) Village Operational Diagram

DISTRIBUTION: Special 8 Copies

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRETCopy No. of Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN

Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 11-68

Ref: (a) MAP: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7914, Sheet 6343II

(b) ImO 3000.1D

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

(a) Weather: Weather in the immediate future should follow the same general pattern that has prevailed for the past few weeks with ground fog in early morning, increasing cloudiness with the possibility of rain in the afternoon and evenings.

(b) Terrain: VINH DIA borders on the CAM LO River. South of the river the terrain consists of nearly flat areas with little cover and concealment. A tree line follows the northern trace of the river. Scrub growth offering good concealment increases to the north. A small ridgeline running east and west 5000 meters north of VINH DIA offers excellent observation south into the CAM VU Valley.

(c) Enemy Situation: THDEN GHANH (YD 160639) is the suspected headquarters of the C-9 Company which numbers approximately 40 including 12 women. Squad to platoon size units operate in the valley but size depends upon tactical situation. Weapons are reported to consist of two (2) 82mm Mortars, one (1) 60mm mortar, two (2) B'40s, three (3) BAR's, SKS sniper rifles and AK 47's. Mission of C-9 is to infiltrate VINH DIA and other areas, make contacts, recruit information, collect taxes, and obtain food. Guides are sent north to bring units south. VINH DIA resettlement area consists of civilians relocated from areas which have been VC strongholds in the past. First priority in the cordon must be to cover the river. Many boats tied to the shore offer opportunities for escape. The search must include inside and under the waterline of each boat.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:

- (a) What individuals are part of the VCI.
- (b) What families willingly supporting the NLF.
- (c) What VC units are supplied and supported by members of the village.
- (d) Where do these units operate, and in what manner.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET**3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS:**

- (a) An aerial reconnaissance will be tasked to MAG 36 and made by the Bn S-3A and S-2.
- (b) An accurate drawing of the village and a list of head's of household is tasked to the CAM IO District Central Grievance Committee (CGC).
- (c) Aerial photography of the VINH DIA/CAM IO area is tasked to the 7th Air Force via 3rd Marine Division G-2.
- (d) The acquisition of agent reports is tasked to the 15th CTF.
- (e) 15th CTF and the following GVN agencies are each tasked to compile Blacklists:

- (1) Military Security Service (MSS)
- (2) Special Branch National Police (NBNP)
- (3) National Police (NP)
- (4) National Police Field Forces (NPF)
- (5) Central Census Grievance Committee (CCGG)

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL**(a) POW's, CIVILIANS, SUSPECTS AND OTHER PERSONS.**

The CGC, MSS, NP, CTF, and NPF will each screen every person with help provided by the 7th IFT. All villagers will be brought to a central point for this screening. The village will be segmented into quarters, and thus 1/4 of the population will be screened each of the four (4) days, D + 1 through D + 4. The joint screening Center (JSC) and the Joint Interrogation Center (JIC) will be established in accordance with Appendix 1 (Screening and Interrogation Plan).

- (b) Captured documents and material will be turned over to the JIC.

5. DOCUMENTS REQUIRED:

- (a) Air photos will be available and should be used by commanders of the cordon and search forces.
- (b) See Appendix 2 (Village sketch and Household Roster of VINH DIA).
- (c) MAPS (Ref 2).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

6. REPORTS. Standard intelligence reports will be submitted as prescribed by reference (b).

B. T. CHEN
LtCol USMC
Commanding

APPENDICES:

- (1) Screening and Interrogation Plan
- (2) Village sketch and Household Roster of VINH DIA.

DISTRIBUTION: Special 8 Copies


DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy of Copies
 2nd, 3rd Marines
 QUANG TRI Province, RVN

Appendix 1 (Screening and Interrogation Plan) of Annex A (Intelligence)
 of Operation Plan 11-68



B. T. CHEN
 1st Col USMC
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 6 Copies


1-A1

SECRET

COPY NO. of Copies
2d BN. 3rd Marines
Quang Tri Province, RVN

Annex B (Operation Overlay) of
Operation Order 11 - 68
Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS,
Series L 7914 Sheet 6334V
Time Zone E

SECRET



B.T. CHEN
LACOL USMC
Commanding

Distribution: Special, 8 copies

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

Copy of Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN

Annex C (Deception Plan) of Operation Order 11-68

Ref: MAP: Vietnam, 1:50,000, QUANG TRI AMS, Series L7914, Sheet 6343III

Time Zone: H

1. The following will be accomplished so as to deceive the enemy in regard to Operation VINH DIA.

(A) D - 3 a helicopter aerial recon will be made of villages other than VINH DIA, so that if the VC get information of the coming operation, they will expect to come in another area.

(b) Food supplements will be obtained from GVN sources under the guise they are to be used for another village rather than VINH DIA.

(c) On D - 1 the 912^{2nd 350} RF Company moves to ^{TAM HIEP} ~~CAM VU~~ with instructions to conduct an operation in that area. On D - Day, H - 4 they will be ordered to move to their cordon position.

(d) Company G will set up a company patrol base on D - 1. It will be constructed so that it has the look of a semi-permanent site. They will move out of the camp and move into the MOB 22 Camp after 2000.

(e) Company E will take up positions at the C-3 Bridge as if they are to operate with the 912 RF Company, in the CAM VU area.

B. T. CHEN
LtCol USMC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 8 Copies

SECRET


DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy of Copies
2nd Bn 2nd Marines
Quang Tri Province RVN

Annex D (VINH DIA Operational Diagram) to Operation Order 11-68



B.T. CHEN
Lt. Col. USMC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 8 Copies

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy No 12 Of 15 Copies
2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN
3 December 1968

Operation Plan 12-68 (Operation MAI LOO)

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Cam Lo, 2nd Doc Kinh,
AMS series L7014 sheets 6342I and 6442II

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 3rd Marines continues present mission within AO, and provides additional forces to 2/3 in accordance with the Concept of Operations.

(2) U.S. Forces.

(a) 4.2 Mortar Platoon 2/12, D/S, 2/3, provides fire support and illumination as required.

(b) 7th ITT, 3rd Mar Div, D/S, 2/3 provides interpreter and translator services as required.

(c) 1st Platoon, Company B, 3rd Engineer Battalion, D/S, 2/3 provides road sweeps and engineer support as required.

(d) 7th and 15th CITeams, 3rd Mar Div, D/S, 2/3, provides intelligence, screening, and interrogation support as required by Appendix 1 of Annex A.

(e) Company B, 3rd Tank Battalion, D/S, 2/3.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED(3) GVN Forces.

- (a) Platoon National Police Field Forces (NPFF) C&C, search the hamlets in accordance with the Concept of Operations. During hours of darkness, provide security for COC and interrogation point.
- (b) National Police (NP) and National Police Special Branch (NPSB) C&C, provides screening and interrogation support.
- (c) Central Grievance Committee (CGC), C&C, provides screening support, village diagrams and census rosters.
- (d) Vietnamese Information Service (VIS)
- (e) Armed Propaganda Team (APT)
- (f) 256 RF Company C&C
- (g) 73 PF Platoon C&C
- (h) 74 PF Platoon C&C
- (i) 107 PF Platoon C&C
- (j) Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) C&C

(c) Attachments and Detachments. None(d) Assumptions.

- (1) That forces required both US and GVN, will be available.
- (2) That assets, particularly food supplements, for logistical support will be available.

-2-

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- (3) That security measures and deception plans will be adequate.

2. MISSION. At 0001 on D-Day 2/3 (-) (Rein) and GVN forces conduct a combined cordon and search operation of the MAI LOC population center; a civil affairs program will be conducted in conjunction with the operation.

3. EXECUTION.

a. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

- (1) Maneuver Annex B (Operation Overlay), 2nd Annex F (Operational Diagram). After the completion of Operation VINH DIA, 2/3 (-) commences Operation MAI LOC by occupying the NW, NE and Eastern sectors of the cordon. The PF Platoons, with integrated Marines, will occupy the SW sector of the cordon, with the CIDG filling in the SW sector, and thus completing the cordon by H-Hr. Company F will assume the mission of Battalion reserve, and the RF Company will establish the interior cordons.
- (2) Fire Annex C (Fire Plan)
 - (a) Artillery and mortar illumination will be fired to supplement that provided by aerial illumination.
 - (b) Prep fires consisting of white phosphorus, H. C. Smoke, and V. T. will be used to assist in the Deception Plan (Annex D).
 - (c) On call fires will be planned to isolate the objective for the duration of the operation.
- (3) Air A flareship will light the interior of the cordon nightly during the operation.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET(4) Concept Schedule.

- (a) D-1, execute deception plan (Annex D)
- (b) D-Day, establish external cordon and place internal security in the Hamlets; also pick up all known VCI; and prior to dark establish interior cordon.
- (c) D+1, search one third of the area, and screen its population.
- (d) D+2, search the 2d third of the area and screen its population.
- (e) D+3, search the 3d section of the area and screen its population.
- (f) D+4, resweep and search the entire cordoned area.

b. Company Echo, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines

- (1) D-2, move by truck and foot to YD 092561 and execute the deception plan in accordance with Annex D.
- (2) H-Hr, D-Day, establish a cordon in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay). Be prepared to move cordon out to day positions (Annex F).

c. Company Fox (-), 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines

- (1) D-3, intergrate one platoon with the 256 RF Company.
- (2) D-1, continue normal operations.
- (3) Night of D-1 and D-Day, conduct ambushes 1000 meters to the rear of the RF and CIDG sectors.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- (4) D-Day through D+5, have one platoon prepared to assist the NPFF in the search of the village. This platoon will be on 30 minute alert to act as a reserve/re-action force.

d. Company Golf, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines.

- (1) D-2, move to the MAI LOC area by convoy and execute the deception plan in accordance with Annex D.
- (2) D-1 provide one fire team to CIDG during day of D-1 to assist tie-in on cordon.
- (3) H-Hr, D-Day, establish a cordon in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay) with two platoons. Be prepared to move cordon out to day positions (Annex F (Operational Diagram)).
- (4) Provide security on 558 with one platoon.

e. 73, 74 and 107 PF Platoons (Under the C&C of Company F 2/3 and the MACV Senior Advisor).

- (1) Establish a cordon with two platoons in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Provide internal Hamlet security, on order, D+1 through D+3.

f. CIDG. H-Hr, D-Day. Establish cordon in accordance with Annex B (Operation Overlay).

g. 256 RF Company.

- (1) First light D-Day, conduct initial sweep through obj. area.
- (2) Prior to Dark D-Day establish the interior cordon in accordance with Annex F (Operational Diagram).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIEDh. 81mm Mortar Platoon

- (1) Be prepared to support the operation with three gun section as required in accordance with Annex C (Fire Support).
- (2) Insure that the section located at MAI LOC is heavy on illumination.

i. Company B, 3rd Tank Battalion

- (1) On order provide support as required.

j. 1st Platoon Company B, 3rd Engineer Battalion

- (1) Continue to provide roadsweeps as required.
- (2) D-Day provide a construction force to string wire and erect tents.
- (3) D+1 to D+3 make a detailed sweep of the hamlet areas as directed, clearing each one of the 1/3 sections each day.
- (4) Be prepared to provide other support as required.

k. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) Tentative D-Day, 6 December 1968.
- (2) H Hour, TBA 0001.
- (3) All briefings will be held at the last possible moment and in an isolated location (away from populated areas) to insure security.
- (4) Once the cordon is closed no one will enter or leave the enclosed area without authorization of the Combined Operation Center (COC) in the field;

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

this includes all children and GVN military personnel.

- (5) Cordon force sector commanders will walk their sectors continually to insure they are alert and well tied in with adjacent units.
- (6) Refer to Appendix 1 (Screening and Interrogation Plan) to Annex A (Intelligence) for the establishment of the Joint Screening Center (JSC) and the Joint Interrogation Center (JIC).
- (7) Cordon units will report reaching the check points set forth in Annex B (Operations Overlay) to facilitate coordination.
- (8) The cordon will remain a minimum of 50 meters from populated areas; and further when possible.
- (9) All positions will be two (2) men with 50 % security at night, and 25% during daylight hours if observation permits.
- (10) Cordon forces will establish LP's/OP's to the rear of their sectors, both during daylight and hours of darkness.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

(a) Supply

- (1) Cordon forces will move into the MAI LOC Area with four (4) MCI.
- (2) Resupply of food will be on a daily basis.
- (3) Resupply of munitions will be on an "as required" basis.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(b) Transportation. Truck requirements for troop movement and resupply at MAI LOC.

(1) D-2 Ten (10) trucks for the movement of Companies "E" and "G".

(2) D-Day to D+5, two (2) trucks for resupply and utility missions.

(c) Medical. See Annex E (Civil Affairs)

(d) Construction

(1) Five (5) GP and one (1) CP tent will be required and constructed in the locations pictured in Annex F (Operational Diagram).

(e) Civic Action. See Annex E.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION.

(a) 2nd Bn, 3rd Marine CP will remain at the CM LO District Headquarters.

(b) A forward CP will be established within the MAI LOC Operational Area on D-1 (See Annex F).

(c) The forward CP call sign will be GMX-Ray.

B. T. CHEN
Lt Colonel USMC
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

ANNEXES:

- (a) Intelligence
- (b) Operation Overlay
- (c) Fire Plan
- (d) Deception Plan
- (e) Civil Affairs
- (f) Operational Diagram

DISTRIBUTION: Special 15 Copies.

3rd Marine Division
3rd Marine Regiment
District Chief, HUONG HOA
District Advisor, HUONG HOA
CIDG
Echo Company
Fox Company
Golf Company
Hotel Company
District Chief, CAM LO
S-3 2/3
S-2 2/3
S-5 2/3
Artillery Ln. O. and Air Ln. O.
Files -- 2

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy No of copies
2d En., 3d Marines
Quang Tri Province, RVN
3 December 1968

ANNEX A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 12-68

Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS series L7014 sheet 6342 I
(b) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS series L7014 sheet 6342 II
(c) BnO 3800.1D

Time Zone: H

1. Summary of Enemy Situation

a. Weather: Weather in the immediate future should follow the same general pattern that has prevailed for the past weeks with ground fog in the early morning, increasing cloudiness with the possibility of rain in the afternoons and evenings.

b. Terrain: The Mia Loc cordon and search AO borders 500 meters to the east along route 558 with the main AO concentrated to the west with the southern boundary just north of the airstrip. Relief and drainage in the area are significant. The AO is horizontally divided in the center by a stream bordered 500 meters to the north and south by rice paddies. The populated areas run along a ridgeline which slopes gradually into the central drainage area. Except for numerous hedgerows, vegetation is primarily located in two populated areas north of the stream which are characterized by bushes, shrubs, and trees found between buildings and along the trails and roads. Small plots for food crops are associated with the populated areas. Observation and fields of fire are restricted in the populated areas but are excellent along the stream and adjacent rice paddies. The southern road into Bong Son from 096523 is accessible only by jeep but the northern approach from Route 558 from 104543 west to 097544 then southwest to Bong Son can accommodate heavy vehicles.

c. Enemy Situation: Intelligence reports indicate that the 31st Main Force Group along with small elements of the F-16 group are the primary units operating in this area. The F-16 group operates in the eastern sector of our Battalion AO as far east as to the immediate Dong Ha area while the 31st Main Force Group operates basically in between the Cam Lo and Houng Hoa regions. The primary function of these units is to guide NVA units from the north, south into the Bao Long Valley in addition to harassing our pacification efforts. These units are reported to be wearing green uniforms and are armed with 82mm mortars, 60mm mortars, B140s SKS sniper rifles, and AK47's. On 26 November the Golf company C.P. received four RPG rounds and 15 to 20 60mm mortar rounds from a reported 38 man attacking unit which later moved into Bong Son. This area is a suspected VC stronghold reported to contain many active sympathizers, regularly contacted for food, taxes, and information. Since resupply for the operation will most likely be made by convoy, increased mining harassment can be expected along Route 558.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2. Essential Elements of Information:

- a. What individuals are part of the VCI
- b. What families willingly support the NLF
- c. What VC units are supplied and supported by members of the village
- d. Where do these units operate, and in what manner

3. Intelligence Acquisition Tasks:

- a. An accurate drawing of the area is tasked to S-2 2d Bn 3d Mar
- b. Aerial photography of the Mai Loc area is tasked to 7th CIT
- c. The acquisition of agent reports is tasked to 7th CIT
- d. 7th and 15th CIT and the following GVN agencies are each tasked to compile blacklists:

- (1) National Police (NP)
- (2) Military Security Service (MSS)
- (3) Census Grievance Committee (CGC)
- (4) Special Branch National Police (SBNP)
- (5) National Police Field Forces (NPFF)

4. Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Material

a. Pow's, Civilians, Suspects and other Persons: The CGC, MSS, NP? and NPFF will each screen every person with help provided by the 7th ITT. All villagers will be brought to a central point for the screening. The village will be segmented in thirds and thus 1/3 of the population will be screened each of the three days. D + 1 through D + 3. A joint screening center (JSC) and the Joint Interigation Center (JIC) will be established in accordance with Appendix 1 (Screening and Interigation Plan)

b. Captured documents and material will be turned over to the JIC.

5. Documents required:

- a. Air photos
- b. See Annex F (Operational Diagram).

6. Reports Standard intelligence reports will be submitted as prescribed by reference (C).

B. T. CHEN
LtCol.USMC
Commanding

Appendixes:

- (1) Screening and Interigation Plan

DISTRINUTION: Special 15 copies (See Op Plan 12-68
2-A

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy No. 1 Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
Quang Tri Province, RVN
3 December 1968

Appendix 1 (Screening and Interigation Plan) of Annex A (Intelligence)
of Operation Plan 12-68

Collection

NPFF

RF & USMC

Screening
&
Identification

1st Tent: OGS & NP/NPSB } Suspects & Confirmed
2nd Tent: CIT & MSS & S2 }
3rd Tent: Commodities Issue
MEDCAP
Release

INTER

1st Tent : S2 ~~CAN-10~~ Military Order of Battle
S2 2/3
MSS
2nd Tent : NPSS Police Order of Battle
CIT
177

Detention: (On site or sub sector)

Exploitation

B. T. CHEN
LtCol. USMC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 15 copies (See Op Plan 12-68)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED


Annex B (Operation Overlay) to Operation Plan 12-68

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam; 1:50,000 AMS? series L7014
sheets 6342 I and 6442 II

Time Zone H



DISTRIBUTION: 15 copies Special (see Operation Plan 12-68)



SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2d Battalion, 3d Marines
Quang Tri Province
3 December 1968

Annex C (Fire Plan) to Operation Plan 12-68

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, CAM 10, THON DOG KINH, and BA LONG, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6342 I and II, 6442 II and IV.

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)
- b. Friendly Forces. OpPlan 12-68
- c. Attachments and Detachments. None

2. MISSION. To provide timely and accurate fire support to forces under OpPlan 12-68.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept.

- 1. Heavy concentrations of HC smoke, white phosphorous, VT, and quick will be fired to the east of Mai Loo on D-1 as a diversion. Those fires will be fired throughout the night.
- 2. Heavy prep fires will be shot to the east on D Day prior to setting in the cordon.
- 3. Illumination will be fired to supplement that provided by aircraft.
- 4. An H&I program will provide additional support to the operation.

b. Concept Schedule.

- 1. On D-2 the deception fires are scheduled from 1600 to 1800. These will be followed by the H&I program until 0600 on D Day (See Annex 1)
- 2. On D-2 the initial prep deception fires are scheduled to be fired between 2100 and 2200 (See Annex 2).
- 3. The blocking fires will begin at 2130 to support the movement of troops into the cordon and will continue until 0030. The blocking fires will be shot from four to six thousand meters from the cordon, incircling the village and gradually closing to within two thousand meters of the cordon (See Annex 2).
- 4. Illumination will be fired as needed after 2400
- 5. H&I's will be fired from 0100 to 0600.
- 6. From D-2 until completion of the operation, fires will be provided as needed. On calls will be planned on suspected or likely enemy mortar and troop positions.
- 7. On D-Day platoon of searchlights will be moved into the area to provide additional illumination support.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

6. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See OpPlan 12-68
7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. See OpPlan 12-68

B.T. CHEN
Lt. Colonel USMC
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION: Special 15 Copies (See OpPlan 12-68).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2d Battalion, 3d Marines
Quang Tri Province, RVN
3 December 1968

Appendix 1 (D-1 Fire Schedule) to Annex C (Fire Plan) to OpPlan 12-68

1600	1630	1700	1730
AB209	AB210	AB212	AB214
AB215		AB216	AB213

B.T. CHEN
Lt. Colonel USMC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 15 Copies (See OpPlan 12-68)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

28 Battalion, 3d Marines
 Quang Tri Province, RVN
 3 December 1968

200 as (Target Overlay) to Appendix 1 (D-1 Fire Schedule) to Annex C (Fire Plan) to OpPlan 12-68

07 57
 56

AB210 AB211
 AB209 AB212 AB213
 AB214AB215
 AB216

D.I. GUN
 Lt. Colonel
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION ON Special 15 Order (See O-12-68)

2d Battalion, 3d Marines
 Quang Tri Province, RVN
 3 December 1968

DDAY
 Appendix 2 (1st Fire Schedule) to Annex C (Fire Plan) to OpPlan 12-68

	2100	2130	2200	2230	2300	2330	2400	0030	0100	0130	0200
	2000	0030	2100	2130	2200	2230	2300	0030	0100	0030	0100
	AB231	AB225	AB226	AB236	AB219	AB241	AB244	AB247	AB250	AB249	
155	AB230		AB227		AB223	AB243	AB246	AB245			
	AB23		AB225		AB224						
	AB228										
175	AB238		AB237	AB221	AB222	AB220					
	AB234	AB235	AB235	AB217	AB218	AB241	AB240				
					AB239						
	507	506	505		501	502	504	510			
			508			503	512				


H.T. (JH)
 Lt. Colonel USMC
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 15 Copies (See OpPlan 12-68)

SECRET

At Battalion, 3d Marine
 Army Air Division, 3d
 3 December 1966

Tab a: (Loyalty Overlay) to Admin 1 (See Also Schedule) to know 1 (See Plan) to OpPlan 12-67



B.F. CHEN
 Lt Colonel USMC
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 15 Copies (See OpPlan 12-68).

DECLASSIFIED

Copy _____ of _____ Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN
3 December 1968

Annex D. (Deception Plan) to Operation Plan 12-68

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Cam Lo, and Doc
Kinh, AMS, series L7014 sheets 6342I and 6442II

Time Zone: H

1. Situation

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)
- b. Friendly Forces. Op Plan 12-68
- c. Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. Mission. 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, supporting units and GVN Forces will initiate measures to deceive the enemy as to our future operational intentions in the MAI LOC area.

3. Execution

- a. Concept of Operations: Companies will operate on their own prior to the operation indicating they have returned to their previous missions in the Mai Loc area. Special interest will be given to the area east of Mai Loc with patrols, platoon operations, and artillery fire.
- b. Company E, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
 - (1) Set up a company patrol base at YD 092561, and construct it to look like a semi-permanent site.
 - (2) Conduct normal operations within the area.
 - (3) Break camp, disassemble shelters after dark and move into the cordon on D-Day.

c. Company F, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines

Continue normal operations with an increase of daylight patrols to the east.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRETd. Company G, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines

- (1) Set up a company patrol base at YD 104539, and construct it to look basically the same as it did during the time the position was last occupied.
- (2) Assume road security north on 558.
- (3) D Day conduct a two (2) platoon operation 300 meters to the east so as if to check the area hit by arty the night before.

e. RF, PF and CIDG Forces: Continue normal operation until H-2

- f.
- NFFF
- will be requested under the guise that they are replacing the unit now in Vinh Dia, and future need for their services will be on check points set up along route #9.

g. Artillery Annex C (Fire Plan)

- (1) Heavy concentrations of HC smoke, white phosphorus, and VT will be fired to the east of the Mai Loc area during the early evening hours of D-1 and D Day.
- (2) HE and high burst VC will be shot in the same area as indicated above during the hours of darkness.

h. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) All units will initiate other deception measures as they see fit.
- (2) Deception measures of Company G, Company F and artillery will be accomplished so as to indicate special interest in the area to the east of Mai Loc.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. Administration and Logistics

Op Plan 12-68

5. Command and Communication

Op Plan 12-68

B. T. CHEN
Lt Colonel USMC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 15 Copies (See Op Plan 12-68)

-3-

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy of Copies
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN
14 December 1968

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 13-68

- Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS series L7014 sheet 6342-I
(b) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS series L7014 sheet 6342-II
(c) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS series L7014 sheet 6442-III
(d) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS series L7014 sheet 6442-IV
(e) BnO 3800.1D

Time Zone: H

1. Summary of Enemy Situation:

a. Weather: Weather in the immediate future should follow the same general pattern that has prevailed for the preceding two weeks.

b. Terrain: Separate prepared packets with required terrain information, to include aerial photos of respective assigned areas, will be delivered to each unit. *delivered*

c. Enemy Situation: The 31st Group is the main enemy operational force within this A.O. It has a mission of establishing liaison between NVA and local Force units; operating generally in the Leatherneck Square area (Gio Linh-Cong Ha-Cam Lo-Con Thien) and adjacent areas south. Its mission includes attacks and ~~harrasing~~ ^{harrasing} actions against friendly troops, interdiction of Allied LOC's, laying of mines, spreading of propaganda, proselyting and recruiting from the local populace, and rice collection. The 31st Group operates with a strength of 700 to 800 personnel and is composed of a headquarters element and seven Companies (C-5-C-11). The headquarters is composed of a command staff and four 3-Man reconnaissance cells. The C-5 through C-8 Companies are NVA and are actually the 27th Battalion, which is the first Battalion of the 27th Regiment. The 27th Battalion has a strength of 300 to 400 men. The C-9 through C-11 Companies are formed primarily of South Vietnamese drawn from the Gio Linh, Cam Lo Districts, and sent north to Vinh Linh (D) for training and then returned south to tactical units. The strengths of C-9 through C-11 Companies are 50, 80, and 50 men respectively. The C-11 Company is a sapper unit with an engineer and reconnaissance capability. Rounding out the strength of the 31st Group are numerous VC hamlet guerrilla units of 5 to 15 men subordinate to the group. The area of operation of the C-5 and C-7 Companies is the Con Thien area and areas north of it. Additionally elements of the C-7 Company along with C-9 Company, operate west and north west of Dong Ha. The C-6 and C-8 Companies reportedly operate north west and west of Gio Linh. The C-10 Company with its prime mission of mining, conducts the majority of its activity east and south of Con Thien. Indications are that the C-11 Sapper Company supports the 31st Group throughout its area of operations. The area of operation has expanded south into the Cua Valley area, where elements of the C-11

UNCLASSIFIED

14
Company have been located and confirmed. Weaponery for the 31st Group includes 60 and 82 MM mortars, B-40 rockets, RPD machine guns, and various individual weapons. It has been confirmed that the 31st Group has been responsible for a majority of the recent increases in enemy initiated activities to include attacks by fire and mining incidents in this A.O.

2. Essential Elements of Information:

- a. What specific points or areas are the enemy operating from.
- b. Where is the enemy locating his ammunition and food caches.
- c. Location of enemy weapons and defensive positions.

3. Reports: Standard intelligence reports will be submitted as prescribed in reference (e).

J. J. McMONAGLE

LtCol. USMC

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

RECEIVED

2-A

DECLASSIFIED

Copy _____ of _____ Copies
2nd Bn, 3rd Marines
QUANG TRI Province, RVN
3 December 1968

ANNEX E (CIVIL AFFAIRS) TO OPERATION PLAN 12-68

1. Situation.

- a. Enemy Forces. Current Intelligence Summaries.
- b. Friendly Forces. Operation Plan 12-68
- c. Attachments and Detachments. None
- d. Assumptions.

- (1) That the agencies requested to participate in the operation will be available.
- (2) That the required supplies and materials will be available.
- (3) That the Civic Affairs Program will project the GVN in a favorable and acceptable light.
- (4) That the populace will benefit from the Civil Affairs facet of the operation.

2. Mission. To provide Civil Affairs support in conjunction with Operation Mai Loc.3. Execution.a. Concept of Operation.

- (1) Marine and GVN agencies will conduct Civil Affairs for Operation Mai Loc on a limited County Fair basis. The main Civil Affairs effort will commence on D+1 and be repeated three times for each of the three sections formed by the inner cordons.

(2) Sequence of Events.

- (a) Inform the people as to what is taking place and what they are to do.
- (b) Remove people from homes and assemble

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

with the exception of one very young one or one very old member of each household to insure that the people know that their property is not being destroyed or stolen.

- (c) People addressed by district and village chiefs.
- (d) Begin screening; listen to complaints; census taken.
- (e) MEDCAP begins operations.
- (f) Armed propaganda team begins indoctrination.
- (g) Food and VIP posters distributed and food prepared.
- (h) District chief makes final address.
- (i) After dusk, CIDG Political Ops. team shows movies.

b. Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) and CIDG Political Ops. teams.

Inform the people as to what they are to do and what is taking place when inner cordon is in place.

- c. MEDCAP Team. Begin examining patients after the people have been screened.
- d. Armed Propaganda Team. Begin indoctrination of people toward GVN after they have been examined by MEDCAP Team.
- e. CIDG PO-OPS. Show movies to the people after dusk.
- f. ISO. Operate throughout the day taking advantage of any opportunity they deem will be advantageous for future propaganda.
- g. Coordinating Instructions. All above mentioned teams will operate as stated on D+1, D+2 and D+3.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. Administration and Logistics.

- a. Battalion S-5 will coordinate U.S. supply and logistical support of Civil Affairs to include:

- (1) 4000 VIF propaganda leaflets.
- (2) Food stuffs sufficient for four thousand meals.

- b. Battalion S-5 will coordinate with the following teams to support the operation.

- (1) VIS and CIDG PO-OPS
- (2) MEDCLF Team
- (3) Armed Propaganda Team
- (4) ISO

- c. Battalion S-5 will maintain a complete file of contacts, sources and means of procuring Civil Affairs support.

5. Command and Communications. GVN officials will direct Civil Affairs operations and Battalion S-5 will act as advisors after coordination is effected.

B. T. CHEN
Lt Colonel USMC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special 15 Copies (See Op Plan 12-68)

-3E-

DECLASSIFIED